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+*********The Project Gutenberg Etext of Lysis, by Plato*********

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+Lysis

+

+by Plato

+

+Translated by Benjamin Jowett

+

+December,  1998  [Etext #1579]

+

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+

+LYSIS

+

+by PLATO

+

+

+

+Translated by Benjamin Jowett

+

+

+

+

+INTRODUCTION.

+

+No answer is given in the Lysis to the question, 'What is Friendship?' any

+more than in the Charmides to the question, 'What is Temperance?'  There

+are several resemblances in the two Dialogues:  the same youthfulness and

+sense of beauty pervades both of them; they are alike rich in the

+description of Greek life.  The question is again raised of the relation of

+knowledge to virtue and good, which also recurs in the Laches; and Socrates

+appears again as the elder friend of the two boys, Lysis and Menexenus.  In

+the Charmides, as also in the Laches, he is described as middleaged; in the

+Lysis he is advanced in years.

+

+The Dialogue consists of two scenes or conversations which seem to have no

+relation to each other.  The first is a conversation between Socrates and

+Lysis, who, like Charmides, is an Athenian youth of noble descent and of

+great beauty, goodness, and intelligence:  this is carried on in the

+absence of Menexenus, who is called away to take part in a sacrifice. 

+Socrates asks Lysis whether his father and mother do not love him very

+much?  'To be sure they do.'  'Then of course they allow him to do exactly

+as he likes.'  'Of course not:  the very slaves have more liberty than he

+has.'  'But how is this?'  'The reason is that he is not old enough.'  'No;

+the real reason is that he is not wise enough:  for are there not some

+things which he is allowed to do, although he is not allowed to do others?' 

+'Yes, because he knows them, and does not know the others.'  This leads to

+the conclusion that all men everywhere will trust him in what he knows, but

+not in what he does not know; for in such matters he will be unprofitable

+to them, and do them no good.  And no one will love him, if he does them no

+good; and he can only do them good by knowledge; and as he is still without

+knowledge, he can have as yet no conceit of knowledge.  In this manner

+Socrates reads a lesson to Hippothales, the foolish lover of Lysis,

+respecting the style of conversation which he should address to his

+beloved.

+

+After the return of Menexenus, Socrates, at the request of Lysis, asks him

+a new question:  'What is friendship?  You, Menexenus, who have a friend

+already, can tell me, who am always longing to find one, what is the secret

+of this great blessing.'

+

+When one man loves another, which is the friend--he who loves, or he who is

+loved?  Or are both friends?  From the first of these suppositions they are

+driven to the second; and from the second to the third; and neither the two

+boys nor Socrates are satisfied with any of the three or with all of them.

+Socrates turns to the poets, who affirm that God brings like to like

+(Homer), and to philosophers (Empedocles), who also assert that like is the

+friend of like.  But the bad are not friends, for they are not even like

+themselves, and still less are they like one another.  And the good have no

+need of one another, and therefore do not care about one another.  Moreover

+there are others who say that likeness is a cause of aversion, and

+unlikeness of love and friendship; and they too adduce the authority of

+poets and philosophers in support of their doctrines; for Hesiod says that

+'potter is jealous of potter, bard of bard;' and subtle doctors tell us

+that 'moist is the friend of dry, hot of cold,' and the like.  But neither

+can their doctrine be maintained; for then the just would be the friend of

+the unjust, good of evil.

+

+Thus we arrive at the conclusion that like is not the friend of like, nor

+unlike of unlike; and therefore good is not the friend of good, nor evil of

+evil, nor good of evil, nor evil of good.  What remains but that the

+indifferent, which is neither good nor evil, should be the friend (not of

+the indifferent, for that would be 'like the friend of like,' but) of the

+good, or rather of the beautiful?

+

+But why should the indifferent have this attachment to the beautiful or

+good?  There are circumstances under which such an attachment would be

+natural.  Suppose the indifferent, say the human body, to be desirous of

+getting rid of some evil, such as disease, which is not essential but only

+accidental to it (for if the evil were essential the body would cease to be

+indifferent, and would become evil)--in such a case the indifferent becomes

+a friend of the good for the sake of getting rid of the evil.  In this

+intermediate 'indifferent' position the philosopher or lover of wisdom

+stands:  he is not wise, and yet not unwise, but he has ignorance

+accidentally clinging to him, and he yearns for wisdom as the cure of the

+evil.  (Symp.)

+

+After this explanation has been received with triumphant accord, a fresh

+dissatisfaction begins to steal over the mind of Socrates:  Must not

+friendship be for the sake of some ulterior end? and what can that final

+cause or end of friendship be, other than the good?  But the good is

+desired by us only as the cure of evil; and therefore if there were no evil

+there would be no friendship.  Some other explanation then has to be

+devised.  May not desire be the source of friendship?  And desire is of

+what a man wants and of what is congenial to him.  But then the congenial

+cannot be the same as the like; for like, as has been already shown, cannot

+be the friend of like.  Nor can the congenial be the good; for good is not

+the friend of good, as has been also shown.  The problem is unsolved, and

+the three friends, Socrates, Lysis, and Menexenus, are still unable to find

+out what a friend is.

+

+Thus, as in the Charmides and Laches, and several of the other Dialogues of

+Plato (compare especially the Protagoras and Theaetetus), no conclusion is

+arrived at.  Socrates maintains his character of a 'know nothing;' but the

+boys have already learned the lesson which he is unable to teach them, and

+they are free from the conceit of knowledge.  (Compare Chrm.)  The dialogue

+is what would be called in the language of Thrasyllus tentative or

+inquisitive.  The subject is continued in the Phaedrus and Symposium, and

+treated, with a manifest reference to the Lysis, in the eighth and ninth

+books of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle.  As in other writings of

+Plato (for example, the Republic), there is a progress from unconscious

+morality, illustrated by the friendship of the two youths, and also by the

+sayings of the poets ('who are our fathers in wisdom,' and yet only tell us

+half the truth, and in this particular instance are not much improved upon

+by the philosophers), to a more comprehensive notion of friendship.  This,

+however, is far from being cleared of its perplexity.  Two notions appear

+to be struggling or balancing in the mind of Socrates:--First, the sense

+that friendship arises out of human needs and wants; Secondly, that the

+higher form or ideal of friendship exists only for the sake of the good. 

+That friends are not necessarily either like or unlike, is also a truth

+confirmed by experience.  But the use of the terms 'like' or 'good' is too

+strictly limited; Socrates has allowed himself to be carried away by a sort

+of eristic or illogical logic against which no definition of friendship

+would be able to stand.  In the course of the argument he makes a

+distinction between property and accident which is a real contribution to

+the science of logic.  Some higher truths appear through the mist.  The

+manner in which the field of argument is widened, as in the Charmides and

+Laches by the introduction of the idea of knowledge, so here by the

+introduction of the good, is deserving of attention.  The sense of the

+inter-dependence of good and evil, and the allusion to the possibility of

+the non-existence of evil, are also very remarkable.

+

+The dialectical interest is fully sustained by the dramatic accompaniments. 

+Observe, first, the scene, which is a Greek Palaestra, at a time when a

+sacrifice is going on, and the Hermaea are in course of celebration;

+secondly, the 'accustomed irony' of Socrates, who declares, as in the

+Symposium, that he is ignorant of all other things, but claims to have a

+knowledge of the mysteries of love.  There are likewise several contrasts

+of character; first of the dry, caustic Ctesippus, of whom Socrates

+professes a humorous sort of fear, and Hippothales the flighty lover, who

+murders sleep by bawling out the name of his beloved; there is also a

+contrast between the false, exaggerated, sentimental love of Hippothales

+towards Lysis, and the childlike and innocent friendship of the boys with

+one another.  Some difference appears to be intended between the characters

+of the more talkative Menexenus and the reserved and simple Lysis. 

+Socrates draws out the latter by a new sort of irony, which is sometimes

+adopted in talking to children, and consists in asking a leading question

+which can only be answered in a sense contrary to the intention of the

+question:  'Your father and mother of course allow you to drive the

+chariot?'  'No they do not.'  When Menexenus returns, the serious dialectic

+begins.  He is described as 'very pugnacious,' and we are thus prepared for

+the part which a mere youth takes in a difficult argument.  But Plato has

+not forgotten dramatic propriety, and Socrates proposes at last to refer

+the question to some older person.

+

+SOME QUESTIONS RELATING TO FRIENDSHIP. 

+

+The subject of friendship has a lower place in the modern than in the

+ancient world, partly because a higher place is assigned by us to love and

+marriage.  The very meaning of the word has become slighter and more

+superficial; it seems almost to be borrowed from the ancients, and has

+nearly disappeared in modern treatises on Moral Philosophy.  The received

+examples of friendship are to be found chiefly among the Greeks and Romans.

+Hence the casuistical or other questions which arise out of the relations

+of friends have not often been considered seriously in modern times.  Many

+of them will be found to be the same which are discussed in the Lysis.  We

+may ask with Socrates, 1) whether friendship is 'of similars or

+dissimilars,' or of both; 2) whether such a tie exists between the good

+only and for the sake of the good; or 3) whether there may not be some

+peculiar attraction, which draws together 'the neither good nor evil' for

+the sake of the good and because of the evil; 4) whether friendship is

+always mutual,--may there not be a one-sided and unrequited friendship? 

+This question, which, like many others, is only one of a laxer or stricter

+use of words, seems to have greatly exercised the minds both of Aristotle

+and Plato.

+

+5) Can we expect friendship to be permanent, or must we acknowledge with

+Cicero, 'Nihil difficilius quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitae

+permanere'?  Is not friendship, even more than love, liable to be swayed by

+the caprices of fancy?  The person who pleased us most at first sight or

+upon a slight acquaintance, when we have seen him again, and under

+different circumstances, may make a much less favourable impression on our

+minds.  Young people swear 'eternal friendships,' but at these innocent

+perjuries their elders laugh.  No one forms a friendship with the intention

+of renouncing it; yet in the course of a varied life it is practically

+certain that many changes will occur of feeling, opinion, locality,

+occupation, fortune, which will divide us from some persons and unite us to

+others.  6) There is an ancient saying, Qui amicos amicum non habet.  But

+is not some less exclusive form of friendship better suited to the

+condition and nature of man?  And in those especially who have no family

+ties, may not the feeling pass beyond one or a few, and embrace all with

+whom we come into contact, and, perhaps in a few passionate and exalted

+natures, all men everywhere?  7) The ancients had their three kinds of

+friendship, 'for the sake of the pleasant, the useful, and the good:'  is

+the last to be resolved into the two first; or are the two first to be

+included in the last?  The subject was puzzling to them:  they could not

+say that friendship was only a quality, or a relation, or a virtue, or a

+kind of virtue; and they had not in the age of Plato reached the point of

+regarding it, like justice, as a form or attribute of virtue.  They had

+another perplexity:  8) How could one of the noblest feelings of human

+nature be so near to one of the most detestable corruptions of it? 

+(Compare Symposium; Laws).

+

+Leaving the Greek or ancient point of view, we may regard the question in a

+more general way.  Friendship is the union of two persons in mutual

+affection and remembrance of one another.  The friend can do for his friend

+what he cannot do for himself.  He can give him counsel in time of

+difficulty; he can teach him 'to see himself as others see him'; he can

+stand by him, when all the world are against him; he can gladden and

+enlighten him by his presence; he 'can divide his sorrows,' he can 'double

+his joys;' he can anticipate his wants.  He will discover ways of helping

+him without creating a sense of his own superiority; he will find out his

+mental trials, but only that he may minister to them.  Among true friends

+jealousy has no place:  they do not complain of one another for making new

+friends, or for not revealing some secret of their lives; (in friendship

+too there must be reserves;) they do not intrude upon one another, and they

+mutually rejoice in any good which happens to either of them, though it may

+be to the loss of the other.  They may live apart and have little

+intercourse, but when they meet, the old tie is as strong as ever--

+according to the common saying, they find one another always the same.  The

+greatest good of friendship is not daily intercourse, for circumstances

+rarely admit of this; but on the great occasions of life, when the advice

+of a friend is needed, then the word spoken in season about conduct, about

+health, about marriage, about business,--the letter written from a distance

+by a disinterested person who sees with clearer eyes may be of inestimable

+value.  When the heart is failing and despair is setting in, then to hear

+the voice or grasp the hand of a friend, in a shipwreck, in a defeat, in

+some other failure or misfortune, may restore the necessary courage and

+composure to the paralysed and disordered mind, and convert the feeble

+person into a hero; (compare Symposium).

+

+It is true that friendships are apt to be disappointing:  either we expect

+too much from them; or we are indolent and do not 'keep them in repair;' or

+being admitted to intimacy with another, we see his faults too clearly and

+lose our respect for him; and he loses his affection for us.  Friendships

+may be too violent; and they may be too sensitive.  The egotism of one of

+the parties may be too much for the other.  The word of counsel or sympathy

+has been uttered too obtrusively, at the wrong time, or in the wrong

+manner; or the need of it has not been perceived until too late.  'Oh if he

+had only told me' has been the silent thought of many a troubled soul.  And

+some things have to be indicated rather than spoken, because the very

+mention of them tends to disturb the equability of friendship.  The

+alienation of friends, like many other human evils, is commonly due to a

+want of tact and insight.  There is not enough of the Scimus et hanc veniam

+petimusque damusque vicissim.  The sweet draught of sympathy is not

+inexhaustible; and it tends to weaken the person who too freely partakes of

+it.  Thus we see that there are many causes which impair the happiness of

+friends.

+

+We may expect a friendship almost divine, such as philosophers have

+sometimes dreamed of:  we find what is human.  The good of it is

+necessarily limited; it does not take the place of marriage; it affords

+rather a solace than an arm of support.  It had better not be based on

+pecuniary obligations; these more often mar than make a friendship.  It is

+most likely to be permanent when the two friends are equal and independent,

+or when they are engaged together in some common work or have some public

+interest in common.  It exists among the bad or inferior sort of men almost

+as much as among the good; the bad and good, and 'the neither bad nor

+good,' are drawn together in a strange manner by personal attachment.  The

+essence of it is loyalty, without which it would cease to be friendship.

+

+Another question 9) may be raised, whether friendship can safely exist

+between young persons of different sexes, not connected by ties of

+relationship, and without the thought of love or marriage; whether, again,

+a wife or a husband should have any intimate friend, besides his or her

+partner in marriage.  The answer to this latter question is rather

+perplexing, and would probably be different in different countries (compare

+Sympos.).  While we do not deny that great good may result from such

+attachments, for the mind may be drawn out and the character enlarged by

+them; yet we feel also that they are attended with many dangers, and that

+this Romance of Heavenly Love requires a strength, a freedom from passion,

+a self-control, which, in youth especially, are rarely to be found.  The

+propriety of such friendships must be estimated a good deal by the manner

+in which public opinion regards them; they must be reconciled with the

+ordinary duties of life; and they must be justified by the result.

+

+Yet another question, 10).  Admitting that friendships cannot be always

+permanent, we may ask when and upon what conditions should they be

+dissolved.  It would be futile to retain the name when the reality has

+ceased to be.  That two friends should part company whenever the relation

+between them begins to drag may be better for both of them.  But then

+arises the consideration, how should these friends in youth or friends of

+the past regard or be regarded by one another?  They are parted, but there

+still remain duties mutually owing by them.  They will not admit the world

+to share in their difference any more than in their friendship; the memory

+of an old attachment, like the memory of the dead, has a kind of sacredness

+for them on which they will not allow others to intrude.  Neither, if they

+were ever worthy to bear the name of friends, will either of them entertain

+any enmity or dislike of the other who was once so much to him.  Neither

+will he by 'shadowed hint reveal' the secrets great or small which an

+unfortunate mistake has placed within his reach.  He who is of a noble mind

+will dwell upon his own faults rather than those of another, and will be

+ready to take upon himself the blame of their separation.  He will feel

+pain at the loss of a friend; and he will remember with gratitude his

+ancient kindness.  But he will not lightly renew a tie which has not been

+lightly broken...These are a few of the Problems of Friendship, some of

+them suggested by the Lysis, others by modern life, which he who wishes to

+make or keep a friend may profitably study.  (Compare Bacon, Essay on

+Friendship; Cic. de Amicitia.)

+

+

+LYSIS, OR FRIENDSHIP

+

+by

+

+Plato

+

+Translated by Benjamin Jowett

+

+

+PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:  Socrates, who is the narrator, Menexenus,

+Hippothales, Lysis, Ctesippus.

+

+SCENE:  A newly-erected Palaestra outside the walls of Athens.

+

+

+I was going from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, intending to take the

+outer road, which is close under the wall.  When I came to the postern gate

+of the city, which is by the fountain of Panops, I fell in with

+Hippothales, the son of Hieronymus, and Ctesippus the Paeanian, and a

+company of young men who were standing with them.  Hippothales, seeing me

+approach, asked whence I came and whither I was going.

+

+I am going, I replied, from the Academy straight to the Lyceum.

+

+Then come straight to us, he said, and put in here; you may as well.

+

+Who are you, I said; and where am I to come?

+

+He showed me an enclosed space and an open door over against the wall.  And

+there, he said, is the building at which we all meet:  and a goodly company

+we are.

+

+And what is this building, I asked; and what sort of entertainment have

+you?

+

+The building, he replied, is a newly erected Palaestra; and the

+entertainment is generally conversation, to which you are welcome.

+

+Thank you, I said; and is there any teacher there?

+

+Yes, he said, your old friend and admirer, Miccus.

+

+Indeed, I replied; he is a very eminent professor.

+

+Are you disposed, he said, to go with me and see them?

+

+Yes, I said; but I should like to know first, what is expected of me, and

+who is the favourite among you?

+

+Some persons have one favourite, Socrates, and some another, he said.

+

+And who is yours? I asked:  tell me that, Hippothales.

+

+At this he blushed; and I said to him, O Hippothales, thou son of

+Hieronymus! do not say that you are, or that you are not, in love; the

+confession is too late; for I see that you are not only in love, but are

+already far gone in your love.  Simple and foolish as I am, the Gods have

+given me the power of understanding affections of this kind.

+

+Whereupon he blushed more and more.

+

+Ctesippus said:  I like to see you blushing, Hippothales, and hesitating to

+tell Socrates the name; when, if he were with you but for a very short

+time, you would have plagued him to death by talking about nothing else. 

+Indeed, Socrates, he has literally deafened us, and stopped our ears with

+the praises of Lysis; and if he is a little intoxicated, there is every

+likelihood that we may have our sleep murdered with a cry of Lysis.  His

+performances in prose are bad enough, but nothing at all in comparison with

+his verse; and when he drenches us with his poems and other compositions,

+it is really too bad; and worse still is his manner of singing them to his

+love; he has a voice which is truly appalling, and we cannot help hearing

+him:  and now having a question put to him by you, behold he is blushing.

+

+Who is Lysis? I said:  I suppose that he must be young; for the name does

+not recall any one to me.

+

+Why, he said, his father being a very well-known man, he retains his

+patronymic, and is not as yet commonly called by his own name; but,

+although you do not know his name, I am sure that you must know his face,

+for that is quite enough to distinguish him.

+

+But tell me whose son he is, I said.

+

+He is the eldest son of Democrates, of the deme of Aexone.

+

+Ah, Hippothales, I said; what a noble and really perfect love you have

+found!  I wish that you would favour me with the exhibition which you have

+been making to the rest of the company, and then I shall be able to judge

+whether you know what a lover ought to say about his love, either to the

+youth himself, or to others.

+

+Nay, Socrates, he said; you surely do not attach any importance to what he

+is saying.

+

+Do you mean, I said, that you disown the love of the person whom he says

+that you love?

+

+No; but I deny that I make verses or address compositions to him.

+

+He is not in his right mind, said Ctesippus; he is talking nonsense, and is

+stark mad.

+

+O Hippothales, I said, if you have ever made any verses or songs in honour

+of your favourite, I do not want to hear them; but I want to know the

+purport of them, that I may be able to judge of your mode of approaching

+your fair one.

+

+Ctesippus will be able to tell you, he said; for if, as he avers, the sound

+of my words is always dinning in his ears, he must have a very accurate

+knowledge and recollection of them.

+

+Yes, indeed, said Ctesippus; I know only too well; and very ridiculous the

+tale is:  for although he is a lover, and very devotedly in love, he has

+nothing particular to talk about to his beloved which a child might not

+say.  Now is not that ridiculous?  He can only speak of the wealth of

+Democrates, which the whole city celebrates, and grandfather Lysis, and the

+other ancestors of the youth, and their stud of horses, and their victory

+at the Pythian games, and at the Isthmus, and at Nemea with four horses and

+single horses--these are the tales which he composes and repeats.  And

+there is greater twaddle still.  Only the day before yesterday he made a

+poem in which he described the entertainment of Heracles, who was a

+connexion of the family, setting forth how in virtue of this relationship

+he was hospitably received by an ancestor of Lysis; this ancestor was

+himself begotten of Zeus by the daughter of the founder of the deme.  And

+these are the sort of old wives' tales which he sings and recites to us,

+and we are obliged to listen to him.

+

+When I heard this, I said:  O ridiculous Hippothales! how can you be making

+and singing hymns in honour of yourself before you have won?

+

+But my songs and verses, he said, are not in honour of myself, Socrates.

+

+You think not? I said.

+

+Nay, but what do you think? he replied.

+

+Most assuredly, I said, those songs are all in your own honour; for if you

+win your beautiful love, your discourses and songs will be a glory to you,

+and may be truly regarded as hymns of praise composed in honour of you who

+have conquered and won such a love; but if he slips away from you, the more

+you have praised him, the more ridiculous you will look at having lost this

+fairest and best of blessings; and therefore the wise lover does not praise

+his beloved until he has won him, because he is afraid of accidents.  There

+is also another danger; the fair, when any one praises or magnifies them,

+are filled with the spirit of pride and vain-glory.  Do you not agree with

+me?

+

+Yes, he said.

+

+And the more vain-glorious they are, the more difficult is the capture of

+them?

+

+I believe you.

+

+What should you say of a hunter who frightened away his prey, and made the

+capture of the animals which he is hunting more difficult?

+

+He would be a bad hunter, undoubtedly.

+

+Yes; and if, instead of soothing them, he were to infuriate them with words

+and songs, that would show a great want of wit:  do you not agree.

+

+Yes.

+

+And now reflect, Hippothales, and see whether you are not guilty of all

+these errors in writing poetry.  For I can hardly suppose that you will

+affirm a man to be a good poet who injures himself by his poetry.

+

+Assuredly not, he said; such a poet would be a fool.  And this is the

+reason why I take you into my counsels, Socrates, and I shall be glad of

+any further advice which you may have to offer.  Will you tell me by what

+words or actions I may become endeared to my love?

+

+That is not easy to determine, I said; but if you will bring your love to

+me, and will let me talk with him, I may perhaps be able to show you how to

+converse with him, instead of singing and reciting in the fashion of which

+you are accused.

+

+There will be no difficulty in bringing him, he replied; if you will only

+go with Ctesippus into the Palaestra, and sit down and talk, I believe that

+he will come of his own accord; for he is fond of listening, Socrates.  And

+as this is the festival of the Hermaea, the young men and boys are all

+together, and there is no separation between them.  He will be sure to

+come:  but if he does not, Ctesippus with whom he is familiar, and whose

+relation Menexenus is his great friend, shall call him.

+

+That will be the way, I said.  Thereupon I led Ctesippus into the

+Palaestra, and the rest followed.

+

+Upon entering we found that the boys had just been sacrificing; and this

+part of the festival was nearly at an end.  They were all in their white

+array, and games at dice were going on among them.  Most of them were in

+the outer court amusing themselves; but some were in a corner of the

+Apodyterium playing at odd and even with a number of dice, which they took

+out of little wicker baskets.  There was also a circle of lookers-on; among

+them was Lysis.  He was standing with the other boys and youths, having a

+crown upon his head, like a fair vision, and not less worthy of praise for

+his goodness than for his beauty.  We left them, and went over to the

+opposite side of the room, where, finding a quiet place, we sat down; and

+then we began to talk.  This attracted Lysis, who was constantly turning

+round to look at us--he was evidently wanting to come to us.  For a time he

+hesitated and had not the courage to come alone; but first of all, his

+friend Menexenus, leaving his play, entered the Palaestra from the court,

+and when he saw Ctesippus and myself, was going to take a seat by us; and

+then Lysis, seeing him, followed, and sat down by his side; and the other

+boys joined.  I should observe that Hippothales, when he saw the crowd, got

+behind them, where he thought that he would be out of sight of Lysis, lest

+he should anger him; and there he stood and listened.

+

+I turned to Menexenus, and said:  Son of Demophon, which of you two youths

+is the elder?

+

+That is a matter of dispute between us, he said.

+

+And which is the nobler?  Is that also a matter of dispute?

+

+Yes, certainly.

+

+And another disputed point is, which is the fairer?

+

+The two boys laughed.

+

+I shall not ask which is the richer of the two, I said; for you are

+friends, are you not?

+

+Certainly, they replied.

+

+And friends have all things in common, so that one of you can be no richer

+than the other, if you say truly that you are friends.

+

+They assented.  I was about to ask which was the juster of the two, and

+which was the wiser of the two; but at this moment Menexenus was called

+away by some one who came and said that the gymnastic-master wanted him.  I

+supposed that he had to offer sacrifice.  So he went away, and I asked

+Lysis some more questions.  I dare say, Lysis, I said, that your father and

+mother love you very much.

+

+Certainly, he said.

+

+And they would wish you to be perfectly happy.

+

+Yes.

+

+But do you think that any one is happy who is in the condition of a slave,

+and who cannot do what he likes?

+

+I should think not indeed, he said.

+

+And if your father and mother love you, and desire that you should be

+happy, no one can doubt that they are very ready to promote your happiness.

+

+Certainly, he replied.

+

+And do they then permit you to do what you like, and never rebuke you or

+hinder you from doing what you desire?

+

+Yes, indeed, Socrates; there are a great many things which they hinder me

+from doing.

+

+What do you mean? I said.  Do they want you to be happy, and yet hinder you

+from doing what you like? for example, if you want to mount one of your

+father's chariots, and take the reins at a race, they will not allow you to

+do so--they will prevent you?

+

+Certainly, he said, they will not allow me to do so.

+

+Whom then will they allow?

+

+There is a charioteer, whom my father pays for driving.

+

+And do they trust a hireling more than you? and may he do what he likes

+with the horses? and do they pay him for this?

+

+They do.

+

+But I dare say that you may take the whip and guide the mule-cart if you

+like;--they will permit that?

+

+Permit me! indeed they will not.

+

+Then, I said, may no one use the whip to the mules?

+

+Yes, he said, the muleteer.

+

+And is he a slave or a free man?

+

+A slave, he said.

+

+And do they esteem a slave of more value than you who are their son?  And

+do they entrust their property to him rather than to you? and allow him to

+do what he likes, when they prohibit you?  Answer me now:  Are you your own

+master, or do they not even allow that?

+

+Nay, he said; of course they do not allow it.

+

+Then you have a master?

+

+Yes, my tutor; there he is.

+

+And is he a slave?

+

+To be sure; he is our slave, he replied.

+

+Surely, I said, this is a strange thing, that a free man should be governed

+by a slave.  And what does he do with you?

+

+He takes me to my teachers.

+

+You do not mean to say that your teachers also rule over you?

+

+Of course they do.

+

+Then I must say that your father is pleased to inflict many lords and

+masters on you.  But at any rate when you go home to your mother, she will

+let you have your own way, and will not interfere with your happiness; her

+wool, or the piece of cloth which she is weaving, are at your disposal:  I

+am sure that there is nothing to hinder you from touching her wooden

+spathe, or her comb, or any other of her spinning implements.

+

+Nay, Socrates, he replied, laughing; not only does she hinder me, but I

+should be beaten if I were to touch one of them.

+

+Well, I said, this is amazing.  And did you ever behave ill to your father

+or your mother?

+

+No, indeed, he replied.

+

+But why then are they so terribly anxious to prevent you from being happy,

+and doing as you like?--keeping you all day long in subjection to another,

+and, in a word, doing nothing which you desire; so that you have no good,

+as would appear, out of their great possessions, which are under the

+control of anybody rather than of you, and have no use of your own fair

+person, which is tended and taken care of by another; while you, Lysis, are

+master of nobody, and can do nothing?

+

+Why, he said, Socrates, the reason is that I am not of age.

+

+I doubt whether that is the real reason, I said; for I should imagine that

+your father Democrates, and your mother, do permit you to do many things

+already, and do not wait until you are of age:  for example, if they want

+anything read or written, you, I presume, would be the first person in the

+house who is summoned by them.

+

+Very true.

+

+And you would be allowed to write or read the letters in any order which

+you please, or to take up the lyre and tune the notes, and play with the

+fingers, or strike with the plectrum, exactly as you please, and neither

+father nor mother would interfere with you.

+

+That is true, he said.

+

+Then what can be the reason, Lysis, I said, why they allow you to do the

+one and not the other?

+

+I suppose, he said, because I understand the one, and not the other.

+

+Yes, my dear youth, I said, the reason is not any deficiency of years, but

+a deficiency of knowledge; and whenever your father thinks that you are

+wiser than he is, he will instantly commit himself and his possessions to

+you.

+

+I think so.

+

+Aye, I said; and about your neighbour, too, does not the same rule hold as

+about your father?  If he is satisfied that you know more of housekeeping

+than he does, will he continue to administer his affairs himself, or will

+he commit them to you?

+

+I think that he will commit them to me.

+

+Will not the Athenian people, too, entrust their affairs to you when they

+see that you have wisdom enough to manage them?

+

+Yes.

+

+And oh! let me put another case, I said:  There is the great king, and he

+has an eldest son, who is the Prince of Asia;--suppose that you and I go to

+him and establish to his satisfaction that we are better cooks than his

+son, will he not entrust to us the prerogative of making soup, and putting

+in anything that we like while the pot is boiling, rather than to the

+Prince of Asia, who is his son?

+

+To us, clearly.

+

+And we shall be allowed to throw in salt by handfuls, whereas the son will

+not be allowed to put in as much as he can take up between his fingers?

+

+Of course.

+

+Or suppose again that the son has bad eyes, will he allow him, or will he

+not allow him, to touch his own eyes if he thinks that he has no knowledge

+of medicine?

+

+He will not allow him.

+

+Whereas, if he supposes us to have a knowledge of medicine, he will allow

+us to do what we like with him--even to open the eyes wide and sprinkle

+ashes upon them, because he supposes that we know what is best?

+

+That is true.

+

+And everything in which we appear to him to be wiser than himself or his

+son he will commit to us?

+

+That is very true, Socrates, he replied.

+

+Then now, my dear Lysis, I said, you perceive that in things which we know

+every one will trust us,--Hellenes and barbarians, men and women,--and we

+may do as we please about them, and no one will like to interfere with us;

+we shall be free, and masters of others; and these things will be really

+ours, for we shall be benefited by them.  But in things of which we have no

+understanding, no one will trust us to do as seems good to us--they will

+hinder us as far as they can; and not only strangers, but father and

+mother, and the friend, if there be one, who is dearer still, will also

+hinder us; and we shall be subject to others; and these things will not be

+ours, for we shall not be benefited by them.  Do you agree?

+

+He assented.

+

+And shall we be friends to others, and will any others love us, in as far

+as we are useless to them?

+

+Certainly not.

+

+Neither can your father or mother love you, nor can anybody love anybody

+else, in so far as they are useless to them?

+

+No.

+

+And therefore, my boy, if you are wise, all men will be your friends and

+kindred, for you will be useful and good; but if you are not wise, neither

+father, nor mother, nor kindred, nor any one else, will be your friends. 

+And in matters of which you have as yet no knowledge, can you have any

+conceit of knowledge?

+

+That is impossible, he replied.

+

+And you, Lysis, if you require a teacher, have not yet attained to wisdom.

+

+True.

+

+And therefore you are not conceited, having nothing of which to be

+conceited.

+

+Indeed, Socrates, I think not.

+

+When I heard him say this, I turned to Hippothales, and was very nearly

+making a blunder, for I was going to say to him:  That is the way,

+Hippothales, in which you should talk to your beloved, humbling and

+lowering him, and not as you do, puffing him up and spoiling him.  But I

+saw that he was in great excitement and confusion at what had been said,

+and I remembered that, although he was in the neighbourhood, he did not

+want to be seen by Lysis; so upon second thoughts I refrained.

+

+In the meantime Menexenus came back and sat down in his place by Lysis; and

+Lysis, in a childish and affectionate manner, whispered privately in my

+ear, so that Menexenus should not hear:  Do, Socrates, tell Menexenus what

+you have been telling me.

+

+Suppose that you tell him yourself, Lysis, I replied; for I am sure that

+you were attending.

+

+Certainly, he replied.

+

+Try, then, to remember the words, and be as exact as you can in repeating

+them to him, and if you have forgotten anything, ask me again the next time

+that you see me.

+

+I will be sure to do so, Socrates; but go on telling him something new, and

+let me hear, as long as I am allowed to stay.

+

+I certainly cannot refuse, I said, since you ask me; but then, as you know,

+Menexenus is very pugnacious, and therefore you must come to the rescue if

+he attempts to upset me.

+

+Yes, indeed, he said; he is very pugnacious, and that is the reason why I

+want you to argue with him.

+

+That I may make a fool of myself?

+

+No, indeed, he said; but I want you to put him down.

+

+That is no easy matter, I replied; for he is a terrible fellow--a pupil of

+Ctesippus.  And there is Ctesippus himself:  do you see him?

+

+Never mind, Socrates, you shall argue with him.

+

+Well, I suppose that I must, I replied.

+

+Hereupon Ctesippus complained that we were talking in secret, and keeping

+the feast to ourselves.

+

+I shall be happy, I said, to let you have a share.  Here is Lysis, who does

+not understand something that I was saying, and wants me to ask Menexenus,

+who, as he thinks, is likely to know.

+

+And why do you not ask him? he said.

+

+Very well, I said, I will; and do you, Menexenus, answer.  But first I must

+tell you that I am one who from my childhood upward have set my heart upon

+a certain thing.  All people have their fancies; some desire horses, and

+others dogs; and some are fond of gold, and others of honour.  Now, I have

+no violent desire of any of these things; but I have a passion for friends;

+and I would rather have a good friend than the best cock or quail in the

+world:  I would even go further, and say the best horse or dog.  Yea, by

+the dog of Egypt, I should greatly prefer a real friend to all the gold of

+Darius, or even to Darius himself:  I am such a lover of friends as that. 

+And when I see you and Lysis, at your early age, so easily possessed of

+this treasure, and so soon, he of you, and you of him, I am amazed and

+delighted, seeing that I myself, although I am now advanced in years, am so

+far from having made a similar acquisition, that I do not even know in what

+way a friend is acquired.  But I want to ask you a question about this, for

+you have experience:  tell me then, when one loves another, is the lover or

+the beloved the friend; or may either be the friend?

+

+Either may, I should think, be the friend of either.

+

+Do you mean, I said, that if only one of them loves the other, they are

+mutual friends?

+

+Yes, he said; that is my meaning.

+

+But what if the lover is not loved in return? which is a very possible

+case.

+

+Yes.

+

+Or is, perhaps, even hated? which is a fancy which sometimes is entertained

+by lovers respecting their beloved.  Nothing can exceed their love; and yet

+they imagine either that they are not loved in return, or that they are

+hated.  Is not that true?

+

+Yes, he said, quite true.

+

+In that case, the one loves, and the other is loved?

+

+Yes.

+

+Then which is the friend of which?  Is the lover the friend of the beloved,

+whether he be loved in return, or hated; or is the beloved the friend; or

+is there no friendship at all on either side, unless they both love one

+another?

+

+There would seem to be none at all.

+

+Then this notion is not in accordance with our previous one.  We were

+saying that both were friends, if one only loved; but now, unless they both

+love, neither is a friend.

+

+That appears to be true.

+

+Then nothing which does not love in return is beloved by a lover?

+

+I think not.

+

+Then they are not lovers of horses, whom the horses do not love in return;

+nor lovers of quails, nor of dogs, nor of wine, nor of gymnastic exercises,

+who have no return of love; no, nor of wisdom, unless wisdom loves them in

+return.  Or shall we say that they do love them, although they are not

+beloved by them; and that the poet was wrong who sings--

+

+'Happy the man to whom his children are dear, and steeds having single

+hoofs, and dogs of chase, and the stranger of another land'?

+

+I do not think that he was wrong.

+

+You think that he is right?

+

+Yes.

+

+Then, Menexenus, the conclusion is, that what is beloved, whether loving or

+hating, may be dear to the lover of it:  for example, very young children,

+too young to love, or even hating their father or mother when they are

+punished by them, are never dearer to them than at the time when they are

+being hated by them.

+

+I think that what you say is true.

+

+And, if so, not the lover, but the beloved, is the friend or dear one?

+

+Yes.

+

+And the hated one, and not the hater, is the enemy?

+

+Clearly.

+

+Then many men are loved by their enemies, and hated by their friends, and

+are the friends of their enemies, and the enemies of their friends.  Yet

+how absurd, my dear friend, or indeed impossible is this paradox of a man

+being an enemy to his friend or a friend to his enemy.

+

+I quite agree, Socrates, in what you say.

+

+But if this cannot be, the lover will be the friend of that which is loved?

+

+True.

+

+And the hater will be the enemy of that which is hated?

+

+Certainly.

+

+Yet we must acknowledge in this, as in the preceding instance, that a man

+may be the friend of one who is not his friend, or who may be his enemy,

+when he loves that which does not love him or which even hates him.  And he

+may be the enemy of one who is not his enemy, and is even his friend:  for

+example, when he hates that which does not hate him, or which even loves

+him.

+

+That appears to be true.

+

+But if the lover is not a friend, nor the beloved a friend, nor both

+together, what are we to say?  Whom are we to call friends to one another? 

+Do any remain?

+

+Indeed, Socrates, I cannot find any.

+

+But, O Menexenus! I said, may we not have been altogether wrong in our

+conclusions?

+

+I am sure that we have been wrong, Socrates, said Lysis.  And he blushed as

+he spoke, the words seeming to come from his lips involuntarily, because

+his whole mind was taken up with the argument; there was no mistaking his

+attentive look while he was listening.

+

+I was pleased at the interest which was shown by Lysis, and I wanted to

+give Menexenus a rest, so I turned to him and said, I think, Lysis, that

+what you say is true, and that, if we had been right, we should never have

+gone so far wrong; let us proceed no further in this direction (for the

+road seems to be getting troublesome), but take the other path into which

+we turned, and see what the poets have to say; for they are to us in a

+manner the fathers and authors of wisdom, and they speak of friends in no

+light or trivial manner, but God himself, as they say, makes them and draws

+them to one another; and this they express, if I am not mistaken, in the

+following words:--

+

+'God is ever drawing like towards like, and making them acquainted.'

+

+I dare say that you have heard those words.

+

+Yes, he said; I have.

+

+And have you not also met with the treatises of philosophers who say that

+like must love like? they are the people who argue and write about nature

+and the universe.

+

+Very true, he replied.

+

+And are they right in saying this?

+

+They may be.

+

+Perhaps, I said, about half, or possibly, altogether, right, if their

+meaning were rightly apprehended by us.  For the more a bad man has to do

+with a bad man, and the more nearly he is brought into contact with him,

+the more he will be likely to hate him, for he injures him; and injurer and

+injured cannot be friends.  Is not that true?

+

+Yes, he said.

+

+Then one half of the saying is untrue, if the wicked are like one another?

+

+That is true.

+

+But the real meaning of the saying, as I imagine, is, that the good are

+like one another, and friends to one another; and that the bad, as is often

+said of them, are never at unity with one another or with themselves; for

+they are passionate and restless, and anything which is at variance and

+enmity with itself is not likely to be in union or harmony with any other

+thing.  Do you not agree?

+

+Yes, I do.

+

+Then, my friend, those who say that the like is friendly to the like mean

+to intimate, if I rightly apprehend them, that the good only is the friend

+of the good, and of him only; but that the evil never attains to any real

+friendship, either with good or evil.  Do you agree?

+

+He nodded assent.

+

+Then now we know how to answer the question 'Who are friends?' for the

+argument declares 'That the good are friends.'

+

+Yes, he said, that is true.

+

+Yes, I replied; and yet I am not quite satisfied with this answer.  By

+heaven, and shall I tell you what I suspect?  I will.  Assuming that like,

+inasmuch as he is like, is the friend of like, and useful to him--or rather

+let me try another way of putting the matter:  Can like do any good or harm

+to like which he could not do to himself, or suffer anything from his like

+which he would not suffer from himself?  And if neither can be of any use

+to the other, how can they be loved by one another?  Can they now?

+

+They cannot.

+

+And can he who is not loved be a friend?

+

+Certainly not.

+

+But say that the like is not the friend of the like in so far as he is

+like; still the good may be the friend of the good in so far as he is good?

+

+True.

+

+But then again, will not the good, in so far as he is good, be sufficient

+for himself?  Certainly he will.  And he who is sufficient wants nothing--

+that is implied in the word sufficient.

+

+Of course not.

+

+And he who wants nothing will desire nothing?

+

+He will not.

+

+Neither can he love that which he does not desire?

+

+He cannot.

+

+And he who loves not is not a lover or friend?

+

+Clearly not.

+

+What place then is there for friendship, if, when absent, good men have no

+need of one another (for even when alone they are sufficient for

+themselves), and when present have no use of one another?  How can such

+persons ever be induced to value one another?

+

+They cannot.

+

+And friends they cannot be, unless they value one another?

+

+Very true.

+

+But see now, Lysis, whether we are not being deceived in all this--are we

+not indeed entirely wrong?

+

+How so? he replied.

+

+Have I not heard some one say, as I just now recollect, that the like is

+the greatest enemy of the like, the good of the good?--Yes, and he quoted

+the authority of Hesiod, who says:

+

+'Potter quarrels with potter, bard with bard,

+Beggar with beggar;'

+

+and of all other things he affirmed, in like manner, 'That of necessity the

+most like are most full of envy, strife, and hatred of one another, and the

+most unlike, of friendship.  For the poor man is compelled to be the friend

+of the rich, and the weak requires the aid of the strong, and the sick man

+of the physician; and every one who is ignorant, has to love and court him

+who knows.'  And indeed he went on to say in grandiloquent language, that

+the idea of friendship existing between similars is not the truth, but the

+very reverse of the truth, and that the most opposed are the most friendly;

+for that everything desires not like but that which is most unlike:  for

+example, the dry desires the moist, the cold the hot, the bitter the sweet,

+the sharp the blunt, the void the full, the full the void, and so of all

+other things; for the opposite is the food of the opposite, whereas like

+receives nothing from like.  And I thought that he who said this was a

+charming man, and that he spoke well.  What do the rest of you say?

+

+I should say, at first hearing, that he is right, said Menexenus.

+

+Then we are to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites?

+

+Exactly.

+

+Yes, Menexenus; but will not that be a monstrous answer? and will not the

+all-wise eristics be down upon us in triumph, and ask, fairly enough,

+whether love is not the very opposite of hate; and what answer shall we

+make to them--must we not admit that they speak the truth?

+

+We must.

+

+They will then proceed to ask whether the enemy is the friend of the

+friend, or the friend the friend of the enemy?

+

+Neither, he replied.

+

+Well, but is a just man the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of the

+intemperate, or the good of the bad?

+

+I do not see how that is possible.

+

+And yet, I said, if friendship goes by contraries, the contraries must be

+friends.

+

+They must.

+

+Then neither like and like nor unlike and unlike are friends.

+

+I suppose not.

+

+And yet there is a further consideration:  may not all these notions of

+friendship be erroneous? but may not that which is neither good nor evil

+still in some cases be the friend of the good?

+

+How do you mean? he said.

+

+Why really, I said, the truth is that I do not know; but my head is dizzy

+with thinking of the argument, and therefore I hazard the conjecture, that

+'the beautiful is the friend,' as the old proverb says.  Beauty is

+certainly a soft, smooth, slippery thing, and therefore of a nature which

+easily slips in and permeates our souls.  For I affirm that the good is the

+beautiful.  You will agree to that?

+

+Yes.

+

+This I say from a sort of notion that what is neither good nor evil is the

+friend of the beautiful and the good, and I will tell you why I am inclined

+to think so:  I assume that there are three principles--the good, the bad,

+and that which is neither good nor bad.  You would agree--would you not?

+

+I agree.

+

+And neither is the good the friend of the good, nor the evil of the evil,

+nor the good of the evil;--these alternatives are excluded by the previous

+argument; and therefore, if there be such a thing as friendship or love at

+all, we must infer that what is neither good nor evil must be the friend,

+either of the good, or of that which is neither good nor evil, for nothing

+can be the friend of the bad.

+

+True.

+

+But neither can like be the friend of like, as we were just now saying.

+

+True.

+

+And if so, that which is neither good nor evil can have no friend which is

+neither good nor evil.

+

+Clearly not.

+

+Then the good alone is the friend of that only which is neither good nor

+evil.

+

+That may be assumed to be certain.

+

+And does not this seem to put us in the right way?  Just remark, that the

+body which is in health requires neither medical nor any other aid, but is

+well enough; and the healthy man has no love of the physician, because he

+is in health.

+

+He has none.

+

+But the sick loves him, because he is sick?

+

+Certainly.

+

+And sickness is an evil, and the art of medicine a good and useful thing?

+

+Yes.

+

+But the human body, regarded as a body, is neither good nor evil?

+

+True.

+

+And the body is compelled by reason of disease to court and make friends of

+the art of medicine?

+

+Yes.

+

+Then that which is neither good nor evil becomes the friend of good, by

+reason of the presence of evil?

+

+So we may infer.

+

+And clearly this must have happened before that which was neither good nor

+evil had become altogether corrupted with the element of evil--if itself

+had become evil it would not still desire and love the good; for, as we

+were saying, the evil cannot be the friend of the good.

+

+Impossible.

+

+Further, I must observe that some substances are assimilated when others

+are present with them; and there are some which are not assimilated:  take,

+for example, the case of an ointment or colour which is put on another

+substance.

+

+Very good.

+

+In such a case, is the substance which is anointed the same as the colour

+or ointment?

+

+What do you mean? he said.

+

+This is what I mean:  Suppose that I were to cover your auburn locks with

+white lead, would they be really white, or would they only appear to be

+white?

+

+They would only appear to be white, he replied.

+

+And yet whiteness would be present in them?

+

+True.

+

+But that would not make them at all the more white, notwithstanding the

+presence of white in them--they would not be white any more than black?

+

+No.

+

+But when old age infuses whiteness into them, then they become assimilated,

+and are white by the presence of white.

+

+Certainly.

+

+Now I want to know whether in all cases a substance is assimilated by the

+presence of another substance; or must the presence be after a peculiar

+sort?

+

+The latter, he said.

+

+Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of evil,

+but not as yet evil, and that has happened before now?

+

+Yes.

+

+And when anything is in the presence of evil, not being as yet evil, the

+presence of good arouses the desire of good in that thing; but the presence

+of evil, which makes a thing evil, takes away the desire and friendship of

+the good; for that which was once both good and evil has now become evil

+only, and the good was supposed to have no friendship with the evil?

+

+None.

+

+And therefore we say that those who are already wise, whether Gods or men,

+are no longer lovers of wisdom; nor can they be lovers of wisdom who are

+ignorant to the extent of being evil, for no evil or ignorant person is a

+lover of wisdom.  There remain those who have the misfortune to be

+ignorant, but are not yet hardened in their ignorance, or void of

+understanding, and do not as yet fancy that they know what they do not

+know:  and therefore those who are the lovers of wisdom are as yet neither

+good nor bad.  But the bad do not love wisdom any more than the good; for,

+as we have already seen, neither is unlike the friend of unlike, nor like

+of like.  You remember that?

+

+Yes, they both said.

+

+And so, Lysis and Menexenus, we have discovered the nature of friendship--

+there can be no doubt of it:  Friendship is the love which by reason of the

+presence of evil the neither good nor evil has of the good, either in the

+soul, or in the body, or anywhere.

+

+They both agreed and entirely assented, and for a moment I rejoiced and was

+satisfied like a huntsman just holding fast his prey.  But then a most

+unaccountable suspicion came across me, and I felt that the conclusion was

+untrue.  I was pained, and said, Alas! Lysis and Menexenus, I am afraid

+that we have been grasping at a shadow only.

+

+Why do you say so? said Menexenus.

+

+I am afraid, I said, that the argument about friendship is false: 

+arguments, like men, are often pretenders.

+

+How do you mean? he asked.

+

+Well, I said; look at the matter in this way:  a friend is the friend of

+some one; is he not?

+

+Certainly he is.

+

+And has he a motive and object in being a friend, or has he no motive and

+object?

+

+He has a motive and object.

+

+And is the object which makes him a friend, dear to him, or neither dear

+nor hateful to him?

+

+I do not quite follow you, he said.

+

+I do not wonder at that, I said.  But perhaps, if I put the matter in

+another way, you will be able to follow me, and my own meaning will be

+clearer to myself.  The sick man, as I was just now saying, is the friend

+of the physician--is he not?

+

+Yes.

+

+And he is the friend of the physician because of disease, and for the sake

+of health?

+

+Yes.

+

+And disease is an evil?

+

+Certainly.

+

+And what of health? I said.  Is that good or evil, or neither?

+

+Good, he replied.

+

+And we were saying, I believe, that the body being neither good nor evil,

+because of disease, that is to say because of evil, is the friend of

+medicine, and medicine is a good:  and medicine has entered into this

+friendship for the sake of health, and health is a good.

+

+True.

+

+And is health a friend, or not a friend?

+

+A friend.

+

+And disease is an enemy?

+

+Yes.

+

+Then that which is neither good nor evil is the friend of the good because

+of the evil and hateful, and for the sake of the good and the friend?

+

+Clearly.

+

+Then the friend is a friend for the sake of the friend, and because of the

+enemy?

+

+That is to be inferred.

+

+Then at this point, my boys, let us take heed, and be on our guard against

+deceptions.  I will not again repeat that the friend is the friend of the

+friend, and the like of the like, which has been declared by us to be an

+impossibility; but, in order that this new statement may not delude us, let

+us attentively examine another point, which I will proceed to explain: 

+Medicine, as we were saying, is a friend, or dear to us for the sake of

+health?

+

+Yes.

+

+And health is also dear?

+

+Certainly.

+

+And if dear, then dear for the sake of something?

+

+Yes.

+

+And surely this object must also be dear, as is implied in our previous

+admissions?

+

+Yes.

+

+And that something dear involves something else dear?

+

+Yes.

+

+But then, proceeding in this way, shall we not arrive at some first

+principle of friendship or dearness which is not capable of being referred

+to any other, for the sake of which, as we maintain, all other things are

+dear, and, having there arrived, we shall stop?

+

+True.

+

+My fear is that all those other things, which, as we say, are dear for the

+sake of another, are illusions and deceptions only, but where that first

+principle is, there is the true ideal of friendship.  Let me put the matter

+thus:  Suppose the case of a great treasure (this may be a son, who is more

+precious to his father than all his other treasures); would not the father,

+who values his son above all things, value other things also for the sake

+of his son?  I mean, for instance, if he knew that his son had drunk

+hemlock, and the father thought that wine would save him, he would value

+the wine?

+

+He would.

+

+And also the vessel which contains the wine?

+

+Certainly.

+

+But does he therefore value the three measures of wine, or the earthen

+vessel which contains them, equally with his son?  Is not this rather the

+true state of the case?  All his anxiety has regard not to the means which

+are provided for the sake of an object, but to the object for the sake of

+which they are provided.  And although we may often say that gold and

+silver are highly valued by us, that is not the truth; for there is a

+further object, whatever it may be, which we value most of all, and for the

+sake of which gold and all our other possessions are acquired by us.  Am I

+not right?

+

+Yes, certainly.

+

+And may not the same be said of the friend?  That which is only dear to us

+for the sake of something else is improperly said to be dear, but the truly

+dear is that in which all these so-called dear friendships terminate.

+

+That, he said, appears to be true.

+

+And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the sake

+of any other or further dear.

+

+True.

+

+Then we have done with the notion that friendship has any further object. 

+May we then infer that the good is the friend?

+

+I think so.

+

+And the good is loved for the sake of the evil?  Let me put the case in

+this way:  Suppose that of the three principles, good, evil, and that which

+is neither good nor evil, there remained only the good and the neutral, and

+that evil went far away, and in no way affected soul or body, nor ever at

+all that class of things which, as we say, are neither good nor evil in

+themselves;--would the good be of any use, or other than useless to us? 

+For if there were nothing to hurt us any longer, we should have no need of

+anything that would do us good.  Then would be clearly seen that we did but

+love and desire the good because of the evil, and as the remedy of the

+evil, which was the disease; but if there had been no disease, there would

+have been no need of a remedy.  Is not this the nature of the good--to be

+loved by us who are placed between the two, because of the evil? but there

+is no use in the good for its own sake.

+

+I suppose not.

+

+Then the final principle of friendship, in which all other friendships

+terminated, those, I mean, which are relatively dear and for the sake of

+something else, is of another and a different nature from them.  For they

+are called dear because of another dear or friend.  But with the true

+friend or dear, the case is quite the reverse; for that is proved to be

+dear because of the hated, and if the hated were away it would be no longer

+dear.

+

+Very true, he replied:  at any rate not if our present view holds good.

+

+But, oh! will you tell me, I said, whether if evil were to perish, we

+should hunger any more, or thirst any more, or have any similar desire?  Or

+may we suppose that hunger will remain while men and animals remain, but

+not so as to be hurtful?  And the same of thirst and the other desires,--

+that they will remain, but will not be evil because evil has perished?  Or

+rather shall I say, that to ask what either will be then or will not be is

+ridiculous, for who knows?  This we do know, that in our present condition

+hunger may injure us, and may also benefit us:--Is not that true?

+

+Yes.

+

+And in like manner thirst or any similar desire may sometimes be a good and

+sometimes an evil to us, and sometimes neither one nor the other?

+

+To be sure.

+

+But is there any reason why, because evil perishes, that which is not evil

+should perish with it?

+

+None.

+

+Then, even if evil perishes, the desires which are neither good nor evil

+will remain?

+

+Clearly they will.

+

+And must not a man love that which he desires and affects?

+

+He must.

+

+Then, even if evil perishes, there may still remain some elements of love

+or friendship?

+

+Yes.

+

+But not if evil is the cause of friendship:  for in that case nothing will

+be the friend of any other thing after the destruction of evil; for the

+effect cannot remain when the cause is destroyed.

+

+True.

+

+And have we not admitted already that the friend loves something for a

+reason? and at the time of making the admission we were of opinion that the

+neither good nor evil loves the good because of the evil?

+

+Very true.

+

+But now our view is changed, and we conceive that there must be some other

+cause of friendship?

+

+I suppose so.

+

+May not the truth be rather, as we were saying just now, that desire is the

+cause of friendship; for that which desires is dear to that which is

+desired at the time of desiring it? and may not the other theory have been

+only a long story about nothing?

+

+Likely enough.

+

+But surely, I said, he who desires, desires that of which he is in want?

+

+Yes.

+

+And that of which he is in want is dear to him?

+

+True.

+

+And he is in want of that of which he is deprived?

+

+Certainly.

+

+Then love, and desire, and friendship would appear to be of the natural or

+congenial.  Such, Lysis and Menexenus, is the inference.

+

+They assented.

+

+Then if you are friends, you must have natures which are congenial to one

+another?

+

+Certainly, they both said.

+

+And I say, my boys, that no one who loves or desires another would ever

+have loved or desired or affected him, if he had not been in some way

+congenial to him, either in his soul, or in his character, or in his

+manners, or in his form.

+

+Yes, yes, said Menexenus.  But Lysis was silent.

+

+Then, I said, the conclusion is, that what is of a congenial nature must be

+loved.

+

+It follows, he said.

+

+Then the lover, who is true and no counterfeit, must of necessity be loved

+by his love.

+

+Lysis and Menexenus gave a faint assent to this; and Hippothales changed

+into all manner of colours with delight.

+

+Here, intending to revise the argument, I said:  Can we point out any

+difference between the congenial and the like?  For if that is possible,

+then I think, Lysis and Menexenus, there may be some sense in our argument

+about friendship.  But if the congenial is only the like, how will you get

+rid of the other argument, of the uselessness of like to like in as far as

+they are like; for to say that what is useless is dear, would be absurd? 

+Suppose, then, that we agree to distinguish between the congenial and the

+like--in the intoxication of argument, that may perhaps be allowed.

+

+Very true.

+

+And shall we further say that the good is congenial, and the evil

+uncongenial to every one?  Or again that the evil is congenial to the evil,

+and the good to the good; and that which is neither good nor evil to that

+which is neither good nor evil?

+

+They agreed to the latter alternative.

+

+Then, my boys, we have again fallen into the old discarded error; for the

+unjust will be the friend of the unjust, and the bad of the bad, as well as

+the good of the good.

+

+That appears to be the result.

+

+But again, if we say that the congenial is the same as the good, in that

+case the good and he only will be the friend of the good.

+

+True.

+

+But that too was a position of ours which, as you will remember, has been

+already refuted by ourselves.

+

+We remember.

+

+Then what is to be done?  Or rather is there anything to be done?  I can

+only, like the wise men who argue in courts, sum up the arguments:--If

+neither the beloved, nor the lover, nor the like, nor the unlike, nor the

+good, nor the congenial, nor any other of whom we spoke--for there were

+such a number of them that I cannot remember all--if none of these are

+friends, I know not what remains to be said.

+

+Here I was going to invite the opinion of some older person, when suddenly

+we were interrupted by the tutors of Lysis and Menexenus, who came upon us

+like an evil apparition with their brothers, and bade them go home, as it

+was getting late.  At first, we and the by-standers drove them off; but

+afterwards, as they would not mind, and only went on shouting in their

+barbarous dialect, and got angry, and kept calling the boys--they appeared

+to us to have been drinking rather too much at the Hermaea, which made them

+difficult to manage--we fairly gave way and broke up the company.

+

+I said, however, a few words to the boys at parting:  O Menexenus and

+Lysis, how ridiculous that you two boys, and I, an old boy, who would fain

+be one of you, should imagine ourselves to be friends--this is what the by-

+standers will go away and say--and as yet we have not been able to discover

+what is a friend!

+

+

+

+End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Lysis by Plato

+

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