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diff --git a/15110-h/15110-h.htm b/15110-h/15110-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9042718 --- /dev/null +++ b/15110-h/15110-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,3860 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1" /> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Lessons of the War, by Spenser Wilkinson</title> + <style type="text/css"> +/*<![CDATA[ XML blockout */ +<!-- + p { margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; + } + h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + clear: both; + } + hr { width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + clear: both; + } + + table {margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;} + + body{margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + } + + .linenum {position: absolute; top: auto; left: 4%;} /* poetry number */ + .blockquot{margin-left: 5%; margin-right: 10%;} + .pagenum {position: absolute; left: 92%; font-size: smaller; text-align: right;} /* page numbers */ + .sidenote {width: 20%; padding-bottom: .5em; padding-top: .5em; + padding-left: .5em; padding-right: .5em; margin-left: 1em; + float: right; clear: right; margin-top: 1em; + font-size: smaller; background: #eeeeee; border: dashed 1px;} + + .bb {border-bottom: solid 2px;} + .bl {border-left: solid 2px;} + .bt {border-top: solid 2px;} + .br {border-right: solid 2px;} + .bbox {border: solid 2px;} + + .center {text-align: center;} + .smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + + .figcenter {margin: auto; text-align: center;} + + .figleft {float: left; clear: left; margin-left: 0; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-top: + 1em; margin-right: 1em; padding: 0; text-align: center;} + + .figright {float: right; clear: right; margin-left: 1em; margin-bottom: 1em; + margin-top: 1em; margin-right: 0; padding: 0; text-align: center;} + + .footnotes {border: dashed 1px;} + .footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} + .footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} + .fnanchor {vertical-align: super; font-size: .8em; text-decoration: none;} + + .poem {margin-left:10%; margin-right:10%; text-align: left;} + .poem br {display: none;} + .poem .stanza {margin: 1em 0em 1em 0em;} + .poem span {display: block; margin: 0; padding-left: 3em; text-indent: -3em;} + .poem span.i2 {display: block; margin-left: 2em;} + .poem span.i4 {display: block; margin-left: 4em;} + hr.full { width: 100%; } + pre {font-size: 8pt;} + // --> + /* XML end ]]>*/ + </style> +</head> +<body> +<h1>The Project Gutenberg eBook, Lessons of the War, by Spenser Wilkinson</h1> +<pre> +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at <a href = "https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a></pre> +<p>Title: Lessons of the War</p> +<p>Author: Spenser Wilkinson</p> +<p>Release Date: February 19, 2005 [eBook #15110]</p> +<p>Language: English</p> +<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p> +<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LESSONS OF THE WAR***</p> +<p> </p> +<h4>E-text prepared by Jonathan Ingram, Garrett Alley,<br /> + and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team</h4> +<p> </p> +<hr class="full" /> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> + +<h1><a name="Page_-8" id="Page_-8" /><a name="Page_-7" id="Page_-7" />LESSONS OF THE WAR</h1> + +<h3>Being Comments from Week to Week</h3> + +<h3>To the Relief of Ladysmith</h3> + +<h2>BY SPENSER WILKINSON</h2> + +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p class="center">WESTMINSTER</p> + +<p class="center">ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE & COMPANY</p> + +<p class="center">PHILADELPHIA: J.B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY.</p> + +<p class="center">1900<br /><br /></p> + +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<h2><a name="Page_-6" id="Page_-6" /><a name="PREFACE" />PREFACE</h2> + + +<p>The history of a war cannot be properly written until long after its +close, for such a work must be based upon a close study of the military +correspondence of the generals and upon the best records, to be had of +the doings of both sides. Nor can the tactical lessons of a war be fully +set forth until detailed and authoritative accounts of the battles are +accessible.</p> + +<p>But for the nation the lessons of this war are not obscure, at any rate +not to those whose occupations have led them to indulge in any close +study of war.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_-4" id="Page_-4" />Since the middle of December I have written a daily introduction to the +telegrams for one of the morning papers. Before I contemplated that work +I had undertaken for my friend Mr. Locker, the Editor of <i>The London +Letter</i>, to write a weekly review of the war.</p> + +<p>Many requests have been made to me by publishers for a volume on the +history of the war, with which, for the reasons given above, it is +impossible at present to comply; but to the proposal of my old friends, +Messrs. Archibald Constable and Co., to reprint my weekly reviews from +<i>The London Letter</i>, the same objections do not hold.</p> + +<p>In revising the articles, I have found <a name="Page_-3" id="Page_-3" />but few alterations necessary. +My views have not changed, and to make the details of the battles +accurate would hardly be practicable without more information than is +likely to be at hand until after the return of the troops.</p> + +<p>S.W.</p> + +<p><i>March 9th</i>, 1900</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS" /><a name="Page_-2" id="Page_-2" /><a name="Page_-1" id="Page_-1" />CONTENTS</h2> + +<div class="center"> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="4" summary="toc"> + <tr><td><br /></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#PREFACE"><b>PREFACE</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#CONTENTS"><b>CONTENTS</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#THE_EVE_OF_WAR"><b>THE EVE OF WAR</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#THE_MILITARY_ISSUES"><b>THE MILITARY ISSUES</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#A_WEEKS_CAMPAIGN"><b>A WEEK'S CAMPAIGN</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#PLAYING_WITH_FIRE"><b>PLAYING WITH FIRE</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#HOW_WEAK_POLICY_LEADS_TO_BAD_STRATEGY"><b>HOW WEAK POLICY LEADS TO BAD STRATEGY</b></a> </td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#TWO_VIEWS_OR_TRUE_VIEWS"><b>TWO VIEWS OR TRUE VIEWS?</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#BULLERS_PROBLEM"><b>BULLER'S PROBLEM</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#FIGHTING_AGAINST_ODDS"><b>FIGHTING AGAINST ODDS</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#THE_DELAY_OF_REINFORCEMENTS"><b>THE DELAY OF REINFORCEMENTS</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#THE_NATIONS_PROBLEM"><b>THE NATION'S PROBLEM</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#MORE_AWAKENING"><b>MORE AWAKENING</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#THE_NATIONS_BUSINESS"><b>THE NATION'S BUSINESS</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#WANTED_THE_MAN"><b>WANTED, THE MAN</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#THE_STRATEGY_OF_THE_WAR"><b>THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#THE_DECISIVE_BATTLE"><b>THE DECISIVE BATTLE</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#SUBSTANTIAL_PROGRESS"><b>SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#THE_ELEVENTH_HOUR"><b>THE ELEVENTH HOUR</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#TRY_TRY_TRY_AGAIN"><b>TRY, TRY, TRY AGAIN</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#A_COMMANDER"><b>A COMMANDER</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#CRONJES_SEDAN"><b>CRONJE'S SEDAN</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#THE_BOER_DEFEATS"><b>THE BOER DEFEATS</b></a></td></tr> + <tr><td><a href="#THE_COLLAPSE_OF_THE_BOER_POWER"><b>THE COLLAPSE OF THE BOER POWER</b></a></td></tr></table> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="LESSONS_OF_THE_WAR" id="LESSONS_OF_THE_WAR" /><a name="Page_0" id="Page_0" /><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1" />LESSONS OF THE WAR</h2> + +<h3>Being Comments from Week to Week</h3> + +<h3>To the Relief of Ladysmith</h3> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="THE_EVE_OF_WAR" id="THE_EVE_OF_WAR" />THE EVE OF WAR</h2> + + +<p>The next six weeks will be an anxious time for the British Empire. The +war which begins as I write between three and four on Wednesday +afternoon, October 11th, 1899, is a conflict for supremacy in South +Africa between the Boer States, their aiders and abettors, and the +British Empire. In point of resources the British Empire is so +incomparably stronger than the Boer States that there ought to be no +possibility of doubt about the issue. But the Boer States with all their +resources are actually in the theatre of war, which is, separated by the +wide oceans from all the sources of British power, from Great Britain, +from India, from the Australian and Canadian colonies. The +reinforcements <a name="Page_2" id="Page_2" />ordered on September 8th have not yet all arrived, +though the last transports are due to arrive during the next four or +five days. After that no further reinforcements can be expected for a +month, so that during the next few weeks the whole strength of the +Boers, so far as it is available at all, can be employed against a mere +fragment of the British power. To the gravity of this situation it would +be folly to shut our eyes. It contains the possibility of disaster, +though what the consequences of disaster now would involve must for the +present be left unsaid. Yet it may be well to say one word on the origin +of the unpleasant situation which exists, in order to prevent needless +misgivings in case the first news should not be as favourable as we all +hope. There is no sign of any mistake or neglect in the military +department of the Army. The quantity and character of the force required +to bring the war to a successful issue has been most carefully estimated +in advance; every preparation which forethought can suggest has been +thought <a name="Page_3" id="Page_3" />out, so that the moment the word was given by the supreme +authority, the Cabinet, the mobilisation and despatch of the forces +could begin and proceed without a hitch. The Army was never in better +condition either as regards the zeal and skill of its officers from the +highest to the lowest, the training and discipline of the men, or the +organisation of all branches of the service. Nor is the present +condition of the Army good merely by comparison with what it was twenty +years ago. A very high standard has been attained, and those who have +watched the Army continuously for many years feel confident that all +ranks and all arms will do their duty. The present situation, in which +the Boers start favourably handicapped for five weeks certain, is the +foreseen consequence of the decision of the Cabinet to postpone the +measures necessary for the defence of the British colonies and for +attack upon the Boer States. This decision is not attributable to +imperfect information. It was <a name="Page_4" id="Page_4" />regarded as certain so long ago as +December last, by those in a position to give the best forecast, that +the Boers of both States meant war with the object of establishing Boer +supremacy. The Cabinet, therefore, has knowingly and deliberately taken +upon itself the responsibility for whatever risks are now run. In this +deliberate decision of the Cabinet lies the best ground for hoping that +the risks are not so great as they seem.</p> + +<p>The two Boer Republics are well supplied with money, arms, and +ammunition, and I believe have collected large stores of supplies. Their +armies consist of their burghers, with a small nucleus of professional +artillery, officers, and men. The total number of burghers of both +States is about fifty thousand, and that number is swollen by the +addition of non-British Uitlanders who have been induced to take arms by +the offer of burghership. The two States are bound by treaty to stand or +fall together, and the treaty gives the Commander-in-Chief of both +armies to the Transvaal <a name="Page_5" id="Page_5" />Commander-in-Chief, who is however, bound to +consult his subordinate colleague of the Orange Free State. The whole of +the fifty thousand burghers cannot take the field. Some must remain to +watch the native population, which far outnumbers the burghers and is +not well affected. Some must be kept to watch the Basutos, who are +anxious to raid the Free State, and there will be deductions for sick +and absentees as well as for the necessary duties of civil +administration. The forts of Pretoria, Johannesburg, and Bloemfontein +require permanent garrisons. In the absence of the accurate data +obtainable in the case of an army regularly organised into tactical and +administrative units, the most various estimates are current of the +force that the two States can put into the field as a mobile army +available for attack as well as for defence. I think thirty-five +thousand men a safer estimate than twenty-five thousand. The Boers are +fighting for their political existence, which to their minds is +identical with their monopoly of <a name="Page_6" id="Page_6" />political rights, and therefore their +States will and must exert themselves to the uttermost. This view is +confirmed by the action of the British military authorities, who +estimate the British force necessary to disarm the Boer States at over +seventy thousand men, a number which would seem disproportionate to a +Boer field force of only twenty-five thousand. The British forces now in +South Africa are in two separate groups. In Natal Sir George White has +some ten thousand regular troops and two thousand volunteers, the +regulars being eight or nine infantry battalions, four regiments of +cavalry, six field batteries, and a mounted battery. He appears to have +no horse artillery. In the Cape Colony there are seven British +battalions and, either landed or on passage, three field batteries. A +part of this force is scattered in small garrisons of half a battalion +each at points on the railways leading to the Free State—Burghersdrop, +Naauwpoort, and Kimberley. At Mafeking Colonel Baden-Powell has raised a +local force and has <a name="Page_7" id="Page_7" />fortified the place as well as its resources +permit. A force of Rhodesian volunteers is moving from Buluwayo towards +Tuli, on the northern border of the Transvaal. There are volunteer corps +in the Cape Colony with a total of some seven thousand men, but it is +not clear whether the Schreiner Ministry, whose sympathies with the +Boers are undisguised, has not prevented the effective arming of these +corps.</p> + +<p>The reports of the distribution of the Boer forces on the frontiers must +be taken with caution. Apparently there are preparations for the attack +of Mafeking and of Kimberley, and it is open for the Boers to bring +against either or both of these places forces largely outnumbering their +defenders. Both places are prepared for defence against ordinary field +forces. The actions at these places cannot very greatly affect the +general result. Their nearness to the frontier makes it likely that the +first engagements will take place on this border. On the other side of +the theatre of war the Boers may be expected <a name="Page_8" id="Page_8" />to invade Natal and to +attack Sir George White, whose forces a few days ago were divided +between positions near Ladysmith and Glencoe, places nearly thirty-five +miles apart. The bulk of the Boer forces are deployed on two sides of +the angle formed by the Natal border, where it meets the frontiers of +the Transvaal and of the Free State. From the Free State border +Ladysmith is about twenty-five miles distant in a straight line, and +from the Transvaal border near Vryheid to Ladysmith is about twice that +distance. If the Boers move on Thursday morning they would be able +easily to collect their whole force at Ladysmith on Sunday morning, +supposing the country contained no British troops. By Sunday, therefore, +the Boer commander, if he knows his business, ought to be able to attack +Sir George White with a force outnumbering the British by something like +two to one.</p> + +<p>If I were a Cabinet Minister I should not sleep for the next few days, +but as an irresponsible <a name="Page_9" id="Page_9" />citizen I trust that the Boers will be shocked +to find how much better the British soldier shoots in 1899 than he did +in 1881.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="THE_MILITARY_ISSUES" id="THE_MILITARY_ISSUES" />THE MILITARY ISSUES</h2> + +<p><i>October 18th</i>, 1899</p> + + +<p>When the Boers sent their ultimatum they knew that fifty thousand +British troops were under orders for South Africa, and that for six +weeks the British forces in the theatre of war could not be +substantially increased. As they were of opinion that no settlement of +the dispute satisfactory to England could possibly be satisfactory to +themselves they had resolved upon fighting. If we assume, as we are +bound to do, that they had really faced the situation and thought it +out, they must have had in their minds some course of action by which if +they should begin the war on October 11th they would be likely to gain +their end: the recognition of the sovereignty of the Transvaal. They +could hardly <a name="Page_10" id="Page_10" />expect to disarm the British Empire and dictate peace, but +they might hope to make the occupation of their country so difficult +that Great Britain would be tired of the effort before the moment of +success. The Boer defence taken altogether could hope to do no more than +to gain time, during which some outside embarrassment might cripple +Great Britain; there might be a rising at the Cape, or some other Power +might interfere.</p> + +<p>If before the arrival of Sir Redvers Buller and his men the Boers could +destroy a considerable fraction of the British forces now in South +Africa, their chance of prolonging the struggle would be greatly +improved. These forces were in two groups. There was the small army of +Sir George White in Natal, something more than fifteen thousand men, and +there were the detached parties holding points on the colonial railway +system, Naauwport, De Aar, Orange River, Kimberley and Mafeking. These +detachments, however, are largely made up of local levies, and the total +number of British troops among <a name="Page_11" id="Page_11" />them can hardly amount to three +thousand. The whole set might be captured or otherwise swept from the +board without any material improvement in the Boer position. Sir Redvers +Buller is not tied to the line of railway which most of the detachments +guard, and the disappearance both of the railway and of its protectors +would be merely a temporary inconvenience to the British. But if during +the six weeks' respite it were possible to destroy Sir George White's +force the position would be very substantially changed. The confidence +of the Boers would be so increased as to add greatly to their fighting +power, the difficulties of Sir Redvers Buller would be multiplied, the +probability of outside intervention might be brought nearer, and the +Army of invasion to be eventually resisted would be weaker by something +like a quarter. For these reasons I think Sir George White's force the +centre of gravity of the situation. If the Boers cannot defeat it their +case is hopeless; if they can crush it they may <a name="Page_12" id="Page_12" />have hopes of ultimate +success. That was the bird's-eye view of the whole situation a week ago, +and it still holds good. The week's news does not enable us to judge +whether the Boers have grasped it. You can never be too strong at the +decisive point, and a first-rate general never lets a single man go away +from his main force except for a necessary object important enough to be +worth the risk of a great failure. The capture of Mafeking, of +Kimberley, and even of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, would not compensate the Boers +for failure in Natal. Neither Colonel Baden-Powell nor Colonel Kekewich +would be likely to make a serious inroad into Boer territory. I should +therefore have expected the Boers merely to watch these places with +parties hardly larger than patrols and to have thrown all their energy +into a determined attack on Sir George White. But they seem to have sent +considerable bodies, in each case several thousand men, against both +Mafeking and Kimberley. This proves either that they have a +superabundance of force at their <a name="Page_13" id="Page_13" />disposal or that they have failed to +grip the situation and to concentrate their minds, their will, and their +troops upon the key of the whole position. I believe the latter to be +the true interpretation.</p> + +<p>If the cardinal principle is to put all your strength into the decisive +blow, its corollary is that you should deliver the blow as soon as you +can, for in war time is as precious as lives. Here again it is not easy +to judge whether the Boer Commander-in-Chief is fulfilling his mission. +When the ultimatum expired his forces were spread along the border line +of the Free State and the Transvaal, so that a forward movement would +concentrate them in the northern triangle of Natal. The advance has not +been resisted, and at the end of a week the Transvaal wing of the +combined army has reached a point a few miles north of Glencoe, while +the bulk of the Free State wing is still behind the passes. The movement +has not been rapid, but as the ground is difficult—marches through a +mountainous <a name="Page_14" id="Page_14" />country and in bad weather always take incomparably longer +than is expected—the delay may be due not to lack of energy but to the +inevitable friction of movement. The mere lapse of time throws no light +on the Boer plan, for though sound strategy counsels rapidity in the +decisive blow, rapidity is a relative term, the pace varying with the +Army, the country, and the weather.</p> + +<p>Sir George White's object is not merely to make the time pass until Sir +Redvers Buller's forces come upon the scene. He has also to prevent the +Boers from gaining any great advantage, moral or material. Time could be +gained by a gradual retreat, but that would raise the courage of the +Boer party, and depress the spirits of the British. Accordingly Sir +George White may be expected to take the first opportunity of showing +the Boers that his men are fighters, but he will avoid an engagement +such as might commit a fraction of his force against the Boer main body. +The detachment which was a few days ago near Glencoe may be expected, as +<a name="Page_15" id="Page_15" />the Boer advance continues, to act as a rear guard, of which the +business is to delay the enemy without running too great a risk of being +itself cut off, or as an advance guard, which is to be reinforced so +soon as the general drift of the Boer movements has been made out. The +next few days can hardly pass without an engagement in this quarter of +Natal, and the first serious engagement will throw a flood of light upon +the aims of both generals and upon the quality of the troops of both +sides. Meantime the incidents of last week, the wreck of the armoured +train, and the attacks which have probably been made upon Mafeking and +Kimberley, are of minor importance.</p> + +<p>A very serious piece of news, if it should be confirmed, is that the +Basutos have begun to attack the Free State. The British authorities +have exerted themselves to the utmost to prevent this and to keep the +Kaffir population quiet. The mere fact of the existence all over South +Africa of a Kaffir population outnumbering Boers <a name="Page_16" id="Page_16" />and British together +made it an imperative duty of both white races to come to a peaceful +settlement. This was as well known to the Boers as to the British, and +forms an essential factor in any judgment on the action which has caused +and precipitated the conflict.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="A_WEEKS_CAMPAIGN" id="A_WEEKS_CAMPAIGN" />A WEEK'S CAMPAIGN</h2> + +<p><i>October 25th</i>, 1899</p> + +<p>The Boer Commander-in-Chief has beyond doubt grasped the situation. His +total force seems to be larger than was usually expected and to exceed +my own rough estimate of thirty-five thousand men, the balance to his +advantage being due probably to the British efforts to keep the Basutos +from attacking the Free State. Thus the Boers have been able to overrun +their western and southern borders in force sufficient to make a +pretence of occupying a large extent of territory in which only the +important posts specially prepared by the British for defence continue +to hold out. Of <a name="Page_17" id="Page_17" />these posts, however, Mafeking and Kimberley are as yet +the only ones that have been attacked or threatened.</p> + +<p>For operations in the northern corner of Natal the Boer commander was +able to collect some thirty thousand men, who on the eve of hostilities +were posted in separate columns upon the various routes leading from the +Free State and from the Transvaal into the triangle of northern Natal. +This triangle is like a letter <i>A</i>, the cross-stroke being the range of +hills known as the Biggarsberg, which is intersected near the centre on +a north and south line by the head-stream of the Waschbank River forming +a pass through which run the railway and the Dundee-Ladysmith road. +North of the Biggarsberg the gates of the frontier are Muller's Pass, +Botha's Pass, the Charlestown road, Wool's Drift, and De Jager's Drift, +of which Landman's Drift is a wicket-gate. At each of these points, +except perhaps Muller's Drift, of which I have seen no specific mention, +the Boers had a column <a name="Page_18" id="Page_18" />waiting. South of the Biggarsberg are on the +east Rorke's Drift, and on the west the passes of Ollivier's Hoek, +Bezuidenhout, Tintwa, Van Reenen, De Beers, Bramkock, and Collins. At +all these points there were Boer gatherings, though on the west the Free +Staters, having their headquarters at Albertina, were likely to put +their main column on the road leading through Van Reenen's Pass to +Ladysmith.</p> + +<p>By Thursday morning the Boer advance had developed. The columns from +Botha's Pass, Charlestown, and Wool's Drift had advanced through +Newcastle, where they had converged, and moved south along the main +road. The Landman's Drift column had moved towards Dundee, the Rorke's +Drift column had pushed some distance towards the west, and the forces +from Albertina had showed the heads of their columns on the Natal side +of the passes.</p> + +<p>The British force was divided between Dundee and Ladysmith. The +Biggarsberg range, the cross-line of the A, is about fifty miles long. +It <a name="Page_19" id="Page_19" />is traversed from north to south by three passes. In the centre runs +the railway through a defile. Twelve miles to the west of the railway +runs the direct Newcastle-Ladysmith road; eight miles to the east runs +the road Newcastle-Dannhauser-Dundee-Helpmakaar. A third road runs from +De Jager's Drift through Dundee to Glencoe and thence follows the +railway to Ladysmith. Dundee is about five miles from Glencoe on a spur +of the Biggarsberg range. Between the two places by the Craigie Burn was +the camp of Sir Penn Symons, who had under him the eighth brigade (four +battalions), three batteries, the 18th Hussars, and a portion of the +Natal Mounted Volunteers, in all about four thousand men. Thirty-five +miles away at Ladysmith, the junction of the Natal and Free State +railways, as well as of the Natal and Free State road systems, Sir +George White had a larger force, the seventh brigade, three field +batteries, a mountain battery, the Natal battery, two or three cavalry +regiments, the newly-raised Imperial <a name="Page_20" id="Page_20" />Light Horse, and some Natal +Mounted Volunteers. It is not clear whether there were more infantry +battalions and it seems probable that one battalion and perhaps a +battery were at Pietermaritzburg. The Ladysmith force was at least six +thousand five hundred strong, and its total may have been as high as +eight thousand.</p> + +<p>The Boer plan was dictated by the configuration of the frontier and of +the obstacles and communications in Northern Natal. The various columns +to the north of the Biggarsberg had only to move forward in order to +effect their junction on the Newcastle-Dundee road, and their advance +southwards on that road would enable them at Dundee to meet the column +from Landman's Drift. The movement, if well timed, must lead to an +enveloping attack upon Sir Penn Symons, whose brigade would thus have to +resist an assault delivered in the most dangerous form by a force of +twenty thousand men. From the point of view of the Boer +Commander-in-Chief, the danger was that the Glencoe and <a name="Page_21" id="Page_21" />Dundee force +should escape his blow by retiring to Ladysmith, or should be reinforced +by the bulk of the Ladysmith force before his own combined blow could be +delivered. It was essential for him to keep Sir George White at +Ladysmith and also to cut the communications between Glencoe and +Ladysmith. Accordingly, on Wednesday, the 18th, the Free State forces +from Albertina, the heads of whose columns had been shown on Tuesday, +moved forward towards Acton Homes and Bester's Station, and led Sir +George White to hope for the opportunity to strike a blow at them on +Thursday, the 18th. At the same time a detachment from the main column +was pushed on southwards, and was able on Thursday, while Sir George +White was watching the Free State columns, to reach the +Glencoe-Ladysmith line near Elandslaagte, to break it up, and to take +position to check any northward movement from Ladysmith. Everything was +thus ready for the blow to be struck at Dundee, but by some want of +concert the combination was imperfect. <a name="Page_22" id="Page_22" />On Friday morning the Landman's +Drift column, which had been reinforced during the previous days by a +part of the Newcastle column, was in position on the two hills to the +east of Dundee, and began shelling the British camp at long range. At +the same time the column from the north was within an easy march from +the British position. Sir Penn Symons decided promptly to attack the +Landman's Drift column and to check the northern column's advance. Three +battalions and a couple of batteries were devoted to the attack of the +Boer position, while a battalion and a battery were sent along the north +road to delay the approaching column. Both measures were successful. The +attack on the Boer position of Talana or Smith's Hill was a sample of +good tactical work, in which the three arms, or if mounted infantry may +be considered a special arm, the four arms, were alike judiciously and +boldly handled. The co-operation of rifle and gun, of foot and horse, +was well illustrated, and the Boer force was after <a name="Page_23" id="Page_23" />a hard fight driven +from its position and pursued to the eastward. Unhappily, Sir Penn +Symons, who himself took charge of the fight, was mortally wounded at +the moment of victory, leaving the command of the force in the hands of +the brigadier, Lieut.-Colonel Yule. The northern Boer column seems to +have disappeared early in the day. Possibly only its advance guard was +within striking distance and had no orders to make an independent attack +on the British delaying force.</p> + +<p>On Saturday morning Sir George White sent a small force of cavalry and +artillery to reconnoitre along the line of the interrupted railway. Some +two thousand Boers were found in position near Elandslaagte, and +accordingly during the day the British were reinforced by road and rail +from Ladysmith, until in the afternoon the Boer position could be +attacked by two battalions, three batteries, two cavalry regiments, and +a regiment and a half of mounted infantry—about three thousand five +hundred men. The Boers <a name="Page_24" id="Page_24" />were completely crushed and a large number of +prisoners taken, including the commander and the commanding officer of +the German contingent. The British loss, however, as at Glencoe, was +heavy, especially in officers. The force returned on Sunday to +Ladysmith.</p> + +<p>The British force at Dundee-Glencoe was thus still isolated, and until +now no detailed account of its movements has reached England. On +Saturday it was again attacked and, there is reason to believe, it again +repulsed a large Boer force, probably the main northern column. On +Sunday also the attack seems to have been renewed, this time apparently +by two columns, one of which may have been composed of Free State troops +from Muller's Pass. Either on Sunday or Monday General Yule determined +to withdraw from a position in which he could hardly hope without +destruction to resist the overwhelming numbers brought to bear against +him, especially as the Boer forces, either from the direction of +Muller's Pass or from Bester's <a name="Page_25" id="Page_25" />Station, were threatening his line of +retreat by the Glencoe-Ladysmith road. Accordingly, leaving in hospital +at Dundee those of his wounded who could not be moved, he retired along +the Helpmakaar road, which he followed as far as Beith, about fourteen +miles from Dundee, and near there he bivouacked on Monday night. On +Tuesday he continued his march from Beith towards Ladysmith, expecting +to reach Sunday's River, about sixteen miles, by dark. Sir George White, +informed of this movement and of the presence of a strong Boer force to +the west of the Ladysmith-Glencoe road, set out on Tuesday morning to +interpose between this force and General Yule, and by delivering a smart +attack at Reitfontein was able for that day to cover the retreat of +General Yule's brigade.</p> + +<p>The Boer Commander-in-Chief has thus, apparently, failed in his attempt +to crush one wing of the British force, and has accomplished no more +than bringing about its return to the main body, which must have been a +part of the original <a name="Page_26" id="Page_26" />British plan, unless it was thought that a British +brigade was capable of defeating four times its own number of Boers.</p> + +<p>The net result hitherto seems to be that the Boers have had the +strategical and the British the tactical advantage. The British troops +have proved their superiority; the Boers have shown that even against +troops of better training, spirit, and discipline, numbers must tell, +especially if directed according to a sound though not always +perfectly-executed plan.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="PLAYING_WITH_FIRE" id="PLAYING_WITH_FIRE" />PLAYING WITH FIRE</h2> + +<p><i>November 1st</i>, 1899</p> + +<p>The first week's campaign, dimly seen through scanty information, gives +a peculiar impression of the two armies. The British force seems like an +athlete in fine training but without an idea except that of +self-preservation, while the Boer army resembles a burly labourer, +clumsy in his move<a name="Page_27" id="Page_27" />ments, but knowing very well what he wants. The +British force at first is divided upon a front of forty miles, each of +its halves looking away from the other, so that there is little +attention to the weak point of such a front, the communication between +its parts. The first event is the cutting of this communication (on the +19th), and not until the 21st is there an attempt to clear it, and that +attempt, though it leads to a severe blow against the interposing Boer +force (Elandslaagte), is not successful, for the communication has +eventually to be sought on another route behind the direct one. The Boer +idea is, after severing the connection between the British halves, to +crush the weaker Dundee portion; but the execution is imperfect, so that +Sir Penn Symons has the opportunity, which he seizes instantly, to +defeat and drive off one of the columns before the other can assist it. +His successor, General Yule, the heir to his design, is no sooner +convinced by this move to Glencoe that his line of junction with +Ladysmith is threatened with attack by a great superiority than he sets +out by the nearest way <a name="Page_28" id="Page_28" />still open to him to rejoin the main body. The +Ladysmith force covers this march by a shielding movement (Reitfontein) +and the junction of the two British halves is effected. From Dundee to +Ladysmith is forty miles, and General Joubert unopposed would have +covered the distance in three days. He was before Dundee on Saturday, +the 21st, and there was no sign of him before Ladysmith until Saturday, +the 28th, or Sunday, the 29th. The original division of the British +force and the Battle of Glencoe thus produced a delay of several days in +the Boer advance: more could not have been expected from it. This first +impression ought to be supplemented by a consideration of Sir George +White's peculiarly difficult position, on which I will venture a word or +two.</p> + +<p>The Government, by its action in the first half of September, decided +that Sir George White must defend Natal for about five weeks<a name="FNanchor_A_1" id="FNanchor_A_1" /><a href="#Footnote_A_1" class="fnanchor">[A]</a> with +sixteen thousand men against the bulk of the <a name="Page_29" id="Page_29" />Boer army, which was +likely to be double his own force. It was evidently expected that he +should hold his ground near Ladysmith and thereby cover Natal to the +south of the Tugela. This double task was quite disproportionate to his +force. If Ladysmith had been a fortress, secure for a month or two +against assault, and able to take care of itself, the field force using +it as a base could no doubt have covered Natal. But in the absence of a +strong place there were only two ways by which a small force could delay +the Boer invasion. The force might let itself be invested and thereby +hold a proportion of the Boer army, leaving the balance to raid where it +could, or the campaign must be conducted as a retreat from position to +position. For a general with ten thousand men and only two hundred miles +of ground behind him to carry on a retreat in the face of a force double +his own so as to make it last five, weeks and to incur no disaster would +be a creditable achievement. Sir John Moore is thought to have shown +judg<a name="Page_30" id="Page_30" />ment and character by his decision to retreat before a greatly +superior force, commanded it is true by Napoleon himself. Moore when he +decided to retreat was about as far from Corunna as Dundee is from +Durban, and Moore's retreat took nineteen days. He had the sympathy if +not the effective help of the population, and was thought to have been +clever to get out of the trap laid for him. Sir George White seems to +have been expected as a matter of course to resist the Boer army, to +prevent the overrunning of Natal by the Boers, and to preserve his own +force from the beginning of October to the middle of November.<a name="FNanchor_B_2" id="FNanchor_B_2" /><a href="#Footnote_B_2" class="fnanchor">[B]</a> The +Government expected the Boers to attack as soon as they should hear of +the calling out of the Reserves, that being the reason why the Reserves +were not called out earlier. Therefore Sir George White's campaign was +timed to last from October 9th to November 15th (December 15th). I +conclude that the force to be given to Sir George White was fixed <a name="Page_31" id="Page_31" />by +Lord Lansdowne at haphazard, and that the calculations of the military +department were put on one side, this unbusinesslike way of playing with +National affairs and with soldier's lives being veiled from the +Secretary of State's mind by the phrase, "political reasons." But the +"political reason" for exposing a Nation's troops to unreasonable risks +and to needless loss must be bad reason and bad policy. Mr. Wyndham has +had the courage to assert that there was no haphazard, that his chief +knew quite well what he was doing, and that "the policy which the +Government adopted was deliberately adopted with the fullest knowledge +of possible consequences." If these words in Mr. Wyndham's speech of +October 20th mean anything, they mean that Lord Lansdowne and Mr. +Wyndham intended Sir George White to be left for a month to fight +against double his number of Boers; that they looked calmly forward to +the terrible losses and all the risks inseparable from such conditions. +That being the case, it seems to me <a name="Page_32" id="Page_32" />that it is Mr. Wyndham's duty, and +if he fails, Lord Lansdowne's duty, to tell the country plainly whether +in that deliberate resolve Lord Wolseley was a partner or an overruled +protester. Ministers have a higher duty than that to their party. The +Nation has as much confidence in Lord Rosebery as in Lord Salisbury and +the difference in principle between the two men is a vanishing quantity. +A change of ministry would be an inconvenience, but no more. But if the +public comes to believe, what I am sure is untrue, that the military +department at the War Office has blundered, the consequences will be so +grave that I hardly care to use the word which would describe them.</p> + +<p>I accept the maxim that it is no use crying over spilt milk or even over +spilt blood, but the maxim does not hold when the men whose decision +seems inexplicable are in a position to repeat it on a grander scale. +The temper of the Boers as early as June left no doubt in any South +African mind that if equality of rights and <a name="Page_33" id="Page_33" />British supremacy were to +be secured it would have to be by the sword. The Government alone among +those who cared for the Empire failed to realise this in time. That has +been admitted. The excess of hope for peace has been condoned and is +being atoned for on the battlefields of Natal. But to-day the temper of +Europe leaves no room for doubt that, in case of a serious reverse in +Natal, Europe if it can will interfere. Have Mr. Goschen and Lord +Lansdowne worked out that problem, or is there to be a repetition in the +case of the continental Powers—an adversary very different from the +Boers—of patience, postponement, and haphazard? It is not the situation +in South Africa that gives its gravity to the present aspect of things, +but the situation in Europe. Upon the next fortnight's fighting in Natal +may turn the fate not merely of Natal and of South Africa, but of the +British Empire. That this must be the case was plain enough at +Christmas, and has been said over and over again. Yet this was the +crisis <a name="Page_34" id="Page_34" />which was met by sending to the decisive point a reinforcement +of ten thousand men to do the best they could along with the six +thousand already there during a five weeks' campaign.</p> + +<p>After reconnaissance on Friday and Saturday (October 27th-8th) Sir +George White, finding a large Boer force in front of him at Ladysmith, +determined to hit out on Monday. Suppose Ladysmith to be the centre of a +compass card, the Boers were spread across the radii from N. to E. Sir +George meaning to clear the Boers from a position near N.E. prepared to +move forward towards N.E. and towards E., sending in each direction +about a brigade of infantry and a brigade division of field artillery. +He sent two battalions and a mounted battery towards N. The party sent +to N. started after dark on Sunday; the other parties, making ready in +the night, set forward at dawn. There was no enemy in position at N.E. +The force sent towards E. pushed back a Boer force, which retreated only +to enable a second Boer force to <a name="Page_35" id="Page_35" />take the British E. column in +flank—apparently its left flank. The N.E. column had to be brought up +to cover the retirement of the E. column. When these two columns +returned to Ladysmith the N. column was still out. Long after dark Sir +George White learned that the N. column, which had lost its battery and +its reserve rifle ammunition by a stampede of the mules, had been +surrounded by a far stronger Boer force, had held its ground until the +last cartridge was gone, and that then the survivors had accepted +quarter and surrendered.</p> + +<p>Sir George White manfully takes upon himself the blame for this +misfortune. His portentous blunders were in sending out the party to a +distance and in taking no steps to keep in communication with it or to +support it. The detachment of a small party to a distant point is a +habit of Indian warfare. It is out of place against an enemy of European +race, for the detachment is sure to be destroyed if the enemy has a +capable commander. Every man in the <a name="Page_36" id="Page_36" />Ladysmith force will have felt on +Tuesday that the commander had make mistakes which he ought not to have +made. The question is what effect this consciousness will have upon the +spirits of the force.</p> + +<p>Sir George White was reinforced before and during the action, a +battalion of rifles having arrived in the morning and a party of +bluejackets with heavy quick-firers coming up during the day. Further +reinforcements were sent towards him from the squadron after the action, +so that his force is still about sixteen thousand. If he does not elect +to retreat, a course which might demoralise the troops, he may well be +able to defend Ladysmith until relieved; but the first business of the +troops now on their way out will be to relieve him, and until that has +been arranged for, it is to be feared that Mafeking and Kimberley must +wait.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_A_1" id="Footnote_A_1" /><a href="#FNanchor_A_1"><span class="label">[A]</span></a> Thirteen weeks, as we now (March) know from the official +correspondence.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_B_2" id="Footnote_B_2" /><a href="#FNanchor_B_2"><span class="label">[B]</span></a> I should have said December.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="HOW_WEAK_POLICY_LEADS_TO_BAD_STRATEGY" id="HOW_WEAK_POLICY_LEADS_TO_BAD_STRATEGY" /><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37" />HOW WEAK POLICY LEADS TO BAD STRATEGY</h2> + +<p><i>November 8th</i>, 1899</p> + + +<p>The war is doing us good. It is giving us the beginnings of political +education in a department that has been utterly neglected. It may be +worth while to review the whole situation of to-day, and to ask how the +man in the street can lend a helping hand.</p> + +<p>The British Government, primarily representing the people of Great +Britain, has for many years been an affair of party; the dominant idea +of the party leaders has been when out of office to get in, and when in +to stay. The way to manage this was to cajole the man in the street, and +as he was a busy man getting his living and not much concerned about +watching the whole globe, the party leaders made bids for his support; +votes to be distributed on the principle that one man was as good as +another; taxation to be made light for him, and, consequently, as the +money had to be found, heavy <a name="Page_38" id="Page_38" />for some one else. Each party offered what +it sincerely believed to be for the general good; but the kind of +general good thought of was the personal improvement or comfort of each +individual or of a mass of individuals. While this was going on in +British towns and counties, something was happening on the neglected +globe. There was a large part of the British Nation living on other +continents without votes in any British town or county, yet looking to +the British Government to champion something they loved, which has come +to be called the Empire. There were also great nations emulating the +British in the notion that the world was their inheritance, and that +they would take possession of a fair share of it. Their quarrels had +driven them to perfect their armies and to build navies. Each of them +was annoyed to find that in the scramble for the heritage some one had +been before them. On the best plots the British flag was flying, yet +Great Britain had not much Army and was very careless about her Navy. +The strong powers began to elbow her a little. The <a name="Page_39" id="Page_39" />British Government +was not disturbed by these hints from the globe. A Government made by a +Parliament in which every member represented a town or a county or a +scrap of a town or county, and in which no one represented the Nation, +no one the Empire, and no one the Globe, felt bound to keep its eye upon +towns and counties, the Opposition benches, and the next election. Why +should it stand up for the British outside, and why concern itself about +other Powers looking round the globe for claims to peg out? The +colonists who looked to the British Government for championship were +snubbed; the foreign Powers working for elbow-room were politely made +way for, or if they brushed against the British coat-sleeve and caused +an exclamation received a meek apology. This was the normal frame of +mind of British party leaders and ministers, from which they have never +quite emerged. They were asleep, dreaming of a parochial millennium.</p> + +<p>But outside of cabinets there were a few men <a name="Page_40" id="Page_40" />who used their eyes. Sir +Charles Dilke took a turn round the globe, and when he came back said +"Greater Britain." That was an idea, and ideas are like the plague—they +are catching. Sir John Seeley took a tour through the history of the +last three centuries, and said "Expansion of England"; that meant +continuity in the Nation's life not merely in space but in time. +Whatever the cause, a few years ago there set in an epidemic of fresh +ideas, tending to reveal the Nation as more than a crowd of individuals +and the Empire as the Nation's work and the Nation's cause. The +Government did all it could to resist the infection. Instead of standing +up for the Empire it was bent on passing measures in the sense of its +own party. It ran away from Russia, from France, and from Germany. But +the new ideas grew; every globetrotter became a Nationalist and an +Imperialist, and shed his party skin. Then came Fashoda, and Lord +Rosebery's action in that matter killed what was left of party.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41" />The case of the British in South Africa cried aloud for British action. +But the Government was still hidebound in bad traditions, thinking that +democracy means the tail wagging the dog, not seeing that if the +statesman leads straight along the path of duty the Nation is sure to +follow him. Happily, a statesman was sent to Cape Town, probably because +the Cabinet hardly realised how big a man he was. Sir Alfred Milner +mastered his case, thought out his cause, and at the opportune moment +put it before the Government. The first result was the Bloemfontein +conference. There, with the prescience and the strength of a Cavour or a +Bismarck, Milner put the issue: either the minimum concession which will +secure the political equality of the two races or war. Kruger's +obstinate refusal of the concessions required showed plainly that it +would be war. There was only one possible way of averting war; if fifty +thousand men had been at once sent to South Africa, <a name="Page_42" id="Page_42" />Kruger and his +people would have known where they were, and might have accepted +possible terms, those offered at Bloemfontein. The moment of the +breaking off of the conference was the crisis, and to appreciate men you +must watch them in a crisis. Mr. Balfour expressed his unbounded +confidence in Kruger's sweet reasonableness and in the justice of the +British cause; he could not believe there would be war. Mr. Chamberlain +entered into ambiguous negotiations, beginning in a way that made +everyone, especially Kruger, imagine that the Government would accept +less than the Bloemfontein minimum. Of preparing to coerce the Boers +there was no sign. The Boers began to get their forces in order. In +England big speeches were made; "hands" were "put to the plough"; but at +the end of July no military force was made ready. At length, when Natal +appealed for protection against the Boer army, ten thousand men were +ordered so as to bring up the garrison <a name="Page_43" id="Page_43" />of the colony to some seventeen +thousand. After the ten thousand not another man was sent until October +20th.</p> + +<p>The present situation is the necessary outcome of the Government's +action between the beginning of June and October 7th, when the orders +for calling out the Reserves and for mobilisation were issued. The +Cabinet's decisions involved that Sir George White with his small force +should have to bear the brunt of the Boer attack from the outbreak of +hostilities until the time when the Army Corps should be landed and +ready to move. That was at least five weeks<a name="FNanchor_C_3" id="FNanchor_C_3" /><a href="#Footnote_C_3" class="fnanchor">[C]</a> of which three have +elapsed, and in the three weeks Sir George White, after one or two +initial mishaps of no great consequence by themselves, is invested at +Ladysmith, while Mafeking and Kimberley are waiting for relief, and the +Free State Boers are invading the northern provinces of Cape Colony and +trying to enlist the doubtful Dutch farmers. This is not a pleasant +situation <a name="Page_44" id="Page_44" />for the Nation that declares itself the paramount Power in +South Africa. Three questions may be discussed with regard to it: What +are the risks still run, what are the probabilities, and how can we help +to prevent such a situation from recurring?</p> + +<p>To see what has been risked on the chance that the force under Sir +George White may hold its own we must look from the Boer side. The Boer +commander hopes, or ought to hope, to destroy Sir George White's force +before it can be relieved. He has a chance of succeeding in this, for an +investing force has with modern arms a great advantage over the force it +surrounds. The outside circle is so much larger than the inside one that +it can bring many more rifles into play; it exposes no flanks, and the +interior force cannot attack it without exposing one or both flanks. +With anything like equal skill and determination the surrounding force +is sure to win in time. But if the time is limited the surrounding force +must hurry the result by <a name="Page_45" id="Page_45" />assaults, in which it loses the advantage of +the defensive. If Joubert and his men have the courage and determination +to make repeated assaults it may go hard with the defenders of +Ladysmith. But the defenders hitherto have had the counterbalancing +advantage of a superior artillery. I think it reasonable to expect that +with the better discipline of his force, its greater cohesion and +mobility and the high spirit which animates it, Sir George White will be +able to defy the Boers for many weeks. But suppose the unexpected to +happen, as it sometimes does in war, and Sir George White's resistance +to be overcome? Such a victory would have a tremendous effect upon the +hopes and spirits of the Boers. It would almost double the fighting +value of their army, and would probably bring to their side many of +their colonial kinsmen. Joubert would become more daring, and, if Sir +Redvers Buller had divided his force, would attack its nearest portion +with a prospect of success. The failure of Sir Redvers Buller would +<a name="Page_46" id="Page_46" />then not be outside the bounds of possibility. What that would involve +there is no need to expound—the Empire would be in peril of its +existence. We may feel pretty sure that things will not come to such a +pass; that another week will show Sir George White well holding his own +and a part of the Army Corps preparing to move. Yet it would be prudent +to guard against accidents by sending further troops to the Cape. Ten +thousand men ordered now would be at Cape Town by the middle of +December; but every delay in ordering them will mean, in case they +should in December be wanted, a period of suspense like that through +which we are now passing.</p> + +<p>The moral of the present situation seems to me to be that we should +scrutinise our political personages, noting which of them have betrayed +their inability to see what was happening and to look ahead, bringing +down their figures in our minds to their natural size, and exalting +those who have shown themselves equal to their tasks. <a name="Page_47" id="Page_47" />The man in the +street might do well to consider whether the great departments of +Government, such as the War Office and the Army, should for ever be +entrusted to men who have not even a nodding acquaintance with the +business which their departments have to transact, the business called +War. Success in that as in other business depends on putting knowledge +in power.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_C_3" id="Footnote_C_3" /><a href="#FNanchor_C_3"><span class="label">[C]</span></a> We now know that the time was thirteen weeks.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="TWO_VIEWS_OR_TRUE_VIEWS" id="TWO_VIEWS_OR_TRUE_VIEWS" />TWO VIEWS OR TRUE VIEWS?</h2> + +<p><i>November 15th</i>, 1899</p> + +<p>October 11th saw the opening of hostilities, and of the first chapter of +the war, the conflict between Sir George White with sixteen thousand men +and General Joubert with something like double that number. The first +chapter had three sections: First, the unfortunate division of Sir +George White's force and the isolation <a name="Page_48" id="Page_48" />of and unsuccessful attack upon +his right wing; secondly, the reunion of his wings at Ladysmith; +thirdly, the concentration of the Boers against the force at Ladysmith +and the surrounding or investment of Sir George White. This third +section is not yet ended, but the gathering of the forces at Cape Town +and at Port Natal points to its conclusion and to the opening of the +second chapter. The arrival of the first portion of the transport +flotilla is the only important change since last week.</p> + +<p>I thought from the beginning that the division of Sir George White's +force was strategically unsound, and the position of Ladysmith a bad one +because it lent itself to investment. It is now known that the division +of forces and the decision to hold Ladysmith, even until it should be +turned and surrounded, was due not to strategical but to what are called +political considerations. The Government of Natal thought that if the +troops were withdrawn from Glencoe—Dundee, or the whole force +<a name="Page_49" id="Page_49" />collected, say at Colenso instead of Ladysmith, the appearance of +retreat would have a bad effect on the natives, the Kaffirs, and perhaps +the Dutch farmers. Accordingly, out of deference to the view of the +local Government, the General consented to do his work in what he knew +to be the wrong way. This is a perfect specimen of the way in which wars +are "muddled"—I borrow the expression from Lord Rosebery—and it +deserves thinking over.</p> + +<p>No popular delusion is more extraordinary and none more widespread than +the notion that there are two ways of looking at a war, one the military +aspect and the other the governmental or civil aspect, that both are +legitimate, and that, as the Government is above the general, in case of +a clash the military view must fall into the background. This notion is +quite wrong, and the more important the position of the men who have got +it into their heads, the more harm it does. There is only one right way +of looking at war, and that consists in seeing <a name="Page_50" id="Page_50" />it as it is. If two men +both take a true view of an operation of war, they will agree, whether +they are both soldiers, both civilians, or one a soldier and the other a +civilian. It does not matter what you call their view, but, as a soldier +who knows his business ought to have true views about it, the proper +name for the true view is the military view. If the civil view is a +different one it must be wrong. In this case the belief that a retreat +from a position to which troops had been sent would have a bad effect +was no doubt founded on fact. But for that reason the troops ought not +to have been sent there until it was ascertained that the forward move +was consistent with the best plan of campaign. Some person other than +the general charged with the defence of Natal had been arranging his +troops for him without consulting him, and had done it badly. Then came +the question of moving them back, and the probable "bad effect" was +raised as a scarecrow. But the reply to that was that the bad effect of +<a name="Page_51" id="Page_51" />retreat is not half so bad as the bad effect of defeat, or of the +embarrassments of a position which, being strategically wrong, may +involve mishaps.</p> + +<p>When a civil government moves troops in connection with war it ought to +move them to the right places; that is according to sound strategy or +sound military principles. In short, whoever deals in war ought to +understand war. The reader may think that a commonplace, but in reality +it is like too many commonplaces—a truth that very important people +forget at critical moments. The first principle of action in war is to +have two men to one at the decisive point. How comes it, then, that for +six weeks Sir George White has to defend Natal with one against two? +Evidently the first principle has been violated. It came about exactly +in the same way as the putting one of Sir George White's brigades at +Dundee. The Government managed it; it was a fragment of the civil view +of war. How long, then, the reader may ask, should the civil view of war +be allowed scope and when should the <a name="Page_52" id="Page_52" />military view be called in? Let me +be permitted to alter the labels and instead of "military view" to say +"view based upon knowledge"; and instead of "civil view" to say, "view +not based upon knowledge." I think that all dealings in war should be +guided by the view based upon knowledge and that the other view should +be for ever left out of account.</p> + +<p>My unpopular belief that nobody should meddle with the management of a +war unless he understands it is, I admit, most uncomfortable, for as a +war is always managed by the Government I am obliged to think that every +Government ought to understand war. But in this country the Government +is entrusted to a Committee of Peers and Members of Parliament, none of +whom is supposed to be able to take a military view of war. If my belief +is right, a British Cabinet is very liable to take a civilian view, and +the consequences might be awkward. In fact they are awkward, as the +South African war up to date abundantly reveals.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53" />The military view of war is that it consists in the employment of force +to compel an adversary to do your will. The employment of force is +required in the management of a Nation's affairs when the Nation has +quite made up its mind to have something done which another Nation or +State has made up its mind shall not be done. When there is this +point-blank conflict of wills, and neither side can give way, there must +be war; and the military view is that when you see war coming you should +get your troops into their places, because the first moves are the most +important, and a bad first move is very apt to lead to checkmate.</p> + +<p>In the case of South Africa the true view was taken at the right time by +Sir Alfred Milner. He was instructed that Great Britain would take up +the Uitlander's cause, and sent to Bloemfontein to see whether President +Kruger was prepared for an equitable settlement. He proposed such a +settlement, and, as President Kruger declared the terms impossible, he +made it plain that if there <a name="Page_54" id="Page_54" />were no settlement on such lines as he had +suggested, there must be war. That was the true view, and the moment +when the conference was broken off was the moment for Great Britain to +get her forces ready with all convenient speed. But Mr. Balfour on the +day when he heard the news took a civilian view; instead of looking the +war in the face he expressed the hope that President Kruger would change +his mind. That hope the Government cherished, as we now know, until the +end of the first week of September, when the Boer forces were so far on +in their preparations that Natal had been begging for protection. The +Government then sent ten thousand men, making the sixteen thousand of +Sir George White. Yet the Government at that time had before it the +military view that to compel the Boers to accept Great Britain's will +seventy thousand men would be required. Evidently, then, the sending of +the ten thousand arose not from the military view, but the civil view +that war is a disagreeable <a name="Page_55" id="Page_55" />business, and that it is to be hoped there +will be none of it, or at any rate as little as possible.</p> + +<p>The misfortunes in Natal will probably be repaired and the war in time +brought to its conclusion—the submission of the Boers to Great +Britain's will. But suppose the dispute had been with a great Power, and +that in such a case the military view had been shut out from the day the +negotiations began until the great Power was ready? The result must have +been disaster and defeat on a great scale. Disaster and defeat on a +great scale are as certain to come as the sun to rise to-morrow morning +unless the Government arranges to take the military view of war into its +midst. There will have to be a strategist in the Cabinet if the British +Empire is to be maintained. This is another unpopular view and is +hateful to all politicians, who declare that it is unconstitutional. But +it does not, in fact, involve any constitutional change, far less change +than has been made since 1895 at the instance of Mr. Balfour; and it +would be better to alter a little <a name="Page_56" id="Page_56" />the system of managing the Nation's +affairs than to risk the overthrow of the Empire.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="BULLERS_PROBLEM" id="BULLERS_PROBLEM" />BULLER'S PROBLEM</h2> + +<p><i>November 22nd</i>, 1899</p> + +<p>The six weeks of anxious waiting are over, and to-day the second chapter +of the war begins. On either side of the Boer States a division of Sir +Redvers Buller's force is now in touch with the enemy, and at either +point there may be a battle any day.</p> + +<p>The small British forces sent out or organised on the spot before the +declaration of war have kept the enemy's principal forces occupied until +now, so that he has been unable to make any decisive use of the margin +of superiority which he possessed over and above what was needed to keep +the British detachments where they were. The resisting power of these +detachments is, however, not inexhaustible; they have kept at bay for a +considerable time forces much more <a name="Page_57" id="Page_57" />numerous than themselves, and the +first move required of the fresh British forces is to take the pressure +off them and to combine with them. The centre of gravity is in Natal, +for there is the principal Boer army, probably two-thirds of the whole +Boer power, and there, too, a whole British division is invested. A +palpable success here for either side must go far to decide the issue of +the war.</p> + +<p>General Joubert's force in Natal is so strong that while keeping his +grip upon Ladysmith, where Sir George White has not less than ten +thousand men, he has been able to move south with a considerable force, +perhaps fifteen thousand men, to oppose Sir C.F. Clery's advance. Sir +C.F. Clery has already at least seven, and possibly nine, strong +battalions, to which within a day or two three more will be added, and +perhaps as many as thirty-six guns, with parties of bluejackets and +various Natal levies. His interest is to delay battle until all his +force has come up. The advanced troops seem <a name="Page_58" id="Page_58" />to be spread along the line +from Mooi River to Estcourt, and the Boer forces are facing them on a +long line to the east of the railway from a point beyond Estcourt to a +point below Mooi River. The Boers are on the flank from which their +attack would be most dangerous, and seem to aim at interposing between +the parts of Sir C.F. Clery's force, and at a convergent attack in +superior strength upon his advance guard at Estcourt.</p> + +<p>I should have expected the advance parties of Sir C.F. Clery's force to +have fallen back as the Boers approached. The attempt to keep up the +connection between the parts of a concentrating force by means of the +railway strikes me as very dangerous from the moment that the enemy is +in the neighbourhood. The important thing for Sir C.F. Clery is not +whether his battle takes place twenty miles nearer to Ladysmith or +twenty miles farther away, but that it should be an unmistakable +victory, so that after it the Boer force engaged should be unable to +offer any <a name="Page_59" id="Page_59" />further serious hindrance to his advance. To gain an end of +this kind a general should not merely bring up all the troops from the +rear, falling back for them if necessary, but should take care that none +can be cut off by the enemy in his front. A decisive victory by Sir C.F. +Clery or by Sir Redvers Duller, who may feel this action to be so +important as to justify his presence, would leave no doubt as to the +issue of the war. An indecisive battle would postpone indefinitely the +relief of Ladysmith and leave the future of the campaign in suspense. +Defeat would be disastrous, for it would probably involve the ultimate +loss of Sir George White's force. For these reasons I regard the battle +shortly to be fought in Natal as the first decisive action of the war, +and am astonished that a larger proportion of Sir Redvers Buller's force +has not been sent to take part in it.</p> + +<p>The whole business of a commander-in-chief in war is to find out the +decisive point and to have the bulk of his forces there in time. If he +can <a name="Page_60" id="Page_60" />do that on the half-dozen occasions which make the skeleton of a +war he has fulfilled his mission. He never need do anything else, for +all the rest can be done by his subordinates. Not every commander +fulfils this simple task because not every one refuses to let himself be +distracted. All sorts of calls are made upon him to which he finds it +hard to be deaf; very often he is doubtful whether one or another +subordinate is competent, and then he is tempted to do that +subordinate's work for him. That is always a mistake because it means +neglect of the commander's own work, which is more important.</p> + +<p>The task, though it appears simple is by no means easy, as the present +war and the present situation show. While the fate of the Empire hangs +in the balance between Ladysmith and Pietermaritzburg, a good deal +depends on the course of events between Kimberley and Queenstown. In the +northern part of Cape Colony the Dutch inhabitants are naturally divided +in their sympathies, and the loyally <a name="Page_61" id="Page_61" />disposed have been sorely tried by +the long weeks of waiting for some sign of Great Britain's power. None +has yet been forthcoming. They know that Kimberley is besieged and that +the British Government has done little for its defence. During the last +week or two they have been threatened by the Free State Boers, and have +seen Stormberg and other places evacuated by the British. At length the +Free State Boers have come among them, marched into their towns, +proclaimed the annexation of the country, and commandeered the citizens. +If this goes on the Boer armies will soon be swelled to great dimensions +by recruits from the British colony, a process which cannot go on much +longer without shaking the faith of the whole Dutch population in the +supremacy of Great Britain. Some manifestation of British strength, +energy, and will is evidently urgently needed in this region. Moreover, +Kimberley is hard beset, and its fall would seem to the whole +countryside to be the visible sign of a British collapse. No <a name="Page_62" id="Page_62" />wonder, +then, that Sir Redvers Duller has sent Lord Methuen as soon as he could +be ready to the relief of Kimberley. The column consists of the Brigade +of Guards, the Ninth Brigade, made up of such battalions as were at hand +to replace Hildyard's brigade (sent to Natal), of a naval detachment, a +cavalry regiment, and two or three batteries, besides local levies. +Kimberley is five or six days' march from Orange River, and at some +point on the way the Boers will no doubt try to stop the advance. I feel +confident that Lord Methuen, whom I know as an accomplished tactician, +will so win his battle as not to need to do the same work twice over.</p> + +<p>The advance of Lord Methuen's division renders imperative the protection +of the long railway line from Cape Town to Orange River. This seems to +be entrusted to General Forestier-Walker's forces, reduced to two +battalions, and to General Wauchope's Highland brigade. One battalion +only is with General Gatacre at Queenstown, and two battalions of +General <a name="Page_63" id="Page_63" />Lyttelton's brigade which have reached Cape Town are as yet +unaccounted for in the telegrams.</p> + +<p>How, then, if all his forces are thus employed could Sir Redvers Buller, +by taking thought, have added anything to Sir C.F. Clery's force on the +Mooi River? The answer is that a commander's decision must usually be a +choice of risks. To have sent on to Natal a part of the troops now in +Cape Colony would have been to have increased the danger of the Cape +Dutch going over to the Boers. Which was the less of two possible +evils—the spread of disaffection in the Cape Colony or the loss of Sir +George White's force? No one at home can decide with confidence because +the knowledge here available of the situation in either colony is very +limited. Subject to this reserve, I should be disposed to think the +danger in Natal the more serious, and the chance of losing Colonel +Kekewich's force a mere trifle in comparison with the defeat of General +Joubert, for the effect <a name="Page_64" id="Page_64" />of Joubert's defeat would be felt on the Orange +River, whereas the relief of Kimberley can hardly produce an appreciable +effect on the situation in Natal.</p> + +<p>The difficult problem of which General Buller is now giving his solution +has been created for him by the Government, which from June to October +was playing with a war which according to its own admissions it did not +seriously mean. "Mistakes in the original assembling of armies can +hardly be repaired during the whole course of the campaigns, but all +arrangements of this sort can be considered long beforehand and—if the +troops are ready for war and the transport service is organised—must +lead to the result intended." So wrote Moltke in 1874 in one of the most +famous passages ever published. If last spring the Government or even +the Secretary of State for War alone had been in earnest, had been doing +what plain duty required, the nature and conditions of the South African +war would have been thought out, and the military judgment <a name="Page_65" id="Page_65" />which was to +conduct it would have been set to devise the proper opening. That would +have consisted in landing simultaneously, thirty thousand men at Durban +and forty thousand at the Cape. These forces would not have moved +forward until they were complete and ready, and though the Boers might +meantime have overrun their borders, the British advance when it came +would have been continuous, irresistible, and decisive. Instead of that +the Government gave the Boers notice in June that there might be war, so +that the Boers had the whole summer to get ready.</p> + +<p>When in September the Government began to think of action the only idea +was defending Natal. But this defence was not thought of as part of a +war. The idea never seems to have occurred to the Government that the +need for defence in Natal could not arise except in case of war, and +that then to defend Natal would be impracticable except by beating the +Boer army. Accordingly, the handful of troops in Natal were posted +<a name="Page_66" id="Page_66" />without regard to the probable outlines of the war, and therefore, +wrongly posted. The consequence was that when war came they could not be +concentrated except at the cost of fighting and loss, and of a retreat +which gave the enemy the belief that he had won a victory. Even then the +point held—Ladysmith—was too far north and liable to be turned. All +these mistakes, made before Sir George White arrived, were evident to +that general when he first reached Ladysmith, but they could not then be +remedied, and he had to do, and has done, the best he could in the +circumstances. The fact of Sir George White's investment compels Sir +Redvers Buller to begin his campaign with the effort to relieve him, and +the fact that Kimberley is held by a weak force compels him to divide +his force when his one desire certainly must have been to keep it +united. In the expected battle at Mooi River Sir Redvers Buller will be +trying to make up for the faulty arrangements of September. The desire +to hold as much of the railway as possible—also due to the false +position of Sir <a name="Page_67" id="Page_67" />George White's force—has, perhaps, led General +Hildyard to spread out his force over too long a line. But, in spite of +the difficulties created by errors at the start, I am not without hopes +that these remarks will soon be put out of date by a decisive British +victory.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="FIGHTING_AGAINST_ODDS" id="FIGHTING_AGAINST_ODDS" />FIGHTING AGAINST ODDS</h2> + +<p><i>November 29th</i>, 1899</p> + +<p>Two factors in the present war were impressed upon my mind at the +beginning: first, that the British Army was never in better condition as +regards the zeal and skill of its officers, the training and discipline +of the men, and the organisation of the field services; secondly, that +the Government had deliberately handicapped that Army by giving the +Boers many weeks' clear start in which to try with their whole forces to +overwhelm the small British parties sent out at haphazard to delay them. +The whole course <a name="Page_68" id="Page_68" />of events up to now has been underlining these two +judgments. The British troops gave proof of their qualities at Talana +Hill, at Elandslaagte, and on the trying retreat from Dundee. There is +no more difficult task in war than a frontal attack upon a position +defended by the repeating rifle. Good judges have over and over again +pronounced it impossible. But the British troops have done it again and +again. General Hildyard's attack on Beacon Hill, an arduous action for a +definite purpose which was effected—the re-opening of the railway from +Estcourt towards the south—was a creditable achievement on the Natal +side. On the Cape side Lord Methuen's advance from Orange River is an +example of the greatest determination and energy coupled with caution on +the part of the general, and of the most brilliant courage on the part +of the troops. I thought it probable that so skilful a tactician as Lord +Methuen would combine flank with frontal attacks. It seems that the +conditions gave him little or no opportunity to do that, and he has <a name="Page_69" id="Page_69" />had +three times to assault and drive back a well-posted enemy. At Belmont, +on the 23rd, and at Enslin, on the 25th, Lord Methuen had a numerical +superiority large enough to justify an attack in which heavy loss was to +be expected. The losses were not exceptionally great, and this fact +proves that the British troops are of very much higher quality than +their adversaries. At Modder River, on the 28th, the numbers were +practically equal. The Boers were strongly entrenched and concealed, and +could not be out-flanked. That they were driven back at all is as proud +a record for our troops as any army could desire, for the attacking +force ought to have been destroyed. The engagement may well have been +"one of the hardest and most trying in the annals of the British Army," +and if the victory is a glory to the soldiers, the resolve to attack in +such conditions reveals in Lord Methuen the strength of character which +is the finest quality of a commander.</p> + +<p>If it is well that we at home should appreciate <a name="Page_70" id="Page_70" />the splendid results of +many years of good teaching given to the officers and men of the Army, +results to be attributed in great part, though not exclusively, to the +efforts of Lord Wolseley and his school, it is no less our duty to face +squarely the fact that the Nation has not done its duty by this Army. +The Nation in this sense means the people acting through the Government. +To see how the Government has treated the Army we have only to survey +the situation in South Africa. Fifty thousand men were ordered out on +October 7th,—an Army Corps, a cavalry division and troops for the line +of communications. The design was that, with the communications covered +by the special troops sent for that duty, the Army Corps and the cavalry +division, making together a body of forty thousand men, should cross the +Orange River and sweep through the Free State towards Pretoria, while +Natal was protected by a special force there posted.</p> + +<p>But long before the Army Corps was complete <a name="Page_71" id="Page_71" />this plan had been torn to +pieces by the Boers. Sir George White's force, being hardly more than a +third the strength of the army with which the Boers invaded Natal, could +not stop the invasion, though it could hold out when surrounded and +invested.</p> + +<p>Accordingly the first task of Sir Redvers Buller was to stem the flood +of Boer invasion in. Natal and to relieve Sir George White. For this +purpose he is none too strong with three out of the six infantry +brigades that make up the Army Corps. The remaining three brigades could +not carry out the original programme of sweeping through the Free State, +and meantime the Boers have overrun the great district between Colesberg +and Barkly East, between the Orange River and the Stormberg range. +General Gatacre with a weak brigade at Queenstown is watching this +invasion which as yet he seems hardly strong enough to repel. The rest +of the troops are required in the protection of the railways, of the +depôt of stores at De Aar, and the bridge at Orange <a name="Page_72" id="Page_72" />River. But +Kimberley was invested and Mafeking in danger, and the effect of the +fall of either of them upon the Cape Dutch might be serious. Something +must be done. Accordingly Lord Methuen with two brigades set out towards +Kimberley. His task is both difficult and dangerous; he has not merely +to break the Boer resistance by sheer hard fighting, but to run the risk +that Boer forces from other quarters, perhaps from the army invading +Cape Colony, may be brought up in his rear, and that he may in this way +be turned, enveloped, and invested. The scattering of forces is due to +the initial error of sending too small a force to Natal, and of making +no provision for its reinforcement until after a six weeks' interval. +The consequence is that instead of our generals being able to attack the +Boers with the advantage of superior numbers, with the concomitant power +of combining flank and frontal attacks, and with the possibility of thus +making their victories decisive by enveloping tactics or by effective +<a name="Page_73" id="Page_73" />pursuit, the British Army has to make attack after attack against +prepared fronts, which though they prove its valour can lead to no +decisive results, except at the cost of quite disproportionate losses.</p> + +<p>It is possible, and indeed we all hope that the Boer forces, at first +under-estimated, may now be over-estimated, and that Sir Kedvers Buller, +whose advance is probably now beginning, will not have to deal with +superior numbers. In that case his blows will shatter the Boer army in +Natal, so that by the time he has joined hands with Sir George White the +enemy will feel himself overmastered, will lose the initiative, and +begin to shrink from the British attacks. That state of things in Natal +would lighten Lord Methuen's work. But it would be rash to assume such +favourable conditions. We must be prepared for the spectacle of hard and +prolonged fighting in Natal, and for the heavy losses that accompany it. +The better our troops come out of their trials the more are we bound to +ask <a name="Page_74" id="Page_74" />ourselves how it came about that they were set to fight under +difficulties, usually against superior numbers, though the British force +devoted to the war was larger than the whole Boer army? The cause of +this is that a small force was sent out on September 8th, and nothing +more ordered until October 7th, and the cause of that arrangement was +that the Government, as Mr. Balfour has naively told us, never believed +that there would be a war, or that the Free State would join the +Transvaal, until the forces of both States were on the move. Our +statesmen negotiated through June, July, and August, talked in July of +"putting their hands to the plough," and yet took no step to meet the +possibility that the Boers would prove in earnest and attack the British +colonies until the Boer riflemen were assembling at Standerton and +patrolling into Natal. Does not this argue a defect in the training of +our public men, a defect which may be described as ignorance of the +nature of war and of the way in which it should be provided for? Mr. +Balfour <a name="Page_75" id="Page_75" />admits that his eyes have been opened, but does not that imply +that they had been shut when they ought to have been open? If the +members of the Government failed to take the situation seriously in +June, what is to be thought of the members of the Opposition, some of +whom even now cannot see that the choice was between abandoning Empire +and coercing the Boers? The moral is that we should, if possible, +strengthen the Government by sending to Parliament representatives of +the younger school, which is National and Imperialist rather than +Conservative or Liberal.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="THE_DELAY_OF_REINFORCEMENTS" id="THE_DELAY_OF_REINFORCEMENTS" />THE DELAY OF REINFORCEMENTS</h2> + +<p><i>December 7th</i>, 1899</p> + +<p>The conditions in South Africa are still critical; indeed, more so than +ever. There are three campaigns in progress, and, though there are good +grounds for hoping that in each case the balance will turn in favour of +the British, the <a name="Page_76" id="Page_76" />hope rests rather upon faith than upon that numerical +superiority which it is the first duty of a Government to give to its +generals.</p> + +<p>Lord Methuen's advance came to a pause after the battle of Modder River, +now nine days ago. There appear to have been good reasons for the delay. +First of all, it is necessary that when, or soon after, Kimberley is +reached the railway to De Aar should be available both for the removal +of non-combatants, and for the transport of provisions, ammunition and +guns. This involves the repair in some way of the bridge at Modder +River. Next, it was proved-by that battle, in which the Boer force was +large enough to make the victory most difficult, and by the arrival +after the battle of fresh Boer forces, that Lord Methuen's force was not +strong enough for its work. If a whole day and heavy loss were needed to +bring about the retreat of eleven thousand Boers from a prepared +position it might be impracticable for Lord Methuen without more force +to drive away fifteen or eighteen thousand Boers from a prepared +position at Spyt<a name="Page_77" id="Page_77" />fontein, and the possibility of such a body of Boers +being at that point had to be reckoned with. Lord Methuen needed more +infantry, more artillery, and more cavalry. Of none of the three arms +had General Forestier-Walker any abundant supply. If he has sent on, +besides a cavalry regiment, the whole of the Highland brigade and three +batteries of artillery, Lord Methuen would be none too strong. It is +essential that, having started, he should defeat the Boers again and +reach Kimberley, for a failure would be a disaster. I have great +confidence in Lord Methuen and his troops; what determination and +bravery can do they will accomplish, and I feel pretty sure that in a +day or two we shall have news of another victory and of the relief of +Kimberley. But why has the paramount power in South Africa sent a fine +general and splendid troops to face heavy odds and to run the risk of +finding themselves over-tasked by superior numbers?</p> + +<p>If we put the most liberal construction on <a name="Page_78" id="Page_78" />General Walker's account of +what he has done to reinforce Lord Methueh there are now fifteen +battalions, five batteries, and two cavalry regiments north of De Aar. +To protect the great depôt of military stores at De Aar and the railway +from that point to the Cape a considerable force is needed, and to stem +the tide of Boer invasion and Dutch disaffection, which has spread from +the Orange River to Tarkastad and Dordrecht, from Colesberg to Barkly +East, a further large force is badly wanted. But in the whole of Cape +Colony south of the Orange River there appear to be only nine +battalions, perhaps a couple of regiments of cavalry, and on the most +favourable assumption five batteries. Of these battalions Sir William +Gatacre has half-a-dozen on the lines running north from Algoa Bay and +East London, the greater part at Putters Kraal, north of Queenstown. +This is a tiny force with which to clear an invaded and disaffected area +of twelve thousand square miles. We may be perfectly certain that Sir +William Gatacre will do the best that can be <a name="Page_79" id="Page_79" />done with his force, and +if that should be more than his numbers alone would lead us to expect +the reason will be that Lord Methuen's victories will have made the Free +State Boers uneasy about their road home. A fresh victory near Kimberley +and the effectual relief of that place will lighten Sir William +Gatacre's load.</p> + +<p>The centre of gravity is in Natal, where the greater part of the Boer +army and the greater part of the British force in South Africa are +confronting one another. There are three British divisions, strong in +infantry but weak in artillery, and there is cavalry enough for a strong +division. But one of the divisions has been invested and bombarded with +more or less persistence since the beginning of November, and the other +two are not yet known to be quite ready to move. Sir George White's +force is reported to be on short rations, and some of the messages from +correspondents in Ladysmith declared a week ago that it was high time +for relief to come. The force can hardly be as yet near the limit of its +<a name="Page_80" id="Page_80" />resisting powers, but it is evidently nearing the stage when after +relief it will need rest and recuperation instead of being ready for a +vigorous and prolonged advance. General Buller with two divisions will +shortly set out to force the passage of the Tugela and to fight his way +round Ladysmith, either on the east or on the west, so as to cut off +either the retreat to the Free State or that to the Transvaal of the +Boer army. If Sir Redvers Buller can in this way win a victory in which +the enemy is not merely pushed back, but controlled in his choice of the +direction of his retirement, the issue of the campaign in Natal will be +settled, and the British Commander will be able to consider his great +purpose—the crushing of the Boer armies. The long wrestle between Sir +George White and the Boers has no doubt produced a state of exhaustion +on both sides, and by the time the decision comes exhaustion will be +turned into collapse. If, as we trust, it should be a Boer collapse, Sir +Redvers Buller's best <a name="Page_81" id="Page_81" />policy, if practicable, will be to follow up a +success with the utmost promptitude and vigour, to push on through the +mountains, and open a doorway into the country beyond them. A check to +Sir Redvers Buller's advance would be disastrous. He can take no more +troops from the Cape. The fifth division can hardly be at his disposal +before Christmas, for the first transport did not start till November +24th, and the last has not yet left. But a check means insufficient +force, and is as a rule to be made good only by reinforcement. It is +clear, then, that Sir Redvers Buller must not be checked; he must cross +the Tugela and must win his battle. I think that with his twenty +thousand men he may be trusted to do both, even if the Boer force is as +large as the highest estimates that have been given.</p> + +<p>The four decisions pending—at Kimberley, north of Queenstown, at +Ladysmith, and on the Tugela—are here represented as all doubtful. I do +not expect any of them to go wrong, but it is wise <a name="Page_82" id="Page_82" />before a fight to +reckon with possibilities, and where the enemy, stubborn, well-armed, +and skilful, has also the advantage of numbers, it would be folly not to +consider the possibility that he may hold his ground. There are elements +of success on the British side that should not be forgotten. The British +soldier to-day, as in the past, proves to be a staunch support to any +general. To-day, however, he has leaders who, taking them all round, are +probably better qualified than any of their predecessors. The divisional +generals are all picked for their known grip of the business of war; +among the brigadiers there are such devoted students of their profession +as Lyttelton and Hildyard, and the younger officers of to-day are more +zealous in their business and better instructed than at any previous +period. There should be less in this war than in any that the British +Army has waged of that incompetence of the subordinates which in past +campaigns has often caused the commanders more anxiety than all the +enemy's doings.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83" />Yet at every point the Boers appear to outnumber our troops. The +question arises how this came about; either the Government has not sent +troops enough, or the force given to the Commander-in-Chief has been +wrongly distributed. Sir Redvers Buller has done the best he could in +difficult conditions. Ladysmith had to be relieved, and he has taken +more than half of his force for the purpose. He might have wished to +take a third division, but if he had done so Kimberley might have +fallen, and the rising at the Cape have spread so fast and so far that +the defeat of Joubert would not have restored the balance. Accordingly +the smaller half of the force was left in the Cape Colony. Here also +there were two tasks. To push back the invasion was a slow business, and +if meantime Kimberley had fallen, the insurrection would have become +general. Accordingly a minimum force was set to stem the invasion and a +maximum force devoted to the relief of Kimberley. The difficulties, +therefore, arose not <a name="Page_84" id="Page_84" />merely from the strategy in South Africa but from +the delay of the Government to send enough troops in time. The fact that +Sir George White with a small force was left for two months unsupported +produced the rising at the Cape, and compelled the division of the +British Army Corps, in, consequence of which the whole force is reduced +to a perilous numerical weakness at each of four points. But the Army +Corps, the cavalry division, and the force for the line of +communications, have now to wait three weeks before they can be +strengthened. It was known to the Government before the end of October +that Ladysmith would be invested and need relief, that the Cape Dutch +would rise, and that unless Kimberley were helped the rising would +become dangerous. Yet the despatch of the first transport of the fifth +division was delayed until November 24th. Has the Government even now +begun to take the war seriously? Do the members of the Cabinet at this +eleventh hour understand that failure to crush the Boers means +<a name="Page_85" id="Page_85" />breakdown for the Empire, and that a prolonged struggle with them +carries with it grave danger of the intervention of other Powers? Does +Lord Lansdowne continue to direct the movement of reinforcements +according to his own unmilitary judgment modified by that of one or more +of his unmilitary colleagues? I decline to believe that Lord Wolseley +has arranged or accepted without protest this new system of sending out +the Army in fragments, each of which may be invested or used up before +the next can arrive.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="THE_NATIONS_PROBLEM" id="THE_NATIONS_PROBLEM" />THE NATION'S PROBLEM</h2> + +<p><i>December 14th</i>, 1899</p> + +<p>The failure of Lord Methuen's attack at Magersfontein has brought home +to every mind the extreme gravity of the situation in South Africa, and +it seems most likely that in the western theatre of war the crisis has +issued <a name="Page_86" id="Page_86" />in a decision unfavourable to the British cause.</p> + +<p>It is well to keep the whole before our eyes even when examining a part, +so I begin with a bird's-eye view. In Natal Sir Redvers Buller seems to +be ready, and to be about to strike, for the advance of Barton's brigade +towards Colenso must be the prelude to the advance of the main body to +the right or the left to cross the Tugela above or below the broken +railway bridge. If Sir Redvers Buller is so fortunate as to bring the +principal Boer army to an action and to defeat it so thoroughly as +seriously to impair its fighting power, the balance in the eastern +theatre of war will have turned, and attention may be concentrated upon +the restoration of the position in the west. There the balance has +turned the wrong way. General Gatacre's defeat at Stormberg would not be +a very serious matter, for his force was small, were it not that it +damages the credit of British generalship, and that it must have given a +great stimulus not only to the Free State <a name="Page_87" id="Page_87" />army but to the rebellion of +the Cape Boers. For the Boers Stormberg is a great victory, which will +encourage them to fresh enterprises in a country where at least every +second Dutch farmer is their friend and ally. They may, therefore, be +expected to turn their attention as soon as they can to Lord Methuen's +communications. This probability rendered Lord Methuen's position at +Modder River doubly critical. On Sunday he was ready, and set out to +test his fate. On Tuesday he was back again in his camp, the measure of +his defeat being given by his assurance that in his camp he was in +perfect security. Those are ominous words, for they have not the air of +the man who does not know that he is beaten, and who means to try again +at once. It is, however, conceivable that, as the defeat seems to have +been caused by an inexplicable blunder, the marching of a brigade in the +dark in dense formation close up to the muzzles of the enemy's rifles, +the effort may be made to attack again with better dispositions. A +second attack would, of <a name="Page_88" id="Page_88" />course, be attended with twofold risks, but if +it has no chance of success the defeat already suffered must be reckoned +a disaster. If Lord Methuen is definitely beaten, Kimberley must be set +down as lost, and the question is of the safety of Lord Methuen's +division. In that case to remain at Modder River is to court investment, +which would last for many weeks. The risk would not be justified unless +there is in the camp an ample store of supplies and ammunition, and even +then it is not clear what purpose it would serve. If, therefore, the +defeat is decisive the proper course is a retreat to a position of which +the communications can be protected, and which cannot easily be turned. +The whole situation, then, is failure in the Cape Colony on both lines, +coupled with an impending action in Natal, of which, until it is over, a +favourable result, though there is reason to hope for it, had better not +be too lightly assumed. Yet the British purpose of the war is to +establish the British power in South Africa on a firm basis: the only +<a name="Page_89" id="Page_89" />way to prepare that basis being to crush the military power of the two +Republics. The British forces now in South Africa are clearly not strong +enough to do their work. What is the Nation to do in order to accomplish +the task which it has undertaken?</p> + +<p>A nation can act only through its Government, and, as at this moment the +British Nation is united in the resolve to fight this war out, the +Government has, without looking back, to give a lead. The first thing is +for the Cabinet to convince the public that it is doing all that can be +done, and doing it in the right way. But the public does not trust its +own judgment. That much-talked-of person the man in the street does not +fancy himself a general, and is not over-fond of the military +critic—the unfortunate man whose duties have compelled him to try to +qualify himself, to form a judgment about war. There is a sound instinct +that war is a special business, and that it should be managed according +to the judgment of those who are <a name="Page_90" id="Page_90" />masters of the trade; not those who +can write about it, but those who have practised it and proved their +capacity. But those men, the generals who are, believed to have a grasp +of the way to carry a war through, are all outside the Cabinet. The +Cabinet has its chosen expert adviser, the Commander-in-Chief; but +rumour or surmise hints that his advice has been by no means uniformly +followed. Surely the wisest course which the Cabinet could now adopt +would be to call Lord Wolseley to their board as an announcement and a +guarantee that in the prosecution of the war his judgment was given its +true place, and that nothing thought by him necessary or desirable was +being left undone. If the military judgment holds that more force is +required the extra force must be provided. There are, after the Regular +Army and the Marines, the whole of the Militia, the Volunteers, and +thousands of trained men in the British colonies. There is no +difficulty, seeing that the Nation is determined to keep on its course, +about <a name="Page_91" id="Page_91" />drawing upon these forces to any extent that may be required. If +there are constitutional forms to be fulfilled they can be fulfilled; if +Parliamentary sanction is needed it can be had for the asking.</p> + +<p>At the present rate of consumption the fifth division will hardly have +been landed before its energies will be absorbed, and unless Sir Redvers +Buller is peculiarly fortunate during the next few days, the fifth and +sixth divisions together will not be enough to change the present +adverse situation into one of decided British preponderance. There +should be at the Cape a reservoir of forces upon which the British +Commander should be able to draw until he can drive the enemy before +him. When that stage comes the flow of reinforcements might be +suspended, but to stay or delay it before that stage has been reached is +to court misfortune.</p> + +<p>Something might probably be done to block the channel through which the +enemy derives some of his resources and some of his information. The +telegraph cable at Delagoa Bay might <a name="Page_92" id="Page_92" />with advantage have its shore end +lifted into a British man-of-war. There must be ways and means of +stopping all intercourse through Portuguese territory between the +Transvaal and the sea. That this is desirable is manifest, and to such +cases may be applied the maxim, "Where there is a will there is a way."</p> + +<p>The idea seems to be spreading that this war must lead to a thorough +overhauling and recasting of the British military organisation. But if +you are to make a bigger army, an army better suited to the times and to +the needs of the Nation, you must begin by getting a competent +army-creating instrument. You cannot expect a Cabinet of twelve or +eighteen men ignorant of war to create a good war-fighting machine. You +cannot entrust the organisation of your Army to any authority but the +Government, for the body that creates your Army will govern you. The +only plan that will produce the result required is to give authority +over the making and using of the Army to a man or men who under<a name="Page_93" id="Page_93" />stand +War—War as it is to-day. In short, a Nation that is liable to War +requires men of War in its Government, and, in the case of Great +Britain, the place for them is in the Cabinet. The traditional practice +of having a civilian Minister inside the Cabinet with all the authority, +and a soldier with all the knowledge outside the Cabinet, was devised +for electioneering purposes, and not for war. The plan has answered its +object very well for many years, having secured Cabinets against any +intrusion of military wisdom upon their domestic party felicity. But now +that the times have changed, and that the chief business of a Cabinet is +to manage a war, it seems unwise to keep the military judgment locked +out. Party felicity was valuable some years ago when there was a demand +for it; but the fashions have changed. To-day the article in demand is +not eloquence nor the infallibility of "our side," whichever that may +be; the article in demand to-day is the organisation of victory. That is +<a name="Page_94" id="Page_94" />not to be had at all the shops. Those who can supply it are very +special men, who must be found and their price paid. The Nation has +given bail for the production of this particular article, and if it is +not forthcoming in time the forfeit must be paid. The bail is the +British Empire.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="MORE_AWAKENING" id="MORE_AWAKENING" />MORE AWAKENING</h2> + +<p><i>December 21st</i>, 1899</p> + + +<p>A week ago, while we were thinking over failure in the Cape Colony on +both lines of advance, we could still hope for success on what +circumstances had made the most important line, in Natal. But now there +has been failure in Natal also.</p> + +<p>Of the battle of Colenso Sir Redvers Buller's telegraphic despatch, +though it probably does the commander less justice than he would have +received at the hands of any other narrator, gives an authoritative if +meagre account. The attack <a name="Page_95" id="Page_95" />seems to have been planned rather as a +reconnaissance in force, to be followed up in case it should reveal +possibilities of victory, than as a determined effort on which +everything was to be staked. In all probability this form of action was +inevitable in the conditions. The Boers held a strong position, covered +in front by a river fordable at only two points. Such a position can +hardly be reconnoitred except by attack. It could not be turned except +by a long flank march, which, if successful would have occupied several +days, during which the camp and railhead would have to be strongly +guarded. There is reason to believe that the force in Natal has not the +transport necessary to enable it to leave the railway for several days, +during which it would be a flying column. Moreover, the Boers, being all +mounted, could always place themselves across the path of any advance. +Accordingly it is at least premature to assume that any course other +than that which he adopted was open to Sir Redvers Buller. The mishap to +a portion of the <a name="Page_96" id="Page_96" />artillery will be better understood when the full +story of the battle is accessible. Meanwhile Sir Redvers Buller's +withdrawal of the troops when he saw that success was unattainable has +preserved his force, and he is now awaiting reinforcement before again +attempting an advance. The critical element in the position of affairs +in Natal lies in the fact that time runs against the British. Sir +Redvers Buller and the Government no doubt know pretty accurately the +date up to which Sir George White can hold Ladysmith. If by that date he +has neither been relieved nor succeeded in fighting his way to the +Tugela his situation will be desperate.</p> + +<p>Lord Methuen has probably been as much hampered as Sir Redvers Buller by +want of transport. He, too, will not forget the importance of preserving +his force and his liberty of action, and will retire rather than await +investment.</p> + +<p>Through the mists which always shroud a war during its progress the fact +is beginning to be visible that the British generals have been from <a name="Page_97" id="Page_97" />the +beginning paralysed not, as anxious observers are always prone to +conclude, by any want of knowledge or energy, but by the nature of the +implement in their hands. They have to fight an enemy of unprecedented +mobility. The Boers are all horsemen and can ride from point to point +more than twice as fast as the British infantry can march; they live in +British territory by requisitions or loot, and therefore can limit their +transport train. But the British forces are restricted to a little more +than two miles an hour and to twelve or fifteen miles a day according to +the ground. There is everywhere a deficiency if not a complete lack of +transport, said to be due to the action of the Treasury during the +summer, and therefore every column is dependent for its food and +ammunition upon a line of railway, which a handful of Boers may at any +moment and at any point in its hundreds of miles temporarily interrupt. +These considerations should be kept in view not merely in reviewing the +conduct of the campaign and the work of the British generals, <a name="Page_98" id="Page_98" />but above +all in the preparations now being pushed forward throughout the Empire. +The project of a Corps of Imperial Yeomanry is a step in the right +direction. If it is to contribute to success due importance must be +given in the selection of the men to straight shooting, without which +good riding can be of little use. Equally important, too, is the +selection of leaders. The home-trained officer, however good, must not +be exclusively relied upon. Every local war we have had, beginning with +the campaigns against the French in America which led to the Seven +Years' War, has proved the necessity of giving full scope to local +experience and local instincts. Old and new instances abound of the way +in which the neglect of the feelings of colonists and of their special +qualifications for special work rankles in breasts of a colonial +population. If, then, the new Yeomanry are to be of real service in +South Africa and to deserve the name Imperial a proportion of their +officers of all grades should be men of colonial birth and colonial +experience. <a name="Page_99" id="Page_99" />The South African troops now at the front have done fine +service, and some of their officers might be promoted and transferred to +the new Yeomanry, their places being filled by promotions in the corps +which they leave. The preparation of transport ought not to lag behind +the despatch of reinforcements. At the earliest possible moment the +attempt should be made to send into the enemy's territory a great raid +of horsemen, on the model of the raids of the American Civil War. A body +of several thousand mounted men should march right through a part of the +Free State, living upon the country, consuming every scrap of food, and +clearing out every farm of all its provisions. If that operation can be +repeated two or three times a belt of country will be left across which +the Boers without transport will not be able to move, while the British, +properly equipped, will not be delayed by its exhaustion.</p> + +<p>The plan adopted by the authorities for raising a volunteer contingent +is more significant for the future of the National defences than has yet +been <a name="Page_100" id="Page_100" />realised. Each volunteer battalion is to supply a company to its +line battalion in the field and to keep a second company ready at home +in reserve. Thus the volunteer force is to be used by being absorbed +into the Army. That leads inevitably to the amalgamation of the +volunteers with the regular Army, and is a death-blow to the specific +character of each of them. It means that henceforth the British Army, +like other armies, will be homogeneous, containing no other categories +than men with the colours and men in reserves, classified according to +the immediacy of their liability to be called up. The volunteer +commanding officer disappears, and with him the volunteer officer as +such. For now that it is known that the Government will employ +non-professional officers only as company officers under professional +field officers, no one will take a volunteer commission with the idea of +serving for many years from subaltern to commanding officer. What has +hitherto been the volunteer force will therefore become a force +administered <a name="Page_101" id="Page_101" />by professional paid officers. It will cost more, and it +will become a branch of the Army. In short, the Government has +unwittingly taken a step of which the inevitable consequence is +conscription.</p> + +<p>But from this follows another change, equally unsuspected by the +Ministry. The day that the Nation discovers, as it is now beginning to +discover, that war makes its claims on every man and on every household, +there will be no more toleration of the unskilled management that is +inseparable from the practice of choosing a. Secretary of State for War +for his ignorance of the subject. The British Nation is at length +opening its eyes to the truth that war is a serious matter, and that the +neglect of it in peace is costly in blood and perilous to the body +politic. When its eyes are wide open it will insist on putting knowledge +in power over the Army and the Navy. Thus is coming about, to the +infinite benefit of the community, the overthrow of that noxious sham, +the party politician.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102" />Late in the day, when the position has become what it is, the +Government has thought of the elementary principle that if you want to +carry on a war you should begin by finding a commander in whom you have +confidence. Accordingly at the eleventh hour Ministers have remembered +that the Nation trusts Lord Roberts. This is proof positive that the +Government was not in earnest before the late reverses, for had they +been serious they would have appointed Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener +at the outset. The precedent is useful by what it suggests; for, if +during a war you can strengthen the military direction by giving the +authority to the man recognised as the most competent, you may also +strengthen the political direction by a similar procedure. The Cabinet +has thus, perhaps without suspicion of what it was doing, set before the +Nation the true problem: "Wanted, a Ministry competent in the management +of war."</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="THE_NATIONS_BUSINESS" id="THE_NATIONS_BUSINESS" /><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103" />THE NATION'S BUSINESS</h2> + +<p><i>December 28th</i>, 1899</p> + + +<p>War is the Nation's business and, when it comes, the most important part +of the Nation's business. A Nation that for many years neglects this +branch of its affairs is liable to suffer to any extent. The proverb, "a +stitch in time saves nine," gives a very fair idea of the proportion +between the amount of effort required in a properly-prepared and +well-conducted war, and the amount required when there has been previous +neglect.</p> + +<p>There must be some way in which a national affair of such importance can +be properly managed, and just now it might be well to consider how a +nation can manage a war. Certainly not by the methods of political +decision to which recent developments of democracy have accustomed us. +You cannot fight a campaign by consulting the constituencies or even the +House of Commons before deciding whether a general shall move to his +right or his left, shall advance <a name="Page_104" id="Page_104" />or retire, shall seek or shall avoid a +battle. Neither can you settle by popular vote whether you will make +guns of wire or of fluid compressed steel, what formations your infantry +shall adopt, whether the soldier is to give six hours a week to shooting +and one to drill, or six to drill and one to shooting.</p> + +<p>Yet all these questions and many others must be settled, some during +peace and some during war, and they must be settled correctly or else +there will be defeat. In political matters the accepted test of what is +correct is the opinion of the majority as expressed by votes in a +general election, but in war the test of what is correct is the result +produced upon the enemy. If his guns out-range yours, if his troops at +the point of collision defeat yours, there has been some error in the +preparation or in the direction, unless indeed the enemy is a State so +much stronger than your own that it was folly to go to war at all, and +in that case there must have been an error of policy. The decisions upon +which <a name="Page_105" id="Page_105" />successful war depends turn upon matters which have no relation +to the wishes or feelings of the majority; matters not of opinion but of +fact; matters about which eloquence is no guide, and in regard to which +the truth cannot be ascertained from the ballot box, but only by the +hard labour of prolonged study after previous training. For success in +war depends upon the troops being armed with the best weapons of the +day, upon their being trained to use them in the most appropriate +manner, upon the amount of knowledge and practice possessed by the +generals; upon a correct estimate of the enemy's forces, of their +armament and tactics, and upon a true insight into the policy of the +Powers with which quarrels are possible.</p> + +<p>A year ago it was known to many persons in this country, and the +Government was informed by those whose, special duty it was to give the +information, that the Boer States aimed at supremacy in South Africa, +that they were heavily armed, that a large force would be <a name="Page_106" id="Page_106" />required to +defeat them, and that to postpone the quarrel would make the inevitable +war still more difficult. It was well understood also that the +difficulty lay in the probability that if a small force were sent it +would be exposed to defeat, while if a large one were sent its despatch +would precipitate the war. These were the facts known more than a year +ago to those who wanted to know. Is it not clear that the Government's +management has been based upon something other than the facts; that the +Government was all the time basing its action not upon the facts but +upon speculations as to what might come out of future ballot-boxes? They +were attending to their own mission, that of keeping in office, but +neglecting the Nation's necessary business, that of dealing promptly +with the Boer assault upon British supremacy in South Africa. The +explanation is simple. Every man in the Cabinet has devoted his life +since he has been grown up to the art of getting votes for his party, +either at the polls or in Parliament. Not one of them has given <a name="Page_107" id="Page_107" />his +twenty years to studying the art of managing a war.</p> + +<p>But a war cannot possibly be well managed by anyone who is not a master +of the art. Now and then there has been success by an amateur—a person +who, without being a soldier by profession, has made himself one; such a +person, for example, as Cromwell. Apart from rare instances of that +sort, the only plan for a Government which does not include among its +members a soldier, professional or amateur, is to choose a soldier of +one class or the other and to delegate authority to him. But this plan +does not always succeed, because sometimes a Government composed of men +who know nothing of war postpones calling in the competent man until too +late. There have been in our time two instances of this plan, one +successful and the other a failure. In 1882 Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet +drifted against its will and to its painful surprise into the Egyptian +war. The Cabinet when it saw that war had come gave Lord Wolseley <a name="Page_108" id="Page_108" />a +free hand and he was able to save them by the victory of Tel-el-Kebir. A +year or two later, being anxious to avoid a Soudan war, they drifted +slowly into it; but this time they were too late in giving Lord Wolseley +full powers, and he was unable to save Gordon and Khartoum solely +because he had not been called upon in time. The best analogy to the +course then pursued is that of a sick person whose friends attempt to +prescribe for him themselves until the disease takes a palpably virulent +form, when they send for a doctor just in time to learn that the +patient's life could have been saved by proper treatment a week earlier, +but that now there is no hope. For war requires competent management in +advance. There are many things which must be done, if they are to be +done in time, before the beginning of hostilities, and the more distant +the theatre of war the more necessary it may be to take measures +beforehand.</p> + +<p>The management of a war can never be taken out of the hands of the +Government, <a name="Page_109" id="Page_109" />because the body which decides when to make preparations +is, by the fact that it has the power of making that decision, the +supreme authority. If, therefore, a Nation wishes to have reasonable +assurance against defeat it must take means to provide the supreme +authority with a military judgment. The British system for a, long time +professed to do this by giving the Secretary of State for War a military +adviser who was Commander-in-Chief. Such a plan might have worked on +condition that the Secretary of State kept the Commander-in-Chief fully +informed of the state of negotiations with other Powers, and invariably +followed his advice in all matters relating to possible wars. The +condition has never been fulfilled, and for many years, as there were no +serious wars, the mischief of the neglect was not apparent except to the +few who understood war, and who have for many years been anxious. But in +1895 the present Cabinet began its career under the inspiration of Mr. +Balfour, who knows nothing <a name="Page_110" id="Page_110" />of war, by giving the Secretary of State +absolute authority over the Army and all preparations for war so far as +the Army is concerned, and by formally declaring that the Secretary of +State could please himself whether he followed the advice of the +Commander-in-Chief. Thus the Nation in its indifference allowed the fate +of its next war to be entrusted to hands not qualified to direct a war, +and allowed itself to be deprived of the means of knowing whose advice +was being followed in regard to the preparation of its defences. At the +same time a Committee of Defence was formed of members of the Cabinet, a +committee of untrained men, to settle the broad lines of the Nation's +preparations for the maintenance of the Empire. The results of these +remarkable arrangements are now manifest, and yet the cry is that there +is to be no change in the Government.</p> + +<p>But unless there is a thorough change as soon as possible, unless steps +are taken to find <a name="Page_111" id="Page_111" />a man competent in the management of war and to give +him a place in the Cabinet, where he can keep the naval and military +preparations abreast of the policy, or check, a policy for the execution +of which adequate preparation cannot be made, what guarantee can the +Nation have that it will not shortly have a second war on its hands, or +that the war now begun will be brought to a successful end?</p> + +<p>But if war as a branch of the Nation's affairs ought to be entrusted to +a man competent in that branch, what about the tradition that any +politician of eminence in the party is fit to be the Cabinet Minister at +the head of any branch of the public service? Is it not the truth that +this tradition is bad and should be got rid of, and that every branch of +the Nation's business has suffered from the practice of giving authority +for its direction to a minister who has not been trained to understand +it? The war will have been a great benefit if it leads to the universal +recognition of the plain fact that Jack of all <a name="Page_112" id="Page_112" />trades is master of +none, and that no branch of the public service can possibly be well +directed unless its director is thoroughly conversant with the business +with which he is entrusted. So soon as the Nation grasps the idea that +democracy can fulfil its mission only when the electors are resolved to +choose leaders by their qualification for the work they have to do, the +British Nation will resume the lead among the nations of the world.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="WANTED_THE_MAN" id="WANTED_THE_MAN" />WANTED, THE MAN</h2> + +<p><i>January 5th</i>, 1900</p> + +<p>There has been no substantial, visible change in the military situation +since the battle of Colenso on December 15th. The actions of General +French at Colesberg and of Colonel Pilcher at Sunnyside are valuable +mainly as evidence that with sound tactics the Boers are by no means +invincible, and that British troops only require <a name="Page_113" id="Page_113" />intelligent leading to +be as capable of the best work as any troops in the world. General +French, however, until the hour at which I write had not finished his +wrestle with the Boers at Colesberg, and until it is over no military +action can be classed either as success or failure. Colonel Pilcher's +opponents were colonial rebels, probably not as good as Transvaal Boers, +who have had in peace more rifle practice. The losses were small, +proving that the resistance of the enemy was by no means desperate, and +as the retreating force was not pursued the defeat was not crushing. +Colonel Pilcher by the temporary occupation of Douglas reaped the fruits +of his victory, but the whole small campaign is of no very great +importance, as the possession of the triangle between the railway and +the Riet and Orange Rivers depends in the ultimate issue not upon the +event of local skirmishes, but on the issue of the decisive fighting +between the British Army and the forces of the Republics. Lord Methuen's +communications appear to be now well <a name="Page_114" id="Page_114" />organized and guarded, so that his +position need cause no special anxiety. A good deal depends on the +outcome of the struggle between General French and the Colesberg Boers, +for, while a Boer defeat would render the line from the Cape to Orange +River quite safe, a Boer victory would endanger not only Naauwpoort but +De Aar. General Gatacre's cue should be to risk nothing. If he waits +where he is and merely holds his own until the sixth division is ready +for use no harm will have been done; if he makes any mistakes the +consequences may be more than the sixth division can remedy. The centre +of interest still lies between Ladysmith and Frere. The tone of the +telegrams from Ladysmith, which declare that though the bombardment has +been more effective since Christmas, and through dysentary and enteric +fever are busy, "all is yet well," proves that the situation of Sir +George White's force is critical, and may at any moment become +desperate. The Boers by occupying and forti<a name="Page_115" id="Page_115" />fying positions south of the +Tugela have taken the best means of making sure that Sir Redvers +Buller's advance, even if successful, shall be delayed and the time +taken over it prolonged. The Boer commander sees clearly that his +present object is to delay Sir Redvers Buller, so as to gain the time +needed to bring about the fall of Ladysmith. If that can be secured the +next question will be how to damage Sir Redvers Buller. Of the prospects +of Sir Redvers Buller's attack no estimate can be made. He is stronger +than he was by the greater part of Sir Charles Warren's division, and it +is to be hoped, by plenty of heavy artillery and by an organised +transport; but the Boers are stronger than they were by a new position, +by three weeks of fortification, and by the consciousness of their last +victory. Upon Sir Redvers Buller's fate depends more than anyone cares +to say. If he wins and relieves Ladysmith the success of Great Britain +in the war will be assured, though the operations may be prolonged for +months; but if he should again <a name="Page_116" id="Page_116" />fail there is no prospect of success +except by exertions of which the Government as yet has not shown the +faintest conception. His action can hardly be completed in a single +battle or in a day; the first telegrams, therefore, need not necessarily +be taken as giving the result; more probably his operations, except in +the most unfavourable case, will be continuous for something like a +week.</p> + +<p>For the Nation there is a question even more vital than the fate of Sir +Redvers Buller, and more practical. Nothing that was at home can do can +affect the impending battle by the Tugela. The issue of that battle, as +of the war, though it is not yet known and can be revealed only by the +event, is in reality already settled, for it depends on the proportion +of the forces of the two sides, which has been determined by British +strategy and cannot now be modified, upon the qualities, armament, and +training of the troops, which are the results of the conditions of their +enlistment, organisation, and education, and upon the <a name="Page_117" id="Page_117" />judgment and will +of Sir Redvers Buller, also the outcome of his training and of the Army +system. But whatever happens on the Tugela the British Nation has its +to-morrow, a very black one in case of a defeat, and a very difficult +one even in case of victory, for all the great Powers are for ever +competitors for the possession and government of the world, and Great +Britain having shown a weakness, expected by others though unsuspected +by her own people, will in future be hard beset. The Russians have just +moved a division from the Caucasus towards the Afghan frontier, which +portends trouble for India. The Austrians, as well as the Germans are +setting out to build an extra fleet—what for? Because the Austrian +Government, like the German and Italian Governments, know, what our +recent Governments have never known, that Great Britain has for two or +three centuries been the balance weight or fly-wheel of the European +machine, by reason of the prescience with which her Navy was handled. +Those Governments now <a name="Page_118" id="Page_118" />see that statesmanship has gone from us; they +divine that the great Navy we now possess cannot be used by a timid and +ignorant Government, and that no reliance can be placed upon Great +Britain to play her own true game. Accordingly, they see that they must +strengthen their own navies with a view to the possible collapse of the +British Power. In the near future the maintenance of the British Empire +depends upon the Nation's having a Government at once far-seeing and +resolute, capable of great resolves and prompt action. Of such a +Government there is, however, no immediate prospect. The present Cabinet +has given its testimonials: a challenge sent to the Boers by a +Government that did not know it was challenging anyone, that did not +know the adversary's strength, nor his determination to fight; and a war +begun in military ignorance displayed by the Cabinet, and carried on by +half measures until the popular determination compelled three-quarter +measures. Does anyone suppose that this Cabinet, that did not know its +mind till the Boers declared <a name="Page_119" id="Page_119" />war, knows or will know its mind about the +conflict with Russia in Asia, or about any other of the troubles, +foreseen and unforeseen, which await us? A victory in Natal would save +the Cabinet and drown the voices of its critics; and in that case the +present leaders will infallibly go halting and irresolute into the +greater contests that are coming. A defeat in Natal would destroy the +Government at once if there were before the public a single man in whose +judgment and character there was confidence; but there is no such man, +and, as the Opposition leaders are discredited by their conduct in +regard to the quarrel with the Boers, the present set will remain at +their posts to continue the traditional policy of waiting to be driven +by public opinion. The Nation, therefore, has before it a necessary task +as urgent as that of reinforcing the Army in the field, which is to find +the man in whose judgment as to war and policy as well as in whose +character it can place confidence.</p> + +<p>The man to be trusted is, unfortunately, not <a name="Page_120" id="Page_120" />Lord Wolseley. I have for +years fought his battle by urging that the Government ought to follow +the advice of its military adviser, a theory of which the corollary is +that the adviser must resign the moment he is overruled. I have never +meant that the adviser is to be a dictator, nor that the Cabinet should +follow advice of the soundness of which it is not convinced. The Cabinet +has the responsibility and ought never to act without full conviction. +The expert who cannot convince a group of intelligent non-experts that a +necessary measure is necessary is not as expert as he should be; and if +he still retains his post after he has been overruled on a measure which +he regards as necessary he has not the strength of character which is +indispensable for great responsibility. Now, though the relation between +a Cabinet and its advisers ought to be secret, in the present case each +side has let the cat out of the bag. Lord Wolseley's friends defend him +by declaring that he has been overruled. But that defence kills him. If +he has been overruled on a trifle it does <a name="Page_121" id="Page_121" />not matter, and the defence +is a quibble; if he has been overruled on an essential point why is he +still Commander-in-Chief? No answer can be devised that is not fatal to +his case. Lord Lansdowne's friend, for such Lord Ernest Hamilton may be +presumed to be, says: "Supposing, for the sake of argument, that the +short-comings of the War Office in and before the present war were due +not to neglect of military counsels, but to the adoption of such +counsels, contrary to the more far-seeing judgment of the civil side." +That is a condemnation of the civilian Minister and of the Cabinet, for +no man in charge of the Nation's affairs ought to take the +responsibility for a decision of the soundness of which he is not +convinced. If Lord Lansdowne disagreed with Lord Wolseley and was not +prepared to ask for that officer's retirement, why did he not himself +retire rather than make himself responsible for measures which he +thought wrong or mistaken? These are not personal criticisms or attacks. +Lord Wolseley and Lord Lansdowne <a name="Page_122" id="Page_122" />have both of them in the past rendered +splendid services to the Nation. But the Empire is at stake, and a +writer's duty is to set forth and apply the principles which he believes +to be sound, without being a respecter of persons yet with that respect +for every man, especially for every public man, which is the best +tradition of our National life. What at the present moment ought not to +be tolerated is what Lord Ernest Hamilton suggests, an attack upon the +generals at the front, to save the War Office or the Cabinet; and what +is needed is that the Ministers should choose a war adviser who can +convince them, even though to find him they have to pass over a hundred +generals and select a colonel, a captain, or a crammer.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="THE_STRATEGY_OF_THE_WAR" id="THE_STRATEGY_OF_THE_WAR" /><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123" />THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR</h2> + +<p><i>January 11th</i>, 1900</p> + + +<p>The arrival of Lord Roberts at Cape Town announces the approaching +beginning of a new chapter in the war, though the second chapter is not +yet quite finished.</p> + +<p>The first chapter was the campaign of Sir George White with sixteen +thousand men against the principal Boer army. It ended with Sir George +White's being surrounded in Ladysmith and there locked up.</p> + +<p>The second chapter began with the arrival of. Sir Redvers Buller at Cape +Town. It may be reviewed under two headings: the conception and the +execution of the operations. When Sir Redvers Buller reached the Cape, +the force which he was expecting, and of which he had the control, +consisted altogether of nearly sixty thousand regular troops, besides +Cape and colonial troops. There was an Army Corps, thirty-five thousand, +a cavalry division, five thousand, troops for the defence of +communica<a name="Page_124" id="Page_124" />tions, ten thousand, and troops at the Cape amounting to eight +thousand, some of whom were at Mafeking and Kimberley. After deducting +fourteen thousand men for communications and garrisons at the Cape, the +commander had at his disposal for use in the field about forty-four +thousand regular troops arranged as a cavalry brigade, seven brigades of +infantry, and corps troops.</p> + +<p>There were many tasks before the British general. Southern Natal was +being invaded and had to be cleared of the enemy; the Cape Colony, too, +had to be freed from its Boer visitors, and the rising of the Cape Dutch +stopped. Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking were all awaiting relief, +and last, but not least, the Boer armies had to be beaten, and the two +Republics conquered. The strategical problem was how to accomplish all +these tasks at once, if possible, and if that could not be done, to sort +them in order of importance and deal with them in that order. The +essential thing was not to <a name="Page_125" id="Page_125" />violate any of those great principles which +the experience of a hundred wars and the practice of a dozen great +generals have proved to be fundamental. The leading principle is that +which enjoins concentration of effort in time, space, and object. Do one +thing at a time and do it with all your might. If the list of tasks be +examined it will be seen that there is a connection between them all, +and that the connecting link is the Boer army. Suppose the Boer army to +be removed from the scene every one of the other aims would be easy of +accomplishment. There would then be no invaders in either colony; +Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking would be safe, and the troops in +those places free to march where they pleased; the Cape rising could be +suppressed at leisure, and the British general could at his convenience +go to Pretoria and set up a fresh government. No other of the tasks had +this same quality of dominating the situation; any one of them might be +accomplished without great or immediate effect upon those that would +remain. For this <a name="Page_126" id="Page_126" />reason wisdom prescribed as the simplest way of +accomplishing the seven or eight tasks the accomplishment of the first +or last, the destruction of the Boer army. That army was in three parts: +there was a fraction on the western border of the Free State, a fraction +south of the Orange River, and the great bulk of the whole force was in +northern Natal. Destroy the principal mass, and you could then at your +leisure deal with the two smaller pieces. Everything pointed to an +attempt to crush the Boer army then in Natal.</p> + +<p>There were two ways of getting at that army which was holding Ladysmith +in its grip. One was along the railway from Durban, one hundred and +eighty-nine miles long; it was sure to bring the British Army face to +face with the Boers at the Tugela. That point reached, either the Boers +would stand to fight and, therefore, give the opportunity of crushing +them, or they would retreat, in which case Ladysmith would be relieved, +and the British force, strengthened by <a name="Page_127" id="Page_127" />White's division, would be +within three hundred miles of Pretoria. A great victory in Natal would +save Natal, stop the Cape rising, and, if followed up, draw the Boer +forces away from Kimberley and the Cape Colony.</p> + +<p>The other way was to follow the railway line or lines from the Cape +ports, to collect the Army on the Orange River and advance to +Bloemfontein, and thence towards Pretoria or towards the western exits +from the passes through the Drakensberg mountains. This plan, however, +gave no immediate certainty of an opportunity to attack the Boer army. +The British force could be assembled on the Orange River no sooner than +on the south bank of the Tugela. But from the Orange River to +Bloemfontein there would be a march of one hundred and twenty miles, and +the Boer army was not at Bloemfontein. There was a probability that when +the British force reached Bloemfontein the Boer army might leave Natal, +but the probability did not amount to certainty; it rested upon a guess +or <a name="Page_128" id="Page_128" />hypothesis of what the Boer general or the Free State Government and +its troops would think. Supposing, however, that these persons did not +think as was expected; that they determined to complete the conquest of +Natal (except Durban, which was protected by the fleet), and to keep +their grip upon Ladysmith, at any rate until the British force was +nearing the passes of the Drakensberg or crossing the Vaal, and then, +but not till then, to retreat to Middleburg? In that case the purpose of +the advance, the crushing of the Boer army, might be deferred for a very +long time, and meanwhile every one of the minor tasks, except the relief +of Kimberley and the repulse of the Free State invaders of the Cape, +would be left over. Ladysmith might fall, and its fall stimulate the +Cape rising and endanger the communications of the British force +advancing north of the Orange River.</p> + +<p>These were the two plans, and I confess that my own judgment at the +beginning of November inclined to the former, though, as I am aware +<a name="Page_129" id="Page_129" />that most of those whose strategical judgment I respect hold a decided +opinion the other way, I cannot be dogmatic. The prevalent opinion +attaches more importance than I can persuade myself to do to the +difficulties of the hilly and mountainous country of northern Natal. +There is, moreover, a reserve imposed upon observers at home by our +ignorance of the state of the transport services of the British forces. +No concentration of troops is profitable if the troops when collected +cannot be fed.</p> + +<p>Subject to these reserves it may be said that Sir Redvers Buller at the +beginning of November had to choose between two lines of operations, +that by Natal and that by the Cape. The cardinal principle is that you +must never divide your force between two lines of operations unless it +is large enough to give you on each of the two lines an assured +superiority to the enemy's whole force. Sir Redvers Buller's design, +however, violated this principle. He neither determined upon action with +all his might through the <a name="Page_130" id="Page_130" />Cape Colony nor upon action with all his +might through Natal, but divided his effort, directing four of his seven +brigades to Natal and the other three towards the Orange River; half his +cavalry brigade going to Colesberg, and a mixed force of the +communication troops to Sterkstrom on the East London line.</p> + +<p>This design gave no promise of effecting the dominant task, the crushing +of the Boer army, though it aimed at grappling in detail with several of +the subordinate tasks; but its execution proved as indecisive as its +conception. In Natal the main force under Sir Redvers Buller himself +completely failed in the attack on the Boer army at Colenso on December +15th; Lord Methuen's advance for the relief of Kimberley came to a +standstill at the Modder River, and met with a serious repulse at +Magersfontein; while the smaller parties of Gatacre and French have made +little headway against the Free State troops and the rebellious Cape +farmers.</p> + +<p>The fifth division, the bulk of which was <a name="Page_131" id="Page_131" />directed to Natal, has been +added to Sir Redvers Buller's force, without having enabled him as yet +to strike the decisive blow or even to prevent a determined assault upon +Ladysmith by the Boer army. That assault is believed to be now +impending, and its delivery will close the second chapter of the war. If +Sir Redvers Buller can win his battle in Natal while Sir George White is +still unconquered, the military power of the Boers will receive a great +shock, and the issue of the war will no longer be doubtful, though its +end may be distant. But if Sir Redvers Buller should again fail the +result must be to leave Sir George White's force in extreme peril, to +give the Boer forces the spirit of a veteran and victorious army, and to +encourage the Dutch element at the Cape to take an active part against +the British.</p> + +<p>This is the situation which confronts Lord Roberts on his arrival at the +Cape. The problem bears a general resemblance to that which Sir Redvers +Buller had to solve at the beginning of November, <a name="Page_132" id="Page_132" />but there are +important differences. Lord Roberts has in hand only a brigade, the +twelfth or first of the sixth division, which has just reached Cape +Town; he has to expect the rest of the sixth division, the seventh, a +possible eighth, and a considerable extra force of mounted troops and of +artillery; but the arrival of these forces will be gradual, and he will +have no mass of fresh troops until the beginning of next month. Even +then he may not have the means of feeding on the march the newly-arrived +divisions. Meantime a British victory in Natal would be more valuable, a +British defeat there more disastrous than ever. The effort ought to be +made if there is a reasonable probability of success, for though failure +would have disastrous consequences, material and moral, the admission of +helplessness involved in making no attempt would depress the hearts of +the British troops perhaps as fatally as a lost battle.</p> + +<p>The first decision required is whether Sir Redvers Buller's force is to +try its fate once <a name="Page_133" id="Page_133" />more. In all probability that decision has been made +while Lord Roberts was at sea, and according to the event will be the +situation with which the new Commander-in-Chief will have to deal. A +victory in Natal will make his task easy; a failure will put before him +a problem the fortunate solution of which would be a triumph for any +commander.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="THE_DECISIVE_BATTLE" id="THE_DECISIVE_BATTLE" />THE DECISIVE BATTLE</h2> + +<p><i>January 18th</i>, 1900</p> + + +<p>Yesterday began the action upon which in all probability depends the +future course of the war. By the time these lines are in the reader's +hands more will be known of the battle that can be guessed to-day by the +wisest, though several days may pass before the result is fully known.</p> + +<p>Sir Redvers Buller on Wednesday, the 10th, had under his command three +infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade, some two thousand mounted +in<a name="Page_134" id="Page_134" />fantry, and probably altogether about eighty guns. Clery's division +consists of Hildyard's and Lyttelton's brigades; the third division, +comprising Hart's and Barton's brigades, is not known to have had a +commander appointed; Warren's division is composed of Woodgate's brigade +and of half of Coke's brigade, to which another half may have been added +by taking two battalions which have been some time in Natal, and belong +neither to Clery's nor to the third division. The whole force ought to +be thirty thousand strong for a fight, taking the division at nine +thousand instead of ten thousand, for though there have been losses +there have also been drafts to fill up gaps. A party of mounted troops +probably one thousand strong is reported to have been detached a few +days ago by rail to Stanger on the coast near the mouth of the Tugela, +and thence to have disappeared on a mission of which the purpose is as +yet unknown, though it looks like a raid upon the railway between Dundee +and Newcastle. The strength of the Boers in Natal has never <a name="Page_135" id="Page_135" />been +accurately known, and the estimates differ widely, ranging from +thirty-five thousand to more than double that number. Sir George White +may have nine thousand effectives at Ladysmith and might be contained by +fifteen thousand Boers, perhaps by a smaller number. There will, +therefore, be available against Sir Redvers Buller a force on the lowest +estimate about equal to his own, and possibly outnumbering it by two to +one.</p> + +<p>On Wednesday, the 10th, the British force started westward. No telegram +as yet gives its distribution, but it is plain that Clery's and Warren's +divisions moved out, together with the cavalry brigade and whatever +mounted infantry had not been sent south. Hart's and Barton's brigades, +or one of them, with a proportion of artillery may be assumed to have +been left in the entrenchments which face Colenso and cover the British +line of communications by the railway. On Thursday morning Lord +Dundonald with the cavalry brigade and some of the mounted infantry <a name="Page_136" id="Page_136" />was +in possession of the hills overlooking Potgieter's Drift and of the pont +or ferry-boat. The same day the infantry or the leading division, +Clery's, was in the hills north of Springfield. Lord Dundonald's force +commanded the river at Potgieter's Drift, and the crossing there was +thus assured. A pause of four days followed: a pause probably not of +inaction, but of strenuous preparation in order to make the final +advance vigorous. During those days, no doubt, supplies would be +accumulated at Springfield Bridge Camp, at Spearman's Farm, and at some +point near to the next drift to the west. This would save delays when +the advance began, for if the force depended upon magazines at Frere the +transport would break down in the advance beyond the Tugela, whereas if +the transport had in the later stages merely to start from the south +side of the Tugela, the force could be kept supplied for a few days. +Lord Dundonald was engaged in strengthening his position at Zwart's Kop, +so that in any case there would be a secure <a name="Page_137" id="Page_137" />retreat across the river if +need be. The river itself seems also to have been properly reconnoitred.</p> + +<p>The enemy's position could be seen four or five miles to the north, and +he was known on Thursday to be strongly entrenched. A passage for +Warren's division was chosen at Trichardt's Drift five miles above +Potgieter's and near to Wagon Drift which is marked on the sketch map +issued by the Intelligence Division. From Trichardt's Drift there is +evidently a road leading into the Bethany-Dewdrop Road, and parallel to +that which runs from Potgieter's Drift. On Tuesday, the 16th, +Lyttelton's brigade of infantry with a battery of howitzers crossed the +Tugela at Potgieter's Drift and gained a line of hills to the north, +probably the edge of the plateau on which lies the Boer position. The +telegrams say nothing of bridge-making at Potgieter's Drift, but are +explicit as to the crossing of at least some of the artillery. On +Wednesday General Lyttelton shelled the Boer position with howitzers and +naval guns without drawing a reply. This silence <a name="Page_138" id="Page_138" />of the Boer guns is +correct for the defenders of a position, as a reply would enable the +assailant to fix the position of the guns and to concentrate his fire +upon them. The same day (Wednesday) Warren's division crossed the Tugela +at Trichardt's Drift, and driving in the enemy's outposts secured a +lodgment on the low wooded hills about a mile north of the river; this +division, after its advance guard had crossed, was passed over by a +pontoon bridge. The remainder of yesterday may have been spent in +reconnaissance, bridge building—for an army that has crossed a river +needs to have behind it as many bridges as possible—in bringing up all +the forces destined for the battle, perhaps including Hildyard's +brigade, and in making complete arrangements for the attack which was +probably delivered this morning.</p> + +<p>Sir Redvers Buller has aimed his blow in a right direction, for, if it +can be delivered with effect, if he can drive the Boers back, their army +will be in a perilous situation. The <a name="Page_139" id="Page_139" />plan evidently is that while +Clery's division holds the Boers in front, Warren's should strike upon +their right flank. If, then, the combined attack of the two divisions +forces the Boers back the situation would be that the Boer army would +have to retreat eastward across the Klip River, its retreat in any other +direction being barred by the defences of Ladysmith, by Warren's and +Clery's divisions, and by the British force in the lines at Chieveley. +In such a situation a forced retreat would be disastrous for the Boers, +as Sir Redvers Buller's two divisions would be nearer to the Boer line +of retreat through Glencoe than the Boer army.</p> + +<p>Of the probabilities of success it would be rash to speak. But though +numbers are against the British we must never forget the splendid +qualities which British troops have displayed in the past and which, as +the actions of this war have proved, are possessed by our officers and +men to-day. The experiences of the last <a name="Page_140" id="Page_140" />few weeks have taught them what +are the formations to avoid and have shown them that they shoot at least +as well as the Boers. We may, therefore, hope for victory even against +numbers.</p> + +<p>But even if Sir Redvers Buller finds positions as strong as that at +Colenso, the Boers will probably be baulked of their prey, the garrison +of Ladysmith. Sir George White has with him the flower of the British +Army, and he does not mean to be reduced by degrees to the extremity of +famine and helplessness. During Sir Redvers Buller's attack the +Ladysmith's force will not be idle, but will attack the Boers who are +investing the place. Signals must have been prearranged between the two +commanders, and it can hardly be doubted that if and when Sir George +White should have reason to believe that Sir Redvers Buller may be +unable to force his way through the Boer positions he would himself set +out to cut his way through the investing lines, and at whatever +sacrifice to <a name="Page_141" id="Page_141" />carry the remnant of his force into Sir Redvers Buller's +camp, and thus to vindicate the honour of the British arms and the +character of the British soldier.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="SUBSTANTIAL_PROGRESS" id="SUBSTANTIAL_PROGRESS" />SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS</h2> + +<p><i>January 25th</i>, 1900</p> + + +<p>The decisive operation is proceeding slowly but surely. On Wednesday, +the 10th, Lord Dundonald reached the south bank of the Tugela at +Potgieter's Drift, and on Thursday a brigade of infantry was up with +him. A week later, on Wednesday, the 17th, Lyttelton's brigade crossed +by the drift, and Warren's wing of the Army began the passage by a +pontoon bridge at Trichardt's or Wagon Drift. On Thursday, the 18th, +Dundonald was on the high road west of Acton Homes, and drove away a +party of Boers.</p> + +<p>North of the Tugela there is a great crescent-<a name="Page_142" id="Page_142" />shaped plateau three or +four miles across at the widest part. The crescent has its convex side +to the south-west. One of its horns touches the Acton Homes—Ladysmith +road; its broadest part bulges south towards the river bank between +Wagon Drift and the loop near Potgieter's Drift; its other limb is +broken into irregular heights, Brakfontein kopje apparently marking its +south-eastern apex. On the concave north-eastern side Spion Kop is about +at the centre, and is four miles north of Wagon Drift. The plateau is +three or four hundred feet above the river and Spion Kop about the same +height above the plateau. Near the northern apex rises the Blaauwbank +River, which flows eastward towards Ladysmith along the foot of an east +and west range, a spur from the Drakensberg mountains jutting out so as +to separate the Van Reenen's road and valley from the valley followed by +the Acton Homes—Ladysmith road.</p> + +<p>When Warren crossed the river he found the western half of the crescent +held by the enemy.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143" />Whatever his original design, which may have been to take his whole +force to Acton Homes, and then march eastward along the road, he had to +drive the Boers from the plateau. His action was deliberate, without +hurry, but without waste of time. The troops had been prepared for +tactics better suited to their weapons, the bullet and the shell, to the +enemy's weapons, and to the ground, than the rapid advance and charge, +which was the plan of earlier actions in this war. The view that the +bullet should do its work before the appeal to the bayonet is made had +at length asserted itself. Moreover, the need for method in attack had +been recognised; first reconnaissance, then shelling; during the +shelling the deployment of the infantry in extended and flexible order, +then the musketry duel supported by the artillery; and then, as the +infantry fire proves stronger than the enemy's, an advance from point to +point in order to bring it to closer and more deadly range; last of all, +if and where it may be needed, the charge. These sound <a name="Page_144" id="Page_144" />tactics—the +only tactics appropriate to modern firearms—cannot be hurried, for to +charge men armed with the magazine rifle and not yet shaken is to +sacrifice your troops to their own bravery.</p> + +<p>Warren's attack then was rightly deliberate. On Friday, the 19th, he was +reconnoitring and feeling for the enemy. On Saturday the shooting match +began. It was continued throughout Sunday, and was not over on Tuesday. +During these days the British were making way, gradually and not without +loss, but steadily. There were, no doubt, pauses for renewing order, for +reinforcing, and for securing the ground won. On Tuesday evening Spion +Kop was still held by the Boers, who seem even then not to have been +driven off the plateau, but to have been clinging to its eastern edge. +On Tuesday night Spion Kop was taken. It was assaulted, probably in the +dark, by surprise, and the Boers driven off. Even on Wednesday the Boers +were tenaciously resisting the advance, making heavy attacks on Spion +Kop and using their artillery with effect. <a name="Page_145" id="Page_145" />At midnight between +Wednesday and Thursday Sir Redvers Duller telegraphed home Sir Charles +Warren's opinion that the enemy's position had been rendered untenable, +and added his own judgment of the behaviour of the British troops in the +words, "the men are splendid."</p> + +<p>All through the week Lyttelton's brigade has been facing a force of the +enemy on the eastern limb of the plateau in front of Potgieter's Drift. +He has not pressed an attack but has kept his infantry back, not pushing +them forward to close range, but contenting himself with shelling the +Boer positions.</p> + +<p>Sir Redvers Buller before the troops left the camps beside the railway +had six infantry brigades. There are indications in the telegrams of a +reorganisation and redistribution of battalions among the brigades, so +that it is hardly safe to speak with certainty as to the present +composition and distribution of the commands. Apparently the left wing +under Warren consists of three or four infantry brigades, the cavalry +<a name="Page_146" id="Page_146" />brigade, and most of the mounted infantry, and five or six batteries. +Sir Charles Warren himself appears to keep the general direction of this +wing in his own hands. Sir F. Clery either commands a division (two +brigades), the third brigade being led by its brigadier, under Sir +Charles Warren's direction, or Sir F. Clery is supervising the whole of +the infantry advance. Lyttelton has his own brigade, and Barton's +brigade covers the railhead at Chieveley. That accounts for five of the +six brigades. The sixth is Coke's, of Warren's division. We do not at +present know whether this is with Warren on the left wing or with Duller +as a general reserve to be put in to the fight at the decisive moment.</p> + +<p>The great difficulties of day-after-day fighting, which has been +regarded for some years as the normal character of future battles, is to +secure for the men the food and rest without which they must soon +collapse, and to ensure the continuous supply of ammunition. If these +difficulties can be overcome Sir Redvers Bullers has a good <a name="Page_147" id="Page_147" />chance of +success in his endeavour to relieve Ladysmith. Once driven from the +plateau by Warren, the Boers must retire several miles before they can +reach a second defensive position, and their retirement may be hastened +by pressure on their flanks, which is to be expected from Dundonald's +mounted infantry and cavalry, probably now on the right or northern +flank of the Boer line, as well as from Lyttelton on their left. A small +reinforcement would give a fresh impetus to the British advance. If +Coke's brigade has not yet been engaged Sir Redvers Buller will know +when and where to use it—either to reinforce Lyttelton for a blow +against the Boer line of retreat or to reinforce Warren's left. The +arrival of the <i>Kildonan Castle</i> at Durban this morning, as far as we +know, with drafts for some of the battalions, is better than nothing, +for the drafts will give fresh vigour to the bodies that receive them. +They cannot reach the fighting line before Saturday, but their arrival +then may be most opportune. Still better would it be if a <a name="Page_148" id="Page_148" />fresh brigade +should arrive while the struggle continues. There was at least a brigade +available at Cape Town a few days ago, and it could not have been better +employed than in strengthening Buller at any point where he can feed it, +at Chieveley if not as a reinforcement to Warren or Lyttelton, for a +fresh brigade at Chieveley would enable Barton to put pressure on the +Boers in his front.</p> + +<p>Supposing that Warren has by this time compelled the retreat of the +Boers from the plateau for which he has been fighting, what can the +Boers do to resist Buller's further advance? They must try to hold a +second position. Two such positions appear to be open to them, if we may +judge by the not very full maps available. The line of hills from +Bulbarrow Hill on the north to the hill near Arnot Hill Farm on the +south might give good opportunities for defence; it blocks the road to +Ladysmith, for the Boers occupying the line would be right across these +roads. Another plan would be for the Boers to <a name="Page_149" id="Page_149" />retreat to the north-east +on to the east and west ridge, which commands from the north the Acton +Homes—Dewdrop road. If the Boers took this position the roads to +Ladysmith, or to the rear of the investing lines, would be open. But Sir +Redvers Buller could not advance along them with the Boer forces +menacing his flank, and he would be obliged either to attack them or to +contain them by extending a force along their front to hold its ground +against them while he pushed the rest of his force towards Ladysmith. +Whether this would be a prudent plan for the Boers depends upon their +numbers, and if they are strong enough they might combine both plans.</p> + +<p>It is, however, by no means certain that Lord Dundonald is unable to +prevent the Boers from crossing the Blaauwbank Spruit. He has not been +heard of for a week, and has had plenty of time to have his force in +position to the north of Clydesdale Farm, unless, indeed, he has been +kept in hand behind Warren's left flank ready for pursuit after the +capture of the great plateau.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150" />The situation continues to be critical, and must be so until the fate +of Ladysmith is decided. Our own men are justifying to the full the +confidence reposed in them; what men can do they will accomplish. But +the Boers are fighting stubbornly, and may be able to wear out Sir +Redvers Buller's force before their own resistance collapses. We at home +must wait patiently, hoping for the best but prepared for fresh efforts. +At least we ought all now to realise that the splendid behaviour of our +soldiers in the field lays upon us as citizens the duty of securing for +the future the best possible treatment of those who are so generous of +their lives.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="THE_ELEVENTH_HOUR" id="THE_ELEVENTH_HOUR" /><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151" />THE ELEVENTH HOUR</h2> + +<p><i>February 1st</i>, 1900</p> + + +<p>If on Tuesday the Bank of England had announced that it could not meet +its obligations I imagine that there would have been a certain amount of +uneasiness in the City and elsewhere, and that some at least of the rich +men to be found in London would have put their heads together to see +what could be done to meet a grave emergency.</p> + +<p>On Tuesday a failure was indeed announced—a failure which must involve +the Bank of England and most of the great banking and trading +corporations of this country. But no one seems to have taken action upon +it, and I see no visible sign of general alarm. The Prime Minister, +speaking in his place in the House of Lords and on behalf of the +National Government, said: "I do not believe in the perfection of the +British Constitution as an instrument of war ...it is evident there is +something in your machinery <a name="Page_152" id="Page_152" />that is wrong." That was Lord Salisbury's +explanation and defence of the failure of his Government in the +diplomacy which preceded the war, in the preparations for the war, and +in the conduct of the war. It was a declaration of bankruptcy—a plain +statement by the Government that it cannot govern. The announcement was +not made to Parliament with closed doors and the reporters excluded. It +was made to the whole world, to the British Nation, and to all the +rivals of Great Britain. Parliament did not take any action upon the +declaration. No committee of both Houses was formed to consider how +without delay to make a Government that can govern. The ordinary normal +routine of public and private life goes on. Thus in the crisis of the +Nation's fate we are ungoverned and unled, and to all appearance we are +content to be so, and the leader-writers trained in the tradition of +respectable formalism interpret the Nation's apathy as fortitude.</p> + +<p>Lord Salisbury's confession of impotence was <a name="Page_153" id="Page_153" />true. From the beginning +to the end of this business the Government has lacked the manliness to +do its plain duty. In the first half of July, before the official +reports of the Bloemfontein conference were published, everyone but the +disciples of Mr. Morley knew that the only honourable course, after the +Government's declaration prior to the conference and after what there +took place, was to insist on the acceptance by the South African +Republic of the Bloemfontein proposals and to back up that insistence by +adequate military preparations. It is admitted that this was not done, +and what is the excuse now made? Mr. Balfour told the House of Commons +on Tuesday, January 30th, that if in August a vote of credit had been +demanded "we should not have been able to persuade the House that the +necessity for the vote was pressing and urgent." The Government charged +with the defence of the Empire excuses itself for not having made +preparations for that task on the ground that perhaps the House of +Commons would not <a name="Page_154" id="Page_154" />have given its approval. Yet the Government had a +great majority at its back, and there is no instance in recent times of +a vote of credit having been rejected by the House of Commons. This +shameful cowardice was exhibited although, as we now know but could not +then have imagined, the Government had in its possession the protest of +the Government of Natal against the intention of the Imperial Government +to abandon the northern portion of that colony. The Natal Ministers on +July 25th confidentially communicated their extreme surprise at learning +that in case of sudden hostilities it would not be possible with the +garrison and colonial forces available to defend the northern portion of +the colony.</p> + +<p>After shilly-shallying from May to September the Government began its +preparations, and the Boers as soon as they were ready began the war. Of +the conduct of the war the readers of <i>The London Letter</i> have had an +account week by week, as to the truth of which they can judge <a name="Page_155" id="Page_155" />for +themselves, for the facts are there by which it can be tested. The +attempt has been made to refrain from any criticism which could hurt the +feelings of the generals, who are doing their duty to the best of their +power in most trying circumstances. But is it not plain that the British +Army has been hampered by a lack of sound strategy and of sound tactics +such as indicate prolonged previous neglect of these branches of study +and training? Who is responsible to the Nation for the training of the +Army? The Government and the Government alone. If any military officer +has not done his work effectively—if, for example, the +Commander-in-Chief has not taught his generals rightly or not selected +them properly—who is responsible to Parliament for that? Not the +officer, even if he be the Commander-in-Chief, for the +Commander-in-Chief is the servant of the Cabinet and responsible to the +Cabinet, which if it were dissatisfied with him ought to have dismissed +him. Authority over the Army is in the hands <a name="Page_156" id="Page_156" />of the Secretary of State +for War as the delegate of the Cabinet. Lord Lansdowne has held his post +only since 1895, and cannot be held responsible for the training of the +older generals; but before him came Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman who for +some years had charge of the preparation of the Army for war as the +delegate of the late Cabinet. For the state of the Army, for the +strategical and tactical training which has resulted in so many +failures, the politicians of both front benches, who in turn have +neglected these vital matters, are responsible.</p> + +<p>Here we are, then, in the middle of the war, without a Government, but +with a body of men who fill the place of a Government while admitting +themselves incompetent to do the work entrusted to them and for which +they are paid. The war so far has consisted of a succession of repulses, +which at any moment may culminate in disaster. Sir Redvers Buller has +twice led his Army to defeat and is about to lead it a third time—to +what? Possibly to victory; we all hope <a name="Page_157" id="Page_157" />that it may be to victory. But +possibly to a third defeat which would mean not merely the loss of the +force at Ladysmith; it would mean that Sir Redvers Buller's Army in its +turn would need succour, and that the plan, so much favoured by the +strategists of the Army, of a march through the Free State would be +hampered. For the final and decisive defeat of Sir Redvers Buller would +be followed by the long-deferred general rising of the Cape Dutch, and +probably enough by the action of one or more of the European Powers. +<i>The Times</i> of to-day announces that a foreign Government has ordered a +large supply of steam coal from the Welsh collieries. That can mean but +one thing, that some foreign Power is getting its Navy ready for action.</p> + +<p>What, then, is the situation to-day? That any day may bring the gravest +news from South Africa, to be followed possibly by an ultimatum from a +foreign coalition. In that event the Nation will have to choose between +abandoning <a name="Page_158" id="Page_158" />its Empire in obedience to foreign dictation, an abandonment +which would mean National ruin, and a war for existence, a war for which +no preparation has been made, which the Government is incompetent to +conduct, and which would begin by a naval conflict during which it would +be impossible to assist the Army in South Africa. That is the situation. +It may take a turn for better; you cannot be quite sure that a storm +which you see brewing may not pass off, but the probabilities are that +the struggle for existence is at hand. What then is our duty, the duty +of every one of us? To support the Government which cannot govern? Not +for a moment, but to get rid of it as soon as possible and to make at +once a Government that will try. Lord Rosebery at least sees the +situation and understands the position. There is no other public man who +commands such general confidence, and it is practically certain that if +the Cabinet were compelled to resign by an adverse vote of the House of +Commons Lord Rosebery would be <a name="Page_159" id="Page_159" />the first statesman to be consulted by +the Queen. Lord Rosebery could make a Government to-morrow if he would +ignore parties and pick out the competent men wherever they are to be +found. Any new Cabinet, except one containing Mr. Morley or Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman, would be given a chance. The House of Commons would +wait a few weeks to see how it bore itself. If there were prompt +evidences of knowledge and will in the measures adopted, even though +half the Ministers or all of them except Lord Rosebery were new men, +there would soon be a feeling of confidence, and the Nation, knowing +that it was led, would respond with enthusiasm. In that case Great +Britain might make a good fight, though no one who knows the state of +our preparations and those of the rest of the world will make a sanguine +prediction as to the result.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="TRY_TRY_TRY_AGAIN" id="TRY_TRY_TRY_AGAIN" /><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160" />TRY, TRY, TRY AGAIN</h2> + +<p><i>February 8th</i>, 1900</p> + +<p>Sir Redvers Buller on Monday set out on his third attempt to relieve +Ladysmith. He appears to have made a feint against the Boer position +north of Potgieter's Drift, and, while there attracting the attention of +the Boers by the concentrated fire of many guns, to have pushed a force +of infantry and artillery across the river to the right of Potgieter's +Drift. This force, of which the infantry belongs to Lyttelton's brigade, +carried and defended against counter attack a hill called Vaal Krantz, +at the eastern end of the Brakfontein ridge. To the east of Vaal Krantz +runs a good road to Ladysmith, along which the distance from the Tugela +to Sir George's White's outposts is about ten miles. To the east again +of the road is a hill called Dorn Kop. Here the Boers have an artillery +position which seems to command Vaal Krantz, and they <a name="Page_161" id="Page_161" />probably have the +usual infantry trenches. The Boer position then faces the Tugela and +runs from Spion Kop on the west, the Boer left, to Dorn Kop on the east, +the Boer right. Sir Redvers Buller's attack is an attempt to pierce the +centre of this position.</p> + +<p>To break the centre of an enemy's line, to pour your forces into and +through the gap, and then roll up the more important of his divided +wings, is an operation which if it can be successfully executed makes a +decisive victory; if followed up it ruins the enemy's army. But it is in +modern conditions the most difficult form of attack. The long range of +modern weapons, of guns that kill at two miles and of rifles that kill +at a mile—to take a moderate estimate of their power—enables the +defender to concentrate upon any attack against his centre the fire of +all the rifles in his front line for a couple of miles, and of all the +guns standing on a length of four miles. A similar concentration of fire +is only occasionally and temporary possible for the assailant, though if +it <a name="Page_162" id="Page_162" />should happen that the ground exposes a point of the defender's line +to such concentric fire, while it protects some points held by the +assailant, the attack would have a prospect of success. But the moment +the point of attack is recognised by the defender he will collect every +available battery and rifleman from all parts of his line and place them +on that portion of his front which commands the path of the assailant. +To prevent this the assailant must engage the defender along his whole +line so that all the defending forces are fully occupied and there are +none to spare for the critical point or region.</p> + +<p>Sir Redvers Buller's task is rendered harder by the fact that his own +troops before they can attack must cross the Tugela. He has two bridges +at the point here supposed to have been selected for the main attack, +but troops can hardly cross a bridge at a quicker rate than a brigade an +hour, and as the Boers ride faster than the British infantry can walk, +and as the British troops south of the river cannot effectually <a name="Page_163" id="Page_163" />engage +the Boers, it will not have been easy so to occupy the enemy along the +whole front as to prevent his massing guns and rifles—at any rate +rifles—to defend his centre.</p> + +<p>So much for the initial difficulties, which seem by a combination of +feint and surprise to have been so far overcome on Monday that the +advanced British troops effected a lodgment in the centre of the Boer +position, from which a counter-attack failed to eject them. The next +thing is, as the British force is brought across the river, to attack +one of the Boer wings while containing or keeping back the other. Before +this, can be done the enemy's centre must really be pierced, so that +troops can be poured through the gap to turn the flank of one of the +enemy's divided halves. This piercing is most difficult in the +conditions of to-day, for the enemy by establishing a new firing line +behind the point carried by our troops may be able to enclose in a +semicircle of fire the party that has made its way into the position. +Against such <a name="Page_164" id="Page_164" />an enveloping fire it is a hard task to make headway.</p> + +<p>All these aspects of his problem a General thinks out before he starts; +he does not make his attempt unless and until he sees his way to meet +the various difficulties, both those inherent in the nature of the +operation and those that arise from the local conditions and from the +character of the particular enemy. The difficulties are therefore not +reasons why General Buller should not succeed, but their consideration +may help to show why with the best previous deliberation and with the +bravest of troops he may perhaps not be able to break the Boer +resistance.</p> + +<p>There is one feature of his task that is perhaps not fully appreciated +by the public. In order to relieve Ladysmith he must thoroughly defeat +and drive away the Boer army—must, so to speak break its back. For, +supposing he could clear a road to Ladysmith and march there, leaving +the Boer army in position on one or both sides of his road, his position +on reaching the place would <a name="Page_165" id="Page_165" />be that he would have to fight his way back +again, and that unless he could then defeat the Boers his Army would be +lost, for it would be cut off from its supplies. The relief of Ladysmith +and the complete defeat of the Boer army are therefore synonymous terms. +There is, however, a sense in which a partial defeat of the Boers would +be of use. If the Boer army, though not driven off, were yet fully +absorbed in its struggle with Sir Redvers Bullet and had drawn to its +assistance some portion of the force investing Ladysmith, it might be +possible for Sir George White to make a sortie and to break through the +investing lines. To that case, however, the term "the relief of +Ladysmith" could hardly be correctly applied.</p> + +<p>How far Sir George White can co-operate with Sir Redvers Buller depends +partly upon the mobility of his force. His horses after three months in +Ladysmith can hardly be in much condition, even supposing that they have +not already begun to be used as food for the troops. <a name="Page_166" id="Page_166" />Supposing there +are horses enough for the field guns, and that the naval guns and +mountain guns were destroyed at the last moment before the sortie. The +men and the field artillery would then have to make a night attack, +followed by a march of about seven miles in trying conditions, and by a +second attack in which they would join hands with Sir Redvers Buller. +This does not imply exertions impossible to troops like Sir George +White's, and such a move perhaps offers the best way out of the +difficulties of the situation. If in that case Sir George White made for +the north side of Dorn Kop a part of the Boer army would probably be +destroyed, and the loss which the British force would have suffered +would thus to some extent be made up for. It is presumed that Sir +Redvers Buller and Sir George White, who are able to communicate with +one another, have a cipher which enables them to inform each other +without informing the enemy.</p> + +<p>Any plan which will unite Sir George White's <a name="Page_167" id="Page_167" />force, or the bulk of it, +with that of Sir Redvers Buller on the Tugela will simplify the whole +problem of the War. Lord Roberts is preparing for an advance in force +from the Orange River, which will sooner or later transfer the centre of +gravity to the western theatre of War, in which the British troops will +not be confronted by the difficulties of an unknown or very imperfectly +known mountainous region. The movements now taking place in the Cape +Colony are the preliminaries to that advance. The method, the only right +method, is to use the reinforcements that have arrived—the sixth and +seventh divisions—to secure a preponderance first at one point and then +at another, instead of distributing them evenly over the whole area and +the various points of contact. The idea would seem to be, first, to +strengthen General French until he has crushed the Boer force with which +he is dealing, then to use his troops to secure the defeat of the Boers +who are opposing Sir William Gatacre, and then to cross <a name="Page_168" id="Page_168" />the Orange +River with three divisions and deal a blow against the Boer army that is +now between the Riet River and Kimberley. This plan of beating in detail +the Boer forces in the western theatre of war, if carried out so as to +lead in each case to a crushing defeat of the Boers, would be the +prelude to a collision between the main Boer army and a British force +its superior in every respect. The first certain evidence that some such +idea is at the foundation of the new operations may be hailed as the +beginning of victory. For the present it is enough to know that the +departure of Lord Roberts from Cape Town augurs the opening of an +energetic campaign with that unity of direction in a strong hand which +is the first element of success in war.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="A_COMMANDER" id="A_COMMANDER" /><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169" />A COMMANDER</h2> + +<p><i>February 15th</i>, 1900</p> + + +<p>In war, as in other great enterprises, the first element of success is +unity of direction in a strong hand. The reason is that whenever the +co-operation of large numbers is involved the needful concentration of +purpose can be supplied only by the head man, the leader or director. +Concentration of purpose means in war the arrangement in due perspective +of all the various objectives, the selection of the most important of +them, the distribution of forces according to the importance of the +blows to be delivered, of which some one is always decisive. To the +decisive point, then, the bulk of the forces are directed, and at other +points small forces are left to make shift as well as they can, unless, +indeed, there is a superabundance of force—not a common phenomenon.</p> + +<p>The same principle of concentration prescribes <a name="Page_170" id="Page_170" />that action when once +begun should, at any rate at the decisive point, be sudden, rapid, and +continuous. These fundamental ideas are illustrated by the practice of +all the great commanders, and there is perhaps no better definition of a +great commander than one whose action illustrates the simple principles +of war. Lord Roberts is once more revealing to his countrymen the nature +of these principles. The tangled mass of the war has suddenly become +simplified, and there is clearness where there was confusion.</p> + +<p>The Commander-in-Chief reached Cape Town on January 10th, and found +large forces dispersed over a front of two or three hundred miles, the +reinforcements at sea, and the transport still in a state very like +confusion. By February 6th, two or three weeks earlier than was +anticipated by those at home who had the most perfect confidence in him, +he was on his way to the front, enabling those at home to draw the +certain inference that all was ready, the divisions assembled, and the +<a name="Page_171" id="Page_171" />transport in order. While he was travelling the six hundred miles from +Cape Town to the Modder River various preliminary moves which he had +ordered were in course of execution. There had been a large display of +British infantry near Colesberg, covering the withdrawal of General +French and the cavalry division. This had the effect of causing the +Boers to reinforce Colesberg, probably by detachments from +Magersfontein. The British infantry, however, was there only to lure the +Boers; it was composed of parts of the sixth division on the way further +north, and only a small infantry force was left to hold the reinforced +Boers in check. The next move was a reconnaissance in force from Modder +River to Koodoosberg Drifts, which drew Commandant Cronje's attention +and some of his troops to his right flank. The reconnaissance had the +further object of inspiriting the Highland Brigade which had been so +badly damaged at Magersfontein, and of establishing good relations +between these troops and their new commander, General Mac <a name="Page_172" id="Page_172" />Donald. On +their return to camp a short address from Lord Roberts had the effect +upon them that Napoleon's proclamations used to produce on the French +troops. A day or two was spent in completing the organisation of the +force at Modder River, where a new division, the ninth, had been formed +probably of troops brought up from the communications. The mounted +infantry were also brigaded, as had been those at Orange River Station. +Meantime various movements had been going on of which the details as yet +are unreported. Two infantry divisions, the sixth and seventh, the last +two from England, were moving towards the Riet River to the East of +Jacobsdal. The point or points from which they started are not known, +nor the direction of their march, which was screened by the cavalry +division and perhaps also by a brigade of mounted infantry. At any rate +on Sunday, the 11th inst., Hannay's brigade of mounted infantry from +Orange River, on the march to Ramdam, had to cover its right flank +against a party of Boers. Ramdam is not to be found, but <a name="Page_173" id="Page_173" />if it is on +the Riet above Jacobsdal the probability is that Hannay's brigade was +covering the right flank of the infantry divisions.</p> + +<p>On Monday French with his cavalry brigade seized a drift or ford across +the Riet ten or a dozen miles above Jacobsdal, and the two infantry +divisions were so close behind him that on Tuesday Lord Roberts could +report them both encamped beyond the river. On Tuesday French was off +again to the north with a cavalry brigade, a mounted infantry brigade, +and a horse artillery brigade, a second cavalry brigade, under Colonel +Gordon moving on his right. By half-past five French was across the +Modder River, having forced a drift and seized the hills beyond so as to +secure the passage for the infantry, while Gordon had seized two drifts +further to the west. Between them the two cavalry commanders had +captured five Boer laagers, and the slightness of the opposition they +encounter proves that the Boers were completely surprised. On Wednesday +morning <a name="Page_174" id="Page_174" />the sixth division was on the march to follow the cavalry, and +the seventh division was to take the same direction on Wednesday +afternoon.</p> + +<p>These are all the facts reported until now, Thursday afternoon. Let us +see what they mean. First of all, Lord Roberts has chosen his objective, +the Boer force before Kimberley, on the right flank of the Boer front +Stormberg—Colesberg—Magersfontein. A blow delivered here and followed +by a march into the Free State places Lord Roberts on the communications +of the Boers now at Stormberg and Colesberg and between the two halves +of the Boer army, of which one is on the border of Cape Colony and the +other in Natal. The objective, therefore, has been chosen with +strategical insight. In the next place forces have been concentrated for +the blow. Lord Roberts has four infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade, +and at least one brigade of mounted infantry, his total strength +amounting to at least fifty thousand men. Then there has been a skilful +and successful attempt to distract <a name="Page_175" id="Page_175" />the enemy's attention, to conceal +from him the nature of the movement and the force to be employed, and +last, but not least, there has been the suddenness and the rapidity of +movement essential to surprise. These are the proofs of that breadth and +simplicity of conception and of that mastery in execution which are the +marks of the best generalship.</p> + +<p>But there is in the best work more than breadth of mind and strength of +hand. The details fit in with the design and repay the closest scrutiny. +The march of twenty-five thousand men round Jacobsdal towards the Modder +tactically turns the Boer position at Magersfontein, so that it need not +be carried by a frontal attack. But it also places the British force on +the direct line of the Boer communications with Bloemfontein, and if +Commandant Cronje values these communications he must either make a +precipitate retreat by Boshof, offering his flank during the process to +attack by French, or must attack the sixth and seventh divisions on +their <a name="Page_176" id="Page_176" />march from the Riet to the Modder. But in either case he has to +reckon with the Guards and ninth divisions which are not mentioned in +the telegrams, but which are assuredly not idle. Lord Methuen has long +held a crossing on to the peninsula or Doab between the two rivers, and +the advance of a division into this peninsula must compel the prompt +evacuation of Jacobsdal or bring about the ruin of any Boer force there, +while at the same time it would increase the weight of troops that +intervene between Magersfontein and Bloemfontein. A single division is a +more than ample force to cover the British railhead at Modder River. +Commandant Cronje may elect to fight where he is, which would be to +court disaster, for he would be attacked from the east in great force, +with no retreat open except to the west away from his base, and with a +considerable river, the Vaal, to cross. Such a retreat after a lost +battle and under the pressure of pursuit would be ruin to his army. He +may move off by Boshof, but that would be <a name="Page_177" id="Page_177" />impracticable unless the +start were made soon after the first news of the British advance. On +Wednesday he would have only the mounted troops to deal with; even on +Thursday (to-day) the sixth division could hardly be used with effect on +the north bank of the Modder, but on Friday he would have the sixth and +seventh divisions to reckon with. Probably his best course would be to +retire before he can be attacked to Barkly, on the right bank of the +Vaal. He would there be in a position most difficult to attack, and yet +his presence there on the flank of any British advance either to the +north or to the east would make it impossible to neglect him. His +decision has been taken before now, or this opinion would have been +suppressed out of deference to the anxiety of those who imagine that +strategical advice is telegraphed from London to the Boer headquarters.</p> + +<p>Of the effect of the new move upon the general course of the war it +would be premature to enlarge. We must wait and see the close of <a name="Page_178" id="Page_178" />the +first act. The most effective issue of this week's movements would be a +battle leading to the thorough defeat, the military destruction, of the +Boer army before Kimberley. A less valuable result would be the raising +of the siege of Kimberley without fighting, a result which is not to be +preferred, because a force that retires before battle has to be fought +later on. For this reason the true Boer game is to retreat in time.</p> + +<p>It will be interesting to watch the effect of the new campaign upon the +ripening resolve of the British Nation to have, its Army set in order. +Upon many minds, and no doubt upon Ministers and their adherents, the +impression made by success in the field will be that reform is needless. +The true impression would be that it is as urgent as before, and that +the right way to begin is to give authority to the right man, the +commander who is now revealing his strength.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CRONJES_SEDAN" id="CRONJES_SEDAN" /><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179" />CRONJE'S SEDAN</h2> + +<p><i>February 22nd</i>, 1900</p> + + +<p>A week ago the news was that Lord Roberts had begun his movement, that +he was moving with fifty thousand men against Commandant Cronje, and +that General French with the cavalry division had crossed the Modder, +the sixth and seventh divisions following him between the Riet and the +Modder.</p> + +<p>The great object was to strike down Cronje's force before it could +receive help, and the design must have been to cut off his retreat to +the eastward. On Thursday, the 15th, French marched from the Modder to +Alexandersfontein, attacked the rear of the Boer line investing +Kimberley, and in the evening entered the town. He had left the sixth +division at the drifts of the Modder. This movement of French's appeared +to imply that Cronje's army was known to be retreating to the west or +north-west, and that French took the road through Kimberley as the +shortest way to reach a position where that retreat could be +<a name="Page_180" id="Page_180" />intercepted. It could hardly be imagined that the move was made for the +sake of Kimberley, of which the relief was assured whether Cronje stood +to fight or retreated in any direction. The essential thing was to find +where Cronje's force was—if it was at Magersfontein to surround it or +drive it to the west; if elsewhere to delay it with the cavalry and +pursue it with the infantry. But Cronje was not found. When French was +in Kimberley, Cronje, retreating eastwards, passed through the fifteen +miles gap between the town and Kelly-Kenny. Kelly-Kenny on Friday +discovered this and set off in pursuit while French was following a Boer +force retreating northwards, probably part of the force that had +invested Kimberley. Kelly-Kenny shelled the Boer laager and captured a +number of waggons, but the Boers retreated eastwards along the north +bank of the Modder with Kelly-Kenny at their heels. To assist +Kelly-Kenny French was recalled from the north, and Macdonald with the +Highland Brigade pushed out by a forced march from Jacobsdal. Accounts +differ as to the site of the fighting, <a name="Page_181" id="Page_181" />but there was a three days' +running fight, during which Cronje may have crossed the Modder and +approached Paardeberg or may have been stopped on the north bank. The +Boer reports, which imply at least that Cronje was hard pressed, were +sent off before the finish, and the first British official reports, +consisting only in a list of officers killed and wounded, show that each +of the three infantry brigades had hard fighting with considerable +losses.</p> + +<p>Of eight infantry brigades with which Lord Roberts began his movement +three were engaged against Cronje; one has probably been sent to +Kimberley, with which town railway communication has been re-opened, so +that it will be soon an advanced base for the Army. Lord Roberts, +therefore, who was at Paardeberg on Monday evening, may have had with +him four brigades or two divisions, representing twenty thousand men, +besides the three brigades engaged, which represented before the battle +something like fifteen thousand.</p> + +<p>Of French and the cavalry division there is no report. The Boers publish +a telegram from <a name="Page_182" id="Page_182" />Commandant de Wet, who seems to have brought up +reinforcements while Cronje's action was in progress on Sunday.</p> + +<p>The Boer commander evidently counted on reinforcements from all +quarters; a party from Colesberg cut off a British waggon train at the +Riet on or about Friday, the 16th, and reinforcements from Natal arrived +during Cronje's action. Lord Roberts has thus drawn the Boers away from +the circumference towards the centre. He has lightened the tasks of +Buller, Clements, Gatacre, and Brabant, but has thereby brought the +chief load on to his own shoulders. It seems a misfortune that Cronje +was able to escape eastwards from Magersfontein, though it would be +wrong until full knowledge of what took place is obtained to assume that +this could have been avoided.</p> + +<p>Cronje, however, has not been able to make good his escape. A Renter's +telegram from Paardeberg dated. Tuesday explicitly states that Cronje's +force was enclosed and remained enclosed. Lord Roberts on Tuesday +reported that <a name="Page_183" id="Page_183" />after examination of the enemy's position by +reconnaissance in force, he decided to avoid the heavy loss involved in +an assault, but to bombard the enemy and to turn his attention to the +approaching reinforcements. The result was that the reinforcements were +driven off and dispersed with heavy loss to them and trifling loss to +the British. This seems to have been effected on Tuesday. Boer prisoners +reported that they have come from Ladysmith, and the commander of the +reinforcements is said to have been Commandant Botha, who was last heard +of at Spion Kop. On Tuesday also the shelling of Cronje's position is +said to have induced him to ask for an armistice, which must be assumed +to be the prelude to a surrender; at any rate the request would hardly +be granted except to settle the terms of a capitulation or to enable the +Boer general to be told that unconditional surrender was the only +alternative to a continuance of the bombardment.</p> + +<p>The advance into the Free State implied that Lord Roberts meant to take +the benefit of acting <a name="Page_184" id="Page_184" />on "interior lines," that is, in plain English, +of getting in between his enemies and striking them in turn before they +can unite or combine. This plan required him with his main body to +attack the enemy's reinforcements in detail as they came up. In that way +he secured time for the completion of the action against Cronje, and +upon its favourable issue he will be master of the situation.</p> + +<p>In Natal the situation has been changed by the action of Lord Roberts. +The two Boer Republics are well aware that they must stand or fall +together. Either the Boer Commander-in-Chief has decided to strike at +Lord Roberts, in which case he must move the bulk of his force into the +Free State, or he hopes to be in time to resist Lord Roberts after +making an end of Sir George White. In the former case he must raise the +siege of Ladysmith, for he cannot carry it on without a strong covering +force to resist Sir Redvers Buller. Then there will be forty thousand +British troops in Natal, whose advance will be almost as dangerous as +that of Lord Roberts. In the latter case there can be little chance of a +<a name="Page_185" id="Page_185" />successful resistance to Lord Roberts, whose advance northwards from +Bloemfontein would in due time compromise the safety of the Boer army. +The reports do not enable us to feel sure which decision has been taken. +Sir Redvers Buller's telegram of Wednesday to the effect that one of his +divisions had crossed the Tugela and was opposed only by a rear guard +looks very like a Boer withdrawal from Natal. A later unofficial +telegram, describing a very strong position north of the Tugela held by +the Boers to cover the siege, suggests that the Boer commander is again +trying to lead his adversary into attack upon a prepared position. Each +case has its favourable aspect. If the Boers are raising the siege the +forces of Buller and White will in a few days be united, and need only +good leading to force the passes and invade either the Free State or the +Transvaal. If the Boers are determined to hold on to Ladysmith, they +cannot effectively check the advance of Lord Roberts.</p> + +<p>While the war is going on the Nation ought to set its military forces in +order. The Militia <a name="Page_186" id="Page_186" />should be formed into divisions for the field and be +shipped off to manoeuvring grounds at the Cape; they can be brought home +as soon as it is certain they will not be wanted. The Volunteers could +soon be formed into an army if the War Office would carry out the +measures which have for years been urged upon it by Volunteer officers. +The first step is to give the officers the authority which has hitherto +been withheld from them, so that by its exercise they may form their +characters; the second to give them the best instruction and +encouragements to learn; the third to find them ground for ranges, for +field firing and for manoeuvres. A minister of war who combined +knowledge of war and of the Volunteers with a serious purpose would be +able in two months to infuse the whole Volunteer force with the right +ideal, and then, by mobilising them for another two months, to transform +them into an army. It is for the Navy and the Ministry of Foreign +Affairs to secure the four months that are needed.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="THE_BOER_DEFEATS" id="THE_BOER_DEFEATS" /><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187" />THE BOER DEFEATS</h2> + +<p><i>March 1st</i>, 1900</p> + + +<p>February has made up for the blunders of August and September, and +retrieved the disasters of October, November, and December.</p> + +<p>On Tuesday the 27th, Commandant Cronje with four thousand men, the +remains of his army, surrendered to Lord Roberts at Paardeberg; the same +day, Sir Redvers Duller attacked and carried the Boer position near +Pieters, in front of Ladysmith, and on Wednesday the 28th, Lord +Dundonald with two mounted regiments, entered Ladysmith.</p> + +<p>The fighting in the Free State and in Natal has been simultaneous, and +it may be worth while briefly to review the two campaigns. Lord Roberts +set out from Modder River on Monday the 12th. On that day began the +march of his force to the attack of Cronje. French with the cavalry +seized Dekiel's Drift on the Riet and was followed by two infantry +divisions. Next day, Tuesday the 13th, <a name="Page_188" id="Page_188" />French was holding the drifts of +the Modder, and on Thursday morning the sixth division was at Klip +Drift. Thereupon French pushed on with his cavalry to Kimberley. The +same night Cronje marched off between Kimberley and Klip Drift, making +eastwards along the north bank of the Modder, which he was to cross near +Paardeberg. But his march was discovered. He was followed and attacked +on Friday the 10th by the advance guard of the sixth division, which +detained him at the crossing of the river. The Highland Brigade made a +forced march to intercept him on the south bank, and between Friday and +Sunday, the 16th and 18th, he was surrounded and driven back into a +position formed by the river banks. Here, from the 17th to the 27th, he +held out against a bombardment, while the British forces, pushing their +trenches gradually nearer, were preparing for an assault. Lord Roberts +had brought up the bulk of his force, and parried with ease the attacks +of two or three parties of Boers who came up in succession to Cronje's +assistance; some of them having been sent for the purpose from <a name="Page_189" id="Page_189" />Northern +Natal. On Tuesday, February 27th, the anniversary of Majuba, Cronje +surrendered.</p> + +<p>The effects of this campaign against Cronje were felt at once in various +parts of the theatre of war. The advance of Lord Roberts and the retreat +of Cronje carried with them the relief of Kimberley. It drew away the +Boers from the Colesberg district, so that on the 26th General Clements +was able to enter Colesberg, which had been evacuated, and on the 27th, +to move his troops forward from Arundel to Rensburg.</p> + +<p>Lord Roberts had arranged for other action simultaneous with his own. On +Friday, the 16th, General Brabant with his Cape Mounted Division +attacked the Boers near Dordrecht and defeated them. A week later he was +in Jamestown, the Boers were retreating towards the Orange River, and +the rebels in Barkly East were asking for terms, receiving the answer +that there were no terms but unconditional surrender.</p> + +<p>On Wednesday the 14th, while French was leading the advance from +Dekiel's Drift to the Modder, Sir Redvers Buller took Hussar Hill, +<a name="Page_190" id="Page_190" />north-east of Chieveley. Four days later, on Sunday the 18th, he fought +a considerable battle at Monte Cristo, a point of the Inhlawe range, the +capture of which turned Hlangwane Hill and led to its capture next day, +Monday the 19th. On Tuesday the 20th, Buller's advance guard crossed the +Tugela near Colenso. On Wednesday the 21st, the river was bridged, and +three brigades crossed to the north bank. The fighting then became +continuous. On Friday there was a determined attack by the Irish brigade +upon a Boer position west of the railway near Pieters. The assault +failed and the troops suffered heavily, but the British force maintained +the general line of front which it had gained. On Monday the 26th, a +fresh bridge was thrown across the Tugela, a mile or two east of the +railway line, and on Tuesday the 27th, Pieters Hill, east of Pieters +Station, in the prolongation of the Boer front, was stormed by General +Barton, whereupon the whole British force renewed the attack in front +upon the Boer positions west of the railway and carried them, dispersing +the enemy. It now seems that <a name="Page_191" id="Page_191" />this was the decisive attack, for the next +evening, Wednesday the 28th, Dundonald with two mounted regiments was in +Ladysmith, and to-day Sir Redvers Buller with his Army Corps moved +forwards towards Nelthorpe, the last railway station before Ladysmith.</p> + +<p>On Wednesday morning Sir Redvers Buller reported a considerable force of +the enemy still on and under Bulwana Mountain, to the east of Ladysmith. +His task and that of his Army Corps is to inflict what damage he can +upon that force of the enemy, taking from Sir George White whatever +assistance that officer and his troops can give, and leaving to the +auxiliary services the work of attending to the sick and wounded in +Ladysmith and the provisioning of the troops and the town. A part of Sir +George White's force is, no doubt, still fit for action so soon as its +supply of cartridges can be renewed. The most effective plan would +probably be to leave a strong rearguard at Nelthorpe, and to push on +with the main body and the bulk of the artillery through <a name="Page_192" id="Page_192" />Ladysmith to +the assault of one of the Boer positions on the north side of the town. +This would compel the Boers to abandon Bulwana, perhaps to leave behind +their heavy guns; would, if successful, prevent their retreat by the +direct road into the Free State, and might greatly embarrass or, at +least, harass their retreat through the Biggarsberg.</p> + +<p>The defeat of the Boer army in Natal and the relief of Ladysmith is a +great blow to the Boer cause. It frustrates the hopes of the Boers for +the one great success on which they were to some extent justified in +counting, and makes an end of their plan of campaign.</p> + +<p>A few days will be needed to repair the railway from the Tugela to +Ladysmith, and to build a temporary railway bridge at Colenso. By that +time the force of Sir George White and Sir Redvers Buller will be +rested, refreshed, and reorganised, forming an army of from thirty-five +thousand to forty thousand men. In the Free State Lord Roberts has +probably forty-five <a name="Page_193" id="Page_193" />thousand. The collapse of the Boer invasion of Cape +Colony points to the early reopening of the railways from Naauwpoort and +Sterkstrom to Norval's Pont and Bethulie, the repair of the railway +bridges over the Orange River, and the concentration at Bloemfontein of +sixty thousand men, with the railway from the Orange River working and +guarded behind them, possibly with a new line of railway from Modder +River or Kimberley to Bloemfontein as an additional resource. The +advance of Lord Roberts with sixty thousand men to the Vaal River must +open to Sir Redvers Buller the passes of the Drakensberg range from Van +Reenen's to Lang's Nek, and between the two forces the Boer army must be +crushed. The Boers may abandon the attempt at resistance by battle, and +may confine themselves to the defence of Pretoria, to raids on the +British communications, and to the various devices of irregular warfare. +But the British forces will shortly have at their disposal as many +mounted men as the Boers, so that even irregular <a name="Page_194" id="Page_194" />warfare can but lead +to their destruction in detail.</p> + +<p>The only hope for the Boer cause now rests upon the intervention of +other Powers, and the crucial moment for the British Government is at +hand. That the Nation is resolved to brook no intervention is absolutely +certain, and that it is ready to make great sacrifices and great efforts +to resist any attempt at intervention seems equally beyond doubt. Has +the Government appreciated either the needs of the situation or the +temper of the Nation? Intervention if offered will be proposed suddenly, +and foreign action, if it is contemplated at all, will follow upon the +heels of the rejection of the proposals. If, then, fleets have still to +be completed for sea, plans of campaign to be matured and adopted, and a +Volunteer Army to be improvised, the great war will find us as unready +and as much surprised as did the supposed small war five months ago.</p> + +<p>The measures required are, first of all, to settle the distribution of +fleets for all eventualities, <a name="Page_195" id="Page_195" />to commission every ship in the navy and +to have all the fleets ready in their intended stations, so that only an +order by cable may be needed to set them to work; secondly, to have all +the coast defences manned and ready thirdly, to have the volunteer +brigades encamped in the defensive positions round London, for which +they are destined; and, lastly, but not least, to have the rest of the +forces at home encamped near great railway centres as field divisions of +regulars, field divisions of militia, and field divisions of volunteers, +with ammunition, transport and supplies attached to them. If these +measures had already been carried out there would be no intervention. If +they are now carried out without loss of time, intervention may be +prevented. If they are much longer postponed intervention becomes +probable; the great war may be expected, and no man can foretell whether +the British Empire, if again taken by surprise and unready, can weather +the storm.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="THE_COLLAPSE_OF_THE_BOER_POWER" id="THE_COLLAPSE_OF_THE_BOER_POWER" /><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196" />THE COLLAPSE OF THE BOER POWER</h2> + +<p><i>March 8th</i>, 1900</p> + + +<p>Lord Roberts yesterday defeated the Boers near Poplar's Drift. In order +to measure the importance of the event it may be well to begin by a +rough general survey of the condition of affairs.</p> + +<p>There have long been signs that the Boer Power was subjected to a very +great strain by the effort made to hold, against ever-increasing British +forces, a number of points upon the circumference of a very large area. +The Boers were attacking Mafeking and Kimberley, and covering their +action at both points by forces intended to delay the relieving columns. +They were also endeavouring to support rebellion throughout a great +tract of country in the Cape Colony, extending from Prieska on the west +to the Basuto border on the east, and covering the rebels by parties +posted to resist the advance of Gatacre and French along the railways +from the south coast to the Orange River. These <a name="Page_197" id="Page_197" />two groups of +enterprises were but the subordinate features of a campaign in which the +principal undertaking was the reduction of Ladysmith, which involved a +prolonged and stubborn resistance to the repeated assaults of Sir +Redvers Buller.</p> + +<p>Thus the Boer Governments, or their commander-in-chief, set out at the +beginning to do many things at the same time. There were few British +troops in the country, and there was the possibility of great success, +at least in the shape of the occupation of territory, before the British +forces could be assembled. But shortly after the arrival of Sir Redvers +Buller's Army Corps it began to be evident that the Boer forces were +balanced by the British. There was a pause in the movements. The British +made little headway and the Boers none. Yet, as both sides were doing +their best, it was clear that the Boers required the utmost exertion of +all their energies to maintain the equilibrium. This condition may be +said to have lasted from about the middle of December to the middle of +February. During <a name="Page_198" id="Page_198" />those two months, however, while the Boers were at +full tension, the British were gathering new forces behind their front +line, which itself was all the time receiving gradual accessions of +strength.</p> + +<p>When Lord Roberts with fifty thousand men burst through the Boer cordon +and destroyed the force with which Cronje had been covering the siege of +Kimberley, the Boers had no reserve of force with which to fill up the +gap. Every man sent to Cronje's assistance had to be taken from some +other post where he was sorely needed. The detachments sent from Natal +into the Free State left the Natal Army, already wearied by its long +unsuccessful siege of Ladysmith, and by Buller's persistent attacks, too +weak to continue at once the siege and the resistance to Buller. But the +two tasks were inseparable, and when Buller renewed his attack and drove +the Boers from their posts south of the Tugela, the Boer army of Natal +found itself able to cover its retreat only by a last desperate +rearguard action at Pieters.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199" />Defeat in the Free State and collapse in Natal were accompanied by the +abandonment of the effort to support the rebellion in Cape Colony.</p> + +<p>This general breakdown following upon prolonged over-exertion, and +accompanied in the two principal regions by complete defeat, must have +had its effects on the spirits of the troops. Hope must be gone and +despair at hand, and the consequent diminution of power is sure to be +considerable. There is no sign as yet of any strong leadership such as +could to some extent restore the fortunes of the Boer army. The retreat +beyond the Orange River has been gradual; the siege of Mafeking has not +been abandoned, and there is no sign of a determined concentration of +forces to oppose Lord Roberts.</p> + +<p>Since the surrender of Cronje on February 27th, Lord Roberts has been +completing his supplies, and probably making good the damage to his +transport caused by the loss of a convoy on the Riet River. He has also +brought up the Guards Brigade as a reinforcement. A few <a name="Page_200" id="Page_200" />days ago the +camp was moved forward from Paardeberg to Osfontein, and beyond +Osfontein the Boers were observed collecting their troops from day to +day and extending their position, which ran roughly north and south +across the Modder. Yesterday Lord Roberts advanced to the attack with +three and a half infantry divisions, a cavalry division and a brigade of +mounted infantry. The cavalry, followed by an infantry division, turned +the enemy's left flank, and by noon the enemy's army was in full retreat +towards the north and east, pursued by the British. The Boers have this +time not ventured to stand to fight. They have seen themselves assailed +in front by a force which must have greatly outnumbered them at the same +time that their flank was turned by a force as mobile as their own. +Their precipitate retreat coming after their late defeats must increase +their demoralisation, and it will hardly be practicable for them to make +a fresh stand east of the Free State Railway. Lord Roberts will be <a name="Page_201" id="Page_201" />on +the railway with the bulk of his force by Saturday or Sunday, and his +presence there will complete the break up of the Boer defences of the +Orange River.</p> + +<p>The situation of the Boers is now, as far as it depends on themselves, +desperate. They can hardly collect forty thousand men for a decisive +battle, and are confronted by two armies, each of which has that +strength, the one nearing Bloemfontein, the other at Ladysmith. Lord +Roberts, when he reaches the railway, will probably call up from the +Orange River such additional forces as are not required as garrisons in +Cape Colony. His numbers can be fed by constant small reinforcements, +while the Boers have no means of increasing their numbers. With each +succeeding week, therefore, the British will grow stronger and the Boers +fewer. The utmost that the Boer commander-in-chief can expect to +accomplish is to delay that advance to Pretoria which he cannot prevent.</p> + +<p>He may perhaps bring about the fall of <a name="Page_202" id="Page_202" />Mafeking, if he chooses to +dispense for a few weeks longer with the reinforcements which Commandant +Snyman by raising the siege could bring to his main army. There was +indeed some days ago an unofficial report that a strong column was +moving north from Kimberley. If that were true the destination of the +column must have been Mafeking, but it is not clear what its composition +could be. The Guards Brigade being at Poplar's Drift there would be left +the other brigade of the first division, and that may be on its way +towards the north. Resistance was expected at the passage of the Vaal at +Fourteen Streams, but that point must have already been reached. +Probably nothing will be heard of this column until it has accomplished +its task, except in the not very probable event of hard fighting between +Winsorton and Mafeking. Colonel Baden-Powell is known to be very hard +pressed, being short of provisions and of troops. It is certain the +column will make every effort to reach Mafeking in time, but the +distance is great. The <a name="Page_203" id="Page_203" />best chance of success would be found in the +despatch of a large body of mounted troops to move in the fashion of the +great raiding expeditions of the American Civil War; but it is doubtful +whether sufficient mounted troops were or are available.</p> + +<p>Apart from their own resources the Boers may hope for help from outside. +They have from the beginning looked for the intervention of some great +Power, for the assistance of the Dutch party at the Cape, and for such +action by the British Opposition as might embarrass the Government in +its resolve to prosecute the war to its logical conclusion.</p> + +<p>Intervention will not be undertaken by any Power that is not prepared to +go to war, and does not see a fair prospect of success in an attack upon +the British Empire. Intervention therefore will be prevented if the Navy +is kept ready for any emergency, and if the Government measures for +arming the Nation are so carried out as to convince continental Powers +that they <a name="Page_204" id="Page_204" />will produce an appreciable result. That conviction does not +yet exist, but it is not too late to create it.</p> + +<p>The Cape Dutch will not be able to embarrass a British Government that +knows its own mind and is resolved to treat them fairly while asserting +its authority in the Transvaal and the Free State. The peace at any +price party at home is trying hard to press its false doctrines, but in +the present temper of the Nation has no chance of success, provided only +that the Government carries out without hesitation or vacillation the +policy to which it is by all its action committed, of bringing the +territories of the Boer Republics under British administration so soon +as the military power of the Boers has been broken.</p> + +<p> </p> +<hr class="full" /> +<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LESSONS OF THE WAR***</p> +<p>******* This file should be named 15110-h.txt or 15110-h.zip *******</p> +<p>This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:<br /> +<a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/5/1/1/15110">https://www.gutenberg.org/1/5/1/1/15110</a></p> +<p>Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed.</p> + +<p>Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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