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diff --git a/1580.txt b/1580.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..356716a --- /dev/null +++ b/1580.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2823 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Charmides, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Charmides + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Posting Date: August 15, 2008 [EBook #1580] +Release Date: December, 1998 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CHARMIDES *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher + + + + + +THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO + +CHARMIDES + +By Plato + +Translated into English with Analyses and Introductions By B. Jowett, +M.A. + + Master of Balliol College + Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford + Doctor in Theology of the University of Leyden + + +TO MY FORMER PUPILS + +in Balliol College and in the University of Oxford who during fifty +years have been the best of friends to me these volumes are inscribed in +grateful recognition of their never failing attachment. + + +The additions and alterations which have been made, both in the +Introductions and in the Text of this Edition, affect at least a third +of the work. + +Having regard to the extent of these alterations, and to the annoyance +which is naturally felt by the owner of a book at the possession of it +in an inferior form, and still more keenly by the writer himself, who +must always desire to be read as he is at his best, I have thought that +the possessor of either of the former Editions (1870 and 1876) might +wish to exchange it for the present one. I have therefore arranged that +those who would like to make this exchange, on depositing a perfect +and undamaged copy of the first or second Edition with any agent of the +Clarendon Press, shall be entitled to receive a copy of a new Edition at +half-price. + + + + +PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. + +The Text which has been mostly followed in this Translation of Plato is +the latest 8vo. edition of Stallbaum; the principal deviations are noted +at the bottom of the page. + +I have to acknowledge many obligations to old friends and pupils. These +are:--Mr. John Purves, Fellow of Balliol College, with whom I have +revised about half of the entire Translation; the Rev. Professor +Campbell, of St. Andrews, who has helped me in the revision of several +parts of the work, especially of the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Politicus; +Mr. Robinson Ellis, Fellow of Trinity College, and Mr. Alfred Robinson, +Fellow of New College, who read with me the Cratylus and the Gorgias; +Mr. Paravicini, Student of Christ Church, who assisted me in the +Symposium; Mr. Raper, Fellow of Queen's College, Mr. Monro, Fellow of +Oriel College, and Mr. Shadwell, Student of Christ Church, who gave me +similar assistance in the Laws. Dr. Greenhill, of Hastings, has also +kindly sent me remarks on the physiological part of the Timaeus, which I +have inserted as corrections under the head of errata at the end of the +Introduction. The degree of accuracy which I have been enabled to attain +is in great measure due to these gentlemen, and I heartily thank them +for the pains and time which they have bestowed on my work. + +I have further to explain how far I have received help from other +labourers in the same field. The books which I have found of most +use are Steinhart and Muller's German Translation of Plato with +Introductions; Zeller's 'Philosophie der Griechen,' and 'Platonische +Studien;' Susemihl's 'Genetische Entwickelung der Paltonischen +Philosophie;' Hermann's 'Geschichte der Platonischen Philosophie;' +Bonitz, 'Platonische Studien;' Stallbaum's Notes and Introductions; +Professor Campbell's editions of the 'Theaetetus,' the 'Sophist,' and +the 'Politicus;' Professor Thompson's 'Phaedrus;' Th. Martin's 'Etudes +sur le Timee;' Mr. Poste's edition and translation of the 'Philebus;' +the Translation of the 'Republic,' by Messrs. Davies and Vaughan, and +the Translation of the 'Gorgias,' by Mr. Cope. + +I have also derived much assistance from the great work of Mr. Grote, +which contains excellent analyses of the Dialogues, and is rich in +original thoughts and observations. I agree with him in rejecting as +futile the attempt of Schleiermacher and others to arrange the Dialogues +of Plato into a harmonious whole. Any such arrangement appears to me not +only to be unsupported by evidence, but to involve an anachronism in +the history of philosophy. There is a common spirit in the writings of +Plato, but not a unity of design in the whole, nor perhaps a perfect +unity in any single Dialogue. The hypothesis of a general plan which +is worked out in the successive Dialogues is an after-thought of the +critics who have attributed a system to writings belonging to an age +when system had not as yet taken possession of philosophy. + +If Mr. Grote should do me the honour to read any portion of this work +he will probably remark that I have endeavoured to approach Plato from a +point of view which is opposed to his own. The aim of the Introductions +in these volumes has been to represent Plato as the father of Idealism, +who is not to be measured by the standard of utilitarianism or any +other modern philosophical system. He is the poet or maker of ideas, +satisfying the wants of his own age, providing the instruments +of thought for future generations. He is no dreamer, but a great +philosophical genius struggling with the unequal conditions of light +and knowledge under which he is living. He may be illustrated by the +writings of moderns, but he must be interpreted by his own, and by his +place in the history of philosophy. We are not concerned to determine +what is the residuum of truth which remains for ourselves. His truth may +not be our truth, and nevertheless may have an extraordinary value and +interest for us. + +I cannot agree with Mr. Grote in admitting as genuine all the +writings commonly attributed to Plato in antiquity, any more than with +Schaarschmidt and some other German critics who reject nearly half of +them. The German critics, to whom I refer, proceed chiefly on grounds +of internal evidence; they appear to me to lay too much stress on the +variety of doctrine and style, which must be equally acknowledged as a +fact, even in the Dialogues regarded by Schaarschmidt as genuine, e.g. +in the Phaedrus, or Symposium, when compared with the Laws. He +who admits works so different in style and matter to have been the +composition of the same author, need have no difficulty in admitting +the Sophist or the Politicus. (The negative argument adduced by the same +school of critics, which is based on the silence of Aristotle, is not +worthy of much consideration. For why should Aristotle, because he has +quoted several Dialogues of Plato, have quoted them all? Something must +be allowed to chance, and to the nature of the subjects treated of in +them.) On the other hand, Mr. Grote trusts mainly to the Alexandrian +Canon. But I hardly think that we are justified in attributing much +weight to the authority of the Alexandrian librarians in an age when +there was no regular publication of books, and every temptation to forge +them; and in which the writings of a school were naturally attributed to +the founder of the school. And even without intentional fraud, there was +an inclination to believe rather than to enquire. Would Mr. Grote accept +as genuine all the writings which he finds in the lists of learned +ancients attributed to Hippocrates, to Xenophon, to Aristotle? The +Alexandrian Canon of the Platonic writings is deprived of credit by the +admission of the Epistles, which are not only unworthy of Plato, and in +several passages plagiarized from him, but flagrantly at variance with +historical fact. It will be seen also that I do not agree with Mr. +Grote's views about the Sophists; nor with the low estimate which he has +formed of Plato's Laws; nor with his opinion respecting Plato's doctrine +of the rotation of the earth. But I 'am not going to lay hands on my +father Parmenides' (Soph.), who will, I hope, forgive me for differing +from him on these points. I cannot close this Preface without expressing +my deep respect for his noble and gentle character, and the great +services which he has rendered to Greek Literature. + +Balliol College, January, 1871. + + + + +PREFACE TO THE SECOND AND THIRD EDITIONS. + +In publishing a Second Edition (1875) of the Dialogues of Plato in +English, I had to acknowledge the assistance of several friends: of +the Rev. G.G. Bradley, Master of University College, now Dean of +Westminster, who sent me some valuable remarks on the Phaedo; of Dr. +Greenhill, who had again revised a portion of the Timaeus; of Mr. R.L. +Nettleship, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, to whom I was indebted +for an excellent criticism of the Parmenides; and, above all, of the +Rev. Professor Campbell of St. Andrews, and Mr. Paravicini, late Student +of Christ Church and Tutor of Balliol College, with whom I had read over +the greater part of the translation. I was also indebted to Mr. Evelyn +Abbott, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, for a complete and accurate +index. + +In this, the Third Edition, I am under very great obligations to Mr. +Matthew Knight, who has not only favoured me with valuable suggestions +throughout the work, but has largely extended the Index (from 61 to 175 +pages) and translated the Eryxias and Second Alcibiades; and to Mr +Frank Fletcher, of Balliol College, my Secretary. I am also considerably +indebted to Mr. J.W. Mackail, late Fellow of Balliol College, who read +over the Republic in the Second Edition and noted several inaccuracies. + +In both editions the Introductions to the Dialogues have been enlarged, +and essays on subjects having an affinity to the Platonic Dialogues have +been introduced into several of them. The analyses have been corrected, +and innumerable alterations have been made in the Text. There have been +added also, in the Third Edition, headings to the pages and a marginal +analysis to the text of each dialogue. + +At the end of a long task, the translator may without impropriety point +out the difficulties which he has had to encounter. These have been far +greater than he would have anticipated; nor is he at all sanguine that +he has succeeded in overcoming them. Experience has made him feel that a +translation, like a picture, is dependent for its effect on very minute +touches; and that it is a work of infinite pains, to be returned to in +many moods and viewed in different lights. + +I. An English translation ought to be idiomatic and interesting, not +only to the scholar, but to the unlearned reader. Its object should not +simply be to render the words of one language into the words of another +or to preserve the construction and order of the original;--this is the +ambition of a schoolboy, who wishes to show that he has made a good use +of his Dictionary and Grammar; but is quite unworthy of the translator, +who seeks to produce on his reader an impression similar or nearly +similar to that produced by the original. To him the feeling should be +more important than the exact word. He should remember Dryden's quaint +admonition not to 'lacquey by the side of his author, but to mount up +behind him.' (Dedication to the Aeneis.) He must carry in his mind a +comprehensive view of the whole work, of what has preceded and of what +is to follow,--as well as of the meaning of particular passages. His +version should be based, in the first instance, on an intimate knowledge +of the text; but the precise order and arrangement of the words may be +left to fade out of sight, when the translation begins to take shape. He +must form a general idea of the two languages, and reduce the one to the +terms of the other. His work should be rhythmical and varied, the +right admixture of words and syllables, and even of letters, should be +carefully attended to; above all, it should be equable in style. There +must also be quantity, which is necessary in prose as well as in verse: +clauses, sentences, paragraphs, must be in due proportion. Metre and +even rhyme may be rarely admitted; though neither is a legitimate +element of prose writing, they may help to lighten a cumbrous +expression (Symp.). The translation should retain as far as possible +the characteristic qualities of the ancient writer--his freedom, grace, +simplicity, stateliness, weight, precision; or the best part of him will +be lost to the English reader. It should read as an original work, and +should also be the most faithful transcript which can be made of the +language from which the translation is taken, consistently with the +first requirement of all, that it be English. Further, the translation +being English, it should also be perfectly intelligible in itself +without reference to the Greek, the English being really the more lucid +and exact of the two languages. In some respects it may be maintained +that ordinary English writing, such as the newspaper article, is +superior to Plato: at any rate it is couched in language which is very +rarely obscure. On the other hand, the greatest writers of Greece, +Thucydides, Plato, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Pindar, Demosthenes, are +generally those which are found to be most difficult and to diverge most +widely from the English idiom. The translator will often have to convert +the more abstract Greek into the more concrete English, or vice versa, +and he ought not to force upon one language the character of another. +In some cases, where the order is confused, the expression feeble, the +emphasis misplaced, or the sense somewhat faulty, he will not strive in +his rendering to reproduce these characteristics, but will re-write the +passage as his author would have written it at first, had he not been +'nodding'; and he will not hesitate to supply anything which, owing to +the genius of the language or some accident of composition, is +omitted in the Greek, but is necessary to make the English clear and +consecutive. + +It is difficult to harmonize all these conflicting elements. In a +translation of Plato what may be termed the interests of the Greek +and English are often at war with one another. In framing the English +sentence we are insensibly diverted from the exact meaning of the Greek; +when we return to the Greek we are apt to cramp and overlay the English. +We substitute, we compromise, we give and take, we add a little here +and leave out a little there. The translator may sometimes be allowed to +sacrifice minute accuracy for the sake of clearness and sense. But he is +not therefore at liberty to omit words and turns of expression which the +English language is quite capable of supplying. He must be patient and +self-controlled; he must not be easily run away with. Let him never +allow the attraction of a favourite expression, or a sonorous cadence, +to overpower his better judgment, or think much of an ornament which is +out of keeping with the general character of his work. He must ever be +casting his eyes upwards from the copy to the original, and down again +from the original to the copy (Rep.). His calling is not held in much +honour by the world of scholars; yet he himself may be excused +for thinking it a kind of glory to have lived so many years in the +companionship of one of the greatest of human intelligences, and in +some degree, more perhaps than others, to have had the privilege of +understanding him (Sir Joshua Reynolds' Lectures: Disc. xv.). + +There are fundamental differences in Greek and English, of which some +may be managed while others remain intractable. (1). The structure of +the Greek language is partly adversative and alternative, and partly +inferential; that is to say, the members of a sentence are either +opposed to one another, or one of them expresses the cause or effect +or condition or reason of another. The two tendencies may be called the +horizontal and perpendicular lines of the language; and the opposition +or inference is often much more one of words than of ideas. But modern +languages have rubbed off this adversative and inferential form: they +have fewer links of connection, there is less mortar in the interstices, +and they are content to place sentences side by side, leaving their +relation to one another to be gathered from their position or from +the context. The difficulty of preserving the effect of the Greek +is increased by the want of adversative and inferential particles in +English, and by the nice sense of tautology which characterizes all +modern languages. We cannot have two 'buts' or two 'fors' in the same +sentence where the Greek repeats (Greek). There is a similar want of +particles expressing the various gradations of objective and subjective +thought--(Greek) and the like, which are so thickly scattered over the +Greek page. Further, we can only realize to a very imperfect degree +the common distinction between (Greek), and the combination of the +two suggests a subtle shade of negation which cannot be expressed +in English. And while English is more dependent than Greek upon the +apposition of clauses and sentences, yet there is a difficulty in using +this form of construction owing to the want of case endings. For the +same reason there cannot be an equal variety in the order of words or an +equal nicety of emphasis in English as in Greek. + +(2) The formation of the sentence and of the paragraph greatly differs +in Greek and English. The lines by which they are divided are generally +much more marked in modern languages than in ancient. Both sentences +and paragraphs are more precise and definite--they do not run into +one another. They are also more regularly developed from within. +The sentence marks another step in an argument or a narrative or a +statement; in reading a paragraph we silently turn over the page and +arrive at some new view or aspect of the subject. Whereas in Plato we +are not always certain where a sentence begins and ends; and paragraphs +are few and far between. The language is distributed in a different way, +and less articulated than in English. For it was long before the true +use of the period was attained by the classical writers both in poetry +or prose; it was (Greek). The balance of sentences and the introduction +of paragraphs at suitable intervals must not be neglected if the harmony +of the English language is to be preserved. And still a caution has to +be added on the other side, that we must avoid giving it a numerical or +mechanical character. + +(3) This, however, is not one of the greatest difficulties of the +translator; much greater is that which arises from the restriction +of the use of the genders. Men and women in English are masculine +and feminine, and there is a similar distinction of sex in the words +denoting animals; but all things else, whether outward objects or +abstract ideas, are relegated to the class of neuters. Hardly in some +flight of poetry do we ever endue any of them with the characteristics +of a sentient being, and then only by speaking of them in the feminine +gender. The virtues may be pictured in female forms, but they are not so +described in language; a ship is humorously supposed to be the sailor's +bride; more doubtful are the personifications of church and country as +females. Now the genius of the Greek language is the opposite of +this. The same tendency to personification which is seen in the Greek +mythology is common also in the language; and genders are attributed to +things as well as persons according to their various degrees of strength +and weakness; or from fanciful resemblances to the male or female form, +or some analogy too subtle to be discovered. When the gender of any +object was once fixed, a similar gender was naturally assigned to +similar objects, or to words of similar formation. This use of genders +in the denotation of objects or ideas not only affects the words +to which genders are attributed, but the words with which they are +construed or connected, and passes into the general character of the +style. Hence arises a difficulty in translating Greek into English +which cannot altogether be overcome. Shall we speak of the soul and +its qualities, of virtue, power, wisdom, and the like, as feminine or +neuter? The usage of the English language does not admit of the former, +and yet the life and beauty of the style are impaired by the latter. +Often the translator will have recourse to the repetition of the word, +or to the ambiguous 'they,' 'their,' etc.; for fear of spoiling the +effect of the sentence by introducing 'it.' Collective nouns in Greek +and English create a similar but lesser awkwardness. + +(4) To use of relation is far more extended in Greek than in English. +Partly the greater variety of genders and cases makes the connexion of +relative and antecedent less ambiguous: partly also the greater number +of demonstrative and relative pronouns, and the use of the article, make +the correlation of ideas simpler and more natural. The Greek appears +to have had an ear or intelligence for a long and complicated sentence +which is rarely to be found in modern nations; and in order to bring +the Greek down to the level of the modern, we must break up the long +sentence into two or more short ones. Neither is the same precision +required in Greek as in Latin or English, nor in earlier Greek as in +later; there was nothing shocking to the contemporary of Thucydides and +Plato in anacolutha and repetitions. In such cases the genius of +the English language requires that the translation should be more +intelligible than the Greek. The want of more distinctions between the +demonstrative pronouns is also greatly felt. Two genitives dependent +on one another, unless familiarised by idiom, have an awkward effect +in English. Frequently the noun has to take the place of the pronoun. +'This' and 'that' are found repeating themselves to weariness in the +rough draft of a translation. As in the previous case, while the feeling +of the modern language is more opposed to tautology, there is also a +greater difficulty in avoiding it. + +(5) Though no precise rule can be laid down about the repetition of +words, there seems to be a kind of impertinence in presenting to the +reader the same thought in the same words, repeated twice over in the +same passage without any new aspect or modification of it. And the +evasion of tautology--that is, the substitution of one word of precisely +the same meaning for another--is resented by us equally with the +repetition of words. Yet on the other hand the least difference of +meaning or the least change of form from a substantive to an adjective, +or from a participle to a verb, will often remedy the unpleasant effect. +Rarely and only for the sake of emphasis or clearness can we allow an +important word to be used twice over in two successive sentences or even +in the same paragraph. The particles and pronouns, as they are of most +frequent occurrence, are also the most troublesome. Strictly speaking, +except a few of the commonest of them, 'and,' 'the,' etc., they ought +not to occur twice in the same sentence. But the Greek has no such +precise rules; and hence any literal translation of a Greek author is +full of tautology. The tendency of modern languages is to become more +correct as well as more perspicuous than ancient. And, therefore, while +the English translator is limited in the power of expressing relation or +connexion, by the law of his own language increased precision and also +increased clearness are required of him. The familiar use of logic, and +the progress of science, have in these two respects raised the standard. +But modern languages, while they have become more exacting in their +demands, are in many ways not so well furnished with powers of +expression as the ancient classical ones. + +Such are a few of the difficulties which have to be overcome in the work +of translation; and we are far from having exhausted the list. (6) The +excellence of a translation will consist, not merely in the faithful +rendering of words, or in the composition of a sentence only, or yet +of a single paragraph, but in the colour and style of the whole work. +Equability of tone is best attained by the exclusive use of familiar and +idiomatic words. But great care must be taken; for an idiomatic phrase, +if an exception to the general style, is of itself a disturbing element. +No word, however expressive and exact, should be employed, which makes +the reader stop to think, or unduly attracts attention by difficulty +and peculiarity, or disturbs the effect of the surrounding language. +In general the style of one author is not appropriate to another; as in +society, so in letters, we expect every man to have 'a good coat of his +own,' and not to dress himself out in the rags of another. (a) Archaic +expressions are therefore to be avoided. Equivalents may be occasionally +drawn from Shakspere, who is the common property of us all; but they +must be used sparingly. For, like some other men of genius of the +Elizabethan and Jacobean age, he outdid the capabilities of the +language, and many of the expressions which he introduced have been laid +aside and have dropped out of use. (b) A similar principle should be +observed in the employment of Scripture. Having a greater force and +beauty than other language, and a religious association, it disturbs the +even flow of the style. It may be used to reproduce in the translation +the quaint effect of some antique phrase in the original, but rarely; +and when adopted, it should have a certain freshness and a suitable +'entourage.' It is strange to observe that the most effective use of +Scripture phraseology arises out of the application of it in a sense +not intended by the author. (c) Another caution: metaphors differ in +different languages, and the translator will often be compelled to +substitute one for another, or to paraphrase them, not giving word for +word, but diffusing over several words the more concentrated thought of +the original. The Greek of Plato often goes beyond the English in its +imagery: compare Laws, (Greek); Rep.; etc. Or again the modern word, +which in substance is the nearest equivalent to the Greek, may be found +to include associations alien to Greek life: e.g. (Greek), 'jurymen,' +(Greek), 'the bourgeoisie.' (d) The translator has also to provide +expressions for philosophical terms of very indefinite meaning in the +more definite language of modern philosophy. And he must not allow +discordant elements to enter into the work. For example, in translating +Plato, it would equally be an anachronism to intrude on him the feeling +and spirit of the Jewish or Christian Scriptures or the technical terms +of the Hegelian or Darwinian philosophy. + +(7) As no two words are precise equivalents (just as no two leaves of +the forest are exactly similar), it is a mistaken attempt at precision +always to translate the same Greek word by the same English word. There +is no reason why in the New Testament (Greek) should always be rendered +'righteousness,' or (Greek) 'covenant.' In such cases the translator may +be allowed to employ two words--sometimes when the two meanings occur +in the same passage, varying them by an 'or'--e.g. (Greek), 'science' +or 'knowledge,' (Greek), 'idea' or 'class,' (Greek), 'temperance' +or 'prudence,'--at the point where the change of meaning occurs. If +translations are intended not for the Greek scholar but for the general +reader, their worst fault will be that they sacrifice the general effect +and meaning to the over-precise rendering of words and forms of speech. + +(8) There is no kind of literature in English which corresponds to the +Greek Dialogue; nor is the English language easily adapted to it. The +rapidity and abruptness of question and answer, the constant repetition +of (Greek), etc., which Cicero avoided in Latin (de Amicit), +the frequent occurrence of expletives, would, if reproduced in a +translation, give offence to the reader. Greek has a freer and more +frequent use of the Interrogative, and is of a more passionate and +emotional character, and therefore lends itself with greater readiness +to the dialogue form. Most of the so-called English Dialogues are but +poor imitations of Plato, which fall very far short of the original. The +breath of conversation, the subtle adjustment of question and answer, +the lively play of fancy, the power of drawing characters, are wanting +in them. But the Platonic dialogue is a drama as well as a dialogue, of +which Socrates is the central figure, and there are lesser performers as +well:--the insolence of Thrasymachus, the anger of Callicles and Anytus, +the patronizing style of Protagoras, the self-consciousness of Prodicus +and Hippias, are all part of the entertainment. To reproduce this living +image the same sort of effort is required as in translating poetry. The +language, too, is of a finer quality; the mere prose English is slow in +lending itself to the form of question and answer, and so the ease of +conversation is lost, and at the same time the dialectical precision +with which the steps of the argument are drawn out is apt to be +impaired. + +II. In the Introductions to the Dialogues there have been added some +essays on modern philosophy, and on political and social life. The chief +subjects discussed in these are Utility, Communism, the Kantian and +Hegelian philosophies, Psychology, and the Origin of Language. (There +have been added also in the Third Edition remarks on other subjects. +A list of the most important of these additions is given at the end of +this Preface.) + +Ancient and modern philosophy throw a light upon one another: but they +should be compared, not confounded. Although the connexion between +them is sometimes accidental, it is often real. The same questions +are discussed by them under different conditions of language and +civilization; but in some cases a mere word has survived, while nothing +or hardly anything of the pre-Socratic, Platonic, or Aristotelian +meaning is retained. There are other questions familiar to the moderns, +which have no place in ancient philosophy. The world has grown older in +two thousand years, and has enlarged its stock of ideas and methods of +reasoning. Yet the germ of modern thought is found in ancient, and we +may claim to have inherited, notwithstanding many accidents of time and +place, the spirit of Greek philosophy. There is, however, no continuous +growth of the one into the other, but a new beginning, partly +artificial, partly arising out of the questionings of the mind itself, +and also receiving a stimulus from the study of ancient writings. + +Considering the great and fundamental differences which exist in ancient +and modern philosophy, it seems best that we should at first study them +separately, and seek for the interpretation of either, especially of the +ancient, from itself only, comparing the same author with himself and +with his contemporaries, and with the general state of thought and +feeling prevalent in his age. Afterwards comes the remoter light which +they cast on one another. We begin to feel that the ancients had the +same thoughts as ourselves, the same difficulties which characterize all +periods of transition, almost the same opposition between science and +religion. Although we cannot maintain that ancient and modern philosophy +are one and continuous (as has been affirmed with more truth respecting +ancient and modern history), for they are separated by an interval of +a thousand years, yet they seem to recur in a sort of cycle, and we are +surprised to find that the new is ever old, and that the teaching of the +past has still a meaning for us. + +III. In the preface to the first edition I expressed a strong opinion +at variance with Mr. Grote's, that the so-called Epistles of Plato were +spurious. His friend and editor, Professor Bain, thinks that I ought to +give the reasons why I differ from so eminent an authority. Reserving +the fuller discussion of the question for another place, I will shortly +defend my opinion by the following arguments:-- + +(a) Because almost all epistles purporting to be of the classical age +of Greek literature are forgeries. (Compare Bentley's Works (Dyce's +Edition).) Of all documents this class are the least likely to be +preserved and the most likely to be invented. The ancient world swarmed +with them; the great libraries stimulated the demand for them; and at a +time when there was no regular publication of books, they easily crept +into the world. + +(b) When one epistle out of a number is spurious, the remainder of +the series cannot be admitted to be genuine, unless there be some +independent ground for thinking them so: when all but one are spurious, +overwhelming evidence is required of the genuineness of the one: when +they are all similar in style or motive, like witnesses who agree in the +same tale, they stand or fall together. But no one, not even Mr. Grote, +would maintain that all the Epistles of Plato are genuine, and very few +critics think that more than one of them is so. And they are clearly all +written from the same motive, whether serious or only literary. Nor is +there an example in Greek antiquity of a series of Epistles, continuous +and yet coinciding with a succession of events extending over a great +number of years. + +The external probability therefore against them is enormous, and the +internal probability is not less: for they are trivial and unmeaning, +devoid of delicacy and subtlety, wanting in a single fine expression. +And even if this be matter of dispute, there can be no dispute that +there are found in them many plagiarisms, inappropriately borrowed, +which is a common note of forgery. They imitate Plato, who never +imitates either himself or any one else; reminiscences of the Republic +and the Laws are continually recurring in them; they are too like +him and also too unlike him, to be genuine (see especially Karsten, +Commentio Critica de Platonis quae feruntur Epistolis). They are full of +egotism, self-assertion, affectation, faults which of all writers Plato +was most careful to avoid, and into which he was least likely to +fall. They abound in obscurities, irrelevancies, solecisms, pleonasms, +inconsistencies, awkwardnesses of construction, wrong uses of words. +They also contain historical blunders, such as the statement respecting +Hipparinus and Nysaeus, the nephews of Dion, who are said to 'have been +well inclined to philosophy, and well able to dispose the mind of their +brother Dionysius in the same course,' at a time when they could not +have been more than six or seven years of age--also foolish allusions, +such as the comparison of the Athenian empire to the empire of Darius, +which show a spirit very different from that of Plato; and mistakes of +fact, as e.g. about the Thirty Tyrants, whom the writer of the letters +seems to have confused with certain inferior magistrates, making them +in all fifty-one. These palpable errors and absurdities are absolutely +irreconcilable with their genuineness. And as they appear to have a +common parentage, the more they are studied, the more they will be found +to furnish evidence against themselves. The Seventh, which is thought to +be the most important of these Epistles, has affinities with the Third +and the Eighth, and is quite as impossible and inconsistent as the rest. +It is therefore involved in the same condemnation.--The final conclusion +is that neither the Seventh nor any other of them, when carefully +analyzed, can be imagined to have proceeded from the hand or mind of +Plato. The other testimonies to the voyages of Plato to Sicily and the +court of Dionysius are all of them later by several centuries than the +events to which they refer. No extant writer mentions them older +than Cicero and Cornelius Nepos. It does not seem impossible that so +attractive a theme as the meeting of a philosopher and a tyrant, once +imagined by the genius of a Sophist, may have passed into a romance +which became famous in Hellas and the world. It may have created one of +the mists of history, like the Trojan war or the legend of Arthur, which +we are unable to penetrate. In the age of Cicero, and still more in +that of Diogenes Laertius and Appuleius, many other legends had gathered +around the personality of Plato,--more voyages, more journeys to visit +tyrants and Pythagorean philosophers. But if, as we agree with Karsten +in supposing, they are the forgery of some rhetorician or sophist, we +cannot agree with him in also supposing that they are of any historical +value, the rather as there is no early independent testimony by which +they are supported or with which they can be compared. + +IV. There is another subject to which I must briefly call attention, +lest I should seem to have overlooked it. Dr. Henry Jackson, of Trinity +College, Cambridge, in a series of articles which he has contributed to +the Journal of Philology, has put forward an entirely new explanation of +the Platonic 'Ideas.' He supposes that in the mind of Plato they took, +at different times in his life, two essentially different forms:--an +earlier one which is found chiefly in the Republic and the Phaedo, and +a later, which appears in the Theaetetus, Philebus, Sophist, Politicus, +Parmenides, Timaeus. In the first stage of his philosophy Plato +attributed Ideas to all things, at any rate to all things which +have classes or common notions: these he supposed to exist only by +participation in them. In the later Dialogues he no longer included in +them manufactured articles and ideas of relation, but restricted them to +'types of nature,' and having become convinced that the many cannot be +parts of the one, for the idea of participation in them he substituted +imitation of them. To quote Dr. Jackson's own expressions,--'whereas +in the period of the Republic and the Phaedo, it was proposed to pass +through ontology to the sciences, in the period of the Parmenides and +the Philebus, it is proposed to pass through the sciences to ontology': +or, as he repeats in nearly the same words,--'whereas in the Republic +and in the Phaedo he had dreamt of passing through ontology to the +sciences, he is now content to pass through the sciences to ontology.' + +This theory is supposed to be based on Aristotle's Metaphysics, a +passage containing an account of the ideas, which hitherto scholars have +found impossible to reconcile with the statements of Plato himself. The +preparations for the new departure are discovered in the Parmenides and +in the Theaetetus; and it is said to be expressed under a different +form by the (Greek) and the (Greek) of the Philebus. The (Greek) of the +Philebus is the principle which gives form and measure to the (Greek); +and in the 'Later Theory' is held to be the (Greek) or (Greek) which +converts the Infinite or Indefinite into ideas. They are neither (Greek) +nor (Greek), but belong to the (Greek) which partakes of both. + +With great respect for the learning and ability of Dr. Jackson, I find +myself unable to agree in this newly fashioned doctrine of the Ideas, +which he ascribes to Plato. I have not the space to go into the question +fully; but I will briefly state some objections which are, I think, +fatal to it. + +(1) First, the foundation of his argument is laid in the Metaphysics of +Aristotle. But we cannot argue, either from the Metaphysics, or from any +other of the philosophical treatises of Aristotle, to the dialogues +of Plato until we have ascertained the relation in which his so-called +works stand to the philosopher himself. There is of course no doubt +of the great influence exercised upon Greece and upon the world by +Aristotle and his philosophy. But on the other hand almost every one who +is capable of understanding the subject acknowledges that his writings +have not come down to us in an authentic form like most of the dialogues +of Plato. How much of them is to be ascribed to Aristotle's own hand, +how much is due to his successors in the Peripatetic School, is a +question which has never been determined, and probably never can be, +because the solution of it depends upon internal evidence only. To +'the height of this great argument' I do not propose to ascend. But one +little fact, not irrelevant to the present discussion, will show +how hopeless is the attempt to explain Plato out of the writings of +Aristotle. In the chapter of the Metaphysics quoted by Dr. Jackson, +about two octavo pages in length, there occur no less than seven or +eight references to Plato, although nothing really corresponding to them +can be found in his extant writings:--a small matter truly; but what a +light does it throw on the character of the entire book in which they +occur! We can hardly escape from the conclusion that they are not +statements of Aristotle respecting Plato, but of a later generation of +Aristotelians respecting a later generation of Platonists. (Compare +the striking remark of the great Scaliger respecting the Magna +Moralia:--Haec non sunt Aristotelis, tamen utitur auctor Aristotelis +nomine tanquam suo.) + +(2) There is no hint in Plato's own writings that he was conscious of +having made any change in the Doctrine of Ideas such as Dr. Jackson +attributes to him, although in the Republic the platonic Socrates speaks +of 'a longer and a shorter way', and of a way in which his disciple +Glaucon 'will be unable to follow him'; also of a way of Ideas, to +which he still holds fast, although it has often deserted him (Philebus, +Phaedo), and although in the later dialogues and in the Laws the +reference to Ideas disappears, and Mind claims her own (Phil.; Laws). +No hint is given of what Plato meant by the 'longer way' (Rep.), or 'the +way in which Glaucon was unable to follow'; or of the relation of Mind +to the Ideas. It might be said with truth that the conception of the +Idea predominates in the first half of the Dialogues, which, according +to the order adopted in this work, ends with the Republic, the +'conception of Mind' and a way of speaking more in agreement with modern +terminology, in the latter half. But there is no reason to suppose that +Plato's theory, or, rather, his various theories, of the Ideas +underwent any definite change during his period of authorship. They are +substantially the same in the twelfth Book of the Laws as in the Meno +and Phaedo; and since the Laws were written in the last decade of his +life, there is no time to which this change of opinions can be ascribed. +It is true that the theory of Ideas takes several different forms, not +merely an earlier and a later one, in the various Dialogues. They are +personal and impersonal, ideals and ideas, existing by participation or +by imitation, one and many, in different parts of his writings or even +in the same passage. They are the universal definitions of Socrates, and +at the same time 'of more than mortal knowledge' (Rep.). But they +are always the negations of sense, of matter, of generation, of the +particular: they are always the subjects of knowledge and not of +opinion; and they tend, not to diversity, but to unity. Other entities +or intelligences are akin to them, but not the same with them, such as +mind, measure, limit, eternity, essence (Philebus; Timaeus): these and +similar terms appear to express the same truths from a different point +of view, and to belong to the same sphere with them. But we are not +justified, therefore, in attempting to identify them, any more than +in wholly opposing them. The great oppositions of the sensible and +intellectual, the unchangeable and the transient, in whatever form of +words expressed, are always maintained in Plato. But the lesser +logical distinctions, as we should call them, whether of ontology or +predication, which troubled the pre-Socratic philosophy and came to the +front in Aristotle, are variously discussed and explained. Thus far we +admit inconsistency in Plato, but no further. He lived in an age before +logic and system had wholly permeated language, and therefore we must +not always expect to find in him systematic arrangement or logical +precision:--'poema magis putandum.' But he is always true to his own +context, the careful study of which is of more value to the interpreter +than all the commentators and scholiasts put together. + +(3) The conclusions at which Dr. Jackson has arrived are such as might +be expected to follow from his method of procedure. For he takes words +without regard to their connection, and pieces together different +parts of dialogues in a purely arbitrary manner, although there is no +indication that the author intended the two passages to be so combined, +or that when he appears to be experimenting on the different points of +view from which a subject of philosophy may be regarded, he is secretly +elaborating a system. By such a use of language any premises may be made +to lead to any conclusion. I am not one of those who believe Plato to +have been a mystic or to have had hidden meanings; nor do I agree +with Dr. Jackson in thinking that 'when he is precise and dogmatic, +he generally contrives to introduce an element of obscurity into the +expostion' (J. of Philol.). The great master of language wrote as +clearly as he could in an age when the minds of men were clouded by +controversy, and philosophical terms had not yet acquired a fixed +meaning. I have just said that Plato is to be interpreted by his +context; and I do not deny that in some passages, especially in the +Republic and Laws, the context is at a greater distance than would be +allowable in a modern writer. But we are not therefore justified in +connecting passages from different parts of his writings, or even from +the same work, which he has not himself joined. We cannot argue from +the Parmenides to the Philebus, or from either to the Sophist, or +assume that the Parmenides, the Philebus, and the Timaeus were 'written +simultaneously,' or 'were intended to be studied in the order in +which they are here named (J. of Philol.) We have no right to connect +statements which are only accidentally similar. Nor is it safe for the +author of a theory about ancient philosophy to argue from what will +happen if his statements are rejected. For those consequences may never +have entered into the mind of the ancient writer himself; and they +are very likely to be modern consequences which would not have been +understood by him. 'I cannot think,' says Dr. Jackson, 'that Plato would +have changed his opinions, but have nowhere explained the nature of the +change.' But is it not much more improbable that he should have changed +his opinions, and not stated in an unmistakable manner that the most +essential principle of his philosophy had been reversed? It is true that +a few of the dialogues, such as the Republic and the Timaeus, or +the Theaetetus and the Sophist, or the Meno and the Apology, contain +allusions to one another. But these allusions are superficial and, +except in the case of the Republic and the Laws, have no philosophical +importance. They do not affect the substance of the work. It may be +remarked further that several of the dialogues, such as the Phaedrus, +the Sophist, and the Parmenides, have more than one subject. But it +does not therefore follow that Plato intended one dialogue to succeed +another, or that he begins anew in one dialogue a subject which he has +left unfinished in another, or that even in the same dialogue he always +intended the two parts to be connected with each other. We cannot argue +from a casual statement found in the Parmenides to other statements +which occur in the Philebus. Much more truly is his own manner described +by himself when he says that 'words are more plastic than wax' (Rep.), +and 'whither the wind blows, the argument follows'. The dialogues of +Plato are like poems, isolated and separate works, except where they are +indicated by the author himself to have an intentional sequence. + +It is this method of taking passages out of their context and placing +them in a new connexion when they seem to confirm a preconceived theory, +which is the defect of Dr. Jackson's procedure. It may be compared, +though not wholly the same with it, to that method which the Fathers +practised, sometimes called 'the mystical interpretation of Scripture,' +in which isolated words are separated from their context, and receive +any sense which the fancy of the interpreter may suggest. It is akin +to the method employed by Schleiermacher of arranging the dialogues +of Plato in chronological order according to what he deems the true +arrangement of the ideas contained in them. (Dr. Jackson is also +inclined, having constructed a theory, to make the chronology of Plato's +writings dependent upon it (See J. of Philol. and elsewhere.) It may +likewise be illustrated by the ingenuity of those who employ symbols to +find in Shakespeare a hidden meaning. In the three cases the error is +nearly the same:--words are taken out of their natural context, and thus +become destitute of any real meaning. + +(4) According to Dr. Jackson's 'Later Theory,' Plato's Ideas, which were +once regarded as the summa genera of all things, are now to be explained +as Forms or Types of some things only,--that is to say, of natural +objects: these we conceive imperfectly, but are always seeking in vain +to have a more perfect notion of them. He says (J. of Philol.) that +'Plato hoped by the study of a series of hypothetical or provisional +classifications to arrive at one in which nature's distribution of kinds +is approximately represented, and so to attain approximately to the +knowledge of the ideas. But whereas in the Republic, and even in the +Phaedo, though less hopefully, he had sought to convert his provisional +definitions into final ones by tracing their connexion with the +summum genus, the (Greek), in the Parmenides his aspirations are less +ambitious,' and so on. But where does Dr. Jackson find any such notion +as this in Plato or anywhere in ancient philosophy? Is it not an +anachronism, gracious to the modern physical philosopher, and the more +acceptable because it seems to form a link between ancient and modern +philosophy, and between physical and metaphysical science; but really +unmeaning? + +(5) To this 'Later Theory' of Plato's Ideas I oppose the authority of +Professor Zeller, who affirms that none of the passages to which Dr. +Jackson appeals (Theaet.; Phil.; Tim.; Parm.) 'in the smallest degree +prove his point'; and that in the second class of dialogues, in which +the 'Later Theory of Ideas' is supposed to be found, quite as clearly +as in the first, are admitted Ideas, not only of natural objects, but of +properties, relations, works of art, negative notions (Theaet.; Parm.; +Soph.); and that what Dr. Jackson distinguishes as the first class of +dialogues from the second equally assert or imply that the relation +of things to the Ideas, is one of participation in them as well as +of imitation of them (Prof. Zeller's summary of his own review of Dr. +Jackson, Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie.) + +In conclusion I may remark that in Plato's writings there is both unity, +and also growth and development; but that we must not intrude upon him +either a system or a technical language. + +Balliol College, October, 1891. + + + + +NOTE + +The chief additions to the Introductions in the Third Edition consist of +Essays on the following subjects:-- + +1. Language. + +2. The decline of Greek Literature. + +3. The 'Ideas' of Plato and Modern Philosophy. + +4. The myths of Plato. + +5. The relation of the Republic, Statesman and Laws. + +6. The legend of Atlantis. + +7. Psychology. + +8. Comparison of the Laws of Plato with Spartan and Athenian Laws and +Institutions. + + +CHARMIDES. + +INTRODUCTION. + +The subject of the Charmides is Temperance or (Greek), a peculiarly +Greek notion, which may also be rendered Moderation (Compare Cic. +Tusc. '(Greek), quam soleo equidem tum temperantiam, tum moderationem +appellare, nonnunquam etiam modestiam.'), Modesty, Discretion, +Wisdom, without completely exhausting by all these terms the various +associations of the word. It may be described as 'mens sana in corpore +sano,' the harmony or due proportion of the higher and lower elements +of human nature which 'makes a man his own master,' according to the +definition of the Republic. In the accompanying translation the word has +been rendered in different places either Temperance or Wisdom, as the +connection seemed to require: for in the philosophy of Plato (Greek) +still retains an intellectual element (as Socrates is also said to have +identified (Greek) with (Greek): Xen. Mem.) and is not yet relegated to +the sphere of moral virtue, as in the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. + +The beautiful youth, Charmides, who is also the most temperate of +human beings, is asked by Socrates, 'What is Temperance?' He answers +characteristically, (1) 'Quietness.' 'But Temperance is a fine and noble +thing; and quietness in many or most cases is not so fine a thing as +quickness.' He tries again and says (2) that temperance is modesty. +But this again is set aside by a sophistical application of Homer: +for temperance is good as well as noble, and Homer has declared that +'modesty is not good for a needy man.' (3) Once more Charmides makes +the attempt. This time he gives a definition which he has heard, and of +which Socrates conjectures that Critias must be the author: 'Temperance +is doing one's own business.' But the artisan who makes another man's +shoes may be temperate, and yet he is not doing his own business; and +temperance defined thus would be opposed to the division of labour which +exists in every temperate or well-ordered state. How is this riddle to +be explained? + +Critias, who takes the place of Charmides, distinguishes in his +answer between 'making' and 'doing,' and with the help of a misapplied +quotation from Hesiod assigns to the words 'doing' and 'work' an +exclusively good sense: Temperance is doing one's own business;--(4) is +doing good. + +Still an element of knowledge is wanting which Critias is readily +induced to admit at the suggestion of Socrates; and, in the spirit of +Socrates and of Greek life generally, proposes as a fifth definition, +(5) Temperance is self-knowledge. But all sciences have a subject: +number is the subject of arithmetic, health of medicine--what is the +subject of temperance or wisdom? The answer is that (6) Temperance is +the knowledge of what a man knows and of what he does not know. But +this is contrary to analogy; there is no vision of vision, but only of +visible things; no love of loves, but only of beautiful things; how then +can there be a knowledge of knowledge? That which is older, heavier, +lighter, is older, heavier, and lighter than something else, not than +itself, and this seems to be true of all relative notions--the object of +relation is outside of them; at any rate they can only have relation to +themselves in the form of that object. Whether there are any such cases +of reflex relation or not, and whether that sort of knowledge which we +term Temperance is of this reflex nature, has yet to be determined by +the great metaphysician. But even if knowledge can know itself, how +does the knowledge of what we know imply the knowledge of what we do not +know? Besides, knowledge is an abstraction only, and will not inform us +of any particular subject, such as medicine, building, and the like. It +may tell us that we or other men know something, but can never tell us +what we know. + +Admitting that there is a knowledge of what we know and of what we do +not know, which would supply a rule and measure of all things, still +there would be no good in this; and the knowledge which temperance gives +must be of a kind which will do us good; for temperance is a good. But +this universal knowledge does not tend to our happiness and good: the +only kind of knowledge which brings happiness is the knowledge of good +and evil. To this Critias replies that the science or knowledge of +good and evil, and all the other sciences, are regulated by the higher +science or knowledge of knowledge. Socrates replies by again dividing +the abstract from the concrete, and asks how this knowledge conduces to +happiness in the same definite way in which medicine conduces to health. + +And now, after making all these concessions, which are really +inadmissible, we are still as far as ever from ascertaining the nature +of temperance, which Charmides has already discovered, and had therefore +better rest in the knowledge that the more temperate he is the happier +he will be, and not trouble himself with the speculations of Socrates. + +In this Dialogue may be noted (1) The Greek ideal of beauty and +goodness, the vision of the fair soul in the fair body, realised in the +beautiful Charmides; (2) The true conception of medicine as a science +of the whole as well as the parts, and of the mind as well as the body, +which is playfully intimated in the story of the Thracian; (3) The +tendency of the age to verbal distinctions, which here, as in the +Protagoras and Cratylus, are ascribed to the ingenuity of Prodicus; +and to interpretations or rather parodies of Homer or Hesiod, which are +eminently characteristic of Plato and his contemporaries; (4) The germ +of an ethical principle contained in the notion that temperance is +'doing one's own business,' which in the Republic (such is the shifting +character of the Platonic philosophy) is given as the definition, not +of temperance, but of justice; (5) The impatience which is exhibited by +Socrates of any definition of temperance in which an element of science +or knowledge is not included; (6) The beginning of metaphysics and logic +implied in the two questions: whether there can be a science of science, +and whether the knowledge of what you know is the same as the knowledge +of what you do not know; and also in the distinction between 'what you +know' and 'that you know,' (Greek;) here too is the first conception of +an absolute self-determined science (the claims of which, however, +are disputed by Socrates, who asks cui bono?) as well as the first +suggestion of the difficulty of the abstract and concrete, and one of +the earliest anticipations of the relation of subject and object, and +of the subjective element in knowledge--a 'rich banquet' of metaphysical +questions in which we 'taste of many things.' (7) And still the mind +of Plato, having snatched for a moment at these shadows of the future, +quickly rejects them: thus early has he reached the conclusion that +there can be no science which is a 'science of nothing' (Parmen.). (8) +The conception of a science of good and evil also first occurs here, an +anticipation of the Philebus and Republic as well as of moral philosophy +in later ages. + +The dramatic interest of the Dialogue chiefly centres in the youth +Charmides, with whom Socrates talks in the kindly spirit of an elder. +His childlike simplicity and ingenuousness are contrasted with the +dialectical and rhetorical arts of Critias, who is the grown-up man of +the world, having a tincture of philosophy. No hint is given, either +here or in the Timaeus, of the infamy which attaches to the name of the +latter in Athenian history. He is simply a cultivated person who, like +his kinsman Plato, is ennobled by the connection of his family with +Solon (Tim.), and had been the follower, if not the disciple, both +of Socrates and of the Sophists. In the argument he is not unfair, if +allowance is made for a slight rhetorical tendency, and for a natural +desire to save his reputation with the company; he is sometimes nearer +the truth than Socrates. Nothing in his language or behaviour is +unbecoming the guardian of the beautiful Charmides. His love of +reputation is characteristically Greek, and contrasts with the humility +of Socrates. Nor in Charmides himself do we find any resemblance to the +Charmides of history, except, perhaps, the modest and retiring nature +which, according to Xenophon, at one time of his life prevented him from +speaking in the Assembly (Mem.); and we are surprised to hear that, like +Critias, he afterwards became one of the thirty tyrants. In the Dialogue +he is a pattern of virtue, and is therefore in no need of the charm +which Socrates is unable to apply. With youthful naivete, keeping his +secret and entering into the spirit of Socrates, he enjoys the detection +of his elder and guardian Critias, who is easily seen to be the author +of the definition which he has so great an interest in maintaining. +The preceding definition, 'Temperance is doing one's own business,' is +assumed to have been borrowed by Charmides from another; and when the +enquiry becomes more abstract he is superseded by Critias (Theaet.; +Euthyd.). Socrates preserves his accustomed irony to the end; he is in +the neighbourhood of several great truths, which he views in various +lights, but always either by bringing them to the test of common sense, +or by demanding too great exactness in the use of words, turns aside +from them and comes at last to no conclusion. + +The definitions of temperance proceed in regular order from the popular +to the philosophical. The first two are simple enough and partially +true, like the first thoughts of an intelligent youth; the third, +which is a real contribution to ethical philosophy, is perverted by the +ingenuity of Socrates, and hardly rescued by an equal perversion on the +part of Critias. The remaining definitions have a higher aim, which is +to introduce the element of knowledge, and at last to unite good and +truth in a single science. But the time has not yet arrived for the +realization of this vision of metaphysical philosophy; and such a +science when brought nearer to us in the Philebus and the Republic will +not be called by the name of (Greek). Hence we see with surprise that +Plato, who in his other writings identifies good and knowledge, here +opposes them, and asks, almost in the spirit of Aristotle, how can there +be a knowledge of knowledge, and even if attainable, how can such a +knowledge be of any use? + +The difficulty of the Charmides arises chiefly from the two senses of +the word (Greek), or temperance. From the ethical notion of temperance, +which is variously defined to be quietness, modesty, doing our own +business, the doing of good actions, the dialogue passes onto the +intellectual conception of (Greek), which is declared also to be the +science of self-knowledge, or of the knowledge of what we know and do +not know, or of the knowledge of good and evil. The dialogue represents +a stage in the history of philosophy in which knowledge and action were +not yet distinguished. Hence the confusion between them, and the easy +transition from one to the other. The definitions which are offered are +all rejected, but it is to be observed that they all tend to throw a +light on the nature of temperance, and that, unlike the distinction of +Critias between (Greek), none of them are merely verbal quibbles, it is +implied that this question, although it has not yet received a solution +in theory, has been already answered by Charmides himself, who has +learned to practise the virtue of self-knowledge which philosophers are +vainly trying to define in words. In a similar spirit we might say to a +young man who is disturbed by theological difficulties, 'Do not trouble +yourself about such matters, but only lead a good life;' and yet +in either case it is not to be denied that right ideas of truth may +contribute greatly to the improvement of character. + +The reasons why the Charmides, Lysis, Laches have been placed together +and first in the series of Platonic dialogues, are: (i) Their shortness +and simplicity. The Charmides and the Lysis, if not the Laches, are of +the same 'quality' as the Phaedrus and Symposium: and it is probable, +though far from certain, that the slighter effort preceded the greater +one. (ii) Their eristic, or rather Socratic character; they belong to +the class called dialogues of search (Greek), which have no conclusion. +(iii) The absence in them of certain favourite notions of Plato, such as +the doctrine of recollection and of the Platonic ideas; the questions, +whether virtue can be taught; whether the virtues are one or many. +(iv) They have a want of depth, when compared with the dialogues of +the middle and later period; and a youthful beauty and grace which is +wanting in the later ones. (v) Their resemblance to one another; in all +the three boyhood has a great part. These reasons have various degrees +of weight in determining their place in the catalogue of the Platonic +writings, though they are not conclusive. No arrangement of the Platonic +dialogues can be strictly chronological. The order which has been +adopted is intended mainly for the convenience of the reader; at the +same time, indications of the date supplied either by Plato himself or +allusions found in the dialogues have not been lost sight of. Much may +be said about this subject, but the results can only be probable; +there are no materials which would enable us to attain to anything like +certainty. + +The relations of knowledge and virtue are again brought forward in the +companion dialogues of the Lysis and Laches; and also in the Protagoras +and Euthydemus. The opposition of abstract and particular knowledge in +this dialogue may be compared with a similar opposition of ideas and +phenomena which occurs in the Prologues to the Parmenides, but seems +rather to belong to a later stage of the philosophy of Plato. + + + + +CHARMIDES, OR TEMPERANCE + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, who is the narrator, Charmides, +Chaerephon, Critias. + +SCENE: The Palaestra of Taureas, which is near the Porch of the King +Archon. + + +Yesterday evening I returned from the army at Potidaea, and having been +a good while away, I thought that I should like to go and look at my old +haunts. So I went into the palaestra of Taureas, which is over against +the temple adjoining the porch of the King Archon, and there I found +a number of persons, most of whom I knew, but not all. My visit was +unexpected, and no sooner did they see me entering than they saluted me +from afar on all sides; and Chaerephon, who is a kind of madman, started +up and ran to me, seizing my hand, and saying, How did you escape, +Socrates?--(I should explain that an engagement had taken place at +Potidaea not long before we came away, of which the news had only just +reached Athens.) + +You see, I replied, that here I am. + +There was a report, he said, that the engagement was very severe, and +that many of our acquaintance had fallen. + +That, I replied, was not far from the truth. + +I suppose, he said, that you were present. + +I was. + +Then sit down, and tell us the whole story, which as yet we have only +heard imperfectly. + +I took the place which he assigned to me, by the side of Critias the son +of Callaeschrus, and when I had saluted him and the rest of the +company, I told them the news from the army, and answered their several +enquiries. + +Then, when there had been enough of this, I, in my turn, began to make +enquiries about matters at home--about the present state of philosophy, +and about the youth. I asked whether any of them were remarkable for +wisdom or beauty, or both. Critias, glancing at the door, invited my +attention to some youths who were coming in, and talking noisily to +one another, followed by a crowd. Of the beauties, Socrates, he said, I +fancy that you will soon be able to form a judgment. For those who +are just entering are the advanced guard of the great beauty, as he is +thought to be, of the day, and he is likely to be not far off himself. + +Who is he, I said; and who is his father? + +Charmides, he replied, is his name; he is my cousin, and the son of my +uncle Glaucon: I rather think that you know him too, although he was not +grown up at the time of your departure. + +Certainly, I know him, I said, for he was remarkable even then when he +was still a child, and I should imagine that by this time he must be +almost a young man. + +You will see, he said, in a moment what progress he has made and what he +is like. He had scarcely said the word, when Charmides entered. + +Now you know, my friend, that I cannot measure anything, and of the +beautiful, I am simply such a measure as a white line is of chalk; for +almost all young persons appear to be beautiful in my eyes. But at that +moment, when I saw him coming in, I confess that I was quite astonished +at his beauty and stature; all the world seemed to be enamoured of him; +amazement and confusion reigned when he entered; and a troop of lovers +followed him. That grown-up men like ourselves should have been affected +in this way was not surprising, but I observed that there was the same +feeling among the boys; all of them, down to the very least child, +turned and looked at him, as if he had been a statue. + +Chaerephon called me and said: What do you think of him, Socrates? Has +he not a beautiful face? + +Most beautiful, I said. + +But you would think nothing of his face, he replied, if you could see +his naked form: he is absolutely perfect. + +And to this they all agreed. + +By Heracles, I said, there never was such a paragon, if he has only one +other slight addition. + +What is that? said Critias. + +If he has a noble soul; and being of your house, Critias, he may be +expected to have this. + +He is as fair and good within, as he is without, replied Critias. + +Then, before we see his body, should we not ask him to show us his soul, +naked and undisguised? he is just of an age at which he will like to +talk. + +That he will, said Critias, and I can tell you that he is a philosopher +already, and also a considerable poet, not in his own opinion only, but +in that of others. + +That, my dear Critias, I replied, is a distinction which has long been +in your family, and is inherited by you from Solon. But why do you not +call him, and show him to us? for even if he were younger than he is, +there could be no impropriety in his talking to us in the presence of +you, who are his guardian and cousin. + +Very well, he said; then I will call him; and turning to the attendant, +he said, Call Charmides, and tell him that I want him to come and see +a physician about the illness of which he spoke to me the day before +yesterday. Then again addressing me, he added: He has been complaining +lately of having a headache when he rises in the morning: now why should +you not make him believe that you know a cure for the headache? + +Why not, I said; but will he come? + +He will be sure to come, he replied. + +He came as he was bidden, and sat down between Critias and me. Great +amusement was occasioned by every one pushing with might and main at his +neighbour in order to make a place for him next to themselves, until at +the two ends of the row one had to get up and the other was rolled over +sideways. Now I, my friend, was beginning to feel awkward; my former +bold belief in my powers of conversing with him had vanished. And when +Critias told him that I was the person who had the cure, he looked at me +in such an indescribable manner, and was just going to ask a question. +And at that moment all the people in the palaestra crowded about us, +and, O rare! I caught a sight of the inwards of his garment, and took +the flame. Then I could no longer contain myself. I thought how well +Cydias understood the nature of love, when, in speaking of a fair youth, +he warns some one 'not to bring the fawn in the sight of the lion to +be devoured by him,' for I felt that I had been overcome by a sort of +wild-beast appetite. But I controlled myself, and when he asked me if +I knew the cure of the headache, I answered, but with an effort, that I +did know. + +And what is it? he said. + +I replied that it was a kind of leaf, which required to be accompanied +by a charm, and if a person would repeat the charm at the same time that +he used the cure, he would be made whole; but that without the charm the +leaf would be of no avail. + +Then I will write out the charm from your dictation, he said. + +With my consent? I said, or without my consent? + +With your consent, Socrates, he said, laughing. + +Very good, I said; and are you quite sure that you know my name? + +I ought to know you, he replied, for there is a great deal said about +you among my companions; and I remember when I was a child seeing you in +company with my cousin Critias. + +I am glad to find that you remember me, I said; for I shall now be more +at home with you and shall be better able to explain the nature of the +charm, about which I felt a difficulty before. For the charm will do +more, Charmides, than only cure the headache. I dare say that you have +heard eminent physicians say to a patient who comes to them with bad +eyes, that they cannot cure his eyes by themselves, but that if his eyes +are to be cured, his head must be treated; and then again they say that +to think of curing the head alone, and not the rest of the body also, is +the height of folly. And arguing in this way they apply their methods +to the whole body, and try to treat and heal the whole and the part +together. Did you ever observe that this is what they say? + +Yes, he said. + +And they are right, and you would agree with them? + +Yes, he said, certainly I should. + +His approving answers reassured me, and I began by degrees to regain +confidence, and the vital heat returned. Such, Charmides, I said, is the +nature of the charm, which I learned when serving with the army from one +of the physicians of the Thracian king Zamolxis, who are said to be so +skilful that they can even give immortality. This Thracian told me that +in these notions of theirs, which I was just now mentioning, the Greek +physicians are quite right as far as they go; but Zamolxis, he added, +our king, who is also a god, says further, 'that as you ought not to +attempt to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body, +so neither ought you to attempt to cure the body without the soul; and +this,' he said, 'is the reason why the cure of many diseases is unknown +to the physicians of Hellas, because they are ignorant of the whole, +which ought to be studied also; for the part can never be well unless +the whole is well.' For all good and evil, whether in the body or in +human nature, originates, as he declared, in the soul, and overflows +from thence, as if from the head into the eyes. And therefore if the +head and body are to be well, you must begin by curing the soul; that is +the first thing. And the cure, my dear youth, has to be effected by +the use of certain charms, and these charms are fair words; and by them +temperance is implanted in the soul, and where temperance is, there +health is speedily imparted, not only to the head, but to the whole +body. And he who taught me the cure and the charm at the same time added +a special direction: 'Let no one,' he said, 'persuade you to cure the +head, until he has first given you his soul to be cured by the charm. +For this,' he said, 'is the great error of our day in the treatment of +the human body, that physicians separate the soul from the body.' And he +added with emphasis, at the same time making me swear to his words, 'Let +no one, however rich, or noble, or fair, persuade you to give him the +cure, without the charm.' Now I have sworn, and I must keep my oath, and +therefore if you will allow me to apply the Thracian charm first to your +soul, as the stranger directed, I will afterwards proceed to apply the +cure to your head. But if not, I do not know what I am to do with you, +my dear Charmides. + +Critias, when he heard this, said: The headache will be an unexpected +gain to my young relation, if the pain in his head compels him to +improve his mind: and I can tell you, Socrates, that Charmides is not +only pre-eminent in beauty among his equals, but also in that quality +which is given by the charm; and this, as you say, is temperance? + +Yes, I said. + +Then let me tell you that he is the most temperate of human beings, and +for his age inferior to none in any quality. + +Yes, I said, Charmides; and indeed I think that you ought to excel +others in all good qualities; for if I am not mistaken there is no one +present who could easily point out two Athenian houses, whose union +would be likely to produce a better or nobler scion than the two from +which you are sprung. There is your father's house, which is descended +from Critias the son of Dropidas, whose family has been commemorated +in the panegyrical verses of Anacreon, Solon, and many other poets, +as famous for beauty and virtue and all other high fortune: and your +mother's house is equally distinguished; for your maternal uncle, +Pyrilampes, is reputed never to have found his equal, in Persia at the +court of the great king, or on the continent of Asia, in all the places +to which he went as ambassador, for stature and beauty; that whole +family is not a whit inferior to the other. Having such ancestors you +ought to be first in all things, and, sweet son of Glaucon, your outward +form is no dishonour to any of them. If to beauty you add temperance, +and if in other respects you are what Critias declares you to be, then, +dear Charmides, blessed art thou, in being the son of thy mother. And +here lies the point; for if, as he declares, you have this gift of +temperance already, and are temperate enough, in that case you have no +need of any charms, whether of Zamolxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean, +and I may as well let you have the cure of the head at once; but if you +have not yet acquired this quality, I must use the charm before I give +you the medicine. Please, therefore, to inform me whether you admit the +truth of what Critias has been saying;--have you or have you not this +quality of temperance? + +Charmides blushed, and the blush heightened his beauty, for modesty is +becoming in youth; he then said very ingenuously, that he really could +not at once answer, either yes, or no, to the question which I had +asked: For, said he, if I affirm that I am not temperate, that would be +a strange thing for me to say of myself, and also I should give the +lie to Critias, and many others who think as he tells you, that I am +temperate: but, on the other hand, if I say that I am, I shall have to +praise myself, which would be ill manners; and therefore I do not know +how to answer you. + +I said to him: That is a natural reply, Charmides, and I think that +you and I ought together to enquire whether you have this quality about +which I am asking or not; and then you will not be compelled to say what +you do not like; neither shall I be a rash practitioner of medicine: +therefore, if you please, I will share the enquiry with you, but I will +not press you if you would rather not. + +There is nothing which I should like better, he said; and as far as I am +concerned you may proceed in the way which you think best. + +I think, I said, that I had better begin by asking you a question; for +if temperance abides in you, you must have an opinion about her; she +must give some intimation of her nature and qualities, which may enable +you to form a notion of her. Is not that true? + +Yes, he said, that I think is true. + +You know your native language, I said, and therefore you must be able to +tell what you feel about this. + +Certainly, he said. + +In order, then, that I may form a conjecture whether you have temperance +abiding in you or not, tell me, I said, what, in your opinion, is +Temperance? + +At first he hesitated, and was very unwilling to answer: then he said +that he thought temperance was doing things orderly and quietly, such +things for example as walking in the streets, and talking, or anything +else of that nature. In a word, he said, I should answer that, in my +opinion, temperance is quietness. + +Are you right, Charmides? I said. No doubt some would affirm that the +quiet are the temperate; but let us see whether these words have any +meaning; and first tell me whether you would not acknowledge temperance +to be of the class of the noble and good? + +Yes. + +But which is best when you are at the writing-master's, to write the +same letters quickly or quietly? + +Quickly. + +And to read quickly or slowly? + +Quickly again. + +And in playing the lyre, or wrestling, quickness or sharpness are far +better than quietness and slowness? + +Yes. + +And the same holds in boxing and in the pancratium? + +Certainly. + +And in leaping and running and in bodily exercises generally, quickness +and agility are good; slowness, and inactivity, and quietness, are bad? + +That is evident. + +Then, I said, in all bodily actions, not quietness, but the greatest +agility and quickness, is noblest and best? + +Yes, certainly. + +And is temperance a good? + +Yes. + +Then, in reference to the body, not quietness, but quickness will be the +higher degree of temperance, if temperance is a good? + +True, he said. + +And which, I said, is better--facility in learning, or difficulty in +learning? + +Facility. + +Yes, I said; and facility in learning is learning quickly, and +difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly? + +True. + +And is it not better to teach another quickly and energetically, rather +than quietly and slowly? + +Yes. + +And which is better, to call to mind, and to remember, quickly and +readily, or quietly and slowly? + +The former. + +And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul, and not a +quietness? + +True. + +And is it not best to understand what is said, whether at the +writing-master's or the music-master's, or anywhere else, not as quietly +as possible, but as quickly as possible? + +Yes. + +And in the searchings or deliberations of the soul, not the quietest, +as I imagine, and he who with difficulty deliberates and discovers, is +thought worthy of praise, but he who does so most easily and quickly? + +Quite true, he said. + +And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and activity are +clearly better than slowness and quietness? + +Clearly they are. + +Then temperance is not quietness, nor is the temperate life +quiet,--certainly not upon this view; for the life which is temperate is +supposed to be the good. And of two things, one is true,--either never, +or very seldom, do the quiet actions in life appear to be better than +the quick and energetic ones; or supposing that of the nobler actions, +there are as many quiet, as quick and vehement: still, even if we grant +this, temperance will not be acting quietly any more than acting quickly +and energetically, either in walking or talking or in anything else; +nor will the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet, seeing that +temperance is admitted by us to be a good and noble thing, and the quick +have been shown to be as good as the quiet. + +I think, he said, Socrates, that you are right. + +Then once more, Charmides, I said, fix your attention, and look within; +consider the effect which temperance has upon yourself, and the nature +of that which has the effect. Think over all this, and, like a brave +youth, tell me--What is temperance? + +After a moment's pause, in which he made a real manly effort to think, +he said: My opinion is, Socrates, that temperance makes a man ashamed or +modest, and that temperance is the same as modesty. + +Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is +noble? + +Yes, certainly, he said. + +And the temperate are also good? + +Yes. + +And can that be good which does not make men good? + +Certainly not. + +And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but also good? + +That is my opinion. + +Well, I said; but surely you would agree with Homer when he says, + +'Modesty is not good for a needy man'? + +Yes, he said; I agree. + +Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good? + +Clearly. + +But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is +always good? + +That appears to me to be as you say. + +And the inference is that temperance cannot be modesty--if temperance is +a good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good? + +All that, Socrates, appears to me to be true; but I should like to know +what you think about another definition of temperance, which I just +now remember to have heard from some one, who said, 'That temperance is +doing our own business.' Was he right who affirmed that? + +You monster! I said; this is what Critias, or some philosopher has told +you. + +Some one else, then, said Critias; for certainly I have not. + +But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this? + +No matter at all, I replied; for the point is not who said the words, +but whether they are true or not. + +There you are in the right, Socrates, he replied. + +To be sure, I said; yet I doubt whether we shall ever be able to +discover their truth or falsehood; for they are a kind of riddle. + +What makes you think so? he said. + +Because, I said, he who uttered them seems to me to have meant one +thing, and said another. Is the scribe, for example, to be regarded as +doing nothing when he reads or writes? + +I should rather think that he was doing something. + +And does the scribe write or read, or teach you boys to write or read, +your own names only, or did you write your enemies' names as well as +your own and your friends'? + +As much one as the other. + +And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this? + +Certainly not. + +And yet if reading and writing are the same as doing, you were doing +what was not your own business? + +But they are the same as doing. + +And the healing art, my friend, and building, and weaving, and doing +anything whatever which is done by art,--these all clearly come under +the head of doing? + +Certainly. + +And do you think that a state would be well ordered by a law which +compelled every man to weave and wash his own coat, and make his own +shoes, and his own flask and strigil, and other implements, on this +principle of every one doing and performing his own, and abstaining from +what is not his own? + +I think not, he said. + +But, I said, a temperate state will be a well-ordered state. + +Of course, he replied. + +Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one's own business; not at +least in this way, or doing things of this sort? + +Clearly not. + +Then, as I was just now saying, he who declared that temperance is a man +doing his own business had another and a hidden meaning; for I do not +think that he could have been such a fool as to mean this. Was he a fool +who told you, Charmides? + +Nay, he replied, I certainly thought him a very wise man. + +Then I am quite certain that he put forth his definition as a riddle, +thinking that no one would know the meaning of the words 'doing his own +business.' + +I dare say, he replied. + +And what is the meaning of a man doing his own business? Can you tell +me? + +Indeed, I cannot; and I should not wonder if the man himself who used +this phrase did not understand what he was saying. Whereupon he laughed +slyly, and looked at Critias. + +Critias had long been showing uneasiness, for he felt that he had a +reputation to maintain with Charmides and the rest of the company. He +had, however, hitherto managed to restrain himself; but now he could no +longer forbear, and I am convinced of the truth of the suspicion which +I entertained at the time, that Charmides had heard this answer about +temperance from Critias. And Charmides, who did not want to answer +himself, but to make Critias answer, tried to stir him up. He went on +pointing out that he had been refuted, at which Critias grew angry, and +appeared, as I thought, inclined to quarrel with him; just as a poet +might quarrel with an actor who spoiled his poems in repeating them; so +he looked hard at him and said-- + +Do you imagine, Charmides, that the author of this definition of +temperance did not understand the meaning of his own words, because you +do not understand them? + +Why, at his age, I said, most excellent Critias, he can hardly be +expected to understand; but you, who are older, and have studied, may +well be assumed to know the meaning of them; and therefore, if you agree +with him, and accept his definition of temperance, I would much rather +argue with you than with him about the truth or falsehood of the +definition. + +I entirely agree, said Critias, and accept the definition. + +Very good, I said; and now let me repeat my question--Do you admit, as I +was just now saying, that all craftsmen make or do something? + +I do. + +And do they make or do their own business only, or that of others also? + +They make or do that of others also. + +And are they temperate, seeing that they make not for themselves or +their own business only? + +Why not? he said. + +No objection on my part, I said, but there may be a difficulty on his +who proposes as a definition of temperance, 'doing one's own business,' +and then says that there is no reason why those who do the business of +others should not be temperate. + +Nay (The English reader has to observe that the word 'make' (Greek), +in Greek, has also the sense of 'do' (Greek).), said he; did I ever +acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate? I +said, those who make, not those who do. + +What! I asked; do you mean to say that doing and making are not the +same? + +No more, he replied, than making or working are the same; thus much I +have learned from Hesiod, who says that 'work is no disgrace.' Now do +you imagine that if he had meant by working and doing such things as +you were describing, he would have said that there was no disgrace in +them--for example, in the manufacture of shoes, or in selling pickles, +or sitting for hire in a house of ill-fame? That, Socrates, is not to be +supposed: but I conceive him to have distinguished making from doing +and work; and, while admitting that the making anything might sometimes +become a disgrace, when the employment was not honourable, to have +thought that work was never any disgrace at all. For things nobly and +usefully made he called works; and such makings he called workings, and +doings; and he must be supposed to have called such things only man's +proper business, and what is hurtful, not his business: and in that +sense Hesiod, and any other wise man, may be reasonably supposed to call +him wise who does his own work. + +O Critias, I said, no sooner had you opened your mouth, than I pretty +well knew that you would call that which is proper to a man, and that +which is his own, good; and that the makings (Greek) of the good +you would call doings (Greek), for I am no stranger to the endless +distinctions which Prodicus draws about names. Now I have no objection +to your giving names any signification which you please, if you will +only tell me what you mean by them. Please then to begin again, and be +a little plainer. Do you mean that this doing or making, or whatever is +the word which you would use, of good actions, is temperance? + +I do, he said. + +Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate? + +Yes, he said; and you, friend, would agree. + +No matter whether I should or not; just now, not what I think, but what +you are saying, is the point at issue. + +Well, he answered; I mean to say, that he who does evil, and not good, +is not temperate; and that he is temperate who does good, and not evil: +for temperance I define in plain words to be the doing of good actions. + +And you may be very likely right in what you are saying; but I am +curious to know whether you imagine that temperate men are ignorant of +their own temperance? + +I do not think so, he said. + +And yet were you not saying, just now, that craftsmen might be temperate +in doing another's work, as well as in doing their own? + +I was, he replied; but what is your drift? + +I have no particular drift, but I wish that you would tell me whether a +physician who cures a patient may do good to himself and good to another +also? + +I think that he may. + +And he who does so does his duty? + +Yes. + +And does not he who does his duty act temperately or wisely? + +Yes, he acts wisely. + +But must the physician necessarily know when his treatment is likely to +prove beneficial, and when not? or must the craftsman necessarily know +when he is likely to be benefited, and when not to be benefited, by the +work which he is doing? + +I suppose not. + +Then, I said, he may sometimes do good or harm, and not know what he +is himself doing, and yet, in doing good, as you say, he has done +temperately or wisely. Was not that your statement? + +Yes. + +Then, as would seem, in doing good, he may act wisely or temperately, +and be wise or temperate, but not know his own wisdom or temperance? + +But that, Socrates, he said, is impossible; and therefore if this is, as +you imply, the necessary consequence of any of my previous admissions, +I will withdraw them, rather than admit that a man can be temperate or +wise who does not know himself; and I am not ashamed to confess that I +was in error. For self-knowledge would certainly be maintained by me +to be the very essence of knowledge, and in this I agree with him who +dedicated the inscription, 'Know thyself!' at Delphi. That word, if I +am not mistaken, is put there as a sort of salutation which the god +addresses to those who enter the temple; as much as to say that the +ordinary salutation of 'Hail!' is not right, and that the exhortation +'Be temperate!' would be a far better way of saluting one another. The +notion of him who dedicated the inscription was, as I believe, that the +god speaks to those who enter his temple, not as men speak; but, when +a worshipper enters, the first word which he hears is 'Be temperate!' +This, however, like a prophet he expresses in a sort of riddle, for +'Know thyself!' and 'Be temperate!' are the same, as I maintain, and as +the letters imply (Greek), and yet they may be easily misunderstood; +and succeeding sages who added 'Never too much,' or, 'Give a pledge, and +evil is nigh at hand,' would appear to have so misunderstood them; for +they imagined that 'Know thyself!' was a piece of advice which the god +gave, and not his salutation of the worshippers at their first coming +in; and they dedicated their own inscription under the idea that they +too would give equally useful pieces of advice. Shall I tell you, +Socrates, why I say all this? My object is to leave the previous +discussion (in which I know not whether you or I are more right, but, at +any rate, no clear result was attained), and to raise a new one in which +I will attempt to prove, if you deny, that temperance is self-knowledge. + +Yes, I said, Critias; but you come to me as though I professed to know +about the questions which I ask, and as though I could, if I only would, +agree with you. Whereas the fact is that I enquire with you into the +truth of that which is advanced from time to time, just because I do not +know; and when I have enquired, I will say whether I agree with you or +not. Please then to allow me time to reflect. + +Reflect, he said. + +I am reflecting, I replied, and discover that temperance, or wisdom, if +implying a knowledge of anything, must be a science, and a science of +something. + +Yes, he said; the science of itself. + +Is not medicine, I said, the science of health? + +True. + +And suppose, I said, that I were asked by you what is the use or effect +of medicine, which is this science of health, I should answer that +medicine is of very great use in producing health, which, as you will +admit, is an excellent effect. + +Granted. + +And if you were to ask me, what is the result or effect of architecture, +which is the science of building, I should say houses, and so of other +arts, which all have their different results. Now I want you, Critias, +to answer a similar question about temperance, or wisdom, which, +according to you, is the science of itself. Admitting this view, I ask +of you, what good work, worthy of the name wise, does temperance or +wisdom, which is the science of itself, effect? Answer me. + +That is not the true way of pursuing the enquiry, Socrates, he said; for +wisdom is not like the other sciences, any more than they are like one +another: but you proceed as if they were alike. For tell me, he said, +what result is there of computation or geometry, in the same sense as a +house is the result of building, or a garment of weaving, or any other +work of any other art? Can you show me any such result of them? You +cannot. + +That is true, I said; but still each of these sciences has a subject +which is different from the science. I can show you that the art of +computation has to do with odd and even numbers in their numerical +relations to themselves and to each other. Is not that true? + +Yes, he said. + +And the odd and even numbers are not the same with the art of +computation? + +They are not. + +The art of weighing, again, has to do with lighter and heavier; but the +art of weighing is one thing, and the heavy and the light another. Do +you admit that? + +Yes. + +Now, I want to know, what is that which is not wisdom, and of which +wisdom is the science? + +You are just falling into the old error, Socrates, he said. You come +asking in what wisdom or temperance differs from the other sciences, and +then you try to discover some respect in which they are alike; but they +are not, for all the other sciences are of something else, and not of +themselves; wisdom alone is a science of other sciences, and of itself. +And of this, as I believe, you are very well aware: and that you are +only doing what you denied that you were doing just now, trying to +refute me, instead of pursuing the argument. + +And what if I am? How can you think that I have any other motive in +refuting you but what I should have in examining into myself? which +motive would be just a fear of my unconsciously fancying that I knew +something of which I was ignorant. And at this moment I pursue the +argument chiefly for my own sake, and perhaps in some degree also for +the sake of my other friends. For is not the discovery of things as they +truly are, a good common to all mankind? + +Yes, certainly, Socrates, he said. + +Then, I said, be cheerful, sweet sir, and give your opinion in answer to +the question which I asked, never minding whether Critias or Socrates is +the person refuted; attend only to the argument, and see what will come +of the refutation. + +I think that you are right, he replied; and I will do as you say. + +Tell me, then, I said, what you mean to affirm about wisdom. + +I mean to say that wisdom is the only science which is the science of +itself as well as of the other sciences. + +But the science of science, I said, will also be the science of the +absence of science. + +Very true, he said. + +Then the wise or temperate man, and he only, will know himself, and be +able to examine what he knows or does not know, and to see what others +know and think that they know and do really know; and what they do not +know, and fancy that they know, when they do not. No other person +will be able to do this. And this is wisdom and temperance and +self-knowledge--for a man to know what he knows, and what he does not +know. That is your meaning? + +Yes, he said. + +Now then, I said, making an offering of the third or last argument +to Zeus the Saviour, let us begin again, and ask, in the first place, +whether it is or is not possible for a person to know that he knows and +does not know what he knows and does not know; and in the second place, +whether, if perfectly possible, such knowledge is of any use. + +That is what we have to consider, he said. + +And here, Critias, I said, I hope that you will find a way out of a +difficulty into which I have got myself. Shall I tell you the nature of +the difficulty? + +By all means, he replied. + +Does not what you have been saying, if true, amount to this: that there +must be a single science which is wholly a science of itself and of +other sciences, and that the same is also the science of the absence of +science? + +Yes. + +But consider how monstrous this proposition is, my friend: in any +parallel case, the impossibility will be transparent to you. + +How is that? and in what cases do you mean? + +In such cases as this: Suppose that there is a kind of vision which is +not like ordinary vision, but a vision of itself and of other sorts of +vision, and of the defect of them, which in seeing sees no colour, but +only itself and other sorts of vision: Do you think that there is such a +kind of vision? + +Certainly not. + +Or is there a kind of hearing which hears no sound at all, but only +itself and other sorts of hearing, or the defects of them? + +There is not. + +Or take all the senses: can you imagine that there is any sense of +itself and of other senses, but which is incapable of perceiving the +objects of the senses? + +I think not. + +Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure, but +of itself, and of all other desires? + +Certainly not. + +Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good, but only for itself +and all other wishes? + +I should answer, No. + +Or would you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty, +but of itself and of other loves? + +I should not. + +Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears, but +has no object of fear? + +I never did, he said. + +Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions, +and which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general? + +Certainly not. + +But surely we are assuming a science of this kind, which, having no +subject-matter, is a science of itself and of the other sciences? + +Yes, that is what is affirmed. + +But how strange is this, if it be indeed true: we must not however as +yet absolutely deny the possibility of such a science; let us rather +consider the matter. + +You are quite right. + +Well then, this science of which we are speaking is a science of +something, and is of a nature to be a science of something? + +Yes. + +Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than +something else? (Socrates is intending to show that science differs from +the object of science, as any other relative differs from the object +of relation. But where there is comparison--greater, less, heavier, +lighter, and the like--a relation to self as well as to other things +involves an absolute contradiction; and in other cases, as in the case +of the senses, is hardly conceivable. The use of the genitive after the +comparative in Greek, (Greek), creates an unavoidable obscurity in the +translation.) + +Yes. + +Which is less, if the other is conceived to be greater? + +To be sure. + +And if we could find something which is at once greater than itself, and +greater than other great things, but not greater than those things in +comparison of which the others are greater, then that thing would have +the property of being greater and also less than itself? + +That, Socrates, he said, is the inevitable inference. + +Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of other doubles, +these will be halves; for the double is relative to the half? + +That is true. + +And that which is greater than itself will also be less, and that which +is heavier will also be lighter, and that which is older will also be +younger: and the same of other things; that which has a nature relative +to self will retain also the nature of its object: I mean to say, for +example, that hearing is, as we say, of sound or voice. Is that true? + +Yes. + +Then if hearing hears itself, it must hear a voice; for there is no +other way of hearing. + +Certainly. + +And sight also, my excellent friend, if it sees itself must see a +colour, for sight cannot see that which has no colour. + +No. + +Do you remark, Critias, that in several of the examples which have been +recited the notion of a relation to self is altogether inadmissible, and +in other cases hardly credible--inadmissible, for example, in the case +of magnitudes, numbers, and the like? + +Very true. + +But in the case of hearing and sight, or in the power of self-motion, +and the power of heat to burn, this relation to self will be regarded +as incredible by some, but perhaps not by others. And some great man, +my friend, is wanted, who will satisfactorily determine for us, whether +there is nothing which has an inherent property of relation to self, +or some things only and not others; and whether in this class of +self-related things, if there be such a class, that science which is +called wisdom or temperance is included. I altogether distrust my own +power of determining these matters: I am not certain whether there is +such a science of science at all; and even if there be, I should not +acknowledge this to be wisdom or temperance, until I can also see +whether such a science would or would not do us any good; for I have an +impression that temperance is a benefit and a good. And therefore, O son +of Callaeschrus, as you maintain that temperance or wisdom is a science +of science, and also of the absence of science, I will request you to +show in the first place, as I was saying before, the possibility, and in +the second place, the advantage, of such a science; and then perhaps you +may satisfy me that you are right in your view of temperance. + +Critias heard me say this, and saw that I was in a difficulty; and as +one person when another yawns in his presence catches the infection of +yawning from him, so did he seem to be driven into a difficulty by my +difficulty. But as he had a reputation to maintain, he was ashamed +to admit before the company that he could not answer my challenge or +determine the question at issue; and he made an unintelligible attempt +to hide his perplexity. In order that the argument might proceed, I said +to him, Well then Critias, if you like, let us assume that there is +this science of science; whether the assumption is right or wrong may +hereafter be investigated. Admitting the existence of it, will you tell +me how such a science enables us to distinguish what we know or do not +know, which, as we were saying, is self-knowledge or wisdom: so we were +saying? + +Yes, Socrates, he said; and that I think is certainly true: for he who +has this science or knowledge which knows itself will become like the +knowledge which he has, in the same way that he who has swiftness +will be swift, and he who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has +knowledge will know. In the same way he who has that knowledge which is +self-knowing, will know himself. + +I do not doubt, I said, that a man will know himself, when he possesses +that which has self-knowledge: but what necessity is there that, having +this, he should know what he knows and what he does not know? + +Because, Socrates, they are the same. + +Very likely, I said; but I remain as stupid as ever; for still I fail to +comprehend how this knowing what you know and do not know is the same as +the knowledge of self. + +What do you mean? he said. + +This is what I mean, I replied: I will admit that there is a science of +science;--can this do more than determine that of two things one is and +the other is not science or knowledge? + +No, just that. + +But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or +want of knowledge of justice? + +Certainly not. + +The one is medicine, and the other is politics; whereas that of which we +are speaking is knowledge pure and simple. + +Very true. + +And if a man knows only, and has only knowledge of knowledge, and has no +further knowledge of health and justice, the probability is that he will +only know that he knows something, and has a certain knowledge, whether +concerning himself or other men. + +True. + +Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows? +Say that he knows health;--not wisdom or temperance, but the art of +medicine has taught it to him;--and he has learned harmony from the art +of music, and building from the art of building,--neither, from wisdom +or temperance: and the same of other things. + +That is evident. + +How will wisdom, regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of +science, ever teach him that he knows health, or that he knows building? + +It is impossible. + +Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows, +but not what he knows? + +True. + +Then wisdom or being wise appears to be not the knowledge of the things +which we do or do not know, but only the knowledge that we know or do +not know? + +That is the inference. + +Then he who has this knowledge will not be able to examine whether a +pretender knows or does not know that which he says that he knows: he +will only know that he has a knowledge of some kind; but wisdom will not +show him of what the knowledge is? + +Plainly not. + +Neither will he be able to distinguish the pretender in medicine from +the true physician, nor between any other true and false professor of +knowledge. Let us consider the matter in this way: If the wise man or +any other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false, +how will he proceed? He will not talk to him about medicine; and that, +as we were saying, is the only thing which the physician understands. + +True. + +And, on the other hand, the physician knows nothing of science, for this +has been assumed to be the province of wisdom. + +True. + +And further, since medicine is science, we must infer that he does not +know anything of medicine. + +Exactly. + +Then the wise man may indeed know that the physician has some kind of +science or knowledge; but when he wants to discover the nature of this +he will ask, What is the subject-matter? For the several sciences are +distinguished not by the mere fact that they are sciences, but by the +nature of their subjects. Is not that true? + +Quite true. + +And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the +subject-matter of health and disease? + +Yes. + +And he who would enquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the +enquiry into health and disease, and not into what is extraneous? + +True. + +And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in +what relates to these? + +He will. + +He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether what he does +is right, in relation to health and disease? + +He will. + +But can any one attain the knowledge of either unless he have a +knowledge of medicine? + +He cannot. + +No one at all, it would seem, except the physician can have this +knowledge; and therefore not the wise man; he would have to be a +physician as well as a wise man. + +Very true. + +Then, assuredly, wisdom or temperance, if only a science of science, and +of the absence of science or knowledge, will not be able to distinguish +the physician who knows from one who does not know but pretends or +thinks that he knows, or any other professor of anything at all; like +any other artist, he will only know his fellow in art or wisdom, and no +one else. + +That is evident, he said. + +But then what profit, Critias, I said, is there any longer in wisdom or +temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom? If, indeed, as we were +supposing at first, the wise man had been able to distinguish what he +knew and did not know, and that he knew the one and did not know the +other, and to recognize a similar faculty of discernment in others, +there would certainly have been a great advantage in being wise; for +then we should never have made a mistake, but have passed through life +the unerring guides of ourselves and of those who are under us; and we +should not have attempted to do what we did not know, but we should have +found out those who knew, and have handed the business over to them and +trusted in them; nor should we have allowed those who were under us to +do anything which they were not likely to do well; and they would be +likely to do well just that of which they had knowledge; and the house +or state which was ordered or administered under the guidance of wisdom, +and everything else of which wisdom was the lord, would have been well +ordered; for truth guiding, and error having been eliminated, in all +their doings, men would have done well, and would have been happy. Was +not this, Critias, what we spoke of as the great advantage of wisdom--to +know what is known and what is unknown to us? + +Very true, he said. + +And now you perceive, I said, that no such science is to be found +anywhere. + +I perceive, he said. + +May we assume then, I said, that wisdom, viewed in this new light merely +as a knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, has this advantage:--that he +who possesses such knowledge will more easily learn anything which he +learns; and that everything will be clearer to him, because, in addition +to the knowledge of individuals, he sees the science, and this also will +better enable him to test the knowledge which others have of what he +knows himself; whereas the enquirer who is without this knowledge may be +supposed to have a feebler and weaker insight? Are not these, my friend, +the real advantages which are to be gained from wisdom? And are not we +looking and seeking after something more than is to be found in her? + +That is very likely, he said. + +That is very likely, I said; and very likely, too, we have been +enquiring to no purpose; as I am led to infer, because I observe that if +this is wisdom, some strange consequences would follow. Let us, if you +please, assume the possibility of this science of sciences, and further +admit and allow, as was originally suggested, that wisdom is the +knowledge of what we know and do not know. Assuming all this, still, +upon further consideration, I am doubtful, Critias, whether wisdom, +such as this, would do us much good. For we were wrong, I think, in +supposing, as we were saying just now, that such wisdom ordering the +government of house or state would be a great benefit. + +How so? he said. + +Why, I said, we were far too ready to admit the great benefits which +mankind would obtain from their severally doing the things which they +knew, and committing the things of which they are ignorant to those who +were better acquainted with them. + +Were we not right in making that admission? + +I think not. + +How very strange, Socrates! + +By the dog of Egypt, I said, there I agree with you; and I was thinking +as much just now when I said that strange consequences would follow, and +that I was afraid we were on the wrong track; for however ready we may +be to admit that this is wisdom, I certainly cannot make out what good +this sort of thing does to us. + +What do you mean? he said; I wish that you could make me understand what +you mean. + +I dare say that what I am saying is nonsense, I replied; and yet if a +man has any feeling of what is due to himself, he cannot let the thought +which comes into his mind pass away unheeded and unexamined. + +I like that, he said. + +Hear, then, I said, my own dream; whether coming through the horn or the +ivory gate, I cannot tell. The dream is this: Let us suppose that wisdom +is such as we are now defining, and that she has absolute sway over us; +then each action will be done according to the arts or sciences, and +no one professing to be a pilot when he is not, or any physician or +general, or any one else pretending to know matters of which he is +ignorant, will deceive or elude us; our health will be improved; our +safety at sea, and also in battle, will be assured; our coats and shoes, +and all other instruments and implements will be skilfully made, because +the workmen will be good and true. Aye, and if you please, you may +suppose that prophecy, which is the knowledge of the future, will be +under the control of wisdom, and that she will deter deceivers and set +up the true prophets in their place as the revealers of the future. Now +I quite agree that mankind, thus provided, would live and act according +to knowledge, for wisdom would watch and prevent ignorance from +intruding on us. But whether by acting according to knowledge we shall +act well and be happy, my dear Critias,--this is a point which we have +not yet been able to determine. + +Yet I think, he replied, that if you discard knowledge, you will hardly +find the crown of happiness in anything else. + +But of what is this knowledge? I said. Just answer me that small +question. Do you mean a knowledge of shoemaking? + +God forbid. + +Or of working in brass? + +Certainly not. + +Or in wool, or wood, or anything of that sort? + +No, I do not. + +Then, I said, we are giving up the doctrine that he who lives according +to knowledge is happy, for these live according to knowledge, and yet +they are not allowed by you to be happy; but I think that you mean +to confine happiness to particular individuals who live according to +knowledge, such for example as the prophet, who, as I was saying, knows +the future. Is it of him you are speaking or of some one else? + +Yes, I mean him, but there are others as well. + +Yes, I said, some one who knows the past and present as well as the +future, and is ignorant of nothing. Let us suppose that there is such a +person, and if there is, you will allow that he is the most knowing of +all living men. + +Certainly he is. + +Yet I should like to know one thing more: which of the different kinds +of knowledge makes him happy? or do all equally make him happy? + +Not all equally, he replied. + +But which most tends to make him happy? the knowledge of what past, +present, or future thing? May I infer this to be the knowledge of the +game of draughts? + +Nonsense about the game of draughts. + +Or of computation? + +No. + +Or of health? + +That is nearer the truth, he said. + +And that knowledge which is nearest of all, I said, is the knowledge of +what? + +The knowledge with which he discerns good and evil. + +Monster! I said; you have been carrying me round in a circle, and all +this time hiding from me the fact that the life according to knowledge +is not that which makes men act rightly and be happy, not even if +knowledge include all the sciences, but one science only, that of good +and evil. For, let me ask you, Critias, whether, if you take away this, +medicine will not equally give health, and shoemaking equally produce +shoes, and the art of the weaver clothes?--whether the art of the pilot +will not equally save our lives at sea, and the art of the general in +war? + +Quite so. + +And yet, my dear Critias, none of these things will be well or +beneficially done, if the science of the good be wanting. + +True. + +But that science is not wisdom or temperance, but a science of human +advantage; not a science of other sciences, or of ignorance, but of good +and evil: and if this be of use, then wisdom or temperance will not be +of use. + +And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use? For, however much we +assume that wisdom is a science of sciences, and has a sway over other +sciences, surely she will have this particular science of the good under +her control, and in this way will benefit us. + +And will wisdom give health? I said; is not this rather the effect of +medicine? Or does wisdom do the work of any of the other arts,--do they +not each of them do their own work? Have we not long ago asseverated +that wisdom is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and of +nothing else? + +That is obvious. + +Then wisdom will not be the producer of health. + +Certainly not. + +The art of health is different. + +Yes, different. + +Nor does wisdom give advantage, my good friend; for that again we have +just now been attributing to another art. + +Very true. + +How then can wisdom be advantageous, when giving no advantage? + +That, Socrates, is certainly inconceivable. + +You see then, Critias, that I was not far wrong in fearing that I could +have no sound notion about wisdom; I was quite right in depreciating +myself; for that which is admitted to be the best of all things would +never have seemed to us useless, if I had been good for anything at +an enquiry. But now I have been utterly defeated, and have failed to +discover what that is to which the imposer of names gave this name of +temperance or wisdom. And yet many more admissions were made by us than +could be fairly granted; for we admitted that there was a science of +science, although the argument said No, and protested against us; and we +admitted further, that this science knew the works of the other sciences +(although this too was denied by the argument), because we wanted to +show that the wise man had knowledge of what he knew and did not know; +also we nobly disregarded, and never even considered, the impossibility +of a man knowing in a sort of way that which he does not know at all; +for our assumption was, that he knows that which he does not know; +than which nothing, as I think, can be more irrational. And yet, after +finding us so easy and good-natured, the enquiry is still unable to +discover the truth; but mocks us to a degree, and has gone out of its +way to prove the inutility of that which we admitted only by a sort +of supposition and fiction to be the true definition of temperance or +wisdom: which result, as far as I am concerned, is not so much to be +lamented, I said. But for your sake, Charmides, I am very sorry--that +you, having such beauty and such wisdom and temperance of soul, should +have no profit or good in life from your wisdom and temperance. And +still more am I grieved about the charm which I learned with so much +pain, and to so little profit, from the Thracian, for the sake of a +thing which is nothing worth. I think indeed that there is a mistake, +and that I must be a bad enquirer, for wisdom or temperance I believe to +be really a great good; and happy are you, Charmides, if you certainly +possess it. Wherefore examine yourself, and see whether you have this +gift and can do without the charm; for if you can, I would rather +advise you to regard me simply as a fool who is never able to reason out +anything; and to rest assured that the more wise and temperate you are, +the happier you will be. + +Charmides said: I am sure that I do not know, Socrates, whether I have +or have not this gift of wisdom and temperance; for how can I know +whether I have a thing, of which even you and Critias are, as you say, +unable to discover the nature?--(not that I believe you.) And further, +I am sure, Socrates, that I do need the charm, and as far as I am +concerned, I shall be willing to be charmed by you daily, until you say +that I have had enough. + +Very good, Charmides, said Critias; if you do this I shall have a proof +of your temperance, that is, if you allow yourself to be charmed by +Socrates, and never desert him at all. + +You may depend on my following and not deserting him, said Charmides: if +you who are my guardian command me, I should be very wrong not to obey +you. + +And I do command you, he said. + +Then I will do as you say, and begin this very day. + +You sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about? + +We are not conspiring, said Charmides, we have conspired already. + +And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms +of justice? + +Yes, I shall use violence, he replied, since he orders me; and therefore +you had better consider well. + +But the time for consideration has passed, I said, when violence is +employed; and you, when you are determined on anything, and in the mood +of violence, are irresistible. + +Do not you resist me then, he said. + +I will not resist you, I replied. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Charmides, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CHARMIDES *** + +***** This file should be named 1580.txt or 1580.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/5/8/1580/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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