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diff --git a/old/15699.txt b/old/15699.txt deleted file mode 100644 index ca6f2fa..0000000 --- a/old/15699.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12699 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's A Handbook of the Boer War, by Gale and Polden, Limited - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: A Handbook of the Boer War - -Author: Gale and Polden, Limited - -Release Date: April 24, 2005 [EBook #15699] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ASCII - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HANDBOOK OF THE BOER WAR *** - - - - -Produced by Jonathan Ingram, David King, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team - - - - - -A HANDBOOK OF THE BOER WAR - -With General Map of South Africa -and 18 Sketch Maps -and Plans - - -GALE AND POLDEN LIMITED - -LONDON AND ALDERSHOT - -1910 - -BUTLER & TANNER - -THE SELWOOD PRINTING WORKS - -FROME AND LONDON - - - - -CONTENTS - - -CHAPTER PAGE - -I PROLEGOMENA 1 - - I The Roundheads of South Africa 1 - - II Patriotism, Duty and Discipline 19 - - III War considered as a Branch of Sport 26 - -II THE NATAL WEDGE 36 - -III DEUS EX MACHINA NO. I 51 - -IV KIMBERLEY AND THE SIEGE OF RHODES 82 - -V A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 96 - -VI MORE TUGELA TROUBLES 116 - -VII LADYSMITH AT BAY 138 - -VIII DEUS EX MACHINA NO. 2 156 - -IX ALARMS AND EXCURSIONS 193 - -X BADEN-POWELL AND THE SIEGE OF MAFEKING 212 - -XI BLOEMFONTEIN TO PRETORIA 229 - -XII THE NEW COLONY 247 - -XIII NEC CELER NEC AUDAX 262 - -XIV THE TAMING OF THE TRANSVAAL 273 - -XV THE RECURRENCES OF DE WET 294 - -XVI LORD KITCHENER AT WORK 311 - -XVII THE MECHANICAL PHASE 345 - - I Orange River Colony 345 - - II Eastern Transvaal 354 - - III Western Transvaal 357 - - IV Cape Colony 363 - -XVIII THE END 365 - -COMMANDERS OF DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES 368 - -INDEX OF PERSONS AND PLACES 369 - - - -SKETCH MAPS AND PLANS[1] - - PAGE - -Northern Natal 50 - -Modder River and Magersfontein 59 - -Stormberg 65 - -Colenso 70 - -Spion Kop and Vaalkrantz 98 - -Spion Kop 104 - -Final Advance on Ladysmith 128 - -Siege of Ladysmith 139 - -Riet and Modder Drifts 161 - -Paardeberg 172 - -Poplar Grove and Driefontein 185 - -Sannah's Post 199 - -Magaliesberg District 240 - -Diamond Hill 243 - -Brandwater Basin 257 - -Orange Free State 260 - -Southern Transvaal 292 - -Noitgedacht Nek 319 - -General Map of South Africa--at the beginning. - -[Footnote 1: The thanks of the Author are due to the Army Council for -permission to copy the maps and plans in the Official History of the -War, and to L.S. Amery, Esq., for permission to copy the plans in the -fifth volume of the _Times_ History of the War.] - - - - -PREFATORY NOTE - - -The author has endeavoured in this Handbook to compile, for the use of -students and others, a general account of the various phases of the Boer -War of 1899-1902, in which he served for twenty-six months. - -With some exceptions, every statement of fact relating to the military -operations may be verified in one or more of the following -publications-- - - The "Times" History of the War; - - The War Office Official History of the War; - - The Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission of - Inquiry into the War. - -To the two Histories, which have been but recently completed, the Author -is much indebted. Other authorities have, however, been consulted. - -The Sketch Maps and Plans of certain areas and battlefields are only -intended to give, by means of a few hachures, contours, and form-lines, -a general impression of topographical features. - -The Author has from time to time in the course of the narrative -indicated what he believes to have been the chief causes of the -prolongation of the War:-- - - The inefficacy of modern Tactics as a means of dealing with - partisan warfare; - - The moral reinforcement derived from a confident belief in the - justice of a cause, by which the enemy was continually - encouraged to persevere; - - The reluctance of the British leaders to fight costly battles; - - The constitutional inability of the British Officer to take War - seriously; - - The waste of British horses due to inexpert Horsemastership. - -May, 1910. - - - - -CHAPTER I - -Prolegomena - -I. THE ROUNDHEADS OF SOUTH AFRICA - - -History often reproduces without reference to nationality some -particular human type or class which becomes active and predominant for -a time, and fades away when its task is finished. It is, however, not -utterly lost, for the germ of it lies dormant yet ready to re-appear -when the exigencies of the moment recall it. The reserve forces of human -nature are inexhaustible and inextinguishable. - -It is probable that few of the Boers had ever heard of Oliver Cromwell, -or that his life and times had ever been studied in the South African -Republics, and had influenced the Boer action; yet the affinity of the -South African burghers of the XIXth century with the Puritans and the -Roundheads of the XVIIth is striking. It was not so much a parallelism -of aims and hopes, for the struggle in England was political and not -national as in South Africa, as of temperament, character, and method. -There was hardly an individuity in the Boers of the War which might not -have been found in the followers of Cromwell. Like these they were -fanatically but sincerely religious, and their unabashed and fearless -adherence to their beliefs and their open observance of the outward -forms of religion exposed them to the same cruel and baseless charge of -hypocrisy. Just as the aristocratic followers of Charles I had jeered at -the Roundheads, so did every thoughtless officer and newspaper -correspondent jeer at the psalm-singing and the prayer meetings in the -laagers. The Boers had the courage of their religious opinions, and were -not ashamed to proclaim them in the face of man. The Bible was the only -book they knew, and they guided themselves according to their lights by -its precepts. In opposing the English they believed that they were -resisting the enemies of the Almighty. Like the Puritans they honestly -thought that certain passages in the Holy Scriptures applied to them as -the Chosen People, and that they were assured of Divine Protection; and -if they erred in their exegesis their delusion at least deserves -respect. Yet all the while the Old Testament was the volume they chiefly -studied, and if they quoted the New Testament they sometimes modified -the context to their own advantage. - -Each Puritan movement has derived its strength not so much from its -abstract merit as from the intense personal conviction felt by each unit -engaged in it, that the righteousness of the cause was unassailable. The -Puritan never wavered in philosophic doubt. No misgivings disturbed his -soul, and he pursued his object with all the strength of his body. - -The Puritan stir in the reign of Charles I was a revival, almost a -continuation, of the half political, half religious activity which in -the previous century had effected the Reformation. The Boer movement in -South Africa, which sprang up after a germination lasting three -generations, was brought about by a recrudescence of the spirit which -made the Boers of the Netherlands rise against Alva and the Spanish -domination in the XVIth century. - -In the XVIIth century the Boers of the Netherlands, made a voluntary -settlement in South Africa, and there under the Southern Cross they were -joined by French Puritans, who had fought under Condé and who left their -country after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and also by some -persecuted sectaries from Piedmont. The two stocks, although one was of -Teutonic and the other of Celtic origin, easily came together, and under -the pressure of common interests and common dangers were consolidated -and vulcanized: and if in the previous generation the English Pilgrim -Fathers of the _Mayflower_ had directed their course to the south -instead of to the west, and had cast anchor off the shore of that -distant region of Good Hope, it is probable that a mighty nation would -have been founded in South Africa. - -Cromwell as the military leader of the Commonwealth Boers is, at least -in England where the military art has not been scientifically studied, -one of the suppressed characters of history. His political achievements, -as is perhaps natural in a community which courts the voter and despises -the soldier, have put out of sight the means by which he mainly won -them; namely his genius as a cavalry and partisan commander. An -ungainly, narrow-minded, bigoted, bucolic squireen of Huntingdon, -lacking in every quality which we are accustomed to associate with a -cavalry officer, inaugurated an era in the history of Mounted Troops. -His methods are studied on the Continent, and the German Staff has -recently discovered that he was the first leader to use cavalry as a -screen to hide the movements of the main body. Yet there is no evidence -that he ever studied the military art, and he did not become a soldier -until he had reached his fourth decade. In the Royalist Army opposed to -him were soldiers by profession and experience; officers and men who had -been under Gustavus Adolphus in the Thirty Years' War; for in the XVIIth -century the services of aliens were in request on the Continent, and at -one time no less than eighty-seven senior officers of British -nationality were serving in the Swedish Army, then the most renowned in -Europe. Yet Cromwell with his "Eastern Association," his Ironsides, his -yeomen and raw levies, beat the Royalist Army, officered from the same -class which is still believed to possess the monopoly of the aptitude -for leading men in war, by exercising the homely qualities of energy, -self-control, endurance, and practical common sense applied instantly to -the occasion of the moment. - -The lessons to be learnt from Cromwell's campaigns have been thus -epitomized by General Baden-Powell:--"There is one thing that ought not -to escape the attention of students, namely the success that attended -Cromwell's method of rallying his troops whenever they got dispersed. -When things looked bad, as they did on one or two occasions, when some -of his cavalry were defeated and the rest scattered, he never lost heart -and his men never lost heart; they knew they had to rally again and -attack somewhere else. Very often the enemy were deceived by that, -thinking that the Roundheads were scattered and broken up, and took no -further notice of him until they suddenly found him attacking from quite -a new direction. That was the secret of his success on many occasions, -and one that has its lesson to-day, just as it had in those days--that -when all seems pretty bad and you are scattered and broken, keep up a -good heart and get together again and have another go." With scarcely -the change of a word these remarks will account for the prolongation of -the war for two years after the occupation of the Boer capitals. - -The Boer leaders, like their great prototype Cromwell, owed much of -their success to their novel and skilful use of mounted troops. The -European conception of the functions of mounted troops had been -stereotyped for some time; Cavalry screens an advancing army, prevents -the enemy observing its dispositions, acts as its eyes and ears; and so -forth. It is true that Great Britain had already for at least a -generation employed Mounted Infantry in colonial wars; but the -innovation had never been approved of on the Continent, where it was -regarded as a cheap and inefficient British substitute for Cavalry. - -Yet the famous postscript "unmounted men preferred,"[2] which was -affixed to the acceptance of the help proffered by the Australian -Colonies, shows that at first the power of mounted troops acting not as -the eyes and ears of an army, but as a mobile and supple "mailed fist," -was not understood. In ten weeks, however, the tune changed, and it was -"preference given to mounted contingents." - -When the grand operations were over, the enemy's chief towns occupied, -and the lines of communication fairly secure, the necessity for mounted -troops became still more apparent. The Boers saw that it was useless for -them to campaign at large. They took to _guerilla_, and restricted -themselves generally to independent horse raids against which foot -troops were powerless. Gradually the proportion of horses to men in the -British columns rose, until practically all the combatants were mounted, -and at last the Cromwellian principle that the best military weapon is a -man on a horse was fully accepted. - -The military qualities of the Boers, like those of Cromwell's men, were -useful but not showy. They came by instinct and not by acquisition, and -they cannot be sufficiently accounted for as the outcome of experience -in the pursuit of game on the veld. They were neutralized partially by -characteristics the reverse of military. The Boers were not remarkable -for personal courage. If there had been in the Boer Army a decoration -corresponding to the Victoria Cross it would have been rarely won or at -least rarely earned. There is scarcely an instance of an individual feat -of arms or act of devotion performed by a Burgher. On the few occasions -when the Boers were charged by cavalry they became paralysed with -terror. They were incapable of submitting themselves to discipline, and -difficult to command in large numbers. They could not be made to -understand that prompt action, which possibly might not be the best -under the circumstances, was preferable to wasting time in discussing a -better with the field cornets. They were subject to panics and, for the -time, easily disheartened: and their sense of duty was not conspicuous. -The principles of strategy were unknown to them, their tactics were -crude, and with the exception of a very few who had fought in 1881, they -were without experience of the realities of war.[3] - -If in the month of September, 1899, an impartial military critic in a -foreign Ministry of War had been directed to draw up an appreciation of -the situation and to forecast the course of the impending struggle, he -would probably have expressed himself somewhat as follows:-- - -"An Army of 100,000 men is the utmost that Great Britain will be able to -place in the field in South Africa, for the Indian and Colonial drafts -must be provided for, and the Militia and other Auxiliary Forces, which -are not of much account, are tethered to the country; but it will be -sufficient for the purpose. Although the military system of Great -Britain is hopelessly behind the times, she has always done wonders with -her boomerangs, bows and arrows, and flint instruments. That Army will -be fairly well furnished with modern weapons and equipment, and the -excellent personality of the soldier will compensate to a great extent -for incapacity in the Staff and superior officers. With this Army she -will have to meet a brave but undisciplined opponent whose numbers -cannot be estimated. Even if the Free Staters are included it is -improbable that more than 100,000 men can be put into the field. These -have had no military training, their leaders will be unprofessional -officers who will be unable to make good use of the munitions of War -which the two Republics have been strangely allowed to import through -British ports and to accumulate in large quantities. If the burghers of -the Orange Free State throw in their lot with the Transvaalers, which is -improbable as they have no quarrel with Great Britain, the numbers -opposed to her will certainly be augmented, but the task before her will -be greatly simplified. Instead of having to send one portion of her Army -by way of Natal to effect a junction in the Transvaal, with the other -portion working northwards through Kimberley and Mafeking, a campaign -which would involve two long and vulnerable lines of communication, she -will be able to strike at once through the heart of the Free State and -will advance without much difficulty to Johannesburg and Pretoria. The -hardest part of her task will be the passage of the Vaal, where a great -battle will be fought, and the capture of Pretoria, which is reported to -be well fortified. With Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, Pretoria and the -railways in the possession of Great Britain, the opposition will -collapse in a very few weeks, for no nation has ever been able to carry -on a struggle when its chief towns and means of communication are in the -enemy's possession." - -This hypothetical appreciation probably represents the general opinion -current both at home and abroad during the period immediately preceding -the outbreak of the War; but it proved to be mistaken from the first. -The Free Staters joined the Transvaalers and the allied forces assumed -the offensive over a wide area without delay. Kimberley and Mafeking -were threatened on the west, and on the east the Boers poured into -Natal, upon which they had for sixty years looked with the aggrieved and -greedy eyes of a dog from whom a bone, to which he believes he is -entitled, has been recovered. - -To Natal, in 1824, had come a handful of British pioneers. From Chaka, -the King of the Zulus, they obtained a grant of land upon the coast, and -after eleven years they endeavoured without success to induce the -British Government to recognize the settlement, which in course of time -became the City of Durban, as a Colony to which, in honour of the -Princess heiress presumptive to the Throne of Great Britain, they -proposed to give the name Victoria; and they were thus the first to -associate her with the Empire, which, in spite of reluctant politicians -who did their best to restrict it, was destined to expand marvellously -during her reign. - -The Natal settlement was frowned on by the Imperial Government, who even -confiscated a little ship which the pioneers had toilfully fitted out -and which was bringing envoys from the King of the Zulus to the King of -England, on the plea that it was unregistered and that it came from a -foreign port. In 1828 Chaka, who was not unfavourably disposed towards -the Durban pioneers, was murdered by his brother Dingaan, who succeeded -him as King of the Zulus. It is said that his last words to Dingaan -were, "You think that you will rule the land when I am gone, but I see -the white men coming, and they will be your masters." - -His words were prophetically true, but there were two races of white men -hovering over Natal; and the Great King of the Zulus, a tribe held in -little account before his time, but which had under his leadership -absorbed or exterminated almost every other tribe from Pondoland to -Delagoa Bay, was no longer with them to choose between the rivals to his -own ends and advantage; and Dingaan inherited the cruelty without the -ability or the statecraft of his brother, the Napoleon of South Africa. - -Of all the races of Europe the Low Germans of Holland seemed the least -likely to contract the migratory habit. The Hollander of the present -day, popularly but incorrectly called a Dutchman, is home-staying and -home-loving. The compact, well-cared-for, well-ordered homestead, -village, and town communities of the Netherlands are inconsistent with a -roving disposition, and yet the Hollanders of South Africa furnished the -most conspicuous example of Nomadism in modern times. - -It may have been that the ordeal of Alva and the subsequent disturbance -of the Thirty Years' War had constitutionally unsettled the Hollanders -to such a degree that their descendants, emancipated from European -ideas, became prone to restlessness, for in a generation or two they -began to trek; or perhaps the magic of the spacious veld, with its clear -sky and the mountains and flat-topped kopjes sharply defined on the -horizon, irresistibly lured them on. In the land they had quitted the -air was dense with moisture; scarcely a hill was to be seen; they were -hemmed in by sluggish rivers and by the sea, which leaned heavily -against the dykes and threw its spray angrily down on to the reclaimed -pastures which had been stolen from it. - -The original Dutch settlement at the Cape was made by a Company of -Amsterdam merchants for the refreshment and refitting of their ships -engaged in trade with the East. The Company was a harsh and extortionate -master, who paid little attention to the needs and the welfare of the -settlement, which was regarded merely as a place of call. The -discontented colonists began to leave the seacoast and trekked inwards, -where the heavy hands of the cordially detested representatives of the -Company could not reach them. Its rule came to an end in 1795, when, at -the request of Holland, Great Britain took over the Colony in order to -prevent it falling into the hands of France. It was restored at the -Peace of Amiens, but in a few years again came into the possession of -Great Britain. - -The Colonies of the Empire were at that time administered by a Branch of -the War Office which regarded the Cape settlement much in the same light -as it had been regarded by the Dutch Company, as a necessary but -troublesome depôt on the way to the East; and had the Overland Route and -the Suez Canal been available a generation earlier it would probably -have been abandoned. - -The Boers hoped that their new masters, who at least were not an -association of Amsterdam merchants absorbed in their ledgers, would -treat them with more sympathy and consideration. But the only serious -colonial problem with which British politicians had up to that time been -called upon to deal was in North America, and they had disastrously -failed in their attempt to solve it. They were without experience in the -management of white plantations, they shirked the future and looked only -to the "ignorant present," and their policy in South Africa was based -upon two principles: that on no account must the boundaries of the -Empire be enlarged and new responsibilities incurred, and that in all -quarrels between white man and black man the presumption was that the -white man was in the wrong. - -The Great Trek of 1836-7 was brought about by the emancipation of the -slaves and by the refusal or inability of the Government to protect the -farmers against the raids of the "Kaffir"[4] tribes on the border. There -is no doubt that enslaved Hottentots, Bushmen, and even Malays who had -been with the knowledge of the authorities imported from Madagascar and -Malacca, were often ill-treated by individual slave-owners; but the -Boers resented the charge of wholesale cruelty which was made against -them, and the favour and patronage bestowed upon native tribes. -Moreover, although the slave-owners were entitled to compensation for -the loss of their helots, the fund was administered in London, with the -result that a considerable proportion of the already inadequate sum was -retained in the hands of agents. - -The object of the Great Trek was deliverance from the harsh and hostile -jurisdiction of the British Government, and the setting up of a new and -independent Boer community in Natal, which was reported to be a promised -land flowing with milk and honey. The Boers proposed to shake themselves -free from the Egyptian and to occupy Canaan. - -The _voortrekkers_, among whom was the boy Paul Kruger, slowly passed -away towards the north and crossed the Orange River. Moshesh, the chief -of the Basutos, watched curiously from his mountains the trains of -wagons strung out on the veld, but refrained from molesting the -emigrants. Not so Moselekatse,[5] a chief who had formerly broken away -from Chaka and had set himself up beyond the Vaal, and who subsequently -founded the Matabele Kingdom in which he was succeeded by his son -Lobengula. He swooped down upon the advanced parties, who defended -themselves with success and afterwards chastised him in his own country, -in which, hidden from his eyes, lay the gold-bearing reefs of -Johannesburg. - -Meanwhile the British Government had forged a useless and clumsy weapon -for the coercion of its "erring and misguided" subjects. It was held by -the lawyers that the trekkers could not at will and by the simple -process of migration throw off their allegiance to the Crown of England, -and a declaratory Act was passed under which all British subjects south -of Latitude 25, whether within or without the colony, could be arrested -and punished. - -The Boer scouts discovered passes over the Drakensberg which gave them a -readier access than they had expected into Natal. It had not recovered -from the devastations of Chaka and was thinly inhabited. Settlements -were made near the banks of the Tugela, while Piet Retief, after a brief -visit to Durban, went on to negotiate with Dingaan at the royal kraal of -Umgungundhlovu in Zululand. He was received with some cordiality, but -accused of participating in a recent cattle raid. Retief, to show his -good faith, offered to catch the robber, a chief named Sikunyela, whose -kraal was a hundred miles away. He found Sikunyela, who greatly admired -the glistening rings of a pair of handcuffs shown him by the slim -Dutchman, and who was even persuaded that they would be a becoming -ornament to a native chief. He tried them on, but a more intimate -acquaintance with the use of handcuffs induced him to surrender the -cattle he had stolen from Dingaan, the King of the Zulus. - -Again Retief with a hundred followers waited upon Dingaan at -Umgungundhlovu, and after military displays on each side received from -him a grant of the same land which Chaka had already given to the -British pioneers of Durban. Next day the Boers were received in farewell -audience by Dingaan, by whose orders they were treacherously surrounded -and led out to the place of execution, a hill of mimosas outside the -royal kraal, where they were put to death. - -There remained the defenceless plantations on the Tugela. Before the -news of the massacre could reach them, and while they were hourly -expecting the return of Retief, Dingaan's impis swooped down upon them -from Zululand. At the cost of the lives of 600 men, women, and children, -the tribes were driven back, and the little town of Weenen, the "place -of weeping," remains to mark the spot. - -Soon other parties of emigrants came in from beyond the Drakensberg, and -in 1838 an expedition under Potgieter failed to punish Dingaan for his -treachery. Nor did an attempt to help the emigrants made by the British -settlers at Durban meet with success. A small force of Natal natives -under an Englishman named Biggar was greatly out-numbered at the mouth -of the Tugela and perished almost to a man. Dingaan retaliated by -sending an impi to Durban, which he held for a few days; the settlers -taking refuge on board a ship in the Bay. - -The Boers were disheartened and many of them trekked back to the veld -beyond the Drakensberg passes, which is now the Orange River Colony. -Their position in face of Dingaan seemed hopeless; but in November, -1838, there came out of the Cape Colony one Pretorius. He had heard of -their distress, and he organized a force of 500 men, with whom, on -December 16, he successfully encountered Dingaan's army and slew 3,000 -of his warriors at the Blood River, an affluent of the Buffalo. Dingaan -fled and the column marched on to Umgungundhlovu, where Retief's -mouldering body was found on the hill of mimosas, and on it the deed of -grant of land at Durban. Pretorius was ambushed by Zulus disguised as -cattle, crawling on all fours and wearing ox hides; but he escaped with -slight loss, and returned to the Tugela. "Dingaan's Day," December 16, -is kept by the Boers as a festival of thanksgiving and rejoicing. - -Soon a new complication beset the harassed emigrants. In December, 1838, -the British Government, anxious to stop the wars between the Boers and -the natives and to exclude the former from the sea, sent one hundred -soldiers to Durban and issued a proclamation in which the Boers were -declared to be British subjects who had unlawfully occupied Natal, and -who were morally responsible for all the blood that had been shed. They -protested against the imputation and against the military occupation of -Durban, but took no active steps to resent the affront. - -When twelve months had passed without hostilities between Boer and -native, the British Government withdrew its hundred warriors from Durban -and tacitly handed over Natal to the emigrant Boers. Hardly had the -little transport _Vectis_ catted her anchor when the Republic of Natalia -was proclaimed and its flag run up on the staff of the forsaken British -Camp on Durban Bay. - -But the dog-in-the-manger policy of neither incorporating Natal in the -British Empire nor frankly allowing the Boers to occupy it could not be -indefinitely maintained. Each present difficulty wriggled out of made -the future more embarrassing. Soon, as might have been anticipated, the -Boers were again in trouble with the natives. Panda, the father of -Cetchwayo, whose impis forty years after washed their spears in the -blood of 800 British soldiers at Isandhlwana, broke away from his -brother Dingaan, taking with him into Natal many thousand Zulus who were -awaiting an opportunity of shaking themselves free from the tyranny and -cruelty of Dingaan. Panda made overtures to the Boers and was gladly -received as an ally, and with his help Dingaan was finally crushed and -driven into Swaziland, where, in the hands of a hostile tribe, he -perished miserably by torture. - -The emigrants were now favourably situated in Natal. They had -established an equitable if not a legal claim to it; Dingaan was out of -the way; and the British Government seemed indisposed to inter-meddle. -But the fatal and grotesque alliance with Panda, which culminated in his -installation as King of the Zulus by Pretorius in 1840, and which was -entirely inconsistent with the attitude hitherto assumed towards the -natives, was the undoing of the trekkers of 1836. - -Panda's men as native auxiliaries eager to avenge themselves on the -common enemy Dingaan were all very well in their way. Most of them, -however, belonged to Natal and joined him in the hope of recovering the -tribal lands from which they had been evicted by Chaka and to which they -had a better right than the trekkers. - -The Boers now began to reap the harvest of the Panda alliance. They -regarded the new arrivals as intruders, refused to acknowledge their -claims, and finally in August, 1841, decreed their expulsion from Natal. -The location chosen for their settlement was a district in Pondoland in -the possession of a chief under British protection, who already had had -occasion to lodge at Capetown a complaint against the Boers. - -The British Government now found it necessary to intervene again in -Natal. A military occupation was announced by proclamation in December, -1841, and 240 men, under the command of an infantry captain named Smith, -were sent up to Durban to give effect to it. - -When Smith, after a difficult march along the coast, reached his -destination on May 4, 1842, he pitched his camp on the flat which forms -the base of one of the promontories enclosing the Bay. He at once -lowered the Republican flag flying over the block-house at the Point, -and soon found that 1,500 Boers were occupying Congella on the shore of -the Bay. An attempt to surprise them by night failed disastrously; -Smith's force was reduced to half its strength, and the block-house was -captured by Pretorius. - -Smith was now besieged in his camp, and the nearest help that could come -to him was at Grahamstown, five hundred miles away. Thither a gallant -civilian named King, who was one of the pioneers, rode in ten days; and -on June 25, when the little garrison was in extremity, it was relieved -by sea. Pretorius withdrew into the interior, and the Volksraad at -Pietermaritzburg, the capital of the Republic of Natalia, voted the -submission of the Boers. Pending a final settlement it was allowed to -remain in authority over the settlers, but the district around Durban -Bay was at once taken over as British territory. In May, 1843, a year -after the landing of Smith, the Republic of Natalia passed away and -Natal was proclaimed a British Colony. - -The final settlement did not come for some time. The Volksraad was -abolished, but the claims of the Boers to the lands upon which they had -squatted were liberally considered. They were, however, dissatisfied -because the rights of Panda's men were also regarded, and many trekked -away across the Drakensberg. Those who remained protested that their -lives and property were insecure in the presence of the natives, and -Pretorius was deputed to go and lay their grievances before the British -Governor at the Cape. - -The ill success of his mission provoked him to reprisals, and he -proceeded to stir up trouble in the Orange River Sovereignty, which had -recently been formally proclaimed British Territory. If not actively -loyal it was peaceably disposed until the arrival of Pretorius, who soon -drove out the British Resident and the little garrison of Bloemfontein -and set them on the run as far as Colesberg in the Cape Colony. He was -defeated at Boomplatz in August, 1848, by Sir Harry Smith, a veteran of -the Peninsular War, and British authority was for a time reestablished -over the Sovereignty. The Colonial Office soon however tired of the new -possession and gladly scuttled out in 1854 in order to avoid the task of -reaping the harvest of a clumsy and grotesque policy, which it had -formulated a few years before, of hemming in the _voortrekkers_, who had -settled north of the Orange River, with a barrier of native states set -up for the purpose on the east and west; and which now threatened to -involve it in a quarrel which naturally arose between Moshesh, the -Basuto chief, and the emigrants whom he had been appointed to restrain. - -Pretorius retired across the Vaal where he joined Potgieter, who, after -the failure of his attack on Dingaan in 1838, had gone into -Moselekatse's country and had driven him beyond the Limpopo. A Republic -was set up beyond the Vaal which the British Government recognized as -independent in the Zand River Convention of 1852. - -Such is in brief the story of the Boers' claim to Natal. They considered -it to be their lawful heritage out of which they had been jockeyed, and -in October, 1899, they seemed to have a chance of recovering it. They -boasted that they would not only win back Pietermaritzburg, which was -named after two leaders of the Great Trek, Pieter Retief and Gert -Maritz, but that they would establish themselves on the shores of the -Indian Ocean. It was not the vainglorious gasconade of a swashbuckler. -Four months after October 11, 1899, when the Boer ultimatum expired, the -British Army was still engaged in endeavouring to drive out the Boers -from British territory, and hardly a rifle had been discharged in the -enemy's country. - -Napoleon was in the habit of impressing upon his officers the necessity -of studying past campaigns, both modern and ancient; but those who -anticipated confidently that the Boer War would soon be brought to a -successful close by the British Army were led into their error by the -history of past campaigns. There was, however, one campaign, the War of -Independence in North America, which the discerning might have -recognized as an analogous struggle; but it was overlooked, and the -history of the great European conflicts was established as the leading -authority. The occupation of the populous places and the control of the -means of access to them, which seemed to present few difficulties, meant -the end of the war and the subsequent negotiations as to the amount of -the indemnity or other penalty to be paid by the defeated. - -But not only were the necessary preliminary successes deferred far -beyond the expected time of their accomplishment--Bloemfontein was not -occupied until five months, nor Pretoria until eight months had rolled -by since that October dawn when the Boers crossed the frontier into -Natal--but the prospect of the end of the War soon began to recede into -the perspective of infinity: and even now, after an interval of some -years since the peace of Vereeniging, when, like the proportions of some -huge edifice which can be truly comprehended only by the observer who -views it from a distance, the various incidents and phases of the War -begin to assume their relative importance, the difficulty of discovering -some guiding principle which shall reconcile the Great Boer War with -other wars is as great as ever. - -Sometimes a cause can be found _a posteriori_ by groping in the dim and -deceptive light cast by an effect: or a process of exhaustion and -elimination may be set up in which the qualities common to each side are -cancelled and the result attributed to the credit balance which will -appear under one of the accounts. We saw for some months a gallant and -well equipped if somewhat amorphous British Army impotently -endeavouring, though in superior numbers, to make headway against an -aggregation of Boer commandos, and checked at various points on an arc -drawn wholly in British territory and extending in a circuit of over 500 -miles from Ladysmith in Northern Natal through Stormberg and Colesberg -to Kimberley and Mafeking; and at each extremity of the arc was a -besieged city. Was the military art as taught in Europe founded upon -error, or had the British Army been negligently instructed in it? - -Yet no European troops had had so much recent experience of active -service. We had lately fought in the Soudan, in East and West Africa, in -Burmah and on the North-West frontier of India; there was in fact hardly -a year in the preceding decade in which the portals of the temple of a -British Janus would have been closed. Moreover, our fighting had not -been against trained soldiers, but against enemies who like the Boers -were undisciplined, collectively if not individually brave men -patriotically defending their own country. We therefore entered the -arena with experience which no other European Army possessed. - - - -II. PATRIOTISM, DUTY, AND DISCIPLINE. - - -Many hard things have been said of Patriotism.[6] Dr. Johnson's -definition is well known, and more recently it has been styled the -sublimest form of Selfishness. These, however, are not definitions but -rather criticisms of certain phases of Patriotism, which is closely -allied to Family Affection and, like that sentiment, originates in the -helplessness and the egotism of the Individual. - -The weak infant clings to his mother for sustenance, comfort and -protection, and the tender care which is bestowed upon him while his -body and his mind are developing fosters the notion of the subjective -importance of the human unit. Human nature is so constituted that the -Individual is disposed to over-estimate his own consequence and to -regard his own surroundings as superior to the surroundings of all other -persons, and therefore more worthy of recognition, encouragement, and -admiration. As the Child grows in years this sentiment is gradually and -unconsciously modified, but it is never wholly eradicated. The inward -emotion aroused in his heart by parental solicitude becomes partially -altruistic and outward and is transmuted into Gratitude and Love. - -The Child emerges into Youth and thence into Manhood, and the area of -his immediate environment is enlarged. He needs further succour and -assistance, and the Family Community to which he belongs and which -nurtured and watched over his early years can no longer supply his -requirements. He is in want of new fellowships and must strengthen -himself by joining various bodies and associations. With these he -incorporates himself more or less and his friendly attitude towards them -for his own good is a development of the primitive Family Affection. In -the case of a class, a social, or professional community the sentiment -is termed _Esprit de Corps_;[7] in view of recognized civil institutions -by which he perceives that he benefits, it is Loyalty; while with -respect to the Fatherland it is Patriotism, which denotes the adherence -of the helpless individual Ego to the Supreme Community. Patriotism, -like Family Affection, is a growth and culture of the idea of Self. It -is the expression of the Individual's thanks for the support, -countenance, protection, and other moral and material advantages claimed -by him from the Supreme Community, to which in return he readily attorns -with respect and admiration. He is, however, patriotic because with -unconscious egotism he regards his Country as part of himself rather -than himself as part of his Country. Even the act of a man who -sacrifices his life for the good of his country may not be wholly -unselfish, for some natures are so constituted that they can discount -the future and be gratified by the prospective award of posthumous -honour. There can, however, be no doubt that Patriotism, though possibly -of not very noble origin, is a sentiment beneficial both to the -community and the individual, and is therefore worthy of encouragement. -Happily, those cold heights of philosophy on which every man is loved as -a brother and every nationality held in equal honour and esteem are -unattainable by human nature; for without the stimulus of Patriotism -National Life would be impracticable.[8] It's chief defect is that like -most of the emotions it is sometimes hasty and unreasoning. - -Such, it is believed, is briefly the history of Patriotism, and the -theory is supported by the fact that the British soldier is not -patriotic by nature. It is not his fault. The class from which he is -usually drawn has unhappily less reason for respecting and admiring the -Supreme Community than any other class, for it participates fully in the -distresses and meagerly in the successes and good fortune of the Nation, -from which, though not actually unpatriotic, it stands sullenly aloof. -It can hardly be denied that the power and prosperity of Great Britain -have favourably affected the position of the upper and middle classes to -a greater degree than they have ameliorated the condition of the lower -classes, and it is therefore not surprising that the latter seem to take -little or no pride in their nationality, and sometimes even act -perversely in opposition to its interests. - -The private soldier has never been taught to think about his country. -The education which he may have received at the Board School is not -calculated to arouse in him a feeling of national pride which is -non-existent in his home life. The display of the National Flag, which -flutters over so many distant lands, is discouraged in the primary -schools of Great Britain as tending to "flag-worship." In the United -States, on the other hand, the Stars and Stripes are hoisted in every -school yard. No systematic effort is made to interest the children of -the operative classes in Greater Britain. India and the Colonies are -facts in geography troublesome to learn and easy to forget. The history -of the British Empire is sterilized before it is imparted to them. They -are not taught to realize that the happiness and prosperity of a large -proportion of the inhabitants of the world are dependent upon the moods -of the population of a small group of islands in the Atlantic Ocean, and -that in the ballot-boxes of Great Britain are cast the fortunes of many -millions of their fellow-creatures. - -Foreigners have remarked that the minstrelsy of Great Britain is -singularly devoid of patriotic songs. The British soldier has no -"Star-Spangled Banner" or "Wacht am Rhein" to sing on the line of march -or in the bivouac, but only the last comic or sentimental ditty which he -may have heard at the Garrison Music Hall before embarking on active -service. The National Anthem is not a patriotic song but a prayer for -Divine Protection for the Sovereign, to which have been appended some -inappropriate stanzas now rarely heard; while "Rule, Britannia!" might -have been composed for the gasconading swashbuckler of an extravaganza. - -It would therefore be surprising if the recruit joined the Army with a -highly pitched conception of the work he has undertaken. Destitution; or -trouble about a woman, or with his own people, or with the police; or -the mysterious magnetism of an adventurous life rather than the desire -to serve his country, has induced him to enlist. An existing or -prospective War always keeps the recruiting sergeant busy, but the -object of a War is a matter of indifference to the recruit. Most of our -wars have been waged for political reasons which he cannot understand. -Apart from the difficulties of language and of unaccustomed -environments, he would as readily serve in any other Army in which the -pay was as liberal and the restraint of discipline not more irksome. How -is it, then, that lacking the stimulus of Patriotism through no fault of -his own and being, in fact, a mercenary, he becomes an excellent -soldier; perhaps, next to the Turk, the best in Europe? - -The answer seems to be that he soon acquires a high sense of Duty. Duty -may be defined as the necessity to do something for one's own or for the -general good which is not naturally pleasurable or agreeable or -instinctively desired. In the trite proverb it is contrasted with and -takes precedence of Pleasure. As a motive for action it stands on a -higher plane than Patriotism. - -The alchemic process by which the indifferent, unemotional, and -sometimes unintelligent recruit is transmuted into the precious metal of -the soldier who wins battles seems to be somewhat as follows: Of his own -volition he has taken on a certain job and his dogged pride or obstinacy -will not allow him to be beaten by it, however little enthusiasm it may -arouse in him and however distasteful it may be to him at first. He -offers no "ca' canny" service, but plods on and does his best in his own -way. The lack of the enthusiastic temperament does not seriously retard -the progress of his military education, and without much ado he becomes -a stolid dependable unit of the Army. He is not carried away by success -nor unduly depressed by failure. His instincts tell him that they are -the accidents of Duty. - -It has been noticed that the word Glory and its derivatives[9] rarely -appear in the accounts of the action of the British Army on service, -except in a War Correspondent's letter or telegram. No reference is made -in reports, orders or despatches to the so-called "glorious" incidents -of a soldier's life in time of war. He is commended for his endurance, -his tenacity and his matter-of-fact acceptance of the vicissitudes of -war as "part of the day's work." The truest Glory is the conscientious -performance of Duty. - -If through the incompetence or neglect of his leaders he is called upon -to sacrifice himself, he sacrifices himself without a murmur. If he is -compelled to keep himself alive on scanty rations of horseflesh and to -wet his parched lips with the trickle of a dwindled and tainted spruit, -he believes that his officers have done their best for him. He is -ordered to fall in upon the deck of a burning troopship and to stand at -attention while Death inspects the ranks. He is besieged in a hill fort -on the Indian frontier by a horde of fanatics eager to kill or to -mutilate him. He lies wounded on the field of battle from which, after -an indecisive engagement, each combatant has retired; and there, -scorched by the mid-day sun and starved by the cold of the night, and -perhaps also in danger of being burnt alive by a veld fire, he waits -without water for the armistice which shall bring up the ambulances. He -returns to his own land where he soon finds that he is not of much -account. After a great war there may be a period of evanescent -patronage; or a deed of Dargai, Rorke's Drift, or Balaklava may have -temporarily thrilled the audience into Music Hall enthusiasm; but he is -not greatly impressed, and stoically reflects that like the battle, the -starvation, and the Field Hospital it is "all in the day's work" and -will soon pass away. - -There has probably never been a struggle in which the private soldier -more fully earned the gratitude of his country than in the South African -War. The most unfriendly critics in the foreign staff offices have paid -tribute to the excellence of the British soldier: sometimes, however, -sneering at him as a mercenary, whom, by a curious perversion of the -probabilities, they profess to think unlikely to be as efficient as -their own conscripts who are forced into military service; but they -never hold him responsible for the ill-success of the war. Throughout -their criticisms there lurks a feeling of pained astonishment that the -British "mercenary" proves himself to be as good or even a better -soldier than the continental conscript, coupled with a comfortable -conviction that Discipline is not well maintained in the British Army. - -The final cause of Discipline is the efficient use of arms on the field -of battle. Discipline is the result of an irksome educational process by -which a man is taught to submit his wishes, his instincts, and, to a -great extent, his personal liberty to the control of one who may be his -inferior morally, mentally, and physically. It has also been cynically -defined as the art of making a man more afraid of his own officers than -of the enemy. Its function seems to be the formation of certain military -qualities which Patriotism and the Sense of Duty are by themselves -believed incapable of creating. It has always been considered an -essential part of a soldier's training; but this view, though probably -correct, is not confirmed by the South African War, in which an -undisciplined force held its own for some years against greatly superior -numbers of disciplined men. - -The ideal Army, patriotic, full of the sense of Duty, and perfect in -discipline, would be invincible; but such an Army has never yet been -seen. A deficiency of one or two of these qualities may be made up for -by a fuller measure of the others. The history of each war will seem to -indicate for a time the proportions in which the qualities should be -blended, which is the essential, and whether any one of them can be -omitted; but the inferences thus drawn from one war will probably be -found misleading in the next war. - -The inference to be drawn from the South African War seems to be that -the value of those military qualities which are created by Discipline -and training has been over-rated, and that a passionate bigoted belief -in the justice of a cause is a more potent factor in the making of a -soldier. Even if every allowance be made for the strategical advantages -possessed by the Boers, of fighting in their own land on interior lines -in a sparsely populated country peculiarly adopted for _guerilla_, it is -difficult to account for their success if the tests by which the -efficiency of a European army is measured are applied to them. It may be -that war has hitherto been regarded too exclusively as a statical and -dynamical problem and that the moral element has been overlooked. It -certainly was overlooked in South Africa; for the war which Lord Roberts -in October, 1900, believed was practically at an end had in fact then -run little more than one-third of its course. - - - -III. WAR CONSIDERED AS A BRANCH OF SPORT - - -The astonishment, distress, chagrin and bewilderment caused by want of -success, "regrettable incidents," and disasters, sometimes found -consolation during the South African War in the foolish remark--The -Germans would have done no better. What the German Army, which had not -been actively employed for twenty-eight years, might have accomplished -under the same conditions is a matter for sterile speculation which has -little bearing on the case. But the German Army certainly had not been -accustomed to look upon War as a branch of Sport or Athletics. - -Owing in all probability to the happy fact in History that England has -not been invaded and over-run by a foreign army since the time of -William the Conqueror--an episode which had in the end an excellent -influence on the national life--she has never taken the military art -seriously. She alone, thanks to the protection of Providence, has never -been compelled to fight on her own fields for her existence as a nation; -she alone knows nothing even by tradition handed down from distant -generations of the appearance of an alien soldier on her shores.[10] -Some of her wars, as for example the successful struggle by which the -Napoleonic domination was broken up, have been fought for the purpose of -safe-guarding her independence, but they were not popular with the -people at large, whose short sight did not permit them to see that a -defensive war may have to be fought beyond the seas; and they had little -or no effect in evoking a patriotic military spirit. Napoleon's gibe -that the English were a nation of shopkeepers was not unasked for, and -is still seasonable. - -On the other hand there are hundreds of thousands of persons on the -Continent of Europe who have seen, or who are the near descendants of -those who have seen, their fatherland ravaged; their homes destroyed; -their relations, friends, and neighbours slaughtered in the defence; the -tree of the national life maimed; and the full cup of the horrors of war -drained to its dregs. - -To them the prospect of an invasion is not a remote contingency to be -considered and provided for at leisure after academical discussion, but -a real and instant danger from which only universal service, to which -fortunately for themselves they submit without much demur, as it could -not be enforced upon a reluctant community, can preserve them. - -The possibility of invasion is the dominant anxiety of the land-frontier -nations.[11] Across the frontier they can see the conscripts drilling -who almost at a moment's notice may be marching in to attack them. Their -armies are not sent on interesting little expeditions to restrain a -too-militant tribe of hill-men or to patrol the distant marches of a -magnificent Empire, but must stand at attention generation after -generation, year after year, maintaining the featureless routine of -military life. None of the Romance of War that falls to the lot of the -British soldier--the service among strange Easterns in Asia, the -building up of a new imperial province in South Africa, the constant -change of scene along the posts which form a girdle round the world from -Hongkong to Jamaica--falls also to the lot of the continental conscript, -for whom there is only the dull waiting for the critical moment. - -The land-frontier nations alone are aware of the reality of the Terror -of War; it is a Thing overshadowing and, apart from every other thing in -their world, which must not, cannot be expelled from their thoughts. The -objects that meet the eye on all sides speak of War; the railway -vehicles marked with the number of men and horses conveyable, the noble -war memorials, the officers constantly in uniform, the crowds of -soldiers in the streets, the military bearing and precision of even the -civilian servants of the State; while upon the ears falls the sound, -which is in most cases a lingering echo of the roar of war, of alien -tongues spoken within the frontier, or of the tongue of the Fatherland -spoken in exile without it. - -On the other hand, Peace is believed to be permanently settled upon the -shore of the silver streak which encloses the British Isles. The war -monuments are scanty and not a few of them are grotesque; the soldier -and his work are thrust into the background, and his uniform is so often -a hindrance to him that on certain occasions he is permitted to appear -in plain clothes, that is to disguise himself as a civilian; and this -concession is officially termed a "privilege." The red tunic of the -soldier, like the red rays of the spectrum which cannot be brought into -focus with the other colours, fails to make a sharp impression upon the -British retina, but projects an ill-defined image seen through a medium -of doubt and indifference. - -The nation looks upon the Army much as the individual looks upon the -Policeman, as a necessary institution, but one rather to be avoided and -kept in its place when its services are not actually in requisition. -Little interest is taken in its difficulties, its merits, and its -opportunities. It is regarded not as an indispensable protection, but -rather as an expensive result of possessions in all parts of the world, -and when the peace of these is in danger of being broken, the cry too -often belated goes up: Send for the Soldiers. Probably nothing less than -an actual landing of foreign troops or the scare of it so tremendous as -to drive the nation into the opposite and equally dangerous extreme of -consternation and panic will be necessary to shake its belief, that the -white cliffs of Albion are immune to an invasion in force. - -The nightmare of Militarism by which so many worthy persons are -fanatically obsessed obscures the dangers against which Militarism is an -insurance. Now Militarism is not in itself a desirable thing, and the -developments and accidents of it upon the Continent of Europe are often -not only irksome and absurd but also irreconcilable with the existence -of a healthy feeling of self-respect in the non-military sections of the -community, who are taught to regard themselves as an inferior caste; but -with all its shortcomings it promotes the moral as well as the physical -strength of a nation. It calls up some of the nobler qualities of human -nature; self-control, self-reliance, endurance, and altruism or the -devotion of Self to the good of the community; and not the least of its -merits is that it corrects and restrains the dreary materialism of the -Labour and Socialist movements. - -The shy and distant bearing of the British nation and its persistent -refusal to regard the Army as part of itself, in conjunction with the -growing national passion for Sport and Athletics, fostered the idea that -War itself must be a branch of them. From time immemorial the military -had been eyed with suspicion by the country, which professed to believe -that its liberties were in greater danger from its own soldiers than -from the soldiers of a foreign power, and which for a long time withheld -from its rulers the right of having a standing army. Gradually and with -great reluctance it was convinced of the necessity of a permanent force, -not so much for home defence as for the performance of the police duties -of an Empire. As the Empire grew year by year, these duties became more -onerous and responsible, but the Army itself was not taken seriously. It -was confessedly too weak to engage in a European campaign, and the Navy -was considered to be sufficient to protect the country against invasion. - -The duties of the Army abroad were generally interesting and exciting -but they did not call for the exercise of the military art with great -precision, as the opponents which it was called upon to face were rarely -experts, and there was a comfortable belief that the bravery and -endurance of the British soldier would outweigh deficiencies in other -military qualities.[12] - -The War-as-a-Sport idea was also encouraged by the opinion still stoutly -held by many persons that a good sportsman is necessarily a good -soldier, and that the qualities which ensure success in Athletics or -Sport make also for success in War: but this is true of certain of them -only. In so far as Athletics and Sport tend to manliness, self-reliance, -good comradeship, endurance of bodily hardship, and contempt of danger, -they are no doubt an excellent preparatory school for War. But there is -one quality without the possession of which no man is held to be a good -sportsman, and that is the acceptance of defeat or non-success with -equanimity and good-humour as "part of the game." Without this quality -Athletics and Sport would, in fact, become impossible. - -In the soldier, however, this temperament is a dangerous gift. It led to -reverses, captures, loss of convoys and other "regrettable incidents" -being regarded with stoical composure as "part of the game"; and the -victims were condoled with on their "shocking bad luck." It would have -been difficult to discern from the bearing and demeanour of the typical -officer whether he was at the moment a prisoner of war in the Model -School at Pretoria, or had just taken part in the magnificent cavalry -charge by which Kimberley was relieved. The former plight did not -greatly depress him, nor did the latter phase of military life greatly -elate him. It is probable that the War would have been brought to a -successful close at a much earlier date if throughout the British Army -and especially among the officers hearty disgust and indignation at the -failures of the first few months had taken the place of a light-hearted -accommodation to circumstances. The companions of Ulysses may - - With a frolic welcome take - The thunder and the sunshine, - -but it is not War. - -The British officer played at war in South Africa much in the same way -that he hunted or played cricket or polo at home. He enjoyed the sport -and the game, did his best for his own side, and rejoiced if he was -successful, but was not greatly disturbed when he lost. A dictum -attributed to the Duke of Wellington says that the Battle of Waterloo -was won upon the Playing Fields at Eton. It would not be so very far -from the truth to say that the guns at Sannah's Post were captured on -the polo-ground at Hurlingham; that Magersfontein was lost at Lord's; -that Spionkop was evacuated at Sandown; and that the war lingered on for -thirty-two months in the Quorn and Pytchley coverts. - -The sporting view of War was recognized and confirmed in Army Orders and -official reports, in which the words "bag," "drive," "stop," and some -other sporting terms not infrequently appeared. No one would reasonably -object to the judicious and illuminating use of metaphor, but there are -metaphors which impair the dignity of a cause and degrade it in the eyes -of those whose duty is to maintain that cause. When the advance of a -British Division at a critical period in the operations is frivolously -termed a "drive," and when the men extended at ten paces' interval over -a wide front are called "beaters," it is natural that the leaders should -look upon their work as analogous to the duties of a gamekeeper; and -when an artillery officer is instructed to "pitch his shells well up," -he is encouraged to regard failure as no worse than the loss of a -cricket-match. - -It was at least to be expected that in the use, care, and management of -horses upon which the success of a campaign, in which mounted men formed -an unusually large proportion of the troops engaged, so much depended, -the sporting instincts of the British officer would have made him -particularly efficient; yet the evidence given by General officers -before the Royal Commission showed that it was otherwise. They are -practically unanimous in the opinion that all branches of the mounted -troops were inefficient, except the artillery, whose work so far as -horses are concerned is akin to that of the skilful but unsporting farm -teamster or wagoner. - -A nation greatly addicted to Sport, Games, and Athletics is a nation -lacking in that earnestness of moral purpose which should be its chief -strength for War. Amusements are regarded not as "recreation" or means -of refreshing and re-invigorating the mind and body for the duties of -life by a temporary change of occupation, but as the main objective of -existence. - -A retrospect into history will show that the most efficient armies were -those in which the sporting instinct was non-existent. The armies which -in modern times have most satisfactorily performed the duties for which -armies are raised were those of Gustavus Adolphus, Napoleon, Moltke, and -Oyama. Each of these was the most perfect military instrument of its -day, and their exploits have never been surpassed. Yet neither the -Swedes, the French, the Germans, nor the Japanese were addicted to -Athletics or Sport. Their manly instincts were exercised, to the great -advantage of their countries, in skill at arms and in the Military -Art.[13] - -The cult of Sport and Athletics sets up false ideals and lowers the -intellectual standard. Thousands of loafers, idlers, and work skirkers -live upon the anticipations or recollections of out-door sports when not -actually present at them, and are ready to spend their last shilling at -the turnstile of the ground on which a handful of football gladiators -are at play: and are more exasperated by the defeat of the team which -they patronise in a Cup Tie match than they would be by the loss of a -battle by the British Army. There is this to be said for the working -classes, that in youth, if not longer, they in general endure a hard and -strenuous life, and at least in their school years they cannot indulge a -passion for amusement; whereas the class from which the officers of the -British Army are drawn is encouraged on the other hand to indulge it -from childhood. Owing to the prominence given in the Public Schools and -Universities to games and athletics and to the esteem in which -proficiency in these is held, youths of the upper middle and upper -classes are dumped upon the world not humbly but arrogantly ignorant of -almost everything necessary to qualify them to take their proper place -in the community. They have subsisted in a rarefied intellectual -atmosphere, and to fit themselves for any profession for which they may -have an inclination they have to be forced or "crammed" in a saturated -atmosphere by which they are congested. The result is that "young -officers now join the service with a very fair idea of cricket and -football, bridge, and even motor-driving; but with no education in -patriotism; no real acquaintance with the history or geography of their -own or other countries; unable to write English concisely, or even -grammatically;[14] unaccustomed to read general information for -themselves other than under the headings of the _Daily Mail_; unable to -talk a foreign language; and with no knowledge of the sciences which are -of military use."[15] To this may be added the fact that these young -dullards, the supply of whom is dwindling, are, on joining the service, -encouraged and accepted rather with reference to their sporting and -social qualities than to their military capacity. - -England, as a sporting, athletic, and game-loving nation, has of late -years suffered many rebuffs. By the United States she has been taught -the scientific method of riding racehorses, and also of sailing yachts; -she has been defeated in polo by a Transatlantic team; her selected -representative horsemen are unsuccessful in the International Military -Tournaments; she cannot defeat Australia on the cricket field; a Belgian -crew holds its own at Henley. If these rebuffs tend to abate the mania -for watching the performances of a handsome but not particularly -intelligent quadruped, and for studying the various methods of imparting -motion to a Ball and to show the vanity of the passion for sports and -games when indulged to excess, they will have served their purpose. The -nation, disgusted at its want of success in its favourite pursuits, may -perhaps turn its manhood to the noblest pursuit of all, the defence of -the Fatherland; and then it will not be the betting and football news -that has to be blacked out of the daily papers in the free libraries, -but the bi-weekly military gazettes, the reports from the military -stations and the Special Correspondents' letters from Salisbury Plain -during the manoeuvres. - -Notes: - -[Footnote 2: In justice to the War Office it should be stated that this -was inserted at the instance of Sir Redvers Buller, who believed that he -would be able to raise in South Africa a sufficient force of mounted -troops.] - -[Footnote 3: B. Viljoen in his "Reminiscences of the Anglo-Boer War" -frequently complains of the insubordination, the malingering, and the -cowardice of his followers, and of the incompetence of his superior -officers.] - -[Footnote 4: "Kaffir" is an Arabic word meaning one who does not believe -in the religion of Mahomet. It was introduced into South Africa by the -Portuguese and subsequently applied to the tribes living on the N.E. of -the Cape Colony.] - -[Footnote 5: Zilikat's Nek in the Magaliesberg is named after him.] - -[Footnote 6: In its crudest and least admirable form Patriotism may be -expressed in the terms of an equation-- - - One Englishman=Two Aliens.] - -[Footnote 7: _Esprit de Corps_ in the British Army is the predilection -of the individual for the unit in which he is serving. It creates a -healthy rivalry which, on the whole, makes for efficiency; but its -effects are sometimes unfortunate. A distinguished regiment was accused -of misbehaviour in one of the battles of the advance on Bloemfontein. -The charge was unfounded, but some of its hasty partisans, with the idea -of removing the reproach as far as possible from Self and forgetful that -the honour of the British Army is not contained in water-tight -compartments, endeavoured to transfer the imputation to another regiment -in the same brigade.] - -[Footnote 8: The citizens of a Republic are usually more patriotic than -the subjects of a Monarchy. This may be accounted for by the fact that a -Republic is usually a new nation or a nation that has made a fresh start -and has not had time to get tired of itself.] - -[Footnote 9: Lord Roberts once used the word "glorious."] - -[Footnote 10: Except the French raid at Fishguard in 1797.] - -[Footnote 11: The Franco-German War cost France £600,000,000 exclusive -of the loss from suspension of business and commerce.] - -[Footnote 12: The attaché of a Great Power noticed in the South African -War an aversion to the tedious duties of outposts and reconnaissance, -and he remarks that "it is often openly stated by British officers that -it is better to get now and then into a really tight place by the -neglect of these duties than to have to endure the constant irksomeness -which they entail."] - -[Footnote 13: Apart from the question of the relative importance of the -two services, it can hardly be denied that the British Naval Officer is -an asset more valuable to his country than his brother in the Army. The -social side of his character may be more rugged and less acceptable, but -as a rule he has had neither the time nor the inclination to fritter -away his manhood in sporting pursuits which do not make for proficiency -in his profession, and he therefore excels in it; in spite of trying -conditions which do not exist in any other calling, for with some -rhetorical exaggeration it may be said that in the lower ranks he is an -abject slave, in the higher an irresponsible despot.] - -[Footnote 14: To the various courses, ranging from Balloons to -Economics, which are open to British Officers, might be added a course -in English Grammar and Composition, for the instruction of staff -officers and others who may have to formulate battle orders and despatch -important telegrams on active service. The art of composing a clear, -terse, and unambiguous order or telegraphic message is not studied in -the Army. Not a few telegrams of vital importance in the South African -War were composed by impressionist staff officers who lightly assumed -that what was present in their own minds must necessarily also be -present in the mind of the recipient. The author particularly remembers -a certain telegram from a staff officer of a column, in which it was -impossible to discover from the context whether the word "they" in the -concluding paragraph referred to British Columns or to Boer Commandos -previously mentioned.] - -[Footnote 15: Major-General Baden-Powell, in _Cavalry Journal_, April.] - - - - -CHAPTER II - -The Natal Wedge - -[Sidenote: Map p. 50] - - -The northern section of Natal before the war[16] roughly assumed the -shape of a wedge driven in between the Transvaal and the Orange Free -State. The Drakensberg Range on the one side and the Buffalo River on -the other formed the cleaving surfaces, Majuba and Laing's Nek were the -cutting edge, and the base was the Tugela River. - -In mechanics a wedge is an instrument which can be usefully employed -only under favourable circumstances. It has many disadvantages. It is -easily jammed. The driving power at the base must be considerable; much -of the force is absorbed by the friction on the surfaces; the progress -made is very slow; and if the surfaces encounter a more tenacious -material they will be perforated. A wedge is intended chiefly for -cleavage and disruption when less clumsy methods are not at hand. - -The defects of a wedge as a mechanical power at once became apparent to -the British force which occupied Natal when war became inevitable. The -cutting edge was inaccessible and liable to injury which could not be -easily repaired; much trouble was anticipated from the presence of Boer -commandos in contact with the surfaces; the base did not appear to be -sufficiently well designed to receive the impact of the propelling -force; and there were grave doubts as to the soundness of the material -of which an important section of the wedge, namely Ladysmith, was -constructed. - -It was therefore proposed by the military authorities that the Natal -wedge should not be used as an instrument in the war. To this the civil -government at Pietermaritzburg strongly objected on account of the evil -moral effect which the abandonment of a considerable proportion of the -Colony to the enemy would exercise upon the general situation in South -Africa, and of the loss of prestige which the evacuation would entail in -the minds of the natives, who numbered three-quarters of a million. -Under pressure from the Colonial Office, and against its own judgment, -the Army of Natal set itself to work upon the Wedge. - -The mistake soon became manifest, although the artisans did their best. -The Wedge was not an effective instrument; its cutting edge was never in -operation; and in a very few weeks it was hewn into a mangled, cumbrous -and irregular mass, which could neither be advanced nor withdrawn and -which for nearly five months led a precarious and unhappy existence. Its -distress necessitated the recasting of the plan of the South African -campaign and a pernicious "moral effect" was not avoided. One British -Army besieged in an open town surrounded by heights, while another was -lying impotent upon the banks of the Tugela, eighteen miles distant, was -the result of a few weeks' work with the Natal Wedge, which had been -forced by the civilian strategists into the reluctant hands of the -troops.[17] - -When Sir George White arrived in Natal on October 7 he found Sir W. Tenn -Symons carrying out the wedge policy of the Colonial Government. Part of -the latter's force was at Ladysmith and part was protecting the -collieries in the Dundee district. It was his intention to advance -northwards to Newcastle as soon as he was reinforced by the contingent -on its way from India, the full strength of which had not arrived at -Durban. The position at Dundee was strategically defective, as it was -exposed to a raid from the Transvaal border only twelve miles distant, -and it was actually further from the Orange Free State than Ladysmith. -Its defects as a tactical position were still more obvious as it was -commanded by hills. - -Such, in a few words, was the situation with which White was called upon -to deal. He had two courses before turn; he could accommodate himself to -it or he could endeavour to modify it. He attempted the latter, and -failing he recurred to the former. He saw at once the insecurity of -Symons' detached force, but being unable to convince the Natal -Government of the necessity of withdrawing it he reluctantly allowed it -to remain. - -Soon the Boer plan of campaign, which aimed at the isolation of the -British Troops in the wedge, began to unroll itself. Fourteen thousand -Transvaalers under Joubert, who had first tested the cutting edge by -sending a coal truck through the tunnel at Laing's Nek and who suspected -an ambush when he found it clear, were moving south on Newcastle, while -six thousand Free Staters under Martin Prinsloo were pouring through the -Drakensberg passes west of Ladysmith. The Natal Government now began to -feel uneasy about the safety of the colonial capital and even of Durban; -and informed White that undue importance had been attached to the -occupation of Dundee and that its retention was no longer desirable. -Thus in little more than a week White's original objection was -reconsidered and upheld. But again he allowed his better judgment to be -over-borne. Symons, whom he instructed to withdraw southwards unless he -felt his position to be absolutely secure, was at his own urgent request -allowed to remain. Next day, October 19, Elandslaagte, on the railway -between Ladysmith and Dundee, was occupied by a Boer commando, and it -was reported that 4,000 burghers were ready to cross the Buffalo River -at Jager's Drift during the night. - -Symons' camp was pitched about a mile west of Dundee which lay between -it and Talana and Lennox Hills, which commanded the town from the east. -Some hours before sunrise on October 20 a British picket on Talana was -attacked. The incident was reported to Head Quarters, where it was not -deemed to be of much importance and the routine duties of the morning -were not interrupted. The artillery horses had been taken down as usual -to water, and some companies had even fallen in for skirmishing drill, -when the curtain of the morning mist upon the higher ground was raised -to the first scene in the Natal drama. The eastward hills, looming up -darkly into the brightening sky, were seen to be occupied in force by -the enemy under L. Meyer, and soon his shells were falling among the -tents. - -The troops in camp, though taken by surprise, pulled themselves together -with admirable promptitude. The Boer guns were soon silenced, the -figures of men silhouetted along the sky line vanished, and the infantry -was ordered out to clear the hill. It was a formidable and dangerous -task, but it was facilitated by some of the features of the ground. -There was a dry river bed in which the troops could be formed up for -attack, and, half a mile beyond, a farmhouse and a plantation afforded -some cover; while a donga on the left at right angles to the river bed -apparently offered a covered way up the hill to the crest. In the -plantation occurred the first calamity of the war. Symons, who had come -up impatiently from the lower ground to hurry up the assault, which he -thought was being unnecessarily delayed, was mortally wounded. Three -days later he paid with his life for his adherence to a forward policy -in tactics as well as in strategy; and the command devolved upon Yule. - -The donga on the left was found to be useless, as it led nowhere; and -the advance was made directly from the plantation towards a wall running -along the foot of the hill. Here a long halt was made in order to -reorganize the attack, and when the word was given the men pressed -forward and threw-themselves upon the rough front of the acclivity after -a rush across an open slope. The crest was attained and carried without -much difficulty; for all but a few stalwarts had quitted it when they -saw the British bayonets pricking upwards towards their hold. - -It seemed now that the victory was won, but an unfortunate mistake -postponed it. The two field batteries on the plain, which had ceased -fire before the final infantry rush, changed position and came under a -heavy fire from the Boers who were still in possession of a section of -the Talana ridge. The light was bad and the guns re-opened upon the -crest line in the belief that the whole of it was still occupied by the -enemy. The practice was excellent, and in a brief space both sides were -driven off the hill by the shrapnel. A subsequent attempt to take it was -successful. The result of the battle, which lasted from sunrise until 2 -p.m., might have been reversed but for the inaction of the main Boer -force posted on Lennox Hill under L. Meyer, and of another force on -Impati under Erasmus, who, though he could hear the noise of battle -pealing through the mist which lay upon the hill, abstained from -intervening. - -The whole Boer force was now in full retreat along the line by which it -had advanced so silently the night before, and Yule ordered the two -field batteries up to the nek between Talana and Lennox to pound the -retreating burghers as they slowly trekked towards the Buffalo River; -but again an unfortunate misapprehension intervened. The officer in -command, being under the impression that an armistice asked for by Meyer -two hours before had been granted, refrained from opening fire and the -Boers escaped untouched. A serious misadventure marred the success of -the day. The 18th Hussars, who at the commencement of the action -received orders to hold themselves in readiness to advance when occasion -offers, soon appeared to the restless general to be losing their -opportunity, and were hustled into activity. They charged in various -directions and even made some prisoners; but one squadron lost its way -and was captured in an attempt to ride round Impati by a detachment of -Erasmus' force at a farm where it had taken refuge. - -The fight for Talana Hill encouraged each belligerent. In England it was -received as an indication of the early and successful termination of the -struggle. The Boers regarded it as a reconnaissance in force from which -they had returned with slight loss, and they could boast that they had -reaped the first fruits of the harvest of war; a squadron of British -cavalry which, with the commanding officer of the regiment, was at once -dispatched into captivity at Pretoria, where its arrival was accepted as -a proof of a great Boer victory in Natal. - -Talana Hill regarded as an isolated event in the Natal campaign was a -distinctly successful encounter, the credit of which is due entirely to -the infantry engaged in it. Twice the artillery blundered, and the -cavalry was inoperative. The extent of the loss suffered by the Natal -Field Force in the death of Symons must always be a matter for -speculation. But it is at least probable that if he had survived to take -part in the subsequent operations, his ardent, impetuous, Prince Rupert -like temperament would have beneficially impregnated with greater -audacity the stolid and ponderous tactics and strategy of the Natal -campaign. - -The unreality of the Talana Hill victory soon became apparent. The -threat of Erasmus sitting on Impati still impended, and Yule moved his -camp next day to a site which he believed to be out of range. But in the -meantime Erasmus awoke from his trance and, on the afternoon of October -21, opened fire with a six-inch gun,[18] and again Yule was compelled to -shift his camp. He had already asked for reinforcements, but White was -unable to spare them, and recommended him to fall back upon Ladysmith. -Next day Yule was encouraged by the news of a British success at -Elandslaagte; and with the object of intercepting the Boers who were -reported to be retreating on Newcastle, he endeavoured to seize Glencoe, -but Erasmus on Impati forbade the movement. - -Shortly before midnight on October 19, Kock, a Free Stater who commanded -a force chiefly composed of foreign auxiliaries and who was working -southwards from Newcastle, sent on an advanced party to swoop down upon -the railway between Ladysmith and Glencoe, and Elandslaagte station was -seized. Early next morning Kock came in with his main body. White at -first made no serious attempt to clear the line beyond sending out a -reconnoitring force which he soon recalled, as he was reluctant to -employ troops away from the immediate neighbourhood of Ladysmith, which -had been already threatened on the N.W. by Free State commandos. - -The news however of Yule's success at Talana changed the situation and -seemed to justify a more forward policy; and early in the morning of -October 21 French was sent out to re-occupy Elandslaagte and repair the -line. Although he succeeded in driving the enemy out of the railway -station and in holding it for a very brief period, he found himself -outclassed in artillery and too weak to stand up to the Boers, and -withdrew a few miles southward; at the same time asking White to -reinforce him. It was reported that Kock expected shortly to be -reinforced. - -The main Boer position was on the northern limb of a horseshoe -arrangement of kopjes which develops close to the railway station and -swings round southwards and westwards, at an elevation generally about -300 feet above the normal level of the ground. Two posts were also held -north of the railway. The southern limb of the horseshoe was lightly -held, and against it French, without waiting for the arrival of all his -reinforcements, moved with his mounted troops, and easily cleared it. -Here he was joined by the Manchester Regiment, one of the battalions of -the brigade of infantry sent out by White under the command of Ian -Hamilton, and established himself on the left flank of the Boer position -on the two kopjes on the northern limb of the horseshoe. - -The other two battalions, the Devonshire Regiment and the Gordon -Highlanders, simultaneously came into position, the former for a frontal -attack, and the latter as a reserve acting in the interval between the -Manchesters and the Devons; while the artillery advanced between the two -limbs and shelled the enemy's position on the kopjes. The artillery -preparation enjoined by the regulations had, however, to be curtailed -owing to the approach of night, but not before the two Boer guns on the -southern kopje were silenced; and then the main attack was delivered. - -The Boers on the kopjes were reinforced by a body of German auxiliaries -under Schiel, who had been driven out of a position north of the railway -by the cavalry acting on the left and who circled round to the main -position, but the reinforcement did not avail them. Hardly pressed on -their left, they were unable to withstand the frontal charge of the -Devons led by Hamilton in person. The guns were captured and the -position occupied at sunset. By this time most of the Boers were in -retreat and their tracks were made devious by the cavalry, which so long -as light remained harried them hither and thither. - -Suddenly a white flag was seen fluttering near the laager between the -kopjes. There is no reason to believe that it was treacherously raised, -but it compelled Hamilton to order the Cease Fire. Yet at once half a -hundred Boers started up and rushed as a forlorn hope upon the crest: a -remnant of stalwarts, who even succeeded in firing a round or two from -the guns which had just been taken from them. There was a moment or two -of doubt and bewilderment, but Hamilton with the help of a few junior -officers rallied the waverers, and earned the Victoria Cross, which on -account of his high military rank was withheld from him; the guns were -recovered, the laager rushed, and the tactical victory was complete. - -Elandslaagte was as unreal a victory as Talana. The troops had not -rested many hours in their bivouacs on the ridge before they received -orders to return without delay to Ladysmith, which was still threatened -from the west by the Free State commandos; and by noon on October 22 not -only had Elandslaagte been hurriedly evacuated, but stores, ammunition -and even some prisoners had been left behind in the scuttle. Next day it -passed without effort into the possession of a small body of Free -Staters, who were astonished to find it abandoned. - -Meanwhile Yule after the failure of his movement on Glencoe found his -position insecure and reluctantly resolved to retire on Ladysmith, -although it entailed leaving not only his supplies and ammunition but -also his wounded behind him. The victory of Talana had indeed been won -but the victors were exhausted by it and unfit to stand up to Erasmus on -Impati. It became necessary for Yule to disappear immediately and -stealthily. - -On October 23 soon after midnight the maimed and harassed force slipped -quietly away and trudged wearily to the south. When the mist rolling -aside next morning disclosed the evacuation the Transvaalers on Impati -occupied the town almost simultaneously with the reoccupation of -Elandslaagte by their allies the Free Staters; and thus the battlefields -of two British victories were redeemed by the defeated. It is no -reproach to Yule that military necessity compelled him to leave behind -the wounded of Talana Hill. The death of Symons on October 23 was a -pathetic episode of the Natal Campaign. He passed away of his mortal -wound while the Boers were looting the camp in which he was lying and -wondering, in the rare intervals of conscious thought, why the troops -whom he had led so gallantly had been taken from him; and for half a -year his grave lay lonely in the enemy's country before another British -soldier could stand beside it. - -The retreat of Yule's force was effected without more trouble than that -which was caused by the nature of the country and the alternations of -the climate. Van Tonder's Pass--a difficult defile which would have been -impassable under opposition--was crossed, and a sudden spate on the -Waschbank river only temporarily checked the retirement. A column was -sent out from Ladysmith by White to check the Free Staters who had -re-occupied Elandslaagte and to prevent them falling on Yule, and on -October 24 they were engaged with success at Rietfontein. The sound of -the artillery in this action was audible to Yule on the Waschbank, but -he was unable to account for it. - -On the afternoon of October 25 Yule was within one day's march of -Ladysmith. He proposed to halt for the night; but suddenly a patrol from -a column sent out by White to help him in appeared, and he received -orders to press forward to Ladysmith. - -The exhausted men resumed their march, and the misery of that night's -journey was probably never exceeded during any subsequent movement in -the war. Sodden, hungry, weary, disheartened; men and transport animals -inextricably intermingled; the column plodded onwards in the rain and -the night. A halt at daylight next morning brought in some of the -stragglers and gave a little rest to those who were still in the ranks; -and by mid-day the men of Talana Hill had trudged into Ladysmith. - -The urgency of the immediate resumption of the march had arisen from -White's anxiety for the safety of Yule's force. Rietfontein had indeed, -like Talana and Elandslaagte, been a tactically successful engagement -and had similarly been followed by a retreat; but Yule was exposed to an -attack by Erasmus, to whom he had given the slip at Dundee during the -night of October 22 and who was known to be endeavouring to overtake -him. Erasmus was believed to be acting from the direction of -Elandslaagte; but fortunately for Yule his movements were not -judiciously directed and his information was imperfect. - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 139.] - -All the detached members of the Natal Wedge had now been driven in and -the reconnaissances sent out by White on October 27 and the following -days showed that the Boers had lost no time in pressing on to Ladysmith. -The Transvaalers were apparently in force N.E. of the town on a section -of the arc in which Lombard's Kop, Long Hill, and Pepworth Hill were the -chief physical features; the Free Staters were approaching from the N.W. -and a small force of them under A.P. Cronje was already in touch with -the Transvaalers; their main body, however, seemed to be making for the -Tugela in order to isolate Ladysmith from the south. On October 29 White -assumed the offensive with the greater part of his command, and -endeavoured to cut through the still unconsolidated investing line and -to thwart the co-operation of the allies. - -The general idea was that an infantry brigade, supported on its right -flank by cavalry acting towards Lombard's Kop, should attack the enemy, -who was presumed to be in force on Long Hill and Pepworth Hill. On the -left flank of the attack a column would endeavour to pass through the -Boer line, and having seized Nicholson's Nek due north of Ladysmith -would either close it against the retreating enemy or hold it as a post -through which a mounted force could debouch in pursuit on to the more -practicable ground beyond. - -Some difficulty in drawing and loading up ammunition delayed the start -of the column, which under the command of Carleton was to secure the -left flank of the operations; and fearing that daylight on October 30 -would find his vulnerable force still on the march he determined soon -after midnight to halt short of Nicholson's Nek, from which he was then -two miles distant. He had succeeded in passing through the enemy's -picket line, and was perhaps not justified in discontinuing his advance, -although his instructions were to take Nicholson's Nek only "if -possible." But an error of judgment made by a commanding officer on a -dark night in a strange country acting under instructions which left him -a free hand must not be judged severely, and had it not been for a -disaster which could not be foreseen, he would probably have been -commended for his prudence. - -Kainguba Hill, which rises on the left of the road to Nicholson's Nek, -seemed to offer a suitable stage on the journey and towards it the -column was diverted. While the men were climbing the steep and stony -hillside a panic suddenly seized the transport mules. It may have been a -spontaneous emotion, or it may have originated in an alarm raised by the -Boers who were holding the crest. The animals stampeded down the slope, -and carrying with them not only the reserve ammunition but also the -signalling equipment, the water carts, and the component parts of the -mountain artillery, charged through the rear of the column. The timely -exertions of the officers checked the general scare that was imminent; -and with the exception of a few score of infantry men and gunners the -column reached the summit before daybreak, having lost almost everything -needed for a successful occupation of it. - -Misfortune continued relentlessly to pursue the column. A position was -taken up on the hill on the supposition that it could only be attacked -from the south, but at daylight C. de Wet, who here came upon the stage -which afterwards he often filled so effectively, threatened it from the -north with a Free State commando. A gesture made by an officer in order -to attract attention was interpreted as a signal to retire; another -officer thinking that his company was left alone on the summit, though -it was in fact within seventy yards of an occupied sangar, raised the -white flag; and almost at the same moment a bugle sounded the Cease -Fire. Neither the white flag nor the bugle call was authorized by -Carleton; but a glance at the situation showed him that they could not -be repudiated and after a gallant struggle to maintain an indefensible -position he surrendered. Nearly a thousand men were led away into -captivity. - -The main infantry attack was made by a force of five battalions with six -field batteries under the command of Grimwood. He marched out of -Ladysmith soon after midnight, but had not covered half the distance to -the point of attack when an unfortunate incident deprived him of all his -artillery and of two of his battalions. The guns marching in the centre -of the column and acting under orders which were not communicated to -Grimwood, diverged to the right and were followed by the two battalions -in rear; and the absence of nearly half the force was not discovered by -him until daybreak, and after he had taken up the position assigned -south of Long Hill. Daybreak also revealed the fact that Long Hill which -was assumed to be the Boer left was not occupied, and that Long Tom from -Impati had been emplaced on Pepworth Hill. The cavalry brigade under -French upon whom Grimwood relied to protect his right flank was two -miles away in his rear; and finding himself attacked on that flank -instead of from the front he was compelled to swing round and almost -reverse his front. Thus far the general scheme of attack had signally -failed. Carleton on the left had not reached Nicholson's Nek and was in -trouble; Grimwood with nearly half of his command gone astray, and -having discovered that the enemy's left was not on Long Hill but on -Lombard's Kop, had to improvise a scheme of his own; while French -instead of conforming to Grimwood was compelling Grimwood to conform to -him. At 8 a.m. Grimwood was suffering severely from artillery fire, and -French whose cavalry now prolonged Grimwood's line southwards was with -difficulty holding his own. The enemy, whom the general idea destined to -be outflanked and rolled up towards the north and pursued by mounted -troops issuing from Nicholson's Nek, was instead attacking vigorously -from Lombard's Kop on the east and seemed likely to outflank White; the -infantry reserves under Ian Hamilton were almost expended; and the -British artillery was unable to silence the Boer guns. - -All through the forenoon Ladysmith and the little garrison left behind -for its defence was the target of Long Tom on Pepworth Hill. The -fugitives from Kainguba brought in disheartening reports and the Boers -seemed to be threatening from the north. W. Knox, a Horse Artillery -officer who had been left in command, anticipated an attack which he had -little chance of meeting successfully with the scanty force at his -disposal and sent an urgent message to White, who at noon ordered the -battle to be broken off and the troops to retire to Ladysmith. - -The retreat was effected in confusion. Grimwood's force was the first to -be withdrawn and was saved from disaster by the gallant stand made by -two field batteries as it crossed the level ground. The cavalry -scampered home in Grimwood's track. A dramatic episode brought the -battle of Lombard's Kop to a close. Just as the baffled troops were -entering Ladysmith a battery of naval guns, which had arrived from -Durban that morning and had gone immediately into action, succeeded in -silencing Long Tom and some other guns on Pepworth Hill, nearly four -miles distant. In the evening Joubert sent in a flag of truce to White -to announce Carleton's surrender. - -The Natal Wedge disappeared in the smoke of the battle of Lombard's Kop -and was never again heard of as an instrument in the Natal campaign. The -Boers filled the gaps in the investing line without difficulty, and on -November 2 the Siege of Ladysmith began. The last man to leave the town -was French, who went forth to win honour on distant fields. - -Notes: - -[Footnote 16: In 1902 the Vryheid and Utrecht districts of the Transvaal -were annexed to Natal and the wedge disappeared.] - -[Footnote 17: They were indeed authorized as early as October 18 to -throw it aside but by that time they were committed to its use.] - -[Footnote 18: "Long Tom," which was afterwards sent to Ladysmith and -subsequently to bombard Rhodes in Kimberley.] - -[Illustration: Sketch map of Northern Natal.] - - - - -CHAPTER III - -Deus Ex Machina No. I - - -The arrival of Sir Redvers Buller at Cape Town on October 31, 1899, the -morrow of the battle of Lombard's Kop, encouraged the despondent at home -and in Cape Colony.[19] Twenty years previously he had distinguished -himself in the command of a Boer contingent which served with the -British Army during the Zulu campaign; and it was doubtless from the -experience then gained that he formed the opinion that the war which he -was now called upon to direct, could be brought to a successful -conclusion only "by the actual conquest of every man in the field: a -task doubly difficult owing to the extreme mobility of the enemy." - -In his first telegram to Lord Lansdowne he described the situation as -one of "extreme gravity." - -White, with five-sixths of the British Troops in South Africa, was shut -up in Ladysmith; a month at least must elapse before the Expeditionary -Force, which the British Government had on September 22 decided to send -out, would be able to take the field; Mafeking was besieged; the diamond -men of Kimberley, like a passionate child interned in a dark room, were -screaming for release; Sir Alfred Milner was pleading that the defence -of the Cape Peninsula, an area of a few thousand square miles as far -removed from the front as Marseilles is from Berlin, must be first -attended to; President Steyn had overcome his scruples and was sending -Free State commandos across the Orange River into the Cape Colony at -Bethulie and Norval's Pont; the disaffected colonials were restive; and -the fall of Ladysmith, which seemed probable, would lay Natal open from -the Tugela to the Indian Ocean. - -It was a dismal outlook; but Buller, after a few days' review of the -situation, was able to report that in his opinion the opposition would -probably collapse when Kimberley and Ladysmith were relieved. His -optimism at Capetown was destined soon to be superseded by pessimism on -the Tugela. He compared himself to a man who, having a busy day before -him, has overslept himself. The original plan of campaign, a march on -Pretoria through the Free State, had necessarily to be postponed; and -the important railway junctions at Naauwpoort and Stormberg were too -weakly held and too liable to investment by the Free State commandos -which had crossed the Orange to justify their retention, and the little -garrisons were withdrawn. To Gatacre and French, who had just escaped -from Ladysmith, was assigned the duty of holding the centre, while Lord -Methuen advanced to the relief of Kimberley. - -It was, however, the situation in Natal which gave the most anxiety to -Buller. The Free State commandos which had been seen passing Ladysmith -shortly before the investment were now at Colenso, having driven back to -Estcourt the small British force which was all that was left to stem the -tide of an invasion. The Free Staters, fortunately, were not active and -delayed to avail themselves of the opportunity. When at length, after -eleven days of inertia, L. Botha persuaded Joubert to undertake an -offensive movement south of the Tugela, it had passed away, as Estcourt -had in the meantime been reinforced by troops from England under the -command of Hildyard. - -Encouraged by the capture of an armoured train at Chieveley, Joubert -advanced south in two bodies, one on each side of Estcourt, and seized -the railway at Highlands, thus cutting off Hildyard's communication with -Pietermaritzburg; and Hildyard having no cavalry was unable to touch -him. The raid, which for a time seemed dangerous, was however soon -checked by troops coming up from the south under Barton, and Joubert -found himself pressed between two forces each as strong as his own. -After an action at Willow Grange, which each side claimed as a victory, -Joubert, fearing lest he should be cut off, retired unpursued, against -the wishes of the more pushful and energetic Botha, who was in favour of -an advance on Pietermaritzburg. - -The alarms and excursions of October and November were the cause of the -dissolution of a military apparatus which had been put together at home -with much care and thought, and which had never yet been seen in -warfare. Its designers and constructors were proud of it and they looked -forward with confidence to its successful working. The apparatus was the -British Army Corps. It was taken to pieces as soon as it reached South -Africa; but fortunately the ties, ligaments, and braces which held it -together yielded to slight pressure and little difficulty was -experienced in resolving it into its constituent elements. The more -important of these were despatched to Natal and the rest were -distributed over the western and central commands. - -Buller, perhaps leaving the pessimistic atmosphere of Capetown with -relief, went by sea to Durban, the defence of which was entrusted to the -Royal Navy, and reached Pietermaritzburg on November 25. By this time -the situation had improved all along the line, and it seemed that it -might still be possible to resume the original plan of a central advance -on Bloemfontein and Pretoria as soon as Ladysmith was relieved. The Boer -raid towards southern Natal which caused so much consternation had been -easily foiled and British troops were now at Frere. - -Buller, soon after his arrival in Natal, found himself in command of a -force of 19,000 men with whom to tackle about 21,000 Boers under the -command of L. Botha. Joubert was invalided after the unsuccessful -Estcourt raid, and the change was, from the enemy's point of view, for -the better. The new Head Commandant was a more strenuous and active -leader than his predecessor. - -Little was known of the topography of the country in which Buller was -about to operate. It had never been systematically surveyed, and the -existing maps had been constructed for agricultural rather than for -campaigning purposes, and could not be trusted. The Tugela formed the -ditch of a natural fortress covering Ladysmith. On its left bank rose an -almost continuous ridge or rampart from which the easy open ground on -the right bank could be watched for miles, and reconnaissances kept at a -distance. - -Reconnaissances were, however, not needed to prove to Buller that -Colenso, where the railway passed up into the Tugela ridge, was immune -to a frontal attack, and that Ladysmith must be relieved by a turning -movement. Two alternatives offered themselves. The advance might be made -through Weenen and across the Tugela some distance below Colenso, and -thence to Elandslaagte, where the Boer line of communication with the -Transvaal might be cut; but to Ladysmith this was a circuitous route. It -also would necessitate the traversing of a rough bush country, into -which Buller was reluctant to throw raw troops just off the transports -who had not yet heard the sounds of war. - -He therefore decided upon a westerly flank march by way of Potgieter's -Drift, twenty miles west of Colenso; and once on the left bank of the -Tugela he would be within a day's march of Ladysmith and the railway -into the Free State. White was heliographically consulted, and all the -arrangements for an advance on December 11 were made. The force had even -been set in motion when certain disturbing news came out of the west. -Gatacre had suffered a reverse at Stormberg, and simultaneously Methuen -had been roughly handled at Magersfontein, and was unable to continue -his march on Kimberley. - -The strategic timidity of Buller and his curious habit of allowing -himself to be influenced by psychological probabilities were at once -apparent. The anticipated moral effect of these successes upon the enemy -swayed him back to the plan which a day or two previously he had -rejected as impracticable. The plan of a flank march by way of -Potgieter's Drift was thrown aside. It might have been justifiable in -the presence of a dispirited enemy; but now the burghers on the Tugela -had been suddenly encouraged by news of victories won on two widely -separated scenes of action and were no doubt anxious to rival the -exploits of their comrades far away.[20] The flank march would expose -the army to the danger of being cut off by a quickened and revived foe, -and Buller determined not to run the risk. On December 12 he ordered an -advance on Colenso. - -The course of the war in the western and central scenes of action up to -the time of the two defeats which caused Buller to revise the plan of -campaign for Natal must now be traced. - -[Sidenote: Map p. 260.] - -The force of nearly 10,000 men under Lord Methuen detailed by Buller for -the relief of Kimberley, advanced from De Aar and Orange River Bridge -along the railway. At Belmont a body of Free Staters under Jacob -Prinsloo was found strongly posted on the heights east of the line, and -although reinforced by Delarey from Kimberley, it was unable to hold to -its positions, and was compelled to retreat eastwards on November 23. - -Prinsloo withdrew with his Free Staters across the border, but was -persuaded by Delarey, who had fallen back on Graspan about eight miles -N.E. of Belmont, to rejoin him; and a favourable position was occupied -on a group of kopjes astride the railway, where on November 25 another -battle was fought, in which the Naval Brigade suffered a loss of nearly -half its strength. The enemy, though driven back, retreated in good -order, as at Belmont two days previously, there being no cavalry -available for effective pursuit. Methuen pushed on to Witkoplaagte. - -The Boers were greatly discouraged by Belmont and Graspan, where, as at -Talana and Elandslaagte, they had been ejected from strong kopje -positions chosen by themselves. The moral was not lost upon Delarey, who -determined to try whether a better stand could not be made in a river -position, and selected the junction of the Modder and the Riet for the -experiment. His idea was not so much to dispute the passage of the river -as to use the deep channels as covered ways and as natural trenches from -which the plain could be grazed by rifle fire. The Modder after -approaching the Riet changes its direction abruptly three tunes above -the junction, enclosing a diamond-shaped area which provided the Boers -with a ready-made perimeter camp. - -[Sidenote: Map. p. 59.] - -Methuen, thinking that the enemy would as before select the good kopje -position which offered itself on Spytfontein halfway to Kimberley, -determined to diverge from the railway with the greater part of his army -and circling through Jacobsdaal, Brown's Drift and Abon's Dam to attack -Spytfontein in flank, where he had little doubt that he would find the -Boers in position; but Modder River, which he was inclined to believe -was only held as an advanced post, must first be taken. Delarey had been -joined by P. Cronje, who unperceived by Methuen's cavalry came in with a -body of Transvaalers from Mafeking, and was in occupation of the loop -between the rivers. - -At sunrise on November 28 Methuen advanced from his camp at Witkoplaagte -six miles south of the river. The fight began under misapprehensions on -each side. Methuen believed that only the river bank above the railway -bridge was held in force; while he was credited by his opponents with -the intention of crossing the Riet River by Bosnian's Drift of which he -did not know the existence. - -Everything promised well for Delarey and Cronje, but they made little -use of their opportunities. Methuen fought in the dark, and whenever the -Fog of War lifted, found that the situation had changed. He attacked the -Modder as the opening move of his flank march on a mythical position on -Spytfontein and suddenly discovered before him, not a mere advanced post -to be checked or masked, but an enemy holding a well-entrenched and -defended front several miles in length. The maps at his disposal did not -shew the extraordinary windings of the two rivers over part of the area -on which he was engaged, and some of the reaches were only discovered -when they tripped up the advancing troops. The result of a hard day's -work, in which Methuen was wounded, was the capture of Rosmead, a -village on the right bank below the railway bridge. The troops of the -right attack did not succeed in crossing the river, and an attempt to -work up the right bank from Rosmead failed. What effect the battle would -have upon the situation, and whether on the whole it had been a success -for Methuen, were not apparent at nightfall. The question was answered -next morning when it was found that the Boers had retired to Jacobsdaal. -Next day the British troops took up a position north of the river. - -So far, the Kimberley relief force had done its work well. The obstacles -in its way at Belmont, Graspan, and Modder River had been thrust aside, -and it was now within two easy marches of its destination. It seemed -therefore that in three days at the most, allowing one day for another -battle, it would be reported to Buller as having finished its task: and -had the necessity been urgent the relief could no doubt have been -effected within that time. Kimberley, however, appeared able to take -care of itself for a few weeks, and Methuen halted for twelve days at -Modder River in order to receive supplies and reinforcements, and to -strengthen his slender and vulnerable line of communication with the -south. He still believed that the Boers would make their next stand at -Spytfontein. - -The Boers remained but a few days at Jacobsdaal. After a council of war -at which Cronje declared himself in favour of remaining there as a -menace to the British line of communication which would attract Methuen -to the town, a movement which Methuen himself had had in mind; while -Delarey advocated the taking up of a position between the Modder River -and Kimberley; the plan of the latter was adopted and the Boer forces -trekked northwards to Spytfontein. They found, however, that between -Spytfontein and the river, the Magersfontein group of kopjes would -afford excellent positions to Methuen from which Spytfontein could be -attacked. - -During Methuen's halt at Modder River Delarey and Cronje received -considerable reinforcements. From Natal, from the Basuto border, and -from Kimberley, commandos were summoned to Spytfontein. That position -was, however, for the reason just stated, insecure; and on the December -4 the Magersfontein position was taken up and prepared for defence by -Delarey. A low arc stretching from the position towards the Modder was -discovered, from which a flanking fire could be poured in upon a frontal -attack. - -With an unerring instinct which was more useful to him than most of the -knowledge he could have acquired in a European Staff College, and with -an originality which if it had been displayed by a young British officer -in an examination for promotion would probably have injured that -officer's prospects, Delarey dug his trenches not at the foot of the -hill but in sinuous lines some little way in advance of it, by which he -gained the power of meeting an attack with grazing or skimming fire, and -which also removed the firing line from physical features on which the -British guns could be laid. It is said that he manned the works on the -slope with burghers firing black powder so as to draw the enemy's fire -away from the trenches in which only smokeless powder was used. - -[Illustration: Modder River and Magersfontein.] - -Methuen obtained little information during his halt at Modder River. The -country was so much intersected by the wire fences of the farms that -cavalry scouting was difficult. He decided to make a direct frontal -attack upon Magersfontein on December 11 after a bombardment on the -previous evening; and here, as at Colenso, the text-book preliminary -shrapnel practice put the enemy on the alert and did no harm. It greatly -encouraged the burghers in their trenches. Only three men were touched -by the projectiles hurled by the naval, howitzer, field, and horse -batteries; and an impending infantry advance was clearly indicated. To -the Highland Brigade under Wauchope, who had joined the command since -the Modder River battle, was entrusted the execution of the night -attack. He does not appear to have altogether approved of Methuen's -scheme; but with the same dogged valour which he displayed many years -before when he threw himself upon the Gladstonian political -Magersfontein in Midlothian, he incorporated himself in it. - -At 1 a.m. on December 12 in a storm of rain and thunder the Brigade in -mass of quarter-columns marched out of its bivouac, guided by a staff -officer's compass which the lightning and the rain soon made unreliable. -The objective point was the southern edge of the Magersfontein Ridge, -about three miles distant. The progress made over the rough and -encumbered veld was slow, and it was difficult to judge in the darkness -how much ground had really been covered. Wauchope either underestimated -the distance made good or, as is more probable, did not expect to find -the enemy entrenched in advance of the foot of the hill, and the error -cost him his life and the lives of many other gallant Highlanders. -Afraid lest dawn should find his Brigade too far away from the position -to rush it, he hesitated to deploy, and when at last he was about to -give the order, a further delay was caused by a line of thorn bushes. -The Brigade passed through or avoided the obstruction and was at the -halt on the point of changing formation when the Boers in the advanced -trenches, which had been so stealthily excavated that no one in the -British Army seems to have been aware of their existence, received the -alarm and opened fire. Possibly the situation might have been saved if -an order to charge had been given at once, and the Highlanders had heard -the skirl of the pipes; but Wauchope had at the first shot rushed -forward impetuously towards the flashing Mausers. With his life he -measured the unknown distance to the trenches, and at the supreme moment -his Highlanders lost their leader and knew not whom to follow. - -The sudden stroke of the impact falling upon men of dissimilar -temperament reacted on them diversely. The majority absorbed it by -throwing themselves upon the ground on which they stood; others recoiled -mechanically upon the companies in rear; while to not a few it was a -stimulus which projected them into the jaws of death gaping before them -in the dim light. A mixed body, hardly exceeding the strength of three -companies, pushed on in obedience to the last words that fell from -Wauchope's lips, to reinforce the right; and succeeded in wriggling -round the eastward flank of the enemy's advanced trenches and in -shattering a foreign contingent in the Boer service which was holding -the gap of level ground between the low arc and the Magersfontein Ridge. -The little force of progressives came under the fire of the British guns -which opened upon the ridge at daybreak, but a remnant under Wilson -drove a keen-edged but slender wedge into the curve of the Boer -position, and was favourably placed to storm the ridge. A few score of -Highlanders were now fingering the key with which it seemed possible to -unlock the sluice gates and allow the flood waters of war to overwhelm -the foe. But War is a game of chance. The key was snatched away and the -issue of the day reversed by a man who had lost his way. - -In the absence of Delarey, who was absent at Kimberley, P. Cronje was in -chief command of the Boer forces. His Head-Quarters were at Brown's -Drift on the Modder, six miles from the key of the position on -Magersfontein. The sound of the bombardment notified him that an -infantry attack was imminent, and he hurried off to make the final -arrangements for meeting it. These he seems to have completed to his -satisfaction, and he rested for an hour or two, rising soon after -midnight. In the darkness and rain he lost his way on the unfamiliar -ground. But chance found him at daybreak close to the gap which Wilson's -little band of Highlanders had hewn in his line, and their promising -advance was effectually repressed, as they were simultaneously fired on -by Cronje's escort on their front and by a commando which had come up on -their right rear. - -Daylight found the shattered and dismembered Highland Brigade lying in -patches upon the veld, with their leader dead before their eyes; -themselves unable to advance or retreat, conspicuous, hungry, thirsty, -and soon to be scorched by the midsummer sun at the zenith; and there -they lay for eight hours. Only the shells of the artillery, which from -daylight onwards played upon the trenches and partially mastered the -fire from them, saved the Highland Brigade from destruction. - -The Guards' Brigade under Colvile was in the first instance detailed as -the reserve of the Highland Brigade, but the repulse of the latter and -the probability that it would sooner or later be compelled to retreat -gave the former a definite objective, the low arc held by the left of -the Boer line. In marching on this the wire fence which was the boundary -between British territory and the Orange Free State was crossed, and the -Guards' Brigade had the honour of being the first body of troops to go -into action in the enemy's country. Colvile held his own, but although -he was unable to occupy the arc he screened the right flank of the -Highlanders. On their left a weak Brigade under Pole-Carew was drawn up -astride the railway, and thus apparently the firing line, which had been -so hardly pressed during so many weary hours, was secure on either -flank. But Pole-Carew was paralysed by the variety of the duties which -had been assigned to him, and was unable to operate offensively on the -enemy's right. His original orders were to act as camp guard and to -demonstrate northwards in support of the Highland Brigade; and -subsequently he seems to have been instructed to hold himself in -readiness to cross over to support the Guards' attack on the enemy's -left, with the result that his Brigade was never seriously engaged. - -The interval between the Highlanders' right facing the trenches and the -Guards' left had never been effectively closed and early in the -afternoon the Boers renewed their attacks upon it, and threatened to -enfilade the line. Hughes-Hallett, who after the death of Wauchope -succeeded to the command of the Highland Brigade and to whom Methuen had -sent orders to hold on until nightfall, asked Colvile in vain to support -him and at last was compelled to throw back his right. Methuen's orders -were unfortunately known only to Hughes-Hallett and the movement was -interpreted as an order from the brigadier for a general retirement. The -wave of retreat beginning on the right passed rapidly down the line, and -soon all but a few score of men who held on gallantly as long as there -was light were streaming back in confusion to the field batteries in -rear. Even the shelter of the guns did not wholly avail them for -protection, for they were shelled while rallying by the Boer guns which -had been strangely silent during the battle; and the retreat was -continued to the bivouac ground which so many more of them, now lying on -the veld, had quitted seventeen hours before. The battle was lost. - -It is probable that if the work had been more evenly distributed the -result might have been, at least, less disastrous. An intolerable strain -was put upon one Brigade which it was unable to bear. The Highlanders -were blundered into action, then abandoned to their fate for many hours, -and finally withdrawn by a misunderstanding. The inequality of the tasks -set to the various columns is strikingly shown in the return of -casualties. To the total of 948 killed and wounded the Highland Brigade -contributed no less than 752. Two of its battalions lost 37 per cent of -their strength; while the losses of the Division were but 7 per cent. - -Methuen's expectations that as at Modder River after the fight of -November 28 so also at Magersfontein the Boers would evacuate their -positions during the night were not realized. Next day he retired to the -Modder River Camp, where he received orders from Buller either to attack -Cronje again or to fall back upon the Orange River; but at the instance -of Forestier-Walker, who was in command of the Lines of Communication, -the orders were cancelled and Methuen was allowed to remain. - -Magersfontein of itself would probably have sufficed to disarrange the -plans of Duller in Natal, but coming a few hours after a serious rebuff -in the centre, of which the story must now be told, it loomed fearfully -on his near horizon. Soon after he landed at Capetown he ordered the -weak and vulnerable detachments at Naauwpoort and Stormberg to be -withdrawn to De Aar and Queenstown. The movement opened to the enemy the -gates of access to a district in the Cape Colony teeming with Dutch -disaffection. The Free Staters, however, did not avail themselves of the -opportunity with alacrity, as they were more or less committed to -defensive action within their own territory; and a fortnight elapsed -before Colesberg was occupied by a force under the command of a -Transvaaler named Schoeman, who on November 1 had crossed the Orange -River at Norval's Pont. A few days later the Colesberg district was -formally annexed by proclamation to the Orange Free State and the -transfer of allegiance was enthusiastically approved by a public meeting -held at Colesberg on November 14. This action not only brought the -inhabitants under the commando law of the adjacent Republic by which a -form of conscription was enforced, but also overcame the scruples of the -Free Staters who could still maintain that they were only engaged in -defending their own territory. Simultaneously Du Plooy with a commando -which had crossed at Bethulie annexed the Burghersdorp district; while -Olivier with a force mainly composed of colonial rebels took over on -behalf of the Free State all that remained of the border districts of -Cape Colony as far as Basutoland. By the end of November the easy -process of annexation by proclamation had augmented the territory of the -Orange Free State by about 7,000 square miles; and then almost as an -afterthought the burghers occupied the important strategic post of -Stormberg Junction. - -To meet and if possible to thrust back these intrusions French was sent -to the Naauwpoort and Gatacre to the Stormberg district. Buller soon -found it necessary to order Naauwpoort to be re-occupied, as that town -would have afforded a useful base to the enemy from which the main line -of railway could be raided in the neighbourhood of De Aar. French -arrived at Naauwpoort on November 20 and was for some weeks engaged in -protecting the lines and in checking rebellion. - -[Illustration: Stormberg.] - -The little force of half a battalion of infantry which evacuated -Stormberg withdrew to Queenstown, where Gatacre arrived on November 18. -He intended to march on Stormberg as soon as he had collected a -sufficient force; his own Division, which he had brought out from -England, having been diverted to Natal. He soon advanced to Putterskraal -near Sterkstroom and about thirty miles from Stormberg, the occupation -of which by the enemy on November 25 prevented co-operation between him -and French at Naauwpoort. - -Meanwhile rebellion was spreading, and owing to the dilatory -proclamation of Martial Law by the Cape Government, always reluctant to -take action which might wound the susceptibilities of the Dutch -population, it had assumed a formidable aspect. Buller was uneasy, and -although at first he had cautioned Gatacre to be careful he now -suggested his closing with the enemy. - -On December 7, by which time considerable reinforcements had come in, -Gatacre felt himself strong enough to tackle Olivier at Stormberg. His -plan was to take his column by train as far as Molteno, whence a night -march of about eight miles would bring it into position for attacking -the Boer laager. The use of the railway would not only enable him to -strike more suddenly and with a greater chance of taking Olivier by -surprise but would also economise the strength of his force, a portion -of which having left the transports only a few days previously was not -yet in hard condition. The force with which he proposed to take -Stormberg amounted to 2,600 men, who detrained at Molteno soon after -sunset on December 9. Gatacre calculated that after a march of about six -hours he would be able to rush the position before dawn. - -The Boers, to the number of 1,700 men, were in occupation of the -Kissieberg ridge, and of a nek which runs westward from its southern end -towards a higher hill overhanging Stormberg Junction called Rooi Kop. -Gatacre had originally intended to attack the Boer position frontally, -but the reports which he received on arrival at Molteno determined him -to turn it. The change of plan was not made known to all the troops, -with the result that the ambulance and ammunition wagons left the town -by the Stormberg road instead of by the Steynsburg road, along which the -rest of the column was marching to the new objective. No trustworthy -maps were available, and the enterprise was dependent for its success -upon the knowledge and fidelity of a sergeant of police and a few native -constables who acted as guides and who professed to know "every inch of -the way." - -Soon after midnight, however, Gatacre's suspicions were aroused by the -sudden appearance of a railway which ought not to have been there, and -it was discovered that the guides had a mile or two back missed a path -on which the column should have diverged to the right. They assured him, -however, that they had chosen a better road and that he was now less -than 3,000 yards from the Boer position. He therefore halted the column -for an hour's rest, and hoped for the best. - -When the march was resumed another railway was almost immediately -encountered. It was in fact the colliery line which had been crossed -before the halt and which here curves almost to the extent of a -semicircle; but Gatacre believed that he had come upon the main line to -Steynsburg and judged that he was now N.W. of the Boer position; while -many of the officers in the rear of the column, unaware of the change of -plan, imagined that they were approaching it from the S.E. along the -Stormberg road originally selected for the advance on which the -ambulance and ammunition wagons had already gone astray. - -The direction of the march was now almost reversed, owing to Gatacre's -misapprehension of his position; and at dawn the column unknown to -itself reached certain cross roads on Van Zyl's farm which had been -fixed upon as the point from which the attack should be delivered; but -the locality was not recognized by the staff, and the guides, who seem -to have misunderstood the object of the march, conducted the column -still deeper into the valley beneath the Kissieberg ridge. - -Suddenly a shot from the heights startled the errant and plodding -column. The Boers had indeed been taken by surprise, but were at once on -the alert and the crest line was soon occupied. The column marching in -fours halted and turned to the right and, except the leading companies -of Irish Rifles, which were formed to the front in order to seize a -detached hill at the end of the ridge, sprang up the slope, but were -soon baffled by the irregular tiers of krantzes or rock walls on the -hill side. The artillery diverged to the left, losing one gun in the -donga which ran down the valley, and took post on the detached hill from -which the Kissieberg ridge could be shelled. The companies of Irish -Rifles, after seizing this hill, passed along the nek which joined it to -the ridge and almost won the crest line. - -Meanwhile the Northumberland Fusiliers and the remaining companies of -the Irish Rifles found the task of mounting the encumbered slope beyond -their powers, and were soon ordered to fall back into the valley. The -artillery noticed the movement, and in order to cover the retreat opened -upon Kissieberg; not perceiving in the eastern dazzle of the sun about -to rise above the sky line that some of the infantry who had not heard -the order to retire were still clinging to the darkened westward -hillside, and these were shelled by their own guns. - -Gatacre, confident of an easy success, had thrown all his infantry into -the firing line, and had no reserves to fall back upon to support the -companies of the Irish Rifles which were still holding their own on the -left flank of the attack. As soon as the troops had crossed the valley -to reform on the opposite ridge a new entanglement beset them. - -A commando under E.R. Grobler and Steenkamp, chiefly composed of rebels, -which had been sent by Olivier on the previous day to stir up trouble in -the district, was halted for the night a few miles out on the Steynsburg -road. The sound of the firing quickly called it to attention, and a -position which seriously threatened Gatacre's line of retreat was -quickly seized. The commando, however, was handled with little judgment -or energy, and was soon checked by the field guns which had been -withdrawn from the detached hill near the Kissieberg ridge to cover the -retreat of the infantry; and which at one time were firing trail to -trail, some still engaging Olivier on Kissieberg while others were -shelling Grobler. - -The raid on Stormberg had manifestly failed and Gatacre ordered a -retreat to Molteno. Thither the weary, dispirited column trudged all -through the forenoon of December 10. A gun was abandoned on the way, and -even the wagon in which the breech block had been secreted fell also -into the enemy's hands. But this was a comparatively insignificant loss. -It was soon discovered that nearly a third of the infantry was absent. -When the troops were withdrawn from the attack on Kissieberg not a few -of them remained in the donga or under the krantzes on the hill side, -while others appear to have held on to the ridge. By some extraordinary -neglect or default nearly 600 men were left to their fate. No one seems -to have missed them at the time and they were made prisoners of war -without an effort to extricate them. - -In less than two hours all the fighting except the little affair with -Grobler was over. On neither side were the casualties of killed and -wounded heavy. No British officer was killed and of the eight who were -wounded four had been struck by shells not fired by the enemy. - - * * * * * - -Stonmberg on December 10, followed by Magersfontein on December 13, -brought about Colenso on December 15. The latter was Buller's attempt to -retrieve the former mishaps. - -A naturally strong position on the left bank of the Tugela had by the -efforts of the Boers during the previous three weeks been almost -perfectly secured. They showed, however, some hesitation with regard to -Hlangwhane, a detached hill on the right bank from which the Tugela line -could be enfiladed. It was a somewhat precarious position as it was -accessible from the left bank only by two bridle drifts. It had been -originally held by the Boers, but the garrison was withdrawn when -Barton's Brigade appeared at Chieveley; and now all Botha's persistence, -and even a reference to Kruger and Joubert at Pretoria, were required to -induce the burghers to re-occupy it on December 15. From the south -Hlangwhane, though separated from the Colenso kopjes by the river, -appears to be an integral continuation of them. - -[Illustration: Colenso Battlefield.] - -The enemy's general idea was a defensive occupation of the Colenso -position, although Botha, with characteristic spirit, proposed to send a -commando across the river to face the British on the open. The -initiative, always a disadvantage when attacking an enemy strongly -posted and entrenched, was thus imposed upon Buller. It was not doubted -that he would be compelled to make a frontal attack on Colenso and in -this the Boers showed the more correct appreciation of the situation. -Botha hoped to lure Buller on and was prepared even to allow him to -cross the river; and having crushed him to act upon the British flanks, -an operation which the wide extension of Botha's front from Hlangwhane -to Robinson's farm, a distance of seven miles, gave him a good chance of -being able to carry out. If necessary, reinforcements could be drawn -from the investing circle around Ladysmith, which seemed to be detaining -more burghers than were necessary for the maintenance of the siege. - -Buller proclaimed his intention of attacking Botha by a preliminary -bombardment of the Colenso kopjes on December 13 and 14; but the -burghers lay low and gave so little indication of their presence that it -almost seemed that they had abandoned the line of the Tugela. The -British Army was encamped near Chieveley four miles south of Colenso. - -On the evening of December 14 the scheme of attack was delivered to the -Brigadiers. The leading idea of it was a frontal attack to be delivered -from the village of Colenso, where the Tugela is crossed by an iron -railway bridge as well as by an iron wagon bridge. The latter had been -left intact by the enemy, possibly in order to entice the British troops -across the river. Buller appears to have been unaware how far the Boer -trenches extended towards the west, and to have assumed that only the -kopjes immediately opposite Colenso were occupied. Hildyard's Brigade -was ordered to march in the direction of the "iron bridge,"[21] to cross -at that point, and then to "seize the kopjes north of the iron bridge." -The attack on the enemy's right, which was believed to be weak, was -assigned to Hart's Irish Brigade. He was instructed to cross the Tugela -at a bridle drift about two miles west of Colenso and work down the left -bank towards the occupied kopjes. Two infantry Brigades were retained as -reserves to be used when required; and the mounted Brigade was ordered -to move towards Hlangwhane and occupy it, if possible, and cover the -right flank; but the weakness of the Boer position on that hill, which -was cut off by the river from the main line of defence, does not seem to -have been realized. A few batteries were sent with Hart, but the bulk of -the artillery was ordered east of the railway to support Hildyard. - -Buller's scheme has been severely criticized ever since its failure, but -Clery who was in nominal command of the Natal force, and in whose name -the battle orders were issued, as well as the other general officers, -acquiesced in it. But in fact hardly any scheme could have been devised -more likely to play into Botha's hands. Buller hoped to get a footing on -the left bank and Botha hoped that he would succeed in doing so. Botha's -special idea was to allure the troops of the frontal attack to his own -side, where he could easily pound them from his kopjes and carry out his -general idea of netting the British flanks. - -Buller had not then been in action with the Boers and he probably -underrated their tactical capacity; but already he seems to have -contemplated the possibility of the loss of Ladysmith, for in his -despatch of December 13 to Lord Lansdowne, in which he justified his -sudden change of the plan of campaign, he said that "it would be better -to lose Ladysmith than to leave Natal open to the enemy." - -Nor did the Boers enter into the contest with much confidence. They had -not yet tried Buller's mettle and his name was to them a tradition of -courage handed down from the Zulu war, in which some of the older -burghers now opposing him on the Tugela had served under him. The -curious omission to inform White in Ladysmith that an attack on Colenso -was to be made on December 15 may have arisen from Buller's doubts as to -its issue, or from reluctance to heliograph a message in a cipher of -which the enemy might have the key. - -The story of the Battle of Colenso is mainly the narrative of the action -of two important components of the Army of Natal. Each of these was led -by a dangerously brave man, whose impetuosity crippled the tactical -scheme and whose method of working his command was, at least, unusual. -If in Hart and Long, who commanded the Artillery, the quality of -personal courage had been less prominent it is probable that Colenso -would not have filled up the cup of Stormberg and Magersfontein in that -dark midsummer December week. - -The naval guns on the west of the railway had the honour of opening the -battle, and shelled Fort Wyllie for some time without eliciting any -response. Long joined Hildyard with another naval battery and two field -batteries. He was not only an impetuous man but he also belonged to the -short range school of artillerists;[22] and he soon outpaced his -infantry escort and came into action with his field batteries in the -open a little in advance of a shallow intersecting donga, and within -1,100 yards of the Boer entrenchments across the river. The naval -battery had been compelled by the flight of the Kaffir ox drivers to -outspan astride a deeper donga about a quarter of a mile in rear, to -which Long had sent back his gun teams. A terrific rifle and shrapnel -fire, which the infantry escort which soon came up was powerless to -subdue, was now opened upon the guns, and for an hour the batteries were -beaten on until the casualties left but four men to each gun, and -ammunition was running short. Long, who was one of the first to be -wounded, withdrew the dwindled gun detachments to the shallow donga and -sent back for a fresh supply of ammunition, intending to resume fire as -soon as the general attack developed. - -All the while the batteries had been unsupported except by the escorting -companies, which were not under Long's orders, and no attempt was made -by Hildyard's or Barton's brigade in rear to relieve or divert the -pressure on the guns, which had succeeded in silencing temporarily some -of the Boer artillery and in checking the rifle fire. - -Earlier in the action Buller had been informed that the guns were "all -right and comfortable," but later reports gave him the impression that -this cheery optimism was delusive, and that owing to loss of men and -exhaustion of ammunition the artillery told off to support Hildyard was -now permanently out of action. The rest of the artillery was engaged in -assisting Hart, who was in trouble, and Buller came to the conclusion -that the attack on the Colenso kopjes must be withdrawn. - -Hart's Brigade was ordered to march "towards the Bridle Drift at the -junction of the Doornkop Spruit and the Tugela, and to cross at that -point." Here was yet another ambiguity. As there were two "Iron Bridges" -so also were there two "Bridle Drifts," one on each side of the isthmus -of the river loop, and yet another at the head of it. The West Drift was -unfordable on the morning of December 15, and a hasty sketch which had -probably been filled in from hearsay evidence and which was Hart's only -map, showed the Doornkop Spruit as entering the Tugela below that Drift -instead of just above the East Drift.[23] The sketch also duplicated the -loop. - -In dense formation, although the enemy was reported to be in force on -his front, Hart crossed the Doornkop Spruit without recognizing it and -advanced to the West Drift guided by a Kaffir who lived close by. The -native seems either to have had misgivings as to the fordability of the -Drift or to have been carelessly instructed, for as the column -approached the river he pointed to a Drift which was not the East Drift, -but the Drift at the head of the loop near his own kraal; and Hart was -induced to change direction and lead the Brigade into the loop. - -At 6 a.m. against the orders of Botha, who wished to lure on his foe, -the Boer guns commanding Hart's loop suddenly opened on the dense -battalions, and the trenches on the left bank took up the firing. The -Kaffir guide disappeared in terror. But Hart still believed that there -was a drift to be found somewhere or other and pushed his Brigade, like -a shoal of herrings driven into a purse net, up the loop; and some -companies even reached the kraal near the head of it. Without -artillery--for Hart had not brought up the field batteries assigned to -him--and exposed to a concentrated fire from front, left, and right, the -unhappy Irish Brigade, which suffered 400 casualties in less than three -quarters of an hour, was helpless. Hart began to deploy, but Buller who -from Naval Gun Hill was watching, possibly with astonishment, the -entanglement in the loop ordered him to withdraw, at the same time -sending two battalions to dig him out of his hole. It was not an easy -task and it was made more difficult by the gallant reluctance of the -Irishmen to retreat before the enemy. Thus Hart and Long, the former -with his Hibernian zeal to move in the line of the greatest resistance, -the latter with his rash generalization that entrenched Boers could be -coerced as if they were Omdurman dervishes in the open, brought about -the reverse at Colenso. - -By this time it was evident to Buller that his scheme must fail. He had -already arranged the extrication of Hart and now the extrication of Long -called for immediate action. He therefore rode across to the deep donga -east of the railway; on his way informing Hildyard, whose brigade was -awaiting an opportunity to carry out its orders, that the attack was -abandoned and that the brigade must cover the withdrawal of the field -batteries. He ordered the naval battery to retire, and sent back the -ammunition wagons, which after long delay were on their way to the field -guns: and acknowledged that he was baffled. - -Hildyard occupied Colenso but was unable to prevent the Boers re-opening -fire from Fort Wyllie on the desolate batteries lying on the veld. No -troops could move across the open; and only individual efforts could now -save the guns. Not a few officers and men offered for the forlorn hope, -and at the first attempt two guns were rescued. A later attempt was not -successful, and at 11 a.m. Buller ordered a general retirement and the -abandonment of the guns. The main naval battery remained in position -west of the railway for some hours, and in its presence the Boers were -afraid to cross the river and take possession of the derelict but not -disabled guns; which were not captured until all the British troops had -left the field except a few gunners and infantry details who had taken -refuge in the deep donga and whom the order to retreat had not reached; -and these were made prisoners of war. - -The mounted Brigade under Lord Dundonald acting on the right flank with -orders to take Hlangwhane, if possible, was too weak to support the main -attack effectively. Assistance was refused at first by Barton and -afterwards by Buller, who thought that Hlangwhane would be of little use -to him without the possession of the Colenso kopjes; yet these could -have been enfiladed from it. As the Brigade retired it passed within -striking distance of the field guns and their captors; but nothing could -be done as ambulances and groups of prisoners were bemingled in the -throng. Dundonald seems to have been alone in his recognition of the -value of the Hlangwhane position. - -A retirement to Chieveley and Frere completed the triad of December -disasters. Buller, of whom so much was expected, had failed in his first -attempt to measure swords with the burghers. His 19,000 men and -forty-two guns fighting for six hours inflicted on the enemy a loss of -less than two score. His casualties exceeded 1,100, he lost ten guns, -and he then returned to the place from which he came. He thought that he -had fought a battle, but in reality he had only made a reconnaissance in -force, a dangerous operation only justifiable by urgent necessity.[24] - -Possibly if Buller, who was practically without a staff, had allowed a -freer hand to Clery, that authority on Minor Tactics might have done -better. It has been said that the defeat was due to insufficient -reconnaissance; and this is to a certain extent true, for a more -accurate knowledge of the terrain and the dispositions of the enemy -would have clearly demonstrated the hopelessness of a frontal attack on -the Colenso Kopjes, and the attempt would never have been made. Again, -as at Magersfontein four days before, a considerable portion of the -troops was not seriously engaged; and the total casualties in eight -battalions were but 120. - -The loss of the guns is the chief fact in the story of Colenso. What -were Buller's intentions with regard to the Naval battery and the two -Field batteries which he sent to "a point from which they could prepare -the crossing for Hildyard's Brigade," and how did Long understand and -carry out his orders. - -The battle orders had been orally anticipated by Buller, who before they -were issued, explained his intentions personally to Long: and, as often -happens in conferences, the impression retained by one conferent -differed from that intended to be conveyed by the other. Long believed -that he was instructed to shell the Kopjes and entrenched positions -behind Fort Wyllie, which he did not at first know was held by the -enemy, and he opened at a range of a mile; and Buller's statement that -he was ordered to open fire with the long-range naval guns only, the -position not being within reach of the field batteries, is contradicted; -while Buller complained that Long had taken up a position within 1,200 -yards of a fortified hill and less than a quarter of a mile from cover -occupied by the enemy. There is, indeed, a small area of low trees and -scrub near the right bank of the Tugela a few hundred yards on the right -front of the line of guns, but there is no evidence that the Boers had -ever crossed the river to hold it. - -When the field guns, after firing nearly 100 rounds each, became silent, -Buller, who was already perturbed by Hart's discomfiture, jumped to the -conclusion that they were exterminated, and that it would be useless to -proceed with the attack without them; but the gunners were only waiting -for more ammunition. Not until the following day did he know that men -enough to fight the guns were still untouched. If the whole of his force -had been seriously engaged he would perhaps have been justified in his -decision not to hold on to Colenso with exhausted and parched troops in -the burning heat of the South African midsummer in the hope of rescuing -the guns at night; but several battalions had been doing little more -than watching the fight during the morning, and he might have left them -on the field; and it is clear from a telegram sent by Botha early in the -afternoon that if the Naval battery had remained with an effective -infantry support no attempt would have been made by the Boers to cross -the river, and that the guns would not have been lost. - -The repulse at Colenso staggered Buller's humanity. He was a brave man -on the right of whose many war medals hung the Victoria Cross which he -had won not far away from the field on which he was now fighting; but he -was lacking in bull-dog tenacity, and in the ascetic temperament which -is quickened rather than disheartened by failure. He returned to his -tent, wrung his hands, and announced to those whom it might concern that -all was lost. In the telegram in which he reported his defeat to Lord -Lansdowne and of which the frankness, the candour, and the copious yet -not egotistical use of the first personal pronoun were in curious -contrast to the formal and sterilized paragraphs of an official account, -he confessed that with the force at his disposal he had little hope of -relieving Ladysmith and he proposed that he should let it go. He ordered -the staff to select a defensive line eastward from Estcourt which his -army might occupy until the end of the hot season. - -His message to White in Ladysmith was still more pessimistic, and with -an intention that was chivalrous but was not war he "spatchcocked"[25] -into it a suggestion that White should surrender, and even indicated how -the gain to the enemy could be minimised. The magnanimity of Buller was -manifest: he desired to give White the opportunity of surrendering -without incurring the full responsibility for the act, but the lack of -military instinct in Buller's mind was likewise manifest. To this -message, which was suspected in Ladysmith to have originated in the Boer -laagers, White replied that he had no intention of surrendering. - -Nor did Buller's pessimism turn the Home Government from its purpose. He -was ordered to hold on, and on December 17 Lord Roberts accepted the -chief command in South Africa. In announcing the appointment, the War -Office explained that Buller was superseded because it was advisable to -relieve him of responsibility for the operations outside Natal, which he -could not effectively control from his detached position on the right -flank. The Vth Division under Sir C. Warren which had been ordered at -his request a month before, and which he found was available for service -on the Natal side, was on the point of landing in South Africa; the VIth -Division was embarking at home; the components of a VIIth Division were -being assembled, and he became less despondent. - -The War Office thought that the Magersfontein mishap called for the -supersession of Methuen, and when Warren reached Capetown with the Vth -Division he found orders from home directing him to assume command of -the force at Modder River. It would probably have been better for Buller -if he had freely acquiesced in the idea of Pall Mall and had allowed -Warren, but not necessarily the Vth Division, to operate in a country -with which he had become acquainted twenty years before in the -Bechuanaland Expedition, but he could not foresee Spion Kop; and Warren -while moving towards the Orange was suddenly recalled to Capetown and -ordered to reinforce the Army of Natal with the Vth Division; and -Methuen was allowed to retain his command at Modder River. - -The transfer of the Vth Division to Natal was undoubtedly called for; -but the position in the districts of Cape Colony bordering on the Free -State was alarming. A belt extending from Barkly East near the Basuto -border westwards and northwards as far as the Molopo River, and -interrupted only near the Orange and Modder Rivers, had been annexed by -the Boers and was more or less effectively occupied by them; and had -they acted with enterprise and concurrence during the period of Lord -Roberts' journey from England, the task before the new -Commander-in-Chief would have been still more formidable. In rear of -French and Gatacre was an indefinite area through which ran the British -lines of communication, and which, if not indeed actually under arms, -was ready to spring up whenever a favourable opportunity presented -itself. - -Of the four Generals set to stem the tide of war until the arrival of -Lord Roberts, French alone did not restrict himself to restraining its -flow. A policy of "worry without risk" had been recommended to him by -Buller, and he carried it out with good effect. He thrust Schoeman out -of Arundel and Rensburg, and occupied a commanding position outside -Colesberg, which he maintained until he was summoned on January 29 to -confer with Lord Roberts at Capetown, where he was confidentially -informed of the plan of campaign. Clements, who a few weeks before had -reinforced him with a brigade of the recently landed VIth Division under -Kelly-Kenny, took over the command of the troops before Colesberg. But -the force which he had to his hand had been considerably reduced by the -withdrawal of the cavalry and nearly half the infantry to serve -elsewhere, while Schoeman and Delarey, who had come from Magersfontein, -had been strongly reinforced. - -The Boers doubted not that the positions taken up by Gatacre and French -indicated that the impending advance of the British Army into the Free -State would be by way of Bethulie and Norval's Pont, and were -accordingly disposing all their available men, one commando even being -sent to Colesberg from Natal; but fortunately they were at first unaware -that Clements had been almost simultaneously weakened. He soon found -that he was not strong enough to hold on to the Colesberg positions and -on February 14 retired to Arundel; losing on the way two companies of -infantry which had been mislaid and forgotten and which after a gallant -running fight of three miles were captured. - -But now ominous reports of Lord Roberts' movements in the West began to -come in, and the Boers realized that they had misinterpreted the signs -which had been so ostentatiously displayed. They hesitated and wavered, -and on February 20 hurried away from Colesberg to succour Cronje and the -threatened capital of the Free State. - -Notes: - -[Footnote 19: Buller aroused a "now-we-shan't-be-long" feeling. He would -certainly be in Pretoria by Christmas. It is said that a large number of -plum-puddings intended for the soldiers' dinners on December 25 were -addressed to Pretoria "to await arrival," by their good friends at -home.] - -[Footnote 20: The history of the war showed, however, that generally the -Boers fought more strenuously and effectively when the tide was against -them than when it was flowing with them.] - -[Footnote 21: The two chief authorities on the events of the day are not -in agreement as to which of the iron bridges was meant; and in the -absence of information of what was in the mind of the staff officer who -drew up the battle orders the question cannot be answered. The context -and certain expressions in other paragraphs seem to show that the -railway bridge was indicated. It was, indeed, broken but there were -drifts used by the natives above and below it. Probably the river had -not been carefully reconnoitred and the two bridges were confused, or -one only was believed to exist.] - -[Footnote 22: At the battle of Omdurman he had put short range -principles successfully into practice against dervishes.] - -[Footnote 23: The mistake in Hart's map is shown by a broken line in the -sketch map. It is, curiously enough, reproduced in the Colenso map not -only of the _Times_ History, but also of the German Official Report on -the War.] - -[Footnote 24: See _Combined Training_, 1905, p. 109.] - -[Footnote 25: _Sic_ in his speech of October 10, 1901, but he probably -meant "sandwiched."] - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -Kimberley and the Siege of Rhodes - - -More than thirty years before the outbreak of the Second Boer War a -Dutch child in the Hopetown District of Cape Colony found, while playing -carelessly near the left bank of the Orange, a pretty pebble that was -destined to mould the History of South Africa. - -He took the bagatelle home to his father's farm, where a neighbour, one -Van Niekirk, saw it and was struck by its brilliancy. It chanced that -the Irishman O'Reilly was passing that way and to him it was entrusted -to take to Colesberg for expert opinion upon its value. Here certain -Jews declared that it was but a white topaz not worth one shilling and -it was disdainfully cast out into the road, from which it was with -difficulty recovered by O'Reilly, whose belief in it though shaken was -not wholly abandoned. Through a mutual friend, Lorenzo Boyes, Acting -Civil Commissioner of the District, the pebble came to the notice of an -expert mineralogist named Atherstone at Grahamstown, but it was held so -lightly in esteem by the sender that it reached Atherstone as an -enclosure in an ordinary unregistered letter. Atherstone examined it, -and when it had not only spoilt all the jeweller's files in the town but -had also passed an examination by polarized light, pronounced that it -was a diamond worth £500. His certificate to its character, which had -been so ignorantly disparaged, was the origin of the Diamond industry of -South Africa. Another diamond was soon picked up near Hopetown which -without difficulty or misadventure rose to its own plane in mineralogy. -Its career was short and its destiny happy. It was purchased by the -first Earl of Dudley for the adornment of his second wife. - -When it was noised abroad with the customary exaggeration that the -monopoly of Golconda and the Brazils was at an end and that diamonds -grew wild on the South African veld, a wide extent of country was -explored and the precious crystallized carbon was found in districts -separated by many hundreds of miles. In certain places, one of which -became known as the town of Kimberley, it was ascertained to recur in a -constant proportion of the contents of the "pipes" or volcanic tubes -which rose through the surface strata. - -The pioneers of Kimberley took possession of the diamondiferous grounds -without ascertaining to whom they belonged, and when their value became -positive the question of ownership arose. The boundaries of the -districts administered by the Cape Colony, the Orange Free State, and -the Transvaal respectively were, as regards territory, supposed to be of -little account, vague, ill-defined, and unsurveyed; and the districts -themselves were occupied by native tribes of nomad habits. About the -middle of the XIXth century a Hottentot chief named Waterboer came up -out of the West and squatted in the districts lying between the Orange -and the Vaal. His rights, such as they were, were assumed or acquired by -the Cape Government, which soon became involved in controversy with the -Orange Free State as to their extent and nature. Finally the British -Empire secured a good title to the estate by the payment of £90,000. But -the Orange Free State not unnaturally, when the value of the Diamond -Fields increased day by day, soon began to think that it had parted with -a profitable possession for an inadequate return. The feeling rankled; -and the confident expectation of recovering Kimberley sold for a song -tempted Bloemfontein into the fatal alliance with Pretoria. - -In 1871 a sickly youth named Cecil Rhodes came from England to South -Africa in search of health, which after a short sojourn in Natal he -found at Kimberley. The prospects of the place favourably impressed him, -and he soon laid in it the foundations of his fortune; but six years -later the future of Kimberley was still precarious and the discovery of -gold in a remote district of the Transvaal sucked thither the greater -proportion of the citizens, who, however, found that they had not -bettered themselves by the change and returned to the pipes: and soon -nearly a hundred companies, syndicates, and private adventurers were -groping for diamonds over an area of less than two hundred acres. The -waste of energy was manifest to Rhodes, who in 1888 completed, with the -help of the Rothschilds, the task upon which he had been engaged for -some years, the amalgamation of the conflicting and overlapping diamond -interests under the name of the De Beers Consolidated Mines. It was soon -found that the new industry was insufficiently protected by the existing -criminal law and a new felony was created by the Illicit Diamond Buying -Act. - -It has been for several centuries the practice of Great Britain to -entrust to private companies the imperial responsibilities which she is -reluctant to assume and to let out to contractors, who can be repudiated -if they fail and expropriated if they succeed, the job of expanding an -Empire. Of this policy the most prominent instance is the East India -Company, a commercial venture which obtained from Queen Elizabeth a -charter empowering it to trade with the East and which, though connected -with Great Britain only by the slender thread of an ocean track of -12,000 miles, maintained itself for two centuries and a half with ever -increasing territory and authority until it became a great military -Empire. Other examples of lower degree are the Hudson's Bay Company and -the Borneo Company. The De Beers Company provided out of its abundance -large sums for exploration and settlement in South Africa and for the -furtherance of the Imperial idea, and it is said that Rhodes spent the -whole of one night in arguing with some of the materialistic magnates of -Kimberley, before he could induce them to consent to the employment of -the resources of the Company in the advancement of his schemes of -Empire. He found, however, that these could not be satisfactorily -promoted by a Company whose primary interests were commercial rather -than imperial; and in 1888 he obtained a charter for the British South -Africa Company, an offshoot of the De Beers Company, formed for the -purpose of extending the British Empire towards the Equator. - -The question of the defences of Kimberley engaged the attention of the -De Beers Company some years before the outbreak of the war. Its -vulnerability to attack from the Orange Free State, the border of which -ran close to the town, was obvious; and in 1896 a depot of arms and -ammunition was formed. A military plan of the place was sent to the -Imperial authorities and a defence force was also organized. This, -however, had in 1899 ceased to exist owing chiefly to the action of Mr. -Schreiner, at that time the Premier of the Cape Colony, who in June -refused, with complacent optimism, to furnish it with arms, saying that, -"there is no reason for apprehending that Kimberley is in danger of -attack," and that "the fears of the citizens are groundless and their -anticipations without foundation." A battery of artillery was, however, -surreptitiously brought up from King Williamstown. - -The policy of Schreiner during the months preceding the war is obscure. -While refusing help to Kimberley he was allowing munitions of war, which -were way billed as pianos and hardware, to pass through the Cape Colony -to the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. He does not appear to have -been actively disloyal to the Imperial Government and in his own way he -probably did his best to keep the peace. His mind was cast in a mould -which is not uncommon in the British Empire but which is rarely found -outside it. He was more anxious to stand well with its enemies, and like -the Unjust Steward to have a claim to a place in their houses, if they -were successful, than to work for its security. It was with great -difficulty that Sir A. Milner as late as September 18 obtained his -consent to the dispatch of a few regulars to Kimberley to form the -backbone of a defensive force. He seems to have retained almost to the -end, in spite of all indications to the contrary, the belief that the -war would be averted or at least that the Orange Free State would not -join in it. Yet in this he erred in good company. Mr. Balfour said that -if on September 28 he had been asked whether war with the Orange Free -State was a probable contingency he would have replied that war with -Switzerland was one equally probable; and Lord Lansdowne declined before -September 23 to discuss with Lord Roberts the question of operations in -the Free State. Buller, with surer insight, had foreseen the alliance as -far back as 1881. - -The War Office, however, was to a certain extent on the alert and -distrusted the optimism of Schreiner and of a high military official who -had been for some years in South Africa. Officers were sent to Kimberley -to organize a scheme of defence, but having regard to the susceptibility -of the Capetown Government it was done secretly and confidentially and -Schreiner was outwitted. By October 7 the town, which was under the -command of Colonel Kekewich, was secure against a _coup de main_ though -not against a vigorous and sustained siege. Little more than an eighth -of the garrison was composed of regular troops; the artillery was out of -date; rifles and ammunition were deficient. On October 13 Rhodes threw -himself into Kimberley and became for better or worse a power in the -town. As soon as the siege began the relative value of the chief -products of the mines was inverted: water, the most generous gift of -nature and hitherto an embarrassment in the workings, became for the -time being more valuable than the diamonds. - -On October 12 the curtain of the great drama was raised and the first -scene presented. It showed the capture of an armoured train on the -railway between Kimberley and Mafeking. Kimberley under any -circumstances was a prize worth winning. But Kimberley taken with Rhodes -as a prisoner of war, the man who had curbed and checked on every side -the expansion of the Republics, who had taken Matabeleland on the north -and Bechuanaland on the west into the fold of the British Empire, would -be more than a prize, would be a triumph. Rhodes metaphorically in -chains, and actually paraded as a captive in the streets of Bloemfontein -and Pretoria was an alluring prospect. - -Great, however, as were the advantages to be gained by the early capture -of Kimberley, the object was not pursued with energy and determination. -When the siege began on November 6 the situation was in favour of the -attack. The Boers were in possession of the railway from Orange River -Station to Mafeking: Kimberley was ill-supplied with the munitions and -weapons of war and was defended by a force mainly composed of -irregulars; it was encumbered with a large native population; and the -civil and military authorities were not working in harmony. - -The defence throughout was more active than the attack. Reconnaissances -and raids against the enemy's positions were made with effect; and the -bombardment which followed a rejected summons to surrender did little -harm. Communication with the outer world was not seriously impeded. -Cattle grazed almost with impunity inside the line of investment and -several thousands of the natives escaped. - -But the difficulties of Kekewich, who had been in command since -September 20, were not confined to those created by the military -situation. He was thrown into close association with the man who was one -of the indirect causes of the war, and who had little confidence in -military men, or sympathy with their ideas and methods. Rhodes had come -into his own Kimberley and for the first time he was not master in it. -He found himself a sterilized dictator acting in an atmosphere too -tenuous to support his vitality but sufficient to preserve it from -extinction. He was subject to the authority of the military commandant, -a galling position for a distinguished statesman who had not a high -opinion of the professional capacity of the British officer. From the -age of eighteen he had been his own master except during the intervals -which he had spared from South Africa and spent at Oxford, when he was -temporarily subject to the lax discipline of a University. While his -contemporaries were amusing themselves at college, or performing routine -duties in the Army or the Civil Service, or preparing to enter a -profession, Rhodes was spending the critical years of his life in -outlining the future and scheming for a South African Empire to be -erected on the foundation of the Kimberley Mines. - -It was inevitable from the nature of the case and from his intimate -concern in the fortunes of Kimberley that he could not see South African -affairs at large in their true perspective. The sparkle of his diamonds -made him curiously colour-blind and out of this defect in his mental -vision sprang the mischief. Kimberley, for the time being at least, -stood so closely in the foreground that other objects were thrown out of -focus. Nor did the disturbing influence of the glare and halation of -Kimberley only affect the vision of the diamond men within the town. It -closed the eyes of the besiegers without it to a great strategical -opportunity which soon passed away. - -The figure of Rhodes in Kimberley was the magnet which attracted and -detained commandos which could have been more usefully employed -elsewhere, and his presence, so far as it had this effect, was of great -service to the perilously weak British force during the first few weeks -of the war. If the commandos squatting before Kimberley had instead been -sent to raid southwards towards the Karroo, and to inflame the Dutch -districts in the Cape Colony, they would have met with little -resistance, and advancing with daily increasing numbers would have had -little difficulty in planting themselves firmly in the heart of the -enemy's country. For the moment the war in the west was waged not -against Great Britain but against the Man of Kimberley. - -The diamond men, with Rhodes at their head, forgetting that the object -of the war was the redress of the Outlanders' wrongs in the Transvaal, -began to bellow for relief even before the Boers had completed the -investment of the town. Telegrams couched in extravagant and almost -hysterical language and betraying the egotism and the want of -self-control of the senders were repeatedly despatched. One of these, in -which on October 19 the De Beers directors asked for information as to -the plans of the military authorities at Capetown, "so as to enable us -to take our own steps in case relief is refused," was thought not -unnaturally by Buller to hint at surrender; and although this was not -the intention of the senders it is probable that they did not regret the -interpretation that was put upon it. - -Fortunately, however, Kekewich was a cool-headed man who did not suffer -himself to be hustled. While preserving amicable personal relations with -Rhodes, he was careful to let Capetown know that the situation in -Kimberley was by no means desperate and that it would be able to hold -out for several weeks. - -The impetuous and childish letters and telegrams sent out by the diamond -men induced Buller, who said afterwards that "although I had every -confidence in Colonel Kekewich's military capacity I did not trust the -other powers within the city," to send Lord Methuen northwards on -November 10 with instructions to help Kimberley by removing unnecessary -non-combatants and natives, and "to let the people understand that you -have not come to undertake its defence, but to afford it better means of -maintaining its defence." - -The news of Methuen's approach did not allay the excitement of the -townsmen. His movement was not an essential part of the general plan of -campaign but only a raid in force with the object of putting men and -supplies into Kimberley and enable it to hold on until pressure -elsewhere upon the Boers should raise the siege automatically. - -The dignity and the self-respect of the diamond men was affronted. Like -the Syrian captain Naaman, when offered relief of his leprosy by the -prophet Elisha, they resented the simple process by which their own -relief was to be effected. They had looked to an Army Corps at least -marching on Kimberley with all the pomp of war and speedily enabling it -to resume its normal occupation of diamond grubbing; and now they found -that the town was not considered of much account in the scheme of the -military, who regarded it as a mere besieged place of little strategical -importance; which, after some assistance, was to be left dependent for -its safety upon its own exertions while the main army advanced through -the Free State. - -On December 4 Kekewich was instructed to make arrangements for the -deportation of a large proportion of the white and coloured population, -Methuen hinting that Rhodes himself might be included. Although Rhodes -had a few weeks before complained of the difficulties caused by the -presence of non-combatants and had even endeavoured to send them away, -he now vehemently opposed their removal. His reasons for so doing are -not very clear, but they appear to be part of the systematic obstruction -which he offered to every proposition of the military authorities which -tended to restrict the output of diamonds. His objections were -transmitted to Buller, who speedily put the question in its proper light -by telegraphing to Kekewich that "what we have to do is to keep the -Union Jack flying over South Africa without favour to any particular set -of capitalists," and Methuen met his protest with the answer that -"Rhodes has no voice in the matter." After the defeat at Magersfontein -the plan of deportation had necessarily to be given up. - -In his own proper sphere of a civilian working with civilians Rhodes was -usefully active and his services were great. He employed the persons -thrown out of work by the closing of the mines in labour for the general -benefit of the town, and did much to relieve the distress among the -poorer inhabitants. - -The manufacture of a heavy gun, to which the name of Long Cecil was -given, in the De Beers engineering establishment, was soon countered by -the Boers, who brought into action a gun throwing a much heavier shell -which had been disabled by the Naval Battery at Ladysmith, repaired at -Pretoria, and was now mounted before Kimberley. The appearance of Long -Tom, supervening on a reduction on the daily rations, caused a panic -among the civilians. On February 9 Rhodes threatened to call a public -meeting to consider the situation unless he was informed of the plans -for the relief of the town: but Kekewich was authorized by Lord Roberts -not only to forbid the holding of the meeting, but even if necessary to -arrest Rhodes. A private meeting was then held at which a remonstrance -was drawn up for transmission to Lord Roberts through Kekewich; and for -the second time a communication from the Kimberley men was interpreted -as a threat to surrender. It was probably sent with that intent in order -to elicit information as to Lord Roberts' plans. - -Kekewich meanwhile was finding his position almost intolerable, and his -representations convinced Lord Roberts of the necessity of raising the -siege of Rhodes without delay and at any cost. It was effected on -February 15 by French's brilliant cavalry movement; but at the cost of -the convoy of 170 wagons which were snapped up by De Wet at Waterval -Drift, and of an Army compelled to march and to fight for nearly four -weeks on reduced rations. But the harvesting of the crop of diamonds was -resumed, and as far as Kimberley was concerned the war was at an end. - -Although the siege lasted for more than three months the casualties were -few, only 40 persons being killed and 123 wounded by acts of war. The -privations suffered by the inhabitants, especially during the last few -weeks, were no doubt great, but certainly not greater than the -privations which unhappily are endured by the unemployed in Great -Britain during a hard winter. The siege was conducted without much -vigour and determination, and the most important operation on the side -of the defence was a sortie on November 29 after the news had come in of -Methuen's approach. - -The relief of Kimberley closed the public career of the most conspicuous -figure in the British Empire; and with great dignity and self-restraint, -which might well have been imitated by other persons whose conduct -during the war was impugned, Rhodes refrained from publishing a -Kimberley book. - -If the Siege of Kimberley brought out the weak side of his character, -his egotism and impatience, his lack of power to adapt himself even -temporarily to unaccustomed conditions, it will be remembered that these -defects were inherent and that his marvellous success in life had -accentuated them. The acts of a public man are so variously regarded by -his opponents and his admirers, are seen by them in such different -lights, that there can rarely be any general agreement on the question -of the ratio between his merits and his failings; but the chief phases -of his life afford the raw material out of which each man for himself -can form an estimate of his character. - -Like many men who have afterwards become famous in the secular world, -Cecil Rhodes was intended for the Church. His health suffered from the -rigours of the East Anglian climate and he was sent out to South Africa. -His brother's farm in Natal, to which he was consigned, he found -derelict on his arrival, but he was soon growing cotton on it, against -the advice of the local experts, but with eventual success. At the age -of 18 he was prospecting for diamonds at Kimberley, and forming the -opinion during a visit to the Transvaal that an insufficient proportion -of the South African Continent belonged to the British Empire. In 1872, -being then 19 years of age, he went to Oxford, but in a few months his -health broke down and another voyage to the Cape became necessary. In -1876 he returned to the University and remained there for two years when -South Africa recalled him. As soon as he could be spared he went back to -his college and, eight years after matriculation, completed his -undergraduate course. It was a high compliment to the value of a Pass -Degree at Oxford, where, however, he formed the opinion, which was not -publicly divulged until his will was opened twenty-one years later, that -Oxford Dons were "children in finance." - -His election to the Cape Parliament in 1881 as Member for Kimberley -placed him in a favourable position to advance his schemes for the -northward extension of the British Empire. When the trespasses and -encroachments of the Transvaal Boers beyond the limits assigned to them -under the Convention of 1884 made it advisable to incorporate -Bechuanaland he was unable to persuade the Cape Government to undertake -that responsibility, but with the assistance of Sir Hercules Robinson -and the support of Mr. Chamberlain he induced the Imperial Government to -take action. President Kruger had connived at the establishment on -native territory under British protection of two little republics of -raiders, to which the names of Goshen and Stellaland were assigned; and -a costly expedition under Sir C. Warren was needed to bring him to his -senses. In 1885 Bechuanaland became an integral part of the British -Empire. - -In 1888 he again opened the flood gates of Imperialism, and secured by -means of a treaty with Lobengula the reversion of the native territory -north of the Transvaal, at which two European nations were nibbling, and -which in his honour received the name of Rhodesia. - -He became Premier of the Cape Colony in 1890 by the help of the Dutch -vote and from that time gradually sank from the zenith of his success. -His good fortune left him when he attained his ambition. The Jameson -Raid, for which he was not personally, though he confessed himself -morally, responsible, ended his political career. His last good service -to the Empire was given during the Matabele rising. He accompanied the -troops sent to suppress the rebellion; and when the operations seemed -likely to be indefinitely prolonged, he brought it to an end by going -fearlessly and almost unattended among the natives, whose confidence he -won by meeting them trustfully in council and listening to their -grievances. - -His physical vitality, always inadequate, was seriously impaired by the -strain of the siege. He never fully recovered his strength and he died -on March 26, 1902, two months before the Second Boer war was brought to -a close by the Vereeniging Treaty. - -He was a rich but honest man, and the great wealth which he amassed -never led him to attach undue importance to the possession of it. He -valued it not for his own advantage, but for its help in advancing his -political and imperial schemes. He employed it creditably and without -ostentation, and spent none of it in social display in London. By his -will he left the greater portion of it to the University of Oxford for -the establishment of an amiable if somewhat quixotic system of bringing -the various branches of the Anglo-Saxon race into association at a -centre of learning and athletics, where they were to be leavened by a -Teutonic admixture. - -The vision of posthumous reputation allured him, and he delighted in the -hope that the name of his own Rhodesia, like the cities which still bear -the name of Alexander, would be on the lips of men of generations as far -distant from his own as his own was from the days of the Great -Macedonian. - -He presented a pair of sculptured lions to President Kruger. Almost on -the eve of the war he asserted confidently that Kruger would not fight. -It is probable that this was not his belief, but that it was said in -order to provoke the President into rejecting the overtures of the -British Government, and to make inevitable the war which he foresaw was -the only way of settling the South African question. - -Not a few incidents in his life are difficult to explain. The donation -of £10,000 to the funds of the Parnellite Party by an ardent English -Imperialist who had never expressed any particular enthusiasm for Home -Rule may have been a _douceur_ to prevent the Irish members from -attacking him in the British Parliament. He had not forgotten that -Parnell inaugurated the policy of obstruction carried to the length of -all-night sittings upon the occasion of the discussion of a Cape -Colonial question in the House of Commons. Possibly Rhodes was a Home -Ruler not in spite of his Imperialism but because of it. Home rule was -necessary to it. The function of the Imperial Parliament was the general -control of the affairs of the Empire, leaving local politics to be dealt -with by local legislatures. - -The strong and dominant personality of Cecil Rhodes came to the front at -a time when the British Empire was beginning to show signs of lassitude -and appeared to be growing tired of itself. Patriotism was being slowly -transmuted into a limp and sickly cosmopolitan altruism. He checked this -decadence, at least for the time being, but passed away before he was -able to subdue it. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -A Tragedy of Errors - - -The lassitude induced by the battle of Colenso affected each combatant -on the Tugela. The Boers put the finishing touches to their works on the -left bank, and at their leisure continued the position across the river -eastwards from Hlangwhane. They did not seem to have been withdrawn in -force[26] to assist the besiegers of Ladysmith in the great assault on -Wagon Hill and Caesar's Camp on January 6, for a demonstration ordered -by Buller at White's request during the crisis showed that the Tugela -front was as strongly held as ever. - -On January 8, Buller, whose Head Quarters were at Frere, was reinforced -by the Vth Division under Warren, and he now resumed his original plan, -out of which he had been scared by Magersfontein, of advancing on -Ladysmith by way of Potgieter's Drift, rejecting an alternative plan -proposed by Warren, which differed little from that by which the relief -of Ladysmith was effected six weeks later, of a direct advance by way of -Hlangwhane and Pieter's Hill. Between Buller's army and Ladysmith lay -not only the tortuous and difficult Tugela, but also a barrier of -heights and ridges through which there were but four or five possible -ways of access, one of which had already been tried without success, to -the beleaguered city lying on a plain considerably above the level of -the open ground on the right bank of the Tugela. - -Buller, having selected the route which seemed at the time to be the -line of least resistance, began on January 9 to transfer the bulk of his -force from Frere to Springfield, a distance of sixteen miles, but owing -to difficulties of transport and the necessity of accumulating a large -stock of supplies at the new base, it was six days before the -concentration was effected. One brigade was left at Chieveley to watch -the Boer front at Colenso. - -In Orders issued at Frere on January 9, Buller announced that he -"proposed to effect the passage of the Tugela in the neighbourhood of -Potgieter's Drift, with a view to the relief of Ladysmith." His scheme -was based upon imperfect information and misleading maps, and was in -fact not so much a surprise flank attack, as all his movements had to be -made in full view of the enemy, as an attack from a position higher up -the river that must be frontal, because the enemy would have ample time -to make it so: and herein lay its weakness. When, however, he personally -surveyed the situation from Mount Alice, which overlooks Potgieter's -Drift, the aspect of the curving amphitheatre showed the danger of -attempting to force the river at that point. On the N.E. was Vaalkrantz -and Doornkop, and the high ridge of Brakfontein, which the enemy had -already begun to entrench, and over which passed the road by which he -proposed to reach Ladysmith, everywhere commanded by the heights, filled -the quadrant towards Spion Kop on the N.W. - -On January 13, Buller reported to the War Office that, having found the -Potgieter's Drift scheme impracticable, he proposed as "the only -possible chance for Ladysmith" to send Warren across at Trickhardt's -Drift, five miles higher up the river. The new scheme was based upon a -theory which had been evolved out of the experiences of autumn manoeuvre -battles collated on the office desks of Pall Mall, that the easiest -method of defeating the enemy with a small casualty list was to contain -his front and attack one or both of his flanks; and General Officers had -come to regard this as the regulation opening to which they were bound -to conform. - -[Illustration: Spion Kop and Vaal Krantz positions. _Stanford's Geog'l: -Estab't._] - -Buller divided his force into two unequal portions. Warren with the -stronger portion was to attack the Boer right which Buller believed to -be weak, while Lyttelton with the remainder demonstrated at Potgieter's -Drift. To himself Buller reserved the part of the Chorus in a Greek -play, taking a general interest in the action, yet not personally -concerned in it; and in that capacity he issued a stirring appeal to the -relieving force. - -On January 15 "secret instructions" were given to Warren. He was -recommended, after crossing the Tugela at Trickhardt's Drift, to proceed -west of Spion Kop, and to pivot his right and swing round on to the open -plain in rear of the Boer position facing Potgieter's Drift. - -Warren, who was not of opinion that the Boer right was weak, marched out -of Springfield on the evening of January 16. Lyttelton had already -started, and during the night occupied a position on the north side of -the river near Potgieter's Drift. - -The task before Warren was hard. In order to carry out Buller's plan he -must cross an unbridged river and struggle through a country of which -little was known. Next day two bridges were thrown over the Tugela above -Trickhardt's Drift, which recent rains had made dangerous, and Hart's -and Woodgate's Brigades were transferred to the left bank to cover the -crossing: but it was not until sunset on January 18 that the entire -force with its tedious transport was established on the north side of -the river. - -The mounted troops under Dundonald were sent out at mid-day to -reconnoitre towards the N.W. and in the course of the afternoon his -advanced squadrons came upon a Boer commando which was easily dealt -with, but before the issue was decided, he had reported that he was -engaged near Acton Holmes, and asked for help. Warren assumed that the -mounted troops, which he had sent out to reconnoitre, had wilfully and -prematurely forced on an action, and were now in trouble; and it was not -until the next morning, after an infantry brigade had been moved out to -support them, that Warren heard from Dundonald, whose previous messages -had not clearly described the situation, that he was able to take care -of himself. Dundonald had at first expected that the main body would -follow him, and his reports seem to show that he had hoped to induce -Warren to move towards Acton Holmes. He was rebuked for assuming, not -unnaturally, that the objective of the operations was Ladysmith, and -instructed that the objective was a junction with the other portion of -Buller's force. He was summoned to Warren's headquarters and ordered to -abstain from further attempts to ride round the enemy's right. Thus, as -before at Hlangwhane, a promising cavalry movement by Dundonald was -thrown away. - -The deliberate march of the British Army from Frere and the delay at the -Drifts gave the Boers ample time to prepare for the attack. On January -19, on which day Warren moved to Venter's Spruit three miles from -Trickhardt's Drift, they were in occupation of the whole line from -Vaalkrantz to the Rangeworthy Heights. Fourie was in command of the -left, Schalk Burger of the centre, which included the important features -of Green Hill, Spion Kop, and the Twin Peaks; and L. Botha of the right, -in which was Bastion Hill. - -There were two roads by which Warren could advance; one running by -Fairview northwards from Trickhardt's Drift between Green Hill and Three -Tree Hill, and the other eight miles longer by Acton Holmes. The length -of the latter and a report from White that several commandos were on -their way to Acton Holmes from Ladysmith, led Warren to adopt the former -route. - -He informed Buller of his decision, adding that certain "special -arrangements" which he had made would oblige him to remain near -Trickhardt's Drift, and that he must therefore have further supplies. -The "special arrangements" were in fact the steps which every general -would take before attacking a strong position not immediately -accessible; namely to acquire ground from which it could be threatened -and shelled. Clery was ordered to direct the operation, which Warren -believed would entail "comparatively little loss of life." - -Early on January 20 Clery with one brigade and artillery advanced up the -re-entrant which springs from the river towards the east end of the -Rangeworthy Heights, and posted his guns half way up the valley on Three -Tree Hill. Hart, with a brigade of five battalions, was sent to occupy -the irregular southern crest of the heights running from Three Tree Hill -towards Bastion Hill. He drove the Boers out of their advanced trenches, -but found that the northern and higher crest to which they had retired, -could only be won by a frontal advance across open ground. He and his -brave Irishmen were as ready as ever to push on in the line of the -greatest resistance, but he was ordered by Clery to forbear. Meanwhile -Dundonald, not deterred by the damping of his trek on the 18th, and -while obeying an order from Warren to come to heel, seized Bastion Hill, -thereby securing Hart's left flank on the crest. So far as they went, -the operations of January 20 were successful. Warren's pivot movement -was in train, the whole of his force was now threatening the Boer right -which was widely extended but deficient in depth; and the day's -casualties were few. Following the example of Buller, who delegated his -authority to Warren, the latter entrusted the conduct of the day's -operations to Clery, who in succession ordered the chief movement to be -carried out by Hart. Next day the mounted troops on Bastion Hill were -relieved by infantry. - -Buller was aware that the Ladysmith garrison, weakened by sickness and -privation, could give him little or no help; but at least during the -earlier phase of the Trickhardt's Drift operations he was confident. On -January 17 he told White that "somehow he thought he was going to be -successful this time," and that he hoped to be within touch of Ladysmith -in six days. His Head Quarters were at Spearman's Camp, a few miles -south of Mount Alice, whence he rode over daily to note and criticize -the tactics. - -It now occurred to Warren that he might have been mistaken as to the -significance of the position occupied by the enemy on the Rangeworthy -Heights, and that it might be in reality a screen to hide a trek of the -Free Staters back to their own country; and on this supposition, which -was founded upon reports that the Siege of Ladysmith had been raised and -that some wagons had been seen on trek westwards towards the Drakensberg -passes, he applied for reinforcements to enable him to block the way. - -Buller sent him Talbot Coke's brigade with some howitzers; and came over -to consult with him on January 22. The situation was not satisfactory. -Time was being wasted, Warren's "special arrangements" had done little, -and now he had a new idea. Buller still advocated an attack on the -enemy's right, while Warren wished to persevere with his advance by the -Fairview Road; but he pointed out that Spion Kop, which his reading of -the "secret instructions" had led him to regard as out of bounds, must -first be taken. No definite action seems to have been decided on, and -Warren was left to act within certain limits on his own responsibility. -Finally, with the approval of the four infantry generals, he resolved to -seize Spion Kop that night. The attack, however, was postponed until the -following night, to give time for the position to be reconnoitred. - -Spion Kop is a ridge of which the chief features are a pair of high -peaks joined by a nek to a plateau, from which a spur, ending in a kopje -called Conical Hill, juts out at right angles to the nek, which becomes -a spur of the plateau at a Little Knoll east of the summit. Its tactical -importance was derived from its height, as the summit, though not the -peaks, is higher than any of the ground held by the enemy; and from its -position, as it was on the obtuse angle formed by the meeting of Botha's -line on the Boer right with Schalk Burger's on the centre, and enfiladed -each of them. It was accessible from the British front by a slope which -rises from the lower ground to another spur running S.W. from the -plateau. - -On the morning of January 23, Buller saw Warren, and again pressed him -to make an attack on the Boer right; but finding that the orders for the -assault on Spion Kop had already been issued, he refrained from vetoing -it. He threatened, however, that if immediate action in some direction -were not taken, Warren's force would be withdrawn to the south of the -Tugela. - -On the previous day Warren, betraying the Engineer officer unused to -handling large bodies of men, and unfamiliar with the military unities, -rearranged his command with a straight edge, and distributed it in one -way for tactical, and in another for administrative purposes. All the -troops lying west of an imaginary line became the left attack under -Clery, while those east of it became the right attack. The latter, under -Talbot Coke, were ordered to seize the Spion Kop position by night, and -entrench it before daybreak, the actual assault being made by Woodgate -with two battalions, some mounted infantry on foot, and a few Engineers. -At sunset on January 23, the curtain fell upon the first act of the -Tragedy of Spion Kop. - -On the night of the January 23 Spion Kop was held as an observation post -by a party of seventy burghers. When Buller first appeared at -Potgieter's Drift, it was on the right of the Boer line, but now it was -only the right of the centre under Schalk Burger. Little was known of -its features and tactical value, beyond the information obtainable by a -telescopic reconnaissance. It was a prominent object in the Boer -position, and it seemed to be within the grasp of a night adventure. -Woodgate left his rendezvous at 9 p.m., but it is doubtful whether he -would have reached the summit before daybreak but for Thorneycroft, who -was in command of the mounted infantry which bore his name, and who had -before nightfall picked out and noted the recognizable objects on the -slope. A staff officer from Head Quarters, who accompanied the column to -direct the march, had had no opportunity of making himself acquainted -with the way of access to Spion Kop, and Thorneycroft was ordered to act -as guide. - -[Illustration: Sketch Plan of Spion Kop.] - -The summit, but fortunately little more than the summit, was veiled in -mist, and the crest was reached. Bayonets were fixed before the Boer -picket was alarmed and opened fire, but the ammunition was spent without -effect, as Thorneycroft's men had by order thrown themselves on the -ground as soon as they were discovered. A charge into the mist drove -back the picket and scared the main body off the summit. Thus before -dawn on January 24, Warren was in possession of the hill which was -believed to be the key of the Boer position, and the chief obstacle in -the way of his advance seemed to be thrust aside: but the mist on Spion -Kop was the forecast of the Fog of War which was soon to envelope him. - -Woodgate, having the men, the tools and the ground, at once began -impulsively to dig, without endeavouring to inform himself of the -features of the position he had so easily won. A sort of a trench had -been scratched on the summit by the weary men, when the mist rolling -away for a little while disclosed the startling topography of the -position. The surface of the plateau sloped gently at first, and then -abruptly fell away, and the trench was found to be of little use. The -enemy could approach on dead ground to within two hundred yards of it. -Woodgate, seeing that the real defensible line was not the highest part -of the summit, but the edge lower down, where the steep descent began, -sent working parties to the front, but they at once came under fire. -Soon the mist again enveloped the hill, and having disposed his force, -he reported to Warren that he had established himself on Spion Kop. - -The Boer outpost which had been driven from the summit belonged to -Schalk Burger's command. With Botha's co-operation a storming force was -soon brought together, and almost every point from which Spion Kop could -be brought under fire was seized, even the Little Knoll near the summit, -which enfiladed the main trench. Joubert telegraphed from Ladysmith that -the position must be re-captured, and Kruger at Pretoria asked what was -being done to win it back. - -Little did Woodgate's force realize what the morning mist was hiding. -Soon after 8 a.m. the sun dissolved the veil, and the storm burst. From -the right the men in the trench and lower crest were enfiladed by the -Little Knoll and the Twin Peaks; on their front and left they were -rained on by bullet and shrapnel from Conical Hill, Green Hill, and -beyond; with such effect that the lower crest had to be temporarily -abandoned. Woodgate was soon mortally wounded and the command devolved -upon Crofton. Spion Kop was the first position of great tactical -importance won by the British Army on the Tugela, and the Boers were -determined to recover it. - -The naval guns posted on Mount Alice and at Potgieter's Drift opened -fire not only on the Little Knoll near the Spion Kop plateau and on the -Twin Peaks, but were also pitching their shells over the summit on to -the Boer positions supposed to be in line with it, and a field battery -on Three Tree Hill shelled the open ground on which the enemy was -advancing. - -Heliograms and flag messages from Spion Kop, orally handed in and -incorrectly transmitted by scared signallers, bewildered the recipients -and increased the density of the Fog of War upon the Tugela. To -Lyttelton was flashed an appeal for help without a signature. A message -sent by Crofton soon after he assumed command, in which he reported -Woodgate's death and said that reinforcements were urgently required, -was transmuted into a despairing cry which made Warren think that he had -lost his head, and which led to his supersession. Warren replied that -there must be no surrender, and that Coke was on his way up with -reinforcements. - -Warren and Lyttelton, as well as the Umpire in Chief, Buller, were too -far away to be able to appreciate the situation on Spion Kop, or to know -how much or how little of the ridge was in possession of the British -troops. Lyttelton's naval guns, playing upon the Little Knoll, were -twice silenced by a message from Warren, who was under the impression -that the whole of the ridge from the Twin Peaks to the main position on -Spion Kop was held. A demonstration made earlier in the day by Lyttelton -towards Brakfontein was checked by Buller, who was unwilling to engage -the enemy in that direction. - -The Boers, a small party of whom before Woodgate's death had climbed the -dead ground, and had come within fifty yards of the main trench, again -attained the outer crest, and a counter attack led by Thorneycroft in -person partially failed, and although the verge was not wholly -abandoned, only the main trench filled with dead, wounded, and unwounded -men parched with thirst, remained for effective resistance. Woodgate had -already paid the penalty for the hasty and fatal act of squatting down -in an indefensible position, and lay among the other victims strewn upon -the plateau; but the British soldier is not easily discouraged by the -errors of his leaders. The cry "_nous sommes trahis_" is never heard -from his lips, and when called upon on active service, - - To live laborious days and shun delights, - -he rarely fails to do his duty. - -At mid-day the situation on Spion Kop was hazardous but not hopeless. -Reinforcements had arrived and were quickly absorbed in the works which -they quickened with patches of new vigour, but the terrible hail of -bullet and shrapnel was not abated. No definite orders had been given to -Clery, who was on the southern crest of the Rangeworthy Heights, except -that he was to "use his discretion about opening fire against the enemy -to his front, with a view to creating a diversion," a discretion which -he exercised by doing nothing. - -Shortly before noon a step was taken by Buller, who was four miles away -on Mount Alice, which enlarged the area of the Fog of War and brought -Spion Kop within its chilling grasp. Thorneycroft was ordered to take -command on the summit with the local rank of Brigadier-General, although -there were several officers present senior to him: but many hours -elapsed before the appointment was made known to all of those whom it -most concerned. Coke, who was now on the S.W. spur, was unaware of it, -and without communicating with Thorneycroft, sent at 12.50 p.m. to -Warren a message which was not delivered till 2.20 p.m., that as the -summit was crowded and the defence was maintaining itself, he had -stopped further reinforcements. - -Almost simultaneously with the despatch of this not unfavourable report, -and long before it was received by Warren, two companies posted in a -detached trench on the right threw up their hands, but not before they -had lost all their officers. Out of the crest line sprang the Boers, who -having made them prisoners, endeavoured to impose the surrender upon the -men in the main trench.[27] Thorneycroft saw that if these wavered, as -they seemed inclined to do, all was lost; and rallying the details -within reach, he succeeded in thrusting back the intruders, who, -however, had already sent their prisoners below the hill. His prompt -action stayed the wave of doubt which threatened to flood the position, -and compelled it to break before it could do much harm. - -At 3.50 p.m. Coke, who was still on the S.W. spur, and therefore not in -direct touch with Thorneycroft, informed Warren that the enemy was being -gradually cleared from the summit, and that he had been reinforced with -the Scottish Rifles from Potgieter's Drift by Lyttelton, whom Warren, -after receiving Crofton's mis-transmitted message, had ordered to -co-operate. He had already forwarded a letter written at 2.30 p.m. by -Thorneycroft, stating that the force on Spion Kop was being badly -punished by artillery, was in want of water, and was insufficient to -hold the position. To this letter he had added a note of his own which -showed that he did not attach much importance to it, saying that he had -ordered more troops on to the plateau, where "we appear to be holding -our own." This letter, with Coke's covering note, did not reach Warren -until after he had received Coke's message sent nearly an hour later, -and he assumed that the latter indicated the existing hopeful situation -with which he had to deal. Of the physical features of the Spion Kop -position he knew little more than what his telescope told him, and he -read optimistically the meagre, inconsistent, and misleading reports -which reached him occasionally from the summit. He hoped during the -night to place some naval guns on the plateau: he was informed that an -accessible spring of water had been discovered: reinforcements were at -hand: there was nothing more to be done. - -Lyttelton, when ordered to "assist from his side," acted with -intelligence and discernment. Noticing that Spion Kop, whither he had -already dispatched the Scottish Rifles, was full of men, he sent the -King's Royal Rifles towards the flanking position on the Twin Peaks, and -the battalion supported by the naval guns, and ignoring messages of -recall prompted by Buller, who was watching the advance with anxiety, -worked its way up and expelled a Transvaal contingent and a small body -commanded by an Irish renegade, all of whom were hurled by the impact -into a flight of eight miles. The position was at once entrenched and at -5 p.m. the right flank of Spion Kop was secured, but only for a time. -Again, as after Lord Dundonald's movement on Acton Holmes, a promising -enterprise was thrown away. Buller had from the first disapproved of -Lyttelton's action, which still more widely distributed his already -scattered command. He was too far away to see its bearing upon the -situation, and now ordered him to recall the King's Royal Rifles, who -after sunset were withdrawn from the position, which they had so -gallantly captured in spite of warnings signalled from Spion Kop that it -was strongly held by the enemy. - -On Spion Kop the Fog of War hung more densely than ever. Coke, who was -lame and unable to move freely about the position, believed that Hill, -who had come up with a reinforcement soon after noon, and who was next -in seniority to Crofton, was in command on the summit. He thought that -Crofton had been wounded, and neither saw Thorneycroft nor knew until -the following day that Warren had given him the local rank of -Brigadier-General at Buller's suggestion. Thorneycroft was a junior -major in the Army, having the local rank of Lieutenant-Colonel: and with -two colonels senior to him present as well as a major-general, he was -doubtful as to his status. No instructions reached him from Coke; he was -unaware that the Twin Peaks had been taken by one of Lyttelton's -battalions, and he was without means of signalling to Warren. He had no -information of the measures which were being taken, such as the dispatch -of guns, to make the retention of Spion Kop possible. - -The men on the summit were utterly exhausted by fatigue, hunger, thirst, -want of sleep, and exposure to the summer sun beating down upon the -rocky surface, and their ammunition was running short. At 5.50 p.m. Coke -reported "that the situation is extremely critical" and that the men -"would not stand another day's shelling," but it was two hours before -the message reached Warren. He ordered Coke to come down to consult him. -Coke endeavoured to obtain permission by flash signal to stay where he -was, but no oil could be obtained for the lamp, so regarding the order -as imperative, he quitted Spion Kop at 9.30 p.m., leaving, as he -thought, Hill in command. For four hours he strayed in the Fog of War -before he found Warren's Head Quarters, which had come under shell fire, -and which, unknown to him, had been moved from their original position. - -Between 8 and 9, Warren received a letter written at 6.30 p.m. by -Thorneycroft, who reported that the enemy's shell fire rendered the -permanent occupation of Spion Kop impossible, and asked for -instructions. - -Coke's departure left the position without a clearly recognized -commander, although he had done little more than attend to and -distribute the supports and reinforcements on the S.W. spur. After the -dispatch of Thorneycroft's letter at 6.30 p.m., the situation grew more -hopeless every minute. The enemy's artillery was out of reach, the -nature of the ground and the want of tools made it impossible to cut -properly designed trenches, rations and water were exhausted, and -nothing was known of assistance to be brought up during the night except -that a mountain battery, which would be of little use against the -enemy's guns, was at the foot of the slope. - -For these reasons Thorneycroft justified in his official report his -decision to retire from Spion Kop. With the acquiescence of all the -senior officers, except Hill, who could not be found, he ordered a -withdrawal at 10 p.m. The alternative seemed to be a Majuba surrender -next morning. At 10.30 p.m. as the troops were beginning to move off the -hill, he received a letter from Warren, asking for his views on the -situation, and as to the measures to be adopted. It was now unnecessary -to give these, and he sent a brief reply that he was obliged to abandon -Spion Kop as the position was untenable. - -The retirement was not made without protests from Hill and from Coke's -staff officer who was still on the plateau. The former, eleven hours -after Thorneycroft's appointment as Brigadier-General, believed, as he -had every right to do, that he was in command, and halted the men; the -latter sent round a memorandum to the commanding officers, asserting -that there was no authority for the withdrawal. But the force of -Thorneycroft's local rank prevailed, and the retreat was not stayed. -Near the foot of the slope he found the mountain battery, and met a -fatigue party on its way to prepare emplacements for two naval guns -which were coming up, and received a message from Warren urging him to -hold on to the position. It was too late. Ordering back the party and -the battery, he went on to report himself to Warren, and arrived at Head -Quarters almost simultaneously with Coke. - -The Boers meanwhile were greatly discouraged by their expulsion from the -Twin Peaks, and their failure to occupy the main position on Spion Kop. -The guns which had tormented Thorneycroft for so many hours, and which -were the chief cause of his retirement, were withdrawn, and Schalk -Burger's commandos oozed away towards Ladysmith. But there was, however, -a stalwart and not inconsiderable remnant of burghers who responded to -Botha's expostulations, and stood fast as a forlorn hope determined to -win back Spion Kop and the Twin Peaks. Their constancy was rewarded, and -when at sunrise on January 25 they once more climbed the hill, they -found to their astonishment and relief that it was still held--by more -than 300 bodies of their fallen foes. - -Such in brief is the tale of Spion Kop so far as it can be disentangled -from the accumulation of messages, orders, reports, dispatches, and -personal accounts, which obscure the subject. Many of these are -inconsistent, not a few contradictory, and sufficient evidence might be -found to support plausibly half a dozen conflicting theories of the -cause of the disaster, and as many variants of the narrative. - -At 2 a.m. Warren heard from Thorneycroft's lips--the latter's written -message sent off at 10.30 p.m. on the previous evening not having -reached him--of the evacuation of Spion Kop. At sunrise he was joined by -Buller, who viewed the situation in a spirit of philosophic detachment. -He had never cordially approved of the Spion Kop adventure, and was not -surprised to hear that it had failed. Warren was inclined to persevere, -but Buller decided to retire south of the Tugela and assumed the direct -command of the Army, which on January 27 was once more drawn up on the -right bank after an absence of ten days; with most of its superior -officers discredited, with Ladysmith unrelieved, and the nation at home -aghast at the disaster. - -The lonely figure of Thorneycroft, the only man of action on the summit -energizing and quickening the defence, stands out prominently in the -confusion, gloom, and half lights of Spion Kop. Buller's impulsive -intervention made him responsible for the position, and he tried to do -his best. If the final act was an error of judgment, there is little -doubt that but for Thorneycroft, the Boers would have rushed the plateau -on the afternoon of January 24. He received no effective support from -Clery and little from Warren, and was out of touch with Coke and the -Colonels. His uncertainty as to his authority caused him to refrain from -exercising it fully until the last moment. For the pain which the -decision to withdraw must have given him, he deserves much sympathy. But -although it was approved of by Buller, who probably felt bound to -support his nominee, it was at least premature. He might reasonably have -expected that an effort would be made during the night to relieve him, -and might have postponed it for a few hours. It is unjust to judge a man -in the light of eventualities which he could not reasonably be expected -to foresee, but subsequent accounts from the Boer side show that the -attack would not have been renewed the next morning if the enemy had -found the Twin Peaks, for the evacuation of which Buller and not -Thorneycroft was responsible, and Spion Kop still occupied. - -Not only the inconvenience, but also the danger of suddenly conferred -local rank were illustrated on January 24. Buller, hastily concluding -from a garbled message that Crofton was incompetent, asked Warren to put -Thorneycroft in charge. Thorneycroft heard of his appointment orally -through an officer who had chanced to be at the signalling station, and -the written message which never reached him was, it is said, picked up -next day by a Boer! If the exigencies of war should ever require the -sudden promotion of a junior officer to a position of great -responsibility, it should not take effect until all concerned are -notified. The defence of Spion Kop was, during the greater part of the -day, conducted by a syndicate of officers acting severally. - -The curtain had fallen, the drama was over, and the critics took up -their pens. With Thorneycroft's report on the retirement from Spion Kop -began a controversy which lasted for more than two years. Warren -enclosed it in his own report to Buller, with the suggestion that a -Court of Enquiry should be held to investigate the circumstances of the -unauthorized withdrawal, and in succession each grade of the military -hierarchy passed censure on the grades below. In Buller's covering -despatch of January 31 with which he forwarded to the War Office, -through Lord Roberts, Warren's Spion Kop report, he commented very -unfavourably on Warren's arrangements and disposition of troops; and -said that Thorneycroft had "exercised a wise discretion, and that no -investigation was necessary": while to Warren's general report on the -whole operations of January 17-27, he attached a memorandum to the -Secretary of State for War, "not necessarily for publication," in which -he not only blamed himself for not having taken command on the 19th, -when he saw "that things were not going well," but also said that he -could "never employ Warren again in an independent command"; as his -slowness had allowed the enemy to concentrate and to increase the force -opposed to him more than twenty-fold. - -With this accumulation of censure Lord Roberts dealt in his despatch to -Lord Lansdowne of February 13, written at a drift on the Riet River -during the advance on Kimberley. The Commander-in-Chief confirmed all -the censures passed by his subordinates and added some of his own. -Buller was rebuked for not having intervened when he saw that a most -important enterprise was not being "conducted in the manner which in his -opinion would lead to the attainment of the object in view with the -least possible loss of life on our side"; Warren was reproved because he -did not visit Spion Kop during the crisis, and had instead ordered Coke -to come to him; and while Thorneycroft's gallantry and exertions, -without which the troops would probably have been driven off the hill -during the day, were acknowledged, his action in ordering the retirement -without endeavouring to communicate with Coke or Warren was pronounced -to be a "wholly inexcusable assumption of responsibility and authority." - -Never before had such an inconvenient batch of despatches been laid upon -the desks of Pall Mall. To publish them and to proclaim to the world -that the Natal Generals, when they were beaten by the enemy, had began -to fight among themselves, was impossible. If they were withheld from -publication, many awkward questions would be asked. The War Office -temporized, and endeavoured to steer a middle course. Would Buller -kindly substitute a simple narrative for his despatch? This Buller -refused to do, and in April, 1900, the War Office published the -despatches, imperfectly sterilized. As they now appeared, they were -neither a simple narrative, nor a full revelation. Lord Roberts' -criticisms on Buller were cut out. The memorandum, "not necessarily for -publication," in which Buller reflected severely on Warren's incapacity -was withheld. Only the censure passed upon Thorneycroft was allowed to -appear. The junior officer was made the scapegoat of his superiors' -mistakes. Of all the officers concerned, he alone had failed. The War -Office had taken a politic but not straightforward course. The blame -must be laid upon some one, and if it were laid upon Thorneycroft alone -it would affect public opinion less mischievously. - -It soon became suspected, however, that certain things were being kept -back, and the controversy dragged on for two years; Buller to the end -maintaining that as he was not present at, nor in command of, the Spion -Kop operations, it was not incumbent on him to write a simple narrative -of them; and that his duty was to write a critical account of the -affair, such as would be sent in by an Umpire in Chief during peace -manoeuvres. - -Not until April, 1902, did the Epilogue of the Tragedy of Errors appear. -The despatches, with the memorandum "not necessarily for publication," -were published in full, as well as the "Secret Orders" given to Warren -at Springfield, which were its Prologue. - -Notes: - -[Footnote 26: A detachment numbering about 600 only was sent.] - -[Footnote 27: In the Fog of War some of the British soldiers thought -that the Boers were coming up to surrender themselves, and acted in this -belief for a brief period.] - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -More Tugela Troubles - - -By a process of elimination Buller hoped in time to find the road to -Ladysmith. He had tried in succession, but without success, Colenso, -Potgieter's Drift, and Trickhardt's Drift. He now informed White that he -intended to make another attempt, but Lord Roberts advised him to -postpone it until his own advance should draw off the Free Staters and -weaken the barrier on the line of the Tugela. - -The situation in the besieged town was growing worse every day, but a -proposal made by White as well as by the War Office that the garrison -should endeavour to break out, was not sanctioned by Lord Roberts. White -also was opposed to Buller's making another attempt to cross the Tugela, -as he considered that the force would be more usefully employed in -preventing the enemy from concentrating on Ladysmith. - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 98.] - -Buller's new plan was an advance by way of Vaalkrantz. Here the river -winds in two salient loops towards the north, with a re-entrant loop -between them, and there is a slight break in the heights on the left -bank. The Brakfontein ridge slopes down towards Vaalkrantz Hill, between -which and Green Hill there is a dip through which a road passes on to -the open ground towards Ladysmith, eleven miles distant. - -Buller proposed to occupy the ridge of Vaalkrantz with artillery, and -after a feint attack on the Boer position on Brakfontein, to push -through under cover of the guns. It was believed that the enemy's -extreme left lay on Vaalkrantz, which was commanded by Mount Alice and -Zwart Kop. Lord Roberts when informed of the project was not hopeful of -its success, but did not veto it, although he thought that Buller would -be better advised to abstain from offensive tactics. - -The feint attack on Brakfontein was to be made by seven Field Batteries -and a Brigade of Infantry, and was to be continued long enough to -convince the enemy that it was "meant". It was then to be withdrawn and -the real attack set in motion. The advance of the feint would be covered -by heavy guns posted on Mount Alice, and concealed batteries on Zwart -Kop would open on Vaalkrantz in support of the real attack. - -The bulk of the infantry was posted in the east loop, so as to appear -ready to cross the river and support the feint attack between the loops. -As soon as the guns had driven the enemy into their trenches on -Brakfontein, a pontoon bridge was to be thrown across the river south of -Hunger's Drift, and the guns on Zwart Kop were to open on Vaalkrantz, -and when this had been sufficiently bombarded, it would be carried by -the infantry, and guns would be brought up to enfilade the Boer line; -while the cavalry "when feasible" would push through under the ridge and -threaten it from the rear. - -It was a pretty tactical scheme, with much of the War-Game about it, and -it depended for its success upon the practicability of using Vaalkrantz -as an artillery position, and upon the correctness of the assumption -that the enemy was not in force eastward of it. - -Buller was not successful in placing his guns on Zwart Kop unnoticed by -the enemy, who was warned in time. After Spion Kop, Botha went to -Pretoria, and Schalk Burger took furlough. B. Viljoen was now in -command. He saw the danger and applied to Joubert at Ladysmith for help, -who thought he was over-anxious but sent him a heavy gun. Little however -would have been done but for the intervention of the two civilian -Presidents. Steyn appealed to Kruger who, having tried without success -to induce Joubert to take command on the Upper Tugela, fell in with -Steyn's suggestion that Martin Prinsloo, a Free Stater, should go there; -and Botha was ordered back from Pretoria. Prinsloo took command of the -Brakfontein position, Viljoen remaining on Vaalkrantz. - -At sunrise on February 5 began Buller's third attempt to relieve -Ladysmith. Wynne, who had succeeded Woodgate in command of the 11th -Brigade, advanced in two lines up the slope towards Brakfontein, -supported by the fire of forty-four guns. Nearly six hours passed before -any reply was vouchsafed by the enemy. At mid-day some guns on Wynne's -left front opened on the batteries, but not a shot was fired by the -Boers in the trenches. - -Already one field battery had been detached from the left of the line of -guns, the first movement in the real attack, and had taken up a position -to cover the pontoon troop which was throwing a bridge across the Tugela -near Hunger's Drift. At noon the completion of the bridge was signalled -to the feint attack. The batteries fronting the Brakfontein ridge were -withdrawn, and Wynne's brigade which, having been marched up the slope, -was now marched down again, came under a heavy but almost innocuous -infantry fire, which at last broke out on Brakfontein. - -To the Boers it appeared that another attack, determined while it -lasted, but devoid of backbone, had been kept at bay. The guns on Zwart -Kop opened on Vaalkrantz as soon as the detached battery was seen to be -in motion; and the other batteries came into action as they arrived from -the Brakfontein demonstration. There was some annoyance from casual -rifle fire and a Maxim posted on the heights S.E. of the loop, but it -did not seriously interfere with the work of the bridge-builders. - -The rules of the game were strictly obeyed, and there was "a thorough -preparation by artillery" before the infantry was allowed to advance. -The movement was delayed until half a hundred guns were playing upon -Vaalkrantz and the chance of a _celer et audax_ exploit was lost. At 2 -p.m. Lyttelton with two battalions of the 4th Brigade was permitted to -cross the pontoon and with these he worked up under the protection of -the left bank, and emerging upon Munger's Farm, rose thence to the -southern edge of Vaalkrantz, and took hold of the ridge. Here he was -joined by a battalion of Hildyard's Brigade, whose original orders to -occupy Green Hill were cancelled, and later on by the remaining -battalions of his own brigade; which Buller, wavering for a time, had -held back, as the pontoon and the open ground were under fire from the -right flank. At 4 p.m. Lyttelton was established on the main hill of -Vaalkrantz, and during the night the position was entrenched. The -occupation, however, brought two facts to light. Half a mile to the -north of the main hill was another hill, only a few feet lower, -unapproachable and in the enemy's possession; and it was not -practicable, as Buller had hoped, to bring up artillery on to the -position seized by Lyttelton. - -At daylight on February 6, the situation was favourable to the Boers. -Botha had arrived and had taken over the command from Prinsloo. The -heavy gun sent from Ladysmith had been mounted on Doom Kop, which was -now held by reinforcements under L. Meyer; other good positions east of -Vaalkrantz had been strengthened; and some of the guns on the -Brakfontein position had been moved round. Vaalkrantz standing between -Doorn Kop and the Twin Peaks, was shelled simultaneously from the left -front, and the right rear, as well as from Green Hill;[28] it seemed as -if Spion Kop were about to be repeated. - -Buller opened on Green Hill with artillery, and on the hill north of the -main hill of Vaalkrantz, in the hope of making the North Hill -assailable. In view of a retirement, a pontoon bridge was, at -Lyttelton's request, thrown across the river under the main ridge. He -discouraged a proposal made by Buller to attack the North Hill by a -force creeping along the foot of the westward slope of Vaalkrantz, -covered by fire from the ridge. - -Buller was now stalemated. The artillery fire had not cleared the way to -the North Hill, and Lyttelton was unable to move on it, but he said that -he could hold on for the rest of the day if no more artillery were -brought to bear on him from the S.E. - -Finally Buller determined to shift the responsibility. He reported the -capture of Vaalkrantz to Lord Roberts, and in effect asked what he -should do with the white elephant. To carry out his plan would "cost -from 2,000 to 3,000 men," and he was "not confident of success." Was -Ladysmith worth it? Yes, replied Lord Roberts without hesitation, -Ladysmith was worth it and it must be done. - -In the evening Lyttelton, having thwarted an attempt by the enemy to -recover Vaalkrantz, was relieved by Hildyard. On the following -afternoon, Buller, in spite of Lord Roberts' message, made up his mind -to withdraw. Further reconnaissances had shown that the North Hill, even -if taken, could hardly be held. A council of war was summoned, at which, -as might have been anticipated, Hart alone was for persevering, and at -which Warren again put forward the scheme rejected by Buller at Frere, -but now gladly adopted by him, of advancing on Ladysmith by way of -Hlangwhane. - -Orders were issued for the withdrawal of the force from Vaalkrantz -during the night. It was skilfully carried out, and Buller was once more -ferrying his men across the Tugela, having for the third time failed to -reach Ladysmith. - -On February 8 the Army was retracing its steps on the road by which four -weeks before it had marched from Springfield to Potgieter's Drift; and -on the 11th it was concentrated at Chieveley, from which eight weeks -before it had been thrown at the Colenso heights. All the Tugela -operations had been conducted in a rarified medium. Want of -determination, want of system, the absence of maps, the lack of a -sufficient staff, were responsible for two months of misadventure. -Buller, like the Boers, was easily discouraged by failure, but unlike -them was unable to quicken himself readily for a renewed effort. He lost -confidence in himself, and then in his subordinates. Like a nervous -child, he opened the door of a dark chamber, but was afraid to enter. -The terror of the unknown drove him back in a panic. When his plans, -which were usually well thought out, miscarried, he became peevish, and -scarcely made an attempt to reconstruct them. Only an Army of which the -backbone was the stolid, unimaginative Englishman of the lower classes, -and which believed that its leader was doing his best, could have -remained undemoralized by the campaign on the Tugela. - -Buller possessed one quality which to a great extent outweighed his -shortcomings as a military commander: namely the power of inspiring -confidence. His men believed in him, and would do anything for him. They -liked him for his bluff, John-Bullish, and rampant manner. The enlisted -man is a curious differentiation from the class to which he belongs. His -democratic instincts become less acute when he shoulders the -Lee-Metford, and he readily accommodates himself to the will of a -benevolent despot of robust appearance, and blunt and somewhat -contemptuous address; whom in fact he prefers to the ascetic, -dispassionate General Officer of quiet habit and speech. - -The criticisms passed upon Buller were far more friendly in the men's -than in the officers' bivouacs. Possibly the men's opinions, as being -the more natural and spontaneous, were also the more correct. The enemy -conducted the war upon principles which were strange to the British -Army, and to which it had to adapt itself painfully; and the men seem to -have recognized sooner than the professors the difficulties of the -situation, and to have been less intolerant of ill-success. - -Few general officers have ever revealed in their official communications -more of the workings and the moods of their minds than did Buller in -Natal. His telegrams and despatches always reflected the thoughts of the -moment. After the Colenso fight, he candidly referred to it as my -"unfortunate undertaking of to-day." Six days before the Vaalkrantz -affair he told Lord Roberts that "this time I feel fairly confident of -success"; and on the eve of the attack he said that "while I have every -hope of success, I am not quite certain of it." - -After the retirement, it was, "wherever I turn I come upon the enemy in -superior force to my own." He subjected his personal and individual -ideas and feelings to no restraint, and they incontinently leavened all -his messages which were now confident, now diffident, and now querulous, -and which read as if they were quotations from his private diary. From -Vaalkrantz he heliographed to White that the enemy was too strong for -him, and that the "Bulwana big gun is here"; and could White suggest -anything better than an advance by way of Hlangwhane? In his telegrams -from Chieveley to Lord Roberts, he complained of want of support, and of -the feebleness of the resistance made by the Ladysmith garrison, which -he professed to believe did not detain more than 2,000 men. Yet in -recording his weakness, it must in justice be said that he gained and -never lost the confidence of the rank and file of the relieving force, -and that under any other leader it would probably have succumbed to its -misfortunes. - -On February 12 the re-concentration of Buller's Army at Chieveley was -complete. The enemy's front had been greatly strengthened since the -attack on Colenso. The Boers saw what Buller could not be persuaded to -believe, that Hlangwhane was the key of the position, and extended their -line thence in a curve through Green Hill and Monte Cristo, with a -detached post outside it on Cingolo. These four hills and the ground -between them Buller proposed to occupy, and then pass between Cingolo -and Monte Cristo to a drift of the Tugela N.E. of Monte Cristo, cross -the river and advance by the Klip Riyer on Bulwana. The two "iron -bridges" at Colenso were impassable, but the Boers had thrown a bridge -across near Naval Hill by which, and also by a ferry higher up, -communication was kept up with their left flank. - -The initial movement on February 12 was made appropriately enough by -Dundonald, who two months before had seen the value of the Hlangwhane -position, and who now perhaps as he marched out, realized the truth of -the proverb _tout vient à ce qui sait attendre_. He occupied Hussar Hill -temporarily as a reconnaissance to give Buller an opportunity of -surveying the ground over which he was about to operate. The -Intelligence officers reported that the enemy was strongly posted at -several points within the area and unmasked some of his slim tricks. In -order to conceal the line of the trenches, the excavated earth was piled -up some distance towards the front, and tents not intended for -occupation were pitched to divert fire from the positions in which he -lay. The war-craft which comes by instinct to nationalities not in an -advanced state of civilization and leading simple lives face to face -with wild animals and native tribes, and which the conventionally -trained European soldier only learns by experience, strengthened the -Boer commandos without an augmentation of individuals liable to be -killed or wounded. The veld trenches which kept Methuen at arm's length -at Magersfontein and the Boer devices on the Tugela seem to show that -War is not a Science, but an Art, easily acquired by unprofessional -soldiers. - -On February 14 the movement began and a front at Hussar Hill was taken -up, but owing to the heat and the scarcity of water, little was done -during the next two days, except a bombardment of the Boer trenches and -gun positions. The advance of the relieving force has been likened to -the deliberate progression of a steam roller. - -Clery having been invalided, the IInd Division was temporarily under the -command of Lyttelton, whose orders for February 17 were to move upon -Cingolo Nek and Green Hill. Dundonald was instructed to work in rear of -the infantry and outflank any detachment of the enemy that might appear -on the Nek. But Dundonald was not a military pedant devoid of initiative -and tied to the letter of his instructions, and when the difficulties of -the ground broke the touch between him and Lyttelton he was perhaps not -sorry to find himself disengaged; and when he saw that the Boers were -entrenched on Cingolo Ridge, he attacked instead of outflanking it. - -While the commando on the ridge was occupied with the infantry, it was -suddenly surprised from the flank by Dundonald's men, and was driven out -of the trenches. Meanwhile one of Lyttelton's battalions, which in -ignorance of Dundonald's movement, had been sent to clear Cingolo of -some Boers who were firing on the advance and checking it, found when it -reached the ridge that it had been forestalled in the capture. - -When Lyttelton became aware that the enemy had been expelled, he -proposed to avail himself of the success without delay, and push on to -the Nek and Monte Cristo, while Warren's Vth Division attacked Green -Hill; but Buller objected to an advance which could not be completed -before nightfall. Lyttelton bivouacked S.W. of the ridge and Dundonald -on the detached hill at its northern end. During the night, field guns -were brought up the slopes and with much difficulty emplaced in a -position from which shell fire could be directed on Monte Cristo. - -If the movement of the day was not remarkable for speed and enterprise, -it was at least directed with skill and without excessive caution; and -Dundonald showed that his military spirit had not been chilled by -previous rebuffs, one of them administered almost on the spot where he -was now in activity. - -At daylight on February 18, the movement was resumed, the immediate -objective being the capture of Monte Cristo and Green Hill. One brigade -was sent through the Nek on to the eastward slopes of Monte Cristo, -while the other attacked the hill from the south. With the help of the -ever-ready Dundonald the IInd Division established itself on the main -hill of the ridge early in the afternoon. The Fusilier Brigade of the -Vth Division was meanwhile acting in support; and advancing as soon as -Monte Cristo was seen to be occupied, easily took hold of Green Hill. -The enemy was now expelled from all the positions commanding the -proposed line of advance over the Nek, and was retreating westward -towards the positions near the right bank of the Tugela, but no attempt -was made to pursue him. The motto of Buller's Army was _festina lente_ -and its track towards Ladysmith was in zigzag. - -On the following day Hlangwhane was occupied by the British troops, and -before noon on February 20, all the Boers had withdrawn to the left bank -of the Tugela, and Buller was favourably placed for the advance by way -of the Klip River on Bulwana. A reconnaissance, however, caused him to -change his mind and to resume the movement at an acute angle by doubling -back towards Hlangwhane and crossing the river by a pontoon bridge west -of the hill. - -His new plan was to capture a position between the Onderbroek and -Langewacht Spruits, which appeared from a distance to be one hill, but -which in reality was two, Wynne's Hill and Horseshoe Hill, which were -separated by a donga. On the morning of February 21 he signalled his -intentions to White, saying that he thought he had "only a rearguard -before him"[29] and that he hoped to be in Ladysmith next day. - -After the capture of Monte Cristo and the Hlangwhane position, some of -the commandos seem to have trekked away towards the north, and even -Botha for a time appears to have lost heart and to have suggested to -Joubert that the siege of Ladysmith should be raised. The Boer leaders -had already, like King Arthur, - - Heard the steps of Modred in the west, - -and their army in Natal had been weakened, before Buller's final -advance, by the departure of commandos going to succour their brethren -not only on the Modder, but also in the Cape Colony. - -The situation on the Tugela was reported to Pretoria almost -simultaneously with the news that Cronje was hemmed in at Paardeberg. -But owing it may be to the distance which intervened between Kruger and -the scene of action, the dour old _voortrekker_ of Colesberg would not -hear of any voluntary retirement before the enemy who had driven him out -of the Cape Colony sixty years before. He sent an appeal to the Boers of -the Tugela which, in an intense human document, displayed his steadfast -and touching faith, and which might have been addressed by his prototype -Cromwell to the Ironsides. - -He rebuked the burghers for their cowardice, which he attributed to the -waning of their trust in the power of the Almighty to help them in their -distress, and with many instances and quotations from Holy Writ, he -adjured them to stand fast in faith. He was confident that the cause -which he in all sincerity believed to be the cause of the Church of -Christ would prevail in the end, and justifiably encouraged by successes -in the field against superior numbers he exhorted the commandos to -endure without flinching the purification by fire. Kruger's passionate -appeal availed, and the waverers returned to their posts. The incident -disclosed the power of the factor of moral force, wherein the Boer -strength lay; and it will in a great measure account for the -prolongation of the war. When their cause seemed hopeless, they -comforted themselves with the honest and irradicable belief that its -righteousness was the assurance of final success. Though most of their -leaders were incompetent, though they themselves were easily -discouraged; disobeyed orders; often malingered and mutinied; quitted -the field with their wagons which they were reluctant to abandon, under -such frivolous pretexts that the _verlafpest_ or leave-plague became a -bye-word; though time after time their power of resistance seemed to be -exhausted; though in their thousands they were distributed over the -British Empire as prisoners of war; though their confident expectation -of European intervention was not realized; though they were always -greatly outnumbered; they continued stubbornly to defy for the space of -two years and seven months the most numerous and the most efficient Army -which has ever left the shores of Great Britain, until at last they were -worn down by mechanical friction and attrition, and not by the stroke of -war. When the Boers were driven out of the Hlangwhane positions, they -took up a new position facing S.E. on the left bank of the Tugela. Their -right was near the head of Hart's loop, and their centre came within a -few hundred yards of the river at Wynne's Hill, whence the line was -carried on towards Pieter's Hill. - -At noon on February 21 Buller began once more to send his men across the -Tugela, intending to content himself that day with establishing his -force "comfortably" on the position north of the railway bridge enclosed -by the bend of the river, which was now free of the enemy. He ordered -Talbot Coke with the 10th Brigade of Warren's Division to pass over the -Colenso Kopjes on to the open ground beyond, from which the Onderbroek -valley could be enfiladed by artillery. He had received information that -the enemy were there in force, and in the belief that "what Boers there -were, were hiding in that kloof," he changed his plan of moving -northwards at once on Wynne's Hill. - -On February 21 Coke advanced in three lines, but soon after he had -cleared the hilly ground, his scouting line came under fire from the -Grobelaar slopes, and his right flank was also involved from the -direction of Wynne's Hill. His Brigade was pinned to the ground by rifle -and shell fire until nightfall, when it was retired to the Colenso -Kopjes, where Wynne's Brigade of Warren's Division had arrived during -the afternoon. - -[Illustration: Map of the Final Advance on Ladysmith.] - -The route march to Ladysmith was checked. Instead of a mere rearguard to -be driven in, as Buller had fondly believed, a strongly posted line, -extending nearly four miles S.W. from Wynne's Hill, had to be attacked. -The enemy had been so much encouraged by the failure of Coke's movement, -that Botha telegraphed to Kruger that he had hopes of a "great reverse." - -Warren thought that it would be necessary to diverge from the advance -and take the Grobelaar slopes, and White reported that Boer -reinforcements were coming in from the north. Towards evening on -February 21, it seemed not unlikely that another Colenso, Spion Kop, or -Vaalkrantz would soon be debited to Buller. The line of approach to -Ladysmith was held by the enemy, and the British Army of relief, the -greater part of which had crossed to the left bank of the Tugela, was -entangled in the Colenso Kopjes, and the river loop. - -Warren's general idea for the 22nd, of which Buller approved, was to -attack Wynne's Hill with the 11th Brigade, leaving Horseshoe Hill to be -dealt with by the artillery. Although the Boers on the Grobelaar slopes -had been well pounded for some hours by the field batteries, Wynne -considered that it would be unsafe to advance unless these slopes were -actually taken, but he was overruled. He had also been promised support -on his left rear, but only two of the battalions detailed for the -purpose were at hand and these were fully occupied in offering a front -to the Boers on Grobelaar, while the movement was in progress; and he -advanced against the enemy's centre unsupported except by the long range -fire of a brigade on Naval Hill across the river. - -He had expected that the promised supports would secure his left flank -by seizing Horseshoe Hill, and in default he was compelled to detach a -portion of his own scanty force against it. At sunset the cutting edge -of the advancing wedge was touching the enemy, but was unable to break -into him, and Briton and Boer were face to face on Wynne's Hill and on -Horseshoe Hill. - -Reinforcements were brought up and defences were constructed during the -night, while the Boers continually fired upon the confused units -labouring in the darkness. The enemy had an entrenched position on -Hart's Hill which enfiladed Wynne's Hill, and which Warren had not been -able to take, as Buller hoped, with the 11th Brigade. - -Next morning the 5th Brigade under Hart, which was in reserve near the -river loop, was sent against Hart's Hill. He advanced, wherever -possible, under cover of the steep left bank of the river along a trail -so narrow that the men were compelled often to move in single file; and -at one place, where the Langewacht Spruit enters the Tugela, it was -necessary to make a detour and cross the spruit by the railway bridge, -and to quit the dead ground and emerge on to a defile under heavy fire. -The advance of the Brigade was retarded by the stringing out of the -battalions, and from time to time Hart's Hill was shelled without -seriously harming the enemy, who as usual was not posted on the apparent -crest, but some distance in rear of it. - -Two battalions of the 4th Brigade, which had been lent to Hart, were so -far behind that as only two or three hours of daylight remained, he -decided to attack without them. For impetuous gallantry the advance of -the Irish regiments was not surpassed by any other exploit in the War. -Working up on difficult ground to the sound of the Regimental calls, and -then almost brought to a standstill by the barbed wire fences of the -railway, which became a trap of death, they rushed the slope, pushing -the enemy's outposts before them, and won the crest: and then in the -failing light which compelled the supporting artillery to discontinue -the bombardment and relieve the enemy from the pressure of shrapnel, -they saw the Boer positions still above them. The crest was false. - -It was a cruel disappointment to brave men who had struggled so well, -but they did not flinch. A charge was made across the plateau, but it -soon was withered by fire and few of the men reached the Boer trenches. -Two more battalions of the 4th Brigade arrived at dawn, but the -reinforcement came too late. The troops were reorganized, as far as -possible, on the slope leading down from the crest, but were eventually -compelled to retire across the railway to the lower ground by flanking -fire, which Hart succeeded in silencing, and was able to reoccupy the -dead ground below the false crest with fresh troops. - -The failure of the attack did not deter Buller from pursuing his plan, -and on February 24 he proposed to renew it and to operate against -Railway Hill, which stands fourth in the line of hills running in a N.E. -direction from Horseshoe Hill to Pieter's Hill; but by Hart's suggestion -the movement was postponed, and in the end, abandoned. The greater part -of his Brigade was dangerously and densely posted on the lower ground, -and when during the night a surprise party of Boers opened fire, there -was some fear of a general panic. The situation was precarious. The Boer -line had not been pierced: on each side it outflanked Buller and fronted -the Tugela loops in which the greater portion of his force was huddled. -It was fortunate for him that DeWet had gone to the Modder. - -On the night of February 24 began the third movement in zigzag. The -general direction of the first was N.E.; of the second W.S.W.; of the -third East. It was discovered that there was a path by which troops -could pass east of Naval Hill down to the right bank out of the enemy's -reach, and that they could cross the Tugela by pontoon. Buller then -determined to transfer the bulk of his force back to the Hlangwhane side -of the river over the pontoon bridge by which he had crossed to the left -bank three days before. The plan involved not only the concentration of -a clubbed and unwieldy force on the right bank, but also the necessity -of keeping it there until the passage of the last detail allowed the -pontoon bridge to be taken up and moved to the new place of crossing, -three miles below. - -An armistice, restricted to the arena of the recent fighting, was -granted by the Boers on February 25, for the purpose of bringing away -the wounded and burying the dead; and during the barter of news on the -very narrow strip which separated the British fallen from the enemy's -positions, the burghers refused to believe that Cronje was surrounded at -Paardeberg, and retorted that Lord Roberts had lost all his transport -and supplies at Waterval Drift, and was helpless. - -The cessation of the music of war during the armistice dismayed the -garrison of Ladysmith, which feared that it must indicate another -failure; for owing to spies and the leakage of plans, Buller was afraid -of informing White fully of his position and intentions, and during the -final advance he usually restricted himself in his heliograms to the -expression of his hopes or to the reasons for their non-fulfilment. - -On the enemy's side, in spite of a strong line held in sufficient -numbers, the moral position was weak. Botha, who commanded the Boer -right, distrusted Meyer, who was in charge of the threatened left. The -war-sick burghers skulked in their laagers, and it is said that even -necessary movements within the line were not ordered, from a fear lest -the burgher, when once on his feet, would march in the direction which -soonest took him out of his enemy's reach. To Botha, Buller's retirement -across the Tugela came as a gleam of hope. If it did not signify a -retreat, as he suggested to Joubert, it at least indicated that the -attack on the line of hills would not be immediately renewed. - -On February 26, the preparations for the fifth attempt to relieve -Ladysmith were completed. Horse, Field, Howitzer, Mountain, and Naval -Guns, to the number of nearly three score and ten, were in position on -the northern features of Hlangwhane, Naval Hill and Fuzzy Hill, and also -on Clump Hill, N.W. of Monte Cristo. The relieving force was arranged in -two commands; the troops west of the Langewacht Spruit being placed -under Lyttelton, the rest being assigned to Warren. On Hlangwhane was -Barton with the 6th Fusilier Brigade; and W. Kitchener, now in command -of the 11th Brigade, was also on the right bank. On the left bank near -Hart's Hill were Norcott and Hart with the 4th and 5th Brigades. Under -Lyttelton was the 2nd Brigade, the 10th Brigade, though in his section, -being placed under Warren's orders. - -On the previous day, a mounted brigade had been sent to the east to deal -with an expedition under Erasmus against the British lines of -communication south of Colenso. He led it timidly, and it was easily -checked, and the brigade was brought back to the river. - -Buller's scheme for the operations of February 27, was an attack on -Pieter's Hill by Barton, followed in succession by attacks on Railway -Hill by Kitchener, and on Hart's Hill by Norcott, supported by artillery -fire from the positions on the right bank. By the evening of February 26 -the troops for the main attack had recrossed the Tugela, and the pontoon -bridge west of Hlangwhane could now be removed. Early in the forenoon of -February 27, it was thrown over the river S.E. of Hart's Hill, where the -left bank afforded a covered way of approach to Pieter's Hill, and the -fourth and final member of the zigzag advance was traced, on this -occasion towards the north. For the seventh time Buller ferried the -Tugela with his men, who impelled alternately by the impulse of his -initiative and by the resilience of the enemy, had been tossed like a -tennis ball from bank to bank at Trickhardt's Drift, Vaalkrantz, and -Hlangwhane, yet whom nothing could dishearten. As they heard the news of -Cronje's surrender at Paardeberg, they were crossing the newly placed -pontoon bridge, and on it they set up a signpost bearing the legend "To -Ladysmith." - -Barton led the way across the bridge, then turning to the right, crept -down the left bank of the river for two miles, and mounted the slopes of -Pieter's Hill, when he became aware of the great strength of the Boer -position. It was hedged in by a river, a wooded donga, and a valley; -along its westward face ran a line of kopjes, ending in a detached rocky -hill; and it was supported by fire from Railway Hill. The nearer kopjes -were carried without much difficulty, but a sweeping movement to clear -the plateau as with the swing of a scythe, was checked by heavy fire -from the east, and failed to gather in the rocky hill which commanded -the outlying kopjes, and which the enemy succeeded in reinforcing during -the fight, and in holding for several hours. - -Until the development of the attack on Railway Hill by Kitchener, -Barton's Fusiliers were able to do little more than maintain themselves, -as their reserves had been absorbed and their ammunition was running -short. A final attempt was made, with partial success, at the close of -the day, to occupy the rocky hill, but at the cost of many casualties. -The enemy was not entirely expelled, but those who remained disappeared -during the night. - -Kitchener followed in Barton's track as far as the gorge which separates -Pieter's from Railway Hill. In spite of the Boer rifles and of the -shrapnel of the British gunners on the right bank playing upon the Hill, -whose attention was eventually drawn to the situation by the bold -advance of two companies to a position from which they could be seen and -recognized through the gunners' telescopes, the eastward edge of Railway -Hill was won. But a portion of Kitchener's command in rear was -magnetically attracted away from the direction of the advance by a -flanking fire from Hart's Hill and, by diverging towards it, broke the -continuity of the line facing the position entrenched by the Boers. -Kitchener was, however, able to fill the gap, and he expelled the -burghers, most of whom fled before the charge got home; and Railway Hill -was won. - -Norcott's Brigade was nearer to its objective than either of the -brigades which had preceded it, as it was lying south of Hart's Hill -between the railway and the river; and although deprived of a -considerable portion of his command by a demand for help which purported -to have come from Railway Hill, he finished his task in three hours. He -toiled up the dead ground to the apparent crest of Hart's Hill, and then -came face to face with the higher position, which three days before had -so cruelly baffled the Irish Brigade. But the Boers were not now in a -mood to stay. The shrapnel from the right bank, which they had not to -meet when Hart charged across from the crest in the failing light, was -now hailing on them. All but a few stalwarts took to flight, and Hart's -Hill was taken before sunset on February 27. - -The capture of the hills supervening on the bad news from Paardeberg -shattered the Boer Armies in Natal. Botha's left had been defeated; and -although his right had not been seriously attacked by Lyttelton, but -only prevented from effectively reinforcing the hill positions, it fell -away towards the north. He was not able to stay the general retreat, but -he hoped at least to join Joubert and cover it with the aid of the -besieging force. Joubert, however, had already raised the Siege and was -retreating towards Elandslaagte. - -Next morning Barton on Pieter's Hill vainly appealed for permission to -press forward, but Buller would only put the two mounted Brigades under -Dundonald and Burn-Murdoch on to the enemy's trail. Dundonald made for -Ladysmith, and Burn-Murdoch was instructed to act on the right front -towards Bulwana, but was soon called upon to assist Dundonald in driving -in a Boer rearguard. He then resumed his advance, and from the east -covered Dundonald, who being fired on from Bulwana thought it advisable -to send his Brigade to a safer position in rear, and having done so, -rode on at the head of a body of colonial troops, and as the sun was -setting on February 28, marched into Ladysmith and ended the four -months' Siege. It was a fitting exploit to be performed by the grandson -of that Lord Cochrane who at Aix Roads nearly a century before had -similarly chafed and strained at the leash of a superior officer's -reluctance.[30] Burn-Murdoch came into action with a rearguard covering -Bulwana, which was evacuated during the night. He bivouacked near the -Klip River, and next morning proposed to pursue the enemy, but Buller -whistled him to heel. The relieving force advanced with deliberation, -and on March 3, entered Ladysmith, and unravelled the Natal entanglement -which at one time seemed likely to wreck the South African Campaign. - -The flight of the Boers continued for three days. Ladysmith, which lay -directly in the line of the retreat, divided it into two streams, one of -which flowed towards the Drakensberg, while the other went in the -direction of Elandslaagte and Glencoe, some of the fugitives not -outspanning until they reached Newcastle. So great was the -demoralization that Kruger hurried down from Pretoria to Glencoe in the -hope of staying it. He succeeded in persuading the burghers to hold the -line of the Biggarsberg, but was almost immediately summoned away to the -arena in the west; and only a few hours after he was upbraiding the -fugitives from Ladysmith and the Tugela for their irresolution and want -of faith, the fugitives of the Modder were streaming past him at Poplar -Grove. - -Buller has been severely criticized for allowing the Boers to retreat -unpursued, taking with them all but two of their guns. Assuming however -that his appreciation of the situation was correct, he probably acted -wisely. He thought that his first duty was to put food into Ladysmith. -All his guns, except one Field Battery at Colenso and one Horse -Artillery Battery with Burn-Murdoch, as well as all his supply and -regimental transport, were still on the right bank of the Tugela, for -the crossing of which he had but one pontoon bridge. He therefore -decided that the wagons must have precedence, and that the army must -wait. - -He was misled by his recollections and by his experience of the Parthian -tactics of the burghers whom he commanded during the Zulu War of 1879, -and from whom he says he learnt "all that he knew" about rearguards. He -believed "that an attempt to force a Boer rearguard is merely a waste of -men." Yet only a week had passed since he told White that he thought -there was "only a rearguard" between him and Ladysmith. - -Thus in the glamour of an ancient rearguard reputation the enemy -disappeared. - -Notes: - -[Footnote 28: Not the Green Hill near Spion Kop. There were several -Green Hills on the left bank of the Tugela.] - -[Footnote 29: White, however, said that he saw no signs of a general -retreat.] - -[Footnote 30: The Cochrane daring and resourcefulness were not confined -to the men of the clan. During the Jacobite troubles Grizel Cochrane, -when her father was sentenced to death for treason, turned -highway-woman, and held up the coach which was bringing his death -warrant from London, and abstracted it from the mail-bag.] - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -Ladysmith at Bay - - -Eighty-seven years before the outbreak of the South African War, the -British Army was besieging the city of Badajoz, in Spain. When it was -taken by assault, a Spanish matron and her sister were molested and came -for protection to the British Camp, where they were received by Harry -Smith, a young Captain in the 95th Regiment, who when the Peninsular War -was over, married the girl fugitive, Juana Maria de los Dolores de Leon. - -After a distinguished military career in the East Indies and elsewhere, -Sir Harry Smith went out to South Africa in 1848 as Governor of the Cape -Colony, and its dependencies; and in that year he proclaimed the country -between the Orange and the Vaal to be British Territory. - -The Boers of the Great Trek resented the annexation, and one Pretorius -took the field, but was beaten on August 29 at the battle of Boomplatz -by Smith, who had under his command six companies of infantry and two -squadrons of cavalry; a force which strangely contrasts with the masses -of soldiery opposed to Pretorius' successors, Joubert, Botha, Cronje, De -Wet, and Delarey. - -Harrismith, in the Free State, was named after him; his services in the -Sikh War were commemorated by an Aliwal on the Orange; while upon a new -township in Natal, she who was once Donna Juana Maria de los Dolores de -Leon of Badajoz on the Guadiana, bestowed the commonplace designation -for which she had exchanged her retinue of tuneful Spanish, and it was -called Ladysmith. - -[Illustration: The siege of Ladysmith.] - -After fifty years of obscurity, Ladysmith suddenly became the pivot upon -which the fortunes of the British Empire were poised. Its loss, at least -during the early weeks of the siege, would not only have thrown a -British Army into captivity, but would have left an encouraged and very -mobile enemy, replenished with the spoils of war, free to march -irresistibly towards the sea. - -In November, Buller was prepared, if Ladysmith should fall, to abandon -the whole of Natal except Durban. He had private information that, if -the Boers reached the coast, a certain European power would intervene. -There was also the fear that another reverse would call out the -disaffected Dutch in the Cape Colony, and the danger lest the British -nation, treacherously harassed by the cries of the disaffected at home, -who sympathize with the misfortunes of every nation but their own, would -again write off South Africa as a bad debt, and offer peace on -ignominious terms. In India the news of the capture of White, a former -Commander in Chief, and of his removal as a prisoner of war, would have -seriously, if not fatally, impaired the British _raj_. - -At a later period, when the reinforcements had arrived and the plan of -campaign had been altered to suit the situation in Natal, the loss of -Ladysmith would not have so vitally affected the position in South -Africa; and, in fact, Buller on December 16, authorized White to -surrender. - -On November 1, the commanders of the allied forces, Joubert and A.P. -Cronje, decided to invest and bombard Ladysmith, confidently expecting -that the only obstacle in the way of the procession to the sea would -soon be removed by the fall of the intimidated town. They were even -urged by some of the subordinate leaders, who, as a rule, were never so -venturesome as when there was no immediate prospect of meeting the -enemy, to mask White and march at once upon Durban, but Joubert would -only sanction a minor effort in that direction which was postponed until -it was too late to be effective. - -The last man to leave Ladysmith was French. He was ordered to Capetown -to meet Buller, who was persuaded by his report on the situation that -White's force was insufficient to keep Natal from being overrun, and -that the worst might be feared. The escape of French, by a margin of a -few minutes only, made him available for employment in an arena more -suited to his capacity than a besieged town; and his subsequent good -work in the Cape Colony, south of the Orange River, and during the -advance on Kimberley and Bloemfontein, showed how ill the fortune of war -served the Boers, when they just failed to capture the train which was -taking out of their clutches the soldier who was to relieve Kimberley -and head off Cronje at Paardeberg before the relief of Ladysmith was -effected. - -White has been blamed for keeping the whole of his strong force of -cavalry in Ladysmith. He had with him four regiments of regular cavalry -besides five irregular colonial corps. For the space of three months the -action of the British Army was hampered by the absence of the mounted -troops interned in Ladysmith and engaged in garrison duties, until at -last the horses were either killed for food, or, when forage was -exhausted, turned out on the bare veld under the enemy's fire, to -support themselves as they could. White justified, or it may be, -excused, his retention of the cavalry, by its mobility, which virtually -increased the effective strength of the garrison, and enabled him to -reinforce rapidly any threatened section of the defence, as for example, -during the attack on Caesar's Camp. It is no doubt arguable that cavalry -was more useful within the lines of investment than it would have been, -if squandered over the whole area of the concurrent operations -elsewhere; and if so, the limits of its tactical employment have been -considerably extended.[31] - -White's force, which numbered about 13,000 men, occupied a perimeter of -fourteen miles on the hills and kopjes nearest to the town, and was -enveloped by an outer perimeter of thirty six miles held by 23,000 -Boers. The positions N.E. of the Klip River were occupied by the -Transvaalers, and the opposite semi-circle by the Free Staters. - -On November 2, began the bombardment, which the enemy fondly hoped would -bring White on his knees within a week; the first death casualty during -the siege being a naval officer who had reached Ladysmith only a few -hours before the investment with a re-inforcement of long-range naval -guns from the fleet; and during the next two days it was continued from -Pepworth, Bulwana, and elsewhere, with such effect as to induce White to -ask, at the instigation of the civilian authorities, permission to send -away the women, children, and other non-combatants. This somewhat -_naive_ request was naturally disallowed by Joubert, who, however, -consented to the formation of a neutral camp for them and the sick and -wounded at Intombi, within the area of the siege, and dependent for its -supplies and maintenance upon the resources of the garrison. Joubert put -into Ladysmith 200 derelict Indian coolies from the Natal collieries, an -act which was perhaps justified by the code of war, which sanctions the -employment of any means by which the difficulties of a besieged town can -be increased; but a subsequent attempt made by Schalk Burger during -Joubert's advance on the raid towards the south, to saddle White with -the Indian refugees from the Transvaal was successfully resisted. - -On November 9, the enemy was foiled in an attack on Observation Hill and -Wagon Hill which were not then held in force, and for eight weeks the -siege was carried on with so little vigour, and confronted with so much -skill, that the British casualties in killed and wounded during that -period numbered less than 250. When the Boers found that the walls of -Ladysmith did not at once fall to the sound of the artillery, they began -with equal confidence to rely upon the indirect casualties caused by -sickness and privation, and awaited the result without impatience in -their laagers. During the last fortnight of November a strong column -under Joubert was detached to raid into Southern Natal. It was prudently -but not enterprisingly led, did little harm, and returned with slight -loss. - -Meanwhile the enemy's artillery had been considerably re-inforced, and -the British gun ammunition was beginning to run short. The capture of a -large herd of cattle by the Boers, who neatly drew the animals away from -the town by exploding shells behind them, entailed a reduced meat -ration. In order to co-operate with the relieving force under Clery, who -at the end of November was within signalling distance, White exercised a -part of the garrison as a striking column, which, when the time came, he -proposed to take out under his own command, and to clear the line of -approach from the South. - -Three weeks after the abortive attack of November 9, Joubert returned -from his expedition to Estcourt. A council of war was held, and an -assault on the Platrand[32] was determined on for the 30th. On the -previous evening the commandos detailed as covering parties on the left -flank went into position on Rifleman's Ridge, and awaited the main -attack. Meanwhile much had happened in the laagers. The decisions of the -Boer Krijgsraad seem to have been subject to confirmation by a minor -convention composed of the subordinate officers. These took counsel -during the night, and resolved that "the plan was too dangerous to -attempt." When the covering parties opened fire at dawn there was no -assaulting column to cover. - -The activity during December was confined to the defence. On the night -of the 7th a raid on Gun Hill, an underfeature of Lombard's Kop, -silenced--at least in Natal--two heavy guns which were worrying the -garrison. By the rules of the game the pieces were injured beyond repair -by the gun-cotton charges which the sappers had fired in the breeches -and muzzles; but the heavier gun was removed to Pretoria, where it was -made serviceable. It was eventually sent to Kimberley, and its arrival -greatly alarmed the timid and irresolute diamond men, whose life was -easy and almost luxurious when compared with the privations which the -steadfast garrison of Ladysmith endured for four months. On the same -night Limit Hill, which the enemy seized a few days after the -investment, was recovered. - -A heavy gun was emplaced by the Boers to the front of the northward -section of the defence, on a hill in the angle between the Bell Spruit -and the railway to Harrismith. The approach to it was commanded by -Bell's Kopje and Thornhill's Kopje, but a Battalion of Rifles under -Metcalfe wriggled in between them at midnight on December 11, without -alarming the enemy, and almost reached the crest of the eminence which -was thereafter known as Surprise Hill, before the Boers opened fire. The -assaulters encircled the emplacement, but could not find the gun. In a -little time it was discovered outside the work, and disabled, but not -permanently. The Boers on the flanking kopjes were now on the alert; and -the battalion as it withdrew down the slope met in the darkness a small -but determined detachment which had formed up athwart the line of -retirement. The obstacle was rushed with the bayonet, and the expedition -returned to Ladysmith with a loss exceeding 12 per cent of its strength. - -The gun raids were almost the only offensive action taken by the defence -during the siege, and though successful as far as they went, they did -not greatly reduce the strength of the enemy's artillery and were not -continued. He had still more than a score of pieces with which he daily -bombarded the town; but no attempt to assault it by a moving force was -made for some weeks. His confidence in the final issue was unimpaired; -he had but to squat in his trenches worrying the garrison with shell -fire, and the inevitable surrender must come. - -His complacent view of the situation was manifested by his use of the -besieging force as a depot which was from time to time called upon to -furnish drafts for service elsewhere. Joubert's absence on the raid -towards the south did not sensibly diminish the retaining power of the -attack, and although the loss of several thousand Free State burghers -who were transferred to Cronje's command on the Modder or to Delarey's -at Colesberg was in part made up by a reinforcement of Transvaalers, the -force sitting round Ladysmith had to assist in the defence of the line -of the Tugela against Duller; yet, albeit weakened by that necessity, it -was still able without much effort to pin White down to the banks of the -Klip River. The inactivity of the garrison, as well as the daily -increasing hospital camp at Intombi under the shadow of Bulwana and the -mournful processions to the cemetery hard by, showed that sickness, the -waning physical and moral strength of those who were still on duty, and -the expenditure of stores, supplies, and ammunition, were slowly -impairing White's power of resistance; and that the numbers of the -besieging force, which later on Buller believed did not exceed 2,000 -men, could be safely reduced. - -The Boers believed that "their strength was to sit still," and they were -not far wrong. Early in the New Year, however, external pressure -emanating from Pretoria and Bloemfontein was brought to bear upon -Joubert, and he sanctioned another assault on the Platrand, which was -from the first considered to be the key to Ladysmith. It is a series of -plateaux, about two miles long and varying in breadth from half a mile -to a few hundred yards. Its chief features are Caesar's Camp and Wagon -Hill. A mile north of the centre of the position is Maiden's Castle. The -contours on Caesar's Camp and Wagon Hill are pinched in in three places -and divide the Platrand into four positions of unequal area, the -smallest being Wagon Point, an underfeature on the extreme right of -Wagon Hill. The latter is joined by a nek to Caesar's Camp, the plan of -which owing to the contraction of the contours somewhat resembles the -outline of a dumb-bell. The highest point of the position is a knoll on -Wagon Hill, and the front slopes southwards down to Bester's Valley and -Fourie's Spruit. On each flank were hills occupied by the enemy's -artillery. - -The strength of the assaulting column as detailed was composed of -approximately equal numbers of Free Staters and Transvaalers and -amounted to upwards of 4,000 burghers. To the former Wagon Hill was -assigned as their objective, to the latter Caesar's Camp, which was held -in greater strength. Early on the morning of January 6, the sentry of -the picket posted on the nek between Wagon Hill and Wagon Point, became -aware of movement on the slope and gave the alarm. Soon after, a party -of Engineers and Infantry preparing gun positions on Wagon Point in view -of a contemplated operation in support of Buller's expected advance by -way of Potgieter's Drift, were fired on at short range by a body of Free -Staters, who had succeeded in climbing to the nek, and who then -threatened a redoubt in the western shoulder of the knoll on Wagon Hill, -which commanded Wagon Point. The first rush was checked by the Natal -Volunteers, who opened with a Hotchkiss gun from the knoll at a range of -less than 100 yards, and threw the leading ranks of the enemy into -confusion. The working parties were thus given time to take up their -rifles, and to organize themselves more effectively for defence. - -A counter-attack was made from the adjacent post on the eastern -shoulder, but it failed to dislodge the enemy, a small party of whom -diverged towards their left, and circled round Wagon Point to the rear -of the position between Wagon Hill and Maiden's Castle. Here they -lighted upon the heavy gun at the foot of the northward slope for which -an emplacement had just been made on Wagon Point, and although the gun -was successfully defended by the escort, the insecurity of the Platrand -position was shown by the attempt. - -While the Free Staters were assaulting Wagon Hill and Wagon Point, the -Transvaalers obtained a footing on the edge of the Caesar's Camp -position; but their supports failed them. A considerable proportion of -the burghers detailed for the attack on Caesar's Camp, most of them -Transvaalers, again either refused, as on November 9, to take part in -it, or shirked during the advance. But at dawn, after a struggle in the -dark at such close quarters that the face of each combatant was often -for the first time revealed by the flash of his adversary's rifle, the -enemy had his finger on the key to Ladysmith; and was clinging, like -swallows on the eaves, to the whole length of the Platrand from Wagon -Point along a sinuous contour line which curved round the eastern -shoulder of Caesar's Camp, and awaiting the supporting bombardment -which, as soon as there was light enough for the alignment of the -sights, would be opened upon the position from the flanking guns on -Bulwana and Rifleman's Ridge, and from Middle Hill on the front. - -The normal garrison of the Platrand, which, since the attack on November -9 had been entirely included in the perimeter of the defence, numbered -not more than about 1,000 men, but it was under the command of Ian -Hamilton. - -When the firing began he was in his bivouac near Caesar's Camp. He -quickly collected what troops he could lay his hands on, and went to -Wagon Hill, where he found the situation so serious that he asked White -to re-inforce him. At daybreak the Boer artillery opened upon the -position, and it is probable that it would have been lost, but for the -action of two field batteries which, at a critical moment, came out of -Ladysmith and diverged so as to protect each flank. - -Already on the Wagon Point flank, the enemy had worked round and had -threatened the heavy gun, and on the other flank he was holding the -eastern shoulder of Caesar's Camp. Wagon Point was saved from a turning -movement by one battery, while the other, though itself under artillery -fire from Bulwana, opened on the Boers clinging on to the eastern -shoulder, and by checking the advance of their supports, caused them to -withdraw the hook with which they were grappling that flank. But more -than this the British guns could not do, and the Boers holding on to the -front crest could not be touched by shrapnel, and were maintaining -themselves against the defenders of Caesar's Camp; while a combat of -even greater intensity was being waged on Wagon Hill. - -Here an attempt made by a few companies of Highlanders to outflank the -Boer line on the crest by working round the shoulder of Wagon Point, had -failed, as the men were exposed to an irresistible fire as they turned -the corner. On Wagon Hill the enemy was holding on to the front of the -redoubt on the knoll and each attempt to dislodge him was unsuccessful. - -Towards noon there was a lull in the storm. After nine hours' fighting, -the combatants were face to face on the plateau and the advantage lay -apparently with the attacking Boers, who, in spite of the strong -re-inforcements which had been sent up by White, were still clinging to -the southern crest of Caesar's Camp, and who on their left had won a -footing close to the knoll on Wagon Hill, and were effectively checking -the details on Wagon Point. White having used up all the infantry which -he could safely spare from the other positions on the perimeter, now -sent the cavalry to the rescue. - -The pause in the fight, which seems to have been occasioned by the -exhaustion and discouragement of the enemy, and which, perforce, had to -be acquiesced in by the defence, led White to report to Buller soon -after noon, that the Boers had been beaten off for the time being, but -that a renewal of the attack was probable. It came at the moment when he -was sending the despatch from his Head Quarters on Convent Hill, and -when Ian Hamilton was preparing a counter-attack round the shoulder of -Wagon Point. A small body of Free Staters rushed the summit of Wagon -Point, and by their impact drove many of the defenders down the reverse -slope. But those who remained were resolute. After a hand to hand fight -between Boer commandants and British officers around the emplacement -which had been prepared for the heavy gun, the position was recovered -and a reinforcement of dismounted Hussars came up in time to secure it. - -On Wagon Hill also the struggle was renewed, and here also the defence -was strengthened by some dismounted cavalry which had been waiting in -support in rear of Caesar's Camp. It was evident that if the enemy were -not dislodged from Wagon Hill during daylight, he would be able to -establish himself irremovably after dark, when all the waverers would -come up under the protection of the night. At 3 in the afternoon White -reported to Buller that the attack had been renewed and that he was -"very hard pressed." He called the Devons to his aid from their post on -the northern section of the perimeter, and in a storm of rain and -thunder, themselves a resistless tempest, they cleared Wagon Hill with -magazine and bayonet. - -On Caesar's Camp the enemy had already wavered, and the crest was in -possession of the defence; and now all along the line from Wagon Point -to the eastern shoulder the Boers were scuttling down the slopes toward -the flooded dongas below under a hail of rifle fire. The battle, which -had begun soon after midnight, was continued until near sunset and -resulted in the discomfiture of the only serious attempt made by the -Boers to capture Ladysmith by offensive action. The success was due -primarily to the determination of an enfeebled garrison, which had -already undergone a siege of nine weeks; and secondarily to the tactical -mistakes of the enemy, who had allowed troops to concentrate upon the -Platrand which should have been contained and pinned to their posts at -other sections of the perimeter of defence. Not a few of the commandos -detailed for the assault on the Platrand flinched, yet it almost -succeeded; and if these had been distributed to positions elsewhere, -they would not have incurred great danger, and their presence would -probably have prevented the transfer of the Devons and of the mounted -troops to Wagon Hill at the critical moment. - -The battle casualties of January 6 outnumbered in the proportion of 6 to -4 the entire losses due to the acts of the enemy during the whole four -months' investment before and after that date. Twice Wagon Point was -occupied only by the wounded and the dead. Much of the fighting was -either hand to hand or at such short range that the effect of the bullet -could be almost read in the expression on the face of the stricken -opponent; now of anguish, despair, or hatred, now of a gentle sinking to -sleep after toil. The homely name of Wagon Hill, far away from the -fatherland under the southern sun, will abide for all time in the -chronicles of the deeds of the British private soldier. It was his own -battle, by which he saved Ladysmith. Next day a message from home -reached White. - -"Heartily congratulate you and all under your command for your brilliant -success. Greatly admire conduct of Devonshire Regiment." The Sender was -Queen Victoria. - -The failure of the attack on the Platrand deterred the Boers from -further attempts to break into Ladysmith, which was left like Paris -thirty years before to "stew in its own juice." An ingenious but -impracticable method of bringing the place to its senses by damming the -Klip River below the town in the hope of isolating it by flood was put -in hand, and some alarm was created, but the loyal stream refused to -rise. The garrison was too much weakened by disease and famine to be -able to assist effectively Buller's promised advance by way of -Potgieter's Drift, and in fact he never came near enough to Ladysmith to -make co-operation possible. A mobile column was for the second time -organized by White, but it is doubtful whether it could have taken the -field. - -Perhaps some poet of a future generation may follow the example of the -Homeric syndicate and select the Siege of Ladysmith as the theme of a -great Epic, romantically but unhistorically interwoven with the legend -of Juana Maria of Badajoz. On the Boer side the struggle was carried on -with much of the simplicity of Homeric times and the Siege of Troy. The -debates in the war councils; the doubts of the subordinate commanders; -the devices and stratagems, such as the attempt to dam the Klip River, -and the proposal to disguise an assaulting commando in the helmets and -accoutrements of the slain opponents; the abstinence of some of the -leaders from the fray; the single combats on Wagon Point; the democratic -organization of the Boer forces; the difficulty of keeping the burghers -to their duty when the attraction of a domestic and pastoral life -presented themselves in an alluring form; were not of these days nor -even of the Puritan period, but belonged to a remoter age when every man -was a soldier or a shepherd according to the exigences of the moment. -Many a Boer leader, like Ajax, defied the lightning--when it was not -playing directly upon him. Not one of them comes prominently into the -foreground in the great South African siege. - -De Wet's brief service in Natal came to an end before the investment, -and in the light of his exploits elsewhere, it is interesting to -speculate upon what might have happened if he had been in command of the -attack on January 6. In all probability it would have succeeded. The -Boers rarely failed when commanded by a resolute leader who knew his own -mind and was able to impose his own will upon them. In isolated -enterprises daringly conducted, they were usually efficient, and -sometimes irresistible, but like most primitive communities in which the -military instinct is individual rather than collective, they were -incapable of forming themselves into a coherent and unified Army for -action in mass. De Wet, in his _Three Years' War_, protests against the -British theory that the burghers were only fit to engage in _guerilla_, -which, possibly from ignorance of the meaning of the word, he seems to -regard as an unworthy term of reproach; but the theory was in reality a -grudging recognition of a suppressed factor in the problem of the war -which the professors had overlooked. His own exploits go far to prove -its soundness. - -Like mariners adrift upon the ocean in an open boat, their food and -their water dwindling hour by hour, who eagerly watch a white topsail or -a faint wreath of smoke which seems for a time to be approaching, yet -soon sinks beneath the horizon and leaves them alone upon the waste; the -garrison of Ladysmith was cruelly tantalized by Buller's fitful -appearances on the Tugela. Again and again the boom of his guns growing -clearer and clearer and his heliographs sparkling more distinctly -deluded the defenders with the hope that the day of their deliverance -was at hand. During the Spion Kop affair, the confidence was so great -that for a day or two full rations were issued. The summit could be seen -crowded with people on January 25 who surely must be Buller's men. Not -so; they were the Boers who, to their astonishment, had found the summit -unoccupied, and were burying the dead and collecting the wounded. The -roar of war died away; was heard again from Vaalkrantz, soon to sink -into silence on February 7, when Buller announced that the enemy was too -strong for him. It was renewed at Hlangwhane, Monte Cristo, and Pieter's -Hill, but former disappointments had made the garrison insensible to -hope and it fell upon apathetic ears. When at last Dundonald's little -band was seen approaching, the chilled and dazed soldiers of the -garrison could scarcely realize that they were saved. - -After January 6 the increasing sickness and the deficiency of food -became the chief facts of the Siege. More than three-score horses were -sacrificed daily to provide a meat ration for the garrison. The men -slaked their thirst with the turbid water of the Klip River, and munched -a makeshift biscuit made of Indian corn and starch. "Chevril" soup and -potted horse were luxuries. At Intombi nearly 2,000 sick and wounded -were lying without hospital diet or comforts. - -On January 27 the situation was so grave that White, when he heard from -Buller that the attempt on Spion Kop had failed, proposed as a last and -desperate resource, but one which, at least, would not involve the moral -effect of a surrender, to abandon Ladysmith, his sick and wounded, and -his heavy guns, and with about 7,000 men and 36 field guns to endeavour -to join Buller. Even if another Buller failure did not sooner doom the -garrison he could only hold out until the end of February. - -With this proposal Buller temporized and communicated it to Lord -Roberts, who sent an encouraging message to White, in which he asked the -garrison to accept his congratulations for its heroic defence and -expressed his regret at the delay of the relief and his hope that the -term would not be the limit of possible endurance; though he fully -expected that his own operations in the Free State would before its -expiration relieve the pressure on Ladysmith. Buller doubted Lord -Roberts' forecast and preferred to "play his hand alone," and nothing -came of the proposed break out of Ladysmith. White in his acknowledgment -of Lord Roberts' message said that by sacrificing most of his horses, he -could hold out for six weeks. - -There was good reason to believe that by this time the besieging force -numbered not more than 4,000 men, who, however, could be reinforced in a -few hours from the 16,000 burghers standing up to Buller on the Tugela. -The enfeebled garrison was, however, not in a condition to act against -the attenuated cordon from which a constant bombardment was maintained. -As the month of February wore on, the news of Lord Roberts' entry into -the Orange Free State infused more hope into the garrison than the too -familiar sound of Buller once more in action on the Tugela, and so -little was expected of Buller that the lull in the fire during the -Sunday armistice on February 25 was interpreted as another repulse; and -the rations which had been increased, when a message came that he would -be in Ladysmith on February 22--which he soon found was a too confident -expectation--were again reduced. The darkness before the dawn was very -black. The news of Paardeberg reached Ladysmith on the afternoon of the -27th; towards sunset next day Dundonald marched in. White endeavoured to -organize a column to pursue the commandos retreating before Buller, but -found that the toll of war had been paid so heavily by the Natal Field -Force that little more than the strength of one company in each -battalion was fit for service. - -Not the least of the trials undergone by the Ladysmith staff were the -heliograms from the Tugela and the constant surprises of the -_déchiffrage_. Sometimes pessimistic, sometimes the reverse and -frequently trivial, there was scarcely an occasion on which they were -helpful. The troubles of the relieving force figured largely in them. - -The sequel to the Colenso disaster was a suggestion that White after -burning his ciphers[33]--a precaution which he naturally would take--and -firing away his ammunition, should negotiate with the enemy for the -surrender of the town. To this White made the manly and dignified reply -that there was no thought of surrender; and to his own men he issued a -soldier-like order of the day, in which he told them that they must not -expect relief as early as had been anticipated, and expressed his -confidence that the defence would be continued in the same spirited -manner in which it had hitherto been conducted; and dutifully he applied -himself to his task. - -A few days later he was bidden by Buller to "boil all his water." From -Potgieter's Drift, Buller heliographed that "somehow he thought he was -going to be successful this time"; that it was "quite pleasant to see -how keen the men were"; that he hoped to be "knocking at Lancer's Hill" -in six days' time; but after Spion Kop it was, "we had awful luck on the -25th." - -Notes: - -[Footnote 31: As the officer in command of the Naval Brigade neatly put -it: "the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The cavalry soldiers did -excellent service in the lines--and we ate their horses."] - -[Footnote 32: The Boer name for Caesar's Camp--Wagon Hill Position.] - -[Footnote 33: This instruction was not included in the original -heliogram, but was annexed to it as an afterthought in a supplementary -message.] - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -Deus ex Machina, No. II - - -On January 10, 1900, Lord Roberts reached Capetown in the _Dunottar -Castle_, the ship which ten weeks previously had brought Buller to South -Africa, and resumed the task which he was not allowed to finish in 1881. -The terms of peace imposed upon the British Government by the Boers -after Majuba Hill resulted in an armistice of eighteen years, and he was -still the soldier to whom the nation instinctively turned when it was -again in trouble in South Africa. - -With one unimportant exception all his war experience had been gained in -India or near its frontiers; but India is a spacious arena where -spacious ideas can be freely developed. His mind had not been scored -into grooves by years of desk duties in Pall Mall, or subjected to the -necessity of accommodating itself to obsolete methods and House of -Commons' views. The Indian Army, of which he obtained the command after -serving in it in each commissioned rank, more closely approaches in its -training, organization, and readiness for active service, the military -standard set up by the chief continental nations, than the British Army; -of which a distinguished German officer said at the time of the Boer War -that it was meant for detachment warfare only and not to win great -battles. - -With Lord Roberts came, as Chief of the Staff, Lord Kitchener of -Khartoum, a hard and ready man who for fifteen years had been scouring -the Nile. All his war service had been in Egypt, where recently he had -not only smashed the dervishes and secured the Soudan, but by his -diplomatic tact in the Fashoda affair had relaxed the tension of a -dangerous international situation. He belonged to the Royal Engineers, -who are, like the Army Service Corps, a semi-combatant body engaged in -technical duties that do not offer much opportunity of gaining -experience in the art of war or of practice in handling troops, but who -have, nevertheless, given to the nation not a few soldiers of -distinction. It was, perhaps, for this reason that Lord Roberts -generally employed Lord Kitchener as an expert military foreman, -entrusted with the supervision of the work of others. - -The situation in South Africa at the time of Lord Roberts' arrival was -as follows:-- - -Methuen was established at Modder River; Mafeking and Kimberley were -holding out, and the latter at least seemed to be in no immediate -danger; French was in a good position before Colesberg; Gatacre was -maintaining himself without difficulty at Sterkstroom; the garrison at -Ladysmith, after sixteen hours' fighting, had recently warded off a -determined attack; the disaffected districts in the Cape Colony had not -risen; and the despondent Buller, quickened by reinforcements and -stimulated by the approach of the _Dunottar Castle_, was about to make -another attempt to relieve Ladysmith. - -Schemes for a South African campaign had been for some time under -consideration by the War Office, but as the attitude of the Free State -could not be forecasted, they were more or less provisional. As late as -the end of September the Premier and the War Minister scouted the idea -of war with the Free State, and the official plan of a central advance -on Bloemfontein by way of Bethulie and Norval's Pont, which held good -until some little time after Lord Roberts' arrival, must therefore have -been subterraneously drawn up without their knowledge. It was no doubt -an excellent solution of a strategical problem studied by men in an -office with a map of South Africa before them which showed several lines -of communication converging on the Orange River; and Buller was about to -carry it out when he was called aside to Natal. - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 260.] - -Lord Roberts had, however, two years before drawn up a scheme for an -advance on the Transvaal by way of the Kimberley line as far as Mafeking -and thence across country to Pretoria, and before leaving England he -modified it so as to adapt it to action in the Free State. He proposed -to leave the Kimberley line at some point between the Orange River and -the Modder River, and to march in a S.E. direction on the Bloemfontein -line. He was a firm believer in the indirect results of military -movements, and he expected that his arrival at Springfontein or Edenburg -and the menace to the Free State capital "must draw the Free Staters -back from Kimberley and Natal," and that the occupation of it "would -render the Boer positions south of the Orange River untenable." The -official plan of an advance from the centre would force back the Free -Staters engaged in the Cape Colony, and instead of isolating them would -enable them to reinforce Cronje. - -After his arrival at Capetown, circumstances however compelled Lord -Roberts to modify his plan of campaign. The news of the Spion Kop -affair, anxiety on account of Kimberley, the presence of Cronje at -Magersfontein and other considerations, determined him to march through -the Free State by a more northerly route which would enable him to -relieve Kimberley _en passant_ and to give battle to Cronje. - -The secret of the plan, which was known only to Lord Roberts' personal -staff, was well kept, and operations were continued without reference to -it. The earlier orders issued by him seemed to indicate that the central -advance was still to be carried out. The VIth Division under Kelly-Kenny -was sent to Naauwpoort; French was instructed to make a demonstration -against Norval's Pont; and Methuen was warned that it might be necessary -to withdraw part of the Modder River force. - -The Boers, who had captured at Dundee some intelligence papers which -disclosed the original plan of campaign, were now more than ever -convinced that the British Army must advance by way of Norval's Pont and -Bethulie, and did not discover their error until it was too late to -rectify it.[34] When Lord Roberts had made all his preparations, which -involved the entire reorganization of the transport, and the raising of -a considerable force of mounted troops, for his march of 100 miles -across the veld eastward from the railway, the secret was disclosed to -Kelly-Kenny and French on February 1. This plan of a flank march had -also suggested itself to Buller, who proposed it in a memorandum which -Lord Roberts found on his arrival in Capetown; but as Buller's scheme -included the construction of a railway across the veld, and limited the -advance of the Army to the rate at which the line could be pushed -forward, it did not fall in with Lord Roberts' ideas. - -Meanwhile Cronje was not perturbed by the reports of troops coming up -the Western line, and was confident that they only indicated a renewed -but isolated attack on Magersfontein. He had no doubt that if necessary -he could always fall back upon Kimberley and retreat towards the -Transvaal; and the demonstrations made by Methuen westwards in the -direction of Koedoesberg Drift served the double purpose of warning a -disaffected region and of diverting Cronje's attention from the flank on -which he was to be attacked and which he believed to be secure. - -The two months following the arrival of Lord Roberts in South Africa -were the only brilliant period of a dreary war which lasted nearly three -years, and will perhaps save it from being quoted in military history as -the most sluggish campaign of recent times. In each of the two objects -of strategy, namely to avoid fighting the enemy on ground of his own -choosing, and to compel him to fight under unfavourable conditions, Lord -Roberts was extraordinarily successful. There was a light touch, an -ingenuity, in his swift and silent strategy which contrasted strongly -with the heavy and dull methods which had hitherto controlled the -action. While Buller was talking about his tedious railway across the -veld, and Milner at Capetown was dismalling the situation and -discouraging the advance, Lord Roberts had in effect entered the capital -of the Free State and seemed to have completed half his task. The Boers -were hypnotized and deceived not only by signs from which they drew -wrong inferences, but also by bogus orders which it was arranged should -come under their notice and which were simultaneously cancelled in -cipher: and when too late they awoke from the bewilderment, they began -to scuttle to and fro like rabbits in a warren. There is good reason to -believe that if the strategic ability of Lord Roberts could have been -united in one mind to the determination of Lord Kitchener the war would -have been over in a year. - -On February 8 Lord Roberts arrived at Modder River, where he found bad -news awaiting him. Buller had failed at Vaalkrantz, and the diamond men -of Kimberley were threatening to capitulate. By February 13 30,000 -combatants, some of whom in order to preserve the illusion had been kept -in the centre until the last moment, were in readiness at various points -between the Orange and the Modder. The immediate problem before Lord -Roberts was the relief of Kimberley in combination with the cornering of -Cronje. In the background was the Natal trouble. Buller was again -helplessly wringing his hands and reaching round to find excuses for his -misadventures. Lord Roberts wisely left him alone and went on with his -own work. He saw what Buller refused to see, that the Tugela could be -crossed at Magersfontein and Ladysmith relieved at a drift of the Modder -River. - -[Illustration: Sketch map of the Riet and Modder Drifts.] - -On February 11 Lord Roberts set his army in motion; and the operations -of the next few days may be summarised with sufficient accuracy as a -cavalry raid northwards, but avoiding Cronje's left flank at Brown's -Drift, to relieve Kimberley; combined with an infantry advance to cut -him off. It was not possible to make the initial movements in the -direction of the eventual advance, as the Magersfontein-Brown's Drift -quadrant N.E. of Modder River was strongly held by the enemy, and -disallowed a cavalry advance from below the junction of the Riet and the -Modder in the direction of Kimberley except by a westerly detour which -could not be accommodated to the general scheme. In order to strike the -practicable drifts on the two rivers above their confluence, it was -necessary for the advance to be made along the curve of a parabola which -issued from Modder River Station in a S.E. direction, and in a -sixty-mile circuit crossed the rivers and finally approached Kimberley, -only twenty miles distant from the starting point, almost in the -opposite direction. - -At midday on February 11 the Cavalry Division under French reached -Ramdam, a farm east of Graspan and fronting the drifts of the Riet, -where the Army was being concentrated for the advance. Some hours -elapsed before Cronje became aware that French had trekked away to the -S.E., and to his slow and sullen spirit the movement did not appear to -have much significance. He was persuaded that the British never trusted -themselves much more than a day's march away from a railway. It was only -a demonstration, a reconnaissance. He did, however, take certain -precautions which, if they had been devised with a true appreciation of -the situation and intelligently carried out, might have seriously -checked French. - -He assumed that the initial direction of French's march would be -continued indefinitely towards Koffyfontein, possibly even that it was a -retirement from the Modder River position caused by bad news from the -centre, and he sent a commando of observation, under C. de Wet, up the -right bank of the Riet. The most adroit and skilful movement of the war -had now begun without Cronje's comprehending its object. - -But French did not complete his first day's work very auspiciously. His -supply column was far behind when he reached Ramdam, and owing to a -misunderstanding Hannay's Brigade of Mounted Infantry from Orange River, -which was instructed to join him, did not turn up: conflicting orders -had resulted as usual, _ordre_, _contr'ordre_, _désordre_. French, -however, felt himself strong enough to continue his march without -Hannay, who, on his delayed march to Ramdam, engaged a detached body of -Boers and thereby strengthened the enemy's conviction that Koffyfontein -was the objective. - -As French approached the river, Waterval Drift, the lower of the two -drifts across the Riet, was found to be occupied by De Wet, and the -Division was diverted to De Kiel's Drift, which was reached without much -difficulty at midday, February 12. On the right bank were the commando -of the Jacobsdaal garrison under Lubbe, and the commando under De Wet -and A.P.J. Cronje which had been sent to observe the cavalry movement; -about 1,000 men in all. But De Wet could not get the Koffyfontein idea -out of his head, and its influence removed many obstructions from the -path of the advance. He boldly rode across French's front at De Kiel's -Drift, and made S.E. for Winterhoek, closely followed by A.P.J. Cronje; -and all French's horses could not find out where they had gone. Next day -it was given out in Divisional Orders that the commandos had gone to the -Modder River, and four weeks passed by before the Army ceased to suffer -from the error. - -There was still "one more river to cross" before the diamond men of -Kimberley could be relieved; and ere the thirst of the South African -summer could be slaked on the banks of the Modder, a tract of -twenty-five miles of veld, in which the absence of any homestead having -"_fontein_" for its suffix declared the scarcity of water, must be -traversed under the sun. - -In the forenoon of February 13 the Cavalry Division started northwards -from De Kiel's Drift; and at last De Wet, who, unknown to French, was -watching the trek from its right flank, partially relieved himself of -the Koffyfontein idea. The effort weakened him, and he displayed none of -that readiness of resource and promptitude of action with which he -subsequently worried the British Army for the space of two years. He -withdrew his own commando towards Koffyfontein, and having ordered Lubbe -to follow French, reported to Cronje at Magersfontein that the cavalry -was making for the Modder. - -French's objective points were now Rondeval and Klip River Drifts on the -Modder, but in order to deceive Lubbe, who was hanging on to his right -flank, and to elbow him away from the drifts, French changed direction -with two brigades and headed for Klip Kraal Drift, some eight miles -above Klip Drift, reverting suddenly to his original line as soon as the -river came in sight. The drifts were held by small parties of the enemy, -who offered no resistance, and on the evening of February 13 the -Division took possession of the kopjes on the north bank. - -The occupation of the drifts was soon made known to Cronje, but the news -revealed little to his dull and uninstructed nature, permeated with the -idea that a British force and a railway were indissoluble entities. -Though his communications eastward were now seriously threatened, it did -not occur to him that there might be an alternative to fighting him out -of Magersfontein, namely manoeuvring him out of it; and he persuaded -himself that French's movement was a trap to entice him away pending an -attack on Magersfontein from the south, and he was probably unaware that -the relief of Kimberley was an urgent matter. He moved his own camp from -Brown's Drift to a less exposed position at Bosjespan, and while -retaining his hold on Magersfontein with his main body, sent out two -commandos to watch French, and these accidentally occupied a line -through which the cavalry must pass on its way to Kimberley. - -The arrival of the VIth Division on the morning of February 15 set -French free to resume his march on Kimberley. The two commandos had on -the previous day joined hands with Lubbe, who, after he was pushed out -of French's way, crossed the Modder at Klip Kraal Drift and worked round -to a position north of Klip Drift. The relieving force was now -obstructed in the line of its advance by ridges on its right and left -fronts and by the nek connecting them, all occupied by the enemy; while -on its left flank was Cronje's new camp at Bosjespan, of the existence -of which it was unaware. The situation seemed awkward, as the only way -out of it was the shallow valley leading up to the nek, and exposed to a -converging fire from the ridges on which two guns were posted. - -But French was not long in doubt, and like a bridge player who in order -to win the game is sometimes compelled to assume the position of certain -cards, with rare intuition correctly assumed that the nek was weakly -held. Like a ship going down the ways to the water, the Division was -launched to the front; cleaving the opposing waves and gaining momentum -as it advanced, then righting itself, rose to the slope of the nek and -carried it with resistless energy. - -After a short midday halt at Abon's Dam, French raised the siege of -Kimberley before sunset; the besiegers under Ferreira did not wait to be -attacked, but withdrew towards Boshof. - -The relief of Kimberley was perhaps the most brilliant feat of arms in -the campaign. It was well-conceived and, considered by itself alone, -well carried out, but the merit of it has been obscured by the fact that -it cost less than half a hundred human casualties. When, on the morning -of February 15, the VIth Division took over the outposts, and the -Cavalry Division fell in on the banks of the Modder, there was the -terrain of a Balaklava charge before it. - -It may well be doubted whether the price paid for the relief of the -diamond men was not too high. Uninstructed public opinion at home called -for the movement, and forced Lord Roberts' hand, but it was never an -imperative military necessity. The horse casualties,[35] due to want of -water, forced marches, and ignorance of horsemastership on the part of -all ranks, who were inclined to regard cavalry work in the light of a -steeplechase, were so heavy that when on February 17 French, after an -attempt on the previous day to pursue a body of retreating Boers with -his exhausted horses, was suddenly called upon to march thirty miles to -head off Cronje, he could in all his Division mount less than the -strength of two regiments. Nor was this all, for the rush to Kimberley -was the indirect cause of the loss of the supply column at Waterval -Drift on February 15; and thus in a few hours the mounted force and the -supply column and transport which Lord Roberts and his staff had -assembled with so much difficulty were, the former partially and the -latter entirely, sacrificed. - -The VIth, VIIth, and IXth Infantry Divisions, under Kelly-Kenny, Tucker, -and Colvile respectively, were withdrawn from Modder River and the -stations south of it, and concentrated at Ramdam on February 11 and the -two following days. Owing to the steepness of its banks the Riet River -could only be crossed at Waterval and De Kiel's Drifts, and on these the -Army converged, and trickled through them like the sands in the neck of -an hour-glass. Men, horses, guns, supply and ammunition wagons were -slowly and painfully transferred to the right bank, and the VIth -Division, which followed the cavalry to De Kiel's Drift, though the -first infantry to get through by more than twenty-four hours, was -delayed by the block of transport and lost its start in the race to the -Modder River. - -Meanwhile to Waterval Drift came Kelly-Kenny and Colvile in succession, -and were soon pushed on to Wegdraai Drift, to which Tucker also hastened -as soon as he could shake himself clear of De Kiel's Drift. The latter -was now out of the running, for although Kelly-Kenny had already had a -nine hours' march from Waterval Drift beginning soon after midnight, by -5 in the afternoon of February 14 the VIth Division was ready to resume -its march to support French at Klip Drift, some hours before Tucker came -in. Kitchener had been ordered by Lord Roberts to attach himself to the -VIth Division as assessor to Kelly-Kenny, and marched out with it. - -When Colvile, whose division was detailed as a reserve, arrived at -Waterval Drift, he found the passage congested by transport of all -kinds; and although after half a day's delay he was able to proceed to -Wegdraai Drift, a large convoy on which the Army depended for the -greater part of its supplies for the march to Bloemfontein, had to be -left behind. A small escort remained with it, the wagons were laagered, -and the oxen outspanned and sent out upon the veld to graze. No danger -was anticipated. - -De Wet had not been lurking on the banks of the Riet for nothing. -Hitherto he had not greatly distinguished himself. On the outbreak of -the war he and his three sons were commandeered as private burghers, and -when he reached the Natal border he was appointed vice-commandant. He -served under A.P. Cronje and witnessed Carleton's surrender at -Nicholson's Nek. In December he joined P. Cronje at Magersfontein, and -was sent early in February to Koedoesberg Drift to check the British -demonstrations on the Riet below Modder River Station, and later on to -observe French. It is probable that the military deficiencies of his -leaders made him sullen. Erasmus at Dundee stood idly in the background -while Symons and Yule were on the slopes of Talana Hill, and Cronje was -deaf to his remonstrances against a mere passive defence on the Modder -River and the presence of women and children in the laager. - -But De Wet with a free hand quickly recovered himself when the fortune -of war threw him a casual chance after French had despatched him in -imagination to a destination where he could do no harm. The convoy was -ordered to follow Colvile to Wegdraai at 5 p.m. on February 15, and at 8 -that morning, while the oxen were still grazing on the veld, De Wet, who -was hovering near Winterhoek, swooped down upon the laager. The slender -escort made a good resistance and the attack was reported to Lord -Roberts at Wegdraai, who at first sent back a battalion with a battery -and some mounted infantry, and when these were found insufficient the -rest of the 14th Brigade were despatched under Tucker to endeavour to -extricate the convoy. But when Tucker reached the Drift at sunset he -found himself unable to bring it away. Most of the oxen had disappeared -and De Wet had been reinforced. Lord Roberts was unwilling to delay his -advance, and finding that the supplies were not absolutely indispensable -to the success of his march, at midnight ordered Tucker to abandon the -convoy and to return to Wegdraai. Next morning De Wet took possession of -176 wagon loads of supplies and 500 slaughter oxen--his first exploit in -the war. - -On February 16 Lord Roberts moved his Head Quarters to Jacobsdaal. It -was his intention to advance on Kimberley and to make that town the base -of his operations in the direction of Bloemfontein, when suddenly his -plans were disarranged by an unexpected event. Cronje, who for two -months had held stubbornly to Magersfontein, was reported to be trekking -to the east. French's relief of Kimberley, the presence of an infantry -division at Klip Drift, and the occupation of Jacobsdaal, were facts -which even his obstinacy could not disregard. Like a wild creature -startled in the night by a veld fire and suddenly dazzled by the glare, -he rushed blindly towards the flames which were soon to consume him. -Almost any direction but that which he took, the line of the Modder -River, would have given him a better chance of escape. French's maimed -cavalry could not have stopped him if he had retreated on either side of -Kimberley, and even a withdrawal westward down the right bank of the -Riet would have probably saved him. Methuen at Modder River took twelve -hours to discover that Magersfontein had been abandoned at midnight on -February 15. - -On the morning of the 16th Kelly-Kenny sent out from Klip Drift a force -under C. Knox to cover the advance of the rest of the VIth Division on -Kimberley. Soon a long column of dust was observed in the distance -beyond the ridge on the right, and a closer examination showed that it -was caused by Cronje's wagons. The discovery came not altogether as a -surprise, for Boers had been noticed crossing the front on the previous -day, and as what was now seen proved to be the rear of a column, the -trek must have been some hours in progress. - -Kelly-Kenny at once abandoned his march on Kimberley and faced -eastwards. It was found that the enemy had taken up a rearguard position -on the southern end of the ridge. The northern end was soon seized by -mounted infantry, but an attempt in interpose between the river and the -Boer position failed. The ridge was cleared at 9 a.m. by a frontal -attack, but not before Cronje's convoy had retired without molestation -to Klip Kraal, where a second rearguard position was taken up on either -side of Klip Kraal Drift. - -On the assumption that Cronje was endeavouring to effect a retreat on -Bloemfontein, it was necessary to confine him to the right bank of the -Modder. He was already in possession of Klip Kraal Drift, and although -he could hardly hope to pass his wagons across it in sight of an active -enemy, it was not his only chance. Within ten miles of his laager were -Brandvallei, Paardeberg, and Vendutie Drifts, each of which would give -him access to the southern bank. - -The task before the pursuing army was therefore to drive in his -rearguards from their successive positions and prevent him getting -comfortably away to secure a passage across the river. At nightfall on -February 16 it seemed likely that he would succeed. His convoy in the -main laager at Klip Kraal had had twelve hours' rest, and his rearguard -had maintained itself on the second position; in spite of a frontal -attack on the right bank, and of a flank attack on the left bank made by -a battery and a force of mounted infantry which had crossed the -semicircle formed by a northward bend of the river between Klip Drift -and Klip Kraal Drift. The guns even succeeded in throwing a few shells -into the laager, but ran short of ammunition. Kitchener, who remained -with Kelly-Kenny as military assessor, had early in the day advocated a -raid up the river in order to head off Cronje at Paardeberg Drift, but -the exhaustion of the troops prevented the enterprise. - -Next day the chase began in earnest--to borrow for the occasion, as was -done so frequently during the war, a metaphor from the sporting -world--but only a few of the hounds were on the spot, and the rest of -the pack were at Kimberley and Jacobsdaal. - -When the report of Cronje's retreat from Magersfontein, which Lord -Roberts received soon after he reached Jacobsdaal, was confirmed by a -message from Kitchener, he ordered French, who at that time was engaged -with the enemy some miles north of Kimberley and endeavouring to capture -the Long Tom whose recent arrival from Ladysmith _viâ_ Pretoria had -scared the Kimberley civilians into a threat of surrender, to hurry -eastward and endeavour to place himself between Cronje and Bloemfontein; -but owing to a break in the field telegraph cable the message was -delayed. Kelly-Kenny was at the same time instructed to carry on the -pursuit. - -But the situation had not yet clearly disclosed itself, and Lord Roberts -did not abandon his intention of sending Colvile's and Tucker's -Divisions towards Kimberley; and their orders to march on the lower -drifts of the Modder held good. Cronje's retreat in an unexpected -direction was hard to explain. Was he going to meet the reinforcements -which Buller had just reported were on their way from Natal? De Wet had -just shown that there was a vigorous and enterprising body of the enemy -ready to raid the railway south of Kimberley, and it was possible that -he might have been reinforced from Colesberg. - -Towards evening, however, a second message came from Kitchener at Klip -Drift. He summarised the situation on the Modder, which he was unable to -control with the troops at his disposal, and said that he was asking -French to proceed to Koodoos Drift to check Cronje from the east. Lord -Roberts was not the man to adhere stolidly to his own plan when a better -one was laid before him. The orders to the Divisions were cancelled, and -before midnight on February 16 Colvile was marching out to join -Kelly-Kenny in the chase. Tucker, whose Division had hardly recovered -from the Waterval Drift affair, remained at Jacobsdaal. - -After sunset Cronje broke up his camp at Klip Kraal Drift and trekked -along the right bank. At midnight he passed half of his transport over -to the left bank at Paardeberg Drift, himself going on to Vendutie -Drift, where the remainder, with the women and children against whose -presence in camp De Wet had vainly protested, joined him next morning. - -So far he had done well, and even when his rearguard at Paardeberg was -fired on by an advanced brigade of mounted infantry which had been -pushed on by Kitchener, he did not lose confidence; although he was -surprised that the British, "who could not march," had overtaken him. - -To De Wet and especially to Ferreira, whom he knew to be not far off, he -looked for help, and even without them he believed that he would be able -to cross Vendutie Drift. - -Ferreira was indeed not far off, but an obstacle suddenly sprang up -between him and Cronje, and the aspect of it was so alarming that he -withdrew in the opposite direction. The obstacle was French's attenuated -Cavalry Division which, in obedience to Kitchener's summons, had left -Kimberley before sunrise that morning, and after a march of twenty-six -miles had reached the spot indicated by Kitchener for the heading of -Cronje. As the Boer wagons were about to cross Vendutie Drift the shells -of French's Horse Artillery began to fall upon them. The convoy was -thrown into confusion, the oxen stampeded, Cronje was entangled and -bewildered, and but for the gallant exertions of some foreign officers -in the service of the Boers a fatal panic might have ensued. The advance -guard under De Beer was reinforced from the main laager, and a -demonstration made against the left flank of the cavalry; and although -French held on, his position remained insecure and even precarious until -the arrival of the infantry on the following morning. With a handful of -tired, hungry, and unsupported horsemen he not only frightened Ferreira, -whose force outnumbered his own, off the field, but also paralysed and -prepared for destruction the army which had beaten Methuen and had held -Magersfontein for two months. - -[Illustration: Paardeberg.] - -Next day, February 18, at 3 a.m. began the ten days' operations to which -the name of the Battle of Paardeberg has been somewhat inaccurately -given. Paardeberg is a prominent hill on the right bank of the Modder, -four miles W.S.W. of the battle centre, Cronje's laager at Vendutie -Drift, and lies on the extreme edge of the elliptical arena on which the -battle was fought. It seems to have been chosen as the official word -because the hill was the only distinctive physical feature shown on the -banks of the river in the incomplete surveys of the time, and because -the alternative would have been Stinkfontein, a farm near the field of -battle. The Battle of Vendutie Drift would have been a more correct -term. - -The Modder forms the major axis of the ellipse, which it enters near -Koodoos Drift and leaves at Paardeberg Drift, and like most South -African rivers runs in a deep channel between banks intersected by the -tributary dongas which the rains have scored in the soft soil, and which -afford almost the only shelter from artillery fire. The whole area is -commanded by the surrounding kopjes and ridges. - -Cronje, though urged to break out of his laager on the night of February -17, refused to move. It is probable that he might have effected his -escape if he had abandoned his transport. An active force led by a -determined man could have wriggled out under cover of the night, and -joined one or other of the commandos which were known to be hovering. -Cronje was in communication with Ferreira; he had sent to Bloemfontein -for help; and De Wet was known to be on his way from Koffyfontein. But -instead of making an effort to save himself he fatally trusted to relief -from outside. He did not realize that Vendutie Drift was not a -Magersfontein which he could hold indefinitely, or that during the last -few weeks the British Army had been greatly increased. One result of his -obstinacy was the desertion of several hundred Free Staters, who had not -served very willingly under the leadership of a Transvaaler. Most of -them returned to their homes. - -In the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, who was detained at Jacobsdaal -by illness, Kelly-Kenny was the senior officer present with the force on -the Modder River; but for some reason which may have formed itself in -Lord Roberts' mind when they were fellow-passengers on the _Dunottar -Castle_, he was not entrusted with the management of the battle. -Kitchener had marched several hours with the VIth Division on February -14 before Kelly-Kenny was aware of his presence; and as Chief of the -Staff in direct communication with Head Quarters, he had much to say at -Klip Drift. At Paardeberg the status of Kelly-Kenny became still more -anomalous, Kitchener, though junior not only to him but also to two -other generals present, being empowered by Lord Roberts to issue orders -in his name so that there might be "no delay such as references to and -fro would entail." The difficulty of the situation was increased by the -fact that Kitchener was practically without a staff. - -The reason which induced Cronje to remain in his laager, namely the -expected arrival of help from outside, also determined Kitchener to -attack it without delay. He confidently expected to carry it in less -than four hours, but Cronje held out for nine days. - -Kitchener's plan might have been foreseen by any officer who had been -present at manoeuvres: a preliminary bombardment of the laager, followed -by a holding frontal attack, in combination with rolling-up flank -attacks. The strength of Cronje's position was supposed to be the laager -itself, whereas it was rather the river banks and tributary dongas which -he had occupied. - -The frontal display was assigned to a portion of the VIth Division; the -Mounted Infantry under Hannay supported by an infantry brigade were to -work round upstream and fall upon Cronje's left flank; while the IXth -Division attacked his right flank from the west. - -Kitchener, who had come on with Hannay in advance of the VIth Division, -began to issue his orders before he had seen the commanding officers of -the troops which were to carry them out. Hannay, who was at hand, was -despatched to his place in the east from which he never returned. -Kelly-Kenny's ambiguous and humiliating position; Kitchener's impatience -and impetuosity; his lack of a staff to carry out his plan; his omission -to explain it to the divisional and brigade commanders; and his habit of -"short-circuiting" orders to subordinates while their superior officers -stood passively in the background, made unity of action impossible and -February 18 a day of misunderstanding and ill-success. The battle was -fought by a Board of Directors, who, in the unavoidable absence of their -Chairman, were dominated by a headstrong General Manager, who was -doubtful of their capacity to carry on the business. - -Kelly-Kenny and Colvile, whose Divisions came in during the night, had -begun to put their troops in motion before Kitchener's plan was made -known to them, and throughout the day the difficulty of co-ordinating -the whole force to it was increased by the incorrect transmission or -apprehension of oral orders. Kelly-Kenny proposed a preliminary -investment of Cronje, but Kitchener would not consent to any -postponement of his attack, for which no operation orders were issued. -In a few hours, however, the soundness of Kelly-Kenny's judgment was -shown; the attack became an investment, which was prolonged many days by -the moral and physical exhaustion of the troops, who after forced -marches by day and night on scanty rations were hustled without method -into a costly battle. - -By 8 a.m. Kitchener was able to report to Head Quarters that Cronje was -hemmed in. The cavalry had occupied the ground in rear of the laager, -and he "thought that it must be a case of complete surrender." The -troops were now set to the assault, and were quickened by an encouraging -message from Lord Roberts. But they were almost immediately in trouble. -Hannay had placed himself into position for the flank attack from the -east, and his battery had already opened fire on the laager, when the -guns themselves were shelled. A commando with two guns, under Steyn of -Bethlehem, had arrived from Natal, and unobserved had seized a ridge -between Stinkfontein and the Modder, which Hannay was about to cross; -and although the Boer guns were silenced and the commando compelled to -retire, the diversion seriously disarranged the scheme of assault. - -Stephenson's Brigade of the VIth Division, when on its way to cross to -the right bank at Paardeberg Drift under instructions from Kelly-Kenny, -had been recalled by Kitchener, whose orders were so vaguely expressed, -that while the Brigadier believed that he was to act in the frontal -attack from the south with the other brigade of the Division, he was -really intended by the Chief of the Staff to support Hannay's flank -movement. He was now compelled to change front to meet Steyn's threat, -and Hannay's attack was postponed. Stephenson was then ordered to resume -his advance, but apparently still in ignorance that he was expected to -act in co-operation with the mounted infantry, he so disposed his troops -that he gave little support to Hannay, who early in the afternoon -reported to Kitchener that he was too weak to advance with the flank -attack. A peremptory message was returned, in which he was ordered "to -rush the laager at all costs," even without Stephenson's support. Some -of the words of the order seemed to reflect upon his determination, so -he obeyed it literally and immediately. At the head of as many men as he -could bring to him on the spot, he charged towards the laager, and when -his horse was killed under him he marched on foot to meet his death. - -As soon as it was seen that Hannay had thrown himself away, Stephenson -was ordered to renew the flank attack. With a portion of his troops and -some mounted infantry, he crossed to the right bank at Vanderberg's -Drift, and formed to the left. A small body of Hannay's force had won a -position near the Boer entrenchments, and it is probable that -Stephenson's assault would have succeeded but for a curious accident, -which could not have been foreseen, and by which he was deprived of part -of his firing line when it was most needed. The setting sun suddenly -appeared from beneath a bank of clouds in the west, directly in line -with the objective, and the dazzle of the light blotted out the laager, -at the same time illuminating the target on which the Boers were firing. -A further advance was impracticable, and the troops, which had already -fixed bayonets for the assault, were withdrawn when within 500 yards of -the enemy's position. Thus the second attempt to get at the laager from -the east failed, but Stephenson's action was not entirely without a -result, as he was able to put his men into entrenchments, where they -remained during the night. - -Meanwhile, Colvile was pushing upstream from the west. On that side the -Boers had an advanced position in a big donga, which runs into the right -bank, about two miles below the laager, and upon which a few companies -of the Highland Brigade, having waded the river, had already made a -gallant but unsuccessful attack. Colvile, under orders from Kitchener, -placed himself astride the river, sending the Brigade under -Smith-Dorrien across to the north bank, while the Highland Brigade acted -on the left of the frontal attack; and when Gun Hill, which outflanked -the donga, was occupied, Kitchener ordered an assault on the donga, to -be carried out simultaneously with Hannay's attack on the left flank. -The order, however, was not communicated to Smith-Dorrien on Gun Hill, -and he was not aware of it until he saw some troops of his own Division, -supported by a few companies sent across by Kitchener from the left -bank, charging across the open. In a few minutes, the gradual -retardation of the rush, and then its extinction under a heavy fire, -showed that the attempt had failed. It is said that Smith-Dorrien had -been so imperfectly made acquainted with Kitchener's plan, that he was -under the impression that he had been sent to the north bank to prevent -the Boers breaking out of the laager, and not to attack them upstream. - -The frontal attack was initiated by Kelly-Kenny with the 13th Brigade -under C. Knox, the 18th Brigade having been detached to support Hannay's -flank attack. The main body of the Boers was north of the river, but -strong detachments held the left-bank dongas. Colvile was dealing with a -demonstration against Paardeberg Drift when an oral message from -Kitchener reached him, which he interpreted as an order to go to Knox's -assistance with his Division, which was thus withdrawn from the flank -and lent to the frontal attack. He was doubtfully carrying out what he -believed to be his instructions when an order reached him to send the -19th Brigade, under Smith-Dorrien, across the river. A few companies of -his Highland Brigade succeeded in establishing themselves on the right -bank, and Knox drove the enemy out of the left-bank dongas, but was -forbidden by Kelly-Kenny to cross the river, as the enemy was too -strongly posted. The frontal attack was spent, but the troops remained -on their ground until the approach of night released them. - -Two miles S.E. of Vendutie Drift, a hill, to which the name of -Kitchener's Kopje was afterwards given, rises out of the veld. In the -tactics of the assault on the laager, it was not a position of much -importance, but in the Paardeberg drama it was a striking scene. The -detachment of infantry which Kelly-Kenny sent early in the day to occupy -it had been withdrawn without his knowledge by some wandering staff -officer, who thought he had found a better use for the little garrison, -and replaced by a few mounted men. These, while watching the progress of -the fight, and perhaps regretting that they were not taking a more -active part in it, were suddenly called upon to defend themselves. - -De Wet, with two guns and 600 men, had arrived from Koffyfontein at the -opportune moment of the crisis of the flank attacks. He soon carried the -kopje, and when at 4.30 p.m. he opened fire, the shells which he pitched -into the VIth Division baggage and artillery were the first intimation -of his intervention received by the Head Quarter Staff, absorbed in -their attack on the laager; and for the second time the troops were -called away from the work in hand, to deal with an unexpected attack -from the rear, and the dwindling hope of carrying Cronje's position -before nightfall passed away. - -If, on the British side at Paardeberg, the commanders were not at their -best when acting _in partibus_ beyond the personal control of Lord -Roberts, on the other hand De Wet's release from immediate subordination -to Cronje seemed to make him a more dangerous foe. His capture of the -convoy at Waterval Drift on February 15 was followed in three days by a -daring raid on a British army with a handful of men. It was an impudent -and haphazard enterprise, which would hardly have been attempted if he -had been in possession of fuller information, but it was justified by -its success. De Wet had been reinforced at Koffyfontein, and if he had -brought all the commandos at his disposal with him to Paardeberg Cronje -would probably have been relieved. But he had not clearly discerned the -strategy of Lord Roberts, whose presence at Jacobsdaal deceived him, and -instead of striking with all his strength in one direction, he weakened -his force by expeditions eastward towards Edenburg and westward towards -Belmont. - -His appreciation of the tactical situation at Paardeberg, based on the -rumours which drifted into Koffyfontein, was imperfect, and when he came -within sight of the Modder, and saw the British Army before him, he must -have regretted that he had not entirely abandoned the idea that the -advance would be made by way of Koffyfontein. But the time and the place -could not have been better arranged. The British Army was preoccupied -with Cronje; and Kitchener's Kopje in De Wet's hands gave a strong flank -protection to Steyn, and later on to De Beer, who, when driven out of -his position north of Koodoos Drift by a resuscitated cavalry brigade -under Gordon, crossed to the kopjes south of the river. Neither Steyn -nor De Beer had been effectually checked, and they were hovering for a -chance to swoop down. - -At nightfall the situation was as follows:-- - -The laager was holding out, and the chief result of the day's work was a -contraction of the line held by the Boers on the river; an attempt by -Kelly-Kenny to recapture Kitchener's Kopje had failed; fully one quarter -of the perimeter commanding Vendutie Drift was in the possession of the -enemy; the troops were exhausted and the casualties exceeded 1,200.[36] - -It does not necessarily follow from the failure of a tactical scheme -that it was unsuited to the occasion; but the failure of February 18 was -due to one of three causes: to the defects of the scheme, to the mode of -its execution, or to the Boer external attacks. It was not a scheme -which either Kelly-Kenny or Colvile would have devised if left to -himself, and it is very doubtful whether Kitchener had Lord Roberts' -direct authority for it. But assuming that it offered a better chance of -crippling the enemy at large than the alternative of an investment, it -was so hastily devised and so clumsily pursued that it became hourly -more difficult to carry through, until it was finally subverted by De -Wet. Many of the commanding officers had as little knowledge of -Kitchener's purpose as the pawns which are moved by the hands of the -chess player. - -The conclusion seems to be that but for De Wet's intrusion the brute -force of the investors might possibly have prevailed. But the final -cause of the failure was Lord Roberts' error of judgment in putting -Kitchener into virtual command of the Vendutie Drift force, thereby -superseding senior officers of greater tactical ability. The -complications arising out of brevet rank and local rank, grades peculiar -to the British Army,[37] were already sufficiently disturbing, and yet -Kitchener was irregularly advanced by a few words in a private letter -from Lord Roberts to Kelly-Kenny. - -In his report on the day's work to Lord Roberts at Jacobsdaal, Kitchener -could only say that he hoped to do something more definite on the -morrow. Lord Roberts at once ordered him to be reinforced, and being now -convalescent set out for Paardeberg, where he arrived during the -forenoon of February 19. - -It is significant that Lord Roberts did not renew the assault on the -laager, and confined himself to operations against Kitchener's Kopje, -thus reverting to the scheme of investment proposed by Kelly-Kenny on -the previous day. The burghers evacuated the big donga during the night. - -Lord Roberts was, from motives of humanity as well as from lack of -hospital accommodation, reluctant to inflict another loss of 8 per cent, -upon his troops. The inability to deal with a further accumulation of -wounded was perhaps a justification of his decision, but his hesitancy -to fight costly battles, which was characteristic of many general and -field officers of undoubted personal courage, is not so easy to excuse. -Even on the score of humanity, it is better to fight one decisive action -in which the casualties amount to 20 per cent., than to obtain the same -result by fighting three actions in each of which the casualties amount -to 8 per cent. The aggregate of human suffering caused to each side by -the war would have been less if the struggle had been fought out more -relentlessly, and without so much regard to the expenditure of life. -There seems to have been a theory that a percentage of casualties which -exceeded ten would demoralize the troops, although it had often been -greatly exceeded in the battles of former campaigns. In some of the -operation orders subsequently issued, the reservation, "if this be -possible without undue loss," appeared. - -The presence of De Wet on Kitchener's Kopje gave Cronje a moral support -which was not of much use to him. According to De Wet's account, he -considered it a point of honour to remain with the women, children, and -wagons in the laager, which every hour was growing more unfit for -occupation. - -The ejectment of De Wet, to be followed by an advance on Bloemfontein by -French's cavalry, was substituted by Lord Roberts for the assault on the -laager, which was to be left to starve itself out. But the removal of De -Wet from the kopje, which he had stolen from his opponents, was not an -easy task, and for three nights and two days the Ajax of the Boers -defied the lightnings which played upon the hill. On the 19th, a body of -cavalry was brought round from the north, but was found unequal to the -task. Towards evening an infantry brigade was thrown at the kopje, but -after it had obtained some success, and had partially entrenched itself -on the slopes, it was withdrawn by Lord Roberts. No action was taken on -the following day, but on the 21st a cavalry attack forced De Wet out of -his hold; but though squeezed like a sponge between the fingers, his -commando was incompressible, and oozed away towards the east; no -effective pursuit being possible, owing to the condition of the horses. -Meanwhile the investment continued, but the scarcity of ammunition -restrained the activity of the bombardment. An offer made by Lord -Roberts to take away the piteous women and children, praying for peace -in their time, was rejected by Cronje. - -The departure of De Wet, who picked up De Beer and Steyn on his way, -enabled the gap in the circle of investment to be filled in, and the -agony of the laager was drawn out for six days. Nothing but a strenuous -attack from outside the circle could save it. De Wet indeed, who had -trekked in the direction of Poplar Grove, and who had received -reinforcements from Colesberg and Natal, which placed 5,000 burghers -under his orders, made an unsuccessful attempt to recover the kopje and -retreated hastily, though a gallant remnant of eighty-seven burghers -under Theunissen held on, and were not made prisoners until a brigade -had been launched against them. An envoy was sent by De Wet into the -laager to urge Cronje to break out. A half-hearted consent was given, -but at the appointed time the river was in flood and the attempt was -postponed. - -The exhaustion of the cavalry, and the report of the arrival of -reinforcements at Poplar Grove, compelled Lord Roberts to abandon his -plan of sending on French to Bloemfontein; but as he confidently looked -to an early occupation of the Free State capital, he detached Kitchener -to Naauwpoort with instructions to see to the opening up of the railway -from the south, upon which the Army would depend for its supplies as -soon as it reached Bloemfontein. He was, perhaps, glad of an excuse to -employ his Chief of the Staff elsewhere for a time, for although the -Divisional Commanders had loyally accepted the situation, he could not -but feel that they had not been quite fairly treated, and that the -Kitchener dictatorship had not been a success. - -The end came on February 27. Soon after sunrise on the anniversary of -Majuba Hill the white flag was raised in the laager. During the last -five days, Tucker, who with a portion of his Division had been ordered -up from Jacobsdaal when the news of the investment reached Lord Roberts, -closed gradually in on the west, and Stephenson on the east; and on the -26th the laager was severely bombarded by four newly arrived howitzers. -The final stroke was delivered by two companies of the Royal Canadians, -who, disregarding a false order to retire, held on, and by daybreak had -entrenched themselves within 100 yards of the flanking trench of the -laager; and though this feat was not the direct cause of the surrender, -which had been decided on the previous evening, it was not the less -meritorious. Cronje in vain endeavoured to persuade the burghers to -postpone the surrender over Majuba Day. In a few hours 4,000 men, the -majority of whom were Transvaalers, were under guard as prisoners of -war, and Cronje was on his way to St. Helena, there to commune with the -Shade of Napoleon. - -It is said that when Kruger heard of the capitulation of Vendutie Drift -he exclaimed, "The real war will now begin." To the British public, the -surrender of Cronje, followed in a few hours by the relief of Ladysmith, -seemed to prove that the real war had now ended. - -On the following day Lord Roberts transferred the bulk of the Army to a -fresh camping ground at Osfontein, and remained there for seven days. -The halt was rendered necessary by the exhaustion of the cavalry and -artillery horses, on whom the greater stress of the advance had fallen, -and whose rations had been docked even more than those of their riders; -and it gave Lord Roberts an opportunity of drawing supplies for the -advance from the Kimberley line, from which he was about to sever -himself. The halt also enabled the Army of the Modder to pull itself -together for a fresh effort, after a fortnight of harassing marches and -weary investment work on stinted rations. - -What might almost be called a Select Committee of the House of Lords met -at Kimberley on March 1. Lord Roberts rode over from Osfontein to -consult Lord Methuen, and they were joined by Lord Kitchener, who -returned from his brief visit of inspection to Naauwpoort and De Aar. - -Mafeking was in greater embarrassment than ever had come upon Kimberley, -and there was trouble in the spacious area of Cape Colony lying west of -the Capetown-Kimberley railway. Lord Roberts' hopes that a force raised -locally in Kimberley might be available for the relief of Mafeking were -disappointed; and after his return to Osfontein with Kitchener, he -instructed Methuen to see to it with a Yeomanry brigade, which would be -sent to him. To check the risings in Cape Colony, which for the time -being were confined to the Prieska district, Kitchener had already sent -out flying columns from De Aar. - -The tenacity and resolution of De Wet were never more conspicuous than -during the disheartening days which followed his retirement from -Kitchener's Kopje. Neither Cronje's surrender, nor the news of the -relief of Ladysmith and of the British working steadily towards the -Orange River bridges, nor the despondency of his own men, diverted him -from his purpose of interposing between Lord Roberts and the Free State -capital. President Steyn came over from Bloemfontein to stimulate the -discouraged, and President Kruger was brought round from Joubert's Head -Quarters in Natal, where he had been successful in persuading the -burghers dismayed by the relief of Ladysmith to hold on to the -Biggarsberg positions. After a conference with Steyn, he went on to -Poplar Grove, arriving there in time to hear the opening shots of the -battle of March 7. - -[Illustration: Map.] - -De Wet's force at Poplar Grove was at first sufficient for the -occupation of a position on the left bank of the Modder only, but -subsequent reinforcements brought it up to a number which was estimated -by the British Intelligence not to exceed 14,000 and which was probably -much less. The position was then prolonged across the river, the front -being divided into two unequal portions by the Drift at Poplar Grove. - -To drive away De Wet, and to entangle him as Cronje had been fatally -entangled in the Drifts of the Modder River, and cut off his retreat to -Bloemfontein, was the tactical scheme of Lord Roberts, who had twice as -many men, and at least five times as many guns, as his opponent. - -In his method of communicating his plan to the officers concerned Lord -Roberts made an innovation. Instead of issuing written Battle Orders he -read a memorandum at a council of war, and afterwards circulated copies -of it. Thus he was able to explain the situation and expound his plan in -greater detail than is possible in the bald and sterilized paragraphs of -Orders; but he omitted to give in it definite times at which certain -movements were to be begun, or to be completed, and the oral -instructions on these points given subsequently were not clearly -understood. - -In brief, Lord Roberts' plan for Poplar Grove was as follows. When -French's cavalry had made a wide circuit of seventeen miles south of the -Modder, out of reach of De Wet's left flank, and had placed itself in -rear of the Boer position, the VIth Division was to make a flank attack -on the Boer left on the Seven Kopjes, and endeavour to roll it up -towards the river, by way of Table Mountain. The enemy's centre was to -be threatened by the VIIth Division along the line of the Modder, and -his right on the north bank of the river by the IXth Division. With his -great superiority in men and guns, Lord Roberts might reasonably expect -to capture the whole Boer force, although he had no longer a Cronje but -a De Wet to deal with. - -The day's operations began at 3 a.m., when the cavalry marched out of -Osfontein; but soon the absence of precise staff arrangements gave -trouble. The VIth Division, which was ordered to follow French, who it -was understood would leave camp at 2 a.m., was headed off by the -cavalry, and had to be halted until he was clear of the infantry front. -Neither Kelly-Kenny nor French seems to have mastered the scheme of -attack. At daylight, when the cavalry should have been well in rear of -the Boer position, it was in fact not far from the VIth Division, about -two miles south of the Boer left flank on Seven Kopjes and in full view -of the enemy. - -As soon as the Boers perceived that an enveloping movement was in train, -they withdrew towards the river, and French reported that he had turned -their left flank, and was in pursuit, and that Seven Kopjes was open to -Kelly-Kenny's advance. The part assigned to him in the morning's work -was, however, the cutting off of the enemy's retreat, and he nullified -the tactical scheme by showing himself prematurely. - -His next message to Lord Roberts, who was watching the battle from Le -Gallais Kopje, announced that he was shelling the wagons in retreat, but -that he could not get at them, as they were protected by flanking -positions on neighbouring kopjes. It was now evident that French instead -of cutting off the enemy was only pursuing him without much success. - -The VIth Division advanced with great deliberation. Kelly-Kenny reported -to Head Quarters that Seven Kopjes had been reoccupied, and that a -detached hill to the east seemed to be strongly held, which was not the -impression given by French's message less than an hour previously. -However, Kelly-Kenny occupied Seven Kopjes without opposition, and it is -said that the infantry on the south bank were never in touch with the -enemy. On the north bank the IXth Division slowly, but without much -difficulty, pushed back the Boer right and captured a gun on Leeuw Kop, -the solitary trophy of the day. - -Finally, the Divisions converged on Poplar Grove, but De Wet had shaken -himself free without the loss of a single burgher taken prisoner, and -with almost his full complement of wagons. He retired along the Modder -towards Abraham's Kraal, keeping French at arm's length with his -rearguards. He owed his escape to the hesitancy of his opponents and his -own mobility. The details of the fight show that some of the commanders -waited upon one another like Lord Chatham and Sir Richard Strachan at -Walcheren. Again the British cavalry was ineffective for pursuit. - -It was not known at the time that had Lord Roberts' scheme been -successful in its entirety, a capture would have been made that might -have brought the war to a sudden close. President Kruger was present -during the greater part of the battle, and with bitter chagrin saw the -burghers streaming past him in retreat. - -Whether the battle of Poplar Grove is to be considered a success or not -depends upon the view which is taken of its actual and potential -results. Lord Roberts did not capture another Boer army, as he fully -expected to do, but he expelled it from a good position, and put it on -the run; and the British Army was one stage nearer to Bloemfontein. - -Next day Kitchener was again, in his capacity of military foreman, sent -away to superintend the carrying out of the arrangements he had already -made for dealing with the disaffected Prieska district. His -disengagement from Lord Roberts removed for the time a potential cause -of failure, namely, the uncertainty, to which perhaps the escape of De -Wet at Poplar Grove may be due, whether a battle was to be fought with -the Commander-in-Chiefs rapier or with the Chief-of-the-Staff's -bludgeon. - -De Wet, undaunted by his defeat and by the defection of a large number -of his men, who disappeared after Poplar Grove, summoned a Krijgsraad, -which authorized further resistance. A position threatening the left -flank of the advance on Bloemfontein was taken up on the kopjes near -Abraham's Kraal. - -Reinforcements of "Zarps" from the Transvaal, and of contingents under -Delarey and P. de Wet, came in, and a force of about 5,000 men was -rallied, to make one more rearguard stand against Lord Roberts. In the -absence of C. de Wet, who had been called away to Bloemfontein, Delarey -was in command. - -Lord Roberts' scheme for the advance on Bloemfontein was based on -reports that the Boers would take up a strong position a few miles N.W. -of the capital. He divided his force into three columns, each having a -cavalry brigade attached to it, which, marching by different routes to a -point south of the city, would cut the railway and turn the Boer flank. -On March 10 the advance began, French being in command of the left -column, which alone was seriously engaged during the march. - -The position taken up by the Boers at Abraham's Kraal at first only -included a group of kopjes near the river, and another group at -Damvallei, but eventually it was extended further south to Driefontein -and Boschrand, in order to command another road to Bloemfontein. - -In accordance with Lord Roberts' instructions, and to the great -disappointment of Delarey, who hoped to commit the left column to a -frontal attack on the Abraham's Kraal and Damvallei Kopjes, which lay on -the direct road to Baberspan, where it was due to bivouac that night, -French avoided them, and changed direction towards Driefontein and -Boschrand. Delarey, finding that he was not to be attacked on his right, -reinforced Driefontein Hill, which, as it happened, had just been -evacuated by De Wet, who had returned from Bloemfontein. The occupation -of a detached spur of the Boschrand by a chance body of mounted infantry -from the centre column, and a threatening movement of that column's -cavalry brigade, had drawn him away from Driefontein on to the crest of -the Boschrand. French's change of direction caused the march of his -column to converge upon that of the centre column, and he was now -crossing the front of a sinuous line of ten miles occupied by the enemy, -and extending from the Boschrand, through Driefontein, Damvallei, and -the Abraham's Kraal Kopjes to Oertel's Drift on the Modder. The right of -the line had already diverted French from his march on the appointed -bivouac, which he now proposed to reach by turning the left. - -Suddenly Delarey opened fire from Driefontein on the cavalry, and the -advance of the infantry had to be delayed while the situation was -examined. The result of the reconnaissance determined Kelly-Kenny, who -was in command of the left column's infantry, to attack the minor -features of Delarey's position. He was unable to communicate with -French, but the latter, as soon as he saw that Kelly-Kenny had achieved -his object, ordered a turning movement by the cavalry. - -The cavalry of the centre column, which earlier in the day had been -informed that French was not in need of its assistance, co-operated -imperfectly. The afternoon was wearing away, and Kelly-Kenny, while -waiting impatiently for the turning movement to take effect, received a -message from Lord Roberts, instructing him to push on, as it was -believed that the enemy's position was not held in great strength. - -Kelly-Kenny, for the first time able to fight a battle in his own way, -now set himself to clear the enemy out of the Driefontein ridge. -Reinforcements were ordered up to him from the centre column, but he won -his victory without their aid, and after a struggle which lasted till -sunset, Delarey was expelled from Driefontein. The Boers were still in -occupation of the other positions on the line, but De Wet, although -strongly urged by Delarey to hold on, found it advisable to withdraw -from them. The burghers drifted away in the darkness, after the -exhausted cavalry had made a formal attempt at pursuit. - -Two of the field guns which had been taken three months before at -Colenso fought on the Boer side at the Battle of Driefontein, which -though but a passing incident in the war, has been favoured by the -German critics with their cordial approval. "Driefontein was fought -substantially on the principles evolved by the experiences of the -campaign of 1870-1871." Kelly-Kenny's wilful and successful "use of deep -formations, limited front, and of a wasting fire to obtain ascendancy -before crushing the enemy with a simultaneous charge" is considered to -uphold the correctness of the German theory of attack, which thirty -years of new conditions of warfare have not modified.[38] - -Next day the advance on Bloemfontein was resumed, and French's column -was merged in the centre column under Lord Roberts. The column under -Tucker was marching on the Free State capital by way of Petrusburg, -twenty miles to the south, as there was a possibility that some of the -commandos in retreat from beyond the Orange might be approaching. De Wet -did his best to organize a final stand N.W. of the city, but it was soon -evident that Lord Roberts' movements could not be checked, and President -Steyn fled to Kroonstad. - -The cavalry was pushed on, and on the afternoon of March 12 the railway -was cut at Ferreira's Siding, a few miles south of Bloemfontein. Some -resistance was offered at a ridge commanding the approach to the -capital, but the defenders withdrew during the night. Soon after -midnight, a small party of pioneers, under Hunter-Weston of the Royal -Engineers, started to circle eastwards round the city, and having with -much difficulty in the darkness found the railway on the north side, -destroyed a culvert on the line and thereby entrapped a considerable -amount of rolling stock. - -Next morning Lord Roberts came to the line, and at midday the -municipality and leading citizens of Bloemfontein waited on him at -Ferreira's Siding, and tendered the submission of the city. It was a -notable episode in the military history of Great Britain, and there was -a touch of a vanished mediaevalism in the ceremony. - -The march from Ramdam to Bloemfontein restored the British Army in the -eyes of the nation. It was no longer a machine which constantly broke -down whenever stress was laid upon it, but was working quietly and on -the whole successfully. It had acquired confidence in itself, and the -infantry especially had done well during the month's advance. -Notwithstanding long marches, which in the end were equally fatiguing -whether made by day or by night, on restricted rations in a trying -climate, the proportion of men who fell out was small. - -The cavalry did not greatly distinguish itself. Two brilliant exploits, -the rush from Klip Drift to Kimberley, and the heading off of Cronje at -Vendutie Drift, practically exhausted it. Its reconnaissance work during -the advance was poorly executed, and after each fight came the same -report, that the horses were unable to pursue the retiring burghers. -Overloading, indifferent march discipline and horsemastership, night -marches without previously watering and feeding the horses, reduced Lord -Roberts' mounted troops to but a fraction of their nominal strength; and -raised a question whether French, whose military capacity was -undeniable, might not be more usefully employed in infantry operations. - -There is more than a substratum of truth in the remark once made by a -caustic foreign critic, that an Englishman talks more and knows less -about horses and their management than any other man. - -Notes: - -[Footnote 34: In the Egyptian War of 1882 Arabi was similarly misled by -Sir Garnet Wolseley, who making as if to land his Army near Aboukir Bay, -suddenly took it into the Suez Canal, and threw it ashore at Ismailia.] - -[Footnote 35: 350,000 horses were used up during the campaign, in other -words, the war strength of one cavalry regiment every other day. The -removal of a cavalry officer from his command after the battle of -Graspan, because he could not do with exhausted horses what was expected -of him by an infantry officer, will perhaps account for a considerable -portion of the wastage.] - -[Footnote 36: It is stated on the authority of the United States -Military attaché that Kitchener said next day that if he had known the -power of the Mauser behind entrenchments, he would not have attempted to -assault the laager.] - -[Footnote 37: They were originally granted as a counterpoise to the -irregularities of the system of promotion by purchase.] - -[Footnote 38: See Colonel du Cane's translation of Vol. II. of the -German Official Account, p. 52.] - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -Alarms and Excursions - - -The occupation of Bloemfontein by the British Army in March, 1900, -ushered in the second or _guerilla_ period of the war. Hitherto the -struggle had been mainly, though not entirely, maintained against -considerable bodies of Boers, who though widely dispersed acted more or -less under a common direction; but after the capture of the Free State -capital, a system of partisan and irregular warfare was adopted by the -enemy. - -The change was not suddenly effected. It was an instinctive, almost an -imperceptible, development rendered necessary by circumstances. The -reverses on the Modder, the failure at Ladysmith, the ill success which -attended the attempts to raise the fiery cross in the northern districts -of Cape Colony, indicated to the burghers the cause of the instability -of their military machine. They discovered, in time, that its centre of -gravity was too highly pitched and must be brought nearer the earth. For -five months the war had been carried on under the orders of a federal -syndicate composed of the two Presidents sitting with casual military -assessors, scarcely one of whom was a strategist or capable of viewing -the Boer cause synoptically. Cronje was gone into captivity; Joubert was -suspected to be half-hearted; and Botha, who had begun so well in Natal, -was a disappointment. - -The Boers recognized that the British strategy had been astonishingly -successful, and that they could not hope to compete with it. But they -believed, not without justification, that in minor tactics and the -smaller operations of war they were the equals of their enemy and in -war-craft his superior. The power of a slender, well-led, and resolute -force was shown at Nicholson's Nek, Waterval Drift, and elsewhere, and -it began to dawn upon their lethargic minds that the individual efforts -of handy commandos acting to a great extent independently offered them -the best chance of resisting the invader.[39] The new method was almost -immediately put on trial and, with certain notable exceptions, continued -throughout the war, which mainly by its use was prolonged for twenty-six -months against an enemy daily increasing in numbers. Not that the Boers -were not at first greatly discouraged by the victories on the Modder, -which admitted Lord Roberts to Bloemfontein, and by the tranquillity -which suddenly brooded upon the arena of war. Even the Prieska -rebellion, from which so much was hoped owing to its proximity to the -line of communication with Capetown, was dying away under the vigorous -hands of Kitchener, who had been detached from Head Quarters to deal -with it. - -Many of the burghers availed themselves of a proclamation issued by Lord -Roberts on March 15, under which, after taking an oath of neutrality, -they were allowed to return to their farms, and there remain during good -behaviour. Others took furlough, with or without permission, or fled to -Kroonstad. When Joubert remonstrated with De Wet for acquiescing in the -exodus, the latter replied that he could not help it. The burghers were -not accustomed to discipline and could not be coerced, but they would -return with renewed courage by and by. - -The demoralization was, however, confined to the burghers who had been -fighting on the Modder River. The commandos which had been opposed to -Gatacre, Clements, and Brabant in the Cape Colony retired across the -Orange in good order under Olivier, Lemmer, and E.R. Grobler; and -although encumbered by lengthy trains of ox-wagons, marched up the right -bank of the Caledon along the Basuto Border, and established themselves -with a strength of 6,000 burghers on Lord Roberts' right flank near -Ladybrand and Clocolan: a daring exploit which was justified by its -success, as the left flank throughout the trek was exposed to a raid -from Bloemfontein or Edenburg. A mounted force 1,800 strong under French -was indeed sent eastward to show the flag, detach the waverers, and if -possible, intercept the retreat; but the information at Head Quarters -was imperfect and the strength of the commandos was greatly -underestimated. It was assumed that they had been subject to the -disintegration which obliterated the Modder River commandos; but a small -reconnoitring column, detached under Pilcher by French from Thabanchu, -found itself in presence of a force which outnumbered it thirty times, -and was recalled. - -The presence of a considerable body of the enemy organized on the flank, -the necessity of accumulating a large stock of supplies and stores, and -a serious epidemic of fever among the troops, postponed the advance on -the Transvaal many weeks beyond the end of March, when Lord Roberts had -hoped to set out for the north. The apparent pacification of the country -and the alacrity displayed by the burghers in submitting to the generous -conditions of the proclamation of neutrality, had encouraged him in the -belief that prompt action before the enemy had time to take breath would -finally crush the dwindling opposition; but he soon became aware that it -was but a lull in the storm, of which the mutterings were almost -immediately renewed. - -Pole-Carew, who shortly after the occupation was sent south with a -brigade to establish touch with Gatacre and Clements and open up the -railway, heard of the Boer movement along the Basuto Border and at once -reported it to Lord Roberts, whom he rejoined at Bloemfontein on March -17. Before the end of the month the line was cleared and trains were -passing to and fro between Capetown and the capital of the Free State, -which had lately been renamed the Orange River Colony. From that time -forward the enemy succeeded on one occasion only, and then but for a few -hours, in cutting the Springfontein-Bloemfontein railway; and the -hazardous advance along the Modder River, which involved the possibility -of the Army being left in the air at Bloemfontein, was fully justified. - -The Boers, who were supposed to be hypnotized, soon began to show signs -of returning animation. At a Krijgsraad which assembled at Kroonstad on -March 17, and at which Steyn and Kruger were present, plans for the -renewal of the struggle were discussed and measures for enforcing -discipline on the burghers were taken. Steyn professed to have -information that a Russian advance on India was imminent. The idea of -resistance _en masse_ was abandoned, and a policy of flying columns -unencumbered with wagons and acting aggressively against the British -lines of communication was adopted. It was hoped that a timely -demonstration would lure the enemy out of his hold, and that a little -encouragement would revive the Prieska rebellion. The determination to -continue hostilities in which even Joubert, who after the fall of -Ladysmith joined the commandos operating in the Free State, acquiesced, -was a proof of the courage and the steady patriotism of the Boer -leaders, and the events of the next two years justified their -resolution. Joubert, who had attended the Krijgsraad in feeble health, -died a few days after its adjournment, and L. Botha was appointed to the -thankless office of Commandant-General. - -The only direction from which Bloemfontein appeared to be vulnerable was -the north, which also was the direction in which Lord Roberts hoped soon -to be leading his troops. At a distance of a day's march from the -capital, the railway to Pretoria crosses the Modder at Glen, and again -the river which had recently figured so prominently in the campaign came -upon the stage of war, and not as a last appearance. The railway bridge -had been destroyed by the Boers, who thus excluded themselves from -action on the left bank. A considerable force was sent out from -Bloemfontein to hold the position while the bridge was being rebuilt, -and to keep at arm's length the enemy skirmishing on the right bank. It -was soon found necessary to hold a more advanced post at Karee Siding, -north of Glen, and a force which seems out of proportion to the -resistance which, according to the ideas then prevalent at Head -Quarters, might be expected, was assembled at Glen on March 28. The -VIIth Division under Tucker was brought up from Bloemfontein, and French -was recalled from Thabanchu to lead the cavalry. With him, in command of -the mounted infantry, was Le Gallais, a remarkable association of two -soldiers whose names, though in different languages, were identical. -Bloemfontein was denuded of cavalry, but the combined strength of the -two cavalry brigades was much under 1,000. The force under Tucker and -French, which judging from its strength Lord Roberts seems to have -detailed rather as the advanced guard of an immediate march on Pretoria -than as the minimum with which the opposition could be safely -encountered, numbered about 9,000 men with thirty guns. At Karee Siding -were 3,500 burghers under T. Smuts, who had come up to carry out the -Krijgsraad idea of enticing the British out of Bloemfontein. - -Next day a battle of the usual type was fought. The mounted troops -worked upon the flanks of the enemy, who was posted on a line of kopjes -on each side of the railway, while the infantry attacked frontally with -success and drove back the burghers, who retired in good order towards -Brandfort unmolested by the cavalry, which was as before too much -exhausted for effective pursuit. Thus, at a cost of less than 200 -casualties, Lord Roberts made good the first stage on the road to the -north. - -Soon after his entry into Bloemfontein Lord Roberts sent out a small -mounted column under Amphlett to Sannah's Post, where the water which -supplied the capital was drawn from the Modder River. This had been cut -off by the enemy, and the Army was dependent upon the disused and -tainted wells within the city. The Boer commandos, which under the -command of Olivier had retreated from the Cape Colony to Ladybrand and -Clocolan, now began to threaten Broadwood, who, when French was sent to -Glen, succeeded to the command of the mounted column. Broadwood was -compelled to retire from Thabanchu on March 30. Early on the following -morning he bivouacked at the Waterworks, whither his convoy under -Pilcher had already preceded him; and simultaneously the IXth Division -under Colvile and a brigade of Mounted Infantry under Martyr were -ordered out from Bloemfontein to help him in. - -Meanwhile De Wet at Brandfort was watching his opportunity of working at -the task assigned to him under the Krijgsraad scheme, of attacking the -British lines of communication. His anticipation that the burghers would -return with renewed vigour from the furlough which they had granted to -themselves proved to be accurate. While Smuts was standing up to Tucker -and French at Karee Siding, 1,600 men with five field guns under C. De -Wet, whose second in command was his brother Piet, were circling to the -Waterworks. The initial direction of the march was N.E., in order to -conceal the real objective of the raid even from his own men. His -intention was to seize Amphlett at the Waterworks, and there lie in wait -for Broadwood's convoy. Before reaching his destination he handed over -two-thirds of his force to his brother, who early in the morning took up -a position on the right bank of the Modder east and north of the -Waterworks, while he himself went to the Wagon Drift on the Korn Spruit, -where the bed is deep enough to afford perfect concealment to a large -body of men in ambush. He occupied it at 4 a.m. on March 31. - -A farmer, brought in by a patrol from Amphlett's post, reported to the -officer in command of the connecting post at Boesman's Kop that the -enemy had been seen; but the officer did not pay much attention to the -report, though he communicated it to the connecting post at Springfield -in the direction of Bloemfontein; at the same time sending back the -patrol to Amphlett at the Waterworks with a reinforcement of his own -men. The patrol was fired on while attempting to return to the -Waterworks, and retired to Boesman's Kop. - -[Illustration: Map.] - -Broadwood, whose column had already been in bivouac near the Waterworks -for some hours with the convoy which had preceded it, was at sunrise -shelled by Piet De Wet, of whose presence on the right bank of the -Modder he had only a few minutes previously been made aware, and in the -belief that his front was clear, he at once determined to take up a -position on Boesman's Kop. - -Rarely had two leaders about to meet in battle been more strangely -deceived by the Fog of War. C. De Wet, although cut off from his guns -and the main body of his command by an unfordable river, was confident -in his lurking place in the Korn Spruit that he could easily repeat his -exploit of February 15 and annex another British convoy; yet he suddenly -discovered that he had to deal not with a mere escort, but with a strong -mounted force and two batteries of Horse Artillery, and he was equal to -the occasion. - -Broadwood, equally confident that the whole force of the enemy was on -his flank on the right bank of the Modder, marched heedlessly into the -ambush which De Wet had laid for him in the Korn Spruit, on the direct -line between two adjacent British posts, and which neither of them had -discovered, although the usual patrols had been sent out. When the -patrol from the Waterworks to Boesman's Kop did not return in due course -on the morning of March 31, its absence seems to have caused no anxiety -to Amphlett. - -Broadwood, groping in the Fog of War, believed that the force on his -flank was Olivier's, who had driven him out of Thabanchu, and who now, -as he thought, had overtaken him. The possibility of a raid from the -north did not occur to him. He pressed on towards Boesman's Kop and -carelessly approached the sunken and treacherous cutting through which -the Korn Spruit trickles to the Modder, between banks of even height -which almost up to the brink make no perceptible break in the surface of -the veld. His ground scouts and advanced guard were Cape carts full of -refugees followed by the wagons of his convoy. Next in succession came U -Battery of Horse Artillery with its mounted escort of colonial troops. - -Preceded by the Cape carts, which De Wet, in order to disarm suspicion, -allowed to cross to the left bank, the column lumbered down the slope -into the spruit and was quickly sucked into the trap. In silence broken -only by the rumble of the wheels and the Kaffir cries of the drivers, -and unseen by the gunners close behind the leading wagons were seized by -quiet, determined burghers and placed under guard. The approach to the -drift was soon blocked, and in the heart of the entanglement was U -Battery. When it reached the incline, men sprang up out of the spruit -and lined the bank, and without firing a shot made prisoners of the -gunners, who, jammed by the transport, could neither fight nor retire, -and were easily taken from their teams and guns, and conducted by their -captors down to the bed of the spruit. Only the Major commanding the -Battery and the Serjeant-Major got away. Q Battery and its mounted -escort narrowly escaped being drawn into the ambush, but were warned in -time and galloped back to the railway station buildings. - -Up to that moment not a shot had been fired, but as Q Battery wheeled -the Boers lining the bank opened upon it, and in the scrimmage another -gun was lost. - -The derelict and riderless teams of U Battery at the spruit were shot -down by the Boers to prevent the escape of the guns, but not before one -gallant team had wrenched its gun out of the enemy's grasp and had -broken away. The Boers were now in possession of five guns of U Battery -and of one gun of Q Battery. The spruit was shelled with little effect -by Q Battery, which unlimbered near the station buildings. Only a -plunging fire could have harmed the enemy hidden in it. - -It is hard to say whether De Wet or Broadwood was in the greater danger -at 9 a.m. on March 31. The former had, it is true, just obtained a -dramatic and most encouraging success. He laid a trap for a convoy and -found himself in action with a force numerically equal to his own. He -had made many prisoners, and almost without striking a blow had captured -not only Broadwood's convoy but also six of Broadwood's guns. His force, -however, was divided. The portion of it under his own command could not -be effectively supported by his brother's command, and was confined in a -spruit out of which he could not move, and which was commanded in rear -by higher ground. - -Broadwood had been outwitted by De Wet and very roughly handled. With a -crippled and maimed force he was lying between the jaws of a vice which -might at any moment close and crush him. The loss of the convoy was, -from a tactical point of view, not an unmixed evil, as he gained thereby -greater freedom of action, but the loss of half his guns was for the -time being irremediable. The careless and haphazard scouting from the -Waterworks and Boesman's Kop, in which he complacently trusted, had -lured him on.[40] When it was reported to him that the spruit was in -possession of the enemy, he could scarcely believe it possible. Whether -he or the officers in command of the artillery and the mounted escort -were responsible for the extraordinary omission to send out ground -scouts in advance of the column is not known, but the guns and wagons -would not have been lost had this simple and customary precaution been -taken. - -Broadwood, who had no information that Colvile and Martyr were -approaching from the west, and that the latter was actually at Boesman's -Kop, acted in the belief that he would have to deal with the situation -unaided. He ordered the mounted infantry under Alderson to hold P. De -Wet's force on the Modder, while the cavalry, supported by fire from Q -Battery at the station buildings and working south and west of the Korn -Spruit Drift, endeavoured to turn C. De Wet's precarious position. -Neither of these operations was successful. Alderson could barely hold -his own; the turning movement, although aided by a few companies of -Martyr's force, was frustrated by small parties of marksmen whom C. De -Wet had posted on the ridge in rear; and Q Battery was losing heavily. - -At 10 a.m. Broadwood ordered a general retirement. No attempt seems to -have been made to communicate with him by heliograph, and he was still -unaware that Martyr had been on Boesman's Kop for three hours, and was -actually assisting in the turning movement; and that Colvile was -hurrying forward to the sound of the firing with the IXth Division. As -the battle had begun in the Fog of War, so also therein did it end. - -With the utmost difficulty Q Battery, which had been fighting in the -open until only Phipps-Hornby and less than a dozen gunners were left to -work five guns, was withdrawn. The enemy's fire was so heavy that the -teams could not be brought up to the guns, four of which were run back -by hand to the station buildings, which afforded some cover. The fifth -gun was abandoned, but by the heroic efforts of Phipps-Hornby and a -handful of gunners and volunteers from the mounted infantry escort, four -guns were brought away. - -Meanwhile Alderson was fighting a rearguard action against P. De Wet, to -cover the retirement of the guns, and when this was effected, he -followed them, closely pursued as far as the Korn Spruit by P. De Wet's -burghers, who crossed the Modder at the Waterworks. Before noon the -remains of Broadwood's column were formed up near Boesman's Kop. He had -lost seven[41] guns, seventy-three wagons and nearly a third of his -strength in killed, wounded, and prisoners. - -Broadwood's withdrawal gave C. De Wet the opportunity which he could -hardly have dared hope would ever be offered to him. He was reinforced -by his brother, and at once drew his spoils out of the spruit and easily -got away with them to the right bank of the Modder, where at noon he met -the advanced guard of Olivier's force. Although he was in presence not -only of Broadwood's force, but also almost in touch with a division of -infantry and a brigade of mounted infantry his movements were so little -impeded that he was able to bring two of the captured guns back to the -left bank, and to bring them into action against a detachment of mounted -infantry which was holding Waterval Drift. - -Martyr reached Boesman's Kop at 7 a.m., where in the course of the -morning he was joined by Colvile, whose Division was also on its way to -Waterval Drift. Broadwood, who was about two miles away, was ordered by -Colvile to come to him, but he refused to leave his command so long as -there was any chance of recovering the guns. He technically committed a -breach of discipline, but Lord Roberts subsequently approved of his -action. He requested Colvile to advance against the spruit, but the -message was not delivered; and Colvile said that it would not have -modified his dispositions. He had already refused to listen to the -obvious suggestion made by his staff that he should go to Broadwood, who -after waiting for two hours in the expectation that something would be -done by the infantry division, gave up hope and retired towards -Springfield. - -Colvile's appreciation of the situation was that it would have been -useless to pursue De Wet's mounted troops with infantry. He therefore -carried out the letter of his instructions from Lord Roberts, and, -seeing that Broadwood's column was apparently safe, went on towards -Waterval Drift: whither also Martyr had already sent the greater portion -of the mounted infantry. Thus the brothers De Wet gained not only an -actual, but also a moral success of the greatest importance to their -cause, and took away the prizes they had so unexpectedly won, under the -eyes of a strong British force helplessly watching the commandos -trailing away across the veld. - -Waterval Drift had been indicated to Colvile and Martyr as their -objective by Lord Roberts, and they considered that it was their duty to -make for it. They did not, however, recognize that instructions must be -read in the light of the information at the disposal of the superior -officer at the moment of issue, and they adhered to them -pedantically.[42] Lord Roberts could not have anticipated Broadwood's -plight when he ordered Colvile and Martyr to Waterval Drift. - -Meanwhile, the news of the disaster had reached Bloemfontein. French's -attenuated cavalry brigade, still panting with the fatigue of the Karee -Siding affair, was ordered out, and Colvile was instructed to endeavour -to make a turning movement, and with French's assistance to act on the -Boer line of retreat. By sunset Colvile, after some opposition, was in -possession of the Waterval Drift; the enemy having despatched the -prisoners, the loot, and the captured guns to the north, was still in -occupation of the Waterworks; Broadwood's mangled column was on its way -back to Bloemfontein; and French was expected to appear upon the stage -at sunrise next morning. The approach of the cavalry, which had picked -up Broadwood at Springfield, was delayed by a report, which proved to be -unfounded, that a body of the enemy was on the right flank marching on -Bloemfontein, and French did not come into touch with Colvile until -nearly midday on April 1. After reconnoitring the Waterworks and the -Boer positions on the right bank of the Modder, Colvile came to the -conclusion that he was not strong enough to attack them. Next day all -the troops were ordered by Lord Roberts to fall back upon Bloemfontein. - -Broadwood was not wholly, not even mainly, responsible for the Sannah's -Post disaster. He was unable to retrace that unlucky first false step -when, rashly assuming that the ground had been properly reconnoitred and -patrolled, he pushed into the angle between the Modder and its -tributary; and there can be no excuse for the negligence which tossed -the convoy and the guns into the abyss. But he received neither support -nor information until it was too late. No serious attempt was made to -let him know that a strong force was on its way from Bloemfontein. -Martyr failed to report himself, and Colvile was content to be an -interested spectator of the closing scene of the drama. Each leader -assumed that the moves of the Kriegspiel had been correctly played and -that there was nothing more to be done. - -After the occupation of Bloemfontein, the columns operating south of the -Orange River were drawn into the Free State. Clements crossed at -Norval's Pont, and Gatacre at Bethulie on March 15; Brabant, who -commanded the colonial troops of the latter's Division, having reached -Aliwal North four days previously. Clements' force advanced in a -peaceful procession through the districts west of the railway, meeting -with no opposition, and receiving what, under the circumstances, was -almost a welcome from the inhabitants. Early in April he joined Lord -Roberts at Bloemfontein. - -Not so with Gatacre and Brabant, who were soon seriously involved. Lord -Roberts' view of the situation, which although mistaken was not -unwarranted, was that the majority of the Boers were inclined to submit, -and would do so but for the malign influence of a small belligerent -party; and in order to encourage the waverers to assert themselves, and -to give protection to them when they took the oath of neutrality and -returned to their homes, he sent out flying columns in various -directions to register names, take over arms, and make known the -conditions on which surrenders would be accepted. - -The story of the Thabanchu column has already been told. Other columns -were detached from Gatacre's and Brabant's commands, and Smithfield, -Wepener, and Dewetsdorp, and smaller towns were occupied. Lord Roberts' -orders for the occupation of Dewetsdorp were conditional on Gatacre's -having enough troops for the purpose at his disposal. So little was it -expected that the columns would meet with serious resistance that they -were unaccompanied by guns, and all Gatacre's artillery was sent to -Bloemfontein. - -De Wet, a soldier possessed of more power of initiative than many of his -opponents, took "upon himself the responsibility of varying the -instructions" he had received from the Kroonstad Krijgsraad. The chance -of snapping up isolated garrisons allured him from the less brilliant -but more practically useful work of hacking at the railway upon which -Lord Roberts depended for his communications, and his wonderful and -unexpected success at Sannah's Post encouraged him to persevere. He -became aware that small columns were scouring the country, administering -lightly taken oaths and giving receipts for arms handed in by burghers -who protested that they were "sick of the war"; and he determined to -deal promptly with these ominous signs. - -Between Sannah's Post and Reddersburg he in one day persuaded more than -a hundred sworn burghers to break their oaths of neutrality and join -him. Whether the energy and resource which he displayed would not have -been more profitably expended in a vigorous effort to shrivel up the -line between Bloemfontein and the Orange is a matter for speculation. -Kruger watched his proceedings with misgiving, and proposed that he -should retire northwards, as soon as he had cut the railway, or even -without doing so. - -Korn Spruit opened Lord Roberts' eyes. He became alarmed for the safety -of the railway, and ordered Gatacre to evacuate Dewetsdorp and to -concentrate the weak pacificatory columns wandering helplessly over the -country. The column of 550 men without guns, sent by Gatacre to garrison -Dewetsdorp, had not been there many hours before it was ordered to -retire on Reddersburg, and at daybreak on April 2 was again on the -march, and soon De Wet was in touch with it. On the following morning he -was close to it. In his own account of the affair he says that there was -a sort of a race, which was won by the British column, for a ridge near -Reddersburg, named Mostert's Hoek. He had with him 2,000 men with four -guns, but an invitation to surrender was promptly declined by the -defenders, who all that day were beaten on by bullet and by shell. After -sunset the last drop of water was served out. Next morning De Wet rushed -the western spur of the ridge, which now became untenable, and at 9 a.m. -on April 4 the column surrendered and was swept into his net. - -Another hour of resistance would probably have saved it. On the previous -evening Gatacre and Lord Roberts received the news that it was in -trouble, and a relieving force was hurriedly collected at Bethany from -Springfontein and Bloemfontein, and sent out under Gatacre's command. -His scouts heard the last shot fired, and the silence which followed -seemed to show that all was over. When reports of the surrender reached -him near Reddersburg, and before De Wet, only six miles away, had -cleared out of Mostert's Hoek, he abandoned the attempt; although some -of his advanced mounted troops did indeed come into touch with the -rearguard of De Wet hurrying away with his prisoners. - -Next day he was recalled to Bloemfontein by Lord Roberts, who held him -responsible for the disaster. He had occupied Dewetsdorp, an exposed and -isolated position, with an inadequate force, although expressly -instructed to leave it alone if he had not sufficient troops for the -purpose. Mostert's Hoek supervening on Stormberg ended the career of a -most gallant, energetic, and enthusiastic soldier. _Bic peccare in bello -non licet_. He was removed from his command and sent back to England. - -After leaving Sannah's Post, De Wet seems to have recognized that he was -not exactly carrying out the Krijgsraad policy, for he informed Steyn -that he was going to Dewetsdorp to "collect the burghers and to obtain -dynamite for our operations" against the railway between Bloemfontein -and Bethany. Next day he heard that the British had occupied Dewetsdorp, -and soon after that the garrison was retiring on Reddersburg, and the -attack on the line, which perhaps he never seriously intended to make, -was indefinitely postponed. - -For as soon as he had disposed of the prisoners of Mostert's Hoek, he -cast his eye round the horizon and descried two other isolated -garrisons, at Smithfield and Wepener. Against the former he sent one of -his lieutenants, who, however, found the little town evacuated, while he -himself made for Wepener, and longing to teach a lesson to Brabant's -loyal colonials, sat down before it on April 9 with ten guns and 6,000 -men. In the course of the northward advance from the Orange it had been -occupied by a detachment from Brabant's force, which was increased by -subsequent reinforcements to a strength of nearly 1,900 men under -Dalgety, of whom little more than 100 were regular troops, with seven -guns. The town itself was not held, but a circular position outside it -with a perimeter of seven miles was taken up on the right bank of the -Caledon. - -De Wet maintained the siege for sixteen days. The failure of an attempt -by night on April 10 to storm a post on the southern section of the -perimeter deterred the Boers, as at Ladysmith after the abortive attack -on Caesar's Camp two months before, from further offensive action; but -the position was vigorously bombarded from time to time, and an almost -unceasing hail of Mauser bullets fell upon it. De Wet did his best to -add Wepener to the scalps of Sannah's Post and Mostert's Hoek; but when -two columns detailed for the relief by Lord Roberts under the command of -Brabant and Hart, who had come round from Natal with his brigade, -reached Wepener from Aliwal North on April 25, they found that the siege -had been raised, and that De Wet had trekked away to the north. - -At Waterval Drift, Kitchener's Kopje, Sannah's Post, and Mostert's Hoek, -De Wet showed himself to be a daring and successful partisan leader. He -was instinctively drawn towards helpless or unwary detachments. He -played his own hand without reference to his partner's, and seemed to be -incapable of co-operating in a general scheme of strategy. Perhaps he -had not much confidence in those who directed the campaign of defence. -He did not act in accordance with the instructions he had received from -the Krijgsraad; but who could find fault with a leader who was ever -sending in batches of prisoners of war? Many critics say that he was -wanting in the true military instinct and spirit, and that he lost the -greatest opportunity in his career when he allowed himself to be -attracted away from the British lines of communication by the feeble, -peregrinating columns. He says that his reason, or it may be his excuse, -for not raiding vigorously towards the south, instead of sitting down -before Wepener, was the fear lest the Transvaalers should think that the -Free Staters had abandoned them to their fate. If his action is open to -criticism when judged by the generally accepted principles of warfare, -it should be remembered that these are framed from experience only, and -are subject to accommodation. By all the rules of the game, the Boers -must have been beaten in six months: yet when, after the occupation of -Bloemfontein, the cause seemed to be hopeless, the De Wet revival -prolonged the contest for two years and more. It is almost certain that, -but for De Wet, the war would have been brought to a close in 1900. One -man only, and he was Napoleon, added a greater sum to the British -National Debt. - -The fortune which proverbially attends the bold never deserted him. To -the Boer forces at large he was what the pirate adventurers and -buccaneers of the Elizabethan period, and the privateersmen of the -eighteenth century, were to the National Navy. He sailed where he would -under letters of marque from the Presidents. He is the most interesting -and the most original personage of the South African War: and when its -history is mellowed by time, and its epic is written by some Walter -Scott or Homer of the future, De Wet will be the central figure, and his -exploits will be sung. - -Five years later, having thrown aside his sword, he became a controller -of ploughshares as Minister of Agriculture in the Government of the -Orange River Colony, and the father-in-law of a British officer who had -fought against him. - -Notes: - -[Footnote 39: At the Krijgsraad at Kroonstad Delarey maintained that the -commandos were too large and must be subdivided.] - -[Footnote 40: The scouting of the British Army in South Africa has been -compared to a housemaid searching for an escape of gas with a lighted -candle.] - -[Footnote 41: A The gun of U Battery, which had broken away at the -Drift, was recovered.] - -[Footnote 42: In the official handbook on _Combined Training_ issued -after the war, it was expressly laid down that "officers, must take upon -themselves, whenever it may be necessary, the responsibility of -departing from or varying the orders they may have received." This -responsibility had been laid by Napoleon upon his officers nearly a -century before. Seep. 251.] - - - - -CHAPTER X - -Baden-Powell and the Siege of Mafeking - - -Mafeking is a dull, unimportant town in the veld with a history that -attracted the Boers to it. - -They considered that, like Natal and Kimberley, it did not rightfully -belong to Great Britain. They were a community of trekking and -centrifugal atoms, especially in the direction of territories in the -possession of native tribes, and their own country, though sparsely -inhabited, was not spacious enough for them. The bucolic ambition of the -Boer, which is to dwell in a house from which he cannot see the smoke of -his nearest neighbour's chimney, can be satisfied in a flat country only -when the house stands in the midst of a farm many thousand _morgen_ in -extent. - -For a generation or two before the war, the Transvaalers had been -encroaching upon Bechuanaland. A Baralong chief named Montsioa was -dispossessed of Mafeking and could obtain no redress from the British -Government, which at that time was in an intermediate frame of mind, and -did not necessarily act on the assumption that in every dispute between -white man and native the latter was in the right. - -Thus encouraged, the Transvaalers annexed Bechuanaland in 1868, but -three years later it was taken away from them under the Keate award, in -an arbitration to determine the respective rights of Boer and native -over the debateable territory. - -After the war of 1881, the Transvaalers supposed that the British -Government would be unlikely to assert itself, and two little impudent -republics of adventurers were set up in territory which the award had -declared to be within the British sphere of influence. Montsioa fought -for his rights, but the British Government lay torpid for some time. -Finally it was goaded into action by a proclamation issued by Kruger -annexing the territory to the Transvaal. He soon found it advisable to -cancel the proclamation, and in 1885 the Republics of Goshen at Mafeking -and of Stellaland at Vryburg were effaced by an expedition led by Sir -Charles Warren. Bechuanaland was again annexed by proclamation, but on -this occasion to the British Empire. - -The resentment of the Transvaalers against Mafeking, which originated in -the conviction that they had been wrongfully deprived of it, was -aggravated by the fact that it was the starting place of the Jameson -Raid. - -On October 13 nearly 7,000 burghers, with six guns, under P. Cronje, sat -down before it. He expected to have little difficulty in recovering it. -Appearances were encouraging; the town was open and defenceless, and he -was probably aware that it was held by a weak garrison. Why the British -should have occupied such an out-of-the-way place as part of their plan -of campaign, he could not understand, but there it was, inviting attack. - -Of the half-hearted measures taken by the War and Colonial Offices in -1899, when a war with the Transvaal seemed to be more probable every -day, one of the most intelligent was the commissioning of R. -Baden-Powell, who had formerly served in Bechuanaland and had recently -commanded the 5th Dragoon Guards, to "organize the defence of the -Bechuanaland and Rhodesia frontiers." It would neither involve a great -expenditure of money, nor be likely to wound the susceptibilities of the -Transvaalers, who might be provoked by more vigorous and minatory -measures: and thus little harm would be done if after all it were found -to be an unnecessary precaution. - -For these reasons it commended itself to Pall Mall, but its chief merit -was that it sent to South Africa a capable, versatile and zealous -soldier, whose mind did not run in the grooves. Yet if Baden-Powell had -been sent to Kimberley instead of to Mafeking, Kimberley would probably -have fallen--after an outbreak of civil war within the lines between him -and Rhodes. It would have been impossible to insulate the personal -electricity with which each of them was so highly charged, and short -circuiting must have occurred. - -The object of the contemplated display upon the Bechuanaland and -Rhodesia frontiers was twofold. They ran through the indefinite border -belt which separated black from white territory, and activity on them -would not only be witnessed by the tribes and exert an impressive -influence on the native mind, but would also draw away the Boers and -prevent them concentrating their forces. The central position of -Mafeking on the Western line, and the stores and supplies which had been -collected in the town, attracted Baden-Powell to it. It was singularly -ill-adapted to hold defensively against an active enemy. - -In spite of recruiting difficulties raised by the Facing-both-Ways -Ministry at Capetown, which in a less tolerant and philosophic age would -at once have been swept away by a storm of indignation, he raised two -irregular regiments: the Rhodesian Regiment, which was sent into -Rhodesia under Plumer, and the Protectorate Regiment under Hore. - -The Cape Ministry did what it could to prevent the Protectorate Regiment -going to Mafeking, and the corps was in fact mustered outside the Cape -Colony, and only entered the town a few days before war was declared. As -at Kimberley, so also at Mafeking, the Schreiner sect set itself -placidly to thwart the gentle and tentative early efforts of the British -Government to deal with the situation. - -When P. Cronje appeared before Mafeking, Baden-Powell had a force of -less than 1,200 men, none of whom were regular soldiers and less than -half of whom were efficiently armed, with which to sustain the siege of -an open town by 7,000 Boers. He had also four small field guns of -obsolete pattern, to which were added later on a home-made howitzer and -an ancient man-of-war's smoothbore, which had left the foundry during -the Napoleonic wars. In its youth it had probably fought the French -through a porthole, and now having in the interval trekked across the -South African veld into the possession of a native tribe, was discovered -in a Baralong kraal, restored to active service, and, mounted on a Dutch -wagon, aided in the defence of a little settlement 400 miles away from -the sound of the sea. - -In one respect only Baden-Powell had the advantage over Kekewich at -Kimberley. His burden was not increased by discord within the lines. The -civilians behaved with exemplary composure and put themselves -unreservedly into his hands. - -An archaic but effective simplicity characterized the methods of the -defence. Baden-Powell eked out his slender stock of men and instruments -with tricks and devices that might have been employed at the siege of -Troy, but which none the less deceived and confounded the slow-witted -besiegers, whom he scandalized with gibes and taunting messages. When -asked to surrender to avoid further bloodshed, he replied that the only -blood hitherto shed was the blood of a chicken in a compound; and on -another occasion he reproved Cronje for inactivity. Many of the -incidents read like passages from the Iliad. The besiegers were allured -into determined attacks upon dummy trenches; deceived by bogus orders -shouted for their information through a megaphone; alarmed by the sudden -appearance of cavalry within the lines, for did they not see the glint -of lances? The lances were weapons that had been forged in the railway -workshops, and carried round, as it were in a parade before the -footlights by a body of supers making a gallant show upon the stage. - -What should be done in a besieged place with such an embarrassing asset -as ten tons of dynamite? Buller would have handed them over to his -second in command for disposal, and then if any accident occurred would -have disclaimed responsibility for it. Gatacre would have taken the -chances, but would not have hesitated to pitch his tent if necessary -beside them. Colvile would have searched his orders for instructions. -Baden-Powell, not being able to rid himself of the explosive by firing -it, arranged that it should be fired by the enemy. He loaded it on -railway trucks, which he propelled a few miles out of the town and then -abandoned. There was no Laocoon to warn the Boers, and they rushed at -what they thought was an armoured train in trouble. In the skirmish the -dynamite exploded, and although no one was hurt the enemy was terribly -scared, and the resisting powers of the garrison virtually augmented. - -Baden-Powell thoroughly understood the Boer temperament. Many -generations' isolation from the progressive European world had rendered -it peculiarly liable to be ensnared by simple expedients. It was not -wanting in "slimness," but it was the "slimness" or cunning of a -primitive race, and was easily gulled by wiles that might have been -employed against a tribe of Red Indians. Baden-Powell alone of all the -British leaders was aware of this, and he owed much of his success to -the knowledge. With but one man to defend each ten yards of his -perimeter of seven miles he hypnotized Cronje, a dull man bewildered by -a resourceful. His versatility instantly found a way out of each -difficulty that beset him. Before he sent out a party detailed for a -night attack that might easily go astray, he bethought himself of the -device by which a ship is often guided into her haven, and hung up two -lamps in the town as leading lights across the veld. - -Cronje soon found that Mafeking was not an easy prey. Although in all -probability he might at any time have overwhelmed it by sheer weight of -numbers, he refrained from making the attempt. It hit out so vigorously -and was believed to be so well protected by mines that he requisitioned -a big gun from Pretoria, which was mounted south of the town and came -into action on October 23. With a weapon throwing a shell more than -three times heavier than all the shells that could be fired in salvo by -the artillery of the defence, there was no doubt in his mind that the -place must fall before the end of the month. - -The arrival of the gun quickened the attack for a time. The native -location S.W. of the town was made the object of a feint on October 25 -to be immediately followed by a real attack elsewhere, but the -Baralongs, who had been armed, resisted so stoutly that the operation -failed. By the beginning of November the Boers had been cleared out of a -newly made advanced trench on the east side; and Cannon Kopje on the -south, the possession of which by them would have made a considerable -section of the defence works and perhaps even the town itself untenable, -was held under a converging fire of artillery by fifty troopers of the -British South African Police against a thousand Boers. - -Five weeks of Baden-Powell were enough for Cronje, who on November 19 -trekked away to the south, leaving Snyman and 3,000 burghers to continue -the siege. His self-esteem had been wounded because the walls had not -immediately fallen to the sound of the big gun, and by Baden-Powell's -refusal to take a serious view of the situation in the frequent -communications that passed between them. It may be said that Cronje was -"chaffed" away from Mafeking; the gibes put him out of conceit with -himself, and instead of stimulating him into activity only made him more -dull-spirited than he was by nature. He had none of the instinctive -military genius which showed itself so notably in most of his -colleagues, who, having turned their ploughshares into swords at a -moment's notice, were generally more than a match for the professional -soldiers against whom they were pitted. He had the misfortune of meeting -almost the only British leader then in South Africa capable of -instinctively assessing him on the spot at his true valuation; and like -a timid poker-player with a good hand, he allowed himself to be bluffed -by the flourishes of his opponent. He held good cards, but he feebly -threw them down. At Magersfontein he played his hand with skill, but -lost the deciding game at Paardeberg. - -Baden-Powell was too zealous a soldier to conform to the schism that the -operations of war were akin to athletics or sport. Externally his -predilections were for the drama. He was a competent actor and manager, -and he rejoiced in Mafeking as in a stage play. - -Many of his devices were as unsubstantial as stage scenery; the -besiegers were the villains of the piece who would meet with their -deserts before the curtain fell; there was comic by-play in his ways of -beguiling the tedium and the lassitude of the siege, in the bantering -messages he sent out to the besiegers, and now and then even in his -garrison orders. The little garrison was permeated by the exosmose -action of his cheery optimism and humour during seven weary months of -waiting; and while it might seem to some that he was treating the -serious situation with unbecoming levity, he wisely kept the tragedy of -it, of which he was fully conscious, in the background. - -His methods were so far successful that in a few weeks he had driven -away two-thirds of the force originally opposed to him, and had firmly -gripped the place. The enemy's superiority in artillery was neutralized -by the construction of underground shelters and warrens in which the -women and children took refuge during the daytime, leaving an apparently -deserted town to be bombarded. Thus Baden-Powell was relieved from the -moral pressure which a large number of casualties among them would have -caused; and the garrison suffered but little in the redoubts and -trenches. Supplies were plentiful and the water supply secure. - -What Cronje had failed to do, Snyman could hardly be expected to -accomplish with a considerably reduced force, and the attack became more -faint-hearted. He carried out the Cronje policy of comfortable, -lethargic squatting, doubting not that the place must fall into his -hands sooner or later. Friends and relations tripped over from -Johannesburg to admire and encourage his brave burghers at their posts, -and some were even allowed as a treat to fire a shot at the Khakis. - -No serious operation occurred until the end of the year. On the morrow -of Christmas Day, Baden-Powell made an unsuccessful attempt to carry a -fort on Game Tree Hill, which commanded the approach to the town from -the north. He was unaware of its strength, and the casualties amounted -to nearly one-fifth of the force engaged, a loss which he could ill -afford; but early in January he compelled the big gun, which could -neither face the shells of his little battery of 7-pounders nor the -rifles of his marksmen, to withdraw to a more distant emplacement east -of the town. Towards the end of the month an encouraging message was -received from Lord Roberts at Capetown. - -The Boer line of circumvallation was in plan an irregular hexagon, of -which the north-east face was pushed inwards and a re-entrant angle -formed at the Brickfields; where a fort was built nearer to the town -than any other post of the attack, and the operations during February -and March were mainly a struggle for the possession of it. After several -weeks of sapping and counter sapping, the Boers, though supported by the -fire of the big gun in its new emplacement, were expelled from the -Brickfields on March 23. - -April was marked by the final withdrawal of the big gun, which, after a -heavy bombardment on the 11th, was sent away to Pretoria; and by the -appearance of young Eloff, fresh from the capital, with instructions to -do what he could to stimulate the attack, for once in a way, into real -activity. More than a fortnight elapsed before he succeeded. Snyman gave -him little encouragement, but could not oppose a mandate from Kruger, -Eloff's grandfather. - -The Molopo River, after passing south of the town, runs through the only -weak place in the defence, the native location, which during the first -few days of the siege had been attacked without result by Cronje. -Westward of it the steep banks of the river afford a covered way of -access to the thickly clustered huts lying within the perimeter of the -defence, which Eloff saw might be turned if he got a footing among them. - -Early in the morning of May 12 a heavy fire was opened upon the town -from the east, but was soon discontinued; and then an alarm came from -the S.W. It was Eloff, who, with 300 burghers, had wriggled up the river -bed through the outposts and had set fire to the native huts: a signal -for the reinforcements which Snyman had promised in writing. It also -warned the garrison. The natives were too much terrified to offer -resistance, and Eloff, leaving the greater part of his force to hold the -location, advanced upon the town. The police building in the open was -surrounded and the detachment holding it taken prisoners. A pause was -now made to allow the promised reinforcements to come up. - -Eloff's gallant thrust gave the garrison the opportunity for which it -had long been hoping. The troops of the western section of the defence -closed in and were manoeuvred by Baden-Powell through the telephone. The -door by which Eloff came in was shut, not only to a retreat but also to -the reinforcements which timidly knocked at it; the burghers holding the -location were overpowered, and Eloff's party was penned up in the police -building with its prisoners, whose condition was suddenly dramatically -reversed. Eloff, seeing that Snyman had failed him, surrendered to the -men he had captured a few hours before, within the walls of the prison -in which he had confined them. - -The ordeal of Mafeking soon came to an end. On May 15 it was reported -that the relief column under Mahon, who on that day joined Plumer at -Massibi on the Molopo twenty miles from Mafeking, was approaching. The -combined forces, though vigorously opposed by Delarey, whom L. Botha had -sent when the news of the advance reached him, entered the town on May -17 and ended a siege of 213 days. - -Mafeking, the last and most instructive of the sieges, proved that there -was hardly any disparity of numbers or preponderance of available -military resources that could not be neutralized by good leadership -opposed to bad. Baden-Powell had not only detained a considerable Boer -force on the edge of the storm, but with a body of irregular troops had -beaten the men of Magersfontein, Colenso, and Spion Kop. - -The relief of Mafeking, however, did not vitally affect the general -situation. The capture of the town during Lord Robert's advance would no -doubt have caused annoyance and trouble, but if necessary it could have -been retaken without much difficulty. Nor would its fall have greatly -benefited the enemy, who probably would have been tempted by the success -to hold an unsound position and detain in it commandos urgently required -elsewhere. - -Kimberley, Mafeking, and Wepener, more than the operations at large, -demonstrated the anomalous character of the war. Hitherto, invaders had -been accustomed to besiege the invaded, in South Africa the invaded -besieged the invaders. Such a reversal of the order of things military -had rarely before occurred. The sieges of the Peninsular War are not an -exception, for Wellington was from a military, though not from a -political point of view, as much an invader as the lieutenants of -Napoleon. - -Baden-Powell is a suppressed personality whose merit was not fully -recognized. With scarcely an exception, no individual leader was more -self-reliant, or handled imperfect tools with greater skill. For seven -months he kept the flag flying over the lonely Baralong kraal in the -veld. His unconventional even theatrical methods were not to the taste -of his serious superiors, who underestimated his success. His only -reward was the Companionship of the Bath, which was also bestowed upon -the militia colonels, most of whom, from no fault or no want of zeal on -their part, but from lack of opportunity, never met the enemy except in -some casual paltry skirmish. - -The junction of the two columns advancing to the relief of -Mafeking--Plumer's from the north and Mahon's from the south--was -effected at the right moment, for it is doubtful whether either of them -acting alone would have been able to deal with Delarey. - -Plumer with the Rhodesian Regiment had been trekking here and there and -skirmishing with the enemy for seven months. On the eve of the war he -was sent by Baden-Powell to Tuli, a village in Rhodesia not far from the -right bank of the Limpopo, which is the northern boundary of the -Transvaal. His instructions were "to defend the border, to attract the -enemy away towards the north, and then in due time to co-operate with -the British force," which it was expected would soon be invading the -Transvaal from the south, and also to overawe the doubtful native tribes -between Tuli and Mafeking, a distance of 500 miles; and he had under his -immediate command at Tuli one irregular regiment 500 strong. - -He remained for some weeks seeing to the drifts, which were now in his -possession and now in that of the enemy. A Boer raid into Rhodesia on -November 2 forced the outlying detachments back upon Tuli, which was -seriously threatened by some commandos under F.A. Grobler of Marico. The -Government of Pretoria, however, growing anxious at the presence of -British troops elsewhere, vetoed a promising enterprise and recalled -him. The raid of November 2 was answered a few weeks later by Plumer, -who, finding the drifts unoccupied, reconnoitred thirty miles towards -the south. Nearly six months elapsed before another British soldier set -foot in the Transvaal. A subsequent reconnaissance again found no trace -of the enemy on the left bank of the Limpopo, and showed that it was -unnecessary for him to remain on the river. He had the advantage of -being cut off from communication with superior officers ignorant of -local conditions, and was able to act freely upon his own -responsibility. - -He soon heard news which clearly indicated the way he should go. The -railway from Buluwayo to Mafeking was held as far as possible towards -the south by patrols of police under Nicholson, and the Rhodesian -Volunteers under Holdsworth were also on the line. In the gap between -the railhead and Mafeking, a Boer commando, said to have been detached -from Mafeking by Cronje, was at Sekwani on the N.W. border of the -Transvaal and within striking distance of the Western line. It was face -to face with the border tribes and was soon in trouble with them. -Although they were not allowed to attack Sekwani independently, they -were permitted to co-operate as non-combatants in an attack which -Holdsworth was about to make on it, but only on the condition that they -did not cross the Transvaal border. This was a refinement of policy -which they could hardly be expected to understand, and they precipitated -Holdsworth's action by attacking the Boer laager, which lay but a mile -or two across the border, on their own account, and the operation had -therefore to be abandoned. To avenge this native attack, in which -several burghers had been killed, reinforcements were brought over by -the Boers from the Pietersburg line, and Holdsworth's position at -Mochudi on the Western line, whither he had retired after the Sekwani -failure, was endangered. - -This was the news which reached Plumer at the end of the year. His -original instructions were obsolescent and he readily adapted himself to -the altered situation. He saw that it was more important to clear the -railway north of Mafeking than to remain where he was on the chance of a -Boer invasion of Rhodesia, of which his reconnaissances south of the -Limpopo saw no sign. The nearest station on the Western line was -Palapye, and on December 27 he set out on his midsummer march of 170 -miles to it. Within a fortnight, his little force of irregulars, which -three months before had been sent out into the South African wilderness -to perform duties that might have engrossed a division, passed away from -Tuli beyond the Limpopo on to the visible stage of war near Mochudi. - -In the middle of January, 1900, he reached Gaberones. On his left flank -Sekwani was still occupied by the enemy, though in reduced numbers; in -front of him the Boers were not only strongly posted on the railway at -Crocodile Pools, but able to draw upon Mafeking for reinforcements, by -the help of which they successfully resisted an attack on February 11. -Plumer's force, though augmented by detachments he had picked up on the -line, was unequal to the task of advancing along it. He therefore -decided to diverge from the railway and advance by way of Kanya, a -native town lying twenty miles west of the line. - -On March 6 he reached Lobatsi, where he was forty-five miles from -Mafeking. He found, however, that it was an awkward place to defend and -soon quitted it, as Baden-Powell seemed to be in no immediate need, and -was in fact averse to Plumer's small force throwing itself upon the -besiegers. With the greater part of his command, the rest being sent -back to hold the railway at Crocodile Pools, he withdrew to the base -which he had established at Kanya; afterwards advancing to Sefetili, -thirty miles from Mafeking, where he awaited the approach of Mahon's -relieving column from the south. Baden-Powell, rejoicing in his siege, -was not anxious that the game which he was playing so well should be -brought to a premature conclusion, and was more afraid for Plumer than -for himself. - -Plumer filled in his two months at Kanya and Sefetili by occasional -raids in the direction of Mafeking and by an expedition towards Zeerust. -The column in the south, of whose movements many false reports reached -him from time to time, seemed to be tarrying by the way, and it was not -until May 12 that he received a message from Lord Roberts that it was -nearing its destination. - -For some weeks after his entry into Bloemfontein, Lord Roberts was -unable to arrange for the direct relief of Mafeking by a column -specially detailed for the purpose. He had originally intended that this -should be done by Methuen, but subsequently ordered him to operate in -the Free State on the left flank of the advance on the Transvaal. He -hoped to apply his favourite method of an automatic relief, brought -about by external pressure elsewhere. At the end of April, however, when -it had become an urgent matter, he ordered Hunter, who had recently -arrived at Kimberley from Natal, to send out a mounted force under -Mahon, following it himself with the rest of the Xth Division. - -He left Kimberley on May 3, and on the following day Mahon set out from -Barkly West on his 230 miles' march to Mafeking. Mahon advanced wide of -the railway up the Hart's River, which joins the Vaal at Barkly West, -his right flank being covered by Hunter, who kept close to the Vaal. -Mahon met with no serious resistance until he had covered 200 miles of -his journey, when he found a, force which had been sent down from -Mafeking across his path, and which diverted him to Massibi; where he -joined Plumer on May 15. - -The advance of the main and less mobile body under Hunter was aided by -demonstrations made by Methuen from Boshof. With three columns claiming -their attention the bewildered Boers were unable to do more than offer a -stout but ineffectual resistance to Hunter on the Vaal on May 5. Two -days later he occupied Fourteen Streams and restored the railway -communication across the Vaal, having during his halt taken possession -of Christiana, a village in the Transvaal a few miles up the river. It -was now no longer necessary for him to hurry after Mahon, and his -advance northwards was made at leisure. Early in June he occupied -Lichtenburg, where Mahon rejoined him. - -Mafeking as well as Kimberley were now in the hands of Lord Roberts, but -the Western line joining them to Capetown was not yet secure. The -districts of Cape Colony west of De Aar and Hopetown were remote and -backward, and sparsely inhabited by discontented and unprosperous Dutch -farmers. Nearly a year before, while the Cape Government was placidly -blinking under the shadow of Table Mountain and only taking action that -thwarted the attempts of the Imperial Government to prepare for war, and -like the unjust steward intriguing for reception in Boer houses if the -Empire should fail, arms had been sent into these districts by the Boers -of the Republics, and courses of instruction in the use of them were -actually being held. - -To stir up the discontented and set the veld on fire, a party of -Transvaalers swooped down from Vryburg before the war was many days old. -Rebel commandos were raised, and most of the districts lying between the -Orange and the Molopo were involved, some of them being annexed by -proclamation to the Republics. For several months the trouble was -confined to the right bank of the Orange, but during February it passed -over to the left bank. - -In pursuance of his policy of striking swiftly and strongly at the -centres of population, and not from neglect, Lord Roberts had left the -rebellious and disaffected districts more or less to themselves, in the -belief that indirect action would retrieve the situation and that his -advance would take the heart out of the rebels and deter them from -crossing the river; and for some months there had been no British troops -south of the Orange except at De Aar and Hopetown. - -Now, however, the railway, which until his arrival at Bloemfontein was -his only line of communication, was threatened. The Prieska and Herbert -districts on the left bank of the Orange, and even the remote Gordonia -district lying in the angle between the Orange and the Molopo, which was -too far away to be included in the first batch of proclamations, were -annexed by the Boers. There was much danger of the advancing army not -only finding its communications broken, but also a formidable rebellion -springing up behind it. - -The troops on the line were insufficient to deal with the situation, and -Lord Roberts was obliged to draw upon Clements, who was acting in the -other disturbed districts of the Cape Colony south of the Free State. -Lord Kitchener, who chanced to be passing through De Aar on his way back -from Naauwpoort, where he had been sent to look after the central -advance, made arrangements for the Prieska operations and rejoined Lord -Roberts at Kimberley; but his presence was soon required again at De -Aar. Three columns had started westward from the line, but the centre -column, which was composed of the troops withdrawn from Clement's -command, met with opposition in the Prieska district, and was compelled -to retire on March 6. When the news reached Lord Roberts he sent -Kitchener to take charge of the operations, which from that time was -successful. The rebellion south of the Orange was suppressed; the -leaders disappeared; and by the end of the month Kitchener was free to -return to Head Quarters at Bloemfontein. - -Not many weeks, however, elapsed before there was trouble in Griqualand, -a considerable portion of which was in the hands of rebel descendants of -the burghers of the Great Trek, who were joined by rebels expelled from -the districts south of the Orange during the late operations. A column -had been sent out against them from Kimberley by Methuen in March, but -Lord Roberts disapproved of the expedition and it was recalled. At the -request of Sir A. Milner, who from the first had been of the opinion -that the British hold on South Africa was in greater danger from -rebellion in the Colony than from the commandos of the two Republics, -Lord Roberts consented to send a force into Griqualand under the command -of Warren, who was brought round from Natal, and returned to the country -through which he had worked in the Bechuanaland Expedition of 1885. In -the middle of May, Warren set out from Belmont. The only regular troops -in his column were a few Irish mounted infantry. Douglas was easily -taken on May 21, and on his way to Campbell he was compelled by supply -and transport difficulties to halt at Faber's Put, where at dawn on May -30 he was surprised by the rebels, who, knowing that they had not to -face regular troops, anticipated an easy victory. They succeeded in -almost surrounding the camp before the alarm was given, but after a -brief struggle were driven off. - -Early in June Campbell and Griquatown were occupied; and on the 24th -Kuruman, which had been in the hands of the rebels for nearly six -months, was recovered. Near Khies, lower down the Orange, the force -which had been left to watch the banks after the suppression of the -Prieska rebellion, some of the fugitives from which had returned to the -river under the leadership of a Jew, attacked and carried their laager. -This and the Faber's Put affair were the only serious fights in the -clearing of the Colony north of the Orange. - -Thus by the end of June Lord Roberts had secured the railway from -Mafeking and Kimberley to the south. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -Bloemfontein to Pretoria - - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 260.] - -The agile mind of Lord Roberts rather than the heavy hand of his Chief -of the Staff is discernible in the method of the advance on the -Transvaal. - -There were two courses open to the British Army. It might have -deliberately pulverized and extinguished each atom of opposition within -reach in the Free State, and have taken no step to the front until the -rear and the flanks were absolutely and finally clear of the enemy; or -it might have advanced boldly towards the Transvaal with the ordinary -precautions for the protection of the lines of communication and of the -flanks. - -Lord Roberts adopted the latter course. He had tried it with success in -the Afghan War twenty years before, when he marched even more "in the -air" from Kabul to Kandahar. The tedious process of "steam-rollering" -the Free State was not to his taste, nor would the expectant British -public at home have understood it; and it would have been severely -criticized by the military experts. It would have concentrated before -him north of the Vaal all the Boer forces which could not be crushed on -the spot, and have left the resources of the Transvaal for some time -untouched: free communication with the outer world by way of the neutral -port of Lorenzo Marques, the treasury of the Johannesburg gold mines -upon which the enemy could draw, and the railway and mining workshops in -which munitions of war could be manufactured. - -Lord Roberts therefore determined upon a swift advance from -Bloemfontein. He was confident that the occupation of places would bring -the war to an end without an excessive loss of life; and he would -probably have been right if he had been engaged in a European war. He -did not see, however, that the Boers derived little or no strength from -their towns, which were rather a source of weakness; they were men of -the veld and the veld was their strength. - -De Wet's _guerilla_ advanced Chermside to the command of the IIIrd -Division, in place of Gatacre sent home. A new Division, numbered the -VIIIth, under a new commander, Sir Leslie Rundle, a general with an -Egyptian reputation, was assembled south of Bloemfontein in April. - -The siege of Wepener called for activity from Bloemfontein as well as -from the Orange, and Lord Roberts sent Rundle to Dewetsdorp, where his -presence would, it was hoped, not only draw the Boers away from Wepener, -but deny them a retreat to the north. Pole-Carew with the XIth Division -and French followed Rundle, but De Wet abandoned the siege on the -approach of Hart and Brabant from the south, and his brother P. De Wet -scuttled away from Dewetsdorp on the approach of Rundle; and the -commandos ran the gauntlet successfully. Their hereditary trekking -instincts told them when to move and how to move, and their mobility had -not at that period been recognized by the British Staff. Wepener was -indeed relieved, though not from Bloemfontein, but the subsequent -divagations of the Boers baffled three British divisions which were -endeavouring to squeeze them northwards and head them off. A strong -rearguard was left by the Boers at Houtnek, ten miles north of -Thabanchu. - -Lord Roberts' position at Bloemfontein, and on the line of -communication, had never been seriously endangered. The brilliant -affairs of Sannah's Post and Mostert's Hoek were no doubt annoying to -the British Army and encouraging to the enemy. At home the importance of -them was greatly exaggerated. If the advance on the Transvaal was -delayed by them and the subsequent operations arising out of the siege -of Wepener, more time was given to prepare for it; and the British Army -was usefully informed of a fact which hitherto had hardly been -suspected, namely, that the enemy derived much of his power from -mobility, resourcefulness, and aptitude for _guerilla_. - -Lord Roberts' plan for the movement on the Transvaal was an advance in -line, on a front which extended from Ladysmith to Kimberley. It soon -became an echelon owing to the slow movements of Buller in Natal. In the -centre at Bloemfontein were the troops under the immediate orders of the -Commander-in-Chief; on the left at Kimberley were Methuen, and Hunter -with the Xth Division which had been brought round from Ladysmith. -Between the centre and the right the intervention of Basutoland and the -Drakensberg prevented the effective co-operation of the Natal Army with -Lord Roberts; and a portion of the interval was occupied by the enemy. - -The centre columns under Lord Roberts were about 43,000 strong. Hunter -and Methuen in the west had each under his command about 10,000 troops, -while Buller's force, which was much nearer to the Transvaal objective -than the centre, and which was still lingering on the banks of the Klip -River two months after the relief of Ladysmith, numbered about 45,000. -Ian Hamilton, who had done so well in the Elandslaagte and Caesar's Camp -affairs, was not allowed to waste himself in the Natal lethargy. He was -recalled from Ladysmith, and after taking part from the Bloemfontein -side in the Wepener operations, was given command of a column which was -sent on, a few days before the general movement, in the direction of -Winburg to protect the right flank of the central advance and to fend -off from it the hovering Boer commandos which had been pressed -northwards by the April operations. He started from Thabanchu on April -30 and was soon in action with the Boer force a Houtnek under P. Botha. -The battle lasted until nightfall and was renewed next day, when, with -the help of reinforcements from French and Colvile, Ian Hamilton forced -the Boers to retire on Clocolan. - -Meanwhile there was energy on the left. Methuen had been for some time -in occupation of the Boshof district, where he was in a position to -threaten Kroonstad as well as the commandos at the Vaal bridge at -Fourteen Streams between Kimberley and Mafeking. The relief of the -latter was to be undertaken by a flying column under Mahon supported by -Hunter's division. On May 3 Lord Roberts left Bloemfontein for the -north. Kelly-Kenny's Division remained in charge of the Free State -capital, while Chermside's policed the railway and the country in rear. -Rundle at Thabanchu was instructed to prevent the enemy from regaining a -footing in the districts east and south of Bloemfontein, and Methuen to -push on towards the left bank of the Vaal beyond Hoopstad. No definite -orders were sent to Buller, but for two months there had been a constant -interchange of suggestions, counter-suggestions, plans, and projects for -co-ordinate action. - -Lord Roberts' objective was now Pretoria. The country in front of him -was not difficult and he had a railway behind him. The line of -communication with the south was fairly safe, and it was estimated that -not more than 12,000 Boers with twenty-eight guns, under Delarey and L. -Botha, who had been brought round from Natal to take chief command -during the crisis, barred the way into the Transvaal; not including the -loosely associated commandos operating on the right flank under the -general control of De Wet, the Prince Rupert of the Boer War. - -The nearest Boer post was at Brandfort, a few miles north of Karee -Siding. On the right was the Winburg intervening column, 14,000 strong, -under Ian Hamilton, who dragged in his train a weak supporting Division -under Colvile, his superior officer in an anomalous position obliged to -conform to his movements, and without authority to direct them. -Brandfort was occupied that evening by Lord Roberts at the cost of six -men killed. Vet River, the next obstacle, was secured on May 5, and -crossed on the following day by the greater part of the main column. Ian -Hamilton went into bivouac eight miles north of Winburg, which was -occupied by his henchman Colvile. - -Up to this time, Lord Roberts was acting without the cavalry under -French, who since the Sannah's Post affair had been working in the -Thabanchu district, and who joined the main column on May 9. Though his -horses were not in good condition, his arrival increased the power of -the centre to strike rapidly at the next obstacles, the Zand River and -the town of Kroonstad forty miles beyond, which was now the seat of the -Free State Government. The drifts on a section of the river nearly -twenty miles in length were seized, the most easterly being taken by Ian -Hamilton, who had gradually converged on the centre column and was now -on the right of the line. Next day the passage of the river was -effected; but Lord Roberts' hope of getting round and grappling each -flank of the enemy, who numbered about 3,000 Transvaalers and 5,000 Free -Staters, was not realized, and Botha withdrew without serious loss. That -night the Army went into bivouac astride the railway between Zand River -and Kroonstad. - -On the left was the cavalry under French, who next morning raided -northwards; but although he was unable, owing to the opposition of a -force which came out of Kroonstad, to reach the railway north of the -town, a small party of pioneers whom he had sent on succeeded during the -night in blowing up the line at America Siding within a few yards of the -high-road by which the enemy was retreating. This daring exploit, which -although it had not much effect on the situation was not the less -meritorious, was carried out by Hunter-Weston, who, just two months -previously, had similarly cut the line north of Bloemfontein. The Boers -had taken up a position at Boschrand to defend Kroonstad on the south, -but French's turning movement scared them, and the position as well as -the town was abandoned, in spite of efforts made by Steyn and Botha to -arrest the flight. The seat of Government was transferred to Lindley. - -The Zand River affair was an incident in the advance rather than a -battle. Lord Roberts suffered but 115 casualties. Its effect on the -enemy was chiefly moral. The Transvaalers, whose country had not yet -heard the sounds of war, were alarmed, but the Free Staters were -dismayed. The ties of race and kindred had engulfed them in a war which -was not for their own cause, and the brunt of which they had borne for -ten weeks. They thought that they had done all that could be expected of -them and that the Transvaal must now look after itself. From that time -there was no organized co-operation between the allies. - -On May 12 Lord Roberts entered Kroonstad. In his advance, averaging -thirteen miles per day, he had outstripped the reconstruction of the -railway, of which almost every bridge and culvert had been blown up by -the retreating Boers, and many miles of the permanent way had been -destroyed. A halt was therefore necessary until the railhead could be -brought nearer, and to give the Army an opportunity of pulling itself -together, which was especially required by the cavalry. Little more than -one-half of the 6,000 horses with which French marched out of -Bloemfontein on May 6 were fit for service at Kroonstad seven days -later. - -Ian Hamilton was sent out in chase of the flitting Free State -Government. He found it not at Lindley, nor at Heilbron, for it had -trekked away to Frankfort. Between Lindley and Heilbron he was attacked -in rear by a body of Boers, who emerged from the presumed vacuum behind -him, but they were beaten off. - -The bulk of the enemy's force which had evacuated Kroonstad, was now in -the triangle formed by the railway, the Vaal and the Rhenoster. On its -left flank was Ian Hamilton; and French was ordered out to hook the -right flank, a repetition of the movement which had failed at Zand -River. On May 22 Lord Roberts left Kroonstad. - -The enemy, however, again evaded the net. Reconnaissances by French on -May 23 showed that Botha had been frightened by the appearance of Ian -Hamilton at Heilbron, and had crossed into the Transvaal. The discovery -necessitated the recasting of Lord Roberts' plan, and brought about an -interesting and entirely successful strategic movement. It was evident -from Botha's dispositions that he expected Ian Hamilton to march -straight to his front and endeavour to cross the Vaal above the railway -bridge at Vereeniging. The difficult drifts and country below it were -considered to be a sufficient protection, and were not strongly held by -Botha, who on this occasion was completely out-generalled by his -opponent. - -Lord Roberts ordered Ian Hamilton to march from the right flank to the -left, across the front of the main Army, and then in conjunction with -French to wheel round to Meyerton on the line between Johannesburg and -Vereeniging. On the evening of May 26 he entered the Transvaal at -Wonderwater Drift. But Ian Hamilton's column had not the honour of being -the first troops of the main body to enter the Transvaal, for he found -the cavalry in front of him. French,[43] who had been sent out from -Kroonstad on May 20, reached the Vaal at Paris on the 24th, and at once -threw part of his force into the Transvaal, the rest crossing higher up -at Old Viljoen's Drift. He thus fittingly celebrated the last birthday -festival of Queen Victoria, which was also appropriately honoured by a -proclamation issued on the same day by Lord Roberts, by which the Orange -Free State was annexed to the dominions of Her Majesty under the -designation of the Orange River Colony--a suitable birthday offering -from a distinguished soldier to his Sovereign. - -The main body of the Army with the Commander-in-Chief at its head -entered the Transvaal at Viljoen's Drift on May 27, and, like the -pioneer columns of French and Ian Hamilton, met with no opposition. It -was of good augury for the speedy subjugation of the South African -Republic. The expected firm stand of the enemy along the right bank of -the Vaal, where the great battle of the war was to be fought, was not -made. Vereeniging and subsequently Meyerton were abandoned in spite of -all Botha's efforts to keep his burghers' faces to the front. He held a -strong line enclosing Vereeniging and the drifts and extending from near -Heidelberg to Potchefstroom, but it impotently watched the British -troops crossing the river. Some opposition was indeed offered to French -when he was a day's march from the drift by which he had crossed into -the Transvaal, but the bulk of the commandos fell away to the north and -took up positions between Johannesburg and Krugersdorp. By arrangement -between the Governments, none of the Free Staters accompanied Botha into -the Transvaal; but he was in communication with De Wet at Frankfort, and -was urging him to act against the railway in the Free State. He must -have regretted that the strong hand and will of the man of Waterval -Drift, Kitchener's Kopje, Sannah's Post, and Mostert's Hoek, were not -with him on the right bank of the Vaal to animate the shrinking burghers -of the South African Republic. - -The immediate purpose of Lord Roberts was now the capture of -Johannesburg, the relations of some of whose inhabitants towards -Pretoria had brought on, not only the Jameson raid, but also the war. -Although it was not defended by permanent military works, the burghers -had taken up a position before it which might be very hard to capture, -and there was another and greater cause for anxiety. The task before -Lord Roberts may be likened to an attack on a ship manned by pirates, -who threaten to fire the magazine as soon as a hand is laid upon the -bulwarks. It was seriously proposed by certain persons in authority -under Kruger, that on the appearance of the British Army before the -city, the mines in which so many millions of British capital were -invested should be wrecked; and it is probable that the threat would -have been carried out with official sanction if Botha had not set his -face resolutely against such a piratical act. - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 240.] - -Lord Roberts proposed to effect the capture of Johannesburg by -surrounding it. While with the main body of his Army he occupied -Elandsfontein on the east, French and Ian Hamilton, the pioneers of the -advance from Bloemfontein, would deal with the enemy posted south of the -city and then establish themselves, the former near Klipfontein, north -of it, and the latter near Florida, west of it. The right and the most -vulnerable part of the Boer line was posted on Doornkop near the scene -of the surrender of Jameson, the enthusiast, who, a few years before, -had endeavoured with a few hundred adventurers and soldiers of fortune -to solve the South African question which Great Britain was now tackling -with a quarter of a million of trained soldiers. - -On May 29 Ian Hamilton attacked the Doornkop position and won it after -some hard infantry fighting; French, reinforced by the loan of -Hamilton's mounted troops, having thrown a grappling iron round it, -thereby rendering it untenable. At nightfall the two leaders were firmly -planted west of the city. The movement deceived the enemy, to whom the -advance of the main body under Lord Roberts on Elandsfontein came as an -unwelcome surprise, though Botha had to some extent prepared for it. The -detachments posted by him at various places east of the city offered no -effectual resistance, and Lord Roberts went into bivouac that night at -Elandsfontein. Johannesburg was entrapped between him on the east, and -French and Hamilton on the north and west. - -On May 30 the city agreed not unwillingly to surrender, but having -regard to the presence in it of splinters of the lately shattered -commandos, to the probability of street fighting, and to the risk of -injury to the mines, Lord Roberts consented to postpone his formal entry -until the following day; by which time the judicious action of the -representatives of the Boer Government had averted the impending danger, -and the troops took peaceful possession of Johannesburg. - -In spite of disquieting news from the Free State, Lord Roberts remained -firm in his purpose of advancing on Pretoria without delay. Not only was -it the head quarters of Krugerism, but also the place in which the Boer -harvest of war--more than 4,000 British prisoners, some of whom had been -in captivity since the day of Talana Hill--was garnered. - -On June 3 the advance on Pretoria, which it was hoped would be the last -important movement of the war, was resumed; Wavell, with a brigade of -Tucker's Division, being left behind as Bank Guard over the treasure in -the mines. Botha had retired on the capital, but no one knew whether he -would endeavour to defend it, or whether the vaunted forts would -imperiously address the invader. In view of possible eventualities, -however, a siege train, in which were included two 9.45" howitzers which -had been hastily acquired in Austria, was taken up to answer Forts -Schanzkop, Klapperkop, Wonderboom, and Daspoort if they should speak. - -Throughout the month of May there had been alarms and excursions in the -capital of the South African Republic. The sound of the _plon-plon_ of -the British Army was daily growing more distinct. The house of Ucalegon -was on fire. The Volksraad met on May 7, and after a session of three -days handed over the situation to the wavering executive Government, -which had already made arrangements for an eastward retirement. Kruger, -fearing lest his retreat by the Delagoa Bay railway should be cut off, -slipped away to Machadodorp on May 29; the forts were emptied and -abandoned, and Botha was bidden to do the best he could with the -remnants of the Transvaal forces. On June 3 he took up a position on a -ridge a few miles south of the city and prepared for the worst. - -French, on the left front of the advance, was ambushed in a defile by a -commando which had come up out of the west, but cleared himself with -slight loss. The forts were dumb. Only the ridges between the city and -Six-Mile Spruit were found to be held. The southern ridge was taken, and -when the northern ridge was turned by Ian Hamilton, who was recalled -from acting at large in support of French, the Boers retired. French -passed through Zilikat's Nek and marched on Pretoria north of the -Magaliesberg. On June 5 the capital of the South African Republic -surrendered to Lord Roberts. - -The Boers streamed away towards the east. An attempt made a few days -before to cut the Delagoa Bay railway failed, not, however, through the -fault of Hunter-Weston, who led the enterprise. The force given to him -was insufficient for the purpose, and he was unable to repeat the -exploits of Bloemfontein and Kroonstad. - -The prisoners of war, whom to the number of 3,000 the Boers had not been -able to drag away with them in their hurried flight, and who were in -confinement at Waterval twelve miles north of the city, were brilliantly -liberated on June 4 by some squadrons of cavalry; which not only ran the -gauntlet of the Wonderboom defile, but passed through the Boer posts at -the further Poort and snatched away the prize from under the eyes of -Delarey, who was covering Waterval with 2,000 burghers and some guns. - -On the day of Lord Robert's entry into Pretoria, Buller was still in -Natal. They had started simultaneously, and in thirty-four days the main -body had marched 300 miles, but the tardigrade Natal Army was now on -Lord Roberts' right rear. It had been his hope that Buller would advance -step by step with him, and having reached the Transvaal, would strike -northwards and establish himself on the Delagoa Bay railway and deny it -to Kruger. At Kroonstad, Lord Roberts, seeing that he could not expect -assistance from Buller, contemplated detaching Ian Hamilton and sending -him into the Eastern Transvaal, but the fear of unduly weakening the -main body in view of probable opposition at the Vaal, Johannesburg, and -Pretoria, caused him to give up the project. As events turned out, it -would in all probability have been successful. - -Pretoria was in the hands of the British Army, Kruger was in flight, the -war was over said the experts. Without having fought a single action -that could be termed a battle, and at a cost of less than 500 -casualties, of which but sixty-one men were killed, Lord Roberts had -passed from Bloemfontein and had seized the perverse city in which most -of the South African troubles of the past twenty-five years had been -brewed. The Free State, though kicking, was apparently helpless. There -were, however, not a few observers on the spot to whom the easy success -and the few casualties were of ominous import. A change in the method of -the opposition to be offered in the future to the invader was indicated. -The Boers were discovering that they were incapable of waging systematic -warfare and were on the point of resorting to _guerilla_, for which -they, as well as the arena, were by nature particularly well adapted. - -[Illustration: Sketch map of Magaliesberg district.] - -On the Boer side there was a transitory interval of weakness. Even -before Lord Roberts' occupation of Pretoria Kruger wrote doubtfully to -Steyn; and after it Botha was inclined to negotiate with the invader. He -was with his commandos at Hatherley, a few miles east of Pretoria. A -Council of War was held in the office of a Russian Jew, who was a -distiller of whisky. The leaders complained that they had been deserted -by Kruger, who had slunk away with the civil government and all the -money he could lay his hands on, and the general opinion was in favour -of abandoning the struggle. A meeting between Lord Roberts and Botha was -even arranged, when suddenly De Wet intervened. The news of his -successful raids on the line of communication in the Free State relaxed -the tension of the minds of the despondent commandants. Easily -disheartened and easily reassured, they leapt in an instant from one -psychological pole to the other. Botha announced that he was ready to -meet Lord Roberts, not only in conference, but in battle. The -negotiations were, however, not definitely broken off until after the -Battle of Diamond Hill. - -Lord Roberts had sent Kitchener with a column to see to the trouble in -the Free State, and could not put more than about 16,000 men into the -field against Botha, who, with 6,000 men, had taken up a strong position -astride the Delagoa Bay railway sixteen miles east of Pretoria. His -centre was at Pienaar's Poort, where the railway passes through a -defile, and his front, which his former experience of Lord Roberts' -tactics led him to extend greatly, was nearly twenty-five miles in -length, and ran along an irregular chain of hills, kopjes, and ridges. -Facing the Diamond Hill and Donkerhoek range, south of the centre, is -another range of heights through which the two poorts Tyger and Zwavel -pass, and which circles round the source of Pienaar's River towards the -Diamond Hill range. North of the centre runs a broken range ending -abruptly at the Kameelfontein ridge, which overlooks the broad -Kameelfontein valley leading to the Krokodil Spruit; and across the -valley rises the Boekenhoutskloof ridge, a detached feature with -triangular contours, which, being somewhat in advance, commands the -approaches to Kameelfontein ridge, where the Boer right flank under -Delarey was posted. - -The left flank was on Mors Kop and curved round indefinitely to -Kameelzyn Kraal with detached posts in the direction of Tygerpoort. The -centre north and south of Pienaar's Poort was the strongest section of -the line, and for this reason and for another it was held by -comparatively small numbers. Botha was an acute observer and had learnt -the moves of the British autumn manoeuvre opening, a holding attack on -the centre not intended to be pushed home in order to eke out paucity of -numbers operating on a wide front. Lord Roberts, in spite of his -superiority of strength, could not hope to inflict a decisive defeat -upon Botha's well-posted commandos, but only to remove them out of -striking distance of Pretoria, and he was successful. - -The earlier movements of the attack on June 11 were in the nature of a -reconnaissance in force, as it was uncertain how far to the north and -south the Boer front extended. The usual tactics were adopted. French -with the 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades under Porter and Dickson was to -work round the enemy's right flank and to endeavour to circle round it -to the railway; a demonstrating attack on the centre would be made by -Pole-Carew; while Ian Hamilton acted against the left flank. - -French approached the Kameelfontein valley and won a footing on -Boekenhontskloof ridge, which the Boers were only now moving out to -occupy, with his left. His right soon came under heavy fire from -Krokodil Spruit Hill on the Kameelfontein ridge, but he succeeded in -seizing Louwbaken, which he held tenaciously in spite of Delarey's -attempts to work round it and of the shells of a heavy gun posted six -miles away near Edendale. Meanwhile his left had been struggling for -several hours on the Boekenhoutskloof ridge, which it eventually -cleared, and was then able to support the right, which was still -clinging desperately to Louwbaken. Throughout the afternoon the Boers -continued their attacks on French, but were unable to shift him. At -nightfall he found that instead of turning the enemy's right, he had -only plastered himself against it. He had already reported the situation -to Lord Roberts, who authorized him to withdraw if necessary, at the -same time cautioning him "not to risk too many casualties." - -[Illustration: Diamond Hill.] - -Pole-Carew, in the centre, was in action with his heavy guns only, -"demonstrating" according to the rules, pending the development of the -flank attacks. - -The force on the right under Ian Hamilton was strong in mounted troops. -He entered the arena through Zwavelpoort, and thrust at the bristling -but indeterminate left flank of the enemy. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade under -Broadwood evicted a small body of Boers from Tygerpoort, and when the -3rd Brigade under Gordon came up to hold the position until the arrival -of an infantry regiment, Broadwood advanced across the valley in the -direction of Mors Kop, and soon was not only under shell fire from -Diamond Hill, but also under rifle fire from some vague detachments of -Boers on his right rear. - -Nor was this all, for as he proceeded, the enemy was seen pouncing down -from Diamond Hill on to the Kleinfontein ridge upon the line of his -advance, and simultaneously he was fired on from the right. Two horse -artillery guns, which had been sent out, with an insufficient escort, to -deal with the swoop, were almost captured, and were only saved by Lord -Airlie at the cost of his own life. The attack on the right was soon -checked, but the cavalry instead of outflanking the enemy was itself -outflanked and unable to make a further advance. - -Gordon had now come away from Tygerpoort, and, in touch with Broadwood, -screened the right flank of Ian Hamilton's infantry attack; which after -the failure to turn the enemy's left flank, had necessarily to be a -frontal movement against the strongest section of his line. Bruce -Hamilton, with a brigade of Ian Hamilton's command, crossed Pienaar's -River near Boschkop and expelled the Boer advanced front from the -Kleinfontein ridge. Ian Hamilton was now face to face with Diamond Hill, -but the afternoon was too far spent for further action. - -The general idea for the right attack on the following day was a -movement by Bruce Hamilton, reinforced by the Brigade of Guards from -Pole-Carew's command in the centre. Diamond Hill was taken without much -difficulty early in the afternoon, and the Donkerhoek plateau was -cleared. A gap was now made in the Boer line, the commandos driven off -making for the Donkerpoort ridge on the one side, or the -Rhenosterfontein heights on the other. From three positions a double -rain of bullets poured upon Bruce Hamilton on the plateau, until the -heights were reached by De Lisle's mounted infantry from Broadwood's -brigade. Bruce Hamilton's right flank was thus relieved, but between him -and the enemy clustering on the ridge intervened the impassable ravine -of the Donkerpoort. Night was approaching and nothing more could be -done. - -On the left, French held his own but no more during the day, and -Pole-Carew in the centre had no opportunity of going into action. The -capture of the Rhenosterfontein heights occurred at an opportune moment -and perhaps averted a disaster. At Delarey's request Botha was on the -point of sending reinforcements to the Boer right to enable it to drive -away French and fall upon the weak British centre, when De Lisle's -success vitally changed the situation. - -Next morning, June 13, the British Army found that it had won a victory -without knowing it. The Boers had faded away during the night and had -abandoned the strongest position which they had ever held in the Free -State or the Transvaal. French and Ian Hamilton went in pursuit with no -results. Delarey succeeded in circling round towards the Western -Transvaal, Botha retired to the east. The casualties on the British side -were 176; the Boers professed to have lost but four burghers killed and -twenty wounded. - -Lord Kitchener was away in the Free State, and the battle was fought -under the usual restrictive conditions, that no operation likely to -entail serious loss of life was to be undertaken: and the enemy found -that the ordeal of combat was not very dreadful. - -With the occupation of Pretoria, which was not virtually effected until -Botha's retreat from Diamond Hill, the ranging phase of Lord Roberts' -campaign was nearly at an end. At the two capitals and at other towns -already occupied, he had places of arms, from which without wide -divagations of large bodies of troops, he could hope soon to control and -eventually to dominate the Republics. - -To see to the long and lonely furrow which he had ploughed across the -veld from the Orange to the Magaliesberg, and to prevent its being -obliterated by the wayward and shifting sand of the desert, was the -present task before him. - -Notes: - -[Footnote 43: Plumer raided across the Limpopo into the Transvaal as far -back as December, 1899, and Hunter occupied Christiana on May 15.] - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -The New Colony - - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 260.] - -The Orange River Colony did not receive its incorporation into the -British Empire with a display of gratitude for the honour conferred upon -it. - -The urgent message sent by Botha to De Wet on May 27 after the British -Army had crossed into the Transvaal was hardly necessary to incite that -free lance into action after his own heart, and he at once quitted -Frankfort for Lindley. - -When Lord Roberts entered the Transvaal he left behind him a -considerable force to teach the New Colony its duties. Besides the -stationary troops at Bloemfontein and on the railway, the VIIIth and -Colonial Divisions under Rundle and Brabant were at Senekal and -Ficksburg; Colvile with the IXth Division, who had been taken off Ian -Hamilton's lead and allowed to run alone, was near Lindley; and Methuen -had come into Kroonstad from Bothaville, the line of his march, which -was originally towards the Transvaal, having been changed by orders from -Lord Roberts. - -Such were the forces against which De Wet was ready to fling himself. -Early in June he was faced by another opponent. Lord Kitchener had come -down from the Transvaal with a strong column. - -Lord Roberts, on leaving Bloemfontein for the north, instructed Rundle -to "exercise a vigilant control east of the railway." In co-operation -with Brabant, he worked up through the fertile district along the Basuto -border, slowly but steadily; his immediate object being to prevent the -enemy breaking back towards the south. No serious opposition was -encountered, and by the middle of the month the Divisions had advanced -to Clocolan and Winburg, where Rundle came in touch with the IXth -Division. - -Colvile received orders to advance to Lindley and Heilbron. He was -instructed to reach Heilbron with the Highland Brigade on May 29, and -was informed that a force of Yeomanry under Spragge would on May 23 join -him at Ventersburg, which he would pass through on his march. - -Spragge was unable to be at Ventersburg on the date fixed and was -ordered on to Kroonstad, where he received telegraphic instructions to -join Colvile at Lindley on May 26 at the latest. It has never been -ascertained by whom this fatal message was despatched. No British staff -officer has ever acknowledged himself the sender of it, and it has been -suggested that it was sent by a Boer sympathizer who was better informed -of Colvile's movements than the Intelligence Staff. - -Colvile believed that his presence at Heilbron on May 29 was -imperatively required in connexion with the advance, and, although very -weak in mounted troops, he pushed on from Ventersburg without waiting -for Spragge. On May 26 he reached Lindley after some resistance outside -the town, and next day resumed his march to Heilbron, which, though -checked on the way, he reached on the appointed day. - -Meanwhile, Spragge was doing his best to deliver himself to the IXth -Division, to which he was waybilled. He moved a few miles out of -Kroonstad on May 25, and next evening was in bivouac within eighteen -miles of Lindley. Next day he resumed his march on the town, about the -same time that Colvile was quitting it for Heilbron. The two commanders -were in entire ignorance of each other's movements. - -At midday, Spragge reconnoitred the town, and finding it occupied, -withdrew to a position outside. Although Colvile had quitted it but a -few hours previously, and although the dust of his column could still be -seen on the Heilbron road, a commando under Michael Prinsloo, which he -had driven out, had promptly returned; and some burghers who had -surrendered to Spragge on May 26, and who, having given up their rifles, -had been "allowed to return to their farms," went to Lindley instead and -gave warning of the approach of the Yeomanry. - -Spragge counted on being able to draw rations at Lindley when he joined -Colvile, and marched out of Kroonstad with two days' rations only, and -these, although eked out by a capture of sheep on the way, were almost -exhausted. There were three courses open to him: to retire to Kroonstad, -to follow Colvile, or to remain where he was. He chose the last. - -He took up, and did his best to make defensible, a plateau and kopje -position two miles N.W. of the town. He had 500 men, but no guns, and he -reported the situation to Colvile, who was eighteen miles away when he -received the message next morning; and to Rundle, who was at Senekal. -Colvile answered his appeal for assistance with a refusal, but suggested -a retirement on Kroonstad; but the message did not reach Spragge. Rundle -was too far away to help Spragge directly, but made a movement towards -Bethlehem, which he hoped would draw the enemy away from Lindley. - -On May 28 the Boers took up positions which practically surrounded -Spragge, but he held his own that day and the next; and although the -enemy was reinforced on the 29th, he was not so closely invested that he -could not have broken out. Firing was heard in the S.E., and Spragge, -believing that it was Rundle in action, endeavoured without success to -communicate with him. - -So long as the investing force was without guns, Spragge was confident -of being able to hold on. But on May 30 a further reinforcement came in. -Martin Prinsloo joined his brother with three guns and a strong -commando. The Prinsloos, who were acting under the orders of De Wet, had -originally been detailed to look after Colvile, but were drawn away by -the attraction of an easier prey at Lindley. - -On May 30 a kopje on the west, from which the Boers were sniping into -the position, was captured by Spragge, but soon fell again into the -hands of the burghers. It was recovered next morning, but pressure -elsewhere squeezed it finally out of the grasp of the re-captors. The -Boers had brought their guns into action. The key of Spragge's position -was two kopjes on the S.E. of the defence. The outer kopje was rushed by -the enemy, the detachment occupying it being driven back towards the -inner kopje. A panic-stricken non-commissioned officer in the connecting -post between them raised the white flag without authority, and, it is -said, was immediately shot for having done so. The officer in command on -the inner kopje considered that he was bound by the act and recognized -it, and only hastened the inevitable end. There was a last wriggle or -two, and then Spragge, who was surrounded by 2,000 Boers with artillery, -gave in. - -Nearly 500 yeomen were added to the panel of British prisoners of war by -the hawk-like swoop of De Wet and the brothers Prinsloo almost under the -eyes of three Divisions of the British Army. For not only were Colvile -and Rundle aware of Spragge's predicament, but as soon as it was -reported to Lord Roberts, Methuen was ordered to the rescue. - -Methuen, who only arrived at Kroonstad from the west on May 28, was -already on the move to help Colvile, from whom a disquieting message had -been received at Head Quarters. Colvile's safe arrival at Heilbron next -day rendered assistance unnecessary, and Methuen, under instructions -from Lord Roberts, turned towards Lindley. He was, however, too late, -for as he approached the town the news of Spragge's surrender reached -him on June 1. He ran into the rear of the Boers hurrying away with -their prey, and even intercepted two guns and some wagons, but was -unable to retain them. - -The Lindley affair sent Colvile back to England in the wake of Gatacre. -The responsibility of the surrender was fixed upon him and he was -deprived of his command. He had no doubt been in a false position during -the first fortnight of the advance from Bloemfontein when he was kept -trailing behind a junior officer, and this slight perhaps affected his -judgment, but he was constitutionally incapable of viewing a situation -synoptically and perspectively. As at Sannah's Post, so again at Lindley -the halation of a word or two in his orders fogged the image on his -retina. He doggedly stared at the words _Heilbron, May 29_, as if the -whole issue of the campaign depended upon them. There was nothing in the -context to show that they were more than the details of an itinerary -which he was expected to follow if circumstances permitted. He was -urgently in need of the very mounted troops with which he made no effort -to put himself in touch. _Bis peccare in bello non licet_. Lord Roberts -could forgive once, but Colvile was superseded for having twice shown a -"want of military capacity and initiative."[44] - -Yet the disaster was not due to his default alone, although the -contributory defaults of others were rightly not permitted to excuse -him. He had good reason to think that a well-mounted force would be able -to take care of itself, and to believe that proper staff arrangements -had been made for Spragge's march; but in each of these warrantable -assumptions he was wrong. Lindley was the first of a series of disasters -which seemed to show that Lord Roberts had pushed on too hastily. - -Rundle's endeavour to help Spragge by a demonstration in the direction -of Bethlehem soon came to an end. It is said that a telegram in which he -announced the movement to Brabant fell into the hands of the Boers, who -promptly utilized the information. On May 29 he was seriously checked at -the Biddulphsberg, where they had taken up a position. He failed in an -attack on what he believed was the Boers' flank but which was in reality -their front. During the engagement he received a telegram from Head -Quarters, dated three days previously, ordering him to join Brabant in -the Ficksburg district, and he withdrew from the action, having suffered -186 casualties, some of which were caused by a fire which broke out in -the long grass through which he had advanced, and in which helpless -wounded men were lying. A brigade of Tucker's Division under Clements -took his place at Senekal. - -De Wet now set himself in person to execute the task entrusted to him by -Botha of getting behind the British force in the Transvaal and breaking -or interrupting the line of communication in the Free State. He had not -long to wait for opportunities. He left Frankfort with 800 men, and on -June 2 placed himself in observation near Heilbron, where Colvile was -awaiting a supply column from the railway at Roodeval. The convoy was -harassed from the first by mischances. Against Colvile's orders it was -despatched with but a small escort and without guns. When he heard that -sufficient protection could not be given, he counter-ordered the convoy, -but the message did not arrive until after it had started. - -On the second day of the march a body of the enemy was found blocking -the road at Zwavel Kranz between Heilbron and Heilbron Road Station. It -was De Wet waiting for the convoy. - -The news of its plight reached Heilbron Road Station,[45] and a -relieving column was sent out, which came within four miles of Zwavel -Kranz. No firing, however, was heard, and the officer in command, -hastily concluding that all was well, returned to the railway without -finding the convoy, which next morning surrendered, the victim of -easy-going indifference and neglect. - -So far De Wet had done well, but he was only beginning his work. The -railway between Bloemfontein and Vereeniging was weakly held by -regiments of militia threaded like beads on a string in posts along the -line. At Roodeval supplies and stores in large quantities, urgently -needed by the Army in the Transvaal, were waiting until the bridge over -the Rhenoster River, which had been destroyed by the Boers retreating -before Lord Roberts, could be rebuilt. There was scarcely a post that -did not beckon to De Wet to come to it. - -He was within reach of the railway at three vulnerable points, and he -divided the force to attack them simultaneously; himself taking command -of the raid on Roodeval, which was held by casual details of -departmental troops stiffened by a detachment of militia. Thus an -important link in the chain was unable to bear a comparatively slight -tension. No one was recognized as being definitely responsible for the -railway north of Bloemfontein. The charge of it had been given to an -officer who, unknown to the staff, was at the time in hospital and -unable to take over his command; detachments were moved promiscuously by -orders which came now from Pretoria and now from Bloemfontein; and in -the chaos De Wet wriggled in between Colvile and Methuen. - -On June 7 Heilbron Road Station, Rhenoster River Bridge, and Roodeval -were captured in succession. At the Bridge the Derbyshire Militia fought -gallantly for several hours, but were overpowered in a hopeless -position, and soon afterwards Roodeval and its accumulated booty fell -into the hands of De Wet,[46] who on that day severed Bloemfontein from -Pretoria for a week and added nearly 500 men to the muster-roll of his -prisoners of war. - -It was evident to Lord Roberts that things had taken a serious turn, and -that his position in the Transvaal was unsound. In framing his plans for -the advance from Bloemfontein, he had naturally expected that the Natal -railway would be available as an alternative line of communication soon -after he entered the Transvaal; but the movements of Buller were -deliberate, and nearly a third of it was still in the enemy's hands. It -is probable that Lord Roberts would have been less disinclined to the -"steam-rollering" policy if he could have foreseen that on the day he -entered Pretoria the Natal Army would be still south of Laing's Nek. - -As a preliminary measure pending, the elaboration of a definite scheme -to put the Free State in order, Kitchener, who was always held in -readiness with steam up to proceed to districts in difficulties and -hustle local commandants and their staffs, was sent across the Vaal with -a column; and Methuen's Division was set in motion. - -On the Bloemfontein side, Kelly-Kenny took temporary charge of all the -troops south of Kroonstad, whither a brigade under C. Knox was sent to -protect the stores and supplies; and Winburg was strengthened. While C. -De Wet was engaged upon his own work his brother P. De Wet, whom he -threatened to shoot if he gave in, was discussing terms of surrender -with Methuen at Lindley, but as in the contemporaneous negotiations -between C. Botha and Buller at Laing's Nek, and between L. Botha and -Lord Roberts in the Transvaal, no terms of settlement were arranged; and -Methuen quitted a pacificatory colloquy with one brother to encounter -the other in arms, and joined Kitchener at Heilbron Road Station on June -10. - -De Wet was elbowed away westwards from the railway, but he soon circled -back, recrossing it at Lieuw Spruit between Rhenoster River Bridge and -Heilbron Road Station, where he not only took fifty prisoners, but -almost captured Kitchener, who chanced to be passing through at the -time. - -It is interesting to speculate briefly on the effect which such a -notable capture might have had upon the general situation. The Boers -themselves would hardly have realized its importance. They were unaware -of the position held by Kitchener in the British Army, and his name was -unfamiliar to them. He had been here and there like many another -commander whom they had met in the field. Still, they had never yet -captured an unwounded general officer, and they would no doubt have made -a great effort to prevent his services being again available against -them.[47] It is, however, unlikely that De Wet would have been able to -retain his prisoner for more than a few weeks at most. But no one can -say what De Wet could not do. At home it is probable that a disastrous -reaction would have followed the news of the railway broken, of Lord -Roberts insolated in the Transvaal, and of Lord Kitchener of Khartoum a -prisoner of war and possibly a hostage. It is very doubtful whether the -nation, entangled by fresh difficulties and deafened by pro-Boer yells -growing shriller and shriller every hour, would have remained firm of -purpose. It is hardly too much to say that June 12, 1900, was one of the -most critical dates in the history of the war. - -During the next fortnight, attacks on a convoy for Colvile at Heilbron, -on the railway a few miles north of Kroonstad, a threat on Lindley which -almost became a siege, and a raid on Virginia Siding by a commando under -Roux, which sprang out of the Senekal district, maintained the mutiny, -and again showed that however tightly the Boers might seem to be grasped -in the hand, some of them were sure to wriggle through the fingers. - -It was soon apparent that the Free State would not be brought into -subjection by haphazard divagations of brigades and columns; and about -the middle of June Lord Roberts planned a systematic and simple -campaign. The towns and strategical points were to be strongly held -while flying columns shepherded De Wet and his commandos and endeavoured -to enfold them. Buller, who arrived at Standerton on June 23, would bar -the way should they attempt to retreat into the Transvaal, and a retreat -southwards would throw them on to Rundle and Brabant. The four flying -columns were based on the line of garrisons which extended from -Heidelberg in the Transvaal to Winburg and Senekal in the Free State. - -The command of the Heidelberg column, which was strong in mounted -troops, was given to Ian Hamilton, but an accident compelled him to hand -it over to Hunter, who had come up into the Transvaal after the relief -of Mafeking. The Heilbron column was the Highland Brigade of the late -IXth Division, which was broken up when Colvile returned to England. At -Rhenoster River was Methuen to prevent a break out towards the west. -When the Winburg district was cleared by a strong column under Clements, -who, a few weeks before, had relieved Rundle at Senekal, he would -advance on Bethlehem, Paget at Lindley co-operating with him. As soon as -Hunter, who was put in general charge of all the troops engaged, entered -the Free State, Macdonald was ordered to join him with the Highland -Brigade. Methuen's force at Rhenoster River was soon found to be -unnecessary, as the enemy was retreating in the opposite direction, and -it was sent into the Transvaal. - -At the end of June the columns began to move. Each of them was, as it -were, the head of a spear prodding the mob of commandos towards the pen -which had been assigned to them. With them, union was not strength, but -weakness: the more they were agglomerated the less were they to be -feared. - -[Illustration: Brandwater Basin.] - -Clements herded Roux, whose commando was the only body known to be at -large, towards the kraal, and advanced with Paget to Bethlehem, which -was occupied on July 7. The Boers opposed with delaying actions only, -capturing but being unable to retain two of Paget's guns, and outside -Bethlehem they brought into action and lost a field gun which had been -taken from Gatacre at Stormberg, and which now, after half a year's -exile _in partibus inimicorum_, was restored to the British Service. Two -days after Clement's entry into Bethlehem, he was joined by Hunter, who -had crossed the Vaal on June 29 and had picked up Macdonald at -Frankfort. - -The Brandwater Basin, into which the Boers had retreated from Bethlehem, -taking with them Steyn and the Free State Government, which was set up -at Fouriesburg, is a semicircle formed by the Witteberg and Roodeberg at -the head-waters of two tributaries of the Caledon, the Little Caledon -and the Brandwater; the Caledon being the diameter and the mountains the -circumference of the area. The river section of the perimeter lies on -the Basuto border, and the mountain section is wild and difficult, there -being but four wagon roads into it in nearly seventy-five miles: at -Commando, Slabbert's, Retief's, and Naauwpoort Neks. The passes at -Witnek, Nelspoort, and the Golden Gate are scarcely better than rough -bridle-paths. - -The strength of the enemy holding the Basin and the Neks was about -7,000. The Boers had indeed established themselves in an apparently -strong defensive position, but they had not been there many days before -they began to ask each other what was the good of it to them. They had -taken it up against the advice of De Wet, who saw that it was playing -the game of Lord Roberts. They had deprived themselves of their mobility -and were confined in a house of detention, where they could do no -mischief except to each other. They realized too late that De Wet was -right. The commandants were at variance and there was indiscipline in -the laagers. - -De Wet saw that the Brandwater Basin was no place for him. He was -beating his wings in a vacuum, and he resolved to get out of it as soon -as possible. After a Council of War orders to decamp were issued. The -general idea was that a column under De Wet should break out through -Slabbert's Nek and make for Kroonstad, and that Roux should take out -another column and march on Bloemfontein, a portion of the force being -left behind to guard the passes. - -On the night of July 15 De Wet, accompanied by Steyn, who went out to -establish yet another seat of government, pulled his column, which -included 2,600 burghers and 460 vehicles and was nearly three miles -long, out of the Basin through Slabbert's Nek. He met with no -opposition, and successfully carried out the first episode of the -programme. - -Hunter at Bethlehem was standing sentry over the northward passes, but -want of supplies and deficiency of ammunition prevented him advancing at -once on the Basin: and of the range before him he had no accurate maps -and knew less about its topography than an astronomer knows of the -Mountains of the Moon. While formulating a scheme for blocking the -passes, De Wet's sudden outbreak took him by surprise, and he was unable -to head the Free State leader, who passed northwards between Bethlehem -and Senekal, pursued by Broadwood's cavalry. The hounds were on the -scent of the first De Wet hunt. - -Rundle, who for two months had been painfully, but not with unnecessary -deliberation, pushing his force up the right bank of the Caledon, was at -first ordered by Hunter to watch Slabbert's Nek, but on a report that -the Boers were about to come out through Commando Nek, he was sent back. -The movement, though justified on the assumption that the report, which -came on good authority, was correct, was unfortunate, as it left the key -of the gate at Slabbert's Nek in the enemy's hands, and allowed De Wet -to escape. - -De Wet had assigned to himself the initial movement of the withdrawal, -and left the rest of the programme to develop itself without him. Roux -was put in charge of the Brandwater Basin. De Wet was an unpopular -leader. His attempts to leaven the commandos with a little of the -military spirit were resented. He had from the first, with only partial -success, set his face against the incumbrance of wagons which marched -with every commando. On the way to Sannah's Post he had cashiered a -commandant named Vilonel for disobeying his orders with regard to -transport. His nomination of Roux did not give satisfaction. The -partisans of other leaders protested, and it was determined to settle by -election the question of the Chief Command. In the meantime, the -management was in the hands of a triumvirate composed of Roux, Olivier, -and Martin Prinsloo. - -In the chaos, the commandos which De Wet had arranged should break out -remained in the trap and simplified Hunter's task. In succession, -Retief's Nek, Slabbert's Nek, and Commando Nek were taken, the latter by -Rundle, who on July 28 joined Hunter at Fouriesburg. Witnek had been -abandoned by the Boers, who now had only Naauwpoort Nek and the scarcely -practicable Golden Gate open to them. - -The Nek was closed by Hunter on July 27, and a position outside the -Golden Gate, but not the Gate itself, was occupied. The greater part of -the Boer force was now practically sealed up in the Basin. - -A Council of War was held to elect a new chief commandant. Had the vote -been taken ten days earlier the situation might possibly have been -saved, but the belated proceedings which displayed the weakness of a -democratically organized army, and which, in the absence of -representatives of the commandos not on the spot, were of doubtful -validity, only added to the existing confusion. Prinsloo, however, seems -to have been informally chosen. - -His first act was to endeavour to obtain an armistice from Hunter, who -naturally refused it. A few hours later Prinsloo agreed to surrender, -and on July 30 the main body of the Boers in the Basin laid down their -arms at Slapkranz. Roux, the rival candidate for the Chief Command, -protested against the surrender, not only to Prinsloo, but also in -person to Hunter, to whom he pleaded, that as Prinsloo had not been duly -elected, the act was unauthorized and therefore was not binding on him. -Hunter refused to listen to such quibbles. On several occasions during -the war the Boers had profited by the honourable reluctance of the -British commanders to repudiate an unauthorized raising of the white -flag, lest they should be accused of having laid a trap to lure on the -enemy. Hunter rightly held that Roux's plea for local option was -inadmissible, and that the surrender must apply to the whole force. Roux -then yielded. - -A large number of burghers, however, as soon as they heard that Prinsloo -had agreed to surrender, hurried away under Haasbroek, and scraped -through the Golden Gate and joined Olivier and Hattingh outside the -Basin. They were successful in evading the capitulation, for Olivier, -when informed of it officially under a flag of truce, also declined to -be bound by Prinsloo's act, and Hunter was unable to insist upon it. He -trekked away towards Harrismith unmolested by the troops watching the -Golden Gate, and he baffled for four weeks the columns sent in pursuit -by Hunter, who, however, prevented him joining De Wet. He was taken -prisoner near Winburg on August 27. - -The tangible result of the Brandwater Basin operations was the capture -of more than 4,000 Boers and of three guns, two of which had been lost -at Sannah's Post. The mountains in which the burghers had taken refuge -became a prison, from which they were taken when Hunter came on circuit -for the gaol delivery, and on conviction they were sent beyond the seas. - -Yet subsequent events showed that Lord Roberts would have made a good -bargain if he could have exchanged all the burghers and the guns, and -all the loot of horses, cattle, and sheep, for one man who had slipped -through Slabbert's Nek on July 15, 1900. - -Notes: - -[Footnote 44: Napoleon said that "a military order must not be passively -obeyed except when it is given by a superior who is on the spot at the -moment the order is given, knows the state of things, and can hear -objections and give full explanations to the officer charged with -executing the order."] - -[Footnote 45: Also called Vredefort Road Station.] - -[Footnote 46: 660,000 rounds of Lee-Metford ammunition were buried by -him for future use.] - -[Footnote 47: In the Russian War the Japanese gave orders that a Russian -admiral, who was a wounded prisoner of war on board a Japanese torpedo -boat, was to be shot if any attempt was made by the Russians to capture -it.] - - - - -CHAPTER XIII - -Nec Celer nec Audax - - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 50.] - -Lord Roberts had almost as much difficulty in bringing Buller out of -Ladysmith as he had had in putting him into it. The relieved garrison, -wasted and enfeebled by the rigours of the siege, was unfit to take the -field, but there does not seem to have been any good reason why the -relieving force, or at least a portion of it, should not have been -pushed forward boldly without delay. The inaction invited the retreating -enemy to halt and occupy the Biggarsberg Range; only a few days after -Buller had informed Lord Roberts that he did not expect that any stand -would be made south of Laing's Nek. Buller did indeed propose on March 3 -to advance on Northern Natal, as well as to attack the Drakensberg -passes leading into the Free State; but Lord Roberts thought the scheme -premature and ordered him to remain on the defensive, to police the -country adjacent to the Harrismith railway with the greater part of his -available force, and to send one division round by way of East London to -join the central advance under Gatacre. Warren's Division therefore left -Ladysmith on March 6. White, to whom Lord Roberts had intended to give a -command in the Free State, was compelled by ill health to return to -England. The order to "remain strictly on the defensive" was afterwards -not unreasonably quoted by Buller in justification of two months of -inaction, which, however, Lord Roberts ascribed to other causes, as he -had agreed to subsequent proposals made by Buller for offensive action. - -The Boers on the Biggarsberg at first numbered about 15,000, but by the -end of March many commandos had been attracted away by Lord Roberts' -advance to more strenuous fields. Some time passed without any definite -action having been agreed upon between Lord Roberts and Buller. The -latter objected to almost every proposal made by the former, and -sometimes even on reconsideration criticized his own proposals. He was -allowed to recall the Vth Division, which after a brief absence rejoined -his command; but even with it he protested against an advance on Van -Reenen's Pass, which he had himself proposed and which he was instructed -to make at the beginning of April, because Lord Roberts would consent to -the employment of one division only in it. Lord Roberts did not insist -on the movement, as Buller now said that it would endanger not only his -own force, but also Natal; and finding that Buller had far more troops -than he could usefully employ, ordered him to send the Xth Division -under Hunter round to Kimberley. Even after its departure Buller -outnumbered the enemy by more than five to one. - -He was still haunted by the troubles of the Tugela, and was unable to -nerve himself for the risks that every leader must run. The Boers -bewildered him. He could plan no scheme without a conviction that -somehow their "knavish tricks" would frustrate it, and his inactivity -made him more prone than ever to brood over possible mischances. He -remained in Ladysmith because it was the only course open to him after -he had by a process of elimination considered and rejected all the -alternatives. Each of them had its disadvantages and its dangers, -therefore it were better to stay where he was. During a critical period -the Natal Army was of as little use to Lord Roberts as were the Spanish -contingents to Wellington in the Peninsula; and its laggard action -retarded the progress of the war. Lord Roberts laid his plans for the -advance on the assumption that it would be in operation on his right -flank when he reached Pretoria, and if L. Botha had found it pressing on -him when he was playing at peace-making in June, instead of engaged in -equally fruitless negotiations with his brother 180 miles away at -Laing's Nek, it is improbable that he would have continued the struggle. - -On May 2 Lord Roberts informed Buller that he was ready to start from -Bloemfontein, and that he expected the Natal Army to co-operate with him -by attacking the Boers on the Biggarsberg, and then advancing towards -the Transvaal. For this movement Buller considered that his force, which -consisted of three divisions of infantry and three brigades of mounted -troops, in all about 45,000 men, was insufficient; but he proceeded to -carry it out. The Boers were in occupation of the whole line of the -Biggarsberg from Helpmakaar westwards, and commanded the roads as well -as the railway running through the range. - -Buller on this occasion determined rightly upon a turning movement. All -his previous attacks had either been frontal or had been made so by the -enemy. His plan was to move eastwards with the IInd Division under -Clery, while the Vth Division under Hildyard, who succeeded Warren when -the latter was called away to Bechuanaland, advanced up the railway -against the Boer centre. The IVth Division under Lyttelton, composed of -the infantry which had been in Ladysmith during the siege, was kept in -reserve pending the development of the turning movement, which began on -May 11, and was skilfully conducted by Buller and was entirely -successful. Places and rivers which had not been named in the chronicle -of the war since October of the previous year now emerged from their -obscurity. Elandslaagte became the fulcrum of an aggressive operation. -Sunday's River and the Waschbank River after an interval of seven months -were again crossed by British troops, not, like Yule's force, in hasty -retreat, but in confident advance. - -The Boers prepared for, and fully expected, a direct advance on Beith by -way of Van Tender's Pass, but Buller made for the extreme flank of the -range near Helpmakaar, which they held but lightly. It was rendered -untenable on May 13, and after dark they retired on Beith, setting fire -to the veld to mask the movement and hinder pursuit. At dawn Dundonald -pushed on through the flames and smoke with his mounted infantry, but -was checked by a body of Irish traitors who were acting as rearguard to -their flying employers, and was unable to come up with the burghers. On -the following night his patrols reported that Dundee was clear, and -Buller occupied the town and reached Newcastle on May 18. The success of -the turning movement was due in a great measure to a small force under -Bethune, which had been lying for some months lower down the Tugela, and -which Buller called up to threaten Helpmakaar from the south while he -advanced from the west. It had been originally detached to protect his -right flank during the advance on Ladysmith, and after long inaction as -a watching force was restored to the strenuous campaign. - -Of the rest of Buller's troops, one portion only, namely Hildyard's -Division, was actively engaged in the movement. Its menace to the Boer -centre near Glencoe, through which passed the railway to the north, -attracted commandos away from the enemy's left flank at Helpmakaar and -facilitated the turning movement. Lyttelton's Division and two cavalry -brigades, which although Buller had informed Lord Roberts that he "was -short of his proper strength" for the advance he had left behind near -Ladysmith, took no part in it; and the absence of the cavalry allowed -the enemy to retreat without molestation. The advance of Hildyard's -Division was retarded, not by opposition, but by the duty which fell -upon it of repairing the railway along which it advanced, and it did not -reach Newcastle until May 27. On the 23rd Lytteltonand most of the -cavalry were ordered up from Ladysmith. - -As soon as Buller reached Newcastle he sent on Dundonald to reconnoitre -the Laing's Nek position. On the west it was flanked by Majuba Hill, on -the east by Pougwana, and was found to be strongly held. He therefore -decided to make no further advance until he had concentrated his force -at Newcastle. The cutting edge of the reconstructed Natal wedge had not -as yet sufficient substance behind it to warrant its being put into -operation. Pending the assembly of the Army Buller prodded across the -Buffalo at Vryheid and Utrecht in order to safeguard his right flank. -The expedition against the former town was ambushed and compelled to -retire; while the two strong columns which were sent against Utrecht -were hardly more successful. The town did indeed profess to surrender, -but no garrison was left to enforce the submission, and on the -withdrawal of the troops the Boers hovering in the hills returned like -birds who have been temporarily scared out of their nests. - -By the end of May, Buller's Army was concentrated in the northern corner -of Natal. Towering over his left front was the Drakensberg Range through -which Botha's Pass runs into the Orange Free State; on his right front -was the Buffalo River with a difficult country beyond; and on his front -was Majuba of ill-omened memory and Laing's Nek, over which the road to -Volksrust and the Transvaal passed. - -Buller remained at Newcastle for eighteen days, of which three were an -armistice during negotiations for surrender with C. Botha, who was -unable to accept the terms offered. On June 5 the advance was resumed, -Laing's Nek being the immediate objective. At first Buller proposed to -attack it directly, but soon after reaching Newcastle he found that the -enemy was unassailably established on the position, and that it must be -turned either from the east or from the west. The former movement would -involve a wider detour through difficult country to the line of advance -which would be taken up after the Transvaal was entered, and the western -movement through Botha's Pass was therefore selected. Lord Roberts had -for some time been in favour of it, but he had intended that it should -be more than a mere turning operation. His advance from Bloemfontein had -driven many of the commandos into the N.E. corner of the Free State, and -he asked Buller to cross the Drakensberg and take them in rear by -passing into the Transvaal by way of Vrede; but Buller could not be -persuaded to remove himself so far from the railway. He had already -missed an opportunity of co-operating with the main advance by a -westward movement from Ladysmith to Van Reenen's Pass along the railway -to Harrismith, where the presence of a division of the Natal Army would -have been of the greatest use. The relations between Lord Roberts and -Buller during the Natal campaign were rather those of leaders commanding -the armies of allied nations than of superior officer and subordinate. - -Thus the westward movement, instead of being a helpful operation at -large in support of the main advance, was whittled down to the turning -of Laing's Nek. Between Botha's Pass and Laing's Nek the dominant -contours roughly assume the outline of a sickle and its handle, the Pass -being at the end of the handle and the Nek near the point of the blade. -Within the curve of the blade stands the high Inkwelo Mountain facing -Majuba Hill, and at the upper end of the handle is a mountain of less -elevation called Inkweloane. The Ingogo River, which rises near the -Pass, is flanked on its right bank by Van Wyk's Hill, which commands the -eastern approach to the Pass, and on its left bank by Spitz Kop, a -detached hill of the main range. - -Inkwelo had been held for some days by a portion of Clery's Division. -The Boers occupied Spitz Kop and the ridge from Inkweloane to the Pass -and a short section beyond it, but their line was thin. The Vryheid and -Utrecht affairs had deceived them into the belief that an eastward -turning movement was in contemplation. On June 6 Van Wyk's Hill was -occupied by Hildyard and held against the enemy on Spitz Kop, who -attempted to dislodge him; and by the following morning artillery had -been brought up, and the Pass and the enemy's position on the adjacent -crestline were commanded. These on June 8 were carried by an infantry -movement in echelon with loss of two men killed. Spitz Kop offered no -resistance. A fusillade broke out on Inkweloane, but Dundonald's brigade -soon quenched it by a determined ascent up alpine slopes to the -crestline As at Helpmakaar the enemy set fire to the grass and passed -away behind a veil of smoke. - -The capture of Botha's Pass was an affair which did credit to Buller. It -showed that since Colenso he had learnt how to use artillery, and his -disposition of his guns was admirable. They rendered the enemy's -position untenable and left little but hard climbing to the infantry. It -can hardly be termed a battle, it was rather an autumn manoeuvre -engagement, conducted on Lord Roberts' principles. A very important -position was won and the enemy driven back with scarcely the shedding of -a drop of blood on either side. Hildyard was in executive charge of the -operations. - -Thus, after eight months' fighting, the main body of the Natal Army was -at last in bivouac in the enemy's country. Buller had taken Botha's Pass -with three infantry and two cavalry brigades; and with these he made for -his next objective, the town of Volksrust in the Transvaal, a few miles -north of Laing's Nek, which Clery at Ingogo was watching from the south. -Lyttelton was posted on the left bank of the Buffalo watching the right -flank of the advance. - -Buller's operations in the Free State lasted two days only. On June 10 -he engaged a small body of the retreating enemy and entered the -Transvaal. In front of him was the Versamelberg, a spur of the -Drakensberg, over which the road from Vrede to Volksrust passes at -Alleman's Nek, where 2,000 Boers with four guns had taken up a very -strong position. The road rises to the Nek between heights, and the -initial movements of the attack had to be made across two miles of open -veld. The burghers had not had the time, or did not think it necessary, -to strengthen the position artificially, but they were observed throwing -up some entrenchments when Buller approached. - -His bivouac on June 10 was at the Gansvlei Spruit on the Transvaal-Free -State border, and next day at dawn he resumed his march on Volksrust. No -serious opposition was encountered until early in the afternoon, when -Dundonald, who was operating on the right front, came under artillery -fire from the Nek. The infantry, whose left flank was watched by -Brocklehurst with a cavalry brigade, was then ordered to advance, the -objective of the 2nd Brigade under E. Hamilton being the ridge on the -left of the Nek, and that of the 10th Brigade under Talbot Coke the -ridges on the right of it, the 11th Brigade under Wynne being kept in -reserve. - -The advance was made under a heavy and worrying but not very effective -fire from each section of the ridge. The key of the position proved to -be a conical hill on the right of the road at the entrance to the Nek. -The Dorsets of Coke's brigade gallantly climbed the slopes, and aided by -artillery fire carried it with the bayonet. The fight, however, was far -from ended. The Boers beyond remained until the shells which had been -pouring on the conical hill followed them to the crestline. Then again -the Dorsets threw themselves upon the enemy, and by sunset the heights -on the right of the Nek were in possession of Coke. Almost -simultaneously E. Hamilton established himself on the left of it. The -resistance offered to Dundonald on the right flank was more effective; -and as between him and his immediate opponents the day waned upon an -uncertain issue. He had driven them out of successive positions though -not actually off the ridge; but the occupation of the Nek made further -opposition useless and they withdrew during the night. - -The capture of Alleman's Nek rendered Laing's Nek untenable, and Clery -closing up from Ingogo next day found it abandoned. The enemy had -evacuated the whole of the Majuba-Laing's Nek-Pougwana position, leaving -scarcely so much as a wagon behind him, and was retreating northwards. -The westward turning movement was tactically a success but strategically -a failure. With three brigades of mounted troops under his orders, -including some regiments of regular cavalry which were lying idle at -Ladysmith and elsewhere, Buller made no attempt to cut off the -retreating Boers. A daring raid, such as had been twice made by French -on the Modder four months before, concurrently with the Botha's Pass -operations would have had a good chance of crushing C. Botha; and -Brockleburst's cavalry, which during the attack on the Nek was working -somewhat widely on the left flank, might well have been sent to bar the -way. The ponderous movements of Buller were in strange contrast to the -activity of his ally Lord Roberts. The Natal Army made its way through -the country like an elephant trampling through a sugar-cane plantation. - -On June 13 Buller entered Volksrust and next day established his Head -Quarters at Laing's Nek. Wakkerstroom, a town which threatened his right -flank, surrendered _pro formâ_ to Lyttelton on June 13, and again to -Hildyard four days later; and no doubt would have been equally ready to -accommodate itself to the wishes of any other column sent to it, but -after each surrender it reasserted itself, and Buller was obliged to -leave it in charge of the commandos. - -With the occupation of Laing's Nek the Natal campaign, which had lasted -eight months, came to an end, and Buller, having left a strong force -under Lyttelton in charge of Natal, passed up the railway to Heidelberg; -where on July 4 he for the first time came into physical touch with the -main Army under Lord Roberts. By a curious coincidence he here met -Hart's Brigade of the Xth Division, which had left his command three -months previously at Ladysmith, and which had in the meantime marched up -from Kimberley. - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 292.] - -Lord Roberts' plan for the Natal Army was that it should march across -the veld to the Delagoa Bay railway and co-operate in his movement to -clear the Eastern Transvaal. The Brandwater Basin surrender relieved the -railway in Natal from immediate danger and allowed the ample force -holding it to be reduced. At the end of July Buller was instructed to -lead 11,000 of his men across a sparsely populated country where no -railway was. It was for him a novel phase of warfare. Hitherto he had -hardly dared trust himself out of sight of a culvert. But he was a man -from whom the terror of the unknown very soon passed away when he had no -choice but to face it. In Natal he would have stood aghast at a -suggestion that he should cut away his moorings and be wafted by the -winds of war for ten days or more across a strange ocean. If hitherto he -had been _nec celer nec audax_ now he became at least _audax_. Lord -Roberts had imbued him with the progressive spirit. He raised no -difficulties of his own, and he encountered those arising out of the -situation resolutely and successfully. His army was strung out upon the -railway from Ladysmith to Heidelberg; his transport was still organized -regimentally, a system which had hampered Lord Roberts' movements and -was soon abolished in the main body; and oxen, mules, and wagons were -scarce. For infantry he chose the IVth Division under Lyttelton, and for -cavalry the brigades under Brocklehurst and Dundonald. - -On August 7 Buller's column quitted the Natal line;[48] its destination -being Belfast on the Delagoa Bay line, along which Lord Roberts was now -advancing. - -Its progress may be compared to the course of a steamer across an -unquiet ocean. The waves raised by a fresh gale on the starboard bow -were cleft by the stem, only to reunite behind the churn of the -propeller. They were powerless to abridge the day's run by many miles, -but they could still swing forwards to the shore. On one occasion the -ship was slowed down to a standstill by a fog. - -The waves were the commandos of the district, most of which had retired -under C. Botha from the Laing's Nek positions. Buller had not much -difficulty in dealing with them as obstructions to his advance, and in -succession he occupied Amersfort, Ermelo, and Carolina; but they soon -returned to their stations. His own inclinations would probably have -persuaded him to halt and smash them, but he was marching against time -between two widely separated bases. Near Carolina on August 14 he came -in touch with French, who was acting with Lord Roberts' eastward -movement from Pretoria, and from that date the operations of the Natal -Army were merged in those of the main Army, and came under the immediate -direction of the Commander-in-Chief. - -A scheme proposed by French and sanctioned in substance by Lord Roberts, -for an immediate cavalry turning movement round the left flank of the -enemy, who was strongly posted astride the railway near Belfast; in -conjunction with a central infantry advance to be made by Buller and -Pole-Carew, whose Division was within reach, was discountenanced by -Buller, and a simple frontal movement was substituted for it. Its -practicability was doubtful owing to the marshy character of the ground. - -On August 25 Buller, French, and Pole-Carew entered Belfast, where they -were joined by Lord Roberts. - -Notes: - -[Footnote 48: i.e. the section of the railway from Johannesburg to Natal -which is in the Transvaal.] - - - - -CHAPTER XIV - -The Taming of the Transvaal - - -The course of the war north of the Vaal after the battle of Diamond Hill -up to the date of Lord Roberts' arrival at Belfast seven weeks later was -tortuous and difficult. The main Army changed front as soon as Pretoria -was reached and faced to the east in the direction of the retreating -Transvaal Government. Its line of communication became a prolongation of -its front; its left flank towards the north was open; and on its rear -was the unsubdued country west of the capital in the direction of -Mafeking and Vryburg. - -Through this district, which is intersected by ranges running generally -east and west, and which contains some towns of importance, the troops -set free by the relief of Mafeking advanced in two columns towards -Pretoria and Johannesburg. The southern column was Hunter's Xth -Division, which after easily occupying Potchefstroom and Krugersdorp, -passed through Johannesburg, and on Hunter's being sent into the Free -State was broken up at Heidelberg. The northern column, under -Baden-Powell, occupied Rustenburg and met with little opposition during -the month of June. It was intended by Lord Roberts, if all went well, -that this column should eventually take up a position on the Pietersburg -railway, north of Pretoria, which was unprotected in that direction. - -The inactivity of the Boers seemed to show that they had really lost -heart, and that an awakening such as that which came a few weeks after -the entry into Bloemfontein was improbable. Earlier in the month of June -there had been negotiations for peace, not only between subordinate -leaders in the Free State and Natal, but also between the two -Commanders-in-Chief in Pretoria; and although they were broken off, the -fact that they had occurred made the silence more significant and gave -hope that the enemy was reconsidering his position. - -The illusion was soon dispelled. Whether owing to the natural resilience -of the Boer character after a brief phase of doubt, or to the news of De -Wet's successful attacks on the railway in the Free State, the -smouldering fires broke out anew early in July. Delarey, who had checked -French at Diamond Hill, came out of the east to quicken the west; the -baffled burghers of Snyman, released from the siege of Mafeking, were -trickling vaguely into the district; a force under Grobler of Waterberg -was reported north of Pretoria; an incursion was made across the Vaal -from the Free State; and commandos appeared south of the Magaliesberg -near Olifant's Nek and Commando Nek, thus threatening the movements of -Baden-Powell, who was operating north of the range and who had occupied -Commando Nek and the adjacent Zilikat's Nek on July 2, leaving only a -small force at Rustenburg. Five days later the Boers failed in an -attempt to recapture the town, which was saved by a detachment of the -Rhodesian Field Force. - -This force, which was under the command of Sir F. Carrington, was -composed mainly of mounted contingents from the Colonies. It had been -raised a few months before at the instance of the British South Africa -Company to hold the northern frontier of the Transvaal, which after -Plumer's departure for the south was unguarded, and to deny Rhodesia to -the Boers should they attempt to break out northwards. It was from the -first under a sort of dual control which militated against its -efficiency. The Company made the arrangements for its enrolment and -equipment, while the War Office provided the staff. It was in -difficulties from the first. By a somewhat strained interpretation of a -treaty between Great Britain and Portugal, and after some weeks of -diplomatic discussion and in spite of a protest naturally made by the -Transvaal Government, the Rhodesian Field Force was permitted to land on -Portuguese territory at Beira in April and to move up country. Its -advance was further delayed by a break of gauge on the railway between -Beira and Buluwayo; it was pulled hither and thither, and was never able -to co-operate effectively with the general operations. It was moved in -driblets, and some details did not reach Buluwayo until September. A -portion of it came along the Western line, and Rustenburg was saved by -the Imperial Bushmen. At the end of the year it was disbanded. - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 240.] - -On July 11 three blows were struck by the Boers with success. The -attempt on Rustenburg drew back Baden-Powell, whose place at Zilikat's -and Commando Neks was taken by a regiment of regular cavalry which -happened to be passing that way. As it was required elsewhere, a body of -infantry was sent out from Pretoria to take over the Neks, and on the -night of July 10 Zilikat's Nek was held by three companies and a -squadron. Next day, after a struggle which lasted throughout the day, it -was captured by Delarey, and two guns and nearly 200 prisoners of war -fell into his hands. The disaster, the first of its kind in the -Transvaal, was due to two causes. The British force actually at the Nek -was insufficient to hold it; and the main body of the cavalry stood -aloof. The latter was no doubt in a dubious position. It was under -orders, which were brought by the infantry relief, to meet Smith-Dorrien -nearly twenty-five miles away on July 11; and when the enemy was seen -occupying a strong position on the Nek, it assumed that assistance would -be of no avail, and beyond a short artillery bombardment nothing was -done. Even the squadron holding Commando Nek was ordered to retire at -midday. A relieving force was sent out from Pretoria, but it arrived too -late to avert the disaster. - -The cavalry thus delayed was intended to reinforce a column under -Smith-Dorrien, who had come up into the Transvaal with Ian Hamilton's -column, and who was marching from Krugersdorp to take off the pressure -from the south on Baden-Powell at Rustenburg; Olifant's Nek, over which -the road to the town passed, being in the possession of the Boers. On -July 11, when Smith-Dorrien had marched about ten miles from his -starting point, he met a commando at Dwarsvlei, which was so well -handled that not only was he compelled to retire on Krugersdorp, but -also had much difficulty in bringing away his guns. The failure was -chiefly due to the non-appearance of the cavalry, without which he did -not feel himself justified in standing up to the enemy. - -On the same day another cavalry regiment was in trouble. Onderste Poort, -a few miles north of Pretoria, was attacked by Grobler of Waterberg, and -while reinforcements were on their way he drove back still nearer to the -capital the force which was holding the outpost, and forced one troop to -surrender. - -The situation was alarming. The districts west and south-west of the -capital were infested by energetic commandos which had thwarted all -Baden-Powell's and Smith-Dorrien's efforts to suppress them, and Grobler -was threatening Pretoria from the north. There were indications that the -enemy's plan was to transfer the opposition from the east to the west; -and if so, then Lord Roberts' force, whose front after Diamond Hill -faced eastwards, would have to conform to the movement. A few weeks -previously it had been weakened by the departure of Hunter's strong -column for the Free State, and now Lord Roberts was compelled to redress -the balance by calling up Methuen's Division from Lindley to -Krugersdorp, where it arrived on July 18. French was ordered to operate -north of Pretoria with cavalry, and a column under Ian Hamilton[49] was -also sent up. - -Methuen marched at once on Rustenburg, and cleared Olifant's Nek on July -21. The scheme of shutting up the Boers in it failed, as Baden-Powell -was unable to close the northern exit, and they escaped with slight -loss. - -At the beginning of August the situation was, if anything, worse. The -events which succeeded the occupation of Bloemfontein were repeating -themselves in the Western Transvaal. Methuen had been recalled from the -Rustenburg expedition to deal with an outbreak on the line from -Johannesburg to Klerksdorp, which fell into the hands of the enemy; -5,000 Boers were reported to be on or near the Magaliesberg; a small -British force was besieged in Brakfontein, west of Rustenburg, on the -road to Mafeking; De Wet was at large in the Free State, and it seemed -probable that he would come up into the Transvaal and add to the -trouble. - -At the end of July Ian Hamilton's force was diverted from its movement -towards the north and ordered westward to relieve and bring away -Baden-Powell; and Carrington was instructed to co-operate from Mafeking. -Lord Roberts had decided to abandon Rustenburg and Olifant's Nek and the -greater part of the Magaliesberg. These detached positions detained more -troops than he could spare[50] and were difficult to supply. Ian -Hamilton's trek lasted only a few days. He recaptured Zilikat's Nek, and -on August 5 brought away Baden-Powell, who left Rustenburg most -unwillingly and who was ready to sustain another siege in it. Lord -Roberts, however, would not heed his repeated protests, and the only -section of the Magaliesberg held after the withdrawal from Rustenburg -was that lying between Pretoria and Zilikat's and Commando Neks. -Rustenburg and Olifant's Nek had called for the diversion of three -columns in succession: Smith-Dorrien's, which did not reach them, and -then Methuen's and Ian Hamilton's; and the abandonment of them was -imperative. From the west Carrington made an attempt to relieve -Brakfontein on August 5, but was compelled by the presence of the enemy -in superior force to return to Mafeking. The relief was effected ten -days later, not from the west, but by Lord Kitchener with a column that -had been engaged in the pursuit of De Wet. - -Suddenly all the operations were deranged by the news that De Wet had -crossed the Vaal at Schoeman's Drift on August 6, and the greater part -of the British Army in the Transvaal was either directly or indirectly -turned on to the pursuit of one man; Lord Kitchener, as usual when -energy and pushing power rather than tactical skill were looked for, -being placed in general charge of the operations. The two most -determined and unfaltering men in South Africa were now pitted against -one another. - -De Wet's escape from the Brandwater Basin on July 15 was soon discovered -and he was unable to get a good start. Broadwood's and Little's mounted -brigades were sent after him, now and then taking long shots at him or -worrying his rearguard. His object was to conduct Steyn and the Free -State Government officials into the Transvaal, where they could -co-operate with Kruger. He chose the route which appeared to him, and -rightly so, to be the line of least resistance, namely, towards the Vaal -Drifts near Potchefstroom; instead of making for the upper reaches of -the river, on the other side of which Buller was established on the -Natal railway. - -It was soon found impossible to overtake him, even with mounted troops. -The only course was to shepherd him into a fold from which he could not -escape. The tracery on the map of his movements and of those of his -chief scout Theron, intersected by the reticulations of the pursuing -columns, resembles a spider's web in disorder. - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 292.] - -Finally he was hemmed in on the left bank of the Vaal near Reitzburg. On -the right bank Methuen, supported by Smith-Dorrien, was watching the -drifts. He did his best, but his force was insufficient for the purpose, -and on August 6 De Wet, with it is said no less than 400 wagons, entered -the Transvaal at Schoeman's Drift, the greater part of Methuen's force -having been sent to hold a drift lower down. Methuen doubled back and -fell upon the Boer rearguard, which, though driven out of successive -positions, maintained itself long enough to allow the main body to -escape unscathed. - -De Wet's subsequent movements greatly puzzled his pursuers. He divided -his column into two portions which did not always march in the same -direction, and it was therefore difficult to discern the ruling movement -of his trek. At one time it appeared that he was about to re-cross into -the Free State, and the plans for the northward pursuit were temporarily -suspended; to be resumed when he had received an allowance of one day's -start. It is probable that his original intention had been to return to -his own country as soon as he had put Steyn and the officials into the -Transvaal, leaving them with an escort to find their own way to Kruger, -and that he was prevented by the appearance of a strong column under -Kitchener on the left bank. As a Free Stater, moreover, he would be -disinclined to give his services to the Transvaal. - -Kitchener crossed the Vaal on August 8, and hung to De Wet's right rear, -Methuen hanging on to the left rear; but neither was able to do more -than clutch vainly at the skirts of the elusive column. In front of De -Wet, Smith-Dorrien was holding the Klerksdorp railway, but again he -misled his pursuers, and instead of trekking north after he had crossed -the Gatsrand, a movement which Smith-Dorrien anticipated and provided -for, he changed direction, and on August 11 passed over the railway at a -section which had been left unoccupied on Smith-Dorrien's right flank. - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 240.] - -Lord Roberts saw that Methuen's and Kitchener's pursuit would probably -fail, and that De Wet would reach the Magaliesberg. Ian Hamilton was -instructed to prevent him crossing it, and on August 11 he was -specifically ordered to occupy Olifant's Nek. Commando Nek was held by -Baden-Powell. There was a third pass, the Magato Nek, a few miles west -of Rustenburg, for which De Wet was apparently making, and which seemed -to be his only possible way of escape, as it was confidently assumed -that the other passes were held by British troops. It was, therefore, -only necessary to head him from Magato Nek, and this was done by -Methuen. But the movement threw De Wet towards Olifant's Nek, which to -his great astonishment was not occupied, and through which he passed -with Steyn on August 14 and shook off his pursuers. Ian Hamilton had not -been made to understand that the actual closing of Olifant's Nek was an -urgent matter; and he, in fact, informed Lord Roberts that he did not -propose to do so except indirectly by a movement which would command the -approach to it. - -In this, the first of the De Wet hunts, nearly 30,000 British troops -were directly or indirectly engaged in heading or pursuing over an area -of 7,000 square miles. Nine columns blindly zigzagged and divagated to -false scents and imperfect information in chase of one man encumbered -with a civil government on the run and several hundred wagons. Again and -again the fowler's net was cast upon the migrant, who always wriggled -through the meshes. In one month he trekked 270 miles from the -Brandwater Basin to the north of the Magaliesberg, with British troops -continuously to his flanks, his front, and his rear. - -It would have been regarded as the most notable personal exploit of the -war if De Wet had not himself twice repeated it under circumstances of -even greater difficulty. It must be acknowledged that his daring and -resolution deserved success. He did not attain it by the means of -followers eager to serve a trusted and beloved leader, for they by no -means rose to him. When he reached the Vaal he was careful to throw the -burghers' wagons across the river first of all, knowing that their -unwillingness to leave the Free State would be overcome by their greater -reluctance to sever themselves from their oxen and stuff. He owed his -success mainly to the power of a strong will to make weaker wills work -for it; and in a less degree to the accuracy of the information which -Theron, his chief scout, obtained for him. - -It is at least doubtful whether Lord Roberts did not take De Wet too -seriously. Was the capture of a _guerilla_ leader worth the withdrawal -of so many British troops from the main operations, and would not the -sounder strategy have been to ignore him? If he had been severely let -alone, he would hardly have done more than that which he did with the -strength of an Army Corps against him, and his prestige with his own -people would not have been so surely set up. - -The escape of De Wet was an incident of war, which, having regard to all -the circumstances of the campaign, could not be made impossible. Columns -working independently under directions from Head Quarters cannot be made -aware of all that each has or has not done, and must take many things -for granted; and the information of the enemy's movements which reaches -them from the same source must often be received too late for effective -action. If Lord Roberts had listened to Baden-Powell's protest against -the evacuation of Rustenburg and Olifant's Nek, De Wet would probably -have followed Cronje to St. Helena; but that does not prove that the -policy of withdrawing from remote and exposed positions was unsound. All -that can be said against it is that it chanced to be carried out a few -days too soon. - -Steyn and the officials left for Machadodorp. De Wet felt that his own -country had a claim upon his services, and desired to return to it -without delay. He divided his force, leaving the greater part under -Steenekamp north of the Magaliesberg, himself going south with a small -commando. The division materially aided his return, for it was not known -for certain at Head Quarters with which portion he was marching. While -he was in imagination being chased north of Pretoria, he was in fact -scaling a rough mountain path, for all the passes had been closed, near -Commando Nek, and looking down from the heights upon a British force by -which he was not discovered. On August 21, after an absence of sixteen -days, he recrossed the Vaal, and entered the Free State. The net result -of all the labour, all the efforts, and all the consequent distress and -exhaustion to which the British troops had willingly subjected -themselves, was to re-establish De Wet as a greater power for mischief -than ever. - -The Free Staters under Steenekamp joined Grobler of Waterberg, but the -combination was hustled to the north out of striking distance of -Pretoria by Baden-Powell, whose purely military service in South Africa -ceased soon after. He had been selected to raise and to command the -South African Constabulary, a semi-military body, which it was hoped the -approaching end of the war would ere long permit to take over some of -the duties of the troops. - -For some weeks after the escape of De Wet the various columns operating -north and west of Pretoria were engaged in patrolling the country. They -nowhere encountered serious resistance, but Delarey was neither taken -nor crippled. - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 292.] - -While these events were occurring in Lord Roberts' rear, he was -advancing eastwards from Pretoria. The battle of Diamond Hill was -followed by a brief period of quietude in the east as well as the west. -The objective of the British Army was the railway from Pretoria to -Komati Poort, on which the Transvaal Government, covered by Botha at -Balmoral, was now dwelling at Machadodorp. The movements of Lord Roberts -were for some time controlled by the situation in the Free State and the -Western Transvaal, which called more pressingly for attention than the -eastward advance. - -Early in July a column under Hutton was sent out to feel towards Botha's -left. As he was opposed and made little progress, Lord Roberts a few -days later reinforced him with French and a cavalry brigade, and on July -11 the combined columns thrust back the Boers from their positions at -Witpoort, a few miles south of Diamond Hill. Botha had arranged with the -commandants on the other side of Pretoria for concurrent attacks on the -British forces in the vicinity of the capital, and his own was the only -operation that was foiled on July 11. French's success, however, could -not be followed up. He proposed to raid the railway near Balmoral, but -Lord Roberts had been made anxious for the safety of Pretoria by the -news of the affairs of Zilikat's Nek and Onderste Poort, and recalled -him. Hutton was ordered to remain where he was, about twenty-five miles -south-east of the capital, with a reduced force. - -There were indications that an attack not only on Pretoria but also on -Johannesburg was contemplated by the enemy, in collusion with plots for -risings against the British which were hatching in each city. It was no -time yet for an eastward advance. The successes north and west of -Pretoria stimulated Botha to attack what he supposed would strategically -now be the most vulnerable section of the perimeter of defence, namely, -the section facing him. If it had not been weakened by the withdrawal of -troops to the west, troops would probably have been withdrawn from the -west to meet him, and the task of Delarey thereby lightened. Either -alternative would forward his policy. - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 240.] - -East of Pretoria Pole-Carew with the XIth Division was in touch with -Hutton. Botha recalled Grobler of Waterberg from the north, and on July -16 threw himself upon Pole-Carew and Hutton, near Witpoort. The brunt of -the attack fell upon the latter, who, though at first pressed back and -outflanked on his right, recovered himself and forced the enemy to -retire. His immediate opponent was B. Viljoen, a leader who showed great -military capacity in his management of the action. Against the XIth -Division Botha demonstrated only. The chief incident of the affair was -the holding of an outflanked and commanded kopje position by a few -companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers for six hours. - -The scheme for the eastward advance, which Lord Roberts did not feel -himself justified in initiating until after the affair of July 16, was -that French should rejoin Hutton and take charge of the right; with Ian -Hamilton, brought down from his northward demonstration against Grobler, -on the extreme left north of the railway, while Pole-Carew advanced with -Lord Roberts centrally along it. - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 292.] - -The advance began on July 23. French, with the natural spirit of a -cavalry officer, chafed at being restricted to the slower progress of -Pole-Carew's infantry and proposed to push forward boldly and cut the -railway east of Middelburg, but Lord Roberts was reluctant to part with -the only cavalry he had, and vetoed the movement. Botha was soon -frightened out of Balmoral, which had been his Head Quarters since the -battle of Diamond Hill, and which was entered by Lord Roberts on July -25. Two days later French rode into Middelburg. - -The eastward advance had now gained possession of eighty miles of the -Delagoa Bay railway, but the De Wet trouble and the disturbed state of -the Western Transvaal made the continuation of the movement unsafe, and -Lord Roberts called a halt. It was also advisable to wait until supplies -had been collected at Middelburg, and until Buller, who was coming up -from the south, was in a position to co-operate. Lord Roberts returned -to Pretoria, leaving French in charge. Ian Hamilton, the emergency man, -was sent to the west to deal with Delarey and De Wet. Towards the end of -August Pole-Carew advanced to near Belfast, where he hoped soon to -report himself to Buller. - -Nearly three months had now elapsed since the battle of Diamond Hill. -The progress of the Transvaal campaign was not very apparent, but it was -real. Botha had been driven back along the Delagoa Bay railway, and -neither the outbreaks in the Western Transvaal nor the meteoric -incursion of De Wet had availed him. Nothing that had occurred elsewhere -weakened the western advance to an extent that gave him an opportunity -of effectively withstanding it. Buller was approaching, and Lord Roberts -was no longer dependent upon one line of communication. The fugitive -Free State Government had been driven into asylum with the fugitive -Transvaal Government. No commandos were at large which could seriously -threaten Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, or Pretoria; and the only organized -body which the enemy could bring into the field was confronted by a -British Army and had the barrier of the Portuguese frontier behind it. -There was good hope that in a few weeks the already undermined fabric of -Boerdom would totter to the ground, and that the worst that could happen -was that some of the fragments might not fall clear of the British -troops. - -The arrival of Buller's force from the south gave Lord Roberts, who -returned from Pretoria on August 25, the reinforcement justifying the -resumption of the eastward advance. He found the troops unfavourably -placed for immediate action. Botha was posted on each side of the -railway near Belfast; the junction of his right with his left, which had -different fronts, forming an obtuse salient angle. The greater part of -the British force was south of the line and prevented by the nature of -the ground from undertaking an enveloping movement on the enemy's left. -Buller had kept the cavalry to heel, and it was lying compressed between -him and Pole-Carew, who was entrenched round Belfast. - -Lord Roberts' first act was to distribute over a wider front the -conglomeration of troops, which were hampering each other's movements. -French with his own cavalry, but without Buller's, was sent north of the -line to face Botha's right flank and to clear Pole-Carew's left flank, -while Buller worked up from the south towards the line. - -The movement began on August 26, and by the afternoon French, having -made a wide detour, had established himself north of Belfast; thus -enabling Pole-Carew to leave the town and extend his division in front -of the enemy's right. Buller's movement was at first directly -northwards, on account of the soft ground. His march, like that of -Pole-Carew on the other flank, was across the enemy's front, but neither -of them was seriously checked and the casualties were few. - -Buller had proposed to move eastward in the direction of Dalmanutha as -soon as the ground permitted, but a cavalry reconnaissance discovered -the enemy posted at Bergendal, close to the railway. The position was, -in fact, the point of the obtuse angle formed by the two sections of the -Boer front, one of which faced S.W. towards Buller, and the other west, -towards Pole-Carew; and if it could be carried not only would Botha's -line be broken, but Buller would be in a good position to deal with a -retreat from either section, - -The battle of Bergendal on August 27 was mainly a struggle between less -than fourscore Transvaal Police and two battalions and forty guns of -Buller's Division. The "Zarps" held a rocky ridge at the end of a spur, -where they were bombarded for three hours, yet when the infantry -advanced it was met with a vigorous rifle fire, which was continued -almost without intermission until at last the kopje was carried by -assault. The defence of the kopje was one of the most conspicuous feats -of the war on the Boer side, and it is noteworthy that it was made by a -body of regularly disciplined men. Owing partly no doubt to the -difficulty of reinforcing such an isolated position, no effective -support was given by Botha to the gallant little band, neither did he -trouble Buller seriously with artillery fire; and the commandos east and -north of the Zarps' kopje did little. He does not seem to have -recognized that Bergendal was not a mere strong post, but the key of an -unsound position which should at all hazards have been safeguarded. This -Buller saw at once, and he moved so as to meet with the least -interference from the enemy, who, having two fronts, could not act -solidly upon either of them. - -The capture of Bergendal dissolved the Boer position. The commandos -facing Buller were driven off; and the right, which had been opposing -French and Pole-Carew so feebly that neither of them suffered a single -casualty, fell away. Buller went in pursuit, but was unable to worry the -retreat. Some commandos withdrew eastwards along the line, others broke -off towards Lydenburg and Barberton. The Boer Governments retired from -Machadodorp to Nelspruit. Buller crossed the railway, and on August 29 -Helvetia was taken. Next day the British prisoners of war, whom the -Boers had brought away in the scuttle from Pretoria when Lord Roberts -entered the city, were released at Noitgedacht by their captors, who -were no longer in a position to detain them. - -Botha had indeed been forced into retreat, but not cut off, and he -escaped with all his guns and his losses were comparatively slight. His -burghers were, as usual after a lost battle, demoralized and -disheartened for the time being, but not, as was thought by the British -Army, scared by their reverses into abject impotence. From the time of -the occupation of Bloemfontein _guerilla_ had been gradually taking the -place of organized warfare, of which Bergendal was the last act, and -which the burghers saw that they could not hope to wage successfully. -The history of the previous seven months showed what could be won by -_guerilla_, and what could be lost by pretending to be an Army. The fact -that they were no longer able to act as a coherent military body did not -permanently discourage them, and the struggle had not yet run more than -one-third of its weary course. - -It was, however, the general belief not only in Great Britain but also -in the Army in South Africa, that the Boers had kicked their last kick -at Bergendal. There might be a final wriggle or two; but the end was in -sight, and before the first anniversary of the declaration of war, peace -would again reign in the land. These not ill-founded hopes justified -Lord Roberts' Proclamation of September 1, by which the Transvaal was -formally incorporated in the British Empire. - -To prevent the enemy escaping to the north or to the south, and to -impale him upon the stakes of the Portuguese frontier, Lord Roberts -pushed forward three columns; one under Pole-Carew to follow the railway -towards Komati Poort, another under French to march towards Barberton, -and a third under Buller to occupy the Lydenburg district; to which -Botha had gone after the battle of Bergendal, and which if held by him -would leave in the possession of the Boers the best line of retreat from -the railway to the northern Transvaal. - -Ian Hamilton, on his return from the west after the escape of De Wet, -was lent to Buller for a few days. The occupation of Lydenburg on -September 7, and of Spitz Kop four days later, drove Botha back to the -line at Nelspruit. Buller's operations were carried out with success in -a country more difficult than any that had yet been entered by the -British Army in South Africa. South of the railway, French spread the -net, casting it from Carolina to Barberton, which he entered on -September 13, and where he not only captured a considerable amount of -rolling stock and supplies which the Boers had shoved into the little -branch line, but also released a final remnant of about a hundred -British prisoners of war, most of whom were officers. He had advanced -through a country almost as difficult as that in which Buller was -engaged, and although the commandos opposing him had at first been drawn -away to the south by the report that he was making for Ermelo, they -returned in time to offer some resistance east of Carolina; but he -entered Barberton without the discharge of a rifle. Botha had sounded -the Cease Fire. - -The Boers had found it necessary to consider the situation seriously. -They had been driven into a relatively minute area, which was morally -congested with a pair of Presidents and their parasites, remnants of -Government offices, superfluous commandants, and commandos some of which -were eager and some of which were not eager to continue the struggle; -and physically by the accumulation of stores, supplies, guns, -ammunition, and rolling stock which had been rammed down into the last -section of the Delagoa Bay railway. - -Kruger was induced to lighten the ship which he had so signally failed -to keep on her course. He left Nelspruit on September 11 for Lorenzo -Marques, where he was taken under the protection of the Portuguese -Government, and where he remained until the eve of the first anniversary -of the opening scene of the drama, the battle of Talana Hill. On October -19 another nation offered him asylum, and he sailed for Marseilles in -the _Guelderland_, a cruiser of the Dutch Navy; thus symbolically -repatriating the French and Dutch emigrants who had quitted Europe for -South Africa in the seventeenth century. - -The positions of Buller on the north of the railway, of French at -Barberton, and of Pole-Carew ready to advance centrally, made immediate -action imperative; but Botha was hampered by the presence of not a few -unwilling and unmounted commandos. These he sent under Koetzee to Komati -Poort and left to arrange their own destiny; and with the rest, which -numbered 4,000 burghers, he broke away in two directions, himself with -B. Viljoen leading the northward trek, while T. Smuts endeavoured to -escape southward into Swaziland. - -Thus when Pole-Carew, who had been joined by Ian Hamilton and whose -advance had been delayed to allow French and Buller to get into position -on his flanks, reached Komati Poort on September 24, he found himself -hitting at vacancy with the wreckage of two lost republics around him, -derelict railway stock, disabled guns, abandoned ammunition, and burning -stores. Koetzee's men had disappeared, most of them into Portuguese -territory, which they had been partly persuaded and partly compelled to -enter by the Portuguese authorities, who, although they had regarded the -Boer cause with a more than benevolent neutrality during the earlier -stages of the war, now saw that a fight near the frontier would be a -most embarrassing episode; and, while offering an asylum to the -fugitives, threatened to allow Lord Roberts to land troops at Lorenzo -Marques if it were not accepted. On the 28th Pole-Carew was engaged not -in battle with the Boers, but in celebrating the birthday of the King of -Portugal, a singular interlude between the acts of the war drama. - -Botha in making for the north hoped to establish his remnant and -cultivate the germs somewhere in the Leydsdorp or Pietersburg districts, -which were the only portions of the Transvaal not occupied by British -troops. Lord Roberts' expectations that they would be denied to the -enemy by the Rhodesian Field Force under Carrington were not fulfilled, -and he could not spare any of his own troops to occupy them. - -Botha, preceded by a few days by Steyn, left the Delagoa Bay line on -September 17, and succeeded in scraping past Buller without serious -excoriation, but he was compelled to send the greater part of his force -under B. Viljoen by a circuitous route through the unhealthy lower veld. - -The enemy was now to all appearances chased to the ends of the earth, -but throughout October and November roving bodies worried the railway -and detained a considerable British force upon it. - -Commandos that could not be accounted for by the British Intelligence -Staff seemed to spring out of the ground. Trains were de-railed, raids -and counter-raids north and south were the order of the day. Lydenburg -was prowled upon. Botha and Viljoen, stirred by Steyn, hovered in the -north, and Viljoen went south to co-ordinate the several activities. On -November 19 he effected a temporary success at Balmoral, capturing a -small post and cutting the railway, but it served him little and he soon -retired. - -Of the force engaged in the Komati Poort advance, the Guards' Brigade, -which the hopeful situation would soon, it was thought, allow to be sent -home, as well as French's cavalry and other troops, had been withdrawn; -and a column under Paget which was operating west of Pretoria had to be -called up to expel Viljoen from a position which he afterwards took up -twenty miles north of the railway at Rhenosterkop. The affair was the -only serious action during October and November. - -French did not advance beyond Barberton. Early in October he was ordered -to clear the country lying between the Natal and the Delagoa Bay -railways. At first opposed by Smuts and subsequently impeded by bad -weather, transport difficulties, and constant sniping, his movement -resembled a retreat rather than a voluntary advance, and it was so -regarded by the commandos. When he reached Heidelberg on October 26, he -had lost half his oxen and a third of his wagons. - -After the conclusion of the Komati Poort operations Buller returned to -England. No general officer serving in South Africa was regarded by the -non-commissioned officers and men under his command with greater -affection and admiration. The Natal Army was held together in spite of -disasters and failures by the personality of its leader. He had made not -a few mistakes, but they never lost him the confidence of his troops, -who, when he left their camp at Lydenburg, said farewell to him with an -extraordinary demonstration of genuine regret. - -At the end of November the command of the British Forces in South Africa -was taken over by Lord Kitchener from Lord Roberts, who sailed for -England in the belief that the war was practically over. He had -completed the task which he had set himself when he landed at Capetown -ten months before. At that time hardly even a scout had quitted British -territory; now almost every mile of railway and every considerable town -of the two republics, except Pietersburg, was in the possession of the -British Army; the Boer Governments had been expelled; Natal was free; -organized resistance had ceased; the remnants of a baffled and -bewildered enemy were prowling aimlessly in small bodies. All the -precedents indicated a speedy termination of the War. - -When Lord Roberts left the shadow of Table Mountain the last word in -Strategy and Tactics had been spoken, and the war gradually became a -problem in Mechanics. His strategy was freely criticized at first, but -it proved to be sound; and the only fault that could be found with his -tactics was that like a skilful chess player he always endeavoured to -defeat his opponent with the least possible loss on either side. - -The organization of a European Army had been found inefficient for -dealing with Boer _guerilla_. The Army Corps fell to pieces as soon as -it landed in South Africa; and as time went on the Divisions, the -Brigades, and even many of the regimental units were one by one -liquidated and re-shuffled into columns.[51] - -Lord Kitchener, who had been General Manager to Lord Roberts, was -admirably qualified to succeed him, and to deal with a situation which -seemed to call for the exercise of a strong will and of the power of -organization rather than for the display of purely professional -qualities, in which he was somewhat deficient. It is doubtful whether he -would have commanded a large army successfully on the field of battle, -but no better man could have been chosen to control the vast area over -which the British Forces were distributed. - -[Illustration: Map.] - -Notes: - -[Footnote 49: Not the column with which he had come up to Pretoria with -Lord Roberts, and which after his accident had been taken over by -Hunter, but a newly-constituted column.] - -[Footnote 50: Lord Roberts said that if he had been free to send Ian -Hamilton into the Free State instead of to Rustenburg, De Wet must have -been surrounded.] - -[Footnote 51: After June, 1901, the classification of the South African -Army in Divisions and Brigades disappeared from the Army List.] - - - - -CHAPTER XV - -The Recurrences of De Wet - - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 292.] - -In October, 1900, De Wet, with 1,000 men, again crossed into the -Transvaal at Schoeman's Drift. His movement, which was preceded by -constant raids on the railway throughout September, was not altogether -voluntary, but was rather a withdrawal from columns pressing on him in -the Free State.[52] Barton, who with the Fusilier Brigade had been sent -down by Lord Roberts to meet him, took up a position at Fredrikstad, -where he was surrounded by De Wet and Liebenberg on October 24. The -situation was now so serious that Lord Roberts ordered a brigade under -Knox to come up to Barton's assistance from the Free State, but it was -not required, as the arrival of a column from the north broke the -cordon, and De Wet returned to the Free State. - -The new De Wet hunt was soon in cry. When Knox was set on the trail, he -was in the Free State and De Wet was in the Transvaal. Two days later -the positions were reversed, for they had crossed the river in opposite -directions. The situation now developed itself favourably for De Wet's -methods. For a purely military operation he had never shown much -aptitude. He had failed against Barton at Fredrikstad, but he was not -discouraged by the repulse, which he unjustly attributed to want of -co-operation on the part of Liebenberg. He had put the Vaal between -himself and Knox, who was on the right bank blindly nosing the drifts. -He knew from recent experience that his pursuers, with their imperfect -methods of acquiring information, would hunt by sight and not by scent, -and he had the mobility of a hare as well as the instinct of a fox. He -lay _perdu_ for some days near the left bank of the Vaal, while a net -with spacious meshes was being cast to ensnare him. Again he crossed and -re-crossed the river in order to bring Steyn away from Ventersdorp, whom -two months previously he had conducted into the Transvaal, and who had -in the meantime worked round the British Army to Machadodorp and back; -and who after conferences with Kruger and L. Botha, now returned with -him unscathed into their own land with schemes for the future. - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 260.] - -Pom-pom batteries and mounted infantry, the latest fashions of war, were -sent after him by Knox. On November 6 he was surprised in laager near -Bothaville, but escaped with Steyn and the greater portion of his -command on the first alarm. The gallant Le Gallais was killed and the -laager itself captured after a stout resistance some hours later, and -with it all De Wet's field guns, wagons, a considerable quantity of -ammunition and horse equipment, and more than 100 prisoners of war. - -Most men would have succumbed to the disaster, but it only spurred De -Wet. He had signally failed in his late attempt on the Transvaal, and he -had just lost almost everything at Bothaville, but he resolved to make a -raid in the opposite direction on the northern districts of Cape Colony. -To reach his new objective, he must traverse the whole length of the -Free State, which, having been in the occupation of the British Army for -several months, should have offered the line of greatest resistance to -his movement. - -The Brandwater Basin disaster of July 30 had, however, by no means -crushed Free State Boerdom, which, after having been heavily hurled to -the ground, where it lay for a time apparently unconscious, began to -show signs of returning animation, and in a few weeks was again on its -legs; thanks to the restoratives freely administered by De Wet on his -return from his first incursion into the Transvaal. Into each district -he sent irreconcilable men after his own heart to stimulate the wavering -and animate the discouraged; and barely a month elapsed before the -burghers were besieging Ladybrand, which, however, they failed to take, -and were hacking at the railway into the Transvaal. In October every -village in the S.W. district of the Orange River Colony in the -possession of a British garrison was attacked, all but one of them -without success. - -Lord Roberts had already taken measures to curb the new activities. His -plan was to occupy certain places strongly as bases from which mobile -columns could constantly move to and fro, eating up the intervening -country and rendering it incapable of supporting the enemy. Its -operation was mainly confined to the northern districts of the Free -State, in which lay the centre of disturbance, and the troops engaged -could not be readily employed outside them. It was so far successful, in -that it drove De Wet into the Transvaal in October, but it failed to -restrain his subsequent movements. It probably was the best that could -have been devised for dealing with local _guerilla_, but its action -being centrifugal and not circumferential, it was powerless to deal with -a meteoric raid of well-mounted men. Although the British troops greatly -outnumbered the Boers, yet in practice only the mounted details, which -included no regular cavalry and were relatively weak, were directly -effective against the enemy, and the movements of the divagating columns -were sluggish. - -When De Wet left Bothaville on November 6, his arm was, metaphorically -speaking, in a sling, and he was footsore; but ten days later he had -brought together in the Doornberg a force of 1,500 men, with whom he -proposed to cut his way into the Cape Colony. His movement south may be -compared to that of a small swift steamer endeavouring to escape from a -blockaded seaport. Ahead of him and on each beam were the slow-moving -vessels of the blockading squadron, most of them hull down and with -banked fires. - -He made at once for the scene of his April successes, the country lying -between Bloemfontein and the Basuto border. The chief obstacles in his -way were a line of posts running eastwards from Bloemfontein, and the -town of Dewetsdorp, which was held by 500 British troops. The latter he -might have avoided had he chosen to do so, but he seems to have been -attracted to it because it was the home of his childhood, which it was -incumbent upon him to redeem from bondage. - -The phenomenon of a Boer column marching through the heart of a country -supposed to be effectively in the possession of the British Army was -again witnessed. To borrow another metaphor, this time from Astronomy, -De Wet throughout the greater part of his career was a telescopic star, -invisible to the naked eye. General Officers and column commanders -helplessly watched his course through the telescopes of the Intelligence -Staff, and seemed to have as little power of influencing it as an -observer at Greenwich has of changing the orbit of a planet. The -astronomer can at least forecast with certainty the path which it will -follow in the heavens, but there were no observations available from -which the course of De Wet could be predicted for more than a few hours. -He seemed to defy the laws of gravitation. - -On November 16, he easily rushed the Bloemfontein-Thabanchu line of -posts at Springhaan's Nek, and three days later invested Dewetsdorp. -Meanwhile the alarm had been given. Knox's force, which had been sent -after him into the Transvaal, was now sent after him to Bloemfontein, -and mobile columns were detailed. Dewetsdorp was doomed from the first -unless assistance arrived from outside. The position could not be held -effectively by a small force, One by one the scattered posts fell into -the hands of De Wet, but the defence was maintained until the 23rd, when -the white flag was hoisted. On the previous day two relieving columns -had started from Edenburg, but they were checked near Dewetsdorp on the -24th by De Wet, who shook himself free of them and was soon on his way -to the south with 500 prisoners of war; and Knox with a third relieving -column was marching from Edenburg. - -Thus almost within sight of Sannah's Post and Mostert's Hoek and after -six months of apparently successful activity by the British Army, De Wet -snatched away another garrison. After a repulse at Fredrikstad, soon -followed by a severe mauling at Bothaville, from which he broke out as a -fugitive, he placidly and confidently trekked southwards unopposed for -150 miles, magnetically attracting to himself a force sufficient to blot -out Dewetsdorp in the presence of a bewildered enemy, who, though in -overwhelming numbers, was feebly strung out in lengths without breadth. -The British Army had still to learn, not only in the Free State, but -also elsewhere, the elemental fact in geometry that neither one straight -line nor two, nor under certain conditions even three, can enclose an -area. - -It was evident that De Wet was making for the Cape Colony, the -disaffected northern districts of which were again giving cause for -anxiety, and which at all hazards he must be prevented from entering. -Lord Kitchener came down from the Transvaal to direct the operations; -the Brigade of Guards on its way to Capetown and home, was de-trained to -hold the line of the Orange; Knox's columns hurried forward. De Wet, -after a slight encounter with Knox, who was marching south, turned -adroitly to the west and did not resume the original direction of his -march until he had put a considerable distance between himself and the -columns, which were "running heel" and pursuing him almost in the -opposite direction. Near Bethulie he was reinforced by Hertzog and other -leaders, but by this time he had been headed by Knox at Bethulie and was -compelled to draw off eastwards into the angle between the Orange and -the Caledon. He left Hertzog with instructions to make his way across -the river west of Norval's Pont, intending to cross with his own force -higher up. He was, however, prevented by the forces of nature from -carrying out the raid which the British military forces would probably -have been unable to prohibit. Heavy rains had fallen in the Basuto -Mountains, and the sudden rise of the Caledon and the Orange to flood -level obliterated most of the drifts and entrapped him between them. He -made one dash for the Orange at Odendaal, but found the drift in the -possession of the enemy. - -De Wet now saw that he was not destined to enter the Cape Colony on this -occasion, and that he would have much difficulty in saving himself. On -December 6 he determined to retreat by the way he came. He did not, -however, wholly abandon the scheme of a Cape Colony raid, for he -detached Kritzinger and Scheepers with instructions to hover and watch -their opportunity of breaking into it. The opportune falling of the -Caledon opened to him a postern towards the north, and on December 7 he -crossed the river and made for Helvetia, where again he was entangled. -The line of least resistance seemed to run westwards towards the -railway, and he put himself upon it, soon to find that Kitchener's -dispositions had obstructed it. He doubled back, and trailing Knox after -him in a night march, shook himself free. Knox, confident that the -Bloemfontein-Ladybrand line of posts would be an effectual barrier to De -Wet's retreat, had waited to pull his straggling columns together. De -Wet, reinforced by a commando under Michael Prinsloo, who had been with -him in his first Transvaal incursion when Steyn was put over the border, -rushed at the blockhouse line and again cut it at Springhaan's Nek, for -although it had been attended to recently, there was an aneurism in it -which yielded at the critical moment, and on December 14 De Wet passed -freely through the lesion. He arrived by way of Ficksburg at Tafelberg, -S.E. of Senekal, on December 25. - -The failure of the raid was almost as disconcerting to the British plan -of campaign as its success would have been. It showed that the troops -were unable to prevent a mobile and well-led commando from traversing -the Free State from end to end; it put new spirit into the burghers, and -destroyed the hopes of peace which the operations of Lord Roberts in the -Transvaal had kindled. De Wet was still at large, and although he had -not accomplished all that he intended, he had good reason to be -satisfied, and was stimulated for fresh efforts. He could boast that he -was beaten not by columns but by two rivers in spate. His movements were -so little obstructed that after reaching the Senekal district he was -able to pay a flying visit to the railway at Roodeval, where he -recovered the Lee-Metford ammunition which he had buried in June, and -with which he hoped soon to have an opportunity of charging the rifles -captured at Dewetsdorp. - -When De Wet, Hertzog, and Kritzinger parted company near the Orange -early in December, their tracks formed the letter Y inverted. De Wet -marched along the stem towards the N.E.; Kritzinger struck in the -direction of the midland districts of the Cape Colony; Hertzog made for -the west. Martial law was at last proclaimed in the Colony, the greater -part of which was, in spite of innumerable columns slipped at them, -traversed by Hertzog and Kritzinger. The former, after an adventurous -march of over 400 miles, reached Lambert's Bay on the shore of the -Atlantic, and gave to most of his men their first sight of the sea; and -to all of them a unique experience in the war, for they were shelled by -a British cruiser at anchor in the haven.[53] - -While Hertzog was watching the setting of the sun upon an Atlantic -horizon, Kritzinger was at Willowmore, almost within sight of the Indian -Ocean, having in spite of all the columns pushed his way from Rouxville -down into the S.E. districts of the Cape Colony. Neither Kritzinger nor -Hertzog, however, effected much by their raids except to show in the -Colony what De Wet had already shown in the Transvaal and the Free -State, the impotence of even the best-laid schemes of pursuit, and they -returned towards the centre in February. De Wet and Hertzog had between -them in the course of a few months succeeded in ploughing, through the -heart of the country occupied by the British Army, a lonely furrow which -stretched from the northward slopes of the Magaliesberg in the Transvaal -through the Free State to a haven on the South Atlantic Ocean. - -Meanwhile De Wet was waiting until the moment should come for him to -take part in the wide-reaching plan of campaign which had been devised -by the Boer Governments. They saw the uselessness of attempting to -withstand the British forces in the Republics, and they determined to -bring the war back into the Cape Colony and Natal. The general idea was -that L. Botha should march on Pietermaritzburg from the Eastern -Transvaal, while De Wet followed Hertzog and Kritzinger across the -Orange, and then, having effected a junction with them, should advance -on Capetown. The scheme was not so extravagant and quixotic as it might -appear to be, as recent events had shown the difficulty of restraining -the movements of a Boer leader of dash and enterprise; and there was no -reason why De Wet should not be as successful in eluding pursuit in the -future as he had been in the past. - -Again the Doornberg, although within sight of the railway between -Bloemfontein and Kroonstad, was available as a meeting place. Here on -November 16, 1900, he had assembled his burghers for his first attempt -on the Cape Colony; and here on January 25, 1901, he brought them -together for his second. Steyn was with him, and all the available Free -State commandants with more than 2,000 men mustered on the mountain -unmolested. His intentions were not unknown to the British Intelligence -Staff, and when he quitted the rendezvous he had a column under B. -Hamilton on his right rear and a column under C. Knox on his left front. - -The situation was not novel, and he dealt with it with his customary -good luck and success. He passed across Knox's front, who fortunately -for him had been ordered not to act before Hamilton came up, and reached -the Tabaksberg, between Winburg and Brandfort, next day. On the -following morning he shook off an attack made by a portion of Knox's -column, and went for the Bloemfontein Thabanchu line of posts, which he -had already twice cut. Hamilton, distanced in the chase, had been put on -the railway and sent to Bloemfontein to strengthen the line, but he -arrived too late to prevent De Wet crossing it on January 30 at Israel's -Poort. The sorely-tried pale had again failed.[54] - -De Wet, having shaken off the columns which had been pursuing him from -the Doornberg, had now a free course of 100 miles to the next obstacle, -the Orange. It was evident that the speed of the columns must be -increased and Knox was put upon the railway for the first time and -Hamilton for the second and dispatched to Bethulie. The energy of a -considerable portion of the British Army was devoted to an attempt to -make the barrier of the Orange impassable. - -North of the river was De Wet; south of it Hertzog and Kritzinger were -waiting for him. There was every reason to fear that should he succeed -in joining either of them, the smouldering embers of rebellion would -again break out in the Cape Colony. Troops were hurried by train from -the Transvaal, from Kimberley, and from Capetown. Lyttelton was brought -down from the Delagoa Bay line to Naauwpoort to take general charge of -the operations, and to build as rapidly as possible a wall that could -not be scaled or breached. - -For some reason which is not apparent De Wet, although he had an open -country in front of him in which not a single British column was -operating, moved slowly, and thereby gave more time for the carrying out -of Lyttelton's arrangements. Possibly he may have been delayed by -trouble with his Free State commandos, some of which a few days later -refused to cross with him into the Colony. On January 31 he passed -through Dewetsdorp, gratified no doubt to find that since his capture of -it in November his enemies had not ventured to set foot again in it. At -that time he had not made up his mind whether to cross the Orange east -or west of Norval's Pont. If the former, he would soon be able to join -Kritzinger, who after the Willowmore raid had returned to the Zuurberg, -between Stormberg and Naauwpoort; if the latter, he would be able to -call up Hertzog, who had returned from the shores of the Atlantic and -was hovering in the Carnarvon district west of De Aar. - -De Wet had from time to time to time been in communication with -Kritzinger and Hertzog during their raids. His advanced patrols soon -discovered that the section of the Orange lying eastward of Norval's -Pont was very strongly held. The dispositions of Lyttelton's troops seem -to have been made on the assumption that De Wet would endeavour to join -Kritzinger, who was little more than one day's march from the left bank, -rather than Hertzog, who was 150 miles away. The river section westward -of Norval's Pont was therefore held lightly by a line of outposts at the -drifts, thrown out from the main barrier based on Naauwpoort, nearly -forty miles south of the river. Of this De Wet was at the time unaware. -His information was that the eastward section was impassable. The -westward section might possibly not be so, and he determined to make for -it. - -He spread a report that he intended to cross the river at Odendaalstroom -or Aliwal North, and paused to allow it time to reach the ears of Knox, -who seems to have given some credence to it. A column was sent out to -reconnoitre in the direction of Smithfield. When half-way between that -town and Dewetsdorp, De Wet suddenly changed direction and made for -Phillipolis, detaching a portion of his force under Froeneman, who on -February 5 captured and burnt a train a few miles south of Edenburg and -crossed the railway. On the following night, De Wet crossed it with the -main body near Springfontein, while Knox was hunting for him near -Bethulie. - -It was now evident that De Wet's objective was the Zand Drift on the -Orange west of Phillipolis. He had had a long start, and the nearest -troops available for the pursuit of him were the columns of Knox and -Hamilton at Bethulie. Here the river bends round to the south, forming -an arc through Norval's Pont towards Zand Drift; and the columns -therefore crossed to the right bank and marched eighty miles along the -chord, only to find when they reached the Drift on February 12 that De -Wet had two days previously crossed by it into the Cape Colony. - -The operations of the next sixteen days were confined to a comparatively -small rectangle of about 6,000 square miles lying on the left bank of -the Orange, which bounded it from Norval's Pont to Douglas and thence to -near Prieska. The S.E. side and half the S.W. side, namely from Norval's -Pont to Naauwpoort and thence to De Aar, were formed by the railways, -the remaining portion of the S.W. side being the river Brak, which flows -into the Orange a few miles above Prieska. - -Owing to a sudden flood, which delayed Knox for two days, he was unable -to follow De Wet across Zand Drift, but Plumer started from Naauwpoort -with two columns, and on February 12 came in touch with De Wet and -compelled him to change his course. Two days later De Wet crossed the -railway between De Aar and Hopetown, after a rearguard action with -Plumer, into whose hands fell next morning the transport which De Wet -had been compelled by bad weather to leave behind him. - -De Wet now proposed to fetch a compass towards Prieska, where he hoped -to effect a junction with Hertzog, but the driving power of the raid was -slowly exhausting itself. The motive energy was stored up in -accumulators, and when these were discharged in succession, there was no -means of re-charging them. Hertzog and Kritzinger, who had been relied -on for this purpose, were not at hand; more than a third of the force -with which De Wet had originally left the Doornberg had declined to -leave the Free State; and the transport had been lost. - -Plumer also was exhausted and unable to continue the pursuit, but -fortunately Knox was close behind him. He doubled back towards Hopetown -for supplies, leaving Knox to follow the trail. De Wet was now driven -into the western corner of the rectangle where the Brak falls into the -Orange, and where he found himself in a dilemma similar to that which in -his first raid had cornered him between the Orange and the Caledon. The -Brak was in spate, and he could not cross it to Prieska. All hope of -joining Hertzog and of a successful raid into the Cape Colony was at an -end; there was nothing to be done but make the best of his way back to -the Free State. He reversed his course and made for the confluence of -the Orange and the Vaal. His change of direction was not known to Knox, -who, assuming that De Wet must have crossed the Brak, which fell as -suddenly as it had risen, threw his columns across it and trekked for -twenty miles towards the S.W. Hertzog was reported to be a day's march -higher up the Brak. - -Up to this time the whole of the stress of the pursuit had fallen upon -Knox and Plumer. As soon as the news of De Wet's entry into the Cape -Colony reached Lord Kitchener, he hurried down from the Transvaal to De -Aar to superintend the casting of the nets. His first dispositions were -made with the object of preventing De Wet and Hertzog breaking away into -the districts lying west of the railway to Capetown, and an ingenious -and elaborate scheme of columns springing out from the line in -succession from the north, was arranged. It was not, however, put into -action, for Knox and Plumer had headed back De Wet, and for the time -being had prevented a junction between him and Hertzog. It was no longer -a case of a stern chase, but of the fencing in of a comparatively -limited area, into which more than a dozen columns were thrown, and -which by February 24 was reduced to the district bounded on three sides -by the railways and on the fourth by the Orange. - -When on February 21 Plumer was able to resume the pursuit, Knox having -discovered his mistake was recrossing the Brak, and De Wet on the left -bank of the Orange was unsuccessfully searching for practicable drifts. -He succeeded, however, in transferring a few of his men to the right -bank in a boat at Makow's Drift, but was overtaken by Plumer before he -could complete the movement, and forced to hurry on towards Hopetown. In -the course of one week he had marched in the direction of almost every -point in the compass, and was now heading E.S.E. - -When within fifteen miles of Hopetown he lost two guns, and on the same -day ran up against a new obstacle, a column under Paris, which had come -down from Kimberley and which had extended itself westward from -Hopetown. He succeeded in wriggling through the line without detection -during the night; while Paris, unaware of what had occurred and thinking -that De Wet was still in front of him, pushed on next morning and came -into action, not with De Wet, but with Plumer, who was pursuing De Wet -in the opposite direction. On February 24 De Wet crossed the railway -eastwards a few miles south of Orange River Station. - -As soon as Hertzog in the Carnarvon district heard of the approach of De -Wet he trekked up towards the Brak to meet him, having first detached a -portion of his command under Brand to make a circuit through Britstown. -Brand was followed by B. Hamilton, who had been set on to his trail, but -regained touch with his leader on February 20, when the news came that -De Wet was in difficulties and that the raid must be abandoned. - -Hertzog and Brand joined forces across the river and trekked to the -east, having thrown Plumer off the scent for a day. On February 25 -Hertzog crossed the railway. Three Boer leaders were now groping for -each other in the Fog of War: De Wet, Hertzog, and Fourie, who had been -left behind to do what he could to extricate the transport which De Wet -had been compelled to abandon when he crossed the railway westwards on -February 16, and who had been lost sight of by the British columns. The -forces of gravitation are, however, irresistible, and as Hertzog and -Brand could not be long kept apart, so also De Wet, Hertzog, and Fourie -soon came together. - -De Wet trekked along the left bank of the Orange for nearly sixty miles, -but found every drift impassable. On February 26 he reached Zand Drift. -A fortnight previously a sudden flood had checked his pursuers, now -another flood was checking his retreat from them at the same spot, and -he was hemmed in by a swollen river and a dozen active columns. Most men -would have yielded to the situation, but his tenacity of purpose never -faltered. Early on the morning of February 27 Hertzog, who had picked up -Fourie a few hours before, joined him. - -After crossing the railway Hertzog made for Petrusville, where he heard -that De Wet had passed through the town on his way south, and followed -him. About twenty miles away on Hertzog's right flank a column under -Hickman was marching on Zand Drift, and had it not been suddenly -diverted northwards by orders from Lyttelton, it must have forestalled -him at the Drift, as it was working on interior lines. The change of -direction was made before Hertzog's presence in the vicinity became -known to Hickman, who on sighting a Boer column on February 26 again -changed direction to pursue it. A second column was soon descried, and -later in the day, about the time that De Wet reached the Drift, a -considerable Boer force was sighted. It was composed of the two columns -already seen under Hertzog and Brand, reinforced by Fourie, who had -emerged from the Fog. Hickman's pursuit failed to prevent the three -commandants joining De Wet at the Drift during the night. - -The _disjecta membra_ of the raid were now assembled, but the task of -the British columns was, apparently, greatly facilitated. Instead of -having to chase evasive and elusive commandos now in this direction and -now in that, the leaders had but to pin De Wet down to the left bank of -the Orange at Zand Drift and to leave him to gaze longingly at the -further shore. Nothing could now save him but a sudden fall of the -swollen river. Before De Wet's arrival at Zand Drift Lyttelton had put -troops in motion, some of them from considerable distances, to enclose -the area, but of the columns detailed three only had come up. Hickman -was on the spot, Crabbe from Hopetown was in touch with him, and Byng, -who had been hurried up from Victoria West, was at hand. None of the -other columns were in position, owing mainly to delays on the railway. -Thus the only effective force for the capture of De Wet was the three -columns with Hickman, who was out of communication with Lyttelton. - -The troops had been disposed with the object of driving De Wet back into -the Free State rather than of capturing him, and they were unable to -concentrate themselves upon him. Norval's Pont, from which the line of -the Orange might, perhaps, have been blocked in the direction of Zand -Drift, was unoccupied. On February 27 Hickman pushed De Wet away from -the Drift. Two columns were behind the Boer leader, but in front of him -was a weak and thinly extended force under Byng, which De Wet cut -through without difficulty, and next morning reached Botha's Drift. It -was fordable, and after eighteen days' absence he re-entered his own -country. He had not succeeded in raiding very far into the Cape Colony, -but he had baffled and outwitted the most strenuous military effort of -the war. - -Plumer, who had been ordered round from Orange River Station to -Colesberg, arrived there too late. He was immediately sent on to -continue the pursuit in the Free State in co-operation with a column -under Bethune, which marched directly across the veld to Fauresmith. -Bethune was soon compelled to fall out, but Plumer held on for five days -more without, however, lessening the distance between him and his -quarry. On March 11, after a trek of more than 800 miles, De Wet, having -dismissed on his way up most of the commandos to their several -districts, entered Senekal with Steyn, and returned to within a few -miles of the Doornberg place of assembly which they had quitted -forty-four days before. - -The lessons to be derived from the history of the three De Wet hunts are -mainly of a moral character, and have only an indirect bearing upon the -principles which guide the conduct of military operations in general. No -such episodes could ever occur in a European War. Yet the Power which -holds Hindustan cannot afford to forget them. Who can say that in the -not distant future, which all the signs of the times seem to show will -be marked by turbulence and disorder in India, a De Wet may not come -forth out of the thousands of Sikhs, Ghoorkas, Pathans and Rajputs who -have learnt the Art of War in the Native Army? The arena of the -struggle, with its long lines of communication, all its chief towns held -by British troops and its vast plains inhabited by a disaffected -population, would be strikingly similar to that on which the Boer War -was fought. - -Notes: - -[Footnote 52: De Wet says that he went at the request of Liebenberg, who -was in charge of the commandos operating between the Vaal and the -Magaliesberg, and who had previously been engaged in the Bechuanaland -rebellion.] - -[Footnote 53: Twenty-three centuries previously, a Greek Army, after a -march of many weeks, reached the sea. The emotion of the men at the -sight has been thus described by their leader in a well-known passage -which Hertzog might well have in substance incorporated in his reports -to De Wet: "No sooner had the men in front caught sight of the sea than -a great cry arose, and Xenophon with the rearguard, catching the sound -of it, conjectured that another set of enemies must surely be attacking -the front. But as the shout became louder and nearer, and those who from -time to time came up began racing at the top of their speed towards the -shouters and the shouting continually recommenced with yet greater -volume as the numbers increased, Xenophon settled in his mind that -something extraordinary must have happened, and mounted his horse and -taking with him Lycius and the cavalry, galloped on. And presently they -could hear the soldiers shouting and passing on the joyful word [Greek: -Thalatta, Thalatta]"--_Anabasis_, IV, 7.] - -[Footnote 54: De Wet ascribes his success to a feint which he made in -the direction of Springhaan's Nek, and which he asserts threw the -columns off the scent; but it is improbable that the feint had anything -to do with it. At the time of De Wet's crossing at Israel's Poort -Hamilton had only reached Sannah's Post, nor was Knox marching on the -Nek.] - - - - -CHAPTER XVI - -Lord Kitchener at Work - - -The nation at home, which at the close of 1900 was confidently expecting -the end of the war at an early date, was not long obsessed by its -optimism. Efforts not less vigorous than patriotic were made not only by -Great Britain, but also by the Colonies and South African Loyalists, to -give Lord Kitchener the troops he needed. - -At the end of May, 1901, he had at his disposal a force which, including -all classes of irregulars, semi-combatants, and non-combatants, was not -less than 230,000; of whom more than one-third were mounted. The rule -hitherto observed, that the native races were to be employed in servile -capacities only, was relaxed, and in certain cases natives were allowed -to carry arms when acting as scouts or patrols. - -It is impossible to ascertain with any degree of accuracy either the -actual or the potential strength of the enemy at this period. It has -been estimated that, excluding the burghers actually on commando, there -were less than 30,000 Boers able to take up arms if inclined to do so; -but this number must only be regarded as the maximum strength of a -possible and to a great extent an unreliable reserve upon which the -commandos in action, at no given moment much exceeding 12,000 burghers, -could draw to supply the wastage of war. - -The war now entered fully into its "blockhouse and drive" phase. The use -of these expedients in combination was, it is believed, new to military -history. The principle of the blockhouse had already been tentatively -adopted in South Africa without much success, notably between -Bloemfontein and Thabanchu, where a line of posts was established which -on three occasions was cut by De Wet.[55] The chief defect of the -blockhouse is its vulnerability to shell fire; but by this time the Boer -artillery was a negligible quantity. Its adoption on a large scale dates -from the time of Lord Kitchener's taking over the command. The expedient -was, in the first instance, applied to the railways as a protection -against the raids to which they were subject; and after July, 1901, it -was extended to the open veld. Subsidiary lines of blockhouses, which in -general jutted out at right angles to the railways and in most cases ran -along the cross-veld roads changing direction as circumstances required, -were built. They acted as fences to obstruct or to deflect the movements -of the enemy and enclosed areas greatly differing in size. - -The longest blockhouse line, which was, however, not completed until a -few weeks before the end of the war, extended from Victoria Road Station -to Lambert's Bay on the Atlantic, a distance of 300 miles. In the -vicinity of Johannesburg, and in the Central districts of the Orange -River Colony west of the railway, cordons of posts manned by the South -African Constabulary took the place of blockhouse lines. These posts, -which were established at wider intervals apart than the blockhouses, -were intended to act as bases for minor clearing operations. They -offered little or no obstruction to a Boer commando on trek. The -blockhouse lines were resolutely extended by Lord Kitchener in every -direction; and by the end of the war there was scarcely a district in -the spacious area of hostilities that was not impaled upon them or -helplessly clutched in their fatal grasp. - -The "Drive" as a military weapon is as old as the time of Darius. The -first use of it in South Africa, on a large scale, was French's movement -through the Eastern Transvaal in February, 1901.[56] The "Drive" has -been criticized as an awkward attempt to perform, with one and the same -force, two distinct operations of war; namely, the coercion of the -non-military population and the defeat of the enemy's troops. The dual -task deprives the force set to it of mobility and power of initiative. - -As a detail of abstract and orthodox military criticism the objection is -sound; but it ignores the special local circumstances of the case. In -the vast area on which the British Army was operating it was not -possible to separate the two objectives. Moreover, the purely military -resources of the enemy were waning; and the contest was resolving itself -into an effort to put pressure on the country at large, rather than to -smash the dwindling, evasive, and centrifugal commandos in the field. -French's "drive," from a military point of view, was not a success; but -it at least frightened Botha and the Transvaal Government. In May, 1901, -there was a conference near Ermelo at which it was resolved that -overtures should be made to Lord Kitchener; and but for Steyn, who was -communicated with in the Orange River Colony, and who had had no -experience of the "drive," it is probable that negotiations for peace -would have ensued. On the other hand, the "drive" has been approved as a -method of warfare particularly adapted for use by an army deficient in -mobility and incapable of acquiring accurate intelligence of the enemy. - - * * * * * - -During the two months preceding Lord Roberts' departure from South -Africa at the end of November, 1900, no events of great military -importance occurred in the Transvaal, except De Wet's Fredrikstad raid. -The opposition had, to all appearance, dissolved into impalpable matter. -Here and there some Boer atoms coalesced and were not pulverized; but -for many weeks there was little in the general situation to disturb the -optimistic belief, which was held not only by the people at home but -also by the Army in the field, that the end was not far off. - -Botha and Steyn reached Pietersburg in September, where they were joined -by B. Viljoen, who arrived a few weeks later after a circuitous journey -from Komati Poort through the low veld. An important detail of Lord -Roberts' plan of campaign had not been carried out. He had hoped that -the Northern Transvaal would be denied to the Boers by Carrington, who -failed to carry out his part of the programme. Thus Pietersburg was a -fairly secure eyrie in which plans could be devised and from which a -swoop could be made either east or west of Pretoria. - -Botha and Steyn soon came to the conclusion that the situation, though -serious, was by no means hopeless. Certain events of October and -November were encouraging. They not unnaturally argued that the -withdrawal of their two chief opponents, Lord Roberts and Sir Redvers -Buller, indicated infirmity of purpose on the part of the British -Government. The idea was mistaken, as the recall of these leaders, or at -least of one of them, was due to the fact that the British Government -was of opinion that the war was practically over. Again, they were -relieved of the inconvenient and harassing presence of Kruger, the dour, -reactionary old farmer, who had brought on the war and had now left his -country to its fate; who had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing since -he had set out on the Great Trek of 1836; and whose mind ran in a -channel so shallow that it could almost be heard rippling over the -stones. Also, it is probable that they had information that the majority -of the men of the Colonial and Irregular Corps, whose term of service of -one year would shortly expire, or had already expired, were declining to -re-enlist--yet another sign of infirmity of purpose. Moreover, the Boer -agents in Europe no doubt reported that all the regular infantry and its -reserves in Great Britain had been exhausted. - -In November, 1900, the new plan of campaign was drawn up. L. Botha was -to invade Natal, after a raid into the Cape Colony by De Wet, for whom -Kritzinger and Hertzog would prepare the way and lay out the dâk. Steyn -hurried southwards with the scheme, and was picked up at Ventersdorp by -De Wet. Botha went to the high veld between the Natal Railway and the -Delagoa Bay Railway, leaving B. Viljoen north of the latter railway. -Beyers was ordered to join Delarey, who after the battle of Diamond Hill -went into his own country near the Magaliesberg and was now lurking in -the Zwartruggens. - -French, after his unhappy cross-veld march to Heidelberg, was placed in -charge of the Johannesburg district. His passage had not overawed the -local commandos, which, like the armed men from the teeth of Cadmus, -soon sprang up out of the ground; and two attempts made by Smith-Dorrien -to coerce them failed. Hildyard, after the departure of Buller and the -dissolution of the Natal Army, was placed in charge of an extensive -district which included not only Natal but also the S.E. corner of the -Transvaal. Clery went home in October, 1900, and was succeeded in the -charge of the Natal Railway in the Transvaal by Wynne. Lyttelton, with -his Head Quarters at Middelburg, was posted on the Delagoa Bay Railway. - -Methuen alone of all the British leaders had an opportunity during this -period of acting against definite objectives. Early in September he -quitted Mafeking and zigzagged in the western districts. After a minor -affair at Lichtenburg he was called south, and with the help of Settle, -who sallied from Vryburg, relieved Schweizer Reneke. His next efforts -were not so successful. A march to Rustenburg, with a view of -intercepting the wandering President of the Free State, brought him to -his destination early in October, only to find that Steyn was gone; and -subsequently he was unable to tackle Delarey effectively in the -Zwartruggens, a difficult district lying a day's march west of the -Magaliesberg. When he reached Zeerust a considerable portion of his -command was withdrawn under C. Douglas to reinforce French, and the end -of November found him again at Mafeking, too weak to work outside his -own district. - -The Magaliesberg was patrolled by Clements and Broadwood, who made some -captures. Clements also was called on to furnish troops for French, who -lay at Johannesburg, having under his command several mobile columns as -well as the garrisons on the Klerksdorp railway and elsewhere. - -Paget, who since August had been operating north of Pretoria, made an -attempt in the direction of Rustenburg to cut off Steyn, but was no more -successful than Methuen. His next divagation was to Eerstefabriken, a -few miles east of Pretoria, whence he was ordered away to see to B. -Viljoen, who was harassing the Delagoa Bay Railway, and whom, without -assistance from Lyttelton, he shifted from a strong position at -Rhenoster Kop in an affair which has been termed the last orthodox -pitched battle of the campaign. - - * * * * * - -Such, in brief, was the position in the Transvaal when Lord Kitchener, -after a flying visit to Bloemfontein for the purpose of co-ordinating -the activities against De Wet, returned to Pretoria on December 11, -1900. It would have offered greater difficulties to a man who was a -soldier first and an organizer afterwards than it did to the successor -of Lord Roberts. It may be likened to an archipelago in a stormy sea -infested by pirates who, though powerless to take possession of any of -the islands, made communication between them always dangerous and -sometimes impossible. - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 240.] - -Lord Kitchener's coming difficulties were heralded less than a week -after the departure of Lord Roberts by the loss of a large convoy which -was proceeding to Rustenburg, and for which Delarey, who was always to -be found where weak detachments came his way, was waiting. Ten days -later Clements suffered a disaster. He was based on Krugersdorp, but his -command had been weakened and his transport was deficient. He received -orders to act in the Hekpoort Valley, while Broadwood acted north of the -Magaliesberg. When he reached Noitgedacht Nek he found Delarey a few -miles away. At his urgent request a small portion of the troops which -had been taken from him was restored, with a few wagons; but they left -Krugersdorp too late to be of service. - -Clements was under the impression that he had only Delarey to deal with, -and was unaware that Beyers was on his way to carry out the orders he -had received from Botha. The withdrawal of Paget to Eerstefabriken -cleared his front, and he marched on to the Magaliesberg. His movements -were not unnoticed by the Intelligence, which, however, failed to notify -them to Clements, who on December 11 was in presence of two Boer -leaders, whose united forces were twice as strong as his own. Unknown to -him they had met at Boschfontein near the southern approach to Breedt's -Nek; for when a commando was reported to be at hand, he did not doubt -that it was Delarey's force only. - -Noitgedacht was tactically an unsound position which Clements, assuming -that his right was safe, had taken up in order to maintain heliographic -communication with Broadwood on the other side of the Magaliesberg. The -range rises more than a thousand feet above the camp selected by -Clements and is accessible only by a rough track. The ground on either -side of the Nek was occupied by pickets posted there mainly for -signalling purposes. These posts, however, were helpless if attacked, as -they were not only widely scattered, but could not be reinforced from -the main body in the valley below. Thus they were little or no -protection to the camp. - -In the direction from which an attack might be expected Clements' camp, -which lay at the foot of the Nek, was protected by a low ridge jutting -out from the main range and ending in a detached kopje. This ridge was -held by mounted infantry. Another detached kopje, called Yeomanry Hill, -was occupied towards the S.E. - -Delarey's general idea for the day's operation was simple: an advance by -himself along the low ground upon the camp, coincident with an advance -by Beyers on the other side of the range. Shortly before sunrise on -December 13 Delarey endeavoured to rush the mounted infantry posts on -the ridge, which in anticipation of an attack had been strengthened on -the previous evening. Their vigorous resistance foiled the enterprise -and Delarey was driven off. - -Soon, however, the sound of firing on the heights showed that the -Northumberland Fusilier posts on each side of the Nek were in action. -They had been attacked by Beyers, but fortunately not as had been -intended by Delarey simultaneously with his own attack upon the ridge; -otherwise it is probable that it would have been successful. After a -desperate struggle, in which the Fusiliers lost heavily, they were -overpowered, and Beyers was in possession of the high ground overlooking -the camp. An attempt made by Clements to recover the Nek failed. Beyers' -burghers came plunging down like a cascade and broke upon the camp -itself. - -Clements anticipated that Delarey would soon return to the charge and -ordered a retirement, which was effected under cover of the artillery -and a rearguard of mounted infantry. Shortly before noon he formed up on -Yeomanry Hill. Delarey renewed his attack, but met with such sturdy -resistance that his men could not be induced to push it home. In the -course of the afternoon Clements withdrew towards Rietfontein, having -lost in killed, wounded and prisoners more than two-thirds of his 1,500 -men. An orderly retreat was effected, and the column, which had been -surprised by Beyers and had seen its camp in the possession of the -enemy, brought away, in the presence of superior numbers, all its ten -guns. - -[Illustration: Noitgedacht Nek.] - -Broadwood on the other side of the range, to communicate with whom -Clements had taken up an unsound position at Noitgedacht Nek, lost touch -with him, and like many a British officer before him in South Africa, -was groping in the Fog of War. Two days previously he had heard that -Beyers was approaching, and he knew that Delarey was not far off; yet in -his ignorance of the situation he allowed Beyers to wriggle in between -him and Clements and to meet Delarey. At the time when Clements was -defending himself against the combined attack of the two Boer leaders, -Broadwood was seven miles away, placidly patching a field telegraph -cable; and when at noon he discovered that Clements was in action he -made no attempt to create a diversion. - -It would be inequitable to surcharge the Noitgedacht misadventure and -other "regrettable incidents" to any individual: they should rather be -surcharged, not to this or that responsible commander, but to -irresponsible Human Nature. The British Army was, to a great extent, -stale and veld-sick. It was informed that the war would soon be over, -and it had become slack and careless. Convoys were sent afield with -insufficient escorts to run the gauntlet of ever watchful and alert Boer -commandants; Intelligence news qualified by the reports of untrustworthy -native spies was transmitted circumferentially from column to column, -with the result that the leader to whom it was of the most importance -was sometimes the last to receive it; the scouting and patrol work was -casual and rash. It is, however, but just to say that when the occasion -called for it, the fighting qualities of the British soldier showed no -signs of deterioration. - -The Boers, after their habit, were content with the tactical victory at -Noitgedacht and refrained from endeavouring to improve upon it. French -and Clements took the field without delay, and although they failed in -their plan to pin Delarey and Beyers on to the wall of the Magaliesberg, -the Boer leaders were compelled to separate. Their brilliant and brief -co-operation did much to awake the British nation out of its torpor. -There was no longer any talk of reducing the Army of occupation by -one-half at the end of the year, and still more during the New Year; or -of quenching the smouldering embers of the war with Baden-Powell's new -South African Constabulary. - -Late in December the pursuit of Delarey, who had retired from -Noitgedacht towards the S.W., was resumed. At Ventersdorp he and his 700 -men, after eluding a ponderous force of nearly 6,000 men with 40 guns, -doubled back; and soon the same columns unsuccessfully encountered him -at Cyferfontein, where he ambushed a mounted detachment and then -disappeared. - -Beyers, who went into the west after he was wrenched apart from Delarey, -soon reappeared upon the stage in the Hekpoort Valley with 1,200 men. -His position was precarious. In front of him was Paget, who had been -sent round to intercept him; while pressing on his heels was a -newly-formed mounted force under Babington, 2,000 strong. He extricated -himself cleverly by brushing past Paget and advancing boldly in what was -apparently the line of greatest resistance. - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 240.] - -No one but a Boer leader with a supreme contempt for his enemy would -have thought of placing himself within striking distance of Pretoria and -Johannesburg. Yet on January 11, 1901, he audaciously laagered within a -few miles of Johannesburg, unknown to the garrison. Next day he crossed -the railway at Kaalfontein, half-way between the two cities, and -disappeared in the Eastern Transvaal. That at this stage of the war it -was possible for 1,200 men to cut the railway, and with scarcely the -loss of a man to cross it, with guns and a long train of wagons, midway -between the two chief cities of the Transvaal, showed how much still -remained to be done. - -The disturbances in the Orange River Colony brought about certain -changes and redistributions in the Transvaal commands, by which leaders -were, as in the circuits of Wesleyan ministers, removed from spheres -familiar to them. Clements went to Pretoria in succession to Tucker, who -was sent to Bloemfontein; E. Knox, who, fifteen months previously, had -been in command of the squadrons of the 18th Hussars which were not made -prisoners of war at Talana, took command of the column of Broadwood, who -was sent across the Vaal; Cunningham succeeded Clements in the -Magaliesberg district; Hart quitted Klerksdorp for the Orange River -Colony; and French went away into the west. - -On the Boer side a new name which was destined often to be on men's lips -emerged from the crowd in January, 1901. A young lawyer named J.C. -Smuts, who had received his legal education in England, and whom Delarey -entrusted with a command, soon showed, and not for the first time, that -a shrewd, resourceful, energetic and determined civilian was, at least -in _guerilla_, more than a match for highly trained British officers. - -A movement towards the south by Cunningham, with a view of checking -Delarey, soon brought Cunningham into trouble. After crossing the -Magaliesberg he was entangled by the Transvaal leader, and had to be -extricated by Babington before he could proceed to his destination at -Krugersdorp. - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 292.] - -Smuts, the new leader, went to the Gatsrand. His first exploit was to -snap up a weak and isolated British detachment at Modderfontein Nek, and -to establish his own commando on the position. When Cunningham reached -Krugersdorp he received orders to tackle Smuts. On February 2, having an -overwhelming superiority in guns and a considerable advantage in -numbers, he attacked Smuts; but the apprentice tactician had little -difficulty in meeting the regulation frontal holding attack combined -with a turning movement, and Cunningham withdrew. - -In the Western Transvaal there were now three Boer leaders to be dealt -with: Smuts in the Gatsrand, Delarey in the Zwartruggens, and Kemp. The -latter had come down from the north with Beyers and had been with him -when the line was crossed at Kaalfontein. He had lately returned to his -own district of Krugersdorp. With Botha threatening in the east and De -Wet raiding in the south, few troops could be spared to help the columns -on the spot; but two additional columns, under the command of Shekleton -and Benson, and composed mainly of details, were assembled by Lord -Kitchener. One of these went astray, but the other joined Cunningham and -advanced against Smuts in the Gatsrand, only to find that he had escaped -at first towards the south, and had then changed direction and had -vanished in the N.W. - -Methuen, who towards the end of November, 1900, had gone south from -Mafeking in order to deal with apprehended trouble in Griqualand West, -pushed up from the S.W. corner of the Transvaal and on February 18, -1901, came upon Delarey, who had escaped from Babington and had -reinforced a gathering of weak commandos near Hartebeestfontein. -Although outnumbered by more than 4 to 3, Methuen without much -difficulty compelled Delarey to withdraw, and went on to Klerksdorp. -Smuts reappeared and with Delarey made off to the N.W., the sanctuary to -which each of them had in turn repaired. Methuen was sent south to -Hoopstad in the Orange River Colony. He had hardly started when news -came in that an isolated garrison seventy miles away in the N.W. was -threatened. - -Delarey had a definite objective in view when he disappeared, his native -town of Lichtenburg. The place was one of many for which Methuen, with -an attenuated force, was responsible; and now he had been called away to -a town in trouble in the opposite direction. Two columns nearer at hand -were called upon to relieve Lichtenburg, but in the meantime it had -relieved itself; for although Delarey succeeded in winning a footing -within it, the obstinate resistance which he encountered disheartened -him, and he withdrew on March 4 after twenty-four hours' fighting. - -The next three weeks were occupied in the pursuit of Delarey by two -columns under Shekleton and Babington, at first in directions which he -had not taken. They started westward from Ventersdorp, not conceiving it -possible that, after the repulse at Lichtenburg, he would have the -audacity to throw himself across their left front in an attempt to reach -Klerksdorp. When the news that he had actually done so reached them they -changed direction southwards, Delarey opening outwards to let them pass -through towards Wolmaranstad, whither the Intelligence had in -imagination waybilled him. The British columns, unaware that he was on -either side of them, and still under the impression that he was on their -front towards the south, passed on and halted at Hartebeestfontein, when -a reconnoitring party sent out northwards discovered that he was in rear -of the columns. - -The reconnoitring party had much difficulty in saving itself, as it was -charged by mounted Boers in mass, a tactical movement which hitherto had -not been tried by the enemy. Babington at once reversed the line of his -march, and on March 24 came up with Delarey at Wildfontein, midway -between Ventersdorp and Lichtenburg. Delarey was moving heavily and was -compelled to jettison his guns and his transport. These were picked up -by Babington, who, however, was not able to continue the pursuit and -returned to Ventersdorp. - -The loss did not disconcert Delarey. He retired with Kemp to a position -close to his lair in the Zwartruggens, where, however, he did not long -remain. At the same time, he sent Smuts to the Hartebeestfontein -district, out of which he had just been driven. The audacity of the act -was justified, for Smuts maintained himself against Babington during the -whole of April. - -Early in May a determined effort was made to clear the district. Methuen -after he had relieved Hoopstad was recalled to Mafeking, and then went -to Lichtenburg. The British force on the Magaliesberg, commanded first -by Clements, then by Cunningham, and now by Dixon, was ordered to -operate from the north, while a strong column under Ingouville-Williams -was prepared at Klerksdorp. Thus each angle of the disturbed area was -held by troops ready to converge; and within it were Babington's -columns. Delarey was believed to be at Hartebeestfontein; but neither he -nor any other Boers could be found there when the troops entered it on -May 6. The Boer leaders had, as usual, adopted their usual strategy of -spreading false reports, and of dispersing their commandos as soon as -they were hard pressed. On the British side the subsequent operations -were conducted without method. The columns, having effected little, were -recalled to their bases; and the middle of May, 1901, saw Delarey, Kemp, -and J.C. Smuts still at large. - - * * * * * - -The first offensive action taken by Botha after he came down from -Pietersburg in November, 1900, was against Hildyard's posts in the angle -adjoining Natal. His movements against the garrisons of Vryheid and -other places in December failed, and he returned to the Central -Transvaal in order to co-operate with B. Viljoen in worrying the Delagoa -Bay Railway, on which Lyttelton's[57] force was strung out. Viljoen had -already made a daring and successful raid on Helvetia, from which he -brought away not only prisoners of war but also a heavy gun; although -the town was by no means isolated, being one of a line of posts running -from Belfast and Machadodorp to Lydenburg. - -The exploit encouraged Botha to plan a general attack, in co-operation -with Viljoen, on a section of the railway each side of Belfast. It was -made on January 7, 1901. The chief effort was against Belfast, where -Smith-Dorrien was in command of a garrison too weak for effective -resistance. Viljoen advancing from the north met with some preliminary -success, but a fog prevented co-operation between him and Botha and the -attack failed. The attacks on the other posts on the railway were -repelled without much difficulty. The recrudescence of Botha, the -intrusion of Beyers from the west, the hovering presence of Viljoen -north of the Delagoa Bay Railway, and the rumour that an invasion of -Natal was in contemplation to synchronize with raids beyond the Orange -by De Wet, Kritzinger, and Hertzog, determined Lord Kitchener to try to -sweep up and reduce the Eastern Transvaal. - -A force of five columns under the command of French was assembled a few -miles east of the Elandsfontein-Pretoria Railway and began its advance -on January 28. The general idea was that it should gradually extend its -front, like the cone of dispersion of a shrapnel shell, between the -diverging Natal and Delagoa Bay Railways, and then sweep eastward -towards the Swaziland and Zululand borders; upon which Botha's -commandos, if not already crushed by an enveloping movement on Ermelo, -would be finally impaled. To assist French when he had traversed about -one-half of the area, three columns were detailed to march southwards -from the Delagoa Bay Railway on Ermelo. One of these columns was, -however, sent away at the last moment under Paget to take part in the -operations against De Wet in the Cape Colony. The combined strength of -the seven columns against Botha was about 20,000 men, the majority of -the combatants being mounted. A break back by Beyers and Kemp, who -rejoined Delarey, was the opening incident of French's advance. - -The first objective of French's movement was the town of Ermelo, where -Botha was acting as a sort of rearguard to cover the retreat of the -fugitive burghers, who with their families and their stuff were -endeavouring to escape from the Khakis. His contemplated attack on Natal -was, at least for the time being, impracticable; and he set himself to -the task of inflicting what damage he could on the threatening columns. -He ascertained that Smith-Dorrien's column was approaching Lake Chrissie -on February 5, and that the other column operating from the Delagoa Bay -Railway under W. Campbell, was too far away to give it effectual -support. The gap left by the withdrawal of Paget had not been filled up. - -When Smith-Dorrien reached the Lake, Botha had already started to meet -him. Early in the morning of February 6 the British Camp was attacked, -but although the attempt was furthered by a stampede of Smith-Dorrien's -horses, Botha failed. He was compelled to draw off, but with the greater -portion of his burghers wriggled round to the rear of the columns.[58] -Thus when French reached Ermelo he found that he had nothing to strike -at. The Boer commandos had passed away. After a short halt he changed -direction half right, and projected his front on to a cross-veld line -reaching from the Swaziland border to Amersfort; then bringing round his -right he formed up his seven columns on February 18 along the Swaziland -border, with an eastward front of nearly forty miles extending -southwards from Amsterdam. Dartnell was on the right of the line and -Smith-Dorrien on the left. - -Most of the fugitive commandos had, however, retired into the S.E. -corner of the Transvaal; a movement which Hildyard, who was in charge of -the district as well as of the whole of Natal, was not strong enough to -check. French was now based on Natal for supplies, and arrangements had -been made that two large convoys should be sent to him by way of -Utrecht. Bad roads, bad weather, and submerged drifts impeded the -progress of the painful trains, the first of which did not reach him -until March 2, ten days after it was due. Meanwhile he subsisted on -dwindled rations and on what he could pick up on the veld. - -When, owing to a change in the routes by which he was supplied, French -was able towards the end of March to operate actively, he endeavoured to -isolate the S.E. corner of the Transvaal by disposing his force in two -lines. One line ran from Piet Retief to Vryheid and acted as the driving -force, and the other ran from Piet Retief along the Swaziland border and -acted as the stopping force. Within the angle enclosed by these lines -were commandos under Grobler of Vryheid, Emmett, and other leaders; but -all of them wriggled out with insignificant losses. The line along the -Swaziland border was rendered immobile by difficulties of supply, and -the driving line was exhausted. The closing incident of French's ten -weeks' campaign, the chief harvest of which was the capture, surrender, -wounding, or killing of 1,300 Boers, the seizure of a considerable -amount of ammunition, and the taking of eleven guns, was the return of -Smith-Dorrien to the Delagoa Bay Railway in the middle of April. - -Botha's projected invasion of Natal had indeed been frustrated and -postponed, but he and all the other Boer leaders had escaped, unscathed -and undismayed. French's ponderous columns had trudged painfully across -the veld from Springs almost into Zululand, and had left things much as -they were at the beginning of February. - -During the early months of the year 1901 Viljoen for the most part -contented himself with frequent attacks on the Delagoa Bay Railway, and -a vigorous effort to restrain his activity was not practicable. In March -Lord Kitchener formulated a plan for the subjugation of the Northern -Transvaal. His plan was to send a column with secrecy and dispatch to -Pietersburg, which would be occupied as a base from which the column -would work southwards along the line of the Olifant's River, in -co-operation with columns acting northwards from the Delagoa Bay -Railway. - -The force selected to proceed to Pietersburg was Plumer's Australian -column, which sixteen days after it desisted from the chase of De Wet in -the Orange River Colony was marching northwards out of Pretoria. Plumer -entered Pietersburg on April 8 without opposition, Beyers, who had been -falling back before him from Warmbaths, having evacuated the town. -Plumer halted for a few days in order to secure the railway and to make -arrangements for carrying out his orders to hold the line of the -Olifant's River. Before the end of the month he was in possession of all -the drifts from Commissie Drift downwards, and denied them to Viljoen. - -The country in which Viljoen was acting is hilly and intricate, and Lord -Kitchener, by borrowing Sir Bindon Blood from the Indian Government, an -officer of great experience in frontier _guerilla_, paid Viljoen and the -Boer commandos the compliment of crediting them with the military -qualities of the dangerous, predatory, and enterprising hill tribes of -the underfeatures of the Himalayas. To Blood were given six columns -which were to work from Lydenburg and the Delagoa Bay Railway. - -Viljoen was near Ros Senekal. He had three lines of retreat, northward -or southward along the Steelpoort River, or down the Blood River. -Blood's columns were disposed with the object of closing these exits. -The Transvaal Government, which for some months had been sojourning in -security at Paardeplatz, fled and joined Botha near Ermelo; but Viljoen -stood fast. - -The total force under Blood exceeded 10,000 men. Three columns under -Beatson, Benson, and Pulteney, who had joined from Vryheid where he had -been serving under French's command, advanced northwards from the -Delagoa Bay Railway. On their right front they were supported by three -columns acting from Lydenburg, under Park, W. Douglas, and W. Kitchener. -Douglas was the only leader destined to encounter Viljoen, who on April -10 struck at him near Dullstroom, but was handsomely beaten and -compelled to return to the place from which he came. He was hedged in on -all sides; mutiny and disaffection were rife among his burghers; and he -saw that there was nothing to be done but make his escape as best he -could. - -He was headed off by Benson in an attempt to get away up the Steelpoort -Valley, where next day 100 Boers gave themselves up to Blood. He next -tried the Blood River, and passing down the valley crossed the Olifant -on April 22, almost within sight of Beatson, who was watching the -drifts. A few days later he crossed the railway and joined Botha at -Ermelo. Early in May the active operations north of the Delagoa Bay -Railway ceased. As in French's campaign, so also in Blood's, the results -were chiefly negative. A glut of live stock was rounded up, a -considerable amount of ammunition and all the guns known to be in the -district were taken, and 1,100 Boers either surrendered or were made -prisoners. The columns were withdrawn, as troops were in request in the -districts lately driven by French; and Plumer, who had had no -opportunity of engaging actively in the movement, was recalled. He was -succeeded at Pietersburg by Grenfell. - -At the end of May Dixon set out westwards from Naauwpoort in the -Magaliesberg district on a raiding expedition. He trekked for three days -and then ran unexpectedly into a Boer column at Vlakfontein. He was -attacked through a veil of smoke from a grass fire which the slim enemy -had lit to windward. In spite of this disadvantage he held his own and -compelled the Boers to retire, but soon, however, found it advisable to -retire himself and returned to Naauwpoort. - -The column which had engaged Dixon was under the command of Kemp, whom -the Intelligence had after the Hartebeestfontein operations despatched -in imagination with Delarey to the south, where they were reported to be -concentrating. Kemp, however, had returned to the Zwartruggens. After -the Vlakfontein affair he found columns approaching him from all sides -and dissolved his command. Delarey had gone south, and was now in the -Orange River Colony. - -The northward retreat of De Wet through the Orange River Colony in -March, 1901, drew in its trail a host of British columns, which plodded -sturdily across the veld with scanty results. He endeavoured to -systematize _guerilla_ by parcelling out the late Free State into -districts under commandants acting locally: Lord Kitchener retorted by -parcelling it out into a smaller number of districts, each district -being in charge of a general officer armed with columns with which to -worry the local commandants. Many divagations ensued; few profitable -results were attained. - -Of these divagations the most conspicuous was a visit paid by Rundle to -the Brandwater Basin, wherein the enemy was reported to be once more -concentrated. There were, in fact, less than 1,000 burghers within the -Basin, but these pressed severely on him when, at the end of May, he -made his exit through the Golden Gate with one prisoner of war. - -Exigencies elsewhere compelled Lord Kitchener to allow the Cape Colony, -to a great extent, to take care of itself. Some troops were sent down, -but they were insufficient to control the disaffection which was active -in the midland districts. Kritzinger remained in the Cape Colony; -paying, however, a brief visit to the Orange River Colony in April. - -Early in June Delarey, De Wet, and Steyn met at Reitz, for the purpose -of considering a communication lately received from the Transvaal -Government, suggesting that overtures should be made to Lord Kitchener. -To this Steyn had already returned an unfavourable answer; but he -distrusted the wavering and wandering Transvaal Government, and he was -desirous of obtaining the support of Delarey, whom he knew to be the -most stalwart and implacable of the Transvaal leaders. It was arranged -that Steyn, Delarey, and De Wet should go north and meet Botha at -Ermelo. - -Meanwhile Elliott, who was in charge of one of the districts parcelled -out by Lord Kitchener in the Orange River Colony, was engaged in a drive -from Vrede to Kroonstad. On June 6 he sent on a weak column under Sladen -to capture a Boer convoy near Reitz. It was taken without trouble, but -the news soon reached the triumvirate in camp not far off and they -determined to make an effort to recapture it. A small commando was -quickly mustered and Delarey and De Wet attacked Sladen, who after -several hours' hard fighting was relieved by another column from -Elliott's force. The prize was retained, but Delarey and De Wet got -away. They waited until Elliott had passed by, and then made for the -north with Steyn, crossing into the Transvaal near Standerton. - -Meanwhile the Transvaal Government which they had gone to meet had been -again sent on its journeyings. The effects of French's drive had soon -passed away, and Lord Kitchener found it necessary to resume active -operations in the Eastern Transvaal, the chief object of which was the -capture of the Transvaal Government. It was hustled out of the Ermelo -district and pushed down towards Piet Retief, from which it returned to -Ermelo in the middle of June. Its drooping spirits were revived by an -affair at Wilmansrust, where a wandering Australian column was -overwhelmed by a commando under Muller which was lurking in the -district. On June 20 Steyn, Delarey, and De Wet met the Transvaal -Government in a Council of War near Standerton. - -The allies at once determined to continue the war. Lord Kitchener had -permitted a communication to be sent to ex-President Kruger asking his -advice. Kruger's reply, as might have been anticipated, was in favour of -continuing the war. In his comfortable sanctuary in Holland he had -nothing to lose by urging those whom he had left behind to carry on the -struggle. In view of the tentacles with which Great Britain was grasping -South Africa and of the general situation, the decision of the Council -of War was a morally courageous act. There was in it, moreover, a -special as well as a general idea. Particular attention was to be given -to the cultivation of the numerous germs of mischief in the Cape Colony, -and this part of the plan was entrusted to the brilliant young lawyer, -J.C. Smuts, who returned with Delarey to the Western Transvaal. - -An almost complete reconstruction of the Free State Government was -rendered necessary by an episode which occurred soon after Steyn's -return to his own country. When he and his colleagues crossed the Vaal -they found Elliott again engaged on a drive. On the night of July 10 -they were surprised at Reitz by Broadwood, who had joined Elliott's -command, and all except Steyn were captured. De Wet was away, otherwise -it is improbable that a man of such infinity of resource and strength of -will would have allowed his friends to be taken tamely in their -slumbers. - - * * * * * - -The task set to Smuts was, to all appearance, impossible of fulfilment. -Not only had he to collect a sufficient force in the Gatsrand under the -eyes of British columns, but he had also to conduct it through the whole -length of the Orange River Colony, and run the gauntlet of Elliott, C. -Knox, Rundle, and Bruce Hamilton. By the middle of July he had recruited -340 burghers, who travelled south in four parties with British columns -at their heels and mustered near Hoopstad on August 1. - -Here they entered the precincts of the area into which Lord Kitchener -was endeavouring in one grand drive to sweep the Boer remnants of the -S.W. Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. Elliott was wheeling round -from Reitz through Vredefort and Klerksdorp and advancing on the line of -the Modder River, behind which stood Bruce Hamilton.[59] A considerable -amount of transport and live stock was taken; also 500 Boers, among whom -Smuts and his commando were not. - -He had succeeded on August 3 in wriggling by night through Elliott's -driving line and was now in rear of it. He now divided his force into -two commandos, one of which, under Van der Venter, made for the south by -way of Brandfort. With the other he boldly trailed behind Elliott and -followed him to the Bloemfontein-Jacobsdal line of Constabulary posts, -through which he passed without injury. He then found himself entangled -in Bruce Hamilton's columns, and although he succeeded in reaching -Springfontein, he was soon forced to retreat nearly seventy miles in the -direction of Bloemfontein. Nothing daunted, he made another dash for the -south, and having evaded two pursuing columns entered Zastron on August -27, where he found Van der Venter waiting for him. His daring and -adventurous ride ranks as one of the most notable personal exploits of -the war. He had not only cut Elliott's line from front to rear, but had -afterwards enfranchised himself amid the swarm of Bruce Hamilton's -columns. The lawyer Smuts was the De Wet of the Transvaal. - -Kritzinger after fifteen weeks' activity in the Cape Colony had returned -to Zastron a few days before Smuts' arrival. His incursion into the -Colony in May occurred at an opportune moment, for the local rebels were -being severely worried. He made at first for the Zuurberg, but being -soon expelled from it and from the adjacent mountainous district north -of Sterkstroom, circled back to the Orange and snapped up Jamestown. He -now flung his grenades on all sides. One rebel leader reached the -Transkei districts; others prowled between Graaff Reinet and the -Capetown Railway. Kritzinger himself captured a small British detachment -near Maraisburg. - -As in February when Lyttelton was brought down, so again in July the -situation in the Cape Colony was sufficiently serious to call for -outside assistance. French was sent down from the Transvaal; Lord -Kitchener himself came to Middelburg. The measures concerted between -them, a series of northward drives by the operation of which the rebels -would be plastered against the railways, which were rapidly blockhoused -for the purpose, met with indifferent success. The disaffected midland -districts were swept, but the leaders escaped. Kritzinger crossed the -Orange in August, and at Zastron awaited the arrival of J.C. Smuts with -new schemes for mischief. - -The presence of these leaders attracted columns from several quarters -and they were betimes theoretically surrounded. Kritzinger, however, -refused to consider himself surrounded and even worked freely in -co-operation with Brand: nor had J.C. Smuts any intention of resigning -his commission. He crossed the Orange on September 3. A fortnight later, -Kritzinger and Brand parted company. Kritzinger marched on the Orange, -and near a drift of that river pounced upon and overwhelmed a weak -detail of the force under Hart, who was acting as warden of the Cape -Colony marches. Brand made for the Bloemfontein-Thabanchu line of posts, -which was the sport of every Boer leader who chose to hack at it, and -which recently had scarcely impeded the progress of Van der Venter to -the south for an hour. On September 19, near Sannah's Post, he ambushed -and destroyed a party of mounted infantry engaged in raiding a farm. Two -guns and nearly 100 prisoners of war were taken by Brand. - -Smuts' arrival in the Cape Colony, like Kritzinger's four months before, -stimulated a waning cause. Lotter, who had escaped French's drives, had -just been taken; the other rebel leaders were isolated and comparatively -innocuous. Fresh hopes were kindled, activities were renewed, when it -was noised among the rebel bands that Smuts the Transvaaler had swooped -down like an eagle from the north. - -These hopes were not delusive. Smuts made for the south, pursued by some -of French's columns. Near Tarkastad on September 17 he ambushed and -overwhelmed a detachment of regular cavalry and won a footing in the -midlands, where rebellion again raised its head from the ground. - -Smuts noticed and encouraged the promising movement and returned to the -Zuurberg, out of which, however, he was soon hustled. He went away to -join a rebel leader named Scheepers, who had been working freely 200 -miles away to the S.W. in the districts bordering the sea. Scheepers, -however, was taken prisoner near Prince Albert Road Station on the -Capetown Railway before Smuts reached him; but Smuts continued his -movement. Smuts had entrusted the inflammatory work in the midlands to -local leaders before he left the district, and now set himself to -trespass beyond the furthest point reached by Scheepers, and to make a -bold entry into the extreme S.W. corner of the Cape Colony. Early in -November he penetrated into the Ceres district, where he was less than -100 miles in a direct line from Capetown. He had brilliantly performed -the task set to him by Botha and Steyn at Standerton in June. He had -been in contact with and had evaded the majority of the units of Lord -Kitchener's widely disseminated army at one time or another during his -ride of 1,100 miles, and in fourteen weeks had passed from the Gatsrand -in the Transvaal to within a few days' march of Capetown. - -Meanwhile Lord Kitchener was doing his best to deal with the accruing -winter discontent. He had a plan of his own; and he was also furnished -with a plan that had been drawn up by the civilian authorities in -Downing Street and South Africa, who thought that the walls of Jericho -would fall to the sound of a Proclamation. In August, 1901, a legal -document was served on the Boers, much in the same way that a writ is -served upon a debtor. In it they were declared to be helpless and -incapable of carrying on the struggle, and their leaders were threatened -with perpetual banishment. It had little effect on the enemy, except to -brace him up for further efforts; and Lord Kitchener, it is believed, -had no faith in it. - -Lord Kitchener's plan was the extension across the veld of the system of -blockhouse lines which at first ran only along the railways, and the -formation of pens or enclaves into which the attenuated roving bands of -Boers were to be herded and dealt with severally and severely. The work -of extension was taken in hand in July, 1901. The Boers in the veld -watched it with the detachment and unconcern of a wild bird on the -branches looking down upon the fowler laying his snares in the field -below. - -Another drive by Elliott during August and September, this time through -the eastern districts of the Orange River Colony, affected little. -Kritzinger remained in his corner between the Orange and the Caledon and -could not be extracted from it; De Wet was still at large. In the -Transvaal the leaders were marking time. Viljoen after the Standerton -conference withdrew beyond the Delagoa Bay Railway, but was soon driven -out of the mountains. He lost heart, handed over his command to Muller, -and went down to the low veld adjoining the Pietersburg Railway. - -In the Western Transvaal Delarey and Kemp were alert. Kemp in the -Zwartruggens foiled an attempt to cast a net around him, and in -conjunction with Delarey attacked Methuen on the Marico River without -success on September 5. A pale of blockhouses denied them access to the -"protected area."[60] Muller effected a trifling success in the middle -north. Beyers in the Pietersburg district was unable to prevent Grenfell -reaching a point but sixty miles from the Limpopo and there making -prisoners of a local commando. - -No organized attempt was made to disturb Botha in the Ermelo district. A -column under Benson did indeed set out from the Delagoa Bay Railway in -August, but it was recalled by the alarm of a Boer raid on the line at -Bronkhorst Spruit. Benson subsequently did useful raiding work in the -Carolina district, but was not strong enough to tackle Botha. - - * * * * * - -Botha had never abandoned the scheme of an invasion of Natal which was -drawn up at the end of 1900. His first attempt to carry it out was -frustrated by French, but it was uppermost in his mind during the winter -of 1901. Early in September he left the Ermelo district, in which Lord -Kitchener had never been able to operate effectively, and made for Piet -Retief with 1,000 men. Columns, faint yet pursuing, started from each -railway, and ignorant of his movements trudged wearily across the veld -to the S.E. Botha, after passing through the defile between the -Swaziland border and the Slangapiesberg, turned to the south, his -ultimate objective being Dundee. In the corner abutting on Zululand were -commandos under Emmett and Grobler of Vryheid. - -Lyttelton on his return from leave took over the Natal command from -Hildyard. He disposed his columns as best he could, having regard to the -contradictory reports which reached him of Botha's movements and -intentions. The first encounter occurred on September 17 at Blood River -Poort. A mounted column under Gough and Stewart had been sent out from -Dundee across the Buffalo to bring away a convoy from Vryheid. Gough -soon came into touch with a body of the enemy. It was, he thought, only -a local commando, and when he saw it off-saddle he left Stewart in -support and went out to surprise it. The nature of the ground prevented -a complete surprise, but he partially effected it, only to be surprised -himself by the sudden charge of Botha's main body, which was supposed to -be a day's march distant. After a brief combat, in which Stewart was -unable to intervene, Gough lost the whole of his command of nearly 300 -men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, as well as three guns. Stewart -escaped to the Buffalo. - -The crick-crack of Botha's Mausers at Blood River Poort echoed -throughout South Africa. Troops from all quarters were hurried to the -spot; search parties discovered some columns under W. Kitchener which -had lost themselves on the high veld; and so rarified was the military -atmosphere, that not only columns but even general officers were scarce. -Bruce Hamilton and Clements were brought in. - -Botha seems to have regarded his success as unreal. He hesitated to -follow it up, and soon the Buffalo in flood effectually barred the way -to Dundee. He now proposed to enter Natal through Zululand, below the -junction of the Tugela and the Buffalo. On the point of the angle which, -at that time, the Transvaal thrust into Zululand were two British posts, -Forts Prospect and Itala. Botha was beginning to be doubtful about the -eventual success of his Natal raid, but thought that as he was on the -spot he might as well be doing something. He therefore ordered these -posts to be taken, entrusting to his brother C. Botha the attack on -Itala, and to Emmett and Grobler the attack on Prospect. The failure of -each attack with considerable loss on September 26 made Botha reconsider -his position. There was no more thought of another campaign on the -Tugela, and he determined to retire. - -Lyttelton's dispositions continued for some days to be directed against -the Natal raid upon which Botha was supposed to be still engaged, and -the discovery that he had abandoned it was not made until October 1. His -capture did not seem to be a very difficult task, as his only way of -escape was the Piet Retief defile by which he had entered the district -three weeks before. - -There was, however, an intermediate barrier, the irregular Pondwana -range lying eastward of Vryheid, where he might be arrested. Lyttelton's -plan was that Clements and B. Hamilton should press towards this barrier -from the S.W., while W. Kitchener acted as a stop on the north side of -it. The range is pierced by several neks, at one of which, lying between -the main heights and the Inyati spur, Botha was checked by Kitchener on -October 2. He then made a cast eastward to another nek and by abandoning -his transport succeeded three nights later in getting round Kitchener's -left. He easily kept Kitchener off in a rearguard action and made for -Piet Retief. Neither Clements nor B. Hamilton was ever in the running, -and Kitchener was hampered by the necessity of watching several neks -along a front of twenty miles. - -There was, however, one more barrier for Botha to cross or to turn, the -Slangapiesberg between Wakkerstroom and Piet Retief; but it scarcely -delayed him for an hour. Except one column, which was covering the -building of a blockhouse line and which he evaded without difficulty, -there was nothing to oppose him. When a column under Plumer came upon -the scene he had passed away on October 11 through Piet Retief towards -Ermelo. His movements had bewildered his opponents, who intent on -frustrating a raid on Natal, had omitted to bar and bolt the door by -which he had entered. His capture would, in all probability, have ended -the war. - -When Botha left for the south he instructed B. Viljoen to carry on for -him; but when he joined the itinerant Transvaal Government at Amsterdam -he was disappointed to find that little or nothing had been done in his -absence, thanks chiefly to the mobile energy of Benson, who hovered like -a hawk over the terrorized laagers. Moreover, the pale of Constabulary -posts which formed the eastward section of the great ring fence -enclosing the "protected area" had been advanced. It now ran from -Greylingstad to Wilge River Station on the Delagoa Bay Railway, and -encroached upon the area in which Botha could act with reasonable hope -of success. - -The return of Botha, however, infused some spirit into the hustled -commandos of the high veld, and he gladly accepted a suggestion that -Benson should be attacked. The Ermelo and Carolina men who had -accompanied him to Natal returned to find that their districts had been -roughly handled by Benson and were eager for reprisals. On October 25 -Botha narrowly escaped capture by two columns which had been sent after -him from Standerton. - -Benson left Middelburg, the base to which he returned from time to time, -on October 20, with a column 1,600 strong, to renew his operations on -the high veld. When he reached the Bethal district he noticed ominous -signs of the revived spirit. He was hampered with a considerable -transport, his supplies were dwindling, and he did not think himself -justified in risking an encounter. He therefore decided to return to the -Delagoa Bay Railway. H. Grobler of Bethal, who had suggested to Botha -the attack on Benson, was in the vicinity with 700 burghers, and Botha -himself was again in the field. - -Benson began to retire before sunrise on October 30. Bad weather and -Grobler pressing in rear worried the forenoon march, and ere the midday -halt had been called Botha came up with 500 men after a forced march. -While the convoy was being parked at Bakenlaagte, the pressure on the -rearguard increased, and it was forced back to a ridge about two miles -S.E. of the park. Benson came up and ordered a second retirement of the -rearguard to a position, to which the name of Gun Hill has been given, -nearer the park, and posted two field guns on the hill. - -Botha soon occupied the ridge, and then charged Gun Hill with his main -body under Grobler, at the same time sending parties to attack the -flanking posts. Two detachments of British infantry stranded between the -ridge and the hill were overwhelmed by the charge. Most of the mounted -sections got away to the hill, hotly pursued by the Boers, who leaving -their horses at the foot, at once began to climb the slope. They -clutched each shoulder of the hill, swarmed up the front, and soon -silenced the guns. An attempt to bring up the teams from the reverse -slope failed. - -In less than half an hour Grobler had won Gun Hill with a loss of 100 -men. Benson was mortally wounded. The flanking posts were too much -engaged in defending themselves to be able to assist the defenders of -Gun Hill. An attempt to intervene made by a few companies on the march -to the camp where the convoy was parked was unsuccessful. The Boers, as -usual, were satisfied with a casual tactical success, and made no effort -to follow it up strategically. They were soon driven off Gun Hill by -shell fire from the camp, but after nightfall returned to bring away the -guns. In the British casualties were 120 prisoners of war. -Wools-Sampson, who succeeded Benson in command, maintained himself for -two days, and was then relieved by columns from the south. He returned -to the Delagoa Bay Railway. - - * * * * * - -The exigences of the military situation called for the withdrawal of -most of the troops operating against Kemp and Delarey in the Western -Transvaal; and by the middle of September, 1901, these leaders had -practically but one column to evade, namely the force formerly commanded -by Dixon and now by Kekewich. He left Naauwpoort on September 13, and -after some preliminary work on the Magaliesberg passed through Magato -Nek, and with a force of less than 1,000 men advanced into the -Zwartruggens, a wild, difficult, and confusing district admirably -adapted to Boer _guerilla_. - -On September 29 Kekewich took up a position at Moedvil near the right -bank of the Selous River. He was compelled to place all his westward -outposts, except one double picket, on the right bank, as the veld on -the left bank was bushy and rose gradually from the river and would have -absorbed more men than he could spare for outpost duty. - -Delarey was accurately informed of Kekewich's movements, and it is said -had actually reconnoitred the camp unobserved a few hours after -Kekewich's arrival. He quickly formulated his plan of attack, in which -he seems to have followed, on a smaller scale, the familiar tactics of -the British leaders whom he had met in battle, notably at Diamond Hill, -but with a certain innovation of his own. - -He divided his force into four columns, two of which were told off to -grapple Kekewich's flanks and command his line of retreat, and two to -make a frontal but not merely holding attack on his centre. Early in the -morning of September 30 Delarey put his columns in motion. He started -with certain points in his favour. All Kekewich's outposts save one were -on the right bank and in the vicinity of the camp, and in fact Delarey -took him by surprise. The movements of the Boer columns were, however, -not well co-ordinated. The flanking columns were not in position when -the centre columns, which do not seem to have been challenged by the -post on the left bank, reached the river and concealed themselves in the -deep bed. This might not have marred the success of Delarey's plan if -the columns in the river-bed had not been discovered by a patrol which -gave the alarm and brought them prematurely into action. - -The situation now resolved itself into an attempt to storm the position. -The centre columns sprang out of the river while it was still dark, -mounted the steep bank and opened fire up the slope on to the camp on -the skyline above. A stampede of the horses ensued, but a resolute front -was quickly formed and the attack was checked. An alarm that the enemy -was threatening the rear of the camp was proved to be unfounded by a -scratch gathering of details which was hastily mustered; it then wheeled -round, and picking up reinforcements on the way charged the Boer left at -the river. The charge was irresistible, and the sun had hardly risen -when Delarey's whole line fell away. - -No limit can be assigned to the British soldier's power of resistance -when he finds himself in a tight place, but it would probably have gone -hard with him if Delarey's tactical scheme had been accurately carried -out, and if the flanking columns, one of which was under the command of -Kemp, had been further in advance when the centre columns were -discovered. A panic among the horses which threw the camp into -confusion, supervening on an unexpected attack while the dawn had -scarcely shown above the Magaliesberg, was soon followed by a cry that -the position had been turned. Yet at that critical moment of the dark -hours, when animal courage is supposed to be at its lowest ebb, -Kekewich's men never wavered, and although they were only called upon to -deal with a blundered manoeuvre, yet it exacted from them a toll in -casualties of nearly one fourth of their strength. Kekewich was wounded, -and the loss of horses and transport pinned him to the ground until he -was relieved by a column from the south, which had marched to the sound -of the battle. - -A few days later Kekewich went to Rustenburg, out of which he again -sallied forth on October 13 into the Zwartruggens in search of Delarey. -Methuen had already left Mafeking on the same errand. On October 24 -Delarey fell in with one of Methuen's columns on its way to Zeerust. The -column, which was impeded by wagons slowly progressing along a bad road -in a defile, was pounced upon unexpectedly and hewn in twain; but if, as -usual, the scouting was poor the defence was excellent. After a struggle -which lasted two hours Delarey was driven off, the severed portions of -the column were re-united, and not one of the seven guns was lost. - - * * * * * - -By the end of 1901 all the precedents of European warfare had been -discredited. Tactics and strategy, as practised by the experts, had done -their best, and were now in bankruptcy. The war had drifted into its -final mechanical phase: the coercion of brute force by brute force of -higher potential. It was now mainly a question of putting as many men as -possible on horseback to ride down the enemy. Field guns not being -needed, the Royal Artillery was formed into a corps of Mounted Rifles. - -Ian Hamilton, who had gone home with Lord Roberts, returned to South -Africa a year later as Chief of the Staff to Lord Kitchener. - -Notes: - -[Footnote 55: These posts, however, were small entrenched forts at -considerable distances apart for the protection of the road to -Basutoland, rather than blockhouses.] - -[Footnote 56: See p. 326.] - -[Footnote 57: Lyttelton went to the Cape Colony in February, 1901, to -direct the operations against De Wet, and was subsequently sent into the -Orange River Colony. After a few months' leave he returned to South -Africa in September and took over Hildyard's command in Natal.] - -[Footnote 58: He was next heard of at the abortive peace conference held -at Middelburg, where he met Lord Kitchener at the end of February.] - -[Footnote 59: Bruce Hamilton succeeded Lyttelton in the Orange River -Colony when the latter went home on leave.] - -[Footnote 60: The "protected area" was a district round Pretoria and -Johannesburg which was enclosed by a ring of blockhouses and -Constabulary posts in August, 1901.] - - - - -CHAPTER XVII - -The Mechanical Phase - -I. ORANGE RIVER COLONY - - -The year 1901 was drawing to its close, and the three chief Boer leaders -were still at large. Delarey was lurking in the difficult kloofs of the -Western Transvaal; Botha was on watch in the high veld of the Eastern -Transvaal, just outside the "protected area"; and De Wet was awaiting -his opportunity in the N.E. of the Orange River Colony. - -De Wet, who had been lying low for some months, was roused by a certain -communication from Botha as well as by action taken against him by Lord -Kitchener. A carefully devised and accurately carried out centripetal -drive of fourteen columns converging, like meridian lines on the Pole, -on a certain point ten miles N.E. of Reitz, was abortive. When the -columns reached it on November 12 they found that the enemy had wriggled -through the intervals, leaving scarcely a burgher at the place of -meeting; and while they were blankly staring at each other, De Wet at -Blijdschap, only twenty miles away, was in conference with Steyn and -discussing with him a suggestion made by Botha that peace negotiations -with Lord Kitchener should be opened. - -To this an answer similar to that which had been given to Botha in May -was returned. De Wet and Steyn scouted the idea of reconciliation with -the enemy. A Council of War was summoned and a concentration of burghers -ordered. By the end of November De Wet had collected at Blijdschap a -force of 1,000 men undetected by Elliott's columns, which, having taken -part in the centripetal failure, were again on the move after a brief -rest at Harrismith. Elliott, while on the march to Kroonstad, actually -brushed past De Wet. - -A column under Rimington then came upon the scene. He had heard of the -Council of War from a captured Boer, who probably with intent refrained -from reporting the concentration. Thus when Rimington expected that the -easy task before him was the capture of De Wet and Steyn and the units -of a Council of War, he suddenly found himself opposed by a considerable -force, a detachment of which passed by him and attacked his train in -rear. After an encounter in which a gallant young cavalry subaltern,[61] -who but a few weeks before had joined the Inniskilling Dragoons from the -Militia, laid down his life for his country, Rimington extricated his -convoy, but refrained from attacking De Wet's main body, which was -reported to be strong. - -Each side thereupon withdrew, Rimington to Heilbron and De Wet to -Lindley, from which he found it advisable to retire on coming into -contact with a column forming part of another Elliott drive, the second -of the series, suggested by Rimington on his return to Heilbron. De Wet -then trekked towards Bethlehem, halting at Kaffir Kop, where, nine days -later, he foiled a third Elliott drive by promptly dispersing his -burghers, who soon reassembled on a range of hills beyond Bethlehem. - -Elliott's units then returned to their respective bases to refit. A -column under Dartnell at Bethlehem, which had recently been reinforced -from Rundle's command by a strong detachment under Barrington Campbell, -was on the point of returning to Harrismith, when it was informed that -De Wet's re-united commandos were lying in wait at a spruit about twenty -miles out on the road to Harrismith. Dartnell marched on and maintained -himself without much difficulty when he arrived at the spruit. Campbell -came up, and De Wet's commandos withdrew without orders; but no attempt -was made to convert their retirement into a rout. Dartnell continued his -march to Harrismith. - -After the affair at the spruit De Wet again dispersed his burghers, with -orders to hold themselves in readiness to muster at short notice. He had -not long to wait before he saw another opportunity of employing them. - -A small force, less than 1,000 strong, was covering, half-way between -Harrismith and Bethlehem, the construction of the main blockhouse line -to Kroonstad, under the personal superintendence of Rundle. The force -was broken up into three detachments, which were too far apart to render -each other effective support in case of a sudden attack. - -The strongest detachment, consisting, however, entirely of Yeomanry, was -posted on Groen Kop, three miles distant from Rundle's Head Quarters. -The position is fairly strong, and resembles a wedge lying on the veld, -with a gentle ascent from the east to a plateau to which the normal -level rises steeply on three sides. A mile or two to the S.E. it is -commanded by a higher eminence, from which a party of Boers had already -been expelled. It was not, however, occupied, and De Wet promptly made -use of it as an observation post, for which it was admirably adapted, as -it looks down into the British position on Groen Kop. Moreover, the -customary movements for protection, such as the relief of outposts, were -carried out with such extraordinary laxity and neglect that De Wet was -soon able to acquaint himself with almost every detail of the defence. -Even the emplacements of a field gun and a pom-pom were disclosed by -shots casually fired for range-finding purposes. - -On Christmas Eve De Wet saw that he had before him a prey that would -fall into his hands as easily as Sannah's Post or Waterval Drift, and he -resolved to clutch it at once. His burghers, though dispersed, were -within call, and a force of over 1,000 was quickly assembled. With -unerring instinct he selected the steep N.W. corner of the Groen Kop -wedge as the point of attack, reasoning that the defenders would think -themselves adequately protected in that direction by the nature of the -ground. On Christmas morning, soon after midnight, over 1,000 Boers were -in position under the broad end of the wedge. They were not discovered, -as no patrols had been sent to watch the ground beneath, and the -sentries on the crest gave no sign. - -The pioneers of the storming party attained the crest at 2 a.m.; and not -until then was the alarm given to the dormant camp. The position, after -a struggle which lasted but an hour and a quarter, was captured by De -Wet, who, ere the midsummer sun had risen, was hurrying away with -British prisoners of war, guns and wagons, which neglect of the ordinary -precautions by a body of unprofessional troops had delivered into his -hands. - -At Rundle's Head Quarters, only three miles away, the sound of the -firing had attracted attention, and a weak body of Mounted Infantry, the -only mounted force at his disposal, was sent out to see what was the -matter. It was unable to intervene with effect, and returned to report -the situation. - -The remaining detachment of Rundle's force, consisting of two companies -of slow-moving Infantry only, was still further from his Head Quarters; -but thirteen miles away in the direction of Harrismith lay a force of -Colonial Horse. When a telegram from Rundle to summon them to the rescue -miscarried, his staff-officer galloped away in the dawn and put them on -the trail of De Wet; but he had had a long start and escaped into the -hills near Bethlehem. Here he remained for a few hours, and then went -towards Reitz. - -During a temporary absence for the purpose of conferring with Steyn he -left his commandos in charge of Michael Prinsloo, who on December 28 was -engaged in a rearguard action with Elliott, who was conducting yet -another drive and whom he easily evaded. - -On the last day of the year De Wet disbanded his commandos a few miles -from the spot on which he had assembled them at the end of November. In -the interval he had evaded all the Elliott drives; he had captured a -strong British post; he had marched without damage along the sides of a -triangle on which lay the towns of Reitz, Lindley, and Bethlehem, each -of which was from time to time in the possession of his enemy; and had -never been more than thirty miles distant from the central point of the -triangle. The captured guns were sent away beyond the Wilge River under -Mears. - -No blame can be imputed to Rundle for the unsatisfactory issue of the -operations. He had little reason to suspect that any considerable force -of the enemy was in his vicinity. He was engaged in mechanical work, the -laying out of a blockhouse line. It was the immediate task before him, -and to the best of his ability he used the untrustworthy and meagre -instruments at hand. It would, however, have been more in accordance -with military principles if he had employed his mounted troops in duties -more suited to their arm, instead of holding with them the infantry -position of Groen Kop. - -Only a few days before, a similar misadventure had attended the -construction of the Heilbron-Vrede blockhouse line. Rimington and Damant -had hardly returned to Heilbron after Elliott's third drive when they -were ordered out beyond Frankfort, to the assistance of the blockhouse -builders, who were being worried by a commando under Wessels, which De -Wet had sent out after the Council of War. Near the Wilge River they -acted on a front too extended; and a portion of Damant's force was -deceived by the slim tricks of a party of Boers working in cavalry -formations and many of them dressed in khaki uniforms. In order to keep -up the illusion they fired at detached parties of their own side, and in -the end Damant was overwhelmed on a hill, with a loss of nearly 90 per -cent. of casualties, before the rest of his command came up and drove -away the assailants. Rimington was too far away either to prevent or to -retrieve the disaster. - -When the "drives" were renewed in the northeastern districts of the -Orange River Colony at the end of January, 1902, the experience of the -last few months had shown that they must be conducted on new methods. -Hitherto the typical "drive" had been a net or nets cast too often -hastily and at random, the meshes of which were large, irregular, and -easily cut. The new "drive" was a bar of steel pushed steadily forward -by simultaneous action throughout its length, and with its ends resting -on the two completed blockhouse lines running eastward from Heilbron and -Kroonstad. - -[Sidenote: Map, p. 260.] - -The Drive, Mark II, was inaugurated on February 3. De Wet, who on -January 10 had had a hurried interview with Steyn near Reitz, was lying -at Elandskop between Heilbron and Reitz, and again concentrating his -scattered burghers and planning an escape with them to the south across -the Kroonstad-Bethlehem blockhouse line. Mears, on his way to rejoin De -Wet, ran into a column under Byng, to whom he lost the guns captured by -De Wet at Groen Kop. - -On February 5 a force of 9,000 men under Elliott, Rawlinson, Byng, and -Rimington formed up on a line stretching from Frankfort to Kaffir Kop. -The composition of this force showed the altered conditions of warfare. -It included very few field guns, but no less than 2,200 horse and field -gunners acting as Mounted Riflemen. - -Next day the first impulse was given to the Bar, the blockhouse lines -north and south, as well as the railway, having been strengthened. The -whereabouts of De Wet were approximately known. - -The first drive of the new pattern lasted three days, the columns -reaching the railway on February 8. It was so far effective that none of -the enemy broke back through the advancing line, which was vigorously -maintained in continuity of pickets by night and of scouts by day; but -De Wet was not on the roll of nearly 300 Boer casualties. Although -hampered with live stock from which his followers refused to be parted, -and in spite of two hovering columns which were acting in support of the -southern blockhouse line, he not only broke through it owing to its want -of vigilance, but even succeeded in dragging the cattle across it after -him. He then retired as usual to the Doornberg. Other parties of Boers -broke through the northern blockhouse line; and thus the first of the -new drives ended with poor results. As soon as the trouble was over De -Wet with his followers again crossed the southern blockhouse line and -quietly returned to Elandskop, where he dispersed them. - -A second drive to sweep those districts which had not been touched by -the first drive was soon put in hand. It was to be performed in two -movements by two sets of columns. A force under the Driver-in-Chief -Elliott starting eastwards from Kroonstad and the Doornberg would -advance in line, resting its right first on Lindley and then on -Harrismith, in the vicinity of which it was proposed that it should meet -the other set of columns, under Rawlinson, Byng, and Rimington. These, -starting on an extended front which ran from near Johannesburg to within -a few miles of Heilbron with their centre astride the Vaal and their -right touching the Natal Railway, would advance S.E. to near Vrede; then -wheeling to the right march southwards with their left on the -Drakensberg; finally, in conjunction with Elliott, pushing the fugitives -on to the eastern section of the Harrismith blockhouse line. The -operation may be likened to the sweep of two brooms, one acting with a -semicircular and the other with a forward movement. - -It was begun by Elliott, who started on February 13, and after an -abortive attempt to snap up De Wet reached Wilge River on February 22 -and awaited the arrival of the other columns; his left being near -Tafelkop. - -Rawlinson and Byng meanwhile were advancing. On February 19 they wheeled -to the right and with their centre near Vrede were now wholly within the -Orange River Colony. The two forces were now disposed at right angles to -each other, one of the lines containing the angle being the Wilge River, -which Elliott was unable to hold in sufficient strength as his front was -widely extended. In the vicinity of Harrismith the southern blockhouse -line was reinforced by Brook, who succeeded Rundle in the command of the -district. - -The northern blockhouse line was unable to stem the tide of fugitives -flying before Rawlinson and Byng, whose columns were now strung out on a -much wider front than that on which they had begun their march. The -advance of Elliott had also driven various Boer details into the right -angle, in which were now conglomerated not only combatants, but women, -children, stock, and transport. Included among the fugitives from -Elliott were De Wet and Steyn, who had again come together. With Elliott -at their heels, their only chance of escape was to break through the -attenuated line of Rawlinson's columns. De Wet's good fortune did not -fail him, and with Steyn and a few hundred burghers he severed it at -Langverwacht at midnight on February 23 and was again at large. The -remnant of the commandos was left behind within the pale with their -women, children, cattle, and stuff; and these, augmented by the -Harrismith commando, were the prisoners of Elliott and Rawlinson when -the drive, in which 30,000 British troops were directly or indirectly -engaged, completed its task. - -Yet another drive, the third of the new series, ensued. It had, of -course, for its objective the capture of De Wet, as well as the "tidying -up" of the district, in which certain commandos, which had not been -netted in former drives, still lurked. It was composed, like the second -drive, of two sets of converging columns and traversed the terrain of -the first drive. - -It happened that the point of convergence lay near the spot, not far -from Reitz, where De Wet and Steyn were in hiding. The propinquity of -the columns drove them out of their retreat, and taking a circuitous -route past Heilbron and thence along the left bank of the Vaal they -crossed the river near Commando Drift, and on March 17 joined Delarey -near Wolmaranstad in the Transvaal. Little was done after the junction -of the two sets of columns, and they returned to the railway on March -11, with a stray commando in front of them, which easily rushed the -blockhouse line near Heilbron. A portion of the troops was hastily -withdrawn to deal with the crisis in the Transvaal. - -Hardly had the dust raised by the trampling of the third drive settled -down upon the veld when the fourth drive was in progress, and 14,000 men -on a front which stretched from one blockhouse line to the other were -plodding eastward to the Drakensberg. It was held up for a time by two -rivers in spate, the Wilge and the Liebenberg's, and when released it -trudged on to the mountain range, where on April 5 its components were -dissolved, having disposed of less than 100 of the enemy. - -Yet one more drive, the fifth and last of the series, was called for. -Early in May Bruce Hamilton swooped down from the Eastern Transvaal upon -the harassed land, and in co-operation with Elliott worried it for the -space of ten days. Many small parties of Boers broke through--the last -wriggle in the Orange River Colony. - - -II. EASTERN TRANSVAAL - - -[Sidenote: Map p. 292] - -The episode of Bakenlaagte called for vigorous measures to be taken -against Botha and the men of the high veld in the Eastern Transvaal; and -in November, 1901, a second and revised edition of French's programme at -the beginning of the year was issued. - -The new campaign was placed in charge of Bruce Hamilton, and the general -idea, at least in its earlier movement, was the same as that furnished -to French, namely the outward sweep of columns having for its object the -rounding-up, pursuit towards the Swaziland border, and capture of the -various _guerilla_ commandos, which with the Transvaal Government in -their midst haunted the Ermelo and Bethal districts. - -Bruce Hamilton, with 15,000 men in twelve columns, either under his -immediate command or co-operating with him, started on November 16, his -immediate objective being the same as French's ten months before, -namely, Botha on the high veld. He advanced the Constabulary posts -fifteen miles, so that the line now ran between Brugspruit and Waterval; -and proceeded to carry out a movement on Ermelo, in which he was -supported on either flank by columns acting from the Natal and Delagoa -Bay Railways. Botha, however, had had warning of his approach, and -having conducted the Transvaal Government out of the area of immediate -danger and dispatched it to its old seat at Paardeplatz, returned to -deal with Bruce Hamilton, who, on reaching Ermelo on December 3, found, -as French had found in February, that he had nothing to strike at. The -Transvaal Government had vanished, and Botha and his chief lieutenant, -P. Viljoen, instead of being on the run towards Swaziland, had broken -back and were now behind him. - -In order to deal with them, a pause in the operations became necessary. -A series of night raids was instituted. In the first of these Botha, who -was lying twenty miles west of Ermelo, was nearly taken. He succeeded in -escaping towards the S.E., but was headed by a column under Pulteney -operating from Wakkerstroom and was forced towards the upper waters of -the Vaal. The raid upon P. Viljoen in the Bethal district was so far -successful that in it 200 of his burghers were made prisoners, and one -of the guns taken at Bakenlaagte was recovered: while he himself not -only escaped, but succeeded in putting 300 of his followers under J. -Prinsloo across the recently established Brugspruit-Waterval line of -Constabulary posts and in planting them in the "protected area" as seeds -of future mischief. - -Bruce Hamilton now resumed the general operation eastwards with fair -success. Botha at Beginderlyn was faced by the columns supporting the -right flank of the advance, and had the Ermelo-Standerton blockhouse -line behind him. One of his lieutenants named Britz went out and -ambushed a night raid sent out from the line on December 19 at Holland, -making nearly 100 prisoners; and a few days later he squeezed through an -enveloping movement in which he lost somewhat heavily, but he eventually -succeeded in rejoining Botha. - -It was now necessary to drive on to Bruce Hamilton a compact little -force of over 800 burghers, which on New Year's Day, 1902, Botha had -under his command; and this task devolved upon Plumer and the other -column commanders operating from the S.E. corner of the Transvaal. Botha -was engaged at Bankkop, between Ermelo and Amsterdam, by a strong -scouting party acting in advance of the main columns, which he was on -the point of overwhelming when it was reinforced. He escaped without -difficulty, taking with him eighty prisoners. The plan of throwing him -into Bruce Hamilton's arms had failed. - -Bruce Hamilton returned to Ermelo, and late in January again swept the -country, with scanty results. His operations had been successful to the -extent that they finally denied the high veld to Botha, who in February -withdrew to the Vryheid district, and secreted himself among the -mountains. Bruce Hamilton was sent after him and hunted him for a month. -His next appearance was neither as a prisoner of war nor as an opponent -in battle, but as the representative of his country on the way to attend -the Peace Conference which assembled at Pretoria on April 12. - -P. Viljoen, as soon as Bruce Hamilton was out of the way, discussed the -situation with his followers. It was decided that he should take action -in what was apparently the direction of greatest risk. With 400 men he -burst through the line of Constabulary posts, and on January 24 joined -J. Prinsloo in the Wilge River Valley, within the so-called "protected -area." Prinsloo, even before Viljoen's arrival, had maintained himself -without difficulty; and for some weeks after February 24, when an -unsuccessful effort was made at Klippan to crush them, they were -practically left to roam as they willed, no British troops being -available to deal with them effectively. - -In the N.E. Transvaal B. Viljoen and Muller had been quiescent -throughout the summer. The former lay usually at Pilgrim's Rest; the -latter haunted the hilly country west and S.W. of Lydenburg; neither -leader being able to get much work out of passive and spiritless -followers. When Schalk Burger, the Acting President of the Transvaal, -and the rest of the Government were driven across the Delagoa Bay -Railway by Bruce Hamilton in December, Park, who was in command of the -solitary British force north of the line, aided by a column from -Belfast, made an unsuccessful attempt to capture the wandering -Government. - -B. Viljoen was anxious for its safety and persuaded it to take refuge -with him at Pilgrim's Rest. It started on the journey with him; but -fortunately its courage failed it, and Viljoen was left to return alone -and to be taken prisoner near Lydenburg on January 25. Troops were -slipped at it but were evaded; and it withdrew to the west across the -Olifant's River. It maintained itself until March 12, when by leave of -Lord Kitchener it passed through Balmoral into conference with Steyn and -the remnants of the Orange Free State Government at Kroonstad and thence -to Klerksdorp. - -In the "protected area" P. Viljoen had perforce to be left unmolested -until the end of March, when the conclusion of the third drive in the -Orange River Colony set some troops free for work elsewhere. His -commandos, about 800 strong, were discovered in laager twenty miles east -of Springs by a cavalry column under Lawley during a night raid on April -1. After a temporary panic they not only rallied, but drove away the -attacking force and pursued it until restrained by the intervention of -another portion of Lawley's command which had remained in camp. The -incident called for strenuous measures. During the last three weeks of -April the whole district was driven by Bruce Hamilton; at first from -north to south starting from the vicinity of Carolina, then by a counter -march from south to north through the "protected area," the latter -movement being repeated in the reverse direction. P. Viljoen was not -found in the wilderness, while his colleague Alberts escaped with 500 -burghers into the Orange River Colony, whither he was followed by Bruce -Hamilton. - - -III. WESTERN TRANSVAAL - -[Sidenote: Map. p. 292.] - -Meanwhile in the Western Transvaal Delarey had remained undisturbed save -by the building of blockhouse lines. The situation elsewhere had not -suffered active measures to be taken in the district controlled by him, -which extended from the corner between the Vaal and the Western Railway -almost to the Magaliesberg, and for which on the British side Methuen -and Kekewich were the commanders chiefly responsible. During the earlier -summer months some small incidents occurred which were usually -favourable to the British cause. - -In February, however, the tide of fortune turned. Delarey came down from -the north, apparently to watch his chance of intervening on behalf of De -Wet in the Orange River Colony, and heard from Liebenberg that a convoy -was on its way from Wolmaranstad to Klerksdorp. On February 25 the -convoy, which was escorted by 700 men and two guns, was near Yzer Spruit -within a day's march of its destination, when it was ambushed in the -dawn and captured by Delarey, Kemp, and Liebenberg, who thus easily -obtained what they were most in need of, namely transport animals, guns, -and ammunition to the amount of half a million rounds.[62] The capture -was effected within hearing not only of Klerksdorp, but also of a small -column on the march from Klerksdorp to Hartebeestfontein. Kekewich, who -was near Klerksdorp, then left for Wolmaranstad and sent a column under -Grenfell in pursuit of Delarey; but the column failed to find Delarey. - -Methuen at Vryburg promptly set himself to work, with such tools as he -could lay his hands on, to avenge the disaster. He put together a column -of which about one-third was regular infantry with four field guns, and -the remainder samples of almost every irregular corps that had been -raised during the previous twelve months; and he set out at the head of -it to intercept Delarey, who was reported to be making for the Marico -River. He ordered Kekewich to co-operate with him from Klerksdorp. - -Grenfell's column was accordingly ordered to meet Methuen at -Roirantjesfontein seventeen miles south of Lichtenburg. He arrived there -on March 7; Methuen, who was delayed by the difficulty of finding water, -having reached Tweebosch on the previous day. - -It was now incumbent on Delarey, who was marching up from the south with -1,100 burghers, to attack either Methuen or Grenfell before they could -join hands. He chose the former's heterogeneous host as the easier prey, -and fell first upon his rearguard soon after he left Tweebosch at dawn -on March 7, and then upon his right flank. The mounted troops, which -were promptly disposed as a screen, failed ignominiously, the greater -part of them leaving the field in disorder. The regular infantry stood -fast with the guns, but were soon overwhelmed. Grenfell was unable to -intervene, but he strengthened Lichtenburg in case Delarey should come -that way. Delarey, however, went to the south to meet De Wet and Steyn, -whom he cheered with the news of the capture of four British field guns -and of 600 prisoners of war, among whom was Methuen, severely wounded. -Steyn remained with Delarey; De Wet returned to the Orange River Colony. - -Yzer Spruit and Tweebosch introduced the Drive into the Western -Transvaal. Troops from all quarters reinforced Kekewich at Klerksdorp, -and soon a force 14,000 strong was assembled there and elsewhere. The -difficulty of the task before it was enhanced by the absence of a -network of blockhouse lines, which had only been laid out along the -Schoon Spruit and thence to Lichtenburg and Mafeking, and also along the -Vaal. - -The troops had to begin operations from a faulty strategical base, as -they were aligned along or near the Schoon Spruit blockhouse line, and -between the Boers and that line. To drive Delarey on to it, they must -rapidly place themselves west of him; and this could be done only by a -night march of mounted men darting through his commandos and then -pressing him on to the Schoon Spruit in the opposite direction. - -The operation, which was of spirited and ingenious conception, was -carried out on March 23. In proportion to the effort--the force engaged -in it numbered 11,000 mounted men--the results were paltry. A few score -prisoners and three guns were taken. As in the earlier drives in the -Orange River Colony, the meshes of the net were spacious and fragile. -Delarey, Kemp, and Steyn escaped; and even Liebenberg, when about to -suffer the _peine forte et dure_ upon the Schoon Spruit blockhouse line, -found a discontinuity through which he wriggled at midnight. Delarey -mustered his burghers to the number of over 2,000 on the Hart's River. - -To deal with the embarrassing situation the British columns were again -marched to the west, with instructions to form a line of three -entrenched camps distant one or two days' march from the Schoon Spruit. - -The centre column under the command of W. Kitchener having reached its -destination, made a reconnaissance in force still further to the west on -March 31. Cookson, who was in charge of the expedition, at the end of a -march of thirty-five miles, during which he had pushed back small -parties of the enemy, halted at Boschbult, where two farms lay on the -banks of the Brak River. - -Cookson soon found himself in presence of 2,500 Boers with four field -guns, his own strength being 1,800 with the same number of guns. The -position was a bad one as the ground rose on each side of the river; the -bush offered cover to the attack, and the only cover available to the -defence was the almost dry bed of the river. He threw out screens and -proceeded to entrench and form a laager; while the screens faced in the -open the fire of the enemy under cover in the bush on the high ground. -Liebenberg made one attempt from the south to charge the main position, -but was driven back by the southern screen which had been brought into -the river bank; and after a second unsuccessful attempt, this time from -the east, withdrew to the high ground on the north. - -When the work at the laager at the farms, which was impeded by artillery -fire from the S.W., was sufficiently advanced, the northern screen was -withdrawn. Some confusion ensued, as the Boers in the bush immediately -fell upon it, but their attempt to get at the main position on the -river, though supported by artillery, failed. It never attained the -crisis of an assault; and late in the afternoon it was called off by -Delarey, who arrived from his Head Quarters near Hart's River. - -Meanwhile the sound of the action had reached the ears of W. Kitchener, -who twenty miles away was laying out his entrenched camp. He hurried to -the rescue, but the cessation of the firing and the reports of -stragglers led him to the conclusion that Cookson had been annihilated. -He reported to that effect to his brother, Lord Kitchener, and returned -to camp. Next day he again went out, and found to his satisfaction that -Cookson was still a military asset. - -Kekewich, meanwhile, was searching for Delarey elsewhere. He had -bespoken at Head Quarters W. Kitchener's co-operation in the quest and -was relying on it; but a column commander on trek _in partibus Boerum_ -is hard to find, and no instructions reached Kitchener. - -The need of a General Manager on the spot to co-ordinate the activities -of the syndicate of column commanders who had so signally failed to -bring Delarey to book was now manifest; and Ian Hamilton, who had -greatly distinguished himself in two of the early combats of the war, -was now chosen to bring it to an end. On April 8 he joined Kekewich at -Middelbult. - -Ian Hamilton quickly formulated a plan of using the three columns, -11,000 strong, of Kekewich, W. Kitchener and Rawlinson, who had lately -been in pursuit of De Wet in the Orange River Colony, as a scythe to -sweep over the country with a swing at first grazing Hart's River, then -the Vaal, and finally coming to rest at Klerksdorp. Only four days were -allotted to the movement, which began on April 10 and called for a daily -march of more than forty miles. Delarey had been summoned to take part -in the negotiations for peace, and Kemp was in charge of the Boer -commandos, which numbered about 2,600 burghers. - -It happened that Kekewich, whose force was detailed as the right of the -advance, bore too much to the left on the first day's march, and found -himself in rear of Rawlinson. Kemp was observing the movement, and -assumed that he had located the British right, whereas Kekewich had -partly regained his position by moving towards Roodeval, where Kemp was -hovering for a chance to fall on the rear or the flank of Ian Hamilton's -columns. - -Kekewich reached Roodeval early on April 11, and at once pressed forward -to Hart's River. His advanced guard almost immediately discovered a -large body of mounted men on the left front, who, until they opened -fire, were by some strange misconception taken to be a portion of -Rawlinson's column. They were in fact more than a thousand Boers under -Potgieter, who as soon as he had disposed of the advanced guard, made -for the main body, which was not yet formed up, and by which Potgieter's -men were again mistaken for a portion of Rawlinson's column. The error -was discovered, but not too late. The Boer attack, which for sheer -reckless bravery could hardly be surpassed, and which has been compared -to the Dervish charge at Omdurman, was made in the open against a -considerable force, was repelled; and Potgieter fell dead at the head of -his commandos. Rawlinson hurried up to the sound of the firing and drove -away the enemy, who retired, but not in disorder, to the south. A -remnant, however, broke back and even sniped the main body. In less than -three hours after the first shot had been fired by Potgieter, Kekewich -and Rawlinson started in pursuit. Kemp, however, saved himself, and -escaped with what was, under the circumstances, the inconsiderable loss -of the two field guns which Delarey had taken from Methuen at Tweebosch. - -The two Hamiltons rang down the curtain of the War Tragedy. While Bruce -Hamilton was driving for the last time through the Orange River Colony, -Ian Hamilton with Kekewich, W. Kitchener, and Rawlinson, assisted by a -column from the Vaal under Rochfort, began a westward drive in the -Transvaal, with 17,000 men. Kemp followed the usual practice of Boer -commandants when hard pressed by the enemy, and scattered his commandos; -thus when Ian Hamilton's 17,000 crossed the border and reached the -Western Railway on May 11, they found less than 400 Boers, among whom -Kemp was not, impaled upon the barrier of blockhouses and armoured -trains. - - -IV. CAPE COLONY - - -During the early part of the summer of 1901-2 the Cape Colony was, -comparatively speaking, quiet, though dormantly rebellious. Little -positive progress was made, either by French or by the inflammatory -elements opposed to him, of which the leader was J.C. Smuts. These were -for the most part acting in a spacious and inaccessible area, which -included the districts of Kenhart, Carnarvon, Sutherland, Fraserburg, -and Calvinia. A blockhouse line, which when completed would stretch from -Victoria West to Lambert's Bay, was in course of construction through -these districts. - -In December Kritzinger headed a raid from the Orange River Colony; but -although he was soon captured near Hanover, the greater portion of his -followers escaped to the south and infested the districts of Cradock and -Somerset East. Stephenson was put in immediate charge of the operations -against Smuts, who had established himself on the Zak River between -Kenhart and Calvinia, and who in January moved eastward. It was a false -move, because it brought him into the Fraserburg district, and made him -more accessible to the columns opposed to him. It was made apparently -with the intention of breaking across the railway in the vicinity of -Beaufort West. - -The operations against Smuts, the flank bases of which, Beaufort West -and Lambert's Bay, were over 300 miles apart, attained only negative -success. A large convoy drawn by donkeys fell into the hands of the -rebels between Beaufort West and Fraserburg, and a smaller convoy in the -Sutherland district. - -French now took in hand the Drive, the last weapon left in the British -Armoury, which his colleagues in the Transvaal and the Orange River -Colony had been wielding for some months. It was brandished northwards -from Beaufort West on February 17; but it only dispersed without -destroying the rebels, most of whom had retired to the north and N.W. -Not a few scraped round the right flank of the drive, crossed the -railway, and plunged into the Graaff Reinet and Aberdeen districts, -where they were joined by a band under Fouché, which had been lurking -and conniving far away to the N.E. between Dortrecht and Aliwal North. - -Smuts withdrew to the N.W. and laid siege to Ookiep, which was relieved -on May 3 by an expedition sent from Capetown through Port Nolloth; Smuts -having in the meantime retired in order to attend the Peace Conference. -He had done his best to carry out the instructions given to him by the -Boer Council of War held in June, 1901, to foment a general insurrection -in the Cape Colony, but he had failed. - -Notes: - -[Footnote 61: L.M.O. _Requiescat in pace_.] - -[Footnote 62: It is not easy to understand why an empty convoy on the -march, not from, but to a base of supplies, should have taken over 700 -rounds per man.] - - - - -CHAPTER XVIII - -The End - - -Nearly two years had passed by since the negotiations for peace between -Lord Roberts and L. Botha and between Sir Redvers Buller and C. Botha -had fallen through shortly before the battle of Diamond Hill. In -February, 1901, another conference for peace was held at Middelburg in -the Transvaal between Lord Kitchener and L. Botha, who after parleying -for a fortnight, abruptly broke off the negotiations. If, as seems -probable, he was led to adopt that course by the news of the escape of -De Wet from the Cape Colony, a historical parallel may be found in the -sudden dissolution of the Congress of Vienna, when the courier brought -the news of Napoleon's escape from Elba. - -In January, 1902, an offer made by the Government of the Netherlands to -mediate between the combatants was declined by the British Government. -The incident of the offer was, however, communicated to the Transvaal -Government, which was then lying north of Balmoral, and which asked for -and received permission to discuss proposals for peace with the Free -State Government at Kroonstad. Schalk Burger, the Acting President of -the Transvaal, arrived at Kroonstad on March 22. Steyn, who was with -Delarey, was sent for; De Wet was searched for, and for the first time -found; and the allied Governments, the chief members of which were, on -the one side, Schalk Burger and Delarey, and on the other De Wet and -Steyn, met in conference on April 9 at Klerksdorp, which was, at Steyn's -suggestion, chosen as a more convenient place of meeting than Kroonstad. - -It was soon decided to open negotiations with Lord Kitchener, at whose -invitation the Governments proceeded to Pretoria, where they met him and -Lord Milner. The Boer proposals, which postulated the continued -independent existence of the two shattered Republics, were rejected; it -seemed that the war must be fought to a still bitterer end. Finally, it -was agreed that the negotiations should be adjourned for a month, in -order to allow the feelings of the burghers at large to be ascertained, -and reported at a Convention to be held at Vereeniging on May 15. In the -meantime the military operations were to be continued, subject to the -permission to be given to the Boer leaders to go freely among and -consult their people. - -When the Convention assembled it was found that while the Transvaal was -generally in favour of submission, the Orange River Colony was still -implacable. A compromise was effected between them, and the heads of a -treaty, of which the chief clause ensured a qualified independence to -the late Republics, under the guise of British Protectorates, were drawn -up by J.C. Smuts, who had come from Ookiep to resume his former -profession and to act as legal adviser to his colleagues. It was -submitted to Lord Kitchener at Pretoria, who, as the delegates might -have foreseen, refused to consider it and handed to their counsel Smuts -a document, in which the Boer leaders were required, on their own behalf -as well as on their followers' behalf, to acknowledge themselves as -British subjects. - -The negotiations at Pretoria were conducted by a deputation from the -Vereeniging Convention: Delarey, Botha, Smuts, De Wet, and Hertzog. -These did their best, and even obtained some verbal changes of -phraseology which made Lord Kitchener's terms less unpalatable. The -question of British nationality was waived for the moment to allow of -the other stipulations of the document being discussed; and the general -subject was referred to a minor convention consisting of Lord Milner and -his legal adviser on one side, and of Smuts and Hertzog on the other. - -A proposal for a final settlement was drawn up, which, with certain -alterations insisted on by the Colonial Office, was presented by Lord -Kitchener as his ultimatum, to be accepted within three days by the -Vereeniging Convention. Botha and his colleagues returned to Vereeniging -and laid it before the delegates. Steyn refused to entertain it and -immediately resigned his titular office of President of the Orange Free -State; De Wet, implacable almost to the last, protested against its -terms. The hopelessness of the Boer cause in South Africa was, however, -manifest. Even De Wet yielded, and voted with the majority in favour of -accepting the British terms of peace. - -On May 31, 1902, the Treaty of Vereeniging brought to an end the War of -960 days. - - -FINIS - - - - -COMMANDERS OF DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES, -OCTOBER 1899-JUNE 1901 - -CAVALRY. - -DIVISION--French. - -BRIGADES. - -1 Babington, Porter, Gordon 1 (Natal) Burn-Murdoch -2 Broadwood 2 (Natal) Brocklehurst -3 Gordon, Little 3 (Mounted Brigade, Natal) -4 Dickson Dundonald - -MOUNTED INFANTRY BRIGADES----Alderson, Le Gallais, Martyr, -Ridley, Hutton - -INFANTRY. - -DIVISIONS. - -I Methuen 5 (Irish) Hart -II Clery, Lyttelton, Clery 6 (Fusilier) Barton -III Gatacre, Chermside 7 I. Hamilton, W. Kitchener -IV White (troops in Ladysmith), 8 Howard - Lyttelton 9 Featherstonehaugh, Pole- -V Warren, Hildyard Carew, C. Douglas -VI Kelly-Kenny 10 Talbot Coke -VII Tucker 11 (Lancashire) Woodgate, -VIII Rundle Wynne, W. Kitchener, -IX Colvile Wynne -X Hunter 12 Clements -XI Pole-Carew 13 C. Knox -Colonial: Brabant 14 Chermside, Maxwell - 15 Wavell -BRIGADES. 16 B. Campbell - 17 Boyes -1 (Guards) Cplvile, Pole- 18 Stephenson - Carew, Inigo Jones 19 Smith Dorrien -2 Hildyard, E. Hamilton 20 Paget -3 (Highland) Wauchope, 21 B. Hamilton - MacDonald 22 Allen -4 Lyttelton, Norcott, Cooper 23 W. Knox - - - - -INDEX OF PERSONS AND PLACES - -(It has not been thought necessary to include in the Index names of -towns or of physical features which constantly occur in, or are not -material to the narrative; and incidental or unimportant references and -allusions have also been generally omitted.) - - -Abon's Dam, 56, 165 -Abraham's Kraal, 187-190 -Acton Holmes, 99, 100 -Airlie, Lieutenant-Colonel the Earl of, 244 -Alberts, 357 -Alderson, Brigadier-General E.A.H., 202, 203 -America Siding, 233 -Amersfort, 272 -Amphlett, Major C.G., 198-200 - -Babington, Major-General J.M., 321-324 -Baden-Powell, Major-General R.S.S., 4, 34, 213-222, 224, 273-277, 280-282, - 320 -Bakenlaagte, 341 -Balmoral, 283, 284, 291 -Bankkop, 355 -Barberton, 289 -Barton, Major-General G. 53, 69, 73, 76, 132-135, 294 -Bastion Hill, 100, 101 -Battles, Sieges and Engagements, chief-- - Alleman's Nek, 269, 270 - Belmont, 55 - Bergendal, 286-288 - Botha's Pass, 268 - Caesar's Camp, 141, 143, 145-149 - Colenso, 69-78 - Dewetsdorp, 297, 298 - Diamond Hill, 241-245 - Doornkop (Transvaal), 237 - Driefontein, 189-191 - Elandslaagte, 42-44 - Graspan, 56 - Kimberley, 87-92 - Ladysmith, 140-155 - Lindley, 247-252 - Lombard's Kop, 49-50 - Mafeking, 212-221 - Magersfontein, 58-63 - Modder River, 56-57 - Paardeberg, 172-183 - Pieter's Hill, 133-135 - Poplar Grove, 185-188 - Rhenoster Kop, 316 - Rietfontein, 45 - Sannah's Post, 198-206 - Six Mile Spruit, 239 - Spion Kop, 102-115 - Stormberg, 65-69 - Talana, 39-41 - Vaalkrantz, 116-120 - Wepener, 209, 210 - Zand River, 233 -Beatson, Brigadier-General S.B., 329 -Belfast, 272, 285, 286, 325 -Bell's Kopje and Spruit, 144 -Benson, Colonel G.E., 322, 329, 337, 340-342 -Bethlehem, 249, 252, 256-258 -Bethune, Colonel E.C., 265, 309 -Beyers, General C., 315, 317-322, 325, 326, 328, 337 -Biddulphsberg, 252 -Blijdschap, 345, 346 -Bloemfontein, surrender of, 191 -Blood, Lieutenant--General Sir B., 329, 330 -Blood River Poort, 338 -Boekenhoutskloof Ridge, 241, 242 -Boesman's Kop, 199-204 -Boschbult, 360 -Boschrand (Driefontein), 189 -Boschrand (Kroonstad), 234 -Bosjespan, 164 -Botha, General C., 254, 264, 266, 270, 272, 339, 365 -Botha, General L., 52-54, 70, 75, 78, 100, 112, 117-119, - 126, 128, 132, 193, 196, 232-242, 245-247, 254, - 264, 283-291, 314, 315, 322, 325-327, 337-341, - 345, 354, 355, 365-367 -Botha, P., 232 -Bothaville, 295, 296, 298 -Brabant, Brigadier--General Sir E.Y., 194, 206, 207, 209, 210, 230, 247, - 252, 256 -Brakfontein (Natal), 97, 106, 116-119 -Brakfontein (Transvaal), 277, 278 -Brak River (Cape Colony), 305-307 -Brak River (Transvaal), 360 -Brand, 307, 308, 335 -Brandfort, 197, 198, 232, 233 -Brandwater Basin, 257-261, 271, 278, 280, 295, 331 -Britz, 355 -Broadwood, Brigadier-General R.G., 198-205, 244, 245, 259, 278, 316, - 317, 319, 321, 333 -Brocklehurst, Major-General J.F., 269-271 -Brook, Major-General E.S., 352 -Buller, General Sir Redvers, 51, 53-55, 69-79, 86, 89, - 90, 96-103, 107, 112-127, 131-133, 136, 140, 152-155, - 231, 240, 254, 256, 262-272, 284-291, 365 -Bulwana, 122, 123, 125, 135, 136, 142, 145, 147, 148 -Burger, Schalk, Acting President of the Transvaal, 100, 103, 105, 112, 117, - 142, 356, 365 -Burn-Murdoch, Brigadier-General J.F., 135, 136 -Byng, Colonel the Hon. J.H.G., 350-352 - -Campbell, Colonel W.P., 326 -Campbell, Major-General B., 346, 347 -Carleton, Lieutenant-Colonel F.R.C., 47-49 -Carolina, 272 -Carrington, Lieutenant-General Sir F., 274, 277, 278, 290, 314 -Chermside, Lieutenant-General Sir H., 230, 232 -Chieveley, 53, 76, 97, 121 -Chrissie, Lake, 326 -Christiana, 226, 235 -Cingolo, 123, 124 -Clements, Major-General R.A.P., 81, 194, 195, 206, 227, 252, 256, 257, - 316-321, 324, 339, 340 -Clery, Lieutenant-General Sir C.F., 72, 77, 101, 103, 107, 113, 124, 143, - 264, 267, 268, 270, 315 -Clump Hill, 132 -Coke, Major-General J. Talbot, 102, 103, 106-111, 113, 114, 127, 128, 269 -Colenso Kopjes, 127-129 -Colesberg, 64, 80, 81, 145, 157, 309 -Colvile, Lieutenant-General Sir H.E., 62, 63, 166, 167, 170, 171, 175, 177, - 178, 180, 198, 202-206, 216, 232, 233, 247-253, 255, 256 -Conical Hill, 102, 105 -Cookson, Colonel G.A., 360, 361 -Council of War, _see_ Krijgsraad -Crabbe, Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre, 309 -Crofton, Colonel M., 106, 108, 109, 113 -Cronje, General A.P., 46, 140, 167 -Cronje, General A.P.J., 163 -Cronje, General P., 56-58, 61, 63, 81, 126, 131, 133, 141, 145, 158-164, - 166-175, 179, 181-185, 192, 193, 213-217, 219, 220, 223, 281 -Cunningham, Brigadier-General G.G., 321, 322, 324 -Cyferfontein, 321 - -Dalgety, Colonel E.H., 209 -Damant, Lieutenant-Colonel J.H., 349, 350 -Damvallei, 189 -Dartnell, Brigadier-General Sir J., 327, 346, 347 -De Beer, 172, 179, 182 -Delarey, General, 55-58, 61, 81, 189, 190, 194, 221, 232, 239, 241, 242, - 245, 274, 275, 282, 283, 315-326, 330, 332, 337, 342-345, 353, 357-362, - 365, 366 -De Lisle, Colonel H. de B., 245 -De Wet, General C., 47, 151, 152, 162, 163, 167, 168, 170, 171, 173, - 178-182, 185-191, 198, 200-204, 207-211, 232, 241, 247, 252-256, 258, - 259, 274, 278-282, 294-310, 322, 330, 332, 337, 345-353, 358, 359, - 365-367 -De Wet, General P., 188, 198, 199, 202-204, 230, 254 -Dickson, Major-General J.B., 242 -Dixon, Brigadier-General H.G., 324, 330, 342 -Donkerhoek Range, 241, 245 -Donkerpoort, 245 -Doornberg, 297, 302, 303, 305, 310, 351 -Doornkop Natal, 97, 119 -Doornkop Spruit, 74 -Douglas, Lieutenant-Colonel W., 329 -Douglas, Major-General C.W., 316 -Drifts-- - Bosman's, 57 - Botha's, 309 - Brandvallei, 169 - Bridle, 74 - Brown's, 56, 61, 161, 164 - Commando, 353 - Commissie, 329 - De Kiel's, 162, 163, 166 - East, 74 - Jager's, 39 - Klip, 163, 164, 166, 168, 169, 171, 174, 192 - Klip Kraal, 163, 164, 169, 171 - Koedoesberg, 159, 167 - Koodoos, 171, 173, 179 - Makow's, 307 - Munger's, 117, 118 - Oertel's, 190 - Old Viljoen's, 235 - Paardeberg, 169-171, 173, 176, 178 - Potgieter's, 54, 55, 96, 97, 99, 103, 106, 108, 116, 121, 146, 151 - Rondeval, 163 - Schoeman's, 278, 279, 294 - Trickhardt's, 97, 99-102 - Vanderberg's, 176 - Vendutie, 169, 171-173, 178, 180, 184, 192 - Viljoen's, 236 - Waterval (near Koffyfontein), 91, 132, 162, 166, 167, 171, 179 - Waterval (near Sannah's Post), 204, 205 - Wegdraai, 166, 167 - West, 74 - Wonderwater, 235 - Zand, 304, 305, 308, 309 -Du Cane, Lieutenant-Colonel H.J., 191 -Dullstroom, 329 -Dundee, 37, 39 -Dundonald, Major-General the Earl of, 76, 99-101, 109, 123-125, 135, 153, - 154, 265, 266, 268, 269, 271 -Du Plooy, 64 -Dwarsvlei, 276 - -Elandsfontein, 237 -Elandskop, 350, 351 -Elliott, Major-General E. Locke, 331-334, 337, 346, 349-353 -Eloff, 219, 220 -Emmett, 328, 338, 339 -Ermelo, 272, 326, 327, 330, 332, 354 -Erasmus, 40-42 -Estcourt, 52, 53, 79 - -Faber's Put, 228 -Fairview, 100, 102 -Ferreira, 165, 172, 173 -Florida, 237 -Forestier-Walker, Lieutenant-General Sir F., 63 -Fort Itala, 339 -Fort Prospect, 339 -Fort Wyllie, 73, 76, 77 -Fouché, 364 -Fourie, 100, 307, 308 -Frankfort, 234 -Fredrikstad, 294, 298 -French, Lieutenant-General Sir J.D., 48-50, 52, 64, 65, 80, 91, 141, - 157-159, 162-168, 171, 172, 182, 183, 186, 187, 189-192, 195, 197, - 198, 205, 230, 232-239, 242, 245, 272, 277, 283-291, 313, 315, 320, - 321, 326-328, 334, 364 -Frere, 53, 76, 96 -Froeneman, 304 -Fuzzy Hill, 132 - -Gansvlei Spruit, 269 -Gatacre, Lieutenant-General Sir W., 52, 55, 64-68, 80, 81, 157, 194, 195, - 206-208, 216, 230, 251, 257, 262 -Gatsrand, 279, 322, 333, 336 -Glencoe, 42, 44, 136 -Gordon, Brigadier-General J.R.P., 179, 244 -Gough, Major H. de la P., 338 -Green Hill (near Colenso), 123-125 -Green Hill (near Spion Kop), 100, 105 -Green Hill (near Vaalkrantz), 116, 119, 120 -Grenfell, Lieutenant-Colonel H.M., 330, 337, 358, 359 -Grimwood, Colonel G.G., 48, 49 -Grobelaar Slopes, 128, 129 -Grobler, E.R., 68, 69, 195 -Grobler, F.A. (Marico), 222 -Grobler, H. (Bethal), 341 -Grobler of Vryheid, 328, 338, 339 -Grobler of Waterberg, 274, 276, 282, 284 -Groen Kop, 347-350 -Gun Hill (Bakenlaagte), 341 -Gun Hill (near Ladysmith), 143 -Gun Hill (near Paardeberg), 177 - -Haasbroek, 261 -Hamilton, Lieutenant-General Sir Ian, 43, 44, 49, 147, 149, 231-240, - 242-245, 247, 256, 276-278, 280, 284, 285, 288, 290, 344, 361-363 -Hamilton, Major-General Bruce, 244, 245, 302-304, 307, 333, 334, 339, - 353-357, 363 -Hamilton, Brigadier-General E., 269 -Hannay, Colonel O.E., 162, 174-177 -Hartebeestfontein, 323, 324, 330, 358 -Hart, Major-General A.F. 71-75, 78, 99, 101, 120, 129-132, 135, 210, 230, - 321, 335 -Hart's Hill, 129, 130, 132-135 -Hart's Loop, 127 -Hattingh, 261 -Heilbron Road Station, 253 -Hekpoort Valley, 317, 321 -Helvetia (Transvaal), 287, 325 -Hertzog, General, 299-301, 303-308, 315, 326, 366, 367 -Hickman, Colonel T.E., 308, 309 -Highlands, 53 -Hildyard, Lieutenant-General Sir H., 52, 53, 71-73, 75, 76, 120, 264, 265, - 268, 270, 315, 325, 327, 338 -Hill, Colonel A.W., 109-111 -Hlangwhane, 69-71, 76, 96, 120, 122, 123, 125-127, 131-133 -Holdsworth, Lieutenant-Colonel G.L., 223 -Holland, 355 -Hoopstad, 323, 324 -Hore, Lieutenant-Colonel C.O., 214 -Horseshoe Hill, 125, 129, 131 -Houtnek, 230, 232 -Hughes-Hallett, Colonel J.W., 62, 63 -Hunter, Lieutenant-General Sir A., 225, 226, 231, 232, 256-261 -Hunter-Weston, Lieutenant-Colonel A.G., 191, 234, 239 -Hussar Hill, 123, 124 -Hutton, Major-General Sir E., 283, 284 - -Impati, 40-42 -Ingouville-Williams, Lieutenant-Colonel E.C., 324 -Inkwelo, 267 -Inkweloane, 267, 268 - -Jacobsdaal, 56-58, 163, 168, 170, 171, 173, 179, 181, 183 -Johannesburg, Surrender of, 239 -Joubert, General P., 38, 49, 53, 54, 69, 105, 117, 118, 135, 140, 142, 143, - 145, 185, 193, 194, 196 - -Kaalfontein, 321, 322 -Kaffir Kop, 346, 350 -Kainguba Hill (Nicholson's Nek), 47, 49 -Kameelfontein Ridge and Valley, 241, 242 -Kanya, 224 -Karee Siding, 197, 198, 205, 232 -Kekewich, Colonel R.G., 86, 87, 89-91, 215, 342-344, 357-359, 361-363 -Kelly-Kenny, Lieutenant-General T., 81, 158, 159, 166, 168-171, 173-178, - 180, 181, 186, 187, 190, 232, 254 -Kemp, 322, 324-326, 330, 337, 342, 343, 358, 360-363 -Kissieberg, 66-69 -Kitchener, General Lord, 156, 160, 166, 170, 171, 173-178, 180, 181, 183, - 184, 188, 194, 227, 229, 241, 246, 247, 254, 255, 278-280, 292, 298, - 299, 306, 312, 316, 326, 328, 331-334, 336, 345, 365-367 -Kitchener, Major-General W., 132-134, 329, 338, 339, 360, 361, 363 -Kitchener's Kopje, 178-182, 185 -Kleinfontein Ridge, 244 -Klipfontein, 237 -Klippan, 356 -Klip River, 123, 125, 150 -Knox, Colonel E.C., 321 -Knox, Major-General C., 168, 177, 254, 294, 295, 297-299, 302-306, 333 -Knox, Major-General W., 49 -Kock, 42 -Koetzee, 289, 290 -Koffyfontein, 162, 179 -Korn Spruit, 199, 200, 202, 203, 207 -Krijgsraad, 143, 188, 194, 196-198, 207, 209, 210, 240, 258, 260, 332, 345, - 346, 349, 364 -Kritzinger, 299-301, 303-305, 315, 326, 331, 334, 335, 337, 363 -Krokodil Spruit and Hill, 241, 242 -Kroonstad, 191, 234, 247-250, 258, 357, 365 -Kruger, President Paul, 11, 69, 95, 105, 118, 126, 128, 136, 184, 185, 188, - 196, 2O7, 213, 220, 239-241, 289, 295, 314, 332 - -Lancer's Hill, 155 -Langewacht Spruit, 125, 130, 132 -Langvervacht, 352 -Lawley, Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. R., 357 -Le Gallais Kopje, 187 -Le Gallais, Lieutenant-Colonel P.W., 197, 295 -Lemmer, 195 -Lennox Hill, 39, 40 -Lichtenburg, 226, 315, 323 -Liebenberg, 294, 358, 361 -Liebenberg's River, 353 -Lieuw Kop, 187 -Lieuw Spruit, 255 -Limit Hill, 144 -Little Knoll, 105, 106 -Little, Colonel M.O., 278 -Long, Colonel C.J., 73, 75, 77 -Long Hill, 46, 48, 49 -Lotter, 335 -Louwbaken, 242 -Lubbe, 163, 164 -Lydenburg, 288 -Lyttelton, Lieutenant-General the Hon. N.G., 99, 106, 108, 109, 119, 120, - 124, 135, 264, 265, 268, 270, 271, 303, 308, 309, 315, 316, 325, 333, - 334, 338, 339 - -MacDonald, Major-General Sir H.A., 256, 257 -Machadodorp, 239, 282, 283, 287, 295 -Mahon, Brigadier-General B.T., 221, 222, 224-226, 232 -Maiden's Castle, 145, 146 -Majuba Hill, 36, 266, 267 -Martyr, Lieutenant-Colonel C., 198, 202-206 -Mears, 349, 350 -Metcalfe, Colonel C.T.E., 144 -Methuen, Lieutenant-General Lord, 52, 55-59, 62, 63, 79, 80, 89-92, 123, - 157, 159, 168, 172, 184, 225, 228, 231, 232, 247, 250, 253, 254, 256, - 276-280, 315, 323, 324, 337, 344, 357-359, 362 -Meyer, L., 39, 40 -Meyerton, 235, 236 -Middle Hill, 147 -Milner, Lord, 51, 86, 160, 228, 367 -Moedvil, 342 -Monte Cristo, 123-126 -Mors Kop, 242, 244 -Mostert's Hoek, 208 -Mount Alice, 97, 102, 106, 107 -Muller, 332, 337, 356 - -Naval Gun Hill, 75 -Naval Hill, 123, 129, 131, 132 -Neks - Breedt's, 317 - Cingolo, 125 - Commando (Orange River Colony), 258-260 - Commando (Transvaal), 274-276, 278, 280, 282 - Laing's, 36, 38, 254, 262, 264, 266-268, 270, 272 - Magato, 280, 342 - Modderfontein, 322 - Naauwpoort, 258, 260 - Nicholson's, 46-49, 167 - Noitgedacht, 317-320 - Olifant's, 274, 276-278, 280, 281 - Retiefs, 258, 260 - Slabbert's, 258-261 - Springhaan's, 297, 299, 302 - Zilikat's 11, 239, 274, 275, 277, 278, 283 -Nelspruit, 287, 289 -Nicholson, Colonel J.S., 223 -Noitgedacht (Delagoa Bay Railway), 287 -Norcott, Colonel C.H.B., 132, 133 - -Observation Hill, 142 -Olivier, General J.H., 64, 66, 68, 195, 198, 200, 259, 261 -Onderbroek, 125, 127 -Onderste Poort, 276, 283 -Ookiep, 364, 366 -Orange Free State, Annexation of, 236 -Osfontein, 184, 186 - -Paget, Major-General A.H., 256, 257, 291, 316, 317, 321, 326 -Paris, Major A., 307 -Park, Colonel C.W., 329, 356 -Penn-Symons, Major-General Sir W., 37, 39, 41, 45 -Pepworth Hill, 46, 48, 49, 142 -Phipps Hornby, Lieutenant-Colonel E.J., 203 -Pienaar's Poort and River, 241, 242, 244 -Pietersburg, 292, 314, 328 -Pilcher, Lieutenant-Colonel T.D., 195, 198 -Pilgrim's Rest, 356 -Platrand, 143, 145, 147, 150 -Plumer, Brigadier-General H.C.O., 214, 221-225, 274, 305-307, 309, 328, - 330, 340, 355 -Pole-Carew, Lieutenant-General Sir R., 62, 195, 230, 242, 244, 245, 272, - 283-290 -Porter, Colonel N.C., 242 -Potgieter, F., 362 -Potgieter, H., 16 -Pretoria, surrender of, 239 -Prieska, 184, 194, 196, 227, 305, 306 -Prinsloo, Jacob, 55, 355, 356 -Prinsloo, Martin, 38, 118, 119, 250, 259-261 -Prinsloo, Michael, 249, 250, 299, 349 -"Protected Area," 337, 340, 345, 355, 357 -Pulteney, Colonel W.P., 329, 355 - -Railway Hill, 131, 133, 134 -Ramdam, 162, 166 -Rangeworthy Heights, 100-102, 107 -Rawlinson, Colonel Sir H., 350-352, 361-363 -Reddersburg, 207-209 -Reitz, 333 -Rhenosterfontein Heights, 245 -Rhenoster River Bridge, 253 -Rhodes, Right Hon. Cecil, 83-95, 214 -Rifleman's Ridge, 143, 147 -Rimington, Colonel M.F., 346, 349, 351 -Roberts, Field-Marshal Lord, 79, 114, 120, 132, 153, 154, 156, 158, 160, - 161, 167, 168, 170, 171, 173, 179, 181, 183, 184, 186, 189, 191, 194, - 195, 219, 226, 228, 229, 231, 232, 234, 236, 239, 241, 246, 254, 256, - 262, 264, 271-273, 280-282, 284, 286, 288, 292, 296, 313, 314, 365 -Rochfort, Colonel A.N., 363 -Roirantjesfontein, 358 -Roodeval (Orange River Colony), 252, 253, 300 -Roodeval (Transvaal), 362 -Rooi Kop, 66 -Rosmead (on Riet River), 57 -Roux, General P.H., 256-260 -Rundle, Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie, 230, 232, 247-250, 252, 256, 259, - 260, 331, 333, 347-349, 352 -Rustenburg, 273-278, 281, 316, 317, 344 - -Scheepers, 299, 336 -Schiel, 43 -Schoeman, 64, 80, 81 -Schoon Spruit, 359 -Schweizer Reneke, 315 -Sefetili, 224 -Settle, Major-General Sir H., 315 -Seven Kopjes, 186, 187 -Shekleton, Lieutenant-Colonel H.P., 322, 323 -Sladen, Lieutenant-Colonel J.F.R., 331, 332 -Slapkranz, 260 -Smith-Dorrien, Major-General H.L., 177, 178, 275, 276, 278-280, 315, - 325-328 -Smuts, General J.C., 322, 324, 325, 332-336, 363, 364, 366 -Smuts, General T., 197, 198, 290, 291 -Snyman, General, 217, 219, 220 -Spitz Kop (Natal), 267, 268 -Spitz Kop (Transvaal), 288 -Spragge, Lieutenant-Colonel B.E., 248-252 -Spytfontein, 56-58 -Steenekamp (of Heilbron), 282 -Steenkamp, L.P., 68 -Stephenson, Major-General T.E., 176, 177, 183, 363 -Stewart, Lieutenant-Colonel H.K., 338 -Steyn, Commandant, of Bethlehem, 175, 176, 179, 182 -Steyn, M. President, Orange Free State, 52, 118, 185, 191, 196, 257, 258, - 278-280, 282, 290, 291, 295, 302, 310, 313-316, 331-333, 345, 346, 350, - 352, 353, 357, 359, 360, 365-367 -Stinkfontein, 173, 175 -Surprise Hill, 144 - -Table Mountain (on Modder), 186 -Theron, 279, 281 -Theunissen, 182 -Thorneycroft, Colonel A.W., 104, 107-115 -Thornhill's Kopje, 144 -Three Tree Hill, 100, 101, 106 -Transvaal, Annexation of, 288 -Tucker, Lieutenant-General Sir C., 166, 168, 171, 191, 197, 198, 321 -Tweebosch, 358, 359 -Twin Peaks, 100, 105, 106, 109-112, 119 -Tygerpoort, 241, 242, 244 - -Utrecht, 266, 327 - -Van der Venter, 333-335 -Van Reenen's Pass, 263, 267 -Van Tender's Pass, 45, 265 -Van Wyk's Hill, 267, 268 -Van Zyl's Farm, 67 -Venter's Spruit, 100 -Vereeniging, 235, 236, 366, 367 -Viljoen, General B., 6, 117, 118, 284, 290, 291, 315, 316, 325, 328, 329, - 340, 356 -Viljoen, P., 354-357 -Virginia Siding, 255 -Vlakfontein, 330 -Volksrust, 266, 268-270 -Vryheid, 266, 325 - -Wagon Hill and Point, 142-151 -Wakkerstroom, 270 -Warren, Lieutenant-General Sir C., 79, 80, 93, 96, 97, 99-1O3, 1O5-115, - 120, 128, 129, 132, 213, 228, 264 -Waterval (near Pretoria), 239 -Waterworks, 198-200, 202, 203, 205 -Wauchope, Major-General A.G., 59-62 -Wavell, Major-General A.G., 238 -Wessels, 349 -White, Lieutenant-General Sir George, 37, 38, 42, 43, 45, 46, 49, 51, 72, - 79, 96, 100, 102, 116, 122, 125, 126, 128, 132, 137, 140-143, 147-151, - 153-155, 263 -Wildfontein, 324 -Willow Grange, 53 -Willowmore, 301 -Wilge River (Orange River Colony), 349, 352, 353 -Wilge River (Transvaal), 356 - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A Handbook of the Boer War -by Gale and Polden, Limited - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HANDBOOK OF THE BOER WAR *** - -***** This file should be named 15699.txt or 15699.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - https://www.gutenberg.org/1/5/6/9/15699/ - -Produced by Jonathan Ingram, David King, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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