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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Charmides + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Release Date: August 15, 2008 [EBook #1580] +Last Updated: January 15, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CHARMIDES *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + + + + + +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h1> + THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO + </h1> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h1> + CHARMIDES + </h1> + <h2> + <br /> By Plato + </h2> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Translated into English with Analyses and Introductions<br /> By B. Jowett, + M.A. + </h3> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Master of Balliol College + Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford + Doctor in Theology of the University of Leyden + </pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h4> + TO MY FORMER PUPILS + </h4> + <p> + in Balliol College and in the University of Oxford who during fifty years + have been the best of friends to me these volumes are inscribed in + grateful recognition of their never failing attachment. + </p> + <p> + The additions and alterations which have been made, both in the + Introductions and in the Text of this Edition, affect at least a third of + the work. + </p> + <p> + Having regard to the extent of these alterations, and to the annoyance + which is naturally felt by the owner of a book at the possession of it in + an inferior form, and still more keenly by the writer himself, who must + always desire to be read as he is at his best, I have thought that the + possessor of either of the former Editions (1870 and 1876) might wish to + exchange it for the present one. I have therefore arranged that those who + would like to make this exchange, on depositing a perfect and undamaged + copy of the first or second Edition with any agent of the Clarendon Press, + shall be entitled to receive a copy of a new Edition at half-price. + </p> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <h2> + Contents + </h2> + <table summary="" style="margin-right: auto; margin-left: auto"> + <tr> + <td> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_PREF"> PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_PREF2"> PREFACE TO THE SECOND AND THIRD EDITIONS. + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0003"> NOTE </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_INTR"> INTRODUCTION. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0005"> CHARMIDES, OR TEMPERANCE </a> + </p> + </td> + </tr> + </table> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> <a name="link2H_PREF" id="link2H_PREF"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <h2> + PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. + </h2> + <p> + The Text which has been mostly followed in this Translation of Plato is + the latest 8vo. edition of Stallbaum; the principal deviations are noted + at the bottom of the page. + </p> + <p> + I have to acknowledge many obligations to old friends and pupils. These + are:—Mr. John Purves, Fellow of Balliol College, with whom I have + revised about half of the entire Translation; the Rev. Professor Campbell, + of St. Andrews, who has helped me in the revision of several parts of the + work, especially of the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Politicus; Mr. Robinson + Ellis, Fellow of Trinity College, and Mr. Alfred Robinson, Fellow of New + College, who read with me the Cratylus and the Gorgias; Mr. Paravicini, + Student of Christ Church, who assisted me in the Symposium; Mr. Raper, + Fellow of Queen's College, Mr. Monro, Fellow of Oriel College, and Mr. + Shadwell, Student of Christ Church, who gave me similar assistance in the + Laws. Dr. Greenhill, of Hastings, has also kindly sent me remarks on the + physiological part of the Timaeus, which I have inserted as corrections + under the head of errata at the end of the Introduction. The degree of + accuracy which I have been enabled to attain is in great measure due to + these gentlemen, and I heartily thank them for the pains and time which + they have bestowed on my work. + </p> + <p> + I have further to explain how far I have received help from other + labourers in the same field. The books which I have found of most use are + Steinhart and Muller's German Translation of Plato with Introductions; + Zeller's 'Philosophie der Griechen,' and 'Platonische Studien;' Susemihl's + 'Genetische Entwickelung der Paltonischen Philosophie;' Hermann's + 'Geschichte der Platonischen Philosophie;' Bonitz, 'Platonische Studien;' + Stallbaum's Notes and Introductions; Professor Campbell's editions of the + 'Theaetetus,' the 'Sophist,' and the 'Politicus;' Professor Thompson's + 'Phaedrus;' Th. Martin's 'Etudes sur le Timee;' Mr. Poste's edition and + translation of the 'Philebus;' the Translation of the 'Republic,' by + Messrs. Davies and Vaughan, and the Translation of the 'Gorgias,' by Mr. + Cope. + </p> + <p> + I have also derived much assistance from the great work of Mr. Grote, + which contains excellent analyses of the Dialogues, and is rich in + original thoughts and observations. I agree with him in rejecting as + futile the attempt of Schleiermacher and others to arrange the Dialogues + of Plato into a harmonious whole. Any such arrangement appears to me not + only to be unsupported by evidence, but to involve an anachronism in the + history of philosophy. There is a common spirit in the writings of Plato, + but not a unity of design in the whole, nor perhaps a perfect unity in any + single Dialogue. The hypothesis of a general plan which is worked out in + the successive Dialogues is an after-thought of the critics who have + attributed a system to writings belonging to an age when system had not as + yet taken possession of philosophy. + </p> + <p> + If Mr. Grote should do me the honour to read any portion of this work he + will probably remark that I have endeavoured to approach Plato from a + point of view which is opposed to his own. The aim of the Introductions in + these volumes has been to represent Plato as the father of Idealism, who + is not to be measured by the standard of utilitarianism or any other + modern philosophical system. He is the poet or maker of ideas, satisfying + the wants of his own age, providing the instruments of thought for future + generations. He is no dreamer, but a great philosophical genius struggling + with the unequal conditions of light and knowledge under which he is + living. He may be illustrated by the writings of moderns, but he must be + interpreted by his own, and by his place in the history of philosophy. We + are not concerned to determine what is the residuum of truth which remains + for ourselves. His truth may not be our truth, and nevertheless may have + an extraordinary value and interest for us. + </p> + <p> + I cannot agree with Mr. Grote in admitting as genuine all the writings + commonly attributed to Plato in antiquity, any more than with + Schaarschmidt and some other German critics who reject nearly half of + them. The German critics, to whom I refer, proceed chiefly on grounds of + internal evidence; they appear to me to lay too much stress on the variety + of doctrine and style, which must be equally acknowledged as a fact, even + in the Dialogues regarded by Schaarschmidt as genuine, e.g. in the + Phaedrus, or Symposium, when compared with the Laws. He who admits works + so different in style and matter to have been the composition of the same + author, need have no difficulty in admitting the Sophist or the Politicus. + (The negative argument adduced by the same school of critics, which is + based on the silence of Aristotle, is not worthy of much consideration. + For why should Aristotle, because he has quoted several Dialogues of + Plato, have quoted them all? Something must be allowed to chance, and to + the nature of the subjects treated of in them.) On the other hand, Mr. + Grote trusts mainly to the Alexandrian Canon. But I hardly think that we + are justified in attributing much weight to the authority of the + Alexandrian librarians in an age when there was no regular publication of + books, and every temptation to forge them; and in which the writings of a + school were naturally attributed to the founder of the school. And even + without intentional fraud, there was an inclination to believe rather than + to enquire. Would Mr. Grote accept as genuine all the writings which he + finds in the lists of learned ancients attributed to Hippocrates, to + Xenophon, to Aristotle? The Alexandrian Canon of the Platonic writings is + deprived of credit by the admission of the Epistles, which are not only + unworthy of Plato, and in several passages plagiarized from him, but + flagrantly at variance with historical fact. It will be seen also that I + do not agree with Mr. Grote's views about the Sophists; nor with the low + estimate which he has formed of Plato's Laws; nor with his opinion + respecting Plato's doctrine of the rotation of the earth. But I 'am not + going to lay hands on my father Parmenides' (Soph.), who will, I hope, + forgive me for differing from him on these points. I cannot close this + Preface without expressing my deep respect for his noble and gentle + character, and the great services which he has rendered to Greek + Literature. + </p> + <p> + Balliol College, January, 1871. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_PREF2" id="link2H_PREF2"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + PREFACE TO THE SECOND AND THIRD EDITIONS. + </h2> + <p> + In publishing a Second Edition (1875) of the Dialogues of Plato in + English, I had to acknowledge the assistance of several friends: of the + Rev. G.G. Bradley, Master of University College, now Dean of Westminster, + who sent me some valuable remarks on the Phaedo; of Dr. Greenhill, who had + again revised a portion of the Timaeus; of Mr. R.L. Nettleship, Fellow and + Tutor of Balliol College, to whom I was indebted for an excellent + criticism of the Parmenides; and, above all, of the Rev. Professor + Campbell of St. Andrews, and Mr. Paravicini, late Student of Christ Church + and Tutor of Balliol College, with whom I had read over the greater part + of the translation. I was also indebted to Mr. Evelyn Abbott, Fellow and + Tutor of Balliol College, for a complete and accurate index. + </p> + <p> + In this, the Third Edition, I am under very great obligations to Mr. + Matthew Knight, who has not only favoured me with valuable suggestions + throughout the work, but has largely extended the Index (from 61 to 175 + pages) and translated the Eryxias and Second Alcibiades; and to Mr Frank + Fletcher, of Balliol College, my Secretary. I am also considerably + indebted to Mr. J.W. Mackail, late Fellow of Balliol College, who read + over the Republic in the Second Edition and noted several inaccuracies. + </p> + <p> + In both editions the Introductions to the Dialogues have been enlarged, + and essays on subjects having an affinity to the Platonic Dialogues have + been introduced into several of them. The analyses have been corrected, + and innumerable alterations have been made in the Text. There have been + added also, in the Third Edition, headings to the pages and a marginal + analysis to the text of each dialogue. + </p> + <p> + At the end of a long task, the translator may without impropriety point + out the difficulties which he has had to encounter. These have been far + greater than he would have anticipated; nor is he at all sanguine that he + has succeeded in overcoming them. Experience has made him feel that a + translation, like a picture, is dependent for its effect on very minute + touches; and that it is a work of infinite pains, to be returned to in + many moods and viewed in different lights. + </p> + <p> + I. An English translation ought to be idiomatic and interesting, not only + to the scholar, but to the unlearned reader. Its object should not simply + be to render the words of one language into the words of another or to + preserve the construction and order of the original;—this is the + ambition of a schoolboy, who wishes to show that he has made a good use of + his Dictionary and Grammar; but is quite unworthy of the translator, who + seeks to produce on his reader an impression similar or nearly similar to + that produced by the original. To him the feeling should be more important + than the exact word. He should remember Dryden's quaint admonition not to + 'lacquey by the side of his author, but to mount up behind him.' + (Dedication to the Aeneis.) He must carry in his mind a comprehensive view + of the whole work, of what has preceded and of what is to follow,—as + well as of the meaning of particular passages. His version should be + based, in the first instance, on an intimate knowledge of the text; but + the precise order and arrangement of the words may be left to fade out of + sight, when the translation begins to take shape. He must form a general + idea of the two languages, and reduce the one to the terms of the other. + His work should be rhythmical and varied, the right admixture of words and + syllables, and even of letters, should be carefully attended to; above + all, it should be equable in style. There must also be quantity, which is + necessary in prose as well as in verse: clauses, sentences, paragraphs, + must be in due proportion. Metre and even rhyme may be rarely admitted; + though neither is a legitimate element of prose writing, they may help to + lighten a cumbrous expression (Symp.). The translation should retain as + far as possible the characteristic qualities of the ancient writer—his + freedom, grace, simplicity, stateliness, weight, precision; or the best + part of him will be lost to the English reader. It should read as an + original work, and should also be the most faithful transcript which can + be made of the language from which the translation is taken, consistently + with the first requirement of all, that it be English. Further, the + translation being English, it should also be perfectly intelligible in + itself without reference to the Greek, the English being really the more + lucid and exact of the two languages. In some respects it may be + maintained that ordinary English writing, such as the newspaper article, + is superior to Plato: at any rate it is couched in language which is very + rarely obscure. On the other hand, the greatest writers of Greece, + Thucydides, Plato, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Pindar, Demosthenes, are + generally those which are found to be most difficult and to diverge most + widely from the English idiom. The translator will often have to convert + the more abstract Greek into the more concrete English, or vice versa, and + he ought not to force upon one language the character of another. In some + cases, where the order is confused, the expression feeble, the emphasis + misplaced, or the sense somewhat faulty, he will not strive in his + rendering to reproduce these characteristics, but will re-write the + passage as his author would have written it at first, had he not been + 'nodding'; and he will not hesitate to supply anything which, owing to the + genius of the language or some accident of composition, is omitted in the + Greek, but is necessary to make the English clear and consecutive. + </p> + <p> + It is difficult to harmonize all these conflicting elements. In a + translation of Plato what may be termed the interests of the Greek and + English are often at war with one another. In framing the English sentence + we are insensibly diverted from the exact meaning of the Greek; when we + return to the Greek we are apt to cramp and overlay the English. We + substitute, we compromise, we give and take, we add a little here and + leave out a little there. The translator may sometimes be allowed to + sacrifice minute accuracy for the sake of clearness and sense. But he is + not therefore at liberty to omit words and turns of expression which the + English language is quite capable of supplying. He must be patient and + self-controlled; he must not be easily run away with. Let him never allow + the attraction of a favourite expression, or a sonorous cadence, to + overpower his better judgment, or think much of an ornament which is out + of keeping with the general character of his work. He must ever be casting + his eyes upwards from the copy to the original, and down again from the + original to the copy (Rep.). His calling is not held in much honour by the + world of scholars; yet he himself may be excused for thinking it a kind of + glory to have lived so many years in the companionship of one of the + greatest of human intelligences, and in some degree, more perhaps than + others, to have had the privilege of understanding him (Sir Joshua + Reynolds' Lectures: Disc. xv.). + </p> + <p> + There are fundamental differences in Greek and English, of which some may + be managed while others remain intractable. (1). The structure of the + Greek language is partly adversative and alternative, and partly + inferential; that is to say, the members of a sentence are either opposed + to one another, or one of them expresses the cause or effect or condition + or reason of another. The two tendencies may be called the horizontal and + perpendicular lines of the language; and the opposition or inference is + often much more one of words than of ideas. But modern languages have + rubbed off this adversative and inferential form: they have fewer links of + connection, there is less mortar in the interstices, and they are content + to place sentences side by side, leaving their relation to one another to + be gathered from their position or from the context. The difficulty of + preserving the effect of the Greek is increased by the want of adversative + and inferential particles in English, and by the nice sense of tautology + which characterizes all modern languages. We cannot have two 'buts' or two + 'fors' in the same sentence where the Greek repeats (Greek). There is a + similar want of particles expressing the various gradations of objective + and subjective thought—(Greek) and the like, which are so thickly + scattered over the Greek page. Further, we can only realize to a very + imperfect degree the common distinction between (Greek), and the + combination of the two suggests a subtle shade of negation which cannot be + expressed in English. And while English is more dependent than Greek upon + the apposition of clauses and sentences, yet there is a difficulty in + using this form of construction owing to the want of case endings. For the + same reason there cannot be an equal variety in the order of words or an + equal nicety of emphasis in English as in Greek. + </p> + <p> + (2) The formation of the sentence and of the paragraph greatly differs in + Greek and English. The lines by which they are divided are generally much + more marked in modern languages than in ancient. Both sentences and + paragraphs are more precise and definite—they do not run into one + another. They are also more regularly developed from within. The sentence + marks another step in an argument or a narrative or a statement; in + reading a paragraph we silently turn over the page and arrive at some new + view or aspect of the subject. Whereas in Plato we are not always certain + where a sentence begins and ends; and paragraphs are few and far between. + The language is distributed in a different way, and less articulated than + in English. For it was long before the true use of the period was attained + by the classical writers both in poetry or prose; it was (Greek). The + balance of sentences and the introduction of paragraphs at suitable + intervals must not be neglected if the harmony of the English language is + to be preserved. And still a caution has to be added on the other side, + that we must avoid giving it a numerical or mechanical character. + </p> + <p> + (3) This, however, is not one of the greatest difficulties of the + translator; much greater is that which arises from the restriction of the + use of the genders. Men and women in English are masculine and feminine, + and there is a similar distinction of sex in the words denoting animals; + but all things else, whether outward objects or abstract ideas, are + relegated to the class of neuters. Hardly in some flight of poetry do we + ever endue any of them with the characteristics of a sentient being, and + then only by speaking of them in the feminine gender. The virtues may be + pictured in female forms, but they are not so described in language; a + ship is humorously supposed to be the sailor's bride; more doubtful are + the personifications of church and country as females. Now the genius of + the Greek language is the opposite of this. The same tendency to + personification which is seen in the Greek mythology is common also in the + language; and genders are attributed to things as well as persons + according to their various degrees of strength and weakness; or from + fanciful resemblances to the male or female form, or some analogy too + subtle to be discovered. When the gender of any object was once fixed, a + similar gender was naturally assigned to similar objects, or to words of + similar formation. This use of genders in the denotation of objects or + ideas not only affects the words to which genders are attributed, but the + words with which they are construed or connected, and passes into the + general character of the style. Hence arises a difficulty in translating + Greek into English which cannot altogether be overcome. Shall we speak of + the soul and its qualities, of virtue, power, wisdom, and the like, as + feminine or neuter? The usage of the English language does not admit of + the former, and yet the life and beauty of the style are impaired by the + latter. Often the translator will have recourse to the repetition of the + word, or to the ambiguous 'they,' 'their,' etc.; for fear of spoiling the + effect of the sentence by introducing 'it.' Collective nouns in Greek and + English create a similar but lesser awkwardness. + </p> + <p> + (4) To use of relation is far more extended in Greek than in English. + Partly the greater variety of genders and cases makes the connexion of + relative and antecedent less ambiguous: partly also the greater number of + demonstrative and relative pronouns, and the use of the article, make the + correlation of ideas simpler and more natural. The Greek appears to have + had an ear or intelligence for a long and complicated sentence which is + rarely to be found in modern nations; and in order to bring the Greek down + to the level of the modern, we must break up the long sentence into two or + more short ones. Neither is the same precision required in Greek as in + Latin or English, nor in earlier Greek as in later; there was nothing + shocking to the contemporary of Thucydides and Plato in anacolutha and + repetitions. In such cases the genius of the English language requires + that the translation should be more intelligible than the Greek. The want + of more distinctions between the demonstrative pronouns is also greatly + felt. Two genitives dependent on one another, unless familiarised by + idiom, have an awkward effect in English. Frequently the noun has to take + the place of the pronoun. 'This' and 'that' are found repeating themselves + to weariness in the rough draft of a translation. As in the previous case, + while the feeling of the modern language is more opposed to tautology, + there is also a greater difficulty in avoiding it. + </p> + <p> + (5) Though no precise rule can be laid down about the repetition of words, + there seems to be a kind of impertinence in presenting to the reader the + same thought in the same words, repeated twice over in the same passage + without any new aspect or modification of it. And the evasion of tautology—that + is, the substitution of one word of precisely the same meaning for another—is + resented by us equally with the repetition of words. Yet on the other hand + the least difference of meaning or the least change of form from a + substantive to an adjective, or from a participle to a verb, will often + remedy the unpleasant effect. Rarely and only for the sake of emphasis or + clearness can we allow an important word to be used twice over in two + successive sentences or even in the same paragraph. The particles and + pronouns, as they are of most frequent occurrence, are also the most + troublesome. Strictly speaking, except a few of the commonest of them, + 'and,' 'the,' etc., they ought not to occur twice in the same sentence. + But the Greek has no such precise rules; and hence any literal translation + of a Greek author is full of tautology. The tendency of modern languages + is to become more correct as well as more perspicuous than ancient. And, + therefore, while the English translator is limited in the power of + expressing relation or connexion, by the law of his own language increased + precision and also increased clearness are required of him. The familiar + use of logic, and the progress of science, have in these two respects + raised the standard. But modern languages, while they have become more + exacting in their demands, are in many ways not so well furnished with + powers of expression as the ancient classical ones. + </p> + <p> + Such are a few of the difficulties which have to be overcome in the work + of translation; and we are far from having exhausted the list. (6) The + excellence of a translation will consist, not merely in the faithful + rendering of words, or in the composition of a sentence only, or yet of a + single paragraph, but in the colour and style of the whole work. + Equability of tone is best attained by the exclusive use of familiar and + idiomatic words. But great care must be taken; for an idiomatic phrase, if + an exception to the general style, is of itself a disturbing element. No + word, however expressive and exact, should be employed, which makes the + reader stop to think, or unduly attracts attention by difficulty and + peculiarity, or disturbs the effect of the surrounding language. In + general the style of one author is not appropriate to another; as in + society, so in letters, we expect every man to have 'a good coat of his + own,' and not to dress himself out in the rags of another. (a) Archaic + expressions are therefore to be avoided. Equivalents may be occasionally + drawn from Shakspere, who is the common property of us all; but they must + be used sparingly. For, like some other men of genius of the Elizabethan + and Jacobean age, he outdid the capabilities of the language, and many of + the expressions which he introduced have been laid aside and have dropped + out of use. (b) A similar principle should be observed in the employment + of Scripture. Having a greater force and beauty than other language, and a + religious association, it disturbs the even flow of the style. It may be + used to reproduce in the translation the quaint effect of some antique + phrase in the original, but rarely; and when adopted, it should have a + certain freshness and a suitable 'entourage.' It is strange to observe + that the most effective use of Scripture phraseology arises out of the + application of it in a sense not intended by the author. (c) Another + caution: metaphors differ in different languages, and the translator will + often be compelled to substitute one for another, or to paraphrase them, + not giving word for word, but diffusing over several words the more + concentrated thought of the original. The Greek of Plato often goes beyond + the English in its imagery: compare Laws, (Greek); Rep.; etc. Or again the + modern word, which in substance is the nearest equivalent to the Greek, + may be found to include associations alien to Greek life: e.g. (Greek), + 'jurymen,' (Greek), 'the bourgeoisie.' (d) The translator has also to + provide expressions for philosophical terms of very indefinite meaning in + the more definite language of modern philosophy. And he must not allow + discordant elements to enter into the work. For example, in translating + Plato, it would equally be an anachronism to intrude on him the feeling + and spirit of the Jewish or Christian Scriptures or the technical terms of + the Hegelian or Darwinian philosophy. + </p> + <p> + (7) As no two words are precise equivalents (just as no two leaves of the + forest are exactly similar), it is a mistaken attempt at precision always + to translate the same Greek word by the same English word. There is no + reason why in the New Testament (Greek) should always be rendered + 'righteousness,' or (Greek) 'covenant.' In such cases the translator may + be allowed to employ two words—sometimes when the two meanings occur + in the same passage, varying them by an 'or'—e.g. (Greek), 'science' + or 'knowledge,' (Greek), 'idea' or 'class,' (Greek), 'temperance' or + 'prudence,'—at the point where the change of meaning occurs. If + translations are intended not for the Greek scholar but for the general + reader, their worst fault will be that they sacrifice the general effect + and meaning to the over-precise rendering of words and forms of speech. + </p> + <p> + (8) There is no kind of literature in English which corresponds to the + Greek Dialogue; nor is the English language easily adapted to it. The + rapidity and abruptness of question and answer, the constant repetition of + (Greek), etc., which Cicero avoided in Latin (de Amicit), the frequent + occurrence of expletives, would, if reproduced in a translation, give + offence to the reader. Greek has a freer and more frequent use of the + Interrogative, and is of a more passionate and emotional character, and + therefore lends itself with greater readiness to the dialogue form. Most + of the so-called English Dialogues are but poor imitations of Plato, which + fall very far short of the original. The breath of conversation, the + subtle adjustment of question and answer, the lively play of fancy, the + power of drawing characters, are wanting in them. But the Platonic + dialogue is a drama as well as a dialogue, of which Socrates is the + central figure, and there are lesser performers as well:—the + insolence of Thrasymachus, the anger of Callicles and Anytus, the + patronizing style of Protagoras, the self-consciousness of Prodicus and + Hippias, are all part of the entertainment. To reproduce this living image + the same sort of effort is required as in translating poetry. The + language, too, is of a finer quality; the mere prose English is slow in + lending itself to the form of question and answer, and so the ease of + conversation is lost, and at the same time the dialectical precision with + which the steps of the argument are drawn out is apt to be impaired. + </p> + <p> + II. In the Introductions to the Dialogues there have been added some + essays on modern philosophy, and on political and social life. The chief + subjects discussed in these are Utility, Communism, the Kantian and + Hegelian philosophies, Psychology, and the Origin of Language. (There have + been added also in the Third Edition remarks on other subjects. A list of + the most important of these additions is given at the end of this + Preface.) + </p> + <p> + Ancient and modern philosophy throw a light upon one another: but they + should be compared, not confounded. Although the connexion between them is + sometimes accidental, it is often real. The same questions are discussed + by them under different conditions of language and civilization; but in + some cases a mere word has survived, while nothing or hardly anything of + the pre-Socratic, Platonic, or Aristotelian meaning is retained. There are + other questions familiar to the moderns, which have no place in ancient + philosophy. The world has grown older in two thousand years, and has + enlarged its stock of ideas and methods of reasoning. Yet the germ of + modern thought is found in ancient, and we may claim to have inherited, + notwithstanding many accidents of time and place, the spirit of Greek + philosophy. There is, however, no continuous growth of the one into the + other, but a new beginning, partly artificial, partly arising out of the + questionings of the mind itself, and also receiving a stimulus from the + study of ancient writings. + </p> + <p> + Considering the great and fundamental differences which exist in ancient + and modern philosophy, it seems best that we should at first study them + separately, and seek for the interpretation of either, especially of the + ancient, from itself only, comparing the same author with himself and with + his contemporaries, and with the general state of thought and feeling + prevalent in his age. Afterwards comes the remoter light which they cast + on one another. We begin to feel that the ancients had the same thoughts + as ourselves, the same difficulties which characterize all periods of + transition, almost the same opposition between science and religion. + Although we cannot maintain that ancient and modern philosophy are one and + continuous (as has been affirmed with more truth respecting ancient and + modern history), for they are separated by an interval of a thousand + years, yet they seem to recur in a sort of cycle, and we are surprised to + find that the new is ever old, and that the teaching of the past has still + a meaning for us. + </p> + <p> + III. In the preface to the first edition I expressed a strong opinion at + variance with Mr. Grote's, that the so-called Epistles of Plato were + spurious. His friend and editor, Professor Bain, thinks that I ought to + give the reasons why I differ from so eminent an authority. Reserving the + fuller discussion of the question for another place, I will shortly defend + my opinion by the following arguments:— + </p> + <p> + (a) Because almost all epistles purporting to be of the classical age of + Greek literature are forgeries. (Compare Bentley's Works (Dyce's + Edition).) Of all documents this class are the least likely to be + preserved and the most likely to be invented. The ancient world swarmed + with them; the great libraries stimulated the demand for them; and at a + time when there was no regular publication of books, they easily crept + into the world. + </p> + <p> + (b) When one epistle out of a number is spurious, the remainder of the + series cannot be admitted to be genuine, unless there be some independent + ground for thinking them so: when all but one are spurious, overwhelming + evidence is required of the genuineness of the one: when they are all + similar in style or motive, like witnesses who agree in the same tale, + they stand or fall together. But no one, not even Mr. Grote, would + maintain that all the Epistles of Plato are genuine, and very few critics + think that more than one of them is so. And they are clearly all written + from the same motive, whether serious or only literary. Nor is there an + example in Greek antiquity of a series of Epistles, continuous and yet + coinciding with a succession of events extending over a great number of + years. + </p> + <p> + The external probability therefore against them is enormous, and the + internal probability is not less: for they are trivial and unmeaning, + devoid of delicacy and subtlety, wanting in a single fine expression. And + even if this be matter of dispute, there can be no dispute that there are + found in them many plagiarisms, inappropriately borrowed, which is a + common note of forgery. They imitate Plato, who never imitates either + himself or any one else; reminiscences of the Republic and the Laws are + continually recurring in them; they are too like him and also too unlike + him, to be genuine (see especially Karsten, Commentio Critica de Platonis + quae feruntur Epistolis). They are full of egotism, self-assertion, + affectation, faults which of all writers Plato was most careful to avoid, + and into which he was least likely to fall. They abound in obscurities, + irrelevancies, solecisms, pleonasms, inconsistencies, awkwardnesses of + construction, wrong uses of words. They also contain historical blunders, + such as the statement respecting Hipparinus and Nysaeus, the nephews of + Dion, who are said to 'have been well inclined to philosophy, and well + able to dispose the mind of their brother Dionysius in the same course,' + at a time when they could not have been more than six or seven years of + age—also foolish allusions, such as the comparison of the Athenian + empire to the empire of Darius, which show a spirit very different from + that of Plato; and mistakes of fact, as e.g. about the Thirty Tyrants, + whom the writer of the letters seems to have confused with certain + inferior magistrates, making them in all fifty-one. These palpable errors + and absurdities are absolutely irreconcilable with their genuineness. And + as they appear to have a common parentage, the more they are studied, the + more they will be found to furnish evidence against themselves. The + Seventh, which is thought to be the most important of these Epistles, has + affinities with the Third and the Eighth, and is quite as impossible and + inconsistent as the rest. It is therefore involved in the same + condemnation.—The final conclusion is that neither the Seventh nor + any other of them, when carefully analyzed, can be imagined to have + proceeded from the hand or mind of Plato. The other testimonies to the + voyages of Plato to Sicily and the court of Dionysius are all of them + later by several centuries than the events to which they refer. No extant + writer mentions them older than Cicero and Cornelius Nepos. It does not + seem impossible that so attractive a theme as the meeting of a philosopher + and a tyrant, once imagined by the genius of a Sophist, may have passed + into a romance which became famous in Hellas and the world. It may have + created one of the mists of history, like the Trojan war or the legend of + Arthur, which we are unable to penetrate. In the age of Cicero, and still + more in that of Diogenes Laertius and Appuleius, many other legends had + gathered around the personality of Plato,—more voyages, more + journeys to visit tyrants and Pythagorean philosophers. But if, as we + agree with Karsten in supposing, they are the forgery of some rhetorician + or sophist, we cannot agree with him in also supposing that they are of + any historical value, the rather as there is no early independent + testimony by which they are supported or with which they can be compared. + </p> + <p> + IV. There is another subject to which I must briefly call attention, lest + I should seem to have overlooked it. Dr. Henry Jackson, of Trinity + College, Cambridge, in a series of articles which he has contributed to + the Journal of Philology, has put forward an entirely new explanation of + the Platonic 'Ideas.' He supposes that in the mind of Plato they took, at + different times in his life, two essentially different forms:—an + earlier one which is found chiefly in the Republic and the Phaedo, and a + later, which appears in the Theaetetus, Philebus, Sophist, Politicus, + Parmenides, Timaeus. In the first stage of his philosophy Plato attributed + Ideas to all things, at any rate to all things which have classes or + common notions: these he supposed to exist only by participation in them. + In the later Dialogues he no longer included in them manufactured articles + and ideas of relation, but restricted them to 'types of nature,' and + having become convinced that the many cannot be parts of the one, for the + idea of participation in them he substituted imitation of them. To quote + Dr. Jackson's own expressions,—'whereas in the period of the + Republic and the Phaedo, it was proposed to pass through ontology to the + sciences, in the period of the Parmenides and the Philebus, it is proposed + to pass through the sciences to ontology': or, as he repeats in nearly the + same words,—'whereas in the Republic and in the Phaedo he had dreamt + of passing through ontology to the sciences, he is now content to pass + through the sciences to ontology.' + </p> + <p> + This theory is supposed to be based on Aristotle's Metaphysics, a passage + containing an account of the ideas, which hitherto scholars have found + impossible to reconcile with the statements of Plato himself. The + preparations for the new departure are discovered in the Parmenides and in + the Theaetetus; and it is said to be expressed under a different form by + the (Greek) and the (Greek) of the Philebus. The (Greek) of the Philebus + is the principle which gives form and measure to the (Greek); and in the + 'Later Theory' is held to be the (Greek) or (Greek) which converts the + Infinite or Indefinite into ideas. They are neither (Greek) nor (Greek), + but belong to the (Greek) which partakes of both. + </p> + <p> + With great respect for the learning and ability of Dr. Jackson, I find + myself unable to agree in this newly fashioned doctrine of the Ideas, + which he ascribes to Plato. I have not the space to go into the question + fully; but I will briefly state some objections which are, I think, fatal + to it. + </p> + <p> + (1) First, the foundation of his argument is laid in the Metaphysics of + Aristotle. But we cannot argue, either from the Metaphysics, or from any + other of the philosophical treatises of Aristotle, to the dialogues of + Plato until we have ascertained the relation in which his so-called works + stand to the philosopher himself. There is of course no doubt of the great + influence exercised upon Greece and upon the world by Aristotle and his + philosophy. But on the other hand almost every one who is capable of + understanding the subject acknowledges that his writings have not come + down to us in an authentic form like most of the dialogues of Plato. How + much of them is to be ascribed to Aristotle's own hand, how much is due to + his successors in the Peripatetic School, is a question which has never + been determined, and probably never can be, because the solution of it + depends upon internal evidence only. To 'the height of this great + argument' I do not propose to ascend. But one little fact, not irrelevant + to the present discussion, will show how hopeless is the attempt to + explain Plato out of the writings of Aristotle. In the chapter of the + Metaphysics quoted by Dr. Jackson, about two octavo pages in length, there + occur no less than seven or eight references to Plato, although nothing + really corresponding to them can be found in his extant writings:—a + small matter truly; but what a light does it throw on the character of the + entire book in which they occur! We can hardly escape from the conclusion + that they are not statements of Aristotle respecting Plato, but of a later + generation of Aristotelians respecting a later generation of Platonists. + (Compare the striking remark of the great Scaliger respecting the Magna + Moralia:—Haec non sunt Aristotelis, tamen utitur auctor Aristotelis + nomine tanquam suo.) + </p> + <p> + (2) There is no hint in Plato's own writings that he was conscious of + having made any change in the Doctrine of Ideas such as Dr. Jackson + attributes to him, although in the Republic the platonic Socrates speaks + of 'a longer and a shorter way', and of a way in which his disciple + Glaucon 'will be unable to follow him'; also of a way of Ideas, to which + he still holds fast, although it has often deserted him (Philebus, + Phaedo), and although in the later dialogues and in the Laws the reference + to Ideas disappears, and Mind claims her own (Phil.; Laws). No hint is + given of what Plato meant by the 'longer way' (Rep.), or 'the way in which + Glaucon was unable to follow'; or of the relation of Mind to the Ideas. It + might be said with truth that the conception of the Idea predominates in + the first half of the Dialogues, which, according to the order adopted in + this work, ends with the Republic, the 'conception of Mind' and a way of + speaking more in agreement with modern terminology, in the latter half. + But there is no reason to suppose that Plato's theory, or, rather, his + various theories, of the Ideas underwent any definite change during his + period of authorship. They are substantially the same in the twelfth Book + of the Laws as in the Meno and Phaedo; and since the Laws were written in + the last decade of his life, there is no time to which this change of + opinions can be ascribed. It is true that the theory of Ideas takes + several different forms, not merely an earlier and a later one, in the + various Dialogues. They are personal and impersonal, ideals and ideas, + existing by participation or by imitation, one and many, in different + parts of his writings or even in the same passage. They are the universal + definitions of Socrates, and at the same time 'of more than mortal + knowledge' (Rep.). But they are always the negations of sense, of matter, + of generation, of the particular: they are always the subjects of + knowledge and not of opinion; and they tend, not to diversity, but to + unity. Other entities or intelligences are akin to them, but not the same + with them, such as mind, measure, limit, eternity, essence (Philebus; + Timaeus): these and similar terms appear to express the same truths from a + different point of view, and to belong to the same sphere with them. But + we are not justified, therefore, in attempting to identify them, any more + than in wholly opposing them. The great oppositions of the sensible and + intellectual, the unchangeable and the transient, in whatever form of + words expressed, are always maintained in Plato. But the lesser logical + distinctions, as we should call them, whether of ontology or predication, + which troubled the pre-Socratic philosophy and came to the front in + Aristotle, are variously discussed and explained. Thus far we admit + inconsistency in Plato, but no further. He lived in an age before logic + and system had wholly permeated language, and therefore we must not always + expect to find in him systematic arrangement or logical precision:—'poema + magis putandum.' But he is always true to his own context, the careful + study of which is of more value to the interpreter than all the + commentators and scholiasts put together. + </p> + <p> + (3) The conclusions at which Dr. Jackson has arrived are such as might be + expected to follow from his method of procedure. For he takes words + without regard to their connection, and pieces together different parts of + dialogues in a purely arbitrary manner, although there is no indication + that the author intended the two passages to be so combined, or that when + he appears to be experimenting on the different points of view from which + a subject of philosophy may be regarded, he is secretly elaborating a + system. By such a use of language any premises may be made to lead to any + conclusion. I am not one of those who believe Plato to have been a mystic + or to have had hidden meanings; nor do I agree with Dr. Jackson in + thinking that 'when he is precise and dogmatic, he generally contrives to + introduce an element of obscurity into the expostion' (J. of Philol.). The + great master of language wrote as clearly as he could in an age when the + minds of men were clouded by controversy, and philosophical terms had not + yet acquired a fixed meaning. I have just said that Plato is to be + interpreted by his context; and I do not deny that in some passages, + especially in the Republic and Laws, the context is at a greater distance + than would be allowable in a modern writer. But we are not therefore + justified in connecting passages from different parts of his writings, or + even from the same work, which he has not himself joined. We cannot argue + from the Parmenides to the Philebus, or from either to the Sophist, or + assume that the Parmenides, the Philebus, and the Timaeus were 'written + simultaneously,' or 'were intended to be studied in the order in which + they are here named (J. of Philol.) We have no right to connect statements + which are only accidentally similar. Nor is it safe for the author of a + theory about ancient philosophy to argue from what will happen if his + statements are rejected. For those consequences may never have entered + into the mind of the ancient writer himself; and they are very likely to + be modern consequences which would not have been understood by him. 'I + cannot think,' says Dr. Jackson, 'that Plato would have changed his + opinions, but have nowhere explained the nature of the change.' But is it + not much more improbable that he should have changed his opinions, and not + stated in an unmistakable manner that the most essential principle of his + philosophy had been reversed? It is true that a few of the dialogues, such + as the Republic and the Timaeus, or the Theaetetus and the Sophist, or the + Meno and the Apology, contain allusions to one another. But these + allusions are superficial and, except in the case of the Republic and the + Laws, have no philosophical importance. They do not affect the substance + of the work. It may be remarked further that several of the dialogues, + such as the Phaedrus, the Sophist, and the Parmenides, have more than one + subject. But it does not therefore follow that Plato intended one dialogue + to succeed another, or that he begins anew in one dialogue a subject which + he has left unfinished in another, or that even in the same dialogue he + always intended the two parts to be connected with each other. We cannot + argue from a casual statement found in the Parmenides to other statements + which occur in the Philebus. Much more truly is his own manner described + by himself when he says that 'words are more plastic than wax' (Rep.), and + 'whither the wind blows, the argument follows'. The dialogues of Plato are + like poems, isolated and separate works, except where they are indicated + by the author himself to have an intentional sequence. + </p> + <p> + It is this method of taking passages out of their context and placing them + in a new connexion when they seem to confirm a preconceived theory, which + is the defect of Dr. Jackson's procedure. It may be compared, though not + wholly the same with it, to that method which the Fathers practised, + sometimes called 'the mystical interpretation of Scripture,' in which + isolated words are separated from their context, and receive any sense + which the fancy of the interpreter may suggest. It is akin to the method + employed by Schleiermacher of arranging the dialogues of Plato in + chronological order according to what he deems the true arrangement of the + ideas contained in them. (Dr. Jackson is also inclined, having constructed + a theory, to make the chronology of Plato's writings dependent upon it + (See J. of Philol. and elsewhere.) It may likewise be illustrated by the + ingenuity of those who employ symbols to find in Shakespeare a hidden + meaning. In the three cases the error is nearly the same:—words are + taken out of their natural context, and thus become destitute of any real + meaning. + </p> + <p> + (4) According to Dr. Jackson's 'Later Theory,' Plato's Ideas, which were + once regarded as the summa genera of all things, are now to be explained + as Forms or Types of some things only,—that is to say, of natural + objects: these we conceive imperfectly, but are always seeking in vain to + have a more perfect notion of them. He says (J. of Philol.) that 'Plato + hoped by the study of a series of hypothetical or provisional + classifications to arrive at one in which nature's distribution of kinds + is approximately represented, and so to attain approximately to the + knowledge of the ideas. But whereas in the Republic, and even in the + Phaedo, though less hopefully, he had sought to convert his provisional + definitions into final ones by tracing their connexion with the summum + genus, the (Greek), in the Parmenides his aspirations are less ambitious,' + and so on. But where does Dr. Jackson find any such notion as this in + Plato or anywhere in ancient philosophy? Is it not an anachronism, + gracious to the modern physical philosopher, and the more acceptable + because it seems to form a link between ancient and modern philosophy, and + between physical and metaphysical science; but really unmeaning? + </p> + <p> + (5) To this 'Later Theory' of Plato's Ideas I oppose the authority of + Professor Zeller, who affirms that none of the passages to which Dr. + Jackson appeals (Theaet.; Phil.; Tim.; Parm.) 'in the smallest degree + prove his point'; and that in the second class of dialogues, in which the + 'Later Theory of Ideas' is supposed to be found, quite as clearly as in + the first, are admitted Ideas, not only of natural objects, but of + properties, relations, works of art, negative notions (Theaet.; Parm.; + Soph.); and that what Dr. Jackson distinguishes as the first class of + dialogues from the second equally assert or imply that the relation of + things to the Ideas, is one of participation in them as well as of + imitation of them (Prof. Zeller's summary of his own review of Dr. + Jackson, Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie.) + </p> + <p> + In conclusion I may remark that in Plato's writings there is both unity, + and also growth and development; but that we must not intrude upon him + either a system or a technical language. + </p> + <p> + Balliol College, October, 1891. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0003" id="link2H_4_0003"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + NOTE + </h2> + <p> + The chief additions to the Introductions in the Third Edition consist of + Essays on the following subjects:— + </p> + <p> + 1. Language. + </p> + <p> + 2. The decline of Greek Literature. + </p> + <p> + 3. The 'Ideas' of Plato and Modern Philosophy. + </p> + <p> + 4. The myths of Plato. + </p> + <p> + 5. The relation of the Republic, Statesman and Laws. + </p> + <p> + 6. The legend of Atlantis. + </p> + <p> + 7. Psychology. + </p> + <p> + 8. Comparison of the Laws of Plato with Spartan and Athenian Laws and + Institutions. + </p> + <p> + CHARMIDES. <a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION. + </h2> + <p> + The subject of the Charmides is Temperance or (Greek), a peculiarly Greek + notion, which may also be rendered Moderation (Compare Cic. Tusc. + '(Greek), quam soleo equidem tum temperantiam, tum moderationem appellare, + nonnunquam etiam modestiam.'), Modesty, Discretion, Wisdom, without + completely exhausting by all these terms the various associations of the + word. It may be described as 'mens sana in corpore sano,' the harmony or + due proportion of the higher and lower elements of human nature which + 'makes a man his own master,' according to the definition of the Republic. + In the accompanying translation the word has been rendered in different + places either Temperance or Wisdom, as the connection seemed to require: + for in the philosophy of Plato (Greek) still retains an intellectual + element (as Socrates is also said to have identified (Greek) with (Greek): + Xen. Mem.) and is not yet relegated to the sphere of moral virtue, as in + the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. + </p> + <p> + The beautiful youth, Charmides, who is also the most temperate of human + beings, is asked by Socrates, 'What is Temperance?' He answers + characteristically, (1) 'Quietness.' 'But Temperance is a fine and noble + thing; and quietness in many or most cases is not so fine a thing as + quickness.' He tries again and says (2) that temperance is modesty. But + this again is set aside by a sophistical application of Homer: for + temperance is good as well as noble, and Homer has declared that 'modesty + is not good for a needy man.' (3) Once more Charmides makes the attempt. + This time he gives a definition which he has heard, and of which Socrates + conjectures that Critias must be the author: 'Temperance is doing one's + own business.' But the artisan who makes another man's shoes may be + temperate, and yet he is not doing his own business; and temperance + defined thus would be opposed to the division of labour which exists in + every temperate or well-ordered state. How is this riddle to be explained? + </p> + <p> + Critias, who takes the place of Charmides, distinguishes in his answer + between 'making' and 'doing,' and with the help of a misapplied quotation + from Hesiod assigns to the words 'doing' and 'work' an exclusively good + sense: Temperance is doing one's own business;—(4) is doing good. + </p> + <p> + Still an element of knowledge is wanting which Critias is readily induced + to admit at the suggestion of Socrates; and, in the spirit of Socrates and + of Greek life generally, proposes as a fifth definition, (5) Temperance is + self-knowledge. But all sciences have a subject: number is the subject of + arithmetic, health of medicine—what is the subject of temperance or + wisdom? The answer is that (6) Temperance is the knowledge of what a man + knows and of what he does not know. But this is contrary to analogy; there + is no vision of vision, but only of visible things; no love of loves, but + only of beautiful things; how then can there be a knowledge of knowledge? + That which is older, heavier, lighter, is older, heavier, and lighter than + something else, not than itself, and this seems to be true of all relative + notions—the object of relation is outside of them; at any rate they + can only have relation to themselves in the form of that object. Whether + there are any such cases of reflex relation or not, and whether that sort + of knowledge which we term Temperance is of this reflex nature, has yet to + be determined by the great metaphysician. But even if knowledge can know + itself, how does the knowledge of what we know imply the knowledge of what + we do not know? Besides, knowledge is an abstraction only, and will not + inform us of any particular subject, such as medicine, building, and the + like. It may tell us that we or other men know something, but can never + tell us what we know. + </p> + <p> + Admitting that there is a knowledge of what we know and of what we do not + know, which would supply a rule and measure of all things, still there + would be no good in this; and the knowledge which temperance gives must be + of a kind which will do us good; for temperance is a good. But this + universal knowledge does not tend to our happiness and good: the only kind + of knowledge which brings happiness is the knowledge of good and evil. To + this Critias replies that the science or knowledge of good and evil, and + all the other sciences, are regulated by the higher science or knowledge + of knowledge. Socrates replies by again dividing the abstract from the + concrete, and asks how this knowledge conduces to happiness in the same + definite way in which medicine conduces to health. + </p> + <p> + And now, after making all these concessions, which are really + inadmissible, we are still as far as ever from ascertaining the nature of + temperance, which Charmides has already discovered, and had therefore + better rest in the knowledge that the more temperate he is the happier he + will be, and not trouble himself with the speculations of Socrates. + </p> + <p> + In this Dialogue may be noted (1) The Greek ideal of beauty and goodness, + the vision of the fair soul in the fair body, realised in the beautiful + Charmides; (2) The true conception of medicine as a science of the whole + as well as the parts, and of the mind as well as the body, which is + playfully intimated in the story of the Thracian; (3) The tendency of the + age to verbal distinctions, which here, as in the Protagoras and Cratylus, + are ascribed to the ingenuity of Prodicus; and to interpretations or + rather parodies of Homer or Hesiod, which are eminently characteristic of + Plato and his contemporaries; (4) The germ of an ethical principle + contained in the notion that temperance is 'doing one's own business,' + which in the Republic (such is the shifting character of the Platonic + philosophy) is given as the definition, not of temperance, but of justice; + (5) The impatience which is exhibited by Socrates of any definition of + temperance in which an element of science or knowledge is not included; + (6) The beginning of metaphysics and logic implied in the two questions: + whether there can be a science of science, and whether the knowledge of + what you know is the same as the knowledge of what you do not know; and + also in the distinction between 'what you know' and 'that you know,' + (Greek;) here too is the first conception of an absolute self-determined + science (the claims of which, however, are disputed by Socrates, who asks + cui bono?) as well as the first suggestion of the difficulty of the + abstract and concrete, and one of the earliest anticipations of the + relation of subject and object, and of the subjective element in knowledge—a + 'rich banquet' of metaphysical questions in which we 'taste of many + things.' (7) And still the mind of Plato, having snatched for a moment at + these shadows of the future, quickly rejects them: thus early has he + reached the conclusion that there can be no science which is a 'science of + nothing' (Parmen.). (8) The conception of a science of good and evil also + first occurs here, an anticipation of the Philebus and Republic as well as + of moral philosophy in later ages. + </p> + <p> + The dramatic interest of the Dialogue chiefly centres in the youth + Charmides, with whom Socrates talks in the kindly spirit of an elder. His + childlike simplicity and ingenuousness are contrasted with the dialectical + and rhetorical arts of Critias, who is the grown-up man of the world, + having a tincture of philosophy. No hint is given, either here or in the + Timaeus, of the infamy which attaches to the name of the latter in + Athenian history. He is simply a cultivated person who, like his kinsman + Plato, is ennobled by the connection of his family with Solon (Tim.), and + had been the follower, if not the disciple, both of Socrates and of the + Sophists. In the argument he is not unfair, if allowance is made for a + slight rhetorical tendency, and for a natural desire to save his + reputation with the company; he is sometimes nearer the truth than + Socrates. Nothing in his language or behaviour is unbecoming the guardian + of the beautiful Charmides. His love of reputation is characteristically + Greek, and contrasts with the humility of Socrates. Nor in Charmides + himself do we find any resemblance to the Charmides of history, except, + perhaps, the modest and retiring nature which, according to Xenophon, at + one time of his life prevented him from speaking in the Assembly (Mem.); + and we are surprised to hear that, like Critias, he afterwards became one + of the thirty tyrants. In the Dialogue he is a pattern of virtue, and is + therefore in no need of the charm which Socrates is unable to apply. With + youthful naivete, keeping his secret and entering into the spirit of + Socrates, he enjoys the detection of his elder and guardian Critias, who + is easily seen to be the author of the definition which he has so great an + interest in maintaining. The preceding definition, 'Temperance is doing + one's own business,' is assumed to have been borrowed by Charmides from + another; and when the enquiry becomes more abstract he is superseded by + Critias (Theaet.; Euthyd.). Socrates preserves his accustomed irony to the + end; he is in the neighbourhood of several great truths, which he views in + various lights, but always either by bringing them to the test of common + sense, or by demanding too great exactness in the use of words, turns + aside from them and comes at last to no conclusion. + </p> + <p> + The definitions of temperance proceed in regular order from the popular to + the philosophical. The first two are simple enough and partially true, + like the first thoughts of an intelligent youth; the third, which is a + real contribution to ethical philosophy, is perverted by the ingenuity of + Socrates, and hardly rescued by an equal perversion on the part of + Critias. The remaining definitions have a higher aim, which is to + introduce the element of knowledge, and at last to unite good and truth in + a single science. But the time has not yet arrived for the realization of + this vision of metaphysical philosophy; and such a science when brought + nearer to us in the Philebus and the Republic will not be called by the + name of (Greek). Hence we see with surprise that Plato, who in his other + writings identifies good and knowledge, here opposes them, and asks, + almost in the spirit of Aristotle, how can there be a knowledge of + knowledge, and even if attainable, how can such a knowledge be of any use? + </p> + <p> + The difficulty of the Charmides arises chiefly from the two senses of the + word (Greek), or temperance. From the ethical notion of temperance, which + is variously defined to be quietness, modesty, doing our own business, the + doing of good actions, the dialogue passes onto the intellectual + conception of (Greek), which is declared also to be the science of + self-knowledge, or of the knowledge of what we know and do not know, or of + the knowledge of good and evil. The dialogue represents a stage in the + history of philosophy in which knowledge and action were not yet + distinguished. Hence the confusion between them, and the easy transition + from one to the other. The definitions which are offered are all rejected, + but it is to be observed that they all tend to throw a light on the nature + of temperance, and that, unlike the distinction of Critias between + (Greek), none of them are merely verbal quibbles, it is implied that this + question, although it has not yet received a solution in theory, has been + already answered by Charmides himself, who has learned to practise the + virtue of self-knowledge which philosophers are vainly trying to define in + words. In a similar spirit we might say to a young man who is disturbed by + theological difficulties, 'Do not trouble yourself about such matters, but + only lead a good life;' and yet in either case it is not to be denied that + right ideas of truth may contribute greatly to the improvement of + character. + </p> + <p> + The reasons why the Charmides, Lysis, Laches have been placed together and + first in the series of Platonic dialogues, are: (i) Their shortness and + simplicity. The Charmides and the Lysis, if not the Laches, are of the + same 'quality' as the Phaedrus and Symposium: and it is probable, though + far from certain, that the slighter effort preceded the greater one. (ii) + Their eristic, or rather Socratic character; they belong to the class + called dialogues of search (Greek), which have no conclusion. (iii) The + absence in them of certain favourite notions of Plato, such as the + doctrine of recollection and of the Platonic ideas; the questions, whether + virtue can be taught; whether the virtues are one or many. (iv) They have + a want of depth, when compared with the dialogues of the middle and later + period; and a youthful beauty and grace which is wanting in the later + ones. (v) Their resemblance to one another; in all the three boyhood has a + great part. These reasons have various degrees of weight in determining + their place in the catalogue of the Platonic writings, though they are not + conclusive. No arrangement of the Platonic dialogues can be strictly + chronological. The order which has been adopted is intended mainly for the + convenience of the reader; at the same time, indications of the date + supplied either by Plato himself or allusions found in the dialogues have + not been lost sight of. Much may be said about this subject, but the + results can only be probable; there are no materials which would enable us + to attain to anything like certainty. + </p> + <p> + The relations of knowledge and virtue are again brought forward in the + companion dialogues of the Lysis and Laches; and also in the Protagoras + and Euthydemus. The opposition of abstract and particular knowledge in + this dialogue may be compared with a similar opposition of ideas and + phenomena which occurs in the Prologues to the Parmenides, but seems + rather to belong to a later stage of the philosophy of Plato. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0005" id="link2H_4_0005"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h1> + CHARMIDES, <br /> <br /> OR TEMPERANCE + </h1> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <p> + PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, who is the narrator, Charmides, + Chaerephon, Critias. + </p> + <p> + SCENE: The Palaestra of Taureas, which is near the Porch of the King + Archon. + </p> + <p> + Yesterday evening I returned from the army at Potidaea, and having been a + good while away, I thought that I should like to go and look at my old + haunts. So I went into the palaestra of Taureas, which is over against the + temple adjoining the porch of the King Archon, and there I found a number + of persons, most of whom I knew, but not all. My visit was unexpected, and + no sooner did they see me entering than they saluted me from afar on all + sides; and Chaerephon, who is a kind of madman, started up and ran to me, + seizing my hand, and saying, How did you escape, Socrates?—(I should + explain that an engagement had taken place at Potidaea not long before we + came away, of which the news had only just reached Athens.) + </p> + <p> + You see, I replied, that here I am. + </p> + <p> + There was a report, he said, that the engagement was very severe, and that + many of our acquaintance had fallen. + </p> + <p> + That, I replied, was not far from the truth. + </p> + <p> + I suppose, he said, that you were present. + </p> + <p> + I was. + </p> + <p> + Then sit down, and tell us the whole story, which as yet we have only + heard imperfectly. + </p> + <p> + I took the place which he assigned to me, by the side of Critias the son + of Callaeschrus, and when I had saluted him and the rest of the company, I + told them the news from the army, and answered their several enquiries. + </p> + <p> + Then, when there had been enough of this, I, in my turn, began to make + enquiries about matters at home—about the present state of + philosophy, and about the youth. I asked whether any of them were + remarkable for wisdom or beauty, or both. Critias, glancing at the door, + invited my attention to some youths who were coming in, and talking + noisily to one another, followed by a crowd. Of the beauties, Socrates, he + said, I fancy that you will soon be able to form a judgment. For those who + are just entering are the advanced guard of the great beauty, as he is + thought to be, of the day, and he is likely to be not far off himself. + </p> + <p> + Who is he, I said; and who is his father? + </p> + <p> + Charmides, he replied, is his name; he is my cousin, and the son of my + uncle Glaucon: I rather think that you know him too, although he was not + grown up at the time of your departure. + </p> + <p> + Certainly, I know him, I said, for he was remarkable even then when he was + still a child, and I should imagine that by this time he must be almost a + young man. + </p> + <p> + You will see, he said, in a moment what progress he has made and what he + is like. He had scarcely said the word, when Charmides entered. + </p> + <p> + Now you know, my friend, that I cannot measure anything, and of the + beautiful, I am simply such a measure as a white line is of chalk; for + almost all young persons appear to be beautiful in my eyes. But at that + moment, when I saw him coming in, I confess that I was quite astonished at + his beauty and stature; all the world seemed to be enamoured of him; + amazement and confusion reigned when he entered; and a troop of lovers + followed him. That grown-up men like ourselves should have been affected + in this way was not surprising, but I observed that there was the same + feeling among the boys; all of them, down to the very least child, turned + and looked at him, as if he had been a statue. + </p> + <p> + Chaerephon called me and said: What do you think of him, Socrates? Has he + not a beautiful face? + </p> + <p> + Most beautiful, I said. + </p> + <p> + But you would think nothing of his face, he replied, if you could see his + naked form: he is absolutely perfect. + </p> + <p> + And to this they all agreed. + </p> + <p> + By Heracles, I said, there never was such a paragon, if he has only one + other slight addition. + </p> + <p> + What is that? said Critias. + </p> + <p> + If he has a noble soul; and being of your house, Critias, he may be + expected to have this. + </p> + <p> + He is as fair and good within, as he is without, replied Critias. + </p> + <p> + Then, before we see his body, should we not ask him to show us his soul, + naked and undisguised? he is just of an age at which he will like to talk. + </p> + <p> + That he will, said Critias, and I can tell you that he is a philosopher + already, and also a considerable poet, not in his own opinion only, but in + that of others. + </p> + <p> + That, my dear Critias, I replied, is a distinction which has long been in + your family, and is inherited by you from Solon. But why do you not call + him, and show him to us? for even if he were younger than he is, there + could be no impropriety in his talking to us in the presence of you, who + are his guardian and cousin. + </p> + <p> + Very well, he said; then I will call him; and turning to the attendant, he + said, Call Charmides, and tell him that I want him to come and see a + physician about the illness of which he spoke to me the day before + yesterday. Then again addressing me, he added: He has been complaining + lately of having a headache when he rises in the morning: now why should + you not make him believe that you know a cure for the headache? + </p> + <p> + Why not, I said; but will he come? + </p> + <p> + He will be sure to come, he replied. + </p> + <p> + He came as he was bidden, and sat down between Critias and me. Great + amusement was occasioned by every one pushing with might and main at his + neighbour in order to make a place for him next to themselves, until at + the two ends of the row one had to get up and the other was rolled over + sideways. Now I, my friend, was beginning to feel awkward; my former bold + belief in my powers of conversing with him had vanished. And when Critias + told him that I was the person who had the cure, he looked at me in such + an indescribable manner, and was just going to ask a question. And at that + moment all the people in the palaestra crowded about us, and, O rare! I + caught a sight of the inwards of his garment, and took the flame. Then I + could no longer contain myself. I thought how well Cydias understood the + nature of love, when, in speaking of a fair youth, he warns some one 'not + to bring the fawn in the sight of the lion to be devoured by him,' for I + felt that I had been overcome by a sort of wild-beast appetite. But I + controlled myself, and when he asked me if I knew the cure of the + headache, I answered, but with an effort, that I did know. + </p> + <p> + And what is it? he said. + </p> + <p> + I replied that it was a kind of leaf, which required to be accompanied by + a charm, and if a person would repeat the charm at the same time that he + used the cure, he would be made whole; but that without the charm the leaf + would be of no avail. + </p> + <p> + Then I will write out the charm from your dictation, he said. + </p> + <p> + With my consent? I said, or without my consent? + </p> + <p> + With your consent, Socrates, he said, laughing. + </p> + <p> + Very good, I said; and are you quite sure that you know my name? + </p> + <p> + I ought to know you, he replied, for there is a great deal said about you + among my companions; and I remember when I was a child seeing you in + company with my cousin Critias. + </p> + <p> + I am glad to find that you remember me, I said; for I shall now be more at + home with you and shall be better able to explain the nature of the charm, + about which I felt a difficulty before. For the charm will do more, + Charmides, than only cure the headache. I dare say that you have heard + eminent physicians say to a patient who comes to them with bad eyes, that + they cannot cure his eyes by themselves, but that if his eyes are to be + cured, his head must be treated; and then again they say that to think of + curing the head alone, and not the rest of the body also, is the height of + folly. And arguing in this way they apply their methods to the whole body, + and try to treat and heal the whole and the part together. Did you ever + observe that this is what they say? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said. + </p> + <p> + And they are right, and you would agree with them? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, certainly I should. + </p> + <p> + His approving answers reassured me, and I began by degrees to regain + confidence, and the vital heat returned. Such, Charmides, I said, is the + nature of the charm, which I learned when serving with the army from one + of the physicians of the Thracian king Zamolxis, who are said to be so + skilful that they can even give immortality. This Thracian told me that in + these notions of theirs, which I was just now mentioning, the Greek + physicians are quite right as far as they go; but Zamolxis, he added, our + king, who is also a god, says further, 'that as you ought not to attempt + to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so + neither ought you to attempt to cure the body without the soul; and this,' + he said, 'is the reason why the cure of many diseases is unknown to the + physicians of Hellas, because they are ignorant of the whole, which ought + to be studied also; for the part can never be well unless the whole is + well.' For all good and evil, whether in the body or in human nature, + originates, as he declared, in the soul, and overflows from thence, as if + from the head into the eyes. And therefore if the head and body are to be + well, you must begin by curing the soul; that is the first thing. And the + cure, my dear youth, has to be effected by the use of certain charms, and + these charms are fair words; and by them temperance is implanted in the + soul, and where temperance is, there health is speedily imparted, not only + to the head, but to the whole body. And he who taught me the cure and the + charm at the same time added a special direction: 'Let no one,' he said, + 'persuade you to cure the head, until he has first given you his soul to + be cured by the charm. For this,' he said, 'is the great error of our day + in the treatment of the human body, that physicians separate the soul from + the body.' And he added with emphasis, at the same time making me swear to + his words, 'Let no one, however rich, or noble, or fair, persuade you to + give him the cure, without the charm.' Now I have sworn, and I must keep + my oath, and therefore if you will allow me to apply the Thracian charm + first to your soul, as the stranger directed, I will afterwards proceed to + apply the cure to your head. But if not, I do not know what I am to do + with you, my dear Charmides. + </p> + <p> + Critias, when he heard this, said: The headache will be an unexpected gain + to my young relation, if the pain in his head compels him to improve his + mind: and I can tell you, Socrates, that Charmides is not only pre-eminent + in beauty among his equals, but also in that quality which is given by the + charm; and this, as you say, is temperance? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said. + </p> + <p> + Then let me tell you that he is the most temperate of human beings, and + for his age inferior to none in any quality. + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said, Charmides; and indeed I think that you ought to excel others + in all good qualities; for if I am not mistaken there is no one present + who could easily point out two Athenian houses, whose union would be + likely to produce a better or nobler scion than the two from which you are + sprung. There is your father's house, which is descended from Critias the + son of Dropidas, whose family has been commemorated in the panegyrical + verses of Anacreon, Solon, and many other poets, as famous for beauty and + virtue and all other high fortune: and your mother's house is equally + distinguished; for your maternal uncle, Pyrilampes, is reputed never to + have found his equal, in Persia at the court of the great king, or on the + continent of Asia, in all the places to which he went as ambassador, for + stature and beauty; that whole family is not a whit inferior to the other. + Having such ancestors you ought to be first in all things, and, sweet son + of Glaucon, your outward form is no dishonour to any of them. If to beauty + you add temperance, and if in other respects you are what Critias declares + you to be, then, dear Charmides, blessed art thou, in being the son of thy + mother. And here lies the point; for if, as he declares, you have this + gift of temperance already, and are temperate enough, in that case you + have no need of any charms, whether of Zamolxis or of Abaris the + Hyperborean, and I may as well let you have the cure of the head at once; + but if you have not yet acquired this quality, I must use the charm before + I give you the medicine. Please, therefore, to inform me whether you admit + the truth of what Critias has been saying;—have you or have you not + this quality of temperance? + </p> + <p> + Charmides blushed, and the blush heightened his beauty, for modesty is + becoming in youth; he then said very ingenuously, that he really could not + at once answer, either yes, or no, to the question which I had asked: For, + said he, if I affirm that I am not temperate, that would be a strange + thing for me to say of myself, and also I should give the lie to Critias, + and many others who think as he tells you, that I am temperate: but, on + the other hand, if I say that I am, I shall have to praise myself, which + would be ill manners; and therefore I do not know how to answer you. + </p> + <p> + I said to him: That is a natural reply, Charmides, and I think that you + and I ought together to enquire whether you have this quality about which + I am asking or not; and then you will not be compelled to say what you do + not like; neither shall I be a rash practitioner of medicine: therefore, + if you please, I will share the enquiry with you, but I will not press you + if you would rather not. + </p> + <p> + There is nothing which I should like better, he said; and as far as I am + concerned you may proceed in the way which you think best. + </p> + <p> + I think, I said, that I had better begin by asking you a question; for if + temperance abides in you, you must have an opinion about her; she must + give some intimation of her nature and qualities, which may enable you to + form a notion of her. Is not that true? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, that I think is true. + </p> + <p> + You know your native language, I said, and therefore you must be able to + tell what you feel about this. + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he said. + </p> + <p> + In order, then, that I may form a conjecture whether you have temperance + abiding in you or not, tell me, I said, what, in your opinion, is + Temperance? + </p> + <p> + At first he hesitated, and was very unwilling to answer: then he said that + he thought temperance was doing things orderly and quietly, such things + for example as walking in the streets, and talking, or anything else of + that nature. In a word, he said, I should answer that, in my opinion, + temperance is quietness. + </p> + <p> + Are you right, Charmides? I said. No doubt some would affirm that the + quiet are the temperate; but let us see whether these words have any + meaning; and first tell me whether you would not acknowledge temperance to + be of the class of the noble and good? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + But which is best when you are at the writing-master's, to write the same + letters quickly or quietly? + </p> + <p> + Quickly. + </p> + <p> + And to read quickly or slowly? + </p> + <p> + Quickly again. + </p> + <p> + And in playing the lyre, or wrestling, quickness or sharpness are far + better than quietness and slowness? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And the same holds in boxing and in the pancratium? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + And in leaping and running and in bodily exercises generally, quickness + and agility are good; slowness, and inactivity, and quietness, are bad? + </p> + <p> + That is evident. + </p> + <p> + Then, I said, in all bodily actions, not quietness, but the greatest + agility and quickness, is noblest and best? + </p> + <p> + Yes, certainly. + </p> + <p> + And is temperance a good? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Then, in reference to the body, not quietness, but quickness will be the + higher degree of temperance, if temperance is a good? + </p> + <p> + True, he said. + </p> + <p> + And which, I said, is better—facility in learning, or difficulty in + learning? + </p> + <p> + Facility. + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said; and facility in learning is learning quickly, and difficulty + in learning is learning quietly and slowly? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And is it not better to teach another quickly and energetically, rather + than quietly and slowly? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And which is better, to call to mind, and to remember, quickly and + readily, or quietly and slowly? + </p> + <p> + The former. + </p> + <p> + And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul, and not a + quietness? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And is it not best to understand what is said, whether at the + writing-master's or the music-master's, or anywhere else, not as quietly + as possible, but as quickly as possible? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And in the searchings or deliberations of the soul, not the quietest, as I + imagine, and he who with difficulty deliberates and discovers, is thought + worthy of praise, but he who does so most easily and quickly? + </p> + <p> + Quite true, he said. + </p> + <p> + And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and activity are + clearly better than slowness and quietness? + </p> + <p> + Clearly they are. + </p> + <p> + Then temperance is not quietness, nor is the temperate life quiet,—certainly + not upon this view; for the life which is temperate is supposed to be the + good. And of two things, one is true,—either never, or very seldom, + do the quiet actions in life appear to be better than the quick and + energetic ones; or supposing that of the nobler actions, there are as many + quiet, as quick and vehement: still, even if we grant this, temperance + will not be acting quietly any more than acting quickly and energetically, + either in walking or talking or in anything else; nor will the quiet life + be more temperate than the unquiet, seeing that temperance is admitted by + us to be a good and noble thing, and the quick have been shown to be as + good as the quiet. + </p> + <p> + I think, he said, Socrates, that you are right. + </p> + <p> + Then once more, Charmides, I said, fix your attention, and look within; + consider the effect which temperance has upon yourself, and the nature of + that which has the effect. Think over all this, and, like a brave youth, + tell me—What is temperance? + </p> + <p> + After a moment's pause, in which he made a real manly effort to think, he + said: My opinion is, Socrates, that temperance makes a man ashamed or + modest, and that temperance is the same as modesty. + </p> + <p> + Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is + noble? + </p> + <p> + Yes, certainly, he said. + </p> + <p> + And the temperate are also good? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And can that be good which does not make men good? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but also good? + </p> + <p> + That is my opinion. + </p> + <p> + Well, I said; but surely you would agree with Homer when he says, + </p> + <p> + 'Modesty is not good for a needy man'? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said; I agree. + </p> + <p> + Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good? + </p> + <p> + Clearly. + </p> + <p> + But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is always + good? + </p> + <p> + That appears to me to be as you say. + </p> + <p> + And the inference is that temperance cannot be modesty—if temperance + is a good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good? + </p> + <p> + All that, Socrates, appears to me to be true; but I should like to know + what you think about another definition of temperance, which I just now + remember to have heard from some one, who said, 'That temperance is doing + our own business.' Was he right who affirmed that? + </p> + <p> + You monster! I said; this is what Critias, or some philosopher has told + you. + </p> + <p> + Some one else, then, said Critias; for certainly I have not. + </p> + <p> + But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this? + </p> + <p> + No matter at all, I replied; for the point is not who said the words, but + whether they are true or not. + </p> + <p> + There you are in the right, Socrates, he replied. + </p> + <p> + To be sure, I said; yet I doubt whether we shall ever be able to discover + their truth or falsehood; for they are a kind of riddle. + </p> + <p> + What makes you think so? he said. + </p> + <p> + Because, I said, he who uttered them seems to me to have meant one thing, + and said another. Is the scribe, for example, to be regarded as doing + nothing when he reads or writes? + </p> + <p> + I should rather think that he was doing something. + </p> + <p> + And does the scribe write or read, or teach you boys to write or read, + your own names only, or did you write your enemies' names as well as your + own and your friends'? + </p> + <p> + As much one as the other. + </p> + <p> + And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + And yet if reading and writing are the same as doing, you were doing what + was not your own business? + </p> + <p> + But they are the same as doing. + </p> + <p> + And the healing art, my friend, and building, and weaving, and doing + anything whatever which is done by art,—these all clearly come under + the head of doing? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + And do you think that a state would be well ordered by a law which + compelled every man to weave and wash his own coat, and make his own + shoes, and his own flask and strigil, and other implements, on this + principle of every one doing and performing his own, and abstaining from + what is not his own? + </p> + <p> + I think not, he said. + </p> + <p> + But, I said, a temperate state will be a well-ordered state. + </p> + <p> + Of course, he replied. + </p> + <p> + Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one's own business; not at + least in this way, or doing things of this sort? + </p> + <p> + Clearly not. + </p> + <p> + Then, as I was just now saying, he who declared that temperance is a man + doing his own business had another and a hidden meaning; for I do not + think that he could have been such a fool as to mean this. Was he a fool + who told you, Charmides? + </p> + <p> + Nay, he replied, I certainly thought him a very wise man. + </p> + <p> + Then I am quite certain that he put forth his definition as a riddle, + thinking that no one would know the meaning of the words 'doing his own + business.' + </p> + <p> + I dare say, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And what is the meaning of a man doing his own business? Can you tell me? + </p> + <p> + Indeed, I cannot; and I should not wonder if the man himself who used this + phrase did not understand what he was saying. Whereupon he laughed slyly, + and looked at Critias. + </p> + <p> + Critias had long been showing uneasiness, for he felt that he had a + reputation to maintain with Charmides and the rest of the company. He had, + however, hitherto managed to restrain himself; but now he could no longer + forbear, and I am convinced of the truth of the suspicion which I + entertained at the time, that Charmides had heard this answer about + temperance from Critias. And Charmides, who did not want to answer + himself, but to make Critias answer, tried to stir him up. He went on + pointing out that he had been refuted, at which Critias grew angry, and + appeared, as I thought, inclined to quarrel with him; just as a poet might + quarrel with an actor who spoiled his poems in repeating them; so he + looked hard at him and said— + </p> + <p> + Do you imagine, Charmides, that the author of this definition of + temperance did not understand the meaning of his own words, because you do + not understand them? + </p> + <p> + Why, at his age, I said, most excellent Critias, he can hardly be expected + to understand; but you, who are older, and have studied, may well be + assumed to know the meaning of them; and therefore, if you agree with him, + and accept his definition of temperance, I would much rather argue with + you than with him about the truth or falsehood of the definition. + </p> + <p> + I entirely agree, said Critias, and accept the definition. + </p> + <p> + Very good, I said; and now let me repeat my question—Do you admit, + as I was just now saying, that all craftsmen make or do something? + </p> + <p> + I do. + </p> + <p> + And do they make or do their own business only, or that of others also? + </p> + <p> + They make or do that of others also. + </p> + <p> + And are they temperate, seeing that they make not for themselves or their + own business only? + </p> + <p> + Why not? he said. + </p> + <p> + No objection on my part, I said, but there may be a difficulty on his who + proposes as a definition of temperance, 'doing one's own business,' and + then says that there is no reason why those who do the business of others + should not be temperate. + </p> + <p> + Nay (The English reader has to observe that the word 'make' (Greek), in + Greek, has also the sense of 'do' (Greek).), said he; did I ever + acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate? I + said, those who make, not those who do. + </p> + <p> + What! I asked; do you mean to say that doing and making are not the same? + </p> + <p> + No more, he replied, than making or working are the same; thus much I have + learned from Hesiod, who says that 'work is no disgrace.' Now do you + imagine that if he had meant by working and doing such things as you were + describing, he would have said that there was no disgrace in them—for + example, in the manufacture of shoes, or in selling pickles, or sitting + for hire in a house of ill-fame? That, Socrates, is not to be supposed: + but I conceive him to have distinguished making from doing and work; and, + while admitting that the making anything might sometimes become a + disgrace, when the employment was not honourable, to have thought that + work was never any disgrace at all. For things nobly and usefully made he + called works; and such makings he called workings, and doings; and he must + be supposed to have called such things only man's proper business, and + what is hurtful, not his business: and in that sense Hesiod, and any other + wise man, may be reasonably supposed to call him wise who does his own + work. + </p> + <p> + O Critias, I said, no sooner had you opened your mouth, than I pretty well + knew that you would call that which is proper to a man, and that which is + his own, good; and that the makings (Greek) of the good you would call + doings (Greek), for I am no stranger to the endless distinctions which + Prodicus draws about names. Now I have no objection to your giving names + any signification which you please, if you will only tell me what you mean + by them. Please then to begin again, and be a little plainer. Do you mean + that this doing or making, or whatever is the word which you would use, of + good actions, is temperance? + </p> + <p> + I do, he said. + </p> + <p> + Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said; and you, friend, would agree. + </p> + <p> + No matter whether I should or not; just now, not what I think, but what + you are saying, is the point at issue. + </p> + <p> + Well, he answered; I mean to say, that he who does evil, and not good, is + not temperate; and that he is temperate who does good, and not evil: for + temperance I define in plain words to be the doing of good actions. + </p> + <p> + And you may be very likely right in what you are saying; but I am curious + to know whether you imagine that temperate men are ignorant of their own + temperance? + </p> + <p> + I do not think so, he said. + </p> + <p> + And yet were you not saying, just now, that craftsmen might be temperate + in doing another's work, as well as in doing their own? + </p> + <p> + I was, he replied; but what is your drift? + </p> + <p> + I have no particular drift, but I wish that you would tell me whether a + physician who cures a patient may do good to himself and good to another + also? + </p> + <p> + I think that he may. + </p> + <p> + And he who does so does his duty? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And does not he who does his duty act temperately or wisely? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he acts wisely. + </p> + <p> + But must the physician necessarily know when his treatment is likely to + prove beneficial, and when not? or must the craftsman necessarily know + when he is likely to be benefited, and when not to be benefited, by the + work which he is doing? + </p> + <p> + I suppose not. + </p> + <p> + Then, I said, he may sometimes do good or harm, and not know what he is + himself doing, and yet, in doing good, as you say, he has done temperately + or wisely. Was not that your statement? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Then, as would seem, in doing good, he may act wisely or temperately, and + be wise or temperate, but not know his own wisdom or temperance? + </p> + <p> + But that, Socrates, he said, is impossible; and therefore if this is, as + you imply, the necessary consequence of any of my previous admissions, I + will withdraw them, rather than admit that a man can be temperate or wise + who does not know himself; and I am not ashamed to confess that I was in + error. For self-knowledge would certainly be maintained by me to be the + very essence of knowledge, and in this I agree with him who dedicated the + inscription, 'Know thyself!' at Delphi. That word, if I am not mistaken, + is put there as a sort of salutation which the god addresses to those who + enter the temple; as much as to say that the ordinary salutation of + 'Hail!' is not right, and that the exhortation 'Be temperate!' would be a + far better way of saluting one another. The notion of him who dedicated + the inscription was, as I believe, that the god speaks to those who enter + his temple, not as men speak; but, when a worshipper enters, the first + word which he hears is 'Be temperate!' This, however, like a prophet he + expresses in a sort of riddle, for 'Know thyself!' and 'Be temperate!' are + the same, as I maintain, and as the letters imply (Greek), and yet they + may be easily misunderstood; and succeeding sages who added 'Never too + much,' or, 'Give a pledge, and evil is nigh at hand,' would appear to have + so misunderstood them; for they imagined that 'Know thyself!' was a piece + of advice which the god gave, and not his salutation of the worshippers at + their first coming in; and they dedicated their own inscription under the + idea that they too would give equally useful pieces of advice. Shall I + tell you, Socrates, why I say all this? My object is to leave the previous + discussion (in which I know not whether you or I are more right, but, at + any rate, no clear result was attained), and to raise a new one in which I + will attempt to prove, if you deny, that temperance is self-knowledge. + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said, Critias; but you come to me as though I professed to know + about the questions which I ask, and as though I could, if I only would, + agree with you. Whereas the fact is that I enquire with you into the truth + of that which is advanced from time to time, just because I do not know; + and when I have enquired, I will say whether I agree with you or not. + Please then to allow me time to reflect. + </p> + <p> + Reflect, he said. + </p> + <p> + I am reflecting, I replied, and discover that temperance, or wisdom, if + implying a knowledge of anything, must be a science, and a science of + something. + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said; the science of itself. + </p> + <p> + Is not medicine, I said, the science of health? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And suppose, I said, that I were asked by you what is the use or effect of + medicine, which is this science of health, I should answer that medicine + is of very great use in producing health, which, as you will admit, is an + excellent effect. + </p> + <p> + Granted. + </p> + <p> + And if you were to ask me, what is the result or effect of architecture, + which is the science of building, I should say houses, and so of other + arts, which all have their different results. Now I want you, Critias, to + answer a similar question about temperance, or wisdom, which, according to + you, is the science of itself. Admitting this view, I ask of you, what + good work, worthy of the name wise, does temperance or wisdom, which is + the science of itself, effect? Answer me. + </p> + <p> + That is not the true way of pursuing the enquiry, Socrates, he said; for + wisdom is not like the other sciences, any more than they are like one + another: but you proceed as if they were alike. For tell me, he said, what + result is there of computation or geometry, in the same sense as a house + is the result of building, or a garment of weaving, or any other work of + any other art? Can you show me any such result of them? You cannot. + </p> + <p> + That is true, I said; but still each of these sciences has a subject which + is different from the science. I can show you that the art of computation + has to do with odd and even numbers in their numerical relations to + themselves and to each other. Is not that true? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said. + </p> + <p> + And the odd and even numbers are not the same with the art of computation? + </p> + <p> + They are not. + </p> + <p> + The art of weighing, again, has to do with lighter and heavier; but the + art of weighing is one thing, and the heavy and the light another. Do you + admit that? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Now, I want to know, what is that which is not wisdom, and of which wisdom + is the science? + </p> + <p> + You are just falling into the old error, Socrates, he said. You come + asking in what wisdom or temperance differs from the other sciences, and + then you try to discover some respect in which they are alike; but they + are not, for all the other sciences are of something else, and not of + themselves; wisdom alone is a science of other sciences, and of itself. + And of this, as I believe, you are very well aware: and that you are only + doing what you denied that you were doing just now, trying to refute me, + instead of pursuing the argument. + </p> + <p> + And what if I am? How can you think that I have any other motive in + refuting you but what I should have in examining into myself? which motive + would be just a fear of my unconsciously fancying that I knew something of + which I was ignorant. And at this moment I pursue the argument chiefly for + my own sake, and perhaps in some degree also for the sake of my other + friends. For is not the discovery of things as they truly are, a good + common to all mankind? + </p> + <p> + Yes, certainly, Socrates, he said. + </p> + <p> + Then, I said, be cheerful, sweet sir, and give your opinion in answer to + the question which I asked, never minding whether Critias or Socrates is + the person refuted; attend only to the argument, and see what will come of + the refutation. + </p> + <p> + I think that you are right, he replied; and I will do as you say. + </p> + <p> + Tell me, then, I said, what you mean to affirm about wisdom. + </p> + <p> + I mean to say that wisdom is the only science which is the science of + itself as well as of the other sciences. + </p> + <p> + But the science of science, I said, will also be the science of the + absence of science. + </p> + <p> + Very true, he said. + </p> + <p> + Then the wise or temperate man, and he only, will know himself, and be + able to examine what he knows or does not know, and to see what others + know and think that they know and do really know; and what they do not + know, and fancy that they know, when they do not. No other person will be + able to do this. And this is wisdom and temperance and self-knowledge—for + a man to know what he knows, and what he does not know. That is your + meaning? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said. + </p> + <p> + Now then, I said, making an offering of the third or last argument to Zeus + the Saviour, let us begin again, and ask, in the first place, whether it + is or is not possible for a person to know that he knows and does not know + what he knows and does not know; and in the second place, whether, if + perfectly possible, such knowledge is of any use. + </p> + <p> + That is what we have to consider, he said. + </p> + <p> + And here, Critias, I said, I hope that you will find a way out of a + difficulty into which I have got myself. Shall I tell you the nature of + the difficulty? + </p> + <p> + By all means, he replied. + </p> + <p> + Does not what you have been saying, if true, amount to this: that there + must be a single science which is wholly a science of itself and of other + sciences, and that the same is also the science of the absence of science? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + But consider how monstrous this proposition is, my friend: in any parallel + case, the impossibility will be transparent to you. + </p> + <p> + How is that? and in what cases do you mean? + </p> + <p> + In such cases as this: Suppose that there is a kind of vision which is not + like ordinary vision, but a vision of itself and of other sorts of vision, + and of the defect of them, which in seeing sees no colour, but only itself + and other sorts of vision: Do you think that there is such a kind of + vision? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + Or is there a kind of hearing which hears no sound at all, but only itself + and other sorts of hearing, or the defects of them? + </p> + <p> + There is not. + </p> + <p> + Or take all the senses: can you imagine that there is any sense of itself + and of other senses, but which is incapable of perceiving the objects of + the senses? + </p> + <p> + I think not. + </p> + <p> + Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure, but of + itself, and of all other desires? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good, but only for itself + and all other wishes? + </p> + <p> + I should answer, No. + </p> + <p> + Or would you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty, but + of itself and of other loves? + </p> + <p> + I should not. + </p> + <p> + Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears, but has + no object of fear? + </p> + <p> + I never did, he said. + </p> + <p> + Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions, and + which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + But surely we are assuming a science of this kind, which, having no + subject-matter, is a science of itself and of the other sciences? + </p> + <p> + Yes, that is what is affirmed. + </p> + <p> + But how strange is this, if it be indeed true: we must not however as yet + absolutely deny the possibility of such a science; let us rather consider + the matter. + </p> + <p> + You are quite right. + </p> + <p> + Well then, this science of which we are speaking is a science of + something, and is of a nature to be a science of something? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than something + else? (Socrates is intending to show that science differs from the object + of science, as any other relative differs from the object of relation. But + where there is comparison—greater, less, heavier, lighter, and the + like—a relation to self as well as to other things involves an + absolute contradiction; and in other cases, as in the case of the senses, + is hardly conceivable. The use of the genitive after the comparative in + Greek, (Greek), creates an unavoidable obscurity in the translation.) + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Which is less, if the other is conceived to be greater? + </p> + <p> + To be sure. + </p> + <p> + And if we could find something which is at once greater than itself, and + greater than other great things, but not greater than those things in + comparison of which the others are greater, then that thing would have the + property of being greater and also less than itself? + </p> + <p> + That, Socrates, he said, is the inevitable inference. + </p> + <p> + Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of other doubles, + these will be halves; for the double is relative to the half? + </p> + <p> + That is true. + </p> + <p> + And that which is greater than itself will also be less, and that which is + heavier will also be lighter, and that which is older will also be + younger: and the same of other things; that which has a nature relative to + self will retain also the nature of its object: I mean to say, for + example, that hearing is, as we say, of sound or voice. Is that true? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Then if hearing hears itself, it must hear a voice; for there is no other + way of hearing. + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + And sight also, my excellent friend, if it sees itself must see a colour, + for sight cannot see that which has no colour. + </p> + <p> + No. + </p> + <p> + Do you remark, Critias, that in several of the examples which have been + recited the notion of a relation to self is altogether inadmissible, and + in other cases hardly credible—inadmissible, for example, in the + case of magnitudes, numbers, and the like? + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + But in the case of hearing and sight, or in the power of self-motion, and + the power of heat to burn, this relation to self will be regarded as + incredible by some, but perhaps not by others. And some great man, my + friend, is wanted, who will satisfactorily determine for us, whether there + is nothing which has an inherent property of relation to self, or some + things only and not others; and whether in this class of self-related + things, if there be such a class, that science which is called wisdom or + temperance is included. I altogether distrust my own power of determining + these matters: I am not certain whether there is such a science of science + at all; and even if there be, I should not acknowledge this to be wisdom + or temperance, until I can also see whether such a science would or would + not do us any good; for I have an impression that temperance is a benefit + and a good. And therefore, O son of Callaeschrus, as you maintain that + temperance or wisdom is a science of science, and also of the absence of + science, I will request you to show in the first place, as I was saying + before, the possibility, and in the second place, the advantage, of such a + science; and then perhaps you may satisfy me that you are right in your + view of temperance. + </p> + <p> + Critias heard me say this, and saw that I was in a difficulty; and as one + person when another yawns in his presence catches the infection of yawning + from him, so did he seem to be driven into a difficulty by my difficulty. + But as he had a reputation to maintain, he was ashamed to admit before the + company that he could not answer my challenge or determine the question at + issue; and he made an unintelligible attempt to hide his perplexity. In + order that the argument might proceed, I said to him, Well then Critias, + if you like, let us assume that there is this science of science; whether + the assumption is right or wrong may hereafter be investigated. Admitting + the existence of it, will you tell me how such a science enables us to + distinguish what we know or do not know, which, as we were saying, is + self-knowledge or wisdom: so we were saying? + </p> + <p> + Yes, Socrates, he said; and that I think is certainly true: for he who has + this science or knowledge which knows itself will become like the + knowledge which he has, in the same way that he who has swiftness will be + swift, and he who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has knowledge + will know. In the same way he who has that knowledge which is + self-knowing, will know himself. + </p> + <p> + I do not doubt, I said, that a man will know himself, when he possesses + that which has self-knowledge: but what necessity is there that, having + this, he should know what he knows and what he does not know? + </p> + <p> + Because, Socrates, they are the same. + </p> + <p> + Very likely, I said; but I remain as stupid as ever; for still I fail to + comprehend how this knowing what you know and do not know is the same as + the knowledge of self. + </p> + <p> + What do you mean? he said. + </p> + <p> + This is what I mean, I replied: I will admit that there is a science of + science;—can this do more than determine that of two things one is + and the other is not science or knowledge? + </p> + <p> + No, just that. + </p> + <p> + But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or + want of knowledge of justice? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + The one is medicine, and the other is politics; whereas that of which we + are speaking is knowledge pure and simple. + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + And if a man knows only, and has only knowledge of knowledge, and has no + further knowledge of health and justice, the probability is that he will + only know that he knows something, and has a certain knowledge, whether + concerning himself or other men. + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows? + Say that he knows health;—not wisdom or temperance, but the art of + medicine has taught it to him;—and he has learned harmony from the + art of music, and building from the art of building,—neither, from + wisdom or temperance: and the same of other things. + </p> + <p> + That is evident. + </p> + <p> + How will wisdom, regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of + science, ever teach him that he knows health, or that he knows building? + </p> + <p> + It is impossible. + </p> + <p> + Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows, but + not what he knows? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + Then wisdom or being wise appears to be not the knowledge of the things + which we do or do not know, but only the knowledge that we know or do not + know? + </p> + <p> + That is the inference. + </p> + <p> + Then he who has this knowledge will not be able to examine whether a + pretender knows or does not know that which he says that he knows: he will + only know that he has a knowledge of some kind; but wisdom will not show + him of what the knowledge is? + </p> + <p> + Plainly not. + </p> + <p> + Neither will he be able to distinguish the pretender in medicine from the + true physician, nor between any other true and false professor of + knowledge. Let us consider the matter in this way: If the wise man or any + other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false, how will + he proceed? He will not talk to him about medicine; and that, as we were + saying, is the only thing which the physician understands. + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And, on the other hand, the physician knows nothing of science, for this + has been assumed to be the province of wisdom. + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And further, since medicine is science, we must infer that he does not + know anything of medicine. + </p> + <p> + Exactly. + </p> + <p> + Then the wise man may indeed know that the physician has some kind of + science or knowledge; but when he wants to discover the nature of this he + will ask, What is the subject-matter? For the several sciences are + distinguished not by the mere fact that they are sciences, but by the + nature of their subjects. Is not that true? + </p> + <p> + Quite true. + </p> + <p> + And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the + subject-matter of health and disease? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And he who would enquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the + enquiry into health and disease, and not into what is extraneous? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in + what relates to these? + </p> + <p> + He will. + </p> + <p> + He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether what he does is + right, in relation to health and disease? + </p> + <p> + He will. + </p> + <p> + But can any one attain the knowledge of either unless he have a knowledge + of medicine? + </p> + <p> + He cannot. + </p> + <p> + No one at all, it would seem, except the physician can have this + knowledge; and therefore not the wise man; he would have to be a physician + as well as a wise man. + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + Then, assuredly, wisdom or temperance, if only a science of science, and + of the absence of science or knowledge, will not be able to distinguish + the physician who knows from one who does not know but pretends or thinks + that he knows, or any other professor of anything at all; like any other + artist, he will only know his fellow in art or wisdom, and no one else. + </p> + <p> + That is evident, he said. + </p> + <p> + But then what profit, Critias, I said, is there any longer in wisdom or + temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom? If, indeed, as we were + supposing at first, the wise man had been able to distinguish what he knew + and did not know, and that he knew the one and did not know the other, and + to recognize a similar faculty of discernment in others, there would + certainly have been a great advantage in being wise; for then we should + never have made a mistake, but have passed through life the unerring + guides of ourselves and of those who are under us; and we should not have + attempted to do what we did not know, but we should have found out those + who knew, and have handed the business over to them and trusted in them; + nor should we have allowed those who were under us to do anything which + they were not likely to do well; and they would be likely to do well just + that of which they had knowledge; and the house or state which was ordered + or administered under the guidance of wisdom, and everything else of which + wisdom was the lord, would have been well ordered; for truth guiding, and + error having been eliminated, in all their doings, men would have done + well, and would have been happy. Was not this, Critias, what we spoke of + as the great advantage of wisdom—to know what is known and what is + unknown to us? + </p> + <p> + Very true, he said. + </p> + <p> + And now you perceive, I said, that no such science is to be found + anywhere. + </p> + <p> + I perceive, he said. + </p> + <p> + May we assume then, I said, that wisdom, viewed in this new light merely + as a knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, has this advantage:—that + he who possesses such knowledge will more easily learn anything which he + learns; and that everything will be clearer to him, because, in addition + to the knowledge of individuals, he sees the science, and this also will + better enable him to test the knowledge which others have of what he knows + himself; whereas the enquirer who is without this knowledge may be + supposed to have a feebler and weaker insight? Are not these, my friend, + the real advantages which are to be gained from wisdom? And are not we + looking and seeking after something more than is to be found in her? + </p> + <p> + That is very likely, he said. + </p> + <p> + That is very likely, I said; and very likely, too, we have been enquiring + to no purpose; as I am led to infer, because I observe that if this is + wisdom, some strange consequences would follow. Let us, if you please, + assume the possibility of this science of sciences, and further admit and + allow, as was originally suggested, that wisdom is the knowledge of what + we know and do not know. Assuming all this, still, upon further + consideration, I am doubtful, Critias, whether wisdom, such as this, would + do us much good. For we were wrong, I think, in supposing, as we were + saying just now, that such wisdom ordering the government of house or + state would be a great benefit. + </p> + <p> + How so? he said. + </p> + <p> + Why, I said, we were far too ready to admit the great benefits which + mankind would obtain from their severally doing the things which they + knew, and committing the things of which they are ignorant to those who + were better acquainted with them. + </p> + <p> + Were we not right in making that admission? + </p> + <p> + I think not. + </p> + <p> + How very strange, Socrates! + </p> + <p> + By the dog of Egypt, I said, there I agree with you; and I was thinking as + much just now when I said that strange consequences would follow, and that + I was afraid we were on the wrong track; for however ready we may be to + admit that this is wisdom, I certainly cannot make out what good this sort + of thing does to us. + </p> + <p> + What do you mean? he said; I wish that you could make me understand what + you mean. + </p> + <p> + I dare say that what I am saying is nonsense, I replied; and yet if a man + has any feeling of what is due to himself, he cannot let the thought which + comes into his mind pass away unheeded and unexamined. + </p> + <p> + I like that, he said. + </p> + <p> + Hear, then, I said, my own dream; whether coming through the horn or the + ivory gate, I cannot tell. The dream is this: Let us suppose that wisdom + is such as we are now defining, and that she has absolute sway over us; + then each action will be done according to the arts or sciences, and no + one professing to be a pilot when he is not, or any physician or general, + or any one else pretending to know matters of which he is ignorant, will + deceive or elude us; our health will be improved; our safety at sea, and + also in battle, will be assured; our coats and shoes, and all other + instruments and implements will be skilfully made, because the workmen + will be good and true. Aye, and if you please, you may suppose that + prophecy, which is the knowledge of the future, will be under the control + of wisdom, and that she will deter deceivers and set up the true prophets + in their place as the revealers of the future. Now I quite agree that + mankind, thus provided, would live and act according to knowledge, for + wisdom would watch and prevent ignorance from intruding on us. But whether + by acting according to knowledge we shall act well and be happy, my dear + Critias,—this is a point which we have not yet been able to + determine. + </p> + <p> + Yet I think, he replied, that if you discard knowledge, you will hardly + find the crown of happiness in anything else. + </p> + <p> + But of what is this knowledge? I said. Just answer me that small question. + Do you mean a knowledge of shoemaking? + </p> + <p> + God forbid. + </p> + <p> + Or of working in brass? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + Or in wool, or wood, or anything of that sort? + </p> + <p> + No, I do not. + </p> + <p> + Then, I said, we are giving up the doctrine that he who lives according to + knowledge is happy, for these live according to knowledge, and yet they + are not allowed by you to be happy; but I think that you mean to confine + happiness to particular individuals who live according to knowledge, such + for example as the prophet, who, as I was saying, knows the future. Is it + of him you are speaking or of some one else? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I mean him, but there are others as well. + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said, some one who knows the past and present as well as the + future, and is ignorant of nothing. Let us suppose that there is such a + person, and if there is, you will allow that he is the most knowing of all + living men. + </p> + <p> + Certainly he is. + </p> + <p> + Yet I should like to know one thing more: which of the different kinds of + knowledge makes him happy? or do all equally make him happy? + </p> + <p> + Not all equally, he replied. + </p> + <p> + But which most tends to make him happy? the knowledge of what past, + present, or future thing? May I infer this to be the knowledge of the game + of draughts? + </p> + <p> + Nonsense about the game of draughts. + </p> + <p> + Or of computation? + </p> + <p> + No. + </p> + <p> + Or of health? + </p> + <p> + That is nearer the truth, he said. + </p> + <p> + And that knowledge which is nearest of all, I said, is the knowledge of + what? + </p> + <p> + The knowledge with which he discerns good and evil. + </p> + <p> + Monster! I said; you have been carrying me round in a circle, and all this + time hiding from me the fact that the life according to knowledge is not + that which makes men act rightly and be happy, not even if knowledge + include all the sciences, but one science only, that of good and evil. + For, let me ask you, Critias, whether, if you take away this, medicine + will not equally give health, and shoemaking equally produce shoes, and + the art of the weaver clothes?—whether the art of the pilot will not + equally save our lives at sea, and the art of the general in war? + </p> + <p> + Quite so. + </p> + <p> + And yet, my dear Critias, none of these things will be well or + beneficially done, if the science of the good be wanting. + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + But that science is not wisdom or temperance, but a science of human + advantage; not a science of other sciences, or of ignorance, but of good + and evil: and if this be of use, then wisdom or temperance will not be of + use. + </p> + <p> + And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use? For, however much we + assume that wisdom is a science of sciences, and has a sway over other + sciences, surely she will have this particular science of the good under + her control, and in this way will benefit us. + </p> + <p> + And will wisdom give health? I said; is not this rather the effect of + medicine? Or does wisdom do the work of any of the other arts,—do + they not each of them do their own work? Have we not long ago asseverated + that wisdom is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and of + nothing else? + </p> + <p> + That is obvious. + </p> + <p> + Then wisdom will not be the producer of health. + </p> + <p> + Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + The art of health is different. + </p> + <p> + Yes, different. + </p> + <p> + Nor does wisdom give advantage, my good friend; for that again we have + just now been attributing to another art. + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + How then can wisdom be advantageous, when giving no advantage? + </p> + <p> + That, Socrates, is certainly inconceivable. + </p> + <p> + You see then, Critias, that I was not far wrong in fearing that I could + have no sound notion about wisdom; I was quite right in depreciating + myself; for that which is admitted to be the best of all things would + never have seemed to us useless, if I had been good for anything at an + enquiry. But now I have been utterly defeated, and have failed to discover + what that is to which the imposer of names gave this name of temperance or + wisdom. And yet many more admissions were made by us than could be fairly + granted; for we admitted that there was a science of science, although the + argument said No, and protested against us; and we admitted further, that + this science knew the works of the other sciences (although this too was + denied by the argument), because we wanted to show that the wise man had + knowledge of what he knew and did not know; also we nobly disregarded, and + never even considered, the impossibility of a man knowing in a sort of way + that which he does not know at all; for our assumption was, that he knows + that which he does not know; than which nothing, as I think, can be more + irrational. And yet, after finding us so easy and good-natured, the + enquiry is still unable to discover the truth; but mocks us to a degree, + and has gone out of its way to prove the inutility of that which we + admitted only by a sort of supposition and fiction to be the true + definition of temperance or wisdom: which result, as far as I am + concerned, is not so much to be lamented, I said. But for your sake, + Charmides, I am very sorry—that you, having such beauty and such + wisdom and temperance of soul, should have no profit or good in life from + your wisdom and temperance. And still more am I grieved about the charm + which I learned with so much pain, and to so little profit, from the + Thracian, for the sake of a thing which is nothing worth. I think indeed + that there is a mistake, and that I must be a bad enquirer, for wisdom or + temperance I believe to be really a great good; and happy are you, + Charmides, if you certainly possess it. Wherefore examine yourself, and + see whether you have this gift and can do without the charm; for if you + can, I would rather advise you to regard me simply as a fool who is never + able to reason out anything; and to rest assured that the more wise and + temperate you are, the happier you will be. + </p> + <p> + Charmides said: I am sure that I do not know, Socrates, whether I have or + have not this gift of wisdom and temperance; for how can I know whether I + have a thing, of which even you and Critias are, as you say, unable to + discover the nature?—(not that I believe you.) And further, I am + sure, Socrates, that I do need the charm, and as far as I am concerned, I + shall be willing to be charmed by you daily, until you say that I have had + enough. + </p> + <p> + Very good, Charmides, said Critias; if you do this I shall have a proof of + your temperance, that is, if you allow yourself to be charmed by Socrates, + and never desert him at all. + </p> + <p> + You may depend on my following and not deserting him, said Charmides: if + you who are my guardian command me, I should be very wrong not to obey + you. + </p> + <p> + And I do command you, he said. + </p> + <p> + Then I will do as you say, and begin this very day. + </p> + <p> + You sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about? + </p> + <p> + We are not conspiring, said Charmides, we have conspired already. + </p> + <p> + And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms of + justice? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I shall use violence, he replied, since he orders me; and therefore + you had better consider well. + </p> + <p> + But the time for consideration has passed, I said, when violence is + employed; and you, when you are determined on anything, and in the mood of + violence, are irresistible. + </p> + <p> + Do not you resist me then, he said. + </p> + <p> + I will not resist you, I replied. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Charmides, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CHARMIDES *** + +***** This file should be named 1580-h.htm or 1580-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/5/8/1580/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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