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diff --git a/1579-h/1579-h.htm b/1579-h/1579-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb89312 --- /dev/null +++ b/1579-h/1579-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,2489 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="us-ascii"?> + +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd" > + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en"> + <head> + <title> + Lysis, by Plato + </title> + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .25em; margin-bottom: .25em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3em; font-size: 90%; } + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {display:inline; font-size: 70%; font-style:normal; + margin: 0; padding: 0; position: absolute; right: 1%; + text-align: right;} + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 90%; margin-left: 10%;} + +</style> + </head> + <body> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Lysis, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Lysis + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Release Date: August 24, 2008 [EBook #1579] +Last Updated: January 15, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LYSIS *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + + + + + +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h1> + LYSIS + </h1> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h2> + By Plato + </h2> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Translated by Benjamin Jowett + </h3> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Contents + </h3> + <table summary="" style="margin-right: auto; margin-left: auto"> + <tr> + <td> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_INTR"> INTRODUCTION. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0002"> LYSIS, OR FRIENDSHIP </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0003"> PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE </a> + </p> + </td> + </tr> + </table> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> <a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION. + </h2> + <p> + No answer is given in the Lysis to the question, 'What is Friendship?' any + more than in the Charmides to the question, 'What is Temperance?' There + are several resemblances in the two Dialogues: the same youthfulness and + sense of beauty pervades both of them; they are alike rich in the + description of Greek life. The question is again raised of the relation of + knowledge to virtue and good, which also recurs in the Laches; and + Socrates appears again as the elder friend of the two boys, Lysis and + Menexenus. In the Charmides, as also in the Laches, he is described as + middle-aged; in the Lysis he is advanced in years. + </p> + <p> + The Dialogue consists of two scenes or conversations which seem to have no + relation to each other. The first is a conversation between Socrates and + Lysis, who, like Charmides, is an Athenian youth of noble descent and of + great beauty, goodness, and intelligence: this is carried on in the + absence of Menexenus, who is called away to take part in a sacrifice. + Socrates asks Lysis whether his father and mother do not love him very + much? 'To be sure they do.' 'Then of course they allow him to do exactly + as he likes.' 'Of course not: the very slaves have more liberty than he + has.' 'But how is this?' 'The reason is that he is not old enough.' 'No; + the real reason is that he is not wise enough: for are there not some + things which he is allowed to do, although he is not allowed to do + others?' 'Yes, because he knows them, and does not know the others.' This + leads to the conclusion that all men everywhere will trust him in what he + knows, but not in what he does not know; for in such matters he will be + unprofitable to them, and do them no good. And no one will love him, if he + does them no good; and he can only do them good by knowledge; and as he is + still without knowledge, he can have as yet no conceit of knowledge. In + this manner Socrates reads a lesson to Hippothales, the foolish lover of + Lysis, respecting the style of conversation which he should address to his + beloved. + </p> + <p> + After the return of Menexenus, Socrates, at the request of Lysis, asks him + a new question: 'What is friendship? You, Menexenus, who have a friend + already, can tell me, who am always longing to find one, what is the + secret of this great blessing.' + </p> + <p> + When one man loves another, which is the friend—he who loves, or he + who is loved? Or are both friends? From the first of these suppositions + they are driven to the second; and from the second to the third; and + neither the two boys nor Socrates are satisfied with any of the three or + with all of them. Socrates turns to the poets, who affirm that God brings + like to like (Homer), and to philosophers (Empedocles), who also assert + that like is the friend of like. But the bad are not friends, for they are + not even like themselves, and still less are they like one another. And + the good have no need of one another, and therefore do not care about one + another. Moreover there are others who say that likeness is a cause of + aversion, and unlikeness of love and friendship; and they too adduce the + authority of poets and philosophers in support of their doctrines; for + Hesiod says that 'potter is jealous of potter, bard of bard;' and subtle + doctors tell us that 'moist is the friend of dry, hot of cold,' and the + like. But neither can their doctrine be maintained; for then the just + would be the friend of the unjust, good of evil. + </p> + <p> + Thus we arrive at the conclusion that like is not the friend of like, nor + unlike of unlike; and therefore good is not the friend of good, nor evil + of evil, nor good of evil, nor evil of good. What remains but that the + indifferent, which is neither good nor evil, should be the friend (not of + the indifferent, for that would be 'like the friend of like,' but) of the + good, or rather of the beautiful? + </p> + <p> + But why should the indifferent have this attachment to the beautiful or + good? There are circumstances under which such an attachment would be + natural. Suppose the indifferent, say the human body, to be desirous of + getting rid of some evil, such as disease, which is not essential but only + accidental to it (for if the evil were essential the body would cease to + be indifferent, and would become evil)—in such a case the + indifferent becomes a friend of the good for the sake of getting rid of + the evil. In this intermediate 'indifferent' position the philosopher or + lover of wisdom stands: he is not wise, and yet not unwise, but he has + ignorance accidentally clinging to him, and he yearns for wisdom as the + cure of the evil. (Symp.) + </p> + <p> + After this explanation has been received with triumphant accord, a fresh + dissatisfaction begins to steal over the mind of Socrates: Must not + friendship be for the sake of some ulterior end? and what can that final + cause or end of friendship be, other than the good? But the good is + desired by us only as the cure of evil; and therefore if there were no + evil there would be no friendship. Some other explanation then has to be + devised. May not desire be the source of friendship? And desire is of what + a man wants and of what is congenial to him. But then the congenial cannot + be the same as the like; for like, as has been already shown, cannot be + the friend of like. Nor can the congenial be the good; for good is not the + friend of good, as has been also shown. The problem is unsolved, and the + three friends, Socrates, Lysis, and Menexenus, are still unable to find + out what a friend is. + </p> + <p> + Thus, as in the Charmides and Laches, and several of the other Dialogues + of Plato (compare especially the Protagoras and Theaetetus), no conclusion + is arrived at. Socrates maintains his character of a 'know nothing;' but + the boys have already learned the lesson which he is unable to teach them, + and they are free from the conceit of knowledge. (Compare Chrm.) The + dialogue is what would be called in the language of Thrasyllus tentative + or inquisitive. The subject is continued in the Phaedrus and Symposium, + and treated, with a manifest reference to the Lysis, in the eighth and + ninth books of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. As in other writings + of Plato (for example, the Republic), there is a progress from unconscious + morality, illustrated by the friendship of the two youths, and also by the + sayings of the poets ('who are our fathers in wisdom,' and yet only tell + us half the truth, and in this particular instance are not much improved + upon by the philosophers), to a more comprehensive notion of friendship. + This, however, is far from being cleared of its perplexity. Two notions + appear to be struggling or balancing in the mind of Socrates:—First, + the sense that friendship arises out of human needs and wants; Secondly, + that the higher form or ideal of friendship exists only for the sake of + the good. That friends are not necessarily either like or unlike, is also + a truth confirmed by experience. But the use of the terms 'like' or 'good' + is too strictly limited; Socrates has allowed himself to be carried away + by a sort of eristic or illogical logic against which no definition of + friendship would be able to stand. In the course of the argument he makes + a distinction between property and accident which is a real contribution + to the science of logic. Some higher truths appear through the mist. The + manner in which the field of argument is widened, as in the Charmides and + Laches by the introduction of the idea of knowledge, so here by the + introduction of the good, is deserving of attention. The sense of the + inter-dependence of good and evil, and the allusion to the possibility of + the non-existence of evil, are also very remarkable. + </p> + <p> + The dialectical interest is fully sustained by the dramatic + accompaniments. Observe, first, the scene, which is a Greek Palaestra, at + a time when a sacrifice is going on, and the Hermaea are in course of + celebration; secondly, the 'accustomed irony' of Socrates, who declares, + as in the Symposium, that he is ignorant of all other things, but claims + to have a knowledge of the mysteries of love. There are likewise several + contrasts of character; first of the dry, caustic Ctesippus, of whom + Socrates professes a humorous sort of fear, and Hippothales the flighty + lover, who murders sleep by bawling out the name of his beloved; there is + also a contrast between the false, exaggerated, sentimental love of + Hippothales towards Lysis, and the childlike and innocent friendship of + the boys with one another. Some difference appears to be intended between + the characters of the more talkative Menexenus and the reserved and simple + Lysis. Socrates draws out the latter by a new sort of irony, which is + sometimes adopted in talking to children, and consists in asking a leading + question which can only be answered in a sense contrary to the intention + of the question: 'Your father and mother of course allow you to drive the + chariot?' 'No they do not.' When Menexenus returns, the serious dialectic + begins. He is described as 'very pugnacious,' and we are thus prepared for + the part which a mere youth takes in a difficult argument. But Plato has + not forgotten dramatic propriety, and Socrates proposes at last to refer + the question to some older person. + </p> + <p> + SOME QUESTIONS RELATING TO FRIENDSHIP. + </p> + <p> + The subject of friendship has a lower place in the modern than in the + ancient world, partly because a higher place is assigned by us to love and + marriage. The very meaning of the word has become slighter and more + superficial; it seems almost to be borrowed from the ancients, and has + nearly disappeared in modern treatises on Moral Philosophy. The received + examples of friendship are to be found chiefly among the Greeks and + Romans. Hence the casuistical or other questions which arise out of the + relations of friends have not often been considered seriously in modern + times. Many of them will be found to be the same which are discussed in + the Lysis. We may ask with Socrates, 1) whether friendship is 'of similars + or dissimilars,' or of both; 2) whether such a tie exists between the good + only and for the sake of the good; or 3) whether there may not be some + peculiar attraction, which draws together 'the neither good nor evil' for + the sake of the good and because of the evil; 4) whether friendship is + always mutual,—may there not be a one-sided and unrequited + friendship? This question, which, like many others, is only one of a laxer + or stricter use of words, seems to have greatly exercised the minds both + of Aristotle and Plato. + </p> + <p> + 5) Can we expect friendship to be permanent, or must we acknowledge with + Cicero, 'Nihil difficilius quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitae + permanere'? Is not friendship, even more than love, liable to be swayed by + the caprices of fancy? The person who pleased us most at first sight or + upon a slight acquaintance, when we have seen him again, and under + different circumstances, may make a much less favourable impression on our + minds. Young people swear 'eternal friendships,' but at these innocent + perjuries their elders laugh. No one forms a friendship with the intention + of renouncing it; yet in the course of a varied life it is practically + certain that many changes will occur of feeling, opinion, locality, + occupation, fortune, which will divide us from some persons and unite us + to others. 6) There is an ancient saying, Qui amicos amicum non habet. But + is not some less exclusive form of friendship better suited to the + condition and nature of man? And in those especially who have no family + ties, may not the feeling pass beyond one or a few, and embrace all with + whom we come into contact, and, perhaps in a few passionate and exalted + natures, all men everywhere? 7) The ancients had their three kinds of + friendship, 'for the sake of the pleasant, the useful, and the good:' is + the last to be resolved into the two first; or are the two first to be + included in the last? The subject was puzzling to them: they could not say + that friendship was only a quality, or a relation, or a virtue, or a kind + of virtue; and they had not in the age of Plato reached the point of + regarding it, like justice, as a form or attribute of virtue. They had + another perplexity: 8) How could one of the noblest feelings of human + nature be so near to one of the most detestable corruptions of it? + (Compare Symposium; Laws). + </p> + <p> + Leaving the Greek or ancient point of view, we may regard the question in + a more general way. Friendship is the union of two persons in mutual + affection and remembrance of one another. The friend can do for his friend + what he cannot do for himself. He can give him counsel in time of + difficulty; he can teach him 'to see himself as others see him'; he can + stand by him, when all the world are against him; he can gladden and + enlighten him by his presence; he 'can divide his sorrows,' he can 'double + his joys;' he can anticipate his wants. He will discover ways of helping + him without creating a sense of his own superiority; he will find out his + mental trials, but only that he may minister to them. Among true friends + jealousy has no place: they do not complain of one another for making new + friends, or for not revealing some secret of their lives; (in friendship + too there must be reserves;) they do not intrude upon one another, and + they mutually rejoice in any good which happens to either of them, though + it may be to the loss of the other. They may live apart and have little + intercourse, but when they meet, the old tie is as strong as ever—according + to the common saying, they find one another always the same. The greatest + good of friendship is not daily intercourse, for circumstances rarely + admit of this; but on the great occasions of life, when the advice of a + friend is needed, then the word spoken in season about conduct, about + health, about marriage, about business,—the letter written from a + distance by a disinterested person who sees with clearer eyes may be of + inestimable value. When the heart is failing and despair is setting in, + then to hear the voice or grasp the hand of a friend, in a shipwreck, in a + defeat, in some other failure or misfortune, may restore the necessary + courage and composure to the paralysed and disordered mind, and convert + the feeble person into a hero; (compare Symposium). + </p> + <p> + It is true that friendships are apt to be disappointing: either we expect + too much from them; or we are indolent and do not 'keep them in repair;' + or being admitted to intimacy with another, we see his faults too clearly + and lose our respect for him; and he loses his affection for us. + Friendships may be too violent; and they may be too sensitive. The egotism + of one of the parties may be too much for the other. The word of counsel + or sympathy has been uttered too obtrusively, at the wrong time, or in the + wrong manner; or the need of it has not been perceived until too late. 'Oh + if he had only told me' has been the silent thought of many a troubled + soul. And some things have to be indicated rather than spoken, because the + very mention of them tends to disturb the equability of friendship. The + alienation of friends, like many other human evils, is commonly due to a + want of tact and insight. There is not enough of the Scimus et hanc veniam + petimusque damusque vicissim. The sweet draught of sympathy is not + inexhaustible; and it tends to weaken the person who too freely partakes + of it. Thus we see that there are many causes which impair the happiness + of friends. + </p> + <p> + We may expect a friendship almost divine, such as philosophers have + sometimes dreamed of: we find what is human. The good of it is necessarily + limited; it does not take the place of marriage; it affords rather a + solace than an arm of support. It had better not be based on pecuniary + obligations; these more often mar than make a friendship. It is most + likely to be permanent when the two friends are equal and independent, or + when they are engaged together in some common work or have some public + interest in common. It exists among the bad or inferior sort of men almost + as much as among the good; the bad and good, and 'the neither bad nor + good,' are drawn together in a strange manner by personal attachment. The + essence of it is loyalty, without which it would cease to be friendship. + </p> + <p> + Another question 9) may be raised, whether friendship can safely exist + between young persons of different sexes, not connected by ties of + relationship, and without the thought of love or marriage; whether, again, + a wife or a husband should have any intimate friend, besides his or her + partner in marriage. The answer to this latter question is rather + perplexing, and would probably be different in different countries + (compare Sympos.). While we do not deny that great good may result from + such attachments, for the mind may be drawn out and the character enlarged + by them; yet we feel also that they are attended with many dangers, and + that this Romance of Heavenly Love requires a strength, a freedom from + passion, a self-control, which, in youth especially, are rarely to be + found. The propriety of such friendships must be estimated a good deal by + the manner in which public opinion regards them; they must be reconciled + with the ordinary duties of life; and they must be justified by the + result. + </p> + <p> + Yet another question, 10). Admitting that friendships cannot be always + permanent, we may ask when and upon what conditions should they be + dissolved. It would be futile to retain the name when the reality has + ceased to be. That two friends should part company whenever the relation + between them begins to drag may be better for both of them. But then + arises the consideration, how should these friends in youth or friends of + the past regard or be regarded by one another? They are parted, but there + still remain duties mutually owing by them. They will not admit the world + to share in their difference any more than in their friendship; the memory + of an old attachment, like the memory of the dead, has a kind of + sacredness for them on which they will not allow others to intrude. + Neither, if they were ever worthy to bear the name of friends, will either + of them entertain any enmity or dislike of the other who was once so much + to him. Neither will he by 'shadowed hint reveal' the secrets great or + small which an unfortunate mistake has placed within his reach. He who is + of a noble mind will dwell upon his own faults rather than those of + another, and will be ready to take upon himself the blame of their + separation. He will feel pain at the loss of a friend; and he will + remember with gratitude his ancient kindness. But he will not lightly + renew a tie which has not been lightly broken...These are a few of the + Problems of Friendship, some of them suggested by the Lysis, others by + modern life, which he who wishes to make or keep a friend may profitably + study. (Compare Bacon, Essay on Friendship; Cic. de Amicitia.) + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0002" id="link2H_4_0002"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h1> + LYSIS, OR FRIENDSHIP + </h1> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0003" id="link2H_4_0003"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: + </h2> + <h3> + Socrates, who is the narrator, Menexenus, Hippothales, Lysis, Ctesippus. + </h3> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <p> + SCENE: A newly-erected Palaestra outside the walls of Athens. + </p> + <p> + I was going from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, intending to take the + outer road, which is close under the wall. When I came to the postern gate + of the city, which is by the fountain of Panops, I fell in with + Hippothales, the son of Hieronymus, and Ctesippus the Paeanian, and a + company of young men who were standing with them. Hippothales, seeing me + approach, asked whence I came and whither I was going. + </p> + <p> + I am going, I replied, from the Academy straight to the Lyceum. + </p> + <p> + Then come straight to us, he said, and put in here; you may as well. + </p> + <p> + Who are you, I said; and where am I to come? + </p> + <p> + He showed me an enclosed space and an open door over against the wall. And + there, he said, is the building at which we all meet: and a goodly company + we are. + </p> + <p> + And what is this building, I asked; and what sort of entertainment have + you? + </p> + <p> + The building, he replied, is a newly erected Palaestra; and the + entertainment is generally conversation, to which you are welcome. + </p> + <p> + Thank you, I said; and is there any teacher there? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, your old friend and admirer, Miccus. + </p> + <p> + Indeed, I replied; he is a very eminent professor. + </p> + <p> + Are you disposed, he said, to go with me and see them? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said; but I should like to know first, what is expected of me, and + who is the favourite among you? + </p> + <p> + Some persons have one favourite, Socrates, and some another, he said. + </p> + <p> + And who is yours? I asked: tell me that, Hippothales. + </p> + <p> + At this he blushed; and I said to him, O Hippothales, thou son of + Hieronymus! do not say that you are, or that you are not, in love; the + confession is too late; for I see that you are not only in love, but are + already far gone in your love. Simple and foolish as I am, the Gods have + given me the power of understanding affections of this kind. + </p> + <p> + Whereupon he blushed more and more. + </p> + <p> + Ctesippus said: I like to see you blushing, Hippothales, and hesitating to + tell Socrates the name; when, if he were with you but for a very short + time, you would have plagued him to death by talking about nothing else. + Indeed, Socrates, he has literally deafened us, and stopped our ears with + the praises of Lysis; and if he is a little intoxicated, there is every + likelihood that we may have our sleep murdered with a cry of Lysis. His + performances in prose are bad enough, but nothing at all in comparison + with his verse; and when he drenches us with his poems and other + compositions, it is really too bad; and worse still is his manner of + singing them to his love; he has a voice which is truly appalling, and we + cannot help hearing him: and now having a question put to him by you, + behold he is blushing. + </p> + <p> + Who is Lysis? I said: I suppose that he must be young; for the name does + not recall any one to me. + </p> + <p> + Why, he said, his father being a very well-known man, he retains his + patronymic, and is not as yet commonly called by his own name; but, + although you do not know his name, I am sure that you must know his face, + for that is quite enough to distinguish him. + </p> + <p> + But tell me whose son he is, I said. + </p> + <p> + He is the eldest son of Democrates, of the deme of Aexone. + </p> + <p> + Ah, Hippothales, I said; what a noble and really perfect love you have + found! I wish that you would favour me with the exhibition which you have + been making to the rest of the company, and then I shall be able to judge + whether you know what a lover ought to say about his love, either to the + youth himself, or to others. + </p> + <p> + Nay, Socrates, he said; you surely do not attach any importance to what he + is saying. + </p> + <p> + Do you mean, I said, that you disown the love of the person whom he says + that you love? + </p> + <p> + No; but I deny that I make verses or address compositions to him. + </p> + <p> + He is not in his right mind, said Ctesippus; he is talking nonsense, and + is stark mad. + </p> + <p> + O Hippothales, I said, if you have ever made any verses or songs in honour + of your favourite, I do not want to hear them; but I want to know the + purport of them, that I may be able to judge of your mode of approaching + your fair one. + </p> + <p> + Ctesippus will be able to tell you, he said; for if, as he avers, the + sound of my words is always dinning in his ears, he must have a very + accurate knowledge and recollection of them. + </p> + <p> + Yes, indeed, said Ctesippus; I know only too well; and very ridiculous the + tale is: for although he is a lover, and very devotedly in love, he has + nothing particular to talk about to his beloved which a child might not + say. Now is not that ridiculous? He can only speak of the wealth of + Democrates, which the whole city celebrates, and grandfather Lysis, and + the other ancestors of the youth, and their stud of horses, and their + victory at the Pythian games, and at the Isthmus, and at Nemea with four + horses and single horses—these are the tales which he composes and + repeats. And there is greater twaddle still. Only the day before yesterday + he made a poem in which he described the entertainment of Heracles, who + was a connexion of the family, setting forth how in virtue of this + relationship he was hospitably received by an ancestor of Lysis; this + ancestor was himself begotten of Zeus by the daughter of the founder of + the deme. And these are the sort of old wives' tales which he sings and + recites to us, and we are obliged to listen to him. + </p> + <p> + When I heard this, I said: O ridiculous Hippothales! how can you be making + and singing hymns in honour of yourself before you have won? + </p> + <p> + But my songs and verses, he said, are not in honour of myself, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + You think not? I said. + </p> + <p> + Nay, but what do you think? he replied. + </p> + <p> + Most assuredly, I said, those songs are all in your own honour; for if you + win your beautiful love, your discourses and songs will be a glory to you, + and may be truly regarded as hymns of praise composed in honour of you who + have conquered and won such a love; but if he slips away from you, the + more you have praised him, the more ridiculous you will look at having + lost this fairest and best of blessings; and therefore the wise lover does + not praise his beloved until he has won him, because he is afraid of + accidents. There is also another danger; the fair, when any one praises or + magnifies them, are filled with the spirit of pride and vain-glory. Do you + not agree with me? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said. + </p> + <p> + And the more vain-glorious they are, the more difficult is the capture of + them? + </p> + <p> + I believe you. + </p> + <p> + What should you say of a hunter who frightened away his prey, and made the + capture of the animals which he is hunting more difficult? + </p> + <p> + He would be a bad hunter, undoubtedly. + </p> + <p> + Yes; and if, instead of soothing them, he were to infuriate them with + words and songs, that would show a great want of wit: do you not agree. + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And now reflect, Hippothales, and see whether you are not guilty of all + these errors in writing poetry. For I can hardly suppose that you will + affirm a man to be a good poet who injures himself by his poetry. + </p> + <p> + Assuredly not, he said; such a poet would be a fool. And this is the + reason why I take you into my counsels, Socrates, and I shall be glad of + any further advice which you may have to offer. Will you tell me by what + words or actions I may become endeared to my love? + </p> + <p> + That is not easy to determine, I said; but if you will bring your love to + me, and will let me talk with him, I may perhaps be able to show you how + to converse with him, instead of singing and reciting in the fashion of + which you are accused. + </p> + <p> + There will be no difficulty in bringing him, he replied; if you will only + go with Ctesippus into the Palaestra, and sit down and talk, I believe + that he will come of his own accord; for he is fond of listening, + Socrates. And as this is the festival of the Hermaea, the young men and + boys are all together, and there is no separation between them. He will be + sure to come: but if he does not, Ctesippus with whom he is familiar, and + whose relation Menexenus is his great friend, shall call him. + </p> + <p> + That will be the way, I said. Thereupon I led Ctesippus into the + Palaestra, and the rest followed. + </p> + <p> + Upon entering we found that the boys had just been sacrificing; and this + part of the festival was nearly at an end. They were all in their white + array, and games at dice were going on among them. Most of them were in + the outer court amusing themselves; but some were in a corner of the + Apodyterium playing at odd and even with a number of dice, which they took + out of little wicker baskets. There was also a circle of lookers-on; among + them was Lysis. He was standing with the other boys and youths, having a + crown upon his head, like a fair vision, and not less worthy of praise for + his goodness than for his beauty. We left them, and went over to the + opposite side of the room, where, finding a quiet place, we sat down; and + then we began to talk. This attracted Lysis, who was constantly turning + round to look at us—he was evidently wanting to come to us. For a + time he hesitated and had not the courage to come alone; but first of all, + his friend Menexenus, leaving his play, entered the Palaestra from the + court, and when he saw Ctesippus and myself, was going to take a seat by + us; and then Lysis, seeing him, followed, and sat down by his side; and + the other boys joined. I should observe that Hippothales, when he saw the + crowd, got behind them, where he thought that he would be out of sight of + Lysis, lest he should anger him; and there he stood and listened. + </p> + <p> + I turned to Menexenus, and said: Son of Demophon, which of you two youths + is the elder? + </p> + <p> + That is a matter of dispute between us, he said. + </p> + <p> + And which is the nobler? Is that also a matter of dispute? + </p> + <p> + Yes, certainly. + </p> + <p> + And another disputed point is, which is the fairer? + </p> + <p> + The two boys laughed. + </p> + <p> + I shall not ask which is the richer of the two, I said; for you are + friends, are you not? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, they replied. + </p> + <p> + And friends have all things in common, so that one of you can be no richer + than the other, if you say truly that you are friends. + </p> + <p> + They assented. I was about to ask which was the juster of the two, and + which was the wiser of the two; but at this moment Menexenus was called + away by some one who came and said that the gymnastic-master wanted him. I + supposed that he had to offer sacrifice. So he went away, and I asked + Lysis some more questions. I dare say, Lysis, I said, that your father and + mother love you very much. + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he said. + </p> + <p> + And they would wish you to be perfectly happy. + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + But do you think that any one is happy who is in the condition of a slave, + and who cannot do what he likes? + </p> + <p> + I should think not indeed, he said. + </p> + <p> + And if your father and mother love you, and desire that you should be + happy, no one can doubt that they are very ready to promote your + happiness. + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And do they then permit you to do what you like, and never rebuke you or + hinder you from doing what you desire? + </p> + <p> + Yes, indeed, Socrates; there are a great many things which they hinder me + from doing. + </p> + <p> + What do you mean? I said. Do they want you to be happy, and yet hinder you + from doing what you like? for example, if you want to mount one of your + father's chariots, and take the reins at a race, they will not allow you + to do so—they will prevent you? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he said, they will not allow me to do so. + </p> + <p> + Whom then will they allow? + </p> + <p> + There is a charioteer, whom my father pays for driving. + </p> + <p> + And do they trust a hireling more than you? and may he do what he likes + with the horses? and do they pay him for this? + </p> + <p> + They do. + </p> + <p> + But I dare say that you may take the whip and guide the mule-cart if you + like;—they will permit that? + </p> + <p> + Permit me! indeed they will not. + </p> + <p> + Then, I said, may no one use the whip to the mules? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, the muleteer. + </p> + <p> + And is he a slave or a free man? + </p> + <p> + A slave, he said. + </p> + <p> + And do they esteem a slave of more value than you who are their son? And + do they entrust their property to him rather than to you? and allow him to + do what he likes, when they prohibit you? Answer me now: Are you your own + master, or do they not even allow that? + </p> + <p> + Nay, he said; of course they do not allow it. + </p> + <p> + Then you have a master? + </p> + <p> + Yes, my tutor; there he is. + </p> + <p> + And is he a slave? + </p> + <p> + To be sure; he is our slave, he replied. + </p> + <p> + Surely, I said, this is a strange thing, that a free man should be + governed by a slave. And what does he do with you? + </p> + <p> + He takes me to my teachers. + </p> + <p> + You do not mean to say that your teachers also rule over you? + </p> + <p> + Of course they do. + </p> + <p> + Then I must say that your father is pleased to inflict many lords and + masters on you. But at any rate when you go home to your mother, she will + let you have your own way, and will not interfere with your happiness; her + wool, or the piece of cloth which she is weaving, are at your disposal: I + am sure that there is nothing to hinder you from touching her wooden + spathe, or her comb, or any other of her spinning implements. + </p> + <p> + Nay, Socrates, he replied, laughing; not only does she hinder me, but I + should be beaten if I were to touch one of them. + </p> + <p> + Well, I said, this is amazing. And did you ever behave ill to your father + or your mother? + </p> + <p> + No, indeed, he replied. + </p> + <p> + But why then are they so terribly anxious to prevent you from being happy, + and doing as you like?—keeping you all day long in subjection to + another, and, in a word, doing nothing which you desire; so that you have + no good, as would appear, out of their great possessions, which are under + the control of anybody rather than of you, and have no use of your own + fair person, which is tended and taken care of by another; while you, + Lysis, are master of nobody, and can do nothing? + </p> + <p> + Why, he said, Socrates, the reason is that I am not of age. + </p> + <p> + I doubt whether that is the real reason, I said; for I should imagine that + your father Democrates, and your mother, do permit you to do many things + already, and do not wait until you are of age: for example, if they want + anything read or written, you, I presume, would be the first person in the + house who is summoned by them. + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + And you would be allowed to write or read the letters in any order which + you please, or to take up the lyre and tune the notes, and play with the + fingers, or strike with the plectrum, exactly as you please, and neither + father nor mother would interfere with you. + </p> + <p> + That is true, he said. + </p> + <p> + Then what can be the reason, Lysis, I said, why they allow you to do the + one and not the other? + </p> + <p> + I suppose, he said, because I understand the one, and not the other. + </p> + <p> + Yes, my dear youth, I said, the reason is not any deficiency of years, but + a deficiency of knowledge; and whenever your father thinks that you are + wiser than he is, he will instantly commit himself and his possessions to + you. + </p> + <p> + I think so. + </p> + <p> + Aye, I said; and about your neighbour, too, does not the same rule hold as + about your father? If he is satisfied that you know more of housekeeping + than he does, will he continue to administer his affairs himself, or will + he commit them to you? + </p> + <p> + I think that he will commit them to me. + </p> + <p> + Will not the Athenian people, too, entrust their affairs to you when they + see that you have wisdom enough to manage them? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And oh! let me put another case, I said: There is the great king, and he + has an eldest son, who is the Prince of Asia;—suppose that you and I + go to him and establish to his satisfaction that we are better cooks than + his son, will he not entrust to us the prerogative of making soup, and + putting in anything that we like while the pot is boiling, rather than to + the Prince of Asia, who is his son? + </p> + <p> + To us, clearly. + </p> + <p> + And we shall be allowed to throw in salt by handfuls, whereas the son will + not be allowed to put in as much as he can take up between his fingers? + </p> + <p> + Of course. + </p> + <p> + Or suppose again that the son has bad eyes, will he allow him, or will he + not allow him, to touch his own eyes if he thinks that he has no knowledge + of medicine? + </p> + <p> + He will not allow him. + </p> + <p> + Whereas, if he supposes us to have a knowledge of medicine, he will allow + us to do what we like with him—even to open the eyes wide and + sprinkle ashes upon them, because he supposes that we know what is best? + </p> + <p> + That is true. + </p> + <p> + And everything in which we appear to him to be wiser than himself or his + son he will commit to us? + </p> + <p> + That is very true, Socrates, he replied. + </p> + <p> + Then now, my dear Lysis, I said, you perceive that in things which we know + every one will trust us,—Hellenes and barbarians, men and women,—and + we may do as we please about them, and no one will like to interfere with + us; we shall be free, and masters of others; and these things will be + really ours, for we shall be benefited by them. But in things of which we + have no understanding, no one will trust us to do as seems good to us—they + will hinder us as far as they can; and not only strangers, but father and + mother, and the friend, if there be one, who is dearer still, will also + hinder us; and we shall be subject to others; and these things will not be + ours, for we shall not be benefited by them. Do you agree? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + And shall we be friends to others, and will any others love us, in as far + as we are useless to them? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + Neither can your father or mother love you, nor can anybody love anybody + else, in so far as they are useless to them? + </p> + <p> + No. + </p> + <p> + And therefore, my boy, if you are wise, all men will be your friends and + kindred, for you will be useful and good; but if you are not wise, neither + father, nor mother, nor kindred, nor any one else, will be your friends. + And in matters of which you have as yet no knowledge, can you have any + conceit of knowledge? + </p> + <p> + That is impossible, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And you, Lysis, if you require a teacher, have not yet attained to wisdom. + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And therefore you are not conceited, having nothing of which to be + conceited. + </p> + <p> + Indeed, Socrates, I think not. + </p> + <p> + When I heard him say this, I turned to Hippothales, and was very nearly + making a blunder, for I was going to say to him: That is the way, + Hippothales, in which you should talk to your beloved, humbling and + lowering him, and not as you do, puffing him up and spoiling him. But I + saw that he was in great excitement and confusion at what had been said, + and I remembered that, although he was in the neighbourhood, he did not + want to be seen by Lysis; so upon second thoughts I refrained. + </p> + <p> + In the meantime Menexenus came back and sat down in his place by Lysis; + and Lysis, in a childish and affectionate manner, whispered privately in + my ear, so that Menexenus should not hear: Do, Socrates, tell Menexenus + what you have been telling me. + </p> + <p> + Suppose that you tell him yourself, Lysis, I replied; for I am sure that + you were attending. + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he replied. + </p> + <p> + Try, then, to remember the words, and be as exact as you can in repeating + them to him, and if you have forgotten anything, ask me again the next + time that you see me. + </p> + <p> + I will be sure to do so, Socrates; but go on telling him something new, + and let me hear, as long as I am allowed to stay. + </p> + <p> + I certainly cannot refuse, I said, since you ask me; but then, as you + know, Menexenus is very pugnacious, and therefore you must come to the + rescue if he attempts to upset me. + </p> + <p> + Yes, indeed, he said; he is very pugnacious, and that is the reason why I + want you to argue with him. + </p> + <p> + That I may make a fool of myself? + </p> + <p> + No, indeed, he said; but I want you to put him down. + </p> + <p> + That is no easy matter, I replied; for he is a terrible fellow—a + pupil of Ctesippus. And there is Ctesippus himself: do you see him? + </p> + <p> + Never mind, Socrates, you shall argue with him. + </p> + <p> + Well, I suppose that I must, I replied. + </p> + <p> + Hereupon Ctesippus complained that we were talking in secret, and keeping + the feast to ourselves. + </p> + <p> + I shall be happy, I said, to let you have a share. Here is Lysis, who does + not understand something that I was saying, and wants me to ask Menexenus, + who, as he thinks, is likely to know. + </p> + <p> + And why do you not ask him? he said. + </p> + <p> + Very well, I said, I will; and do you, Menexenus, answer. But first I must + tell you that I am one who from my childhood upward have set my heart upon + a certain thing. All people have their fancies; some desire horses, and + others dogs; and some are fond of gold, and others of honour. Now, I have + no violent desire of any of these things; but I have a passion for + friends; and I would rather have a good friend than the best cock or quail + in the world: I would even go further, and say the best horse or dog. Yea, + by the dog of Egypt, I should greatly prefer a real friend to all the gold + of Darius, or even to Darius himself: I am such a lover of friends as + that. And when I see you and Lysis, at your early age, so easily possessed + of this treasure, and so soon, he of you, and you of him, I am amazed and + delighted, seeing that I myself, although I am now advanced in years, am + so far from having made a similar acquisition, that I do not even know in + what way a friend is acquired. But I want to ask you a question about + this, for you have experience: tell me then, when one loves another, is + the lover or the beloved the friend; or may either be the friend? + </p> + <p> + Either may, I should think, be the friend of either. + </p> + <p> + Do you mean, I said, that if only one of them loves the other, they are + mutual friends? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said; that is my meaning. + </p> + <p> + But what if the lover is not loved in return? which is a very possible + case. + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Or is, perhaps, even hated? which is a fancy which sometimes is + entertained by lovers respecting their beloved. Nothing can exceed their + love; and yet they imagine either that they are not loved in return, or + that they are hated. Is not that true? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, quite true. + </p> + <p> + In that case, the one loves, and the other is loved? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Then which is the friend of which? Is the lover the friend of the beloved, + whether he be loved in return, or hated; or is the beloved the friend; or + is there no friendship at all on either side, unless they both love one + another? + </p> + <p> + There would seem to be none at all. + </p> + <p> + Then this notion is not in accordance with our previous one. We were + saying that both were friends, if one only loved; but now, unless they + both love, neither is a friend. + </p> + <p> + That appears to be true. + </p> + <p> + Then nothing which does not love in return is beloved by a lover? + </p> + <p> + I think not. + </p> + <p> + Then they are not lovers of horses, whom the horses do not love in return; + nor lovers of quails, nor of dogs, nor of wine, nor of gymnastic + exercises, who have no return of love; no, nor of wisdom, unless wisdom + loves them in return. Or shall we say that they do love them, although + they are not beloved by them; and that the poet was wrong who sings— + </p> + <p> + 'Happy the man to whom his children are dear, and steeds having single + hoofs, and dogs of chase, and the stranger of another land'? + </p> + <p> + I do not think that he was wrong. + </p> + <p> + You think that he is right? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Then, Menexenus, the conclusion is, that what is beloved, whether loving + or hating, may be dear to the lover of it: for example, very young + children, too young to love, or even hating their father or mother when + they are punished by them, are never dearer to them than at the time when + they are being hated by them. + </p> + <p> + I think that what you say is true. + </p> + <p> + And, if so, not the lover, but the beloved, is the friend or dear one? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And the hated one, and not the hater, is the enemy? + </p> + <p> + Clearly. + </p> + <p> + Then many men are loved by their enemies, and hated by their friends, and + are the friends of their enemies, and the enemies of their friends. Yet + how absurd, my dear friend, or indeed impossible is this paradox of a man + being an enemy to his friend or a friend to his enemy. + </p> + <p> + I quite agree, Socrates, in what you say. + </p> + <p> + But if this cannot be, the lover will be the friend of that which is + loved? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And the hater will be the enemy of that which is hated? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + Yet we must acknowledge in this, as in the preceding instance, that a man + may be the friend of one who is not his friend, or who may be his enemy, + when he loves that which does not love him or which even hates him. And he + may be the enemy of one who is not his enemy, and is even his friend: for + example, when he hates that which does not hate him, or which even loves + him. + </p> + <p> + That appears to be true. + </p> + <p> + But if the lover is not a friend, nor the beloved a friend, nor both + together, what are we to say? Whom are we to call friends to one another? + Do any remain? + </p> + <p> + Indeed, Socrates, I cannot find any. + </p> + <p> + But, O Menexenus! I said, may we not have been altogether wrong in our + conclusions? + </p> + <p> + I am sure that we have been wrong, Socrates, said Lysis. And he blushed as + he spoke, the words seeming to come from his lips involuntarily, because + his whole mind was taken up with the argument; there was no mistaking his + attentive look while he was listening. + </p> + <p> + I was pleased at the interest which was shown by Lysis, and I wanted to + give Menexenus a rest, so I turned to him and said, I think, Lysis, that + what you say is true, and that, if we had been right, we should never have + gone so far wrong; let us proceed no further in this direction (for the + road seems to be getting troublesome), but take the other path into which + we turned, and see what the poets have to say; for they are to us in a + manner the fathers and authors of wisdom, and they speak of friends in no + light or trivial manner, but God himself, as they say, makes them and + draws them to one another; and this they express, if I am not mistaken, in + the following words:— + </p> + <p> + 'God is ever drawing like towards like, and making them acquainted.' + </p> + <p> + I dare say that you have heard those words. + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said; I have. + </p> + <p> + And have you not also met with the treatises of philosophers who say that + like must love like? they are the people who argue and write about nature + and the universe. + </p> + <p> + Very true, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And are they right in saying this? + </p> + <p> + They may be. + </p> + <p> + Perhaps, I said, about half, or possibly, altogether, right, if their + meaning were rightly apprehended by us. For the more a bad man has to do + with a bad man, and the more nearly he is brought into contact with him, + the more he will be likely to hate him, for he injures him; and injurer + and injured cannot be friends. Is not that true? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said. + </p> + <p> + Then one half of the saying is untrue, if the wicked are like one another? + </p> + <p> + That is true. + </p> + <p> + But the real meaning of the saying, as I imagine, is, that the good are + like one another, and friends to one another; and that the bad, as is + often said of them, are never at unity with one another or with + themselves; for they are passionate and restless, and anything which is at + variance and enmity with itself is not likely to be in union or harmony + with any other thing. Do you not agree? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I do. + </p> + <p> + Then, my friend, those who say that the like is friendly to the like mean + to intimate, if I rightly apprehend them, that the good only is the friend + of the good, and of him only; but that the evil never attains to any real + friendship, either with good or evil. Do you agree? + </p> + <p> + He nodded assent. + </p> + <p> + Then now we know how to answer the question 'Who are friends?' for the + argument declares 'That the good are friends.' + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, that is true. + </p> + <p> + Yes, I replied; and yet I am not quite satisfied with this answer. By + heaven, and shall I tell you what I suspect? I will. Assuming that like, + inasmuch as he is like, is the friend of like, and useful to him—or + rather let me try another way of putting the matter: Can like do any good + or harm to like which he could not do to himself, or suffer anything from + his like which he would not suffer from himself? And if neither can be of + any use to the other, how can they be loved by one another? Can they now? + </p> + <p> + They cannot. + </p> + <p> + And can he who is not loved be a friend? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + But say that the like is not the friend of the like in so far as he is + like; still the good may be the friend of the good in so far as he is + good? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + But then again, will not the good, in so far as he is good, be sufficient + for himself? Certainly he will. And he who is sufficient wants nothing—that + is implied in the word sufficient. + </p> + <p> + Of course not. + </p> + <p> + And he who wants nothing will desire nothing? + </p> + <p> + He will not. + </p> + <p> + Neither can he love that which he does not desire? + </p> + <p> + He cannot. + </p> + <p> + And he who loves not is not a lover or friend? + </p> + <p> + Clearly not. + </p> + <p> + What place then is there for friendship, if, when absent, good men have no + need of one another (for even when alone they are sufficient for + themselves), and when present have no use of one another? How can such + persons ever be induced to value one another? + </p> + <p> + They cannot. + </p> + <p> + And friends they cannot be, unless they value one another? + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + But see now, Lysis, whether we are not being deceived in all this—are + we not indeed entirely wrong? + </p> + <p> + How so? he replied. + </p> + <p> + Have I not heard some one say, as I just now recollect, that the like is + the greatest enemy of the like, the good of the good?—Yes, and he + quoted the authority of Hesiod, who says: + </p> + <p> + 'Potter quarrels with potter, bard with bard, Beggar with beggar;' + </p> + <p> + and of all other things he affirmed, in like manner, 'That of necessity + the most like are most full of envy, strife, and hatred of one another, + and the most unlike, of friendship. For the poor man is compelled to be + the friend of the rich, and the weak requires the aid of the strong, and + the sick man of the physician; and every one who is ignorant, has to love + and court him who knows.' And indeed he went on to say in grandiloquent + language, that the idea of friendship existing between similars is not the + truth, but the very reverse of the truth, and that the most opposed are + the most friendly; for that everything desires not like but that which is + most unlike: for example, the dry desires the moist, the cold the hot, the + bitter the sweet, the sharp the blunt, the void the full, the full the + void, and so of all other things; for the opposite is the food of the + opposite, whereas like receives nothing from like. And I thought that he + who said this was a charming man, and that he spoke well. What do the rest + of you say? + </p> + <p> + I should say, at first hearing, that he is right, said Menexenus. + </p> + <p> + Then we are to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites? + </p> + <p> + Exactly. + </p> + <p> + Yes, Menexenus; but will not that be a monstrous answer? and will not the + all-wise eristics be down upon us in triumph, and ask, fairly enough, + whether love is not the very opposite of hate; and what answer shall we + make to them—must we not admit that they speak the truth? + </p> + <p> + We must. + </p> + <p> + They will then proceed to ask whether the enemy is the friend of the + friend, or the friend the friend of the enemy? + </p> + <p> + Neither, he replied. + </p> + <p> + Well, but is a just man the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of the + intemperate, or the good of the bad? + </p> + <p> + I do not see how that is possible. + </p> + <p> + And yet, I said, if friendship goes by contraries, the contraries must be + friends. + </p> + <p> + They must. + </p> + <p> + Then neither like and like nor unlike and unlike are friends. + </p> + <p> + I suppose not. + </p> + <p> + And yet there is a further consideration: may not all these notions of + friendship be erroneous? but may not that which is neither good nor evil + still in some cases be the friend of the good? + </p> + <p> + How do you mean? he said. + </p> + <p> + Why really, I said, the truth is that I do not know; but my head is dizzy + with thinking of the argument, and therefore I hazard the conjecture, that + 'the beautiful is the friend,' as the old proverb says. Beauty is + certainly a soft, smooth, slippery thing, and therefore of a nature which + easily slips in and permeates our souls. For I affirm that the good is the + beautiful. You will agree to that? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + This I say from a sort of notion that what is neither good nor evil is the + friend of the beautiful and the good, and I will tell you why I am + inclined to think so: I assume that there are three principles—the + good, the bad, and that which is neither good nor bad. You would agree—would + you not? + </p> + <p> + I agree. + </p> + <p> + And neither is the good the friend of the good, nor the evil of the evil, + nor the good of the evil;—these alternatives are excluded by the + previous argument; and therefore, if there be such a thing as friendship + or love at all, we must infer that what is neither good nor evil must be + the friend, either of the good, or of that which is neither good nor evil, + for nothing can be the friend of the bad. + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + But neither can like be the friend of like, as we were just now saying. + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And if so, that which is neither good nor evil can have no friend which is + neither good nor evil. + </p> + <p> + Clearly not. + </p> + <p> + Then the good alone is the friend of that only which is neither good nor + evil. + </p> + <p> + That may be assumed to be certain. + </p> + <p> + And does not this seem to put us in the right way? Just remark, that the + body which is in health requires neither medical nor any other aid, but is + well enough; and the healthy man has no love of the physician, because he + is in health. + </p> + <p> + He has none. + </p> + <p> + But the sick loves him, because he is sick? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + And sickness is an evil, and the art of medicine a good and useful thing? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + But the human body, regarded as a body, is neither good nor evil? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And the body is compelled by reason of disease to court and make friends + of the art of medicine? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Then that which is neither good nor evil becomes the friend of good, by + reason of the presence of evil? + </p> + <p> + So we may infer. + </p> + <p> + And clearly this must have happened before that which was neither good nor + evil had become altogether corrupted with the element of evil—if + itself had become evil it would not still desire and love the good; for, + as we were saying, the evil cannot be the friend of the good. + </p> + <p> + Impossible. + </p> + <p> + Further, I must observe that some substances are assimilated when others + are present with them; and there are some which are not assimilated: take, + for example, the case of an ointment or colour which is put on another + substance. + </p> + <p> + Very good. + </p> + <p> + In such a case, is the substance which is anointed the same as the colour + or ointment? + </p> + <p> + What do you mean? he said. + </p> + <p> + This is what I mean: Suppose that I were to cover your auburn locks with + white lead, would they be really white, or would they only appear to be + white? + </p> + <p> + They would only appear to be white, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And yet whiteness would be present in them? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + But that would not make them at all the more white, notwithstanding the + presence of white in them—they would not be white any more than + black? + </p> + <p> + No. + </p> + <p> + But when old age infuses whiteness into them, then they become + assimilated, and are white by the presence of white. + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + Now I want to know whether in all cases a substance is assimilated by the + presence of another substance; or must the presence be after a peculiar + sort? + </p> + <p> + The latter, he said. + </p> + <p> + Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of evil, + but not as yet evil, and that has happened before now? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And when anything is in the presence of evil, not being as yet evil, the + presence of good arouses the desire of good in that thing; but the + presence of evil, which makes a thing evil, takes away the desire and + friendship of the good; for that which was once both good and evil has now + become evil only, and the good was supposed to have no friendship with the + evil? + </p> + <p> + None. + </p> + <p> + And therefore we say that those who are already wise, whether Gods or men, + are no longer lovers of wisdom; nor can they be lovers of wisdom who are + ignorant to the extent of being evil, for no evil or ignorant person is a + lover of wisdom. There remain those who have the misfortune to be + ignorant, but are not yet hardened in their ignorance, or void of + understanding, and do not as yet fancy that they know what they do not + know: and therefore those who are the lovers of wisdom are as yet neither + good nor bad. But the bad do not love wisdom any more than the good; for, + as we have already seen, neither is unlike the friend of unlike, nor like + of like. You remember that? + </p> + <p> + Yes, they both said. + </p> + <p> + And so, Lysis and Menexenus, we have discovered the nature of friendship—there + can be no doubt of it: Friendship is the love which by reason of the + presence of evil the neither good nor evil has of the good, either in the + soul, or in the body, or anywhere. + </p> + <p> + They both agreed and entirely assented, and for a moment I rejoiced and + was satisfied like a huntsman just holding fast his prey. But then a most + unaccountable suspicion came across me, and I felt that the conclusion was + untrue. I was pained, and said, Alas! Lysis and Menexenus, I am afraid + that we have been grasping at a shadow only. + </p> + <p> + Why do you say so? said Menexenus. + </p> + <p> + I am afraid, I said, that the argument about friendship is false: + arguments, like men, are often pretenders. + </p> + <p> + How do you mean? he asked. + </p> + <p> + Well, I said; look at the matter in this way: a friend is the friend of + some one; is he not? + </p> + <p> + Certainly he is. + </p> + <p> + And has he a motive and object in being a friend, or has he no motive and + object? + </p> + <p> + He has a motive and object. + </p> + <p> + And is the object which makes him a friend, dear to him, or neither dear + nor hateful to him? + </p> + <p> + I do not quite follow you, he said. + </p> + <p> + I do not wonder at that, I said. But perhaps, if I put the matter in + another way, you will be able to follow me, and my own meaning will be + clearer to myself. The sick man, as I was just now saying, is the friend + of the physician—is he not? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And he is the friend of the physician because of disease, and for the sake + of health? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And disease is an evil? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + And what of health? I said. Is that good or evil, or neither? + </p> + <p> + Good, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And we were saying, I believe, that the body being neither good nor evil, + because of disease, that is to say because of evil, is the friend of + medicine, and medicine is a good: and medicine has entered into this + friendship for the sake of health, and health is a good. + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And is health a friend, or not a friend? + </p> + <p> + A friend. + </p> + <p> + And disease is an enemy? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Then that which is neither good nor evil is the friend of the good because + of the evil and hateful, and for the sake of the good and the friend? + </p> + <p> + Clearly. + </p> + <p> + Then the friend is a friend for the sake of the friend, and because of the + enemy? + </p> + <p> + That is to be inferred. + </p> + <p> + Then at this point, my boys, let us take heed, and be on our guard against + deceptions. I will not again repeat that the friend is the friend of the + friend, and the like of the like, which has been declared by us to be an + impossibility; but, in order that this new statement may not delude us, + let us attentively examine another point, which I will proceed to explain: + Medicine, as we were saying, is a friend, or dear to us for the sake of + health? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And health is also dear? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + And if dear, then dear for the sake of something? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And surely this object must also be dear, as is implied in our previous + admissions? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And that something dear involves something else dear? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + But then, proceeding in this way, shall we not arrive at some first + principle of friendship or dearness which is not capable of being referred + to any other, for the sake of which, as we maintain, all other things are + dear, and, having there arrived, we shall stop? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + My fear is that all those other things, which, as we say, are dear for the + sake of another, are illusions and deceptions only, but where that first + principle is, there is the true ideal of friendship. Let me put the matter + thus: Suppose the case of a great treasure (this may be a son, who is more + precious to his father than all his other treasures); would not the + father, who values his son above all things, value other things also for + the sake of his son? I mean, for instance, if he knew that his son had + drunk hemlock, and the father thought that wine would save him, he would + value the wine? + </p> + <p> + He would. + </p> + <p> + And also the vessel which contains the wine? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + But does he therefore value the three measures of wine, or the earthen + vessel which contains them, equally with his son? Is not this rather the + true state of the case? All his anxiety has regard not to the means which + are provided for the sake of an object, but to the object for the sake of + which they are provided. And although we may often say that gold and + silver are highly valued by us, that is not the truth; for there is a + further object, whatever it may be, which we value most of all, and for + the sake of which gold and all our other possessions are acquired by us. + Am I not right? + </p> + <p> + Yes, certainly. + </p> + <p> + And may not the same be said of the friend? That which is only dear to us + for the sake of something else is improperly said to be dear, but the + truly dear is that in which all these so-called dear friendships + terminate. + </p> + <p> + That, he said, appears to be true. + </p> + <p> + And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the sake + of any other or further dear. + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + Then we have done with the notion that friendship has any further object. + May we then infer that the good is the friend? + </p> + <p> + I think so. + </p> + <p> + And the good is loved for the sake of the evil? Let me put the case in + this way: Suppose that of the three principles, good, evil, and that which + is neither good nor evil, there remained only the good and the neutral, + and that evil went far away, and in no way affected soul or body, nor ever + at all that class of things which, as we say, are neither good nor evil in + themselves;—would the good be of any use, or other than useless to + us? For if there were nothing to hurt us any longer, we should have no + need of anything that would do us good. Then would be clearly seen that we + did but love and desire the good because of the evil, and as the remedy of + the evil, which was the disease; but if there had been no disease, there + would have been no need of a remedy. Is not this the nature of the good—to + be loved by us who are placed between the two, because of the evil? but + there is no use in the good for its own sake. + </p> + <p> + I suppose not. + </p> + <p> + Then the final principle of friendship, in which all other friendships + terminated, those, I mean, which are relatively dear and for the sake of + something else, is of another and a different nature from them. For they + are called dear because of another dear or friend. But with the true + friend or dear, the case is quite the reverse; for that is proved to be + dear because of the hated, and if the hated were away it would be no + longer dear. + </p> + <p> + Very true, he replied: at any rate not if our present view holds good. + </p> + <p> + But, oh! will you tell me, I said, whether if evil were to perish, we + should hunger any more, or thirst any more, or have any similar desire? Or + may we suppose that hunger will remain while men and animals remain, but + not so as to be hurtful? And the same of thirst and the other desires,—that + they will remain, but will not be evil because evil has perished? Or + rather shall I say, that to ask what either will be then or will not be is + ridiculous, for who knows? This we do know, that in our present condition + hunger may injure us, and may also benefit us:—Is not that true? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And in like manner thirst or any similar desire may sometimes be a good + and sometimes an evil to us, and sometimes neither one nor the other? + </p> + <p> + To be sure. + </p> + <p> + But is there any reason why, because evil perishes, that which is not evil + should perish with it? + </p> + <p> + None. + </p> + <p> + Then, even if evil perishes, the desires which are neither good nor evil + will remain? + </p> + <p> + Clearly they will. + </p> + <p> + And must not a man love that which he desires and affects? + </p> + <p> + He must. + </p> + <p> + Then, even if evil perishes, there may still remain some elements of love + or friendship? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + But not if evil is the cause of friendship: for in that case nothing will + be the friend of any other thing after the destruction of evil; for the + effect cannot remain when the cause is destroyed. + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And have we not admitted already that the friend loves something for a + reason? and at the time of making the admission we were of opinion that + the neither good nor evil loves the good because of the evil? + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + But now our view is changed, and we conceive that there must be some other + cause of friendship? + </p> + <p> + I suppose so. + </p> + <p> + May not the truth be rather, as we were saying just now, that desire is + the cause of friendship; for that which desires is dear to that which is + desired at the time of desiring it? and may not the other theory have been + only a long story about nothing? + </p> + <p> + Likely enough. + </p> + <p> + But surely, I said, he who desires, desires that of which he is in want? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And that of which he is in want is dear to him? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And he is in want of that of which he is deprived? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + Then love, and desire, and friendship would appear to be of the natural or + congenial. Such, Lysis and Menexenus, is the inference. + </p> + <p> + They assented. + </p> + <p> + Then if you are friends, you must have natures which are congenial to one + another? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, they both said. + </p> + <p> + And I say, my boys, that no one who loves or desires another would ever + have loved or desired or affected him, if he had not been in some way + congenial to him, either in his soul, or in his character, or in his + manners, or in his form. + </p> + <p> + Yes, yes, said Menexenus. But Lysis was silent. + </p> + <p> + Then, I said, the conclusion is, that what is of a congenial nature must + be loved. + </p> + <p> + It follows, he said. + </p> + <p> + Then the lover, who is true and no counterfeit, must of necessity be loved + by his love. + </p> + <p> + Lysis and Menexenus gave a faint assent to this; and Hippothales changed + into all manner of colours with delight. + </p> + <p> + Here, intending to revise the argument, I said: Can we point out any + difference between the congenial and the like? For if that is possible, + then I think, Lysis and Menexenus, there may be some sense in our argument + about friendship. But if the congenial is only the like, how will you get + rid of the other argument, of the uselessness of like to like in as far as + they are like; for to say that what is useless is dear, would be absurd? + Suppose, then, that we agree to distinguish between the congenial and the + like—in the intoxication of argument, that may perhaps be allowed. + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + And shall we further say that the good is congenial, and the evil + uncongenial to every one? Or again that the evil is congenial to the evil, + and the good to the good; and that which is neither good nor evil to that + which is neither good nor evil? + </p> + <p> + They agreed to the latter alternative. + </p> + <p> + Then, my boys, we have again fallen into the old discarded error; for the + unjust will be the friend of the unjust, and the bad of the bad, as well + as the good of the good. + </p> + <p> + That appears to be the result. + </p> + <p> + But again, if we say that the congenial is the same as the good, in that + case the good and he only will be the friend of the good. + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + But that too was a position of ours which, as you will remember, has been + already refuted by ourselves. + </p> + <p> + We remember. + </p> + <p> + Then what is to be done? Or rather is there anything to be done? I can + only, like the wise men who argue in courts, sum up the arguments:—If + neither the beloved, nor the lover, nor the like, nor the unlike, nor the + good, nor the congenial, nor any other of whom we spoke—for there + were such a number of them that I cannot remember all—if none of + these are friends, I know not what remains to be said. + </p> + <p> + Here I was going to invite the opinion of some older person, when suddenly + we were interrupted by the tutors of Lysis and Menexenus, who came upon us + like an evil apparition with their brothers, and bade them go home, as it + was getting late. At first, we and the by-standers drove them off; but + afterwards, as they would not mind, and only went on shouting in their + barbarous dialect, and got angry, and kept calling the boys—they + appeared to us to have been drinking rather too much at the Hermaea, which + made them difficult to manage—we fairly gave way and broke up the + company. + </p> + <p> + I said, however, a few words to the boys at parting: O Menexenus and + Lysis, how ridiculous that you two boys, and I, an old boy, who would fain + be one of you, should imagine ourselves to be friends—this is what + the by-standers will go away and say—and as yet we have not been + able to discover what is a friend! + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Lysis, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LYSIS *** + +***** This file should be named 1579-h.htm or 1579-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/5/7/1579/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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