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diff --git a/15877.txt b/15877.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2818173 --- /dev/null +++ b/15877.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8205 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus +by Marcus Aurelius Antoninus + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus + +Author: Marcus Aurelius Antoninus + +Translator: George Long + +Editor: George Long + +Release Date: May 22, 2005 [EBook #15877] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THOUGHTS OF MARCUS AURELIUS *** + + + + +Produced by Juliet Sutherland, Turgut Dincer, Leonard +Johnson and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +https://www.pgdp.net. + + + + + + + + + +THE THOUGHTS + +OF + +THE EMPEROR + +MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS + +[Illustration: MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS] + +CONTENTS. + + +BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 9 + +PHILOSOPHY OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS 45 + +THE THOUGHTS 99 + +INDEX OF TERMS 305 + +GENERAL INDEX 311 + + + +BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH + +OF + +MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. + + +M. Antoninus was born at Rome, A.D. 121, on the 26th of April. His +father, Annius Verus, died while he was praetor. His mother was Domitia +Calvilla, also named Lucilla. The Emperor T. Antoninus Pius married +Annia Galeria Faustina, the sister of Annius Verus, and was consequently +the uncle of M. Antoninus. When Hadrian adopted Antoninus Pius and +declared him his successor in the empire, Antoninus Pius adopted both L. +Ceionius Commodus, the son of Aelius Caesar, and M. Antoninus, whose +original name was M. Annius Verus. Antoninus then took the name of M. +Aelius Aurelius Verus, to which was added the title of Caesar in A.D. +139: the name Aelius belonged to Hadrian's family, and Aurelius was the +name of Antoninus Pius. When M. Antoninus became Augustus, he dropped +the name of Verus and took the name of Antoninus. Accordingly he is +generally named M. Aurelius Antoninus, or simply M. Antoninus. + +The youth was most carefully brought up. He thanks the gods (i. 17) that +he had good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, +good associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly everything good. He +had the happy fortune to witness the example of his uncle and adoptive +father Antoninus Pius, and he has recorded in his word (i. 16; vi. 30) +the virtues of the excellent man and prudent ruler. Like many young +Romans he tried his hand at poetry and studied rhetoric. Herodes Atticus +and M. Cornelius Fronto were his teachers in eloquence. There are extant +letters between Fronto and Marcus,[A] which show the great affection of +the pupil for the master, and the master's great hopes of his +industrious pupil. M. Antoninus mentions Fronto (i. 11) among those to +whom he was indebted for his education. + + [A] M. Cornelii Frontonis Reliquiae, Berlin, 1816. There are a + few letters between Fronto and Antoninus Pius. + +When he was eleven years old, he assumed the dress of philosophers, +something plain and coarse, became a hard student, and lived a most +laborious, abstemious life, even so far as to injure his health. +Finally, he abandoned poetry and rhetoric for philosophy, and he +attached himself to the sect of the Stoics. But he did not neglect the +study of law, which was a useful preparation for the high place which he +was designed to fill. His teacher was L. Volusianus Maecianus, a +distinguished jurist. We must suppose that he learned the Roman +discipline of arms, which was a necessary part of the education of a man +who afterwards led his troops to battle against a warlike race. + +Antoninus has recorded in his first book the names of his teachers, and +the obligations which he owed to each of them. The way in which he +speaks of what he learned from them might seem to savor of vanity or +self-praise, if we look carelessly at the way in which he has expressed +himself; but if any one draws this conclusion, he will be mistaken. +Antoninus means to commemorate the merits of his several teachers, what +they taught, and what a pupil might learn from them. Besides, this book, +like the eleven other books, was for his own use; and if we may trust +the note at the end of the first book, it was written during one of M. +Antoninus' campaigns against the Quadi, at a time when the commemoration +of the virtues of his illustrious teachers might remind him of their +lessons and the practical uses which he might derive from them. + +Among his teachers of philosophy was Sextus of Chaeroneia, a grandson of +Plutarch. What he learned from this excellent man is told by himself (i. +9). His favorite teacher was Q. Junius Rusticus (i. 7), a philosopher, +and also a man of practical good sense in public affairs. Rusticus was +the adviser of Antoninus after he became emperor. Young men who are +destined for high places are not often fortunate in those who are about +them, their companions and teachers; and I do not know any example of a +young prince having had an education which can be compared with that of +M. Antoninus. Such a body of teachers distinguished by their +acquirements and their character will hardly be collected again; and as +to the pupil, we have not had one like him since. + +Hadrian died in July A.D. 138, and was succeeded by Antoninus Pius. M. +Antoninus married Faustina, his cousin, the daughter of Pius, probably +about A.D. 146, for he had a daughter born in 147. He received from his +adoptive father the title of Caesar, and was associated with him in the +administration of the state. The father and the adopted son lived +together in perfect friendship and confidence. Antoninus was a dutiful +son, and the emperor Pius loved and esteemed him. + +Antoninus Pius died in March, A.D. 161. The Senate, it is said, urged M. +Antoninus to take the sole administration of the empire, but he +associated with himself the other adopted son of Pius, L. Ceionius +Commodus, who is generally called L. Verus. Thus Rome for the first time +had two emperors. Verus was an indolent man of pleasure, and unworthy of +his station. Antoninus however bore with him, and it is said Verus had +sense enough to pay to his colleague the respect due to his character. A +virtuous emperor and a loose partner lived together in peace, and their +alliance was strengthened by Antoninus giving to Verus for wife his +daughter Lucilla. + +The reign of Antoninus was first troubled by a Parthian war, in which +Verus was sent to command; but he did nothing, and the success that was +obtained by the Romans in Armenia and on the Euphrates and Tigris was +due to his generals. This Parthian war ended in A.D. 165. Aurelius and +Verus had a triumph (A.D. 166) for the victories in the East. A +pestilence followed, which carried off great numbers in Rome and Italy, +and spread to the west of Europe. + +The north of Italy was also threatened by the rude people beyond the +Alps, from the borders of Gallia to the eastern side of the Hadriatic. +These barbarians attempted to break into Italy, as the Germanic nations +had attempted near three hundred years before; and the rest of the life +of Antoninus, with some intervals, was employed in driving back the +invaders. In 169 Verus suddenly died, and Antoninus administered the +state alone. + +During the German wars Antoninus resided for three years on the Danube +at Carnuntum. The Marcomanni were driven out of Pannonia and almost +destroyed in their retreat across the Danube; and in A.D. 174 the +emperor gained a great victory over the Quadi. + +In A.D. 175, Avidius Cassius, a brave and skilful Roman commander who +was at the head of the troops in Asia, revolted, and declared himself +Augustus. But Cassius was assassinated by some of his officers, and so +the rebellion came to an end. Antoninus showed his humanity by his +treatment of the family and the partisans of Cassius; and his letter to +the Senate, in which he recommends mercy, is extant. (Vulcatius, Avidius +Cassius, c. 12.) + +Antoninus set out for the East on hearing of Cassius' revolt. Though he +appears to have returned to Rome in A.D. 174, he went back to prosecute +the war against the Germans, and it is probable that he marched direct +to the East from the German war. His wife Faustina, who accompanied him +into Asia, died suddenly at the foot of the Taurus, to the great grief +of her husband. Capitolinus, who has written the life of Antoninus, and +also Dion Cassius, accuses the empress of scandalous infidelity to her +husband, and of abominable lewdness. But Capitolinus says that Antoninus +either knew it not or pretended not to know it. Nothing is so common as +such malicious reports in all ages, and the history of imperial Rome is +full of them. Antoninus loved his wife, and he says that she was +"obedient, affectionate, and simple." The same scandal had been spread +about Faustina's mother, the wife of Antoninus Pius, and yet he too was +perfectly satisfied with his wife. Antoninus Pius says after her death, +in a letter to Fronto, that he would rather have lived in exile with his +wife than in his palace at Rome without her. There are not many men who +would give their wives a better character than these two emperors. +Capitolinus wrote in the time of Diocletian. He may have intended to +tell the truth, but he is a poor, feeble biographer. Dion Cassius, the +most malignant of historians, always reports, and perhaps he believed, +any scandal against anybody. + +Antoninus continued his journey to Syria and Egypt, and on his return to +Italy through Athens he was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries. It +was the practice of the emperor to conform to the established rites of +the age, and to perform religious ceremonies with due solemnity. We +cannot conclude from this that he was a superstitious man, though we +might perhaps do so if his book did not show that he was not. But that +is only one among many instances that a ruler's public acts do not +always prove his real opinions. A prudent governor will not roughly +oppose even the superstitions of his people; and though he may wish they +were wiser, he will know that he cannot make them so by offending their +prejudices. + +Antoninus and his son Commodus entered Rome in triumph, perhaps for some +German victories, on the 23d. of December, A.D. 176. In the following +year Commodus was associated with his father in the empire, and took +the name of Augustus. This year A.D. 177 is memorable in ecclesiastical +history. Attalus and others were put to death at Lyon for their +adherence to the Christian religion. The evidence of this persecution is +a letter preserved by Eusebius (E.H. V. I; printed in Routh's Reliquiae +Sacrae, vol. i, with notes). The letter is from the Christians of Vienna +and Lugdunum in Gallia (Vienna and Lyon) to their Christian brethren in +Asia and Phrygia; and it is preserved perhaps nearly entire. It contains +a very particular description of the tortures inflicted on the +Christians in Gallia, and it states that while the persecution was going +on, Attalus, a Christian and a Roman citizen, was loudly demanded by the +populace and brought into the amphitheatre; but the governor ordered him +to be reserved, with the rest who were in prison, until he had received +instructions from the emperor. Many had been tortured before the +governor thought of applying to Antoninus. The imperial rescript, says +the letter, was that the Christians should be punished, but if they +would deny their faith, they must be released. On this the work began +again. The Christians who were Roman citizens were beheaded; the rest +were exposed to the wild beasts in the amphitheatre. Some modern writers +on ecclesiastical history, when they use this letter, say nothing of the +wonderful stories of the martyrs' sufferings. Sanctus, as the letter +says, was burnt with plates of hot iron till his body was one sore and +had lost all human form; but on being put to the rack he recovered his +former appearance under the torture, which was thus a cure instead of a +punishment. He was afterwards torn by beasts, and placed on an iron +chair and roasted. He died at last. + +The letter is one piece of evidence. The writer, whoever he was that +wrote in the name of the Gallic Christians, is our evidence both for the +ordinary and the extraordinary circumstances of the story, and we cannot +accept his evidence for one part and reject the other. We often receive +small evidence as a proof of a thing we believe to be within the limits +of probability or possibility, and we reject exactly the same evidence, +when the thing to which it refers appears very improbable or impossible. +But this is a false method of inquiry, though it is followed by some +modern writers, who select what they like from a story and reject the +rest of the evidence; or if they do not reject it, they dishonestly +suppress it. A man can only act consistently by accepting all this +letter or rejecting it all, and we cannot blame him for either. But he +who rejects it may still admit that such a letter may be founded on real +facts; and he would make this admission as the most probable way of +accounting for the existence of the letter; but if, as he would suppose, +the writer has stated some things falsely, he cannot tell what part of +his story is worthy of credit. + +The war on the northern frontier appears to have been uninterrupted +during the visit of Antoninus to the East, and on his return the emperor +again left Rome to oppose the barbarians. The Germanic people were +defeated in a great battle A.D. 179. During this campaign the emperor +was seized with some contagious malady, of which he died in the camp at +Sirmium (Mitrovitz), on the Save, in Lower Pannonia, but at Vindebona +(Vienna), according to other authorities, on the 17th of March, A.D. +180, in the fifty-ninth year of his age. His son Commodus was with him. +The body, or the ashes probably, of the emperor were carried to Rome, +and he received the honor of deification. Those who could afford it had +his statue or bust; and when Capitolinus wrote, many people still had +statues of Antoninus among the Dei Penates or household deities. He was +in a manner made a saint. Commodus erected to the memory of his father +the Antonine column which is now in the Piazza Colonna at Rome. The +_bassi rilievi_ which are placed in a spiral line round the shaft +commemorate the victories of Antoninus over the Marcomanni and the +Quadi, and the miraculous shower of rain which refreshed the Roman +soldiers and discomfited their enemies. The statue of Antoninus was +placed on the capital of the column, but it was removed at some time +unknown, and a bronze statue of St. Paul was put in the place by Pope +Sixtus the fifth. + +The historical evidence for the times of Antoninus is very defective, +and some of that which remains is not credible. The most curious is the +story about the miracle which happened in A.D. 174, during the war with +the Quadi. The Roman army was in danger of perishing by thirst, but a +sudden storm drenched them with rain, while it discharged fire and hail +on their enemies, and the Romans gained a great victory. All the +authorities which speak of the battle speak also of the miracle. The +Gentile writers assign it to their gods, and the Christians to the +intercession of the Christian legion in the emperor's army. To confirm +the Christian statement it is added that the emperor gave the title of +Thundering to this legion; but Dacier and others, who maintain the +Christian report of the miracle, admit that this title of Thundering or +Lightning was not given to this legion because the Quadi were struck +with lightning, but because there was a figure of lightning on their +shields, and that this title of the legion existed in the time of +Augustus. + +Scaliger also had observed that the legion was called Thundering +([Greek: keraunobolos], or [Greek: keraunophoros]) before the reign of +Antoninus. We learn this from Dion Cassius (Lib. 55, c. 23, and the note +of Reimarus), who enumerates all the legions of Augustus' time. The name +Thundering of Lightning also occurs on an inscription of the reign of +Trajan, which was found at Trieste. Eusebius (v. 5), when he relates the +miracle, quotes Apolinarius, bishop of Hierapolis, as authority for this +name being given to the legion Melitene by the emperor in consequence of +the success which he obtained through their prayers; from which we may +estimate the value of Apolinarius' testimony. Eusebius does not say in +what book of Apolinarius the statement occurs. Dion says that the +Thundering legion was stationed in Cappadocia in the time of Augustus. +Valesius also observes that in the Notitia of the Imperium Romanum there +is mentioned under the commander of Armenia the Praefectura of the +twelfth legion named "Thundering Melitene;" and this position in Armenia +will agree with what Dion says of its position in Cappadocia. +Accordingly Valesius concludes that Melitene was not the name of the +legion, but of the town in which it was stationed. Melitene was also the +name of the district in which this town was situated. The legions did +not, he says, take their name from the place where they were on duty, +but from the country in which they were raised, and therefore what +Eusebius says about the Melitene does not seem probable to him. Yet +Valesius, on the authority of Apolinarius and Tertullian, believed that +the miracle was worked through the prayers of the Christian soldiers in +the emperor's army. Rufinus does not give the name of Melitene to this +legion, says Valesius, and probably he purposely omitted it, because he +knew that Melitene was the name of a town in Armenia Minor, where the +legion was stationed in his time. + +The emperor, it is said, made a report of his victory to the Senate, +which we may believe, for such was the practice; but we do not know what +he said in his letter, for it is not extant. Dacier assumes that the +emperor's letter was purposely destroyed by the Senate or the enemies of +Christianity, that so honorable a testimony to the Christians and their +religion might not be perpetuated. The critic has however not seen that +he contradicts himself when he tells us the purport of the letter, for +he says that it was destroyed, and even Eusebius could not find it. But +there does exist a letter in Greek addressed by Antoninus to the Roman +people and the sacred Senate after this memorable victory. It is +sometimes printed after Justin's first Apology, but it is totally +unconnected with the apologies. This letter is one of the most stupid +forgeries of the many which exist, and it cannot be possibly founded +even on the genuine report of Antoninus to the Senate. If it were +genuine, it would free the emperor from the charge of persecuting men +because they were Christians, for he says in this false letter that if a +man accuse another only of being a Christian, and the accused confess, +and there is nothing else against him, he must be set free; with this +monstrous addition, made by a man inconceivably ignorant, that the +informer must be burnt alive.[A] + + [A] Eusebius (v. 5) quotes Tertullian's Apology to the Roman + Senate in confirmation of the story. Tertullian, he says, + writes that letters of the emperor were extant, in which he + declares that his army was saved by the prayers of the + Christians; and that he "threatened to punish with death those + who ventured to accuse us." It is possible that the forged + letter which is now extant may be one of those which Tertullian + had seen, for he uses the plural number, "letters." A great + deal has been written about this miracle of the Thundering + Legion, and more than is worth reading. There is a dissertation + on this supposed miracle in Moyle's Works, London, 1726. + +During the time of Antoninus Pius and Marcus Antoninus there appeared +the first Apology of Justinus, and under M. Antoninus the Oration of +Tatian against the Greeks, which was a fierce attack on the established +religions; the address of Athenagoras to M. Antoninus on behalf of the +Christians, and the Apology of Melito, bishop of Sardes, also addressed +to the emperor, and that of Apolinarius. The first Apology of Justinus +is addressed to T. Antoninus Pius and his two adopted sons, M. Antoninus +and L. Verus; but we do not know whether they read it.[A] The second +Apology of Justinus is entitled "to the Roman Senate;" but this +superscription is from some copyist. In the first chapter Justinus +addresses the Romans. In the second chapter he speaks of an affair that +had recently happened in the time of M. Antoninus and L,. Verus, as it +seems; and he also directly addresses the emperor, saying of a certain +woman, "she addressed a petition to thee, the emperor, and thou didst +grant the petition." In other passages the writer addresses the two +emperors, from which we must conclude that the Apology was directed to +them. Eusebius (E.H. iv. 18) states that the second Apology was +addressed to the successor of Antoninus Pius, and he names him Antoninus +Verus, meaning M. Antoninus. In one passage of this second Apology (c. +8), Justinus, or the writer, whoever he may be, says that even men who +followed the Stoic doctrines, when they ordered their lives according to +ethical reason, were hated and murdered, such as Heraclitus, Musonius in +his own times, and others; for all those who in any way labored to live +according to reason and avoided wickedness were always hated; and this +was the effect of the work of daemons. + + [A] Orosius, vii. 14, says that Justinus the philosopher + presented to Antonius Pius his work in defence of the Christian + religion, and made him merciful to the Christians. + +Justinus himself is said to have been put to death at Rome, because he +refused to sacrifice to the gods. It cannot have been in the reign of +Hadrian, as one authority states; nor in the time of Antoninus Pius, if +the second Apology was written in the time of M. Antoninus; and there is +evidence that this event took place under M. Antoninus and L. Verus, +when Rusticus was praefect of the city.[A] + + [A] See the Martyrium Sanctorum Justini, &c., in the works of + Justinus, ed. Otto, vol. ii. 559. "Junius Rusticus Praefectus + Urbi erat sub imperatoribus M. Aurelio et L. Vero, id quod + liquet ex Themistii Orat. xxxiv Dindorf. p. 451, et ex quodam + illorum rescripto, Dig. 49. 1. I, Sec. 2" (Otto). The rescript + contains the words "Junium Rusticum amicum nostrum Praefectum + Urbi." The Martyrium of Justinus and others is written in + Greek. It begins, "In the time of the wicked defenders of + idolatry impious edicts were published against the pious + Christians both in cities and country places, for the purpose + of compelling them to make offerings to vain idols. Accordingly + the holy men (Justinus, Chariton, a woman Charito, Paeon, + Liberianus, and others) were brought before Rusticus, the + praefect of Rome." + + The Martyrium gives the examination of the accused by Rusticus. + All of them professed to be Christians. Justinus was asked if + he expected to ascend into heaven and to receive a reward for + his sufferings, if he was condemned to death. He answered that + he did not expect: he was certain of it. Finally, the test of + obedience was proposed to the prisoners; they were required to + sacrifice to the gods. All refused, and Rusticus pronounced the + sentence, which was that those who refused to sacrifice to the + gods and obey the emperor's order should be whipped and + beheaded according to the law. The martyrs were then led to the + usual place of execution and beheaded. Some of the faithful + secretly carried off the bodies and deposited them in a fit + place. + +The persecution in which Polycarp suffered at Smyrna belongs to the time +of M. Antoninus. The evidence for it is the letter of the church of +Smyrna to the churches of Philomelium and the other Christian churches, +and it is preserved by Eusebius (E.H. iv. 15). But the critics do not +agree about the time of Polycarp's death, differing in the two extremes +to the amount of twelve years. The circumstances of Polycarp's martyrdom +were accompanied by miracles, one of which Eusebius (iv. 15) has +omitted, but it appears in the oldest Latin version of the letter, which +Usher published, and it is supposed that this version was made not long +after the time of Eusebius. The notice at the end of the letter states +that it was transcribed by Caius from the copy of Irenaeus, the disciple +of Polycarp, then transcribed by Socrates at Corinth; "after which I +Pionius again wrote it out from the copy above mentioned, having +searched it out by the revelation of Polycarp, who directed me to it," +&c. The story of Polycarp's martyrdom is embellished with miraculous +circumstances which some modern writers on ecclesiastical history take +the liberty of omitting.[A] + + [A] Conyers Middleton, An Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers, + &c. p. 126. Middleton says that Eusebius omitted to mention the + dove, which flew out of Polycarp's body, and Dodwell and + Archbishop Wake have done the same. Wake says, "I am so little + a friend to such miracles that I thought it better with + Eusebius to omit that circumstance than to mention it from Bp. + Usher's Manuscript," which manuscript however, says Middleton, + he afterwards declares to be so well attested that we need not + any further assurance of the truth of it. + +In order to form a proper notion of the condition of the Christians +under M. Antoninus we must go back to Trajan's time. When the younger +Pliny was governor of Bithynia, the Christians were numerous in those +parts, and the worshipers of the old religion were falling off. The +temples were deserted, the festivals neglected, and there were no +purchasers of victims for sacrifice. Those who were interested in the +maintenance of the old religion thus found that their profits were in +danger. Christians of both sexes and all ages were brought before the +governor who did not know what to do with them. He could come to no +other conclusion than this, that those who confessed to be Christians +and persevered in their religion ought to be punished; if for nothing +else, for their invincible obstinancy. He found no crimes proved against +the Christians, and he could only characterize their religion as a +depraved and extravagant superstition, which might be stopped if the +people were allowed the opportunity of recanting. Pliny wrote this in a +letter to Trajan (Plinius, Ep. x. 97). He asked for the emperor's +directions, because he did not know what to do. He remarks that he had +never been engaged in judicial inquiries about the Christians, and that +accordingly he did not know what to inquire about, or how far to inquire +and punish. This proves that it was not a new thing to examine into a +man's profession of Christianity and to punish him for it.[A] + + [A] Orosius (vii. 12) speaks of Trajan's persecution of the + Christians, and of Pliny's application to him having led the + emperor to mitigate his severity. The punishment by the Mosaic + law for those who attempted to seduce the Jews to follow new + gods was death. If a man was secretly enticed to such new + worship, he must kill the seducer, even if the seducer were + brother, son, daughter, wife, or friend. (Deut. xiii.) + +Trajan's rescript is extant. He approved of the governor's judgment in +the matter, but he said that no search must be made after the +Christians; if a man was charged with the new religion and convicted, he +must not be punished if he affirmed that he was not a Christian, and +confirmed his denial by showing his reverence to the heathen gods. He +added that no notice must be taken of anonymous informations, for such +things were of bad example. Trajan was a mild and sensible man; and both +motives of mercy and policy probably also induced him to take as little +notice of the Christians as he could, to let them live in quiet if it +were possible. Trajan's rescript is the first legislative act of the +head of the Roman state with reference to Christianity, which is known +to us. It does not appear that the Christians were further disturbed +under his reign. The martyrdom of Ignatius by the order of Trajan +himself is not universally admitted to be an historical fact.[A] + + [A] The Martyrium Ignatii, first published in Latin by + Archbishop Usher, is the chief evidence for the circumstances + of Ignatius' death. + +In the time of Hadrian it was no longer possible for the Roman +government to overlook the great increase of the Christians and the +hostility of the common sort to them. If the governors in the provinces +were willing to let them alone, they could not resist the fanaticism of +the heathen community, who looked on the Christians as atheists. The +Jews too, who were settled all over the Roman Empire, were as hostile to +the Christians as the Gentiles were.[A] With the time of Hadrian begin +the Christian Apologies, which show plainly what the popular feeling +towards the Christians then was. A rescript of Hadrian to Minucius +Fundanus, the Proconsul of Asia, which stands at the end of Justin's +first Apology,[B] instructs the governor that innocent people must not +be troubled, and false accusers must not be allowed to extort money from +them; the charges against the Christians must be made in due form, and +no attention must be paid to popular clamors; when Christians were +regularly prosecuted and convicted of illegal acts, they must be +punished according to their deserts; and false accusers also must be +punished. Antoninus Pius is said to have published rescripts to the same +effect. The terms of Hadrian's rescript seem very favorable to the +Christians; but if we understand it in this sense, that they were only +to be punished like other people for illegal acts, it would have had no +meaning, for that could have been done without asking the emperor's +advice. The real purpose of the rescript is that Christians must be +punished if they persisted in their belief, and would not prove their +renunciation of it by acknowledging the heathen religion. This was +Trajan's rule, and we have no reason for supposing that Hadrian granted +more to the Christians than Trajan did. There is also printed at the end +of Justin's first Apology a rescript of Antoninus Pius to the Commune of +([Greek: to koinon tes Asias]), and it is also in Eusebius (E.H. iv. +13). The date of the rescript is the third consulship of Antoninus +Pius.[C] The rescript declares that the Christians--for they are meant, +though the name Christians does not occur in the rescript--were not to +be disturbed unless they were attempting something against the Roman +rule; and no man was to be punished simply for being a Christian. But +this rescript is spurious. Any man moderately acquainted with Roman +history will see by the style and tenor that it is a clumsy forgery. + + [A] We have the evidence of Justinus (ad Diognetum, c. 5) to + this effect: "The Christians are attacked by the Jews as if + they were men of a different race, and are persecuted by the + Greeks; and those who hate them cannot give the reason of their + enmity." + + [B] And in Eusebius (E.H. iv. 8, 9). Orosius (vii. 13) says + that Hadrian sent this rescript to Minucius Fundanus, proconsul + of Asia after being instructed in books written on the + Christian religion by Quadratus, a disciple of the Apostles, + and Aristides, an Athenian, an honest and wise man, and Serenus + Granius. In the Greek text of Hadrian's rescript there + is mentioned Serenius Granianus, the predecessor of Minucius + Fundanus in the government of _Asia_. + + This rescript of Hadrian has clearly been added to the Apology + by some editor. The Apology ends with the words: [Greek: ho + philon to Oeo, touto genestho] + + [C] Eusebius (E.H. iv. 12), after giving the beginning of + Justinus' first Apology, which contains the address to T. + Antoninus and his two adopted sons, adds: "The same emperor + being addressed by other brethren in Asia, honored the Commune + of Asia with the following rescript." This rescript, which is + in the next chapter of Eusebius (E.H. iv. 13) is in the sole + name of Caesar Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus Armenius, + though Eusebius had just before said that he was going to give + us a rescript of Antoninus Pius. There are some material + variations between the two copies of the rescript besides the + difference in the title, which difference makes it impossible + to say whether the forger intended to assign this rescript to + Pius or to M. Antoninus. + + The author of the Alexandrine Chronicum says that Marcus, being + moved by the entreaties of Melito and other heads of the + church, wrote an Epistle to the Commune of Asia in which he + forbade the Christians to be troubled on account of their + religion. Valesius supposes this to be the letter or rescript + which is contained in Eusebius (iv. 13), and to be the answer + to the Apology of Melito, of which I shall soon give the + substance. But Marcus certainly did not write this letter which + is in Eusebius, and we know not what answer he made to Melito. + +In the time of M. Antoninus the opposition between the old and the new +belief was still stronger, and the adherents of the heathen religion +urged those in authority to a more regular resistance to the invasions +of the Christian faith. Melito in his Apology to M. Antoninus represents +the Christians of Asia as persecuted under new imperial orders. +Shameless informers, he says, men who were greedy after the property of +others, used these orders as a means of robbing those who were doing no +harm. He doubts if a just emperor could have ordered anything so unjust; +and if the last order was really not from the emperor, the Christians +entreat him not to give them up to their enemies.[A] We conclude from +this that there were at least imperial rescripts or constitutions of M. +Antoninus which were made the foundation of these persecutions. The fact +of being a Christian was now a crime and punished, unless the accused +denied their religion. Then come the persecutions at Smyrna, which some +modern critics place in A.D. 167, ten years before the persecution of +Lyon. The governors of the provinces under M. Antoninus might have found +enough even in Trajan's rescript to warrant them in punishing +Christians, and the fanaticism of the people would drive them to +persecution, even if they were unwilling. But besides the fact of the +Christians rejecting all the heathen ceremonies, we must not forget that +they plainly maintain that all the heathen religions were false. The +Christians thus declared war against the heathen rites, and it is hardly +necessary to observe that this was a declaration of hostility against +the Roman government, which tolerated all the various forms of +superstition that existed in the empire, and could not consistently +tolerate another religion, which declared that all the rest were false +and all the splendid ceremonies of the empire only a worship of devils. + + [A] Eusebius, iv. 26; and Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae, vol. I, and + the notes. The interpretation of this Fragment is not easy. + Mosheim misunderstood one passage so far as to affirm that + Marcus promised rewards to those who denounced the Christians; + an interpretation which is entirely false. Melito calls the + Christian religion "our philosophy," which began among + barbarians (the Jews), and flourished among the Roman subjects + in the time of Augustus, to the great advantage of the empire, + for from that time the power of the Romans grew great and + glorious. He says that the emperor has and will have as the + successor to Augustus' power the good wishes of men, if he will + protect that philosophy which grew up with the empire and began + with Augustus, which philosophy the predecessors of Antoninus + honored in addition to the other religions. He further says + that the Christian religion had suffered no harm since the time + of Augustus, but on the contrary had enjoyed all honor and + respect that any man could desire. Nero and Domitian, he says, + were alone persuaded by some malicious men to calumniate the + Christian religion, and this was the origin of the false + charges against the Christians. But this was corrected by the + emperors who immediately preceded Antoninus, who often by their + rescripts reproved those who attempted to trouble the + Christians. Hadrian, Antoninus' grandfather, wrote to many, and + among them to Fundanus, the governor of Asia. Antoninus Pius, + when Marcus was associated with him in the empire, wrote to the + cities that they must not trouble the Christians; among others, + to the people of Larissa, Thessalonica, the Athenians, and all + the Greeks. Melito concluded thus: "We are persuaded that thou + who hast about these things the same mind that they had, nay + rather one much more humane and philosophical, wilt do all that + we ask thee."--This Apology was written after A.D. 169, the + year in which Verus died, for it speaks of Marcus only and his + son Commodus. According to Melito's testimony, Christians had + only been punished for their religion in the time of Nero and + Domitian, and the persecutions began again in the time of M. + Antoninus, and were founded on his orders, which were abused, + as he seems to mean. He distinctly affirms "that the race of + the godly is now persecuted and harassed by fresh imperial + orders in Asia, a thing which had never happened before." But + we know that all this is not true, and that Christians had been + punished in Trajan's time. + +If we had a true ecclesiastical history, we should know how the Roman +emperors attempted to check the new religion; how they enforced their +principle of finally punishing Christians, simply as Christians, which +Justin in his Apology affirms that they did, and I have no doubt that he +tells the truth; how far popular clamor and riots went in this matter, +and how far many fanatical and ignorant Christians--for there were many +such--contributed to excite the fanaticism on the other side and to +embitter the quarrel between the Roman government and the new religion. +Our extant ecclesiastical histories are manifestly falsified, and what +truth they contain is grossly exaggerated; but the fact is certain that +in the time of M. Antoninus the heathen populations were in open +hostility to the Christians, and that under Antoninus' rule men were put +to death because they were Christians. Eusebius, in the preface to his +fifth book, remarks that in the seventeenth year of Antoninus' reign, in +some parts of the world, the persecution of the Christians became more +violent, and that it proceeded from the populace in the cities; and he +adds, in his usual style of exaggeration, that we may infer from what +took place in a single nation that myriads of martyrs were made in the +habitable earth. The nation which he alludes to is Gallia; and he then +proceeds to give the letter of the churches of Vienna and Lugdunum. It +is probable that he has assiged the true cause of the persecutions, the +fanaticism of the populace, and that both governors and emperor had a +great deal of trouble with these disturbances. How far Marcus was +cognizant of these cruel proceedings we do not know, for the historical +records of his reign are very defective. He did not make the rule +against the Christians, for Trajan did that; and if we admit that he +would have been willing to let the Christians alone, we cannot affirm +that it was in his power, for it would be a great mistake to suppose +that Antoninus had the unlimited authority which some modern sovereigns +have had. His power was limited by certain constitutional forms, by the +Senate, and by the precedents of his predecessors. We cannot admit that +such a man was an active persecutor, for there is no evidence that he +was,[A] though it is certain that he had no good opinion of the +Christians, as appears from his own words.[B] But he knew nothing of +them except their hostility to the Roman religion, and he probably +thought that they were dangerous to the state, notwithstanding the +professions, false or true, of some of the Apologists. So much I have +said, because it would be unfair not to state all that can be urged +against a man whom his contemporaries and subsequent ages venerated as a +model of virtue and benevolence. If I admitted the genuineness of some +documents, he would be altogether clear from the charge of even allowing +any persecutions; but as I seek the truth and am sure that they are +false, I leave him to bear whatever blame is his due.[C] I add that it +is quite certain that Antoninus did not derive any of his ethical +principles from a religion of which he knew nothing.[D] + + [A] Except that of Orosius (vii. 15), who says that during the + Parthian war there were grievous persecutions of the Christians + in Asia and Gallia under the orders of Marcus (praecepto ejus), + and "many were crowned with the martyrdom of saints." + + [B] See xi. 3. The emperor probably speaks of such fanatics as + Clemens (quoted by Gataker on this passage) mentions. The + rational Christians admitted no fellowship with them. "Some of + these heretics," says Clemens, "show their impiety and + cowardice by loving their lives, saying that the knowledge of + the really existing God is true testimony (martyrdom), but that + a man is a self-murderer who bears witness by his death. We + also blame those who rush to death; for there are some, not of + us, but only bearing the same name, who give themselves up. We + say of them that they die without being martyrs, even if they + are publicly punished; and they give themselves up to a death + which avails nothing, as the Indian Gymnosophists give + themselves up foolishly to fire." Cave, in his primitive + Christianity (ii. c. 7), says of the Christians: "They did + flock to the place of torment faster than droves of beasts that + are driven to the shambles. They even longed to be in the arms + of suffering. Ignatius, though then in his journey to Rome in + order to his execution, yet by the way as he went could not but + vent his passionate desire of it 'Oh that I might come to those + wild beasts that are prepared for me; I heartily wish that I + may presently meet with them; I would invite and encourage them + speedily to devour me, and not be afraid to set upon me as they + have been to others; nay, should they refuse it, I would even + force them to it;'" and more to the same purpose from Eusebius. + Cave, an honest and good man, says all this in praise of the + Christians; but I think that he mistook the matter. We admire a + man who holds to his principles even to death; but these + fanatical Christians are the Gymnosophists whom Clemens treats + with disdain. + + [C] Dr. F.C. Baur, in his work entitled "Das Christenthum und + die Christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte," &c., has + examined this question with great good sense and fairness, and + I believe he has stated the truth as near as our authorities + enable us to reach it. + + [D] In the Digest, 48, 19, 30, there is the following excerpt + from Modestinus: "Si quis aliquid fecerit, quo leves hominum + animi superstitione numinis terrerentur, divus Marcus hujusmodi + homines in insulam relegari rescripsit." + +There is no doubt that the Emperor's Reflections--or his Meditations, as +they are generally named--is a genuine work. In the first book he speaks +of himself, his family, and his teachers; and in other books he mentions +himself. Suidas (v.[Greek: Markos]) notices a work of Antoninus in +twelve books, which he names the "conduct of his own life;" and he cites +the book under several words in his Dictionary, giving the emperor's +name, but not the title of the work. There are also passages cited by +Suidas from Antoninus without mention of the emperor's name. The true +title of the work is unknown. Xylander, who published the first edition +of this book (Zuerich, 1558, 8vo, with a Latin version), used a +manuscript which contained the twelve books, but it is not known where +the manuscript is now. The only other complete manuscript which is known +to exist is in the Vatican library, but it has no title and no +inscriptions of the several books: the eleventh only has the +inscription, [Greek: Markou autokratoros] marked with an asterisk. The +other Vatican manuscripts and the three Florentine contain only excerpts +from the emperor's book. All the titles of the excerpts nearly agree +with that which Xylander prefixed to his edition, [Greek: Markou +Antoninou Autokratoros ton eis heauton biblia ib.] This title has been +used by all subsequent editors. We cannot tell whether Antoninus divided +his work into books or somebody else did it. If the inscriptions at the +end of the first and second books are genuine, he may have made the +division himself. + +It is plain that the emperor wrote down his thoughts or reflections as +the occasions arose; and since they were intended for his own use, it is +no improbable conjecture that he left a complete copy behind him written +with his own hand; for it is not likely that so diligent a man would use +the labor of a transcriber for such a purpose, and expose his most +secret thoughts to any other eye. He may have also intended the book for +his son Commodus, who however had no taste for his father's philosophy. +Some careful hand preserved the precious volume; and a work by Antoninus +is mentioned by other late writers besides Suidas. + +Many critics have labored on the text of Antoninus. The most complete +edition is that by Thomas Gataker, 1652, 4to. The second edition of +Gataker was superintended by George Stanhope, 1697, 4to. There is also +an edition of 1704. Gataker made and suggested many good corrections, +and he also made a new Latin version, which is not a very good specimen +of Latin, but it generally expresses the sense of the original, and +often better than some of the more recent translations. He added in the +margin opposite to each paragraph references to the other parallel +passages; and he wrote a commentary, one of the most complete that has +been written on any ancient author. This commentary contains the +editor's exposition of the more difficult passages, and quotations from +all the Greek and Roman writers for the illustration of the text. It is +a wonderful monument of learning and labor, and certainly no Englishman +has yet done anything like it. At the end of his preface the editor says +that he wrote it at Rotherhithe near London, in a severe winter, when he +was in the seventy-eighth year of his age, 1651--a time when Milton, +Selden, and other great men of the Commonwealth time were living; and +the great French scholar Saumaise (Salmasius), with whom Gataker +corresponded and received help from him for his edition of Antoninus. +The Greek test has also been edited by J. M. Schultz, Leipzig, 1802, +8vo; and by the learned Greek Adamantinus Corais, Paris, 1816, 8vo. The +text of Schultz was republished by Tauchnitz, 1821. + +There are English, German, French, Italian, and Spanish translations of +M. Antoninus, and there may be others. I have not seen all the English +translations. There is one by Jeremy Collier, 1702, 8vo, a most coarse +and vulgar copy of the original. The latest French translation by +Alexis Pierron in the collection of Charpentier is better than Dacier's, +which has been honored with an Italian version (Udine, 1772). There is +an Italian version (1675), which I have not seen. It is by a cardinal. +"A man illustrious in the church, the Cardinal Francis Barberini the +elder, nephew of Pope Urban VIII., occupied the last years of his life +in translating into his native language the thoughts of the Roman +emperor, in order to diffuse among the faithful the fertilizing and +vivifying seeds. He dedicated this translation to his soul, to make it, +as he says in his energetic style, redder than his purple at the sight +of the virtues of this Gentile" (Pierron, Preface). + +I have made this translation at intervals after having used the book for +many years. It is made from the Greek, but I have not always followed +one text; and I have occasionally compared other versions with my own. I +made this translation for my own use, because I found that it was worth +the labor; but it may be useful to others also; and therefore I +determined to print it. As the original is sometimes very difficult to +understand and still more difficult to translate, it is not possible +that I have always avoided error. But I believe that I have not often +missed the meaning, and those who will take the trouble to compare the +translation with the original should not hastily conclude that I am +wrong, if they do not agree with me. Some passages do give the meaning, +though at first sight they may not appear to do so; and when I differ +from the translators, I think that in some places they are wrong, and in +other places I am sure that they are. I have placed in some passages a ++, which indicates corruption in the text or great uncertainty in the +meaning. I could have made the language more easy and flowing, but I +have preferred a ruder style as being better suited to express the +character of the original; and sometimes the obscurity which may appear +in the version is a fair copy of the obscurity of the Greek. If I should +ever revise this version, I would gladly make use of any corrections +which may be suggested. I have added an index of some of the Greek terms +with the corresponding English. If I have not given the best words for +the Greek, I have done the best that I could; and in the text I have +always given the same translation of the same word. + +The last reflection of the Stoic philosophy that I have observed is in +Simplicius' Commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus. Simplicius was +not a Christian, and such a man was not likely to be converted at a time +when Christianity was grossly corrupted. But he was a really religious +man, and he concludes his commentary with a prayer to the Deity which no +Christian could improve. From the time of Zeno to Simplicius, a period +of about nine hundred years, the Stoic philosophy formed the characters +of some of the best and greatest men. Finally it became extinct, and we +hear no more of it till the revival of letters in Italy. Angelo +Poliziano met with two very inaccurate and incomplete manuscripts of +Epictetus' Enchiridion, which he translated into Latin and dedicated to +his great patron Lorenzo de' Medici, in whose collection he had found +the book. Poliziano's version was printed in the first Bale edition of +the Enchiridion, A.D. 1531 (apud And. Cratandrum). Poliziano recommends +the Enchiridion to Lorenzo as a work well suited to his temper, and +useful in the difficulties by which he was surrounded. + +Epictetus and Antoninus have had readers ever since they were first +printed. The little book of Antoninus has been the companion of some +great men. Machiavelli's Art of War and Marcus Antoninus were the two +books which were used when he was a young man by Captain John Smith, and +he could not have found two writers better fitted to form the character +of a soldier and a man. Smith is almost unknown and forgotten in +England, his native country, but not in America, where he saved the +young colony of Virginia. He was great in his heroic mind and his deeds +in arms, but greater still in the nobleness of his character. For a +man's greatness lies not in wealth and station, as the vulgar believe, +nor yet in his intellectual capacity, which is often associated with +the meanest moral character, the most abject servility to those in high +places, and arrogance to the poor and lowly; but a man's true greatness +lies in the consciousness of an honest purpose in life, founded on a +just estimate of himself and everything else, on frequent +self-examination, and a steady obedience to the rule which he knows to +be right, without troubling himself, as the emperor says he should not, +about what others may think or say, or whether they do or do not do that +which he thinks and says and does. + + + + +THE PHILOSOPHY + +OF + +MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONIUS + + +It has been said that the Stoic philosophy first showed its real value +when it passed from Greece to Rome. The doctrines of Zeno and his +successors were well suited to the gravity and practical good sense of +the Romans; and even in the Republican period we have an example of a +man, M. Cato Uticensis, who lived the life of a Stoic and died +consistently with the opinions which he professed. He was a man, says +Cicero, who embraced the Stoic philosophy from conviction; not for the +purpose of vain discussion, as most did, but in order to make his life +conformable to the Stoic precepts. In the wretched times from the death +of Augustus to the murder of Domitian, there was nothing but the Stoic +philosophy which could console and support the followers of the old +religion under imperial tyranny and amidst universal corruption. There +were even then noble minds that could dare and endure, sustained by a +good conscience and an elevated idea of the purposes of man's existence. +Such were Paetus Thrasae, Helvidius Priscus, Cornutus, C. Musonius +Rufus,[A] and the poets Persius and Juvenal, whose energetic language +and manly thoughts may be as instructive to us now as they might have +been to their contemporaries. Persius died under Nero's bloody reign; +but Juvenal had the good fortune to survive the tyrant Domitian and to +see the better times of Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian.[B] His best precepts +are derived from the Stoic school, and they are enforced in his finest +verses by the unrivalled vigor of the Latin language. + + [A] I have omitted Seneca, Nero's preceptor. He was in a sense + a Stoic, and he has said many good things in a very fine way. + There is a judgment of Gellius (xii. 2.) on Seneca, or rather a + statement of what some people thought of his philosophy, and it + is not favorable. His writings and his life must be taken + together, and I have nothing more to say of him here. The + reader will find a notice of Seneca and his philosophy in + "Seekers after God," by the Rev. P. W. Farrar. Macmillan and + Co. + + [B] Ribbeck has labored to prove that those Satires, which + contain philosophical precepts, are not the work of the real, + but of a false Juvenal, a Declamator. Still the verses exist, + and were written by somebody who was acquainted with the Stoic + doctrines. + + +The best two expounders of the later Stoical philosophy were a Greek +slave and a Roman emperor. Epictetus, a Phrygian Greek, was brought to +Rome, we know not how, but he was there the slave and afterwards the +freedman of an unworthy master, Epaphroditus by name, himself a freedman +and a favorite of Nero. Epictetus may have been a hearer of C. Musonius +Rufus, while he was still a slave, but he could hardly have been a +teacher before he was made free. He was one of the philosophers whom +Domitian's order banished from Rome. He retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, +and he may have died there. Like other great teachers he wrote nothing, +and we are indebted to his grateful pupil Arrian for what we have of +Epictetus' discourses. Arrian wrote eight books of the discourses of +Epictetus, of which only four remain and some fragments. We have also +from Arrian's hand the small Enchiridion or Manual of the chief precepts +of Epictetus. This is a valuable commentary on the Enchiridion by +Simplicius, who lived in the time of the emperor Justinian.[A] + + [A] There is a complete edition of Arrian's Epictetus with the + commentary of Simplicius by J. Schweighaeuser, 6 vols. 8vo. + 1799, 1800. There is also an English translation of Epictetus + by Mrs. Carter. + +Antoninus in his first book (i. 7), in which he gratefully commemorates +his obligations to his teachers, says that he was made acquainted by +Junius Rusticus with the discourses of Epictetus, whom he mentions also +in other passages (iv. 41; xi. 34, 36). Indeed, the doctrines of +Epictetus and Antoninus are the same, and Epictetus is the best +authority for the explanation of the philosophical language of Antoninus +and the exposition of his opinions. But the method of the two +philosophers is entirely different. Epictetus addressed himself to his +hearers in a continuous discourse and in a familiar and simple manner. +Antoninus wrote down his reflections for his own use only, in short, +unconnected paragraphs, which are often obscure. + +The Stoics made three divisions of philosophy,--Physic ([Greek: +phusikon]), Ethic ([Greek: ethikon]), and Logic ([Greek: logikon]) +(viii. 13). This division, we are told by Diogenes, was made by Zeno of +Citium, the founder of the Stoic sect, and by Chrysippus; but these +philosophers placed the three divisions in the following order,--Logic, +Physic, Ethic. It appears, however, that this division was made before +Zeno's time, and acknowledged by Plato, as Cicero remarks (Acad. Post. +i. 5). Logic is not synonymous with our term Logic in the narrower sense +of that word. + +Cleanthes, a Stoic, subdivided the three divisions and made +six,--Dialectic and Rhetoric, comprised in Logic; Ethic and Politic; +Physic and Theology. This division was merely for practical use, for all +Philosophy is one. Even among the earliest Stoics Logic, or Dialectic, +does not occupy the same place as in Plato: it is considered only as an +instrument which is to be used for the other divisions of Philosophy. +An exposition of the earlier Stoic doctrines and of their modifications +would require a volume. My object is to explain only the opinions of +Antoninus, so far as they can be collected from his book. + +According to the subdivision of Cleanthes, Physic and Theology go +together, or the study of the nature of Things, and the study of the +nature of the Deity, so far as man can understand the Deity, and of his +government of the universe. This division or subdivision is not formally +adopted by Antoninus, for, as already observed, there is no method in +his book; but it is virtually contained in it. + +Cleanthes also connects Ethic and Politic, or the study of the +principles of morals and the study of the constitution of civil society; +and undoubtedly he did well in subdividing Ethic into two parts. Ethic +in the narrower sense and Politic; for though the two are intimately +connected, they are also very distinct, and many questions can only be +properly discussed by carefully observing the distinction. Antoninus +does not treat of Politic. His subject is Ethic, and Ethic in its +practical application to his own conduct in life as a man and as a +governor. His Ethic is founded on his doctrines about man's nature, the +Universal Nature, and the relation of every man to everything else. It +is therefore intimately and inseparably connected with Physic, or the +Nature of Things, and with Theology, or the Nature of the Deity. He +advises us to examine well all the impressions on our minds +([Greek: phantasiai]) and to form a right judgment of them, to make just +conclusions, and to inquire into the meanings of words, and so far to +apply Dialectic; but he has no attempt at any exposition of Dialectic, +and his philosophy is in substance purely moral and practical. He says +(viii. 13), "Constantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every +impression on the soul,[A] apply to it the principles of Physic, of +Ethic, and of Dialectic:" which is only another way of telling us to +examine the impression in every possible way. In another passage (iii. +11) he says, "To the aids which have been mentioned, let this one still +be added: make for thyself a definition or description of the object +([Greek: to phantaston]) which is presented to thee, so as to see +distinctly what kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, +in its complete entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the +names of the things of which it has been compounded, and into which it +will be resolved." Such an examination implies a use of Dialectic, which +Antoninus accordingly employed as a means toward establishing his +Physical, Theological, and Ethical principles. + + [A] The original is [Greek: epi pases phantasias]. We have no word + which expresses [Greek: phantasia], for it is not only the sensuous + appearance which comes from an external object, which object is + called [Greek: to phantaston], but it is also the thought or feeling + or opinion which is produced even when there is no + corresponding external object before us. Accordingly everything + which moves the soul is [Greek: phantaston], and produces a + [Greek: phantasia]. + + In this extract Antoninus says [Greek: physiologein, pathologein, + dialektikeuesthai]. I have translated [Greek: pathologein] by using + the word Moral (Ethic), and that is the meaning here. + +There are several expositions of the Physical, Theological, and Ethical +principles, which are contained in the work of Antoninus; and more +expositions than I have read. Ritter (Geschichte der Philosophie, iv. +241), after explaining the doctrines of Epictetus, treats very briefly +and insufficiently those of Antoninus. But he refers to a short essay, +in which the work is done better.[A] There is also an essay on the +Philosophical Principles of M. Aurelius Antoninus by J.M. Schultz, +placed at the end of his German translation of Antoninus (Schleswig, +1799). With the assistance of these two useful essays and his own +diligent study, a man may form a sufficient notion of the principles of +Antoninus; but he will find it more difficult to expound them to others. +Besides the want of arrangement in the original and of connection among +the numerous paragraphs, the corruption of the text, the obscurity of +the language and the style, and sometimes perhaps the confusion in the +writer's own ideas--besides all this, there is occasionally an apparent +contradiction in the emperor's thoughts, as if his principles were +sometimes unsettled, as if doubt sometimes clouded his mind. A man who +leads a life of tranquillity and reflection, who is not disturbed at +home and meddles not with the affairs of the world, may keep his mind at +ease and his thoughts in one even course. But such a man has not been +tried. All his Ethical philosophy and his passive virtue might turn out +to be idle words, if he were once exposed to the rude realities of human +existence. Fine thoughts and moral dissertations from men who have not +worked and suffered may be read, but they will be forgotten. No +religion, no Ethical philosophy is worth anything, if the teacher has +not lived the "life of an apostle," and been ready to die "the death of +a martyr." "Not in passivity (the passive effects) but in activity lie +the evil and the good of the rational social animal, just as his virtue +and his vice lie not in passivity, but in activity" (ix. 16). The +emperor Antoninus was a practical moralist. From his youth he followed a +laborious discipline, and though his high station placed him above all +want or the fear of it, he lived as frugally and temperately as the +poorest philospher. Epictetus wanted little, and it seems that he always +had the little that he wanted and he was content with it, as he had been +with his servile station! But Antoninus after his accession to the +empire sat on an uneasy seat. He had the administration of an empire +which extended from the Euphrates to the Atlantic, from the cold +mountains of Scotland to the hot sands of Africa; and we may imagine, +though we cannot know it by experience, what must be the trials, the +troubles, the anxiety, and the sorrows of him who has the world's +business on his hands, with the wish to do the best that he can, and the +certain knowledge that he can do very little of the good which he +wishes. + + [A] De Marco Aurelio Antonino ... ex ipsius Commentariis. + Scriptio Philologica. Instituit Nicolaus Bachius, Lipsiae, + 1826. + +In the midst of war, pestilence, conspiracy, general corruption, and +with the weight of so unwieldy an empire upon him, we may easily +comprehend that Antoninus often had need of all his fortitude to support +him. The best and the bravest men have moments of doubt and of weakness; +but if they are the best and the bravest, they rise again from their +depression by recurring to first principles, as Antoninus does. The +emperor says that life is smoke, a vapor, and St. James in his Epistle +is of the same mind; that the world is full of envious, jealous, +malignant people, and a man might be well content to get out of it. He +has doubts perhaps sometimes even about that to which he holds most +firmly. There are only a few passages of this kind, but they are +evidence of the struggles which even the noblest of the sons of men had +to maintain against the hard realities of his daily life. A poor remark +it is which I have seen somewhere, and made in a disparaging way, that +the emperor's reflections show that he had need of consolation and +comfort in life, and even to prepare him to meet his death. True that he +did need comfort and support, and we see how he found it. He constantly +recurs to his fundamental principle that the universe is wisely ordered, +that every man is a part of it and must conform to that order which he +cannot change, that whatever the Deity has done is good, that all +mankind are a man's brethren, that he must love and cherish them and try +to make them better, even those who would do him harm. This is his +conclusion (ii. 17): "What then is that which is able to conduct a man? +One thing and only one, Philosophy. But this consists in keeping the +divinity within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior to pains +and pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose nor yet falsely and with +hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's doing or not doing +anything; and besides, accepting all that happens and all that is +allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he himself +came; and finally waiting for death with a cheerful mind as being +nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every living +being is compounded. But if there is no harm, to the elements themselves +in each continually changing into another, why should a man have any +apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the elements +[himself]? for it is according to nature; and nothing is evil that is +according to nature." + +The Physic of Antoninus is the knowledge of the Nature of the Universe, +of its government, and of the relation of man's nature to both. He names +the universe ([Greek: he ton hylon ousia], vi. 1),[A] "the universal +substance," and he adds that "reason" ([Greek: logos]) governs the +universe. He also (vi. 9) uses the terms "universal nature" or "nature +of the universe." He (vi. 25) calls the universe "the one and all, which +we name Cosmos or Order" ([Greek: kosmos]). If he ever seems to use +these general terms as significant of the All, of all that man can in +any way conceive to exist, he still on other occasions plainly +distinguishes between Matter, Material things ([Greek: hyle, hylikon]), +and Cause, Origin, Reason ([Greek: aitia, aitiodes, logos]).[B] This is +conformable to Zeno's doctrine that there are two original principles +([Greek: archai]) of all things, that which acts ([Greek: to poioun]) +and that which is acted upon ([Greek: to paschon]). That which is acted +on is the formless matter ([Greek: hyle]): that which acts is the reason +([Greek: logos]), God, who is eternal and operates through all matter, +and produces all things. So Antoninus (v. 32) speaks of the reason +([Greek: logos])which pervades all substance ([Greek: ousia]), and +through all time by fixed periods (revolutions) administers the universe +([Greek: to pan]). God is eternal, and Matter is eternal. It is God who +gives form to matter, but he is not said to have created matter. +According to this view, which is as old as Anaxagoras, God and matter +exist independently, but God governs matter. This doctrine is simply the +expression of the fact of the existence both of matter and of God. The +Stoics did not perplex themselves with the in-soluble question of the +origin and nature of matter.[C] Antoninus also assumes a beginning of +things, as we now know them; but his language is sometimes very obscure. +I have endeavored to explain the meaning of one difficult passage (vii. +75, and the note). + + [A] As to the word [Greek: ousia], the reader may see the + Index. I add here a few examples of the use of the word; + Antoninus has (v. 24), [Greek: he sumpasa ousia], "the + universal substance." He says (xii. 30 and iv. 40), "there is + one common substance" ([Greek: ousia]), distributed among + countless bodies. In Stobaeus (tom. 1, lib. 1, tit. 14) there + is this definition, [Greek: ousian de phasin ton onton hapanton + ten proten hylen]. In viii. II, Antoninus speaks of [Greek: to + ousiodes kai hyulikon], "the substantial and the material;" and + (vii. 10) he says that "everything material" ([Greek: enulon]) + disappears in the substance of the whole ([Greek: te ton holon + ousia]). The [Greek: ousia] is the generic name of that existence + which we assume as the highest or ultimate, because we conceive + no existence which can be coordinated with it and none above + it. It is the philosopher's "substance:" it is the ultimate + expression for that which we conceive or suppose to be the + basis, the being of a thing. "From the Divine, which is + substance in itself, or the only and sole substance, all and + everything that is created exists" (Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, + 198). + + [B] I remark, in order to anticipate any misapprehension, that + all these general terms involve a contradiction. The "one and + all," and the like, and "the whole," imply limitation. "One" is + limited; "all" is limited; the "whole" is limited. We cannot + help it. We cannot find words to express that which we cannot + fully conceive. The addition of "absolute" or any other such + word does not mend the matter. Even the word God is used by + most people, often unconsciously, in such a way that limitation + is implied, and yet at the same time words are added which are + intended to deny limitation. A Christian martyr, when he was + asked what God was, is said to have answered that God has no + name like a man; and Justin says the same (Apol. ii. 6), "the + names Father, God, Creator, Lord, and Master are not names, but + appellations derived from benefactions and acts." (Compare + Seneca, De Benef. iv. 8.) We can conceive the existence of a + thing, or rather we may have the idea of an existence, without + an adequate notion of it, "adequate" meaning coextensive and + coequal with the thing. We have a notion of limited space + derived from the dimensions of what we call a material thing, + though of space absolute, if I may use the term, we have no + notion at all; and of infinite space the notion is the same--no + notion at all; and yet we conceive it in a sense, though I know + not how, and we believe that space is infinite, and we cannot + conceive it to be finite. + + [C] The notions of matter and of space are inseparable. We + derive the notion of space from matter and form. But we have no + adequate conception either of matter or space. Matter in its + ultimate resolution is as unintelligible as what men call mind, + spirit, or by whatever other name they may express the power + which makes itself known by acts. Anaxagoras laid down the + distinction between intelligence [Greek: nous] and matter, and + he said that intelligence impressed motion on matter, and so + separated the elements of matter and gave them order; but he + probably only assumed a beginning, as Simplicius says, as a + foundation of his philosophical teaching. Empedocles said, "The + universe always existed." He had no idea of what is called + creation. Ocellus Lucanus (i, Sec. 2) maintained that the Universe + ([Greek: to pan]) was imperishable and uncreated. Consequently + it is eternal. He admitted the existence of God; but his + theology would require some discussion. On the contrary, the + Brachmans, according to Strabo (p. 713, ed. Cas.), taught that + the universe was created and perishable; and the creator and + administrator of it pervades the whole. The author of the book + of Solomon's Wisdom says (xi. 17): "Thy Almighty hand made the + world of matter without form," which may mean that matter + existed already. + + The common Greek word which we translate "matter" is [Greek: + hyle]. It is the stuff that things are made of. + +Matter consists of elemental parts ([Greek: stoicheia]) of which all +material objects are made. But nothing is permanent in form. The nature +of the universe, according to Antoninus' expression (iv. 36), "loves +nothing so much as to change the things which are, and to make new +things like them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed of +that which will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast +into the earth or into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion." All +things then are in a constant flux and change; some things are dissolved +into the elements, others come in their places; and so the "whole +universe continues ever young and perfect" (xii. 23). + +Antoninus has some obscure expressions about what he calls "seminal +principles" ([Greek: spermatikoi logoi]). He opposes them to the +Epicurean atoms (vi. 24), and consequently his "seminal principles" are +not material atoms which wander about at hazard, and combine nobody +knows how. In one passage (iv. 21) he speaks of living principles, souls +([Greek: psychahi]) after the dissolution of their bodies being +received into the "seminal principle of the universe." Schultz thinks +that by "seminal principles Antoninus means the relations of the various +elemental principles, which relations are determined by the Deity and by +which alone the production of organized beings is possible." This may be +the meaning; but if it is, nothing of any value can be derived from +it.[A] Antoninus often uses the word "Nature" ([Greek: physis]), and we +must attempt to fix its meaning, The simple etymological sense of +[Greek: physis] is "production," the birth of what we call Things. The +Romans used Natura, which also means "birth" originally. But neither the +Greeks nor the Romans stuck to this simple meaning, nor do we. Antoninus +says (x. 6): "Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms or Nature +[is a system], let this first be established, that I am a part of the +whole which is governed by nature." Here it might seem as if nature were +personified and viewed as an active, efficient power; as something +which, it not independent of the Deity, acts by a power which is given +to it by the Deity. Such, if I understand the expression right, is the +way in which the word Nature is often used now, though it is plain that +many writers use the word without fixing any exact meaning to it. It is +the same with the expression Laws of Nature, which some writers may use +in an intelligible sense, but others as clearly use in no definite sense +at all. There is no meaning in this word Nature, except that which +Bishop Butler assigns to it, when he says, "The only distinct meaning of +that word Natural is Stated, Fixed, or Settled; since what is natural as +much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, +_i.e._, to effect it continually or at stated times, as what is +supernatural or miraculous does to effect it at once." This is Plato's +meaning (De Leg., iv. 715) when he says that God holds the beginning and +end and middle of all that exists, and proceeds straight on his course, +making his circuit according to nature (that is by a fixed order); and +he is continually accompanied by justice, who punishes those who deviate +from the divine law, that is, from the order or course which God +observes. + + [A] Justin (Apol. ii. 8) has the words [Greek: kata + spermatikou logou meros], where he is speaking of the Stoics; + but he uses this expression in a peculiar sense (note II). The + early Christian writers were familiar with the Stoic terms, and + their writings show that the contest was begun between the + Christian expositors and the Greek philosophy. Even in the + second Epistle of St. Peter (ii. I, v. 4) we find a Stoic + expression, [Greek: Ina dia touton genesthe theias koinonoi + physeos.] + +When we look at the motions of the planets, the action of what we call +gravitation, the elemental combination of unorganized bodies and their +resolution, the production of plants and of living bodies, their +generation, growth, and their dissolution, which we call their death, we +observe a regular sequence of phenomena, which within the limits of +experience present and past, so far as we know the past, is fixed and +invariable. But if this is not so, if the order and sequence of +phenomena, as known to us, are subject to change in the course of an +infinite progression,--and such change is conceivable,--we have not +discovered, nor shall we ever discover, the whole of the order and +sequence of phenomena, in which sequence there may be involved according +to its very nature, that is, according to its fixed order, some +variation of what we now call the Order or Nature of Things. It is also +conceivable that such changes have taken place,--changes in the order of +things, as we are compelled by the imperfection of language to call +them, but which are no changes; and further it is certain that our +knowledge of the true sequence of all actual phenomena, as for instance +the phenomena of generation, growth, and dissolution, is and ever must +be imperfect. + +We do not fare much better when we speak of Causes and Effects than when +we speak of Nature. For the practical purposes of life we may use the +terms cause and effect conveniently, and we may fix a distinct meaning +to them, distinct enough at least to prevent all misunderstanding. But +the case is different when we speak of causes and effects as of Things. +All that we know is phenomena, as the Greeks called them, or appearances +which follow one another in a regular order, as we conceive it, so that +if some one phenomenon should fail in the series, we conceive that there +must either be an interruption of the series, or that something else +will appear after the phenomenon which has failed to appear, and will +occupy the vacant place; and so the series in its progression may be +modified or totally changed. Cause and effect then mean nothing in the +sequence of natural phenomena beyond what I have said; and the real +cause, or the transcendent cause, as some would call it, of each +successive phenomenon is in that which is the cause of all things which +are, which have been, and which will be forever. Thus the word Creation +may have a real sense if we consider it as the first, if we can conceive +a first, in the present order of natural phenomena; but in the vulgar +sense a creation of all things at a certain time, followed by a +quiescence of the first cause and an abandonment of all sequences of +Phenomena to the laws of Nature, or to the other words that people may +Use, is absolutely absurd.[A] + + [A] Time and space are the conditions of our thought; but time + infinite and space infinite cannot be objects of thought, + except in a very imperfect way. Time and space must not in any + way be thought of when we think of the Deity. Swedenborg says, + "The natural man may believe that he would have no thought, if + the ideas of time, of space, and of things material were taken + away; for upon those is founded all the thought that man has. + But let him know that the thoughts are limited and confined in + proportion as they partake of time, of space, and of what is + material; and that they are not limited and are extended, in + proportion as they do not partake of those things; since the + mind is so far elevated above the things corporeal and worldly" + (Concerning Heaven and Hell, 169). + +[Illustration: THE TEMPLE OF PALLAS] + +Now, though there is great difficulty in understanding all the +passages of Antoninus, in which he speaks of Nature, of the changes of +things and of the economy of the universe, I am convinced that his sense +of Nature and Natural is the same as that which I have stated; and as he +was a man who knew how to use words in a clear way and with strict +consistency, we ought to assume, even if his meaning in some passages is +doubtful, that his view of Nature was in harmony with his fixed belief +in the all-pervading, ever present, and ever active energy of God. (ii. +4; iv. 40; x. 1; vi. 40; and other passages. Compare Seneca, De Benef., +iv. 7. Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 349-357.) + +There is much in Antoninus that is hard to understand, and it might be +said that he did not fully comprehend all that he wrote; which would +however be in no way remarkable, for it happens now that a man may write +what neither he nor anybody can understand. Antoninus tells us (xii. 10) +to look at things and see what they are, resolving them into the +material [Greek: hyle], the casual [Greek: aition], and the relation +[Greek: anaphora], or the purpose, by which he seems to mean something +in the nature of what we call effect, or end. The word Caus ([Greek: +aitia]) is the difficulty. There is the same word in the Sanscrit +(hetu); and the subtle philosophers of India and of Greece, and +the less subtle philosophers of modern times, have all used this word, +or an equivalent word, in a vague way. Yet the confusion sometimes may +be in the inevitable ambiguity of language rather than in the mind of +the writer, for I cannot think that some of the wisest of men did not +know what they intended to say. When Antoninus says (iv. 36), "that +everything that exists is in a manner the seed of that which will be," +he might be supposed to say what some of the Indian philosophers have +said, and thus a profound truth might be converted into a gross +absurdity. But he says, "in a manner," and in a manner he said true; and +in another manner, if you mistake his meaning, he said false. When Plato +said, "Nothing ever is, but is always becoming" ([Greek: aei +gignetai]), he delivered a text, out of which we may derive something; +for he destroys by it not all practical, but all speculative notions of +cause and effect. The whole series of things, as they appear to us, must +be contemplated in time, that is in succession, and we conceive or +suppose intervals between one state of things and another state of +things, so that there is priority and sequence, and interval, and Being, +and a ceasing to Be, and beginning and ending. But there is nothing of +the kind in the Nature of Things. It is an everlasting continuity (iv. +45; vii. 75). When Antoninus speaks of generation (x. 26), he speaks of +one cause ([Greek: aitia]) acting, and then another cause taking up the +work, which the former left in a certain state, and so on; and we might +perhaps conceive that he had some notion like what has been called "the +self-evolving power of nature;" a fine phrase indeed, the full import of +which I believe that the writer of it did not see, and thus he laid +himself open to the imputation of being a follower of one of the Hindu +sects, which makes all things come by evolution out of nature or matter, +or out of something which takes the place of Deity, but is not Deity. I +would have all men think as they please, or as they can, and I only +claim the same freedom which I give. When a man writes anything, we may +fairly try to find out all that his words must mean, even if the result +is that they mean what he did not mean; and if we find this +contradiction, it is not our fault, but his misfortune. Now Antoninus is +perhaps somewhat in this condition in what he says (x. 26), though he +speaks at the end of the paragraph of the power which acts, unseen by +the eyes, but still no less clearly. But whether in this passage (x. 26) +lie means that the power is conceived to be in the different successive +causes ([Greek: aitiai]), or in something else, nobody can tell. From +other passages, however, I do collect that his notion of the phenomena +of the universe is what I have stated. The Deity works unseen, if we may +use such language, and perhaps I may, as Job did, or he who wrote the +book of Job. "In him we live and move and are," said St. Paul to the +Athenians; and to show his hearers that this was no new doctrine, he +quoted the Greek poets. One of these poets was the Stoic Cleauthes, +whose noble hymn to Zeus, or God, is an elevated expression of devotion +and philosophy. It deprives Nature of her power, and puts her under the +immediate government of the Deity. + +"Thee all this heaven, which whirls around the earth, + Obeys, and willing follows where thou leadest. + Without thee, God, nothing is done on earth, + Nor in the ethereal realms, nor in the sea, + Save what the wicked through their folly do." + +Antoninus' conviction of the existence of a divine power and government +was founded on his perception of the order of the universe. Like +Socrates (Xen. Mem., iv. 3, 13, etc.) he says that though we cannot see +the forms of divine powers, we know that they exist because we see their +works. + +"To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods, or how dost thou +comprehend that they exist and so worshipest them? I answer, in the +first place, that they may be seen even with the eyes; in the second +place, neither have I seen my own soul, and yet I honor it. Thus then +with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of their +power, from this I comprehend that they exist, and I venerate them." +(xii. 28, and the note. Comp. Aristotle de Mundo, c. 6; Xen. Mem. i. 4, +9; Cicero, Tuscul. i. 28, 29; St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, i. 19, +20; and Montaigne's Apology for Raimond de Sebonde, ii. c. 12.) This is +a very old argument, which has always had great weight with most people, +and has appeared sufficient. It does not acquire the least additional +strength by being developed in a learned treatise. It is as intelligible +in its simple enunciation as it can be made. If it is rejected, there is +no arguing with him who rejects it: and if it is worked out into +innumerable particulars, the value of the evidence runs the risk of +being buried under a mass of words. + +Man being conscious that he is a spiritual power, or that he has such a +power, in whatever way he conceives that he has it--for I wish simply to +state a fact--from this power which he has in himself, he is led, as +Antoninus says, to believe that there is a greater power, which, as the +old Stoics tell us, pervades the whole universe as the intellect[A] +([Greek: nous]) pervades man. (Compare Epictetus' Discourses, i. 14; +and Voltaire a Mad^e. Necker, vol. lxvii., p. 278, ed. Lequien.) + + [A] I have always translated the word [Greek: nous], + "intelligence" or "intellect." It appears to be the word used + by the oldest Greek philosophers to express the notion of + "intelligence" as opposed to the notion of "matter." I have + always translated the word [Greek: logos] by "reason," and + [Greek: logikos] by the word "rational," or perhaps sometimes + "reasonable," as I have translated [Greek: noeros] by the word + "intellectual." Every man who has thought and has read any + philosophical writings knows the difficulty of finding words to + express certain notions, how imperfectly words express these + notions, and how carelessly the words are often used. The + various senses of the word [Greek: logos] are enough to perplex + any man. Our translators of the New Testament (St. John, c. 1.) + have simply translated [Greek: ho logos] by "the word," as the + Germans translated it by "das Wort;" but in their theological + writings they sometimes retain the original term Logos. The + Germans have a term Vernunft, which seems to come nearest to + our word Reason, or the necessary and absolute truths which we + cannot conceive as being other than what they are. Such are + what some people have called the laws of thought, the + conceptions of space and of time, and axioms or first + principles, which need no proof and cannot be proved or denied. + Accordingly the Germans can say, "Gott ist die hoechste + Vernunft," the Supreme Reason. The Germans have also a word + Verstand, which seems to represent our word "understanding," + "intelligence," "intellect," not as a thing absolute which + exists by itself, but as a thing connected with an individual + being, as a man. Accordingly it is the capacity of receiving + impressions (Vorstellungen, [Greek: phantasiai],) and forming + from them distinct ideas (Begriffe), and perceiving + differences. I do not think that these remarks will help the + reader to the understanding of Antoninus, or his use of the + words [Greek: nous] and [Greek: logos]. The emperor's meaning + must be got from his own words, and if it does not agree + altogether with modern notions, it is not our business to force + it into agreement, but simply to find out what his meaning is, + if we can. + + Justinus (ad Diognetum, c. vii.) says that the omnipotent, + all-creating, and invisible God has fixed truth and the holy, + incomprehensible Logos in men's hearts; and this Logos is the + architect and creator of the Universe. In the first Apology (c. + xxxii.), he says that the seed ([Greek: sperma]) from God is + the Logos, which dwells in those who believe in God. So it + appears that according to Justinus the Logos is only in such + believers. In the second Apology (c. viii.) he speaks of the + seed of the Logos being implanted in all mankind; but those who + order their lives according to Logos, such as the Stoics, have + only a portion of the Logos ([Greek: kata spermatikou logou + meros]), and have not the knowledge and contemplation of the + entire Logos, which is Christ. Swedenborg's remarks (Angelic + Wisdom, 240) are worth comparing with Justinus. The modern + philosopher in substance agrees with the ancient; but he is + more precise. + +God exists then, but what do we know of his nature? Antoninus says that +the soul of man is an efflux from the divinity. We have bodies like +animals, but we have reason, intelligence, as the gods. Animals have +life ([Greek: psyche]) and what we call instincts or natural principles +of action: but the rational animal man alone has a rational, intelligent +soul ([Greek: psyche logike noera]). Antoninus insists on this +continually: God is in man,[A] and so we must constantly attend to the +divinity within us, for it is only in this way that we can have any +knowledge of the nature of God. The human soul is in a sense a portion +of the divinity, and the soul alone has any communication with the +Deity; for as he says (xii. 2): "With his intellectual part alone God +touches the intelligence only which has flowed and been derived from +himself into these bodies." In fact he says that which is hidden within +a man is life, that is, the man himself. All the rest is vesture, +covering, organs, instrument, which the living man, the real[B] man, +uses for the purpose of his present existence. The air is universally +diffused for him who is able to respire; and so for him who is willing +to partake of it the intelligent power, which holds within it all +things, is diffused as wide and free as the air (viii. 54). It is by +living a divine life that man approaches to a knowledge of the +divinity.[C] It is by following the divinity within [Greek: daimon] or +[Greek: theos], as Antonius calls it, that man comes nearest to the +Deity, the supreme good; for man can never attain to perfect agreement +with his internal guide ([Greek: to hegemonikon]). "Live with the gods. +And he does live with the gods who constantly shows to them that his own +soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and that it does +all the daemon ([Greek: daimon]) wishes, which Zeus hath given to every +man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this daemon is +every man's understanding and reason" (v. 27). + + [A] Comp. Ep. to the Corinthians, i. 3, 17, and James iv. 8, + "Drawnigh to God and he will draw nigh to you." + + [B] This is also Swedenborg's doctrine of the soul. "As to what + concerns the soul, of which it is said that it shall live after + death, it is nothing else but the man himself, who lives in the + body, that is, the interior man, who by the body acts in the + world and from whom the body itself lives" (quoted by Clissold, + p. 456 of "The Practical Nature of the Theological Writings of + Emanuel Swedenborg, in a Letter to the Archbishop of Dublin + (Whately)," second edition, 1859; a book which theologians + might read with profit). This is an old doctrine of the soul, + which has been often proclaimed, but never better expressed + than by the "Auctor de Mundo," c. 6, quoted by Gataker in his + "Antoninus," p. 436. "The soul by which we live and have cities + and houses is invisible, but it is seen by its works; for the + whole method of life has been devised by it and ordered, and by + it is held together. In like manner we must think also about + the Deity, who in power is most mighty, in beauty most comely, + in life immortal, and in virtue supreme: wherefore though he is + invisible to human nature, he is seen by his very works." Other + passages to the same purpose are quoted by Gataker (p. 382). + Bishop Butler has the same as to the soul: "Upon the whole, + then, our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly + instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, make use of + to perceive and move with." If this is not plain enough, be + also says: "It follows that our organized bodies are no more + ourselves, or part of ourselves, than any other matter around + us." (Compare Anton, x. 38). + + [C] The reader may consult Discourse V., "Of the existence and + nature of God," in John Smith's "Select Discourses." He has + prefixed as a text to this Discourse, the striking passage of + Agapetus, Paraenes. Sec. 3: "He who knows himself will know God; + and he who knows God will be made like to God; and he will be + made like to God, who has become worthy of God; and he becomes + worthy of God, who does nothing unworthy of God, but thinks the + things that are his, and speaks what he thinks, and does what + he speaks." I suppose that the old saying, "Know thyself," + which is attributed to Socrates and others, had a larger + meaning than the narrow sense which is generally given to it. + (Agapetus, ed. Stephan. Schoning, Franeker, 1608. This volume + contains also the Paraeneses of Nilus.) + +There is in man, that is in the reason, the intelligence, a superior +faculty which if it is exercised rules all the rest. This is the ruling +faculty ([Greek: to hegemonikon]), which Cicero (De Natura Deorum, ii. +11) renders by the Latin word Principatus, "to which nothing can or +ought to be superior." Antoninus often uses this term and others which +are equivalent. He names it (vii. 64) "the governing intelligence." The +governing faculty is the master of the soul (v. 26). A man must +reverence only his ruling faculty and the divinity within him. As we +must reverence that which is supreme in the universe, so we must +reverence that which is supreme in ourselves; and this is that which is +of like kind with that which is supreme in the universe (v. 21). So, as +Plotinus says, the soul of man can only know the divine so far as it +knows itself. In one passage (xi. 19) Antoninus speaks of a man's +condemnation of himself when the diviner part within him has been +overpowered and yields to the less honorable and to the perishable part, +the body, and its gross pleasures. In a word, the views of Antoninus on +this matter, however his expressions may vary, are exactly what Bishop +Butler expresses when he speaks of "the natural supremacy of reflection +or conscience," of the faculty "which surveys, approves, or disapproves +the several affections of our mind and actions of our lives." + +Much matter might be collected from Antoninus on the notion of the +Universe being one animated Being. But all that he says amounts to no +more, as Schultz remarks, than this: the soul of man is most intimately +united to his body, and together they make one animal, which we call +man; so the Deity is most intimately united to the world, or the +material universe, and together they form one whole. But Antoninus did +not view God and the material universe as the same, any more than he +viewed the body and soul of man as one. Antoninus has 110 speculations +on the absolute nature of the Deity. It was not his fashion to waste his +time on what man cannot understand.[A] He was satisfied that God exists, +that he governs all things, that man can only have an imperfect +knowledge of his nature, and he must attain this imperfect knowledge by +reverencing the divinity which is within him, and keeping it pure. + + [A] "God, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow + capacities" (Locke, Essay concerning the Human Understanding, + ii. chap. 17). + +From all that has been said, it follows that the universe is +administered by the Providence of God ([Greek: pronoia]), and that all +things are wisely ordered. There are passages in which Antoninus +expresses doubts, or states different possible theories of the +constitution and government of the universe; but he always recurs to his +fundamental principle, that if we admit the existence of a deity, we +must also admit that he orders all things wisely and well (iv. 27; vi. +1; ix. 28; xii. 5; and many other passages). Epictetus says (i. 6) that +we can discern the providence which rules the world, if we possess two +things,--the power of seeing all that happens with respect to each +thing, and a grateful disposition. + +But if all things are wisely ordered, how is the world so full of what +we call evil, physical and moral? If instead of saying that there is +evil in the world, we use the expression which I have used, "what we +call evil," we have partly anticipated the emperor's answer. We see and +feel and know imperfectly very few things in the few years that we live, +and all the knowledge and all the experience of all the human race is +positive ignorance of the whole, which is infinite. Now, as our reason +teaches us that everything is in some way related to and connected with +every other thing, all notion of evil as being in the universe of things +is a contradiction; for if the whole comes from and is governed by an +intelligent being, it is impossible to conceive anything in it which +tends to the evil or destruction of the whole (viii. 55; x. 6). +Everything is in constant mutation, and yet the whole subsists; we might +imagine the solar system resolved into its elemental parts, and yet the +whole would still subsist "ever young and perfect." + +All things, all forms, are dissolved, and new forms appear. All living +things undergo the change which we call death. If we call death an evil, +then all change is an evil. Living beings also suffer pain, and man +suffers most of all, for he suffers both in and by his body and by his +intelligent part. Men suffer also from one another, and perhaps the +largest part of human suffering comes to man from those whom he calls +his brothers. Antoninus says (viii. 55), "Generally, wickedness does no +harm at all to the universe; and particularly, the wickedness [of one +man] does no harm to another. It is only harmful to him who has it in +his power to be released from it as soon as he shall choose." The first +part of this is perfectly consistent with the doctrine that the whole +can sustain no evil or harm. The second part must be explained by the +Stoic principle that there is no evil in anything which is not in our +power. What wrong we suffer from another is his evil, not ours. But this +is an admission that there is evil in a sort, for he who does wrong does +evil, and if others can endure the wrong, still there is evil in the +wrong-doer. Antoninus (xi. 18) gives many excellent precepts with +respect to wrongs and injuries, and his precepts are practical. He +teaches us to bear what we cannot avoid, and his lessons may be just as +useful to him who denies the being and the government of God as to him +who believes in both. There is no direct answer in Antoninus to the +objections which may be made to the existence and providence of God +because of the moral disorder and suffering which are in the world, +except this answer which he makes in reply to the supposition that even +the best men may be extinguished by death. He says if it is so, we may +be sure that if it ought to have been otherwise, the gods would have +ordered it otherwise (xii. 5). His conviction of the wisdom which we may +observe in the government of the world is too strong to be disturbed by +any apparent irregularities in the order of things. That these disorders +exist is a fact, and those who would conclude from them against the +being and government of God conclude too hastily. We all admit that +there is an order in the material world, a Nature, in the sense in which +that word has been explained, a constitution ([Greek: kataskeue]), what we +call a system, a relation of parts to one another and a fitness of the +whole for something. So in the constitution of plants and of animals +there is an order, a fitness for some end. Sometimes the order, as we +conceive it, is interrupted, and the end, as we conceive it, is not +attained. The seed, the plant, or the animal sometimes perishes before +it has passed through all its changes and done all its uses. It is +according to Nature, that is a fixed order, for some to perish early and +for others to do all their uses and leave successors to take their +place. So man has a corporeal and intellectual and moral constitution +fit for certain uses, and on the whole man performs these uses, dies, +and leaves other men in his place. So society exists, and a social state +is manifestly the natural state of man--the state for which his nature +fits him, and society amidst innumerable irregularities and disorders +still subsists; and perhaps we may say that the history of the past and +our present knowledge give us a reasonable hope that its disorders will +diminish, and that order, its governing principle, may be more firmly +established. As order then, a fixed order, we may say, subject to +deviations real or apparent, must be admitted to exist in the whole +nature of things, that which we call disorder or evil, as it seems to +us, does not in any way alter the fact of the general constitution of +things having a nature or fixed order. Nobody will conclude from the +existence of disorder that order is not the rule, for the existence of +order both physical and moral is proved by daily experience and all past +experience. We cannot conceive how the order of the universe is +maintained: we cannot even conceive how our own life from day to day is +continued, nor how we perform the simplest movements of the body, nor +how we grow and think and act, though we know many of the conditions +which are necessary for all these functions. Knowing nothing then of the +unseen power which acts in ourselves except by what is done, we know +nothing of the power which acts through what we call all time and all +space; but seeing that there is a nature or fixed order in all things +known to us, it is conformable to the nature of our minds to believe +that this universal Nature has a cause which operates continually, and +that we are totally unable to speculate on the reason of any of those +disorders or evils which we perceive. This I believe is the answer which +may be collected from all that Antoninus has said.[A] + + [A] Cleanthes says in his Hymn:-- + + "For all things good and bad to One thou formest, + So that One everlasting reason governs all." + + See Bishop Butler's Sermons. Sermon XV., "Upon the Ignorance of + Man." + +The origin of evil is an old question. Achilles tells Priam (Iliad, +24, 527) that Zeus has two casks, one filled with good things, and the +other with bad, and that he gives to men out of each according to his +pleasure; and so we must be content, for we cannot alter the will of +Zeus. One of the Greek commentators asks how must we reconcile this +doctrine with what we find in the first book of the Odyssey, where the +king of the gods says, Men say that evil comes to them from us, but they +bring it on themselves through their own folly. The answer is plain +enough even to the Greek commentator. The poets make both Achilles and +Zeus speak appropriately to their several characters. Indeed, Zeus says +plainly that men do attribute their sufferings to their gods, but they +do it falsely, for they are the cause of their own sorrows. + +[Illustration: THE APPIAN WAY, ROME] + +Epictetus in his Enchiridion (c. 27) makes short work of the question of +evil. He says, "As a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it, +so neither does the nature of evil exist in the universe." This will +appear obscure enough to those who are not acquainted with Epictetus, +but he always knows what he is talking about. We do not set up a mark in +order to miss it, though we may miss it. God, whose existence Epictetus +assumes, has not ordered all things so that his purpose shall fail. +Whatever there may be of what we call evil, the nature of evil, as he +expresses it, does not exist; that is, evil is not a part of the +constitution or nature of things. If there were a principle of evil +([Greek: arche]) in the constitution of things, evil would no longer be +evil, as Simplicius argues, but evil would be good. Simplicius (c. 34, +[27]) has a long and curious discourse on this text of Epictetus, and it +is amusing and instructive. + +One passage more will conclude this matter. It contains all that the +emperor could say (ii. 11): "To go from among men, if there are gods, is +not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not involve thee in evil; +but if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no concern about human +affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid +of providence? But in truth they do exist, and they do care for human +things, and they have put all the means in man's power to enable him not +to fall into real evils. And as to the rest, if there was anything evil, +they would have provided for this also, that it should be altogether in +a man's power not to fall into it. But that which does not make a man +worse, how can it make a man's life worse? But neither through +ignorance, nor having the knowledge but not the power to guard against +or correct these things, is it possible that the nature of the universe +has overlooked them; nor is it possible that it has made so great a +mistake, either through want of power or want of skill, that good and +evil should happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death +certainly and life, honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure, all these +things equally happen to good and bad men, being things which make us +neither better nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil." + +The Ethical part of Antoninus' Philosophy follows from his general +principles. The end of all his philosophy is to live conformably to +Nature, both a man's own nature and the nature of the universe. Bishop +Butler has explained what the Greek philosophers meant when they spoke +of living according to Nature, and he says that when it is explained, as +he has explained it and as they understood it, it is "a manner of +speaking not loose and undeterminate, but clear and distinct, strictly +just and true." To live according to Nature is to live according to a +man's whole nature, not according to a part of it, and to reverence the +divinity within him as the governor of all his actions. "To the rational +animal the same act is according to nature and according to reason"[A] +(vii. 11). That which is done contrary to reason is also an act contrary +to nature, to the whole nature, though it is certainly conformable to +some part of man's nature, or it could not be done. Man is made for +action, not for idleness or pleasure. As plants and animals do the uses +of their nature, so man must do his (v. 1). + + [A] This is what Juvenal means when he says (xiv. 321),-- + + "Nunquam aliud Natura aliud Sapientia dicit." + +Man must also live conformably to the universal nature, conformably to +the nature of all things of which he is one; and as a citizen of a +political community he must direct his life and actions with reference +to those among whom, among other purposes, he lives.[A] A man must not +retire into solitude and cut himself off from his fellow-men. He must be +ever active to do his part in the great whole. All men are his kin, not +only in blood, but still more by participating in the same intelligence +and by being a portion of the same divinity. A man cannot really be +injured by his brethren, for no act of theirs can make him bad, and he +must not be angry with them nor hate them: "For we are made for +co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the +upper and lower teeth. To act against one another then is contrary to +nature; and it is acting against one another to be vexed and to turn +away" (ii. 1). + + [A] See viii. 52; and Persius iii. 66 + +Further he says: "Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it in passing +from one social act to another social act, thinking of God" (vi. 7). +Again: "Love mankind. Follow God" (vii. 31). It is the characteristic of +the rational soul for a man to love his neighbor (xi. 1). Antoninus +teaches in various passages the forgiveness of injuries, and we know +that he also practised what he taught. Bishop Butler remarks that "this +divine precept to forgive injuries and to love our enemies, though to be +met with in Gentile moralists, yet is in a peculiar sense a precept of +Christianity, as our Saviour has insisted more upon it than on any other +single virtue." The practice of this precept is the most difficult of +all virtues. Antoninus often enforces it and gives us aid towards +following it. When we are injured, we feel anger and resentment, and the +feeling is natural, just, and useful for the conservation of society. It +is useful that wrong-doers should feel the natural consequences of their +actions, among which is the disapprobation of society and the resentment +of him who is wronged. But revenge, in the proper sense of that word, +must not be practised. "The best way of avenging thyself," says the +emperor, "is not to become like the wrong-doer." It is plain by this +that he does not mean that we should in any case practise revenge; but +he says to those who talk of revenging wrongs, Be not like him who has +done the wrong. Socrates in the Crito (c. 10) says the same in other +words, and St. Paul (Ep. to the Romans, xii. 17). "When a man has done +thee any wrong, immediately consider with what opinion about good or +evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen this, thou wilt pity him +and wilt neither wonder nor be angry" (vii. 26). Antoninus would not +deny that wrong naturally produces the feeling of anger and resentment, +for this is implied in the recommendation to reflect on the nature of +the man's mind who has done the wrong, and then you will have pity +instead of resentment; and so it comes to the same as St. Paul's advice +to be angry and sin not; which, as Butler well explains it, is not a +recommendation to be angry, which nobody needs, for anger is a natural +passion, but it is a warning against allowing anger to lead us into sin. +In short the emperor's doctrine about wrongful acts is this: wrong-doers +do not know what good and bad are: they offend out of ignorance, and in +the sense of the Stoics this is true. Though this kind of ignorance will +never be admitted as a legal excuse, and ought not to be admitted as a +full excuse in any way by society, there may be grievous injuries, such +as it is in a man's power to forgive without harm to society; and if he +forgives because he sees that his enemies know not what they do, he is +acting in the spirit of the sublime prayer, "Father, forgive them, for +they know not what they do." + +The emperor's moral philosophy was not a feeble, narrow system, which +teaches a man to look directly to his own happiness, though a man's +happiness or tranquillity is indirectly promoted by living as he ought +to do. A man must live conformably to the universal nature, which means, +as the emperor explains it in many passages, that a man's actions must +be conformable to his true relations to all other human beings, both as +a citizen of a political community and as a member of the whole human +family. This implies, and he often expresses it in the most forcible +language, that a man's words and actions, so far as they affect others, +must be measured by a fixed rule, which is their consistency with the +conservation and the interests of the particular society of which he is +a member, and of the whole human race. To live conformably to such a +rule, a man must use his rational faculties in order to discern clearly +the consequences and full effect of all his actions and of the actions +of others: he must not live a life of contemplation and reflection only, +though he must often retire within himself to calm and purify his soul +by thought,[A] but he must mingle in the work of man and be a fellow +laborer for the general good. + + [A] Ut nemo in sese tentat descendere, nemo.--_Persius_, iv. + 21. + +A man should have an object or purpose in life, that he may direct all +his energies to it; of course a good object (ii. 7). He who has not one +object or purpose of life, cannot be one and the same all through his +life (xi. 21). Bacon has a remark to the same effect, on the best means +of "reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate; which is, the +electing and propounding unto a man's self good and virtuous ends of his +life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain." +He is a happy man who has been wise enough to do this when he was young +and has had the opportunities; but the emperor seeing well that a man +cannot always be so wise in his youth, encourages himself to do it when +he can, and not to let life slip away before he has begun. He who can +propose to himself good and virtuous ends of life, and be true to them, +cannot fail to live conformably to his own interest and the universal +interest, for in the nature of things they are one. If a thing is not +good for the hive, it is not good for the bee (vi. 54). + +One passage may end this matter. "If the gods have determined about me +and about the things which must happen to me, they have determined well, +for it is not easy even to imagine a deity without forethought; and as +to doing me harm, why should they have any desire towards that? For what +advantage would result to them from this or to the whole, which is the +special object of their providence? But if they have not determined +about me individually, they have certainly determined about the whole at +least; and the things which happen by way of sequence in this general +arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be content with them. +But if they determine about nothing--which it is wicked to believe, or +if we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by +them, nor do anything else which we do as if the gods were present and +lived with us; but if however the gods determine about none of the +things which concern us, I am able to determine about myself, and I can +inquire about that which is useful: and that is useful to every man +which is conformable to his own constitution ([Greek: kataskeue]) and +nature. But my nature is rational and social; and my city and country, +so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome; but so far as I am a man, it is the +world. The things then which are useful to these cities are alone useful +to me" (vi. 44). + +It would be tedious, and it is not necessary, to state the emperor's +opinions on all the ways in which a man may profitably use his +understanding towards perfecting himself in practical virtue. The +passages to this purpose are in all parts of his book, but as they are +in no order or connection, a man must use the book a long time before he +will find out all that is in it. A few words may be added here. If we +analyze all other things, we find how insufficient they are for human +life, and how truly worthless many of them are. Virtue alone is +indivisible, one, and perfectly satisfying. The notion of Virtue cannot +be considered vague or unsettled, because a man may find it difficult to +explain the notion fully to himself, or to expound it to others in such +a way as to prevent cavilling. Virtue is a whole, and no more consists +of parts than man's intelligence does; and yet we speak of various +intellectual faculties as a convenient way of expressing the various +powers which man's intellect shows by his works. In the same way we may +speak of various virtues or parts of virtue, in a practical sense, for +the purpose of showing what particular virtues we ought to practice in +order to the exercise of the whole of virtue, that is, as man's nature +is capable of. + +The prime principle in man's constitution is social. The next in order +is not to yield to the persuasions of the body, when they are not +conformable to the rational principle, which must govern. The third is +freedom from error and from deception. "Let then the ruling principle +holding fast to these things go straight on, and it has what is its own" +(vii. 55). The emperor selects justice as the virtue which is the basis +of all the rest (x. 11), and this had been said long before his time. + +It is true that all people have some notion of what is meant by justice +as a disposition of the mind, and some notion about acting in conformity +to this disposition; but experience shows that men's notions about +justice are as confused as their actions are inconsistent with the true +notion of justice. The emperor's notion of justice is clear enough, but +not practical enough for all mankind. "Let there be freedom from +perturbations with respect to the things which come from the external +cause; and let there be justice in the things done by virtue of the +internal cause, that is, let there be movement and action terminating in +this, in social acts, for this is according to thy nature" (ix. 31). In +another place (ix. 1) he says that "he who acts unjustly acts +impiously," which follows of course from all that he says in various +places. He insists on the practice of truth as a virtue and as a means +to virtue, which no doubt it is: for lying even in indifferent things +weakens the understanding; and lying maliciously is as great a moral +offense as a man can be guilty of, viewed both as showing an habitual +disposition, and viewed with respect to consequences. He couples the +notion of justice with action. A man must not pride himself on having +some fine notion of justice in his head, but he must exhibit his justice +in act, like St. James' notion of faith. But this is enough. + +The Stoics, and Antoninus among them, call some things beautiful +([Greek: kala]) and some ugly ([Greek: aischra]), and as they are beautiful +so they are good, and as they are ugly so they are evil, or bad (ii. 1). +All these things, good and evil, are in our power, absolutely, some of +the stricter Stoics would say; in a manner only, as those who would not +depart altogether from common sense would say; practically they are to a +great degree in the power of some persons and in some circumstances, but +in a small degree only in other persons and in other circumstances. The +Stoics maintain man's free will as to the things which are in his power; +for as to the things which are out of his power, free will terminating +in action is of course excluded by the very terms of the expression. I +hardly know if we can discover exactly Antoninus' notion of the free +will of man, nor is the question worth the inquiry. What he does mean +and does say is intelligible. All the things which are not in our power +([Greek: aproaireta]) are indifferent: they are neither good nor bad, +morally. Such are life, health, wealth, power, disease, poverty, and +death. Life and death are all men's portion. Health, wealth, power, +disease, and poverty happen to men, indifferently to the good and to the +bad; to those who live according to nature and to those who do not.[A] +"Life," says the emperor, "is a warfare and a stranger's sojourn, and +after fame is oblivion" (ii. 17). After speaking of those men who have +disturbed the world and then died, and of the death of philosophers such +as Heraclitus and Democritus, who was destroyed by lice, and of Socrates +whom other lice (his enemies) destroyed, he says: "What means all this? +Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the voyage, thou art come to shore; +get out. If indeed to another life, there is no want of gods, not even +there. But if to a state without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held +by pains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel which is as much +inferior as that which serves it is superior: for the one is +intelligence and Deity; the other is earth and corruption" (iii. 3). It +is not death that a man should fear, but he should fear never beginning +to live according to nature (xii. 1). Every man should live in such a +way as to discharge his duty, and to trouble himself about nothing else. +He should live such a life that he shall always be ready for death, and +shall depart content when the summons comes. For what is death? "A +cessation of the impressions through the senses, and of the pulling of +the strings which move the appetites, and of the discursive movements of +the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh" (vi. 28). Death is such +as generation is, a mystery of nature (iv. 5). In another passage, the +exact meaning of which is perhaps doubtful (ix. 3), he speaks of the +child which leaves the womb, and so he says the soul at death leaves its +envelope. As the child is born or comes into life by leaving the womb, +so the soul may on leaving the body pass into another existence which is +perfect. I am not sure if this is the emperor's meaning. Butler compares +it with a passage in Strabo (p. 713) about the Brachmans' notion of +death being the birth into real life and a happy life, to those who have +philosophized; and he thinks Antoninus may allude to this opinion.[B] + + [A] "All events come alike to all: there is one event to the + righteous and to the wicked: to the good and to the clean and + to the unclean," &c. (Ecclesiastes, ix. v. 2); and (v. 3), + "This is an evil among all things that are done under the sun, + that there is one event unto all." In what sense "evil" is + meant here seems rather doubtful. There is no doubt about the + emperor's meaning. Compare Epictetus, Enchiridion, c. i., &c.; + and the doctrine of the Brachmans (Strabo p. 713, ed. Cas.): + [Greek: agathon de e kakon meden einai ton sumbainonton + anthropois]. + + [B] Seneca (Ep. 102) has the same, whether an expression of his + own opinion, or merely a fine saying of others employed to + embellish his writings, I know not. After speaking of the child + being prepared in the womb to live this life, he adds, "Sic per + hoc spatium, quod ab infantia patet in senectutem, in alium + naturae sumimur partum. Alia origo nos expectat, alius rerum + status." See Ecclesiastes, xii. 7; and Lucan, i. 457:-- + + "Longae, canitis si cognita, vitae + Mors media est." + +Antoninus' opinion of a future life is nowhere clearly expressed. His +doctrine of the nature of the soul of necessity implies that it does not +perish absolutely, for a portion of the divinity cannot perish. The +opinion is at least as old as the time of Epicharmus and Euripides; what +comes from earth goes back to earth, and what comes from heaven, the +divinity, returns to him who gave it. But I find nothing clear in +Antoninus as to the notion of the man existing after death so as to be +conscious of his sameness with that soul which occupied his vessel of +clay. He seems to be perplexed on this matter, and finally to have +rested in this, that God or the gods will do whatever is best, and +consistent with the university of things. + +Nor, I think, does he speak conclusively on another Stoic doctrine, +which some Stoics practised,--the anticipating the regular course of +nature by a man's own act. The reader will find some passages in which +this is touched on, and he may make of them what he can. But there are +passages in which the emperor encourages himself to wait for the end +patiently and with tranquillity; and certainly it is consistent with all +his best teaching that a man should bear all that falls to his lot and +do useful acts as he lives. He should not therefore abridge the time of +his usefulness by his own act. Whether he contemplates any possible +cases in which a man should die by his own hand, I cannot tell; and the +matter is not worth a curious inquiry, for I believe it would not lead +to any certain result as to his opinion on this point. I do not think +that Antoninus, who never mentions Seneca, though he must have known all +about him, would have agreed with Seneca when he gives as a reason for +suicide, that the eternal law, whatever he means, has made nothing +better for us than this, that it has given us only one way of entering +into life and many ways of going out of it. The ways of going out indeed +are many, and that is a good reason for a man taking care of himself.[A] + + [A] See Plinius H.N. ii., c. 7; Seneca, De Provid. c. 6; and + Ep. 70: "Nihil melius aeterna lex," &c. + +Happiness was not the direct object of a Stoic's life. There is no rule +of life contained in the precept that a man should pursue his own +happiness. Many men think that they are seeking happiness when they are +only seeking the gratification of some particular passion, the strongest +that they have. The end of a man is, as already explained, to live +conformably to nature, and he will thus obtain happiness, tranquillity +of mind, and contentment (iii. 12; viii. 1, and other places). As a +means of living conformably to nature he must study the four chief +virtues, each of which has its proper sphere: wisdom, or the knowledge +of good and evil; justice, or the giving to every man his due; +fortitude, or the enduring of labor and pain; and temperance, which is +moderation in all things. By thus living conformably to nature the Stoic +obtained all that he wished or expected. His reward was in his virtuous +life, and he was satisfied with that. Some Greek poet long ago wrote:-- + + "For virtue only of all human things + Takes her reward not from the hands of others. + Virtue herself rewards the toils of virtue." + +Some of the Stoics indeed expressed themselves in very arrogant, absurd +terms, about the wise man's self-sufficiency; they elevated him to the +rank of a deity.[A] But these were only talkers and lecturers, such as +those in all ages who utter fine words, know little of human affairs, +and care only for notoriety. Epictetus and Antoninus both by precept and +example labored to improve themselves and others; and if we discover +imperfections in their teaching, we must still honor these great men who +attempted to show that there is in man's nature and in the constitution +of things sufficient reason for living a virtuous life. It is difficult +enough to live as we ought to live, difficult even for any man to live +in such a way as to satisfy himself, if he exercises only in a moderate +degree the power of reflecting upon and reviewing his own conduct; and +if all men cannot be brought to the same opinions in morals and +religion, it is at least worth while to give them good reasons for as +much as they can be persuaded to accept. + + [A] J. Smith in his Select Discourses on "the Excellency and + Nobleness of True Religion" (c. vi.) has remarked on this + Stoical arrogance. He finds it in Seneca and others. In Seneca + certainly, and perhaps something of it in Epictetus; but it is + not in Antoninus. + + + + +THE THOUGHTS + +OF + +MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONIUS. + + + + +I. + + +From my grandfather Verus[A] [I learned] good morals and the government +of my temper. + +2. From the reputation and remembrance of my father,[B] modesty and a +manly character. + +3. From my mother,[C] piety and beneficence, and abstinence, not only +from evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts; and further, simplicity in +my way of living, far removed from the habits of the rich. + +4. From my great-grandfather,[D] not to have frequented public schools, +and to have had good teachers at home, and to know that on such things a +man should spend liberally. + + [A] Annius Verus was his grandfather's name. There is no verb + in this section connected with the word "from," nor in the + following sections of this book; and it is not quite certain + what verb should be supplied. What I have added may express the + meaning here, though there are sections which it will not fit. + If he does not mean to say that he learned all these good + things from the several persons whom he mentions, he means that + he observed certain good qualities in them, or received certain + benefits from them, and it is implied that he was the better + for it, or at least might have been: for it would be a mistake + to understand Marcus as saying that he possessed all the + virtues which he observed in his kinsmen and teachers. + + [B] His father's name was Annius Verus. + + [C] His mother was Domitia Calvilla, named also Lucilla. + + [D] Perhaps his mother's grandfather, Catilius Severus. + +5. From my governor, to be neither of the green nor of the blue party at +the games in the Circus, nor a partisan either of the Parmularius or the +Scutarius at the gladiators' fights; from him too I learned endurance of +labor, and to want little, and to work with my own hands, and not to +meddle with other people's affairs, and not to be ready to listen to +slander. + +6. From Diognetus,[A] not to busy myself about trifling things, and not +to give credit to what was said by miracle-workers and jugglers about +incantations and the driving away of daemons and such things; and not to +breed quails [for fighting], nor to give myself up passionately to such +things; and to endure freedom of speech; and to have become intimate +with philosophy; and to have been a hearer, first of Bacchius, then of +Tandasis and Marcianus; and to have written dialogues in my youth; and +to have desired a plank bed and skin, and whatever else of the kind +belongs to the Grecian discipline. + + [A] In the works of Justinus there is printed a letter to one + Diognetus, whom the writer names "most excellent." He was a + Gentile, but he wished very much to know what the religion of + the Christians was, what God they worshipped, and how this + worship made them despise the world and death, and neither + believe in the gods of the Greeks nor observe the superstition + of the Jews; and what was this love to one another which they + had, and why this new kind of religion was introduced now and + not before. My friend Mr. Jenkins, rector of Lyminge in Kent, + has suggested to me that this Diognetus may have been the tutor + of M. Antoninus. + +7. From Rusticus[A] I received the impression that my character required +improvement and discipline; and from him I learned not to be led astray +to sophistic emulation, nor to writing on speculative matters, nor to +delivering little hortatory orations, nor to showing myself off as a man +who practises much discipline, or does benevolent acts in order to make +a display; and to abstain from rhetoric, and poetry, and fine writing; +and not to walk about in the house in my outdoor dress, nor to do other +things of the kind; and to write my letters with simplicity, like the +letter which Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa to my mother; and with respect +to those who have offended me by words, or done me wrong, to be easily +disposed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon as they have shown a +readiness to be reconciled; and to read carefully, and not to be +satisfied with a superficial understanding of a book; nor hastily to +give my assent to those who talk overmuch; and I am indebted to him for +being acquainted with the discourses of Epictetus, which he communicated +to me out of his own collection. + + [A] Q. Junius Rusticus was a Stoic philosopher, whom Antoninus + valued highly, and often took his advice (Capitol. _M. Antonin_. + iii). + + Antoninus says, [Greek: tois Epikteteiois hypomnemasin] which + must not be translated, "the writings of Epictetus," for + Epictetus wrote nothing. His pupil Arrian, who has preserved + for us all that we know of Epictetus, says, [Greek: tauta + epeirathen hypomnemata emauto diaphylaxai tes ekeinou dianoias] + (_Ep. ad. Gell_.) + +8. From Apollonius[A] I learned freedom of will and undeviating +steadiness of purpose; and to look to nothing else, not even for a +moment, except to reason; and to be always the same, in sharp pains, on +the occasion of the loss of a child, and in long illness; and to see +clearly in a living example that the same man can be both most resolute +and yielding, and not peevish in giving his instruction; and to have had +before my eyes a man who clearly considered his experience and his skill +in expounding philosophical principles as the smallest of his merits; +and from him I learned how to receive from friends what are esteemed +favors, without being either humbled by them or letting them pass +unnoticed. + + [A] Apollonius of Chalcis came to Rome in the time of Pius to + be Marcus' preceptor. He was a rigid Stoic. + +9. From Sextus,[A] a benevolent disposition, and the example of a +family governed in a fatherly manner, and the idea of living conformably +to nature; and gravity without affectation, and to look carefully after +the interests of friends, and to tolerate ignorant persons, and those +who form opinions without consideration:+ he had the power of readily +accommodating himself to all, so that intercourse with him was more +agreeable than any flattery; and at the same time he was most highly +venerated by those who associated with him: and he had the faculty both +of discovery and ordering, in an intelligent and methodical way, the +principles necessary for life; and he never showed anger or any other +passion, but was entirely free from passion, and also most affectionate; +and he could express approbation without noisy display, and he possessed +much knowledge without ostentation. + +10. From Alexander[B] the grammarian, to refrain from fault-finding, and +not in a reproachful way to chide those who uttered any barbarous or +solecistic or strange-sounding expression; but dexterously to introduce +the very expression which ought to have been used, and in the way of +answer or giving confirmation, or joining in an inquiry about the thing +itself, not about the word, or by some other fit suggestion. + +11. From Fronto[C] I learned to observe what envy and duplicity and +hypocrisy are in a tyrant, and that generally those among us who are +called Patricians are rather deficient in paternal affection. + +12. From Alexander the Platonic, not frequently nor without necessity to +say to any one, or to write in a letter, that I have no leisure; nor +continually to excuse the neglect of duties required by our relation to +those with whom we live, by alleging urgent occupations. + +13. From Catulus[D] not to be indifferent when a friend finds fault, +even if he should find fault without reason, but to try to restore him +to his usual disposition; and to be ready to speak well of teachers, as +it is reported of Domitius and Athenodotus; and to love my children +truly. + + [A] Sextus of Chaeronea, a grandson of Plutarch, or nephew, as + some say; but more probably a grandson. + + [B] Alexander was a Grammaticus, a native of Phrygia. He wrote + a commentary on Homer; and the rhetorician Aristides wrote a + panegyric on Alexander in a funeral oration. + + [C] M. Cornelius Fronto was a rhetorician, and in great favor + with Marcus. There are extant various letters between Marcus + and Fronto. + + [D] Cinna Catulus, a Stoic philosopher. + +14. From my brother[A] Severus, to love my kin, and to love truth, and +to love justice; and through him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvidius, +Cato, Dion, Brutus;[B] and from him I received the idea of a polity in +which there is the same law for all, a polity administered with regard +to equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly +government which respects most of all the freedom of the governed; I +learned from him also + consistency and undeviating steadiness in my +regard for philosophy; and a disposition to do good, and to give to +others readily, and to cherish good hopes, and to believe that I am +loved by my friends; and in him I observed no concealment of his +opinions with respect to those whom he condemned, and that his friends +had no need to conjecture what he wished or did not wish, but it was +quite plain. + + [A] The word brother may not be genuine. Antoninus had no + brother. It has been supposed that he may mean some cousin. + Schultz in his translation omits "brother," and says that this + Severus is probably Claudius Severus, a peripatetic. + + [B] We know, from Tacitus (_Annal._ xiii., xvi. 21; and other + passages), who Thrasea and Helvidius were. Plutarch has written + the lives of the two Catos, and of Dion and Brutus. Antoninus + probably alludes to Cato of Utica, who was a Stoic. + +15. From Maximus[A] I learned self-government, and not to be led aside +by anything; and cheerfulness in all circumstances, as well as in +illness; and a just admixture in the moral character of sweetness and +dignity, and to do what was set before me without complaining. I +observed that everybody believed that he thought as he spoke, and that +in all that he did he never had any bad intention; and he never showed +amazement and surprise, and was never in a hurry, and never put off +doing a thing, nor was perplexed nor dejected, nor did he ever laugh to +disguise his vexation, nor, on the other hand, was he ever passionate or +suspicious. He was accustomed to do acts of beneficence, and was ready +to forgive, and was free from all falsehood; and he presented the +appearance of a man who could not be diverted from right, rather than of +a man who had been improved. I observed, too, that no man could ever +think that he was despised by Maximus, or ever venture to think himself +a better man. He had also the art of being humorous in an agreeable +way.+ + + [A] Claudius Maximus was a Stoic philosopher, who was highly + esteemed also by Antoninus Pius, Marcus' predecessor. The + character of Maximus is that of a perfect man. (See viii. 25.) + +16. In my father[A] I observed mildness of temper, and unchangeable +resolution in the things which he had determined after due deliberation; +and no vain-glory in those things which men call honors; and a love of +labor and perseverance; and a readiness to listen to those who had +anything to propose for the common weal; and undeviating firmness in +giving to every man according to his deserts; and a knowledge derived +from experience of the occasions for vigorous action and for remission. +And I observed that he had overcome all passion for boys; and he +considered himself no more than any other citizen;[B] and he released +his friends from all obligation to sup with him or to attend him of +necessity when he went abroad, and those who had failed to accompany +him, by reason of any urgent circumstances, always found him the same. I +observed too his habit of careful inquiry in all matters of +deliberation, and his persistency, and that he never stopped his +investigation through being satisfied with appearances which first +present themselves; and that his disposition was to keep his friends, +and not to be soon tired of them, nor yet to be extravagant in his +affection; and to be satisfied on all occasions, and cheerful; and to +foresee things a long way off, and to provide for the smallest without +display; and to check immediately popular applause and all flattery; and +to be ever watchful over the things which were necessary for the +administration of the empire, and to be a good manager of the +expenditure, and patiently to endure the blame which he got for such +conduct; and he was neither superstitious with respect to the gods, nor +did he court men by gifts or by trying to please them, or by flattering +the populace; but he showed sobriety in all things, and firmness, and +never any mean thoughts or action, nor love of novelty. And the things +which conduce in any way to the commodity of life, and of which fortune +gives an abundant supply, he used without arrogance and without excusing +himself; so that when he had them, he enjoyed them without affectation, +and when he had them not, he did not want them. No one could ever say of +him that he was either a sophist or a [home-bred] flippant slave or a +pedant; but every one acknowledged him to be a man ripe, perfect, above +flattery, able to manage his own and other men's affairs. Besides this, +he honored those who were true philosophers, and he did not reproach +those who pretended to be philosophers, nor yet was he easily led by +them. He was also easy in conversation, and he made himself agreeable +without any offensive affectation. He took a reasonable care of his +body's health, not as one who was greatly attached to life, nor out of +regard to personal appearance, nor yet in a careless way, but so that +through his own attention he very seldom stood in need of the +physician's art or of medicine or external applications. He was most +ready to give without envy to those who possessed any particular +faculty, such as that of eloquence or knowledge of the law or of morals, +or of anything else; and he gave them his help, that each might enjoy +reputation according to his deserts; and he always acted conformably to +the institutions of his country, without showing any affectation of +doing so. Further, he was not fond of change nor unsteady, but he loved +to stay in the same places, and to employ himself about the same things; +and after his paroxysms of headache he came immediately fresh and +vigorous to his usual occupations. His secrets were not many, but very +few and very rare, and these only about public matters; and he showed +prudence and economy in the exhibition of the public spectacles and the +construction of public buildings, his donations to the people, and in +such things, for he was a man who looked to what ought to be done, not +to the reputation which is got by a man's acts. He did not take the bath +at unseasonable hours; he was not fond of building houses, nor curious +about what he ate, nor about the texture and color of his clothes, nor +about the beauty of his slaves.[C] His dress came from Lorium, his villa +on the coast, and from Lanuvium generally.[D] We know how he behaved to +the toll-collector at Tusculum who asked his pardon; and such was all +his behavior. There was in him nothing harsh, nor implacable, nor +violent, nor, as one may say, anything carried to the sweating point; +but he examined all things severally, as if he had abundance of time, +and without confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously and consistently. +And that might be applied to him which is recorded of Socrates,[E] that +he was able both to abstain from, and to enjoy, those things which many +are too weak to abstain from, and cannot enjoy without excess. But to be +strong enough both to bear the one and to be sober in the other is the +mark of a man who has a perfect and invincible soul, such as he showed +in the illness of Maximus. + + [A] He means his adoptive father, his predecessor, the Emperor + Antoninus Pius. Compare vi. 30. + + [B] He uses the word [Greek: koinonoemosune]. See Gataker's + note. + + [C] This passage is corrupt, and the exact meaning is + uncertain. + + [D] Lorium was a villa on the coast north of Rome, and there + Antoninus was brought up, and he died there. This also is + corrupt. + + [E] Xenophon, Memorab. i. 3, 15. + +17. To the gods I am indebted for having good grandfathers, good +parents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and +friends, nearly everything good. Further, I owe it to the gods that I +was not hurried into any offence against any of them, though I had a +disposition which, if opportunity had offered, might have led me to do +something of this kind; but, through their favor, there never was such a +concurrence of circumstances as put me to the trial. Further, I am +thankful to the gods that I was not longer brought up with my +grandfather's concubine, and that I preserved the flower of my youth, +and that I did not make proof of my virility before the proper season, +but even deferred the time; that I was subjected to a ruler and father +who was able to take away all pride from me, and to bring me to the +knowledge that it is possible for a man to live in a palace without +wanting either guards or embroidered dresses, or torches and statues, +and such-like show; but that it is in such a man's power to bring +himself very near to the fashion of a private person, without being for +this reason either meaner in thought, or more remiss in action, with +respect to the things which must be done for the public interest in a +manner that befits a ruler. I thank the gods for giving me such a +brother,[A] who was able by his moral character to rouse me to vigilance +over myself, and who at the same time pleased me by his respect and +affection; that my children have not been stupid nor deformed in body; +that I did not make more proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the other +studies, in which I should perhaps have been completely engaged, if I +had seen that I was making progress in them; that I made haste to place +those who brought me up in the station of honor, which they seemed to +desire, without putting them off with hope of my doing it some other +time after, because they were then still young; that I knew Apollonius, +Rusticus, Maximus; that I received clear and frequent impressions about +living according to nature, and what kind of a life that is, so that, so +far as depended on the gods, and their gifts, and help, and +inspirations, nothing hindered me from forthwith living according to +nature, though I still fall short of it through my own fault, and +through not observing the admonitions of the gods, and, I may almost +say, their direct instructions; that my body has held out so long in +such a kind of life; that I never touched either Benedicta or Theodotus, +and that, after having fallen into amatory passions, I was cured, and, +though I was often out of humor with Rusticus, I never did anything of +which I had occasion to repent; that, though it was my mother's fate to +die young, she spent the last years of her life with me; that, whenever +I wished to help any man in his need, or on any other occasion, I was +never told that I had not the means of doing it; and that to myself the +same necessity never happened, to receive anything from another; that I +have such a wife,[B] so obedient, and so affectionate, and so simple; +that I had abundance of good masters for my children; and that remedies +have been shown to me by dreams, both others, and against bloodspitting +and giddiness[C]...; and that, when I had an inclination to philosophy, +I did not fall into the hands of any sophist, and that I did not waste +my time on writers [of histories], or in the resolution of syllogisms, +or occupy myself about the investigation of appearances in the heavens; +for all these things require the help of the gods and fortune. + +Among the Quadi at the Granua.[D] + + [A] The emperor had no brother except L. Verus, his brother by + adoption. + + [B] See the _Life of Antoninus_. + + [C] This is corrupt. + + [D] The Quadi lived in the southern part of Bohemia and + Moravia; and Antoninus made a campaign against them. (See the + _Life_.) Granua is probably the river Graan, which flows into + the Danube. + + If these words are genuine, Antoninus may have written this + first book during the war with the Quadi. In the first edition + of Antoninus, and in the older editions, the first three + sections of the second book make the conclusion of the first + book. Gataker placed them at the beginning of the second book. + + + + +II. + + +Begin the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet with the busybody, +the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these things +happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil. +But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful, and of +the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does wrong, that it +is akin to me; not [only] of the same blood or seed, but that it +participates in [the same] intelligence and [the same] portion of the +divinity, I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one can fix on +me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. For +we are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like +the rows of the upper and lower teeth.[A] To act against one another, +then, is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one another to be +vexed and to turn away. + + [A] Xenophon, Mem. ii. 3. 18. + +2. Whatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh and breath, and the +ruling part. Throw away thy books; no longer distract thyself: it is not +allowed; but as if thou wast now dying, despise the flesh; it is blood +and bones and network, a contexture of nerves, veins, and arteries. See +the breath also, what kind of a thing it is; air, and not always the +same, but every moment sent out and again sucked in. The third, then, is +the ruling part; consider thus: Thou art an old man; no longer let this +be a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings like a puppet to unsocial +movements, no longer be either dissatisfied with thy present lot, or +shrink from the future. + +3. All that is from the gods is full of providence. That which is from +fortune is not separated from nature or without an interweaving and +involution with the things which are ordered by providence. From thence +all things flow; and there is besides necessity, and that which is for +the advantage of the whole universe, of which thou art a part. But that +is good for every part of nature which the nature of the whole brings, +and what serves to maintain this nature. Now the universe is preserved, +as by the changes of the elements so by the changes of things compounded +of the elements. Let these principles be enough for thee; let them +always be fixed opinions. But cast away the thirst after books, that +thou mayest not die murmuring, but cheerfully, truly, and from thy heart +thankful to the gods. + +4. Remember how long thou hast been putting off these things, and how +often thou hast received an opportunity from the gods, and yet dost not +use it. Thou must now at last perceive of what universe thou art a +part, and of what administrator of the universe thy existence is an +efflux, and that a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost +not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind, it will go and thou +wilt go, and it will never return. + +5. Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to do what thou hast +in hand with perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection, and +freedom, and justice, and to give thyself relief from all other +thoughts. And thou wilt give thyself relief if thou doest every act of +thy life as if it were the last, laying aside all carelessness and +passionate aversion from the commands of reason, and all hypocrisy, and +self-love, and discontent with the portion which has been given to thee. +Thou seest how few the things are, the which if a man lays hold of, he +is able to live a life which flows in quiet, and is like the existence +of the gods; for the gods on their part will require nothing more from +him who observes these things. + +6. Do wrong[A] to thyself, do wrong to thyself, my soul; but thou wilt +no longer have the opportunity of honoring thyself. Every man's life is +sufficient.+ But thine is nearly finished, though thy soul reverences +not itself, but places thy felicity in the souls of others. + + [A] Perhaps it should be, "thou art doing violence to thyself." + [Greek: hybrizeis] not [Greek: hybrize]. + +7. Do the things external which fall upon thee distract thee? Give +thyself time to learn something new and good, and cease to be whirled +around. But then thou must also avoid being carried about the other way; +for those too are triflers who have wearied themselves in life by their +activity, and yet have no object to which to direct every movement, and, +in a word, all their thoughts. + +8. Through not observing what is in the mind of another a man has seldom +been seen to be unhappy; but those who do not observe the movements of +their own minds must of necessity be unhappy. + +9. This thou must always bear in mind, what is the nature of the whole, +and what is my nature, and how this is related to that, and what kind of +a part it is of what kind of a whole, and that there is no one who +hinders thee from always doing and saying the things which are according +to the nature of which thou art a part. + +10. Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts--such a comparison as +one would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind--says, +like a true philosopher, that the offenses which are committed through +desire are more blamable than those which are committed through anger. +For he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from reason with a +certain pain and unconscious contraction; but he who offends through +desire, being overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner more +intemperate and more womanish in his offences. Rightly, then, and in a +way worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence which is committed +with pleasure is more blamable than that which is committed with pain; +and on the whole the one is more like a person who has been first +wronged and through pain is compelled to be angry, but the other is +moved by his own impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing +something by desire. + +11. Since it is possible[A] that thou mayest depart from life this very +moment, regulate every act and thought accordingly.[B] But to go away +from among men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for +the gods will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, +or if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live +in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of providence? But in truth they +do exist, and they do care for human things, and they have put all the +means in man's power to enable him not to fall into real evils. And as +to the rest, if there was anything evil, they would have provided for +this also, that it should be altogether in a man's power not to fall +into it. Now that which does not make a man worse, how can it make a +man's life worse? But neither through ignorance, nor--having the +knowledge but not the power to guard against or correct these things, is +it possible that the nature of the universe has overlooked them; nor is +it possible that it has made so great a mistake, either through want of +power or want of skill, that good and evil should happen +indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death certainly, and life, +honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure,--all these things equally happen +to good men and bad, being things which make us neither better nor +worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil. + + [A] Or it may mean, "since it is in thy power to depart;" which + gives a meaning somewhat different. + + [B] See Cicero, Tuscul., i. 49. + +12. How quickly all things disappear,--in the universe the bodies +themselves, but in time the remembrance of them. What is the nature of +all sensible things, and particularly those which attract with the bait +of pleasure or terrify by pain, or are noised abroad by vapory fame; how +worthless, and contemptible, and sordid, and perishable, and dead they +are,--all this it is the part of the intellectual faculty to observe. To +observe too who these are whose opinions and voices give reputation; +what death is, and the fact that, if a man looks at it in itself, and by +the abstractive power of reflection resolves into their parts all the +things which present themselves to the imagination in it, he will then +consider it to be nothing else than an operation of nature; and if any +one is afraid of an operation of nature, he is a child. This, however, +is not only an operation of nature, but it is also a thing which +conduces to the purposes of nature. To observe too how man comes near to +the Deity, and by what part of him, and when this part of man is so +disposed+ (vi. 28). + +13. Nothing is more wretched than a man who traverses everything in a +round, and pries into the things beneath the earth, as the poet[A] says, +and seeks by conjecture what is in the minds of his neighbors, without +perceiving that it is sufficient to attend to the daemon within him, and +to reverence it sincerely. And reverence of the daemon consists in +keeping it pure from passion and thoughtlessness, and dissatisfaction +with what comes from gods and men. For the things from the gods merit +veneration for their excellence; and the things from men should be dear +to us by reason of kinship; and sometimes even, in a manner, they move +our pity by reason of men's ignorance of good and bad; this defect being +not less than that which deprives us of the power of distinguishing +things that are white and black. + + [A] Pindar, in the Theaetetus of Plato. See xi. 1. + +14. Though thou shouldest be going to live three thousand years and as +many times ten thousand years, still remember that no man loses any +other life than this which he now lives, nor lives any other than this +which he now loses. The longest and shortest are thus brought to the +same. For the present is the same to all, though that which perish is +not the same;+[A] and so that which is lost appears to be a mere +moment. For a man cannot lose either the past or the future: for what a +man has not, how can any one take this from him? These two things then +thou must bear in mind; the one, that all things from eternity are of +like forms and come round in a circle, and that it makes no difference +whether a man shall see the same things during a hundred years, or two +hundred, or an infinite time; and the second, that the longest liver and +he who will die soonest lose just the same. For the present is the only +thing of which a man can be deprived, if it is true that this is the +only thing which he has, and that a man cannot lose a thing if he has it +not. + + [A] See Gataker's note. + +15. Remember that all is opinion. For what was said by the Cynic Monimus +is manifest: and manifest too is the use of what was said, if a man +receives what may be got out of it as far as it is true. + +16. The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it +becomes an abscess, and, as it were, a tumor on the universe, so far as +it can. For to be vexed at anything which happens is a separation of +ourselves from nature, in some part of which the natures of all other +things are contained. In the next place, the soul does violence to +itself when it turns away from any man, or even moves towards him with +the intention of injuring, such as are the souls of those who are angry. +In the third place, the soul does violence to itself when it is +overpowered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, when it plays a part, and +does or says anything insincerely and untruly. Fifthly, when it allows +any act of its own and any movement to be without an aim, and does +anything thoughtlessly and without considering what it is, it being +right that even the smallest things be done with reference to an end; +and the end of rational animals is to follow the reason and the law of +the most ancient city and polity. + +17. Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in a flux, +and the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject +to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to divine, and +fame a thing devoid of judgment. And, to say all in a word, everything +which belongs to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul is a +dream and vapor, and life is a warfare and a stranger's sojourn, and +after fame is oblivion. What then is that which is able to conduct a +man? One thing, and only one, philosophy. But this consists in keeping +the daemon within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior to +pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet falsely +and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's doing or not +doing anything; and besides, accepting all that happens, and all that +is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he +himself came; and, finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as +being nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every +living being is compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements +themselves in each continually changing into another, why should a man +have any apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the +elements? For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil which is +according to nature. + +This in Carnuntum.[A] + + [A] Carnuntum was a town of Pannonia, on the south side of the + Danube, about thirty miles east of Vindobona (Vienna). + Orosius (vii. 15) and Eutropius (viii. 13) say that Antoninus + remained three years at Carmuntum during his war with the + Marcomanni. + + + + +III. + + +We ought to consider not only that our life is daily wasting away and a +smaller part of it is left, but another thing also must be taken into +the account, that if a man should live longer, it is quite uncertain +whether the understanding will still continue sufficient for the +comprehension of things, and retain the power of contemplation which +strives to acquire the knowledge of the divine and the human. For if he +shall begin to fall into dotage, perspiration and nutrition and +imagination and appetite, and whatever else there is of the kind, will +not fail; but the power of making use of ourselves, and filling up the +measure of our duty, and clearly separating all appearances, and +considering whether a man should now depart from life, and whatever else +of the kind absolutely requires a disciplined reason,--all this is +already extinguished. We must make haste, then, not only because we are +daily nearer to death, but also because the conception of things and the +understanding of them cease first. + +2. We ought to observe also that even the things which follow after the +things which are produced according to nature contain something pleasing +and attractive. For instance, when bread is baked some parts are split +at the surface, and these parts which thus open, and have a certain +fashion contrary to the purpose of the baker's art, are beautiful in a +manner, and in a peculiar way excite a desire for eating. And again, +figs, when they are quite ripe, gape open; and in the ripe olives the +very circumstance of their being near to rottenness adds a peculiar +beauty to the fruit. And the ears of corn bending down, and the lion's +eyebrows, and the foam which flows from the mouth of wild boars, and +many other things,--though they are far from being beautiful if a man +should examine them severally,--still, because they are consequent upon +the things which are formed by nature, help to adorn them, and they +please the mind; so that if a man should have a feeling and deeper +insight with respect to the things which are produced in the universe, +there is hardly one of those which follow by way of consequence which +will not seem to him to be in a manner disposed so as to give pleasure. +And so he will see even the real gaping jaws of wild beasts with no less +pleasure than those which painters and sculptors show by imitation; and +in an old woman and an old man he will be able to see a certain maturity +and comeliness; and the attractive loveliness of young persons he will +be able to look on with chaste eyes; and many such things will present +themselves, not pleasing to every man, but to him only who has become +truly familiar with Nature and her works. + +3. Hippocrates, after curing many diseases, himself fell sick and died. +The Chaldaei foretold the deaths of many, and then fate caught them too. +Alexander and Pompeius, and Caius Caesar, after so often completely +destroying whole cities, and in battle cutting to pieces many ten +thousands of cavalry and infantry, themselves too at last departed from +life. Heraclitus, after so many speculations on the conflagration of the +universe, was filled with water internally and died smeared all over +with mud. And lice destroyed Democritus; and other lice killed Socrates. +What means all this? Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the voyage, thou +art come to shore; get out. If indeed to another life, there is no want +of gods, not even there; but if to a state without sensation, thou wilt +cease to be held by pains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the +vessel, which is as much inferior as that which serves it is superior:+ +for the one is intelligence and deity; the other is earth and +corruption. + +4. Do not waste the remainder of thy life in thoughts about others, when +thou dost not refer thy thoughts to some object of common utility. For +thou losest the opportunity of doing something else when thou hast such +thoughts as these,--What is such a person doing, and why, and what is he +saying, and what is he thinking of, and what is he contriving, and +whatever else of the kind makes us wander away from the observation of +our own ruling power. We ought then to check in the series of our +thoughts everything that is without a purpose and useless, but most of +all the over-curious feeling and the malignant; and a man should use +himself to think of those things only about which if one should suddenly +ask, What hast thou now in thy thoughts? with perfect openness thou +mightest immediately answer, This or That; so that from thy words it +should be plain that everything in thee is simple and benevolent, and +such as befits a social animal, and one that cares not for thoughts +about pleasure or sensual enjoyments at all, nor has any rivalry or envy +and suspicion, or anything else for which thou wouldst blush if thou +shouldst say that thou hadst it in thy mind. For the man who is such, +and no longer delays being among the number of the best, is like a +priest and minister of the gods, using too the [deity] which is planted +within him, which makes the man uncontaminated by pleasure, unharmed by +any pain, untouched by any insult, feeling no wrong, a fighter in the +noblest fight, one who cannot be overpowered by any passion, dyed deep +with justice, accepting with all his soul everything which happens and +is assigned to him as his portion; and not often, nor yet without great +necessity and for the general interest, imagining what another says, or +does, or thinks. For it is only what belongs to himself that he makes +the matter for his activity; and he constantly thinks of that which is +allotted to himself out of the sum total of things, and he makes his own +acts fair, and he is persuaded that his own portion is good. For the lot +which is assigned to each man is carried along with him and carries him +along with it.+ And he remembers also that every rational animal is his +kinsman, and that to care for all men is according to man's nature; and +a man should hold on to the opinion not of all, but of those only who +confessedly live according to nature. But as to those who live not so, +he always bears in mind what kind of men they are both at home and from +home, both by night and by day, and what they are, and with what men +they live an impure life. Accordingly, he does not value at all the +praise which comes from such men, since they are not even satisfied with +themselves. + +5. Labor not unwillingly, nor without regard to the common interest, nor +without due consideration, nor with distraction; nor let studied +ornament set off thy thoughts, and be not either a man of many words, or +busy about too many things. And further, let the deity which is in thee +be the guardian of a living being, manly and of ripe age, and engaged in +matter political, and a Roman, and a ruler, who has taken his post like +a man waiting for the signal which summons him from life, and ready to +go, having need neither of oath nor of any man's testimony. Be cheerful +also, and seek not external help nor the tranquillity which others +give. A man then must stand erect, not be kept erect by others. + +6. If thou findest in human life anything better than justice, truth, +temperance, fortitude, and, in a word, anything better than thy own +mind's self-satisfaction in the things which it enables thee to do +according to right reason, and in the condition that is assigned to thee +without thy own choice; if, I say, thou seest anything better than this, +turn to it with all thy soul, and enjoy that which thou hast found to be +the best. But if nothing appears to be better than the Deity which is +planted in thee, which has subjected to itself all thy appetites, and +carefully examines all the impressions, and, as Socrates said, has +detached itself from the persuasions of sense, and has submitted itself +to the gods, and cares for mankind; if thou findest everything else +smaller and of less value than this, give place to nothing else, for if +thou dost once diverge and incline to it, thou wilt no longer without +distraction be able to give the preference to that good thing which is +thy proper possession and thy own; for it is not right that anything of +any other kind, such as praise from the many, or power, or enjoyment of +pleasure, should come into competition with that which is rationally and +politically [or, practically] good. All these things, even though they +may seem to adapt themselves [to the better things] in a small degree, +obtain the superiority all at once, and carry us away. But do thou, I +say, simply and freely choose the better, and hold to it.--But that +which is useful is the better.--Well, then, if it is useful to thee as a +rational being, keep to it; but if it is only useful to thee as an +animal, say so, and maintain thy judgment without arrogance: only take +care that thou makest the inquiry by a sure method. + +7. Never value anything as profitable to thyself which shall compel thee +to break thy promise, to lose thy self-respect, to hate any man, to +suspect, to curse, to act the hypocrite, to desire anything which needs +walls and curtains: for he who has preferred to everything else his own +intelligence and daemon and the worship of its excellence, acts no +tragic part, does not groan, will not need either solitude or much +company; and, what is chief of all, he will live without either pursuing +or flying from [death];[A] but whether for a longer or a shorter time he +shall have the soul enclosed in the body, he cares not at all: for even +if he must depart immediately, he will go as readily as if he were going +to do anything else which can be done with decency and order; taking +care of this only all through life, that his thoughts turn not away from +anything which belongs to an intelligent animal and a member of a civil +community. + + [A] Comp. ix. 3. + +8. In the mind of one who is chastened and purified thou wilt find no +corrupt matter, nor impurity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is his life +incomplete when fate overtakes him, as one may say of an actor who +leaves the stage before ending and finishing the play. Besides, there is +in him nothing servile, nor affected, nor too closely bound [to other +things], nor yet detached[A] [from other things], nothing worthy of +blame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place. + + [A] viii. 34. + +9. Reverence the faculty which produces opinion. On this faculty it +entirely depends whether there shall exist in thy ruling part any +opinion inconsistent with nature and the constitution of the rational +animal. And this faculty promises freedom from hasty judgment, and +friendship towards men, and obedience to the gods. + +10. Throwing away then all things, hold to these only which are few; and +besides, bear in mind that every man lives only this present time, which +is an indivisible point, and that all the rest of his life is either +past or it is uncertain. Short then is the time which every man lives; +and small the nook of the earth where he lives; and short too the +longest posthumous fame, and even this only continued by a succession of +poor human beings, who will very soon die, and who know not even +themselves, much less him who died long ago. + +11. To the aids which have been mentioned let this one still be added: +Make for thyself a definition or description of the thing which is +presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is in +its substance, in its nudity, in its complete entirety, and tell thyself +its proper name, and the names of the things of which it has been +compounded, and into which it will be resolved. For nothing is so +productive of elevation of mind as to be able to examine methodically +and truly every object which is presented to thee in life, and always to +look at things so as to see at the same time what kind of universe this +is, and what kind of use everything performs in it, and what value +everything has with reference to the whole, and what with reference to +man, who is a citizen of the highest city, of which all other cities are +like families; what each thing is, and of what it is composed, and how +long it is the nature of this thing to endure which now makes an +impression on me, and what virtue I have need of with respect to it, +such as gentleness, manliness, truth, fidelity, simplicity, contentment, +and the rest. Wherefore, on every occasion a man should say: This comes +from god; and this is according to the apportionment + and spinning of +the thread of destiny, and such-like coincidence and chance; and this is +from one of the same stock, and a kinsman and partner, one who knows +not, however, what is according to his nature. But I know; for this +reason I behave towards him according to the natural law of fellowship +with benevolence and justice. At the same time, however, in things +indifferent[A] I attempt to ascertain the value of each. + + [A] Est et horum quae media appellamus grande + discrimen.--_Seneca_, Ep. 82. + +12. If thou workest at that which is before thee, following right reason +seriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing anything else to +distract thee, but keeping thy divine part pure, as if thou shouldst be +bound to give it back immediately; if thou holdest to this, expecting +nothing, fearing nothing, but satisfied with thy present activity +according to nature, and with heroic truth in every word and sound which +thou utterest, thou wilt live happy. And there is no man who is able to +prevent this. + +13. As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for +cases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles +ready for the understanding of things divine and human, and for doing +everything, even the smallest, with a recollection of the bond which +unites the divine and human to one another. For neither wilt thou do +anything well which pertains to man without at the same time having a +reference to things divine; nor the contrary. + +14. No longer wander at hazard; for neither wilt thou read thy own +memoirs,[A] nor the acts of the ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the +selections from books which thou wast reserving for thy old age.[B] +Hasten then to the end which thou hast before thee, and, throwing away +idle hopes, come to thy own aid, if thou carest at all for thyself, +while it is in thy power. + + [A] [Greek: hypomnemata]: or memoranda, notes, and the like. + See i. 17. + + [B] Compare Fronto, ii. 9; a letter of Marcus to Fronto, who + was then consul: "Feci tamen mihi per hos dies excerpta ex + libris sexaginta in quinque tomis." But he says some of them + were small books. + +15. They know not how many things are signified by the words stealing, +sowing, buying, keeping quiet, seeing what ought to be done; for this is +not effected by the eyes, but by another kind of vision. + +16. Body, soul, intelligence: to the body belong sensation, to the soul +appetites, to the intelligence principles. To receive the impressions of +forms by means of appearances belongs even to animals; to be pulled by +the strings[A] of desire belongs both to wild beasts and to men who have +made themselves into women, and to a Phalaris and a Nero: and to have +the intelligence that guides to the things which appear suitable belongs +also to those who do not believe in the gods, and who betray their +country, and do their impure deeds when they have shut the doors. If +then everything else is common to all that I have mentioned, there +remains that which is peculiar to the good man, to be pleased and +content with what happens, and with the thread which is spun for him; +and not to defile the divinity which is planted in his breast, nor +disturb it by a crowd of images, but to preserve it tranquil, following +it obediently as a god, neither saying anything contrary to the truth, +nor doing anything contrary to justice. And if all men refuse to believe +that he lives a simple, modest, and contented life, he is neither angry +with any of them, nor does he deviate from the way which leads to the +end of life, to which a man ought to come pure, tranquil, ready to +depart, and without any compulsion perfectly reconciled to his lot. + + [A] Compare Plato, De Legibus, i. p. 644, [Greek: oti tauta ta + pathe] etc.; and Antoninus, ii. 2; vii. 3; xii. 19. + + + + +IV. + + +That which rules within, when it is according to nature, is so affected +with respect to the events which happened, that it always easily adapts +itself to that which is possible and is presented to it. For it requires +no definite material, but it moves towards its purpose,[A] under certain +conditions, however; and it makes a material for itself out of that +which opposes it, as fire lays hold of what falls into it, by which a +small light would have been extinguished; but when the fire is strong, +it soon appropriates to itself the matter which is heaped on it, and +consumes it, and rises higher by means of this very material. + + [A] [Greek: pros tha hegoumena] literally "towards that which + leads." The exact translation is doubtful. See Gataker's note. + +2. Let no act be done without a purpose, nor otherwise than according to +the perfect principles of art. + +3. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, sea-shores, +and mountains; and thou too art wont to desire such things very much. +But this is altogether a mark of the most common sort of men, for it is +in thy power whenever thou shalt choose to retire into thyself. For +nowhere either with more quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man +retire than into his own soul, particularly when he has within him such +thoughts that by looking into them he is immediately in perfect +tranquillity; and I affirm that tranquillity is nothing else than the +good ordering of the mind. Constantly then give to thyself this retreat, +and renew thyself; and let thy principles be brief and fundamental, +which, as soon as thou shalt recur to them, will be sufficient to +cleanse the soul completely, and to send thee back free from all +discontent with the things to which thou returnest. For with what art +thou discontented? With the badness of men? Recall to thy mind this +conclusion, that rational animals exist for one another, and that to +endure is a part of justice, and that men do wrong involuntarily; and +consider how many already, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred, and +fighting, have been stretched dead, reduced to ashes; and be quiet at +last.--But perhaps thou art dissatisfied with that which is assigned to +thee out of the universe.--Recall to thy recollection this alternative; +either there is providence or atoms [fortuitous concurrence of things]; +or remember the arguments by which it has been proved that the world is +a kind of political community [and be quiet at last].--But perhaps +corporeal things will still fasten upon thee.--Consider then further +that the mind mingles not with the breath, whether moving gently or +violently, when it has once drawn itself apart and discovered its own +power, and think also of all that thou hast heard and assented to about +pain and pleasure [and be quiet at last].--But perhaps the desire of the +thing called fame will torment thee.--See how soon everything is +forgotten, and look at the chaos of infinite time on each side of [the +present], and the emptiness of applause, and the changeableness and want +of judgment in those who pretend to give praise, and the narrowness of +the space within which it is circumscribed [and be quiet at last]. For +the whole earth is a point, and how small a nook in it is this thy +dwelling, and how few are there in it, and what kind of people are they +who will praise thee. + +This then remains: Remember to retire into this little territory of thy +own,[A] and above all do not distract or strain thyself, but be free, +and look at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a +mortal. But among the things readiest to thy hand to which thou shalt +turn, let there be these, which are two. One is that things do not touch +the soul, for they are external and remain immovable; but our +perturbations come only from the opinion which is within. The other is +that all these things, which thou seest, change immediately and will no +longer be; and constantly bear in mind how many of these changes thou +hast already witnessed. The universe is transformation: life is opinion. + + [A] Tecum habita, noris quam sit tibi curta + supellex.--_Perseus_, iv. 52. + +4. If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of +which we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is +the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is +so, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens; +if this is so, we are members of some political community; if this is +so, the world is in a manner a state.[A] For of what other common +political community will any one say that the whole human race are +members? And from thence, from this common political community, comes +also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty and our +capacity for law; or whence do they come? For as my earthly part is a +portion given to me from certain earth, and that which is watery from +another element, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar +source (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also +returns to non-existence), so also the intellectual part comes from some +source. + + [A] Compare Cicero De Legibus, i. 7. + +5. Death is such as generation is, a mystery of nature; composition out +of the same elements, and a decomposition into the same; and altogether +not a thing of which any man should be ashamed, for it is not contrary +to [the nature of] a reasonable animal, and not contrary to the reason +of our constitution. + +6. It is natural that these things should be done by such persons, it is +a matter of necessity; and if a man will not have it so, he will not +allow the fig-tree to have juice. But by all means bear this in mind, +that within a very short time both thou and he will be dead; and soon +not even your names will be left behind. + +7. Take away thy opinion, and then there is taken away the complaint, "I +have been harmed." Take away the complaint, "I have been harmed," and +the harm is taken away. + +8. That which does not make a man worse than he was, also does not make +his life worse, nor does it harm him either from without or from within. + +9. The nature of that which is [universally] useful has been compelled +to do this. + +10. Consider that everything which happens, happens justly, and if thou +observest carefully, thou wilt find it to be so. I do not say only with +respect to the continuity of the series of things, but with respect to +what is just, and as if it were done by one who assigns to each thing +its value. Observe then as thou hast begun; and whatever thou doest, do +it in conjunction with this, the being good, and in the sense in which a +man is properly understood to be good. Keep to this in every action. + +11. Do not have such an opinion of things as he has who does thee wrong, +or such as he wishes thee to have, but look at them as they are in +truth. + +12. A man should always have these two rules in readiness; the one to do +only whatever the reason of the ruling and legislating faculty may +suggest for the use of men; the other, to change thy opinion, if there +is any one at hand who sets thee right and moves thee from any opinion. +But this change of opinion must proceed only from a certain persuasion, +as of what is just or of common advantage, and the like, not because it +appears pleasant or brings reputation. + +13. Hast thou reason? I have.--Why then dost not thou use it? For if +this does its own work, what else dost thou wish? + +14. Thou hast existed as a part. Thou shalt disappear in that which +produced thee; but rather thou shalt be received back into its seminal +principle by transmutation. + +15. Many grains of frankincense on the same altar: one falls before, +another falls after; but it makes no difference. + +16. Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to those to whom thou art now a +beast and an ape, if thou wilt return to thy principles and the worship +of reason. + +17. Do not act as if thou wert going to live ten thousand years. Death +hangs over thee. While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be good. + +18. How much trouble he avoids who does not look to see what his +neighbor says or does or thinks, but only to what he does himself, that +it may be just and pure; or, as Agathon+ says, look not round at the +depraved morals of others, but run straight along the line without +deviating from it. + +19. He who has a vehement desire for posthumous fame does not consider +that every one of those who remember him will himself also die very +soon; then again also they who have succeeded them, until the whole +remembrance shall have been extinguished as it is transmitted through +men who foolishly admire and perish. But suppose that those who will +remember are even immortal, and that the remembrance will be immortal, +what then is this to thee? And I say not what is it to the dead, but +what is it to the living? What is praise, except + indeed so far as it +has + a certain utility? For thou now rejectest unseasonably the gift +of nature, clinging to something else ... +. + +20. Everything which is in any way beautiful is beautiful in itself, and +terminates in itself, not having praise as part of itself. Neither worse +then nor better is a thing made by being praised. I affirm this also of +the things which are called beautiful by the vulgar, for example, +material things and works of art. That which is really beautiful has no +need of anything; not more than law, not more than truth, not more than +benevolence or modesty. Which of these things is beautiful because it +is praised, or spoiled by being blamed? Is such a thing as an emerald +made worse than it was, if it is not praised? or gold, ivory, purple, a +lyre, a little knife, a flower, a shrub? + +[Illustration: INTERIOR OF THE PARTHENON] + +21. If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them from +eternity?--But how does the earth contain the bodies of those who have +been buried from time so remote? For as here the mutation of these +bodies after a certain continuance, whatever it may be, and their +dissolution, make room for other dead bodies, so the souls which are +removed into the air after subsisting for some time are transmuted and +diffused, and assume a fiery nature by being received into the seminal +intelligence of the universe, and in this way make room for the fresh +souls which come to dwell there. And this is the answer which a man +might give on the hypothesis of souls continuing to exist. But we must +not only think of the number of bodies which are thus buried, but also +of the number of animals which are daily eaten by us and the other +animals. For what a number is consumed, and thus in a manner buried in +the bodies of those who feed on them! And nevertheless this earth +receives them by reason of the changes [of these bodies] into blood, and +the transformations into the aerial or the fiery element. + +What is the investigation into the truth in this matter? The division +into that which is material and that which is the cause of form [the +formal], (vii. 29.) + +22. Do not be whirled about, but in every movement have respect to +justice, and on the occasion of every impression maintain the faculty of +comprehension [or understanding]. + +23. Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O +Universe. Nothing for me is too early nor too late, which is in due time +for thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O Nature: +from thee are all things, in thee are all things, to thee all things +return. The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops; and wilt not thou say, Dear +city of Zeus? + +24. Occupy thyself with few things, says the philosopher, if thou +wouldst be tranquil.--But consider if it would not be better to say, Do +what is necessary, and whatever the reason of the animal which is +naturally social requires, and as it requires. For this brings not only +the tranquillity which comes from doing well, but also that which comes +from doing few things. For the greatest part of what we say and do being +unnecessary, if a man takes this away, he will have more leisure and +less uneasiness. Accordingly, on every occasion a man should ask +himself, Is this one of the unnecessary things? Now a man should take +away not only unnecessary acts, but also unnecessary thoughts, for thus +superfluous acts will not follow after. + +25. Try how the life of the good man suits thee, the life of him who is +satisfied with his portion out of the whole, and satisfied with his own +just acts and benevolent disposition. + +26. Hast thou seen those things? Look also at these. Do not disturb +thyself. Make thyself all simplicity. Does any one do wrong? It is to +himself that he does the wrong. Has anything happened to thee? Well; out +of the universe from the beginning everything which happens has been +apportioned and spun out to thee. In a word, thy life is short. Thou +must turn to profit the present by the aid of reason and justice. Be +sober in thy relaxation. + +27. Either it is a well-arranged universe[A] or a chaos huddled +together, but still a universe. But can a certain order subsist in thee, +and disorder in the All? And this too when all things are so separated +and diffused and sympathetic. + + [A] Antoninus here uses the word [Greek: kosmos] both in the + sense of the Universe and of Order; and it is difficult to + express his meaning. + +28. A black character, a womanish character, a stubborn character, +bestial, childish, animal, stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, fraudulent, +tyrannical. + +29. If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it, +no less is he a stranger who does not know what is going on in it. He is +a runaway, who flies from social reason; he is blind, who shuts the eyes +of understanding; he is poor, who has need of another, and has not from +himself all things which are useful for life. He is an abscess on the +universe who withdraws and separates himself from the reason of our +common nature through being displeased with the things which happen, for +the same nature produces this, and has produced thee too: he is a piece +rent asunder from the state, who tears, his own soul from that of +reasonable animals, which is one. + +30. The one is a philosopher without a tunic, and the other without a +book: here is another half naked: Bread I have not, he says, and I abide +by reason--and I do not get the means of living out of my learning, + +and I abide [by my reason]. + +31. Love the art, poor as it may be, which thou hast learned, and be +content with it; and pass through the rest of life like one who has +intrusted to the gods with his whole soul all that he has, making +thyself neither the tyrant nor the slave of any man. + +32. Consider, for example, the times of Vespasian. Thou wilt see all +these things, people marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying, +warring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating the ground, flattering, +obstinately arrogant, suspecting, plotting, wishing for some to die, +grumbling about the present, loving, heaping up treasure, desiring +consulship, kingly power. Well, then, that life of these people no +longer exists at all. Again, remove to the times of Trajan. Again, all +is the same. Their life too is gone. In like manner view also the other +epochs of time and of whole nations, and see how many after great +efforts soon fell and were resolved into the elements. But chiefly thou +shouldst think of those whom thou hast thyself known distracting +themselves about idle things, neglecting to do what was in accordance +with their proper constitution, and to hold firmly to this and to be +content with it. And herein it is necessary to remember that the +attention given to everything has its proper value and proportion. For +thus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, if thou appliest thyself to smaller +matters no further than is fit. + +33. The words which were formerly familiar are now antiquated: so also +the names of those who were famed of old, are now in a manner +antiquated, Camillus, Caeso, Volesus, Leonnatus, and a little after also +Scipio and Cato, then Augustus, then also Hadrianus and Antoninus. For +all things soon pass away and become a mere tale, and complete oblivion +soon buries them. And I say this of those who have shone in a wondrous +way. For the rest, as soon as they have breathed out their breath they +are gone, and no man speaks of them. And, to conclude the matter, what +is even an eternal remembrance? A mere nothing. What then is that about +which we ought to employ our serious pains? This one thing, thoughts +just, and acts social, and words which never lie, and a disposition +which gladly accepts all that happens, as necessary, as usual, as +flowing from a principle and source of the same kind. + +34. Willingly give thyself up to Clotho [one of the fates], allowing her +to spin thy thread + into whatever things she pleases. + +35. Everything is only for a day, both that which remembers and that +which is remembered. + +36. Observe constantly that all things take place by change, and +accustom thyself to consider that the nature of the universe loves +nothing so much as to change the things which are and to make new things +like them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed of that +which will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast into +the earth or into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion. + +37. Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet simple, nor free from +perturbations, nor without suspicion of being hurt by external things, +nor kindly disposed towards all; nor dost thou yet place wisdom only in +acting justly. + +38. Examine men's ruling principles, even those of the wise, what kind +of things they avoid, and what kind they pursue. + +39. What is evil to thee does not subsist in the ruling principle of +another; nor yet in any turning and mutation of thy corporeal covering. +Where is it then? It is in that part of thee in which subsists the power +of forming opinions about evils. Let this power then not form [such] +opinions, and all is well. And if that which is nearest to it, the poor +body, is cut, burnt, filled with matter and rottenness, nevertheless let +the part which forms opinions about these things be quiet; that is, let +it judge that nothing is either bad or good which can happen equally to +the bad man and the good. For that which happens equally to him who +lives contrary to nature and to him who lives according to nature, is +neither according to nature nor contrary to nature. + +40. Constantly regard the universe as one living being, having one +substance and one soul; and observe how all things have reference to one +perception, the perception of this one living being; and how all things +act with one movement; and how all things are the co-operating causes of +all things which exist; observe too the continuous spinning of the +thread and the contexture of the web. + +41. Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epictetus used to +say (i. c. 19). + +42. It is no evil for things to undergo change, and no good for things +to subsist in consequence of change. + +43. Time is like a river made up of the events which happen, and a +violent stream; for as soon as a thing has been seen, it is carried +away, and another comes in its place, and this will be carried away too. + +44. Everything which happens is as familiar and well known as the rose +in spring and the fruit in summer; for such is disease, and death, and +calumny, and treachery, and whatever else delights fools or vexes them. + +45. In the series of things, those which follow are always aptly fitted +to those which have gone before: for this series is not like a mere +enumeration of disjointed things, which has only a necessary sequence, +but it is a rational connection: and as all existing things are arranged +together harmoniously, so the things which come into existence exhibit +no mere succession, but a certain wonderful relationship (vi. 38; vii. +9; vii. 75, note). + +46. Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, that the death of earth is +to become water, and the death of water is to become air, and the death +of air is to become fire, and reversely. And think too of him who +forgets whither the way leads, and that men quarrel with that with which +they are most constantly in communion, the reason which governs the +universe; and the things which they daily meet with seem to them +strange: and consider that we ought not to act and speak as if we were +asleep, for even in sleep we seem to act and speak; and that + we ought +not, like children who learn from their parents, simply to act and speak +as we have been taught. + + +47. If any god told thee that thou shalt die to-morrow, or certainly on +the day after to-morrow, thou wouldst not care much whether it was on +the third day or on the morrow, unless thou wast in the highest degree +mean-spirited; for how small is the difference! So think it no great +thing to die after as many years as thou canst name rather than +to-morrow. + +48. Think continually how many physicians are dead after often +contracting their eyebrows over the sick; and how many astrologers after +predicting with great pretensions the deaths of others; and how many +philosophers after endless discourses on death or immortality; how many +heroes after killing thousands; and how many tyrants who have used their +power over men's lives with terrible insolence, as if they were +immortal; and how many cities are entirely dead, so to speak, Helice[A] +and Pompeii and Herculaneum, and others innumerable. Add to the +reckoning all whom thou hast known, one after another. One man after +burying another has been laid out dead, and another buries him; and all +this in a short time. To conclude, always observe how ephemeral and +worthless human things are, and what was yesterday a little mucus, +to-morrow will be a mummy or ashes. Pass then through this little space +of time conformably to nature, and end thy journey in content, as an +olive falls off when it is ripe, blessing nature who produced it, and +thanking the tree on which it grew. + + [A] Ovid, Met. xv. 293:-- + + "Si quaeras Helicen et Burin Achaidas urbes, + Invenies sub aquis." + +49. Be like the promontory against which the waves continually break, +but it stands firm and tames the fury of the water around it. + +Unhappy am I because this has happened to me? Not so, but happy am I, +though this has happened to me, because I continue free from pain, +neither crushed by the present nor fearing the future. For such a thing +as this might have happened to every man; but every man would not have +continued free from pain on such an occasion. Why then is that rather a +misfortune than this a good fortune? And dost thou in all cases call +that a man's misfortune which is not a deviation from man's nature? And +does a thing seem to thee to be a deviation from man's nature, when it +is not contrary to the will of man's nature? Well, thou knowest the will +of nature. Will then this which has happened prevent thee from being +just, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, secure against inconsiderate +opinions and falsehood; will it prevent thee from having modesty, +freedom, and everything else, by the presence of which man's nature +obtains all that is its own? Remember too on every occasion which leads +thee to vexation to apply this principle; not that this is a misfortune, +but that to bear it nobly is good fortune. + +50. It is a vulgar, but still a useful help towards contempt of death, +to pass in review those who have tenaciously stuck to life. What more +then have they gained than those who have died early? Certainly they +lie in their tombs somewhere at last, Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, +Lepidus, or any one else like them, who have carried out many to be +buried, and then were carried out themselves. Altogether the interval is +small [between birth and death]; and consider with how much trouble, and +in company with what sort of people, and in what a feeble body, this +interval is laboriously passed. Do not then consider life a thing of any +value. + For look to the immensity of time behind thee, and to the time +which is before thee, another boundless space. In this infinity then +what is the difference between him who lives three days and him who +lives three generations?[A] + + [A] An allusion to Homer's Nestor, who was living at the war of + Troy among the third generation, like old Parr with his hundred + and fifty-two years, and some others in modern times who have + beaten Parr by twenty or thirty years if it is true; and yet + they died at last. The word is [Greek: trigereniou] in + Antoninus. Nestor is named [Greek: trigeron] by some writers; + but here perhaps there is an allusion to Homer's [Greek: + Gerenios hippota Nestor]. + +51. Always run to the short way; and the short way is the natural: +accordingly say and do everything in conformity with the soundest +reason. For such a purpose frees a man from trouble,+ and warfare, and +all artifice and ostentatious display. + + + + +V. + + +In the morning when thou risest unwillingly, let this thought be +present,--I am rising to the work of a human being. Why then am I +dissatisfied if I am going to do the things for which I exist and for +which I was brought into the world? Or have I been made for this, to lie +in the bed-clothes and keep myself warm?--But this is more +pleasant.--Dost thou exist then to take thy pleasure, and not at all for +action or exertion? Dost thou not see the little plants, the little +birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees working together to put in order +their several parts of the universe? And art thou unwilling to do the +work of a human being, and dost thou not make haste to do that which, is +according to thy nature? But it is necessary to take rest also.--It is +necessary. However, Nature has fixed bounds to this too: she has fixed +bounds to eating and drinking, and yet thou goest beyond these bounds, +beyond what is sufficient; yet in thy acts it is not so, but thou +stoppest short of what thou canst do. So thou lovest not thyself, for if +thou didst, thou wouldst love thy nature and her will. But those who +love their several arts exhaust themselves in working at them unwashed +and without food; but thou valuest thy own nature less than the turner +values the turning art, or the dancer the dancing art, or the lover of +money values his money, or the vain-glorious man his little glory. And +such men, when they have a violent affection to a thing, choose neither +to eat nor to sleep rather than to perfect the things which they care +for. But are the acts which concern society more vile in thy eyes and +less worthy of thy labor? + +2. How easy it is to repel and to wipe away every impression which is +troublesome or unsuitable, and immediately to be in all tranquillity. + +3. Judge every word and deed which are according to nature to be fit for +thee; and be not diverted by the blame which follows from any people, +nor by their words, but if a thing is good to be done or said, do not +consider it unworthy of thee. For those persons have their peculiar +leading principle and follow their peculiar movement; which things do +not thou regard, but go straight on, following thy own nature and the +common nature; and the way of both is one. + +4. I go through the things which happen according to nature until I +shall fall and rest, breathing out my breath into that element out of +which I daily draw it in, and falling upon that earth out of which my +father collected the seed, and my mother the blood, and my nurse the +milk; out of which during so many years I have been supplied with food +and drink; which bears me when I tread on it and abuse it for so many +purposes. + +5. Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharpness of thy wits.--Be it so: +but there are many other things of which thou canst not say, I am not +formed from them by nature. Show those qualities then which are +altogether in thy power, sincerity, gravity, endurance of labor, +aversion to pleasure, contentment with thy portion and with few things, +benevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from trifling, +magnanimity. Dost thou not see how many qualities thou art immediately +able to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of natural incapacity and +unfitness, and yet thou still remainest voluntarily below the mark? or +art thou compelled through being defectively furnished by nature to +murmur, and to be stingy, and to flatter, and to find fault with thy +poor body, and to try to please men, and to make great display, and to +be so restless in thy mind? No, by the gods; but thou mightest have been +delivered from these things long ago. Only if in truth thou canst be +charged with being rather slow and dull of comprehension, thou must +exert thyself about this also, not neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure +in thy dullness. + +6. One man, when he has done a service to another, is ready to set it +down to his account as a favor conferred. Another is not ready to do +this, but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor, and +he knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even know what +he has done, but he is like a vine which has produced grapes, and seeks +for nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit. As a horse +when he has run, a dog when he has tackled the game, a bee when it has +made the honey, so a man when he has done a good act does not call out +for others to come and see, but he goes on to another act, as a vine +goes on to produce again the grapes in season.--Must a man then be one +of these, who in a manner act thus without observing it?--Yes.--But this +very thing is necessary, the observation of what a man is doing: for, it +may be said, it is characteristic of the social animal to perceive that +he is working in a social manner, and indeed to wish that his social +partner also should perceive it.--It is true that thou sayest, but thou +dost not rightly understand what is now said: and for this reason thou +wilt become one of those of whom I spoke before, for even they are +misled by a certain show of reason. But if thou wilt choose to +understand the meaning of what is said, do not fear that for this reason +thou wilt omit any social act. + +7. A prayer of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, down on the +ploughed fields of the Athenians and on the plains.--In truth we ought +not to pray at all, or we ought to pray in this simple and noble +fashion. + +8. Just as we must understand when it is said, That Aesculapius +prescribed to this man horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water, or +going without shoes, so we must understand it when it is said, That the +nature of the universe prescribed to this man disease, or mutilation, or +loss, or anything else of the kind. For in the first case Prescribed +means something like this: he prescribed this for this man as a thing +adapted to procure health; and in the second case it means, That which +happens[A] to [or suits] every man is fixed in a manner for him suitably +to his destiny. For this is what we mean when we say that things are +suitable to us, as the workmen say of squared stones in walls or the +pyramids, that they are suitable, when they fit them to one another in +some kind of connection. For there is altogether one fitness [harmony]. +And as the universe is made up out of all bodies to be such a body as it +is, so out of all existing causes necessity [destiny] is made up to be +such a cause as it is. And even those who are completely ignorant +understand what I mean; for they say, It [necessity, destiny] brought +this to such a person.--This then was brought and this was prescribed to +him. Let us then receive these things, as well as those which +Aesculapius prescribes. Many as a matter of course even among his +prescriptions are disagreeable, but we accept them in the hope of +health. Let the perfecting and accomplishment of the things which the +common nature judges to be good, be judged by thee to be of the same +kind as thy health. And so accept everything which happens, even if it +seem disagreeable, because it leads to this, to the health of the +universe and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus [the universe]. For +he would not have brought on any man what he has brought, if it were not +useful for the whole. Neither does the nature of anything, whatever it +may be, cause anything which is not suitable to that which is directed +by it. For two reasons then it is right to be content with that which +happens to thee; the one, because it was done for thee and prescribed +for thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, originally from the +most ancient causes spun with thy destiny; and the other, because even +that which comes severally to every man is to the power which +administers the universe a cause of felicity and perfection, nay even of +its very continuance. For the integrity of the whole is mutilated, if +thou cuttest off anything whatever from the conjunction and the +continuity either of the parts or of the causes. And thou dost cut off, +as far as it is in thy power, when thou art dissatisfied, and in a +manner triest to put anything out of the way. + + [A] In this section there is a play on the meaning of [Greek: + sumbainein]. + +[Illustration: THE CAPITOL AND TEMPLE OF JUPITER] + +9. Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dissatisfied, if thou dost not +succeed in doing everything according to right principles, but when +thou hast failed, return back again, and be content if the greater part +of what thou doest is consistent with man's nature, and love this to +which thou returnest; and do not return to philosophy as if she were a +master, but act like those who have sore eyes and apply a bit of sponge +and egg, or as another applies a plaster, or drenching with water. For +thus thou wilt not fail to + obey reason, and thou wilt repose in it. +And remember that philosophy requires only things which thy nature +requires; but thou wouldst have something else which is not according to +nature.--It may be objected, Why, what is more agreeable than this +[which I am doing]? But is not this the very reason why pleasure +deceives us? And consider if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity, +equanimity, piety, are not more agreeable. For what is more agreeable +than wisdom itself, when thou thinkest of the security and the happy +course of all things which depend on the faculty of understanding and +knowledge? + +10. Things are in such a kind of envelopment that they have seemed to +philosophers, not a few nor those common philosophers, altogether +unintelligible; nay even to the Stoics themselves they seem difficult to +understand. And all our assent is changeable; for where is the man who +never changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects themselves, and +consider how short-lived they are and worthless, and that they may be in +the possession of a filthy wretch or a whore or a robber. Then turn to +the morals of those who live with thee, and it is hardly possible to +endure even the most agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man being +hardly able to endure himself. In such darkness then and dirt, and in so +constant a flux both of substance and of time, and of motion and of +things moved, what there is worth being highly prized, or even an object +of serious pursuit, I cannot imagine. But on the contrary it is a man's +duty to comfort himself, and to wait for the natural dissolution, and +not to be vexed at the delay, but to rest in these principles only: the +one, that nothing will happen to me which is not conformable to the +nature of the universe; and the other, that it is in my power never to +act contrary to my god and daemon: for there is no man who will compel +me to this. + +11. About what am I now employing my own soul? On every occasion I must +ask myself this question, and inquire, What have I now in this part of +me which they call the ruling principle? and whose soul have I +now,--that of a child, or of a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a +tyrant, or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast? + +12. What kind of things those are which appear good to the many, we may +learn even from this. For if any man should conceive certain things as +being really good, such as prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude, he +would not after having first conceived these endure to listen to +anything+ which should not be in harmony with what is really good.+ But +if a man has first conceived as good the things which appear to the many +to be good, he will listen and readily receive as very applicable that +which was said by the comic writer. +Thus even the many perceive the +difference.+ For were it not so, this saying would not offend and would +not be rejected [in the first case], while we receive it when it is said +of wealth, and of the means which further luxury and fame, as said fitly +and wittily. Go on then and ask if we should value and think those +things to be good, to which after their first conception in the mind the +words of the comic writer might be aptly applied,--that he who has them, +through pure abundance has not a place to ease himself in. + +13. I am composed of the formal and the material; and neither of them +will perish into non-existence, as neither of them came into existence +out of non-existence. Every part of me then will be reduced by change +into some part of the universe, and that again will change into another +part of the universe, and so on forever. And by consequence of such a +change I too exist, and those who begot me, and so on forever in the +other direction. For nothing hinders us from saying so, even if the +universe is administered according to definite periods [of revolution]. + +14. Reason and the reasoning art [philosophy] are powers which are +sufficient for themselves and for their own works. They move then from a +first principle which is their own, and they make their way to the end +which is proposed to them; and this is the reason why such acts are +named Catorthoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they proceed +by the right road. + +15. None of these things ought to be called a man's, which do not belong +to a man, as man. They are not required of a man, nor does man's nature +promise them, nor are they the means of man's nature attaining its end. +Neither then does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet that which +aids to the accomplishment of this end, and that which aids toward this +end is that which is good. Besides, if any of these things did belong to +man, it would not be right for a man to despise them and to set himself +against them; nor would a man be worthy of praise who snowed that he did +not want these things, nor would he who stinted himself in any of them +be good, if indeed these things were good. But now the more of these +things a man deprives himself of, or of other things like them, or even +when he is deprived of any of them, the more patiently he endures the +loss, just in the same degree he is a better man. + +16. Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the character +of thy mind; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with a +continuous series of such thoughts as these: for instance, that where a +man can live, there he can also live well. But he must live in a palace; +well then, he can also live well in a palace. And again, consider that +for whatever purpose each thing has been constituted, for this it has +been constituted, and towards this it is carried; and its end is in that +towards which it is carried; and where the end is, there also is the +advantage and the good of each thing. Now the good for the reasonable +animal is society; for that we are made for society has been shown +above.[A] Is it not plain that the inferior exists for the sake of the +superior? But the things which have life are superior to those which +have not life, and of those which have life the superior are those which +have reason. + + [A] ii. 1. + +17. To seek what is impossible is madness: and it is impossible that the +bad should not do something of this kind. + +18. Nothing happens to any man which he is not formed by nature to bear. +The same things happen to another, and either because he does not see +that they have happened, or because he would show a great spirit, he is +firm and remains unharmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and conceit +should be stronger than wisdom. + +19. Things themselves touch not the soul, not in the least degree; nor +have they admission to the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul: but +the soul turns and moves itself alone, and whatever judgments it may +think proper to make, such it makes for itself the things which present +themselves to it. + +20. In one respect man is the nearest thing to me, so far as I must do +good to men and endure them. But so far as some men make themselves +obstacles to my proper acts, man becomes to me one of the things which +are indifferent, no less than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now it is +true that these may impede my action, but they are no impediments to my +affects and disposition, which have the power of acting conditionally +and changing: for the mind converts and changes every hindrance to its +activity into an aid; and so that which is a hindrance is made a +furtherance to an act; and that which is an obstacle on the road helps +us on this road. + +21. Reverence that which is best in the universe; and this is that which +makes use of all things and directs all things. And in like manner also +reverence that which is best in thyself; and this is of the same kind as +that. For in thyself also, that which makes use of everything else is +this, and thy life is directed by this. + +22. That which does no harm to the state, does no harm to the citizen. +In the case of every appearance of harm apply this rule: if the state +is not harmed by this, neither am I harmed. But if the state is harmed, +thou must not be angry with him who does harm to the state. Show him +where his error is. + +23. Often think of the rapidity with which things pass by and disappear, +both the things which are and the things which are produced. For +substance is like a river in a continual flow, and the activities of +things are in constant change, and the causes work in infinite +varieties; and there is hardly anything which stands still. And consider +this which is near to thee, this boundless abyss of the past and of the +future in which all things disappear. How then is he not a fool who is +puffed up with such things or plagued about them and makes himself +miserable? for they vex him only for a time, and a short time. + +24. Think of the universal substance, of which thou hast a very small +portion; and of universal time, of which a short and indivisible +interval has been assigned to thee; and of that which is fixed by +destiny, and how small a part of it thou art. + +25. Does another do me wrong? Let him look to it. He has his own +disposition, his own activity. I now have what the universal nature now +wills me to have; and I do what my nature now wills me to do. + +26. Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be undisturbed by +the movements in the flesh, whether of pleasure or of pain; and let it +not unite with them, but let it circumscribe itself and limit those +affects to their parts. But when these affects rise up to the mind by +virtue of that other sympathy that naturally exists in a body which is +all one, then thou must not strive to resist the sensation, for it is +natural: but let not the ruling part of itself add to the sensation the +opinion that it is either good or bad. + +27. Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly +shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned +to him, and that it does all that the daemon wishes, which Zeus hath +given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And +this is every man's understanding and reason. + +28. Art thou angry with him whose armpits stink? art thou angry with him +whose mouth smells foul? What good will this anger do thee? He has such +a mouth, he has such armpits: it is necessary that such an emanation +must come from such things: but the man has reason, it will be said, and +he is able, if he takes pains, to discover wherein he offends; I wish +thee well of thy discovery. Well then, and thou hast reason: by thy +rational faculty stir up his rational faculty; show him his error, +admonish him. For if he listens, thou wilt cure him, and there is no +need of anger. [+ Neither tragic actor nor whore. +][A] + + [A] This is imperfect or corrupt, or both. There is also + something wrong or incomplete in the beginning of S. 29, where + he says [Greek: hos exelthon zen dianoe], which Gataker + translates "as if thou wast about to quit life;" but we cannot + translate [Greek: exelthon] in that way. Other translations are + not much more satisfactory. I have translated it literally and + left it imperfect. + +29. As thou intendest to live when them art gone out, ... so it is in +thy power to live here. But if men do not permit thee, then get away out +of life, yet so as if thou wert suffering no harm. The house is smoky, +and I quit it.[A] Why dost thou think that this is any trouble? But so +long as nothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, am free, and no man +shall hinder me from doing what I choose; and I choose to do what is +according to the nature of the rational and social animal. + + [A] Epictetus, i. 25, 18. + +30. The intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly it has made +the inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the +superior to one another. Thou seest how it has subordinated, +co-ordinated, and assigned to everything its proper portion, and has +brought together into concord with one another the things which are the +best. + +31. How hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods, thy parents, brethren, +children, teachers, to those who looked after thy infancy, to thy +friends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast hitherto behaved +to all in such a way that this may be said of thee,-- + + "Never has wronged a man in deed or word." + +And call to recollection both how many things thou hast passed through, +and how many things thou hast been able to endure, and that the history +of thy life is now complete and thy service is ended; and how many +beautiful things thou hast seen; and how many pleasures and pains thou +hast despised; and how many things called honorable thou hast spurned; +and to how many ill-minded folks thou hast shown a kind disposition. + +32. Why do unskilled and ignorant souls disturb him who has skill and +knowledge? What soul then has skill and knowledge? That which knows +beginning and end, and knows the reason which pervades all substance, +and though all time by fixed periods [revolutions] administers the +universe. + +33. Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a skeleton, and either a +name or not even a name; but name is sound and echo. And the things +which are much valued in life are empty and rotten and trifling, and +[like] little dogs biting one another, and little children quarreling, +laughing, and then straightway weeping. But fidelity and modesty and +justice and truth are fled + + Up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth. + HESIOD, _Works, etc_. v. 197. + +What then is there which still detains thee here, if the objects of +sense are easily changed and never stand still, and the organs of +perception are dull and easily receive false impressions, and the poor +soul itself is an exhalation from blood? But to have good repute amid +such a world as this is an empty thing. Why then dost thou not wait in +tranquillity for thy end, whether it is extinction or removal to another +state? And until that time comes, what is sufficient? Why, what else +than to venerate the gods and bless them, and to do good to men, and to +practise tolerance and self-restraint;[A] but as to everything which is +beyond the limits of the poor flesh and breath, to remember that this is +neither thine nor in thy power. + + [A] This is the Stoic precept [Greek: anechou kai apechou]. The + first part teaches us to be content with men and things as they + are. The second part teaches us the virtue of self-restraint, + or the government of our passions. + +34. Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow of happiness, if thou +canst go by the right way, and think and act in the right way. These two +things are common both to the soul of God and to the soul of man, and to +the soul of every rational being: not to be hindered by another; and to +hold good to consist in the disposition to justice and the practice of +it, and in this to let thy desire find its termination. + +35. If this is neither my own badness, nor an effect of my own badness, +and the common weal is not injured, why am I troubled about it, and what +is the harm to the common weal? + +36. Do not be carried along inconsiderately by the appearance of +things, but give help [to all] according to thy ability and their +fitness; and if they should have sustained loss in matters which are +indifferent, do not imagine this to be a damage; for it is a bad habit. +But as the old man, when he went away, asked back his foster-child's +top, remembering that it was a top, so do thou in this case also. + +When thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast thou forgotten, man, what +these things are?--Yes; but they are objects of great concern to these +people--wilt thou too then be made a fool for these things? I was once a +fortunate man, but I lost it, I know not how.--But fortunate means that +a man has assigned to himself a good fortune: and a good fortune is good +disposition of the soul, good emotions, good actions.[A] + + [A] This section is unintelligible. Many of the words may be + corrupt, and the general purport of the section cannot be + discovered. Perhaps several things have been improperly joined + in one section. I have translated it nearly literally. + Different translators give the section a different turn, and + the critics have tried to mend what they cannot understand. + + + + +VI. + + +The substance of the universe is obedient and compliant; and the reason +which governs it has in itself no cause for doing evil, for it has no +malice, nor does it do evil to anything, nor is anything harmed by it. +But all things are made and perfected according to this reason. + +2. Let it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold or warm, if +thou art doing thy duty; and whether thou art drowsy or satisfied with +sleep; and whether ill-spoken of or praised; and whether dying or doing +something else. For it is one of the acts of life, this act by which we +die; it is sufficient then in this act also to do well what we have in +hand (vi. 22, 28). + +3. Look within. Let neither the peculiar quality of anything nor its +value escape thee. + +4. All existing things soon change, and they will either be reduced to +vapor, if indeed all substance is one, or they will be dispersed. + +5. The reason which governs knows what its own disposition is, and what +it does, and on what material it works. + +6. The best way of avenging thyself is not to become like [the +wrong-doer]. + +7. Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in passing from one social +act to another social act, thinking of God. + +8. The ruling principle is that which rouses and turns itself, and while +it makes itself such as it is and such as it wills to be, it also makes +everything which happens appear to itself to be such as it wills. + +9. In conformity to the nature of the universe every single thing is +accomplished; for certainly it is not in conformity to any other nature +that each thing is accomplished, either a nature which externally +comprehends this, or a nature which is comprehended within this nature, +or a nature external and independent of this (xi. 1; vi. 40; viii. 50). + +10. The universe is either a confusion, and a mutual involution of +things, and a dispersion, or it is unity and order and providence. If +then it is the former, why do I desire to tarry in a fortuitous +combination of things and such a disorder? and why do I care about +anything else than how I shall at last become earth? and why am I +disturbed, for the dispersion of my elements will happen whatever I do? +But if the other supposition is true, I venerate, and I am firm, and I +trust in him who governs (iv. 27). + +11. When thou hast been compelled by circumstances to be disturbed in a +manner, quickly return to thyself, and do not continue out of tune +longer than the compulsion lasts; for thou wilt have more mastery over +the harmony by continually recurring to it. + +12. If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother at the same time, thou +wouldst be dutiful to thy step-mother, but still thou wouldst constantly +return to thy mother. Let the court and philosophy now be to thee +step-mother and mother: return to philosophy frequently and repose in +her, through whom what thou meetest with in the court appears to thee +tolerable, and thou appearest tolerable in the court. + +13. When we have meat before us and such eatables, we receive the +impression that this is the dead body of a fish, and this the dead body +of a bird or of a pig; and again, that this Falernian is only a little +grape-juice, and this purple robe some sheep's wool dyed with the blood +of a shell-fish: such then are these impressions, and they reach the +things themselves and penetrate them, and so we see what kind of things +they are. Just in the same way ought we to act all through life, and +where there are things which appear most worthy of our approbation, we +ought to lay them bare and look at their worthlessness and strip them of +all the words by which they are exalted. For outward show is a wonderful +perverter of the reason, and when thou art most sure that thou art +employed about things worth thy pains, it is then that it cheats thee +most. Consider then what Crates says of Xenocrates himself. + +14. Most of the things which the multitude admire are referred to +objects of the most general kind, those which are held together by +cohesion or natural organization, such as stones, wood, fig-trees, +vines, olives. But those which are admired by men, who are a little more +reasonable, are referred to the things which are held together by a +living principle, as flocks, herds. Those which are admired by men who +are still more instructed are the things which are held together by a +rational soul, not however a universal soul, but rational so far as it +is a soul skilled in some art, or expert in some other way, or simply +rational so far as it possesses a number of slaves. But he who values a +rational soul, a soul universal and fitted for political life, regards +nothing else except this; and above all things he keeps his soul in a +condition and in an activity conformable to reason and social life, and +he co-operates to this end with those who are of the same kind as +himself. + +15. Some things are hurrying into existence, and others are hurrying out +of it; and of that which is coming into existence part is already +extinguished. Motions and changes are continually renewing the world, +just as the uninterrupted course of time is always renewing the infinite +duration of ages. In this flowing stream then, on which there is no +abiding, what is there of the things which hurry by on which a man would +set a high price? It would be just as if a man should fall in love with +one of the sparrows which fly by, but it has already passed out of +sight. Something of this kind is the very life of every man, like the +exhalation of the blood and the respiration of the air. For such as it +is to have once drawn in the air and to have given it back, which we do +every moment, just the same is it with the whole respiratory power, +which thou didst receive at thy birth yesterday and the day before, to +give it back to the element from which thou didst first draw it. + +16. Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a thing to be valued, nor +respiration, as in domesticated animals and wild beasts, nor the +receiving of impressions by the appearances of things, nor being moved +by desires as puppets by strings, nor assembling in herds, nor being +nourished by food; for this is just like the act of separating and +parting with the useless part of our food. What then is worth being +valued? To be received with clapping of hands? No. Neither must we value +the clapping of tongues; for the praise which comes from the many is a +clapping of tongues. Suppose then that thou hast given up this worthless +thing called fame, what remains that is worth valuing? This, in my +opinion: to move thyself and to restrain thyself in conformity to thy +proper constitution, to which end both all employments and arts lead. +For every art aims at this, that the thing which has been made should be +adapted to the work for which it has been made; and both the +vine-planter who looks after the vine, and the horse-breaker, and he who +trains the dog, seek this end. But the education and the teaching of +youth aim at something. In this then is the value of the education and +the teaching. And if this is well, thou wilt not seek anything else. +Wilt thou not cease to value many other things too? Then thou wilt be +neither free, nor sufficient for thy own happiness, nor without passion. +For of necessity thou must be envious, jealous, and suspicious of those +who can take away those things, and plot against those who have that +which is valued by thee. Of necessity a man must be altogether in a +state of perturbation who wants any of these things; and besides, he +must often find fault with the gods. But to reverence and honor thy own +mind will make thee content with thyself, and in harmony with society, +and in agreement with the gods, that is, praising all that they give and +have ordered. + +17. Above, below, all around are the movements of the elements. But the +motion of virtue is in none of these: it is something more divine, and +advancing by a way hardly observed, it goes happily on its road. + +18. How strangely men act! They will not praise those who are living at +the same time and living with themselves; but to be themselves praised +by posterity, by those whom they have never seen nor ever will see, this +they set much value on. But this is very much the same as if thou +shouldst be grieved because those who have lived before thee did not +praise thee. + +19. If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by thyself, do not think +that it is impossible for man: but if anything is possible for man and +conformable to his nature, think that this can be attained by thyself +too. + +20. In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a man has torn thee with his +nails, and by dashing against thy head has inflicted a wound. Well, we +neither show any signs of vexation, nor are we offended, nor do we +suspect him afterwards as a treacherous fellow; and yet we are on our +guard against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet with suspicion, but +we quietly get out of his way. Something like this let thy behavior be +in all the other parts of life; let us overlook many things in those who +are like antagonists in the gymnasium. For it is in our power, as I +said, to get out of the way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred. + +21. If any man is able to convince me and show me that I do not think or +act right, I will gladly change; for I seek the truth, by which no man +was ever injured. But he is injured who abides in his error and +ignorance. + +22. I do my duty: other things trouble me not; for they are either +things without life, or things without reason, or things that have +rambled and know not the way. + +23. As to the animals which have no reason, and generally all things +and objects, do thou, since thou hast reason and they have none, make +use of them with a generous and liberal spirit. But towards human +beings, as they have reason, behave in a social spirit. And on all +occasions call on the gods, and do not perplex thyself about the length +of time in which thou shalt do this; for even three hours so spent are +sufficient. + +24. Alexander the Macedonian and his groom by death were brought to the +same state; for either they were received among the same seminal +principles of the universe, or they were alike dispersed among the +atoms. + +25. Consider how many things in the same indivisible time take place in +each of us,--things which concern the body and things which concern the +soul: and so thou wilt not wonder if many more things, or rather all +things which come into existence in that which is the one and all, which +we call Cosmos, exist in it at the same time. + +26. If any man should propose to thee the question, how the name +Antoninus is written, wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter +each letter? What then if they grow angry, wilt thou be angry too? Wilt +thou not go on with composure and number every letter? Just so then in +this life also remember that every duty is made up of certain parts. +These it is thy duty to observe, and without being disturbed or showing +anger towards those who are angry with thee, to go on thy way and +finish that which is set before thee. + +27. How cruel it is not to allow men to strive After the things which +appear to them to be suitable to their nature and profitable! And yet in +a manner thou dost not allow them to do this, when thou art vexed +because they do wrong. For they are certainly moved towards things +because they suppose them to be suitable to their nature and profitable +to them. But it is not so. Teach them then, and show them without being +angry. + +28. Death is a cessation of the impressions through the senses, and of +the pulling of the strings which move the appetites, and of the +discursive movements of the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh +(ii. 12). + +29. It is a shame for the soul to be first to give way in this life, +when thy body does not give way. + +30. Take care that thou art not made into a Caesar, that thou art not +dyed with this dye; for such things happen. Keep thyself then simple, +good, pure, serious, free from affectation, a friend of justice, a +worshipper of the gods, kind, affectionate, strenuous in all proper +acts. Strive to continue to be such as philosophy wished to make thee. +Reverence the gods, and help men. Short is life. There is only one fruit +of this terrene life--a pious disposition and social acts. Do everything +as a disciple of Antoninus. Remember his constancy in every act which +was conformable to reason, and his evenness in all things, and his +piety, and the serenity of his countenance, and his sweetness, and his +disregard of empty fame, and his efforts to understand things; and how +he would never let anything pass without having first most carefully +examined it and clearly understood it; and how he bore with those who +blamed him unjustly without blaming them in return; how he did nothing +in a hurry; and how he listened not to calumnies, and how exact an +examiner of manners and actions he was; and not given to reproach +people, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor a sophist; and with how little he +was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, dress, food, servants; and how +laborious and patient; and how he was able on account of his sparing +diet to hold out to the evening, not even requiring to relieve himself +by any evacuations except at the usual hour; and his firmness and +uniformity in his friendships; and how he tolerated freedom of speech in +those who opposed his opinions; and the pleasure that he had when any +man showed him anything better; and how religious he was without +superstition. Imitate all this, that thou mayest have as good a +conscience, when thy last hour comes, as he had (i. 16). + +31. Return to thy sober senses and call thyself back; and when thou hast +roused thyself from sleep and hast perceived that they were only dreams +which troubled thee, now in thy waking hours look at these [the things +about thee] as thou didst look at those [the dreams]. + +32. I consist of a little body and a soul. Now to this little body all +things are indifferent, for it is not able to perceive differences. But +to the understanding those things only are indifferent which are not the +works of its own activity. But whatever things are the works of its own +activity, all these are in its power. And of these however only those +which are done with reference to the present; for as to the future and +the past activities of the mind, even these are for the present +indifferent. + +33. Neither the labor which the hand does nor that of the foot is +contrary to nature, so long as the foot does the foot's work and the +hand the hand's. So then neither to a man as a man is his labor contrary +to nature, so long as it does the things of a man. But if the labor is +not contrary to his nature, neither is it an evil to him. + +34. How many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers, patricides, +tyrants. + +35. Dost thou not see how the handicrafts-men accommodate themselves up +to a certain point to those who are not skilled in their +craft--nevertheless they cling to the reason [the principles] of their +art, and do not endure to depart from it? Is it not strange if the +architect and the physician shall have more respect to the reason [the +principles] of their own arts than man to his own reason, which is +common to him and the gods? + +36. Asia, Europe, are corners of the universe; all the sea a drop in the +universe; Athos a little clod of the universe: all the present time is a +point in eternity. All things are little, changeable, perishable. All +things come from thence, from that universal ruling power, either +directly proceeding or by way of sequence. And accordingly the lion's +gaping jaws, and that which is poisonous, and every harmful thing, as a +thorn, as mud, are after-products of the grand and beautiful. Do not +then imagine that they are of another kind from that which thou dost +venerate, but form a just opinion of the source of all (vii. 75). + +37. He who has seen present things has seen all, both everything which +has taken place from all eternity and everything which will be for time +without end; for all things are of one kin and of one form. + +38. Frequently consider the connection of all things in the universe and +their relation to one another. For in a manner all things are implicated +with one another, and all in this way are friendly to one another; for +one thing comes in order after another, and this is by virtue of the + +active movement and mutual conspiration and the unity of the substance +(ix. 1). + +39. Adapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has been cast: and +the men among whom thou hast received thy portion, love them, but do it +truly [sincerely]. + +40. Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which it has +been made, is well, and yet he who made it is not there. But in the +things which are held together by nature there is within, and there +abides in them the power which made them; wherefore the more is it fit +to reverence this power, and to think, that, if thou dost live and act +according to its will, everything in thee is in conformity to +intelligence. And thus also in the universe the things which belong to +it are in conformity to intelligence. + +41. Whatever of the things which are not within thy power thou shalt +suppose to be good for thee or evil, it must of necessity be that, if +such a bad thing befall thee, or the loss of such a good thing, thou +wilt not blame the gods, and hate men too, those who are the cause of +the misfortune or the loss, or those who are suspected of being likely +to be the cause; and indeed we do much injustice because we make a +difference between these things [because we do not regard these things +as indifferent+].[A] But if we judge only those things which are in our +power to be good or bad, there remains no reason either for finding +fault with God or standing in a hostile attitude to man.[B] + + [A] Gataker translates this "because we strive to get these + things," comparing the use of [Greek: diapheresthai] in v. I, and x. + 27, and ix. 38, where it appears that his reference should be + xi. 10. He may be right in his interpretation, but I doubt. + + [B] Cicero, De Natura Deorum. iii. 32. + +42. We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and +design, and others without knowing what they do; as men also when they +are asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, I think, who says that they are +laborers and co-operators in the things which take place in the +universe. But men co-operate after different fashions: and even those +co-operate abundantly, who find fault with what happens and those who +try to oppose it and to hinder it; for the universe had need even of +such men as these. It remains then for thee to understand among what +kind of workmen thou placest thyself; for he who rules all things will +certainly make a right use of thee, and he will receive thee among some +part of the co-operators and of those whose labors conduce to one end. +But be not thou such a part as the mean and ridiculous verse in the +play, which Chrysippus speaks of.[A] + + [A] Plutarch, adversus Stoicos, c. 14. + +43. Does the sun undertake to do the work of the rain, or Aesculapius +the work of the Fruit-bearer [the earth]? And how is it with respect to +each of the stars--are they not different and yet they work together to +the same end? + +44. If the gods have determined about me and about the things which must +happen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even to +imagine a deity without forethought; and as to doing me harm, why +should they have any desire towards that? for what advantage would +result to them from this or to the whole, which is the special object of +their providence? But if they have not determined about me individually, +they have certainly determined about the whole at least, and the things +which happen by way of sequence in this general arrangement I ought to +accept with pleasure and to be content with them. But if they determine +about nothing,--which it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, +let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them, nor do anything +else which we do as if the gods were present and lived with us,--but if +however the gods determine about none of the things which concern us, I +am able to determine about myself, and I can inquire about that which is +useful; and that is useful to every man which is conformable to his own +constitution and nature. But my nature is rational and social; and my +city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am +a man, it is the world. The things then which are useful to these cities +are alone useful to me. + +45. Whatever happens to every man, this is for the interest of the +universal: this might be sufficient. But further thou wilt observe this +also as a general truth, if thou dost observe, that whatever is +profitable to any man is profitable also to other men. But let the word +profitable be taken here in the common sense as said of things of the +middle kind [neither good nor bad]. + +46. As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre and such places, that the +continual sight of the same things, and the uniformity, make the +spectacle wearisome, so it is in the whole of life; for all things +above, below, are the same and from the same. How long then? + +47. Think continually that all kinds of men and all kinds of pursuits +and of all nations are dead, so that thy thoughts come down even to +Philistion and Phoebus and Origanion. Now turn thy thoughts to the other +kinds [of men]. To that place then we must remove, where there are so +many great orators, and so many noble philosophers, Heraclitus, +Pythagoras, Socrates; so many heroes of former days, and so many +generals after them, and tyrants; besides these, Eudoxus, Hipparchus, +Archimedes, and other men of acute natural talents, great minds, lovers +of labor, versatile, confident, mockers even of the perishable and +ephemeral life of man, as Menippus and such as are like him. As to all +these consider that they have long been in the dust. What harm then is +this to them; and what to those whose names are altogether unknown? One +thing here is worth a great deal, to pass thy life in truth and justice, +with a benevolent disposition even to liars and unjust men. + +48. When thou wishest to delight thyself, think of the virtues of those +who live with thee; for instance, the activity of one, and the modesty +of another, and the liberality of a third, and some other good quality +of a fourth. For nothing delights so much as the examples of the +virtues, when they are exhibited in the morals of those who live with us +and present themselves in abundance, as far as is possible. Wherefore we +must keep them before us. + +49. Thou art not dissatisfied. I suppose, because thou weighest only so +many litrae and not three hundred. Be not dissatisfied then that thou +must live only so many years and not more; for as thou art satisfied +with the amount of substance which has been assigned to thee, so be +content with the time. + +50. Let us try to persuade them [men]. But act even against their will, +when the principles of justice lead that way. If however any man by +using force stands in thy way, betake thyself to contentment and +tranquillity, and at the same time employ the hindrance towards the +exercise of some other virtue; and remember that thy attempt was with a +reservation [conditionally], that thou didst not desire to do +impossibilities. What then didst thou desire?--Some such effort as +this.--But thou attainest thy object, if the things to which thou wast +moved are [not] accomplished. + + +51. He who loves fame considers another man's activity to be his own +good; and he who loves pleasure, his own sensations; but he who has +understanding considers his own acts to be his own good. + +52. It is in our power to have no opinion about a thing, and not to be +disturbed in our soul; for things themselves have no natural power to +form our judgments. + +53. Accustom thyself to attend carefully to what is said by another, and +as much as it is possible, be in the speaker's mind. + +54. That which is not good for the swarm, neither is it good for the +bee. + +55. If sailors abused the helmsman, or the sick the doctor, would they +listen to anybody else? or how could the helmsman secure the safety of +those in the ship, or the doctor the health of those whom he attends? + +56. How many together with whom I came into the world are already gone +out of it. + +57. To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and to those bitten by mad +dogs water causes fear; and to little children the ball is a fine thing. +Why then am I angry? Dost thou think that a false opinion has less power +than the bile in the jaundiced or the poison in him who is bitten by a +mad dog? + +58. No man will hinder thee from living according to the reason of thy +own nature: nothing will happen to thee contrary to the reason of the +universal nature. + +59. What kind of people are those whom men wish to please, and for what +objects, and by what kind of acts? How soon will time cover all things, +and how many it has covered already. + + + + +VII. + + +What is badness? It is that which thou hast often seen. And on the +occasion of everything which happens keep this in mind, that it is that +which thou hast often seen. Everywhere up and down thou wilt find the +same things, with which the old histories are filled, those of the +middle ages and those of our own day; with which cities and houses are +filled now. There is nothing new: all things are both familiar and +short-lived. + +2. How can our principles become dead, unless the impressions [thoughts] +which correspond to them are extinguished? But it is in thy power +continuously to fan these thoughts into a flame. I can have that opinion +about anything which I ought to have. If I can, why am I disturbed? The +things which are external to my mind have no relation at all to my +mind.--Let this be the state of thy affects, and thou standest erect. To +recover thy life is in thy power. Look at things again as thou didst use +to look at them; for in this consists the recovery of thy life. + +3. The idle business of show, plays on the stage, flocks of sheep, +herds, exercises with spears, a bone cast to little dogs, a bit of bread +into fishponds, laborings of ants and burden-carrying, runnings about +of frightened little mice, puppets pulled by strings--[all alike]. It is +thy duty then in the midst of such things to show good humor and not a +proud air; to understand however that every man is worth just so much as +the things are worth about which he busies himself. + +4. In discourse thou must attend to what is said, and in every movement +thou must observe what is doing. And in the one thou shouldst see +immediately to what end it refers, but in the other watch carefully what +is the thing signified. + +5. Is my understanding sufficient for this or not? If it is sufficient, +I use it for the work as an instrument given by the universal nature. +But if it is not sufficient, then either I retire from the work and give +way to him who is able to do it better, unless there be some reason why +I ought not to do so; or I do it as well as I can, taking to help me the +man who with the aid of my ruling principle can do what is now fit and +useful for the general good. For what-soever either by myself or with +another I can do, ought to be directed to this only, to that which is +useful and well suited to society. + +6. How many after being celebrated by fame have been given up to +oblivion; and how many who have celebrated the fame of others have long +been dead. + +7. Be not ashamed to be helped; for it is thy business to do thy duty +like a soldier in the assault on a town. How then, if being lame thou +canst not mount up on the battlements alone, but with the help of +another it is possible? + +8. Let not future things disturb thee, for thou wilt come to them, if it +shall be necessary, having with thee the same reason which now thou +usest for present things. + +9. All things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy; and +there is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing. For things +have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form the same universe +[order]. For there is one universe made up of all things, and one god +who pervades all things, and one substance,[A] and one law, [one] common +reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth; if indeed there is +also one perfection for all animals which are of the same stock and +participate in the reason. + + [A] "One substance," p. 42, note 1. + +10. Everything material soon disappears in the substance of the whole; +and everything formal [causal] is very soon taken back into the +universal reason; and the memory of everything is very soon overwhelmed +in time. + +11. To the rational animal the same act is according to nature and +according to reason. + +12. Be thou erect, or be made erect (iii. 5). + +13. Just as it is with the members in those bodies which are united in +one, so it is with rational beings which exist separate, for they have +been constituted for one co-operation. And the perception of this will +be more apparent to thee if thou often sayest to thyself that I am a +member [Greek: melos] of the system of rational beings. But if [using +the letter _r_] thou sayest that thou art a part [Greek: meros], thou +dost not yet love men from thy heart; beneficence does not yet delight +thee for its own sake;[A] thou still doest it barely as a thing of +propriety, and not yet as doing good to thyself. + + [A] I have used Gataker's conjecture [Greek: katalektikos] + instead of the common reading [Greek: kataleptikos]: compare + iv. 20; ix. 42. + +14. Let there fall externally what will on the parts which can feel the +effects of this fall. For those parts which have felt will complain, if +they choose. But I, unless I think that what has happened is an evil, am +not injured. And it is in my power not to think so. + +15. Whatever any one does or says, I must be good; just as if the gold, +or the emerald, or the purple, were always saying this. Whatever any one +does or says, I must be emerald and keep my color. + +16. The ruling faculty does not disturb itself; I mean, does not +frighten itself or cause itself pain.+ But if any one else can frighten +or pain it, let him do so. For the faculty itself will not by its own +opinion turn itself into such ways. Let the body itself take care, if it +can, that it suffer nothing, and let it speak, if it suffers. But the +soul itself, that which is subject to fear, to pain, which has +completely the power of forming an opinion about these things, will +suffer nothing, for it will never deviate+ into such a judgment. The +leading principle in itself wants nothing, unless it makes a want for +itself; and therefore it is both free from perturbation and unimpeded, +if it does not disturb and impede itself. + +17. Eudaemonia [happiness] is a good daemon, or a good thing. What then +art thou doing here, O imagination? Go away, I entreat thee by the gods, +as thou didst come, for I want thee not. But thou art come according to +thy old fashion. I am not angry with thee: only go away. + +18. Is any man afraid of change? Why, what can take place without +change? What then is more pleasing or more suitable to the universal +nature? And canst thou take a bath unless the wood undergoes a change? +and canst thou be nourished, unless the food undergoes a change? And can +anything else that is useful be accomplished without change? Dost thou +not see then that for thyself also to change is just the same, and +equally necessary for the universal nature? + +19. Through the universal substance as through a furious torrent all +bodies are carried, being by their nature united with and co-operating +with the whole, as the parts of our body with one another. How many a +Chrysippus, how many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus has time already +swallowed up! And let the same thought occur to thee with reference to +every man and thing (v. 23; vi. 15). + +20. One thing only troubles me, lest I should do something which the +constitution of man does not allow, or in the way which it does not +allow, or what it does not allow now. + +21. Near is thy forgetfulness of all things; and near the forgetfulness +of thee by all. + +22. It is peculiar to man to love even those who do wrong. And this +happens, if when they do wrong it occurs to thee that they are kinsmen, +and that they do wrong through ignorance and unintentionally, and that +soon both of you will die; and above all, that the wrong-doer has done +thee no harm, for he has not made thy ruling faculty worse than it was +before. + +23. The universal nature out of the universal substance, as if it were +wax, now moulds a horse, and when it has broken this up, it uses the +material for a tree, then for a man, then for something else; and each +of these things subsists for a very short time. But it is no hardship +for the vessel to be broken up, just as there was none in its being +fastened together (viii. 50). + +24. A scowling look is altogether unnatural; when it is often +assumed,[A] the result is that all comeliness dies away, and at last is +so completely extinguished that it cannot be again lighted up at +all. Try to conclude from this very fact that it is contrary to reason. +For if even the perception of doing wrong shall depart, what reason is +there for living any longer? + + [A] This is corrupt. + +25. Nature which governs the whole will soon change all things thou +seest, and out of their substance will make other things, and again +other things from the substance of them, in order that the world may be +ever new (xii. 23). + +26. When a man has done thee any wrong, immediately consider with what +opinion about good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen +this, thou wilt pity him, and wilt neither wonder nor be angry. For +either thou thyself thinkest the same thing to be good that he does, or +another thing of the same kind. It is thy duty then to pardon him. But +if thou dost not think such things to be good or evil, thou wilt more +readily be well disposed to him who is in error. + +27. Think not so much of what thou hast not as of what thou hast: but of +the things which thou hast select the best, and then reflect how eagerly +they would have been sought, if thou hadst them not. At the same time, +however, take care that thou dost not through being so pleased with them +accustom thyself to overvalue them, so as to be disturbed if ever thou +shouldst not have them. + +28. Retire into thyself. The rational principle which rules has this +nature, that it is content with itself when it does what is just, and so +secures tranquillity. + +29. Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pulling of the strings. Confine +thyself to the present. Understand well what happens either to thee or +to another. Divide and distribute every object into the causal [formal] +and the material. Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is done by +a man stay there where the wrong was done (viii. 29). + +30. Direct thy attention to what is said. Let thy understanding enter +into the things that are doing and the things which do them (vii. 4). + +31. Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty, and with indifference +towards the things which lie between virtue and vice. Love mankind. +Follow God. The poet says that law rules all--+ And it is enough to +remember that law rules all.+[A] + + [A] The end of this section is unintelligible. + +32. About death: whether it is a dispersion, or a resolution into atoms, +or annihilation, it is either extinction or change. + +33. About pain: the pain which is intolerable carries us off; but that +which lasts a long time is tolerable; and the mind maintains its own +tranquillity by retiring into itself, and the ruling faculty is not made +worse. But the parts which are harmed by pain, let them, if they can, +give their opinion about it. + +34. About fame: look at the minds [of those who seek fame], observe what +they are, and what kind of things they avoid, and what kind of things +they pursue. And consider that as the heaps of sand piled on one another +hide the former sands; so in life the events which go before are soon +covered by those which come after. + +35. From Plato:[A] The man who has an elevated mind and takes a view of +all time and of all substance, dost thou suppose it possible for him to +think that human life is anything great? It is not possible, he +said.--Such a man then will think that death also is no evil.--Certainly +not. + +36. From Antisthenes: It is royal to do good and to be abused. + +37. It is a base thing for the countenance to be obedient and to +regulate and compose itself as the mind commands, and for the mind not +to be regulated and composed by itself. + +38. It is not right to vex ourselves at things, For they care nought +about it.[B] + +39. To the immortal gods and us give joy. + +40. Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn. + One man is born; another dies.[C] + + [A] Plato, Pol. vi. 486. + + [B] From the Bellerophon of Euripides. + + [C] From the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Cicero (Tuscul. iii. 25) + has translated six lines from Euripides, and among them are + these two lines,-- + + "Reddenda terrae est terra: tum vita omnibus + Metenda ut fruges: Sic jubet necessitas." + +41. If gods care not for me and my children, + There is a reason for it. + +42. For the good is with me, and the just.[A] + +43. No joining others in their wailing, + no violent emotion. + +44. From Plato:[B] But I would make this man a sufficient answer, which +is this: Thou sayest not well, if thou thinkest that a man who is good +for anything at all ought to compute the hazard of life or death, and +should not rather look to this only in all that he does, whether he is +doing what is just or unjust, and the works of a good or bad man. + +45. [C]For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth: wherever a man has +placed himself thinking it the best place for him, or has been placed by +a commander, there in my opinion he ought to stay and to abide the +hazard, taking nothing into the reckoning, either death or anything +else, before the baseness [of deserting his post]. + +[A] See Aristophanes, Acharnenses, v. 661. + +[B] From the Apologia, c. 16. + +[C] From the Apologia, c. 16. + +46. But, my good friend, reflect whether that which is noble and good is +not something different from saving and being saved; for+ as to a man +living such or such a time, at least one who is really a man, consider +if this is not---a thing to be dismissed from the thoughts:+ and there +must be no love of life: but as to these matters a man must intrust them +to the Deity and believe what the women say, that no man can escape his +destiny, the next inquiry being how he may best live the time that he +has to live.[A] + +47. Look round at the courses of the stars, as if thou wert going along +with them; and constantly consider the changes of the elements into one +another, for such thoughts purge away the filth of the terrene life. + +48. This is a fine saying of Plato:[B] That he who is discoursing about +men should look also at earthly things as if he viewed them from some +higher place; should look at them in their assemblies, armies, +agricultural labors, marriages, treaties, births, deaths, noise of the +courts of justice, desert places, various nations of barbarians, feasts, +lamentations, markets, a mixture of all things and an orderly +combination of contraries. + + [A] Plato, Gorgias, c. 68 (512). In this passage the text of + Antoninus has [Greek: eateon], which is perhaps right; but + there is a difficulty in the words [Greek: me gar touto men, + to zen hoposonde chronon tonge hos alethos andra eateon esti, kai + ou] &C. The conjecture [Greek: eukteon] for [Greek: eateon] + does not mend the matter. + + [B] It is said that this is not in the extant writings of + Plato. + +49. Consider the past,--such great changes of political supremacies; +thou mayest foresee also the things which will be. For they will +certainly be of like form, and it is not possible that they should +deviate from the order of the things which take place now; accordingly +to have contemplated human life for forty years is the same as to have +contemplated it for ten thousand years. For what more wilt thou see? + +50. That which has grown from the earth to the earth, + But that which has sprung from heavenly seed, + Back to the heavenly realms returns.[A] + +This is either a dissolution of the mutual involution of the atoms, or a +similar dispersion of the unsentient elements. + +51. With food and drinks and cunning magic arts + Turning the channel's course to 'scape from death.[B] + The breeze which heaven has sent + We must endure, and toil without complaining. + + [A] From the Chrysippus of Euripides. + + [B] The first two lines are from the Supplices of Euripides, v. + 1110. + +52. Another may be more expert in casting his opponent; but he is not +more social, nor more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all that +happens, nor more considerate with respect to the faults of his +neighbors. + +53. Where any work can be done conformably to the reason which is common +to gods and men, there we have nothing to fear; for where we are able +to get profit by means of the activity which is successful and proceeds +according to our constitution, there no harm is to be suspected. + +54. Everywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously to acquiesce +in thy present condition, and to behave, justly to those who are about +thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy present thoughts, that nothing +shall steal into them without being well examined. + +55. Do not look around thee to discover other men's ruling principles, +but look straight to this, to what nature leads thee, both the universal +nature through the things which happen to thee, and thy own nature +through the acts which must be done by thee. But every being ought to do +that which is according to its constitution; and all other things have +been constituted for the sake of rational beings, just as among +irrational things the inferior for the sake of the superior, but the +rational for the sake of one another. + +The prime principle then in man's constitution is the social. And the +second is not to yield to the persuasions of the body,--for it is the +peculiar office of the rational and intelligent motion to circumscribe +itself, and never to be overpowered either by the motion of the senses +or of the appetites, for both are animal: but the intelligent motion +claims superiority, and does not permit itself to be overpowered by the +others. And with good reason, for it is formed by nature to use all of +them. The third thing in the rational constitution is freedom from error +and from deception. Let then the ruling principle holding fast to these +things go straight on, and it has what is its own. + +56. Consider thyself to be dead, and to have completed thy life up to +the present time; and live according to nature the remainder which is +allowed thee. + +57. Love that only which happens to thee and is spun with the thread of +thy destiny. For what is more suitable? + +58. In everything which happens keep before thy eyes those to whom the +same things happened, and how they were vexed, and treated them as +strange things, and found fault with them: and now where are they? +Nowhere. Why then dost thou too choose to act in the same way? and why +dost thou not leave these agitations which are foreign to nature to +those who cause them and those who are moved by them; and why art thou +not altogether intent upon the right way of making use of the things +which happen to thee? For then thou wilt use them well, and they will be +a material for thee [to work on]. Only attend to thyself, and resolve to +be a good man in every act which thou doest: and remember ...[A] + + [A] This section is obscure, and the conclusion is so corrupt + that it is impossible to give any probable meaning to it. It is + better to leave it as it is than to patch it up, as some + critics and translators have done. + +59. Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and it will ever bubble +up, if thou wilt ever dig. + +60. The body ought to be compact, and to show no irregularity either in +motion or attitude. For what the mind shows in the face by maintaining +in it the expression of intelligence and propriety, that ought to be +required also in the whole body. But all these things should be observed +without affectation. + +61. The art of life is more like the wrestler's art than the dancer's, +in respect of this, that it should stand ready and firm to meet onsets +which are sudden and unexpected. + +62. Constantly observe who those are whose approbation thou wishest to +have, and what ruling principles they possess. For then thou wilt +neither blame those who offend involuntarily, nor wilt thou want their +approbation, if thou lookest to the sources of their opinions and +appetites. + +63. Every soul, the philosopher says, is involuntarily deprived of +truth; consequently in the same way it is deprived of justice and +temperance and benevolence and everything of the kind. It is most +necessary to bear this constantly in mind, for thus thou wilt be more +gentle towards all. + +64. In every pain let this thought be present, that there is no dishonor +in it, nor does it make the governing intelligence worse, for it does +not damage the intelligence either so far as the intelligence is +rational[A] or so far as it is social. Indeed in the case of most pains +let this remark of Epicurus aid thee, that pain is neither intolerable +nor everlasting, if thou bearest in mind that it has its limits, and if +thou addest nothing to it in imagination: and remember this too, that we +do not perceive that many things which are disagreeable to us are the +same as pain, such as excessive drowsiness, and the being scorched by +heat, and the having no appetite. When then thou art discontented about +any of these things, say to thyself that thou art yielding to pain. + +65. Take care not to feel towards the inhuman as they feel towards +men.[B] + +66. How do we know if Telauges was not superior in character to +Socrates? For it is not enough that Socrates died a more noble death, +and disputed more skilfully with the sophists, and passed the night in +the cold with more endurance, and that when he was bid to arrest Leon[C] +of Salamis, he considered it more noble to refuse, and that he walked in +a swaggering way in the streets[D]--though as to this fact one may have +great doubts if it was true. But we ought to inquire what kind of a soul +it was that Socrates possessed, and if he was able to be content with +being just towards men and pious towards the gods, neither idly vexed on +account of men's villainy, nor yet making himself a slave to any man's +ignorance, nor receiving as strange anything that fell to his share out +of the universal, nor enduring it as intolerable, nor allowing his +understanding to sympathize with the affects of the miserable flesh. + + [A] The text has [Greek: hylike], which it has been proposed to + alter to [Greek: logike], and this change is necessary. We + shall then have in this section [Greek: logike] and [Greek: + koinonike] associated, as we have in s. 68 [Greek: logike] and + [Greek: politike], and in s. 72. + + [B] I have followed Gataker's conjecture [Greek: ohi + apanthropoi] instead of the MSS. reading [Greek: ohi anthropoi] + + [C] Leon of Salamis. See Plato, Epist. 7; Apolog. c. 20; + Epictetus, iv. I, 160; iv. 7, 30. + + [D] Aristophan. Nub. 362. [Greek: hoti brenthuei t' en taisis + hodois kai to ophthalmo paraballei.] + +67. Nature has not so mingled+ [the intelligence] with the composition +of the body, as not to have allowed thee the power of circumscribing +thyself and of bringing under subjection to thyself all that is thy own; +for it is very possible to be a divine man and to be recognized as such +by no one. Always bear this in mind; and another thing too, that very +little indeed is necessary for living a happy life. And because thou +hast despaired of becoming a dialectician and skilled in the knowledge +of nature, do not for this reason renounce the hope of being both free +and modest, and social and obedient to God. + +68. It is in thy power to live free from all compulsion in the greatest +tranquillity of mind, even if all the world cry out against thee as +much as they choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces the members +of this kneaded matter which has grown around thee. For what hinders the +mind in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in tranquillity +and in a just judgment of all surrounding things and in a ready use of +the objects which are presented to it, so that the judgment may say to +the thing which falls under its observation: This thou art in substance +[reality], though in men's opinion thou mayest appear to be of a +different kind; and the use shall say to that which falls under the +hand: Thou art the thing that I was seeking; for to me that which +presents itself is always a material for virtue both rational and +political, and in a word, for the exercise of art, which belongs to man +or God. For everything which happens has a relationship either to God or +man, and is neither new nor difficult to handle, but usual and apt +matter to work on. + +69. The perfection of moral character consists in this, in passing every +day as the last, and in being neither violently excited nor torpid nor +playing the hypocrite. + +70. The gods who are immortal are not vexed because during so long a +time they must tolerate continually men such as they are and so many of +them bad; and besides this, they also take care of them in all ways. +But thou, who art destined to end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring +the bad, and this too when thou art one of them? + +71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own badness, +which is indeed possible, but to fly from other men's badness, which is +impossible. + +72. Whatever the rational and political [social] faculty finds to be +neither intelligent nor social, it properly judges to be inferior to +itself. + +73. When thou hast done a good act and another has received it, why dost +thou still look for a third thing besides these, as fools do, either to +have the reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a return? + +74. No man is tired of receiving what is useful. But it is useful to act +according to nature. Do not then be tired of receiving what is useful by +doing it to others. + +75. The nature of the All moved to make the universe. But now either +everything that takes place comes by way of consequence or [continuity]; +or even the chief things towards which the ruling power of the universe +directs its own movement are governed by no rational principle. If this +is remembered, it will make thee more tranquil in many things (vi. 44; +ix. 28).[A] + + [A] It is not easy to understand this section. It has been + suggested that there is some error in [Greek: e alogista] &c. + Some of the translators have made nothing of the passage, and + they have somewhat perverted the words. The first proposition + is, that the universe was made by some sufficient power. A + beginning of the universe is assumed, and a power which framed + an order. The next question is, How are things produced now? + Or, in other words, by what power do forms appear in continuous + succession? The answer, according to Antoninus, may be this: It + is by virtue of the original constitution of things that all + change and succession have been effected and are effected. And + this is intelligible in a sense, if we admit that the universe + is always one and the same, a continuity of identity; as much + one and the same as man is one and the same--which he believes + himself to be, though he also believes, and cannot help + believing, that both in his body and in his thoughts there is + change and succession. There is no real discontinuity then in + the universe; and if we say that there was an order framed in + the beginning, and that the things which are now produced are a + consequence of a previous arrangement, we speak of things as we + are compelled to view them, as forming a series of succession, + just as we speak of the changes in our own bodies and the + sequence of our own thoughts. But as there are no intervals, + not even intervals infinitely small, between any two supposed + states of any one thing, so there are no intervals, not even + infinitely small, between what we call one thing and any other + thing which we speak of as immediately preceding or following + it. What we call time is an idea derived from our notion of a + succession of things or events, an idea which is a part of our + constitution, but not an idea which we can suppose to belong to + an infinite intelligence and power. The conclusion then is + certain that the present and the past, the production of + present things and the supposed original order, out of which we + say that present things now come, are one, and the present + productive power and the so-called past arrangement are only + different names for one thing. I suppose then that Antoninus + wrote here as people sometimes talk now, and that his real + meaning is not exactly expressed by his words. There are + certainly other passages from which I think that we may collect + that he had notions of production something like what I have + expressed. We now come to the alternate: "or even the chief + things ... principle." I do not exactly know what he means by + [Greek: ta kureotata] "the chief," or "the most excellent," or + whatever it is. But as he speaks elsewhere of inferior and + superior things, and of the inferior being for the use of the + superior, and of rational beings being the highest, he may here + mean rational beings. He also in this alternative assumes a + governing power of the universe, and that it acts by directing + its power towards these chief objects, or making its special, + proper motion towards them. And here he uses the noun ([Greek: + horme]) "movement," which contains the same notion as the verb + ([Greek: ormese]) "moved," which he used at the beginning of + the paragraph, when he was speaking of the making of the + universe. If we do not accept the first hypothesis, he says, we + must take the conclusion of the second, that the "chief things + towards which the ruling power of the universe directs its own + movement are governed by no rational principle." The meaning + then is, if there is a meaning in it, that though there is a + governing power which strives to give effect to its efforts, we + must conclude that there is no rational direction of anything, + if the power which first made the universe does not in some way + govern it still. Besides, if we assume that anything is now + produced or now exists without the action of the supreme + intelligence, and yet that this intelligence makes an effort to + act, we obtain a conclusion which cannot be reconciled with the + nature of a supreme power, whose existence Antoninus always + assumes. The tranquillity that a man may gain from these + reflections must result from his rejecting the second + hypothesis and accepting the first--whatever may be the exact + sense in which the emperor understood the first. Or, as he says + elsewhere, if there is no Providence which governs the world, + man has at least the power of governing himself according to + the constitution of his nature; and so he may be tranquil if he + does the best that he can. + + If there is no error in the passage, it is worth the labor to + discover the writer's exact meaning--for I think that he had a + meaning, though people may not agree what it was. (Compare ix. + 28.) If I have rightly explained the emperor's meaning in this + and other passages, he has touched the solution of a great + question. + + + + +VIII. + + +This reflection also tends to the removal of the desire of empty fame, +that it is no longer in thy power to have lived the whole of thy life, +or at least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a philosopher; but +both to many others and to thyself it is plain that thou art far from +philosophy. Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is no longer +easy for thee to get the reputation of a philosopher; and thy plan of +life also opposes it. If then thou hast truly seen where the matter +lies, throw away the thought, How thou shall seem [to others], and be +content if thou shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise as thy +nature wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else distract +thee; for thou hast had experience of many wanderings without having +found happiness anywhere,--not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, nor in +reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where is it then? In doing +what man's nature requires. How then shall a man do this? If he has +principles from which come his affects and his acts. What principles? +Those which relate to good and bad: the belief that there is nothing +good for man which does not make him just, temperate, manly, free; and +that there is nothing bad which does not do the contrary to what has +been mentioned. + +2. On the occasion of every act ask thyself, How is this with respect to +me? Shall I repent of it? A little time and I am dead, and all is gone. +What more do I seek, if what I am now doing is the work of an +intelligent living being, and a social being, and one who is under the +same law with God? + +3. Alexander and Caius[A] and Pompeius, what are they in comparison with +Diogenes and Heraclitus and Socrates? For they were acquainted with +things, and their causes [forms], and their matter, and the ruling +principles of these men were the same [or conformable to their +pursuits]. But as to the others, how many things had they to care for, +and to how many things were they slaves! + + [A] Caius is C. Julius Caesar, the dictator; and Pompeius is + Cn. Pompeius, named Magnus. + +4. [Consider] that men will do the same things nevertheless, even though +thou shouldst burst. + +5. This is the chief thing: Be not perturbed, for all things are +according to the nature of the universal; and in a little time thou wilt +be nobody and nowhere, like Hadrianus and Augustus. In the next place, +having fixed thy eyes steadily on thy business, look at it, and at the +same time remembering that it is thy duty to be a good man, and what +man's nature demands, do that without turning aside; and speak as it +seems to thee most just, only let it be with a good disposition and with +modesty and without hypocrisy. + +6. The nature of the universal has this work to do,--to remove to that +place the things which are in this, to change them, to take, them away +hence, and to carry them there. All things are change, yet we need not +fear anything new. All things are familiar [to us]; but the distribution +of them still remains the same. + +7. Every nature is contented with itself when it goes on its way well; +and a rational nature goes on its way well when in its thoughts it +assents to nothing false or uncertain, and when it directs its movements +to social acts only, and when it confines its desires and aversions to +the things which are in its power, and when it is satisfied with +everything that is assigned to it by the common nature. For of this +common nature every particular nature is a part, as the nature of the +leaf is a part of the nature of the plant; except that in the plant the +nature of the leaf is part of a nature which has not perception or +reason, and is subject to be impeded; but the nature of man is part of a +nature which is not subject to impediments, and is intelligent and just, +since it gives to everything in equal portions and according to its +worth, times, substance, cause [form], activity, and incident. But +examine, not to discover that any one thing compared with any other +single thing is equal in all respects, but by taking all the parts +together of one thing and comparing them with all the parts together of +another. + +8. Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read. But thou hast leisure [or +ability] to check arrogance: thou hast leisure to be superior to +pleasure and pain: thou hast leisure to be superior to love of fame, and +not to be vexed at stupid and ungrateful people, nay even to care for +them. + +9. Let no man any longer hear thee finding fault with the court life or +with thy own (v. 16). + +10. Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for having neglected something +useful; but that which is good must be something useful, and the perfect +good man should look after it. But no such man would ever repent of +having refused any sensual pleasure. Pleasure then is neither good nor +useful. + +11. This thing, what is it in itself, in its own constitution? What is +its substance and material? And what its causal nature [or form]? And +what is it doing in the world? And how long does it subsist? + +12. When thou risest from sleep with reluctance, remember that it is +according to thy constitution and according to human nature to perform +social acts, but sleeping is common also to irrational animals. But that +which is according to each individual's nature is also more peculiarly +its own, and more suitable to its nature, and indeed also more agreeable +(v. 1). + +13. Constantly, and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every +impression on the soul, apply to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic, +and of Dialectic. + +14. Whatever man thou meetest with, immediately say to thyself: What +opinions has this man about good and bad? For if with respect to +pleasure and pain and the causes of each, and with respect to fame and +ignominy, death and life, he has such and such opinions, it will seem +nothing wonderful or strange to me if he does such and such things; and +I shall bear in mind that he is compelled to do so.[A] + + [A] Antoninus v. 16. Thucydides, iii 10: [Greek: en gar to + diallassonti tes gnomes kai ai diaphorai ton ergon + kathistantai]. + +15. Remember that as it is a shame to be surprised if the fig-tree +produces figs, so it is to be surprised if the world produces such and +such things of which it is productive; and for the physician and the +helmsman it is a shame to be surprised if a man has a fever, or if the +wind is unfavorable. + +16. Remember that to change thy opinion and to follow him who corrects +thy error is as consistent with freedom as it is to persist in thy +error. For it is thy own, the activity which is exerted according to thy +own movement and judgment, and indeed according to thy own understanding +too. + +17. If a thing is in thy own power, why dost thou do it? but if it is in +the power of another, whom dost thou blame,--the atoms [chance] or the +gods? Both are foolish. Thou must blame nobody. For if thou canst, +correct [that which is the cause]; but if thou canst not do this, +correct at least the thing itself; but if thou canst not do even this, +of what use is it to thee to find fault? for nothing should be done +without a purpose. + +18. That which has died falls not out of the universe. If it stays here, +it also changes here, and is dissolved into its proper parts, which are +elements of the universe and of thyself. And these too change, and they +murmur not. + +19. Everything exists for some end,--a horse, a vine. Why dost thou +wonder? Even the sun will say, I am for some purpose, and the rest of +the gods will say the same. For what purpose then art thou,--to enjoy +pleasure? See if common sense allows this. + +20. Nature has had regard in everything no less to the end than to the +beginning and the continuance, just like the man who throws up a ball. +What good is it then for the ball to be thrown up, or harm for it to +come down, or even to have fallen? and what good is it to the bubble +while it holds together, or what harm when it is burst? The same may be +said of a light also. + +21. Turn it [the body] inside out, and see what kind of thing it is; and +when it has grown old, what kind of thing it becomes, and when it is +diseased. + +Short lived are both the praiser and the praised, and the rememberer and +the remembered: and all this in a nook of this part of the world; and +not even here do all agree, no, not any one with himself: and the whole +earth too is a point. + +22. Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an opinion +or an act or a word. + +Thou sufferest this justly: for thou choosest rather to become good +to-morrow than to be good to-day. + +23. Am I doing anything? I do it with reference to the good of mankind. +Does anything happen to me? I receive it and refer it to the gods, and +the source of all things, from which all that happens is derived. + +24. Such as bathing appears to thee,--oil, sweat, dirt, filthy water, +all things disgusting,--so is every part of life and everything. + +25. Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla died. Secunda saw Maximus +die, and then Secunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus die, and then +Epitynchanus died. Antoninus saw Faustina die, and then Antoninus died. +Such is everything. Celer saw Hadrianus die, and then Celer died. And +those sharp-witted men, either seers or men inflated with pride, where +are they,--for instance the sharp-witted men, Charax and Demetrius the +Platonist, and Eudaemon, and any one else like them? All ephemeral, +dead long ago. Some indeed have not been remembered even for a short +time, and others have become the heroes of fables, and again others have +disappeared even from fables. Remember this then, that this little +compound, thyself, must either be dissolved, or thy poor breath must be +extinguished, or be removed and placed elsewhere. + +26. It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a man. Now it +is a proper work of a man to be benevolent to his own kind, to despise +the movements of the senses, to form a just judgment of plausible +appearances, and to take a survey of the nature of the universe and of +the things which happen in it. + +27. There are three relations [between thee and other things]: the one +to the body[A] which surrounds thee; the second to the divine cause from +which all things come to all; and the third to those who live with thee. + + [A] The text has [Greek: aition], which in Antoninus means + "form," "formal." Accordingly Schultz recommends either + Valkenaer's emendation [Greek: angeion], "body," or Corais' + [Greek: somation]. Compare xii. 13; x. 38. + +28. Pain is either an evil to the body--then let the body say what it +thinks of it--or to the soul; but it is in the power of the soul to +maintain its own serenity and tranquillity, and not to think that pain +is an evil. For every judgment and movement and desire and aversion is +within, and no evil ascends so high. + +29. Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying to thyself: Now it is in +my power to let no badness be in this soul, nor desire, nor any +perturbation at all; but looking at all things I see what is their +nature, and I use each according to its value.--Remember this power +which thou hast from nature. + +30. Speak both in the senate and to every man, whoever he may be, +appropriately, not with any affectation: use plain discourse. + +31. Augustus' court, wife, daughter, descendants, ancestors, sister, +Agrippa, kinsmen, intimates, friends; Areius,[A] Maecenas, physicians, +and sacrificing priests,--the whole court is dead. Then turn to the +rest, not considering the death of a single man [but of a whole race], +as of the Pompeii; and that which is inscribed on the tombs,--The last +of his race. Then consider what trouble those before them have had that +they might leave a successor; and then, that of necessity some one must +be the last. Again, here consider the death of a whole race. + + [A] Areius ([Greek: Areios]) was a philosopher, who was + intimate with Augustus; Sueton. Augustus, c. 89; Plutarch, + Antoninus, 80; Dion Cassius, 51, c. 16. + +32. It is thy duty to order thy life well in every single act; and if +every act does its duty as far as is possible, be content; and no one is +able to hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty.--But +something external will stand in the way. Nothing will stand in the way +of thy acting justly and soberly and considerately.--But perhaps some +other active power will be hindered. Well, but by acquiescing in the +hindrance and by being content to transfer thy efforts to that which is +allowed, another opportunity of action is immediately put before thee in +place of that which was hindered, and one which will adapt itself to +this ordering of which we are speaking. + +33. Receive [wealth or prosperity] without arrogance; and be ready to +let it go. + +34. If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, lying +anywhere apart from the rest of the body, such does a man make himself, +as far as he can, who is not content with what happens, and separates +himself from others, or does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast +detached thyself from the natural unity,--for thou wast made by nature a +part, but now thou hast cut thyself off,--yet here there is this +beautiful provision, that it is in thy power again to unite thyself. God +has allowed this to no other part, after it has been separated and cut +asunder, to come together again. But consider the kindness by which he +has distinguished man, for he has put it in his power not to be +separated at all from the universal; and when he has been separated, he +has allowed him to return and to be united and to resume his place as a +part. + +35. As the nature of the universal has given to every rational being +all the other powers that it has, + so we have received from it this +power also. For as the universal nature converts and fixes in its +predestined place everything which stands in the way and opposes it, and +makes such things a part of itself, so also the rational animal is able +to make every hindrance its own material, and to use it for such +purposes as it may have designed.[A] + +36. Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the whole of thy life. Let not +thy thoughts at once embrace all the various troubles which thou mayest +expect to befall thee: but on every occasion ask thyself, What is there +in this which is intolerable and past bearing? for thou wilt be ashamed +to confess. In the next place remember that neither the future nor the +past pains thee, but only the present. But this is reduced to a very +little, if thou only circumscribest it, and chidest thy mind if it is +unable to hold out against even this. + +37. Does Panthea or Fergamus now sit by the tomb of Verus?[B] Does +Chaurias or Diotimus sit by the tomb of Hadrianus? That would be +ridiculous. Well, suppose they did sit there, would the dead be +conscious of it? and if the dead were conscious, would they be pleased? +and if they were pleased, would that make them immortal? Was it not in +the order of destiny that these persons too should first become old +women and old men and then die? What then would those do after these +were dead? All this is foul smell and blood in a bag. + + [A] The text is corrupt at the beginning of the paragraph, but + the meaning will appear if the second [Greek: logikon] is + changed into [Greek: holon] though this change alone will not + establish the grammatical completeness of the text. + + [B] "Verus" is a conjecture of Saumaise, and perhaps the true + reading. + +38. If thou canst see sharp, look and judge wisely, + says the +philosopher. + +39. In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is +opposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is opposed to love of +pleasure, and that is temperance. + +40. If thou takest away thy opinion about that which appears to give +thee pain, thou thyself standest in perfect security.--Who is this +self?--The reason.--But I am not reason.--Be it so. Let then the reason +itself not trouble itself. But if any other part of thee suffers, let it +have its own opinion about itself (vii. 16). + +41. Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is an evil to the animal +nature. Hindrance to the movements [desires] is equally an evil to the +animal nature. And something else also is equally an impediment and an +evil to the constitution of plants. So then that which is a hindrance to +the intelligence is an evil to the intelligent nature. Apply all these +things then to thyself. Does pain or sensuous pleasure affect thee? The +senses will look to that. Has any obstacle opposed thee in thy efforts +towards an object? If indeed thou wast making this effort absolutely +[unconditionally, or without any reservation], certainly this obstacle +is an evil to thee considered as a rational animal. But if thou takest +[into consideration] the usual course of things, thou hast not yet been +injured nor even impeded. The things however which are proper to the +understanding no other man is used to impede, for neither fire, nor +iron, nor tyrant, nor abuse, touches it in any way. When it has been +made a sphere, it continues a sphere (xi. 12). + +42. It is not fit that I should give myself pain, for I have never +intentionally given pain even to another. + +43. Different things delight different people; but it is my delight to +keep the ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any man +or from any of the things which happen to men, but looking at and +receiving all with welcome eyes and using everything according to its +value. + +44. See that thou secure this present time to thyself: for those who +rather pursue posthumous fame do not consider that the men of after time +will be exactly such as these whom they cannot bear now; and both are +mortal. And what is it in any way to thee if these men of after time +utter this or that sound, or have this or that opinion about thee? + +45. Take me and cast me where thou wilt; for there I shall keep my +divine part tranquil, that is, content, if it can feel and act +comformably to its proper constitution. Is this [change of place] +sufficient reason why my soul should be unhappy and worse than it was, +depressed, expanded, shrinking, affrighted? and what wilt thou find +which is sufficient reason for this?[A] + + [A] [Greek: oregomene] in this passage seems to have a passive + sense. It is difficult to find an apt expression for it and + some of the other words. A comparison with xi. 12, will help to + explain the meaning. + +46. Nothing can happen to any man which is not a human accident, nor to +an ox which is not according to the nature of an ox, nor to a vine which +is not according to the nature of a vine, nor to a stone which is not +proper to a stone. If then there happens to each thing both what is +usual and natural, why shouldst thou complain? For the common nature +brings nothing which may not be borne by thee. + +47. If thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing that +disturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it. And it is in thy power to +wipe out this judgment now. But if anything in thy own disposition gives +thee pain, who hinders thee from correcting thy opinion? And even if +thou art pained because thou art not doing some particular thing which +seems to thee to be right, why dost thou not rather act than +complain?--But some insuperable obstacle is in the way?--Do not be +grieved then, for the cause of its not being done depends not on +thee.--But it is not worth while to live, if this cannot be done.--Take +thy departure then from life contentedly, just as he dies who is in full +activity, and well pleased too with the things which are obstacles. + +48. Remember that the ruling faculty is invincible, when self-collected +it is satisfied with itself, if it does nothing which it does not choose +to do, even if it resist from mere obstinacy. What then will it be when +it forms a judgment about anything aided by reason and deliberately? +Therefore the mind which is free from passions is a citadel, for man has +nothing more secure to which he can fly for refuge and for the future be +inexpugnable. He then who has not seen this is an ignorant man; but he +who has seen it and does not fly to this refuge is unhappy. + +49. Say nothing more to thyself than what the first appearances report. +Suppose that it has been reported to thee that a certain person speaks +ill of thee. This has been reported; but that thou hast been injured, +that has not been reported. I see that my child is sick. I do see; but +that he is in danger, I do not see. Thus then always abide by the first +appearances, and add nothing thyself from within, and then nothing +happens to thee. Or rather add something like a man who knows everything +that happens in the world. + +50. A cucumber is bitter--Throw it away.--There are briers in the +road--Turn aside from them.--This is enough. Do not add, And why were +such things made in the world? For thou wilt be ridiculed by a man who +is acquainted with nature, as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter +and shoemaker if thou didst find fault because thou seest in their +workshop shavings and cuttings from the things which they make. And yet +they have places into which they can throw these shavings and cuttings, +and the universal nature has no external space; but the wondrous part of +her art is that though she has circumscribed herself, everything within +her which appears to decay and to grow old and to be useless she changes +into herself, and again makes other new things from these very same, so +that she requires neither substance from without nor wants a place into +which she may cast that which decays. She is content then with her own +space, and her own matter, and her own art. + +51. Neither in thy actions be sluggish nor in thy conversation without +method, nor wandering in thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy soul +inward contention nor external effusion, nor in life be so busy as to +have no leisure. + +Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, curse thee. What then +can these things do to prevent thy mind from remaining pure, wise, +sober, just? For instance, if a man should stand by a limpid pure +spring, and curse it, the spring never ceases sending up potable water; +and if he should cast clay into it or filth, it will speedily disperse +them and wash them out, and will not be at all polluted. How then shalt +thou possess a perpetual fountain [and not a mere well]? By forming + +thyself hourly to freedom conjoined with contentment, simplicity, and +modesty. + +52. He who does not know what the world is, does not know where he is. +And he who does not know for what purpose the world exists, does not +know who he is, nor what the world is. But he who has failed in any one +of these things could not even say for what purpose he exists himself. +What then dost thou think of him who [avoids or] seeks the praise of +those who applaud, of men who know not either where they are or who they +are? + +53. Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who curses himself thrice +every hour? wouldst thou wish to please a man who does not please +himself? Does a man please himself who repents of nearly everything that +he does? + +54. No longer let thy breathing only act in concert with the air which +surrounds thee, but let thy intelligence also now be in harmony with the +intelligence which embraces all things. For the intelligent power is no +less diffused in all parts and pervades all things for him who is +willing to draw it to him than the aerial power for him who is able to +respire it. + +55. Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe; and +particularly the wickedness [of one man] does no harm to another. It is +only harmful to him who has it in his power to be released from it as +soon as he shall choose. + +56. To my own free will the free will of my neighbor is just as +indifferent as his poor breath and flesh. For though we are made +especially for the sake of one another, still the ruling power of each +of us has its own office, for otherwise my neighbor's wickedness would +be my harm, which God has not willed, in order that my unhappiness may +not depend on another. + +57. The sun appears to be poured down, and in all directions indeed it +is diffused, yet it is not effused. For this diffusion is extension: +Accordingly its rays are called Extensions [[Greek: aktines]] because +they are extended [[Greek: apo tou ekteinesthai]].[A] But one may judge +what kind of a thing a ray is, if he looks at the sun's light passing +through a narrow opening into a darkened room, for it is extended in a +right line, and as it were is divided when it meets with any solid body +which stands in the way and intercepts the air beyond; but there the +light remains fixed and does not glide or fall off. Such then ought to +be the outpouring and diffusion of the understanding, and it should in +no way be an effusion, but an extension, and it should make no violent +or impetuous collision with the obstacles which are in its way; nor yet +fall down, but be fixed, and enlighten that which receives it. For a +body will deprive itself of the illumination, if it does not admit it. + + [A] A piece of bad etymology. + +58. He who fears death either fears the loss of sensation or a different +kind of sensation. But if thou shalt have no sensation, neither wilt +thou feel any harm; and if thou shalt acquire another kind of sensation, +thou wilt be a different kind of living being and thou wilt not cease to +live. + +59. Men exist for the sake of one another. Teach them then, or bear with +them. + +60. In one way an arrow moves, in another way the mind. The mind indeed, +both when it exercises caution and when it is employed about inquiry, +moves straight onward not the less, and to its object. + +61. Enter into every man's ruling faculty; and also let every other man +enter into thine.[A] + + [A] Compare Epictetus, iii. 9, 12. + + + + +IX. + + +He who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature has +made rational animals for the sake of one another, to help one another +according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one another, he who +transgresses her will is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest +divinity. And he too who lies is guilty of impiety to the same divinity; +for the universal nature is the nature of things that are; and things +that are have a relation to all things that come into existence.[A] And +further, this universal nature is named truth, and is the prime cause of +all things that are true. He then who lies intentionally is guilty of +impiety, inasmuch as he acts unjustly by deceiving; and he also who lies +unintentionally, inasmuch as he is at variance with the universal +nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs the order by fighting against the +nature of the world; for he fights against it, who is moved of himself +to that which is contrary to truth, for he had received powers from +nature through the neglect of which he is not able now to distinguish +falsehood from truth. And indeed he who pursues pleasure as good, and +avoids pain as evil, is guilty of impiety. For of necessity such a man +must often find fault with the universal nature, alleging that it +assigns things to the bad and the good contrary to their deserts, +because frequently the bad are in the enjoyment of pleasure and possess +the things which procure pleasure, but the good have pain for their +share and the things which cause pain. And further, he who is afraid of +pain will sometimes also be afraid of some of the things which will +happen in the world, and even this is impiety. And he who pursues +pleasure will not abstain from injustice, and this is plainly impiety. +Now with respect to the things towards which the universal nature is +equally affected--for it would not have made both, unless it was equally +affected towards both--towards these they who wish to follow nature +should be of the same mind with it, and equally affected. With respect +to pain, then, and pleasure, or death and life, or honor and dishonor, +which the universal nature employs equally, whoever is not equally +affected is manifestly acting impiously. And I say that the universal +nature employs them equally, instead of saying that they happen alike to +those who are produced in continuous series and to those who come after +them by virtue of a certain original movement of Providence, according +to which it moved from a certain beginning to this ordering of things, +having conceived certain principles of the things which were to be, and +having determined powers productive of beings and of changes and of such +like successions (vii. 75). + + [A] "As there is not any action or natural event, which we are + acquainted with, so single and unconnected as not to have a + respect to some other actions and events, so possibly each of + them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have a remote, + natural relation to other actions and events, much beyond the + compass of this present world." Again: "Things seemingly the + most insignificant imaginable are perpetually observed to be + necessary conditions to other things of the greatest + importance, so that any one thing whatever may, for aught we + know to the contrary, be a necessary condition to any + other."--Butler's Analogy, Chap. 7. See all the chapter. Some + critics take [Greek: ta hyparchonta] in this passage of + Antoninus to be the same as [Greek: ta honta]: but if that were + so he might have said [Greek: pros allela] instead of [Greek: + pros ta hyparchonta]. Perhaps the meaning of [Greek: pros ta + hyparchonta] may be "to all prior things." If so, the + translation is still correct. See vi. 38. + +2. It would be a man's happiest lot to depart from mankind without +having had any taste of lying and hypocrisy and luxury and pride. +However, to breathe out one's life when a man has had enough of these +things is the next best voyage, as the saying is. Hast thou determined +to abide with vice, and hast not experience yet induced thee to fly from +this pestilence? For the destruction of the understanding is a +pestilence, much more, indeed, than any such corruption and change of +this atmosphere which surrounds us. For this corruption is a pestilence +of animals so far as they are animals; but the other is a pestilence of +men so far as they are men. + +3. Do not despise death, but be well content with it, since this too is +one of those things which nature wills. For such as it is to be young +and to grow old, and to increase and to reach maturity, and to have +teeth and beard and gray hairs, and to beget and to be pregnant and to +bring forth, and all the other natural operations which the seasons of +thy life bring, such also is dissolution. This, then, is consistent with +the character of a reflecting man--to be neither careless nor impatient +nor contemptuous with respect to death, but to wait for it as one of the +operations of nature. As thou now waitest for the time when the child +shall come out of thy wife's womb, so be ready for the time when thy +soul shall fall out of this envelope.[A] But if thou requirest also a +vulgar kind of comfort which shall reach thy heart, thou wilt be made +best reconciled to death by observing the objects from which thou art +going to be removed, and the morals of those with whom thy soul will no +longer be mingled. For it is no way right to be offended with men, but +it is thy duty to care for them and to bear with them gently; and yet to +remember that thy departure will not be from men who have the same +principles as thyself. For this is the only thing, if there be any, +which could draw us the contrary way and attach us to life,--to be +permitted to live with those who have the same principles as ourselves. +But now thou seest how great is the trouble arising from the discordance +of those who live together, so that thou mayst say, Come quick, O death, +lest perchance I, too, should forget myself. + + [A] Note 1 of the Philosophy, p. 76. + +4. He who does wrong does wrong against himself. He who acts unjustly +acts unjustly to himself, because he makes himself bad. + +5. He often acts unjustly who does not do a certain thing; not only he +who does a certain thing. + +6. Thy present opinion founded on understanding, and thy present conduct +directed to social good, and thy present disposition of contentment with +everything which happens+--that is enough. + +7. Wipe out imagination; check desire: extinguish appetite: keep the +ruling faculty in its own power. + +8. Among the animals which have not reason one life is distributed; but +among reasonable animals one intelligent soul is distributed: just as +there is one earth of all things which are of an earthly nature, and we +see by one light, and breathe one air, all of us that have the faculty +of vision and all that have life. + +9. All things which participate in anything which is common to them all, +move towards that which is of the same kind with themselves. Everything +which is earthy turns towards the earth, everything which is liquid +flows together, and everything which is of an aerial kind does the +same, so that they require something to keep them asunder, and the +application of force. Fire indeed moves upwards on account of the +elemental fire, but it is so ready to be kindled together with all the +fire which is here, that even every substance which is somewhat dry is +easily ignited, because there is less mingled with it of that which is a +hindrance to ignition. Accordingly, then, everything also which +participates in the common intelligent nature moves in like manner +towards that which is of the same kind with itself, or moves even more. +For so much as it is superior in comparison with all other things, in +the same degree also is it more ready to mingle with and to be fused +with that which is akin to it. Accordingly among animals devoid of +reason we find swarms of bees, and herds of cattle, and the nurture of +young birds, and in a manner, loves; for even in animals there are +souls, and that power which brings them together is seen to exert itself +in a superior degree, and in such a way as never has been observed in +plants nor in stones nor in trees. But in rational animals there are +political communities and friendships, and families and meetings of +people; and in wars, treaties, and armistices. But in the things which +are still superior, even though they are separated from one another, +unity in a manner exists, as in the stars. Thus the ascent to the higher +degree is able to produce a sympathy even in things which are +separated. See, then, what now takes place; for only intelligent animals +have now forgotten this mutual desire and inclination, and in them alone +the property of flowing together is not seen. But still, though men +strive to avoid [this union], they are caught and held by it, for their +nature is too strong for them; and thou wilt see what I say, if thou +only observest. Sooner, then, will one find anything earthy which comes +in contact with no earthy thing, than a man altogether separated from +other men. + +10. Both man and God and the universe produce fruit; at the proper +seasons each produces it. But and if usage has especially fixed these +terms to the vine and like things, this is nothing. Reason produces +fruit both for all and for itself, and there are produced from it other +things of the same kind as reason itself. + +11. If thou art able, correct by teaching those who do wrong; but if +thou canst not, remember that indulgence is given to thee for this +purpose. And the gods, too, are indulgent to such persons; and for some +purposes they even help them to get health, wealth, reputation; so kind +they are. And it is in thy power also; or say, who hinders thee? + +12. Labor not as one who is wretched, nor yet as one who would be pitied +or admired; but direct thy will to one thing only--to put thyself in +motion and to check thyself, as the social reason requires. + +13. To-day I have got out of all trouble, or rather I have cast out all +trouble, for it was not outside, but within and in my opinions. + +14. All things are the same, familiar in experience, and ephemeral in +time, and worthless in the matter. Everything now is just as it was in +the time of those whom we have buried. + +15. Things stand outside of us, themselves by themselves, neither +knowing aught of themselves, nor expressing any judgment. What is it, +then, which does judge about them? The ruling faculty. + +16. Not in passivity but in activity lie the evil and the good of the +rational social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie not in +passivity but in activity.[A] + + [A] Virtutis omnis laus in actione consistit.--_Cicero_, De + Off., 1. 6. + +17. For the stone which has been thrown up it is no evil to come down, +nor indeed any good to have been carried up (viii. 20). + +18. Penetrate inwards into men's leading principles, and thou wilt see +what judges thou art afraid of, and what kind of judges they are of +themselves. + +19. All things are changing: and thou thyself art in continuous mutation +and in a manner in continuous destruction, and the whole universe too. + +20. It is thy duty to leave another man's wrongful act there where it is +(vii. 29; ix. 38). + +21. Termination of activity, cessation from movement and opinion, and +in a sense their death, is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to the +consideration of thy life, thy life as a child, as a youth, thy manhood, +thy old age, for in these also every change was a death. Is this +anything to fear? Turn thy thoughts now to thy life under thy +grandfather, then to thy life under thy mother, then to thy life under +thy father; and as thou findest many other differences and changes and +terminations, ask thyself, Is this anything to fear? In like manner, +then, neither are the termination and cessation and change of thy whole +life a thing to be afraid of. + +[Illustration: THE FORUM] + +22. Hasten [to examine] thy own ruling faculty and that of the universe +and that of thy neighbor: thy own, that thou mayst make it just: and +that of the universe, that thou mayst remember of what thou art a part; +and that of thy neighbor, that thou mayst know whether he has acted +ignorantly or with knowledge, and thou mayst also consider that his +ruling faculty is akin to thine. + +23. As thou thyself art a component part of a social system, so let +every act of thine be a component part of social life. Whatever act of +thine then has no reference either immediately or remotely to a social +end, this tears asunder thy life, and does not allow it to be one, and +it is of the nature of a mutiny, just as when in a popular assembly a +man acting by himself stands apart from the general agreement. + +24. Quarrels of little children and their sports, and poor spirits +carrying about dead bodies [such is everything]; and so what is +exhibited in the representation of the mansions of the dead[A] strikes +our eyes more clearly. + + [A] [Greek: to tes Nekuias] may be, as Gataker conjectures, a + dramatic representation of the state of the dead. Schultz + supposes that it may be also a reference to the [Greek: Nekuia] + of the Odyssey (lib. xi.). + +25. Examine into the quality of the form of an object, and detach it +altogether from its material part, and then contemplate it; then +determine the time, the longest which a thing of this peculiar form is +naturally made to endure. + +26. Thou hast endured infinite troubles through not being contented with +thy ruling faculty when it does the things which it is constituted by +nature to do. But enough + [of this]. + +27. When another blames thee or hates thee, or when men say about thee +anything injurious, approach their poor souls, penetrate within, and see +what kind of men they are. Thou wilt discover that there is no reason to +take any trouble that these men may have this or that opinion about +thee. However, thou must be well disposed towards them, for by nature +they are friends. And the gods too aid them in all ways, by dreams, by +signs, towards the attainment of those things on which they set a value.+ + +28. The periodic movements of the universe are the same, up and down +from age to age. And either the universal intelligence puts itself in +motion for every separate effect, and if this is so, be thou content +with that which is the result of its activity; or it puts itself in +motion once, and everything else comes by way of sequence[A] in a +manner; or indivisible elements are the origin of all things.--In a +word, if there is a god, all is well; and if chance rules, do not thou +also be governed by it (vi. 44; vii. 75). + + [A] The words which immediately follow [Greek: kat' + epakolouthesin] are corrupt. But the meaning is hardly + doubtful. (Compare vii. 75.) + +Soon will the earth cover us all: then the earth, too, will change, and +the things also which result from change will continue to change +forever, and these again forever. For if a man reflects on the changes +and transformations which follow one another like wave after wave and +their rapidity, he will despise everything which is perishable (xii. +21). + +29. The universal cause is like a winter torrent: it carries everything +along with it. But how worthless are all these poor people who are +engaged in matters political, and, as they suppose, are playing the +philosopher! All drivellers. Well then, man: do what nature now +requires. Set thyself in motion, if it is in thy power, and do not look +about thee to see if any one will observe it; nor yet expect Plato's +Republic:[A] but be content if the smallest thing goes on well, and +consider such an event to be no small matter. For who can change men's +opinions? and without a change of opinions what else is there than the +slavery of men who groan while they pretend to obey? Come now and tell +me of Alexander and Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. They themselves +shall judge whether they discovered what the common nature required, and +trained themselves accordingly. But if they acted like tragedy heroes, +no one has condemned me to imitate them. Simple and modest is the work +of philosophy. Draw me not aside to insolence and pride. + + [A] Those who wish to know what Plato's Republic is may now + study it in the accurate translation of Davies and Vaughan. + +30. Look down from above on the countless herds of men and their +countless solemnities, and the infinitely varied voyagings in storms and +calms, and the differences among those who are born, who live together, +and die. And consider, too, the life lived by others in olden time, and +the life of those who will live after thee, and the life now lived among +barbarous nations, and how many know not even thy name, and how many +will soon forget it, and how they who perhaps now are praising thee will +very soon blame thee, and that neither a posthumous name is of any +value, nor reputation, nor anything else. + +31. Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things +which come from the external cause; and let there be justice in the +things done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be +movement and action terminating in this, in social acts, for this is +according to thy nature. + +32. Thou canst remove out of the way many useless things among those +which disturb thee, for they lie entirely in thy opinion; and thou wilt +then gain for thyself ample space by comprehending the whole universe in +thy mind, and by contemplating the eternity of time, and observing the +rapid change of every several thing, how short is the time from birth to +dissolution, and the illimitable time before birth as well as the +equally boundless time after dissolution! + +33. All that thou seest will quickly perish, and those who have been +spectators of its dissolution will very soon perish too. And he who dies +at the extremest old age will be brought into the same condition with +him who died prematurely. + +34. What are these men's leading principles, and about what kind of +things are they busy, and for what kind of reasons do they love and +honor? Imagine that thou seest their pool souls laid bare. When they +think that they do harm by their blame or good by their praise, what an +idea! + +35. Loss is nothing else than change. But the universal nature delights +in change, and in obedience to her all things are now done well, and +from eternity have been in like form, and will be such to time without +end. What, then, dost thou say,--that all things have been and all +things always will be bad, and that no power has ever been found in so +many gods to rectify these things, but the world has been condemned to +be bound in never ceasing evil (iv. 45, vii. 18)? + +36. The rottenness of the matter which is the foundation of everything! +water, dust, bones, filth: or again, marble rocks, the callosities of +the earth; and gold and silver, the sediments; and garments, only bits +of hair; and purple dye, blood; and everything else is of the same kind. +And that which is of the nature of breath is also another thing of the +same kind, changing from this to that. + +37. Enough of this wretched life and murmuring and apish tricks. Why art +thou disturbed? What is there new in this? What unsettles thee? Is it +the form of the thing? Look at it. Or is it the matter? Look at it. But +besides these there is nothing. Towards the gods then, now become at +last more simple and better. It is the same whether we examine these +things for a hundred years or three. + +38. If a man has done wrong the harm is his own. But perhaps he has not +done wrong. + +39. Either all things proceed from one intelligent source and come +together as in one body, and the part ought not to find fault with what +is done for the benefit of the whole; or there are only atoms, and +nothing else than mixture and dispersion. Why, then, art thou disturbed? +Say to the ruling faculty, Art thou dead, art thou corrupted, art thou +playing the hypocrite, art thou become a beast, dost thou herd and feed +with the rest?[A] + + [A] There is some corruption at the end of this section, but I + think that the translation expresses the emperor's meaning. + Whether intelligence rules all things or chance rules, a man + must not be disturbed. He must use the power that he has and be + tranquil. + +40. Either the gods have no power or they have power. If, then, they +have no power, why dost thou pray to them? But if they have power, why +dost thou not pray for them to give thee the faculty of not fearing any +of the things which thou fearest, or of not desiring any of the things +which thou desirest, or not being pained at anything, rather than pray +that any of these things should not happen or happen? for certainly if +they can co-operate with men, they can co-operate for these purposes. +But perhaps thou wilt say the gods have placed them in thy power. Well, +then, is it not better to use what is in thy power like a free man than +to desire in a slavish and abject way what is not in thy power? And who +has told thee that the gods do not aid us, even in the things which are +in our power? Begin, then, to pray for such things, and thou wilt see. +One man prays thus: How shall I be able to lie with that woman? Do thou +pray thus: How shall I not desire to lie with her? Another prays thus: +How shall I be released from this? Pray thou: How shall I not desire to +be released? Another thus: How shall I not lose my little son? Thou +thus: How shall I not be afraid to lose him? In fine, turn thy prayers +this way, and see what comes. + +41. Epicurus says, In my sickness my conversation was not about my +bodily sufferings, nor, says he, did I talk on such subjects to those +who visited me; but I continued to discourse on the nature of things as +before, keeping to this main point, how the mind, while participating in +such movements as go on in the poor flesh, shall be free from +perturbations and maintain its proper good. Nor did I, he says, give the +physicians an opportunity of putting on solemn looks, as if they were +doing something great, but my life went on well and happily. Do, then, +the same that he did both in sickness, if thou art sick, and in any +other circumstances; for never to desert philosophy in any events that +may befall us, nor to hold trifling talks either with an ignorant man or +with one unacquainted with nature, is a principle of all schools of +philosophy; but to be intent only on that which thou art now doing and +on the instrument by which thou doest it. + +42. When thou art offended with any man's shameless conduct, immediately +ask thyself, Is it possible, then, that shameless men should not be in +the world? It is not possible. Do not, then, require what is impossible. +For this man also is one of those shameless men who must of necessity be +in the world. Let the same considerations be present to thy mind in the +case of the knave, and the faithless man, and of every man who does +wrong in any way. For at the same time that thou dost remind thyself +that it is impossible that such kind of men should not exist, thou wilt +become more kindly disposed towards every one individually. It is useful +to perceive this, too, immediately when the occasion arises, what virtue +nature has given to man to oppose to every wrongful act. For she has +given to man, as an antidote against the stupid man, mildness, and +against another kind of man some other power. And in all cases it is +possible for thee to correct by teaching the man who is gone astray; for +every man who errs misses his object and is gone astray. Besides, +wherein hast thou been injured? For thou wilt find that no one among +those against whom thou art irritated has done anything by which thy +mind could be made worse; but that which is evil to thee and harmful has +its foundation only in the mind. And what harm is done or what is there +strange, if the man who has not been instructed does the acts of an +uninstructed man? Consider whether thou shouldst not rather blame +thyself, because thou didst not expect such a man to err in such a way. +For thou hadst means given thee by thy reason to suppose that it was +likely that he would commit this error, and yet thou hast forgotten and +art amazed that he has erred. But most of all when thou blamest a man as +faithless or ungrateful, turn to thyself. For the fault is manifestly +thy own, whether thou didst trust that a man who had such a disposition +would keep his promise, or when conferring thy kindness thou didst not +confer it absolutely, nor yet in such way as to have received from thy +very act all the profit. For what more dost thou want when thou hast +done a man a service? art thou not content that thou hast done something +conformable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it? just as +if the eye demanded a recompense for seeing, or the feet for walking. +For as these members are formed for a particular purpose, and by working +according to their several constitutions obtain what is their own;[A] so +also as man is formed by nature to acts of benevolence, when he has done +anything benevolent or in any other way conducive to the common +interest, he has acted conformably to his constitution, and he gets what +is his own. + + [A] [Greek: Apechei to idion]. This sense of [Greek: apechein] + occurs in xi. 1, and iv. 49; also in St. Matthew, vi. 2, + [Greek: apechousi ton misthon], and in Epictetus. + + + + +X. + + +Wilt thou, then, my soul, never be good and simple and one and naked, +more manifest than the body which surrounds thee? Wilt thou never enjoy +an affectionate and contented disposition? Wilt thou never be full and +without a want of any kind, longing for nothing more, nor desiring +anything, either animate or inanimate, for the enjoyment of pleasures? +nor yet desiring time wherein thou shalt have longer enjoyment, or +place, or pleasant climate, or society of men with whom thou mayst live +in harmony? but wilt thou be satisfied with thy present condition, and +pleased with all that is about thee, and wilt thou convince thyself that +thou hast everything, and that it comes from the gods, that everything +is well for thee, and will be well whatever shall please them, and +whatever they shall give for the conservation of the perfect living +being,[A] the good and just and beautiful, which generates and holds +together all things, and contains and embraces all things which are +dissolved for the production of other like things? Wilt thou never be +such that thou shalt so dwell in community with gods and men as neither +to find fault with them at all, nor to be condemned by them? + + [A] That is, God (iv. 40), as he is defined by Zeno. But the + confusion between gods and God is strange. + +2. Observe what thy nature requires, so far as thou art governed by +nature only: then do it and accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou art +a living being, shall not be made worse by it. And next thou must +observe what thy nature requires so far as thou art a living being. And +all this thou mayst allow thyself, if thy nature, so far as thou art a +rational animal, shall not be made worse by it. But the rational animal +is consequently also a political [social] animal. Use these rules, then, +and trouble thyself about nothing else. + +3. Everything which happens either happens in such wise as thou art +formed by nature to bear it, or as thou art not formed by nature to bear +it. If, then, it happens to thee in such way as thou art formed by +nature to bear it, do not complain, but bear it as thou art formed by +nature to bear it. But if it happens in such wise as thou art not formed +by nature to bear it, do not complain, for it will perish after it has +consumed thee. Remember, however, that thou art formed by nature to bear +everything, with respect to which it depends on thy own opinion to make +it endurable and tolerable, by thinking that it is either thy interest +or thy duty to do this. + +4. If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly and show him his error. But +if thou art not able, blame thyself, or blame not even thyself. + +5. Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee from all +eternity; and the implication of causes was from eternity spinning the +thread of thy being, and of that which is incident to it (iii. 11; iv. +26). + +6. Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms, or nature [is a +system], let this first be established, that I am a part of the whole +which is governed by nature; next, I am in a manner intimately related +to the parts which are of the same kind with myself. For remembering +this, inasmuch as I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of the +things which are assigned to me out of the whole; for nothing is +injurious to the part if it is for the advantage of the whole. For the +whole contains nothing which is not for its advantage; and all natures +indeed have this common principle, but the nature of the universe has +this principle besides, that it cannot be compelled even by any external +cause to generate anything harmful to itself. By remembering, then, that +I am a part of such a whole, I shall be content with everything that +happens. And inasmuch as I am in a manner intimately related to the +parts which are of the same kind with myself, I shall do nothing +unsocial, but I shall rather direct myself to the things which are of +the same kind with myself, and I shall turn all my efforts to the common +interest, and divert them from the contrary. Now, if these things are +done so, life must flow on happily, just as thou mayst observe that the +life of a citizen is happy, who continues a course of action which is +advantageous to his fellow-citizens, and is content with whatever the +state may assign to him. + +7. The parts of the whole, everything, I mean, which is naturally +comprehended in the universe, must of necessity perish; but let this be +understood in this sense, that they must undergo change. But if this is +naturally both an evil and a necessity for the parts, the whole would +not continue to exist in a good condition, the parts being subject to +change and constituted so as to perish in various ways. For whether did +Nature herself design to do evil to the things which are parts of +herself, and to make them subject to evil and of necessity fall into +evil, or have such results happened without her knowing it? Both these +suppositions, indeed, are incredible. But if a man should even drop the +term Nature [as an efficient power], and should speak of these things as +natural, even then it would be ridiculous to affirm at the same time +that the parts of the whole are in their nature subject to change, and +at the same time to be surprised or vexed as if something were happening +contrary to nature, particularly as the dissolution of things is into +those things of which each thing is composed. For there is either a +dispersion of the elements out of which everything has been compounded, +or a change from the solid to the earthy and from the airy to the +aerial, so that these parts are taken back into the universal reason, +whether this at certain periods is consumed by fire or renewed by +eternal changes. And do not imagine that the solid and the airy part +belong to thee from the time of generation. For all this received its +accretion only yesterday and the day before, as one may say, from the +food and the air which is inspired. This, then, which has received [the +accretion], changes, not that which thy mother brought forth. But +suppose that this [which thy mother brought forth] implicates thee very +much with that other part, which has the peculiar quality [of change], +this is nothing in fact in the way of objection to what is said.[A] + + [A] The end of this section is perhaps corrupt. The meaning is + very obscure. I have given that meaning which appears to be + consistent with the whole argument. The emperor here maintains + that the essential part of man is unchangeable, and that the + other parts, if they change or perish, do not affect that which + really constitutes the man. See the Philosophy of Antoninus, p. + 56, note 2. Schultz supposed "thy mother" to mean nature, + [Greek: he physis]. But I doubt about that. + +8. When thou hast assumed these names, good, modest, true, rational, a +man of equanimity, and magnanimous, take care that thou dost not change +these names; and if thou shouldst lose them, quickly return to them. And +remember that the term Rational was intended to signify a discriminating +attention to every several thing, and freedom from negligence; and that +Equanimity is the voluntary acceptance of the things which are assigned +to thee by the common nature; and that Magnanimity is the elevation of +the intelligent part above the pleasurable or painful sensations of the +flesh, and above that poor thing called fame, and death, and all such +things. If, then, thou maintainest thyself in the possession of these +names, without desiring to be called by these names by others, thou wilt +be another person and wilt enter on another life. For to continue to be +such as thou hast hitherto been, and to be torn in pieces and defiled in +such a life, is the character of a very stupid man and one over-fond of +his life, and like those half-devoured fighters with wild beasts, who +though covered with wounds and gore, still intreat to be kept to the +following day, though they will be exposed in the same state to the same +claws and bites.[A] Therefore fix thyself in the possession of these few +names: and if thou art able to abide in them, abide as if thou wast +removed to certain islands of the Happy.[B] But if thou shalt perceive +that thou fallest out of them and dost not maintain thy hold, go +courageously into some nook where thou shalt maintain them, or even +depart at once from life, not in passion, but with simplicity and +freedom and modesty, after doing this one [laudable] thing at least in +thy life, to have gone out of it thus. In order, however to the +remembrance of these names, it will greatly help thee if thou +rememberest the gods, and that they wish not to be flattered, but wish +all reasonable beings to be made like themselves; and if thou +rememberest that what does the work of a fig-tree is a fig-tree, and +that what does the work of a dog is a dog, and that what does the work +of a bee is a bee, and that what does the work of a man is a man. + + [A] See Seneca, Epp. 70, on these exhibitions which amused the + people of those days. These fighters were the Bestiarri, some + of whom may have been criminals; but even if they were, the + exhibition was equally characteristic of the depraved habits of + the spectators. + + [B] The islands of the Happy, or the Fortunatae Insulae, are + spoken of by the Greek and Roman writers. They were the abode + of Heroes, like Achilles and Diomedes, as we see in the Scolion + of Harmodius and Aristogiton. Sertorius heard of the islands at + Cadiz from some sailors who had been there; and he had a wish + to go and live in them and rest from his troubles (Plutarch, + Sertorius, c. 8). In the Odyssey, Proteus told Menelaus that he + should not die in Argos, but be removed to a place at the + boundary of the earth where Rhadamanthus dwelt (Odyssey, iv. + 565):-- + + "For there in sooth man's life is easiest: + Nor snow nor raging storm nor rain is there + But ever gently breathing gales of Zephyr + Oceanus sends up to gladden man." + + It is certain that the writer of the Odyssey only follows some + old legend, without having any knowledge of any place which + corresponds to his description. The two islands which Sertorius + heard of may be Madeira and the adjacent island. Compare + Pindar, Ol. ii. 129. + +9. Mimi,[A] war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, will daily wipe out +those holy principles of thine. + How many things without studying +nature dost thou imagine, and how many dost thou neglect?[B] But it is +thy duty so to look on and so to do everything, that at the same time +the power of dealing with circumstances is perfected, and the +contemplative faculty is exercised, and the confidence which comes from +the knowledge of each several thing is maintained without showing it, +but yet not concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy simplicity, when +gravity, and when the knowledge of every several thing, both what it is +in substance, and what place it has in the universe, and how long it is +formed to exist, and of what things it is compounded, and to whom it can +belong, and who are able both to give it and take it away? + + [A] Corais conjectured [Greek: misos] "hatred" in place of + Mimi, Roman plays in which action and gesticulation were all or + nearly all. + + [B] This is corrupt. See the addition of Schultz. + +10. A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, and another when he has +caught a poor hare, and another when he has taken a little fish in a +net, and another when he has taken wild boars, and another when he has +taken bears, and another when he has taken Sarmatians. Are not these +robbers, if thou examinest their opinions?[A] + +11. Acquire the contemplative way of seeing how all things change into +one another, and constantly attend to it, and exercise thyself about +this part [of philosophy]. For nothing is so much adapted to produce +magnanimity. Such a man has put off the body, and as he sees that he +must, no one knows how soon, go away from among men and leave everything +here, he gives himself up entirely to just doing in all his actions, and +in everything else that happens he resigns himself to the universal +nature. But as to what any man shall say or think about him or do +against him, he never even thinks of it, being himself contented with +these two things--with acting justly in what he now does, and being +satisfied with what is now assigned to him; and he lays aside all +distracting and busy pursuits, and desires nothing else than to +accomplish the straight course through the law[B] and by accomplishing +the straight course to follow God. + + [A] Marcus means to say that conquerors are robbers. He himself + warred against Sarmatians, and was a robber, as he says, like + the rest. But compare the life of Avidius Cassius, c. 4, by + Vulcatius. + + [B] By the law he means the divine law, obedience to the will + of God. + +12. What need is there of suspicious fear, since it is in thy power to +inquire what ought to be done? And if thou seest clear, go by this way +content, without turning back; but if thou dost not see clear, stop and +take the best advisers. But if any other things oppose thee, go on +according to thy powers with due consideration, keeping to that which +appears to be just. For it is best to reach this object, and if thou +dost fail, let thy failure be in attempting this. He who follows reason +in all things is both tranquil and active at the same time, and also +cheerful and collected. + +13. Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest from sleep whether it will +make any difference to thee if another does what is just and right. It +will make no difference (vi. 32; viii. 55). + +Thou hast not forgotten, I suppose, that those who assume arrogant airs +in bestowing their praise or blame on others are such as they are at bed +and at board, and thou hast not forgotten what they do, and what they +avoid, and what they pursue, and how they steal and how they rob, not +with hands and feet, but with their most valuable part, by means of +which there is produced, when a man chooses, fidelity, modesty, truth, +law, a good daemon [happiness] (vii. 17)? + +14. To her who gives and takes back all, to nature, the man who is +instructed and modest says, Give what thou wilt; take back what thou +wilt. And he says this not proudly, but obediently, and well pleased +with her. + +15. Short is the little which remains to thee of life. Live as on a +mountain. For it makes no difference whether a man lives there or here, +if he lives everywhere in the world as in a state [political community]. +Let me see, let them know a real man who lives according to nature. If +they cannot endure him, let them kill him. For that is better than to +live thus [as men do]. + +16. No longer talk at all about the kind of man that a good man ought to +be, but be such. + +17. Constantly contemplate the whole of time and the whole of substance, +and consider that all individual things as to substance are a grain of a +fig, and as to time the turning of a gimlet. + +18. Look at everything that exists, and observe that it is already in +dissolution and in change, and as it were putrefaction or dispersion, or +that everything is so constituted by nature as to die. + +19. Consider what men are when they are eating, sleeping, generating, +easing themselves, and so forth. Then what kind of men they are when +they are imperious + and arrogant, or angry and scolding from their +elevated place. But a short time ago to how many they were slaves and +for what things; and after a little time consider in what a condition +they will be. + +20. That is for the good of each thing, which the universal nature +brings to each. And it is for its good at the time when nature brings +it. + +21. "The earth loves the shower;" and "the solemn ether loves;" and the +universe loves to make whatever is about to be. I say then to the +universe, that I love as thou lovest. And is not this too said that +"this or that loves [is wont] to be produced?"[A] + +22. Either thou livest here and hast already accustomed thyself to it, +or thou art going away, and this was thy own will; or thou art dying and +hast discharged thy duty. But besides these things there is nothing. Be +of good cheer, then. + +23. Let this always be plain to thee, that this piece of land is like +any other; and that all things here are the same with things on the top +of a mountain, or on the sea-shore, or wherever thou choosest to be. For +thou wilt find just what Plato says, Dwelling within the walls of a city +as in a shepherd's fold on a mountain. [The three last words are omitted +in the translation.][B] + + [A] These words are from Euripides. They are cited by + Aristotle, Ethic. Nicom. viii. 1. Athenaeus (xiii. 296) and + Stobaeus quote seven complete lines beginning [Greek: era men + ombrou gaia]. There is a similar fragment of Aeschylus, + Danaides, also quoted by Athenaeus. + + It was the fashion of the Stoics to work on the meanings of + words. So Antoninus here takes the verb [Greek: philei], + "loves," which has also the sense of "is wont," "uses," and the + like. He finds in the common language of mankind a + philosophical truth, and most great truths are expressed in the + common language of life; some understand them, but most people + utter them without knowing how much they mean. + + [B] Plato, Theaet. 174 D.E. But compare the original with the + use that Antoninus has made of it. + +24. What is my ruling faculty now to me? and of what nature am I now +making it? and for what purpose am I now using it? is it void of +understanding? is it loosed and rent asunder from social life? is it +melted into and mixed with the poor flesh so as to move together with +it? + +25. He who flies from his master is a runaway; but the law is master, +and he who breaks the law is a runaway. And he also who is grieved or +angry or afraid, + is dissatisfied because something has been or is or +shall be of the things which are appointed by him who rules all things, +and he is Law and assigns to every man what is fit. He then who fears or +is grieved or is angry is a runaway.[A] + + [A] Antoninus is here playing on the etymology, of [Greek: + nomos], law, assignment, that which assigns ([Greek: nemei]) to + every man his portion. + +26. A man deposits seed in a womb and goes away, and then another cause +takes it and labors on it, and makes a child. What a thing from such a +material! Again, the child passes food down through the throat, and then +another cause takes it and makes perception and motion, and in fine, +life and strength and other things; how many and how strange! Observe +then the things which are produced in such a hidden way, and see the +power, just as we see the power which carries things downwards and +upwards, not with the eyes, but still no less plainly (vii. 85). + +27. Constantly consider how all things such as they now are, in time +past also were; and consider that they will be the same again. And place +before thy eyes entire dramas and stages of the same form, whatever thou +hast learned from thy experience or from older history; for example, the +whole court of Hadrianus, and the whole court of Antoninus, and the +whole court of Philippus, Alexander, Croesus; for all those were such +dramas as we see now, only with different actors. + +28. Imagine every man who is grieved at anything or discontented to be +like a pig which is sacrificed and kicks and screams. + +Like this pig also is he who on his bed in silence laments the bonds in +which we are held. And consider that only to the rational animal is it +given to follow voluntarily what happens; but simply to follow is a +necessity imposed on all. + +29. Severally on the occasion of everything that thou dost, pause and +ask thyself if death is a dreadful thing because it deprives thee of +this. + +30. When thou art offended at any man's fault, forthwith turn to thyself +and reflect in what like manner thou dost err thyself; for example, in +thinking that money is a good thing, or pleasure, or a bit of +reputation, and the like. For by attending to this thou wilt quickly +forget thy anger, if this consideration also is added, that the man is +compelled: for what else could he do? or, if thou art able, take away +from him the compulsion. + +31. When thou hast seen Satyron[A] the Socratic,+ think of either +Eutyches or Hymen, and when thou hast seen Euphrates, think of Eutychion +or Silvanus, and when thou hast seen Alciphron think of Tropaeophorus, +and when thou hast seen Xenophon, think of Crito[B] or Severus, and when +thou hast looked on thyself, think of any other Caesar, and in the case +of every one do in like manner. Then let this thought be in thy mind, +Where then are those men? Nowhere, or nobody knows where. For thus +continuously thou wilt look at human things as smoke and nothing at all; +especially if thou reflectest at the same time that what has once +changed will never exist again in the infinite duration of time. But +thou, in what a brief space of time is thy existence? And why art thou +not content to pass through this short time in an orderly way? What +matter and opportunity [for thy activity] art thou avoiding? For what +else are all these things, except exercises for the reason, when it has +viewed carefully and by examination into their nature the things which +happen in life? Persevere then until thou shalt have made these things +thy own, as the stomach which is strengthened makes all things its own, +as the blazing fire makes flame and brightness out of everything that is +thrown into it. + +32. Let it not be in any man's power to say truly of thee that thou are +not simple or that thou art not good; but let him be a liar whoever +shall think anything of this kind about thee; and this is altogether in +thy power. For who is he that shall hinder thee from being good and +simple? Do thou only determine to live no longer unless thou shalt be +such. For neither does reason allow [thee to live], if thou art not +such.[C] + + [A] Nothing is known of Satyron or Satyrion; nor, I believe, of + Eutyches or Hymen. Euphrates is honorably mentioned by + Epictetus (iii. 15, 8; iv. 8, 17). Pliny (Epp. i. 10) speaks + very highly of him. He obtained the permission of the Emperor + Hadrian to drink poison, because he was old and in bad health + (Dion Cassius, 69, c. 8). + + [B] Crito is the friend of Socrates; and he was, it appears, + also a friend of Xenophon. When the emperor says "seen" + ([Greek: idon]), he does not mean with the eyes. + + [C] Compare Epictetus, i. 29, 28. + +33. What is that which as to this material [our life] can be done or +said in the way most conformable to reason? For whatever this may be, it +is in thy power to do it or to say it, and do not make excuses that thou +art hindered. Thou wilt not cease to lament till thy mind is in such a +condition that what luxury is to those who enjoy pleasure, such shall be +to thee, in the matter which is subjected and presented to thee, the +doing of the things which are conformable to man's constitution; for a +man ought to consider as an enjoyment everything which it is in his +power to do according to his own nature. And it is in his power +everywhere. Now, it is not given to a cylinder to move everywhere by its +own motion, nor yet to water nor to fire, nor to anything else which is +governed by nature or an irrational soul, for the things which check +them and stand in the way are many. But intelligence and reason are able +to go through everything that opposes them, and in such manner as they +are formed by nature and as they choose. Place before thy eyes this +facility with which the reason will be carried through all things, as +fire upwards, as a stone downwards, as a cylinder down an inclined +surface, and seek for nothing further. For all other obstacles either +affect the body only, which is a dead thing; or, except through opinion +and the yielding of the reason itself, they do not crush nor do any harm +of any kind; for if they did, he who felt it would immediately become +bad. Now, in the case of all things which have a certain constitution, +whatever harm may happen to any of them, that which is so affected +becomes consequently worse; but in the like case, a man becomes both +better, if one may say so, and more worthy of praise by making a right +use of these accidents. And finally remember that nothing harms him who +is really a citizen, which does not harm the state; nor yet does +anything harm the state, which does not harm law [order]; and of these +things which are called misfortunes not one harms law. What then does +not harm law does not harm either state or citizen. + +34. To him who is penetrated by true principles even the briefest +precept is sufficient, and any common precept, to remind him that he +should be free from grief and fear. For example:-- + + "Leaves, some the wind scatters on the ground-- + So is the race of men."[A] + +Leaves, also, are thy children; and leaves, too, are they who cry out as +if they were worthy of credit and bestow their praise, or on the +contrary curse, or secretly blame and sneer; and leaves, in like manner, +are those who shall receive and transmit a man's fame to after-times. +For all such things as these "are produced in the season of spring," as +the poet says; then the wind casts them down; then the forest produces +other leaves in their places. But a brief existence is common to all +things, and yet thou avoidest and pursuest all things as if they would +be eternal. A little time, and thou shalt close thy eyes; and him who +has attended thee to thy grave another soon will lament. + + [A] Homer, II., vi. 146. + +35. The healthy eye ought to see all visible things and not to say, I +wish for green things; for this is the condition of a diseased eye. And +the healthy hearing and smelling ought to be ready to perceive all that +can be heard and smelled. And the healthy stomach ought to be with +respect to all food just as the mill with respect to all things which it +is formed to grind. And accordingly the healthy understanding ought to +be prepared for everything which happens; but that which says, Let my +dear children live, and let all men praise whatever I may do, is an eye +which seeks for green things, or teeth which seek for soft things. + +36. There is no man so fortunate that there shall not be by him when he +is dying some who are pleased with what is going to happen.[A] Suppose +that he was a good and wise man, will there not be at least some one to +say to himself, Let us at last breathe freely, being relieved from this +schoolmaster? It is true that he was harsh to none of us, but I +perceived that he tacitly condemns us.--This is what is said of a good +man. But in our own case how many other things are there for which there +are many who wish to get rid of us? Thou wilt consider this, then, when +thou art dying, and thou wilt depart more contentedly by reflecting +thus: I am going away from such a life, in which even my associates in +behalf of whom I have striven so much, prayed, and cared, themselves +wish me to depart, hoping perchance to get some little advantage by it. +Why then should a man cling to a longer stay here? Do not, however, for +this reason go away less kindly disposed to them, but preserving thy own +character, and friendly and benevolent and mild, and on the other hand +not as if thou wast torn away; but as when a man dies a quiet death, the +poor soul is easily separated from the body, such also ought thy +departure from men to be, for nature united thee to them and associated +thee. But does she now dissolve the union? Well, I am separated as from +kinsmen, not however dragged resisting, but without compulsion; for +this, too, is one of the things according to nature. + + [A] He says [Greek: kakon], but as he affirms in other places + that death is no evil, he must mean what others may call an + evil, and he means only "what is going to happen." + +37. Accustom thyself as much as possible on the occasion of anything +being done by any person to inquire with thyself, For what object is +this man doing this? But begin with thyself, and examine thyself first. + +38. Remember that this which pulls the strings is the thing which is +hidden within: this is the power of persuasion, this is life, this, if +one may so say, is man. In contemplating thyself never include the +vessel which surrounds thee and these instruments which are attached +about it. For they are like to an axe, differing only in this, that they +grow to the body. For indeed there is no more use in these parts without +the cause which moves and checks them than in the weaver's shuttle, and +the writer's pen, and the driver's whip.[A] + + [A] See the Philosophy of Antoninus, p. 72, note. + + + + +XI. + + +These are the properties of the rational soul: it sees itself, analyzes +itself, and makes itself such as it chooses; the fruit which it bears +itself enjoys--for the fruits of plants and that in animals which +corresponds to fruits others enjoy--it obtains its own end, wherever the +limit of life may be fixed. Not as in a dance and in a play and in such +like things, where the whole action is incomplete if anything cuts it +short; but in every part, and wherever it may be stopped, it makes what +has been set before it full and complete, so that it can say, I have +what is my own. And further it traverses the whole universe, and the +surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and it extends itself into the +infinity of time, and embraces and comprehends the[A] periodical +renovation of all things, and it comprehends that those who come after +us will see nothing new, nor have those before us seen anything more, +but in a manner he who is forty years old, if he has any understanding +at all, has seen by virtue of the uniformity that prevails all things +which have been and all that will be. This too is a property of the +rational soul, love of one's neighbor, and truth and modesty, and to +value nothing more than itself, which is also the property of Law.[B] +Thus the right reason differs not at all from the reason of justice. + + [A] [Greek: Ten periodiken palingenesian]. See v. 13, 32; x. + 7. + + [B] Law is the order by which all things are governed. + +2. Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song and dancing and the +pancratium, if thou wilt distribute the melody of the voice into its +several sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if thou art mastered by +this; for thou wilt be prevented by shame from confessing it: and in the +matter of dancing, if at each movement and attitude thou wilt do the +same; and the like also in the matter of the pancratium. In all things, +then, except virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to apply thyself to +their several parts, and by this division to come to value them little: +and apply this rule also to thy whole life. + +3. What a soul that is which is ready, if at any moment it must be +separated from the body, and ready either to be extinguished or +dispersed or continue to exist; but so that this readiness comes from a +man's own judgment, not from mere obstinacy, as with the Christians,[A] +but considerately and with dignity and in a way to persuade another, +without tragic show. + + [A] See the Life of Antoninus. This is the only passage in + which the emperor speaks of the Christians. Epictetus (iv. 7, + 6) names them Galilaei. + +4. Have I done something for the general interest? Well then, I have +had my reward. Let this always be present to thy mind, and never stop +[doing such good]. + +5. What is thy art? To be good. And how is this accomplished well except +by general principles, some about the nature of the universe, and others +about the proper constitution of man? + +6. At first tragedies were brought on the stage as means of reminding +men of the things which happen to them, and that it is according to +nature for things to happen so, and that, if you are delighted with what +is shown on the stage, you should not be troubled with that which takes +place on the larger stage. For you see that these things must be +accomplished thus, and that even they bear them who cry out,[A] "O +Cithaeron." And, indeed, some things are said well by the dramatic +writers, of which kind is the following especially:-- + + "Me and my children if the gods neglect, + This has its reason too."[B] + +And again,-- + + "We must not chafe and fret at that which happens." + +And,-- + + "Life's harvest reap like the wheat's fruitful ear." + +And other things of the same kind. + +After tragedy the old comedy was introduced, which had a magisterial +freedom of speech, and by its very plainness of speaking was useful in +reminding men to beware of insolence; and for this purpose too Diogenes +used to take from these writers. + + [A] Sophocles, Oedipus Rex. + + [B] See vii. 41, 38, 40. + +But as to the middle comedy, which came next, observe what it was, and +again, for what object the new comedy was introduced, which gradually +sank down into a mere mimic artifice. That some good things are said +even by these writers, everybody knows: but the whole plan of such +poetry and dramaturgy, to what end does it look? + +7. How plain does it appear that there is not another condition of life +so well suited for philosophizing as this in which thou now happenest to +be. + +8. A branch cut off from the adjacent branch must of necessity be cut +off from the whole tree also. So too a man when he is separated from +another man has fallen off from the whole social community. Now as to a +branch, another cuts it off; but a man by his own act separates himself +from his neighbor when he hates him and turns away from him, and he does +not know that he has at the same time cut himself off from the whole +social system. Yet he has this privilege certainly from Zeus, who framed +society, for it is in our power to grow again to that which is near to +us, and again to become a part which helps to make up the whole. +However, if it often happens, this kind of separation, it makes it +difficult for that which detaches itself to be brought to unity and to +be restored to its former condition. Finally, the branch, which from the +first grew together with the tree, and has continued to have one life +with it, is not like that which after being cut off is then ingrafted, +for this is something like what the gardeners mean when they say that it +grows with the rest of the tree, but+ that it has not the same mind with +it. + +9. As those who try to stand in thy way when thou art proceeding +according to right reason will not be able to turn thee aside from thy +proper action, so neither let them drive thee from thy benevolent +feelings toward them, but be on thy guard equally in both matters, not +only in the matter of steady judgment and action, but also in the matter +of gentleness to those who try to hinder or otherwise trouble thee. For +this also is a weakness, to be vexed at them, as well as to be diverted +from thy course of action and to give way through fear; for both are +equally deserters from their post,--the man who does it through fear, +and the man who is alienated from him who is by nature a kinsman and a +friend. + +10. There is no nature which is inferior to art, for the arts imitate +the natures of things. But if this is so, that nature which is the most +perfect and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot fall short of +the skill of art Now all arts do the inferior things for the sake of +the superior; therefore the universal nature does so too. And, indeed, +hence is the origin of justice, and in justice the other virtues have +their foundation: for justice will not be observed, if we either care +for middle things [things indifferent], or are easily deceived and +careless and changeable (v. 16. 30; vii. 55). + +11. If the things do not come to thee, the pursuits and avoidances of +which disturb thee, still in a manner thou goest to them. Let then thy +judgment about them be at rest, and they will remain quiet, and thou +wilt not be seen either pursuing or avoiding. + +12. The spherical form of the soul maintains its figure when it is +neither extended towards any object, nor contracted inwards, nor +dispersed, nor sinks down, but is illuminated by light, by which it sees +the truth,--the truth of all things and the truth that is in itself +(viii. 41, 45; xii. 3). + +13. Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that himself. But +I will look to this, that I be not discovered doing or saying anything +deserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me? Let him look to it. But I +will be mild and benevolent towards every man, and ready to show even +him his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as making a display of my +endurance, but nobly and honestly, like the great Phocion, unless indeed +he only assumed it. For the interior [parts] ought to be such, and a +man ought to be seen by the gods neither dissatisfied with anything nor +complaining. For what evil is it to thee, if thou art now doing what is +agreeable to thy own nature, and art satisfied with that which at this +moment is suitable to the nature of the universe, since thou art a human +being placed at thy post in order that what is for the common advantage +may be done in some way? + +14. Men despise one another and flatter one another; and men wish to +raise themselves above one another, and crouch before one another. + +15. How unsound and insincere is he who says, I have determined to deal +with thee in a fair way!--What are thou doing, man? There is no occasion +to give this notice. It will soon show itself by acts. The voice ought +to be plainly written on the forehead. Such as a man's character is,+ he +immediately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is beloved forthwith +reads everything in the eyes of lovers. The man who is honest and good +ought to be exactly like a man who smells strong, so that the bystander +as soon as he comes near him must smell whether he choose or not. But +the affectation of simplicity is like a crooked stick.[A] Nothing is +more disgraceful than a wolfish friendship [false friendship]. Avoid +this most of all. The good and simple and benevolent show all these +things in the eyes, and there is no mistaking. + + [A] Instead of [Greek: skalme] Saumaise reads [Greek: skambe]. + There is a Greek proverb, [Greek: skambon xylon oudepot + orthon]: "You cannot make a crooked stick straight." + + The wolfish friendship is an allusion to the fable of the sheep + and the wolves. + +16. As to living in the best way, this power is in the soul, if it be +indifferent to things which are indifferent. And it will be indifferent, +if it looks on each of these things separately and all together, and if +it remembers that not one of them produces in us an opinion about +itself, nor comes to us; but these things remain immovable, and it is we +ourselves who produce the judgments about them, and, as we may say, +write them in ourselves, it being in our power not to write them, and it +being in our power, if perchance these judgments have imperceptibly got +admission to our minds, to wipe them out; and if we remember also that +such attention will only be for a short time, and then life will be at +an end. Besides, what trouble is there at all in doing this? For if +these things are according to nature, rejoice in them and they will be +easy to thee: but if contrary to nature, seek what is conformable to thy +own nature, and strive towards this, even if it bring no reputation; for +every man is allowed to seek his own good. + +17. Consider whence each thing is come, and of what it consists, + and +into what it changes, and what kind of a thing it will be when it has +changed, and that it will sustain no harm. + +18. [If any have offended against thee, consider first]: What is my +relation to men, and that we are made for one another; and in another +respect I was made to be set over them, as a ram over the flock or a +bull over the herd. But examine the matter from first principles, from +this. If all things are not mere atoms, it is nature which orders all +things: if this is so, the inferior things exist for the sake of the +superior, and these for the sake of one another (ii. 1; ix. 39; v. 16; +iii. 4). + +Second, consider what kind of men they are at table, in bed, and so +forth; and particularly, under what compulsions in respect of opinions +they are; and as to their acts, consider with what pride they do what +they do (viii. 14; ix. 34). + +Third, that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not to be +displeased: but if they do not right, it is plain that they do so +involuntarily and in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly +deprived of the truth, so also is it unwillingly deprived of the power +of behaving to each man according to his deserts. Accordingly men are +pained when they are called unjust, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a +word wrong-doers to their neighbors (vii. 62, 63; ii. 1; vii. 26; viii. +29). + +Fourth, consider that thou also doest many things wrong, and that thou +art a man like others; and even if thou dost abstain from certain +faults, still thou hast the disposition to commit them, though either +through cowardice, or concern about reputation, or some such mean +motive, thou dost abstain from such faults (i. 17). + +Fifth, consider that thou dost not even understand whether men are doing +wrong or not, for many things are done with a certain reference to +circumstances. And in short, a man must learn a great deal to enable him +to pass a correct judgment on another man's acts (ix. 38; iv. 51). + +Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed or grieved, that man's life is +only a moment, and after a short time we are all laid out dead (vii. 58; +iv. 48). + +Seventh, that it is not men's acts which disturb us, for those acts have +their foundation in men's ruling principles, but it is our own opinions +which disturb us. Take away these opinions then, and resolve to dismiss +thy judgment about an act as if it were something grievous, and thy +anger is gone. How then shall I take away these opinions? By reflecting +that no wrongful act of another brings shame on thee: for unless that +which is shameful is alone bad, thou also must of necessity do many +things wrong, and become a robber and everything else (v. 25; vii. 16). + +Eighth, consider how much more pain is brought on us by the anger and +vexation caused by such acts than by the acts themselves, at which we +are angry and vexed (iv. 39, 49; vii. 24). + +Ninth, consider that a good disposition is invincible if it be genuine, +and not an affected smile and acting a part. For what will the most +violent man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of a kind disposition +towards him, and if, as opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest him +and calmly correctest his errors at the very time when he is trying to +do thee harm, saying, Not so, my child: we are constituted by nature for +something else: I shall certainly not be injured, but thou art injuring +thyself, my child.--And show him with gentle tact and by general +principles that this is so, and that even bees do not do as he does, nor +any animals which are formed by nature to be gregarious. And thou must +do this neither with any double meaning nor in the way of reproach, but +affectionately and without any rancor in thy soul; and not as if thou +wert lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander may admire, but either +when he is alone, and if others are present ...[A] + + [A] It appears that there is a defect in the text here. + +Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst received them as a gift from +the Muses, and begin at last to be a man while thou livest. But thou +must equally avoid nattering men and being vexed at them, for both are +unsocial and lead to harm. And let this truth be present to thee in the +excitement of anger, that to be moved by passion is not manly, but that +mildness and gentleness, as they are more agreeable to human nature, so +also are they more manly; and he who possesses these qualities possesses +strength, nerves, and courage, and not the man who is subject to fits of +passion and discontent. For in the same degree in which a man's mind is +nearer to freedom from all passion, in the same degree also is it nearer +to strength: and as the sense of pain is a characteristic of weakness, +so also is anger. For he who yields to pain and he who yields to anger, +both are wounded and both submit. + +But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present from the leader of the +Muses [Apollo], and it is this,--that to expect bad men not to do wrong +is madness, for he who expects this desires an impossibility. But to +allow men to behave so to others, and to expect them not to do thee any +wrong, is irrational and tyrannical. + +19. There are four principal aberrations of the superior faculty against +which thou shouldst be constantly on thy guard, and when thou hast +detected them, thou shouldst wipe them out and say on each occasion +thus: This thought is not necessary: this tends to destroy social union: +this which thou art going to say comes not from the real thoughts; for +thou shouldst consider it among the most absurd of things for a man not +to speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth is when thou shalt +reproach thyself for anything, for this is an evidence of the diviner +part within thee being overpowered and yielding to the less honorable +and to the perishable part, the body, and to its gross pleasures (iv. +24; ii. 16). + +20. Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts which are mingled in thee, +though by nature they have an upward tendency, still in obedience to the +disposition of the universe they are overpowered here in the compound +mass [the body]. And also the whole of the earthy part in thee and the +watery, though their tendency is downward, still are raised up and +occupy a position which is not their natural one. In this manner then +the elemental parts obey the universal; for when they have been fixed in +any place, perforce they remain there until again the universal shall +sound the signal for dissolution. Is it not then strange that thy +intelligent part only should be disobedient and discontented with its +own place? And yet no force is imposed on it, but only those things +which are conformable to its nature: still it does not submit, but is +carried in the opposite direction. For the movement towards injustice +and intemperance and to anger and grief and fear is nothing else than +the act of one who deviates from nature. And also when the ruling +faculty is discontented with anything that happens, then too it deserts +its post: for it is constituted for piety and reverence towards the gods +no less than for justice. For these qualities also are comprehended +under the generic term of contentment with the constitution of things, +and indeed they are prior[A] to acts of justice. + + [A] The word [Greek: presbytera], which is here translated + "prior," may also mean "superior;" but Antoninus seems to say + that piety and reverence of the gods precede all virtues, and + that other virtues are derived from them, even justice, which + in another passage (xi. 10) he makes the foundation of all + virtues. The ancient notion of justice is that of giving to + every one his due. It is not a legal definition, as some have + supposed, but a moral rule which law cannot in all cases + enforce. Besides, law has its own rules, which are sometimes + moral and sometimes immoral; but it enforces them all simply + because they are general rules, and if it did not or could not + enforce them, so far Law would not be Law. Justice, or the + doing what is just, implies a universal rule and obedience to + it; and as we all live under universal Law, which commands both + our body and our intelligence, and is the law of our nature, + that is, the law of the whole constitution of a man, we must + endeavor to discover what this supreme Law is. It is the will + of the power that rules all. By acting in obedience to this + will, we do justice, and by consequence everything else that we + ought to do. + +21. He who has not one and always the same object in life, cannot be one +and the same all through his life. But what I have said is not enough, +unless this also is added, what this object ought to be. For as there is +not the same opinion about all the things which in some way or other are +considered by the majority to be good, but only about some certain +things, that is, things which concern the common interest, so also ought +we to propose to ourselves an object which shall be of a common kind +[social] and political. For he who directs all his own efforts to this +object, will make all his acts alike, and thus will always be the same. + +22. Think of the country mouse and of the town mouse, and of the alarm +and trepidation of the town mouse.[A] + +23. Socrates used to call the opinions of the many by the name of +Lamiae,--bugbears to frighten children. + +24. The Lacedaemonians at their public spectacles used to set seats in +the shade for strangers, but themselves sat down anywhere. + +25. Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas[B] for not going to him, +saying, It is because I would not perish by the worst of all ends; that +is, I would not receive a favor and then be unable to return it. + +26. In the writings of the [Ephesians][C] there was this precept, +constantly to think of some one of the men of former times who practiced +virtue. + + [A] The story is told by Horace in his Satires (ii. 6), and by + others since but not better. + + [B] Perhaps the emperor made a mistake here, for other writers + say that it was Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, who invited + Socrates to Macedonia. + + [C] Gataker suggested [Greek: Epekoureion] for [Greek: + Ephesion]. + +27. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the heavens that we +may be reminded of those bodies which continually do the same things +and in the same manner perform their work, and also be reminded of their +purity and nudity. For there is no veil over a star. + +28. Consider what a man Socrates was when he dressed himself in a skin, +after Xanthippe had taken his cloak and gone out, and what Socrates said +to his friends who were ashamed of him and drew back from him when they +saw him dressed thus. + +29. Neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to lay down +rules for others before thou shalt have first learned to obey rules +thyself. Much more is this so in life. + +30. A slave thou art: free speech is not for thee. + +31. And my heart laughed within. + _Odyssey_, ix. 413. + +32. And virtue they will curse, speaking harsh words. + HESIOD, _Works and Days_, 184. + +33. To look for the fig in winter is a mad-man's act: such is he who +looks for his child when it is no longer allowed (Epictetus, iii. 24, +87). + +34. When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should whisper to +himself, "To-morrow perchance thou wilt die."--But those are words of +bad omen.--"No word is a word of bad omen," said Epictetus, "which +expresses any work of nature; or if it is so, it is also a word of bad +omen to speak of the ears of corn being reaped" (Epictetus, iii. 24, 88). + +35. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried grape, are all changes, +not into nothing, but into something which exists not yet (Epictetus, +iii. 24). + +36. No man can rob us of our free will (Epictetus, iii. 22, 105). + +37. Epictetus also said, a man must discover an art [or rules] with +respect to giving his assent; and in respect to his movements he must be +careful that they be made with regard to circumstances, that they be +consistent with social interests, that they have regard to the value of +the object; and as to sensual desire, he should altogether keep away +from it; and as to avoidance [aversion], he should not show it with +respect to any of the things which are not in our power. + +38. The dispute then, he said, is not about any common matter, but about +being mad or not. + +39. Socrates used to say, What do you want, souls of rational men or +irrational?--Souls of rational men.--Of what rational men, sound or +unsound?--Sound.--Why then do you not seek for them?--Because we have +them.--Why then do you fight and quarrel? + + + + +XII. + + +All those things at which thou wishest to arrive by a circuitous road +thou canst have now, if thou dost not refuse them to thyself. And this +means, if thou wilt take no notice of all the past, and trust the future +to providence, and direct the present only conformably to piety and +justice. Conformably to piety that thou mayest be content with the lot +which is assigned to thee, for nature designed it for thee and thee for +it. Conformably to justice, that thou mayst always speak the truth +freely and without disguise, and do the things which are agreeable to +law and according to the worth of each. And let neither another man's +wickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor voice, nor yet the sensations of +the poor flesh which has grown about thee; for the passive part will +look to this. If, then, whatever the time may be when thou shalt be near +to thy departure, neglecting everything else thou shalt respect only thy +ruling faculty and the divinity within thee, and if thou shalt be afraid +not because thou must some time cease to live, but if thou shalt fear +never to have begun to live according to nature--then thou wilt be a man +worthy of the universe which has produced thee, and thou wilt cease to +be a stranger in thy native land, and to wonder at things which happen +daily as if they were something unexpected, and to be dependent on this +or that. + +2. God sees the minds [ruling principles] of all men bared of the +material vesture and rind and impurities. For with his intellectual part +alone he touches the intelligence only which has flowed and been derived +from himself into these bodies. And if thou also usest thyself to do +this, thou wilt rid thyself of thy much trouble. For he who regards not +the poor flesh which envelops him, surely will not trouble himself by +looking after raiment and dwelling and fame and such like externals and +show. + +3. The things are three of which thou art composed: a little body, a +little breath [life], intelligence. Of these the first two are thine, so +far as it is thy duty to take care of them; but the third alone is +properly thine. Therefore if thou shalt separate from thyself, that is, +from thy understanding, whatever others do or say, and whatever thou +hast done or said thyself, and whatever future things trouble thee +because they may happen, and whatever in the body which envelops thee or +in the breath [life], which is by nature associated with the body, is +attached to thee independent of thy will, and whatever the external +circumfluent vortex whirls round, so that the intellectual power exempt +from the things of fate can live pure and free by itself, doing what is +just and accepting what happens and saying the truth: if thou wilt +separate, I say, from this ruling faculty the things which are attached +to it by the impressions of sense, and the things of time to come and of +time that is past, and wilt make thyself like Empedocles' sphere, + + "All round and in its joyous rest reposing;"[A] + +and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life, that is, +the present,--then thou wilt be able to pass that portion of life which +remains for thee up to the time of thy death free from perturbations, +nobly, and obedient to thy own daemon [to the god that is within thee] +(ii. 13, 17; iii. 5, 6; xi. 12). + +4. I have often wondered how it is that every man loves himself more +than all the rest of men, but yet sets less value on his own opinion of +himself than on the opinion of others. If then a god or a wise teacher +should present himself to a man and bid him to think of nothing and to +design nothing which he would not express as soon as he conceived it, he +could not endure it even for a single day.[B] So much more respect have +we to what our neighbors shall think of us than to what we shall think +of ourselves. + + [A] The verse of Empedocles is corrupt in Antoninus. It has + been restored by Peyron from a Turin manuscript, thus:-- + + [Greek: Sphairos kykloteres monie perigethei gaion.] + + [B] iii. 4. + +5. How can it be that the gods, after having arranged all things well +and benevolently for mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some men, +and very good men, and men who, as we may say, have had most communion +with the divinity, and through pious acts and religious observances have +been most intimate with the divinity, when they have once died should +never exist again, but should be completely extinguished? + +But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been otherwise, +the gods would have done it. For if it were just, it would also be +possible; and if it were according to nature, nature would have had it +so. But because it is not so, if in fact it is not so, be thou convinced +that it ought not to have been so: for thou seest even of thyself that +in this inquiry thou art disputing with the Deity; and we should not +thus dispute with the gods, unless they were most excellent and most +just; but if this is so, they would not have allowed anything in the +ordering of the universe to be neglected unjustly and irrationally. + +6. Practise thyself even in the things which thou despairest of +accomplishing. For even the left hand, which is ineffectual for all +other things for want of practice, holds the bridle more vigorously than +the right hand; for it has been practised in this. + +7. Consider in what condition both in body and soul a man should be when +he is overtaken by death; and consider the shortness of life, the +boundless abyss of time past and future, the feebleness of all matter. + +8. Contemplate the formative principles [forms] of things bare of their +coverings; the purposes of actions; consider what pain is, what pleasure +is, and death, and fame; who is to himself the cause of his uneasiness; +how no man is hindered by another; that everything is opinion. + +9. In the application of thy principles thou must be like the +pancratiast, not like the gladiator; for the gladiator lets fall the +sword which he uses and is killed; but the other always has his hand, +and needs to do nothing else than use it. + +10. See what things are in themselves, dividing them into matter, form, +and purpose. + +11. What a power man has to do nothing except what God will approve, and +to accept all that God may give him. + +12. With respect to that which happens conformably to nature, we ought +to blame neither gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily or +involuntarily, nor men, for they do nothing wrong except involuntarily. +Consequently we should blame nobody (ii. 11, 12, 13; vii. 62; 18 viii. +17). + +13. How ridiculous and what a stranger he is who is surprised at +anything which happens in life. + +14. Either there is a fatal necessity and invincible order, or a kind +providence, or a confusion without a purpose and without a director +(iv. 27). If then there is an invincible necessity, why dost thou +resist? But if there is a providence which allows itself to be +propitiated, make thyself worthy of the help of the divinity. But if +there is a confusion without a governor, be content that in such a +tempest thou hast in thyself a certain ruling intelligence. And even if +the tempest carry thee away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the poor +breath, everything else; for the intelligence at least it will not carry +away. + +15. Does the light of the lamp shine without losing its splendor until +it is extinguished? and shall the truth which is in thee and justice and +temperance be extinguished [before thy death]? + +16. When a man has presented the appearance of having done wrong [say], +How then do I know if this is a wrongful act? And even if he has done +wrong, how do I know that he has not condemned himself? And so this is +like tearing his own face. Consider that he who would not have the bad +man do wrong, is like the man who would not have the fig-tree to bear +juice in the figs, and infants to cry, and the horse to neigh, and +whatever else must of necessity be. For what must a man do who has such +a character? If then thou art irritable, + cure this man's +disposition.[A] + +17. If it is not right, do not do it: if it is not true, do not say it. +[For let thy efforts be--][B] + + [A] The interpreters translate [Greek: gorgos] by the words + "acer, validusque," and "skilful." But in Epictetus (ii. 16, + 20; iii. 12, 10) [Greek: gorgos] means "vehement," "prone to + anger," "irritable." + + [B] There is something wrong here, or incomplete. + +18. In everything always observe what the thing is which produces for +thee an appearance, and resolve it by dividing it into the formal, the +material, the purpose, and the time within which it must end. + +19. Perceive at last that thou hast in thee something better and more +divine than the things which cause the various affects, and as it were +pull thee by the strings. What is there now in my mind,--is it fear, or +suspicion, or desire, or anything of the kind (v. 11)? + +20. First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor without a purpose. Second, +make thy acts refer to nothing else than to a social end. + +21. Consider that before long thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, nor will +any of the things exist which thou now seest, nor any of those who are +now living. For all things are formed by nature to change and be turned +and to perish, in order that other things in continuous succession may +exist (ix. 28). + +22. Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power. +Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner who +has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and +a waveless bay. + +23. Any one activity, whatever it may be, when it has ceased at its +proper time, suffers no evil because it has ceased; nor he who has done +this act, does he suffer any evil for this reason, that the act has +ceased. In like manner then the whole, which consists of all the acts, +which is our life, if it cease at its proper time, suffers no evil for +this reason, that it has ceased; nor he who has terminated this series +at the proper time, has he been ill dealt with. But the proper time and +the limit nature fixes, sometimes as in old age the peculiar nature of +man, but always the universal nature, by the change of whose parts the +whole universe continues ever young and perfect.[A] And everything which +is useful to the universal is always good and in season. Therefore the +termination of life for every man is no evil, because neither is it +shameful, since it is both independent of the will and not opposed to +the general interest, but it is good, since it is seasonable, and +profitable to and congruent with the universal. For thus too he is moved +by the Deity who is moved in the same manner with the Deity, and moved +towards the same thing in his mind. + + [A] vii. 25. + +24. These three principles thou must have in readiness: In the things +which thou doest, do nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise than as +justice herself would act; but with respect to what may happen to thee +from without, consider that it happens either by chance or according to +providence, and thou must neither blame chance nor accuse providence. +Second, consider what every being is from the seed to the time of its +receiving a soul, and from the reception of a soul to the giving back of +the same, and of what things every being is compounded, and into what +things it is resolved. Third, if thou shouldst suddenly be raised up +above the earth, and shouldst look down on human things, and observe the +variety of them how great it is, and at the same time also shouldst see +at a glance how great is the number of beings who dwell all around in +the air and the ether, consider that as often as thou shouldst be raised +up, thou wouldst see the same things, sameness of form and shortness of +duration. Are these things to be proud of? + +25. Cast away opinion: thou art saved. Who then hinders thee from +casting it away? + +26. When thou art troubled about anything, thou hast forgotten this, +that all things happen according to the universal nature; and forgotten +this, that a man's wrongful act is nothing to thee; and further thou +hast forgotten this, that everything which happens, always happened so +and will happen so, and now happens so everywhere; forgotten this too, +how close is the kinship between a man and the whole human race, for it +is a community, not of a little blood or seed, but of intelligence. And +thou hast forgotten this too, that every man's intelligence is a god and +is an efflux of the Deity;[A] and forgotten this, that nothing is a +man's own, but that his child and his body and his very soul came from +the Deity; forgotten this, that everything is opinion; and lastly thou +hast forgotten that every man lives the present time only, and loses +only this. + + [A] See Epictetus, ii. 8, 9, etc. + +27. Constantly bring to thy recollection those who have complained +greatly about anything, those who have been most conspicuous by the +greatest fame or misfortunes or enmities or fortunes of any kind: then +think where are they all now? Smoke and ash and a tale, or not even a +tale. And let there be present to thy mind also everything of this sort, +how Fabius Catellinus lived in the country, and Lucius Lupus in his +gardens, and Stertinius at Briae, and Tiberius at Capreae, and Velius +Rufus [or Rufus at Velia]; and in fine think of the eager pursuit of +anything conjoined with pride;[A] and how worthless everything is after +which men violently strain; and how much more philosophical it is for a +man in the opportunities presented to him to show himself just, +temperate, obedient to the gods, and to do this with all simplicity: for +the pride which is proud of its want of pride is the most intolerable of +all. + + [A] [Greek: met' oieseos. Oiesis kai typhos], Epict. i. 8, 6. + +28. To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods, or how dost thou +comprehend that they exist and so worshippest them, I answer, in the +first place, they may be seen even with the eyes;[A] in the second +place, neither have I seen even my own soul, and yet I honor it. Thus +then with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of +their power, from this I comprehend that they exist, and I venerate +them. + + [A] "Seen even with the eyes." It is supposed that this may be + explained by the Stoic doctrine, that the universe is a god or + living being (iv. 40), and that the celestial bodies are gods + (viii. 19). But the emperor may mean that we know that the gods + exist, as he afterwards states it, because we see what they do; + as we know that man has intellectual powers, because we see + what he does, and in no other way do we know it. This passage + then will agree with the passage in the Epistle to the Romans + (i. _v_. 20), and with the Epistle to the Colossians (i. _v_. + 15), in which Jesus Christ is named "the image of the invisible + god;" and with the passage in the Gospel of St. John (xiv. _v_. + 9). + + Gataker, whose notes are a wonderful collection of learning, + and all of it sound and good, quotes a passage of Calvin which + is founded on St. Paul's language (Rom. i. _v_. 20): "God by + creating the universe [or world, mundum], being himself + invisible, has presented himself to our eyes conspicuously in a + certain visible form." He also quotes Seneca (De Benef. iv. c. + 8): "Quocunque te flexeris, ibi illum videbis occurrentem tibi: + nihil ab illo vacat, opus suum ipse implet." Compare also + Cicero, De Senectute (c. 22), Xenophon's Cyropaedia (viii. 7), + and Mem. iv. 3; also Epictetus, i. 6, de Providentia. I think + that my interpretation of Antoninus is right. + +29. The safety of life is this, to examine everything all through, what +it is itself, that is its material, what the formal part; with all thy +soul to do justice and to say the truth. What remains, except to enjoy +life by joining one good thing to another so as not to leave even the +smallest intervals between? + +30. There is one light of the sun, though it is interrupted by walls, +mountains, and other things infinite. There is one common substance,[A] +though it is distributed among countless bodies which have their several +qualities. There is one soul, though it is distributed among infinite +natures and individual circumscriptions [or individuals]. There is one +intelligent soul, though it seems to be divided. Now in the things which +have been mentioned, all the other parts, such as those which are air +and matter, are without sensation and have no fellowship: and yet even +these parts the intelligent principle holds together and the gravitation +towards the same. But intellect in a peculiar manner tends to that which +is of the same kin, and combines with it, and the feeling for communion +is not interrupted. + + [A] iv. 40. + +31. What dost thou wish--to continue to exist? Well, dost thou wish to +have sensation, movement, growth, and then again to cease to grow, to +use thy speech, to think? What is there of all these things which seems +to thee worth desiring? But if it is easy to set little value on all +these things, turn to that which remains, which is to follow reason and +God. But it is inconsistent with honoring reason and God to be troubled +because by death a man will be deprived of the other things. + +32. How small a part of the boundless and unfathomable time is assigned +to every man, for it is very soon swallowed up in the eternal! And how +small a part of the whole substance; and how small a part of the +universal soul; and on what a small clod of the whole earth thou +creepest! Reflecting on all this, consider nothing to be great, except +to act as thy nature leads thee, and to endure that which the common +nature brings. + +33. How does the ruling faculty make use of itself? for all lies in +this. But everything else, whether it is in the power of thy will or +not, is only lifeless ashes and smoke. + +34. This reflection is most adapted to move us to contempt of death, +that even those who think pleasure to be a good and pain an evil still +have despised it. + +35. The man to whom that only is good which comes in due season, and to +whom it is the same thing whether he has done more or fewer acts +conformable to right reason, and to whom it makes no difference whether +he contemplates the world for a longer or a shorter time--for this man +neither is death a terrible thing (iii. 7; vi. 23; x. 20; xii. 23). + +36. Man, thou hast been a citizen in this great state [the world];[A] +what difference does it make to thee whether for five years [or three]? +for that which is conformable to the laws is just for all. Where is the +hardship then, if no tyrant nor yet an unjust judge sends thee away +from the state, but nature, who brought thee into it? the same as if a +praetor who has employed an actor dismisses him from the stage.[B]--"But +I have not finished the five acts, but only three of them."--Thou sayest +well, but in life the three acts are the whole drama; for what shall be +a complete drama is determined by him who was once the cause of its +composition, and now of its dissolution: but thou art the cause of +neither. Depart then satisfied, for he also who releases thee is +satisfied. + + [A] ii. 16; iii. 11; iv. 29. + + [B] iii. 8; xi. 1. + + + + +INDEXES. + + +INDEX OF TERMS. + + +[Greek: adiaphora] (indifferentia, Cicero, Seneca, Epp. 82); things + indifferent, neither good nor bad; the same as [Greek: mesa]. + +[Greek: aischros] (turpis, Cic.), ugly; morally ugly. + +[Greek: aitia], cause. + +[Greek: aitiodes], [Greek: aition], [Greek: to], the formal or formative + principle, the cause. + +[Greek: akoinonetos], unsocial. + +[Greek: anaphora], reference, relation to a purpose. + +[Greek: anypexairetos], unconditionally. + +[Greek: aporroia], efflux. + +[Greek: aproaireta], [Greek: ta], the things which are not in our will + or power. + +[Greek: arche], a first principle. + +[Greek: atomoi] (corpora individua, Cic.), atoms. + +[Greek: autarkeia] est quae parvo contenta omne id respuit quod abundat + (Cic.); contentment. + +[Greek: autarkes], sufficient in itself; contented. + +[Greek: aphormai], means, principles. The word has also other + significations in Epictetus. Index ed. Schweig. + +[Greek: gignomena], [Greek: ta], things which are produced, come into + existence. + +[Greek: daimon], god, god in man, man's intelligent principle. + +[Greek: diathesis], disposition, affection of the mind. + +[Greek: diairesis], division of things into their parts, dissection, + resolution, analysis. + +[Greek: dialektike], ars bene disserendi et vera ac falsa dijudicandi + (Cic.). + +[Greek: dialysis], dissolution, the opposite of [Greek: sygkrisis]. + +[Greek: dianoia], understanding; sometimes, the mind generally, + the whole intellectual power. + +[Greek: dogmata] (decreta, Cic.), principles. + +[Greek: dynamis noera], intellectual faculty. + +[Greek: enkrateia], temperance, self-restraint. + +[Greek: eidos] in divisione formae sunt, quas Graeci [Greek: eide] + vocant; nostri, si qui haec forte tractant, species appellant (Cic.). + But [Greek: eidos] is used by Epictetus and Antoninus less exactly and + as a general term, like _genus_. Index Epict. ed. Schweig.--[Greek: + Hos de ge ahi protai ousiai pros ta alla echousin, outo kai to eidos + pros to genos echei hypokeitai gar to eidos to genei]. (Aristot. Cat. + c. 5.) + +[Greek: eimarmene] (fatalis necessitas, fatum, Cic.), destiny, + necessity. + +[Greek: ekkliseis], aversions, avoidance, the turning away from + things; the opposite of [Greek: orexeiz.] + +[Greek: empsycha, ta] things which have life. + +[Greek: energeia], action, activity. + +[Greek: ennoia], [Greek: ennoiai], notio, notiones (Cic.), or "notitiae + rerum;" notions of things. (Notionem appello quam Graeci tum [Greek: + ennoian], tum [Greek: prolepsin], Cic.). + +[Greek: enosis], [Greek: e], the unity. + +[Greek: epistrophe], attention to an object. + +[Greek: euthymia], animi tranquillitas (Cic.). + +[Greek: eumenes], [Greek: to], [Greek: eumeneia], benevolence; [Greek: + eumenes] sometimes means well-contented. + +[Greek: eunoia], benevolence. + +[Greek: exousia], power, faculty. + +[Greek: epakolouthesin], [Greek: kata], by way of sequence. + +[Greek: hegemonikon], [Greek: to], the ruling faculty or part; principatus + (Cic.). + +[Greek: theoremata], percepta (Cic.), things perceived, general + principles. + +[Greek: kathekein], [Greek: to], duty, "officium." + +[Greek: kalos], beautiful. + +[Greek: katalepsis], comprehension; cognitio, perceptio, comprehensio + (Cic.). + +[Greek: kataskeue], constitution. + +[Greek: katorthoseis, katorthomata]; recta, recte facta (Cic.); right + acts, those acts to which we proceed by the right or straight road. + +[Greek: kosmos], order, world, universe. + +[Greek: kosmos, ho olos], the universe, that which is the One and + the all (vi. 25). + +[Greek: krima], a judgment. + +[Greek: kyrieuon, to endon], that which rules within (iv. 1), the same + as [Greek: to hegemonikon]. Diogenes Laertius vii., Zeno. [Greek: + hegemonikon de einai to kyriotaton tes psyches]. + +[Greek: logika, ta], the things which have reason. + +[Greek: logikos], rational. + +[Greek: logos], reason. + +[Greek: logos spermatikos], seminal principle. + +[Greek: mesa, ta], things indifferent, viewed with respect to + virtue. + +[Greek: noeros], intellectual. + +[Greek: nomos], law. + +[Greek: nous], intelligence, understanding. + +[Greek: oiesis], arrogance, pride. It sometimes means in Antoninus + the same as [Greek: typhos]; but it also means "opinion." + +[Greek: oikonomia] (dispositio, ordo, Cic.) has sometimes the peculiar + sense of artifice, or doing something with an apparent purpose + different from the real purpose. + +[Greek: holon, to], the universe, the whole: [Greek: he ton olon physis]. + +[Greek: onta, ta], things which exist; existence, being. + +[Greek: orexis], desire of a thing, which is opposed to [Greek: ekklisis], +aversion. + +[Greek: horme], movement towards an object, appetite; appetitio, +naturalis appetitus, appetitus animi (Cic.). + +[Greek: ousia], substance (vi. 49). Modern writers sometimes incorrectly + translate it "essentia." It is often used by Epictetus in the same + sense as [Greek: hyle]. Aristotle (Cat. c. 5) defines [Greek: ousia], + and it is properly translated "substantia" (ed. Jul. Pacius). + Porphyrius (Isag. c. 2): [Greek: he ousia anotato ousa to meden pro + autes genos hen to genikotaton]. + +[Greek: parakolouthetike dynamis, he], the power which enables us + to observe and understand. + +[Greek: peisis], passivity, opposed to [Greek: energeia]: also, affect. + +[Greek: peristaseis], circumstances, the things which surround + us; troubles, difficulties. + +[Greek: pepromene, he], destiny. + +[Greek: proairesis], purpose, free will (Aristot. Rhet. i. 13). + +[Greek: proaireta, ta], things which are within our will or power. + +[Greek: proairetikon, to], free will. + +[Greek: prothesis], a purpose, proposition. + +[Greek: pronoia] (providentia, Cic.), providence. + +[Greek: skopos], object, purpose. + +[Greek: stoicheion], element. + +[Greek: synkatathesis] (assensio, approbatio, Cic.), assent; [Greek: + synkatatheseis] (probationes, Gellius, xix. 1). + +[Greek: synkrimata], things compounded (ii. 3). + +[Greek: synkrisis], the act of combining elements out of which + a body is produced, combination. + +[Greek: synthesis], ordering, arrangement (compositio). + +[Greek: systema], system, a thing compounded of parts which + have a certain relation to one another. + +[Greek: hyle], matter, material. + +[Greek: hylikon, to], the material principle. + +[Greek: hypexairesis], exception, reservation; [Greek: meth' + hypexaireseos], conditionally. + +[Greek: hypothesis], material to work on; thing to employ the reason on; + proposition, thing assumed as matter for argument and to lead to + conclusions. (Quaestionum duo sunt genera; alterum infinitum, definitum + alterum. Definitum est, quod [Greek: hypothesin] Graeci, nos + _causam_: infinitum, quod [Greek: thesin] illi appellant, nos + _propositum_ possumus nominare. Cic. See Aristot. Anal. Post. + i. c. 2). + +[Greek: hypokeimena, ta], things present or existing, vi. 4; or + things which are a basis or foundation. + +[Greek: hypolepsis], opinion. + +[Greek: hypostasis], basis, substance, being, foundation (x. 5). + Epictetus has [Greek: to hypostatikon kai ousiodes]. (Justinus + ad Diogn. c. 2.) + +[Greek: hyphistasthai], to subsist, to be. + +[Greek: phantasiai] (visus, Cic.); appearances, thoughts, impressions + (visa animi, Gellius, xix. 1): [Greek: phantasia esti + typosis en psyche]. + +[Greek: phantasma], seems to be used by Antoninus in the same + sense as [Greek: phantasia]. Epictetus uses only [Greek: phantasia]. + +[Greek: phantaston], that which produces a [Greek: phantasia: phantaston + to tepsiekos ten phantasian aistheton] + +[Greek: physis], nature. + +[Greek: physis he ton olon], the nature of the universe. + +[Greek: psyche], soul, life, living principle. + +[Greek: psyche logike, noera], a rational soul, an intelligent soul + + + + +GENERAL INDEX. + +*** The paragraphs (par.) and lines (l.) are those of the sections. + + +Active, man is by nature, ix. 16. + +Advice from the good to be taken, vii. 21; viii. 16. + +Affectation, vii. 60; viii. 30; xi. 18 (par. 9), 19. + +Anger discouraged, vi. 26, 27; xi. 18. + +Anger, offenses of, ii. 10. + +Anger, uselessness of, v. 28; viii. 4. + +Appearances not to be regarded, v. 36; vi. 3, 13. + +Astonishment should not be felt at any thing that happens, viii. 15; + xii. 1 (sub fine), 13. + +Attainment, what is within every one's, vii. 67; viii. 8. + +Attention to what is said or done, vi. 53; vii. 4, 30; viii. 22. + + +Bad, the, ii. 1. + +Beautiful, the, ii. 1. + + +Casual. _See_ Formal. + +Change keeps the world ever new, vii. 25; viii. 50 (l. 13); xii. 23 (l. + 10). + +Change, law of, iv. 3 (sub f.), 36, v. 13, 23; vi. 4, 15, 36; vii. 18; + viii. 6; ix. 19, 28 (par. 2), 35; x. 7, 18; xii. 21. + +Change, no evil in, iv. 42. + +Christians, the xi. 3. + +Circle, things come round in a, ii. 14. + +Comedy, new, xi. 6. + +Comedy, Old, xi. 6. + +Complaining, uselessness of, viii. 17, 50. + +Connection. _See_ Universe. + +Conquerers are robbers, x. 10. + +Contentment. _See_ Resignation. + +Co-operation. _See_ Mankind and Universe. + +Daemon, the, ii. 13, 17; iii. 6 (l. 8), 7, 16 (l. 18); v. 10 (sub f.) + 27; xii. 3 (sub. f.). + +Death, ii. 11, 12, 17; iii. 3, 7; iv. 5; v. 33; vi. 2, 24, 28; vii. 32; + viii. 20, 58; ix. 3, 21; x. 36; xii. 23, 34, 35. + +Death inevitable, iii. 3; iv. 3 (l. 22), 6, 32, 48, 50; v. 33; vi. 47; + viii. 25, 31. + +Desire, offenses of, ii. 10. + +Destiny, iii. 11 (l. 19); iv. 26; v. 8 (l. 13, etc.), 24; vii. 57; x. 5. + +Discontent. _See_ Resignation. + +Doubts discussed, vi. 10; vii. 75; ix. 28, 39; xii. 5, 14. + +Duty, all-importance of, vi. 2, 22; x. 22. + + +Earth, insignificance of the, iii. 10; iv. 3 (par. 1, sub f.); vi. 36; + viii. 21; xii. 32. + +Earthly things, transitory nature of, ii. 12, 17; iv. 32, 33, 35, 48; v. + 23; vi. 15, 36; vii. 21, 34; viii. 21, 25; x. 18, 31; xii. 27. + +Earthly things, worthlessness of, ii. 12; v. 10, 33; vi. 15; vii. 3; ix. + 24, 36; xi. 2; xii. 27. + +Equanimity, x. 8. + +Example, we should not follow bad, vi. 6; vii. 65. + +Existence, meanness of, viii. 24. + +Existence, the object of, v. 1; viii. 19. + +External things cannot really harm a man, or affect the soul, ii, 11 (l. + 22); iv. 3 (par. 2, sub f.); 8, 39, 49 (par. 2); v. 35; vii. 64; + viii. 1 (sub f.); 32, 51 (par. 2); ix. 31; x. 33. + + +Failure, x. 12. + +Fame, worthlessness of, iii. 10; iv. 3 (l. 45), 19, 33 (l. 10); v. 33; + vi. 16, 18; vii. 34; viii. 1, 44; ix. 30. + +Fear, what we ought to, xii. 1 (l. 18). + +Fellowship. _See_ Mankind. + +Few things necessary for a virtuous and happy life, ii. 5; iii. 10; vii. + 67; x. 8 (l. 22). + +Flattery, xi. 18 (par. 10). + +Formal, the, and the material, iv. 21 (par. 2); v. 13; vii. 10, 29; + viii. 11; ix. 25; xii. 8, 10, 18. + +Future, we should not be anxious about the, vii. 8; viii. 11; ix. 25; + xii. 1. + + +Gods, perfect justice of the, xii. 5 (par. 2). + +Gods, the, vi. 44; xii. 28. + +Gods, the, cannot be evil, ii. 11; vi. 44. + +Good, the, ii. 1. + + +Habit of thought, v. 16. + +Happiness, what is true, v. 9 (sub f.), 34; viii. 1; x. 33. + +Help to be accepted from others, xii. 7. + +Heroism, true, xi. 18 (par. 10). + + +Ignorance. _See_ Wrong-doing. + +Independence. _See_ Self-reliance. + +Indifferent things, ii. 11 (sub f.); ix. 39; vi 32; ix, 1; (l. 30). + +Individual, the. _See_ Interests. + +Infinity. _See_ Time. + +Ingratitude. _See_ Mankind. + +Injustice, ix. 1. + +Intelligent soul, rational beings participate in the same, iv. 40; ix. + 8, 9; x. 1 (l. 15); xii. 26, 30. + +Interests of the whole and the individual identical, iv. 23; v. 8 (l. + 34); vi. 45, 54; x. 6, 20, 33 (sub f.); xii. 23 (l. 12). + + +Justice, v. 34; x. 11; xi. 10. + +Justice and reason identical, xi. 1 (sub f.). + +Justice prevails everywhere, iv. 10. + + +Leisure, we ought to have some, viii. 51. + +Life, a good, everywhere possible, v. 16. + +Life can only be lived once, ii. 14; x. 31 (l. 11). + +Life, shortness of, ii. 4, 17; iii. 10, 14; iv. 17, 48 (sub f.). 50; vi. + 15, 36, 56; x. 31, 34. + +Life to be made a proper use of, without delay, ii. 4; iii. 1, 14; iv. + 17, 37; vii. 56; viii. 22; x. 31 (l. 14); xii. 1 (l. 18). + +Life, whether long or short, matters not, vi. 49; ix. 33; xii. 36. + + +Magnanimity, x. 8. + +Mankind, co-operation and fellowship of, one with another; ii. 1 (l. + 11), 16; iii. 4 (sub f.); 11 (sub f.); iv. 4, 33 (sub f.); v. + 16 (l. 11), 20; vi. 7, 14 (sub f.), 23, 39; vii. 5, 13, 22, 55; + viii. 12, 26, 34, 43, 59; ix. 1, 9 (sub f.), 23, 31, 42 (sub. + f.); x. 36, (l. 16); xi. 8, 21; xii. 20. + +Mankind, folly and baseness of, v. 10 (l. 9); ix. 2, 3 (l. 13), 29; x. + 15, 19. + +Mankind, ingratitude of, x. 36. + +Material, the. _See_ Formal. + + +Nature, after products of, iii. 2; vi. 36. + +Nature, bounds fixed by, v. 1. + +Nature, man formed by, to bear all that happens to him, v. 18; viii. 46. + +Nature, nothing evil, which is according to, ii. 17 (sub f.); vi. 33. + +Nature of the universe. _See_ Universe, nothing that happens is contrary + to the nature of the. + +Nature, perfect beauty of, iii. 2; vi. 36. + +Nature, we should live according to, iv. 48 (sub. f.), 51; v. 3. 25; vi. + 16 (l. 12); vii. 15, 55; viii. 1, 54; x. 33. + +New, nothing, under the sun, ii. 14 (l. 11); iv. 44; vi. 37, 46; vii. 1, + 49; viii. 6; ix. 14; x. 27; xi. 1. + + +Object, we should always act with a view to some, ii. 7, 16 (l. 12); + iii. 4; iv. 2; viii. 17; x. 37; xi. 21; xii. 20. + +Obsolete, all things become, iv. 33. + +Omissions, sins of, ix. 5. + +Opinion, iv. 3 (par. 2) (sub f.), 7, 12, 39; vi. 52, 57; vii. 2, 14, 16, + 26, 68; viii. 14, 29, 40, 47, 49; ix. 13, 29 (l. 12), 32, 42 + (l. 21); x. 3; xi. 16, 18; xii. 22, 25. + +Others' conduct not to be inquired into, iii. 4; iv. 18; v. 25. + +Others, opinion of, to be disregarded, viii. 1 (l. 12); x. 8 (l. 12), + 11; xi. 13; xii. 4. + +Others, we should be lenient towards, ii. 13 (sub f.); iii. 11 (sub f.); + iv. 3 (l. 16); v. 33 (l. 17); vi. 20, 27; vii. 26, 62, 63, 70; + ix. 11, 27; x. 4; xi. 9, 13, 18; xii. 16. + +Others, we should examine the ruling principles of; iv. 38; ix. 18, 22, + 27, 34. + +Ourselves often to blame for expecting men to act contrary to their + nature, ix. 42 (l. 31). + +Ourselves, reformation should begin with, xi. 29. + +Ourselves, we should judge, x. 30; xi. 18 (par. 4). + + +Pain, vii. 33, 64; viii. 28. + +Perfection not to be expected in this world, ix. 29 (l. 7). + +Perseverance, v. 9; x. 12. + +Persuasion, to be used, vi. 50. + +Perturbation, vi. 16 (sub f.); viii. 58; ix. 31. + +Pessimism, ix. 35. + +Philosophy, v. 9; vi. 12; ix. 41 (l. 15). + +Pleasure, he who pursues, is guilty of impiety, ix. 1 (l. 24). + +Pleasures are enjoyed by the bad, vi. 34; ix. 1 (l. 30). + +Power, things in our own, v. 5, 10 (sub f.); vi. 32, 41, 52, 58; vii. 2, + 14, 54, 68; x. 32, 33. + +Power, things not in our own, v. 33 (sub f.); vi. 41. + +Practice is good, even in things which we despair of accomplishing, xii. + 6. + +Praise, worthlessness of, iii. 4 (sub f.); iv. 20: vi. 16, 59; vii. 62; + viii. 52, 53; ix. 34. + +Prayer, the right sort of, v. 7; ix. 40. + +Present time the only thing a man really possesses, ii. 14; iii. 10; + viii. 44; xii. 3 (sub f.) + +Procrastination, _See_ Life to be made a proper use of, etc. + +Puppet pulled by strings of desire, ii. 2; iii. 16; vi. 16, 28; vii. 3, + 29; xii. 19. + + +Rational soul. _See_ Ruling part. + +Rational soul, spherical form of the, viii. 41 (sub f.); xi. 12; xii. 3 + (and _see_ Ruling part). + +Reason, all-prevailing, v. 32; vi. 1, 40. + +Reason and nature identical, vii. 11. + +Reason the, can adapt everything that happens to its own use, v. 20; vi. + 8; vii. 68 (l. 16); viii. 35; x. 31 (sub f.). + +Reason, we should live according to. _See_ Nature. + +Repentance does not follow renouncement of pleasure, viii. 10. + +Resignation and contentment, iii. 4 (l. 27, etc.), 16 (l. 10, etc.); iv. + 23, 31, 33 (sub f.), 34; v. 8 (sub f.), 33 (l. 16); vi. 16 (sub f.), + 44, 49; vii. 27, 57; ix. 37; x. 1, 11, 14, 25, 28, 35. + +Revenge, best kind of, vi. 6. + +Rising from bed, v. 1; viii. 11. + +Ruling part, the, ii. 2; iv. 11, 19, 21, 26; vi. 14, 35; vii. 16, 55 + (par. 2); viii. 45, 48, 56, 57, 60, 61; ix. 15, 26; x. 24, + 33 (l. 21), 38; xi. 1, 19, 20; xii. 3, 14. + + +Self-reliance and steadfastness of soul, iii. 5 (sub f.), 12; iv. 14, 29 + (l. 5), 49 (par. 1); v. 3, 34 (l. 5); vi. 44 (l. 15); vii. 12, 15; ix. + 28 (l. 8), 29 (sub f.); xii. 14. + +Self-restraint, v. 33 (sub f.). + +Self, we should retire into, iv. 3 (l. 4 and par. 2); vii. 28, 33, 59; + viii. 48. + +Senses, movements of the, to be disregarded, v. 31 (l. 10); vii. 55 + (par. 2); viii. 26, 39; x. 8 (l. 13); xi. 19; xii. 1 (l. 18). + +Sickness, behavior in, ix. 41. + +Social. _See_ Mankind. + +Steadfastness of soul. _See_ Self-reliance. + +Substance, the universal, iv. 40; v. 24; vii. 19, 23; xii. 30. + +Suicide, v. 29; viii. 47 (sub f.); x. 8 (l. 35). + + +Time compared to a river, iv. 43. + +Time, infinity of, iv. 3 (l. 35), 50 (sub f.); v. 24; ix. 32; xii. 7, + 32. + +Tragedy, xi. 6. + +Tranquillity of soul, iv. 3; vi. 11; vii. 68; viii. 28. + + +Ugly, the, ii. 1. + +Unintelligible things, v. 10. + +Universe, harmony of the, iv. 27, 45; v. 8 (l. 14). + +Universe, intimate connection and co-operation of all things in the, one + with another, ii. 3, 9; iv. 29; v. 8, 30; vi. 38, 42, 43; vii. 9, 19, + 68 (sub f.); viii. 7; ix. 1; x. 1. + +Universe, nothing that dies falls out of the, viii. 18, 50 (l. 13); x. 7 + (l. 25). + +Universe, nothing that happens is contrary to the nature of the, v. 8, + 10 (sub f.); vi. 9, 58; viii. 5; xii. 26. + +Unnecessary things, v. 45. + +Unnecessary thoughts, words, and actions, iii. 4; iv. 24. + + +Vain professions, x. 16; xi. 15. + +Virtue, vi. 17. + +Virtue its own reward, v. 6; vii. 73; ix. 42 (l. 47); xi. 4. + +Virtue, omnipotence of, iv. 16. + +Virtue, pleasure in contemplating, vi. 48. + + +Whole, integrity of the, to be preserved, v. 8 (sub f.). + +Whole, the. _See_ Interests. + +Wickedness has always existed, vii. 1. + +Wickedness must exist in the world, viii. 15, 50; ix. 42; xi. 18 (par. + ii); xii. 16. + +Worst evil, the, ix. 2 (l. 9.) + +Worth and importance, things of real, iv. 33 (sub f.); v. 10 (l. 16); + vi. 16, 30 (l. 7), 47 (sub f.); vii. 20, 44, 46, 58, 66; viii. 2, + 3, 5; ix. 6, 12; x. 8 (l. 27), 11; xii. 1, 27, 31, 33. + +Wrong-doing cannot really harm any one, vii. 22; viii. 55; ix. 42 (l. + 25); x. 13 (par. 1); xi. 18 (par. 7). + +Wrong-doing injures the wrong-doer, iv. 26; ix. 4, 38; xi. 18 (par. 3). + +Wrong-doing owing to ignorance, ii. 1, 13; vi. 27; vii. 22, 26, 62, 63; + xi. 18 (par. 3); xii. 22. + +Wrong-doing to be left where it is, vii. 29; ix. 20. + + + + +THE END. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus +by Marcus Aurelius Antoninus + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THOUGHTS OF MARCUS AURELIUS *** + +***** This file should be named 15877.txt or 15877.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/5/8/7/15877/ + +Produced by Juliet Sutherland, Turgut Dincer, Leonard +Johnson and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +https://www.pgdp.net. + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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