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You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: A Handbook of the Boer War - -Author: Gale and Polden, Limited - -Release Date: April 24, 2005 [EBook #15699] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ASCII - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HANDBOOK OF THE BOER WAR *** - - - - -Produced by Jonathan Ingram, David King, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team - - - - - - -</pre> - -<h1>A HANDBOOK OF THE BOER WAR</h1> -<h2>With General Map of South Africa and 18 Sketch Maps and -Plans</h2> -<h3>GALE AND POLDEN LIMITED</h3> -<h3>LONDON AND ALDERSHOT</h3> -<h3>1910</h3> -<h3>BUTLER & TANNER</h3> -<h3>THE SELWOOD PRINTING WORKS</h3> -<h3>FROME AND LONDON</h3> -<h2>CONTENTS</h2> -<div class="poem"> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap1">I PROLEGOMENA</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p class="i2"><a href="#chap1-1">I The Roundheads of South -Africa</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p class="i2"><a href="#chap1-2">II Patriotism, Duty and -Discipline</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p class="i2"><a href="#chap1-3">III War considered as a Branch of -Sport</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap2">II THE NATAL WEDGE</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap3">III DEUS EX MACHINA NO. I</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap4">IV KIMBERLEY AND THE SIEGE OF RHODES</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap5">V A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap6">VI MORE TUGELA TROUBLES</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap7">VII LADYSMITH AT BAY</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap8">VIII DEUS EX MACHINA NO. 2</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap9">IX ALARMS AND EXCURSIONS</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap10">X BADEN-POWELL AND THE SIEGE OF -MAFEKING</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap11">XI BLOEMFONTEIN TO PRETORIA</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap12">XII THE NEW COLONY</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap13">XIII NEC CELER NEC AUDAX</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap14">XIV THE TAMING OF THE TRANSVAAL</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap15">XV THE RECURRENCES OF DE WET</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap16">XVI LORD KITCHENER AT WORK</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap17">XVII THE MECHANICAL PHASE</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p class="i2"><a href="#chap17-1">I Orange River Colony</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p class="i2"><a href="#chap17-2">II Eastern Transvaal</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p class="i2"><a href="#chap17-3">III Western Transvaal</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p class="i2"><a href="#chap17-4">IV Cape Colony</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#chap18">XVIII THE END</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#commanders">COMMANDERS OF DIVISIONS AND -BRIGADES</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#index">INDEX OF PERSONS AND PLACES</a></p> -</div> -</div> -<h2>SKETCH MAPS AND PLANS<a id="footnotetag1" name= -"footnotetag1"></a><a href="#footnote1"><sup>1</sup></a></h2> -<div class="poem"> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-natal">Northern Natal</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-modder">Modder River and Magersfontein</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-stormberg">Stormberg</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-colenso">Colenso</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-vaalkrantz">Spion Kop and Vaalkrantz</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-spion">Spion Kop</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-ladysmith-advance">Final Advance on -Ladysmith</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-ladysmith-siege">Siege of Ladysmith</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-riet">Riet and Modder Drifts</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-paardeberg">Paardeberg</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-poplar">Poplar Grove and Driefontein</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-sannahs">Sannah's Post</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-magaliesberg">Magaliesberg District</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-diamond">Diamond Hill</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-brandwater">Brandwater Basin</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-orange">Orange Free State</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-so-transvaal">Southern Transvaal</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-noitgadecht">Noitgedacht Nek</a></p> -</div> -<div class="stanza"> -<p><a href="#fig-general">General Map of South Africa—at the -beginning.</a></p> -</div> -</div> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote1" name= -"footnote1"></a><b>Footnote 1:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag1">(return)</a> -<p>The thanks of the Author are due to the Army Council for -permission to copy the maps and plans in the Official History of -the War, and to L.S. Amery, Esq., for permission to copy the plans -in the fifth volume of the <i>Times</i> History of the War.</p> -</blockquote> -<h2>PREFATORY NOTE</h2> -<p>The author has endeavoured in this Handbook to compile, for the -use of students and others, a general account of the various phases -of the Boer War of 1899-1902, in which he served for twenty-six -months.</p> -<p>With some exceptions, every statement of fact relating to the -military operations may be verified in one or more of the following -publications—</p> -<blockquote> -<p>The "Times" History of the War;</p> -<p>The War Office Official History of the War;</p> -<p>The Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission of -Inquiry into the War.</p> -</blockquote> -<p>To the two Histories, which have been but recently completed, -the Author is much indebted. Other authorities have, however, been -consulted.</p> -<p>The Sketch Maps and Plans of certain areas and battlefields are -only intended to give, by means of a few hachures, contours, and -form-lines, a general impression of topographical features.</p> -<p>The Author has from time to time in the course of the narrative -indicated what he believes to have been the chief causes of the -prolongation of the War:—</p> -<blockquote> -<p>The inefficacy of modern Tactics as a means of dealing with -partisan warfare;</p> -<p>The moral reinforcement derived from a confident belief in the -justice of a cause, by which the enemy was continually encouraged -to persevere;</p> -<p>The reluctance of the British leaders to fight costly -battles;</p> -<p>The constitutional inability of the British Officer to take War -seriously;</p> -<p>The waste of British horses due to inexpert Horsemastership.</p> -</blockquote> -<p>May, 1910.</p> -<a name="fig-general" id="fig-general"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image01.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image01.png" -alt="General Map of South Africa" /></a></div> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image02.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image02.png" -alt="General Map of South Africa" /></a></div> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page1" id="page1"></a>{1}</span> -<h2><a name="chap1" id="chap1">CHAPTER I</a></h2> -<h3>Prolegomena</h3> -<h3><a name="chap1-1" id="chap1-1">I. THE ROUNDHEADS OF SOUTH -AFRICA</a></h3> -<p>History often reproduces without reference to nationality some -particular human type or class which becomes active and predominant -for a time, and fades away when its task is finished. It is, -however, not utterly lost, for the germ of it lies dormant yet -ready to re-appear when the exigencies of the moment recall it. The -reserve forces of human nature are inexhaustible and -inextinguishable.</p> -<p>It is probable that few of the Boers had ever heard of Oliver -Cromwell, or that his life and times had ever been studied in the -South African Republics, and had influenced the Boer action; yet -the affinity of the South African burghers of the XIXth century -with the Puritans and the Roundheads of the XVIIth is striking. It -was not so much a parallelism of aims and hopes, for the struggle -in England was political and not national as in South Africa, as of -temperament, character, and method. There was hardly an individuity -in the Boers of the War which might not have been found in the -followers of Cromwell. Like these they were fanatically but -sincerely religious, and their unabashed and fearless adherence to -their beliefs and their open observance of the outward forms of -religion exposed them to the same cruel and baseless charge of -hypocrisy. Just as the aristocratic followers of Charles I had -jeered at <span class="pagenum"><a name="page2" id= -"page2"></a>{2}</span> the Roundheads, so did every thoughtless -officer and newspaper correspondent jeer at the psalm-singing and -the prayer meetings in the laagers. The Boers had the courage of -their religious opinions, and were not ashamed to proclaim them in -the face of man. The Bible was the only book they knew, and they -guided themselves according to their lights by its precepts. In -opposing the English they believed that they were resisting the -enemies of the Almighty. Like the Puritans they honestly thought -that certain passages in the Holy Scriptures applied to them as the -Chosen People, and that they were assured of Divine Protection; and -if they erred in their exegesis their delusion at least deserves -respect. Yet all the while the Old Testament was the volume they -chiefly studied, and if they quoted the New Testament they -sometimes modified the context to their own advantage.</p> -<p>Each Puritan movement has derived its strength not so much from -its abstract merit as from the intense personal conviction felt by -each unit engaged in it, that the righteousness of the cause was -unassailable. The Puritan never wavered in philosophic doubt. No -misgivings disturbed his soul, and he pursued his object with all -the strength of his body.</p> -<p>The Puritan stir in the reign of Charles I was a revival, almost -a continuation, of the half political, half religious activity -which in the previous century had effected the Reformation. The -Boer movement in South Africa, which sprang up after a germination -lasting three generations, was brought about by a recrudescence of -the spirit which made the Boers of the Netherlands rise against -Alva and the Spanish domination in the XVIth century.</p> -<p>In the XVIIth century the Boers of the Netherlands, made a -voluntary settlement in South Africa, and there under the Southern -Cross they were joined by French Puritans, who had fought under -Condé and who left their country after the revocation of the -Edict of Nantes, <span class="pagenum"><a name="page3" id= -"page3"></a>{3}</span> and also by some persecuted sectaries from -Piedmont. The two stocks, although one was of Teutonic and the -other of Celtic origin, easily came together, and under the -pressure of common interests and common dangers were consolidated -and vulcanized: and if in the previous generation the English -Pilgrim Fathers of the <i>Mayflower</i> had directed their course -to the south instead of to the west, and had cast anchor off the -shore of that distant region of Good Hope, it is probable that a -mighty nation would have been founded in South Africa.</p> -<p>Cromwell as the military leader of the Commonwealth Boers is, at -least in England where the military art has not been scientifically -studied, one of the suppressed characters of history. His political -achievements, as is perhaps natural in a community which courts the -voter and despises the soldier, have put out of sight the means by -which he mainly won them; namely his genius as a cavalry and -partisan commander. An ungainly, narrow-minded, bigoted, bucolic -squireen of Huntingdon, lacking in every quality which we are -accustomed to associate with a cavalry officer, inaugurated an era -in the history of Mounted Troops. His methods are studied on the -Continent, and the German Staff has recently discovered that he was -the first leader to use cavalry as a screen to hide the movements -of the main body. Yet there is no evidence that he ever studied the -military art, and he did not become a soldier until he had reached -his fourth decade. In the Royalist Army opposed to him were -soldiers by profession and experience; officers and men who had -been under Gustavus Adolphus in the Thirty Years' War; for in the -XVIIth century the services of aliens were in request on the -Continent, and at one time no less than eighty-seven senior -officers of British nationality were serving in the Swedish Army, -then the most renowned in Europe. Yet Cromwell with his "Eastern -Association," his Ironsides, his yeomen and raw levies, beat the -Royalist Army, officered from the same class which is still -believed <span class="pagenum"><a name="page4" id= -"page4"></a>{4}</span> to possess the monopoly of the aptitude for -leading men in war, by exercising the homely qualities of energy, -self-control, endurance, and practical common sense applied -instantly to the occasion of the moment.</p> -<p>The lessons to be learnt from Cromwell's campaigns have been -thus epitomized by General Baden-Powell:—"There is one thing -that ought not to escape the attention of students, namely the -success that attended Cromwell's method of rallying his troops -whenever they got dispersed. When things looked bad, as they did on -one or two occasions, when some of his cavalry were defeated and -the rest scattered, he never lost heart and his men never lost -heart; they knew they had to rally again and attack somewhere else. -Very often the enemy were deceived by that, thinking that the -Roundheads were scattered and broken up, and took no further notice -of him until they suddenly found him attacking from quite a new -direction. That was the secret of his success on many occasions, -and one that has its lesson to-day, just as it had in those -days—that when all seems pretty bad and you are scattered and -broken, keep up a good heart and get together again and have -another go." With scarcely the change of a word these remarks will -account for the prolongation of the war for two years after the -occupation of the Boer capitals.</p> -<p>The Boer leaders, like their great prototype Cromwell, owed much -of their success to their novel and skilful use of mounted troops. -The European conception of the functions of mounted troops had been -stereotyped for some time; Cavalry screens an advancing army, -prevents the enemy observing its dispositions, acts as its eyes and -ears; and so forth. It is true that Great Britain had already for -at least a generation employed Mounted Infantry in colonial wars; -but the innovation had never been approved of on the Continent, -where it was regarded as a cheap and inefficient British substitute -for Cavalry.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page5" id="page5"></a>{5}</span> -<p>Yet the famous postscript "unmounted men preferred,"<a id= -"footnotetag2" name="footnotetag2"></a><a href= -"#footnote2"><sup>2</sup></a> which was affixed to the acceptance -of the help proffered by the Australian Colonies, shows that at -first the power of mounted troops acting not as the eyes and ears -of an army, but as a mobile and supple "mailed fist," was not -understood. In ten weeks, however, the tune changed, and it was -"preference given to mounted contingents."</p> -<p>When the grand operations were over, the enemy's chief towns -occupied, and the lines of communication fairly secure, the -necessity for mounted troops became still more apparent. The Boers -saw that it was useless for them to campaign at large. They took to -<i>guerilla</i>, and restricted themselves generally to independent -horse raids against which foot troops were powerless. Gradually the -proportion of horses to men in the British columns rose, until -practically all the combatants were mounted, and at last the -Cromwellian principle that the best military weapon is a man on a -horse was fully accepted.</p> -<p>The military qualities of the Boers, like those of Cromwell's -men, were useful but not showy. They came by instinct and not by -acquisition, and they cannot be sufficiently accounted for as the -outcome of experience in the pursuit of game on the veld. They were -neutralized partially by characteristics the reverse of military. -The Boers were not remarkable for personal courage. If there had -been in the Boer Army a decoration corresponding to the Victoria -Cross it would have been rarely won or at least rarely earned. -There is scarcely an instance of an individual feat of arms or act -of devotion performed by a Burgher. On the few occasions when the -Boers were charged by cavalry they became paralysed with terror. -They were incapable of submitting themselves <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page6" id="page6"></a>{6}</span> to discipline, -and difficult to command in large numbers. They could not be made -to understand that prompt action, which possibly might not be the -best under the circumstances, was preferable to wasting time in -discussing a better with the field cornets. They were subject to -panics and, for the time, easily disheartened: and their sense of -duty was not conspicuous. The principles of strategy were unknown -to them, their tactics were crude, and with the exception of a very -few who had fought in 1881, they were without experience of the -realities of war.<a id="footnotetag3" name= -"footnotetag3"></a><a href="#footnote3"><sup>3</sup></a></p> -<p>If in the month of September, 1899, an impartial military critic -in a foreign Ministry of War had been directed to draw up an -appreciation of the situation and to forecast the course of the -impending struggle, he would probably have expressed himself -somewhat as follows:—</p> -<p>"An Army of 100,000 men is the utmost that Great Britain will be -able to place in the field in South Africa, for the Indian and -Colonial drafts must be provided for, and the Militia and other -Auxiliary Forces, which are not of much account, are tethered to -the country; but it will be sufficient for the purpose. Although -the military system of Great Britain is hopelessly behind the -times, she has always done wonders with her boomerangs, bows and -arrows, and flint instruments. That Army will be fairly well -furnished with modern weapons and equipment, and the excellent -personality of the soldier will compensate to a great extent for -incapacity in the Staff and superior officers. With this Army she -will have to meet a brave but undisciplined opponent whose numbers -cannot be estimated. Even if the Free Staters are included it is -improbable <span class="pagenum"><a name="page7" id= -"page7"></a>{7}</span> that more than 100,000 men can be put into -the field. These have had no military training, their leaders will -be unprofessional officers who will be unable to make good use of -the munitions of War which the two Republics have been strangely -allowed to import through British ports and to accumulate in large -quantities. If the burghers of the Orange Free State throw in their -lot with the Transvaalers, which is improbable as they have no -quarrel with Great Britain, the numbers opposed to her will -certainly be augmented, but the task before her will be greatly -simplified. Instead of having to send one portion of her Army by -way of Natal to effect a junction in the Transvaal, with the other -portion working northwards through Kimberley and Mafeking, a -campaign which would involve two long and vulnerable lines of -communication, she will be able to strike at once through the heart -of the Free State and will advance without much difficulty to -Johannesburg and Pretoria. The hardest part of her task will be the -passage of the Vaal, where a great battle will be fought, and the -capture of Pretoria, which is reported to be well fortified. With -Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, Pretoria and the railways in the -possession of Great Britain, the opposition will collapse in a very -few weeks, for no nation has ever been able to carry on a struggle -when its chief towns and means of communication are in the enemy's -possession."</p> -<p>This hypothetical appreciation probably represents the general -opinion current both at home and abroad during the period -immediately preceding the outbreak of the War; but it proved to be -mistaken from the first. The Free Staters joined the Transvaalers -and the allied forces assumed the offensive over a wide area -without delay. Kimberley and Mafeking were threatened on the west, -and on the east the Boers poured into Natal, upon which they had -for sixty years looked with the aggrieved and greedy eyes of a dog -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page8" id="page8"></a>{8}</span> -from whom a bone, to which he believes he is entitled, has been -recovered.</p> -<p>To Natal, in 1824, had come a handful of British pioneers. From -Chaka, the King of the Zulus, they obtained a grant of land upon -the coast, and after eleven years they endeavoured without success -to induce the British Government to recognize the settlement, which -in course of time became the City of Durban, as a Colony to which, -in honour of the Princess heiress presumptive to the Throne of -Great Britain, they proposed to give the name Victoria; and they -were thus the first to associate her with the Empire, which, in -spite of reluctant politicians who did their best to restrict it, -was destined to expand marvellously during her reign.</p> -<p>The Natal settlement was frowned on by the Imperial Government, -who even confiscated a little ship which the pioneers had toilfully -fitted out and which was bringing envoys from the King of the Zulus -to the King of England, on the plea that it was unregistered and -that it came from a foreign port. In 1828 Chaka, who was not -unfavourably disposed towards the Durban pioneers, was murdered by -his brother Dingaan, who succeeded him as King of the Zulus. It is -said that his last words to Dingaan were, "You think that you will -rule the land when I am gone, but I see the white men coming, and -they will be your masters."</p> -<p>His words were prophetically true, but there were two races of -white men hovering over Natal; and the Great King of the Zulus, a -tribe held in little account before his time, but which had under -his leadership absorbed or exterminated almost every other tribe -from Pondoland to Delagoa Bay, was no longer with them to choose -between the rivals to his own ends and advantage; and Dingaan -inherited the cruelty without the ability or the statecraft of his -brother, the Napoleon of South Africa.</p> -<p>Of all the races of Europe the Low Germans of Holland -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page9" id="page9"></a>{9}</span> -seemed the least likely to contract the migratory habit. The -Hollander of the present day, popularly but incorrectly called a -Dutchman, is home-staying and home-loving. The compact, -well-cared-for, well-ordered homestead, village, and town -communities of the Netherlands are inconsistent with a roving -disposition, and yet the Hollanders of South Africa furnished the -most conspicuous example of Nomadism in modern times.</p> -<p>It may have been that the ordeal of Alva and the subsequent -disturbance of the Thirty Years' War had constitutionally unsettled -the Hollanders to such a degree that their descendants, emancipated -from European ideas, became prone to restlessness, for in a -generation or two they began to trek; or perhaps the magic of the -spacious veld, with its clear sky and the mountains and flat-topped -kopjes sharply defined on the horizon, irresistibly lured them on. -In the land they had quitted the air was dense with moisture; -scarcely a hill was to be seen; they were hemmed in by sluggish -rivers and by the sea, which leaned heavily against the dykes and -threw its spray angrily down on to the reclaimed pastures which had -been stolen from it.</p> -<p>The original Dutch settlement at the Cape was made by a Company -of Amsterdam merchants for the refreshment and refitting of their -ships engaged in trade with the East. The Company was a harsh and -extortionate master, who paid little attention to the needs and the -welfare of the settlement, which was regarded merely as a place of -call. The discontented colonists began to leave the seacoast and -trekked inwards, where the heavy hands of the cordially detested -representatives of the Company could not reach them. Its rule came -to an end in 1795, when, at the request of Holland, Great Britain -took over the Colony in order to prevent it falling into the hands -of France. It was restored at the Peace of Amiens, but in a few -years again came into the possession of Great Britain.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page10" id="page10"></a>{10}</span> -<p>The Colonies of the Empire were at that time administered by a -Branch of the War Office which regarded the Cape settlement much in -the same light as it had been regarded by the Dutch Company, as a -necessary but troublesome depôt on the way to the East; and -had the Overland Route and the Suez Canal been available a -generation earlier it would probably have been abandoned.</p> -<p>The Boers hoped that their new masters, who at least were not an -association of Amsterdam merchants absorbed in their ledgers, would -treat them with more sympathy and consideration. But the only -serious colonial problem with which British politicians had up to -that time been called upon to deal was in North America, and they -had disastrously failed in their attempt to solve it. They were -without experience in the management of white plantations, they -shirked the future and looked only to the "ignorant present," and -their policy in South Africa was based upon two principles: that on -no account must the boundaries of the Empire be enlarged and new -responsibilities incurred, and that in all quarrels between white -man and black man the presumption was that the white man was in the -wrong.</p> -<p>The Great Trek of 1836-7 was brought about by the emancipation -of the slaves and by the refusal or inability of the Government to -protect the farmers against the raids of the "Kaffir"<a id= -"footnotetag4" name="footnotetag4"></a><a href= -"#footnote4"><sup>4</sup></a> tribes on the border. There is no -doubt that enslaved Hottentots, Bushmen, and even Malays who had -been with the knowledge of the authorities imported from Madagascar -and Malacca, were often ill-treated by individual slave-owners; but -the Boers resented the charge of wholesale cruelty which was made -against them, and the favour and patronage <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page11" id="page11"></a>{11}</span> bestowed -upon native tribes. Moreover, although the slave-owners were -entitled to compensation for the loss of their helots, the fund was -administered in London, with the result that a considerable -proportion of the already inadequate sum was retained in the hands -of agents.</p> -<p>The object of the Great Trek was deliverance from the harsh and -hostile jurisdiction of the British Government, and the setting up -of a new and independent Boer community in Natal, which was -reported to be a promised land flowing with milk and honey. The -Boers proposed to shake themselves free from the Egyptian and to -occupy Canaan.</p> -<p>The <i>voortrekkers</i>, among whom was the boy Paul Kruger, -slowly passed away towards the north and crossed the Orange River. -Moshesh, the chief of the Basutos, watched curiously from his -mountains the trains of wagons strung out on the veld, but -refrained from molesting the emigrants. Not so Moselekatse,<a id= -"footnotetag5" name="footnotetag5"></a><a href= -"#footnote5"><sup>5</sup></a> a chief who had formerly broken away -from Chaka and had set himself up beyond the Vaal, and who -subsequently founded the Matabele Kingdom in which he was succeeded -by his son Lobengula. He swooped down upon the advanced parties, -who defended themselves with success and afterwards chastised him -in his own country, in which, hidden from his eyes, lay the -gold-bearing reefs of Johannesburg.</p> -<p>Meanwhile the British Government had forged a useless and clumsy -weapon for the coercion of its "erring and misguided" subjects. It -was held by the lawyers that the trekkers could not at will and by -the simple process of migration throw off their allegiance to the -Crown of England, and a declaratory Act was passed under which all -British subjects south of Latitude 25, whether within or without -the colony, could be arrested and punished.</p> -<p>The Boer scouts discovered passes over the Drakensberg -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page12" id="page12"></a>{12}</span> -which gave them a readier access than they had expected into Natal. -It had not recovered from the devastations of Chaka and was thinly -inhabited. Settlements were made near the banks of the Tugela, -while Piet Retief, after a brief visit to Durban, went on to -negotiate with Dingaan at the royal kraal of Umgungundhlovu in -Zululand. He was received with some cordiality, but accused of -participating in a recent cattle raid. Retief, to show his good -faith, offered to catch the robber, a chief named Sikunyela, whose -kraal was a hundred miles away. He found Sikunyela, who greatly -admired the glistening rings of a pair of handcuffs shown him by -the slim Dutchman, and who was even persuaded that they would be a -becoming ornament to a native chief. He tried them on, but a more -intimate acquaintance with the use of handcuffs induced him to -surrender the cattle he had stolen from Dingaan, the King of the -Zulus.</p> -<p>Again Retief with a hundred followers waited upon Dingaan at -Umgungundhlovu, and after military displays on each side received -from him a grant of the same land which Chaka had already given to -the British pioneers of Durban. Next day the Boers were received in -farewell audience by Dingaan, by whose orders they were -treacherously surrounded and led out to the place of execution, a -hill of mimosas outside the royal kraal, where they were put to -death.</p> -<p>There remained the defenceless plantations on the Tugela. Before -the news of the massacre could reach them, and while they were -hourly expecting the return of Retief, Dingaan's impis swooped down -upon them from Zululand. At the cost of the lives of 600 men, -women, and children, the tribes were driven back, and the little -town of Weenen, the "place of weeping," remains to mark the -spot.</p> -<p>Soon other parties of emigrants came in from beyond the -Drakensberg, and in 1838 an expedition under Potgieter failed to -punish Dingaan for his treachery. Nor <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page13" id="page13"></a>{13}</span> did an -attempt to help the emigrants made by the British settlers at -Durban meet with success. A small force of Natal natives under an -Englishman named Biggar was greatly out-numbered at the mouth of -the Tugela and perished almost to a man. Dingaan retaliated by -sending an impi to Durban, which he held for a few days; the -settlers taking refuge on board a ship in the Bay.</p> -<p>The Boers were disheartened and many of them trekked back to the -veld beyond the Drakensberg passes, which is now the Orange River -Colony. Their position in face of Dingaan seemed hopeless; but in -November, 1838, there came out of the Cape Colony one Pretorius. He -had heard of their distress, and he organized a force of 500 men, -with whom, on December 16, he successfully encountered Dingaan's -army and slew 3,000 of his warriors at the Blood River, an affluent -of the Buffalo. Dingaan fled and the column marched on to -Umgungundhlovu, where Retief's mouldering body was found on the -hill of mimosas, and on it the deed of grant of land at Durban. -Pretorius was ambushed by Zulus disguised as cattle, crawling on -all fours and wearing ox hides; but he escaped with slight loss, -and returned to the Tugela. "Dingaan's Day," December 16, is kept -by the Boers as a festival of thanksgiving and rejoicing.</p> -<p>Soon a new complication beset the harassed emigrants. In -December, 1838, the British Government, anxious to stop the wars -between the Boers and the natives and to exclude the former from -the sea, sent one hundred soldiers to Durban and issued a -proclamation in which the Boers were declared to be British -subjects who had unlawfully occupied Natal, and who were morally -responsible for all the blood that had been shed. They protested -against the imputation and against the military occupation of -Durban, but took no active steps to resent the affront.</p> -<p>When twelve months had passed without hostilities <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page14" id="page14"></a>{14}</span> between Boer -and native, the British Government withdrew its hundred warriors -from Durban and tacitly handed over Natal to the emigrant Boers. -Hardly had the little transport <i>Vectis</i> catted her anchor -when the Republic of Natalia was proclaimed and its flag run up on -the staff of the forsaken British Camp on Durban Bay.</p> -<p>But the dog-in-the-manger policy of neither incorporating Natal -in the British Empire nor frankly allowing the Boers to occupy it -could not be indefinitely maintained. Each present difficulty -wriggled out of made the future more embarrassing. Soon, as might -have been anticipated, the Boers were again in trouble with the -natives. Panda, the father of Cetchwayo, whose impis forty years -after washed their spears in the blood of 800 British soldiers at -Isandhlwana, broke away from his brother Dingaan, taking with him -into Natal many thousand Zulus who were awaiting an opportunity of -shaking themselves free from the tyranny and cruelty of Dingaan. -Panda made overtures to the Boers and was gladly received as an -ally, and with his help Dingaan was finally crushed and driven into -Swaziland, where, in the hands of a hostile tribe, he perished -miserably by torture.</p> -<p>The emigrants were now favourably situated in Natal. They had -established an equitable if not a legal claim to it; Dingaan was -out of the way; and the British Government seemed indisposed to -inter-meddle. But the fatal and grotesque alliance with Panda, -which culminated in his installation as King of the Zulus by -Pretorius in 1840, and which was entirely inconsistent with the -attitude hitherto assumed towards the natives, was the undoing of -the trekkers of 1836.</p> -<p>Panda's men as native auxiliaries eager to avenge themselves on -the common enemy Dingaan were all very well in their way. Most of -them, however, belonged to Natal and joined him in the hope of -recovering the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page15" id= -"page15"></a>{15}</span> tribal lands from which they had been -evicted by Chaka and to which they had a better right than the -trekkers.</p> -<p>The Boers now began to reap the harvest of the Panda alliance. -They regarded the new arrivals as intruders, refused to acknowledge -their claims, and finally in August, 1841, decreed their expulsion -from Natal. The location chosen for their settlement was a district -in Pondoland in the possession of a chief under British protection, -who already had had occasion to lodge at Capetown a complaint -against the Boers.</p> -<p>The British Government now found it necessary to intervene again -in Natal. A military occupation was announced by proclamation in -December, 1841, and 240 men, under the command of an infantry -captain named Smith, were sent up to Durban to give effect to -it.</p> -<p>When Smith, after a difficult march along the coast, reached his -destination on May 4, 1842, he pitched his camp on the flat which -forms the base of one of the promontories enclosing the Bay. He at -once lowered the Republican flag flying over the block-house at the -Point, and soon found that 1,500 Boers were occupying Congella on -the shore of the Bay. An attempt to surprise them by night failed -disastrously; Smith's force was reduced to half its strength, and -the block-house was captured by Pretorius.</p> -<p>Smith was now besieged in his camp, and the nearest help that -could come to him was at Grahamstown, five hundred miles away. -Thither a gallant civilian named King, who was one of the pioneers, -rode in ten days; and on June 25, when the little garrison was in -extremity, it was relieved by sea. Pretorius withdrew into the -interior, and the Volksraad at Pietermaritzburg, the capital of the -Republic of Natalia, voted the submission of the Boers. Pending a -final settlement it was allowed to remain in authority over the -settlers, but the district around Durban Bay was at once taken over -as British territory. In May, 1843, a year after the landing of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page16" id="page16"></a>{16}</span> -Smith, the Republic of Natalia passed away and Natal was proclaimed -a British Colony.</p> -<p>The final settlement did not come for some time. The Volksraad -was abolished, but the claims of the Boers to the lands upon which -they had squatted were liberally considered. They were, however, -dissatisfied because the rights of Panda's men were also regarded, -and many trekked away across the Drakensberg. Those who remained -protested that their lives and property were insecure in the -presence of the natives, and Pretorius was deputed to go and lay -their grievances before the British Governor at the Cape.</p> -<p>The ill success of his mission provoked him to reprisals, and he -proceeded to stir up trouble in the Orange River Sovereignty, which -had recently been formally proclaimed British Territory. If not -actively loyal it was peaceably disposed until the arrival of -Pretorius, who soon drove out the British Resident and the little -garrison of Bloemfontein and set them on the run as far as -Colesberg in the Cape Colony. He was defeated at Boomplatz in -August, 1848, by Sir Harry Smith, a veteran of the Peninsular War, -and British authority was for a time reestablished over the -Sovereignty. The Colonial Office soon however tired of the new -possession and gladly scuttled out in 1854 in order to avoid the -task of reaping the harvest of a clumsy and grotesque policy, which -it had formulated a few years before, of hemming in the -<i>voortrekkers</i>, who had settled north of the Orange River, -with a barrier of native states set up for the purpose on the east -and west; and which now threatened to involve it in a quarrel which -naturally arose between Moshesh, the Basuto chief, and the -emigrants whom he had been appointed to restrain.</p> -<p>Pretorius retired across the Vaal where he joined Potgieter, -who, after the failure of his attack on Dingaan in 1838, had gone -into Moselekatse's country and had driven him beyond the Limpopo. A -Republic was set up beyond the Vaal which the British Government -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page17" id="page17"></a>{17}</span> -recognized as independent in the Zand River Convention of 1852.</p> -<p>Such is in brief the story of the Boers' claim to Natal. They -considered it to be their lawful heritage out of which they had -been jockeyed, and in October, 1899, they seemed to have a chance -of recovering it. They boasted that they would not only win back -Pietermaritzburg, which was named after two leaders of the Great -Trek, Pieter Retief and Gert Maritz, but that they would establish -themselves on the shores of the Indian Ocean. It was not the -vainglorious gasconade of a swashbuckler. Four months after October -11, 1899, when the Boer ultimatum expired, the British Army was -still engaged in endeavouring to drive out the Boers from British -territory, and hardly a rifle had been discharged in the enemy's -country.</p> -<p>Napoleon was in the habit of impressing upon his officers the -necessity of studying past campaigns, both modern and ancient; but -those who anticipated confidently that the Boer War would soon be -brought to a successful close by the British Army were led into -their error by the history of past campaigns. There was, however, -one campaign, the War of Independence in North America, which the -discerning might have recognized as an analogous struggle; but it -was overlooked, and the history of the great European conflicts was -established as the leading authority. The occupation of the -populous places and the control of the means of access to them, -which seemed to present few difficulties, meant the end of the war -and the subsequent negotiations as to the amount of the indemnity -or other penalty to be paid by the defeated.</p> -<p>But not only were the necessary preliminary successes deferred -far beyond the expected time of their -accomplishment—Bloemfontein was not occupied until five -months, nor Pretoria until eight months had rolled by since that -October dawn when the Boers crossed the frontier into -Natal—but the prospect of the end of <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page18" id="page18"></a>{18}</span> the War soon -began to recede into the perspective of infinity: and even now, -after an interval of some years since the peace of Vereeniging, -when, like the proportions of some huge edifice which can be truly -comprehended only by the observer who views it from a distance, the -various incidents and phases of the War begin to assume their -relative importance, the difficulty of discovering some guiding -principle which shall reconcile the Great Boer War with other wars -is as great as ever.</p> -<p>Sometimes a cause can be found <i>a posteriori</i> by groping in -the dim and deceptive light cast by an effect: or a process of -exhaustion and elimination may be set up in which the qualities -common to each side are cancelled and the result attributed to the -credit balance which will appear under one of the accounts. We saw -for some months a gallant and well equipped if somewhat amorphous -British Army impotently endeavouring, though in superior numbers, -to make headway against an aggregation of Boer commandos, and -checked at various points on an arc drawn wholly in British -territory and extending in a circuit of over 500 miles from -Ladysmith in Northern Natal through Stormberg and Colesberg to -Kimberley and Mafeking; and at each extremity of the arc was a -besieged city. Was the military art as taught in Europe founded -upon error, or had the British Army been negligently instructed in -it?</p> -<p>Yet no European troops had had so much recent experience of -active service. We had lately fought in the Soudan, in East and -West Africa, in Burmah and on the North-West frontier of India; -there was in fact hardly a year in the preceding decade in which -the portals of the temple of a British Janus would have been -closed. Moreover, our fighting had not been against trained -soldiers, but against enemies who like the Boers were -undisciplined, collectively if not individually brave men -patriotically defending their own country. We therefore entered the -arena with experience which no other European Army possessed.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page19" id="page19"></a>{19}</span> -<h3><a name="chap1-2" id="chap1-2">II. PATRIOTISM, DUTY, AND -DISCIPLINE.</a></h3> -<p>Many hard things have been said of Patriotism.<a id= -"footnotetag6" name="footnotetag6"></a><a href= -"#footnote6"><sup>6</sup></a> Dr. Johnson's definition is well -known, and more recently it has been styled the sublimest form of -Selfishness. These, however, are not definitions but rather -criticisms of certain phases of Patriotism, which is closely allied -to Family Affection and, like that sentiment, originates in the -helplessness and the egotism of the Individual.</p> -<p>The weak infant clings to his mother for sustenance, comfort and -protection, and the tender care which is bestowed upon him while -his body and his mind are developing fosters the notion of the -subjective importance of the human unit. Human nature is so -constituted that the Individual is disposed to over-estimate his -own consequence and to regard his own surroundings as superior to -the surroundings of all other persons, and therefore more worthy of -recognition, encouragement, and admiration. As the Child grows in -years this sentiment is gradually and unconsciously modified, but -it is never wholly eradicated. The inward emotion aroused in his -heart by parental solicitude becomes partially altruistic and -outward and is transmuted into Gratitude and Love.</p> -<p>The Child emerges into Youth and thence into Manhood, and the -area of his immediate environment is enlarged. He needs further -succour and assistance, and the Family Community to which he -belongs and which nurtured and watched over his early years can no -longer supply his requirements. He is in want of new fellowships -and must strengthen himself by joining various bodies and -associations. With these he incorporates himself more or less and -his friendly attitude towards them for his own good is a -development of the primitive Family Affection. In the case of a -class, a social, or professional community the sentiment is termed -<i>Esprit de Corps</i>;<a id="footnotetag7" name= -"footnotetag7"></a><a href="#footnote7"><sup>7</sup></a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page20" id="page20"></a>{20}</span> -in view of recognized civil institutions by which he perceives that -he benefits, it is Loyalty; while with respect to the Fatherland it -is Patriotism, which denotes the adherence of the helpless -individual Ego to the Supreme Community. Patriotism, like Family -Affection, is a growth and culture of the idea of Self. It is the -expression of the Individual's thanks for the support, countenance, -protection, and other moral and material advantages claimed by him -from the Supreme Community, to which in return he readily attorns -with respect and admiration. He is, however, patriotic because with -unconscious egotism he regards his Country as part of himself -rather than himself as part of his Country. Even the act of a man -who sacrifices his life for the good of his country may not be -wholly unselfish, for some natures are so constituted that they can -discount the future and be gratified by the prospective award of -posthumous honour. There can, however, be no doubt that Patriotism, -though possibly of not very noble origin, is a sentiment beneficial -both to the community and the individual, and is therefore worthy -of encouragement. Happily, those cold heights of philosophy on -which every man is loved as a brother and every nationality held in -equal honour and esteem are unattainable by human nature; for -without the stimulus of Patriotism National Life would be -impracticable.<a id="footnotetag8" name="footnotetag8"></a><a href= -"#footnote8"><sup>8</sup></a> <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page21" id="page21"></a>{21}</span> It's chief defect is that like -most of the emotions it is sometimes hasty and unreasoning.</p> -<p>Such, it is believed, is briefly the history of Patriotism, and -the theory is supported by the fact that the British soldier is not -patriotic by nature. It is not his fault. The class from which he -is usually drawn has unhappily less reason for respecting and -admiring the Supreme Community than any other class, for it -participates fully in the distresses and meagerly in the successes -and good fortune of the Nation, from which, though not actually -unpatriotic, it stands sullenly aloof. It can hardly be denied that -the power and prosperity of Great Britain have favourably affected -the position of the upper and middle classes to a greater degree -than they have ameliorated the condition of the lower classes, and -it is therefore not surprising that the latter seem to take little -or no pride in their nationality, and sometimes even act perversely -in opposition to its interests.</p> -<p>The private soldier has never been taught to think about his -country. The education which he may have received at the Board -School is not calculated to arouse in him a feeling of national -pride which is non-existent in his home life. The display of the -National Flag, which flutters over so many distant lands, is -discouraged in the primary schools of Great Britain as tending to -"flag-worship." In the United States, on the other hand, the Stars -and Stripes are hoisted in every school yard. No systematic effort -is made to interest the children of the operative classes in -Greater Britain. India and the Colonies are facts in geography -troublesome to learn and easy to forget. The history of the British -Empire is sterilized before it is imparted to them. They are not -taught to realize that the happiness and prosperity of a large -proportion of the inhabitants of the world are dependent upon the -moods of the population of a small group of islands in the Atlantic -Ocean, and that in the ballot-boxes of Great Britain are cast the -fortunes of many millions of their fellow-creatures.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page22" id="page22"></a>{22}</span> -<p>Foreigners have remarked that the minstrelsy of Great Britain is -singularly devoid of patriotic songs. The British soldier has no -"Star-Spangled Banner" or "Wacht am Rhein" to sing on the line of -march or in the bivouac, but only the last comic or sentimental -ditty which he may have heard at the Garrison Music Hall before -embarking on active service. The National Anthem is not a patriotic -song but a prayer for Divine Protection for the Sovereign, to which -have been appended some inappropriate stanzas now rarely heard; -while "Rule, Britannia!" might have been composed for the -gasconading swashbuckler of an extravaganza.</p> -<p>It would therefore be surprising if the recruit joined the Army -with a highly pitched conception of the work he has undertaken. -Destitution; or trouble about a woman, or with his own people, or -with the police; or the mysterious magnetism of an adventurous life -rather than the desire to serve his country, has induced him to -enlist. An existing or prospective War always keeps the recruiting -sergeant busy, but the object of a War is a matter of indifference -to the recruit. Most of our wars have been waged for political -reasons which he cannot understand. Apart from the difficulties of -language and of unaccustomed environments, he would as readily -serve in any other Army in which the pay was as liberal and the -restraint of discipline not more irksome. How is it, then, that -lacking the stimulus of Patriotism through no fault of his own and -being, in fact, a mercenary, he becomes an excellent soldier; -perhaps, next to the Turk, the best in Europe?</p> -<p>The answer seems to be that he soon acquires a high sense of -Duty. Duty may be defined as the necessity to do something for -one's own or for the general good which is not naturally -pleasurable or agreeable or instinctively desired. In the trite -proverb it is contrasted with and takes precedence of Pleasure. As -a motive for action it stands on a higher plane than -Patriotism.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page23" id="page23"></a>{23}</span> -<p>The alchemic process by which the indifferent, unemotional, and -sometimes unintelligent recruit is transmuted into the precious -metal of the soldier who wins battles seems to be somewhat as -follows: Of his own volition he has taken on a certain job and his -dogged pride or obstinacy will not allow him to be beaten by it, -however little enthusiasm it may arouse in him and however -distasteful it may be to him at first. He offers no "ca' canny" -service, but plods on and does his best in his own way. The lack of -the enthusiastic temperament does not seriously retard the progress -of his military education, and without much ado he becomes a stolid -dependable unit of the Army. He is not carried away by success nor -unduly depressed by failure. His instincts tell him that they are -the accidents of Duty.</p> -<p>It has been noticed that the word Glory and its -derivatives<a id="footnotetag9" name="footnotetag9"></a><a href= -"#footnote9"><sup>9</sup></a> rarely appear in the accounts of the -action of the British Army on service, except in a War -Correspondent's letter or telegram. No reference is made in -reports, orders or despatches to the so-called "glorious" incidents -of a soldier's life in time of war. He is commended for his -endurance, his tenacity and his matter-of-fact acceptance of the -vicissitudes of war as "part of the day's work." The truest Glory -is the conscientious performance of Duty.</p> -<p>If through the incompetence or neglect of his leaders he is -called upon to sacrifice himself, he sacrifices himself without a -murmur. If he is compelled to keep himself alive on scanty rations -of horseflesh and to wet his parched lips with the trickle of a -dwindled and tainted spruit, he believes that his officers have -done their best for him. He is ordered to fall in upon the deck of -a burning troopship and to stand at attention while Death inspects -the ranks. He is besieged in a hill fort on the Indian frontier by -a horde of fanatics eager to kill or to mutilate him. He lies -wounded on the field of battle from which, after an indecisive -engagement, each combatant <span class="pagenum"><a name="page24" -id="page24"></a>{24}</span> has retired; and there, scorched by the -mid-day sun and starved by the cold of the night, and perhaps also -in danger of being burnt alive by a veld fire, he waits without -water for the armistice which shall bring up the ambulances. He -returns to his own land where he soon finds that he is not of much -account. After a great war there may be a period of evanescent -patronage; or a deed of Dargai, Rorke's Drift, or Balaklava may -have temporarily thrilled the audience into Music Hall enthusiasm; -but he is not greatly impressed, and stoically reflects that like -the battle, the starvation, and the Field Hospital it is "all in -the day's work" and will soon pass away.</p> -<p>There has probably never been a struggle in which the private -soldier more fully earned the gratitude of his country than in the -South African War. The most unfriendly critics in the foreign staff -offices have paid tribute to the excellence of the British soldier: -sometimes, however, sneering at him as a mercenary, whom, by a -curious perversion of the probabilities, they profess to think -unlikely to be as efficient as their own conscripts who are forced -into military service; but they never hold him responsible for the -ill-success of the war. Throughout their criticisms there lurks a -feeling of pained astonishment that the British "mercenary" proves -himself to be as good or even a better soldier than the continental -conscript, coupled with a comfortable conviction that Discipline is -not well maintained in the British Army.</p> -<p>The final cause of Discipline is the efficient use of arms on -the field of battle. Discipline is the result of an irksome -educational process by which a man is taught to submit his wishes, -his instincts, and, to a great extent, his personal liberty to the -control of one who may be his inferior morally, mentally, and -physically. It has also been cynically defined as the art of making -a man more afraid of his own officers than of the enemy. Its -function seems to be the formation of certain military qualities -which Patriotism and the Sense of Duty are by themselves -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page25" id="page25"></a>{25}</span> -believed incapable of creating. It has always been considered an -essential part of a soldier's training; but this view, though -probably correct, is not confirmed by the South African War, in -which an undisciplined force held its own for some years against -greatly superior numbers of disciplined men.</p> -<p>The ideal Army, patriotic, full of the sense of Duty, and -perfect in discipline, would be invincible; but such an Army has -never yet been seen. A deficiency of one or two of these qualities -may be made up for by a fuller measure of the others. The history -of each war will seem to indicate for a time the proportions in -which the qualities should be blended, which is the essential, and -whether any one of them can be omitted; but the inferences thus -drawn from one war will probably be found misleading in the next -war.</p> -<p>The inference to be drawn from the South African War seems to be -that the value of those military qualities which are created by -Discipline and training has been over-rated, and that a passionate -bigoted belief in the justice of a cause is a more potent factor in -the making of a soldier. Even if every allowance be made for the -strategical advantages possessed by the Boers, of fighting in their -own land on interior lines in a sparsely populated country -peculiarly adopted for <i>guerilla</i>, it is difficult to account -for their success if the tests by which the efficiency of a -European army is measured are applied to them. It may be that war -has hitherto been regarded too exclusively as a statical and -dynamical problem and that the moral element has been overlooked. -It certainly was overlooked in South Africa; for the war which Lord -Roberts in October, 1900, believed was practically at an end had in -fact then run little more than one-third of its course.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page26" id="page26"></a>{26}</span> -<h3><a name="chap1-3" id="chap1-3">III. WAR CONSIDERED AS A BRANCH -OF SPORT</a></h3> -<p>The astonishment, distress, chagrin and bewilderment caused by -want of success, "regrettable incidents," and disasters, sometimes -found consolation during the South African War in the foolish -remark—The Germans would have done no better. What the German -Army, which had not been actively employed for twenty-eight years, -might have accomplished under the same conditions is a matter for -sterile speculation which has little bearing on the case. But the -German Army certainly had not been accustomed to look upon War as a -branch of Sport or Athletics.</p> -<p>Owing in all probability to the happy fact in History that -England has not been invaded and over-run by a foreign army since -the time of William the Conqueror—an episode which had in the -end an excellent influence on the national life—she has never -taken the military art seriously. She alone, thanks to the -protection of Providence, has never been compelled to fight on her -own fields for her existence as a nation; she alone knows nothing -even by tradition handed down from distant generations of the -appearance of an alien soldier on her shores.<a id="footnotetag10" -name="footnotetag10"></a><a href="#footnote10"><sup>10</sup></a> -Some of her wars, as for example the successful struggle by which -the Napoleonic domination was broken up, have been fought for the -purpose of safe-guarding her independence, but they were not -popular with the people at large, whose short sight did not permit -them to see that a defensive war may have to be fought beyond the -seas; and they had little or no effect in evoking a patriotic -military spirit. Napoleon's gibe that the English were a nation of -shopkeepers was not unasked for, and is still seasonable.</p> -<p>On the other hand there are hundreds of thousands of persons on -the Continent of Europe who have seen, or who are the near -descendants of those who have <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page27" id="page27"></a>{27}</span> seen, their fatherland -ravaged; their homes destroyed; their relations, friends, and -neighbours slaughtered in the defence; the tree of the national -life maimed; and the full cup of the horrors of war drained to its -dregs.</p> -<p>To them the prospect of an invasion is not a remote contingency -to be considered and provided for at leisure after academical -discussion, but a real and instant danger from which only universal -service, to which fortunately for themselves they submit without -much demur, as it could not be enforced upon a reluctant community, -can preserve them.</p> -<p>The possibility of invasion is the dominant anxiety of the -land-frontier nations.<a id="footnotetag11" name= -"footnotetag11"></a><a href="#footnote11"><sup>11</sup></a> Across -the frontier they can see the conscripts drilling who almost at a -moment's notice may be marching in to attack them. Their armies are -not sent on interesting little expeditions to restrain a -too-militant tribe of hill-men or to patrol the distant marches of -a magnificent Empire, but must stand at attention generation after -generation, year after year, maintaining the featureless routine of -military life. None of the Romance of War that falls to the lot of -the British soldier—the service among strange Easterns in -Asia, the building up of a new imperial province in South Africa, -the constant change of scene along the posts which form a girdle -round the world from Hongkong to Jamaica—falls also to the -lot of the continental conscript, for whom there is only the dull -waiting for the critical moment.</p> -<p>The land-frontier nations alone are aware of the reality of the -Terror of War; it is a Thing overshadowing and, apart from every -other thing in their world, which must not, cannot be expelled from -their thoughts. The objects that meet the eye on all sides speak of -War; the railway vehicles marked with the number of men and horses -conveyable, the noble war memorials, the <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page28" id="page28"></a>{28}</span> officers -constantly in uniform, the crowds of soldiers in the streets, the -military bearing and precision of even the civilian servants of the -State; while upon the ears falls the sound, which is in most cases -a lingering echo of the roar of war, of alien tongues spoken within -the frontier, or of the tongue of the Fatherland spoken in exile -without it.</p> -<p>On the other hand, Peace is believed to be permanently settled -upon the shore of the silver streak which encloses the British -Isles. The war monuments are scanty and not a few of them are -grotesque; the soldier and his work are thrust into the background, -and his uniform is so often a hindrance to him that on certain -occasions he is permitted to appear in plain clothes, that is to -disguise himself as a civilian; and this concession is officially -termed a "privilege." The red tunic of the soldier, like the red -rays of the spectrum which cannot be brought into focus with the -other colours, fails to make a sharp impression upon the British -retina, but projects an ill-defined image seen through a medium of -doubt and indifference.</p> -<p>The nation looks upon the Army much as the individual looks upon -the Policeman, as a necessary institution, but one rather to be -avoided and kept in its place when its services are not actually in -requisition. Little interest is taken in its difficulties, its -merits, and its opportunities. It is regarded not as an -indispensable protection, but rather as an expensive result of -possessions in all parts of the world, and when the peace of these -is in danger of being broken, the cry too often belated goes up: -Send for the Soldiers. Probably nothing less than an actual landing -of foreign troops or the scare of it so tremendous as to drive the -nation into the opposite and equally dangerous extreme of -consternation and panic will be necessary to shake its belief, that -the white cliffs of Albion are immune to an invasion in force.</p> -<p>The nightmare of Militarism by which so many worthy persons are -fanatically obsessed obscures the dangers <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page29" id="page29"></a>{29}</span> against -which Militarism is an insurance. Now Militarism is not in itself a -desirable thing, and the developments and accidents of it upon the -Continent of Europe are often not only irksome and absurd but also -irreconcilable with the existence of a healthy feeling of -self-respect in the non-military sections of the community, who are -taught to regard themselves as an inferior caste; but with all its -shortcomings it promotes the moral as well as the physical strength -of a nation. It calls up some of the nobler qualities of human -nature; self-control, self-reliance, endurance, and altruism or the -devotion of Self to the good of the community; and not the least of -its merits is that it corrects and restrains the dreary materialism -of the Labour and Socialist movements.</p> -<p>The shy and distant bearing of the British nation and its -persistent refusal to regard the Army as part of itself, in -conjunction with the growing national passion for Sport and -Athletics, fostered the idea that War itself must be a branch of -them. From time immemorial the military had been eyed with -suspicion by the country, which professed to believe that its -liberties were in greater danger from its own soldiers than from -the soldiers of a foreign power, and which for a long time withheld -from its rulers the right of having a standing army. Gradually and -with great reluctance it was convinced of the necessity of a -permanent force, not so much for home defence as for the -performance of the police duties of an Empire. As the Empire grew -year by year, these duties became more onerous and responsible, but -the Army itself was not taken seriously. It was confessedly too -weak to engage in a European campaign, and the Navy was considered -to be sufficient to protect the country against invasion.</p> -<p>The duties of the Army abroad were generally interesting and -exciting but they did not call for the exercise of the military art -with great precision, as the opponents which it was called upon to -face were rarely experts, <span class="pagenum"><a name="page30" -id="page30"></a>{30}</span> and there was a comfortable belief that -the bravery and endurance of the British soldier would outweigh -deficiencies in other military qualities.<a id="footnotetag12" -name="footnotetag12"></a><a href= -"#footnote12"><sup>12</sup></a></p> -<p>The War-as-a-Sport idea was also encouraged by the opinion still -stoutly held by many persons that a good sportsman is necessarily a -good soldier, and that the qualities which ensure success in -Athletics or Sport make also for success in War: but this is true -of certain of them only. In so far as Athletics and Sport tend to -manliness, self-reliance, good comradeship, endurance of bodily -hardship, and contempt of danger, they are no doubt an excellent -preparatory school for War. But there is one quality without the -possession of which no man is held to be a good sportsman, and that -is the acceptance of defeat or non-success with equanimity and -good-humour as "part of the game." Without this quality Athletics -and Sport would, in fact, become impossible.</p> -<p>In the soldier, however, this temperament is a dangerous gift. -It led to reverses, captures, loss of convoys and other -"regrettable incidents" being regarded with stoical composure as -"part of the game"; and the victims were condoled with on their -"shocking bad luck." It would have been difficult to discern from -the bearing and demeanour of the typical officer whether he was at -the moment a prisoner of war in the Model School at Pretoria, or -had just taken part in the magnificent cavalry charge by which -Kimberley was relieved. The former plight did not greatly depress -him, nor did the latter phase of military life greatly elate him. -It is probable that the War would have been brought to a successful -close at a much earlier date if throughout the British Army and -especially among the officers <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page31" id="page31"></a>{31}</span> hearty disgust and indignation -at the failures of the first few months had taken the place of a -light-hearted accommodation to circumstances. The companions of -Ulysses may</p> -<div class="poem"> -<div class="stanza"> -<p>With a frolic welcome take</p> -<p>The thunder and the sunshine,</p> -</div> -</div> -<p>but it is not War.</p> -<p>The British officer played at war in South Africa much in the -same way that he hunted or played cricket or polo at home. He -enjoyed the sport and the game, did his best for his own side, and -rejoiced if he was successful, but was not greatly disturbed when -he lost. A dictum attributed to the Duke of Wellington says that -the Battle of Waterloo was won upon the Playing Fields at Eton. It -would not be so very far from the truth to say that the guns at -Sannah's Post were captured on the polo-ground at Hurlingham; that -Magersfontein was lost at Lord's; that Spionkop was evacuated at -Sandown; and that the war lingered on for thirty-two months in the -Quorn and Pytchley coverts.</p> -<p>The sporting view of War was recognized and confirmed in Army -Orders and official reports, in which the words "bag," "drive," -"stop," and some other sporting terms not infrequently appeared. No -one would reasonably object to the judicious and illuminating use -of metaphor, but there are metaphors which impair the dignity of a -cause and degrade it in the eyes of those whose duty is to maintain -that cause. When the advance of a British Division at a critical -period in the operations is frivolously termed a "drive," and when -the men extended at ten paces' interval over a wide front are -called "beaters," it is natural that the leaders should look upon -their work as analogous to the duties of a gamekeeper; and when an -artillery officer is instructed to "pitch his shells well up," he -is encouraged to regard failure as no worse than the loss of a -cricket-match.</p> -<p>It was at least to be expected that in the use, care, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page32" id="page32"></a>{32}</span> -and management of horses upon which the success of a campaign, in -which mounted men formed an unusually large proportion of the -troops engaged, so much depended, the sporting instincts of the -British officer would have made him particularly efficient; yet the -evidence given by General officers before the Royal Commission -showed that it was otherwise. They are practically unanimous in the -opinion that all branches of the mounted troops were inefficient, -except the artillery, whose work so far as horses are concerned is -akin to that of the skilful but unsporting farm teamster or -wagoner.</p> -<p>A nation greatly addicted to Sport, Games, and Athletics is a -nation lacking in that earnestness of moral purpose which should be -its chief strength for War. Amusements are regarded not as -"recreation" or means of refreshing and re-invigorating the mind -and body for the duties of life by a temporary change of -occupation, but as the main objective of existence.</p> -<p>A retrospect into history will show that the most efficient -armies were those in which the sporting instinct was non-existent. -The armies which in modern times have most satisfactorily performed -the duties for which armies are raised were those of Gustavus -Adolphus, Napoleon, Moltke, and Oyama. Each of these was the most -perfect military instrument of its day, and their exploits have -never been surpassed. Yet neither the Swedes, the French, the -Germans, nor the Japanese were addicted to Athletics or Sport. -Their manly instincts were exercised, to the great advantage of -their countries, in skill at arms and in the Military Art.<a id= -"footnotetag13" name="footnotetag13"></a><a href= -"#footnote13"><sup>13</sup></a></p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page33" id="page33"></a>{33}</span> -<p>The cult of Sport and Athletics sets up false ideals and lowers -the intellectual standard. Thousands of loafers, idlers, and work -skirkers live upon the anticipations or recollections of out-door -sports when not actually present at them, and are ready to spend -their last shilling at the turnstile of the ground on which a -handful of football gladiators are at play: and are more -exasperated by the defeat of the team which they patronise in a Cup -Tie match than they would be by the loss of a battle by the British -Army. There is this to be said for the working classes, that in -youth, if not longer, they in general endure a hard and strenuous -life, and at least in their school years they cannot indulge a -passion for amusement; whereas the class from which the officers of -the British Army are drawn is encouraged on the other hand to -indulge it from childhood. Owing to the prominence given in the -Public Schools and Universities to games and athletics and to the -esteem in which proficiency in these is held, youths of the upper -middle and upper classes are dumped upon the world not humbly but -arrogantly ignorant of almost everything necessary to qualify them -to take their proper place in the community. They have subsisted in -a rarefied intellectual atmosphere, and to fit themselves for any -profession for which they may have an inclination they have to be -forced or "crammed" in a saturated atmosphere by which they are -congested. The result is that "young officers now join the service -with a very fair idea of cricket and football, bridge, and even -motor-driving; but with no education in patriotism; no real -acquaintance with the history or geography of their own or other -countries; unable to write English concisely, or even -grammatically;<a id="footnotetag14" name= -"footnotetag14"></a><a href="#footnote14"><sup>14</sup></a> -unaccustomed <span class="pagenum"><a name="page34" id= -"page34"></a>{34}</span> to read general information for themselves -other than under the headings of the <i>Daily Mail</i>; unable to -talk a foreign language; and with no knowledge of the sciences -which are of military use."<a id="footnotetag15" name= -"footnotetag15"></a><a href="#footnote15"><sup>15</sup></a> To this -may be added the fact that these young dullards, the supply of whom -is dwindling, are, on joining the service, encouraged and accepted -rather with reference to their sporting and social qualities than -to their military capacity.</p> -<p>England, as a sporting, athletic, and game-loving nation, has of -late years suffered many rebuffs. By the United States she has been -taught the scientific method of riding racehorses, and also of -sailing yachts; she has been defeated in polo by a Transatlantic -team; her selected representative horsemen are unsuccessful in the -International Military Tournaments; she cannot defeat Australia on -the cricket field; a Belgian crew holds its own at Henley. If these -rebuffs tend to abate the mania for watching the performances of a -handsome but not particularly intelligent quadruped, and for -studying the various methods of imparting motion to a Ball and to -show the vanity of the passion for sports and games when indulged -to excess, they will have served their purpose. The nation, -disgusted at its want of success in its favourite pursuits, may -perhaps turn its manhood to the noblest pursuit of all, the defence -of the Fatherland; and then it will not be the betting and football -news that has to be blacked out <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page35" id="page35"></a>{35}</span> of the daily papers in the -free libraries, but the bi-weekly military gazettes, the reports -from the military stations and the Special Correspondents' letters -from Salisbury Plain during the manoeuvres.</p> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote2" name= -"footnote2"></a><b>Footnote 2:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag2">(return)</a> -<p>In justice to the War Office it should be stated that this was -inserted at the instance of Sir Redvers Buller, who believed that -he would be able to raise in South Africa a sufficient force of -mounted troops.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote3" name= -"footnote3"></a><b>Footnote 3:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag3">(return)</a> -<p>B. Viljoen in his "Reminiscences of the Anglo-Boer War" -frequently complains of the insubordination, the malingering, and -the cowardice of his followers, and of the incompetence of his -superior officers.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote4" name= -"footnote4"></a><b>Footnote 4:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag4">(return)</a> -<p>"Kaffir" is an Arabic word meaning one who does not believe in -the religion of Mahomet. It was introduced into South Africa by the -Portuguese and subsequently applied to the tribes living on the -N.E. of the Cape Colony.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote5" name= -"footnote5"></a><b>Footnote 5:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag5">(return)</a> -<p>Zilikat's Nek in the Magaliesberg is named after him.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote6" name= -"footnote6"></a><b>Footnote 6:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag6">(return)</a> -<p>In its crudest and least admirable form Patriotism may be -expressed in the terms of an equation—</p> -<blockquote> -<p>One Englishman=Two Aliens.</p> -</blockquote> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote7" name= -"footnote7"></a><b>Footnote 7:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag7">(return)</a> -<p><i>Esprit de Corps</i> in the British Army is the predilection -of the individual for the unit in which he is serving. It creates a -healthy rivalry which, on the whole, makes for efficiency; but its -effects are sometimes unfortunate. A distinguished regiment was -accused of misbehaviour in one of the battles of the advance on -Bloemfontein. The charge was unfounded, but some of its hasty -partisans, with the idea of removing the reproach as far as -possible from Self and forgetful that the honour of the British -Army is not contained in water-tight compartments, endeavoured to -transfer the imputation to another regiment in the same -brigade.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote8" name= -"footnote8"></a><b>Footnote 8:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag8">(return)</a> -<p>The citizens of a Republic are usually more patriotic than the -subjects of a Monarchy. This may be accounted for by the fact that -a Republic is usually a new nation or a nation that has made a -fresh start and has not had time to get tired of itself.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote9" name= -"footnote9"></a><b>Footnote 9:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag9">(return)</a> -<p>Lord Roberts once used the word "glorious."</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote10" name= -"footnote10"></a><b>Footnote 10:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag10">(return)</a> -<p>Except the French raid at Fishguard in 1797.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote11" name= -"footnote11"></a><b>Footnote 11:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag11">(return)</a> -<p>The Franco-German War cost France £600,000,000 exclusive -of the loss from suspension of business and commerce.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote12" name= -"footnote12"></a><b>Footnote 12:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag12">(return)</a> -<p>The attaché of a Great Power noticed in the South African -War an aversion to the tedious duties of outposts and -reconnaissance, and he remarks that "it is often openly stated by -British officers that it is better to get now and then into a -really tight place by the neglect of these duties than to have to -endure the constant irksomeness which they entail."</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote13" name= -"footnote13"></a><b>Footnote 13:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag13">(return)</a> -<p>Apart from the question of the relative importance of the two -services, it can hardly be denied that the British Naval Officer is -an asset more valuable to his country than his brother in the Army. -The social side of his character may be more rugged and less -acceptable, but as a rule he has had neither the time nor the -inclination to fritter away his manhood in sporting pursuits which -do not make for proficiency in his profession, and he therefore -excels in it; in spite of trying conditions which do not exist in -any other calling, for with some rhetorical exaggeration it may be -said that in the lower ranks he is an abject slave, in the higher -an irresponsible despot.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote14" name= -"footnote14"></a><b>Footnote 14:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag14">(return)</a> -<p>To the various courses, ranging from Balloons to Economics, -which are open to British Officers, might be added a course in -English Grammar and Composition, for the instruction of staff -officers and others who may have to formulate battle orders and -despatch important telegrams on active service. The art of -composing a clear, terse, and unambiguous order or telegraphic -message is not studied in the Army. Not a few telegrams of vital -importance in the South African War were composed by impressionist -staff officers who lightly assumed that what was present in their -own minds must necessarily also be present in the mind of the -recipient. The author particularly remembers a certain telegram -from a staff officer of a column, in which it was impossible to -discover from the context whether the word "they" in the concluding -paragraph referred to British Columns or to Boer Commandos -previously mentioned.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote15" name= -"footnote15"></a><b>Footnote 15:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag15">(return)</a> -<p>Major-General Baden-Powell, in <i>Cavalry Journal</i>, -April.</p> -</blockquote> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page36" id="page36"></a>{36}</span> -<h2><a name="chap2" id="chap2">CHAPTER II</a></h2> -<h3>The Natal Wedge</h3> -<p><a href="#fig-natal">Map p. 50</a></p> -<p>The northern section of Natal before the war<a id= -"footnotetag16" name="footnotetag16"></a><a href= -"#footnote16"><sup>16</sup></a> roughly assumed the shape of a -wedge driven in between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. -The Drakensberg Range on the one side and the Buffalo River on the -other formed the cleaving surfaces, Majuba and Laing's Nek were the -cutting edge, and the base was the Tugela River.</p> -<p>In mechanics a wedge is an instrument which can be usefully -employed only under favourable circumstances. It has many -disadvantages. It is easily jammed. The driving power at the base -must be considerable; much of the force is absorbed by the friction -on the surfaces; the progress made is very slow; and if the -surfaces encounter a more tenacious material they will be -perforated. A wedge is intended chiefly for cleavage and disruption -when less clumsy methods are not at hand.</p> -<p>The defects of a wedge as a mechanical power at once became -apparent to the British force which occupied Natal when war became -inevitable. The cutting edge was inaccessible and liable to injury -which could not be easily repaired; much trouble was anticipated -from the presence of Boer commandos in contact with the surfaces; -the base did not appear to be sufficiently well designed to receive -the impact of the propelling force; and there were grave doubts as -to the soundness <span class="pagenum"><a name="page37" id= -"page37"></a>{37}</span> of the material of which an important -section of the wedge, namely Ladysmith, was constructed.</p> -<p>It was therefore proposed by the military authorities that the -Natal wedge should not be used as an instrument in the war. To this -the civil government at Pietermaritzburg strongly objected on -account of the evil moral effect which the abandonment of a -considerable proportion of the Colony to the enemy would exercise -upon the general situation in South Africa, and of the loss of -prestige which the evacuation would entail in the minds of the -natives, who numbered three-quarters of a million. Under pressure -from the Colonial Office, and against its own judgment, the Army of -Natal set itself to work upon the Wedge.</p> -<p>The mistake soon became manifest, although the artisans did -their best. The Wedge was not an effective instrument; its cutting -edge was never in operation; and in a very few weeks it was hewn -into a mangled, cumbrous and irregular mass, which could neither be -advanced nor withdrawn and which for nearly five months led a -precarious and unhappy existence. Its distress necessitated the -recasting of the plan of the South African campaign and a -pernicious "moral effect" was not avoided. One British Army -besieged in an open town surrounded by heights, while another was -lying impotent upon the banks of the Tugela, eighteen miles -distant, was the result of a few weeks' work with the Natal Wedge, -which had been forced by the civilian strategists into the -reluctant hands of the troops.<a id="footnotetag17" name= -"footnotetag17"></a><a href="#footnote17"><sup>17</sup></a></p> -<p>When Sir George White arrived in Natal on October 7 he found Sir -W. Tenn Symons carrying out the wedge policy of the Colonial -Government. Part of the latter's force was at Ladysmith and part -was protecting the collieries in the Dundee district. It was his -intention to advance northwards to Newcastle as soon as he was -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page38" id="page38"></a>{38}</span> -reinforced by the contingent on its way from India, the full -strength of which had not arrived at Durban. The position at Dundee -was strategically defective, as it was exposed to a raid from the -Transvaal border only twelve miles distant, and it was actually -further from the Orange Free State than Ladysmith. Its defects as a -tactical position were still more obvious as it was commanded by -hills.</p> -<p>Such, in a few words, was the situation with which White was -called upon to deal. He had two courses before turn; he could -accommodate himself to it or he could endeavour to modify it. He -attempted the latter, and failing he recurred to the former. He saw -at once the insecurity of Symons' detached force, but being unable -to convince the Natal Government of the necessity of withdrawing it -he reluctantly allowed it to remain.</p> -<p>Soon the Boer plan of campaign, which aimed at the isolation of -the British Troops in the wedge, began to unroll itself. Fourteen -thousand Transvaalers under Joubert, who had first tested the -cutting edge by sending a coal truck through the tunnel at Laing's -Nek and who suspected an ambush when he found it clear, were moving -south on Newcastle, while six thousand Free Staters under Martin -Prinsloo were pouring through the Drakensberg passes west of -Ladysmith. The Natal Government now began to feel uneasy about the -safety of the colonial capital and even of Durban; and informed -White that undue importance had been attached to the occupation of -Dundee and that its retention was no longer desirable. Thus in -little more than a week White's original objection was reconsidered -and upheld. But again he allowed his better judgment to be -over-borne. Symons, whom he instructed to withdraw southwards -unless he felt his position to be absolutely secure, was at his own -urgent request allowed to remain. Next day, October 19, -Elandslaagte, on the railway between Ladysmith and Dundee, was -occupied by a Boer commando, and it was reported that 4,000 -burghers <span class="pagenum"><a name="page39" id= -"page39"></a>{39}</span> were ready to cross the Buffalo River at -Jager's Drift during the night.</p> -<p>Symons' camp was pitched about a mile west of Dundee which lay -between it and Talana and Lennox Hills, which commanded the town -from the east. Some hours before sunrise on October 20 a British -picket on Talana was attacked. The incident was reported to Head -Quarters, where it was not deemed to be of much importance and the -routine duties of the morning were not interrupted. The artillery -horses had been taken down as usual to water, and some companies -had even fallen in for skirmishing drill, when the curtain of the -morning mist upon the higher ground was raised to the first scene -in the Natal drama. The eastward hills, looming up darkly into the -brightening sky, were seen to be occupied in force by the enemy -under L. Meyer, and soon his shells were falling among the -tents.</p> -<p>The troops in camp, though taken by surprise, pulled themselves -together with admirable promptitude. The Boer guns were soon -silenced, the figures of men silhouetted along the sky line -vanished, and the infantry was ordered out to clear the hill. It -was a formidable and dangerous task, but it was facilitated by some -of the features of the ground. There was a dry river bed in which -the troops could be formed up for attack, and, half a mile beyond, -a farmhouse and a plantation afforded some cover; while a donga on -the left at right angles to the river bed apparently offered a -covered way up the hill to the crest. In the plantation occurred -the first calamity of the war. Symons, who had come up impatiently -from the lower ground to hurry up the assault, which he thought was -being unnecessarily delayed, was mortally wounded. Three days later -he paid with his life for his adherence to a forward policy in -tactics as well as in strategy; and the command devolved upon -Yule.</p> -<p>The donga on the left was found to be useless, as it led -nowhere; and the advance was made directly from <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page40" id="page40"></a>{40}</span> the -plantation towards a wall running along the foot of the hill. Here -a long halt was made in order to reorganize the attack, and when -the word was given the men pressed forward and threw-themselves -upon the rough front of the acclivity after a rush across an open -slope. The crest was attained and carried without much difficulty; -for all but a few stalwarts had quitted it when they saw the -British bayonets pricking upwards towards their hold.</p> -<p>It seemed now that the victory was won, but an unfortunate -mistake postponed it. The two field batteries on the plain, which -had ceased fire before the final infantry rush, changed position -and came under a heavy fire from the Boers who were still in -possession of a section of the Talana ridge. The light was bad and -the guns re-opened upon the crest line in the belief that the whole -of it was still occupied by the enemy. The practice was excellent, -and in a brief space both sides were driven off the hill by the -shrapnel. A subsequent attempt to take it was successful. The -result of the battle, which lasted from sunrise until 2 p.m., might -have been reversed but for the inaction of the main Boer force -posted on Lennox Hill under L. Meyer, and of another force on -Impati under Erasmus, who, though he could hear the noise of battle -pealing through the mist which lay upon the hill, abstained from -intervening.</p> -<p>The whole Boer force was now in full retreat along the line by -which it had advanced so silently the night before, and Yule -ordered the two field batteries up to the nek between Talana and -Lennox to pound the retreating burghers as they slowly trekked -towards the Buffalo River; but again an unfortunate misapprehension -intervened. The officer in command, being under the impression that -an armistice asked for by Meyer two hours before had been granted, -refrained from opening fire and the Boers escaped untouched. A -serious misadventure marred the success of the day. <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page41" id="page41"></a>{41}</span> The 18th -Hussars, who at the commencement of the action received orders to -hold themselves in readiness to advance when occasion offers, soon -appeared to the restless general to be losing their opportunity, -and were hustled into activity. They charged in various directions -and even made some prisoners; but one squadron lost its way and was -captured in an attempt to ride round Impati by a detachment of -Erasmus' force at a farm where it had taken refuge.</p> -<p>The fight for Talana Hill encouraged each belligerent. In -England it was received as an indication of the early and -successful termination of the struggle. The Boers regarded it as a -reconnaissance in force from which they had returned with slight -loss, and they could boast that they had reaped the first fruits of -the harvest of war; a squadron of British cavalry which, with the -commanding officer of the regiment, was at once dispatched into -captivity at Pretoria, where its arrival was accepted as a proof of -a great Boer victory in Natal.</p> -<p>Talana Hill regarded as an isolated event in the Natal campaign -was a distinctly successful encounter, the credit of which is due -entirely to the infantry engaged in it. Twice the artillery -blundered, and the cavalry was inoperative. The extent of the loss -suffered by the Natal Field Force in the death of Symons must -always be a matter for speculation. But it is at least probable -that if he had survived to take part in the subsequent operations, -his ardent, impetuous, Prince Rupert like temperament would have -beneficially impregnated with greater audacity the stolid and -ponderous tactics and strategy of the Natal campaign.</p> -<p>The unreality of the Talana Hill victory soon became apparent. -The threat of Erasmus sitting on Impati still impended, and Yule -moved his camp next day to a site which he believed to be out of -range. But in the meantime Erasmus awoke from his trance and, on -the afternoon of October 21, opened fire with a six-inch -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page42" id="page42"></a>{42}</span> -gun,<a id="footnotetag18" name="footnotetag18"></a><a href= -"#footnote18"><sup>18</sup></a> and again Yule was compelled to -shift his camp. He had already asked for reinforcements, but White -was unable to spare them, and recommended him to fall back upon -Ladysmith. Next day Yule was encouraged by the news of a British -success at Elandslaagte; and with the object of intercepting the -Boers who were reported to be retreating on Newcastle, he -endeavoured to seize Glencoe, but Erasmus on Impati forbade the -movement.</p> -<p>Shortly before midnight on October 19, Kock, a Free Stater who -commanded a force chiefly composed of foreign auxiliaries and who -was working southwards from Newcastle, sent on an advanced party to -swoop down upon the railway between Ladysmith and Glencoe, and -Elandslaagte station was seized. Early next morning Kock came in -with his main body. White at first made no serious attempt to clear -the line beyond sending out a reconnoitring force which he soon -recalled, as he was reluctant to employ troops away from the -immediate neighbourhood of Ladysmith, which had been already -threatened on the N.W. by Free State commandos.</p> -<p>The news however of Yule's success at Talana changed the -situation and seemed to justify a more forward policy; and early in -the morning of October 21 French was sent out to re-occupy -Elandslaagte and repair the line. Although he succeeded in driving -the enemy out of the railway station and in holding it for a very -brief period, he found himself outclassed in artillery and too weak -to stand up to the Boers, and withdrew a few miles southward; at -the same time asking White to reinforce him. It was reported that -Kock expected shortly to be reinforced.</p> -<p>The main Boer position was on the northern limb of a horseshoe -arrangement of kopjes which develops close to the railway station -and swings round southwards and westwards, at an elevation -generally about 300 <span class="pagenum"><a name="page43" id= -"page43"></a>{43}</span> feet above the normal level of the ground. -Two posts were also held north of the railway. The southern limb of -the horseshoe was lightly held, and against it French, without -waiting for the arrival of all his reinforcements, moved with his -mounted troops, and easily cleared it. Here he was joined by the -Manchester Regiment, one of the battalions of the brigade of -infantry sent out by White under the command of Ian Hamilton, and -established himself on the left flank of the Boer position on the -two kopjes on the northern limb of the horseshoe.</p> -<p>The other two battalions, the Devonshire Regiment and the Gordon -Highlanders, simultaneously came into position, the former for a -frontal attack, and the latter as a reserve acting in the interval -between the Manchesters and the Devons; while the artillery -advanced between the two limbs and shelled the enemy's position on -the kopjes. The artillery preparation enjoined by the regulations -had, however, to be curtailed owing to the approach of night, but -not before the two Boer guns on the southern kopje were silenced; -and then the main attack was delivered.</p> -<p>The Boers on the kopjes were reinforced by a body of German -auxiliaries under Schiel, who had been driven out of a position -north of the railway by the cavalry acting on the left and who -circled round to the main position, but the reinforcement did not -avail them. Hardly pressed on their left, they were unable to -withstand the frontal charge of the Devons led by Hamilton in -person. The guns were captured and the position occupied at sunset. -By this time most of the Boers were in retreat and their tracks -were made devious by the cavalry, which so long as light remained -harried them hither and thither.</p> -<p>Suddenly a white flag was seen fluttering near the laager -between the kopjes. There is no reason to believe that it was -treacherously raised, but it compelled Hamilton to order the Cease -Fire. Yet at once half a hundred Boers started up and rushed as a -forlorn hope upon <span class="pagenum"><a name="page44" id= -"page44"></a>{44}</span> the crest: a remnant of stalwarts, who -even succeeded in firing a round or two from the guns which had -just been taken from them. There was a moment or two of doubt and -bewilderment, but Hamilton with the help of a few junior officers -rallied the waverers, and earned the Victoria Cross, which on -account of his high military rank was withheld from him; the guns -were recovered, the laager rushed, and the tactical victory was -complete.</p> -<p>Elandslaagte was as unreal a victory as Talana. The troops had -not rested many hours in their bivouacs on the ridge before they -received orders to return without delay to Ladysmith, which was -still threatened from the west by the Free State commandos; and by -noon on October 22 not only had Elandslaagte been hurriedly -evacuated, but stores, ammunition and even some prisoners had been -left behind in the scuttle. Next day it passed without effort into -the possession of a small body of Free Staters, who were astonished -to find it abandoned.</p> -<p>Meanwhile Yule after the failure of his movement on Glencoe -found his position insecure and reluctantly resolved to retire on -Ladysmith, although it entailed leaving not only his supplies and -ammunition but also his wounded behind him. The victory of Talana -had indeed been won but the victors were exhausted by it and unfit -to stand up to Erasmus on Impati. It became necessary for Yule to -disappear immediately and stealthily.</p> -<p>On October 23 soon after midnight the maimed and harassed force -slipped quietly away and trudged wearily to the south. When the -mist rolling aside next morning disclosed the evacuation the -Transvaalers on Impati occupied the town almost simultaneously with -the reoccupation of Elandslaagte by their allies the Free Staters; -and thus the battlefields of two British victories were redeemed by -the defeated. It is no reproach to Yule that military necessity -compelled him to leave behind <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page45" id="page45"></a>{45}</span> the wounded of Talana Hill. -The death of Symons on October 23 was a pathetic episode of the -Natal Campaign. He passed away of his mortal wound while the Boers -were looting the camp in which he was lying and wondering, in the -rare intervals of conscious thought, why the troops whom he had led -so gallantly had been taken from him; and for half a year his grave -lay lonely in the enemy's country before another British soldier -could stand beside it.</p> -<p>The retreat of Yule's force was effected without more trouble -than that which was caused by the nature of the country and the -alternations of the climate. Van Tonder's Pass—a difficult -defile which would have been impassable under opposition—was -crossed, and a sudden spate on the Waschbank river only temporarily -checked the retirement. A column was sent out from Ladysmith by -White to check the Free Staters who had re-occupied Elandslaagte -and to prevent them falling on Yule, and on October 24 they were -engaged with success at Rietfontein. The sound of the artillery in -this action was audible to Yule on the Waschbank, but he was unable -to account for it.</p> -<p>On the afternoon of October 25 Yule was within one day's march -of Ladysmith. He proposed to halt for the night; but suddenly a -patrol from a column sent out by White to help him in appeared, and -he received orders to press forward to Ladysmith.</p> -<p>The exhausted men resumed their march, and the misery of that -night's journey was probably never exceeded during any subsequent -movement in the war. Sodden, hungry, weary, disheartened; men and -transport animals inextricably intermingled; the column plodded -onwards in the rain and the night. A halt at daylight next morning -brought in some of the stragglers and gave a little rest to those -who were still in the ranks; and by mid-day the men of Talana Hill -had trudged into Ladysmith.</p> -<p>The urgency of the immediate resumption of the <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page46" id="page46"></a>{46}</span> march had -arisen from White's anxiety for the safety of Yule's force. -Rietfontein had indeed, like Talana and Elandslaagte, been a -tactically successful engagement and had similarly been followed by -a retreat; but Yule was exposed to an attack by Erasmus, to whom he -had given the slip at Dundee during the night of October 22 and who -was known to be endeavouring to overtake him. Erasmus was believed -to be acting from the direction of Elandslaagte; but fortunately -for Yule his movements were not judiciously directed and his -information was imperfect.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-ladysmith-siege">Map, p. 139.</a></p> -<p>All the detached members of the Natal Wedge had now been driven -in and the reconnaissances sent out by White on October 27 and the -following days showed that the Boers had lost no time in pressing -on to Ladysmith. The Transvaalers were apparently in force N.E. of -the town on a section of the arc in which Lombard's Kop, Long Hill, -and Pepworth Hill were the chief physical features; the Free -Staters were approaching from the N.W. and a small force of them -under A.P. Cronje was already in touch with the Transvaalers; their -main body, however, seemed to be making for the Tugela in order to -isolate Ladysmith from the south. On October 29 White assumed the -offensive with the greater part of his command, and endeavoured to -cut through the still unconsolidated investing line and to thwart -the co-operation of the allies.</p> -<p>The general idea was that an infantry brigade, supported on its -right flank by cavalry acting towards Lombard's Kop, should attack -the enemy, who was presumed to be in force on Long Hill and -Pepworth Hill. On the left flank of the attack a column would -endeavour to pass through the Boer line, and having seized -Nicholson's Nek due north of Ladysmith would either close it -against the retreating enemy or hold it as a post through which a -mounted force could debouch in pursuit on to the more practicable -ground beyond.</p> -<p>Some difficulty in drawing and loading up ammunition -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page47" id="page47"></a>{47}</span> -delayed the start of the column, which under the command of -Carleton was to secure the left flank of the operations; and -fearing that daylight on October 30 would find his vulnerable force -still on the march he determined soon after midnight to halt short -of Nicholson's Nek, from which he was then two miles distant. He -had succeeded in passing through the enemy's picket line, and was -perhaps not justified in discontinuing his advance, although his -instructions were to take Nicholson's Nek only "if possible." But -an error of judgment made by a commanding officer on a dark night -in a strange country acting under instructions which left him a -free hand must not be judged severely, and had it not been for a -disaster which could not be foreseen, he would probably have been -commended for his prudence.</p> -<p>Kainguba Hill, which rises on the left of the road to -Nicholson's Nek, seemed to offer a suitable stage on the journey -and towards it the column was diverted. While the men were climbing -the steep and stony hillside a panic suddenly seized the transport -mules. It may have been a spontaneous emotion, or it may have -originated in an alarm raised by the Boers who were holding the -crest. The animals stampeded down the slope, and carrying with them -not only the reserve ammunition but also the signalling equipment, -the water carts, and the component parts of the mountain artillery, -charged through the rear of the column. The timely exertions of the -officers checked the general scare that was imminent; and with the -exception of a few score of infantry men and gunners the column -reached the summit before daybreak, having lost almost everything -needed for a successful occupation of it.</p> -<p>Misfortune continued relentlessly to pursue the column. A -position was taken up on the hill on the supposition that it could -only be attacked from the south, but at daylight C. de Wet, who -here came upon the stage which afterwards he often filled so -effectively, <span class="pagenum"><a name="page48" id= -"page48"></a>{48}</span> threatened it from the north with a Free -State commando. A gesture made by an officer in order to attract -attention was interpreted as a signal to retire; another officer -thinking that his company was left alone on the summit, though it -was in fact within seventy yards of an occupied sangar, raised the -white flag; and almost at the same moment a bugle sounded the Cease -Fire. Neither the white flag nor the bugle call was authorized by -Carleton; but a glance at the situation showed him that they could -not be repudiated and after a gallant struggle to maintain an -indefensible position he surrendered. Nearly a thousand men were -led away into captivity.</p> -<p>The main infantry attack was made by a force of five battalions -with six field batteries under the command of Grimwood. He marched -out of Ladysmith soon after midnight, but had not covered half the -distance to the point of attack when an unfortunate incident -deprived him of all his artillery and of two of his battalions. The -guns marching in the centre of the column and acting under orders -which were not communicated to Grimwood, diverged to the right and -were followed by the two battalions in rear; and the absence of -nearly half the force was not discovered by him until daybreak, and -after he had taken up the position assigned south of Long Hill. -Daybreak also revealed the fact that Long Hill which was assumed to -be the Boer left was not occupied, and that Long Tom from Impati -had been emplaced on Pepworth Hill. The cavalry brigade under -French upon whom Grimwood relied to protect his right flank was two -miles away in his rear; and finding himself attacked on that flank -instead of from the front he was compelled to swing round and -almost reverse his front. Thus far the general scheme of attack had -signally failed. Carleton on the left had not reached Nicholson's -Nek and was in trouble; Grimwood with nearly half of his command -gone astray, and having discovered that the enemy's left was not on -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page49" id="page49"></a>{49}</span> -Long Hill but on Lombard's Kop, had to improvise a scheme of his -own; while French instead of conforming to Grimwood was compelling -Grimwood to conform to him. At 8 a.m. Grimwood was suffering -severely from artillery fire, and French whose cavalry now -prolonged Grimwood's line southwards was with difficulty holding -his own. The enemy, whom the general idea destined to be outflanked -and rolled up towards the north and pursued by mounted troops -issuing from Nicholson's Nek, was instead attacking vigorously from -Lombard's Kop on the east and seemed likely to outflank White; the -infantry reserves under Ian Hamilton were almost expended; and the -British artillery was unable to silence the Boer guns.</p> -<p>All through the forenoon Ladysmith and the little garrison left -behind for its defence was the target of Long Tom on Pepworth Hill. -The fugitives from Kainguba brought in disheartening reports and -the Boers seemed to be threatening from the north. W. Knox, a Horse -Artillery officer who had been left in command, anticipated an -attack which he had little chance of meeting successfully with the -scanty force at his disposal and sent an urgent message to White, -who at noon ordered the battle to be broken off and the troops to -retire to Ladysmith.</p> -<p>The retreat was effected in confusion. Grimwood's force was the -first to be withdrawn and was saved from disaster by the gallant -stand made by two field batteries as it crossed the level ground. -The cavalry scampered home in Grimwood's track. A dramatic episode -brought the battle of Lombard's Kop to a close. Just as the baffled -troops were entering Ladysmith a battery of naval guns, which had -arrived from Durban that morning and had gone immediately into -action, succeeded in silencing Long Tom and some other guns on -Pepworth Hill, nearly four miles distant. In the evening Joubert -sent in a flag of truce to White to announce Carleton's -surrender.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page50" id="page50"></a>{50}</span> -<p>The Natal Wedge disappeared in the smoke of the battle of -Lombard's Kop and was never again heard of as an instrument in the -Natal campaign. The Boers filled the gaps in the investing line -without difficulty, and on November 2 the Siege of Ladysmith began. -The last man to leave the town was French, who went forth to win -honour on distant fields.</p> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote16" name= -"footnote16"></a><b>Footnote 16:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag16">(return)</a> -<p>In 1902 the Vryheid and Utrecht districts of the Transvaal were -annexed to Natal and the wedge disappeared.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote17" name= -"footnote17"></a><b>Footnote 17:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag17">(return)</a> -<p>They were indeed authorized as early as October 18 to throw it -aside but by that time they were committed to its use.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote18" name= -"footnote18"></a><b>Footnote 18:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag18">(return)</a> -<p>"Long Tom," which was afterwards sent to Ladysmith and -subsequently to bombard Rhodes in Kimberley.</p> -</blockquote> -<a name="fig-natal" id="fig-natal"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image03.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image03.png" -alt="Sketch map of Northern Natal" /></a></div> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page51" id="page51"></a>{51}</span> -<h2><a name="chap3" id="chap3">CHAPTER III</a></h2> -<h3>Deus Ex Machina No. I</h3> -<p>The arrival of Sir Redvers Buller at Cape Town on October 31, -1899, the morrow of the battle of Lombard's Kop, encouraged the -despondent at home and in Cape Colony.<a id="footnotetag19" name= -"footnotetag19"></a><a href="#footnote19"><sup>19</sup></a> Twenty -years previously he had distinguished himself in the command of a -Boer contingent which served with the British Army during the Zulu -campaign; and it was doubtless from the experience then gained that -he formed the opinion that the war which he was now called upon to -direct, could be brought to a successful conclusion only "by the -actual conquest of every man in the field: a task doubly difficult -owing to the extreme mobility of the enemy."</p> -<p>In his first telegram to Lord Lansdowne he described the -situation as one of "extreme gravity."</p> -<p>White, with five-sixths of the British Troops in South Africa, -was shut up in Ladysmith; a month at least must elapse before the -Expeditionary Force, which the British Government had on September -22 decided to send out, would be able to take the field; Mafeking -was besieged; the diamond men of Kimberley, like a passionate child -interned in a dark room, were screaming for release; Sir Alfred -Milner was pleading that the defence of the Cape Peninsula, an area -of a few thousand square miles as far removed from the front as -Marseilles <span class="pagenum"><a name="page52" id= -"page52"></a>{52}</span> is from Berlin, must be first attended to; -President Steyn had overcome his scruples and was sending Free -State commandos across the Orange River into the Cape Colony at -Bethulie and Norval's Pont; the disaffected colonials were restive; -and the fall of Ladysmith, which seemed probable, would lay Natal -open from the Tugela to the Indian Ocean.</p> -<p>It was a dismal outlook; but Buller, after a few days' review of -the situation, was able to report that in his opinion the -opposition would probably collapse when Kimberley and Ladysmith -were relieved. His optimism at Capetown was destined soon to be -superseded by pessimism on the Tugela. He compared himself to a man -who, having a busy day before him, has overslept himself. The -original plan of campaign, a march on Pretoria through the Free -State, had necessarily to be postponed; and the important railway -junctions at Naauwpoort and Stormberg were too weakly held and too -liable to investment by the Free State commandos which had crossed -the Orange to justify their retention, and the little garrisons -were withdrawn. To Gatacre and French, who had just escaped from -Ladysmith, was assigned the duty of holding the centre, while Lord -Methuen advanced to the relief of Kimberley.</p> -<p>It was, however, the situation in Natal which gave the most -anxiety to Buller. The Free State commandos which had been seen -passing Ladysmith shortly before the investment were now at -Colenso, having driven back to Estcourt the small British force -which was all that was left to stem the tide of an invasion. The -Free Staters, fortunately, were not active and delayed to avail -themselves of the opportunity. When at length, after eleven days of -inertia, L. Botha persuaded Joubert to undertake an offensive -movement south of the Tugela, it had passed away, as Estcourt had -in the meantime been reinforced by troops from England under the -command of Hildyard.</p> -<p>Encouraged by the capture of an armoured train at <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page53" id="page53"></a>{53}</span> Chieveley, -Joubert advanced south in two bodies, one on each side of Estcourt, -and seized the railway at Highlands, thus cutting off Hildyard's -communication with Pietermaritzburg; and Hildyard having no cavalry -was unable to touch him. The raid, which for a time seemed -dangerous, was however soon checked by troops coming up from the -south under Barton, and Joubert found himself pressed between two -forces each as strong as his own. After an action at Willow Grange, -which each side claimed as a victory, Joubert, fearing lest he -should be cut off, retired unpursued, against the wishes of the -more pushful and energetic Botha, who was in favour of an advance -on Pietermaritzburg.</p> -<p>The alarms and excursions of October and November were the cause -of the dissolution of a military apparatus which had been put -together at home with much care and thought, and which had never -yet been seen in warfare. Its designers and constructors were proud -of it and they looked forward with confidence to its successful -working. The apparatus was the British Army Corps. It was taken to -pieces as soon as it reached South Africa; but fortunately the -ties, ligaments, and braces which held it together yielded to -slight pressure and little difficulty was experienced in resolving -it into its constituent elements. The more important of these were -despatched to Natal and the rest were distributed over the western -and central commands.</p> -<p>Buller, perhaps leaving the pessimistic atmosphere of Capetown -with relief, went by sea to Durban, the defence of which was -entrusted to the Royal Navy, and reached Pietermaritzburg on -November 25. By this time the situation had improved all along the -line, and it seemed that it might still be possible to resume the -original plan of a central advance on Bloemfontein and Pretoria as -soon as Ladysmith was relieved. The Boer raid towards southern -Natal which caused so much consternation had been easily foiled and -British troops were now at Frere.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page54" id="page54"></a>{54}</span> -<p>Buller, soon after his arrival in Natal, found himself in -command of a force of 19,000 men with whom to tackle about 21,000 -Boers under the command of L. Botha. Joubert was invalided after -the unsuccessful Estcourt raid, and the change was, from the -enemy's point of view, for the better. The new Head Commandant was -a more strenuous and active leader than his predecessor.</p> -<p>Little was known of the topography of the country in which -Buller was about to operate. It had never been systematically -surveyed, and the existing maps had been constructed for -agricultural rather than for campaigning purposes, and could not be -trusted. The Tugela formed the ditch of a natural fortress covering -Ladysmith. On its left bank rose an almost continuous ridge or -rampart from which the easy open ground on the right bank could be -watched for miles, and reconnaissances kept at a distance.</p> -<p>Reconnaissances were, however, not needed to prove to Buller -that Colenso, where the railway passed up into the Tugela ridge, -was immune to a frontal attack, and that Ladysmith must be relieved -by a turning movement. Two alternatives offered themselves. The -advance might be made through Weenen and across the Tugela some -distance below Colenso, and thence to Elandslaagte, where the Boer -line of communication with the Transvaal might be cut; but to -Ladysmith this was a circuitous route. It also would necessitate -the traversing of a rough bush country, into which Buller was -reluctant to throw raw troops just off the transports who had not -yet heard the sounds of war.</p> -<p>He therefore decided upon a westerly flank march by way of -Potgieter's Drift, twenty miles west of Colenso; and once on the -left bank of the Tugela he would be within a day's march of -Ladysmith and the railway into the Free State. White was -heliographically consulted, and all the arrangements for an advance -on December 11 were made. The force had even been set in motion -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page55" id="page55"></a>{55}</span> -when certain disturbing news came out of the west. Gatacre had -suffered a reverse at Stormberg, and simultaneously Methuen had -been roughly handled at Magersfontein, and was unable to continue -his march on Kimberley.</p> -<p>The strategic timidity of Buller and his curious habit of -allowing himself to be influenced by psychological probabilities -were at once apparent. The anticipated moral effect of these -successes upon the enemy swayed him back to the plan which a day or -two previously he had rejected as impracticable. The plan of a -flank march by way of Potgieter's Drift was thrown aside. It might -have been justifiable in the presence of a dispirited enemy; but -now the burghers on the Tugela had been suddenly encouraged by news -of victories won on two widely separated scenes of action and were -no doubt anxious to rival the exploits of their comrades far -away.<a id="footnotetag20" name="footnotetag20"></a><a href= -"#footnote20"><sup>20</sup></a> The flank march would expose the -army to the danger of being cut off by a quickened and revived foe, -and Buller determined not to run the risk. On December 12 he -ordered an advance on Colenso.</p> -<p>The course of the war in the western and central scenes of -action up to the time of the two defeats which caused Buller to -revise the plan of campaign for Natal must now be traced.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-so-transvaal">Map p. 260.</a></p> -<p>The force of nearly 10,000 men under Lord Methuen detailed by -Buller for the relief of Kimberley, advanced from De Aar and Orange -River Bridge along the railway. At Belmont a body of Free Staters -under Jacob Prinsloo was found strongly posted on the heights east -of the line, and although reinforced by Delarey from Kimberley, it -was unable to hold to its positions, and was compelled to retreat -eastwards on November 23.</p> -<p>Prinsloo withdrew with his Free Staters across the border, but -was persuaded by Delarey, who had fallen <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page56" id="page56"></a>{56}</span> back on -Graspan about eight miles N.E. of Belmont, to rejoin him; and a -favourable position was occupied on a group of kopjes astride the -railway, where on November 25 another battle was fought, in which -the Naval Brigade suffered a loss of nearly half its strength. The -enemy, though driven back, retreated in good order, as at Belmont -two days previously, there being no cavalry available for effective -pursuit. Methuen pushed on to Witkoplaagte.</p> -<p>The Boers were greatly discouraged by Belmont and Graspan, -where, as at Talana and Elandslaagte, they had been ejected from -strong kopje positions chosen by themselves. The moral was not lost -upon Delarey, who determined to try whether a better stand could -not be made in a river position, and selected the junction of the -Modder and the Riet for the experiment. His idea was not so much to -dispute the passage of the river as to use the deep channels as -covered ways and as natural trenches from which the plain could be -grazed by rifle fire. The Modder after approaching the Riet changes -its direction abruptly three tunes above the junction, enclosing a -diamond-shaped area which provided the Boers with a ready-made -perimeter camp.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-modder">Map. p. 59.</a></p> -<p>Methuen, thinking that the enemy would as before select the good -kopje position which offered itself on Spytfontein halfway to -Kimberley, determined to diverge from the railway with the greater -part of his army and circling through Jacobsdaal, Brown's Drift and -Abon's Dam to attack Spytfontein in flank, where he had little -doubt that he would find the Boers in position; but Modder River, -which he was inclined to believe was only held as an advanced post, -must first be taken. Delarey had been joined by P. Cronje, who -unperceived by Methuen's cavalry came in with a body of -Transvaalers from Mafeking, and was in occupation of the loop -between the rivers.</p> -<p>At sunrise on November 28 Methuen advanced from his camp at -Witkoplaagte six miles south of the river. <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page57" id="page57"></a>{57}</span> The fight -began under misapprehensions on each side. Methuen believed that -only the river bank above the railway bridge was held in force; -while he was credited by his opponents with the intention of -crossing the Riet River by Bosnian's Drift of which he did not know -the existence.</p> -<p>Everything promised well for Delarey and Cronje, but they made -little use of their opportunities. Methuen fought in the dark, and -whenever the Fog of War lifted, found that the situation had -changed. He attacked the Modder as the opening move of his flank -march on a mythical position on Spytfontein and suddenly discovered -before him, not a mere advanced post to be checked or masked, but -an enemy holding a well-entrenched and defended front several miles -in length. The maps at his disposal did not shew the extraordinary -windings of the two rivers over part of the area on which he was -engaged, and some of the reaches were only discovered when they -tripped up the advancing troops. The result of a hard day's work, -in which Methuen was wounded, was the capture of Rosmead, a village -on the right bank below the railway bridge. The troops of the right -attack did not succeed in crossing the river, and an attempt to -work up the right bank from Rosmead failed. What effect the battle -would have upon the situation, and whether on the whole it had been -a success for Methuen, were not apparent at nightfall. The question -was answered next morning when it was found that the Boers had -retired to Jacobsdaal. Next day the British troops took up a -position north of the river.</p> -<p>So far, the Kimberley relief force had done its work well. The -obstacles in its way at Belmont, Graspan, and Modder River had been -thrust aside, and it was now within two easy marches of its -destination. It seemed therefore that in three days at the most, -allowing one day for another battle, it would be reported to Buller -as having finished its task: and had the necessity <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page58" id="page58"></a>{58}</span> been urgent -the relief could no doubt have been effected within that time. -Kimberley, however, appeared able to take care of itself for a few -weeks, and Methuen halted for twelve days at Modder River in order -to receive supplies and reinforcements, and to strengthen his -slender and vulnerable line of communication with the south. He -still believed that the Boers would make their next stand at -Spytfontein.</p> -<p>The Boers remained but a few days at Jacobsdaal. After a council -of war at which Cronje declared himself in favour of remaining -there as a menace to the British line of communication which would -attract Methuen to the town, a movement which Methuen himself had -had in mind; while Delarey advocated the taking up of a position -between the Modder River and Kimberley; the plan of the latter was -adopted and the Boer forces trekked northwards to Spytfontein. They -found, however, that between Spytfontein and the river, the -Magersfontein group of kopjes would afford excellent positions to -Methuen from which Spytfontein could be attacked.</p> -<p>During Methuen's halt at Modder River Delarey and Cronje -received considerable reinforcements. From Natal, from the Basuto -border, and from Kimberley, commandos were summoned to Spytfontein. -That position was, however, for the reason just stated, insecure; -and on the December 4 the Magersfontein position was taken up and -prepared for defence by Delarey. A low arc stretching from the -position towards the Modder was discovered, from which a flanking -fire could be poured in upon a frontal attack.</p> -<p>With an unerring instinct which was more useful to him than most -of the knowledge he could have acquired in a European Staff -College, and with an originality which if it had been displayed by -a young British officer in an examination for promotion would -probably have injured that officer's prospects, Delarey dug his -trenches not at the foot of the hill but in sinuous lines some -little way in advance of it, by which he gained the power of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page59" id="page59"></a>{59}</span> -meeting an attack with grazing or skimming fire, and which also -removed the firing line from physical features on which the British -guns could be laid. It is said that he manned the works on the -slope with burghers firing black powder so as to draw the enemy's -fire away from the trenches in which only smokeless powder was -used.</p> -<a name="fig-modder" id="fig-modder"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image04.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image04.png" -alt="Modder River and Magersfontein" /></a></div> -<p>Methuen obtained little information during his halt at Modder -River. The country was so much intersected by the wire fences of -the farms that cavalry scouting was difficult. He decided to make a -direct frontal attack upon Magersfontein on December 11 after a -bombardment on the previous evening; and here, as at Colenso, the -text-book preliminary shrapnel practice put the enemy on the alert -and did no harm. It greatly encouraged the burghers in their -trenches. Only three men were touched by the projectiles hurled by -the naval, howitzer, field, and horse batteries; and an impending -infantry advance was clearly indicated. To the Highland Brigade -under Wauchope, who had joined the command since the Modder River -battle, was entrusted the execution of the night attack. He does -not appear to have altogether approved of Methuen's scheme; but -with the same dogged valour which he displayed many years before -when he threw himself upon the <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page60" id="page60"></a>{60}</span> Gladstonian political -Magersfontein in Midlothian, he incorporated himself in it.</p> -<p>At 1 a.m. on December 12 in a storm of rain and thunder the -Brigade in mass of quarter-columns marched out of its bivouac, -guided by a staff officer's compass which the lightning and the -rain soon made unreliable. The objective point was the southern -edge of the Magersfontein Ridge, about three miles distant. The -progress made over the rough and encumbered veld was slow, and it -was difficult to judge in the darkness how much ground had really -been covered. Wauchope either underestimated the distance made good -or, as is more probable, did not expect to find the enemy -entrenched in advance of the foot of the hill, and the error cost -him his life and the lives of many other gallant Highlanders. -Afraid lest dawn should find his Brigade too far away from the -position to rush it, he hesitated to deploy, and when at last he -was about to give the order, a further delay was caused by a line -of thorn bushes. The Brigade passed through or avoided the -obstruction and was at the halt on the point of changing formation -when the Boers in the advanced trenches, which had been so -stealthily excavated that no one in the British Army seems to have -been aware of their existence, received the alarm and opened fire. -Possibly the situation might have been saved if an order to charge -had been given at once, and the Highlanders had heard the skirl of -the pipes; but Wauchope had at the first shot rushed forward -impetuously towards the flashing Mausers. With his life he measured -the unknown distance to the trenches, and at the supreme moment his -Highlanders lost their leader and knew not whom to follow.</p> -<p>The sudden stroke of the impact falling upon men of dissimilar -temperament reacted on them diversely. The majority absorbed it by -throwing themselves upon the ground on which they stood; others -recoiled mechanically upon the companies in rear; while to not a -few it was a stimulus which projected them into the jaws of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page61" id="page61"></a>{61}</span> -death gaping before them in the dim light. A mixed body, hardly -exceeding the strength of three companies, pushed on in obedience -to the last words that fell from Wauchope's lips, to reinforce the -right; and succeeded in wriggling round the eastward flank of the -enemy's advanced trenches and in shattering a foreign contingent in -the Boer service which was holding the gap of level ground between -the low arc and the Magersfontein Ridge. The little force of -progressives came under the fire of the British guns which opened -upon the ridge at daybreak, but a remnant under Wilson drove a -keen-edged but slender wedge into the curve of the Boer position, -and was favourably placed to storm the ridge. A few score of -Highlanders were now fingering the key with which it seemed -possible to unlock the sluice gates and allow the flood waters of -war to overwhelm the foe. But War is a game of chance. The key was -snatched away and the issue of the day reversed by a man who had -lost his way.</p> -<p>In the absence of Delarey, who was absent at Kimberley, P. -Cronje was in chief command of the Boer forces. His Head-Quarters -were at Brown's Drift on the Modder, six miles from the key of the -position on Magersfontein. The sound of the bombardment notified -him that an infantry attack was imminent, and he hurried off to -make the final arrangements for meeting it. These he seems to have -completed to his satisfaction, and he rested for an hour or two, -rising soon after midnight. In the darkness and rain he lost his -way on the unfamiliar ground. But chance found him at daybreak -close to the gap which Wilson's little band of Highlanders had hewn -in his line, and their promising advance was effectually repressed, -as they were simultaneously fired on by Cronje's escort on their -front and by a commando which had come up on their right rear.</p> -<p>Daylight found the shattered and dismembered Highland Brigade -lying in patches upon the veld, with their leader dead before their -eyes; themselves unable to <span class="pagenum"><a name="page62" -id="page62"></a>{62}</span> advance or retreat, conspicuous, -hungry, thirsty, and soon to be scorched by the midsummer sun at -the zenith; and there they lay for eight hours. Only the shells of -the artillery, which from daylight onwards played upon the trenches -and partially mastered the fire from them, saved the Highland -Brigade from destruction.</p> -<p>The Guards' Brigade under Colvile was in the first instance -detailed as the reserve of the Highland Brigade, but the repulse of -the latter and the probability that it would sooner or later be -compelled to retreat gave the former a definite objective, the low -arc held by the left of the Boer line. In marching on this the wire -fence which was the boundary between British territory and the -Orange Free State was crossed, and the Guards' Brigade had the -honour of being the first body of troops to go into action in the -enemy's country. Colvile held his own, but although he was unable -to occupy the arc he screened the right flank of the Highlanders. -On their left a weak Brigade under Pole-Carew was drawn up astride -the railway, and thus apparently the firing line, which had been so -hardly pressed during so many weary hours, was secure on either -flank. But Pole-Carew was paralysed by the variety of the duties -which had been assigned to him, and was unable to operate -offensively on the enemy's right. His original orders were to act -as camp guard and to demonstrate northwards in support of the -Highland Brigade; and subsequently he seems to have been instructed -to hold himself in readiness to cross over to support the Guards' -attack on the enemy's left, with the result that his Brigade was -never seriously engaged.</p> -<p>The interval between the Highlanders' right facing the trenches -and the Guards' left had never been effectively closed and early in -the afternoon the Boers renewed their attacks upon it, and -threatened to enfilade the line. Hughes-Hallett, who after the -death of Wauchope succeeded to the command of the Highland Brigade -and to whom Methuen had sent orders to hold on until <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page63" id="page63"></a>{63}</span> nightfall, -asked Colvile in vain to support him and at last was compelled to -throw back his right. Methuen's orders were unfortunately known -only to Hughes-Hallett and the movement was interpreted as an order -from the brigadier for a general retirement. The wave of retreat -beginning on the right passed rapidly down the line, and soon all -but a few score of men who held on gallantly as long as there was -light were streaming back in confusion to the field batteries in -rear. Even the shelter of the guns did not wholly avail them for -protection, for they were shelled while rallying by the Boer guns -which had been strangely silent during the battle; and the retreat -was continued to the bivouac ground which so many more of them, now -lying on the veld, had quitted seventeen hours before. The battle -was lost.</p> -<p>It is probable that if the work had been more evenly distributed -the result might have been, at least, less disastrous. An -intolerable strain was put upon one Brigade which it was unable to -bear. The Highlanders were blundered into action, then abandoned to -their fate for many hours, and finally withdrawn by a -misunderstanding. The inequality of the tasks set to the various -columns is strikingly shown in the return of casualties. To the -total of 948 killed and wounded the Highland Brigade contributed no -less than 752. Two of its battalions lost 37 per cent of their -strength; while the losses of the Division were but 7 per cent.</p> -<p>Methuen's expectations that as at Modder River after the fight -of November 28 so also at Magersfontein the Boers would evacuate -their positions during the night were not realized. Next day he -retired to the Modder River Camp, where he received orders from -Buller either to attack Cronje again or to fall back upon the -Orange River; but at the instance of Forestier-Walker, who was in -command of the Lines of Communication, the orders were cancelled -and Methuen was allowed to remain.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page64" id="page64"></a>{64}</span> -<p>Magersfontein of itself would probably have sufficed to -disarrange the plans of Duller in Natal, but coming a few hours -after a serious rebuff in the centre, of which the story must now -be told, it loomed fearfully on his near horizon. Soon after he -landed at Capetown he ordered the weak and vulnerable detachments -at Naauwpoort and Stormberg to be withdrawn to De Aar and -Queenstown. The movement opened to the enemy the gates of access to -a district in the Cape Colony teeming with Dutch disaffection. The -Free Staters, however, did not avail themselves of the opportunity -with alacrity, as they were more or less committed to defensive -action within their own territory; and a fortnight elapsed before -Colesberg was occupied by a force under the command of a -Transvaaler named Schoeman, who on November 1 had crossed the -Orange River at Norval's Pont. A few days later the Colesberg -district was formally annexed by proclamation to the Orange Free -State and the transfer of allegiance was enthusiastically approved -by a public meeting held at Colesberg on November 14. This action -not only brought the inhabitants under the commando law of the -adjacent Republic by which a form of conscription was enforced, but -also overcame the scruples of the Free Staters who could still -maintain that they were only engaged in defending their own -territory. Simultaneously Du Plooy with a commando which had -crossed at Bethulie annexed the Burghersdorp district; while -Olivier with a force mainly composed of colonial rebels took over -on behalf of the Free State all that remained of the border -districts of Cape Colony as far as Basutoland. By the end of -November the easy process of annexation by proclamation had -augmented the territory of the Orange Free State by about 7,000 -square miles; and then almost as an afterthought the burghers -occupied the important strategic post of Stormberg Junction.</p> -<p>To meet and if possible to thrust back these intrusions French -was sent to the Naauwpoort and Gatacre to the <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page65" id="page65"></a>{65}</span> Stormberg -district. Buller soon found it necessary to order Naauwpoort to be -re-occupied, as that town would have afforded a useful base to the -enemy from which the main line of railway could be raided in the -neighbourhood of De Aar. French arrived at Naauwpoort on November -20 and was for some weeks engaged in protecting the lines and in -checking rebellion.</p> -<a name="fig-stormberg" id="fig-stormberg"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image05.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image05.png" -alt="Stormberg" /></a></div> -<p>The little force of half a battalion of infantry which evacuated -Stormberg withdrew to Queenstown, where Gatacre arrived on November -18. He intended to march on Stormberg as soon as he had collected a -sufficient force; his own Division, which he had brought out from -England, having been diverted to Natal. He soon advanced to -Putterskraal near Sterkstroom and about thirty miles from -Stormberg, the occupation of which by the enemy on November 25 -prevented co-operation between him and French at Naauwpoort.</p> -<p>Meanwhile rebellion was spreading, and owing to the dilatory -proclamation of Martial Law by the Cape Government, always -reluctant to take action which might wound the susceptibilities of -the Dutch population, it had assumed a formidable aspect. Buller -was uneasy, and although at first he had cautioned Gatacre to be -careful he now suggested his closing with the enemy.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page66" id="page66"></a>{66}</span> -<p>On December 7, by which time considerable reinforcements had -come in, Gatacre felt himself strong enough to tackle Olivier at -Stormberg. His plan was to take his column by train as far as -Molteno, whence a night march of about eight miles would bring it -into position for attacking the Boer laager. The use of the railway -would not only enable him to strike more suddenly and with a -greater chance of taking Olivier by surprise but would also -economise the strength of his force, a portion of which having left -the transports only a few days previously was not yet in hard -condition. The force with which he proposed to take Stormberg -amounted to 2,600 men, who detrained at Molteno soon after sunset -on December 9. Gatacre calculated that after a march of about six -hours he would be able to rush the position before dawn.</p> -<p>The Boers, to the number of 1,700 men, were in occupation of the -Kissieberg ridge, and of a nek which runs westward from its -southern end towards a higher hill overhanging Stormberg Junction -called Rooi Kop. Gatacre had originally intended to attack the Boer -position frontally, but the reports which he received on arrival at -Molteno determined him to turn it. The change of plan was not made -known to all the troops, with the result that the ambulance and -ammunition wagons left the town by the Stormberg road instead of by -the Steynsburg road, along which the rest of the column was -marching to the new objective. No trustworthy maps were available, -and the enterprise was dependent for its success upon the knowledge -and fidelity of a sergeant of police and a few native constables -who acted as guides and who professed to know "every inch of the -way."</p> -<p>Soon after midnight, however, Gatacre's suspicions were aroused -by the sudden appearance of a railway which ought not to have been -there, and it was discovered that the guides had a mile or two back -missed a path on which the column should have diverged to -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page67" id="page67"></a>{67}</span> -the right. They assured him, however, that they had chosen a better -road and that he was now less than 3,000 yards from the Boer -position. He therefore halted the column for an hour's rest, and -hoped for the best.</p> -<p>When the march was resumed another railway was almost -immediately encountered. It was in fact the colliery line which had -been crossed before the halt and which here curves almost to the -extent of a semicircle; but Gatacre believed that he had come upon -the main line to Steynsburg and judged that he was now N.W. of the -Boer position; while many of the officers in the rear of the -column, unaware of the change of plan, imagined that they were -approaching it from the S.E. along the Stormberg road originally -selected for the advance on which the ambulance and ammunition -wagons had already gone astray.</p> -<p>The direction of the march was now almost reversed, owing to -Gatacre's misapprehension of his position; and at dawn the column -unknown to itself reached certain cross roads on Van Zyl's farm -which had been fixed upon as the point from which the attack should -be delivered; but the locality was not recognized by the staff, and -the guides, who seem to have misunderstood the object of the march, -conducted the column still deeper into the valley beneath the -Kissieberg ridge.</p> -<p>Suddenly a shot from the heights startled the errant and -plodding column. The Boers had indeed been taken by surprise, but -were at once on the alert and the crest line was soon occupied. The -column marching in fours halted and turned to the right and, except -the leading companies of Irish Rifles, which were formed to the -front in order to seize a detached hill at the end of the ridge, -sprang up the slope, but were soon baffled by the irregular tiers -of krantzes or rock walls on the hill side. The artillery diverged -to the left, losing one gun in the donga which ran down the valley, -and took post on the detached hill from which the Kissieberg ridge -could be shelled. The companies of Irish Rifles, <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page68" id="page68"></a>{68}</span> after -seizing this hill, passed along the nek which joined it to the -ridge and almost won the crest line.</p> -<p>Meanwhile the Northumberland Fusiliers and the remaining -companies of the Irish Rifles found the task of mounting the -encumbered slope beyond their powers, and were soon ordered to fall -back into the valley. The artillery noticed the movement, and in -order to cover the retreat opened upon Kissieberg; not perceiving -in the eastern dazzle of the sun about to rise above the sky line -that some of the infantry who had not heard the order to retire -were still clinging to the darkened westward hillside, and these -were shelled by their own guns.</p> -<p>Gatacre, confident of an easy success, had thrown all his -infantry into the firing line, and had no reserves to fall back -upon to support the companies of the Irish Rifles which were still -holding their own on the left flank of the attack. As soon as the -troops had crossed the valley to reform on the opposite ridge a new -entanglement beset them.</p> -<p>A commando under E.R. Grobler and Steenkamp, chiefly composed of -rebels, which had been sent by Olivier on the previous day to stir -up trouble in the district, was halted for the night a few miles -out on the Steynsburg road. The sound of the firing quickly called -it to attention, and a position which seriously threatened -Gatacre's line of retreat was quickly seized. The commando, -however, was handled with little judgment or energy, and was soon -checked by the field guns which had been withdrawn from the -detached hill near the Kissieberg ridge to cover the retreat of the -infantry; and which at one time were firing trail to trail, some -still engaging Olivier on Kissieberg while others were shelling -Grobler.</p> -<p>The raid on Stormberg had manifestly failed and Gatacre ordered -a retreat to Molteno. Thither the weary, dispirited column trudged -all through the forenoon of December 10. A gun was abandoned on the -way, <span class="pagenum"><a name="page69" id= -"page69"></a>{69}</span> and even the wagon in which the breech -block had been secreted fell also into the enemy's hands. But this -was a comparatively insignificant loss. It was soon discovered that -nearly a third of the infantry was absent. When the troops were -withdrawn from the attack on Kissieberg not a few of them remained -in the donga or under the krantzes on the hill side, while others -appear to have held on to the ridge. By some extraordinary neglect -or default nearly 600 men were left to their fate. No one seems to -have missed them at the time and they were made prisoners of war -without an effort to extricate them.</p> -<p>In less than two hours all the fighting except the little affair -with Grobler was over. On neither side were the casualties of -killed and wounded heavy. No British officer was killed and of the -eight who were wounded four had been struck by shells not fired by -the enemy.</p> -<hr /> -<p>Stonmberg on December 10, followed by Magersfontein on December -13, brought about Colenso on December 15. The latter was Buller's -attempt to retrieve the former mishaps.</p> -<p>A naturally strong position on the left bank of the Tugela had -by the efforts of the Boers during the previous three weeks been -almost perfectly secured. They showed, however, some hesitation -with regard to Hlangwhane, a detached hill on the right bank from -which the Tugela line could be enfiladed. It was a somewhat -precarious position as it was accessible from the left bank only by -two bridle drifts. It had been originally held by the Boers, but -the garrison was withdrawn when Barton's Brigade appeared at -Chieveley; and now all Botha's persistence, and even a reference to -Kruger and Joubert at Pretoria, were required to induce the -burghers to re-occupy it on December 15. From the south Hlangwhane, -though separated from the Colenso kopjes by the river, appears to -be an integral continuation of them.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page70" id="page70"></a>{70}</span> -<a name="fig-colenso" id="fig-colenso"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image06.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image06.png" -alt="Colenso Battlefield" /></a></div> -<p>The enemy's general idea was a defensive occupation of the -Colenso position, although Botha, with characteristic spirit, -proposed to send a commando across the river to face the British on -the open. The initiative, always a disadvantage when attacking an -enemy strongly posted and entrenched, was thus imposed upon Buller. -It was not doubted that he would be compelled to make a frontal -attack on Colenso and in this the Boers showed the more correct -appreciation of the situation. Botha hoped to lure Buller on and -was prepared even to allow him to cross the river; and having -crushed him to act upon the British flanks, an operation which the -wide extension of Botha's front from Hlangwhane to Robinson's farm, -a distance of seven miles, gave him a good chance of being able to -carry out. If necessary, reinforcements could be drawn from the -investing circle around Ladysmith, which seemed to be detaining -more burghers than were necessary for the maintenance of the -siege.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page71" id="page71"></a>{71}</span> -<p>Buller proclaimed his intention of attacking Botha by a -preliminary bombardment of the Colenso kopjes on December 13 and -14; but the burghers lay low and gave so little indication of their -presence that it almost seemed that they had abandoned the line of -the Tugela. The British Army was encamped near Chieveley four miles -south of Colenso.</p> -<p>On the evening of December 14 the scheme of attack was delivered -to the Brigadiers. The leading idea of it was a frontal attack to -be delivered from the village of Colenso, where the Tugela is -crossed by an iron railway bridge as well as by an iron wagon -bridge. The latter had been left intact by the enemy, possibly in -order to entice the British troops across the river. Buller appears -to have been unaware how far the Boer trenches extended towards the -west, and to have assumed that only the kopjes immediately opposite -Colenso were occupied. Hildyard's Brigade was ordered to march in -the direction of the "iron bridge,"<a id="footnotetag21" name= -"footnotetag21"></a><a href="#footnote21"><sup>21</sup></a> to -cross at that point, and then to "seize the kopjes north of the -iron bridge." The attack on the enemy's right, which was believed -to be weak, was assigned to Hart's Irish Brigade. He was instructed -to cross the Tugela at a bridle drift about two miles west of -Colenso and work down the left bank towards the occupied kopjes. -Two infantry Brigades were retained as reserves to be used when -required; and the mounted Brigade was ordered to move towards -Hlangwhane and occupy it, if possible, and cover the right flank; -but the weakness of the Boer position on that hill, which was cut -off by the river <span class="pagenum"><a name="page72" id= -"page72"></a>{72}</span> from the main line of defence, does not -seem to have been realized. A few batteries were sent with Hart, -but the bulk of the artillery was ordered east of the railway to -support Hildyard.</p> -<p>Buller's scheme has been severely criticized ever since its -failure, but Clery who was in nominal command of the Natal force, -and in whose name the battle orders were issued, as well as the -other general officers, acquiesced in it. But in fact hardly any -scheme could have been devised more likely to play into Botha's -hands. Buller hoped to get a footing on the left bank and Botha -hoped that he would succeed in doing so. Botha's special idea was -to allure the troops of the frontal attack to his own side, where -he could easily pound them from his kopjes and carry out his -general idea of netting the British flanks.</p> -<p>Buller had not then been in action with the Boers and he -probably underrated their tactical capacity; but already he seems -to have contemplated the possibility of the loss of Ladysmith, for -in his despatch of December 13 to Lord Lansdowne, in which he -justified his sudden change of the plan of campaign, he said that -"it would be better to lose Ladysmith than to leave Natal open to -the enemy."</p> -<p>Nor did the Boers enter into the contest with much confidence. -They had not yet tried Buller's mettle and his name was to them a -tradition of courage handed down from the Zulu war, in which some -of the older burghers now opposing him on the Tugela had served -under him. The curious omission to inform White in Ladysmith that -an attack on Colenso was to be made on December 15 may have arisen -from Buller's doubts as to its issue, or from reluctance to -heliograph a message in a cipher of which the enemy might have the -key.</p> -<p>The story of the Battle of Colenso is mainly the narrative of -the action of two important components of the Army of Natal. Each -of these was led by a dangerously <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page73" id="page73"></a>{73}</span> brave man, whose impetuosity -crippled the tactical scheme and whose method of working his -command was, at least, unusual. If in Hart and Long, who commanded -the Artillery, the quality of personal courage had been less -prominent it is probable that Colenso would not have filled up the -cup of Stormberg and Magersfontein in that dark midsummer December -week.</p> -<p>The naval guns on the west of the railway had the honour of -opening the battle, and shelled Fort Wyllie for some time without -eliciting any response. Long joined Hildyard with another naval -battery and two field batteries. He was not only an impetuous man -but he also belonged to the short range school of -artillerists;<a id="footnotetag22" name= -"footnotetag22"></a><a href="#footnote22"><sup>22</sup></a> and he -soon outpaced his infantry escort and came into action with his -field batteries in the open a little in advance of a shallow -intersecting donga, and within 1,100 yards of the Boer -entrenchments across the river. The naval battery had been -compelled by the flight of the Kaffir ox drivers to outspan astride -a deeper donga about a quarter of a mile in rear, to which Long had -sent back his gun teams. A terrific rifle and shrapnel fire, which -the infantry escort which soon came up was powerless to subdue, was -now opened upon the guns, and for an hour the batteries were beaten -on until the casualties left but four men to each gun, and -ammunition was running short. Long, who was one of the first to be -wounded, withdrew the dwindled gun detachments to the shallow donga -and sent back for a fresh supply of ammunition, intending to resume -fire as soon as the general attack developed.</p> -<p>All the while the batteries had been unsupported except by the -escorting companies, which were not under Long's orders, and no -attempt was made by Hildyard's or Barton's brigade in rear to -relieve or divert the pressure on the guns, which had succeeded in -silencing <span class="pagenum"><a name="page74" id= -"page74"></a>{74}</span> temporarily some of the Boer artillery and -in checking the rifle fire.</p> -<p>Earlier in the action Buller had been informed that the guns -were "all right and comfortable," but later reports gave him the -impression that this cheery optimism was delusive, and that owing -to loss of men and exhaustion of ammunition the artillery told off -to support Hildyard was now permanently out of action. The rest of -the artillery was engaged in assisting Hart, who was in trouble, -and Buller came to the conclusion that the attack on the Colenso -kopjes must be withdrawn.</p> -<p>Hart's Brigade was ordered to march "towards the Bridle Drift at -the junction of the Doornkop Spruit and the Tugela, and to cross at -that point." Here was yet another ambiguity. As there were two -"Iron Bridges" so also were there two "Bridle Drifts," one on each -side of the isthmus of the river loop, and yet another at the head -of it. The West Drift was unfordable on the morning of December 15, -and a hasty sketch which had probably been filled in from hearsay -evidence and which was Hart's only map, showed the Doornkop Spruit -as entering the Tugela below that Drift instead of just above the -East Drift.<a id="footnotetag23" name="footnotetag23"></a><a href= -"#footnote23"><sup>23</sup></a> The sketch also duplicated the -loop.</p> -<p>In dense formation, although the enemy was reported to be in -force on his front, Hart crossed the Doornkop Spruit without -recognizing it and advanced to the West Drift guided by a Kaffir -who lived close by. The native seems either to have had misgivings -as to the fordability of the Drift or to have been carelessly -instructed, for as the column approached the river he pointed to a -Drift which was not the East Drift, but the Drift at the head of -the loop near his own <span class="pagenum"><a name="page75" id= -"page75"></a>{75}</span> kraal; and Hart was induced to change -direction and lead the Brigade into the loop.</p> -<p>At 6 a.m. against the orders of Botha, who wished to lure on his -foe, the Boer guns commanding Hart's loop suddenly opened on the -dense battalions, and the trenches on the left bank took up the -firing. The Kaffir guide disappeared in terror. But Hart still -believed that there was a drift to be found somewhere or other and -pushed his Brigade, like a shoal of herrings driven into a purse -net, up the loop; and some companies even reached the kraal near -the head of it. Without artillery—for Hart had not brought up -the field batteries assigned to him—and exposed to a -concentrated fire from front, left, and right, the unhappy Irish -Brigade, which suffered 400 casualties in less than three quarters -of an hour, was helpless. Hart began to deploy, but Buller who from -Naval Gun Hill was watching, possibly with astonishment, the -entanglement in the loop ordered him to withdraw, at the same time -sending two battalions to dig him out of his hole. It was not an -easy task and it was made more difficult by the gallant reluctance -of the Irishmen to retreat before the enemy. Thus Hart and Long, -the former with his Hibernian zeal to move in the line of the -greatest resistance, the latter with his rash generalization that -entrenched Boers could be coerced as if they were Omdurman -dervishes in the open, brought about the reverse at Colenso.</p> -<p>By this time it was evident to Buller that his scheme must fail. -He had already arranged the extrication of Hart and now the -extrication of Long called for immediate action. He therefore rode -across to the deep donga east of the railway; on his way informing -Hildyard, whose brigade was awaiting an opportunity to carry out -its orders, that the attack was abandoned and that the brigade must -cover the withdrawal of the field batteries. He ordered the naval -battery to retire, and sent back the ammunition wagons, which after -long <span class="pagenum"><a name="page76" id= -"page76"></a>{76}</span> delay were on their way to the field guns: -and acknowledged that he was baffled.</p> -<p>Hildyard occupied Colenso but was unable to prevent the Boers -re-opening fire from Fort Wyllie on the desolate batteries lying on -the veld. No troops could move across the open; and only individual -efforts could now save the guns. Not a few officers and men offered -for the forlorn hope, and at the first attempt two guns were -rescued. A later attempt was not successful, and at 11 a.m. Buller -ordered a general retirement and the abandonment of the guns. The -main naval battery remained in position west of the railway for -some hours, and in its presence the Boers were afraid to cross the -river and take possession of the derelict but not disabled guns; -which were not captured until all the British troops had left the -field except a few gunners and infantry details who had taken -refuge in the deep donga and whom the order to retreat had not -reached; and these were made prisoners of war.</p> -<p>The mounted Brigade under Lord Dundonald acting on the right -flank with orders to take Hlangwhane, if possible, was too weak to -support the main attack effectively. Assistance was refused at -first by Barton and afterwards by Buller, who thought that -Hlangwhane would be of little use to him without the possession of -the Colenso kopjes; yet these could have been enfiladed from it. As -the Brigade retired it passed within striking distance of the field -guns and their captors; but nothing could be done as ambulances and -groups of prisoners were bemingled in the throng. Dundonald seems -to have been alone in his recognition of the value of the -Hlangwhane position.</p> -<p>A retirement to Chieveley and Frere completed the triad of -December disasters. Buller, of whom so much was expected, had -failed in his first attempt to measure swords with the burghers. -His 19,000 men and forty-two guns fighting for six hours inflicted -on the enemy a loss of less than two score. His casualties exceeded -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page77" id="page77"></a>{77}</span> -1,100, he lost ten guns, and he then returned to the place from -which he came. He thought that he had fought a battle, but in -reality he had only made a reconnaissance in force, a dangerous -operation only justifiable by urgent necessity.<a id= -"footnotetag24" name="footnotetag24"></a><a href= -"#footnote24"><sup>24</sup></a></p> -<p>Possibly if Buller, who was practically without a staff, had -allowed a freer hand to Clery, that authority on Minor Tactics -might have done better. It has been said that the defeat was due to -insufficient reconnaissance; and this is to a certain extent true, -for a more accurate knowledge of the terrain and the dispositions -of the enemy would have clearly demonstrated the hopelessness of a -frontal attack on the Colenso Kopjes, and the attempt would never -have been made. Again, as at Magersfontein four days before, a -considerable portion of the troops was not seriously engaged; and -the total casualties in eight battalions were but 120.</p> -<p>The loss of the guns is the chief fact in the story of Colenso. -What were Buller's intentions with regard to the Naval battery and -the two Field batteries which he sent to "a point from which they -could prepare the crossing for Hildyard's Brigade," and how did -Long understand and carry out his orders.</p> -<p>The battle orders had been orally anticipated by Buller, who -before they were issued, explained his intentions personally to -Long: and, as often happens in conferences, the impression retained -by one conferent differed from that intended to be conveyed by the -other. Long believed that he was instructed to shell the Kopjes and -entrenched positions behind Fort Wyllie, which he did not at first -know was held by the enemy, and he opened at a range of a mile; and -Buller's statement that he was ordered to open fire with the -long-range naval guns only, the position not being within reach of -the field batteries, is contradicted; while Buller complained that -Long had taken up a position within <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page78" id="page78"></a>{78}</span> 1,200 yards of a fortified -hill and less than a quarter of a mile from cover occupied by the -enemy. There is, indeed, a small area of low trees and scrub near -the right bank of the Tugela a few hundred yards on the right front -of the line of guns, but there is no evidence that the Boers had -ever crossed the river to hold it.</p> -<p>When the field guns, after firing nearly 100 rounds each, became -silent, Buller, who was already perturbed by Hart's discomfiture, -jumped to the conclusion that they were exterminated, and that it -would be useless to proceed with the attack without them; but the -gunners were only waiting for more ammunition. Not until the -following day did he know that men enough to fight the guns were -still untouched. If the whole of his force had been seriously -engaged he would perhaps have been justified in his decision not to -hold on to Colenso with exhausted and parched troops in the burning -heat of the South African midsummer in the hope of rescuing the -guns at night; but several battalions had been doing little more -than watching the fight during the morning, and he might have left -them on the field; and it is clear from a telegram sent by Botha -early in the afternoon that if the Naval battery had remained with -an effective infantry support no attempt would have been made by -the Boers to cross the river, and that the guns would not have been -lost.</p> -<p>The repulse at Colenso staggered Buller's humanity. He was a -brave man on the right of whose many war medals hung the Victoria -Cross which he had won not far away from the field on which he was -now fighting; but he was lacking in bull-dog tenacity, and in the -ascetic temperament which is quickened rather than disheartened by -failure. He returned to his tent, wrung his hands, and announced to -those whom it might concern that all was lost. In the telegram in -which he reported his defeat to Lord Lansdowne and of which the -frankness, the candour, and the copious yet not egotistical use of -the first personal pronoun <span class="pagenum"><a name="page79" -id="page79"></a>{79}</span> were in curious contrast to the formal -and sterilized paragraphs of an official account, he confessed that -with the force at his disposal he had little hope of relieving -Ladysmith and he proposed that he should let it go. He ordered the -staff to select a defensive line eastward from Estcourt which his -army might occupy until the end of the hot season.</p> -<p>His message to White in Ladysmith was still more pessimistic, -and with an intention that was chivalrous but was not war he -"spatchcocked"<a id="footnotetag25" name= -"footnotetag25"></a><a href="#footnote25"><sup>25</sup></a> into it -a suggestion that White should surrender, and even indicated how -the gain to the enemy could be minimised. The magnanimity of Buller -was manifest: he desired to give White the opportunity of -surrendering without incurring the full responsibility for the act, -but the lack of military instinct in Buller's mind was likewise -manifest. To this message, which was suspected in Ladysmith to have -originated in the Boer laagers, White replied that he had no -intention of surrendering.</p> -<p>Nor did Buller's pessimism turn the Home Government from its -purpose. He was ordered to hold on, and on December 17 Lord Roberts -accepted the chief command in South Africa. In announcing the -appointment, the War Office explained that Buller was superseded -because it was advisable to relieve him of responsibility for the -operations outside Natal, which he could not effectively control -from his detached position on the right flank. The Vth Division -under Sir C. Warren which had been ordered at his request a month -before, and which he found was available for service on the Natal -side, was on the point of landing in South Africa; the VIth -Division was embarking at home; the components of a VIIth Division -were being assembled, and he became less despondent.</p> -<p>The War Office thought that the Magersfontein mishap called for -the supersession of Methuen, and when Warren <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page80" id="page80"></a>{80}</span> reached -Capetown with the Vth Division he found orders from home directing -him to assume command of the force at Modder River. It would -probably have been better for Buller if he had freely acquiesced in -the idea of Pall Mall and had allowed Warren, but not necessarily -the Vth Division, to operate in a country with which he had become -acquainted twenty years before in the Bechuanaland Expedition, but -he could not foresee Spion Kop; and Warren while moving towards the -Orange was suddenly recalled to Capetown and ordered to reinforce -the Army of Natal with the Vth Division; and Methuen was allowed to -retain his command at Modder River.</p> -<p>The transfer of the Vth Division to Natal was undoubtedly called -for; but the position in the districts of Cape Colony bordering on -the Free State was alarming. A belt extending from Barkly East near -the Basuto border westwards and northwards as far as the Molopo -River, and interrupted only near the Orange and Modder Rivers, had -been annexed by the Boers and was more or less effectively occupied -by them; and had they acted with enterprise and concurrence during -the period of Lord Roberts' journey from England, the task before -the new Commander-in-Chief would have been still more formidable. -In rear of French and Gatacre was an indefinite area through which -ran the British lines of communication, and which, if not indeed -actually under arms, was ready to spring up whenever a favourable -opportunity presented itself.</p> -<p>Of the four Generals set to stem the tide of war until the -arrival of Lord Roberts, French alone did not restrict himself to -restraining its flow. A policy of "worry without risk" had been -recommended to him by Buller, and he carried it out with good -effect. He thrust Schoeman out of Arundel and Rensburg, and -occupied a commanding position outside Colesberg, which he -maintained until he was summoned on January 29 to confer with Lord -Roberts at Capetown, where he was <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page81" id="page81"></a>{81}</span> confidentially informed of the -plan of campaign. Clements, who a few weeks before had reinforced -him with a brigade of the recently landed VIth Division under -Kelly-Kenny, took over the command of the troops before Colesberg. -But the force which he had to his hand had been considerably -reduced by the withdrawal of the cavalry and nearly half the -infantry to serve elsewhere, while Schoeman and Delarey, who had -come from Magersfontein, had been strongly reinforced.</p> -<p>The Boers doubted not that the positions taken up by Gatacre and -French indicated that the impending advance of the British Army -into the Free State would be by way of Bethulie and Norval's Pont, -and were accordingly disposing all their available men, one -commando even being sent to Colesberg from Natal; but fortunately -they were at first unaware that Clements had been almost -simultaneously weakened. He soon found that he was not strong -enough to hold on to the Colesberg positions and on February 14 -retired to Arundel; losing on the way two companies of infantry -which had been mislaid and forgotten and which after a gallant -running fight of three miles were captured.</p> -<p>But now ominous reports of Lord Roberts' movements in the West -began to come in, and the Boers realized that they had -misinterpreted the signs which had been so ostentatiously -displayed. They hesitated and wavered, and on February 20 hurried -away from Colesberg to succour Cronje and the threatened capital of -the Free State.</p> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote19" name= -"footnote19"></a><b>Footnote 19:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag19">(return)</a> -<p>Buller aroused a "now-we-shan't-be-long" feeling. He would -certainly be in Pretoria by Christmas. It is said that a large -number of plum-puddings intended for the soldiers' dinners on -December 25 were addressed to Pretoria "to await arrival," by their -good friends at home.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote20" name= -"footnote20"></a><b>Footnote 20:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag20">(return)</a> -<p>The history of the war showed, however, that generally the Boers -fought more strenuously and effectively when the tide was against -them than when it was flowing with them.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote21" name= -"footnote21"></a><b>Footnote 21:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag21">(return)</a> -<p>The two chief authorities on the events of the day are not in -agreement as to which of the iron bridges was meant; and in the -absence of information of what was in the mind of the staff officer -who drew up the battle orders the question cannot be answered. The -context and certain expressions in other paragraphs seem to show -that the railway bridge was indicated. It was, indeed, broken but -there were drifts used by the natives above and below it. Probably -the river had not been carefully reconnoitred and the two bridges -were confused, or one only was believed to exist.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote22" name= -"footnote22"></a><b>Footnote 22:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag22">(return)</a> -<p>At the battle of Omdurman he had put short range principles -successfully into practice against dervishes.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote23" name= -"footnote23"></a><b>Footnote 23:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag23">(return)</a> -<p>The mistake in Hart's map is shown by a broken line in the -sketch map. It is, curiously enough, reproduced in the Colenso map -not only of the <i>Times</i> History, but also of the German -Official Report on the War.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote24" name= -"footnote24"></a><b>Footnote 24:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag24">(return)</a> -<p>See <i>Combined Training</i>, 1905, p. 109.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote25" name= -"footnote25"></a><b>Footnote 25:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag25">(return)</a> -<p><i>Sic</i> in his speech of October 10, 1901, but he probably -meant "sandwiched."</p> -</blockquote> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page82" id="page82"></a>{82}</span> -<h2><a name="chap4" id="chap4">CHAPTER IV</a></h2> -<h3>Kimberley and the Siege of Rhodes</h3> -<p>More than thirty years before the outbreak of the Second Boer -War a Dutch child in the Hopetown District of Cape Colony found, -while playing carelessly near the left bank of the Orange, a pretty -pebble that was destined to mould the History of South Africa.</p> -<p>He took the bagatelle home to his father's farm, where a -neighbour, one Van Niekirk, saw it and was struck by its -brilliancy. It chanced that the Irishman O'Reilly was passing that -way and to him it was entrusted to take to Colesberg for expert -opinion upon its value. Here certain Jews declared that it was but -a white topaz not worth one shilling and it was disdainfully cast -out into the road, from which it was with difficulty recovered by -O'Reilly, whose belief in it though shaken was not wholly -abandoned. Through a mutual friend, Lorenzo Boyes, Acting Civil -Commissioner of the District, the pebble came to the notice of an -expert mineralogist named Atherstone at Grahamstown, but it was -held so lightly in esteem by the sender that it reached Atherstone -as an enclosure in an ordinary unregistered letter. Atherstone -examined it, and when it had not only spoilt all the jeweller's -files in the town but had also passed an examination by polarized -light, pronounced that it was a diamond worth £500. His -certificate to its character, which had been so ignorantly -disparaged, was the origin of the Diamond industry of South Africa. -Another diamond was soon picked up near Hopetown which without -difficulty or misadventure rose to its own plane in mineralogy. Its -career was short and its destiny <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page83" id="page83"></a>{83}</span> happy. It was purchased by the -first Earl of Dudley for the adornment of his second wife.</p> -<p>When it was noised abroad with the customary exaggeration that -the monopoly of Golconda and the Brazils was at an end and that -diamonds grew wild on the South African veld, a wide extent of -country was explored and the precious crystallized carbon was found -in districts separated by many hundreds of miles. In certain -places, one of which became known as the town of Kimberley, it was -ascertained to recur in a constant proportion of the contents of -the "pipes" or volcanic tubes which rose through the surface -strata.</p> -<p>The pioneers of Kimberley took possession of the diamondiferous -grounds without ascertaining to whom they belonged, and when their -value became positive the question of ownership arose. The -boundaries of the districts administered by the Cape Colony, the -Orange Free State, and the Transvaal respectively were, as regards -territory, supposed to be of little account, vague, ill-defined, -and unsurveyed; and the districts themselves were occupied by -native tribes of nomad habits. About the middle of the XIXth -century a Hottentot chief named Waterboer came up out of the West -and squatted in the districts lying between the Orange and the -Vaal. His rights, such as they were, were assumed or acquired by -the Cape Government, which soon became involved in controversy with -the Orange Free State as to their extent and nature. Finally the -British Empire secured a good title to the estate by the payment of -£90,000. But the Orange Free State not unnaturally, when the -value of the Diamond Fields increased day by day, soon began to -think that it had parted with a profitable possession for an -inadequate return. The feeling rankled; and the confident -expectation of recovering Kimberley sold for a song tempted -Bloemfontein into the fatal alliance with Pretoria.</p> -<p>In 1871 a sickly youth named Cecil Rhodes came <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page84" id="page84"></a>{84}</span> from England -to South Africa in search of health, which after a short sojourn in -Natal he found at Kimberley. The prospects of the place favourably -impressed him, and he soon laid in it the foundations of his -fortune; but six years later the future of Kimberley was still -precarious and the discovery of gold in a remote district of the -Transvaal sucked thither the greater proportion of the citizens, -who, however, found that they had not bettered themselves by the -change and returned to the pipes: and soon nearly a hundred -companies, syndicates, and private adventurers were groping for -diamonds over an area of less than two hundred acres. The waste of -energy was manifest to Rhodes, who in 1888 completed, with the help -of the Rothschilds, the task upon which he had been engaged for -some years, the amalgamation of the conflicting and overlapping -diamond interests under the name of the De Beers Consolidated -Mines. It was soon found that the new industry was insufficiently -protected by the existing criminal law and a new felony was created -by the Illicit Diamond Buying Act.</p> -<p>It has been for several centuries the practice of Great Britain -to entrust to private companies the imperial responsibilities which -she is reluctant to assume and to let out to contractors, who can -be repudiated if they fail and expropriated if they succeed, the -job of expanding an Empire. Of this policy the most prominent -instance is the East India Company, a commercial venture which -obtained from Queen Elizabeth a charter empowering it to trade with -the East and which, though connected with Great Britain only by the -slender thread of an ocean track of 12,000 miles, maintained itself -for two centuries and a half with ever increasing territory and -authority until it became a great military Empire. Other examples -of lower degree are the Hudson's Bay Company and the Borneo -Company. The De Beers Company provided out of its abundance large -sums for exploration and settlement in South Africa and for -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page85" id="page85"></a>{85}</span> -the furtherance of the Imperial idea, and it is said that Rhodes -spent the whole of one night in arguing with some of the -materialistic magnates of Kimberley, before he could induce them to -consent to the employment of the resources of the Company in the -advancement of his schemes of Empire. He found, however, that these -could not be satisfactorily promoted by a Company whose primary -interests were commercial rather than imperial; and in 1888 he -obtained a charter for the British South Africa Company, an -offshoot of the De Beers Company, formed for the purpose of -extending the British Empire towards the Equator.</p> -<p>The question of the defences of Kimberley engaged the attention -of the De Beers Company some years before the outbreak of the war. -Its vulnerability to attack from the Orange Free State, the border -of which ran close to the town, was obvious; and in 1896 a depot of -arms and ammunition was formed. A military plan of the place was -sent to the Imperial authorities and a defence force was also -organized. This, however, had in 1899 ceased to exist owing chiefly -to the action of Mr. Schreiner, at that time the Premier of the -Cape Colony, who in June refused, with complacent optimism, to -furnish it with arms, saying that, "there is no reason for -apprehending that Kimberley is in danger of attack," and that "the -fears of the citizens are groundless and their anticipations -without foundation." A battery of artillery was, however, -surreptitiously brought up from King Williamstown.</p> -<p>The policy of Schreiner during the months preceding the war is -obscure. While refusing help to Kimberley he was allowing munitions -of war, which were way billed as pianos and hardware, to pass -through the Cape Colony to the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. -He does not appear to have been actively disloyal to the Imperial -Government and in his own way he probably did his best to keep the -peace. His mind was cast in a mould which is not uncommon in the -British Empire <span class="pagenum"><a name="page86" id= -"page86"></a>{86}</span> but which is rarely found outside it. He -was more anxious to stand well with its enemies, and like the -Unjust Steward to have a claim to a place in their houses, if they -were successful, than to work for its security. It was with great -difficulty that Sir A. Milner as late as September 18 obtained his -consent to the dispatch of a few regulars to Kimberley to form the -backbone of a defensive force. He seems to have retained almost to -the end, in spite of all indications to the contrary, the belief -that the war would be averted or at least that the Orange Free -State would not join in it. Yet in this he erred in good company. -Mr. Balfour said that if on September 28 he had been asked whether -war with the Orange Free State was a probable contingency he would -have replied that war with Switzerland was one equally probable; -and Lord Lansdowne declined before September 23 to discuss with -Lord Roberts the question of operations in the Free State. Buller, -with surer insight, had foreseen the alliance as far back as -1881.</p> -<p>The War Office, however, was to a certain extent on the alert -and distrusted the optimism of Schreiner and of a high military -official who had been for some years in South Africa. Officers were -sent to Kimberley to organize a scheme of defence, but having -regard to the susceptibility of the Capetown Government it was done -secretly and confidentially and Schreiner was outwitted. By October -7 the town, which was under the command of Colonel Kekewich, was -secure against a <i>coup de main</i> though not against a vigorous -and sustained siege. Little more than an eighth of the garrison was -composed of regular troops; the artillery was out of date; rifles -and ammunition were deficient. On October 13 Rhodes threw himself -into Kimberley and became for better or worse a power in the town. -As soon as the siege began the relative value of the chief products -of the mines was inverted: water, the most generous gift of nature -and hitherto an embarrassment <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page87" id="page87"></a>{87}</span> in the workings, became for -the time being more valuable than the diamonds.</p> -<p>On October 12 the curtain of the great drama was raised and the -first scene presented. It showed the capture of an armoured train -on the railway between Kimberley and Mafeking. Kimberley under any -circumstances was a prize worth winning. But Kimberley taken with -Rhodes as a prisoner of war, the man who had curbed and checked on -every side the expansion of the Republics, who had taken -Matabeleland on the north and Bechuanaland on the west into the -fold of the British Empire, would be more than a prize, would be a -triumph. Rhodes metaphorically in chains, and actually paraded as a -captive in the streets of Bloemfontein and Pretoria was an alluring -prospect.</p> -<p>Great, however, as were the advantages to be gained by the early -capture of Kimberley, the object was not pursued with energy and -determination. When the siege began on November 6 the situation was -in favour of the attack. The Boers were in possession of the -railway from Orange River Station to Mafeking: Kimberley was -ill-supplied with the munitions and weapons of war and was defended -by a force mainly composed of irregulars; it was encumbered with a -large native population; and the civil and military authorities -were not working in harmony.</p> -<p>The defence throughout was more active than the attack. -Reconnaissances and raids against the enemy's positions were made -with effect; and the bombardment which followed a rejected summons -to surrender did little harm. Communication with the outer world -was not seriously impeded. Cattle grazed almost with impunity -inside the line of investment and several thousands of the natives -escaped.</p> -<p>But the difficulties of Kekewich, who had been in command since -September 20, were not confined to those created by the military -situation. He was thrown into close association with the man who -was one of the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page88" id= -"page88"></a>{88}</span> indirect causes of the war, and who had -little confidence in military men, or sympathy with their ideas and -methods. Rhodes had come into his own Kimberley and for the first -time he was not master in it. He found himself a sterilized -dictator acting in an atmosphere too tenuous to support his -vitality but sufficient to preserve it from extinction. He was -subject to the authority of the military commandant, a galling -position for a distinguished statesman who had not a high opinion -of the professional capacity of the British officer. From the age -of eighteen he had been his own master except during the intervals -which he had spared from South Africa and spent at Oxford, when he -was temporarily subject to the lax discipline of a University. -While his contemporaries were amusing themselves at college, or -performing routine duties in the Army or the Civil Service, or -preparing to enter a profession, Rhodes was spending the critical -years of his life in outlining the future and scheming for a South -African Empire to be erected on the foundation of the Kimberley -Mines.</p> -<p>It was inevitable from the nature of the case and from his -intimate concern in the fortunes of Kimberley that he could not see -South African affairs at large in their true perspective. The -sparkle of his diamonds made him curiously colour-blind and out of -this defect in his mental vision sprang the mischief. Kimberley, -for the time being at least, stood so closely in the foreground -that other objects were thrown out of focus. Nor did the disturbing -influence of the glare and halation of Kimberley only affect the -vision of the diamond men within the town. It closed the eyes of -the besiegers without it to a great strategical opportunity which -soon passed away.</p> -<p>The figure of Rhodes in Kimberley was the magnet which attracted -and detained commandos which could have been more usefully employed -elsewhere, and his presence, so far as it had this effect, was of -great service to the perilously weak British force during the first -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page89" id="page89"></a>{89}</span> -few weeks of the war. If the commandos squatting before Kimberley -had instead been sent to raid southwards towards the Karroo, and to -inflame the Dutch districts in the Cape Colony, they would have met -with little resistance, and advancing with daily increasing numbers -would have had little difficulty in planting themselves firmly in -the heart of the enemy's country. For the moment the war in the -west was waged not against Great Britain but against the Man of -Kimberley.</p> -<p>The diamond men, with Rhodes at their head, forgetting that the -object of the war was the redress of the Outlanders' wrongs in the -Transvaal, began to bellow for relief even before the Boers had -completed the investment of the town. Telegrams couched in -extravagant and almost hysterical language and betraying the -egotism and the want of self-control of the senders were repeatedly -despatched. One of these, in which on October 19 the De Beers -directors asked for information as to the plans of the military -authorities at Capetown, "so as to enable us to take our own steps -in case relief is refused," was thought not unnaturally by Buller -to hint at surrender; and although this was not the intention of -the senders it is probable that they did not regret the -interpretation that was put upon it.</p> -<p>Fortunately, however, Kekewich was a cool-headed man who did not -suffer himself to be hustled. While preserving amicable personal -relations with Rhodes, he was careful to let Capetown know that the -situation in Kimberley was by no means desperate and that it would -be able to hold out for several weeks.</p> -<p>The impetuous and childish letters and telegrams sent out by the -diamond men induced Buller, who said afterwards that "although I -had every confidence in Colonel Kekewich's military capacity I did -not trust the other powers within the city," to send Lord Methuen -northwards on November 10 with instructions to help Kimberley by -removing unnecessary non-combatants and natives, and "to let the -people understand that <span class="pagenum"><a name="page90" id= -"page90"></a>{90}</span> you have not come to undertake its -defence, but to afford it better means of maintaining its -defence."</p> -<p>The news of Methuen's approach did not allay the excitement of -the townsmen. His movement was not an essential part of the general -plan of campaign but only a raid in force with the object of -putting men and supplies into Kimberley and enable it to hold on -until pressure elsewhere upon the Boers should raise the siege -automatically.</p> -<p>The dignity and the self-respect of the diamond men was -affronted. Like the Syrian captain Naaman, when offered relief of -his leprosy by the prophet Elisha, they resented the simple process -by which their own relief was to be effected. They had looked to an -Army Corps at least marching on Kimberley with all the pomp of war -and speedily enabling it to resume its normal occupation of diamond -grubbing; and now they found that the town was not considered of -much account in the scheme of the military, who regarded it as a -mere besieged place of little strategical importance; which, after -some assistance, was to be left dependent for its safety upon its -own exertions while the main army advanced through the Free -State.</p> -<p>On December 4 Kekewich was instructed to make arrangements for -the deportation of a large proportion of the white and coloured -population, Methuen hinting that Rhodes himself might be included. -Although Rhodes had a few weeks before complained of the -difficulties caused by the presence of non-combatants and had even -endeavoured to send them away, he now vehemently opposed their -removal. His reasons for so doing are not very clear, but they -appear to be part of the systematic obstruction which he offered to -every proposition of the military authorities which tended to -restrict the output of diamonds. His objections were transmitted to -Buller, who speedily put the question in its proper light by -telegraphing to Kekewich that "what we have to do is to keep the -Union Jack flying <span class="pagenum"><a name="page91" id= -"page91"></a>{91}</span> over South Africa without favour to any -particular set of capitalists," and Methuen met his protest with -the answer that "Rhodes has no voice in the matter." After the -defeat at Magersfontein the plan of deportation had necessarily to -be given up.</p> -<p>In his own proper sphere of a civilian working with civilians -Rhodes was usefully active and his services were great. He employed -the persons thrown out of work by the closing of the mines in -labour for the general benefit of the town, and did much to relieve -the distress among the poorer inhabitants.</p> -<p>The manufacture of a heavy gun, to which the name of Long Cecil -was given, in the De Beers engineering establishment, was soon -countered by the Boers, who brought into action a gun throwing a -much heavier shell which had been disabled by the Naval Battery at -Ladysmith, repaired at Pretoria, and was now mounted before -Kimberley. The appearance of Long Tom, supervening on a reduction -on the daily rations, caused a panic among the civilians. On -February 9 Rhodes threatened to call a public meeting to consider -the situation unless he was informed of the plans for the relief of -the town: but Kekewich was authorized by Lord Roberts not only to -forbid the holding of the meeting, but even if necessary to arrest -Rhodes. A private meeting was then held at which a remonstrance was -drawn up for transmission to Lord Roberts through Kekewich; and for -the second time a communication from the Kimberley men was -interpreted as a threat to surrender. It was probably sent with -that intent in order to elicit information as to Lord Roberts' -plans.</p> -<p>Kekewich meanwhile was finding his position almost intolerable, -and his representations convinced Lord Roberts of the necessity of -raising the siege of Rhodes without delay and at any cost. It was -effected on February 15 by French's brilliant cavalry movement; but -at the cost of the convoy of 170 wagons which were snapped up by De -Wet at Waterval Drift, and of an <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page92" id="page92"></a>{92}</span> Army compelled to march and to -fight for nearly four weeks on reduced rations. But the harvesting -of the crop of diamonds was resumed, and as far as Kimberley was -concerned the war was at an end.</p> -<p>Although the siege lasted for more than three months the -casualties were few, only 40 persons being killed and 123 wounded -by acts of war. The privations suffered by the inhabitants, -especially during the last few weeks, were no doubt great, but -certainly not greater than the privations which unhappily are -endured by the unemployed in Great Britain during a hard winter. -The siege was conducted without much vigour and determination, and -the most important operation on the side of the defence was a -sortie on November 29 after the news had come in of Methuen's -approach.</p> -<p>The relief of Kimberley closed the public career of the most -conspicuous figure in the British Empire; and with great dignity -and self-restraint, which might well have been imitated by other -persons whose conduct during the war was impugned, Rhodes refrained -from publishing a Kimberley book.</p> -<p>If the Siege of Kimberley brought out the weak side of his -character, his egotism and impatience, his lack of power to adapt -himself even temporarily to unaccustomed conditions, it will be -remembered that these defects were inherent and that his marvellous -success in life had accentuated them. The acts of a public man are -so variously regarded by his opponents and his admirers, are seen -by them in such different lights, that there can rarely be any -general agreement on the question of the ratio between his merits -and his failings; but the chief phases of his life afford the raw -material out of which each man for himself can form an estimate of -his character.</p> -<p>Like many men who have afterwards become famous in the secular -world, Cecil Rhodes was intended for the Church. His health -suffered from the rigours of the East Anglian climate and he was -sent out to South <span class="pagenum"><a name="page93" id= -"page93"></a>{93}</span> Africa. His brother's farm in Natal, to -which he was consigned, he found derelict on his arrival, but he -was soon growing cotton on it, against the advice of the local -experts, but with eventual success. At the age of 18 he was -prospecting for diamonds at Kimberley, and forming the opinion -during a visit to the Transvaal that an insufficient proportion of -the South African Continent belonged to the British Empire. In -1872, being then 19 years of age, he went to Oxford, but in a few -months his health broke down and another voyage to the Cape became -necessary. In 1876 he returned to the University and remained there -for two years when South Africa recalled him. As soon as he could -be spared he went back to his college and, eight years after -matriculation, completed his undergraduate course. It was a high -compliment to the value of a Pass Degree at Oxford, where, however, -he formed the opinion, which was not publicly divulged until his -will was opened twenty-one years later, that Oxford Dons were -"children in finance."</p> -<p>His election to the Cape Parliament in 1881 as Member for -Kimberley placed him in a favourable position to advance his -schemes for the northward extension of the British Empire. When the -trespasses and encroachments of the Transvaal Boers beyond the -limits assigned to them under the Convention of 1884 made it -advisable to incorporate Bechuanaland he was unable to persuade the -Cape Government to undertake that responsibility, but with the -assistance of Sir Hercules Robinson and the support of Mr. -Chamberlain he induced the Imperial Government to take action. -President Kruger had connived at the establishment on native -territory under British protection of two little republics of -raiders, to which the names of Goshen and Stellaland were assigned; -and a costly expedition under Sir C. Warren was needed to bring him -to his senses. In 1885 Bechuanaland became an integral part of the -British Empire.</p> -<p>In 1888 he again opened the flood gates of Imperialism, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page94" id="page94"></a>{94}</span> -and secured by means of a treaty with Lobengula the reversion of -the native territory north of the Transvaal, at which two European -nations were nibbling, and which in his honour received the name of -Rhodesia.</p> -<p>He became Premier of the Cape Colony in 1890 by the help of the -Dutch vote and from that time gradually sank from the zenith of his -success. His good fortune left him when he attained his ambition. -The Jameson Raid, for which he was not personally, though he -confessed himself morally, responsible, ended his political career. -His last good service to the Empire was given during the Matabele -rising. He accompanied the troops sent to suppress the rebellion; -and when the operations seemed likely to be indefinitely prolonged, -he brought it to an end by going fearlessly and almost unattended -among the natives, whose confidence he won by meeting them -trustfully in council and listening to their grievances.</p> -<p>His physical vitality, always inadequate, was seriously impaired -by the strain of the siege. He never fully recovered his strength -and he died on March 26, 1902, two months before the Second Boer -war was brought to a close by the Vereeniging Treaty.</p> -<p>He was a rich but honest man, and the great wealth which he -amassed never led him to attach undue importance to the possession -of it. He valued it not for his own advantage, but for its help in -advancing his political and imperial schemes. He employed it -creditably and without ostentation, and spent none of it in social -display in London. By his will he left the greater portion of it to -the University of Oxford for the establishment of an amiable if -somewhat quixotic system of bringing the various branches of the -Anglo-Saxon race into association at a centre of learning and -athletics, where they were to be leavened by a Teutonic -admixture.</p> -<p>The vision of posthumous reputation allured him, and he -delighted in the hope that the name of his own <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page95" id="page95"></a>{95}</span> Rhodesia, -like the cities which still bear the name of Alexander, would be on -the lips of men of generations as far distant from his own as his -own was from the days of the Great Macedonian.</p> -<p>He presented a pair of sculptured lions to President Kruger. -Almost on the eve of the war he asserted confidently that Kruger -would not fight. It is probable that this was not his belief, but -that it was said in order to provoke the President into rejecting -the overtures of the British Government, and to make inevitable the -war which he foresaw was the only way of settling the South African -question.</p> -<p>Not a few incidents in his life are difficult to explain. The -donation of £10,000 to the funds of the Parnellite Party by -an ardent English Imperialist who had never expressed any -particular enthusiasm for Home Rule may have been a <i>douceur</i> -to prevent the Irish members from attacking him in the British -Parliament. He had not forgotten that Parnell inaugurated the -policy of obstruction carried to the length of all-night sittings -upon the occasion of the discussion of a Cape Colonial question in -the House of Commons. Possibly Rhodes was a Home Ruler not in spite -of his Imperialism but because of it. Home rule was necessary to -it. The function of the Imperial Parliament was the general control -of the affairs of the Empire, leaving local politics to be dealt -with by local legislatures.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page96" id="page96"></a>{96}</span> -<p>The strong and dominant personality of Cecil Rhodes came to the -front at a time when the British Empire was beginning to show signs -of lassitude and appeared to be growing tired of itself. Patriotism -was being slowly transmuted into a limp and sickly cosmopolitan -altruism. He checked this decadence, at least for the time being, -but passed away before he was able to subdue it.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page97" id="page97"></a>{97}</span> -<h2><a name="chap5" id="chap5">CHAPTER V</a></h2> -<h3>A Tragedy of Errors</h3> -<p>The lassitude induced by the battle of Colenso affected each -combatant on the Tugela. The Boers put the finishing touches to -their works on the left bank, and at their leisure continued the -position across the river eastwards from Hlangwhane. They did not -seem to have been withdrawn in force<a id="footnotetag26" name= -"footnotetag26"></a><a href="#footnote26"><sup>26</sup></a> to -assist the besiegers of Ladysmith in the great assault on Wagon -Hill and Caesar's Camp on January 6, for a demonstration ordered by -Buller at White's request during the crisis showed that the Tugela -front was as strongly held as ever.</p> -<p>On January 8, Buller, whose Head Quarters were at Frere, was -reinforced by the Vth Division under Warren, and he now resumed his -original plan, out of which he had been scared by Magersfontein, of -advancing on Ladysmith by way of Potgieter's Drift, rejecting an -alternative plan proposed by Warren, which differed little from -that by which the relief of Ladysmith was effected six weeks later, -of a direct advance by way of Hlangwhane and Pieter's Hill. Between -Buller's army and Ladysmith lay not only the tortuous and difficult -Tugela, but also a barrier of heights and ridges through which -there were but four or five possible ways of access, one of which -had already been tried without success, to the beleaguered city -lying on a plain considerably above the level of the open ground on -the right bank of the Tugela.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page98" id="page98"></a>{98}</span> -<p>Buller, having selected the route which seemed at the time to be -the line of least resistance, began on January 9 to transfer the -bulk of his force from Frere to Springfield, a distance of sixteen -miles, but owing to difficulties of transport and the necessity of -accumulating a large stock of supplies at the new base, it was six -days before the concentration was effected. One brigade was left at -Chieveley to watch the Boer front at Colenso.</p> -<p>In Orders issued at Frere on January 9, Buller announced that he -"proposed to effect the passage of the Tugela in the neighbourhood -of Potgieter's Drift, with a view to the relief of Ladysmith." His -scheme was based upon imperfect information and misleading maps, -and was in fact not so much a surprise flank attack, as all his -movements had to be made in full view of the enemy, as an attack -from a position higher up the river that must be frontal, because -the enemy would have ample time to make it so: and herein lay its -weakness. When, however, he personally surveyed the situation from -Mount Alice, which overlooks Potgieter's Drift, the aspect of the -curving amphitheatre showed the danger of attempting to force the -river at that point. On the N.E. was Vaalkrantz and Doornkop, and -the high ridge of Brakfontein, which the enemy had already begun to -entrench, and over which passed the road by which he proposed to -reach Ladysmith, everywhere commanded by the heights, filled the -quadrant towards Spion Kop on the N.W.</p> -<p>On January 13, Buller reported to the War Office that, having -found the Potgieter's Drift scheme impracticable, he proposed as -"the only possible chance for Ladysmith" to send Warren across at -Trickhardt's Drift, five miles higher up the river. The new scheme -was based upon a theory which had been evolved out of the -experiences of autumn manoeuvre battles collated on the office -desks of Pall Mall, that the easiest method of defeating the enemy -with a small casualty list was <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page99" id="page99"></a>{99}</span> to contain his front and -attack one or both of his flanks; and General Officers had come to -regard this as the regulation opening to which they were bound to -conform.</p> -<a name="fig-vaalkrantz" id="fig-vaalkrantz"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image07.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image07.png" -alt="Spion Kop and Vall Krantz Positions" /></a></div> -<p>Buller divided his force into two unequal portions. Warren with -the stronger portion was to attack the Boer right which Buller -believed to be weak, while Lyttelton with the remainder -demonstrated at Potgieter's Drift. To himself Buller reserved the -part of the Chorus in a Greek play, taking a general interest in -the action, yet not personally concerned in it; and in that -capacity he issued a stirring appeal to the relieving force.</p> -<p>On January 15 "secret instructions" were given to Warren. He was -recommended, after crossing the Tugela at Trickhardt's Drift, to -proceed west of Spion Kop, and to pivot his right and swing round -on to the open plain in rear of the Boer position facing -Potgieter's Drift.</p> -<p>Warren, who was not of opinion that the Boer right was weak, -marched out of Springfield on the evening of January 16. Lyttelton -had already started, and during the night occupied a position on -the north side of the river near Potgieter's Drift.</p> -<p>The task before Warren was hard. In order to carry out Buller's -plan he must cross an unbridged river and struggle through a -country of which little was known. Next day two bridges were thrown -over the Tugela above Trickhardt's Drift, which recent rains had -made dangerous, and Hart's and Woodgate's Brigades were transferred -to the left bank to cover the crossing: but it was not until sunset -on January 18 that the entire force with its tedious transport was -established on the north side of the river.</p> -<p>The mounted troops under Dundonald were sent out at mid-day to -reconnoitre towards the N.W. and in the course of the afternoon his -advanced squadrons came upon a Boer commando which was easily dealt -with, but before the issue was decided, he had reported that he was -engaged near Acton Holmes, and asked for <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page100" id="page100"></a>{100}</span> help. -Warren assumed that the mounted troops, which he had sent out to -reconnoitre, had wilfully and prematurely forced on an action, and -were now in trouble; and it was not until the next morning, after -an infantry brigade had been moved out to support them, that Warren -heard from Dundonald, whose previous messages had not clearly -described the situation, that he was able to take care of himself. -Dundonald had at first expected that the main body would follow -him, and his reports seem to show that he had hoped to induce -Warren to move towards Acton Holmes. He was rebuked for assuming, -not unnaturally, that the objective of the operations was -Ladysmith, and instructed that the objective was a junction with -the other portion of Buller's force. He was summoned to Warren's -headquarters and ordered to abstain from further attempts to ride -round the enemy's right. Thus, as before at Hlangwhane, a promising -cavalry movement by Dundonald was thrown away.</p> -<p>The deliberate march of the British Army from Frere and the -delay at the Drifts gave the Boers ample time to prepare for the -attack. On January 19, on which day Warren moved to Venter's Spruit -three miles from Trickhardt's Drift, they were in occupation of the -whole line from Vaalkrantz to the Rangeworthy Heights. Fourie was -in command of the left, Schalk Burger of the centre, which included -the important features of Green Hill, Spion Kop, and the Twin -Peaks; and L. Botha of the right, in which was Bastion Hill.</p> -<p>There were two roads by which Warren could advance; one running -by Fairview northwards from Trickhardt's Drift between Green Hill -and Three Tree Hill, and the other eight miles longer by Acton -Holmes. The length of the latter and a report from White that -several commandos were on their way to Acton Holmes from Ladysmith, -led Warren to adopt the former route.</p> -<p>He informed Buller of his decision, adding that certain "special -arrangements" which he had made <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page101" id="page101"></a>{101}</span> would oblige him to remain -near Trickhardt's Drift, and that he must therefore have further -supplies. The "special arrangements" were in fact the steps which -every general would take before attacking a strong position not -immediately accessible; namely to acquire ground from which it -could be threatened and shelled. Clery was ordered to direct the -operation, which Warren believed would entail "comparatively little -loss of life."</p> -<p>Early on January 20 Clery with one brigade and artillery -advanced up the re-entrant which springs from the river towards the -east end of the Rangeworthy Heights, and posted his guns half way -up the valley on Three Tree Hill. Hart, with a brigade of five -battalions, was sent to occupy the irregular southern crest of the -heights running from Three Tree Hill towards Bastion Hill. He drove -the Boers out of their advanced trenches, but found that the -northern and higher crest to which they had retired, could only be -won by a frontal advance across open ground. He and his brave -Irishmen were as ready as ever to push on in the line of the -greatest resistance, but he was ordered by Clery to forbear. -Meanwhile Dundonald, not deterred by the damping of his trek on the -18th, and while obeying an order from Warren to come to heel, -seized Bastion Hill, thereby securing Hart's left flank on the -crest. So far as they went, the operations of January 20 were -successful. Warren's pivot movement was in train, the whole of his -force was now threatening the Boer right which was widely extended -but deficient in depth; and the day's casualties were few. -Following the example of Buller, who delegated his authority to -Warren, the latter entrusted the conduct of the day's operations to -Clery, who in succession ordered the chief movement to be carried -out by Hart. Next day the mounted troops on Bastion Hill were -relieved by infantry.</p> -<p>Buller was aware that the Ladysmith garrison, weakened by -sickness and privation, could give him little or <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page102" id="page102"></a>{102}</span> no help; -but at least during the earlier phase of the Trickhardt's Drift -operations he was confident. On January 17 he told White that -"somehow he thought he was going to be successful this time," and -that he hoped to be within touch of Ladysmith in six days. His Head -Quarters were at Spearman's Camp, a few miles south of Mount Alice, -whence he rode over daily to note and criticize the tactics.</p> -<p>It now occurred to Warren that he might have been mistaken as to -the significance of the position occupied by the enemy on the -Rangeworthy Heights, and that it might be in reality a screen to -hide a trek of the Free Staters back to their own country; and on -this supposition, which was founded upon reports that the Siege of -Ladysmith had been raised and that some wagons had been seen on -trek westwards towards the Drakensberg passes, he applied for -reinforcements to enable him to block the way.</p> -<p>Buller sent him Talbot Coke's brigade with some howitzers; and -came over to consult with him on January 22. The situation was not -satisfactory. Time was being wasted, Warren's "special -arrangements" had done little, and now he had a new idea. Buller -still advocated an attack on the enemy's right, while Warren wished -to persevere with his advance by the Fairview Road; but he pointed -out that Spion Kop, which his reading of the "secret instructions" -had led him to regard as out of bounds, must first be taken. No -definite action seems to have been decided on, and Warren was left -to act within certain limits on his own responsibility. Finally, -with the approval of the four infantry generals, he resolved to -seize Spion Kop that night. The attack, however, was postponed -until the following night, to give time for the position to be -reconnoitred.</p> -<p>Spion Kop is a ridge of which the chief features are a pair of -high peaks joined by a nek to a plateau, from which a spur, ending -in a kopje called Conical Hill, <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page103" id="page103"></a>{103}</span> juts out at right angles to -the nek, which becomes a spur of the plateau at a Little Knoll east -of the summit. Its tactical importance was derived from its height, -as the summit, though not the peaks, is higher than any of the -ground held by the enemy; and from its position, as it was on the -obtuse angle formed by the meeting of Botha's line on the Boer -right with Schalk Burger's on the centre, and enfiladed each of -them. It was accessible from the British front by a slope which -rises from the lower ground to another spur running S.W. from the -plateau.</p> -<p>On the morning of January 23, Buller saw Warren, and again -pressed him to make an attack on the Boer right; but finding that -the orders for the assault on Spion Kop had already been issued, he -refrained from vetoing it. He threatened, however, that if -immediate action in some direction were not taken, Warren's force -would be withdrawn to the south of the Tugela.</p> -<p>On the previous day Warren, betraying the Engineer officer -unused to handling large bodies of men, and unfamiliar with the -military unities, rearranged his command with a straight edge, and -distributed it in one way for tactical, and in another for -administrative purposes. All the troops lying west of an imaginary -line became the left attack under Clery, while those east of it -became the right attack. The latter, under Talbot Coke, were -ordered to seize the Spion Kop position by night, and entrench it -before daybreak, the actual assault being made by Woodgate with two -battalions, some mounted infantry on foot, and a few Engineers. At -sunset on January 23, the curtain fell upon the first act of the -Tragedy of Spion Kop.</p> -<p>On the night of the January 23 Spion Kop was held as an -observation post by a party of seventy burghers. When Buller first -appeared at Potgieter's Drift, it was on the right of the Boer -line, but now it was only the right of the centre under Schalk -Burger. Little was known of its features and tactical value, beyond -the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page104" id= -"page104"></a>{104}</span> information obtainable by a telescopic -reconnaissance. It was a prominent object in the Boer position, and -it seemed to be within the grasp of a night adventure. Woodgate -left his rendezvous at 9 p.m., but it is doubtful whether he would -have reached the summit before daybreak but for Thorneycroft, who -was in command of the mounted infantry which bore his name, and who -had before nightfall picked out and noted the recognizable objects -on the slope. A staff officer from Head Quarters, who accompanied -the column to direct the march, had had no opportunity of making -himself acquainted with the way of access to Spion Kop, and -Thorneycroft was ordered to act as guide.</p> -<a name="fig-spion" id="fig-spion"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image08.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image08.png" -alt="Sketch Plan of Spion Kop" /></a></div> -<p>The summit, but fortunately little more than the summit, was -veiled in mist, and the crest was reached. Bayonets were fixed -before the Boer picket was alarmed and opened fire, but the -ammunition was spent without effect, as Thorneycroft's men had by -order thrown themselves on the ground as soon as they were -discovered. A charge into the mist drove back the picket and scared -the main body off the summit. Thus before dawn on <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page105" id="page105"></a>{105}</span> January -24, Warren was in possession of the hill which was believed to be -the key of the Boer position, and the chief obstacle in the way of -his advance seemed to be thrust aside: but the mist on Spion Kop -was the forecast of the Fog of War which was soon to envelope -him.</p> -<p>Woodgate, having the men, the tools and the ground, at once -began impulsively to dig, without endeavouring to inform himself of -the features of the position he had so easily won. A sort of a -trench had been scratched on the summit by the weary men, when the -mist rolling away for a little while disclosed the startling -topography of the position. The surface of the plateau sloped -gently at first, and then abruptly fell away, and the trench was -found to be of little use. The enemy could approach on dead ground -to within two hundred yards of it. Woodgate, seeing that the real -defensible line was not the highest part of the summit, but the -edge lower down, where the steep descent began, sent working -parties to the front, but they at once came under fire. Soon the -mist again enveloped the hill, and having disposed his force, he -reported to Warren that he had established himself on Spion -Kop.</p> -<p>The Boer outpost which had been driven from the summit belonged -to Schalk Burger's command. With Botha's co-operation a storming -force was soon brought together, and almost every point from which -Spion Kop could be brought under fire was seized, even the Little -Knoll near the summit, which enfiladed the main trench. Joubert -telegraphed from Ladysmith that the position must be re-captured, -and Kruger at Pretoria asked what was being done to win it -back.</p> -<p>Little did Woodgate's force realize what the morning mist was -hiding. Soon after 8 a.m. the sun dissolved the veil, and the storm -burst. From the right the men in the trench and lower crest were -enfiladed by the Little Knoll and the Twin Peaks; on their front -and left they were rained on by bullet and shrapnel from Conical -Hill, Green Hill, and beyond; with such effect <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page106" id="page106"></a>{106}</span> that the -lower crest had to be temporarily abandoned. Woodgate was soon -mortally wounded and the command devolved upon Crofton. Spion Kop -was the first position of great tactical importance won by the -British Army on the Tugela, and the Boers were determined to -recover it.</p> -<p>The naval guns posted on Mount Alice and at Potgieter's Drift -opened fire not only on the Little Knoll near the Spion Kop plateau -and on the Twin Peaks, but were also pitching their shells over the -summit on to the Boer positions supposed to be in line with it, and -a field battery on Three Tree Hill shelled the open ground on which -the enemy was advancing.</p> -<p>Heliograms and flag messages from Spion Kop, orally handed in -and incorrectly transmitted by scared signallers, bewildered the -recipients and increased the density of the Fog of War upon the -Tugela. To Lyttelton was flashed an appeal for help without a -signature. A message sent by Crofton soon after he assumed command, -in which he reported Woodgate's death and said that reinforcements -were urgently required, was transmuted into a despairing cry which -made Warren think that he had lost his head, and which led to his -supersession. Warren replied that there must be no surrender, and -that Coke was on his way up with reinforcements.</p> -<p>Warren and Lyttelton, as well as the Umpire in Chief, Buller, -were too far away to be able to appreciate the situation on Spion -Kop, or to know how much or how little of the ridge was in -possession of the British troops. Lyttelton's naval guns, playing -upon the Little Knoll, were twice silenced by a message from -Warren, who was under the impression that the whole of the ridge -from the Twin Peaks to the main position on Spion Kop was held. A -demonstration made earlier in the day by Lyttelton towards -Brakfontein was checked by Buller, who was unwilling to engage the -enemy in that direction.</p> -<p>The Boers, a small party of whom before Woodgate's death had -climbed the dead ground, and had come <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page107" id="page107"></a>{107}</span> within -fifty yards of the main trench, again attained the outer crest, and -a counter attack led by Thorneycroft in person partially failed, -and although the verge was not wholly abandoned, only the main -trench filled with dead, wounded, and unwounded men parched with -thirst, remained for effective resistance. Woodgate had already -paid the penalty for the hasty and fatal act of squatting down in -an indefensible position, and lay among the other victims strewn -upon the plateau; but the British soldier is not easily discouraged -by the errors of his leaders. The cry "<i>nous sommes trahis</i>" -is never heard from his lips, and when called upon on active -service,</p> -<div class="poem"> -<div class="stanza"> -<p>To live laborious days and shun delights,</p> -</div> -</div> -<p>he rarely fails to do his duty.</p> -<p>At mid-day the situation on Spion Kop was hazardous but not -hopeless. Reinforcements had arrived and were quickly absorbed in -the works which they quickened with patches of new vigour, but the -terrible hail of bullet and shrapnel was not abated. No definite -orders had been given to Clery, who was on the southern crest of -the Rangeworthy Heights, except that he was to "use his discretion -about opening fire against the enemy to his front, with a view to -creating a diversion," a discretion which he exercised by doing -nothing.</p> -<p>Shortly before noon a step was taken by Buller, who was four -miles away on Mount Alice, which enlarged the area of the Fog of -War and brought Spion Kop within its chilling grasp. Thorneycroft -was ordered to take command on the summit with the local rank of -Brigadier-General, although there were several officers present -senior to him: but many hours elapsed before the appointment was -made known to all of those whom it most concerned. Coke, who was -now on the S.W. spur, was unaware of it, and without communicating -with Thorneycroft, sent at 12.50 p.m. to Warren a message which was -not delivered till 2.20 p.m., that as the summit was crowded and -the defence was maintaining <span class="pagenum"><a name="page108" -id="page108"></a>{108}</span> itself, he had stopped further -reinforcements.</p> -<p>Almost simultaneously with the despatch of this not unfavourable -report, and long before it was received by Warren, two companies -posted in a detached trench on the right threw up their hands, but -not before they had lost all their officers. Out of the crest line -sprang the Boers, who having made them prisoners, endeavoured to -impose the surrender upon the men in the main trench.<a id= -"footnotetag27" name="footnotetag27"></a><a href= -"#footnote27"><sup>27</sup></a> Thorneycroft saw that if these -wavered, as they seemed inclined to do, all was lost; and rallying -the details within reach, he succeeded in thrusting back the -intruders, who, however, had already sent their prisoners below the -hill. His prompt action stayed the wave of doubt which threatened -to flood the position, and compelled it to break before it could do -much harm.</p> -<p>At 3.50 p.m. Coke, who was still on the S.W. spur, and therefore -not in direct touch with Thorneycroft, informed Warren that the -enemy was being gradually cleared from the summit, and that he had -been reinforced with the Scottish Rifles from Potgieter's Drift by -Lyttelton, whom Warren, after receiving Crofton's mis-transmitted -message, had ordered to co-operate. He had already forwarded a -letter written at 2.30 p.m. by Thorneycroft, stating that the force -on Spion Kop was being badly punished by artillery, was in want of -water, and was insufficient to hold the position. To this letter he -had added a note of his own which showed that he did not attach -much importance to it, saying that he had ordered more troops on to -the plateau, where "we appear to be holding our own." This letter, -with Coke's covering note, did not reach Warren until after he had -received Coke's message sent nearly an hour later, and he assumed -that the latter indicated the existing hopeful situation with which -he had to deal. Of the physical features of the Spion Kop position -he knew little more than <span class="pagenum"><a name="page109" -id="page109"></a>{109}</span> what his telescope told him, and he -read optimistically the meagre, inconsistent, and misleading -reports which reached him occasionally from the summit. He hoped -during the night to place some naval guns on the plateau: he was -informed that an accessible spring of water had been discovered: -reinforcements were at hand: there was nothing more to be done.</p> -<p>Lyttelton, when ordered to "assist from his side," acted with -intelligence and discernment. Noticing that Spion Kop, whither he -had already dispatched the Scottish Rifles, was full of men, he -sent the King's Royal Rifles towards the flanking position on the -Twin Peaks, and the battalion supported by the naval guns, and -ignoring messages of recall prompted by Buller, who was watching -the advance with anxiety, worked its way up and expelled a -Transvaal contingent and a small body commanded by an Irish -renegade, all of whom were hurled by the impact into a flight of -eight miles. The position was at once entrenched and at 5 p.m. the -right flank of Spion Kop was secured, but only for a time. Again, -as after Lord Dundonald's movement on Acton Holmes, a promising -enterprise was thrown away. Buller had from the first disapproved -of Lyttelton's action, which still more widely distributed his -already scattered command. He was too far away to see its bearing -upon the situation, and now ordered him to recall the King's Royal -Rifles, who after sunset were withdrawn from the position, which -they had so gallantly captured in spite of warnings signalled from -Spion Kop that it was strongly held by the enemy.</p> -<p>On Spion Kop the Fog of War hung more densely than ever. Coke, -who was lame and unable to move freely about the position, believed -that Hill, who had come up with a reinforcement soon after noon, -and who was next in seniority to Crofton, was in command on the -summit. He thought that Crofton had been wounded, and neither saw -Thorneycroft nor knew until the following day that Warren had given -him the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page110" id= -"page110"></a>{110}</span> local rank of Brigadier-General at -Buller's suggestion. Thorneycroft was a junior major in the Army, -having the local rank of Lieutenant-Colonel: and with two colonels -senior to him present as well as a major-general, he was doubtful -as to his status. No instructions reached him from Coke; he was -unaware that the Twin Peaks had been taken by one of Lyttelton's -battalions, and he was without means of signalling to Warren. He -had no information of the measures which were being taken, such as -the dispatch of guns, to make the retention of Spion Kop -possible.</p> -<p>The men on the summit were utterly exhausted by fatigue, hunger, -thirst, want of sleep, and exposure to the summer sun beating down -upon the rocky surface, and their ammunition was running short. At -5.50 p.m. Coke reported "that the situation is extremely critical" -and that the men "would not stand another day's shelling," but it -was two hours before the message reached Warren. He ordered Coke to -come down to consult him. Coke endeavoured to obtain permission by -flash signal to stay where he was, but no oil could be obtained for -the lamp, so regarding the order as imperative, he quitted Spion -Kop at 9.30 p.m., leaving, as he thought, Hill in command. For four -hours he strayed in the Fog of War before he found Warren's Head -Quarters, which had come under shell fire, and which, unknown to -him, had been moved from their original position.</p> -<p>Between 8 and 9, Warren received a letter written at 6.30 p.m. -by Thorneycroft, who reported that the enemy's shell fire rendered -the permanent occupation of Spion Kop impossible, and asked for -instructions.</p> -<p>Coke's departure left the position without a clearly recognized -commander, although he had done little more than attend to and -distribute the supports and reinforcements on the S.W. spur. After -the dispatch of Thorneycroft's letter at 6.30 p.m., the situation -grew more hopeless every minute. The enemy's artillery was out of -reach, the nature of the ground and the want of tools <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page111" id="page111"></a>{111}</span> made it -impossible to cut properly designed trenches, rations and water -were exhausted, and nothing was known of assistance to be brought -up during the night except that a mountain battery, which would be -of little use against the enemy's guns, was at the foot of the -slope.</p> -<p>For these reasons Thorneycroft justified in his official report -his decision to retire from Spion Kop. With the acquiescence of all -the senior officers, except Hill, who could not be found, he -ordered a withdrawal at 10 p.m. The alternative seemed to be a -Majuba surrender next morning. At 10.30 p.m. as the troops were -beginning to move off the hill, he received a letter from Warren, -asking for his views on the situation, and as to the measures to be -adopted. It was now unnecessary to give these, and he sent a brief -reply that he was obliged to abandon Spion Kop as the position was -untenable.</p> -<p>The retirement was not made without protests from Hill and from -Coke's staff officer who was still on the plateau. The former, -eleven hours after Thorneycroft's appointment as Brigadier-General, -believed, as he had every right to do, that he was in command, and -halted the men; the latter sent round a memorandum to the -commanding officers, asserting that there was no authority for the -withdrawal. But the force of Thorneycroft's local rank prevailed, -and the retreat was not stayed. Near the foot of the slope he found -the mountain battery, and met a fatigue party on its way to prepare -emplacements for two naval guns which were coming up, and received -a message from Warren urging him to hold on to the position. It was -too late. Ordering back the party and the battery, he went on to -report himself to Warren, and arrived at Head Quarters almost -simultaneously with Coke.</p> -<p>The Boers meanwhile were greatly discouraged by their expulsion -from the Twin Peaks, and their failure to occupy the main position -on Spion Kop. The guns which had tormented Thorneycroft for so many -hours, <span class="pagenum"><a name="page112" id= -"page112"></a>{112}</span> and which were the chief cause of his -retirement, were withdrawn, and Schalk Burger's commandos oozed -away towards Ladysmith. But there was, however, a stalwart and not -inconsiderable remnant of burghers who responded to Botha's -expostulations, and stood fast as a forlorn hope determined to win -back Spion Kop and the Twin Peaks. Their constancy was rewarded, -and when at sunrise on January 25 they once more climbed the hill, -they found to their astonishment and relief that it was still -held—by more than 300 bodies of their fallen foes.</p> -<p>Such in brief is the tale of Spion Kop so far as it can be -disentangled from the accumulation of messages, orders, reports, -dispatches, and personal accounts, which obscure the subject. Many -of these are inconsistent, not a few contradictory, and sufficient -evidence might be found to support plausibly half a dozen -conflicting theories of the cause of the disaster, and as many -variants of the narrative.</p> -<p>At 2 a.m. Warren heard from Thorneycroft's lips—the -latter's written message sent off at 10.30 p.m. on the previous -evening not having reached him—of the evacuation of Spion -Kop. At sunrise he was joined by Buller, who viewed the situation -in a spirit of philosophic detachment. He had never cordially -approved of the Spion Kop adventure, and was not surprised to hear -that it had failed. Warren was inclined to persevere, but Buller -decided to retire south of the Tugela and assumed the direct -command of the Army, which on January 27 was once more drawn up on -the right bank after an absence of ten days; with most of its -superior officers discredited, with Ladysmith unrelieved, and the -nation at home aghast at the disaster.</p> -<p>The lonely figure of Thorneycroft, the only man of action on the -summit energizing and quickening the defence, stands out -prominently in the confusion, gloom, and half lights of Spion Kop. -Buller's impulsive intervention made him responsible for the -position, and he <span class="pagenum"><a name="page113" id= -"page113"></a>{113}</span> tried to do his best. If the final act -was an error of judgment, there is little doubt that but for -Thorneycroft, the Boers would have rushed the plateau on the -afternoon of January 24. He received no effective support from -Clery and little from Warren, and was out of touch with Coke and -the Colonels. His uncertainty as to his authority caused him to -refrain from exercising it fully until the last moment. For the -pain which the decision to withdraw must have given him, he -deserves much sympathy. But although it was approved of by Buller, -who probably felt bound to support his nominee, it was at least -premature. He might reasonably have expected that an effort would -be made during the night to relieve him, and might have postponed -it for a few hours. It is unjust to judge a man in the light of -eventualities which he could not reasonably be expected to foresee, -but subsequent accounts from the Boer side show that the attack -would not have been renewed the next morning if the enemy had found -the Twin Peaks, for the evacuation of which Buller and not -Thorneycroft was responsible, and Spion Kop still occupied.</p> -<p>Not only the inconvenience, but also the danger of suddenly -conferred local rank were illustrated on January 24. Buller, -hastily concluding from a garbled message that Crofton was -incompetent, asked Warren to put Thorneycroft in charge. -Thorneycroft heard of his appointment orally through an officer who -had chanced to be at the signalling station, and the written -message which never reached him was, it is said, picked up next day -by a Boer! If the exigencies of war should ever require the sudden -promotion of a junior officer to a position of great -responsibility, it should not take effect until all concerned are -notified. The defence of Spion Kop was, during the greater part of -the day, conducted by a syndicate of officers acting severally.</p> -<p>The curtain had fallen, the drama was over, and the critics took -up their pens. With Thorneycroft's report <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page114" id="page114"></a>{114}</span> on the -retirement from Spion Kop began a controversy which lasted for more -than two years. Warren enclosed it in his own report to Buller, -with the suggestion that a Court of Enquiry should be held to -investigate the circumstances of the unauthorized withdrawal, and -in succession each grade of the military hierarchy passed censure -on the grades below. In Buller's covering despatch of January 31 -with which he forwarded to the War Office, through Lord Roberts, -Warren's Spion Kop report, he commented very unfavourably on -Warren's arrangements and disposition of troops; and said that -Thorneycroft had "exercised a wise discretion, and that no -investigation was necessary": while to Warren's general report on -the whole operations of January 17-27, he attached a memorandum to -the Secretary of State for War, "not necessarily for publication," -in which he not only blamed himself for not having taken command on -the 19th, when he saw "that things were not going well," but also -said that he could "never employ Warren again in an independent -command"; as his slowness had allowed the enemy to concentrate and -to increase the force opposed to him more than twenty-fold.</p> -<p>With this accumulation of censure Lord Roberts dealt in his -despatch to Lord Lansdowne of February 13, written at a drift on -the Riet River during the advance on Kimberley. The -Commander-in-Chief confirmed all the censures passed by his -subordinates and added some of his own. Buller was rebuked for not -having intervened when he saw that a most important enterprise was -not being "conducted in the manner which in his opinion would lead -to the attainment of the object in view with the least possible -loss of life on our side"; Warren was reproved because he did not -visit Spion Kop during the crisis, and had instead ordered Coke to -come to him; and while Thorneycroft's gallantry and exertions, -without which the troops would probably have been driven off the -hill during the day, were acknowledged, his action in ordering the -retirement without endeavouring to communicate with Coke or Warren -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page115" id= -"page115"></a>{115}</span> was pronounced to be a "wholly -inexcusable assumption of responsibility and authority."</p> -<p>Never before had such an inconvenient batch of despatches been -laid upon the desks of Pall Mall. To publish them and to proclaim -to the world that the Natal Generals, when they were beaten by the -enemy, had began to fight among themselves, was impossible. If they -were withheld from publication, many awkward questions would be -asked. The War Office temporized, and endeavoured to steer a middle -course. Would Buller kindly substitute a simple narrative for his -despatch? This Buller refused to do, and in April, 1900, the War -Office published the despatches, imperfectly sterilized. As they -now appeared, they were neither a simple narrative, nor a full -revelation. Lord Roberts' criticisms on Buller were cut out. The -memorandum, "not necessarily for publication," in which Buller -reflected severely on Warren's incapacity was withheld. Only the -censure passed upon Thorneycroft was allowed to appear. The junior -officer was made the scapegoat of his superiors' mistakes. Of all -the officers concerned, he alone had failed. The War Office had -taken a politic but not straightforward course. The blame must be -laid upon some one, and if it were laid upon Thorneycroft alone it -would affect public opinion less mischievously.</p> -<p>It soon became suspected, however, that certain things were -being kept back, and the controversy dragged on for two years; -Buller to the end maintaining that as he was not present at, nor in -command of, the Spion Kop operations, it was not incumbent on him -to write a simple narrative of them; and that his duty was to write -a critical account of the affair, such as would be sent in by an -Umpire in Chief during peace manoeuvres.</p> -<p>Not until April, 1902, did the Epilogue of the Tragedy of Errors -appear. The despatches, with the memorandum "not necessarily for -publication," were published in full, as well as the "Secret -Orders" given to Warren at Springfield, which were its -Prologue.</p> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote26" name= -"footnote26"></a><b>Footnote 26:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag26">(return)</a> -<p>A detachment numbering about 600 only was sent.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote27" name= -"footnote27"></a><b>Footnote 27:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag27">(return)</a> -<p>In the Fog of War some of the British soldiers thought that the -Boers were coming up to surrender themselves, and acted in this -belief for a brief period.</p> -</blockquote> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page116" id= -"page116"></a>{116}</span> -<h2><a name="chap6" id="chap6">CHAPTER VI</a></h2> -<h3>More Tugela Troubles</h3> -<p>By a process of elimination Buller hoped in time to find the -road to Ladysmith. He had tried in succession, but without success, -Colenso, Potgieter's Drift, and Trickhardt's Drift. He now informed -White that he intended to make another attempt, but Lord Roberts -advised him to postpone it until his own advance should draw off -the Free Staters and weaken the barrier on the line of the -Tugela.</p> -<p>The situation in the besieged town was growing worse every day, -but a proposal made by White as well as by the War Office that the -garrison should endeavour to break out, was not sanctioned by Lord -Roberts. White also was opposed to Buller's making another attempt -to cross the Tugela, as he considered that the force would be more -usefully employed in preventing the enemy from concentrating on -Ladysmith.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-vaalkrantz">Map, p. 98.</a></p> -<p>Buller's new plan was an advance by way of Vaalkrantz. Here the -river winds in two salient loops towards the north, with a -re-entrant loop between them, and there is a slight break in the -heights on the left bank. The Brakfontein ridge slopes down towards -Vaalkrantz Hill, between which and Green Hill there is a dip -through which a road passes on to the open ground towards -Ladysmith, eleven miles distant.</p> -<p>Buller proposed to occupy the ridge of Vaalkrantz with -artillery, and after a feint attack on the Boer position on -Brakfontein, to push through under cover of <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page117" id="page117"></a>{117}</span> the guns. -It was believed that the enemy's extreme left lay on Vaalkrantz, -which was commanded by Mount Alice and Zwart Kop. Lord Roberts when -informed of the project was not hopeful of its success, but did not -veto it, although he thought that Buller would be better advised to -abstain from offensive tactics.</p> -<p>The feint attack on Brakfontein was to be made by seven Field -Batteries and a Brigade of Infantry, and was to be continued long -enough to convince the enemy that it was "meant". It was then to be -withdrawn and the real attack set in motion. The advance of the -feint would be covered by heavy guns posted on Mount Alice, and -concealed batteries on Zwart Kop would open on Vaalkrantz in -support of the real attack.</p> -<p>The bulk of the infantry was posted in the east loop, so as to -appear ready to cross the river and support the feint attack -between the loops. As soon as the guns had driven the enemy into -their trenches on Brakfontein, a pontoon bridge was to be thrown -across the river south of Hunger's Drift, and the guns on Zwart Kop -were to open on Vaalkrantz, and when this had been sufficiently -bombarded, it would be carried by the infantry, and guns would be -brought up to enfilade the Boer line; while the cavalry "when -feasible" would push through under the ridge and threaten it from -the rear.</p> -<p>It was a pretty tactical scheme, with much of the War-Game about -it, and it depended for its success upon the practicability of -using Vaalkrantz as an artillery position, and upon the correctness -of the assumption that the enemy was not in force eastward of -it.</p> -<p>Buller was not successful in placing his guns on Zwart Kop -unnoticed by the enemy, who was warned in time. After Spion Kop, -Botha went to Pretoria, and Schalk Burger took furlough. B. Viljoen -was now in command. He saw the danger and applied to Joubert at -Ladysmith for help, who thought he was over-anxious <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page118" id="page118"></a>{118}</span> but sent -him a heavy gun. Little however would have been done but for the -intervention of the two civilian Presidents. Steyn appealed to -Kruger who, having tried without success to induce Joubert to take -command on the Upper Tugela, fell in with Steyn's suggestion that -Martin Prinsloo, a Free Stater, should go there; and Botha was -ordered back from Pretoria. Prinsloo took command of the -Brakfontein position, Viljoen remaining on Vaalkrantz.</p> -<p>At sunrise on February 5 began Buller's third attempt to relieve -Ladysmith. Wynne, who had succeeded Woodgate in command of the 11th -Brigade, advanced in two lines up the slope towards Brakfontein, -supported by the fire of forty-four guns. Nearly six hours passed -before any reply was vouchsafed by the enemy. At mid-day some guns -on Wynne's left front opened on the batteries, but not a shot was -fired by the Boers in the trenches.</p> -<p>Already one field battery had been detached from the left of the -line of guns, the first movement in the real attack, and had taken -up a position to cover the pontoon troop which was throwing a -bridge across the Tugela near Hunger's Drift. At noon the -completion of the bridge was signalled to the feint attack. The -batteries fronting the Brakfontein ridge were withdrawn, and -Wynne's brigade which, having been marched up the slope, was now -marched down again, came under a heavy but almost innocuous -infantry fire, which at last broke out on Brakfontein.</p> -<p>To the Boers it appeared that another attack, determined while -it lasted, but devoid of backbone, had been kept at bay. The guns -on Zwart Kop opened on Vaalkrantz as soon as the detached battery -was seen to be in motion; and the other batteries came into action -as they arrived from the Brakfontein demonstration. There was some -annoyance from casual rifle fire and a Maxim posted on the heights -S.E. of the loop, but it did not seriously interfere with the work -of the bridge-builders.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page119" id= -"page119"></a>{119}</span> -<p>The rules of the game were strictly obeyed, and there was "a -thorough preparation by artillery" before the infantry was allowed -to advance. The movement was delayed until half a hundred guns were -playing upon Vaalkrantz and the chance of a <i>celer et audax</i> -exploit was lost. At 2 p.m. Lyttelton with two battalions of the -4th Brigade was permitted to cross the pontoon and with these he -worked up under the protection of the left bank, and emerging upon -Munger's Farm, rose thence to the southern edge of Vaalkrantz, and -took hold of the ridge. Here he was joined by a battalion of -Hildyard's Brigade, whose original orders to occupy Green Hill were -cancelled, and later on by the remaining battalions of his own -brigade; which Buller, wavering for a time, had held back, as the -pontoon and the open ground were under fire from the right flank. -At 4 p.m. Lyttelton was established on the main hill of Vaalkrantz, -and during the night the position was entrenched. The occupation, -however, brought two facts to light. Half a mile to the north of -the main hill was another hill, only a few feet lower, -unapproachable and in the enemy's possession; and it was not -practicable, as Buller had hoped, to bring up artillery on to the -position seized by Lyttelton.</p> -<p>At daylight on February 6, the situation was favourable to the -Boers. Botha had arrived and had taken over the command from -Prinsloo. The heavy gun sent from Ladysmith had been mounted on -Doom Kop, which was now held by reinforcements under L. Meyer; -other good positions east of Vaalkrantz had been strengthened; and -some of the guns on the Brakfontein position had been moved round. -Vaalkrantz standing between Doorn Kop and the Twin Peaks, was -shelled simultaneously from the left front, and the right rear, as -well as from Green Hill;<a id="footnotetag28" name= -"footnotetag28"></a><a href="#footnote28"><sup>28</sup></a> it -seemed as if Spion Kop were about to be repeated.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page120" id= -"page120"></a>{120}</span> -<p>Buller opened on Green Hill with artillery, and on the hill -north of the main hill of Vaalkrantz, in the hope of making the -North Hill assailable. In view of a retirement, a pontoon bridge -was, at Lyttelton's request, thrown across the river under the main -ridge. He discouraged a proposal made by Buller to attack the North -Hill by a force creeping along the foot of the westward slope of -Vaalkrantz, covered by fire from the ridge.</p> -<p>Buller was now stalemated. The artillery fire had not cleared -the way to the North Hill, and Lyttelton was unable to move on it, -but he said that he could hold on for the rest of the day if no -more artillery were brought to bear on him from the S.E.</p> -<p>Finally Buller determined to shift the responsibility. He -reported the capture of Vaalkrantz to Lord Roberts, and in effect -asked what he should do with the white elephant. To carry out his -plan would "cost from 2,000 to 3,000 men," and he was "not -confident of success." Was Ladysmith worth it? Yes, replied Lord -Roberts without hesitation, Ladysmith was worth it and it must be -done.</p> -<p>In the evening Lyttelton, having thwarted an attempt by the -enemy to recover Vaalkrantz, was relieved by Hildyard. On the -following afternoon, Buller, in spite of Lord Roberts' message, -made up his mind to withdraw. Further reconnaissances had shown -that the North Hill, even if taken, could hardly be held. A council -of war was summoned, at which, as might have been anticipated, Hart -alone was for persevering, and at which Warren again put forward -the scheme rejected by Buller at Frere, but now gladly adopted by -him, of advancing on Ladysmith by way of Hlangwhane.</p> -<p>Orders were issued for the withdrawal of the force from -Vaalkrantz during the night. It was skilfully carried out, and -Buller was once more ferrying his men across the Tugela, having for -the third time failed to reach Ladysmith.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page121" id= -"page121"></a>{121}</span> -<p>On February 8 the Army was retracing its steps on the road by -which four weeks before it had marched from Springfield to -Potgieter's Drift; and on the 11th it was concentrated at -Chieveley, from which eight weeks before it had been thrown at the -Colenso heights. All the Tugela operations had been conducted in a -rarified medium. Want of determination, want of system, the absence -of maps, the lack of a sufficient staff, were responsible for two -months of misadventure. Buller, like the Boers, was easily -discouraged by failure, but unlike them was unable to quicken -himself readily for a renewed effort. He lost confidence in -himself, and then in his subordinates. Like a nervous child, he -opened the door of a dark chamber, but was afraid to enter. The -terror of the unknown drove him back in a panic. When his plans, -which were usually well thought out, miscarried, he became peevish, -and scarcely made an attempt to reconstruct them. Only an Army of -which the backbone was the stolid, unimaginative Englishman of the -lower classes, and which believed that its leader was doing his -best, could have remained undemoralized by the campaign on the -Tugela.</p> -<p>Buller possessed one quality which to a great extent outweighed -his shortcomings as a military commander: namely the power of -inspiring confidence. His men believed in him, and would do -anything for him. They liked him for his bluff, John-Bullish, and -rampant manner. The enlisted man is a curious differentiation from -the class to which he belongs. His democratic instincts become less -acute when he shoulders the Lee-Metford, and he readily -accommodates himself to the will of a benevolent despot of robust -appearance, and blunt and somewhat contemptuous address; whom in -fact he prefers to the ascetic, dispassionate General Officer of -quiet habit and speech.</p> -<p>The criticisms passed upon Buller were far more friendly in the -men's than in the officers' bivouacs. Possibly the men's opinions, -as being the more natural <span class="pagenum"><a name="page122" -id="page122"></a>{122}</span> and spontaneous, were also the more -correct. The enemy conducted the war upon principles which were -strange to the British Army, and to which it had to adapt itself -painfully; and the men seem to have recognized sooner than the -professors the difficulties of the situation, and to have been less -intolerant of ill-success.</p> -<p>Few general officers have ever revealed in their official -communications more of the workings and the moods of their minds -than did Buller in Natal. His telegrams and despatches always -reflected the thoughts of the moment. After the Colenso fight, he -candidly referred to it as my "unfortunate undertaking of to-day." -Six days before the Vaalkrantz affair he told Lord Roberts that -"this time I feel fairly confident of success"; and on the eve of -the attack he said that "while I have every hope of success, I am -not quite certain of it."</p> -<p>After the retirement, it was, "wherever I turn I come upon the -enemy in superior force to my own." He subjected his personal and -individual ideas and feelings to no restraint, and they -incontinently leavened all his messages which were now confident, -now diffident, and now querulous, and which read as if they were -quotations from his private diary. From Vaalkrantz he heliographed -to White that the enemy was too strong for him, and that the -"Bulwana big gun is here"; and could White suggest anything better -than an advance by way of Hlangwhane? In his telegrams from -Chieveley to Lord Roberts, he complained of want of support, and of -the feebleness of the resistance made by the Ladysmith garrison, -which he professed to believe did not detain more than 2,000 men. -Yet in recording his weakness, it must in justice be said that he -gained and never lost the confidence of the rank and file of the -relieving force, and that under any other leader it would probably -have succumbed to its misfortunes.</p> -<p>On February 12 the re-concentration of Buller's Army at -Chieveley was complete. The enemy's front had been greatly -strengthened since the attack on <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page123" id="page123"></a>{123}</span> Colenso. The Boers saw what -Buller could not be persuaded to believe, that Hlangwhane was the -key of the position, and extended their line thence in a curve -through Green Hill and Monte Cristo, with a detached post outside -it on Cingolo. These four hills and the ground between them Buller -proposed to occupy, and then pass between Cingolo and Monte Cristo -to a drift of the Tugela N.E. of Monte Cristo, cross the river and -advance by the Klip Riyer on Bulwana. The two "iron bridges" at -Colenso were impassable, but the Boers had thrown a bridge across -near Naval Hill by which, and also by a ferry higher up, -communication was kept up with their left flank.</p> -<p>The initial movement on February 12 was made appropriately -enough by Dundonald, who two months before had seen the value of -the Hlangwhane position, and who now perhaps as he marched out, -realized the truth of the proverb <i>tout vient à ce qui -sait attendre</i>. He occupied Hussar Hill temporarily as a -reconnaissance to give Buller an opportunity of surveying the -ground over which he was about to operate. The Intelligence -officers reported that the enemy was strongly posted at several -points within the area and unmasked some of his slim tricks. In -order to conceal the line of the trenches, the excavated earth was -piled up some distance towards the front, and tents not intended -for occupation were pitched to divert fire from the positions in -which he lay. The war-craft which comes by instinct to -nationalities not in an advanced state of civilization and leading -simple lives face to face with wild animals and native tribes, and -which the conventionally trained European soldier only learns by -experience, strengthened the Boer commandos without an augmentation -of individuals liable to be killed or wounded. The veld trenches -which kept Methuen at arm's length at Magersfontein and the Boer -devices on the Tugela seem to show that War is not a Science, but -an Art, easily acquired by unprofessional soldiers.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page124" id= -"page124"></a>{124}</span> -<p>On February 14 the movement began and a front at Hussar Hill was -taken up, but owing to the heat and the scarcity of water, little -was done during the next two days, except a bombardment of the Boer -trenches and gun positions. The advance of the relieving force has -been likened to the deliberate progression of a steam roller.</p> -<p>Clery having been invalided, the IInd Division was temporarily -under the command of Lyttelton, whose orders for February 17 were -to move upon Cingolo Nek and Green Hill. Dundonald was instructed -to work in rear of the infantry and outflank any detachment of the -enemy that might appear on the Nek. But Dundonald was not a -military pedant devoid of initiative and tied to the letter of his -instructions, and when the difficulties of the ground broke the -touch between him and Lyttelton he was perhaps not sorry to find -himself disengaged; and when he saw that the Boers were entrenched -on Cingolo Ridge, he attacked instead of outflanking it.</p> -<p>While the commando on the ridge was occupied with the infantry, -it was suddenly surprised from the flank by Dundonald's men, and -was driven out of the trenches. Meanwhile one of Lyttelton's -battalions, which in ignorance of Dundonald's movement, had been -sent to clear Cingolo of some Boers who were firing on the advance -and checking it, found when it reached the ridge that it had been -forestalled in the capture.</p> -<p>When Lyttelton became aware that the enemy had been expelled, he -proposed to avail himself of the success without delay, and push on -to the Nek and Monte Cristo, while Warren's Vth Division attacked -Green Hill; but Buller objected to an advance which could not be -completed before nightfall. Lyttelton bivouacked S.W. of the ridge -and Dundonald on the detached hill at its northern end. During the -night, field guns were brought up the slopes and with much -difficulty emplaced in a position from which shell fire could be -directed on Monte Cristo.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page125" id= -"page125"></a>{125}</span> -<p>If the movement of the day was not remarkable for speed and -enterprise, it was at least directed with skill and without -excessive caution; and Dundonald showed that his military spirit -had not been chilled by previous rebuffs, one of them administered -almost on the spot where he was now in activity.</p> -<p>At daylight on February 18, the movement was resumed, the -immediate objective being the capture of Monte Cristo and Green -Hill. One brigade was sent through the Nek on to the eastward -slopes of Monte Cristo, while the other attacked the hill from the -south. With the help of the ever-ready Dundonald the IInd Division -established itself on the main hill of the ridge early in the -afternoon. The Fusilier Brigade of the Vth Division was meanwhile -acting in support; and advancing as soon as Monte Cristo was seen -to be occupied, easily took hold of Green Hill. The enemy was now -expelled from all the positions commanding the proposed line of -advance over the Nek, and was retreating westward towards the -positions near the right bank of the Tugela, but no attempt was -made to pursue him. The motto of Buller's Army was <i>festina -lente</i> and its track towards Ladysmith was in zigzag.</p> -<p>On the following day Hlangwhane was occupied by the British -troops, and before noon on February 20, all the Boers had withdrawn -to the left bank of the Tugela, and Buller was favourably placed -for the advance by way of the Klip River on Bulwana. A -reconnaissance, however, caused him to change his mind and to -resume the movement at an acute angle by doubling back towards -Hlangwhane and crossing the river by a pontoon bridge west of the -hill.</p> -<p>His new plan was to capture a position between the Onderbroek -and Langewacht Spruits, which appeared from a distance to be one -hill, but which in reality was two, Wynne's Hill and Horseshoe -Hill, which were separated by a donga. On the morning of February -21 he signalled his intentions to White, saying that he -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page126" id= -"page126"></a>{126}</span> thought he had "only a rearguard before -him"<a id="footnotetag29" name="footnotetag29"></a><a href= -"#footnote29"><sup>29</sup></a> and that he hoped to be in -Ladysmith next day.</p> -<p>After the capture of Monte Cristo and the Hlangwhane position, -some of the commandos seem to have trekked away towards the north, -and even Botha for a time appears to have lost heart and to have -suggested to Joubert that the siege of Ladysmith should be raised. -The Boer leaders had already, like King Arthur,</p> -<div class="poem"> -<div class="stanza"> -<p>Heard the steps of Modred in the west,</p> -</div> -</div> -<p>and their army in Natal had been weakened, before Buller's final -advance, by the departure of commandos going to succour their -brethren not only on the Modder, but also in the Cape Colony.</p> -<p>The situation on the Tugela was reported to Pretoria almost -simultaneously with the news that Cronje was hemmed in at -Paardeberg. But owing it may be to the distance which intervened -between Kruger and the scene of action, the dour old -<i>voortrekker</i> of Colesberg would not hear of any voluntary -retirement before the enemy who had driven him out of the Cape -Colony sixty years before. He sent an appeal to the Boers of the -Tugela which, in an intense human document, displayed his steadfast -and touching faith, and which might have been addressed by his -prototype Cromwell to the Ironsides.</p> -<p>He rebuked the burghers for their cowardice, which he attributed -to the waning of their trust in the power of the Almighty to help -them in their distress, and with many instances and quotations from -Holy Writ, he adjured them to stand fast in faith. He was confident -that the cause which he in all sincerity believed to be the cause -of the Church of Christ would prevail in the end, and justifiably -encouraged by successes in the field against superior numbers he -exhorted the commandos to endure without flinching the purification -by fire. Kruger's passionate appeal availed, and the <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page127" id="page127"></a>{127}</span> waverers -returned to their posts. The incident disclosed the power of the -factor of moral force, wherein the Boer strength lay; and it will -in a great measure account for the prolongation of the war. When -their cause seemed hopeless, they comforted themselves with the -honest and irradicable belief that its righteousness was the -assurance of final success. Though most of their leaders were -incompetent, though they themselves were easily discouraged; -disobeyed orders; often malingered and mutinied; quitted the field -with their wagons which they were reluctant to abandon, under such -frivolous pretexts that the <i>verlafpest</i> or leave-plague -became a bye-word; though time after time their power of resistance -seemed to be exhausted; though in their thousands they were -distributed over the British Empire as prisoners of war; though -their confident expectation of European intervention was not -realized; though they were always greatly outnumbered; they -continued stubbornly to defy for the space of two years and seven -months the most numerous and the most efficient Army which has ever -left the shores of Great Britain, until at last they were worn down -by mechanical friction and attrition, and not by the stroke of war. -When the Boers were driven out of the Hlangwhane positions, they -took up a new position facing S.E. on the left bank of the Tugela. -Their right was near the head of Hart's loop, and their centre came -within a few hundred yards of the river at Wynne's Hill, whence the -line was carried on towards Pieter's Hill.</p> -<p>At noon on February 21 Buller began once more to send his men -across the Tugela, intending to content himself that day with -establishing his force "comfortably" on the position north of the -railway bridge enclosed by the bend of the river, which was now -free of the enemy. He ordered Talbot Coke with the 10th Brigade of -Warren's Division to pass over the Colenso Kopjes on to the open -ground beyond, from which the Onderbroek valley could be enfiladed -by artillery. He had <span class="pagenum"><a name="page128" id= -"page128"></a>{128}</span> received information that the enemy were -there in force, and in the belief that "what Boers there were, were -hiding in that kloof," he changed his plan of moving northwards at -once on Wynne's Hill.</p> -<p>On February 21 Coke advanced in three lines, but soon after he -had cleared the hilly ground, his scouting line came under fire -from the Grobelaar slopes, and his right flank was also involved -from the direction of Wynne's Hill. His Brigade was pinned to the -ground by rifle and shell fire until nightfall, when it was retired -to the Colenso Kopjes, where Wynne's Brigade of Warren's Division -had arrived during the afternoon.</p> -<a name="fig-ladysmith-advance" id="fig-ladysmith-advance"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image09.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image09.png" -alt="Map of the Final Advance on Ladysmith" /></a></div> -<p>The route march to Ladysmith was checked. Instead of a mere -rearguard to be driven in, as Buller had fondly believed, a -strongly posted line, extending nearly four miles S.W. from Wynne's -Hill, had to be attacked. The enemy had been so much encouraged by -the failure of Coke's movement, that Botha telegraphed to Kruger -that he had hopes of a "great reverse."</p> -<p>Warren thought that it would be necessary to diverge from the -advance and take the Grobelaar slopes, and White reported that Boer -reinforcements were coming in <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page129" id="page129"></a>{129}</span> from the north. Towards -evening on February 21, it seemed not unlikely that another -Colenso, Spion Kop, or Vaalkrantz would soon be debited to Buller. -The line of approach to Ladysmith was held by the enemy, and the -British Army of relief, the greater part of which had crossed to -the left bank of the Tugela, was entangled in the Colenso Kopjes, -and the river loop.</p> -<p>Warren's general idea for the 22nd, of which Buller approved, -was to attack Wynne's Hill with the 11th Brigade, leaving Horseshoe -Hill to be dealt with by the artillery. Although the Boers on the -Grobelaar slopes had been well pounded for some hours by the field -batteries, Wynne considered that it would be unsafe to advance -unless these slopes were actually taken, but he was overruled. He -had also been promised support on his left rear, but only two of -the battalions detailed for the purpose were at hand and these were -fully occupied in offering a front to the Boers on Grobelaar, while -the movement was in progress; and he advanced against the enemy's -centre unsupported except by the long range fire of a brigade on -Naval Hill across the river.</p> -<p>He had expected that the promised supports would secure his left -flank by seizing Horseshoe Hill, and in default he was compelled to -detach a portion of his own scanty force against it. At sunset the -cutting edge of the advancing wedge was touching the enemy, but was -unable to break into him, and Briton and Boer were face to face on -Wynne's Hill and on Horseshoe Hill.</p> -<p>Reinforcements were brought up and defences were constructed -during the night, while the Boers continually fired upon the -confused units labouring in the darkness. The enemy had an -entrenched position on Hart's Hill which enfiladed Wynne's Hill, -and which Warren had not been able to take, as Buller hoped, with -the 11th Brigade.</p> -<p>Next morning the 5th Brigade under Hart, which was in reserve -near the river loop, was sent against <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page130" id="page130"></a>{130}</span> Hart's -Hill. He advanced, wherever possible, under cover of the steep left -bank of the river along a trail so narrow that the men were -compelled often to move in single file; and at one place, where the -Langewacht Spruit enters the Tugela, it was necessary to make a -detour and cross the spruit by the railway bridge, and to quit the -dead ground and emerge on to a defile under heavy fire. The advance -of the Brigade was retarded by the stringing out of the battalions, -and from time to time Hart's Hill was shelled without seriously -harming the enemy, who as usual was not posted on the apparent -crest, but some distance in rear of it.</p> -<p>Two battalions of the 4th Brigade, which had been lent to Hart, -were so far behind that as only two or three hours of daylight -remained, he decided to attack without them. For impetuous -gallantry the advance of the Irish regiments was not surpassed by -any other exploit in the War. Working up on difficult ground to the -sound of the Regimental calls, and then almost brought to a -standstill by the barbed wire fences of the railway, which became a -trap of death, they rushed the slope, pushing the enemy's outposts -before them, and won the crest: and then in the failing light which -compelled the supporting artillery to discontinue the bombardment -and relieve the enemy from the pressure of shrapnel, they saw the -Boer positions still above them. The crest was false.</p> -<p>It was a cruel disappointment to brave men who had struggled so -well, but they did not flinch. A charge was made across the -plateau, but it soon was withered by fire and few of the men -reached the Boer trenches. Two more battalions of the 4th Brigade -arrived at dawn, but the reinforcement came too late. The troops -were reorganized, as far as possible, on the slope leading down -from the crest, but were eventually compelled to retire across the -railway to the lower ground by flanking fire, which Hart succeeded -in silencing, and was able to reoccupy the dead ground below the -false crest with fresh troops.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page131" id= -"page131"></a>{131}</span> -<p>The failure of the attack did not deter Buller from pursuing his -plan, and on February 24 he proposed to renew it and to operate -against Railway Hill, which stands fourth in the line of hills -running in a N.E. direction from Horseshoe Hill to Pieter's Hill; -but by Hart's suggestion the movement was postponed, and in the -end, abandoned. The greater part of his Brigade was dangerously and -densely posted on the lower ground, and when during the night a -surprise party of Boers opened fire, there was some fear of a -general panic. The situation was precarious. The Boer line had not -been pierced: on each side it outflanked Buller and fronted the -Tugela loops in which the greater portion of his force was huddled. -It was fortunate for him that DeWet had gone to the Modder.</p> -<p>On the night of February 24 began the third movement in zigzag. -The general direction of the first was N.E.; of the second W.S.W.; -of the third East. It was discovered that there was a path by which -troops could pass east of Naval Hill down to the right bank out of -the enemy's reach, and that they could cross the Tugela by pontoon. -Buller then determined to transfer the bulk of his force back to -the Hlangwhane side of the river over the pontoon bridge by which -he had crossed to the left bank three days before. The plan -involved not only the concentration of a clubbed and unwieldy force -on the right bank, but also the necessity of keeping it there until -the passage of the last detail allowed the pontoon bridge to be -taken up and moved to the new place of crossing, three miles -below.</p> -<p>An armistice, restricted to the arena of the recent fighting, -was granted by the Boers on February 25, for the purpose of -bringing away the wounded and burying the dead; and during the -barter of news on the very narrow strip which separated the British -fallen from the enemy's positions, the burghers refused to believe -that Cronje was surrounded at Paardeberg, and retorted that -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page132" id= -"page132"></a>{132}</span> Lord Roberts had lost all his transport -and supplies at Waterval Drift, and was helpless.</p> -<p>The cessation of the music of war during the armistice dismayed -the garrison of Ladysmith, which feared that it must indicate -another failure; for owing to spies and the leakage of plans, -Buller was afraid of informing White fully of his position and -intentions, and during the final advance he usually restricted -himself in his heliograms to the expression of his hopes or to the -reasons for their non-fulfilment.</p> -<p>On the enemy's side, in spite of a strong line held in -sufficient numbers, the moral position was weak. Botha, who -commanded the Boer right, distrusted Meyer, who was in charge of -the threatened left. The war-sick burghers skulked in their -laagers, and it is said that even necessary movements within the -line were not ordered, from a fear lest the burgher, when once on -his feet, would march in the direction which soonest took him out -of his enemy's reach. To Botha, Buller's retirement across the -Tugela came as a gleam of hope. If it did not signify a retreat, as -he suggested to Joubert, it at least indicated that the attack on -the line of hills would not be immediately renewed.</p> -<p>On February 26, the preparations for the fifth attempt to -relieve Ladysmith were completed. Horse, Field, Howitzer, Mountain, -and Naval Guns, to the number of nearly three score and ten, were -in position on the northern features of Hlangwhane, Naval Hill and -Fuzzy Hill, and also on Clump Hill, N.W. of Monte Cristo. The -relieving force was arranged in two commands; the troops west of -the Langewacht Spruit being placed under Lyttelton, the rest being -assigned to Warren. On Hlangwhane was Barton with the 6th Fusilier -Brigade; and W. Kitchener, now in command of the 11th Brigade, was -also on the right bank. On the left bank near Hart's Hill were -Norcott and Hart with the 4th and 5th Brigades. Under Lyttelton was -the 2nd Brigade, the 10th Brigade, though in his section, being -placed under Warren's orders.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page133" id= -"page133"></a>{133}</span> -<p>On the previous day, a mounted brigade had been sent to the east -to deal with an expedition under Erasmus against the British lines -of communication south of Colenso. He led it timidly, and it was -easily checked, and the brigade was brought back to the river.</p> -<p>Buller's scheme for the operations of February 27, was an attack -on Pieter's Hill by Barton, followed in succession by attacks on -Railway Hill by Kitchener, and on Hart's Hill by Norcott, supported -by artillery fire from the positions on the right bank. By the -evening of February 26 the troops for the main attack had recrossed -the Tugela, and the pontoon bridge west of Hlangwhane could now be -removed. Early in the forenoon of February 27, it was thrown over -the river S.E. of Hart's Hill, where the left bank afforded a -covered way of approach to Pieter's Hill, and the fourth and final -member of the zigzag advance was traced, on this occasion towards -the north. For the seventh time Buller ferried the Tugela with his -men, who impelled alternately by the impulse of his initiative and -by the resilience of the enemy, had been tossed like a tennis ball -from bank to bank at Trickhardt's Drift, Vaalkrantz, and -Hlangwhane, yet whom nothing could dishearten. As they heard the -news of Cronje's surrender at Paardeberg, they were crossing the -newly placed pontoon bridge, and on it they set up a signpost -bearing the legend "To Ladysmith."</p> -<p>Barton led the way across the bridge, then turning to the right, -crept down the left bank of the river for two miles, and mounted -the slopes of Pieter's Hill, when he became aware of the great -strength of the Boer position. It was hedged in by a river, a -wooded donga, and a valley; along its westward face ran a line of -kopjes, ending in a detached rocky hill; and it was supported by -fire from Railway Hill. The nearer kopjes were carried without much -difficulty, but a sweeping movement to clear the plateau as with -the swing of a scythe, was checked by heavy fire from the east, and -failed to <span class="pagenum"><a name="page134" id= -"page134"></a>{134}</span> gather in the rocky hill which commanded -the outlying kopjes, and which the enemy succeeded in reinforcing -during the fight, and in holding for several hours.</p> -<p>Until the development of the attack on Railway Hill by -Kitchener, Barton's Fusiliers were able to do little more than -maintain themselves, as their reserves had been absorbed and their -ammunition was running short. A final attempt was made, with -partial success, at the close of the day, to occupy the rocky hill, -but at the cost of many casualties. The enemy was not entirely -expelled, but those who remained disappeared during the night.</p> -<p>Kitchener followed in Barton's track as far as the gorge which -separates Pieter's from Railway Hill. In spite of the Boer rifles -and of the shrapnel of the British gunners on the right bank -playing upon the Hill, whose attention was eventually drawn to the -situation by the bold advance of two companies to a position from -which they could be seen and recognized through the gunners' -telescopes, the eastward edge of Railway Hill was won. But a -portion of Kitchener's command in rear was magnetically attracted -away from the direction of the advance by a flanking fire from -Hart's Hill and, by diverging towards it, broke the continuity of -the line facing the position entrenched by the Boers. Kitchener -was, however, able to fill the gap, and he expelled the burghers, -most of whom fled before the charge got home; and Railway Hill was -won.</p> -<p>Norcott's Brigade was nearer to its objective than either of the -brigades which had preceded it, as it was lying south of Hart's -Hill between the railway and the river; and although deprived of a -considerable portion of his command by a demand for help which -purported to have come from Railway Hill, he finished his task in -three hours. He toiled up the dead ground to the apparent crest of -Hart's Hill, and then came face to face with the higher position, -which three days before had so cruelly baffled the Irish Brigade. -But the Boers <span class="pagenum"><a name="page135" id= -"page135"></a>{135}</span> were not now in a mood to stay. The -shrapnel from the right bank, which they had not to meet when Hart -charged across from the crest in the failing light, was now hailing -on them. All but a few stalwarts took to flight, and Hart's Hill -was taken before sunset on February 27.</p> -<p>The capture of the hills supervening on the bad news from -Paardeberg shattered the Boer Armies in Natal. Botha's left had -been defeated; and although his right had not been seriously -attacked by Lyttelton, but only prevented from effectively -reinforcing the hill positions, it fell away towards the north. He -was not able to stay the general retreat, but he hoped at least to -join Joubert and cover it with the aid of the besieging force. -Joubert, however, had already raised the Siege and was retreating -towards Elandslaagte.</p> -<p>Next morning Barton on Pieter's Hill vainly appealed for -permission to press forward, but Buller would only put the two -mounted Brigades under Dundonald and Burn-Murdoch on to the enemy's -trail. Dundonald made for Ladysmith, and Burn-Murdoch was -instructed to act on the right front towards Bulwana, but was soon -called upon to assist Dundonald in driving in a Boer rearguard. He -then resumed his advance, and from the east covered Dundonald, who -being fired on from Bulwana thought it advisable to send his -Brigade to a safer position in rear, and having done so, rode on at -the head of a body of colonial troops, and as the sun was setting -on February 28, marched into Ladysmith and ended the four months' -Siege. It was a fitting exploit to be performed by the grandson of -that Lord Cochrane who at Aix Roads nearly a century before had -similarly chafed and strained at the leash of a superior officer's -reluctance.<a id="footnotetag30" name="footnotetag30"></a><a href= -"#footnote30"><sup>30</sup></a> Burn-Murdoch came into action with -a <span class="pagenum"><a name="page136" id= -"page136"></a>{136}</span> rearguard covering Bulwana, which was -evacuated during the night. He bivouacked near the Klip River, and -next morning proposed to pursue the enemy, but Buller whistled him -to heel. The relieving force advanced with deliberation, and on -March 3, entered Ladysmith, and unravelled the Natal entanglement -which at one time seemed likely to wreck the South African -Campaign.</p> -<p>The flight of the Boers continued for three days. Ladysmith, -which lay directly in the line of the retreat, divided it into two -streams, one of which flowed towards the Drakensberg, while the -other went in the direction of Elandslaagte and Glencoe, some of -the fugitives not outspanning until they reached Newcastle. So -great was the demoralization that Kruger hurried down from Pretoria -to Glencoe in the hope of staying it. He succeeded in persuading -the burghers to hold the line of the Biggarsberg, but was almost -immediately summoned away to the arena in the west; and only a few -hours after he was upbraiding the fugitives from Ladysmith and the -Tugela for their irresolution and want of faith, the fugitives of -the Modder were streaming past him at Poplar Grove.</p> -<p>Buller has been severely criticized for allowing the Boers to -retreat unpursued, taking with them all but two of their guns. -Assuming however that his appreciation of the situation was -correct, he probably acted wisely. He thought that his first duty -was to put food into Ladysmith. All his guns, except one Field -Battery at Colenso and one Horse Artillery Battery with -Burn-Murdoch, as well as all his supply and regimental transport, -were still on the right bank of the Tugela, for the crossing of -which he had but one pontoon bridge. He therefore decided that the -wagons must have precedence, and that the army must wait.</p> -<p>He was misled by his recollections and by his experience of the -Parthian tactics of the burghers whom he commanded during the Zulu -War of 1879, and from <span class="pagenum"><a name="page137" id= -"page137"></a>{137}</span> whom he says he learnt "all that he -knew" about rearguards. He believed "that an attempt to force a -Boer rearguard is merely a waste of men." Yet only a week had -passed since he told White that he thought there was "only a -rearguard" between him and Ladysmith.</p> -<p>Thus in the glamour of an ancient rearguard reputation the enemy -disappeared.</p> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote28" name= -"footnote28"></a><b>Footnote 28:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag28">(return)</a> -<p>Not the Green Hill near Spion Kop. There were several Green -Hills on the left bank of the Tugela.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote29" name= -"footnote29"></a><b>Footnote 29:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag29">(return)</a> -<p>White, however, said that he saw no signs of a general -retreat.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote30" name= -"footnote30"></a><b>Footnote 30:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag30">(return)</a> -<p>The Cochrane daring and resourcefulness were not confined to the -men of the clan. During the Jacobite troubles Grizel Cochrane, when -her father was sentenced to death for treason, turned -highway-woman, and held up the coach which was bringing his death -warrant from London, and abstracted it from the mail-bag.</p> -</blockquote> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page138" id= -"page138"></a>{138}</span> -<h2><a name="chap7" id="chap7">CHAPTER VII</a></h2> -<h3>Ladysmith at Bay</h3> -<p>Eighty-seven years before the outbreak of the South African War, -the British Army was besieging the city of Badajoz, in Spain. When -it was taken by assault, a Spanish matron and her sister were -molested and came for protection to the British Camp, where they -were received by Harry Smith, a young Captain in the 95th Regiment, -who when the Peninsular War was over, married the girl fugitive, -Juana Maria de los Dolores de Leon.</p> -<p>After a distinguished military career in the East Indies and -elsewhere, Sir Harry Smith went out to South Africa in 1848 as -Governor of the Cape Colony, and its dependencies; and in that year -he proclaimed the country between the Orange and the Vaal to be -British Territory.</p> -<p>The Boers of the Great Trek resented the annexation, and one -Pretorius took the field, but was beaten on August 29 at the battle -of Boomplatz by Smith, who had under his command six companies of -infantry and two squadrons of cavalry; a force which strangely -contrasts with the masses of soldiery opposed to Pretorius' -successors, Joubert, Botha, Cronje, De Wet, and Delarey.</p> -<p>Harrismith, in the Free State, was named after him; his services -in the Sikh War were commemorated by an Aliwal on the Orange; while -upon a new township in Natal, she who was once Donna Juana Maria de -los Dolores de Leon of Badajoz on the Guadiana, bestowed the -commonplace designation for which she had exchanged her retinue of -tuneful Spanish, and it was called Ladysmith.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page139" id= -"page139"></a>{139}</span> <a name="fig-ladysmith-siege" id= -"fig-ladysmith-siege"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image10.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image10.png" -alt="The Siege of Ladysmith" /></a></div> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page140" id= -"page140"></a>{140}</span> -<p>After fifty years of obscurity, Ladysmith suddenly became the -pivot upon which the fortunes of the British Empire were poised. -Its loss, at least during the early weeks of the siege, would not -only have thrown a British Army into captivity, but would have left -an encouraged and very mobile enemy, replenished with the spoils of -war, free to march irresistibly towards the sea.</p> -<p>In November, Buller was prepared, if Ladysmith should fall, to -abandon the whole of Natal except Durban. He had private -information that, if the Boers reached the coast, a certain -European power would intervene. There was also the fear that -another reverse would call out the disaffected Dutch in the Cape -Colony, and the danger lest the British nation, treacherously -harassed by the cries of the disaffected at home, who sympathize -with the misfortunes of every nation but their own, would again -write off South Africa as a bad debt, and offer peace on -ignominious terms. In India the news of the capture of White, a -former Commander in Chief, and of his removal as a prisoner of war, -would have seriously, if not fatally, impaired the British -<i>raj</i>.</p> -<p>At a later period, when the reinforcements had arrived and the -plan of campaign had been altered to suit the situation in Natal, -the loss of Ladysmith would not have so vitally affected the -position in South Africa; and, in fact, Buller on December 16, -authorized White to surrender.</p> -<p>On November 1, the commanders of the allied forces, Joubert and -A.P. Cronje, decided to invest and bombard Ladysmith, confidently -expecting that the only obstacle in the way of the procession to -the sea would soon be removed by the fall of the intimidated town. -They were even urged by some of the subordinate leaders, who, as a -rule, were never so venturesome as when there was no immediate -prospect of meeting the enemy, to mask White and march at once upon -Durban, but Joubert would only sanction a minor effort in that -direction which was postponed until it was too late to be -effective.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page141" id= -"page141"></a>{141}</span> -<p>The last man to leave Ladysmith was French. He was ordered to -Capetown to meet Buller, who was persuaded by his report on the -situation that White's force was insufficient to keep Natal from -being overrun, and that the worst might be feared. The escape of -French, by a margin of a few minutes only, made him available for -employment in an arena more suited to his capacity than a besieged -town; and his subsequent good work in the Cape Colony, south of the -Orange River, and during the advance on Kimberley and Bloemfontein, -showed how ill the fortune of war served the Boers, when they just -failed to capture the train which was taking out of their clutches -the soldier who was to relieve Kimberley and head off Cronje at -Paardeberg before the relief of Ladysmith was effected.</p> -<p>White has been blamed for keeping the whole of his strong force -of cavalry in Ladysmith. He had with him four regiments of regular -cavalry besides five irregular colonial corps. For the space of -three months the action of the British Army was hampered by the -absence of the mounted troops interned in Ladysmith and engaged in -garrison duties, until at last the horses were either killed for -food, or, when forage was exhausted, turned out on the bare veld -under the enemy's fire, to support themselves as they could. White -justified, or it may be, excused, his retention of the cavalry, by -its mobility, which virtually increased the effective strength of -the garrison, and enabled him to reinforce rapidly any threatened -section of the defence, as for example, during the attack on -Caesar's Camp. It is no doubt arguable that cavalry was more useful -within the lines of investment than it would have been, if -squandered over the whole area of the concurrent operations -elsewhere; and if so, the limits of its tactical employment have -been considerably extended.<a id="footnotetag31" name= -"footnotetag31"></a><a href="#footnote31"><sup>31</sup></a></p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page142" id= -"page142"></a>{142}</span> -<p>White's force, which numbered about 13,000 men, occupied a -perimeter of fourteen miles on the hills and kopjes nearest to the -town, and was enveloped by an outer perimeter of thirty six miles -held by 23,000 Boers. The positions N.E. of the Klip River were -occupied by the Transvaalers, and the opposite semi-circle by the -Free Staters.</p> -<p>On November 2, began the bombardment, which the enemy fondly -hoped would bring White on his knees within a week; the first death -casualty during the siege being a naval officer who had reached -Ladysmith only a few hours before the investment with a -re-inforcement of long-range naval guns from the fleet; and during -the next two days it was continued from Pepworth, Bulwana, and -elsewhere, with such effect as to induce White to ask, at the -instigation of the civilian authorities, permission to send away -the women, children, and other non-combatants. This somewhat -<i>naive</i> request was naturally disallowed by Joubert, who, -however, consented to the formation of a neutral camp for them and -the sick and wounded at Intombi, within the area of the siege, and -dependent for its supplies and maintenance upon the resources of -the garrison. Joubert put into Ladysmith 200 derelict Indian -coolies from the Natal collieries, an act which was perhaps -justified by the code of war, which sanctions the employment of any -means by which the difficulties of a besieged town can be -increased; but a subsequent attempt made by Schalk Burger during -Joubert's advance on the raid towards the south, to saddle White -with the Indian refugees from the Transvaal was successfully -resisted.</p> -<p>On November 9, the enemy was foiled in an attack on Observation -Hill and Wagon Hill which were not then held in force, and for -eight weeks the siege was carried on with so little vigour, and -confronted with so much skill, that the British casualties in -killed and wounded during that period numbered less than 250. When -the Boers found that the walls of Ladysmith did not at once -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page143" id= -"page143"></a>{143}</span> fall to the sound of the artillery, they -began with equal confidence to rely upon the indirect casualties -caused by sickness and privation, and awaited the result without -impatience in their laagers. During the last fortnight of November -a strong column under Joubert was detached to raid into Southern -Natal. It was prudently but not enterprisingly led, did little -harm, and returned with slight loss.</p> -<p>Meanwhile the enemy's artillery had been considerably -re-inforced, and the British gun ammunition was beginning to run -short. The capture of a large herd of cattle by the Boers, who -neatly drew the animals away from the town by exploding shells -behind them, entailed a reduced meat ration. In order to co-operate -with the relieving force under Clery, who at the end of November -was within signalling distance, White exercised a part of the -garrison as a striking column, which, when the time came, he -proposed to take out under his own command, and to clear the line -of approach from the South.</p> -<p>Three weeks after the abortive attack of November 9, Joubert -returned from his expedition to Estcourt. A council of war was -held, and an assault on the Platrand<a id="footnotetag32" name= -"footnotetag32"></a><a href="#footnote32"><sup>32</sup></a> was -determined on for the 30th. On the previous evening the commandos -detailed as covering parties on the left flank went into position -on Rifleman's Ridge, and awaited the main attack. Meanwhile much -had happened in the laagers. The decisions of the Boer Krijgsraad -seem to have been subject to confirmation by a minor convention -composed of the subordinate officers. These took counsel during the -night, and resolved that "the plan was too dangerous to attempt." -When the covering parties opened fire at dawn there was no -assaulting column to cover.</p> -<p>The activity during December was confined to the defence. On the -night of the 7th a raid on Gun Hill, an underfeature of Lombard's -Kop, silenced—at least in Natal—two heavy guns which -were worrying the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page144" id= -"page144"></a>{144}</span> garrison. By the rules of the game the -pieces were injured beyond repair by the gun-cotton charges which -the sappers had fired in the breeches and muzzles; but the heavier -gun was removed to Pretoria, where it was made serviceable. It was -eventually sent to Kimberley, and its arrival greatly alarmed the -timid and irresolute diamond men, whose life was easy and almost -luxurious when compared with the privations which the steadfast -garrison of Ladysmith endured for four months. On the same night -Limit Hill, which the enemy seized a few days after the investment, -was recovered.</p> -<p>A heavy gun was emplaced by the Boers to the front of the -northward section of the defence, on a hill in the angle between -the Bell Spruit and the railway to Harrismith. The approach to it -was commanded by Bell's Kopje and Thornhill's Kopje, but a -Battalion of Rifles under Metcalfe wriggled in between them at -midnight on December 11, without alarming the enemy, and almost -reached the crest of the eminence which was thereafter known as -Surprise Hill, before the Boers opened fire. The assaulters -encircled the emplacement, but could not find the gun. In a little -time it was discovered outside the work, and disabled, but not -permanently. The Boers on the flanking kopjes were now on the -alert; and the battalion as it withdrew down the slope met in the -darkness a small but determined detachment which had formed up -athwart the line of retirement. The obstacle was rushed with the -bayonet, and the expedition returned to Ladysmith with a loss -exceeding 12 per cent of its strength.</p> -<p>The gun raids were almost the only offensive action taken by the -defence during the siege, and though successful as far as they -went, they did not greatly reduce the strength of the enemy's -artillery and were not continued. He had still more than a score of -pieces with which he daily bombarded the town; but no attempt to -assault it by a moving force was made for some weeks. His -confidence in the final issue was unimpaired; he <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page145" id="page145"></a>{145}</span> had but -to squat in his trenches worrying the garrison with shell fire, and -the inevitable surrender must come.</p> -<p>His complacent view of the situation was manifested by his use -of the besieging force as a depot which was from time to time -called upon to furnish drafts for service elsewhere. Joubert's -absence on the raid towards the south did not sensibly diminish the -retaining power of the attack, and although the loss of several -thousand Free State burghers who were transferred to Cronje's -command on the Modder or to Delarey's at Colesberg was in part made -up by a reinforcement of Transvaalers, the force sitting round -Ladysmith had to assist in the defence of the line of the Tugela -against Duller; yet, albeit weakened by that necessity, it was -still able without much effort to pin White down to the banks of -the Klip River. The inactivity of the garrison, as well as the -daily increasing hospital camp at Intombi under the shadow of -Bulwana and the mournful processions to the cemetery hard by, -showed that sickness, the waning physical and moral strength of -those who were still on duty, and the expenditure of stores, -supplies, and ammunition, were slowly impairing White's power of -resistance; and that the numbers of the besieging force, which -later on Buller believed did not exceed 2,000 men, could be safely -reduced.</p> -<p>The Boers believed that "their strength was to sit still," and -they were not far wrong. Early in the New Year, however, external -pressure emanating from Pretoria and Bloemfontein was brought to -bear upon Joubert, and he sanctioned another assault on the -Platrand, which was from the first considered to be the key to -Ladysmith. It is a series of plateaux, about two miles long and -varying in breadth from half a mile to a few hundred yards. Its -chief features are Caesar's Camp and Wagon Hill. A mile north of -the centre of the position is Maiden's Castle. The contours on -Caesar's Camp and Wagon Hill are pinched in in three places and -divide the Platrand into four positions of unequal <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page146" id="page146"></a>{146}</span> area, the -smallest being Wagon Point, an underfeature on the extreme right of -Wagon Hill. The latter is joined by a nek to Caesar's Camp, the -plan of which owing to the contraction of the contours somewhat -resembles the outline of a dumb-bell. The highest point of the -position is a knoll on Wagon Hill, and the front slopes southwards -down to Bester's Valley and Fourie's Spruit. On each flank were -hills occupied by the enemy's artillery.</p> -<p>The strength of the assaulting column as detailed was composed -of approximately equal numbers of Free Staters and Transvaalers and -amounted to upwards of 4,000 burghers. To the former Wagon Hill was -assigned as their objective, to the latter Caesar's Camp, which was -held in greater strength. Early on the morning of January 6, the -sentry of the picket posted on the nek between Wagon Hill and Wagon -Point, became aware of movement on the slope and gave the alarm. -Soon after, a party of Engineers and Infantry preparing gun -positions on Wagon Point in view of a contemplated operation in -support of Buller's expected advance by way of Potgieter's Drift, -were fired on at short range by a body of Free Staters, who had -succeeded in climbing to the nek, and who then threatened a redoubt -in the western shoulder of the knoll on Wagon Hill, which commanded -Wagon Point. The first rush was checked by the Natal Volunteers, -who opened with a Hotchkiss gun from the knoll at a range of less -than 100 yards, and threw the leading ranks of the enemy into -confusion. The working parties were thus given time to take up -their rifles, and to organize themselves more effectively for -defence.</p> -<p>A counter-attack was made from the adjacent post on the eastern -shoulder, but it failed to dislodge the enemy, a small party of -whom diverged towards their left, and circled round Wagon Point to -the rear of the position between Wagon Hill and Maiden's Castle. -Here they lighted upon the heavy gun at the foot of the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page147" id= -"page147"></a>{147}</span> northward slope for which an emplacement -had just been made on Wagon Point, and although the gun was -successfully defended by the escort, the insecurity of the Platrand -position was shown by the attempt.</p> -<p>While the Free Staters were assaulting Wagon Hill and Wagon -Point, the Transvaalers obtained a footing on the edge of the -Caesar's Camp position; but their supports failed them. A -considerable proportion of the burghers detailed for the attack on -Caesar's Camp, most of them Transvaalers, again either refused, as -on November 9, to take part in it, or shirked during the advance. -But at dawn, after a struggle in the dark at such close quarters -that the face of each combatant was often for the first time -revealed by the flash of his adversary's rifle, the enemy had his -finger on the key to Ladysmith; and was clinging, like swallows on -the eaves, to the whole length of the Platrand from Wagon Point -along a sinuous contour line which curved round the eastern -shoulder of Caesar's Camp, and awaiting the supporting bombardment -which, as soon as there was light enough for the alignment of the -sights, would be opened upon the position from the flanking guns on -Bulwana and Rifleman's Ridge, and from Middle Hill on the -front.</p> -<p>The normal garrison of the Platrand, which, since the attack on -November 9 had been entirely included in the perimeter of the -defence, numbered not more than about 1,000 men, but it was under -the command of Ian Hamilton.</p> -<p>When the firing began he was in his bivouac near Caesar's Camp. -He quickly collected what troops he could lay his hands on, and -went to Wagon Hill, where he found the situation so serious that he -asked White to re-inforce him. At daybreak the Boer artillery -opened upon the position, and it is probable that it would have -been lost, but for the action of two field batteries which, at a -critical moment, came out of Ladysmith and diverged so as to -protect each flank.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page148" id= -"page148"></a>{148}</span> -<p>Already on the Wagon Point flank, the enemy had worked round and -had threatened the heavy gun, and on the other flank he was holding -the eastern shoulder of Caesar's Camp. Wagon Point was saved from a -turning movement by one battery, while the other, though itself -under artillery fire from Bulwana, opened on the Boers clinging on -to the eastern shoulder, and by checking the advance of their -supports, caused them to withdraw the hook with which they were -grappling that flank. But more than this the British guns could not -do, and the Boers holding on to the front crest could not be -touched by shrapnel, and were maintaining themselves against the -defenders of Caesar's Camp; while a combat of even greater -intensity was being waged on Wagon Hill.</p> -<p>Here an attempt made by a few companies of Highlanders to -outflank the Boer line on the crest by working round the shoulder -of Wagon Point, had failed, as the men were exposed to an -irresistible fire as they turned the corner. On Wagon Hill the -enemy was holding on to the front of the redoubt on the knoll and -each attempt to dislodge him was unsuccessful.</p> -<p>Towards noon there was a lull in the storm. After nine hours' -fighting, the combatants were face to face on the plateau and the -advantage lay apparently with the attacking Boers, who, in spite of -the strong re-inforcements which had been sent up by White, were -still clinging to the southern crest of Caesar's Camp, and who on -their left had won a footing close to the knoll on Wagon Hill, and -were effectively checking the details on Wagon Point. White having -used up all the infantry which he could safely spare from the other -positions on the perimeter, now sent the cavalry to the rescue.</p> -<p>The pause in the fight, which seems to have been occasioned by -the exhaustion and discouragement of the enemy, and which, -perforce, had to be acquiesced in by the defence, led White to -report to Buller soon after noon, that the Boers had been beaten -off for the time <span class="pagenum"><a name="page149" id= -"page149"></a>{149}</span> being, but that a renewal of the attack -was probable. It came at the moment when he was sending the -despatch from his Head Quarters on Convent Hill, and when Ian -Hamilton was preparing a counter-attack round the shoulder of Wagon -Point. A small body of Free Staters rushed the summit of Wagon -Point, and by their impact drove many of the defenders down the -reverse slope. But those who remained were resolute. After a hand -to hand fight between Boer commandants and British officers around -the emplacement which had been prepared for the heavy gun, the -position was recovered and a reinforcement of dismounted Hussars -came up in time to secure it.</p> -<p>On Wagon Hill also the struggle was renewed, and here also the -defence was strengthened by some dismounted cavalry which had been -waiting in support in rear of Caesar's Camp. It was evident that if -the enemy were not dislodged from Wagon Hill during daylight, he -would be able to establish himself irremovably after dark, when all -the waverers would come up under the protection of the night. At 3 -in the afternoon White reported to Buller that the attack had been -renewed and that he was "very hard pressed." He called the Devons -to his aid from their post on the northern section of the -perimeter, and in a storm of rain and thunder, themselves a -resistless tempest, they cleared Wagon Hill with magazine and -bayonet.</p> -<p>On Caesar's Camp the enemy had already wavered, and the crest -was in possession of the defence; and now all along the line from -Wagon Point to the eastern shoulder the Boers were scuttling down -the slopes toward the flooded dongas below under a hail of rifle -fire. The battle, which had begun soon after midnight, was -continued until near sunset and resulted in the discomfiture of the -only serious attempt made by the Boers to capture Ladysmith by -offensive action. The success was due primarily to the -determination of an enfeebled garrison, which had already undergone -a siege of nine weeks; and <span class="pagenum"><a name="page150" -id="page150"></a>{150}</span> secondarily to the tactical mistakes -of the enemy, who had allowed troops to concentrate upon the -Platrand which should have been contained and pinned to their posts -at other sections of the perimeter of defence. Not a few of the -commandos detailed for the assault on the Platrand flinched, yet it -almost succeeded; and if these had been distributed to positions -elsewhere, they would not have incurred great danger, and their -presence would probably have prevented the transfer of the Devons -and of the mounted troops to Wagon Hill at the critical moment.</p> -<p>The battle casualties of January 6 outnumbered in the proportion -of 6 to 4 the entire losses due to the acts of the enemy during the -whole four months' investment before and after that date. Twice -Wagon Point was occupied only by the wounded and the dead. Much of -the fighting was either hand to hand or at such short range that -the effect of the bullet could be almost read in the expression on -the face of the stricken opponent; now of anguish, despair, or -hatred, now of a gentle sinking to sleep after toil. The homely -name of Wagon Hill, far away from the fatherland under the southern -sun, will abide for all time in the chronicles of the deeds of the -British private soldier. It was his own battle, by which he saved -Ladysmith. Next day a message from home reached White.</p> -<p>"Heartily congratulate you and all under your command for your -brilliant success. Greatly admire conduct of Devonshire Regiment." -The Sender was Queen Victoria.</p> -<p>The failure of the attack on the Platrand deterred the Boers -from further attempts to break into Ladysmith, which was left like -Paris thirty years before to "stew in its own juice." An ingenious -but impracticable method of bringing the place to its senses by -damming the Klip River below the town in the hope of isolating it -by flood was put in hand, and some alarm was created, but the loyal -stream refused to rise. The garrison was <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page151" id="page151"></a>{151}</span> too much -weakened by disease and famine to be able to assist effectively -Buller's promised advance by way of Potgieter's Drift, and in fact -he never came near enough to Ladysmith to make co-operation -possible. A mobile column was for the second time organized by -White, but it is doubtful whether it could have taken the -field.</p> -<p>Perhaps some poet of a future generation may follow the example -of the Homeric syndicate and select the Siege of Ladysmith as the -theme of a great Epic, romantically but unhistorically interwoven -with the legend of Juana Maria of Badajoz. On the Boer side the -struggle was carried on with much of the simplicity of Homeric -times and the Siege of Troy. The debates in the war councils; the -doubts of the subordinate commanders; the devices and stratagems, -such as the attempt to dam the Klip River, and the proposal to -disguise an assaulting commando in the helmets and accoutrements of -the slain opponents; the abstinence of some of the leaders from the -fray; the single combats on Wagon Point; the democratic -organization of the Boer forces; the difficulty of keeping the -burghers to their duty when the attraction of a domestic and -pastoral life presented themselves in an alluring form; were not of -these days nor even of the Puritan period, but belonged to a -remoter age when every man was a soldier or a shepherd according to -the exigences of the moment. Many a Boer leader, like Ajax, defied -the lightning—when it was not playing directly upon him. Not -one of them comes prominently into the foreground in the great -South African siege.</p> -<p>De Wet's brief service in Natal came to an end before the -investment, and in the light of his exploits elsewhere, it is -interesting to speculate upon what might have happened if he had -been in command of the attack on January 6. In all probability it -would have succeeded. The Boers rarely failed when commanded by a -resolute leader who knew his own mind and was <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page152" id="page152"></a>{152}</span> able to -impose his own will upon them. In isolated enterprises daringly -conducted, they were usually efficient, and sometimes irresistible, -but like most primitive communities in which the military instinct -is individual rather than collective, they were incapable of -forming themselves into a coherent and unified Army for action in -mass. De Wet, in his <i>Three Years' War</i>, protests against the -British theory that the burghers were only fit to engage in -<i>guerilla</i>, which, possibly from ignorance of the meaning of -the word, he seems to regard as an unworthy term of reproach; but -the theory was in reality a grudging recognition of a suppressed -factor in the problem of the war which the professors had -overlooked. His own exploits go far to prove its soundness.</p> -<p>Like mariners adrift upon the ocean in an open boat, their food -and their water dwindling hour by hour, who eagerly watch a white -topsail or a faint wreath of smoke which seems for a time to be -approaching, yet soon sinks beneath the horizon and leaves them -alone upon the waste; the garrison of Ladysmith was cruelly -tantalized by Buller's fitful appearances on the Tugela. Again and -again the boom of his guns growing clearer and clearer and his -heliographs sparkling more distinctly deluded the defenders with -the hope that the day of their deliverance was at hand. During the -Spion Kop affair, the confidence was so great that for a day or two -full rations were issued. The summit could be seen crowded with -people on January 25 who surely must be Buller's men. Not so; they -were the Boers who, to their astonishment, had found the summit -unoccupied, and were burying the dead and collecting the wounded. -The roar of war died away; was heard again from Vaalkrantz, soon to -sink into silence on February 7, when Buller announced that the -enemy was too strong for him. It was renewed at Hlangwhane, Monte -Cristo, and Pieter's Hill, but former disappointments had made the -garrison insensible to hope and it <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page153" id="page153"></a>{153}</span> fell upon apathetic ears. -When at last Dundonald's little band was seen approaching, the -chilled and dazed soldiers of the garrison could scarcely realize -that they were saved.</p> -<p>After January 6 the increasing sickness and the deficiency of -food became the chief facts of the Siege. More than three-score -horses were sacrificed daily to provide a meat ration for the -garrison. The men slaked their thirst with the turbid water of the -Klip River, and munched a makeshift biscuit made of Indian corn and -starch. "Chevril" soup and potted horse were luxuries. At Intombi -nearly 2,000 sick and wounded were lying without hospital diet or -comforts.</p> -<p>On January 27 the situation was so grave that White, when he -heard from Buller that the attempt on Spion Kop had failed, -proposed as a last and desperate resource, but one which, at least, -would not involve the moral effect of a surrender, to abandon -Ladysmith, his sick and wounded, and his heavy guns, and with about -7,000 men and 36 field guns to endeavour to join Buller. Even if -another Buller failure did not sooner doom the garrison he could -only hold out until the end of February.</p> -<p>With this proposal Buller temporized and communicated it to Lord -Roberts, who sent an encouraging message to White, in which he -asked the garrison to accept his congratulations for its heroic -defence and expressed his regret at the delay of the relief and his -hope that the term would not be the limit of possible endurance; -though he fully expected that his own operations in the Free State -would before its expiration relieve the pressure on Ladysmith. -Buller doubted Lord Roberts' forecast and preferred to "play his -hand alone," and nothing came of the proposed break out of -Ladysmith. White in his acknowledgment of Lord Roberts' message -said that by sacrificing most of his horses, he could hold out for -six weeks.</p> -<p>There was good reason to believe that by this time <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page154" id="page154"></a>{154}</span> the -besieging force numbered not more than 4,000 men, who, however, -could be reinforced in a few hours from the 16,000 burghers -standing up to Buller on the Tugela. The enfeebled garrison was, -however, not in a condition to act against the attenuated cordon -from which a constant bombardment was maintained. As the month of -February wore on, the news of Lord Roberts' entry into the Orange -Free State infused more hope into the garrison than the too -familiar sound of Buller once more in action on the Tugela, and so -little was expected of Buller that the lull in the fire during the -Sunday armistice on February 25 was interpreted as another repulse; -and the rations which had been increased, when a message came that -he would be in Ladysmith on February 22—which he soon found -was a too confident expectation—were again reduced. The -darkness before the dawn was very black. The news of Paardeberg -reached Ladysmith on the afternoon of the 27th; towards sunset next -day Dundonald marched in. White endeavoured to organize a column to -pursue the commandos retreating before Buller, but found that the -toll of war had been paid so heavily by the Natal Field Force that -little more than the strength of one company in each battalion was -fit for service.</p> -<p>Not the least of the trials undergone by the Ladysmith staff -were the heliograms from the Tugela and the constant surprises of -the <i>déchiffrage</i>. Sometimes pessimistic, sometimes the -reverse and frequently trivial, there was scarcely an occasion on -which they were helpful. The troubles of the relieving force -figured largely in them.</p> -<p>The sequel to the Colenso disaster was a suggestion that White -after burning his ciphers<a id="footnotetag33" name= -"footnotetag33"></a><a href="#footnote33"><sup>33</sup></a>—a -precaution which he naturally would take—and firing away his -ammunition, should negotiate with the enemy for the <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page155" id="page155"></a>{155}</span> surrender -of the town. To this White made the manly and dignified reply that -there was no thought of surrender; and to his own men he issued a -soldier-like order of the day, in which he told them that they must -not expect relief as early as had been anticipated, and expressed -his confidence that the defence would be continued in the same -spirited manner in which it had hitherto been conducted; and -dutifully he applied himself to his task.</p> -<p>A few days later he was bidden by Buller to "boil all his -water." From Potgieter's Drift, Buller heliographed that "somehow -he thought he was going to be successful this time"; that it was -"quite pleasant to see how keen the men were"; that he hoped to be -"knocking at Lancer's Hill" in six days' time; but after Spion Kop -it was, "we had awful luck on the 25th."</p> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote31" name= -"footnote31"></a><b>Footnote 31:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag31">(return)</a> -<p>As the officer in command of the Naval Brigade neatly put it: -"the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The cavalry soldiers -did excellent service in the lines—and we ate their -horses."</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote32" name= -"footnote32"></a><b>Footnote 32:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag32">(return)</a> -<p>The Boer name for Caesar's Camp—Wagon Hill Position.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote33" name= -"footnote33"></a><b>Footnote 33:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag33">(return)</a> -<p>This instruction was not included in the original heliogram, but -was annexed to it as an afterthought in a supplementary -message.</p> -</blockquote> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page156" id= -"page156"></a>{156}</span> -<h2><a name="chap8" id="chap8">CHAPTER VIII</a></h2> -<h3>Deus ex Machina, No. II</h3> -<p>On January 10, 1900, Lord Roberts reached Capetown in the -<i>Dunottar Castle</i>, the ship which ten weeks previously had -brought Buller to South Africa, and resumed the task which he was -not allowed to finish in 1881. The terms of peace imposed upon the -British Government by the Boers after Majuba Hill resulted in an -armistice of eighteen years, and he was still the soldier to whom -the nation instinctively turned when it was again in trouble in -South Africa.</p> -<p>With one unimportant exception all his war experience had been -gained in India or near its frontiers; but India is a spacious -arena where spacious ideas can be freely developed. His mind had -not been scored into grooves by years of desk duties in Pall Mall, -or subjected to the necessity of accommodating itself to obsolete -methods and House of Commons' views. The Indian Army, of which he -obtained the command after serving in it in each commissioned rank, -more closely approaches in its training, organization, and -readiness for active service, the military standard set up by the -chief continental nations, than the British Army; of which a -distinguished German officer said at the time of the Boer War that -it was meant for detachment warfare only and not to win great -battles.</p> -<p>With Lord Roberts came, as Chief of the Staff, Lord Kitchener of -Khartoum, a hard and ready man who for fifteen years had been -scouring the Nile. All his war service had been in Egypt, where -recently he had not only smashed the dervishes and secured the -Soudan, <span class="pagenum"><a name="page157" id= -"page157"></a>{157}</span> but by his diplomatic tact in the -Fashoda affair had relaxed the tension of a dangerous international -situation. He belonged to the Royal Engineers, who are, like the -Army Service Corps, a semi-combatant body engaged in technical -duties that do not offer much opportunity of gaining experience in -the art of war or of practice in handling troops, but who have, -nevertheless, given to the nation not a few soldiers of -distinction. It was, perhaps, for this reason that Lord Roberts -generally employed Lord Kitchener as an expert military foreman, -entrusted with the supervision of the work of others.</p> -<p>The situation in South Africa at the time of Lord Roberts' -arrival was as follows:—</p> -<p>Methuen was established at Modder River; Mafeking and Kimberley -were holding out, and the latter at least seemed to be in no -immediate danger; French was in a good position before Colesberg; -Gatacre was maintaining himself without difficulty at Sterkstroom; -the garrison at Ladysmith, after sixteen hours' fighting, had -recently warded off a determined attack; the disaffected districts -in the Cape Colony had not risen; and the despondent Buller, -quickened by reinforcements and stimulated by the approach of the -<i>Dunottar Castle</i>, was about to make another attempt to -relieve Ladysmith.</p> -<p>Schemes for a South African campaign had been for some time -under consideration by the War Office, but as the attitude of the -Free State could not be forecasted, they were more or less -provisional. As late as the end of September the Premier and the -War Minister scouted the idea of war with the Free State, and the -official plan of a central advance on Bloemfontein by way of -Bethulie and Norval's Pont, which held good until some little time -after Lord Roberts' arrival, must therefore have been -subterraneously drawn up without their knowledge. It was no doubt -an excellent solution of a strategical problem studied by men in an -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page158" id= -"page158"></a>{158}</span> office with a map of South Africa before -them which showed several lines of communication converging on the -Orange River; and Buller was about to carry it out when he was -called aside to Natal.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-so-transvaal">Map, p. 260.</a></p> -<p>Lord Roberts had, however, two years before drawn up a scheme -for an advance on the Transvaal by way of the Kimberley line as far -as Mafeking and thence across country to Pretoria, and before -leaving England he modified it so as to adapt it to action in the -Free State. He proposed to leave the Kimberley line at some point -between the Orange River and the Modder River, and to march in a -S.E. direction on the Bloemfontein line. He was a firm believer in -the indirect results of military movements, and he expected that -his arrival at Springfontein or Edenburg and the menace to the Free -State capital "must draw the Free Staters back from Kimberley and -Natal," and that the occupation of it "would render the Boer -positions south of the Orange River untenable." The official plan -of an advance from the centre would force back the Free Staters -engaged in the Cape Colony, and instead of isolating them would -enable them to reinforce Cronje.</p> -<p>After his arrival at Capetown, circumstances however compelled -Lord Roberts to modify his plan of campaign. The news of the Spion -Kop affair, anxiety on account of Kimberley, the presence of Cronje -at Magersfontein and other considerations, determined him to march -through the Free State by a more northerly route which would enable -him to relieve Kimberley <i>en passant</i> and to give battle to -Cronje.</p> -<p>The secret of the plan, which was known only to Lord Roberts' -personal staff, was well kept, and operations were continued -without reference to it. The earlier orders issued by him seemed to -indicate that the central advance was still to be carried out. The -VIth Division under Kelly-Kenny was sent to Naauwpoort; French was -instructed to make a demonstration against Norval's <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page159" id="page159"></a>{159}</span> Pont; and -Methuen was warned that it might be necessary to withdraw part of -the Modder River force.</p> -<p>The Boers, who had captured at Dundee some intelligence papers -which disclosed the original plan of campaign, were now more than -ever convinced that the British Army must advance by way of -Norval's Pont and Bethulie, and did not discover their error until -it was too late to rectify it.<a id="footnotetag34" name= -"footnotetag34"></a><a href="#footnote34"><sup>34</sup></a> When -Lord Roberts had made all his preparations, which involved the -entire reorganization of the transport, and the raising of a -considerable force of mounted troops, for his march of 100 miles -across the veld eastward from the railway, the secret was disclosed -to Kelly-Kenny and French on February 1. This plan of a flank march -had also suggested itself to Buller, who proposed it in a -memorandum which Lord Roberts found on his arrival in Capetown; but -as Buller's scheme included the construction of a railway across -the veld, and limited the advance of the Army to the rate at which -the line could be pushed forward, it did not fall in with Lord -Roberts' ideas.</p> -<p>Meanwhile Cronje was not perturbed by the reports of troops -coming up the Western line, and was confident that they only -indicated a renewed but isolated attack on Magersfontein. He had no -doubt that if necessary he could always fall back upon Kimberley -and retreat towards the Transvaal; and the demonstrations made by -Methuen westwards in the direction of Koedoesberg Drift served the -double purpose of warning a disaffected region and of diverting -Cronje's attention from the flank on which he was to be attacked -and which he believed to be secure.</p> -<p>The two months following the arrival of Lord Roberts in South -Africa were the only brilliant period of a dreary war which lasted -nearly three years, and will perhaps <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page160" id="page160"></a>{160}</span> save it from being quoted -in military history as the most sluggish campaign of recent times. -In each of the two objects of strategy, namely to avoid fighting -the enemy on ground of his own choosing, and to compel him to fight -under unfavourable conditions, Lord Roberts was extraordinarily -successful. There was a light touch, an ingenuity, in his swift and -silent strategy which contrasted strongly with the heavy and dull -methods which had hitherto controlled the action. While Buller was -talking about his tedious railway across the veld, and Milner at -Capetown was dismalling the situation and discouraging the advance, -Lord Roberts had in effect entered the capital of the Free State -and seemed to have completed half his task. The Boers were -hypnotized and deceived not only by signs from which they drew -wrong inferences, but also by bogus orders which it was arranged -should come under their notice and which were simultaneously -cancelled in cipher: and when too late they awoke from the -bewilderment, they began to scuttle to and fro like rabbits in a -warren. There is good reason to believe that if the strategic -ability of Lord Roberts could have been united in one mind to the -determination of Lord Kitchener the war would have been over in a -year.</p> -<p>On February 8 Lord Roberts arrived at Modder River, where he -found bad news awaiting him. Buller had failed at Vaalkrantz, and -the diamond men of Kimberley were threatening to capitulate. By -February 13 30,000 combatants, some of whom in order to preserve -the illusion had been kept in the centre until the last moment, -were in readiness at various points between the Orange and the -Modder. The immediate problem before Lord Roberts was the relief of -Kimberley in combination with the cornering of Cronje. In the -background was the Natal trouble. Buller was again helplessly -wringing his hands and reaching round to find excuses for his -misadventures. Lord Roberts wisely left him alone and went on with -his own work. <span class="pagenum"><a name="page161" id= -"page161"></a>{161}</span> He saw what Buller refused to see, that -the Tugela could be crossed at Magersfontein and Ladysmith relieved -at a drift of the Modder River.</p> -<a name="fig-riet" id="fig-riet"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image11.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image11.png" -alt="Sketch Map of the Riet and Modder Drifts" /></a></div> -<p>On February 11 Lord Roberts set his army in motion; and the -operations of the next few days may be summarised with sufficient -accuracy as a cavalry raid northwards, but avoiding Cronje's left -flank at Brown's Drift, to relieve Kimberley; combined with an -infantry advance to cut him off. It was not possible to make the -initial movements in the direction of the eventual advance, as the -Magersfontein-Brown's Drift quadrant N.E. of Modder River was -strongly held by the enemy, and disallowed a cavalry advance from -below the junction of the Riet and the Modder in the direction of -Kimberley except by a westerly detour which could not be -accommodated to the general scheme. In order to strike the -practicable drifts on the two rivers above their confluence, it was -necessary for the advance to be made along the curve of a parabola -which issued from Modder River Station in a S.E. direction, and in -a sixty-mile circuit crossed the rivers and finally approached -Kimberley, only twenty miles distant from the starting point, -almost in the opposite direction.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page162" id= -"page162"></a>{162}</span> -<p>At midday on February 11 the Cavalry Division under French -reached Ramdam, a farm east of Graspan and fronting the drifts of -the Riet, where the Army was being concentrated for the advance. -Some hours elapsed before Cronje became aware that French had -trekked away to the S.E., and to his slow and sullen spirit the -movement did not appear to have much significance. He was persuaded -that the British never trusted themselves much more than a day's -march away from a railway. It was only a demonstration, a -reconnaissance. He did, however, take certain precautions which, if -they had been devised with a true appreciation of the situation and -intelligently carried out, might have seriously checked French.</p> -<p>He assumed that the initial direction of French's march would be -continued indefinitely towards Koffyfontein, possibly even that it -was a retirement from the Modder River position caused by bad news -from the centre, and he sent a commando of observation, under C. de -Wet, up the right bank of the Riet. The most adroit and skilful -movement of the war had now begun without Cronje's comprehending -its object.</p> -<p>But French did not complete his first day's work very -auspiciously. His supply column was far behind when he reached -Ramdam, and owing to a misunderstanding Hannay's Brigade of Mounted -Infantry from Orange River, which was instructed to join him, did -not turn up: conflicting orders had resulted as usual, -<i>ordre</i>, <i>contr'ordre</i>, <i>désordre</i>. French, -however, felt himself strong enough to continue his march without -Hannay, who, on his delayed march to Ramdam, engaged a detached -body of Boers and thereby strengthened the enemy's conviction that -Koffyfontein was the objective.</p> -<p>As French approached the river, Waterval Drift, the lower of the -two drifts across the Riet, was found to be occupied by De Wet, and -the Division was diverted to De Kiel's Drift, which was reached -without much difficulty at midday, February 12. On the right bank -were <span class="pagenum"><a name="page163" id= -"page163"></a>{163}</span> the commando of the Jacobsdaal garrison -under Lubbe, and the commando under De Wet and A.P.J. Cronje which -had been sent to observe the cavalry movement; about 1,000 men in -all. But De Wet could not get the Koffyfontein idea out of his -head, and its influence removed many obstructions from the path of -the advance. He boldly rode across French's front at De Kiel's -Drift, and made S.E. for Winterhoek, closely followed by A.P.J. -Cronje; and all French's horses could not find out where they had -gone. Next day it was given out in Divisional Orders that the -commandos had gone to the Modder River, and four weeks passed by -before the Army ceased to suffer from the error.</p> -<p>There was still "one more river to cross" before the diamond men -of Kimberley could be relieved; and ere the thirst of the South -African summer could be slaked on the banks of the Modder, a tract -of twenty-five miles of veld, in which the absence of any homestead -having "<i>fontein</i>" for its suffix declared the scarcity of -water, must be traversed under the sun.</p> -<p>In the forenoon of February 13 the Cavalry Division started -northwards from De Kiel's Drift; and at last De Wet, who, unknown -to French, was watching the trek from its right flank, partially -relieved himself of the Koffyfontein idea. The effort weakened him, -and he displayed none of that readiness of resource and promptitude -of action with which he subsequently worried the British Army for -the space of two years. He withdrew his own commando towards -Koffyfontein, and having ordered Lubbe to follow French, reported -to Cronje at Magersfontein that the cavalry was making for the -Modder.</p> -<p>French's objective points were now Rondeval and Klip River -Drifts on the Modder, but in order to deceive Lubbe, who was -hanging on to his right flank, and to elbow him away from the -drifts, French changed direction with two brigades and headed for -Klip Kraal Drift, some eight miles above Klip Drift, reverting -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page164" id= -"page164"></a>{164}</span> suddenly to his original line as soon as -the river came in sight. The drifts were held by small parties of -the enemy, who offered no resistance, and on the evening of -February 13 the Division took possession of the kopjes on the north -bank.</p> -<p>The occupation of the drifts was soon made known to Cronje, but -the news revealed little to his dull and uninstructed nature, -permeated with the idea that a British force and a railway were -indissoluble entities. Though his communications eastward were now -seriously threatened, it did not occur to him that there might be -an alternative to fighting him out of Magersfontein, namely -manoeuvring him out of it; and he persuaded himself that French's -movement was a trap to entice him away pending an attack on -Magersfontein from the south, and he was probably unaware that the -relief of Kimberley was an urgent matter. He moved his own camp -from Brown's Drift to a less exposed position at Bosjespan, and -while retaining his hold on Magersfontein with his main body, sent -out two commandos to watch French, and these accidentally occupied -a line through which the cavalry must pass on its way to -Kimberley.</p> -<p>The arrival of the VIth Division on the morning of February 15 -set French free to resume his march on Kimberley. The two commandos -had on the previous day joined hands with Lubbe, who, after he was -pushed out of French's way, crossed the Modder at Klip Kraal Drift -and worked round to a position north of Klip Drift. The relieving -force was now obstructed in the line of its advance by ridges on -its right and left fronts and by the nek connecting them, all -occupied by the enemy; while on its left flank was Cronje's new -camp at Bosjespan, of the existence of which it was unaware. The -situation seemed awkward, as the only way out of it was the shallow -valley leading up to the nek, and exposed to a converging fire from -the ridges on which two guns were posted.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page165" id= -"page165"></a>{165}</span> -<p>But French was not long in doubt, and like a bridge player who -in order to win the game is sometimes compelled to assume the -position of certain cards, with rare intuition correctly assumed -that the nek was weakly held. Like a ship going down the ways to -the water, the Division was launched to the front; cleaving the -opposing waves and gaining momentum as it advanced, then righting -itself, rose to the slope of the nek and carried it with resistless -energy.</p> -<p>After a short midday halt at Abon's Dam, French raised the siege -of Kimberley before sunset; the besiegers under Ferreira did not -wait to be attacked, but withdrew towards Boshof.</p> -<p>The relief of Kimberley was perhaps the most brilliant feat of -arms in the campaign. It was well-conceived and, considered by -itself alone, well carried out, but the merit of it has been -obscured by the fact that it cost less than half a hundred human -casualties. When, on the morning of February 15, the VIth Division -took over the outposts, and the Cavalry Division fell in on the -banks of the Modder, there was the terrain of a Balaklava charge -before it.</p> -<p>It may well be doubted whether the price paid for the relief of -the diamond men was not too high. Uninstructed public opinion at -home called for the movement, and forced Lord Roberts' hand, but it -was never an imperative military necessity. The horse -casualties,<a id="footnotetag35" name="footnotetag35"></a><a href= -"#footnote35"><sup>35</sup></a> due to want of water, forced -marches, and ignorance of horsemastership on the part of all ranks, -who were inclined to regard cavalry work in the light of a -steeplechase, were so heavy that when on February 17 French, after -an attempt on the previous day to pursue a body of retreating Boers -with his exhausted horses, <span class="pagenum"><a name="page166" -id="page166"></a>{166}</span> was suddenly called upon to march -thirty miles to head off Cronje, he could in all his Division mount -less than the strength of two regiments. Nor was this all, for the -rush to Kimberley was the indirect cause of the loss of the supply -column at Waterval Drift on February 15; and thus in a few hours -the mounted force and the supply column and transport which Lord -Roberts and his staff had assembled with so much difficulty were, -the former partially and the latter entirely, sacrificed.</p> -<p>The VIth, VIIth, and IXth Infantry Divisions, under Kelly-Kenny, -Tucker, and Colvile respectively, were withdrawn from Modder River -and the stations south of it, and concentrated at Ramdam on -February 11 and the two following days. Owing to the steepness of -its banks the Riet River could only be crossed at Waterval and De -Kiel's Drifts, and on these the Army converged, and trickled -through them like the sands in the neck of an hour-glass. Men, -horses, guns, supply and ammunition wagons were slowly and -painfully transferred to the right bank, and the VIth Division, -which followed the cavalry to De Kiel's Drift, though the first -infantry to get through by more than twenty-four hours, was delayed -by the block of transport and lost its start in the race to the -Modder River.</p> -<p>Meanwhile to Waterval Drift came Kelly-Kenny and Colvile in -succession, and were soon pushed on to Wegdraai Drift, to which -Tucker also hastened as soon as he could shake himself clear of De -Kiel's Drift. The latter was now out of the running, for although -Kelly-Kenny had already had a nine hours' march from Waterval Drift -beginning soon after midnight, by 5 in the afternoon of February 14 -the VIth Division was ready to resume its march to support French -at Klip Drift, some hours before Tucker came in. Kitchener had been -ordered by Lord Roberts to attach himself to the VIth Division as -assessor to Kelly-Kenny, and marched out with it.</p> -<p>When Colvile, whose division was detailed as a reserve, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page167" id= -"page167"></a>{167}</span> arrived at Waterval Drift, he found the -passage congested by transport of all kinds; and although after -half a day's delay he was able to proceed to Wegdraai Drift, a -large convoy on which the Army depended for the greater part of its -supplies for the march to Bloemfontein, had to be left behind. A -small escort remained with it, the wagons were laagered, and the -oxen outspanned and sent out upon the veld to graze. No danger was -anticipated.</p> -<p>De Wet had not been lurking on the banks of the Riet for -nothing. Hitherto he had not greatly distinguished himself. On the -outbreak of the war he and his three sons were commandeered as -private burghers, and when he reached the Natal border he was -appointed vice-commandant. He served under A.P. Cronje and -witnessed Carleton's surrender at Nicholson's Nek. In December he -joined P. Cronje at Magersfontein, and was sent early in February -to Koedoesberg Drift to check the British demonstrations on the -Riet below Modder River Station, and later on to observe French. It -is probable that the military deficiencies of his leaders made him -sullen. Erasmus at Dundee stood idly in the background while Symons -and Yule were on the slopes of Talana Hill, and Cronje was deaf to -his remonstrances against a mere passive defence on the Modder -River and the presence of women and children in the laager.</p> -<p>But De Wet with a free hand quickly recovered himself when the -fortune of war threw him a casual chance after French had -despatched him in imagination to a destination where he could do no -harm. The convoy was ordered to follow Colvile to Wegdraai at 5 -p.m. on February 15, and at 8 that morning, while the oxen were -still grazing on the veld, De Wet, who was hovering near -Winterhoek, swooped down upon the laager. The slender escort made a -good resistance and the attack was reported to Lord Roberts at -Wegdraai, who at first sent back a battalion with a battery and -some <span class="pagenum"><a name="page168" id= -"page168"></a>{168}</span> mounted infantry, and when these were -found insufficient the rest of the 14th Brigade were despatched -under Tucker to endeavour to extricate the convoy. But when Tucker -reached the Drift at sunset he found himself unable to bring it -away. Most of the oxen had disappeared and De Wet had been -reinforced. Lord Roberts was unwilling to delay his advance, and -finding that the supplies were not absolutely indispensable to the -success of his march, at midnight ordered Tucker to abandon the -convoy and to return to Wegdraai. Next morning De Wet took -possession of 176 wagon loads of supplies and 500 slaughter -oxen—his first exploit in the war.</p> -<p>On February 16 Lord Roberts moved his Head Quarters to -Jacobsdaal. It was his intention to advance on Kimberley and to -make that town the base of his operations in the direction of -Bloemfontein, when suddenly his plans were disarranged by an -unexpected event. Cronje, who for two months had held stubbornly to -Magersfontein, was reported to be trekking to the east. French's -relief of Kimberley, the presence of an infantry division at Klip -Drift, and the occupation of Jacobsdaal, were facts which even his -obstinacy could not disregard. Like a wild creature startled in the -night by a veld fire and suddenly dazzled by the glare, he rushed -blindly towards the flames which were soon to consume him. Almost -any direction but that which he took, the line of the Modder River, -would have given him a better chance of escape. French's maimed -cavalry could not have stopped him if he had retreated on either -side of Kimberley, and even a withdrawal westward down the right -bank of the Riet would have probably saved him. Methuen at Modder -River took twelve hours to discover that Magersfontein had been -abandoned at midnight on February 15.</p> -<p>On the morning of the 16th Kelly-Kenny sent out from Klip Drift -a force under C. Knox to cover the advance of the rest of the VIth -Division on Kimberley. <span class="pagenum"><a name="page169" id= -"page169"></a>{169}</span> Soon a long column of dust was observed -in the distance beyond the ridge on the right, and a closer -examination showed that it was caused by Cronje's wagons. The -discovery came not altogether as a surprise, for Boers had been -noticed crossing the front on the previous day, and as what was now -seen proved to be the rear of a column, the trek must have been -some hours in progress.</p> -<p>Kelly-Kenny at once abandoned his march on Kimberley and faced -eastwards. It was found that the enemy had taken up a rearguard -position on the southern end of the ridge. The northern end was -soon seized by mounted infantry, but an attempt in interpose -between the river and the Boer position failed. The ridge was -cleared at 9 a.m. by a frontal attack, but not before Cronje's -convoy had retired without molestation to Klip Kraal, where a -second rearguard position was taken up on either side of Klip Kraal -Drift.</p> -<p>On the assumption that Cronje was endeavouring to effect a -retreat on Bloemfontein, it was necessary to confine him to the -right bank of the Modder. He was already in possession of Klip -Kraal Drift, and although he could hardly hope to pass his wagons -across it in sight of an active enemy, it was not his only chance. -Within ten miles of his laager were Brandvallei, Paardeberg, and -Vendutie Drifts, each of which would give him access to the -southern bank.</p> -<p>The task before the pursuing army was therefore to drive in his -rearguards from their successive positions and prevent him getting -comfortably away to secure a passage across the river. At nightfall -on February 16 it seemed likely that he would succeed. His convoy -in the main laager at Klip Kraal had had twelve hours' rest, and -his rearguard had maintained itself on the second position; in -spite of a frontal attack on the right bank, and of a flank attack -on the left bank made by a battery and a force of mounted infantry -which had crossed the semicircle formed by a northward bend of the -river between Klip Drift and Klip Kraal Drift. <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page170" id="page170"></a>{170}</span> The guns -even succeeded in throwing a few shells into the laager, but ran -short of ammunition. Kitchener, who remained with Kelly-Kenny as -military assessor, had early in the day advocated a raid up the -river in order to head off Cronje at Paardeberg Drift, but the -exhaustion of the troops prevented the enterprise.</p> -<p>Next day the chase began in earnest—to borrow for the -occasion, as was done so frequently during the war, a metaphor from -the sporting world—but only a few of the hounds were on the -spot, and the rest of the pack were at Kimberley and -Jacobsdaal.</p> -<p>When the report of Cronje's retreat from Magersfontein, which -Lord Roberts received soon after he reached Jacobsdaal, was -confirmed by a message from Kitchener, he ordered French, who at -that time was engaged with the enemy some miles north of Kimberley -and endeavouring to capture the Long Tom whose recent arrival from -Ladysmith <i>viâ</i> Pretoria had scared the Kimberley -civilians into a threat of surrender, to hurry eastward and -endeavour to place himself between Cronje and Bloemfontein; but -owing to a break in the field telegraph cable the message was -delayed. Kelly-Kenny was at the same time instructed to carry on -the pursuit.</p> -<p>But the situation had not yet clearly disclosed itself, and Lord -Roberts did not abandon his intention of sending Colvile's and -Tucker's Divisions towards Kimberley; and their orders to march on -the lower drifts of the Modder held good. Cronje's retreat in an -unexpected direction was hard to explain. Was he going to meet the -reinforcements which Buller had just reported were on their way -from Natal? De Wet had just shown that there was a vigorous and -enterprising body of the enemy ready to raid the railway south of -Kimberley, and it was possible that he might have been reinforced -from Colesberg.</p> -<p>Towards evening, however, a second message came <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page171" id="page171"></a>{171}</span> from -Kitchener at Klip Drift. He summarised the situation on the Modder, -which he was unable to control with the troops at his disposal, and -said that he was asking French to proceed to Koodoos Drift to check -Cronje from the east. Lord Roberts was not the man to adhere -stolidly to his own plan when a better one was laid before him. The -orders to the Divisions were cancelled, and before midnight on -February 16 Colvile was marching out to join Kelly-Kenny in the -chase. Tucker, whose Division had hardly recovered from the -Waterval Drift affair, remained at Jacobsdaal.</p> -<p>After sunset Cronje broke up his camp at Klip Kraal Drift and -trekked along the right bank. At midnight he passed half of his -transport over to the left bank at Paardeberg Drift, himself going -on to Vendutie Drift, where the remainder, with the women and -children against whose presence in camp De Wet had vainly -protested, joined him next morning.</p> -<p>So far he had done well, and even when his rearguard at -Paardeberg was fired on by an advanced brigade of mounted infantry -which had been pushed on by Kitchener, he did not lose confidence; -although he was surprised that the British, "who could not march," -had overtaken him.</p> -<p>To De Wet and especially to Ferreira, whom he knew to be not far -off, he looked for help, and even without them he believed that he -would be able to cross Vendutie Drift.</p> -<p>Ferreira was indeed not far off, but an obstacle suddenly sprang -up between him and Cronje, and the aspect of it was so alarming -that he withdrew in the opposite direction. The obstacle was -French's attenuated Cavalry Division which, in obedience to -Kitchener's summons, had left Kimberley before sunrise that -morning, and after a march of twenty-six miles had reached the spot -indicated by Kitchener for the heading of Cronje. As the Boer -wagons were about to cross Vendutie Drift the shells of French's -Horse Artillery began to fall <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page172" id="page172"></a>{172}</span> upon them. The convoy was -thrown into confusion, the oxen stampeded, Cronje was entangled and -bewildered, and but for the gallant exertions of some foreign -officers in the service of the Boers a fatal panic might have -ensued. The advance guard under De Beer was reinforced from the -main laager, and a demonstration made against the left flank of the -cavalry; and although French held on, his position remained -insecure and even precarious until the arrival of the infantry on -the following morning. With a handful of tired, hungry, and -unsupported horsemen he not only frightened Ferreira, whose force -outnumbered his own, off the field, but also paralysed and prepared -for destruction the army which had beaten Methuen and had held -Magersfontein for two months.</p> -<a name="fig-paardeberg" id="fig-paardeberg"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image12.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image12.png" -alt="Paardeberg" /></a></div> -<p>Next day, February 18, at 3 a.m. began the ten days' operations -to which the name of the Battle of Paardeberg has been somewhat -inaccurately given. Paardeberg is a prominent hill on the right -bank of the Modder, four miles W.S.W. of the battle centre, -Cronje's laager at Vendutie Drift, and lies on the extreme edge of -the elliptical arena on which the battle was fought. It seems to -have been chosen as the official word because the hill was the only -distinctive physical feature shown <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page173" id="page173"></a>{173}</span> on the banks of the river -in the incomplete surveys of the time, and because the alternative -would have been Stinkfontein, a farm near the field of battle. The -Battle of Vendutie Drift would have been a more correct term.</p> -<p>The Modder forms the major axis of the ellipse, which it enters -near Koodoos Drift and leaves at Paardeberg Drift, and like most -South African rivers runs in a deep channel between banks -intersected by the tributary dongas which the rains have scored in -the soft soil, and which afford almost the only shelter from -artillery fire. The whole area is commanded by the surrounding -kopjes and ridges.</p> -<p>Cronje, though urged to break out of his laager on the night of -February 17, refused to move. It is probable that he might have -effected his escape if he had abandoned his transport. An active -force led by a determined man could have wriggled out under cover -of the night, and joined one or other of the commandos which were -known to be hovering. Cronje was in communication with Ferreira; he -had sent to Bloemfontein for help; and De Wet was known to be on -his way from Koffyfontein. But instead of making an effort to save -himself he fatally trusted to relief from outside. He did not -realize that Vendutie Drift was not a Magersfontein which he could -hold indefinitely, or that during the last few weeks the British -Army had been greatly increased. One result of his obstinacy was -the desertion of several hundred Free Staters, who had not served -very willingly under the leadership of a Transvaaler. Most of them -returned to their homes.</p> -<p>In the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, who was detained at -Jacobsdaal by illness, Kelly-Kenny was the senior officer present -with the force on the Modder River; but for some reason which may -have formed itself in Lord Roberts' mind when they were -fellow-passengers on the <i>Dunottar Castle</i>, he was not -entrusted with the management of the battle. Kitchener had -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page174" id= -"page174"></a>{174}</span> marched several hours with the VIth -Division on February 14 before Kelly-Kenny was aware of his -presence; and as Chief of the Staff in direct communication with -Head Quarters, he had much to say at Klip Drift. At Paardeberg the -status of Kelly-Kenny became still more anomalous, Kitchener, -though junior not only to him but also to two other generals -present, being empowered by Lord Roberts to issue orders in his -name so that there might be "no delay such as references to and fro -would entail." The difficulty of the situation was increased by the -fact that Kitchener was practically without a staff.</p> -<p>The reason which induced Cronje to remain in his laager, namely -the expected arrival of help from outside, also determined -Kitchener to attack it without delay. He confidently expected to -carry it in less than four hours, but Cronje held out for nine -days.</p> -<p>Kitchener's plan might have been foreseen by any officer who had -been present at manoeuvres: a preliminary bombardment of the -laager, followed by a holding frontal attack, in combination with -rolling-up flank attacks. The strength of Cronje's position was -supposed to be the laager itself, whereas it was rather the river -banks and tributary dongas which he had occupied.</p> -<p>The frontal display was assigned to a portion of the VIth -Division; the Mounted Infantry under Hannay supported by an -infantry brigade were to work round upstream and fall upon Cronje's -left flank; while the IXth Division attacked his right flank from -the west.</p> -<p>Kitchener, who had come on with Hannay in advance of the VIth -Division, began to issue his orders before he had seen the -commanding officers of the troops which were to carry them out. -Hannay, who was at hand, was despatched to his place in the east -from which he never returned. Kelly-Kenny's ambiguous and -humiliating position; Kitchener's impatience and impetuosity; his -lack of a staff to carry out his plan; his omission <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page175" id="page175"></a>{175}</span> to -explain it to the divisional and brigade commanders; and his habit -of "short-circuiting" orders to subordinates while their superior -officers stood passively in the background, made unity of action -impossible and February 18 a day of misunderstanding and -ill-success. The battle was fought by a Board of Directors, who, in -the unavoidable absence of their Chairman, were dominated by a -headstrong General Manager, who was doubtful of their capacity to -carry on the business.</p> -<p>Kelly-Kenny and Colvile, whose Divisions came in during the -night, had begun to put their troops in motion before Kitchener's -plan was made known to them, and throughout the day the difficulty -of co-ordinating the whole force to it was increased by the -incorrect transmission or apprehension of oral orders. Kelly-Kenny -proposed a preliminary investment of Cronje, but Kitchener would -not consent to any postponement of his attack, for which no -operation orders were issued. In a few hours, however, the -soundness of Kelly-Kenny's judgment was shown; the attack became an -investment, which was prolonged many days by the moral and physical -exhaustion of the troops, who after forced marches by day and night -on scanty rations were hustled without method into a costly -battle.</p> -<p>By 8 a.m. Kitchener was able to report to Head Quarters that -Cronje was hemmed in. The cavalry had occupied the ground in rear -of the laager, and he "thought that it must be a case of complete -surrender." The troops were now set to the assault, and were -quickened by an encouraging message from Lord Roberts. But they -were almost immediately in trouble. Hannay had placed himself into -position for the flank attack from the east, and his battery had -already opened fire on the laager, when the guns themselves were -shelled. A commando with two guns, under Steyn of Bethlehem, had -arrived from Natal, and unobserved had seized a ridge between -Stinkfontein and the Modder, which Hannay was about to cross; and -although the Boer guns <span class="pagenum"><a name="page176" id= -"page176"></a>{176}</span> were silenced and the commando compelled -to retire, the diversion seriously disarranged the scheme of -assault.</p> -<p>Stephenson's Brigade of the VIth Division, when on its way to -cross to the right bank at Paardeberg Drift under instructions from -Kelly-Kenny, had been recalled by Kitchener, whose orders were so -vaguely expressed, that while the Brigadier believed that he was to -act in the frontal attack from the south with the other brigade of -the Division, he was really intended by the Chief of the Staff to -support Hannay's flank movement. He was now compelled to change -front to meet Steyn's threat, and Hannay's attack was postponed. -Stephenson was then ordered to resume his advance, but apparently -still in ignorance that he was expected to act in co-operation with -the mounted infantry, he so disposed his troops that he gave little -support to Hannay, who early in the afternoon reported to Kitchener -that he was too weak to advance with the flank attack. A peremptory -message was returned, in which he was ordered "to rush the laager -at all costs," even without Stephenson's support. Some of the words -of the order seemed to reflect upon his determination, so he obeyed -it literally and immediately. At the head of as many men as he -could bring to him on the spot, he charged towards the laager, and -when his horse was killed under him he marched on foot to meet his -death.</p> -<p>As soon as it was seen that Hannay had thrown himself away, -Stephenson was ordered to renew the flank attack. With a portion of -his troops and some mounted infantry, he crossed to the right bank -at Vanderberg's Drift, and formed to the left. A small body of -Hannay's force had won a position near the Boer entrenchments, and -it is probable that Stephenson's assault would have succeeded but -for a curious accident, which could not have been foreseen, and by -which he was deprived of part of his firing line when it was most -needed. The setting sun suddenly appeared from beneath a bank of -clouds in the west, directly in line with the objective, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page177" id= -"page177"></a>{177}</span> and the dazzle of the light blotted out -the laager, at the same time illuminating the target on which the -Boers were firing. A further advance was impracticable, and the -troops, which had already fixed bayonets for the assault, were -withdrawn when within 500 yards of the enemy's position. Thus the -second attempt to get at the laager from the east failed, but -Stephenson's action was not entirely without a result, as he was -able to put his men into entrenchments, where they remained during -the night.</p> -<p>Meanwhile, Colvile was pushing upstream from the west. On that -side the Boers had an advanced position in a big donga, which runs -into the right bank, about two miles below the laager, and upon -which a few companies of the Highland Brigade, having waded the -river, had already made a gallant but unsuccessful attack. Colvile, -under orders from Kitchener, placed himself astride the river, -sending the Brigade under Smith-Dorrien across to the north bank, -while the Highland Brigade acted on the left of the frontal attack; -and when Gun Hill, which outflanked the donga, was occupied, -Kitchener ordered an assault on the donga, to be carried out -simultaneously with Hannay's attack on the left flank. The order, -however, was not communicated to Smith-Dorrien on Gun Hill, and he -was not aware of it until he saw some troops of his own Division, -supported by a few companies sent across by Kitchener from the left -bank, charging across the open. In a few minutes, the gradual -retardation of the rush, and then its extinction under a heavy -fire, showed that the attempt had failed. It is said that -Smith-Dorrien had been so imperfectly made acquainted with -Kitchener's plan, that he was under the impression that he had been -sent to the north bank to prevent the Boers breaking out of the -laager, and not to attack them upstream.</p> -<p>The frontal attack was initiated by Kelly-Kenny with the 13th -Brigade under C. Knox, the 18th Brigade having been detached to -support Hannay's flank attack. <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page178" id="page178"></a>{178}</span> The main body of the Boers -was north of the river, but strong detachments held the left-bank -dongas. Colvile was dealing with a demonstration against Paardeberg -Drift when an oral message from Kitchener reached him, which he -interpreted as an order to go to Knox's assistance with his -Division, which was thus withdrawn from the flank and lent to the -frontal attack. He was doubtfully carrying out what he believed to -be his instructions when an order reached him to send the 19th -Brigade, under Smith-Dorrien, across the river. A few companies of -his Highland Brigade succeeded in establishing themselves on the -right bank, and Knox drove the enemy out of the left-bank dongas, -but was forbidden by Kelly-Kenny to cross the river, as the enemy -was too strongly posted. The frontal attack was spent, but the -troops remained on their ground until the approach of night -released them.</p> -<p>Two miles S.E. of Vendutie Drift, a hill, to which the name of -Kitchener's Kopje was afterwards given, rises out of the veld. In -the tactics of the assault on the laager, it was not a position of -much importance, but in the Paardeberg drama it was a striking -scene. The detachment of infantry which Kelly-Kenny sent early in -the day to occupy it had been withdrawn without his knowledge by -some wandering staff officer, who thought he had found a better use -for the little garrison, and replaced by a few mounted men. These, -while watching the progress of the fight, and perhaps regretting -that they were not taking a more active part in it, were suddenly -called upon to defend themselves.</p> -<p>De Wet, with two guns and 600 men, had arrived from Koffyfontein -at the opportune moment of the crisis of the flank attacks. He soon -carried the kopje, and when at 4.30 p.m. he opened fire, the shells -which he pitched into the VIth Division baggage and artillery were -the first intimation of his intervention received by the Head -Quarter Staff, absorbed in their attack on the laager; and for the -second time the troops were called away from <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page179" id="page179"></a>{179}</span> the work -in hand, to deal with an unexpected attack from the rear, and the -dwindling hope of carrying Cronje's position before nightfall -passed away.</p> -<p>If, on the British side at Paardeberg, the commanders were not -at their best when acting <i>in partibus</i> beyond the personal -control of Lord Roberts, on the other hand De Wet's release from -immediate subordination to Cronje seemed to make him a more -dangerous foe. His capture of the convoy at Waterval Drift on -February 15 was followed in three days by a daring raid on a -British army with a handful of men. It was an impudent and -haphazard enterprise, which would hardly have been attempted if he -had been in possession of fuller information, but it was justified -by its success. De Wet had been reinforced at Koffyfontein, and if -he had brought all the commandos at his disposal with him to -Paardeberg Cronje would probably have been relieved. But he had not -clearly discerned the strategy of Lord Roberts, whose presence at -Jacobsdaal deceived him, and instead of striking with all his -strength in one direction, he weakened his force by expeditions -eastward towards Edenburg and westward towards Belmont.</p> -<p>His appreciation of the tactical situation at Paardeberg, based -on the rumours which drifted into Koffyfontein, was imperfect, and -when he came within sight of the Modder, and saw the British Army -before him, he must have regretted that he had not entirely -abandoned the idea that the advance would be made by way of -Koffyfontein. But the time and the place could not have been better -arranged. The British Army was preoccupied with Cronje; and -Kitchener's Kopje in De Wet's hands gave a strong flank protection -to Steyn, and later on to De Beer, who, when driven out of his -position north of Koodoos Drift by a resuscitated cavalry brigade -under Gordon, crossed to the kopjes south of the river. Neither -Steyn nor De Beer had been effectually checked, and they were -hovering for a chance to swoop down.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page180" id= -"page180"></a>{180}</span> -<p>At nightfall the situation was as follows:—</p> -<p>The laager was holding out, and the chief result of the day's -work was a contraction of the line held by the Boers on the river; -an attempt by Kelly-Kenny to recapture Kitchener's Kopje had -failed; fully one quarter of the perimeter commanding Vendutie -Drift was in the possession of the enemy; the troops were exhausted -and the casualties exceeded 1,200.<a id="footnotetag36" name= -"footnotetag36"></a><a href="#footnote36"><sup>36</sup></a></p> -<p>It does not necessarily follow from the failure of a tactical -scheme that it was unsuited to the occasion; but the failure of -February 18 was due to one of three causes: to the defects of the -scheme, to the mode of its execution, or to the Boer external -attacks. It was not a scheme which either Kelly-Kenny or Colvile -would have devised if left to himself, and it is very doubtful -whether Kitchener had Lord Roberts' direct authority for it. But -assuming that it offered a better chance of crippling the enemy at -large than the alternative of an investment, it was so hastily -devised and so clumsily pursued that it became hourly more -difficult to carry through, until it was finally subverted by De -Wet. Many of the commanding officers had as little knowledge of -Kitchener's purpose as the pawns which are moved by the hands of -the chess player.</p> -<p>The conclusion seems to be that but for De Wet's intrusion the -brute force of the investors might possibly have prevailed. But the -final cause of the failure was Lord Roberts' error of judgment in -putting Kitchener into virtual command of the Vendutie Drift force, -thereby superseding senior officers of greater tactical ability. -The complications arising out of brevet rank and local rank, grades -peculiar to the British Army,<a id="footnotetag37" name= -"footnotetag37"></a><a href="#footnote37"><sup>37</sup></a> were -already sufficiently disturbing, and yet Kitchener was irregularly -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page181" id= -"page181"></a>{181}</span> advanced by a few words in a private -letter from Lord Roberts to Kelly-Kenny.</p> -<p>In his report on the day's work to Lord Roberts at Jacobsdaal, -Kitchener could only say that he hoped to do something more -definite on the morrow. Lord Roberts at once ordered him to be -reinforced, and being now convalescent set out for Paardeberg, -where he arrived during the forenoon of February 19.</p> -<p>It is significant that Lord Roberts did not renew the assault on -the laager, and confined himself to operations against Kitchener's -Kopje, thus reverting to the scheme of investment proposed by -Kelly-Kenny on the previous day. The burghers evacuated the big -donga during the night.</p> -<p>Lord Roberts was, from motives of humanity as well as from lack -of hospital accommodation, reluctant to inflict another loss of 8 -per cent, upon his troops. The inability to deal with a further -accumulation of wounded was perhaps a justification of his -decision, but his hesitancy to fight costly battles, which was -characteristic of many general and field officers of undoubted -personal courage, is not so easy to excuse. Even on the score of -humanity, it is better to fight one decisive action in which the -casualties amount to 20 per cent., than to obtain the same result -by fighting three actions in each of which the casualties amount to -8 per cent. The aggregate of human suffering caused to each side by -the war would have been less if the struggle had been fought out -more relentlessly, and without so much regard to the expenditure of -life. There seems to have been a theory that a percentage of -casualties which exceeded ten would demoralize the troops, although -it had often been greatly exceeded in the battles of former -campaigns. In some of the operation orders subsequently issued, the -reservation, "if this be possible without undue loss," -appeared.</p> -<p>The presence of De Wet on Kitchener's Kopje gave Cronje a moral -support which was not of much use to <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page182" id="page182"></a>{182}</span> him. According to De Wet's -account, he considered it a point of honour to remain with the -women, children, and wagons in the laager, which every hour was -growing more unfit for occupation.</p> -<p>The ejectment of De Wet, to be followed by an advance on -Bloemfontein by French's cavalry, was substituted by Lord Roberts -for the assault on the laager, which was to be left to starve -itself out. But the removal of De Wet from the kopje, which he had -stolen from his opponents, was not an easy task, and for three -nights and two days the Ajax of the Boers defied the lightnings -which played upon the hill. On the 19th, a body of cavalry was -brought round from the north, but was found unequal to the task. -Towards evening an infantry brigade was thrown at the kopje, but -after it had obtained some success, and had partially entrenched -itself on the slopes, it was withdrawn by Lord Roberts. No action -was taken on the following day, but on the 21st a cavalry attack -forced De Wet out of his hold; but though squeezed like a sponge -between the fingers, his commando was incompressible, and oozed -away towards the east; no effective pursuit being possible, owing -to the condition of the horses. Meanwhile the investment continued, -but the scarcity of ammunition restrained the activity of the -bombardment. An offer made by Lord Roberts to take away the piteous -women and children, praying for peace in their time, was rejected -by Cronje.</p> -<p>The departure of De Wet, who picked up De Beer and Steyn on his -way, enabled the gap in the circle of investment to be filled in, -and the agony of the laager was drawn out for six days. Nothing but -a strenuous attack from outside the circle could save it. De Wet -indeed, who had trekked in the direction of Poplar Grove, and who -had received reinforcements from Colesberg and Natal, which placed -5,000 burghers under his orders, made an unsuccessful attempt to -recover the kopje and retreated hastily, though a gallant remnant -of eighty-seven burghers under Theunissen held on, and were not -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page183" id= -"page183"></a>{183}</span> made prisoners until a brigade had been -launched against them. An envoy was sent by De Wet into the laager -to urge Cronje to break out. A half-hearted consent was given, but -at the appointed time the river was in flood and the attempt was -postponed.</p> -<p>The exhaustion of the cavalry, and the report of the arrival of -reinforcements at Poplar Grove, compelled Lord Roberts to abandon -his plan of sending on French to Bloemfontein; but as he -confidently looked to an early occupation of the Free State -capital, he detached Kitchener to Naauwpoort with instructions to -see to the opening up of the railway from the south, upon which the -Army would depend for its supplies as soon as it reached -Bloemfontein. He was, perhaps, glad of an excuse to employ his -Chief of the Staff elsewhere for a time, for although the -Divisional Commanders had loyally accepted the situation, he could -not but feel that they had not been quite fairly treated, and that -the Kitchener dictatorship had not been a success.</p> -<p>The end came on February 27. Soon after sunrise on the -anniversary of Majuba Hill the white flag was raised in the laager. -During the last five days, Tucker, who with a portion of his -Division had been ordered up from Jacobsdaal when the news of the -investment reached Lord Roberts, closed gradually in on the west, -and Stephenson on the east; and on the 26th the laager was severely -bombarded by four newly arrived howitzers. The final stroke was -delivered by two companies of the Royal Canadians, who, -disregarding a false order to retire, held on, and by daybreak had -entrenched themselves within 100 yards of the flanking trench of -the laager; and though this feat was not the direct cause of the -surrender, which had been decided on the previous evening, it was -not the less meritorious. Cronje in vain endeavoured to persuade -the burghers to postpone the surrender over Majuba Day. In a few -hours 4,000 men, the majority of whom were Transvaalers, were under -guard as prisoners of war, and Cronje was on his way <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page184" id="page184"></a>{184}</span> to St. -Helena, there to commune with the Shade of Napoleon.</p> -<p>It is said that when Kruger heard of the capitulation of -Vendutie Drift he exclaimed, "The real war will now begin." To the -British public, the surrender of Cronje, followed in a few hours by -the relief of Ladysmith, seemed to prove that the real war had now -ended.</p> -<p>On the following day Lord Roberts transferred the bulk of the -Army to a fresh camping ground at Osfontein, and remained there for -seven days. The halt was rendered necessary by the exhaustion of -the cavalry and artillery horses, on whom the greater stress of the -advance had fallen, and whose rations had been docked even more -than those of their riders; and it gave Lord Roberts an opportunity -of drawing supplies for the advance from the Kimberley line, from -which he was about to sever himself. The halt also enabled the Army -of the Modder to pull itself together for a fresh effort, after a -fortnight of harassing marches and weary investment work on stinted -rations.</p> -<p>What might almost be called a Select Committee of the House of -Lords met at Kimberley on March 1. Lord Roberts rode over from -Osfontein to consult Lord Methuen, and they were joined by Lord -Kitchener, who returned from his brief visit of inspection to -Naauwpoort and De Aar.</p> -<p>Mafeking was in greater embarrassment than ever had come upon -Kimberley, and there was trouble in the spacious area of Cape -Colony lying west of the Capetown-Kimberley railway. Lord Roberts' -hopes that a force raised locally in Kimberley might be available -for the relief of Mafeking were disappointed; and after his return -to Osfontein with Kitchener, he instructed Methuen to see to it -with a Yeomanry brigade, which would be sent to him. To check the -risings in Cape Colony, which for the time being were confined to -the Prieska district, Kitchener had already sent out flying columns -from De Aar.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page185" id= -"page185"></a>{185}</span> -<p>The tenacity and resolution of De Wet were never more -conspicuous than during the disheartening days which followed his -retirement from Kitchener's Kopje. Neither Cronje's surrender, nor -the news of the relief of Ladysmith and of the British working -steadily towards the Orange River bridges, nor the despondency of -his own men, diverted him from his purpose of interposing between -Lord Roberts and the Free State capital. President Steyn came over -from Bloemfontein to stimulate the discouraged, and President -Kruger was brought round from Joubert's Head Quarters in Natal, -where he had been successful in persuading the burghers dismayed by -the relief of Ladysmith to hold on to the Biggarsberg positions. -After a conference with Steyn, he went on to Poplar Grove, arriving -there in time to hear the opening shots of the battle of March -7.</p> -<a name="fig-poplar" id="fig-poplar"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image13.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image13.png" -alt="Poplar Grove and Driefontein" /></a></div> -<p>De Wet's force at Poplar Grove was at first sufficient for the -occupation of a position on the left bank of the Modder only, but -subsequent reinforcements brought it up to a number which was -estimated by the British Intelligence not to exceed 14,000 and -which was probably much less. The position was then prolonged -across the river, the front being divided into two unequal portions -by the Drift at Poplar Grove.</p> -<p>To drive away De Wet, and to entangle him as Cronje <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page186" id="page186"></a>{186}</span> had been -fatally entangled in the Drifts of the Modder River, and cut off -his retreat to Bloemfontein, was the tactical scheme of Lord -Roberts, who had twice as many men, and at least five times as many -guns, as his opponent.</p> -<p>In his method of communicating his plan to the officers -concerned Lord Roberts made an innovation. Instead of issuing -written Battle Orders he read a memorandum at a council of war, and -afterwards circulated copies of it. Thus he was able to explain the -situation and expound his plan in greater detail than is possible -in the bald and sterilized paragraphs of Orders; but he omitted to -give in it definite times at which certain movements were to be -begun, or to be completed, and the oral instructions on these -points given subsequently were not clearly understood.</p> -<p>In brief, Lord Roberts' plan for Poplar Grove was as follows. -When French's cavalry had made a wide circuit of seventeen miles -south of the Modder, out of reach of De Wet's left flank, and had -placed itself in rear of the Boer position, the VIth Division was -to make a flank attack on the Boer left on the Seven Kopjes, and -endeavour to roll it up towards the river, by way of Table -Mountain. The enemy's centre was to be threatened by the VIIth -Division along the line of the Modder, and his right on the north -bank of the river by the IXth Division. With his great superiority -in men and guns, Lord Roberts might reasonably expect to capture -the whole Boer force, although he had no longer a Cronje but a De -Wet to deal with.</p> -<p>The day's operations began at 3 a.m., when the cavalry marched -out of Osfontein; but soon the absence of precise staff -arrangements gave trouble. The VIth Division, which was ordered to -follow French, who it was understood would leave camp at 2 a.m., -was headed off by the cavalry, and had to be halted until he was -clear of the infantry front. Neither Kelly-Kenny nor French seems -to have mastered the scheme of attack. <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page187" id="page187"></a>{187}</span> At -daylight, when the cavalry should have been well in rear of the -Boer position, it was in fact not far from the VIth Division, about -two miles south of the Boer left flank on Seven Kopjes and in full -view of the enemy.</p> -<p>As soon as the Boers perceived that an enveloping movement was -in train, they withdrew towards the river, and French reported that -he had turned their left flank, and was in pursuit, and that Seven -Kopjes was open to Kelly-Kenny's advance. The part assigned to him -in the morning's work was, however, the cutting off of the enemy's -retreat, and he nullified the tactical scheme by showing himself -prematurely.</p> -<p>His next message to Lord Roberts, who was watching the battle -from Le Gallais Kopje, announced that he was shelling the wagons in -retreat, but that he could not get at them, as they were protected -by flanking positions on neighbouring kopjes. It was now evident -that French instead of cutting off the enemy was only pursuing him -without much success.</p> -<p>The VIth Division advanced with great deliberation. Kelly-Kenny -reported to Head Quarters that Seven Kopjes had been reoccupied, -and that a detached hill to the east seemed to be strongly held, -which was not the impression given by French's message less than an -hour previously. However, Kelly-Kenny occupied Seven Kopjes without -opposition, and it is said that the infantry on the south bank were -never in touch with the enemy. On the north bank the IXth Division -slowly, but without much difficulty, pushed back the Boer right and -captured a gun on Leeuw Kop, the solitary trophy of the day.</p> -<p>Finally, the Divisions converged on Poplar Grove, but De Wet had -shaken himself free without the loss of a single burgher taken -prisoner, and with almost his full complement of wagons. He retired -along the Modder towards Abraham's Kraal, keeping French at arm's -length with his rearguards. He owed his escape to the <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page188" id="page188"></a>{188}</span> hesitancy -of his opponents and his own mobility. The details of the fight -show that some of the commanders waited upon one another like Lord -Chatham and Sir Richard Strachan at Walcheren. Again the British -cavalry was ineffective for pursuit.</p> -<p>It was not known at the time that had Lord Roberts' scheme been -successful in its entirety, a capture would have been made that -might have brought the war to a sudden close. President Kruger was -present during the greater part of the battle, and with bitter -chagrin saw the burghers streaming past him in retreat.</p> -<p>Whether the battle of Poplar Grove is to be considered a success -or not depends upon the view which is taken of its actual and -potential results. Lord Roberts did not capture another Boer army, -as he fully expected to do, but he expelled it from a good -position, and put it on the run; and the British Army was one stage -nearer to Bloemfontein.</p> -<p>Next day Kitchener was again, in his capacity of military -foreman, sent away to superintend the carrying out of the -arrangements he had already made for dealing with the disaffected -Prieska district. His disengagement from Lord Roberts removed for -the time a potential cause of failure, namely, the uncertainty, to -which perhaps the escape of De Wet at Poplar Grove may be due, -whether a battle was to be fought with the Commander-in-Chiefs -rapier or with the Chief-of-the-Staff's bludgeon.</p> -<p>De Wet, undaunted by his defeat and by the defection of a large -number of his men, who disappeared after Poplar Grove, summoned a -Krijgsraad, which authorized further resistance. A position -threatening the left flank of the advance on Bloemfontein was taken -up on the kopjes near Abraham's Kraal.</p> -<p>Reinforcements of "Zarps" from the Transvaal, and of contingents -under Delarey and P. de Wet, came in, and a force of about 5,000 -men was rallied, to make one more rearguard stand against Lord -Roberts. In <span class="pagenum"><a name="page189" id= -"page189"></a>{189}</span> the absence of C. de Wet, who had been -called away to Bloemfontein, Delarey was in command.</p> -<p>Lord Roberts' scheme for the advance on Bloemfontein was based -on reports that the Boers would take up a strong position a few -miles N.W. of the capital. He divided his force into three columns, -each having a cavalry brigade attached to it, which, marching by -different routes to a point south of the city, would cut the -railway and turn the Boer flank. On March 10 the advance began, -French being in command of the left column, which alone was -seriously engaged during the march.</p> -<p>The position taken up by the Boers at Abraham's Kraal at first -only included a group of kopjes near the river, and another group -at Damvallei, but eventually it was extended further south to -Driefontein and Boschrand, in order to command another road to -Bloemfontein.</p> -<p>In accordance with Lord Roberts' instructions, and to the great -disappointment of Delarey, who hoped to commit the left column to a -frontal attack on the Abraham's Kraal and Damvallei Kopjes, which -lay on the direct road to Baberspan, where it was due to bivouac -that night, French avoided them, and changed direction towards -Driefontein and Boschrand. Delarey, finding that he was not to be -attacked on his right, reinforced Driefontein Hill, which, as it -happened, had just been evacuated by De Wet, who had returned from -Bloemfontein. The occupation of a detached spur of the Boschrand by -a chance body of mounted infantry from the centre column, and a -threatening movement of that column's cavalry brigade, had drawn -him away from Driefontein on to the crest of the Boschrand. -French's change of direction caused the march of his column to -converge upon that of the centre column, and he was now crossing -the front of a sinuous line of ten miles occupied by the enemy, and -extending from the Boschrand, through Driefontein, Damvallei, and -the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page190" id= -"page190"></a>{190}</span> Abraham's Kraal Kopjes to Oertel's Drift -on the Modder. The right of the line had already diverted French -from his march on the appointed bivouac, which he now proposed to -reach by turning the left.</p> -<p>Suddenly Delarey opened fire from Driefontein on the cavalry, -and the advance of the infantry had to be delayed while the -situation was examined. The result of the reconnaissance determined -Kelly-Kenny, who was in command of the left column's infantry, to -attack the minor features of Delarey's position. He was unable to -communicate with French, but the latter, as soon as he saw that -Kelly-Kenny had achieved his object, ordered a turning movement by -the cavalry.</p> -<p>The cavalry of the centre column, which earlier in the day had -been informed that French was not in need of its assistance, -co-operated imperfectly. The afternoon was wearing away, and -Kelly-Kenny, while waiting impatiently for the turning movement to -take effect, received a message from Lord Roberts, instructing him -to push on, as it was believed that the enemy's position was not -held in great strength.</p> -<p>Kelly-Kenny, for the first time able to fight a battle in his -own way, now set himself to clear the enemy out of the Driefontein -ridge. Reinforcements were ordered up to him from the centre -column, but he won his victory without their aid, and after a -struggle which lasted till sunset, Delarey was expelled from -Driefontein. The Boers were still in occupation of the other -positions on the line, but De Wet, although strongly urged by -Delarey to hold on, found it advisable to withdraw from them. The -burghers drifted away in the darkness, after the exhausted cavalry -had made a formal attempt at pursuit.</p> -<p>Two of the field guns which had been taken three months before -at Colenso fought on the Boer side at the Battle of Driefontein, -which though but a passing incident in the war, has been favoured -by the German critics with their cordial approval. "Driefontein was -fought substantially on the principles evolved by the <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page191" id="page191"></a>{191}</span> -experiences of the campaign of 1870-1871." Kelly-Kenny's wilful and -successful "use of deep formations, limited front, and of a wasting -fire to obtain ascendancy before crushing the enemy with a -simultaneous charge" is considered to uphold the correctness of the -German theory of attack, which thirty years of new conditions of -warfare have not modified.<a id="footnotetag38" name= -"footnotetag38"></a><a href="#footnote38"><sup>38</sup></a></p> -<p>Next day the advance on Bloemfontein was resumed, and French's -column was merged in the centre column under Lord Roberts. The -column under Tucker was marching on the Free State capital by way -of Petrusburg, twenty miles to the south, as there was a -possibility that some of the commandos in retreat from beyond the -Orange might be approaching. De Wet did his best to organize a -final stand N.W. of the city, but it was soon evident that Lord -Roberts' movements could not be checked, and President Steyn fled -to Kroonstad.</p> -<p>The cavalry was pushed on, and on the afternoon of March 12 the -railway was cut at Ferreira's Siding, a few miles south of -Bloemfontein. Some resistance was offered at a ridge commanding the -approach to the capital, but the defenders withdrew during the -night. Soon after midnight, a small party of pioneers, under -Hunter-Weston of the Royal Engineers, started to circle eastwards -round the city, and having with much difficulty in the darkness -found the railway on the north side, destroyed a culvert on the -line and thereby entrapped a considerable amount of rolling -stock.</p> -<p>Next morning Lord Roberts came to the line, and at midday the -municipality and leading citizens of Bloemfontein waited on him at -Ferreira's Siding, and tendered the submission of the city. It was -a notable episode in the military history of Great Britain, and -there was a touch of a vanished mediaevalism in the ceremony.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page192" id= -"page192"></a>{192}</span> -<p>The march from Ramdam to Bloemfontein restored the British Army -in the eyes of the nation. It was no longer a machine which -constantly broke down whenever stress was laid upon it, but was -working quietly and on the whole successfully. It had acquired -confidence in itself, and the infantry especially had done well -during the month's advance. Notwithstanding long marches, which in -the end were equally fatiguing whether made by day or by night, on -restricted rations in a trying climate, the proportion of men who -fell out was small.</p> -<p>The cavalry did not greatly distinguish itself. Two brilliant -exploits, the rush from Klip Drift to Kimberley, and the heading -off of Cronje at Vendutie Drift, practically exhausted it. Its -reconnaissance work during the advance was poorly executed, and -after each fight came the same report, that the horses were unable -to pursue the retiring burghers. Overloading, indifferent march -discipline and horsemastership, night marches without previously -watering and feeding the horses, reduced Lord Roberts' mounted -troops to but a fraction of their nominal strength; and raised a -question whether French, whose military capacity was undeniable, -might not be more usefully employed in infantry operations.</p> -<p>There is more than a substratum of truth in the remark once made -by a caustic foreign critic, that an Englishman talks more and -knows less about horses and their management than any other -man.</p> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote34" name= -"footnote34"></a><b>Footnote 34:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag34">(return)</a> -<p>In the Egyptian War of 1882 Arabi was similarly misled by Sir -Garnet Wolseley, who making as if to land his Army near Aboukir -Bay, suddenly took it into the Suez Canal, and threw it ashore at -Ismailia.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote35" name= -"footnote35"></a><b>Footnote 35:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag35">(return)</a> -<p>350,000 horses were used up during the campaign, in other words, -the war strength of one cavalry regiment every other day. The -removal of a cavalry officer from his command after the battle of -Graspan, because he could not do with exhausted horses what was -expected of him by an infantry officer, will perhaps account for a -considerable portion of the wastage.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote36" name= -"footnote36"></a><b>Footnote 36:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag36">(return)</a> -<p>It is stated on the authority of the United States Military -attaché that Kitchener said next day that if he had known -the power of the Mauser behind entrenchments, he would not have -attempted to assault the laager.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote37" name= -"footnote37"></a><b>Footnote 37:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag37">(return)</a> -<p>They were originally granted as a counterpoise to the -irregularities of the system of promotion by purchase.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote38" name= -"footnote38"></a><b>Footnote 38:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag38">(return)</a> -<p>See Colonel du Cane's translation of Vol. II. of the German -Official Account, p. 52.</p> -</blockquote> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page193" id= -"page193"></a>{193}</span> -<h2><a name="chap9" id="chap9">CHAPTER IX</a></h2> -<h3>Alarms and Excursions</h3> -<p>The occupation of Bloemfontein by the British Army in March, -1900, ushered in the second or <i>guerilla</i> period of the war. -Hitherto the struggle had been mainly, though not entirely, -maintained against considerable bodies of Boers, who though widely -dispersed acted more or less under a common direction; but after -the capture of the Free State capital, a system of partisan and -irregular warfare was adopted by the enemy.</p> -<p>The change was not suddenly effected. It was an instinctive, -almost an imperceptible, development rendered necessary by -circumstances. The reverses on the Modder, the failure at -Ladysmith, the ill success which attended the attempts to raise the -fiery cross in the northern districts of Cape Colony, indicated to -the burghers the cause of the instability of their military -machine. They discovered, in time, that its centre of gravity was -too highly pitched and must be brought nearer the earth. For five -months the war had been carried on under the orders of a federal -syndicate composed of the two Presidents sitting with casual -military assessors, scarcely one of whom was a strategist or -capable of viewing the Boer cause synoptically. Cronje was gone -into captivity; Joubert was suspected to be half-hearted; and -Botha, who had begun so well in Natal, was a disappointment.</p> -<p>The Boers recognized that the British strategy had been -astonishingly successful, and that they could not hope to compete -with it. But they believed, not without justification, that in -minor tactics and the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page194" id= -"page194"></a>{194}</span> smaller operations of war they were the -equals of their enemy and in war-craft his superior. The power of a -slender, well-led, and resolute force was shown at Nicholson's Nek, -Waterval Drift, and elsewhere, and it began to dawn upon their -lethargic minds that the individual efforts of handy commandos -acting to a great extent independently offered them the best chance -of resisting the invader.<a id="footnotetag39" name= -"footnotetag39"></a><a href="#footnote39"><sup>39</sup></a> The new -method was almost immediately put on trial and, with certain -notable exceptions, continued throughout the war, which mainly by -its use was prolonged for twenty-six months against an enemy daily -increasing in numbers. Not that the Boers were not at first greatly -discouraged by the victories on the Modder, which admitted Lord -Roberts to Bloemfontein, and by the tranquillity which suddenly -brooded upon the arena of war. Even the Prieska rebellion, from -which so much was hoped owing to its proximity to the line of -communication with Capetown, was dying away under the vigorous -hands of Kitchener, who had been detached from Head Quarters to -deal with it.</p> -<p>Many of the burghers availed themselves of a proclamation issued -by Lord Roberts on March 15, under which, after taking an oath of -neutrality, they were allowed to return to their farms, and there -remain during good behaviour. Others took furlough, with or without -permission, or fled to Kroonstad. When Joubert remonstrated with De -Wet for acquiescing in the exodus, the latter replied that he could -not help it. The burghers were not accustomed to discipline and -could not be coerced, but they would return with renewed courage by -and by.</p> -<p>The demoralization was, however, confined to the burghers who -had been fighting on the Modder River. The commandos which had been -opposed to Gatacre, Clements, and Brabant in the Cape Colony -retired across <span class="pagenum"><a name="page195" id= -"page195"></a>{195}</span> the Orange in good order under Olivier, -Lemmer, and E.R. Grobler; and although encumbered by lengthy trains -of ox-wagons, marched up the right bank of the Caledon along the -Basuto Border, and established themselves with a strength of 6,000 -burghers on Lord Roberts' right flank near Ladybrand and Clocolan: -a daring exploit which was justified by its success, as the left -flank throughout the trek was exposed to a raid from Bloemfontein -or Edenburg. A mounted force 1,800 strong under French was indeed -sent eastward to show the flag, detach the waverers, and if -possible, intercept the retreat; but the information at Head -Quarters was imperfect and the strength of the commandos was -greatly underestimated. It was assumed that they had been subject -to the disintegration which obliterated the Modder River commandos; -but a small reconnoitring column, detached under Pilcher by French -from Thabanchu, found itself in presence of a force which -outnumbered it thirty times, and was recalled.</p> -<p>The presence of a considerable body of the enemy organized on -the flank, the necessity of accumulating a large stock of supplies -and stores, and a serious epidemic of fever among the troops, -postponed the advance on the Transvaal many weeks beyond the end of -March, when Lord Roberts had hoped to set out for the north. The -apparent pacification of the country and the alacrity displayed by -the burghers in submitting to the generous conditions of the -proclamation of neutrality, had encouraged him in the belief that -prompt action before the enemy had time to take breath would -finally crush the dwindling opposition; but he soon became aware -that it was but a lull in the storm, of which the mutterings were -almost immediately renewed.</p> -<p>Pole-Carew, who shortly after the occupation was sent south with -a brigade to establish touch with Gatacre and Clements and open up -the railway, heard of the Boer movement along the Basuto Border and -at once <span class="pagenum"><a name="page196" id= -"page196"></a>{196}</span> reported it to Lord Roberts, whom he -rejoined at Bloemfontein on March 17. Before the end of the month -the line was cleared and trains were passing to and fro between -Capetown and the capital of the Free State, which had lately been -renamed the Orange River Colony. From that time forward the enemy -succeeded on one occasion only, and then but for a few hours, in -cutting the Springfontein-Bloemfontein railway; and the hazardous -advance along the Modder River, which involved the possibility of -the Army being left in the air at Bloemfontein, was fully -justified.</p> -<p>The Boers, who were supposed to be hypnotized, soon began to -show signs of returning animation. At a Krijgsraad which assembled -at Kroonstad on March 17, and at which Steyn and Kruger were -present, plans for the renewal of the struggle were discussed and -measures for enforcing discipline on the burghers were taken. Steyn -professed to have information that a Russian advance on India was -imminent. The idea of resistance <i>en masse</i> was abandoned, and -a policy of flying columns unencumbered with wagons and acting -aggressively against the British lines of communication was -adopted. It was hoped that a timely demonstration would lure the -enemy out of his hold, and that a little encouragement would revive -the Prieska rebellion. The determination to continue hostilities in -which even Joubert, who after the fall of Ladysmith joined the -commandos operating in the Free State, acquiesced, was a proof of -the courage and the steady patriotism of the Boer leaders, and the -events of the next two years justified their resolution. Joubert, -who had attended the Krijgsraad in feeble health, died a few days -after its adjournment, and L. Botha was appointed to the thankless -office of Commandant-General.</p> -<p>The only direction from which Bloemfontein appeared to be -vulnerable was the north, which also was the direction in which -Lord Roberts hoped soon to be leading his troops. At a distance of -a day's march from the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page197" id= -"page197"></a>{197}</span> capital, the railway to Pretoria crosses -the Modder at Glen, and again the river which had recently figured -so prominently in the campaign came upon the stage of war, and not -as a last appearance. The railway bridge had been destroyed by the -Boers, who thus excluded themselves from action on the left bank. A -considerable force was sent out from Bloemfontein to hold the -position while the bridge was being rebuilt, and to keep at arm's -length the enemy skirmishing on the right bank. It was soon found -necessary to hold a more advanced post at Karee Siding, north of -Glen, and a force which seems out of proportion to the resistance -which, according to the ideas then prevalent at Head Quarters, -might be expected, was assembled at Glen on March 28. The VIIth -Division under Tucker was brought up from Bloemfontein, and French -was recalled from Thabanchu to lead the cavalry. With him, in -command of the mounted infantry, was Le Gallais, a remarkable -association of two soldiers whose names, though in different -languages, were identical. Bloemfontein was denuded of cavalry, but -the combined strength of the two cavalry brigades was much under -1,000. The force under Tucker and French, which judging from its -strength Lord Roberts seems to have detailed rather as the advanced -guard of an immediate march on Pretoria than as the minimum with -which the opposition could be safely encountered, numbered about -9,000 men with thirty guns. At Karee Siding were 3,500 burghers -under T. Smuts, who had come up to carry out the Krijgsraad idea of -enticing the British out of Bloemfontein.</p> -<p>Next day a battle of the usual type was fought. The mounted -troops worked upon the flanks of the enemy, who was posted on a -line of kopjes on each side of the railway, while the infantry -attacked frontally with success and drove back the burghers, who -retired in good order towards Brandfort unmolested by the cavalry, -which was as before too much exhausted for effective <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page198" id="page198"></a>{198}</span> pursuit. -Thus, at a cost of less than 200 casualties, Lord Roberts made good -the first stage on the road to the north.</p> -<p>Soon after his entry into Bloemfontein Lord Roberts sent out a -small mounted column under Amphlett to Sannah's Post, where the -water which supplied the capital was drawn from the Modder River. -This had been cut off by the enemy, and the Army was dependent upon -the disused and tainted wells within the city. The Boer commandos, -which under the command of Olivier had retreated from the Cape -Colony to Ladybrand and Clocolan, now began to threaten Broadwood, -who, when French was sent to Glen, succeeded to the command of the -mounted column. Broadwood was compelled to retire from Thabanchu on -March 30. Early on the following morning he bivouacked at the -Waterworks, whither his convoy under Pilcher had already preceded -him; and simultaneously the IXth Division under Colvile and a -brigade of Mounted Infantry under Martyr were ordered out from -Bloemfontein to help him in.</p> -<p>Meanwhile De Wet at Brandfort was watching his opportunity of -working at the task assigned to him under the Krijgsraad scheme, of -attacking the British lines of communication. His anticipation that -the burghers would return with renewed vigour from the furlough -which they had granted to themselves proved to be accurate. While -Smuts was standing up to Tucker and French at Karee Siding, 1,600 -men with five field guns under C. De Wet, whose second in command -was his brother Piet, were circling to the Waterworks. The initial -direction of the march was N.E., in order to conceal the real -objective of the raid even from his own men. His intention was to -seize Amphlett at the Waterworks, and there lie in wait for -Broadwood's convoy. Before reaching his destination he handed over -two-thirds of his force to his brother, who early in the morning -took up a position on the right bank <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page199" id="page199"></a>{199}</span> of the Modder east and -north of the Waterworks, while he himself went to the Wagon Drift -on the Korn Spruit, where the bed is deep enough to afford perfect -concealment to a large body of men in ambush. He occupied it at 4 -a.m. on March 31.</p> -<p>A farmer, brought in by a patrol from Amphlett's post, reported -to the officer in command of the connecting post at Boesman's Kop -that the enemy had been seen; but the officer did not pay much -attention to the report, though he communicated it to the -connecting post at Springfield in the direction of Bloemfontein; at -the same time sending back the patrol to Amphlett at the Waterworks -with a reinforcement of his own men. The patrol was fired on while -attempting to return to the Waterworks, and retired to Boesman's -Kop.</p> -<a name="fig-sannahs" id="fig-sannahs"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image14.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image14.png" -alt="Sannah's Post" /></a></div> -<p>Broadwood, whose column had already been in bivouac near the -Waterworks for some hours with the convoy which had preceded it, -was at sunrise shelled by Piet De Wet, of whose presence on the -right bank of the Modder he had only a few minutes previously been -made aware, and in the belief that his front was clear, he at once -determined to take up a position on Boesman's Kop.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page200" id= -"page200"></a>{200}</span> -<p>Rarely had two leaders about to meet in battle been more -strangely deceived by the Fog of War. C. De Wet, although cut off -from his guns and the main body of his command by an unfordable -river, was confident in his lurking place in the Korn Spruit that -he could easily repeat his exploit of February 15 and annex another -British convoy; yet he suddenly discovered that he had to deal not -with a mere escort, but with a strong mounted force and two -batteries of Horse Artillery, and he was equal to the occasion.</p> -<p>Broadwood, equally confident that the whole force of the enemy -was on his flank on the right bank of the Modder, marched -heedlessly into the ambush which De Wet had laid for him in the -Korn Spruit, on the direct line between two adjacent British posts, -and which neither of them had discovered, although the usual -patrols had been sent out. When the patrol from the Waterworks to -Boesman's Kop did not return in due course on the morning of March -31, its absence seems to have caused no anxiety to Amphlett.</p> -<p>Broadwood, groping in the Fog of War, believed that the force on -his flank was Olivier's, who had driven him out of Thabanchu, and -who now, as he thought, had overtaken him. The possibility of a -raid from the north did not occur to him. He pressed on towards -Boesman's Kop and carelessly approached the sunken and treacherous -cutting through which the Korn Spruit trickles to the Modder, -between banks of even height which almost up to the brink make no -perceptible break in the surface of the veld. His ground scouts and -advanced guard were Cape carts full of refugees followed by the -wagons of his convoy. Next in succession came U Battery of Horse -Artillery with its mounted escort of colonial troops.</p> -<p>Preceded by the Cape carts, which De Wet, in order to disarm -suspicion, allowed to cross to the left bank, the column lumbered -down the slope into the spruit and was quickly sucked into the -trap. In silence broken <span class="pagenum"><a name="page201" id= -"page201"></a>{201}</span> only by the rumble of the wheels and the -Kaffir cries of the drivers, and unseen by the gunners close behind -the leading wagons were seized by quiet, determined burghers and -placed under guard. The approach to the drift was soon blocked, and -in the heart of the entanglement was U Battery. When it reached the -incline, men sprang up out of the spruit and lined the bank, and -without firing a shot made prisoners of the gunners, who, jammed by -the transport, could neither fight nor retire, and were easily -taken from their teams and guns, and conducted by their captors -down to the bed of the spruit. Only the Major commanding the -Battery and the Serjeant-Major got away. Q Battery and its mounted -escort narrowly escaped being drawn into the ambush, but were -warned in time and galloped back to the railway station -buildings.</p> -<p>Up to that moment not a shot had been fired, but as Q Battery -wheeled the Boers lining the bank opened upon it, and in the -scrimmage another gun was lost.</p> -<p>The derelict and riderless teams of U Battery at the spruit were -shot down by the Boers to prevent the escape of the guns, but not -before one gallant team had wrenched its gun out of the enemy's -grasp and had broken away. The Boers were now in possession of five -guns of U Battery and of one gun of Q Battery. The spruit was -shelled with little effect by Q Battery, which unlimbered near the -station buildings. Only a plunging fire could have harmed the enemy -hidden in it.</p> -<p>It is hard to say whether De Wet or Broadwood was in the greater -danger at 9 a.m. on March 31. The former had, it is true, just -obtained a dramatic and most encouraging success. He laid a trap -for a convoy and found himself in action with a force numerically -equal to his own. He had made many prisoners, and almost without -striking a blow had captured not only Broadwood's convoy but also -six of Broadwood's guns. His force, however, was divided. The -portion of it <span class="pagenum"><a name="page202" id= -"page202"></a>{202}</span> under his own command could not be -effectively supported by his brother's command, and was confined in -a spruit out of which he could not move, and which was commanded in -rear by higher ground.</p> -<p>Broadwood had been outwitted by De Wet and very roughly handled. -With a crippled and maimed force he was lying between the jaws of a -vice which might at any moment close and crush him. The loss of the -convoy was, from a tactical point of view, not an unmixed evil, as -he gained thereby greater freedom of action, but the loss of half -his guns was for the time being irremediable. The careless and -haphazard scouting from the Waterworks and Boesman's Kop, in which -he complacently trusted, had lured him on.<a id="footnotetag40" -name="footnotetag40"></a><a href="#footnote40"><sup>40</sup></a> -When it was reported to him that the spruit was in possession of -the enemy, he could scarcely believe it possible. Whether he or the -officers in command of the artillery and the mounted escort were -responsible for the extraordinary omission to send out ground -scouts in advance of the column is not known, but the guns and -wagons would not have been lost had this simple and customary -precaution been taken.</p> -<p>Broadwood, who had no information that Colvile and Martyr were -approaching from the west, and that the latter was actually at -Boesman's Kop, acted in the belief that he would have to deal with -the situation unaided. He ordered the mounted infantry under -Alderson to hold P. De Wet's force on the Modder, while the -cavalry, supported by fire from Q Battery at the station buildings -and working south and west of the Korn Spruit Drift, endeavoured to -turn C. De Wet's precarious position. Neither of these operations -was successful. Alderson could barely hold his own; the turning -movement, although aided by a few companies of Martyr's force, was -frustrated by small parties of <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page203" id="page203"></a>{203}</span> marksmen whom C. De Wet had -posted on the ridge in rear; and Q Battery was losing heavily.</p> -<p>At 10 a.m. Broadwood ordered a general retirement. No attempt -seems to have been made to communicate with him by heliograph, and -he was still unaware that Martyr had been on Boesman's Kop for -three hours, and was actually assisting in the turning movement; -and that Colvile was hurrying forward to the sound of the firing -with the IXth Division. As the battle had begun in the Fog of War, -so also therein did it end.</p> -<p>With the utmost difficulty Q Battery, which had been fighting in -the open until only Phipps-Hornby and less than a dozen gunners -were left to work five guns, was withdrawn. The enemy's fire was so -heavy that the teams could not be brought up to the guns, four of -which were run back by hand to the station buildings, which -afforded some cover. The fifth gun was abandoned, but by the heroic -efforts of Phipps-Hornby and a handful of gunners and volunteers -from the mounted infantry escort, four guns were brought away.</p> -<p>Meanwhile Alderson was fighting a rearguard action against P. De -Wet, to cover the retirement of the guns, and when this was -effected, he followed them, closely pursued as far as the Korn -Spruit by P. De Wet's burghers, who crossed the Modder at the -Waterworks. Before noon the remains of Broadwood's column were -formed up near Boesman's Kop. He had lost seven<a id= -"footnotetag41" name="footnotetag41"></a><a href= -"#footnote41"><sup>41</sup></a> guns, seventy-three wagons and -nearly a third of his strength in killed, wounded, and -prisoners.</p> -<p>Broadwood's withdrawal gave C. De Wet the opportunity which he -could hardly have dared hope would ever be offered to him. He was -reinforced by his brother, and at once drew his spoils out of the -spruit and easily got away with them to the right bank of the -Modder, where at noon he met the advanced guard of <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page204" id="page204"></a>{204}</span> Olivier's -force. Although he was in presence not only of Broadwood's force, -but also almost in touch with a division of infantry and a brigade -of mounted infantry his movements were so little impeded that he -was able to bring two of the captured guns back to the left bank, -and to bring them into action against a detachment of mounted -infantry which was holding Waterval Drift.</p> -<p>Martyr reached Boesman's Kop at 7 a.m., where in the course of -the morning he was joined by Colvile, whose Division was also on -its way to Waterval Drift. Broadwood, who was about two miles away, -was ordered by Colvile to come to him, but he refused to leave his -command so long as there was any chance of recovering the guns. He -technically committed a breach of discipline, but Lord Roberts -subsequently approved of his action. He requested Colvile to -advance against the spruit, but the message was not delivered; and -Colvile said that it would not have modified his dispositions. He -had already refused to listen to the obvious suggestion made by his -staff that he should go to Broadwood, who after waiting for two -hours in the expectation that something would be done by the -infantry division, gave up hope and retired towards -Springfield.</p> -<p>Colvile's appreciation of the situation was that it would have -been useless to pursue De Wet's mounted troops with infantry. He -therefore carried out the letter of his instructions from Lord -Roberts, and, seeing that Broadwood's column was apparently safe, -went on towards Waterval Drift: whither also Martyr had already -sent the greater portion of the mounted infantry. Thus the brothers -De Wet gained not only an actual, but also a moral success of the -greatest importance to their cause, and took away the prizes they -had so unexpectedly won, under the eyes of a strong British force -helplessly watching the commandos trailing away across the -veld.</p> -<p>Waterval Drift had been indicated to Colvile and <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page205" id="page205"></a>{205}</span> Martyr as -their objective by Lord Roberts, and they considered that it was -their duty to make for it. They did not, however, recognize that -instructions must be read in the light of the information at the -disposal of the superior officer at the moment of issue, and they -adhered to them pedantically.<a id="footnotetag42" name= -"footnotetag42"></a><a href="#footnote42"><sup>42</sup></a> Lord -Roberts could not have anticipated Broadwood's plight when he -ordered Colvile and Martyr to Waterval Drift.</p> -<p>Meanwhile, the news of the disaster had reached Bloemfontein. -French's attenuated cavalry brigade, still panting with the fatigue -of the Karee Siding affair, was ordered out, and Colvile was -instructed to endeavour to make a turning movement, and with -French's assistance to act on the Boer line of retreat. By sunset -Colvile, after some opposition, was in possession of the Waterval -Drift; the enemy having despatched the prisoners, the loot, and the -captured guns to the north, was still in occupation of the -Waterworks; Broadwood's mangled column was on its way back to -Bloemfontein; and French was expected to appear upon the stage at -sunrise next morning. The approach of the cavalry, which had picked -up Broadwood at Springfield, was delayed by a report, which proved -to be unfounded, that a body of the enemy was on the right flank -marching on Bloemfontein, and French did not come into touch with -Colvile until nearly midday on April 1. After reconnoitring the -Waterworks and the Boer positions on the right bank of the Modder, -Colvile came to the conclusion that he was not strong enough to -attack them. Next day all the troops were ordered by Lord Roberts -to fall back upon Bloemfontein.</p> -<p>Broadwood was not wholly, not even mainly, responsible for the -Sannah's Post disaster. He was unable <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page206" id="page206"></a>{206}</span> to -retrace that unlucky first false step when, rashly assuming that -the ground had been properly reconnoitred and patrolled, he pushed -into the angle between the Modder and its tributary; and there can -be no excuse for the negligence which tossed the convoy and the -guns into the abyss. But he received neither support nor -information until it was too late. No serious attempt was made to -let him know that a strong force was on its way from Bloemfontein. -Martyr failed to report himself, and Colvile was content to be an -interested spectator of the closing scene of the drama. Each leader -assumed that the moves of the Kriegspiel had been correctly played -and that there was nothing more to be done.</p> -<p>After the occupation of Bloemfontein, the columns operating -south of the Orange River were drawn into the Free State. Clements -crossed at Norval's Pont, and Gatacre at Bethulie on March 15; -Brabant, who commanded the colonial troops of the latter's -Division, having reached Aliwal North four days previously. -Clements' force advanced in a peaceful procession through the -districts west of the railway, meeting with no opposition, and -receiving what, under the circumstances, was almost a welcome from -the inhabitants. Early in April he joined Lord Roberts at -Bloemfontein.</p> -<p>Not so with Gatacre and Brabant, who were soon seriously -involved. Lord Roberts' view of the situation, which although -mistaken was not unwarranted, was that the majority of the Boers -were inclined to submit, and would do so but for the malign -influence of a small belligerent party; and in order to encourage -the waverers to assert themselves, and to give protection to them -when they took the oath of neutrality and returned to their homes, -he sent out flying columns in various directions to register names, -take over arms, and make known the conditions on which surrenders -would be accepted.</p> -<p>The story of the Thabanchu column has already been <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page207" id="page207"></a>{207}</span> told. -Other columns were detached from Gatacre's and Brabant's commands, -and Smithfield, Wepener, and Dewetsdorp, and smaller towns were -occupied. Lord Roberts' orders for the occupation of Dewetsdorp -were conditional on Gatacre's having enough troops for the purpose -at his disposal. So little was it expected that the columns would -meet with serious resistance that they were unaccompanied by guns, -and all Gatacre's artillery was sent to Bloemfontein.</p> -<p>De Wet, a soldier possessed of more power of initiative than -many of his opponents, took "upon himself the responsibility of -varying the instructions" he had received from the Kroonstad -Krijgsraad. The chance of snapping up isolated garrisons allured -him from the less brilliant but more practically useful work of -hacking at the railway upon which Lord Roberts depended for his -communications, and his wonderful and unexpected success at -Sannah's Post encouraged him to persevere. He became aware that -small columns were scouring the country, administering lightly -taken oaths and giving receipts for arms handed in by burghers who -protested that they were "sick of the war"; and he determined to -deal promptly with these ominous signs.</p> -<p>Between Sannah's Post and Reddersburg he in one day persuaded -more than a hundred sworn burghers to break their oaths of -neutrality and join him. Whether the energy and resource which he -displayed would not have been more profitably expended in a -vigorous effort to shrivel up the line between Bloemfontein and the -Orange is a matter for speculation. Kruger watched his proceedings -with misgiving, and proposed that he should retire northwards, as -soon as he had cut the railway, or even without doing so.</p> -<p>Korn Spruit opened Lord Roberts' eyes. He became alarmed for the -safety of the railway, and ordered Gatacre to evacuate Dewetsdorp -and to concentrate the weak pacificatory columns wandering -helplessly <span class="pagenum"><a name="page208" id= -"page208"></a>{208}</span> over the country. The column of 550 men -without guns, sent by Gatacre to garrison Dewetsdorp, had not been -there many hours before it was ordered to retire on Reddersburg, -and at daybreak on April 2 was again on the march, and soon De Wet -was in touch with it. On the following morning he was close to it. -In his own account of the affair he says that there was a sort of a -race, which was won by the British column, for a ridge near -Reddersburg, named Mostert's Hoek. He had with him 2,000 men with -four guns, but an invitation to surrender was promptly declined by -the defenders, who all that day were beaten on by bullet and by -shell. After sunset the last drop of water was served out. Next -morning De Wet rushed the western spur of the ridge, which now -became untenable, and at 9 a.m. on April 4 the column surrendered -and was swept into his net.</p> -<p>Another hour of resistance would probably have saved it. On the -previous evening Gatacre and Lord Roberts received the news that it -was in trouble, and a relieving force was hurriedly collected at -Bethany from Springfontein and Bloemfontein, and sent out under -Gatacre's command. His scouts heard the last shot fired, and the -silence which followed seemed to show that all was over. When -reports of the surrender reached him near Reddersburg, and before -De Wet, only six miles away, had cleared out of Mostert's Hoek, he -abandoned the attempt; although some of his advanced mounted troops -did indeed come into touch with the rearguard of De Wet hurrying -away with his prisoners.</p> -<p>Next day he was recalled to Bloemfontein by Lord Roberts, who -held him responsible for the disaster. He had occupied Dewetsdorp, -an exposed and isolated position, with an inadequate force, -although expressly instructed to leave it alone if he had not -sufficient troops for the purpose. Mostert's Hoek supervening on -Stormberg ended the career of a most gallant, energetic, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page209" id= -"page209"></a>{209}</span> and enthusiastic soldier. <i>Bic peccare -in bello non licet</i>. He was removed from his command and sent -back to England.</p> -<p>After leaving Sannah's Post, De Wet seems to have recognized -that he was not exactly carrying out the Krijgsraad policy, for he -informed Steyn that he was going to Dewetsdorp to "collect the -burghers and to obtain dynamite for our operations" against the -railway between Bloemfontein and Bethany. Next day he heard that -the British had occupied Dewetsdorp, and soon after that the -garrison was retiring on Reddersburg, and the attack on the line, -which perhaps he never seriously intended to make, was indefinitely -postponed.</p> -<p>For as soon as he had disposed of the prisoners of Mostert's -Hoek, he cast his eye round the horizon and descried two other -isolated garrisons, at Smithfield and Wepener. Against the former -he sent one of his lieutenants, who, however, found the little town -evacuated, while he himself made for Wepener, and longing to teach -a lesson to Brabant's loyal colonials, sat down before it on April -9 with ten guns and 6,000 men. In the course of the northward -advance from the Orange it had been occupied by a detachment from -Brabant's force, which was increased by subsequent reinforcements -to a strength of nearly 1,900 men under Dalgety, of whom little -more than 100 were regular troops, with seven guns. The town itself -was not held, but a circular position outside it with a perimeter -of seven miles was taken up on the right bank of the Caledon.</p> -<p>De Wet maintained the siege for sixteen days. The failure of an -attempt by night on April 10 to storm a post on the southern -section of the perimeter deterred the Boers, as at Ladysmith after -the abortive attack on Caesar's Camp two months before, from -further offensive action; but the position was vigorously bombarded -from time to time, and an almost unceasing hail of Mauser bullets -fell upon it. De Wet did his best <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page210" id="page210"></a>{210}</span> to add Wepener to the -scalps of Sannah's Post and Mostert's Hoek; but when two columns -detailed for the relief by Lord Roberts under the command of -Brabant and Hart, who had come round from Natal with his brigade, -reached Wepener from Aliwal North on April 25, they found that the -siege had been raised, and that De Wet had trekked away to the -north.</p> -<p>At Waterval Drift, Kitchener's Kopje, Sannah's Post, and -Mostert's Hoek, De Wet showed himself to be a daring and successful -partisan leader. He was instinctively drawn towards helpless or -unwary detachments. He played his own hand without reference to his -partner's, and seemed to be incapable of co-operating in a general -scheme of strategy. Perhaps he had not much confidence in those who -directed the campaign of defence. He did not act in accordance with -the instructions he had received from the Krijgsraad; but who could -find fault with a leader who was ever sending in batches of -prisoners of war? Many critics say that he was wanting in the true -military instinct and spirit, and that he lost the greatest -opportunity in his career when he allowed himself to be attracted -away from the British lines of communication by the feeble, -peregrinating columns. He says that his reason, or it may be his -excuse, for not raiding vigorously towards the south, instead of -sitting down before Wepener, was the fear lest the Transvaalers -should think that the Free Staters had abandoned them to their -fate. If his action is open to criticism when judged by the -generally accepted principles of warfare, it should be remembered -that these are framed from experience only, and are subject to -accommodation. By all the rules of the game, the Boers must have -been beaten in six months: yet when, after the occupation of -Bloemfontein, the cause seemed to be hopeless, the De Wet revival -prolonged the contest for two years and more. It is almost certain -that, but for De Wet, the war would have been brought to a close in -1900. One man only, and he was <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page211" id="page211"></a>{211}</span> Napoleon, added a greater -sum to the British National Debt.</p> -<p>The fortune which proverbially attends the bold never deserted -him. To the Boer forces at large he was what the pirate adventurers -and buccaneers of the Elizabethan period, and the privateersmen of -the eighteenth century, were to the National Navy. He sailed where -he would under letters of marque from the Presidents. He is the -most interesting and the most original personage of the South -African War: and when its history is mellowed by time, and its epic -is written by some Walter Scott or Homer of the future, De Wet will -be the central figure, and his exploits will be sung.</p> -<p>Five years later, having thrown aside his sword, he became a -controller of ploughshares as Minister of Agriculture in the -Government of the Orange River Colony, and the father-in-law of a -British officer who had fought against him.</p> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote39" name= -"footnote39"></a><b>Footnote 39:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag39">(return)</a> -<p>At the Krijgsraad at Kroonstad Delarey maintained that the -commandos were too large and must be subdivided.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote40" name= -"footnote40"></a><b>Footnote 40:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag40">(return)</a> -<p>The scouting of the British Army in South Africa has been -compared to a housemaid searching for an escape of gas with a -lighted candle.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote41" name= -"footnote41"></a><b>Footnote 41:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag41">(return)</a> -<p>A The gun of U Battery, which had broken away at the Drift, was -recovered.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote42" name= -"footnote42"></a><b>Footnote 42:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag42">(return)</a> -<p>In the official handbook on <i>Combined Training</i> issued -after the war, it was expressly laid down that "officers, must take -upon themselves, whenever it may be necessary, the responsibility -of departing from or varying the orders they may have received." -This responsibility had been laid by Napoleon upon his officers -nearly a century before. Seep. 251.</p> -</blockquote> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page212" id= -"page212"></a>{212}</span> -<h2><a name="chap10" id="chap10">CHAPTER X</a></h2> -<h3>Baden-Powell and the Siege of Mafeking</h3> -<p>Mafeking is a dull, unimportant town in the veld with a history -that attracted the Boers to it.</p> -<p>They considered that, like Natal and Kimberley, it did not -rightfully belong to Great Britain. They were a community of -trekking and centrifugal atoms, especially in the direction of -territories in the possession of native tribes, and their own -country, though sparsely inhabited, was not spacious enough for -them. The bucolic ambition of the Boer, which is to dwell in a -house from which he cannot see the smoke of his nearest neighbour's -chimney, can be satisfied in a flat country only when the house -stands in the midst of a farm many thousand <i>morgen</i> in -extent.</p> -<p>For a generation or two before the war, the Transvaalers had -been encroaching upon Bechuanaland. A Baralong chief named Montsioa -was dispossessed of Mafeking and could obtain no redress from the -British Government, which at that time was in an intermediate frame -of mind, and did not necessarily act on the assumption that in -every dispute between white man and native the latter was in the -right.</p> -<p>Thus encouraged, the Transvaalers annexed Bechuanaland in 1868, -but three years later it was taken away from them under the Keate -award, in an arbitration to determine the respective rights of Boer -and native over the debateable territory.</p> -<p>After the war of 1881, the Transvaalers supposed that the -British Government would be unlikely to assert itself, and two -little impudent republics of <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page213" id="page213"></a>{213}</span> adventurers were set up in -territory which the award had declared to be within the British -sphere of influence. Montsioa fought for his rights, but the -British Government lay torpid for some time. Finally it was goaded -into action by a proclamation issued by Kruger annexing the -territory to the Transvaal. He soon found it advisable to cancel -the proclamation, and in 1885 the Republics of Goshen at Mafeking -and of Stellaland at Vryburg were effaced by an expedition led by -Sir Charles Warren. Bechuanaland was again annexed by proclamation, -but on this occasion to the British Empire.</p> -<p>The resentment of the Transvaalers against Mafeking, which -originated in the conviction that they had been wrongfully deprived -of it, was aggravated by the fact that it was the starting place of -the Jameson Raid.</p> -<p>On October 13 nearly 7,000 burghers, with six guns, under P. -Cronje, sat down before it. He expected to have little difficulty -in recovering it. Appearances were encouraging; the town was open -and defenceless, and he was probably aware that it was held by a -weak garrison. Why the British should have occupied such an -out-of-the-way place as part of their plan of campaign, he could -not understand, but there it was, inviting attack.</p> -<p>Of the half-hearted measures taken by the War and Colonial -Offices in 1899, when a war with the Transvaal seemed to be more -probable every day, one of the most intelligent was the -commissioning of R. Baden-Powell, who had formerly served in -Bechuanaland and had recently commanded the 5th Dragoon Guards, to -"organize the defence of the Bechuanaland and Rhodesia frontiers." -It would neither involve a great expenditure of money, nor be -likely to wound the susceptibilities of the Transvaalers, who might -be provoked by more vigorous and minatory measures: and thus little -harm would be done if after all it were found to be an unnecessary -precaution.</p> -<p>For these reasons it commended itself to Pall Mall, <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page214" id="page214"></a>{214}</span> but its -chief merit was that it sent to South Africa a capable, versatile -and zealous soldier, whose mind did not run in the grooves. Yet if -Baden-Powell had been sent to Kimberley instead of to Mafeking, -Kimberley would probably have fallen—after an outbreak of -civil war within the lines between him and Rhodes. It would have -been impossible to insulate the personal electricity with which -each of them was so highly charged, and short circuiting must have -occurred.</p> -<p>The object of the contemplated display upon the Bechuanaland and -Rhodesia frontiers was twofold. They ran through the indefinite -border belt which separated black from white territory, and -activity on them would not only be witnessed by the tribes and -exert an impressive influence on the native mind, but would also -draw away the Boers and prevent them concentrating their forces. -The central position of Mafeking on the Western line, and the -stores and supplies which had been collected in the town, attracted -Baden-Powell to it. It was singularly ill-adapted to hold -defensively against an active enemy.</p> -<p>In spite of recruiting difficulties raised by the -Facing-both-Ways Ministry at Capetown, which in a less tolerant and -philosophic age would at once have been swept away by a storm of -indignation, he raised two irregular regiments: the Rhodesian -Regiment, which was sent into Rhodesia under Plumer, and the -Protectorate Regiment under Hore.</p> -<p>The Cape Ministry did what it could to prevent the Protectorate -Regiment going to Mafeking, and the corps was in fact mustered -outside the Cape Colony, and only entered the town a few days -before war was declared. As at Kimberley, so also at Mafeking, the -Schreiner sect set itself placidly to thwart the gentle and -tentative early efforts of the British Government to deal with the -situation.</p> -<p>When P. Cronje appeared before Mafeking, Baden-Powell had a -force of less than 1,200 men, none of whom <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page215" id="page215"></a>{215}</span> were -regular soldiers and less than half of whom were efficiently armed, -with which to sustain the siege of an open town by 7,000 Boers. He -had also four small field guns of obsolete pattern, to which were -added later on a home-made howitzer and an ancient man-of-war's -smoothbore, which had left the foundry during the Napoleonic wars. -In its youth it had probably fought the French through a porthole, -and now having in the interval trekked across the South African -veld into the possession of a native tribe, was discovered in a -Baralong kraal, restored to active service, and, mounted on a Dutch -wagon, aided in the defence of a little settlement 400 miles away -from the sound of the sea.</p> -<p>In one respect only Baden-Powell had the advantage over Kekewich -at Kimberley. His burden was not increased by discord within the -lines. The civilians behaved with exemplary composure and put -themselves unreservedly into his hands.</p> -<p>An archaic but effective simplicity characterized the methods of -the defence. Baden-Powell eked out his slender stock of men and -instruments with tricks and devices that might have been employed -at the siege of Troy, but which none the less deceived and -confounded the slow-witted besiegers, whom he scandalized with -gibes and taunting messages. When asked to surrender to avoid -further bloodshed, he replied that the only blood hitherto shed was -the blood of a chicken in a compound; and on another occasion he -reproved Cronje for inactivity. Many of the incidents read like -passages from the Iliad. The besiegers were allured into determined -attacks upon dummy trenches; deceived by bogus orders shouted for -their information through a megaphone; alarmed by the sudden -appearance of cavalry within the lines, for did they not see the -glint of lances? The lances were weapons that had been forged in -the railway workshops, and carried round, as it were in a parade -before the footlights <span class="pagenum"><a name="page216" id= -"page216"></a>{216}</span> by a body of supers making a gallant -show upon the stage.</p> -<p>What should be done in a besieged place with such an -embarrassing asset as ten tons of dynamite? Buller would have -handed them over to his second in command for disposal, and then if -any accident occurred would have disclaimed responsibility for it. -Gatacre would have taken the chances, but would not have hesitated -to pitch his tent if necessary beside them. Colvile would have -searched his orders for instructions. Baden-Powell, not being able -to rid himself of the explosive by firing it, arranged that it -should be fired by the enemy. He loaded it on railway trucks, which -he propelled a few miles out of the town and then abandoned. There -was no Laocoon to warn the Boers, and they rushed at what they -thought was an armoured train in trouble. In the skirmish the -dynamite exploded, and although no one was hurt the enemy was -terribly scared, and the resisting powers of the garrison virtually -augmented.</p> -<p>Baden-Powell thoroughly understood the Boer temperament. Many -generations' isolation from the progressive European world had -rendered it peculiarly liable to be ensnared by simple expedients. -It was not wanting in "slimness," but it was the "slimness" or -cunning of a primitive race, and was easily gulled by wiles that -might have been employed against a tribe of Red Indians. -Baden-Powell alone of all the British leaders was aware of this, -and he owed much of his success to the knowledge. With but one man -to defend each ten yards of his perimeter of seven miles he -hypnotized Cronje, a dull man bewildered by a resourceful. His -versatility instantly found a way out of each difficulty that beset -him. Before he sent out a party detailed for a night attack that -might easily go astray, he bethought himself of the device by which -a ship is often guided into her haven, and hung up two lamps in the -town as leading lights across the veld.</p> -<p>Cronje soon found that Mafeking was not an easy <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page217" id="page217"></a>{217}</span> prey. -Although in all probability he might at any time have overwhelmed -it by sheer weight of numbers, he refrained from making the -attempt. It hit out so vigorously and was believed to be so well -protected by mines that he requisitioned a big gun from Pretoria, -which was mounted south of the town and came into action on October -23. With a weapon throwing a shell more than three times heavier -than all the shells that could be fired in salvo by the artillery -of the defence, there was no doubt in his mind that the place must -fall before the end of the month.</p> -<p>The arrival of the gun quickened the attack for a time. The -native location S.W. of the town was made the object of a feint on -October 25 to be immediately followed by a real attack elsewhere, -but the Baralongs, who had been armed, resisted so stoutly that the -operation failed. By the beginning of November the Boers had been -cleared out of a newly made advanced trench on the east side; and -Cannon Kopje on the south, the possession of which by them would -have made a considerable section of the defence works and perhaps -even the town itself untenable, was held under a converging fire of -artillery by fifty troopers of the British South African Police -against a thousand Boers.</p> -<p>Five weeks of Baden-Powell were enough for Cronje, who on -November 19 trekked away to the south, leaving Snyman and 3,000 -burghers to continue the siege. His self-esteem had been wounded -because the walls had not immediately fallen to the sound of the -big gun, and by Baden-Powell's refusal to take a serious view of -the situation in the frequent communications that passed between -them. It may be said that Cronje was "chaffed" away from Mafeking; -the gibes put him out of conceit with himself, and instead of -stimulating him into activity only made him more dull-spirited than -he was by nature. He had none of the instinctive military genius -which showed itself so notably in most of his colleagues, who, -having turned their ploughshares into swords at a <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page218" id="page218"></a>{218}</span> moment's -notice, were generally more than a match for the professional -soldiers against whom they were pitted. He had the misfortune of -meeting almost the only British leader then in South Africa capable -of instinctively assessing him on the spot at his true valuation; -and like a timid poker-player with a good hand, he allowed himself -to be bluffed by the flourishes of his opponent. He held good -cards, but he feebly threw them down. At Magersfontein he played -his hand with skill, but lost the deciding game at Paardeberg.</p> -<p>Baden-Powell was too zealous a soldier to conform to the schism -that the operations of war were akin to athletics or sport. -Externally his predilections were for the drama. He was a competent -actor and manager, and he rejoiced in Mafeking as in a stage -play.</p> -<p>Many of his devices were as unsubstantial as stage scenery; the -besiegers were the villains of the piece who would meet with their -deserts before the curtain fell; there was comic by-play in his -ways of beguiling the tedium and the lassitude of the siege, in the -bantering messages he sent out to the besiegers, and now and then -even in his garrison orders. The little garrison was permeated by -the exosmose action of his cheery optimism and humour during seven -weary months of waiting; and while it might seem to some that he -was treating the serious situation with unbecoming levity, he -wisely kept the tragedy of it, of which he was fully conscious, in -the background.</p> -<p>His methods were so far successful that in a few weeks he had -driven away two-thirds of the force originally opposed to him, and -had firmly gripped the place. The enemy's superiority in artillery -was neutralized by the construction of underground shelters and -warrens in which the women and children took refuge during the -daytime, leaving an apparently deserted town to be bombarded. Thus -Baden-Powell was relieved from the moral pressure which a large -number of casualties among them would have caused; and the garrison -suffered but <span class="pagenum"><a name="page219" id= -"page219"></a>{219}</span> little in the redoubts and trenches. -Supplies were plentiful and the water supply secure.</p> -<p>What Cronje had failed to do, Snyman could hardly be expected to -accomplish with a considerably reduced force, and the attack became -more faint-hearted. He carried out the Cronje policy of -comfortable, lethargic squatting, doubting not that the place must -fall into his hands sooner or later. Friends and relations tripped -over from Johannesburg to admire and encourage his brave burghers -at their posts, and some were even allowed as a treat to fire a -shot at the Khakis.</p> -<p>No serious operation occurred until the end of the year. On the -morrow of Christmas Day, Baden-Powell made an unsuccessful attempt -to carry a fort on Game Tree Hill, which commanded the approach to -the town from the north. He was unaware of its strength, and the -casualties amounted to nearly one-fifth of the force engaged, a -loss which he could ill afford; but early in January he compelled -the big gun, which could neither face the shells of his little -battery of 7-pounders nor the rifles of his marksmen, to withdraw -to a more distant emplacement east of the town. Towards the end of -the month an encouraging message was received from Lord Roberts at -Capetown.</p> -<p>The Boer line of circumvallation was in plan an irregular -hexagon, of which the north-east face was pushed inwards and a -re-entrant angle formed at the Brickfields; where a fort was built -nearer to the town than any other post of the attack, and the -operations during February and March were mainly a struggle for the -possession of it. After several weeks of sapping and counter -sapping, the Boers, though supported by the fire of the big gun in -its new emplacement, were expelled from the Brickfields on March -23.</p> -<p>April was marked by the final withdrawal of the big gun, which, -after a heavy bombardment on the 11th, was sent away to Pretoria; -and by the appearance of young Eloff, fresh from the capital, with -instructions to do <span class="pagenum"><a name="page220" id= -"page220"></a>{220}</span> what he could to stimulate the attack, -for once in a way, into real activity. More than a fortnight -elapsed before he succeeded. Snyman gave him little encouragement, -but could not oppose a mandate from Kruger, Eloff's -grandfather.</p> -<p>The Molopo River, after passing south of the town, runs through -the only weak place in the defence, the native location, which -during the first few days of the siege had been attacked without -result by Cronje. Westward of it the steep banks of the river -afford a covered way of access to the thickly clustered huts lying -within the perimeter of the defence, which Eloff saw might be -turned if he got a footing among them.</p> -<p>Early in the morning of May 12 a heavy fire was opened upon the -town from the east, but was soon discontinued; and then an alarm -came from the S.W. It was Eloff, who, with 300 burghers, had -wriggled up the river bed through the outposts and had set fire to -the native huts: a signal for the reinforcements which Snyman had -promised in writing. It also warned the garrison. The natives were -too much terrified to offer resistance, and Eloff, leaving the -greater part of his force to hold the location, advanced upon the -town. The police building in the open was surrounded and the -detachment holding it taken prisoners. A pause was now made to -allow the promised reinforcements to come up.</p> -<p>Eloff's gallant thrust gave the garrison the opportunity for -which it had long been hoping. The troops of the western section of -the defence closed in and were manoeuvred by Baden-Powell through -the telephone. The door by which Eloff came in was shut, not only -to a retreat but also to the reinforcements which timidly knocked -at it; the burghers holding the location were overpowered, and -Eloff's party was penned up in the police building with its -prisoners, whose condition was suddenly dramatically reversed. -Eloff, seeing that Snyman had failed him, surrendered to the men he -had <span class="pagenum"><a name="page221" id= -"page221"></a>{221}</span> captured a few hours before, within the -walls of the prison in which he had confined them.</p> -<p>The ordeal of Mafeking soon came to an end. On May 15 it was -reported that the relief column under Mahon, who on that day joined -Plumer at Massibi on the Molopo twenty miles from Mafeking, was -approaching. The combined forces, though vigorously opposed by -Delarey, whom L. Botha had sent when the news of the advance -reached him, entered the town on May 17 and ended a siege of 213 -days.</p> -<p>Mafeking, the last and most instructive of the sieges, proved -that there was hardly any disparity of numbers or preponderance of -available military resources that could not be neutralized by good -leadership opposed to bad. Baden-Powell had not only detained a -considerable Boer force on the edge of the storm, but with a body -of irregular troops had beaten the men of Magersfontein, Colenso, -and Spion Kop.</p> -<p>The relief of Mafeking, however, did not vitally affect the -general situation. The capture of the town during Lord Robert's -advance would no doubt have caused annoyance and trouble, but if -necessary it could have been retaken without much difficulty. Nor -would its fall have greatly benefited the enemy, who probably would -have been tempted by the success to hold an unsound position and -detain in it commandos urgently required elsewhere.</p> -<p>Kimberley, Mafeking, and Wepener, more than the operations at -large, demonstrated the anomalous character of the war. Hitherto, -invaders had been accustomed to besiege the invaded, in South -Africa the invaded besieged the invaders. Such a reversal of the -order of things military had rarely before occurred. The sieges of -the Peninsular War are not an exception, for Wellington was from a -military, though not from a political point of view, as much an -invader as the lieutenants of Napoleon.</p> -<p>Baden-Powell is a suppressed personality whose merit -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page222" id= -"page222"></a>{222}</span> was not fully recognized. With scarcely -an exception, no individual leader was more self-reliant, or -handled imperfect tools with greater skill. For seven months he -kept the flag flying over the lonely Baralong kraal in the veld. -His unconventional even theatrical methods were not to the taste of -his serious superiors, who underestimated his success. His only -reward was the Companionship of the Bath, which was also bestowed -upon the militia colonels, most of whom, from no fault or no want -of zeal on their part, but from lack of opportunity, never met the -enemy except in some casual paltry skirmish.</p> -<p>The junction of the two columns advancing to the relief of -Mafeking—Plumer's from the north and Mahon's from the -south—was effected at the right moment, for it is doubtful -whether either of them acting alone would have been able to deal -with Delarey.</p> -<p>Plumer with the Rhodesian Regiment had been trekking here and -there and skirmishing with the enemy for seven months. On the eve -of the war he was sent by Baden-Powell to Tuli, a village in -Rhodesia not far from the right bank of the Limpopo, which is the -northern boundary of the Transvaal. His instructions were "to -defend the border, to attract the enemy away towards the north, and -then in due time to co-operate with the British force," which it -was expected would soon be invading the Transvaal from the south, -and also to overawe the doubtful native tribes between Tuli and -Mafeking, a distance of 500 miles; and he had under his immediate -command at Tuli one irregular regiment 500 strong.</p> -<p>He remained for some weeks seeing to the drifts, which were now -in his possession and now in that of the enemy. A Boer raid into -Rhodesia on November 2 forced the outlying detachments back upon -Tuli, which was seriously threatened by some commandos under F.A. -Grobler of Marico. The Government of Pretoria, however, growing -anxious at the presence of British <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page223" id="page223"></a>{223}</span> troops elsewhere, vetoed a -promising enterprise and recalled him. The raid of November 2 was -answered a few weeks later by Plumer, who, finding the drifts -unoccupied, reconnoitred thirty miles towards the south. Nearly six -months elapsed before another British soldier set foot in the -Transvaal. A subsequent reconnaissance again found no trace of the -enemy on the left bank of the Limpopo, and showed that it was -unnecessary for him to remain on the river. He had the advantage of -being cut off from communication with superior officers ignorant of -local conditions, and was able to act freely upon his own -responsibility.</p> -<p>He soon heard news which clearly indicated the way he should go. -The railway from Buluwayo to Mafeking was held as far as possible -towards the south by patrols of police under Nicholson, and the -Rhodesian Volunteers under Holdsworth were also on the line. In the -gap between the railhead and Mafeking, a Boer commando, said to -have been detached from Mafeking by Cronje, was at Sekwani on the -N.W. border of the Transvaal and within striking distance of the -Western line. It was face to face with the border tribes and was -soon in trouble with them. Although they were not allowed to attack -Sekwani independently, they were permitted to co-operate as -non-combatants in an attack which Holdsworth was about to make on -it, but only on the condition that they did not cross the Transvaal -border. This was a refinement of policy which they could hardly be -expected to understand, and they precipitated Holdsworth's action -by attacking the Boer laager, which lay but a mile or two across -the border, on their own account, and the operation had therefore -to be abandoned. To avenge this native attack, in which several -burghers had been killed, reinforcements were brought over by the -Boers from the Pietersburg line, and Holdsworth's position at -Mochudi on the Western line, whither he had retired after the -Sekwani failure, was endangered.</p> -<p>This was the news which reached Plumer at the end <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page224" id="page224"></a>{224}</span> of the -year. His original instructions were obsolescent and he readily -adapted himself to the altered situation. He saw that it was more -important to clear the railway north of Mafeking than to remain -where he was on the chance of a Boer invasion of Rhodesia, of which -his reconnaissances south of the Limpopo saw no sign. The nearest -station on the Western line was Palapye, and on December 27 he set -out on his midsummer march of 170 miles to it. Within a fortnight, -his little force of irregulars, which three months before had been -sent out into the South African wilderness to perform duties that -might have engrossed a division, passed away from Tuli beyond the -Limpopo on to the visible stage of war near Mochudi.</p> -<p>In the middle of January, 1900, he reached Gaberones. On his -left flank Sekwani was still occupied by the enemy, though in -reduced numbers; in front of him the Boers were not only strongly -posted on the railway at Crocodile Pools, but able to draw upon -Mafeking for reinforcements, by the help of which they successfully -resisted an attack on February 11. Plumer's force, though augmented -by detachments he had picked up on the line, was unequal to the -task of advancing along it. He therefore decided to diverge from -the railway and advance by way of Kanya, a native town lying twenty -miles west of the line.</p> -<p>On March 6 he reached Lobatsi, where he was forty-five miles -from Mafeking. He found, however, that it was an awkward place to -defend and soon quitted it, as Baden-Powell seemed to be in no -immediate need, and was in fact averse to Plumer's small force -throwing itself upon the besiegers. With the greater part of his -command, the rest being sent back to hold the railway at Crocodile -Pools, he withdrew to the base which he had established at Kanya; -afterwards advancing to Sefetili, thirty miles from Mafeking, where -he awaited the approach of Mahon's relieving column from the south. -Baden-Powell, rejoicing in his siege, was not anxious <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page225" id="page225"></a>{225}</span> that the -game which he was playing so well should be brought to a premature -conclusion, and was more afraid for Plumer than for himself.</p> -<p>Plumer filled in his two months at Kanya and Sefetili by -occasional raids in the direction of Mafeking and by an expedition -towards Zeerust. The column in the south, of whose movements many -false reports reached him from time to time, seemed to be tarrying -by the way, and it was not until May 12 that he received a message -from Lord Roberts that it was nearing its destination.</p> -<p>For some weeks after his entry into Bloemfontein, Lord Roberts -was unable to arrange for the direct relief of Mafeking by a column -specially detailed for the purpose. He had originally intended that -this should be done by Methuen, but subsequently ordered him to -operate in the Free State on the left flank of the advance on the -Transvaal. He hoped to apply his favourite method of an automatic -relief, brought about by external pressure elsewhere. At the end of -April, however, when it had become an urgent matter, he ordered -Hunter, who had recently arrived at Kimberley from Natal, to send -out a mounted force under Mahon, following it himself with the rest -of the Xth Division.</p> -<p>He left Kimberley on May 3, and on the following day Mahon set -out from Barkly West on his 230 miles' march to Mafeking. Mahon -advanced wide of the railway up the Hart's River, which joins the -Vaal at Barkly West, his right flank being covered by Hunter, who -kept close to the Vaal. Mahon met with no serious resistance until -he had covered 200 miles of his journey, when he found a force -which had been sent down from Mafeking across his path, and which -diverted him to Massibi; where he joined Plumer on May 15.</p> -<p>The advance of the main and less mobile body under Hunter was -aided by demonstrations made by Methuen from Boshof. With three -columns claiming their attention the bewildered Boers were unable -to do more than <span class="pagenum"><a name="page226" id= -"page226"></a>{226}</span> offer a stout but ineffectual resistance -to Hunter on the Vaal on May 5. Two days later he occupied Fourteen -Streams and restored the railway communication across the Vaal, -having during his halt taken possession of Christiana, a village in -the Transvaal a few miles up the river. It was now no longer -necessary for him to hurry after Mahon, and his advance northwards -was made at leisure. Early in June he occupied Lichtenburg, where -Mahon rejoined him.</p> -<p>Mafeking as well as Kimberley were now in the hands of Lord -Roberts, but the Western line joining them to Capetown was not yet -secure. The districts of Cape Colony west of De Aar and Hopetown -were remote and backward, and sparsely inhabited by discontented -and unprosperous Dutch farmers. Nearly a year before, while the -Cape Government was placidly blinking under the shadow of Table -Mountain and only taking action that thwarted the attempts of the -Imperial Government to prepare for war, and like the unjust steward -intriguing for reception in Boer houses if the Empire should fail, -arms had been sent into these districts by the Boers of the -Republics, and courses of instruction in the use of them were -actually being held.</p> -<p>To stir up the discontented and set the veld on fire, a party of -Transvaalers swooped down from Vryburg before the war was many days -old. Rebel commandos were raised, and most of the districts lying -between the Orange and the Molopo were involved, some of them being -annexed by proclamation to the Republics. For several months the -trouble was confined to the right bank of the Orange, but during -February it passed over to the left bank.</p> -<p>In pursuance of his policy of striking swiftly and strongly at -the centres of population, and not from neglect, Lord Roberts had -left the rebellious and disaffected districts more or less to -themselves, in the belief that indirect action would retrieve the -situation and that his advance would take the heart out of the -rebels <span class="pagenum"><a name="page227" id= -"page227"></a>{227}</span> and deter them from crossing the river; -and for some months there had been no British troops south of the -Orange except at De Aar and Hopetown.</p> -<p>Now, however, the railway, which until his arrival at -Bloemfontein was his only line of communication, was threatened. -The Prieska and Herbert districts on the left bank of the Orange, -and even the remote Gordonia district lying in the angle between -the Orange and the Molopo, which was too far away to be included in -the first batch of proclamations, were annexed by the Boers. There -was much danger of the advancing army not only finding its -communications broken, but also a formidable rebellion springing up -behind it.</p> -<p>The troops on the line were insufficient to deal with the -situation, and Lord Roberts was obliged to draw upon Clements, who -was acting in the other disturbed districts of the Cape Colony -south of the Free State. Lord Kitchener, who chanced to be passing -through De Aar on his way back from Naauwpoort, where he had been -sent to look after the central advance, made arrangements for the -Prieska operations and rejoined Lord Roberts at Kimberley; but his -presence was soon required again at De Aar. Three columns had -started westward from the line, but the centre column, which was -composed of the troops withdrawn from Clement's command, met with -opposition in the Prieska district, and was compelled to retire on -March 6. When the news reached Lord Roberts he sent Kitchener to -take charge of the operations, which from that time was successful. -The rebellion south of the Orange was suppressed; the leaders -disappeared; and by the end of the month Kitchener was free to -return to Head Quarters at Bloemfontein.</p> -<p>Not many weeks, however, elapsed before there was trouble in -Griqualand, a considerable portion of which was in the hands of -rebel descendants of the burghers of the Great Trek, who were -joined by rebels expelled from the districts south of the Orange -during the late <span class="pagenum"><a name="page228" id= -"page228"></a>{228}</span> operations. A column had been sent out -against them from Kimberley by Methuen in March, but Lord Roberts -disapproved of the expedition and it was recalled. At the request -of Sir A. Milner, who from the first had been of the opinion that -the British hold on South Africa was in greater danger from -rebellion in the Colony than from the commandos of the two -Republics, Lord Roberts consented to send a force into Griqualand -under the command of Warren, who was brought round from Natal, and -returned to the country through which he had worked in the -Bechuanaland Expedition of 1885. In the middle of May, Warren set -out from Belmont. The only regular troops in his column were a few -Irish mounted infantry. Douglas was easily taken on May 21, and on -his way to Campbell he was compelled by supply and transport -difficulties to halt at Faber's Put, where at dawn on May 30 he was -surprised by the rebels, who, knowing that they had not to face -regular troops, anticipated an easy victory. They succeeded in -almost surrounding the camp before the alarm was given, but after a -brief struggle were driven off.</p> -<p>Early in June Campbell and Griquatown were occupied; and on the -24th Kuruman, which had been in the hands of the rebels for nearly -six months, was recovered. Near Khies, lower down the Orange, the -force which had been left to watch the banks after the suppression -of the Prieska rebellion, some of the fugitives from which had -returned to the river under the leadership of a Jew, attacked and -carried their laager. This and the Faber's Put affair were the only -serious fights in the clearing of the Colony north of the -Orange.</p> -<p>Thus by the end of June Lord Roberts had secured the railway -from Mafeking and Kimberley to the south.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page229" id= -"page229"></a>{229}</span> -<h2><a name="chap11" id="chap11">CHAPTER XI</a></h2> -<h3>Bloemfontein to Pretoria</h3> -<p><a href="#fig-so-transvaal">Map, p. 260.</a></p> -<p>The agile mind of Lord Roberts rather than the heavy hand of his -Chief of the Staff is discernible in the method of the advance on -the Transvaal.</p> -<p>There were two courses open to the British Army. It might have -deliberately pulverized and extinguished each atom of opposition -within reach in the Free State, and have taken no step to the front -until the rear and the flanks were absolutely and finally clear of -the enemy; or it might have advanced boldly towards the Transvaal -with the ordinary precautions for the protection of the lines of -communication and of the flanks.</p> -<p>Lord Roberts adopted the latter course. He had tried it with -success in the Afghan War twenty years before, when he marched even -more "in the air" from Kabul to Kandahar. The tedious process of -"steam-rollering" the Free State was not to his taste, nor would -the expectant British public at home have understood it; and it -would have been severely criticized by the military experts. It -would have concentrated before him north of the Vaal all the Boer -forces which could not be crushed on the spot, and have left the -resources of the Transvaal for some time untouched: free -communication with the outer world by way of the neutral port of -Lorenzo Marques, the treasury of the Johannesburg gold mines upon -which the enemy could draw, and the railway and mining workshops in -which munitions of war could be manufactured.</p> -<p>Lord Roberts therefore determined upon a swift <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page230" id="page230"></a>{230}</span> advance -from Bloemfontein. He was confident that the occupation of places -would bring the war to an end without an excessive loss of life; -and he would probably have been right if he had been engaged in a -European war. He did not see, however, that the Boers derived -little or no strength from their towns, which were rather a source -of weakness; they were men of the veld and the veld was their -strength.</p> -<p>De Wet's <i>guerilla</i> advanced Chermside to the command of -the IIIrd Division, in place of Gatacre sent home. A new Division, -numbered the VIIIth, under a new commander, Sir Leslie Rundle, a -general with an Egyptian reputation, was assembled south of -Bloemfontein in April.</p> -<p>The siege of Wepener called for activity from Bloemfontein as -well as from the Orange, and Lord Roberts sent Rundle to -Dewetsdorp, where his presence would, it was hoped, not only draw -the Boers away from Wepener, but deny them a retreat to the north. -Pole-Carew with the XIth Division and French followed Rundle, but -De Wet abandoned the siege on the approach of Hart and Brabant from -the south, and his brother P. De Wet scuttled away from Dewetsdorp -on the approach of Rundle; and the commandos ran the gauntlet -successfully. Their hereditary trekking instincts told them when to -move and how to move, and their mobility had not at that period -been recognized by the British Staff. Wepener was indeed relieved, -though not from Bloemfontein, but the subsequent divagations of the -Boers baffled three British divisions which were endeavouring to -squeeze them northwards and head them off. A strong rearguard was -left by the Boers at Houtnek, ten miles north of Thabanchu.</p> -<p>Lord Roberts' position at Bloemfontein, and on the line of -communication, had never been seriously endangered. The brilliant -affairs of Sannah's Post and Mostert's Hoek were no doubt annoying -to the British Army and encouraging to the enemy. At home the -importance <span class="pagenum"><a name="page231" id= -"page231"></a>{231}</span> of them was greatly exaggerated. If the -advance on the Transvaal was delayed by them and the subsequent -operations arising out of the siege of Wepener, more time was given -to prepare for it; and the British Army was usefully informed of a -fact which hitherto had hardly been suspected, namely, that the -enemy derived much of his power from mobility, resourcefulness, and -aptitude for <i>guerilla</i>.</p> -<p>Lord Roberts' plan for the movement on the Transvaal was an -advance in line, on a front which extended from Ladysmith to -Kimberley. It soon became an echelon owing to the slow movements of -Buller in Natal. In the centre at Bloemfontein were the troops -under the immediate orders of the Commander-in-Chief; on the left -at Kimberley were Methuen, and Hunter with the Xth Division which -had been brought round from Ladysmith. Between the centre and the -right the intervention of Basutoland and the Drakensberg prevented -the effective co-operation of the Natal Army with Lord Roberts; and -a portion of the interval was occupied by the enemy.</p> -<p>The centre columns under Lord Roberts were about 43,000 strong. -Hunter and Methuen in the west had each under his command about -10,000 troops, while Buller's force, which was much nearer to the -Transvaal objective than the centre, and which was still lingering -on the banks of the Klip River two months after the relief of -Ladysmith, numbered about 45,000. Ian Hamilton, who had done so -well in the Elandslaagte and Caesar's Camp affairs, was not allowed -to waste himself in the Natal lethargy. He was recalled from -Ladysmith, and after taking part from the Bloemfontein side in the -Wepener operations, was given command of a column which was sent -on, a few days before the general movement, in the direction of -Winburg to protect the right flank of the central advance and to -fend off from it the hovering Boer commandos which had been pressed -northwards by the April operations. He started from Thabanchu on -April 30 and was soon <span class="pagenum"><a name="page232" id= -"page232"></a>{232}</span> in action with the Boer force a Houtnek -under P. Botha. The battle lasted until nightfall and was renewed -next day, when, with the help of reinforcements from French and -Colvile, Ian Hamilton forced the Boers to retire on Clocolan.</p> -<p>Meanwhile there was energy on the left. Methuen had been for -some time in occupation of the Boshof district, where he was in a -position to threaten Kroonstad as well as the commandos at the Vaal -bridge at Fourteen Streams between Kimberley and Mafeking. The -relief of the latter was to be undertaken by a flying column under -Mahon supported by Hunter's division. On May 3 Lord Roberts left -Bloemfontein for the north. Kelly-Kenny's Division remained in -charge of the Free State capital, while Chermside's policed the -railway and the country in rear. Rundle at Thabanchu was instructed -to prevent the enemy from regaining a footing in the districts east -and south of Bloemfontein, and Methuen to push on towards the left -bank of the Vaal beyond Hoopstad. No definite orders were sent to -Buller, but for two months there had been a constant interchange of -suggestions, counter-suggestions, plans, and projects for -co-ordinate action.</p> -<p>Lord Roberts' objective was now Pretoria. The country in front -of him was not difficult and he had a railway behind him. The line -of communication with the south was fairly safe, and it was -estimated that not more than 12,000 Boers with twenty-eight guns, -under Delarey and L. Botha, who had been brought round from Natal -to take chief command during the crisis, barred the way into the -Transvaal; not including the loosely associated commandos operating -on the right flank under the general control of De Wet, the Prince -Rupert of the Boer War.</p> -<p>The nearest Boer post was at Brandfort, a few miles north of -Karee Siding. On the right was the Winburg intervening column, -14,000 strong, under Ian Hamilton, who dragged in his train a weak -supporting Division <span class="pagenum"><a name="page233" id= -"page233"></a>{233}</span> under Colvile, his superior officer in -an anomalous position obliged to conform to his movements, and -without authority to direct them. Brandfort was occupied that -evening by Lord Roberts at the cost of six men killed. Vet River, -the next obstacle, was secured on May 5, and crossed on the -following day by the greater part of the main column. Ian Hamilton -went into bivouac eight miles north of Winburg, which was occupied -by his henchman Colvile.</p> -<p>Up to this time, Lord Roberts was acting without the cavalry -under French, who since the Sannah's Post affair had been working -in the Thabanchu district, and who joined the main column on May 9. -Though his horses were not in good condition, his arrival increased -the power of the centre to strike rapidly at the next obstacles, -the Zand River and the town of Kroonstad forty miles beyond, which -was now the seat of the Free State Government. The drifts on a -section of the river nearly twenty miles in length were seized, the -most easterly being taken by Ian Hamilton, who had gradually -converged on the centre column and was now on the right of the -line. Next day the passage of the river was effected; but Lord -Roberts' hope of getting round and grappling each flank of the -enemy, who numbered about 3,000 Transvaalers and 5,000 Free -Staters, was not realized, and Botha withdrew without serious loss. -That night the Army went into bivouac astride the railway between -Zand River and Kroonstad.</p> -<p>On the left was the cavalry under French, who next morning -raided northwards; but although he was unable, owing to the -opposition of a force which came out of Kroonstad, to reach the -railway north of the town, a small party of pioneers whom he had -sent on succeeded during the night in blowing up the line at -America Siding within a few yards of the high-road by which the -enemy was retreating. This daring exploit, which although it had -not much effect on the situation was not the less meritorious, was -carried out by Hunter-Weston, <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page234" id="page234"></a>{234}</span> who, just two months -previously, had similarly cut the line north of Bloemfontein. The -Boers had taken up a position at Boschrand to defend Kroonstad on -the south, but French's turning movement scared them, and the -position as well as the town was abandoned, in spite of efforts -made by Steyn and Botha to arrest the flight. The seat of -Government was transferred to Lindley.</p> -<p>The Zand River affair was an incident in the advance rather than -a battle. Lord Roberts suffered but 115 casualties. Its effect on -the enemy was chiefly moral. The Transvaalers, whose country had -not yet heard the sounds of war, were alarmed, but the Free Staters -were dismayed. The ties of race and kindred had engulfed them in a -war which was not for their own cause, and the brunt of which they -had borne for ten weeks. They thought that they had done all that -could be expected of them and that the Transvaal must now look -after itself. From that time there was no organized co-operation -between the allies.</p> -<p>On May 12 Lord Roberts entered Kroonstad. In his advance, -averaging thirteen miles per day, he had outstripped the -reconstruction of the railway, of which almost every bridge and -culvert had been blown up by the retreating Boers, and many miles -of the permanent way had been destroyed. A halt was therefore -necessary until the railhead could be brought nearer, and to give -the Army an opportunity of pulling itself together, which was -especially required by the cavalry. Little more than one-half of -the 6,000 horses with which French marched out of Bloemfontein on -May 6 were fit for service at Kroonstad seven days later.</p> -<p>Ian Hamilton was sent out in chase of the flitting Free State -Government. He found it not at Lindley, nor at Heilbron, for it had -trekked away to Frankfort. Between Lindley and Heilbron he was -attacked in rear by a body of Boers, who emerged from the presumed -vacuum behind him, but they were beaten off.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page235" id= -"page235"></a>{235}</span> -<p>The bulk of the enemy's force which had evacuated Kroonstad, was -now in the triangle formed by the railway, the Vaal and the -Rhenoster. On its left flank was Ian Hamilton; and French was -ordered out to hook the right flank, a repetition of the movement -which had failed at Zand River. On May 22 Lord Roberts left -Kroonstad.</p> -<p>The enemy, however, again evaded the net. Reconnaissances by -French on May 23 showed that Botha had been frightened by the -appearance of Ian Hamilton at Heilbron, and had crossed into the -Transvaal. The discovery necessitated the recasting of Lord -Roberts' plan, and brought about an interesting and entirely -successful strategic movement. It was evident from Botha's -dispositions that he expected Ian Hamilton to march straight to his -front and endeavour to cross the Vaal above the railway bridge at -Vereeniging. The difficult drifts and country below it were -considered to be a sufficient protection, and were not strongly -held by Botha, who on this occasion was completely out-generalled -by his opponent.</p> -<p>Lord Roberts ordered Ian Hamilton to march from the right flank -to the left, across the front of the main Army, and then in -conjunction with French to wheel round to Meyerton on the line -between Johannesburg and Vereeniging. On the evening of May 26 he -entered the Transvaal at Wonderwater Drift. But Ian Hamilton's -column had not the honour of being the first troops of the main -body to enter the Transvaal, for he found the cavalry in front of -him. French,<a id="footnotetag43" name="footnotetag43"></a><a href= -"#footnote43"><sup>43</sup></a> who had been sent out from -Kroonstad on May 20, reached the Vaal at Paris on the 24th, and at -once threw part of his force into the Transvaal, the rest crossing -higher up at Old Viljoen's Drift. He thus fittingly celebrated the -last birthday festival of Queen Victoria, which was <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page236" id="page236"></a>{236}</span> also -appropriately honoured by a proclamation issued on the same day by -Lord Roberts, by which the Orange Free State was annexed to the -dominions of Her Majesty under the designation of the Orange River -Colony—a suitable birthday offering from a distinguished -soldier to his Sovereign.</p> -<p>The main body of the Army with the Commander-in-Chief at its -head entered the Transvaal at Viljoen's Drift on May 27, and, like -the pioneer columns of French and Ian Hamilton, met with no -opposition. It was of good augury for the speedy subjugation of the -South African Republic. The expected firm stand of the enemy along -the right bank of the Vaal, where the great battle of the war was -to be fought, was not made. Vereeniging and subsequently Meyerton -were abandoned in spite of all Botha's efforts to keep his -burghers' faces to the front. He held a strong line enclosing -Vereeniging and the drifts and extending from near Heidelberg to -Potchefstroom, but it impotently watched the British troops -crossing the river. Some opposition was indeed offered to French -when he was a day's march from the drift by which he had crossed -into the Transvaal, but the bulk of the commandos fell away to the -north and took up positions between Johannesburg and Krugersdorp. -By arrangement between the Governments, none of the Free Staters -accompanied Botha into the Transvaal; but he was in communication -with De Wet at Frankfort, and was urging him to act against the -railway in the Free State. He must have regretted that the strong -hand and will of the man of Waterval Drift, Kitchener's Kopje, -Sannah's Post, and Mostert's Hoek, were not with him on the right -bank of the Vaal to animate the shrinking burghers of the South -African Republic.</p> -<p>The immediate purpose of Lord Roberts was now the capture of -Johannesburg, the relations of some of whose inhabitants towards -Pretoria had brought on, not only the Jameson raid, but also the -war. Although <span class="pagenum"><a name="page237" id= -"page237"></a>{237}</span> it was not defended by permanent -military works, the burghers had taken up a position before it -which might be very hard to capture, and there was another and -greater cause for anxiety. The task before Lord Roberts may be -likened to an attack on a ship manned by pirates, who threaten to -fire the magazine as soon as a hand is laid upon the bulwarks. It -was seriously proposed by certain persons in authority under -Kruger, that on the appearance of the British Army before the city, -the mines in which so many millions of British capital were -invested should be wrecked; and it is probable that the threat -would have been carried out with official sanction if Botha had not -set his face resolutely against such a piratical act.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-magaliesberg">Map, p. 240.</a></p> -<p>Lord Roberts proposed to effect the capture of Johannesburg by -surrounding it. While with the main body of his Army he occupied -Elandsfontein on the east, French and Ian Hamilton, the pioneers of -the advance from Bloemfontein, would deal with the enemy posted -south of the city and then establish themselves, the former near -Klipfontein, north of it, and the latter near Florida, west of it. -The right and the most vulnerable part of the Boer line was posted -on Doornkop near the scene of the surrender of Jameson, the -enthusiast, who, a few years before, had endeavoured with a few -hundred adventurers and soldiers of fortune to solve the South -African question which Great Britain was now tackling with a -quarter of a million of trained soldiers.</p> -<p>On May 29 Ian Hamilton attacked the Doornkop position and won it -after some hard infantry fighting; French, reinforced by the loan -of Hamilton's mounted troops, having thrown a grappling iron round -it, thereby rendering it untenable. At nightfall the two leaders -were firmly planted west of the city. The movement deceived the -enemy, to whom the advance of the main body under Lord Roberts on -Elandsfontein came as an unwelcome surprise, though Botha had to -some extent prepared for it. The detachments posted by him at -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page238" id= -"page238"></a>{238}</span> various places east of the city offered -no effectual resistance, and Lord Roberts went into bivouac that -night at Elandsfontein. Johannesburg was entrapped between him on -the east, and French and Hamilton on the north and west.</p> -<p>On May 30 the city agreed not unwillingly to surrender, but -having regard to the presence in it of splinters of the lately -shattered commandos, to the probability of street fighting, and to -the risk of injury to the mines, Lord Roberts consented to postpone -his formal entry until the following day; by which time the -judicious action of the representatives of the Boer Government had -averted the impending danger, and the troops took peaceful -possession of Johannesburg.</p> -<p>In spite of disquieting news from the Free State, Lord Roberts -remained firm in his purpose of advancing on Pretoria without -delay. Not only was it the head quarters of Krugerism, but also the -place in which the Boer harvest of war—more than 4,000 -British prisoners, some of whom had been in captivity since the day -of Talana Hill—was garnered.</p> -<p>On June 3 the advance on Pretoria, which it was hoped would be -the last important movement of the war, was resumed; Wavell, with a -brigade of Tucker's Division, being left behind as Bank Guard over -the treasure in the mines. Botha had retired on the capital, but no -one knew whether he would endeavour to defend it, or whether the -vaunted forts would imperiously address the invader. In view of -possible eventualities, however, a siege train, in which were -included two 9.45" howitzers which had been hastily acquired in -Austria, was taken up to answer Forts Schanzkop, Klapperkop, -Wonderboom, and Daspoort if they should speak.</p> -<p>Throughout the month of May there had been alarms and excursions -in the capital of the South African Republic. The sound of the -<i>plon-plon</i> of the British Army was daily growing more -distinct. The house of Ucalegon was on fire. The Volksraad met on -May 7, and after <span class="pagenum"><a name="page239" id= -"page239"></a>{239}</span> a session of three days handed over the -situation to the wavering executive Government, which had already -made arrangements for an eastward retirement. Kruger, fearing lest -his retreat by the Delagoa Bay railway should be cut off, slipped -away to Machadodorp on May 29; the forts were emptied and -abandoned, and Botha was bidden to do the best he could with the -remnants of the Transvaal forces. On June 3 he took up a position -on a ridge a few miles south of the city and prepared for the -worst.</p> -<p>French, on the left front of the advance, was ambushed in a -defile by a commando which had come up out of the west, but cleared -himself with slight loss. The forts were dumb. Only the ridges -between the city and Six-Mile Spruit were found to be held. The -southern ridge was taken, and when the northern ridge was turned by -Ian Hamilton, who was recalled from acting at large in support of -French, the Boers retired. French passed through Zilikat's Nek and -marched on Pretoria north of the Magaliesberg. On June 5 the -capital of the South African Republic surrendered to Lord -Roberts.</p> -<p>The Boers streamed away towards the east. An attempt made a few -days before to cut the Delagoa Bay railway failed, not, however, -through the fault of Hunter-Weston, who led the enterprise. The -force given to him was insufficient for the purpose, and he was -unable to repeat the exploits of Bloemfontein and Kroonstad.</p> -<p>The prisoners of war, whom to the number of 3,000 the Boers had -not been able to drag away with them in their hurried flight, and -who were in confinement at Waterval twelve miles north of the city, -were brilliantly liberated on June 4 by some squadrons of cavalry; -which not only ran the gauntlet of the Wonderboom defile, but -passed through the Boer posts at the further Poort and snatched -away the prize from under the eyes of Delarey, who was covering -Waterval with 2,000 burghers and some guns.</p> -<p>On the day of Lord Robert's entry into Pretoria, <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page240" id="page240"></a>{240}</span> Buller -was still in Natal. They had started simultaneously, and in -thirty-four days the main body had marched 300 miles, but the -tardigrade Natal Army was now on Lord Roberts' right rear. It had -been his hope that Buller would advance step by step with him, and -having reached the Transvaal, would strike northwards and establish -himself on the Delagoa Bay railway and deny it to Kruger. At -Kroonstad, Lord Roberts, seeing that he could not expect assistance -from Buller, contemplated detaching Ian Hamilton and sending him -into the Eastern Transvaal, but the fear of unduly weakening the -main body in view of probable opposition at the Vaal, Johannesburg, -and Pretoria, caused him to give up the project. As events turned -out, it would in all probability have been successful.</p> -<p>Pretoria was in the hands of the British Army, Kruger was in -flight, the war was over said the experts. Without having fought a -single action that could be termed a battle, and at a cost of less -than 500 casualties, of which but sixty-one men were killed, Lord -Roberts had passed from Bloemfontein and had seized the perverse -city in which most of the South African troubles of the past -twenty-five years had been brewed. The Free State, though kicking, -was apparently helpless. There were, however, not a few observers -on the spot to whom the easy success and the few casualties were of -ominous import. A change in the method of the opposition to be -offered in the future to the invader was indicated. The Boers were -discovering that they were incapable of waging systematic warfare -and were on the point of resorting to <i>guerilla</i>, for which -they, as well as the arena, were by nature particularly well -adapted.</p> -<a name="fig-magaliesberg" id="fig-magaliesberg"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image15.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image15.png" -alt="Sketch Cap of Magaliesberg District" /></a></div> -<p>On the Boer side there was a transitory interval of weakness. -Even before Lord Roberts' occupation of Pretoria Kruger wrote -doubtfully to Steyn; and after it Botha was inclined to negotiate -with the invader. He was with his commandos at Hatherley, a few -miles east of Pretoria. A Council of War was held in the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page241" id= -"page241"></a>{241}</span> office of a Russian Jew, who was a -distiller of whisky. The leaders complained that they had been -deserted by Kruger, who had slunk away with the civil government -and all the money he could lay his hands on, and the general -opinion was in favour of abandoning the struggle. A meeting between -Lord Roberts and Botha was even arranged, when suddenly De Wet -intervened. The news of his successful raids on the line of -communication in the Free State relaxed the tension of the minds of -the despondent commandants. Easily disheartened and easily -reassured, they leapt in an instant from one psychological pole to -the other. Botha announced that he was ready to meet Lord Roberts, -not only in conference, but in battle. The negotiations were, -however, not definitely broken off until after the Battle of -Diamond Hill.</p> -<p>Lord Roberts had sent Kitchener with a column to see to the -trouble in the Free State, and could not put more than about 16,000 -men into the field against Botha, who, with 6,000 men, had taken up -a strong position astride the Delagoa Bay railway sixteen miles -east of Pretoria. His centre was at Pienaar's Poort, where the -railway passes through a defile, and his front, which his former -experience of Lord Roberts' tactics led him to extend greatly, was -nearly twenty-five miles in length, and ran along an irregular -chain of hills, kopjes, and ridges. Facing the Diamond Hill and -Donkerhoek range, south of the centre, is another range of heights -through which the two poorts Tyger and Zwavel pass, and which -circles round the source of Pienaar's River towards the Diamond -Hill range. North of the centre runs a broken range ending abruptly -at the Kameelfontein ridge, which overlooks the broad Kameelfontein -valley leading to the Krokodil Spruit; and across the valley rises -the Boekenhoutskloof ridge, a detached feature with triangular -contours, which, being somewhat in advance, commands the approaches -to Kameelfontein ridge, where the Boer right flank under Delarey -was posted.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page242" id= -"page242"></a>{242}</span> -<p>The left flank was on Mors Kop and curved round indefinitely to -Kameelzyn Kraal with detached posts in the direction of Tygerpoort. -The centre north and south of Pienaar's Poort was the strongest -section of the line, and for this reason and for another it was -held by comparatively small numbers. Botha was an acute observer -and had learnt the moves of the British autumn manoeuvre opening, a -holding attack on the centre not intended to be pushed home in -order to eke out paucity of numbers operating on a wide front. Lord -Roberts, in spite of his superiority of strength, could not hope to -inflict a decisive defeat upon Botha's well-posted commandos, but -only to remove them out of striking distance of Pretoria, and he -was successful.</p> -<p>The earlier movements of the attack on June 11 were in the -nature of a reconnaissance in force, as it was uncertain how far to -the north and south the Boer front extended. The usual tactics were -adopted. French with the 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades under Porter -and Dickson was to work round the enemy's right flank and to -endeavour to circle round it to the railway; a demonstrating attack -on the centre would be made by Pole-Carew; while Ian Hamilton acted -against the left flank.</p> -<p>French approached the Kameelfontein valley and won a footing on -Boekenhontskloof ridge, which the Boers were only now moving out to -occupy, with his left. His right soon came under heavy fire from -Krokodil Spruit Hill on the Kameelfontein ridge, but he succeeded -in seizing Louwbaken, which he held tenaciously in spite of -Delarey's attempts to work round it and of the shells of a heavy -gun posted six miles away near Edendale. Meanwhile his left had -been struggling for several hours on the Boekenhoutskloof ridge, -which it eventually cleared, and was then able to support the -right, which was still clinging desperately to Louwbaken. -Throughout the afternoon the Boers continued their attacks on -French, but were unable to shift him. At nightfall he <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page244" id="page244"></a>{244}</span> found -that instead of turning the enemy's right, he had only plastered -himself against it. He had already reported the situation to Lord -Roberts, who authorized him to withdraw if necessary, at the same -time cautioning him "not to risk too many casualties."</p> -<a name="fig-diamond" id="fig-diamond"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image16.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image16.png" -alt="Diamond Hill" /></a></div> -<p>Pole-Carew, in the centre, was in action with his heavy guns -only, "demonstrating" according to the rules, pending the -development of the flank attacks.</p> -<p>The force on the right under Ian Hamilton was strong in mounted -troops. He entered the arena through Zwavelpoort, and thrust at the -bristling but indeterminate left flank of the enemy. The 2nd -Cavalry Brigade under Broadwood evicted a small body of Boers from -Tygerpoort, and when the 3rd Brigade under Gordon came up to hold -the position until the arrival of an infantry regiment, Broadwood -advanced across the valley in the direction of Mors Kop, and soon -was not only under shell fire from Diamond Hill, but also under -rifle fire from some vague detachments of Boers on his right -rear.</p> -<p>Nor was this all, for as he proceeded, the enemy was seen -pouncing down from Diamond Hill on to the Kleinfontein ridge upon -the line of his advance, and simultaneously he was fired on from -the right. Two horse artillery guns, which had been sent out, with -an insufficient escort, to deal with the swoop, were almost -captured, and were only saved by Lord Airlie at the cost of his own -life. The attack on the right was soon checked, but the cavalry -instead of outflanking the enemy was itself outflanked and unable -to make a further advance.</p> -<p>Gordon had now come away from Tygerpoort, and, in touch with -Broadwood, screened the right flank of Ian Hamilton's infantry -attack; which after the failure to turn the enemy's left flank, had -necessarily to be a frontal movement against the strongest section -of his line. Bruce Hamilton, with a brigade of Ian Hamilton's -command, crossed Pienaar's River near Boschkop and expelled the -Boer advanced front from the Kleinfontein <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page245" id="page245"></a>{245}</span> ridge. -Ian Hamilton was now face to face with Diamond Hill, but the -afternoon was too far spent for further action.</p> -<p>The general idea for the right attack on the following day was a -movement by Bruce Hamilton, reinforced by the Brigade of Guards -from Pole-Carew's command in the centre. Diamond Hill was taken -without much difficulty early in the afternoon, and the Donkerhoek -plateau was cleared. A gap was now made in the Boer line, the -commandos driven off making for the Donkerpoort ridge on the one -side, or the Rhenosterfontein heights on the other. From three -positions a double rain of bullets poured upon Bruce Hamilton on -the plateau, until the heights were reached by De Lisle's mounted -infantry from Broadwood's brigade. Bruce Hamilton's right flank was -thus relieved, but between him and the enemy clustering on the -ridge intervened the impassable ravine of the Donkerpoort. Night -was approaching and nothing more could be done.</p> -<p>On the left, French held his own but no more during the day, and -Pole-Carew in the centre had no opportunity of going into action. -The capture of the Rhenosterfontein heights occurred at an -opportune moment and perhaps averted a disaster. At Delarey's -request Botha was on the point of sending reinforcements to the -Boer right to enable it to drive away French and fall upon the weak -British centre, when De Lisle's success vitally changed the -situation.</p> -<p>Next morning, June 13, the British Army found that it had won a -victory without knowing it. The Boers had faded away during the -night and had abandoned the strongest position which they had ever -held in the Free State or the Transvaal. French and Ian Hamilton -went in pursuit with no results. Delarey succeeded in circling -round towards the Western Transvaal, Botha retired to the east. The -casualties on the British side were 176; the Boers professed to -have lost but four burghers killed and twenty wounded.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page246" id= -"page246"></a>{246}</span> -<p>Lord Kitchener was away in the Free State, and the battle was -fought under the usual restrictive conditions, that no operation -likely to entail serious loss of life was to be undertaken: and the -enemy found that the ordeal of combat was not very dreadful.</p> -<p>With the occupation of Pretoria, which was not virtually -effected until Botha's retreat from Diamond Hill, the ranging phase -of Lord Roberts' campaign was nearly at an end. At the two capitals -and at other towns already occupied, he had places of arms, from -which without wide divagations of large bodies of troops, he could -hope soon to control and eventually to dominate the Republics.</p> -<p>To see to the long and lonely furrow which he had ploughed -across the veld from the Orange to the Magaliesberg, and to prevent -its being obliterated by the wayward and shifting sand of the -desert, was the present task before him.</p> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote43" name= -"footnote43"></a><b>Footnote 43:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag43">(return)</a> -<p>Plumer raided across the Limpopo into the Transvaal as far back -as December, 1899, and Hunter occupied Christiana on May 15.</p> -</blockquote> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page247" id= -"page247"></a>{247}</span> -<h2><a name="chap12" id="chap12">CHAPTER XII</a></h2> -<h3>The New Colony</h3> -<p><a href="#fig-so-transvaal">Map, p. 260.</a></p> -<p>The Orange River Colony did not receive its incorporation into -the British Empire with a display of gratitude for the honour -conferred upon it.</p> -<p>The urgent message sent by Botha to De Wet on May 27 after the -British Army had crossed into the Transvaal was hardly necessary to -incite that free lance into action after his own heart, and he at -once quitted Frankfort for Lindley.</p> -<p>When Lord Roberts entered the Transvaal he left behind him a -considerable force to teach the New Colony its duties. Besides the -stationary troops at Bloemfontein and on the railway, the VIIIth -and Colonial Divisions under Rundle and Brabant were at Senekal and -Ficksburg; Colvile with the IXth Division, who had been taken off -Ian Hamilton's lead and allowed to run alone, was near Lindley; and -Methuen had come into Kroonstad from Bothaville, the line of his -march, which was originally towards the Transvaal, having been -changed by orders from Lord Roberts.</p> -<p>Such were the forces against which De Wet was ready to fling -himself. Early in June he was faced by another opponent. Lord -Kitchener had come down from the Transvaal with a strong -column.</p> -<p>Lord Roberts, on leaving Bloemfontein for the north, instructed -Rundle to "exercise a vigilant control east of the railway." In -co-operation with Brabant, he worked up through the fertile -district along the Basuto <span class="pagenum"><a name="page248" -id="page248"></a>{248}</span> border, slowly but steadily; his -immediate object being to prevent the enemy breaking back towards -the south. No serious opposition was encountered, and by the middle -of the month the Divisions had advanced to Clocolan and Winburg, -where Rundle came in touch with the IXth Division.</p> -<p>Colvile received orders to advance to Lindley and Heilbron. He -was instructed to reach Heilbron with the Highland Brigade on May -29, and was informed that a force of Yeomanry under Spragge would -on May 23 join him at Ventersburg, which he would pass through on -his march.</p> -<p>Spragge was unable to be at Ventersburg on the date fixed and -was ordered on to Kroonstad, where he received telegraphic -instructions to join Colvile at Lindley on May 26 at the latest. It -has never been ascertained by whom this fatal message was -despatched. No British staff officer has ever acknowledged himself -the sender of it, and it has been suggested that it was sent by a -Boer sympathizer who was better informed of Colvile's movements -than the Intelligence Staff.</p> -<p>Colvile believed that his presence at Heilbron on May 29 was -imperatively required in connexion with the advance, and, although -very weak in mounted troops, he pushed on from Ventersburg without -waiting for Spragge. On May 26 he reached Lindley after some -resistance outside the town, and next day resumed his march to -Heilbron, which, though checked on the way, he reached on the -appointed day.</p> -<p>Meanwhile, Spragge was doing his best to deliver himself to the -IXth Division, to which he was waybilled. He moved a few miles out -of Kroonstad on May 25, and next evening was in bivouac within -eighteen miles of Lindley. Next day he resumed his march on the -town, about the same time that Colvile was quitting it for -Heilbron. The two commanders were in entire ignorance of each -other's movements.</p> -<p>At midday, Spragge reconnoitred the town, and <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page249" id="page249"></a>{249}</span> finding -it occupied, withdrew to a position outside. Although Colvile had -quitted it but a few hours previously, and although the dust of his -column could still be seen on the Heilbron road, a commando under -Michael Prinsloo, which he had driven out, had promptly returned; -and some burghers who had surrendered to Spragge on May 26, and -who, having given up their rifles, had been "allowed to return to -their farms," went to Lindley instead and gave warning of the -approach of the Yeomanry.</p> -<p>Spragge counted on being able to draw rations at Lindley when he -joined Colvile, and marched out of Kroonstad with two days' rations -only, and these, although eked out by a capture of sheep on the -way, were almost exhausted. There were three courses open to him: -to retire to Kroonstad, to follow Colvile, or to remain where he -was. He chose the last.</p> -<p>He took up, and did his best to make defensible, a plateau and -kopje position two miles N.W. of the town. He had 500 men, but no -guns, and he reported the situation to Colvile, who was eighteen -miles away when he received the message next morning; and to -Rundle, who was at Senekal. Colvile answered his appeal for -assistance with a refusal, but suggested a retirement on Kroonstad; -but the message did not reach Spragge. Rundle was too far away to -help Spragge directly, but made a movement towards Bethlehem, which -he hoped would draw the enemy away from Lindley.</p> -<p>On May 28 the Boers took up positions which practically -surrounded Spragge, but he held his own that day and the next; and -although the enemy was reinforced on the 29th, he was not so -closely invested that he could not have broken out. Firing was -heard in the S.E., and Spragge, believing that it was Rundle in -action, endeavoured without success to communicate with him.</p> -<p>So long as the investing force was without guns, <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page250" id="page250"></a>{250}</span> Spragge -was confident of being able to hold on. But on May 30 a further -reinforcement came in. Martin Prinsloo joined his brother with -three guns and a strong commando. The Prinsloos, who were acting -under the orders of De Wet, had originally been detailed to look -after Colvile, but were drawn away by the attraction of an easier -prey at Lindley.</p> -<p>On May 30 a kopje on the west, from which the Boers were sniping -into the position, was captured by Spragge, but soon fell again -into the hands of the burghers. It was recovered next morning, but -pressure elsewhere squeezed it finally out of the grasp of the -re-captors. The Boers had brought their guns into action. The key -of Spragge's position was two kopjes on the S.E. of the defence. -The outer kopje was rushed by the enemy, the detachment occupying -it being driven back towards the inner kopje. A panic-stricken -non-commissioned officer in the connecting post between them raised -the white flag without authority, and, it is said, was immediately -shot for having done so. The officer in command on the inner kopje -considered that he was bound by the act and recognized it, and only -hastened the inevitable end. There was a last wriggle or two, and -then Spragge, who was surrounded by 2,000 Boers with artillery, -gave in.</p> -<p>Nearly 500 yeomen were added to the panel of British prisoners -of war by the hawk-like swoop of De Wet and the brothers Prinsloo -almost under the eyes of three Divisions of the British Army. For -not only were Colvile and Rundle aware of Spragge's predicament, -but as soon as it was reported to Lord Roberts, Methuen was ordered -to the rescue.</p> -<p>Methuen, who only arrived at Kroonstad from the west on May 28, -was already on the move to help Colvile, from whom a disquieting -message had been received at Head Quarters. Colvile's safe arrival -at Heilbron next day rendered assistance unnecessary, and Methuen, -under instructions from Lord Roberts, turned <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page251" id="page251"></a>{251}</span> towards -Lindley. He was, however, too late, for as he approached the town -the news of Spragge's surrender reached him on June 1. He ran into -the rear of the Boers hurrying away with their prey, and even -intercepted two guns and some wagons, but was unable to retain -them.</p> -<p>The Lindley affair sent Colvile back to England in the wake of -Gatacre. The responsibility of the surrender was fixed upon him and -he was deprived of his command. He had no doubt been in a false -position during the first fortnight of the advance from -Bloemfontein when he was kept trailing behind a junior officer, and -this slight perhaps affected his judgment, but he was -constitutionally incapable of viewing a situation synoptically and -perspectively. As at Sannah's Post, so again at Lindley the -halation of a word or two in his orders fogged the image on his -retina. He doggedly stared at the words <i>Heilbron, May 29</i>, as -if the whole issue of the campaign depended upon them. There was -nothing in the context to show that they were more than the details -of an itinerary which he was expected to follow if circumstances -permitted. He was urgently in need of the very mounted troops with -which he made no effort to put himself in touch. <i>Bis peccare in -bello non licet</i>. Lord Roberts could forgive once, but Colvile -was superseded for having twice shown a "want of military capacity -and initiative."<a id="footnotetag44" name= -"footnotetag44"></a><a href="#footnote44"><sup>44</sup></a></p> -<p>Yet the disaster was not due to his default alone, although the -contributory defaults of others were rightly not permitted to -excuse him. He had good reason to think that a well-mounted force -would be able to take care of itself, and to believe that proper -staff arrangements had been made for Spragge's march; but in each -of these warrantable assumptions he was <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page252" id="page252"></a>{252}</span> wrong. -Lindley was the first of a series of disasters which seemed to show -that Lord Roberts had pushed on too hastily.</p> -<p>Rundle's endeavour to help Spragge by a demonstration in the -direction of Bethlehem soon came to an end. It is said that a -telegram in which he announced the movement to Brabant fell into -the hands of the Boers, who promptly utilized the information. On -May 29 he was seriously checked at the Biddulphsberg, where they -had taken up a position. He failed in an attack on what he believed -was the Boers' flank but which was in reality their front. During -the engagement he received a telegram from Head Quarters, dated -three days previously, ordering him to join Brabant in the -Ficksburg district, and he withdrew from the action, having -suffered 186 casualties, some of which were caused by a fire which -broke out in the long grass through which he had advanced, and in -which helpless wounded men were lying. A brigade of Tucker's -Division under Clements took his place at Senekal.</p> -<p>De Wet now set himself in person to execute the task entrusted -to him by Botha of getting behind the British force in the -Transvaal and breaking or interrupting the line of communication in -the Free State. He had not long to wait for opportunities. He left -Frankfort with 800 men, and on June 2 placed himself in observation -near Heilbron, where Colvile was awaiting a supply column from the -railway at Roodeval. The convoy was harassed from the first by -mischances. Against Colvile's orders it was despatched with but a -small escort and without guns. When he heard that sufficient -protection could not be given, he counter-ordered the convoy, but -the message did not arrive until after it had started.</p> -<p>On the second day of the march a body of the enemy was found -blocking the road at Zwavel Kranz between Heilbron and Heilbron -Road Station. It was De Wet waiting for the convoy.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page253" id= -"page253"></a>{253}</span> -<p>The news of its plight reached Heilbron Road Station,<a id= -"footnotetag45" name="footnotetag45"></a><a href= -"#footnote45"><sup>45</sup></a> and a relieving column was sent -out, which came within four miles of Zwavel Kranz. No firing, -however, was heard, and the officer in command, hastily concluding -that all was well, returned to the railway without finding the -convoy, which next morning surrendered, the victim of easy-going -indifference and neglect.</p> -<p>So far De Wet had done well, but he was only beginning his work. -The railway between Bloemfontein and Vereeniging was weakly held by -regiments of militia threaded like beads on a string in posts along -the line. At Roodeval supplies and stores in large quantities, -urgently needed by the Army in the Transvaal, were waiting until -the bridge over the Rhenoster River, which had been destroyed by -the Boers retreating before Lord Roberts, could be rebuilt. There -was scarcely a post that did not beckon to De Wet to come to -it.</p> -<p>He was within reach of the railway at three vulnerable points, -and he divided the force to attack them simultaneously; himself -taking command of the raid on Roodeval, which was held by casual -details of departmental troops stiffened by a detachment of -militia. Thus an important link in the chain was unable to bear a -comparatively slight tension. No one was recognized as being -definitely responsible for the railway north of Bloemfontein. The -charge of it had been given to an officer who, unknown to the -staff, was at the time in hospital and unable to take over his -command; detachments were moved promiscuously by orders which came -now from Pretoria and now from Bloemfontein; and in the chaos De -Wet wriggled in between Colvile and Methuen.</p> -<p>On June 7 Heilbron Road Station, Rhenoster River Bridge, and -Roodeval were captured in succession. At the Bridge the Derbyshire -Militia fought gallantly for several hours, but were overpowered in -a hopeless position, and soon afterwards Roodeval and its -accumulated <span class="pagenum"><a name="page254" id= -"page254"></a>{254}</span> booty fell into the hands of De -Wet,<a id="footnotetag46" name="footnotetag46"></a><a href= -"#footnote46"><sup>46</sup></a> who on that day severed -Bloemfontein from Pretoria for a week and added nearly 500 men to -the muster-roll of his prisoners of war.</p> -<p>It was evident to Lord Roberts that things had taken a serious -turn, and that his position in the Transvaal was unsound. In -framing his plans for the advance from Bloemfontein, he had -naturally expected that the Natal railway would be available as an -alternative line of communication soon after he entered the -Transvaal; but the movements of Buller were deliberate, and nearly -a third of it was still in the enemy's hands. It is probable that -Lord Roberts would have been less disinclined to the -"steam-rollering" policy if he could have foreseen that on the day -he entered Pretoria the Natal Army would be still south of Laing's -Nek.</p> -<p>As a preliminary measure pending, the elaboration of a definite -scheme to put the Free State in order, Kitchener, who was always -held in readiness with steam up to proceed to districts in -difficulties and hustle local commandants and their staffs, was -sent across the Vaal with a column; and Methuen's Division was set -in motion.</p> -<p>On the Bloemfontein side, Kelly-Kenny took temporary charge of -all the troops south of Kroonstad, whither a brigade under C. Knox -was sent to protect the stores and supplies; and Winburg was -strengthened. While C. De Wet was engaged upon his own work his -brother P. De Wet, whom he threatened to shoot if he gave in, was -discussing terms of surrender with Methuen at Lindley, but as in -the contemporaneous negotiations between C. Botha and Buller at -Laing's Nek, and between L. Botha and Lord Roberts in the -Transvaal, no terms of settlement were arranged; and Methuen -quitted a pacificatory colloquy with one brother to encounter the -other in arms, and joined Kitchener at Heilbron Road Station on -June 10.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page255" id= -"page255"></a>{255}</span> -<p>De Wet was elbowed away westwards from the railway, but he soon -circled back, recrossing it at Lieuw Spruit between Rhenoster River -Bridge and Heilbron Road Station, where he not only took fifty -prisoners, but almost captured Kitchener, who chanced to be passing -through at the time.</p> -<p>It is interesting to speculate briefly on the effect which such -a notable capture might have had upon the general situation. The -Boers themselves would hardly have realized its importance. They -were unaware of the position held by Kitchener in the British Army, -and his name was unfamiliar to them. He had been here and there -like many another commander whom they had met in the field. Still, -they had never yet captured an unwounded general officer, and they -would no doubt have made a great effort to prevent his services -being again available against them.<a id="footnotetag47" name= -"footnotetag47"></a><a href="#footnote47"><sup>47</sup></a> It is, -however, unlikely that De Wet would have been able to retain his -prisoner for more than a few weeks at most. But no one can say what -De Wet could not do. At home it is probable that a disastrous -reaction would have followed the news of the railway broken, of -Lord Roberts insolated in the Transvaal, and of Lord Kitchener of -Khartoum a prisoner of war and possibly a hostage. It is very -doubtful whether the nation, entangled by fresh difficulties and -deafened by pro-Boer yells growing shriller and shriller every -hour, would have remained firm of purpose. It is hardly too much to -say that June 12, 1900, was one of the most critical dates in the -history of the war.</p> -<p>During the next fortnight, attacks on a convoy for Colvile at -Heilbron, on the railway a few miles north of Kroonstad, a threat -on Lindley which almost became a siege, and a raid on Virginia -Siding by a commando <span class="pagenum"><a name="page256" id= -"page256"></a>{256}</span> under Roux, which sprang out of the -Senekal district, maintained the mutiny, and again showed that -however tightly the Boers might seem to be grasped in the hand, -some of them were sure to wriggle through the fingers.</p> -<p>It was soon apparent that the Free State would not be brought -into subjection by haphazard divagations of brigades and columns; -and about the middle of June Lord Roberts planned a systematic and -simple campaign. The towns and strategical points were to be -strongly held while flying columns shepherded De Wet and his -commandos and endeavoured to enfold them. Buller, who arrived at -Standerton on June 23, would bar the way should they attempt to -retreat into the Transvaal, and a retreat southwards would throw -them on to Rundle and Brabant. The four flying columns were based -on the line of garrisons which extended from Heidelberg in the -Transvaal to Winburg and Senekal in the Free State.</p> -<p>The command of the Heidelberg column, which was strong in -mounted troops, was given to Ian Hamilton, but an accident -compelled him to hand it over to Hunter, who had come up into the -Transvaal after the relief of Mafeking. The Heilbron column was the -Highland Brigade of the late IXth Division, which was broken up -when Colvile returned to England. At Rhenoster River was Methuen to -prevent a break out towards the west. When the Winburg district was -cleared by a strong column under Clements, who, a few weeks before, -had relieved Rundle at Senekal, he would advance on Bethlehem, -Paget at Lindley co-operating with him. As soon as Hunter, who was -put in general charge of all the troops engaged, entered the Free -State, Macdonald was ordered to join him with the Highland Brigade. -Methuen's force at Rhenoster River was soon found to be -unnecessary, as the enemy was retreating in the opposite direction, -and it was sent into the Transvaal.</p> -<p>At the end of June the columns began to move. Each of them was, -as it were, the head of a spear prodding <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page257" id="page257"></a>{257}</span> the mob -of commandos towards the pen which had been assigned to them. With -them, union was not strength, but weakness: the more they were -agglomerated the less were they to be feared.</p> -<a name="fig-brandwater" id="fig-brandwater"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image17.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image17.png" -alt="Brandwater Basin" /></a></div> -<p>Clements herded Roux, whose commando was the only body known to -be at large, towards the kraal, and advanced with Paget to -Bethlehem, which was occupied on July 7. The Boers opposed with -delaying actions only, capturing but being unable to retain two of -Paget's guns, and outside Bethlehem they brought into action and -lost a field gun which had been taken from Gatacre at Stormberg, -and which now, after half a year's exile <i>in partibus -inimicorum</i>, was restored to the British Service. Two days after -Clement's entry into Bethlehem, he was joined by Hunter, who had -crossed the Vaal on June 29 and had picked up Macdonald at -Frankfort.</p> -<p>The Brandwater Basin, into which the Boers had retreated from -Bethlehem, taking with them Steyn and the Free State Government, -which was set up at Fouriesburg, is a semicircle formed by the -Witteberg and Roodeberg at the head-waters of two tributaries of -the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page258" id= -"page258"></a>{258}</span> Caledon, the Little Caledon and the -Brandwater; the Caledon being the diameter and the mountains the -circumference of the area. The river section of the perimeter lies -on the Basuto border, and the mountain section is wild and -difficult, there being but four wagon roads into it in nearly -seventy-five miles: at Commando, Slabbert's, Retief's, and -Naauwpoort Neks. The passes at Witnek, Nelspoort, and the Golden -Gate are scarcely better than rough bridle-paths.</p> -<p>The strength of the enemy holding the Basin and the Neks was -about 7,000. The Boers had indeed established themselves in an -apparently strong defensive position, but they had not been there -many days before they began to ask each other what was the good of -it to them. They had taken it up against the advice of De Wet, who -saw that it was playing the game of Lord Roberts. They had deprived -themselves of their mobility and were confined in a house of -detention, where they could do no mischief except to each other. -They realized too late that De Wet was right. The commandants were -at variance and there was indiscipline in the laagers.</p> -<p>De Wet saw that the Brandwater Basin was no place for him. He -was beating his wings in a vacuum, and he resolved to get out of it -as soon as possible. After a Council of War orders to decamp were -issued. The general idea was that a column under De Wet should -break out through Slabbert's Nek and make for Kroonstad, and that -Roux should take out another column and march on Bloemfontein, a -portion of the force being left behind to guard the passes.</p> -<p>On the night of July 15 De Wet, accompanied by Steyn, who went -out to establish yet another seat of government, pulled his column, -which included 2,600 burghers and 460 vehicles and was nearly three -miles long, out of the Basin through Slabbert's Nek. He met with no -opposition, and successfully carried out the first episode of the -programme.</p> -<p>Hunter at Bethlehem was standing sentry over the <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page259" id="page259"></a>{259}</span> northward -passes, but want of supplies and deficiency of ammunition prevented -him advancing at once on the Basin: and of the range before him he -had no accurate maps and knew less about its topography than an -astronomer knows of the Mountains of the Moon. While formulating a -scheme for blocking the passes, De Wet's sudden outbreak took him -by surprise, and he was unable to head the Free State leader, who -passed northwards between Bethlehem and Senekal, pursued by -Broadwood's cavalry. The hounds were on the scent of the first De -Wet hunt.</p> -<p>Rundle, who for two months had been painfully, but not with -unnecessary deliberation, pushing his force up the right bank of -the Caledon, was at first ordered by Hunter to watch Slabbert's -Nek, but on a report that the Boers were about to come out through -Commando Nek, he was sent back. The movement, though justified on -the assumption that the report, which came on good authority, was -correct, was unfortunate, as it left the key of the gate at -Slabbert's Nek in the enemy's hands, and allowed De Wet to -escape.</p> -<p>De Wet had assigned to himself the initial movement of the -withdrawal, and left the rest of the programme to develop itself -without him. Roux was put in charge of the Brandwater Basin. De Wet -was an unpopular leader. His attempts to leaven the commandos with -a little of the military spirit were resented. He had from the -first, with only partial success, set his face against the -incumbrance of wagons which marched with every commando. On the way -to Sannah's Post he had cashiered a commandant named Vilonel for -disobeying his orders with regard to transport. His nomination of -Roux did not give satisfaction. The partisans of other leaders -protested, and it was determined to settle by election the question -of the Chief Command. In the meantime, the management was in the -hands of a triumvirate composed of Roux, Olivier, and Martin -Prinsloo.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page260" id= -"page260"></a>{260}</span> -<p>In the chaos, the commandos which De Wet had arranged should -break out remained in the trap and simplified Hunter's task. In -succession, Retief's Nek, Slabbert's Nek, and Commando Nek were -taken, the latter by Rundle, who on July 28 joined Hunter at -Fouriesburg. Witnek had been abandoned by the Boers, who now had -only Naauwpoort Nek and the scarcely practicable Golden Gate open -to them.</p> -<p>The Nek was closed by Hunter on July 27, and a position outside -the Golden Gate, but not the Gate itself, was occupied. The greater -part of the Boer force was now practically sealed up in the -Basin.</p> -<p>A Council of War was held to elect a new chief commandant. Had -the vote been taken ten days earlier the situation might possibly -have been saved, but the belated proceedings which displayed the -weakness of a democratically organized army, and which, in the -absence of representatives of the commandos not on the spot, were -of doubtful validity, only added to the existing confusion. -Prinsloo, however, seems to have been informally chosen.</p> -<p>His first act was to endeavour to obtain an armistice from -Hunter, who naturally refused it. A few hours later Prinsloo agreed -to surrender, and on July 30 the main body of the Boers in the -Basin laid down their arms at Slapkranz. Roux, the rival candidate -for the Chief Command, protested against the surrender, not only to -Prinsloo, but also in person to Hunter, to whom he pleaded, that as -Prinsloo had not been duly elected, the act was unauthorized and -therefore was not binding on him. Hunter refused to listen to such -quibbles. On several occasions during the war the Boers had -profited by the honourable reluctance of the British commanders to -repudiate an unauthorized raising of the white flag, lest they -should be accused of having laid a trap to lure on the enemy. -Hunter rightly held that Roux's plea for local option was -inadmissible, and that the surrender must apply to the whole force. -Roux then yielded.</p> -<a name="fig-orange" id="fig-orange"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image18.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image18.png" -alt="Orange Free State" /></a></div> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page261" id= -"page261"></a>{261}</span> -<p>A large number of burghers, however, as soon as they heard that -Prinsloo had agreed to surrender, hurried away under Haasbroek, and -scraped through the Golden Gate and joined Olivier and Hattingh -outside the Basin. They were successful in evading the -capitulation, for Olivier, when informed of it officially under a -flag of truce, also declined to be bound by Prinsloo's act, and -Hunter was unable to insist upon it. He trekked away towards -Harrismith unmolested by the troops watching the Golden Gate, and -he baffled for four weeks the columns sent in pursuit by Hunter, -who, however, prevented him joining De Wet. He was taken prisoner -near Winburg on August 27.</p> -<p>The tangible result of the Brandwater Basin operations was the -capture of more than 4,000 Boers and of three guns, two of which -had been lost at Sannah's Post. The mountains in which the burghers -had taken refuge became a prison, from which they were taken when -Hunter came on circuit for the gaol delivery, and on conviction -they were sent beyond the seas.</p> -<p>Yet subsequent events showed that Lord Roberts would have made a -good bargain if he could have exchanged all the burghers and the -guns, and all the loot of horses, cattle, and sheep, for one man -who had slipped through Slabbert's Nek on July 15, 1900.</p> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote44" name= -"footnote44"></a><b>Footnote 44:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag44">(return)</a> -<p>Napoleon said that "a military order must not be passively -obeyed except when it is given by a superior who is on the spot at -the moment the order is given, knows the state of things, and can -hear objections and give full explanations to the officer charged -with executing the order."</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote45" name= -"footnote45"></a><b>Footnote 45:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag45">(return)</a> -<p>Also called Vredefort Road Station.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote46" name= -"footnote46"></a><b>Footnote 46:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag46">(return)</a> -<p>660,000 rounds of Lee-Metford ammunition were buried by him for -future use.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote47" name= -"footnote47"></a><b>Footnote 47:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag47">(return)</a> -<p>In the Russian War the Japanese gave orders that a Russian -admiral, who was a wounded prisoner of war on board a Japanese -torpedo boat, was to be shot if any attempt was made by the -Russians to capture it.</p> -</blockquote> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page262" id= -"page262"></a>{262}</span> -<h2><a name="chap13" id="chap13">CHAPTER XIII</a></h2> -<h3>Nec Celer nec Audax</h3> -<p><a href="#fig-natal">Map, p. 50.</a></p> -<p>Lord Roberts had almost as much difficulty in bringing Buller -out of Ladysmith as he had had in putting him into it. The relieved -garrison, wasted and enfeebled by the rigours of the siege, was -unfit to take the field, but there does not seem to have been any -good reason why the relieving force, or at least a portion of it, -should not have been pushed forward boldly without delay. The -inaction invited the retreating enemy to halt and occupy the -Biggarsberg Range; only a few days after Buller had informed Lord -Roberts that he did not expect that any stand would be made south -of Laing's Nek. Buller did indeed propose on March 3 to advance on -Northern Natal, as well as to attack the Drakensberg passes leading -into the Free State; but Lord Roberts thought the scheme premature -and ordered him to remain on the defensive, to police the country -adjacent to the Harrismith railway with the greater part of his -available force, and to send one division round by way of East -London to join the central advance under Gatacre. Warren's Division -therefore left Ladysmith on March 6. White, to whom Lord Roberts -had intended to give a command in the Free State, was compelled by -ill health to return to England. The order to "remain strictly on -the defensive" was afterwards not unreasonably quoted by Buller in -justification of two months of inaction, which, however, Lord -Roberts ascribed to other causes, as he had agreed to subsequent -proposals made by Buller for offensive action.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page263" id= -"page263"></a>{263}</span> -<p>The Boers on the Biggarsberg at first numbered about 15,000, but -by the end of March many commandos had been attracted away by Lord -Roberts' advance to more strenuous fields. Some time passed without -any definite action having been agreed upon between Lord Roberts -and Buller. The latter objected to almost every proposal made by -the former, and sometimes even on reconsideration criticized his -own proposals. He was allowed to recall the Vth Division, which -after a brief absence rejoined his command; but even with it he -protested against an advance on Van Reenen's Pass, which he had -himself proposed and which he was instructed to make at the -beginning of April, because Lord Roberts would consent to the -employment of one division only in it. Lord Roberts did not insist -on the movement, as Buller now said that it would endanger not only -his own force, but also Natal; and finding that Buller had far more -troops than he could usefully employ, ordered him to send the Xth -Division under Hunter round to Kimberley. Even after its departure -Buller outnumbered the enemy by more than five to one.</p> -<p>He was still haunted by the troubles of the Tugela, and was -unable to nerve himself for the risks that every leader must run. -The Boers bewildered him. He could plan no scheme without a -conviction that somehow their "knavish tricks" would frustrate it, -and his inactivity made him more prone than ever to brood over -possible mischances. He remained in Ladysmith because it was the -only course open to him after he had by a process of elimination -considered and rejected all the alternatives. Each of them had its -disadvantages and its dangers, therefore it were better to stay -where he was. During a critical period the Natal Army was of as -little use to Lord Roberts as were the Spanish contingents to -Wellington in the Peninsula; and its laggard action retarded the -progress of the war. Lord Roberts laid his plans for the advance on -the assumption that it would be in operation on his right flank -when he <span class="pagenum"><a name="page264" id= -"page264"></a>{264}</span> reached Pretoria, and if L. Botha had -found it pressing on him when he was playing at peace-making in -June, instead of engaged in equally fruitless negotiations with his -brother 180 miles away at Laing's Nek, it is improbable that he -would have continued the struggle.</p> -<p>On May 2 Lord Roberts informed Buller that he was ready to start -from Bloemfontein, and that he expected the Natal Army to -co-operate with him by attacking the Boers on the Biggarsberg, and -then advancing towards the Transvaal. For this movement Buller -considered that his force, which consisted of three divisions of -infantry and three brigades of mounted troops, in all about 45,000 -men, was insufficient; but he proceeded to carry it out. The Boers -were in occupation of the whole line of the Biggarsberg from -Helpmakaar westwards, and commanded the roads as well as the -railway running through the range.</p> -<p>Buller on this occasion determined rightly upon a turning -movement. All his previous attacks had either been frontal or had -been made so by the enemy. His plan was to move eastwards with the -IInd Division under Clery, while the Vth Division under Hildyard, -who succeeded Warren when the latter was called away to -Bechuanaland, advanced up the railway against the Boer centre. The -IVth Division under Lyttelton, composed of the infantry which had -been in Ladysmith during the siege, was kept in reserve pending the -development of the turning movement, which began on May 11, and was -skilfully conducted by Buller and was entirely successful. Places -and rivers which had not been named in the chronicle of the war -since October of the previous year now emerged from their -obscurity. Elandslaagte became the fulcrum of an aggressive -operation. Sunday's River and the Waschbank River after an interval -of seven months were again crossed by British troops, not, like -Yule's force, in hasty retreat, but in confident advance.</p> -<p>The Boers prepared for, and fully expected, a direct -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page265" id= -"page265"></a>{265}</span> advance on Beith by way of Van Tender's -Pass, but Buller made for the extreme flank of the range near -Helpmakaar, which they held but lightly. It was rendered untenable -on May 13, and after dark they retired on Beith, setting fire to -the veld to mask the movement and hinder pursuit. At dawn Dundonald -pushed on through the flames and smoke with his mounted infantry, -but was checked by a body of Irish traitors who were acting as -rearguard to their flying employers, and was unable to come up with -the burghers. On the following night his patrols reported that -Dundee was clear, and Buller occupied the town and reached -Newcastle on May 18. The success of the turning movement was due in -a great measure to a small force under Bethune, which had been -lying for some months lower down the Tugela, and which Buller -called up to threaten Helpmakaar from the south while he advanced -from the west. It had been originally detached to protect his right -flank during the advance on Ladysmith, and after long inaction as a -watching force was restored to the strenuous campaign.</p> -<p>Of the rest of Buller's troops, one portion only, namely -Hildyard's Division, was actively engaged in the movement. Its -menace to the Boer centre near Glencoe, through which passed the -railway to the north, attracted commandos away from the enemy's -left flank at Helpmakaar and facilitated the turning movement. -Lyttelton's Division and two cavalry brigades, which although -Buller had informed Lord Roberts that he "was short of his proper -strength" for the advance he had left behind near Ladysmith, took -no part in it; and the absence of the cavalry allowed the enemy to -retreat without molestation. The advance of Hildyard's Division was -retarded, not by opposition, but by the duty which fell upon it of -repairing the railway along which it advanced, and it did not reach -Newcastle until May 27. On the 23rd Lytteltonand most of the -cavalry were ordered up from Ladysmith.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page266" id= -"page266"></a>{266}</span> -<p>As soon as Buller reached Newcastle he sent on Dundonald to -reconnoitre the Laing's Nek position. On the west it was flanked by -Majuba Hill, on the east by Pougwana, and was found to be strongly -held. He therefore decided to make no further advance until he had -concentrated his force at Newcastle. The cutting edge of the -reconstructed Natal wedge had not as yet sufficient substance -behind it to warrant its being put into operation. Pending the -assembly of the Army Buller prodded across the Buffalo at Vryheid -and Utrecht in order to safeguard his right flank. The expedition -against the former town was ambushed and compelled to retire; while -the two strong columns which were sent against Utrecht were hardly -more successful. The town did indeed profess to surrender, but no -garrison was left to enforce the submission, and on the withdrawal -of the troops the Boers hovering in the hills returned like birds -who have been temporarily scared out of their nests.</p> -<p>By the end of May, Buller's Army was concentrated in the -northern corner of Natal. Towering over his left front was the -Drakensberg Range through which Botha's Pass runs into the Orange -Free State; on his right front was the Buffalo River with a -difficult country beyond; and on his front was Majuba of ill-omened -memory and Laing's Nek, over which the road to Volksrust and the -Transvaal passed.</p> -<p>Buller remained at Newcastle for eighteen days, of which three -were an armistice during negotiations for surrender with C. Botha, -who was unable to accept the terms offered. On June 5 the advance -was resumed, Laing's Nek being the immediate objective. At first -Buller proposed to attack it directly, but soon after reaching -Newcastle he found that the enemy was unassailably established on -the position, and that it must be turned either from the east or -from the west. The former movement would involve a wider detour -through difficult country to the line of advance which would -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page267" id= -"page267"></a>{267}</span> be taken up after the Transvaal was -entered, and the western movement through Botha's Pass was -therefore selected. Lord Roberts had for some time been in favour -of it, but he had intended that it should be more than a mere -turning operation. His advance from Bloemfontein had driven many of -the commandos into the N.E. corner of the Free State, and he asked -Buller to cross the Drakensberg and take them in rear by passing -into the Transvaal by way of Vrede; but Buller could not be -persuaded to remove himself so far from the railway. He had already -missed an opportunity of co-operating with the main advance by a -westward movement from Ladysmith to Van Reenen's Pass along the -railway to Harrismith, where the presence of a division of the -Natal Army would have been of the greatest use. The relations -between Lord Roberts and Buller during the Natal campaign were -rather those of leaders commanding the armies of allied nations -than of superior officer and subordinate.</p> -<p>Thus the westward movement, instead of being a helpful operation -at large in support of the main advance, was whittled down to the -turning of Laing's Nek. Between Botha's Pass and Laing's Nek the -dominant contours roughly assume the outline of a sickle and its -handle, the Pass being at the end of the handle and the Nek near -the point of the blade. Within the curve of the blade stands the -high Inkwelo Mountain facing Majuba Hill, and at the upper end of -the handle is a mountain of less elevation called Inkweloane. The -Ingogo River, which rises near the Pass, is flanked on its right -bank by Van Wyk's Hill, which commands the eastern approach to the -Pass, and on its left bank by Spitz Kop, a detached hill of the -main range.</p> -<p>Inkwelo had been held for some days by a portion of Clery's -Division. The Boers occupied Spitz Kop and the ridge from -Inkweloane to the Pass and a short section beyond it, but their -line was thin. The Vryheid and Utrecht affairs had deceived them -into the belief <span class="pagenum"><a name="page268" id= -"page268"></a>{268}</span> that an eastward turning movement was in -contemplation. On June 6 Van Wyk's Hill was occupied by Hildyard -and held against the enemy on Spitz Kop, who attempted to dislodge -him; and by the following morning artillery had been brought up, -and the Pass and the enemy's position on the adjacent crestline -were commanded. These on June 8 were carried by an infantry -movement in echelon with loss of two men killed. Spitz Kop offered -no resistance. A fusillade broke out on Inkweloane, but Dundonald's -brigade soon quenched it by a determined ascent up alpine slopes to -the crestline As at Helpmakaar the enemy set fire to the grass and -passed away behind a veil of smoke.</p> -<p>The capture of Botha's Pass was an affair which did credit to -Buller. It showed that since Colenso he had learnt how to use -artillery, and his disposition of his guns was admirable. They -rendered the enemy's position untenable and left little but hard -climbing to the infantry. It can hardly be termed a battle, it was -rather an autumn manoeuvre engagement, conducted on Lord Roberts' -principles. A very important position was won and the enemy driven -back with scarcely the shedding of a drop of blood on either side. -Hildyard was in executive charge of the operations.</p> -<p>Thus, after eight months' fighting, the main body of the Natal -Army was at last in bivouac in the enemy's country. Buller had -taken Botha's Pass with three infantry and two cavalry brigades; -and with these he made for his next objective, the town of -Volksrust in the Transvaal, a few miles north of Laing's Nek, which -Clery at Ingogo was watching from the south. Lyttelton was posted -on the left bank of the Buffalo watching the right flank of the -advance.</p> -<p>Buller's operations in the Free State lasted two days only. On -June 10 he engaged a small body of the retreating enemy and entered -the Transvaal. In front of him was the Versamelberg, a spur of the -Drakensberg, over which the road from Vrede to Volksrust passes at -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page269" id= -"page269"></a>{269}</span> Alleman's Nek, where 2,000 Boers with -four guns had taken up a very strong position. The road rises to -the Nek between heights, and the initial movements of the attack -had to be made across two miles of open veld. The burghers had not -had the time, or did not think it necessary, to strengthen the -position artificially, but they were observed throwing up some -entrenchments when Buller approached.</p> -<p>His bivouac on June 10 was at the Gansvlei Spruit on the -Transvaal-Free State border, and next day at dawn he resumed his -march on Volksrust. No serious opposition was encountered until -early in the afternoon, when Dundonald, who was operating on the -right front, came under artillery fire from the Nek. The infantry, -whose left flank was watched by Brocklehurst with a cavalry -brigade, was then ordered to advance, the objective of the 2nd -Brigade under E. Hamilton being the ridge on the left of the Nek, -and that of the 10th Brigade under Talbot Coke the ridges on the -right of it, the 11th Brigade under Wynne being kept in -reserve.</p> -<p>The advance was made under a heavy and worrying but not very -effective fire from each section of the ridge. The key of the -position proved to be a conical hill on the right of the road at -the entrance to the Nek. The Dorsets of Coke's brigade gallantly -climbed the slopes, and aided by artillery fire carried it with the -bayonet. The fight, however, was far from ended. The Boers beyond -remained until the shells which had been pouring on the conical -hill followed them to the crestline. Then again the Dorsets threw -themselves upon the enemy, and by sunset the heights on the right -of the Nek were in possession of Coke. Almost simultaneously E. -Hamilton established himself on the left of it. The resistance -offered to Dundonald on the right flank was more effective; and as -between him and his immediate opponents the day waned upon an -uncertain issue. He had driven them out of successive positions -though not actually off the ridge; but the occupation of the Nek -made <span class="pagenum"><a name="page270" id= -"page270"></a>{270}</span> further opposition useless and they -withdrew during the night.</p> -<p>The capture of Alleman's Nek rendered Laing's Nek untenable, and -Clery closing up from Ingogo next day found it abandoned. The enemy -had evacuated the whole of the Majuba-Laing's Nek-Pougwana -position, leaving scarcely so much as a wagon behind him, and was -retreating northwards. The westward turning movement was tactically -a success but strategically a failure. With three brigades of -mounted troops under his orders, including some regiments of -regular cavalry which were lying idle at Ladysmith and elsewhere, -Buller made no attempt to cut off the retreating Boers. A daring -raid, such as had been twice made by French on the Modder four -months before, concurrently with the Botha's Pass operations would -have had a good chance of crushing C. Botha; and Brockleburst's -cavalry, which during the attack on the Nek was working somewhat -widely on the left flank, might well have been sent to bar the way. -The ponderous movements of Buller were in strange contrast to the -activity of his ally Lord Roberts. The Natal Army made its way -through the country like an elephant trampling through a sugar-cane -plantation.</p> -<p>On June 13 Buller entered Volksrust and next day established his -Head Quarters at Laing's Nek. Wakkerstroom, a town which threatened -his right flank, surrendered <i>pro formâ</i> to Lyttelton on -June 13, and again to Hildyard four days later; and no doubt would -have been equally ready to accommodate itself to the wishes of any -other column sent to it, but after each surrender it reasserted -itself, and Buller was obliged to leave it in charge of the -commandos.</p> -<p>With the occupation of Laing's Nek the Natal campaign, which had -lasted eight months, came to an end, and Buller, having left a -strong force under Lyttelton in charge of Natal, passed up the -railway to Heidelberg; where on July 4 he for the first time came -into physical <span class="pagenum"><a name="page271" id= -"page271"></a>{271}</span> touch with the main Army under Lord -Roberts. By a curious coincidence he here met Hart's Brigade of the -Xth Division, which had left his command three months previously at -Ladysmith, and which had in the meantime marched up from -Kimberley.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-orange">Map, p. 292.</a></p> -<p>Lord Roberts' plan for the Natal Army was that it should march -across the veld to the Delagoa Bay railway and co-operate in his -movement to clear the Eastern Transvaal. The Brandwater Basin -surrender relieved the railway in Natal from immediate danger and -allowed the ample force holding it to be reduced. At the end of -July Buller was instructed to lead 11,000 of his men across a -sparsely populated country where no railway was. It was for him a -novel phase of warfare. Hitherto he had hardly dared trust himself -out of sight of a culvert. But he was a man from whom the terror of -the unknown very soon passed away when he had no choice but to face -it. In Natal he would have stood aghast at a suggestion that he -should cut away his moorings and be wafted by the winds of war for -ten days or more across a strange ocean. If hitherto he had been -<i>nec celer nec audax</i> now he became at least <i>audax</i>. -Lord Roberts had imbued him with the progressive spirit. He raised -no difficulties of his own, and he encountered those arising out of -the situation resolutely and successfully. His army was strung out -upon the railway from Ladysmith to Heidelberg; his transport was -still organized regimentally, a system which had hampered Lord -Roberts' movements and was soon abolished in the main body; and -oxen, mules, and wagons were scarce. For infantry he chose the IVth -Division under Lyttelton, and for cavalry the brigades under -Brocklehurst and Dundonald.</p> -<p>On August 7 Buller's column quitted the Natal line;<a id= -"footnotetag48" name="footnotetag48"></a><a href= -"#footnote48"><sup>48</sup></a> its destination being Belfast on -the Delagoa Bay line, along which Lord Roberts was now -advancing.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page272" id= -"page272"></a>{272}</span> -<p>Its progress may be compared to the course of a steamer across -an unquiet ocean. The waves raised by a fresh gale on the starboard -bow were cleft by the stem, only to reunite behind the churn of the -propeller. They were powerless to abridge the day's run by many -miles, but they could still swing forwards to the shore. On one -occasion the ship was slowed down to a standstill by a fog.</p> -<p>The waves were the commandos of the district, most of which had -retired under C. Botha from the Laing's Nek positions. Buller had -not much difficulty in dealing with them as obstructions to his -advance, and in succession he occupied Amersfort, Ermelo, and -Carolina; but they soon returned to their stations. His own -inclinations would probably have persuaded him to halt and smash -them, but he was marching against time between two widely separated -bases. Near Carolina on August 14 he came in touch with French, who -was acting with Lord Roberts' eastward movement from Pretoria, and -from that date the operations of the Natal Army were merged in -those of the main Army, and came under the immediate direction of -the Commander-in-Chief.</p> -<p>A scheme proposed by French and sanctioned in substance by Lord -Roberts, for an immediate cavalry turning movement round the left -flank of the enemy, who was strongly posted astride the railway -near Belfast; in conjunction with a central infantry advance to be -made by Buller and Pole-Carew, whose Division was within reach, was -discountenanced by Buller, and a simple frontal movement was -substituted for it. Its practicability was doubtful owing to the -marshy character of the ground.</p> -<p>On August 25 Buller, French, and Pole-Carew entered Belfast, -where they were joined by Lord Roberts.</p> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote48" name= -"footnote48"></a><b>Footnote 48:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag48">(return)</a> -<p>i.e. the section of the railway from Johannesburg to Natal which -is in the Transvaal.</p> -</blockquote> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page273" id= -"page273"></a>{273}</span> -<h2><a name="chap14" id="chap14">CHAPTER XIV</a></h2> -<h3>The Taming of the Transvaal</h3> -<p>The course of the war north of the Vaal after the battle of -Diamond Hill up to the date of Lord Roberts' arrival at Belfast -seven weeks later was tortuous and difficult. The main Army changed -front as soon as Pretoria was reached and faced to the east in the -direction of the retreating Transvaal Government. Its line of -communication became a prolongation of its front; its left flank -towards the north was open; and on its rear was the unsubdued -country west of the capital in the direction of Mafeking and -Vryburg.</p> -<p>Through this district, which is intersected by ranges running -generally east and west, and which contains some towns of -importance, the troops set free by the relief of Mafeking advanced -in two columns towards Pretoria and Johannesburg. The southern -column was Hunter's Xth Division, which after easily occupying -Potchefstroom and Krugersdorp, passed through Johannesburg, and on -Hunter's being sent into the Free State was broken up at -Heidelberg. The northern column, under Baden-Powell, occupied -Rustenburg and met with little opposition during the month of June. -It was intended by Lord Roberts, if all went well, that this column -should eventually take up a position on the Pietersburg railway, -north of Pretoria, which was unprotected in that direction.</p> -<p>The inactivity of the Boers seemed to show that they had really -lost heart, and that an awakening such as that <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page274" id="page274"></a>{274}</span> which -came a few weeks after the entry into Bloemfontein was improbable. -Earlier in the month of June there had been negotiations for peace, -not only between subordinate leaders in the Free State and Natal, -but also between the two Commanders-in-Chief in Pretoria; and -although they were broken off, the fact that they had occurred made -the silence more significant and gave hope that the enemy was -reconsidering his position.</p> -<p>The illusion was soon dispelled. Whether owing to the natural -resilience of the Boer character after a brief phase of doubt, or -to the news of De Wet's successful attacks on the railway in the -Free State, the smouldering fires broke out anew early in July. -Delarey, who had checked French at Diamond Hill, came out of the -east to quicken the west; the baffled burghers of Snyman, released -from the siege of Mafeking, were trickling vaguely into the -district; a force under Grobler of Waterberg was reported north of -Pretoria; an incursion was made across the Vaal from the Free -State; and commandos appeared south of the Magaliesberg near -Olifant's Nek and Commando Nek, thus threatening the movements of -Baden-Powell, who was operating north of the range and who had -occupied Commando Nek and the adjacent Zilikat's Nek on July 2, -leaving only a small force at Rustenburg. Five days later the Boers -failed in an attempt to recapture the town, which was saved by a -detachment of the Rhodesian Field Force.</p> -<p>This force, which was under the command of Sir F. Carrington, -was composed mainly of mounted contingents from the Colonies. It -had been raised a few months before at the instance of the British -South Africa Company to hold the northern frontier of the -Transvaal, which after Plumer's departure for the south was -unguarded, and to deny Rhodesia to the Boers should they attempt to -break out northwards. It was from the first under a sort of dual -control which militated against its efficiency. The Company made -the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page275" id= -"page275"></a>{275}</span> arrangements for its enrolment and -equipment, while the War Office provided the staff. It was in -difficulties from the first. By a somewhat strained interpretation -of a treaty between Great Britain and Portugal, and after some -weeks of diplomatic discussion and in spite of a protest naturally -made by the Transvaal Government, the Rhodesian Field Force was -permitted to land on Portuguese territory at Beira in April and to -move up country. Its advance was further delayed by a break of -gauge on the railway between Beira and Buluwayo; it was pulled -hither and thither, and was never able to co-operate effectively -with the general operations. It was moved in driblets, and some -details did not reach Buluwayo until September. A portion of it -came along the Western line, and Rustenburg was saved by the -Imperial Bushmen. At the end of the year it was disbanded.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-magaliesberg">Map, p. 240.</a></p> -<p>On July 11 three blows were struck by the Boers with success. -The attempt on Rustenburg drew back Baden-Powell, whose place at -Zilikat's and Commando Neks was taken by a regiment of regular -cavalry which happened to be passing that way. As it was required -elsewhere, a body of infantry was sent out from Pretoria to take -over the Neks, and on the night of July 10 Zilikat's Nek was held -by three companies and a squadron. Next day, after a struggle which -lasted throughout the day, it was captured by Delarey, and two guns -and nearly 200 prisoners of war fell into his hands. The disaster, -the first of its kind in the Transvaal, was due to two causes. The -British force actually at the Nek was insufficient to hold it; and -the main body of the cavalry stood aloof. The latter was no doubt -in a dubious position. It was under orders, which were brought by -the infantry relief, to meet Smith-Dorrien nearly twenty-five miles -away on July 11; and when the enemy was seen occupying a strong -position on the Nek, it assumed that assistance would be of no -avail, and beyond a short artillery bombardment nothing was -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page276" id= -"page276"></a>{276}</span> done. Even the squadron holding Commando -Nek was ordered to retire at midday. A relieving force was sent out -from Pretoria, but it arrived too late to avert the disaster.</p> -<p>The cavalry thus delayed was intended to reinforce a column -under Smith-Dorrien, who had come up into the Transvaal with Ian -Hamilton's column, and who was marching from Krugersdorp to take -off the pressure from the south on Baden-Powell at Rustenburg; -Olifant's Nek, over which the road to the town passed, being in the -possession of the Boers. On July 11, when Smith-Dorrien had marched -about ten miles from his starting point, he met a commando at -Dwarsvlei, which was so well handled that not only was he compelled -to retire on Krugersdorp, but also had much difficulty in bringing -away his guns. The failure was chiefly due to the non-appearance of -the cavalry, without which he did not feel himself justified in -standing up to the enemy.</p> -<p>On the same day another cavalry regiment was in trouble. -Onderste Poort, a few miles north of Pretoria, was attacked by -Grobler of Waterberg, and while reinforcements were on their way he -drove back still nearer to the capital the force which was holding -the outpost, and forced one troop to surrender.</p> -<p>The situation was alarming. The districts west and south-west of -the capital were infested by energetic commandos which had thwarted -all Baden-Powell's and Smith-Dorrien's efforts to suppress them, -and Grobler was threatening Pretoria from the north. There were -indications that the enemy's plan was to transfer the opposition -from the east to the west; and if so, then Lord Roberts' force, -whose front after Diamond Hill faced eastwards, would have to -conform to the movement. A few weeks previously it had been -weakened by the departure of Hunter's strong column for the Free -State, and now Lord Roberts was compelled to redress the balance by -calling up Methuen's Division <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page277" id="page277"></a>{277}</span> from Lindley to -Krugersdorp, where it arrived on July 18. French was ordered to -operate north of Pretoria with cavalry, and a column under Ian -Hamilton<a id="footnotetag49" name="footnotetag49"></a><a href= -"#footnote49"><sup>49</sup></a> was also sent up.</p> -<p>Methuen marched at once on Rustenburg, and cleared Olifant's Nek -on July 21. The scheme of shutting up the Boers in it failed, as -Baden-Powell was unable to close the northern exit, and they -escaped with slight loss.</p> -<p>At the beginning of August the situation was, if anything, -worse. The events which succeeded the occupation of Bloemfontein -were repeating themselves in the Western Transvaal. Methuen had -been recalled from the Rustenburg expedition to deal with an -outbreak on the line from Johannesburg to Klerksdorp, which fell -into the hands of the enemy; 5,000 Boers were reported to be on or -near the Magaliesberg; a small British force was besieged in -Brakfontein, west of Rustenburg, on the road to Mafeking; De Wet -was at large in the Free State, and it seemed probable that he -would come up into the Transvaal and add to the trouble.</p> -<p>At the end of July Ian Hamilton's force was diverted from its -movement towards the north and ordered westward to relieve and -bring away Baden-Powell; and Carrington was instructed to -co-operate from Mafeking. Lord Roberts had decided to abandon -Rustenburg and Olifant's Nek and the greater part of the -Magaliesberg. These detached positions detained more troops than he -could spare<a id="footnotetag50" name="footnotetag50"></a><a href= -"#footnote50"><sup>50</sup></a> and were difficult to supply. Ian -Hamilton's trek lasted only a few days. He recaptured Zilikat's -Nek, and on August 5 brought away Baden-Powell, who left Rustenburg -most unwillingly and who was ready to sustain another siege in it. -Lord Roberts, however, would not heed his repeated protests, and -the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page278" id= -"page278"></a>{278}</span> only section of the Magaliesberg held -after the withdrawal from Rustenburg was that lying between -Pretoria and Zilikat's and Commando Neks. Rustenburg and Olifant's -Nek had called for the diversion of three columns in succession: -Smith-Dorrien's, which did not reach them, and then Methuen's and -Ian Hamilton's; and the abandonment of them was imperative. From -the west Carrington made an attempt to relieve Brakfontein on -August 5, but was compelled by the presence of the enemy in -superior force to return to Mafeking. The relief was effected ten -days later, not from the west, but by Lord Kitchener with a column -that had been engaged in the pursuit of De Wet.</p> -<p>Suddenly all the operations were deranged by the news that De -Wet had crossed the Vaal at Schoeman's Drift on August 6, and the -greater part of the British Army in the Transvaal was either -directly or indirectly turned on to the pursuit of one man; Lord -Kitchener, as usual when energy and pushing power rather than -tactical skill were looked for, being placed in general charge of -the operations. The two most determined and unfaltering men in -South Africa were now pitted against one another.</p> -<p>De Wet's escape from the Brandwater Basin on July 15 was soon -discovered and he was unable to get a good start. Broadwood's and -Little's mounted brigades were sent after him, now and then taking -long shots at him or worrying his rearguard. His object was to -conduct Steyn and the Free State Government officials into the -Transvaal, where they could co-operate with Kruger. He chose the -route which appeared to him, and rightly so, to be the line of -least resistance, namely, towards the Vaal Drifts near -Potchefstroom; instead of making for the upper reaches of the -river, on the other side of which Buller was established on the -Natal railway.</p> -<p>It was soon found impossible to overtake him, even with mounted -troops. The only course was to shepherd him into a fold from which -he could not escape. The <span class="pagenum"><a name="page279" -id="page279"></a>{279}</span> tracery on the map of his movements -and of those of his chief scout Theron, intersected by the -reticulations of the pursuing columns, resembles a spider's web in -disorder.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-orange">Map, p. 292.</a></p> -<p>Finally he was hemmed in on the left bank of the Vaal near -Reitzburg. On the right bank Methuen, supported by Smith-Dorrien, -was watching the drifts. He did his best, but his force was -insufficient for the purpose, and on August 6 De Wet, with it is -said no less than 400 wagons, entered the Transvaal at Schoeman's -Drift, the greater part of Methuen's force having been sent to hold -a drift lower down. Methuen doubled back and fell upon the Boer -rearguard, which, though driven out of successive positions, -maintained itself long enough to allow the main body to escape -unscathed.</p> -<p>De Wet's subsequent movements greatly puzzled his pursuers. He -divided his column into two portions which did not always march in -the same direction, and it was therefore difficult to discern the -ruling movement of his trek. At one time it appeared that he was -about to re-cross into the Free State, and the plans for the -northward pursuit were temporarily suspended; to be resumed when he -had received an allowance of one day's start. It is probable that -his original intention had been to return to his own country as -soon as he had put Steyn and the officials into the Transvaal, -leaving them with an escort to find their own way to Kruger, and -that he was prevented by the appearance of a strong column under -Kitchener on the left bank. As a Free Stater, moreover, he would be -disinclined to give his services to the Transvaal.</p> -<p>Kitchener crossed the Vaal on August 8, and hung to De Wet's -right rear, Methuen hanging on to the left rear; but neither was -able to do more than clutch vainly at the skirts of the elusive -column. In front of De Wet, Smith-Dorrien was holding the -Klerksdorp railway, but again he misled his pursuers, and instead -of trekking north after he had crossed the Gatsrand, a movement -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page280" id= -"page280"></a>{280}</span> which Smith-Dorrien anticipated and -provided for, he changed direction, and on August 11 passed over -the railway at a section which had been left unoccupied on -Smith-Dorrien's right flank.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-magaliesberg">Map, p. 240.</a></p> -<p>Lord Roberts saw that Methuen's and Kitchener's pursuit would -probably fail, and that De Wet would reach the Magaliesberg. Ian -Hamilton was instructed to prevent him crossing it, and on August -11 he was specifically ordered to occupy Olifant's Nek. Commando -Nek was held by Baden-Powell. There was a third pass, the Magato -Nek, a few miles west of Rustenburg, for which De Wet was -apparently making, and which seemed to be his only possible way of -escape, as it was confidently assumed that the other passes were -held by British troops. It was, therefore, only necessary to head -him from Magato Nek, and this was done by Methuen. But the movement -threw De Wet towards Olifant's Nek, which to his great astonishment -was not occupied, and through which he passed with Steyn on August -14 and shook off his pursuers. Ian Hamilton had not been made to -understand that the actual closing of Olifant's Nek was an urgent -matter; and he, in fact, informed Lord Roberts that he did not -propose to do so except indirectly by a movement which would -command the approach to it.</p> -<p>In this, the first of the De Wet hunts, nearly 30,000 British -troops were directly or indirectly engaged in heading or pursuing -over an area of 7,000 square miles. Nine columns blindly zigzagged -and divagated to false scents and imperfect information in chase of -one man encumbered with a civil government on the run and several -hundred wagons. Again and again the fowler's net was cast upon the -migrant, who always wriggled through the meshes. In one month he -trekked 270 miles from the Brandwater Basin to the north of the -Magaliesberg, with British troops continuously to his flanks, his -front, and his rear.</p> -<p>It would have been regarded as the most notable <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page281" id="page281"></a>{281}</span> personal -exploit of the war if De Wet had not himself twice repeated it -under circumstances of even greater difficulty. It must be -acknowledged that his daring and resolution deserved success. He -did not attain it by the means of followers eager to serve a -trusted and beloved leader, for they by no means rose to him. When -he reached the Vaal he was careful to throw the burghers' wagons -across the river first of all, knowing that their unwillingness to -leave the Free State would be overcome by their greater reluctance -to sever themselves from their oxen and stuff. He owed his success -mainly to the power of a strong will to make weaker wills work for -it; and in a less degree to the accuracy of the information which -Theron, his chief scout, obtained for him.</p> -<p>It is at least doubtful whether Lord Roberts did not take De Wet -too seriously. Was the capture of a <i>guerilla</i> leader worth -the withdrawal of so many British troops from the main operations, -and would not the sounder strategy have been to ignore him? If he -had been severely let alone, he would hardly have done more than -that which he did with the strength of an Army Corps against him, -and his prestige with his own people would not have been so surely -set up.</p> -<p>The escape of De Wet was an incident of war, which, having -regard to all the circumstances of the campaign, could not be made -impossible. Columns working independently under directions from -Head Quarters cannot be made aware of all that each has or has not -done, and must take many things for granted; and the information of -the enemy's movements which reaches them from the same source must -often be received too late for effective action. If Lord Roberts -had listened to Baden-Powell's protest against the evacuation of -Rustenburg and Olifant's Nek, De Wet would probably have followed -Cronje to St. Helena; but that does not prove that the policy of -withdrawing from remote and exposed positions was unsound. All that -can be said against it <span class="pagenum"><a name="page282" id= -"page282"></a>{282}</span> is that it chanced to be carried out a -few days too soon.</p> -<p>Steyn and the officials left for Machadodorp. De Wet felt that -his own country had a claim upon his services, and desired to -return to it without delay. He divided his force, leaving the -greater part under Steenekamp north of the Magaliesberg, himself -going south with a small commando. The division materially aided -his return, for it was not known for certain at Head Quarters with -which portion he was marching. While he was in imagination being -chased north of Pretoria, he was in fact scaling a rough mountain -path, for all the passes had been closed, near Commando Nek, and -looking down from the heights upon a British force by which he was -not discovered. On August 21, after an absence of sixteen days, he -recrossed the Vaal, and entered the Free State. The net result of -all the labour, all the efforts, and all the consequent distress -and exhaustion to which the British troops had willingly subjected -themselves, was to re-establish De Wet as a greater power for -mischief than ever.</p> -<p>The Free Staters under Steenekamp joined Grobler of Waterberg, -but the combination was hustled to the north out of striking -distance of Pretoria by Baden-Powell, whose purely military service -in South Africa ceased soon after. He had been selected to raise -and to command the South African Constabulary, a semi-military -body, which it was hoped the approaching end of the war would ere -long permit to take over some of the duties of the troops.</p> -<p>For some weeks after the escape of De Wet the various columns -operating north and west of Pretoria were engaged in patrolling the -country. They nowhere encountered serious resistance, but Delarey -was neither taken nor crippled.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-orange">Map, p. 292.</a></p> -<p>While these events were occurring in Lord Roberts' rear, he was -advancing eastwards from Pretoria. The battle of Diamond Hill was -followed by a brief period of quietude in the east as well as the -west. The objective <span class="pagenum"><a name="page283" id= -"page283"></a>{283}</span> of the British Army was the railway from -Pretoria to Komati Poort, on which the Transvaal Government, -covered by Botha at Balmoral, was now dwelling at Machadodorp. The -movements of Lord Roberts were for some time controlled by the -situation in the Free State and the Western Transvaal, which called -more pressingly for attention than the eastward advance.</p> -<p>Early in July a column under Hutton was sent out to feel towards -Botha's left. As he was opposed and made little progress, Lord -Roberts a few days later reinforced him with French and a cavalry -brigade, and on July 11 the combined columns thrust back the Boers -from their positions at Witpoort, a few miles south of Diamond -Hill. Botha had arranged with the commandants on the other side of -Pretoria for concurrent attacks on the British forces in the -vicinity of the capital, and his own was the only operation that -was foiled on July 11. French's success, however, could not be -followed up. He proposed to raid the railway near Balmoral, but -Lord Roberts had been made anxious for the safety of Pretoria by -the news of the affairs of Zilikat's Nek and Onderste Poort, and -recalled him. Hutton was ordered to remain where he was, about -twenty-five miles south-east of the capital, with a reduced -force.</p> -<p>There were indications that an attack not only on Pretoria but -also on Johannesburg was contemplated by the enemy, in collusion -with plots for risings against the British which were hatching in -each city. It was no time yet for an eastward advance. The -successes north and west of Pretoria stimulated Botha to attack -what he supposed would strategically now be the most vulnerable -section of the perimeter of defence, namely, the section facing -him. If it had not been weakened by the withdrawal of troops to the -west, troops would probably have been withdrawn from the west to -meet him, and the task of Delarey thereby lightened. Either -alternative would forward his policy.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-magaliesberg">Map, p. 240.</a></p> -<p>East of Pretoria Pole-Carew with the XIth Division <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page284" id="page284"></a>{284}</span> was in -touch with Hutton. Botha recalled Grobler of Waterberg from the -north, and on July 16 threw himself upon Pole-Carew and Hutton, -near Witpoort. The brunt of the attack fell upon the latter, who, -though at first pressed back and outflanked on his right, recovered -himself and forced the enemy to retire. His immediate opponent was -B. Viljoen, a leader who showed great military capacity in his -management of the action. Against the XIth Division Botha -demonstrated only. The chief incident of the affair was the holding -of an outflanked and commanded kopje position by a few companies of -the Royal Irish Fusiliers for six hours.</p> -<p>The scheme for the eastward advance, which Lord Roberts did not -feel himself justified in initiating until after the affair of July -16, was that French should rejoin Hutton and take charge of the -right; with Ian Hamilton, brought down from his northward -demonstration against Grobler, on the extreme left north of the -railway, while Pole-Carew advanced with Lord Roberts centrally -along it.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-orange">Map, p. 292.</a></p> -<p>The advance began on July 23. French, with the natural spirit of -a cavalry officer, chafed at being restricted to the slower -progress of Pole-Carew's infantry and proposed to push forward -boldly and cut the railway east of Middelburg, but Lord Roberts was -reluctant to part with the only cavalry he had, and vetoed the -movement. Botha was soon frightened out of Balmoral, which had been -his Head Quarters since the battle of Diamond Hill, and which was -entered by Lord Roberts on July 25. Two days later French rode into -Middelburg.</p> -<p>The eastward advance had now gained possession of eighty miles -of the Delagoa Bay railway, but the De Wet trouble and the -disturbed state of the Western Transvaal made the continuation of -the movement unsafe, and Lord Roberts called a halt. It was also -advisable to wait until supplies had been collected at Middelburg, -and until Buller, who was coming up from the south, was in a -position to co-operate. Lord Roberts <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page285" id="page285"></a>{285}</span> returned to Pretoria, -leaving French in charge. Ian Hamilton, the emergency man, was sent -to the west to deal with Delarey and De Wet. Towards the end of -August Pole-Carew advanced to near Belfast, where he hoped soon to -report himself to Buller.</p> -<p>Nearly three months had now elapsed since the battle of Diamond -Hill. The progress of the Transvaal campaign was not very apparent, -but it was real. Botha had been driven back along the Delagoa Bay -railway, and neither the outbreaks in the Western Transvaal nor the -meteoric incursion of De Wet had availed him. Nothing that had -occurred elsewhere weakened the western advance to an extent that -gave him an opportunity of effectively withstanding it. Buller was -approaching, and Lord Roberts was no longer dependent upon one line -of communication. The fugitive Free State Government had been -driven into asylum with the fugitive Transvaal Government. No -commandos were at large which could seriously threaten -Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, or Pretoria; and the only organized -body which the enemy could bring into the field was confronted by a -British Army and had the barrier of the Portuguese frontier behind -it. There was good hope that in a few weeks the already undermined -fabric of Boerdom would totter to the ground, and that the worst -that could happen was that some of the fragments might not fall -clear of the British troops.</p> -<p>The arrival of Buller's force from the south gave Lord Roberts, -who returned from Pretoria on August 25, the reinforcement -justifying the resumption of the eastward advance. He found the -troops unfavourably placed for immediate action. Botha was posted -on each side of the railway near Belfast; the junction of his right -with his left, which had different fronts, forming an obtuse -salient angle. The greater part of the British force was south of -the line and prevented by the nature of the ground from undertaking -an enveloping movement on the enemy's left. Buller had kept the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page286" id= -"page286"></a>{286}</span> cavalry to heel, and it was lying -compressed between him and Pole-Carew, who was entrenched round -Belfast.</p> -<p>Lord Roberts' first act was to distribute over a wider front the -conglomeration of troops, which were hampering each other's -movements. French with his own cavalry, but without Buller's, was -sent north of the line to face Botha's right flank and to clear -Pole-Carew's left flank, while Buller worked up from the south -towards the line.</p> -<p>The movement began on August 26, and by the afternoon French, -having made a wide detour, had established himself north of -Belfast; thus enabling Pole-Carew to leave the town and extend his -division in front of the enemy's right. Buller's movement was at -first directly northwards, on account of the soft ground. His -march, like that of Pole-Carew on the other flank, was across the -enemy's front, but neither of them was seriously checked and the -casualties were few.</p> -<p>Buller had proposed to move eastward in the direction of -Dalmanutha as soon as the ground permitted, but a cavalry -reconnaissance discovered the enemy posted at Bergendal, close to -the railway. The position was, in fact, the point of the obtuse -angle formed by the two sections of the Boer front, one of which -faced S.W. towards Buller, and the other west, towards Pole-Carew; -and if it could be carried not only would Botha's line be broken, -but Buller would be in a good position to deal with a retreat from -either section,</p> -<p>The battle of Bergendal on August 27 was mainly a struggle -between less than fourscore Transvaal Police and two battalions and -forty guns of Buller's Division. The "Zarps" held a rocky ridge at -the end of a spur, where they were bombarded for three hours, yet -when the infantry advanced it was met with a vigorous rifle fire, -which was continued almost without intermission until at last the -kopje was carried by assault. The defence of the kopje was one of -the most conspicuous feats of the war on the Boer side, and it is -noteworthy <span class="pagenum"><a name="page287" id= -"page287"></a>{287}</span> that it was made by a body of regularly -disciplined men. Owing partly no doubt to the difficulty of -reinforcing such an isolated position, no effective support was -given by Botha to the gallant little band, neither did he trouble -Buller seriously with artillery fire; and the commandos east and -north of the Zarps' kopje did little. He does not seem to have -recognized that Bergendal was not a mere strong post, but the key -of an unsound position which should at all hazards have been -safeguarded. This Buller saw at once, and he moved so as to meet -with the least interference from the enemy, who, having two fronts, -could not act solidly upon either of them.</p> -<p>The capture of Bergendal dissolved the Boer position. The -commandos facing Buller were driven off; and the right, which had -been opposing French and Pole-Carew so feebly that neither of them -suffered a single casualty, fell away. Buller went in pursuit, but -was unable to worry the retreat. Some commandos withdrew eastwards -along the line, others broke off towards Lydenburg and Barberton. -The Boer Governments retired from Machadodorp to Nelspruit. Buller -crossed the railway, and on August 29 Helvetia was taken. Next day -the British prisoners of war, whom the Boers had brought away in -the scuttle from Pretoria when Lord Roberts entered the city, were -released at Noitgedacht by their captors, who were no longer in a -position to detain them.</p> -<p>Botha had indeed been forced into retreat, but not cut off, and -he escaped with all his guns and his losses were comparatively -slight. His burghers were, as usual after a lost battle, -demoralized and disheartened for the time being, but not, as was -thought by the British Army, scared by their reverses into abject -impotence. From the time of the occupation of Bloemfontein -<i>guerilla</i> had been gradually taking the place of organized -warfare, of which Bergendal was the last act, and which the -burghers saw that they could not hope to wage successfully. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page288" id= -"page288"></a>{288}</span> The history of the previous seven months -showed what could be won by <i>guerilla</i>, and what could be lost -by pretending to be an Army. The fact that they were no longer able -to act as a coherent military body did not permanently discourage -them, and the struggle had not yet run more than one-third of its -weary course.</p> -<p>It was, however, the general belief not only in Great Britain -but also in the Army in South Africa, that the Boers had kicked -their last kick at Bergendal. There might be a final wriggle or -two; but the end was in sight, and before the first anniversary of -the declaration of war, peace would again reign in the land. These -not ill-founded hopes justified Lord Roberts' Proclamation of -September 1, by which the Transvaal was formally incorporated in -the British Empire.</p> -<p>To prevent the enemy escaping to the north or to the south, and -to impale him upon the stakes of the Portuguese frontier, Lord -Roberts pushed forward three columns; one under Pole-Carew to -follow the railway towards Komati Poort, another under French to -march towards Barberton, and a third under Buller to occupy the -Lydenburg district; to which Botha had gone after the battle of -Bergendal, and which if held by him would leave in the possession -of the Boers the best line of retreat from the railway to the -northern Transvaal.</p> -<p>Ian Hamilton, on his return from the west after the escape of De -Wet, was lent to Buller for a few days. The occupation of Lydenburg -on September 7, and of Spitz Kop four days later, drove Botha back -to the line at Nelspruit. Buller's operations were carried out with -success in a country more difficult than any that had yet been -entered by the British Army in South Africa. South of the railway, -French spread the net, casting it from Carolina to Barberton, which -he entered on September 13, and where he not only captured a -considerable amount of rolling stock and supplies which the Boers -had shoved into the little branch line, but also released a final -remnant of about a hundred British <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page289" id="page289"></a>{289}</span> prisoners of war, most of -whom were officers. He had advanced through a country almost as -difficult as that in which Buller was engaged, and although the -commandos opposing him had at first been drawn away to the south by -the report that he was making for Ermelo, they returned in time to -offer some resistance east of Carolina; but he entered Barberton -without the discharge of a rifle. Botha had sounded the Cease -Fire.</p> -<p>The Boers had found it necessary to consider the situation -seriously. They had been driven into a relatively minute area, -which was morally congested with a pair of Presidents and their -parasites, remnants of Government offices, superfluous commandants, -and commandos some of which were eager and some of which were not -eager to continue the struggle; and physically by the accumulation -of stores, supplies, guns, ammunition, and rolling stock which had -been rammed down into the last section of the Delagoa Bay -railway.</p> -<p>Kruger was induced to lighten the ship which he had so signally -failed to keep on her course. He left Nelspruit on September 11 for -Lorenzo Marques, where he was taken under the protection of the -Portuguese Government, and where he remained until the eve of the -first anniversary of the opening scene of the drama, the battle of -Talana Hill. On October 19 another nation offered him asylum, and -he sailed for Marseilles in the <i>Guelderland</i>, a cruiser of -the Dutch Navy; thus symbolically repatriating the French and Dutch -emigrants who had quitted Europe for South Africa in the -seventeenth century.</p> -<p>The positions of Buller on the north of the railway, of French -at Barberton, and of Pole-Carew ready to advance centrally, made -immediate action imperative; but Botha was hampered by the presence -of not a few unwilling and unmounted commandos. These he sent under -Koetzee to Komati Poort and left to arrange their own destiny; and -with the rest, which numbered 4,000 burghers, he broke away in two -directions, himself with <span class="pagenum"><a name="page290" -id="page290"></a>{290}</span> B. Viljoen leading the northward -trek, while T. Smuts endeavoured to escape southward into -Swaziland.</p> -<p>Thus when Pole-Carew, who had been joined by Ian Hamilton and -whose advance had been delayed to allow French and Buller to get -into position on his flanks, reached Komati Poort on September 24, -he found himself hitting at vacancy with the wreckage of two lost -republics around him, derelict railway stock, disabled guns, -abandoned ammunition, and burning stores. Koetzee's men had -disappeared, most of them into Portuguese territory, which they had -been partly persuaded and partly compelled to enter by the -Portuguese authorities, who, although they had regarded the Boer -cause with a more than benevolent neutrality during the earlier -stages of the war, now saw that a fight near the frontier would be -a most embarrassing episode; and, while offering an asylum to the -fugitives, threatened to allow Lord Roberts to land troops at -Lorenzo Marques if it were not accepted. On the 28th Pole-Carew was -engaged not in battle with the Boers, but in celebrating the -birthday of the King of Portugal, a singular interlude between the -acts of the war drama.</p> -<p>Botha in making for the north hoped to establish his remnant and -cultivate the germs somewhere in the Leydsdorp or Pietersburg -districts, which were the only portions of the Transvaal not -occupied by British troops. Lord Roberts' expectations that they -would be denied to the enemy by the Rhodesian Field Force under -Carrington were not fulfilled, and he could not spare any of his -own troops to occupy them.</p> -<p>Botha, preceded by a few days by Steyn, left the Delagoa Bay -line on September 17, and succeeded in scraping past Buller without -serious excoriation, but he was compelled to send the greater part -of his force under B. Viljoen by a circuitous route through the -unhealthy lower veld.</p> -<p>The enemy was now to all appearances chased to the ends of the -earth, but throughout October and <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page291" id="page291"></a>{291}</span> November roving bodies -worried the railway and detained a considerable British force upon -it.</p> -<p>Commandos that could not be accounted for by the British -Intelligence Staff seemed to spring out of the ground. Trains were -de-railed, raids and counter-raids north and south were the order -of the day. Lydenburg was prowled upon. Botha and Viljoen, stirred -by Steyn, hovered in the north, and Viljoen went south to -co-ordinate the several activities. On November 19 he effected a -temporary success at Balmoral, capturing a small post and cutting -the railway, but it served him little and he soon retired.</p> -<p>Of the force engaged in the Komati Poort advance, the Guards' -Brigade, which the hopeful situation would soon, it was thought, -allow to be sent home, as well as French's cavalry and other -troops, had been withdrawn; and a column under Paget which was -operating west of Pretoria had to be called up to expel Viljoen -from a position which he afterwards took up twenty miles north of -the railway at Rhenosterkop. The affair was the only serious action -during October and November.</p> -<p>French did not advance beyond Barberton. Early in October he was -ordered to clear the country lying between the Natal and the -Delagoa Bay railways. At first opposed by Smuts and subsequently -impeded by bad weather, transport difficulties, and constant -sniping, his movement resembled a retreat rather than a voluntary -advance, and it was so regarded by the commandos. When he reached -Heidelberg on October 26, he had lost half his oxen and a third of -his wagons.</p> -<p>After the conclusion of the Komati Poort operations Buller -returned to England. No general officer serving in South Africa was -regarded by the non-commissioned officers and men under his command -with greater affection and admiration. The Natal Army was held -together in spite of disasters and failures by the personality of -its leader. He had made not a few mistakes, but they never lost him -the confidence of his troops, who, when he <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page292" id="page292"></a>{292}</span> left -their camp at Lydenburg, said farewell to him with an extraordinary -demonstration of genuine regret.</p> -<p>At the end of November the command of the British Forces in -South Africa was taken over by Lord Kitchener from Lord Roberts, -who sailed for England in the belief that the war was practically -over. He had completed the task which he had set himself when he -landed at Capetown ten months before. At that time hardly even a -scout had quitted British territory; now almost every mile of -railway and every considerable town of the two republics, except -Pietersburg, was in the possession of the British Army; the Boer -Governments had been expelled; Natal was free; organized resistance -had ceased; the remnants of a baffled and bewildered enemy were -prowling aimlessly in small bodies. All the precedents indicated a -speedy termination of the War.</p> -<p>When Lord Roberts left the shadow of Table Mountain the last -word in Strategy and Tactics had been spoken, and the war gradually -became a problem in Mechanics. His strategy was freely criticized -at first, but it proved to be sound; and the only fault that could -be found with his tactics was that like a skilful chess player he -always endeavoured to defeat his opponent with the least possible -loss on either side.</p> -<p>The organization of a European Army had been found inefficient -for dealing with Boer <i>guerilla</i>. The Army Corps fell to -pieces as soon as it landed in South Africa; and as time went on -the Divisions, the Brigades, and even many of the regimental units -were one by one liquidated and re-shuffled into columns.<a id= -"footnotetag51" name="footnotetag51"></a><a href= -"#footnote51"><sup>51</sup></a></p> -<p>Lord Kitchener, who had been General Manager to Lord Roberts, -was admirably qualified to succeed him, and to deal with a -situation which seemed to call for the exercise of a strong will -and of the power of organization rather than for the display of -purely professional <span class="pagenum"><a name="page293" id= -"page293"></a>{293}</span> qualities, in which he was somewhat -deficient. It is doubtful whether he would have commanded a large -army successfully on the field of battle, but no better man could -have been chosen to control the vast area over which the British -Forces were distributed.</p> -<a name="fig-so-transvaal" id="fig-so-transvaal"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image19.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image19.png" -alt="Map of Southern Transvaal" /></a></div> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote49" name= -"footnote49"></a><b>Footnote 49:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag49">(return)</a> -<p>Not the column with which he had come up to Pretoria with Lord -Roberts, and which after his accident had been taken over by -Hunter, but a newly-constituted column.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote50" name= -"footnote50"></a><b>Footnote 50:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag50">(return)</a> -<p>Lord Roberts said that if he had been free to send Ian Hamilton -into the Free State instead of to Rustenburg, De Wet must have been -surrounded.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote51" name= -"footnote51"></a><b>Footnote 51:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag51">(return)</a> -<p>After June, 1901, the classification of the South African Army -in Divisions and Brigades disappeared from the Army List.</p> -</blockquote> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page294" id= -"page294"></a>{294}</span> -<h2><a name="chap15" id="chap15">CHAPTER XV</a></h2> -<h3>The Recurrences of De Wet</h3> -<p><a href="#fig-orange">Map, p. 292.</a></p> -<p>In October, 1900, De Wet, with 1,000 men, again crossed into the -Transvaal at Schoeman's Drift. His movement, which was preceded by -constant raids on the railway throughout September, was not -altogether voluntary, but was rather a withdrawal from columns -pressing on him in the Free State.<a id="footnotetag52" name= -"footnotetag52"></a><a href="#footnote52"><sup>52</sup></a> Barton, -who with the Fusilier Brigade had been sent down by Lord Roberts to -meet him, took up a position at Fredrikstad, where he was -surrounded by De Wet and Liebenberg on October 24. The situation -was now so serious that Lord Roberts ordered a brigade under Knox -to come up to Barton's assistance from the Free State, but it was -not required, as the arrival of a column from the north broke the -cordon, and De Wet returned to the Free State.</p> -<p>The new De Wet hunt was soon in cry. When Knox was set on the -trail, he was in the Free State and De Wet was in the Transvaal. -Two days later the positions were reversed, for they had crossed -the river in opposite directions. The situation now developed -itself favourably for De Wet's methods. For a purely military -operation he had never shown much aptitude. He had failed against -Barton at Fredrikstad, but he was not discouraged by the repulse, -which he unjustly attributed to want of co-operation on the part of -Liebenberg. <span class="pagenum"><a name="page295" id= -"page295"></a>{295}</span> He had put the Vaal between himself and -Knox, who was on the right bank blindly nosing the drifts. He knew -from recent experience that his pursuers, with their imperfect -methods of acquiring information, would hunt by sight and not by -scent, and he had the mobility of a hare as well as the instinct of -a fox. He lay <i>perdu</i> for some days near the left bank of the -Vaal, while a net with spacious meshes was being cast to ensnare -him. Again he crossed and re-crossed the river in order to bring -Steyn away from Ventersdorp, whom two months previously he had -conducted into the Transvaal, and who had in the meantime worked -round the British Army to Machadodorp and back; and who after -conferences with Kruger and L. Botha, now returned with him -unscathed into their own land with schemes for the future.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-so-transvaal">Map, p. 260.</a></p> -<p>Pom-pom batteries and mounted infantry, the latest fashions of -war, were sent after him by Knox. On November 6 he was surprised in -laager near Bothaville, but escaped with Steyn and the greater -portion of his command on the first alarm. The gallant Le Gallais -was killed and the laager itself captured after a stout resistance -some hours later, and with it all De Wet's field guns, wagons, a -considerable quantity of ammunition and horse equipment, and more -than 100 prisoners of war.</p> -<p>Most men would have succumbed to the disaster, but it only -spurred De Wet. He had signally failed in his late attempt on the -Transvaal, and he had just lost almost everything at Bothaville, -but he resolved to make a raid in the opposite direction on the -northern districts of Cape Colony. To reach his new objective, he -must traverse the whole length of the Free State, which, having -been in the occupation of the British Army for several months, -should have offered the line of greatest resistance to his -movement.</p> -<p>The Brandwater Basin disaster of July 30 had, however, by no -means crushed Free State Boerdom, which, <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page296" id="page296"></a>{296}</span> after -having been heavily hurled to the ground, where it lay for a time -apparently unconscious, began to show signs of returning animation, -and in a few weeks was again on its legs; thanks to the -restoratives freely administered by De Wet on his return from his -first incursion into the Transvaal. Into each district he sent -irreconcilable men after his own heart to stimulate the wavering -and animate the discouraged; and barely a month elapsed before the -burghers were besieging Ladybrand, which, however, they failed to -take, and were hacking at the railway into the Transvaal. In -October every village in the S.W. district of the Orange River -Colony in the possession of a British garrison was attacked, all -but one of them without success.</p> -<p>Lord Roberts had already taken measures to curb the new -activities. His plan was to occupy certain places strongly as bases -from which mobile columns could constantly move to and fro, eating -up the intervening country and rendering it incapable of supporting -the enemy. Its operation was mainly confined to the northern -districts of the Free State, in which lay the centre of -disturbance, and the troops engaged could not be readily employed -outside them. It was so far successful, in that it drove De Wet -into the Transvaal in October, but it failed to restrain his -subsequent movements. It probably was the best that could have been -devised for dealing with local <i>guerilla</i>, but its action -being centrifugal and not circumferential, it was powerless to deal -with a meteoric raid of well-mounted men. Although the British -troops greatly outnumbered the Boers, yet in practice only the -mounted details, which included no regular cavalry and were -relatively weak, were directly effective against the enemy, and the -movements of the divagating columns were sluggish.</p> -<p>When De Wet left Bothaville on November 6, his arm was, -metaphorically speaking, in a sling, and he was footsore; but ten -days later he had brought together <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page297" id="page297"></a>{297}</span> in the Doornberg a force of -1,500 men, with whom he proposed to cut his way into the Cape -Colony. His movement south may be compared to that of a small swift -steamer endeavouring to escape from a blockaded seaport. Ahead of -him and on each beam were the slow-moving vessels of the blockading -squadron, most of them hull down and with banked fires.</p> -<p>He made at once for the scene of his April successes, the -country lying between Bloemfontein and the Basuto border. The chief -obstacles in his way were a line of posts running eastwards from -Bloemfontein, and the town of Dewetsdorp, which was held by 500 -British troops. The latter he might have avoided had he chosen to -do so, but he seems to have been attracted to it because it was the -home of his childhood, which it was incumbent upon him to redeem -from bondage.</p> -<p>The phenomenon of a Boer column marching through the heart of a -country supposed to be effectively in the possession of the British -Army was again witnessed. To borrow another metaphor, this time -from Astronomy, De Wet throughout the greater part of his career -was a telescopic star, invisible to the naked eye. General Officers -and column commanders helplessly watched his course through the -telescopes of the Intelligence Staff, and seemed to have as little -power of influencing it as an observer at Greenwich has of changing -the orbit of a planet. The astronomer can at least forecast with -certainty the path which it will follow in the heavens, but there -were no observations available from which the course of De Wet -could be predicted for more than a few hours. He seemed to defy the -laws of gravitation.</p> -<p>On November 16, he easily rushed the Bloemfontein-Thabanchu line -of posts at Springhaan's Nek, and three days later invested -Dewetsdorp. Meanwhile the alarm had been given. Knox's force, which -had been sent after him into the Transvaal, was now sent after him -to Bloemfontein, and mobile columns were detailed. Dewetsdorp was -doomed from the first unless <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page298" id="page298"></a>{298}</span> assistance arrived from -outside. The position could not be held effectively by a small -force, One by one the scattered posts fell into the hands of De -Wet, but the defence was maintained until the 23rd, when the white -flag was hoisted. On the previous day two relieving columns had -started from Edenburg, but they were checked near Dewetsdorp on the -24th by De Wet, who shook himself free of them and was soon on his -way to the south with 500 prisoners of war; and Knox with a third -relieving column was marching from Edenburg.</p> -<p>Thus almost within sight of Sannah's Post and Mostert's Hoek and -after six months of apparently successful activity by the British -Army, De Wet snatched away another garrison. After a repulse at -Fredrikstad, soon followed by a severe mauling at Bothaville, from -which he broke out as a fugitive, he placidly and confidently -trekked southwards unopposed for 150 miles, magnetically attracting -to himself a force sufficient to blot out Dewetsdorp in the -presence of a bewildered enemy, who, though in overwhelming -numbers, was feebly strung out in lengths without breadth. The -British Army had still to learn, not only in the Free State, but -also elsewhere, the elemental fact in geometry that neither one -straight line nor two, nor under certain conditions even three, can -enclose an area.</p> -<p>It was evident that De Wet was making for the Cape Colony, the -disaffected northern districts of which were again giving cause for -anxiety, and which at all hazards he must be prevented from -entering. Lord Kitchener came down from the Transvaal to direct the -operations; the Brigade of Guards on its way to Capetown and home, -was de-trained to hold the line of the Orange; Knox's columns -hurried forward. De Wet, after a slight encounter with Knox, who -was marching south, turned adroitly to the west and did not resume -the original direction of his march until he had put a considerable -distance between himself and the columns, which were "running heel" -and pursuing him almost in <span class="pagenum"><a name="page299" -id="page299"></a>{299}</span> the opposite direction. Near Bethulie -he was reinforced by Hertzog and other leaders, but by this time he -had been headed by Knox at Bethulie and was compelled to draw off -eastwards into the angle between the Orange and the Caledon. He -left Hertzog with instructions to make his way across the river -west of Norval's Pont, intending to cross with his own force higher -up. He was, however, prevented by the forces of nature from -carrying out the raid which the British military forces would -probably have been unable to prohibit. Heavy rains had fallen in -the Basuto Mountains, and the sudden rise of the Caledon and the -Orange to flood level obliterated most of the drifts and entrapped -him between them. He made one dash for the Orange at Odendaal, but -found the drift in the possession of the enemy.</p> -<p>De Wet now saw that he was not destined to enter the Cape Colony -on this occasion, and that he would have much difficulty in saving -himself. On December 6 he determined to retreat by the way he came. -He did not, however, wholly abandon the scheme of a Cape Colony -raid, for he detached Kritzinger and Scheepers with instructions to -hover and watch their opportunity of breaking into it. The -opportune falling of the Caledon opened to him a postern towards -the north, and on December 7 he crossed the river and made for -Helvetia, where again he was entangled. The line of least -resistance seemed to run westwards towards the railway, and he put -himself upon it, soon to find that Kitchener's dispositions had -obstructed it. He doubled back, and trailing Knox after him in a -night march, shook himself free. Knox, confident that the -Bloemfontein-Ladybrand line of posts would be an effectual barrier -to De Wet's retreat, had waited to pull his straggling columns -together. De Wet, reinforced by a commando under Michael Prinsloo, -who had been with him in his first Transvaal incursion when Steyn -was put over the border, rushed at the blockhouse line and again -cut it at Springhaan's Nek, for although it had <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page300" id="page300"></a>{300}</span> been -attended to recently, there was an aneurism in it which yielded at -the critical moment, and on December 14 De Wet passed freely -through the lesion. He arrived by way of Ficksburg at Tafelberg, -S.E. of Senekal, on December 25.</p> -<p>The failure of the raid was almost as disconcerting to the -British plan of campaign as its success would have been. It showed -that the troops were unable to prevent a mobile and well-led -commando from traversing the Free State from end to end; it put new -spirit into the burghers, and destroyed the hopes of peace which -the operations of Lord Roberts in the Transvaal had kindled. De Wet -was still at large, and although he had not accomplished all that -he intended, he had good reason to be satisfied, and was stimulated -for fresh efforts. He could boast that he was beaten not by columns -but by two rivers in spate. His movements were so little obstructed -that after reaching the Senekal district he was able to pay a -flying visit to the railway at Roodeval, where he recovered the -Lee-Metford ammunition which he had buried in June, and with which -he hoped soon to have an opportunity of charging the rifles -captured at Dewetsdorp.</p> -<p>When De Wet, Hertzog, and Kritzinger parted company near the -Orange early in December, their tracks formed the letter Y -inverted. De Wet marched along the stem towards the N.E.; -Kritzinger struck in the direction of the midland districts of the -Cape Colony; Hertzog made for the west. Martial law was at last -proclaimed in the Colony, the greater part of which was, in spite -of innumerable columns slipped at them, traversed by Hertzog and -Kritzinger. The former, after an adventurous march of over 400 -miles, reached Lambert's Bay on the shore of the Atlantic, and gave -to most of his men their first sight of the sea; and to all of them -a unique experience in the war, for they were shelled by a British -cruiser at anchor in the haven.<a id="footnotetag53" name= -"footnotetag53"></a><a href="#footnote53"><sup>53</sup></a></p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page301" id= -"page301"></a>{301}</span> -<p>While Hertzog was watching the setting of the sun upon an -Atlantic horizon, Kritzinger was at Willowmore, almost within sight -of the Indian Ocean, having in spite of all the columns pushed his -way from Rouxville down into the S.E. districts of the Cape Colony. -Neither Kritzinger nor Hertzog, however, effected much by their -raids except to show in the Colony what De Wet had already shown in -the Transvaal and the Free State, the impotence of even the -best-laid schemes of pursuit, and they returned towards the centre -in February. De Wet and Hertzog had between them in the course of a -few months succeeded in ploughing, through the heart of the country -occupied by the British Army, a lonely furrow which stretched from -the northward slopes of the Magaliesberg in the Transvaal through -the Free State to a haven on the South Atlantic Ocean.</p> -<p>Meanwhile De Wet was waiting until the moment should come for -him to take part in the wide-reaching plan of campaign which had -been devised by the Boer Governments. They saw the uselessness of -attempting to withstand the British forces in the Republics, and -they determined to bring the war back into the Cape Colony and -Natal. The general idea was that L. Botha should march on -Pietermaritzburg from the Eastern Transvaal, while De Wet followed -Hertzog and Kritzinger across the Orange, and then, having effected -a <span class="pagenum"><a name="page302" id= -"page302"></a>{302}</span> junction with them, should advance on -Capetown. The scheme was not so extravagant and quixotic as it -might appear to be, as recent events had shown the difficulty of -restraining the movements of a Boer leader of dash and enterprise; -and there was no reason why De Wet should not be as successful in -eluding pursuit in the future as he had been in the past.</p> -<p>Again the Doornberg, although within sight of the railway -between Bloemfontein and Kroonstad, was available as a meeting -place. Here on November 16, 1900, he had assembled his burghers for -his first attempt on the Cape Colony; and here on January 25, 1901, -he brought them together for his second. Steyn was with him, and -all the available Free State commandants with more than 2,000 men -mustered on the mountain unmolested. His intentions were not -unknown to the British Intelligence Staff, and when he quitted the -rendezvous he had a column under B. Hamilton on his right rear and -a column under C. Knox on his left front.</p> -<p>The situation was not novel, and he dealt with it with his -customary good luck and success. He passed across Knox's front, who -fortunately for him had been ordered not to act before Hamilton -came up, and reached the Tabaksberg, between Winburg and Brandfort, -next day. On the following morning he shook off an attack made by a -portion of Knox's column, and went for the Bloemfontein Thabanchu -line of posts, which he had already twice cut. Hamilton, distanced -in the chase, had been put on the railway and sent to Bloemfontein -to strengthen the line, but he arrived too late to prevent De Wet -crossing it on January 30 at Israel's Poort. The sorely-tried pale -had again failed.<a id="footnotetag54" name= -"footnotetag54"></a><a href="#footnote54"><sup>54</sup></a></p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page303" id= -"page303"></a>{303}</span> -<p>De Wet, having shaken off the columns which had been pursuing -him from the Doornberg, had now a free course of 100 miles to the -next obstacle, the Orange. It was evident that the speed of the -columns must be increased and Knox was put upon the railway for the -first time and Hamilton for the second and dispatched to Bethulie. -The energy of a considerable portion of the British Army was -devoted to an attempt to make the barrier of the Orange -impassable.</p> -<p>North of the river was De Wet; south of it Hertzog and -Kritzinger were waiting for him. There was every reason to fear -that should he succeed in joining either of them, the smouldering -embers of rebellion would again break out in the Cape Colony. -Troops were hurried by train from the Transvaal, from Kimberley, -and from Capetown. Lyttelton was brought down from the Delagoa Bay -line to Naauwpoort to take general charge of the operations, and to -build as rapidly as possible a wall that could not be scaled or -breached.</p> -<p>For some reason which is not apparent De Wet, although he had an -open country in front of him in which not a single British column -was operating, moved slowly, and thereby gave more time for the -carrying out of Lyttelton's arrangements. Possibly he may have been -delayed by trouble with his Free State commandos, some of which a -few days later refused to cross with him into the Colony. On -January 31 he passed through Dewetsdorp, gratified no doubt to find -that since his capture of it in November his enemies had not -ventured to set foot again in it. At that time he had not made up -his mind whether to cross the Orange east or west of Norval's Pont. -If the former, he would soon be able to join Kritzinger, who after -the Willowmore raid had returned to the Zuurberg, between Stormberg -and Naauwpoort; if the latter, he would be able to call up Hertzog, -who had returned from the shores of the Atlantic and was hovering -in the Carnarvon district west of De Aar.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page304" id= -"page304"></a>{304}</span> -<p>De Wet had from time to time to time been in communication with -Kritzinger and Hertzog during their raids. His advanced patrols -soon discovered that the section of the Orange lying eastward of -Norval's Pont was very strongly held. The dispositions of -Lyttelton's troops seem to have been made on the assumption that De -Wet would endeavour to join Kritzinger, who was little more than -one day's march from the left bank, rather than Hertzog, who was -150 miles away. The river section westward of Norval's Pont was -therefore held lightly by a line of outposts at the drifts, thrown -out from the main barrier based on Naauwpoort, nearly forty miles -south of the river. Of this De Wet was at the time unaware. His -information was that the eastward section was impassable. The -westward section might possibly not be so, and he determined to -make for it.</p> -<p>He spread a report that he intended to cross the river at -Odendaalstroom or Aliwal North, and paused to allow it time to -reach the ears of Knox, who seems to have given some credence to -it. A column was sent out to reconnoitre in the direction of -Smithfield. When half-way between that town and Dewetsdorp, De Wet -suddenly changed direction and made for Phillipolis, detaching a -portion of his force under Froeneman, who on February 5 captured -and burnt a train a few miles south of Edenburg and crossed the -railway. On the following night, De Wet crossed it with the main -body near Springfontein, while Knox was hunting for him near -Bethulie.</p> -<p>It was now evident that De Wet's objective was the Zand Drift on -the Orange west of Phillipolis. He had had a long start, and the -nearest troops available for the pursuit of him were the columns of -Knox and Hamilton at Bethulie. Here the river bends round to the -south, forming an arc through Norval's Pont towards Zand Drift; and -the columns therefore crossed to the right bank and marched eighty -miles along the chord, only to find when they reached the Drift on -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page305" id= -"page305"></a>{305}</span> February 12 that De Wet had two days -previously crossed by it into the Cape Colony.</p> -<p>The operations of the next sixteen days were confined to a -comparatively small rectangle of about 6,000 square miles lying on -the left bank of the Orange, which bounded it from Norval's Pont to -Douglas and thence to near Prieska. The S.E. side and half the S.W. -side, namely from Norval's Pont to Naauwpoort and thence to De Aar, -were formed by the railways, the remaining portion of the S.W. side -being the river Brak, which flows into the Orange a few miles above -Prieska.</p> -<p>Owing to a sudden flood, which delayed Knox for two days, he was -unable to follow De Wet across Zand Drift, but Plumer started from -Naauwpoort with two columns, and on February 12 came in touch with -De Wet and compelled him to change his course. Two days later De -Wet crossed the railway between De Aar and Hopetown, after a -rearguard action with Plumer, into whose hands fell next morning -the transport which De Wet had been compelled by bad weather to -leave behind him.</p> -<p>De Wet now proposed to fetch a compass towards Prieska, where he -hoped to effect a junction with Hertzog, but the driving power of -the raid was slowly exhausting itself. The motive energy was stored -up in accumulators, and when these were discharged in succession, -there was no means of re-charging them. Hertzog and Kritzinger, who -had been relied on for this purpose, were not at hand; more than a -third of the force with which De Wet had originally left the -Doornberg had declined to leave the Free State; and the transport -had been lost.</p> -<p>Plumer also was exhausted and unable to continue the pursuit, -but fortunately Knox was close behind him. He doubled back towards -Hopetown for supplies, leaving Knox to follow the trail. De Wet was -now driven into the western corner of the rectangle where -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page306" id= -"page306"></a>{306}</span> the Brak falls into the Orange, and -where he found himself in a dilemma similar to that which in his -first raid had cornered him between the Orange and the Caledon. The -Brak was in spate, and he could not cross it to Prieska. All hope -of joining Hertzog and of a successful raid into the Cape Colony -was at an end; there was nothing to be done but make the best of -his way back to the Free State. He reversed his course and made for -the confluence of the Orange and the Vaal. His change of direction -was not known to Knox, who, assuming that De Wet must have crossed -the Brak, which fell as suddenly as it had risen, threw his columns -across it and trekked for twenty miles towards the S.W. Hertzog was -reported to be a day's march higher up the Brak.</p> -<p>Up to this time the whole of the stress of the pursuit had -fallen upon Knox and Plumer. As soon as the news of De Wet's entry -into the Cape Colony reached Lord Kitchener, he hurried down from -the Transvaal to De Aar to superintend the casting of the nets. His -first dispositions were made with the object of preventing De Wet -and Hertzog breaking away into the districts lying west of the -railway to Capetown, and an ingenious and elaborate scheme of -columns springing out from the line in succession from the north, -was arranged. It was not, however, put into action, for Knox and -Plumer had headed back De Wet, and for the time being had prevented -a junction between him and Hertzog. It was no longer a case of a -stern chase, but of the fencing in of a comparatively limited area, -into which more than a dozen columns were thrown, and which by -February 24 was reduced to the district bounded on three sides by -the railways and on the fourth by the Orange.</p> -<p>When on February 21 Plumer was able to resume the pursuit, Knox -having discovered his mistake was recrossing the Brak, and De Wet -on the left bank of the Orange was unsuccessfully searching for -practicable <span class="pagenum"><a name="page307" id= -"page307"></a>{307}</span> drifts. He succeeded, however, in -transferring a few of his men to the right bank in a boat at -Makow's Drift, but was overtaken by Plumer before he could complete -the movement, and forced to hurry on towards Hopetown. In the -course of one week he had marched in the direction of almost every -point in the compass, and was now heading E.S.E.</p> -<p>When within fifteen miles of Hopetown he lost two guns, and on -the same day ran up against a new obstacle, a column under Paris, -which had come down from Kimberley and which had extended itself -westward from Hopetown. He succeeded in wriggling through the line -without detection during the night; while Paris, unaware of what -had occurred and thinking that De Wet was still in front of him, -pushed on next morning and came into action, not with De Wet, but -with Plumer, who was pursuing De Wet in the opposite direction. On -February 24 De Wet crossed the railway eastwards a few miles south -of Orange River Station.</p> -<p>As soon as Hertzog in the Carnarvon district heard of the -approach of De Wet he trekked up towards the Brak to meet him, -having first detached a portion of his command under Brand to make -a circuit through Britstown. Brand was followed by B. Hamilton, who -had been set on to his trail, but regained touch with his leader on -February 20, when the news came that De Wet was in difficulties and -that the raid must be abandoned.</p> -<p>Hertzog and Brand joined forces across the river and trekked to -the east, having thrown Plumer off the scent for a day. On February -25 Hertzog crossed the railway. Three Boer leaders were now groping -for each other in the Fog of War: De Wet, Hertzog, and Fourie, who -had been left behind to do what he could to extricate the transport -which De Wet had been compelled to abandon when he crossed the -railway westwards on February 16, and who had been lost sight of by -the British columns. The forces of gravitation are, however, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page308" id= -"page308"></a>{308}</span> irresistible, and as Hertzog and Brand -could not be long kept apart, so also De Wet, Hertzog, and Fourie -soon came together.</p> -<p>De Wet trekked along the left bank of the Orange for nearly -sixty miles, but found every drift impassable. On February 26 he -reached Zand Drift. A fortnight previously a sudden flood had -checked his pursuers, now another flood was checking his retreat -from them at the same spot, and he was hemmed in by a swollen river -and a dozen active columns. Most men would have yielded to the -situation, but his tenacity of purpose never faltered. Early on the -morning of February 27 Hertzog, who had picked up Fourie a few -hours before, joined him.</p> -<p>After crossing the railway Hertzog made for Petrusville, where -he heard that De Wet had passed through the town on his way south, -and followed him. About twenty miles away on Hertzog's right flank -a column under Hickman was marching on Zand Drift, and had it not -been suddenly diverted northwards by orders from Lyttelton, it must -have forestalled him at the Drift, as it was working on interior -lines. The change of direction was made before Hertzog's presence -in the vicinity became known to Hickman, who on sighting a Boer -column on February 26 again changed direction to pursue it. A -second column was soon descried, and later in the day, about the -time that De Wet reached the Drift, a considerable Boer force was -sighted. It was composed of the two columns already seen under -Hertzog and Brand, reinforced by Fourie, who had emerged from the -Fog. Hickman's pursuit failed to prevent the three commandants -joining De Wet at the Drift during the night.</p> -<p>The <i>disjecta membra</i> of the raid were now assembled, but -the task of the British columns was, apparently, greatly -facilitated. Instead of having to chase evasive and elusive -commandos now in this direction and now in that, the leaders had -but to pin De Wet down to the <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page309" id="page309"></a>{309}</span> left bank of the Orange at -Zand Drift and to leave him to gaze longingly at the further shore. -Nothing could now save him but a sudden fall of the swollen river. -Before De Wet's arrival at Zand Drift Lyttelton had put troops in -motion, some of them from considerable distances, to enclose the -area, but of the columns detailed three only had come up. Hickman -was on the spot, Crabbe from Hopetown was in touch with him, and -Byng, who had been hurried up from Victoria West, was at hand. None -of the other columns were in position, owing mainly to delays on -the railway. Thus the only effective force for the capture of De -Wet was the three columns with Hickman, who was out of -communication with Lyttelton.</p> -<p>The troops had been disposed with the object of driving De Wet -back into the Free State rather than of capturing him, and they -were unable to concentrate themselves upon him. Norval's Pont, from -which the line of the Orange might, perhaps, have been blocked in -the direction of Zand Drift, was unoccupied. On February 27 Hickman -pushed De Wet away from the Drift. Two columns were behind the Boer -leader, but in front of him was a weak and thinly extended force -under Byng, which De Wet cut through without difficulty, and next -morning reached Botha's Drift. It was fordable, and after eighteen -days' absence he re-entered his own country. He had not succeeded -in raiding very far into the Cape Colony, but he had baffled and -outwitted the most strenuous military effort of the war.</p> -<p>Plumer, who had been ordered round from Orange River Station to -Colesberg, arrived there too late. He was immediately sent on to -continue the pursuit in the Free State in co-operation with a -column under Bethune, which marched directly across the veld to -Fauresmith. Bethune was soon compelled to fall out, but Plumer held -on for five days more without, however, lessening the distance -between him and his quarry. On March 11, after a trek of more than -800 miles, De Wet, <span class="pagenum"><a name="page310" id= -"page310"></a>{310}</span> having dismissed on his way up most of -the commandos to their several districts, entered Senekal with -Steyn, and returned to within a few miles of the Doornberg place of -assembly which they had quitted forty-four days before.</p> -<p>The lessons to be derived from the history of the three De Wet -hunts are mainly of a moral character, and have only an indirect -bearing upon the principles which guide the conduct of military -operations in general. No such episodes could ever occur in a -European War. Yet the Power which holds Hindustan cannot afford to -forget them. Who can say that in the not distant future, which all -the signs of the times seem to show will be marked by turbulence -and disorder in India, a De Wet may not come forth out of the -thousands of Sikhs, Ghoorkas, Pathans and Rajputs who have learnt -the Art of War in the Native Army? The arena of the struggle, with -its long lines of communication, all its chief towns held by -British troops and its vast plains inhabited by a disaffected -population, would be strikingly similar to that on which the Boer -War was fought.</p> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote52" name= -"footnote52"></a><b>Footnote 52:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag52">(return)</a> -<p>De Wet says that he went at the request of Liebenberg, who was -in charge of the commandos operating between the Vaal and the -Magaliesberg, and who had previously been engaged in the -Bechuanaland rebellion.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote53" name= -"footnote53"></a><b>Footnote 53:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag53">(return)</a> -<p>Twenty-three centuries previously, a Greek Army, after a march -of many weeks, reached the sea. The emotion of the men at the sight -has been thus described by their leader in a well-known passage -which Hertzog might well have in substance incorporated in his -reports to De Wet: "No sooner had the men in front caught sight of -the sea than a great cry arose, and Xenophon with the rearguard, -catching the sound of it, conjectured that another set of enemies -must surely be attacking the front. But as the shout became louder -and nearer, and those who from time to time came up began racing at -the top of their speed towards the shouters and the shouting -continually recommenced with yet greater volume as the numbers -increased, Xenophon settled in his mind that something -extraordinary must have happened, and mounted his horse and taking -with him Lycius and the cavalry, galloped on. And presently they -could hear the soldiers shouting and passing on the joyful word -[Greek: Thalatta, Thalatta]"—<i>Anabasis</i>, IV, 7.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote54" name= -"footnote54"></a><b>Footnote 54:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag54">(return)</a> -<p>De Wet ascribes his success to a feint which he made in the -direction of Springhaan's Nek, and which he asserts threw the -columns off the scent; but it is improbable that the feint had -anything to do with it. At the time of De Wet's crossing at -Israel's Poort Hamilton had only reached Sannah's Post, nor was -Knox marching on the Nek.</p> -</blockquote> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page311" id= -"page311"></a>{311}</span> -<h2><a name="chap16" id="chap16">CHAPTER XVI</a></h2> -<h3>Lord Kitchener at Work</h3> -<p>The nation at home, which at the close of 1900 was confidently -expecting the end of the war at an early date, was not long -obsessed by its optimism. Efforts not less vigorous than patriotic -were made not only by Great Britain, but also by the Colonies and -South African Loyalists, to give Lord Kitchener the troops he -needed.</p> -<p>At the end of May, 1901, he had at his disposal a force which, -including all classes of irregulars, semi-combatants, and -non-combatants, was not less than 230,000; of whom more than -one-third were mounted. The rule hitherto observed, that the native -races were to be employed in servile capacities only, was relaxed, -and in certain cases natives were allowed to carry arms when acting -as scouts or patrols.</p> -<p>It is impossible to ascertain with any degree of accuracy either -the actual or the potential strength of the enemy at this period. -It has been estimated that, excluding the burghers actually on -commando, there were less than 30,000 Boers able to take up arms if -inclined to do so; but this number must only be regarded as the -maximum strength of a possible and to a great extent an unreliable -reserve upon which the commandos in action, at no given moment much -exceeding 12,000 burghers, could draw to supply the wastage of -war.</p> -<p>The war now entered fully into its "blockhouse and <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page312" id="page312"></a>{312}</span> drive" -phase. The use of these expedients in combination was, it is -believed, new to military history. The principle of the blockhouse -had already been tentatively adopted in South Africa without much -success, notably between Bloemfontein and Thabanchu, where a line -of posts was established which on three occasions was cut by De -Wet.<a id="footnotetag55" name="footnotetag55"></a><a href= -"#footnote55"><sup>55</sup></a> The chief defect of the blockhouse -is its vulnerability to shell fire; but by this time the Boer -artillery was a negligible quantity. Its adoption on a large scale -dates from the time of Lord Kitchener's taking over the command. -The expedient was, in the first instance, applied to the railways -as a protection against the raids to which they were subject; and -after July, 1901, it was extended to the open veld. Subsidiary -lines of blockhouses, which in general jutted out at right angles -to the railways and in most cases ran along the cross-veld roads -changing direction as circumstances required, were built. They -acted as fences to obstruct or to deflect the movements of the -enemy and enclosed areas greatly differing in size.</p> -<p>The longest blockhouse line, which was, however, not completed -until a few weeks before the end of the war, extended from Victoria -Road Station to Lambert's Bay on the Atlantic, a distance of 300 -miles. In the vicinity of Johannesburg, and in the Central -districts of the Orange River Colony west of the railway, cordons -of posts manned by the South African Constabulary took the place of -blockhouse lines. These posts, which were established at wider -intervals apart than the blockhouses, were intended to act as bases -for minor clearing operations. They offered little or no -obstruction to a Boer commando on trek. The blockhouse lines were -resolutely extended by Lord Kitchener in every direction; and by -the end of the war there was scarcely a district in the spacious -area of hostilities that was not <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page313" id="page313"></a>{313}</span> impaled upon them or -helplessly clutched in their fatal grasp.</p> -<p>The "Drive" as a military weapon is as old as the time of -Darius. The first use of it in South Africa, on a large scale, was -French's movement through the Eastern Transvaal in February, -1901.<a id="footnotetag56" name="footnotetag56"></a><a href= -"#footnote56"><sup>56</sup></a> The "Drive" has been criticized as -an awkward attempt to perform, with one and the same force, two -distinct operations of war; namely, the coercion of the -non-military population and the defeat of the enemy's troops. The -dual task deprives the force set to it of mobility and power of -initiative.</p> -<p>As a detail of abstract and orthodox military criticism the -objection is sound; but it ignores the special local circumstances -of the case. In the vast area on which the British Army was -operating it was not possible to separate the two objectives. -Moreover, the purely military resources of the enemy were waning; -and the contest was resolving itself into an effort to put pressure -on the country at large, rather than to smash the dwindling, -evasive, and centrifugal commandos in the field. French's "drive," -from a military point of view, was not a success; but it at least -frightened Botha and the Transvaal Government. In May, 1901, there -was a conference near Ermelo at which it was resolved that -overtures should be made to Lord Kitchener; and but for Steyn, who -was communicated with in the Orange River Colony, and who had had -no experience of the "drive," it is probable that negotiations for -peace would have ensued. On the other hand, the "drive" has been -approved as a method of warfare particularly adapted for use by an -army deficient in mobility and incapable of acquiring accurate -intelligence of the enemy.</p> -<hr /> -<p>During the two months preceding Lord Roberts' departure from -South Africa at the end of November, 1900, no events of great -military importance occurred <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page314" id="page314"></a>{314}</span> in the Transvaal, except De -Wet's Fredrikstad raid. The opposition had, to all appearance, -dissolved into impalpable matter. Here and there some Boer atoms -coalesced and were not pulverized; but for many weeks there was -little in the general situation to disturb the optimistic belief, -which was held not only by the people at home but also by the Army -in the field, that the end was not far off.</p> -<p>Botha and Steyn reached Pietersburg in September, where they -were joined by B. Viljoen, who arrived a few weeks later after a -circuitous journey from Komati Poort through the low veld. An -important detail of Lord Roberts' plan of campaign had not been -carried out. He had hoped that the Northern Transvaal would be -denied to the Boers by Carrington, who failed to carry out his part -of the programme. Thus Pietersburg was a fairly secure eyrie in -which plans could be devised and from which a swoop could be made -either east or west of Pretoria.</p> -<p>Botha and Steyn soon came to the conclusion that the situation, -though serious, was by no means hopeless. Certain events of October -and November were encouraging. They not unnaturally argued that the -withdrawal of their two chief opponents, Lord Roberts and Sir -Redvers Buller, indicated infirmity of purpose on the part of the -British Government. The idea was mistaken, as the recall of these -leaders, or at least of one of them, was due to the fact that the -British Government was of opinion that the war was practically -over. Again, they were relieved of the inconvenient and harassing -presence of Kruger, the dour, reactionary old farmer, who had -brought on the war and had now left his country to its fate; who -had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing since he had set out on -the Great Trek of 1836; and whose mind ran in a channel so shallow -that it could almost be heard rippling over the stones. Also, it is -probable that they had information that the majority of the men of -the Colonial and Irregular Corps, <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page315" id="page315"></a>{315}</span> whose term of service of -one year would shortly expire, or had already expired, were -declining to re-enlist—yet another sign of infirmity of -purpose. Moreover, the Boer agents in Europe no doubt reported that -all the regular infantry and its reserves in Great Britain had been -exhausted.</p> -<p>In November, 1900, the new plan of campaign was drawn up. L. -Botha was to invade Natal, after a raid into the Cape Colony by De -Wet, for whom Kritzinger and Hertzog would prepare the way and lay -out the dâk. Steyn hurried southwards with the scheme, and -was picked up at Ventersdorp by De Wet. Botha went to the high veld -between the Natal Railway and the Delagoa Bay Railway, leaving B. -Viljoen north of the latter railway. Beyers was ordered to join -Delarey, who after the battle of Diamond Hill went into his own -country near the Magaliesberg and was now lurking in the -Zwartruggens.</p> -<p>French, after his unhappy cross-veld march to Heidelberg, was -placed in charge of the Johannesburg district. His passage had not -overawed the local commandos, which, like the armed men from the -teeth of Cadmus, soon sprang up out of the ground; and two attempts -made by Smith-Dorrien to coerce them failed. Hildyard, after the -departure of Buller and the dissolution of the Natal Army, was -placed in charge of an extensive district which included not only -Natal but also the S.E. corner of the Transvaal. Clery went home in -October, 1900, and was succeeded in the charge of the Natal Railway -in the Transvaal by Wynne. Lyttelton, with his Head Quarters at -Middelburg, was posted on the Delagoa Bay Railway.</p> -<p>Methuen alone of all the British leaders had an opportunity -during this period of acting against definite objectives. Early in -September he quitted Mafeking and zigzagged in the western -districts. After a minor affair at Lichtenburg he was called south, -and with the help of Settle, who sallied from Vryburg, relieved -Schweizer <span class="pagenum"><a name="page316" id= -"page316"></a>{316}</span> Reneke. His next efforts were not so -successful. A march to Rustenburg, with a view of intercepting the -wandering President of the Free State, brought him to his -destination early in October, only to find that Steyn was gone; and -subsequently he was unable to tackle Delarey effectively in the -Zwartruggens, a difficult district lying a day's march west of the -Magaliesberg. When he reached Zeerust a considerable portion of his -command was withdrawn under C. Douglas to reinforce French, and the -end of November found him again at Mafeking, too weak to work -outside his own district.</p> -<p>The Magaliesberg was patrolled by Clements and Broadwood, who -made some captures. Clements also was called on to furnish troops -for French, who lay at Johannesburg, having under his command -several mobile columns as well as the garrisons on the Klerksdorp -railway and elsewhere.</p> -<p>Paget, who since August had been operating north of Pretoria, -made an attempt in the direction of Rustenburg to cut off Steyn, -but was no more successful than Methuen. His next divagation was to -Eerstefabriken, a few miles east of Pretoria, whence he was ordered -away to see to B. Viljoen, who was harassing the Delagoa Bay -Railway, and whom, without assistance from Lyttelton, he shifted -from a strong position at Rhenoster Kop in an affair which has been -termed the last orthodox pitched battle of the campaign.</p> -<hr /> -<p>Such, in brief, was the position in the Transvaal when Lord -Kitchener, after a flying visit to Bloemfontein for the purpose of -co-ordinating the activities against De Wet, returned to Pretoria -on December 11, 1900. It would have offered greater difficulties to -a man who was a soldier first and an organizer afterwards than it -did to the successor of Lord Roberts. It may be likened to an -archipelago in a stormy sea infested by pirates who, though -powerless to take possession of any of the islands, made -communication between them always dangerous and sometimes -impossible.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page317" id= -"page317"></a>{317}</span> -<p><a href="#fig-magaliesberg">Map, p. 240.</a></p> -<p>Lord Kitchener's coming difficulties were heralded less than a -week after the departure of Lord Roberts by the loss of a large -convoy which was proceeding to Rustenburg, and for which Delarey, -who was always to be found where weak detachments came his way, was -waiting. Ten days later Clements suffered a disaster. He was based -on Krugersdorp, but his command had been weakened and his transport -was deficient. He received orders to act in the Hekpoort Valley, -while Broadwood acted north of the Magaliesberg. When he reached -Noitgedacht Nek he found Delarey a few miles away. At his urgent -request a small portion of the troops which had been taken from him -was restored, with a few wagons; but they left Krugersdorp too late -to be of service.</p> -<p>Clements was under the impression that he had only Delarey to -deal with, and was unaware that Beyers was on his way to carry out -the orders he had received from Botha. The withdrawal of Paget to -Eerstefabriken cleared his front, and he marched on to the -Magaliesberg. His movements were not unnoticed by the Intelligence, -which, however, failed to notify them to Clements, who on December -11 was in presence of two Boer leaders, whose united forces were -twice as strong as his own. Unknown to him they had met at -Boschfontein near the southern approach to Breedt's Nek; for when a -commando was reported to be at hand, he did not doubt that it was -Delarey's force only.</p> -<p>Noitgedacht was tactically an unsound position which Clements, -assuming that his right was safe, had taken up in order to maintain -heliographic communication with Broadwood on the other side of the -Magaliesberg. The range rises more than a thousand feet above the -camp selected by Clements and is accessible only by a rough track. -The ground on either side of the Nek was occupied by pickets posted -there mainly for signalling purposes. These posts, however, were -helpless if attacked, as they were not only widely scattered, but -could not be reinforced <span class="pagenum"><a name="page318" id= -"page318"></a>{318}</span> from the main body in the valley below. -Thus they were little or no protection to the camp.</p> -<p>In the direction from which an attack might be expected -Clements' camp, which lay at the foot of the Nek, was protected by -a low ridge jutting out from the main range and ending in a -detached kopje. This ridge was held by mounted infantry. Another -detached kopje, called Yeomanry Hill, was occupied towards the -S.E.</p> -<p>Delarey's general idea for the day's operation was simple: an -advance by himself along the low ground upon the camp, coincident -with an advance by Beyers on the other side of the range. Shortly -before sunrise on December 13 Delarey endeavoured to rush the -mounted infantry posts on the ridge, which in anticipation of an -attack had been strengthened on the previous evening. Their -vigorous resistance foiled the enterprise and Delarey was driven -off.</p> -<p>Soon, however, the sound of firing on the heights showed that -the Northumberland Fusilier posts on each side of the Nek were in -action. They had been attacked by Beyers, but fortunately not as -had been intended by Delarey simultaneously with his own attack -upon the ridge; otherwise it is probable that it would have been -successful. After a desperate struggle, in which the Fusiliers lost -heavily, they were overpowered, and Beyers was in possession of the -high ground overlooking the camp. An attempt made by Clements to -recover the Nek failed. Beyers' burghers came plunging down like a -cascade and broke upon the camp itself.</p> -<p>Clements anticipated that Delarey would soon return to the -charge and ordered a retirement, which was effected under cover of -the artillery and a rearguard of mounted infantry. Shortly before -noon he formed up on Yeomanry Hill. Delarey renewed his attack, but -met with such sturdy resistance that his men could not be induced -to push it home. In the course of the afternoon Clements withdrew -towards Rietfontein, having lost in killed, wounded and prisoners -more than two-thirds of his <span class="pagenum"><a name="page319" -id="page319"></a>{319}</span> 1,500 men. An orderly retreat was -effected, and the column, which had been surprised by Beyers and -had seen its camp in the possession of the enemy, brought away, in -the presence of superior numbers, all its ten guns.</p> -<a name="fig-noitgadecht" id="fig-noitgadecht"></a> -<div class="figcenter" style="width:50%;"><a href= -"images/image20.png"><img width="100%" src="images/image20.png" -alt="Noitgedacht Nek" /></a></div> -<p>Broadwood on the other side of the range, to communicate with -whom Clements had taken up an unsound position at Noitgedacht Nek, -lost touch with him, and like many a British officer before him in -South Africa, was groping in the Fog of War. Two days previously he -had heard that Beyers was approaching, and he knew that Delarey was -not far off; yet in his ignorance of the situation he allowed -Beyers to wriggle in between him and Clements and to meet Delarey. -At the time when Clements was defending himself against the -combined attack of the two Boer leaders, Broadwood was seven miles -away, placidly patching a field telegraph cable; <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page320" id="page320"></a>{320}</span> and when -at noon he discovered that Clements was in action he made no -attempt to create a diversion.</p> -<p>It would be inequitable to surcharge the Noitgedacht -misadventure and other "regrettable incidents" to any individual: -they should rather be surcharged, not to this or that responsible -commander, but to irresponsible Human Nature. The British Army was, -to a great extent, stale and veld-sick. It was informed that the -war would soon be over, and it had become slack and careless. -Convoys were sent afield with insufficient escorts to run the -gauntlet of ever watchful and alert Boer commandants; Intelligence -news qualified by the reports of untrustworthy native spies was -transmitted circumferentially from column to column, with the -result that the leader to whom it was of the most importance was -sometimes the last to receive it; the scouting and patrol work was -casual and rash. It is, however, but just to say that when the -occasion called for it, the fighting qualities of the British -soldier showed no signs of deterioration.</p> -<p>The Boers, after their habit, were content with the tactical -victory at Noitgedacht and refrained from endeavouring to improve -upon it. French and Clements took the field without delay, and -although they failed in their plan to pin Delarey and Beyers on to -the wall of the Magaliesberg, the Boer leaders were compelled to -separate. Their brilliant and brief co-operation did much to awake -the British nation out of its torpor. There was no longer any talk -of reducing the Army of occupation by one-half at the end of the -year, and still more during the New Year; or of quenching the -smouldering embers of the war with Baden-Powell's new South African -Constabulary.</p> -<p>Late in December the pursuit of Delarey, who had retired from -Noitgedacht towards the S.W., was resumed. At Ventersdorp he and -his 700 men, after eluding a ponderous force of nearly 6,000 men -with 40 guns, doubled back; and soon the same columns -unsuccessfully encountered <span class="pagenum"><a name="page321" -id="page321"></a>{321}</span> him at Cyferfontein, where he -ambushed a mounted detachment and then disappeared.</p> -<p>Beyers, who went into the west after he was wrenched apart from -Delarey, soon reappeared upon the stage in the Hekpoort Valley with -1,200 men. His position was precarious. In front of him was Paget, -who had been sent round to intercept him; while pressing on his -heels was a newly-formed mounted force under Babington, 2,000 -strong. He extricated himself cleverly by brushing past Paget and -advancing boldly in what was apparently the line of greatest -resistance.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-magaliesberg">Map, p. 240.</a></p> -<p>No one but a Boer leader with a supreme contempt for his enemy -would have thought of placing himself within striking distance of -Pretoria and Johannesburg. Yet on January 11, 1901, he audaciously -laagered within a few miles of Johannesburg, unknown to the -garrison. Next day he crossed the railway at Kaalfontein, half-way -between the two cities, and disappeared in the Eastern Transvaal. -That at this stage of the war it was possible for 1,200 men to cut -the railway, and with scarcely the loss of a man to cross it, with -guns and a long train of wagons, midway between the two chief -cities of the Transvaal, showed how much still remained to be -done.</p> -<p>The disturbances in the Orange River Colony brought about -certain changes and redistributions in the Transvaal commands, by -which leaders were, as in the circuits of Wesleyan ministers, -removed from spheres familiar to them. Clements went to Pretoria in -succession to Tucker, who was sent to Bloemfontein; E. Knox, who, -fifteen months previously, had been in command of the squadrons of -the 18th Hussars which were not made prisoners of war at Talana, -took command of the column of Broadwood, who was sent across the -Vaal; Cunningham succeeded Clements in the Magaliesberg district; -Hart quitted Klerksdorp for the Orange River Colony; and French -went away into the west.</p> -<p>On the Boer side a new name which was destined often -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page322" id= -"page322"></a>{322}</span> to be on men's lips emerged from the -crowd in January, 1901. A young lawyer named J.C. Smuts, who had -received his legal education in England, and whom Delarey entrusted -with a command, soon showed, and not for the first time, that a -shrewd, resourceful, energetic and determined civilian was, at -least in <i>guerilla</i>, more than a match for highly trained -British officers.</p> -<p>A movement towards the south by Cunningham, with a view of -checking Delarey, soon brought Cunningham into trouble. After -crossing the Magaliesberg he was entangled by the Transvaal leader, -and had to be extricated by Babington before he could proceed to -his destination at Krugersdorp.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-orange">Map, p. 292.</a></p> -<p>Smuts, the new leader, went to the Gatsrand. His first exploit -was to snap up a weak and isolated British detachment at -Modderfontein Nek, and to establish his own commando on the -position. When Cunningham reached Krugersdorp he received orders to -tackle Smuts. On February 2, having an overwhelming superiority in -guns and a considerable advantage in numbers, he attacked Smuts; -but the apprentice tactician had little difficulty in meeting the -regulation frontal holding attack combined with a turning movement, -and Cunningham withdrew.</p> -<p>In the Western Transvaal there were now three Boer leaders to be -dealt with: Smuts in the Gatsrand, Delarey in the Zwartruggens, and -Kemp. The latter had come down from the north with Beyers and had -been with him when the line was crossed at Kaalfontein. He had -lately returned to his own district of Krugersdorp. With Botha -threatening in the east and De Wet raiding in the south, few troops -could be spared to help the columns on the spot; but two additional -columns, under the command of Shekleton and Benson, and composed -mainly of details, were assembled by Lord Kitchener. One of these -went astray, but the other joined Cunningham and advanced against -Smuts in the Gatsrand, only to find that he had escaped at first -towards the south, and <span class="pagenum"><a name="page323" id= -"page323"></a>{323}</span> had then changed direction and had -vanished in the N.W.</p> -<p>Methuen, who towards the end of November, 1900, had gone south -from Mafeking in order to deal with apprehended trouble in -Griqualand West, pushed up from the S.W. corner of the Transvaal -and on February 18, 1901, came upon Delarey, who had escaped from -Babington and had reinforced a gathering of weak commandos near -Hartebeestfontein. Although outnumbered by more than 4 to 3, -Methuen without much difficulty compelled Delarey to withdraw, and -went on to Klerksdorp. Smuts reappeared and with Delarey made off -to the N.W., the sanctuary to which each of them had in turn -repaired. Methuen was sent south to Hoopstad in the Orange River -Colony. He had hardly started when news came in that an isolated -garrison seventy miles away in the N.W. was threatened.</p> -<p>Delarey had a definite objective in view when he disappeared, -his native town of Lichtenburg. The place was one of many for which -Methuen, with an attenuated force, was responsible; and now he had -been called away to a town in trouble in the opposite direction. -Two columns nearer at hand were called upon to relieve Lichtenburg, -but in the meantime it had relieved itself; for although Delarey -succeeded in winning a footing within it, the obstinate resistance -which he encountered disheartened him, and he withdrew on March 4 -after twenty-four hours' fighting.</p> -<p>The next three weeks were occupied in the pursuit of Delarey by -two columns under Shekleton and Babington, at first in directions -which he had not taken. They started westward from Ventersdorp, not -conceiving it possible that, after the repulse at Lichtenburg, he -would have the audacity to throw himself across their left front in -an attempt to reach Klerksdorp. When the news that he had actually -done so reached them they changed direction southwards, Delarey -opening outwards to let them pass through towards Wolmaranstad, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page324" id= -"page324"></a>{324}</span> whither the Intelligence had in -imagination waybilled him. The British columns, unaware that he was -on either side of them, and still under the impression that he was -on their front towards the south, passed on and halted at -Hartebeestfontein, when a reconnoitring party sent out northwards -discovered that he was in rear of the columns.</p> -<p>The reconnoitring party had much difficulty in saving itself, as -it was charged by mounted Boers in mass, a tactical movement which -hitherto had not been tried by the enemy. Babington at once -reversed the line of his march, and on March 24 came up with -Delarey at Wildfontein, midway between Ventersdorp and Lichtenburg. -Delarey was moving heavily and was compelled to jettison his guns -and his transport. These were picked up by Babington, who, however, -was not able to continue the pursuit and returned to -Ventersdorp.</p> -<p>The loss did not disconcert Delarey. He retired with Kemp to a -position close to his lair in the Zwartruggens, where, however, he -did not long remain. At the same time, he sent Smuts to the -Hartebeestfontein district, out of which he had just been driven. -The audacity of the act was justified, for Smuts maintained himself -against Babington during the whole of April.</p> -<p>Early in May a determined effort was made to clear the district. -Methuen after he had relieved Hoopstad was recalled to Mafeking, -and then went to Lichtenburg. The British force on the -Magaliesberg, commanded first by Clements, then by Cunningham, and -now by Dixon, was ordered to operate from the north, while a strong -column under Ingouville-Williams was prepared at Klerksdorp. Thus -each angle of the disturbed area was held by troops ready to -converge; and within it were Babington's columns. Delarey was -believed to be at Hartebeestfontein; but neither he nor any other -Boers could be found there when the troops entered it on May 6. The -Boer leaders had, as usual, adopted their <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page325" id="page325"></a>{325}</span> usual -strategy of spreading false reports, and of dispersing their -commandos as soon as they were hard pressed. On the British side -the subsequent operations were conducted without method. The -columns, having effected little, were recalled to their bases; and -the middle of May, 1901, saw Delarey, Kemp, and J.C. Smuts still at -large.</p> -<hr /> -<p>The first offensive action taken by Botha after he came down -from Pietersburg in November, 1900, was against Hildyard's posts in -the angle adjoining Natal. His movements against the garrisons of -Vryheid and other places in December failed, and he returned to the -Central Transvaal in order to co-operate with B. Viljoen in -worrying the Delagoa Bay Railway, on which Lyttelton's<a id= -"footnotetag57" name="footnotetag57"></a><a href= -"#footnote57"><sup>57</sup></a> force was strung out. Viljoen had -already made a daring and successful raid on Helvetia, from which -he brought away not only prisoners of war but also a heavy gun; -although the town was by no means isolated, being one of a line of -posts running from Belfast and Machadodorp to Lydenburg.</p> -<p>The exploit encouraged Botha to plan a general attack, in -co-operation with Viljoen, on a section of the railway each side of -Belfast. It was made on January 7, 1901. The chief effort was -against Belfast, where Smith-Dorrien was in command of a garrison -too weak for effective resistance. Viljoen advancing from the north -met with some preliminary success, but a fog prevented co-operation -between him and Botha and the attack failed. The attacks on the -other posts on the railway were repelled without much difficulty. -The recrudescence of Botha, the intrusion of Beyers from the west, -the hovering presence of Viljoen north of the Delagoa Bay Railway, -and the rumour that an invasion <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page326" id="page326"></a>{326}</span> of Natal was in -contemplation to synchronize with raids beyond the Orange by De -Wet, Kritzinger, and Hertzog, determined Lord Kitchener to try to -sweep up and reduce the Eastern Transvaal.</p> -<p>A force of five columns under the command of French was -assembled a few miles east of the Elandsfontein-Pretoria Railway -and began its advance on January 28. The general idea was that it -should gradually extend its front, like the cone of dispersion of a -shrapnel shell, between the diverging Natal and Delagoa Bay -Railways, and then sweep eastward towards the Swaziland and -Zululand borders; upon which Botha's commandos, if not already -crushed by an enveloping movement on Ermelo, would be finally -impaled. To assist French when he had traversed about one-half of -the area, three columns were detailed to march southwards from the -Delagoa Bay Railway on Ermelo. One of these columns was, however, -sent away at the last moment under Paget to take part in the -operations against De Wet in the Cape Colony. The combined strength -of the seven columns against Botha was about 20,000 men, the -majority of the combatants being mounted. A break back by Beyers -and Kemp, who rejoined Delarey, was the opening incident of -French's advance.</p> -<p>The first objective of French's movement was the town of Ermelo, -where Botha was acting as a sort of rearguard to cover the retreat -of the fugitive burghers, who with their families and their stuff -were endeavouring to escape from the Khakis. His contemplated -attack on Natal was, at least for the time being, impracticable; -and he set himself to the task of inflicting what damage he could -on the threatening columns. He ascertained that Smith-Dorrien's -column was approaching Lake Chrissie on February 5, and that the -other column operating from the Delagoa Bay Railway under W. -Campbell, was too far away to give it effectual support. The gap -left by the withdrawal of Paget had not been filled up.</p> -<p>When Smith-Dorrien reached the Lake, Botha had <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page327" id="page327"></a>{327}</span> already -started to meet him. Early in the morning of February 6 the British -Camp was attacked, but although the attempt was furthered by a -stampede of Smith-Dorrien's horses, Botha failed. He was compelled -to draw off, but with the greater portion of his burghers wriggled -round to the rear of the columns.<a id="footnotetag58" name= -"footnotetag58"></a><a href="#footnote58"><sup>58</sup></a> Thus -when French reached Ermelo he found that he had nothing to strike -at. The Boer commandos had passed away. After a short halt he -changed direction half right, and projected his front on to a -cross-veld line reaching from the Swaziland border to Amersfort; -then bringing round his right he formed up his seven columns on -February 18 along the Swaziland border, with an eastward front of -nearly forty miles extending southwards from Amsterdam. Dartnell -was on the right of the line and Smith-Dorrien on the left.</p> -<p>Most of the fugitive commandos had, however, retired into the -S.E. corner of the Transvaal; a movement which Hildyard, who was in -charge of the district as well as of the whole of Natal, was not -strong enough to check. French was now based on Natal for supplies, -and arrangements had been made that two large convoys should be -sent to him by way of Utrecht. Bad roads, bad weather, and -submerged drifts impeded the progress of the painful trains, the -first of which did not reach him until March 2, ten days after it -was due. Meanwhile he subsisted on dwindled rations and on what he -could pick up on the veld.</p> -<p>When, owing to a change in the routes by which he was supplied, -French was able towards the end of March to operate actively, he -endeavoured to isolate the S.E. corner of the Transvaal by -disposing his force in two lines. One line ran from Piet Retief to -Vryheid and acted as the driving force, and the other ran from Piet -Retief along the Swaziland border and acted as the <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page328" id="page328"></a>{328}</span> stopping -force. Within the angle enclosed by these lines were commandos -under Grobler of Vryheid, Emmett, and other leaders; but all of -them wriggled out with insignificant losses. The line along the -Swaziland border was rendered immobile by difficulties of supply, -and the driving line was exhausted. The closing incident of -French's ten weeks' campaign, the chief harvest of which was the -capture, surrender, wounding, or killing of 1,300 Boers, the -seizure of a considerable amount of ammunition, and the taking of -eleven guns, was the return of Smith-Dorrien to the Delagoa Bay -Railway in the middle of April.</p> -<p>Botha's projected invasion of Natal had indeed been frustrated -and postponed, but he and all the other Boer leaders had escaped, -unscathed and undismayed. French's ponderous columns had trudged -painfully across the veld from Springs almost into Zululand, and -had left things much as they were at the beginning of February.</p> -<p>During the early months of the year 1901 Viljoen for the most -part contented himself with frequent attacks on the Delagoa Bay -Railway, and a vigorous effort to restrain his activity was not -practicable. In March Lord Kitchener formulated a plan for the -subjugation of the Northern Transvaal. His plan was to send a -column with secrecy and dispatch to Pietersburg, which would be -occupied as a base from which the column would work southwards -along the line of the Olifant's River, in co-operation with columns -acting northwards from the Delagoa Bay Railway.</p> -<p>The force selected to proceed to Pietersburg was Plumer's -Australian column, which sixteen days after it desisted from the -chase of De Wet in the Orange River Colony was marching northwards -out of Pretoria. Plumer entered Pietersburg on April 8 without -opposition, Beyers, who had been falling back before him from -Warmbaths, having evacuated the town. Plumer halted for a few days -in order to secure the railway and <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page329" id="page329"></a>{329}</span> to make arrangements for -carrying out his orders to hold the line of the Olifant's River. -Before the end of the month he was in possession of all the drifts -from Commissie Drift downwards, and denied them to Viljoen.</p> -<p>The country in which Viljoen was acting is hilly and intricate, -and Lord Kitchener, by borrowing Sir Bindon Blood from the Indian -Government, an officer of great experience in frontier -<i>guerilla</i>, paid Viljoen and the Boer commandos the compliment -of crediting them with the military qualities of the dangerous, -predatory, and enterprising hill tribes of the underfeatures of the -Himalayas. To Blood were given six columns which were to work from -Lydenburg and the Delagoa Bay Railway.</p> -<p>Viljoen was near Ros Senekal. He had three lines of retreat, -northward or southward along the Steelpoort River, or down the -Blood River. Blood's columns were disposed with the object of -closing these exits. The Transvaal Government, which for some -months had been sojourning in security at Paardeplatz, fled and -joined Botha near Ermelo; but Viljoen stood fast.</p> -<p>The total force under Blood exceeded 10,000 men. Three columns -under Beatson, Benson, and Pulteney, who had joined from Vryheid -where he had been serving under French's command, advanced -northwards from the Delagoa Bay Railway. On their right front they -were supported by three columns acting from Lydenburg, under Park, -W. Douglas, and W. Kitchener. Douglas was the only leader destined -to encounter Viljoen, who on April 10 struck at him near -Dullstroom, but was handsomely beaten and compelled to return to -the place from which he came. He was hedged in on all sides; mutiny -and disaffection were rife among his burghers; and he saw that -there was nothing to be done but make his escape as best he -could.</p> -<p>He was headed off by Benson in an attempt to get away up the -Steelpoort Valley, where next day 100 Boers gave themselves up to -Blood. He next tried the <span class="pagenum"><a name="page330" -id="page330"></a>{330}</span> Blood River, and passing down the -valley crossed the Olifant on April 22, almost within sight of -Beatson, who was watching the drifts. A few days later he crossed -the railway and joined Botha at Ermelo. Early in May the active -operations north of the Delagoa Bay Railway ceased. As in French's -campaign, so also in Blood's, the results were chiefly negative. A -glut of live stock was rounded up, a considerable amount of -ammunition and all the guns known to be in the district were taken, -and 1,100 Boers either surrendered or were made prisoners. The -columns were withdrawn, as troops were in request in the districts -lately driven by French; and Plumer, who had had no opportunity of -engaging actively in the movement, was recalled. He was succeeded -at Pietersburg by Grenfell.</p> -<p>At the end of May Dixon set out westwards from Naauwpoort in the -Magaliesberg district on a raiding expedition. He trekked for three -days and then ran unexpectedly into a Boer column at Vlakfontein. -He was attacked through a veil of smoke from a grass fire which the -slim enemy had lit to windward. In spite of this disadvantage he -held his own and compelled the Boers to retire, but soon, however, -found it advisable to retire himself and returned to -Naauwpoort.</p> -<p>The column which had engaged Dixon was under the command of -Kemp, whom the Intelligence had after the Hartebeestfontein -operations despatched in imagination with Delarey to the south, -where they were reported to be concentrating. Kemp, however, had -returned to the Zwartruggens. After the Vlakfontein affair he found -columns approaching him from all sides and dissolved his command. -Delarey had gone south, and was now in the Orange River Colony.</p> -<p>The northward retreat of De Wet through the Orange River Colony -in March, 1901, drew in its trail a host of British columns, which -plodded sturdily across the veld with scanty results. He -endeavoured to systematize <span class="pagenum"><a name="page331" -id="page331"></a>{331}</span> <i>guerilla</i> by parcelling out the -late Free State into districts under commandants acting locally: -Lord Kitchener retorted by parcelling it out into a smaller number -of districts, each district being in charge of a general officer -armed with columns with which to worry the local commandants. Many -divagations ensued; few profitable results were attained.</p> -<p>Of these divagations the most conspicuous was a visit paid by -Rundle to the Brandwater Basin, wherein the enemy was reported to -be once more concentrated. There were, in fact, less than 1,000 -burghers within the Basin, but these pressed severely on him when, -at the end of May, he made his exit through the Golden Gate with -one prisoner of war.</p> -<p>Exigencies elsewhere compelled Lord Kitchener to allow the Cape -Colony, to a great extent, to take care of itself. Some troops were -sent down, but they were insufficient to control the disaffection -which was active in the midland districts. Kritzinger remained in -the Cape Colony; paying, however, a brief visit to the Orange River -Colony in April.</p> -<p>Early in June Delarey, De Wet, and Steyn met at Reitz, for the -purpose of considering a communication lately received from the -Transvaal Government, suggesting that overtures should be made to -Lord Kitchener. To this Steyn had already returned an unfavourable -answer; but he distrusted the wavering and wandering Transvaal -Government, and he was desirous of obtaining the support of -Delarey, whom he knew to be the most stalwart and implacable of the -Transvaal leaders. It was arranged that Steyn, Delarey, and De Wet -should go north and meet Botha at Ermelo.</p> -<p>Meanwhile Elliott, who was in charge of one of the districts -parcelled out by Lord Kitchener in the Orange River Colony, was -engaged in a drive from Vrede to Kroonstad. On June 6 he sent on a -weak column under Sladen to capture a Boer convoy near Reitz. It -was taken without trouble, but the news soon reached <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page332" id="page332"></a>{332}</span> the -triumvirate in camp not far off and they determined to make an -effort to recapture it. A small commando was quickly mustered and -Delarey and De Wet attacked Sladen, who after several hours' hard -fighting was relieved by another column from Elliott's force. The -prize was retained, but Delarey and De Wet got away. They waited -until Elliott had passed by, and then made for the north with -Steyn, crossing into the Transvaal near Standerton.</p> -<p>Meanwhile the Transvaal Government which they had gone to meet -had been again sent on its journeyings. The effects of French's -drive had soon passed away, and Lord Kitchener found it necessary -to resume active operations in the Eastern Transvaal, the chief -object of which was the capture of the Transvaal Government. It was -hustled out of the Ermelo district and pushed down towards Piet -Retief, from which it returned to Ermelo in the middle of June. Its -drooping spirits were revived by an affair at Wilmansrust, where a -wandering Australian column was overwhelmed by a commando under -Muller which was lurking in the district. On June 20 Steyn, -Delarey, and De Wet met the Transvaal Government in a Council of -War near Standerton.</p> -<p>The allies at once determined to continue the war. Lord -Kitchener had permitted a communication to be sent to ex-President -Kruger asking his advice. Kruger's reply, as might have been -anticipated, was in favour of continuing the war. In his -comfortable sanctuary in Holland he had nothing to lose by urging -those whom he had left behind to carry on the struggle. In view of -the tentacles with which Great Britain was grasping South Africa -and of the general situation, the decision of the Council of War -was a morally courageous act. There was in it, moreover, a special -as well as a general idea. Particular attention was to be given to -the cultivation of the numerous germs of mischief in the Cape -Colony, and this part of the plan was entrusted to the brilliant -young lawyer, J.C. Smuts, who returned with Delarey to the Western -Transvaal.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page333" id= -"page333"></a>{333}</span> -<p>An almost complete reconstruction of the Free State Government -was rendered necessary by an episode which occurred soon after -Steyn's return to his own country. When he and his colleagues -crossed the Vaal they found Elliott again engaged on a drive. On -the night of July 10 they were surprised at Reitz by Broadwood, who -had joined Elliott's command, and all except Steyn were captured. -De Wet was away, otherwise it is improbable that a man of such -infinity of resource and strength of will would have allowed his -friends to be taken tamely in their slumbers.</p> -<hr /> -<p>The task set to Smuts was, to all appearance, impossible of -fulfilment. Not only had he to collect a sufficient force in the -Gatsrand under the eyes of British columns, but he had also to -conduct it through the whole length of the Orange River Colony, and -run the gauntlet of Elliott, C. Knox, Rundle, and Bruce Hamilton. -By the middle of July he had recruited 340 burghers, who travelled -south in four parties with British columns at their heels and -mustered near Hoopstad on August 1.</p> -<p>Here they entered the precincts of the area into which Lord -Kitchener was endeavouring in one grand drive to sweep the Boer -remnants of the S.W. Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. Elliott -was wheeling round from Reitz through Vredefort and Klerksdorp and -advancing on the line of the Modder River, behind which stood Bruce -Hamilton.<a id="footnotetag59" name="footnotetag59"></a><a href= -"#footnote59"><sup>59</sup></a> A considerable amount of transport -and live stock was taken; also 500 Boers, among whom Smuts and his -commando were not.</p> -<p>He had succeeded on August 3 in wriggling by night through -Elliott's driving line and was now in rear of it. He now divided -his force into two commandos, one of which, under Van der Venter, -made for the south by way of Brandfort. With the other he boldly -trailed behind Elliott and followed him to the -Bloemfontein-Jacobsdal <span class="pagenum"><a name="page334" id= -"page334"></a>{334}</span> line of Constabulary posts, through -which he passed without injury. He then found himself entangled in -Bruce Hamilton's columns, and although he succeeded in reaching -Springfontein, he was soon forced to retreat nearly seventy miles -in the direction of Bloemfontein. Nothing daunted, he made another -dash for the south, and having evaded two pursuing columns entered -Zastron on August 27, where he found Van der Venter waiting for -him. His daring and adventurous ride ranks as one of the most -notable personal exploits of the war. He had not only cut Elliott's -line from front to rear, but had afterwards enfranchised himself -amid the swarm of Bruce Hamilton's columns. The lawyer Smuts was -the De Wet of the Transvaal.</p> -<p>Kritzinger after fifteen weeks' activity in the Cape Colony had -returned to Zastron a few days before Smuts' arrival. His incursion -into the Colony in May occurred at an opportune moment, for the -local rebels were being severely worried. He made at first for the -Zuurberg, but being soon expelled from it and from the adjacent -mountainous district north of Sterkstroom, circled back to the -Orange and snapped up Jamestown. He now flung his grenades on all -sides. One rebel leader reached the Transkei districts; others -prowled between Graaff Reinet and the Capetown Railway. Kritzinger -himself captured a small British detachment near Maraisburg.</p> -<p>As in February when Lyttelton was brought down, so again in July -the situation in the Cape Colony was sufficiently serious to call -for outside assistance. French was sent down from the Transvaal; -Lord Kitchener himself came to Middelburg. The measures concerted -between them, a series of northward drives by the operation of -which the rebels would be plastered against the railways, which -were rapidly blockhoused for the purpose, met with indifferent -success. The disaffected midland districts were swept, but the -leaders escaped. Kritzinger crossed the Orange in August, and at -Zastron <span class="pagenum"><a name="page335" id= -"page335"></a>{335}</span> awaited the arrival of J.C. Smuts with -new schemes for mischief.</p> -<p>The presence of these leaders attracted columns from several -quarters and they were betimes theoretically surrounded. -Kritzinger, however, refused to consider himself surrounded and -even worked freely in co-operation with Brand: nor had J.C. Smuts -any intention of resigning his commission. He crossed the Orange on -September 3. A fortnight later, Kritzinger and Brand parted -company. Kritzinger marched on the Orange, and near a drift of that -river pounced upon and overwhelmed a weak detail of the force under -Hart, who was acting as warden of the Cape Colony marches. Brand -made for the Bloemfontein-Thabanchu line of posts, which was the -sport of every Boer leader who chose to hack at it, and which -recently had scarcely impeded the progress of Van der Venter to the -south for an hour. On September 19, near Sannah's Post, he ambushed -and destroyed a party of mounted infantry engaged in raiding a -farm. Two guns and nearly 100 prisoners of war were taken by -Brand.</p> -<p>Smuts' arrival in the Cape Colony, like Kritzinger's four months -before, stimulated a waning cause. Lotter, who had escaped French's -drives, had just been taken; the other rebel leaders were isolated -and comparatively innocuous. Fresh hopes were kindled, activities -were renewed, when it was noised among the rebel bands that Smuts -the Transvaaler had swooped down like an eagle from the north.</p> -<p>These hopes were not delusive. Smuts made for the south, pursued -by some of French's columns. Near Tarkastad on September 17 he -ambushed and overwhelmed a detachment of regular cavalry and won a -footing in the midlands, where rebellion again raised its head from -the ground.</p> -<p>Smuts noticed and encouraged the promising movement and returned -to the Zuurberg, out of which, however, he was soon hustled. He -went away to join a rebel <span class="pagenum"><a name="page336" -id="page336"></a>{336}</span> leader named Scheepers, who had been -working freely 200 miles away to the S.W. in the districts -bordering the sea. Scheepers, however, was taken prisoner near -Prince Albert Road Station on the Capetown Railway before Smuts -reached him; but Smuts continued his movement. Smuts had entrusted -the inflammatory work in the midlands to local leaders before he -left the district, and now set himself to trespass beyond the -furthest point reached by Scheepers, and to make a bold entry into -the extreme S.W. corner of the Cape Colony. Early in November he -penetrated into the Ceres district, where he was less than 100 -miles in a direct line from Capetown. He had brilliantly performed -the task set to him by Botha and Steyn at Standerton in June. He -had been in contact with and had evaded the majority of the units -of Lord Kitchener's widely disseminated army at one time or another -during his ride of 1,100 miles, and in fourteen weeks had passed -from the Gatsrand in the Transvaal to within a few days' march of -Capetown.</p> -<p>Meanwhile Lord Kitchener was doing his best to deal with the -accruing winter discontent. He had a plan of his own; and he was -also furnished with a plan that had been drawn up by the civilian -authorities in Downing Street and South Africa, who thought that -the walls of Jericho would fall to the sound of a Proclamation. In -August, 1901, a legal document was served on the Boers, much in the -same way that a writ is served upon a debtor. In it they were -declared to be helpless and incapable of carrying on the struggle, -and their leaders were threatened with perpetual banishment. It had -little effect on the enemy, except to brace him up for further -efforts; and Lord Kitchener, it is believed, had no faith in -it.</p> -<p>Lord Kitchener's plan was the extension across the veld of the -system of blockhouse lines which at first ran only along the -railways, and the formation of pens or enclaves into which the -attenuated roving bands of Boers were to be herded and dealt with -severally and <span class="pagenum"><a name="page337" id= -"page337"></a>{337}</span> severely. The work of extension was -taken in hand in July, 1901. The Boers in the veld watched it with -the detachment and unconcern of a wild bird on the branches looking -down upon the fowler laying his snares in the field below.</p> -<p>Another drive by Elliott during August and September, this time -through the eastern districts of the Orange River Colony, affected -little. Kritzinger remained in his corner between the Orange and -the Caledon and could not be extracted from it; De Wet was still at -large. In the Transvaal the leaders were marking time. Viljoen -after the Standerton conference withdrew beyond the Delagoa Bay -Railway, but was soon driven out of the mountains. He lost heart, -handed over his command to Muller, and went down to the low veld -adjoining the Pietersburg Railway.</p> -<p>In the Western Transvaal Delarey and Kemp were alert. Kemp in -the Zwartruggens foiled an attempt to cast a net around him, and in -conjunction with Delarey attacked Methuen on the Marico River -without success on September 5. A pale of blockhouses denied them -access to the "protected area."<a id="footnotetag60" name= -"footnotetag60"></a><a href="#footnote60"><sup>60</sup></a> Muller -effected a trifling success in the middle north. Beyers in the -Pietersburg district was unable to prevent Grenfell reaching a -point but sixty miles from the Limpopo and there making prisoners -of a local commando.</p> -<p>No organized attempt was made to disturb Botha in the Ermelo -district. A column under Benson did indeed set out from the Delagoa -Bay Railway in August, but it was recalled by the alarm of a Boer -raid on the line at Bronkhorst Spruit. Benson subsequently did -useful raiding work in the Carolina district, but was not strong -enough to tackle Botha.</p> -<hr /> -<p>Botha had never abandoned the scheme of an invasion <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page338" id="page338"></a>{338}</span> of Natal -which was drawn up at the end of 1900. His first attempt to carry -it out was frustrated by French, but it was uppermost in his mind -during the winter of 1901. Early in September he left the Ermelo -district, in which Lord Kitchener had never been able to operate -effectively, and made for Piet Retief with 1,000 men. Columns, -faint yet pursuing, started from each railway, and ignorant of his -movements trudged wearily across the veld to the S.E. Botha, after -passing through the defile between the Swaziland border and the -Slangapiesberg, turned to the south, his ultimate objective being -Dundee. In the corner abutting on Zululand were commandos under -Emmett and Grobler of Vryheid.</p> -<p>Lyttelton on his return from leave took over the Natal command -from Hildyard. He disposed his columns as best he could, having -regard to the contradictory reports which reached him of Botha's -movements and intentions. The first encounter occurred on September -17 at Blood River Poort. A mounted column under Gough and Stewart -had been sent out from Dundee across the Buffalo to bring away a -convoy from Vryheid. Gough soon came into touch with a body of the -enemy. It was, he thought, only a local commando, and when he saw -it off-saddle he left Stewart in support and went out to surprise -it. The nature of the ground prevented a complete surprise, but he -partially effected it, only to be surprised himself by the sudden -charge of Botha's main body, which was supposed to be a day's march -distant. After a brief combat, in which Stewart was unable to -intervene, Gough lost the whole of his command of nearly 300 men in -killed, wounded, and prisoners, as well as three guns. Stewart -escaped to the Buffalo.</p> -<p>The crick-crack of Botha's Mausers at Blood River Poort echoed -throughout South Africa. Troops from all quarters were hurried to -the spot; search parties discovered some columns under W. Kitchener -which had lost themselves on the high veld; and so rarified was the -military atmosphere, that not only columns but <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page339" id="page339"></a>{339}</span> even -general officers were scarce. Bruce Hamilton and Clements were -brought in.</p> -<p>Botha seems to have regarded his success as unreal. He hesitated -to follow it up, and soon the Buffalo in flood effectually barred -the way to Dundee. He now proposed to enter Natal through Zululand, -below the junction of the Tugela and the Buffalo. On the point of -the angle which, at that time, the Transvaal thrust into Zululand -were two British posts, Forts Prospect and Itala. Botha was -beginning to be doubtful about the eventual success of his Natal -raid, but thought that as he was on the spot he might as well be -doing something. He therefore ordered these posts to be taken, -entrusting to his brother C. Botha the attack on Itala, and to -Emmett and Grobler the attack on Prospect. The failure of each -attack with considerable loss on September 26 made Botha reconsider -his position. There was no more thought of another campaign on the -Tugela, and he determined to retire.</p> -<p>Lyttelton's dispositions continued for some days to be directed -against the Natal raid upon which Botha was supposed to be still -engaged, and the discovery that he had abandoned it was not made -until October 1. His capture did not seem to be a very difficult -task, as his only way of escape was the Piet Retief defile by which -he had entered the district three weeks before.</p> -<p>There was, however, an intermediate barrier, the irregular -Pondwana range lying eastward of Vryheid, where he might be -arrested. Lyttelton's plan was that Clements and B. Hamilton should -press towards this barrier from the S.W., while W. Kitchener acted -as a stop on the north side of it. The range is pierced by several -neks, at one of which, lying between the main heights and the -Inyati spur, Botha was checked by Kitchener on October 2. He then -made a cast eastward to another nek and by abandoning his transport -succeeded three nights later in getting round Kitchener's left. He -easily kept Kitchener off in a rearguard action <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page340" id="page340"></a>{340}</span> and made -for Piet Retief. Neither Clements nor B. Hamilton was ever in the -running, and Kitchener was hampered by the necessity of watching -several neks along a front of twenty miles.</p> -<p>There was, however, one more barrier for Botha to cross or to -turn, the Slangapiesberg between Wakkerstroom and Piet Retief; but -it scarcely delayed him for an hour. Except one column, which was -covering the building of a blockhouse line and which he evaded -without difficulty, there was nothing to oppose him. When a column -under Plumer came upon the scene he had passed away on October 11 -through Piet Retief towards Ermelo. His movements had bewildered -his opponents, who intent on frustrating a raid on Natal, had -omitted to bar and bolt the door by which he had entered. His -capture would, in all probability, have ended the war.</p> -<p>When Botha left for the south he instructed B. Viljoen to carry -on for him; but when he joined the itinerant Transvaal Government -at Amsterdam he was disappointed to find that little or nothing had -been done in his absence, thanks chiefly to the mobile energy of -Benson, who hovered like a hawk over the terrorized laagers. -Moreover, the pale of Constabulary posts which formed the eastward -section of the great ring fence enclosing the "protected area" had -been advanced. It now ran from Greylingstad to Wilge River Station -on the Delagoa Bay Railway, and encroached upon the area in which -Botha could act with reasonable hope of success.</p> -<p>The return of Botha, however, infused some spirit into the -hustled commandos of the high veld, and he gladly accepted a -suggestion that Benson should be attacked. The Ermelo and Carolina -men who had accompanied him to Natal returned to find that their -districts had been roughly handled by Benson and were eager for -reprisals. On October 25 Botha narrowly escaped capture by two -columns which had been sent after him from Standerton.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page341" id= -"page341"></a>{341}</span> -<p>Benson left Middelburg, the base to which he returned from time -to time, on October 20, with a column 1,600 strong, to renew his -operations on the high veld. When he reached the Bethal district he -noticed ominous signs of the revived spirit. He was hampered with a -considerable transport, his supplies were dwindling, and he did not -think himself justified in risking an encounter. He therefore -decided to return to the Delagoa Bay Railway. H. Grobler of Bethal, -who had suggested to Botha the attack on Benson, was in the -vicinity with 700 burghers, and Botha himself was again in the -field.</p> -<p>Benson began to retire before sunrise on October 30. Bad weather -and Grobler pressing in rear worried the forenoon march, and ere -the midday halt had been called Botha came up with 500 men after a -forced march. While the convoy was being parked at Bakenlaagte, the -pressure on the rearguard increased, and it was forced back to a -ridge about two miles S.E. of the park. Benson came up and ordered -a second retirement of the rearguard to a position, to which the -name of Gun Hill has been given, nearer the park, and posted two -field guns on the hill.</p> -<p>Botha soon occupied the ridge, and then charged Gun Hill with -his main body under Grobler, at the same time sending parties to -attack the flanking posts. Two detachments of British infantry -stranded between the ridge and the hill were overwhelmed by the -charge. Most of the mounted sections got away to the hill, hotly -pursued by the Boers, who leaving their horses at the foot, at once -began to climb the slope. They clutched each shoulder of the hill, -swarmed up the front, and soon silenced the guns. An attempt to -bring up the teams from the reverse slope failed.</p> -<p>In less than half an hour Grobler had won Gun Hill with a loss -of 100 men. Benson was mortally wounded. The flanking posts were -too much engaged in defending themselves to be able to assist the -defenders of Gun Hill. An attempt to intervene made by a few -companies on <span class="pagenum"><a name="page342" id= -"page342"></a>{342}</span> the march to the camp where the convoy -was parked was unsuccessful. The Boers, as usual, were satisfied -with a casual tactical success, and made no effort to follow it up -strategically. They were soon driven off Gun Hill by shell fire -from the camp, but after nightfall returned to bring away the guns. -In the British casualties were 120 prisoners of war. Wools-Sampson, -who succeeded Benson in command, maintained himself for two days, -and was then relieved by columns from the south. He returned to the -Delagoa Bay Railway.</p> -<hr /> -<p>The exigences of the military situation called for the -withdrawal of most of the troops operating against Kemp and Delarey -in the Western Transvaal; and by the middle of September, 1901, -these leaders had practically but one column to evade, namely the -force formerly commanded by Dixon and now by Kekewich. He left -Naauwpoort on September 13, and after some preliminary work on the -Magaliesberg passed through Magato Nek, and with a force of less -than 1,000 men advanced into the Zwartruggens, a wild, difficult, -and confusing district admirably adapted to Boer -<i>guerilla</i>.</p> -<p>On September 29 Kekewich took up a position at Moedvil near the -right bank of the Selous River. He was compelled to place all his -westward outposts, except one double picket, on the right bank, as -the veld on the left bank was bushy and rose gradually from the -river and would have absorbed more men than he could spare for -outpost duty.</p> -<p>Delarey was accurately informed of Kekewich's movements, and it -is said had actually reconnoitred the camp unobserved a few hours -after Kekewich's arrival. He quickly formulated his plan of attack, -in which he seems to have followed, on a smaller scale, the -familiar tactics of the British leaders whom he had met in battle, -notably at Diamond Hill, but with a certain innovation of his -own.</p> -<p>He divided his force into four columns, two of which -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page343" id= -"page343"></a>{343}</span> were told off to grapple Kekewich's -flanks and command his line of retreat, and two to make a frontal -but not merely holding attack on his centre. Early in the morning -of September 30 Delarey put his columns in motion. He started with -certain points in his favour. All Kekewich's outposts save one were -on the right bank and in the vicinity of the camp, and in fact -Delarey took him by surprise. The movements of the Boer columns -were, however, not well co-ordinated. The flanking columns were not -in position when the centre columns, which do not seem to have been -challenged by the post on the left bank, reached the river and -concealed themselves in the deep bed. This might not have marred -the success of Delarey's plan if the columns in the river-bed had -not been discovered by a patrol which gave the alarm and brought -them prematurely into action.</p> -<p>The situation now resolved itself into an attempt to storm the -position. The centre columns sprang out of the river while it was -still dark, mounted the steep bank and opened fire up the slope on -to the camp on the skyline above. A stampede of the horses ensued, -but a resolute front was quickly formed and the attack was checked. -An alarm that the enemy was threatening the rear of the camp was -proved to be unfounded by a scratch gathering of details which was -hastily mustered; it then wheeled round, and picking up -reinforcements on the way charged the Boer left at the river. The -charge was irresistible, and the sun had hardly risen when -Delarey's whole line fell away.</p> -<p>No limit can be assigned to the British soldier's power of -resistance when he finds himself in a tight place, but it would -probably have gone hard with him if Delarey's tactical scheme had -been accurately carried out, and if the flanking columns, one of -which was under the command of Kemp, had been further in advance -when the centre columns were discovered. A panic among the horses -which threw the camp into confusion, supervening on an unexpected -attack while the dawn had scarcely <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page344" id="page344"></a>{344}</span> shown above the -Magaliesberg, was soon followed by a cry that the position had been -turned. Yet at that critical moment of the dark hours, when animal -courage is supposed to be at its lowest ebb, Kekewich's men never -wavered, and although they were only called upon to deal with a -blundered manoeuvre, yet it exacted from them a toll in casualties -of nearly one fourth of their strength. Kekewich was wounded, and -the loss of horses and transport pinned him to the ground until he -was relieved by a column from the south, which had marched to the -sound of the battle.</p> -<p>A few days later Kekewich went to Rustenburg, out of which he -again sallied forth on October 13 into the Zwartruggens in search -of Delarey. Methuen had already left Mafeking on the same errand. -On October 24 Delarey fell in with one of Methuen's columns on its -way to Zeerust. The column, which was impeded by wagons slowly -progressing along a bad road in a defile, was pounced upon -unexpectedly and hewn in twain; but if, as usual, the scouting was -poor the defence was excellent. After a struggle which lasted two -hours Delarey was driven off, the severed portions of the column -were re-united, and not one of the seven guns was lost.</p> -<hr /> -<p>By the end of 1901 all the precedents of European warfare had -been discredited. Tactics and strategy, as practised by the -experts, had done their best, and were now in bankruptcy. The war -had drifted into its final mechanical phase: the coercion of brute -force by brute force of higher potential. It was now mainly a -question of putting as many men as possible on horseback to ride -down the enemy. Field guns not being needed, the Royal Artillery -was formed into a corps of Mounted Rifles.</p> -<p>Ian Hamilton, who had gone home with Lord Roberts, returned to -South Africa a year later as Chief of the Staff to Lord -Kitchener.</p> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote55" name= -"footnote55"></a><b>Footnote 55:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag55">(return)</a> -<p>These posts, however, were small entrenched forts at -considerable distances apart for the protection of the road to -Basutoland, rather than blockhouses.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote56" name= -"footnote56"></a><b>Footnote 56:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag56">(return)</a> -<p>See <a href="#page326">p. 326</a>.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote57" name= -"footnote57"></a><b>Footnote 57:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag57">(return)</a> -<p>Lyttelton went to the Cape Colony in February, 1901, to direct -the operations against De Wet, and was subsequently sent into the -Orange River Colony. After a few months' leave he returned to South -Africa in September and took over Hildyard's command in Natal.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote58" name= -"footnote58"></a><b>Footnote 58:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag58">(return)</a> -<p>He was next heard of at the abortive peace conference held at -Middelburg, where he met Lord Kitchener at the end of February.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote59" name= -"footnote59"></a><b>Footnote 59:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag59">(return)</a> -<p>Bruce Hamilton succeeded Lyttelton in the Orange River Colony -when the latter went home on leave.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote60" name= -"footnote60"></a><b>Footnote 60:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag60">(return)</a> -<p>The "protected area" was a district round Pretoria and -Johannesburg which was enclosed by a ring of blockhouses and -Constabulary posts in August, 1901.</p> -</blockquote> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page345" id= -"page345"></a>{345}</span> -<h2><a name="chap17" id="chap17">CHAPTER XVII</a></h2> -<h3>The Mechanical Phase</h3> -<h3><a name="chap17-1" id="chap17-1">I. ORANGE RIVER -COLONY</a></h3> -<p>The year 1901 was drawing to its close, and the three chief Boer -leaders were still at large. Delarey was lurking in the difficult -kloofs of the Western Transvaal; Botha was on watch in the high -veld of the Eastern Transvaal, just outside the "protected area"; -and De Wet was awaiting his opportunity in the N.E. of the Orange -River Colony.</p> -<p>De Wet, who had been lying low for some months, was roused by a -certain communication from Botha as well as by action taken against -him by Lord Kitchener. A carefully devised and accurately carried -out centripetal drive of fourteen columns converging, like meridian -lines on the Pole, on a certain point ten miles N.E. of Reitz, was -abortive. When the columns reached it on November 12 they found -that the enemy had wriggled through the intervals, leaving scarcely -a burgher at the place of meeting; and while they were blankly -staring at each other, De Wet at Blijdschap, only twenty miles -away, was in conference with Steyn and discussing with him a -suggestion made by Botha that peace negotiations with Lord -Kitchener should be opened.</p> -<p>To this an answer similar to that which had been given to Botha -in May was returned. De Wet and Steyn scouted the idea of -reconciliation with the enemy. A Council of War was summoned and a -concentration of <span class="pagenum"><a name="page346" id= -"page346"></a>{346}</span> burghers ordered. By the end of November -De Wet had collected at Blijdschap a force of 1,000 men undetected -by Elliott's columns, which, having taken part in the centripetal -failure, were again on the move after a brief rest at Harrismith. -Elliott, while on the march to Kroonstad, actually brushed past De -Wet.</p> -<p>A column under Rimington then came upon the scene. He had heard -of the Council of War from a captured Boer, who probably with -intent refrained from reporting the concentration. Thus when -Rimington expected that the easy task before him was the capture of -De Wet and Steyn and the units of a Council of War, he suddenly -found himself opposed by a considerable force, a detachment of -which passed by him and attacked his train in rear. After an -encounter in which a gallant young cavalry subaltern,<a id= -"footnotetag61" name="footnotetag61"></a><a href= -"#footnote61"><sup>61</sup></a> who but a few weeks before had -joined the Inniskilling Dragoons from the Militia, laid down his -life for his country, Rimington extricated his convoy, but -refrained from attacking De Wet's main body, which was reported to -be strong.</p> -<p>Each side thereupon withdrew, Rimington to Heilbron and De Wet -to Lindley, from which he found it advisable to retire on coming -into contact with a column forming part of another Elliott drive, -the second of the series, suggested by Rimington on his return to -Heilbron. De Wet then trekked towards Bethlehem, halting at Kaffir -Kop, where, nine days later, he foiled a third Elliott drive by -promptly dispersing his burghers, who soon reassembled on a range -of hills beyond Bethlehem.</p> -<p>Elliott's units then returned to their respective bases to -refit. A column under Dartnell at Bethlehem, which had recently -been reinforced from Rundle's command by a strong detachment under -Barrington Campbell, was on the point of returning to Harrismith, -when it was informed that De Wet's re-united commandos were lying -in wait at a spruit about twenty miles out on the <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page347" id="page347"></a>{347}</span> road to -Harrismith. Dartnell marched on and maintained himself without much -difficulty when he arrived at the spruit. Campbell came up, and De -Wet's commandos withdrew without orders; but no attempt was made to -convert their retirement into a rout. Dartnell continued his march -to Harrismith.</p> -<p>After the affair at the spruit De Wet again dispersed his -burghers, with orders to hold themselves in readiness to muster at -short notice. He had not long to wait before he saw another -opportunity of employing them.</p> -<p>A small force, less than 1,000 strong, was covering, half-way -between Harrismith and Bethlehem, the construction of the main -blockhouse line to Kroonstad, under the personal superintendence of -Rundle. The force was broken up into three detachments, which were -too far apart to render each other effective support in case of a -sudden attack.</p> -<p>The strongest detachment, consisting, however, entirely of -Yeomanry, was posted on Groen Kop, three miles distant from -Rundle's Head Quarters. The position is fairly strong, and -resembles a wedge lying on the veld, with a gentle ascent from the -east to a plateau to which the normal level rises steeply on three -sides. A mile or two to the S.E. it is commanded by a higher -eminence, from which a party of Boers had already been expelled. It -was not, however, occupied, and De Wet promptly made use of it as -an observation post, for which it was admirably adapted, as it -looks down into the British position on Groen Kop. Moreover, the -customary movements for protection, such as the relief of outposts, -were carried out with such extraordinary laxity and neglect that De -Wet was soon able to acquaint himself with almost every detail of -the defence. Even the emplacements of a field gun and a pom-pom -were disclosed by shots casually fired for range-finding -purposes.</p> -<p>On Christmas Eve De Wet saw that he had before <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page348" id="page348"></a>{348}</span> him a -prey that would fall into his hands as easily as Sannah's Post or -Waterval Drift, and he resolved to clutch it at once. His burghers, -though dispersed, were within call, and a force of over 1,000 was -quickly assembled. With unerring instinct he selected the steep -N.W. corner of the Groen Kop wedge as the point of attack, -reasoning that the defenders would think themselves adequately -protected in that direction by the nature of the ground. On -Christmas morning, soon after midnight, over 1,000 Boers were in -position under the broad end of the wedge. They were not -discovered, as no patrols had been sent to watch the ground -beneath, and the sentries on the crest gave no sign.</p> -<p>The pioneers of the storming party attained the crest at 2 a.m.; -and not until then was the alarm given to the dormant camp. The -position, after a struggle which lasted but an hour and a quarter, -was captured by De Wet, who, ere the midsummer sun had risen, was -hurrying away with British prisoners of war, guns and wagons, which -neglect of the ordinary precautions by a body of unprofessional -troops had delivered into his hands.</p> -<p>At Rundle's Head Quarters, only three miles away, the sound of -the firing had attracted attention, and a weak body of Mounted -Infantry, the only mounted force at his disposal, was sent out to -see what was the matter. It was unable to intervene with effect, -and returned to report the situation.</p> -<p>The remaining detachment of Rundle's force, consisting of two -companies of slow-moving Infantry only, was still further from his -Head Quarters; but thirteen miles away in the direction of -Harrismith lay a force of Colonial Horse. When a telegram from -Rundle to summon them to the rescue miscarried, his staff-officer -galloped away in the dawn and put them on the trail of De Wet; but -he had had a long start and escaped into the hills near Bethlehem. -Here he remained for a few hours, and then went towards Reitz.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page349" id= -"page349"></a>{349}</span> -<p>During a temporary absence for the purpose of conferring with -Steyn he left his commandos in charge of Michael Prinsloo, who on -December 28 was engaged in a rearguard action with Elliott, who was -conducting yet another drive and whom he easily evaded.</p> -<p>On the last day of the year De Wet disbanded his commandos a few -miles from the spot on which he had assembled them at the end of -November. In the interval he had evaded all the Elliott drives; he -had captured a strong British post; he had marched without damage -along the sides of a triangle on which lay the towns of Reitz, -Lindley, and Bethlehem, each of which was from time to time in the -possession of his enemy; and had never been more than thirty miles -distant from the central point of the triangle. The captured guns -were sent away beyond the Wilge River under Mears.</p> -<p>No blame can be imputed to Rundle for the unsatisfactory issue -of the operations. He had little reason to suspect that any -considerable force of the enemy was in his vicinity. He was engaged -in mechanical work, the laying out of a blockhouse line. It was the -immediate task before him, and to the best of his ability he used -the untrustworthy and meagre instruments at hand. It would, -however, have been more in accordance with military principles if -he had employed his mounted troops in duties more suited to their -arm, instead of holding with them the infantry position of Groen -Kop.</p> -<p>Only a few days before, a similar misadventure had attended the -construction of the Heilbron-Vrede blockhouse line. Rimington and -Damant had hardly returned to Heilbron after Elliott's third drive -when they were ordered out beyond Frankfort, to the assistance of -the blockhouse builders, who were being worried by a commando under -Wessels, which De Wet had sent out after the Council of War. Near -the Wilge River they acted on a front too extended; and a portion -of Damant's force was deceived by the slim tricks of a party -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page350" id= -"page350"></a>{350}</span> of Boers working in cavalry formations -and many of them dressed in khaki uniforms. In order to keep up the -illusion they fired at detached parties of their own side, and in -the end Damant was overwhelmed on a hill, with a loss of nearly 90 -per cent. of casualties, before the rest of his command came up and -drove away the assailants. Rimington was too far away either to -prevent or to retrieve the disaster.</p> -<p>When the "drives" were renewed in the northeastern districts of -the Orange River Colony at the end of January, 1902, the experience -of the last few months had shown that they must be conducted on new -methods. Hitherto the typical "drive" had been a net or nets cast -too often hastily and at random, the meshes of which were large, -irregular, and easily cut. The new "drive" was a bar of steel -pushed steadily forward by simultaneous action throughout its -length, and with its ends resting on the two completed blockhouse -lines running eastward from Heilbron and Kroonstad.</p> -<p><a href="#fig-so-transvaal">Map, p. 260.</a></p> -<p>The Drive, Mark II, was inaugurated on February 3. De Wet, who -on January 10 had had a hurried interview with Steyn near Reitz, -was lying at Elandskop between Heilbron and Reitz, and again -concentrating his scattered burghers and planning an escape with -them to the south across the Kroonstad-Bethlehem blockhouse line. -Mears, on his way to rejoin De Wet, ran into a column under Byng, -to whom he lost the guns captured by De Wet at Groen Kop.</p> -<p>On February 5 a force of 9,000 men under Elliott, Rawlinson, -Byng, and Rimington formed up on a line stretching from Frankfort -to Kaffir Kop. The composition of this force showed the altered -conditions of warfare. It included very few field guns, but no less -than 2,200 horse and field gunners acting as Mounted Riflemen.</p> -<p>Next day the first impulse was given to the Bar, the blockhouse -lines north and south, as well as the <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page351" id="page351"></a>{351}</span> railway, -having been strengthened. The whereabouts of De Wet were -approximately known.</p> -<p>The first drive of the new pattern lasted three days, the -columns reaching the railway on February 8. It was so far effective -that none of the enemy broke back through the advancing line, which -was vigorously maintained in continuity of pickets by night and of -scouts by day; but De Wet was not on the roll of nearly 300 Boer -casualties. Although hampered with live stock from which his -followers refused to be parted, and in spite of two hovering -columns which were acting in support of the southern blockhouse -line, he not only broke through it owing to its want of vigilance, -but even succeeded in dragging the cattle across it after him. He -then retired as usual to the Doornberg. Other parties of Boers -broke through the northern blockhouse line; and thus the first of -the new drives ended with poor results. As soon as the trouble was -over De Wet with his followers again crossed the southern -blockhouse line and quietly returned to Elandskop, where he -dispersed them.</p> -<p>A second drive to sweep those districts which had not been -touched by the first drive was soon put in hand. It was to be -performed in two movements by two sets of columns. A force under -the Driver-in-Chief Elliott starting eastwards from Kroonstad and -the Doornberg would advance in line, resting its right first on -Lindley and then on Harrismith, in the vicinity of which it was -proposed that it should meet the other set of columns, under -Rawlinson, Byng, and Rimington. These, starting on an extended -front which ran from near Johannesburg to within a few miles of -Heilbron with their centre astride the Vaal and their right -touching the Natal Railway, would advance S.E. to near Vrede; then -wheeling to the right march southwards with their left on the -Drakensberg; finally, in conjunction with Elliott, pushing the -fugitives on to the eastern section of the Harrismith blockhouse -line. The operation <span class="pagenum"><a name="page352" id= -"page352"></a>{352}</span> may be likened to the sweep of two -brooms, one acting with a semicircular and the other with a forward -movement.</p> -<p>It was begun by Elliott, who started on February 13, and after -an abortive attempt to snap up De Wet reached Wilge River on -February 22 and awaited the arrival of the other columns; his left -being near Tafelkop.</p> -<p>Rawlinson and Byng meanwhile were advancing. On February 19 they -wheeled to the right and with their centre near Vrede were now -wholly within the Orange River Colony. The two forces were now -disposed at right angles to each other, one of the lines containing -the angle being the Wilge River, which Elliott was unable to hold -in sufficient strength as his front was widely extended. In the -vicinity of Harrismith the southern blockhouse line was reinforced -by Brook, who succeeded Rundle in the command of the district.</p> -<p>The northern blockhouse line was unable to stem the tide of -fugitives flying before Rawlinson and Byng, whose columns were now -strung out on a much wider front than that on which they had begun -their march. The advance of Elliott had also driven various Boer -details into the right angle, in which were now conglomerated not -only combatants, but women, children, stock, and transport. -Included among the fugitives from Elliott were De Wet and Steyn, -who had again come together. With Elliott at their heels, their -only chance of escape was to break through the attenuated line of -Rawlinson's columns. De Wet's good fortune did not fail him, and -with Steyn and a few hundred burghers he severed it at Langverwacht -at midnight on February 23 and was again at large. The remnant of -the commandos was left behind within the pale with their women, -children, cattle, and stuff; and these, augmented by the Harrismith -commando, were the prisoners of Elliott and Rawlinson when the -drive, in which 30,000 British troops were directly or indirectly -engaged, completed its task.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page353" id= -"page353"></a>{353}</span> -<p>Yet another drive, the third of the new series, ensued. It had, -of course, for its objective the capture of De Wet, as well as the -"tidying up" of the district, in which certain commandos, which had -not been netted in former drives, still lurked. It was composed, -like the second drive, of two sets of converging columns and -traversed the terrain of the first drive.</p> -<p>It happened that the point of convergence lay near the spot, not -far from Reitz, where De Wet and Steyn were in hiding. The -propinquity of the columns drove them out of their retreat, and -taking a circuitous route past Heilbron and thence along the left -bank of the Vaal they crossed the river near Commando Drift, and on -March 17 joined Delarey near Wolmaranstad in the Transvaal. Little -was done after the junction of the two sets of columns, and they -returned to the railway on March 11, with a stray commando in front -of them, which easily rushed the blockhouse line near Heilbron. A -portion of the troops was hastily withdrawn to deal with the crisis -in the Transvaal.</p> -<p>Hardly had the dust raised by the trampling of the third drive -settled down upon the veld when the fourth drive was in progress, -and 14,000 men on a front which stretched from one blockhouse line -to the other were plodding eastward to the Drakensberg. It was held -up for a time by two rivers in spate, the Wilge and the -Liebenberg's, and when released it trudged on to the mountain -range, where on April 5 its components were dissolved, having -disposed of less than 100 of the enemy.</p> -<p>Yet one more drive, the fifth and last of the series, was called -for. Early in May Bruce Hamilton swooped down from the Eastern -Transvaal upon the harassed land, and in co-operation with Elliott -worried it for the space of ten days. Many small parties of Boers -broke through—the last wriggle in the Orange River -Colony.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page354" id= -"page354"></a>{354}</span> -<h3><a name="chap17-2" id="chap17-2">II. EASTERN TRANSVAAL</a></h3> -<p><a href="#fig-orange">Map, p. 292.</a></p> -<p>The episode of Bakenlaagte called for vigorous measures to be -taken against Botha and the men of the high veld in the Eastern -Transvaal; and in November, 1901, a second and revised edition of -French's programme at the beginning of the year was issued.</p> -<p>The new campaign was placed in charge of Bruce Hamilton, and the -general idea, at least in its earlier movement, was the same as -that furnished to French, namely the outward sweep of columns -having for its object the rounding-up, pursuit towards the -Swaziland border, and capture of the various <i>guerilla</i> -commandos, which with the Transvaal Government in their midst -haunted the Ermelo and Bethal districts.</p> -<p>Bruce Hamilton, with 15,000 men in twelve columns, either under -his immediate command or co-operating with him, started on November -16, his immediate objective being the same as French's ten months -before, namely, Botha on the high veld. He advanced the -Constabulary posts fifteen miles, so that the line now ran between -Brugspruit and Waterval; and proceeded to carry out a movement on -Ermelo, in which he was supported on either flank by columns acting -from the Natal and Delagoa Bay Railways. Botha, however, had had -warning of his approach, and having conducted the Transvaal -Government out of the area of immediate danger and dispatched it to -its old seat at Paardeplatz, returned to deal with Bruce Hamilton, -who, on reaching Ermelo on December 3, found, as French had found -in February, that he had nothing to strike at. The Transvaal -Government had vanished, and Botha and his chief lieutenant, P. -Viljoen, instead of being on the run towards Swaziland, had broken -back and were now behind him.</p> -<p>In order to deal with them, a pause in the operations became -necessary. A series of night raids was instituted. In the first of -these Botha, who was lying twenty miles <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page355" id="page355"></a>{355}</span> west of -Ermelo, was nearly taken. He succeeded in escaping towards the -S.E., but was headed by a column under Pulteney operating from -Wakkerstroom and was forced towards the upper waters of the Vaal. -The raid upon P. Viljoen in the Bethal district was so far -successful that in it 200 of his burghers were made prisoners, and -one of the guns taken at Bakenlaagte was recovered: while he -himself not only escaped, but succeeded in putting 300 of his -followers under J. Prinsloo across the recently established -Brugspruit-Waterval line of Constabulary posts and in planting them -in the "protected area" as seeds of future mischief.</p> -<p>Bruce Hamilton now resumed the general operation eastwards with -fair success. Botha at Beginderlyn was faced by the columns -supporting the right flank of the advance, and had the -Ermelo-Standerton blockhouse line behind him. One of his -lieutenants named Britz went out and ambushed a night raid sent out -from the line on December 19 at Holland, making nearly 100 -prisoners; and a few days later he squeezed through an enveloping -movement in which he lost somewhat heavily, but he eventually -succeeded in rejoining Botha.</p> -<p>It was now necessary to drive on to Bruce Hamilton a compact -little force of over 800 burghers, which on New Year's Day, 1902, -Botha had under his command; and this task devolved upon Plumer and -the other column commanders operating from the S.E. corner of the -Transvaal. Botha was engaged at Bankkop, between Ermelo and -Amsterdam, by a strong scouting party acting in advance of the main -columns, which he was on the point of overwhelming when it was -reinforced. He escaped without difficulty, taking with him eighty -prisoners. The plan of throwing him into Bruce Hamilton's arms had -failed.</p> -<p>Bruce Hamilton returned to Ermelo, and late in January again -swept the country, with scanty results. His operations had been -successful to the extent that they finally denied the high veld to -Botha, who in February <span class="pagenum"><a name="page356" id= -"page356"></a>{356}</span> withdrew to the Vryheid district, and -secreted himself among the mountains. Bruce Hamilton was sent after -him and hunted him for a month. His next appearance was neither as -a prisoner of war nor as an opponent in battle, but as the -representative of his country on the way to attend the Peace -Conference which assembled at Pretoria on April 12.</p> -<p>P. Viljoen, as soon as Bruce Hamilton was out of the way, -discussed the situation with his followers. It was decided that he -should take action in what was apparently the direction of greatest -risk. With 400 men he burst through the line of Constabulary posts, -and on January 24 joined J. Prinsloo in the Wilge River Valley, -within the so-called "protected area." Prinsloo, even before -Viljoen's arrival, had maintained himself without difficulty; and -for some weeks after February 24, when an unsuccessful effort was -made at Klippan to crush them, they were practically left to roam -as they willed, no British troops being available to deal with them -effectively.</p> -<p>In the N.E. Transvaal B. Viljoen and Muller had been quiescent -throughout the summer. The former lay usually at Pilgrim's Rest; -the latter haunted the hilly country west and S.W. of Lydenburg; -neither leader being able to get much work out of passive and -spiritless followers. When Schalk Burger, the Acting President of -the Transvaal, and the rest of the Government were driven across -the Delagoa Bay Railway by Bruce Hamilton in December, Park, who -was in command of the solitary British force north of the line, -aided by a column from Belfast, made an unsuccessful attempt to -capture the wandering Government.</p> -<p>B. Viljoen was anxious for its safety and persuaded it to take -refuge with him at Pilgrim's Rest. It started on the journey with -him; but fortunately its courage failed it, and Viljoen was left to -return alone and to be taken prisoner near Lydenburg on January 25. -Troops were slipped at it but were evaded; and it withdrew to the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page357" id= -"page357"></a>{357}</span> west across the Olifant's River. It -maintained itself until March 12, when by leave of Lord Kitchener -it passed through Balmoral into conference with Steyn and the -remnants of the Orange Free State Government at Kroonstad and -thence to Klerksdorp.</p> -<p>In the "protected area" P. Viljoen had perforce to be left -unmolested until the end of March, when the conclusion of the third -drive in the Orange River Colony set some troops free for work -elsewhere. His commandos, about 800 strong, were discovered in -laager twenty miles east of Springs by a cavalry column under -Lawley during a night raid on April 1. After a temporary panic they -not only rallied, but drove away the attacking force and pursued it -until restrained by the intervention of another portion of Lawley's -command which had remained in camp. The incident called for -strenuous measures. During the last three weeks of April the whole -district was driven by Bruce Hamilton; at first from north to south -starting from the vicinity of Carolina, then by a counter march -from south to north through the "protected area," the latter -movement being repeated in the reverse direction. P. Viljoen was -not found in the wilderness, while his colleague Alberts escaped -with 500 burghers into the Orange River Colony, whither he was -followed by Bruce Hamilton.</p> -<h3><a name="chap17-3" id="chap17-3">III. WESTERN -TRANSVAAL</a></h3> -<p><a href="#fig-orange">Map, p. 292.</a></p> -<p>Meanwhile in the Western Transvaal Delarey had remained -undisturbed save by the building of blockhouse lines. The situation -elsewhere had not suffered active measures to be taken in the -district controlled by him, which extended from the corner between -the Vaal and the Western Railway almost to the Magaliesberg, and -for which on the British side Methuen and Kekewich were the -commanders chiefly responsible. During the earlier summer months -some small incidents <span class="pagenum"><a name="page358" id= -"page358"></a>{358}</span> occurred which were usually favourable -to the British cause.</p> -<p>In February, however, the tide of fortune turned. Delarey came -down from the north, apparently to watch his chance of intervening -on behalf of De Wet in the Orange River Colony, and heard from -Liebenberg that a convoy was on its way from Wolmaranstad to -Klerksdorp. On February 25 the convoy, which was escorted by 700 -men and two guns, was near Yzer Spruit within a day's march of its -destination, when it was ambushed in the dawn and captured by -Delarey, Kemp, and Liebenberg, who thus easily obtained what they -were most in need of, namely transport animals, guns, and -ammunition to the amount of half a million rounds.<a id= -"footnotetag62" name="footnotetag62"></a><a href= -"#footnote62"><sup>62</sup></a> The capture was effected within -hearing not only of Klerksdorp, but also of a small column on the -march from Klerksdorp to Hartebeestfontein. Kekewich, who was near -Klerksdorp, then left for Wolmaranstad and sent a column under -Grenfell in pursuit of Delarey; but the column failed to find -Delarey.</p> -<p>Methuen at Vryburg promptly set himself to work, with such tools -as he could lay his hands on, to avenge the disaster. He put -together a column of which about one-third was regular infantry -with four field guns, and the remainder samples of almost every -irregular corps that had been raised during the previous twelve -months; and he set out at the head of it to intercept Delarey, who -was reported to be making for the Marico River. He ordered Kekewich -to co-operate with him from Klerksdorp.</p> -<p>Grenfell's column was accordingly ordered to meet Methuen at -Roirantjesfontein seventeen miles south of Lichtenburg. He arrived -there on March 7; Methuen, who was delayed by the difficulty of -finding water, having reached Tweebosch on the previous day.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page359" id= -"page359"></a>{359}</span> -<p>It was now incumbent on Delarey, who was marching up from the -south with 1,100 burghers, to attack either Methuen or Grenfell -before they could join hands. He chose the former's heterogeneous -host as the easier prey, and fell first upon his rearguard soon -after he left Tweebosch at dawn on March 7, and then upon his right -flank. The mounted troops, which were promptly disposed as a -screen, failed ignominiously, the greater part of them leaving the -field in disorder. The regular infantry stood fast with the guns, -but were soon overwhelmed. Grenfell was unable to intervene, but he -strengthened Lichtenburg in case Delarey should come that way. -Delarey, however, went to the south to meet De Wet and Steyn, whom -he cheered with the news of the capture of four British field guns -and of 600 prisoners of war, among whom was Methuen, severely -wounded. Steyn remained with Delarey; De Wet returned to the Orange -River Colony.</p> -<p>Yzer Spruit and Tweebosch introduced the Drive into the Western -Transvaal. Troops from all quarters reinforced Kekewich at -Klerksdorp, and soon a force 14,000 strong was assembled there and -elsewhere. The difficulty of the task before it was enhanced by the -absence of a network of blockhouse lines, which had only been laid -out along the Schoon Spruit and thence to Lichtenburg and Mafeking, -and also along the Vaal.</p> -<p>The troops had to begin operations from a faulty strategical -base, as they were aligned along or near the Schoon Spruit -blockhouse line, and between the Boers and that line. To drive -Delarey on to it, they must rapidly place themselves west of him; -and this could be done only by a night march of mounted men darting -through his commandos and then pressing him on to the Schoon Spruit -in the opposite direction.</p> -<p>The operation, which was of spirited and ingenious conception, -was carried out on March 23. In proportion to the effort—the -force engaged in it numbered 11,000 mounted men—the results -were paltry. A few <span class="pagenum"><a name="page360" id= -"page360"></a>{360}</span> score prisoners and three guns were -taken. As in the earlier drives in the Orange River Colony, the -meshes of the net were spacious and fragile. Delarey, Kemp, and -Steyn escaped; and even Liebenberg, when about to suffer the -<i>peine forte et dure</i> upon the Schoon Spruit blockhouse line, -found a discontinuity through which he wriggled at midnight. -Delarey mustered his burghers to the number of over 2,000 on the -Hart's River.</p> -<p>To deal with the embarrassing situation the British columns were -again marched to the west, with instructions to form a line of -three entrenched camps distant one or two days' march from the -Schoon Spruit.</p> -<p>The centre column under the command of W. Kitchener having -reached its destination, made a reconnaissance in force still -further to the west on March 31. Cookson, who was in charge of the -expedition, at the end of a march of thirty-five miles, during -which he had pushed back small parties of the enemy, halted at -Boschbult, where two farms lay on the banks of the Brak River.</p> -<p>Cookson soon found himself in presence of 2,500 Boers with four -field guns, his own strength being 1,800 with the same number of -guns. The position was a bad one as the ground rose on each side of -the river; the bush offered cover to the attack, and the only cover -available to the defence was the almost dry bed of the river. He -threw out screens and proceeded to entrench and form a laager; -while the screens faced in the open the fire of the enemy under -cover in the bush on the high ground. Liebenberg made one attempt -from the south to charge the main position, but was driven back by -the southern screen which had been brought into the river bank; and -after a second unsuccessful attempt, this time from the east, -withdrew to the high ground on the north.</p> -<p>When the work at the laager at the farms, which was impeded by -artillery fire from the S.W., was sufficiently advanced, the -northern screen was withdrawn. Some <span class="pagenum"><a name= -"page361" id="page361"></a>{361}</span> confusion ensued, as the -Boers in the bush immediately fell upon it, but their attempt to -get at the main position on the river, though supported by -artillery, failed. It never attained the crisis of an assault; and -late in the afternoon it was called off by Delarey, who arrived -from his Head Quarters near Hart's River.</p> -<p>Meanwhile the sound of the action had reached the ears of W. -Kitchener, who twenty miles away was laying out his entrenched -camp. He hurried to the rescue, but the cessation of the firing and -the reports of stragglers led him to the conclusion that Cookson -had been annihilated. He reported to that effect to his brother, -Lord Kitchener, and returned to camp. Next day he again went out, -and found to his satisfaction that Cookson was still a military -asset.</p> -<p>Kekewich, meanwhile, was searching for Delarey elsewhere. He had -bespoken at Head Quarters W. Kitchener's co-operation in the quest -and was relying on it; but a column commander on trek <i>in -partibus Boerum</i> is hard to find, and no instructions reached -Kitchener.</p> -<p>The need of a General Manager on the spot to co-ordinate the -activities of the syndicate of column commanders who had so -signally failed to bring Delarey to book was now manifest; and Ian -Hamilton, who had greatly distinguished himself in two of the early -combats of the war, was now chosen to bring it to an end. On April -8 he joined Kekewich at Middelbult.</p> -<p>Ian Hamilton quickly formulated a plan of using the three -columns, 11,000 strong, of Kekewich, W. Kitchener and Rawlinson, -who had lately been in pursuit of De Wet in the Orange River -Colony, as a scythe to sweep over the country with a swing at first -grazing Hart's River, then the Vaal, and finally coming to rest at -Klerksdorp. Only four days were allotted to the movement, which -began on April 10 and called for a daily march of more than forty -miles. Delarey had been summoned to take part in the negotiations -for peace, and Kemp <span class="pagenum"><a name="page362" id= -"page362"></a>{362}</span> was in charge of the Boer commandos, -which numbered about 2,600 burghers.</p> -<p>It happened that Kekewich, whose force was detailed as the right -of the advance, bore too much to the left on the first day's march, -and found himself in rear of Rawlinson. Kemp was observing the -movement, and assumed that he had located the British right, -whereas Kekewich had partly regained his position by moving towards -Roodeval, where Kemp was hovering for a chance to fall on the rear -or the flank of Ian Hamilton's columns.</p> -<p>Kekewich reached Roodeval early on April 11, and at once pressed -forward to Hart's River. His advanced guard almost immediately -discovered a large body of mounted men on the left front, who, -until they opened fire, were by some strange misconception taken to -be a portion of Rawlinson's column. They were in fact more than a -thousand Boers under Potgieter, who as soon as he had disposed of -the advanced guard, made for the main body, which was not yet -formed up, and by which Potgieter's men were again mistaken for a -portion of Rawlinson's column. The error was discovered, but not -too late. The Boer attack, which for sheer reckless bravery could -hardly be surpassed, and which has been compared to the Dervish -charge at Omdurman, was made in the open against a considerable -force, was repelled; and Potgieter fell dead at the head of his -commandos. Rawlinson hurried up to the sound of the firing and -drove away the enemy, who retired, but not in disorder, to the -south. A remnant, however, broke back and even sniped the main -body. In less than three hours after the first shot had been fired -by Potgieter, Kekewich and Rawlinson started in pursuit. Kemp, -however, saved himself, and escaped with what was, under the -circumstances, the inconsiderable loss of the two field guns which -Delarey had taken from Methuen at Tweebosch.</p> -<p>The two Hamiltons rang down the curtain of the War <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page363" id="page363"></a>{363}</span> Tragedy. -While Bruce Hamilton was driving for the last time through the -Orange River Colony, Ian Hamilton with Kekewich, W. Kitchener, and -Rawlinson, assisted by a column from the Vaal under Rochfort, began -a westward drive in the Transvaal, with 17,000 men. Kemp followed -the usual practice of Boer commandants when hard pressed by the -enemy, and scattered his commandos; thus when Ian Hamilton's 17,000 -crossed the border and reached the Western Railway on May 11, they -found less than 400 Boers, among whom Kemp was not, impaled upon -the barrier of blockhouses and armoured trains.</p> -<h3><a name="chap17-4" id="chap17-4">IV. CAPE COLONY</a></h3> -<p>During the early part of the summer of 1901-2 the Cape Colony -was, comparatively speaking, quiet, though dormantly rebellious. -Little positive progress was made, either by French or by the -inflammatory elements opposed to him, of which the leader was J.C. -Smuts. These were for the most part acting in a spacious and -inaccessible area, which included the districts of Kenhart, -Carnarvon, Sutherland, Fraserburg, and Calvinia. A blockhouse line, -which when completed would stretch from Victoria West to Lambert's -Bay, was in course of construction through these districts.</p> -<p>In December Kritzinger headed a raid from the Orange River -Colony; but although he was soon captured near Hanover, the greater -portion of his followers escaped to the south and infested the -districts of Cradock and Somerset East. Stephenson was put in -immediate charge of the operations against Smuts, who had -established himself on the Zak River between Kenhart and Calvinia, -and who in January moved eastward. It was a false move, because it -brought him into the Fraserburg district, and made him more -accessible to the columns opposed to him. It was made apparently -with the intention of breaking across the railway in the vicinity -of Beaufort West.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page364" id= -"page364"></a>{364}</span> -<p>The operations against Smuts, the flank bases of which, Beaufort -West and Lambert's Bay, were over 300 miles apart, attained only -negative success. A large convoy drawn by donkeys fell into the -hands of the rebels between Beaufort West and Fraserburg, and a -smaller convoy in the Sutherland district.</p> -<p>French now took in hand the Drive, the last weapon left in the -British Armoury, which his colleagues in the Transvaal and the -Orange River Colony had been wielding for some months. It was -brandished northwards from Beaufort West on February 17; but it -only dispersed without destroying the rebels, most of whom had -retired to the north and N.W. Not a few scraped round the right -flank of the drive, crossed the railway, and plunged into the -Graaff Reinet and Aberdeen districts, where they were joined by a -band under Fouché, which had been lurking and conniving far -away to the N.E. between Dortrecht and Aliwal North.</p> -<p>Smuts withdrew to the N.W. and laid siege to Ookiep, which was -relieved on May 3 by an expedition sent from Capetown through Port -Nolloth; Smuts having in the meantime retired in order to attend -the Peace Conference. He had done his best to carry out the -instructions given to him by the Boer Council of War held in June, -1901, to foment a general insurrection in the Cape Colony, but he -had failed.</p> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote61" name= -"footnote61"></a><b>Footnote 61:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag61">(return)</a> -<p>L.M.O. <i>Requiescat in pace</i>.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote class="footnote"><a id="footnote62" name= -"footnote62"></a><b>Footnote 62:</b><a href= -"#footnotetag62">(return)</a> -<p>It is not easy to understand why an empty convoy on the march, -not from, but to a base of supplies, should have taken over 700 -rounds per man.</p> -</blockquote> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="page365" id= -"page365"></a>{365}</span> -<h2><a name="chap18" id="chap18">CHAPTER XVIII</a></h2> -<h3>The End</h3> -<p>Nearly two years had passed by since the negotiations for peace -between Lord Roberts and L. Botha and between Sir Redvers Buller -and C. Botha had fallen through shortly before the battle of -Diamond Hill. In February, 1901, another conference for peace was -held at Middelburg in the Transvaal between Lord Kitchener and L. -Botha, who after parleying for a fortnight, abruptly broke off the -negotiations. If, as seems probable, he was led to adopt that -course by the news of the escape of De Wet from the Cape Colony, a -historical parallel may be found in the sudden dissolution of the -Congress of Vienna, when the courier brought the news of Napoleon's -escape from Elba.</p> -<p>In January, 1902, an offer made by the Government of the -Netherlands to mediate between the combatants was declined by the -British Government. The incident of the offer was, however, -communicated to the Transvaal Government, which was then lying -north of Balmoral, and which asked for and received permission to -discuss proposals for peace with the Free State Government at -Kroonstad. Schalk Burger, the Acting President of the Transvaal, -arrived at Kroonstad on March 22. Steyn, who was with Delarey, was -sent for; De Wet was searched for, and for the first time found; -and the allied Governments, the chief members of which were, on the -one side, Schalk Burger and Delarey, and on the other De Wet and -Steyn, met in conference on April 9 at <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page366" id="page366"></a>{366}</span> -Klerksdorp, which was, at Steyn's suggestion, chosen as a more -convenient place of meeting than Kroonstad.</p> -<p>It was soon decided to open negotiations with Lord Kitchener, at -whose invitation the Governments proceeded to Pretoria, where they -met him and Lord Milner. The Boer proposals, which postulated the -continued independent existence of the two shattered Republics, -were rejected; it seemed that the war must be fought to a still -bitterer end. Finally, it was agreed that the negotiations should -be adjourned for a month, in order to allow the feelings of the -burghers at large to be ascertained, and reported at a Convention -to be held at Vereeniging on May 15. In the meantime the military -operations were to be continued, subject to the permission to be -given to the Boer leaders to go freely among and consult their -people.</p> -<p>When the Convention assembled it was found that while the -Transvaal was generally in favour of submission, the Orange River -Colony was still implacable. A compromise was effected between -them, and the heads of a treaty, of which the chief clause ensured -a qualified independence to the late Republics, under the guise of -British Protectorates, were drawn up by J.C. Smuts, who had come -from Ookiep to resume his former profession and to act as legal -adviser to his colleagues. It was submitted to Lord Kitchener at -Pretoria, who, as the delegates might have foreseen, refused to -consider it and handed to their counsel Smuts a document, in which -the Boer leaders were required, on their own behalf as well as on -their followers' behalf, to acknowledge themselves as British -subjects.</p> -<p>The negotiations at Pretoria were conducted by a deputation from -the Vereeniging Convention: Delarey, Botha, Smuts, De Wet, and -Hertzog. These did their best, and even obtained some verbal -changes of phraseology which made Lord Kitchener's terms less -unpalatable. The question of British nationality was waived for the -moment to allow of the other stipulations of the <span class= -"pagenum"><a name="page367" id="page367"></a>{367}</span> document -being discussed; and the general subject was referred to a minor -convention consisting of Lord Milner and his legal adviser on one -side, and of Smuts and Hertzog on the other.</p> -<p>A proposal for a final settlement was drawn up, which, with -certain alterations insisted on by the Colonial Office, was -presented by Lord Kitchener as his ultimatum, to be accepted within -three days by the Vereeniging Convention. Botha and his colleagues -returned to Vereeniging and laid it before the delegates. Steyn -refused to entertain it and immediately resigned his titular office -of President of the Orange Free State; De Wet, implacable almost to -the last, protested against its terms. The hopelessness of the Boer -cause in South Africa was, however, manifest. Even De Wet yielded, -and voted with the majority in favour of accepting the British -terms of peace.</p> -<p>On May 31, 1902, the Treaty of Vereeniging brought to an end the -War of 960 days.</p> -<p>FINIS</p> -<h2><a name="commanders" id="commanders">COMMANDERS OF DIVISIONS -AND BRIGADES, OCTOBER 1899-JUNE 1901</a></h2> -<p>CAVALRY.</p> -<p>DIVISION—French.</p> -<p>BRIGADES.</p> -<div class="poem"> -<div class="stanza"> -<p>1 Babington, Porter, Gordon</p> -<p>1 (Natal) Burn-Murdoch</p> -<p>2 Broadwood</p> -<p>2 (Natal) Brocklehurst</p> -<p>3 Gordon, Little</p> -<p>3 (Mounted Brigade, Natal) Dundonald</p> -<p>4 Dickson</p> -</div> -</div> -<p>MOUNTED INFANTRY BRIGADES——Alderson, Le Gallais, -Martyr, Ridley, Hutton</p> -<p>INFANTRY.<br /> -<br /> -DIVISIONS.</p> -<p>I Methuen<br /> -II Clery, Lyttelton, Clery<br /> -III Gatacre, Chermside<br /> -IV White (troops in Ladysmith), Lyttelton<br /> -V Warren, Hildyard<br /> -VI Kelly-Kenny<br /> -VII Tucker<br /> -VIII Rundle<br /> -IX Colvile<br /> -X Hunter<br /> -XI Pole-Carew<br /> -Colonial: Brabant<br /> -<br /> -BRIGADES.<br /> -<br /> -1 (Guards) Cplvile, Pole-Carew, Inigo Jones<br /> -2 Hildyard, E. Hamilton<br /> -3 (Highland) Wauchope, MacDonald<br /> -4 Lyttelton, Norcott, Cooper<br /> -5 (Irish) Hart<br /> -6 (Fusilier) Barton<br /> -7 I. Hamilton, W. Kitchener<br /> -8 Howard<br /> -9 Featherstonehaugh, Pole-Carew, C. Douglas<br /> -10 Talbot Coke<br /> -11 (Lancashire) Woodgate, Wynne, W. Kitchener, Wynne<br /> -12 Clements<br /> -13 C. Knox<br /> -14 Chermside, Maxwell<br /> -15 Wavell<br /> -16 B. Campbell<br /> -17 Boyes<br /> -18 Stephenson<br /> -19 Smith Dorrien<br /> -20 Paget<br /> -21 B. Hamilton<br /> -22 Allen<br /> -23 W. Knox</p> -<h2><a name="index" id="index">INDEX OF PERSONS AND PLACES</a></h2> -<p>(It has not been thought necessary to include in the Index names -of towns or of physical features which constantly occur in, or are -not material to the narrative; and incidental or unimportant -references and allusions have also been generally omitted.)</p> -<p>Abon's Dam, <a href="#page56">56</a>, <a href= -"#page165">165</a><br /> -Abraham's Kraal, <a href="#page187">187-190</a><br /> -Acton Holmes, <a href="#page99">99</a>, <a href= -"#page100">100</a><br /> -Airlie, Lieutenant-Colonel the Earl of, <a href= -"#page244">244</a><br /> -Alberts, <a href="#page357">357</a><br /> -Alderson, Brigadier-General E.A.H., <a href="#page202">202</a>, -<a href="#page203">203</a><br /> -America Siding, <a href="#page233">233</a><br /> -Amersfort, <a href="#page272">272</a><br /> -Amphlett, Major C.G., <a href="#page198">198-200</a></p> -<p>Babington, Major-General J.M., <a href= -"#page321">321-324</a><br /> -Baden-Powell, Major-General R.S.S., <a href="#page4">4</a>, -<a href="#page34">34</a>, <a href="#page213">213-222</a>, <a href= -"#page224">224</a>, <a href="#page273">273-277</a>, <a href= -"#page280">280-282</a>, <a href="#page320">320</a><br /> -Bakenlaagte, <a href="#page341">341</a><br /> -Balmoral, <a href="#page283">283</a>, <a href="#page284">284</a>, -<a href="#page291">291</a><br /> -Bankkop, <a href="#page355">355</a><br /> -Barberton, <a href="#page289">289</a><br /> -Barton, Major-General G. <a href="#page53">53</a>, <a href= -"#page69">69</a>, <a href="#page73">73</a>, <a href= -"#page76">76</a>, <a href="#page132">132-135</a>, <a href= -"#page294">294</a><br /> -Bastion Hill, <a href="#page100">100</a>, <a href= -"#page101">101</a><br /> -Battles, Sieges and Engagements, chief—<br /> - Alleman's Nek, <a href="#page269">269</a>, <a href= -"#page270">270</a><br /> - Belmont, <a href="#page55">55</a><br /> - Bergendal, <a href="#page286">286-288</a><br /> - Botha's Pass, <a href="#page268">268</a><br /> - Caesar's Camp, <a href="#page141">141</a>, <a href= -"#page143">143</a>, <a href="#page145">145-149</a><br /> - Colenso, <a href="#page69">69-78</a><br /> - Dewetsdorp, <a href="#page297">297</a>, <a href= -"#page298">298</a><br /> - Diamond Hill, <a href="#page241">241-245</a><br /> - Doornkop (Transvaal), <a href="#page237">237</a><br /> - Driefontein, <a href="#page189">189-191</a><br /> - Elandslaagte, <a href="#page42">42-44</a><br /> - Graspan, <a href="#page56">56</a><br /> - Kimberley, <a href="#page87">87-92</a><br /> - Ladysmith, <a href="#page140">140-155</a><br /> - Lindley, <a href="#page247">247-252</a><br /> - Lombard's Kop, <a href="#page49">49-50</a><br /> - Mafeking, <a href="#page212">212-221</a><br /> - Magersfontein, <a href="#page58">58-63</a><br /> - Modder River, <a href="#page56">56-57</a><br /> - Paardeberg, <a href="#page172">172-183</a><br /> - Pieter's Hill, <a href="#page133">133-135</a><br /> - Poplar Grove, <a href="#page185">185-188</a><br /> - Rhenoster Kop, <a href="#page316">316</a><br /> - Rietfontein, <a href="#page45">45</a><br /> - Sannah's Post, <a href="#page198">198-206</a><br /> - Six Mile Spruit, <a href="#page239">239</a><br /> - Spion Kop, <a href="#page102">102-115</a><br /> - Stormberg, <a href="#page65">65-69</a><br /> - Talana, <a href="#page39">39-41</a><br /> - Vaalkrantz, <a href="#page116">116-120</a><br /> - Wepener, <a href="#page209">209</a>, <a href= -"#page210">210</a><br /> - Zand River, <a href="#page233">233</a><br /> -Beatson, Brigadier-General S.B., <a href="#page329">329</a><br /> -Belfast, <a href="#page272">272</a>, <a href="#page285">285</a>, -<a href="#page286">286</a>, <a href="#page325">325</a><br /> -Bell's Kopje and Spruit, <a href="#page144">144</a><br /> -Benson, Colonel G.E., <a href="#page322">322</a>, <a href= -"#page329">329</a>, <a href="#page337">337</a>, <a href= -"#page340">340-342</a><br /> -Bethlehem, <a href="#page249">249</a>, <a href="#page252">252</a>, -<a href="#page256">256-258</a><br /> -Bethune, Colonel E.C., <a href="#page265">265</a>, <a href= -"#page309">309</a><br /> -Beyers, General C., <a href="#page315">315</a>, <a href= -"#page317">317-322</a>, <a href="#page325">325</a>, <a href= -"#page326">326</a>, <a href="#page328">328</a>, <a href= -"#page337">337</a><br /> -Biddulphsberg, <a href="#page252">252</a><br /> -Blijdschap, <a href="#page345">345</a>, <a href= -"#page346">346</a><br /> -Bloemfontein, surrender of, <a href="#page191">191</a><br /> -Blood, Lieutenant—General Sir B., <a href="#page329">329</a>, -<a href="#page330">330</a><br /> -Blood River Poort, <a href="#page338">338</a><br /> -Boekenhoutskloof Ridge, <a href="#page241">241</a>, <a href= -"#page242">242</a><br /> -Boesman's Kop, <a href="#page199">199-204</a><br /> -Boschbult, <a href="#page360">360</a><br /> -Boschrand (Driefontein), <a href="#page189">189</a><br /> -Boschrand (Kroonstad), <a href="#page234">234</a><br /> -Bosjespan, <a href="#page164">164</a><br /> -Botha, General C., <a href="#page254">254</a>, <a href= -"#page264">264</a>, <a href="#page266">266</a>, <a href= -"#page270">270</a>, <a href="#page272">272</a>, <a href= -"#page339">339</a>, <a href="#page365">365</a><br /> -Botha, General L., <a href="#page52">52-54</a>, <a href= -"#page70">70</a>, <a href="#page75">75</a>, <a href= -"#page78">78</a>, <a href="#page100">100</a>, <a href= -"#page112">112</a>, <a href="#page117">117-119</a>, <a href= -"#page126">126</a>, <a href="#page128">128</a>, <a href= -"#page132">132</a>, <a href="#page193">193</a>, <a href= -"#page196">196</a>, <a href="#page232">232-242</a>, <a href= -"#page245">245-247</a>, <a href="#page254">254</a>, <a href= -"#page264">264</a>, <a href="#page283">283-291</a>, <a href= -"#page314">314</a>, <a href="#page315">315</a>, <a href= -"#page322">322</a>, <a href="#page325">325-327</a>, <a href= -"#page337">337-341</a>, <a href="#page345">345</a>, <a href= -"#page354">354</a>, <a href="#page355">355</a>, <a href= -"#page365">365-367</a><br /> -Botha, P., <a href="#page232">232</a><br /> -Bothaville, <a href="#page295">295</a>, <a href="#page296">296</a>, -<a href="#page298">298</a><br /> -Brabant, Brigadier—General Sir E.Y., <a href= -"#page194">194</a>, <a href="#page206">206</a>, <a href= -"#page207">207</a>, <a href="#page209">209</a>, <a href= -"#page210">210</a>, <a href="#page230">230</a>, <a href= -"#page247">247</a>, <a href="#page252">252</a>, <a href= -"#page256">256</a><br /> -Brakfontein (Natal), <a href="#page97">97</a>, <a href= -"#page106">106</a>, <a href="#page116">116-119</a><br /> -Brakfontein (Transvaal), <a href="#page277">277</a>, <a href= -"#page278">278</a><br /> -Brak River (Cape Colony), <a href="#page305">305-307</a><br /> -Brak River (Transvaal), <a href="#page360">360</a><br /> -Brand, <a href="#page307">307</a>, <a href="#page308">308</a>, -<a href="#page335">335</a><br /> -Brandfort, <a href="#page197">197</a>, <a href="#page198">198</a>, -<a href="#page232">232</a>, <a href="#page233">233</a><br /> -Brandwater Basin, <a href="#page257">257-261</a>, <a href= -"#page271">271</a>, <a href="#page278">278</a>, <a href= -"#page280">280</a>, <a href="#page295">295</a>, <a href= -"#page331">331</a><br /> -Britz, <a href="#page355">355</a><br /> -Broadwood, Brigadier-General R.G., <a href="#page198">198-205</a>, -<a href="#page244">244</a>, <a href="#page245">245</a>, <a href= -"#page259">259</a>, <a href="#page278">278</a>, <a href= -"#page316">316</a>, <a href="#page317">317</a>, <a href= -"#page319">319</a>, <a href="#page321">321</a>, <a href= -"#page333">333</a><br /> -Brocklehurst, Major-General J.F., <a href= -"#page269">269-271</a><br /> -Brook, Major-General E.S., <a href="#page352">352</a><br /> -Buller, General Sir Redvers, <a href="#page51">51</a>, <a href= -"#page53">53-55</a>, <a href="#page69">69-79</a>, <a href= -"#page86">86</a>, <a href="#page89">89</a>, <a href= -"#page90">90</a>, <a href="#page96">96-103</a>, <a href= -"#page107">107</a>, <a href="#page112">112-127</a>, <a href= -"#page131">131-133</a>, <a href="#page136">136</a>, <a href= -"#page140">140</a>, <a href="#page152">152-155</a>, <a href= -"#page231">231</a>, <a href="#page240">240</a>, <a href= -"#page254">254</a>, <a href="#page256">256</a>, <a href= -"#page262">262-272</a>, <a href="#page284">284-291</a>, <a href= -"#page365">365</a><br /> -Bulwana, <a href="#page122">122</a>, <a href="#page123">123</a>, -<a href="#page125">125</a>, <a href="#page135">135</a>, <a href= -"#page136">136</a>, <a href="#page142">142</a>, <a href= -"#page145">145</a>, <a href="#page147">147</a>, <a href= -"#page148">148</a><br /> -Burger, Schalk, Acting President of the Transvaal, <a href= -"#page100">100</a>, <a href="#page103">103</a>, <a href= -"#page105">105</a>, <a href="#page112">112</a>, <a href= -"#page117">117</a>, <a href="#page142">142</a>, <a href= -"#page356">356</a>, <a href="#page365">365</a><br /> -Burn-Murdoch, Brigadier-General J.F., <a href="#page135">135</a>, -<a href="#page136">136</a><br /> -Byng, Colonel the Hon. J.H.G., <a href="#page350">350-352</a></p> -<p>Campbell, Colonel W.P., <a href="#page326">326</a><br /> -Campbell, Major-General B., <a href="#page346">346</a>, <a href= -"#page347">347</a><br /> -Carleton, Lieutenant-Colonel F.R.C., <a href= -"#page47">47-49</a><br /> -Carolina, <a href="#page272">272</a><br /> -Carrington, Lieutenant-General Sir F., <a href="#page274">274</a>, -<a href="#page277">277</a>, <a href="#page278">278</a>, <a href= -"#page290">290</a>, <a href="#page314">314</a><br /> -Chermside, Lieutenant-General Sir H., <a href="#page230">230</a>, -<a href="#page232">232</a><br /> -Chieveley, <a href="#page53">53</a>, <a href="#page76">76</a>, -<a href="#page97">97</a>, <a href="#page121">121</a><br /> -Chrissie, Lake, <a href="#page326">326</a><br /> -Christiana, <a href="#page226">226</a>, <a href= -"#page235">235</a><br /> -Cingolo, <a href="#page123">123</a>, <a href= -"#page124">124</a><br /> -Clements, Major-General R.A.P., <a href="#page81">81</a>, <a href= -"#page194">194</a>, <a href="#page195">195</a>, <a href= -"#page206">206</a>, <a href="#page227">227</a>, <a href= -"#page252">252</a>, <a href="#page256">256</a>, <a href= -"#page257">257</a>, <a href="#page316">316-321</a>, <a href= -"#page324">324</a>, <a href="#page339">339</a>, <a href= -"#page340">340</a><br /> -Clery, Lieutenant-General Sir C.F., <a href="#page72">72</a>, -<a href="#page77">77</a>, <a href="#page101">101</a>, <a href= -"#page103">103</a>, <a href="#page107">107</a>, <a href= -"#page113">113</a>, <a href="#page124">124</a>, <a href= -"#page143">143</a>, <a href="#page264">264</a>, <a href= -"#page267">267</a>, <a href="#page268">268</a>, <a href= -"#page270">270</a>, <a href="#page315">315</a><br /> -Clump Hill, <a href="#page132">132</a><br /> -Coke, Major-General J. Talbot, <a href="#page102">102</a>, <a href= -"#page103">103</a>, <a href="#page106">106-111</a>, <a href= -"#page113">113</a>, <a href="#page114">114</a>, <a href= -"#page127">127</a>, <a href="#page128">128</a>, <a href= -"#page269">269</a><br /> -Colenso Kopjes, <a href="#page127">127-129</a><br /> -Colesberg, <a href="#page64">64</a>, <a href="#page80">80</a>, -<a href="#page81">81</a>, <a href="#page145">145</a>, <a href= -"#page157">157</a>, <a href="#page309">309</a><br /> -Colvile, Lieutenant-General Sir H.E., <a href="#page62">62</a>, -<a href="#page63">63</a>, <a href="#page166">166</a>, <a href= -"#page167">167</a>, <a href="#page170">170</a>, <a href= -"#page171">171</a>, <a href="#page175">175</a>, <a href= -"#page177">177</a>, <a href="#page178">178</a>, <a href= -"#page180">180</a>, <a href="#page198">198</a>, <a href= -"#page202">202-206</a>, <a href="#page216">216</a>, <a href= -"#page232">232</a>, <a href="#page233">233</a>, <a href= -"#page247">247-253</a>, <a href="#page255">255</a>, <a href= -"#page256">256</a><br /> -Conical Hill, <a href="#page102">102</a>, <a href= -"#page105">105</a><br /> -Cookson, Colonel G.A., <a href="#page360">360</a>, <a href= -"#page361">361</a><br /> -Council of War, <i>see</i> <a href= -"#index-krijgsraad">Krijgsraad</a><br /> -Crabbe, Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre, <a href="#page309">309</a><br /> -Crofton, Colonel M., <a href="#page106">106</a>, <a href= -"#page108">108</a>, <a href="#page109">109</a>, <a href= -"#page113">113</a><br /> -Cronje, General A.P., <a href="#page46">46</a>, <a href= -"#page140">140</a>, <a href="#page167">167</a><br /> -Cronje, General A.P.J., <a href="#page163">163</a><br /> -Cronje, General P., <a href="#page56">56-58</a>, <a href= -"#page61">61</a>, <a href="#page63">63</a>, <a href= -"#page81">81</a>, <a href="#page126">126</a>, <a href= -"#page131">131</a>, <a href="#page133">133</a>, <a href= -"#page141">141</a>, <a href="#page145">145</a>, <a href= -"#page158">158-164</a>, <a href="#page166">166-175</a>, <a href= -"#page179">179</a>, <a href="#page181">181-185</a>, <a href= -"#page192">192</a>, <a href="#page193">193</a>, <a href= -"#page213">213-217</a>, <a href="#page219">219</a>, <a href= -"#page220">220</a>, <a href="#page223">223</a>, <a href= -"#page281">281</a><br /> -Cunningham, Brigadier-General G.G., <a href="#page321">321</a>, -<a href="#page322">322</a>, <a href="#page324">324</a><br /> -Cyferfontein, <a href="#page321">321</a></p> -<p>Dalgety, Colonel E.H., <a href="#page209">209</a><br /> -Damant, Lieutenant-Colonel J.H., <a href="#page349">349</a>, -<a href="#page350">350</a><br /> -Damvallei, <a href="#page189">189</a><br /> -Dartnell, Brigadier-General Sir J., <a href="#page327">327</a>, -<a href="#page346">346</a>, <a href="#page347">347</a><br /> -De Beer, <a href="#page172">172</a>, <a href="#page179">179</a>, -<a href="#page182">182</a><br /> -Delarey, General, <a href="#page55">55-58</a>, <a href= -"#page61">61</a>, <a href="#page81">81</a>, <a href= -"#page189">189</a>, <a href="#page190">190</a>, <a href= -"#page194">194</a>, <a href="#page221">221</a>, <a href= -"#page232">232</a>, <a href="#page239">239</a>, <a href= -"#page241">241</a>, <a href="#page242">242</a>, <a href= -"#page245">245</a>, <a href="#page274">274</a>, <a href= -"#page275">275</a>, <a href="#page282">282</a>, <a href= -"#page283">283</a>, <a href="#page315">315-326</a>, <a href= -"#page330">330</a>, <a href="#page332">332</a>, <a href= -"#page337">337</a>, <a href="#page342">342-345</a>, <a href= -"#page353">353</a>, <a href="#page357">357-362</a>, <a href= -"#page365">365</a>, <a href="#page366">366</a><br /> -De Lisle, Colonel H. de B., <a href="#page245">245</a><br /> -De Wet, General C., <a href="#page47">47</a>, <a href= -"#page151">151</a>, <a href="#page152">152</a>, <a href= -"#page162">162</a>, <a href="#page163">163</a>, <a href= -"#page167">167</a>, <a href="#page168">168</a>, <a href= -"#page170">170</a>, <a href="#page171">171</a>, <a href= -"#page173">173</a>, <a href="#page178">178-182</a>, <a href= -"#page185">185-191</a>, <a href="#page198">198</a>, <a href= -"#page200">200-204</a>, <a href="#page207">207-211</a>, <a href= -"#page232">232</a>, <a href="#page241">241</a>, <a href= -"#page247">247</a>, <a href="#page252">252-256</a>, <a href= -"#page258">258</a>, <a href="#page259">259</a>, <a href= -"#page274">274</a>, <a href="#page278">278-282</a>, <a href= -"#page294">294-310</a>, <a href="#page322">322</a>, <a href= -"#page330">330</a>, <a href="#page332">332</a>, <a href= -"#page337">337</a>, <a href="#page345">345-353</a>, <a href= -"#page358">358</a>, <a href="#page359">359</a>, <a href= -"#page365">365-367</a><br /> -De Wet, General P., <a href="#page188">188</a>, <a href= -"#page198">198</a>, <a href="#page199">199</a>, <a href= -"#page202">202-204</a>, <a href="#page230">230</a>, <a href= -"#page254">254</a><br /> -Dickson, Major-General J.B., <a href="#page242">242</a><br /> -Dixon, Brigadier-General H.G., <a href="#page324">324</a>, <a href= -"#page330">330</a>, <a href="#page342">342</a><br /> -Donkerhoek Range, <a href="#page241">241</a>, <a href= -"#page245">245</a><br /> -Donkerpoort, <a href="#page245">245</a><br /> -Doornberg, <a href="#page297">297</a>, <a href="#page302">302</a>, -<a href="#page303">303</a>, <a href="#page305">305</a>, <a href= -"#page310">310</a>, <a href="#page351">351</a><br /> -Doornkop Natal, <a href="#page97">97</a>, <a href= -"#page119">119</a><br /> -Doornkop Spruit, <a href="#page74">74</a><br /> -Douglas, Lieutenant-Colonel W., <a href="#page329">329</a><br /> -Douglas, Major-General C.W., <a href="#page316">316</a><br /> -Drifts—<br /> - Bosman's, <a href="#page57">57</a><br /> - Botha's, <a href="#page309">309</a><br /> - Brandvallei, <a href="#page169">169</a><br /> - Bridle, <a href="#page74">74</a><br /> - Brown's, <a href="#page56">56</a>, <a href= -"#page61">61</a>, <a href="#page161">161</a>, <a href= -"#page164">164</a><br /> - Commando, <a href="#page353">353</a><br /> - Commissie, <a href="#page329">329</a><br /> - De Kiel's, <a href="#page162">162</a>, <a href= -"#page163">163</a>, <a href="#page166">166</a><br /> - East, <a href="#page74">74</a><br /> - Jager's, <a href="#page39">39</a><br /> - Klip, <a href="#page163">163</a>, <a href= -"#page164">164</a>, <a href="#page166">166</a>, <a href= -"#page168">168</a>, <a href="#page169">169</a>, <a href= -"#page171">171</a>, <a href="#page174">174</a>, <a href= -"#page192">192</a><br /> - Klip Kraal, <a href="#page163">163</a>, <a href= -"#page164">164</a>, <a href="#page169">169</a>, <a href= -"#page171">171</a><br /> - Koedoesberg, <a href="#page159">159</a>, <a href= -"#page167">167</a><br /> - Koodoos, <a href="#page171">171</a>, <a href= -"#page173">173</a>, <a href="#page179">179</a><br /> - Makow's, <a href="#page307">307</a><br /> - Munger's, <a href="#page117">117</a>, <a href= -"#page118">118</a><br /> - Oertel's, <a href="#page190">190</a><br /> - Old Viljoen's, <a href="#page235">235</a><br /> - Paardeberg, <a href="#page169">169-171</a>, <a href= -"#page173">173</a>, <a href="#page176">176</a>, <a href= -"#page178">178</a><br /> - Potgieter's, <a href="#page54">54</a>, <a href= -"#page55">55</a>, <a href="#page96">96</a>, <a href= -"#page97">97</a>, <a href="#page99">99</a>, <a href= -"#page103">103</a>, <a href="#page106">106</a>, <a href= -"#page108">108</a>, <a href="#page116">116</a>, <a href= -"#page121">121</a>, <a href="#page146">146</a>, <a href= -"#page151">151</a><br /> - Rondeval, <a href="#page163">163</a><br /> - Schoeman's, <a href="#page278">278</a>, <a href= -"#page279">279</a>, <a href="#page294">294</a><br /> - Trickhardt's, <a href="#page97">97</a>, <a href= -"#page99">99-102</a><br /> - Vanderberg's, <a href="#page176">176</a><br /> - Vendutie, <a href="#page169">169</a>, <a href= -"#page171">171-173</a>, <a href="#page178">178</a>, <a href= -"#page180">180</a>, <a href="#page184">184</a>, <a href= -"#page192">192</a><br /> - Viljoen's, <a href="#page236">236</a><br /> - Waterval (near Koffyfontein), <a href="#page91">91</a>, -<a href="#page132">132</a>, <a href="#page162">162</a>, <a href= -"#page166">166</a>, <a href="#page167">167</a>, <a href= -"#page171">171</a>, <a href="#page179">179</a><br /> - Waterval (near Sannah's Post), <a href= -"#page204">204</a>, <a href="#page205">205</a><br /> - Wegdraai, <a href="#page166">166</a>, <a href= -"#page167">167</a><br /> - West, <a href="#page74">74</a><br /> - Wonderwater, <a href="#page235">235</a><br /> - Zand, <a href="#page304">304</a>, <a href= -"#page305">305</a>, <a href="#page308">308</a>, <a href= -"#page309">309</a><br /> -Du Cane, Lieutenant-Colonel H.J., <a href="#page191">191</a><br /> -Dullstroom, <a href="#page329">329</a><br /> -Dundee, <a href="#page37">37</a>, <a href="#page39">39</a><br /> -Dundonald, Major-General the Earl of, <a href="#page76">76</a>, -<a href="#page99">99-101</a>, <a href="#page109">109</a>, <a href= -"#page123">123-125</a>, <a href="#page135">135</a>, <a href= -"#page153">153</a>, <a href="#page154">154</a>, <a href= -"#page265">265</a>, <a href="#page266">266</a>, <a href= -"#page268">268</a>, <a href="#page269">269</a>, <a href= -"#page271">271</a><br /> -Du Plooy, <a href="#page64">64</a><br /> -Dwarsvlei, <a href="#page276">276</a></p> -<p>Elandsfontein, <a href="#page237">237</a><br /> -Elandskop, <a href="#page350">350</a>, <a href= -"#page351">351</a><br /> -Elliott, Major-General E. Locke, <a href="#page331">331-334</a>, -<a href="#page337">337</a>, <a href="#page346">346</a>, <a href= -"#page349">349-353</a><br /> -Eloff, <a href="#page219">219</a>, <a href="#page220">220</a><br /> -Emmett, <a href="#page328">328</a>, <a href="#page338">338</a>, -<a href="#page339">339</a><br /> -Ermelo, <a href="#page272">272</a>, <a href="#page326">326</a>, -<a href="#page327">327</a>, <a href="#page330">330</a>, <a href= -"#page332">332</a>, <a href="#page354">354</a><br /> -Erasmus, <a href="#page40">40-42</a><br /> -Estcourt, <a href="#page52">52</a>, <a href="#page53">53</a>, -<a href="#page79">79</a></p> -<p>Faber's Put, <a href="#page228">228</a><br /> -Fairview, <a href="#page100">100</a>, <a href= -"#page102">102</a><br /> -Ferreira, <a href="#page165">165</a>, <a href="#page172">172</a>, -<a href="#page173">173</a><br /> -Florida, <a href="#page237">237</a><br /> -Forestier-Walker, Lieutenant-General Sir F., <a href= -"#page63">63</a><br /> -Fort Itala, <a href="#page339">339</a><br /> -Fort Prospect, <a href="#page339">339</a><br /> -Fort Wyllie, <a href="#page73">73</a>, <a href="#page76">76</a>, -<a href="#page77">77</a><br /> -Fouché, <a href="#page364">364</a><br /> -Fourie, <a href="#page100">100</a>, <a href="#page307">307</a>, -<a href="#page308">308</a><br /> -Frankfort, <a href="#page234">234</a><br /> -Fredrikstad, <a href="#page294">294</a>, <a href= -"#page298">298</a><br /> -French, Lieutenant-General Sir J.D., <a href="#page48">48-50</a>, -<a href="#page52">52</a>, <a href="#page64">64</a>, <a href= -"#page65">65</a>, <a href="#page80">80</a>, <a href= -"#page91">91</a>, <a href="#page141">141</a>, <a href= -"#page157">157-159</a>, <a href="#page162">162-168</a>, <a href= -"#page171">171</a>, <a href="#page172">172</a>, <a href= -"#page182">182</a>, <a href="#page183">183</a>, <a href= -"#page186">186</a>, <a href="#page187">187</a>, <a href= -"#page189">189-192</a>, <a href="#page195">195</a>, <a href= -"#page197">197</a>, <a href="#page198">198</a>, <a href= -"#page205">205</a>, <a href="#page230">230</a>, <a href= -"#page232">232-239</a>, <a href="#page242">242</a>, <a href= -"#page245">245</a>, <a href="#page272">272</a>, <a href= -"#page277">277</a>, <a href="#page283">283-291</a>, <a href= -"#page313">313</a>, <a href="#page315">315</a>, <a href= -"#page320">320</a>, <a href="#page321">321</a>, <a href= -"#page326">326-328</a>, <a href="#page334">334</a>, <a href= -"#page364">364</a><br /> -Frere, <a href="#page53">53</a>, <a href="#page76">76</a>, <a href= -"#page96">96</a><br /> -Froeneman, <a href="#page304">304</a><br /> -Fuzzy Hill, <a href="#page132">132</a></p> -<p>Gansvlei Spruit, <a href="#page269">269</a><br /> -Gatacre, Lieutenant-General Sir W., <a href="#page52">52</a>, -<a href="#page55">55</a>, <a href="#page64">64-68</a>, <a href= -"#page80">80</a>, <a href="#page81">81</a>, <a href= -"#page157">157</a>, <a href="#page194">194</a>, <a href= -"#page195">195</a>, <a href="#page206">206-208</a>, <a href= -"#page216">216</a>, <a href="#page230">230</a>, <a href= -"#page251">251</a>, <a href="#page257">257</a>, <a href= -"#page262">262</a><br /> -Gatsrand, <a href="#page279">279</a>, <a href="#page322">322</a>, -<a href="#page333">333</a>, <a href="#page336">336</a><br /> -Glencoe, <a href="#page42">42</a>, <a href="#page44">44</a>, -<a href="#page136">136</a><br /> -Gordon, Brigadier-General J.R.P., <a href="#page179">179</a>, -<a href="#page244">244</a><br /> -Gough, Major H. de la P., <a href="#page338">338</a><br /> -Green Hill (near Colenso), <a href="#page123">123-125</a><br /> -Green Hill (near Spion Kop), <a href="#page100">100</a>, <a href= -"#page105">105</a><br /> -Green Hill (near Vaalkrantz), <a href="#page116">116</a>, <a href= -"#page119">119</a>, <a href="#page120">120</a><br /> -Grenfell, Lieutenant-Colonel H.M., <a href="#page330">330</a>, -<a href="#page337">337</a>, <a href="#page358">358</a>, <a href= -"#page359">359</a><br /> -Grimwood, Colonel G.G., <a href="#page48">48</a>, <a href= -"#page49">49</a><br /> -Grobelaar Slopes, <a href="#page128">128</a>, <a href= -"#page129">129</a><br /> -Grobler, E.R., <a href="#page68">68</a>, <a href="#page69">69</a>, -<a href="#page195">195</a><br /> -Grobler, F.A. (Marico), <a href="#page222">222</a><br /> -Grobler, H. (Bethal), <a href="#page341">341</a><br /> -Grobler of Vryheid, <a href="#page328">328</a>, <a href= -"#page338">338</a>, <a href="#page339">339</a><br /> -Grobler of Waterberg, <a href="#page274">274</a>, <a href= -"#page276">276</a>, <a href="#page282">282</a>, <a href= -"#page284">284</a><br /> -Groen Kop, <a href="#page347">347-350</a><br /> -Gun Hill (Bakenlaagte), <a href="#page341">341</a><br /> -Gun Hill (near Ladysmith), <a href="#page143">143</a><br /> -Gun Hill (near Paardeberg), <a href="#page177">177</a></p> -<p>Haasbroek, <a href="#page261">261</a><br /> -Hamilton, Lieutenant-General Sir Ian, <a href="#page43">43</a>, -<a href="#page44">44</a>, <a href="#page49">49</a>, <a href= -"#page147">147</a>, <a href="#page149">149</a>, <a href= -"#page231">231-240</a>, <a href="#page242">242-245</a>, <a href= -"#page247">247</a>, <a href="#page256">256</a>, <a href= -"#page276">276-278</a>, <a href="#page280">280</a>, <a href= -"#page284">284</a>, <a href="#page285">285</a>, <a href= -"#page288">288</a>, <a href="#page290">290</a>, <a href= -"#page344">344</a>, <a href="#page361">361-363</a><br /> -Hamilton, Major-General Bruce, <a href="#page244">244</a>, <a href= -"#page245">245</a>, <a href="#page302">302-304</a>, <a href= -"#page307">307</a>, <a href="#page333">333</a>, <a href= -"#page334">334</a>, <a href="#page339">339</a>, <a href= -"#page353">353-357</a>, <a href="#page363">363</a><br /> -Hamilton, Brigadier-General E., <a href="#page269">269</a><br /> -Hannay, Colonel O.E., <a href="#page162">162</a>, <a href= -"#page174">174-177</a><br /> -Hartebeestfontein, <a href="#page323">323</a>, <a href= -"#page324">324</a>, <a href="#page330">330</a>, <a href= -"#page358">358</a><br /> -Hart, Major-General A.F. <a href="#page71">71-75</a>, <a href= -"#page78">78</a>, <a href="#page99">99</a>, <a href= -"#page101">101</a>, <a href="#page120">120</a>, <a href= -"#page129">129-132</a>, <a href="#page135">135</a>, <a href= -"#page210">210</a>, <a href="#page230">230</a>, <a href= -"#page321">321</a>, <a href="#page335">335</a><br /> -Hart's Hill, <a href="#page129">129</a>, <a href= -"#page130">130</a>, <a href="#page132">132-135</a><br /> -Hart's Loop, <a href="#page127">127</a><br /> -Hattingh, <a href="#page261">261</a><br /> -Heilbron Road Station, <a href="#page253">253</a><br /> -Hekpoort Valley, <a href="#page317">317</a>, <a href= -"#page321">321</a><br /> -Helvetia (Transvaal), <a href="#page287">287</a>, <a href= -"#page325">325</a><br /> -Hertzog, General, <a href="#page299">299-301</a>, <a href= -"#page303">303-308</a>, <a href="#page315">315</a>, <a href= -"#page326">326</a>, <a href="#page366">366</a>, <a href= -"#page367">367</a><br /> -Hickman, Colonel T.E., <a href="#page308">308</a>, <a href= -"#page309">309</a><br /> -Highlands, <a href="#page53">53</a><br /> -Hildyard, Lieutenant-General Sir H., <a href="#page52">52</a>, -<a href="#page53">53</a>, <a href="#page71">71-73</a>, <a href= -"#page75">75</a>, <a href="#page76">76</a>, <a href= -"#page120">120</a>, <a href="#page264">264</a>, <a href= -"#page265">265</a>, <a href="#page268">268</a>, <a href= -"#page270">270</a>, <a href="#page315">315</a>, <a href= -"#page325">325</a>, <a href="#page327">327</a>, <a href= -"#page338">338</a><br /> -Hill, Colonel A.W., <a href="#page109">109-111</a><br /> -Hlangwhane, <a href="#page69">69-71</a>, <a href="#page76">76</a>, -<a href="#page96">96</a>, <a href="#page120">120</a>, <a href= -"#page122">122</a>, <a href="#page123">123</a>, <a href= -"#page125">125-127</a>, <a href="#page131">131-133</a><br /> -Holdsworth, Lieutenant-Colonel G.L., <a href= -"#page223">223</a><br /> -Holland, <a href="#page355">355</a><br /> -Hoopstad, <a href="#page323">323</a>, <a href= -"#page324">324</a><br /> -Hore, Lieutenant-Colonel C.O., <a href="#page214">214</a><br /> -Horseshoe Hill, <a href="#page125">125</a>, <a href= -"#page129">129</a>, <a href="#page131">131</a><br /> -Houtnek, <a href="#page230">230</a>, <a href= -"#page232">232</a><br /> -Hughes-Hallett, Colonel J.W., <a href="#page62">62</a>, <a href= -"#page63">63</a><br /> -Hunter, Lieutenant-General Sir A., <a href="#page225">225</a>, -<a href="#page226">226</a>, <a href="#page231">231</a>, <a href= -"#page232">232</a>, <a href="#page256">256-261</a><br /> -Hunter-Weston, Lieutenant-Colonel A.G., <a href="#page191">191</a>, -<a href="#page234">234</a>, <a href="#page239">239</a><br /> -Hussar Hill, <a href="#page123">123</a>, <a href= -"#page124">124</a><br /> -Hutton, Major-General Sir E., <a href="#page283">283</a>, <a href= -"#page284">284</a></p> -<p>Impati, <a href="#page40">40-42</a><br /> -Ingouville-Williams, Lieutenant-Colonel E.C., <a href= -"#page324">324</a><br /> -Inkwelo, <a href="#page267">267</a><br /> -Inkweloane, <a href="#page267">267</a>, <a href= -"#page268">268</a></p> -<p>Jacobsdaal, <a href="#page56">56-58</a>, <a href= -"#page163">163</a>, <a href="#page168">168</a>, <a href= -"#page170">170</a>, <a href="#page171">171</a>, <a href= -"#page173">173</a>, <a href="#page179">179</a>, <a href= -"#page181">181</a>, <a href="#page183">183</a><br /> -Johannesburg, Surrender of, <a href="#page239">239</a><br /> -Joubert, General P., <a href="#page38">38</a>, <a href= -"#page49">49</a>, <a href="#page53">53</a>, <a href= -"#page54">54</a>, <a href="#page69">69</a>, <a href= -"#page105">105</a>, <a href="#page117">117</a>, <a href= -"#page118">118</a>, <a href="#page135">135</a>, <a href= -"#page140">140</a>, <a href="#page142">142</a>, <a href= -"#page143">143</a>, <a href="#page145">145</a>, <a href= -"#page185">185</a>, <a href="#page193">193</a>, <a href= -"#page194">194</a>, <a href="#page196">196</a></p> -<p>Kaalfontein, <a href="#page321">321</a>, <a href= -"#page322">322</a><br /> -Kaffir Kop, <a href="#page346">346</a>, <a href= -"#page350">350</a><br /> -Kainguba Hill (Nicholson's Nek), <a href="#page47">47</a>, <a href= -"#page49">49</a><br /> -Kameelfontein Ridge and Valley, <a href="#page241">241</a>, -<a href="#page242">242</a><br /> -Kanya, <a href="#page224">224</a><br /> -Karee Siding, <a href="#page197">197</a>, <a href= -"#page198">198</a>, <a href="#page205">205</a>, <a href= -"#page232">232</a><br /> -Kekewich, Colonel R.G., <a href="#page86">86</a>, <a href= -"#page87">87</a>, <a href="#page89">89-91</a>, <a href= -"#page215">215</a>, <a href="#page342">342-344</a>, <a href= -"#page357">357-359</a>, <a href="#page361">361-363</a><br /> -Kelly-Kenny, Lieutenant-General T., <a href="#page81">81</a>, -<a href="#page158">158</a>, <a href="#page159">159</a>, <a href= -"#page166">166</a>, <a href="#page168">168-171</a>, <a href= -"#page173">173-178</a>, <a href="#page180">180</a>, <a href= -"#page181">181</a>, <a href="#page186">186</a>, <a href= -"#page187">187</a>, <a href="#page190">190</a>, <a href= -"#page232">232</a>, <a href="#page254">254</a><br /> -Kemp, <a href="#page322">322</a>, <a href="#page324">324-326</a>, -<a href="#page330">330</a>, <a href="#page337">337</a>, <a href= -"#page342">342</a>, <a href="#page343">343</a>, <a href= -"#page358">358</a>, <a href="#page360">360-363</a><br /> -Kissieberg, <a href="#page66">66-69</a><br /> -Kitchener, General Lord, <a href="#page156">156</a>, <a href= -"#page160">160</a>, <a href="#page166">166</a>, <a href= -"#page170">170</a>, <a href="#page171">171</a>, <a href= -"#page173">173-178</a>, <a href="#page180">180</a>, <a href= -"#page181">181</a>, <a href="#page183">183</a>, <a href= -"#page184">184</a>, <a href="#page188">188</a>, <a href= -"#page194">194</a>, <a href="#page227">227</a>, <a href= -"#page229">229</a>, <a href="#page241">241</a>, <a href= -"#page246">246</a>, <a href="#page247">247</a>, <a href= -"#page254">254</a>, <a href="#page255">255</a>, <a href= -"#page278">278-280</a>, <a href="#page292">292</a>, <a href= -"#page298">298</a>, <a href="#page299">299</a>, <a href= -"#page306">306</a>, <a href="#page312">312</a>, <a href= -"#page316">316</a>, <a href="#page326">326</a>, <a href= -"#page328">328</a>, <a href="#page331">331-334</a>, <a href= -"#page336">336</a>, <a href="#page345">345</a>, <a href= -"#page365">365-367</a><br /> -Kitchener, Major-General W., <a href="#page132">132-134</a>, -<a href="#page329">329</a>, <a href="#page338">338</a>, <a href= -"#page339">339</a>, <a href="#page360">360</a>, <a href= -"#page361">361</a>, <a href="#page363">363</a><br /> -Kitchener's Kopje, <a href="#page178">178-182</a>, <a href= -"#page185">185</a><br /> -Kleinfontein Ridge, <a href="#page244">244</a><br /> -Klipfontein, <a href="#page237">237</a><br /> -Klippan, <a href="#page356">356</a><br /> -Klip River, <a href="#page123">123</a>, <a href="#page125">125</a>, -<a href="#page150">150</a><br /> -Knox, Colonel E.C., <a href="#page321">321</a><br /> -Knox, Major-General C., <a href="#page168">168</a>, <a href= -"#page177">177</a>, <a href="#page254">254</a>, <a href= -"#page294">294</a>, <a href="#page295">295</a>, <a href= -"#page297">297-299</a>, <a href="#page302">302-306</a>, <a href= -"#page333">333</a><br /> -Knox, Major-General W., <a href="#page49">49</a><br /> -Kock, <a href="#page42">42</a><br /> -Koetzee, <a href="#page289">289</a>, <a href= -"#page290">290</a><br /> -Koffyfontein, <a href="#page162">162</a>, <a href= -"#page179">179</a><br /> -Korn Spruit, <a href="#page199">199</a>, <a href= -"#page200">200</a>, <a href="#page202">202</a>, <a href= -"#page203">203</a>, <a href="#page207">207</a><br /> -<a name="index-krijgsraad" id="index-krijgsraad">Krijgsraad</a>, -<a href="#page143">143</a>, <a href="#page188">188</a>, <a href= -"#page194">194</a>, <a href="#page196">196-198</a>, <a href= -"#page207">207</a>, <a href="#page209">209</a>, <a href= -"#page210">210</a>, <a href="#page240">240</a>, <a href= -"#page258">258</a>, <a href="#page260">260</a>, <a href= -"#page332">332</a>, <a href="#page345">345</a>, <a href= -"#page346">346</a>, <a href="#page349">349</a>, <a href= -"#page364">364</a><br /> -Kritzinger, <a href="#page299">299-301</a>, <a href= -"#page303">303-305</a>, <a href="#page315">315</a>, <a href= -"#page326">326</a>, <a href="#page331">331</a>, <a href= -"#page334">334</a>, <a href="#page335">335</a>, <a href= -"#page337">337</a>, <a href="#page363">363</a><br /> -Krokodil Spruit and Hill, <a href="#page241">241</a>, <a href= -"#page242">242</a><br /> -Kroonstad, <a href="#page191">191</a>, <a href="#page234">234</a>, -<a href="#page247">247-250</a>, <a href="#page258">258</a>, -<a href="#page357">357</a>, <a href="#page365">365</a><br /> -Kruger, President Paul, <a href="#page11">11</a>, <a href= -"#page69">69</a>, <a href="#page95">95</a>, <a href= -"#page105">105</a>, <a href="#page118">118</a>, <a href= -"#page126">126</a>, <a href="#page128">128</a>, <a href= -"#page136">136</a>, <a href="#page184">184</a>, <a href= -"#page185">185</a>, <a href="#page188">188</a>, <a href= -"#page196">196</a>, <a href="#page207">207</a>, <a href= -"#page213">213</a>, <a href="#page220">220</a>, <a href= -"#page239">239-241</a>, <a href="#page289">289</a>, <a href= -"#page295">295</a>, <a href="#page314">314</a>, <a href= -"#page332">332</a></p> -<p>Lancer's Hill, <a href="#page155">155</a><br /> -Langewacht Spruit, <a href="#page125">125</a>, <a href= -"#page130">130</a>, <a href="#page132">132</a><br /> -Langvervacht, <a href="#page352">352</a><br /> -Lawley, Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. R., <a href= -"#page357">357</a><br /> -Le Gallais Kopje, <a href="#page187">187</a><br /> -Le Gallais, Lieutenant-Colonel P.W., <a href="#page197">197</a>, -<a href="#page295">295</a><br /> -Lemmer, <a href="#page195">195</a><br /> -Lennox Hill, <a href="#page39">39</a>, <a href= -"#page40">40</a><br /> -Lichtenburg, <a href="#page226">226</a>, <a href= -"#page315">315</a>, <a href="#page323">323</a><br /> -Liebenberg, <a href="#page294">294</a>, <a href="#page358">358</a>, -<a href="#page361">361</a><br /> -Liebenberg's River, <a href="#page353">353</a><br /> -Lieuw Kop, <a href="#page187">187</a><br /> -Lieuw Spruit, <a href="#page255">255</a><br /> -Limit Hill, <a href="#page144">144</a><br /> -Little Knoll, <a href="#page105">105</a>, <a href= -"#page106">106</a><br /> -Little, Colonel M.O., <a href="#page278">278</a><br /> -Long, Colonel C.J., <a href="#page73">73</a>, <a href= -"#page75">75</a>, <a href="#page77">77</a><br /> -Long Hill, <a href="#page46">46</a>, <a href="#page48">48</a>, -<a href="#page49">49</a><br /> -Lotter, <a href="#page335">335</a><br /> -Louwbaken, <a href="#page242">242</a><br /> -Lubbe, <a href="#page163">163</a>, <a href="#page164">164</a><br /> -Lydenburg, <a href="#page288">288</a><br /> -Lyttelton, Lieutenant-General the Hon. N.G., <a href= -"#page99">99</a>, <a href="#page106">106</a>, <a href= -"#page108">108</a>, <a href="#page109">109</a>, <a href= -"#page119">119</a>, <a href="#page120">120</a>, <a href= -"#page124">124</a>, <a href="#page135">135</a>, <a href= -"#page264">264</a>, <a href="#page265">265</a>, <a href= -"#page268">268</a>, <a href="#page270">270</a>, <a href= -"#page271">271</a>, <a href="#page303">303</a>, <a href= -"#page308">308</a>, <a href="#page309">309</a>, <a href= -"#page315">315</a>, <a href="#page316">316</a>, <a href= -"#page325">325</a>, <a href="#page333">333</a>, <a href= -"#page334">334</a>, <a href="#page338">338</a>, <a href= -"#page339">339</a></p> -<p>MacDonald, Major-General Sir H.A., <a href="#page256">256</a>, -<a href="#page257">257</a><br /> -Machadodorp, <a href="#page239">239</a>, <a href= -"#page282">282</a>, <a href="#page283">283</a>, <a href= -"#page287">287</a>, <a href="#page295">295</a><br /> -Mahon, Brigadier-General B.T., <a href="#page221">221</a>, <a href= -"#page222">222</a>, <a href="#page224">224-226</a>, <a href= -"#page232">232</a><br /> -Maiden's Castle, <a href="#page145">145</a>, <a href= -"#page146">146</a><br /> -Majuba Hill, <a href="#page36">36</a>, <a href="#page266">266</a>, -<a href="#page267">267</a><br /> -Martyr, Lieutenant-Colonel C., <a href="#page198">198</a>, <a href= -"#page202">202-206</a><br /> -Mears, <a href="#page349">349</a>, <a href="#page350">350</a><br /> -Metcalfe, Colonel C.T.E., <a href="#page144">144</a><br /> -Methuen, Lieutenant-General Lord, <a href="#page52">52</a>, -<a href="#page55">55-59</a>, <a href="#page62">62</a>, <a href= -"#page63">63</a>, <a href="#page79">79</a>, <a href= -"#page80">80</a>, <a href="#page89">89-92</a>, <a href= -"#page123">123</a>, <a href="#page157">157</a>, <a href= -"#page159">159</a>, <a href="#page168">168</a>, <a href= -"#page172">172</a>, <a href="#page184">184</a>, <a href= -"#page225">225</a>, <a href="#page228">228</a>, <a href= -"#page231">231</a>, <a href="#page232">232</a>, <a href= -"#page247">247</a>, <a href="#page250">250</a>, <a href= -"#page253">253</a>, <a href="#page254">254</a>, <a href= -"#page256">256</a>, <a href="#page276">276-280</a>, <a href= -"#page315">315</a>, <a href="#page323">323</a>, <a href= -"#page324">324</a>, <a href="#page337">337</a>, <a href= -"#page344">344</a>, <a href="#page357">357-359</a>, <a href= -"#page362">362</a><br /> -Meyer, L., <a href="#page39">39</a>, <a href="#page40">40</a><br /> -Meyerton, <a href="#page235">235</a>, <a href= -"#page236">236</a><br /> -Middle Hill, <a href="#page147">147</a><br /> -Milner, Lord, <a href="#page51">51</a>, <a href="#page86">86</a>, -<a href="#page160">160</a>, <a href="#page228">228</a>, <a href= -"#page367">367</a><br /> -Moedvil, <a href="#page342">342</a><br /> -Monte Cristo, <a href="#page123">123-126</a><br /> -Mors Kop, <a href="#page242">242</a>, <a href= -"#page244">244</a><br /> -Mostert's Hoek, <a href="#page208">208</a><br /> -Mount Alice, <a href="#page97">97</a>, <a href="#page102">102</a>, -<a href="#page106">106</a>, <a href="#page107">107</a><br /> -Muller, <a href="#page332">332</a>, <a href="#page337">337</a>, -<a href="#page356">356</a></p> -<p>Naval Gun Hill, <a href="#page75">75</a><br /> -Naval Hill, <a href="#page123">123</a>, <a href="#page129">129</a>, -<a href="#page131">131</a>, <a href="#page132">132</a><br /> -Neks<br /> - Breedt's, <a href="#page317">317</a><br /> - Cingolo, <a href="#page125">125</a><br /> - Commando (Orange River Colony), <a href= -"#page258">258-260</a><br /> - Commando (Transvaal), <a href="#page274">274-276</a>, -<a href="#page278">278</a>, <a href="#page280">280</a>, <a href= -"#page282">282</a><br /> - Laing's, <a href="#page36">36</a>, <a href= -"#page38">38</a>, <a href="#page254">254</a>, <a href= -"#page262">262</a>, <a href="#page264">264</a>, <a href= -"#page266">266-268</a>, <a href="#page270">270</a>, <a href= -"#page272">272</a><br /> - Magato, <a href="#page280">280</a>, <a href= -"#page342">342</a><br /> - Modderfontein, <a href="#page322">322</a><br /> - Naauwpoort, <a href="#page258">258</a>, <a href= -"#page260">260</a><br /> - Nicholson's, <a href="#page46">46-49</a>, <a href= -"#page167">167</a><br /> - Noitgedacht, <a href="#page317">317-320</a><br /> - Olifant's, <a href="#page274">274</a>, <a href= -"#page276">276-278</a>, <a href="#page280">280</a>, <a href= -"#page281">281</a><br /> - Retiefs, <a href="#page258">258</a>, <a href= -"#page260">260</a><br /> - Slabbert's, <a href="#page258">258-261</a><br /> - Springhaan's, <a href="#page297">297</a>, <a href= -"#page299">299</a>, <a href="#page302">302</a><br /> - Zilikat's <a href="#page11">11</a>, <a href= -"#page239">239</a>, <a href="#page274">274</a>, <a href= -"#page275">275</a>, <a href="#page277">277</a>, <a href= -"#page278">278</a>, <a href="#page283">283</a><br /> -Nelspruit, <a href="#page287">287</a>, <a href= -"#page289">289</a><br /> -Nicholson, Colonel J.S., <a href="#page223">223</a><br /> -Noitgedacht (Delagoa Bay Railway), <a href="#page287">287</a><br /> -Norcott, Colonel C.H.B., <a href="#page132">132</a>, <a href= -"#page133">133</a></p> -<p>Observation Hill, <a href="#page142">142</a><br /> -Olivier, General J.H., <a href="#page64">64</a>, <a href= -"#page66">66</a>, <a href="#page68">68</a>, <a href= -"#page195">195</a>, <a href="#page198">198</a>, <a href= -"#page200">200</a>, <a href="#page259">259</a>, <a href= -"#page261">261</a><br /> -Onderbroek, <a href="#page125">125</a>, <a href= -"#page127">127</a><br /> -Onderste Poort, <a href="#page276">276</a>, <a href= -"#page283">283</a><br /> -Ookiep, <a href="#page364">364</a>, <a href= -"#page366">366</a><br /> -Orange Free State, Annexation of, <a href="#page236">236</a><br /> -Osfontein, <a href="#page184">184</a>, <a href= -"#page186">186</a></p> -<p>Paget, Major-General A.H., <a href="#page256">256</a>, <a href= -"#page257">257</a>, <a href="#page291">291</a>, <a href= -"#page316">316</a>, <a href="#page317">317</a>, <a href= -"#page321">321</a>, <a href="#page326">326</a><br /> -Paris, Major A., <a href="#page307">307</a><br /> -Park, Colonel C.W., <a href="#page329">329</a>, <a href= -"#page356">356</a><br /> -Penn-Symons, Major-General Sir W., <a href="#page37">37</a>, -<a href="#page39">39</a>, <a href="#page41">41</a>, <a href= -"#page45">45</a><br /> -Pepworth Hill, <a href="#page46">46</a>, <a href="#page48">48</a>, -<a href="#page49">49</a>, <a href="#page142">142</a><br /> -Phipps Hornby, Lieutenant-Colonel E.J., <a href= -"#page203">203</a><br /> -Pienaar's Poort and River, <a href="#page241">241</a>, <a href= -"#page242">242</a>, <a href="#page244">244</a><br /> -Pietersburg, <a href="#page292">292</a>, <a href= -"#page314">314</a>, <a href="#page328">328</a><br /> -Pilcher, Lieutenant-Colonel T.D., <a href="#page195">195</a>, -<a href="#page198">198</a><br /> -Pilgrim's Rest, <a href="#page356">356</a><br /> -Platrand, <a href="#page143">143</a>, <a href="#page145">145</a>, -<a href="#page147">147</a>, <a href="#page150">150</a><br /> -Plumer, Brigadier-General H.C.O., <a href="#page214">214</a>, -<a href="#page221">221-225</a>, <a href="#page274">274</a>, -<a href="#page305">305-307</a>, <a href="#page309">309</a>, -<a href="#page328">328</a>, <a href="#page330">330</a>, <a href= -"#page340">340</a>, <a href="#page355">355</a><br /> -Pole-Carew, Lieutenant-General Sir R., <a href="#page62">62</a>, -<a href="#page195">195</a>, <a href="#page230">230</a>, <a href= -"#page242">242</a>, <a href="#page244">244</a>, <a href= -"#page245">245</a>, <a href="#page272">272</a>, <a href= -"#page283">283-290</a><br /> -Porter, Colonel N.C., <a href="#page242">242</a><br /> -Potgieter, F., <a href="#page362">362</a><br /> -Potgieter, H., <a href="#page16">16</a><br /> -Pretoria, surrender of, <a href="#page239">239</a><br /> -Prieska, <a href="#page184">184</a>, <a href="#page194">194</a>, -<a href="#page196">196</a>, <a href="#page227">227</a>, <a href= -"#page305">305</a>, <a href="#page306">306</a><br /> -Prinsloo, Jacob, <a href="#page55">55</a>, <a href= -"#page355">355</a>, <a href="#page356">356</a><br /> -Prinsloo, Martin, <a href="#page38">38</a>, <a href= -"#page118">118</a>, <a href="#page119">119</a>, <a href= -"#page250">250</a>, <a href="#page259">259-261</a><br /> -Prinsloo, Michael, <a href="#page249">249</a>, <a href= -"#page250">250</a>, <a href="#page299">299</a>, <a href= -"#page349">349</a><br /> -"Protected Area," <a href="#page337">337</a>, <a href= -"#page340">340</a>, <a href="#page345">345</a>, <a href= -"#page355">355</a>, <a href="#page357">357</a><br /> -Pulteney, Colonel W.P., <a href="#page329">329</a>, <a href= -"#page355">355</a></p> -<p>Railway Hill, <a href="#page131">131</a>, <a href= -"#page133">133</a>, <a href="#page134">134</a><br /> -Ramdam, <a href="#page162">162</a>, <a href= -"#page166">166</a><br /> -Rangeworthy Heights, <a href="#page100">100-102</a>, <a href= -"#page107">107</a><br /> -Rawlinson, Colonel Sir H., <a href="#page350">350-352</a>, <a href= -"#page361">361-363</a><br /> -Reddersburg, <a href="#page207">207-209</a><br /> -Reitz, <a href="#page333">333</a><br /> -Rhenosterfontein Heights, <a href="#page245">245</a><br /> -Rhenoster River Bridge, <a href="#page253">253</a><br /> -Rhodes, Right Hon. Cecil, <a href="#page83">83-95</a>, <a href= -"#page214">214</a><br /> -Rifleman's Ridge, <a href="#page143">143</a>, <a href= -"#page147">147</a><br /> -Rimington, Colonel M.F., <a href="#page346">346</a>, <a href= -"#page349">349</a>, <a href="#page351">351</a><br /> -Roberts, Field-Marshal Lord, <a href="#page79">79</a>, <a href= -"#page114">114</a>, <a href="#page120">120</a>, <a href= -"#page132">132</a>, <a href="#page153">153</a>, <a href= -"#page154">154</a>, <a href="#page156">156</a>, <a href= -"#page158">158</a>, <a href="#page160">160</a>, <a href= -"#page161">161</a>, <a href="#page167">167</a>, <a href= -"#page168">168</a>, <a href="#page170">170</a>, <a href= -"#page171">171</a>, <a href="#page173">173</a>, <a href= -"#page179">179</a>, <a href="#page181">181</a>, <a href= -"#page183">183</a>, <a href="#page184">184</a>, <a href= -"#page186">186</a>, <a href="#page189">189</a>, <a href= -"#page191">191</a>, <a href="#page194">194</a>, <a href= -"#page195">195</a>, <a href="#page219">219</a>, <a href= -"#page226">226</a>, <a href="#page228">228</a>, <a href= -"#page229">229</a>, <a href="#page231">231</a>, <a href= -"#page232">232</a>, <a href="#page234">234</a>, <a href= -"#page236">236</a>, <a href="#page239">239</a>, <a href= -"#page241">241</a>, <a href="#page246">246</a>, <a href= -"#page254">254</a>, <a href="#page256">256</a>, <a href= -"#page262">262</a>, <a href="#page264">264</a>, <a href= -"#page271">271-273</a>, <a href="#page280">280-282</a>, <a href= -"#page284">284</a>, <a href="#page286">286</a>, <a href= -"#page288">288</a>, <a href="#page292">292</a>, <a href= -"#page296">296</a>, <a href="#page313">313</a>, <a href= -"#page314">314</a>, <a href="#page365">365</a><br /> -Rochfort, Colonel A.N., <a href="#page363">363</a><br /> -Roirantjesfontein, <a href="#page358">358</a><br /> -Roodeval (Orange River Colony), <a href="#page252">252</a>, -<a href="#page253">253</a>, <a href="#page300">300</a><br /> -Roodeval (Transvaal), <a href="#page362">362</a><br /> -Rooi Kop, <a href="#page66">66</a><br /> -Rosmead (on Riet River), <a href="#page57">57</a><br /> -Roux, General P.H., <a href="#page256">256-260</a><br /> -Rundle, Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie, <a href="#page230">230</a>, -<a href="#page232">232</a>, <a href="#page247">247-250</a>, -<a href="#page252">252</a>, <a href="#page256">256</a>, <a href= -"#page259">259</a>, <a href="#page260">260</a>, <a href= -"#page331">331</a>, <a href="#page333">333</a>, <a href= -"#page347">347-349</a>, <a href="#page352">352</a><br /> -Rustenburg, <a href="#page273">273-278</a>, <a href= -"#page281">281</a>, <a href="#page316">316</a>, <a href= -"#page317">317</a>, <a href="#page344">344</a></p> -<p>Scheepers, <a href="#page299">299</a>, <a href= -"#page336">336</a><br /> -Schiel, <a href="#page43">43</a><br /> -Schoeman, <a href="#page64">64</a>, <a href="#page80">80</a>, -<a href="#page81">81</a><br /> -Schoon Spruit, <a href="#page359">359</a><br /> -Schweizer Reneke, <a href="#page315">315</a><br /> -Sefetili, <a href="#page224">224</a><br /> -Settle, Major-General Sir H., <a href="#page315">315</a><br /> -Seven Kopjes, <a href="#page186">186</a>, <a href= -"#page187">187</a><br /> -Shekleton, Lieutenant-Colonel H.P., <a href="#page322">322</a>, -<a href="#page323">323</a><br /> -Sladen, Lieutenant-Colonel J.F.R., <a href="#page331">331</a>, -<a href="#page332">332</a><br /> -Slapkranz, <a href="#page260">260</a><br /> -Smith-Dorrien, Major-General H.L., <a href="#page177">177</a>, -<a href="#page178">178</a>, <a href="#page275">275</a>, <a href= -"#page276">276</a>, <a href="#page278">278-280</a>, <a href= -"#page315">315</a>, <a href="#page325">325-328</a><br /> -Smuts, General J.C., <a href="#page322">322</a>, <a href= -"#page324">324</a>, <a href="#page325">325</a>, <a href= -"#page332">332-336</a>, <a href="#page363">363</a>, <a href= -"#page364">364</a>, <a href="#page366">366</a><br /> -Smuts, General T., <a href="#page197">197</a>, <a href= -"#page198">198</a>, <a href="#page290">290</a>, <a href= -"#page291">291</a><br /> -Snyman, General, <a href="#page217">217</a>, <a href= -"#page219">219</a>, <a href="#page220">220</a><br /> -Spitz Kop (Natal), <a href="#page267">267</a>, <a href= -"#page268">268</a><br /> -Spitz Kop (Transvaal), <a href="#page288">288</a><br /> -Spragge, Lieutenant-Colonel B.E., <a href= -"#page248">248-252</a><br /> -Spytfontein, <a href="#page56">56-58</a><br /> -Steenekamp (of Heilbron), <a href="#page282">282</a><br /> -Steenkamp, L.P., <a href="#page68">68</a><br /> -Stephenson, Major-General T.E., <a href="#page176">176</a>, -<a href="#page177">177</a>, <a href="#page183">183</a>, <a href= -"#page363">363</a><br /> -Stewart, Lieutenant-Colonel H.K., <a href="#page338">338</a><br /> -Steyn, Commandant, of Bethlehem, <a href="#page175">175</a>, -<a href="#page176">176</a>, <a href="#page179">179</a>, <a href= -"#page182">182</a><br /> -Steyn, M. President, Orange Free State, <a href="#page52">52</a>, -<a href="#page118">118</a>, <a href="#page185">185</a>, <a href= -"#page191">191</a>, <a href="#page196">196</a>, <a href= -"#page257">257</a>, <a href="#page258">258</a>, <a href= -"#page278">278-280</a>, <a href="#page282">282</a>, <a href= -"#page290">290</a>, <a href="#page291">291</a>, <a href= -"#page295">295</a>, <a href="#page302">302</a>, <a href= -"#page310">310</a>, <a href="#page313">313-316</a>, <a href= -"#page331">331-333</a>, <a href="#page345">345</a>, <a href= -"#page346">346</a>, <a href="#page350">350</a>, <a href= -"#page352">352</a>, <a href="#page353">353</a>, <a href= -"#page357">357</a>, <a href="#page359">359</a>, <a href= -"#page360">360</a>, <a href="#page365">365-367</a><br /> -Stinkfontein, <a href="#page173">173</a>, <a href= -"#page175">175</a><br /> -Surprise Hill, <a href="#page144">144</a></p> -<p>Table Mountain (on Modder), <a href="#page186">186</a><br /> -Theron, <a href="#page279">279</a>, <a href= -"#page281">281</a><br /> -Theunissen, <a href="#page182">182</a><br /> -Thorneycroft, Colonel A.W., <a href="#page104">104</a>, <a href= -"#page107">107-115</a><br /> -Thornhill's Kopje, <a href="#page144">144</a><br /> -Three Tree Hill, <a href="#page100">100</a>, <a href= -"#page101">101</a>, <a href="#page106">106</a><br /> -Transvaal, Annexation of, <a href="#page288">288</a><br /> -Tucker, Lieutenant-General Sir C., <a href="#page166">166</a>, -<a href="#page168">168</a>, <a href="#page171">171</a>, <a href= -"#page191">191</a>, <a href="#page197">197</a>, <a href= -"#page198">198</a>, <a href="#page321">321</a><br /> -Tweebosch, <a href="#page358">358</a>, <a href= -"#page359">359</a><br /> -Twin Peaks, <a href="#page100">100</a>, <a href="#page105">105</a>, -<a href="#page106">106</a>, <a href="#page109">109-112</a>, -<a href="#page119">119</a><br /> -Tygerpoort, <a href="#page241">241</a>, <a href="#page242">242</a>, -<a href="#page244">244</a></p> -<p>Utrecht, <a href="#page266">266</a>, <a href= -"#page327">327</a></p> -<p>Van der Venter, <a href="#page333">333-335</a><br /> -Van Reenen's Pass, <a href="#page263">263</a>, <a href= -"#page267">267</a><br /> -Van Tender's Pass, <a href="#page45">45</a>, <a href= -"#page265">265</a><br /> -Van Wyk's Hill, <a href="#page267">267</a>, <a href= -"#page268">268</a><br /> -Van Zyl's Farm, <a href="#page67">67</a><br /> -Venter's Spruit, <a href="#page100">100</a><br /> -Vereeniging, <a href="#page235">235</a>, <a href= -"#page236">236</a>, <a href="#page366">366</a>, <a href= -"#page367">367</a><br /> -Viljoen, General B., <a href="#page6">6</a>, <a href= -"#page117">117</a>, <a href="#page118">118</a>, <a href= -"#page284">284</a>, <a href="#page290">290</a>, <a href= -"#page291">291</a>, <a href="#page315">315</a>, <a href= -"#page316">316</a>, <a href="#page325">325</a>, <a href= -"#page328">328</a>, <a href="#page329">329</a>, <a href= -"#page340">340</a>, <a href="#page356">356</a><br /> -Viljoen, P., <a href="#page354">354-357</a><br /> -Virginia Siding, <a href="#page255">255</a><br /> -Vlakfontein, <a href="#page330">330</a><br /> -Volksrust, <a href="#page266">266</a>, <a href= -"#page268">268-270</a><br /> -Vryheid, <a href="#page266">266</a>, <a href="#page325">325</a></p> -<p>Wagon Hill and Point, <a href="#page142">142-151</a><br /> -Wakkerstroom, <a href="#page270">270</a><br /> -Warren, Lieutenant-General Sir C., <a href="#page79">79</a>, -<a href="#page80">80</a>, <a href="#page93">93</a>, <a href= -"#page96">96</a>, <a href="#page97">97</a>, <a href= -"#page99">99-103</a>, <a href="#page105">105-115</a>, <a href= -"#page120">120</a>, <a href="#page128">128</a>, <a href= -"#page129">129</a>, <a href="#page132">132</a>, <a href= -"#page213">213</a>, <a href="#page228">228</a>, <a href= -"#page264">264</a><br /> -Waterval (near Pretoria), <a href="#page239">239</a><br /> -Waterworks, <a href="#page198">198-200</a>, <a href= -"#page202">202</a>, <a href="#page203">203</a>, <a href= -"#page205">205</a><br /> -Wauchope, Major-General A.G., <a href="#page59">59-62</a><br /> -Wavell, Major-General A.G., <a href="#page238">238</a><br /> -Wessels, <a href="#page349">349</a><br /> -White, Lieutenant-General Sir George, <a href="#page37">37</a>, -<a href="#page38">38</a>, <a href="#page42">42</a>, <a href= -"#page43">43</a>, <a href="#page45">45</a>, <a href= -"#page46">46</a>, <a href="#page49">49</a>, <a href= -"#page51">51</a>, <a href="#page72">72</a>, <a href= -"#page79">79</a>, <a href="#page96">96</a>, <a href= -"#page100">100</a>, <a href="#page102">102</a>, <a href= -"#page116">116</a>, <a href="#page122">122</a>, <a href= -"#page125">125</a>, <a href="#page126">126</a>, <a href= -"#page128">128</a>, <a href="#page132">132</a>, <a href= -"#page137">137</a>, <a href="#page140">140-143</a>, <a href= -"#page147">147-151</a>, <a href="#page153">153-155</a>, <a href= -"#page263">263</a><br /> -Wildfontein, <a href="#page324">324</a><br /> -Willow Grange, <a href="#page53">53</a><br /> -Willowmore, <a href="#page301">301</a><br /> -Wilge River (Orange River Colony), <a href="#page349">349</a>, -<a href="#page352">352</a>, <a href="#page353">353</a><br /> -Wilge River (Transvaal), <a href="#page356">356</a></p> -<hr class="full" /> - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A Handbook of the Boer War -by Gale and Polden, Limited - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HANDBOOK OF THE BOER WAR *** - -***** This file should be named 15699-h.htm or 15699-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - https://www.gutenberg.org/1/5/6/9/15699/ - -Produced by Jonathan Ingram, David King, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these 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