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JOWETT, M.A. + +Master of Balliol College +Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford +Doctor in Theology of the University of Leyden + + +TO MY FORMER PUPILS + +in Balliol College and in the University of Oxford who during fifty years +have been the best of friends to me these volumes are inscribed in grateful +recognition of their never failing attachment. + + +The additions and alterations which have been made, both in the +Introductions and in the Text of this Edition, affect at least a third of +the work. + +Having regard to the extent of these alterations, and to the annoyance +which is naturally felt by the owner of a book at the possession of it in +an inferior form, and still more keenly by the writer himself, who must +always desire to be read as he is at his best, I have thought that the +possessor of either of the former Editions (1870 and 1876) might wish to +exchange it for the present one. I have therefore arranged that those who +would like to make this exchange, on depositing a perfect and undamaged +copy of the first or second Edition with any agent of the Clarendon Press, +shall be entitled to receive a copy of a new Edition at half-price. + + +PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. + +The Text which has been mostly followed in this Translation of Plato is the +latest 8vo. edition of Stallbaum; the principal deviations are noted at the +bottom of the page. + +I have to acknowledge many obligations to old friends and pupils. These +are:--Mr. John Purves, Fellow of Balliol College, with whom I have revised +about half of the entire Translation; the Rev. Professor Campbell, of St. +Andrews, who has helped me in the revision of several parts of the work, +especially of the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Politicus; Mr. Robinson Ellis, +Fellow of Trinity College, and Mr. Alfred Robinson, Fellow of New College, +who read with me the Cratylus and the Gorgias; Mr. Paravicini, Student of +Christ Church, who assisted me in the Symposium; Mr. Raper, Fellow of +Queen's College, Mr. Monro, Fellow of Oriel College, and Mr. Shadwell, +Student of Christ Church, who gave me similar assistance in the Laws. Dr. +Greenhill, of Hastings, has also kindly sent me remarks on the +physiological part of the Timaeus, which I have inserted as corrections +under the head of errata at the end of the Introduction. The degree of +accuracy which I have been enabled to attain is in great measure due to +these gentlemen, and I heartily thank them for the pains and time which +they have bestowed on my work. + +I have further to explain how far I have received help from other labourers +in the same field. The books which I have found of most use are Steinhart +and Muller's German Translation of Plato with Introductions; Zeller's +'Philosophie der Griechen,' and 'Platonische Studien;' Susemihl's +'Genetische Entwickelung der Paltonischen Philosophie;' Hermann's +'Geschichte der Platonischen Philosophie;' Bonitz, 'Platonische Studien;' +Stallbaum's Notes and Introductions; Professor Campbell's editions of the +'Theaetetus,' the 'Sophist,' and the 'Politicus;' Professor Thompson's +'Phaedrus;' Th. Martin's 'Etudes sur le Timee;' Mr. Poste's edition and +translation of the 'Philebus;' the Translation of the 'Republic,' by +Messrs. Davies and Vaughan, and the Translation of the 'Gorgias,' by Mr. +Cope. + +I have also derived much assistance from the great work of Mr. Grote, which +contains excellent analyses of the Dialogues, and is rich in original +thoughts and observations. I agree with him in rejecting as futile the +attempt of Schleiermacher and others to arrange the Dialogues of Plato into +a harmonious whole. Any such arrangement appears to me not only to be +unsupported by evidence, but to involve an anachronism in the history of +philosophy. There is a common spirit in the writings of Plato, but not a +unity of design in the whole, nor perhaps a perfect unity in any single +Dialogue. The hypothesis of a general plan which is worked out in the +successive Dialogues is an after-thought of the critics who have attributed +a system to writings belonging to an age when system had not as yet taken +possession of philosophy. + +If Mr. Grote should do me the honour to read any portion of this work he +will probably remark that I have endeavoured to approach Plato from a point +of view which is opposed to his own. The aim of the Introductions in these +volumes has been to represent Plato as the father of Idealism, who is not +to be measured by the standard of utilitarianism or any other modern +philosophical system. He is the poet or maker of ideas, satisfying the +wants of his own age, providing the instruments of thought for future +generations. He is no dreamer, but a great philosophical genius struggling +with the unequal conditions of light and knowledge under which he is +living. He may be illustrated by the writings of moderns, but he must be +interpreted by his own, and by his place in the history of philosophy. We +are not concerned to determine what is the residuum of truth which remains +for ourselves. His truth may not be our truth, and nevertheless may have +an extraordinary value and interest for us. + +I cannot agree with Mr. Grote in admitting as genuine all the writings +commonly attributed to Plato in antiquity, any more than with Schaarschmidt +and some other German critics who reject nearly half of them. The German +critics, to whom I refer, proceed chiefly on grounds of internal evidence; +they appear to me to lay too much stress on the variety of doctrine and +style, which must be equally acknowledged as a fact, even in the Dialogues +regarded by Schaarschmidt as genuine, e.g. in the Phaedrus, or Symposium, +when compared with the Laws. He who admits works so different in style and +matter to have been the composition of the same author, need have no +difficulty in admitting the Sophist or the Politicus. (The negative +argument adduced by the same school of critics, which is based on the +silence of Aristotle, is not worthy of much consideration. For why should +Aristotle, because he has quoted several Dialogues of Plato, have quoted +them all? Something must be allowed to chance, and to the nature of the +subjects treated of in them.) On the other hand, Mr. Grote trusts mainly +to the Alexandrian Canon. But I hardly think that we are justified in +attributing much weight to the authority of the Alexandrian librarians in +an age when there was no regular publication of books, and every temptation +to forge them; and in which the writings of a school were naturally +attributed to the founder of the school. And even without intentional +fraud, there was an inclination to believe rather than to enquire. Would +Mr. Grote accept as genuine all the writings which he finds in the lists of +learned ancients attributed to Hippocrates, to Xenophon, to Aristotle? The +Alexandrian Canon of the Platonic writings is deprived of credit by the +admission of the Epistles, which are not only unworthy of Plato, and in +several passages plagiarized from him, but flagrantly at variance with +historical fact. It will be seen also that I do not agree with Mr. Grote's +views about the Sophists; nor with the low estimate which he has formed of +Plato's Laws; nor with his opinion respecting Plato's doctrine of the +rotation of the earth. But I 'am not going to lay hands on my father +Parmenides' (Soph.), who will, I hope, forgive me for differing from him on +these points. I cannot close this Preface without expressing my deep +respect for his noble and gentle character, and the great services which he +has rendered to Greek Literature. + +Balliol College, +January, 1871. + + +PREFACE TO THE SECOND AND THIRD EDITIONS. + +In publishing a Second Edition (1875) of the Dialogues of Plato in English, +I had to acknowledge the assistance of several friends: of the Rev. G.G. +Bradley, Master of University College, now Dean of Westminster, who sent me +some valuable remarks on the Phaedo; of Dr. Greenhill, who had again +revised a portion of the Timaeus; of Mr. R.L. Nettleship, Fellow and Tutor +of Balliol College, to whom I was indebted for an excellent criticism of +the Parmenides; and, above all, of the Rev. Professor Campbell of St. +Andrews, and Mr. Paravicini, late Student of Christ Church and Tutor of +Balliol College, with whom I had read over the greater part of the +translation. I was also indebted to Mr. Evelyn Abbott, Fellow and Tutor of +Balliol College, for a complete and accurate index. + +In this, the Third Edition, I am under very great obligations to Mr. +Matthew Knight, who has not only favoured me with valuable suggestions +throughout the work, but has largely extended the Index (from 61 to 175 +pages) and translated the Eryxias and Second Alcibiades; and to Mr Frank +Fletcher, of Balliol College, my Secretary. I am also considerably +indebted to Mr. J.W. Mackail, late Fellow of Balliol College, who read over +the Republic in the Second Edition and noted several inaccuracies. + +In both editions the Introductions to the Dialogues have been enlarged, and +essays on subjects having an affinity to the Platonic Dialogues have been +introduced into several of them. The analyses have been corrected, and +innumerable alterations have been made in the Text. There have been added +also, in the Third Edition, headings to the pages and a marginal analysis +to the text of each dialogue. + +At the end of a long task, the translator may without impropriety point out +the difficulties which he has had to encounter. These have been far +greater than he would have anticipated; nor is he at all sanguine that he +has succeeded in overcoming them. Experience has made him feel that a +translation, like a picture, is dependent for its effect on very minute +touches; and that it is a work of infinite pains, to be returned to in many +moods and viewed in different lights. + +I. An English translation ought to be idiomatic and interesting, not only +to the scholar, but to the unlearned reader. Its object should not simply +be to render the words of one language into the words of another or to +preserve the construction and order of the original;--this is the ambition +of a schoolboy, who wishes to show that he has made a good use of his +Dictionary and Grammar; but is quite unworthy of the translator, who seeks +to produce on his reader an impression similar or nearly similar to that +produced by the original. To him the feeling should be more important than +the exact word. He should remember Dryden's quaint admonition not to +'lacquey by the side of his author, but to mount up behind him.' +(Dedication to the Aeneis.) He must carry in his mind a comprehensive view +of the whole work, of what has preceded and of what is to follow,--as well +as of the meaning of particular passages. His version should be based, in +the first instance, on an intimate knowledge of the text; but the precise +order and arrangement of the words may be left to fade out of sight, when +the translation begins to take shape. He must form a general idea of the +two languages, and reduce the one to the terms of the other. His work +should be rhythmical and varied, the right admixture of words and +syllables, and even of letters, should be carefully attended to; above all, +it should be equable in style. There must also be quantity, which is +necessary in prose as well as in verse: clauses, sentences, paragraphs, +must be in due proportion. Metre and even rhyme may be rarely admitted; +though neither is a legitimate element of prose writing, they may help to +lighten a cumbrous expression (Symp.). The translation should retain as +far as possible the characteristic qualities of the ancient writer--his +freedom, grace, simplicity, stateliness, weight, precision; or the best +part of him will be lost to the English reader. It should read as an +original work, and should also be the most faithful transcript which can be +made of the language from which the translation is taken, consistently with +the first requirement of all, that it be English. Further, the translation +being English, it should also be perfectly intelligible in itself without +reference to the Greek, the English being really the more lucid and exact +of the two languages. In some respects it may be maintained that ordinary +English writing, such as the newspaper article, is superior to Plato: at +any rate it is couched in language which is very rarely obscure. On the +other hand, the greatest writers of Greece, Thucydides, Plato, Aeschylus, +Sophocles, Pindar, Demosthenes, are generally those which are found to be +most difficult and to diverge most widely from the English idiom. The +translator will often have to convert the more abstract Greek into the more +concrete English, or vice versa, and he ought not to force upon one +language the character of another. In some cases, where the order is +confused, the expression feeble, the emphasis misplaced, or the sense +somewhat faulty, he will not strive in his rendering to reproduce these +characteristics, but will re-write the passage as his author would have +written it at first, had he not been 'nodding'; and he will not hesitate to +supply anything which, owing to the genius of the language or some accident +of composition, is omitted in the Greek, but is necessary to make the +English clear and consecutive. + +It is difficult to harmonize all these conflicting elements. In a +translation of Plato what may be termed the interests of the Greek and +English are often at war with one another. In framing the English sentence +we are insensibly diverted from the exact meaning of the Greek; when we +return to the Greek we are apt to cramp and overlay the English. We +substitute, we compromise, we give and take, we add a little here and leave +out a little there. The translator may sometimes be allowed to sacrifice +minute accuracy for the sake of clearness and sense. But he is not +therefore at liberty to omit words and turns of expression which the +English language is quite capable of supplying. He must be patient and +self-controlled; he must not be easily run away with. Let him never allow +the attraction of a favourite expression, or a sonorous cadence, to +overpower his better judgment, or think much of an ornament which is out of +keeping with the general character of his work. He must ever be casting +his eyes upwards from the copy to the original, and down again from the +original to the copy (Rep.). His calling is not held in much honour by the +world of scholars; yet he himself may be excused for thinking it a kind of +glory to have lived so many years in the companionship of one of the +greatest of human intelligences, and in some degree, more perhaps than +others, to have had the privilege of understanding him (Sir Joshua +Reynolds' Lectures: Disc. xv.). + +There are fundamental differences in Greek and English, of which some may +be managed while others remain intractable. (1). The structure of the +Greek language is partly adversative and alternative, and partly +inferential; that is to say, the members of a sentence are either opposed +to one another, or one of them expresses the cause or effect or condition +or reason of another. The two tendencies may be called the horizontal and +perpendicular lines of the language; and the opposition or inference is +often much more one of words than of ideas. But modern languages have +rubbed off this adversative and inferential form: they have fewer links of +connection, there is less mortar in the interstices, and they are content +to place sentences side by side, leaving their relation to one another to +be gathered from their position or from the context. The difficulty of +preserving the effect of the Greek is increased by the want of adversative +and inferential particles in English, and by the nice sense of tautology +which characterizes all modern languages. We cannot have two 'buts' or two +'fors' in the same sentence where the Greek repeats (Greek). There is a +similar want of particles expressing the various gradations of objective +and subjective thought--(Greek) and the like, which are so thickly +scattered over the Greek page. Further, we can only realize to a very +imperfect degree the common distinction between (Greek), and the +combination of the two suggests a subtle shade of negation which cannot be +expressed in English. And while English is more dependent than Greek upon +the apposition of clauses and sentences, yet there is a difficulty in using +this form of construction owing to the want of case endings. For the same +reason there cannot be an equal variety in the order of words or an equal +nicety of emphasis in English as in Greek. + +(2) The formation of the sentence and of the paragraph greatly differs in +Greek and English. The lines by which they are divided are generally much +more marked in modern languages than in ancient. Both sentences and +paragraphs are more precise and definite--they do not run into one another. +They are also more regularly developed from within. The sentence marks +another step in an argument or a narrative or a statement; in reading a +paragraph we silently turn over the page and arrive at some new view or +aspect of the subject. Whereas in Plato we are not always certain where a +sentence begins and ends; and paragraphs are few and far between. The +language is distributed in a different way, and less articulated than in +English. For it was long before the true use of the period was attained by +the classical writers both in poetry or prose; it was (Greek). The balance +of sentences and the introduction of paragraphs at suitable intervals must +not be neglected if the harmony of the English language is to be preserved. +And still a caution has to be added on the other side, that we must avoid +giving it a numerical or mechanical character. + +(3) This, however, is not one of the greatest difficulties of the +translator; much greater is that which arises from the restriction of the +use of the genders. Men and women in English are masculine and feminine, +and there is a similar distinction of sex in the words denoting animals; +but all things else, whether outward objects or abstract ideas, are +relegated to the class of neuters. Hardly in some flight of poetry do we +ever endue any of them with the characteristics of a sentient being, and +then only by speaking of them in the feminine gender. The virtues may be +pictured in female forms, but they are not so described in language; a ship +is humorously supposed to be the sailor's bride; more doubtful are the +personifications of church and country as females. Now the genius of the +Greek language is the opposite of this. The same tendency to +personification which is seen in the Greek mythology is common also in the +language; and genders are attributed to things as well as persons according +to their various degrees of strength and weakness; or from fanciful +resemblances to the male or female form, or some analogy too subtle to be +discovered. When the gender of any object was once fixed, a similar gender +was naturally assigned to similar objects, or to words of similar +formation. This use of genders in the denotation of objects or ideas not +only affects the words to which genders are attributed, but the words with +which they are construed or connected, and passes into the general +character of the style. Hence arises a difficulty in translating Greek +into English which cannot altogether be overcome. Shall we speak of the +soul and its qualities, of virtue, power, wisdom, and the like, as feminine +or neuter? The usage of the English language does not admit of the former, +and yet the life and beauty of the style are impaired by the latter. Often +the translator will have recourse to the repetition of the word, or to the +ambiguous 'they,' 'their,' etc.; for fear of spoiling the effect of the +sentence by introducing 'it.' Collective nouns in Greek and English create +a similar but lesser awkwardness. + +(4) To use of relation is far more extended in Greek than in English. +Partly the greater variety of genders and cases makes the connexion of +relative and antecedent less ambiguous: partly also the greater number of +demonstrative and relative pronouns, and the use of the article, make the +correlation of ideas simpler and more natural. The Greek appears to have +had an ear or intelligence for a long and complicated sentence which is +rarely to be found in modern nations; and in order to bring the Greek down +to the level of the modern, we must break up the long sentence into two or +more short ones. Neither is the same precision required in Greek as in +Latin or English, nor in earlier Greek as in later; there was nothing +shocking to the contemporary of Thucydides and Plato in anacolutha and +repetitions. In such cases the genius of the English language requires +that the translation should be more intelligible than the Greek. The want +of more distinctions between the demonstrative pronouns is also greatly +felt. Two genitives dependent on one another, unless familiarised by +idiom, have an awkward effect in English. Frequently the noun has to take +the place of the pronoun. 'This' and 'that' are found repeating themselves +to weariness in the rough draft of a translation. As in the previous case, +while the feeling of the modern language is more opposed to tautology, +there is also a greater difficulty in avoiding it. + +(5) Though no precise rule can be laid down about the repetition of words, +there seems to be a kind of impertinence in presenting to the reader the +same thought in the same words, repeated twice over in the same passage +without any new aspect or modification of it. And the evasion of +tautology--that is, the substitution of one word of precisely the same +meaning for another--is resented by us equally with the repetition of +words. Yet on the other hand the least difference of meaning or the least +change of form from a substantive to an adjective, or from a participle to +a verb, will often remedy the unpleasant effect. Rarely and only for the +sake of emphasis or clearness can we allow an important word to be used +twice over in two successive sentences or even in the same paragraph. The +particles and pronouns, as they are of most frequent occurrence, are also +the most troublesome. Strictly speaking, except a few of the commonest of +them, 'and,' 'the,' etc., they ought not to occur twice in the same +sentence. But the Greek has no such precise rules; and hence any literal +translation of a Greek author is full of tautology. The tendency of modern +languages is to become more correct as well as more perspicuous than +ancient. And, therefore, while the English translator is limited in the +power of expressing relation or connexion, by the law of his own language +increased precision and also increased clearness are required of him. The +familiar use of logic, and the progress of science, have in these two +respects raised the standard. But modern languages, while they have become +more exacting in their demands, are in many ways not so well furnished with +powers of expression as the ancient classical ones. + +Such are a few of the difficulties which have to be overcome in the work of +translation; and we are far from having exhausted the list. (6) The +excellence of a translation will consist, not merely in the faithful +rendering of words, or in the composition of a sentence only, or yet of a +single paragraph, but in the colour and style of the whole work. +Equability of tone is best attained by the exclusive use of familiar and +idiomatic words. But great care must be taken; for an idiomatic phrase, if +an exception to the general style, is of itself a disturbing element. No +word, however expressive and exact, should be employed, which makes the +reader stop to think, or unduly attracts attention by difficulty and +peculiarity, or disturbs the effect of the surrounding language. In +general the style of one author is not appropriate to another; as in +society, so in letters, we expect every man to have 'a good coat of his +own,' and not to dress himself out in the rags of another. (a) Archaic +expressions are therefore to be avoided. Equivalents may be occasionally +drawn from Shakspere, who is the common property of us all; but they must +be used sparingly. For, like some other men of genius of the Elizabethan +and Jacobean age, he outdid the capabilities of the language, and many of +the expressions which he introduced have been laid aside and have dropped +out of use. (b) A similar principle should be observed in the employment +of Scripture. Having a greater force and beauty than other language, and a +religious association, it disturbs the even flow of the style. It may be +used to reproduce in the translation the quaint effect of some antique +phrase in the original, but rarely; and when adopted, it should have a +certain freshness and a suitable 'entourage.' It is strange to observe +that the most effective use of Scripture phraseology arises out of the +application of it in a sense not intended by the author. (c) Another +caution: metaphors differ in different languages, and the translator will +often be compelled to substitute one for another, or to paraphrase them, +not giving word for word, but diffusing over several words the more +concentrated thought of the original. The Greek of Plato often goes beyond +the English in its imagery: compare Laws, (Greek); Rep.; etc. Or again the +modern word, which in substance is the nearest equivalent to the Greek, may +be found to include associations alien to Greek life: e.g. (Greek), +'jurymen,' (Greek), 'the bourgeoisie.' (d) The translator has also to +provide expressions for philosophical terms of very indefinite meaning in +the more definite language of modern philosophy. And he must not allow +discordant elements to enter into the work. For example, in translating +Plato, it would equally be an anachronism to intrude on him the feeling and +spirit of the Jewish or Christian Scriptures or the technical terms of the +Hegelian or Darwinian philosophy. + +(7) As no two words are precise equivalents (just as no two leaves of the +forest are exactly similar), it is a mistaken attempt at precision always +to translate the same Greek word by the same English word. There is no +reason why in the New Testament (Greek) should always be rendered +'righteousness,' or (Greek) 'covenant.' In such cases the translator may +be allowed to employ two words--sometimes when the two meanings occur in +the same passage, varying them by an 'or'--e.g. (Greek), 'science' or +'knowledge,' (Greek), 'idea' or 'class,' (Greek), 'temperance' or +'prudence,'--at the point where the change of meaning occurs. If +translations are intended not for the Greek scholar but for the general +reader, their worst fault will be that they sacrifice the general effect +and meaning to the over-precise rendering of words and forms of speech. + +(8) There is no kind of literature in English which corresponds to the +Greek Dialogue; nor is the English language easily adapted to it. The +rapidity and abruptness of question and answer, the constant repetition of +(Greek), etc., which Cicero avoided in Latin (de Amicit), the frequent +occurrence of expletives, would, if reproduced in a translation, give +offence to the reader. Greek has a freer and more frequent use of the +Interrogative, and is of a more passionate and emotional character, and +therefore lends itself with greater readiness to the dialogue form. Most +of the so-called English Dialogues are but poor imitations of Plato, which +fall very far short of the original. The breath of conversation, the +subtle adjustment of question and answer, the lively play of fancy, the +power of drawing characters, are wanting in them. But the Platonic +dialogue is a drama as well as a dialogue, of which Socrates is the central +figure, and there are lesser performers as well:--the insolence of +Thrasymachus, the anger of Callicles and Anytus, the patronizing style of +Protagoras, the self-consciousness of Prodicus and Hippias, are all part of +the entertainment. To reproduce this living image the same sort of effort +is required as in translating poetry. The language, too, is of a finer +quality; the mere prose English is slow in lending itself to the form of +question and answer, and so the ease of conversation is lost, and at the +same time the dialectical precision with which the steps of the argument +are drawn out is apt to be impaired. + +II. In the Introductions to the Dialogues there have been added some +essays on modern philosophy, and on political and social life. The chief +subjects discussed in these are Utility, Communism, the Kantian and +Hegelian philosophies, Psychology, and the Origin of Language. (There have +been added also in the Third Edition remarks on other subjects. A list of +the most important of these additions is given at the end of this Preface.) + +Ancient and modern philosophy throw a light upon one another: but they +should be compared, not confounded. Although the connexion between them is +sometimes accidental, it is often real. The same questions are discussed +by them under different conditions of language and civilization; but in +some cases a mere word has survived, while nothing or hardly anything of +the pre-Socratic, Platonic, or Aristotelian meaning is retained. There are +other questions familiar to the moderns, which have no place in ancient +philosophy. The world has grown older in two thousand years, and has +enlarged its stock of ideas and methods of reasoning. Yet the germ of +modern thought is found in ancient, and we may claim to have inherited, +notwithstanding many accidents of time and place, the spirit of Greek +philosophy. There is, however, no continuous growth of the one into the +other, but a new beginning, partly artificial, partly arising out of the +questionings of the mind itself, and also receiving a stimulus from the +study of ancient writings. + +Considering the great and fundamental differences which exist in ancient +and modern philosophy, it seems best that we should at first study them +separately, and seek for the interpretation of either, especially of the +ancient, from itself only, comparing the same author with himself and with +his contemporaries, and with the general state of thought and feeling +prevalent in his age. Afterwards comes the remoter light which they cast +on one another. We begin to feel that the ancients had the same thoughts +as ourselves, the same difficulties which characterize all periods of +transition, almost the same opposition between science and religion. +Although we cannot maintain that ancient and modern philosophy are one and +continuous (as has been affirmed with more truth respecting ancient and +modern history), for they are separated by an interval of a thousand years, +yet they seem to recur in a sort of cycle, and we are surprised to find +that the new is ever old, and that the teaching of the past has still a +meaning for us. + +III. In the preface to the first edition I expressed a strong opinion at +variance with Mr. Grote's, that the so-called Epistles of Plato were +spurious. His friend and editor, Professor Bain, thinks that I ought to +give the reasons why I differ from so eminent an authority. Reserving the +fuller discussion of the question for another place, I will shortly defend +my opinion by the following arguments:-- + +(a) Because almost all epistles purporting to be of the classical age of +Greek literature are forgeries. (Compare Bentley's Works (Dyce's +Edition).) Of all documents this class are the least likely to be +preserved and the most likely to be invented. The ancient world swarmed +with them; the great libraries stimulated the demand for them; and at a +time when there was no regular publication of books, they easily crept into +the world. + +(b) When one epistle out of a number is spurious, the remainder of the +series cannot be admitted to be genuine, unless there be some independent +ground for thinking them so: when all but one are spurious, overwhelming +evidence is required of the genuineness of the one: when they are all +similar in style or motive, like witnesses who agree in the same tale, they +stand or fall together. But no one, not even Mr. Grote, would maintain +that all the Epistles of Plato are genuine, and very few critics think that +more than one of them is so. And they are clearly all written from the +same motive, whether serious or only literary. Nor is there an example in +Greek antiquity of a series of Epistles, continuous and yet coinciding with +a succession of events extending over a great number of years. + +The external probability therefore against them is enormous, and the +internal probability is not less: for they are trivial and unmeaning, +devoid of delicacy and subtlety, wanting in a single fine expression. And +even if this be matter of dispute, there can be no dispute that there are +found in them many plagiarisms, inappropriately borrowed, which is a common +note of forgery. They imitate Plato, who never imitates either himself or +any one else; reminiscences of the Republic and the Laws are continually +recurring in them; they are too like him and also too unlike him, to be +genuine (see especially Karsten, Commentio Critica de Platonis quae +feruntur Epistolis). They are full of egotism, self-assertion, +affectation, faults which of all writers Plato was most careful to avoid, +and into which he was least likely to fall. They abound in obscurities, +irrelevancies, solecisms, pleonasms, inconsistencies, awkwardnesses of +construction, wrong uses of words. They also contain historical blunders, +such as the statement respecting Hipparinus and Nysaeus, the nephews of +Dion, who are said to 'have been well inclined to philosophy, and well able +to dispose the mind of their brother Dionysius in the same course,' at a +time when they could not have been more than six or seven years of age-- +also foolish allusions, such as the comparison of the Athenian empire to +the empire of Darius, which show a spirit very different from that of +Plato; and mistakes of fact, as e.g. about the Thirty Tyrants, whom the +writer of the letters seems to have confused with certain inferior +magistrates, making them in all fifty-one. These palpable errors and +absurdities are absolutely irreconcileable with their genuineness. And as +they appear to have a common parentage, the more they are studied, the more +they will be found to furnish evidence against themselves. The Seventh, +which is thought to be the most important of these Epistles, has affinities +with the Third and the Eighth, and is quite as impossible and inconsistent +as the rest. It is therefore involved in the same condemnation.--The final +conclusion is that neither the Seventh nor any other of them, when +carefully analyzed, can be imagined to have proceeded from the hand or mind +of Plato. The other testimonies to the voyages of Plato to Sicily and the +court of Dionysius are all of them later by several centuries than the +events to which they refer. No extant writer mentions them older than +Cicero and Cornelius Nepos. It does not seem impossible that so attractive +a theme as the meeting of a philosopher and a tyrant, once imagined by the +genius of a Sophist, may have passed into a romance which became famous in +Hellas and the world. It may have created one of the mists of history, +like the Trojan war or the legend of Arthur, which we are unable to +penetrate. In the age of Cicero, and still more in that of Diogenes +Laertius and Appuleius, many other legends had gathered around the +personality of Plato,--more voyages, more journeys to visit tyrants and +Pythagorean philosophers. But if, as we agree with Karsten in supposing, +they are the forgery of some rhetorician or sophist, we cannot agree with +him in also supposing that they are of any historical value, the rather as +there is no early independent testimony by which they are supported or with +which they can be compared. + +IV. There is another subject to which I must briefly call attention, lest +I should seem to have overlooked it. Dr. Henry Jackson, of Trinity +College, Cambridge, in a series of articles which he has contributed to the +Journal of Philology, has put forward an entirely new explanation of the +Platonic 'Ideas.' He supposes that in the mind of Plato they took, at +different times in his life, two essentially different forms:--an earlier +one which is found chiefly in the Republic and the Phaedo, and a later, +which appears in the Theaetetus, Philebus, Sophist, Politicus, Parmenides, +Timaeus. In the first stage of his philosophy Plato attributed Ideas to +all things, at any rate to all things which have classes or common notions: +these he supposed to exist only by participation in them. In the later +Dialogues he no longer included in them manufactured articles and ideas of +relation, but restricted them to 'types of nature,' and having become +convinced that the many cannot be parts of the one, for the idea of +participation in them he substituted imitation of them. To quote Dr. +Jackson's own expressions,--'whereas in the period of the Republic and the +Phaedo, it was proposed to pass through ontology to the sciences, in the +period of the Parmenides and the Philebus, it is proposed to pass through +the sciences to ontology': or, as he repeats in nearly the same words,-- +'whereas in the Republic and in the Phaedo he had dreamt of passing through +ontology to the sciences, he is now content to pass through the sciences to +ontology.' + +This theory is supposed to be based on Aristotle's Metaphysics, a passage +containing an account of the ideas, which hitherto scholars have found +impossible to reconcile with the statements of Plato himself. The +preparations for the new departure are discovered in the Parmenides and in +the Theaetetus; and it is said to be expressed under a different form by +the (Greek) and the (Greek) of the Philebus. The (Greek) of the Philebus +is the principle which gives form and measure to the (Greek); and in the +'Later Theory' is held to be the (Greek) or (Greek) which converts the +Infinite or Indefinite into ideas. They are neither (Greek) nor (Greek), +but belong to the (Greek) which partakes of both. + +With great respect for the learning and ability of Dr. Jackson, I find +myself unable to agree in this newly fashioned doctrine of the Ideas, which +he ascribes to Plato. I have not the space to go into the question fully; +but I will briefly state some objections which are, I think, fatal to it. + +(1) First, the foundation of his argument is laid in the Metaphysics of +Aristotle. But we cannot argue, either from the Metaphysics, or from any +other of the philosophical treatises of Aristotle, to the dialogues of +Plato until we have ascertained the relation in which his so-called works +stand to the philosopher himself. There is of course no doubt of the great +influence exercised upon Greece and upon the world by Aristotle and his +philosophy. But on the other hand almost every one who is capable of +understanding the subject acknowledges that his writings have not come down +to us in an authentic form like most of the dialogues of Plato. How much +of them is to be ascribed to Aristotle's own hand, how much is due to his +successors in the Peripatetic School, is a question which has never been +determined, and probably never can be, because the solution of it depends +upon internal evidence only. To 'the height of this great argument' I do +not propose to ascend. But one little fact, not irrelevant to the present +discussion, will show how hopeless is the attempt to explain Plato out of +the writings of Aristotle. In the chapter of the Metaphysics quoted by Dr. +Jackson, about two octavo pages in length, there occur no less than seven +or eight references to Plato, although nothing really corresponding to them +can be found in his extant writings:--a small matter truly; but what a +light does it throw on the character of the entire book in which they +occur! We can hardly escape from the conclusion that they are not +statements of Aristotle respecting Plato, but of a later generation of +Aristotelians respecting a later generation of Platonists. (Compare the +striking remark of the great Scaliger respecting the Magna Moralia:--Haec +non sunt Aristotelis, tamen utitur auctor Aristotelis nomine tanquam suo.) + +(2) There is no hint in Plato's own writings that he was conscious of +having made any change in the Doctrine of Ideas such as Dr. Jackson +attributes to him, although in the Republic the platonic Socrates speaks of +'a longer and a shorter way', and of a way in which his disciple Glaucon +'will be unable to follow him'; also of a way of Ideas, to which he still +holds fast, although it has often deserted him (Philebus, Phaedo), and +although in the later dialogues and in the Laws the reference to Ideas +disappears, and Mind claims her own (Phil.; Laws). No hint is given of +what Plato meant by the 'longer way' (Rep.), or 'the way in which Glaucon +was unable to follow'; or of the relation of Mind to the Ideas. It might +be said with truth that the conception of the Idea predominates in the +first half of the Dialogues, which, according to the order adopted in this +work, ends with the Republic, the 'conception of Mind' and a way of +speaking more in agreement with modern terminology, in the latter half. +But there is no reason to suppose that Plato's theory, or, rather, his +various theories, of the Ideas underwent any definite change during his +period of authorship. They are substantially the same in the twelfth Book +of the Laws as in the Meno and Phaedo; and since the Laws were written in +the last decade of his life, there is no time to which this change of +opinions can be ascribed. It is true that the theory of Ideas takes +several different forms, not merely an earlier and a later one, in the +various Dialogues. They are personal and impersonal, ideals and ideas, +existing by participation or by imitation, one and many, in different parts +of his writings or even in the same passage. They are the universal +definitions of Socrates, and at the same time 'of more than mortal +knowledge' (Rep.). But they are always the negations of sense, of matter, +of generation, of the particular: they are always the subjects of +knowledge and not of opinion; and they tend, not to diversity, but to +unity. Other entities or intelligences are akin to them, but not the same +with them, such as mind, measure, limit, eternity, essence (Philebus; +Timaeus): these and similar terms appear to express the same truths from a +different point of view, and to belong to the same sphere with them. But +we are not justified, therefore, in attempting to identify them, any more +than in wholly opposing them. The great oppositions of the sensible and +intellectual, the unchangeable and the transient, in whatever form of words +expressed, are always maintained in Plato. But the lesser logical +distinctions, as we should call them, whether of ontology or predication, +which troubled the pre-Socratic philosophy and came to the front in +Aristotle, are variously discussed and explained. Thus far we admit +inconsistency in Plato, but no further. He lived in an age before logic +and system had wholly permeated language, and therefore we must not always +expect to find in him systematic arrangement or logical precision:--'poema +magis putandum.' But he is always true to his own context, the careful +study of which is of more value to the interpreter than all the +commentators and scholiasts put together. + +(3) The conclusions at which Dr. Jackson has arrived are such as might be +expected to follow from his method of procedure. For he takes words +without regard to their connection, and pieces together different parts of +dialogues in a purely arbitrary manner, although there is no indication +that the author intended the two passages to be so combined, or that when +he appears to be experimenting on the different points of view from which a +subject of philosophy may be regarded, he is secretly elaborating a system. +By such a use of language any premises may be made to lead to any +conclusion. I am not one of those who believe Plato to have been a mystic +or to have had hidden meanings; nor do I agree with Dr. Jackson in thinking +that 'when he is precise and dogmatic, he generally contrives to introduce +an element of obscurity into the expostion' (J. of Philol.). The great +master of language wrote as clearly as he could in an age when the minds of +men were clouded by controversy, and philosophical terms had not yet +acquired a fixed meaning. I have just said that Plato is to be interpreted +by his context; and I do not deny that in some passages, especially in the +Republic and Laws, the context is at a greater distance than would be +allowable in a modern writer. But we are not therefore justified in +connecting passages from different parts of his writings, or even from the +same work, which he has not himself joined. We cannot argue from the +Parmenides to the Philebus, or from either to the Sophist, or assume that +the Parmenides, the Philebus, and the Timaeus were 'written +simultaneously,' or 'were intended to be studied in the order in which they +are here named (J. of Philol.) We have no right to connect statements +which are only accidentally similar. Nor is it safe for the author of a +theory about ancient philosophy to argue from what will happen if his +statements are rejected. For those consequences may never have entered +into the mind of the ancient writer himself; and they are very likely to be +modern consequences which would not have been understood by him. 'I cannot +think,' says Dr. Jackson, 'that Plato would have changed his opinions, but +have nowhere explained the nature of the change.' But is it not much more +improbable that he should have changed his opinions, and not stated in an +unmistakable manner that the most essential principle of his philosophy had +been reversed? It is true that a few of the dialogues, such as the +Republic and the Timaeus, or the Theaetetus and the Sophist, or the Meno +and the Apology, contain allusions to one another. But these allusions are +superficial and, except in the case of the Republic and the Laws, have no +philosophical importance. They do not affect the substance of the work. +It may be remarked further that several of the dialogues, such as the +Phaedrus, the Sophist, and the Parmenides, have more than one subject. But +it does not therefore follow that Plato intended one dialogue to succeed +another, or that he begins anew in one dialogue a subject which he has left +unfinished in another, or that even in the same dialogue he always intended +the two parts to be connected with each other. We cannot argue from a +casual statement found in the Parmenides to other statements which occur in +the Philebus. Much more truly is his own manner described by himself when +he says that 'words are more plastic than wax' (Rep.), and 'whither the +wind blows, the argument follows'. The dialogues of Plato are like poems, +isolated and separate works, except where they are indicated by the author +himself to have an intentional sequence. + +It is this method of taking passages out of their context and placing them +in a new connexion when they seem to confirm a preconceived theory, which +is the defect of Dr. Jackson's procedure. It may be compared, though not +wholly the same with it, to that method which the Fathers practised, +sometimes called 'the mystical interpretation of Scripture,' in which +isolated words are separated from their context, and receive any sense +which the fancy of the interpreter may suggest. It is akin to the method +employed by Schleiermacher of arranging the dialogues of Plato in +chronological order according to what he deems the true arrangement of the +ideas contained in them. (Dr. Jackson is also inclined, having constructed +a theory, to make the chronology of Plato's writings dependent upon it +(See J. of Philol.and elsewhere.).) It may likewise be illustrated by the +ingenuity of those who employ symbols to find in Shakespeare a hidden +meaning. In the three cases the error is nearly the same:--words are taken +out of their natural context, and thus become destitute of any real +meaning. + +(4) According to Dr. Jackson's 'Later Theory,' Plato's Ideas, which were +once regarded as the summa genera of all things, are now to be explained as +Forms or Types of some things only,--that is to say, of natural objects: +these we conceive imperfectly, but are always seeking in vain to have a +more perfect notion of them. He says (J. of Philol.) that 'Plato hoped by +the study of a series of hypothetical or provisional classifications to +arrive at one in which nature's distribution of kinds is approximately +represented, and so to attain approximately to the knowledge of the ideas. +But whereas in the Republic, and even in the Phaedo, though less hopefully, +he had sought to convert his provisional definitions into final ones by +tracing their connexion with the summum genus, the (Greek), in the +Parmenides his aspirations are less ambitious,' and so on. But where does +Dr. Jackson find any such notion as this in Plato or anywhere in ancient +philosophy? Is it not an anachronism, gracious to the modern physical +philosopher, and the more acceptable because it seems to form a link +between ancient and modern philosophy, and between physical and +metaphysical science; but really unmeaning? + +(5) To this 'Later Theory' of Plato's Ideas I oppose the authority of +Professor Zeller, who affirms that none of the passages to which Dr. +Jackson appeals (Theaet.; Phil.; Tim.; Parm.) 'in the smallest degree prove +his point'; and that in the second class of dialogues, in which the 'Later +Theory of Ideas' is supposed to be found, quite as clearly as in the first, +are admitted Ideas, not only of natural objects, but of properties, +relations, works of art, negative notions (Theaet.; Parm.; Soph.); and that +what Dr. Jackson distinguishes as the first class of dialogues from the +second equally assert or imply that the relation of things to the Ideas, is +one of participation in them as well as of imitation of them (Prof. +Zeller's summary of his own review of Dr. Jackson, Archiv fur Geschichte +der Philosophie.) + +In conclusion I may remark that in Plato's writings there is both unity, +and also growth and development; but that we must not intrude upon him +either a system or a technical language. + +Balliol College, +October, 1891. + + +NOTE + +The chief additions to the Introductions in the Third Edition consist of +Essays on the following subjects:-- + +1. Language. + +2. The decline of Greek Literature. + +3. The 'Ideas' of Plato and Modern Philosophy. + +4. The myths of Plato. + +5. The relation of the Republic, Statesman and Laws. + +6. The legend of Atlantis. + +7. Psychology. + +8. Comparison of the Laws of Plato with Spartan and Athenian Laws and +Institutions. + + +CHARMIDES. + +INTRODUCTION. + +The subject of the Charmides is Temperance or (Greek), a peculiarly Greek +notion, which may also be rendered Moderation (Compare Cic. Tusc. '(Greek), +quam soleo equidem tum temperantiam, tum moderationem appellare, nonnunquam +etiam modestiam.'), Modesty, Discretion, Wisdom, without completely +exhausting by all these terms the various associations of the word. It may +be described as 'mens sana in corpore sano,' the harmony or due proportion +of the higher and lower elements of human nature which 'makes a man his own +master,' according to the definition of the Republic. In the accompanying +translation the word has been rendered in different places either +Temperance or Wisdom, as the connection seemed to require: for in the +philosophy of Plato (Greek) still retains an intellectual element (as +Socrates is also said to have identified (Greek) with (Greek): Xen. Mem.) +and is not yet relegated to the sphere of moral virtue, as in the +Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. + +The beautiful youth, Charmides, who is also the most temperate of human +beings, is asked by Socrates, 'What is Temperance?' He answers +characteristically, (1) 'Quietness.' 'But Temperance is a fine and noble +thing; and quietness in many or most cases is not so fine a thing as +quickness.' He tries again and says (2) that temperance is modesty. But +this again is set aside by a sophistical application of Homer: for +temperance is good as well as noble, and Homer has declared that 'modesty +is not good for a needy man.' (3) Once more Charmides makes the attempt. +This time he gives a definition which he has heard, and of which Socrates +conjectures that Critias must be the author: 'Temperance is doing one's +own business.' But the artisan who makes another man's shoes may be +temperate, and yet he is not doing his own business; and temperance defined +thus would be opposed to the division of labour which exists in every +temperate or well-ordered state. How is this riddle to be explained? + +Critias, who takes the place of Charmides, distinguishes in his answer +between 'making' and 'doing,' and with the help of a misapplied quotation +from Hesiod assigns to the words 'doing' and 'work' an exclusively good +sense: Temperance is doing one's own business;--(4) is doing good. + +Still an element of knowledge is wanting which Critias is readily induced +to admit at the suggestion of Socrates; and, in the spirit of Socrates and +of Greek life generally, proposes as a fifth definition, (5) Temperance is +self-knowledge. But all sciences have a subject: number is the subject of +arithmetic, health of medicine--what is the subject of temperance or +wisdom? The answer is that (6) Temperance is the knowledge of what a man +knows and of what he does not know. But this is contrary to analogy; there +is no vision of vision, but only of visible things; no love of loves, but +only of beautiful things; how then can there be a knowledge of knowledge? +That which is older, heavier, lighter, is older, heavier, and lighter than +something else, not than itself, and this seems to be true of all relative +notions--the object of relation is outside of them; at any rate they can +only have relation to themselves in the form of that object. Whether there +are any such cases of reflex relation or not, and whether that sort of +knowledge which we term Temperance is of this reflex nature, has yet to be +determined by the great metaphysician. But even if knowledge can know +itself, how does the knowledge of what we know imply the knowledge of what +we do not know? Besides, knowledge is an abstraction only, and will not +inform us of any particular subject, such as medicine, building, and the +like. It may tell us that we or other men know something, but can never +tell us what we know. + +Admitting that there is a knowledge of what we know and of what we do not +know, which would supply a rule and measure of all things, still there +would be no good in this; and the knowledge which temperance gives must be +of a kind which will do us good; for temperance is a good. But this +universal knowledge does not tend to our happiness and good: the only kind +of knowledge which brings happiness is the knowledge of good and evil. To +this Critias replies that the science or knowledge of good and evil, and +all the other sciences, are regulated by the higher science or knowledge of +knowledge. Socrates replies by again dividing the abstract from the +concrete, and asks how this knowledge conduces to happiness in the same +definite way in which medicine conduces to health. + +And now, after making all these concessions, which are really inadmissible, +we are still as far as ever from ascertaining the nature of temperance, +which Charmides has already discovered, and had therefore better rest in +the knowledge that the more temperate he is the happier he will be, and not +trouble himself with the speculations of Socrates. + +In this Dialogue may be noted (1) The Greek ideal of beauty and goodness, +the vision of the fair soul in the fair body, realised in the beautiful +Charmides; (2) The true conception of medicine as a science of the whole as +well as the parts, and of the mind as well as the body, which is playfully +intimated in the story of the Thracian; (3) The tendency of the age to +verbal distinctions, which here, as in the Protagoras and Cratylus, are +ascribed to the ingenuity of Prodicus; and to interpretations or rather +parodies of Homer or Hesiod, which are eminently characteristic of Plato +and his contemporaries; (4) The germ of an ethical principle contained in +the notion that temperance is 'doing one's own business,' which in the +Republic (such is the shifting character of the Platonic philosophy) is +given as the definition, not of temperance, but of justice; (5) The +impatience which is exhibited by Socrates of any definition of temperance +in which an element of science or knowledge is not included; (6) The +beginning of metaphysics and logic implied in the two questions: whether +there can be a science of science, and whether the knowledge of what you +know is the same as the knowledge of what you do not know; and also in the +distinction between 'what you know' and 'that you know,' (Greek;) here too +is the first conception of an absolute self-determined science (the claims +of which, however, are disputed by Socrates, who asks cui bono?) as well as +the first suggestion of the difficulty of the abstract and concrete, and +one of the earliest anticipations of the relation of subject and object, +and of the subjective element in knowledge--a 'rich banquet' of +metaphysical questions in which we 'taste of many things.' (7) And still +the mind of Plato, having snatched for a moment at these shadows of the +future, quickly rejects them: thus early has he reached the conclusion +that there can be no science which is a 'science of nothing' (Parmen.). +(8) The conception of a science of good and evil also first occurs here, an +anticipation of the Philebus and Republic as well as of moral philosophy in +later ages. + +The dramatic interest of the Dialogue chiefly centres in the youth +Charmides, with whom Socrates talks in the kindly spirit of an elder. His +childlike simplicity and ingenuousness are contrasted with the dialectical +and rhetorical arts of Critias, who is the grown-up man of the world, +having a tincture of philosophy. No hint is given, either here or in the +Timaeus, of the infamy which attaches to the name of the latter in Athenian +history. He is simply a cultivated person who, like his kinsman Plato, is +ennobled by the connection of his family with Solon (Tim.), and had been +the follower, if not the disciple, both of Socrates and of the Sophists. +In the argument he is not unfair, if allowance is made for a slight +rhetorical tendency, and for a natural desire to save his reputation with +the company; he is sometimes nearer the truth than Socrates. Nothing in +his language or behaviour is unbecoming the guardian of the beautiful +Charmides. His love of reputation is characteristically Greek, and +contrasts with the humility of Socrates. Nor in Charmides himself do we +find any resemblance to the Charmides of history, except, perhaps, the +modest and retiring nature which, according to Xenophon, at one time of his +life prevented him from speaking in the Assembly (Mem.); and we are +surprised to hear that, like Critias, he afterwards became one of the +thirty tyrants. In the Dialogue he is a pattern of virtue, and is +therefore in no need of the charm which Socrates is unable to apply. With +youthful naivete, keeping his secret and entering into the spirit of +Socrates, he enjoys the detection of his elder and guardian Critias, who is +easily seen to be the author of the definition which he has so great an +interest in maintaining. The preceding definition, 'Temperance is doing +one's own business,' is assumed to have been borrowed by Charmides from +another; and when the enquiry becomes more abstract he is superseded by +Critias (Theaet.; Euthyd.). Socrates preserves his accustomed irony to the +end; he is in the neighbourhood of several great truths, which he views in +various lights, but always either by bringing them to the test of common +sense, or by demanding too great exactness in the use of words, turns aside +from them and comes at last to no conclusion. + +The definitions of temperance proceed in regular order from the popular to +the philosophical. The first two are simple enough and partially true, +like the first thoughts of an intelligent youth; the third, which is a real +contribution to ethical philosophy, is perverted by the ingenuity of +Socrates, and hardly rescued by an equal perversion on the part of Critias. +The remaining definitions have a higher aim, which is to introduce the +element of knowledge, and at last to unite good and truth in a single +science. But the time has not yet arrived for the realization of this +vision of metaphysical philosophy; and such a science when brought nearer +to us in the Philebus and the Republic will not be called by the name of +(Greek). Hence we see with surprise that Plato, who in his other writings +identifies good and knowledge, here opposes them, and asks, almost in the +spirit of Aristotle, how can there be a knowledge of knowledge, and even if +attainable, how can such a knowledge be of any use? + +The difficulty of the Charmides arises chiefly from the two senses of the +word (Greek), or temperance. From the ethical notion of temperance, which +is variously defined to be quietness, modesty, doing our own business, the +doing of good actions, the dialogue passes onto the intellectual conception +of (Greek), which is declared also to be the science of self-knowledge, or +of the knowledge of what we know and do not know, or of the knowledge of +good and evil. The dialogue represents a stage in the history of +philosophy in which knowledge and action were not yet distinguished. Hence +the confusion between them, and the easy transition from one to the other. +The definitions which are offered are all rejected, but it is to be +observed that they all tend to throw a light on the nature of temperance, +and that, unlike the distinction of Critias between (Greek), none of them +are merely verbal quibbles, it is implied that this question, although it +has not yet received a solution in theory, has been already answered by +Charmides himself, who has learned to practise the virtue of self-knowledge +which philosophers are vainly trying to define in words. In a similar +spirit we might say to a young man who is disturbed by theological +difficulties, 'Do not trouble yourself about such matters, but only lead a +good life;' and yet in either case it is not to be denied that right ideas +of truth may contribute greatly to the improvement of character. + +The reasons why the Charmides, Lysis, Laches have been placed together and +first in the series of Platonic dialogues, are: (i) Their shortness and +simplicity. The Charmides and the Lysis, if not the Laches, are of the +same 'quality' as the Phaedrus and Symposium: and it is probable, though +far from certain, that the slighter effort preceded the greater one. (ii) +Their eristic, or rather Socratic character; they belong to the class +called dialogues of search (Greek), which have no conclusion. (iii) The +absence in them of certain favourite notions of Plato, such as the doctrine +of recollection and of the Platonic ideas; the questions, whether virtue +can be taught; whether the virtues are one or many. (iv) They have a want +of depth, when compared with the dialogues of the middle and later period; +and a youthful beauty and grace which is wanting in the later ones. (v) +Their resemblance to one another; in all the three boyhood has a great +part. These reasons have various degrees of weight in determining their +place in the catalogue of the Platonic writings, though they are not +conclusive. No arrangement of the Platonic dialogues can be strictly +chronological. The order which has been adopted is intended mainly for the +convenience of the reader; at the same time, indications of the date +supplied either by Plato himself or allusions found in the dialogues have +not been lost sight of. Much may be said about this subject, but the +results can only be probable; there are no materials which would enable us +to attain to anything like certainty. + +The relations of knowledge and virtue are again brought forward in the +companion dialogues of the Lysis and Laches; and also in the Protagoras and +Euthydemus. The opposition of abstract and particular knowledge in this +dialogue may be compared with a similar opposition of ideas and phenomena +which occurs in the Prologues to the Parmenides, but seems rather to belong +to a later stage of the philosophy of Plato. + + +CHARMIDES, OR TEMPERANCE + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, who is the narrator, Charmides, +Chaerephon, Critias. + +SCENE: The Palaestra of Taureas, which is near the Porch of the King +Archon. + +Yesterday evening I returned from the army at Potidaea, and having been a +good while away, I thought that I should like to go and look at my old +haunts. So I went into the palaestra of Taureas, which is over against the +temple adjoining the porch of the King Archon, and there I found a number +of persons, most of whom I knew, but not all. My visit was unexpected, and +no sooner did they see me entering than they saluted me from afar on all +sides; and Chaerephon, who is a kind of madman, started up and ran to me, +seizing my hand, and saying, How did you escape, Socrates?--(I should +explain that an engagement had taken place at Potidaea not long before we +came away, of which the news had only just reached Athens.) + +You see, I replied, that here I am. + +There was a report, he said, that the engagement was very severe, and that +many of our acquaintance had fallen. + +That, I replied, was not far from the truth. + +I suppose, he said, that you were present. + +I was. + +Then sit down, and tell us the whole story, which as yet we have only heard +imperfectly. + +I took the place which he assigned to me, by the side of Critias the son of +Callaeschrus, and when I had saluted him and the rest of the company, I +told them the news from the army, and answered their several enquiries. + +Then, when there had been enough of this, I, in my turn, began to make +enquiries about matters at home--about the present state of philosophy, and +about the youth. I asked whether any of them were remarkable for wisdom or +beauty, or both. Critias, glancing at the door, invited my attention to +some youths who were coming in, and talking noisily to one another, +followed by a crowd. Of the beauties, Socrates, he said, I fancy that you +will soon be able to form a judgment. For those who are just entering are +the advanced guard of the great beauty, as he is thought to be, of the day, +and he is likely to be not far off himself. + +Who is he, I said; and who is his father? + +Charmides, he replied, is his name; he is my cousin, and the son of my +uncle Glaucon: I rather think that you know him too, although he was not +grown up at the time of your departure. + +Certainly, I know him, I said, for he was remarkable even then when he was +still a child, and I should imagine that by this time he must be almost a +young man. + +You will see, he said, in a moment what progress he has made and what he is +like. He had scarcely said the word, when Charmides entered. + +Now you know, my friend, that I cannot measure anything, and of the +beautiful, I am simply such a measure as a white line is of chalk; for +almost all young persons appear to be beautiful in my eyes. But at that +moment, when I saw him coming in, I confess that I was quite astonished at +his beauty and stature; all the world seemed to be enamoured of him; +amazement and confusion reigned when he entered; and a troop of lovers +followed him. That grown-up men like ourselves should have been affected +in this way was not surprising, but I observed that there was the same +feeling among the boys; all of them, down to the very least child, turned +and looked at him, as if he had been a statue. + +Chaerephon called me and said: What do you think of him, Socrates? Has he +not a beautiful face? + +Most beautiful, I said. + +But you would think nothing of his face, he replied, if you could see his +naked form: he is absolutely perfect. + +And to this they all agreed. + +By Heracles, I said, there never was such a paragon, if he has only one +other slight addition. + +What is that? said Critias. + +If he has a noble soul; and being of your house, Critias, he may be +expected to have this. + +He is as fair and good within, as he is without, replied Critias. + +Then, before we see his body, should we not ask him to show us his soul, +naked and undisguised? he is just of an age at which he will like to talk. + +That he will, said Critias, and I can tell you that he is a philosopher +already, and also a considerable poet, not in his own opinion only, but in +that of others. + +That, my dear Critias, I replied, is a distinction which has long been in +your family, and is inherited by you from Solon. But why do you not call +him, and show him to us? for even if he were younger than he is, there +could be no impropriety in his talking to us in the presence of you, who +are his guardian and cousin. + +Very well, he said; then I will call him; and turning to the attendant, he +said, Call Charmides, and tell him that I want him to come and see a +physician about the illness of which he spoke to me the day before +yesterday. Then again addressing me, he added: He has been complaining +lately of having a headache when he rises in the morning: now why should +you not make him believe that you know a cure for the headache? + +Why not, I said; but will he come? + +He will be sure to come, he replied. + +He came as he was bidden, and sat down between Critias and me. Great +amusement was occasioned by every one pushing with might and main at his +neighbour in order to make a place for him next to themselves, until at the +two ends of the row one had to get up and the other was rolled over +sideways. Now I, my friend, was beginning to feel awkward; my former bold +belief in my powers of conversing with him had vanished. And when Critias +told him that I was the person who had the cure, he looked at me in such an +indescribable manner, and was just going to ask a question. And at that +moment all the people in the palaestra crowded about us, and, O rare! I +caught a sight of the inwards of his garment, and took the flame. Then I +could no longer contain myself. I thought how well Cydias understood the +nature of love, when, in speaking of a fair youth, he warns some one 'not +to bring the fawn in the sight of the lion to be devoured by him,' for I +felt that I had been overcome by a sort of wild-beast appetite. But I +controlled myself, and when he asked me if I knew the cure of the headache, +I answered, but with an effort, that I did know. + +And what is it? he said. + +I replied that it was a kind of leaf, which required to be accompanied by a +charm, and if a person would repeat the charm at the same time that he used +the cure, he would be made whole; but that without the charm the leaf would +be of no avail. + +Then I will write out the charm from your dictation, he said. + +With my consent? I said, or without my consent? + +With your consent, Socrates, he said, laughing. + +Very good, I said; and are you quite sure that you know my name? + +I ought to know you, he replied, for there is a great deal said about you +among my companions; and I remember when I was a child seeing you in +company with my cousin Critias. + +I am glad to find that you remember me, I said; for I shall now be more at +home with you and shall be better able to explain the nature of the charm, +about which I felt a difficulty before. For the charm will do more, +Charmides, than only cure the headache. I dare say that you have heard +eminent physicians say to a patient who comes to them with bad eyes, that +they cannot cure his eyes by themselves, but that if his eyes are to be +cured, his head must be treated; and then again they say that to think of +curing the head alone, and not the rest of the body also, is the height of +folly. And arguing in this way they apply their methods to the whole body, +and try to treat and heal the whole and the part together. Did you ever +observe that this is what they say? + +Yes, he said. + +And they are right, and you would agree with them? + +Yes, he said, certainly I should. + +His approving answers reassured me, and I began by degrees to regain +confidence, and the vital heat returned. Such, Charmides, I said, is the +nature of the charm, which I learned when serving with the army from one of +the physicians of the Thracian king Zamolxis, who are said to be so skilful +that they can even give immortality. This Thracian told me that in these +notions of theirs, which I was just now mentioning, the Greek physicians +are quite right as far as they go; but Zamolxis, he added, our king, who is +also a god, says further, 'that as you ought not to attempt to cure the +eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so neither ought you +to attempt to cure the body without the soul; and this,' he said, 'is the +reason why the cure of many diseases is unknown to the physicians of +Hellas, because they are ignorant of the whole, which ought to be studied +also; for the part can never be well unless the whole is well.' For all +good and evil, whether in the body or in human nature, originates, as he +declared, in the soul, and overflows from thence, as if from the head into +the eyes. And therefore if the head and body are to be well, you must +begin by curing the soul; that is the first thing. And the cure, my dear +youth, has to be effected by the use of certain charms, and these charms +are fair words; and by them temperance is implanted in the soul, and where +temperance is, there health is speedily imparted, not only to the head, but +to the whole body. And he who taught me the cure and the charm at the same +time added a special direction: 'Let no one,' he said, 'persuade you to +cure the head, until he has first given you his soul to be cured by the +charm. For this,' he said, 'is the great error of our day in the treatment +of the human body, that physicians separate the soul from the body.' And +he added with emphasis, at the same time making me swear to his words, 'Let +no one, however rich, or noble, or fair, persuade you to give him the cure, +without the charm.' Now I have sworn, and I must keep my oath, and +therefore if you will allow me to apply the Thracian charm first to your +soul, as the stranger directed, I will afterwards proceed to apply the cure +to your head. But if not, I do not know what I am to do with you, my dear +Charmides. + +Critias, when he heard this, said: The headache will be an unexpected gain +to my young relation, if the pain in his head compels him to improve his +mind: and I can tell you, Socrates, that Charmides is not only pre-eminent +in beauty among his equals, but also in that quality which is given by the +charm; and this, as you say, is temperance? + +Yes, I said. + +Then let me tell you that he is the most temperate of human beings, and for +his age inferior to none in any quality. + +Yes, I said, Charmides; and indeed I think that you ought to excel others +in all good qualities; for if I am not mistaken there is no one present who +could easily point out two Athenian houses, whose union would be likely to +produce a better or nobler scion than the two from which you are sprung. +There is your father's house, which is descended from Critias the son of +Dropidas, whose family has been commemorated in the panegyrical verses of +Anacreon, Solon, and many other poets, as famous for beauty and virtue and +all other high fortune: and your mother's house is equally distinguished; +for your maternal uncle, Pyrilampes, is reputed never to have found his +equal, in Persia at the court of the great king, or on the continent of +Asia, in all the places to which he went as ambassador, for stature and +beauty; that whole family is not a whit inferior to the other. Having such +ancestors you ought to be first in all things, and, sweet son of Glaucon, +your outward form is no dishonour to any of them. If to beauty you add +temperance, and if in other respects you are what Critias declares you to +be, then, dear Charmides, blessed art thou, in being the son of thy mother. +And here lies the point; for if, as he declares, you have this gift of +temperance already, and are temperate enough, in that case you have no need +of any charms, whether of Zamolxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean, and I may +as well let you have the cure of the head at once; but if you have not yet +acquired this quality, I must use the charm before I give you the medicine. +Please, therefore, to inform me whether you admit the truth of what Critias +has been saying;--have you or have you not this quality of temperance? + +Charmides blushed, and the blush heightened his beauty, for modesty is +becoming in youth; he then said very ingenuously, that he really could not +at once answer, either yes, or no, to the question which I had asked: For, +said he, if I affirm that I am not temperate, that would be a strange thing +for me to say of myself, and also I should give the lie to Critias, and +many others who think as he tells you, that I am temperate: but, on the +other hand, if I say that I am, I shall have to praise myself, which would +be ill manners; and therefore I do not know how to answer you. + +I said to him: That is a natural reply, Charmides, and I think that you +and I ought together to enquire whether you have this quality about which I +am asking or not; and then you will not be compelled to say what you do not +like; neither shall I be a rash practitioner of medicine: therefore, if +you please, I will share the enquiry with you, but I will not press you if +you would rather not. + +There is nothing which I should like better, he said; and as far as I am +concerned you may proceed in the way which you think best. + +I think, I said, that I had better begin by asking you a question; for if +temperance abides in you, you must have an opinion about her; she must give +some intimation of her nature and qualities, which may enable you to form a +notion of her. Is not that true? + +Yes, he said, that I think is true. + +You know your native language, I said, and therefore you must be able to +tell what you feel about this. + +Certainly, he said. + +In order, then, that I may form a conjecture whether you have temperance +abiding in you or not, tell me, I said, what, in your opinion, is +Temperance? + +At first he hesitated, and was very unwilling to answer: then he said that +he thought temperance was doing things orderly and quietly, such things for +example as walking in the streets, and talking, or anything else of that +nature. In a word, he said, I should answer that, in my opinion, +temperance is quietness. + +Are you right, Charmides? I said. No doubt some would affirm that the +quiet are the temperate; but let us see whether these words have any +meaning; and first tell me whether you would not acknowledge temperance to +be of the class of the noble and good? + +Yes. + +But which is best when you are at the writing-master's, to write the same +letters quickly or quietly? + +Quickly. + +And to read quickly or slowly? + +Quickly again. + +And in playing the lyre, or wrestling, quickness or sharpness are far +better than quietness and slowness? + +Yes. + +And the same holds in boxing and in the pancratium? + +Certainly. + +And in leaping and running and in bodily exercises generally, quickness and +agility are good; slowness, and inactivity, and quietness, are bad? + +That is evident. + +Then, I said, in all bodily actions, not quietness, but the greatest +agility and quickness, is noblest and best? + +Yes, certainly. + +And is temperance a good? + +Yes. + +Then, in reference to the body, not quietness, but quickness will be the +higher degree of temperance, if temperance is a good? + +True, he said. + +And which, I said, is better--facility in learning, or difficulty in +learning? + +Facility. + +Yes, I said; and facility in learning is learning quickly, and difficulty +in learning is learning quietly and slowly? + +True. + +And is it not better to teach another quickly and energetically, rather +than quietly and slowly? + +Yes. + +And which is better, to call to mind, and to remember, quickly and readily, +or quietly and slowly? + +The former. + +And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul, and not a +quietness? + +True. + +And is it not best to understand what is said, whether at the writing- +master's or the music-master's, or anywhere else, not as quietly as +possible, but as quickly as possible? + +Yes. + +And in the searchings or deliberations of the soul, not the quietest, as I +imagine, and he who with difficulty deliberates and discovers, is thought +worthy of praise, but he who does so most easily and quickly? + +Quite true, he said. + +And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and activity are +clearly better than slowness and quietness? + +Clearly they are. + +Then temperance is not quietness, nor is the temperate life quiet,-- +certainly not upon this view; for the life which is temperate is supposed +to be the good. And of two things, one is true,--either never, or very +seldom, do the quiet actions in life appear to be better than the quick and +energetic ones; or supposing that of the nobler actions, there are as many +quiet, as quick and vehement: still, even if we grant this, temperance +will not be acting quietly any more than acting quickly and energetically, +either in walking or talking or in anything else; nor will the quiet life +be more temperate than the unquiet, seeing that temperance is admitted by +us to be a good and noble thing, and the quick have been shown to be as +good as the quiet. + +I think, he said, Socrates, that you are right. + +Then once more, Charmides, I said, fix your attention, and look within; +consider the effect which temperance has upon yourself, and the nature of +that which has the effect. Think over all this, and, like a brave youth, +tell me--What is temperance? + +After a moment's pause, in which he made a real manly effort to think, he +said: My opinion is, Socrates, that temperance makes a man ashamed or +modest, and that temperance is the same as modesty. + +Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is +noble? + +Yes, certainly, he said. + +And the temperate are also good? + +Yes. + +And can that be good which does not make men good? + +Certainly not. + +And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but also good? + +That is my opinion. + +Well, I said; but surely you would agree with Homer when he says, + +'Modesty is not good for a needy man'? + +Yes, he said; I agree. + +Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good? + +Clearly. + +But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is always +good? + +That appears to me to be as you say. + +And the inference is that temperance cannot be modesty--if temperance is a +good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good? + +All that, Socrates, appears to me to be true; but I should like to know +what you think about another definition of temperance, which I just now +remember to have heard from some one, who said, 'That temperance is doing +our own business.' Was he right who affirmed that? + +You monster! I said; this is what Critias, or some philosopher has told +you. + +Some one else, then, said Critias; for certainly I have not. + +But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this? + +No matter at all, I replied; for the point is not who said the words, but +whether they are true or not. + +There you are in the right, Socrates, he replied. + +To be sure, I said; yet I doubt whether we shall ever be able to discover +their truth or falsehood; for they are a kind of riddle. + +What makes you think so? he said. + +Because, I said, he who uttered them seems to me to have meant one thing, +and said another. Is the scribe, for example, to be regarded as doing +nothing when he reads or writes? + +I should rather think that he was doing something. + +And does the scribe write or read, or teach you boys to write or read, your +own names only, or did you write your enemies' names as well as your own +and your friends'? + +As much one as the other. + +And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this? + +Certainly not. + +And yet if reading and writing are the same as doing, you were doing what +was not your own business? + +But they are the same as doing. + +And the healing art, my friend, and building, and weaving, and doing +anything whatever which is done by art,--these all clearly come under the +head of doing? + +Certainly. + +And do you think that a state would be well ordered by a law which +compelled every man to weave and wash his own coat, and make his own shoes, +and his own flask and strigil, and other implements, on this principle of +every one doing and performing his own, and abstaining from what is not his +own? + +I think not, he said. + +But, I said, a temperate state will be a well-ordered state. + +Of course, he replied. + +Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one's own business; not at least +in this way, or doing things of this sort? + +Clearly not. + +Then, as I was just now saying, he who declared that temperance is a man +doing his own business had another and a hidden meaning; for I do not think +that he could have been such a fool as to mean this. Was he a fool who +told you, Charmides? + +Nay, he replied, I certainly thought him a very wise man. + +Then I am quite certain that he put forth his definition as a riddle, +thinking that no one would know the meaning of the words 'doing his own +business.' + +I dare say, he replied. + +And what is the meaning of a man doing his own business? Can you tell me? + +Indeed, I cannot; and I should not wonder if the man himself who used this +phrase did not understand what he was saying. Whereupon he laughed slyly, +and looked at Critias. + +Critias had long been showing uneasiness, for he felt that he had a +reputation to maintain with Charmides and the rest of the company. He had, +however, hitherto managed to restrain himself; but now he could no longer +forbear, and I am convinced of the truth of the suspicion which I +entertained at the time, that Charmides had heard this answer about +temperance from Critias. And Charmides, who did not want to answer +himself, but to make Critias answer, tried to stir him up. He went on +pointing out that he had been refuted, at which Critias grew angry, and +appeared, as I thought, inclined to quarrel with him; just as a poet might +quarrel with an actor who spoiled his poems in repeating them; so he looked +hard at him and said-- + +Do you imagine, Charmides, that the author of this definition of temperance +did not understand the meaning of his own words, because you do not +understand them? + +Why, at his age, I said, most excellent Critias, he can hardly be expected +to understand; but you, who are older, and have studied, may well be +assumed to know the meaning of them; and therefore, if you agree with him, +and accept his definition of temperance, I would much rather argue with you +than with him about the truth or falsehood of the definition. + +I entirely agree, said Critias, and accept the definition. + +Very good, I said; and now let me repeat my question--Do you admit, as I +was just now saying, that all craftsmen make or do something? + +I do. + +And do they make or do their own business only, or that of others also? + +They make or do that of others also. + +And are they temperate, seeing that they make not for themselves or their +own business only? + +Why not? he said. + +No objection on my part, I said, but there may be a difficulty on his who +proposes as a definition of temperance, 'doing one's own business,' and +then says that there is no reason why those who do the business of others +should not be temperate. + +Nay (The English reader has to observe that the word 'make' (Greek), in +Greek, has also the sense of 'do' (Greek).), said he; did I ever +acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate? I +said, those who make, not those who do. + +What! I asked; do you mean to say that doing and making are not the same? + +No more, he replied, than making or working are the same; thus much I have +learned from Hesiod, who says that 'work is no disgrace.' Now do you +imagine that if he had meant by working and doing such things as you were +describing, he would have said that there was no disgrace in them--for +example, in the manufacture of shoes, or in selling pickles, or sitting for +hire in a house of ill-fame? That, Socrates, is not to be supposed: but I +conceive him to have distinguished making from doing and work; and, while +admitting that the making anything might sometimes become a disgrace, when +the employment was not honourable, to have thought that work was never any +disgrace at all. For things nobly and usefully made he called works; and +such makings he called workings, and doings; and he must be supposed to +have called such things only man's proper business, and what is hurtful, +not his business: and in that sense Hesiod, and any other wise man, may be +reasonably supposed to call him wise who does his own work. + +O Critias, I said, no sooner had you opened your mouth, than I pretty well +knew that you would call that which is proper to a man, and that which is +his own, good; and that the makings (Greek) of the good you would call +doings (Greek), for I am no stranger to the endless distinctions which +Prodicus draws about names. Now I have no objection to your giving names +any signification which you please, if you will only tell me what you mean +by them. Please then to begin again, and be a little plainer. Do you mean +that this doing or making, or whatever is the word which you would use, of +good actions, is temperance? + +I do, he said. + +Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate? + +Yes, he said; and you, friend, would agree. + +No matter whether I should or not; just now, not what I think, but what you +are saying, is the point at issue. + +Well, he answered; I mean to say, that he who does evil, and not good, is +not temperate; and that he is temperate who does good, and not evil: for +temperance I define in plain words to be the doing of good actions. + +And you may be very likely right in what you are saying; but I am curious +to know whether you imagine that temperate men are ignorant of their own +temperance? + +I do not think so, he said. + +And yet were you not saying, just now, that craftsmen might be temperate in +doing another's work, as well as in doing their own? + +I was, he replied; but what is your drift? + +I have no particular drift, but I wish that you would tell me whether a +physician who cures a patient may do good to himself and good to another +also? + +I think that he may. + +And he who does so does his duty? + +Yes. + +And does not he who does his duty act temperately or wisely? + +Yes, he acts wisely. + +But must the physician necessarily know when his treatment is likely to +prove beneficial, and when not? or must the craftsman necessarily know when +he is likely to be benefited, and when not to be benefited, by the work +which he is doing? + +I suppose not. + +Then, I said, he may sometimes do good or harm, and not know what he is +himself doing, and yet, in doing good, as you say, he has done temperately +or wisely. Was not that your statement? + +Yes. + +Then, as would seem, in doing good, he may act wisely or temperately, and +be wise or temperate, but not know his own wisdom or temperance? + +But that, Socrates, he said, is impossible; and therefore if this is, as +you imply, the necessary consequence of any of my previous admissions, I +will withdraw them, rather than admit that a man can be temperate or wise +who does not know himself; and I am not ashamed to confess that I was in +error. For self-knowledge would certainly be maintained by me to be the +very essence of knowledge, and in this I agree with him who dedicated the +inscription, 'Know thyself!' at Delphi. That word, if I am not mistaken, +is put there as a sort of salutation which the god addresses to those who +enter the temple; as much as to say that the ordinary salutation of 'Hail!' +is not right, and that the exhortation 'Be temperate!' would be a far +better way of saluting one another. The notion of him who dedicated the +inscription was, as I believe, that the god speaks to those who enter his +temple, not as men speak; but, when a worshipper enters, the first word +which he hears is 'Be temperate!' This, however, like a prophet he +expresses in a sort of riddle, for 'Know thyself!' and 'Be temperate!' are +the same, as I maintain, and as the letters imply (Greek), and yet they may +be easily misunderstood; and succeeding sages who added 'Never too much,' +or, 'Give a pledge, and evil is nigh at hand,' would appear to have so +misunderstood them; for they imagined that 'Know thyself!' was a piece of +advice which the god gave, and not his salutation of the worshippers at +their first coming in; and they dedicated their own inscription under the +idea that they too would give equally useful pieces of advice. Shall I +tell you, Socrates, why I say all this? My object is to leave the previous +discussion (in which I know not whether you or I are more right, but, at +any rate, no clear result was attained), and to raise a new one in which I +will attempt to prove, if you deny, that temperance is self-knowledge. + +Yes, I said, Critias; but you come to me as though I professed to know +about the questions which I ask, and as though I could, if I only would, +agree with you. Whereas the fact is that I enquire with you into the truth +of that which is advanced from time to time, just because I do not know; +and when I have enquired, I will say whether I agree with you or not. +Please then to allow me time to reflect. + +Reflect, he said. + +I am reflecting, I replied, and discover that temperance, or wisdom, if +implying a knowledge of anything, must be a science, and a science of +something. + +Yes, he said; the science of itself. + +Is not medicine, I said, the science of health? + +True. + +And suppose, I said, that I were asked by you what is the use or effect of +medicine, which is this science of health, I should answer that medicine is +of very great use in producing health, which, as you will admit, is an +excellent effect. + +Granted. + +And if you were to ask me, what is the result or effect of architecture, +which is the science of building, I should say houses, and so of other +arts, which all have their different results. Now I want you, Critias, to +answer a similar question about temperance, or wisdom, which, according to +you, is the science of itself. Admitting this view, I ask of you, what +good work, worthy of the name wise, does temperance or wisdom, which is the +science of itself, effect? Answer me. + +That is not the true way of pursuing the enquiry, Socrates, he said; for +wisdom is not like the other sciences, any more than they are like one +another: but you proceed as if they were alike. For tell me, he said, +what result is there of computation or geometry, in the same sense as a +house is the result of building, or a garment of weaving, or any other work +of any other art? Can you show me any such result of them? You cannot. + +That is true, I said; but still each of these sciences has a subject which +is different from the science. I can show you that the art of computation +has to do with odd and even numbers in their numerical relations to +themselves and to each other. Is not that true? + +Yes, he said. + +And the odd and even numbers are not the same with the art of computation? + +They are not. + +The art of weighing, again, has to do with lighter and heavier; but the art +of weighing is one thing, and the heavy and the light another. Do you +admit that? + +Yes. + +Now, I want to know, what is that which is not wisdom, and of which wisdom +is the science? + +You are just falling into the old error, Socrates, he said. You come +asking in what wisdom or temperance differs from the other sciences, and +then you try to discover some respect in which they are alike; but they are +not, for all the other sciences are of something else, and not of +themselves; wisdom alone is a science of other sciences, and of itself. +And of this, as I believe, you are very well aware: and that you are only +doing what you denied that you were doing just now, trying to refute me, +instead of pursuing the argument. + +And what if I am? How can you think that I have any other motive in +refuting you but what I should have in examining into myself? which motive +would be just a fear of my unconsciously fancying that I knew something of +which I was ignorant. And at this moment I pursue the argument chiefly for +my own sake, and perhaps in some degree also for the sake of my other +friends. For is not the discovery of things as they truly are, a good +common to all mankind? + +Yes, certainly, Socrates, he said. + +Then, I said, be cheerful, sweet sir, and give your opinion in answer to +the question which I asked, never minding whether Critias or Socrates is +the person refuted; attend only to the argument, and see what will come of +the refutation. + +I think that you are right, he replied; and I will do as you say. + +Tell me, then, I said, what you mean to affirm about wisdom. + +I mean to say that wisdom is the only science which is the science of +itself as well as of the other sciences. + +But the science of science, I said, will also be the science of the absence +of science. + +Very true, he said. + +Then the wise or temperate man, and he only, will know himself, and be able +to examine what he knows or does not know, and to see what others know and +think that they know and do really know; and what they do not know, and +fancy that they know, when they do not. No other person will be able to do +this. And this is wisdom and temperance and self-knowledge--for a man to +know what he knows, and what he does not know. That is your meaning? + +Yes, he said. + +Now then, I said, making an offering of the third or last argument to Zeus +the Saviour, let us begin again, and ask, in the first place, whether it is +or is not possible for a person to know that he knows and does not know +what he knows and does not know; and in the second place, whether, if +perfectly possible, such knowledge is of any use. + +That is what we have to consider, he said. + +And here, Critias, I said, I hope that you will find a way out of a +difficulty into which I have got myself. Shall I tell you the nature of +the difficulty? + +By all means, he replied. + +Does not what you have been saying, if true, amount to this: that there +must be a single science which is wholly a science of itself and of other +sciences, and that the same is also the science of the absence of science? + +Yes. + +But consider how monstrous this proposition is, my friend: in any parallel +case, the impossibility will be transparent to you. + +How is that? and in what cases do you mean? + +In such cases as this: Suppose that there is a kind of vision which is not +like ordinary vision, but a vision of itself and of other sorts of vision, +and of the defect of them, which in seeing sees no colour, but only itself +and other sorts of vision: Do you think that there is such a kind of +vision? + +Certainly not. + +Or is there a kind of hearing which hears no sound at all, but only itself +and other sorts of hearing, or the defects of them? + +There is not. + +Or take all the senses: can you imagine that there is any sense of itself +and of other senses, but which is incapable of perceiving the objects of +the senses? + +I think not. + +Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure, but of +itself, and of all other desires? + +Certainly not. + +Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good, but only for itself and +all other wishes? + +I should answer, No. + +Or would you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty, but +of itself and of other loves? + +I should not. + +Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears, but has +no object of fear? + +I never did, he said. + +Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions, and +which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general? + +Certainly not. + +But surely we are assuming a science of this kind, which, having no +subject-matter, is a science of itself and of the other sciences? + +Yes, that is what is affirmed. + +But how strange is this, if it be indeed true: we must not however as yet +absolutely deny the possibility of such a science; let us rather consider +the matter. + +You are quite right. + +Well then, this science of which we are speaking is a science of something, +and is of a nature to be a science of something? + +Yes. + +Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than something +else? (Socrates is intending to show that science differs from the object +of science, as any other relative differs from the object of relation. But +where there is comparison--greater, less, heavier, lighter, and the like--a +relation to self as well as to other things involves an absolute +contradiction; and in other cases, as in the case of the senses, is hardly +conceivable. The use of the genitive after the comparative in Greek, +(Greek), creates an unavoidable obscurity in the translation.) + +Yes. + +Which is less, if the other is conceived to be greater? + +To be sure. + +And if we could find something which is at once greater than itself, and +greater than other great things, but not greater than those things in +comparison of which the others are greater, then that thing would have the +property of being greater and also less than itself? + +That, Socrates, he said, is the inevitable inference. + +Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of other doubles, +these will be halves; for the double is relative to the half? + +That is true. + +And that which is greater than itself will also be less, and that which is +heavier will also be lighter, and that which is older will also be younger: +and the same of other things; that which has a nature relative to self will +retain also the nature of its object: I mean to say, for example, that +hearing is, as we say, of sound or voice. Is that true? + +Yes. + +Then if hearing hears itself, it must hear a voice; for there is no other +way of hearing. + +Certainly. + +And sight also, my excellent friend, if it sees itself must see a colour, +for sight cannot see that which has no colour. + +No. + +Do you remark, Critias, that in several of the examples which have been +recited the notion of a relation to self is altogether inadmissible, and in +other cases hardly credible--inadmissible, for example, in the case of +magnitudes, numbers, and the like? + +Very true. + +But in the case of hearing and sight, or in the power of self-motion, and +the power of heat to burn, this relation to self will be regarded as +incredible by some, but perhaps not by others. And some great man, my +friend, is wanted, who will satisfactorily determine for us, whether there +is nothing which has an inherent property of relation to self, or some +things only and not others; and whether in this class of self-related +things, if there be such a class, that science which is called wisdom or +temperance is included. I altogether distrust my own power of determining +these matters: I am not certain whether there is such a science of science +at all; and even if there be, I should not acknowledge this to be wisdom or +temperance, until I can also see whether such a science would or would not +do us any good; for I have an impression that temperance is a benefit and a +good. And therefore, O son of Callaeschrus, as you maintain that +temperance or wisdom is a science of science, and also of the absence of +science, I will request you to show in the first place, as I was saying +before, the possibility, and in the second place, the advantage, of such a +science; and then perhaps you may satisfy me that you are right in your +view of temperance. + +Critias heard me say this, and saw that I was in a difficulty; and as one +person when another yawns in his presence catches the infection of yawning +from him, so did he seem to be driven into a difficulty by my difficulty. +But as he had a reputation to maintain, he was ashamed to admit before the +company that he could not answer my challenge or determine the question at +issue; and he made an unintelligible attempt to hide his perplexity. In +order that the argument might proceed, I said to him, Well then Critias, if +you like, let us assume that there is this science of science; whether the +assumption is right or wrong may hereafter be investigated. Admitting the +existence of it, will you tell me how such a science enables us to +distinguish what we know or do not know, which, as we were saying, is +self-knowledge or wisdom: so we were saying? + +Yes, Socrates, he said; and that I think is certainly true: for he who has +this science or knowledge which knows itself will become like the knowledge +which he has, in the same way that he who has swiftness will be swift, and +he who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has knowledge will know. +In the same way he who has that knowledge which is self-knowing, will know +himself. + +I do not doubt, I said, that a man will know himself, when he possesses +that which has self-knowledge: but what necessity is there that, having +this, he should know what he knows and what he does not know? + +Because, Socrates, they are the same. + +Very likely, I said; but I remain as stupid as ever; for still I fail to +comprehend how this knowing what you know and do not know is the same as +the knowledge of self. + +What do you mean? he said. + +This is what I mean, I replied: I will admit that there is a science of +science;--can this do more than determine that of two things one is and the +other is not science or knowledge? + +No, just that. + +But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or +want of knowledge of justice? + +Certainly not. + +The one is medicine, and the other is politics; whereas that of which we +are speaking is knowledge pure and simple. + +Very true. + +And if a man knows only, and has only knowledge of knowledge, and has no +further knowledge of health and justice, the probability is that he will +only know that he knows something, and has a certain knowledge, whether +concerning himself or other men. + +True. + +Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows? +Say that he knows health;--not wisdom or temperance, but the art of +medicine has taught it to him;--and he has learned harmony from the art of +music, and building from the art of building,--neither, from wisdom or +temperance: and the same of other things. + +That is evident. + +How will wisdom, regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of +science, ever teach him that he knows health, or that he knows building? + +It is impossible. + +Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows, but +not what he knows? + +True. + +Then wisdom or being wise appears to be not the knowledge of the things +which we do or do not know, but only the knowledge that we know or do not +know? + +That is the inference. + +Then he who has this knowledge will not be able to examine whether a +pretender knows or does not know that which he says that he knows: he will +only know that he has a knowledge of some kind; but wisdom will not show +him of what the knowledge is? + +Plainly not. + +Neither will he be able to distinguish the pretender in medicine from the +true physician, nor between any other true and false professor of +knowledge. Let us consider the matter in this way: If the wise man or any +other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false, how will +he proceed? He will not talk to him about medicine; and that, as we were +saying, is the only thing which the physician understands. + +True. + +And, on the other hand, the physician knows nothing of science, for this +has been assumed to be the province of wisdom. + +True. + +And further, since medicine is science, we must infer that he does not know +anything of medicine. + +Exactly. + +Then the wise man may indeed know that the physician has some kind of +science or knowledge; but when he wants to discover the nature of this he +will ask, What is the subject-matter? For the several sciences are +distinguished not by the mere fact that they are sciences, but by the +nature of their subjects. Is not that true? + +Quite true. + +And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the subject- +matter of health and disease? + +Yes. + +And he who would enquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the +enquiry into health and disease, and not into what is extraneous? + +True. + +And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in +what relates to these? + +He will. + +He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether what he does is +right, in relation to health and disease? + +He will. + +But can any one attain the knowledge of either unless he have a knowledge +of medicine? + +He cannot. + +No one at all, it would seem, except the physician can have this knowledge; +and therefore not the wise man; he would have to be a physician as well as +a wise man. + +Very true. + +Then, assuredly, wisdom or temperance, if only a science of science, and of +the absence of science or knowledge, will not be able to distinguish the +physician who knows from one who does not know but pretends or thinks that +he knows, or any other professor of anything at all; like any other artist, +he will only know his fellow in art or wisdom, and no one else. + +That is evident, he said. + +But then what profit, Critias, I said, is there any longer in wisdom or +temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom? If, indeed, as we were +supposing at first, the wise man had been able to distinguish what he knew +and did not know, and that he knew the one and did not know the other, and +to recognize a similar faculty of discernment in others, there would +certainly have been a great advantage in being wise; for then we should +never have made a mistake, but have passed through life the unerring guides +of ourselves and of those who are under us; and we should not have +attempted to do what we did not know, but we should have found out those +who knew, and have handed the business over to them and trusted in them; +nor should we have allowed those who were under us to do anything which +they were not likely to do well; and they would be likely to do well just +that of which they had knowledge; and the house or state which was ordered +or administered under the guidance of wisdom, and everything else of which +wisdom was the lord, would have been well ordered; for truth guiding, and +error having been eliminated, in all their doings, men would have done +well, and would have been happy. Was not this, Critias, what we spoke of +as the great advantage of wisdom--to know what is known and what is unknown +to us? + +Very true, he said. + +And now you perceive, I said, that no such science is to be found anywhere. + +I perceive, he said. + +May we assume then, I said, that wisdom, viewed in this new light merely as +a knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, has this advantage:--that he who +possesses such knowledge will more easily learn anything which he learns; +and that everything will be clearer to him, because, in addition to the +knowledge of individuals, he sees the science, and this also will better +enable him to test the knowledge which others have of what he knows +himself; whereas the enquirer who is without this knowledge may be supposed +to have a feebler and weaker insight? Are not these, my friend, the real +advantages which are to be gained from wisdom? And are not we looking and +seeking after something more than is to be found in her? + +That is very likely, he said. + +That is very likely, I said; and very likely, too, we have been enquiring +to no purpose; as I am led to infer, because I observe that if this is +wisdom, some strange consequences would follow. Let us, if you please, +assume the possibility of this science of sciences, and further admit and +allow, as was originally suggested, that wisdom is the knowledge of what we +know and do not know. Assuming all this, still, upon further +consideration, I am doubtful, Critias, whether wisdom, such as this, would +do us much good. For we were wrong, I think, in supposing, as we were +saying just now, that such wisdom ordering the government of house or state +would be a great benefit. + +How so? he said. + +Why, I said, we were far too ready to admit the great benefits which +mankind would obtain from their severally doing the things which they knew, +and committing the things of which they are ignorant to those who were +better acquainted with them. + +Were we not right in making that admission? + +I think not. + +How very strange, Socrates! + +By the dog of Egypt, I said, there I agree with you; and I was thinking as +much just now when I said that strange consequences would follow, and that +I was afraid we were on the wrong track; for however ready we may be to +admit that this is wisdom, I certainly cannot make out what good this sort +of thing does to us. + +What do you mean? he said; I wish that you could make me understand what +you mean. + +I dare say that what I am saying is nonsense, I replied; and yet if a man +has any feeling of what is due to himself, he cannot let the thought which +comes into his mind pass away unheeded and unexamined. + +I like that, he said. + +Hear, then, I said, my own dream; whether coming through the horn or the +ivory gate, I cannot tell. The dream is this: Let us suppose that wisdom +is such as we are now defining, and that she has absolute sway over us; +then each action will be done according to the arts or sciences, and no one +professing to be a pilot when he is not, or any physician or general, or +any one else pretending to know matters of which he is ignorant, will +deceive or elude us; our health will be improved; our safety at sea, and +also in battle, will be assured; our coats and shoes, and all other +instruments and implements will be skilfully made, because the workmen will +be good and true. Aye, and if you please, you may suppose that prophecy, +which is the knowledge of the future, will be under the control of wisdom, +and that she will deter deceivers and set up the true prophets in their +place as the revealers of the future. Now I quite agree that mankind, thus +provided, would live and act according to knowledge, for wisdom would watch +and prevent ignorance from intruding on us. But whether by acting +according to knowledge we shall act well and be happy, my dear Critias,-- +this is a point which we have not yet been able to determine. + +Yet I think, he replied, that if you discard knowledge, you will hardly +find the crown of happiness in anything else. + +But of what is this knowledge? I said. Just answer me that small question. +Do you mean a knowledge of shoemaking? + +God forbid. + +Or of working in brass? + +Certainly not. + +Or in wool, or wood, or anything of that sort? + +No, I do not. + +Then, I said, we are giving up the doctrine that he who lives according to +knowledge is happy, for these live according to knowledge, and yet they are +not allowed by you to be happy; but I think that you mean to confine +happiness to particular individuals who live according to knowledge, such +for example as the prophet, who, as I was saying, knows the future. Is it +of him you are speaking or of some one else? + +Yes, I mean him, but there are others as well. + +Yes, I said, some one who knows the past and present as well as the future, +and is ignorant of nothing. Let us suppose that there is such a person, +and if there is, you will allow that he is the most knowing of all living +men. + +Certainly he is. + +Yet I should like to know one thing more: which of the different kinds of +knowledge makes him happy? or do all equally make him happy? + +Not all equally, he replied. + +But which most tends to make him happy? the knowledge of what past, +present, or future thing? May I infer this to be the knowledge of the game +of draughts? + +Nonsense about the game of draughts. + +Or of computation? + +No. + +Or of health? + +That is nearer the truth, he said. + +And that knowledge which is nearest of all, I said, is the knowledge of +what? + +The knowledge with which he discerns good and evil. + +Monster! I said; you have been carrying me round in a circle, and all this +time hiding from me the fact that the life according to knowledge is not +that which makes men act rightly and be happy, not even if knowledge +include all the sciences, but one science only, that of good and evil. +For, let me ask you, Critias, whether, if you take away this, medicine will +not equally give health, and shoemaking equally produce shoes, and the art +of the weaver clothes?--whether the art of the pilot will not equally save +our lives at sea, and the art of the general in war? + +Quite so. + +And yet, my dear Critias, none of these things will be well or beneficially +done, if the science of the good be wanting. + +True. + +But that science is not wisdom or temperance, but a science of human +advantage; not a science of other sciences, or of ignorance, but of good +and evil: and if this be of use, then wisdom or temperance will not be of +use. + +And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use? For, however much we +assume that wisdom is a science of sciences, and has a sway over other +sciences, surely she will have this particular science of the good under +her control, and in this way will benefit us. + +And will wisdom give health? I said; is not this rather the effect of +medicine? Or does wisdom do the work of any of the other arts,--do they +not each of them do their own work? Have we not long ago asseverated that +wisdom is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and of nothing +else? + +That is obvious. + +Then wisdom will not be the producer of health. + +Certainly not. + +The art of health is different. + +Yes, different. + +Nor does wisdom give advantage, my good friend; for that again we have just +now been attributing to another art. + +Very true. + +How then can wisdom be advantageous, when giving no advantage? + +That, Socrates, is certainly inconceivable. + +You see then, Critias, that I was not far wrong in fearing that I could +have no sound notion about wisdom; I was quite right in depreciating +myself; for that which is admitted to be the best of all things would never +have seemed to us useless, if I had been good for anything at an enquiry. +But now I have been utterly defeated, and have failed to discover what that +is to which the imposer of names gave this name of temperance or wisdom. +And yet many more admissions were made by us than could be fairly granted; +for we admitted that there was a science of science, although the argument +said No, and protested against us; and we admitted further, that this +science knew the works of the other sciences (although this too was denied +by the argument), because we wanted to show that the wise man had knowledge +of what he knew and did not know; also we nobly disregarded, and never even +considered, the impossibility of a man knowing in a sort of way that which +he does not know at all; for our assumption was, that he knows that which +he does not know; than which nothing, as I think, can be more irrational. +And yet, after finding us so easy and good-natured, the enquiry is still +unable to discover the truth; but mocks us to a degree, and has gone out of +its way to prove the inutility of that which we admitted only by a sort of +supposition and fiction to be the true definition of temperance or wisdom: +which result, as far as I am concerned, is not so much to be lamented, I +said. But for your sake, Charmides, I am very sorry--that you, having such +beauty and such wisdom and temperance of soul, should have no profit or +good in life from your wisdom and temperance. And still more am I grieved +about the charm which I learned with so much pain, and to so little profit, +from the Thracian, for the sake of a thing which is nothing worth. I think +indeed that there is a mistake, and that I must be a bad enquirer, for +wisdom or temperance I believe to be really a great good; and happy are +you, Charmides, if you certainly possess it. Wherefore examine yourself, +and see whether you have this gift and can do without the charm; for if you +can, I would rather advise you to regard me simply as a fool who is never +able to reason out anything; and to rest assured that the more wise and +temperate you are, the happier you will be. + +Charmides said: I am sure that I do not know, Socrates, whether I have or +have not this gift of wisdom and temperance; for how can I know whether I +have a thing, of which even you and Critias are, as you say, unable to +discover the nature?--(not that I believe you.) And further, I am sure, +Socrates, that I do need the charm, and as far as I am concerned, I shall +be willing to be charmed by you daily, until you say that I have had +enough. + +Very good, Charmides, said Critias; if you do this I shall have a proof of +your temperance, that is, if you allow yourself to be charmed by Socrates, +and never desert him at all. + +You may depend on my following and not deserting him, said Charmides: if +you who are my guardian command me, I should be very wrong not to obey you. + +And I do command you, he said. + +Then I will do as you say, and begin this very day. + +You sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about? + +We are not conspiring, said Charmides, we have conspired already. + +And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms of +justice? + +Yes, I shall use violence, he replied, since he orders me; and therefore +you had better consider well. + +But the time for consideration has passed, I said, when violence is +employed; and you, when you are determined on anything, and in the mood of +violence, are irresistible. + +Do not you resist me then, he said. + +I will not resist you, I replied. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Charmides, by Plato + |