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diff --git a/15076-h/15076-h.htm b/15076-h/15076-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1456e16 --- /dev/null +++ b/15076-h/15076-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,14482 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> +<html> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1" /> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, by Julian Stafford Corbett</title> + <style type="text/css"> + + <!-- + p { margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; + } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + } + hr {text-align: center; width: 50%;} + hr.full {width: 100%;} + hr.short {text-align: center; width: 20%;} + body { margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + } + + img { + BORDER-TOP-STYLE: none; BORDER-RIGHT-STYLE: none; BORDER-LEFT-STYLE: none; BORDER-BOTTOM-STYLE: none } + blockquote {text-align: justify; } /* block indent */ + .noflo + {margin-left:10%; margin-right:10%; margin-bottom: 1em; text-align: left;} + .noflo .nofblk {margin: 1em 0em 1em 0em;} + .noflo p {margin: 0; padding-left: 3em; text-indent: -3em;} + .noflo p.i2 {margin-left: 1em;} + .noflo p.i4 {margin-left: 2em;} + .noflo p.i6 {margin-left: 3em;} + .noflo p.i8 {margin-left: 4em;} + .noflo p.i16 {margin-left: 8em;} + + td {text-align: left; } + .author {text-align: right; margin-top: -1em; margin-right: 5%;} + .center {text-align: center; } + .right {text-align: right; } + .linenum {position: absolute; top: auto; left: 4%;} /* poetry number */ + + .pagenum {position: absolute; left: 92%; font-size: smaller; text-align: right;} /* page numbers */ + .sidenote {position: absolute; left: 92%; font-size: smaller; text-align: left;} /* sidenotes */ + .note {margin-left: 2em; margin-right: 2em; + font-size: small ;} /* footnote */ + + .figure, .figcenter, .figright, .figleft + {padding: 1em; margin: 0; text-align: center; font-size: 0.8em;} + .figcenter {margin: auto;} + .figright {float: right;} + .figleft {float: left;} + pre {font-size: 8pt;} + + --> + + </style> +</head> +<body> +<h1>The Project Gutenberg eBook, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, by +Julian Stafford Corbett</h1> +<pre> +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at <a href = "https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a></pre> +<p>Title: Some Principles of Maritime Strategy</p> +<p>Author: Julian Stafford Corbett</p> +<p>Release Date: February 16, 2005 [eBook #15076]</p> +<p>Language: english</p> +<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p> +<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME STRATEGY***</p> +<p> </p> +<h3>E-text prepared by Suzanne Shell, Keith Edkins,<br /> + and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team</h3> +<p> </p> +<hr class="full" /> + <h1>Some principles of maritime strategy</h1> + <hr /> + + <div class="center"> + <img src="images/001.jpg" + alt="Portrait of Sir Julian Corbett" /> + </div> + + <p class="center"><i>Sir Julian Corbett (courtesy D.M. + Schurman)</i></p><br /> + + <h3>LONDON 1911.</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>CONTENTS</h2> + <hr /> + + <div class="center"> + <table summary="contents"> + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> + <h3>INTRODUCTION</h3> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>THE THEORETICAL STUDY OF WAR—ITS USE AND + LIMITATIONS</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_3">3</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> + <h3>PART I. THEORY OF WAR</h3> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>I. THE THEORY OF WAR</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_15">15</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>II. NATURES OF WARS—OFFENSIVE AND + DEFENSIVE</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_31">31</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>III. NATURES OF WARS—LIMITED AND + UNLIMITED</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_41">41</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>IV. LIMITED WAR AND MARITIME EMPIRES</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_52">52</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>V. WARS OF INTERVENTION—LIMITED + INTERFERENCE IN UNLIMITED WAR</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_60">60</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>VI. CONDITIONS OF STRENGTH IN LIMITED WAR</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_72">72</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> + <h3>PART II. THEORY OF NAVAL WAR</h3> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>I. THEORY OF THE OBJECT—COMMAND OF THE + SEA</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_91">91</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>II. THEORY OF THE MEANS—THE CONSTITUTION + OF FLEETS</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_107">107</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>III. THEORY OF THE METHOD—CONCENTRATION + AND DISPERSAL OF FORCE</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_128">128</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> + <!-- Page 2 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" + id="Page_2"></a>[pg 2]</span> </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> + <h3>PART III. CONDUCT OF NAVAL WAR</h3> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>I. INTRODUCTORY—</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_155">155</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 1. INHERENT DIFFERENCES IN THE + CONDITIONS OF WAR ON LAND AND ON SEA</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_155">155</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 2. TYPICAL FORMS OF NAVAL + OPERATIONS</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_161">161</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>II. METHODS OF SECURING COMMAND—</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_167">167</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 1. ON OBTAINING A DECISION</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_167">167</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 2. BLOCKADE</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_183">183</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>III. METHODS OF DISPUTING COMMAND—</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_209">209</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 1. DEFENSIVE FLEET + OPERATIONS—"A FLEET IN BEING"</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_209">209</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 2. MINOR COUNTER-ATTACKS</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_227">227</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>IV. METHODS OF EXERCISING COMMAND—</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_233">233</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 1. DEFENCE AGAINST INVASION</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_233">233</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 2. ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF + TRADE</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_261">261</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 3. ATTACK, DEFENCE, AND SUPPORT OF + MILITARY EXPEDITIONS</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_280">280</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>Appendix: The "Green Pamphlet"</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_305">305</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>INDEX</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_346">346</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </div><!-- Page 3 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" + id="Page_3"></a>[pg 3]</span> + <hr /> + + <h1>INTRODUCTION</h1> + + <h3>The Theoretical Study of War—Its Use and<br /> + Limitations</h3> + <hr /> + + <p>At first sight nothing can appear more unpractical, less + promising of useful result, than to approach the study of war + with a theory. There seems indeed to be something essentially + antagonistic between the habit of mind that seeks theoretical + guidance and that which makes for the successful conduct of + war. The conduct of war is so much a question of personality, + of character, of common-sense, of rapid decision upon complex + and ever-shifting factors, and those factors themselves are so + varied, so intangible, so dependent upon unstable moral and + physical conditions, that it seems incapable of being reduced + to anything like true scientific analysis. At the bare idea of + a theory or "science" of war the mind recurs uneasily to + well-known cases where highly "scientific" officers failed as + leaders. Yet, on the other hand, no one will deny that since + the great theorists of the early nineteenth century attempted + to produce a reasoned theory of war, its planning and conduct + have acquired a method, a precision, and a certainty of grasp + which were unknown before. Still less will any one deny the + value which the shrewdest and most successful leaders in war + have placed upon the work of the classical strategical + writers.</p> + + <p>The truth is that the mistrust of theory arises from a + misconception of what it is that theory claims to do. It does + not <!-- Page 4 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" + id="Page_4"></a>[pg 4]</span> pretend to give the power of + conduct in the field; it claims no more than to increase the + effective power of conduct. Its main practical value is that + it can assist a capable man to acquire a broad outlook + whereby he may be the surer his plan shall cover all the + ground, and whereby he may with greater rapidity and + certainty seize all the factors of a sudden situation. The + greatest of the theorists himself puts the matter quite + frankly. Of theoretical study he says, "It should educate + the mind of the man who is to lead in war, or rather guide + him to self-education, but it should not accompany him on + the field of battle."</p> + + <p>Its practical utility, however, is not by any means confined + to its effects upon the powers of a leader. It is not enough + that a leader should have the ability to decide rightly; his + subordinates must seize at once the full meaning of his + decision and be able to express it with certainty in + well-adjusted action. For this every man concerned must have + been trained to think in the same plane; the chief's order must + awake in every brain the same process of thought; his words + must have the same meaning for all. If a theory of tactics had + existed in 1780, and if Captain Carkett had had a sound + training in + <!-- Page 5 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" + id="Page_5"></a>[pg 5]</span> such a theory, he could not + possibly have misunderstood Rodney's signal. As it was, the + real intention of the signal was obscure, and Rodney's + neglect to explain the tactical device it indicated robbed + his country of a victory at an hour of the direst need. + There had been no previous theoretical training to supply + the omission, and Rodney's fine conception was + unintelligible to anybody but himself.</p> + + <p>Nor is it only for the sake of mental solidarity between a + chief and his subordinates that theory is indispensable. It is + of still higher value for producing a similar solidarity + between him and his superiors at the Council table at home. How + often have officers dumbly acquiesced in ill-advised operations + simply for lack of the mental power and verbal apparatus to + convince an impatient Minister where the errors of his plan + lay? How often, moreover, have statesmen and officers, even in + the most harmonious conference, been unable to decide on a + coherent plan of war from inability to analyse scientifically + the situation they had to face, and to recognise the general + character of the struggle in which they were about + <!-- Page 6 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" + id="Page_6"></a>[pg 6]</span> to engage. That the true + nature of a war should be realised by contemporaries as + clearly as it comes to be seen afterwards in the fuller + light of history is seldom to be expected. At close range + accidental factors will force themselves into undue + prominence and tend to obscure the true horizon. Such error + can scarcely ever be eliminated, but by theoretical study we + can reduce it, nor by any other means can we hope to + approach the clearness of vision with which posterity will + read our mistakes. Theory is, in fact, a question of + education and deliberation, and not of execution at all. + That depends on the combination of intangible human + qualities which we call executive ability.</p> + + <p>This, then, is all the great authorities ever claimed for + theory, but to this claim the chief of them at least, after + years of active service on the Staff, attached the highest + importance. "In actual operations," he wrote in one of his + latest memoranda, "men are guided solely by their judgment, and + it will hit the mark more or less accurately according as they + possess more or less genius. This is the way all great generals + have acted.... Thus it will always be in action, and so far + judgment will suffice. But when it is a question not of taking + action yourself, but of convincing others at the Council table, + then everything depends on clear conceptions and the exposition + of the inherent relations of things. So little progress has + been made in this respect that most deliberations are merely + verbal contentions which rest on no firm foundation, and end + either in every one retaining his own opinion, or in a + compromise from considerations of mutual respect—a middle + course of no actual value."<a name="NtA_1" + id="NtA_1"></a><a href="#Nt_1"><sup>1</sup></a></p> + + <p>The writer's experience of such discussions was rich and at + <!-- Page + 7 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" + id="Page_7"></a>[pg 7]</span> first hand. Clear conceptions + of the ideas and factors involved in a war problem, and a + definite exposition of the relations between them, were in + his eyes the remedy for loose and purposeless discussion; + and such conceptions and expositions are all we mean by the + theory or the science of war. It is a process by which we + co-ordinate our ideas, define the meaning of the words we + use, grasp the difference between essential and unessential + factors, and fix and expose the fundamental data on which + every one is agreed. In this way we prepare the apparatus of + practical discussion; we secure the means of arranging the + factors in manageable shape, and of deducing from them with + precision and rapidity a practical course of action. Without + such an apparatus no two men can even think on the same + line; much less can they ever hope to detach the real point + of difference that divides them and isolate it for quiet + solution.</p> + + <p>In our own case this view of the value of strategical theory + has a special significance, and one far wider than its + continental enunciators contemplated. For a world-wide maritime + Empire the successful conduct of war will often turn not only + on the decisions of the Council chamber at home, but on the + outcome of conferences in all parts of the world between + <!-- Page 8 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" + id="Page_8"></a>[pg 8]</span> squadronal commanders and the + local authorities, both civil and military, and even between + commanders-in-chief of adjacent stations. In time of war or + of preparation for war, in which the Empire is concerned, + arrangements must always be based to an exceptional degree + on the mutual relation of naval, military, and political + considerations. The line of mean efficiency, though + indicated from home, must be worked out locally, and worked + out on factors of which no one service is master. Conference + is always necessary, and for conference to succeed there + must be a common vehicle of expression and a common plane of + thought. It is for this essential preparation that + theoretical study alone can provide; and herein lies its + practical value for all who aspire to the higher + responsibilities of the Imperial service.</p> + + <p>So great indeed is the value of abstract strategical study + from this point of view, that it is necessary to guard + ourselves against over-valuation. So far from claiming for + their so-called science more than the possibilities we have + indicated, the classical strategists insist again and again on + the danger of seeking from it what it cannot give. They even + repudiate the very name of "Science." They prefer the older + term "Art." They will permit no laws or rules. Such laws, they + say, can only mislead in practice, for the friction to which + they are subject from the incalculable human factors alone is + such that the friction is stronger than the law. It is an old + adage of lawyers that nothing is so misleading as a legal + maxim, but a strategical maxim is undoubtedly and in every way + less to be trusted in action.</p> + + <p>What then, it will be asked, are the tangible results which + we can hope to attain from theory? If all on which we have to + build is so indeterminate, how are any practical conclusions to + be reached? That the factors are infinitely varied and + difficult to determine is true, but that, it must be + remembered, is just what emphasises the necessity of reaching + such firm standpoints as are attainable. The vaguer the problem + to be <!-- Page 9 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" + id="Page_9"></a>[pg 9]</span> solved, the more resolute must + we be in seeking points of departure from which we can begin + to lay a course, keeping always an eye open for the + accidents that will beset us, and being always alive to + their deflecting influences. And this is just what the + theoretical study of strategy can do. It can at least + determine the normal. By careful collation of past events it + becomes clear that certain lines of conduct tend normally to + produce certain effects; that wars tend to take certain + forms each with a marked idiosyncrasy; that these forms are + normally related to the object of the war and to its value + to one or both belligerents; that a system of operations + which suits one form may not be that best suited to another. + We can even go further. By pursuing an historical and + comparative method we can detect that even the human factor + is not quite indeterminable. We can assert that certain + situations will normally produce, whether in ourselves or in + our adversaries, certain moral states on which we may + calculate.</p> + + <p>Having determined the normal, we are at once in a stronger + position. Any proposal can be compared with it, and we can + proceed to discuss clearly the weight of the factors which + prompt us to depart from the normal. Every case must be judged + on its merits, but without a normal to work from we cannot form + any real judgment at all; we can only guess. Every case will + assuredly depart from the normal to a greater or less extent, + and it is equally certain that the greatest successes in war + have been the boldest departures from the normal. But for the + most part they have been departures made with open eyes by + geniuses who could perceive in the accidents of the case a just + reason for the departure.</p> + + <p>Take an analogous example, and the province of strategical + theory becomes clear at once. Navigation and the parts of + seamanship that belong to it have to deal with phenomena as + varied and unreliable as those of the conduct of war. Together + they form an art which depends quite as much as generalship on + the judgment of individuals. The law of <!-- Page 10 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" + id="Page_10"></a>[pg 10]</span> storms and tides, of winds + and currents, and the whole of meteorology are subject to + infinite and incalculable deflections, and yet who will deny + nowadays that by the theoretical study of such things the + seaman's art has gained in coherence and strength? Such + study will not by itself make a seaman or a navigator, but + without it no seaman or navigator can nowadays pretend to + the name. Because storms do not always behave in the same + way, because currents are erratic, will the most practical + seaman deny that the study of the normal conditions are + useless to him in his practical decisions?</p> + + <p>If, then, the theoretical study of strategy be approached in + this way—if, that is, it be regarded not as a substitute + for judgment and experience, but as a means of fertilising + both, it can do no man harm. Individual thought and + common-sense will remain the masters and remain the guides to + point the general direction when the mass of facts begins to + grow bewildering. Theory will warn us the moment we begin to + leave the beaten track, and enable us to decide with open eyes + whether the divergence is necessary or justifiable. Above all, + when men assemble in Council it will hold discussion to the + essential lines, and help to keep side issues in their + place.</p> + + <p>But beyond all this there lies in the theory of war yet + another element of peculiar value to a maritime Empire. We are + accustomed, partly for convenience and partly from lack of a + scientific habit of thought, to speak of naval strategy and + military strategy as though they were distinct branches of + knowledge which had no common ground. It is the theory of war + which brings out their intimate relation. It reveals that + embracing them both is a larger strategy which regards the + fleet and army as one weapon, which co-ordinates their action, + and indicates the lines on which each must move to realise the + full power of both. It will direct us to assign to each its + proper function in a plan of war; it will enable each service + to realise the better the limitations and the possibilities of + the function with which it is charged, and how and <!-- Page 11 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" + id="Page_11"></a>[pg 11]</span> when its own necessities + must give way to a higher or more pressing need of the + other. It discloses, in short, that naval strategy is not a + thing by itself, that its problems can seldom or never be + solved on naval considerations alone, but that it is only a + part of maritime strategy—the higher learning which + teaches us that for a maritime State to make successful war + and to realise her special strength, army and navy must be + used and thought of as instruments no less intimately + connected than are the three arms ashore.</p> + + <p>It is for these reasons that it is of little use to approach + naval strategy except through the theory of war. Without such + theory we can never really understand its scope or meaning, nor + can we hope to grasp the forces which most profoundly affect + its conclusions.</p><!-- Page 12 blank --> + <!-- Page 13 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" + id="Page_13"></a>[pg 13]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>PART ONE</h3> + <hr /> + + <h1>THEORY OF WAR</h1> + <hr /> + <!-- Page 14 blank --> + <!-- Page 15 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" + id="Page_15"></a>[pg 15]</span> + + <h3>CHAPTER ONE</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>THE THEORY<br /> + OF WAR</h2> + <hr /> + + <p>The last thing that an explorer arrives at is a complete map + that will cover the whole ground he has travelled, but for + those who come after him and would profit by and extend his + knowledge his map is the first thing with which they will + begin. So it is with strategy. Before we start upon its study + we seek a chart which will show us at a glance what exactly is + the ground we have to cover and what are the leading features + which determine its form and general characteristics. Such a + chart a "theory of war" alone can provide. It is for this + reason that in the study of war we must get our theory clear + before we can venture in search of practical conclusions. So + great is the complexity of war that without such a guide we are + sure to go astray amidst the bewildering multiplicity of tracks + and obstacles that meet us at every step. If for continental + strategy its value has been proved abundantly, then for + maritime strategy, where the conditions are far more complex, + the need of it is even greater.</p> + + <p>By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a + war in which the sea is a substantial factor. Naval strategy is + but that part of it which determines the movements of the fleet + when maritime strategy has determined what part the fleet must + play in relation to the action of the land forces; for it + scarcely needs saying that it is almost impossible that a war + can be decided by naval action alone. Unaided, naval pressure + <!-- Page 16 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" + id="Page_16"></a>[pg 16]</span> can only work by a process + of exhaustion. Its effects must always be slow, and so + galling both to our own commercial community and to + neutrals, that the tendency is always to accept terms of + peace that are far from conclusive. For a firm decision a + quicker and more drastic form of pressure is required. Since + men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues + between nations at war have always been decided—except + in the rarest cases—either by what your army can do + against your enemy's territory and national life or else by + the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army + to do.</p> + + <p>The paramount concern, then, of maritime strategy is to + determine the mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan + of war. When this is done, and not till then, naval strategy + can begin to work out the manner in which the fleet can best + discharge the function assigned to it.</p> + + <p>The problem of such co-ordination is one that is susceptible + of widely varying solutions. It may be that the command of the + sea is of so urgent an importance that the army will have to + devote itself to assisting the fleet in its special task before + it can act directly against the enemy's territory and land + forces; on the other hand, it may be that the immediate duty of + the fleet will be to forward military action ashore before it + is free to devote itself whole-heartedly to the destruction of + the enemy's fleets. The crude maxims as to primary objects + which seem to have served well enough in continental warfare + have never worked so clearly where the sea enters seriously + into a war. In such cases it will not suffice to say the + primary object of the army is to destroy the enemy's army, or + that of the fleet to destroy the enemy's fleet. The delicate + interactions of the land and sea factors produce conditions too + intricate for such blunt solutions. Even the initial equations + they present are too complex to be reduced by the simple + application of rough-and-ready maxims. Their right handling + depends upon the broadest and most fundamental + <!-- Page 17 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" + id="Page_17"></a>[pg 17]</span> principles of war, and it is + as a standpoint from which to get a clear and unobstructed + view of the factors in their true relations that a theory of + war has perhaps its highest value.</p> + + <p>The theory which now holds the field is that war in a + fundamental sense is a continuation of policy by other means. + The process by which the continental strategists arrived at it + involved some hard philosophical reasoning. Practical and + experienced veterans as they were, their method is not one that + works easily with our own habit of thought. It will be well, + therefore, to endeavour first to present their conclusions in a + concrete form, which will make the pith of the matter + intelligible at once. Take, now, the ordinary case of a naval + or military Staff being asked to prepare a war plan against a + certain State and to advise what means it will require. To any + one who has considered such matters it is obvious the reply + must be another question—What will the war be about? + Without a definite answer or alternative answers to that + question a Staff can scarcely do more than engage in making + such forces as the country can afford as efficient as possible. + Before they take any sure step further they must know many + things. They must know whether they are expected to take + something from the enemy, or to prevent his taking something + either from us or from some other State. If from some other + State, the measures to be taken will depend on its geographical + situation and on its relative strength by land and sea. Even + when the object is clear it will be necessary to know how much + value the enemy attaches to it. Is it one for which he will be + likely to fight to the death, or one which he will abandon in + the face of comparatively slight resistance? If the former, we + cannot hope to succeed without entirely overthrowing his powers + of resistance. If the latter, it <!-- + Page 18 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" + id="Page_18"></a>[pg 18]</span> will suffice, as it often + has sufficed, to aim at something less costly and hazardous + and better within our means. All these are questions which + lie in the lap of Ministers charged with the foreign policy + of the country, and before the Staff can proceed with a war + plan they must be answered by Ministers.</p> + + <p>In short, the Staff must ask of them what is the policy + which your diplomacy is pursuing, and where, and why, do you + expect it to break down and force you to take up arms? The + Staff has to carry on in fact when diplomacy has failed to + achieve the object in view, and the method they will use will + depend on the nature of that object. So we arrive crudely at + our theory that war is a continuation of policy, a form of + political intercourse in which we fight battles instead of + writing notes.</p> + + <p>It was this theory, simple and even meaningless as it + appears at first sight, that gave the key to the practical work + of framing a modern war plan and revolutionised the study of + strategy. It was not till the beginning of the nineteenth + century that such a theory was arrived at. For centuries men + had written on the "Art of War," but for want of a working + theory their labours as a whole had been unscientific, + concerned for the most part with the discussion of passing + fashions and the elaboration of platitudes. Much good work it + is true was done on details, but no broad outlook had been + obtained to enable us to determine their relation to the + fundamental constants of the subject. No standpoint had been + found from which we could readily detach such constants from + what was merely accidental. The result was a tendency to argue + too exclusively from the latest examples and to become + entangled in erroneous thought by trying to apply the methods + which had attained the last success to war as a + <!-- Page 19 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" + id="Page_19"></a>[pg 19]</span> whole. There was no means of + determining how far the particular success was due to + special conditions and how far it was due to factors common + to all wars.</p> + + <p>It was the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, coinciding as + they did with a period of philosophic activity, that revealed + the shallowness and empirical nature of all that had been done + up to that time. Napoleon's methods appeared to his + contemporaries to have produced so strenuous a revolution in + the conduct of land warfare that it assumed a wholly new + aspect, and it was obvious that those conceptions which had + sufficed previously had become inadequate as a basis of sound + study. War on land seemed to have changed from a calculated + affair of thrust and parry between standing armies to a + headlong rush of one nation in arms upon another, each + thirsting for the other's life, and resolved to have it or + perish in the attempt. Men felt themselves faced with a + manifestation of human energy which had had no counterpart, at + least in civilised times.</p> + + <p>The assumption was not entirely true. For although the + Continent had never before adopted the methods in question, our + own country was no stranger to them either on sea or land. As + we shall see, our own Revolution in the seventeenth century had + produced strenuous methods of making war which were closely + related to those which Napoleon took over from the French + Revolutionary leaders. A more philosophic outlook might have + suggested that the phenomenon was not really exceptional, but + rather the natural outcome of popular energy inspired by a + stirring political ideal. But the British precedent was + forgotten, and so profound was the disturbance caused by the + new French methods that its effects <!-- Page + 20 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" + id="Page_20"></a>[pg 20]</span> are with us still. We are in + fact still dominated by the idea that since the Napoleonic + era war has been essentially a different thing. Our teachers + incline to insist that there is now only one way of making + war, and that is Napoleon's way. Ignoring the fact that he + failed in the end, they brand as heresy the bare suggestion + that there may be other ways, and not content with assuming + that his system will fit all land wars, however much their + natures and objects may differ, they would force naval + warfare into the same uniform under the impression + apparently that they are thereby making it presentable and + giving it some new force.</p> + + <p>Seeing how cramping the Napoleonic idea has become, it will + be convenient before going further to determine its special + characteristics exactly, but that is no easy matter. The moment + we approach it in a critical spirit, it begins to grow nebulous + and very difficult to define. We can dimly make out four + distinct ideas mingled in the current notion. First, there is + the idea of making war not merely with a professional standing + army, but with the whole armed nation—a conception which + of course was not really Napoleon's. It was inherited by him + from the Revolution, but was in fact far older. It was but a + revival of the universal practice which obtained in the + barbaric stages of social development, and which every + civilisation in turn had abandoned as economically unsound and + subversive of specialisation in citizenship. The results of the + abandonment were sometimes good and sometimes bad, but the + determining conditions have been studied as yet too imperfectly + to justify any broad generalisation. Secondly, there is the + idea of strenuous and persistent effort—not resting to + secure each minor advantage, but pressing the enemy without + pause or rest till he is utterly overthrown—an idea in + which Cromwell had anticipated Napoleon by a century and + <!-- Page 21 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" + id="Page_21"></a>[pg 21]</span> a half. Scarcely + distinguishable from this is a third idea—that of + taking the offensive, in which there was really nothing new + at all, since its advantages had always been understood, and + Frederick the Great had pressed it to extremity with little + less daring than Napoleon himself—nay even to culpable + rashness, as the highest exponents of the Napoleonic idea + admit. Finally, there is the notion of making the armed + forces of the enemy and not his territory or any part of it + your main objective. This perhaps is regarded as the + strongest characteristic of Napoleon's methods, and yet even + here we are confused by the fact that undoubtedly on some + very important occasions—the Austerlitz campaign, for + example—Napoleon made the hostile capital his + objective as though he believed its occupation was the most + effective step towards the overthrow of the enemy's power + and will to resist. He certainly did not make the enemy's + main army his primary objective—for their main army + was not Mack's but that of the Archduke Charles.</p> + <!-- Page 22 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" + id="Page_22"></a>[pg 22]</span> + + <p>On the whole then, when men speak of the Napoleonic system + they seem to include two groups of ideas—one which + comprises the conception of war made with the whole force of + the nation; the other, a group which includes the Cromwellian + idea of persistent effort, Frederick's preference for the + offensive at almost any risk, and finally the idea of the + enemy's armed forces as the main objective, which was also + Cromwell's.</p> + + <p>It is the combination of these by no means original or very + distinct ideas that we are told has brought about so entire a + change in the conduct of war that it has become altogether a + different thing. It is unnecessary for our purpose to consider + how far the facts seem to support such a conclusion, for in the + inherent nature of things it must be radically unsound. Neither + war nor anything else can change in its essentials. If it + appears to do so, it is because we are still mistaking + accidents for essentials, and this is exactly how it struck the + acutest thinkers of Napoleonic times.</p> + + <p>For a while it is true they were bewildered, but so soon as + they had had time to clear their heads from the din of the + struggle in which they had taken part, they began to see that + the new phenomena were but accidents after all. They perceived + that Napoleon's methods, which had taken the world by storm, + had met with success in wars of a certain nature only, and that + when he tried to extend those methods to other natures of war + he had met with failure and even disaster. How was this to be + explained? What theory, for instance, would cover Napoleon's + successes in Germany and Italy, as well as his failures in + Spain and Russia? If the whole conception of war had changed, + how could you account for the success of England, who had not + changed her methods? To us the answer to these questions is of + living and infinite importance. Our standpoint remains still + unchanged. Is there anything inherent in the conception of war + that justifies that attitude in our case? Are we entitled to + expect from it again the same success it met with in the + past?</p><!-- Page 23 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" + id="Page_23"></a>[pg 23]</span> + + <p>The first man to enunciate a theory which would explain the + phenomena of the Napoleonic era and co-ordinate them with + previous history was General Carl von Clausewitz, a man whose + arduous service on the Staff and the actual work of higher + instruction had taught the necessity of systematising the study + of his profession. He was no mere professor, but a soldier bred + in the severest school of war. The pupil and friend of + Sharnhorst and Gneisenau, he had served on the Staff of + Blücher in 1813, he had been Chief of the Staff to + Wallmoden in his campaign against Davoust on the Lower Elbe, + and also to the Third Prussian Army Corps in + <!-- Page 24 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" + id="Page_24"></a>[pg 24]</span> the campaign of 1815. + Thereafter for more than ten years he was Director of the + General Academy of War at Berlin, and died in 1831 as Chief + of the Staff to Marshal Gneisenau. For the fifty years that + followed his death his theories and system were, as he + expected they would be, attacked from all sides. Yet to-day + his work is more firmly established than ever as the + necessary basis of all strategical thought, and above all in + the "blood and iron" school of Germany.</p> + + <p>The process by which he reached his famous theory can be + followed in his classical work <i>On War</i> and the + <i>Notes</i> regarding it which he left behind him. In + accordance with the philosophic fashion of his time he began by + trying to formulate an abstract idea of war. The definition he + started with was that "War is an act of violence to compel our + opponent to do our will." But that act of violence was not + merely "the shock of armies," as Montecuccoli had defined it a + century and a half before. If the abstract idea of war be + followed to its logical conclusion, the act of violence must be + performed with the whole of the means at our disposal and with + the utmost exertion of our will. Consequently we get the + conception of two armed nations flinging themselves one upon + the other, and continuing the struggle with the utmost strength + <!-- Page 25 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" + id="Page_25"></a>[pg 25]</span> and energy they can command + till one or other is no longer capable of resistance. This + Clausewitz called "Absolute War." But his practical + experience and ripe study of history told him at once that + "Real War" was something radically different. It was true, + as he said, that Napoleon's methods had approximated to the + absolute and had given some colour to the use of the + absolute idea as a working theory. "But shall we," he + acutely asks, "rest satisfied with this idea and judge all + wars by it however much they may differ from it—shall + we deduce from it all the requirements of theory? We must + decide the point, for we can say nothing trustworthy about a + war plan until we have made up our minds whether war should + only be of this kind or whether it may be of another kind." + He saw at once that a theory formed upon the abstract or + absolute idea of war would not cover the ground, and + therefore failed to give what was required for practical + purposes. It would exclude almost the whole of war from + Alexander's time to Napoleon's. And what guarantee was there + that the next war would confirm to the Napoleonic type and + accommodate itself to the abstract theory? "This theory," he + says, "is still quite powerless against the force of + circumstances." And so it proved, for the wars of the middle + nineteenth century did in fact revert to the pre-Napoleonic + type.</p> + + <p>In short, Clausewitz's difficulty in adopting his abstract + theory as a working rule was that his practical mind could not + forget that war had not begun with the Revolutionary era, nor + was it likely to end with it. If that era had changed + <!-- Page 26 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" + id="Page_26"></a>[pg 26]</span> the conduct of war, it must + be presumed that war would change again with other times and + other conditions. A theory of war which did not allow for + this and did not cover all that had gone before was no + theory at all. If a theory of war was to be of any use as a + practical guide it must cover and explain not only the + extreme manifestation of hostility which he himself had + witnessed, but every manifestation that had occurred in the + past or was likely to recur in the future.</p> + + <p>It was in casting about for the underlying causes of the + oscillations manifested in the energy and intensity of hostile + relations that he found his solution. His experience on the + Staff, and his study of the inner springs of war, told him it + was never in fact a question of purely military endeavour + aiming always at the extreme of what was possible or expedient + from a purely military point of view. The energy exhibited + would always be modified by political considerations and by the + depth of the national interest in the object of the war. He saw + that real war was in fact an international relation which + differed from other international relations only in the method + we adopted to achieve the object of our policy. So it was he + arrived at his famous theory—"that war is a mere + continuation of policy by other means."</p> + + <p>At first sight there seems little enough in it. It may seem + perhaps that we have been watching a mountain in labour and + nothing but a mouse has been produced. But it is only upon some + such simple, even obvious, formula that any scientific system + can be constructed with safety. We have only to develop the + meaning of this one to see how important and practical are the + guiding lines which flow from it.</p> + + <p>With the conception of war as a continuation of political + intercourse before us, it is clear that everything which lies + outside the political conception, everything, that is, which is + <!-- Page 27 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" + id="Page_27"></a>[pg 27]</span> strictly peculiar to + military and naval operations, relates merely to the means + which we use to achieve our policy. Consequently, the first + desideratum of a war plan is that the means adopted must + conflict as little as possible with the political conditions + from which the war springs. In practice, of course, as in + all human relations, there will be a compromise between the + means and the end, between the political and the military + exigencies. But Clausewitz held that policy must always be + the master. The officer charged with the conduct of the war + may of course demand that the tendencies and views of policy + shall not be incompatible with the military means which are + placed at his disposal; but however strongly this demand may + react on policy in particular cases, military action must + still be regarded only as a manifestation of policy. It must + never supersede policy. The policy is always the object; war + is only the means by which we obtain the object, and the + means must always keep the end in view.</p> + + <p>The practical importance of this conception will now become + clear. It will be seen to afford the logical or theoretical + exposition of what we began by stating in its purely concrete + form. When a Chief of Staff is asked for a war plan he must not + say we will make war in such and such a way because it was + Napoleon's or Moltke's way. He will ask what is the political + object of the war, what are the political conditions, and how + much does the question at issue mean respectively to us and to + our adversary. It is these considerations which determine the + nature of the war. This primordial question settled, he will be + in a position to say whether the war is of the same nature as + those in which Napoleon's and Moltke's methods were successful, + or whether it is of another nature in which those methods + failed. He will then design and offer a <!-- Page 28 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" + id="Page_28"></a>[pg 28]</span> war plan, not because it has + the hall-mark of this or that great master of war, but + because it is one that has been proved to fit the kind of + war in hand. To assume that one method of conducting war + will suit all kinds of war is to fall a victim to abstract + theory, and not to be a prophet of reality, as the narrowest + disciples of the Napoleonic school are inclined to see + themselves.</p> + + <p>Hence, says Clausewitz, the first, the greatest and most + critical decision upon which the Statesman and the General have + to exercise their judgment is to determine the nature of the + war, to be sure they do not mistake it for something nor seek + to make of it something which from its inherent conditions it + can never be. "This," he declares, "is the first and the most + far-reaching of all strategical questions."</p> + + <p>The first value, then, of his theory of war is that it gives + a clear line on which we may proceed to determine the nature of + a war in which we are about to engage, and to ensure that we do + not try to apply to one nature of war any particular course of + operations simply because they have proved successful in + another nature of war. It is only, he insists, by regarding war + not as an independent thing but as a political instrument that + we can read aright the lessons of history and understand for + our practical guidance how wars must differ in character + according to the nature of the motives and circumstances from + which they proceed. This conception, he claims, is the first + ray of light to guide us to a true theory of war and thereby + enable us to classify wars and distinguish them one from + another.</p> + + <p>Jomini, his great contemporary and rival, though proceeding + by a less philosophical but no less lucid method, entirely + endorses this view. A Swiss soldier of fortune, his + <!-- Page 29 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" + id="Page_29"></a>[pg 29]</span> experience was much the same + as that of Clausewitz. It was obtained mainly on the Staff + of Marshal Ney and subsequently on the Russian headquarter + Staff. He reached no definite theory of war, but his + fundamental conclusions were the same. The first chapter of + his final work, <i>Précis de l'art de la Guerre</i>, + is devoted to "La Politique de la Guerre." In it he + classifies wars into nine categories according to their + political object, and he lays it down as a base proposition + "That these + <!-- Page 30 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" + id="Page_30"></a>[pg 30]</span> different kinds of war will + have more or less influence on the nature of the operations + which will be demanded to attain the end in view, on the + amount of energy that must be put forth, and on the extent + of the undertakings in which we must engage." "There will," + he adds, "be a great difference in the operations according + to the risks we have to run."</p> + + <p>Both men, therefore, though on details of means they were + often widely opposed, are agreed that the fundamental + conception of war is political. Both of course agree that if we + isolate in our mind the forces engaged in any theatre of war + the abstract conception reappears. So far as those forces are + concerned, war is a question of fighting in which each + belligerent should endeavour by all means at his command and + with all his energy to destroy the other. But even so they may + find that certain means are barred to them for political + reasons, and at any moment the fortune of war or a development + of the political conditions with which it is entangled may + throw them back upon the fundamental political theory.</p> + + <p>That theory it will be unprofitable to labour further at + this point. Let it suffice for the present to mark that it + gives us a conception of war as an exertion of violence to + secure a political end which we desire to attain, and that from + this broad and simple formula we are able to deduce at once + that wars will vary according to the nature of the end and the + intensity of our desire to attain it. Here we may leave it to + gather force and coherence as we examine the practical + considerations which are its immediate outcome.</p> + <!-- Page 31 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" + id="Page_31"></a>[pg 31]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER TWO</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>NATURES OF WARS—<br /> + OFFENSIVE AND<br /> + DEFENSIVE</h2> + <hr /> + + <p>Having determined that wars must vary in character according + to the nature and importance of their object, we are faced with + the difficulty that the variations will be of infinite number + and of all degrees of distinction. So complex indeed is the + graduation presented that at first sight it appears scarcely + possible to make it the basis of practical study. But on + further examination it will be seen that by applying the usual + analytical method the whole subject is susceptible of much + simplification. We must in short attempt to reach some system + of classification; that is, we must see if it is not possible + to group the variations into some well-founded categories. With + a subject so complex and intangible the grouping must of course + be to some extent arbitrary, and in some places the lines of + demarcation will be shadowy; but if classification has been + found possible and helpful in Zoology or Botany, with the + infinite and minute individual variations with which they have + to deal, it should be no less possible and helpful in the study + of war.</p> + + <p>The political theory of war will at any rate give us two + broad and well-marked classifications. The first is simple and + well known, depending on whether the political object of the + war is positive or negative. If it be positive—that is, + if our aim is to wrest something from the enemy—then our + war in its main lines will be offensive. If, on the other hand, + our aim <!-- Page 32 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" + id="Page_32"></a>[pg 32]</span> be negative, and we simply + seek to prevent the enemy wresting some advantage to our + detriment, then the war in its general direction will be + defensive.</p> + + <p>It is only as a broad conception that this classification + has value. Though it fixes the general trend of our operations, + it will not in itself affect their character. For a maritime + Power at least it is obvious that this must be so. For in any + circumstances it is impossible for such a Power either to + establish its defence or develop fully its offence without + securing a working control of the sea by aggressive action + against the enemy's fleets. Furthermore, we have always found + that however strictly our aim may be defensive, the most + effective means of securing it has been by counter-attack + over-sea, either to support an ally directly or to deprive our + enemy of his colonial possessions. Neither category, then, + excludes the use of offensive operations nor the idea of + overthrowing our enemy so far as is necessary to gain our end. + In neither case does the conception lead us eventually to any + other objective than the enemy's armed forces, and particularly + his naval forces. The only real difference is this—that + if our object be positive our general plan must be offensive, + and we should at least open with a true offensive movement; + whereas if our object be negative our general plan will be + preventive, and we may bide our time for our counter-attack. To + this extent our action must always tend to the offensive. For + counter-attack is the soul of defence. Defence is not a passive + attitude, for that is the negation of war. Rightly conceived, + it is an attitude of alert expectation. We wait for the moment + when the enemy shall expose himself to a counter-stroke, the + success of which will so far cripple him as to render us + relatively strong enough to pass to the offensive + ourselves.</p> + + <p>From these considerations it will appear that, real and + logical as the classification is, to give it the designation + "offensive and defensive" is objectionable from every point of + view. To begin with, it does not emphasise what the real and + logical <!-- Page 33 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" + id="Page_33"></a>[pg 33]</span> distinction is. It suggests + that the basis of the classification is not so much a + difference of object as a difference in the means employed + to achieve the object. Consequently we find ourselves + continually struggling with the false assumption that + positive war means using attack, and negative war being + content with defence.</p> + + <p>That is confusing enough, but a second objection to the + designation is far more serious and more fertile of error. For + the classification "offensive and defensive" implies that + offensive and defensive are mutually exclusive ideas, whereas + the truth is, and it is a fundamental truth of war, that they + are mutually complementary. All war and every form of it must + be both offensive and defensive. No matter how clear our + positive aim nor how high our offensive spirit, we cannot + develop an aggressive line of strategy to the full without the + support of the defensive on all but the main lines of + operation. In tactics it is the same. The most convinced + devotee of attack admits the spade as well as the rifle. And + even when it comes to men and material, we know that without a + certain amount of protection neither ships, guns, nor men can + develop their utmost energy and endurance in striking power. + There is never, in fact, a clean choice between attack and + defence. In aggressive operations the question always is, how + far must defence enter into the methods we employ in order to + enable us to do the utmost within our resources to break or + paralyse the strength of the enemy. So also with defence. Even + in its most legitimate use, it must always be supplemented by + attack. Even behind the walls of a fortress men know that + sooner or later the place must fall unless by counter-attack on + the enemy's siege works or communications they can cripple his + power of attack.</p> + + <p>It would seem, therefore, that it were better to lay aside + the designation "offensive and defensive" altogether and + substitute the terms "positive and negative." But here again we + are confronted with a difficulty. There have been many wars in + <!-- Page 34 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" + id="Page_34"></a>[pg 34]</span> which positive methods have + been used all through to secure a negative end, and such + wars will not sit easily in either class. For instance, in + the War of Spanish Succession our object was mainly to + prevent the Mediterranean becoming a French lake by the + union of the French and Spanish crowns, but the method by + which we succeeded in achieving our end was to seize the + naval positions of Gibraltar and Minorca, and so in practice + our method was positive. Again, in the late Russo-Japanese + War the main object of Japan was to prevent Korea being + absorbed by Russia. That aim was preventive and negative. + But the only effective way of securing her aim was to take + Korea herself, and so for her the war was in practice + positive.</p> + + <p>On the other hand, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that + in the majority of wars the side with the positive object has + acted generally on the offensive and the other generally on the + defensive. Unpractical therefore as the distinction seems to + be, it is impossible to dismiss it without inquiring why this + was so, and it is in this inquiry that the practical results of + the classification will be found to lie—that is, it + forces us to analyse the comparative advantages of offence and + defence. A clear apprehension of their relative possibilities + is the corner stone of strategical study.</p> + + <p>Now the advantages of the offensive are patent and admitted. + It is only the offensive that can produce positive results, + while the strength and energy which are born of the moral + stimulation of attack are of a practical value that outweighs + almost every other consideration. Every man of spirit would + desire to use the offensive whether his object were positive or + <!-- Page 35 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" + id="Page_35"></a>[pg 35]</span> negative, and yet there are + a number of cases in which some of the most energetic + masters of war have chosen the defensive, and chosen with + success. They have chosen it when they have found themselves + inferior in physical force to their enemy, and when they + believed that no amount of aggressive spirit could redress + that inferiority.</p> + + <p>Obviously, then, for all the inferiority of the defensive as + a drastic form of war it must have some inherent advantage + which the offensive does not enjoy. In war we adopt every + method for which we have sufficient strength. If, then, we + adopt the less desirable method of defence, it must be either + that we have not sufficient strength for offence, or that the + defence gives us some special strength for the attainment of + our object.</p> + + <p>What, then, are these elements of strength? It is very + necessary to inquire, not only that we may know that if for a + time we are forced back upon the defensive all is not lost, but + also that we may judge with how much daring we should push our + offensive to prevent the enemy securing the advantages of + defence.</p> + + <p>As a general principle we all know that possession is nine + points of the law. It is easier to keep money in our pocket + than to take it from another man's. If one man would rob + another he must be the stronger or better armed unless he can + do it by dexterity or stealth, and there lies one of the + advantages of offence. The side which takes the initiative has + usually the better chance of securing advantage by dexterity or + stealth. But it is not always so. If either by land or sea we + can take a defensive position so good that it cannot be turned + and must be broken down before our enemy can reach his + objective, then the advantage of dexterity and stealth passes + to us. We choose our own ground for the trial of strength. We + are hidden on familiar ground; he is exposed on ground that is + less familiar. We can lay traps and prepare surprises by + counter-attack, when he is most dangerously exposed. Hence + <!-- Page 36 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" + id="Page_36"></a>[pg 36]</span> the paradoxical doctrine + that where defence is sound and well designed the advantage + of surprise is against the attack.</p> + + <p>It will be seen therefore that whatever advantages lie in + defence they depend on the preservation of the offensive + spirit. Its essence is the counter-attack—waiting + deliberately for a chance to strike—not cowering in + inactivity. Defence is a condition of restrained + activity—not a mere condition of rest. Its real weakness + is that if unduly prolonged it tends to deaden the spirit of + offence. This is a truth so vital that some authorities in + their eagerness to enforce it have travestied it into the + misleading maxim, "That attack is the best defence." Hence + again an amateurish notion that defence is always stupid or + pusillanimous, leading always to defeat, and that what is + called "the military spirit" means nothing but taking the + offensive. Nothing is further from the teaching or the practice + of the best masters. Like Wellington at Torres Vedras, they all + at times used the defensive till the elements of strength + inherent in that form of war, as opposed to the exhausting + strain inherent in the form that they had fixed upon their + opponents, lifted them to a position where they in their turn + were relatively strong enough to use the more exhausting + form.</p> + + <p>The confusion of thought which has led to the misconceptions + about defence as a method of war is due to several obvious + causes. Counter-attacks from a general defensive attitude have + been regarded as a true offensive, as, for instance, in + Frederick the Great's best-known operations, or in Admiral + Tegetthoff's brilliant counterstroke at Lissa, or our own + <!-- Page 37 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" + id="Page_37"></a>[pg 37]</span> operations against the + Spanish Armada. Again, the defensive has acquired an ill + name by its being confused with a wrongly arrested + offensive, where the superior Power with the positive object + lacked the spirit to use his material superiority with + sufficient activity and perseverance. Against such a Power + an inferior enemy can always redress his inferiority by + passing to a bold and quick offensive, thus acquiring a + momentum both moral and physical which more than compensates + his lack of weight. The defensive has also failed by the + choice of a bad position which the enemy was able to turn or + avoid. A defensive attitude is nothing at all, its elements + of strength entirely disappear, unless it is such that the + enemy must break it down by force before he can reach his + ultimate objective. Even more often has it failed when the + belligerent adopting it, finding he has no available + defensive position which will bar the enemy's progress, + attempts to guard every possible line of attack. The result + is of course that by attenuating his force he only + accentuates his inferiority.</p> + + <p>Clear and well proven as these considerations are for land + warfare, their application to the sea is not so obvious. It + will be objected that at sea there is no defensive. This is + generally true for tactics, but even so not universally true. + Defensive tactical positions are possible at sea, as in + defended anchorages. These were always a reality, and the mine + has increased their possibilities. In the latest developments + of naval warfare we have seen the Japanese at the Elliot + Islands preparing a real defensive position to cover the + landing of their Second Army in the Liaotung Peninsula. + Strategically the proposition is not true at all. A strategical + defensive has been quite as common at sea as on land, and our + own gravest problems have often been how to break down such an + attitude when + <!-- Page 38 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" + id="Page_38"></a>[pg 38]</span> our enemy assumed it. It + usually meant that the enemy remained in his own waters and + near his own bases, where it was almost impossible for us to + attack him with decisive result, and whence he always + threatened us with counterattack at moments of exhaustion, + as the Dutch did at Sole Bay and in the Medway. The + difficulty of dealing decisively with an enemy who adopted + this course was realised by our service very early, and from + first to last one of our chief preoccupations was to prevent + the enemy availing himself of this device and to force him + to fight in the open, or at least to get between him and his + base and force an action there.</p> + + <p>Probably the most remarkable manifestation of the advantages + that may be derived in suitable conditions from a strategical + defensive is also to be found in the late Russo-Japanese War. + In the final crisis of the naval struggle the Japanese fleet + was able to take advantage of a defensive attitude in its own + waters which the Russian Baltic fleet would have to break down + to attain its end, and the result was the most decisive naval + victory ever recorded.</p> + + <p>The deterrent power of active and dexterous operations from + such a position was well known to our old tradition. The device + was used several times, particularly in our home waters, to + prevent a fleet, which for the time we were locally + <!-- Page 39 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" + id="Page_39"></a>[pg 39]</span> too weak to destroy, from + carrying out the work assigned to it. A typical position of + the kind was off Scilly, and it was proved again and again + that even a superior fleet could not hope to effect anything + in the Channel till the fleet off Scilly had been brought to + decisive action. But the essence of the device was the + preservation of the aggressive spirit in its most daring + form. For success it depended on at least the will to seize + every occasion for bold and harassing counter-attacks such + as Drake and his colleagues struck at the Armada.</p> + + <p>To submit to blockade in order to engage the attention of a + superior enemy's fleet is another form of defensive, but one + that is almost wholly evil. For a short time it may do good by + permitting offensive operations elsewhere which otherwise would + be impossible. But if prolonged, it will sooner or later + destroy the spirit of your force and render it incapable of + effective aggression.</p> + + <p>The conclusion then is that although for the practical + purpose of framing or appreciating plans of war the + classification of wars into offensive and defensive is of + little use, a clear apprehension of the inherent relative + advantages of offence and defence is essential. We must realise + that in certain cases, provided always we preserve the + aggressive spirit, the + <!-- Page 40 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" + id="Page_40"></a>[pg 40]</span> defensive will enable an + inferior force to achieve points when the offensive would + probably lead to its destruction. But the elements of + strength depend entirely on the will and insight to deal + rapid blows in the enemy's unguarded moments. So soon as the + defensive ceases to be regarded as a means of fostering + power to strike and of reducing the enemy's power of attack + it loses all its strength. It ceases to be even a suspended + activity, and anything that is not activity is not war.</p> + + <p>With these general indications of the relative advantages of + offence and defence we may leave the subject for the present. + It is possible of course to catalogue the advantages and + disadvantages of each form, but any such bald + statement—without concrete examples to explain the + meaning—must always appear controversial and is apt to + mislead. It is better to reserve their fuller consideration + till we come to deal with strategical operations and are able + to note their actual effect upon the conduct of war in its + various forms. Leaving therefore our first classification of + wars into offensive and defensive we will pass on to the + second, which is the only one of real practical importance.</p> + <!-- Page 41 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" + id="Page_41"></a>[pg 41]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER THREE</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>NATURES OF WARS—<br /> + LIMITED AND<br /> + UNLIMITED</h2> + <hr /> + + <p>The second classification to which we are led by the + political theory of war, is one which Clausewitz was the first + to formulate and one to which he came to attach the highest + importance. It becomes necessary therefore to examine his views + in some detail—not because there is any need to regard a + continental soldier, however distinguished, as an indispensable + authority for a maritime nation. The reason is quite the + reverse. It is because a careful examination of his doctrine on + this point will lay open what are the radical and essential + differences between the German or Continental School of + Strategy and the British or Maritime School—that is, our + own traditional School, which too many writers both at home and + abroad quietly assume to have no existence. The evil tendency + of that assumption cannot be too strongly emphasised, and the + main purpose of this and the following chapters will be to show + how and why even the greatest of the continental strategists + fell short of realising fully the characteristic conception of + the British tradition.</p> + + <p>By the classification in question Clausewitz distinguished + wars into those with a "Limited" object and those whose object + was "Unlimited." Such a classification was entirely + characteristic of him, for it rested not alone upon the + material nature of the object, but on certain moral + considerations to which he was the first to attach their real + value in war. Other + <!-- Page 42 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" + id="Page_42"></a>[pg 42]</span> writers such as Jomini had + attempted to classify wars by the special purpose for which + they were fought, but Clausewitz's long course of study + convinced him that such a distinction was unphilosophical + and bore no just relation to any tenable theory of war. + Whether, that is, a war was positive or negative mattered + much, but its special purpose, whether, for instance, + according to Jomini's system, it was a war "to assert + rights" or "to assist an ally" or "to acquire territory," + mattered not at all.</p> + + <p>Whatever the object, the vital and paramount question was + the intensity with which the spirit of the nation was absorbed + in its attainment. The real point to determine in approaching + any war plan was what did the object mean to the two + belligerents, what sacrifices would they make for it, what + risks were they prepared to run? It was thus he stated his + view. "The smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, + the smaller presumably will be the means of resistance he will + employ, and the smaller his means, the smaller will ours be + required to be. Similarly the smaller our political object, the + less value shall we set upon it and the more easily we shall be + induced to abandon it." Thus the political object of the war, + its original motive, will not only determine for both + belligerents reciprocally the aim of the force they use, but it + will also be the standard of the intensity of the efforts they + will make. So he concludes there may be wars of all degrees of + importance and energy from a war of extermination down to the + use of an army of observation. So also in the naval sphere + there may be a life and death struggle for maritime supremacy + or hostilities which never rise beyond a blockade.</p> + + <p>Such a view of the subject was of course a wide departure + from the theory of "Absolute War" on which Clausewitz had + started working. Under that theory "Absolute War" was the + <!-- Page 43 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" + id="Page_43"></a>[pg 43]</span> ideal form to which all war + ought to attain, and those which fell short of it were + imperfect wars cramped by a lack of true military spirit. + But so soon as he had seized the fact that in actual life + the moral factor always must override the purely military + factor, he saw that he had been working on too narrow a + basis—a basis that was purely theoretical in that it + ignored the human factor. He began to perceive that it was + logically unsound to assume as the foundation of a + strategical system that there was one pattern to which all + wars ought to conform. In the light of his full and final + apprehension of the value of the human factor he saw wars + falling into two well-marked categories, each of which would + legitimately be approached in a radically different manner, + and not necessarily on the lines of "Absolute War."</p> + + <p>He saw that there was one class of war where the political + object was of so vital an importance to both belligerents that + they would tend to fight to the utmost limit of their endurance + to secure it. But there was another class where the object was + of less importance, that is to say, where its value to one or + both the belligerents was not so great as to be worth unlimited + sacrifices of blood and treasure. It was these two kinds of war + he designated provisionally "Unlimited" and "Limited," by which + he meant not that you were not to exert the force employed with + all the vigour you could develop, but that there might be a + limit beyond which it would be bad policy to spend that vigour, + a point at which, long before your force was exhausted or even + fully developed, it would be wiser to abandon your object + rather than to spend more upon it.</p> + + <p>This distinction it is very necessary to grasp quite + clearly, for it is often superficially confused with the + distinction already referred to, which Clausewitz drew in the + earlier part of his work—that is, the distinction between + what he called the character of modern war and the character of + the wars which preceded the Napoleonic era. It will be + remembered he + <!-- Page 44 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" + id="Page_44"></a>[pg 44]</span> insisted that the wars of + his own time had been wars between armed nations with a + tendency to throw the whole weight of the nation into the + fighting line, whereas in the seventeenth and eighteenth + centuries wars were waged by standing armies and not by the + whole nation in arms. The distinction of course is real and + of far-reaching consequences, but it has no relation to the + distinction between "Limited" and "Unlimited" war. War may + be waged on the Napoleonic system either for a limited or an + unlimited object.</p> + + <p>A modern instance will serve to clear the field. The recent + Russo-Japanese War was fought for a limited object—the + assertion of certain claims over territory which formed no part + of the possessions of either belligerent. Hostilities were + conducted on entirely modern lines by two armed nations and not + by standing armies alone. But in the case of one belligerent + her interest in the object was so limited as to cause her to + abandon it long before her whole force as an armed nation was + exhausted or even put forth. The expense of life and treasure + which the struggle was involving was beyond what the object was + worth.</p> + + <p>This second distinction—that is, between Limited and + Unlimited wars—Clausewitz regarded as of greater + importance than his previous one founded on the negative or + positive nature of the object. He was long in reaching it. His + great work <i>On War</i> as he left it proceeds almost entirely + on the conception of offensive or defensive as applied to the + Napoleonic ideal of absolute war. The new idea came to him + towards the end in the full maturity of his prolonged study, + and it came to him in endeavouring to apply his strategical + speculations to the practical process of framing a war plan in + anticipation of a threatened breach with France. It was only in + his final section <i>On War Plans</i> that he began to deal + with it. By that time he had grasped the first practical result + to <!-- Page 45 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" + id="Page_45"></a>[pg 45]</span> which his theory led. He saw + that the distinction between Limited and Unlimited war + connoted a cardinal distinction in the methods of waging it. + When the object was unlimited, and would consequently call + forth your enemy's whole war power, it was evident that no + firm decision of the struggle could be reached till his war + power was entirely crushed. Unless you had a reasonable hope + of being able to do this it was bad policy to seek your end + by force—that is, you ought not to go to war. In the + case of a limited object, however, the complete destruction + of the enemy's armed force was beyond what was necessary. + Clearly you could achieve your end if you could seize the + object, and by availing yourself of the elements of strength + inherent in the defensive could set up such a situation that + it would cost the enemy more to turn you out than the object + was worth to him.</p> + + <p>Here then was a wide difference in the fundamental postulate + of your war plan. In the case of an unlimited war your main + strategical offensive must be directed against the armed forces + of the enemy; in the case of a limited war, even where its + object was positive, it need not be. If conditions were + favourable, it would suffice to make the object itself the + objective of your main strategical offensive. Clearly, then, he + had reached a theoretical distinction which modified his whole + conception of strategy. No longer is there logically but one + kind of war, the Absolute, and no longer is there but one + legitimate objective, the enemy's armed forces. Being sound + theory, it of course had an immediate practical value, for + obviously it was a distinction from which the actual work of + framing a war plan must take its departure.</p> + + <p>A curious corroboration of the soundness of these views is + that Jomini reached an almost identical standpoint + independently and by an entirely different road. His method was + severely concrete, based on the comparison of observed facts, + but it brought him as surely as the abstract method of his + rival to the conclusion that there were two distinct classes of + <!-- + Page 46 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" + id="Page_46"></a>[pg 46]</span> object. "They are of two + different kinds," he says, "one which may be called + territorial or geographical ... the other on the contrary + consists exclusively in the destruction or disorganisation + of the enemy's forces without concerning yourself with + geographical points of any kind." It is under the first + category of his first main classification "Of offensive wars + to assert rights," that he deals with what Clausewitz would + call "Limited Wars." Citing as an example Frederick the + Great's war for the conquest of Silesia, he says, "In such a + war ... the offensive operations ought to be proportional to + the end in view. The first move is naturally to occupy the + provinces claimed" (not, be it noted, to direct your blow at + the enemy's main force). "Afterwards," he proceeds, "you can + push the offensive according to circumstances and your + relative strength in order to obtain the desired cession by + menacing the enemy at home." Here we have Clausewitz's whole + doctrine of "Limited War"; firstly, the primary or + territorial stage, in which you endeavour to occupy the + geographical object, and then the secondary or coercive + stage, in which you seek by exerting general pressure upon + your enemy to force him to accept the adverse situation you + have set up.</p> + + <p>Such a method of making war obviously differs in a + fundamental manner from that which Napoleon habitually adopted, + and yet we have it presented by Jomini and Clausewitz, + <!-- Page 47 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" + id="Page_47"></a>[pg 47]</span> the two apostles of the + Napoleonic method. The explanation is, of course, that both + of them had seen too much not to know that Napoleon's method + was only applicable when you could command a real physical + or moral preponderance. Given such a preponderance, both + were staunch for the use of extreme means in Napoleon's + manner. It is not as something better than the higher road + that they commend the lower one, but being veteran + staff-officers and not mere theorists, they knew well that a + belligerent must sometimes find the higher road beyond his + strength, or beyond the effort which the spirit of the + nation is prepared to make for the end in view, and like the + practical men they were, they set themselves to study the + potentialities of the lower road should hard necessity force + them to travel it. They found that these potentialities in + certain circumstances were great. As an example of a case + where the lower form was more appropriate Jomini cites + Napoleon's campaign against Russia in 1812. In his opinion + it would have been better if Napoleon had been satisfied to + begin on the lower method with a limited territorial object, + and he attributes his failure to the abuse of a method + which, however well suited to his wars in Germany, was + incapable of achieving success in the conditions presented + by a war with Russia.</p> + + <p>Seeing how high was Napoleon's opinion of Jomini as a master + of the science of war, it is curious how his views on the two + natures of wars have been ignored in the present day. It is + even more curious in the case of Clausewitz, since we know that + in the plenitude of his powers he came to regard this + classification as the master-key of the subject. The + explanation is that the distinction is not very clearly + formulated in his first seven books, which alone he left in + anything like a finished condition. It was not till he came to + write his eighth book <i>On War Plans</i> that he saw the vital + importance of the distinction round which he had been hovering. + In that book the distinction is clearly laid down, but the book + unhappily + <!-- Page 48 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" + id="Page_48"></a>[pg 48]</span> was never completed. With + his manuscript, however, he left a "Note" warning us against + regarding his earlier books as a full presentation of his + developed ideas. From the note it is also evident that he + thought the classification on which he had lighted was of + the utmost importance, that he believed it would clear up + all the difficulties which he had encountered in his earlier + books—difficulties which he had come to see arose from + a too exclusive consideration of the Napoleonic method of + conducting war. "I look upon the first six books," he wrote + in 1827, "as only a mass of material which is still in a + manner without form and which has still to be revised again. + In this revision the two kinds of wars will be kept more + distinctly in view all through, and thereby all ideas will + gain in clearness, in precision, and in exactness of + application." Evidently he had grown dissatisfied with the + theory of Absolute War on which he had started. His new + discovery had convinced him that that theory would not serve + as a standard for all natures of wars. "Shall we," he asks + in his final book, "shall we now rest satisfied with this + idea and by it judge of all wars, however much they may + differ?"<a name="NtA_2" + id="NtA_2"></a><a href="#Nt_2"><sup>2</sup></a> He answers + his question in the negative. "You cannot determine the + requirements of all wars from the Napoleonic type. Keep that + type and its absolute method before you to use <i>when you + can</i> or <i>when you must</i>, but keep equally before you + that there are two main natures of war."</p> + + <p>In his note written at this time, when the distinction first + came to him, he defines these two natures of war as follows: + "First, those in which the object is the <i>overthrow of the + enemy</i>, whether it be we aim at his political destruction or + merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace + <!-- Page 49 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" + id="Page_49"></a>[pg 49]</span> on our terms; and secondly, + those in which our object is <i>merely to make some + conquests on the frontiers of his country</i>, either for + the purpose of retaining them permanently or of turning them + to account as a matter of exchange in settling terms of + peace."<a name="NtA_3" + id="NtA_3"></a><a href="#Nt_3"><sup>3</sup></a> It was in + his eighth book that he intended, had he lived, to have + worked out the comprehensive idea he had conceived. Of that + book he says, "The chief object will be to make good the two + points of view above mentioned, by which everything will be + simplified and at the same time be given the breath of life. + I hope in this book to iron out many creases in the heads of + strategists and statesmen, and at least to show the object + of action and the real point to be considered in + war."<a name="NtA_4" + id="NtA_4"></a><a href="#Nt_4"><sup>4</sup></a></p> + + <p>That hope was never realised, and that perhaps is why his + penetrating analysis has been so much ignored. The eighth book + as we have it is only a fragment. In the spring of + 1830—an anxious moment, when it seemed that Prussia would + require all her best for another struggle single-handed with + France—he was called away to an active command. What + <!-- Page 50 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" + id="Page_50"></a>[pg 50]</span> he left of the book on "War + Plans" he describes as "merely a track roughly cleared, as + it were, through the mass, in order to ascertain the points + of greatest moment." It was his intention, he says, to + "carry the spirit of these ideas into his first six + books"—to put the crown on his work, in fact, by + elaborating and insisting upon his two great propositions, + viz. that war was a form of policy, and that being so it + might be Limited or Unlimited.</p> + + <p>The extent to which he would have infused his new idea into + the whole every one is at liberty to judge for himself; but + this indisputable fact remains. In the winter in view of the + threatening attitude of France in regard to Belgium he drew up + a war plan, and it was designed not on the Napoleonic method of + making the enemy's armed force the main strategical objective, + but on seizing a limited territorial object and forcing a + disadvantageous counter-offensive upon the French. The + revolutionary movement throughout Europe had broken the Holy + Alliance to pieces. Not only did Prussia find herself almost + single-handed against France, but she herself was sapped by + revolution. To adopt the higher form <!-- Page + 51 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" + id="Page_51"></a>[pg 51]</span> of war and seek to destroy + the armed force of the enemy was beyond her power. But she + could still use the lower form, and by seizing Belgium she + could herself force so exhausting a task on France that + success was well within her strength. It was exactly so we + endeavoured to begin the Seven Years' War; and it was + exactly so the Japanese successfully conducted their war + with Russia; and what is more striking, it was on similar + lines that in 1859 Moltke in similar circumstances drew up + his first war plan against France. His idea at that time was + on the lines which Jomini held should have been Napoleon's + in 1812. It was not to strike directly at Paris or the + French main army, but to occupy Alsace-Lorraine and hold + that territory till altered conditions should give him the + necessary preponderance for proceeding to the higher form or + forcing a favourable peace.</p> + + <p>In conclusion, then, we have to note that the matured fruit + of the Napoleonic period was a theory of war based not on the + single absolute idea, but on the dual distinction of Limited + and Unlimited. Whatever practical importance we may attach to + the distinction, so much must be admitted on the clear and + emphatic pronouncements of Clausewitz and Jomini. The practical + importance is another matter. It may fairly be argued that in + continental warfare—in spite of the instances quoted by + both the classical writers—it is not very great, for + reasons that will appear directly. But it must be remembered + that continental warfare is not the only form in which great + international issues are decided. Standing at the final point + which Clausewitz and Jomini reached, we are indeed only on the + threshold of the subject. We have to begin where they left off + and inquire what their ideas have to tell for the modern + conditions of worldwide imperial States, where the sea becomes + a direct and vital factor.</p> + <!-- Page 52 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" + id="Page_52"></a>[pg 52]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER FOUR</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>LIMITED WAR AND<br /> + MARITIME EMPIRES—</h2> + + <h3>Development of Clausewitz's and Jomini's<br /> + Theory of a Limited Territorial Object, and Its<br /> + Application to Modern Imperial Conditions</h3> + <hr /> + + <p>The German war plans already cited, which were based + respectively on the occupation of Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine, + and Jomini's remarks on Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign + serve well to show the point to which continental strategists + have advanced along the road which Clausewitz was the first to + indicate clearly. We have now to consider its application to + modern imperial conditions, and above all where the maritime + element forcibly asserts itself. We shall then see how small + that advance has been compared with its far-reaching effects + for a maritime and above all an insular Power.</p> + + <p>It is clear that Clausewitz himself never apprehended the + full significance of his brilliant theory. His outlook was + still purely continental, and the limitations of continental + warfare tend to veil the fuller meaning of the principle he had + framed. Had he lived, there is little doubt he would have + worked it out to its logical conclusion, but his death + condemned his theory of limited war to remain in the inchoate + condition in which he had left it.</p> + + <p>It will be observed, as was natural enough, that all through + his work Clausewitz had in his mind war between two contiguous + or at least adjacent continental States, and a moment's + consideration will show that in that type of war the principle + of the limited object can rarely if ever assert itself in + <!-- Page 53 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" + id="Page_53"></a>[pg 53]</span> perfect precision. + Clausewitz himself put it quite clearly. Assuming a case + where "the overthrow of the enemy"—that is, unlimited + war—is beyond our strength, he points out that we need + not therefore necessarily act on the defensive. Our action + may still be positive and offensive, but the object can be + nothing more than "the conquest of part of the enemy's + country." Such a conquest he knew might so far weaken your + enemy or strengthen your own position as to enable you to + secure a satisfactory peace. The path of history is indeed + strewn with such cases. But he was careful to point out that + such a form of war was open to the gravest objections. Once + you had occupied the territory you aimed at, your offensive + action was, as a rule, arrested. A defensive attitude had to + be assumed, and such an arrest of offensive action he had + previously shown was inherently vicious, if only for moral + reasons. Added to this you might find that in your effort to + occupy the territorial object you had so irretrievably + separated your striking force from your home-defence force + as to be in no position to meet your enemy if he was able to + retort by acting on unlimited lines with a stroke at your + heart. A case in point was the Austerlitz campaign, where + Austria's object was to wrest North Italy from Napoleon's + empire. She sent her main army under the Archduke Charles to + seize the territory she desired. Napoleon immediately struck + at Vienna, destroyed her home army, and occupied the capital + before the Archduke could turn to bar his way.</p> + + <p>The argument is this: that, as all strategic attack tends to + leave points of your own uncovered, it always involves greater + or less provision for their defence. It is obvious, therefore, + that if we are aiming at a limited territorial object the + <!-- Page 54 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" + id="Page_54"></a>[pg 54]</span> proportion of defence + required will tend to be much greater than if we are + directing our attack on the main forces of the enemy. In + unlimited war our attack will itself tend to defend + everything elsewhere, by forcing the enemy to concentrate + against our attack. Whether the limited form is justifiable + or not therefore depends, as Clausewitz points out, on the + geographical position of the object.</p> + + <p>So far British experience is with him, but he then goes on + to say the more closely the territory in question is an annex + of our own the safer is this form of war, because then our + offensive action will the more surely cover our home country. + As a case in point he cites Frederick the Great's opening of + the Seven Years' War with the occupation of Saxony—a + piece of work which materially strengthened Prussian defence. + Of the British opening in Canada he says nothing. His outlook + was too exclusively continental for it to occur to him to test + his doctrine with a conspicuously successful case in which the + territory aimed at was distant from the home territory and in + no way covered it. Had he done so he must have seen how much + stronger an example of the strength of limited war was the case + of Canada than the case of Saxony. Moreover, he would have seen + that the difficulties, which in spite of his faith in his + discovery accompanied his attempt to apply it, arose from the + fact that the examples he selected were not really examples at + all.</p> + + <p>When he conceived the idea, the only kind of limited object + he had in his mind was, to use his own words, "some conquests + on the frontiers of the enemy's country," such as Silesia and + Saxony for Frederick the Great, Belgium in his own war plan, + and Alsace-Lorraine in that of Moltke. Now it is obvious that + such objects are not truly limited, for two reasons. In the + first place, such territory is usually an organic part of your + enemy's country, or otherwise of so much importance to him that + he will be willing to use unlimited effort to retain it. In the + second place, there will be no strategical + <!-- Page 55 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" + id="Page_55"></a>[pg 55]</span> obstacle to his being able + to use his whole force to that end. To satisfy the full + conception of a limited object, one of two conditions is + essential. Firstly, it must be not merely limited in area, + but of really limited political importance; and secondly, it + must be so situated as to be strategically isolated or to be + capable of being reduced to practical isolation by + strategical operations. Unless this condition exists, it is + in the power of either belligerent, as Clausewitz himself + saw, to pass to unlimited war if he so desires, and, + ignoring the territorial objective, to strike at the heart + of his enemy and force him to desist.</p> + + <p>If, then, we only regard war between contiguous continental + States, in which the object is the conquest of territory on + either of their frontiers, we get no real generic difference + between limited and unlimited war. The line between them is in + any case too shadowy or unstable to give a classification of + any solidity. It is a difference of degree rather than of kind. + If, on the other hand, we extend our view to wars between + worldwide empires, the distinction at once becomes organic. + Possessions which lie oversea or at the extremities of vast + areas of imperfectly settled territory are in an entirely + different category from those limited objects which Clausewitz + contemplated. History shows that they can never have the + political importance of objects which are organically part of + the European system, and it shows further that they can be + isolated by naval action sufficiently to set up the conditions + of true limited war.</p> + + <p>Jomini approaches the point, but without clearly detaching + it. In his chapter "On Great Invasions and Distant + Expeditions," he points out how unsafe it is to take the + conditions of war between contiguous States and apply them + crudely to cases where the belligerents are separated by large + areas of + <!-- Page 56 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" + id="Page_56"></a>[pg 56]</span> land or sea. He hovers round + the sea factor, feeling how great a difference it makes, but + without getting close to the real distinction. His + conception of the inter-action of fleets and armies never + rises above their actual co-operation in touch one with the + other in a distant theatre. He has in mind the assistance + which the British fleet afforded Wellington in the + Peninsula, and Napoleon's dreams of Asiatic conquest, + pronouncing such distant invasions as impossible in modern + times except perhaps in combination with a powerful fleet + that could provide the army of invasion with successive + advanced bases. Of the paramount value of the fleet's + isolating and preventive functions he gives no hint.</p> + + <p>Even when he deals with oversea expeditions, as he does at + some length, his grip of the point is no closer. It is indeed + significant of how entirely continental thought had failed to + penetrate the subject that in devoting over thirty pages to an + enumeration of the principles of oversea expeditions, he, like + Clausewitz, does not so much as mention the conquest of Canada; + and yet it is the leading case of a weak military Power + succeeding by the use of the limited form of war in forcing its + will upon a strong one, and succeeding because it was able by + naval action to secure its home defence and isolate the + territorial object.</p> + + <p>For our ideas of true limited objects, therefore, we must + leave the continental theatres and turn to mixed or maritime + wars. We have to look to such cases as Canada and Havana in the + Seven Years' War, and Cuba in the Spanish-American War, cases + in which complete isolation of the object by naval action was + possible, or to such examples as the Crimea <!-- Page + 57 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" + id="Page_57"></a>[pg 57]</span> and Korea, where sufficient + isolation was attainable by naval action owing to the length + and difficulty of the enemy's land communications and to the + strategical situation of the territory at stake.</p> + + <p>These examples will also serve to illustrate and enforce the + second essential of this kind of war. As has been already said, + for a true limited object we must have not only the power of + isolation, but also the power by a secure home defence of + barring an unlimited counterstroke. In all the above cases this + condition existed. In all of them the belligerents had no + contiguous frontiers, and this point is vital. For it is + obvious that if two belligerents have a common frontier, it is + open to the superior of them, no matter how distant or how easy + to isolate the limited object may be, to pass at will to + unlimited war by invasion. This process is even possible when + the belligerents are separated by a neutral State, since the + territory of a weak neutral will be violated if the object be + of sufficient importance, or if the neutral be too strong to + coerce, there still remains the possibility that his alliance + may be secured.</p> + + <p>We come, then, to this final proposition—that limited + war is only permanently possible to island Powers or between + Powers which are separated by sea, and then only when the Power + desiring limited war is able to command the sea to such a + degree as to be able not only to isolate the distant object, + but also to render impossible the invasion of his home + territory.</p> + + <p>Here, then, we reach the true meaning and highest military + value of what we call the command of the sea, and here we touch + the secret of England's success against Powers so greatly + superior to herself in military strength. It is only fitting + <!-- Page 58 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" + id="Page_58"></a>[pg 58]</span> that such a secret should + have been first penetrated by an Englishman. For so it was, + though it must be said that except in the light of + Clausewitz's doctrine the full meaning of Bacon's famous + aphorism is not revealed. "This much is certain," said the + great Elizabethan on the experience of our first imperial + war; "he that commands the sea is at great liberty and may + take as much or as little of the war as he will, whereas + those that be strongest by land are many times nevertheless + in great straits." It would be difficult to state more + pithily the ultimate significance of Clausewitz's doctrine. + Its cardinal truth is clearly indicated—that limited + wars do not turn upon the armed strength of the + belligerents, but upon the amount of that strength which + they are able or willing to bring to bear at the decisive + point.</p> + + <p>It is much to be regretted that Clausewitz did not live to + see with Bacon's eyes and to work out the full + comprehensiveness of his doctrine. His ambition was to + formulate a theory which would explain all wars. He believed he + had done so, and yet it is clear he never knew how complete was + his success, nor how wide was the field he had covered. To the + end it would seem he was unaware that he had found an + explanation of one of the most inscrutable problems in + history—the expansion of England—at least so far as + it has been due to successful war. That a small country with a + weak army should have been able to gather to herself the most + desirable regions of the earth, and to gather them at the + expense of the greatest military Powers, is a paradox to which + such Powers find it hard to be reconciled. The phenomenon + seemed always a matter of chance-an accident without any + foundation in the essential constants of war. It remained for + Clausewitz, + <!-- Page 59 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" + id="Page_59"></a>[pg 59]</span> unknown to himself, to + discover that explanation, and he reveals it to us in the + inherent strength of limited war when means and conditions + are favourable for its use.</p> + + <p>We find, then, if we take a wider view than was open to + Clausewitz and submit his latest ideas to the test of present + imperial conditions, so far from failing to cover the ground + they gain a fuller meaning and a firmer basis. Apply them to + maritime warfare and it becomes clear that his distinction + between limited and unlimited war does not rest alone on the + moral factor. A war may be limited not only because the + importance of the object is too limited to call forth the whole + national force, but also because the sea may be made to present + an insuperable physical obstacle to the whole national force + being brought to bear. That is to say, a war may be limited + physically by the strategical isolation of the object, as well + as morally by its comparative unimportance.</p> + <!-- Page 60 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" + id="Page_60"></a>[pg 60]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER FIVE</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>WARS OF<br /> + INTERVENTION—LIMITED<br /> + INTERFERENCE<br /> + IN UNLIMITED WAR</h2> + <hr /> + + <p>Before leaving the general consideration of limited war, we + have still to deal with a form of it that has not yet been + mentioned. Clausewitz gave it provisionally the name of "War + limited by contingent," and could find no place for it in his + system. It appeared to him to differ essentially from war + limited by its political object, or as Jomini put it, war with + a territorial object. Yet it had to be taken into account and + explained, if only for the part it had played in European + history.</p> + + <p>For us it calls for the most careful examination, not only + because it baffled the great German strategist to reconcile it + with his theory of war, but also because it is the form in + which Great Britain most successfully demonstrated the + potentiality for direct continental interference of a small + army acting in conjunction with a dominant fleet.</p> + + <p>The combined operations which were the normal expression of + the British method of making war on the limited basis were of + two main classes. Firstly, there were those designed purely for + the conquest of the objects for which we went to war, which + were usually colonial or distant oversea territory; + <!-- Page 61 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" + id="Page_61"></a>[pg 61]</span> and secondly, operations + more or less upon the European seaboard designed not for + permanent conquest, but as a method of disturbing our + enemy's plans and strengthening the hands of our allies and + our own position. Such operations might take the form of + insignificant coastal diversions, or they might rise through + all degrees of importance till, as in Wellington's + operations in the Peninsula, they became indistinguishable + in form from regular continental warfare.</p> + + <p>It would seem, therefore, that these operations were + distinguished not so much by the nature of the object as by the + fact that we devoted to them, not the whole of our military + strength, but only a certain part of it which was known as our + "disposal force." Consequently, they appear to call for some + such special classification, and to fall naturally into the + category which Clausewitz called "War limited by + contingent."</p> + + <p>It was a nature of war well enough known in another form on + the Continent. During the eighteenth century there had been a + large number of cases of war actually limited by + contingent—that is, cases where a country not having a + vital interest in the object made war by furnishing the chief + belligerent with an auxiliary force of a stipulated + strength.</p> + + <p>It was in the sixth chapter of his last book that Clausewitz + intended to deal with this anomalous form of hostility. His + untimely death, however, has left us with no more than a + fragment, in which he confesses that such cases are + "embarrassing to his theory." If, he adds, the auxiliary force + were placed unreservedly at the disposal of the chief + belligerent, the problem would be simple enough. It would then, + in effect, be the same thing as unlimited war with the aid of a + subsidised force. But in fact, as he observes, this seldom + happened, for the contingent was always more or less controlled + in <!-- Page 62 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" + id="Page_62"></a>[pg 62]</span> accordance with the special + political aims of the Government which furnished it. + Consequently, the only conclusion he succeeded in reaching + was that it was a form of war that had to be taken into + account, and that it was a form of limited war that appeared + to differ essentially from war limited by object. We are + left, in fact, with an impression that there must be two + kinds of limited war.</p> + + <p>But if we pursue his historical method and examine the cases + in which this nature of war was successful, and those in which + it was unsuccessful, we shall find that wherever success is + taken as an index of its legitimate employment, the practical + distinction between the two kinds of limited war tends to + disappear. The indications are that where the essential factors + which justify the use of war limited by object are present in + war limited by contingent, then that form of war tends to + succeed, but not otherwise. We are brought, in fact, to this + proposition, that the distinction "Limited by contingent" is + not one that is inherent in war, and is quite out of line with + the theory in hand—that, in reality, it is not a + <i>form</i> of war, but a <i>method</i> which may be employed + either for limited or unlimited war. In other words, war + limited by contingent, if it is to be regarded as a legitimate + form of war at all, must take frankly the one shape or the + other. Either the contingent must act as an organic unit of the + force making unlimited war without any reservations whatever, + or else it should be given a definite territorial object, with + an independent organisation and an independent limited + function.</p> + + <p>Our own experience seems to indicate that war by contingent + or war with "a disposal force" attains the highest success when + it approaches most closely to true limited war—that is, + as in the case of the Peninsula and the Crimea, where its + object is to wrest or secure from the enemy a definite piece of + territory that to a greater or less extent can be isolated by + naval action. Its operative power, in fact, appears to bear + some direct relation to the intimacy with which naval and + <!-- Page + 63 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" + id="Page_63"></a>[pg 63]</span> military action can be + combined to give the contingent a weight and mobility that + are beyond its intrinsic power.</p> + + <p>If, then, we would unravel the difficulties of war limited + by contingent, it seems necessary to distinguish between the + continental and the British form of it. The continental form, + as we have seen, differs but little in conception from + unlimited war. The contingent is furnished at least ostensibly + with the idea that it is to be used by the chief belligerent to + assist him in overthrowing the common enemy, and that its + objective will be the enemy's organised forces or his capital. + Or it may be that the contingent is to be used as an army of + observation to prevent a counterstroke, so as to facilitate and + secure the main offensive movement of the chief belligerent. In + either case, however small may be our contribution to the + allied force, we are using the unlimited form and aiming at an + unlimited and not a mere territorial object.</p> + + <p>If now we turn to British experience of war limited by + contingent, we find that the continental form has frequently + been used, but we also find it almost invariably accompanied by + a popular repugnance, as though there were something in it + antagonistic to the national instinct. A leading case is the + assistance we sent to Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' + War. At the opening of the war, so great was the popular + repugnance that the measure was found impossible, and it was + not till Frederick's dazzling resistance to the Catholic powers + had clothed him with the glory of a Protestant hero, that Pitt + could do what he wanted. The old religious fire was stirred. + The most potent of all national instincts kindled the people to + a generous warmth which overcame their inborn <!-- + Page 64 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" + id="Page_64"></a>[pg 64]</span> antipathy to continental + operations, and it was possible to send a substantial + contingent to Frederick's assistance. In the end the support + fully achieved its purpose, but it must be noted that even + in this case the operations were limited not only by + contingent but also by object. It is true that Frederick was + engaged in an unlimited war in which the continued existence + of Prussia was at stake, and that the British force was an + organic element in his war plan. Nevertheless, it formed + part of a British subsidised army under Prince Ferdinand of + Brunswick, who though nominated by Frederick was a British + commander-in-chief. His army was in organisation entirely + distinct from that of Frederick, and it was assigned the + very definite and limited function of preventing the French + occupying Hanover and so turning the Prussian right flank. + Finally it must be noted that its ability to perform this + function was due to the fact that the theatre of operations + assigned to it was such that in no probable event could it + lose touch with the sea, nor could the enemy cut its lines + of supply and retreat.</p> + + <p>These features of the enterprise should be noted. They + differentiate it from our earlier use of war limited by + contingent in the continental manner, of which Marlborough's + campaigns were typical, and they exhibit the special form which + Marlborough would have chosen had political exigencies + permitted and which was to become characteristic of British + effort from Pitt's time onward. In the method of our greatest + War Minister we have not only the limit by contingent but + <!-- Page 65 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" + id="Page_65"></a>[pg 65]</span> also the limit of a definite + and independent function, and finally we have touch with the + sea. This is the really vital factor, and upon it, as will + presently appear, depends the strength of the method.</p> + + <p>In the earlier part of the Great War we employed the same + form in our operations in North-Western Europe. There we had + also the limited function of securing Holland, and also + complete touch with the sea, but our theatre of operations was + not independent. Intimate concerted action with other forces + was involved, and the result in every case was failure. Later + on in Sicily, where absolute isolation was attainable, the + strength of the method enabled us to achieve a lasting result + with very slender means. But the result was purely defensive. + It was not till the Peninsular War developed that we found a + theatre for war limited by contingent in which all the + conditions that make for success were present. Even there so + long as our army was regarded as a contingent auxiliary to the + Spanish army the usual failure ensued. Only in Portugal, the + defence of which was a true limited object, and where we had a + sea-girt theatre independent of extraneous allies, was success + achieved from the first. So strong was the method here, and so + exhausting the method which it forced on the enemy, that the + local balance of force was eventually reversed and we were able + to pass to a drastic offensive.</p> + + <p>The real secret of Wellington's success—apart from his + own genius—was that in perfect conditions he was applying + the limited form to an unlimited war. Our object was unlimited. + It was nothing less than the overthrow of Napoleon. Complete + success at sea had failed to do it, but that success had given + us the power of applying the limited form, which was the most + decisive form of offence within our means. Its <!-- + Page 66 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" + id="Page_66"></a>[pg 66]</span> substantial contribution to + the final achievement of the object is now universally + recognised.</p> + + <p>The general result, then, of these considerations is that + war by contingent in the continental form seldom or never + differs generically from unlimited war, for the conditions + required by limited war are seldom or never present. But what + may be called the British or maritime form is in fact the + application of the limited method to the unlimited form, as + ancillary to the larger operations of our allies—a method + which has usually been open to us because the control of the + sea has enabled us to select a theatre in effect truly + limited.<a name="NtA_5" + id="NtA_5"></a><a href="#Nt_5"><sup>5</sup></a></p> + + <p>But what if the conditions of the struggle in which we wish + to intervene are such that no truly limited theatre is + available? In that case we have to choose between placing a + contingent frankly at the disposal of our ally, or confining + ourselves to coastal diversion, as we did at Frederick the + Great's request in the early campaigns of the Seven Years' War. + Such operations can seldom be satisfactory to either party. The + small positive results of our efforts to intervene in this way + have indeed done more than anything to discredit this form of + war, and to brand it as unworthy of a first-class Power. Yet + the fact remains that all the great continental masters of war + have feared or valued British intervention of this character + even in the most unfavourable conditions. It was because + <!-- Page 67 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" + id="Page_67"></a>[pg 67]</span> they looked for its effects + rather in the threat than in the performance. They did not + reckon for positive results at all. So long as such + intervention took an amphibious form they knew its + disturbing effect upon a European situation was always out + of all proportion to the intrinsic strength employed or the + positive results it could give. Its operative action was + that it threatened positive results unless it were strongly + met. Its effect, in short, was negative. Its value lay in + its power of containing force greater than its own. That is + all that can be claimed for it, but it may be all that is + required. It is not the most drastic method of intervention, + but it has proved itself the most drastic for a Power whose + forces are not adapted for the higher method. Frederick the + Great was the first great soldier to recognise it, and + Napoleon was the last. For years he shut his eyes to it, + laughed at it, covered it with a contempt that grew ever + more irritable. In 1805 he called Craig's expedition a + "pygmy combination," yet the preparation of another combined + force for an entirely different destination caused him to + see the first as an advance guard of a movement he could not + ignore, and he sacrificed his fleet in an impotent effort to + deal with it.</p> + <!-- Page 68 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" + id="Page_68"></a>[pg 68]</span> + + <p>It was not, however, till four years later that he was + forced to place on record his recognition of the principle. + Then, curiously enough, he was convinced by an expedition which + we have come to regard as above all others condemnatory of + amphibious operations against the Continent. The Walcheren + expedition is now usually held as the leading case of fatuous + war administration. Historians can find no words too bad for + it. They ignore the fact that it was a step—the final and + most difficult step—in our post-Trafalgar policy of using + the army to perfect our command of the sea against a fleet + acting stubbornly on the defensive. It began with Copenhagen in + 1807. It failed at the Dardanelles because fleet and army were + separated; it succeeded at Lisbon and at Cadiz by demonstration + alone. Walcheren, long contemplated, had been put off till the + last as the most formidable and the least pressing. Napoleon + had been looking for the attempt ever since the idea was first + broached in this country, but as time passed and the blow did + not fall, the danger came to be more and more ignored. Finally, + the moment came when he was heavily engaged in Austria and + forced to call up + <!-- Page 69 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" + id="Page_69"></a>[pg 69]</span> the bulk of his strength to + deal with the Archduke Charles. The risks were still great, + but the British Government faced them boldly with open eyes. + It was now or never. They were bent on developing their + utmost military strength in the Peninsula, and so long as a + potent and growing fleet remained in the North Sea it would + always act as an increasing drag on such development. The + prospective gain of success was in the eyes of the + Government out of all proportion to the probable loss by + failure. So when Napoleon least expected it they determined + to act, and caught him napping. The defences of Antwerp had + been left incomplete. There was no army to meet the + blow—nothing but a polyglot rabble without staff or + even officers. For a week at least success was in our hands. + Napoleon's fleet only escaped by twenty-four hours, and yet + the failure was not only complete but disastrous. Still so + entirely were the causes of failure accidental, and so near + had it come to success, that Napoleon received a thorough + shock and looked for a quick repetition of the attempt. So + seriously indeed did he regard his narrow escape that he + found himself driven to reconsider his whole system of home + defence. Not only did he deem it necessary to spend large + sums in increasing the fixed defences of Antwerp and Toulon, + but his Director of Conscription was called upon to work out + a scheme for providing a permanent force of no less than + 300,000 men from the National Guard to defend the French + coasts. "With 30,000 men in transports at the Downs," the + Emperor wrote, "the English can paralyse 300,000 of my army, + and that will reduce us to the rank of a second-class + Power."<a name="NtA_6" + id="NtA_6"></a><a href="#Nt_6"><sup>6</sup></a></p> + <!-- Page 70 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" + id="Page_70"></a>[pg 70]</span> + + <p>The concentration of the British efforts in the Peninsula + apparently rendered the realisation of this project + unnecessary—that is, our line of operation was declared + and the threat ceased. But none the less Napoleon's recognition + of the principle remains on record—not in one of his + speeches made for some ulterior purpose, but in a staff order + to the principal officer concerned.</p> + + <p>It is generally held that modern developments in military + organisation and transport will enable a great continental + Power to ignore such threats. Napoleon ignored them in the + past, but only to verify the truth that in war to ignore a + threat is too often to create an opportunity. Such + opportunities may occur late or early. As both Lord Ligonier + and Wolfe laid it down for such operations, surprise is not + necessarily to be looked for at the beginning. We have usually + had to create or wait for our opportunity—too often + because we were either not ready or not bold enough to seize + the first that occurred.</p> + + <p>The cases in which such intervention has been most potent + have been of two classes. Firstly, there is the intrusion into + a war plan which our enemy has designed without allowing for + our intervention, and to which he is irrevocably committed by + his opening movements. Secondly, there is intervention to + deprive the enemy of the fruits of victory. This form finds its + efficacy in the principle that unlimited wars are not always + decided by the destruction of armies. There usually remains the + difficult work of conquering the people afterwards with an + exhausted army. The intrusion of a small fresh force from the + sea in such cases may suffice to turn the scale, as it did in + <!-- Page 71 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" + id="Page_71"></a>[pg 71]</span> the Peninsula, and as, in + the opinion of some high authorities, it might have done in + France in 1871.</p> + + <p>Such a suggestion will appear to be almost heretical as + sinning against the principle which condemns a strategical + reserve. We say that the whole available force should be + developed for the vital period of the struggle. No one can be + found to dispute it nowadays. It is too obviously true when it + is a question of a conflict between organised forces, but in + the absence of all proof we are entitled to doubt whether it is + true for that exhausting and demoralising period which lies + beyond the shock of armies.</p> + <!-- Page 72 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" + id="Page_72"></a>[pg 72]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER SIX</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>CONDITIONS OF<br /> + STRENGTH IN LIMITED<br /> + WAR</h2> + <hr /> + + <p>The elements of strength in limited war are closely + analogous to those generally inherent in defence. That is to + say, that as a correct use of defence will sometimes enable an + inferior force to gain its end against a superior one, so are + there instances in which the correct use of the limited form of + war has enabled a weak military Power to attain success against + a much stronger one, and these instances are too numerous to + permit us to regard the results as accidental.</p> + + <p>An obvious element of strength is that where the + geographical conditions are favourable we are able by the use + of our navy to restrict the amount of force our army will have + to deal with. We can in fact bring up our fleet to redress the + adverse balance of our land force. But apart from this very + practical reason there is another, which is rooted in the first + principles of strategy.</p> + + <p>It is that limited war permits the use of the defensive + without its usual drawbacks to a degree that is impossible in + unlimited war. These drawbacks are chiefly that it tends to + surrender the initiative to the enemy and that it deprives us + of the moral exhilaration of the offensive. But in limited war, + as we shall see, this need not be the case, and if without + making these sacrifices we are able to act mainly on the + defensive our position becomes exceedingly strong.</p> + + <p>The proposition really admits of no doubt. For even if we + <!-- Page 73 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" + id="Page_73"></a>[pg 73]</span> be not in whole-hearted + agreement with Clausewitz's doctrine of the strength of + defence, still we may at least accept Moltke's modification + of it. He held that the strongest form of war—that is, + the form which economically makes for the highest + development of strength in a given force—is strategic + offensive combined with tactical defensive. Now these are in + effect the conditions which limited war should + give—that is, if the theatre and method be rightly + chosen. Let it be remembered that the use of this form of + war presupposes that we are able by superior readiness or + mobility or by being more conveniently situated to establish + ourselves in the territorial object before our opponent can + gather strength to prevent us. This done, we have the + initiative, and the enemy being unable by hypothesis to + attack us at home, must conform to our opening by + endeavouring to turn us out. We are in a position to meet + his attack on ground of our own choice and to avail + ourselves of such opportunities of counter-attack as his + distant and therefore exhausting offensive movements are + likely to offer. Assuming, as in our own case we always must + assume, that the territorial object is sea-girt and our + enemy is not able to command the sea, such opportunities are + certain to present themselves, and even if they are not used + will greatly embarrass the main attack—as was + abundantly shown in the Russian nervousness during their + advance into the Liaotung Peninsula, due to the fear of a + counter-stroke from the Gulf of Pe-chi-li.</p> + <!-- Page 74 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" + id="Page_74"></a>[pg 74]</span> + + <p>The actual situation which this method of procedure sets up + is that our major strategy is offensive—that is, our main + movement is positive, having for its aim the occupation of the + territorial object. The minor strategy that follows should be + in its general lines defensive, designed, so soon as the enemy + sets about dislodging us, to develop the utmost energy of + counter-attack which our force and opportunities justify.</p> + + <p>Now if we consider that by universal agreement it is no + longer possible in the present conditions of land warfare to + draw a line between tactics and minor strategy, we have in our + favour for all practical purposes the identical position which + Moltke regarded as constituting the strongest form of war. That + is to say, our major strategy is offensive and our minor + strategy is defensive.</p> + + <p>If, then, the limited form of war has this element of + strength over and above the unlimited form, it must be correct + to use it when we are not strong enough to use the more + exhausting form and when the object is limited; just as much as + it is correct to use the defensive when our object is negative + and we are too weak for the offensive. The point is of the + highest importance, for it is a direct negation of the current + doctrine that in war there can be but one legitimate object, + the overthrow of the enemy's means of resistance, and that the + primary objective must always be his armed forces. It raises in + fact the whole question as to whether it is not sometimes + legitimate and even correct to aim directly at the ulterior + object of the war.</p> + + <p>An impression appears to prevail—in spite of all that + Clausewitz and Jomini had to say on the point—that the + question <!-- Page 75 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" + id="Page_75"></a>[pg 75]</span> admits of only one answer. + Von der Goltz, for instance, is particularly emphatic in + asserting that the overthrow of the enemy must always be the + object in modern war. He lays it down as "the first + principle of modern warfare," that "the immediate objective + against which all our efforts must be directed is the + hostile main army." Similarly Prince Kraft has the maxim + that "the first aim should be to overcome the enemy's army. + Everything else, the occupation of the country, &c., + only comes in the second line."</p> + + <p>It will be observed that he here admits that the process of + occupying the enemy's territory is an operation distinct from + the overthrow of the enemy's force. Von der Goltz goes further, + and protests against the common error of regarding the + annihilation of the enemy's principal army as synonymous with + the complete attainment of the object. He is careful to assert + that the current doctrine only holds good "when the two + belligerent states are of approximately the same nature." + <!-- Page 76 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" + id="Page_76"></a>[pg 76]</span> If, then, there are cases in + which the occupation of territory must be undertaken as an + operation distinct from defeating the enemy's forces, and if + in such cases the conditions are such that we can occupy the + territory with advantage without first defeating the enemy, + it is surely mere pedantry to insist that we should put off + till to-morrow what we can do better to-day. If the + occupation of the enemy's whole territory is involved, or + even a substantial part of it, the German principle of + course holds good, but all wars are not of that + character.</p> + + <p>Insistence on the principle of "overthrow," and even its + exaggeration, was of value, in its day, to prevent a recurrence + to the old and discredited methods. But its work is done, and + blind adherence to it without regard to the principles on which + it rests tends to turn the art of war into mere bludgeon + play.</p> + + <p>Clausewitz, at any rate, as General Von Caemmerer has + pointed out,<a name="NtA_7" + id="NtA_7"></a><a href="#Nt_7"><sup>7</sup></a> was far too + practical a soldier to commit himself to so abstract a + proposition in all its modern crudity. If it were true, it + would never be possible for a weaker Power to make + successful war against a stronger one in any cause + whatever—a conclusion abundantly refuted by historical + experience. That the higher form like the offensive is the + more drastic is certain, if conditions are suitable for its + use, but Clausewitz, it must be remembered, distinctly lays + it down that such conditions presuppose in the belligerent + employing the higher form a great physical or moral + superiority or a + <!-- Page 77 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" + id="Page_77"></a>[pg 77]</span> great spirit of + enterprise—an innate propensity for extreme hazards. + Jomini did not go even so far as this. He certainly would + have ruled out "an innate propensity to extreme hazards," + for in his judgment it was this innate propensity which led + Napoleon to abuse the higher form to his own undoing. So + entirely indeed does history, no less than theory, fail to + support the idea of the one answer, that it would seem that + even in Germany a reaction to Clausewitz's real teaching is + beginning. In expounding it Von Caemmerer says, "Since the + majority of the most prominent military authors of our time + uphold the principle that in war our efforts must always be + directed to their utmost limits and that a deliberate + employment of lower means betrays more or less weakness, I + feel bound to declare that the wideness of Clausewitz's + views have inspired me with a high degree of + admiration."</p> + + <p>Now what Clausewitz held precisely was this—that when + the conditions are not favourable for the use of the higher + form, the seizure of a small part of the enemy's territory may + be regarded as a correct alternative to destroying his armed + forces. But he clearly regards this form of war only as a + make-shift. His purely continental outlook prevented his + considering that there might be cases where the object was + actually so limited in character that the lower form of war + would be at once the more effective and the more economical to + use. In continental warfare, as we have seen, such cases can + hardly occur, but they tend to declare themselves strongly when + the maritime factor is introduced to any serious extent.</p> + + <p>The tendency of British warfare to take the lower or limited + form has always been as clearly marked as is the opposite + tendency on the Continent. To attribute such a tendency, as is + sometimes the fashion, to an inherent lack of warlike spirit is + sufficiently contradicted by the results it has achieved. + <!-- Page 78 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" + id="Page_78"></a>[pg 78]</span> There is no reason indeed to + put it down to anything but a sagacious instinct for the + kind of war that best accords with the conditions of our + existence. So strong has this instinct been that it has led + us usually to apply the lower form not only where the object + of the war was a well-defined territorial one, but to cases + in which its correctness was less obvious. As has been + explained in the last chapter, we have applied it, and + applied it on the whole with success, when we have been + acting in concert with continental allies for an unlimited + object—where, that is, the common object has been the + overthrow of the common enemy.</p> + + <p>The choice between the two forms really depends upon the + circumstances of each case. We have to consider whether the + political object is in fact limited, whether if unlimited in + the abstract it can be reduced to a concrete object that is + limited, and finally whether the strategical conditions are + such as lend themselves to the successful application of the + limited form.</p> + + <p>What we require now is to determine those conditions with + greater exactness, and this will be best done by changing our + method to the concrete and taking a leading case.</p> + + <p>The one which presents them in their clearest and simplest + form is without doubt the recent war between Russia and Japan. + Here we have a particularly striking example of a small Power + having forced her will upon a much greater Power without + "overthrowing" her—that is, without having crushed her + power of resistance. That was entirely beyond the strength of + Japan. So manifest was the fact that everywhere upon the + Continent, where the overthrow of your enemy was regarded as + the only admissible form of war, the action of the Japanese in + resorting to hostilities was regarded as madness. Only in + England, with her tradition and instinct for what an island + Power may achieve by the lower means, was Japan considered to + have any reasonable chance of success.</p> + + <p>The case is particularly striking; for every one felt that + the <!-- + Page 79 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" + id="Page_79"></a>[pg 79]</span> real object of the war was + in the abstract unlimited, that it was in fact to decide + whether Russia or Japan was to be the predominant power in + the Far East. Like the Franco-German War of 1870 it had all + the aspect of what the Germans call "a trial of strength." + Such a war is one which above all appears incapable of + decision except by the complete overthrow of the one Power + or the other. There was no complication of alliances nor any + expectation of them. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty had isolated + the struggle. If ever issue hung on the sheer fighting force + of the two belligerents it would seem to have been this one. + After the event we are inclined to attribute the result to + the moral qualities and superior training and readiness of + the victors. These qualities indeed played their part, and + they must not be minimised; but who will contend that if + Japan had tried to make her war with Russia, as Napoleon + made his, she could have fared even as well as he did? She + had no such preponderance as Clausewitz laid down as a + condition precedent to attempting the overthrow of her + enemy—the employment of unlimited war.</p> + + <p>Fortunately for her the circumstances did not call for the + employment of such extreme means. The political and + geographical conditions were such that she was able to reduce + the intangible object of asserting her prestige to the purely + concrete form of a territorial objective. The penetration of + Russia into Manchuria threatened the absorption of Korea into + the Russian Empire, and this Japan regarded as fatal to her own + position and future development. Her power to maintain Korean + integrity would be the outward and visible sign of her ability + to assert herself as a Pacific Power. Her abstract quarrel with + Russia could therefore be crystallised into a concrete + objective in the same way as the quarrel of the + <!-- Page 80 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" + id="Page_80"></a>[pg 80]</span> Western Powers with Russia + in 1854 crystallised into the concrete objective of + Sebastopol.</p> + + <p>In the Japanese case the immediate political object was + exceptionally well adapted for the use of limited war. Owing to + the geographical position of Korea and to the vast and + undeveloped territories which separate it from the centre of + Russian power, it could be practically isolated by naval + action. Further than this, it fulfilled the condition to which + Clausewitz attached the greatest importance—that is to + say, the seizure of the particular object so far from weakening + the home defence of Japan would have the effect of greatly + increasing the strength of her position. Though offensive in + effect and intention it was also, like Frederick's seizure of + Saxony, a sound piece of defensive work. So far from exposing + her heart, it served to cover it almost impregnably. The reason + is plain. Owing to the wide separation of the two Russian + arsenals at Port Arthur and Vladivostock, with a defile + controlled by Japan interposed, the Russian naval position was + very faulty. The only way of correcting it was for Russia to + secure a base in the Straits of Korea, and for this she had + been striving by diplomatic means at Seoul for some time. + Strategically the integrity of Korea was for Japan very much + what the integrity of the Low Countries was for us, but in the + case of the Low Countries, since they were incapable of + isolation, our power of direct action was always comparatively + weak. Portugal, with its unrivalled strategical harbour at + Lisbon, was an analogous case in our old oceanic wars, and + since it was capable of being in a measure isolated from the + strength of our great rival by naval means we were there almost + uniformly successful. On the whole it must be said that + notwithstanding the success we achieved in our long series of + wars waged on a limited basis, in none of them were + <!-- Page 81 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" + id="Page_81"></a>[pg 81]</span> the conditions so favourable + for us as in this case they were for Japan. In none of them + did our main offensive movement so completely secure our + home defence. Canada was as eccentric as possible to our + line of home defence, while in the Crimea so completely did + our offensive uncover the British Islands, that we had to + supplement our movement against the limited object by + sending our main fighting fleet to hold the exit of the + Baltic against the danger of an unlimited + counter-stroke.<a name="NtA_8" + id="NtA_8"></a><a href="#Nt_8"><sup>8</sup></a></p> + + <p>Whether or not it was on this principle that the Japanese + conceived the war from the outset matters little. The main + considerations are that with so favourable a territorial object + as Korea limited war was possible in its most formidable + <!-- Page 82 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" + id="Page_82"></a>[pg 82]</span> shape, that the war did in + fact develop on limited lines, and that it was entirely + successful. Without waiting to secure the command of the + sea, Japan opened by a surprise seizure of Seoul, and then + under cover of minor operations of the fleet proceeded to + complete her occupation of Korea. As she faced the second + stage, that of making good the defence of her conquest, the + admirable nature of her geographical object was further + displayed. The theoretical weakness of limited war at this + point is the arrest of your offensive action. But in this + case such arrest was neither necessary nor possible, and for + these reasons. To render the conquest secure not only must + the Korean frontier be made inviolable, but Korea must be + permanently isolated by sea. This involved the destruction + of the Russian fleet, and this in its turn entailed the + reduction of Port Arthur by military means. Here, then, in + the second stage Japan found herself committed to two lines + of operation with two distinct objectives, Port Arthur and + the Russian army that was slowly concentrating in + Manchuria—a thoroughly vicious situation. So + fortunate, however, was the geographical conformation of the + theatre that by promptitude and the bold use of an + uncommanded sea it could be reduced to something far more + correct. By continuing the advance of the Korean army into + Manchuria and landing another force between it and the Port + Arthur army the three corps could be concentrated and the + vicious separation of the lines of operations turned to good + account. They could be combined in such a way as to threaten + an enveloping counter-attack on Liao-yang before the Russian + offensive concentration could be completed. Not only was + Liao-yang the Russian point of concentration, but it also + was a sound position both for defending + <!-- Page 83 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" + id="Page_83"></a>[pg 83]</span> Korea and covering the siege + of Port Arthur. Once secured, it gave the Japanese all the + advantages of defence and forced the Russians to exhaust + themselves in offensive operations which were beyond their + strength. Nor was it only ashore that this advantage was + gained. The success of the system, which culminated in the + fall of Port Arthur, went further still. Not only did it + make Japan relatively superior at sea, but it enabled her to + assume a naval defensive and so to force the final naval + decision on Russia with every advantage of time, place, and + strength in her own favour.</p> + + <p>By the battle of Tsushima the territorial object was + completely isolated by sea, and the position of Japan in Korea + was rendered as impregnable as that of Wellington at Torres + Vedras. All that remained was to proceed to the third stage and + demonstrate to Russia that the acceptance of the situation that + had been set up was more to her advantage than the further + attempt to break it down. This the final advance to Mukden + accomplished, and Japan obtained her end very far short of + having overthrown her enemy. The offensive power of Russia had + never been so strong, while that of Japan was almost if not + quite exhausted.</p> + + <p>Approached in this way, the Far Eastern struggle is seen to + develop on the same lines as all our great maritime wars of the + past, which continental strategists have so persistently + excluded from their field of study. It presents the normal + three phases—the initial offensive movement to seize the + territorial object, the secondary phase, which forces an + attenuated offensive on the enemy, and the final stage of + pressure, in which there is a return to the offensive + "according," as Jomini puts it, "to circumstances and your + relative force in order to obtain the cession desired."</p> + + <p>It must not of course be asked that these phases shall be + always clearly defined. Strategical analysis can never give + exact results. It aims only at approximations, at groupings + which will serve to guide but will always leave much to the + <!-- Page 84 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" + id="Page_84"></a>[pg 84]</span> judgment. The three phases + in the Russo-Japanese War, though unusually well defined, + continually overlapped. It must be so; for in war the effect + of an operation is never confined to the limits of its + immediate or primary intention. Thus the occupation of Korea + had the secondary defensive effect of covering the home + country, while the initial blow which Admiral Togo delivered + at Port Arthur to cover the primary offensive movement + proved, by the demoralisation it caused in the Russian + fleet, to be a distinct step in the secondary phase of + isolating the conquest. In the later stages of the war the + line between what was essential to set up the second phase + of perfecting the isolation and the third phase of general + pressure seems to have grown very nebulous.</p> + + <p>It was at this stage that the Japanese strategy has been + most severely criticised, and it was just here they seem to + have lost hold of the conception of a limited war, if in fact + they had ever securely grasped the conception as the elder Pitt + understood it. It has been argued that in their eagerness to + deal a blow at the enemy's main army they neglected to devote + sufficient force to reduce Port Arthur, an essential step to + complete the second phase. Whether or not the exigencies of the + case rendered such distribution of force inevitable or whether + it was due to miscalculation of difficulties, the result was a + most costly set-back. For not only did it entail a vast loss of + time and life at Port Arthur itself, but when the sortie of the + Russian fleet in June brought home to them their + <!-- Page 85 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" + id="Page_85"></a>[pg 85]</span> error, the offensive + movement on Liao-yang had to be delayed, and the opportunity + passed for a decisive counter-stroke at the enemy's + concentration ashore.</p> + + <p>This misfortune, which was to cost the Japanese so dear, may + perhaps be attributed at least in part to the continental + influences under which their army had been trained. We at least + can trace the unlimited outlook in the pages of the German + Staff history. In dealing with the Japanese plan of operations + it is assumed that the occupation of Korea and the isolation of + Port Arthur were but preliminaries to a concentric advance on + Liao-yang, "which was kept in view as the first objective of + the operations on land." But surely on every theory of the war + the first objective of the Japanese on land was Seoul, where + they expected to have to fight their first important action + against troops advancing from the Yalu; and surely their second + was Port Arthur, with its fleet and arsenal, which they + expected to reduce with little more difficulty than they had + met with ten years before against the Chinese. Such at least + was the actual progression of events, and a criticism which + regards operations of such magnitude and ultimate importance as + mere incidents of strategic deployment is only to be explained + by the domination of the Napoleonic idea of war, against the + universal application of which Clausewitz so solemnly + protested. It is the work of men who have a natural difficulty + in conceiving a war plan that does not culminate in a Jena or a + Sedan. It is a view surely which is the child of theory, + bearing no relation to the actuality of the war in question and + affording no explanation of its ultimate success. The truth is, + that so long as the Japanese acted on the principles of limited + war, as laid down by Clausewitz and Jomini and plainly + deducible from our own <!-- Page 86 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" + id="Page_86"></a>[pg 86]</span> rich experience, they + progressed beyond all their expectations, but so soon as + they departed from them and suffered themselves to be + confused with continental theories they were surprised by + unaccountable failure.</p> + + <p>The expression "Limited war" is no doubt not entirely happy. + Yet no other has been found to condense the ideas of limited + object and limited interest, which are its special + characteristics. Still if the above example be kept in mind as + a typical case, the meaning of the term will not be mistaken. + It only remains to emphasise one important point. The fact that + the doctrine of limited war traverses the current belief that + our primary objective must always be the enemy's armed forces + is liable to carry with it a false inference that it also + rejects the corollary that war means the use of battles. + Nothing is further from the conception. Whatever the form of + war, there is no likelihood of our ever going back to the old + fallacy of attempting to decide wars by manoeuvres. All forms + alike demand the use of battles. By our fundamental theory war + is always "a continuation of political intercourse, in which + fighting is substituted for writing notes." However great the + controlling influence of the political object, it must never + obscure the fact that it is by fighting we have to gain our + end.</p> + + <p>It is the more necessary to insist on this point, for the + idea of making a piece of territory your object is liable to be + confused with the older method of conducting war, in which + armies were content to manoeuvre for strategical positions, and + a battle came almost to be regarded as a mark of bad + generalship. With such parading limited war has nothing to do. + Its conduct differs only from that of unlimited war in that + instead of having to destroy our enemy's whole power of + resistance, we need only overthrow so much of his active force + as he is able or willing to bring to bear in order to prevent + or terminate our occupation of the territorial object.</p> + + <p>The first consideration, then, in entering on such a war is + to endeavour to determine what the force will amount to. It + <!-- Page 87 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" + id="Page_87"></a>[pg 87]</span> will depend, firstly, on the + importance the enemy attaches to the limited object, coupled + with the nature and extent of his preoccupations elsewhere, + and, secondly, it will depend upon the natural difficulties + of his lines of communication and the extent to which we can + increase those difficulties by our conduct of the initial + operations. In favourable circumstances therefore (and here + lies the great value of the limited form) we are able to + control the amount of force we shall have to encounter. The + most favourable circumstances and the only circumstances by + which we ourselves can profit are such as permit the more or + less complete isolation of the object by naval action, and + such isolation can never be established until we have + entirely overthrown the enemy's naval forces.</p> + + <p>Here, then, we enter the field of naval strategy. We can now + leave behind us the theory of war in general and, in order to + pave the way to our final conclusions, devote our attention to + the theory of naval warfare in particular.</p> + <!-- Page 88 blank --> + <!-- Page 89 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" + id="Page_89"></a>[pg 89]</span> + <hr /> + + <h2>PART TWO</h2> + <hr /> + + <h1>THEORY<br /> + OF<br /> + NAVAL WAR</h1><!-- Page 90 blank --> + <!-- Page 91 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" + id="Page_91"></a>[pg 91]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER ONE</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>THEORY OF THE<br /> + OBJECT—COMMAND<br /> + OF THE SEA</h2> + <hr /> + + <p>The object of naval warfare must always be directly or + indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to + prevent the enemy from securing it.</p> + + <p>The second part of the proposition should be noted with + special care in order to exclude a habit of thought, which is + one of the commonest sources of error in naval speculation. + That error is the very general assumption that if one + belligerent loses the command of the sea it passes at once to + the other belligerent. The most cursory study of naval history + is enough to reveal the falseness of such an assumption. It + tells us that the most common situation in naval war is that + neither side has the command; that the normal position is not a + commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea. The mere assertion, + which no one denies, that the object of naval warfare is to get + command of the sea actually connotes the proposition that the + command is normally in dispute. It is this state of dispute + with which naval strategy is most nearly concerned, for when + the command is lost or won pure naval strategy comes to an + end.</p> + + <p>This truth is so obvious that it would scarcely be worth + mentioning were it not for the constant recurrence of such + phrases as: "If England were to lose command of the sea, it + would be all over with her." The fallacy of the idea is that it + ignores the power of the strategical defensive. It assumes that + <!-- Page 92 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" + id="Page_92"></a>[pg 92]</span> if in the face of some + extraordinary hostile coalition or through some + extraordinary mischance we found ourselves without + sufficient strength to keep the command, we should therefore + be too weak to prevent the enemy getting it—a negation + of the whole theory of war, which at least requires further + support than it ever receives.</p> + + <p>And not only is this assumption a negation of theory; it is + a negation both of practical experience and of the expressed + opinion of our greatest masters. We ourselves have used the + defensive at sea with success, as under William the Third and + in the War of American Independence, while in our long wars + with France she habitually used it in such a way that sometimes + for years, though we had a substantial preponderance, we could + not get command, and for years were unable to carry out our war + plan without serious interruption from her fleet.</p> + + <p>So far from the defensive being a negligible factor at sea, + or even the mere pestilent heresy it is generally represented, + it is of course inherent in all war, and, as we have seen, the + paramount questions of strategy both at sea and on land turn on + the relative possibilities of offensive and defensive, and upon + the relative proportions in which each should enter into our + plan of war. At sea the most powerful and aggressively-minded + belligerent can no more avoid his alternating periods of + defence, which result from inevitable arrests of offensive + action, than they can be avoided on land. The defensive, then, + has to be considered; but before we are in a position to do so + with profit, we have to proceed with our analysis of the + <!-- Page 93 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" + id="Page_93"></a>[pg 93]</span> phrase, "Command of the + Sea," and ascertain exactly what it is we mean by it in + war.</p> + + <p>In the first place, "Command of the Sea" is not identical in + its strategical conditions with the conquest of territory. You + cannot argue from the one to the other, as has been too + commonly done. Such phrases as the "Conquest of water + territory" and "Making the enemy's coast our frontier" had + their use and meaning in the mouths of those who framed them, + but they are really little but rhetorical expressions founded + on false analogy, and false analogy is not a secure basis for a + theory of war.</p> + + <p>The analogy is false for two reasons, both of which enter + materially into the conduct of naval war. You cannot conquer + sea because it is not susceptible of ownership, at least + outside territorial waters. You cannot, as lawyers say, "reduce + it into possession," because you cannot exclude neutrals from + it as you can from territory you conquer. In the second place, + you cannot subsist your armed force upon it as you can upon + enemy's territory. Clearly, then, to make deductions from an + assumption that command of the sea is analogous to conquest of + territory is unscientific, and certain to lead to error.</p> + + <p>The only safe method is to inquire what it is we can secure + for ourselves, and what it is we can deny the enemy by command + of the sea. Now, if we exclude fishery rights, which are + irrelevant to the present matter, the only right we or our + enemy can have on the sea is the right of passage; in other + words, the only positive value which the high seas have for + national life is as a means of communication. For the active + life of a nation such means may stand for much or it may stand + for little, but to every maritime State it has some value. + Consequently by denying an enemy this means of passage we check + the movement of his national life at sea in the same kind of + way that we check it on land by occupying his territory. So far + the analogy holds good, but no further.</p> + <!-- Page 94 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" + id="Page_94"></a>[pg 94]</span> + + <p>So much for the positive value which the sea has in national + life. It has also a negative value. For not only is it a means + of communication, but, unlike the means of communication + ashore, it is also a barrier. By winning command of the sea we + remove that barrier from our own path, thereby placing + ourselves in position to exert direct military pressure upon + the national life of our enemy ashore, while at the same time + we solidify it against him and prevent his exerting direct + military pressure upon ourselves.</p> + + <p>Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control + of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military + purposes. The object of naval warfare is the control of + communications, and not, as in land warfare, the conquest of + territory. The difference is fundamental. True, it is rightly + said that strategy ashore is mainly a question of + communications, but they are communications in another sense. + The phrase refers to the communications of the army alone, and + not to the wider communications which are part of the life of + the nation.</p> + + <p>But on land also there are communications of a kind which + are essential to national life—the internal + communications which connect the points of distribution. Here + again we touch an analogy between the two kinds of war. Land + warfare, as the most devoted adherents of the modern view + admit, cannot attain its end by military victories alone. The + destruction of your enemy's forces will not avail for certain + unless you have in reserve sufficient force to complete the + occupation of his inland communications and principal points of + distribution. This power is the real fruit of victory, the + power to strangle the whole national life. It is not until this + is done that a high-spirited nation, whose whole heart is in + the war, will consent to make peace and do your will. It is + precisely in the same way that the command of the sea works + towards peace, though of course in a far less coercive manner, + against a continental State. By occupying her maritime + <!-- Page 95 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" + id="Page_95"></a>[pg 95]</span> communications and closing + the points of distribution in which they terminate we + destroy the national life afloat, and thereby check the + vitality of that life ashore so far as the one is dependent + on the other. Thus we see that so long as we retain the + power and right to stop maritime communications, the analogy + between command of the sea and the conquest of territory is + in this aspect very close. And the analogy is of the utmost + practical importance, for on it turns the most burning + question of maritime war, which it will be well to deal with + in this place.</p> + + <p>It is obvious that if the object and end of naval warfare is + the control of communications it must carry with it the right + to forbid, if we can, the passage of both public and private + property upon the sea. Now the only means we have of enforcing + such control of commercial communications at sea is in the last + resort the capture or destruction of sea-borne property. Such + capture or destruction is the penalty which we impose upon our + enemy for attempting to use the communications of which he does + not hold the control. In the language of jurisprudence, it is + the ultimate sanction of the interdict which we are seeking to + enforce. The current term "Commerce destruction" is not in fact + a logical expression of the strategical idea. To make the + position clear we should say "Commerce prevention."</p> + + <p>The methods of this "Commerce prevention" have no more + connection with the old and barbarous idea of plunder and + reprisal than orderly requisitions ashore have with the old + idea of plunder and ravaging. No form of war indeed causes so + little human suffering as the capture of property at sea. It is + more akin to process of law, such as distress for rent, or + execution of judgment, or arrest of a ship, than to a military + operation. Once, it is true, it was not so. In the days of + privateers it was accompanied too often, and particularly in + the Mediterranean and the West Indies, with lamentable cruelty + and lawlessness, and the existence of such abuses was the + <!-- Page 96 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" + id="Page_96"></a>[pg 96]</span> real reason for the general + agreement to the Declaration of Paris by which privateering + was abolished.</p> + + <p>But it was not the only reason. The idea of privateering was + a survival of a primitive and unscientific conception of war, + which was governed mainly by a general notion of doing your + enemy as much damage as possible and making reprisal for wrongs + he had done you. To the same class of ideas belonged the + practice of plunder and ravaging ashore. But neither of these + methods of war was abolished for humanitarian reasons. They + disappeared indeed as a general practice before the world had + begun to talk of humanity. They were abolished because war + became more scientific. The right to plunder and ravage was not + denied. But plunder was found to demoralise your troops and + unfit them for fighting, and ravaging proved to be a less + powerful means of coercing your enemy than exploiting the + occupied country by means of regular requisitions for the + supply of your own army and the increase of its offensive + range. In short, the reform arose from a desire to husband your + enemy's resources for your own use instead of wantonly wasting + them.</p> + + <p>In a similar way privateering always had a debilitating + effect upon our own regular force. It greatly increased the + difficulty of manning the navy, and the occasional large + profits had a demoralising influence on detached cruiser + commanders. It tended to keep alive the mediaeval corsair + spirit at the expense of the modern military spirit which made + for direct operations against the enemy's armed forces. It was + inevitable that as the new movement of opinion gathered force + it should carry with it a conviction that for operating against + sea-borne trade sporadic attack could never be so efficient as + an organised system of operations to secure a real strategical + control of the enemy's maritime communications. + <!-- Page 97 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" + id="Page_97"></a>[pg 97]</span> A riper and sounder view of + war revealed that what may be called tactical commercial + blockade—that is, the blockade of ports—could be + extended to and supplemented by a strategical blockade of + the great trade routes. In moral principle there is no + difference between the two. Admit the principle of tactical + or close blockade, and as between belligerents you cannot + condemn the principle of strategical or distant blockade. + Except in their effect upon neutrals, there is no juridical + difference between the two.</p> + + <p>Why indeed should this humane yet drastic process of war be + rejected at sea if the same thing is permitted on land? If on + land you allow contributions and requisitions, if you permit + the occupation of towns, ports, and inland communications, + without which no conquest is complete and no effective war + possible, why should you refuse similar procedure at sea where + it causes far less individual suffering? If you refuse the + right of controlling communications at sea, you must also + refuse the right on land. If you admit the right of + contributions on land, you must admit the right of capture at + sea. Otherwise you will permit to military Powers the extreme + rights of war and leave to the maritime Powers no effective + rights at all. Their ultimate argument would be gone.</p> + + <p>In so far as the idea of abolishing private capture at sea + is humanitarian, and in so far as it rests on a belief that it + would strengthen our position as a commercial maritime State, + let it be honourably dealt with. But so far as its advocates + have as yet expressed themselves, the proposal appears to be + based on two fallacies. One is, that you can avoid attack by + depriving yourself of the power of offence and resting on + defence alone, and the other, the idea that war consists + entirely of battles between armies or fleets. It ignores the + fundamental fact that battles are only the means of enabling + you to do that which really brings wars to an end-that is, to + exert pressure on the citizens and their collective life. + "After shattering the hostile main army," says Von der Goltz, + "we still have the + <!-- Page 98 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" + id="Page_98"></a>[pg 98]</span> forcing of a peace as a + separate and, in certain circumstances, a more difficult + task ... to make the enemy's country feel the burdens of war + with such weight that the desire for peace will prevail. + This is the point in which Napoleon failed.... It may be + necessary to seize the harbours, commercial centres, + important lines of traffic, fortifications and arsenals, in + other words, all important property necessary to the + existence of the people and army."</p> + + <p>If, then, we are deprived of the right to use analogous + means at sea, the object for which we fight battles almost + ceases to exist. Defeat the enemy's fleets as we may, he will + be but little the worse. We shall have opened the way for + invasion, but any of the great continental Powers can laugh at + our attempts to invade single-handed. If we cannot reap the + harvest of our success by deadening his national activities at + sea, the only legitimate means of pressure within our strength + will be denied us. Our fleet, if it would proceed with such + secondary operations as are essential for forcing a peace, will + be driven to such barbarous expedients as the bombardment of + seaport towns and destructive raids upon the hostile + coasts.</p> + + <p>If the means of pressure which follow successful fighting + were abolished both on land and sea there would be this + argument in favour of the change, that it would mean perhaps + for civilised States the entire cessation of war; for war would + become so impotent, that no one would care to engage in it. It + would be an affair between regular armies and fleets, with + which the people had little concern. International quarrels + would tend to take the form of the mediaeval private disputes + which were settled by champions in trial by battle, an + absurdity which led rapidly to the domination of purely legal + procedure. If international quarrels could go the same way, + humanity would have advanced a long stride. But the world is + scarcely ripe for such a revolution. Meanwhile to <!-- Page + 99 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" + id="Page_99"></a>[pg 99]</span> abolish the right of + interference with the flow of private property at sea + without abolishing the corresponding right ashore would only + defeat the ends of humanitarians. The great deterrent, the + most powerful check on war, would be gone. It is commerce + and finance which now more than ever control or check the + foreign policy of nations. If commerce and finance stand to + lose by war, their influence for a peaceful solution will be + great; and so long as the right of private capture at sea + exists, they stand to lose in every maritime war immediately + and inevitably whatever the ultimate result may be. Abolish + the right, and this deterrent disappears; nay, they will + even stand to win immediate gains owing to the sudden + expansion of Government expenditure which the hostilities + will entail, and the expansion of sea commerce which the + needs of the armed forces will create. Any such losses as + maritime warfare under existing conditions must immediately + inflict will be remote if interference with property is + confined to the land. They will never indeed be serious + except in the case of complete defeat, and no one enters + upon war expecting defeat. It is in the hope of victory and + gain that aggressive wars are born. The fear of quick and + certain loss is their surest preventive. Humanity, then, + will surely beware how in a too hasty pursuit of peaceful + ideals it lets drop the best weapon it has for scotching the + evil it has as yet no power to kill.</p> + + <p>In what follows, therefore, it is intended to regard the + right of private capture at sea as still subsisting. Without + it, indeed, naval warfare is almost inconceivable, and in any + case no one has any experience of such a truncated method of + war on which profitable study can be founded.</p> + + <p>The primary method, then, in which we use victory or + preponderance at sea and bring it to bear on the enemy's + population to secure peace, is by the capture or destruction of + the enemy's property, whether public or private. But in + comparing the process with the analogous occupation of + territory and the levying of contributions and requisitions we + have to + <!-- Page 100 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" + id="Page_100"></a>[pg 100]</span> observe a marked + difference. Both processes are what may be called economic + pressure. But ashore the economic pressure can only be + exerted as the consequence of victory or acquired domination + by military success. At sea the process begins at once. + Indeed, more often than not, the first act of hostility in + maritime wars has been the capture of private property at + sea. In a sense this is also true ashore. The first step of + an invader after crossing the frontier will be to control to + a less or greater extent such private property as he is able + to use for his purposes. But such interference with private + property is essentially a military act, and does not belong + to the secondary phase of economic pressure. At sea it does, + and the reason why this should be so lies in certain + fundamental differences between land and sea warfare which + are implicit in the communication theory of naval war.</p> + + <p>To elucidate the point, it must be repeated that maritime + communications, which are the root of the idea of command of + the sea, are not analogous to military communications in the + ordinary use of the term. Military communications refer solely + to the army's lines of supply and retreat. Maritime + communications have a wider meaning. Though in effect embracing + the lines of fleet supply, they correspond in strategical + values not to military lines of supply, but to those internal + lines of communication by which the flow of national life is + maintained ashore. Consequently maritime communications are on + a wholly different footing from land communications. At sea the + communications are, for the most part, common to both + belligerents, whereas ashore each possesses his own in his own + territory. The strategical effect is of far-reaching + importance, for it means that at sea strategical offence and + defence tend to merge in a way that is unknown ashore. Since + maritime communications are common, we as a rule cannot attack + those of the enemy without defending our own. In military + operations the converse is the rule. Normally, an attack on our + enemy's communications tends to expose their own.</p> + <!-- Page 101 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" + id="Page_101"></a>[pg 101]</span> + + <p>The theory of common communications will become clear by + taking an example. In our wars with France our communications + with the Mediterranean, India, and America ran down from the + Channel mouth past Finisterre and St. Vincent; and those of + France, at least from her Atlantic ports, were identical for + almost their entire distance. In our wars with the Dutch the + identity was even closer. Even in the case of Spain, her great + trade routes followed the same lines as our own for the greater + part of their extent. Consequently the opening moves which we + generally made to defend our trade by the occupation of those + lines placed us in a position to attack our enemy's trade. The + same situation arose even when our opening dispositions were + designed as defence against home invasion or against attacks + upon our colonies, for the positions our fleet had to take up + to those ends always lay on or about the terminal and focal + points of trade routes. Whether our immediate object were to + bring the enemy's main fleets to action or to exercise economic + pressure, it made but little difference. If the enemy were + equally anxious to engage, it was at one of the terminal or + focal areas we were almost certain to get contact. If he wished + to avoid a decision, the best way to force him to action was to + occupy his trade routes at the same vital points.</p> + + <p>Thus it comes about that, whereas on land the process of + economic pressure, at least in the modern conception of war, + should only begin after decisive victory, at sea it starts + automatically from the first. Indeed such pressure may be the + only means of forcing the decision we seek, as will appear more + clearly when we come to deal with the other fundamental + difference between land and sea warfare.</p> + + <p>Meanwhile we may note that at sea the use of economic + <!-- Page 102 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" + id="Page_102"></a>[pg 102]</span> pressure from the + commencement is justified for two reasons. The first is, as + we have seen, that it is an economy of means to use our + defensive positions for attack when attack does not vitiate + those positions, and it will not vitiate them if fleet + cruisers operate with restraint. The second is, that + interference with the enemy's trade has two aspects. It is + not only a means of exerting the secondary economic + pressure, it is also a primary means towards overthrowing + the enemy's power of resistance. Wars are not decided + exclusively by military and naval force. Finance is scarcely + less important. When other things are equal, it is the + longer purse that wins. It has even many times redressed an + unfavourable balance of armed force and given victory to the + physically weaker Power. Anything, therefore, which we are + able to achieve towards crippling our enemy's finance is a + direct step to his overthrow, and the most effective means + we can employ to this end against a maritime State is to + deny him the resources of seaborne trade.</p> + + <p>It will be seen, therefore, that in naval warfare, however + closely we may concentrate our efforts on the destruction of + our enemy's armed forces as the direct means to his overthrow, + it would be folly to stay our hands when opportunities occur, + as they will automatically, for undermining his financial + position on which the continued vigour of those armed forces so + largely depends. Thus the occupation of our enemy's sea + communications and the confiscatory operations it connotes are + in a sense primary operations, and not, as on land, + secondary.</p> + + <p>Such, then, are the abstract conclusions at which we arrive + in our attempt to analyse the idea of command of the sea and to + give it precision as the control of common communications. + Their concrete value will appear when we come to deal with the + various forms which naval operations may take, such as, + "seeking out the enemy's fleet," blockade, attack and defence + of trade, and the safeguarding of combined expeditions. + <!-- Page 103 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" + id="Page_103"></a>[pg 103]</span> For the present it remains + to deal with the various kinds of sea command which flow + from the communication idea.</p> + + <p>If the object of the command of the sea is to control + communications, it is obvious it may exist in various degrees. + We may be able to control the whole of the common + communications as the result either of great initial + preponderance or of decisive victory. If we are not + sufficiently strong to do this, we may still be able to control + some of the communications; that is, our control may be general + or local. Obvious as the point is, it needs emphasising, + because of a maxim that has become current that "the sea is all + one." Like other maxims of the kind, it conveys a truth with a + trail of error in its wake. The truth it contains seems to be + simply this, that as a rule local control can only avail us + temporarily, for so long as the enemy has a sufficient fleet + anywhere, it is theoretically in his power to overthrow our + control of any special sea area.</p> + + <p>It amounts indeed to little more than a rhetorical + expression, used to emphasise the high mobility of fleets as + contrasted with that of armies and the absence of physical + obstacles to restrict that mobility. That this vital feature of + naval warfare should be consecrated in a maxim is well, but + when it is caricatured into a doctrine, as it sometimes is, + that you cannot move a battalion oversea till you have entirely + overthrown your enemy's fleet, it deserves gibbeting. It would + be as wise to hold that in war you must never risk + anything.</p> + + <p>It would seem to have been the evil influence of this + travestied maxim which had much to do with the cramped and + timorous strategy of the Americans in their late war with + Spain. They had ample naval force to secure such a local and + temporary command of the Gulf of Mexico as to have justified + them at once in throwing all the troops they had ready into + Cuba to support the insurgents, in accordance with their war + plan. They had also sufficient strength to ensure that the + communications with the expeditionary force could not be + <!-- Page 104 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" + id="Page_104"></a>[pg 104]</span> interrupted permanently. + And yet, because the Spaniards had an undefeated fleet at + sea somewhere, they hesitated, and were nearly lost. The + Japanese had no such illusions. Without having struck a + naval blow of any kind, and with a hostile fleet actually + within the theatre of operations, they started their + essential military movement oversea, content that though + they might not be able to secure the control of the line of + passage, they were in a position to deny effective control + to the enemy. Our own history is full of such operations. + There are cases in plenty where the results promised by a + successful military blow oversea, before permanent command + had been obtained, were great enough to justify a risk + which, like the Japanese, we knew how to minimise by + judicious use of our favourable geographical position, and + of a certain system of protection, which must be dealt with + later.</p> + + <p>For the purpose, then, of framing a plan of war or campaign, + it must be taken that command may exist in various states or + degrees, each of which has its special possibilities and + limitations. It may be general or local, and it may be + permanent or temporary. General command may be permanent or + temporary, but mere local command, except in very favourable + geographical conditions, should scarcely ever be regarded as + more than temporary, since normally it is always liable to + interruption from other theatres so long as the enemy possesses + an effective naval force.</p> + + <p>Finally, it has to be noted that even permanent general + command can never in practice be absolute. No degree of naval + superiority can ensure our communications against sporadic + attack from detached cruisers, or even raiding squadrons if + they be boldly led and are prepared to risk destruction. Even + after Hawke's decisive victory at <!-- Page 105 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" + id="Page_105"></a>[pg 105]</span> Quiberon had completed the + overthrow of the enemy's sea forces, a British transport was + captured between Cork and Portsmouth, and an Indiaman in + sight of the Lizard, while Wellington's complaints in the + Peninsula of the insecurity of his communications are well + known.<a name="NtA_9" + id="NtA_9"></a><a href="#Nt_9"><sup>9</sup></a> By general + and permanent control we do not mean that the enemy can do + nothing, but that he cannot interfere with our maritime + trade and oversea operations so seriously as to affect the + issue of the war, and that he cannot carry on his own trade + and operations except at such risk and hazard as to remove + them from the field of practical strategy. In other words, + it means that the enemy can no longer attack our lines of + passage and communication effectively, and that he cannot + use or defend his own.</p> + + <p>To complete our equipment for appreciating any situation for + which operations have to be designed, it is necessary to + remember that when the command is in dispute the general + conditions may give a stable or an unstable equilibrium. It may + be that the power of neither side preponderates to any + appreciable extent. It may also be that the preponderance is + with ourselves, or it may be that it lies with the enemy. Such + preponderance of course will not depend entirely on actual + relative strength, either physical or moral, but will be + influenced by the inter-relation of naval positions and the + comparative convenience of their situation in regard to the + object of the war or campaign. By naval positions we mean, + firstly, + <!-- Page 106 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" + id="Page_106"></a>[pg 106]</span> naval bases and, secondly, + the terminals of the greater lines of communication or + trade-routes and the focal areas where they tend to + converge, as at Finisterre, Gibraltar, Suez, the Cape, + Singapore, and many others.</p> + + <p>Upon the degree and distribution of this preponderance will + depend in a general way the extent to which our plans will be + governed by the idea of defence or offence. Generally speaking, + it will be to the advantage of the preponderating side to seek + a decision as quickly as possible in order to terminate the + state of dispute. Conversely, the weaker side will as a rule + seek to avoid or postpone a decision in hope of being able by + minor operations, the chances of war, or the development of + fresh strength, to turn the balance in its favour. Such was the + line which France adopted frequently in her wars with us, + sometimes legitimately, but sometimes to such an excess as + seriously to demoralise her fleet. Her experience has led to a + hasty deduction that the defensive at sea for even a weaker + Power is an unmixed evil. Such a conclusion is foreign to the + fundamental principles of war. It is idle to exclude the use of + an expectant attitude because in itself it cannot lead to final + success, and because if used to excess it ends in + demoralisation and the loss of will to attack. The + misconception appears to have arisen from insistence on the + drawbacks of defence by writers seeking to persuade their + country to prepare in time of peace sufficient naval strength + to justify offence from the outset.</p> + + <p>Having now determined the fundamental principles which + underlie the idea of Command of the Sea, we are in a position + to consider the manner in which fleets are constituted in order + to fit them for their task.</p> + <!-- Page 107 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" + id="Page_107"></a>[pg 107]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER TWO</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>THEORY OF THE<br /> + MEANS—THE<br /> + CONSTITUTION OF<br /> + FLEETS</h2> + <hr /> + + <p>In all eras of naval warfare fighting ships have exhibited a + tendency to differentiate into groups in accordance with the + primary function each class was designed to serve. These + groupings or classifications are what is meant by the + constitution of a fleet. A threefold differentiation into + battleships, cruisers, and flotilla has so long dominated naval + thought that we have come to regard it as normal, and even + essential. It may be so, but such a classification has been by + no means constant. Other ideas of fleet constitution have not + only existed, but have stood the test of war for long periods, + and it is unscientific and unsafe to ignore such facts if we + wish to arrive at sound doctrine.</p> + + <p>The truth is, that the classes of ships which constitute a + fleet are, or ought to be, the expression in material of the + strategical and tactical ideas that prevail at any given time, + and consequently they have varied not only with the ideas, but + also with the material in vogue. It may also be said more + broadly that they have varied with the theory of war, by which + more or less consciously naval thought was dominated. It is + true that few ages have formulated a theory of war, or even + been clearly aware of its influence; but nevertheless such + theories have always existed, and even in their most nebulous + and intangible shapes seem to have exerted an ascertainable + influence on the constitution of fleets.</p> + <!-- Page 108 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" + id="Page_108"></a>[pg 108]</span> + + <p>Going back to the dawn of modern times, we note that at the + opening of the sixteenth century, when galley warfare reached + its culmination, the constitution was threefold, bearing a + superficial analogy to that which we have come to regard as + normal. There were the galeasses and heavy galleys + corresponding to our battleships, light galleys corresponding + to our cruisers, while the flotilla was represented by the + small "frigates," "brigantines," and similar craft, which had + no slave gang for propulsion, but were rowed by the fighting + crew. Such armed sailing ships as then existed were regarded as + auxiliaries, and formed a category apart, as fireships and + bomb-vessels did in the sailing period, and as mine-layers do + now. But the parallel must not be overstrained. The distinction + of function between the two classes of galleys was not so + strongly marked as that between the lighter craft and the + galleys; that is to say, the scientific differentiation between + battleships and cruisers had not yet been so firmly developed + as it was destined to become in later times, and the smaller + galleys habitually took their place in the fighting line.</p> + + <p>With the rise of the sailing vessel as the typical + ship-of-war an entirely new constitution made its appearance. + The dominating classification became twofold. It was a + classification into vessels of subservient movement using + sails, and vessels of free movement using oars. It was on these + lines that our true Royal Navy was first organised by Henry the + Eighth, an expert who, in the science of war, was one of the + most advanced masters in Europe. In this constitution there + appears even less conception than in that of the galley period + of a radical distinction between battleships and cruisers. As + Henry's fleet was originally designed, practically the whole of + the battleships were sailing vessels, though it is true that + when the French brought up galleys from the Mediterranean, he + <!-- Page 109 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" + id="Page_109"></a>[pg 109]</span> gave some of the smartest + of them oars. The constitution was in fact one of + battleships and flotilla. Of cruisers there were none as we + understand them. Fleet scouting was done by the "Row-barges" + and newly introduced "Pinnaces" of the flotilla, while as + for commerce protection, merchant vessels had usually to + look after themselves, the larger ones being regularly armed + for their own defence.</p> + + <p>The influence of this twofold constitution continued long + after the conditions of its origin had passed away. In + ever-lessening degree indeed it may be said to have lasted for + two hundred years. During the Dutch wars of the seventeenth + century, which finally established the dominant status of the + sailing warship, practically all true sailing + vessels—that is, vessels that had no auxiliary oar + propulsion—took station in the line. The "Frigates" of + that time differed not at all from the "Great Ship" in their + functions, but only in their design. By the beginning of the + eighteenth century, however, the old tendency to a threefold + organisation began to reassert itself, but it was not till the + middle of the century that the process of development can be + regarded as complete.</p> + + <p>Down to the end of the War of the Austrian + Succession—a period which is usually deemed to be one of + conspicuous depression in the naval art—the + classification of our larger sailing vessels was purely + arbitrary. The "Rates" (which had been introduced during the + Dutch wars) bore no relation to any philosophical conception of + the complex duties of a fleet. In the first rate were 100-gun + ships; in the second, 90-gun ships—all three-deckers. So + far the system of rating was sound enough, but when we come to + the third rate we find it includes 80-gun ships, which were + also of three decks, while + <!-- Page 110 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" + id="Page_110"></a>[pg 110]</span> the bulk of the rest were + 70-gun two-deckers. The fourth rate was also composed of + two-decked ships—weak battle-units of 60 and 50 + guns—and this was far the largest class. All these + four rates were classed as ships-of-the-line. Below them + came the fifth rates, which, though they were used as + cruisers, had no distinct class name. They differed indeed + only in degree from the ship-of-the-line, being all cramped + two-deckers of 44 and 40 guns, and they must be regarded, in + so far as they expressed any logical idea of naval warfare, + as the forerunners of the "Intermediate" class, represented + in the succeeding epochs by 50-gun ships, and in our own + time by armoured cruisers. The only true cruiser is found in + the sixth rate, which comprised small and weakly armed + 20-gun ships, and between them and the "Forties" there was + nothing. Below them, but again without any clear + differentiation, came the unrated sloops representing the + flotilla.</p> + + <p>In such a system of rating there is no logical distinction + either between large and small battleships or between + battleships and cruisers, or between cruisers and flotilla. The + only marked break in the gradual descent is that between the + 40-gun two-deckers and the 20-gun cruisers. As these latter + vessels as well as the sloops used sweeps for auxiliary + propulsion, we are forced to conclude that the only basis of + the classification was that adopted by Henry the Eighth, which, + sound as it was in his time, had long ceased to have any real + relation to the actuality of naval war.</p> + + <p>It was not till Anson's memorable administration that a + scientific system of rating was re-established and the fleet at + <!-- Page 111 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" + id="Page_111"></a>[pg 111]</span> last assumed the logical + constitution which it retained up to our own time. In the + first two rates appear the fleet flagship class, + three-deckers of 100 and 90 guns respectively. All smaller + three-deckers are eliminated. In the next two rates we have + the rank and file of the battle-line, two-deckers of + increased size-namely, seventy-fours in the third rate, and + sixty-fours in the fourth. Here, however, is a slight break + in the perfection of the system, for the fourth rate also + included 50-gun ships of two decks, which, during the + progress of the Seven Years' War, ceased to be regarded as + ships-of-the-line. War experience was eliminating small + battleships, and therewith it called for a type intermediate + between battleships and cruisers, with whose functions we + shall have to deal directly. In practice these units soon + formed a rate by themselves, into which, by the same + tendency, 60-gun ships were destined to sink half a century + later.</p> + + <p>But most pregnant of all Anson's reforms was the + introduction of the true cruiser, no longer a small battleship, + but a vessel specialised for its logical functions, and + distinct in design both from the battle rates and the flotilla. + Both 40-gun and 20-gun types were abolished, and in their place + appear two cruiser rates, and the fifth consisting of 32-gun + true frigates, and the sixth of 28-gun frigates, both + completely divorced from any battle function. Finally, after a + very distinct gap, came the unrated sloops and smaller craft, + which formed the flotilla for coastwise and inshore work, + despatch service, and kindred duties.</p> + + <p>The reforms of the great First Lord amounted in fact to a + clearly apprehended threefold constitution, in which the + various groups were frankly specialised in accordance with the + functions each was expected to perform. Specialisation, it will + be observed, is the note of the process of development. + <!-- Page 112 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" + id="Page_112"></a>[pg 112]</span> We have no longer an + endeavour to adapt the fleet to its multifarious duties by + multiplying a comparatively weak nature of fighting-ship, + which could act in the line and yet be had in sufficient + numbers to protect commerce, but which was not well fitted + for either service. Instead we note a definite recognition + of the principle that battleships should be as powerful as + possible, and that in order to permit of their due + development they must be relieved of their cruising + functions by a class of vessel specially adapted for the + purpose. The question we have to consider is, was this + specialisation, which has asserted itself down to our own + times, in the true line of development? Was it, in fact, a + right expression of the needs which are indicated by the + theory of naval war?</p> + + <p>By the theory of naval war it must be reiterated we mean + nothing but an enunciation of the fundamental principles which + underlie all naval war. Those principles, if we have determined + them correctly, should be found giving shape not only to + strategy and tactics, but also to material, whatever method and + means of naval warfare may be in use at any given time. + Conversely, if we find strategy, tactics, or organisation + exhibiting a tendency to reproduce the same forms under widely + differing conditions of method and material, we should be able + to show that those forms bear a constant and definite relation + to the principles which our theory endeavours to express.</p> + + <p>In the case of Anson's threefold organisation, the relation + is not far to seek, though it has become obscured by two + maxims. The one is, that "the command of the sea depends upon + battleships," and the other, that "cruisers are the eyes of the + fleet." It is the inherent evil of maxims that they tend to get + stretched beyond their original meaning. Both of these express + a truth, but neither expresses the whole truth. On no theory of + naval warfare can we expect to command the sea with + battleships, nor, on the communication theory, can we regard + the primary function of cruisers as being to scout for a + <!-- Page 113 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" + id="Page_113"></a>[pg 113]</span> battle-fleet. It is + perfectly true that the control depends ultimately on the + battle-fleet if control is disputed by a hostile + battle-fleet, as it usually is. It is also true that, so far + as is necessary to enable the battle-fleet to secure the + control, we have to furnish it with eyes from our cruiser + force. But it does not follow that this is the primary + function of cruisers. The truth is, we have to withdraw them + from their primary function in order to do work for the + battle-fleet which it cannot do for itself.</p> + + <p>Well established as is the "Eyes of the fleet" maxim, it + would be very difficult to show that scouting was ever regarded + as the primary function of cruisers by the highest authorities. + In Nelson's practice at least their paramount function was to + exercise the control which he was securing with his + battle-squadron. Nothing is more familiar in naval history than + his incessant cry from the Mediterranean for more cruisers, but + the significance of that cry has become obscured. It was not + that his cruisers were not numerous in proportion to his + battleships—they were usually nearly double in + number—but it was rather that he was so deeply convinced + of their true function, that he used them to exercise control + to an extent which sometimes reduced his fleet cruisers below + the limit of bare necessity. The result on a memorable occasion + was the escape of the enemy's battle-fleet, but the further + result is equally important. It was that the escape of that + fleet did not deprive him of the control which he was + <!-- Page 114 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" + id="Page_114"></a>[pg 114]</span> charged to maintain. His + judgment may have been at fault, but the strategical + distribution of his force was consistent throughout the + whole period of his Mediterranean command. Judged by his + record, no man ever grasped more clearly than Nelson that + the object of naval warfare was to control communications, + and if he found that he had not a sufficient number of + cruisers to exercise that control and to furnish eyes for + his battle-fleet as well, it was the battle-fleet that was + made to suffer, and surely this is at least the logical + view. Had the French been ready to risk settling the + question of the control in a fleet action, it would have + been different. He would then have been right to sacrifice + the exercise of control for the time in order to make sure + that the action should take place and end decisively in his + favour. But he knew they were not ready to take such a risk, + and he refused to permit a purely defensive attitude on the + part of the enemy to delude him from the special function + with which he had been charged.</p> + + <p>If the object of naval warfare is to control communications, + then the fundamental requirement is the means of exercising + that control. Logically, therefore, if the enemy holds back + from battle decision, we must relegate the battle-fleet to a + secondary position, for cruisers are the means of exercising + control; the battle-fleet is but the means of preventing their + being interfered with in their work. Put it to the test of + actual practice. In no case can we exercise control by + battleships alone. Their specialisation has rendered them unfit + for the work, and has made them too costly ever to be numerous + enough. Even, therefore, if our enemy had no battle-fleet we + could not make control effective with battleships alone. We + should still require cruisers specialised for the work and in + sufficient numbers to cover the necessary ground. But the + converse is not true. We could exercise control with cruisers + alone if the enemy had no battle-fleet to interfere with + them.</p> + + <p>If, then, we seek a formula that will express the practical + <!-- Page + 115 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" + id="Page_115"></a>[pg 115]</span> results of our theory, it + would take some such shape as this. On cruisers depends our + exercise of control; on the battle-fleet depends the + security of control. That is the logical sequence of ideas, + and it shows us that the current maxim is really the + conclusion of a logical argument in which the initial steps + must not be ignored. The maxim that the command of the sea + depends on the battle-fleet is then perfectly sound so long + as it is taken to include all the other facts on which it + hangs. The true function of the battle-fleet is to protect + cruisers and flotilla at their special work. The best means + of doing this is of course to destroy the enemy's power of + interference. The doctrine of destroying the enemy's armed + forces as the paramount object here reasserts itself, and + reasserts itself so strongly as to permit for most practical + purposes the rough generalisation that the command depends + upon the battle-fleet.</p> + + <p>Of what practical use then, it may be asked, is all this + hairsplitting? Why not leave untainted the conviction that our + first and foremost business is to crush the enemy's + battle-fleet, and that to this end our whole effort should be + concentrated? The answer is to point to Nelson's dilemma. It + was a dilemma which, in the golden age of naval warfare, every + admiral at sea had had to solve for himself, and it was always + one of the most difficult details of every naval war plan. If + we seek to ensure the effective action of the battle-fleet by + giving it a large proportion of cruisers, by so much do we + weaken the actual and continuous exercise of control. If we + seek to make that control effective by devoting to the service + a large proportion of cruisers, by so much do we prejudice our + chance of getting contact with and defeating the enemy's + battle-fleet, which is the only means of perfecting + control.</p> + + <p>The correct solution of the dilemma will of course depend + upon the conditions of each case—mainly upon the relative + strength and activity of the hostile battle-fleet and our + enemy's probable intentions. But no matter how completely we + <!-- Page 116 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" + id="Page_116"></a>[pg 116]</span> have tabulated all the + relevant facts, we can never hope to come to a sound + conclusion upon them without a just appreciation of all the + elements which go to give command, and without the power of + gauging their relative importance. This, and this alone, + will ultimately settle the vital question of what proportion + of our cruiser force it is right to devote to the + battle-fleet.</p> + + <p>If the doctrine of cruiser control be correct, then every + cruiser attached to the battle-fleet is one withdrawn from its + true function. Such withdrawals are inevitable. A squadron of + battleships is an imperfect organism unable to do its work + without cruiser assistance, and since the performance of its + work is essential to cruiser freedom, some cruisers must be + sacrificed. But in what proportion? If we confine ourselves to + the view that command depends on the battle-fleet, then we + shall attach to it such a number as its commander may deem + necessary to make contact with the enemy absolutely certain and + to surround himself with an impenetrable screen. If we knew the + enemy was as anxious for a decision as ourselves, such a course + might be justified. But the normal condition is that if we + desire a decision it is because we have definite hopes of + success, and consequently the enemy will probably seek to avoid + one on our terms. In practice this means that if we have + perfected our arrangements for the destruction of his main + fleet he will refuse to expose it till he sees a more + favourable opportunity. And what will be the result? He remains + on the defensive, and theoretically all the ensuing period of + inaction tends to fall into his scale. Without stirring from + port his fleet is doing its work. The more closely he induces + us to concentrate our cruiser force in face of his + battle-fleet, the more he frees the sea for the circulation of + his own trade, and the more he exposes ours to cruiser + raids.</p> + + <p>Experience, then, and theory alike dictate that as a general + principle cruisers should be regarded as primarily concerned + with the active occupation of communications, and that + <!-- Page 117 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" + id="Page_117"></a>[pg 117]</span> withdrawals for fleet + purposes should be reduced to the furthest margin of + reasonable risk. What that margin should be can only be + decided on the circumstances of each case as it arises, and + by the personal characteristics of the officers who are + responsible. Nelson's practice was to reduce fleet cruisers + lower than perhaps any other commander. So small indeed was + the margin of efficiency he left, that in the campaign + already cited, when his judgment was ripest, one stroke of + ill-luck—a chance betrayal of his position by a + neutral—availed to deprive him of the decision he + sought, and to let the enemy's fleet escape.</p> + + <p>We arrive, then, at this general conclusion. The object of + naval warfare is to control maritime communications. In order + to exercise that control effectively we must have a numerous + class of vessels specially adapted for pursuit. But their power + of exercising control is in proportion to our degree of + command, that is, to our power of preventing their operations + being interfered with by the enemy. Their own power of + resistance is in inverse proportion to their power of + exercising control; that is to say, the more numerous and + better adapted they are for preying on commerce and transports, + the weaker will be their individual fighting power. We cannot + give them as a whole the power of resisting disturbance without + at the same time reducing their power of exercising control. + The accepted solution of the difficulty during the great period + of Anson's school was to provide them with a covering force of + battle units specially adapted for fighting. But here arises a + correlative difficulty. In so far as we give our battle units + fighting power we deny them scouting power, and scouting is + essential to their effective operation. The battle-fleet must + have eyes. Now, vessels adapted for control of communications + are also well adapted for "eyes." It becomes the practice, + therefore, to withdraw from control operations a sufficient + number of units to enable the battle-fleet to cover effectively + the operations of those that remain.</p> + <!-- Page 118 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" + id="Page_118"></a>[pg 118]</span> + + <p>Such were the broad principles on which the inevitable + dilemma always had to be solved, and on which Anson's + organisation was based. They flow naturally from the + communication theory of maritime war, and it was this theory + which then dominated naval thought, as is apparent from the + technical use of such phrases as "lines of passage and + communication." The war plans of the great strategists from + Anson and Barham can always be resolved into these simple + elements, and where we find the Admiralty grip of them + loosened, we have the confusion and quite unnecessary failures + of the War of American Independence. In that mismanaged contest + the cardinal mistake was that we suffered the enemy's + battle-fleets to get upon and occupy the vital lines of + "passage and communication" without first bringing them to + action, an error partly due to the unreadiness of a weak + administration, and partly to an insufficient allocation of + cruisers to secure contact at the right places.</p> + + <p>So far, then, the principles on which our naval supremacy + was built up are clear. For the enemies with whom we had to + deal Anson's system was admirably conceived. Both Spain and + France held the communication theory so strongly, that they + were content to count as success the power of continually + disturbing our control without any real attempt to secure it + for themselves. To defeat such a policy Anson's constitution + and the strategy it connoted were thoroughly well adapted and + easy to work. But it by no means follows that his doctrine is + the last word. Even in his own time complications had begun to + develop which tended to confuse the precision of his system. By + the culminating year of Trafalgar there <!-- + Page 119 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" + id="Page_119"></a>[pg 119]</span> were indications that it + was getting worn out, while the new methods and material + used by the Americans in 1812 made a serious rent in it. The + disturbances then inaugurated have continued to develop, and + it is necessary to consider how seriously they have confused + the problem of fleet constitution.</p> + + <p>Firstly, there is the general recognition, always patent to + ourselves, that by far the most drastic, economical, and + effective way of securing control is to destroy the enemy's + means of interfering with it. In our own service this + "overthrow" idea always tended to assert itself so strongly, + that occasionally the means became for a time more important + than the end; that is to say, circumstances were such that on + occasions it was considered advisable to sacrifice the exercise + of control for a time in order quickly and permanently to + deprive the enemy of all means of interference. When there was + reasonable hope of the enemy risking a decision this + consideration tended to override all others; but when, as in + Nelson's case in the Mediterranean, the hope was small, the + exercise of control tended to take the paramount place.</p> + + <p>The second complexity arose from the fact that however + strong might be our battleship cover, it is impossible for it + absolutely to secure cruiser control from disturbance by + sporadic attack. Isolated heavy ships, taking advantage of the + chances of the sea, could elude even the strictest blockade, + and one such ship, if she succeeded in getting upon a line of + communication, might paralyse the operations of a number of + weaker units. They must either run or concentrate, and in + either case the control was broken. If it were a squadron of + heavy ships that caused the disturbance, the practice was to + detach against it a division of the covering battle-fleet. But + it was obviously highly inconvenient and contrary to the whole + idea on which the constitution of the fleet was based to allow + every slight danger to cruiser control to loosen the cohesion + of the main fleet.</p> + + <p>It was necessary, then, to give cruiser lines some power of + <!-- Page + 120 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" + id="Page_120"></a>[pg 120]</span> resistance. This necessity + once admitted, there seemed no point at which you could stop + increasing the fighting power of your cruisers, and sooner + or later, unless some means of checking the process were + found, the distinction between cruisers and battleships + would practically disappear. Such a means was found in what + may be called the "Intermediate" ship. Frigates did indeed + continue to increase in size and fighting power throughout + the remainder of the sailing era, but it was not only in + this manner that the power of resistance was gained. The + evil results of the movement were checked by the + introduction of a supporting ship, midway between frigates + and true ships-of-the-line. Sometimes classed as a + battleship, and taking her place in the line, the 50-gun + ship came to be essentially a type for stiffening cruiser + squadrons. They most commonly appear as the flagships of + cruiser commodores, or stationed in terminal waters or at + focal points where sporadic raids were likely to fall and be + most destructive. The strategical effect of the presence of + such a vessel in a cruiser line was to give the whole line + in some degree the strength of the intermediate ship; for + any hostile cruiser endeavouring to disturb the line was + liable to have to deal with the supporting ship, while if a + frigate and a 50-gun ship got together they were a match + even for a small ship-of-the-line.</p> + + <p>In sailing days, of course, this power of the supporting + ship was weak owing to the imperfection of the means of distant + communication between ships at sea and the non-existence of + such means beyond extreme range of vision. But as wireless + telegraphy develops it is not unreasonable to expect that the + strategic value of the supporting or intermediate ship will be + found greater than it ever was in sailing days, and that for + dealing with sporadic disturbance the tendency will be for a + cruiser line to approximate more and more in power of + resistance to that of its strongest unit.</p> + + <p>For fleet service a cruiser's power of resistance was hardly + less valuable; for though we speak of fleet cruisers as the + eyes <!-- Page 121 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" + id="Page_121"></a>[pg 121]</span> of the fleet, their + purpose is almost equally to blindfold the enemy. Their duty + is not only to disclose the movements of the enemy, but also + to act as a screen to conceal our own. The point was + specially well marked in the blockades, where the old 50-gun + ships are almost always found with the inshore cruiser + squadron, preventing that squadron being forced by + inquisitive frigates. Important as this power of resistance + in the screen was in the old days, it is tenfold more + important now, and the consequent difficulty of keeping + cruisers distinct from battleships is greater than ever. The + reason for this is best considered under the third and most + serious cause of complexity.</p> + + <p>The third cause is the acquisition by the flotilla of battle + power. It is a feature of naval warfare that is entirely + new.<a name="NtA_10" + id="NtA_10"></a><a href="#Nt_10"><sup>10</sup></a> For all + practical purposes it was unknown until the full development + of the mobile torpedo. It is true that the fireship as + originally conceived was regarded as having something of the + same power. During the Dutch wars—the heyday of its + vogue—its assigned power was on some occasions + actually realised, as in the burning of Lord Sandwich's + flagship at the battle of Solebay, and the destruction of + the Spanish-Dutch fleet at Palermo by Duquesne. But as the + "nimbleness" + <!-- Page 122 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" + id="Page_122"></a>[pg 122]</span> of great-ships increased + with the ripening of seamanship and naval architecture, the + fireship as a battle weapon became almost negligible, while + a fleet at anchor was found to be thoroughly defensible by + its own picket-boats. Towards the middle of the eighteenth + century indeed the occasions on which the fireship could be + used for its special purpose was regarded as highly + exceptional, and though the type was retained till the end + of the century, its normal functions differed not at all + from those of the rest of the flotilla of which it then + formed part.</p> + + <p>Those functions, as we have seen, expressed the cruising + idea in its purest sense. It was numbers and mobility that + determined flotilla types rather than armament or capacity for + sea-endurance. Their primary purpose was to control + communications in home and colonial waters against weakly armed + privateers. The type which these duties determined fitted them + adequately for the secondary purpose of inshore and despatch + work with a fleet. It was, moreover, on the ubiquity which + their numbers gave them, and on their power of dealing with + unarmed or lightly armed vessels, that we relied for our first + line of defence against invasion. These latter duties were of + course exceptional, and the Navy List did not carry as a rule + sufficient numbers for the purpose. But a special value of the + class was that it was capable of rapid and almost indefinite + expansion from the mercantile marine. Anything that could carry + a gun had its use, and during the period of the Napoleonic + threat the defence flotilla rose all told to considerably over + a thousand units.</p> + + <p>Formidable and effective as was a flotilla of this type for + the ends it was designed to serve, it obviously in no way + affected the security of a battle-fleet. But so soon as the + flotilla acquired battle power the whole situation was changed, + and the old principles of cruiser design and distribution were + torn to shreds. The battle-fleet became a more imperfect + organism than ever. Formerly it was only its offensive power + <!-- Page 123 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" + id="Page_123"></a>[pg 123]</span> that required + supplementing. The new condition meant that unaided it could + no longer ensure its own defence. It now required screening, + not only from observation, but also from flotilla attack. + The theoretical weakness of an arrested offensive received a + practical and concrete illustration to a degree that war had + scarcely ever known. Our most dearly cherished strategical + traditions were shaken to the bottom. The "proper place" for + our battle-fleet had always been "on the enemy's coasts," + and now that was precisely where the enemy would be best + pleased to see it. What was to be done? So splendid a + tradition could not lightly be laid aside, but the attempt + to preserve it involved us still deeper in heresy. The + vital, most difficult, and most absorbing problem has become + not how to increase the power of a battle-fleet for attack, + which is a comparatively simple matter, but how to defend + it. As the offensive power of the flotilla developed, the + problem pressed with an almost bewildering intensity. With + every increase in the speed and sea-keeping power of torpedo + craft, the problem of the screen grew more exacting. To keep + the hostile flotilla out of night range the screen must be + flung out wider and wider, and this meant more and more + cruisers withdrawn from their primary function. And not only + this. The screen must not only be far flung, but it must be + made as far as possible impenetrable. In other words, its + own power of resistance must be increased all along the + line. Whole squadrons of armoured cruisers had to be + attached to battle-fleets to support the weaker members of + the screen. The crying need for this type of ship set up a + rapid movement for increasing their fighting power, and with + it fell with equal rapidity the economic possibility of + giving the cruiser class its essential attribute of + numbers.</p> + + <p>As an inevitable result we find ourselves involved in an + effort to restore to the flotilla some of its old cruiser + capacity, by endowing it with gun armament, higher sea-keeping + power, and facilities for distant communication, all at the + <!-- Page 124 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" + id="Page_124"></a>[pg 124]</span> cost of specialisation and + of greater economic strain. Still judged by past experience, + some means of increasing numbers in the cruising types is + essential, nor is it clear how it is possible to secure that + essential in the ranks of the true cruiser. No point has + been found at which it was possible to stop the tendency of + this class of vessel to increase in size and cost, or to + recall it to the strategical position it used to occupy. So + insecure is the battle-squadron, so imperfect as a + self-contained weapon has it become, that its need has + overridden the old order of things, and the primary function + of the cruising ship inclines to be no longer the exercise + of control under cover of the battle-fleet. The battle-fleet + now demands protection by the cruising ship, and what the + battle-fleet needs is held to be the first necessity.</p> + + <p>Judged by the old naval practice, it is an anomalous + position to have reached. But the whole naval art has suffered + a revolution beyond all previous experience, and it is possible + the old practice is no longer a safe guide. Driven by the same + necessities, every naval Power is following the same course. It + may be right, it may be wrong; no one at least but the ignorant + or hasty will venture to pass categorical judgment. The best we + can do is to endeavour to realise the situation to which, in + spite of all misgivings, we have been forced, and to determine + its relations to the developments of the past.</p> + + <p>It is undoubtedly a difficult task. As we have seen, there + have prevailed in the constitution of fleets at various times + several methods of expressing the necessities of naval war. The + present system differs from them all. On the one hand, we have + the fact that the latest developments of cruiser power have + finally obliterated all logical distinction between cruisers + and battleships, and we thus find ourselves hand in hand with + the fleet constitution of the old Dutch <!-- Page 125 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" + id="Page_125"></a>[pg 125]</span> wars. On the other, + however, we have armoured cruisers organised in squadrons + and attached to battle-fleets not only for strategical + purposes, but also with as yet undeveloped tactical + functions in battle. Here we come close to the latest + development of the sailing era, when "Advanced" or "Light" + squadrons began to appear in the organisation of + battle-fleets.</p> + + <p>The system arose towards the end of the eighteenth century + in the Mediterranean, where the conditions of control called + for so wide a dispersal of cruisers and so great a number of + them, that it was almost imperative for a battle-squadron in + that sea to do much of its own scouting. It was certainly for + this purpose that the fastest and lightest ships-of-the-line + were formed into a separate unit, and the first designation it + received was that of "Observation Squadron." It remained for + Nelson to endeavour to endow it with a tactical function, but + his idea was never realised either by himself or any of his + successors.</p> + + <p>Side by side with this new element in the organisation of a + battle-fleet, which perhaps is best designated as a "Light + Division," we have another significant fact. Not only was it + not always composed entirely of ships-of-the-line, especially + in the French service, but in 1805, the year of the full + development, we have Sir Richard Strachan using the heavy + frigates attached to his battle-squadron as a "Light Division," + and giving them a definite tactical function. The collapse of + the French Navy put a stop to further developments of either + idea. Whither they would have led we cannot tell. But it is + impossible to shut our eyes to the indication of a growing + tendency towards the system that exists at present. It is + difficult at least to ignore the fact that both Nelson and + Strachan in that culminating year found the actuality of war + calling for + <!-- Page 126 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" + id="Page_126"></a>[pg 126]</span> something for which there + was then no provision in the constitution of the fleet, but + which it does contain to-day. What Nelson felt for was a + battleship of cruiser speed. What Strachan desired was a + cruiser fit to take a tactical part in a fleet action. We + have them both, but with what result? Anson's specialisation + of types has almost disappeared, and our present fleet + constitution is scarcely to be distinguished from that of + the seventeenth century. We retain the three-fold + nomenclature, but the system itself has really gone. + Battleships grade into armoured cruisers, armoured cruisers + into protected cruisers. We can scarcely detect any real + distinction except a twofold one between vessels whose + primary armament is the gun and vessels whose primary + armament is the torpedo. But even here the existence of a + type of cruiser designed to act with flotillas blurs the + outline, while, as we have seen, the larger units of the + flotilla are grading up to cruiser level.</p> + + <p>We are thus face to face with a situation which has its + closest counterpart in the structureless fleets of the + seventeenth century. That naval thought should have so nearly + retraced its steps in the course of two centuries is curious + enough, but it is still more striking when we consider how + widely the underlying causes differ in each case. The pressure + which has forced the present situation is due most obviously to + two causes. One is the excessive development of the + "intermediate" ship originally devised for purposes of commerce + protection, and dictated by a menace which the experience of + the American War had taught us to respect. The other is the + introduction of the torpedo, and the consequent vulnerability + of battle-squadrons that are not securely screened. Nothing of + the kind had any influence on the fleet constitution of the + seventeenth century. But if we seek deeper, there is a less + obvious consideration which for what it is worth is too + striking to be ignored.</p> + + <p>It has been suggested above that the constitution of fleets + appears to have some more or less recognisable relation to + <!-- Page 127 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" + id="Page_127"></a>[pg 127]</span> the prevalent theory of + war. Now, amongst all our uncertainty we can assert with + confidence that the theory which holds the field at the + present day bears the closest possible resemblance to that + which dominated the soldier-admirals of the Dutch war. It + was the "Overthrow" theory, the firm faith in the decisive + action as the key of all strategical problems. They carried + it to sea with them from the battlefields of the New Model + Army, and the Dutch met them squarely. In the first war at + least their commerce had to give place to the exigencies of + throwing into the battle everything that could affect the + issue. It is not of course pretended that this attitude was + dictated by any clearly conceived theory of absolute war. It + was due rather to the fact that, owing to the relative + geographical conditions, all attempts to guard trade + communications were useless without the command of the home + waters in the North Sea, and the truth received a clinching + moral emphasis from the British claim to the actual dominion + of the Narrow Seas. It was, in fact, a war which resembled + rather the continental conditions of territorial conquest + than the naval procedure that characterised our rivalry with + France.</p> + + <p>Is it then possible, however much we may resist the + conclusion in loyalty to the eighteenth-century tradition, that + the rise of a new naval Power in the room of Holland must bring + us back to the drastic, if crude, methods of the Dutch wars, + and force us to tread under foot the nicer ingenuity of Anson's + system? Is it this which has tempted us to mistrust any type of + vessel which cannot be flung into the battle? The recurrence of + a formidable rival in the North Sea was certainly not the first + cause of the reaction. It began before that menace arose. Still + it has undoubtedly forced the pace, and even if it be not a + cause, it may well be a justification.</p> + <!-- Page 128 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" + id="Page_128"></a>[pg 128]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER THREE</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>THEORY OF THE<br /> + METHOD—CONCENTRATION<br /> + AND DISPERSAL OF<br /> + FORCE</h2> + <hr /> + + <p>From the point of view of the method by which its ends are + obtained, strategy is often described as the art of assembling + the utmost force at the right time and place; and this method + is called "Concentration."</p> + + <p>At first sight the term seems simple and expressive enough, + but on analysis it will be found to include several distinct + ideas, to all of which the term is applied indifferently. The + result is a source of some confusion, even to the most lucid + writers. "The word concentration," says one of the most recent + of them, "evokes the idea of a grouping of forces. We believe, + in fact, that we cannot make war without grouping ships into + squadrons and squadrons into fleets."<a name="NtA_11" + id="NtA_11"></a><a href="#Nt_11"><sup>11</sup></a> Here in + one sentence the word hovers between the formation of fleets + and their strategical distribution. Similar looseness will + embarrass the student at every turn. At one time he will + find the word + <!-- Page 129 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" + id="Page_129"></a>[pg 129]</span> used to express the + antithesis of division or dispersal of force; at another, to + express strategic deployment, which implies division to a + greater or less extent. He will find it used of the process + of assembling a force, as well as of the state of a force + when the process is complete. The truth is that the term, + which is one of the most common and most necessary in + strategical discussion, has never acquired a very precise + meaning, and this lack of precision is one of the commonest + causes of conflicting opinion and questionable judgments. No + strategical term indeed calls more urgently for a clear + determination of the ideas for which it stands.</p> + + <p>Military phraseology, from which the word is taken, employs + "concentration" in three senses. It is used for assembling the + units of an army after they have been mobilised. In this sense, + concentration is mainly an administrative process; logically, + it means the complement of the process of mobilisation, whereby + the army realises its war organisation and becomes ready to + take the field. In a second sense it is used for the process of + moving the army when formed, or in process of formation, to the + localities from which operations can best begin. This is a true + strategical stage, and it culminates in what is known as + strategic deployment. Finally, it is used for the ultimate + stage when the army so deployed is closed up upon a definite + line of operations in immediate readiness for tactical + deployment—gathered up, that is, to deal a concentrated + blow.</p> + + <p>Well as this terminology appears to serve on land, where the + processes tend to overlap, something more exact is required if + we try to extend it to the sea. Such extension magnifies the + error at every step, and clear thinking becomes difficult. Even + if we set aside the first meaning, that is, the final stage of + mobilisation, we have still to deal with the two others which, + in a great measure, are mutually contradictory. The essential + distinction of strategic deployment, which contemplates + dispersal with a view to a choice of combinations, + <!-- Page 130 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" + id="Page_130"></a>[pg 130]</span> is flexibility and free + movement. The characteristic of an army massed for a blow is + rigidity and restricted mobility. In the one sense of + concentration we contemplate a disposal of force which will + conceal our intention from the enemy and will permit us to + adapt our movements to the plan of operations he develops. + In the other, strategic concealment is at an end. We have + made our choice, and are committed to a definite operation. + Clearly, then, if we would apply the principles of land + concentration to naval warfare it is desirable to settle + which of the two phases of an operation we mean by the + term.</p> + + <p>Which meaning, then, is most closely connected with the + ordinary use of the word? The dictionaries define concentration + as "the state of being brought to a common point or centre," + and this coincides very exactly with the stage of a war plan + which intervenes between the completion of mobilisation and the + final massing or deployment for battle. It is an incomplete and + continuing act. Its ultimate consequence is the mass. It is a + method of securing mass at the right time and place. As we have + seen, the essence of the state of strategic deployment to which + it leads is flexibility. In war the choice of time and place + will always be influenced by the enemy's dispositions and + movements, or by our desire to deal him an unexpected blow. The + merit of concentration, then, in this sense, is its power of + permitting us to form our mass in time at one of the greatest + number of different points where mass may be required.</p> + + <p>It is for this stage that the more recent text-books incline + to specialise concentration—qualifying it as "strategic + concentration." But even that term scarcely meets the case, for + the succeeding process of gathering up the army into a position + for tactical deployment is also a strategical concentration. + Some further specialisation is required. The analytical + difference between the two processes is that the first is an + operation of major strategy and the other of minor, and if they + are <!-- Page 131 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" + id="Page_131"></a>[pg 131]</span> to be fully expressed, we + have to weight ourselves with the terms "major and minor + strategic concentration."</p> + + <p>Such cumbrous terminology is too forbidding to use. It + serves only to mark that the middle stage differs logically + from the third as much as it does from the first. In practice + it comes to this. If we are going to use concentration in its + natural sense, we must regard it as something that comes after + complete mobilisation and stops short of the formation of + mass.</p> + + <p>In naval warfare at least this distinction between + concentration and mass is essential to clear appreciation. It + leads us to conclusions that are of the first importance. For + instance, when once the mass is formed, concealment and + flexibility are at an end. The further, therefore, from the + formation of the ultimate mass we can stop the process of + concentration the better designed it will be. The less we are + committed to any particular mass, and the less we indicate what + and where our mass is to be, the more formidable our + concentration. To concentration, therefore, the idea of + division is as essential as the idea of connection. It is this + view of the process which, at least for naval warfare, a + weighty critical authority has most strongly emphasised. + "Such," he says, "is concentration reasonably + understood—not huddled together like a drove of sheep, + but distributed with a regard to a common purpose, and linked + together by the effectual energy of a single + will."<a name="NtA_12" + id="NtA_12"></a><a href="#Nt_12"><sup>12</sup></a> Vessels + in a state of concentration he compares to a fan that opens + and shuts. In this view concentration connotes not a + homogeneous body, but a compound organism controlled from a + common centre, and elastic enough to permit it to cover a + wide field without sacrificing the mutual support of its + parts.</p> + <!-- Page 132 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" + id="Page_132"></a>[pg 132]</span> + + <p>If, then, we exclude the meaning of mere assembling and the + meaning of the mass, we have left a signification which + expresses coherent disposal about a strategical centre, and + this it will be seen gives for naval warfare just the working + definition that we want as the counterpart of strategic + deployment on land. The object of a naval concentration like + that of strategic deployment will be to cover the widest + possible area, and to preserve at the same time elastic + cohesion, so as to secure rapid condensations of any two or + more of the parts of the organism, and in any part of the area + to be covered, at the will of the controlling mind; and above + all, a sure and rapid condensation of the whole at the + strategical centre.</p> + + <p>Concentration of this nature, moreover, will be the + expression of a war plan which, while solidly based on an + ultimate central mass, still preserves the faculty of + delivering or meeting minor attacks in any direction. It will + permit us to exercise control of the sea while we await and + work for the opportunity of a decision which shall permanently + secure control, and it will permit this without prejudicing our + ability of bringing the utmost force to bear when the moment + for the decision arrives. Concentration, in fact, implies a + continual conflict between cohesion and reach, and for + practical purposes it is the right adjustment of those two + tensions—ever shifting in force—which constitutes + the greater part of practical strategy.</p> + + <p>In naval warfare this concentration stage has a peculiar + significance in the development of a campaign, and at sea it is + more clearly detached than ashore. Owing to the vast size of + modern armies, and the restricted nature of their lines of + movement, no less than their lower intrinsic mobility as + compared with fleets, the processes of assembly, concentration, + and forming the battle mass tend to grade into one another + without any demarcation of practical value. An army frequently + reaches the stage of strategic deployment direct from + <!-- Page 133 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" + id="Page_133"></a>[pg 133]</span> the mobilisation bases of + its units, and on famous occasions its only real + concentration has taken place on the battlefield. In + Continental warfare, then, there is less difficulty in using + the term to cover all three processes. Their tendency is + always to overlap. But at sea, where communications are free + and unrestricted by obstacles, and where mobility is high, + they are susceptible of sharper differentiation. The normal + course is for a fleet to assemble at a naval port; thence by + a distinct movement it proceeds to the strategical centre + and reaches out in divisions as required. The concentration + about that centre may be very far from a mass, and the final + formation of the mass will bear no resemblance to either of + the previous movements, and will be quite distinct.</p> + + <p>But free as a fleet is from the special fetters of an army, + there always exist at sea peculiar conditions of friction which + clog its freedom of disposition. One source of this friction is + commerce protection. However much our war plan may press for + close concentration, the need of commerce protection will + always be calling for dispersal. The other source is the + peculiar freedom and secrecy of movements at sea. As the sea + knows no roads to limit or indicate our own lines of operation, + so it tells little about those of the enemy. The most distant + and widely dispersed points must be kept in view as possible + objectives of the enemy. When we add to this that two or more + fleets can act in conjunction from widely separated bases with + far greater certainty than is possible for armies, it is + obvious that the variety of combinations is much higher at sea + than on land, and variety of combination is in constant + opposition to the central mass.</p> + + <p>It follows that so long as the enemy's fleet is divided, and + thereby retains various possibilities of either concentrated or + sporadic action, our distribution will be dictated by the need + of being able to deal with a variety of combinations and to + protect a variety of objectives. Our concentrations must + therefore be kept as open and flexible as possible. History + <!-- Page 134 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" + id="Page_134"></a>[pg 134]</span> accordingly shows us that + the riper and fresher our experience and the surer our grip + of war, the looser were our concentrations. The idea of + massing, as a virtue in itself, is bred in peace and not in + war. It indicates the debilitating idea that in war we must + seek rather to avoid than to inflict defeat. True, advocates + of the mass entrench themselves in the plausible conception + that their aim is to inflict crushing defeats. But this too + is an idea of peace. War has proved to the hilt that + victories have not only to be won, but worked for. They must + be worked for by bold strategical combinations, which as a + rule entail at least apparent dispersal. They can only be + achieved by taking risks, and the greatest and most + effective of these is division.</p> + + <p>The effect of prolonged peace has been to make + "concentration" a kind of shibboleth, so that the division of a + fleet tends almost to be regarded as a sure mark of bad + leadership. Critics have come to lose sight of the old war + experience, that without division no strategical combinations + are possible. In truth they must be founded on division. + Division is bad only when it is pushed beyond the limits of + well-knit deployment. It is theoretically wrong to place a + section of the fleet in such a position that it may be + prevented from falling back on its strategical centre when it + is encountered by a superior force. Such retreats of course can + never be made certain; they will always depend in some measure + on the skill and resource of the opposing commanders, and on + the chances of weather: but risks must be taken. If we risk + nothing, we shall seldom perform anything. The great leader is + the man who can measure rightly to what breadth of deployment + he can stretch his concentration. This power of bold and sure + adjustment between cohesion and reach is indeed a supreme test + of that judgment which in the conduct of war takes the place of + strategical theory.</p> + + <p>In British naval history examples of faulty division are + hard to find. The case most commonly cited is an early one. It + <!-- Page 135 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" + id="Page_135"></a>[pg 135]</span> occurred in 1666 during + the second Dutch war. Monk and Rupert were in command of the + main fleet, which from its mobilisation bases in the Thames + and at Spithead had concentrated in the Downs. There they + were awaiting De Ruyter's putting to sea in a position from + which they could deal with him whether his object was an + attack on the Thames or to join hands with the French. In + this position a rumour reached them that the Toulon squadron + was on its way to the Channel to co-operate with the Dutch. + Upon this false intelligence the fleet was divided, and + Rupert went back to Portsmouth to cover that position in + case it might be the French objective. De Ruyter at once put + to sea with a fleet greatly superior to Monk's division. + Monk, however, taking advantage of thick weather that had + supervened, surprised him at + <!-- Page 136 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" + id="Page_136"></a>[pg 136]</span> anchor, and believing he + had a sufficient tactical advantage attacked him + impetuously. Meanwhile the real situation became known. + There was no French fleet, and Rupert was recalled. He + succeeded in rejoining Monk after his action with De Ruyter + had lasted three days. In the course of it Monk had been + very severely handled and forced to retreat to the Thames, + and it was generally believed that it was only the belated + arrival of Rupert that saved us from a real disaster.</p> + + <p>The strategy in this case is usually condemned out of hand + and made to bear the entire blame of the reverse. Monk, who as + a soldier had proved himself one of the finest strategists of + the time, is held to have blundered from sheer ignorance of + elementary principles. It is assumed that he should have kept + his fleet massed; but his critics fail to observe that at least + in the opinion of the time this would not have met the case. + Had he kept the whole to deal with De Ruyter, it is probable + that De Ruyter would not have put to sea, and it is certain + Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight would have lain open to the + French had they come. If he had moved his mass to deal with the + French, he would have exposed the Thames to De Ruyter. It was a + situation that could not be solved by a simple application of + what the French call the <i>masse centrale</i>. The only way to + secure both places from attack was to divide the fleet, just as + in 1801 Nelson in the same theatre was compelled to divide his + defence force. In neither case was division a fault, because it + was a necessity. The fault in Monk's and Rupert's case was that + they extended their reach with no proper provision to preserve + cohesion. Close cruiser connection should have been maintained + between the two divisions, and Monk should not have engaged + deeply till he felt Rupert at his elbow. This we are told was + the opinion of most of his flag-officers. They held that he + should not have fought when he + <!-- Page 137 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" + id="Page_137"></a>[pg 137]</span> did. His correct course, + on Kempenfelt's principle, would have been to hang on De + Ruyter so as to prevent his doing anything, and to have + slowly fallen back, drawing the Dutch after him till his + loosened concentration was closed up again. If De Ruyter had + refused to follow him through the Straits, there would have + been plenty of time to mass the fleet. If De Ruyter had + followed, he could have been fought in a position from which + there would have been no escape. The fault, in fact, was not + strategical, but rather one of tactical judgment. Monk + over-estimated the advantage of his surprise and the + relative fighting values of the two fleets, and believed he + saw his way to victory single-handed. The danger of division + is being surprised and forced to fight in inferiority. This + was not Monk's case. He was not surprised, and he could + easily have avoided action had he so desired. To judge such + a case simply by using concentration as a touchstone can + only tend to set up such questionable habits of thought as + have condemned the more famous division which occurred in + the crisis of the campaign of 1805, and with which we must + deal later.</p> + + <p>Apart from the general danger of using either words or + maxims in this way, it is obviously specially unwise in the + case of concentration and division. The current rule is that it + is bad to divide unless you have a great superiority; yet there + have been numerous occasions when, being at war with an + inferior enemy, we have found our chief embarrassment in the + fact that he kept his fleet divided, and was able thereby to + set up something like a deadlock. The main object of our naval + operations would then be to break it down. To force an inferior + enemy to concentrate is indeed the almost necessary preliminary + to securing one of those crushing victories at + <!-- Page 138 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" + id="Page_138"></a>[pg 138]</span> which we must always aim, + but which so seldom are obtained. It is by forcing the enemy + to attempt to concentrate that we get our opportunity by + sagacious dispersal of crushing his divisions in detail. It + is by inducing him to mass that we simplify our problem and + compel him to choose between leaving to us the exercise of + command and putting it to the decision of a great + action.</p> + + <p>Advocates of close concentration will reply that that is + true enough. We do often seek to force our enemy to + concentrate, but that does not show that concentration is + sometimes a disadvantage, for we ourselves must concentrate + closely to force a similar concentration on the enemy. The + maxim, indeed, has become current that concentration begets + concentration, but it is not too much to say that it is a maxim + which history flatly contradicts. If the enemy is willing to + hazard all on a battle, it is true. But if we are too superior, + or our concentration too well arranged for him to hope for + victory, then our concentration has almost always had the + effect of forcing him to disperse for sporadic action. So + certain was this result, that in our old wars, in which we were + usually superior, we always adopted the loosest possible + concentrations in order to prevent sporadic action. True, the + tendency of the French to adopt this mode of warfare is usually + set down to some constitutional ineptitude that is outside + strategical theory, but this view is due rather to the + irritation which the method caused us, than to sober reasoning. + For a comparatively weak belligerent sporadic action was better + than nothing, and the only other alternative was for him to + play into our hands by hazarding the decision which it was our + paramount interest to obtain. Sporadic action alone could never + give our enemy command of the sea, but it could do us injury + and embarrass our plans, and there was always hope it might so + much loosen our concentration as to give him a fair chance of + obtaining a series of successful minor decisions.</p> + + <p>Take, now, the leading case of 1805. In that campaign our + <!-- Page + 139 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" + id="Page_139"></a>[pg 139]</span> distribution was very + wide, and was based on several concentrations. The first had + its centre in the Downs, and extended not only athwart the + invading army's line of passage, but also over the whole + North Sea, so as to prevent interference with our trade or + our system of coast defence either from the Dutch in the + Texel or from French squadrons arriving north-about. The + second, which was known as the Western Squadron, had its + centre off Ushant, and was spread over the whole Bay of + Biscay by means of advanced squadrons before Ferrol and + Rochefort. With a further squadron off the coast of Ireland, + it was able also to reach far out into the Atlantic in order + to receive our trade. It kept guard, in fact, not only over + the French naval ports, but over the approaches to the + Channel, where were the home terminals of the great southern + and western trade-routes. A third concentration was in the + Mediterranean, whose centre under Nelson was at Sardinia. It + had outlying sub-centres at Malta and Gibraltar, and covered + the whole ground from Cape St. Vincent outside the Straits + to Toulon, Trieste, and the Dardanelles. When war broke out + with Spain in 1804, it was considered advisable to divide + this command, and Spanish waters outside the Straits were + held by a fourth concentration, whose centre was off Cadiz, + and whose northern limit was Cape Finisterre, where it + joined the Ushant concentration. For reasons which were + personal rather than strategical this arrangement was not + continued long, nor indeed after a few months was there the + same need for it, for the Toulon squadron had changed its + base to Cadiz. By this comprehensive system the whole of the + <!-- Page 140 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" + id="Page_140"></a>[pg 140]</span> European seas were + controlled both for military and trade purposes. In the + distant terminal areas, like the East and West Indies, there + were nucleus concentrations with the necessary connective + machinery permanently established, and to render them + effective, provision was made by which the various European + squadrons could throw off detachments to bring up their + force to any strength which the movements of the enemy might + render necessary.</p> + + <p>Wide as was this distribution, and great as its reach, a + high degree of cohesion was maintained not only between the + parts of each concentration, but between the several + concentrations themselves. By means of a minor cruiser centre + at the Channel Islands, the Downs and Ushant concentrations + could rapidly cohere. Similarly the Cadiz concentration was + linked up with that of Ushant at Finisterre, and but for + personal friction and repulsion, the cohesion between the + Mediterranean and Cadiz concentrations would have been equally + strong. Finally, there was a masterly provision made for all + the concentrations to condense into one great mass at the + crucial point off Ushant before by any calculable chance a + hostile mass could gather there.</p> + + <p>For Napoleon's best admirals, "who knew the craft of the + sea," the British fleet thus disposed was in a state of + concentration that nothing but a stroke of luck beyond the + limit of sober calculation could break. Decrès and Bruix + had no doubt of it, and the knowledge overpowered Villeneuve + <!-- Page 141 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" + id="Page_141"></a>[pg 141]</span> when the crisis came. + After he had carried the concentration which Napoleon had + planned so far as to have united three divisions in Ferrol, + he knew that the outlying sections of our Western Squadron + had disappeared from before Ferrol and Rochefort. In his + eyes, as well as those of the British Admiralty, this + squadron, in spite of its dispersal in the Bay of Biscay, + had always been in a state of concentration. It was not this + which caused his heart to fail. It was the news that Nelson + had reappeared at Gibraltar, and had been seen steering + northward. It meant for him that the whole of his enemy's + European fleet was in a state of concentration. "Their + concentration of force," he afterwards wrote, "was at the + moment more serious than in any previous disposition, and + such that they were in a position to meet in superiority the + combined forces of Brest and Ferrol," and for that reason, + he explained, he had given up the game as lost. But to + Napoleon's unpractised eye it was impossible to see what it + was he had to deal with. Measuring the elasticity of the + British naval distribution by the comparatively cumbrous and + restricted mobility of armies, he saw it as a rash and + unwarlike dispersal. Its looseness seemed to indicate so + great a tenderness for the distant objectives that lay open + to his scattered squadrons, that he believed by a show of + sporadic action he could further disperse our fleet, and + then by a close concentration crush the essential part in + detail. It was a clear case of the enemy's dispersal forcing + us to adopt the loosest concentration, and of our + comparative dispersal tempting the enemy to concentrate and + hazard a decision. It cannot be said we forced the fatal + move upon him intentionally. It was rather the operation of + strategical law set in motion by our bold distribution. We + were determined that his threat of invasion, formidable as + it was, should not force upon us so close a concentration as + to leave our widespread interests open to his attack. + Neither can it be said that our first aim was to prevent + <!-- Page 142 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" + id="Page_142"></a>[pg 142]</span> his attempting to + concentrate. Every one of his naval ports was watched by a + squadron, but it was recognised that this would not prevent + concentration. The escape of one division might well break + the chain. But that consideration made no difference. The + distribution of our squadrons before his naval ports was + essential for preventing sporadic action. Their distribution + was dictated sufficiently by the defence of commerce and of + colonial and allied territory, by our need, that is, to + exercise a general command even if we could not destroy the + enemy's force.</p> + + <p>The whole of Nelson's correspondence for this period shows + that his main object was the protection of our Mediterranean + trade and of Neapolitan and Turkish territory. When Villeneuve + escaped him, his irritation was caused not by the prospect of a + French concentration, which had no anxieties for him, for he + knew counter-concentrations were provided for. It was caused + rather by his having lost the opportunity which the attempt to + concentrate had placed within his reach. He followed Villeneuve + to the West Indies, not to prevent concentration, but, firstly, + to protect the local trade and Jamaica, and secondly, in hope + of another chance of dealing the blow he had missed. Lord + Barham took precisely the same view. When on news of + Villeneuve's return from the West Indies he moved out the three + divisions of the Western Squadron, that is, the Ushant + concentration, to meet him, he expressly stated, not that his + object was to prevent concentration, but that it was to deter + the French from attempting sporadic action. "The interception + of the fleet in question," he wrote, "on its return to Europe + would be a greater object than any I know. It would damp all + future expeditions, and would show to Europe that it might be + advisable to relax in the blockading system occasionally for + the express purpose of putting them in our hands at a + convenient opportunity."</p> + <!-- Page 143 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" + id="Page_143"></a>[pg 143]</span> + + <p>Indeed we had no reason for preventing the enemy's + concentration. It was our best chance of solving effectually + the situation we have to confront. Our true policy was to + secure permanent command by a great naval decision. So long as + the enemy remained divided, no such decision could be expected. + It was not, in fact, till he attempted his concentration, and + its last stage had been reached, that the situation was in our + hands. The intricate problem with which we had been struggling + was simplified down to closing up our own concentration to the + strategical centre off Ushant. But at the last stage the enemy + could not face the formidable position we held. His + concentration was stopped. Villeneuve fell back on Cadiz, and + the problem began to assume for us something of its former + intricacy. So long as we held the mass off Ushant which our + great concentration had produced, we were safe from invasion. + But that was not enough. It left the seas open to sporadic + action from Spanish ports. There were convoys from the East and + West Indies at hand, and there was our expedition in the + Mediterranean in jeopardy, and another on the point of sailing + from Cork. Neither Barham at the Admiralty nor Cornwallis in + command off Ushant hesitated an hour. By a simultaneous + induction they both decided the mass must be divided. The + concentration must be opened out again, and it was done. + Napoleon called the move an <i>insigne betise</i>, but it was + the move that beat him, and must have beaten him, whatever the + skill of his admirals, for the two squadrons never lost touch. + He found himself caught in a situation from which there was + nothing to hope. His fleet was neither concentrated for a + decisive blow nor spread for sporadic action. He had merely + simplified his enemy's problem. Our hold was surer than ever, + and in a desperate attempt to extricate himself he was forced + to expose his fleet to the final decision we required.</p> + <!-- Page 144 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" + id="Page_144"></a>[pg 144]</span> + + <p>The whole campaign serves well to show what was understood + by concentration at the end of the great naval wars. To Lord + Barham and the able admirals who interpreted his plans it meant + the possibility of massing at the right time and place. It + meant, in close analogy to strategic deployment on land, the + disposal of squadrons about a strategical centre from which + fleets could condense for massed action in any required + direction, and upon which they could fall back when unduly + pressed. In this case the ultimate centre was the narrows of + the Channel, where Napoleon's army lay ready to cross, but + there was no massing there. So crude a distribution would have + meant a purely defensive attitude. It would have meant waiting + to be struck instead of seeking to strike, and such an attitude + was arch-heresy to our old masters of war.</p> + + <p>So far we have only considered concentration as applied to + wars in which we have a preponderance of naval force, but the + principles are at least equally valid when a coalition places + us in inferiority. The leading case is the home campaign of + 1782. It was strictly on defensive lines. Our information was + that France and Spain intended to end the war with a great + combined effort against our West Indian islands, and + particularly Jamaica. It was recognised that the way to meet + the threat was to concentrate for offensive action in the + Caribbean Sea everything that was not absolutely needed for + home defence. Instead, therefore, of trying to be strong enough + to attempt the offensive in both areas, it was decided to make + sure of the area that was most critical. To do this the home + fleet had to be reduced so low relatively to what the enemy had + in European waters that offence was out of the question.</p> + + <p>While Rodney took the offensive area, Lord Howe was + <!-- Page 145 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" + id="Page_145"></a>[pg 145]</span> given the other. His task + was to prevent the coalition obtaining such a command of + home waters as would place our trade and coasts at their + mercy, and it was not likely to prove a light one. We knew + that the enemy's plan was to combine their attack on the + West Indies with an attempt to control the North Sea, and + possibly the Straits of Dover, with a Dutch squadron of + twelve to fifteen of the line, while a combined + Franco-Spanish fleet of at least forty sail would occupy the + mouth of the Channel. It was also possible that these two + forces would endeavour to form a junction. In any case the + object of the joint operations would be to paralyse our + trade and annoy our coasts, and thereby force us to neglect + the West Indian area and the two Spanish objectives, Minorca + and Gibraltar. All told we had only about thirty of the line + on the home station, and though a large proportion of these + were three-deckers, a good many could not be ready for sea + till the summer.</p> + + <p>Inferior as was the available force, there was no thought of + a purely passive defence. It would not meet the case. Something + must be done to interfere with the offensive operations of the + allies in the West Indies and against Gibraltar, or they would + attain the object of their home campaign. It was resolved to + effect this by minor counterstrokes on their line of + communications to the utmost limit of our defensive reach. It + would mean a considerable stretch of our concentration, but we + were determined to do what we could to prevent reinforcements + from reaching the West Indies from Brest, to intercept + <!-- Page 146 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" + id="Page_146"></a>[pg 146]</span> French trade as occasion + offered, and, finally, at almost any risk to relieve + Gibraltar.</p> + + <p>In these conditions the defensive concentration was based on + a central mass or reserve at Spithead, a squadron in the Downs + to watch the Texel for the safety of the North Sea trade, and + another to the westward to watch Brest and interrupt its + transatlantic communications. Kempenfelt in command of the + latter squadron had just shown what could be done by his great + exploit of capturing Guichen's convoy of military and naval + stores for the West Indies. Early in the spring he was relieved + by Barrington, who sailed on April 5th to resume the Ushant + position. His instructions were not to fight a superior enemy + unless in favourable circumstances, but to retire on Spithead. + He was away three weeks, and returned with a French East India + convoy with troops and stores, and two of the ships of-the-line + which formed its escort.</p> + + <p>Up to this time there had been no immediate sign of the + great movement from the south. The Franco-Spanish fleet which + had assembled at Cadiz was occupied ineffectually in trying to + stop small reliefs reaching Gibraltar and in covering their own + homeward-bound trade. The Dutch, however, <!-- + Page 147 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" + id="Page_147"></a>[pg 147]</span> were becoming active, and + the season was approaching for our Baltic trade to come + home. Ross in the North Sea had but four of the line to + watch the Texel, and was in no position to deal with the + danger. Accordingly early in May the weight of the home + concentration was thrown into the North Sea. On the 10th + Howe sailed with Barrington and the bulk of the fleet to + join Ross in the Downs, while Kempenfelt again took the + Ushant position. Only about half the Brest Squadron had gone + down to join the Spaniards at Cadiz, and he was told his + first duty was to intercept the rest if it put to sea, but, + as in Barrington's instructions, if he met a superior + squadron he was to retire up Channel under the English coast + and join hands with Howe. In spite of the fact that + influenza was now raging in the fleet, he succeeded in + holding the French inactive. Howe with the same difficulty + to face was equally successful. The Dutch had put to sea, + but returned immediately they knew of his movement, and + cruising off the Texel, he held them there, and kept + complete command of the North Sea till our Baltic trade was + safe home.</p> + + <p>By the end of May it was done, and as our intelligence + indicated that the great movement from Cadiz was at last about + to begin, Howe, to whom a certain discretion had been left, + decided it was time to shift the weight to his other wing and + close on Kempenfelt. The Government, however, seemed to think + that he ought to be able to use his position for offensive + operations against Dutch trade, but in the admiral's opinion + this was to lose hold of the design and sacrifice cohesion too + much to reach. He informed them that he had not deemed it + advisable to make detachments from his squadron against the + trade, "not knowing how suddenly there might be + <!-- Page 148 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" + id="Page_148"></a>[pg 148]</span> a call, for the greater + part of it at least, to the westward." In accordance, + therefore, with his general instructions he left with Ross a + strong squadron of nine of the line, sufficient to hold in + check, and even "to take and destroy," the comparatively + weak ships of the Dutch, and with the rest returned to the + westward.<a name="NtA_13" + id="NtA_13"></a><a href="#Nt_13"><sup>13</sup></a> His + intention was to proceed with all possible expedition to + join Kempenfelt on the coast of France, but this, owing to + the ravages of the influenza, he was unable to do. + Kempenfelt was forced to come in, and on June 5th the + junction was made at Spithead.</p> + + <p>For three weeks, so severe was the epidemic, they could not + move. Then came news that the Cadiz fleet under Langara had + sailed the day Howe had reached Spithead, and he resolved to + make a dash with every ship fit to put to sea to cut it off + from Brest. He was too late. Before he could get into position + the junction between Langara and the Brest squadron was made, + and in their full force the allies had occupied the mouth of + the Channel. With the addition of the Brest ships the combined + fleet numbered forty of the line, while all + <!-- Page 149 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" + id="Page_149"></a>[pg 149]</span> Howe could muster was + twenty-two, but amongst them were seven three-deckers and + three eighties, and he would soon be reinforced. Three of + Ross's smallest ships were recalled, and five others were + nearly ready, but for these Howe could not wait. The + homeward-bound Jamaica convoy was at hand, and at all + hazards it must be saved.</p> + + <p>What was to be done? So soon as he sighted the enemy he + realised that a successful action was out of the question. + Early in the morning of July 12th, "being fifteen leagues + S.S.E. from Scilly," Langara with thirty-six of the line was + seen to the westward. "As soon," wrote Howe, "as their force + had been ascertained, I thought proper to avoid coming to + battle with them as then circumstanced, and therefore steered + to the north to pass between Scilly and the Land's End. My + purpose therein was to get to the westward of the enemy, both + for protecting the Jamaica convoy and to gain the advantage of + situation for bringing them to action which the difference in + our numbers renders desirable."</p> + + <p>By a most brilliant effort of seamanship the dangerous + movement was effected safely that night, and it proved an + entire success. Till Howe was met with and defeated, the allies + would not venture into the Channel, and his unprecedented feat + had effectually thrown them off. Assuming apparently that he + must have passed round their rear to seaward, they sought him + to the southward, and there for a month beat up and down in + ineffective search. Meanwhile Howe, sending his cruisers ahead + to the convoy's rendezvous off the south-west coast of Iceland, + had taken his whole fleet + <!-- Page 150 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" + id="Page_150"></a>[pg 150]</span> about two hundred miles + west of the Skelligs to meet it. Northerly winds prevented + his reaching the right latitude in time, but it mattered + little. The convoy passed in between him and the south of + Ireland, and as the enemy had taken a cast down to Ushant, + it was able to enter the Channel in safety without sighting + an enemy's sail. Ignorant of what had happened, Howe cruised + for a week practising the ships "in connected movements so + particularly necessary on the present occasion." Then with + his fleet in fine condition to carry out preventive tactics + in accordance with Kempenfelt's well-known + exposition,<a name="NtA_14" + id="NtA_14"></a><a href="#Nt_14"><sup>14</sup></a> he + returned to seek the enemy to the eastward, in order to try + to draw them from their station at Scilly and open the + Channel. On his way he learnt the convoy had passed in, and + with this anxiety off his mind he bore up for the Lizard, + where his reinforcements were awaiting him. There he found + the Channel was free. From lack of supplies the enemy had + been forced to retire to port, and he returned to Spithead + to make preparations for the relief of Gibraltar. While this + work was going on, the North Sea squadron was again + strengthened that it might resume the blockade of the Texel + and cover the arrival of the autumn convoys from the Baltic. + It was done with complete success. Not a single ship fell + into the enemy's hands, and the campaign, and indeed the + war, ended by Howe taking the mass of his force down to + Gibraltar and performing his remarkable feat of relieving it + in the face of the Spanish squadron. For the power and reach + of a well-designed concentration there can be no finer + example.</p> + <!-- Page 151 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" + id="Page_151"></a>[pg 151]</span> + + <p>If, now, we seek from the above and similar examples for + principles to serve as a guide between concentration and + division we shall find, firstly, this one. The degree of + division we shall require is in proportion to the number of + naval ports from which the enemy can act against our maritime + interests and to the extent of coastline along which they are + spread. It is a principle which springs from the soul of our + old tradition that we must always seek, not merely to prevent + the enemy striking at our heart, but also to strike him the + moment he attempts to do anything. We must make of his every + attempt an opportunity for a counterstroke. The distribution + this aim entailed varied greatly with different enemies. In our + wars with France, and particularly when Spain and Holland were + in alliance with her, the number of the ports to be dealt with + was very considerable and their distribution very wide. In our + wars with the Dutch alone, on the other hand, the number and + distribution were comparatively small, and in this case our + concentration was always close.</p> + + <p>This measure of distribution, however, will never stand + alone. Concentration will not depend solely upon the number and + position of the enemy's naval ports. It will be modified by the + extent to which the lines of operation starting from those + ports traverse our own home waters. The reason is plain. + Whatever the enemy opposed to us, and whatever the nature of + the war, we must always keep a fleet at home. In any + circumstances it is essential for the defence of our home trade + terminals, and it is essential as a central reserve from which + divisions can be thrown off to reinforce distant terminals and + to seize opportunities for counterstrokes. It is "the + mainspring," as Lord Barham put it, "from which all offensive + operations must proceed." This squadron, then, being permanent + and fixed as the foundation of our whole system, it is clear + that if, as in the case of the French wars, the enemy's lines + of operation do not traverse our home waters, close + concentration upon it will not serve our turn. If, on the + <!-- Page 152 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" + id="Page_152"></a>[pg 152]</span> other hand, as in the case + of the Dutch wars, the lines do traverse home waters, a home + concentration is all that is required. Our division will + then be measured by the amount of our surplus strength, and + by the extent to which we feel able to detach squadrons for + offensive action against the enemy's distant maritime + interests without prejudicing our hold on the home terminals + of his lines of operation and our power of striking directly + he moves. These remarks apply, of course, to the main fleet + operations. If such an enemy has distant colonial bases from + which he can annoy our trade, minor concentrations must + naturally be arranged in those areas.</p> + + <p>Next we have to note that where the enemy's squadrons are + widely distributed in numerous bases, we cannot always simplify + the problem by leaving some of them open so as to entice him to + concentrate and reduce the number of ports to be watched. For + if we do this, we leave the unwatched squadrons free for + sporadic action. Unless we are sure he intends to concentrate + with a view to a decisive action, our only means of simplifying + the situation is to watch every port closely enough to + interfere effectually with sporadic action. Then, sporadic + action being denied him, the enemy must either do nothing or + concentrate.</p> + + <p>The next principle is flexibility. Concentration should be + so arranged that any two parts may freely cohere, and that all + parts may quickly condense into a mass at any point in the area + of concentration. The object of holding back from forming the + mass is to deny the enemy knowledge of our actual distribution + or its intention at any given moment, and at the same time to + ensure that it will be adjusted to meet any dangerous movement + that is open to him. Further than this our aim should be not + merely to prevent any part being overpowered by a superior + force, but to regard every detached squadron as a trap to lure + the enemy to destruction. The ideal concentration, in short, is + an appearance of weakness that covers a reality of + strength.</p><!-- Page 153 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" + id="Page_153"></a>[pg 153]</span> + <hr /> + + <h2>PART THREE</h2> + <hr /> + + <h1>CONDUCT<br /> + OF<br /> + NAVAL WAR</h1><!-- Page 154 blank --> + <!-- Page 155 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" + id="Page_155"></a>[pg 155]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER ONE</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>INTRODUCTORY</h2> + <hr /> + + <h3>I. INHERENT DIFFERENCES IN THE<br /> + CONDITIONS OF WAR ON LAND AND ON SEA</h3> + + <p>Before attempting to apply the foregoing general principles + in a definite manner to the conduct of naval war, it is + necessary to clear the ground of certain obstacles to right + judgment. The gradual elucidation of the theory of war, it must + be remembered, has been almost entirely the work of soldiers, + but so admirable is the work they have done, and so + philosophical the method they have adopted, that a very natural + tendency has arisen to assume that their broad-based + conclusions are of universal application. That the leading + lines which they have charted are in a certain sense those + which must govern all strategy no one will deny. They are the + real pioneers, and their methods must be in the main our + methods, but what we have to remember is that the country we + have to travel is radically different from that in which they + acquired their skill.</p> + + <p>A moment's consideration will reveal how far-reaching the + differences are. Let us ask ourselves what are the main ideas + around which all the military lore turns. It may be taken + broadly that the general principles are three in number. + Firstly, there is the idea of concentration of force, that is, + the idea of overthrowing the enemy's main strength by bringing + <!-- Page 156 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" + id="Page_156"></a>[pg 156]</span> to bear upon it the utmost + accumulation of weight and energy within your means; + secondly, there is the idea that strategy is mainly a + question of definite lines of communication; and thirdly, + there is the idea of concentration of effort, which means + keeping a single eye on the force you wish to overthrow + without regard to ulterior objects. Now if we examine the + conditions which give these principles so firm a footing on + land, we shall find that in all three cases they differ at + sea, and differ materially.</p> + + <p>Take the first, which, in spite of all the deductions we + have to make from it in the case of limited wars, is the + dominating one. The pithy maxim which expresses its essence is + that our primary objective is the enemy's main force. In + current naval literature the maxim is applied to the sea in + some such form as this: "The primary object of our battle-fleet + is to seek out and destroy that of the enemy." On the surface + nothing could look sounder, but what are the conditions which + underlie the one and the other?</p> + + <p>The practical value of the military maxim is based upon the + fact that in land warfare it is always theoretically possible + to strike at your enemy's army, that is, if you have the + strength and spirit to overcome the obstacles and face the + risks. But at sea this is not so. In naval warfare we have a + far-reaching fact which is entirely unknown on land. It is + simply this—that it is possible for your enemy to remove + his fleet from the board altogether. He may withdraw it into a + defended port, where it is absolutely out of your reach without + the assistance of an army. No amount of naval force, and no + amount of offensive spirit, can avail you. The result is that + in naval warfare an embarrassing dilemma tends to assert + itself. If you are in a superiority that justifies a vigorous + offensive and prompts you to seek out your enemy with a view to + a decision, the chances are you will find him in a position + where you cannot touch him. Your offence is arrested, and + <!-- Page 157 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" + id="Page_157"></a>[pg 157]</span> you find yourself in what, + at least theoretically, is the weakest general position + known to war.</p> + + <p>This was one of our earliest discoveries in strategy. It + followed indeed immediately and inevitably upon our discovery + that the most drastic way of making war was to concentrate + every effort on the enemy's armed forces. In dealing with the + theory of war in general a caveat has already been entered + against the too common assumption that this method was an + invention of Napoleon's or Frederick's, or that it was a + foreign importation at all. In the view at least of our own + military historians the idea was born in our Civil Wars with + Cromwell and the New Model Army. It was the conspicuous feature + that distinguished our Civil War from all previous wars of + modern times. So astonishing was its success—as foreign + observers remarked—that it was naturally applied by our + soldier-admirals at sea so soon as war broke out with the + Dutch. Whatever may be the claims of the Cromwellian soldiers + to have invented for land warfare what is regarded abroad as + the chief characteristic of the Napoleonic method, it is beyond + doubt that they deserve the credit of it at sea. All three + Dutch wars had a commercial object, and yet after the first + campaign the general idea never was to make the enemy's + commerce a primary objective. That place was occupied + throughout by their battle-fleets, and under Monk and Rupert at + least those objectives were pursued with a singleness of + purpose and a persistent vehemence that was entirely + Napoleonic.</p> + + <p>But in the later stages of the struggle, when we began to + gain a preponderance, it was found that the method ceased to + <!-- Page 158 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" + id="Page_158"></a>[pg 158]</span> work. The attempt to seek + the enemy with a view to a decisive action was again and + again frustrated by his retiring to his own coasts, where + either we could not reach him or his facilities for retreat + made a decisive result impossible. He assumed, in fact, a + defensive attitude with which we were powerless to deal, and + in the true spirit of defence he sprang out from time to + time to deal us a counterstroke as he saw his + opportunity.</p> + + <p>It was soon perceived that the only way of dealing with this + attitude was to adopt some means of forcing the enemy to sea + and compelling him to expose himself to the decision we sought. + The most cogent means at hand was to threaten his commerce. + Instead, therefore, of attempting to seek out his fleet + directly, our own would sit upon the fairway of his + homeward-bound trade, either on the Dogger Bank or elsewhere, + thereby setting up a situation which it was hoped would cost + him either his trade or his battle-fleet, or possibly both. + Thus in spite of the fact that with our increasing + preponderance our preoccupation with the idea of battle + decision had become stronger than ever, we found ourselves + forced to fall back upon subsidiary operations of an ulterior + strategical character. It is a curious paradox, but it is one + that seems inherent in the special feature of naval war, which + permits the armed force to be removed from the board + altogether.</p> + + <p>The second distinguishing characteristic of naval warfare + which relates to the communication idea is not so well marked, + but it is scarcely less important. It will be recalled that + this characteristic is concerned with lines of communication in + so far as they tend to determine lines of operation. It is a + simple question of roads and obstacles. In land warfare we can + determine with some precision the limits and direction of our + enemy's possible movements. We know that they must be + determined mainly by roads and obstacles. But afloat neither + roads nor obstacles exist. There is nothing of the kind on the + <!-- Page 159 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" + id="Page_159"></a>[pg 159]</span> face of the sea to assist + us in locating him and determining his movements. True it is + that in sailing days his movements were to some extent + limited by prevailing winds and by the elimination of + impossible courses, but with steam even these determinants + have gone, and there is practically nothing to limit the + freedom of his movement except the exigencies of fuel. + Consequently in seeking to strike our enemy the liability to + miss him is much greater at sea than on land, and the + chances of being eluded by the enemy whom we are seeking to + bring to battle become so serious a check upon our offensive + action as to compel us to handle the maxim of "Seeking out + the enemy's fleet" with caution.</p> + + <p>The difficulty obtruded itself from the moment the idea was + born. It may be traced back—so far at least as modern + warfare is concerned—to Sir Francis Drake's famous + appreciation in the year of the Armada. This memorable despatch + was written when an acute difference of opinion had arisen as + to whether it were better to hold our fleet back in home waters + or to send it forward to the coast of Spain. The enemy's + objective was very uncertain. We could not tell whether the + blow was to fall in the Channel or Ireland or Scotland, and the + situation was complicated by a Spanish army of invasion ready + to cross from the Flemish coast, and the possibility of + combined action by the Guises from France. Drake was for + solving the problem by taking station off the Armada's port of + departure, and fully aware of the risk such a move entailed, he + fortified his purely strategical reasons with moral + considerations of the highest moment. But the Government was + unconvinced, not as is usually assumed out of sheer + <!-- Page 160 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" + id="Page_160"></a>[pg 160]</span> pusillanimity and lack of + strategical insight, but because the chances of Drake's + missing contact were too great if the Armada should sail + before our own fleet could get into position.</p> + + <p>Our third elementary principle is the idea of concentration + of effort, and the third characteristic of naval warfare which + clashes with it is that over and above the duty of winning + battles, fleets are charged with the duty of protecting + commerce. In land warfare, at least since laying waste an + undefended part of your enemy's country ceased to be a + recognised strategical operation, there is no corresponding + deflection of purely military operations. It is idle for + purists to tell us that the deflection of commerce protection + should not be permitted to turn us from our main purpose. We + have to do with the hard facts of war, and experience tells us + that for economic reasons alone, apart from the pressure of + public opinion, no one has ever found it possible to ignore the + deflection entirely. So vital indeed is financial vigour in + war, that more often than not the maintenance of the flow of + trade has been felt as a paramount consideration. Even in the + best days of our Dutch wars, when the whole plan was based on + ignoring the enemy's commerce as an objective, we found + ourselves at times forced to protect our own trade with + seriously disturbing results.</p> + + <p>Nor is it more profitable to declare that the only sound way + to protect your commerce is to destroy the enemy's fleet. As an + enunciation of a principle it is a truism—no one would + dispute it. As a canon of practical strategy, it is untrue; for + here our first deflection again asserts itself. What are you to + do if the enemy refuses to permit you to destroy his fleets? + You cannot leave your trade exposed to squadronal or cruiser + raids while you await your opportunity, and the more you + concentrate your force and efforts to secure the desired + decision, the more you will expose your trade to sporadic + attack. The result is that you are not always free to adopt the + plan which is best calculated to bring your enemy to a + decision. + <!-- Page 161 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" + id="Page_161"></a>[pg 161]</span> You may find yourself + compelled to occupy, not the best positions, but those which + will give a fair chance of getting contact in favourable + conditions, and at the same time afford reasonable cover for + your trade. Hence the maxim that the enemy's coast should be + our frontier. It is not a purely military maxim like that + for seeking out the enemy's fleet, though the two are often + used as though they were interchangeable. Our usual + positions on the enemy's coast were dictated quite as much + by the exigencies of commerce protection as by primary + strategical reasons. To maintain a rigorous watch close off + the enemy's ports was never the likeliest way to bring him + to decisive action—we have Nelson's well-known + declaration on the point—but it was the best way, and + often the only way, to keep the sea clear for the passage of + our own trade and for the operations of our cruisers against + that of the enemy.</p> + + <p>For the present these all-important points need not be + elaborated further. As we proceed to deal with the methods of + naval warfare they will gather force and lucidity. Enough has + been said to mark the shoals and warn us that, admirably + constructed as is the craft which the military strategists have + provided for our use, we must be careful with our + navigation.</p> + + <p>But before proceeding further it is necessary to simplify + what lies before us by endeavouring to group the complex + variety of naval operations into manageable shape.</p> + + <h3>II. TYPICAL FORMS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS</h3> + + <p>In the conduct of naval war all operations will be found to + relate to two broad classes of object. The one is to obtain or + dispute the command of the sea, and the other to exercise such + control of communications as we have, whether the complete + command has been secured or not.</p> + + <p>It was on the logical and practical distinction between + <!-- Page 162 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" + id="Page_162"></a>[pg 162]</span> these two kinds of naval + object, as we have seen, that the constitution of fleets was + based in the fulness of the sailing period, when maritime + wars were nearly incessant and were shaping the existing + distribution of power in the world. During that period at + any rate the dual conception lay at the root of naval + methods and naval policy, and as it is also the logical + outcome of the theory of war, we may safely take it as the + basis of our analysis of the conduct of naval + operations.</p> + + <p>Practically, of course, we can seldom assert categorically + that any operation of war has but one clearly defined object. A + battle-squadron whose primary function was to secure command + was often so placed as to enable it to exercise control; and, + <i>vice versa</i>, cruiser lines intended primarily to exercise + control upon the trade routes were regarded as outposts of the + battle-fleet to give it warning of the movements of hostile + squadrons. Thus Cornwallis during his blockade of Brest had + sometimes to loosen his hold in order to cover the arrival of + convoys against raiding squadrons; and thus also when Nelson + was asked by Lord Barham for his views on cruiser patrol lines, + he expressed himself as follows: "Ships on this service would + not only prevent the depredations of privateers, but be in the + way to watch any squadron of the enemy should they pass on + their track.... Therefore intelligence will be quickly + conveyed, and the enemy never, I think, lost sight + of."<a name="NtA_15" + id="NtA_15"></a><a href="#Nt_15"><sup>15</sup></a> + Instructions in this sense were issued by + <!-- Page 163 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" + id="Page_163"></a>[pg 163]</span> Lord Barham to the + commodores concerned. In both cases, it will be seen, the + two classes of operation overlapped. Still for purposes of + analysis the distinction holds good, and is valuable for + obtaining a clear view of the field.</p> + + <p>Take, first, the methods of securing command, by which we + mean putting it out of the enemy's power to use effectually the + common communications or materially to interfere with our use + of them. We find the means employed were two: decision by + battle, and blockade. Of the two, the first was the less + frequently attainable, but it was the one the British service + always preferred. It was only natural that it should be so, + seeing that our normal position was one of preponderance over + our enemy, and so long as the policy of preponderance is + maintained, the chances are the preference will also be + maintained.</p> + + <p>But further than this, the idea seems to be rooted in the + oldest traditions of the Royal Navy. As we have seen, the + conviction of the sea service that war is primarily a question + of battles, and that battles once joined on anything like equal + terms must be pressed to the last gasp, is one that has had + nothing to learn from more recent continental discoveries. The + Cromwellian admirals handed down to us the memory of battles + lasting three, and even four, days. Their creed is enshrined in + the robust article of war under which Byng and Calder were + condemned; and in the apotheosis of Nelson the service has + deified the battle idea.</p> + <!-- Page 164 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" + id="Page_164"></a>[pg 164]</span> + + <p>It is true there were periods when the idea seemed to have + lost its colour, but nevertheless it is so firmly embedded in + the British conception of naval warfare, that there would be + nothing left to say but for the unavoidable modification with + which we have to temper the doctrine of overthrow. "Use that + means," said its best-known advocate, "when you can and when + you must." Devoutly as we may hold the battle faith, it is not + always possible or wise to act upon it. If we are strong, we + press to the issue of battle when we can. If we are weak, we do + not accept the issue unless we must. If circumstances are + advantageous to us, we are not always able to effect a + decision; and if they are disadvantageous, we are not always + obliged to fight. Hence we find the apparently simple doctrine + of the battle was almost always entangled in two of the most + difficult problems that beset our old admirals. The most thorny + questions they had to decide were these. In the normal case of + strength, it was not how to defeat the enemy, but how to bring + him to action; and in casual cases of temporary weakness, it + was not how to sell your life dearly, but how to maintain the + fleet actively on the defensive so as at once to deny the enemy + the decision he sought and to prevent his attaining his + ulterior object.</p> + + <p>From these considerations it follows that we are able to + group all naval operations in some such way as this. Firstly, + on the only assumption we can permit ourselves, namely, that we + start with a preponderance of force or advantage, we adopt + methods for securing command. These methods, again, fall under + two heads. Firstly, there are operations for securing a + decision by battle, under which head, as has been explained, we + shall be chiefly concerned with methods of bringing an + unwilling enemy to action, and with the value to that end of + the maxim of "Seeking out the enemy's fleet." + <!-- Page 165 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" + id="Page_165"></a>[pg 165]</span> Secondly, there are the + operations which become necessary when no decision is + obtainable and our war plan demands the immediate control of + communications. Under this head it will be convenient to + treat all forms of blockade, whether military or commercial, + although, as we shall see, certain forms of military, and + even commercial, blockade are primarily concerned with + forcing the enemy to a decision.</p> + + <p>Our second main group covers operations to which we have to + resort when our relative strength is not adequate for either + class of operations to secure command. In these conditions we + have to content ourselves with endeavouring to hold the command + in dispute; that is, we endeavour by active defensive + operations to prevent the enemy either securing or exercising + control for the objects he has in view. Such are the operations + which are connoted by the true conception of "A fleet in + being." Under this head also should fall those new forms of + minor counter-attack which have entered the field of strategy + since the introduction of the mobile torpedo and offensive + mining.</p> + + <p>In the third main group we have to deal with the methods of + exercising control of passage and communication. These + operations vary in character according to the several purposes + for which the control is desired, and they will be found to + take one of three general forms. Firstly, the control of the + lines of passage of an invading army; secondly, the control of + trade routes and trade terminals for the attack and defence of + commerce; and thirdly, the control of passage and communication + for our own oversea expeditions, and the control of their + objective area for the active support of their operations.</p> + + <p>For clearness we may summarise the whole in tabulated + analysis, thus:—</p> + + <div class="noflo"> + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>1. Methods of securing command:</p> + + <p class="i2">(<i>a</i>) By obtaining a decision.</p> + + <p class="i2">(<i>b</i>) By blockade.</p> + <!-- Page 166 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" + id="Page_166"></a>[pg 166]</span> + + <p>2. Methods of disputing command:</p> + + <p class="i2">(<i>a</i>) Principle of "the fleet in + being."</p> + + <p class="i2">(<i>b</i>) Minor counter-attacks.</p> + + <p>3. Methods of exercising command:</p> + + <p class="i2">(<i>a</i>) Defence against invasion.</p> + + <p class="i2">(<i>b</i>) Attack and defence of + commerce.</p> + + <p class="i2">(<i>c</i>) Attack, defence, and support + of military expeditions.</p> + </div> + </div><!-- Page 167 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" + id="Page_167"></a>[pg 167]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER TWO</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>METHODS OF<br /> + SECURING COMMAND</h2> + <hr /> + + <h3>I. ON OBTAINING A DECISION</h3> + + <p>Whatever the nature of the war in which we are engaged, + whether it be limited or unlimited, permanent and general + command of the sea is the condition of ultimate success. The + only way of securing such a command by naval means is to obtain + a decision by battle against the enemy's fleet. Sooner or later + it must be done, and the sooner the better. That was the old + British creed. It is still our creed, and needs no labouring. + No one will dispute it, no one will care even to discuss it, + and we pass with confidence to the conclusion that the first + business of our fleet is to seek out the enemy's fleet and + destroy it.</p> + + <p>No maxim can so well embody the British spirit of making war + upon the sea, and nothing must be permitted to breathe on that + spirit. To examine its claim to be the logical conclusion of + our theory of war will even be held dangerous, yet nothing is + so dangerous in the study of war as to permit maxims to become + a substitute for judgment. Let us examine its credentials, and + as a first step put it to the test of the two most modern + instances.</p> + + <p>Both of them, it must be noted, were instances of Limited + War, the most usual form of our own activities, and indeed the + only one to which our war organisation, with its essential + <!-- Page 168 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" + id="Page_168"></a>[pg 168]</span> preponderance of the naval + element, has ever been really adapted. The first instance is + the Spanish-American War, and the second that between Russia + and Japan.</p> + + <p>In the former case the Americans took up arms in order to + liberate Cuba from Spanish domination—a strictly limited + object. There is no evidence that the nature of the war was + ever clearly formulated by either side, but in just conformity + with the general political conditions the American war plan + aimed at opening with a movement to secure the territorial + object. At the earliest possible moment they intended to + establish themselves in the west of Cuba in support of the + Colonial insurgents. Everything depended on the initiative + being seized with decision and rapidity. Its moral and physical + importance justified the utmost risk, and such was the + conformation of the sea which the American army had to pass, + that a strictly defensive or covering attitude with their fleet + could reduce the risk almost to security. Yet so unwisely + dominated were the Americans by recently rediscovered maxims, + that when on the eve of executing the vital movement they heard + a Spanish squadron was crossing the Atlantic, their own + covering force was diverted from its defensive position and + sent away to "seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it."</p> + + <p>Puerto Rico was the most obvious point at which to seek it, + and thither Admiral Sampson was permitted to go, regardless of + the elementary truth that in such cases what is obvious to you + is also usually obvious to your enemy. The result was that not + only did the Americans fail to get contact, but they also + uncovered their own army's line of passage and paralysed the + initial movement. In the end it was only pure chance <!-- + Page 169 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" + id="Page_169"></a>[pg 169]</span> that permitted them to + retrieve the mistake they had made. Had the Spanish squadron + put into a Cuban port in railway communication with the main + Royalist army, such as Cienfuegos or Havana, instead of + hurrying into Santiago, the whole campaign must have been + lost. "It appears now," wrote Admiral Mahan, in his + <i>Lessons of the War with Spain</i>, "not only that the + eastward voyage of our Havana division was unfortunate, but + it should have been seen beforehand to be a mistake, because + inconsistent with a well and generally accepted principle of + war, the non-observance of which was not commanded by the + conditions. The principle is that which condemns eccentric + movements. By the disregard of rule in this case we + uncovered both Havana and Cienfuegos, which it was our + object to close to the enemy's division."</p> + + <p>Whether or not we regard Admiral Mahan's exposition of the + error as penetrating to the real principle that was violated, + the movement was in fact not only eccentric, but unnecessary. + Had the Americans been content to keep their fleet concentrated + in its true defensive position, not only would they have + covered their army's line of passage and their blockade of the + territorial objective, but they would have had a far better + chance of bringing the Spaniards to action. The Spaniards were + bound to come to them or remain outside the theatre of + operations where they could in no way affect the issue of the + war except adversely to themselves by sapping the spirit of + their own Cuban garrison. It is a clear case of the letter + killing the spirit, of an attractive maxim being permitted + <!-- Page 170 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" + id="Page_170"></a>[pg 170]</span> to shut the door upon + judgment. Strategical offence in this case was not the best + defence. "Seeking out the enemy's fleet" was almost bound to + end in a blow in the air, which not only would fail to gain + any offensive result, but would sacrifice the main defensive + plank in the American war plan upon which their offensive + relied for success. To stigmatise such a movement as merely + eccentric is to pass very lenient censure.</p> + + <p>In the Russo-Japanese War we have a converse case, in which + judgment kept the aphorism silent. It is true that during the + earlier stage of the naval operations the Japanese did in a + sense seek out the enemy's fleet, in so far as they advanced + their base close to Port Arthur; but this was done, not with + any fixed intention of destroying the Russian fleet—there + was small hope of that at sea—but rather because by no + other means could they cover the army's lines of passage, which + it was the function of the fleet to secure, the true offensive + operations being on land. Never except once, under express + orders from Tokio, did either Admiral Togo or Admiral Kamimura + press offensive movements in such a way as to jeopardise the + preventive duty with which the war plan charged them. Still + less in the later stage, when everything depended on the + destruction of the Baltic fleet, did Admiral Togo "seek it + out." He was content, as the Americans should have been + content, to have set up such a situation that the enemy must + come and break it down if they were to affect the issue of the + war. So he waited on the defensive, assured his enemy must come + to him, and thereby he rendered it, as <!-- Page 171 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" + id="Page_171"></a>[pg 171]</span> certain as war can be, + that when the moment for the tactical offensive came his + blow should be sure and sudden, in overwhelming strength of + concentration, and decisive beyond all precedent.</p> + + <p>Clearly, then, the maxim of "seeking out" for all its moral + exhilaration, for all its value as an expression of high and + sound naval spirit, must not be permitted to displace + well-reasoned judgment. Trusty servant as it is, it will make a + bad master, as the Americans found to their serious jeopardy. + Yet we feel instinctively that it expresses, as no other + aphorism does, the secret of British success at sea. We cannot + do without it; we cannot do with it in its nakedness. Let us + endeavour to clothe it with its real meaning, with the true + principles that it connotes. Let us endeavour to determine the + stuff that it is made of, and for this purpose there is no + better way than to trace its gradual growth from the days when + it was born of the crude and virile instinct of the earliest + masters.</p> + + <p>The germ is to be found in the despatch already mentioned + which Drake wrote from Plymouth at the end of March in 1588. + His arguments were not purely naval, for it was a combined + problem, a problem of defence against invasion, that had to be + solved. What he wished to persuade the Government was, that the + kernel of the situation was not so much Parma's army of + invasion in Flanders, as the fleet that was preparing in Spain + to clear its passage. The Government appeared to be acting on + the opposite view. Howard with the bulk of the fleet was at the + base in the Medway within supporting distance of the light + squadron that was blockading the Flemish ports in concert with + the Dutch. Drake himself with another light squadron had been + sent to the westward + <!-- Page 172 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" + id="Page_172"></a>[pg 172]</span> with some indeterminate + idea of his serving as an observation squadron, or being + used in the mediaeval fashion for an eccentric + counterstroke. Being invited to give his opinion on this + disposition, he pronounced it vicious. In his eyes, what was + demanded was an offensive movement against the enemy's main + fleet. "If there may be such a stay or stop made," he urged, + "by any means of this fleet in Spain, so that they may not + come through the seas as conquerors, then shall the Prince + of Parma have such a check thereby as were meet." What he + had in his mind is clearly not so much a decision in the + open as an interruption of the enemy's incomplete + mobilisation, such as he had so brilliantly effected the + previous year. For later on he says that "Next under God's + mighty protection the advantage of time and place will be + the only and chief means for our good, wherein I most humbly + beseech your good lordships to persevere as you have begun, + for with fifty sail of shipping we shall do more upon their + own coast than a great many more will do here at home; and + the sooner we are gone, the better we shall be able to + impeach them." He does not say "destroy." "Impeach" meant + "to prevent."</p> + + <p>Clearly, then, what he had in his mind was a repetition of + the previous year's strategy, whereby he had been able to break + up the Spanish mobilisation and "impeach" the Armada from + sailing. He did not even ask for a concentration of the whole + fleet for the purpose, but only that his own squadron should be + reinforced as was thought convenient. The actual reasons he + gave for his advice were purely moral—that is, he dwelt + on the enheartening effect of striking the first blow, and + attacking instead of waiting to be attacked. The nation, he + urged, "will be persuaded that the Lord will put + <!-- Page 173 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" + id="Page_173"></a>[pg 173]</span> into Her Majesty and her + people courage and boldness not to fear invasion, but to + seek God's enemies and Her Majesty's where they may be + found."</p> + + <p>Here is the germ of the maxim. The consequence of his + despatch was a summons to attend the Council. The conference + was followed, not by the half measure, which was all he had + ventured to advise in his despatch, but by something that + embodied a fuller expression of his general idea, and closely + resembled what was to be consecrated as our regular disposition + in such cases. The whole of the main fleet, except the squadron + watching the Flemish coast, was massed to the westward to cover + the blockade of Parma's transports, but the position assigned + to it was inside the Channel instead of outside, which + tactically was bad, for it was almost certain to give the + Armada the weather gage. No movement to the coast of Spain was + permitted—not necessarily, be it remembered, out of + pusillanimity or failure to grasp Drake's idea, but for fear + that, as in the recent American case, a forward movement was + likely to result in a blow in the air, and to uncover the vital + position without bringing the enemy to action.</p> + + <p>When, however, the sailing of the Armada was so long delayed + Drake's importunity was renewed, with that of Howard and all + his colleagues to back it. It brought eventually the desired + permission. The fleet sailed for Coruña, where it was + known the Armada, after an abortive start from Lisbon, had been + driven by bad weather, and something like what the Government + feared happened. Before it could reach its destination it met + southerly gales, its offensive power was exhausted, and it had + to return to Plymouth impotent for immediate action as the + Armada finally sailed. When the Spaniards appeared it was still + in port refitting and victualling. It was only by an + unprecedented feat of seamanship that <!-- + Page 174 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" + id="Page_174"></a>[pg 174]</span> the situation was saved, + and Howard was able to gain the orthodox position to seaward + of his enemy.</p> + + <p>So far, then, the Government's cautious clinging to a + general defensive attitude, instead of seeking out the enemy's + fleet, was justified, but it must be remembered that Drake from + the first had insisted it was a question of time as well as + place. If he had been permitted to make the movement when he + first proposed it, there is good reason to believe that the + final stages of the Spanish mobilisation could not have been + carried out that year; that is to say, the various divisions of + the Armada could not have been assembled into a fleet. But + information as to its condition was at the time very uncertain, + and in view of the negotiations that were on foot, there were, + moreover, high political reasons for our not taking too drastic + an offensive if a reasonable alternative existed.</p> + + <p>The principles, then, which we distil from this, the + original case of "seeking out," are, firstly, the moral value + of seizing the initiative, and, secondly, the importance of + striking before the enemy's mobilisation is complete. The idea + of overthrow by a great fleet action is not present, unless we + find it in a not clearly formulated idea of the Elizabethan + admirals of striking a fleet when it is demoralised, as the + Armada was by its first rebuff, or immediately on its leaving + port before it had settled down.</p> + + <p>In our next naval struggle with the Dutch in the latter half + of the seventeenth century the principle of overthrow, as we + have seen, became fully developed. It was the keynote of the + strategy which was evolved, and the conditions which forced it + to recognition also emphasised the principles of seeking out + and destroying. It was a case of a purely naval struggle, in + which there were no military considerations to deflect naval + strategy. It was, moreover, a question of narrow seas, and the + risk of missing contact which had cramped the Elizabethans in + their oceanic theatre was a negligible factor. Yet fresh + objections to using the "seeking out" maxim as a strategical + panacea soon declared themselves.</p> + <!-- Page 175 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" + id="Page_175"></a>[pg 175]</span> + + <p>The first war opened without any trace of the new principle. + The first campaign was concerned in the old fashion entirely + with the attack and defence of trade, and such indecisive + actions as occurred were merely incidental to the process. No + one appears to have realised the fallacy of such method except, + perhaps, Tromp. The general instructions he received were that + "the first and principal object was to do all possible harm to + the English," and to that end "he was given a fleet in order to + sail to the damage and offence of the English fleet, and also + to give convoy to the west." Seeing at once the incompatibility + of the two functions, he asked for more definite instructions. + What, for instance, was he to do if he found a chance of + blockading the main English fleet at its base? Was he to devote + himself to the blockade and "leave the whole fleet of + merchantmen to be a prey to a squadron of fast-sailing + frigates," or was he to continue his escort duty? Full as he + was of desire to deal with the enemy's main fleet, he was + perplexed with the practical difficulty—too often + forgotten—that the mere domination of the enemy's battle + strength does not solve the problem of control of the sea. No + fresh instructions were forthcoming to clear his perplexity, + and he could only protest again. "I could wish," he wrote, "to + be so fortunate as to have only one of these two + duties—to seek out the enemy, or to give convoy, for to + do both is attended with great difficulties."</p> + + <p>The indecisive campaign which naturally resulted from this + lack of strategical grip and concentration of effort came to an + <!-- Page 176 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" + id="Page_176"></a>[pg 176]</span> end with Tromp's partial + defeat of Blake off Dungeness on 30th November 1652. Though + charged in spite of his protests with a vast convoy, the + Dutch admiral had sent it back to Ostend when he found Blake + was in the Downs, and then, free from all preoccupation, he + had gone to seek out his enemy.</p> + + <p>It was the effect which this unexpected blow had upon the + strong military insight of the Cromwellian Government that led + to those famous reforms which made this winter so memorable a + landmark in British naval history. Monk, the most finished + professional soldier in the English service, and Deane, another + general, were joined in the command with Blake, and with their + coming was breathed into the sea service the high military + spirit of the New Model Army. To that winter we owe not only + the Articles of War, which made discipline possible, and the + first attempt to formulate Fighting Instructions, in which a + regular tactical system was conceived, but also two other + conceptions that go to make up the modern idea of naval + warfare. One was the conviction that war upon the sea meant + operations against the enemy's armed fleets in order to destroy + his power of naval resistance as distinguished from operations + by way of reprisal against his trade; and the other, that such + warfare required for its <!-- + Page 177 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" + id="Page_177"></a>[pg 177]</span> effective use a fleet of + State-owned ships specialised for war, with as little + assistance as possible from private-owned ships. It was not + unnatural that all four ideas should have taken shape + together, so closely are they related. The end connotes the + means. Discipline, fleet tactics, and a navy of warships + were indispensable for making war in the modern sense of the + term.</p> + + <p>The results were seen in the three great actions of the + following spring, the first under the three Generals, and the + other two under Monk alone. In the last, he carried the new + ideas so far as to forbid taking possession of disabled + vessels, that nothing might check the work of destruction. All + were to be sunk with as much tenderness for human life as + destruction would permit. In like manner the second war was + characterised by three great naval actions, one of which, after + Monk had resumed command, lasted no less than four days. The + new doctrine was indeed carried to exaggeration. So entirely + was naval thought centred on the action of the battle-fleets, + that no provision was made for an adequate exercise of control. + In our own case at least, massing for offensive action was + pressed so far that no thought was given to sustaining it by + reliefs. Consequently our offensive power suffered periods of + exhaustion when the fleet had to return to its base, and the + Dutch were left sufficient freedom not only to secure their own + trade, but to strike severely at ours. Their counterstrokes + culminated in the famous attack upon Sheerness and Chatham. + That such an opportunity was allowed them can be traced + directly to an exaggeration of the new doctrine. In the belief + of the British Government the "St. <!-- Page 178 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" + id="Page_178"></a>[pg 178]</span> James's Fight"—the + last of the three actions—had settled the question of + command. Negotiations for peace were opened, and they were + content to reap the fruit of the great battles in preying on + Dutch trade. Having done its work, as was believed, the bulk + of the battle-fleet for financial reasons was laid up, and + the Dutch seized the opportunity to demonstrate the + limitations of the abused doctrine. The lesson is one we + have never forgotten, but its value is half lost if we + attribute the disaster to lack of grasp of the battle-fleet + doctrine rather than to an exaggeration of its + possibilities.</p> + + <p>The truth is, that we had not obtained a victory + sufficiently decisive to destroy the enemy's fleet. The most + valuable lesson of the war was that such victories required + working for, and particularly in cases where the belligerents + face each other from either side of a narrow sea. In such + conditions it was proved that owing to the facility of retreat + and the restricted possibilities of pursuit a complete decision + is not to be looked for without very special strategical + preparation. The new doctrine in fact gave that new direction + to strategy which has been already referred to. It was no + longer a question of whether to make the enemy's trade or his + fleet the primary objective, but of how to get contact with his + fleet in such a way as to lead to decisive action. Merely to + seek him out on his own coasts was to ensure that no decisive + action would take place. Measures had to be taken to force him + to sea away from his own bases. The favourite device was to + substitute organised strategical operations against his trade + in place of the old sporadic attacks; that is, the fleet took a + position calculated to stop his trade altogether, not on his + own coasts, but far to sea in the main fairway. The operations + failed for lack of provision for enabling the fleet by + systematic relief to retain its position, but nevertheless it + was <!-- Page 179 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" + id="Page_179"></a>[pg 179]</span> the germ of the system + which afterwards, under riper organisation, was to prove so + effective, and to produce such actions as the "Glorious + First of June."</p> + + <p>In the third war, after this device had failed again and + again, a new one was tried. It was Charles the Second's own + conception. His idea was to use the threat of a military + expedition. Some 15,000 men in transports were brought to + Yarmouth in the hope that the Dutch would come out to bar their + passage across the open North Sea, and would thus permit our + fleet to cut in behind them. There was, however, no proper + coordination of the two forces, and the project failed.</p> + + <p>This method of securing a decision was not lost sight of; + Anson tried to use it in the Seven Years' War. For two years + every attempt to seek out the enemy's fleet had led to nothing + but the exhaustion of our own. But when Pitt began his raids on + the French coast, Anson, who had little faith in their value + for military purposes, thought he saw in them definite naval + possibilities. Accordingly when, in 1758, he was placed in + command of the Channel Fleet to cover the expedition against + St. Malo, he raised the blockade of Brest, and took up a + position near the Isle of Batz between the enemy's main fleet + and the army's line of passage. The Brest fleet, however, was + in no condition to move, and again there was no result. It was + not till 1805 that there was any clear case of the device + succeeding, and then it was not used deliberately. It was a + joint Anglo-Russian expedition in the Mediterranean that forced + from Napoleon his reckless order for Villeneuve to put to sea + from Cadiz, and so solved the problem out of which Nelson had + seen no issue. Lissa may be taken as an analogous + <!-- Page 180 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" + id="Page_180"></a>[pg 180]</span> case. But there the + Italians, treating the territorial attack as a real attack + instead of as a strategical device, suffered themselves to + be surprised by the Austrian fleet and defeated.</p> + + <p>This instance serves well to introduce the important fact, + that although our own military expeditions have seldom + succeeded in leading to a naval decision, the converse was + almost always true. The attempt of the enemy to use his army + against our territory has been the most fertile source of our + great naval victories. The knowledge that our enemy intends to + invade these shores, or to make some serious expedition against + our oversea dominions or interests, should always be welcomed. + Unless History belie herself, we know that such attempts are + the surest means of securing what we want. We have the memories + of La Hogue, Quiberon, and the Nile to assure us that sooner or + later they must lead to a naval decision, and the chance of a + real decision is all we can ask of the Fortune of War.</p> + + <p>Enough has now been said to show that "seeking out the + enemy's fleet" is not in itself sufficient to secure such a + decision. What the maxim really means is that we should + endeavour from the first to secure contact in the best position + for bringing about a complete decision in our favour, and as + soon as the other parts of our war plan, military or political, + will permit. If the main offensive is military, as it was in + the Japanese and American cases, then if possible the effort to + secure such control must be subordinated to the movement of + <!-- Page 181 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" + id="Page_181"></a>[pg 181]</span> the army, otherwise we + give the defensive precedence of the offensive. If, however, + the military offensive cannot be ensured until the naval + defensive is perfected, as will be the case if the enemy + brings a fleet up to our army's line of passage, then our + first move must be to secure naval contact.</p> + + <p>The vice of the opposite method of procedure is obvious. If + we assume the maxim that the first duty of our fleet is to seek + out the enemy wherever he may be, it means in its nakedness + that we merely conform to the enemy's dispositions and + movements. It is open to him to lead us wherever he likes. It + was one of the fallacies that underlay all Napoleon's naval + combinations, that he believed that our hard-bitten admirals + would behave in this guileless manner. But nothing was further + from their cunning. There is a typical order of Cornwallis's + which serves well to mark their attitude. It was one he gave to + Admiral Cotton, his second in command, in July 1804 on handing + over to his charge the Western Squadron off Ushant: "If the + French put to sea," he says, "without any of your vessels + seeing them, do not follow them, unless you are absolutely sure + of the course they have taken. If you leave the entrance of the + Channel without protection, the enemy might profit by it, and + assist the invasion which threatens His Majesty's dominions, + the protection of which is your principal object."</p> + + <p>It is indeed a common belief that Nelson never permitted + himself but a single purpose, the pursuit of the enemy's fleet, + and that, ignoring the caution which Cornwallis impressed upon + Cotton, he fell into the simple trap. But it has to be noted + that he never suffered himself to be led in pursuit of a fleet + away from the position he had been charged to maintain, unless + and until he had made that position secure behind him. His + famous chase to the West Indies is the case + <!-- Page 182 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" + id="Page_182"></a>[pg 182]</span> which has led to most + misconception on the point from an insufficient regard to + the surrounding circumstances. Nelson did not pursue + Villeneuve with the sole, or even the primary, object of + bringing him to action. His dominant object was to save + Jamaica from capture. If it had only been a question of + getting contact, he would certainly have felt in a surer + position by waiting for Villeneuve's return off St. Vincent + or closing in to the strategical centre off Ushant. Further, + it must be observed that Nelson by his pursuit did not + uncover what it was his duty to defend. The Mediterranean + position was rendered quite secure before he ventured on his + eccentric movement. Finally, we have the important fact that + though the moral effect of Nelson's implacable persistence + and rapidity was of priceless value, it is impossible to + show that as a mere strategical movement it had any + influence on the course of the campaign. His appearance in + the West Indies may have saved one or two small islands from + ransom and a good deal of trade from capture. It may also + have hastened Villeneuve's return by a few days, but that + was not to our advantage. Had he returned even a week later + there would have been no need to raise the Rochefort + blockade. Barham would have had enough ships at his command + to preserve the whole of his blockades, as he had intended + to do till the <i>Curieux's</i> news of Villeneuve's + precipitate return forced his hand before he was ready.</p> + + <p>If we desire a typical example of the way the old masters + used the doctrine of seeking out, it is to be found, not in + <!-- Page 183 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" + id="Page_183"></a>[pg 183]</span> Nelson's magnificent + chase, but in the restrained boldness of Barham's orders to + Cornwallis and Calder. Their instructions for seeking out + Villeneuve were to move out on his two possible lines of + approach for such a time and such a distance as would make + decisive action almost certain, and at the same time, if + contact were missed, would ensure the preservation of the + vital defensive positions. Barham was far too astute to play + into Napoleon's hands, and by blindly following his enemy's + lead to be jockeyed into sacrificing the position which his + enemy wished to secure. If our maxim be suffered to usurp + the place of instructed judgment, the almost inevitable + result will be that it will lead us into just the kind of + mistake which Barham avoided.</p> + + <h3>II. BLOCKADE</h3> + + <p>Under the term blockade we include operations which vary + widely in character and in strategical intention. In the first + place, blockade may be either naval or commercial. By naval + blockade we seek either to prevent an enemy's armed force + leaving port, or to make certain it shall be brought to action + before it can carry out the ulterior purpose for which it puts + to sea. That armed force may be purely naval, or it may consist + wholly or in part of a military expedition. If it be purely + naval, then our blockade is a method of securing command. If it + be purely military, it is a method of exercising command, and + as such will be dealt with when we come to consider defence + against invasion. But in so far as military expeditions are + normally accompanied by a naval escort, operations to prevent + their sailing are not purely concerned with the exercise of + command. Naval blockade, therefore, may be regarded for + practical purposes as a method of securing command and as a + function of battle-squadrons. Commercial blockade, on the other + hand, is essentially a method of exercising command, and is + mainly an affair of cruisers. Its + <!-- Page 184 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" + id="Page_184"></a>[pg 184]</span> immediate object is to + stop the flow of the enemy's sea-borne trade, whether + carried in his own or neutral bottoms, by denying him the + use of trade communications.</p> + + <p>From the point of view of the conduct of war, therefore, we + have two well-defined categories of blockade, naval and + commercial. But our classification must go further; for naval + blockade itself is equally varied in intention, and must be + subdivided. Strictly speaking, the term implies a desire to + close the blockaded port and to prevent the enemy putting to + sea. But this was not always the intention. As often as not our + wish was that he should put to sea that we might bring him to + action, and in order to do this, before he could effect his + purpose, we had to watch the port with a fleet more or less + closely. For this operation there was no special name. Widely + as it differed in object from the other, it was also usually + called blockade, and Nelson's protest against the consequent + confusion of thought is well known. "It is not my intention," + he said, "to close-watch Toulon"; and again, "My system is the + very contrary of blockading. Every opportunity has been offered + the enemy to put to sea." It is desirable, therefore, to adopt + terms to distinguish the two forms. "Close" and "open" express + the antithesis suggested by Nelson's letter, and the two terms + serve well enough to mark the characteristic feature of each + operation. Close blockade, it is true, as formerly conceived, + is generally regarded as no longer practicable; but the + antithetical ideas, which the two forms of blockade connote, + can never be eliminated from strategical consideration. It must + always be with the relations of these two forms, whatever shape + they may take in future, that the strategy of naval blockade is + chiefly concerned.</p> + + <p>With regard to commercial blockade, in strict analysis it + <!-- Page + 185 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" + id="Page_185"></a>[pg 185]</span> should be eliminated from + an inquiry that concerns methods of securing command and + postponed to that section of exercising command which deals + with the attack and defence of trade. It is, however, + necessary to treat certain of its aspects in conjunction + with naval blockade for two reasons: one, that as a rule + naval blockade is indissolubly united to a subordinate + commercial blockade; and the other, that the commercial + form, though its immediate object is the exercise of + control, has almost invariably an ulterior object which is + concerned with securing control; that is to say, while its + immediate object was to keep the enemy's commercial ports + closed, its ulterior object was to force his fleet to + sea.</p> + + <p>Commercial blockade, therefore, has an intimate relation + with naval blockade in its open form. We adopt that form when + we wish his fleet to put to sea, and commercial blockade is + usually the most effective means we have of forcing upon him + the movement we leave him free to attempt. By closing his + commercial ports we exercise the highest power of injuring him + which the command of the sea can give us. We choke the flow of + his national activity afloat in the same way that military + occupation of his territory chokes it ashore. He must, + therefore, either tamely submit to the worst which a naval + defeat can inflict upon him, or he must fight to release + himself. He may see fit to choose the one course or the other, + but in any case we can do no more by naval means alone to force + our will upon him.</p> + + <p>In the long run a rigorous and uninterrupted blockade is + almost sure to exhaust him before it exhausts us, but the end + will be far and costly. As a rule, therefore, we have found + that where we had a substantial predominance our enemy + preferred to submit to commercial blockade in hope that by the + chances of war or the development of fresh force he might later + on be in a better position to come out into the open. That he + should come out and stake the issue in battle was nearly always + our wish, and it was obvious that too rigorous + <!-- Page 186 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" + id="Page_186"></a>[pg 186]</span> a naval blockade was not + the way to achieve the desired end, or to reap the + strategical result which we might expect from paralysing his + commerce. Consequently where the desire for a decision at + sea was not crossed by higher military considerations, as in + the case of imminent invasion, or where we ourselves had an + important expedition in hand, it was to our interest to + incline the enemy's mind towards the bolder choice.</p> + + <p>The means was to tempt him with a prospect of success, + either by leading him to believe the blockading force was + smaller than it was, or by removing it to such a distance as + would induce him to attempt to evade it, or both. A leading + case of such an open blockade was Nelson's disposition of his + fleet off Cadiz when he was seeking to bring Villeneuve to + action in 1805. But merely to leave a port open does not fulfil + the idea of open blockade, and in this case to opportunity and + temptation Nelson added the pressure of a commercial blockade + of the adjacent ports in hope of starving Villeneuve into the + necessity of taking to the sea.</p> + + <p>Finally, in a general comparison of the two forms, we have + to observe that close blockade is characteristically a method + of securing local and temporary command. Its dominating purpose + will usually be to prevent the enemy's fleet acting in a + certain area and for a certain purpose. Whereas open blockade, + in that it aims at the destruction of an enemy's naval force, + is a definite step towards securing permanent command.</p> + + <p>Enough has now been said to show that the question of choice + between close and open blockade is one of extreme complexity. + Our naval literature, it is true, presents the old masters as + divided into two schools on the subject, implying that one was + in favour of the close form always, and the other of the open + form. We are even led to believe that the choice depended on + the military spirit of the officer concerned. If his military + spirit was high, he chose the close and <!-- Page 187 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" + id="Page_187"></a>[pg 187]</span> more exacting form; if it + were low, he was content with the open and less exacting + form. True, we are told that men of the latter school based + their objections to close blockade on the excessive wear and + tear of a fleet that it involved, but it is too often + suggested that this attitude was no more than a mask for a + defective spirit. Seldom if ever are we invited to compare + their decisions with the attendant strategical intention, + with the risks which the conditions justified, or with the + expenditure of energy which the desired result could + legitimately demand. Yet all these considerations must enter + into the choice, and on closer examination of the leading + cases it will be found that they bear a striking and almost + constant relation to the nature of the blockade + employed.</p> + + <p>In considering open blockade, three postulates must be kept + in mind. Firstly, since our object is to get the enemy to sea, + our position must be such as will give him an opportunity of + doing so. Secondly, since we desire contact for a decisive + battle, that position must be no further away from his port + than is compatible with bringing him to action before he can + effect his purpose. Thirdly, there is the idea of + economy—that is, the idea of adopting the method which is + least exhausting to our fleet, and which will best preserve its + battle fitness. It is on the last point that the greatest + difference of opinion has existed. A close blockade always + tended to exhaust a fleet, and always must do so. But, on the + other hand, it was contended that the exhaustion is compensated + by the high temper and moral domination which the maintenance + of a close blockade produces in a good fleet, whereas the + comparative ease of distant and secure watch tended to + deterioration. Before considering these opposed views, one + warning is necessary. It is usually assumed that the + alternative to close blockade is watching the enemy from one of + our own ports, but this is not essential. What is required is + an interior and, if possible, a secret position which will + render contact certain; and with modern developments in the + means of distant communication, + <!-- Page 188 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" + id="Page_188"></a>[pg 188]</span> such a position is usually + better found at sea than in port. A watching position can in + fact be obtained free from the strain of dangerous + navigation and incessant liability to attack without + sacrifice of sea training. With this very practical point in + mind, we may proceed to test the merits of the two forms on + abstract principles.</p> + + <p>It was always obvious that a close naval blockade was one of + the weakest and least desirable forms of war. Here again when + we say "weakest" we do not mean "least effective," but that it + was exhausting, and that it tended to occupy a force greater + than that against which it was acting. This was not because a + blockading fleet, tempered and toughened by its watch, and with + great advantage of tactical position, could not be counted on + to engage successfully a raw fleet of equal force issuing from + port, but because in order to maintain its active efficiency it + required large reserves for its relief. So severe was the wear + and tear both to men and ships, that even the most strenuous + exponents of the system considered that at least a fifth of the + force should always be refitting, and in every case two + admirals were employed to relieve one another. In 1794 one of + the highest authorities in the service considered that to + maintain an effective close blockade of Brest two complete sets + of flag-officers were necessary, and that no less than + one-fourth of the squadron should always be in + port.<a name="NtA_16" + id="NtA_16"></a><a href="#Nt_16"><sup>16</sup></a></p> + + <p>Now these weaknesses, being inherent in close blockade, + necessarily affected the appreciation of its value. The weight + <!-- Page 189 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" + id="Page_189"></a>[pg 189]</span> of the objection tended of + course to decrease as seamanship, material, or organisation + improved, but it was always a factor. It is true also that + it seems to have had more weight with some men than with + others, but it will appear equally true, if we endeavour to + trace the movement of opinion on the subject, that it was + far from being the sole determinant.</p> + + <p>It was in the Seven Years' War under Anson's administration + that continuous and close blockade was first used + systematically, but it was Hawke who originated it. In the + first three campaigns the old system of watching Brest from a + British western port had been in vogue, but it had twice failed + to prevent a French concentration in the vital Canadian + theatre. In the spring of 1759 Hawke was in command of the + Channel Fleet with the usual instructions for watching, but + being directed to stand over and look into Brest, he intimated + his intention, unless he received orders to the contrary, to + remain off the port instead of returning to Torbay. His reason + was that he had found there a squadron which he believed was + intended for the West Indies, and he considered it better to + prevent its sailing than to let it put to sea and try to catch + it. In other words, he argued that none of the usual western + watching ports afforded a position interior to the usual French + route from Brest to the West Indies.</p> + + <p>Since rumours of invasion were in the air, it was obviously + the better course to deal with the enemy's squadrons in home + waters and avoid dispersal of the fleet in seeking them out. In + spite of extraordinarily bad weather, therefore, he was + permitted to act as he advised. With Boscawen as relief, the + <!-- Page 190 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" + id="Page_190"></a>[pg 190]</span> new form of blockade was + kept up thenceforward, and with entire success. But it must + be noted that this success was rather due to the fact that + the French made no further effort to cross the Atlantic, + than to the fact that the blockade was maintained with + sufficient strictness to prevent their doing so. In certain + states of weather our fleet was forced to raise the blockade + and run to Torbay or Plymouth. Such temporary reversions to + the open form nearly always afforded an opportunity for the + French to get away to the southward with two or three days' + start. Against any attempt, however, to get to the east or + the north in order to dispute command of the Channel or + other home waters the system was thoroughly efficient, and + was unaffected by the intervals of the open form.</p> + + <p>It may have been these considerations which in the War of + American Independence induced so fine an officer as Howe to be + strongly in favour of a reversion to the old system. The vital + theatre was then again across the Atlantic, and there was no + serious preparation for invasion. It should also be borne in + mind in judging Howe against Hawke, that in the Seven Years' + War we had such a preponderance at sea as permitted ample + reserves to nourish a close blockade, whereas in the latter war + we were numerically inferior to the hostile coalition. Since it + was impossible to prevent the French reaching the West Indies + and North America if they so determined, our policy was to + follow them with equal fleets and reduce the home force as low + as that policy demanded + <!-- Page 191 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" + id="Page_191"></a>[pg 191]</span> and as was consistent with + a reasonable degree of safety. The force required might well + be inferior to the enemy, since it was certain that all + attempts upon the Channel would be made with an unwieldy and + ill-knit force composed of Spanish and French units.</p> + + <p>In Howe's opinion this particular situation was not to be + solved by attempting to close Brest, and nothing can be more + misleading than to stretch such an opinion beyond the + circumstances it was intended to meet. He did not consider it + was in his power to close the port. The enemy, he held, could + always be in readiness to escape after a gale of wind by which + the blockading squadron would be drawn off or dispersed, the + ships much damaged, and the enemy enheartened. "An enemy," he + said, "is not to be restrained from putting to sea by a station + taken off their port with a barely superior squadron." The + experience of 1805 appears to contradict him. Then a barely + superior squadron did succeed in preventing Ganteaume's exit, + but though the squadron actually employed was barely superior, + it had ample fleet reserves to sustain its numbers in + efficiency. It was, moreover, only for a short time that it had + to deal with any real effort to escape. After May 20th, + Ganteaume was forbidden to put to sea. There were certainly + several occasions during that famous blockade when he could + have escaped to the southward had Napoleon wished it.</p> + + <p>This case, then, cannot be taken to condemn Howe's judgment. + <!-- Page + 192 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" + id="Page_192"></a>[pg 192]</span> His special function in + the war plan was, with a force reduced to defensive + strength, to prevent the enemy obtaining command of our home + waters. It was certainly not his duty to undertake + operations to which his force was not equal. His first duty + was to keep it in being for its paramount purpose. To this + end he decided on open blockade based on a general reserve + at Spithead or St. Helen's, where he could husband the ships + and train his recruits, while at the same time he protected + our trade and communications and harassed those of the + enemy. Kempenfelt, than whom there was no warmer advocate of + activity, entirely approved the policy at least for the + winter months, and in his case no one will be found to + suggest that the idea was prompted by lack of spirit or love + of ease. So far as the summer was concerned there was really + little difference of opinion as to whether the fleet should + be kept at sea or not, for sea-training during summer more + than compensated for the exhaustion of material likely to be + caused by intermittent spells of bad weather. Even for the + winter the two policies came to much the same thing. Thus in + Hawke's blockade at the end of 1759, during the critical + month from mid-October to mid-November, he was unable to + keep his station for nearly half the time, and when he did + get contact with Conflans it was from Torbay and not Ushant. + Still it may be doubted if without the confidence bred of + his stormy vigil the battle of Quiberon would have been + fought as it was.</p> + <!-- Page 193 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" + id="Page_193"></a>[pg 193]</span> + + <p>With all this experience fresh in his mind Kempenfelt + frankly advocated keeping the fleet in port for the winter. + "Suppose," he wrote from Torbay in November 1779, "the enemy + should put to sea with their fleet (that is, from + Brest)—a thing much to be wished for by us—let us + act wisely and keep ours in port. Leave them to the mercy of + long nights and hard gales. They will do more in favour of you + than your fleet can." Far better he thought to devote the + winter to preparing the fleet for the next campaign so as to + have "the advantage of being the first in the field." "Let us," + he concluded, "keep a stout squadron to the westward ready to + attend the motions of the enemy. I don't mean to keep them at + sea, disabling themselves in buffeting the winds, but at Torbay + ready to act as intelligence may suggest."<a name="NtA_17" + id="NtA_17"></a><a href="#Nt_17"><sup>17</sup></a> It will + be seen, therefore, that the conclusion that close blockade + was always the best means of rendering the fleet most + efficient for the function it had to perform must not be + accepted too hastily. The reasons which induced Howe and + Kempenfelt to prefer open blockade were mainly based on this + very consideration. Having in mind the whole of the + surrounding conditions, in their highly experienced opinion + careful preparation in the winter and tactical evolutions in + the summer were the surest road to battle fitness in the + force available.</p> + + <p>On the other hand, we have the fact that during the War of + American Independence the open system was not very successful. + But before condemning it out of hand, it must be remembered + that the causes of failure were not all inherent in the system. + In the first place, the need of relieving Gibraltar from time + to time prevented the Western Squadron devoting + <!-- Page 194 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" + id="Page_194"></a>[pg 194]</span> itself entirely to its + watch. In the next place, owing to defective administration + the winters were not devoted with sufficient energy to + preparing the fleet to be first in the field in the spring. + Finally, we have to recognise that the lack of success was + due not so much to permitting the French to cross the + Atlantic, as to the failure to deal faithfully with them + when contact was obtained at their destination. Obviously + there is nothing to be said for the policy of "seeking out" + as against that of preventing exit unless you are determined + when you find to destroy or to be destroyed. It was here + that Rodney and his fellows were found wanting. The system + failed from defective execution quite as much as from + defective design.</p> + + <p>In the next war Howe was still in the ascendant and in + command of the Channel fleet. He retained his system. Leaving + Brest open he forced the French by operating against their + trade to put to sea, and he was rewarded with the battle of the + First of June. No attempt was made to maintain a close blockade + during the following winter. The French were allowed to sail, + and their disastrous cruise of January 1795 fully justified + Kempenfelt's anticipations. So great was the damage done that + they abandoned all idea of using their fleet as a whole. Howe's + system was continued, but no longer with entirely successful + results. In 1796 the French were able to make descents upon + Ireland, and Howe in consequence has come in for the severest + castigations. His method is contemptuously contrasted with that + which St. Vincent adopted <!-- Page + 195 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" + id="Page_195"></a>[pg 195]</span> four years later, without + any regard to the situation each admiral had to meet, and + again on the assumption that the closing of Brest would have + solved the one problem as well as it did the other.</p> + + <p>In 1796 we were not on the defensive as we were in 1800. The + French fleet had been practically destroyed. No invasion + threatened. With a view to forcing peace our policy was + directed to offensive action against French trade and territory + in order by general pressure to back our overtures for a + settlement. The policy may have been mistaken, but that is not + the question. The question is, whether or not the strategy + fitted the policy. We were also, it must be remembered, at war + with Holland and expecting war with Spain, an eventuality which + forced us to keep an eye on the defence of Portugal. In these + circumstances nothing was further from our desire than to keep + what was left of the Brest fleet in port. Our hope was by our + offensive action against French maritime interests to force it + to expose itself for their defence. To devote the fleet to the + closing of Brest was to cripple it for offensive action and to + play the enemy's game. The actual disposition of the home fleet + was designed so as to preserve its offensive activity, and at + the same time to ensure superiority in any part of the home + waters in which the enemy might attempt a counterstroke. It was + distributed in three active squadrons, one in the North Sea, + one before Brest, and one cruising to the westward, with a + strong reserve at Portsmouth. It is the location of the reserve + that has been most lightly ridiculed, on the hasty assumption + that it was merely the reserve of the squadron before Brest; + whereas in truth it was a general reserve + <!-- Page 196 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" + id="Page_196"></a>[pg 196]</span> designed to act in the + North Sea or wherever else it might be needed. At the same + time it served as a training and depot squadron for + increasing our power at sea in view of the probable addition + of the Spanish fleet to Napoleon's naval force. To have + exhausted our fleet merely to prevent raids leaving Brest + which might equally well leave the Texel or Dunkirk was just + what the enemy would have desired. The disposition was in + fact a good example of concentration—that is, disposal + about a strategical centre to preserve flexibility for + offence without risking defensive needs, and yet it is by + the most ardent advocates of concentration and the offensive + that Howe's dispositions at this time have been most roundly + condemned.</p> + + <p>In the end the disposition did fail to prevent the landing + of part of the force intended for Ireland, but it made the + venture so difficult that it had to be deferred till + mid-winter, and then the weather which rendered evasion + possible broke up the expedition and denied it all chance of + serious success. It was, in fact, another example of the + working of Kempenfelt's rule concerning winter weather. So far + as naval defence can go, the disposition was all that was + required. The Irish expedition was seen leaving Brest by our + inshore cruiser squadron. It was reported to Colpoys, who had + the battle-squadron outside, and it was only a dense fog that + enabled it to escape. It was, in fact, nothing more than the + evasion of a small raiding force—an eventuality against + which no naval defence can provide certain guarantee, + especially in winter.</p> + + <p>It was under wholly different conditions that at the end of + 1800 Hawke's system was revived. St. Vincent's succession + <!-- Page 197 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" + id="Page_197"></a>[pg 197]</span> to the control of the + fleet coincided with Napoleon's definite assumption of the + control of the destinies of France. Our great duel with him + had begun. The measures he was taking made it obvious we + were once more facing the old life and death struggle for + naval supremacy; we were openly threatened with invasion, + and we had a distinct preponderance at sea. In short, we + have to recognize the fact that the methods of the Seven + Years' War were revived when the problems and factors of + that war were renewed. As those problems grew more intense, + as they did after the Peace of Amiens, and the threat of + invasion became really formidable, so did the rigour of the + close blockade increase. Under Cornwallis and Gardner it was + maintained in such a way as to deny, so far as human effort + could go, all possibility of exit without fighting. In spite + of the importance of dealing with the enemy's squadrons in + detail no risks were taken to bring Ganteaume to decisive + action. Our first necessity was absolute local command. The + acuteness of the invasion crisis demanded that the Brest + fleet should be kept in port, and every time Ganteaume + showed a foot the British admiral flew at him and drove him + back. Once only during the continuation of the crisis was + the rigour of this attitude relaxed, and that was to deal + with what for the moment was the higher object. It was to + meet Villeneuve on his return from the West Indies, but even + then so nicely was the relaxation calculated, that Ganteaume + was given no time to take advantage of it.</p> + <!-- Page 198 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" + id="Page_198"></a>[pg 198]</span> + + <p>The analogy between the conditions of the blockade which St. + Vincent inaugurated and those of the Seven Years' War becomes + all the more significant when we note that while Cornwallis and + Gardner in home waters were pressing close blockade to its + utmost limit of rigour, Nelson in the Mediterranean was not + using it at all. Yet with him also the chief concern was to + prevent an invasion. His main function, as he and his + Government saw it, was to prevent a descent from Southern + France upon Neapolitan or Levantine territory. Why, then, did + he not employ close blockade? It is usually assumed that it was + because of his overpowering desire to bring the Toulon squadron + to action. Occasional expressions in his letters give colour to + such a view, but his dispositions show clearly that his desire + to bring the fleet to action was kept in scientific + subordination to the defensive duty with which he was charged. + Close blockade was the most effectual means of securing this + end, but in his case one of the conditions, which we have found + always accompanying successful close blockade, was absent. He + had no such preponderance of force as would enable him to + nourish it up to the point of perfect continuity. In the + circumstances the close form was too weak or exhausting for him + to use with the force at his disposal.</p> + + <p>If this case be not considered conclusive as to Nelson's + views, we have a perfectly clear endorsement from his pen in + 1801. It is a particularly strong testimony, for he was at the + time actually charged with defence against the invasion of + England. With several cruiser squadrons he had to prevent the + enemy's force issuing from a number of ports extending from + Flushing to Dieppe, and he was directing the operations from + the Downs. On the approach of winter he was impressed with the + inexpediency of attempting to continue a close blockade, and + wrote to the Admiralty as follows: "I am of opinion, and submit + to their Lordships' better judgment, that care should be taken + to keep our squadrons compact and + <!-- Page 199 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" + id="Page_199"></a>[pg 199]</span> in good order ... under + Dungeness to be their principal station.... In fine weather + our squadrons to go out and show themselves, but never to + risk either being crippled or drawn into the North Sea; thus + we shall always be sure of an effective force, ready to act + as occasion calls for it."<a name="NtA_18" + id="NtA_18"></a><a href="#Nt_18"><sup>18</sup></a></p> + + <p>The case of course is not entirely in point, for it concerns + the question of direct resistance to invasion and not to + securing general command. Its value is that it gives Nelson's + views on the broad question of balancing the risks—that + is, the risk of relaxing close watch against the risk of + destroying the efficiency of the ships by maintaining it too + rigorously.</p> + + <p>With Nelson holding this view, it is not surprising to find + that as late as 1804 naval opinion was not quite settled on the + relative advantages of close and open blockade even in the case + of threatened invasion. Just a year before Trafalgar was + fought, Cornwallis pressed the Admiralty for more strength to + enable him to keep his blockade efficient. Lord Melville, who + at this time had Barham at his elbow, replied recommending the + "policy of relaxing the strictness of blockade, formerly + resorted to." He protested the means available were + insufficient for "sustaining the necessary extent of naval + force, if your ships are to be torn to pieces by an eternal + conflict with the elements during the tempestuous months of + <!-- Page 200 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" + id="Page_200"></a>[pg 200]</span> winter."<a name="NtA_19" + id="NtA_19"></a><a href="#Nt_19"><sup>19</sup></a> Melville + was craving for a decisive action to end the insupportable + strain. "Allow me to remind you," he added, "that the + occasions when we have been able to bring our enemy to + battle and our fleets to victory have generally been when we + were at a distance from the blockading station." In the end, + as we know, Cornwallis had his way, and the verdict of + history has been to approve the decision for its moral + effect alone. Such conflicts must always arise. "War," as + Wolfe said, "is an option of difficulties," and the choice + must sway to the one side or the other as the circumstances + tend to develop the respective advantages of each form. We + can never say that close blockade is better than open, or + the reverse. It must always be a matter of judgment.</p> + + <p>Are there, then, no principles which we can deduce from the + old practice for the strengthening of judgment? Certain broad + lines of guidance at least are to be traced. The main question + will be, is it to our advantage, in regard to all the + strategical conditions, to keep the enemy in and get him to sea + for a decision? Presumably it will always be our policy to get + a decision as soon as possible. Still that desire may be + overridden by the necessity or special advantage of closely + <!-- Page + 201 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" + id="Page_201"></a>[pg 201]</span> blockading one or more of + his squadrons. This situation may arise in two ways. + Firstly, it may be essential to provide for the local and + temporary command of a certain theatre of operations, as + when an invasion threatens in that area, or when we wish to + pass a military expedition across it, or from special + exigencies in regard to the attack or defence of commerce. + Secondly, even where we are seeking a great decision, we may + blockade one squadron closely in order to induce a decision + at the point most advantageous to ourselves; that is to say, + we may blockade one or more squadrons in order to induce the + enemy to attempt with one or more other squadrons to break + that blockade. In this way we may lead him either to expose + himself to be struck in detail, or to concentrate where we + desire his concentration.</p> + + <p>For any of these reasons we may decide that the best way of + realising our object is to use close blockade, but the matter + does not end there. We have still to consider whether close + blockade is within the limit of the force we have available, + and whether it is the best method of developing the fullest + potentialities of that force. Close blockade being the more + exhausting form will require the greater strength; we cannot + blockade closely for any length of time without a force + relatively superior; but if by open blockade of a squadron we + permit it to put to sea with contact assured, we know that, + even with a slightly inferior force, we can so deal with it as + to prevent its getting local control sufficient to break down + our mobile flotilla defence or to interfere seriously with our + trade.</p> + + <p>Finally, there is the question of risk. In the old days, + before free movement and wireless telegraphy, and before the + flotilla had acquired battle power, there was always to be + faced the risk of not getting contact in time to prevent + mischief. This consideration was specially dominant where the + enemy had a squadron within or near the critical theatre of + operations. Therefore when the invasion threatened, our + developed policy was to blockade Brest closely at almost any + sacrifice. + <!-- Page 202 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" + id="Page_202"></a>[pg 202]</span> There was always a vague + possibility that by evasion or chance of wind a squadron so + close to the line of invasion might get sufficient temporary + command in the vital area before it could be brought to + action. It was a possibility that was never realised in the + Narrow Seas, and since mobility of fleets and means of + distant communication have so greatly increased in range and + certainty, and since the power of resistance in the flotilla + has become so high, the risk is probably much less than + ever, and the field for open blockade is consequently less + restricted.</p> + + <p>There is no need, however, to accept these principles as + incontrovertible. Even if we take the great blockade of 1803-5, + which has most firmly dominated thought on the subject ever + since, it may be argued with some plausibility that the + situation could have been solved more quickly and effectually + by letting Ganteaume get out from Brest into the open, at least + as far as Admiral Togo was forced to permit the Russians to + emerge from Port Arthur, though his reasons for keeping them in + were even stronger than ours in 1805. But in any case, the + whole trend of the evidence will admit no doubt as to the + inherent weakness of close blockade as a form of war. As under + modern developments the possibilities of open blockade have + increased, so the difficulties and dangers of close blockade + have certainly not decreased. It is also probable that certain + advantages which in the sailing era went far to compensate for + its weakness have lost much of their force. A sailing fleet + cooped up in port not only rapidly lost its spirit, but, being + barred from sea-training, could not be kept in a condition of + efficiency, whereas the blockading fleet was quickly raised to + the highest temper by the stress of vigilance and danger that + was its incessant portion. So long as the strain did not pass + the limit of human endurance, it was all to the good. In the + old days, with very moderate + <!-- Page 203 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" + id="Page_203"></a>[pg 203]</span> reliefs, the limit was + never reached, and the sacrifices that were made to those + exhausting vigils were rewarded twentyfold in exuberant + confidence on the day of battle. Can we expect the same + compensation now? Will the balance of strength and weakness + remain as it used to be? In the face of the vast change of + conditions and the thinness of experience, it is to general + principles we must turn for the answer.</p> + + <p>What, in fact, is the inherent weakness of close blockade? + Strategical theory will at once reply that it is an operation + which involves "an arrest of the offensive," a situation which + is usually taken to exhibit every kind of drawback. Close + blockade is essentially an offensive operation, although its + object is usually negative; that is, it is a forward movement + to prevent the enemy carrying out some offensive operation + either direct or by way of counterstroke. So far the common + tendency to confuse "Seeking out the enemy's fleet" with + "Making the enemy's coast your frontier" may be condoned. But + the two operations are widely different in that they have + different objectives. In "seeking out," our objective is the + enemy's armed force. In "making the enemy's coast our + frontier," the objective is inseparable from the ulterior + object of the naval war. In this case the objective is the + common communications. By establishing a blockade we operate + offensively against those communications. We occupy them, and + then we can do no more. Our offensive is arrested; we cannot + carry it on to the destruction of the enemy's fleet. We have to + wait in a defensive attitude, holding the communications we + have seized, till he chooses to attack in order to break our + hold; and during that period of arrest the advantage of + surprise—the all-important advantage in war—passes + by a well recognised rule to our enemy. We, in fact, are held + upon the defensive, with none of the material advantages of the + defensive. The moral advantage of having taken the initiative + remains, but that is all. The advantage which we thus gain will + of course have the same kind of depressing effect upon the + <!-- Page 204 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" + id="Page_204"></a>[pg 204]</span> blockaded fleet as it had + of old, but scarcely in so high a degree. The degradation of + a steam fleet in port can scarcely be so rapid or + debilitating as it was when nine-tenths of seamanship lay in + the smart handling of sails. For the blockading fleet it is + also true that the effects of weather, which formerly were + the main cause of wear and tear, can scarcely be so severe. + But, on the other hand, the physical strain to officers and + men, and the difficulty of supply, will be far greater, so + long at least as coal is the chief fuel. The wind no longer + sets a measure on the enemy's movements. Vigilance close and + unremitting beyond all our predecessors knew is the portion + of the blockaders to prevent surprise. Furthermore, in the + old days surprise meant at worst the enemy's escape; now it + may mean our own destruction by mine or torpedo. It is + unnecessary to labour the point. It is too obvious that a + close blockade of the old type exhibits under present + conditions the defects of "arrested offence" in so high a + degree as practically to prohibit its use.</p> + + <p>What, then, can be done? Must we rest content in all + situations with Howe's system, which riper experience condemned + for cases of extreme necessity? Cannot the old close blockade + be given a modern form? Assuredly it can. In old days the + shoreward limit of the blockading fleet was just beyond the + range of the coast batteries, and this position it held + continuously by means of an inshore squadron. In these days of + mobile defence that limit is by analogy the night range of + destroyers and the day range of submarines, that is, half the + distance they can traverse between dark and dawn or dawn and + dark respectively, unless within that limit a torpedo-proof + base can be established. A blockade of this nature will + correspond in principle to a close blockade of the old type; + nor in practice, as was proved in the Japanese blockade of Port + Arthur, will its incidents be materially different. The + distance at which the battle-squadron must keep will seem at + first sight to deny it certainty of immediate contact—the + essence + <!-- Page 205 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" + id="Page_205"></a>[pg 205]</span> of close blockade. But in + truth other new factors already noticed will reduce that + distance relatively. Quicker and more certain means of + communication between the admiral and his scouts, the + absolute freedom of movement and the power of delaying the + enemy's actual exit by mining, may go far to bring things + back to their old relations. At Port Arthur they did so + entirely. If then, as in that case, our paramount object is + to keep the enemy in, there seems still no reason why we + should not make our dispositions on the principle of close + blockade. Distances will be greater, but that is all.</p> + + <p>Nor must it be forgotten that for a squadron to take station + off a port in the old manner is not the only means of close + blockade. It may still effect its purpose, at least + temporarily, by supporting mining vessels or block + ships—"sinkers," as they used to be called. The latter + expedient, it is true, had little success in the latest + experiments, but even in the Russo-Japanese War its + possibilities were by no means exhausted. We have therefore to + conclude that where the strategical conditions call obviously + for close blockade, our plan of operations will be modified in + that direction with the means still at our disposal.</p> + + <p>If, however, our object is not so sharply defined, if in + spite of our desire to deny the enemy the sea we are ready to + take risks in order to bring about a decision, the case is not + so clear. It will be observed that the looseness which the new + conditions force upon close blockade-increasing as they are in + intensity year by year-must tend more and more to approximate + it in practice to open blockade. The question will therefore + present itself whether it would not be more in accordance with + the fundamental elements of strength to adopt open blockade + frankly for all purposes. We should thus substitute a true + defensive disposition for an arrested offence, and, + theoretically, that in itself is a great advantage. The + practical benefits, whatever the correlative drawbacks, are + <!-- Page 206 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" + id="Page_206"></a>[pg 206]</span> equally clear, nor are + they less great now than they appeared to Howe and + Kempenfelt. We avoid exhaustion of machinery, coal, and men, + and this, at least for the necessary flotilla screen, will + be greater than anything that had to be faced in former + days. We have at least the opportunity of occupying a + position secure from surprise, and of keeping the fleet + continually up to its highest striking energy. Finally, + assuming the geographical conditions give reasonable promise + of contact, a quick decision, which modern war demands with + ever greater insistence, is more probable. In such a + disposition of course contact can rarely be made certain. + The enemy, whom the hypothesis of blockade assumes to be + anxious to avoid action, will always have a chance of + evasion, but this will always be so, even with the closest + blockade now possible. We may even go further and claim for + open blockade that in favourable conditions it may give the + better chance of contact. For by adopting the principle of + open blockade we shall have, in accordance with the theory + of defence, the further advantages of being able the better + to conceal our dispositions, and consequently to lay traps + for our enemy, such as that which Nelson prepared for + Villeneuve in the Gulf of Lyons in 1805.</p> + + <p>The objection to such a course which appears to have the + most weight with current opinion is the moral one, which is + inseparable from all deliberate choices of the defensive. If + the watching fleet remains in a home fortified base, it may be + assumed that the usual moral degradation will set in. But the + method does not entail the inglorious security of such a base. + A sound position may well be found at a spot such as Admiral + <!-- Page 207 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" + id="Page_207"></a>[pg 207]</span> Togo occupied while + waiting for the Baltic fleet, and in that case there was no + observable degradation of any kind. Nor is there much + evidence that this objection weighed materially with the + opponents of Howe's view. Their objection was of a purely + physical kind. Open blockade left the enemy too much freedom + to raid our trade routes. The watching system might be + sufficient to keep an unwilling battle-fleet in port or to + bring a more adventurous one to action, but it could not + control raiding squadrons. This was certainly Barham's + objection. "If," he wrote to Pitt in 1794, "the French + should have any intention of sending their fleet to sea with + this easterly wind, and Lord Howe continues at Torbay, our + Mediterranean and Jamaica convoys are in a very critical + situation. Both fleets must by this time be drawing near the + Channel, and cannot enter it while the easterly wind holds." + This danger must always be with us, especially in narrow + waters such as the North Sea. In more open theatres the + difficulty is not so obtrusive, for with sufficient sea room + trade may take naturally or by direction a course which our + watching dispositions will cover. Thus with Nelson in the + case of Toulon, his normal positions on the Sardinian coast + covered effectually the flow of our trade to the Levant and + the Two Sicilies, which was all there was at the time.</p> + + <p>The truth is, that in endeavouring to decide between open + and close blockade we find ourselves confronted with those + special difficulties which so sharply distinguish naval warfare + from warfare on land. We cannot choose on purely naval + considerations. In naval warfare, however great may be our + desire to concentrate our effort on the enemy's main forces, + the ulterior object will always obtrude itself. We must from + the first do our best to control sea communications, and since + those communications are usually common, we cannot refrain + <!-- Page 208 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" + id="Page_208"></a>[pg 208]</span> from occupying those of + the enemy without at the same time neglecting and exposing + our own. Thus in the case of Brest a close blockade was + always desirable, and especially at convoy seasons, because + the great trade routes which passed within striking distance + of the port were all common, whereas in the region of Toulon + the main lines were not common except along the coasts of + Africa and Southern Italy, and these Nelson's open blockade + amply secured.</p> + + <p>The general conclusion, then, is that however high may be + the purely naval and strategical reasons for adopting open + blockade as the best means of securing a decision against the + enemy's fleet, yet the inevitable intrusion of the ulterior + object in the form of trade protection or the security of + military expeditions will seldom leave us entirely free to use + the open method. We must be prepared, in fact, to find + ourselves at least at times faced with the necessity of using a + form of blockade as nearly modelled on the old close blockade + as changed conditions will permit.</p> + <!-- Page 209 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" + id="Page_209"></a>[pg 209]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER THREE</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>METHODS OF<br /> + DISPUTING COMMAND</h2> + <hr /> + + <h3>I. DEFENSIVE FLEET OPERATIONS—"A FLEET IN<br /> + BEING"</h3> + + <p>In dealing with the theory of sea command, attention was + called to the error of assuming that if we are unable to win + the command we therefore lose it. It was pointed out that this + proposition, which is too often implied in strategical + discussion, denies in effect that there can be such a thing as + strategical defensive at sea, and ignores the fact that the + normal condition in war is for the command to be in dispute. + Theory and history are at one on the point. Together they + affirm that a Power too weak to win command by offensive + operations may yet succeed in holding the command in dispute by + assuming a general defensive attitude.</p> + + <p>That such an attitude in itself cannot lead to any positive + result at sea goes without saying, but nevertheless even over + prolonged periods it can prevent an enemy securing positive + results, and so give time for the other belligerent to dominate + the situation by securing his ends ashore.</p> + + <p>It is seldom that we have been forced even for a time to + adopt such an attitude, but our enemies have done so frequently + to our serious annoyance and loss. In the Seven Years' War, for + instance, the French by avoiding offensive operations likely to + lead to a decision, and confining themselves + <!-- Page 210 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" + id="Page_210"></a>[pg 210]</span> to active defence, were + able for five campaigns to prevent our reducing Canada, + which was the object of the war. Had they staked the issue + on a great fleet action in the first campaign, and had the + result been against them, we could certainly have achieved + our object in half the time. In the end, of course, they + failed to prevent the conquest, but during all the time the + catastrophe was postponed France had abundant opportunity of + gaining offensively elsewhere territory which, as she at all + events believed, would have compelled us to give up our + conquest at the peace.</p> + + <p>Again, in our last great naval war Napoleon by avoiding + general actions was able to keep the command in dispute till by + alliances and otherwise he had gathered force which he deemed + sufficient to warrant a return to the offensive. Eventually + that force proved unequal to the task, yet when it failed and + the command passed to his enemy, he had had time to consolidate + his power so far that the loss of his fleet seemed scarcely to + affect it, and for nine years more he was able to continue the + struggle.</p> + + <p>Such examples—and there are many of them—serve + to show how serious a matter is naval defence in the hands of a + great military Power with other means of offence. They tell us + how difficult it is to deal with, and how serious therefore for + even the strongest naval Power is the need to give it careful + study.</p> + + <p>And not for this reason only, but also because the strongest + naval Power, if faced with a coalition, may find it impossible + to exert a drastic offensive anywhere without temporarily + reducing its force in certain areas to a point relatively so + low as to permit of nothing higher than the defensive. The + leading case of such a state of affairs, which we must further + consider presently, was our own position in the War of American + Independence, when, as we have seen, in order to secure an + adequate concentration for offence in the West Indies we were + forced to reduce our home fleet to defensive level.</p> + <!-- Page 211 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" + id="Page_211"></a>[pg 211]</span> + + <p>What, then, do we mean by naval defence? To arrive at a + right answer we must first clear our mind of all confusing + shadows cast by the accidents of land defence. Both on land and + at sea defence means of course taking certain measures to defer + a decision until military or political developments so far + redress the balance of strength that we are able to pass to the + offensive. In the operations of armies the most usual means + employed are the holding of positions and forcing our superior + enemy to exhaust his strength in attacking them. Consequently + the idea of military defence is dominated by the conception of + entrenched positions and fortresses.</p> + + <p>In naval warfare this is not so. At sea the main conception + is avoiding decisive action by strategical or tactical + activity, so as to keep our fleet in being till the situation + develops in our favour. In the golden age of our navy the + keynote of naval defence was mobility, not rest. The idea was + to dispute the control by harassing operations, to exercise + control at any place or at any moment as we saw a chance, and + to prevent the enemy exercising control in spite of his + superiority by continually occupying his attention. The idea of + mere resistance was hardly present at all. Everything was + counterattack, whether upon the enemy's force or his maritime + communications. On land, of course, such methods of defence are + also well known, but they belong much more to guerilla warfare + than to regular operations. In regular warfare with standing + armies, however brilliantly harassing operations and + counter-attack are used, the fundamental conception is the + defended or defensible position.</p> + + <p>Similarly at sea, although the essence of defence is + mobility and an untiring aggressive spirit rather than rest and + resistance, yet there also defended and defensible positions + are not excluded. But they are only used in the last resort. A + fleet may retire temporarily into waters difficult of access, + where it can only be attacked at great risk, or into a + fortified base, where it is practically removed from the board + and cannot be + <!-- Page 212 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" + id="Page_212"></a>[pg 212]</span> attacked at all by a fleet + alone. But the occasions on which such expedients can be + used at sea are far rarer than on land. Indeed except for + the most temporary purposes they can scarcely be regarded as + admissible at sea, however great their value on land. The + reason is simple. A fleet withdrawing to such a position + leaves open to the enemy the ulterior object, which is the + control of sea communications, whereas on land an army in a + good position may even for a prolonged period cover the + ulterior object, which is usually territory. An army in + position, moreover, is always doing something to exhaust its + opponent and redress the unfavourable balance, but a fleet + in inactivity is too often permitting the enemy to carry on + operations which tend to exhaust the resources of its own + country.</p> + + <p>For a maritime Power, then, a naval defensive means nothing + but keeping the fleet actively in being-not merely in + existence, but in active and vigorous life. No phrase can + better express the full significance of the idea than "A fleet + in being," if it be rightly understood. Unfortunately it has + come to be restricted, by a misunderstanding of the + circumstances in which it was first invented, to one special + class of defence. We speak of it as though it were essentially + a method of defence against invasion, and so miss its fuller + meaning. If, however, it be extended to express defence against + any kind of maritime attack, whether against territory or sea + communications, its broad truth will become apparent, and it + will give us the true conception of the idea as held in the + British service.</p> + + <p>The occasion on which it was first used was one that well + exhibits the special possibilities of a naval defensive. It was + in the year 1690, when, in alliance with the Dutch, we were at + war with France, and though really superior, had been caught in + a situation which placed us temporarily at a great disadvantage + in home waters. The French by a surprising rapidity of + mobilisation and concentration had stolen a <!-- + Page 213 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" + id="Page_213"></a>[pg 213]</span> march on us before either + our mobilisation or our concentration was complete. King + William, with the best of the army, was in Ireland dealing + with a French invasion in support of James, and a squadron + of seven sail under Sir Cloudesley Shovel had been detached + into the Irish Sea to guard his communications. Another + squadron, consisting of sixteen of the line, British and + Dutch, had been sent to Gibraltar under Admiral Killigrew to + take down the trade and to keep an eye on Chateaurenault, + who with a slightly inferior squadron was at Toulon. It was + assumed he would probably make a push for Brest, where the + French main fleet was mobilising under the Comte de + Tourville, and Killigrew had orders to follow him if he got + through the Straits. Chateaurenault did get through; + Killigrew failed to bring him to action, and instead of + following him immediately, he went into Cadiz to complete + his arrangements for forwarding his outward-bound convoy and + escorting the one he was to bring home. What of course he + should have done, according to the practice of more + experienced times, was to have left this work to a + <!-- Page 214 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" + id="Page_214"></a>[pg 214]</span> cruiser detachment, and + failing contact with Chateaurenault, should have closed at + once to the strategical centre with his battle-squadron.</p> + + <p>Meanwhile the home fleet, which Lord Torrington was to + command, was still unformed. It lay in three divisions, at the + Downs, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, while a considerable part of + the promised Dutch contingent had not made its appearance. It + was a splendid chance for the French to seize the command of + the Channel before the concentration could take place and to + crush the British in detail. Accordingly, on June 13th, as soon + as Chateaurenault had arrived, Tourville put to sea with some + seventy of the line. The day before, however, Torrington, + having hoisted his flag in the Downs, had massed his two main + divisions at Portsmouth, and by the time Tourville appeared off + the Isle of Wight he had with later arrivals, both Dutch and + British, about fifty-six of the line in St. Helen's Road. Not + knowing that the Toulon contingent had joined, he put to sea + intending to fight, but on discovering the great superiority of + the French, he decided in concert with his council of war to + act on the defensive, and before offering battle to endeavour + to secure a concentration with Killigrew and Shovel and the + Plymouth division by getting to the westward. If he found this + course impossible without fighting an action, his plan was to + retire before Tourville "even to the Gunfleet," where amidst + the shoals of the Thames estuary he felt he would have a good + chance of repelling an attack with success. There, too, he + counted on being reinforced not only <!-- + Page 215 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" + id="Page_215"></a>[pg 215]</span> by the ships still at + Chatham, but also possibly by ships from the westward which + might steal along the coast and join him "over the flats" by + channels unknown to the French. To fight as he was he + considered to be only playing the enemy's game. "If we are + beaten," he said in communicating his plan to the + Government, "they being absolute masters of the sea will be + at great liberty of doing many things which they dare not do + whilst we observe them and are in a possibility of joining + Admiral Killigrew and our ships to the westward."</p> + + <p>It was a plan conceived on the best principles of + defence—waiting till the acquisition of fresh force + justified a return to the offensive. It is further interesting + as a pure case of naval defence, with no ulterior object other + than control of home waters. In the minds of the Government + there was no apprehension of any definite attempt to invade + across the Channel, but the invasion of Ireland was in full + progress, and all nourishment of it must be stopped and our own + communications kept free. There was, moreover, serious anxiety + lest the French should extend their operations to Scotland, and + there was Killigrew's homeward-bound convoy approaching. The + situation was one that obviously could not be solved + effectually except by winning a general command of the sea, but + in Torrington's judgment it could be rendered innocuous by + holding the command in dispute. His design, therefore, was to + act upon the defensive and prevent the enemy achieving any + positive result until he was in a position to fight them with a + fair chance of victory. A temporary defensive he considered was + the only way to win the command, while to hazard a decision in + inferior strength was the best way to lose it.</p> + + <p>Nothing could be in closer harmony with the principles of + good strategy as we understand them now. It was undoubtedly + <!-- Page 216 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" + id="Page_216"></a>[pg 216]</span> in advance of anything + that had been done up to that time, and it was little wonder + if the Government, as is usually said, failed to appreciate + the design. Their rejection of it has come in for very + severe criticism. But it would seem that they misunderstood + rather than failed to appreciate. The Earl of Nottingham, + who was at the head of the Government, believed, as his + reply to the admiral clearly shows, that Torrington meant to + retire to the Gunfleet at once; whereas it is equally clear + to us that the Gunfleet was to be his extreme point, and + that he did not mean to retire so far unless the French + forced him. The Minister failed, as others have done since, + to grasp what the admiral meant by "A fleet in being." He + thought that in Torrington's view a fleet safe in port and + not in contact with the enemy was "in being," whereas + Torrington had no such idea. As Nottingham conceived the + admiral's intention he saw that although it might preserve + the fleet, it would expose everything else to destruction; + that is, he was oppressed with the special characteristic of + naval warfare which always permits action against the + ulterior object when the enemy denies you any chance of + acting against his armed force.</p> + + <p>Under this misapprehension, which indeed was not justified + by the words of Torrington's despatch, he procured from the + Queen an order in these terms: "We apprehend," it ran, "the + consequences of your retiring to the Gunfleet to be so fatal, + that we choose rather you should upon any advantage of the wind + give battle to the enemy than retreat farther than is necessary + to get an advantage upon the enemy." It was, however, left to + his discretion to proceed to the westward to complete his + concentration that way, provided, it said, "you by no means + ever lose sight of the French fleet whereby they + <!-- Page 217 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" + id="Page_217"></a>[pg 217]</span> may have opportunity of + making attempts upon the shore or in the rivers of Medway or + Thames, or get away without fighting."</p> + + <p>This order has been very hardly dealt with by modern + critics, although it clearly contemplates true preventive + observation, and even, as the last words suggest, the idea + contained in Nelson's well-known saying, "that by the time the + enemy had beat our fleet soundly they would do us no more harm + this year." It is true that Nelson could rely on the proved + superiority of the British at that time unit for unit, but it + is also true that Nottingham and his colleagues in the + Government had information which led them greatly to + underestimate Tourville's strength. This was evident on the + face of Nottingham's despatch which covered the order, so + evident indeed that Torrington might well perhaps have + suspended the execution of an order so obviously based on + incorrect information. But knowing probably what intrigues were + going on against him at Court, he chose to regard it as a + peremptory command to engage whenever he found himself to + windward.</p> + + <p>Much as a more scientific view of naval strategy may admire + Torrington's conception, there seems no reason for losing + temper over the Government's plan. It was certainly one way of + solving the problem, and seeing how large were our reserves, a + defeat need not have meant disaster. Still, it was doubtless + dictated by an inability to grasp, the strategical strength of + Torrington's novel plan, a plan which was not + <!-- Page 218 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" + id="Page_218"></a>[pg 218]</span> only safer, but was + calculated to achieve greater positive results in the end. + The real fallacy of the Government's plan was that although + it had a specious appearance of a bold offensive, it could + have achieved nothing but a negative result. The most a + battle could have given in the circumstances could only have + left the command in dispute, and the worst would have given + the enemy a positive result, which must have gravely + compromised William's campaign in Ireland.</p> + + <p>On these lines Torrington replied to the Government. Dealing + with their anxiety for the ships to the westward and the + Mediterranean convoy, whose danger was their expressed reason + for forbidding him the Gunfleet, he pointed out that they could + not run much hazard if they took care of themselves. For, as he + repeated, "while we observe the French, they cannot make any + attempt on ships or shore without running great hazard, and if + we are beaten, all is exposed to their mercy." Thus without + specially noticing the Minister's misinterpretation of his + despatch, he intimated that his intention was observation, and + not simple retreat.</p> + + <p>By the time Torrington sent this reply he had been pressed + back as far as Beachy Head; it was no longer possible to get to + the westward; and the following day, finding himself to + windward, he attacked. But still confirmed in his idea of + defence, and carrying it on to his tactics, he refused to give + the French the chance of a real decision, and disengaged as + soon as a drop in the wind permitted. So far he felt justified + in <!-- + Page 219 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" + id="Page_219"></a>[pg 219]</span> interpreting orders which + he knew were founded on false information. He was sure, as + he said in justification of the way he fought the action, + "that the Queen could not have been prevailed with to sign + an order for it, had not both our weakness and the strength + of the enemy been disguised to her."</p> + + <p>So severely was his fleet crippled that he believed his plan + could no longer act. "What the consequences of this unfortunate + battle may be," he wrote in his Journal, "God Almighty only + knows, but this I dare be positive in, had I been left to my + liberty I had prevented any attempt upon the land, and secured + the western ships, Killigrew, and the merchantmen." Actually in + all this he was successful. Slowly retiring eastward he drew + the French after him as far as Dover before he ran to the Nore; + and Tourville was unable to get back to + <!-- Page 220 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" + id="Page_220"></a>[pg 220]</span> the westward, till all the + endangered ships were safe in Plymouth. In spite of + Torrington's being forced to fight an action at the wrong + time and place, his design had so far succeeded. Not only + had he prevented the French doing anything that could affect + the issue of the war, but he had completely foiled + Tourville's plan of destroying the British fleet in detail. + That he had done, but retribution by passing to the + offensive was no longer in his power.</p> + + <p>That Tourville or his Government was impressed with the + efficacy of the method was demonstrated the following year, + when he in his turn found himself in an inferiority that denied + him hope of a successful battle decision. During the summer he + kept his fleet hovering off the mouth of the Channel without + giving the British admiral a chance of contact. His method, + however, differed from that of Torrington, and he only achieved + his negative object by keeping out of sight of his enemy + altogether. In his opinion, if a fleet remained at sea in close + observation of an active enemy an action could not be avoided. + "If (the admiral)," he wrote in his memorandum on the subject, + "be ordered to keep the sea to try to amuse the enemy and to + let them know we are in a position to attack in case they + attempt a descent, I think it my duty to say that in that case + we must make up our mind to have to fight them in the end; for + if they have really sought an action, they will have been able + to fight, seeing that it is impossible to pirouette so long + near a fleet without coming to grips."<a name="NtA_20" + id="NtA_20"></a><a href="#Nt_20"><sup>20</sup></a> This is + as much as to say that a sure point of temporary retreat is + necessary to "a fleet in being," and this was an essential + part of Torrington's idea.</p> + + <p>In Torrington's and Tourville's time, when ships were + unhandy and fleet tactics in their infancy, the difficulty of + avoiding <!-- Page 221 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" + id="Page_221"></a>[pg 221]</span> action, when a determined + enemy had once got contact, were undoubtedly great, unless a + port of retreat was kept open. But as the art of naval + warfare developed, the possibilities of "a fleet in being" + were regarded as much wider, at least in the British + service. It was nearly a hundred years before we were again + forced to use the same device on a large scale, and then it + was believed that superior speed and tactical precision were + factors that could be counted on to an almost unlimited + extent. In the darkest days of the War of American + Independence we have a memorandum of the subject by + Kempenfelt, which not only gives the developed idea of "a + fleet in being" and the high aggressive spirit that is its + essence, but also explains its value, not merely as a + defensive expedient, but as a means of permitting a drastic + offensive even when you are as a whole inferior. "When you + know the enemy's designs," he says, "in order to do + something effectual you must endeavour to be superior to + them in some part where they have designs to execute, and + where, if they succeed, they would most injure you. If your + fleet is divided as to be in all places inferior to the + enemy, they will have a fair chance of succeeding everywhere + in their attempts. If a squadron cannot be formed sufficient + to face the enemy's at home, it would be more advantageous + to let your inferiority be still greater in order by it to + gain the superiority elsewhere."</p> + + <p>"When inferior to the enemy, and you have only a squadron of + observation to watch and attend upon their motions, such a + squadron should be composed of two-decked ships only [that is, + ships of the highest mobility] as to assure it purpose. It must + have the advantage of the enemy in sailing, else under certain + circumstances it will be liable to be forced to battle or to + give up some of its heavy sailers. It is highly necessary to + have such a flying squadron to hang on the enemy's large fleet, + as it will prevent their dividing into separate squadrons for + intercepting your trade or spreading their + <!-- Page 222 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" + id="Page_222"></a>[pg 222]</span> ships for a more extensive + view. You will be at hand to profit from any accidental + separation or dispersion of their fleet from hard gales, + fogs, or other causes. You may intercept supplies, + intelligence, &c, sent to them. In fine, such a squadron + will be a check and restraint upon their motions, and + prevent a good deal of the mischief they might otherwise + do."</p> + + <p>Three years before, when first called to be Chief of the + Staff in the Channel, he had emphasised the same points. + "Much," he wrote in July 1779, "I may say all, depends upon + this fleet. 'Tis an inferior against a superior fleet. + Therefore the greatest skill and address is requisite to + counteract the designs of the enemy, to watch and seize the + favourable opportunity for action, and to catch the advantage + of making the effort at some or other feeble part of the + enemy's line; or if such opportunities don't offer, to hover + near the enemy, keep him at bay, and prevent his attempting + anything but at risk and hazard; to command their attention, + and oblige them to think of nothing but being on their guard + against your attack."<a name="NtA_21" + id="NtA_21"></a><a href="#Nt_21"><sup>21</sup></a></p> + + <p>It was on these lines the war was conducted. The West Indian + area, in which lay the enemy's principal object, was treated as + the offensive theatre and the home waters as the defensive. + Inferior as was the Channel fleet to the home fleet of the + allies, its defensive operations proved adequate to prevent + their achieving any success. Nor was this all, for Kempenfelt + was able to demonstrate the positive side of his theory in the + most brilliant and convincing manner. In dealing with + <!-- Page 223 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" + id="Page_223"></a>[pg 223]</span> concentration we have seen + how, in command of such a flying squadron as he postulated, + he was able off Ushant to seize a favourable opportunity for + action, which resulted in his capturing a convoy of military + stores essential to the French operations in the West Indies + under the nose of De Guichen with an escort of nearly twice + his force.</p> + + <p>Nelson certainly shared Kempenfelt's views as to the + possibilities of an inferior fleet kept actively in being. "As + to our fleet," he wrote from the Mediterranean in 1796, "under + such a commander-in-chief as Sir John Jervis nobody has any + fear ... We are now twenty-two sail of the line. The combined + fleet will not be above thirty-five.... I will venture my life + Sir John Jervis defeats them. I do not mean by a regular + battle, but by the skill of our admiral and the activity and + spirit of our officers and seamen. This country is the most + favourable possible for that skill with an inferior fleet; for + the winds are so variable, that some one time in twenty-four + hours you must be able to attack a part of a large fleet, and + the other will be becalmed or have a contrary wind. Therefore I + hope the Government will not be alarmed for our safety."</p> + + <p>Such a conception of the defensive may indeed be said to + have become current in the British service. It was part of the + reasoning which in 1805, after Villeneuve's escape from the + Mediterranean, decided Sir John Orde to fall back on + <!-- Page 224 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" + id="Page_224"></a>[pg 224]</span> Ushant instead of entering + the Straits. "I dare believe," he wrote, "Lord Nelson will + be found in condition with his twelve of the line and + numerous frigates to act on the defensive without loss and + even to hang on to the skirts of the enemy's fleet should it + attempt any material service, especially when encumbered + with troops."</p> + + <p>In all this consideration of the potentialities of "a fleet + in being" operating defensively it must never be forgotten that + we are dealing with its possibilities in relation to a general + command of the sea—to its general power of holding such + command in dispute, as Torrington used it. Its power of + preventing a particular operation, such as oversea invasion, is + another matter, which will always depend upon the local + conditions. If the "fleet in being" can be contained in such a + way that it is impossible for it to reach the invading line of + passage, it will be no bar to invasion. In 1690, so far as + Torrington's fleet was concerned, the French, had they been so + minded, might have made a descent, say, at Portsmouth while + Torrington was at the Nore. But Torrington's fleet was not the + only factor. His retreat forced Tourville to leave behind him + unfought the squadrons of Shovel and Killigrew, and so far as + commanding a line of invasion passage was concerned Tourville + was himself as well contained as Torrington. The conditions of + naval defence against invasion are in fact so complex compared + with those of general naval defence that they must be treated + later as a special branch of the subject.</p> + + <p>The doctrine of the "Fleet in being" as formulated and + practised by Torrington and developed by Kempenfelt goes no + further than this, that where the enemy regards the general + command of a sea area as necessary to his offensive purposes, + you may be able to prevent his gaining such command by using + your fleet defensively, refusing what Nelson <!-- Page + 225 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" + id="Page_225"></a>[pg 225]</span> called a regular battle, + and seizing every opportunity for a counterstroke. To use it + as it was used by the French in the case of Tourville's + famous deterrent cruise, where the whole object of the + French was offensive and could not be obtained except by + offence, is quite another thing.</p> + + <p>It is indeed difficult to understand the admiration with + which his <i>campagne au large</i> has been treated in France. + He kept the sea off the mouth of the Channel for fifty days in + the summer of 1691, and for forty of those days our Channel + fleet was making no systematic effort to seek him out. He had + been sent to sea in hope of intercepting our great "Smyrna + convoy," which was then the backbone of our oversea trade. + Russell with the British main fleet simply took positions to + cover its approach until it was safe, knowing presumably that + Tourville must come to him if he wished to accomplish his + purpose. When the convoy was safe Russell proceeded off Ushant, + that is, between the enemy and his base. Tourville's + communications were thus cut, his line of retreat threatened, + and he seized the first opportunity to elude Russell and to + return into port. Beyond taking a few ships from one of the + West India convoys, he accomplished nothing. The central French + offensive in Ireland was broken at the battle of the Boyne, and + the prestige of England at sea was restored. It is true our + trade suffered in the North Sea, but this was not directly due + to the concentration which Tourville's cruise forced upon us, + but rather to the failure of the Dutch—apparently by a + misunderstanding-to provide for an effective blockade of + Dunkirk.</p> + <!-- Page 226 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" + id="Page_226"></a>[pg 226]</span> + + <p>To British eyes it will seem that the heresy which was + latent in Tourville's instructions was a seed that choked all + the finer aspirations of the French navy. In 1691 the plan of + his cruise may possibly be defended as sufficiently aggressive, + since, seeing how unstable was William's new throne, a + resounding blow at British trade, combined with an expected + victory in Ireland, might have been enough to upset it. But + afterwards the idea was stretched to occasions it would not + fit. It seems to have bred a belief that where the object of + the war plainly depended on winning a real command of the sea, + that object could yet be attained by naval defensive + operations. Many times it is true a policy which had starved + the navy of France left no other course open to her seamen, and + had they in their inferiority attempted the offensive, the end + must have been swifter if not more certain. In criticising the + maritime history of France we must be careful to distinguish + policy from strategy. It was not always the defensive strategy + that was bad, but the policy that condemned her admirals to + negative operations. Seeing that she was a continental Power + with continental aspirations, it was often a policy from which + her military exigencies permitted no escape. Nevertheless the + policy was twice accursed: it cursed her when she was weak, and + cursed her when she was strong. The prolonged use of the + defensive bred a habit of mind which seems to have rendered her + incapable of striking hard when she had the strength. In no + other way at least can we account for the behaviour of so + high-spirited a nation when her chance of revenge came in the + War of American Independence.</p> + + <p>It is here in its moral reactions lies the danger of the + defensive, a danger so insidious in its working as to tempt us + never to utter the word. Yet with the voice of Torrington, + Kempenfelt, and Nelson in our ears, it would be folly to ignore + it for ourselves, and still more to ignore the exhausting + strain its use by our enemy may impose upon us. It must be + studied, if for no other reasons than to learn how to break it + down. Nor + <!-- Page 227 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" + id="Page_227"></a>[pg 227]</span> will the study have + danger, if only we keep well in view the spirit of restless + and vigilant counter-attack which Kempenfelt and Nelson + regarded as its essence. True, some of the conditions which + in the days of sails made for opportunity have passed away, + but many still remain. Shifts of wind and calms will no + longer bring them, but weather thick or violent can yet make + seamanship, nimbleness, and cohesion tell as it always did; + and there is no reason to doubt that it is still possible + for hard sea-training to make "the activity and spirit of + our officers and seamen" give the results which Nelson so + confidently expected.</p> + + <h3>II. MINOR COUNTER-ATTACKS</h3> + + <p>For the weaker of two belligerents minor-attack has always + exercised a certain fascination. Where a Power was so inferior + in naval force that it could scarcely count even on disputing + command by fleet operations, there remained a hope of reducing + the relative inferiority by putting part of the enemy's force + out of action. Such hopes were rarely realised. In 1587 Drake + succeeded in stopping the Spanish invasion by such a + counter-attack on the Cadiz division of the Armada while it was + still unmobilised. In 1667 the Dutch achieved a similar success + against our Chatham division when it was demobilised and + undefended, and thereby probably secured rather more favourable + terms of peace. But it cannot be said that the old wars present + any case where the ultimate question of command was seriously + affected by a minor counterattack.</p> + + <p>The advent of the torpedo, however, has given the idea a new + importance that cannot be overlooked. The degree of that + importance is at present beyond calculation. There is at least + no evidence that it would be very high in normal conditions and + between ordinarily efficient fleets. The comparative success of + the opening Japanese attack on the Port Arthur + <!-- Page 228 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" + id="Page_228"></a>[pg 228]</span> squadron is the only case + in point, and where only one case exists, it is necessary to + use extreme caution in estimating its significance. Before + we can deduce anything of permanent value we must consider + very carefully both its conditions and results.</p> + + <p>To begin with, it was a new experience of a new class of + weapon, and it by no means follows that the success of a new + expedient will be repeated with anything like equal result. It + will not be irrelevant again to recall the case of fireships. + At the outset of the sailing era in 1588, this device prepared + the way for a decisive success against a fleet in the open. In + the succeeding wars the new weapon found a prominent place in + the organisation of sea-going fleets, but its success was never + repeated. Against ships in ill-defended harbours it did + occasionally produce good results, and during the infancy of + tactics its moral and even material effects in fleet actions + were frequently demonstrated. But as naval science developed + and the limitations of the weapon were more accurately + measured, it was able to achieve less and less, till in the + eighteenth century it was regarded as almost negligible. Even + its moral effect was lost, and it ceased to be considered as a + battle unit.</p> + + <p>Now, if we examine closely the Port Arthur case, we shall + find it pointing to the existence of certain inherent + conditions not dissimilar from those which discredited + fireships as a decisive factor in war. In spite of the + apparently formidable nature of a surprise attack by torpedo + the indications from the one case in point are that these + conditions make for greater power in the defence than in the + attack. The first <!-- Page + 229 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" + id="Page_229"></a>[pg 229]</span> condition relates to the + difficulty of locating the objective accurately. It is + obvious that for this kind of operation the most precise + intelligence is essential, and of all intelligence the most + difficult to obtain in war is the distribution of an enemy's + fleet from day to day. The Japanese had fairly certain + information that the bulk of the Port Arthur squadron was + lying in the outer anchorage, but it had been constantly + moving, and there was a report that three battleships had + just been detached from it. The report was false, but the + result was that of the five divisions of destroyers which + the Japanese had available, two were diverted against Dalny, + where no enemy was found. Such uncertainty must always + exist, and in no circumstances is it likely to be less than + where, as in the Japanese case, the attack is made before + declaration, and while the ordinary channels of intelligence + are still open.</p> + + <p>Further, it is to be noted that in spite of the fact that + relations for some weeks had been highly strained, and a + surprise torpedo attack was regarded as probable, the Russians + had taken no precautions to confuse their enemy. It is obvious + that measures to prevent accurate locating can, and should, be + taken in such cases. We may go further. From confusing the + enemy by such means it is but a step to lead him to a wrong + conclusion, and to lay for him a trap which may swallow up the + bulk of his destroyer force in the first hours of the war. It + is to be feared, however, that the risks of such an eventuality + are so great in minor counter-attacks of this nature, that it + will probably be very difficult to tempt an inferior enemy to + expose his flotilla in this way.</p> + + <p>This view receives emphasis from the second point which the + Port Arthur case serves to demonstrate, and that is the great + power of even the flimsiest defence against such attacks; in + other words, the chances of success can scarcely ever + <!-- Page 230 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" + id="Page_230"></a>[pg 230]</span> be great enough to justify + the risk. Everything was in favour of the Japanese. Orders + had been issued in the Russian squadron for two or three + nights previously to prepare for a torpedo attack, but so + low had discipline fallen, that the orders were obeyed in a + very perfunctory manner. Guns were not loaded, their crews + were not at quarters, nor were the nets got out. The only + real precaution taken was that two destroyers and no more + had been sent out as guard patrol, but even they were + forbidden to fire on anything they met until they had + reported to the admiral or had themselves been fired on. + Defence against a surprise attack could scarcely have been + more feeble, and yet so high was the nervous tension in the + attacking force, that it proved stronger than could + reasonably have been expected. The mere existence of the + patrol and the necessity of evading it threw the Japanese + approach into a confusion from which it was unable to + recover entirely, and the attack lost its essential momentum + and cohesion. Again, defective as were the arrangements in + the squadron itself, and lax as were its training and + discipline, no torpedo hits were made, so far as we can + judge, after the Russian guns and searchlights got into + play.</p> + + <p>Such development of strength in the defence seems inherent + in the conditions of minor attack, and there appears to be no + reason for expecting better results for such attacks in normal + cases. But in deducing principles from the Port Arthur case, it + must always be remembered that it was far from normal. It was a + blow before declaration, when the menace of strained relations, + though realised, had been almost entirely ignored by the + Russians. In such exceptional and almost incredible + circumstances a minor attack might always be counted on for a + certain measure of success. To this we have to add the fact + that the Russian squadron was not ordinarily efficient, but + appears to have fallen into a lax condition such as could + scarcely recur in the case of any other naval Power.</p> + <!-- Page 231 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" + id="Page_231"></a>[pg 231]</span> + + <p>Finally, we must ask what, with every condition abnormally + in favour of the attack, was the actual material result? Did it + have any real influence on the ultimate question of command? It + is true that it so far swung the balance in favour of the + Japanese that they were able to exercise the local control long + enough to land their troops and isolate Port Arthur. But the + Japanese plan for securing ultimate command rested on their + power of taking Port Arthur by military operation and + sustaining the siege from the sea. Yet in spite of every + condition of success the physical effect of the blow was so + small, that even without the help of an adequate dockyard the + squadron recovered from it and became potent again before the + siege could even be formed. The minor attacks which followed + the first blow were all failures, and whether delivered at the + port or upon the squadron in the open had no appreciable effect + whatever.</p> + + <p>At the same time it must be remembered that since that war + the art of torpedo warfare has developed very rapidly. Its + range and offensive power have increased in a higher ratio than + the means of resisting it. Still those means have advanced, and + it is probable that a squadron in a naval port or in a properly + defended anchorage is not more easy to injure than it ever was; + while a squadron at sea, so long as it constantly shifts its + position, still remains very difficult to locate with + sufficient precision for successful minor attack.</p> + + <p>The unproved value of submarines only deepens the mist which + overhangs the next naval war. From a strategical point of view + we can say no more than that we have to count with a new + factor, which gives a new possibility to minor counterattack. + It is a possibility which on the whole tells in favour of naval + defence, a new card which, skilfully played in combination with + defensive fleet operations, may lend fresh importance to the + "Fleet in being." It may further be expected that whatever the + effective possibilities of minor operations may ultimately + prove to be in regard to securing command, the + <!-- Page 232 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" + id="Page_232"></a>[pg 232]</span> moral influence will be + considerable, and at least at the beginning of a future war + will tend to deflect and hamper the major operations and rob + of their precision the lines which formerly led so frankly + to the issue by battle.</p> + + <p>In the absence of a sufficient volume of experience it would + be idle to go further, particularly as torpedo attack, like + fireship attack, depends for success more than any other on the + spirit and skill of officers and men. With regard to the + torpedo as the typical arm of mobile coastal defence, it is a + different matter. What has been said applies only to its power + towards securing command of the sea, and not to the exercise or + to disputing the exercise of command. This is a question which + is concerned with defence against invasion, and to that we must + now turn.</p> + <!-- Page 233 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" + id="Page_233"></a>[pg 233]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER FOUR</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>METHODS OF EXERCISING COMMAND</h2> + <hr /> + + <h3>I. DEFENCE AGAINST INVASION</h3> + + <p>In methods of exercising command are included all operations + not directly concerned with securing command or with preventing + its being secured by the enemy. We engage in exercising command + whenever we conduct operations which are directed not against + the enemy's battle-fleet, but to using sea communications for + our own purposes, or to interfering with the enemy's use of + them. Such operations, though logically of secondary + importance, have always occupied the larger part of naval + warfare. Naval warfare does not begin and end with the + destruction of the enemy's battle-fleet, nor even with breaking + his cruiser power. Beyond all this there is the actual work of + preventing his passing an army across the sea and of protecting + the passage of our own military expeditions. There is also the + obstruction of his trade and the protection of our own. In all + such operations we are concerned with the exercise of command. + We are using the sea, or interfering with its use by the enemy; + we are not endeavouring to secure the use or to prevent the + enemy from securing it. The two categories of operation differ + radically in conception and purpose, and strategically they are + on wholly different planes.</p> + + <p>Logically, of course, operations for exercising command + <!-- Page 234 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" + id="Page_234"></a>[pg 234]</span> should follow those for + securing command; that is to say, that since the attainment + of command is the special object of naval warfare, and since + that command can only be obtained permanently by the + destruction of the enemy's armed forces afloat, it follows + that in strictness no other objects should be allowed to + interfere with our concentration of effort on the supreme + end of securing command by destruction. War, however, is not + conducted by logic, and the order of proceeding which logic + prescribes cannot always be adhered to in practice. We have + seen how, owing to the special conditions of naval warfare, + extraneous necessities intrude themselves which make it + inevitable that operations for exercising command should + accompany as well as follow operations for securing command. + War being, as it is, a complex sum of naval, military, + political, financial, and moral factors, its actuality can + seldom offer to a naval staff a clean slate on which + strategical problems can be solved by well-turned + syllogisms. The naval factor can never ignore the others. + From the outset one or more of them will always call for + some act of exercising command which will not wait for its + turn in the logical progression. To a greater or less extent + in all ordinary cases both categories of operation will have + to be put in motion from the beginning.</p> + + <p>Hence the importance of realising the distinction between + the two generic forms of naval activity. In the hurry and + stress of war confusion between them is easy. By keeping a firm + grip upon the difference we can see at least what we are doing. + We can judge how far any given operation that may be called for + is a sacrifice of security to exercise, how far such a + sacrifice may be justified, and how far the one end may be made + to serve the other. By applying the distinction as a test much + error may be avoided. The risk we take may be great, but we + shall be able to weigh it accurately against the value of the + end, and we shall take it with our eyes open and of set + purpose. Above all, it will enable the Staff to settle clearly + for each squadronal commander what is to be his primary + objective, + <!-- Page 235 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" + id="Page_235"></a>[pg 235]</span> and what the object or + purpose of the operations entrusted to him. It is above all + in this last consideration, and particularly in the + determination of the objective, that lies the main practical + value of the distinction.</p> + + <p>This will become clear the moment we begin to consider + defence against invasion, which naturally takes the first place + amongst operations for the exercise of control. Of all the + current assumptions, not one is so confusing for the finer + adjustments of strategy as that which affirms that the primary + objective of our fleet is always the enemy's fleet. Of the + battle-fleet and its attendant units it is of course true, so + long at least as the enemy has a battle-fleet in being. It is + true, that is, of all operations for securing control, but of + operations for exercising control it is not true. In the case + we have now to consider-defence against invasion-the objective + of the special operations is, and always has been, the enemy's + army. On this fundamental postulate our plans for resisting + invasion have always been constructed from the year of the + Armada to 1805.</p> + + <p>In the old service tradition the point was perfectly well + established. Admirals' instructions constantly insist on the + fact that the transports are the "principal object." The whole + disposition of the fleet during Hawke's blockade in 1759 was + based on keeping a firm hold on the transports in the Morbihan, + and when he sought to extend his operations against the + Rochefort squadron, he was sharply reminded by Anson that "the + principal object of attention at this time" was, firstly, "the + interception of the embarkations of the enemy at Morbihan," and + secondly, "the keeping of the ships of war from coming out of + Brest." Similarly Commodore Warren + <!-- Page 236 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" + id="Page_236"></a>[pg 236]</span> in 1796, when he had the + permanent frigate guard before Brest, issued orders to his + captains that in case of encountering enemy's transports + under escort they were "to run them down or destroy them in + the most expeditious manner possible previous to attacking + the ships of war, but to preserve such a situation as to + effect that purpose when directed by signal." Lord Keith's + orders when watching Napoleon's flotilla were to the same + effect. "Directing your chief attention," they run, "to the + destruction of the ships, vessels, or boats having men, + horses, or artillery on board (in preference to that of the + vessels by which they are protected), and in the strict + execution of this important duty losing sight entirely of + the possibility of idle censure for avoiding contact with an + armed force, because the prevention of debarkation is the + object of primary importance to which every other + consideration must give way."<a name="NtA_22" + id="NtA_22"></a><a href="#Nt_22"><sup>22</sup></a></p> + + <p>In tactics, then, the idea was the same as in strategy. The + army was the primary objective round which all dispositions + turned. In the French service the strength and soundness of the + British practice was understood at least by the best men. When + in 1805 Napoleon consulted Ganteaume as to the possibility of + the flotilla of transports effecting its passage by evasion, + the admiral told him it was impossible, since no <!-- Page 237 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" + id="Page_237"></a>[pg 237]</span> weather could avail to + relax the British hold sufficiently. "In former wars," he + said, "the English vigilance was miraculous."</p> + + <p>To this rule there was no exception, not even when + circumstances rendered it difficult to distinguish between the + enemy's fleet and army as objectives. This situation could + occur in two ways. Firstly, when the invading army was designed + to sail with the battle-fleet, as in the case of Napoleon's + invasion of Egypt; and secondly, when, although the design was + that the two should operate on separate lines, our system of + defence forced the fleet to come up to the army's line of + passage in order to clear it, as happened in the case of the + Armada and the French attempt of 1744.</p> + + <p>In the latter case the invading army, whose objective was + unknown, was at Dunkirk, and a French fleet was coming up the + Channel to cover the passage. Sir John Norris, in command of + the home fleet, was in the Downs. Though his name is now almost + forgotten, he was one of the great founders of our naval + tradition, and a strategist of the first order. In informing + the Government of his plan of operations, he said he intended + to proceed with his whole squadron off Dunkirk to prevent the + transports sailing. "But," he says, "if they should + unfortunately get out and pass us in the night and go + northward, I intend to detach a superior force to endeavour to + overtake and destroy them; and with the remainder of my + squadron either to fight the French fleet now in the Channel, + <!-- Page 238 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" + id="Page_238"></a>[pg 238]</span> or observe them and cover + the country as our circumstances will admit of; or I shall + pursue the embarkation with all my strength." In this case + there had been no time to organise a special squadron or + flotilla, in the usual way, to bar the line of passage, and + the battle-fleet had to be used for the purpose. This being + so, Norris was not going to allow the presence of an enemy's + battle-fleet to entice him away from his grip on the + invading army, and so resolutely did he hold to the + principle, that he meant if the transports put to sea to + direct his offensive against them, while he merely contained + the enemy's battle-fleet by defensive observation.</p> + + <p>In the Egyptian case there was no distinction between the + two objectives at all. Napoleon's expedition sailed in one + mass. Yet in the handling of his fleet Nelson preserved the + essential idea. He organised it into three "sub-squadrons," one + of six sail and two of four each. "Two of these sub-squadrons," + says Berry, his flag-captain, "were to attack the ships of war, + while the third was to pursue the transports and to sink and + destroy as many as it could"; that is, he intended, in order to + make sure of Napoleon's army, to use no more than ten, and + possibly only eight, of his own battleships against the eleven + of the enemy.</p> + <!-- Page 239 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" + id="Page_239"></a>[pg 239]</span> + + <p>Many other examples could be given of British insistence on + making the enemy's army the primary objective and not his fleet + in cases of invasion. No point in the old tradition was more + firmly established. Its value was of course more strongly + marked where the army and the fleet of the enemy endeavoured to + act on separate lines of operation; that is, where the army + took the real offensive line and the fleet the covering or + preventive line, and where consequently for our own fleet there + was no confusion between the two objectives. This was the + normal case, and the reason it was so is simple enough. It may + be stated at once, since it serves to enunciate the general + principle upon which our traditional system of defence was + based.</p> + + <p>An invasion of Great Britain must always be an attempt over + an uncommanded sea. It may be that our fleet predominates or it + may be that it does not, but the command must always be in + dispute. If we have gained complete command, no invasion can + take place, nor will it be attempted. If we have lost it + completely no invasion will be necessary, since, quite apart + from the threat of invasion, we must make peace on the best + terms we can get. Now, if the sea be uncommanded, there are + obviously two ways in which an invasion may be attempted. + Firstly, the enemy may endeavour to force it through our naval + defence with transports and fleet in one mass. This was the + primitive idea on which the Spanish invasion of Philip the + Second was originally planned by his famous admiral, + Santa-Cruz. Ripening military science, however, was able to + convince him of its weakness. A mass of transports and warships + is the most cumbrous and vulnerable + <!-- Page 240 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" + id="Page_240"></a>[pg 240]</span> engine of war ever known. + The weaker the naval defence of the threatened country, the + more devoutly will it pray the invader may use this device. + Where contact with the enemy's fleet is certain, and + particularly in narrow seas, as it was in this case, such a + course will give the defender all the chances he could + desire, and success for the invader is inconceivable, + provided always we resolutely determine to make the army in + its transports our main objective, and are not to be induced + to break our head against its escort.</p> + + <p>Where, however, contact is not certain, the invasion over an + uncommanded sea may succeed by evasion of the defender's + battle-fleet, as it did in the case of Napoleon's invasion of + Egypt. But that operation belongs to an entirely different + category from that which we are now considering. None of the + factors on which the traditional system of British defence is + based were present. It was an operation over an open sea + against a distant and undetermined objective that had no naval + defence of its own, whereas in our own case the determining + factors are permanent naval defence, an approximately + determined objective, and a narrow sea where evasion by any + force of invasion strength is impossible. Napoleon's exploit + was in fact nothing more than the evasion of an open blockade + which had no naval defence beyond it. The vital importance of + these things will appear as we proceed and note the + characteristics which marked every attempt to invade England. + From such attempts we of course exclude the various descents + upon Ireland, which, not being of invasion strength, fall into + another class, to be dealt with hereafter.</p> + + <p>Since the expedient of forcing an invasion by the strength + of a powerful battleship escort has always been rejected as an + inadmissible operation, the invader has had no choice but to + adopt a separate line for his army, and operate with his fleet + in such a way as may promise to prevent the enemy controlling + that line. That, in short, is the problem of invasion over + <!-- Page 241 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" + id="Page_241"></a>[pg 241]</span> an uncommanded sea. In + spite of an unbroken record of failure scored at times with + naval disaster, continental strategists from Parma to + Napoleon have clung obstinately to the belief that there is + a solution short of a complete fleet decision. They have + tried every conceivable expedient again and again. They have + tried it by simple surprise evasion and by evasion through + diversion or dispersal of our naval defence. They have tried + it by seeking local control through a local naval success + prepared by surprise, or by attempting to entice our fleet + away from home waters to a sufficient extent to give them + temporarily local superiority. But the end has always been + the same. Try as they would, they were faced ultimately by + one of two alternatives—they must either defeat our + covering battle-fleet in battle, or they must close their + own battle-fleet on the transports, and so set up the very + situation which it was their main design to avoid.</p> + + <p>The truth is, that all attempts to invade England without + command of the sea have moved in a vicious circle, from which + no escape was ever found. No matter how ingenious or complex + the enemy's design, a determined hold on their army as the + primary naval objective has always set up a process of + degradation which rendered the enterprise impracticable. Its + stages are distinct and recurrent, and may be expressed as it + were diagrammatically as follows:—</p> + + <p>Two lines of operation having been decided on, the invading + army is gathered at a point as close as possible to the coast + to be invaded; that is, where the intervening sea is narrowest, + and where the army's passage will be exposed to interference + for the shortest time. The covering fleet will operate from a + point as distant as convenient, so as to entice the enemy as + far as possible from the army's line of passage. The <!-- Page + 242 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" + id="Page_242"></a>[pg 242]</span> defender replies by + blockading the army's ports of departure with a flotilla of + light vessels capable of dealing with transports, or by + establishing a mobile defence of the threatened coasts which + transports cannot break unaided, or more probably he will + combine both expedients. The first fallacy of the invasion + plan is then apparent. The narrower the sea, the easier it + is to watch. Pure evasion becomes impossible, and it is + necessary to give the transports sufficient armed strength + by escort or otherwise to protect them against flotilla + attack. The defender at once stiffens his flotilla defence + with cruisers and intermediate ships, and the invader has to + arrange for breaking the barrier with a battle-squadron. So + weak and disturbing a position is then set up that the whole + scheme begins to give way, if, that is, the defender has + clung stubbornly to the strategy we always used. Our + battle-fleet refused to seek out that of the invader. It has + always held a position between the invader's fleet and the + blockaded invasion base, covering the blockade and flotilla + defence. To enable a battle-squadron to break our hold and + to reinforce the army escort, the invader must either force + this covering position by battle, or disturb it so + effectively as to permit the reinforcing squadron to evade + it. But since <i>ex hypothesi</i> he is trying to invade + without securing the command by battle, he will first try to + reinforce his transport escort by evasion. At once he is + faced with new difficulty. The reinforcement entails + dividing his fleet, and this is an expedient so vicious and + disturbing to morale, that no invader has ever been found to + risk it. And for this reason. To make evasion possible for + the detached squadron, he must bring up the rest of his + force and engage the attention of the enemy's fleet, and + thus unless he is in very great superiority, and by + hypothesis is not—he runs the hazard of having his two + divisions beaten in detail. This method has sometimes been + urged by Governments, but so loud have been the protests + both from the fleet and the army, that it has always been + dropped, and the invader finds himself + <!-- Page 243 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" + id="Page_243"></a>[pg 243]</span> at the end of the vicious + circle. Unable to reinforce his transport escort + sufficiently without dividing his battle-fleet, he is forced + to bring his whole force up to the army or abandon the + attempt till command shall have been secured by battle.</p> + + <p>Thus the traditional British system has never failed to + bring about the deadlock, and it will be observed it is founded + on making the invading army the primary objective. We keep a + hold on it, firstly, by flotilla blockade and defence stiffened + as circumstances may dictate by higher units, and secondly, by + battle-fleet cover. It is on the flotilla hold that the whole + system is built up. It is the local danger to that hold which + determines the amount of stiffening the flotilla demands, and + it is the security of that hold which determines the position + and action of the battle-fleet.</p> + + <p>A few typical examples will serve to show how the system + worked in practice under all kinds of conditions. The first + scientific attempt to work on two lines of operation, as + distinguished from the crude mass methods of the Middle Ages, + was the Spanish enterprise of 1588. Though internal support + from Catholic malcontents was expected, it was designed as a + true invasion, that is, a continuing operation for permanent + conquest. Parma, the military commander-in-chief, laid it down + that the Spanish fleet would have not only to protect his + passage and support his landing, but also "to keep open his + communications for the flow of provisions and munition."</p> + <!-- Page 244 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" + id="Page_244"></a>[pg 244]</span> + + <p>In advising the dual line of operation, Parma's original + intention was to get his army across by surprise. As always, + however, it proved impossible to conceal the design, and long + before he was ready he found himself securely blockaded by a + Dutch flotilla supported by an English squadron. So firm indeed + was the English hold on the army, that for a time it was + overdone. The bulk of the English fleet was kept on the line of + passage under Howard, while Drake alone was sent to the + westward. It was only under the great sailor's importunity that + the disposition, which was to become traditional, was + perfected, and the whole fleet, with the exception of the + squadron supporting the flotilla blockade, was massed in a + covering position to the westward. The normal situation was + then set up, and it could only have one result. Surprise was + out of the question. Parma could not move till the blockade was + broken, nor in face of the covering fleet could the Spanish + fleet hope to break it by a sudden intrusion. The vague + prospects the Spaniards had conceived of keeping the English + fleet away from the line of passage by threatening a descent in + the West Country or blockading it in a western port would no + longer do. No such expedient would release Parma, and the Duke + of Medina-Sidonia was ordered to proceed direct to Dunkirk if + possible without fighting, there to break the blockade and + secure the passage.</p> + + <p>There was some idea in the King's mind that he would be able + to do this without a battle, but Parma and every seasoned + Spanish sailor knew that the English fleet would have to be + totally defeated before the transports could venture out of + port. Such a battle was indeed inevitable, and the English + dispositions secured that the Spaniards would have to fight it + <!-- Page 245 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" + id="Page_245"></a>[pg 245]</span> under every disadvantage + which was inherent in the plan of dual lines of operation. + The English would secure certain contact at such a distance + from the line of passage as would permit prolonged harassing + attacks in waters unfamiliar to the enemy and close to their + own sources of support and supply. No battle to the death + would be necessary until the Spaniards were herded into the + confined and narrow waters which the army's passage + demanded, and where both sections of the British fleet would + be massed for the final struggle. They must arrive there + dispirited with indecisive actions and with the terrors of + unknown and difficult seas at the highest point. All this + was no matter of chance. It was inherent in the strategical + and geographical conditions. The English dispositions had + taken every advantage of them, and the result was that not + only was the Spanish army unable even to move, but the + English advantages in the final battle were so great, that + it was only a lucky shift of wind that saved the Armada from + being driven to total destruction upon the Dutch banks.</p> + + <p>In this case, of course, there had been ample time to make + the necessary dispositions. It will be well to follow it with + an example in which surprise came as near to being complete as + it is possible to conceive, and where the arrangements for + defence had to be improvised on the spur of the moment.</p> + + <p>A case in point was the French attempt of 1744. In that year + everything was in favour of the invader. England was undermined + with Jacobite sedition; Scotland was restless and threatening; + the navy had sunk to what is universally regarded as its worst + for spirit, organisation, and command; and the government was + in the hands of the notorious "Drunken Administration." For + three years we had been making unsuccessful war with Spain, and + had been supporting <!-- Page 246 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" + id="Page_246"></a>[pg 246]</span> Maria Theresa on the + Continent against France, with the result that our home + defence was reduced to its lowest ebb. The navy then + numbered 183 sail—about equal to that of France and + Spain combined—but owing to the strain of the war in + the Mediterranean and Transatlantic stations only + forty-three, including eighteen of the line, were available + for home waters. Even counting all cruising ships "within + call," as the phrase then was, the Government had barely + one-fourth of the fleet at hand to meet the crisis. With the + land forces it was little better. Considerably more than + half the home army was abroad with the King, who was + assisting the Empress-Queen as Elector of Hanover. Between + France and England, however, there was no war. In the summer + the King won the battle of Dettingen; a formal alliance with + Maria Theresa followed in the autumn; France responded with + a secret alliance with Spain; and to prevent further British + action on the Continent, she resolved to strike a blow at + London in combination with a Jacobite insurrection. It was + to be a "bolt from the blue" before declaration and in + mid-winter, when the best ships of the home fleet were laid + up. The operation was planned on dual lines, the army to + start from Dunkirk, the covering fleet from Brest.</p> + + <p>The surprise was admirably designed. The port of Dunkirk had + been destroyed under the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, and though + the French had been restoring it secretly for some time, it was + still unfit to receive a fleet of transports. In spite of the + warnings of Sir John Norris, the senior admiral in the service, + the assembling of troops in its neighbourhood from the French + army in Flanders could only be taken for a movement into winter + quarters, and that no suspicion might be <!-- Page + 247 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" + id="Page_247"></a>[pg 247]</span> aroused the necessary + transports were secretly taken up in other ports under false + charter-parties, and were only to assemble off Dunkirk at + the last moment. With equal skill the purpose of the naval + mobilisation at Brest was concealed. By false information + cleverly imparted to our spies and by parade of victualling + for a long voyage, the British Government was led to believe + that the main fleet was intended to join the Spaniards in + the Mediterranean, while a detachment, which was designed to + escort the transports, was ostensibly equipped for a raid in + the West Indies.</p> + + <p>So far as concealment was concerned the arrangement was + perfect. Yet it contained within it the fatal ingredient. The + army was to strike in the Thames at Tilbury; but complete as + was the secrecy, Marshal Saxe, who was to command, could not + face the passage without escort. There were too many privateers + and armed merchantmen always in the river, besides cruisers + moving to and fro on commerce-protection duty. The division, + therefore, which we supposed to be for the West Indies was to + be detached from the Brest fleet after it entered the Channel + and was to proceed to join the transports off Dunkirk, while + the Marquis de Roquefeuil with the main fleet held what British + ships might be ready in Portsmouth either by battle or + blockade.</p> + + <p>Nothing could look simpler or more certain of success. The + British Government seemed quite asleep. The blow was timed for + the first week in January, and it was mid-December before they + even began to watch Brest with cruisers regularly. On these + cruisers' reports measures were taken to prepare an equal + squadron for sea by the new year. By this time nearly + <!-- Page 248 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" + id="Page_248"></a>[pg 248]</span> twenty of the line were + ready or nearly so at the Nore, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, + and a press was ordered to man them. Owing to various causes + the French had now to postpone their venture. Finally it was + not till February 6th that Roquefeuil was seen to leave + Brest with nineteen of the line. The news reached London on + the 12th, and next day Norris was ordered to hoist his flag + at Spithead. His instructions were "to take the most + effectual measures to prevent the making of any descent upon + the kingdoms." It was nothing but news that the young + Pretender had left Rome for France that led to this + precaution. The Government had still no suspicion of what + was brewing at Dunkirk. It was not till the 20th that a + Dover smuggler brought over information which at last opened + their eyes.</p> + + <p>A day or two later the French transports were seen making + for Dunkirk, and were mistaken for the Brest fleet. Orders were + consequently sent down to Norris to follow them. In vain he + protested at the interference. He knew the French were still to + the westward of him, but his orders were repeated, and he had + to go. Tiding it up-Channel against easterly winds, he reached + the Downs and joined the Nore Division there on the 28th. + History usually speaks of this false movement as the happy + chance which saved the country from invasion. But it was not + so. Saxe had determined not to face the Thames ships without + escort. They were ample to destroy him had he done so. In truth + the move which the Government forced on Norris spoilt the + campaign and prevented his destroying the Brest fleet as well + as stopping the invasion.</p> + + <p>Roquefeuil had just received his final orders off the Start. + <!-- Page + 249 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" + id="Page_249"></a>[pg 249]</span> He was instructed by all + possible means to bring the main British fleet to action, or + at least to prevent further concentration, while he was also + to detach the special division of four of the line under + Admiral Barraille to Dunkirk to escort the transports. It + was in fact the inevitable order, caused by our hold on the + army, to divide the fleet. Both officers as usual began to + be upset, and as with Medina-Sidonia, they decided to keep + company till they reached the Isle of Wight and remain there + till they could get touch with Saxe and pilots for the Dover + Strait. They were beset with the nervousness that seems + inseparable from this form of operation. Roquefeuil + explained to his Government that it was impossible to tell + what ships the enemy had passed to the Downs, and that + Barraille when he arrived off Dunkirk might well find + himself in inferiority. He ended in the usual way by urging + that the whole fleet must move in a body to the line of + passage. On arriving off Portsmouth, however, a + reconnaissance in thick weather led him to believe that the + whole of Norris's fleet was still there, and he therefore + detached Barraille, who reached Dunkirk in safety.</p> + + <p>Not knowing that Norris was in the Downs, Saxe began + immediately to embark his troops, but bad weather delayed the + operation for three days, and so saved the expedition, exposed + as it was in the open roads, from destruction by an attack + which Norris was on the point of delivering with his flotilla + of fireships and bomb vessels.</p> + + <p>The Brest squadron had an equally narrow escape. Saxe and + his staff having heard rumours of Norris's movement to the + Downs had become seized with the sea-sickness which always + seems to afflict an army as it waits to face the dangers + <!-- Page 250 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" + id="Page_250"></a>[pg 250]</span> of an uncommanded passage. + They too wanted the whole fleet to escort them, and orders + had been sent to Roquefeuille to do as he had suggested. All + unconscious of Norris's presence in the Downs with a score + of the line more powerful than his own, he came on with the + fifteen he had still with his flag to close on Barraille. + Norris was informed of his approach, and it was now he wrote + his admirable appreciation, already quoted, for dealing with + the situation.</p> + + <p>"As I think it," he said, "of the greatest consequence to + his Majesty's service to prevent the landing of these troops in + any part of the country, I have ... determined to anchor + without the sands of Dunkirk, where we shall be in the fairest + way for keeping them in." That is, he determined to keep hold + of the army regardless of the enemy's fleet, and as Saxe's + objective was not quite certain, he would do it by close + blockade. "But if," he continued, "they should unfortunately + get out and pass in the night and go northward [that is, for + Scotland], I intend to detach a superior force to endeavour to + overtake and destroy them, and with the remainder of my + squadron either fight the French fleet now in the Channel, or + observe them and cover the country as our circumstances will + admit of; or I shall pursue the embarkation [that is, follow + the transports] with all my strength." This meant he would + treat the enemy's army offensively and their fleet defensively, + and his plan was entirely approved by the King.</p> + + <p>As to which of the two plans he would adopt, the inference + is that his choice would depend on the strength of the enemy, + for it was reported the Rochefort squadron had joined + Roquefeuille. The doubt was quickly settled. On the morrow he + heard that Roquefeuille was at Dungeness with only fifteen of + <!-- Page 251 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" + id="Page_251"></a>[pg 251]</span> the line. In a moment he + seized all the advantage of the interior position which + Roquefeuille's necessity to close on the army had given him. + With admirable insight he saw there was time to fling his + whole force at the enemy's fleet without losing his hold on + the army's line of passage. The movement was made + immediately. The moment the French were sighted "General + chase" was signalled, and Roquefeuille was within an ace of + being surprised at his anchorage when a calm stopped the + attack. The calm was succeeded by another furious gale, in + which the French escaped in a disastrous <i>sauve qui + peut</i>, and the fleet of transports was destroyed. The + outcome of it all was not only the failure of the invasion, + but that we secured the command of home waters for the rest + of the war.</p> + + <p>The whole attempt, it will be seen, with everything in its + favour, had exhibited the normal course of degradation. For all + the nicely framed plan and the perfect deception, the inherent + difficulties, when it came to the point of execution, had as + usual forced a clumsy concentration of the enemy's battle-fleet + with his transports, and we on our part were able to forestall + it with every advantage in our favour by the simple expedient + of a central mass on a revealed and certain line of + passage.</p> + + <p>In the next project, that of 1759, a new and very clever + plan was devised for turning the difficulty. The first idea of + Marshal Belleisle, like that of Napoleon, was to gather the + army at Ambleteuse and Boulogne, and to avoid the assemblage of + transports by passing it across the Strait by stealth in flat + boats. But this idea was abandoned before it had gone + <!-- Page 252 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" + id="Page_252"></a>[pg 252]</span> very far for something + much more subtle. The fallacious advantage of a short + passage was dropped, and the army was to start from three + widely separated points all in more open waters—a + diversionary raid from Dunkirk and two more formidable + forces from Havre and the Morbihan in South Brittany. To + secure sufficient control there was to be a concentration on + the Brest fleet from the Mediterranean and the West + Indies.</p> + + <p>The new feature, it will be observed, was that our covering + fleet—that is, the Western Squadron off Brest—would + have two cruiser blockades to secure, one on either side of it. + Difficult as the situation looked, it was solved on the old + lines. The two divisions of the French army at Dunkirk and + Morbihan were held by cruiser squadrons capable of following + them over the open sea if by chance they escaped, while the + third division at Havre, which had nothing but flat boats for + transport, was held by a flotilla well supported. Its case was + hopeless. It could not move without a squadron to release it, + and no fortune of weather could possibly bring a squadron from + Brest. Hawke, who had the main blockade, might be blown off, + but he could scarcely fail to bring to action any squadron that + attempted to enter the Channel. With the Morbihan force it was + different. Any time that Hawke was blown off a squadron could + reach it from Brest and break the cruiser blockade. The French + Government actually ordered a portion of the fleet to make the + attempt. Conflans however, who was in command, protested his + force was too weak to divide, owing to the failure of the + intended concentration. Boscawen had caught and beaten the + Mediterranean squadron off Lagos, and though the West Indian + squadron got in, it proved, as in Napoleon's great plan of + concentration, unfit for further service. The old situation had + arisen, forced by the old method of defence; and in the end + <!-- Page 253 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" + id="Page_253"></a>[pg 253]</span> there was nothing for it + but for Conflans to take his whole fleet to the Morbihan + transports. Hawke was upon him at once, and the disastrous + day of Quiberon was the result. The Dunkirk division alone + got free, but the smallness of its size, which permitted it + to evade the watch, also prevented its doing any harm. Its + escort, after landing its handful of troops in Ireland, was + entirely destroyed; and so again the attempt of the French + to invade over an uncommanded sea produced no effect but the + loss of their fleet.</p> + + <p>The project of 1779 marked these principles even more + strongly, for it demonstrated them working even when our home + fleet was greatly inferior to that of the enemy. In this case + the invader's idea was to form two expeditionary forces at + Cherbourg and Havre, and under cover of an overwhelming + combination of the Spanish and French fleets, to unite them at + sea and seize Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight. It was in the + early summer we got wind of the scheme, and two cruiser + squadrons and flotillas were at once formed at the Downs and + Channel Islands to watch the French coasts and prevent the + concentration of transports. Spain had not yet declared war, + but she was suspected, and the main fleet, under the veteran + Sir Charles Hardy, who had been Norris's second in command in + 1744, was ordered to proceed off Brest and prevent any Spanish + squadron that might appear from entering that port. The French, + however, outmanoeuvred us by putting to sea before Hardy could + reach his station and forming a junction with the Spaniards off + Finisterre. The combined fleet contained about fifty of the + line, <!-- Page 254 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" + id="Page_254"></a>[pg 254]</span> nearly double our own. The + army of invasion, with Dumouriez for its Chief of the Staff, + numbered some 50,000 men, a force we were in no condition to + meet ashore. Everything, therefore, was in favour of + success, and yet in the navy, at least, a feeling of + confidence prevailed that no invasion could take place.</p> + + <p>The brains of the naval defence were Lord Barham (then Sir + Charles Middleton) at the Admiralty and Kempenfelt as Chief of + the Staff in the fleet; and it is to their correspondence at + this time that we owe some of the most valuable strategical + appreciations we possess. The idea of the French was to come + into the Channel in their overwhelming force, and while they + destroyed or held Hardy, to detach a sufficient squadron to + break the cruiser blockade and escort the troops across. + Kempenfelt was confident that it could not be done. He was sure + that the unwieldy combined mass could be rendered powerless by + his comparatively homogeneous and mobile fleet, inferior as it + was, so long as he could keep it at sea and to the westward. + The appreciation of the power of a nimble inferior fleet which + he wrote at this time has already been given.<a name="NtA_23" + id="NtA_23"></a><a href="#Nt_23"><sup>23</sup></a> When the + worst of the position was fully known, and the enemy was + reported off the mouth of the Channel, he wrote another to + Middleton. His only doubt was whether his fleet had the + necessary cohesion and mobility. "We don't seem," he said, + "to have considered sufficiently a certain fact that the + comparative force of two fleets depends much upon their + sailing. The fleet that sails fastest has much the + advantage, as they can engage or not as they please, and so + have always in + <!-- Page 255 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" + id="Page_255"></a>[pg 255]</span> their power to choose the + favourable opportunity to attack. I think I may safely + hazard an opinion that twenty-five sail of the line coppered + would be sufficient to harass and tease this great unwieldy + combined Armada so as to prevent their effecting anything, + hanging continually upon them, ready to catch at any + opportunity of a separation from night, gale or fog, to dart + upon the separated, to cut off convoys of provisions coming + to them, and if they attempted an invasion, to oblige their + whole fleet to escort the transports, and even then it would + be impossible to protect them entirely from so active and + nimble a fleet."</p> + + <p>Here we have from the pen of one of the greatest masters the + real key of the solution—the power, that is, of forcing + the mass of the enemy's fleet to escort the transports. Hardy, + of course, knew it well from his experience of 1744, and acted + accordingly. This case is the more striking, since defence + against the threatened invasion was not the whole of the + problem he had to solve. It was complicated by instructions + that he must also prevent a possible descent on Ireland, and + cover the arrival of the great convoys. In reply, on August + 1st, he announced his intention of taking station ten to twenty + leagues W.S.W. of Scilly, "which I am of opinion," he said, "is + the most proper station for the security of the trade expected + from the East and West Indies, and for the meeting of the + fleets of the enemy <i>should they attempt to come into the + Channel</i>." He underlined the last words, indicating, + apparently, his belief that they would not venture to do so so + long as he could keep his fleet to the westward and undefeated. + This at least he did, till a month later he found it + <!-- Page 256 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" + id="Page_256"></a>[pg 256]</span> necessary to come in for + supplies. Then, still avoiding the enemy, he ran not to + Plymouth, but right up to St. Helen's. The movement is + always regarded as an unworthy retreat, and it caused much + dissatisfaction in the fleet at the time. But it is to be + observed that his conduct was strictly in accordance with + the principle which makes the invading army the primary + objective. If Hardy's fleet was no longer fit to keep the + sea without replenishment, then the proper place to seek + replenishment was on the invader's line of passage. So long + as he was there, invasion could not take place till he was + defeated. The allies, it was true, were now free to join + their transports, but the prospect of such a movement gave + the admiral no uneasiness, for it would bring him the chance + of serving his enemy as the Spaniards were served in 1588. + "I shall do my utmost," he said, "to drive them up the + Channel." It is the old principle. If the worst comes to the + worst, so long as you are able to force the covering fleet + upon the transports, and especially in narrow waters, + invasion becomes an operation beyond the endurable risks of + war.</p> + + <p>So it proved. On August 14th Count d'Orvilliers, the allied + commander-in-chief, had made the Lizard, and for a fortnight + had striven to bring Hardy to decisive action. Until he had + done so he dared neither enter the Channel with his fleet nor + detach a squadron to break the cruiser blockades at the + invasion bases. His ineffectual efforts exhausted his fleet's + endurance, which the distant concentration at Finisterre had + <!-- Page 257 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" + id="Page_257"></a>[pg 257]</span> already severely sapped, + and he was forced to return impotent to Brest before + anything had been accomplished. The allies were not able to + take the sea again that campaign, but even had it been in + their power to do so, Hardy and Kempenfelt could have played + their defensive game indefinitely, and with ever-increasing + chances, as the winter drew near, of dealing a paralysing + blow.</p> + + <p>There was never any real chance of success, though it is + true Dumouriez thought otherwise. He believed the enterprise + might have gone through if a diversion had been made by the + bulk of the fleet against Ireland, and under cover of it a + <i>coup de main</i> delivered upon the Isle of Wight, "for + which," he said, "six or eight of the line would have been + enough." But it is inconceivable that old hands like Hardy and + Kempenfelt would have been so easily beguiled of their hold on + the line of passage. Had such a division been detached up the + Channel from the allied fleet they would surely, according to + tradition, have followed it with either a superior force or + their whole squadron.</p> + + <p>The well-known projects of the Great War followed the same + course. Under Napoleon's directions they ran the whole gamut of + every scheme that ever raised delusive hope before. Beginning + from the beginning with the idea of stealing his army across in + flat-boats, he was met with the usual flotilla defence. Then + came his only new idea, which was to arm his transport flotilla + to the point of giving it power to force a passage for itself. + We replied by strengthening our flotilla. Convinced by + experiment that his scheme was now impracticable, he set his + mind on breaking the blockade by the sudden intrusion of a + flying squadron from a distance. To this end various plausible + schemes were worked out, but plan after plan melted in his + hand, till he was forced to face the inevitable necessity of + bringing an overwhelming battle force up to his transports. The + experience of two centuries had taught him nothing. By a more + distant concentration than + <!-- Page 258 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" + id="Page_258"></a>[pg 258]</span> had ever been attempted + before he believed he could break the fatal hold of his + enemy. The only result was so severely to exhaust his fleet + that it never could get within reach of the real + difficulties of its task, a task which every admiral in his + service knew to be beyond the strength of the Imperial Navy. + Nor did Napoleon even approach a solution of the problem he + had set himself—invasion over an uncommanded sea. With + our impregnable flotilla hold covered by an automatic + concentration of battle-squadrons off Ushant, his army could + never even have put forth, unless he had inflicted upon our + covering fleet such a defeat as would have given him command + of the sea, and with absolute control of the sea the passage + of an army presents no difficulties.</p> + + <p>Of the working of these principles under modern conditions + we have no example. The acquisition of free movement must + necessarily modify their application, and since the advent of + steam there have been only two invasions over uncommanded + seas—that of the Crimea in 1854, and that of Manchuria in + 1904—and neither of these cases is in point, for in + neither was there any attempt at naval defence. Still there + seems no reason to believe that such defence applied in the old + manner would be less effective than formerly. The flotilla was + its basis, and since the introduction of the torpedo the power + of the flotilla has greatly increased. Its real and moral + effect against transports must certainly be greater than ever, + and the power of squadrons to break a flotilla blockade is more + restricted. Mines, again, tell almost entirely in favour of + defence, so much so indeed as to render a rapid <i>coup de + main</i> against any important port almost an impossibility. In + the absence of all experience it is to such theoretical + considerations we must turn for light.</p> + + <p>Theoretically stated, the success of our old system of + defence depended on four relations. Firstly, there is the + relation between the rapidity with which an invasion force + could be mobilised and embarked, and the rapidity with which + restlessness + <!-- Page 259 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" + id="Page_259"></a>[pg 259]</span> in foreign ports and + <i>places d'armes</i> could be reported; that is to say, the + chance of surprise and evasion are as the speed of + preparation to the speed of intelligence.</p> + + <p>Secondly, there is the relation of the speed of convoys to + the speed of cruisers and flotilla; that is to say, our ability + to get contact with a convoy after it has put to sea and before + the expedition can be disembarked is as the speed of our + cruisers and flotilla to the speed of the convoy.</p> + + <p>Thirdly, there is the relation between the destructive power + of modern cruisers and flotillas against a convoy unescorted or + weakly escorted and the corresponding power in sailing + days.</p> + + <p>Fourthly, there is the relation between the speed of convoys + and the speed of battle-squadrons, which is of importance where + the enemy's transports are likely to be strongly escorted. On + this relation depends the facility with which the + battle-squadron covering our mobile defence can secure an + interior position from which it may strike either the enemy's + battle-squadron if it moves or his convoy before it can + complete its passage and effect the landing.</p> + + <p>All these relations appear to have been modified by modern + developments in favour of the defence. In the first ratio, that + of speed of mobilisation to speed of intelligence, it is + obviously so. Although military mobilisation may be still + relatively as rapid as the mobilisation of fleets, yet + intelligence has outstripped both. This is true both for + gaining and for conveying intelligence. Preparations for + oversea invasion were never easy to conceal, owing to the + disturbance of the flow of shipping that they caused. Elaborate + precautions were taken to prevent commercial leakage of + intelligence, but they never entirely succeeded. Yet formerly, + in the condition of comparative crudeness with which + international trade was then organised, concealment was + relatively easy, at least for a time. But the ever-growing + sensitiveness of world-wide commerce, when market movements are + reported from hour to <!-- + Page 260 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" + id="Page_260"></a>[pg 260]</span> hour instead of from week + to week, has greatly increased the difficulty. And apart + from the rapidity with which information may be gathered + through this alert and intimate sympathy between Exchanges, + there is the still more important fact that with wireless + the speed of conveying naval intelligence has increased in a + far higher ratio than the speed of sea transit.</p> + + <p>As regards the ratio between cruiser and convoy speeds, on + which evasion so much depends, it is the same. In frigate days + the ratio appears to have been not more than seven to five. Now + in the case at any rate of large convoys it would be nearly + double.</p> + + <p>Of the destructive power of the flotilla, growing as it does + from year to year, enough has been said already. With the + advent of the torpedo and submarine it has probably increased + tenfold. In a lesser degree the same is true of cruisers. In + former days the physical power of a cruiser to injure a + dispersing convoy was comparatively low, owing to her + relatively low excess of speed and the restricted range and + destructive power of her guns. With higher speed and higher + energy and range in gun power the ability of cruisers to cut up + a convoy renders its practical annihilation almost certain if + once it be caught, and consequently affords a moral deterrent + against trusting to evasion beyond anything that was known + before.</p> + + <p>The increased ratio of battle-fleet speed to that of large + convoys is equally indisputable and no less important, for the + facility of finding interior positions which it implies goes to + the root of the old system. So long as our battle-fleet is in a + position whence it can cover our flotilla blockade or strike + the enemy's convoy in transit, it forces his battle-fleet in + the last resort to close up on the convoy, and that, as + Kempenfelt pointed out, is practically fatal to the success of + invasion.</p> + + <p>From whatever point of view, then, we regard the future + chances of successful invasion over an uncommanded sea, it + <!-- Page 261 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" + id="Page_261"></a>[pg 261]</span> would seem that not only + does the old system hold good, but that all modern + developments which touch the question bid fair to intensify + the results which our sea service at least used so + confidently to expect, and which it never failed to + secure.</p> + + <h3>II. ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF TRADE</h3> + + <p>The base idea of the attack and defence of trade may be + summed up in the old adage, "Where the carcase is, there will + the eagles be gathered together." The most fertile areas always + attracted the strongest attack, and therefore required the + strongest defence; and between the fertile and the infertile + areas it was possible to draw a line which for strategical + purposes was definite and constant. The fertile areas were the + terminals of departure and destination where trade tends to be + crowded, and in a secondary degree the focal points where, + owing to the conformation of the land, trade tends to converge. + The infertile areas were the great routes which passed through + the focal points and connected the terminal areas. Consequently + attack on commerce tends to take one of two forms. It may be + terminal or it may be pelagic, terminal attack being the more + profitable, but demanding the greater force and risk, and + pelagic attack being the more uncertain, but involving less + force and risk.</p> + + <p>These considerations lead us directly to the paradox which + underlies the unbroken failure of our enemies to exercise + decisive pressure upon us by operations against our trade. It + is that where attack is most to be feared, there defence is + easiest. A plan of war which has the destruction of trade for + its primary object implies in the party using it an inferiority + at sea. Had he superiority, his object would be to convert that + superiority to a working command by battle or blockade. Except, + therefore, in the rare cases where the opposed forces are + equal, we must assume that the belligerent who makes commerce + destruction his primary object will have to deal + <!-- Page 262 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" + id="Page_262"></a>[pg 262]</span> with a superior fleet. + Now, it is true that the difficulty of defending trade lies + mainly in the extent of sea it covers. But, on the other + hand, the areas in which it tends to congregate, and in + which alone it is seriously vulnerable, are few and narrow, + and can be easily occupied if we are in superior force. + Beyond those areas effective occupation is impossible, but + so also is effective attack. Hence the controlling fact of + war on commerce, that facility of attack means facility of + defence.</p> + + <p>Beside this fundamental principle we must place another that + is scarcely less important. Owing to the general common nature + of sea communications, attack and defence of trade are so + intimately connected that the one operation is almost + indistinguishable from the other. Both ideas are satisfied by + occupying the common communications. The strongest form of + attack is the occupation of the enemy's terminals, and the + establishment of a commercial blockade of the ports they + contain. But as this operation usually requires the blockade of + an adjacent naval port, it also constitutes, as a rule, a + defensive disposition for our own trade, even when the enemy's + terminal area does not overlap one of our own. In the + occupation of focal areas the two ideas are even more + inseparable, since most, if not all, such areas are on lines of + communication that are common. It will suffice, therefore, to + deal with the general aspect of the subject from the point of + view of defence.</p> + + <p>It was in conformity with the distinction between fertile + and infertile areas that our old system of trade defence was + developed. Broadly speaking, that system was to hold the + terminals in strength, and in important cases the focal points + as well. By means of a battle-squadron with a full complement + of cruisers they were constituted defended areas, or "tracts" + as the old term was, and the trade was regarded as safe when it + entered them. The intervening trade-routes were left as a rule + undefended. Thus our home terminals were held <!-- Page + 263 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" + id="Page_263"></a>[pg 263]</span> by two battle-squadrons, + the Western Squadron at the mouth of the Channel, and the + North Sea or Eastern Squadron with its headquarters usually + in the Downs. To these was added a cruiser squadron on the + Irish station based at Cork, which was sometimes subordinate + to the Western Squadron and sometimes an independent + organisation. The area of the Western Squadron in the French + wars extended, as we have seen, over the whole Bay of + Biscay, with the double function, so far as commerce was + concerned, of preventing the issue of raiding squadrons from + the enemy's ports, and acting offensively against his + Atlantic trade. That of the North Sea squadron extended to + the mouth of the Baltic and the north-about passage. Its + main function during the great naval coalitions against us + was to check the operations of Dutch squadrons or to prevent + the intrusion of French ones north-about against our Baltic + trade. Like the Western Squadron, it threw out divisions + usually located at Yarmouth and Leith for the protection of + our coastwise trade from privateers and sporadic cruisers + acting from ports within the defended area. Similarly, + between the Downs and the Western Squadron was usually one + or more smaller squadrons, mainly cruisers, and generally + located about Havre and the Channel Islands, which served + the same purpose for the Norman and North Breton ports. To + complete the system there were flotilla patrols acting under + the port admirals and doing their best to police the routes + of the coastwise and local traffic, which then had an + importance long since lost. The home system of course + differed at different times, but it was always on these + general lines. The naval defence was supplemented by + defended ports of refuge, the principal ones being on the + coast of Ireland to shelter the ocean trade, but others in + great numbers were provided within the defended areas + against the operations of privateers, and the ruins of + batteries all round the British shores testify how complete + was the organisation.</p> + + <p>A similar system prevailed in the colonial areas, but there + <!-- Page + 264 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" + id="Page_264"></a>[pg 264]</span> the naval defence + consisted normally of cruiser squadrons stiffened with one + or two ships-of-the-line mainly for the purpose of carrying + the flag. They were only occupied by battle-squadrons when + the enemy threatened operations with a similar force. The + minor or interior defence against local privateers was to a + large extent local; that is, the great part of the flotilla + was furnished by sloops built or hired on the spot, as being + best adapted for the service.</p> + + <p>Focal points were not then so numerous as they have become + since the development of the Far Eastern trade. The most + important of them, the Straits of Gibraltar, was treated as a + defended area. From the point of view of commerce-protection it + was held by the Mediterranean squadron. By keeping watch on + Toulon that squadron covered not only the Straits, but also the + focal points within the sea. It too had its extended divisions, + sometimes as many as four, one about the approaches to Leghorn, + one in the Adriatic, a third at Malta, and the fourth at + Gibraltar. In cases of war with Spain the latter was very + strong, so as to secure the focal area against Cartagena and + Cadiz. On one occasion indeed, in 1804-5, as we have seen, it + was constituted for a short time an independent area with a + special squadron. But in any case the Gibraltar area had its + own internal flotilla guard under the direction of the port + admiral as a defence against local privateers and pirates.</p> + + <p>The general theory of these defended terminal and focal + areas, it will be seen, was to hold in force those waters which + converging trade made most fertile, and which therefore + furnished an adequate field for the operations of raiding + squadrons. In spite of the elaborate defensive system, such + squadrons might, and sometimes did, intrude by surprise or + stealth, and were then able to set at defiance both convoy + escorts and the cruiser outposts. But, as experience proved, + the system of terminal defence by battle-squadrons made it + impossible for such raiding squadrons to remain long enough on + the ground + <!-- Page 265 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" + id="Page_265"></a>[pg 265]</span> to cause any serious + interruption or to do serious harm. It was only by a regular + fleet of superior strength that the system could be broken + down. In other words, the defence could only fall when our + means of local control was destroyed by battle.</p> + + <p>So much for the defended areas. With regard to the great + routes that connected them, it has been said they were left + undefended. By this is meant that the security of ships passing + along them was provided for, not by patrols but by escort. The + convoy system was adopted, and the theory of that system is + that while vessels are on the great routes they are normally + liable only to sporadic attack, and they are consequently + collected into fleets and furnished with an escort sufficient + to repel sporadic attack. In theory, cruiser escort is + sufficient, but in practice it was found convenient and + economical to assign the duty in part to ships-of-the-line + which were going out to join the distant terminal squadron or + returning from it for a refit or some other reason; in other + words, the system of foreign reliefs was made to work in with + the supplementary escort system. Where no such ships were + available and the convoys were of great value, or enemy's + ships-of-the-line were known to be out, similar units were + specially detailed for convoy duty to go and return, but this + use of battle units was exceptional.</p> + + <p>Such a method of dealing with the great routes is the + corollary of the idea of defended areas. As those areas were + fertile and likely to attract raiding squadrons, so the great + routes were infertile, and no enemy could afford to spend + squadrons upon them. It is obvious, however, that the system + had its weak side, for the mere fact that a convoy was upon a + great route tended to attract a squadron, and the comparative + immunity of those routes was lost. The danger was provided for + to a great extent by the fact that the enemy's ports from which + a squadron could issue were all within defended areas and + watched by our own squadrons. Still, the guard could + <!-- Page 266 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" + id="Page_266"></a>[pg 266]</span> not be made impenetrable. + There was always the chance of a squadron escaping, and if + it escaped towards a critical trade-route, it must be + followed. Hence there were times when the convoy system + seriously disturbed our dispositions, as, for instance, in + the crisis of the Trafalgar campaign, when for a short time + our chain of defended areas was broken down by the escape of + the Toulon squadron. That escape eventually forced a close + concentration on the Western Squadron, but all other + considerations apart, it was felt to be impossible to retain + the mass for more than two days owing to the fact that the + great East and West Indies convoys were approaching, and + Villeneuve's return to Ferrol from Martinique exposed them + to squadronal attack. It was, in fact, impossible to tell + whether the mass had not been forced upon us with this + special end in view.</p> + + <p>In the liability to deflection of this kind lay the most + serious strategical objection to the convoy system. It was + sought to minimise it by giving the convoys a secret route when + there was apprehension of squadronal interference. It was done + in the case just cited, but the precaution seemed in no way to + lessen the anxiety. It may have been because in those days of + slow communication there could be no such certainty that the + secret route had been received as there would be now.</p> + + <p>Modern developments and changes in shipping and naval + material have indeed so profoundly modified the whole + conditions of commerce protection, that there is no part of + strategy where historical deduction is more difficult or more + liable to error. To avoid such error as far as possible, it is + essential to keep those developments in mind at every step. The + more important of them are three in number. Firstly, the + abolition of privateering; secondly, the reduced range of + action for all warships; and thirdly, the development of + wireless telegraphy. There are others which must be dealt with + in their place, but these three go to the root of the whole + problem.</p> + + <p>Difficult as it is to arrive at exact statistics of commerce + <!-- Page + 267 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" + id="Page_267"></a>[pg 267]</span> destruction in the old + wars, one thing seems certain—that the bulk of + captures, which were reckoned in hundreds and sometimes even + in thousands, were due to the action of privateers. Further, + it seems certain that, reckoning at least by numbers, the + greater part of the damage was done by small privateers + operating close to their bases, either home or colonial, + against coastwise and local traffic. The complaints of + merchants, so far as they are known, relate mainly to this + kind of work in the West Indies and home waters, while + accounts of serious captures by large privateers on the high + seas are comparatively rare. The actual damage done by the + swarm of small vessels may not have been great, but its + moral effects were very serious. It was impossible for the + strongest Governments to ignore them, and the consequence + was a chronic disturbance of the larger strategical + dispositions. While these dispositions were adequate to + check the operations of large privateers acting in the same + way as regular cruisers, the smaller ones found very free + play amidst the ribwork of the protective system, and they + could only be dealt with by filling up the spaces with a + swarm of small cruisers to the serious detriment of the + larger arrangements. Even so, the proximity of the enemy's + ports made escape so easy, that the work of repression was + very ineffective. The state of the case was indeed almost + identical with a people's war. The ordinary devices of + strategy failed to deal with it, as completely as Napoleon's + broadly planned methods failed to deal with the + <i>guerilleros</i> in Spain, or as our own failed for so + long in South Africa.</p> + + <p>By the abolition of privateering, then, it would seem that + the most disturbing part of the problem has been eliminated. It + is, of course, uncertain how far the Declaration of Paris + <!-- Page 268 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" + id="Page_268"></a>[pg 268]</span> will hold good in + practice. It is still open even to the parties to it to + evade its restrictions to a greater or less extent by taking + up and commissioning merchantmen as regular ships of war. + But it is unlikely that such methods will extend beyond the + larger privately owned vessels. Any attempt to revive in + this way the old <i>picaresque</i> methods could only amount + to a virtual repudiation of statutory international law, + which would bring its own retribution. Moreover, for home + waters at least, the conditions which favoured this + <i>picaresque</i> warfare no longer exist. In the old wars + the bulk of our trade came into the Thames, and thence the + greater part of it was distributed in small coasting + vessels. It was against this coastwise traffic that the + small, short-range privateers found their opportunity and + their richest harvest. But, now that so many other great + centres of distribution have established themselves, and + that the bulk of the distribution is done by internal lines + of communication, the Channel is no longer the sole artery, + and the old troublesome disturbance can be avoided without a + vital dislocation of our commercial system.</p> + + <p>The probability, then, is that in the future the whole + problem will be found to be simplified, and that the work of + commerce protection will lie much more within the scope of + large strategical treatment than it ever did before, with the + result that the change should be found to tell substantially in + favour of defence and against attack.</p> + + <p>The reduction of range of action is scarcely less important. + In the old days a cruising ship could be stored for six months, + and so long as she could occasionally renew her fuel and water, + she was free to range the sea outside the defended areas for + the whole of the period with unimpaired vitality. For such + pelagic operations her movement was practically unrestricted. + She could run for two or three days from a superior enemy or + chase for as long without loss of energy, and she could wait + indefinitely at a likely spot, or change her ground, as danger + or hope of plunder dictated. So long as she had men left to man + her prizes, her power of mischief was + <!-- Page 269 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" + id="Page_269"></a>[pg 269]</span> almost unlimited. All this + is now changed. The capacity of each cruise of a ship to-day + is very small. She is confined to short dashes within a + strategically defended area, or if she is bent on pelagic + operations, is compelled to proceed so far to find + undefended waters that her coal will scarcely permit of more + than a few days' actual cruising. A couple of chases at high + speed during that period may force her to return at once, + subject only to the precarious possibility of renewing her + coal from a prize. She has, further, to face the fact that + manning prizes must necessarily reduce her capacity for + speed, which depends so much on a fully manned engine-room. + This will tend to jeopardise her chances of return through + or near defended areas. The only escape from this difficulty + is to sink the captured ship. But this course has objections + scarcely less weighty than the other. No Power will incur + the odium of sinking a prize with all hands, and their + removal to the captor's ship takes time, especially in bad + weather, and the presence of such prisoners in a cruiser in + any number soon becomes a serious check on her fighting + power. In the case of large ships, moreover, the work of + destruction is no easy matter. In the most favourable + circumstances it takes a considerable time, and thus not + only eats into the cruiser's endurance, but decreases her + chances of evasion.</p> + + <p>From these and similar considerations it is obvious that the + possibilities of operations on the great trade-routes are much + less extensive than they were formerly, while to speak of + cruisers "infesting" those routes is sheer hyperbole. Under + modern conditions it is scarcely more feasible than it would be + to keep up a permanent blockade of the British Islands. It + would require a flow of ships in such numbers as no country but + our own can contemplate possessing, and such as could not be + maintained without having first secured a very decided + preponderance at sea. The loss of radius of action therefore, + though it does not increase the power of defence, sensibly + lessens that of attack by pelagic operations.</p> + + <p>For the great increase in the powers of defence we must + <!-- Page 270 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" + id="Page_270"></a>[pg 270]</span> turn to the extraordinary + development in the means of distant communication. Under + former conditions it was possible for a cruising ship to + remain for days upon a fertile spot and make a number of + captures before her presence was known. But since most large + merchantmen have been fitted with wireless installations, + she cannot now attack a single one of them without fear of + calling down upon her an adversary. Moreover, when she is + once located, every ship within wireless reach can be warned + of her presence and avoid her. She must widely and + constantly shift her position, thereby still further + reducing her staying power. On the whole, then, it would + appear that in so far as modern developments affect the + problem, they certainly render pelagic operations far more + difficult and uncertain than they used to be. Upon the great + routes the power of attack has been reduced and the means of + evasion has increased to such an extent as to demand entire + reconsideration of the defence of trade between terminal + areas. The whole basis of the old system would seem to be + involved. That basis was the convoy system, and it now + becomes doubtful whether the additional security which + convoys afforded is sufficient to outweigh their economical + drawbacks and their liability to cause strategical + disturbance.</p> + + <p>Over and above the considerations already noticed, there are + three others, all of which favour the security of our trade by + permitting a much more extended choice of route. The first is, + that steam vessels are not forced by prevailing winds to keep + to particular courses. The second is, that the improvements in + the art of navigation no longer render it so necessary to make + well-known landfalls during transit. The third is, that the + multiplication of our great ports of distribution have divided + the old main flow of trade to the Channel into a number of + minor streams that cover a much wider area and demand a greater + distribution of force for effective attack. It will be obvious + that the combined effect of these considerations is to increase + still further the chances of individual + <!-- Page 271 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" + id="Page_271"></a>[pg 271]</span> vessels evading the + enemy's cruisers and to lessen the risk of dispensing with + escort.</p> + + <p>Nor are the new practical difficulties of sporadic + operations on the great routes the only arguments that minimise + the value of convoys. We have also to remember that while the + number of vessels trading across the ocean has enormously + increased since 1815, it is scarcely possible, even if the + abolition of privateering prove abortive, that the number of + cruisers available for pelagic attack could exceed, or even + equal, the number employed in sailing days. This consideration, + then, must also be thrown into the scale against convoys; for + it is certain that the amount of serious operative damage which + an enemy can do to our trade by pelagic operation is mainly + determined by the ratio which his available cruiser strength + bears to the volume of that trade. This aspect of the question + is, however, part of a much wider one, which concerns the + relation which the volume of our trade bears to the difficulty + of its defence, and this must be considered later.</p> + + <p>It remains, first, to deal with the final link in the old + system of defence. The statement that the great routes were + left undefended will seem to be in opposition to a prevailing + impression derived from the fact that frigates are constantly + mentioned as being "on a cruise." The assumption is that they + in effect patrolled the great routes. But this was not so, nor + did they rove the sea at will. They constituted a definite and + necessary part of the system. Though that system was founded on + a distinction between defended terminals and undefended routes, + which was a real strategical distinction, it was impossible to + draw an actual line where the one sphere began and the other + ended. Outside the regularly defended areas lay a region which, + as the routes began to converge, was comparatively fertile. In + this region enemies' cruisers and their larger privateers found + the mean between risk and profit. Here too convoys, as they + entered the zone, were in their greatest danger for fear of + their escorts being overpowered + <!-- Page 272 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" + id="Page_272"></a>[pg 272]</span> by raiding squadrons. + Consequently it was the practice, when the approach of + convoys was expected, to throw forward from the defended + area groups of powerful cruisers, and even battleship + divisions, to meet them and reinforce their escorts. + Outward-bound convoys had their escorts similarly + strengthened till they were clear of the danger zone. The + system was in regular use both for home and colonial areas. + In no sense did it constitute a patrol of the routes. It was + in practice and conception a system of outposts, which at + seasons of special risk amounted to an extension of the + defended areas combining with a reinforcement of the convoy + escorts. Focal points of lesser importance, such as Capes + Finisterre and St. Vincent, were similarly held by one or + two powerful cruisers, and if necessary by a squadron.</p> + + <p>As has been already explained, owing to the peculiar + conditions of the sea and the common nature of maritime + communications, these dispositions were adopted as well for + attack as defence, and the fertile areas, for the defence of + which a frigate captain was sent "on a cruise," were always + liable to bring him rich reward. His mission of defence carried + with it the best opportunities for attack.</p> + + <p>In the full development of the system patrol lines did + exist, but not for the great routes. They were established to + link up adjacent defended areas and as a more scientific + organisation of the cruiser outposts. In 1805 the Gibraltar and + the home areas were thus connected by a patrol line which + stretched from Cape St. Vincent through the Finisterre focal + area to Cape Clear, with a branch extending to the strategical + centre off Ushant. The new system was introduced at a time when + we had reason to expect that the French and Spanish fleets were + to be devoted entirely to operations in small raiding squadrons + against our trade and colonies. Special provision was therefore + necessary to locate any such squadrons that might elude the + regular blockades, and to ensure that they should be adequately + pursued. The new lines were in fact + <!-- Page 273 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" + id="Page_273"></a>[pg 273]</span> intelligence patrols + primarily, though they were also regarded as the only means + of protecting efficiently the southern trade-route where it + was flanked by French and Spanish ports.<a name="NtA_24" + id="NtA_24"></a><a href="#Nt_24"><sup>24</sup></a></p> + + <p>The whole system, it will be observed, though not + conflicting with the main object of bringing the enemy's fleets + to action, did entail an expenditure of force and deflecting + preoccupations such as are unknown in land warfare. Large + numbers of cruisers had to be employed otherwise than as the + eyes of the battle-squadrons, while the coming and going of + convoys produced periodical oscillations in the general + distribution.</p> + + <p>Embarrassing as was this commercial deflection in the old + wars, an impression appears to prevail that in the future it + must be much more serious. It is argued plausibly enough not + only that our trade is far larger and richer than it was, but + also that, owing to certain well-known economic changes, it is + far more a matter of life and death to the nation than in the + days when food and raw material did not constitute the bulk of + our imports. In view of the new conditions it is held that we + are more vulnerable through our trade now than formerly, and + that, consequently, we must devote relatively more attention + and force to its defence.</p> + + <p>If this were true, it is obvious that war with a strong + naval combination would present difficulties of the most + formidable kind, greater indeed than we have ever experienced; + for since with modern developments the demand for fleet + cruisers is much greater than formerly, the power of devoting + cruisers to trade defence is relatively much less.</p> + <!-- Page 274 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" + id="Page_274"></a>[pg 274]</span> + + <p>It cannot be denied that at first sight the conclusion looks + irreproachable. But on analysis it will be found to involve two + assumptions, both of which are highly questionable. The first + is, that the vulnerability of a sea Power through its maritime + trade is as the volume of that trade. The second is, that the + difficulty of defending sea-borne trade is also as its + volume—that is to say, the larger the amount of the + trade, the larger must be the force devoted to its protection. + This idea indeed is carried so far, that we are frequently + invited to fix the standard of our naval strength by comparing + it with the proportion which the naval strength of other Powers + bears to their sea-borne trade.</p> + + <p>It is hoped that the foregoing sketch of our traditional + system of trade defence will avail to raise a doubt whether + either assumption can be accepted without very careful + consideration. In the history of that system there is no + indication that it was affected by the volume of the trade it + was designed to protect. Nor has any one succeeded in showing + that the pressure which an enemy could exert upon us through + our commerce increased in effect with the volume of our + seaborne trade. The broad indications indeed are the other + way—that the greater the volume of our trade, the less + was the effective impression which an enemy could make upon it, + even when he devoted his whole naval energies to that end. It + is not too much to say that in every case where he took this + course his own trade dwindled to nothing, while ours + continually increased.</p> + + <p>It may be objected that this was because the only periods in + which he devoted his main efforts to trade destruction were + when we had dominated his navy, and being no longer able to + dispute the command, he could do no more than interfere with + its exercise. But this must always be so whether we have + positively dominated his navy or not. If he tries to ignore our + battle-fleets, and devotes himself to operations against trade, + he cannot dispute the command. Whatever his strength, he + <!-- Page 275 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" + id="Page_275"></a>[pg 275]</span> must leave the command to + us. He cannot do both systematically, and unless he attacks + our trade systematically by sustained strategical operation, + he cannot hope to make any real impression.</p> + + <p>If, now, we take the two assumptions and test them by the + application of elementary principles, both will appear + theoretically unsound. Let us take first the relation of + vulnerability to volume. Since the object of war is to force + our will upon the enemy, the only way in which we can expect + war on commerce to serve our end is to inflict so much damage + upon it as will cause our enemy to prefer peace on our terms to + a continuation of the struggle. The pressure on his trade must + be insupportable, not merely annoying. It must seriously + cripple his finance or seriously threaten to strangle his + national life and activities. If his total trade be a hundred + millions, and we succeed in destroying five, he will feel it no + more than he does the ordinary fluctuations to which he is + accustomed in time of peace. If, however, we can destroy fifty + millions, his trade equilibrium will be overthrown, and the + issue of the war will be powerfully affected. In other words, + to affect the issue the impression made on trade must be a + percentage or relative impression. The measure of a nation's + vulnerability through its trade is the percentage of + destruction that an enemy can effect.</p> + + <p>Now, it is true that the amount of damage which a + belligerent can inflict with a given force on an enemy's + commerce will vary to some extent with its volume; for the + greater the volume of commerce, the more fertile will be the + undefended cruising grounds. But no matter how fertile such + areas might be, the destructive power of a cruiser was always + limited, and it must be still more limited in the future. It + was limited by the fact that it was physically impossible to + deal with more than a certain number of prizes in a certain + time, and, for the reasons already indicated, this limit has + suffered a very marked restriction. When this limit of capacity + in a given + <!-- Page 276 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" + id="Page_276"></a>[pg 276]</span> force is passed, the + volume of commerce will not affect the issue; and seeing how + low that capacity must be in the future and how enormous is + the volume of our trade, the limit of destructive power, at + least as against ourselves, provided we have a reasonably + well-organised system of defence, must be relatively low. It + must, in fact, be passed at a percentage figure well within + what we have easily supported in the past. There is reason, + therefore, to believe that so far from the assumption in + question being true, the effective vulnerability of + sea-borne trade is not in direct but in inverse proportion + to its volume. In other words, the greater the volume, the + more difficult it is to make an effective percentage + impression.</p> + + <p>Similarly, it will be observed that the strain of trade + defence was proportioned not to the volume of that trade, but + to the number and exposure of its terminals and focal points. + Whatever the volume of the trade these remained the same in + number, and the amount of force required for their defence + varied only with the strength that could readily be brought to + bear against them. It varied, that is, with the distribution of + the enemy's bases and the amount of his naval force. Thus in + the war of 1812 with the United States, the West Indian and + North American areas were much more exposed than they had been + when we were at war with France alone and when American ports + were not open to her as bases. They became vulnerable not only + to the United States fleet, but also in a much higher degree to + that of France, and consequently the force we found necessary + to devote to trade defence in the North Atlantic was out of all + proportion to the naval strength of the new belligerent. Our + protective force had to be increased enormously, while the + volume of our trade remained precisely the same.</p> + + <p>This relation of trade defence to terminal and focal areas + is of great importance, for it is in the increase of such areas + in the Far East that lies the only radical change in the + problem. + <!-- Page 277 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" + id="Page_277"></a>[pg 277]</span> The East Indian seas were + always of course to some extent treated as a defended area, + but the problem was simplified by the partial survival in + those regions of the old method of defence. Till about the + end of the seventeenth century long-range trade was expected + to defend itself, at least outside the home area, and the + retention of their armament by East Indiamen was the last + survival of the practice. Beyond the important focal area of + St. Helena they relied mainly on their own power of + resistance or to such escort as could be provided by the + relief ships of the East Indian station. As a rule, their + escort proper went no farther outward-bound than St. Helena, + whence it returned with the homeward-bound vessels that + gathered there from India, China, and the South Sea whaling + grounds. The idea of the system was to provide escort for + that part of the great route which was exposed to attack + from French or Spanish colonial bases on the African coasts + and in the adjacent islands.</p> + + <p>For obvious reasons this system would have to be + reconsidered in the future. The expansion of the great European + Powers have changed the conditions for which it sufficed, and + in a war with any one of them the system of defended terminal + and focal areas would require a great extension eastward, + absorbing an appreciable section of our force, and entailing a + comparatively weak prolongation of our chain of concentrations. + Here, then, we must mark a point where trade defence has + increased in difficulty, and there is one other.</p> + + <p>Although minor hostile bases within a defended area have + lost most of their menace to trade, they have acquired as + torpedo bases a power of disturbing the defence itself. So long + as such bases exist with a potent flotilla within them, it is + obvious that the actual provision for defence cannot be so + simple a matter as it was formerly. Other and more complex + arrangements may have to be made. Still, the principle of + <!-- Page 278 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" + id="Page_278"></a>[pg 278]</span> defended areas seems to + remain unshaken, and if it is to work with its old + effectiveness, the means and the disposition for securing + those areas will have to be adapted to the new tactical + possibilities. The old strategical conditions, so far as can + be seen, are unaltered except in so far as the reactions of + modern material make them tell in favour of defence rather + than of attack.</p> + + <p>If we desire to formulate the principles on which this + conclusion rests we shall find them in the two broad rules, + firstly, that the vulnerability of trade is in inverse ratio to + its volume, and secondly, that facility of attack means + facility of defence. The latter, which was always true, + receives special emphasis from modern developments. Facility of + attack means the power of exercising control. For exercise of + control we require not only numbers, but also speed and + endurance, qualities which can only be obtained in two ways: it + must be at the cost of armour and armament, or at the cost of + increased size. By increasing size we at once lose numbers. If + by sacrificing armament and armour we seek to maintain numbers + and so facilitate attack, we at the same time facilitate + defence. Vessels of low fighting power indeed cannot hope to + operate in fertile areas without support to overpower the + defence. Every powerful unit detached for such support sets + free a unit on the other side, and when this process is once + begun, there is no halting-place. Supporting units to be + effective must multiply into squadrons, and sooner or later the + inferior Power seeking to substitute commerce destruction for + the clash of squadrons will have squadronal warfare thrust upon + him, provided again the superior Power adopts a reasonably + sound system of defence. It was always so, and, so far as it is + possible to penetrate the mists which veil the future, it would + seem that with higher mobility and better means of + communication the squadronal stage must be reached long before + any adequate percentage impression can have been + <!-- Page 279 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" + id="Page_279"></a>[pg 279]</span> made by the sporadic + action of commerce destroyers. Ineffectual as such warfare + has always been in the past, until a general command has + been established, its prospects in the future, judged by the + old established principles, are less promising than + ever.</p> + + <p>Finally, in approaching the problem of trade protection, and + especially for the actual determination of the force and + distribution it requires, there is a dominant limitation to be + kept in mind. By no conceivable means is it possible to give + trade absolute protection. We cannot make an omelette without + breaking eggs. We cannot make war without losing ships. To aim + at a standard of naval strength or a strategical distribution + which would make our trade absolutely invulnerable is to march + to economic ruin. It is to cripple our power of sustaining war + to a successful issue, and to seek a position of maritime + despotism which, even if it were attainable, would set every + man's hand against us. All these evils would be upon us, and + our goal would still be in the far distance. In 1870 the second + naval Power in the world was at war with an enemy that could + not be considered a naval Power at all, and yet she lost ships + by capture. Never in the days of our most complete domination + upon the seas was our trade invulnerable, and it never can be. + To seek invulnerability is to fall into the strategical vice of + trying to be superior everywhere, to forfeit the attainment of + the essential for fear of risking the unessential, to base our + plans on an assumption that war may be waged without loss, that + it is, in short, something that it never has been and never can + be. Such peace-bred dreams must be rigorously abjured. Our + standard must be the mean of economic strength—the line + which on the one hand will permit us to nourish our financial + resources for the evil day, and on the other, when that day + comes, will deny to the enemy the possibility of choking our + financial vigour by sufficiently checking the flow of our + trade.</p><!-- Page 280 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" + id="Page_280"></a>[pg 280]</span> + + <h3>III. ATTACK, DEFENCE, AND SUPPORT OF<br /> + MILITARY EXPEDITIONS</h3> + + <p>The attack and defence of oversea expeditions are governed + in a large measure by the principles of attack and defence of + trade. In both cases it is a question of control of + communications, and in a general way it may be said, if we + control them for the one purpose, we control them for the + other. But with combined expeditions freedom of passage is not + the only consideration. The duties of the fleet do not end with + the protection of the troops during transit, as in the case of + convoys, unless indeed, as with convoys, the destination is a + friendly country. In the normal case of a hostile destination, + where resistance is to be expected from the commencement of the + operations, the fleet is charged with further duties of a most + exacting kind. They may be described generally as duties of + support, and it is the intrusion of these duties which + distinguish the naval arrangements for combined operations most + sharply from those for the protection of trade. Except for this + consideration there need be no difference in the method of + defence. In each case the strength required would be measured + by the dangers of interference in transit. But as it is, that + standard will not serve for combined expeditions; for however + small those risks, the protective arrangements must be + sufficiently extensive to include arrangements for support.</p> + + <p>Before dealing with this, the most complex aspect of the + question, it will be well to dismiss attack. From the + strategical point of view its principles differ not at all from + those already laid down for active resistance of invasion. + Whether the expedition that threatens us be small or of + invasion strength, the cardinal rule has always been that the + transports and not the escort must be the primary objective of + the fleet. The escort, according to the old practice, must be + turned or contained, but never treated as a primary objective + unless both turning and containing prove to be impracticable. + It is <!-- Page 281 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" + id="Page_281"></a>[pg 281]</span> needless to repeat the + words of the old masters in which this principle lies + embalmed. It is seldom that we find a rule of naval strategy + laid down in precise technical terms, but this one is an + exception. In the old squadronal instructions, "The + transports of the enemy are to be your principal object," + became something like a common form.</p> + + <p>Nor did this rule apply only to cases where the transports + were protected by a mere escort. It held good even in the + exceptional cases where the military force was accompanied or + guarded by the whole available battle strength of the enemy. We + have seen how in 1744 Norris was prepared to follow the French + transports if necessary with his whole force, and how in 1798 + Nelson organised his fleet in such a way as to contain rather + than destroy the enemy's battle-squadron, so that he might + provide for an overwhelming attack upon the transports.</p> + + <p>Exceptions to this as to all strategical rules may be + conceived. Conditions might exist in which, if the enemy's + battle-fleet accompanied his transports, it would be worth our + while, for ulterior objects of our own, to risk the escape of + the transports in order to seize the opportunity of destroying + the fleet. But even in such a case the distinction would be + little more than academical; for our best chance of securing a + decisive tactical advantage against the enemy's fleet would + usually be to compel it to conform to our movements by + threatening an attack on the transports. It is well known that + it is in the embarrassment arising from the presence of + transports that lies the special weakness of a fleet in charge + of them.</p> + + <p>There is, however, one condition which radically + differentiates comparatively small expeditions from great + invasions and that is the power of evasion. Our experience has + proved beyond dispute that the navy alone cannot guarantee + defence against such expeditions. It cannot be sure of + preventing their sailing or of attacking them in transit, and + this is especially + <!-- Page 282 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" + id="Page_282"></a>[pg 282]</span> the case where an open sea + gives them a free choice of route, as in the case of the + French expeditions against Ireland. It is for this reason + that, although an adequate navy has always proved sufficient + to prevent an invasion, for defence against expeditions it + must be supplemented by a home army. To perfect our defence, + or, in other words, our power of attack, such an army must + be adequate to ensure that all expeditions small enough to + evade the fleet shall do no effective harm when they land. + If in numbers, training, organisation, and distribution it + is adequate for this purpose, an enemy cannot hope to affect + the issue of the war except by raising his expeditions to + invasion strength, and so finding himself involved in a + problem that no one has ever yet solved for an uncommanded + sea.</p> + + <p>Still, even for expeditions below invasion strength the navy + will only regard the army as a second line, and its strategy + must provide in the event of evasion for co-operation with that + line. By means of a just distribution of its coastal flotilla + it will provide for getting contact with the expedition at the + earliest moment after its destination is declared. It will + press the principle of making the army its objective to the + utmost limit by the most powerful and energetic cruiser + pursuit, and with wireless and the increased ratio of cruiser + speed, such pursuit is far more formidable than it ever was. No + expedition nowadays, however successful its evasion, can be + guaranteed against naval interruption in the process of + landing. Still less can it be guaranteed against naval + interference in its rear or flanks while it is securing its + front against the home army. It may seek by using large + transports to reduce their number and secure higher speed, but + while that will raise its chance of evasion, it will prolong + the critical period of landing. If it seek by using smaller + transports to quicken disembarkation, that will decrease its + chances of evasion by lowering its speed and widening the sea + area it will occupy in transit. All the modern developments in + fact which make for + <!-- Page 283 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" + id="Page_283"></a>[pg 283]</span> defence in case of + invasion over an uncommanded sea also go to facilitate + timely contact with an expedition seeking to operate by + evasion. Nor must it be forgotten, since the problem is a + combined one, that the corresponding developments ashore + tell with little less force in favour of the defending army. + Such appear to be the broad principles which govern an + enemy's attempts to act with combined expeditions in our own + waters, where by hypothesis we are in sufficient naval + strength to deny him permanent local command. We may now + turn to the larger and more complex question of the conduct + of such expeditions where the naval conditions are + reversed.</p> + + <p>By the conduct, be it remembered, we mean not only their + defence but also their support, and for this reason the + starting-point of our inquiry is to be found, as above + indicated, in the contrast of combined expeditions with + convoys. A convoy consists of two elements—a fleet of + merchantmen and an escort. But a combined expedition does not + consist simply of an army and a squadron. It is an organism at + once more complex and more homogeneous. Its constitution is + fourfold. There is, firstly, the army; secondly, the transports + and landing flotilla—that is, the flotilla of flat-boats + and steamboats for towing them, all of which may be carried in + the transports or accompany them; thirdly, the "Squadron in + charge of transports," as it came to be called, which includes + the escort proper and the supporting flotilla of lighter craft + for inshore work; and lastly, the "Covering squadron."</p> + + <p>Such at least is a combined expedition in logical analysis. + But so essentially is it a single organism, that in practice + these various elements can seldom be kept sharply distinct. + They may be interwoven in the most intricate manner. Indeed to + a greater or less extent each will always have to discharge + some of the functions of the others. Thus the covering squadron + may not only be indistinguishable from the escort and support, + but it will often provide the greater part of the landing <!-- + Page 284 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" + id="Page_284"></a>[pg 284]</span> flotilla and even a + portion of the landing force. Similarly, the escort may also + serve as transport, and provide in part not only the + supporting force, but also the landing flotilla. The + fourfold constitution is therefore in a great measure + theoretical. Still its use is not merely that it serves to + define the varied functions which the fleet will have to + discharge. As we proceed it will be seen to have a practical + strategical value.</p> + + <p>From a naval point of view it is the covering squadron which + calls first for consideration, because of the emphasis with + which its necessity marks not only the distinction between the + conduct of combined expeditions and the conduct of commercial + convoys, but also the fact that such expeditions are actually a + combined force, and not merely an army escorted by a fleet.</p> + + <p>In our system of commerce protection the covering squadron + had no place. The battle-fleet, as we have seen, was employed + in holding definite terminal areas, and had no organic + connection with the convoys. The convoys had no further + protection than their own escort and the reinforcements that + met them as they approached the terminal areas. But where a + convoy of transports forming part of a combined expedition was + destined for an enemy's country and would have to overcome + resistance by true combined operations, a covering + battle-squadron was always provided. In the case of distant + objectives it might be that the covering squadron was not + attached till the whole expedition assembled in the theatre of + operations; during transit to that theatre the transports might + have commerce protection escort only. But once the operations + began from the point of concentration, a covering squadron was + always in touch.</p> + + <p>It was only where the destination of the troops was a + friendly country, and the line of passage was well protected by + our permanent blockades, that a covering squadron could be + dispensed with altogether. Thus our various expeditions for the + assistance of Portugal were treated exactly like commercial + <!-- Page 285 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" + id="Page_285"></a>[pg 285]</span> convoys, but in such cases + as Wolfe's expedition to Quebec or Amherst's to Louisburg, + or indeed any of those which were continually launched + against the West Indies, a battle-squadron was always + provided as an integral part in the theatre of operations. + Our arrangements in the Crimean War illustrate the point + exactly. Our troops were sent out at first to land at + Gallipoli in a friendly territory, and to act within that + territory as an army of observation. It was not a true + combined expedition, and the transports were given no + covering squadron. Their passage was sufficiently covered by + our Channel and Mediterranean fleets occupying the exits of + the Baltic and the Black Sea. But so soon as the original + war plan proved ineffective and combined offensive + operations against Sebastopol were decided on, the + Mediterranean fleet lost its independent character, and + thenceforth its paramount function was to furnish a covering + squadron in touch with the troops.</p> + + <p>Seeing how important are the support duties of such a force, + the term "Covering squadron" may seem ill-chosen to describe + it. But it is adopted for two reasons. In the first place, it + was the one employed officially in our service on the last + mentioned occasion which was our last great combined + expedition. In preparing the descent on the Crimea, Sir Edmund + Lyons, who was acting as Chief of the Staff to Sir + <!-- Page 286 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" + id="Page_286"></a>[pg 286]</span> James Dundas, and had + charge of the combined operations, organised the fleet into + a "Covering squadron" and a "Squadron in charge of + transports." In the second place, the designation serves to + emphasise what is its main and primary function. For + important as it is to keep in mind its support duties, they + must not be permitted to overshadow the fact that its + paramount function is to prevent interference with the + actual combined operations—that is, the landing, + support, and supply of the army. Thus in 1705, when Shovel + and Peterborough were operating against Barcelona, Shovel + was covering the amphibious siege from the French squadron + in Toulon. Peterborough required the assistance of the + marines ashore to execute a <i>coup de main</i>, and Shovel + only consented to land them on the express understanding + that the moment his cruisers passed the signal that the + Toulon squadron was putting to sea, they would have to be + recalled to the fleet no matter what the state of the land + operations. And to this Peterborough agreed. The principle + involved, it will be seen, is precisely that which Lyons's + term "Covering squadron" embodies.</p> + + <p>To quote anything that happened in the Crimean War as a + precedent without such traditional support will scarcely appear + convincing. In our British way we have fostered a legend that + so far as organisation and staff work were concerned that war + was nothing but a collection of deterrent examples. But in + truth as a combined operation its opening movement + <!-- Page 287 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" + id="Page_287"></a>[pg 287]</span> both in conception and + organisation was perhaps the most daring, brilliant, and + successful thing of the kind we ever did. Designed as the + expedition was to assist an ally in his own country, it was + suddenly called upon without any previous preparation to + undertake a combined operation of the most difficult kind + against the territory of a well-warned enemy. It involved a + landing late in the year on an open and stormy coast within + striking distance of a naval fortress which contained an + army of unknown strength, and a fleet not much inferior in + battle power and undefeated. It was an operation comparable + to the capture of Louisburg and the landing of the Japanese + in the Liaotung Peninsula, but the conditions were far more + difficult. Both those operations had been rehearsed a few + years previously, and they had been long prepared on the + fullest knowledge. In the Crimea everything was in the dark; + even steam was an unproved element, and everything had to be + improvised. The French had practically to demobilise their + fleet to supply transport, and so hazardous did the + enterprise appear, that they resisted its being undertaken + with every military argument. We had in fact, besides all + the other difficulties, to carry an unwilling ally upon our + backs. Yet it was accomplished, and so far at least as the + naval part was concerned, the methods which achieved success + mark the culmination of all we had learnt in three centuries + of rich experience.</p> + + <p>The first of the lessons was that for operations in + uncommanded or imperfectly commanded seas there was need of a + covering squadron differentiated from the squadron in charge of + transports. Its main function was to secure the necessary local + command, whether for transit or for the actual operations. But + as a rule transit was secured by our regular blockading + squadrons, and generally the covering squadron only assembled + in the theatre of operations. When therefore the theatre was + within a defended terminal area, as in our descents upon the + northern and Atlantic coasts of + <!-- Page 288 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" + id="Page_288"></a>[pg 288]</span> France, then the terminal + defence squadron was usually also sufficient to protect the + actual operations. It thus formed automatically the covering + squadron, and either continued its blockade, or, as in the + case of our attack on St. Malo in 1758, took up a position + between the enemy's squadron and the expedition's line of + operation. If, however, the theatre of operation was not + within a terminal area, or lay within a distant one that was + weakly held, the expedition was given its own covering + squadron, in which the local squadron was more or less + completely merged. Whatever, in fact, was necessary to + secure the local control was done, though, as we have seen, + and must presently consider more fully, this necessity was + not always the standard by which the strength of the + covering squadron was measured.</p> + + <p>The strength of the covering squadron being determined, the + next question is the position or "tract" which it should + occupy. Like most other strategical problems, it is "an option + of difficulties." In so far as the squadron is designed for + support—that is, support from its men, boats, and + guns—it will be desirable to station it as near as + possible to the objective; but as a covering squadron, with the + duty of preventing the intrusion of an enemy's force, it should + be as far away as possible, so as to engage such a force at the + earliest possible moment of its attempt to interfere. There is + also the paramount necessity that its position must be such + that favourable contact with the enemy is certain if he tries + to interrupt. Usually such certainty is only to be found either + in touch with the enemy's naval base or in touch with your own + landing force. Where the objective is the local naval base of + the enemy these two points, of course, tend to be identical + strategically, and the position of the covering squadron + becomes a tactical rather than a strategical question. But the + vital principle of an independent existence holds good, and no + matter how great the necessity of support, the covering + squadron should never be so deeply engaged with the landing + force as + <!-- Page 289 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" + id="Page_289"></a>[pg 289]</span> to be unable to + disentangle itself for action as a purely naval unit in time + to discharge its naval function. In other words, it must + always be able to act in the same way as a free field army + covering a siege.</p> + + <p>Where the objective of the expedition is not the local naval + base, the choice of a position for the covering squadron will + turn mainly on the amount of support which the army is likely + to require. If it cannot act by surprise, and serious military + resistance is consequently to be expected, or where the coast + defences are too strong for the transport squadron to + overpower, then the scale will incline to a position close to + the army, though the extent to which, under modern conditions, + ships at sea can usefully perform the delicate operation of + supporting an infantry attack with gun fire, except by + enfilading the enemy's position, remains to be proved. A + similar choice will be indicated where strong support of men + and boats is required, as when a sufficiency of flat-boats and + steam towage cannot be provided by the transports and their + attendant squadron; or again where the locality is such that + amphibious operations beyond the actual landing are likely to + be called for, and the assistance of a large number of boats + and seamen acting with the army is necessary to give it the + amphibious tactical mobility which it would otherwise lack. + Such cases occurred at Quebec in 1759, where Saunders took his + covering battle-squadron right up the St. Lawrence, although + its covering functions could have been discharged even better + by a position several hundreds of miles away from the + objective; and again in 1800 at Alexandria, where Lord Keith + ran the extremest hazard to his covering functions + <!-- Page 290 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" + id="Page_290"></a>[pg 290]</span> in order to undertake the + supply of General Abercromby's army by inland waters and + give him the mobility he required.</p> + + <p>If, on the other hand, the transport squadron is able to + furnish all the support necessary, the covering squadron will + take station as close as possible to the enemy's naval base, + and there it will operate according to the ordinary laws of + blockade. If nothing is desired but to prevent interference, + its guard will take the form of a close blockade. But if there + be a subsidiary purpose of using the expedition as a means of + forcing the enemy to sea, the open form will be employed; as, + for instance, in Anson's case above cited, when he covered the + St. Malo expedition not by closely blockading Brest, but by + taking a position to the eastward at the Isle de Batz.</p> + + <p>In the Japanese operations against Manchuria and the + Kuantung Peninsula these old principles displayed themselves in + undiminished vitality. In the surprise descents against Seoul + and at Takusan the work of support was left entirely with the + transport squadron, while Admiral Togo took up a covering + position far away at Port Arthur. The two elements of the fleet + were kept separate all through. But in the operations for the + isolation and subsequent siege of Port Arthur they were so + closely united as to appear frequently indistinguishable. + Still, so far as the closeness of the landing place to the + objective permitted, the two acted independently. For the + actual landing of the Second Army the boats of the covering + squadron were used, but it remained a live naval unit all + through, and was never organically mingled with the transport + squadron. Its operations throughout were, so far as modern + conditions permit, on the lines of a close blockade. + <!-- Page 291 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" + id="Page_291"></a>[pg 291]</span> To prevent interference + was its paramount function, undisturbed, so far as we are + able to judge, by any subsidiary purpose of bringing the + enemy to decisive action.</p> + + <p>All through the operations, however, there was a new + influence which tended to confuse the precision of the old + methods. Needless to say it was the torpedo and the mine. Their + deflective pressure was curious and interesting. In our own + operations against Sebastopol, to which the Port Arthur case is + most closely comparable, the old rules still held good. On the + traditional principle, dating from Drake's attack on San + Domingo in 1585, a landing place was chosen which gave the mean + between facility for a <i>coup de main</i> and freedom from + opposition; that is, it was chosen at the nearest practicable + point to the objective which was undefended by batteries and + out of reach of the enemy's main army.</p> + + <p>In the handling of the covering squadron Admiral Dundas, the + Commander-in-Chief, gave it its dual function. After explaining + the constitution of the transport squadron he says, "The + remainder of my force ... will act as a covering squadron, and + where practicable assist in the general disembarkation." With + these two objects in mind he took a station near enough to the + landing place to support the army with his guns if it were + opposed, but still in sight of his cruisers before Sebastopol, + and at such a distance that at the first sign of the Russians + moving he would have time to get before the port and engage + them before they could get well to sea; that is, he took a + position as near to the army as was compatible with preventing + interference, or, it may be said, + <!-- Page 292 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" + id="Page_292"></a>[pg 292]</span> his position was as near + to the enemy's base as was compatible with supporting the + landing. From either aspect in fact the position was the + same, and its choice presented no complexity owing mainly to + the fact that for the first time steam simplified the + factors of time and distance.</p> + + <p>In the Japanese case the application of these principles was + not so easy. In selecting the nearest undefended point for a + landing, it was not only batteries, or even the army in Port + Arthur, or the troops dispersed in the Liaotung Peninsula that + had to be considered, but rather, as must always be the case in + the future, mines and mobile torpedo defence. The point they + chose was the nearest practicable bay that was unmined. It was + not strictly out of mobile defence range, but it so happened + that it lay behind islands which lent themselves to the + creation of fixed defences, and thus it fulfilled all the + recognised conditions. But in so far as the defences could be + turned by the Russian fleet a covering squadron was necessary, + and the difficulty of choosing a position for it was + complicated by the fact that the objective of the combined + operations was not merely Port Arthur itself, but also the + squadron it contained. It was necessary, therefore, not only to + hold off that squadron, but to prevent its escape. This + indicated a close blockade. But for close blockade a position + out of night torpedo range is necessary, and the nearest point + where such a position could be secured was behind the defences + that covered the disembarkation. Consequently, in spite of what + the strategical conditions dictated, the covering squadron was + more or less continuously forced back upon the army and its + supporting force, even when the support of the battle-squadron + was no longer required.</p> + + <p>In the conditions that existed nothing was lost. For the + lines of the Japanese fixed defences were so near to the + enemy's base, that by mining the entrance of the port Admiral + Togo ensured that the enemy's exit would be slow enough for him + to be certain of getting contact from his defended anchorage + <!-- Page 293 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" + id="Page_293"></a>[pg 293]</span> before the Russians could + get far to sea. What would happen in a case when no such + position could be secured is another matter. The landing + place and supply base of the army must be secured against + torpedo attack, and the principle of concentration of effort + would suggest that the means of defence should not be + attenuated by providing the covering squadron with a + defended anchorage elsewhere. Thus it would appear that + unless the geographical conditions permit the covering + squadron to use one of its own national bases, the drift of + recent developments will be to force it back on the army, + and thus tend to confuse its duties with those of the + transport squadron. Hence the increased importance of + keeping clear the difference in function between the two + squadrons.</p> + + <p>To emphasise the principle of the covering squadron, these + two cases may be contrasted with the Lissa episode at the end + of the Austro-Italian War of 1866. In that case it was entirely + neglected, with disastrous results. The Austrian admiral, + Tegethoff, with an inferior fleet had by higher order been + acting throughout on the defensive, and was still in Pola + waiting for a chance of a counter-stroke. Persano with the + superior Italian fleet was at Ancona, where he practically + dominated the Adriatic. In July the Italians, owing to the + failure of the army, were confronted with the prospect of being + forced to make peace on unfavourable terms. To improve the + position Persano was ordered to take possession of the Austrian + island of Lissa. Without any attempt to organise his fleet on + the orthodox British principle he proceeded to conduct the + operation with his entire force. Practically the whole of it + became involved in amphibious work, and as soon as Persano was + thus committed, Tegethoff put to sea and surprised him. Persano + was unable to disentangle a sufficient force in time to + <!-- Page 294 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" + id="Page_294"></a>[pg 294]</span> meet the attack, and + having no compact squadron fit for independent naval action, + he was decisively defeated by the inferior enemy. According + to British practice, it was clearly a case where, if the + operation were to be undertaken at all, an independent + covering squadron should have been told off either to hold + Tegethoff in Pola or to bring him to timely action, + according to whether the island or the Austrian fleet was + the primary objective. The reason it was not done may be + that Persano was not given a proper landing force, and he + seems to have considered that the whole strength of his + fleet was needed for the successful seizure of the + objective. If so, it is only one more proof of the rule that + no matter what fleet support the landing operations may + require, it should never be given in an imperfectly + commanded sea to an extent which will deny the possibility + of a covering squadron being left free for independent naval + action.</p> + + <p>The length to which the supporting functions of the fleet + may be carried will always be a delicate question. The + suggestion that its strength must be affected by the need of + the army for the men of the fleet or its boats, which imply its + men as well, will appear heretical. A battle-squadron, we say, + is intended to deal with the enemy's battle-squadron and its + men to fight the ships, and the mind revolts at the idea of the + strength of a squadron being fixed by any other standard. + Theoretically nothing can seem more true, but it is an idea of + peace and the study. The atmosphere of war engendered a wider + and more practical view. The men of the old wars knew that when + a squadron is attached to a combined expedition it is something + different from a purely naval unit. They knew, moreover, that + an army acting oversea against hostile territory is an + incomplete organism incapable of striking its blow in the most + effective manner without the assistance of the men of the + fleet. It was the office, then, of the naval portion of the + force not only to defend the striking part of the organism, but + to complete its deficiencies and lend it the + <!-- Page 295 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" + id="Page_295"></a>[pg 295]</span> power to strike. Alone and + unaided the army cannot depend on getting itself ashore, it + cannot supply itself, it cannot secure its retreat, nor can + it avail itself of the highest advantages of an amphibious + force, the sudden shift of base or line of operation. These + things the fleet must do for it, and it must do them with + its men.<a name="NtA_25" + id="NtA_25"></a><a href="#Nt_25"><sup>25</sup></a></p> + + <p>The authority for this view is abundant. In 1800, for + instance, when General Maitland was charged with an expedition + against Belleisle, he was invited to state what naval force he + would require. He found it difficult to fix with precision. + "Speaking loosely, however," he wrote, "three or four sail of + the line and four or five active frigates appear to me to be + properly adequate to the proposed service. The frigates to + blockade." (Meaning, of course, to blockade the objective and + prevent reinforcements reaching it from the mainland, always + one of the supporting functions of the squadron attached to the + transports.) "The line-of-battle ships," he adds, "to furnish + us with the number of men necessary for land operations." In + this case our permanent blockading squadrons supplied the + cover, and what Maitland meant was that the battleships he + asked for were to be added to the transport + <!-- Page 296 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" + id="Page_296"></a>[pg 296]</span> squadron not as being + required for escort, but for support. St. Vincent, who was + then First Lord, not only endorsed his request, but gave him + for disembarkation work one more ship-of-the-line than he + had asked for. At this time our general command of the sea + had been very fully secured, and we had plenty of naval + force to spare for its exercise. It will be well to compare + it with a case in which the circumstances were + different.</p> + + <p>When in 1795 the expedition under Admiral Christian and + General Abercromby was being prepared for the West Indies, the + admiral in concert with Jervis drew up a memorandum as to the + naval force required.<a name="NtA_26" + id="NtA_26"></a><a href="#Nt_26"><sup>26</sup></a> The force + he asked for was considerable. Both he and Jervis considered + that the escort and local cover must be very strong, because + it was impossible to count on closing either Brest or Toulon + effectually by blockade. But this was not the only reason. + The plan of operations involved three distinct landings, and + each would require at least two of the line, and perhaps + three, "not only as protection, but as the means by which + flat-boats must be manned, cannon landed, and the other + necessary services of fatigue executed." Christian also + required the necessary frigates and three or four brigs "to + cover [that is, support] the operations of the smaller + vessels [that is, the landing flotillas doing inshore + work]." The main attack would require at least four of the + line and seven frigates, with brigs and schooners in + proportion. In all he considered, the ships-of-the-line [the + frigates being "otherwise employed"] would have to provide + landing parties to the number of 2000 men "for the + flat-boats, <!-- Page 297 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" + id="Page_297"></a>[pg 297]</span> landing and moving guns, + water, and provisions," and this would be their daily task. + The military force these landing parties were to serve + amounted to about 18,000 men.</p> + + <p>Lord Barham, it must be said, who as Sir Charles Middleton + was then First Sea Lord, objected to the requirements as + excessive, particularly in the demand for a strong escort, as + he considered that the transit could be safeguarded by special + vigilance on the part of the permanent blockading squadrons. + The need for large shore parties he seems to have ignored. His + opinion, however, is not quite convincing, for from the first + he had taken up an antagonistic attitude to the whole idea of + the expedition. He regarded the policy which dictated it as + radically unsound, and was naturally anxious to restrict the + force that was to be spent upon it. His opposition was based on + the broad and far-sighted principles that were characteristic + of his strategy. He believed that in view of the threatening + attitude of Spain the right course was to husband the navy so + as to bring it up to a two-Power standard for the coming + struggle, and to keep it concentrated for decisive naval action + the moment Spain showed her hand. In short, he stoutly + condemned a policy which entailed a serious dissipation of + naval force for a secondary object before a working command of + the sea had been secured. It was, in fact, the arrangements for + this expedition which forced him to resign + <!-- Page 298 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" + id="Page_298"></a>[pg 298]</span> before the preparations + were complete. But it is to be observed that his objections + to the plan were really due, not to the principle of its + organisation, but to our having insufficient force to give + it adequate naval support without prejudicing the higher + consideration of our whole position at sea.<a name="NtA_27" + id="NtA_27"></a><a href="#Nt_27"><sup>27</sup></a></p> + + <p>It is obvious that the foregoing considerations, beyond the + strategical reactions already noted, will have another of the + first importance, in that they must influence the choice of a + landing place. The interest of the army will always be to fix + it as near to the objective as is compatible with an unopposed + landing. The ideal was one night's march, but this could rarely + be attained except in the case of very small expeditions, which + could be landed rapidly at the close of day and advance in the + dark. In larger expeditions, the aim was to effect the landing + far enough from the objective to prevent the garrison of the + place or the enemy's local forces offering opposition before a + footing was secured. The tendency of the navy will usually be + in the opposite direction; for normally the further they can + land the army away from the enemy's strength, the surer are + they of being able to protect it against naval interference. + Their ideal will be a place far enough away to be out of + torpedo range, and to enable them to work the covering and the + transport squadron in sound strategical independence.</p> + + <p>To reduce these divergencies to a mean of efficiency some + kind of joint Staff is necessary, and to ensure its smooth + working it is no less desirable to ascertain, so far as + possible, the principles and method on which it should proceed. + In the best recent precedents the process has been for the Army + Staff to present the limits of coast-line within which the + landing + <!-- Page 299 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" + id="Page_299"></a>[pg 299]</span> must take place for the + operation to have the desired effect, and to indicate the + known practicable landing points in the order they would + prefer them. It will then be for the Naval Staff to say how + nearly in accordance with the views of the army they are + prepared to act. Their decision will turn on the + difficulties of protection and the essentials of a landing + place from the point of view of weather, currents, beach and + the like, and also in a secondary measure upon the extent to + which the conformation of the coast will permit of tactical + support by gun-fire and feints. If the Naval Staff are + unwilling to agree to the point or points their colleagues + most desire, a question of balance of risk is set up, which + the higher Joint Staff must adjust. It will be the duty of + the Naval Staff to set out frankly and clearly all the sea + risks the proposal of the army entails, and if possible to + suggest an alternative by which the risk of naval + interference can be lessened without laying too heavy a + burden on the army. Balancing these risks against those + stated by the army, the superior Staff must decide which + line is to be taken, and each service then will do its best + to minimise the difficulties it has to face. Whether the + superior Staff will incline to the naval or the military + view will depend upon whether the greater danger likely to + be incurred is from the sea or on land.</p> + + <p>Where the naval conditions are fairly well known the line of + operations can be fixed in this way with much precision. But + if, as usually happens, the probable action of the enemy at sea + cannot be divined with sufficient approximation, then assuming + there is serious possibility of naval interference, the final + choice within the limited area must be left to the admiral. The + practice has been to give him instructions which define in + order of merit the points the army desire, and direct him to + select the one which in the circumstances, as he finds them, he + considers within reasonable risk of war. Similarly, if the + danger of naval interference be small and the local conditions + ashore imperfectly known, the final choice will be with + <!-- Page 300 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" + id="Page_300"></a>[pg 300]</span> the general, subject only + to the practicable possibilities of the landing place he + would choose.</p> + + <p>During the best period of our old wars there was seldom any + difficulty in making things work smoothly on these lines. After + the first inglorious failure at Rochefort in 1757 the practice + was, where discretion of this kind had been allowed, for the + two commanders-in-chief to make a joint coast-reconnaissance in + the same boat and settle the matter amicably on the spot.</p> + + <p>It was on these lines the conduct of our combined operations + was always arranged thenceforth. Since the elder Pitt's time it + has never been our practice to place combined expeditions under + either a naval or a military commander-in-chief and allow him + to decide between naval and military exigencies. The danger of + possible friction between two commanders-in-chief came to be + regarded as small compared with the danger of a single one + making mistakes through unfamiliarity with the limitations of + the service to which he does not belong.</p> + + <p>The system has usually worked well even when questions arose + which were essentially questions for a joint superior Staff. + The exceptions indeed are very few. A fine example of how such + difficulties can be settled, when the spirit is willing, + occurred in the Crimea. The naval difficulties, as we have + already seen, were as formidable as they could well be short of + rendering the whole attempt madness. When it came to the point + of execution a joint council of war was held, at which sat the + allied Staffs of both services. So great were the differences + of opinion between the French and British Generals, and so + imperfectly was the terrain known, that they could + <!-- Page 301 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" + id="Page_301"></a>[pg 301]</span> not indicate a landing + place with any precision. All the admirals knew was that it + must be on an open coast, which they had not been able to + reconnoitre, where the weather might at any time interrupt + communications with the shore, and where they were liable to + be attacked by a force which, until their own ships were + cleared of troops, would not be inferior. All these + objections they laid before the Council General. Lord Raglan + then said the army now perfectly understood the risk, and + was prepared to take it. Whereupon the allied admirals + replied that they were ready to proceed and do their best to + set the army ashore and support it at any point that should + be chosen.</p> + + <p>There remains a form of support which has not yet been + considered, and that is diversionary movements or feints by the + fleet to draw the enemy's attention away from the landing + place. This will naturally be a function of the covering + battle-squadron or its attendant cruisers and flotilla. The + device appears in Drake's attack on San Domingo in 1585, an + attack which may be regarded as our earliest precedent in + modern times and as the pattern to which all subsequent + operations of the kind conformed so far as circumstances + allowed. In that case, while Drake landed the troops a night's + march from the place, the bulk of the fleet moved before it, + kept it in alarm all night, and at dawn made a demonstration + with the boats of forcing a direct landing under cover of its + guns. The result was the garrison moved out to meet the threat + and were surprised in flank by the real landing force. Passing + from this simple case to the most elaborate in our annals, we + find Saunders doing the same thing at Quebec. In preparation + for Wolfe's night landing he made a show of arrangements + <!-- Page 302 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" + id="Page_302"></a>[pg 302]</span> for a bombardment of + Montcalm's lines below the city, and in the morning with the + boats of the fleet began a demonstration of landing his + marines. By this device he held Montcalm away from Wolfe's + landing place till a secure footing had been obtained. + Similar demonstrations had been made above the city, and the + combined result was that Wolfe was able to penetrate the + centre of the French position unopposed.</p> + + <p>Such work belongs of course to the region of tactics rather + than of strategy, but the device has been used with equal + effect strategically. So great is the secrecy as well as the + mobility of an amphibious force, that it is extremely difficult + for an enemy to distinguish a real attack from a feint. Even at + the last moment, when a landing is actually in progress, it is + impossible for the defenders to tell that all the troops are + being landed at the one point if a demonstration is going on + elsewhere. At Quebec it was not till Montcalm was face to face + with Wolfe that he knew he had to deal with the whole British + force. Still less from a strategical point of view can we be + certain whether a particular landing represents an advance + guard or is a diversionary operation to mask a larger landing + elsewhere. This is a special difficulty when in the case of + large operations the landing army arrives in echelon like the + Second Japanese army. In that instance the naval feint was used + strategically, and apparently with conspicuous effect. The + Russians were always apprehensive that the Japanese would + strike for Newchuang at the head of the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, and + for this reason General Stakelberg, who had command of the + troops in the peninsula, was not permitted to concentrate + <!-- Page 303 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" + id="Page_303"></a>[pg 303]</span> for effective action in + its southern part, where the Japanese had fixed their + landing place. Admiral Togo, in spite of the strain on his + fleet in effecting and securing the disembarkation of the + army, detached a cruiser squadron to demonstrate in the + Gulf. The precise effect of this feint upon the Russian + Staff cannot be measured with certainty. All we know is that + Stakelberg was held back from his concentration so long that + he was unable to strike the Japanese army before it was + complete for the field and able to deal him a staggering + counter-stroke.</p> + + <p>This power of disturbing the enemy with feints is of course + inherent in the peculiar attributes of combined expeditions, in + the facility with which their line of operation can be + concealed or changed, and there seems no reason why in the + future it should be less than in the past. Good railway + connections in the theatre of the descent will of course + diminish the effect of feints, but, on the other hand, the + means of making them have increased. In mine-sweeping vessels, + for instance, there is a new instrument which in the + Russo-Japanese War proved capable of creating a very strong + impression at small cost to the fleet. Should a flotilla of + such craft appear at any practicable part of a threatened coast + and make a show of clearing it, it will be almost a moral + impossibility to ignore the demonstration.</p> + + <p>On the whole then, assuming the old methods are followed, it + would seem that with a reasonable naval preponderance the power + of carrying out such operations over an uncommanded sea is not + less than it has proved to be hitherto. The rapidity and + precision of steam propulsion perhaps places that power higher + than ever. It would at any rate be difficult to find in the + past a parallel to the brilliant movement on Seoul with which + the Japanese opened the war in 1904. It is true the Russians at + the last moment decided for political reasons to permit the + occupation to take place without opposition, but this was + unknown to the Japanese, and <!-- + Page 304 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" + id="Page_304"></a>[pg 304]</span> their arrangements were + made on the assumption that their enemy would use the + formidable means at his disposal to obstruct the operation. + The risk was accepted, skillfully measured, and adequately + provided for on principles identical with those of the + British tradition. But, on the other hand, there has been + nothing to show that where the enemy has a working command + of the sea the hazard of such enterprises has been reduced. + Against an enemy controlling the line of passage in force, + the well-tried methods of covering and protecting an oversea + expedition will no more work to-day than they did in the + past. Until his hold is broken by purely naval action, + combined work remains beyond all legitimate risk of war.</p> + <!-- Page 305 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" + id="Page_305"></a>[pg 305]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>APPENDIX</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>THE<br /> + "GREEN PAMPHLET"</h2> + <hr /> + <!-- Page 306 blank --> + <!-- Page 307 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" + id="Page_307"></a>[pg 307]</span> + + <h2>WAR COURSE</h2> + <hr /> + + <h2>Strategical Terms<br /> + and Definitions<br /> + used in<br /> + Lectures on Naval History</h2> + + <h3>BY</h3> + + <h3>JULIAN S. CORBETT, ESQ., L.L.M.</h3> + <hr /> + + <h3>NAVAL + STRATEGY</h3><span class="sidenote">Introductory.</span> + + <p>Naval strategy does not exist as a separate branch of + knowledge. It is only a section of a division of the art of + war.</p> + + <p>The study for officers is the art of war, specialising in + Naval Strategy.</p> + + <p>The true method of procedure then is to get hold of a + general theory of war, and so ascertain the exact relations of + Naval Strategy to the whole.</p><span class="sidenote">Theory + of war.</span> + + <p>War is a form of political intercourse, a continuation of + foreign politics which begins when force is introduced to + attain our ends.</p> + + <h4>OBJECTS.</h4> + + <p>We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, + which may be ulterior or immediate.</p> + + <p>Immediate objects (also called "Primary") are the ends of + particular operations or movements. But it must be remembered + that every primary object has also its ulterior object; that + is, every operation must be regarded, not only from the point + of view of its special object, but also as a step to the end of + the campaign or war.</p> + <!-- Page 308 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" + id="Page_308"></a>[pg 308]<br /> + Strategy.</span> + + <p>Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. + Classified by the object it is Major Strategy, dealing with + ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with primary objects.</p> + + <p>This also means that every operation of an army or fleet + must be regarded in a double light, <i>i.e.</i>, it must be + planned and conducted in relation (1) to the general progress + of the war; (2) to the object to which it is immediately + directed.</p><span class="sidenote">Major Strategy.</span> + + <p>Major Strategy (always regarding the ulterior object) has + for its province the plan of the war, and includes: (1) + Selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at + for attaining the ulterior object; (2) Selection of the force + to be used, <i>i.e.</i>, it determines the relative functions + of the naval and military forces.</p> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—Major Strategy in its broadest sense has also + to deal with the whole resources of the nation for war. It + is a branch of statesmanship. It regards the Army and Navy + as parts of one force, to be handled together; they are + instruments of war. But it also has to keep in view + constantly the politico-diplomatic position of the country + (on which depends the effective action of the instrument), + and its commercial and financial position (by which the + energy for working the instrument is maintained). The + friction of these two considerations is inherent in war, + and we call it the deflection of strategy by politics. It + is usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital + factor in every strategical problem. It may be taken as a + general rule that no question of grand strategy can be + decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versa. For a line of + action or an object which is expedient from the point of + view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic + considerations, and vice versa. To decide a question of + grand strategy without consideration of its diplomatic + aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither + strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This + interaction has to be accepted by commanding officers as + part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is + Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist + Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War, for fear of + compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers. + </blockquote><span class="sidenote">Minor Strategy.</span> + + <p>Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. + It deals with—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the + particular forces of the enemy or the strategical points to + be dealt with in order to secure the object of the + particular operation.<br /> + (2) The directing of the force assigned for the operation. + </blockquote> + <!-- Page 309 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" + id="Page_309"></a>[pg 309]</span> + + <p>Minor Strategy may be of three kinds:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by + a fleet only.<br /> + (2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained + by an army only.<br /> + (3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained + by army and navy together. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—It will be seen that what is usually called + Naval Strategy or Fleet Strategy, is only a sub-division of + a division of strategy, and that, therefore, strategy + cannot be studied from the point of view of naval + operations only. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—Naval Strategy, being only a part of General + Strategy, is subject to the same friction as Major + Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders + have often to take a decision independently of the central + government, or headquarters; they should, therefore, always + keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line of + action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is + strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLE.—Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve + of the Seven Years War. + </blockquote> + + <h4>NATURE OF OBJECT</h4><span class="sidenote">Nature of + object. Offensive and defensive.</span> + + <p>The solution of every strategical problem, whether of Major + or Minor Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the + object in view.</p> + + <p>All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or + negative.</p> + + <p>A positive object is where we seek to assert or acquire + something for ourselves.</p> + + <p>A negative object is where we seek to deny the enemy + something or prevent his gaining something.</p> + + <p>Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive.</p> + + <p>Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive.</p> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLE.—When Togo attacked Rojesvensky his primary + object was offensive, <i>i.e.</i>, to capture or destroy + the Russian Fleet. His ulterior object was to maintain the + defensive function which had been assigned to the Japanese + Fleet. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + NOTES.—This is a good example of true defensive; that + is, Togo's operations, though drastically offensive in + action, were all strictly within the strategical defensive + sphere assigned to him. + </blockquote><!-- Page 310 --> + <span class="sidenote"><a name="Page_310" + id="Page_310"></a>[pg 310]<br /> + Relation of offensive to defensive.</span> + + <p>The Offensive, being positive in its aim is naturally the + more effective form of war (<i>i.e.</i>, it leads more directly + to a final decision), and, as a rule, should be adopted by the + stronger Power.</p> + + <p>The Defensive, being negative in its aim, is naturally the + stronger form of war; <i>i.e.</i>, it requires less force, and, + as a rule, is adopted by the weaker Power.</p> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—The general truth of this proposition is not + affected by apparent exceptions where the contrary appears + to be true. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + <i>The Offensive must not be confused with the + Initiative.</i> It is possible to seize the Initiative, + under certain conditions, by taking a defensive position + from which the enemy is bound to dislodge us or abandon the + operation. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + In most cases where the weaker side successfully assumes + the offensive, it is due to his doing so before the enemy's + mobilization or concentration is complete, whereby the + attacking force is able to deal in succession with locally + inferior forces of the enemy. + </blockquote> + + <p>The advantages of the Offensive are well known.</p> + + <p>Its disadvantages are:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its + communications.<br /> + (2) That it tends to operations on unfamiliar + ground.<br /> + (3) That it continually increases the difficulty of + retreat. + </blockquote> + + <p>The advantages of Defence are chiefly:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) Proximity to base.<br /> + (2) Familiar ground.<br /> + (3) Facility for arranging surprise by counter attack. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—In modern Naval warfare these + advantages—that is, the advantages of fighting on + your own ground—are specially high as giving greater + facility for the use of mine and torpedo. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + The disadvantages are mainly moral or when the enemy's + objective or line of operations cannot be ascertained, but + this disadvantage can be neutralised when it is possible to + secure an interior position. + </blockquote> + + <h4>GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSIVE.</h4> + + <p>True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike.</p> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—When the Dutch burnt our ships at Chatham, we + were not acting on the defensive, we had laid them up and + were doing nothing at all. + </blockquote> + <!-- Page 311 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" + id="Page_311"></a>[pg 311]</span> + + <p>The strength and the essence of the defensive is the + counter-stroke.</p> + + <p>A well designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an + attack.</p> + + <p>A general defensive policy may consist of a series of minor + offensive operations.</p> + + <p>The maxim is: If you are not relatively strong enough to + assume the offensive, assume the defensive till you become + so—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by + attacks or otherwise;<br /> + (2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new + forces or securing allies. + </blockquote> + + <p>Except as a preparation or a cover for offensive action the + defensive is seldom or never of any use; for by the defensive + alone we can never acquire anything, we can only prevent the + enemy acquiring. But where we are too weak to assume the + offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive, and + wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and + permitting us to accumulate strength relatively greater than + the enemy's; we then pass to the offensive, for which our + defensive has been a preparation.</p> + + <p>As a cover or support for the offensive, the defensive will + enable us to intensify the attack; for by assuming the + defensive in one or more minor theatres of operation we can + reduce our forces in those theatres to a minimum, and + concentrate to a maximum for the offensive in the most + important theatre.</p> + + <h4>OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS USED WITH A DEFENSIVE INTENTION</h4> + + <p class="center">(A) Counter attacks.<br /> + (B) Diversions.</p> + + <p>(A) <i>Counter attacks</i> are those which are made upon an + enemy who exposes himself anywhere in the theatre of his + offensive operations. It is this form of attack which + constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise advantage of + defence."</p> + <!-- Page 312 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" + id="Page_312"></a>[pg 312]</span> + + <p>(B) <i>Diversions</i> are similar operations undertaken + against an enemy outside the limit of his theatre of offensive + operations.</p> + + <p>Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract + his attention, and to draw off his forces from his main attack. + If well planned, they should divert a force greater than their + own. They should, therefore, be small. The nearer they approach + the importance of a real attack the less likely they are to + divert a force greater than their own.</p> + + <p>It is only their power of diverting or containing a larger + force than their own that justifies the breach of the law of + concentration which they involve.</p> + + <p>This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and + these qualities are most highly developed in combined + expeditions.</p> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—<i>Diversions</i> must be carefully + distinguished from <i>eccentric attacks</i>. <i>Eccentric + attacks</i> are true offensive movements. They have a + positive object, <i>i.e.</i>, they aim to acquire something + from the enemy; whereas diversions have a negative object, + <i>i.e.</i>, they aim at preventing the enemy doing or + acquiring something. Being in the category of the weaker + form of war, eccentric attacks are usually made in greater + force than diversions. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLES.—<i>Diversion.</i>—Our raid on + Washington in 1815. Landing force, about 4,000 men. Object, + according to official instructions, "a diversion on the + coasts of United States of America in favour of the army + employed in the defence of Canada"; <i>i.e.</i>, the + intention was negative—preventative—defensive. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + 2. <i>Eccentric Attack.</i>—Operations against New + Orleans in 1815. Intended force 15,000 to 20,000 men. + Object, "to obtain command of embouchure of the + Mississippi, and, secondly, to occupy some important and + valuable possession, by the restoration of which the + conditions of peace might be improved, &c."; + <i>i.e.</i>, the intention was positive—to acquire. + Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) and Belleisle + (eccentric attack) in the Seven Years War. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + Note 2.—This distinction gives a threefold + classification of combined expeditions, as used by + Elizabethan strategists. + </blockquote> + + <div class="noflo"> + <div class="nofblk"> + <p class="i8">Raids = Diversions.</p> + + <p class="i8">Incursions = Eccentric attacks.</p> + + <p class="i8">Invasions = True direct offence.</p> + </div> + </div> + + <blockquote> + Compare these with Sir John Ardagh's classification (Report + of Royal Commission on Reserve Forces, 1904):— + </blockquote> + + <div class="noflo"> + <div class="nofblk"> + <p class="i4">"Raids," not exceeding 10,000 men.</p> + + <p class="i4">"Small expeditions," not exceeding 50,000 + men.</p> + + <p class="i4">"Dangerous invasion," not exceeding + 150,000 men.</p> + </div> + </div><!-- Page 313 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" + id="Page_313"></a>[pg 313]</span> + + <h4>NATURE OF ULTERIOR + OBJECT</h4><span class="sidenote">Limited and unlimited + wars.</span> + + <p>From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important + classification of wars, according to whether such object is + <i>limited</i> or <i>unlimited</i>.</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) War with <i>limited object</i> ("limited war") is where + we merely seek to take from the enemy some particular part + of his possessions, or interests; <i>e.g.</i>, + Spanish-American War, where the object was the liberation + of Cuba. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) <i>War with an unlimited object</i> is where we seek to + overthrow the enemy completely, so that to save himself + from destruction he must agree to do our will (become + subservient); <i>e.g.</i>, Franco-German War. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same + in their nature as the immediate (primary or secondary) + objects which lead up to them; <i>e.g.</i>, ulterior + objects may be offensive, while one or more of the + immediate objects may be defensive, and <i>vice + versâ</i>. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLE 1.—Japanese position in the late war. + Ulterior object of the war (to drive Russians from + Manchuria) was offensive (positive). Function or ulterior + object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was defensive + (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack + and destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive + (positive). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLE 2.—In the Spanish-American War the ulterior + object of the war was (for the Americans) to eject the + Spanish Government from Cuba. This was offensive. The + ulterior object of the fleet was to prevent the Spaniards + sending reinforcements or interfering with the intended + American invasion. This was defensive. The primary object + of the fleet was to bring the Spanish Fleet to action. This + was offensive. + </blockquote> + + <h4>SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS</h4> + + <p>Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its + object (i.e., whether it is offensive or defensive and whether + it is limited or unlimited), strategy has to decide on the + system of operations or "plan of the war."</p> + + <p>This depends upon:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) The theatre of the war.<br /> + (2) The means at our disposal. + </blockquote> + <!-- Page 314 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" + id="Page_314"></a>[pg 314]</span> + + <p>1. <i>Theatre of the War.</i>—Usually defined as "all + the territory upon which the hostile parties may assail each + other." This is insufficient. For an island power the theatre + of war will always include sea areas. Truer definition: + "geographical areas within which lie the ulterior objects of + the war and the subordinate objects that lead up to them."</p> + + <p>A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of + operations."</p> + + <p>2. <i>Theatre of Operations</i>.—Is generally used of + the operations of one belligerent only.</p> + + <p>An "operation" is any considerable strategical + undertaking.</p> + + <p>A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing + all the territory we seek to take possession of or to + defend.</p> + + <p>A truer definition is, "the area, whether of sea or land or + both, within which the enemy must be overpowered before we can + secure the object of the particular operation."</p> + + <p>Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the + object, it may be defensive in one theatre of operations and + offensive in another.</p> + + <p>Where the operations are defensive in character any special + movement or movements may be offensive.</p> + + <h4>OBJECTIVE</h4><span class="sidenote">Objective</span> + + <p>An objective is "any point or force against which an + offensive movement is directed." Thus where the <i>object</i> + in any theatre of operation is to get command of a certain sea + in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet will usually + be the <i>objective</i>.</p> + + <h4>LINES OF OPERATION</h4><span class="sidenote">Lines of + operation.</span> + + <p>A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through + which we operate from our base or starting point to reach our + objectives."</p> + + <p>Lines of operation may be exterior or interior. We are said + to hold the interior lines when we hold such a + <!-- Page 315 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" + id="Page_315"></a>[pg 315]</span> position, in regard to a + theatre of operations, that we can reach its chief objective + points, or forces, more quickly than the enemy can move to + their defence or assistance. Such a position is called an + interior position. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior Position" + are the converse of these.</p> + + <h4>LINES OF COMMUNICATION</h4><span class="sidenote">Lines of + communication.</span> + + <p>This expression is used of three different + things:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) <i>Lines of supply</i>, running from the base of + operations to the point which the operating force has + reached. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) <i>Lines of lateral communication</i> by which several + forces engaged in one theatre of operations can communicate + with each other and move to each other's support. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (3) <i>Lines of retreat</i>, which are lines of supply + reversed, <i>i.e.</i>, leading back to the base. + </blockquote> + + <p>These three ideas are best described by the term "lines of + passage and communication," which we had in use at the end of + the eighteenth century.</p> + + <p>Ashore, lines of passage and communication are roads, + railways, waterways, &c.</p> + + <p>At sea, they may be regarded as those waters over which + passes the normal course of vessels proceeding from the base to + the objective or the force to be supplied.</p> + + <p>In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems + of communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as + hinging on communications, but probably it does so even more + than Land Strategy, as will appear from a consideration of + maritime communications, and the extent to which they are the + main preoccupation of Naval operations.</p> + + <h4>MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS</h4> + + <p>The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against + which a fleet may have to operate are:—</p> + <!-- Page 316 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" + id="Page_316"></a>[pg 316]</span> + + <blockquote> + (1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary + (which correspond to the communications of armies operating + ashore). These tend to increase in importance strategically + with the increasing hunger of modern fleets (for coal, + ammunition, &c). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) The communications of an army operating from an + advanced oversea base, that is communication between the + advanced and the main base. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (3) Trade Routes, that is the communications upon which + depend the national resources and the supply of the main + bases, as well as the "lateral" or connecting + communications between various parts of belligerents' + possessions. + </blockquote> + + <p>N.B.—Such "lines of passage and communication" are the + preoccupation of Naval Strategy; that is to say, problems of + Naval Strategy can be reduced to terms of "passage and + communication" and this is probably the best method of solving + them.</p> + + <h3>NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND + COMMUNICATION</h3> + + <p>By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the + operations of the Fleet. Such operations must always have for + their object "passage and communication"; that is, the Fleet is + mainly occupied in guarding our own communications and seizing + those of the enemy.</p> + + <p>PROOF I.—<i>Deductive</i>.—We say the aim of + Naval Strategy is to get command of the sea. What does this + mean? It is something quite different from the Military idea of + occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject of + political dominion or ownership. We cannot subsist upon it + (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we exclude + neutrals from it. Admiral Colomb's theory of "conquest of water + territory," therefore, involves a false analogy, and is not + safe as the basis of a + <!-- Page 317 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" + id="Page_317"></a>[pg 317]</span> strategical system. What + then is the value of the sea in the political system of the + world? Its value is as a means of communication between + States and parts of States. Therefore the "command of the + sea" means the control of communications in which the + belligerents are adversely concerned.</p> + + <blockquote> + COROLLARY.—The command of the sea can never be, like + the conquest of territory, the ulterior object of a war, + unless it be a purely maritime war, as were approximately + our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century, but it may be + a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior object + of particular operations. + </blockquote> + + <p>PROOF II.—<i>Inductive</i>, from history or past + experience.—History shows that the actual functions of + the Fleet (except in purely maritime wars) have been + threefold.</p> + + <p>1. The prevention or securing of alliances (<i>i.e.</i>, + deterring or persuading neutrals as to participating in the + war).</p> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLES.—The operations of Rooke in the first years + of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure + the adhesion of Savoy and Portugal to the Grand Alliance. + Operations of Nelson to maintain the alliance of the + Kingdom of Naples. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + In the first case there came a crisis when it was more + important to demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they + stood to lose by joining Louis XIV than to act immediately + against the Toulon Fleet. In the second, the Neapolitan + Alliance was essential to our operations in the Eastern + Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not. + </blockquote> + + <p>2. The protection or destruction of commerce.</p> + + <p>3. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations + ashore.</p> + + <p>NOTE.—The above is the best working "Definition of + Naval Strategy," as emphasising its intimate connection with + diplomatic, financial, and military aspects of major + strategy.</p> + + <p>These functions may be discharged in two ways:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed + (bombardment, landing, raiding parties, &c). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) By getting command of the sea, <i>i.e.</i>, + establishing ourselves in such a position that we can + control the maritime communications of all parties + <!-- Page 318 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" + id="Page_318"></a>[pg 318]</span> concerned, so that we + can operate by sea against their territory, commerce, + and allies, and they cannot operate against ours. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—The power of the second method, by controlling + communications, is out of all proportion to the + first—direct attack. Indeed, the first can seldom be + performed with any serious effect without the second. Thus, + from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval + Strategy is mainly a question of communications. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the Fleet + must discharge part of its function by direct action before + there is time to get general control of the communications. + (That is, political and military considerations may deflect + normal operation of Naval Strategy.) + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLE.—Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the + face of the unshaken Toulon Fleet. Japanese invasion of + Manchuria. + </blockquote> + + <h4>COMMAND OF THE SEA</h4> + + <p>Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say + we have command of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical + expression meaning that we have (<i>a</i>) adequate Naval + positions; (<i>b</i>) an adequate Fleet to secure the command + when war breaks out.</p> + + <h4>VARIOUS CONDITIONS OF COMMAND</h4> + + <p>1. It may be (<i>a</i>) general; (<i>b</i>) local.</p> + + <p>(<i>a</i>) <i>General command</i> is secured when the enemy + is no longer able to act dangerously against our line of + passage and communication or to defend his own, or (in other + words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously with + our trade or our military or diplomatic operations.</p> + + <p>This condition exists practically when the enemy is no + longer able to send squadrons to sea.</p> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy + can do absolutely nothing, but that he cannot + <i>seriously</i> interfere with the undertakings by which + we seek to secure the object of the war, or to force our + will upon him. + </blockquote> + + <p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Local command</i> implies a state of things in + which we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with + our passage and communication in one or more theatres of + operation.</p> + <!-- Page 319 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" + id="Page_319"></a>[pg 319]</span> + + <p>2. Both local and general command may be (<i>a</i>) + temporary; (<i>b</i>) permanent.</p> + + <p>(<i>a</i>) <i>Temporary command</i> is when we are able to + prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and + communication in all or some theatres of operation during the + period required for gaining the object in view (<i>i.e.</i>, + the object of a particular operation or of a particular + campaign). This condition existed after Togo's first + action.</p> + + <p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Permanent command</i> is when time ceases to + be a vital factor in the situation, <i>i.e.</i>, when the + possibility of the enemy's recovering his maritime position is + too remote to be a practical consideration. This condition + existed after Tsushima.</p> + + <p>3. Command, whether general, local, or temporary, may be in + three different states:—</p> + + <div class="noflo"> + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>(<i>a</i>) With us.</p> + + <p>(<i>b</i>) With the enemy.</p> + + <p>(<i>c</i>) In dispute.</p> + </div> + </div> + + <p>If in dispute, it may be that:—</p> + + <div class="noflo"> + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>(1) We have preponderance.</p> + + <p>(2) Our enemy has preponderance.</p> + + <p>(3) Neither side preponderates.</p> + </div> + </div> + + <h4>COMMAND IN DISPUTE</h4> + + <p>The state of dispute is the most important for practical + strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the + early stages of the war, and frequently all through it.</p> + + <p>The state of dispute continues till a final decision is + obtained, <i>i.e.</i>, till one side is no longer able to send + a squadron to sea.</p> + + <p>It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the + state of dispute by seeking a decision. Hence the French + tradition to avoid decisive actions as a rule when at war with + England.</p> + + <p>The truth of this appears from the fact that <i>general + command of the sea is not essential to all oversea + operations</i>.</p> + + <p>In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may + concentrate in one theatre of operations, and so secure + <!-- Page 320 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" + id="Page_320"></a>[pg 320]</span> the local or temporary + command sufficient for obtaining the special object in view. + The weaker Power may take advantage of such local + concentration to operate safely elsewhere.</p> + + <p><i>Rule 1.</i> So long as a state of dispute can force the + preponderating Power to concentrate, operating by evasion is + possibly open to the weaker.</p> + + <p><i>Rule 2.</i> In a state of dispute although the weaker + Power may not be able to obstruct the passage and communication + of the stronger, it may be able to defend its own.</p> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLES.—This condition of dispute existed during + the first three years of the Seven Years War, until Hawke + and Boscawen obtained a decision by defeating Conflans and + De la Cloue; also in the Great War up to Trafalgar. + </blockquote> + + <h4>SHOULD COMMAND OF THE SEA ALWAYS BE THE PRIMARY + OBJECT?</h4> + + <p>When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get + command (<i>i.e.</i>, leaves the general command in dispute), + the disadvantage to him is not so much the danger to his own + operations as the facility given to the enemy for carrying out + counter operations elsewhere.</p> + + <p>Under certain conditions, therefore, it may not be the + primary function of the fleet to seek out the enemy's fleet and + destroy it, because general command may be in dispute while + local command may be with us, and political or military + considerations may demand of us an operation, for which such + local command is sufficient, and which cannot be delayed until + we have obtained a complete decision.</p> + + <p>From the above it will appear "command of the sea" is too + loose an expression for strategical discussion. For practical + purposes should be substituted "<i>control of passage and + communication</i>."</p> + + <p>The question then in the consideration of any proposed + operation or line of operations will be, not "Have we the + command of the sea?" but "Can we secure the necessary lines of + communication from obstruction by the enemy?"</p> + <!-- Page 321 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" + id="Page_321"></a>[pg 321]</span> + + <h4>METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL</h4> + + <p>1. <i>Permanent general control</i> can only be secured by + the practical annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful + actions.</p> + + <p>2. <i>Local and temporary control</i> may be secured + by:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (<i>a</i>) A defensive action not necessarily entirely + successful (containing). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>b</i>) Forcing concentration on the enemy elsewhere + (diversion). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>c</i>) Superior concentration so as to render impotent + the enemy's force available in the special theatre of + operations (masking or containing). + </blockquote> + + <h4>BLOCKADE</h4> + + <p>Blockades are of two natures, according to the object + review. The object may be:—</p> + + <p>(<i>d</i>) Blockade.</p> + + <blockquote> + i. <i>Close blockade</i> to prevent the enemy putting to + sea. The object being usually to secure local or temporary + control. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + ii. <i>Observation blockade</i>, to force the enemy to put + to sea <i>by occupying the common lines of + communications</i> (<i>see</i> below). In this case you are + seeking a decision as a step towards general control. + </blockquote> + + <p>Both natures are operations upon the lines of passage and + communication, but in case (1) the primary intention is + defensive, to secure our own line; in case (2) the primary + intention is offensive, to seize the enemy's line and compel + him to expose himself in an attempt to recover it.</p> + + <h4>GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING BLOCKADES</h4> + + <p>In case (1) (defensive intention) blockade should be as + close as is compatible with security from torpedo attack.</p> + + <p>In case (2) (offensive intention) it should be as distant + <!-- Page + 322 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" + id="Page_322"></a>[pg 322]</span> as is compatible with + bringing enemy to action if he comes out.</p> + + <blockquote> + Examples:—<i>Case</i> (1): First stage of Togo's + blockade of Port Arthur.<br /> + <i>Case</i> (2): Nelson off Toulon.<br /> + <i>Confusion of the two</i>: Sampson's attempt to close + Santiago simultaneously with an attempt to force Cervera to + sea. + </blockquote> + + <h4>THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS</h4> + + <p>Since the whole idea of command of the sea and the whole + theory of blockade rest on the control of communications, + neither can be fully apprehended without a thorough + understanding of the nature of maritime communications.</p> + + <p>Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each + belligerent tend to run more or less approximately in opposite + directions, until they meet in the theatre of operations or the + objective point.</p> + + <p>At sea the reverse is the case; for in maritime warfare the + great lines of communications of either belligerent tend to run + approximately parallel, if, indeed, they are not identical.</p> + + <p>Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which + lay in the Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South + Africa, our respective lines of communication would be + identical.</p> + + <p>This was also the case in all our imperial wars with + France.</p> + + <p><i>This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime + warfare.</i> Nearly all our current maxims of Naval strategy + can be traced to the pressure it exerts on Naval thought.</p> + + <p>It is at the root of the fundamental difference between + Military and Naval strategy, and affords the explanation of + much strategical error and confusion, which has arisen from + applying the principles of land warfare to the sea without + allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the communications + and operations against them in each case.</p> + + <p>On land the chief reason for not always striking the + <!-- Page 323 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" + id="Page_323"></a>[pg 323]</span> enemy's communications at + once is that as a rule we cannot do so without exposing our + own.</p> + + <p>At sea, on the contrary, since the great lines are common to + both, we cannot defend our own without striking at the + enemy's.</p> + + <p>Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get your fleet + into such a position that it controls the common lines, unless + defeated or evaded.</p> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLE.—This was usually done in our old wars with + France, by our getting a fleet off Brest before the French + could sail. + </blockquote> + + <p>Hence the maxim "that the proper place for our fleets is off + the enemy's coast," "the enemy's coast is our true frontier," + and the like.</p> + + <p>But these maxims are not universally true, witness Togo's + strategy against Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon + his own coast.</p> + + <p>Take again the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is + to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it.</p> + + <p>Here again Togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim.</p> + + <p>The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to + secure communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a + position to render them unsafe it must be put out of + action."</p> + + <p>The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not + always.</p> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLE.—Opening of War of Spanish Succession. The + operations of 1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, + Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish trade communications, + the French lateral communications, and our own lines of + passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief + theatre of operation. These last two lines were identical. + 1703.—Chief operations had for their object to secure + the alliance of Savoy, and particularly of Portugal, and + with same object in view, Rooke's official instructions + directed that the French fleet was to be ignored unless it + threatened our communications. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + RESULT.—By 1704 we had gained a Naval position from + which France could not eject us, and she abandoned struggle + for sea communications. + </blockquote> + + <p>But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the + enemy's fleet, &c., is sound and applicable:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (<i>a</i>) Because for us <i>general permanent command</i> + is + <!-- Page 324 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" + id="Page_324"></a>[pg 324]</span> usually essential to + ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without + destroying the enemy's fleet. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>b</i>) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an + attempt <i>to control the common communications</i>. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>c</i>) Because usually the functions of the fleet are + so complex (<i>i.e.</i>, the calls upon it so numerous) + that it will seek to strike a blow which solve all the + difficulties; <i>e.g.</i>, Sir Palmes Fairborne's solution + of the problem in 1703 (<i>England in the + Mediterranean</i>, Vol. II., p. 234). + </blockquote> + + <p>Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the + most effective way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" + (<i>i.e.</i>, forcing an action on him) is to seize a position + which controls communications vital to his plan of + campaign.</p> + + <p>This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out + the Toulon fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to + him (not intentionally, but by the operation of inevitable + strategical law).</p> + + <p>Compare Togo's strategy and that of the Americans in + 1898.</p> + + <p>Practically all great Naval actions have been brought about + in this way, that is they have been the outcome on an effort to + clear essential communications from the enemy's fleet, + <i>e.g.</i>, Gravelines, La Hogue, Quiberon, Trafalgar, + Tsushima.</p> + + <p>Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were + brought about because our geographical position placed us + astride the Dutch trade communications, and they were forced to + seek a decision against our fleet.</p> + + <h4>FINAL NOTE</h4> + + <p>In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it + should be borne in mind:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) That if you seek it out with a superior force you will + probably find it in a place where you cannot destroy it + except at heavy cost. + </blockquote> + <!-- Page 325 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" + id="Page_325"></a>[pg 325]</span> + + <blockquote> + (2) That seeing that the defensive is a stronger form of + war than the offensive, it is <i>prima facie</i> better + strategy to make the enemy come to you than to go to him + and seek a decision on his own ground. + </blockquote> + <!-- Page 326 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" + id="Page_326"></a>[pg 326]</span> + <hr /> + + <h2>WAR COURSE</h2> + <hr /> + + <h2>Notes on Strategy</h2> + <hr /> + + <h3>PART ONE</h3> + + <h3>GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS</h3> + + <h4>INTRODUCTORY</h4> + + <p>Naval strategy is a section of the Art of War.</p> + + <p>The study for officers is the Art of War, which includes + Naval Strategy.</p> + + <p>War is the application of force to the attainment of + political ends.</p> + + <h4>MAJOR AND MINOR STRATEGY</h4> + + <p>We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, + which may be ulterior or primary.</p> + + <p><i>Primary objects</i> are the special objects of particular + operations or movements which we undertake in order to gain the + ulterior object of the campaign. Consequently it must be + remembered that every particular operation or movement must be + regarded, not only from the point of view of its special + object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or + war.</p> + + <p>Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. + There are two kinds—Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior + objects; Minor Strategy, with primary objects.</p> + + <p>Every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and + conducted in relation (1) to the general plan of the war; (2) + to the object to which it is immediately directed.</p> + + <p>Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has + for its province the plan of the war and includes: (1) + Selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at + for attaining the ulterior <!-- Page + 327 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" + id="Page_327"></a>[pg 327]</span> object; (2) Selection of + the force to be used, <i>i.e.</i>, it determines the + relative functions of the naval and military forces. Major + Strategy in its broadest sense deals with the whole + resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of + statesmanship which regards the Army and Navy as parts of + one force, to be handled together as the instrument of war. + But it also has to keep in constant touch with the political + and diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the + effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and + financial position (by which the energy for working the + instrument is maintained). The friction due to these + considerations is inherent in war, and is called the + deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually regarded + as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every + strategical problem. It may be taken as a general rule that + no question of major strategy can be decided apart from + diplomacy, and <i>vice versâ</i>. For a line of action + or an object which is expedient from the point of view of + strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and + <i>vice versâ</i>. To decide a question of Major + Strategy, without consideration of its diplomatic aspect, is + to decide on half the factors only. Neither strategy or + diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This inter-action has to + be accepted as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A + good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the + Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' + War, for fear of compromising our relations with the + Scandinavian Powers.</p> + + <p>Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. + It deals with—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the + particular forces of the enemy or the strategical points to + be dealt with in order to secure the object of the + particular operation. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) The direction of the force assigned for the operation. + </blockquote> + + <p>Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by + a fleet only. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained + by an army only. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained + by army and navy together. + </blockquote> + <!-- Page 328 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" + id="Page_328"></a>[pg 328]</span> + + <p>It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called + Naval Strategy or Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of + Strategy, and that therefore Strategy cannot be studied from + the point of view of naval operations only. Naval Strategy, + being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same + friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual + commanders have often to take a decision independently of the + central government or headquarters; they should, therefore, + always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line + of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is + strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.</p> + + <p>Example.—For example, take Boscawen's attack on De la + Motte on the eve of the Seven Years' War in 1755. His orders + were to prevent the troops and warlike stores which De la Motte + was taking out from reaching Canada. It was not diplomatically + expedient to open hostilities; but if Boscawen succeeded, the + result would have been worth the diplomatic consequences it + would entail. He missed the expedition, but captured two + isolated vessels; thus striking the first blow in such a way as + to entail the utmost amount of harm with the least possible + good.</p> + + <h4>OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE</h4> + + <p class="center"><i>Nature of Object</i></p> + + <p>Upon the nature of the object depends the fundamental + distinction between <i>offensive</i> and <i>defensive</i>, upon + which all strategical calculation must be based. Consequently, + the solution of every strategical problem, whether of Major or + Minor Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object + in view.</p> + + <p>All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or + negative.</p> + + <p>A <i>positive</i> object is where we seek to assert or + acquire something for ourselves.</p> + + <p>A <i>negative</i> object is where we seek to deny the enemy + something or prevent his gaining something.</p> + + <p>Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive.</p> + + <p>Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive.</p> + + <p>This is the only certain test by which we can decide whether + any particular operation is offensive or defensive.</p> + + <p>Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their + nature as the primary or secondary objects which lead up to + them; <i>e.g.</i>, ulterior objects may be offensive, while one + or more of the primary objects may be defensive, and <i>vice + versâ</i>. For example, in the Russo-Japanese <!-- + Page 329 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" + id="Page_329"></a>[pg 329]</span> War the ulterior object of + the war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive + (positive). The ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the + invasion) was defensive (negative). Its primary object to + effect this was to attack and destroy the Russian naval + force. This was offensive (positive).</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Relation of Offensive to Defensive</i></p> + + <p>The Offensive, being positive in its aim, is naturally the + more effective form of war and, as a rule, should be adopted by + the stronger Power. The Defensive, being negative in its aim, + is the more lasting form of war, since it requires less force + to keep what one has than to take what is another's, and, as a + rule, is adopted by the weaker Power. In most cases where the + weaker side successfully assumes the offensive, it is due to + his doing so before the enemy's mobilization or concentration + is complete, whereby the attacking force is able to deal in + succession with locally inferior forces of the enemy.</p> + + <p>The advantages of the Offensive are well known.</p> + + <p>Its disadvantages are:—</p> + + <blockquote> + That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its + communications, and that it tends to operations on + unfamiliar ground. + </blockquote> + + <p>The advantages of the Defensive are chiefly:—</p> + + <blockquote> + Proximity to the base of supply and repair stations, + familiar ground, facility for arranging surprise by counter + attack, and power of organising in advance. + </blockquote> + + <p>The disadvantages of the Defensive are mainly moral. They + become, however, real and practical when the enemy's objective + or line of operations cannot be ascertained, for then we have + to spread or attenuate our force to cover all probable + objectives, but this disadvantage can be neutralised when it is + possible to secure an interior position.</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Functions and Characteristics of the + Defensive</i></p> + + <p>True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike.</p> + + <p>To assume the defensive does not necessarily mean that we do + not feel strong enough to attack. It may mean that we see our + way by using the defensive to force certain movements on the + enemy which will enable us to hit harder.</p> + <!-- Page 330 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" + id="Page_330"></a>[pg 330]</span> + + <p>A well-designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an + attack. Unless it does this it will not deflect the enemy's + strategy in our favour. Thus, in 1756, the French, by assuming + the defensive in the Channel, threatened an attack on our + coasts, and concealed their attack on Minorca.</p> + + <p>This power inherent in the defensive is peculiarly strong in + naval warfare, since the mobility of fleets enables them to + pass instantaneously from the defensive to the offensive + without any warning. When we assume the defensive because we + are too weak for the offensive, we still do not lay aside + attack. The whole strength and essence of the defensive is the + counter-stroke. Its cardinal idea is to force the enemy to + attack us in a position where he will expose himself to a + counter-stroke.</p> + + <p>The stock instance upon which naval defensive is usually + condemned is the burning of our ships at Chatham by the Dutch. + But in that case we were not <i>acting on the defensive</i> at + all. We had laid up our battle fleet and were doing nothing. We + were purely passive, in expectation of peace. It is really an + instance of the successful use of defensive <i>by the + Dutch</i>. Being no longer strong enough for a general + offensive, they assumed the defensive, and induced us to lay up + our ships and so expose ourselves to a counter-stroke. It was a + counterstroke by the worsted belligerent to get better terms of + peace.</p> + + <p>So far is the defensive from excluding the idea of attack, + that it may consist entirely of a series of minor offensive + operations. Clausewitz calls it "a shield of blows." It is + often called <i>offensive-defensive,</i> or <i>active + defence</i>. Neither term is really necessary. For a defensive + which excludes the idea of offence or action is not war at + all-at least at sea. The old Elizabethan term <i>Preventive</i> + most closely expresses the idea.</p> + + <p>The most important function of the defensive is that of + covering, buttressing, and intensifying the main attack. No + plan of campaign, however strong the offensive intention, is + perfect which does not contemplate the use of the defensive. + Without some use of the defensive the cardinal principle of + concentration can rarely be fully developed. To develop the + highest possible degree of concentration upon the main object + or objective, the defensive must be assumed everywhere else. + Because it is only by using the defensive in the minor or less + important theatres of operation that the forces in those + theatres can be reduced to the minimum of security, and the + maximum of concentration can thereby be obtained in the main + theatre.</p> + <!-- Page 331 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" + id="Page_331"></a>[pg 331]</span> + + <p>In considering the defensive as a general plan of campaign + the maxim is: If not relatively strong enough to assume the + offensive, assume the defensive till you become so—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by + attacks or otherwise; + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new + forces or securing allies. + </blockquote> + + <p>It must always be remembered that, except as a preparation + or a cover for offensive action, the defensive is seldom or + never of any use; for by the continued use of the defensive + alone nothing can be acquired, though the enemy may be + prevented from acquiring anything. But where we are too weak to + assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the + defensive, and wait in expectation of time turning the scale in + our favour and permitting us to accumulate strength relatively + greater than the enemy's; we then pass to the offensive, for + which our defensive has been a preparation. At sea we have had + little occasion for the defensive as a general plan. But that + is no reason for neglecting its study. In despising the + defensive ourselves we have consistently ignored the strength + it gives our enemies. The bulk of our naval history is the + story of how we have been baffled and thwarted by our enemies + assuming the defensive at sea in support of their offensive on + land. We have seldom succeeded in treating this attitude with + success, and it is only by studying the defensive we can hope + to do so.</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Offensive Operations used with a Defensive + Intention</i></p> + + <p class="center">(A) Counter attacks.<br /> + (B) Diversions.</p> + + <p><i>Counter attacks</i> are those which are made upon an + enemy who exposes himself anywhere in the theatre of his + offensive operations. It is this form of attack which + constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise advantage of + defence."</p> + + <p><i>Diversions</i> are similar operations undertaken against + an enemy outside the limit of his theatre of offensive + operations.</p> + + <p>Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract + his attention, and to draw off his forces from his main attack. + If well planned, they should divert a force greater than their + own. They <!-- + Page 332 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" + id="Page_332"></a>[pg 332]</span> should, therefore, be + small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real + attack the less likely they are to divert a force greater + than their own.</p> + + <p>Diversions involve a breach of the law of concentration, and + it is only their power of diverting or containing a larger + force than their own that justifies their use.</p> + + <p>This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and + these qualities are most highly developed in combined + expeditions.</p> + + <p><i>Diversions</i> must be carefully distinguished from + <i>eccentric attacks. Eccentric attacks</i> are true offensive + movements. They have a positive object, <i>i.e.</i>, they aim + to acquire something from the enemy; whereas diversions have a + negative object, <i>i.e.</i>, they aim at preventing the enemy + doing or acquiring something. Eccentric attacks are usually + made in greater force than diversions.</p> + + <p>Examples.—Diversion.—Our raid on Washington in + 1815. Landing force, about 4,000 men. Object, according to + official instruction, "a diversion on the coasts of United + States of America in favour of the army employed in the defence + of Canada"; <i>i.e.</i>, the intention was + negative—preventive—defensive. <i>Eccentric + Attack.</i>—Operations against New Orleans in 1815. + Intended force, 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to obtain + command of the embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to + occupy some important and valuable possession, by the + restoration of which the conditions of peace might be improved, + &c."; <i>i.e.</i>, the intention was positive—to + acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) with those + against Martinique and Belleisle (eccentric attacks) in the + Seven Years' War.</p> + + <p>This distinction gives a threefold classification of + combined expeditions, as used by Elizabethan strategists, viz., + raids, incursions, and invasions. These correspond respectively + with our modern diversions, eccentric attacks, and true direct + offensive.</p> + + <h4>LIMITED AND UNLIMITED WARS</h4> + + <p>From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important + classification of wars, according to whether such object is + <i>limited</i> or <i>unlimited</i>.</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) <i>War with limited object</i> ("limited war") is where + the object is merely to take from the enemy some particular + part of his possessions or interests; <i>e.g.</i>, + Spanish-American War, where the object was the liberation + of Cuba. + </blockquote> + <!-- Page 333 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" + id="Page_333"></a>[pg 333]</span> + + <blockquote> + (2) <i>War with an unlimited object</i> is where the object + is to overthrow the enemy completely, so that to save + himself from destruction he must agree to do our will + (become subservient); <i>e.g.</i>, Franco-German War. + </blockquote> + + <h4>PLANS OF WAR</h4> + + <p class="center"><i>System of Operations</i></p> + + <p>Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its + object (i.e., whether it is offensive or defensive and whether + it is limited or unlimited), Strategy has to decide on the + system of operations or "plan of the war."</p> + + <p>Apart from the means at our disposal a plan of war depends + mainly upon—</p> + + <div class="noflo"> + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>(1) The theatre of the war.</p> + + <p>(2) The various theatres of operation available + within it.</p> + </div> + </div> + + <p>1. <i>Theatre of the War.</i>—Usually defined as "All + the territory upon which the hostile parties may assail each + other." This is insufficient. For an Island Power the theatre + of war will always include sea areas. Truer definition: + "Geographical areas within which must lie the operations + necessary for the attainment of the ulterior objects of the war + and of the subordinate objects that lead up to them."</p> + + <p>A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of + operations."</p> + + <p>2. <i>Theatre of Operations.</i>—Is generally used of + the operations of one belligerent only.</p> + + <p>An "operation" is any considerable strategical + undertaking.</p> + + <p>A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing + all the territory we seek to take possession of or to + defend.</p> + + <p>A truer definition is: "The area, whether of sea or land or + both, within which the enemy must be overpowered before we can + secure the object of the particular operation."</p> + + <p>Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the + object, it may be defensive in one theatre of operations and + offensive in another.</p> + + <p>Where the operations are defensive in character any special + movement or movements may be offensive.</p> + + <p>As the plan of war determines the theatres of operation in + the theatre of war, so in each theatre of operation it + determines the <i>lines of operation</i> and the + <i>objectives</i>.</p> + <!-- Page 334 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" + id="Page_334"></a>[pg 334]</span> + + <p class="center"><i>Objective</i></p> + + <p>An objective is "any point or force against which an + offensive movement is directed." Thus, where the <i>object</i> + in any theatre of operation is to get command of a certain sea + in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet will usually + be the <i>objective</i>.</p> + + <p>"Objective" in ordinary use is frequently confused with + "object." For purposes of strategical discussion it is + desirable to keep them sharply distinguished. <i>Objective</i> + is the end of some particular movement or operation, and is the + special concern of the officer in command. <i>Object</i> is the + end of a system of operations and is the special concern of the + general staff or director of the war. An <i>objective</i> is + some definite point which we wish to get from the enemy or + prevent his occupying, or some part of his strength which we + wish to destroy. It is incorrect to use the term of anything we + already possess. Thus, Vladivostock is often said to have been + Rojesvensky's <i>objective</i>. It was, strictly speaking, only + his <i>destination</i>. To reach it and concentrate with the + units already there was the <i>primary object</i> of the + operations entrusted to him. He had no true <i>objective</i> + before him except Togo's fleet.</p> + + <p>An <i>objective</i> is always subordinate to some + <i>object</i>. It is a step to the attainment of that + object.</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Lines of Operation</i></p> + + <p>A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through + which we operate from our base or starting point to reach our + objectives."</p> + + <p>Lines of operation may be <i>exterior</i> or + <i>interior</i>. We are said to hold the <i>interior</i> lines + when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of + operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or + forces, more quickly than the enemy can move to their defence + or assistance. Such a position is called an <i>interior + position</i>. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior Positions" are the + converse of these.</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Lines of Communication</i></p> + + <p>This expression is used of three different + things:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) <i>Lines of supply</i>, running from the base of + operations to the point which the operating force has + reached. + </blockquote> + <!-- Page 335 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" + id="Page_335"></a>[pg 335]</span> + + <blockquote> + (2) <i>Lines of lateral communication</i> by which several + forces engaged in one theatre of operations can communicate + with each other and move to each other's support. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (3) <i>Lines of retreat</i>, which are usually lines of + supply reversed, <i>i.e.</i>, leading back to the base. + </blockquote> + + <p>For naval purposes these three ideas are best described by + the term "lines of passage and communication," which were in + use at the end of the 18th century, and they may be regarded as + those waters over which passes the normal course of vessels + proceeding from the base to the objective or the force to be + supplied.</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Maritime Communications</i></p> + + <p>The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against + which a fleet may have to operate are:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary + (which correspond to the communications of armies operating + ashore). These have greatly increased in importance + strategically with the increased dependence of modern + fleets on a regular supply of coals, stores, ammunition, + &c. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) The communications of an army operating from an + advanced oversea base, that is, communication between the + advanced and the main base. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (3) Trade Routes, that is, the communications upon which + depend the national resources and the supply of the main + bases, as well as the "lateral" or connecting + communications between various parts of belligerents' + possessions. + </blockquote> + + <p>In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems + of communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as + hinging on communications, but probably it does so, as will + appear from a consideration of Maritime Communications, and the + extent to which they are the main preoccupation of naval + operations; that is to say, all problems of Naval Strategy can + be reduced to terms of "passage and communication," and this is + probably the best method of solving them.</p> + <!-- Page 336 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" + id="Page_336"></a>[pg 336]</span> + <hr /> + + <h2>PART TWO</h2> + + <h3>NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A<br /> + QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND<br /> + COMMUNICATION</h3> + + <h4>NAVAL STRATEGY DEFINED</h4> + + <p>By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the major + operations of the fleet. Such operations have for their object + "passage and communication"; that is, the fleet is mainly + occupied in guarding our own communications and seizing those + of the enemy.</p> + + <p>We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command of the + sea. This means something quite different from the military + idea of occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject + of political dominion or ownership. We cannot subsist upon it + (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we exclude + neutrals from it. The value of the sea in the political system + of the world is as a means of communication between States and + parts of States. Therefore the "command of the sea" means the + control of communications in which the belligerents are + adversely concerned. The command of the sea can never be, like + the conquest of territory, the ulterior object of a war, unless + it be a purely maritime war, as were approximately our wars + with the Dutch in the 17th century, but it may be a primary or + immediate object, and even the ulterior object of particular + operations.</p> + + <p>History shows that the actual functions of the fleet (except + in purely maritime wars) have been threefold:—</p> + + <blockquote> + 1. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations + ashore. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + 2. The protection or destruction of commerce. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + 3. The prevention or securing of alliances (<i>i.e.</i>, + deterring or persuading neutrals as to participating in the + war). + </blockquote> + + <p>EXAMPLES.—The operations of Rooke in the first years + of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the + adhesion of Savoy and Portugal to the Grand Alliance. + Operations of Nelson to maintain the alliance of the Kingdom of + Naples.</p> + + <p>In the first case, there came a crisis when it was more + important to demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood + to lose by <!-- Page + 337 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" + id="Page_337"></a>[pg 337]</span> joining Louis XIV, than to + act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the second, the + Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the + Eastern Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet + was not.</p> + + <p>In this way we get a <i>Definition of the Aim of Naval + Strategy</i>, expressed in terms of the actual functions of the + fleet. For practical purposes it will be found the most useful + definition as emphasising the intimate connection of Naval + Strategy with the diplomatic, financial, and military aspects + of Major Strategy.</p> + + <p>These functions of the fleet may be discharged in two + ways:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed + (bombardment, landings, raiding parties, &c.). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) By getting command of the sea, <i>i.e.</i>, + establishing ourselves in such a position that we can + control the maritime communications of all parties + concerned, so that we can operate by sea against the + enemy's territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot + operate against ours. + </blockquote> + + <p>The power of the second method, by controlling + communications, is out of all proportion to that of the + first—direct attack. Indeed, the first can seldom be + performed with any serious effect without the second. Thus, + from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy + is mainly a question of communications.</p> + + <p>But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the fleet + must discharge part of its function by direct action against + territory before there is time to get general control of the + communications. (That is, political and military considerations + may deflect the normal operation of Naval Strategy.)</p> + + <p>EXAMPLES.—Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the + face of the unshaken Toulon Fleet. Holmes's capture of Emden in + 1758.</p> + + <p>Still, the fact remains that the key to the effective + performance of the fleet's duties is almost always to secure + communications as soon as possible by battle.</p> + + <h4>COMMAND OF THE SEA</h4> + + <p>Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say + we have command of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical + expression meaning that we have adequate naval positions, and + an adequate fleet to secure the command when war breaks + out.</p><!-- Page 338 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" + id="Page_338"></a>[pg 338]</span> + + <p>Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do + absolutely nothing, but that he cannot <i>seriously</i> + interfere with the undertakings by which we seek to secure the + object of the war and to force our will upon him.</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Various Conditions of Command</i></p> + + <p>1. It may be (<i>a</i>) general; (<i>b</i>) local.</p> + + <p>(<i>a</i>) <i>General command</i> is secured when the enemy + is no longer able to act dangerously against our line of + passage and communication or to use or defend his own, or (in + other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously + with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations.</p> + + <p>This condition exists practically when the enemy is no + longer able to send squadrons to sea.</p> + + <p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Local command</i> implies a state of things in + which we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with + our passage and communication in one or more theatres of + operation.</p> + + <p>2. Both general and local command may be (<i>a</i>) + temporary; {<i>b</i>) permanent.</p>{<i>a</i>) <i>Temporary + command</i> is when we are able to prevent the enemy from + interfering with our passage and communication in all or some + theatres of operation during the period required for gaining + the object in view (<i>i.e.</i>, the object of a particular + operation or of a particular campaign). This condition existed + after Togo's first action. It was also that at which Napoleon + aimed in his instructions to Villeneuve in 1805. + + <p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Permanent command</i> is when time ceases to + be a vital factor in the situation, <i>i.e.</i>, when the + possibility of the enemy's recovering his maritime position is + too remote to be a practical consideration. This condition + existed after Tsushima.</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Command in Dispute</i></p> + + <p>The state of dispute is the most important for practical + strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the + early stages of the war, and frequently all through it.</p> + + <p>The state of dispute continues till a final decision is + obtained, <i>i.e.</i>, till one side is no longer able to send + a squadron to sea.</p> + <!-- Page 339 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" + id="Page_339"></a>[pg 339]</span> + + <p><i>It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end + the state of dispute by seeking a decision.</i> Hence the + French tradition to avoid decisive actions as a rule when at + war with England.</p> + + <p>It must be remembered that <i>general command of the sea is + not essential to all oversea operations</i>.</p> + + <p>In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may + concentrate or be induced to concentrate in one theatre of + operations, and so secure the local or temporary command + sufficient for obtaining the special object in view, while the + weaker Power takes advantage of such local concentration to + operate safely elsewhere.</p> + + <p>Thus in a state of dispute, although the weaker Power may + not be able to obstruct the passage and communication of the + stronger, it may be able to defend its own.</p> + + <p>EXAMPLES.—This condition of dispute existed during the + first three years of the Seven Years' War, until Hawke and + Boscawen obtained a decision by defeating Conflans and De la + Clue; also in the Great War up to Trafalgar.</p> + + <p>When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get + command (<i>i.e.</i>, leaves the general command in dispute), + the disadvantage to him is not so much the danger to his own + operations as the facility given to the enemy for carrying out + counter operations elsewhere.</p> + + <h4>METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL.</h4> + + <p>1. <i>Permanent general control</i> can only be secured by + the practical annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful + actions.</p> + + <p>2. <i>Local and temporary control</i> may be secured + by—</p> + + <blockquote> + (<i>a</i>) An action not necessarily entirely successful + (containing). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>b</i>) Inducing concentration on the enemy elsewhere + (diversion). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>c</i>) Superior concentration so as to render impotent + the enemy's force available in the special theatre of + operations (masking or containing). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>d</i>) Blockade. + </blockquote> + + <p class="center"><i>Action of a Fleet off an Enemy's + Port</i></p> + + <p>A belligerent fleet off an enemy's port may carry out three + different operations, for certain purposes; each quite separate + from the others, and intended to obtain an entirely different + result:—</p> + <!-- Page 340 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" + id="Page_340"></a>[pg 340]</span> + + <p>(1) <i>Close Blockade.</i>—This is to prevent the + enemy's fighting ships from putting to sea. In this case the + object is to secure local control for some purpose that is not + purely naval, such as was carried out by the Japanese off Port + Arthur in 1904, so as to enable their transports to cross the + Yellow Sea without fear of molestation from any of the Russian + ships in Port Arthur. Since the cruisers in Vladivostok were + able to emerge (that port not being blockaded), the operation + was not complete, and a danger of interference always + existed.</p> + + <p>This method of blockade is far more difficult to carry out + in the present day, than formerly; owing to the existence of + submarines and torpedo craft, the blockading ships have to + remain further away from the port; there have to be inner lines + of cruisers, scouts and destroyers; and quick concentration + takes longer owing to the greater space covered by the + blockading force, and more ships of all natures are required + for the same reason.</p> + + <p>Greater and more vigilance are required than in former days, + because the enemy's ships can come out regardless of weather + (thick weather would be their opportunity), and it is most + important that not a single craft, from a battleship to a + torpedo boat, be allowed to escape.</p> + + <p>This method of blockade includes the commercial blockade, + and all countries would be informed of its having been + established.</p> + + <p>(2) <i>Commercial Blockade.</i>—To prevent floating + commerce from entering or leaving the blockaded harbour. The + blockading force would not be powerful enough to prevent a + squadron of battleships or cruisers from entering or leaving + the port blockaded; and it would not be instituted outside a + fortified military port, or one containing a strong naval + force. But it would be able to stop scouts and torpedo craft + from entering or emerging, unless in very great numbers; and if + unable to stop them from emerging, would give warning of their + escape and the direction in which they are going.</p> + + <p>In both these forms of blockade it is usual, as a matter of + courtesy, to allow neutral armed ships belonging to foreign + navies to enter and leave for their own purposes, presumably + connected with the subjects of their own country who are in the + blockaded port. This, however, is not a right, and the country + to which the blockading ships belong has a right to refuse it, + and to back her refusal by force.</p> + + <p>All countries must be notified of a properly instituted + commercial blockade, in accordance with International + Agreement.</p><!-- Page 341 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" + id="Page_341"></a>[pg 341]</span> + + <p>(3) <i>Observing a Port.</i>—This, with its subsidiary + operations, should be conducted in such a way as to induce the + enemy to put to sea, the object of observing the port being + primarily a naval one, viz., to bring him to decisive + action.</p> + + <p>The principal observing force (consisting of battleships and + cruisers) would be either in one squadron, or more, provided + that they were in supporting reach of each other, and so placed + as to be able to cut off the enemy's fleet on emerging from the + port observed before it can get dangerously near its probable + objective, and yet sufficiently far out to ensure a battle + before it can regain the shelter of its own ports. It is also + worth noting that the battle should, if possible, be fought so + as to make it difficult for the enemy's damaged ships to obtain + the shelter of a friendly neutral's harbours before being + captured.</p> + + <p>The observed port must be watched closely, so that immediate + notice of the enemy's exit may be given; and this would be done + by small cruisers, scouts and destroyers, which should be + strong and numerous enough to attack any torpedo craft trying + to get to sea.</p> + + <p>In order to induce the enemy's main force to put to sea it + is important that every means be used to prevent his knowing + that our fleet is observing the port, or if that be impossible, + to do nothing which will lead him to suppose that his port is + being observed.</p> + + <p>This operation is not a blockade.</p> + + <p>Subsidiary operations to induce the enemy's fleet to put to + sea, may take the form of a diversion on the enemy's coast, or + against some important part of his sea-borne trade, either by + the observing fleet or by a force affiliated to it, or by any + oversea movements calculated to interfere seriously with the + enemy's war plan.</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Concentration</i></p> + + <p>The guiding feature of modern preparation for war is to be + ready for rapid action. It is true at sea, more even than on + land, that upon the first movements depend the initiative, the + power of controlling the enemy's strategy, and of making him + conform to our movements. This readiness for rapid action will + depend on a proper distribution of the fleet so as to meet all + the requirements.</p> + + <p>The distribution of the fleet should be dominated by the + idea of concentration, but it must be understood clearly what + concentration means. Clausewitz says:—"The best strategy + is always to be sufficiently strong, at first generally, then + at the decisive point. <!-- + Page 342 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" + id="Page_342"></a>[pg 342]</span> There is therefore no + higher or simpler law for strategy than this—keep your + forces together."</p> + + <p>The maxim "Keep your forces together" does not, however, + necessarily mean keeping them all concentrated in one mass, but + rather keeping them so disposed that they can unite readily at + will. At sea it is more difficult than on land to foretell + where the decisive point will be; but since it is quicker and + easier at sea to concentrate forces at any particular point + than on land, in applying this maxim for our purposes, the rule + should be to dispose the forces at sea so as to be able to + concentrate them in time at the decisive point so soon as this + point is determined, and also so as to conceal from the enemy + what it is intended to make the decisive point.</p> + + <p>If the forces are rightly disposed within due limits, + adequate control of all the lines of passage and communication + can be assured, and if the enemy undertakes any operations it + should be possible to ensure that sufficient forces can be + concentrated in time to defeat his object. On the other hand, + if the forces are concentrated in one mass, there can be little + chance of deceiving or confusing the enemy, while it gives him + an opportunity of successfully carrying out some operation by + evasion.</p> + + <h4>THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS</h4> + + <p>Since the whole idea of command of the sea rests on the + control of communications, it cannot be fully apprehended + without a thorough understanding of the nature of maritime + communications.</p> + + <p>Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each + belligerent tend as a rule to run more or less approximately in + opposite directions, until they meet in the theatre of + operations or the objective point.</p> + + <p>At sea, the reverse is frequently the case; for in maritime + warfare the great lines of communications of either belligerent + often tend to run approximately parallel if, indeed, they are + not identical.</p> + + <p>Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which + lay in the Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South + Africa, our respective lines of communication would be + identical.</p> + + <p>This was also the case in all our imperial wars with + France.</p> + + <p><i>This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime + warfare.</i> Nearly all our current maxims of Naval Strategy + can be traced to the pressure it exerts on naval thought.</p> + + <p>It is at the root of the fundamental difference between + Military <!-- + Page 343 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" + id="Page_343"></a>[pg 343]</span> and Naval Strategy, and + affords the explanation of much strategical error and + confusion which have arisen from applying the principles of + land warfare to the sea without allowing for the + antagonistic conditions of the communications and the + operations against them in each case.</p> + + <p>On land, the chief reason for not always striking the + enemy's communications at once is that, as a rule, we cannot do + so without exposing our own. At sea, on the contrary, when the + great lines are common to both, we cannot defend our own + without striking at the enemy's.</p> + + <p>Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get our fleet + into such a position that it controls the common lines, unless + defeated or evaded. This was usually done in our old wars with + France, by our attempting to get a fleet off Brest before the + French could sail.</p> + + <p>Hence the maxims "That the proper place for our fleets is + off the enemy's coast," "The enemy's coast is our true + frontier," and the like.</p> + + <p>But these maxims are not universally true; witness Togo's + strategy against Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon + his own coast.</p> + + <p>Take, again, the maxim that the primary object of the fleet + is to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it. Here, again, + Togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim.</p> + + <p>The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to + secure communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a + position to render them unsafe it must be put out of + action."</p> + + <p>The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not + always.</p> + + <p>EXAMPLE.—Opening of the War of the Spanish Succession. + The operations of 1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, + Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish trade communications, the + French lateral communications, and our own lines of passage to + the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of + operation. These last two lines were identical. In 1703, the + chief operations had for their object to secure the alliance of + Savoy, and particularly of Portugal. Rooke's official + instructions directed that the French fleet was to be ignored + unless it threatened the common communications.</p> + + <p>RESULT.—By 1704 we had gained a naval position from + which France could not eject us, and she abandoned the struggle + for sea communications.</p> + + <p>But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the + enemy's fleet, &c., is sound and applicable—</p> + <!-- Page 344 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" + id="Page_344"></a>[pg 344]</span> + + <blockquote> + (<i>a</i>) Because for us <i>general permanent command</i> + is usually essential to ultimate success, and this cannot + be obtained without destroying the enemy's fleet. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>b</i>) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an + attempt to <i>dispute the control of the common + communications</i>. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>c</i>) Because usually the functions of the fleet are + so complex (<i>i.e.</i>, the calls upon it so numerous) + that it will seek to strike a blow which will solve all the + difficulties; <i>e.g.</i>, Sir. Palmes Fairborne's solution + of the problem in 1703. + </blockquote> + + <p>Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the + most effective way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" + (<i>i.e.</i>, forcing an action on him) is to seize a position + which controls communications vital to his plan of + campaign.</p> + + <p>This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out + the Toulon Fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to + him (not intentionally, but by the operation of strategical + law).</p> + + <p>Practically all great naval actions have been brought about + in this way, that is, they have been the outcome of an effort + to clear essential communications from the enemy's fleet; + <i>e.g.</i>, Gravelines, La Hogue, Quiberon, Trafalgar, + Tsushima.</p> + + <p>Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were + brought about because our geographical position placed us + astride the Dutch trade communications, and they were forced to + seek a decision against our fleet.</p> + + <p>In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it + should be borne in mind that if you seek it out with a superior + force you will probably find it in a place where you cannot + destroy it, except at very heavy cost. It is far better to make + it come to you, and this has often been done by merely sitting + on the common communications.</p> + + <p>Again, if you seek out the enemy's fleet without being + certain of getting contact, you may merely assist it in evading + you, and enable it to get into a position on your own + communications, from which it may be very costly to dislodge + it. It was for this reason that the Elizabethan Government kept + the fleet in home waters in 1588. Sampson, in the + Spanish-American War, was actually permitted to make this + mistake. By going to seek out Cervera without being sure of + contact, he left him a clear run into Cienfuegos or even + Havana, which it was the main function of the fleet to prevent. + Captain Mahan has since modified this maxim as + follows:—"Seek out the + <!-- Page 345 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" + id="Page_345"></a>[pg 345]</span> enemy's fleet, if you are + sure of getting contact." A truer maxim would seem to be + "Seek contact with the enemy's fleet in the most certain and + favourable manner that is open to you." To seek out the + enemy's fleet is only one way of doing this, and not always + the best way. It must be remembered that other conditions + being equal, it is an obvious advantage to fight in your own + waters rather than in those of the enemy, and more likely to + ensure that a defeat of the enemy will be decisive.</p> + + <div class="noflo"> + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>RN WAR COLLEGE PORTSMOUTH</p> + + <p>JANUARY 1909</p> + </div> + </div><!-- Page 346 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" + id="Page_346"></a>[pg 346]</span> + <hr /> + + <h2>INDEX</h2> + + <div class="noflo"> + <div class="nofblk"></div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Abercromby, General Sir Ralph, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, + <a href="#Page_296">296</a></p> + + <p>Absolute War, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, + <a href="#Page_42">42</a>-44</p> + + <p>Alexandria, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></p> + + <p>Alsace-Lorraine, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>-52, + <a href="#Page_55">55</a></p> + + <p>Ambleteuse, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></p> + + <p>Amherst, General Lord, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a></p> + + <p>Anglo-Japanese Treaty, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></p> + + <p>Anson, Admiral Lord, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>-12, + <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, + <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a></p> + + <p>Antwerp, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></p> + + <p>Armada, Spanish, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>-60, + <a href="#Page_172">172</a>-74, + <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, + <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, + <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, + <a href="#Page_255">255</a></p> + + <p>Articles of War, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></p> + + <p>Austerlitz Campaign, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, + <a href="#Page_53">53</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Bacon, Sir Francis, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></p> + + <p>Baltic Fleet, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, + <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, + <a href="#Page_327">327</a></p> + + <p>Baltic trade, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></p> + + <p>Barcelona, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></p> + + <p>Barham, Admiral Sir Charles Middleton, + <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, + <a href="#Page_142">142</a>-44, + <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, + <a href="#Page_162">162</a>-63, + <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, + <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, + <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, + <a href="#Page_297">297</a></p> + + <p>Barraille, Admiral, + <a href="#Page_249">249</a>-51</p> + + <p>Barrington, Admiral Samuel, + <a href="#Page_146">146</a>-47</p> + + <p>Batz, Isle de, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a></p> + + <p>Beachy Head, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></p> + + <p>Belgium, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>-52, + <a href="#Page_55">55</a></p> + + <p>Belleisle, Marechal de, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, + <a href="#Page_332">332</a></p> + + <p>Belleisle, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></p> + + <p>Berry, Captain Sir Edward, + <a href="#Page_238">238</a></p> + + <p>Biscay, Bay of, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, + <a href="#Page_263">263</a></p> + + <p>Black Sea, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></p> + + <p>Blake, Colonel Robert, + <a href="#Page_176">176</a></p> + + <p>Blockade, method of, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, + <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, + <a href="#Page_183">183</a>-86, + <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, + <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, + <a href="#Page_256">256</a>-58, + <a href="#Page_260">260</a>-62, + <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, + <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, + <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, + <a href="#Page_341">341</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">ethics of, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">tactical and strategic, + <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">insecurity of, + <a href="#Page_119">119</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">close and open, + <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, + <a href="#Page_187">187</a>-91, + <a href="#Page_193">193</a>-94, + <a href="#Page_197">197</a>-201, + <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a>-208, + <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, + <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, + <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, + <a href="#Page_295">295</a>-97, + <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, + <a href="#Page_340">340</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">theory of, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, + <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, + <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, + <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, + <a href="#Page_202">202</a>-204, + <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, + <a href="#Page_287">287</a>-88, + <a href="#Page_322">322</a></p> + + <p>Blücher, Field Marshal Gebhard von, + <a href="#Page_23">23</a></p> + + <p>Boscawen, Admiral Edward, + <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, + <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, + <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, + <a href="#Page_339">339</a></p> + + <p>Boulogne, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></p> + + <p>Brest, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, + <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, + <a href="#Page_147">147</a>-48, + <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, + <a href="#Page_193">193</a>-97, + <a href="#Page_201">201</a>-202, + <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, + <a href="#Page_235">235</a>-36, + <a href="#Page_248">248</a>-49, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>-53, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, + <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, + <a href="#Page_323">323</a></p> + + <p>Bruix, Admiral, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></p> + + <p>Byng, Admiral Sir George, + <a href="#Page_163">163</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p> + <!-- Page 347 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" + id="Page_347"></a>[pg 347]</span></p> + + <p>Cadiz, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>-40, + <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, + <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, + <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, + <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, + <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, + <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, + <a href="#Page_323">323</a></p> + + <p>Caemmerer, General von, + <a href="#Page_76">76</a>-77</p> + + <p>Calder, Admiral Sir Robert, + <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, + <a href="#Page_183">183</a></p> + + <p>Canada, 54, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>-57, + <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, + <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, + <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, + <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, + <a href="#Page_332">332</a></p> + + <p>Cape Clear, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></p> + + <p>Caribbean Sea, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></p> + + <p>Carkett, Captain Robert, <a href="#Page_4">4</a></p> + + <p>Cartagena, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></p> + + <p>Channel Islands, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a></p> + + <p>Charles II of England, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a></p> + + <p>Charles of Austria, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, + <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, + <a href="#Page_69">69</a></p> + + <p>Chateaurenault, Admiral Comte de, + <a href="#Page_213">213</a>-14</p> + + <p>Chatham, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, + <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, + <a href="#Page_227">227</a></p> + + <p>Cherbourg, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></p> + + <p>Christian, Admiral Sir Hugh, + <a href="#Page_296">296</a></p> + + <p>Cienfuegos, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, + <a href="#Page_344">344</a></p> + + <p>Clausewitz, General Karl von, + <a href="#Page_79">79</a>-80, + <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, + <a href="#Page_330">330</a>-31;</p> + + <p class="i2">theory, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, + <a href="#Page_27">27</a>-29, + <a href="#Page_41">41</a>-46, + <a href="#Page_51">51</a>-56, + <a href="#Page_60">60</a>-61, + <a href="#Page_73">73</a>-74, + <a href="#Page_76">76</a>-77, + <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, + <a href="#Page_341">341</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">his service, + <a href="#Page_23">23</a>-24;</p> + + <p class="i2"><i>On War</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, + <a href="#Page_44">44</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">his war plans, + <a href="#Page_44">44</a></p> + + <p>Colpoys, Admiral Sir John, + <a href="#Page_196">196</a></p> + + <p>Command at sea, theory of, + <a href="#Page_91">91</a>-106, + <a href="#Page_165">165</a>-66</p> + + <p>Commerce prevention, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></p> + + <p>Communications, maritime, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, + <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, + <a href="#Page_315">315</a>-16, + <a href="#Page_335">335</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">common theory of, + <a href="#Page_100">100</a>-102, + <a href="#Page_118">118</a></p> + + <p>Conflans, Admiral Comte de, + <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>-53, + <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, + <a href="#Page_339">339</a></p> + + <p>Copenhagen, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></p> + + <p>Cornwallis, Admiral Sir William, + <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, + <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, + <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, + <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, + <a href="#Page_197">197</a>-200</p> + + <p>Coruña, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></p> + + <p>Cotton, Admiral Sir Charles, + <a href="#Page_181">181</a></p> + + <p>Covering squadron, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, + <a href="#Page_286">286</a>-88, + <a href="#Page_291">291</a></p> + + <p>Craig's expedition, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></p> + + <p>Crimea, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, + <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, + <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>-87, + <a href="#Page_300">300</a></p> + + <p>Cromwell, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, + <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, + <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, + <a href="#Page_176">176</a></p> + + <p>Cuba, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, + <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, + <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, + <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, + <a href="#Page_332">332</a></p> + + <p><i>Curieux</i>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Dalny, <a href="#Page_229">229</a></p> + + <p>Dardanelles, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, + <a href="#Page_139">139</a></p> + + <p>Davout, Louis-Nicolas, <a href="#Page_23">23</a></p> + + <p>Deane, Colonel Richard, + <a href="#Page_176">176</a></p> + + <p>Declaration of Paris, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, + <a href="#Page_267">267</a></p> + + <p>Dettingen, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></p> + + <p>Dogger Bank, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></p> + + <p>Downs, the, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>-40, + <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, + <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, + <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, + <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, + <a href="#Page_249">249</a>-50, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, + <a href="#Page_263">263</a></p> + + <p>Drake, Sir Francis, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, + <a href="#Page_159">159</a>-60, + <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, + <a href="#Page_173">173</a>-74, + <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, + <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, + <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, + <a href="#Page_301">301</a></p> + + <p>Dumouriez, General, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, + <a href="#Page_257">257</a></p> + + <p>Dundas, Admiral Sir James, + <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, + <a href="#Page_291">291</a></p> + + <p>Dungeness, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, + <a href="#Page_199">199</a></p> + + <p>Dunkirk, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, + <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, + <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, + <a href="#Page_246">246</a>-50, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>-53</p> + + <p>Duquesne, Admiral Abraham, + <a href="#Page_121">121</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Egypt, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>-38, + <a href="#Page_240">240</a></p> + + <p>Elliot Islands, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Ferrol, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, + <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, + <a href="#Page_323">323</a></p> + + <p>Finisterre, Cape, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, + <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, + <a href="#Page_139">139</a>-40, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, + <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, + <a href="#Page_272">272</a></p> + + <p>Flanders, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, + <a href="#Page_246">246</a></p> + + <p>Frederick the Great, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>-22, + <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, + <a href="#Page_54">54</a>-55, + <a href="#Page_63">63</a>-64, + <a href="#Page_66">66</a>-67, + <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, + <a href="#Page_327">327</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Gallipoli, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></p> + + <p>Ganteaume, Admiral Comte, + <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, + <a href="#Page_197">197</a>-98, + <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, + <a href="#Page_236">236</a></p> + + <p> + <!-- Page 348 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" + id="Page_348"></a>[pg 348]</span></p> + + <p>Gardner, Admiral Lord, + <a href="#Page_197">197</a>-98</p> + + <p>Gibraltar, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, + <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, + <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, + <a href="#Page_145">145</a>-46, + <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, + <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, + <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, + <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, + <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, + <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, + <a href="#Page_344">344</a></p> + + <p>Gneisenau, Field Marshal August von, + <a href="#Page_23">23</a></p> + + <p>Goltz, General von der, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, + <a href="#Page_97">97</a></p> + + <p>Guichen, Admiral Comte de, + <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, + <a href="#Page_223">223</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Hanover, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, + <a href="#Page_246">246</a></p> + + <p>Hardy, Admiral Sir Charles, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a>-57</p> + + <p>Havana, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, + <a href="#Page_169">169</a></p> + + <p>Havre, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>-53, + <a href="#Page_263">263</a></p> + + <p>Hawke, Admiral Sir Edward, + <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, + <a href="#Page_189">189</a>-90, + <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, + <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, + <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>-53, + <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, + <a href="#Page_339">339</a></p> + + <p>Henry VIII, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>-110</p> + + <p>Holland, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, + <a href="#Page_195">195</a></p> + + <p>Howe, Admiral Earl, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, + <a href="#Page_147">147</a>-50, + <a href="#Page_190">190</a>-191, + <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, + <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, + <a href="#Page_206">206</a>-207</p> + + <p>Howard of Effingham, Admiral Lord, + <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, + <a href="#Page_173">173</a>-74, + <a href="#Page_244">244</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Iberian Peninsula, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, + <a href="#Page_61">61</a>-62, + <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, + <a href="#Page_69">69</a>-71, + <a href="#Page_105">105</a></p> + + <p>India, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></p> + + <p>Ireland, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, + <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, + <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, + <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, + <a href="#Page_225">225</a>-26, + <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, + <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, + <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, + <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, + <a href="#Page_282">282</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Jamaica, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, + <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, + <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, + <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a></p> + + <p>Jervis, Sir John, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, + <a href="#Page_296">296</a></p> + + <p>Jomini, General Baron de, + <a href="#Page_28">28</a>-30, + <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, + <a href="#Page_45">45</a>-47, + <a href="#Page_51">51</a>-52, + <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, + <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, + <a href="#Page_85">85</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Kamimura, Admiral, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></p> + + <p>Keith, Admiral Lord, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, + <a href="#Page_289">289</a></p> + + <p>Kempenfelt, Admiral Richard, + <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, + <a href="#Page_146">146</a>-48, + <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, + <a href="#Page_192">192</a>-94, + <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, + <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, + <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, + <a href="#Page_222">222</a>-24, + <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, + <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, + <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, + <a href="#Page_260">260</a></p> + + <p>Killigrew, Admiral Henry, + <a href="#Page_213">213</a>-15, + <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, + <a href="#Page_224">224</a></p> + + <p>Korea, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, + <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, + <a href="#Page_79">79</a>-80, + <a href="#Page_82">82</a>-85</p> + + <p>Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Prince, + <a href="#Page_75">75</a></p> + + <p>Kuantung Peninsula, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Lagos, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></p> + + <p>La Hogue, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, + <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, + <a href="#Page_344">344</a></p> + + <p>Langara, Admiral Don Juan, + <a href="#Page_148">148</a>-49</p> + + <p>Leghorn, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></p> + + <p>Leith, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></p> + + <p>Liaotung Peninsula, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, + <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, + <a href="#Page_292">292</a></p> + + <p>Liao-yang, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, + <a href="#Page_85">85</a></p> + + <p>Light squadrons, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></p> + + <p>Ligonier, General Lord, + <a href="#Page_70">70</a></p> + + <p>Limited War, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, + <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, + <a href="#Page_51">51</a>-59, + <a href="#Page_72">72</a>-87, + <a href="#Page_313">313</a></p> + + <p>Lisbon, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, + <a href="#Page_173">173</a></p> + + <p>Lissa, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_293">293</a></p> + + <p>Lizard, the, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, + <a href="#Page_256">256</a></p> + + <p>Louisburg, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, + <a href="#Page_287">287</a></p> + + <p>Lyons, Admiral Sir Edmund, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>-86</p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Mack, General, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></p> + + <p>Mahan, Admiral, <a href="#Nt_12">131n</a>, + <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, + <a href="#Page_344">344</a></p> + + <p>Maitland, General, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></p> + + <p>Malta, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_264">264</a></p> + + <p>Manchuria, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, + <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, + <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, + <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, + <a href="#Page_329">329</a></p> + + <p>Maria Theresa, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></p> + + <p>Marlborough, John, Duke of, + <a href="#Page_64">64</a></p> + + <p> + <!-- Page 349 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" + id="Page_349"></a>[pg 349]</span></p> + + <p>Maxims: "Conquest of water territory," + <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">"Enemy's coast our frontier," + <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">"Eyes of the fleet," + <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, + <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, + <a href="#Page_120">120</a>-21;</p> + + <p class="i2">"Fleet in being," + <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, + <a href="#Page_231">231</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">"The sea is all one," + <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">"Seeking out the enemy's fleet," + <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, + <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, + <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, + <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, + <a href="#Page_167">167</a>-68,</p> + + <p class="i4"><a href="#Page_170">170</a>-71, + <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, + <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, + <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, + <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, + <a href="#Page_344">344</a>-45</p> + + <p>Medina-Sidonia, Duke of, + <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, + <a href="#Page_249">249</a></p> + + <p>Mediterranean, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, + <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, + <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, + <a href="#Page_113">113</a>-14, + <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, + <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, + <a href="#Page_139">139</a>-40, + <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, + <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, + <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, + <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, + <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, + <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, + <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, + <a href="#Page_337">337</a></p> + + <p>Medway, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, + <a href="#Page_217">217</a></p> + + <p>Melville, Lord, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>-200</p> + + <p>Middleton. <i>See</i> Barham</p> + + <p>Minorca, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, + <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, + <a href="#Page_330">330</a></p> + + <p>Moltke, General von, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, + <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, + <a href="#Page_73">73</a>-74</p> + + <p>Monk, George, Duke of Albemarle, + <a href="#Page_135">135</a>-37, + <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, + <a href="#Page_176">176</a>-77</p> + + <p>Montecuculi, Prince, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></p> + + <p>Montcalm, General Marquis de, + <a href="#Page_302">302</a></p> + + <p>Morbihan, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>-53</p> + + <p>Mukden, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Napoleon, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>-44, + <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, + <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, + <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, + <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, + <a href="#Page_257">257</a>-58, + <a href="#Page_338">338</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">methods, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>-23, + <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, + <a href="#Page_27">27</a>-28, + <a href="#Page_46">46</a>-48, + <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, + <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, + <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, + <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, + <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, + <a href="#Page_237">237</a>-38, + <a href="#Page_240">240</a>-41;</p> + + <p class="i2">views on naval warfare, + <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, + <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, + <a href="#Page_236">236</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">his Russian campaign, + <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, + <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">on "pygmy combinations," + <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">his conversion, + <a href="#Page_68">68</a>-70</p> + + <p>Narrow seas, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, + <a href="#Page_202">202</a></p> + + <p>Nelson, Admiral Lord, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, + <a href="#Page_125">125</a>-26, + <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, + <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, + <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, + <a href="#Page_336">336</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">his influence, + <a href="#Page_161">161</a>-63, + <a href="#Page_217">217</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">his use of cruisers, + <a href="#Page_113">113</a>-15, + <a href="#Page_117">117</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">on defensive fleet operations, + <a href="#Page_223">223</a>-24, + <a href="#Page_227">227</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">on blockade, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, + <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, + <a href="#Page_198">198</a>-99, + <a href="#Page_208">208</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">his strategy, + <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, + <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_141">141</a>-42, + <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, + <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, + <a href="#Page_281">281</a></p> + + <p>New Model Army, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, + <a href="#Page_176">176</a></p> + + <p>Ney, Marshal Michael, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></p> + + <p>Nile, <a href="#Page_180">180</a></p> + + <p>Norris, Admiral Sir John, + <a href="#Page_237">237</a>-38, + <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, + <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, + <a href="#Page_281">281</a></p> + + <p>North Sea, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, + <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, + <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, + <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_195">195</a>-96, + <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, + <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, + <a href="#Page_263">263</a></p> + + <p>Nottingham, Daniel Finch, Earl of, + <a href="#Page_216">216</a>-17</p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Observation squadrons, + <a href="#Page_125">125</a></p> + + <p>Offence, theory of, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>-36, + <a href="#Page_39">39</a>-40</p> + + <p>Orde, Admiral Sir John, + <a href="#Page_223">223</a></p> + + <p>Orvilliers, Admiral Comte de, + <a href="#Page_256">256</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Palermo, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></p> + + <p>Paris, Declaration of, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, + <a href="#Page_267">267</a></p> + + <p>Parma, Prince Alexander Farnese, Duke of, + <a href="#Page_171">171</a>-73, + <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, + <a href="#Page_243">243</a>-44</p> + + <p>Pe-chi-li, Gulf of, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, + <a href="#Page_302">302</a></p> + + <p>Persano, Admiral, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>-94</p> + + <p>Philip II, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></p> + + <p>Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, + <a href="#Page_63">63</a>-64, + <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, + <a href="#Page_327">327</a></p> + + <p>Plymouth, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, + <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, + <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, + <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, + <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, + <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, + <a href="#Page_256">256</a></p> + + <p>Pola, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>-94</p> + + <p>Port Arthur, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, + <a href="#Page_82">82</a>-85, + <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, + <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, + <a href="#Page_204">204</a>-205, + <a href="#Page_227">227</a>-31, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a>-92, + <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, + <a href="#Page_340">340</a></p> + + <p> + <!-- Page 350 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" + id="Page_350"></a>[pg 350]</span></p> + + <p>Portsmouth, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, + <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, + <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, + <a href="#Page_248">248</a>-49, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a></p> + + <p>Portugal, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, + <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, + <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, + <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, + <a href="#Page_336">336</a></p> + + <p>Privateering, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>-68</p> + + <p>Prussia, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, + <a href="#Page_49">49</a>-50, + <a href="#Page_64">64</a></p> + + <p>Puerto Rico, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Quebec, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, + <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, + <a href="#Page_301">301</a>-302</p> + + <p>Quiberon, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, + <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, + <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, + <a href="#Page_324">324</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Raglan, General Lord, + <a href="#Page_301">301</a></p> + + <p>"Real War," <a href="#Page_25">25</a></p> + + <p>Revolution, French, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, + <a href="#Page_65">65</a></p> + + <p>Rochefort, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, + <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, + <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, + <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, + <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, + <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, + <a href="#Page_332">332</a></p> + + <p>Rodney, Admiral Sir George B., + <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, + <a href="#Page_194">194</a></p> + + <p>Roquefeuille, Admiral Marquis de, + <a href="#Page_247">247</a>-51</p> + + <p>Ross, Admiral John, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, + <a href="#Page_149">149</a></p> + + <p>Rupert, Prince, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>-36, + <a href="#Page_157">157</a></p> + + <p>Russell, Admiral Edward, + <a href="#Page_225">225</a></p> + + <p>Ruyter, Admiral de, + <a href="#Page_135">135</a>-37</p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>St. Helena, <a href="#Page_277">277</a></p> + + <p>St. James's fight, + <a href="#Page_177">177</a>-78</p> + + <p>St. Vincent, Admiral Sir John, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, + <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, + <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, + <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, + <a href="#Page_296">296</a></p> + + <p>St. Vincent, Cape, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_182">182</a></p> + + <p>San Domingo, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, + <a href="#Page_301">301</a></p> + + <p>Santa Cruz, Marquess of, + <a href="#Page_239">239</a></p> + + <p>Santiago, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, + <a href="#Page_322">322</a></p> + + <p>Sampson, Admiral, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, + <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, + <a href="#Page_344">344</a></p> + + <p>Sandwich, Admiral, the Earl of, + <a href="#Page_121">121</a></p> + + <p>Sardinia, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a></p> + + <p>Saunders, Admiral Sir Charles, + <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, + <a href="#Page_301">301</a></p> + + <p>Saxe, Marshal, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>-50</p> + + <p>Saxony, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>-55, + <a href="#Page_80">80</a></p> + + <p>Scilly, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, + <a href="#Page_149">149</a>-50, + <a href="#Page_255">255</a></p> + + <p>Sebastopol, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, + <a href="#Page_291">291</a></p> + + <p>Seoul, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, + <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, + <a href="#Page_303">303</a></p> + + <p>Sharnhorst, General Gerhard von, + <a href="#Page_23">23</a></p> + + <p>Shovel, Admiral Sir Cloudesley, + <a href="#Page_213">213</a>-14, + <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, + <a href="#Page_286">286</a></p> + + <p>Sicily, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a></p> + + <p>Silesia, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, + <a href="#Page_55">55</a></p> + + <p>Skelligs, the, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></p> + + <p>Smyrna convoy, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></p> + + <p>Sole Bay, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></p> + + <p>Spanish Armada, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>-60, + <a href="#Page_172">172</a>-74, + <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, + <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, + <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, + <a href="#Page_255">255</a></p> + + <p>Spithead, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, + <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, + <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, + <a href="#Page_248">248</a></p> + + <p>Stakelberg, General, + <a href="#Page_302">302</a>-303</p> + + <p>Strachan, Admiral Sir Richard, + <a href="#Page_125">125</a>-26</p> + + <p>Strategy, naval and maritime, + <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">major and minor, + <a href="#Page_308">308</a>-309, + <a href="#Page_327">327</a>-28</p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Tegetthoff, Admiral, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, + <a href="#Page_293">293</a>-94</p> + + <p>Texel, the, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_146">146</a>-47, + <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, + <a href="#Page_197">197</a></p> + + <p>Thames, the, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>-38, + <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, + <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, + <a href="#Page_247">247</a>-48, + <a href="#Page_268">268</a></p> + + <p>Theory of war, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>-30, + <a href="#Page_107">107</a>-52</p> + + <p>Tilbury, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></p> + + <p>Togo, Admiral, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, + <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, + <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, + <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, + <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, + <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, + <a href="#Page_322">322</a>-24, + <a href="#Page_338">338</a></p> + + <p>Torbay, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>-90, + <a href="#Page_192">192</a>-93, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a></p> + + <p>Torres Vedras, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, + <a href="#Page_83">83</a></p> + + <p>Torrington, Admiral Lord, + <a href="#Page_214">214</a>-18, + <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, + <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, + <a href="#Page_226">226</a></p> + + <p>Toulon, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, + <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, + <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, + <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a>-208, + <a href="#Page_213">213</a>-14, + <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, + <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, + <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, + <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, + <a href="#Page_317">317</a>-18, + <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, + <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, + <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, + <a href="#Page_344">344</a></p> + + <p>Tourville, Admiral Comte de, + <a href="#Page_213">213</a>-14, + <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, + <a href="#Page_219">219</a>-20, + <a href="#Page_224">224</a>-26</p> + + <p> + <!-- Page 351 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" + id="Page_351"></a>[pg 351]</span></p> + + <p>Trafalgar, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, + <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, + <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, + <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, + <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, + <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, + <a href="#Page_339">339</a></p> + + <p>Trieste, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></p> + + <p>Tromp, Admiral Martin H., + <a href="#Page_175">175</a>-76</p> + + <p>Tsushima, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, + <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, + <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, + <a href="#Page_338">338</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Unlimited War, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>-51, + <a href="#Page_60">60</a>-71</p> + + <p>Ushant, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>-43, + <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, + <a href="#Page_181">181</a>-82, + <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, + <a href="#Page_223">223</a>-25, + <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, + <a href="#Page_272">272</a></p> + + <p>Utrecht, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></p> + + <p>Villeneuve, Admiral, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, + <a href="#Page_142">142</a>-43, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_182">182</a>-83, + <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, + <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, + <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, + <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, + <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, + <a href="#Page_338">338</a></p> + + <p>Vladivostock, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Walcheren, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>-69</p> + + <p>Warren, Commodore Sir John B., + <a href="#Page_235">235</a></p> + + <p>Wars:</p> + + <p class="i2">Anglo-American (1812), + <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, + <a href="#Page_276">276</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">Anglo-Dutch, + <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">Anglo-Spanish (1588), + <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">American Independence, + <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, + <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, + <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, + <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, + <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, + <a href="#Page_226">226</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">Austro-Italian (1866), + <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_293">293</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">Crimean, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>-88;</p> + + <p class="i2">Franco-German (1870), + <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, + <a href="#Page_333">333</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">Franco-Russian (1812), + <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, + <a href="#Page_51">51</a>-52;</p> + + <p class="i2">Russo-Japanese, + <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, + <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, + <a href="#Page_78">78</a>-79, + <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, + <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, + <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, + <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, + <a href="#Page_328">328</a>-29;</p> + + <p class="i2">Seven Years', <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, + <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, + <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, + <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_189">189</a>-90, + <a href="#Page_197">197</a>-98, + <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, + <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, + <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, + <a href="#Page_327">327</a>-28, + <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, + <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">Spanish-American, + <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, + <a href="#Page_168">168</a>-69, + <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, + <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, + <a href="#Page_344">344</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">Spanish Succession, + <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, + <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, + <a href="#Page_336">336</a></p> + + <p>Wellington, Duke of, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, + <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, + <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, + <a href="#Page_105">105</a></p> + + <p>West Indies, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, + <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, + <a href="#Page_142">142</a>-43, + <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, + <a href="#Page_189">189</a>-90, + <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, + <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, + <a href="#Page_222">222</a>-23, + <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, + <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, + <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, + <a href="#Page_266">266</a>-67, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, + <a href="#Page_296">296</a></p> + + <p>Western Squadron, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, + <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, + <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, + <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, + <a href="#Page_266">266</a></p> + + <p>Wight, Isle of, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, + <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, + <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, + <a href="#Page_257">257</a></p> + + <p>Wolfe, General, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, + <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, + <a href="#Page_301">301</a>-302</p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Yalu, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></p> + + <p>Yarmouth, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></p> + + <p>Yellow Sea, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></p> + </div> + </div> + <hr /> + <a name="Footnotes" + id="Footnotes"></a> + + <h2>Footnotes.</h2> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_1" + id="Nt_1"></a><a href="#NtA_1">1</a> Clausewitz, <i>On + War</i>, p. ix. The references are to Colonel Graham's + translation of the third German edition, but his wording is + not always followed exactly.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_2" + id="Nt_2"></a><a href="#NtA_2">2</a> Clausewitz, On War, + Book viii, chap, ii</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_3" + id="Nt_3"></a><a href="#NtA_3">3</a> Ibid, Preparatory + Notice, p. vii.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_4" + id="Nt_4"></a><a href="#NtA_4">4</a> Ibid, p. viii</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_5" + id="Nt_5"></a><a href="#NtA_5">5</a> Wellington's view of + the essential factor was expressed to Rear Admiral Martin, + who was sent to Spain by the Admiralty to confer with him in + September 1813. "If anyone," he said, "wishes to know the + history of this war, I will tell them it is our maritime + superiority gives me the power of maintaining my army while + the enemy are unable to do so." (<i>Letters of Sir T. Byam + Martin</i>) [Navy Records Society], ii, p. 499.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_6" + id="Nt_6"></a><a href="#NtA_6">6</a> <i>Correspondance de + Napoléon</i>, xix, 421, 4 September.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_7" + id="Nt_7"></a><a href="#NtA_7">7</a> <i>Development of + Strategical Science.</i></p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_8" + id="Nt_8"></a><a href="#NtA_8">8</a> The strategical object + with which the Baltic fleet was sent was certainly to + prevent a counter-stroke—that is, its main function in + our war plan was negative. Its positive function was minor + and diversionary only. It also had a political object as a + demonstration to further our efforts to form a Baltic + coalition against Russia, which entirely failed. Public + opinion mistaking the whole situation expected direct + positive results from this fleet, even the capture of St. + Petersburg. Such an operation would have converted the war + from a limited one to an unlimited one. It would have meant + the "overthrow of the enemy," a task quite beyond the + strength of the allies without the assistance of the Baltic + Powers, and even so their assistance would not have + justified changing the nature of the war, unless both Sweden + and Russia had been ready to make unlimited war and nothing + was further from their intention.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_9" + id="Nt_9"></a><a href="#NtA_9">9</a> In justice to + Wellington, it should be said that his complaints were due + to false reports that exaggerated a couple of insignificant + captures into a serious interruption.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_10" + id="Nt_10"></a><a href="#NtA_10">10</a> But not without + analogous precedent. In the later Middle Ages small craft + were assigned the function in battle of trying to wedge up + the rudders of great ships or bore holes between wind and + water. See Fighting Instructions (Navy Record Society), p. + 13.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_11" + id="Nt_11"></a><a href="#NtA_11">11</a> Daveluy, <i>L'Esprit + de la Guerre Navale</i>, vol. i, p. 27, note.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_12" + id="Nt_12"></a><a href="#NtA_12">12</a> Mahan, <i>War of + 1812</i>, i, 316.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_13" + id="Nt_13"></a><a href="#NtA_13">13</a> The Dutch were + believed to have sixteen of the line—one seventy-four, + seven sixty-eights, and the rest under sixty guns. In Ross's + squadron were one three-decker and two eighties.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_14" + id="Nt_14"></a><a href="#NtA_14">14</a> See post, pp. + <a href="#Page_222">222</a>-24.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_15" + id="Nt_15"></a><a href="#NtA_15">15</a> Nelson to Barham, 29 + August 1805.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_16" + id="Nt_16"></a><a href="#NtA_16">16</a> Captain Philip + Patton to Sir Charles Middleton, 27 June 1794. <i>Barham + Papers</i>, ii, 393. Patton had probably wider war + experience than any officer then living. He was regarded as + possessing a very special knowledge of personnel, and as + vice admiral became second sea lord under Barham in + 1804.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_17" + id="Nt_17"></a><a href="#NtA_17">17</a> <i>Barham + Papers</i>, i, 302.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_18" + id="Nt_18"></a><a href="#NtA_18">18</a> To Evan Nepean, 4 + September 1801. Nicolas, <i>Nelson Despatches</i>, iv, + 484.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_19" + id="Nt_19"></a><a href="#NtA_19">19</a> For Barham's final + views, 1805, see <i>Barham Papers</i>, iii, 90-93.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_20" + id="Nt_20"></a><a href="#NtA_20">20</a> Delarbre, + <i>Tourville et la marine de son temps</i>, p. 339.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_21" + id="Nt_21"></a><a href="#NtA_21">21</a> <i>Barham + Papers</i>, i, 292.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_22" + id="Nt_22"></a><a href="#NtA_22">22</a> <i>Admiralty + Secretary's In-Letters</i>, 537, 8 August 1803.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_23" + id="Nt_23"></a><a href="#NtA_23">23</a> <i>Supra</i>, p. + <a href="#Page_222">222</a>.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_24" + id="Nt_24"></a><a href="#NtA_24">24</a> It should be said + that Cornwallis did not regard this system as new except for + the extension from Finisterre to St. Vincent, which Nelson + advised. In acknowledging the order from Ushant he wrote, + "The instructions ... are nearly the same as have generally + been given. I can therefore only guess why a copy of the + order was sent to me."—<i>Admiralty, In-Letters</i>, + 129, 28 September 1805.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_25" + id="Nt_25"></a><a href="#NtA_25">25</a> The Japanese in the + late war attempted to do this work by means of a highly + organized Army Disembarkation Staff, but except in perfect + conditions of weather and locality it does not seem to have + worked well, and in almost all cases the assistance of the + navy was called in.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_26" + id="Nt_26"></a><a href="#NtA_26">26</a> Sir Hugh Cloberry + Christian was an officer of high distinction with a + remarkable record of battle service. He had been serving as + Howe's second captain just before his promotion to flag rank + in 1795, and died as Commander-in-Chief at the Cape at the + early age of fifty-one.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_27" + id="Nt_27"></a><a href="#NtA_27">27</a> On analogous grounds + almost every military critic has condemned the policy of + this disastrous expedition as involving a dispersal of our + slender military force at a time when everything called for + its concentration in Europe.</p> + +<p> </p> +<hr class="full" /> +<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME STRATEGY***</p> +<p>******* This file should be named 15076-h.txt or 15076-h.zip *******</p> +<p>This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:<br /> +<a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/5/0/7/15076">https://www.gutenberg.org/1/5/0/7/15076</a></p> +<p>Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed.</p> + +<p>Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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