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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Laches, by Plato
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Laches
+
+Author: Plato
+
+Translator: Benjamin Jowett
+
+Posting Date: August 22, 2008 [EBook #1584]
+Release Date: December, 1998
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LACHES ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Sue Asscher
+
+
+
+
+
+LACHES
+
+OR COURAGE
+
+By Plato
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+Lysimachus, the son of Aristides the Just, and Melesias, the son of
+the elder Thucydides, two aged men who live together, are desirous of
+educating their sons in the best manner. Their own education, as often
+happens with the sons of great men, has been neglected; and they are
+resolved that their children shall have more care taken of them, than
+they received themselves at the hands of their fathers.
+
+At their request, Nicias and Laches have accompanied them to see a man
+named Stesilaus fighting in heavy armour. The two fathers ask the two
+generals what they think of this exhibition, and whether they would
+advise that their sons should acquire the accomplishment. Nicias and
+Laches are quite willing to give their opinion; but they suggest that
+Socrates should be invited to take part in the consultation. He is a
+stranger to Lysimachus, but is afterwards recognised as the son of his
+old friend Sophroniscus, with whom he never had a difference to the
+hour of his death. Socrates is also known to Nicias, to whom he had
+introduced the excellent Damon, musician and sophist, as a tutor for his
+son, and to Laches, who had witnessed his heroic behaviour at the battle
+of Delium (compare Symp.).
+
+Socrates, as he is younger than either Nicias or Laches, prefers to
+wait until they have delivered their opinions, which they give in a
+characteristic manner. Nicias, the tactician, is very much in favour of
+the new art, which he describes as the gymnastics of war--useful when
+the ranks are formed, and still more useful when they are broken;
+creating a general interest in military studies, and greatly adding to
+the appearance of the soldier in the field. Laches, the blunt warrior,
+is of opinion that such an art is not knowledge, and cannot be of any
+value, because the Lacedaemonians, those great masters of arms, neglect
+it. His own experience in actual service has taught him that these
+pretenders are useless and ridiculous. This man Stesilaus has been seen
+by him on board ship making a very sorry exhibition of himself. The
+possession of the art will make the coward rash, and subject the
+courageous, if he chance to make a slip, to invidious remarks. And now
+let Socrates be taken into counsel. As they differ he must decide.
+
+Socrates would rather not decide the question by a plurality of votes:
+in such a serious matter as the education of a friend's children, he
+would consult the one skilled person who has had masters, and has works
+to show as evidences of his skill. This is not himself; for he has never
+been able to pay the sophists for instructing him, and has never had
+the wit to do or discover anything. But Nicias and Laches are older
+and richer than he is: they have had teachers, and perhaps have made
+discoveries; and he would have trusted them entirely, if they had not
+been diametrically opposed.
+
+Lysimachus here proposes to resign the argument into the hands of the
+younger part of the company, as he is old, and has a bad memory. He
+earnestly requests Socrates to remain;--in this showing, as Nicias says,
+how little he knows the man, who will certainly not go away until he
+has cross-examined the company about their past lives. Nicias has often
+submitted to this process; and Laches is quite willing to learn from
+Socrates, because his actions, in the true Dorian mode, correspond to
+his words.
+
+Socrates proceeds: We might ask who are our teachers? But a better and
+more thorough way of examining the question will be to ask, 'What is
+Virtue?'--or rather, to restrict the enquiry to that part of virtue
+which is concerned with the use of weapons--'What is Courage?' Laches
+thinks that he knows this: (1) 'He is courageous who remains at his
+post.' But some nations fight flying, after the manner of Aeneas in
+Homer; or as the heavy-armed Spartans also did at the battle of Plataea.
+(2) Socrates wants a more general definition, not only of military
+courage, but of courage of all sorts, tried both amid pleasures and
+pains. Laches replies that this universal courage is endurance.
+But courage is a good thing, and mere endurance may be hurtful and
+injurious. Therefore (3) the element of intelligence must be added. But
+then again unintelligent endurance may often be more courageous than
+the intelligent, the bad than the good. How is this contradiction to be
+solved? Socrates and Laches are not set 'to the Dorian mode' of words
+and actions; for their words are all confusion, although their actions
+are courageous. Still they must 'endure' in an argument about endurance.
+Laches is very willing, and is quite sure that he knows what courage is,
+if he could only tell.
+
+Nicias is now appealed to; and in reply he offers a definition which
+he has heard from Socrates himself, to the effect that (1) 'Courage is
+intelligence.' Laches derides this; and Socrates enquires, 'What sort
+of intelligence?' to which Nicias replies, 'Intelligence of things
+terrible.' 'But every man knows the things to be dreaded in his own
+art.' 'No they do not. They may predict results, but cannot tell whether
+they are really terrible; only the courageous man can tell that.' Laches
+draws the inference that the courageous man is either a soothsayer or a
+god.
+
+Again, (2) in Nicias' way of speaking, the term 'courageous' must be
+denied to animals or children, because they do not know the danger.
+Against this inversion of the ordinary use of language Laches reclaims,
+but is in some degree mollified by a compliment to his own courage.
+Still, he does not like to see an Athenian statesman and general
+descending to sophistries of this sort. Socrates resumes the argument.
+Courage has been defined to be intelligence or knowledge of the
+terrible; and courage is not all virtue, but only one of the virtues.
+The terrible is in the future, and therefore the knowledge of the
+terrible is a knowledge of the future. But there can be no knowledge of
+future good or evil separated from a knowledge of the good and evil
+of the past or present; that is to say, of all good and evil. Courage,
+therefore, is the knowledge of good and evil generally. But he who has
+the knowledge of good and evil generally, must not only have courage,
+but also temperance, justice, and every other virtue. Thus, a single
+virtue would be the same as all virtues (compare Protagoras). And after
+all the two generals, and Socrates, the hero of Delium, are still in
+ignorance of the nature of courage. They must go to school again, boys,
+old men and all.
+
+Some points of resemblance, and some points of difference, appear in
+the Laches when compared with the Charmides and Lysis. There is less
+of poetical and simple beauty, and more of dramatic interest and power.
+They are richer in the externals of the scene; the Laches has more play
+and development of character. In the Lysis and Charmides the youths are
+the central figures, and frequent allusions are made to the place of
+meeting, which is a palaestra. Here the place of meeting, which is also
+a palaestra, is quite forgotten, and the boys play a subordinate part.
+The seance is of old and elder men, of whom Socrates is the youngest.
+
+First is the aged Lysimachus, who may be compared with Cephalus in the
+Republic, and, like him, withdraws from the argument. Melesias, who is
+only his shadow, also subsides into silence. Both of them, by their
+own confession, have been ill-educated, as is further shown by the
+circumstance that Lysimachus, the friend of Sophroniscus, has never
+heard of the fame of Socrates, his son; they belong to different
+circles. In the Meno their want of education in all but the arts of
+riding and wrestling is adduced as a proof that virtue cannot be taught.
+The recognition of Socrates by Lysimachus is extremely graceful; and his
+military exploits naturally connect him with the two generals, of
+whom one has witnessed them. The characters of Nicias and Laches are
+indicated by their opinions on the exhibition of the man fighting in
+heavy armour. The more enlightened Nicias is quite ready to accept the
+new art, which Laches treats with ridicule, seeming to think that this,
+or any other military question, may be settled by asking, 'What do the
+Lacedaemonians say?' The one is the thoughtful general, willing to avail
+himself of any discovery in the art of war (Aristoph. Aves); the other
+is the practical man, who relies on his own experience, and is the
+enemy of innovation; he can act but cannot speak, and is apt to lose his
+temper. It is to be noted that one of them is supposed to be a hearer of
+Socrates; the other is only acquainted with his actions. Laches is the
+admirer of the Dorian mode; and into his mouth the remark is put that
+there are some persons who, having never been taught, are better than
+those who have. Like a novice in the art of disputation, he is delighted
+with the hits of Socrates; and is disposed to be angry with the
+refinements of Nicias.
+
+In the discussion of the main thesis of the Dialogue--'What is Courage?'
+the antagonism of the two characters is still more clearly brought out;
+and in this, as in the preliminary question, the truth is parted between
+them. Gradually, and not without difficulty, Laches is made to pass on
+from the more popular to the more philosophical; it has never occurred
+to him that there was any other courage than that of the soldier; and
+only by an effort of the mind can he frame a general notion at all. No
+sooner has this general notion been formed than it evanesces before the
+dialectic of Socrates; and Nicias appears from the other side with the
+Socratic doctrine, that courage is knowledge. This is explained to mean
+knowledge of things terrible in the future. But Socrates denies that the
+knowledge of the future is separable from that of the past and present;
+in other words, true knowledge is not that of the soothsayer but of the
+philosopher. And all knowledge will thus be equivalent to all virtue--a
+position which elsewhere Socrates is not unwilling to admit, but which
+will not assist us in distinguishing the nature of courage. In this part
+of the Dialogue the contrast between the mode of cross-examination which
+is practised by Laches and by Socrates, and also the manner in which
+the definition of Laches is made to approximate to that of Nicias, are
+worthy of attention.
+
+Thus, with some intimation of the connexion and unity of virtue and
+knowledge, we arrive at no distinct result. The two aspects of courage
+are never harmonized. The knowledge which in the Protagoras is explained
+as the faculty of estimating pleasures and pains is here lost in an
+unmeaning and transcendental conception. Yet several true intimations of
+the nature of courage are allowed to appear: (1) That courage is
+moral as well as physical: (2) That true courage is inseparable from
+knowledge, and yet (3) is based on a natural instinct. Laches exhibits
+one aspect of courage; Nicias the other. The perfect image and harmony
+of both is only realized in Socrates himself.
+
+The Dialogue offers one among many examples of the freedom with which
+Plato treats facts. For the scene must be supposed to have occurred
+between B.C. 424, the year of the battle of Delium, and B.C. 418, the
+year of the battle of Mantinea, at which Laches fell. But if Socrates
+was more than seventy years of age at his trial in 399 (see Apology), he
+could not have been a young man at any time after the battle of Delium.
+
+
+
+
+LACHES, OR COURAGE.
+
+
+
+
+PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
+
+     Lysimachus, son of Aristides.
+     Melesias, son of Thucydides.
+     Their sons.
+     Nicias, Laches, Socrates.
+
+
+LYSIMACHUS: You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in armour,
+Nicias and Laches, but we did not tell you at the time the reason why my
+friend Melesias and I asked you to go with us and see him. I think that
+we may as well confess what this was, for we certainly ought not to have
+any reserve with you. The reason was, that we were intending to ask your
+advice. Some laugh at the very notion of advising others, and when they
+are asked will not say what they think. They guess at the wishes of the
+person who asks them, and answer according to his, and not according to
+their own, opinion. But as we know that you are good judges, and will
+say exactly what you think, we have taken you into our counsels. The
+matter about which I am making all this preface is as follows: Melesias
+and I have two sons; that is his son, and he is named Thucydides,
+after his grandfather; and this is mine, who is also called after his
+grandfather, Aristides. Now, we are resolved to take the greatest care
+of the youths, and not to let them run about as they like, which is too
+often the way with the young, when they are no longer children, but to
+begin at once and do the utmost that we can for them. And knowing you
+to have sons of your own, we thought that you were most likely to have
+attended to their training and improvement, and, if perchance you have
+not attended to them, we may remind you that you ought to have done so,
+and would invite you to assist us in the fulfilment of a common duty. I
+will tell you, Nicias and Laches, even at the risk of being tedious,
+how we came to think of this. Melesias and I live together, and our sons
+live with us; and now, as I was saying at first, we are going to confess
+to you. Both of us often talk to the lads about the many noble deeds
+which our own fathers did in war and peace--in the management of the
+allies, and in the administration of the city; but neither of us has any
+deeds of his own which he can show. The truth is that we are ashamed of
+this contrast being seen by them, and we blame our fathers for letting
+us be spoiled in the days of our youth, while they were occupied with
+the concerns of others; and we urge all this upon the lads, pointing out
+to them that they will not grow up to honour if they are rebellious and
+take no pains about themselves; but that if they take pains they may,
+perhaps, become worthy of the names which they bear. They, on their
+part, promise to comply with our wishes; and our care is to discover
+what studies or pursuits are likely to be most improving to them. Some
+one commended to us the art of fighting in armour, which he thought an
+excellent accomplishment for a young man to learn; and he praised the
+man whose exhibition you have seen, and told us to go and see him. And
+we determined that we would go, and get you to accompany us; and we were
+intending at the same time, if you did not object, to take counsel with
+you about the education of our sons. That is the matter which we wanted
+to talk over with you; and we hope that you will give us your opinion
+about this art of fighting in armour, and about any other studies or
+pursuits which may or may not be desirable for a young man to learn.
+Please to say whether you agree to our proposal.
+
+NICIAS: As far as I am concerned, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaud
+your purpose, and will gladly assist you; and I believe that you,
+Laches, will be equally glad.
+
+LACHES: Certainly, Nicias; and I quite approve of the remark which
+Lysimachus made about his own father and the father of Melesias, and
+which is applicable, not only to them, but to us, and to every one who
+is occupied with public affairs. As he says, such persons are too apt
+to be negligent and careless of their own children and their private
+concerns. There is much truth in that remark of yours, Lysimachus. But
+why, instead of consulting us, do you not consult our friend Socrates
+about the education of the youths? He is of the same deme with you,
+and is always passing his time in places where the youth have any noble
+study or pursuit, such as you are enquiring after.
+
+LYSIMACHUS: Why, Laches, has Socrates ever attended to matters of this
+sort?
+
+LACHES: Certainly, Lysimachus.
+
+NICIAS: That I have the means of knowing as well as Laches; for quite
+lately he supplied me with a teacher of music for my sons,--Damon, the
+disciple of Agathocles, who is a most accomplished man in every way, as
+well as a musician, and a companion of inestimable value for young men
+at their age.
+
+LYSIMACHUS: Those who have reached my time of life, Socrates and Nicias
+and Laches, fall out of acquaintance with the young, because they are
+generally detained at home by old age; but you, O son of Sophroniscus,
+should let your fellow demesman have the benefit of any advice which you
+are able to give. Moreover I have a claim upon you as an old friend of
+your father; for I and he were always companions and friends, and to the
+hour of his death there never was a difference between us; and now it
+comes back to me, at the mention of your name, that I have heard these
+lads talking to one another at home, and often speaking of Socrates
+in terms of the highest praise; but I have never thought to ask them
+whether the son of Sophroniscus was the person whom they meant. Tell me,
+my boys, whether this is the Socrates of whom you have often spoken?
+
+SON: Certainly, father, this is he.
+
+LYSIMACHUS: I am delighted to hear, Socrates, that you maintain the name
+of your father, who was a most excellent man; and I further rejoice at
+the prospect of our family ties being renewed.
+
+LACHES: Indeed, Lysimachus, you ought not to give him up; for I can
+assure you that I have seen him maintaining, not only his father's, but
+also his country's name. He was my companion in the retreat from Delium,
+and I can tell you that if others had only been like him, the honour
+of our country would have been upheld, and the great defeat would never
+have occurred.
+
+LYSIMACHUS: That is very high praise which is accorded to you, Socrates,
+by faithful witnesses and for actions like those which they praise. Let
+me tell you the pleasure which I feel in hearing of your fame; and I
+hope that you will regard me as one of your warmest friends. You ought
+to have visited us long ago, and made yourself at home with us; but now,
+from this day forward, as we have at last found one another out, do as I
+say--come and make acquaintance with me, and with these young men, that
+I may continue your friend, as I was your father's. I shall expect you
+to do so, and shall venture at some future time to remind you of your
+duty. But what say you of the matter of which we were beginning to
+speak--the art of fighting in armour? Is that a practice in which the
+lads may be advantageously instructed?
+
+SOCRATES: I will endeavour to advise you, Lysimachus, as far as I can in
+this matter, and also in every way will comply with your wishes; but as
+I am younger and not so experienced, I think that I ought certainly to
+hear first what my elders have to say, and to learn of them, and if I
+have anything to add, then I may venture to give my opinion to them as
+well as to you. Suppose, Nicias, that one or other of you begin.
+
+NICIAS: I have no objection, Socrates; and my opinion is that the
+acquirement of this art is in many ways useful to young men. It is an
+advantage to them that among the favourite amusements of their leisure
+hours they should have one which tends to improve and not to injure
+their bodily health. No gymnastics could be better or harder exercise;
+and this, and the art of riding, are of all arts most befitting to a
+freeman; for they only who are thus trained in the use of arms are
+the athletes of our military profession, trained in that on which the
+conflict turns. Moreover in actual battle, when you have to fight in a
+line with a number of others, such an acquirement will be of some use,
+and will be of the greatest whenever the ranks are broken and you have
+to fight singly, either in pursuit, when you are attacking some one who
+is defending himself, or in flight, when you have to defend yourself
+against an assailant. Certainly he who possessed the art could not meet
+with any harm at the hands of a single person, or perhaps of several;
+and in any case he would have a great advantage. Further, this sort of
+skill inclines a man to the love of other noble lessons; for every man
+who has learned how to fight in armour will desire to learn the proper
+arrangement of an army, which is the sequel of the lesson: and when he
+has learned this, and his ambition is once fired, he will go on to learn
+the complete art of the general. There is no difficulty in seeing that
+the knowledge and practice of other military arts will be honourable and
+valuable to a man; and this lesson may be the beginning of them. Let me
+add a further advantage, which is by no means a slight one,--that this
+science will make any man a great deal more valiant and self-possessed
+in the field. And I will not disdain to mention, what by some may be
+thought to be a small matter;--he will make a better appearance at the
+right time; that is to say, at the time when his appearance will strike
+terror into his enemies. My opinion then, Lysimachus, is, as I say, that
+the youths should be instructed in this art, and for the reasons which
+I have given. But Laches may take a different view; and I shall be very
+glad to hear what he has to say.
+
+LACHES: I should not like to maintain, Nicias, that any kind of
+knowledge is not to be learned; for all knowledge appears to be a good:
+and if, as Nicias and as the teachers of the art affirm, this use of
+arms is really a species of knowledge, then it ought to be learned; but
+if not, and if those who profess to teach it are deceivers only; or if
+it be knowledge, but not of a valuable sort, then what is the use of
+learning it? I say this, because I think that if it had been really
+valuable, the Lacedaemonians, whose whole life is passed in finding out
+and practising the arts which give them an advantage over other nations
+in war, would have discovered this one. And even if they had not, still
+these professors of the art would certainly not have failed to discover
+that of all the Hellenes the Lacedaemonians have the greatest interest
+in such matters, and that a master of the art who was honoured among
+them would be sure to make his fortune among other nations, just as a
+tragic poet would who is honoured among ourselves; which is the reason
+why he who fancies that he can write a tragedy does not go about
+itinerating in the neighbouring states, but rushes hither straight, and
+exhibits at Athens; and this is natural. Whereas I perceive that these
+fighters in armour regard Lacedaemon as a sacred inviolable territory,
+which they do not touch with the point of their foot; but they make
+a circuit of the neighbouring states, and would rather exhibit to
+any others than to the Spartans; and particularly to those who would
+themselves acknowledge that they are by no means first-rate in the arts
+of war. Further, Lysimachus, I have encountered a good many of these
+gentlemen in actual service, and have taken their measure, which I can
+give you at once; for none of these masters of fence have ever been
+distinguished in war,--there has been a sort of fatality about them;
+while in all other arts the men of note have been always those who have
+practised the art, they appear to be a most unfortunate exception.
+For example, this very Stesilaus, whom you and I have just witnessed
+exhibiting in all that crowd and making such great professions of
+his powers, I have seen at another time making, in sober truth, an
+involuntary exhibition of himself, which was a far better spectacle. He
+was a marine on board a ship which struck a transport vessel, and was
+armed with a weapon, half spear, half scythe; the singularity of this
+weapon was worthy of the singularity of the man. To make a long story
+short, I will only tell you what happened to this notable invention
+of the scythe spear. He was fighting, and the scythe was caught in the
+rigging of the other ship, and stuck fast; and he tugged, but was unable
+to get his weapon free. The two ships were passing one another. He first
+ran along his own ship holding on to the spear; but as the other ship
+passed by and drew him after as he was holding on, he let the spear
+slip through his hand until he retained only the end of the handle.
+The people in the transport clapped their hands, and laughed at his
+ridiculous figure; and when some one threw a stone, which fell on the
+deck at his feet, and he quitted his hold of the scythe-spear, the crew
+of his own trireme also burst out laughing; they could not refrain when
+they beheld the weapon waving in the air, suspended from the transport.
+Now I do not deny that there may be something in such an art, as Nicias
+asserts, but I tell you my experience; and, as I said at first, whether
+this be an art of which the advantage is so slight, or not an art at
+all, but only an imposition, in either case such an acquirement is not
+worth having. For my opinion is, that if the professor of this art be a
+coward, he will be likely to become rash, and his character will be only
+more notorious; or if he be brave, and fail ever so little, other men
+will be on the watch, and he will be greatly traduced; for there is a
+jealousy of such pretenders; and unless a man be pre-eminent in valour,
+he cannot help being ridiculous, if he says that he has this sort of
+skill. Such is my judgment, Lysimachus, of the desirableness of this
+art; but, as I said at first, ask Socrates, and do not let him go until
+he has given you his opinion of the matter.
+
+LYSIMACHUS: I am going to ask this favour of you, Socrates; as is the
+more necessary because the two councillors disagree, and some one is in
+a manner still needed who will decide between them. Had they agreed, no
+arbiter would have been required. But as Laches has voted one way and
+Nicias another, I should like to hear with which of our two friends you
+agree.
+
+SOCRATES: What, Lysimachus, are you going to accept the opinion of the
+majority?
+
+LYSIMACHUS: Why, yes, Socrates; what else am I to do?
+
+SOCRATES: And would you do so too, Melesias? If you were deliberating
+about the gymnastic training of your son, would you follow the advice of
+the majority of us, or the opinion of the one who had been trained and
+exercised under a skilful master?
+
+MELESIAS: The latter, Socrates; as would surely be reasonable.
+
+SOCRATES: His one vote would be worth more than the vote of all us four?
+
+MELESIAS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And for this reason, as I imagine,--because a good decision is
+based on knowledge and not on numbers?
+
+MELESIAS: To be sure.
+
+SOCRATES: Must we not then first of all ask, whether there is any one of
+us who has knowledge of that about which we are deliberating? If there
+is, let us take his advice, though he be one only, and not mind the
+rest; if there is not, let us seek further counsel. Is this a slight
+matter about which you and Lysimachus are deliberating? Are you not
+risking the greatest of your possessions? For children are your riches;
+and upon their turning out well or ill depends the whole order of their
+father's house.
+
+MELESIAS: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: Great care, then, is required in this matter?
+
+MELESIAS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Suppose, as I was just now saying, that we were considering,
+or wanting to consider, who was the best trainer. Should we not select
+him who knew and had practised the art, and had the best teachers?
+
+MELESIAS: I think that we should.
+
+SOCRATES: But would there not arise a prior question about the nature of
+the art of which we want to find the masters?
+
+MELESIAS: I do not understand.
+
+SOCRATES: Let me try to make my meaning plainer then. I do not think
+that we have as yet decided what that is about which we are consulting,
+when we ask which of us is or is not skilled in the art, and has or has
+not had a teacher of the art.
+
+NICIAS: Why, Socrates, is not the question whether young men ought or
+ought not to learn the art of fighting in armour?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, Nicias; but there is also a prior question, which I
+may illustrate in this way: When a person considers about applying a
+medicine to the eyes, would you say that he is consulting about the
+medicine or about the eyes?
+
+NICIAS: About the eyes.
+
+SOCRATES: And when he considers whether he shall set a bridle on a horse
+and at what time, he is thinking of the horse and not of the bridle?
+
+NICIAS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And in a word, when he considers anything for the sake of
+another thing, he thinks of the end and not of the means?
+
+NICIAS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And when you call in an adviser, you should see whether he too
+is skilful in the accomplishment of the end which you have in view?
+
+NICIAS: Most true.
+
+SOCRATES: And at present we have in view some knowledge, of which the
+end is the soul of youth?
+
+NICIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And we are enquiring, Which of us is skilful or successful in
+the treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good teachers?
+
+LACHES: Well but, Socrates; did you never observe that some persons,
+who have had no teachers, are more skilful than those who have, in some
+things?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, Laches, I have observed that; but you would not be very
+willing to trust them if they only professed to be masters of their art,
+unless they could show some proof of their skill or excellence in one or
+more works.
+
+LACHES: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: And therefore, Laches and Nicias, as Lysimachus and Melesias,
+in their anxiety to improve the minds of their sons, have asked our
+advice about them, we too should tell them who our teachers were, if we
+say that we have had any, and prove them to be in the first place men
+of merit and experienced trainers of the minds of youth and also to have
+been really our teachers. Or if any of us says that he has no teacher,
+but that he has works of his own to show; then he should point out
+to them what Athenians or strangers, bond or free, he is generally
+acknowledged to have improved. But if he can show neither teachers nor
+works, then he should tell them to look out for others; and not run the
+risk of spoiling the children of friends, and thereby incurring the
+most formidable accusation which can be brought against any one by those
+nearest to him. As for myself, Lysimachus and Melesias, I am the
+first to confess that I have never had a teacher of the art of virtue;
+although I have always from my earliest youth desired to have one. But
+I am too poor to give money to the Sophists, who are the only professors
+of moral improvement; and to this day I have never been able to discover
+the art myself, though I should not be surprised if Nicias or Laches may
+have discovered or learned it; for they are far wealthier than I am,
+and may therefore have learnt of others. And they are older too; so that
+they have had more time to make the discovery. And I really believe that
+they are able to educate a man; for unless they had been confident in
+their own knowledge, they would never have spoken thus decidedly of
+the pursuits which are advantageous or hurtful to a young man. I repose
+confidence in both of them; but I am surprised to find that they differ
+from one another. And therefore, Lysimachus, as Laches suggested that
+you should detain me, and not let me go until I answered, I in turn
+earnestly beseech and advise you to detain Laches and Nicias, and
+question them. I would have you say to them: Socrates avers that he has
+no knowledge of the matter--he is unable to decide which of you speaks
+truly; neither discoverer nor student is he of anything of the kind.
+But you, Laches and Nicias, should each of you tell us who is the most
+skilful educator whom you have ever known; and whether you invented the
+art yourselves, or learned of another; and if you learned, who were your
+respective teachers, and who were their brothers in the art; and then,
+if you are too much occupied in politics to teach us yourselves, let us
+go to them, and present them with gifts, or make interest with them,
+or both, in the hope that they may be induced to take charge of our
+children and of yours; and then they will not grow up inferior, and
+disgrace their ancestors. But if you are yourselves original discoverers
+in that field, give us some proof of your skill. Who are they who,
+having been inferior persons, have become under your care good and
+noble? For if this is your first attempt at education, there is a danger
+that you may be trying the experiment, not on the 'vile corpus' of a
+Carian slave, but on your own sons, or the sons of your friend, and,
+as the proverb says, 'break the large vessel in learning to make pots.'
+Tell us then, what qualities you claim or do not claim. Make them tell
+you that, Lysimachus, and do not let them off.
+
+LYSIMACHUS: I very much approve of the words of Socrates, my friends;
+but you, Nicias and Laches, must determine whether you will be
+questioned, and give an explanation about matters of this sort.
+Assuredly, I and Melesias would be greatly pleased to hear you answer
+the questions which Socrates asks, if you will: for I began by saying
+that we took you into our counsels because we thought that you would
+have attended to the subject, especially as you have children who, like
+our own, are nearly of an age to be educated. Well, then, if you have no
+objection, suppose that you take Socrates into partnership; and do you
+and he ask and answer one another's questions: for, as he has well said,
+we are deliberating about the most important of our concerns. I hope
+that you will see fit to comply with our request.
+
+NICIAS: I see very clearly, Lysimachus, that you have only known
+Socrates' father, and have no acquaintance with Socrates himself: at
+least, you can only have known him when he was a child, and may have
+met him among his fellow-wardsmen, in company with his father, at a
+sacrifice, or at some other gathering. You clearly show that you have
+never known him since he arrived at manhood.
+
+LYSIMACHUS: Why do you say that, Nicias?
+
+NICIAS: Because you seem not to be aware that any one who has an
+intellectual affinity to Socrates and enters into conversation with
+him is liable to be drawn into an argument; and whatever subject he may
+start, he will be continually carried round and round by him, until at
+last he finds that he has to give an account both of his present and
+past life; and when he is once entangled, Socrates will not let him go
+until he has completely and thoroughly sifted him. Now I am used to his
+ways; and I know that he will certainly do as I say, and also that
+I myself shall be the sufferer; for I am fond of his conversation,
+Lysimachus. And I think that there is no harm in being reminded of any
+wrong thing which we are, or have been, doing: he who does not fly from
+reproof will be sure to take more heed of his after-life; as Solon says,
+he will wish and desire to be learning so long as he lives, and will not
+think that old age of itself brings wisdom. To me, to be cross-examined
+by Socrates is neither unusual nor unpleasant; indeed, I knew all along
+that where Socrates was, the argument would soon pass from our sons to
+ourselves; and therefore, I say that for my part, I am quite willing to
+discourse with Socrates in his own manner; but you had better ask our
+friend Laches what his feeling may be.
+
+LACHES: I have but one feeling, Nicias, or (shall I say?) two feelings,
+about discussions. Some would think that I am a lover, and to others I
+may seem to be a hater of discourse; for when I hear a man discoursing
+of virtue, or of any sort of wisdom, who is a true man and worthy of
+his theme, I am delighted beyond measure: and I compare the man and his
+words, and note the harmony and correspondence of them. And such an one
+I deem to be the true musician, attuned to a fairer harmony than that of
+the lyre, or any pleasant instrument of music; for truly he has in his
+own life a harmony of words and deeds arranged, not in the Ionian, or in
+the Phrygian mode, nor yet in the Lydian, but in the true Hellenic mode,
+which is the Dorian, and no other. Such an one makes me merry with the
+sound of his voice; and when I hear him I am thought to be a lover
+of discourse; so eager am I in drinking in his words. But a man whose
+actions do not agree with his words is an annoyance to me; and the
+better he speaks the more I hate him, and then I seem to be a hater of
+discourse. As to Socrates, I have no knowledge of his words, but of old,
+as would seem, I have had experience of his deeds; and his deeds show
+that free and noble sentiments are natural to him. And if his words
+accord, then I am of one mind with him, and shall be delighted to be
+interrogated by a man such as he is, and shall not be annoyed at having
+to learn of him: for I too agree with Solon, 'that I would fain grow
+old, learning many things.' But I must be allowed to add 'of the good
+only.' Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or I
+shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil: but that the teacher is younger,
+or not as yet in repute--anything of that sort is of no account with
+me. And therefore, Socrates, I give you notice that you may teach and
+confute me as much as ever you like, and also learn of me anything which
+I know. So high is the opinion which I have entertained of you ever
+since the day on which you were my companion in danger, and gave a proof
+of your valour such as only the man of merit can give. Therefore, say
+whatever you like, and do not mind about the difference of our ages.
+
+SOCRATES: I cannot say that either of you show any reluctance to take
+counsel and advise with me.
+
+LYSIMACHUS: But this is our proper business; and yours as well as ours,
+for I reckon you as one of us. Please then to take my place, and find
+out from Nicias and Laches what we want to know, for the sake of the
+youths, and talk and consult with them: for I am old, and my memory is
+bad; and I do not remember the questions which I am going to ask, or
+the answers to them; and if there is any interruption I am quite lost.
+I will therefore beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by
+your selves; and I will listen, and Melesias and I will act upon your
+conclusions.
+
+SOCRATES: Let us, Nicias and Laches, comply with the request of
+Lysimachus and Melesias. There will be no harm in asking ourselves
+the question which was first proposed to us: 'Who have been our own
+instructors in this sort of training, and whom have we made better?' But
+the other mode of carrying on the enquiry will bring us equally to the
+same point, and will be more like proceeding from first principles.
+For if we knew that the addition of something would improve some other
+thing, and were able to make the addition, then, clearly, we must
+know how that about which we are advising may be best and most easily
+attained. Perhaps you do not understand what I mean. Then let me make my
+meaning plainer in this way. Suppose we knew that the addition of sight
+makes better the eyes which possess this gift, and also were able to
+impart sight to the eyes, then, clearly, we should know the nature of
+sight, and should be able to advise how this gift of sight may be best
+and most easily attained; but if we knew neither what sight is, nor what
+hearing is, we should not be very good medical advisers about the eyes
+or the ears, or about the best mode of giving sight and hearing to them.
+
+LACHES: That is true, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: And are not our two friends, Laches, at this very moment
+inviting us to consider in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted
+to their sons for the improvement of their minds?
+
+LACHES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how can
+we advise any one about the best mode of attaining something of which we
+are wholly ignorant?
+
+LACHES: I do not think that we can, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: Then, Laches, we may presume that we know the nature of
+virtue?
+
+LACHES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?
+
+LACHES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: I would not have us begin, my friend, with enquiring about
+the whole of virtue; for that may be more than we can accomplish; let
+us first consider whether we have a sufficient knowledge of a part; the
+enquiry will thus probably be made easier to us.
+
+LACHES: Let us do as you say, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select? Must we
+not select that to which the art of fighting in armour is supposed to
+conduce? And is not that generally thought to be courage?
+
+LACHES: Yes, certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then, Laches, suppose that we first set about determining the
+nature of courage, and in the second place proceed to enquire how the
+young men may attain this quality by the help of studies and pursuits.
+Tell me, if you can, what is courage.
+
+LACHES: Indeed, Socrates, I see no difficulty in answering; he is a man
+of courage who does not run away, but remains at his post and fights
+against the enemy; there can be no mistake about that.
+
+SOCRATES: Very good, Laches; and yet I fear that I did not express
+myself clearly; and therefore you have answered not the question which I
+intended to ask, but another.
+
+LACHES: What do you mean, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain; you would call a man courageous
+who remains at his post, and fights with the enemy?
+
+LACHES: Certainly I should.
+
+SOCRATES: And so should I; but what would you say of another man, who
+fights flying, instead of remaining?
+
+LACHES: How flying?
+
+SOCRATES: Why, as the Scythians are said to fight, flying as well as
+pursuing; and as Homer says in praise of the horses of Aeneas, that they
+knew 'how to pursue, and fly quickly hither and thither'; and he passes
+an encomium on Aeneas himself, as having a knowledge of fear or flight,
+and calls him 'an author of fear or flight.'
+
+LACHES: Yes, Socrates, and there Homer is right: for he was speaking of
+chariots, as you were speaking of the Scythian cavalry, who have that
+way of fighting; but the heavy-armed Greek fights, as I say, remaining
+in his rank.
+
+SOCRATES: And yet, Laches, you must except the Lacedaemonians at
+Plataea, who, when they came upon the light shields of the Persians, are
+said not to have been willing to stand and fight, and to have fled; but
+when the ranks of the Persians were broken, they turned upon them like
+cavalry, and won the battle of Plataea.
+
+LACHES: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: That was my meaning when I said that I was to blame in having
+put my question badly, and that this was the reason of your answering
+badly. For I meant to ask you not only about the courage of heavy-armed
+soldiers, but about the courage of cavalry and every other style of
+soldier; and not only who are courageous in war, but who are courageous
+in perils by sea, and who in disease, or in poverty, or again in
+politics, are courageous; and not only who are courageous against pain
+or fear, but mighty to contend against desires and pleasures, either
+fixed in their rank or turning upon their enemy. There is this sort of
+courage--is there not, Laches?
+
+LACHES: Certainly, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: And all these are courageous, but some have courage in
+pleasures, and some in pains: some in desires, and some in fears, and
+some are cowards under the same conditions, as I should imagine.
+
+LACHES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: Now I was asking about courage and cowardice in general. And I
+will begin with courage, and once more ask, What is that common quality,
+which is the same in all these cases, and which is called courage? Do
+you now understand what I mean?
+
+LACHES: Not over well.
+
+SOCRATES: I mean this: As I might ask what is that quality which is
+called quickness, and which is found in running, in playing the lyre,
+in speaking, in learning, and in many other similar actions, or rather
+which we possess in nearly every action that is worth mentioning of
+arms, legs, mouth, voice, mind;--would you not apply the term quickness
+to all of them?
+
+LACHES: Quite true.
+
+SOCRATES: And suppose I were to be asked by some one: What is that
+common quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call
+quickness? I should say the quality which accomplishes much in a little
+time--whether in running, speaking, or in any other sort of action.
+
+LACHES: You would be quite correct.
+
+SOCRATES: And now, Laches, do you try and tell me in like manner, What
+is that common quality which is called courage, and which includes all
+the various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain, and
+in all the cases to which I was just now referring?
+
+LACHES: I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if
+I am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all.
+
+SOCRATES: But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question.
+And yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion,
+to be deemed courage. Hear my reason: I am sure, Laches, that you would
+consider courage to be a very noble quality.
+
+LACHES: Most noble, certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and
+noble?
+
+LACHES: Very noble.
+
+SOCRATES: But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that, on
+the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?
+
+LACHES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?
+
+LACHES: I ought not to say that, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be
+courage--for it is not noble, but courage is noble?
+
+LACHES: You are right.
+
+SOCRATES: Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?
+
+LACHES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: But as to the epithet 'wise,'--wise in what? In all things
+small as well as great? For example, if a man shows the quality of
+endurance in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he will
+acquire more in the end, do you call him courageous?
+
+LACHES: Assuredly not.
+
+SOCRATES: Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, or some
+patient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs that he may be
+allowed to eat or drink something, and the other is firm and refuses; is
+that courage?
+
+LACHES: No; that is not courage at all, any more than the last.
+
+SOCRATES: Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and is willing
+to fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others will help him,
+and that there will be fewer and inferior men against him than there are
+with him; and suppose that he has also advantages of position; would you
+say of such a one who endures with all this wisdom and preparation,
+that he, or some man in the opposing army who is in the opposite
+circumstances to these and yet endures and remains at his post, is the
+braver?
+
+LACHES: I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver.
+
+SOCRATES: But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with
+the other?
+
+LACHES: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: Then you would say that he who in an engagement of cavalry
+endures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not so courageous as
+he who endures, having no such knowledge?
+
+LACHES: So I should say.
+
+SOCRATES: And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of the
+sling, or the bow, or of any other art, is not so courageous as he who
+endures, not having such a knowledge?
+
+LACHES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds out in
+this or any similar action, having no knowledge of diving, or the
+like, is, as you would say, more courageous than those who have this
+knowledge?
+
+LACHES: Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?
+
+SOCRATES: Nothing, if that be what he thinks.
+
+LACHES: But that is what I do think.
+
+SOCRATES: And yet men who thus run risks and endure are foolish, Laches,
+in comparison of those who do the same things, having the skill to do
+them.
+
+LACHES: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be base
+and hurtful to us.
+
+LACHES: Quite true.
+
+SOCRATES: Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble quality.
+
+LACHES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And now on the contrary we are saying that the foolish
+endurance, which was before held in dishonour, is courage.
+
+LACHES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: And are we right in saying so?
+
+LACHES: Indeed, Socrates, I am sure that we are not right.
+
+SOCRATES: Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, are not
+attuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds; for
+our deeds are not in accordance with our words. Any one would say that
+we had courage who saw us in action, but not, I imagine, he who heard us
+talking about courage just now.
+
+LACHES: That is most true.
+
+SOCRATES: And is this condition of ours satisfactory?
+
+LACHES: Quite the reverse.
+
+SOCRATES: Suppose, however, that we admit the principle of which we are
+speaking to a certain extent.
+
+LACHES: To what extent and what principle do you mean?
+
+SOCRATES: The principle of endurance. We too must endure and persevere
+in the enquiry, and then courage will not laugh at our faint-heartedness
+in searching for courage; which after all may, very likely, be
+endurance.
+
+LACHES: I am ready to go on, Socrates; and yet I am unused to
+investigations of this sort. But the spirit of controversy has been
+aroused in me by what has been said; and I am really grieved at being
+thus unable to express my meaning. For I fancy that I do know the nature
+of courage; but, somehow or other, she has slipped away from me, and I
+cannot get hold of her and tell her nature.
+
+SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the
+track, and not be lazy?
+
+LACHES: Certainly, he should.
+
+SOCRATES: And shall we invite Nicias to join us? he may be better at the
+sport than we are. What do you say?
+
+LACHES: I should like that.
+
+SOCRATES: Come then, Nicias, and do what you can to help your friends,
+who are tossing on the waves of argument, and at the last gasp: you see
+our extremity, and may save us and also settle your own opinion, if you
+will tell us what you think about courage.
+
+NICIAS: I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches are not
+defining courage in the right way; for you have forgotten an excellent
+saying which I have heard from your own lips.
+
+SOCRATES: What is it, Nicias?
+
+NICIAS: I have often heard you say that 'Every man is good in that in
+which he is wise, and bad in that in which he is unwise.'
+
+SOCRATES: That is certainly true, Nicias.
+
+NICIAS: And therefore if the brave man is good, he is also wise.
+
+SOCRATES: Do you hear him, Laches?
+
+LACHES: Yes, I hear him, but I do not very well understand him.
+
+SOCRATES: I think that I understand him; and he appears to me to mean
+that courage is a sort of wisdom.
+
+LACHES: What can he possibly mean, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: That is a question which you must ask of himself.
+
+LACHES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for you
+surely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute?
+
+NICIAS: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre?
+
+NICIAS: No.
+
+SOCRATES: But what is this knowledge then, and of what?
+
+LACHES: I think that you put the question to him very well, Socrates;
+and I would like him to say what is the nature of this knowledge or
+wisdom.
+
+NICIAS: I mean to say, Laches, that courage is the knowledge of that
+which inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything.
+
+LACHES: How strangely he is talking, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: Why do you say so, Laches?
+
+LACHES: Why, surely courage is one thing, and wisdom another.
+
+SOCRATES: That is just what Nicias denies.
+
+LACHES: Yes, that is what he denies; but he is so silly.
+
+SOCRATES: Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him?
+
+NICIAS: Laches does not want to instruct me, Socrates; but having been
+proved to be talking nonsense himself, he wants to prove that I have
+been doing the same.
+
+LACHES: Very true, Nicias; and you are talking nonsense, as I shall
+endeavour to show. Let me ask you a question: Do not physicians know
+the dangers of disease? or do the courageous know them? or are the
+physicians the same as the courageous?
+
+NICIAS: Not at all.
+
+LACHES: No more than the husbandmen who know the dangers of husbandry,
+or than other craftsmen, who have a knowledge of that which inspires
+them with fear or confidence in their own arts, and yet they are not
+courageous a whit the more for that.
+
+SOCRATES: What is Laches saying, Nicias? He appears to be saying
+something of importance.
+
+NICIAS: Yes, he is saying something, but it is not true.
+
+SOCRATES: How so?
+
+NICIAS: Why, because he does not see that the physician's knowledge only
+extends to the nature of health and disease: he can tell the sick man no
+more than this. Do you imagine, Laches, that the physician knows whether
+health or disease is the more terrible to a man? Had not many a man
+better never get up from a sick bed? I should like to know whether you
+think that life is always better than death. May not death often be the
+better of the two?
+
+LACHES: Yes certainly so in my opinion.
+
+NICIAS: And do you think that the same things are terrible to those who
+had better die, and to those who had better live?
+
+LACHES: Certainly not.
+
+NICIAS: And do you suppose that the physician or any other artist knows
+this, or any one indeed, except he who is skilled in the grounds of fear
+and hope? And him I call the courageous.
+
+SOCRATES: Do you understand his meaning, Laches?
+
+LACHES: Yes; I suppose that, in his way of speaking, the soothsayers are
+courageous. For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live
+is better? And yet Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself a
+soothsayer, or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous?
+
+NICIAS: What! do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know the
+grounds of hope or fear?
+
+LACHES: Indeed I do: who but he?
+
+NICIAS: Much rather I should say he of whom I speak; for the soothsayer
+ought to know only the signs of things that are about to come to pass,
+whether death or disease, or loss of property, or victory, or defeat
+in war, or in any sort of contest; but to whom the suffering or not
+suffering of these things will be for the best, can no more be decided
+by the soothsayer than by one who is no soothsayer.
+
+LACHES: I cannot understand what Nicias would be at, Socrates; for he
+represents the courageous man as neither a soothsayer, nor a physician,
+nor in any other character, unless he means to say that he is a god. My
+opinion is that he does not like honestly to confess that he is talking
+nonsense, but that he shuffles up and down in order to conceal the
+difficulty into which he has got himself. You and I, Socrates, might
+have practised a similar shuffle just now, if we had only wanted to
+avoid the appearance of inconsistency. And if we had been arguing in a
+court of law there might have been reason in so doing; but why should
+a man deck himself out with vain words at a meeting of friends such as
+this?
+
+SOCRATES: I quite agree with you, Laches, that he should not. But
+perhaps Nicias is serious, and not merely talking for the sake of
+talking. Let us ask him just to explain what he means, and if he has
+reason on his side we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him.
+
+LACHES: Do you, Socrates, if you like, ask him: I think that I have
+asked enough.
+
+SOCRATES: I do not see why I should not; and my question will do for
+both of us.
+
+LACHES: Very good.
+
+SOCRATES: Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, for Laches and I
+are partners in the argument: Do you mean to affirm that courage is the
+knowledge of the grounds of hope and fear?
+
+NICIAS: I do.
+
+SOCRATES: And not every man has this knowledge; the physician and the
+soothsayer have it not; and they will not be courageous unless they
+acquire it--that is what you were saying?
+
+NICIAS: I was.
+
+SOCRATES: Then this is certainly not a thing which every pig would know,
+as the proverb says, and therefore he could not be courageous.
+
+NICIAS: I think not.
+
+SOCRATES: Clearly not, Nicias; not even such a big pig as the
+Crommyonian sow would be called by you courageous. And this I say not as
+a joke, but because I think that he who assents to your doctrine, that
+courage is the knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope, cannot allow
+that any wild beast is courageous, unless he admits that a lion, or a
+leopard, or perhaps a boar, or any other animal, has such a degree of
+wisdom that he knows things which but a few human beings ever know
+by reason of their difficulty. He who takes your view of courage must
+affirm that a lion, and a stag, and a bull, and a monkey, have equally
+little pretensions to courage.
+
+LACHES: Capital, Socrates; by the gods, that is truly good. And I hope,
+Nicias, that you will tell us whether these animals, which we all admit
+to be courageous, are really wiser than mankind; or whether you will
+have the boldness, in the face of universal opinion, to deny their
+courage.
+
+NICIAS: Why, Laches, I do not call animals or any other things which
+have no fear of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, courageous,
+but only fearless and senseless. Do you imagine that I should call
+little children courageous, which fear no dangers because they know
+none? There is a difference, to my way of thinking, between fearlessness
+and courage. I am of opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality
+possessed by very few, but that rashness and boldness, and fearlessness,
+which has no forethought, are very common qualities possessed by many
+men, many women, many children, many animals. And you, and men in
+general, call by the term 'courageous' actions which I call rash;--my
+courageous actions are wise actions.
+
+LACHES: Behold, Socrates, how admirably, as he thinks, he dresses
+himself out in words, while seeking to deprive of the honour of courage
+those whom all the world acknowledges to be courageous.
+
+NICIAS: Not so, Laches, but do not be alarmed; for I am quite willing to
+say of you and also of Lamachus, and of many other Athenians, that you
+are courageous and therefore wise.
+
+LACHES: I could answer that; but I would not have you cast in my teeth
+that I am a haughty Aexonian.
+
+SOCRATES: Do not answer him, Laches; I rather fancy that you are not
+aware of the source from which his wisdom is derived. He has got all
+this from my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus, who, of
+all the Sophists, is considered to be the best puller to pieces of words
+of this sort.
+
+LACHES: Yes, Socrates; and the examination of such niceties is a much
+more suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom
+the city chooses to preside over her.
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, my sweet friend, but a great statesman is likely to have
+a great intelligence. And I think that the view which is implied in
+Nicias' definition of courage is worthy of examination.
+
+LACHES: Then examine for yourself, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: That is what I am going to do, my dear friend. Do not,
+however, suppose I shall let you out of the partnership; for I shall
+expect you to apply your mind, and join with me in the consideration of
+the question.
+
+LACHES: I will if you think that I ought.
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, I do; but I must beg of you, Nicias, to begin again. You
+remember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue.
+
+NICIAS: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: And you yourself said that it was a part; and there were many
+other parts, all of which taken together are called virtue.
+
+NICIAS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Do you agree with me about the parts? For I say that justice,
+temperance, and the like, are all of them parts of virtue as well as
+courage. Would you not say the same?
+
+NICIAS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Well then, so far we are agreed. And now let us proceed a
+step, and try to arrive at a similar agreement about the fearful and the
+hopeful: I do not want you to be thinking one thing and myself another.
+Let me then tell you my own opinion, and if I am wrong you shall set me
+right: in my opinion the terrible and the hopeful are the things which
+do or do not create fear, and fear is not of the present, nor of the
+past, but is of future and expected evil. Do you not agree to that,
+Laches?
+
+LACHES: Yes, Socrates, entirely.
+
+SOCRATES: That is my view, Nicias; the terrible things, as I should say,
+are the evils which are future; and the hopeful are the good or not evil
+things which are future. Do you or do you not agree with me?
+
+NICIAS: I agree.
+
+SOCRATES: And the knowledge of these things you call courage?
+
+NICIAS: Precisely.
+
+SOCRATES: And now let me see whether you agree with Laches and myself as
+to a third point.
+
+NICIAS: What is that?
+
+SOCRATES: I will tell you. He and I have a notion that there is not one
+knowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third of
+what is likely to be best and what will be best in the future; but
+that of all three there is one science only: for example, there is one
+science of medicine which is concerned with the inspection of health
+equally in all times, present, past, and future; and one science of
+husbandry in like manner, which is concerned with the productions of the
+earth in all times. As to the art of the general, you yourselves will be
+my witnesses that he has an excellent foreknowledge of the future, and
+that he claims to be the master and not the servant of the soothsayer,
+because he knows better what is happening or is likely to happen in war:
+and accordingly the law places the soothsayer under the general, and not
+the general under the soothsayer. Am I not correct in saying so, Laches?
+
+LACHES: Quite correct.
+
+SOCRATES: And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science has
+understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past?
+
+NICIAS: Yes, indeed Socrates; that is my opinion.
+
+SOCRATES: And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the
+fearful and of the hopeful?
+
+NICIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future
+goods and future evils?
+
+NICIAS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And the same science has to do with the same things in the
+future or at any time?
+
+NICIAS: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the
+fearful and hopeful, for they are future only; courage, like the other
+sciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future, but of
+the present and past, and of any time?
+
+NICIAS: That, as I suppose, is true.
+
+SOCRATES: Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a
+third part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature of
+courage: and according to your view, that is, according to your present
+view, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful,
+but seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to
+time. What do you say to that alteration in your statement?
+
+NICIAS: I agree, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil,
+and how they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not be
+perfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance,
+or holiness? He would possess them all, and he would know which were
+dangers and which were not, and guard against them whether they were
+supernatural or natural; and he would provide the good, as he would know
+how to deal both with gods or men.
+
+NICIAS: I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what
+you say.
+
+SOCRATES: But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of
+yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?
+
+NICIAS: It would seem so.
+
+SOCRATES: But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?
+
+NICIAS: Yes, that was what we were saying.
+
+SOCRATES: And that is in contradiction with our present view?
+
+NICIAS: That appears to be the case.
+
+SOCRATES: Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage is.
+
+NICIAS: We have not.
+
+LACHES: And yet, friend Nicias, I imagined that you would have made the
+discovery, when you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made to
+Socrates. I had very great hopes that you would have been enlightened by
+the wisdom of Damon.
+
+NICIAS: I perceive, Laches, that you think nothing of having displayed
+your ignorance of the nature of courage, but you look only to see
+whether I have not made a similar display; and if we are both equally
+ignorant of the things which a man who is good for anything should know,
+that, I suppose, will be of no consequence. You certainly appear to me
+very like the rest of the world, looking at your neighbour and not at
+yourself. I am of opinion that enough has been said on the subject which
+we have been discussing; and if anything has been imperfectly said, that
+may be hereafter corrected by the help of Damon, whom you think to laugh
+down, although you have never seen him, and with the help of others. And
+when I am satisfied myself, I will freely impart my satisfaction to you,
+for I think that you are very much in want of knowledge.
+
+LACHES: You are a philosopher, Nicias; of that I am aware: nevertheless
+I would recommend Lysimachus and Melesias not to take you and me as
+advisers about the education of their children; but, as I said at first,
+they should ask Socrates and not let him off; if my own sons were old
+enough, I would have asked him myself.
+
+NICIAS: To that I quite agree, if Socrates is willing to take them
+under his charge. I should not wish for any one else to be the tutor
+of Niceratus. But I observe that when I mention the matter to him he
+recommends to me some other tutor and refuses himself. Perhaps he may be
+more ready to listen to you, Lysimachus.
+
+LYSIMACHUS: He ought, Nicias: for certainly I would do things for him
+which I would not do for many others. What do you say, Socrates--will
+you comply? And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of
+the youths?
+
+SOCRATES: Indeed, Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to aid
+in the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversation
+that I had a knowledge which Nicias and Laches have not, then I admit
+that you would be right in inviting me to perform this duty; but as we
+are all in the same perplexity, why should one of us be preferred
+to another? I certainly think that no one should; and under these
+circumstances, let me offer you a piece of advice (and this need not go
+further than ourselves). I maintain, my friends, that every one of us
+should seek out the best teacher whom he can find, first for ourselves,
+who are greatly in need of one, and then for the youth, regardless of
+expense or anything. But I cannot advise that we remain as we are. And
+if any one laughs at us for going to school at our age, I would quote to
+them the authority of Homer, who says, that
+
+'Modesty is not good for a needy man.'
+
+Let us then, regardless of what may be said of us, make the education of
+the youths our own education.
+
+LYSIMACHUS: I like your proposal, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, I am
+also the most eager to go to school with the boys. Let me beg a favour
+of you: Come to my house to-morrow at dawn, and we will advise about
+these matters. For the present, let us make an end of the conversation.
+
+SOCRATES: I will come to you to-morrow, Lysimachus, as you propose, God
+willing.
+
+
+
+
+
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