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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, by
+Julian Stafford Corbett
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
+
+Author: Julian Stafford Corbett
+
+Release Date: February 16, 2005  [eBook #15076]
+
+Language: english
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII)
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME
+STRATEGY***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Suzanne Shell, Keith Edkins, and the Project Gutenberg
+Online Distributed Proofreading Team
+
+
+
+SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME STRATEGY
+
+JULIAN S. CORBETT
+
+London
+
+1911
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+[Illustration: _Sir Julian Corbett (courtesy D.M. Schurman)_]
+
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+  THE THEORETICAL STUDY OF WAR--ITS USE AND LIMITATIONS
+
+PART I. THEORY OF WAR
+
+    I. THE THEORY OF WAR
+   II. NATURES OF WARS--OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE
+  III. NATURES OF WARS--LIMITED AND UNLIMITED
+   IV. LIMITED WAR AND MARITIME EMPIRES
+    V. WARS OF INTERVENTION--LIMITED INTERFERENCE IN UNLIMITED WAR
+   VI. CONDITIONS OF STRENGTH IN LIMITED WAR
+
+PART II. THEORY OF NAVAL WAR
+
+    I. THEORY OF THE OBJECT--COMMAND OF THE SEA
+   II. THEORY OF THE MEANS--THE CONSTITUTION OF FLEETS
+  III. THEORY OF THE METHOD--CONCENTRATION AND DISPERSAL OF FORCE
+
+PART III. CONDUCT OF NAVAL WAR
+
+    I. INTRODUCTORY--
+       1. INHERENT DIFFERENCES IN THE CONDITIONS OF WAR ON LAND AND ON SEA
+       2. TYPICAL FORMS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
+   II. METHODS OF SECURING COMMAND--
+       1. ON OBTAINING A DECISION
+       2. BLOCKADE
+  III. METHODS OF DISPUTING COMMAND--
+       1. DEFENSIVE FLEET OPERATIONS--"A FLEET IN BEING"
+       2. MINOR COUNTER-ATTACKS
+   IV. METHODS OF EXERCISING COMMAND--
+       1. DEFENCE AGAINST INVASION
+       2. ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF TRADE
+       3. ATTACK, DEFENCE, AND SUPPORT OF MILITARY EXPEDITIONS
+
+  Appendix: The "Green Pamphlet"
+
+  INDEX
+
+
+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                  INTRODUCTION
+
+  The Theoretical Study of War--Its Use and
+                  Limitations
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+At first sight nothing can appear more unpractical, less promising of
+useful result, than to approach the study of war with a theory. There seems
+indeed to be something essentially antagonistic between the habit of mind
+that seeks theoretical guidance and that which makes for the successful
+conduct of war. The conduct of war is so much a question of personality, of
+character, of common-sense, of rapid decision upon complex and
+ever-shifting factors, and those factors themselves are so varied, so
+intangible, so dependent upon unstable moral and physical conditions, that
+it seems incapable of being reduced to anything like true scientific
+analysis. At the bare idea of a theory or "science" of war the mind recurs
+uneasily to well-known cases where highly "scientific" officers failed as
+leaders. Yet, on the other hand, no one will deny that since the great
+theorists of the early nineteenth century attempted to produce a reasoned
+theory of war, its planning and conduct have acquired a method, a
+precision, and a certainty of grasp which were unknown before. Still less
+will any one deny the value which the shrewdest and most successful leaders
+in war have placed upon the work of the classical strategical writers.
+
+The truth is that the mistrust of theory arises from a misconception of
+what it is that theory claims to do. It does not pretend to give the power
+of conduct in the field; it claims no more than to increase the effective
+power of conduct. Its main practical value is that it can assist a capable
+man to acquire a broad outlook whereby he may be the surer his plan shall
+cover all the ground, and whereby he may with greater rapidity and
+certainty seize all the factors of a sudden situation. The greatest of the
+theorists himself puts the matter quite frankly. Of theoretical study he
+says, "It should educate the mind of the man who is to lead in war, or
+rather guide him to self-education, but it should not accompany him on the
+field of battle."
+
+Its practical utility, however, is not by any means confined to its effects
+upon the powers of a leader. It is not enough that a leader should have the
+ability to decide rightly; his subordinates must seize at once the full
+meaning of his decision and be able to express it with certainty in
+well-adjusted action. For this every man concerned must have been trained
+to think in the same plane; the chief's order must awake in every brain the
+same process of thought; his words must have the same meaning for all. If a
+theory of tactics had existed in 1780, and if Captain Carkett had had a
+sound training in such a theory, he could not possibly have misunderstood
+Rodney's signal. As it was, the real intention of the signal was obscure,
+and Rodney's neglect to explain the tactical device it indicated robbed his
+country of a victory at an hour of the direst need. There had been no
+previous theoretical training to supply the omission, and Rodney's fine
+conception was unintelligible to anybody but himself.
+
+Nor is it only for the sake of mental solidarity between a chief and his
+subordinates that theory is indispensable. It is of still higher value for
+producing a similar solidarity between him and his superiors at the Council
+table at home. How often have officers dumbly acquiesced in ill-advised
+operations simply for lack of the mental power and verbal apparatus to
+convince an impatient Minister where the errors of his plan lay? How often,
+moreover, have statesmen and officers, even in the most harmonious
+conference, been unable to decide on a coherent plan of war from inability
+to analyse scientifically the situation they had to face, and to recognise
+the general character of the struggle in which they were about to engage.
+That the true nature of a war should be realised by contemporaries as
+clearly as it comes to be seen afterwards in the fuller light of history is
+seldom to be expected. At close range accidental factors will force
+themselves into undue prominence and tend to obscure the true horizon. Such
+error can scarcely ever be eliminated, but by theoretical study we can
+reduce it, nor by any other means can we hope to approach the clearness of
+vision with which posterity will read our mistakes. Theory is, in fact, a
+question of education and deliberation, and not of execution at all. That
+depends on the combination of intangible human qualities which we call
+executive ability.
+
+This, then, is all the great authorities ever claimed for theory, but to
+this claim the chief of them at least, after years of active service on the
+Staff, attached the highest importance. "In actual operations," he wrote in
+one of his latest memoranda, "men are guided solely by their judgment, and
+it will hit the mark more or less accurately according as they possess more
+or less genius. This is the way all great generals have acted.... Thus it
+will always be in action, and so far judgment will suffice. But when it is
+a question not of taking action yourself, but of convincing others at the
+Council table, then everything depends on clear conceptions and the
+exposition of the inherent relations of things. So little progress has been
+made in this respect that most deliberations are merely verbal contentions
+which rest on no firm foundation, and end either in every one retaining his
+own opinion, or in a compromise from considerations of mutual respect--a
+middle course of no actual value."[1]
+
+  [1] Clausewitz, _On War_, p. ix. The references are to Colonel Graham's
+  translation of the third German edition, but his wording is not always
+  followed exactly.
+
+The writer's experience of such discussions was rich and at first hand.
+Clear conceptions of the ideas and factors involved in a war problem, and a
+definite exposition of the relations between them, were in his eyes the
+remedy for loose and purposeless discussion; and such conceptions and
+expositions are all we mean by the theory or the science of war. It is a
+process by which we co-ordinate our ideas, define the meaning of the words
+we use, grasp the difference between essential and unessential factors, and
+fix and expose the fundamental data on which every one is agreed. In this
+way we prepare the apparatus of practical discussion; we secure the means
+of arranging the factors in manageable shape, and of deducing from them
+with precision and rapidity a practical course of action. Without such an
+apparatus no two men can even think on the same line; much less can they
+ever hope to detach the real point of difference that divides them and
+isolate it for quiet solution.
+
+In our own case this view of the value of strategical theory has a special
+significance, and one far wider than its continental enunciators
+contemplated. For a world-wide maritime Empire the successful conduct of
+war will often turn not only on the decisions of the Council chamber at
+home, but on the outcome of conferences in all parts of the world between
+squadronal commanders and the local authorities, both civil and military,
+and even between commanders-in-chief of adjacent stations. In time of war
+or of preparation for war, in which the Empire is concerned, arrangements
+must always be based to an exceptional degree on the mutual relation of
+naval, military, and political considerations. The line of mean efficiency,
+though indicated from home, must be worked out locally, and worked out on
+factors of which no one service is master. Conference is always necessary,
+and for conference to succeed there must be a common vehicle of expression
+and a common plane of thought. It is for this essential preparation that
+theoretical study alone can provide; and herein lies its practical value
+for all who aspire to the higher responsibilities of the Imperial service.
+
+So great indeed is the value of abstract strategical study from this point
+of view, that it is necessary to guard ourselves against over-valuation. So
+far from claiming for their so-called science more than the possibilities
+we have indicated, the classical strategists insist again and again on the
+danger of seeking from it what it cannot give. They even repudiate the very
+name of "Science." They prefer the older term "Art." They will permit no
+laws or rules. Such laws, they say, can only mislead in practice, for the
+friction to which they are subject from the incalculable human factors
+alone is such that the friction is stronger than the law. It is an old
+adage of lawyers that nothing is so misleading as a legal maxim, but a
+strategical maxim is undoubtedly and in every way less to be trusted in
+action.
+
+What then, it will be asked, are the tangible results which we can hope to
+attain from theory? If all on which we have to build is so indeterminate,
+how are any practical conclusions to be reached? That the factors are
+infinitely varied and difficult to determine is true, but that, it must be
+remembered, is just what emphasises the necessity of reaching such firm
+standpoints as are attainable. The vaguer the problem to be solved, the
+more resolute must we be in seeking points of departure from which we can
+begin to lay a course, keeping always an eye open for the accidents that
+will beset us, and being always alive to their deflecting influences. And
+this is just what the theoretical study of strategy can do. It can at least
+determine the normal. By careful collation of past events it becomes clear
+that certain lines of conduct tend normally to produce certain effects;
+that wars tend to take certain forms each with a marked idiosyncrasy; that
+these forms are normally related to the object of the war and to its value
+to one or both belligerents; that a system of operations which suits one
+form may not be that best suited to another. We can even go further. By
+pursuing an historical and comparative method we can detect that even the
+human factor is not quite indeterminable. We can assert that certain
+situations will normally produce, whether in ourselves or in our
+adversaries, certain moral states on which we may calculate.
+
+Having determined the normal, we are at once in a stronger position. Any
+proposal can be compared with it, and we can proceed to discuss clearly the
+weight of the factors which prompt us to depart from the normal. Every case
+must be judged on its merits, but without a normal to work from we cannot
+form any real judgment at all; we can only guess. Every case will assuredly
+depart from the normal to a greater or less extent, and it is equally
+certain that the greatest successes in war have been the boldest departures
+from the normal. But for the most part they have been departures made with
+open eyes by geniuses who could perceive in the accidents of the case a
+just reason for the departure.
+
+Take an analogous example, and the province of strategical theory becomes
+clear at once. Navigation and the parts of seamanship that belong to it
+have to deal with phenomena as varied and unreliable as those of the
+conduct of war. Together they form an art which depends quite as much as
+generalship on the judgment of individuals. The law of storms and tides, of
+winds and currents, and the whole of meteorology are subject to infinite
+and incalculable deflections, and yet who will deny nowadays that by the
+theoretical study of such things the seaman's art has gained in coherence
+and strength? Such study will not by itself make a seaman or a navigator,
+but without it no seaman or navigator can nowadays pretend to the name.
+Because storms do not always behave in the same way, because currents are
+erratic, will the most practical seaman deny that the study of the normal
+conditions are useless to him in his practical decisions?
+
+If, then, the theoretical study of strategy be approached in this way--if,
+that is, it be regarded not as a substitute for judgment and experience,
+but as a means of fertilising both, it can do no man harm. Individual
+thought and common-sense will remain the masters and remain the guides to
+point the general direction when the mass of facts begins to grow
+bewildering. Theory will warn us the moment we begin to leave the beaten
+track, and enable us to decide with open eyes whether the divergence is
+necessary or justifiable. Above all, when men assemble in Council it will
+hold discussion to the essential lines, and help to keep side issues in
+their place.
+
+But beyond all this there lies in the theory of war yet another element of
+peculiar value to a maritime Empire. We are accustomed, partly for
+convenience and partly from lack of a scientific habit of thought, to speak
+of naval strategy and military strategy as though they were distinct
+branches of knowledge which had no common ground. It is the theory of war
+which brings out their intimate relation. It reveals that embracing them
+both is a larger strategy which regards the fleet and army as one weapon,
+which co-ordinates their action, and indicates the lines on which each must
+move to realise the full power of both. It will direct us to assign to each
+its proper function in a plan of war; it will enable each service to
+realise the better the limitations and the possibilities of the function
+with which it is charged, and how and when its own necessities must give
+way to a higher or more pressing need of the other. It discloses, in short,
+that naval strategy is not a thing by itself, that its problems can seldom
+or never be solved on naval considerations alone, but that it is only a
+part of maritime strategy--the higher learning which teaches us that for a
+maritime State to make successful war and to realise her special strength,
+army and navy must be used and thought of as instruments no less intimately
+connected than are the three arms ashore.
+
+It is for these reasons that it is of little use to approach naval strategy
+except through the theory of war. Without such theory we can never really
+understand its scope or meaning, nor can we hope to grasp the forces which
+most profoundly affect its conclusions.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                    PART ONE
+
+                  THEORY OF WAR
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                   CHAPTER ONE
+
+                THE THEORY OF WAR
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The last thing that an explorer arrives at is a complete map that will
+cover the whole ground he has travelled, but for those who come after him
+and would profit by and extend his knowledge his map is the first thing
+with which they will begin. So it is with strategy. Before we start upon
+its study we seek a chart which will show us at a glance what exactly is
+the ground we have to cover and what are the leading features which
+determine its form and general characteristics. Such a chart a "theory of
+war" alone can provide. It is for this reason that in the study of war we
+must get our theory clear before we can venture in search of practical
+conclusions. So great is the complexity of war that without such a guide we
+are sure to go astray amidst the bewildering multiplicity of tracks and
+obstacles that meet us at every step. If for continental strategy its value
+has been proved abundantly, then for maritime strategy, where the
+conditions are far more complex, the need of it is even greater.
+
+By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the
+sea is a substantial factor. Naval strategy is but that part of it which
+determines the movements of the fleet when maritime strategy has determined
+what part the fleet must play in relation to the action of the land forces;
+for it scarcely needs saying that it is almost impossible that a war can be
+decided by naval action alone. Unaided, naval pressure can only work by a
+process of exhaustion. Its effects must always be slow, and so galling both
+to our own commercial community and to neutrals, that the tendency is
+always to accept terms of peace that are far from conclusive. For a firm
+decision a quicker and more drastic form of pressure is required. Since men
+live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at
+war have always been decided--except in the rarest cases--either by what
+your army can do against your enemy's territory and national life or else
+by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.
+
+The paramount concern, then, of maritime strategy is to determine the
+mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war. When this is done,
+and not till then, naval strategy can begin to work out the manner in which
+the fleet can best discharge the function assigned to it.
+
+The problem of such co-ordination is one that is susceptible of widely
+varying solutions. It may be that the command of the sea is of so urgent an
+importance that the army will have to devote itself to assisting the fleet
+in its special task before it can act directly against the enemy's
+territory and land forces; on the other hand, it may be that the immediate
+duty of the fleet will be to forward military action ashore before it is
+free to devote itself whole-heartedly to the destruction of the enemy's
+fleets. The crude maxims as to primary objects which seem to have served
+well enough in continental warfare have never worked so clearly where the
+sea enters seriously into a war. In such cases it will not suffice to say
+the primary object of the army is to destroy the enemy's army, or that of
+the fleet to destroy the enemy's fleet. The delicate interactions of the
+land and sea factors produce conditions too intricate for such blunt
+solutions. Even the initial equations they present are too complex to be
+reduced by the simple application of rough-and-ready maxims. Their right
+handling depends upon the broadest and most fundamental principles of war,
+and it is as a standpoint from which to get a clear and unobstructed view
+of the factors in their true relations that a theory of war has perhaps its
+highest value.
+
+The theory which now holds the field is that war in a fundamental sense is
+a continuation of policy by other means. The process by which the
+continental strategists arrived at it involved some hard philosophical
+reasoning. Practical and experienced veterans as they were, their method is
+not one that works easily with our own habit of thought. It will be well,
+therefore, to endeavour first to present their conclusions in a concrete
+form, which will make the pith of the matter intelligible at once. Take,
+now, the ordinary case of a naval or military Staff being asked to prepare
+a war plan against a certain State and to advise what means it will
+require. To any one who has considered such matters it is obvious the reply
+must be another question--What will the war be about? Without a definite
+answer or alternative answers to that question a Staff can scarcely do more
+than engage in making such forces as the country can afford as efficient as
+possible. Before they take any sure step further they must know many
+things. They must know whether they are expected to take something from the
+enemy, or to prevent his taking something either from us or from some other
+State. If from some other State, the measures to be taken will depend on
+its geographical situation and on its relative strength by land and sea.
+Even when the object is clear it will be necessary to know how much value
+the enemy attaches to it. Is it one for which he will be likely to fight to
+the death, or one which he will abandon in the face of comparatively slight
+resistance? If the former, we cannot hope to succeed without entirely
+overthrowing his powers of resistance. If the latter, it will suffice, as
+it often has sufficed, to aim at something less costly and hazardous and
+better within our means. All these are questions which lie in the lap of
+Ministers charged with the foreign policy of the country, and before the
+Staff can proceed with a war plan they must be answered by Ministers.
+
+In short, the Staff must ask of them what is the policy which your
+diplomacy is pursuing, and where, and why, do you expect it to break down
+and force you to take up arms? The Staff has to carry on in fact when
+diplomacy has failed to achieve the object in view, and the method they
+will use will depend on the nature of that object. So we arrive crudely at
+our theory that war is a continuation of policy, a form of political
+intercourse in which we fight battles instead of writing notes.
+
+It was this theory, simple and even meaningless as it appears at first
+sight, that gave the key to the practical work of framing a modern war plan
+and revolutionised the study of strategy. It was not till the beginning of
+the nineteenth century that such a theory was arrived at. For centuries men
+had written on the "Art of War," but for want of a working theory their
+labours as a whole had been unscientific, concerned for the most part with
+the discussion of passing fashions and the elaboration of platitudes. Much
+good work it is true was done on details, but no broad outlook had been
+obtained to enable us to determine their relation to the fundamental
+constants of the subject. No standpoint had been found from which we could
+readily detach such constants from what was merely accidental. The result
+was a tendency to argue too exclusively from the latest examples and to
+become entangled in erroneous thought by trying to apply the methods which
+had attained the last success to war as a whole. There was no means of
+determining how far the particular success was due to special conditions
+and how far it was due to factors common to all wars.
+
+It was the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, coinciding as they did with a
+period of philosophic activity, that revealed the shallowness and empirical
+nature of all that had been done up to that time. Napoleon's methods
+appeared to his contemporaries to have produced so strenuous a revolution
+in the conduct of land warfare that it assumed a wholly new aspect, and it
+was obvious that those conceptions which had sufficed previously had become
+inadequate as a basis of sound study. War on land seemed to have changed
+from a calculated affair of thrust and parry between standing armies to a
+headlong rush of one nation in arms upon another, each thirsting for the
+other's life, and resolved to have it or perish in the attempt. Men felt
+themselves faced with a manifestation of human energy which had had no
+counterpart, at least in civilised times.
+
+The assumption was not entirely true. For although the Continent had never
+before adopted the methods in question, our own country was no stranger to
+them either on sea or land. As we shall see, our own Revolution in the
+seventeenth century had produced strenuous methods of making war which were
+closely related to those which Napoleon took over from the French
+Revolutionary leaders. A more philosophic outlook might have suggested that
+the phenomenon was not really exceptional, but rather the natural outcome
+of popular energy inspired by a stirring political ideal. But the British
+precedent was forgotten, and so profound was the disturbance caused by the
+new French methods that its effects are with us still. We are in fact still
+dominated by the idea that since the Napoleonic era war has been
+essentially a different thing. Our teachers incline to insist that there is
+now only one way of making war, and that is Napoleon's way. Ignoring the
+fact that he failed in the end, they brand as heresy the bare suggestion
+that there may be other ways, and not content with assuming that his system
+will fit all land wars, however much their natures and objects may differ,
+they would force naval warfare into the same uniform under the impression
+apparently that they are thereby making it presentable and giving it some
+new force.
+
+Seeing how cramping the Napoleonic idea has become, it will be convenient
+before going further to determine its special characteristics exactly, but
+that is no easy matter. The moment we approach it in a critical spirit, it
+begins to grow nebulous and very difficult to define. We can dimly make out
+four distinct ideas mingled in the current notion. First, there is the idea
+of making war not merely with a professional standing army, but with the
+whole armed nation--a conception which of course was not really Napoleon's.
+It was inherited by him from the Revolution, but was in fact far older. It
+was but a revival of the universal practice which obtained in the barbaric
+stages of social development, and which every civilisation in turn had
+abandoned as economically unsound and subversive of specialisation in
+citizenship. The results of the abandonment were sometimes good and
+sometimes bad, but the determining conditions have been studied as yet too
+imperfectly to justify any broad generalisation. Secondly, there is the
+idea of strenuous and persistent effort--not resting to secure each minor
+advantage, but pressing the enemy without pause or rest till he is utterly
+overthrown--an idea in which Cromwell had anticipated Napoleon by a century
+and a half. Scarcely distinguishable from this is a third idea--that of
+taking the offensive, in which there was really nothing new at all, since
+its advantages had always been understood, and Frederick the Great had
+pressed it to extremity with little less daring than Napoleon himself--nay
+even to culpable rashness, as the highest exponents of the Napoleonic idea
+admit. Finally, there is the notion of making the armed forces of the enemy
+and not his territory or any part of it your main objective. This perhaps
+is regarded as the strongest characteristic of Napoleon's methods, and yet
+even here we are confused by the fact that undoubtedly on some very
+important occasions--the Austerlitz campaign, for example--Napoleon made
+the hostile capital his objective as though he believed its occupation was
+the most effective step towards the overthrow of the enemy's power and will
+to resist. He certainly did not make the enemy's main army his primary
+objective--for their main army was not Mack's but that of the Archduke
+Charles.
+
+On the whole then, when men speak of the Napoleonic system they seem to
+include two groups of ideas--one which comprises the conception of war made
+with the whole force of the nation; the other, a group which includes the
+Cromwellian idea of persistent effort, Frederick's preference for the
+offensive at almost any risk, and finally the idea of the enemy's armed
+forces as the main objective, which was also Cromwell's.
+
+It is the combination of these by no means original or very distinct ideas
+that we are told has brought about so entire a change in the conduct of war
+that it has become altogether a different thing. It is unnecessary for our
+purpose to consider how far the facts seem to support such a conclusion,
+for in the inherent nature of things it must be radically unsound. Neither
+war nor anything else can change in its essentials. If it appears to do so,
+it is because we are still mistaking accidents for essentials, and this is
+exactly how it struck the acutest thinkers of Napoleonic times.
+
+For a while it is true they were bewildered, but so soon as they had had
+time to clear their heads from the din of the struggle in which they had
+taken part, they began to see that the new phenomena were but accidents
+after all. They perceived that Napoleon's methods, which had taken the
+world by storm, had met with success in wars of a certain nature only, and
+that when he tried to extend those methods to other natures of war he had
+met with failure and even disaster. How was this to be explained? What
+theory, for instance, would cover Napoleon's successes in Germany and
+Italy, as well as his failures in Spain and Russia? If the whole conception
+of war had changed, how could you account for the success of England, who
+had not changed her methods? To us the answer to these questions is of
+living and infinite importance. Our standpoint remains still unchanged. Is
+there anything inherent in the conception of war that justifies that
+attitude in our case? Are we entitled to expect from it again the same
+success it met with in the past?
+
+The first man to enunciate a theory which would explain the phenomena of
+the Napoleonic era and co-ordinate them with previous history was General
+Carl von Clausewitz, a man whose arduous service on the Staff and the
+actual work of higher instruction had taught the necessity of systematising
+the study of his profession. He was no mere professor, but a soldier bred
+in the severest school of war. The pupil and friend of Sharnhorst and
+Gneisenau, he had served on the Staff of Bluecher in 1813, he had been
+Chief of the Staff to Wallmoden in his campaign against Davoust on the
+Lower Elbe, and also to the Third Prussian Army Corps in the campaign of
+1815. Thereafter for more than ten years he was Director of the General
+Academy of War at Berlin, and died in 1831 as Chief of the Staff to Marshal
+Gneisenau. For the fifty years that followed his death his theories and
+system were, as he expected they would be, attacked from all sides. Yet
+to-day his work is more firmly established than ever as the necessary basis
+of all strategical thought, and above all in the "blood and iron" school of
+Germany.
+
+The process by which he reached his famous theory can be followed in his
+classical work _On War_ and the _Notes_ regarding it which he left behind
+him. In accordance with the philosophic fashion of his time he began by
+trying to formulate an abstract idea of war. The definition he started with
+was that "War is an act of violence to compel our opponent to do our will."
+But that act of violence was not merely "the shock of armies," as
+Montecuccoli had defined it a century and a half before. If the abstract
+idea of war be followed to its logical conclusion, the act of violence must
+be performed with the whole of the means at our disposal and with the
+utmost exertion of our will. Consequently we get the conception of two
+armed nations flinging themselves one upon the other, and continuing the
+struggle with the utmost strength and energy they can command till one or
+other is no longer capable of resistance. This Clausewitz called "Absolute
+War." But his practical experience and ripe study of history told him at
+once that "Real War" was something radically different. It was true, as he
+said, that Napoleon's methods had approximated to the absolute and had
+given some colour to the use of the absolute idea as a working theory. "But
+shall we," he acutely asks, "rest satisfied with this idea and judge all
+wars by it however much they may differ from it--shall we deduce from it
+all the requirements of theory? We must decide the point, for we can say
+nothing trustworthy about a war plan until we have made up our minds
+whether war should only be of this kind or whether it may be of another
+kind." He saw at once that a theory formed upon the abstract or absolute
+idea of war would not cover the ground, and therefore failed to give what
+was required for practical purposes. It would exclude almost the whole of
+war from Alexander's time to Napoleon's. And what guarantee was there that
+the next war would confirm to the Napoleonic type and accommodate itself to
+the abstract theory? "This theory," he says, "is still quite powerless
+against the force of circumstances." And so it proved, for the wars of the
+middle nineteenth century did in fact revert to the pre-Napoleonic type.
+
+In short, Clausewitz's difficulty in adopting his abstract theory as a
+working rule was that his practical mind could not forget that war had not
+begun with the Revolutionary era, nor was it likely to end with it. If that
+era had changed the conduct of war, it must be presumed that war would
+change again with other times and other conditions. A theory of war which
+did not allow for this and did not cover all that had gone before was no
+theory at all. If a theory of war was to be of any use as a practical guide
+it must cover and explain not only the extreme manifestation of hostility
+which he himself had witnessed, but every manifestation that had occurred
+in the past or was likely to recur in the future.
+
+It was in casting about for the underlying causes of the oscillations
+manifested in the energy and intensity of hostile relations that he found
+his solution. His experience on the Staff, and his study of the inner
+springs of war, told him it was never in fact a question of purely military
+endeavour aiming always at the extreme of what was possible or expedient
+from a purely military point of view. The energy exhibited would always be
+modified by political considerations and by the depth of the national
+interest in the object of the war. He saw that real war was in fact an
+international relation which differed from other international relations
+only in the method we adopted to achieve the object of our policy. So it
+was he arrived at his famous theory--"that war is a mere continuation of
+policy by other means."
+
+At first sight there seems little enough in it. It may seem perhaps that we
+have been watching a mountain in labour and nothing but a mouse has been
+produced. But it is only upon some such simple, even obvious, formula that
+any scientific system can be constructed with safety. We have only to
+develop the meaning of this one to see how important and practical are the
+guiding lines which flow from it.
+
+With the conception of war as a continuation of political intercourse
+before us, it is clear that everything which lies outside the political
+conception, everything, that is, which is strictly peculiar to military and
+naval operations, relates merely to the means which we use to achieve our
+policy. Consequently, the first desideratum of a war plan is that the means
+adopted must conflict as little as possible with the political conditions
+from which the war springs. In practice, of course, as in all human
+relations, there will be a compromise between the means and the end,
+between the political and the military exigencies. But Clausewitz held that
+policy must always be the master. The officer charged with the conduct of
+the war may of course demand that the tendencies and views of policy shall
+not be incompatible with the military means which are placed at his
+disposal; but however strongly this demand may react on policy in
+particular cases, military action must still be regarded only as a
+manifestation of policy. It must never supersede policy. The policy is
+always the object; war is only the means by which we obtain the object, and
+the means must always keep the end in view.
+
+The practical importance of this conception will now become clear. It will
+be seen to afford the logical or theoretical exposition of what we began by
+stating in its purely concrete form. When a Chief of Staff is asked for a
+war plan he must not say we will make war in such and such a way because it
+was Napoleon's or Moltke's way. He will ask what is the political object of
+the war, what are the political conditions, and how much does the question
+at issue mean respectively to us and to our adversary. It is these
+considerations which determine the nature of the war. This primordial
+question settled, he will be in a position to say whether the war is of the
+same nature as those in which Napoleon's and Moltke's methods were
+successful, or whether it is of another nature in which those methods
+failed. He will then design and offer a war plan, not because it has the
+hall-mark of this or that great master of war, but because it is one that
+has been proved to fit the kind of war in hand. To assume that one method
+of conducting war will suit all kinds of war is to fall a victim to
+abstract theory, and not to be a prophet of reality, as the narrowest
+disciples of the Napoleonic school are inclined to see themselves.
+
+Hence, says Clausewitz, the first, the greatest and most critical decision
+upon which the Statesman and the General have to exercise their judgment is
+to determine the nature of the war, to be sure they do not mistake it for
+something nor seek to make of it something which from its inherent
+conditions it can never be. "This," he declares, "is the first and the most
+far-reaching of all strategical questions."
+
+The first value, then, of his theory of war is that it gives a clear line
+on which we may proceed to determine the nature of a war in which we are
+about to engage, and to ensure that we do not try to apply to one nature of
+war any particular course of operations simply because they have proved
+successful in another nature of war. It is only, he insists, by regarding
+war not as an independent thing but as a political instrument that we can
+read aright the lessons of history and understand for our practical
+guidance how wars must differ in character according to the nature of the
+motives and circumstances from which they proceed. This conception, he
+claims, is the first ray of light to guide us to a true theory of war and
+thereby enable us to classify wars and distinguish them one from another.
+
+Jomini, his great contemporary and rival, though proceeding by a less
+philosophical but no less lucid method, entirely endorses this view. A
+Swiss soldier of fortune, his experience was much the same as that of
+Clausewitz. It was obtained mainly on the Staff of Marshal Ney and
+subsequently on the Russian headquarter Staff. He reached no definite
+theory of war, but his fundamental conclusions were the same. The first
+chapter of his final work, _Precis de l'art de la Guerre_, is devoted to
+"La Politique de la Guerre." In it he classifies wars into nine categories
+according to their political object, and he lays it down as a base
+proposition "That these different kinds of war will have more or less
+influence on the nature of the operations which will be demanded to attain
+the end in view, on the amount of energy that must be put forth, and on the
+extent of the undertakings in which we must engage." "There will," he adds,
+"be a great difference in the operations according to the risks we have to
+run."
+
+Both men, therefore, though on details of means they were often widely
+opposed, are agreed that the fundamental conception of war is political.
+Both of course agree that if we isolate in our mind the forces engaged in
+any theatre of war the abstract conception reappears. So far as those
+forces are concerned, war is a question of fighting in which each
+belligerent should endeavour by all means at his command and with all his
+energy to destroy the other. But even so they may find that certain means
+are barred to them for political reasons, and at any moment the fortune of
+war or a development of the political conditions with which it is entangled
+may throw them back upon the fundamental political theory.
+
+That theory it will be unprofitable to labour further at this point. Let it
+suffice for the present to mark that it gives us a conception of war as an
+exertion of violence to secure a political end which we desire to attain,
+and that from this broad and simple formula we are able to deduce at once
+that wars will vary according to the nature of the end and the intensity of
+our desire to attain it. Here we may leave it to gather force and coherence
+as we examine the practical considerations which are its immediate outcome.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                   CHAPTER TWO
+
+                 NATURES OF WARS--
+             OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Having determined that wars must vary in character according to the nature
+and importance of their object, we are faced with the difficulty that the
+variations will be of infinite number and of all degrees of distinction. So
+complex indeed is the graduation presented that at first sight it appears
+scarcely possible to make it the basis of practical study. But on further
+examination it will be seen that by applying the usual analytical method
+the whole subject is susceptible of much simplification. We must in short
+attempt to reach some system of classification; that is, we must see if it
+is not possible to group the variations into some well-founded categories.
+With a subject so complex and intangible the grouping must of course be to
+some extent arbitrary, and in some places the lines of demarcation will be
+shadowy; but if classification has been found possible and helpful in
+Zoology or Botany, with the infinite and minute individual variations with
+which they have to deal, it should be no less possible and helpful in the
+study of war.
+
+The political theory of war will at any rate give us two broad and
+well-marked classifications. The first is simple and well known, depending
+on whether the political object of the war is positive or negative. If it
+be positive--that is, if our aim is to wrest something from the enemy--then
+our war in its main lines will be offensive. If, on the other hand, our aim
+be negative, and we simply seek to prevent the enemy wresting some
+advantage to our detriment, then the war in its general direction will be
+defensive.
+
+It is only as a broad conception that this classification has value. Though
+it fixes the general trend of our operations, it will not in itself affect
+their character. For a maritime Power at least it is obvious that this must
+be so. For in any circumstances it is impossible for such a Power either to
+establish its defence or develop fully its offence without securing a
+working control of the sea by aggressive action against the enemy's fleets.
+Furthermore, we have always found that however strictly our aim may be
+defensive, the most effective means of securing it has been by
+counter-attack over-sea, either to support an ally directly or to deprive
+our enemy of his colonial possessions. Neither category, then, excludes the
+use of offensive operations nor the idea of overthrowing our enemy so far
+as is necessary to gain our end. In neither case does the conception lead
+us eventually to any other objective than the enemy's armed forces, and
+particularly his naval forces. The only real difference is this--that if
+our object be positive our general plan must be offensive, and we should at
+least open with a true offensive movement; whereas if our object be
+negative our general plan will be preventive, and we may bide our time for
+our counter-attack. To this extent our action must always tend to the
+offensive. For counter-attack is the soul of defence. Defence is not a
+passive attitude, for that is the negation of war. Rightly conceived, it is
+an attitude of alert expectation. We wait for the moment when the enemy
+shall expose himself to a counter-stroke, the success of which will so far
+cripple him as to render us relatively strong enough to pass to the
+offensive ourselves.
+
+From these considerations it will appear that, real and logical as the
+classification is, to give it the designation "offensive and defensive" is
+objectionable from every point of view. To begin with, it does not
+emphasise what the real and logical distinction is. It suggests that the
+basis of the classification is not so much a difference of object as a
+difference in the means employed to achieve the object. Consequently we
+find ourselves continually struggling with the false assumption that
+positive war means using attack, and negative war being content with
+defence.
+
+That is confusing enough, but a second objection to the designation is far
+more serious and more fertile of error. For the classification "offensive
+and defensive" implies that offensive and defensive are mutually exclusive
+ideas, whereas the truth is, and it is a fundamental truth of war, that
+they are mutually complementary. All war and every form of it must be both
+offensive and defensive. No matter how clear our positive aim nor how high
+our offensive spirit, we cannot develop an aggressive line of strategy to
+the full without the support of the defensive on all but the main lines of
+operation. In tactics it is the same. The most convinced devotee of attack
+admits the spade as well as the rifle. And even when it comes to men and
+material, we know that without a certain amount of protection neither
+ships, guns, nor men can develop their utmost energy and endurance in
+striking power. There is never, in fact, a clean choice between attack and
+defence. In aggressive operations the question always is, how far must
+defence enter into the methods we employ in order to enable us to do the
+utmost within our resources to break or paralyse the strength of the enemy.
+So also with defence. Even in its most legitimate use, it must always be
+supplemented by attack. Even behind the walls of a fortress men know that
+sooner or later the place must fall unless by counter-attack on the enemy's
+siege works or communications they can cripple his power of attack.
+
+It would seem, therefore, that it were better to lay aside the designation
+"offensive and defensive" altogether and substitute the terms "positive and
+negative." But here again we are confronted with a difficulty. There have
+been many wars in which positive methods have been used all through to
+secure a negative end, and such wars will not sit easily in either class.
+For instance, in the War of Spanish Succession our object was mainly to
+prevent the Mediterranean becoming a French lake by the union of the French
+and Spanish crowns, but the method by which we succeeded in achieving our
+end was to seize the naval positions of Gibraltar and Minorca, and so in
+practice our method was positive. Again, in the late Russo-Japanese War the
+main object of Japan was to prevent Korea being absorbed by Russia. That
+aim was preventive and negative. But the only effective way of securing her
+aim was to take Korea herself, and so for her the war was in practice
+positive.
+
+On the other hand, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that in the majority
+of wars the side with the positive object has acted generally on the
+offensive and the other generally on the defensive. Unpractical therefore
+as the distinction seems to be, it is impossible to dismiss it without
+inquiring why this was so, and it is in this inquiry that the practical
+results of the classification will be found to lie--that is, it forces us
+to analyse the comparative advantages of offence and defence. A clear
+apprehension of their relative possibilities is the corner stone of
+strategical study.
+
+Now the advantages of the offensive are patent and admitted. It is only the
+offensive that can produce positive results, while the strength and energy
+which are born of the moral stimulation of attack are of a practical value
+that outweighs almost every other consideration. Every man of spirit would
+desire to use the offensive whether his object were positive or negative,
+and yet there are a number of cases in which some of the most energetic
+masters of war have chosen the defensive, and chosen with success. They
+have chosen it when they have found themselves inferior in physical force
+to their enemy, and when they believed that no amount of aggressive spirit
+could redress that inferiority.
+
+Obviously, then, for all the inferiority of the defensive as a drastic form
+of war it must have some inherent advantage which the offensive does not
+enjoy. In war we adopt every method for which we have sufficient strength.
+If, then, we adopt the less desirable method of defence, it must be either
+that we have not sufficient strength for offence, or that the defence gives
+us some special strength for the attainment of our object.
+
+What, then, are these elements of strength? It is very necessary to
+inquire, not only that we may know that if for a time we are forced back
+upon the defensive all is not lost, but also that we may judge with how
+much daring we should push our offensive to prevent the enemy securing the
+advantages of defence.
+
+As a general principle we all know that possession is nine points of the
+law. It is easier to keep money in our pocket than to take it from another
+man's. If one man would rob another he must be the stronger or better armed
+unless he can do it by dexterity or stealth, and there lies one of the
+advantages of offence. The side which takes the initiative has usually the
+better chance of securing advantage by dexterity or stealth. But it is not
+always so. If either by land or sea we can take a defensive position so
+good that it cannot be turned and must be broken down before our enemy can
+reach his objective, then the advantage of dexterity and stealth passes to
+us. We choose our own ground for the trial of strength. We are hidden on
+familiar ground; he is exposed on ground that is less familiar. We can lay
+traps and prepare surprises by counter-attack, when he is most dangerously
+exposed. Hence the paradoxical doctrine that where defence is sound and
+well designed the advantage of surprise is against the attack.
+
+It will be seen therefore that whatever advantages lie in defence they
+depend on the preservation of the offensive spirit. Its essence is the
+counter-attack--waiting deliberately for a chance to strike--not cowering
+in inactivity. Defence is a condition of restrained activity--not a mere
+condition of rest. Its real weakness is that if unduly prolonged it tends
+to deaden the spirit of offence. This is a truth so vital that some
+authorities in their eagerness to enforce it have travestied it into the
+misleading maxim, "That attack is the best defence." Hence again an
+amateurish notion that defence is always stupid or pusillanimous, leading
+always to defeat, and that what is called "the military spirit" means
+nothing but taking the offensive. Nothing is further from the teaching or
+the practice of the best masters. Like Wellington at Torres Vedras, they
+all at times used the defensive till the elements of strength inherent in
+that form of war, as opposed to the exhausting strain inherent in the form
+that they had fixed upon their opponents, lifted them to a position where
+they in their turn were relatively strong enough to use the more exhausting
+form.
+
+The confusion of thought which has led to the misconceptions about defence
+as a method of war is due to several obvious causes. Counter-attacks from a
+general defensive attitude have been regarded as a true offensive, as, for
+instance, in Frederick the Great's best-known operations, or in Admiral
+Tegetthoff's brilliant counterstroke at Lissa, or our own operations
+against the Spanish Armada. Again, the defensive has acquired an ill name
+by its being confused with a wrongly arrested offensive, where the superior
+Power with the positive object lacked the spirit to use his material
+superiority with sufficient activity and perseverance. Against such a Power
+an inferior enemy can always redress his inferiority by passing to a bold
+and quick offensive, thus acquiring a momentum both moral and physical
+which more than compensates his lack of weight. The defensive has also
+failed by the choice of a bad position which the enemy was able to turn or
+avoid. A defensive attitude is nothing at all, its elements of strength
+entirely disappear, unless it is such that the enemy must break it down by
+force before he can reach his ultimate objective. Even more often has it
+failed when the belligerent adopting it, finding he has no available
+defensive position which will bar the enemy's progress, attempts to guard
+every possible line of attack. The result is of course that by attenuating
+his force he only accentuates his inferiority.
+
+Clear and well proven as these considerations are for land warfare, their
+application to the sea is not so obvious. It will be objected that at sea
+there is no defensive. This is generally true for tactics, but even so not
+universally true. Defensive tactical positions are possible at sea, as in
+defended anchorages. These were always a reality, and the mine has
+increased their possibilities. In the latest developments of naval warfare
+we have seen the Japanese at the Elliot Islands preparing a real defensive
+position to cover the landing of their Second Army in the Liaotung
+Peninsula. Strategically the proposition is not true at all. A strategical
+defensive has been quite as common at sea as on land, and our own gravest
+problems have often been how to break down such an attitude when our enemy
+assumed it. It usually meant that the enemy remained in his own waters and
+near his own bases, where it was almost impossible for us to attack him
+with decisive result, and whence he always threatened us with counterattack
+at moments of exhaustion, as the Dutch did at Sole Bay and in the Medway.
+The difficulty of dealing decisively with an enemy who adopted this course
+was realised by our service very early, and from first to last one of our
+chief preoccupations was to prevent the enemy availing himself of this
+device and to force him to fight in the open, or at least to get between
+him and his base and force an action there.
+
+Probably the most remarkable manifestation of the advantages that may be
+derived in suitable conditions from a strategical defensive is also to be
+found in the late Russo-Japanese War. In the final crisis of the naval
+struggle the Japanese fleet was able to take advantage of a defensive
+attitude in its own waters which the Russian Baltic fleet would have to
+break down to attain its end, and the result was the most decisive naval
+victory ever recorded.
+
+The deterrent power of active and dexterous operations from such a position
+was well known to our old tradition. The device was used several times,
+particularly in our home waters, to prevent a fleet, which for the time we
+were locally too weak to destroy, from carrying out the work assigned to
+it. A typical position of the kind was off Scilly, and it was proved again
+and again that even a superior fleet could not hope to effect anything in
+the Channel till the fleet off Scilly had been brought to decisive action.
+But the essence of the device was the preservation of the aggressive spirit
+in its most daring form. For success it depended on at least the will to
+seize every occasion for bold and harassing counter-attacks such as Drake
+and his colleagues struck at the Armada.
+
+To submit to blockade in order to engage the attention of a superior
+enemy's fleet is another form of defensive, but one that is almost wholly
+evil. For a short time it may do good by permitting offensive operations
+elsewhere which otherwise would be impossible. But if prolonged, it will
+sooner or later destroy the spirit of your force and render it incapable of
+effective aggression.
+
+The conclusion then is that although for the practical purpose of framing
+or appreciating plans of war the classification of wars into offensive and
+defensive is of little use, a clear apprehension of the inherent relative
+advantages of offence and defence is essential. We must realise that in
+certain cases, provided always we preserve the aggressive spirit, the
+defensive will enable an inferior force to achieve points when the
+offensive would probably lead to its destruction. But the elements of
+strength depend entirely on the will and insight to deal rapid blows in the
+enemy's unguarded moments. So soon as the defensive ceases to be regarded
+as a means of fostering power to strike and of reducing the enemy's power
+of attack it loses all its strength. It ceases to be even a suspended
+activity, and anything that is not activity is not war.
+
+With these general indications of the relative advantages of offence and
+defence we may leave the subject for the present. It is possible of course
+to catalogue the advantages and disadvantages of each form, but any such
+bald statement--without concrete examples to explain the meaning--must
+always appear controversial and is apt to mislead. It is better to reserve
+their fuller consideration till we come to deal with strategical operations
+and are able to note their actual effect upon the conduct of war in its
+various forms. Leaving therefore our first classification of wars into
+offensive and defensive we will pass on to the second, which is the only
+one of real practical importance.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                   CHAPTER THREE
+
+                  NATURES OF WARS--
+               LIMITED AND UNLIMITED
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The second classification to which we are led by the political theory of
+war, is one which Clausewitz was the first to formulate and one to which he
+came to attach the highest importance. It becomes necessary therefore to
+examine his views in some detail--not because there is any need to regard a
+continental soldier, however distinguished, as an indispensable authority
+for a maritime nation. The reason is quite the reverse. It is because a
+careful examination of his doctrine on this point will lay open what are
+the radical and essential differences between the German or Continental
+School of Strategy and the British or Maritime School--that is, our own
+traditional School, which too many writers both at home and abroad quietly
+assume to have no existence. The evil tendency of that assumption cannot be
+too strongly emphasised, and the main purpose of this and the following
+chapters will be to show how and why even the greatest of the continental
+strategists fell short of realising fully the characteristic conception of
+the British tradition.
+
+By the classification in question Clausewitz distinguished wars into those
+with a "Limited" object and those whose object was "Unlimited." Such a
+classification was entirely characteristic of him, for it rested not alone
+upon the material nature of the object, but on certain moral considerations
+to which he was the first to attach their real value in war. Other writers
+such as Jomini had attempted to classify wars by the special purpose for
+which they were fought, but Clausewitz's long course of study convinced him
+that such a distinction was unphilosophical and bore no just relation to
+any tenable theory of war. Whether, that is, a war was positive or negative
+mattered much, but its special purpose, whether, for instance, according to
+Jomini's system, it was a war "to assert rights" or "to assist an ally" or
+"to acquire territory," mattered not at all.
+
+Whatever the object, the vital and paramount question was the intensity
+with which the spirit of the nation was absorbed in its attainment. The
+real point to determine in approaching any war plan was what did the object
+mean to the two belligerents, what sacrifices would they make for it, what
+risks were they prepared to run? It was thus he stated his view. "The
+smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, the smaller presumably
+will be the means of resistance he will employ, and the smaller his means,
+the smaller will ours be required to be. Similarly the smaller our
+political object, the less value shall we set upon it and the more easily
+we shall be induced to abandon it." Thus the political object of the war,
+its original motive, will not only determine for both belligerents
+reciprocally the aim of the force they use, but it will also be the
+standard of the intensity of the efforts they will make. So he concludes
+there may be wars of all degrees of importance and energy from a war of
+extermination down to the use of an army of observation. So also in the
+naval sphere there may be a life and death struggle for maritime supremacy
+or hostilities which never rise beyond a blockade.
+
+Such a view of the subject was of course a wide departure from the theory
+of "Absolute War" on which Clausewitz had started working. Under that
+theory "Absolute War" was the ideal form to which all war ought to attain,
+and those which fell short of it were imperfect wars cramped by a lack of
+true military spirit. But so soon as he had seized the fact that in actual
+life the moral factor always must override the purely military factor, he
+saw that he had been working on too narrow a basis--a basis that was purely
+theoretical in that it ignored the human factor. He began to perceive that
+it was logically unsound to assume as the foundation of a strategical
+system that there was one pattern to which all wars ought to conform. In
+the light of his full and final apprehension of the value of the human
+factor he saw wars falling into two well-marked categories, each of which
+would legitimately be approached in a radically different manner, and not
+necessarily on the lines of "Absolute War."
+
+He saw that there was one class of war where the political object was of so
+vital an importance to both belligerents that they would tend to fight to
+the utmost limit of their endurance to secure it. But there was another
+class where the object was of less importance, that is to say, where its
+value to one or both the belligerents was not so great as to be worth
+unlimited sacrifices of blood and treasure. It was these two kinds of war
+he designated provisionally "Unlimited" and "Limited," by which he meant
+not that you were not to exert the force employed with all the vigour you
+could develop, but that there might be a limit beyond which it would be bad
+policy to spend that vigour, a point at which, long before your force was
+exhausted or even fully developed, it would be wiser to abandon your object
+rather than to spend more upon it.
+
+This distinction it is very necessary to grasp quite clearly, for it is
+often superficially confused with the distinction already referred to,
+which Clausewitz drew in the earlier part of his work--that is, the
+distinction between what he called the character of modern war and the
+character of the wars which preceded the Napoleonic era. It will be
+remembered he insisted that the wars of his own time had been wars between
+armed nations with a tendency to throw the whole weight of the nation into
+the fighting line, whereas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries wars
+were waged by standing armies and not by the whole nation in arms. The
+distinction of course is real and of far-reaching consequences, but it has
+no relation to the distinction between "Limited" and "Unlimited" war. War
+may be waged on the Napoleonic system either for a limited or an unlimited
+object.
+
+A modern instance will serve to clear the field. The recent Russo-Japanese
+War was fought for a limited object--the assertion of certain claims over
+territory which formed no part of the possessions of either belligerent.
+Hostilities were conducted on entirely modern lines by two armed nations
+and not by standing armies alone. But in the case of one belligerent her
+interest in the object was so limited as to cause her to abandon it long
+before her whole force as an armed nation was exhausted or even put forth.
+The expense of life and treasure which the struggle was involving was
+beyond what the object was worth.
+
+This second distinction--that is, between Limited and Unlimited
+wars--Clausewitz regarded as of greater importance than his previous one
+founded on the negative or positive nature of the object. He was long in
+reaching it. His great work _On War_ as he left it proceeds almost entirely
+on the conception of offensive or defensive as applied to the Napoleonic
+ideal of absolute war. The new idea came to him towards the end in the full
+maturity of his prolonged study, and it came to him in endeavouring to
+apply his strategical speculations to the practical process of framing a
+war plan in anticipation of a threatened breach with France. It was only in
+his final section _On War Plans_ that he began to deal with it. By that
+time he had grasped the first practical result to which his theory led. He
+saw that the distinction between Limited and Unlimited war connoted a
+cardinal distinction in the methods of waging it. When the object was
+unlimited, and would consequently call forth your enemy's whole war power,
+it was evident that no firm decision of the struggle could be reached till
+his war power was entirely crushed. Unless you had a reasonable hope of
+being able to do this it was bad policy to seek your end by force--that is,
+you ought not to go to war. In the case of a limited object, however, the
+complete destruction of the enemy's armed force was beyond what was
+necessary. Clearly you could achieve your end if you could seize the
+object, and by availing yourself of the elements of strength inherent in
+the defensive could set up such a situation that it would cost the enemy
+more to turn you out than the object was worth to him.
+
+Here then was a wide difference in the fundamental postulate of your war
+plan. In the case of an unlimited war your main strategical offensive must
+be directed against the armed forces of the enemy; in the case of a limited
+war, even where its object was positive, it need not be. If conditions were
+favourable, it would suffice to make the object itself the objective of
+your main strategical offensive. Clearly, then, he had reached a
+theoretical distinction which modified his whole conception of strategy. No
+longer is there logically but one kind of war, the Absolute, and no longer
+is there but one legitimate objective, the enemy's armed forces. Being
+sound theory, it of course had an immediate practical value, for obviously
+it was a distinction from which the actual work of framing a war plan must
+take its departure.
+
+A curious corroboration of the soundness of these views is that Jomini
+reached an almost identical standpoint independently and by an entirely
+different road. His method was severely concrete, based on the comparison
+of observed facts, but it brought him as surely as the abstract method of
+his rival to the conclusion that there were two distinct classes of object.
+"They are of two different kinds," he says, "one which may be called
+territorial or geographical ... the other on the contrary consists
+exclusively in the destruction or disorganisation of the enemy's forces
+without concerning yourself with geographical points of any kind." It is
+under the first category of his first main classification "Of offensive
+wars to assert rights," that he deals with what Clausewitz would call
+"Limited Wars." Citing as an example Frederick the Great's war for the
+conquest of Silesia, he says, "In such a war ... the offensive operations
+ought to be proportional to the end in view. The first move is naturally to
+occupy the provinces claimed" (not, be it noted, to direct your blow at the
+enemy's main force). "Afterwards," he proceeds, "you can push the offensive
+according to circumstances and your relative strength in order to obtain
+the desired cession by menacing the enemy at home." Here we have
+Clausewitz's whole doctrine of "Limited War"; firstly, the primary or
+territorial stage, in which you endeavour to occupy the geographical
+object, and then the secondary or coercive stage, in which you seek by
+exerting general pressure upon your enemy to force him to accept the
+adverse situation you have set up.
+
+Such a method of making war obviously differs in a fundamental manner from
+that which Napoleon habitually adopted, and yet we have it presented by
+Jomini and Clausewitz, the two apostles of the Napoleonic method. The
+explanation is, of course, that both of them had seen too much not to know
+that Napoleon's method was only applicable when you could command a real
+physical or moral preponderance. Given such a preponderance, both were
+staunch for the use of extreme means in Napoleon's manner. It is not as
+something better than the higher road that they commend the lower one, but
+being veteran staff-officers and not mere theorists, they knew well that a
+belligerent must sometimes find the higher road beyond his strength, or
+beyond the effort which the spirit of the nation is prepared to make for
+the end in view, and like the practical men they were, they set themselves
+to study the potentialities of the lower road should hard necessity force
+them to travel it. They found that these potentialities in certain
+circumstances were great. As an example of a case where the lower form was
+more appropriate Jomini cites Napoleon's campaign against Russia in 1812.
+In his opinion it would have been better if Napoleon had been satisfied to
+begin on the lower method with a limited territorial object, and he
+attributes his failure to the abuse of a method which, however well suited
+to his wars in Germany, was incapable of achieving success in the
+conditions presented by a war with Russia.
+
+Seeing how high was Napoleon's opinion of Jomini as a master of the science
+of war, it is curious how his views on the two natures of wars have been
+ignored in the present day. It is even more curious in the case of
+Clausewitz, since we know that in the plenitude of his powers he came to
+regard this classification as the master-key of the subject. The
+explanation is that the distinction is not very clearly formulated in his
+first seven books, which alone he left in anything like a finished
+condition. It was not till he came to write his eighth book _On War Plans_
+that he saw the vital importance of the distinction round which he had been
+hovering. In that book the distinction is clearly laid down, but the book
+unhappily was never completed. With his manuscript, however, he left a
+"Note" warning us against regarding his earlier books as a full
+presentation of his developed ideas. From the note it is also evident that
+he thought the classification on which he had lighted was of the utmost
+importance, that he believed it would clear up all the difficulties which
+he had encountered in his earlier books--difficulties which he had come to
+see arose from a too exclusive consideration of the Napoleonic method of
+conducting war. "I look upon the first six books," he wrote in 1827, "as
+only a mass of material which is still in a manner without form and which
+has still to be revised again. In this revision the two kinds of wars will
+be kept more distinctly in view all through, and thereby all ideas will
+gain in clearness, in precision, and in exactness of application."
+Evidently he had grown dissatisfied with the theory of Absolute War on
+which he had started. His new discovery had convinced him that that theory
+would not serve as a standard for all natures of wars. "Shall we," he asks
+in his final book, "shall we now rest satisfied with this idea and by it
+judge of all wars, however much they may differ?"[2] He answers his
+question in the negative. "You cannot determine the requirements of all
+wars from the Napoleonic type. Keep that type and its absolute method
+before you to use _when you can_ or _when you must_, but keep equally
+before you that there are two main natures of war."
+
+  [2] Clausewitz, On War, Book viii, chap, ii
+
+In his note written at this time, when the distinction first came to him,
+he defines these two natures of war as follows: "First, those in which the
+object is the _overthrow of the enemy_, whether it be we aim at his
+political destruction or merely at disarming him and forcing him to
+conclude peace on our terms; and secondly, those in which our object is
+_merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country_, either for
+the purpose of retaining them permanently or of turning them to account as
+a matter of exchange in settling terms of peace."[3] It was in his eighth
+book that he intended, had he lived, to have worked out the comprehensive
+idea he had conceived. Of that book he says, "The chief object will be to
+make good the two points of view above mentioned, by which everything will
+be simplified and at the same time be given the breath of life. I hope in
+this book to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists and
+statesmen, and at least to show the object of action and the real point to
+be considered in war."[4]
+
+  [3] Ibid, Preparatory Notice, p. vii.
+
+  [4] Ibid, p. viii
+
+That hope was never realised, and that perhaps is why his penetrating
+analysis has been so much ignored. The eighth book as we have it is only a
+fragment. In the spring of 1830--an anxious moment, when it seemed that
+Prussia would require all her best for another struggle single-handed with
+France--he was called away to an active command. What he left of the book
+on "War Plans" he describes as "merely a track roughly cleared, as it were,
+through the mass, in order to ascertain the points of greatest moment." It
+was his intention, he says, to "carry the spirit of these ideas into his
+first six books"--to put the crown on his work, in fact, by elaborating and
+insisting upon his two great propositions, viz. that war was a form of
+policy, and that being so it might be Limited or Unlimited.
+
+The extent to which he would have infused his new idea into the whole every
+one is at liberty to judge for himself; but this indisputable fact remains.
+In the winter in view of the threatening attitude of France in regard to
+Belgium he drew up a war plan, and it was designed not on the Napoleonic
+method of making the enemy's armed force the main strategical objective,
+but on seizing a limited territorial object and forcing a disadvantageous
+counter-offensive upon the French. The revolutionary movement throughout
+Europe had broken the Holy Alliance to pieces. Not only did Prussia find
+herself almost single-handed against France, but she herself was sapped by
+revolution. To adopt the higher form of war and seek to destroy the armed
+force of the enemy was beyond her power. But she could still use the lower
+form, and by seizing Belgium she could herself force so exhausting a task
+on France that success was well within her strength. It was exactly so we
+endeavoured to begin the Seven Years' War; and it was exactly so the
+Japanese successfully conducted their war with Russia; and what is more
+striking, it was on similar lines that in 1859 Moltke in similar
+circumstances drew up his first war plan against France. His idea at that
+time was on the lines which Jomini held should have been Napoleon's in
+1812. It was not to strike directly at Paris or the French main army, but
+to occupy Alsace-Lorraine and hold that territory till altered conditions
+should give him the necessary preponderance for proceeding to the higher
+form or forcing a favourable peace.
+
+In conclusion, then, we have to note that the matured fruit of the
+Napoleonic period was a theory of war based not on the single absolute
+idea, but on the dual distinction of Limited and Unlimited. Whatever
+practical importance we may attach to the distinction, so much must be
+admitted on the clear and emphatic pronouncements of Clausewitz and Jomini.
+The practical importance is another matter. It may fairly be argued that in
+continental warfare--in spite of the instances quoted by both the classical
+writers--it is not very great, for reasons that will appear directly. But
+it must be remembered that continental warfare is not the only form in
+which great international issues are decided. Standing at the final point
+which Clausewitz and Jomini reached, we are indeed only on the threshold of
+the subject. We have to begin where they left off and inquire what their
+ideas have to tell for the modern conditions of worldwide imperial States,
+where the sea becomes a direct and vital factor.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                   CHAPTER FOUR
+
+        LIMITED WAR AND MARITIME EMPIRES--
+
+   Development of Clausewitz's and Jomini's
+   Theory of a Limited Territorial Object, and Its
+   Application to Modern Imperial Conditions
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The German war plans already cited, which were based respectively on the
+occupation of Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine, and Jomini's remarks on
+Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign serve well to show the point to
+which continental strategists have advanced along the road which Clausewitz
+was the first to indicate clearly. We have now to consider its application
+to modern imperial conditions, and above all where the maritime element
+forcibly asserts itself. We shall then see how small that advance has been
+compared with its far-reaching effects for a maritime and above all an
+insular Power.
+
+It is clear that Clausewitz himself never apprehended the full significance
+of his brilliant theory. His outlook was still purely continental, and the
+limitations of continental warfare tend to veil the fuller meaning of the
+principle he had framed. Had he lived, there is little doubt he would have
+worked it out to its logical conclusion, but his death condemned his theory
+of limited war to remain in the inchoate condition in which he had left it.
+
+It will be observed, as was natural enough, that all through his work
+Clausewitz had in his mind war between two contiguous or at least adjacent
+continental States, and a moment's consideration will show that in that
+type of war the principle of the limited object can rarely if ever assert
+itself in perfect precision. Clausewitz himself put it quite clearly.
+Assuming a case where "the overthrow of the enemy"--that is, unlimited
+war--is beyond our strength, he points out that we need not therefore
+necessarily act on the defensive. Our action may still be positive and
+offensive, but the object can be nothing more than "the conquest of part of
+the enemy's country." Such a conquest he knew might so far weaken your
+enemy or strengthen your own position as to enable you to secure a
+satisfactory peace. The path of history is indeed strewn with such cases.
+But he was careful to point out that such a form of war was open to the
+gravest objections. Once you had occupied the territory you aimed at, your
+offensive action was, as a rule, arrested. A defensive attitude had to be
+assumed, and such an arrest of offensive action he had previously shown was
+inherently vicious, if only for moral reasons. Added to this you might find
+that in your effort to occupy the territorial object you had so
+irretrievably separated your striking force from your home-defence force as
+to be in no position to meet your enemy if he was able to retort by acting
+on unlimited lines with a stroke at your heart. A case in point was the
+Austerlitz campaign, where Austria's object was to wrest North Italy from
+Napoleon's empire. She sent her main army under the Archduke Charles to
+seize the territory she desired. Napoleon immediately struck at Vienna,
+destroyed her home army, and occupied the capital before the Archduke could
+turn to bar his way.
+
+The argument is this: that, as all strategic attack tends to leave points
+of your own uncovered, it always involves greater or less provision for
+their defence. It is obvious, therefore, that if we are aiming at a limited
+territorial object the proportion of defence required will tend to be much
+greater than if we are directing our attack on the main forces of the
+enemy. In unlimited war our attack will itself tend to defend everything
+elsewhere, by forcing the enemy to concentrate against our attack. Whether
+the limited form is justifiable or not therefore depends, as Clausewitz
+points out, on the geographical position of the object.
+
+So far British experience is with him, but he then goes on to say the more
+closely the territory in question is an annex of our own the safer is this
+form of war, because then our offensive action will the more surely cover
+our home country. As a case in point he cites Frederick the Great's opening
+of the Seven Years' War with the occupation of Saxony--a piece of work
+which materially strengthened Prussian defence. Of the British opening in
+Canada he says nothing. His outlook was too exclusively continental for it
+to occur to him to test his doctrine with a conspicuously successful case
+in which the territory aimed at was distant from the home territory and in
+no way covered it. Had he done so he must have seen how much stronger an
+example of the strength of limited war was the case of Canada than the case
+of Saxony. Moreover, he would have seen that the difficulties, which in
+spite of his faith in his discovery accompanied his attempt to apply it,
+arose from the fact that the examples he selected were not really examples
+at all.
+
+When he conceived the idea, the only kind of limited object he had in his
+mind was, to use his own words, "some conquests on the frontiers of the
+enemy's country," such as Silesia and Saxony for Frederick the Great,
+Belgium in his own war plan, and Alsace-Lorraine in that of Moltke. Now it
+is obvious that such objects are not truly limited, for two reasons. In the
+first place, such territory is usually an organic part of your enemy's
+country, or otherwise of so much importance to him that he will be willing
+to use unlimited effort to retain it. In the second place, there will be no
+strategical obstacle to his being able to use his whole force to that end.
+To satisfy the full conception of a limited object, one of two conditions
+is essential. Firstly, it must be not merely limited in area, but of really
+limited political importance; and secondly, it must be so situated as to be
+strategically isolated or to be capable of being reduced to practical
+isolation by strategical operations. Unless this condition exists, it is in
+the power of either belligerent, as Clausewitz himself saw, to pass to
+unlimited war if he so desires, and, ignoring the territorial objective, to
+strike at the heart of his enemy and force him to desist.
+
+If, then, we only regard war between contiguous continental States, in
+which the object is the conquest of territory on either of their frontiers,
+we get no real generic difference between limited and unlimited war. The
+line between them is in any case too shadowy or unstable to give a
+classification of any solidity. It is a difference of degree rather than of
+kind. If, on the other hand, we extend our view to wars between worldwide
+empires, the distinction at once becomes organic. Possessions which lie
+oversea or at the extremities of vast areas of imperfectly settled
+territory are in an entirely different category from those limited objects
+which Clausewitz contemplated. History shows that they can never have the
+political importance of objects which are organically part of the European
+system, and it shows further that they can be isolated by naval action
+sufficiently to set up the conditions of true limited war.
+
+Jomini approaches the point, but without clearly detaching it. In his
+chapter "On Great Invasions and Distant Expeditions," he points out how
+unsafe it is to take the conditions of war between contiguous States and
+apply them crudely to cases where the belligerents are separated by large
+areas of land or sea. He hovers round the sea factor, feeling how great a
+difference it makes, but without getting close to the real distinction. His
+conception of the inter-action of fleets and armies never rises above their
+actual co-operation in touch one with the other in a distant theatre. He
+has in mind the assistance which the British fleet afforded Wellington in
+the Peninsula, and Napoleon's dreams of Asiatic conquest, pronouncing such
+distant invasions as impossible in modern times except perhaps in
+combination with a powerful fleet that could provide the army of invasion
+with successive advanced bases. Of the paramount value of the fleet's
+isolating and preventive functions he gives no hint.
+
+Even when he deals with oversea expeditions, as he does at some length, his
+grip of the point is no closer. It is indeed significant of how entirely
+continental thought had failed to penetrate the subject that in devoting
+over thirty pages to an enumeration of the principles of oversea
+expeditions, he, like Clausewitz, does not so much as mention the conquest
+of Canada; and yet it is the leading case of a weak military Power
+succeeding by the use of the limited form of war in forcing its will upon a
+strong one, and succeeding because it was able by naval action to secure
+its home defence and isolate the territorial object.
+
+For our ideas of true limited objects, therefore, we must leave the
+continental theatres and turn to mixed or maritime wars. We have to look to
+such cases as Canada and Havana in the Seven Years' War, and Cuba in the
+Spanish-American War, cases in which complete isolation of the object by
+naval action was possible, or to such examples as the Crimea and Korea,
+where sufficient isolation was attainable by naval action owing to the
+length and difficulty of the enemy's land communications and to the
+strategical situation of the territory at stake.
+
+These examples will also serve to illustrate and enforce the second
+essential of this kind of war. As has been already said, for a true limited
+object we must have not only the power of isolation, but also the power by
+a secure home defence of barring an unlimited counterstroke. In all the
+above cases this condition existed. In all of them the belligerents had no
+contiguous frontiers, and this point is vital. For it is obvious that if
+two belligerents have a common frontier, it is open to the superior of
+them, no matter how distant or how easy to isolate the limited object may
+be, to pass at will to unlimited war by invasion. This process is even
+possible when the belligerents are separated by a neutral State, since the
+territory of a weak neutral will be violated if the object be of sufficient
+importance, or if the neutral be too strong to coerce, there still remains
+the possibility that his alliance may be secured.
+
+We come, then, to this final proposition--that limited war is only
+permanently possible to island Powers or between Powers which are separated
+by sea, and then only when the Power desiring limited war is able to
+command the sea to such a degree as to be able not only to isolate the
+distant object, but also to render impossible the invasion of his home
+territory.
+
+Here, then, we reach the true meaning and highest military value of what we
+call the command of the sea, and here we touch the secret of England's
+success against Powers so greatly superior to herself in military strength.
+It is only fitting that such a secret should have been first penetrated by
+an Englishman. For so it was, though it must be said that except in the
+light of Clausewitz's doctrine the full meaning of Bacon's famous aphorism
+is not revealed. "This much is certain," said the great Elizabethan on the
+experience of our first imperial war; "he that commands the sea is at great
+liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he will, whereas
+those that be strongest by land are many times nevertheless in great
+straits." It would be difficult to state more pithily the ultimate
+significance of Clausewitz's doctrine. Its cardinal truth is clearly
+indicated--that limited wars do not turn upon the armed strength of the
+belligerents, but upon the amount of that strength which they are able or
+willing to bring to bear at the decisive point.
+
+It is much to be regretted that Clausewitz did not live to see with Bacon's
+eyes and to work out the full comprehensiveness of his doctrine. His
+ambition was to formulate a theory which would explain all wars. He
+believed he had done so, and yet it is clear he never knew how complete was
+his success, nor how wide was the field he had covered. To the end it would
+seem he was unaware that he had found an explanation of one of the most
+inscrutable problems in history--the expansion of England--at least so far
+as it has been due to successful war. That a small country with a weak army
+should have been able to gather to herself the most desirable regions of
+the earth, and to gather them at the expense of the greatest military
+Powers, is a paradox to which such Powers find it hard to be reconciled.
+The phenomenon seemed always a matter of chance-an accident without any
+foundation in the essential constants of war. It remained for Clausewitz,
+unknown to himself, to discover that explanation, and he reveals it to us
+in the inherent strength of limited war when means and conditions are
+favourable for its use.
+
+We find, then, if we take a wider view than was open to Clausewitz and
+submit his latest ideas to the test of present imperial conditions, so far
+from failing to cover the ground they gain a fuller meaning and a firmer
+basis. Apply them to maritime warfare and it becomes clear that his
+distinction between limited and unlimited war does not rest alone on the
+moral factor. A war may be limited not only because the importance of the
+object is too limited to call forth the whole national force, but also
+because the sea may be made to present an insuperable physical obstacle to
+the whole national force being brought to bear. That is to say, a war may
+be limited physically by the strategical isolation of the object, as well
+as morally by its comparative unimportance.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                  CHAPTER FIVE
+
+              WARS OF INTERVENTION--
+     LIMITED INTERFERENCE IN UNLIMITED WAR
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Before leaving the general consideration of limited war, we have still to
+deal with a form of it that has not yet been mentioned. Clausewitz gave it
+provisionally the name of "War limited by contingent," and could find no
+place for it in his system. It appeared to him to differ essentially from
+war limited by its political object, or as Jomini put it, war with a
+territorial object. Yet it had to be taken into account and explained, if
+only for the part it had played in European history.
+
+For us it calls for the most careful examination, not only because it
+baffled the great German strategist to reconcile it with his theory of war,
+but also because it is the form in which Great Britain most successfully
+demonstrated the potentiality for direct continental interference of a
+small army acting in conjunction with a dominant fleet.
+
+The combined operations which were the normal expression of the British
+method of making war on the limited basis were of two main classes.
+Firstly, there were those designed purely for the conquest of the objects
+for which we went to war, which were usually colonial or distant oversea
+territory; and secondly, operations more or less upon the European seaboard
+designed not for permanent conquest, but as a method of disturbing our
+enemy's plans and strengthening the hands of our allies and our own
+position. Such operations might take the form of insignificant coastal
+diversions, or they might rise through all degrees of importance till, as
+in Wellington's operations in the Peninsula, they became indistinguishable
+in form from regular continental warfare.
+
+It would seem, therefore, that these operations were distinguished not so
+much by the nature of the object as by the fact that we devoted to them,
+not the whole of our military strength, but only a certain part of it which
+was known as our "disposal force." Consequently, they appear to call for
+some such special classification, and to fall naturally into the category
+which Clausewitz called "War limited by contingent."
+
+It was a nature of war well enough known in another form on the Continent.
+During the eighteenth century there had been a large number of cases of war
+actually limited by contingent--that is, cases where a country not having a
+vital interest in the object made war by furnishing the chief belligerent
+with an auxiliary force of a stipulated strength.
+
+It was in the sixth chapter of his last book that Clausewitz intended to
+deal with this anomalous form of hostility. His untimely death, however,
+has left us with no more than a fragment, in which he confesses that such
+cases are "embarrassing to his theory." If, he adds, the auxiliary force
+were placed unreservedly at the disposal of the chief belligerent, the
+problem would be simple enough. It would then, in effect, be the same thing
+as unlimited war with the aid of a subsidised force. But in fact, as he
+observes, this seldom happened, for the contingent was always more or less
+controlled in accordance with the special political aims of the Government
+which furnished it. Consequently, the only conclusion he succeeded in
+reaching was that it was a form of war that had to be taken into account,
+and that it was a form of limited war that appeared to differ essentially
+from war limited by object. We are left, in fact, with an impression that
+there must be two kinds of limited war.
+
+But if we pursue his historical method and examine the cases in which this
+nature of war was successful, and those in which it was unsuccessful, we
+shall find that wherever success is taken as an index of its legitimate
+employment, the practical distinction between the two kinds of limited war
+tends to disappear. The indications are that where the essential factors
+which justify the use of war limited by object are present in war limited
+by contingent, then that form of war tends to succeed, but not otherwise.
+We are brought, in fact, to this proposition, that the distinction "Limited
+by contingent" is not one that is inherent in war, and is quite out of line
+with the theory in hand--that, in reality, it is not a _form_ of war, but a
+_method_ which may be employed either for limited or unlimited war. In
+other words, war limited by contingent, if it is to be regarded as a
+legitimate form of war at all, must take frankly the one shape or the
+other. Either the contingent must act as an organic unit of the force
+making unlimited war without any reservations whatever, or else it should
+be given a definite territorial object, with an independent organisation
+and an independent limited function.
+
+Our own experience seems to indicate that war by contingent or war with "a
+disposal force" attains the highest success when it approaches most closely
+to true limited war--that is, as in the case of the Peninsula and the
+Crimea, where its object is to wrest or secure from the enemy a definite
+piece of territory that to a greater or less extent can be isolated by
+naval action. Its operative power, in fact, appears to bear some direct
+relation to the intimacy with which naval and military action can be
+combined to give the contingent a weight and mobility that are beyond its
+intrinsic power.
+
+If, then, we would unravel the difficulties of war limited by contingent,
+it seems necessary to distinguish between the continental and the British
+form of it. The continental form, as we have seen, differs but little in
+conception from unlimited war. The contingent is furnished at least
+ostensibly with the idea that it is to be used by the chief belligerent to
+assist him in overthrowing the common enemy, and that its objective will be
+the enemy's organised forces or his capital. Or it may be that the
+contingent is to be used as an army of observation to prevent a
+counterstroke, so as to facilitate and secure the main offensive movement
+of the chief belligerent. In either case, however small may be our
+contribution to the allied force, we are using the unlimited form and
+aiming at an unlimited and not a mere territorial object.
+
+If now we turn to British experience of war limited by contingent, we find
+that the continental form has frequently been used, but we also find it
+almost invariably accompanied by a popular repugnance, as though there were
+something in it antagonistic to the national instinct. A leading case is
+the assistance we sent to Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War. At
+the opening of the war, so great was the popular repugnance that the
+measure was found impossible, and it was not till Frederick's dazzling
+resistance to the Catholic powers had clothed him with the glory of a
+Protestant hero, that Pitt could do what he wanted. The old religious fire
+was stirred. The most potent of all national instincts kindled the people
+to a generous warmth which overcame their inborn antipathy to continental
+operations, and it was possible to send a substantial contingent to
+Frederick's assistance. In the end the support fully achieved its purpose,
+but it must be noted that even in this case the operations were limited not
+only by contingent but also by object. It is true that Frederick was
+engaged in an unlimited war in which the continued existence of Prussia was
+at stake, and that the British force was an organic element in his war
+plan. Nevertheless, it formed part of a British subsidised army under
+Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, who though nominated by Frederick was a
+British commander-in-chief. His army was in organisation entirely distinct
+from that of Frederick, and it was assigned the very definite and limited
+function of preventing the French occupying Hanover and so turning the
+Prussian right flank. Finally it must be noted that its ability to perform
+this function was due to the fact that the theatre of operations assigned
+to it was such that in no probable event could it lose touch with the sea,
+nor could the enemy cut its lines of supply and retreat.
+
+These features of the enterprise should be noted. They differentiate it
+from our earlier use of war limited by contingent in the continental
+manner, of which Marlborough's campaigns were typical, and they exhibit the
+special form which Marlborough would have chosen had political exigencies
+permitted and which was to become characteristic of British effort from
+Pitt's time onward. In the method of our greatest War Minister we have not
+only the limit by contingent but also the limit of a definite and
+independent function, and finally we have touch with the sea. This is the
+really vital factor, and upon it, as will presently appear, depends the
+strength of the method.
+
+In the earlier part of the Great War we employed the same form in our
+operations in North-Western Europe. There we had also the limited function
+of securing Holland, and also complete touch with the sea, but our theatre
+of operations was not independent. Intimate concerted action with other
+forces was involved, and the result in every case was failure. Later on in
+Sicily, where absolute isolation was attainable, the strength of the method
+enabled us to achieve a lasting result with very slender means. But the
+result was purely defensive. It was not till the Peninsular War developed
+that we found a theatre for war limited by contingent in which all the
+conditions that make for success were present. Even there so long as our
+army was regarded as a contingent auxiliary to the Spanish army the usual
+failure ensued. Only in Portugal, the defence of which was a true limited
+object, and where we had a sea-girt theatre independent of extraneous
+allies, was success achieved from the first. So strong was the method here,
+and so exhausting the method which it forced on the enemy, that the local
+balance of force was eventually reversed and we were able to pass to a
+drastic offensive.
+
+The real secret of Wellington's success--apart from his own genius--was
+that in perfect conditions he was applying the limited form to an unlimited
+war. Our object was unlimited. It was nothing less than the overthrow of
+Napoleon. Complete success at sea had failed to do it, but that success had
+given us the power of applying the limited form, which was the most
+decisive form of offence within our means. Its substantial contribution to
+the final achievement of the object is now universally recognised.
+
+The general result, then, of these considerations is that war by contingent
+in the continental form seldom or never differs generically from unlimited
+war, for the conditions required by limited war are seldom or never
+present. But what may be called the British or maritime form is in fact the
+application of the limited method to the unlimited form, as ancillary to
+the larger operations of our allies--a method which has usually been open
+to us because the control of the sea has enabled us to select a theatre in
+effect truly limited.[5]
+
+  [5] Wellington's view of the essential factor was expressed to Rear
+  Admiral Martin, who was sent to Spain by the Admiralty to confer with him
+  in September 1813. "If anyone," he said, "wishes to know the history of
+  this war, I will tell them it is our maritime superiority gives me the
+  power of maintaining my army while the enemy are unable to do so."
+  (_Letters of Sir T. Byam Martin_) [Navy Records Society], ii, p. 499.
+
+But what if the conditions of the struggle in which we wish to intervene
+are such that no truly limited theatre is available? In that case we have
+to choose between placing a contingent frankly at the disposal of our ally,
+or confining ourselves to coastal diversion, as we did at Frederick the
+Great's request in the early campaigns of the Seven Years' War. Such
+operations can seldom be satisfactory to either party. The small positive
+results of our efforts to intervene in this way have indeed done more than
+anything to discredit this form of war, and to brand it as unworthy of a
+first-class Power. Yet the fact remains that all the great continental
+masters of war have feared or valued British intervention of this character
+even in the most unfavourable conditions. It was because they looked for
+its effects rather in the threat than in the performance. They did not
+reckon for positive results at all. So long as such intervention took an
+amphibious form they knew its disturbing effect upon a European situation
+was always out of all proportion to the intrinsic strength employed or the
+positive results it could give. Its operative action was that it threatened
+positive results unless it were strongly met. Its effect, in short, was
+negative. Its value lay in its power of containing force greater than its
+own. That is all that can be claimed for it, but it may be all that is
+required. It is not the most drastic method of intervention, but it has
+proved itself the most drastic for a Power whose forces are not adapted for
+the higher method. Frederick the Great was the first great soldier to
+recognise it, and Napoleon was the last. For years he shut his eyes to it,
+laughed at it, covered it with a contempt that grew ever more irritable. In
+1805 he called Craig's expedition a "pygmy combination," yet the
+preparation of another combined force for an entirely different destination
+caused him to see the first as an advance guard of a movement he could not
+ignore, and he sacrificed his fleet in an impotent effort to deal with it.
+
+It was not, however, till four years later that he was forced to place on
+record his recognition of the principle. Then, curiously enough, he was
+convinced by an expedition which we have come to regard as above all others
+condemnatory of amphibious operations against the Continent. The Walcheren
+expedition is now usually held as the leading case of fatuous war
+administration. Historians can find no words too bad for it. They ignore
+the fact that it was a step--the final and most difficult step--in our
+post-Trafalgar policy of using the army to perfect our command of the sea
+against a fleet acting stubbornly on the defensive. It began with
+Copenhagen in 1807. It failed at the Dardanelles because fleet and army
+were separated; it succeeded at Lisbon and at Cadiz by demonstration alone.
+Walcheren, long contemplated, had been put off till the last as the most
+formidable and the least pressing. Napoleon had been looking for the
+attempt ever since the idea was first broached in this country, but as time
+passed and the blow did not fall, the danger came to be more and more
+ignored. Finally, the moment came when he was heavily engaged in Austria
+and forced to call up the bulk of his strength to deal with the Archduke
+Charles. The risks were still great, but the British Government faced them
+boldly with open eyes. It was now or never. They were bent on developing
+their utmost military strength in the Peninsula, and so long as a potent
+and growing fleet remained in the North Sea it would always act as an
+increasing drag on such development. The prospective gain of success was in
+the eyes of the Government out of all proportion to the probable loss by
+failure. So when Napoleon least expected it they determined to act, and
+caught him napping. The defences of Antwerp had been left incomplete. There
+was no army to meet the blow--nothing but a polyglot rabble without staff
+or even officers. For a week at least success was in our hands. Napoleon's
+fleet only escaped by twenty-four hours, and yet the failure was not only
+complete but disastrous. Still so entirely were the causes of failure
+accidental, and so near had it come to success, that Napoleon received a
+thorough shock and looked for a quick repetition of the attempt. So
+seriously indeed did he regard his narrow escape that he found himself
+driven to reconsider his whole system of home defence. Not only did he deem
+it necessary to spend large sums in increasing the fixed defences of
+Antwerp and Toulon, but his Director of Conscription was called upon to
+work out a scheme for providing a permanent force of no less than 300,000
+men from the National Guard to defend the French coasts. "With 30,000 men
+in transports at the Downs," the Emperor wrote, "the English can paralyse
+300,000 of my army, and that will reduce us to the rank of a second-class
+Power."[6]
+
+  [6] _Correspondance de Napoleon_, xix, 421, 4 September.
+
+The concentration of the British efforts in the Peninsula apparently
+rendered the realisation of this project unnecessary--that is, our line of
+operation was declared and the threat ceased. But none the less Napoleon's
+recognition of the principle remains on record--not in one of his speeches
+made for some ulterior purpose, but in a staff order to the principal
+officer concerned.
+
+It is generally held that modern developments in military organisation and
+transport will enable a great continental Power to ignore such threats.
+Napoleon ignored them in the past, but only to verify the truth that in war
+to ignore a threat is too often to create an opportunity. Such
+opportunities may occur late or early. As both Lord Ligonier and Wolfe laid
+it down for such operations, surprise is not necessarily to be looked for
+at the beginning. We have usually had to create or wait for our
+opportunity--too often because we were either not ready or not bold enough
+to seize the first that occurred.
+
+The cases in which such intervention has been most potent have been of two
+classes. Firstly, there is the intrusion into a war plan which our enemy
+has designed without allowing for our intervention, and to which he is
+irrevocably committed by his opening movements. Secondly, there is
+intervention to deprive the enemy of the fruits of victory. This form finds
+its efficacy in the principle that unlimited wars are not always decided by
+the destruction of armies. There usually remains the difficult work of
+conquering the people afterwards with an exhausted army. The intrusion of a
+small fresh force from the sea in such cases may suffice to turn the scale,
+as it did in the Peninsula, and as, in the opinion of some high
+authorities, it might have done in France in 1871.
+
+Such a suggestion will appear to be almost heretical as sinning against the
+principle which condemns a strategical reserve. We say that the whole
+available force should be developed for the vital period of the struggle.
+No one can be found to dispute it nowadays. It is too obviously true when
+it is a question of a conflict between organised forces, but in the absence
+of all proof we are entitled to doubt whether it is true for that
+exhausting and demoralising period which lies beyond the shock of armies.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                  CHAPTER SIX
+
+     CONDITIONS OF STRENGTH IN LIMITED WAR
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The elements of strength in limited war are closely analogous to those
+generally inherent in defence. That is to say, that as a correct use of
+defence will sometimes enable an inferior force to gain its end against a
+superior one, so are there instances in which the correct use of the
+limited form of war has enabled a weak military Power to attain success
+against a much stronger one, and these instances are too numerous to permit
+us to regard the results as accidental.
+
+An obvious element of strength is that where the geographical conditions
+are favourable we are able by the use of our navy to restrict the amount of
+force our army will have to deal with. We can in fact bring up our fleet to
+redress the adverse balance of our land force. But apart from this very
+practical reason there is another, which is rooted in the first principles
+of strategy.
+
+It is that limited war permits the use of the defensive without its usual
+drawbacks to a degree that is impossible in unlimited war. These drawbacks
+are chiefly that it tends to surrender the initiative to the enemy and that
+it deprives us of the moral exhilaration of the offensive. But in limited
+war, as we shall see, this need not be the case, and if without making
+these sacrifices we are able to act mainly on the defensive our position
+becomes exceedingly strong.
+
+The proposition really admits of no doubt. For even if we be not in
+whole-hearted agreement with Clausewitz's doctrine of the strength of
+defence, still we may at least accept Moltke's modification of it. He held
+that the strongest form of war--that is, the form which economically makes
+for the highest development of strength in a given force--is strategic
+offensive combined with tactical defensive. Now these are in effect the
+conditions which limited war should give--that is, if the theatre and
+method be rightly chosen. Let it be remembered that the use of this form of
+war presupposes that we are able by superior readiness or mobility or by
+being more conveniently situated to establish ourselves in the territorial
+object before our opponent can gather strength to prevent us. This done, we
+have the initiative, and the enemy being unable by hypothesis to attack us
+at home, must conform to our opening by endeavouring to turn us out. We are
+in a position to meet his attack on ground of our own choice and to avail
+ourselves of such opportunities of counter-attack as his distant and
+therefore exhausting offensive movements are likely to offer. Assuming, as
+in our own case we always must assume, that the territorial object is
+sea-girt and our enemy is not able to command the sea, such opportunities
+are certain to present themselves, and even if they are not used will
+greatly embarrass the main attack--as was abundantly shown in the Russian
+nervousness during their advance into the Liaotung Peninsula, due to the
+fear of a counter-stroke from the Gulf of Pe-chi-li.
+
+The actual situation which this method of procedure sets up is that our
+major strategy is offensive--that is, our main movement is positive, having
+for its aim the occupation of the territorial object. The minor strategy
+that follows should be in its general lines defensive, designed, so soon as
+the enemy sets about dislodging us, to develop the utmost energy of
+counter-attack which our force and opportunities justify.
+
+Now if we consider that by universal agreement it is no longer possible in
+the present conditions of land warfare to draw a line between tactics and
+minor strategy, we have in our favour for all practical purposes the
+identical position which Moltke regarded as constituting the strongest form
+of war. That is to say, our major strategy is offensive and our minor
+strategy is defensive.
+
+If, then, the limited form of war has this element of strength over and
+above the unlimited form, it must be correct to use it when we are not
+strong enough to use the more exhausting form and when the object is
+limited; just as much as it is correct to use the defensive when our object
+is negative and we are too weak for the offensive. The point is of the
+highest importance, for it is a direct negation of the current doctrine
+that in war there can be but one legitimate object, the overthrow of the
+enemy's means of resistance, and that the primary objective must always be
+his armed forces. It raises in fact the whole question as to whether it is
+not sometimes legitimate and even correct to aim directly at the ulterior
+object of the war.
+
+An impression appears to prevail--in spite of all that Clausewitz and
+Jomini had to say on the point--that the question admits of only one
+answer. Von der Goltz, for instance, is particularly emphatic in asserting
+that the overthrow of the enemy must always be the object in modern war. He
+lays it down as "the first principle of modern warfare," that "the
+immediate objective against which all our efforts must be directed is the
+hostile main army." Similarly Prince Kraft has the maxim that "the first
+aim should be to overcome the enemy's army. Everything else, the occupation
+of the country, &c., only comes in the second line."
+
+It will be observed that he here admits that the process of occupying the
+enemy's territory is an operation distinct from the overthrow of the
+enemy's force. Von der Goltz goes further, and protests against the common
+error of regarding the annihilation of the enemy's principal army as
+synonymous with the complete attainment of the object. He is careful to
+assert that the current doctrine only holds good "when the two belligerent
+states are of approximately the same nature." If, then, there are cases in
+which the occupation of territory must be undertaken as an operation
+distinct from defeating the enemy's forces, and if in such cases the
+conditions are such that we can occupy the territory with advantage without
+first defeating the enemy, it is surely mere pedantry to insist that we
+should put off till to-morrow what we can do better to-day. If the
+occupation of the enemy's whole territory is involved, or even a
+substantial part of it, the German principle of course holds good, but all
+wars are not of that character.
+
+Insistence on the principle of "overthrow," and even its exaggeration, was
+of value, in its day, to prevent a recurrence to the old and discredited
+methods. But its work is done, and blind adherence to it without regard to
+the principles on which it rests tends to turn the art of war into mere
+bludgeon play.
+
+Clausewitz, at any rate, as General Von Caemmerer has pointed out,[7] was
+far too practical a soldier to commit himself to so abstract a proposition
+in all its modern crudity. If it were true, it would never be possible for
+a weaker Power to make successful war against a stronger one in any cause
+whatever--a conclusion abundantly refuted by historical experience. That
+the higher form like the offensive is the more drastic is certain, if
+conditions are suitable for its use, but Clausewitz, it must be remembered,
+distinctly lays it down that such conditions presuppose in the belligerent
+employing the higher form a great physical or moral superiority or a great
+spirit of enterprise--an innate propensity for extreme hazards. Jomini did
+not go even so far as this. He certainly would have ruled out "an innate
+propensity to extreme hazards," for in his judgment it was this innate
+propensity which led Napoleon to abuse the higher form to his own undoing.
+So entirely indeed does history, no less than theory, fail to support the
+idea of the one answer, that it would seem that even in Germany a reaction
+to Clausewitz's real teaching is beginning. In expounding it Von Caemmerer
+says, "Since the majority of the most prominent military authors of our
+time uphold the principle that in war our efforts must always be directed
+to their utmost limits and that a deliberate employment of lower means
+betrays more or less weakness, I feel bound to declare that the wideness of
+Clausewitz's views have inspired me with a high degree of admiration."
+
+  [7] _Development of Strategical Science._
+
+Now what Clausewitz held precisely was this--that when the conditions are
+not favourable for the use of the higher form, the seizure of a small part
+of the enemy's territory may be regarded as a correct alternative to
+destroying his armed forces. But he clearly regards this form of war only
+as a make-shift. His purely continental outlook prevented his considering
+that there might be cases where the object was actually so limited in
+character that the lower form of war would be at once the more effective
+and the more economical to use. In continental warfare, as we have seen,
+such cases can hardly occur, but they tend to declare themselves strongly
+when the maritime factor is introduced to any serious extent.
+
+The tendency of British warfare to take the lower or limited form has
+always been as clearly marked as is the opposite tendency on the Continent.
+To attribute such a tendency, as is sometimes the fashion, to an inherent
+lack of warlike spirit is sufficiently contradicted by the results it has
+achieved. There is no reason indeed to put it down to anything but a
+sagacious instinct for the kind of war that best accords with the
+conditions of our existence. So strong has this instinct been that it has
+led us usually to apply the lower form not only where the object of the war
+was a well-defined territorial one, but to cases in which its correctness
+was less obvious. As has been explained in the last chapter, we have
+applied it, and applied it on the whole with success, when we have been
+acting in concert with continental allies for an unlimited object--where,
+that is, the common object has been the overthrow of the common enemy.
+
+The choice between the two forms really depends upon the circumstances of
+each case. We have to consider whether the political object is in fact
+limited, whether if unlimited in the abstract it can be reduced to a
+concrete object that is limited, and finally whether the strategical
+conditions are such as lend themselves to the successful application of the
+limited form.
+
+What we require now is to determine those conditions with greater
+exactness, and this will be best done by changing our method to the
+concrete and taking a leading case.
+
+The one which presents them in their clearest and simplest form is without
+doubt the recent war between Russia and Japan. Here we have a particularly
+striking example of a small Power having forced her will upon a much
+greater Power without "overthrowing" her--that is, without having crushed
+her power of resistance. That was entirely beyond the strength of Japan. So
+manifest was the fact that everywhere upon the Continent, where the
+overthrow of your enemy was regarded as the only admissible form of war,
+the action of the Japanese in resorting to hostilities was regarded as
+madness. Only in England, with her tradition and instinct for what an
+island Power may achieve by the lower means, was Japan considered to have
+any reasonable chance of success.
+
+The case is particularly striking; for every one felt that the real object
+of the war was in the abstract unlimited, that it was in fact to decide
+whether Russia or Japan was to be the predominant power in the Far East.
+Like the Franco-German War of 1870 it had all the aspect of what the
+Germans call "a trial of strength." Such a war is one which above all
+appears incapable of decision except by the complete overthrow of the one
+Power or the other. There was no complication of alliances nor any
+expectation of them. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty had isolated the struggle.
+If ever issue hung on the sheer fighting force of the two belligerents it
+would seem to have been this one. After the event we are inclined to
+attribute the result to the moral qualities and superior training and
+readiness of the victors. These qualities indeed played their part, and
+they must not be minimised; but who will contend that if Japan had tried to
+make her war with Russia, as Napoleon made his, she could have fared even
+as well as he did? She had no such preponderance as Clausewitz laid down as
+a condition precedent to attempting the overthrow of her enemy--the
+employment of unlimited war.
+
+Fortunately for her the circumstances did not call for the employment of
+such extreme means. The political and geographical conditions were such
+that she was able to reduce the intangible object of asserting her prestige
+to the purely concrete form of a territorial objective. The penetration of
+Russia into Manchuria threatened the absorption of Korea into the Russian
+Empire, and this Japan regarded as fatal to her own position and future
+development. Her power to maintain Korean integrity would be the outward
+and visible sign of her ability to assert herself as a Pacific Power. Her
+abstract quarrel with Russia could therefore be crystallised into a
+concrete objective in the same way as the quarrel of the Western Powers
+with Russia in 1854 crystallised into the concrete objective of Sebastopol.
+
+In the Japanese case the immediate political object was exceptionally well
+adapted for the use of limited war. Owing to the geographical position of
+Korea and to the vast and undeveloped territories which separate it from
+the centre of Russian power, it could be practically isolated by naval
+action. Further than this, it fulfilled the condition to which Clausewitz
+attached the greatest importance--that is to say, the seizure of the
+particular object so far from weakening the home defence of Japan would
+have the effect of greatly increasing the strength of her position. Though
+offensive in effect and intention it was also, like Frederick's seizure of
+Saxony, a sound piece of defensive work. So far from exposing her heart, it
+served to cover it almost impregnably. The reason is plain. Owing to the
+wide separation of the two Russian arsenals at Port Arthur and
+Vladivostock, with a defile controlled by Japan interposed, the Russian
+naval position was very faulty. The only way of correcting it was for
+Russia to secure a base in the Straits of Korea, and for this she had been
+striving by diplomatic means at Seoul for some time. Strategically the
+integrity of Korea was for Japan very much what the integrity of the Low
+Countries was for us, but in the case of the Low Countries, since they were
+incapable of isolation, our power of direct action was always comparatively
+weak. Portugal, with its unrivalled strategical harbour at Lisbon, was an
+analogous case in our old oceanic wars, and since it was capable of being
+in a measure isolated from the strength of our great rival by naval means
+we were there almost uniformly successful. On the whole it must be said
+that notwithstanding the success we achieved in our long series of wars
+waged on a limited basis, in none of them were the conditions so favourable
+for us as in this case they were for Japan. In none of them did our main
+offensive movement so completely secure our home defence. Canada was as
+eccentric as possible to our line of home defence, while in the Crimea so
+completely did our offensive uncover the British Islands, that we had to
+supplement our movement against the limited object by sending our main
+fighting fleet to hold the exit of the Baltic against the danger of an
+unlimited counter-stroke.[8]
+
+  [8] The strategical object with which the Baltic fleet was sent was
+  certainly to prevent a counter-stroke--that is, its main function in our
+  war plan was negative. Its positive function was minor and diversionary
+  only. It also had a political object as a demonstration to further our
+  efforts to form a Baltic coalition against Russia, which entirely failed.
+  Public opinion mistaking the whole situation expected direct positive
+  results from this fleet, even the capture of St. Petersburg. Such an
+  operation would have converted the war from a limited one to an unlimited
+  one. It would have meant the "overthrow of the enemy," a task quite
+  beyond the strength of the allies without the assistance of the Baltic
+  Powers, and even so their assistance would not have justified changing
+  the nature of the war, unless both Sweden and Russia had been ready to
+  make unlimited war and nothing was further from their intention.
+
+Whether or not it was on this principle that the Japanese conceived the war
+from the outset matters little. The main considerations are that with so
+favourable a territorial object as Korea limited war was possible in its
+most formidable shape, that the war did in fact develop on limited lines,
+and that it was entirely successful. Without waiting to secure the command
+of the sea, Japan opened by a surprise seizure of Seoul, and then under
+cover of minor operations of the fleet proceeded to complete her occupation
+of Korea. As she faced the second stage, that of making good the defence of
+her conquest, the admirable nature of her geographical object was further
+displayed. The theoretical weakness of limited war at this point is the
+arrest of your offensive action. But in this case such arrest was neither
+necessary nor possible, and for these reasons. To render the conquest
+secure not only must the Korean frontier be made inviolable, but Korea must
+be permanently isolated by sea. This involved the destruction of the
+Russian fleet, and this in its turn entailed the reduction of Port Arthur
+by military means. Here, then, in the second stage Japan found herself
+committed to two lines of operation with two distinct objectives, Port
+Arthur and the Russian army that was slowly concentrating in Manchuria--a
+thoroughly vicious situation. So fortunate, however, was the geographical
+conformation of the theatre that by promptitude and the bold use of an
+uncommanded sea it could be reduced to something far more correct. By
+continuing the advance of the Korean army into Manchuria and landing
+another force between it and the Port Arthur army the three corps could be
+concentrated and the vicious separation of the lines of operations turned
+to good account. They could be combined in such a way as to threaten an
+enveloping counter-attack on Liao-yang before the Russian offensive
+concentration could be completed. Not only was Liao-yang the Russian point
+of concentration, but it also was a sound position both for defending Korea
+and covering the siege of Port Arthur. Once secured, it gave the Japanese
+all the advantages of defence and forced the Russians to exhaust themselves
+in offensive operations which were beyond their strength. Nor was it only
+ashore that this advantage was gained. The success of the system, which
+culminated in the fall of Port Arthur, went further still. Not only did it
+make Japan relatively superior at sea, but it enabled her to assume a naval
+defensive and so to force the final naval decision on Russia with every
+advantage of time, place, and strength in her own favour.
+
+By the battle of Tsushima the territorial object was completely isolated by
+sea, and the position of Japan in Korea was rendered as impregnable as that
+of Wellington at Torres Vedras. All that remained was to proceed to the
+third stage and demonstrate to Russia that the acceptance of the situation
+that had been set up was more to her advantage than the further attempt to
+break it down. This the final advance to Mukden accomplished, and Japan
+obtained her end very far short of having overthrown her enemy. The
+offensive power of Russia had never been so strong, while that of Japan was
+almost if not quite exhausted.
+
+Approached in this way, the Far Eastern struggle is seen to develop on the
+same lines as all our great maritime wars of the past, which continental
+strategists have so persistently excluded from their field of study. It
+presents the normal three phases--the initial offensive movement to seize
+the territorial object, the secondary phase, which forces an attenuated
+offensive on the enemy, and the final stage of pressure, in which there is
+a return to the offensive "according," as Jomini puts it, "to circumstances
+and your relative force in order to obtain the cession desired."
+
+It must not of course be asked that these phases shall be always clearly
+defined. Strategical analysis can never give exact results. It aims only at
+approximations, at groupings which will serve to guide but will always
+leave much to the judgment. The three phases in the Russo-Japanese War,
+though unusually well defined, continually overlapped. It must be so; for
+in war the effect of an operation is never confined to the limits of its
+immediate or primary intention. Thus the occupation of Korea had the
+secondary defensive effect of covering the home country, while the initial
+blow which Admiral Togo delivered at Port Arthur to cover the primary
+offensive movement proved, by the demoralisation it caused in the Russian
+fleet, to be a distinct step in the secondary phase of isolating the
+conquest. In the later stages of the war the line between what was
+essential to set up the second phase of perfecting the isolation and the
+third phase of general pressure seems to have grown very nebulous.
+
+It was at this stage that the Japanese strategy has been most severely
+criticised, and it was just here they seem to have lost hold of the
+conception of a limited war, if in fact they had ever securely grasped the
+conception as the elder Pitt understood it. It has been argued that in
+their eagerness to deal a blow at the enemy's main army they neglected to
+devote sufficient force to reduce Port Arthur, an essential step to
+complete the second phase. Whether or not the exigencies of the case
+rendered such distribution of force inevitable or whether it was due to
+miscalculation of difficulties, the result was a most costly set-back. For
+not only did it entail a vast loss of time and life at Port Arthur itself,
+but when the sortie of the Russian fleet in June brought home to them their
+error, the offensive movement on Liao-yang had to be delayed, and the
+opportunity passed for a decisive counter-stroke at the enemy's
+concentration ashore.
+
+This misfortune, which was to cost the Japanese so dear, may perhaps be
+attributed at least in part to the continental influences under which their
+army had been trained. We at least can trace the unlimited outlook in the
+pages of the German Staff history. In dealing with the Japanese plan of
+operations it is assumed that the occupation of Korea and the isolation of
+Port Arthur were but preliminaries to a concentric advance on Liao-yang,
+"which was kept in view as the first objective of the operations on land."
+But surely on every theory of the war the first objective of the Japanese
+on land was Seoul, where they expected to have to fight their first
+important action against troops advancing from the Yalu; and surely their
+second was Port Arthur, with its fleet and arsenal, which they expected to
+reduce with little more difficulty than they had met with ten years before
+against the Chinese. Such at least was the actual progression of events,
+and a criticism which regards operations of such magnitude and ultimate
+importance as mere incidents of strategic deployment is only to be
+explained by the domination of the Napoleonic idea of war, against the
+universal application of which Clausewitz so solemnly protested. It is the
+work of men who have a natural difficulty in conceiving a war plan that
+does not culminate in a Jena or a Sedan. It is a view surely which is the
+child of theory, bearing no relation to the actuality of the war in
+question and affording no explanation of its ultimate success. The truth
+is, that so long as the Japanese acted on the principles of limited war, as
+laid down by Clausewitz and Jomini and plainly deducible from our own rich
+experience, they progressed beyond all their expectations, but so soon as
+they departed from them and suffered themselves to be confused with
+continental theories they were surprised by unaccountable failure.
+
+The expression "Limited war" is no doubt not entirely happy. Yet no other
+has been found to condense the ideas of limited object and limited
+interest, which are its special characteristics. Still if the above example
+be kept in mind as a typical case, the meaning of the term will not be
+mistaken. It only remains to emphasise one important point. The fact that
+the doctrine of limited war traverses the current belief that our primary
+objective must always be the enemy's armed forces is liable to carry with
+it a false inference that it also rejects the corollary that war means the
+use of battles. Nothing is further from the conception. Whatever the form
+of war, there is no likelihood of our ever going back to the old fallacy of
+attempting to decide wars by manoeuvres. All forms alike demand the use of
+battles. By our fundamental theory war is always "a continuation of
+political intercourse, in which fighting is substituted for writing notes."
+However great the controlling influence of the political object, it must
+never obscure the fact that it is by fighting we have to gain our end.
+
+It is the more necessary to insist on this point, for the idea of making a
+piece of territory your object is liable to be confused with the older
+method of conducting war, in which armies were content to manoeuvre for
+strategical positions, and a battle came almost to be regarded as a mark of
+bad generalship. With such parading limited war has nothing to do. Its
+conduct differs only from that of unlimited war in that instead of having
+to destroy our enemy's whole power of resistance, we need only overthrow so
+much of his active force as he is able or willing to bring to bear in order
+to prevent or terminate our occupation of the territorial object.
+
+The first consideration, then, in entering on such a war is to endeavour to
+determine what the force will amount to. It will depend, firstly, on the
+importance the enemy attaches to the limited object, coupled with the
+nature and extent of his preoccupations elsewhere, and, secondly, it will
+depend upon the natural difficulties of his lines of communication and the
+extent to which we can increase those difficulties by our conduct of the
+initial operations. In favourable circumstances therefore (and here lies
+the great value of the limited form) we are able to control the amount of
+force we shall have to encounter. The most favourable circumstances and the
+only circumstances by which we ourselves can profit are such as permit the
+more or less complete isolation of the object by naval action, and such
+isolation can never be established until we have entirely overthrown the
+enemy's naval forces.
+
+Here, then, we enter the field of naval strategy. We can now leave behind
+us the theory of war in general and, in order to pave the way to our final
+conclusions, devote our attention to the theory of naval warfare in
+particular.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                    PART TWO
+
+              THEORY OF NAVAL WAR
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                  CHAPTER ONE
+
+             THEORY OF THE OBJECT--
+               COMMAND OF THE SEA
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to
+secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.
+
+The second part of the proposition should be noted with special care in
+order to exclude a habit of thought, which is one of the commonest sources
+of error in naval speculation. That error is the very general assumption
+that if one belligerent loses the command of the sea it passes at once to
+the other belligerent. The most cursory study of naval history is enough to
+reveal the falseness of such an assumption. It tells us that the most
+common situation in naval war is that neither side has the command; that
+the normal position is not a commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea. The
+mere assertion, which no one denies, that the object of naval warfare is to
+get command of the sea actually connotes the proposition that the command
+is normally in dispute. It is this state of dispute with which naval
+strategy is most nearly concerned, for when the command is lost or won pure
+naval strategy comes to an end.
+
+This truth is so obvious that it would scarcely be worth mentioning were it
+not for the constant recurrence of such phrases as: "If England were to
+lose command of the sea, it would be all over with her." The fallacy of the
+idea is that it ignores the power of the strategical defensive. It assumes
+that if in the face of some extraordinary hostile coalition or through some
+extraordinary mischance we found ourselves without sufficient strength to
+keep the command, we should therefore be too weak to prevent the enemy
+getting it--a negation of the whole theory of war, which at least requires
+further support than it ever receives.
+
+And not only is this assumption a negation of theory; it is a negation both
+of practical experience and of the expressed opinion of our greatest
+masters. We ourselves have used the defensive at sea with success, as under
+William the Third and in the War of American Independence, while in our
+long wars with France she habitually used it in such a way that sometimes
+for years, though we had a substantial preponderance, we could not get
+command, and for years were unable to carry out our war plan without
+serious interruption from her fleet.
+
+So far from the defensive being a negligible factor at sea, or even the
+mere pestilent heresy it is generally represented, it is of course inherent
+in all war, and, as we have seen, the paramount questions of strategy both
+at sea and on land turn on the relative possibilities of offensive and
+defensive, and upon the relative proportions in which each should enter
+into our plan of war. At sea the most powerful and aggressively-minded
+belligerent can no more avoid his alternating periods of defence, which
+result from inevitable arrests of offensive action, than they can be
+avoided on land. The defensive, then, has to be considered; but before we
+are in a position to do so with profit, we have to proceed with our
+analysis of the phrase, "Command of the Sea," and ascertain exactly what it
+is we mean by it in war.
+
+In the first place, "Command of the Sea" is not identical in its
+strategical conditions with the conquest of territory. You cannot argue
+from the one to the other, as has been too commonly done. Such phrases as
+the "Conquest of water territory" and "Making the enemy's coast our
+frontier" had their use and meaning in the mouths of those who framed them,
+but they are really little but rhetorical expressions founded on false
+analogy, and false analogy is not a secure basis for a theory of war.
+
+The analogy is false for two reasons, both of which enter materially into
+the conduct of naval war. You cannot conquer sea because it is not
+susceptible of ownership, at least outside territorial waters. You cannot,
+as lawyers say, "reduce it into possession," because you cannot exclude
+neutrals from it as you can from territory you conquer. In the second
+place, you cannot subsist your armed force upon it as you can upon enemy's
+territory. Clearly, then, to make deductions from an assumption that
+command of the sea is analogous to conquest of territory is unscientific,
+and certain to lead to error.
+
+The only safe method is to inquire what it is we can secure for ourselves,
+and what it is we can deny the enemy by command of the sea. Now, if we
+exclude fishery rights, which are irrelevant to the present matter, the
+only right we or our enemy can have on the sea is the right of passage; in
+other words, the only positive value which the high seas have for national
+life is as a means of communication. For the active life of a nation such
+means may stand for much or it may stand for little, but to every maritime
+State it has some value. Consequently by denying an enemy this means of
+passage we check the movement of his national life at sea in the same kind
+of way that we check it on land by occupying his territory. So far the
+analogy holds good, but no further.
+
+So much for the positive value which the sea has in national life. It has
+also a negative value. For not only is it a means of communication, but,
+unlike the means of communication ashore, it is also a barrier. By winning
+command of the sea we remove that barrier from our own path, thereby
+placing ourselves in position to exert direct military pressure upon the
+national life of our enemy ashore, while at the same time we solidify it
+against him and prevent his exerting direct military pressure upon
+ourselves.
+
+Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of maritime
+communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. The object of
+naval warfare is the control of communications, and not, as in land
+warfare, the conquest of territory. The difference is fundamental. True, it
+is rightly said that strategy ashore is mainly a question of
+communications, but they are communications in another sense. The phrase
+refers to the communications of the army alone, and not to the wider
+communications which are part of the life of the nation.
+
+But on land also there are communications of a kind which are essential to
+national life--the internal communications which connect the points of
+distribution. Here again we touch an analogy between the two kinds of war.
+Land warfare, as the most devoted adherents of the modern view admit,
+cannot attain its end by military victories alone. The destruction of your
+enemy's forces will not avail for certain unless you have in reserve
+sufficient force to complete the occupation of his inland communications
+and principal points of distribution. This power is the real fruit of
+victory, the power to strangle the whole national life. It is not until
+this is done that a high-spirited nation, whose whole heart is in the war,
+will consent to make peace and do your will. It is precisely in the same
+way that the command of the sea works towards peace, though of course in a
+far less coercive manner, against a continental State. By occupying her
+maritime communications and closing the points of distribution in which
+they terminate we destroy the national life afloat, and thereby check the
+vitality of that life ashore so far as the one is dependent on the other.
+Thus we see that so long as we retain the power and right to stop maritime
+communications, the analogy between command of the sea and the conquest of
+territory is in this aspect very close. And the analogy is of the utmost
+practical importance, for on it turns the most burning question of maritime
+war, which it will be well to deal with in this place.
+
+It is obvious that if the object and end of naval warfare is the control of
+communications it must carry with it the right to forbid, if we can, the
+passage of both public and private property upon the sea. Now the only
+means we have of enforcing such control of commercial communications at sea
+is in the last resort the capture or destruction of sea-borne property.
+Such capture or destruction is the penalty which we impose upon our enemy
+for attempting to use the communications of which he does not hold the
+control. In the language of jurisprudence, it is the ultimate sanction of
+the interdict which we are seeking to enforce. The current term "Commerce
+destruction" is not in fact a logical expression of the strategical idea.
+To make the position clear we should say "Commerce prevention."
+
+The methods of this "Commerce prevention" have no more connection with the
+old and barbarous idea of plunder and reprisal than orderly requisitions
+ashore have with the old idea of plunder and ravaging. No form of war
+indeed causes so little human suffering as the capture of property at sea.
+It is more akin to process of law, such as distress for rent, or execution
+of judgment, or arrest of a ship, than to a military operation. Once, it is
+true, it was not so. In the days of privateers it was accompanied too
+often, and particularly in the Mediterranean and the West Indies, with
+lamentable cruelty and lawlessness, and the existence of such abuses was
+the real reason for the general agreement to the Declaration of Paris by
+which privateering was abolished.
+
+But it was not the only reason. The idea of privateering was a survival of
+a primitive and unscientific conception of war, which was governed mainly
+by a general notion of doing your enemy as much damage as possible and
+making reprisal for wrongs he had done you. To the same class of ideas
+belonged the practice of plunder and ravaging ashore. But neither of these
+methods of war was abolished for humanitarian reasons. They disappeared
+indeed as a general practice before the world had begun to talk of
+humanity. They were abolished because war became more scientific. The right
+to plunder and ravage was not denied. But plunder was found to demoralise
+your troops and unfit them for fighting, and ravaging proved to be a less
+powerful means of coercing your enemy than exploiting the occupied country
+by means of regular requisitions for the supply of your own army and the
+increase of its offensive range. In short, the reform arose from a desire
+to husband your enemy's resources for your own use instead of wantonly
+wasting them.
+
+In a similar way privateering always had a debilitating effect upon our own
+regular force. It greatly increased the difficulty of manning the navy, and
+the occasional large profits had a demoralising influence on detached
+cruiser commanders. It tended to keep alive the mediaeval corsair spirit at
+the expense of the modern military spirit which made for direct operations
+against the enemy's armed forces. It was inevitable that as the new
+movement of opinion gathered force it should carry with it a conviction
+that for operating against sea-borne trade sporadic attack could never be
+so efficient as an organised system of operations to secure a real
+strategical control of the enemy's maritime communications. A riper and
+sounder view of war revealed that what may be called tactical commercial
+blockade--that is, the blockade of ports--could be extended to and
+supplemented by a strategical blockade of the great trade routes. In moral
+principle there is no difference between the two. Admit the principle of
+tactical or close blockade, and as between belligerents you cannot condemn
+the principle of strategical or distant blockade. Except in their effect
+upon neutrals, there is no juridical difference between the two.
+
+Why indeed should this humane yet drastic process of war be rejected at sea
+if the same thing is permitted on land? If on land you allow contributions
+and requisitions, if you permit the occupation of towns, ports, and inland
+communications, without which no conquest is complete and no effective war
+possible, why should you refuse similar procedure at sea where it causes
+far less individual suffering? If you refuse the right of controlling
+communications at sea, you must also refuse the right on land. If you admit
+the right of contributions on land, you must admit the right of capture at
+sea. Otherwise you will permit to military Powers the extreme rights of war
+and leave to the maritime Powers no effective rights at all. Their ultimate
+argument would be gone.
+
+In so far as the idea of abolishing private capture at sea is humanitarian,
+and in so far as it rests on a belief that it would strengthen our position
+as a commercial maritime State, let it be honourably dealt with. But so far
+as its advocates have as yet expressed themselves, the proposal appears to
+be based on two fallacies. One is, that you can avoid attack by depriving
+yourself of the power of offence and resting on defence alone, and the
+other, the idea that war consists entirely of battles between armies or
+fleets. It ignores the fundamental fact that battles are only the means of
+enabling you to do that which really brings wars to an end-that is, to
+exert pressure on the citizens and their collective life. "After shattering
+the hostile main army," says Von der Goltz, "we still have the forcing of a
+peace as a separate and, in certain circumstances, a more difficult task
+... to make the enemy's country feel the burdens of war with such weight
+that the desire for peace will prevail. This is the point in which Napoleon
+failed.... It may be necessary to seize the harbours, commercial centres,
+important lines of traffic, fortifications and arsenals, in other words,
+all important property necessary to the existence of the people and army."
+
+If, then, we are deprived of the right to use analogous means at sea, the
+object for which we fight battles almost ceases to exist. Defeat the
+enemy's fleets as we may, he will be but little the worse. We shall have
+opened the way for invasion, but any of the great continental Powers can
+laugh at our attempts to invade single-handed. If we cannot reap the
+harvest of our success by deadening his national activities at sea, the
+only legitimate means of pressure within our strength will be denied us.
+Our fleet, if it would proceed with such secondary operations as are
+essential for forcing a peace, will be driven to such barbarous expedients
+as the bombardment of seaport towns and destructive raids upon the hostile
+coasts.
+
+If the means of pressure which follow successful fighting were abolished
+both on land and sea there would be this argument in favour of the change,
+that it would mean perhaps for civilised States the entire cessation of
+war; for war would become so impotent, that no one would care to engage in
+it. It would be an affair between regular armies and fleets, with which the
+people had little concern. International quarrels would tend to take the
+form of the mediaeval private disputes which were settled by champions in
+trial by battle, an absurdity which led rapidly to the domination of purely
+legal procedure. If international quarrels could go the same way, humanity
+would have advanced a long stride. But the world is scarcely ripe for such
+a revolution. Meanwhile to abolish the right of interference with the flow
+of private property at sea without abolishing the corresponding right
+ashore would only defeat the ends of humanitarians. The great deterrent,
+the most powerful check on war, would be gone. It is commerce and finance
+which now more than ever control or check the foreign policy of nations. If
+commerce and finance stand to lose by war, their influence for a peaceful
+solution will be great; and so long as the right of private capture at sea
+exists, they stand to lose in every maritime war immediately and inevitably
+whatever the ultimate result may be. Abolish the right, and this deterrent
+disappears; nay, they will even stand to win immediate gains owing to the
+sudden expansion of Government expenditure which the hostilities will
+entail, and the expansion of sea commerce which the needs of the armed
+forces will create. Any such losses as maritime warfare under existing
+conditions must immediately inflict will be remote if interference with
+property is confined to the land. They will never indeed be serious except
+in the case of complete defeat, and no one enters upon war expecting
+defeat. It is in the hope of victory and gain that aggressive wars are
+born. The fear of quick and certain loss is their surest preventive.
+Humanity, then, will surely beware how in a too hasty pursuit of peaceful
+ideals it lets drop the best weapon it has for scotching the evil it has as
+yet no power to kill.
+
+In what follows, therefore, it is intended to regard the right of private
+capture at sea as still subsisting. Without it, indeed, naval warfare is
+almost inconceivable, and in any case no one has any experience of such a
+truncated method of war on which profitable study can be founded.
+
+The primary method, then, in which we use victory or preponderance at sea
+and bring it to bear on the enemy's population to secure peace, is by the
+capture or destruction of the enemy's property, whether public or private.
+But in comparing the process with the analogous occupation of territory and
+the levying of contributions and requisitions we have to observe a marked
+difference. Both processes are what may be called economic pressure. But
+ashore the economic pressure can only be exerted as the consequence of
+victory or acquired domination by military success. At sea the process
+begins at once. Indeed, more often than not, the first act of hostility in
+maritime wars has been the capture of private property at sea. In a sense
+this is also true ashore. The first step of an invader after crossing the
+frontier will be to control to a less or greater extent such private
+property as he is able to use for his purposes. But such interference with
+private property is essentially a military act, and does not belong to the
+secondary phase of economic pressure. At sea it does, and the reason why
+this should be so lies in certain fundamental differences between land and
+sea warfare which are implicit in the communication theory of naval war.
+
+To elucidate the point, it must be repeated that maritime communications,
+which are the root of the idea of command of the sea, are not analogous to
+military communications in the ordinary use of the term. Military
+communications refer solely to the army's lines of supply and retreat.
+Maritime communications have a wider meaning. Though in effect embracing
+the lines of fleet supply, they correspond in strategical values not to
+military lines of supply, but to those internal lines of communication by
+which the flow of national life is maintained ashore. Consequently maritime
+communications are on a wholly different footing from land communications.
+At sea the communications are, for the most part, common to both
+belligerents, whereas ashore each possesses his own in his own territory.
+The strategical effect is of far-reaching importance, for it means that at
+sea strategical offence and defence tend to merge in a way that is unknown
+ashore. Since maritime communications are common, we as a rule cannot
+attack those of the enemy without defending our own. In military operations
+the converse is the rule. Normally, an attack on our enemy's communications
+tends to expose their own.
+
+The theory of common communications will become clear by taking an example.
+In our wars with France our communications with the Mediterranean, India,
+and America ran down from the Channel mouth past Finisterre and St.
+Vincent; and those of France, at least from her Atlantic ports, were
+identical for almost their entire distance. In our wars with the Dutch the
+identity was even closer. Even in the case of Spain, her great trade routes
+followed the same lines as our own for the greater part of their extent.
+Consequently the opening moves which we generally made to defend our trade
+by the occupation of those lines placed us in a position to attack our
+enemy's trade. The same situation arose even when our opening dispositions
+were designed as defence against home invasion or against attacks upon our
+colonies, for the positions our fleet had to take up to those ends always
+lay on or about the terminal and focal points of trade routes. Whether our
+immediate object were to bring the enemy's main fleets to action or to
+exercise economic pressure, it made but little difference. If the enemy
+were equally anxious to engage, it was at one of the terminal or focal
+areas we were almost certain to get contact. If he wished to avoid a
+decision, the best way to force him to action was to occupy his trade
+routes at the same vital points.
+
+Thus it comes about that, whereas on land the process of economic pressure,
+at least in the modern conception of war, should only begin after decisive
+victory, at sea it starts automatically from the first. Indeed such
+pressure may be the only means of forcing the decision we seek, as will
+appear more clearly when we come to deal with the other fundamental
+difference between land and sea warfare.
+
+Meanwhile we may note that at sea the use of economic pressure from the
+commencement is justified for two reasons. The first is, as we have seen,
+that it is an economy of means to use our defensive positions for attack
+when attack does not vitiate those positions, and it will not vitiate them
+if fleet cruisers operate with restraint. The second is, that interference
+with the enemy's trade has two aspects. It is not only a means of exerting
+the secondary economic pressure, it is also a primary means towards
+overthrowing the enemy's power of resistance. Wars are not decided
+exclusively by military and naval force. Finance is scarcely less
+important. When other things are equal, it is the longer purse that wins.
+It has even many times redressed an unfavourable balance of armed force and
+given victory to the physically weaker Power. Anything, therefore, which we
+are able to achieve towards crippling our enemy's finance is a direct step
+to his overthrow, and the most effective means we can employ to this end
+against a maritime State is to deny him the resources of seaborne trade.
+
+It will be seen, therefore, that in naval warfare, however closely we may
+concentrate our efforts on the destruction of our enemy's armed forces as
+the direct means to his overthrow, it would be folly to stay our hands when
+opportunities occur, as they will automatically, for undermining his
+financial position on which the continued vigour of those armed forces so
+largely depends. Thus the occupation of our enemy's sea communications and
+the confiscatory operations it connotes are in a sense primary operations,
+and not, as on land, secondary.
+
+Such, then, are the abstract conclusions at which we arrive in our attempt
+to analyse the idea of command of the sea and to give it precision as the
+control of common communications. Their concrete value will appear when we
+come to deal with the various forms which naval operations may take, such
+as, "seeking out the enemy's fleet," blockade, attack and defence of trade,
+and the safeguarding of combined expeditions. For the present it remains to
+deal with the various kinds of sea command which flow from the
+communication idea.
+
+If the object of the command of the sea is to control communications, it is
+obvious it may exist in various degrees. We may be able to control the
+whole of the common communications as the result either of great initial
+preponderance or of decisive victory. If we are not sufficiently strong to
+do this, we may still be able to control some of the communications; that
+is, our control may be general or local. Obvious as the point is, it needs
+emphasising, because of a maxim that has become current that "the sea is
+all one." Like other maxims of the kind, it conveys a truth with a trail of
+error in its wake. The truth it contains seems to be simply this, that as a
+rule local control can only avail us temporarily, for so long as the enemy
+has a sufficient fleet anywhere, it is theoretically in his power to
+overthrow our control of any special sea area.
+
+It amounts indeed to little more than a rhetorical expression, used to
+emphasise the high mobility of fleets as contrasted with that of armies and
+the absence of physical obstacles to restrict that mobility. That this
+vital feature of naval warfare should be consecrated in a maxim is well,
+but when it is caricatured into a doctrine, as it sometimes is, that you
+cannot move a battalion oversea till you have entirely overthrown your
+enemy's fleet, it deserves gibbeting. It would be as wise to hold that in
+war you must never risk anything.
+
+It would seem to have been the evil influence of this travestied maxim
+which had much to do with the cramped and timorous strategy of the
+Americans in their late war with Spain. They had ample naval force to
+secure such a local and temporary command of the Gulf of Mexico as to have
+justified them at once in throwing all the troops they had ready into Cuba
+to support the insurgents, in accordance with their war plan. They had also
+sufficient strength to ensure that the communications with the
+expeditionary force could not be interrupted permanently. And yet, because
+the Spaniards had an undefeated fleet at sea somewhere, they hesitated, and
+were nearly lost. The Japanese had no such illusions. Without having struck
+a naval blow of any kind, and with a hostile fleet actually within the
+theatre of operations, they started their essential military movement
+oversea, content that though they might not be able to secure the control
+of the line of passage, they were in a position to deny effective control
+to the enemy. Our own history is full of such operations. There are cases
+in plenty where the results promised by a successful military blow oversea,
+before permanent command had been obtained, were great enough to justify a
+risk which, like the Japanese, we knew how to minimise by judicious use of
+our favourable geographical position, and of a certain system of
+protection, which must be dealt with later.
+
+For the purpose, then, of framing a plan of war or campaign, it must be
+taken that command may exist in various states or degrees, each of which
+has its special possibilities and limitations. It may be general or local,
+and it may be permanent or temporary. General command may be permanent or
+temporary, but mere local command, except in very favourable geographical
+conditions, should scarcely ever be regarded as more than temporary, since
+normally it is always liable to interruption from other theatres so long as
+the enemy possesses an effective naval force.
+
+Finally, it has to be noted that even permanent general command can never
+in practice be absolute. No degree of naval superiority can ensure our
+communications against sporadic attack from detached cruisers, or even
+raiding squadrons if they be boldly led and are prepared to risk
+destruction. Even after Hawke's decisive victory at Quiberon had completed
+the overthrow of the enemy's sea forces, a British transport was captured
+between Cork and Portsmouth, and an Indiaman in sight of the Lizard, while
+Wellington's complaints in the Peninsula of the insecurity of his
+communications are well known.[9] By general and permanent control we do
+not mean that the enemy can do nothing, but that he cannot interfere with
+our maritime trade and oversea operations so seriously as to affect the
+issue of the war, and that he cannot carry on his own trade and operations
+except at such risk and hazard as to remove them from the field of
+practical strategy. In other words, it means that the enemy can no longer
+attack our lines of passage and communication effectively, and that he
+cannot use or defend his own.
+
+  [9] In justice to Wellington, it should be said that his complaints were
+  due to false reports that exaggerated a couple of insignificant captures
+  into a serious interruption.
+
+To complete our equipment for appreciating any situation for which
+operations have to be designed, it is necessary to remember that when the
+command is in dispute the general conditions may give a stable or an
+unstable equilibrium. It may be that the power of neither side
+preponderates to any appreciable extent. It may also be that the
+preponderance is with ourselves, or it may be that it lies with the enemy.
+Such preponderance of course will not depend entirely on actual relative
+strength, either physical or moral, but will be influenced by the
+inter-relation of naval positions and the comparative convenience of their
+situation in regard to the object of the war or campaign. By naval
+positions we mean, firstly, naval bases and, secondly, the terminals of the
+greater lines of communication or trade-routes and the focal areas where
+they tend to converge, as at Finisterre, Gibraltar, Suez, the Cape,
+Singapore, and many others.
+
+Upon the degree and distribution of this preponderance will depend in a
+general way the extent to which our plans will be governed by the idea of
+defence or offence. Generally speaking, it will be to the advantage of the
+preponderating side to seek a decision as quickly as possible in order to
+terminate the state of dispute. Conversely, the weaker side will as a rule
+seek to avoid or postpone a decision in hope of being able by minor
+operations, the chances of war, or the development of fresh strength, to
+turn the balance in its favour. Such was the line which France adopted
+frequently in her wars with us, sometimes legitimately, but sometimes to
+such an excess as seriously to demoralise her fleet. Her experience has led
+to a hasty deduction that the defensive at sea for even a weaker Power is
+an unmixed evil. Such a conclusion is foreign to the fundamental principles
+of war. It is idle to exclude the use of an expectant attitude because in
+itself it cannot lead to final success, and because if used to excess it
+ends in demoralisation and the loss of will to attack. The misconception
+appears to have arisen from insistence on the drawbacks of defence by
+writers seeking to persuade their country to prepare in time of peace
+sufficient naval strength to justify offence from the outset.
+
+Having now determined the fundamental principles which underlie the idea of
+Command of the Sea, we are in a position to consider the manner in which
+fleets are constituted in order to fit them for their task.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                  CHAPTER TWO
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+             THEORY OF THE MEANS--
+          THE CONSTITUTION OF FLEETS
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In all eras of naval warfare fighting ships have exhibited a tendency to
+differentiate into groups in accordance with the primary function each
+class was designed to serve. These groupings or classifications are what is
+meant by the constitution of a fleet. A threefold differentiation into
+battleships, cruisers, and flotilla has so long dominated naval thought
+that we have come to regard it as normal, and even essential. It may be so,
+but such a classification has been by no means constant. Other ideas of
+fleet constitution have not only existed, but have stood the test of war
+for long periods, and it is unscientific and unsafe to ignore such facts if
+we wish to arrive at sound doctrine.
+
+The truth is, that the classes of ships which constitute a fleet are, or
+ought to be, the expression in material of the strategical and tactical
+ideas that prevail at any given time, and consequently they have varied not
+only with the ideas, but also with the material in vogue. It may also be
+said more broadly that they have varied with the theory of war, by which
+more or less consciously naval thought was dominated. It is true that few
+ages have formulated a theory of war, or even been clearly aware of its
+influence; but nevertheless such theories have always existed, and even in
+their most nebulous and intangible shapes seem to have exerted an
+ascertainable influence on the constitution of fleets.
+
+Going back to the dawn of modern times, we note that at the opening of the
+sixteenth century, when galley warfare reached its culmination, the
+constitution was threefold, bearing a superficial analogy to that which we
+have come to regard as normal. There were the galeasses and heavy galleys
+corresponding to our battleships, light galleys corresponding to our
+cruisers, while the flotilla was represented by the small "frigates,"
+"brigantines," and similar craft, which had no slave gang for propulsion,
+but were rowed by the fighting crew. Such armed sailing ships as then
+existed were regarded as auxiliaries, and formed a category apart, as
+fireships and bomb-vessels did in the sailing period, and as mine-layers do
+now. But the parallel must not be overstrained. The distinction of function
+between the two classes of galleys was not so strongly marked as that
+between the lighter craft and the galleys; that is to say, the scientific
+differentiation between battleships and cruisers had not yet been so firmly
+developed as it was destined to become in later times, and the smaller
+galleys habitually took their place in the fighting line.
+
+With the rise of the sailing vessel as the typical ship-of-war an entirely
+new constitution made its appearance. The dominating classification became
+twofold. It was a classification into vessels of subservient movement using
+sails, and vessels of free movement using oars. It was on these lines that
+our true Royal Navy was first organised by Henry the Eighth, an expert who,
+in the science of war, was one of the most advanced masters in Europe. In
+this constitution there appears even less conception than in that of the
+galley period of a radical distinction between battleships and cruisers. As
+Henry's fleet was originally designed, practically the whole of the
+battleships were sailing vessels, though it is true that when the French
+brought up galleys from the Mediterranean, he gave some of the smartest of
+them oars. The constitution was in fact one of battleships and flotilla. Of
+cruisers there were none as we understand them. Fleet scouting was done by
+the "Row-barges" and newly introduced "Pinnaces" of the flotilla, while as
+for commerce protection, merchant vessels had usually to look after
+themselves, the larger ones being regularly armed for their own defence.
+
+The influence of this twofold constitution continued long after the
+conditions of its origin had passed away. In ever-lessening degree indeed
+it may be said to have lasted for two hundred years. During the Dutch wars
+of the seventeenth century, which finally established the dominant status
+of the sailing warship, practically all true sailing vessels--that is,
+vessels that had no auxiliary oar propulsion--took station in the line. The
+"Frigates" of that time differed not at all from the "Great Ship" in their
+functions, but only in their design. By the beginning of the eighteenth
+century, however, the old tendency to a threefold organisation began to
+reassert itself, but it was not till the middle of the century that the
+process of development can be regarded as complete.
+
+Down to the end of the War of the Austrian Succession--a period which is
+usually deemed to be one of conspicuous depression in the naval art--the
+classification of our larger sailing vessels was purely arbitrary. The
+"Rates" (which had been introduced during the Dutch wars) bore no relation
+to any philosophical conception of the complex duties of a fleet. In the
+first rate were 100-gun ships; in the second, 90-gun ships--all
+three-deckers. So far the system of rating was sound enough, but when we
+come to the third rate we find it includes 80-gun ships, which were also of
+three decks, while the bulk of the rest were 70-gun two-deckers. The fourth
+rate was also composed of two-decked ships--weak battle-units of 60 and 50
+guns--and this was far the largest class. All these four rates were classed
+as ships-of-the-line. Below them came the fifth rates, which, though they
+were used as cruisers, had no distinct class name. They differed indeed
+only in degree from the ship-of-the-line, being all cramped two-deckers of
+44 and 40 guns, and they must be regarded, in so far as they expressed any
+logical idea of naval warfare, as the forerunners of the "Intermediate"
+class, represented in the succeeding epochs by 50-gun ships, and in our own
+time by armoured cruisers. The only true cruiser is found in the sixth
+rate, which comprised small and weakly armed 20-gun ships, and between them
+and the "Forties" there was nothing. Below them, but again without any
+clear differentiation, came the unrated sloops representing the flotilla.
+
+In such a system of rating there is no logical distinction either between
+large and small battleships or between battleships and cruisers, or between
+cruisers and flotilla. The only marked break in the gradual descent is that
+between the 40-gun two-deckers and the 20-gun cruisers. As these latter
+vessels as well as the sloops used sweeps for auxiliary propulsion, we are
+forced to conclude that the only basis of the classification was that
+adopted by Henry the Eighth, which, sound as it was in his time, had long
+ceased to have any real relation to the actuality of naval war.
+
+It was not till Anson's memorable administration that a scientific system
+of rating was re-established and the fleet at last assumed the logical
+constitution which it retained up to our own time. In the first two rates
+appear the fleet flagship class, three-deckers of 100 and 90 guns
+respectively. All smaller three-deckers are eliminated. In the next two
+rates we have the rank and file of the battle-line, two-deckers of
+increased size-namely, seventy-fours in the third rate, and sixty-fours in
+the fourth. Here, however, is a slight break in the perfection of the
+system, for the fourth rate also included 50-gun ships of two decks, which,
+during the progress of the Seven Years' War, ceased to be regarded as
+ships-of-the-line. War experience was eliminating small battleships, and
+therewith it called for a type intermediate between battleships and
+cruisers, with whose functions we shall have to deal directly. In practice
+these units soon formed a rate by themselves, into which, by the same
+tendency, 60-gun ships were destined to sink half a century later.
+
+But most pregnant of all Anson's reforms was the introduction of the true
+cruiser, no longer a small battleship, but a vessel specialised for its
+logical functions, and distinct in design both from the battle rates and
+the flotilla. Both 40-gun and 20-gun types were abolished, and in their
+place appear two cruiser rates, and the fifth consisting of 32-gun true
+frigates, and the sixth of 28-gun frigates, both completely divorced from
+any battle function. Finally, after a very distinct gap, came the unrated
+sloops and smaller craft, which formed the flotilla for coastwise and
+inshore work, despatch service, and kindred duties.
+
+The reforms of the great First Lord amounted in fact to a clearly
+apprehended threefold constitution, in which the various groups were
+frankly specialised in accordance with the functions each was expected to
+perform. Specialisation, it will be observed, is the note of the process of
+development. We have no longer an endeavour to adapt the fleet to its
+multifarious duties by multiplying a comparatively weak nature of
+fighting-ship, which could act in the line and yet be had in sufficient
+numbers to protect commerce, but which was not well fitted for either
+service. Instead we note a definite recognition of the principle that
+battleships should be as powerful as possible, and that in order to permit
+of their due development they must be relieved of their cruising functions
+by a class of vessel specially adapted for the purpose. The question we
+have to consider is, was this specialisation, which has asserted itself
+down to our own times, in the true line of development? Was it, in fact, a
+right expression of the needs which are indicated by the theory of naval
+war?
+
+By the theory of naval war it must be reiterated we mean nothing but an
+enunciation of the fundamental principles which underlie all naval war.
+Those principles, if we have determined them correctly, should be found
+giving shape not only to strategy and tactics, but also to material,
+whatever method and means of naval warfare may be in use at any given time.
+Conversely, if we find strategy, tactics, or organisation exhibiting a
+tendency to reproduce the same forms under widely differing conditions of
+method and material, we should be able to show that those forms bear a
+constant and definite relation to the principles which our theory
+endeavours to express.
+
+In the case of Anson's threefold organisation, the relation is not far to
+seek, though it has become obscured by two maxims. The one is, that "the
+command of the sea depends upon battleships," and the other, that "cruisers
+are the eyes of the fleet." It is the inherent evil of maxims that they
+tend to get stretched beyond their original meaning. Both of these express
+a truth, but neither expresses the whole truth. On no theory of naval
+warfare can we expect to command the sea with battleships, nor, on the
+communication theory, can we regard the primary function of cruisers as
+being to scout for a battle-fleet. It is perfectly true that the control
+depends ultimately on the battle-fleet if control is disputed by a hostile
+battle-fleet, as it usually is. It is also true that, so far as is
+necessary to enable the battle-fleet to secure the control, we have to
+furnish it with eyes from our cruiser force. But it does not follow that
+this is the primary function of cruisers. The truth is, we have to withdraw
+them from their primary function in order to do work for the battle-fleet
+which it cannot do for itself.
+
+Well established as is the "Eyes of the fleet" maxim, it would be very
+difficult to show that scouting was ever regarded as the primary function
+of cruisers by the highest authorities. In Nelson's practice at least their
+paramount function was to exercise the control which he was securing with
+his battle-squadron. Nothing is more familiar in naval history than his
+incessant cry from the Mediterranean for more cruisers, but the
+significance of that cry has become obscured. It was not that his cruisers
+were not numerous in proportion to his battleships--they were usually
+nearly double in number--but it was rather that he was so deeply convinced
+of their true function, that he used them to exercise control to an extent
+which sometimes reduced his fleet cruisers below the limit of bare
+necessity. The result on a memorable occasion was the escape of the enemy's
+battle-fleet, but the further result is equally important. It was that the
+escape of that fleet did not deprive him of the control which he was
+charged to maintain. His judgment may have been at fault, but the
+strategical distribution of his force was consistent throughout the whole
+period of his Mediterranean command. Judged by his record, no man ever
+grasped more clearly than Nelson that the object of naval warfare was to
+control communications, and if he found that he had not a sufficient number
+of cruisers to exercise that control and to furnish eyes for his
+battle-fleet as well, it was the battle-fleet that was made to suffer, and
+surely this is at least the logical view. Had the French been ready to risk
+settling the question of the control in a fleet action, it would have been
+different. He would then have been right to sacrifice the exercise of
+control for the time in order to make sure that the action should take
+place and end decisively in his favour. But he knew they were not ready to
+take such a risk, and he refused to permit a purely defensive attitude on
+the part of the enemy to delude him from the special function with which he
+had been charged.
+
+If the object of naval warfare is to control communications, then the
+fundamental requirement is the means of exercising that control. Logically,
+therefore, if the enemy holds back from battle decision, we must relegate
+the battle-fleet to a secondary position, for cruisers are the means of
+exercising control; the battle-fleet is but the means of preventing their
+being interfered with in their work. Put it to the test of actual practice.
+In no case can we exercise control by battleships alone. Their
+specialisation has rendered them unfit for the work, and has made them too
+costly ever to be numerous enough. Even, therefore, if our enemy had no
+battle-fleet we could not make control effective with battleships alone. We
+should still require cruisers specialised for the work and in sufficient
+numbers to cover the necessary ground. But the converse is not true. We
+could exercise control with cruisers alone if the enemy had no battle-fleet
+to interfere with them.
+
+If, then, we seek a formula that will express the practical results of our
+theory, it would take some such shape as this. On cruisers depends our
+exercise of control; on the battle-fleet depends the security of control.
+That is the logical sequence of ideas, and it shows us that the current
+maxim is really the conclusion of a logical argument in which the initial
+steps must not be ignored. The maxim that the command of the sea depends on
+the battle-fleet is then perfectly sound so long as it is taken to include
+all the other facts on which it hangs. The true function of the
+battle-fleet is to protect cruisers and flotilla at their special work. The
+best means of doing this is of course to destroy the enemy's power of
+interference. The doctrine of destroying the enemy's armed forces as the
+paramount object here reasserts itself, and reasserts itself so strongly as
+to permit for most practical purposes the rough generalisation that the
+command depends upon the battle-fleet.
+
+Of what practical use then, it may be asked, is all this hairsplitting? Why
+not leave untainted the conviction that our first and foremost business is
+to crush the enemy's battle-fleet, and that to this end our whole effort
+should be concentrated? The answer is to point to Nelson's dilemma. It was
+a dilemma which, in the golden age of naval warfare, every admiral at sea
+had had to solve for himself, and it was always one of the most difficult
+details of every naval war plan. If we seek to ensure the effective action
+of the battle-fleet by giving it a large proportion of cruisers, by so much
+do we weaken the actual and continuous exercise of control. If we seek to
+make that control effective by devoting to the service a large proportion
+of cruisers, by so much do we prejudice our chance of getting contact with
+and defeating the enemy's battle-fleet, which is the only means of
+perfecting control.
+
+The correct solution of the dilemma will of course depend upon the
+conditions of each case--mainly upon the relative strength and activity of
+the hostile battle-fleet and our enemy's probable intentions. But no matter
+how completely we have tabulated all the relevant facts, we can never hope
+to come to a sound conclusion upon them without a just appreciation of all
+the elements which go to give command, and without the power of gauging
+their relative importance. This, and this alone, will ultimately settle the
+vital question of what proportion of our cruiser force it is right to
+devote to the battle-fleet.
+
+If the doctrine of cruiser control be correct, then every cruiser attached
+to the battle-fleet is one withdrawn from its true function. Such
+withdrawals are inevitable. A squadron of battleships is an imperfect
+organism unable to do its work without cruiser assistance, and since the
+performance of its work is essential to cruiser freedom, some cruisers must
+be sacrificed. But in what proportion? If we confine ourselves to the view
+that command depends on the battle-fleet, then we shall attach to it such a
+number as its commander may deem necessary to make contact with the enemy
+absolutely certain and to surround himself with an impenetrable screen. If
+we knew the enemy was as anxious for a decision as ourselves, such a course
+might be justified. But the normal condition is that if we desire a
+decision it is because we have definite hopes of success, and consequently
+the enemy will probably seek to avoid one on our terms. In practice this
+means that if we have perfected our arrangements for the destruction of his
+main fleet he will refuse to expose it till he sees a more favourable
+opportunity. And what will be the result? He remains on the defensive, and
+theoretically all the ensuing period of inaction tends to fall into his
+scale. Without stirring from port his fleet is doing its work. The more
+closely he induces us to concentrate our cruiser force in face of his
+battle-fleet, the more he frees the sea for the circulation of his own
+trade, and the more he exposes ours to cruiser raids.
+
+Experience, then, and theory alike dictate that as a general principle
+cruisers should be regarded as primarily concerned with the active
+occupation of communications, and that withdrawals for fleet purposes
+should be reduced to the furthest margin of reasonable risk. What that
+margin should be can only be decided on the circumstances of each case as
+it arises, and by the personal characteristics of the officers who are
+responsible. Nelson's practice was to reduce fleet cruisers lower than
+perhaps any other commander. So small indeed was the margin of efficiency
+he left, that in the campaign already cited, when his judgment was ripest,
+one stroke of ill-luck--a chance betrayal of his position by a
+neutral--availed to deprive him of the decision he sought, and to let the
+enemy's fleet escape.
+
+We arrive, then, at this general conclusion. The object of naval warfare is
+to control maritime communications. In order to exercise that control
+effectively we must have a numerous class of vessels specially adapted for
+pursuit. But their power of exercising control is in proportion to our
+degree of command, that is, to our power of preventing their operations
+being interfered with by the enemy. Their own power of resistance is in
+inverse proportion to their power of exercising control; that is to say,
+the more numerous and better adapted they are for preying on commerce and
+transports, the weaker will be their individual fighting power. We cannot
+give them as a whole the power of resisting disturbance without at the same
+time reducing their power of exercising control. The accepted solution of
+the difficulty during the great period of Anson's school was to provide
+them with a covering force of battle units specially adapted for fighting.
+But here arises a correlative difficulty. In so far as we give our battle
+units fighting power we deny them scouting power, and scouting is essential
+to their effective operation. The battle-fleet must have eyes. Now, vessels
+adapted for control of communications are also well adapted for "eyes." It
+becomes the practice, therefore, to withdraw from control operations a
+sufficient number of units to enable the battle-fleet to cover effectively
+the operations of those that remain.
+
+Such were the broad principles on which the inevitable dilemma always had
+to be solved, and on which Anson's organisation was based. They flow
+naturally from the communication theory of maritime war, and it was this
+theory which then dominated naval thought, as is apparent from the
+technical use of such phrases as "lines of passage and communication." The
+war plans of the great strategists from Anson and Barham can always be
+resolved into these simple elements, and where we find the Admiralty grip
+of them loosened, we have the confusion and quite unnecessary failures of
+the War of American Independence. In that mismanaged contest the cardinal
+mistake was that we suffered the enemy's battle-fleets to get upon and
+occupy the vital lines of "passage and communication" without first
+bringing them to action, an error partly due to the unreadiness of a weak
+administration, and partly to an insufficient allocation of cruisers to
+secure contact at the right places.
+
+So far, then, the principles on which our naval supremacy was built up are
+clear. For the enemies with whom we had to deal Anson's system was
+admirably conceived. Both Spain and France held the communication theory so
+strongly, that they were content to count as success the power of
+continually disturbing our control without any real attempt to secure it
+for themselves. To defeat such a policy Anson's constitution and the
+strategy it connoted were thoroughly well adapted and easy to work. But it
+by no means follows that his doctrine is the last word. Even in his own
+time complications had begun to develop which tended to confuse the
+precision of his system. By the culminating year of Trafalgar there were
+indications that it was getting worn out, while the new methods and
+material used by the Americans in 1812 made a serious rent in it. The
+disturbances then inaugurated have continued to develop, and it is
+necessary to consider how seriously they have confused the problem of fleet
+constitution.
+
+Firstly, there is the general recognition, always patent to ourselves, that
+by far the most drastic, economical, and effective way of securing control
+is to destroy the enemy's means of interfering with it. In our own service
+this "overthrow" idea always tended to assert itself so strongly, that
+occasionally the means became for a time more important than the end; that
+is to say, circumstances were such that on occasions it was considered
+advisable to sacrifice the exercise of control for a time in order quickly
+and permanently to deprive the enemy of all means of interference. When
+there was reasonable hope of the enemy risking a decision this
+consideration tended to override all others; but when, as in Nelson's case
+in the Mediterranean, the hope was small, the exercise of control tended to
+take the paramount place.
+
+The second complexity arose from the fact that however strong might be our
+battleship cover, it is impossible for it absolutely to secure cruiser
+control from disturbance by sporadic attack. Isolated heavy ships, taking
+advantage of the chances of the sea, could elude even the strictest
+blockade, and one such ship, if she succeeded in getting upon a line of
+communication, might paralyse the operations of a number of weaker units.
+They must either run or concentrate, and in either case the control was
+broken. If it were a squadron of heavy ships that caused the disturbance,
+the practice was to detach against it a division of the covering
+battle-fleet. But it was obviously highly inconvenient and contrary to the
+whole idea on which the constitution of the fleet was based to allow every
+slight danger to cruiser control to loosen the cohesion of the main fleet.
+
+It was necessary, then, to give cruiser lines some power of resistance.
+This necessity once admitted, there seemed no point at which you could stop
+increasing the fighting power of your cruisers, and sooner or later, unless
+some means of checking the process were found, the distinction between
+cruisers and battleships would practically disappear. Such a means was
+found in what may be called the "Intermediate" ship. Frigates did indeed
+continue to increase in size and fighting power throughout the remainder of
+the sailing era, but it was not only in this manner that the power of
+resistance was gained. The evil results of the movement were checked by the
+introduction of a supporting ship, midway between frigates and true
+ships-of-the-line. Sometimes classed as a battleship, and taking her place
+in the line, the 50-gun ship came to be essentially a type for stiffening
+cruiser squadrons. They most commonly appear as the flagships of cruiser
+commodores, or stationed in terminal waters or at focal points where
+sporadic raids were likely to fall and be most destructive. The strategical
+effect of the presence of such a vessel in a cruiser line was to give the
+whole line in some degree the strength of the intermediate ship; for any
+hostile cruiser endeavouring to disturb the line was liable to have to deal
+with the supporting ship, while if a frigate and a 50-gun ship got together
+they were a match even for a small ship-of-the-line.
+
+In sailing days, of course, this power of the supporting ship was weak
+owing to the imperfection of the means of distant communication between
+ships at sea and the non-existence of such means beyond extreme range of
+vision. But as wireless telegraphy develops it is not unreasonable to
+expect that the strategic value of the supporting or intermediate ship will
+be found greater than it ever was in sailing days, and that for dealing
+with sporadic disturbance the tendency will be for a cruiser line to
+approximate more and more in power of resistance to that of its strongest
+unit.
+
+For fleet service a cruiser's power of resistance was hardly less valuable;
+for though we speak of fleet cruisers as the eyes of the fleet, their
+purpose is almost equally to blindfold the enemy. Their duty is not only to
+disclose the movements of the enemy, but also to act as a screen to conceal
+our own. The point was specially well marked in the blockades, where the
+old 50-gun ships are almost always found with the inshore cruiser squadron,
+preventing that squadron being forced by inquisitive frigates. Important as
+this power of resistance in the screen was in the old days, it is tenfold
+more important now, and the consequent difficulty of keeping cruisers
+distinct from battleships is greater than ever. The reason for this is best
+considered under the third and most serious cause of complexity.
+
+The third cause is the acquisition by the flotilla of battle power. It is a
+feature of naval warfare that is entirely new.[10] For all practical
+purposes it was unknown until the full development of the mobile torpedo.
+It is true that the fireship as originally conceived was regarded as having
+something of the same power. During the Dutch wars--the heyday of its
+vogue--its assigned power was on some occasions actually realised, as in
+the burning of Lord Sandwich's flagship at the battle of Solebay, and the
+destruction of the Spanish-Dutch fleet at Palermo by Duquesne. But as the
+"nimbleness" of great-ships increased with the ripening of seamanship and
+naval architecture, the fireship as a battle weapon became almost
+negligible, while a fleet at anchor was found to be thoroughly defensible
+by its own picket-boats. Towards the middle of the eighteenth century
+indeed the occasions on which the fireship could be used for its special
+purpose was regarded as highly exceptional, and though the type was
+retained till the end of the century, its normal functions differed not at
+all from those of the rest of the flotilla of which it then formed part.
+
+  [10] But not without analogous precedent. In the later Middle Ages small
+  craft were assigned the function in battle of trying to wedge up the
+  rudders of great ships or bore holes between wind and water. See Fighting
+  Instructions (Navy Record Society), p. 13.
+
+Those functions, as we have seen, expressed the cruising idea in its purest
+sense. It was numbers and mobility that determined flotilla types rather
+than armament or capacity for sea-endurance. Their primary purpose was to
+control communications in home and colonial waters against weakly armed
+privateers. The type which these duties determined fitted them adequately
+for the secondary purpose of inshore and despatch work with a fleet. It
+was, moreover, on the ubiquity which their numbers gave them, and on their
+power of dealing with unarmed or lightly armed vessels, that we relied for
+our first line of defence against invasion. These latter duties were of
+course exceptional, and the Navy List did not carry as a rule sufficient
+numbers for the purpose. But a special value of the class was that it was
+capable of rapid and almost indefinite expansion from the mercantile
+marine. Anything that could carry a gun had its use, and during the period
+of the Napoleonic threat the defence flotilla rose all told to considerably
+over a thousand units.
+
+Formidable and effective as was a flotilla of this type for the ends it was
+designed to serve, it obviously in no way affected the security of a
+battle-fleet. But so soon as the flotilla acquired battle power the whole
+situation was changed, and the old principles of cruiser design and
+distribution were torn to shreds. The battle-fleet became a more imperfect
+organism than ever. Formerly it was only its offensive power that required
+supplementing. The new condition meant that unaided it could no longer
+ensure its own defence. It now required screening, not only from
+observation, but also from flotilla attack. The theoretical weakness of an
+arrested offensive received a practical and concrete illustration to a
+degree that war had scarcely ever known. Our most dearly cherished
+strategical traditions were shaken to the bottom. The "proper place" for
+our battle-fleet had always been "on the enemy's coasts," and now that was
+precisely where the enemy would be best pleased to see it. What was to be
+done? So splendid a tradition could not lightly be laid aside, but the
+attempt to preserve it involved us still deeper in heresy. The vital, most
+difficult, and most absorbing problem has become not how to increase the
+power of a battle-fleet for attack, which is a comparatively simple matter,
+but how to defend it. As the offensive power of the flotilla developed, the
+problem pressed with an almost bewildering intensity. With every increase
+in the speed and sea-keeping power of torpedo craft, the problem of the
+screen grew more exacting. To keep the hostile flotilla out of night range
+the screen must be flung out wider and wider, and this meant more and more
+cruisers withdrawn from their primary function. And not only this. The
+screen must not only be far flung, but it must be made as far as possible
+impenetrable. In other words, its own power of resistance must be increased
+all along the line. Whole squadrons of armoured cruisers had to be attached
+to battle-fleets to support the weaker members of the screen. The crying
+need for this type of ship set up a rapid movement for increasing their
+fighting power, and with it fell with equal rapidity the economic
+possibility of giving the cruiser class its essential attribute of numbers.
+
+As an inevitable result we find ourselves involved in an effort to restore
+to the flotilla some of its old cruiser capacity, by endowing it with gun
+armament, higher sea-keeping power, and facilities for distant
+communication, all at the cost of specialisation and of greater economic
+strain. Still judged by past experience, some means of increasing numbers
+in the cruising types is essential, nor is it clear how it is possible to
+secure that essential in the ranks of the true cruiser. No point has been
+found at which it was possible to stop the tendency of this class of vessel
+to increase in size and cost, or to recall it to the strategical position
+it used to occupy. So insecure is the battle-squadron, so imperfect as a
+self-contained weapon has it become, that its need has overridden the old
+order of things, and the primary function of the cruising ship inclines to
+be no longer the exercise of control under cover of the battle-fleet. The
+battle-fleet now demands protection by the cruising ship, and what the
+battle-fleet needs is held to be the first necessity.
+
+Judged by the old naval practice, it is an anomalous position to have
+reached. But the whole naval art has suffered a revolution beyond all
+previous experience, and it is possible the old practice is no longer a
+safe guide. Driven by the same necessities, every naval Power is following
+the same course. It may be right, it may be wrong; no one at least but the
+ignorant or hasty will venture to pass categorical judgment. The best we
+can do is to endeavour to realise the situation to which, in spite of all
+misgivings, we have been forced, and to determine its relations to the
+developments of the past.
+
+It is undoubtedly a difficult task. As we have seen, there have prevailed
+in the constitution of fleets at various times several methods of
+expressing the necessities of naval war. The present system differs from
+them all. On the one hand, we have the fact that the latest developments of
+cruiser power have finally obliterated all logical distinction between
+cruisers and battleships, and we thus find ourselves hand in hand with the
+fleet constitution of the old Dutch wars. On the other, however, we have
+armoured cruisers organised in squadrons and attached to battle-fleets not
+only for strategical purposes, but also with as yet undeveloped tactical
+functions in battle. Here we come close to the latest development of the
+sailing era, when "Advanced" or "Light" squadrons began to appear in the
+organisation of battle-fleets.
+
+The system arose towards the end of the eighteenth century in the
+Mediterranean, where the conditions of control called for so wide a
+dispersal of cruisers and so great a number of them, that it was almost
+imperative for a battle-squadron in that sea to do much of its own
+scouting. It was certainly for this purpose that the fastest and lightest
+ships-of-the-line were formed into a separate unit, and the first
+designation it received was that of "Observation Squadron." It remained for
+Nelson to endeavour to endow it with a tactical function, but his idea was
+never realised either by himself or any of his successors.
+
+Side by side with this new element in the organisation of a battle-fleet,
+which perhaps is best designated as a "Light Division," we have another
+significant fact. Not only was it not always composed entirely of
+ships-of-the-line, especially in the French service, but in 1805, the year
+of the full development, we have Sir Richard Strachan using the heavy
+frigates attached to his battle-squadron as a "Light Division," and giving
+them a definite tactical function. The collapse of the French Navy put a
+stop to further developments of either idea. Whither they would have led we
+cannot tell. But it is impossible to shut our eyes to the indication of a
+growing tendency towards the system that exists at present. It is difficult
+at least to ignore the fact that both Nelson and Strachan in that
+culminating year found the actuality of war calling for something for which
+there was then no provision in the constitution of the fleet, but which it
+does contain to-day. What Nelson felt for was a battleship of cruiser
+speed. What Strachan desired was a cruiser fit to take a tactical part in a
+fleet action. We have them both, but with what result? Anson's
+specialisation of types has almost disappeared, and our present fleet
+constitution is scarcely to be distinguished from that of the seventeenth
+century. We retain the three-fold nomenclature, but the system itself has
+really gone. Battleships grade into armoured cruisers, armoured cruisers
+into protected cruisers. We can scarcely detect any real distinction except
+a twofold one between vessels whose primary armament is the gun and vessels
+whose primary armament is the torpedo. But even here the existence of a
+type of cruiser designed to act with flotillas blurs the outline, while, as
+we have seen, the larger units of the flotilla are grading up to cruiser
+level.
+
+We are thus face to face with a situation which has its closest counterpart
+in the structureless fleets of the seventeenth century. That naval thought
+should have so nearly retraced its steps in the course of two centuries is
+curious enough, but it is still more striking when we consider how widely
+the underlying causes differ in each case. The pressure which has forced
+the present situation is due most obviously to two causes. One is the
+excessive development of the "intermediate" ship originally devised for
+purposes of commerce protection, and dictated by a menace which the
+experience of the American War had taught us to respect. The other is the
+introduction of the torpedo, and the consequent vulnerability of
+battle-squadrons that are not securely screened. Nothing of the kind had
+any influence on the fleet constitution of the seventeenth century. But if
+we seek deeper, there is a less obvious consideration which for what it is
+worth is too striking to be ignored.
+
+It has been suggested above that the constitution of fleets appears to have
+some more or less recognisable relation to the prevalent theory of war.
+Now, amongst all our uncertainty we can assert with confidence that the
+theory which holds the field at the present day bears the closest possible
+resemblance to that which dominated the soldier-admirals of the Dutch war.
+It was the "Overthrow" theory, the firm faith in the decisive action as the
+key of all strategical problems. They carried it to sea with them from the
+battlefields of the New Model Army, and the Dutch met them squarely. In the
+first war at least their commerce had to give place to the exigencies of
+throwing into the battle everything that could affect the issue. It is not
+of course pretended that this attitude was dictated by any clearly
+conceived theory of absolute war. It was due rather to the fact that, owing
+to the relative geographical conditions, all attempts to guard trade
+communications were useless without the command of the home waters in the
+North Sea, and the truth received a clinching moral emphasis from the
+British claim to the actual dominion of the Narrow Seas. It was, in fact, a
+war which resembled rather the continental conditions of territorial
+conquest than the naval procedure that characterised our rivalry with
+France.
+
+Is it then possible, however much we may resist the conclusion in loyalty
+to the eighteenth-century tradition, that the rise of a new naval Power in
+the room of Holland must bring us back to the drastic, if crude, methods of
+the Dutch wars, and force us to tread under foot the nicer ingenuity of
+Anson's system? Is it this which has tempted us to mistrust any type of
+vessel which cannot be flung into the battle? The recurrence of a
+formidable rival in the North Sea was certainly not the first cause of the
+reaction. It began before that menace arose. Still it has undoubtedly
+forced the pace, and even if it be not a cause, it may well be a
+justification.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                  CHAPTER THREE
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+              THEORY OF THE METHOD--
+     CONCENTRATION AND DISPERSAL OF FORCE
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+From the point of view of the method by which its ends are obtained,
+strategy is often described as the art of assembling the utmost force at
+the right time and place; and this method is called "Concentration."
+
+At first sight the term seems simple and expressive enough, but on analysis
+it will be found to include several distinct ideas, to all of which the
+term is applied indifferently. The result is a source of some confusion,
+even to the most lucid writers. "The word concentration," says one of the
+most recent of them, "evokes the idea of a grouping of forces. We believe,
+in fact, that we cannot make war without grouping ships into squadrons and
+squadrons into fleets."[11] Here in one sentence the word hovers between
+the formation of fleets and their strategical distribution. Similar
+looseness will embarrass the student at every turn. At one time he will
+find the word used to express the antithesis of division or dispersal of
+force; at another, to express strategic deployment, which implies division
+to a greater or less extent. He will find it used of the process of
+assembling a force, as well as of the state of a force when the process is
+complete. The truth is that the term, which is one of the most common and
+most necessary in strategical discussion, has never acquired a very precise
+meaning, and this lack of precision is one of the commonest causes of
+conflicting opinion and questionable judgments. No strategical term indeed
+calls more urgently for a clear determination of the ideas for which it
+stands.
+
+  [11] Daveluy, _L'Esprit de la Guerre Navale_, vol. i, p. 27, note.
+
+Military phraseology, from which the word is taken, employs "concentration"
+in three senses. It is used for assembling the units of an army after they
+have been mobilised. In this sense, concentration is mainly an
+administrative process; logically, it means the complement of the process
+of mobilisation, whereby the army realises its war organisation and becomes
+ready to take the field. In a second sense it is used for the process of
+moving the army when formed, or in process of formation, to the localities
+from which operations can best begin. This is a true strategical stage, and
+it culminates in what is known as strategic deployment. Finally, it is used
+for the ultimate stage when the army so deployed is closed up upon a
+definite line of operations in immediate readiness for tactical
+deployment--gathered up, that is, to deal a concentrated blow.
+
+Well as this terminology appears to serve on land, where the processes tend
+to overlap, something more exact is required if we try to extend it to the
+sea. Such extension magnifies the error at every step, and clear thinking
+becomes difficult. Even if we set aside the first meaning, that is, the
+final stage of mobilisation, we have still to deal with the two others
+which, in a great measure, are mutually contradictory. The essential
+distinction of strategic deployment, which contemplates dispersal with a
+view to a choice of combinations, is flexibility and free movement. The
+characteristic of an army massed for a blow is rigidity and restricted
+mobility. In the one sense of concentration we contemplate a disposal of
+force which will conceal our intention from the enemy and will permit us to
+adapt our movements to the plan of operations he develops. In the other,
+strategic concealment is at an end. We have made our choice, and are
+committed to a definite operation. Clearly, then, if we would apply the
+principles of land concentration to naval warfare it is desirable to settle
+which of the two phases of an operation we mean by the term.
+
+Which meaning, then, is most closely connected with the ordinary use of the
+word? The dictionaries define concentration as "the state of being brought
+to a common point or centre," and this coincides very exactly with the
+stage of a war plan which intervenes between the completion of mobilisation
+and the final massing or deployment for battle. It is an incomplete and
+continuing act. Its ultimate consequence is the mass. It is a method of
+securing mass at the right time and place. As we have seen, the essence of
+the state of strategic deployment to which it leads is flexibility. In war
+the choice of time and place will always be influenced by the enemy's
+dispositions and movements, or by our desire to deal him an unexpected
+blow. The merit of concentration, then, in this sense, is its power of
+permitting us to form our mass in time at one of the greatest number of
+different points where mass may be required.
+
+It is for this stage that the more recent text-books incline to specialise
+concentration--qualifying it as "strategic concentration." But even that
+term scarcely meets the case, for the succeeding process of gathering up
+the army into a position for tactical deployment is also a strategical
+concentration. Some further specialisation is required. The analytical
+difference between the two processes is that the first is an operation of
+major strategy and the other of minor, and if they are to be fully
+expressed, we have to weight ourselves with the terms "major and minor
+strategic concentration."
+
+Such cumbrous terminology is too forbidding to use. It serves only to mark
+that the middle stage differs logically from the third as much as it does
+from the first. In practice it comes to this. If we are going to use
+concentration in its natural sense, we must regard it as something that
+comes after complete mobilisation and stops short of the formation of mass.
+
+In naval warfare at least this distinction between concentration and mass
+is essential to clear appreciation. It leads us to conclusions that are of
+the first importance. For instance, when once the mass is formed,
+concealment and flexibility are at an end. The further, therefore, from the
+formation of the ultimate mass we can stop the process of concentration the
+better designed it will be. The less we are committed to any particular
+mass, and the less we indicate what and where our mass is to be, the more
+formidable our concentration. To concentration, therefore, the idea of
+division is as essential as the idea of connection. It is this view of the
+process which, at least for naval warfare, a weighty critical authority has
+most strongly emphasised. "Such," he says, "is concentration reasonably
+understood--not huddled together like a drove of sheep, but distributed
+with a regard to a common purpose, and linked together by the effectual
+energy of a single will."[12] Vessels in a state of concentration he
+compares to a fan that opens and shuts. In this view concentration connotes
+not a homogeneous body, but a compound organism controlled from a common
+centre, and elastic enough to permit it to cover a wide field without
+sacrificing the mutual support of its parts.
+
+  [12] Mahan, _War of 1812_, i, 316.
+
+If, then, we exclude the meaning of mere assembling and the meaning of the
+mass, we have left a signification which expresses coherent disposal about
+a strategical centre, and this it will be seen gives for naval warfare just
+the working definition that we want as the counterpart of strategic
+deployment on land. The object of a naval concentration like that of
+strategic deployment will be to cover the widest possible area, and to
+preserve at the same time elastic cohesion, so as to secure rapid
+condensations of any two or more of the parts of the organism, and in any
+part of the area to be covered, at the will of the controlling mind; and
+above all, a sure and rapid condensation of the whole at the strategical
+centre.
+
+Concentration of this nature, moreover, will be the expression of a war
+plan which, while solidly based on an ultimate central mass, still
+preserves the faculty of delivering or meeting minor attacks in any
+direction. It will permit us to exercise control of the sea while we await
+and work for the opportunity of a decision which shall permanently secure
+control, and it will permit this without prejudicing our ability of
+bringing the utmost force to bear when the moment for the decision arrives.
+Concentration, in fact, implies a continual conflict between cohesion and
+reach, and for practical purposes it is the right adjustment of those two
+tensions--ever shifting in force--which constitutes the greater part of
+practical strategy.
+
+In naval warfare this concentration stage has a peculiar significance in
+the development of a campaign, and at sea it is more clearly detached than
+ashore. Owing to the vast size of modern armies, and the restricted nature
+of their lines of movement, no less than their lower intrinsic mobility as
+compared with fleets, the processes of assembly, concentration, and forming
+the battle mass tend to grade into one another without any demarcation of
+practical value. An army frequently reaches the stage of strategic
+deployment direct from the mobilisation bases of its units, and on famous
+occasions its only real concentration has taken place on the battlefield.
+In Continental warfare, then, there is less difficulty in using the term to
+cover all three processes. Their tendency is always to overlap. But at sea,
+where communications are free and unrestricted by obstacles, and where
+mobility is high, they are susceptible of sharper differentiation. The
+normal course is for a fleet to assemble at a naval port; thence by a
+distinct movement it proceeds to the strategical centre and reaches out in
+divisions as required. The concentration about that centre may be very far
+from a mass, and the final formation of the mass will bear no resemblance
+to either of the previous movements, and will be quite distinct.
+
+But free as a fleet is from the special fetters of an army, there always
+exist at sea peculiar conditions of friction which clog its freedom of
+disposition. One source of this friction is commerce protection. However
+much our war plan may press for close concentration, the need of commerce
+protection will always be calling for dispersal. The other source is the
+peculiar freedom and secrecy of movements at sea. As the sea knows no roads
+to limit or indicate our own lines of operation, so it tells little about
+those of the enemy. The most distant and widely dispersed points must be
+kept in view as possible objectives of the enemy. When we add to this that
+two or more fleets can act in conjunction from widely separated bases with
+far greater certainty than is possible for armies, it is obvious that the
+variety of combinations is much higher at sea than on land, and variety of
+combination is in constant opposition to the central mass.
+
+It follows that so long as the enemy's fleet is divided, and thereby
+retains various possibilities of either concentrated or sporadic action,
+our distribution will be dictated by the need of being able to deal with a
+variety of combinations and to protect a variety of objectives. Our
+concentrations must therefore be kept as open and flexible as possible.
+History accordingly shows us that the riper and fresher our experience and
+the surer our grip of war, the looser were our concentrations. The idea of
+massing, as a virtue in itself, is bred in peace and not in war. It
+indicates the debilitating idea that in war we must seek rather to avoid
+than to inflict defeat. True, advocates of the mass entrench themselves in
+the plausible conception that their aim is to inflict crushing defeats. But
+this too is an idea of peace. War has proved to the hilt that victories
+have not only to be won, but worked for. They must be worked for by bold
+strategical combinations, which as a rule entail at least apparent
+dispersal. They can only be achieved by taking risks, and the greatest and
+most effective of these is division.
+
+The effect of prolonged peace has been to make "concentration" a kind of
+shibboleth, so that the division of a fleet tends almost to be regarded as
+a sure mark of bad leadership. Critics have come to lose sight of the old
+war experience, that without division no strategical combinations are
+possible. In truth they must be founded on division. Division is bad only
+when it is pushed beyond the limits of well-knit deployment. It is
+theoretically wrong to place a section of the fleet in such a position that
+it may be prevented from falling back on its strategical centre when it is
+encountered by a superior force. Such retreats of course can never be made
+certain; they will always depend in some measure on the skill and resource
+of the opposing commanders, and on the chances of weather: but risks must
+be taken. If we risk nothing, we shall seldom perform anything. The great
+leader is the man who can measure rightly to what breadth of deployment he
+can stretch his concentration. This power of bold and sure adjustment
+between cohesion and reach is indeed a supreme test of that judgment which
+in the conduct of war takes the place of strategical theory.
+
+In British naval history examples of faulty division are hard to find. The
+case most commonly cited is an early one. It occurred in 1666 during the
+second Dutch war. Monk and Rupert were in command of the main fleet, which
+from its mobilisation bases in the Thames and at Spithead had concentrated
+in the Downs. There they were awaiting De Ruyter's putting to sea in a
+position from which they could deal with him whether his object was an
+attack on the Thames or to join hands with the French. In this position a
+rumour reached them that the Toulon squadron was on its way to the Channel
+to co-operate with the Dutch. Upon this false intelligence the fleet was
+divided, and Rupert went back to Portsmouth to cover that position in case
+it might be the French objective. De Ruyter at once put to sea with a fleet
+greatly superior to Monk's division. Monk, however, taking advantage of
+thick weather that had supervened, surprised him at anchor, and believing
+he had a sufficient tactical advantage attacked him impetuously. Meanwhile
+the real situation became known. There was no French fleet, and Rupert was
+recalled. He succeeded in rejoining Monk after his action with De Ruyter
+had lasted three days. In the course of it Monk had been very severely
+handled and forced to retreat to the Thames, and it was generally believed
+that it was only the belated arrival of Rupert that saved us from a real
+disaster.
+
+The strategy in this case is usually condemned out of hand and made to bear
+the entire blame of the reverse. Monk, who as a soldier had proved himself
+one of the finest strategists of the time, is held to have blundered from
+sheer ignorance of elementary principles. It is assumed that he should have
+kept his fleet massed; but his critics fail to observe that at least in the
+opinion of the time this would not have met the case. Had he kept the whole
+to deal with De Ruyter, it is probable that De Ruyter would not have put to
+sea, and it is certain Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight would have lain
+open to the French had they come. If he had moved his mass to deal with the
+French, he would have exposed the Thames to De Ruyter. It was a situation
+that could not be solved by a simple application of what the French call
+the _masse centrale_. The only way to secure both places from attack was to
+divide the fleet, just as in 1801 Nelson in the same theatre was compelled
+to divide his defence force. In neither case was division a fault, because
+it was a necessity. The fault in Monk's and Rupert's case was that they
+extended their reach with no proper provision to preserve cohesion. Close
+cruiser connection should have been maintained between the two divisions,
+and Monk should not have engaged deeply till he felt Rupert at his elbow.
+This we are told was the opinion of most of his flag-officers. They held
+that he should not have fought when he did. His correct course, on
+Kempenfelt's principle, would have been to hang on De Ruyter so as to
+prevent his doing anything, and to have slowly fallen back, drawing the
+Dutch after him till his loosened concentration was closed up again. If De
+Ruyter had refused to follow him through the Straits, there would have been
+plenty of time to mass the fleet. If De Ruyter had followed, he could have
+been fought in a position from which there would have been no escape. The
+fault, in fact, was not strategical, but rather one of tactical judgment.
+Monk over-estimated the advantage of his surprise and the relative fighting
+values of the two fleets, and believed he saw his way to victory
+single-handed. The danger of division is being surprised and forced to
+fight in inferiority. This was not Monk's case. He was not surprised, and
+he could easily have avoided action had he so desired. To judge such a case
+simply by using concentration as a touchstone can only tend to set up such
+questionable habits of thought as have condemned the more famous division
+which occurred in the crisis of the campaign of 1805, and with which we
+must deal later.
+
+Apart from the general danger of using either words or maxims in this way,
+it is obviously specially unwise in the case of concentration and division.
+The current rule is that it is bad to divide unless you have a great
+superiority; yet there have been numerous occasions when, being at war with
+an inferior enemy, we have found our chief embarrassment in the fact that
+he kept his fleet divided, and was able thereby to set up something like a
+deadlock. The main object of our naval operations would then be to break it
+down. To force an inferior enemy to concentrate is indeed the almost
+necessary preliminary to securing one of those crushing victories at which
+we must always aim, but which so seldom are obtained. It is by forcing the
+enemy to attempt to concentrate that we get our opportunity by sagacious
+dispersal of crushing his divisions in detail. It is by inducing him to
+mass that we simplify our problem and compel him to choose between leaving
+to us the exercise of command and putting it to the decision of a great
+action.
+
+Advocates of close concentration will reply that that is true enough. We do
+often seek to force our enemy to concentrate, but that does not show that
+concentration is sometimes a disadvantage, for we ourselves must
+concentrate closely to force a similar concentration on the enemy. The
+maxim, indeed, has become current that concentration begets concentration,
+but it is not too much to say that it is a maxim which history flatly
+contradicts. If the enemy is willing to hazard all on a battle, it is true.
+But if we are too superior, or our concentration too well arranged for him
+to hope for victory, then our concentration has almost always had the
+effect of forcing him to disperse for sporadic action. So certain was this
+result, that in our old wars, in which we were usually superior, we always
+adopted the loosest possible concentrations in order to prevent sporadic
+action. True, the tendency of the French to adopt this mode of warfare is
+usually set down to some constitutional ineptitude that is outside
+strategical theory, but this view is due rather to the irritation which the
+method caused us, than to sober reasoning. For a comparatively weak
+belligerent sporadic action was better than nothing, and the only other
+alternative was for him to play into our hands by hazarding the decision
+which it was our paramount interest to obtain. Sporadic action alone could
+never give our enemy command of the sea, but it could do us injury and
+embarrass our plans, and there was always hope it might so much loosen our
+concentration as to give him a fair chance of obtaining a series of
+successful minor decisions.
+
+Take, now, the leading case of 1805. In that campaign our distribution was
+very wide, and was based on several concentrations. The first had its
+centre in the Downs, and extended not only athwart the invading army's line
+of passage, but also over the whole North Sea, so as to prevent
+interference with our trade or our system of coast defence either from the
+Dutch in the Texel or from French squadrons arriving north-about. The
+second, which was known as the Western Squadron, had its centre off Ushant,
+and was spread over the whole Bay of Biscay by means of advanced squadrons
+before Ferrol and Rochefort. With a further squadron off the coast of
+Ireland, it was able also to reach far out into the Atlantic in order to
+receive our trade. It kept guard, in fact, not only over the French naval
+ports, but over the approaches to the Channel, where were the home
+terminals of the great southern and western trade-routes. A third
+concentration was in the Mediterranean, whose centre under Nelson was at
+Sardinia. It had outlying sub-centres at Malta and Gibraltar, and covered
+the whole ground from Cape St. Vincent outside the Straits to Toulon,
+Trieste, and the Dardanelles. When war broke out with Spain in 1804, it was
+considered advisable to divide this command, and Spanish waters outside the
+Straits were held by a fourth concentration, whose centre was off Cadiz,
+and whose northern limit was Cape Finisterre, where it joined the Ushant
+concentration. For reasons which were personal rather than strategical this
+arrangement was not continued long, nor indeed after a few months was there
+the same need for it, for the Toulon squadron had changed its base to
+Cadiz. By this comprehensive system the whole of the European seas were
+controlled both for military and trade purposes. In the distant terminal
+areas, like the East and West Indies, there were nucleus concentrations
+with the necessary connective machinery permanently established, and to
+render them effective, provision was made by which the various European
+squadrons could throw off detachments to bring up their force to any
+strength which the movements of the enemy might render necessary.
+
+Wide as was this distribution, and great as its reach, a high degree of
+cohesion was maintained not only between the parts of each concentration,
+but between the several concentrations themselves. By means of a minor
+cruiser centre at the Channel Islands, the Downs and Ushant concentrations
+could rapidly cohere. Similarly the Cadiz concentration was linked up with
+that of Ushant at Finisterre, and but for personal friction and repulsion,
+the cohesion between the Mediterranean and Cadiz concentrations would have
+been equally strong. Finally, there was a masterly provision made for all
+the concentrations to condense into one great mass at the crucial point off
+Ushant before by any calculable chance a hostile mass could gather there.
+
+For Napoleon's best admirals, "who knew the craft of the sea," the British
+fleet thus disposed was in a state of concentration that nothing but a
+stroke of luck beyond the limit of sober calculation could break. Decres
+and Bruix had no doubt of it, and the knowledge overpowered Villeneuve when
+the crisis came. After he had carried the concentration which Napoleon had
+planned so far as to have united three divisions in Ferrol, he knew that
+the outlying sections of our Western Squadron had disappeared from before
+Ferrol and Rochefort. In his eyes, as well as those of the British
+Admiralty, this squadron, in spite of its dispersal in the Bay of Biscay,
+had always been in a state of concentration. It was not this which caused
+his heart to fail. It was the news that Nelson had reappeared at Gibraltar,
+and had been seen steering northward. It meant for him that the whole of
+his enemy's European fleet was in a state of concentration. "Their
+concentration of force," he afterwards wrote, "was at the moment more
+serious than in any previous disposition, and such that they were in a
+position to meet in superiority the combined forces of Brest and Ferrol,"
+and for that reason, he explained, he had given up the game as lost. But to
+Napoleon's unpractised eye it was impossible to see what it was he had to
+deal with. Measuring the elasticity of the British naval distribution by
+the comparatively cumbrous and restricted mobility of armies, he saw it as
+a rash and unwarlike dispersal. Its looseness seemed to indicate so great a
+tenderness for the distant objectives that lay open to his scattered
+squadrons, that he believed by a show of sporadic action he could further
+disperse our fleet, and then by a close concentration crush the essential
+part in detail. It was a clear case of the enemy's dispersal forcing us to
+adopt the loosest concentration, and of our comparative dispersal tempting
+the enemy to concentrate and hazard a decision. It cannot be said we forced
+the fatal move upon him intentionally. It was rather the operation of
+strategical law set in motion by our bold distribution. We were determined
+that his threat of invasion, formidable as it was, should not force upon us
+so close a concentration as to leave our widespread interests open to his
+attack. Neither can it be said that our first aim was to prevent his
+attempting to concentrate. Every one of his naval ports was watched by a
+squadron, but it was recognised that this would not prevent concentration.
+The escape of one division might well break the chain. But that
+consideration made no difference. The distribution of our squadrons before
+his naval ports was essential for preventing sporadic action. Their
+distribution was dictated sufficiently by the defence of commerce and of
+colonial and allied territory, by our need, that is, to exercise a general
+command even if we could not destroy the enemy's force.
+
+The whole of Nelson's correspondence for this period shows that his main
+object was the protection of our Mediterranean trade and of Neapolitan and
+Turkish territory. When Villeneuve escaped him, his irritation was caused
+not by the prospect of a French concentration, which had no anxieties for
+him, for he knew counter-concentrations were provided for. It was caused
+rather by his having lost the opportunity which the attempt to concentrate
+had placed within his reach. He followed Villeneuve to the West Indies, not
+to prevent concentration, but, firstly, to protect the local trade and
+Jamaica, and secondly, in hope of another chance of dealing the blow he had
+missed. Lord Barham took precisely the same view. When on news of
+Villeneuve's return from the West Indies he moved out the three divisions
+of the Western Squadron, that is, the Ushant concentration, to meet him, he
+expressly stated, not that his object was to prevent concentration, but
+that it was to deter the French from attempting sporadic action. "The
+interception of the fleet in question," he wrote, "on its return to Europe
+would be a greater object than any I know. It would damp all future
+expeditions, and would show to Europe that it might be advisable to relax
+in the blockading system occasionally for the express purpose of putting
+them in our hands at a convenient opportunity."
+
+Indeed we had no reason for preventing the enemy's concentration. It was
+our best chance of solving effectually the situation we have to confront.
+Our true policy was to secure permanent command by a great naval decision.
+So long as the enemy remained divided, no such decision could be expected.
+It was not, in fact, till he attempted his concentration, and its last
+stage had been reached, that the situation was in our hands. The intricate
+problem with which we had been struggling was simplified down to closing up
+our own concentration to the strategical centre off Ushant. But at the last
+stage the enemy could not face the formidable position we held. His
+concentration was stopped. Villeneuve fell back on Cadiz, and the problem
+began to assume for us something of its former intricacy. So long as we
+held the mass off Ushant which our great concentration had produced, we
+were safe from invasion. But that was not enough. It left the seas open to
+sporadic action from Spanish ports. There were convoys from the East and
+West Indies at hand, and there was our expedition in the Mediterranean in
+jeopardy, and another on the point of sailing from Cork. Neither Barham at
+the Admiralty nor Cornwallis in command off Ushant hesitated an hour. By a
+simultaneous induction they both decided the mass must be divided. The
+concentration must be opened out again, and it was done. Napoleon called
+the move an _insigne betise_, but it was the move that beat him, and must
+have beaten him, whatever the skill of his admirals, for the two squadrons
+never lost touch. He found himself caught in a situation from which there
+was nothing to hope. His fleet was neither concentrated for a decisive blow
+nor spread for sporadic action. He had merely simplified his enemy's
+problem. Our hold was surer than ever, and in a desperate attempt to
+extricate himself he was forced to expose his fleet to the final decision
+we required.
+
+The whole campaign serves well to show what was understood by concentration
+at the end of the great naval wars. To Lord Barham and the able admirals
+who interpreted his plans it meant the possibility of massing at the right
+time and place. It meant, in close analogy to strategic deployment on land,
+the disposal of squadrons about a strategical centre from which fleets
+could condense for massed action in any required direction, and upon which
+they could fall back when unduly pressed. In this case the ultimate centre
+was the narrows of the Channel, where Napoleon's army lay ready to cross,
+but there was no massing there. So crude a distribution would have meant a
+purely defensive attitude. It would have meant waiting to be struck instead
+of seeking to strike, and such an attitude was arch-heresy to our old
+masters of war.
+
+So far we have only considered concentration as applied to wars in which we
+have a preponderance of naval force, but the principles are at least
+equally valid when a coalition places us in inferiority. The leading case
+is the home campaign of 1782. It was strictly on defensive lines. Our
+information was that France and Spain intended to end the war with a great
+combined effort against our West Indian islands, and particularly Jamaica.
+It was recognised that the way to meet the threat was to concentrate for
+offensive action in the Caribbean Sea everything that was not absolutely
+needed for home defence. Instead, therefore, of trying to be strong enough
+to attempt the offensive in both areas, it was decided to make sure of the
+area that was most critical. To do this the home fleet had to be reduced so
+low relatively to what the enemy had in European waters that offence was
+out of the question.
+
+While Rodney took the offensive area, Lord Howe was given the other. His
+task was to prevent the coalition obtaining such a command of home waters
+as would place our trade and coasts at their mercy, and it was not likely
+to prove a light one. We knew that the enemy's plan was to combine their
+attack on the West Indies with an attempt to control the North Sea, and
+possibly the Straits of Dover, with a Dutch squadron of twelve to fifteen
+of the line, while a combined Franco-Spanish fleet of at least forty sail
+would occupy the mouth of the Channel. It was also possible that these two
+forces would endeavour to form a junction. In any case the object of the
+joint operations would be to paralyse our trade and annoy our coasts, and
+thereby force us to neglect the West Indian area and the two Spanish
+objectives, Minorca and Gibraltar. All told we had only about thirty of the
+line on the home station, and though a large proportion of these were
+three-deckers, a good many could not be ready for sea till the summer.
+
+Inferior as was the available force, there was no thought of a purely
+passive defence. It would not meet the case. Something must be done to
+interfere with the offensive operations of the allies in the West Indies
+and against Gibraltar, or they would attain the object of their home
+campaign. It was resolved to effect this by minor counterstrokes on their
+line of communications to the utmost limit of our defensive reach. It would
+mean a considerable stretch of our concentration, but we were determined to
+do what we could to prevent reinforcements from reaching the West Indies
+from Brest, to intercept French trade as occasion offered, and, finally, at
+almost any risk to relieve Gibraltar.
+
+In these conditions the defensive concentration was based on a central mass
+or reserve at Spithead, a squadron in the Downs to watch the Texel for the
+safety of the North Sea trade, and another to the westward to watch Brest
+and interrupt its transatlantic communications. Kempenfelt in command of
+the latter squadron had just shown what could be done by his great exploit
+of capturing Guichen's convoy of military and naval stores for the West
+Indies. Early in the spring he was relieved by Barrington, who sailed on
+April 5th to resume the Ushant position. His instructions were not to fight
+a superior enemy unless in favourable circumstances, but to retire on
+Spithead. He was away three weeks, and returned with a French East India
+convoy with troops and stores, and two of the ships of-the-line which
+formed its escort.
+
+Up to this time there had been no immediate sign of the great movement from
+the south. The Franco-Spanish fleet which had assembled at Cadiz was
+occupied ineffectually in trying to stop small reliefs reaching Gibraltar
+and in covering their own homeward-bound trade. The Dutch, however, were
+becoming active, and the season was approaching for our Baltic trade to
+come home. Ross in the North Sea had but four of the line to watch the
+Texel, and was in no position to deal with the danger. Accordingly early in
+May the weight of the home concentration was thrown into the North Sea. On
+the 10th Howe sailed with Barrington and the bulk of the fleet to join Ross
+in the Downs, while Kempenfelt again took the Ushant position. Only about
+half the Brest Squadron had gone down to join the Spaniards at Cadiz, and
+he was told his first duty was to intercept the rest if it put to sea, but,
+as in Barrington's instructions, if he met a superior squadron he was to
+retire up Channel under the English coast and join hands with Howe. In
+spite of the fact that influenza was now raging in the fleet, he succeeded
+in holding the French inactive. Howe with the same difficulty to face was
+equally successful. The Dutch had put to sea, but returned immediately they
+knew of his movement, and cruising off the Texel, he held them there, and
+kept complete command of the North Sea till our Baltic trade was safe home.
+
+By the end of May it was done, and as our intelligence indicated that the
+great movement from Cadiz was at last about to begin, Howe, to whom a
+certain discretion had been left, decided it was time to shift the weight
+to his other wing and close on Kempenfelt. The Government, however, seemed
+to think that he ought to be able to use his position for offensive
+operations against Dutch trade, but in the admiral's opinion this was to
+lose hold of the design and sacrifice cohesion too much to reach. He
+informed them that he had not deemed it advisable to make detachments from
+his squadron against the trade, "not knowing how suddenly there might be a
+call, for the greater part of it at least, to the westward." In accordance,
+therefore, with his general instructions he left with Ross a strong
+squadron of nine of the line, sufficient to hold in check, and even "to
+take and destroy," the comparatively weak ships of the Dutch, and with the
+rest returned to the westward.[13] His intention was to proceed with all
+possible expedition to join Kempenfelt on the coast of France, but this,
+owing to the ravages of the influenza, he was unable to do. Kempenfelt was
+forced to come in, and on June 5th the junction was made at Spithead.
+
+  [13] The Dutch were believed to have sixteen of the line--one
+  seventy-four, seven sixty-eights, and the rest under sixty guns. In
+  Ross's squadron were one three-decker and two eighties.
+
+For three weeks, so severe was the epidemic, they could not move. Then came
+news that the Cadiz fleet under Langara had sailed the day Howe had reached
+Spithead, and he resolved to make a dash with every ship fit to put to sea
+to cut it off from Brest. He was too late. Before he could get into
+position the junction between Langara and the Brest squadron was made, and
+in their full force the allies had occupied the mouth of the Channel. With
+the addition of the Brest ships the combined fleet numbered forty of the
+line, while all Howe could muster was twenty-two, but amongst them were
+seven three-deckers and three eighties, and he would soon be reinforced.
+Three of Ross's smallest ships were recalled, and five others were nearly
+ready, but for these Howe could not wait. The homeward-bound Jamaica convoy
+was at hand, and at all hazards it must be saved.
+
+What was to be done? So soon as he sighted the enemy he realised that a
+successful action was out of the question. Early in the morning of July
+12th, "being fifteen leagues S.S.E. from Scilly," Langara with thirty-six
+of the line was seen to the westward. "As soon," wrote Howe, "as their
+force had been ascertained, I thought proper to avoid coming to battle with
+them as then circumstanced, and therefore steered to the north to pass
+between Scilly and the Land's End. My purpose therein was to get to the
+westward of the enemy, both for protecting the Jamaica convoy and to gain
+the advantage of situation for bringing them to action which the difference
+in our numbers renders desirable."
+
+By a most brilliant effort of seamanship the dangerous movement was
+effected safely that night, and it proved an entire success. Till Howe was
+met with and defeated, the allies would not venture into the Channel, and
+his unprecedented feat had effectually thrown them off. Assuming apparently
+that he must have passed round their rear to seaward, they sought him to
+the southward, and there for a month beat up and down in ineffective
+search. Meanwhile Howe, sending his cruisers ahead to the convoy's
+rendezvous off the south-west coast of Iceland, had taken his whole fleet
+about two hundred miles west of the Skelligs to meet it. Northerly winds
+prevented his reaching the right latitude in time, but it mattered little.
+The convoy passed in between him and the south of Ireland, and as the enemy
+had taken a cast down to Ushant, it was able to enter the Channel in safety
+without sighting an enemy's sail. Ignorant of what had happened, Howe
+cruised for a week practising the ships "in connected movements so
+particularly necessary on the present occasion." Then with his fleet in
+fine condition to carry out preventive tactics in accordance with
+Kempenfelt's well-known exposition,[14] he returned to seek the enemy to
+the eastward, in order to try to draw them from their station at Scilly and
+open the Channel. On his way he learnt the convoy had passed in, and with
+this anxiety off his mind he bore up for the Lizard, where his
+reinforcements were awaiting him. There he found the Channel was free. From
+lack of supplies the enemy had been forced to retire to port, and he
+returned to Spithead to make preparations for the relief of Gibraltar.
+While this work was going on, the North Sea squadron was again strengthened
+that it might resume the blockade of the Texel and cover the arrival of the
+autumn convoys from the Baltic. It was done with complete success. Not a
+single ship fell into the enemy's hands, and the campaign, and indeed the
+war, ended by Howe taking the mass of his force down to Gibraltar and
+performing his remarkable feat of relieving it in the face of the Spanish
+squadron. For the power and reach of a well-designed concentration there
+can be no finer example.
+
+  [14] See post, pp. 222-24.
+
+If, now, we seek from the above and similar examples for principles to
+serve as a guide between concentration and division we shall find, firstly,
+this one. The degree of division we shall require is in proportion to the
+number of naval ports from which the enemy can act against our maritime
+interests and to the extent of coastline along which they are spread. It is
+a principle which springs from the soul of our old tradition that we must
+always seek, not merely to prevent the enemy striking at our heart, but
+also to strike him the moment he attempts to do anything. We must make of
+his every attempt an opportunity for a counterstroke. The distribution this
+aim entailed varied greatly with different enemies. In our wars with
+France, and particularly when Spain and Holland were in alliance with her,
+the number of the ports to be dealt with was very considerable and their
+distribution very wide. In our wars with the Dutch alone, on the other
+hand, the number and distribution were comparatively small, and in this
+case our concentration was always close.
+
+This measure of distribution, however, will never stand alone.
+Concentration will not depend solely upon the number and position of the
+enemy's naval ports. It will be modified by the extent to which the lines
+of operation starting from those ports traverse our own home waters. The
+reason is plain. Whatever the enemy opposed to us, and whatever the nature
+of the war, we must always keep a fleet at home. In any circumstances it is
+essential for the defence of our home trade terminals, and it is essential
+as a central reserve from which divisions can be thrown off to reinforce
+distant terminals and to seize opportunities for counterstrokes. It is "the
+mainspring," as Lord Barham put it, "from which all offensive operations
+must proceed." This squadron, then, being permanent and fixed as the
+foundation of our whole system, it is clear that if, as in the case of the
+French wars, the enemy's lines of operation do not traverse our home
+waters, close concentration upon it will not serve our turn. If, on the
+other hand, as in the case of the Dutch wars, the lines do traverse home
+waters, a home concentration is all that is required. Our division will
+then be measured by the amount of our surplus strength, and by the extent
+to which we feel able to detach squadrons for offensive action against the
+enemy's distant maritime interests without prejudicing our hold on the home
+terminals of his lines of operation and our power of striking directly he
+moves. These remarks apply, of course, to the main fleet operations. If
+such an enemy has distant colonial bases from which he can annoy our trade,
+minor concentrations must naturally be arranged in those areas.
+
+Next we have to note that where the enemy's squadrons are widely
+distributed in numerous bases, we cannot always simplify the problem by
+leaving some of them open so as to entice him to concentrate and reduce the
+number of ports to be watched. For if we do this, we leave the unwatched
+squadrons free for sporadic action. Unless we are sure he intends to
+concentrate with a view to a decisive action, our only means of simplifying
+the situation is to watch every port closely enough to interfere
+effectually with sporadic action. Then, sporadic action being denied him,
+the enemy must either do nothing or concentrate.
+
+The next principle is flexibility. Concentration should be so arranged that
+any two parts may freely cohere, and that all parts may quickly condense
+into a mass at any point in the area of concentration. The object of
+holding back from forming the mass is to deny the enemy knowledge of our
+actual distribution or its intention at any given moment, and at the same
+time to ensure that it will be adjusted to meet any dangerous movement that
+is open to him. Further than this our aim should be not merely to prevent
+any part being overpowered by a superior force, but to regard every
+detached squadron as a trap to lure the enemy to destruction. The ideal
+concentration, in short, is an appearance of weakness that covers a reality
+of strength.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                  PART THREE
+
+             CONDUCT OF NAVAL WAR
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                  CHAPTER ONE
+
+                 INTRODUCTORY
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+I. INHERENT DIFFERENCES IN THE
+CONDITIONS OF WAR ON LAND AND ON SEA
+
+Before attempting to apply the foregoing general principles in a definite
+manner to the conduct of naval war, it is necessary to clear the ground of
+certain obstacles to right judgment. The gradual elucidation of the theory
+of war, it must be remembered, has been almost entirely the work of
+soldiers, but so admirable is the work they have done, and so philosophical
+the method they have adopted, that a very natural tendency has arisen to
+assume that their broad-based conclusions are of universal application.
+That the leading lines which they have charted are in a certain sense those
+which must govern all strategy no one will deny. They are the real
+pioneers, and their methods must be in the main our methods, but what we
+have to remember is that the country we have to travel is radically
+different from that in which they acquired their skill.
+
+A moment's consideration will reveal how far-reaching the differences are.
+Let us ask ourselves what are the main ideas around which all the military
+lore turns. It may be taken broadly that the general principles are three
+in number. Firstly, there is the idea of concentration of force, that is,
+the idea of overthrowing the enemy's main strength by bringing to bear upon
+it the utmost accumulation of weight and energy within your means;
+secondly, there is the idea that strategy is mainly a question of definite
+lines of communication; and thirdly, there is the idea of concentration of
+effort, which means keeping a single eye on the force you wish to overthrow
+without regard to ulterior objects. Now if we examine the conditions which
+give these principles so firm a footing on land, we shall find that in all
+three cases they differ at sea, and differ materially.
+
+Take the first, which, in spite of all the deductions we have to make from
+it in the case of limited wars, is the dominating one. The pithy maxim
+which expresses its essence is that our primary objective is the enemy's
+main force. In current naval literature the maxim is applied to the sea in
+some such form as this: "The primary object of our battle-fleet is to seek
+out and destroy that of the enemy." On the surface nothing could look
+sounder, but what are the conditions which underlie the one and the other?
+
+The practical value of the military maxim is based upon the fact that in
+land warfare it is always theoretically possible to strike at your enemy's
+army, that is, if you have the strength and spirit to overcome the
+obstacles and face the risks. But at sea this is not so. In naval warfare
+we have a far-reaching fact which is entirely unknown on land. It is simply
+this--that it is possible for your enemy to remove his fleet from the board
+altogether. He may withdraw it into a defended port, where it is absolutely
+out of your reach without the assistance of an army. No amount of naval
+force, and no amount of offensive spirit, can avail you. The result is that
+in naval warfare an embarrassing dilemma tends to assert itself. If you are
+in a superiority that justifies a vigorous offensive and prompts you to
+seek out your enemy with a view to a decision, the chances are you will
+find him in a position where you cannot touch him. Your offence is
+arrested, and you find yourself in what, at least theoretically, is the
+weakest general position known to war.
+
+This was one of our earliest discoveries in strategy. It followed indeed
+immediately and inevitably upon our discovery that the most drastic way of
+making war was to concentrate every effort on the enemy's armed forces. In
+dealing with the theory of war in general a caveat has already been entered
+against the too common assumption that this method was an invention of
+Napoleon's or Frederick's, or that it was a foreign importation at all. In
+the view at least of our own military historians the idea was born in our
+Civil Wars with Cromwell and the New Model Army. It was the conspicuous
+feature that distinguished our Civil War from all previous wars of modern
+times. So astonishing was its success--as foreign observers remarked--that
+it was naturally applied by our soldier-admirals at sea so soon as war
+broke out with the Dutch. Whatever may be the claims of the Cromwellian
+soldiers to have invented for land warfare what is regarded abroad as the
+chief characteristic of the Napoleonic method, it is beyond doubt that they
+deserve the credit of it at sea. All three Dutch wars had a commercial
+object, and yet after the first campaign the general idea never was to make
+the enemy's commerce a primary objective. That place was occupied
+throughout by their battle-fleets, and under Monk and Rupert at least those
+objectives were pursued with a singleness of purpose and a persistent
+vehemence that was entirely Napoleonic.
+
+But in the later stages of the struggle, when we began to gain a
+preponderance, it was found that the method ceased to work. The attempt to
+seek the enemy with a view to a decisive action was again and again
+frustrated by his retiring to his own coasts, where either we could not
+reach him or his facilities for retreat made a decisive result impossible.
+He assumed, in fact, a defensive attitude with which we were powerless to
+deal, and in the true spirit of defence he sprang out from time to time to
+deal us a counterstroke as he saw his opportunity.
+
+It was soon perceived that the only way of dealing with this attitude was
+to adopt some means of forcing the enemy to sea and compelling him to
+expose himself to the decision we sought. The most cogent means at hand was
+to threaten his commerce. Instead, therefore, of attempting to seek out his
+fleet directly, our own would sit upon the fairway of his homeward-bound
+trade, either on the Dogger Bank or elsewhere, thereby setting up a
+situation which it was hoped would cost him either his trade or his
+battle-fleet, or possibly both. Thus in spite of the fact that with our
+increasing preponderance our preoccupation with the idea of battle decision
+had become stronger than ever, we found ourselves forced to fall back upon
+subsidiary operations of an ulterior strategical character. It is a curious
+paradox, but it is one that seems inherent in the special feature of naval
+war, which permits the armed force to be removed from the board altogether.
+
+The second distinguishing characteristic of naval warfare which relates to
+the communication idea is not so well marked, but it is scarcely less
+important. It will be recalled that this characteristic is concerned with
+lines of communication in so far as they tend to determine lines of
+operation. It is a simple question of roads and obstacles. In land warfare
+we can determine with some precision the limits and direction of our
+enemy's possible movements. We know that they must be determined mainly by
+roads and obstacles. But afloat neither roads nor obstacles exist. There is
+nothing of the kind on the face of the sea to assist us in locating him and
+determining his movements. True it is that in sailing days his movements
+were to some extent limited by prevailing winds and by the elimination of
+impossible courses, but with steam even these determinants have gone, and
+there is practically nothing to limit the freedom of his movement except
+the exigencies of fuel. Consequently in seeking to strike our enemy the
+liability to miss him is much greater at sea than on land, and the chances
+of being eluded by the enemy whom we are seeking to bring to battle become
+so serious a check upon our offensive action as to compel us to handle the
+maxim of "Seeking out the enemy's fleet" with caution.
+
+The difficulty obtruded itself from the moment the idea was born. It may be
+traced back--so far at least as modern warfare is concerned--to Sir Francis
+Drake's famous appreciation in the year of the Armada. This memorable
+despatch was written when an acute difference of opinion had arisen as to
+whether it were better to hold our fleet back in home waters or to send it
+forward to the coast of Spain. The enemy's objective was very uncertain. We
+could not tell whether the blow was to fall in the Channel or Ireland or
+Scotland, and the situation was complicated by a Spanish army of invasion
+ready to cross from the Flemish coast, and the possibility of combined
+action by the Guises from France. Drake was for solving the problem by
+taking station off the Armada's port of departure, and fully aware of the
+risk such a move entailed, he fortified his purely strategical reasons with
+moral considerations of the highest moment. But the Government was
+unconvinced, not as is usually assumed out of sheer pusillanimity and lack
+of strategical insight, but because the chances of Drake's missing contact
+were too great if the Armada should sail before our own fleet could get
+into position.
+
+Our third elementary principle is the idea of concentration of effort, and
+the third characteristic of naval warfare which clashes with it is that
+over and above the duty of winning battles, fleets are charged with the
+duty of protecting commerce. In land warfare, at least since laying waste
+an undefended part of your enemy's country ceased to be a recognised
+strategical operation, there is no corresponding deflection of purely
+military operations. It is idle for purists to tell us that the deflection
+of commerce protection should not be permitted to turn us from our main
+purpose. We have to do with the hard facts of war, and experience tells us
+that for economic reasons alone, apart from the pressure of public opinion,
+no one has ever found it possible to ignore the deflection entirely. So
+vital indeed is financial vigour in war, that more often than not the
+maintenance of the flow of trade has been felt as a paramount
+consideration. Even in the best days of our Dutch wars, when the whole plan
+was based on ignoring the enemy's commerce as an objective, we found
+ourselves at times forced to protect our own trade with seriously
+disturbing results.
+
+Nor is it more profitable to declare that the only sound way to protect
+your commerce is to destroy the enemy's fleet. As an enunciation of a
+principle it is a truism--no one would dispute it. As a canon of practical
+strategy, it is untrue; for here our first deflection again asserts itself.
+What are you to do if the enemy refuses to permit you to destroy his
+fleets? You cannot leave your trade exposed to squadronal or cruiser raids
+while you await your opportunity, and the more you concentrate your force
+and efforts to secure the desired decision, the more you will expose your
+trade to sporadic attack. The result is that you are not always free to
+adopt the plan which is best calculated to bring your enemy to a decision.
+You may find yourself compelled to occupy, not the best positions, but
+those which will give a fair chance of getting contact in favourable
+conditions, and at the same time afford reasonable cover for your trade.
+Hence the maxim that the enemy's coast should be our frontier. It is not a
+purely military maxim like that for seeking out the enemy's fleet, though
+the two are often used as though they were interchangeable. Our usual
+positions on the enemy's coast were dictated quite as much by the
+exigencies of commerce protection as by primary strategical reasons. To
+maintain a rigorous watch close off the enemy's ports was never the
+likeliest way to bring him to decisive action--we have Nelson's well-known
+declaration on the point--but it was the best way, and often the only way,
+to keep the sea clear for the passage of our own trade and for the
+operations of our cruisers against that of the enemy.
+
+For the present these all-important points need not be elaborated further.
+As we proceed to deal with the methods of naval warfare they will gather
+force and lucidity. Enough has been said to mark the shoals and warn us
+that, admirably constructed as is the craft which the military strategists
+have provided for our use, we must be careful with our navigation.
+
+But before proceeding further it is necessary to simplify what lies before
+us by endeavouring to group the complex variety of naval operations into
+manageable shape.
+
+II. TYPICAL FORMS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
+
+In the conduct of naval war all operations will be found to relate to two
+broad classes of object. The one is to obtain or dispute the command of the
+sea, and the other to exercise such control of communications as we have,
+whether the complete command has been secured or not.
+
+It was on the logical and practical distinction between these two kinds of
+naval object, as we have seen, that the constitution of fleets was based in
+the fulness of the sailing period, when maritime wars were nearly incessant
+and were shaping the existing distribution of power in the world. During
+that period at any rate the dual conception lay at the root of naval
+methods and naval policy, and as it is also the logical outcome of the
+theory of war, we may safely take it as the basis of our analysis of the
+conduct of naval operations.
+
+Practically, of course, we can seldom assert categorically that any
+operation of war has but one clearly defined object. A battle-squadron
+whose primary function was to secure command was often so placed as to
+enable it to exercise control; and, _vice versa_, cruiser lines intended
+primarily to exercise control upon the trade routes were regarded as
+outposts of the battle-fleet to give it warning of the movements of hostile
+squadrons. Thus Cornwallis during his blockade of Brest had sometimes to
+loosen his hold in order to cover the arrival of convoys against raiding
+squadrons; and thus also when Nelson was asked by Lord Barham for his views
+on cruiser patrol lines, he expressed himself as follows: "Ships on this
+service would not only prevent the depredations of privateers, but be in
+the way to watch any squadron of the enemy should they pass on their
+track.... Therefore intelligence will be quickly conveyed, and the enemy
+never, I think, lost sight of."[15] Instructions in this sense were issued
+by Lord Barham to the commodores concerned. In both cases, it will be seen,
+the two classes of operation overlapped. Still for purposes of analysis the
+distinction holds good, and is valuable for obtaining a clear view of the
+field.
+
+  [15] Nelson to Barham, 29 August 1805.
+
+Take, first, the methods of securing command, by which we mean putting it
+out of the enemy's power to use effectually the common communications or
+materially to interfere with our use of them. We find the means employed
+were two: decision by battle, and blockade. Of the two, the first was the
+less frequently attainable, but it was the one the British service always
+preferred. It was only natural that it should be so, seeing that our normal
+position was one of preponderance over our enemy, and so long as the policy
+of preponderance is maintained, the chances are the preference will also be
+maintained.
+
+But further than this, the idea seems to be rooted in the oldest traditions
+of the Royal Navy. As we have seen, the conviction of the sea service that
+war is primarily a question of battles, and that battles once joined on
+anything like equal terms must be pressed to the last gasp, is one that has
+had nothing to learn from more recent continental discoveries. The
+Cromwellian admirals handed down to us the memory of battles lasting three,
+and even four, days. Their creed is enshrined in the robust article of war
+under which Byng and Calder were condemned; and in the apotheosis of Nelson
+the service has deified the battle idea.
+
+It is true there were periods when the idea seemed to have lost its colour,
+but nevertheless it is so firmly embedded in the British conception of
+naval warfare, that there would be nothing left to say but for the
+unavoidable modification with which we have to temper the doctrine of
+overthrow. "Use that means," said its best-known advocate, "when you can
+and when you must." Devoutly as we may hold the battle faith, it is not
+always possible or wise to act upon it. If we are strong, we press to the
+issue of battle when we can. If we are weak, we do not accept the issue
+unless we must. If circumstances are advantageous to us, we are not always
+able to effect a decision; and if they are disadvantageous, we are not
+always obliged to fight. Hence we find the apparently simple doctrine of
+the battle was almost always entangled in two of the most difficult
+problems that beset our old admirals. The most thorny questions they had to
+decide were these. In the normal case of strength, it was not how to defeat
+the enemy, but how to bring him to action; and in casual cases of temporary
+weakness, it was not how to sell your life dearly, but how to maintain the
+fleet actively on the defensive so as at once to deny the enemy the
+decision he sought and to prevent his attaining his ulterior object.
+
+From these considerations it follows that we are able to group all naval
+operations in some such way as this. Firstly, on the only assumption we can
+permit ourselves, namely, that we start with a preponderance of force or
+advantage, we adopt methods for securing command. These methods, again,
+fall under two heads. Firstly, there are operations for securing a decision
+by battle, under which head, as has been explained, we shall be chiefly
+concerned with methods of bringing an unwilling enemy to action, and with
+the value to that end of the maxim of "Seeking out the enemy's fleet."
+Secondly, there are the operations which become necessary when no decision
+is obtainable and our war plan demands the immediate control of
+communications. Under this head it will be convenient to treat all forms of
+blockade, whether military or commercial, although, as we shall see,
+certain forms of military, and even commercial, blockade are primarily
+concerned with forcing the enemy to a decision.
+
+Our second main group covers operations to which we have to resort when our
+relative strength is not adequate for either class of operations to secure
+command. In these conditions we have to content ourselves with endeavouring
+to hold the command in dispute; that is, we endeavour by active defensive
+operations to prevent the enemy either securing or exercising control for
+the objects he has in view. Such are the operations which are connoted by
+the true conception of "A fleet in being." Under this head also should fall
+those new forms of minor counter-attack which have entered the field of
+strategy since the introduction of the mobile torpedo and offensive mining.
+
+In the third main group we have to deal with the methods of exercising
+control of passage and communication. These operations vary in character
+according to the several purposes for which the control is desired, and
+they will be found to take one of three general forms. Firstly, the control
+of the lines of passage of an invading army; secondly, the control of trade
+routes and trade terminals for the attack and defence of commerce; and
+thirdly, the control of passage and communication for our own oversea
+expeditions, and the control of their objective area for the active support
+of their operations.
+
+For clearness we may summarise the whole in tabulated analysis, thus:--
+
+  1. Methods of securing command:
+    (a) By obtaining a decision.
+    (b) By blockade.
+  2. Methods of disputing command:
+    (a) Principle of "the fleet in being."
+    (b) Minor counter-attacks.
+  3. Methods of exercising command:
+    (a) Defence against invasion.
+    (b) Attack and defence of commerce.
+    (c) Attack, defence, and support of military expeditions.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                  CHAPTER TWO
+
+          METHODS OF SECURING COMMAND
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+I. ON OBTAINING A DECISION
+
+Whatever the nature of the war in which we are engaged, whether it be
+limited or unlimited, permanent and general command of the sea is the
+condition of ultimate success. The only way of securing such a command by
+naval means is to obtain a decision by battle against the enemy's fleet.
+Sooner or later it must be done, and the sooner the better. That was the
+old British creed. It is still our creed, and needs no labouring. No one
+will dispute it, no one will care even to discuss it, and we pass with
+confidence to the conclusion that the first business of our fleet is to
+seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it.
+
+No maxim can so well embody the British spirit of making war upon the sea,
+and nothing must be permitted to breathe on that spirit. To examine its
+claim to be the logical conclusion of our theory of war will even be held
+dangerous, yet nothing is so dangerous in the study of war as to permit
+maxims to become a substitute for judgment. Let us examine its credentials,
+and as a first step put it to the test of the two most modern instances.
+
+Both of them, it must be noted, were instances of Limited War, the most
+usual form of our own activities, and indeed the only one to which our war
+organisation, with its essential preponderance of the naval element, has
+ever been really adapted. The first instance is the Spanish-American War,
+and the second that between Russia and Japan.
+
+In the former case the Americans took up arms in order to liberate Cuba
+from Spanish domination--a strictly limited object. There is no evidence
+that the nature of the war was ever clearly formulated by either side, but
+in just conformity with the general political conditions the American war
+plan aimed at opening with a movement to secure the territorial object. At
+the earliest possible moment they intended to establish themselves in the
+west of Cuba in support of the Colonial insurgents. Everything depended on
+the initiative being seized with decision and rapidity. Its moral and
+physical importance justified the utmost risk, and such was the
+conformation of the sea which the American army had to pass, that a
+strictly defensive or covering attitude with their fleet could reduce the
+risk almost to security. Yet so unwisely dominated were the Americans by
+recently rediscovered maxims, that when on the eve of executing the vital
+movement they heard a Spanish squadron was crossing the Atlantic, their own
+covering force was diverted from its defensive position and sent away to
+"seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it."
+
+Puerto Rico was the most obvious point at which to seek it, and thither
+Admiral Sampson was permitted to go, regardless of the elementary truth
+that in such cases what is obvious to you is also usually obvious to your
+enemy. The result was that not only did the Americans fail to get contact,
+but they also uncovered their own army's line of passage and paralysed the
+initial movement. In the end it was only pure chance that permitted them to
+retrieve the mistake they had made. Had the Spanish squadron put into a
+Cuban port in railway communication with the main Royalist army, such as
+Cienfuegos or Havana, instead of hurrying into Santiago, the whole campaign
+must have been lost. "It appears now," wrote Admiral Mahan, in his _Lessons
+of the War with Spain_, "not only that the eastward voyage of our Havana
+division was unfortunate, but it should have been seen beforehand to be a
+mistake, because inconsistent with a well and generally accepted principle
+of war, the non-observance of which was not commanded by the conditions.
+The principle is that which condemns eccentric movements. By the disregard
+of rule in this case we uncovered both Havana and Cienfuegos, which it was
+our object to close to the enemy's division."
+
+Whether or not we regard Admiral Mahan's exposition of the error as
+penetrating to the real principle that was violated, the movement was in
+fact not only eccentric, but unnecessary. Had the Americans been content to
+keep their fleet concentrated in its true defensive position, not only
+would they have covered their army's line of passage and their blockade of
+the territorial objective, but they would have had a far better chance of
+bringing the Spaniards to action. The Spaniards were bound to come to them
+or remain outside the theatre of operations where they could in no way
+affect the issue of the war except adversely to themselves by sapping the
+spirit of their own Cuban garrison. It is a clear case of the letter
+killing the spirit, of an attractive maxim being permitted to shut the door
+upon judgment. Strategical offence in this case was not the best defence.
+"Seeking out the enemy's fleet" was almost bound to end in a blow in the
+air, which not only would fail to gain any offensive result, but would
+sacrifice the main defensive plank in the American war plan upon which
+their offensive relied for success. To stigmatise such a movement as merely
+eccentric is to pass very lenient censure.
+
+In the Russo-Japanese War we have a converse case, in which judgment kept
+the aphorism silent. It is true that during the earlier stage of the naval
+operations the Japanese did in a sense seek out the enemy's fleet, in so
+far as they advanced their base close to Port Arthur; but this was done,
+not with any fixed intention of destroying the Russian fleet--there was
+small hope of that at sea--but rather because by no other means could they
+cover the army's lines of passage, which it was the function of the fleet
+to secure, the true offensive operations being on land. Never except once,
+under express orders from Tokio, did either Admiral Togo or Admiral
+Kamimura press offensive movements in such a way as to jeopardise the
+preventive duty with which the war plan charged them. Still less in the
+later stage, when everything depended on the destruction of the Baltic
+fleet, did Admiral Togo "seek it out." He was content, as the Americans
+should have been content, to have set up such a situation that the enemy
+must come and break it down if they were to affect the issue of the war. So
+he waited on the defensive, assured his enemy must come to him, and thereby
+he rendered it, as certain as war can be, that when the moment for the
+tactical offensive came his blow should be sure and sudden, in overwhelming
+strength of concentration, and decisive beyond all precedent.
+
+Clearly, then, the maxim of "seeking out" for all its moral exhilaration,
+for all its value as an expression of high and sound naval spirit, must not
+be permitted to displace well-reasoned judgment. Trusty servant as it is,
+it will make a bad master, as the Americans found to their serious
+jeopardy. Yet we feel instinctively that it expresses, as no other aphorism
+does, the secret of British success at sea. We cannot do without it; we
+cannot do with it in its nakedness. Let us endeavour to clothe it with its
+real meaning, with the true principles that it connotes. Let us endeavour
+to determine the stuff that it is made of, and for this purpose there is no
+better way than to trace its gradual growth from the days when it was born
+of the crude and virile instinct of the earliest masters.
+
+The germ is to be found in the despatch already mentioned which Drake wrote
+from Plymouth at the end of March in 1588. His arguments were not purely
+naval, for it was a combined problem, a problem of defence against
+invasion, that had to be solved. What he wished to persuade the Government
+was, that the kernel of the situation was not so much Parma's army of
+invasion in Flanders, as the fleet that was preparing in Spain to clear its
+passage. The Government appeared to be acting on the opposite view. Howard
+with the bulk of the fleet was at the base in the Medway within supporting
+distance of the light squadron that was blockading the Flemish ports in
+concert with the Dutch. Drake himself with another light squadron had been
+sent to the westward with some indeterminate idea of his serving as an
+observation squadron, or being used in the mediaeval fashion for an
+eccentric counterstroke. Being invited to give his opinion on this
+disposition, he pronounced it vicious. In his eyes, what was demanded was
+an offensive movement against the enemy's main fleet. "If there may be such
+a stay or stop made," he urged, "by any means of this fleet in Spain, so
+that they may not come through the seas as conquerors, then shall the
+Prince of Parma have such a check thereby as were meet." What he had in his
+mind is clearly not so much a decision in the open as an interruption of
+the enemy's incomplete mobilisation, such as he had so brilliantly effected
+the previous year. For later on he says that "Next under God's mighty
+protection the advantage of time and place will be the only and chief means
+for our good, wherein I most humbly beseech your good lordships to
+persevere as you have begun, for with fifty sail of shipping we shall do
+more upon their own coast than a great many more will do here at home; and
+the sooner we are gone, the better we shall be able to impeach them." He
+does not say "destroy." "Impeach" meant "to prevent."
+
+Clearly, then, what he had in his mind was a repetition of the previous
+year's strategy, whereby he had been able to break up the Spanish
+mobilisation and "impeach" the Armada from sailing. He did not even ask for
+a concentration of the whole fleet for the purpose, but only that his own
+squadron should be reinforced as was thought convenient. The actual reasons
+he gave for his advice were purely moral--that is, he dwelt on the
+enheartening effect of striking the first blow, and attacking instead of
+waiting to be attacked. The nation, he urged, "will be persuaded that the
+Lord will put into Her Majesty and her people courage and boldness not to
+fear invasion, but to seek God's enemies and Her Majesty's where they may
+be found."
+
+Here is the germ of the maxim. The consequence of his despatch was a
+summons to attend the Council. The conference was followed, not by the half
+measure, which was all he had ventured to advise in his despatch, but by
+something that embodied a fuller expression of his general idea, and
+closely resembled what was to be consecrated as our regular disposition in
+such cases. The whole of the main fleet, except the squadron watching the
+Flemish coast, was massed to the westward to cover the blockade of Parma's
+transports, but the position assigned to it was inside the Channel instead
+of outside, which tactically was bad, for it was almost certain to give the
+Armada the weather gage. No movement to the coast of Spain was
+permitted--not necessarily, be it remembered, out of pusillanimity or
+failure to grasp Drake's idea, but for fear that, as in the recent American
+case, a forward movement was likely to result in a blow in the air, and to
+uncover the vital position without bringing the enemy to action.
+
+When, however, the sailing of the Armada was so long delayed Drake's
+importunity was renewed, with that of Howard and all his colleagues to back
+it. It brought eventually the desired permission. The fleet sailed for
+Coruna, where it was known the Armada, after an abortive start from Lisbon,
+had been driven by bad weather, and something like what the Government
+feared happened. Before it could reach its destination it met southerly
+gales, its offensive power was exhausted, and it had to return to Plymouth
+impotent for immediate action as the Armada finally sailed. When the
+Spaniards appeared it was still in port refitting and victualling. It was
+only by an unprecedented feat of seamanship that the situation was saved,
+and Howard was able to gain the orthodox position to seaward of his enemy.
+
+So far, then, the Government's cautious clinging to a general defensive
+attitude, instead of seeking out the enemy's fleet, was justified, but it
+must be remembered that Drake from the first had insisted it was a question
+of time as well as place. If he had been permitted to make the movement
+when he first proposed it, there is good reason to believe that the final
+stages of the Spanish mobilisation could not have been carried out that
+year; that is to say, the various divisions of the Armada could not have
+been assembled into a fleet. But information as to its condition was at the
+time very uncertain, and in view of the negotiations that were on foot,
+there were, moreover, high political reasons for our not taking too drastic
+an offensive if a reasonable alternative existed.
+
+The principles, then, which we distil from this, the original case of
+"seeking out," are, firstly, the moral value of seizing the initiative,
+and, secondly, the importance of striking before the enemy's mobilisation
+is complete. The idea of overthrow by a great fleet action is not present,
+unless we find it in a not clearly formulated idea of the Elizabethan
+admirals of striking a fleet when it is demoralised, as the Armada was by
+its first rebuff, or immediately on its leaving port before it had settled
+down.
+
+In our next naval struggle with the Dutch in the latter half of the
+seventeenth century the principle of overthrow, as we have seen, became
+fully developed. It was the keynote of the strategy which was evolved, and
+the conditions which forced it to recognition also emphasised the
+principles of seeking out and destroying. It was a case of a purely naval
+struggle, in which there were no military considerations to deflect naval
+strategy. It was, moreover, a question of narrow seas, and the risk of
+missing contact which had cramped the Elizabethans in their oceanic theatre
+was a negligible factor. Yet fresh objections to using the "seeking out"
+maxim as a strategical panacea soon declared themselves.
+
+The first war opened without any trace of the new principle. The first
+campaign was concerned in the old fashion entirely with the attack and
+defence of trade, and such indecisive actions as occurred were merely
+incidental to the process. No one appears to have realised the fallacy of
+such method except, perhaps, Tromp. The general instructions he received
+were that "the first and principal object was to do all possible harm to
+the English," and to that end "he was given a fleet in order to sail to the
+damage and offence of the English fleet, and also to give convoy to the
+west." Seeing at once the incompatibility of the two functions, he asked
+for more definite instructions. What, for instance, was he to do if he
+found a chance of blockading the main English fleet at its base? Was he to
+devote himself to the blockade and "leave the whole fleet of merchantmen to
+be a prey to a squadron of fast-sailing frigates," or was he to continue
+his escort duty? Full as he was of desire to deal with the enemy's main
+fleet, he was perplexed with the practical difficulty--too often
+forgotten--that the mere domination of the enemy's battle strength does not
+solve the problem of control of the sea. No fresh instructions were
+forthcoming to clear his perplexity, and he could only protest again. "I
+could wish," he wrote, "to be so fortunate as to have only one of these two
+duties--to seek out the enemy, or to give convoy, for to do both is
+attended with great difficulties."
+
+The indecisive campaign which naturally resulted from this lack of
+strategical grip and concentration of effort came to an end with Tromp's
+partial defeat of Blake off Dungeness on 30th November 1652. Though charged
+in spite of his protests with a vast convoy, the Dutch admiral had sent it
+back to Ostend when he found Blake was in the Downs, and then, free from
+all preoccupation, he had gone to seek out his enemy.
+
+It was the effect which this unexpected blow had upon the strong military
+insight of the Cromwellian Government that led to those famous reforms
+which made this winter so memorable a landmark in British naval history.
+Monk, the most finished professional soldier in the English service, and
+Deane, another general, were joined in the command with Blake, and with
+their coming was breathed into the sea service the high military spirit of
+the New Model Army. To that winter we owe not only the Articles of War,
+which made discipline possible, and the first attempt to formulate Fighting
+Instructions, in which a regular tactical system was conceived, but also
+two other conceptions that go to make up the modern idea of naval warfare.
+One was the conviction that war upon the sea meant operations against the
+enemy's armed fleets in order to destroy his power of naval resistance as
+distinguished from operations by way of reprisal against his trade; and the
+other, that such warfare required for its effective use a fleet of
+State-owned ships specialised for war, with as little assistance as
+possible from private-owned ships. It was not unnatural that all four ideas
+should have taken shape together, so closely are they related. The end
+connotes the means. Discipline, fleet tactics, and a navy of warships were
+indispensable for making war in the modern sense of the term.
+
+The results were seen in the three great actions of the following spring,
+the first under the three Generals, and the other two under Monk alone. In
+the last, he carried the new ideas so far as to forbid taking possession of
+disabled vessels, that nothing might check the work of destruction. All
+were to be sunk with as much tenderness for human life as destruction would
+permit. In like manner the second war was characterised by three great
+naval actions, one of which, after Monk had resumed command, lasted no less
+than four days. The new doctrine was indeed carried to exaggeration. So
+entirely was naval thought centred on the action of the battle-fleets, that
+no provision was made for an adequate exercise of control. In our own case
+at least, massing for offensive action was pressed so far that no thought
+was given to sustaining it by reliefs. Consequently our offensive power
+suffered periods of exhaustion when the fleet had to return to its base,
+and the Dutch were left sufficient freedom not only to secure their own
+trade, but to strike severely at ours. Their counterstrokes culminated in
+the famous attack upon Sheerness and Chatham. That such an opportunity was
+allowed them can be traced directly to an exaggeration of the new doctrine.
+In the belief of the British Government the "St. James's Fight"--the last
+of the three actions--had settled the question of command. Negotiations for
+peace were opened, and they were content to reap the fruit of the great
+battles in preying on Dutch trade. Having done its work, as was believed,
+the bulk of the battle-fleet for financial reasons was laid up, and the
+Dutch seized the opportunity to demonstrate the limitations of the abused
+doctrine. The lesson is one we have never forgotten, but its value is half
+lost if we attribute the disaster to lack of grasp of the battle-fleet
+doctrine rather than to an exaggeration of its possibilities.
+
+The truth is, that we had not obtained a victory sufficiently decisive to
+destroy the enemy's fleet. The most valuable lesson of the war was that
+such victories required working for, and particularly in cases where the
+belligerents face each other from either side of a narrow sea. In such
+conditions it was proved that owing to the facility of retreat and the
+restricted possibilities of pursuit a complete decision is not to be looked
+for without very special strategical preparation. The new doctrine in fact
+gave that new direction to strategy which has been already referred to. It
+was no longer a question of whether to make the enemy's trade or his fleet
+the primary objective, but of how to get contact with his fleet in such a
+way as to lead to decisive action. Merely to seek him out on his own coasts
+was to ensure that no decisive action would take place. Measures had to be
+taken to force him to sea away from his own bases. The favourite device was
+to substitute organised strategical operations against his trade in place
+of the old sporadic attacks; that is, the fleet took a position calculated
+to stop his trade altogether, not on his own coasts, but far to sea in the
+main fairway. The operations failed for lack of provision for enabling the
+fleet by systematic relief to retain its position, but nevertheless it was
+the germ of the system which afterwards, under riper organisation, was to
+prove so effective, and to produce such actions as the "Glorious First of
+June."
+
+In the third war, after this device had failed again and again, a new one
+was tried. It was Charles the Second's own conception. His idea was to use
+the threat of a military expedition. Some 15,000 men in transports were
+brought to Yarmouth in the hope that the Dutch would come out to bar their
+passage across the open North Sea, and would thus permit our fleet to cut
+in behind them. There was, however, no proper coordination of the two
+forces, and the project failed.
+
+This method of securing a decision was not lost sight of; Anson tried to
+use it in the Seven Years' War. For two years every attempt to seek out the
+enemy's fleet had led to nothing but the exhaustion of our own. But when
+Pitt began his raids on the French coast, Anson, who had little faith in
+their value for military purposes, thought he saw in them definite naval
+possibilities. Accordingly when, in 1758, he was placed in command of the
+Channel Fleet to cover the expedition against St. Malo, he raised the
+blockade of Brest, and took up a position near the Isle of Batz between the
+enemy's main fleet and the army's line of passage. The Brest fleet,
+however, was in no condition to move, and again there was no result. It was
+not till 1805 that there was any clear case of the device succeeding, and
+then it was not used deliberately. It was a joint Anglo-Russian expedition
+in the Mediterranean that forced from Napoleon his reckless order for
+Villeneuve to put to sea from Cadiz, and so solved the problem out of which
+Nelson had seen no issue. Lissa may be taken as an analogous case. But
+there the Italians, treating the territorial attack as a real attack
+instead of as a strategical device, suffered themselves to be surprised by
+the Austrian fleet and defeated.
+
+This instance serves well to introduce the important fact, that although
+our own military expeditions have seldom succeeded in leading to a naval
+decision, the converse was almost always true. The attempt of the enemy to
+use his army against our territory has been the most fertile source of our
+great naval victories. The knowledge that our enemy intends to invade these
+shores, or to make some serious expedition against our oversea dominions or
+interests, should always be welcomed. Unless History belie herself, we know
+that such attempts are the surest means of securing what we want. We have
+the memories of La Hogue, Quiberon, and the Nile to assure us that sooner
+or later they must lead to a naval decision, and the chance of a real
+decision is all we can ask of the Fortune of War.
+
+Enough has now been said to show that "seeking out the enemy's fleet" is
+not in itself sufficient to secure such a decision. What the maxim really
+means is that we should endeavour from the first to secure contact in the
+best position for bringing about a complete decision in our favour, and as
+soon as the other parts of our war plan, military or political, will
+permit. If the main offensive is military, as it was in the Japanese and
+American cases, then if possible the effort to secure such control must be
+subordinated to the movement of the army, otherwise we give the defensive
+precedence of the offensive. If, however, the military offensive cannot be
+ensured until the naval defensive is perfected, as will be the case if the
+enemy brings a fleet up to our army's line of passage, then our first move
+must be to secure naval contact.
+
+The vice of the opposite method of procedure is obvious. If we assume the
+maxim that the first duty of our fleet is to seek out the enemy wherever he
+may be, it means in its nakedness that we merely conform to the enemy's
+dispositions and movements. It is open to him to lead us wherever he likes.
+It was one of the fallacies that underlay all Napoleon's naval
+combinations, that he believed that our hard-bitten admirals would behave
+in this guileless manner. But nothing was further from their cunning. There
+is a typical order of Cornwallis's which serves well to mark their
+attitude. It was one he gave to Admiral Cotton, his second in command, in
+July 1804 on handing over to his charge the Western Squadron off Ushant:
+"If the French put to sea," he says, "without any of your vessels seeing
+them, do not follow them, unless you are absolutely sure of the course they
+have taken. If you leave the entrance of the Channel without protection,
+the enemy might profit by it, and assist the invasion which threatens His
+Majesty's dominions, the protection of which is your principal object."
+
+It is indeed a common belief that Nelson never permitted himself but a
+single purpose, the pursuit of the enemy's fleet, and that, ignoring the
+caution which Cornwallis impressed upon Cotton, he fell into the simple
+trap. But it has to be noted that he never suffered himself to be led in
+pursuit of a fleet away from the position he had been charged to maintain,
+unless and until he had made that position secure behind him. His famous
+chase to the West Indies is the case which has led to most misconception on
+the point from an insufficient regard to the surrounding circumstances.
+Nelson did not pursue Villeneuve with the sole, or even the primary, object
+of bringing him to action. His dominant object was to save Jamaica from
+capture. If it had only been a question of getting contact, he would
+certainly have felt in a surer position by waiting for Villeneuve's return
+off St. Vincent or closing in to the strategical centre off Ushant.
+Further, it must be observed that Nelson by his pursuit did not uncover
+what it was his duty to defend. The Mediterranean position was rendered
+quite secure before he ventured on his eccentric movement. Finally, we have
+the important fact that though the moral effect of Nelson's implacable
+persistence and rapidity was of priceless value, it is impossible to show
+that as a mere strategical movement it had any influence on the course of
+the campaign. His appearance in the West Indies may have saved one or two
+small islands from ransom and a good deal of trade from capture. It may
+also have hastened Villeneuve's return by a few days, but that was not to
+our advantage. Had he returned even a week later there would have been no
+need to raise the Rochefort blockade. Barham would have had enough ships at
+his command to preserve the whole of his blockades, as he had intended to
+do till the _Curieux's_ news of Villeneuve's precipitate return forced his
+hand before he was ready.
+
+If we desire a typical example of the way the old masters used the doctrine
+of seeking out, it is to be found, not in Nelson's magnificent chase, but
+in the restrained boldness of Barham's orders to Cornwallis and Calder.
+Their instructions for seeking out Villeneuve were to move out on his two
+possible lines of approach for such a time and such a distance as would
+make decisive action almost certain, and at the same time, if contact were
+missed, would ensure the preservation of the vital defensive positions.
+Barham was far too astute to play into Napoleon's hands, and by blindly
+following his enemy's lead to be jockeyed into sacrificing the position
+which his enemy wished to secure. If our maxim be suffered to usurp the
+place of instructed judgment, the almost inevitable result will be that it
+will lead us into just the kind of mistake which Barham avoided.
+
+II. BLOCKADE
+
+Under the term blockade we include operations which vary widely in
+character and in strategical intention. In the first place, blockade may be
+either naval or commercial. By naval blockade we seek either to prevent an
+enemy's armed force leaving port, or to make certain it shall be brought to
+action before it can carry out the ulterior purpose for which it puts to
+sea. That armed force may be purely naval, or it may consist wholly or in
+part of a military expedition. If it be purely naval, then our blockade is
+a method of securing command. If it be purely military, it is a method of
+exercising command, and as such will be dealt with when we come to consider
+defence against invasion. But in so far as military expeditions are
+normally accompanied by a naval escort, operations to prevent their sailing
+are not purely concerned with the exercise of command. Naval blockade,
+therefore, may be regarded for practical purposes as a method of securing
+command and as a function of battle-squadrons. Commercial blockade, on the
+other hand, is essentially a method of exercising command, and is mainly an
+affair of cruisers. Its immediate object is to stop the flow of the enemy's
+sea-borne trade, whether carried in his own or neutral bottoms, by denying
+him the use of trade communications.
+
+From the point of view of the conduct of war, therefore, we have two
+well-defined categories of blockade, naval and commercial. But our
+classification must go further; for naval blockade itself is equally varied
+in intention, and must be subdivided. Strictly speaking, the term implies a
+desire to close the blockaded port and to prevent the enemy putting to sea.
+But this was not always the intention. As often as not our wish was that he
+should put to sea that we might bring him to action, and in order to do
+this, before he could effect his purpose, we had to watch the port with a
+fleet more or less closely. For this operation there was no special name.
+Widely as it differed in object from the other, it was also usually called
+blockade, and Nelson's protest against the consequent confusion of thought
+is well known. "It is not my intention," he said, "to close-watch Toulon";
+and again, "My system is the very contrary of blockading. Every opportunity
+has been offered the enemy to put to sea." It is desirable, therefore, to
+adopt terms to distinguish the two forms. "Close" and "open" express the
+antithesis suggested by Nelson's letter, and the two terms serve well
+enough to mark the characteristic feature of each operation. Close
+blockade, it is true, as formerly conceived, is generally regarded as no
+longer practicable; but the antithetical ideas, which the two forms of
+blockade connote, can never be eliminated from strategical consideration.
+It must always be with the relations of these two forms, whatever shape
+they may take in future, that the strategy of naval blockade is chiefly
+concerned.
+
+With regard to commercial blockade, in strict analysis it should be
+eliminated from an inquiry that concerns methods of securing command and
+postponed to that section of exercising command which deals with the attack
+and defence of trade. It is, however, necessary to treat certain of its
+aspects in conjunction with naval blockade for two reasons: one, that as a
+rule naval blockade is indissolubly united to a subordinate commercial
+blockade; and the other, that the commercial form, though its immediate
+object is the exercise of control, has almost invariably an ulterior object
+which is concerned with securing control; that is to say, while its
+immediate object was to keep the enemy's commercial ports closed, its
+ulterior object was to force his fleet to sea.
+
+Commercial blockade, therefore, has an intimate relation with naval
+blockade in its open form. We adopt that form when we wish his fleet to put
+to sea, and commercial blockade is usually the most effective means we have
+of forcing upon him the movement we leave him free to attempt. By closing
+his commercial ports we exercise the highest power of injuring him which
+the command of the sea can give us. We choke the flow of his national
+activity afloat in the same way that military occupation of his territory
+chokes it ashore. He must, therefore, either tamely submit to the worst
+which a naval defeat can inflict upon him, or he must fight to release
+himself. He may see fit to choose the one course or the other, but in any
+case we can do no more by naval means alone to force our will upon him.
+
+In the long run a rigorous and uninterrupted blockade is almost sure to
+exhaust him before it exhausts us, but the end will be far and costly. As a
+rule, therefore, we have found that where we had a substantial predominance
+our enemy preferred to submit to commercial blockade in hope that by the
+chances of war or the development of fresh force he might later on be in a
+better position to come out into the open. That he should come out and
+stake the issue in battle was nearly always our wish, and it was obvious
+that too rigorous a naval blockade was not the way to achieve the desired
+end, or to reap the strategical result which we might expect from
+paralysing his commerce. Consequently where the desire for a decision at
+sea was not crossed by higher military considerations, as in the case of
+imminent invasion, or where we ourselves had an important expedition in
+hand, it was to our interest to incline the enemy's mind towards the bolder
+choice.
+
+The means was to tempt him with a prospect of success, either by leading
+him to believe the blockading force was smaller than it was, or by removing
+it to such a distance as would induce him to attempt to evade it, or both.
+A leading case of such an open blockade was Nelson's disposition of his
+fleet off Cadiz when he was seeking to bring Villeneuve to action in 1805.
+But merely to leave a port open does not fulfil the idea of open blockade,
+and in this case to opportunity and temptation Nelson added the pressure of
+a commercial blockade of the adjacent ports in hope of starving Villeneuve
+into the necessity of taking to the sea.
+
+Finally, in a general comparison of the two forms, we have to observe that
+close blockade is characteristically a method of securing local and
+temporary command. Its dominating purpose will usually be to prevent the
+enemy's fleet acting in a certain area and for a certain purpose. Whereas
+open blockade, in that it aims at the destruction of an enemy's naval
+force, is a definite step towards securing permanent command.
+
+Enough has now been said to show that the question of choice between close
+and open blockade is one of extreme complexity. Our naval literature, it is
+true, presents the old masters as divided into two schools on the subject,
+implying that one was in favour of the close form always, and the other of
+the open form. We are even led to believe that the choice depended on the
+military spirit of the officer concerned. If his military spirit was high,
+he chose the close and more exacting form; if it were low, he was content
+with the open and less exacting form. True, we are told that men of the
+latter school based their objections to close blockade on the excessive
+wear and tear of a fleet that it involved, but it is too often suggested
+that this attitude was no more than a mask for a defective spirit. Seldom
+if ever are we invited to compare their decisions with the attendant
+strategical intention, with the risks which the conditions justified, or
+with the expenditure of energy which the desired result could legitimately
+demand. Yet all these considerations must enter into the choice, and on
+closer examination of the leading cases it will be found that they bear a
+striking and almost constant relation to the nature of the blockade
+employed.
+
+In considering open blockade, three postulates must be kept in mind.
+Firstly, since our object is to get the enemy to sea, our position must be
+such as will give him an opportunity of doing so. Secondly, since we desire
+contact for a decisive battle, that position must be no further away from
+his port than is compatible with bringing him to action before he can
+effect his purpose. Thirdly, there is the idea of economy--that is, the
+idea of adopting the method which is least exhausting to our fleet, and
+which will best preserve its battle fitness. It is on the last point that
+the greatest difference of opinion has existed. A close blockade always
+tended to exhaust a fleet, and always must do so. But, on the other hand,
+it was contended that the exhaustion is compensated by the high temper and
+moral domination which the maintenance of a close blockade produces in a
+good fleet, whereas the comparative ease of distant and secure watch tended
+to deterioration. Before considering these opposed views, one warning is
+necessary. It is usually assumed that the alternative to close blockade is
+watching the enemy from one of our own ports, but this is not essential.
+What is required is an interior and, if possible, a secret position which
+will render contact certain; and with modern developments in the means of
+distant communication, such a position is usually better found at sea than
+in port. A watching position can in fact be obtained free from the strain
+of dangerous navigation and incessant liability to attack without sacrifice
+of sea training. With this very practical point in mind, we may proceed to
+test the merits of the two forms on abstract principles.
+
+It was always obvious that a close naval blockade was one of the weakest
+and least desirable forms of war. Here again when we say "weakest" we do
+not mean "least effective," but that it was exhausting, and that it tended
+to occupy a force greater than that against which it was acting. This was
+not because a blockading fleet, tempered and toughened by its watch, and
+with great advantage of tactical position, could not be counted on to
+engage successfully a raw fleet of equal force issuing from port, but
+because in order to maintain its active efficiency it required large
+reserves for its relief. So severe was the wear and tear both to men and
+ships, that even the most strenuous exponents of the system considered that
+at least a fifth of the force should always be refitting, and in every case
+two admirals were employed to relieve one another. In 1794 one of the
+highest authorities in the service considered that to maintain an effective
+close blockade of Brest two complete sets of flag-officers were necessary,
+and that no less than one-fourth of the squadron should always be in
+port.[16]
+
+  [16] Captain Philip Patton to Sir Charles Middleton, 27 June 1794.
+  _Barham Papers_, ii, 393. Patton had probably wider war experience than
+  any officer then living. He was regarded as possessing a very special
+  knowledge of personnel, and as vice admiral became second sea lord under
+  Barham in 1804.
+
+Now these weaknesses, being inherent in close blockade, necessarily
+affected the appreciation of its value. The weight of the objection tended
+of course to decrease as seamanship, material, or organisation improved,
+but it was always a factor. It is true also that it seems to have had more
+weight with some men than with others, but it will appear equally true, if
+we endeavour to trace the movement of opinion on the subject, that it was
+far from being the sole determinant.
+
+It was in the Seven Years' War under Anson's administration that continuous
+and close blockade was first used systematically, but it was Hawke who
+originated it. In the first three campaigns the old system of watching
+Brest from a British western port had been in vogue, but it had twice
+failed to prevent a French concentration in the vital Canadian theatre. In
+the spring of 1759 Hawke was in command of the Channel Fleet with the usual
+instructions for watching, but being directed to stand over and look into
+Brest, he intimated his intention, unless he received orders to the
+contrary, to remain off the port instead of returning to Torbay. His reason
+was that he had found there a squadron which he believed was intended for
+the West Indies, and he considered it better to prevent its sailing than to
+let it put to sea and try to catch it. In other words, he argued that none
+of the usual western watching ports afforded a position interior to the
+usual French route from Brest to the West Indies.
+
+Since rumours of invasion were in the air, it was obviously the better
+course to deal with the enemy's squadrons in home waters and avoid
+dispersal of the fleet in seeking them out. In spite of extraordinarily bad
+weather, therefore, he was permitted to act as he advised. With Boscawen as
+relief, the new form of blockade was kept up thenceforward, and with entire
+success. But it must be noted that this success was rather due to the fact
+that the French made no further effort to cross the Atlantic, than to the
+fact that the blockade was maintained with sufficient strictness to prevent
+their doing so. In certain states of weather our fleet was forced to raise
+the blockade and run to Torbay or Plymouth. Such temporary reversions to
+the open form nearly always afforded an opportunity for the French to get
+away to the southward with two or three days' start. Against any attempt,
+however, to get to the east or the north in order to dispute command of the
+Channel or other home waters the system was thoroughly efficient, and was
+unaffected by the intervals of the open form.
+
+It may have been these considerations which in the War of American
+Independence induced so fine an officer as Howe to be strongly in favour of
+a reversion to the old system. The vital theatre was then again across the
+Atlantic, and there was no serious preparation for invasion. It should also
+be borne in mind in judging Howe against Hawke, that in the Seven Years'
+War we had such a preponderance at sea as permitted ample reserves to
+nourish a close blockade, whereas in the latter war we were numerically
+inferior to the hostile coalition. Since it was impossible to prevent the
+French reaching the West Indies and North America if they so determined,
+our policy was to follow them with equal fleets and reduce the home force
+as low as that policy demanded and as was consistent with a reasonable
+degree of safety. The force required might well be inferior to the enemy,
+since it was certain that all attempts upon the Channel would be made with
+an unwieldy and ill-knit force composed of Spanish and French units.
+
+In Howe's opinion this particular situation was not to be solved by
+attempting to close Brest, and nothing can be more misleading than to
+stretch such an opinion beyond the circumstances it was intended to meet.
+He did not consider it was in his power to close the port. The enemy, he
+held, could always be in readiness to escape after a gale of wind by which
+the blockading squadron would be drawn off or dispersed, the ships much
+damaged, and the enemy enheartened. "An enemy," he said, "is not to be
+restrained from putting to sea by a station taken off their port with a
+barely superior squadron." The experience of 1805 appears to contradict
+him. Then a barely superior squadron did succeed in preventing Ganteaume's
+exit, but though the squadron actually employed was barely superior, it had
+ample fleet reserves to sustain its numbers in efficiency. It was,
+moreover, only for a short time that it had to deal with any real effort to
+escape. After May 20th, Ganteaume was forbidden to put to sea. There were
+certainly several occasions during that famous blockade when he could have
+escaped to the southward had Napoleon wished it.
+
+This case, then, cannot be taken to condemn Howe's judgment. His special
+function in the war plan was, with a force reduced to defensive strength,
+to prevent the enemy obtaining command of our home waters. It was certainly
+not his duty to undertake operations to which his force was not equal. His
+first duty was to keep it in being for its paramount purpose. To this end
+he decided on open blockade based on a general reserve at Spithead or St.
+Helen's, where he could husband the ships and train his recruits, while at
+the same time he protected our trade and communications and harassed those
+of the enemy. Kempenfelt, than whom there was no warmer advocate of
+activity, entirely approved the policy at least for the winter months, and
+in his case no one will be found to suggest that the idea was prompted by
+lack of spirit or love of ease. So far as the summer was concerned there
+was really little difference of opinion as to whether the fleet should be
+kept at sea or not, for sea-training during summer more than compensated
+for the exhaustion of material likely to be caused by intermittent spells
+of bad weather. Even for the winter the two policies came to much the same
+thing. Thus in Hawke's blockade at the end of 1759, during the critical
+month from mid-October to mid-November, he was unable to keep his station
+for nearly half the time, and when he did get contact with Conflans it was
+from Torbay and not Ushant. Still it may be doubted if without the
+confidence bred of his stormy vigil the battle of Quiberon would have been
+fought as it was.
+
+With all this experience fresh in his mind Kempenfelt frankly advocated
+keeping the fleet in port for the winter. "Suppose," he wrote from Torbay
+in November 1779, "the enemy should put to sea with their fleet (that is,
+from Brest)--a thing much to be wished for by us--let us act wisely and
+keep ours in port. Leave them to the mercy of long nights and hard gales.
+They will do more in favour of you than your fleet can." Far better he
+thought to devote the winter to preparing the fleet for the next campaign
+so as to have "the advantage of being the first in the field." "Let us," he
+concluded, "keep a stout squadron to the westward ready to attend the
+motions of the enemy. I don't mean to keep them at sea, disabling
+themselves in buffeting the winds, but at Torbay ready to act as
+intelligence may suggest."[17] It will be seen, therefore, that the
+conclusion that close blockade was always the best means of rendering the
+fleet most efficient for the function it had to perform must not be
+accepted too hastily. The reasons which induced Howe and Kempenfelt to
+prefer open blockade were mainly based on this very consideration. Having
+in mind the whole of the surrounding conditions, in their highly
+experienced opinion careful preparation in the winter and tactical
+evolutions in the summer were the surest road to battle fitness in the
+force available.
+
+  [17] _Barham Papers_, i, 302.
+
+On the other hand, we have the fact that during the War of American
+Independence the open system was not very successful. But before condemning
+it out of hand, it must be remembered that the causes of failure were not
+all inherent in the system. In the first place, the need of relieving
+Gibraltar from time to time prevented the Western Squadron devoting itself
+entirely to its watch. In the next place, owing to defective administration
+the winters were not devoted with sufficient energy to preparing the fleet
+to be first in the field in the spring. Finally, we have to recognise that
+the lack of success was due not so much to permitting the French to cross
+the Atlantic, as to the failure to deal faithfully with them when contact
+was obtained at their destination. Obviously there is nothing to be said
+for the policy of "seeking out" as against that of preventing exit unless
+you are determined when you find to destroy or to be destroyed. It was here
+that Rodney and his fellows were found wanting. The system failed from
+defective execution quite as much as from defective design.
+
+In the next war Howe was still in the ascendant and in command of the
+Channel fleet. He retained his system. Leaving Brest open he forced the
+French by operating against their trade to put to sea, and he was rewarded
+with the battle of the First of June. No attempt was made to maintain a
+close blockade during the following winter. The French were allowed to
+sail, and their disastrous cruise of January 1795 fully justified
+Kempenfelt's anticipations. So great was the damage done that they
+abandoned all idea of using their fleet as a whole. Howe's system was
+continued, but no longer with entirely successful results. In 1796 the
+French were able to make descents upon Ireland, and Howe in consequence has
+come in for the severest castigations. His method is contemptuously
+contrasted with that which St. Vincent adopted four years later, without
+any regard to the situation each admiral had to meet, and again on the
+assumption that the closing of Brest would have solved the one problem as
+well as it did the other.
+
+In 1796 we were not on the defensive as we were in 1800. The French fleet
+had been practically destroyed. No invasion threatened. With a view to
+forcing peace our policy was directed to offensive action against French
+trade and territory in order by general pressure to back our overtures for
+a settlement. The policy may have been mistaken, but that is not the
+question. The question is, whether or not the strategy fitted the policy.
+We were also, it must be remembered, at war with Holland and expecting war
+with Spain, an eventuality which forced us to keep an eye on the defence of
+Portugal. In these circumstances nothing was further from our desire than
+to keep what was left of the Brest fleet in port. Our hope was by our
+offensive action against French maritime interests to force it to expose
+itself for their defence. To devote the fleet to the closing of Brest was
+to cripple it for offensive action and to play the enemy's game. The actual
+disposition of the home fleet was designed so as to preserve its offensive
+activity, and at the same time to ensure superiority in any part of the
+home waters in which the enemy might attempt a counterstroke. It was
+distributed in three active squadrons, one in the North Sea, one before
+Brest, and one cruising to the westward, with a strong reserve at
+Portsmouth. It is the location of the reserve that has been most lightly
+ridiculed, on the hasty assumption that it was merely the reserve of the
+squadron before Brest; whereas in truth it was a general reserve designed
+to act in the North Sea or wherever else it might be needed. At the same
+time it served as a training and depot squadron for increasing our power at
+sea in view of the probable addition of the Spanish fleet to Napoleon's
+naval force. To have exhausted our fleet merely to prevent raids leaving
+Brest which might equally well leave the Texel or Dunkirk was just what the
+enemy would have desired. The disposition was in fact a good example of
+concentration--that is, disposal about a strategical centre to preserve
+flexibility for offence without risking defensive needs, and yet it is by
+the most ardent advocates of concentration and the offensive that Howe's
+dispositions at this time have been most roundly condemned.
+
+In the end the disposition did fail to prevent the landing of part of the
+force intended for Ireland, but it made the venture so difficult that it
+had to be deferred till mid-winter, and then the weather which rendered
+evasion possible broke up the expedition and denied it all chance of
+serious success. It was, in fact, another example of the working of
+Kempenfelt's rule concerning winter weather. So far as naval defence can
+go, the disposition was all that was required. The Irish expedition was
+seen leaving Brest by our inshore cruiser squadron. It was reported to
+Colpoys, who had the battle-squadron outside, and it was only a dense fog
+that enabled it to escape. It was, in fact, nothing more than the evasion
+of a small raiding force--an eventuality against which no naval defence can
+provide certain guarantee, especially in winter.
+
+It was under wholly different conditions that at the end of 1800 Hawke's
+system was revived. St. Vincent's succession to the control of the fleet
+coincided with Napoleon's definite assumption of the control of the
+destinies of France. Our great duel with him had begun. The measures he was
+taking made it obvious we were once more facing the old life and death
+struggle for naval supremacy; we were openly threatened with invasion, and
+we had a distinct preponderance at sea. In short, we have to recognize the
+fact that the methods of the Seven Years' War were revived when the
+problems and factors of that war were renewed. As those problems grew more
+intense, as they did after the Peace of Amiens, and the threat of invasion
+became really formidable, so did the rigour of the close blockade increase.
+Under Cornwallis and Gardner it was maintained in such a way as to deny, so
+far as human effort could go, all possibility of exit without fighting. In
+spite of the importance of dealing with the enemy's squadrons in detail no
+risks were taken to bring Ganteaume to decisive action. Our first necessity
+was absolute local command. The acuteness of the invasion crisis demanded
+that the Brest fleet should be kept in port, and every time Ganteaume
+showed a foot the British admiral flew at him and drove him back. Once only
+during the continuation of the crisis was the rigour of this attitude
+relaxed, and that was to deal with what for the moment was the higher
+object. It was to meet Villeneuve on his return from the West Indies, but
+even then so nicely was the relaxation calculated, that Ganteaume was given
+no time to take advantage of it.
+
+The analogy between the conditions of the blockade which St. Vincent
+inaugurated and those of the Seven Years' War becomes all the more
+significant when we note that while Cornwallis and Gardner in home waters
+were pressing close blockade to its utmost limit of rigour, Nelson in the
+Mediterranean was not using it at all. Yet with him also the chief concern
+was to prevent an invasion. His main function, as he and his Government saw
+it, was to prevent a descent from Southern France upon Neapolitan or
+Levantine territory. Why, then, did he not employ close blockade? It is
+usually assumed that it was because of his overpowering desire to bring the
+Toulon squadron to action. Occasional expressions in his letters give
+colour to such a view, but his dispositions show clearly that his desire to
+bring the fleet to action was kept in scientific subordination to the
+defensive duty with which he was charged. Close blockade was the most
+effectual means of securing this end, but in his case one of the
+conditions, which we have found always accompanying successful close
+blockade, was absent. He had no such preponderance of force as would enable
+him to nourish it up to the point of perfect continuity. In the
+circumstances the close form was too weak or exhausting for him to use with
+the force at his disposal.
+
+If this case be not considered conclusive as to Nelson's views, we have a
+perfectly clear endorsement from his pen in 1801. It is a particularly
+strong testimony, for he was at the time actually charged with defence
+against the invasion of England. With several cruiser squadrons he had to
+prevent the enemy's force issuing from a number of ports extending from
+Flushing to Dieppe, and he was directing the operations from the Downs. On
+the approach of winter he was impressed with the inexpediency of attempting
+to continue a close blockade, and wrote to the Admiralty as follows: "I am
+of opinion, and submit to their Lordships' better judgment, that care
+should be taken to keep our squadrons compact and in good order ... under
+Dungeness to be their principal station.... In fine weather our squadrons
+to go out and show themselves, but never to risk either being crippled or
+drawn into the North Sea; thus we shall always be sure of an effective
+force, ready to act as occasion calls for it."[18]
+
+  [18] To Evan Nepean, 4 September 1801. Nicolas, _Nelson Despatches_, iv,
+  484.
+
+The case of course is not entirely in point, for it concerns the question
+of direct resistance to invasion and not to securing general command. Its
+value is that it gives Nelson's views on the broad question of balancing
+the risks--that is, the risk of relaxing close watch against the risk of
+destroying the efficiency of the ships by maintaining it too rigorously.
+
+With Nelson holding this view, it is not surprising to find that as late as
+1804 naval opinion was not quite settled on the relative advantages of
+close and open blockade even in the case of threatened invasion. Just a
+year before Trafalgar was fought, Cornwallis pressed the Admiralty for more
+strength to enable him to keep his blockade efficient. Lord Melville, who
+at this time had Barham at his elbow, replied recommending the "policy of
+relaxing the strictness of blockade, formerly resorted to." He protested
+the means available were insufficient for "sustaining the necessary extent
+of naval force, if your ships are to be torn to pieces by an eternal
+conflict with the elements during the tempestuous months of winter."[19]
+Melville was craving for a decisive action to end the insupportable strain.
+"Allow me to remind you," he added, "that the occasions when we have been
+able to bring our enemy to battle and our fleets to victory have generally
+been when we were at a distance from the blockading station." In the end,
+as we know, Cornwallis had his way, and the verdict of history has been to
+approve the decision for its moral effect alone. Such conflicts must always
+arise. "War," as Wolfe said, "is an option of difficulties," and the choice
+must sway to the one side or the other as the circumstances tend to develop
+the respective advantages of each form. We can never say that close
+blockade is better than open, or the reverse. It must always be a matter of
+judgment.
+
+  [19] For Barham's final views, 1805, see _Barham Papers_, iii, 90-93.
+
+Are there, then, no principles which we can deduce from the old practice
+for the strengthening of judgment? Certain broad lines of guidance at least
+are to be traced. The main question will be, is it to our advantage, in
+regard to all the strategical conditions, to keep the enemy in and get him
+to sea for a decision? Presumably it will always be our policy to get a
+decision as soon as possible. Still that desire may be overridden by the
+necessity or special advantage of closely blockading one or more of his
+squadrons. This situation may arise in two ways. Firstly, it may be
+essential to provide for the local and temporary command of a certain
+theatre of operations, as when an invasion threatens in that area, or when
+we wish to pass a military expedition across it, or from special exigencies
+in regard to the attack or defence of commerce. Secondly, even where we are
+seeking a great decision, we may blockade one squadron closely in order to
+induce a decision at the point most advantageous to ourselves; that is to
+say, we may blockade one or more squadrons in order to induce the enemy to
+attempt with one or more other squadrons to break that blockade. In this
+way we may lead him either to expose himself to be struck in detail, or to
+concentrate where we desire his concentration.
+
+For any of these reasons we may decide that the best way of realising our
+object is to use close blockade, but the matter does not end there. We have
+still to consider whether close blockade is within the limit of the force
+we have available, and whether it is the best method of developing the
+fullest potentialities of that force. Close blockade being the more
+exhausting form will require the greater strength; we cannot blockade
+closely for any length of time without a force relatively superior; but if
+by open blockade of a squadron we permit it to put to sea with contact
+assured, we know that, even with a slightly inferior force, we can so deal
+with it as to prevent its getting local control sufficient to break down
+our mobile flotilla defence or to interfere seriously with our trade.
+
+Finally, there is the question of risk. In the old days, before free
+movement and wireless telegraphy, and before the flotilla had acquired
+battle power, there was always to be faced the risk of not getting contact
+in time to prevent mischief. This consideration was specially dominant
+where the enemy had a squadron within or near the critical theatre of
+operations. Therefore when the invasion threatened, our developed policy
+was to blockade Brest closely at almost any sacrifice. There was always a
+vague possibility that by evasion or chance of wind a squadron so close to
+the line of invasion might get sufficient temporary command in the vital
+area before it could be brought to action. It was a possibility that was
+never realised in the Narrow Seas, and since mobility of fleets and means
+of distant communication have so greatly increased in range and certainty,
+and since the power of resistance in the flotilla has become so high, the
+risk is probably much less than ever, and the field for open blockade is
+consequently less restricted.
+
+There is no need, however, to accept these principles as incontrovertible.
+Even if we take the great blockade of 1803-5, which has most firmly
+dominated thought on the subject ever since, it may be argued with some
+plausibility that the situation could have been solved more quickly and
+effectually by letting Ganteaume get out from Brest into the open, at least
+as far as Admiral Togo was forced to permit the Russians to emerge from
+Port Arthur, though his reasons for keeping them in were even stronger than
+ours in 1805. But in any case, the whole trend of the evidence will admit
+no doubt as to the inherent weakness of close blockade as a form of war. As
+under modern developments the possibilities of open blockade have
+increased, so the difficulties and dangers of close blockade have certainly
+not decreased. It is also probable that certain advantages which in the
+sailing era went far to compensate for its weakness have lost much of their
+force. A sailing fleet cooped up in port not only rapidly lost its spirit,
+but, being barred from sea-training, could not be kept in a condition of
+efficiency, whereas the blockading fleet was quickly raised to the highest
+temper by the stress of vigilance and danger that was its incessant
+portion. So long as the strain did not pass the limit of human endurance,
+it was all to the good. In the old days, with very moderate reliefs, the
+limit was never reached, and the sacrifices that were made to those
+exhausting vigils were rewarded twentyfold in exuberant confidence on the
+day of battle. Can we expect the same compensation now? Will the balance of
+strength and weakness remain as it used to be? In the face of the vast
+change of conditions and the thinness of experience, it is to general
+principles we must turn for the answer.
+
+What, in fact, is the inherent weakness of close blockade? Strategical
+theory will at once reply that it is an operation which involves "an arrest
+of the offensive," a situation which is usually taken to exhibit every kind
+of drawback. Close blockade is essentially an offensive operation, although
+its object is usually negative; that is, it is a forward movement to
+prevent the enemy carrying out some offensive operation either direct or by
+way of counterstroke. So far the common tendency to confuse "Seeking out
+the enemy's fleet" with "Making the enemy's coast your frontier" may be
+condoned. But the two operations are widely different in that they have
+different objectives. In "seeking out," our objective is the enemy's armed
+force. In "making the enemy's coast our frontier," the objective is
+inseparable from the ulterior object of the naval war. In this case the
+objective is the common communications. By establishing a blockade we
+operate offensively against those communications. We occupy them, and then
+we can do no more. Our offensive is arrested; we cannot carry it on to the
+destruction of the enemy's fleet. We have to wait in a defensive attitude,
+holding the communications we have seized, till he chooses to attack in
+order to break our hold; and during that period of arrest the advantage of
+surprise--the all-important advantage in war--passes by a well recognised
+rule to our enemy. We, in fact, are held upon the defensive, with none of
+the material advantages of the defensive. The moral advantage of having
+taken the initiative remains, but that is all. The advantage which we thus
+gain will of course have the same kind of depressing effect upon the
+blockaded fleet as it had of old, but scarcely in so high a degree. The
+degradation of a steam fleet in port can scarcely be so rapid or
+debilitating as it was when nine-tenths of seamanship lay in the smart
+handling of sails. For the blockading fleet it is also true that the
+effects of weather, which formerly were the main cause of wear and tear,
+can scarcely be so severe. But, on the other hand, the physical strain to
+officers and men, and the difficulty of supply, will be far greater, so
+long at least as coal is the chief fuel. The wind no longer sets a measure
+on the enemy's movements. Vigilance close and unremitting beyond all our
+predecessors knew is the portion of the blockaders to prevent surprise.
+Furthermore, in the old days surprise meant at worst the enemy's escape;
+now it may mean our own destruction by mine or torpedo. It is unnecessary
+to labour the point. It is too obvious that a close blockade of the old
+type exhibits under present conditions the defects of "arrested offence" in
+so high a degree as practically to prohibit its use.
+
+What, then, can be done? Must we rest content in all situations with Howe's
+system, which riper experience condemned for cases of extreme necessity?
+Cannot the old close blockade be given a modern form? Assuredly it can. In
+old days the shoreward limit of the blockading fleet was just beyond the
+range of the coast batteries, and this position it held continuously by
+means of an inshore squadron. In these days of mobile defence that limit is
+by analogy the night range of destroyers and the day range of submarines,
+that is, half the distance they can traverse between dark and dawn or dawn
+and dark respectively, unless within that limit a torpedo-proof base can be
+established. A blockade of this nature will correspond in principle to a
+close blockade of the old type; nor in practice, as was proved in the
+Japanese blockade of Port Arthur, will its incidents be materially
+different. The distance at which the battle-squadron must keep will seem at
+first sight to deny it certainty of immediate contact--the essence of close
+blockade. But in truth other new factors already noticed will reduce that
+distance relatively. Quicker and more certain means of communication
+between the admiral and his scouts, the absolute freedom of movement and
+the power of delaying the enemy's actual exit by mining, may go far to
+bring things back to their old relations. At Port Arthur they did so
+entirely. If then, as in that case, our paramount object is to keep the
+enemy in, there seems still no reason why we should not make our
+dispositions on the principle of close blockade. Distances will be greater,
+but that is all.
+
+Nor must it be forgotten that for a squadron to take station off a port in
+the old manner is not the only means of close blockade. It may still effect
+its purpose, at least temporarily, by supporting mining vessels or block
+ships--"sinkers," as they used to be called. The latter expedient, it is
+true, had little success in the latest experiments, but even in the
+Russo-Japanese War its possibilities were by no means exhausted. We have
+therefore to conclude that where the strategical conditions call obviously
+for close blockade, our plan of operations will be modified in that
+direction with the means still at our disposal.
+
+If, however, our object is not so sharply defined, if in spite of our
+desire to deny the enemy the sea we are ready to take risks in order to
+bring about a decision, the case is not so clear. It will be observed that
+the looseness which the new conditions force upon close blockade-increasing
+as they are in intensity year by year-must tend more and more to
+approximate it in practice to open blockade. The question will therefore
+present itself whether it would not be more in accordance with the
+fundamental elements of strength to adopt open blockade frankly for all
+purposes. We should thus substitute a true defensive disposition for an
+arrested offence, and, theoretically, that in itself is a great advantage.
+The practical benefits, whatever the correlative drawbacks, are equally
+clear, nor are they less great now than they appeared to Howe and
+Kempenfelt. We avoid exhaustion of machinery, coal, and men, and this, at
+least for the necessary flotilla screen, will be greater than anything that
+had to be faced in former days. We have at least the opportunity of
+occupying a position secure from surprise, and of keeping the fleet
+continually up to its highest striking energy. Finally, assuming the
+geographical conditions give reasonable promise of contact, a quick
+decision, which modern war demands with ever greater insistence, is more
+probable. In such a disposition of course contact can rarely be made
+certain. The enemy, whom the hypothesis of blockade assumes to be anxious
+to avoid action, will always have a chance of evasion, but this will always
+be so, even with the closest blockade now possible. We may even go further
+and claim for open blockade that in favourable conditions it may give the
+better chance of contact. For by adopting the principle of open blockade we
+shall have, in accordance with the theory of defence, the further
+advantages of being able the better to conceal our dispositions, and
+consequently to lay traps for our enemy, such as that which Nelson prepared
+for Villeneuve in the Gulf of Lyons in 1805.
+
+The objection to such a course which appears to have the most weight with
+current opinion is the moral one, which is inseparable from all deliberate
+choices of the defensive. If the watching fleet remains in a home fortified
+base, it may be assumed that the usual moral degradation will set in. But
+the method does not entail the inglorious security of such a base. A sound
+position may well be found at a spot such as Admiral Togo occupied while
+waiting for the Baltic fleet, and in that case there was no observable
+degradation of any kind. Nor is there much evidence that this objection
+weighed materially with the opponents of Howe's view. Their objection was
+of a purely physical kind. Open blockade left the enemy too much freedom to
+raid our trade routes. The watching system might be sufficient to keep an
+unwilling battle-fleet in port or to bring a more adventurous one to
+action, but it could not control raiding squadrons. This was certainly
+Barham's objection. "If," he wrote to Pitt in 1794, "the French should have
+any intention of sending their fleet to sea with this easterly wind, and
+Lord Howe continues at Torbay, our Mediterranean and Jamaica convoys are in
+a very critical situation. Both fleets must by this time be drawing near
+the Channel, and cannot enter it while the easterly wind holds." This
+danger must always be with us, especially in narrow waters such as the
+North Sea. In more open theatres the difficulty is not so obtrusive, for
+with sufficient sea room trade may take naturally or by direction a course
+which our watching dispositions will cover. Thus with Nelson in the case of
+Toulon, his normal positions on the Sardinian coast covered effectually the
+flow of our trade to the Levant and the Two Sicilies, which was all there
+was at the time.
+
+The truth is, that in endeavouring to decide between open and close
+blockade we find ourselves confronted with those special difficulties which
+so sharply distinguish naval warfare from warfare on land. We cannot choose
+on purely naval considerations. In naval warfare, however great may be our
+desire to concentrate our effort on the enemy's main forces, the ulterior
+object will always obtrude itself. We must from the first do our best to
+control sea communications, and since those communications are usually
+common, we cannot refrain from occupying those of the enemy without at the
+same time neglecting and exposing our own. Thus in the case of Brest a
+close blockade was always desirable, and especially at convoy seasons,
+because the great trade routes which passed within striking distance of the
+port were all common, whereas in the region of Toulon the main lines were
+not common except along the coasts of Africa and Southern Italy, and these
+Nelson's open blockade amply secured.
+
+The general conclusion, then, is that however high may be the purely naval
+and strategical reasons for adopting open blockade as the best means of
+securing a decision against the enemy's fleet, yet the inevitable intrusion
+of the ulterior object in the form of trade protection or the security of
+military expeditions will seldom leave us entirely free to use the open
+method. We must be prepared, in fact, to find ourselves at least at times
+faced with the necessity of using a form of blockade as nearly modelled on
+the old close blockade as changed conditions will permit.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                 CHAPTER THREE
+
+          METHODS OF DISPUTING COMMAND
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+I. DEFENSIVE FLEET OPERATIONS--"A FLEET IN BEING"
+
+In dealing with the theory of sea command, attention was called to the
+error of assuming that if we are unable to win the command we therefore
+lose it. It was pointed out that this proposition, which is too often
+implied in strategical discussion, denies in effect that there can be such
+a thing as strategical defensive at sea, and ignores the fact that the
+normal condition in war is for the command to be in dispute. Theory and
+history are at one on the point. Together they affirm that a Power too weak
+to win command by offensive operations may yet succeed in holding the
+command in dispute by assuming a general defensive attitude.
+
+That such an attitude in itself cannot lead to any positive result at sea
+goes without saying, but nevertheless even over prolonged periods it can
+prevent an enemy securing positive results, and so give time for the other
+belligerent to dominate the situation by securing his ends ashore.
+
+It is seldom that we have been forced even for a time to adopt such an
+attitude, but our enemies have done so frequently to our serious annoyance
+and loss. In the Seven Years' War, for instance, the French by avoiding
+offensive operations likely to lead to a decision, and confining themselves
+to active defence, were able for five campaigns to prevent our reducing
+Canada, which was the object of the war. Had they staked the issue on a
+great fleet action in the first campaign, and had the result been against
+them, we could certainly have achieved our object in half the time. In the
+end, of course, they failed to prevent the conquest, but during all the
+time the catastrophe was postponed France had abundant opportunity of
+gaining offensively elsewhere territory which, as she at all events
+believed, would have compelled us to give up our conquest at the peace.
+
+Again, in our last great naval war Napoleon by avoiding general actions was
+able to keep the command in dispute till by alliances and otherwise he had
+gathered force which he deemed sufficient to warrant a return to the
+offensive. Eventually that force proved unequal to the task, yet when it
+failed and the command passed to his enemy, he had had time to consolidate
+his power so far that the loss of his fleet seemed scarcely to affect it,
+and for nine years more he was able to continue the struggle.
+
+Such examples--and there are many of them--serve to show how serious a
+matter is naval defence in the hands of a great military Power with other
+means of offence. They tell us how difficult it is to deal with, and how
+serious therefore for even the strongest naval Power is the need to give it
+careful study.
+
+And not for this reason only, but also because the strongest naval Power,
+if faced with a coalition, may find it impossible to exert a drastic
+offensive anywhere without temporarily reducing its force in certain areas
+to a point relatively so low as to permit of nothing higher than the
+defensive. The leading case of such a state of affairs, which we must
+further consider presently, was our own position in the War of American
+Independence, when, as we have seen, in order to secure an adequate
+concentration for offence in the West Indies we were forced to reduce our
+home fleet to defensive level.
+
+What, then, do we mean by naval defence? To arrive at a right answer we
+must first clear our mind of all confusing shadows cast by the accidents of
+land defence. Both on land and at sea defence means of course taking
+certain measures to defer a decision until military or political
+developments so far redress the balance of strength that we are able to
+pass to the offensive. In the operations of armies the most usual means
+employed are the holding of positions and forcing our superior enemy to
+exhaust his strength in attacking them. Consequently the idea of military
+defence is dominated by the conception of entrenched positions and
+fortresses.
+
+In naval warfare this is not so. At sea the main conception is avoiding
+decisive action by strategical or tactical activity, so as to keep our
+fleet in being till the situation develops in our favour. In the golden age
+of our navy the keynote of naval defence was mobility, not rest. The idea
+was to dispute the control by harassing operations, to exercise control at
+any place or at any moment as we saw a chance, and to prevent the enemy
+exercising control in spite of his superiority by continually occupying his
+attention. The idea of mere resistance was hardly present at all.
+Everything was counterattack, whether upon the enemy's force or his
+maritime communications. On land, of course, such methods of defence are
+also well known, but they belong much more to guerilla warfare than to
+regular operations. In regular warfare with standing armies, however
+brilliantly harassing operations and counter-attack are used, the
+fundamental conception is the defended or defensible position.
+
+Similarly at sea, although the essence of defence is mobility and an
+untiring aggressive spirit rather than rest and resistance, yet there also
+defended and defensible positions are not excluded. But they are only used
+in the last resort. A fleet may retire temporarily into waters difficult of
+access, where it can only be attacked at great risk, or into a fortified
+base, where it is practically removed from the board and cannot be attacked
+at all by a fleet alone. But the occasions on which such expedients can be
+used at sea are far rarer than on land. Indeed except for the most
+temporary purposes they can scarcely be regarded as admissible at sea,
+however great their value on land. The reason is simple. A fleet
+withdrawing to such a position leaves open to the enemy the ulterior
+object, which is the control of sea communications, whereas on land an army
+in a good position may even for a prolonged period cover the ulterior
+object, which is usually territory. An army in position, moreover, is
+always doing something to exhaust its opponent and redress the unfavourable
+balance, but a fleet in inactivity is too often permitting the enemy to
+carry on operations which tend to exhaust the resources of its own country.
+
+For a maritime Power, then, a naval defensive means nothing but keeping the
+fleet actively in being-not merely in existence, but in active and vigorous
+life. No phrase can better express the full significance of the idea than
+"A fleet in being," if it be rightly understood. Unfortunately it has come
+to be restricted, by a misunderstanding of the circumstances in which it
+was first invented, to one special class of defence. We speak of it as
+though it were essentially a method of defence against invasion, and so
+miss its fuller meaning. If, however, it be extended to express defence
+against any kind of maritime attack, whether against territory or sea
+communications, its broad truth will become apparent, and it will give us
+the true conception of the idea as held in the British service.
+
+The occasion on which it was first used was one that well exhibits the
+special possibilities of a naval defensive. It was in the year 1690, when,
+in alliance with the Dutch, we were at war with France, and though really
+superior, had been caught in a situation which placed us temporarily at a
+great disadvantage in home waters. The French by a surprising rapidity of
+mobilisation and concentration had stolen a march on us before either our
+mobilisation or our concentration was complete. King William, with the best
+of the army, was in Ireland dealing with a French invasion in support of
+James, and a squadron of seven sail under Sir Cloudesley Shovel had been
+detached into the Irish Sea to guard his communications. Another squadron,
+consisting of sixteen of the line, British and Dutch, had been sent to
+Gibraltar under Admiral Killigrew to take down the trade and to keep an eye
+on Chateaurenault, who with a slightly inferior squadron was at Toulon. It
+was assumed he would probably make a push for Brest, where the French main
+fleet was mobilising under the Comte de Tourville, and Killigrew had orders
+to follow him if he got through the Straits. Chateaurenault did get
+through; Killigrew failed to bring him to action, and instead of following
+him immediately, he went into Cadiz to complete his arrangements for
+forwarding his outward-bound convoy and escorting the one he was to bring
+home. What of course he should have done, according to the practice of more
+experienced times, was to have left this work to a cruiser detachment, and
+failing contact with Chateaurenault, should have closed at once to the
+strategical centre with his battle-squadron.
+
+Meanwhile the home fleet, which Lord Torrington was to command, was still
+unformed. It lay in three divisions, at the Downs, Portsmouth, and
+Plymouth, while a considerable part of the promised Dutch contingent had
+not made its appearance. It was a splendid chance for the French to seize
+the command of the Channel before the concentration could take place and to
+crush the British in detail. Accordingly, on June 13th, as soon as
+Chateaurenault had arrived, Tourville put to sea with some seventy of the
+line. The day before, however, Torrington, having hoisted his flag in the
+Downs, had massed his two main divisions at Portsmouth, and by the time
+Tourville appeared off the Isle of Wight he had with later arrivals, both
+Dutch and British, about fifty-six of the line in St. Helen's Road. Not
+knowing that the Toulon contingent had joined, he put to sea intending to
+fight, but on discovering the great superiority of the French, he decided
+in concert with his council of war to act on the defensive, and before
+offering battle to endeavour to secure a concentration with Killigrew and
+Shovel and the Plymouth division by getting to the westward. If he found
+this course impossible without fighting an action, his plan was to retire
+before Tourville "even to the Gunfleet," where amidst the shoals of the
+Thames estuary he felt he would have a good chance of repelling an attack
+with success. There, too, he counted on being reinforced not only by the
+ships still at Chatham, but also possibly by ships from the westward which
+might steal along the coast and join him "over the flats" by channels
+unknown to the French. To fight as he was he considered to be only playing
+the enemy's game. "If we are beaten," he said in communicating his plan to
+the Government, "they being absolute masters of the sea will be at great
+liberty of doing many things which they dare not do whilst we observe them
+and are in a possibility of joining Admiral Killigrew and our ships to the
+westward."
+
+It was a plan conceived on the best principles of defence--waiting till the
+acquisition of fresh force justified a return to the offensive. It is
+further interesting as a pure case of naval defence, with no ulterior
+object other than control of home waters. In the minds of the Government
+there was no apprehension of any definite attempt to invade across the
+Channel, but the invasion of Ireland was in full progress, and all
+nourishment of it must be stopped and our own communications kept free.
+There was, moreover, serious anxiety lest the French should extend their
+operations to Scotland, and there was Killigrew's homeward-bound convoy
+approaching. The situation was one that obviously could not be solved
+effectually except by winning a general command of the sea, but in
+Torrington's judgment it could be rendered innocuous by holding the command
+in dispute. His design, therefore, was to act upon the defensive and
+prevent the enemy achieving any positive result until he was in a position
+to fight them with a fair chance of victory. A temporary defensive he
+considered was the only way to win the command, while to hazard a decision
+in inferior strength was the best way to lose it.
+
+Nothing could be in closer harmony with the principles of good strategy as
+we understand them now. It was undoubtedly in advance of anything that had
+been done up to that time, and it was little wonder if the Government, as
+is usually said, failed to appreciate the design. Their rejection of it has
+come in for very severe criticism. But it would seem that they
+misunderstood rather than failed to appreciate. The Earl of Nottingham, who
+was at the head of the Government, believed, as his reply to the admiral
+clearly shows, that Torrington meant to retire to the Gunfleet at once;
+whereas it is equally clear to us that the Gunfleet was to be his extreme
+point, and that he did not mean to retire so far unless the French forced
+him. The Minister failed, as others have done since, to grasp what the
+admiral meant by "A fleet in being." He thought that in Torrington's view a
+fleet safe in port and not in contact with the enemy was "in being,"
+whereas Torrington had no such idea. As Nottingham conceived the admiral's
+intention he saw that although it might preserve the fleet, it would expose
+everything else to destruction; that is, he was oppressed with the special
+characteristic of naval warfare which always permits action against the
+ulterior object when the enemy denies you any chance of acting against his
+armed force.
+
+Under this misapprehension, which indeed was not justified by the words of
+Torrington's despatch, he procured from the Queen an order in these terms:
+"We apprehend," it ran, "the consequences of your retiring to the Gunfleet
+to be so fatal, that we choose rather you should upon any advantage of the
+wind give battle to the enemy than retreat farther than is necessary to get
+an advantage upon the enemy." It was, however, left to his discretion to
+proceed to the westward to complete his concentration that way, provided,
+it said, "you by no means ever lose sight of the French fleet whereby they
+may have opportunity of making attempts upon the shore or in the rivers of
+Medway or Thames, or get away without fighting."
+
+This order has been very hardly dealt with by modern critics, although it
+clearly contemplates true preventive observation, and even, as the last
+words suggest, the idea contained in Nelson's well-known saying, "that by
+the time the enemy had beat our fleet soundly they would do us no more harm
+this year." It is true that Nelson could rely on the proved superiority of
+the British at that time unit for unit, but it is also true that Nottingham
+and his colleagues in the Government had information which led them greatly
+to underestimate Tourville's strength. This was evident on the face of
+Nottingham's despatch which covered the order, so evident indeed that
+Torrington might well perhaps have suspended the execution of an order so
+obviously based on incorrect information. But knowing probably what
+intrigues were going on against him at Court, he chose to regard it as a
+peremptory command to engage whenever he found himself to windward.
+
+Much as a more scientific view of naval strategy may admire Torrington's
+conception, there seems no reason for losing temper over the Government's
+plan. It was certainly one way of solving the problem, and seeing how large
+were our reserves, a defeat need not have meant disaster. Still, it was
+doubtless dictated by an inability to grasp, the strategical strength of
+Torrington's novel plan, a plan which was not only safer, but was
+calculated to achieve greater positive results in the end. The real fallacy
+of the Government's plan was that although it had a specious appearance of
+a bold offensive, it could have achieved nothing but a negative result. The
+most a battle could have given in the circumstances could only have left
+the command in dispute, and the worst would have given the enemy a positive
+result, which must have gravely compromised William's campaign in Ireland.
+
+On these lines Torrington replied to the Government. Dealing with their
+anxiety for the ships to the westward and the Mediterranean convoy, whose
+danger was their expressed reason for forbidding him the Gunfleet, he
+pointed out that they could not run much hazard if they took care of
+themselves. For, as he repeated, "while we observe the French, they cannot
+make any attempt on ships or shore without running great hazard, and if we
+are beaten, all is exposed to their mercy." Thus without specially noticing
+the Minister's misinterpretation of his despatch, he intimated that his
+intention was observation, and not simple retreat.
+
+By the time Torrington sent this reply he had been pressed back as far as
+Beachy Head; it was no longer possible to get to the westward; and the
+following day, finding himself to windward, he attacked. But still
+confirmed in his idea of defence, and carrying it on to his tactics, he
+refused to give the French the chance of a real decision, and disengaged as
+soon as a drop in the wind permitted. So far he felt justified in
+interpreting orders which he knew were founded on false information. He was
+sure, as he said in justification of the way he fought the action, "that
+the Queen could not have been prevailed with to sign an order for it, had
+not both our weakness and the strength of the enemy been disguised to her."
+
+So severely was his fleet crippled that he believed his plan could no
+longer act. "What the consequences of this unfortunate battle may be," he
+wrote in his Journal, "God Almighty only knows, but this I dare be positive
+in, had I been left to my liberty I had prevented any attempt upon the
+land, and secured the western ships, Killigrew, and the merchantmen."
+Actually in all this he was successful. Slowly retiring eastward he drew
+the French after him as far as Dover before he ran to the Nore; and
+Tourville was unable to get back to the westward, till all the endangered
+ships were safe in Plymouth. In spite of Torrington's being forced to fight
+an action at the wrong time and place, his design had so far succeeded. Not
+only had he prevented the French doing anything that could affect the issue
+of the war, but he had completely foiled Tourville's plan of destroying the
+British fleet in detail. That he had done, but retribution by passing to
+the offensive was no longer in his power.
+
+That Tourville or his Government was impressed with the efficacy of the
+method was demonstrated the following year, when he in his turn found
+himself in an inferiority that denied him hope of a successful battle
+decision. During the summer he kept his fleet hovering off the mouth of the
+Channel without giving the British admiral a chance of contact. His method,
+however, differed from that of Torrington, and he only achieved his
+negative object by keeping out of sight of his enemy altogether. In his
+opinion, if a fleet remained at sea in close observation of an active enemy
+an action could not be avoided. "If (the admiral)," he wrote in his
+memorandum on the subject, "be ordered to keep the sea to try to amuse the
+enemy and to let them know we are in a position to attack in case they
+attempt a descent, I think it my duty to say that in that case we must make
+up our mind to have to fight them in the end; for if they have really
+sought an action, they will have been able to fight, seeing that it is
+impossible to pirouette so long near a fleet without coming to grips."[20]
+This is as much as to say that a sure point of temporary retreat is
+necessary to "a fleet in being," and this was an essential part of
+Torrington's idea.
+
+  [20] Delarbre, _Tourville et la marine de son temps_, p. 339. (Author's
+  note.)
+
+In Torrington's and Tourville's time, when ships were unhandy and fleet
+tactics in their infancy, the difficulty of avoiding action, when a
+determined enemy had once got contact, were undoubtedly great, unless a
+port of retreat was kept open. But as the art of naval warfare developed,
+the possibilities of "a fleet in being" were regarded as much wider, at
+least in the British service. It was nearly a hundred years before we were
+again forced to use the same device on a large scale, and then it was
+believed that superior speed and tactical precision were factors that could
+be counted on to an almost unlimited extent. In the darkest days of the War
+of American Independence we have a memorandum of the subject by Kempenfelt,
+which not only gives the developed idea of "a fleet in being" and the high
+aggressive spirit that is its essence, but also explains its value, not
+merely as a defensive expedient, but as a means of permitting a drastic
+offensive even when you are as a whole inferior. "When you know the enemy's
+designs," he says, "in order to do something effectual you must endeavour
+to be superior to them in some part where they have designs to execute, and
+where, if they succeed, they would most injure you. If your fleet is
+divided as to be in all places inferior to the enemy, they will have a fair
+chance of succeeding everywhere in their attempts. If a squadron cannot be
+formed sufficient to face the enemy's at home, it would be more
+advantageous to let your inferiority be still greater in order by it to
+gain the superiority elsewhere."
+
+"When inferior to the enemy, and you have only a squadron of observation to
+watch and attend upon their motions, such a squadron should be composed of
+two-decked ships only [that is, ships of the highest mobility] as to assure
+it purpose. It must have the advantage of the enemy in sailing, else under
+certain circumstances it will be liable to be forced to battle or to give
+up some of its heavy sailers. It is highly necessary to have such a flying
+squadron to hang on the enemy's large fleet, as it will prevent their
+dividing into separate squadrons for intercepting your trade or spreading
+their ships for a more extensive view. You will be at hand to profit from
+any accidental separation or dispersion of their fleet from hard gales,
+fogs, or other causes. You may intercept supplies, intelligence, &c, sent
+to them. In fine, such a squadron will be a check and restraint upon their
+motions, and prevent a good deal of the mischief they might otherwise do."
+
+Three years before, when first called to be Chief of the Staff in the
+Channel, he had emphasised the same points. "Much," he wrote in July 1779,
+"I may say all, depends upon this fleet. 'Tis an inferior against a
+superior fleet. Therefore the greatest skill and address is requisite to
+counteract the designs of the enemy, to watch and seize the favourable
+opportunity for action, and to catch the advantage of making the effort at
+some or other feeble part of the enemy's line; or if such opportunities
+don't offer, to hover near the enemy, keep him at bay, and prevent his
+attempting anything but at risk and hazard; to command their attention, and
+oblige them to think of nothing but being on their guard against your
+attack."[21]
+
+  [21] _Barham Papers_, i, 292.
+
+It was on these lines the war was conducted. The West Indian area, in which
+lay the enemy's principal object, was treated as the offensive theatre and
+the home waters as the defensive. Inferior as was the Channel fleet to the
+home fleet of the allies, its defensive operations proved adequate to
+prevent their achieving any success. Nor was this all, for Kempenfelt was
+able to demonstrate the positive side of his theory in the most brilliant
+and convincing manner. In dealing with concentration we have seen how, in
+command of such a flying squadron as he postulated, he was able off Ushant
+to seize a favourable opportunity for action, which resulted in his
+capturing a convoy of military stores essential to the French operations in
+the West Indies under the nose of De Guichen with an escort of nearly twice
+his force.
+
+Nelson certainly shared Kempenfelt's views as to the possibilities of an
+inferior fleet kept actively in being. "As to our fleet," he wrote from the
+Mediterranean in 1796, "under such a commander-in-chief as Sir John Jervis
+nobody has any fear ... We are now twenty-two sail of the line. The
+combined fleet will not be above thirty-five.... I will venture my life Sir
+John Jervis defeats them. I do not mean by a regular battle, but by the
+skill of our admiral and the activity and spirit of our officers and
+seamen. This country is the most favourable possible for that skill with an
+inferior fleet; for the winds are so variable, that some one time in
+twenty-four hours you must be able to attack a part of a large fleet, and
+the other will be becalmed or have a contrary wind. Therefore I hope the
+Government will not be alarmed for our safety."
+
+Such a conception of the defensive may indeed be said to have become
+current in the British service. It was part of the reasoning which in 1805,
+after Villeneuve's escape from the Mediterranean, decided Sir John Orde to
+fall back on Ushant instead of entering the Straits. "I dare believe," he
+wrote, "Lord Nelson will be found in condition with his twelve of the line
+and numerous frigates to act on the defensive without loss and even to hang
+on to the skirts of the enemy's fleet should it attempt any material
+service, especially when encumbered with troops."
+
+In all this consideration of the potentialities of "a fleet in being"
+operating defensively it must never be forgotten that we are dealing with
+its possibilities in relation to a general command of the sea--to its
+general power of holding such command in dispute, as Torrington used it.
+Its power of preventing a particular operation, such as oversea invasion,
+is another matter, which will always depend upon the local conditions. If
+the "fleet in being" can be contained in such a way that it is impossible
+for it to reach the invading line of passage, it will be no bar to
+invasion. In 1690, so far as Torrington's fleet was concerned, the French,
+had they been so minded, might have made a descent, say, at Portsmouth
+while Torrington was at the Nore. But Torrington's fleet was not the only
+factor. His retreat forced Tourville to leave behind him unfought the
+squadrons of Shovel and Killigrew, and so far as commanding a line of
+invasion passage was concerned Tourville was himself as well contained as
+Torrington. The conditions of naval defence against invasion are in fact so
+complex compared with those of general naval defence that they must be
+treated later as a special branch of the subject.
+
+The doctrine of the "Fleet in being" as formulated and practised by
+Torrington and developed by Kempenfelt goes no further than this, that
+where the enemy regards the general command of a sea area as necessary to
+his offensive purposes, you may be able to prevent his gaining such command
+by using your fleet defensively, refusing what Nelson called a regular
+battle, and seizing every opportunity for a counterstroke. To use it as it
+was used by the French in the case of Tourville's famous deterrent cruise,
+where the whole object of the French was offensive and could not be
+obtained except by offence, is quite another thing.
+
+It is indeed difficult to understand the admiration with which his
+_campagne au large_ has been treated in France. He kept the sea off the
+mouth of the Channel for fifty days in the summer of 1691, and for forty of
+those days our Channel fleet was making no systematic effort to seek him
+out. He had been sent to sea in hope of intercepting our great "Smyrna
+convoy," which was then the backbone of our oversea trade. Russell with the
+British main fleet simply took positions to cover its approach until it was
+safe, knowing presumably that Tourville must come to him if he wished to
+accomplish his purpose. When the convoy was safe Russell proceeded off
+Ushant, that is, between the enemy and his base. Tourville's communications
+were thus cut, his line of retreat threatened, and he seized the first
+opportunity to elude Russell and to return into port. Beyond taking a few
+ships from one of the West India convoys, he accomplished nothing. The
+central French offensive in Ireland was broken at the battle of the Boyne,
+and the prestige of England at sea was restored. It is true our trade
+suffered in the North Sea, but this was not directly due to the
+concentration which Tourville's cruise forced upon us, but rather to the
+failure of the Dutch--apparently by a misunderstanding-to provide for an
+effective blockade of Dunkirk.
+
+To British eyes it will seem that the heresy which was latent in
+Tourville's instructions was a seed that choked all the finer aspirations
+of the French navy. In 1691 the plan of his cruise may possibly be defended
+as sufficiently aggressive, since, seeing how unstable was William's new
+throne, a resounding blow at British trade, combined with an expected
+victory in Ireland, might have been enough to upset it. But afterwards the
+idea was stretched to occasions it would not fit. It seems to have bred a
+belief that where the object of the war plainly depended on winning a real
+command of the sea, that object could yet be attained by naval defensive
+operations. Many times it is true a policy which had starved the navy of
+France left no other course open to her seamen, and had they in their
+inferiority attempted the offensive, the end must have been swifter if not
+more certain. In criticising the maritime history of France we must be
+careful to distinguish policy from strategy. It was not always the
+defensive strategy that was bad, but the policy that condemned her admirals
+to negative operations. Seeing that she was a continental Power with
+continental aspirations, it was often a policy from which her military
+exigencies permitted no escape. Nevertheless the policy was twice accursed:
+it cursed her when she was weak, and cursed her when she was strong. The
+prolonged use of the defensive bred a habit of mind which seems to have
+rendered her incapable of striking hard when she had the strength. In no
+other way at least can we account for the behaviour of so high-spirited a
+nation when her chance of revenge came in the War of American Independence.
+
+It is here in its moral reactions lies the danger of the defensive, a
+danger so insidious in its working as to tempt us never to utter the word.
+Yet with the voice of Torrington, Kempenfelt, and Nelson in our ears, it
+would be folly to ignore it for ourselves, and still more to ignore the
+exhausting strain its use by our enemy may impose upon us. It must be
+studied, if for no other reasons than to learn how to break it down. Nor
+will the study have danger, if only we keep well in view the spirit of
+restless and vigilant counter-attack which Kempenfelt and Nelson regarded
+as its essence. True, some of the conditions which in the days of sails
+made for opportunity have passed away, but many still remain. Shifts of
+wind and calms will no longer bring them, but weather thick or violent can
+yet make seamanship, nimbleness, and cohesion tell as it always did; and
+there is no reason to doubt that it is still possible for hard sea-training
+to make "the activity and spirit of our officers and seamen" give the
+results which Nelson so confidently expected.
+
+II. MINOR COUNTER-ATTACKS
+
+For the weaker of two belligerents minor-attack has always exercised a
+certain fascination. Where a Power was so inferior in naval force that it
+could scarcely count even on disputing command by fleet operations, there
+remained a hope of reducing the relative inferiority by putting part of the
+enemy's force out of action. Such hopes were rarely realised. In 1587 Drake
+succeeded in stopping the Spanish invasion by such a counter-attack on the
+Cadiz division of the Armada while it was still unmobilised. In 1667 the
+Dutch achieved a similar success against our Chatham division when it was
+demobilised and undefended, and thereby probably secured rather more
+favourable terms of peace. But it cannot be said that the old wars present
+any case where the ultimate question of command was seriously affected by a
+minor counterattack.
+
+The advent of the torpedo, however, has given the idea a new importance
+that cannot be overlooked. The degree of that importance is at present
+beyond calculation. There is at least no evidence that it would be very
+high in normal conditions and between ordinarily efficient fleets. The
+comparative success of the opening Japanese attack on the Port Arthur
+squadron is the only case in point, and where only one case exists, it is
+necessary to use extreme caution in estimating its significance. Before we
+can deduce anything of permanent value we must consider very carefully both
+its conditions and results.
+
+To begin with, it was a new experience of a new class of weapon, and it by
+no means follows that the success of a new expedient will be repeated with
+anything like equal result. It will not be irrelevant again to recall the
+case of fireships. At the outset of the sailing era in 1588, this device
+prepared the way for a decisive success against a fleet in the open. In the
+succeeding wars the new weapon found a prominent place in the organisation
+of sea-going fleets, but its success was never repeated. Against ships in
+ill-defended harbours it did occasionally produce good results, and during
+the infancy of tactics its moral and even material effects in fleet actions
+were frequently demonstrated. But as naval science developed and the
+limitations of the weapon were more accurately measured, it was able to
+achieve less and less, till in the eighteenth century it was regarded as
+almost negligible. Even its moral effect was lost, and it ceased to be
+considered as a battle unit.
+
+Now, if we examine closely the Port Arthur case, we shall find it pointing
+to the existence of certain inherent conditions not dissimilar from those
+which discredited fireships as a decisive factor in war. In spite of the
+apparently formidable nature of a surprise attack by torpedo the
+indications from the one case in point are that these conditions make for
+greater power in the defence than in the attack. The first condition
+relates to the difficulty of locating the objective accurately. It is
+obvious that for this kind of operation the most precise intelligence is
+essential, and of all intelligence the most difficult to obtain in war is
+the distribution of an enemy's fleet from day to day. The Japanese had
+fairly certain information that the bulk of the Port Arthur squadron was
+lying in the outer anchorage, but it had been constantly moving, and there
+was a report that three battleships had just been detached from it. The
+report was false, but the result was that of the five divisions of
+destroyers which the Japanese had available, two were diverted against
+Dalny, where no enemy was found. Such uncertainty must always exist, and in
+no circumstances is it likely to be less than where, as in the Japanese
+case, the attack is made before declaration, and while the ordinary
+channels of intelligence are still open.
+
+Further, it is to be noted that in spite of the fact that relations for
+some weeks had been highly strained, and a surprise torpedo attack was
+regarded as probable, the Russians had taken no precautions to confuse
+their enemy. It is obvious that measures to prevent accurate locating can,
+and should, be taken in such cases. We may go further. From confusing the
+enemy by such means it is but a step to lead him to a wrong conclusion, and
+to lay for him a trap which may swallow up the bulk of his destroyer force
+in the first hours of the war. It is to be feared, however, that the risks
+of such an eventuality are so great in minor counter-attacks of this
+nature, that it will probably be very difficult to tempt an inferior enemy
+to expose his flotilla in this way.
+
+This view receives emphasis from the second point which the Port Arthur
+case serves to demonstrate, and that is the great power of even the
+flimsiest defence against such attacks; in other words, the chances of
+success can scarcely ever be great enough to justify the risk. Everything
+was in favour of the Japanese. Orders had been issued in the Russian
+squadron for two or three nights previously to prepare for a torpedo
+attack, but so low had discipline fallen, that the orders were obeyed in a
+very perfunctory manner. Guns were not loaded, their crews were not at
+quarters, nor were the nets got out. The only real precaution taken was
+that two destroyers and no more had been sent out as guard patrol, but even
+they were forbidden to fire on anything they met until they had reported to
+the admiral or had themselves been fired on. Defence against a surprise
+attack could scarcely have been more feeble, and yet so high was the
+nervous tension in the attacking force, that it proved stronger than could
+reasonably have been expected. The mere existence of the patrol and the
+necessity of evading it threw the Japanese approach into a confusion from
+which it was unable to recover entirely, and the attack lost its essential
+momentum and cohesion. Again, defective as were the arrangements in the
+squadron itself, and lax as were its training and discipline, no torpedo
+hits were made, so far as we can judge, after the Russian guns and
+searchlights got into play.
+
+Such development of strength in the defence seems inherent in the
+conditions of minor attack, and there appears to be no reason for expecting
+better results for such attacks in normal cases. But in deducing principles
+from the Port Arthur case, it must always be remembered that it was far
+from normal. It was a blow before declaration, when the menace of strained
+relations, though realised, had been almost entirely ignored by the
+Russians. In such exceptional and almost incredible circumstances a minor
+attack might always be counted on for a certain measure of success. To this
+we have to add the fact that the Russian squadron was not ordinarily
+efficient, but appears to have fallen into a lax condition such as could
+scarcely recur in the case of any other naval Power.
+
+Finally, we must ask what, with every condition abnormally in favour of the
+attack, was the actual material result? Did it have any real influence on
+the ultimate question of command? It is true that it so far swung the
+balance in favour of the Japanese that they were able to exercise the local
+control long enough to land their troops and isolate Port Arthur. But the
+Japanese plan for securing ultimate command rested on their power of taking
+Port Arthur by military operation and sustaining the siege from the sea.
+Yet in spite of every condition of success the physical effect of the blow
+was so small, that even without the help of an adequate dockyard the
+squadron recovered from it and became potent again before the siege could
+even be formed. The minor attacks which followed the first blow were all
+failures, and whether delivered at the port or upon the squadron in the
+open had no appreciable effect whatever.
+
+At the same time it must be remembered that since that war the art of
+torpedo warfare has developed very rapidly. Its range and offensive power
+have increased in a higher ratio than the means of resisting it. Still
+those means have advanced, and it is probable that a squadron in a naval
+port or in a properly defended anchorage is not more easy to injure than it
+ever was; while a squadron at sea, so long as it constantly shifts its
+position, still remains very difficult to locate with sufficient precision
+for successful minor attack.
+
+The unproved value of submarines only deepens the mist which overhangs the
+next naval war. From a strategical point of view we can say no more than
+that we have to count with a new factor, which gives a new possibility to
+minor counterattack. It is a possibility which on the whole tells in favour
+of naval defence, a new card which, skilfully played in combination with
+defensive fleet operations, may lend fresh importance to the "Fleet in
+being." It may further be expected that whatever the effective
+possibilities of minor operations may ultimately prove to be in regard to
+securing command, the moral influence will be considerable, and at least at
+the beginning of a future war will tend to deflect and hamper the major
+operations and rob of their precision the lines which formerly led so
+frankly to the issue by battle.
+
+In the absence of a sufficient volume of experience it would be idle to go
+further, particularly as torpedo attack, like fireship attack, depends for
+success more than any other on the spirit and skill of officers and men.
+With regard to the torpedo as the typical arm of mobile coastal defence, it
+is a different matter. What has been said applies only to its power towards
+securing command of the sea, and not to the exercise or to disputing the
+exercise of command. This is a question which is concerned with defence
+against invasion, and to that we must now turn.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                  CHAPTER FOUR
+
+          METHODS OF EXERCISING COMMAND
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+I. DEFENCE AGAINST INVASION
+
+In methods of exercising command are included all operations not directly
+concerned with securing command or with preventing its being secured by the
+enemy. We engage in exercising command whenever we conduct operations which
+are directed not against the enemy's battle-fleet, but to using sea
+communications for our own purposes, or to interfering with the enemy's use
+of them. Such operations, though logically of secondary importance, have
+always occupied the larger part of naval warfare. Naval warfare does not
+begin and end with the destruction of the enemy's battle-fleet, nor even
+with breaking his cruiser power. Beyond all this there is the actual work
+of preventing his passing an army across the sea and of protecting the
+passage of our own military expeditions. There is also the obstruction of
+his trade and the protection of our own. In all such operations we are
+concerned with the exercise of command. We are using the sea, or
+interfering with its use by the enemy; we are not endeavouring to secure
+the use or to prevent the enemy from securing it. The two categories of
+operation differ radically in conception and purpose, and strategically
+they are on wholly different planes.
+
+Logically, of course, operations for exercising command should follow those
+for securing command; that is to say, that since the attainment of command
+is the special object of naval warfare, and since that command can only be
+obtained permanently by the destruction of the enemy's armed forces afloat,
+it follows that in strictness no other objects should be allowed to
+interfere with our concentration of effort on the supreme end of securing
+command by destruction. War, however, is not conducted by logic, and the
+order of proceeding which logic prescribes cannot always be adhered to in
+practice. We have seen how, owing to the special conditions of naval
+warfare, extraneous necessities intrude themselves which make it inevitable
+that operations for exercising command should accompany as well as follow
+operations for securing command. War being, as it is, a complex sum of
+naval, military, political, financial, and moral factors, its actuality can
+seldom offer to a naval staff a clean slate on which strategical problems
+can be solved by well-turned syllogisms. The naval factor can never ignore
+the others. From the outset one or more of them will always call for some
+act of exercising command which will not wait for its turn in the logical
+progression. To a greater or less extent in all ordinary cases both
+categories of operation will have to be put in motion from the beginning.
+
+Hence the importance of realising the distinction between the two generic
+forms of naval activity. In the hurry and stress of war confusion between
+them is easy. By keeping a firm grip upon the difference we can see at
+least what we are doing. We can judge how far any given operation that may
+be called for is a sacrifice of security to exercise, how far such a
+sacrifice may be justified, and how far the one end may be made to serve
+the other. By applying the distinction as a test much error may be avoided.
+The risk we take may be great, but we shall be able to weigh it accurately
+against the value of the end, and we shall take it with our eyes open and
+of set purpose. Above all, it will enable the Staff to settle clearly for
+each squadronal commander what is to be his primary objective, and what the
+object or purpose of the operations entrusted to him. It is above all in
+this last consideration, and particularly in the determination of the
+objective, that lies the main practical value of the distinction.
+
+This will become clear the moment we begin to consider defence against
+invasion, which naturally takes the first place amongst operations for the
+exercise of control. Of all the current assumptions, not one is so
+confusing for the finer adjustments of strategy as that which affirms that
+the primary objective of our fleet is always the enemy's fleet. Of the
+battle-fleet and its attendant units it is of course true, so long at least
+as the enemy has a battle-fleet in being. It is true, that is, of all
+operations for securing control, but of operations for exercising control
+it is not true. In the case we have now to consider-defence against
+invasion-the objective of the special operations is, and always has been,
+the enemy's army. On this fundamental postulate our plans for resisting
+invasion have always been constructed from the year of the Armada to 1805.
+
+In the old service tradition the point was perfectly well established.
+Admirals' instructions constantly insist on the fact that the transports
+are the "principal object." The whole disposition of the fleet during
+Hawke's blockade in 1759 was based on keeping a firm hold on the transports
+in the Morbihan, and when he sought to extend his operations against the
+Rochefort squadron, he was sharply reminded by Anson that "the principal
+object of attention at this time" was, firstly, "the interception of the
+embarkations of the enemy at Morbihan," and secondly, "the keeping of the
+ships of war from coming out of Brest." Similarly Commodore Warren in 1796,
+when he had the permanent frigate guard before Brest, issued orders to his
+captains that in case of encountering enemy's transports under escort they
+were "to run them down or destroy them in the most expeditious manner
+possible previous to attacking the ships of war, but to preserve such a
+situation as to effect that purpose when directed by signal." Lord Keith's
+orders when watching Napoleon's flotilla were to the same effect.
+"Directing your chief attention," they run, "to the destruction of the
+ships, vessels, or boats having men, horses, or artillery on board (in
+preference to that of the vessels by which they are protected), and in the
+strict execution of this important duty losing sight entirely of the
+possibility of idle censure for avoiding contact with an armed force,
+because the prevention of debarkation is the object of primary importance
+to which every other consideration must give way."[22]
+
+  [22] _Admiralty Secretary's In-Letters_, 537, 8 August 1803.
+
+In tactics, then, the idea was the same as in strategy. The army was the
+primary objective round which all dispositions turned. In the French
+service the strength and soundness of the British practice was understood
+at least by the best men. When in 1805 Napoleon consulted Ganteaume as to
+the possibility of the flotilla of transports effecting its passage by
+evasion, the admiral told him it was impossible, since no weather could
+avail to relax the British hold sufficiently. "In former wars," he said,
+"the English vigilance was miraculous."
+
+To this rule there was no exception, not even when circumstances rendered
+it difficult to distinguish between the enemy's fleet and army as
+objectives. This situation could occur in two ways. Firstly, when the
+invading army was designed to sail with the battle-fleet, as in the case of
+Napoleon's invasion of Egypt; and secondly, when, although the design was
+that the two should operate on separate lines, our system of defence forced
+the fleet to come up to the army's line of passage in order to clear it, as
+happened in the case of the Armada and the French attempt of 1744.
+
+In the latter case the invading army, whose objective was unknown, was at
+Dunkirk, and a French fleet was coming up the Channel to cover the passage.
+Sir John Norris, in command of the home fleet, was in the Downs. Though his
+name is now almost forgotten, he was one of the great founders of our naval
+tradition, and a strategist of the first order. In informing the Government
+of his plan of operations, he said he intended to proceed with his whole
+squadron off Dunkirk to prevent the transports sailing. "But," he says, "if
+they should unfortunately get out and pass us in the night and go
+northward, I intend to detach a superior force to endeavour to overtake and
+destroy them; and with the remainder of my squadron either to fight the
+French fleet now in the Channel, or observe them and cover the country as
+our circumstances will admit of; or I shall pursue the embarkation with all
+my strength." In this case there had been no time to organise a special
+squadron or flotilla, in the usual way, to bar the line of passage, and the
+battle-fleet had to be used for the purpose. This being so, Norris was not
+going to allow the presence of an enemy's battle-fleet to entice him away
+from his grip on the invading army, and so resolutely did he hold to the
+principle, that he meant if the transports put to sea to direct his
+offensive against them, while he merely contained the enemy's battle-fleet
+by defensive observation.
+
+In the Egyptian case there was no distinction between the two objectives at
+all. Napoleon's expedition sailed in one mass. Yet in the handling of his
+fleet Nelson preserved the essential idea. He organised it into three
+"sub-squadrons," one of six sail and two of four each. "Two of these
+sub-squadrons," says Berry, his flag-captain, "were to attack the ships of
+war, while the third was to pursue the transports and to sink and destroy
+as many as it could"; that is, he intended, in order to make sure of
+Napoleon's army, to use no more than ten, and possibly only eight, of his
+own battleships against the eleven of the enemy.
+
+Many other examples could be given of British insistence on making the
+enemy's army the primary objective and not his fleet in cases of invasion.
+No point in the old tradition was more firmly established. Its value was of
+course more strongly marked where the army and the fleet of the enemy
+endeavoured to act on separate lines of operation; that is, where the army
+took the real offensive line and the fleet the covering or preventive line,
+and where consequently for our own fleet there was no confusion between the
+two objectives. This was the normal case, and the reason it was so is
+simple enough. It may be stated at once, since it serves to enunciate the
+general principle upon which our traditional system of defence was based.
+
+An invasion of Great Britain must always be an attempt over an uncommanded
+sea. It may be that our fleet predominates or it may be that it does not,
+but the command must always be in dispute. If we have gained complete
+command, no invasion can take place, nor will it be attempted. If we have
+lost it completely no invasion will be necessary, since, quite apart from
+the threat of invasion, we must make peace on the best terms we can get.
+Now, if the sea be uncommanded, there are obviously two ways in which an
+invasion may be attempted. Firstly, the enemy may endeavour to force it
+through our naval defence with transports and fleet in one mass. This was
+the primitive idea on which the Spanish invasion of Philip the Second was
+originally planned by his famous admiral, Santa-Cruz. Ripening military
+science, however, was able to convince him of its weakness. A mass of
+transports and warships is the most cumbrous and vulnerable engine of war
+ever known. The weaker the naval defence of the threatened country, the
+more devoutly will it pray the invader may use this device. Where contact
+with the enemy's fleet is certain, and particularly in narrow seas, as it
+was in this case, such a course will give the defender all the chances he
+could desire, and success for the invader is inconceivable, provided always
+we resolutely determine to make the army in its transports our main
+objective, and are not to be induced to break our head against its escort.
+
+Where, however, contact is not certain, the invasion over an uncommanded
+sea may succeed by evasion of the defender's battle-fleet, as it did in the
+case of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt. But that operation belongs to an
+entirely different category from that which we are now considering. None of
+the factors on which the traditional system of British defence is based
+were present. It was an operation over an open sea against a distant and
+undetermined objective that had no naval defence of its own, whereas in our
+own case the determining factors are permanent naval defence, an
+approximately determined objective, and a narrow sea where evasion by any
+force of invasion strength is impossible. Napoleon's exploit was in fact
+nothing more than the evasion of an open blockade which had no naval
+defence beyond it. The vital importance of these things will appear as we
+proceed and note the characteristics which marked every attempt to invade
+England. From such attempts we of course exclude the various descents upon
+Ireland, which, not being of invasion strength, fall into another class, to
+be dealt with hereafter.
+
+Since the expedient of forcing an invasion by the strength of a powerful
+battleship escort has always been rejected as an inadmissible operation,
+the invader has had no choice but to adopt a separate line for his army,
+and operate with his fleet in such a way as may promise to prevent the
+enemy controlling that line. That, in short, is the problem of invasion
+over an uncommanded sea. In spite of an unbroken record of failure scored
+at times with naval disaster, continental strategists from Parma to
+Napoleon have clung obstinately to the belief that there is a solution
+short of a complete fleet decision. They have tried every conceivable
+expedient again and again. They have tried it by simple surprise evasion
+and by evasion through diversion or dispersal of our naval defence. They
+have tried it by seeking local control through a local naval success
+prepared by surprise, or by attempting to entice our fleet away from home
+waters to a sufficient extent to give them temporarily local superiority.
+But the end has always been the same. Try as they would, they were faced
+ultimately by one of two alternatives--they must either defeat our covering
+battle-fleet in battle, or they must close their own battle-fleet on the
+transports, and so set up the very situation which it was their main design
+to avoid.
+
+The truth is, that all attempts to invade England without command of the
+sea have moved in a vicious circle, from which no escape was ever found. No
+matter how ingenious or complex the enemy's design, a determined hold on
+their army as the primary naval objective has always set up a process of
+degradation which rendered the enterprise impracticable. Its stages are
+distinct and recurrent, and may be expressed as it were diagrammatically as
+follows:--
+
+Two lines of operation having been decided on, the invading army is
+gathered at a point as close as possible to the coast to be invaded; that
+is, where the intervening sea is narrowest, and where the army's passage
+will be exposed to interference for the shortest time. The covering fleet
+will operate from a point as distant as convenient, so as to entice the
+enemy as far as possible from the army's line of passage. The defender
+replies by blockading the army's ports of departure with a flotilla of
+light vessels capable of dealing with transports, or by establishing a
+mobile defence of the threatened coasts which transports cannot break
+unaided, or more probably he will combine both expedients. The first
+fallacy of the invasion plan is then apparent. The narrower the sea, the
+easier it is to watch. Pure evasion becomes impossible, and it is necessary
+to give the transports sufficient armed strength by escort or otherwise to
+protect them against flotilla attack. The defender at once stiffens his
+flotilla defence with cruisers and intermediate ships, and the invader has
+to arrange for breaking the barrier with a battle-squadron. So weak and
+disturbing a position is then set up that the whole scheme begins to give
+way, if, that is, the defender has clung stubbornly to the strategy we
+always used. Our battle-fleet refused to seek out that of the invader. It
+has always held a position between the invader's fleet and the blockaded
+invasion base, covering the blockade and flotilla defence. To enable a
+battle-squadron to break our hold and to reinforce the army escort, the
+invader must either force this covering position by battle, or disturb it
+so effectively as to permit the reinforcing squadron to evade it. But since
+_ex hypothesi_ he is trying to invade without securing the command by
+battle, he will first try to reinforce his transport escort by evasion. At
+once he is faced with new difficulty. The reinforcement entails dividing
+his fleet, and this is an expedient so vicious and disturbing to morale,
+that no invader has ever been found to risk it. And for this reason. To
+make evasion possible for the detached squadron, he must bring up the rest
+of his force and engage the attention of the enemy's fleet, and thus unless
+he is in very great superiority, and by hypothesis is not--he runs the
+hazard of having his two divisions beaten in detail. This method has
+sometimes been urged by Governments, but so loud have been the protests
+both from the fleet and the army, that it has always been dropped, and the
+invader finds himself at the end of the vicious circle. Unable to reinforce
+his transport escort sufficiently without dividing his battle-fleet, he is
+forced to bring his whole force up to the army or abandon the attempt till
+command shall have been secured by battle.
+
+Thus the traditional British system has never failed to bring about the
+deadlock, and it will be observed it is founded on making the invading army
+the primary objective. We keep a hold on it, firstly, by flotilla blockade
+and defence stiffened as circumstances may dictate by higher units, and
+secondly, by battle-fleet cover. It is on the flotilla hold that the whole
+system is built up. It is the local danger to that hold which determines
+the amount of stiffening the flotilla demands, and it is the security of
+that hold which determines the position and action of the battle-fleet.
+
+A few typical examples will serve to show how the system worked in practice
+under all kinds of conditions. The first scientific attempt to work on two
+lines of operation, as distinguished from the crude mass methods of the
+Middle Ages, was the Spanish enterprise of 1588. Though internal support
+from Catholic malcontents was expected, it was designed as a true invasion,
+that is, a continuing operation for permanent conquest. Parma, the military
+commander-in-chief, laid it down that the Spanish fleet would have not only
+to protect his passage and support his landing, but also "to keep open his
+communications for the flow of provisions and munition."
+
+In advising the dual line of operation, Parma's original intention was to
+get his army across by surprise. As always, however, it proved impossible
+to conceal the design, and long before he was ready he found himself
+securely blockaded by a Dutch flotilla supported by an English squadron. So
+firm indeed was the English hold on the army, that for a time it was
+overdone. The bulk of the English fleet was kept on the line of passage
+under Howard, while Drake alone was sent to the westward. It was only under
+the great sailor's importunity that the disposition, which was to become
+traditional, was perfected, and the whole fleet, with the exception of the
+squadron supporting the flotilla blockade, was massed in a covering
+position to the westward. The normal situation was then set up, and it
+could only have one result. Surprise was out of the question. Parma could
+not move till the blockade was broken, nor in face of the covering fleet
+could the Spanish fleet hope to break it by a sudden intrusion. The vague
+prospects the Spaniards had conceived of keeping the English fleet away
+from the line of passage by threatening a descent in the West Country or
+blockading it in a western port would no longer do. No such expedient would
+release Parma, and the Duke of Medina-Sidonia was ordered to proceed direct
+to Dunkirk if possible without fighting, there to break the blockade and
+secure the passage.
+
+There was some idea in the King's mind that he would be able to do this
+without a battle, but Parma and every seasoned Spanish sailor knew that the
+English fleet would have to be totally defeated before the transports could
+venture out of port. Such a battle was indeed inevitable, and the English
+dispositions secured that the Spaniards would have to fight it under every
+disadvantage which was inherent in the plan of dual lines of operation. The
+English would secure certain contact at such a distance from the line of
+passage as would permit prolonged harassing attacks in waters unfamiliar to
+the enemy and close to their own sources of support and supply. No battle
+to the death would be necessary until the Spaniards were herded into the
+confined and narrow waters which the army's passage demanded, and where
+both sections of the British fleet would be massed for the final struggle.
+They must arrive there dispirited with indecisive actions and with the
+terrors of unknown and difficult seas at the highest point. All this was no
+matter of chance. It was inherent in the strategical and geographical
+conditions. The English dispositions had taken every advantage of them, and
+the result was that not only was the Spanish army unable even to move, but
+the English advantages in the final battle were so great, that it was only
+a lucky shift of wind that saved the Armada from being driven to total
+destruction upon the Dutch banks.
+
+In this case, of course, there had been ample time to make the necessary
+dispositions. It will be well to follow it with an example in which
+surprise came as near to being complete as it is possible to conceive, and
+where the arrangements for defence had to be improvised on the spur of the
+moment.
+
+A case in point was the French attempt of 1744. In that year everything was
+in favour of the invader. England was undermined with Jacobite sedition;
+Scotland was restless and threatening; the navy had sunk to what is
+universally regarded as its worst for spirit, organisation, and command;
+and the government was in the hands of the notorious "Drunken
+Administration." For three years we had been making unsuccessful war with
+Spain, and had been supporting Maria Theresa on the Continent against
+France, with the result that our home defence was reduced to its lowest
+ebb. The navy then numbered 183 sail--about equal to that of France and
+Spain combined--but owing to the strain of the war in the Mediterranean and
+Transatlantic stations only forty-three, including eighteen of the line,
+were available for home waters. Even counting all cruising ships "within
+call," as the phrase then was, the Government had barely one-fourth of the
+fleet at hand to meet the crisis. With the land forces it was little
+better. Considerably more than half the home army was abroad with the King,
+who was assisting the Empress-Queen as Elector of Hanover. Between France
+and England, however, there was no war. In the summer the King won the
+battle of Dettingen; a formal alliance with Maria Theresa followed in the
+autumn; France responded with a secret alliance with Spain; and to prevent
+further British action on the Continent, she resolved to strike a blow at
+London in combination with a Jacobite insurrection. It was to be a "bolt
+from the blue" before declaration and in mid-winter, when the best ships of
+the home fleet were laid up. The operation was planned on dual lines, the
+army to start from Dunkirk, the covering fleet from Brest.
+
+The surprise was admirably designed. The port of Dunkirk had been destroyed
+under the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, and though the French had been
+restoring it secretly for some time, it was still unfit to receive a fleet
+of transports. In spite of the warnings of Sir John Norris, the senior
+admiral in the service, the assembling of troops in its neighbourhood from
+the French army in Flanders could only be taken for a movement into winter
+quarters, and that no suspicion might be aroused the necessary transports
+were secretly taken up in other ports under false charter-parties, and were
+only to assemble off Dunkirk at the last moment. With equal skill the
+purpose of the naval mobilisation at Brest was concealed. By false
+information cleverly imparted to our spies and by parade of victualling for
+a long voyage, the British Government was led to believe that the main
+fleet was intended to join the Spaniards in the Mediterranean, while a
+detachment, which was designed to escort the transports, was ostensibly
+equipped for a raid in the West Indies.
+
+So far as concealment was concerned the arrangement was perfect. Yet it
+contained within it the fatal ingredient. The army was to strike in the
+Thames at Tilbury; but complete as was the secrecy, Marshal Saxe, who was
+to command, could not face the passage without escort. There were too many
+privateers and armed merchantmen always in the river, besides cruisers
+moving to and fro on commerce-protection duty. The division, therefore,
+which we supposed to be for the West Indies was to be detached from the
+Brest fleet after it entered the Channel and was to proceed to join the
+transports off Dunkirk, while the Marquis de Roquefeuil with the main fleet
+held what British ships might be ready in Portsmouth either by battle or
+blockade.
+
+Nothing could look simpler or more certain of success. The British
+Government seemed quite asleep. The blow was timed for the first week in
+January, and it was mid-December before they even began to watch Brest with
+cruisers regularly. On these cruisers' reports measures were taken to
+prepare an equal squadron for sea by the new year. By this time nearly
+twenty of the line were ready or nearly so at the Nore, Portsmouth, and
+Plymouth, and a press was ordered to man them. Owing to various causes the
+French had now to postpone their venture. Finally it was not till February
+6th that Roquefeuil was seen to leave Brest with nineteen of the line. The
+news reached London on the 12th, and next day Norris was ordered to hoist
+his flag at Spithead. His instructions were "to take the most effectual
+measures to prevent the making of any descent upon the kingdoms." It was
+nothing but news that the young Pretender had left Rome for France that led
+to this precaution. The Government had still no suspicion of what was
+brewing at Dunkirk. It was not till the 20th that a Dover smuggler brought
+over information which at last opened their eyes.
+
+A day or two later the French transports were seen making for Dunkirk, and
+were mistaken for the Brest fleet. Orders were consequently sent down to
+Norris to follow them. In vain he protested at the interference. He knew
+the French were still to the westward of him, but his orders were repeated,
+and he had to go. Tiding it up-Channel against easterly winds, he reached
+the Downs and joined the Nore Division there on the 28th. History usually
+speaks of this false movement as the happy chance which saved the country
+from invasion. But it was not so. Saxe had determined not to face the
+Thames ships without escort. They were ample to destroy him had he done so.
+In truth the move which the Government forced on Norris spoilt the campaign
+and prevented his destroying the Brest fleet as well as stopping the
+invasion.
+
+Roquefeuil had just received his final orders off the Start. He was
+instructed by all possible means to bring the main British fleet to action,
+or at least to prevent further concentration, while he was also to detach
+the special division of four of the line under Admiral Barraille to Dunkirk
+to escort the transports. It was in fact the inevitable order, caused by
+our hold on the army, to divide the fleet. Both officers as usual began to
+be upset, and as with Medina-Sidonia, they decided to keep company till
+they reached the Isle of Wight and remain there till they could get touch
+with Saxe and pilots for the Dover Strait. They were beset with the
+nervousness that seems inseparable from this form of operation. Roquefeuil
+explained to his Government that it was impossible to tell what ships the
+enemy had passed to the Downs, and that Barraille when he arrived off
+Dunkirk might well find himself in inferiority. He ended in the usual way
+by urging that the whole fleet must move in a body to the line of passage.
+On arriving off Portsmouth, however, a reconnaissance in thick weather led
+him to believe that the whole of Norris's fleet was still there, and he
+therefore detached Barraille, who reached Dunkirk in safety.
+
+Not knowing that Norris was in the Downs, Saxe began immediately to embark
+his troops, but bad weather delayed the operation for three days, and so
+saved the expedition, exposed as it was in the open roads, from destruction
+by an attack which Norris was on the point of delivering with his flotilla
+of fireships and bomb vessels.
+
+The Brest squadron had an equally narrow escape. Saxe and his staff having
+heard rumours of Norris's movement to the Downs had become seized with the
+sea-sickness which always seems to afflict an army as it waits to face the
+dangers of an uncommanded passage. They too wanted the whole fleet to
+escort them, and orders had been sent to Roquefeuille to do as he had
+suggested. All unconscious of Norris's presence in the Downs with a score
+of the line more powerful than his own, he came on with the fifteen he had
+still with his flag to close on Barraille. Norris was informed of his
+approach, and it was now he wrote his admirable appreciation, already
+quoted, for dealing with the situation.
+
+"As I think it," he said, "of the greatest consequence to his Majesty's
+service to prevent the landing of these troops in any part of the country,
+I have ... determined to anchor without the sands of Dunkirk, where we
+shall be in the fairest way for keeping them in." That is, he determined to
+keep hold of the army regardless of the enemy's fleet, and as Saxe's
+objective was not quite certain, he would do it by close blockade. "But
+if," he continued, "they should unfortunately get out and pass in the night
+and go northward [that is, for Scotland], I intend to detach a superior
+force to endeavour to overtake and destroy them, and with the remainder of
+my squadron either fight the French fleet now in the Channel, or observe
+them and cover the country as our circumstances will admit of; or I shall
+pursue the embarkation [that is, follow the transports] with all my
+strength." This meant he would treat the enemy's army offensively and their
+fleet defensively, and his plan was entirely approved by the King.
+
+As to which of the two plans he would adopt, the inference is that his
+choice would depend on the strength of the enemy, for it was reported the
+Rochefort squadron had joined Roquefeuille. The doubt was quickly settled.
+On the morrow he heard that Roquefeuille was at Dungeness with only fifteen
+of the line. In a moment he seized all the advantage of the interior
+position which Roquefeuille's necessity to close on the army had given him.
+With admirable insight he saw there was time to fling his whole force at
+the enemy's fleet without losing his hold on the army's line of passage.
+The movement was made immediately. The moment the French were sighted
+"General chase" was signalled, and Roquefeuille was within an ace of being
+surprised at his anchorage when a calm stopped the attack. The calm was
+succeeded by another furious gale, in which the French escaped in a
+disastrous _sauve qui peut_, and the fleet of transports was destroyed. The
+outcome of it all was not only the failure of the invasion, but that we
+secured the command of home waters for the rest of the war.
+
+The whole attempt, it will be seen, with everything in its favour, had
+exhibited the normal course of degradation. For all the nicely framed plan
+and the perfect deception, the inherent difficulties, when it came to the
+point of execution, had as usual forced a clumsy concentration of the
+enemy's battle-fleet with his transports, and we on our part were able to
+forestall it with every advantage in our favour by the simple expedient of
+a central mass on a revealed and certain line of passage.
+
+In the next project, that of 1759, a new and very clever plan was devised
+for turning the difficulty. The first idea of Marshal Belleisle, like that
+of Napoleon, was to gather the army at Ambleteuse and Boulogne, and to
+avoid the assemblage of transports by passing it across the Strait by
+stealth in flat boats. But this idea was abandoned before it had gone very
+far for something much more subtle. The fallacious advantage of a short
+passage was dropped, and the army was to start from three widely separated
+points all in more open waters--a diversionary raid from Dunkirk and two
+more formidable forces from Havre and the Morbihan in South Brittany. To
+secure sufficient control there was to be a concentration on the Brest
+fleet from the Mediterranean and the West Indies.
+
+The new feature, it will be observed, was that our covering fleet--that is,
+the Western Squadron off Brest--would have two cruiser blockades to secure,
+one on either side of it. Difficult as the situation looked, it was solved
+on the old lines. The two divisions of the French army at Dunkirk and
+Morbihan were held by cruiser squadrons capable of following them over the
+open sea if by chance they escaped, while the third division at Havre,
+which had nothing but flat boats for transport, was held by a flotilla well
+supported. Its case was hopeless. It could not move without a squadron to
+release it, and no fortune of weather could possibly bring a squadron from
+Brest. Hawke, who had the main blockade, might be blown off, but he could
+scarcely fail to bring to action any squadron that attempted to enter the
+Channel. With the Morbihan force it was different. Any time that Hawke was
+blown off a squadron could reach it from Brest and break the cruiser
+blockade. The French Government actually ordered a portion of the fleet to
+make the attempt. Conflans however, who was in command, protested his force
+was too weak to divide, owing to the failure of the intended concentration.
+Boscawen had caught and beaten the Mediterranean squadron off Lagos, and
+though the West Indian squadron got in, it proved, as in Napoleon's great
+plan of concentration, unfit for further service. The old situation had
+arisen, forced by the old method of defence; and in the end there was
+nothing for it but for Conflans to take his whole fleet to the Morbihan
+transports. Hawke was upon him at once, and the disastrous day of Quiberon
+was the result. The Dunkirk division alone got free, but the smallness of
+its size, which permitted it to evade the watch, also prevented its doing
+any harm. Its escort, after landing its handful of troops in Ireland, was
+entirely destroyed; and so again the attempt of the French to invade over
+an uncommanded sea produced no effect but the loss of their fleet.
+
+The project of 1779 marked these principles even more strongly, for it
+demonstrated them working even when our home fleet was greatly inferior to
+that of the enemy. In this case the invader's idea was to form two
+expeditionary forces at Cherbourg and Havre, and under cover of an
+overwhelming combination of the Spanish and French fleets, to unite them at
+sea and seize Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight. It was in the early summer
+we got wind of the scheme, and two cruiser squadrons and flotillas were at
+once formed at the Downs and Channel Islands to watch the French coasts and
+prevent the concentration of transports. Spain had not yet declared war,
+but she was suspected, and the main fleet, under the veteran Sir Charles
+Hardy, who had been Norris's second in command in 1744, was ordered to
+proceed off Brest and prevent any Spanish squadron that might appear from
+entering that port. The French, however, outmanoeuvred us by putting to sea
+before Hardy could reach his station and forming a junction with the
+Spaniards off Finisterre. The combined fleet contained about fifty of the
+line, nearly double our own. The army of invasion, with Dumouriez for its
+Chief of the Staff, numbered some 50,000 men, a force we were in no
+condition to meet ashore. Everything, therefore, was in favour of success,
+and yet in the navy, at least, a feeling of confidence prevailed that no
+invasion could take place.
+
+The brains of the naval defence were Lord Barham (then Sir Charles
+Middleton) at the Admiralty and Kempenfelt as Chief of the Staff in the
+fleet; and it is to their correspondence at this time that we owe some of
+the most valuable strategical appreciations we possess. The idea of the
+French was to come into the Channel in their overwhelming force, and while
+they destroyed or held Hardy, to detach a sufficient squadron to break the
+cruiser blockade and escort the troops across. Kempenfelt was confident
+that it could not be done. He was sure that the unwieldy combined mass
+could be rendered powerless by his comparatively homogeneous and mobile
+fleet, inferior as it was, so long as he could keep it at sea and to the
+westward. The appreciation of the power of a nimble inferior fleet which he
+wrote at this time has already been given.[23] When the worst of the
+position was fully known, and the enemy was reported off the mouth of the
+Channel, he wrote another to Middleton. His only doubt was whether his
+fleet had the necessary cohesion and mobility. "We don't seem," he said,
+"to have considered sufficiently a certain fact that the comparative force
+of two fleets depends much upon their sailing. The fleet that sails fastest
+has much the advantage, as they can engage or not as they please, and so
+have always in their power to choose the favourable opportunity to attack.
+I think I may safely hazard an opinion that twenty-five sail of the line
+coppered would be sufficient to harass and tease this great unwieldy
+combined Armada so as to prevent their effecting anything, hanging
+continually upon them, ready to catch at any opportunity of a separation
+from night, gale or fog, to dart upon the separated, to cut off convoys of
+provisions coming to them, and if they attempted an invasion, to oblige
+their whole fleet to escort the transports, and even then it would be
+impossible to protect them entirely from so active and nimble a fleet."
+
+  [23] _Supra_, p. 222.
+
+Here we have from the pen of one of the greatest masters the real key of
+the solution--the power, that is, of forcing the mass of the enemy's fleet
+to escort the transports. Hardy, of course, knew it well from his
+experience of 1744, and acted accordingly. This case is the more striking,
+since defence against the threatened invasion was not the whole of the
+problem he had to solve. It was complicated by instructions that he must
+also prevent a possible descent on Ireland, and cover the arrival of the
+great convoys. In reply, on August 1st, he announced his intention of
+taking station ten to twenty leagues W.S.W. of Scilly, "which I am of
+opinion," he said, "is the most proper station for the security of the
+trade expected from the East and West Indies, and for the meeting of the
+fleets of the enemy _should they attempt to come into the Channel_." He
+underlined the last words, indicating, apparently, his belief that they
+would not venture to do so so long as he could keep his fleet to the
+westward and undefeated. This at least he did, till a month later he found
+it necessary to come in for supplies. Then, still avoiding the enemy, he
+ran not to Plymouth, but right up to St. Helen's. The movement is always
+regarded as an unworthy retreat, and it caused much dissatisfaction in the
+fleet at the time. But it is to be observed that his conduct was strictly
+in accordance with the principle which makes the invading army the primary
+objective. If Hardy's fleet was no longer fit to keep the sea without
+replenishment, then the proper place to seek replenishment was on the
+invader's line of passage. So long as he was there, invasion could not take
+place till he was defeated. The allies, it was true, were now free to join
+their transports, but the prospect of such a movement gave the admiral no
+uneasiness, for it would bring him the chance of serving his enemy as the
+Spaniards were served in 1588. "I shall do my utmost," he said, "to drive
+them up the Channel." It is the old principle. If the worst comes to the
+worst, so long as you are able to force the covering fleet upon the
+transports, and especially in narrow waters, invasion becomes an operation
+beyond the endurable risks of war.
+
+So it proved. On August 14th Count d'Orvilliers, the allied
+commander-in-chief, had made the Lizard, and for a fortnight had striven to
+bring Hardy to decisive action. Until he had done so he dared neither enter
+the Channel with his fleet nor detach a squadron to break the cruiser
+blockades at the invasion bases. His ineffectual efforts exhausted his
+fleet's endurance, which the distant concentration at Finisterre had
+already severely sapped, and he was forced to return impotent to Brest
+before anything had been accomplished. The allies were not able to take the
+sea again that campaign, but even had it been in their power to do so,
+Hardy and Kempenfelt could have played their defensive game indefinitely,
+and with ever-increasing chances, as the winter drew near, of dealing a
+paralysing blow.
+
+There was never any real chance of success, though it is true Dumouriez
+thought otherwise. He believed the enterprise might have gone through if a
+diversion had been made by the bulk of the fleet against Ireland, and under
+cover of it a _coup de main_ delivered upon the Isle of Wight, "for which,"
+he said, "six or eight of the line would have been enough." But it is
+inconceivable that old hands like Hardy and Kempenfelt would have been so
+easily beguiled of their hold on the line of passage. Had such a division
+been detached up the Channel from the allied fleet they would surely,
+according to tradition, have followed it with either a superior force or
+their whole squadron.
+
+The well-known projects of the Great War followed the same course. Under
+Napoleon's directions they ran the whole gamut of every scheme that ever
+raised delusive hope before. Beginning from the beginning with the idea of
+stealing his army across in flat-boats, he was met with the usual flotilla
+defence. Then came his only new idea, which was to arm his transport
+flotilla to the point of giving it power to force a passage for itself. We
+replied by strengthening our flotilla. Convinced by experiment that his
+scheme was now impracticable, he set his mind on breaking the blockade by
+the sudden intrusion of a flying squadron from a distance. To this end
+various plausible schemes were worked out, but plan after plan melted in
+his hand, till he was forced to face the inevitable necessity of bringing
+an overwhelming battle force up to his transports. The experience of two
+centuries had taught him nothing. By a more distant concentration than had
+ever been attempted before he believed he could break the fatal hold of his
+enemy. The only result was so severely to exhaust his fleet that it never
+could get within reach of the real difficulties of its task, a task which
+every admiral in his service knew to be beyond the strength of the Imperial
+Navy. Nor did Napoleon even approach a solution of the problem he had set
+himself--invasion over an uncommanded sea. With our impregnable flotilla
+hold covered by an automatic concentration of battle-squadrons off Ushant,
+his army could never even have put forth, unless he had inflicted upon our
+covering fleet such a defeat as would have given him command of the sea,
+and with absolute control of the sea the passage of an army presents no
+difficulties.
+
+Of the working of these principles under modern conditions we have no
+example. The acquisition of free movement must necessarily modify their
+application, and since the advent of steam there have been only two
+invasions over uncommanded seas--that of the Crimea in 1854, and that of
+Manchuria in 1904--and neither of these cases is in point, for in neither
+was there any attempt at naval defence. Still there seems no reason to
+believe that such defence applied in the old manner would be less effective
+than formerly. The flotilla was its basis, and since the introduction of
+the torpedo the power of the flotilla has greatly increased. Its real and
+moral effect against transports must certainly be greater than ever, and
+the power of squadrons to break a flotilla blockade is more restricted.
+Mines, again, tell almost entirely in favour of defence, so much so indeed
+as to render a rapid _coup de main_ against any important port almost an
+impossibility. In the absence of all experience it is to such theoretical
+considerations we must turn for light.
+
+Theoretically stated, the success of our old system of defence depended on
+four relations. Firstly, there is the relation between the rapidity with
+which an invasion force could be mobilised and embarked, and the rapidity
+with which restlessness in foreign ports and _places d'armes_ could be
+reported; that is to say, the chance of surprise and evasion are as the
+speed of preparation to the speed of intelligence.
+
+Secondly, there is the relation of the speed of convoys to the speed of
+cruisers and flotilla; that is to say, our ability to get contact with a
+convoy after it has put to sea and before the expedition can be disembarked
+is as the speed of our cruisers and flotilla to the speed of the convoy.
+
+Thirdly, there is the relation between the destructive power of modern
+cruisers and flotillas against a convoy unescorted or weakly escorted and
+the corresponding power in sailing days.
+
+Fourthly, there is the relation between the speed of convoys and the speed
+of battle-squadrons, which is of importance where the enemy's transports
+are likely to be strongly escorted. On this relation depends the facility
+with which the battle-squadron covering our mobile defence can secure an
+interior position from which it may strike either the enemy's
+battle-squadron if it moves or his convoy before it can complete its
+passage and effect the landing.
+
+All these relations appear to have been modified by modern developments in
+favour of the defence. In the first ratio, that of speed of mobilisation to
+speed of intelligence, it is obviously so. Although military mobilisation
+may be still relatively as rapid as the mobilisation of fleets, yet
+intelligence has outstripped both. This is true both for gaining and for
+conveying intelligence. Preparations for oversea invasion were never easy
+to conceal, owing to the disturbance of the flow of shipping that they
+caused. Elaborate precautions were taken to prevent commercial leakage of
+intelligence, but they never entirely succeeded. Yet formerly, in the
+condition of comparative crudeness with which international trade was then
+organised, concealment was relatively easy, at least for a time. But the
+ever-growing sensitiveness of world-wide commerce, when market movements
+are reported from hour to hour instead of from week to week, has greatly
+increased the difficulty. And apart from the rapidity with which
+information may be gathered through this alert and intimate sympathy
+between Exchanges, there is the still more important fact that with
+wireless the speed of conveying naval intelligence has increased in a far
+higher ratio than the speed of sea transit.
+
+As regards the ratio between cruiser and convoy speeds, on which evasion so
+much depends, it is the same. In frigate days the ratio appears to have
+been not more than seven to five. Now in the case at any rate of large
+convoys it would be nearly double.
+
+Of the destructive power of the flotilla, growing as it does from year to
+year, enough has been said already. With the advent of the torpedo and
+submarine it has probably increased tenfold. In a lesser degree the same is
+true of cruisers. In former days the physical power of a cruiser to injure
+a dispersing convoy was comparatively low, owing to her relatively low
+excess of speed and the restricted range and destructive power of her guns.
+With higher speed and higher energy and range in gun power the ability of
+cruisers to cut up a convoy renders its practical annihilation almost
+certain if once it be caught, and consequently affords a moral deterrent
+against trusting to evasion beyond anything that was known before.
+
+The increased ratio of battle-fleet speed to that of large convoys is
+equally indisputable and no less important, for the facility of finding
+interior positions which it implies goes to the root of the old system. So
+long as our battle-fleet is in a position whence it can cover our flotilla
+blockade or strike the enemy's convoy in transit, it forces his
+battle-fleet in the last resort to close up on the convoy, and that, as
+Kempenfelt pointed out, is practically fatal to the success of invasion.
+
+From whatever point of view, then, we regard the future chances of
+successful invasion over an uncommanded sea, it would seem that not only
+does the old system hold good, but that all modern developments which touch
+the question bid fair to intensify the results which our sea service at
+least used so confidently to expect, and which it never failed to secure.
+
+II. ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF TRADE
+
+The base idea of the attack and defence of trade may be summed up in the
+old adage, "Where the carcase is, there will the eagles be gathered
+together." The most fertile areas always attracted the strongest attack,
+and therefore required the strongest defence; and between the fertile and
+the infertile areas it was possible to draw a line which for strategical
+purposes was definite and constant. The fertile areas were the terminals of
+departure and destination where trade tends to be crowded, and in a
+secondary degree the focal points where, owing to the conformation of the
+land, trade tends to converge. The infertile areas were the great routes
+which passed through the focal points and connected the terminal areas.
+Consequently attack on commerce tends to take one of two forms. It may be
+terminal or it may be pelagic, terminal attack being the more profitable,
+but demanding the greater force and risk, and pelagic attack being the more
+uncertain, but involving less force and risk.
+
+These considerations lead us directly to the paradox which underlies the
+unbroken failure of our enemies to exercise decisive pressure upon us by
+operations against our trade. It is that where attack is most to be feared,
+there defence is easiest. A plan of war which has the destruction of trade
+for its primary object implies in the party using it an inferiority at sea.
+Had he superiority, his object would be to convert that superiority to a
+working command by battle or blockade. Except, therefore, in the rare cases
+where the opposed forces are equal, we must assume that the belligerent who
+makes commerce destruction his primary object will have to deal with a
+superior fleet. Now, it is true that the difficulty of defending trade lies
+mainly in the extent of sea it covers. But, on the other hand, the areas in
+which it tends to congregate, and in which alone it is seriously
+vulnerable, are few and narrow, and can be easily occupied if we are in
+superior force. Beyond those areas effective occupation is impossible, but
+so also is effective attack. Hence the controlling fact of war on commerce,
+that facility of attack means facility of defence.
+
+Beside this fundamental principle we must place another that is scarcely
+less important. Owing to the general common nature of sea communications,
+attack and defence of trade are so intimately connected that the one
+operation is almost indistinguishable from the other. Both ideas are
+satisfied by occupying the common communications. The strongest form of
+attack is the occupation of the enemy's terminals, and the establishment of
+a commercial blockade of the ports they contain. But as this operation
+usually requires the blockade of an adjacent naval port, it also
+constitutes, as a rule, a defensive disposition for our own trade, even
+when the enemy's terminal area does not overlap one of our own. In the
+occupation of focal areas the two ideas are even more inseparable, since
+most, if not all, such areas are on lines of communication that are common.
+It will suffice, therefore, to deal with the general aspect of the subject
+from the point of view of defence.
+
+It was in conformity with the distinction between fertile and infertile
+areas that our old system of trade defence was developed. Broadly speaking,
+that system was to hold the terminals in strength, and in important cases
+the focal points as well. By means of a battle-squadron with a full
+complement of cruisers they were constituted defended areas, or "tracts" as
+the old term was, and the trade was regarded as safe when it entered them.
+The intervening trade-routes were left as a rule undefended. Thus our home
+terminals were held by two battle-squadrons, the Western Squadron at the
+mouth of the Channel, and the North Sea or Eastern Squadron with its
+headquarters usually in the Downs. To these was added a cruiser squadron on
+the Irish station based at Cork, which was sometimes subordinate to the
+Western Squadron and sometimes an independent organisation. The area of the
+Western Squadron in the French wars extended, as we have seen, over the
+whole Bay of Biscay, with the double function, so far as commerce was
+concerned, of preventing the issue of raiding squadrons from the enemy's
+ports, and acting offensively against his Atlantic trade. That of the North
+Sea squadron extended to the mouth of the Baltic and the north-about
+passage. Its main function during the great naval coalitions against us was
+to check the operations of Dutch squadrons or to prevent the intrusion of
+French ones north-about against our Baltic trade. Like the Western
+Squadron, it threw out divisions usually located at Yarmouth and Leith for
+the protection of our coastwise trade from privateers and sporadic cruisers
+acting from ports within the defended area. Similarly, between the Downs
+and the Western Squadron was usually one or more smaller squadrons, mainly
+cruisers, and generally located about Havre and the Channel Islands, which
+served the same purpose for the Norman and North Breton ports. To complete
+the system there were flotilla patrols acting under the port admirals and
+doing their best to police the routes of the coastwise and local traffic,
+which then had an importance long since lost. The home system of course
+differed at different times, but it was always on these general lines. The
+naval defence was supplemented by defended ports of refuge, the principal
+ones being on the coast of Ireland to shelter the ocean trade, but others
+in great numbers were provided within the defended areas against the
+operations of privateers, and the ruins of batteries all round the British
+shores testify how complete was the organisation.
+
+A similar system prevailed in the colonial areas, but there the naval
+defence consisted normally of cruiser squadrons stiffened with one or two
+ships-of-the-line mainly for the purpose of carrying the flag. They were
+only occupied by battle-squadrons when the enemy threatened operations with
+a similar force. The minor or interior defence against local privateers was
+to a large extent local; that is, the great part of the flotilla was
+furnished by sloops built or hired on the spot, as being best adapted for
+the service.
+
+Focal points were not then so numerous as they have become since the
+development of the Far Eastern trade. The most important of them, the
+Straits of Gibraltar, was treated as a defended area. From the point of
+view of commerce-protection it was held by the Mediterranean squadron. By
+keeping watch on Toulon that squadron covered not only the Straits, but
+also the focal points within the sea. It too had its extended divisions,
+sometimes as many as four, one about the approaches to Leghorn, one in the
+Adriatic, a third at Malta, and the fourth at Gibraltar. In cases of war
+with Spain the latter was very strong, so as to secure the focal area
+against Cartagena and Cadiz. On one occasion indeed, in 1804-5, as we have
+seen, it was constituted for a short time an independent area with a
+special squadron. But in any case the Gibraltar area had its own internal
+flotilla guard under the direction of the port admiral as a defence against
+local privateers and pirates.
+
+The general theory of these defended terminal and focal areas, it will be
+seen, was to hold in force those waters which converging trade made most
+fertile, and which therefore furnished an adequate field for the operations
+of raiding squadrons. In spite of the elaborate defensive system, such
+squadrons might, and sometimes did, intrude by surprise or stealth, and
+were then able to set at defiance both convoy escorts and the cruiser
+outposts. But, as experience proved, the system of terminal defence by
+battle-squadrons made it impossible for such raiding squadrons to remain
+long enough on the ground to cause any serious interruption or to do
+serious harm. It was only by a regular fleet of superior strength that the
+system could be broken down. In other words, the defence could only fall
+when our means of local control was destroyed by battle.
+
+So much for the defended areas. With regard to the great routes that
+connected them, it has been said they were left undefended. By this is
+meant that the security of ships passing along them was provided for, not
+by patrols but by escort. The convoy system was adopted, and the theory of
+that system is that while vessels are on the great routes they are normally
+liable only to sporadic attack, and they are consequently collected into
+fleets and furnished with an escort sufficient to repel sporadic attack. In
+theory, cruiser escort is sufficient, but in practice it was found
+convenient and economical to assign the duty in part to ships-of-the-line
+which were going out to join the distant terminal squadron or returning
+from it for a refit or some other reason; in other words, the system of
+foreign reliefs was made to work in with the supplementary escort system.
+Where no such ships were available and the convoys were of great value, or
+enemy's ships-of-the-line were known to be out, similar units were
+specially detailed for convoy duty to go and return, but this use of battle
+units was exceptional.
+
+Such a method of dealing with the great routes is the corollary of the idea
+of defended areas. As those areas were fertile and likely to attract
+raiding squadrons, so the great routes were infertile, and no enemy could
+afford to spend squadrons upon them. It is obvious, however, that the
+system had its weak side, for the mere fact that a convoy was upon a great
+route tended to attract a squadron, and the comparative immunity of those
+routes was lost. The danger was provided for to a great extent by the fact
+that the enemy's ports from which a squadron could issue were all within
+defended areas and watched by our own squadrons. Still, the guard could not
+be made impenetrable. There was always the chance of a squadron escaping,
+and if it escaped towards a critical trade-route, it must be followed.
+Hence there were times when the convoy system seriously disturbed our
+dispositions, as, for instance, in the crisis of the Trafalgar campaign,
+when for a short time our chain of defended areas was broken down by the
+escape of the Toulon squadron. That escape eventually forced a close
+concentration on the Western Squadron, but all other considerations apart,
+it was felt to be impossible to retain the mass for more than two days
+owing to the fact that the great East and West Indies convoys were
+approaching, and Villeneuve's return to Ferrol from Martinique exposed them
+to squadronal attack. It was, in fact, impossible to tell whether the mass
+had not been forced upon us with this special end in view.
+
+In the liability to deflection of this kind lay the most serious
+strategical objection to the convoy system. It was sought to minimise it by
+giving the convoys a secret route when there was apprehension of squadronal
+interference. It was done in the case just cited, but the precaution seemed
+in no way to lessen the anxiety. It may have been because in those days of
+slow communication there could be no such certainty that the secret route
+had been received as there would be now.
+
+Modern developments and changes in shipping and naval material have indeed
+so profoundly modified the whole conditions of commerce protection, that
+there is no part of strategy where historical deduction is more difficult
+or more liable to error. To avoid such error as far as possible, it is
+essential to keep those developments in mind at every step. The more
+important of them are three in number. Firstly, the abolition of
+privateering; secondly, the reduced range of action for all warships; and
+thirdly, the development of wireless telegraphy. There are others which
+must be dealt with in their place, but these three go to the root of the
+whole problem.
+
+Difficult as it is to arrive at exact statistics of commerce destruction in
+the old wars, one thing seems certain--that the bulk of captures, which
+were reckoned in hundreds and sometimes even in thousands, were due to the
+action of privateers. Further, it seems certain that, reckoning at least by
+numbers, the greater part of the damage was done by small privateers
+operating close to their bases, either home or colonial, against coastwise
+and local traffic. The complaints of merchants, so far as they are known,
+relate mainly to this kind of work in the West Indies and home waters,
+while accounts of serious captures by large privateers on the high seas are
+comparatively rare. The actual damage done by the swarm of small vessels
+may not have been great, but its moral effects were very serious. It was
+impossible for the strongest Governments to ignore them, and the
+consequence was a chronic disturbance of the larger strategical
+dispositions. While these dispositions were adequate to check the
+operations of large privateers acting in the same way as regular cruisers,
+the smaller ones found very free play amidst the ribwork of the protective
+system, and they could only be dealt with by filling up the spaces with a
+swarm of small cruisers to the serious detriment of the larger
+arrangements. Even so, the proximity of the enemy's ports made escape so
+easy, that the work of repression was very ineffective. The state of the
+case was indeed almost identical with a people's war. The ordinary devices
+of strategy failed to deal with it, as completely as Napoleon's broadly
+planned methods failed to deal with the _guerilleros_ in Spain, or as our
+own failed for so long in South Africa.
+
+By the abolition of privateering, then, it would seem that the most
+disturbing part of the problem has been eliminated. It is, of course,
+uncertain how far the Declaration of Paris will hold good in practice. It
+is still open even to the parties to it to evade its restrictions to a
+greater or less extent by taking up and commissioning merchantmen as
+regular ships of war. But it is unlikely that such methods will extend
+beyond the larger privately owned vessels. Any attempt to revive in this
+way the old _picaresque_ methods could only amount to a virtual repudiation
+of statutory international law, which would bring its own retribution.
+Moreover, for home waters at least, the conditions which favoured this
+_picaresque_ warfare no longer exist. In the old wars the bulk of our trade
+came into the Thames, and thence the greater part of it was distributed in
+small coasting vessels. It was against this coastwise traffic that the
+small, short-range privateers found their opportunity and their richest
+harvest. But, now that so many other great centres of distribution have
+established themselves, and that the bulk of the distribution is done by
+internal lines of communication, the Channel is no longer the sole artery,
+and the old troublesome disturbance can be avoided without a vital
+dislocation of our commercial system.
+
+The probability, then, is that in the future the whole problem will be
+found to be simplified, and that the work of commerce protection will lie
+much more within the scope of large strategical treatment than it ever did
+before, with the result that the change should be found to tell
+substantially in favour of defence and against attack.
+
+The reduction of range of action is scarcely less important. In the old
+days a cruising ship could be stored for six months, and so long as she
+could occasionally renew her fuel and water, she was free to range the sea
+outside the defended areas for the whole of the period with unimpaired
+vitality. For such pelagic operations her movement was practically
+unrestricted. She could run for two or three days from a superior enemy or
+chase for as long without loss of energy, and she could wait indefinitely
+at a likely spot, or change her ground, as danger or hope of plunder
+dictated. So long as she had men left to man her prizes, her power of
+mischief was almost unlimited. All this is now changed. The capacity of
+each cruise of a ship to-day is very small. She is confined to short dashes
+within a strategically defended area, or if she is bent on pelagic
+operations, is compelled to proceed so far to find undefended waters that
+her coal will scarcely permit of more than a few days' actual cruising. A
+couple of chases at high speed during that period may force her to return
+at once, subject only to the precarious possibility of renewing her coal
+from a prize. She has, further, to face the fact that manning prizes must
+necessarily reduce her capacity for speed, which depends so much on a fully
+manned engine-room. This will tend to jeopardise her chances of return
+through or near defended areas. The only escape from this difficulty is to
+sink the captured ship. But this course has objections scarcely less
+weighty than the other. No Power will incur the odium of sinking a prize
+with all hands, and their removal to the captor's ship takes time,
+especially in bad weather, and the presence of such prisoners in a cruiser
+in any number soon becomes a serious check on her fighting power. In the
+case of large ships, moreover, the work of destruction is no easy matter.
+In the most favourable circumstances it takes a considerable time, and thus
+not only eats into the cruiser's endurance, but decreases her chances of
+evasion.
+
+From these and similar considerations it is obvious that the possibilities
+of operations on the great trade-routes are much less extensive than they
+were formerly, while to speak of cruisers "infesting" those routes is sheer
+hyperbole. Under modern conditions it is scarcely more feasible than it
+would be to keep up a permanent blockade of the British Islands. It would
+require a flow of ships in such numbers as no country but our own can
+contemplate possessing, and such as could not be maintained without having
+first secured a very decided preponderance at sea. The loss of radius of
+action therefore, though it does not increase the power of defence,
+sensibly lessens that of attack by pelagic operations.
+
+For the great increase in the powers of defence we must turn to the
+extraordinary development in the means of distant communication. Under
+former conditions it was possible for a cruising ship to remain for days
+upon a fertile spot and make a number of captures before her presence was
+known. But since most large merchantmen have been fitted with wireless
+installations, she cannot now attack a single one of them without fear of
+calling down upon her an adversary. Moreover, when she is once located,
+every ship within wireless reach can be warned of her presence and avoid
+her. She must widely and constantly shift her position, thereby still
+further reducing her staying power. On the whole, then, it would appear
+that in so far as modern developments affect the problem, they certainly
+render pelagic operations far more difficult and uncertain than they used
+to be. Upon the great routes the power of attack has been reduced and the
+means of evasion has increased to such an extent as to demand entire
+reconsideration of the defence of trade between terminal areas. The whole
+basis of the old system would seem to be involved. That basis was the
+convoy system, and it now becomes doubtful whether the additional security
+which convoys afforded is sufficient to outweigh their economical drawbacks
+and their liability to cause strategical disturbance.
+
+Over and above the considerations already noticed, there are three others,
+all of which favour the security of our trade by permitting a much more
+extended choice of route. The first is, that steam vessels are not forced
+by prevailing winds to keep to particular courses. The second is, that the
+improvements in the art of navigation no longer render it so necessary to
+make well-known landfalls during transit. The third is, that the
+multiplication of our great ports of distribution have divided the old main
+flow of trade to the Channel into a number of minor streams that cover a
+much wider area and demand a greater distribution of force for effective
+attack. It will be obvious that the combined effect of these considerations
+is to increase still further the chances of individual vessels evading the
+enemy's cruisers and to lessen the risk of dispensing with escort.
+
+Nor are the new practical difficulties of sporadic operations on the great
+routes the only arguments that minimise the value of convoys. We have also
+to remember that while the number of vessels trading across the ocean has
+enormously increased since 1815, it is scarcely possible, even if the
+abolition of privateering prove abortive, that the number of cruisers
+available for pelagic attack could exceed, or even equal, the number
+employed in sailing days. This consideration, then, must also be thrown
+into the scale against convoys; for it is certain that the amount of
+serious operative damage which an enemy can do to our trade by pelagic
+operation is mainly determined by the ratio which his available cruiser
+strength bears to the volume of that trade. This aspect of the question is,
+however, part of a much wider one, which concerns the relation which the
+volume of our trade bears to the difficulty of its defence, and this must
+be considered later.
+
+It remains, first, to deal with the final link in the old system of
+defence. The statement that the great routes were left undefended will seem
+to be in opposition to a prevailing impression derived from the fact that
+frigates are constantly mentioned as being "on a cruise." The assumption is
+that they in effect patrolled the great routes. But this was not so, nor
+did they rove the sea at will. They constituted a definite and necessary
+part of the system. Though that system was founded on a distinction between
+defended terminals and undefended routes, which was a real strategical
+distinction, it was impossible to draw an actual line where the one sphere
+began and the other ended. Outside the regularly defended areas lay a
+region which, as the routes began to converge, was comparatively fertile.
+In this region enemies' cruisers and their larger privateers found the mean
+between risk and profit. Here too convoys, as they entered the zone, were
+in their greatest danger for fear of their escorts being overpowered by
+raiding squadrons. Consequently it was the practice, when the approach of
+convoys was expected, to throw forward from the defended area groups of
+powerful cruisers, and even battleship divisions, to meet them and
+reinforce their escorts. Outward-bound convoys had their escorts similarly
+strengthened till they were clear of the danger zone. The system was in
+regular use both for home and colonial areas. In no sense did it constitute
+a patrol of the routes. It was in practice and conception a system of
+outposts, which at seasons of special risk amounted to an extension of the
+defended areas combining with a reinforcement of the convoy escorts. Focal
+points of lesser importance, such as Capes Finisterre and St. Vincent, were
+similarly held by one or two powerful cruisers, and if necessary by a
+squadron.
+
+As has been already explained, owing to the peculiar conditions of the sea
+and the common nature of maritime communications, these dispositions were
+adopted as well for attack as defence, and the fertile areas, for the
+defence of which a frigate captain was sent "on a cruise," were always
+liable to bring him rich reward. His mission of defence carried with it the
+best opportunities for attack.
+
+In the full development of the system patrol lines did exist, but not for
+the great routes. They were established to link up adjacent defended areas
+and as a more scientific organisation of the cruiser outposts. In 1805 the
+Gibraltar and the home areas were thus connected by a patrol line which
+stretched from Cape St. Vincent through the Finisterre focal area to Cape
+Clear, with a branch extending to the strategical centre off Ushant. The
+new system was introduced at a time when we had reason to expect that the
+French and Spanish fleets were to be devoted entirely to operations in
+small raiding squadrons against our trade and colonies. Special provision
+was therefore necessary to locate any such squadrons that might elude the
+regular blockades, and to ensure that they should be adequately pursued.
+The new lines were in fact intelligence patrols primarily, though they were
+also regarded as the only means of protecting efficiently the southern
+trade-route where it was flanked by French and Spanish ports.[24]
+
+  [24] It should be said that Cornwallis did not regard this system as new
+  except for the extension from Finisterre to St. Vincent, which Nelson
+  advised. In acknowledging the order from Ushant he wrote, "The
+  instructions ... are nearly the same as have generally been given. I can
+  therefore only guess why a copy of the order was sent to
+  me."--_Admiralty, In-Letters_, 129, 28 September 1805.
+
+The whole system, it will be observed, though not conflicting with the main
+object of bringing the enemy's fleets to action, did entail an expenditure
+of force and deflecting preoccupations such as are unknown in land warfare.
+Large numbers of cruisers had to be employed otherwise than as the eyes of
+the battle-squadrons, while the coming and going of convoys produced
+periodical oscillations in the general distribution.
+
+Embarrassing as was this commercial deflection in the old wars, an
+impression appears to prevail that in the future it must be much more
+serious. It is argued plausibly enough not only that our trade is far
+larger and richer than it was, but also that, owing to certain well-known
+economic changes, it is far more a matter of life and death to the nation
+than in the days when food and raw material did not constitute the bulk of
+our imports. In view of the new conditions it is held that we are more
+vulnerable through our trade now than formerly, and that, consequently, we
+must devote relatively more attention and force to its defence.
+
+If this were true, it is obvious that war with a strong naval combination
+would present difficulties of the most formidable kind, greater indeed than
+we have ever experienced; for since with modern developments the demand for
+fleet cruisers is much greater than formerly, the power of devoting
+cruisers to trade defence is relatively much less.
+
+It cannot be denied that at first sight the conclusion looks
+irreproachable. But on analysis it will be found to involve two
+assumptions, both of which are highly questionable. The first is, that the
+vulnerability of a sea Power through its maritime trade is as the volume of
+that trade. The second is, that the difficulty of defending sea-borne trade
+is also as its volume--that is to say, the larger the amount of the trade,
+the larger must be the force devoted to its protection. This idea indeed is
+carried so far, that we are frequently invited to fix the standard of our
+naval strength by comparing it with the proportion which the naval strength
+of other Powers bears to their sea-borne trade.
+
+It is hoped that the foregoing sketch of our traditional system of trade
+defence will avail to raise a doubt whether either assumption can be
+accepted without very careful consideration. In the history of that system
+there is no indication that it was affected by the volume of the trade it
+was designed to protect. Nor has any one succeeded in showing that the
+pressure which an enemy could exert upon us through our commerce increased
+in effect with the volume of our seaborne trade. The broad indications
+indeed are the other way--that the greater the volume of our trade, the
+less was the effective impression which an enemy could make upon it, even
+when he devoted his whole naval energies to that end. It is not too much to
+say that in every case where he took this course his own trade dwindled to
+nothing, while ours continually increased.
+
+It may be objected that this was because the only periods in which he
+devoted his main efforts to trade destruction were when we had dominated
+his navy, and being no longer able to dispute the command, he could do no
+more than interfere with its exercise. But this must always be so whether
+we have positively dominated his navy or not. If he tries to ignore our
+battle-fleets, and devotes himself to operations against trade, he cannot
+dispute the command. Whatever his strength, he must leave the command to
+us. He cannot do both systematically, and unless he attacks our trade
+systematically by sustained strategical operation, he cannot hope to make
+any real impression.
+
+If, now, we take the two assumptions and test them by the application of
+elementary principles, both will appear theoretically unsound. Let us take
+first the relation of vulnerability to volume. Since the object of war is
+to force our will upon the enemy, the only way in which we can expect war
+on commerce to serve our end is to inflict so much damage upon it as will
+cause our enemy to prefer peace on our terms to a continuation of the
+struggle. The pressure on his trade must be insupportable, not merely
+annoying. It must seriously cripple his finance or seriously threaten to
+strangle his national life and activities. If his total trade be a hundred
+millions, and we succeed in destroying five, he will feel it no more than
+he does the ordinary fluctuations to which he is accustomed in time of
+peace. If, however, we can destroy fifty millions, his trade equilibrium
+will be overthrown, and the issue of the war will be powerfully affected.
+In other words, to affect the issue the impression made on trade must be a
+percentage or relative impression. The measure of a nation's vulnerability
+through its trade is the percentage of destruction that an enemy can
+effect.
+
+Now, it is true that the amount of damage which a belligerent can inflict
+with a given force on an enemy's commerce will vary to some extent with its
+volume; for the greater the volume of commerce, the more fertile will be
+the undefended cruising grounds. But no matter how fertile such areas might
+be, the destructive power of a cruiser was always limited, and it must be
+still more limited in the future. It was limited by the fact that it was
+physically impossible to deal with more than a certain number of prizes in
+a certain time, and, for the reasons already indicated, this limit has
+suffered a very marked restriction. When this limit of capacity in a given
+force is passed, the volume of commerce will not affect the issue; and
+seeing how low that capacity must be in the future and how enormous is the
+volume of our trade, the limit of destructive power, at least as against
+ourselves, provided we have a reasonably well-organised system of defence,
+must be relatively low. It must, in fact, be passed at a percentage figure
+well within what we have easily supported in the past. There is reason,
+therefore, to believe that so far from the assumption in question being
+true, the effective vulnerability of sea-borne trade is not in direct but
+in inverse proportion to its volume. In other words, the greater the
+volume, the more difficult it is to make an effective percentage
+impression.
+
+Similarly, it will be observed that the strain of trade defence was
+proportioned not to the volume of that trade, but to the number and
+exposure of its terminals and focal points. Whatever the volume of the
+trade these remained the same in number, and the amount of force required
+for their defence varied only with the strength that could readily be
+brought to bear against them. It varied, that is, with the distribution of
+the enemy's bases and the amount of his naval force. Thus in the war of
+1812 with the United States, the West Indian and North American areas were
+much more exposed than they had been when we were at war with France alone
+and when American ports were not open to her as bases. They became
+vulnerable not only to the United States fleet, but also in a much higher
+degree to that of France, and consequently the force we found necessary to
+devote to trade defence in the North Atlantic was out of all proportion to
+the naval strength of the new belligerent. Our protective force had to be
+increased enormously, while the volume of our trade remained precisely the
+same.
+
+This relation of trade defence to terminal and focal areas is of great
+importance, for it is in the increase of such areas in the Far East that
+lies the only radical change in the problem. The East Indian seas were
+always of course to some extent treated as a defended area, but the problem
+was simplified by the partial survival in those regions of the old method
+of defence. Till about the end of the seventeenth century long-range trade
+was expected to defend itself, at least outside the home area, and the
+retention of their armament by East Indiamen was the last survival of the
+practice. Beyond the important focal area of St. Helena they relied mainly
+on their own power of resistance or to such escort as could be provided by
+the relief ships of the East Indian station. As a rule, their escort proper
+went no farther outward-bound than St. Helena, whence it returned with the
+homeward-bound vessels that gathered there from India, China, and the South
+Sea whaling grounds. The idea of the system was to provide escort for that
+part of the great route which was exposed to attack from French or Spanish
+colonial bases on the African coasts and in the adjacent islands.
+
+For obvious reasons this system would have to be reconsidered in the
+future. The expansion of the great European Powers have changed the
+conditions for which it sufficed, and in a war with any one of them the
+system of defended terminal and focal areas would require a great extension
+eastward, absorbing an appreciable section of our force, and entailing a
+comparatively weak prolongation of our chain of concentrations. Here, then,
+we must mark a point where trade defence has increased in difficulty, and
+there is one other.
+
+Although minor hostile bases within a defended area have lost most of their
+menace to trade, they have acquired as torpedo bases a power of disturbing
+the defence itself. So long as such bases exist with a potent flotilla
+within them, it is obvious that the actual provision for defence cannot be
+so simple a matter as it was formerly. Other and more complex arrangements
+may have to be made. Still, the principle of defended areas seems to remain
+unshaken, and if it is to work with its old effectiveness, the means and
+the disposition for securing those areas will have to be adapted to the new
+tactical possibilities. The old strategical conditions, so far as can be
+seen, are unaltered except in so far as the reactions of modern material
+make them tell in favour of defence rather than of attack.
+
+If we desire to formulate the principles on which this conclusion rests we
+shall find them in the two broad rules, firstly, that the vulnerability of
+trade is in inverse ratio to its volume, and secondly, that facility of
+attack means facility of defence. The latter, which was always true,
+receives special emphasis from modern developments. Facility of attack
+means the power of exercising control. For exercise of control we require
+not only numbers, but also speed and endurance, qualities which can only be
+obtained in two ways: it must be at the cost of armour and armament, or at
+the cost of increased size. By increasing size we at once lose numbers. If
+by sacrificing armament and armour we seek to maintain numbers and so
+facilitate attack, we at the same time facilitate defence. Vessels of low
+fighting power indeed cannot hope to operate in fertile areas without
+support to overpower the defence. Every powerful unit detached for such
+support sets free a unit on the other side, and when this process is once
+begun, there is no halting-place. Supporting units to be effective must
+multiply into squadrons, and sooner or later the inferior Power seeking to
+substitute commerce destruction for the clash of squadrons will have
+squadronal warfare thrust upon him, provided again the superior Power
+adopts a reasonably sound system of defence. It was always so, and, so far
+as it is possible to penetrate the mists which veil the future, it would
+seem that with higher mobility and better means of communication the
+squadronal stage must be reached long before any adequate percentage
+impression can have been made by the sporadic action of commerce
+destroyers. Ineffectual as such warfare has always been in the past, until
+a general command has been established, its prospects in the future, judged
+by the old established principles, are less promising than ever.
+
+Finally, in approaching the problem of trade protection, and especially for
+the actual determination of the force and distribution it requires, there
+is a dominant limitation to be kept in mind. By no conceivable means is it
+possible to give trade absolute protection. We cannot make an omelette
+without breaking eggs. We cannot make war without losing ships. To aim at a
+standard of naval strength or a strategical distribution which would make
+our trade absolutely invulnerable is to march to economic ruin. It is to
+cripple our power of sustaining war to a successful issue, and to seek a
+position of maritime despotism which, even if it were attainable, would set
+every man's hand against us. All these evils would be upon us, and our goal
+would still be in the far distance. In 1870 the second naval Power in the
+world was at war with an enemy that could not be considered a naval Power
+at all, and yet she lost ships by capture. Never in the days of our most
+complete domination upon the seas was our trade invulnerable, and it never
+can be. To seek invulnerability is to fall into the strategical vice of
+trying to be superior everywhere, to forfeit the attainment of the
+essential for fear of risking the unessential, to base our plans on an
+assumption that war may be waged without loss, that it is, in short,
+something that it never has been and never can be. Such peace-bred dreams
+must be rigorously abjured. Our standard must be the mean of economic
+strength--the line which on the one hand will permit us to nourish our
+financial resources for the evil day, and on the other, when that day
+comes, will deny to the enemy the possibility of choking our financial
+vigour by sufficiently checking the flow of our trade.
+
+III. ATTACK, DEFENCE, AND SUPPORT OF
+MILITARY EXPEDITIONS
+
+The attack and defence of oversea expeditions are governed in a large
+measure by the principles of attack and defence of trade. In both cases it
+is a question of control of communications, and in a general way it may be
+said, if we control them for the one purpose, we control them for the
+other. But with combined expeditions freedom of passage is not the only
+consideration. The duties of the fleet do not end with the protection of
+the troops during transit, as in the case of convoys, unless indeed, as
+with convoys, the destination is a friendly country. In the normal case of
+a hostile destination, where resistance is to be expected from the
+commencement of the operations, the fleet is charged with further duties of
+a most exacting kind. They may be described generally as duties of support,
+and it is the intrusion of these duties which distinguish the naval
+arrangements for combined operations most sharply from those for the
+protection of trade. Except for this consideration there need be no
+difference in the method of defence. In each case the strength required
+would be measured by the dangers of interference in transit. But as it is,
+that standard will not serve for combined expeditions; for however small
+those risks, the protective arrangements must be sufficiently extensive to
+include arrangements for support.
+
+Before dealing with this, the most complex aspect of the question, it will
+be well to dismiss attack. From the strategical point of view its
+principles differ not at all from those already laid down for active
+resistance of invasion. Whether the expedition that threatens us be small
+or of invasion strength, the cardinal rule has always been that the
+transports and not the escort must be the primary objective of the fleet.
+The escort, according to the old practice, must be turned or contained, but
+never treated as a primary objective unless both turning and containing
+prove to be impracticable. It is needless to repeat the words of the old
+masters in which this principle lies embalmed. It is seldom that we find a
+rule of naval strategy laid down in precise technical terms, but this one
+is an exception. In the old squadronal instructions, "The transports of the
+enemy are to be your principal object," became something like a common
+form.
+
+Nor did this rule apply only to cases where the transports were protected
+by a mere escort. It held good even in the exceptional cases where the
+military force was accompanied or guarded by the whole available battle
+strength of the enemy. We have seen how in 1744 Norris was prepared to
+follow the French transports if necessary with his whole force, and how in
+1798 Nelson organised his fleet in such a way as to contain rather than
+destroy the enemy's battle-squadron, so that he might provide for an
+overwhelming attack upon the transports.
+
+Exceptions to this as to all strategical rules may be conceived. Conditions
+might exist in which, if the enemy's battle-fleet accompanied his
+transports, it would be worth our while, for ulterior objects of our own,
+to risk the escape of the transports in order to seize the opportunity of
+destroying the fleet. But even in such a case the distinction would be
+little more than academical; for our best chance of securing a decisive
+tactical advantage against the enemy's fleet would usually be to compel it
+to conform to our movements by threatening an attack on the transports. It
+is well known that it is in the embarrassment arising from the presence of
+transports that lies the special weakness of a fleet in charge of them.
+
+There is, however, one condition which radically differentiates
+comparatively small expeditions from great invasions and that is the power
+of evasion. Our experience has proved beyond dispute that the navy alone
+cannot guarantee defence against such expeditions. It cannot be sure of
+preventing their sailing or of attacking them in transit, and this is
+especially the case where an open sea gives them a free choice of route, as
+in the case of the French expeditions against Ireland. It is for this
+reason that, although an adequate navy has always proved sufficient to
+prevent an invasion, for defence against expeditions it must be
+supplemented by a home army. To perfect our defence, or, in other words,
+our power of attack, such an army must be adequate to ensure that all
+expeditions small enough to evade the fleet shall do no effective harm when
+they land. If in numbers, training, organisation, and distribution it is
+adequate for this purpose, an enemy cannot hope to affect the issue of the
+war except by raising his expeditions to invasion strength, and so finding
+himself involved in a problem that no one has ever yet solved for an
+uncommanded sea.
+
+Still, even for expeditions below invasion strength the navy will only
+regard the army as a second line, and its strategy must provide in the
+event of evasion for co-operation with that line. By means of a just
+distribution of its coastal flotilla it will provide for getting contact
+with the expedition at the earliest moment after its destination is
+declared. It will press the principle of making the army its objective to
+the utmost limit by the most powerful and energetic cruiser pursuit, and
+with wireless and the increased ratio of cruiser speed, such pursuit is far
+more formidable than it ever was. No expedition nowadays, however
+successful its evasion, can be guaranteed against naval interruption in the
+process of landing. Still less can it be guaranteed against naval
+interference in its rear or flanks while it is securing its front against
+the home army. It may seek by using large transports to reduce their number
+and secure higher speed, but while that will raise its chance of evasion,
+it will prolong the critical period of landing. If it seek by using smaller
+transports to quicken disembarkation, that will decrease its chances of
+evasion by lowering its speed and widening the sea area it will occupy in
+transit. All the modern developments in fact which make for defence in case
+of invasion over an uncommanded sea also go to facilitate timely contact
+with an expedition seeking to operate by evasion. Nor must it be forgotten,
+since the problem is a combined one, that the corresponding developments
+ashore tell with little less force in favour of the defending army. Such
+appear to be the broad principles which govern an enemy's attempts to act
+with combined expeditions in our own waters, where by hypothesis we are in
+sufficient naval strength to deny him permanent local command. We may now
+turn to the larger and more complex question of the conduct of such
+expeditions where the naval conditions are reversed.
+
+By the conduct, be it remembered, we mean not only their defence but also
+their support, and for this reason the starting-point of our inquiry is to
+be found, as above indicated, in the contrast of combined expeditions with
+convoys. A convoy consists of two elements--a fleet of merchantmen and an
+escort. But a combined expedition does not consist simply of an army and a
+squadron. It is an organism at once more complex and more homogeneous. Its
+constitution is fourfold. There is, firstly, the army; secondly, the
+transports and landing flotilla--that is, the flotilla of flat-boats and
+steamboats for towing them, all of which may be carried in the transports
+or accompany them; thirdly, the "Squadron in charge of transports," as it
+came to be called, which includes the escort proper and the supporting
+flotilla of lighter craft for inshore work; and lastly, the "Covering
+squadron."
+
+Such at least is a combined expedition in logical analysis. But so
+essentially is it a single organism, that in practice these various
+elements can seldom be kept sharply distinct. They may be interwoven in the
+most intricate manner. Indeed to a greater or less extent each will always
+have to discharge some of the functions of the others. Thus the covering
+squadron may not only be indistinguishable from the escort and support, but
+it will often provide the greater part of the landing flotilla and even a
+portion of the landing force. Similarly, the escort may also serve as
+transport, and provide in part not only the supporting force, but also the
+landing flotilla. The fourfold constitution is therefore in a great measure
+theoretical. Still its use is not merely that it serves to define the
+varied functions which the fleet will have to discharge. As we proceed it
+will be seen to have a practical strategical value.
+
+From a naval point of view it is the covering squadron which calls first
+for consideration, because of the emphasis with which its necessity marks
+not only the distinction between the conduct of combined expeditions and
+the conduct of commercial convoys, but also the fact that such expeditions
+are actually a combined force, and not merely an army escorted by a fleet.
+
+In our system of commerce protection the covering squadron had no place.
+The battle-fleet, as we have seen, was employed in holding definite
+terminal areas, and had no organic connection with the convoys. The convoys
+had no further protection than their own escort and the reinforcements that
+met them as they approached the terminal areas. But where a convoy of
+transports forming part of a combined expedition was destined for an
+enemy's country and would have to overcome resistance by true combined
+operations, a covering battle-squadron was always provided. In the case of
+distant objectives it might be that the covering squadron was not attached
+till the whole expedition assembled in the theatre of operations; during
+transit to that theatre the transports might have commerce protection
+escort only. But once the operations began from the point of concentration,
+a covering squadron was always in touch.
+
+It was only where the destination of the troops was a friendly country, and
+the line of passage was well protected by our permanent blockades, that a
+covering squadron could be dispensed with altogether. Thus our various
+expeditions for the assistance of Portugal were treated exactly like
+commercial convoys, but in such cases as Wolfe's expedition to Quebec or
+Amherst's to Louisburg, or indeed any of those which were continually
+launched against the West Indies, a battle-squadron was always provided as
+an integral part in the theatre of operations. Our arrangements in the
+Crimean War illustrate the point exactly. Our troops were sent out at first
+to land at Gallipoli in a friendly territory, and to act within that
+territory as an army of observation. It was not a true combined expedition,
+and the transports were given no covering squadron. Their passage was
+sufficiently covered by our Channel and Mediterranean fleets occupying the
+exits of the Baltic and the Black Sea. But so soon as the original war plan
+proved ineffective and combined offensive operations against Sebastopol
+were decided on, the Mediterranean fleet lost its independent character,
+and thenceforth its paramount function was to furnish a covering squadron
+in touch with the troops.
+
+Seeing how important are the support duties of such a force, the term
+"Covering squadron" may seem ill-chosen to describe it. But it is adopted
+for two reasons. In the first place, it was the one employed officially in
+our service on the last mentioned occasion which was our last great
+combined expedition. In preparing the descent on the Crimea, Sir Edmund
+Lyons, who was acting as Chief of the Staff to Sir James Dundas, and had
+charge of the combined operations, organised the fleet into a "Covering
+squadron" and a "Squadron in charge of transports." In the second place,
+the designation serves to emphasise what is its main and primary function.
+For important as it is to keep in mind its support duties, they must not be
+permitted to overshadow the fact that its paramount function is to prevent
+interference with the actual combined operations--that is, the landing,
+support, and supply of the army. Thus in 1705, when Shovel and Peterborough
+were operating against Barcelona, Shovel was covering the amphibious siege
+from the French squadron in Toulon. Peterborough required the assistance of
+the marines ashore to execute a _coup de main_, and Shovel only consented
+to land them on the express understanding that the moment his cruisers
+passed the signal that the Toulon squadron was putting to sea, they would
+have to be recalled to the fleet no matter what the state of the land
+operations. And to this Peterborough agreed. The principle involved, it
+will be seen, is precisely that which Lyons's term "Covering squadron"
+embodies.
+
+To quote anything that happened in the Crimean War as a precedent without
+such traditional support will scarcely appear convincing. In our British
+way we have fostered a legend that so far as organisation and staff work
+were concerned that war was nothing but a collection of deterrent examples.
+But in truth as a combined operation its opening movement both in
+conception and organisation was perhaps the most daring, brilliant, and
+successful thing of the kind we ever did. Designed as the expedition was to
+assist an ally in his own country, it was suddenly called upon without any
+previous preparation to undertake a combined operation of the most
+difficult kind against the territory of a well-warned enemy. It involved a
+landing late in the year on an open and stormy coast within striking
+distance of a naval fortress which contained an army of unknown strength,
+and a fleet not much inferior in battle power and undefeated. It was an
+operation comparable to the capture of Louisburg and the landing of the
+Japanese in the Liaotung Peninsula, but the conditions were far more
+difficult. Both those operations had been rehearsed a few years previously,
+and they had been long prepared on the fullest knowledge. In the Crimea
+everything was in the dark; even steam was an unproved element, and
+everything had to be improvised. The French had practically to demobilise
+their fleet to supply transport, and so hazardous did the enterprise
+appear, that they resisted its being undertaken with every military
+argument. We had in fact, besides all the other difficulties, to carry an
+unwilling ally upon our backs. Yet it was accomplished, and so far at least
+as the naval part was concerned, the methods which achieved success mark
+the culmination of all we had learnt in three centuries of rich experience.
+
+The first of the lessons was that for operations in uncommanded or
+imperfectly commanded seas there was need of a covering squadron
+differentiated from the squadron in charge of transports. Its main function
+was to secure the necessary local command, whether for transit or for the
+actual operations. But as a rule transit was secured by our regular
+blockading squadrons, and generally the covering squadron only assembled in
+the theatre of operations. When therefore the theatre was within a defended
+terminal area, as in our descents upon the northern and Atlantic coasts of
+France, then the terminal defence squadron was usually also sufficient to
+protect the actual operations. It thus formed automatically the covering
+squadron, and either continued its blockade, or, as in the case of our
+attack on St. Malo in 1758, took up a position between the enemy's squadron
+and the expedition's line of operation. If, however, the theatre of
+operation was not within a terminal area, or lay within a distant one that
+was weakly held, the expedition was given its own covering squadron, in
+which the local squadron was more or less completely merged. Whatever, in
+fact, was necessary to secure the local control was done, though, as we
+have seen, and must presently consider more fully, this necessity was not
+always the standard by which the strength of the covering squadron was
+measured.
+
+The strength of the covering squadron being determined, the next question
+is the position or "tract" which it should occupy. Like most other
+strategical problems, it is "an option of difficulties." In so far as the
+squadron is designed for support--that is, support from its men, boats, and
+guns--it will be desirable to station it as near as possible to the
+objective; but as a covering squadron, with the duty of preventing the
+intrusion of an enemy's force, it should be as far away as possible, so as
+to engage such a force at the earliest possible moment of its attempt to
+interfere. There is also the paramount necessity that its position must be
+such that favourable contact with the enemy is certain if he tries to
+interrupt. Usually such certainty is only to be found either in touch with
+the enemy's naval base or in touch with your own landing force. Where the
+objective is the local naval base of the enemy these two points, of course,
+tend to be identical strategically, and the position of the covering
+squadron becomes a tactical rather than a strategical question. But the
+vital principle of an independent existence holds good, and no matter how
+great the necessity of support, the covering squadron should never be so
+deeply engaged with the landing force as to be unable to disentangle itself
+for action as a purely naval unit in time to discharge its naval function.
+In other words, it must always be able to act in the same way as a free
+field army covering a siege.
+
+Where the objective of the expedition is not the local naval base, the
+choice of a position for the covering squadron will turn mainly on the
+amount of support which the army is likely to require. If it cannot act by
+surprise, and serious military resistance is consequently to be expected,
+or where the coast defences are too strong for the transport squadron to
+overpower, then the scale will incline to a position close to the army,
+though the extent to which, under modern conditions, ships at sea can
+usefully perform the delicate operation of supporting an infantry attack
+with gun fire, except by enfilading the enemy's position, remains to be
+proved. A similar choice will be indicated where strong support of men and
+boats is required, as when a sufficiency of flat-boats and steam towage
+cannot be provided by the transports and their attendant squadron; or again
+where the locality is such that amphibious operations beyond the actual
+landing are likely to be called for, and the assistance of a large number
+of boats and seamen acting with the army is necessary to give it the
+amphibious tactical mobility which it would otherwise lack. Such cases
+occurred at Quebec in 1759, where Saunders took his covering
+battle-squadron right up the St. Lawrence, although its covering functions
+could have been discharged even better by a position several hundreds of
+miles away from the objective; and again in 1800 at Alexandria, where Lord
+Keith ran the extremest hazard to his covering functions in order to
+undertake the supply of General Abercromby's army by inland waters and give
+him the mobility he required.
+
+If, on the other hand, the transport squadron is able to furnish all the
+support necessary, the covering squadron will take station as close as
+possible to the enemy's naval base, and there it will operate according to
+the ordinary laws of blockade. If nothing is desired but to prevent
+interference, its guard will take the form of a close blockade. But if
+there be a subsidiary purpose of using the expedition as a means of forcing
+the enemy to sea, the open form will be employed; as, for instance, in
+Anson's case above cited, when he covered the St. Malo expedition not by
+closely blockading Brest, but by taking a position to the eastward at the
+Isle de Batz.
+
+In the Japanese operations against Manchuria and the Kuantung Peninsula
+these old principles displayed themselves in undiminished vitality. In the
+surprise descents against Seoul and at Takusan the work of support was left
+entirely with the transport squadron, while Admiral Togo took up a covering
+position far away at Port Arthur. The two elements of the fleet were kept
+separate all through. But in the operations for the isolation and
+subsequent siege of Port Arthur they were so closely united as to appear
+frequently indistinguishable. Still, so far as the closeness of the landing
+place to the objective permitted, the two acted independently. For the
+actual landing of the Second Army the boats of the covering squadron were
+used, but it remained a live naval unit all through, and was never
+organically mingled with the transport squadron. Its operations throughout
+were, so far as modern conditions permit, on the lines of a close blockade.
+To prevent interference was its paramount function, undisturbed, so far as
+we are able to judge, by any subsidiary purpose of bringing the enemy to
+decisive action.
+
+All through the operations, however, there was a new influence which tended
+to confuse the precision of the old methods. Needless to say it was the
+torpedo and the mine. Their deflective pressure was curious and
+interesting. In our own operations against Sebastopol, to which the Port
+Arthur case is most closely comparable, the old rules still held good. On
+the traditional principle, dating from Drake's attack on San Domingo in
+1585, a landing place was chosen which gave the mean between facility for a
+_coup de main_ and freedom from opposition; that is, it was chosen at the
+nearest practicable point to the objective which was undefended by
+batteries and out of reach of the enemy's main army.
+
+In the handling of the covering squadron Admiral Dundas, the
+Commander-in-Chief, gave it its dual function. After explaining the
+constitution of the transport squadron he says, "The remainder of my force
+... will act as a covering squadron, and where practicable assist in the
+general disembarkation." With these two objects in mind he took a station
+near enough to the landing place to support the army with his guns if it
+were opposed, but still in sight of his cruisers before Sebastopol, and at
+such a distance that at the first sign of the Russians moving he would have
+time to get before the port and engage them before they could get well to
+sea; that is, he took a position as near to the army as was compatible with
+preventing interference, or, it may be said, his position was as near to
+the enemy's base as was compatible with supporting the landing. From either
+aspect in fact the position was the same, and its choice presented no
+complexity owing mainly to the fact that for the first time steam
+simplified the factors of time and distance.
+
+In the Japanese case the application of these principles was not so easy.
+In selecting the nearest undefended point for a landing, it was not only
+batteries, or even the army in Port Arthur, or the troops dispersed in the
+Liaotung Peninsula that had to be considered, but rather, as must always be
+the case in the future, mines and mobile torpedo defence. The point they
+chose was the nearest practicable bay that was unmined. It was not strictly
+out of mobile defence range, but it so happened that it lay behind islands
+which lent themselves to the creation of fixed defences, and thus it
+fulfilled all the recognised conditions. But in so far as the defences
+could be turned by the Russian fleet a covering squadron was necessary, and
+the difficulty of choosing a position for it was complicated by the fact
+that the objective of the combined operations was not merely Port Arthur
+itself, but also the squadron it contained. It was necessary, therefore,
+not only to hold off that squadron, but to prevent its escape. This
+indicated a close blockade. But for close blockade a position out of night
+torpedo range is necessary, and the nearest point where such a position
+could be secured was behind the defences that covered the disembarkation.
+Consequently, in spite of what the strategical conditions dictated, the
+covering squadron was more or less continuously forced back upon the army
+and its supporting force, even when the support of the battle-squadron was
+no longer required.
+
+In the conditions that existed nothing was lost. For the lines of the
+Japanese fixed defences were so near to the enemy's base, that by mining
+the entrance of the port Admiral Togo ensured that the enemy's exit would
+be slow enough for him to be certain of getting contact from his defended
+anchorage before the Russians could get far to sea. What would happen in a
+case when no such position could be secured is another matter. The landing
+place and supply base of the army must be secured against torpedo attack,
+and the principle of concentration of effort would suggest that the means
+of defence should not be attenuated by providing the covering squadron with
+a defended anchorage elsewhere. Thus it would appear that unless the
+geographical conditions permit the covering squadron to use one of its own
+national bases, the drift of recent developments will be to force it back
+on the army, and thus tend to confuse its duties with those of the
+transport squadron. Hence the increased importance of keeping clear the
+difference in function between the two squadrons.
+
+To emphasise the principle of the covering squadron, these two cases may be
+contrasted with the Lissa episode at the end of the Austro-Italian War of
+1866. In that case it was entirely neglected, with disastrous results. The
+Austrian admiral, Tegethoff, with an inferior fleet had by higher order
+been acting throughout on the defensive, and was still in Pola waiting for
+a chance of a counter-stroke. Persano with the superior Italian fleet was
+at Ancona, where he practically dominated the Adriatic. In July the
+Italians, owing to the failure of the army, were confronted with the
+prospect of being forced to make peace on unfavourable terms. To improve
+the position Persano was ordered to take possession of the Austrian island
+of Lissa. Without any attempt to organise his fleet on the orthodox British
+principle he proceeded to conduct the operation with his entire force.
+Practically the whole of it became involved in amphibious work, and as soon
+as Persano was thus committed, Tegethoff put to sea and surprised him.
+Persano was unable to disentangle a sufficient force in time to meet the
+attack, and having no compact squadron fit for independent naval action, he
+was decisively defeated by the inferior enemy. According to British
+practice, it was clearly a case where, if the operation were to be
+undertaken at all, an independent covering squadron should have been told
+off either to hold Tegethoff in Pola or to bring him to timely action,
+according to whether the island or the Austrian fleet was the primary
+objective. The reason it was not done may be that Persano was not given a
+proper landing force, and he seems to have considered that the whole
+strength of his fleet was needed for the successful seizure of the
+objective. If so, it is only one more proof of the rule that no matter what
+fleet support the landing operations may require, it should never be given
+in an imperfectly commanded sea to an extent which will deny the
+possibility of a covering squadron being left free for independent naval
+action.
+
+The length to which the supporting functions of the fleet may be carried
+will always be a delicate question. The suggestion that its strength must
+be affected by the need of the army for the men of the fleet or its boats,
+which imply its men as well, will appear heretical. A battle-squadron, we
+say, is intended to deal with the enemy's battle-squadron and its men to
+fight the ships, and the mind revolts at the idea of the strength of a
+squadron being fixed by any other standard. Theoretically nothing can seem
+more true, but it is an idea of peace and the study. The atmosphere of war
+engendered a wider and more practical view. The men of the old wars knew
+that when a squadron is attached to a combined expedition it is something
+different from a purely naval unit. They knew, moreover, that an army
+acting oversea against hostile territory is an incomplete organism
+incapable of striking its blow in the most effective manner without the
+assistance of the men of the fleet. It was the office, then, of the naval
+portion of the force not only to defend the striking part of the organism,
+but to complete its deficiencies and lend it the power to strike. Alone and
+unaided the army cannot depend on getting itself ashore, it cannot supply
+itself, it cannot secure its retreat, nor can it avail itself of the
+highest advantages of an amphibious force, the sudden shift of base or line
+of operation. These things the fleet must do for it, and it must do them
+with its men.[25]
+
+  [25] The Japanese in the late war attempted to do this work by means of a
+  highly organized Army Disembarkation Staff, but except in perfect
+  conditions of weather and locality it does not seem to have worked well,
+  and in almost all cases the assistance of the navy was called in.
+
+The authority for this view is abundant. In 1800, for instance, when
+General Maitland was charged with an expedition against Belleisle, he was
+invited to state what naval force he would require. He found it difficult
+to fix with precision. "Speaking loosely, however," he wrote, "three or
+four sail of the line and four or five active frigates appear to me to be
+properly adequate to the proposed service. The frigates to blockade."
+(Meaning, of course, to blockade the objective and prevent reinforcements
+reaching it from the mainland, always one of the supporting functions of
+the squadron attached to the transports.) "The line-of-battle ships," he
+adds, "to furnish us with the number of men necessary for land operations."
+In this case our permanent blockading squadrons supplied the cover, and
+what Maitland meant was that the battleships he asked for were to be added
+to the transport squadron not as being required for escort, but for
+support. St. Vincent, who was then First Lord, not only endorsed his
+request, but gave him for disembarkation work one more ship-of-the-line
+than he had asked for. At this time our general command of the sea had been
+very fully secured, and we had plenty of naval force to spare for its
+exercise. It will be well to compare it with a case in which the
+circumstances were different.
+
+When in 1795 the expedition under Admiral Christian and General Abercromby
+was being prepared for the West Indies, the admiral in concert with Jervis
+drew up a memorandum as to the naval force required.[26] The force he asked
+for was considerable. Both he and Jervis considered that the escort and
+local cover must be very strong, because it was impossible to count on
+closing either Brest or Toulon effectually by blockade. But this was not
+the only reason. The plan of operations involved three distinct landings,
+and each would require at least two of the line, and perhaps three, "not
+only as protection, but as the means by which flat-boats must be manned,
+cannon landed, and the other necessary services of fatigue executed."
+Christian also required the necessary frigates and three or four brigs "to
+cover [that is, support] the operations of the smaller vessels [that is,
+the landing flotillas doing inshore work]." The main attack would require
+at least four of the line and seven frigates, with brigs and schooners in
+proportion. In all he considered, the ships-of-the-line [the frigates being
+"otherwise employed"] would have to provide landing parties to the number
+of 2000 men "for the flat-boats, landing and moving guns, water, and
+provisions," and this would be their daily task. The military force these
+landing parties were to serve amounted to about 18,000 men.
+
+  [26] Sir Hugh Cloberry Christian was an officer of high distinction with
+  a remarkable record of battle service. He had been serving as Howe's
+  second captain just before his promotion to flag rank in 1795, and died
+  as Commander-in-Chief at the Cape at the early age of fifty-one.
+
+Lord Barham, it must be said, who as Sir Charles Middleton was then First
+Sea Lord, objected to the requirements as excessive, particularly in the
+demand for a strong escort, as he considered that the transit could be
+safeguarded by special vigilance on the part of the permanent blockading
+squadrons. The need for large shore parties he seems to have ignored. His
+opinion, however, is not quite convincing, for from the first he had taken
+up an antagonistic attitude to the whole idea of the expedition. He
+regarded the policy which dictated it as radically unsound, and was
+naturally anxious to restrict the force that was to be spent upon it. His
+opposition was based on the broad and far-sighted principles that were
+characteristic of his strategy. He believed that in view of the threatening
+attitude of Spain the right course was to husband the navy so as to bring
+it up to a two-Power standard for the coming struggle, and to keep it
+concentrated for decisive naval action the moment Spain showed her hand. In
+short, he stoutly condemned a policy which entailed a serious dissipation
+of naval force for a secondary object before a working command of the sea
+had been secured. It was, in fact, the arrangements for this expedition
+which forced him to resign before the preparations were complete. But it is
+to be observed that his objections to the plan were really due, not to the
+principle of its organisation, but to our having insufficient force to give
+it adequate naval support without prejudicing the higher consideration of
+our whole position at sea.[27]
+
+  [27] On analogous grounds almost every military critic has condemned the
+  policy of this disastrous expedition as involving a dispersal of our
+  slender military force at a time when everything called for its
+  concentration in Europe.
+
+It is obvious that the foregoing considerations, beyond the strategical
+reactions already noted, will have another of the first importance, in that
+they must influence the choice of a landing place. The interest of the army
+will always be to fix it as near to the objective as is compatible with an
+unopposed landing. The ideal was one night's march, but this could rarely
+be attained except in the case of very small expeditions, which could be
+landed rapidly at the close of day and advance in the dark. In larger
+expeditions, the aim was to effect the landing far enough from the
+objective to prevent the garrison of the place or the enemy's local forces
+offering opposition before a footing was secured. The tendency of the navy
+will usually be in the opposite direction; for normally the further they
+can land the army away from the enemy's strength, the surer are they of
+being able to protect it against naval interference. Their ideal will be a
+place far enough away to be out of torpedo range, and to enable them to
+work the covering and the transport squadron in sound strategical
+independence.
+
+To reduce these divergencies to a mean of efficiency some kind of joint
+Staff is necessary, and to ensure its smooth working it is no less
+desirable to ascertain, so far as possible, the principles and method on
+which it should proceed. In the best recent precedents the process has been
+for the Army Staff to present the limits of coast-line within which the
+landing must take place for the operation to have the desired effect, and
+to indicate the known practicable landing points in the order they would
+prefer them. It will then be for the Naval Staff to say how nearly in
+accordance with the views of the army they are prepared to act. Their
+decision will turn on the difficulties of protection and the essentials of
+a landing place from the point of view of weather, currents, beach and the
+like, and also in a secondary measure upon the extent to which the
+conformation of the coast will permit of tactical support by gun-fire and
+feints. If the Naval Staff are unwilling to agree to the point or points
+their colleagues most desire, a question of balance of risk is set up,
+which the higher Joint Staff must adjust. It will be the duty of the Naval
+Staff to set out frankly and clearly all the sea risks the proposal of the
+army entails, and if possible to suggest an alternative by which the risk
+of naval interference can be lessened without laying too heavy a burden on
+the army. Balancing these risks against those stated by the army, the
+superior Staff must decide which line is to be taken, and each service then
+will do its best to minimise the difficulties it has to face. Whether the
+superior Staff will incline to the naval or the military view will depend
+upon whether the greater danger likely to be incurred is from the sea or on
+land.
+
+Where the naval conditions are fairly well known the line of operations can
+be fixed in this way with much precision. But if, as usually happens, the
+probable action of the enemy at sea cannot be divined with sufficient
+approximation, then assuming there is serious possibility of naval
+interference, the final choice within the limited area must be left to the
+admiral. The practice has been to give him instructions which define in
+order of merit the points the army desire, and direct him to select the one
+which in the circumstances, as he finds them, he considers within
+reasonable risk of war. Similarly, if the danger of naval interference be
+small and the local conditions ashore imperfectly known, the final choice
+will be with the general, subject only to the practicable possibilities of
+the landing place he would choose.
+
+During the best period of our old wars there was seldom any difficulty in
+making things work smoothly on these lines. After the first inglorious
+failure at Rochefort in 1757 the practice was, where discretion of this
+kind had been allowed, for the two commanders-in-chief to make a joint
+coast-reconnaissance in the same boat and settle the matter amicably on the
+spot.
+
+It was on these lines the conduct of our combined operations was always
+arranged thenceforth. Since the elder Pitt's time it has never been our
+practice to place combined expeditions under either a naval or a military
+commander-in-chief and allow him to decide between naval and military
+exigencies. The danger of possible friction between two commanders-in-chief
+came to be regarded as small compared with the danger of a single one
+making mistakes through unfamiliarity with the limitations of the service
+to which he does not belong.
+
+The system has usually worked well even when questions arose which were
+essentially questions for a joint superior Staff. The exceptions indeed are
+very few. A fine example of how such difficulties can be settled, when the
+spirit is willing, occurred in the Crimea. The naval difficulties, as we
+have already seen, were as formidable as they could well be short of
+rendering the whole attempt madness. When it came to the point of execution
+a joint council of war was held, at which sat the allied Staffs of both
+services. So great were the differences of opinion between the French and
+British Generals, and so imperfectly was the terrain known, that they could
+not indicate a landing place with any precision. All the admirals knew was
+that it must be on an open coast, which they had not been able to
+reconnoitre, where the weather might at any time interrupt communications
+with the shore, and where they were liable to be attacked by a force which,
+until their own ships were cleared of troops, would not be inferior. All
+these objections they laid before the Council General. Lord Raglan then
+said the army now perfectly understood the risk, and was prepared to take
+it. Whereupon the allied admirals replied that they were ready to proceed
+and do their best to set the army ashore and support it at any point that
+should be chosen.
+
+There remains a form of support which has not yet been considered, and that
+is diversionary movements or feints by the fleet to draw the enemy's
+attention away from the landing place. This will naturally be a function of
+the covering battle-squadron or its attendant cruisers and flotilla. The
+device appears in Drake's attack on San Domingo in 1585, an attack which
+may be regarded as our earliest precedent in modern times and as the
+pattern to which all subsequent operations of the kind conformed so far as
+circumstances allowed. In that case, while Drake landed the troops a
+night's march from the place, the bulk of the fleet moved before it, kept
+it in alarm all night, and at dawn made a demonstration with the boats of
+forcing a direct landing under cover of its guns. The result was the
+garrison moved out to meet the threat and were surprised in flank by the
+real landing force. Passing from this simple case to the most elaborate in
+our annals, we find Saunders doing the same thing at Quebec. In preparation
+for Wolfe's night landing he made a show of arrangements for a bombardment
+of Montcalm's lines below the city, and in the morning with the boats of
+the fleet began a demonstration of landing his marines. By this device he
+held Montcalm away from Wolfe's landing place till a secure footing had
+been obtained. Similar demonstrations had been made above the city, and the
+combined result was that Wolfe was able to penetrate the centre of the
+French position unopposed.
+
+Such work belongs of course to the region of tactics rather than of
+strategy, but the device has been used with equal effect strategically. So
+great is the secrecy as well as the mobility of an amphibious force, that
+it is extremely difficult for an enemy to distinguish a real attack from a
+feint. Even at the last moment, when a landing is actually in progress, it
+is impossible for the defenders to tell that all the troops are being
+landed at the one point if a demonstration is going on elsewhere. At Quebec
+it was not till Montcalm was face to face with Wolfe that he knew he had to
+deal with the whole British force. Still less from a strategical point of
+view can we be certain whether a particular landing represents an advance
+guard or is a diversionary operation to mask a larger landing elsewhere.
+This is a special difficulty when in the case of large operations the
+landing army arrives in echelon like the Second Japanese army. In that
+instance the naval feint was used strategically, and apparently with
+conspicuous effect. The Russians were always apprehensive that the Japanese
+would strike for Newchuang at the head of the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, and for
+this reason General Stakelberg, who had command of the troops in the
+peninsula, was not permitted to concentrate for effective action in its
+southern part, where the Japanese had fixed their landing place. Admiral
+Togo, in spite of the strain on his fleet in effecting and securing the
+disembarkation of the army, detached a cruiser squadron to demonstrate in
+the Gulf. The precise effect of this feint upon the Russian Staff cannot be
+measured with certainty. All we know is that Stakelberg was held back from
+his concentration so long that he was unable to strike the Japanese army
+before it was complete for the field and able to deal him a staggering
+counter-stroke.
+
+This power of disturbing the enemy with feints is of course inherent in the
+peculiar attributes of combined expeditions, in the facility with which
+their line of operation can be concealed or changed, and there seems no
+reason why in the future it should be less than in the past. Good railway
+connections in the theatre of the descent will of course diminish the
+effect of feints, but, on the other hand, the means of making them have
+increased. In mine-sweeping vessels, for instance, there is a new
+instrument which in the Russo-Japanese War proved capable of creating a
+very strong impression at small cost to the fleet. Should a flotilla of
+such craft appear at any practicable part of a threatened coast and make a
+show of clearing it, it will be almost a moral impossibility to ignore the
+demonstration.
+
+On the whole then, assuming the old methods are followed, it would seem
+that with a reasonable naval preponderance the power of carrying out such
+operations over an uncommanded sea is not less than it has proved to be
+hitherto. The rapidity and precision of steam propulsion perhaps places
+that power higher than ever. It would at any rate be difficult to find in
+the past a parallel to the brilliant movement on Seoul with which the
+Japanese opened the war in 1904. It is true the Russians at the last moment
+decided for political reasons to permit the occupation to take place
+without opposition, but this was unknown to the Japanese, and their
+arrangements were made on the assumption that their enemy would use the
+formidable means at his disposal to obstruct the operation. The risk was
+accepted, skillfully measured, and adequately provided for on principles
+identical with those of the British tradition. But, on the other hand,
+there has been nothing to show that where the enemy has a working command
+of the sea the hazard of such enterprises has been reduced. Against an
+enemy controlling the line of passage in force, the well-tried methods of
+covering and protecting an oversea expedition will no more work to-day than
+they did in the past. Until his hold is broken by purely naval action,
+combined work remains beyond all legitimate risk of war.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+APPENDIX
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+THE
+"GREEN PAMPHLET"
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+WAR COURSE
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Strategical Terms
+and Definitions
+used in
+Lectures on Naval History
+
+BY
+
+JULIAN S. CORBETT, ESQ., L.L.M.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+NAVAL STRATEGY
+
+Naval strategy does not exist as a separate branch of knowledge. It is only
+a section of a division of the art of war.
+
+The study for officers is the art of war, specialising in Naval Strategy.
+
+The true method of procedure then is to get hold of a general theory of
+war, and so ascertain the exact relations of Naval Strategy to the whole.
+
+War is a form of political intercourse, a continuation of foreign politics
+which begins when force is introduced to attain our ends.
+
+OBJECTS.
+
+We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be
+ulterior or immediate.
+
+Immediate objects (also called "Primary") are the ends of particular
+operations or movements. But it must be remembered that every primary
+object has also its ulterior object; that is, every operation must be
+regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also
+as a step to the end of the campaign or war.
+
+Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. Classified by
+the object it is Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor
+Strategy, with primary objects.
+
+This also means that every operation of an army or fleet must be regarded
+in a double light, _i.e._, it must be planned and conducted in relation (1)
+to the general progress of the war; (2) to the object to which it is
+immediately directed.
+
+Major Strategy (always regarding the ulterior object) has for its province
+the plan of the war, and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or
+primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2)
+Selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative
+functions of the naval and military forces.
+
+    NOTE.--Major Strategy in its broadest sense has also to deal with the
+    whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship.
+    It regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled
+    together; they are instruments of war. But it also has to keep in view
+    constantly the politico-diplomatic position of the country (on which
+    depends the effective action of the instrument), and its commercial and
+    financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is
+    maintained). The friction of these two considerations is inherent in
+    war, and we call it the deflection of strategy by politics. It is
+    usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every
+    strategical problem. It may be taken as a general rule that no question
+    of grand strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versa.
+    For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of
+    view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice
+    versa. To decide a question of grand strategy without consideration of
+    its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither
+    strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This interaction has to
+    be accepted by commanding officers as part of the inevitable "friction
+    of war." A good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the
+    Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War, for
+    fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers.
+
+Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals
+with--
+
+    (1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces
+        of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order
+        to secure the object of the particular operation.
+    (2) The directing of the force assigned for the operation.
+
+Minor Strategy may be of three kinds:--
+
+    (1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet
+        only.
+    (2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army
+        only.
+    (3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army
+        and navy together.
+
+    NOTE.--It will be seen that what is usually called Naval Strategy or
+    Fleet Strategy, is only a sub-division of a division of strategy, and
+    that, therefore, strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of
+    naval operations only.
+
+    NOTE.--Naval Strategy, being only a part of General Strategy, is
+    subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less
+    degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision
+    independently of the central government, or headquarters; they should,
+    therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any
+    line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is
+    strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.
+
+    EXAMPLE.--Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve of the Seven
+    Years War.
+
+NATURE OF OBJECT
+
+The solution of every strategical problem, whether of Major or Minor
+Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in view.
+
+All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative.
+
+A positive object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for
+ourselves.
+
+A negative object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent
+his gaining something.
+
+Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive.
+
+Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive.
+
+    EXAMPLE.--When Togo attacked Rojesvensky his primary object was
+    offensive, _i.e._, to capture or destroy the Russian Fleet. His
+    ulterior object was to maintain the defensive function which had been
+    assigned to the Japanese Fleet.
+
+    NOTES.--This is a good example of true defensive; that is, Togo's
+    operations, though drastically offensive in action, were all strictly
+    within the strategical defensive sphere assigned to him.
+
+The Offensive, being positive in its aim is naturally the more effective
+form of war (_i.e._, it leads more directly to a final decision), and, as a
+rule, should be adopted by the stronger Power.
+
+The Defensive, being negative in its aim, is naturally the stronger form of
+war; _i.e._, it requires less force, and, as a rule, is adopted by the
+weaker Power.
+
+    NOTE.--The general truth of this proposition is not affected by
+    apparent exceptions where the contrary appears to be true.
+
+    _The Offensive must not be confused with the Initiative._ It is
+    possible to seize the Initiative, under certain conditions, by taking a
+    defensive position from which the enemy is bound to dislodge us or
+    abandon the operation.
+
+    In most cases where the weaker side successfully assumes the offensive,
+    it is due to his doing so before the enemy's mobilization or
+    concentration is complete, whereby the attacking force is able to deal
+    in succession with locally inferior forces of the enemy.
+
+The advantages of the Offensive are well known.
+
+Its disadvantages are:--
+
+  (1) That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its
+      communications.
+  (2) That it tends to operations on unfamiliar ground.
+  (3) That it continually increases the difficulty of retreat.
+
+The advantages of Defence are chiefly:--
+
+  (1) Proximity to base.
+  (2) Familiar ground.
+  (3) Facility for arranging surprise by counter attack.
+
+    NOTE.--In modern Naval warfare these advantages--that is, the
+    advantages of fighting on your own ground--are specially high as giving
+    greater facility for the use of mine and torpedo.
+
+    The disadvantages are mainly moral or when the enemy's objective or
+    line of operations cannot be ascertained, but this disadvantage can be
+    neutralised when it is possible to secure an interior position.
+
+GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSIVE.
+
+True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike.
+
+    NOTE.--When the Dutch burnt our ships at Chatham, we were not acting on
+    the defensive, we had laid them up and were doing nothing at all.
+
+The strength and the essence of the defensive is the counter-stroke.
+
+A well designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack.
+
+A general defensive policy may consist of a series of minor offensive
+operations.
+
+The maxim is: If you are not relatively strong enough to assume the
+offensive, assume the defensive till you become so--
+
+(1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or otherwise;
+
+(2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or
+securing allies.
+
+Except as a preparation or a cover for offensive action the defensive is
+seldom or never of any use; for by the defensive alone we can never acquire
+anything, we can only prevent the enemy acquiring. But where we are too
+weak to assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive,
+and wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and
+permitting us to accumulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's;
+we then pass to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a
+preparation.
+
+As a cover or support for the offensive, the defensive will enable us to
+intensify the attack; for by assuming the defensive in one or more minor
+theatres of operation we can reduce our forces in those theatres to a
+minimum, and concentrate to a maximum for the offensive in the most
+important theatre.
+
+OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS USED WITH A DEFENSIVE INTENTION
+
+    (A) Counter attacks.
+    (B) Diversions.
+
+(A) _Counter attacks_ are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes
+himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. It is this
+form of attack which constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise
+advantage of defence."
+
+(B) _Diversions_ are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside
+the limit of his theatre of offensive operations.
+
+Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention,
+and to draw off his forces from his main attack. If well planned, they
+should divert a force greater than their own. They should, therefore, be
+small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less
+likely they are to divert a force greater than their own.
+
+It is only their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their
+own that justifies the breach of the law of concentration which they
+involve.
+
+This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities
+are most highly developed in combined expeditions.
+
+    NOTE.--_Diversions_ must be carefully distinguished from _eccentric
+    attacks_. _Eccentric attacks_ are true offensive movements. They have a
+    positive object, _i.e._, they aim to acquire something from the enemy;
+    whereas diversions have a negative object, _i.e._, they aim at
+    preventing the enemy doing or acquiring something. Being in the
+    category of the weaker form of war, eccentric attacks are usually made
+    in greater force than diversions.
+
+    EXAMPLES.--_Diversion._--Our raid on Washington in 1815. Landing force,
+    about 4,000 men. Object, according to official instructions, "a
+    diversion on the coasts of United States of America in favour of the
+    army employed in the defence of Canada"; _i.e._, the intention was
+    negative--preventative--defensive.
+
+    2. _Eccentric Attack._--Operations against New Orleans in 1815.
+    Intended force 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to obtain command of
+    embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to occupy some important
+    and valuable possession, by the restoration of which the conditions of
+    peace might be improved, &c."; _i.e._, the intention was positive--to
+    acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) and Belleisle
+    (eccentric attack) in the Seven Years War.
+
+    Note 2.--This distinction gives a threefold classification of combined
+    expeditions, as used by Elizabethan strategists.
+
+          Raids = Diversions.
+          Incursions = Eccentric attacks.
+          Invasions = True direct offence.
+
+    Compare these with Sir John Ardagh's classification (Report of Royal
+    Commission on Reserve Forces, 1904):--
+
+      "Raids," not exceeding 10,000 men.
+      "Small expeditions," not exceeding 50,000 men.
+      "Dangerous invasion," not exceeding 150,000 men.
+
+NATURE OF ULTERIOR OBJECT
+
+From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important classification
+of wars, according to whether such object is _limited_ or _unlimited_.
+
+    (1) War with _limited object_ ("limited war") is where we merely seek
+    to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions, or
+    interests; _e.g._, Spanish-American War, where the object was the
+    liberation of Cuba.
+
+    (2) _War with an unlimited object_ is where we seek to overthrow the
+    enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must
+    agree to do our will (become subservient); _e.g._, Franco-German War.
+
+    NOTE.--Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as
+    the immediate (primary or secondary) objects which lead up to them;
+    _e.g._, ulterior objects may be offensive, while one or more of the
+    immediate objects may be defensive, and _vice versa_.
+
+    EXAMPLE 1.--Japanese position in the late war. Ulterior object of the
+    war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive (positive).
+    Function or ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was
+    defensive (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack
+    and destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive (positive).
+
+    EXAMPLE 2.--In the Spanish-American War the ulterior object of the war
+    was (for the Americans) to eject the Spanish Government from Cuba. This
+    was offensive. The ulterior object of the fleet was to prevent the
+    Spaniards sending reinforcements or interfering with the intended
+    American invasion. This was defensive. The primary object of the fleet
+    was to bring the Spanish Fleet to action. This was offensive.
+
+SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS
+
+Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object
+(_i.e._, whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or
+unlimited), strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of
+the war."
+
+This depends upon:--
+    (1) The theatre of the war.
+    (2) The means at our disposal.
+
+1. _Theatre of the War._--Usually defined as "all the territory upon which
+the hostile parties may assail each other." This is insufficient. For an
+island power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. Truer
+definition: "geographical areas within which lie the ulterior objects of
+the war and the subordinate objects that lead up to them."
+
+A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations."
+
+2. _Theatre of Operations_.--Is generally used of the operations of one
+belligerent only.
+
+An "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking.
+
+A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory
+we seek to take possession of or to defend.
+
+A truer definition is, "the area, whether of sea or land or both, within
+which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the
+particular operation."
+
+Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be
+defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another.
+
+Where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or
+movements may be offensive.
+
+OBJECTIVE
+
+An objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is
+directed." Thus where the _object_ in any theatre of operation is to get
+command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet
+will usually be the _objective_.
+
+LINES OF OPERATION
+
+A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate
+from our base or starting point to reach our objectives."
+
+Lines of operation may be exterior or interior. We are said to hold the
+interior lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of
+operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more
+quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or assistance. Such a
+position is called an interior position. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior
+Position" are the converse of these.
+
+LINES OF COMMUNICATION
+
+This expression is used of three different things:--
+
+    (1) _Lines of supply_, running from the base of operations to the point
+    which the operating force has reached.
+
+    (2) _Lines of lateral communication_ by which several forces engaged in
+    one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to
+    each other's support.
+
+    (3) _Lines of retreat_, which are lines of supply reversed, _i.e._,
+    leading back to the base.
+
+These three ideas are best described by the term "lines of passage and
+communication," which we had in use at the end of the eighteenth century.
+
+Ashore, lines of passage and communication are roads, railways, waterways,
+&c.
+
+At sea, they may be regarded as those waters over which passes the normal
+course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the force to
+be supplied.
+
+In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems of
+communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as hinging on
+communications, but probably it does so even more than Land Strategy, as
+will appear from a consideration of maritime communications, and the extent
+to which they are the main preoccupation of Naval operations.
+
+MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS
+
+The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against which a fleet
+may have to operate are:--
+
+    (1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond
+    to the communications of armies operating ashore). These tend to
+    increase in importance strategically with the increasing hunger of
+    modern fleets (for coal, ammunition, &c).
+
+    (2) The communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea
+    base, that is communication between the advanced and the main base.
+
+    (3) Trade Routes, that is the communications upon which depend the
+    national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the
+    "lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of
+    belligerents' possessions.
+
+N.B.--Such "lines of passage and communication" are the preoccupation of
+Naval Strategy; that is to say, problems of Naval Strategy can be reduced
+to terms of "passage and communication" and this is probably the best
+method of solving them.
+
+NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A
+QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND
+COMMUNICATION
+
+By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the operations of the
+Fleet. Such operations must always have for their object "passage and
+communication"; that is, the Fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own
+communications and seizing those of the enemy.
+
+PROOF I.--_Deductive_.--We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command
+of the sea. What does this mean? It is something quite different from the
+Military idea of occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject of
+political dominion or ownership. We cannot subsist upon it (like an army on
+conquered territory), nor can we exclude neutrals from it. Admiral Colomb's
+theory of "conquest of water territory," therefore, involves a false
+analogy, and is not safe as the basis of a strategical system. What then is
+the value of the sea in the political system of the world? Its value is as
+a means of communication between States and parts of States. Therefore the
+"command of the sea" means the control of communications in which the
+belligerents are adversely concerned.
+
+    COROLLARY.--The command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of
+    territory, the ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime
+    war, as were approximately our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century,
+    but it may be a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior
+    object of particular operations.
+
+PROOF II.--_Inductive_, from history or past experience.--History shows
+that the actual functions of the Fleet (except in purely maritime wars)
+have been threefold.
+
+1. The prevention or securing of alliances (_i.e._, deterring or persuading
+neutrals as to participating in the war).
+
+    EXAMPLES.--The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the
+    Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and
+    Portugal to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the
+    alliance of the Kingdom of Naples.
+
+    In the first case there came a crisis when it was more important to
+    demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining
+    Louis XIV than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the
+    second, the Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the
+    Eastern Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not.
+
+2. The protection or destruction of commerce.
+
+3. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore.
+
+NOTE.--The above is the best working "Definition of Naval Strategy," as
+emphasising its intimate connection with diplomatic, financial, and
+military aspects of major strategy.
+
+These functions may be discharged in two ways:--
+
+    (1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed
+    (bombardment, landing, raiding parties, &c).
+
+    (2) By getting command of the sea, _i.e._, establishing ourselves in
+    such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all
+    parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against their
+    territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours.
+
+    NOTE.--The power of the second method, by controlling communications,
+    is out of all proportion to the first--direct attack. Indeed, the first
+    can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second.
+    Thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is
+    mainly a question of communications.
+
+    But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the Fleet must
+    discharge part of its function by direct action before there is time
+    to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and
+    military considerations may deflect normal operation of Naval
+    Strategy.)
+
+    EXAMPLE.--Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the
+    unshaken Toulon Fleet. Japanese invasion of Manchuria.
+
+COMMAND OF THE SEA
+
+Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command
+of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we
+have (a) adequate Naval positions; (b) an adequate Fleet to secure the
+command when war breaks out.
+
+VARIOUS CONDITIONS OF COMMAND
+
+1. It may be (a) general; (b) local.
+
+(a) _General command_ is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act
+dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to defend his
+own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously
+with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations.
+
+This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send
+squadrons to sea.
+
+    NOTE.--Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do
+    absolutely nothing, but that he cannot _seriously_ interfere with the
+    undertakings by which we seek to secure the object of the war, or to
+    force our will upon him.
+
+(b) _Local command_ implies a state of things in which we are able to
+prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in
+one or more theatres of operation.
+
+2. Both local and general command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent.
+
+(a) _Temporary command_ is when we are able to prevent the enemy from
+interfering with our passage and communication in all or some theatres of
+operation during the period required for gaining the object in view
+(_i.e._, the object of a particular operation or of a particular campaign).
+This condition existed after Togo's first action.
+
+(b) _Permanent command_ is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the
+situation, _i.e._, when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his
+maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. This
+condition existed after Tsushima.
+
+3. Command, whether general, local, or temporary, may be in three different
+states:--
+
+  (a) With us.
+  (b) With the enemy.
+  (c) In dispute.
+
+If in dispute, it may be that:--
+
+  (1) We have preponderance.
+  (2) Our enemy has preponderance.
+  (3) Neither side preponderates.
+
+COMMAND IN DISPUTE
+
+The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it
+is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and
+frequently all through it.
+
+The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, _i.e._,
+till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea.
+
+It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of
+dispute by seeking a decision. Hence the French tradition to avoid decisive
+actions as a rule when at war with England.
+
+The truth of this appears from the fact that _general command of the sea is
+not essential to all oversea operations_.
+
+In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate in one
+theatre of operations, and so secure the local or temporary command
+sufficient for obtaining the special object in view. The weaker Power may
+take advantage of such local concentration to operate safely elsewhere.
+
+_Rule 1._ So long as a state of dispute can force the preponderating Power
+to concentrate, operating by evasion is possibly open to the weaker.
+
+_Rule 2._ In a state of dispute although the weaker Power may not be able
+to obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able
+to defend its own.
+
+    EXAMPLES.--This condition of dispute existed during the first three
+    years of the Seven Years War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a
+    decision by defeating Conflans and De la Cloue; also in the Great War
+    up to Trafalgar.
+
+SHOULD COMMAND OF THE SEA ALWAYS BE THE
+PRIMARY OBJECT?
+
+When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (_i.e._,
+leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so
+much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy
+for carrying out counter operations elsewhere.
+
+Under certain conditions, therefore, it may not be the primary function of
+the fleet to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it, because general
+command may be in dispute while local command may be with us, and political
+or military considerations may demand of us an operation, for which such
+local command is sufficient, and which cannot be delayed until we have
+obtained a complete decision.
+
+From the above it will appear "command of the sea" is too loose an
+expression for strategical discussion. For practical purposes should be
+substituted "_control of passage and communication_."
+
+The question then in the consideration of any proposed operation or line of
+operations will be, not "Have we the command of the sea?" but "Can we
+secure the necessary lines of communication from obstruction by the enemy?"
+
+METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL
+
+1. _Permanent general control_ can only be secured by the practical
+annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions.
+
+2. _Local and temporary control_ may be secured by:--
+
+    (a) A defensive action not necessarily entirely successful
+    (containing).
+
+    (b) Forcing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion).
+
+    (c) Superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy's force
+    available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing).
+
+BLOCKADE
+
+Blockades are of two natures, according to the object review. The object
+may be:--
+
+(d) Blockade.
+
+    i. _Close blockade_ to prevent the enemy putting to sea. The object
+    being usually to secure local or temporary control.
+
+    ii. _Observation blockade_, to force the enemy to put to sea _by
+    occupying the common lines of communications_ (_see_ below). In this
+    case you are seeking a decision as a step towards general control.
+
+Both natures are operations upon the lines of passage and communication,
+but in case (1) the primary intention is defensive, to secure our own line;
+in case (2) the primary intention is offensive, to seize the enemy's line
+and compel him to expose himself in an attempt to recover it.
+
+GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING BLOCKADES
+
+In case (1) (defensive intention) blockade should be as close as is
+compatible with security from torpedo attack.
+
+In case (2) (offensive intention) it should be as distant as is compatible
+with bringing enemy to action if he comes out.
+
+    Examples:--_Case_ (1): First stage of Togo's blockade of Port Arthur.
+    _Case_ (2): Nelson off Toulon.
+    _Confusion of the two_: Sampson's attempt to close Santiago
+    simultaneously with an attempt to force Cervera to sea.
+
+THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS
+
+Since the whole idea of command of the sea and the whole theory of blockade
+rest on the control of communications, neither can be fully apprehended
+without a thorough understanding of the nature of maritime communications.
+
+Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend to
+run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they meet in
+the theatre of operations or the objective point.
+
+At sea the reverse is the case; for in maritime warfare the great lines of
+communications of either belligerent tend to run approximately parallel,
+if, indeed, they are not identical.
+
+Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which lay in the
+Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South Africa, our respective lines
+of communication would be identical.
+
+This was also the case in all our imperial wars with France.
+
+_This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare._ Nearly
+all our current maxims of Naval strategy can be traced to the pressure it
+exerts on Naval thought.
+
+It is at the root of the fundamental difference between Military and Naval
+strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and
+confusion, which has arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to
+the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the
+communications and operations against them in each case.
+
+On land the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's communications
+at once is that as a rule we cannot do so without exposing our own.
+
+At sea, on the contrary, since the great lines are common to both, we
+cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's.
+
+Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get your fleet into such a
+position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded.
+
+    EXAMPLE.--This was usually done in our old wars with France, by our
+    getting a fleet off Brest before the French could sail.
+
+Hence the maxim "that the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's
+coast," "the enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like.
+
+But these maxims are not universally true, witness Togo's strategy against
+Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast.
+
+Take again the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out
+the enemy's fleet and destroy it.
+
+Here again Togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim.
+
+The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure
+communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them
+unsafe it must be put out of action."
+
+The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always.
+
+    EXAMPLE.--Opening of War of Spanish Succession. The operations of 1702
+    were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish
+    trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own
+    lines of passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief
+    theatre of operation. These last two lines were identical. 1703.--Chief
+    operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and
+    particularly of Portugal, and with same object in view, Rooke's
+    official instructions directed that the French fleet was to be ignored
+    unless it threatened our communications.
+
+    RESULT.--By 1704 we had gained a Naval position from which France could
+    not eject us, and she abandoned struggle for sea communications.
+
+But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c.,
+is sound and applicable:--
+
+    (a) Because for us _general permanent command_ is usually essential
+    to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the
+    enemy's fleet.
+
+    (b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt _to
+    control the common communications_.
+
+    (c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex
+    (_i.e._, the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a
+    blow which solve all the difficulties; _e.g._, Sir Palmes Fairborne's
+    solution of the problem in 1703 (_England in the Mediterranean_, Vol.
+    II., p. 234).
+
+Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective
+way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (_i.e._, forcing an action on him)
+is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of
+campaign.
+
+This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon
+fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally,
+but by the operation of inevitable strategical law).
+
+Compare Togo's strategy and that of the Americans in 1898.
+
+Practically all great Naval actions have been brought about in this way,
+that is they have been the outcome on an effort to clear essential
+communications from the enemy's fleet, _e.g._, Gravelines, La Hogue,
+Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsushima.
+
+Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about
+because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade
+communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet.
+
+FINAL NOTE
+
+In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne
+in mind:--
+
+    (1) That if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably
+    find it in a place where you cannot destroy it except at heavy cost.
+
+    (2) That seeing that the defensive is a stronger form of war than the
+    offensive, it is _prima facie_ better strategy to make the enemy come
+    to you than to go to him and seek a decision on his own ground.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+WAR COURSE
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Notes on Strategy
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+PART ONE
+
+GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS
+
+INTRODUCTORY
+
+Naval strategy is a section of the Art of War.
+
+The study for officers is the Art of War, which includes Naval Strategy.
+
+War is the application of force to the attainment of political ends.
+
+MAJOR AND MINOR STRATEGY
+
+We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be
+ulterior or primary.
+
+_Primary objects_ are the special objects of particular operations or
+movements which we undertake in order to gain the ulterior object of the
+campaign. Consequently it must be remembered that every particular
+operation or movement must be regarded, not only from the point of view of
+its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war.
+
+Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. There are two
+kinds--Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with
+primary objects.
+
+Every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and conducted in
+relation (1) to the general plan of the war; (2) to the object to which it
+is immediately directed.
+
+Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has for its province
+the plan of the war and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or primary
+objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2) Selection of
+the force to be used, _i.e._, it determines the relative functions of the
+naval and military forces. Major Strategy in its broadest sense deals with
+the whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship
+which regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled
+together as the instrument of war. But it also has to keep in constant
+touch with the political and diplomatic position of the country (on which
+depends the effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and
+financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is
+maintained). The friction due to these considerations is inherent in war,
+and is called the deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually
+regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every strategical
+problem. It may be taken as a general rule that no question of major
+strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and _vice versa_. For a line
+of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of
+strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and _vice versa_. To
+decide a question of Major Strategy, without consideration of its
+diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither strategy
+or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This inter-action has to be accepted
+as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is Pitt's
+refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist Frederick the Great
+during the Seven Years' War, for fear of compromising our relations with
+the Scandinavian Powers.
+
+Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals
+with--
+
+    (1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces
+    of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to
+    secure the object of the particular operation.
+
+    (2) The direction of the force assigned for the operation.
+
+Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:--
+
+    (1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet
+    only.
+
+    (2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army
+    only.
+
+    (3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and
+    navy together.
+
+It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called Naval Strategy or
+Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of Strategy, and that therefore
+Strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only.
+Naval Strategy, being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same
+friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders
+have often to take a decision independently of the central government or
+headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible
+ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be
+sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically
+inexpedient.
+
+Example.--For example, take Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve of
+the Seven Years' War in 1755. His orders were to prevent the troops and
+warlike stores which De la Motte was taking out from reaching Canada. It
+was not diplomatically expedient to open hostilities; but if Boscawen
+succeeded, the result would have been worth the diplomatic consequences it
+would entail. He missed the expedition, but captured two isolated vessels;
+thus striking the first blow in such a way as to entail the utmost amount
+of harm with the least possible good.
+
+OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE
+
+_Nature of Object_
+
+Upon the nature of the object depends the fundamental distinction between
+_offensive_ and _defensive_, upon which all strategical calculation must be
+based. Consequently, the solution of every strategical problem, whether of
+Major or Minor Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in
+view.
+
+All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative.
+
+A _positive_ object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for
+ourselves.
+
+A _negative_ object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent
+his gaining something.
+
+Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive.
+
+Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive.
+
+This is the only certain test by which we can decide whether any particular
+operation is offensive or defensive.
+
+Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as the
+primary or secondary objects which lead up to them; _e.g._, ulterior
+objects may be offensive, while one or more of the primary objects may be
+defensive, and _vice versa_. For example, in the Russo-Japanese War the
+ulterior object of the war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive
+(positive). The ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was
+defensive (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack and
+destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive (positive).
+
+_Relation of Offensive to Defensive_
+
+The Offensive, being positive in its aim, is naturally the more effective
+form of war and, as a rule, should be adopted by the stronger Power. The
+Defensive, being negative in its aim, is the more lasting form of war,
+since it requires less force to keep what one has than to take what is
+another's, and, as a rule, is adopted by the weaker Power. In most cases
+where the weaker side successfully assumes the offensive, it is due to his
+doing so before the enemy's mobilization or concentration is complete,
+whereby the attacking force is able to deal in succession with locally
+inferior forces of the enemy.
+
+The advantages of the Offensive are well known.
+
+Its disadvantages are:--
+
+    That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its communications,
+    and that it tends to operations on unfamiliar ground.
+
+The advantages of the Defensive are chiefly:--
+
+    Proximity to the base of supply and repair stations, familiar ground,
+    facility for arranging surprise by counter attack, and power of
+    organising in advance.
+
+The disadvantages of the Defensive are mainly moral. They become, however,
+real and practical when the enemy's objective or line of operations cannot
+be ascertained, for then we have to spread or attenuate our force to cover
+all probable objectives, but this disadvantage can be neutralised when it
+is possible to secure an interior position.
+
+_Functions and Characteristics of the Defensive_
+
+True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike.
+
+To assume the defensive does not necessarily mean that we do not feel
+strong enough to attack. It may mean that we see our way by using the
+defensive to force certain movements on the enemy which will enable us to
+hit harder.
+
+A well-designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack. Unless
+it does this it will not deflect the enemy's strategy in our favour. Thus,
+in 1756, the French, by assuming the defensive in the Channel, threatened
+an attack on our coasts, and concealed their attack on Minorca.
+
+This power inherent in the defensive is peculiarly strong in naval warfare,
+since the mobility of fleets enables them to pass instantaneously from the
+defensive to the offensive without any warning. When we assume the
+defensive because we are too weak for the offensive, we still do not lay
+aside attack. The whole strength and essence of the defensive is the
+counter-stroke. Its cardinal idea is to force the enemy to attack us in a
+position where he will expose himself to a counter-stroke.
+
+The stock instance upon which naval defensive is usually condemned is the
+burning of our ships at Chatham by the Dutch. But in that case we were not
+_acting on the defensive_ at all. We had laid up our battle fleet and were
+doing nothing. We were purely passive, in expectation of peace. It is
+really an instance of the successful use of defensive _by the Dutch_. Being
+no longer strong enough for a general offensive, they assumed the
+defensive, and induced us to lay up our ships and so expose ourselves to a
+counter-stroke. It was a counterstroke by the worsted belligerent to get
+better terms of peace.
+
+So far is the defensive from excluding the idea of attack, that it may
+consist entirely of a series of minor offensive operations. Clausewitz
+calls it "a shield of blows." It is often called _offensive-defensive,_ or
+_active defence_. Neither term is really necessary. For a defensive which
+excludes the idea of offence or action is not war at all-at least at sea.
+The old Elizabethan term _Preventive_ most closely expresses the idea.
+
+The most important function of the defensive is that of covering,
+buttressing, and intensifying the main attack. No plan of campaign, however
+strong the offensive intention, is perfect which does not contemplate the
+use of the defensive. Without some use of the defensive the cardinal
+principle of concentration can rarely be fully developed. To develop the
+highest possible degree of concentration upon the main object or objective,
+the defensive must be assumed everywhere else. Because it is only by using
+the defensive in the minor or less important theatres of operation that the
+forces in those theatres can be reduced to the minimum of security, and the
+maximum of concentration can thereby be obtained in the main theatre.
+
+In considering the defensive as a general plan of campaign the maxim is: If
+not relatively strong enough to assume the offensive, assume the defensive
+till you become so--
+
+    (1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or
+    otherwise;
+
+    (2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or
+    securing allies.
+
+It must always be remembered that, except as a preparation or a cover for
+offensive action, the defensive is seldom or never of any use; for by the
+continued use of the defensive alone nothing can be acquired, though the
+enemy may be prevented from acquiring anything. But where we are too weak
+to assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive, and
+wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and permitting
+us to accumulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's; we then pass
+to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a preparation. At sea we
+have had little occasion for the defensive as a general plan. But that is
+no reason for neglecting its study. In despising the defensive ourselves we
+have consistently ignored the strength it gives our enemies. The bulk of
+our naval history is the story of how we have been baffled and thwarted by
+our enemies assuming the defensive at sea in support of their offensive on
+land. We have seldom succeeded in treating this attitude with success, and
+it is only by studying the defensive we can hope to do so.
+
+_Offensive Operations used with a Defensive Intention_
+
+(A) Counter attacks.
+(B) Diversions.
+
+_Counter attacks_ are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes
+himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. It is this
+form of attack which constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise
+advantage of defence."
+
+_Diversions_ are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside the
+limit of his theatre of offensive operations.
+
+Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention,
+and to draw off his forces from his main attack. If well planned, they
+should divert a force greater than their own. They should, therefore, be
+small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less
+likely they are to divert a force greater than their own.
+
+Diversions involve a breach of the law of concentration, and it is only
+their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their own that
+justifies their use.
+
+This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities
+are most highly developed in combined expeditions.
+
+_Diversions_ must be carefully distinguished from _eccentric attacks.
+Eccentric attacks_ are true offensive movements. They have a positive
+object, _i.e._, they aim to acquire something from the enemy; whereas
+diversions have a negative object, _i.e._, they aim at preventing the enemy
+doing or acquiring something. Eccentric attacks are usually made in greater
+force than diversions.
+
+Examples.--Diversion.--Our raid on Washington in 1815. Landing force,
+about 4,000 men. Object, according to official instruction, "a diversion
+on the coasts of United States of America in favour of the army
+employed in the defence of Canada"; _i.e._, the intention was
+negative--preventive--defensive. _Eccentric Attack._--Operations against
+New Orleans in 1815. Intended force, 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to
+obtain command of the embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to
+occupy some important and valuable possession, by the restoration of which
+the conditions of peace might be improved, &c."; _i.e._, the intention was
+positive--to acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) with those
+against Martinique and Belleisle (eccentric attacks) in the Seven Years'
+War.
+
+This distinction gives a threefold classification of combined expeditions,
+as used by Elizabethan strategists, viz., raids, incursions, and invasions.
+These correspond respectively with our modern diversions, eccentric
+attacks, and true direct offensive.
+
+LIMITED AND UNLIMITED WARS
+
+From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important classification
+of wars, according to whether such object is _limited_ or _unlimited_.
+
+    (1) _War with limited object_ ("limited war") is where the object is
+    merely to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions
+    or interests; _e.g._, Spanish-American War, where the object was the
+    liberation of Cuba.
+
+    (2) _War with an unlimited object_ is where the object is to overthrow
+    the enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must
+    agree to do our will (become subservient); _e.g._, Franco-German War.
+
+PLANS OF WAR
+
+_System of Operations_
+
+Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object
+(_i.e._, whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or
+unlimited), Strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of
+the war."
+
+Apart from the means at our disposal a plan of war depends mainly upon--
+
+  (1) The theatre of the war.
+  (2) The various theatres of operation available within it.
+
+1. _Theatre of the War._--Usually defined as "All the territory upon which
+the hostile parties may assail each other." This is insufficient. For an
+Island Power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. Truer
+definition: "Geographical areas within which must lie the operations
+necessary for the attainment of the ulterior objects of the war and of the
+subordinate objects that lead up to them."
+
+A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations."
+
+2. _Theatre of Operations._--Is generally used of the operations of one
+belligerent only.
+
+An "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking.
+
+A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory
+we seek to take possession of or to defend.
+
+A truer definition is: "The area, whether of sea or land or both, within
+which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the
+particular operation."
+
+Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be
+defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another.
+
+Where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or
+movements may be offensive.
+
+As the plan of war determines the theatres of operation in the theatre of
+war, so in each theatre of operation it determines the _lines of operation_
+and the _objectives_.
+
+_Objective_
+
+An objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is
+directed." Thus, where the _object_ in any theatre of operation is to get
+command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet
+will usually be the _objective_.
+
+"Objective" in ordinary use is frequently confused with "object." For
+purposes of strategical discussion it is desirable to keep them sharply
+distinguished. _Objective_ is the end of some particular movement or
+operation, and is the special concern of the officer in command. _Object_
+is the end of a system of operations and is the special concern of the
+general staff or director of the war. An _objective_ is some definite point
+which we wish to get from the enemy or prevent his occupying, or some part
+of his strength which we wish to destroy. It is incorrect to use the term
+of anything we already possess. Thus, Vladivostock is often said to have
+been Rojesvensky's _objective_. It was, strictly speaking, only his
+_destination_. To reach it and concentrate with the units already there was
+the _primary object_ of the operations entrusted to him. He had no true
+_objective_ before him except Togo's fleet.
+
+An _objective_ is always subordinate to some _object_. It is a step to the
+attainment of that object.
+
+_Lines of Operation_
+
+A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate
+from our base or starting point to reach our objectives."
+
+Lines of operation may be _exterior_ or _interior_. We are said to hold the
+_interior_ lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of
+operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more
+quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or assistance. Such a
+position is called an _interior position_. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior
+Positions" are the converse of these.
+
+_Lines of Communication_
+
+This expression is used of three different things:--
+
+    (1) _Lines of supply_, running from the base of operations to the point
+    which the operating force has reached.
+
+    (2) _Lines of lateral communication_ by which several forces engaged in
+    one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to
+    each other's support.
+
+    (3) _Lines of retreat_, which are usually lines of supply reversed,
+    _i.e._, leading back to the base.
+
+For naval purposes these three ideas are best described by the term "lines
+of passage and communication," which were in use at the end of the 18th
+century, and they may be regarded as those waters over which passes the
+normal course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the
+force to be supplied.
+
+_Maritime Communications_
+
+The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against which a fleet
+may have to operate are:--
+
+    (1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond
+    to the communications of armies operating ashore). These have greatly
+    increased in importance strategically with the increased dependence of
+    modern fleets on a regular supply of coals, stores, ammunition, &c.
+
+    (2) The communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea
+    base, that is, communication between the advanced and the main base.
+
+    (3) Trade Routes, that is, the communications upon which depend the
+    national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the
+    "lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of
+    belligerents' possessions.
+
+In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems of
+communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as hinging on
+communications, but probably it does so, as will appear from a
+consideration of Maritime Communications, and the extent to which they are
+the main preoccupation of naval operations; that is to say, all problems of
+Naval Strategy can be reduced to terms of "passage and communication," and
+this is probably the best method of solving them.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+PART TWO
+
+NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A
+QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND
+COMMUNICATION
+
+NAVAL STRATEGY DEFINED
+
+By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the major operations of
+the fleet. Such operations have for their object "passage and
+communication"; that is, the fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own
+communications and seizing those of the enemy.
+
+We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command of the sea. This means
+something quite different from the military idea of occupying territory,
+for the sea cannot be the subject of political dominion or ownership. We
+cannot subsist upon it (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we
+exclude neutrals from it. The value of the sea in the political system of
+the world is as a means of communication between States and parts of
+States. Therefore the "command of the sea" means the control of
+communications in which the belligerents are adversely concerned. The
+command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of territory, the
+ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime war, as were
+approximately our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century, but it may be a
+primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior object of particular
+operations.
+
+History shows that the actual functions of the fleet (except in purely
+maritime wars) have been threefold:--
+
+    1. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore.
+
+    2. The protection or destruction of commerce.
+
+    3. The prevention or securing of alliances (_i.e._, deterring or
+    persuading neutrals as to participating in the war).
+
+EXAMPLES.--The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the
+Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and Portugal
+to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the alliance of the
+Kingdom of Naples.
+
+In the first case, there came a crisis when it was more important to
+demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining Louis
+XIV, than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the second, the
+Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the Eastern
+Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not.
+
+In this way we get a _Definition of the Aim of Naval Strategy_, expressed
+in terms of the actual functions of the fleet. For practical purposes it
+will be found the most useful definition as emphasising the intimate
+connection of Naval Strategy with the diplomatic, financial, and military
+aspects of Major Strategy.
+
+These functions of the fleet may be discharged in two ways:--
+
+    (1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed
+    (bombardment, landings, raiding parties, &c.).
+
+    (2) By getting command of the sea, _i.e._, establishing ourselves in
+    such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all
+    parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against the enemy's
+    territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours.
+
+The power of the second method, by controlling communications, is out of
+all proportion to that of the first--direct attack. Indeed, the first can
+seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second. Thus, from
+this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is mainly a
+question of communications.
+
+But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the fleet must discharge
+part of its function by direct action against territory before there is
+time to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and
+military considerations may deflect the normal operation of Naval
+Strategy.)
+
+EXAMPLES.--Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the
+unshaken Toulon Fleet. Holmes's capture of Emden in 1758.
+
+Still, the fact remains that the key to the effective performance of the
+fleet's duties is almost always to secure communications as soon as
+possible by battle.
+
+COMMAND OF THE SEA
+
+Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command
+of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we
+have adequate naval positions, and an adequate fleet to secure the command
+when war breaks out.
+
+Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do absolutely nothing,
+but that he cannot _seriously_ interfere with the undertakings by which we
+seek to secure the object of the war and to force our will upon him.
+
+_Various Conditions of Command_
+
+1. It may be (a) general; (b) local.
+
+(a) _General command_ is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act
+dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to use or
+defend his own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere
+seriously with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations.
+
+This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send
+squadrons to sea.
+
+(b) _Local command_ implies a state of things in which we are able to
+prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in
+one or more theatres of operation.
+
+2. Both general and local command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent.
+
+(a) _Temporary command_ is when we are able to prevent the
+enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in all
+or some theatres of operation during the period required for gaining
+the object in view (_i.e._, the object of a particular operation or of
+a particular campaign). This condition existed after Togo's first
+action. It was also that at which Napoleon aimed in his instructions
+to Villeneuve in 1805.
+
+(b) _Permanent command_ is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the
+situation, _i.e._, when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his
+maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. This
+condition existed after Tsushima.
+
+_Command in Dispute_
+
+The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it
+is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and
+frequently all through it.
+
+The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, _i.e._,
+till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea.
+
+_It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of
+dispute by seeking a decision._ Hence the French tradition to avoid
+decisive actions as a rule when at war with England.
+
+It must be remembered that _general command of the sea is not essential to
+all oversea operations_.
+
+In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate or be
+induced to concentrate in one theatre of operations, and so secure the
+local or temporary command sufficient for obtaining the special object in
+view, while the weaker Power takes advantage of such local concentration to
+operate safely elsewhere.
+
+Thus in a state of dispute, although the weaker Power may not be able to
+obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able to
+defend its own.
+
+EXAMPLES.--This condition of dispute existed during the first three years
+of the Seven Years' War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a decision by
+defeating Conflans and De la Clue; also in the Great War up to Trafalgar.
+
+When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (_i.e._,
+leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so
+much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy
+for carrying out counter operations elsewhere.
+
+METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL.
+
+1. _Permanent general control_ can only be secured by the practical
+annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions.
+
+2. _Local and temporary control_ may be secured by--
+
+    (a) An action not necessarily entirely successful (containing).
+
+    (b) Inducing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion).
+
+    (c) Superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy's force
+    available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing).
+
+    (d) Blockade.
+
+_Action of a Fleet off an Enemy's Port_
+
+A belligerent fleet off an enemy's port may carry out three different
+operations, for certain purposes; each quite separate from the others, and
+intended to obtain an entirely different result:--
+
+(1) _Close Blockade._--This is to prevent the enemy's fighting ships from
+putting to sea. In this case the object is to secure local control for some
+purpose that is not purely naval, such as was carried out by the Japanese
+off Port Arthur in 1904, so as to enable their transports to cross the
+Yellow Sea without fear of molestation from any of the Russian ships in
+Port Arthur. Since the cruisers in Vladivostok were able to emerge (that
+port not being blockaded), the operation was not complete, and a danger of
+interference always existed.
+
+This method of blockade is far more difficult to carry out in the present
+day, than formerly; owing to the existence of submarines and torpedo craft,
+the blockading ships have to remain further away from the port; there have
+to be inner lines of cruisers, scouts and destroyers; and quick
+concentration takes longer owing to the greater space covered by the
+blockading force, and more ships of all natures are required for the same
+reason.
+
+Greater and more vigilance are required than in former days, because the
+enemy's ships can come out regardless of weather (thick weather would be
+their opportunity), and it is most important that not a single craft, from
+a battleship to a torpedo boat, be allowed to escape.
+
+This method of blockade includes the commercial blockade, and all countries
+would be informed of its having been established.
+
+(2) _Commercial Blockade._--To prevent floating commerce from entering or
+leaving the blockaded harbour. The blockading force would not be powerful
+enough to prevent a squadron of battleships or cruisers from entering or
+leaving the port blockaded; and it would not be instituted outside a
+fortified military port, or one containing a strong naval force. But it
+would be able to stop scouts and torpedo craft from entering or emerging,
+unless in very great numbers; and if unable to stop them from emerging,
+would give warning of their escape and the direction in which they are
+going.
+
+In both these forms of blockade it is usual, as a matter of courtesy, to
+allow neutral armed ships belonging to foreign navies to enter and leave
+for their own purposes, presumably connected with the subjects of their own
+country who are in the blockaded port. This, however, is not a right, and
+the country to which the blockading ships belong has a right to refuse it,
+and to back her refusal by force.
+
+All countries must be notified of a properly instituted commercial
+blockade, in accordance with International Agreement.
+
+(3) _Observing a Port._--This, with its subsidiary operations, should be
+conducted in such a way as to induce the enemy to put to sea, the object of
+observing the port being primarily a naval one, viz., to bring him to
+decisive action.
+
+The principal observing force (consisting of battleships and cruisers)
+would be either in one squadron, or more, provided that they were in
+supporting reach of each other, and so placed as to be able to cut off the
+enemy's fleet on emerging from the port observed before it can get
+dangerously near its probable objective, and yet sufficiently far out to
+ensure a battle before it can regain the shelter of its own ports. It is
+also worth noting that the battle should, if possible, be fought so as to
+make it difficult for the enemy's damaged ships to obtain the shelter of a
+friendly neutral's harbours before being captured.
+
+The observed port must be watched closely, so that immediate notice of the
+enemy's exit may be given; and this would be done by small cruisers, scouts
+and destroyers, which should be strong and numerous enough to attack any
+torpedo craft trying to get to sea.
+
+In order to induce the enemy's main force to put to sea it is important
+that every means be used to prevent his knowing that our fleet is observing
+the port, or if that be impossible, to do nothing which will lead him to
+suppose that his port is being observed.
+
+This operation is not a blockade.
+
+Subsidiary operations to induce the enemy's fleet to put to sea, may take
+the form of a diversion on the enemy's coast, or against some important
+part of his sea-borne trade, either by the observing fleet or by a force
+affiliated to it, or by any oversea movements calculated to interfere
+seriously with the enemy's war plan.
+
+_Concentration_
+
+The guiding feature of modern preparation for war is to be ready for rapid
+action. It is true at sea, more even than on land, that upon the first
+movements depend the initiative, the power of controlling the enemy's
+strategy, and of making him conform to our movements. This readiness for
+rapid action will depend on a proper distribution of the fleet so as to
+meet all the requirements.
+
+The distribution of the fleet should be dominated by the idea of
+concentration, but it must be understood clearly what concentration means.
+Clausewitz says:--"The best strategy is always to be sufficiently strong,
+at first generally, then at the decisive point. There is therefore no
+higher or simpler law for strategy than this--keep your forces together."
+
+The maxim "Keep your forces together" does not, however, necessarily mean
+keeping them all concentrated in one mass, but rather keeping them so
+disposed that they can unite readily at will. At sea it is more difficult
+than on land to foretell where the decisive point will be; but since it is
+quicker and easier at sea to concentrate forces at any particular point
+than on land, in applying this maxim for our purposes, the rule should be
+to dispose the forces at sea so as to be able to concentrate them in time
+at the decisive point so soon as this point is determined, and also so as
+to conceal from the enemy what it is intended to make the decisive point.
+
+If the forces are rightly disposed within due limits, adequate control of
+all the lines of passage and communication can be assured, and if the enemy
+undertakes any operations it should be possible to ensure that sufficient
+forces can be concentrated in time to defeat his object. On the other hand,
+if the forces are concentrated in one mass, there can be little chance of
+deceiving or confusing the enemy, while it gives him an opportunity of
+successfully carrying out some operation by evasion.
+
+THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS
+
+Since the whole idea of command of the sea rests on the control of
+communications, it cannot be fully apprehended without a thorough
+understanding of the nature of maritime communications.
+
+Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend as
+a rule to run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they
+meet in the theatre of operations or the objective point.
+
+At sea, the reverse is frequently the case; for in maritime warfare the
+great lines of communications of either belligerent often tend to run
+approximately parallel if, indeed, they are not identical.
+
+Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which lay in the
+Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South Africa, our respective lines
+of communication would be identical.
+
+This was also the case in all our imperial wars with France.
+
+_This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare._ Nearly
+all our current maxims of Naval Strategy can be traced to the pressure it
+exerts on naval thought.
+
+It is at the root of the fundamental difference between Military and Naval
+Strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and
+confusion which have arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to
+the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the
+communications and the operations against them in each case.
+
+On land, the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's
+communications at once is that, as a rule, we cannot do so without exposing
+our own. At sea, on the contrary, when the great lines are common to both,
+we cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's.
+
+Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get our fleet into such a
+position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded. This
+was usually done in our old wars with France, by our attempting to get a
+fleet off Brest before the French could sail.
+
+Hence the maxims "That the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's
+coast," "The enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like.
+
+But these maxims are not universally true; witness Togo's strategy against
+Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast.
+
+Take, again, the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out
+the enemy's fleet and destroy it. Here, again, Togo's practice was the
+reverse of the maxim.
+
+The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure
+communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them
+unsafe it must be put out of action."
+
+The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always.
+
+EXAMPLE.--Opening of the War of the Spanish Succession. The operations of
+1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish
+trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own lines
+of passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of
+operation. These last two lines were identical. In 1703, the chief
+operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and
+particularly of Portugal. Rooke's official instructions directed that the
+French fleet was to be ignored unless it threatened the common
+communications.
+
+RESULT.--By 1704 we had gained a naval position from which France could not
+eject us, and she abandoned the struggle for sea communications.
+
+But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c.,
+is sound and applicable--
+
+    (a) Because for us _general permanent command_ is usually essential
+    to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the
+    enemy's fleet.
+
+    (b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt to
+    _dispute the control of the common communications_.
+
+    (c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex
+    (_i.e._, the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a
+    blow which will solve all the difficulties; _e.g._, Sir. Palmes
+    Fairborne's solution of the problem in 1703.
+
+Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective
+way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (_i.e._, forcing an action on him)
+is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of
+campaign.
+
+This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon
+Fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally,
+but by the operation of strategical law).
+
+Practically all great naval actions have been brought about in this way,
+that is, they have been the outcome of an effort to clear essential
+communications from the enemy's fleet; _e.g._, Gravelines, La Hogue,
+Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsushima.
+
+Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about
+because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade
+communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet.
+
+In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne
+in mind that if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably
+find it in a place where you cannot destroy it, except at very heavy cost.
+It is far better to make it come to you, and this has often been done by
+merely sitting on the common communications.
+
+Again, if you seek out the enemy's fleet without being certain of getting
+contact, you may merely assist it in evading you, and enable it to get into
+a position on your own communications, from which it may be very costly to
+dislodge it. It was for this reason that the Elizabethan Government kept
+the fleet in home waters in 1588. Sampson, in the Spanish-American War, was
+actually permitted to make this mistake. By going to seek out Cervera
+without being sure of contact, he left him a clear run into Cienfuegos or
+even Havana, which it was the main function of the fleet to prevent.
+Captain Mahan has since modified this maxim as follows:--"Seek out the
+enemy's fleet, if you are sure of getting contact." A truer maxim would
+seem to be "Seek contact with the enemy's fleet in the most certain and
+favourable manner that is open to you." To seek out the enemy's fleet is
+only one way of doing this, and not always the best way. It must be
+remembered that other conditions being equal, it is an obvious advantage to
+fight in your own waters rather than in those of the enemy, and more likely
+to ensure that a defeat of the enemy will be decisive.
+
+  RN WAR COLLEGE PORTSMOUTH
+  JANUARY 1909
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+                     INDEX
+
+  Abercromby, General Sir Ralph, 290, 296
+  Absolute War, 25, 42-44
+  Alexandria, 289
+  Alsace-Lorraine, 51-52, 55
+  Ambleteuse, 251
+  Amherst, General Lord, 285
+  Anglo-Japanese Treaty, 79
+  Anson, Admiral Lord, 110-12, 118, 189, 290
+  Antwerp, 69
+  Armada, Spanish, 159-60, 172-74, 227, 243, 245, 255
+  Articles of War, 176
+  Austerlitz Campaign, 21, 53
+
+  Bacon, Sir Francis, 58
+  Baltic Fleet, 81, 170, 285, 327
+  Baltic trade, 263
+  Barcelona, 286
+  Barham, Admiral Sir Charles Middleton, 118, 142-44, 151, 162-63, 183,
+      199, 207, 254, 297
+  Barraille, Admiral, 249-51
+  Barrington, Admiral Samuel, 146-47
+  Batz, Isle de, 179, 290
+  Beachy Head, 218
+  Belgium, 50-52, 55
+  Belleisle, Marechal de, 295, 332
+  Belleisle, 312
+  Berry, Captain Sir Edward, 238
+  Biscay, Bay of, 139, 142, 263
+  Black Sea, 285
+  Blake, Colonel Robert, 176
+  Blockade, method of, 102, 121, 183-86, 235, 244, 252, 256-58, 260-62,
+      269, 272, 284, 341;
+    ethics of, 39;
+    tactical and strategic, 97;
+    insecurity of, 119;
+    close and open, 97, 184, 187-91, 193-94, 197-201, 205, 207-208, 240,
+        250, 292, 295-97, 321, 340;
+    theory of, 142, 163, 169, 175, 202-204, 242, 287-88, 322
+  Bluecher, Field Marshal Gebhard von, 23
+  Boscawen, Admiral Edward, 189, 252, 320, 328, 339
+  Boulogne, 251
+  Brest, 141, 145, 147-48, 162, 179, 189, 193-97, 201-202, 208, 235-36,
+      248-49, 252-53, 290, 296, 323
+  Bruix, Admiral, 140
+  Byng, Admiral Sir George, 163
+
+  Cadiz, 134-40, 143, 146, 148, 179, 186, 213, 227, 264, 323
+  Caemmerer, General von, 76-77
+  Calder, Admiral Sir Robert, 163, 183
+  Canada, 54, 56-57, 81, 189, 210, 312, 328, 332
+  Cape Clear, 272
+  Caribbean Sea, 144
+  Carkett, Captain Robert, 4
+  Cartagena, 264
+  Channel Islands, 140, 253
+  Charles II of England, 179
+  Charles of Austria, 21, 54, 69
+  Chateaurenault, Admiral Comte de, 213-14
+  Chatham, 177, 215, 227
+  Cherbourg, 253
+  Christian, Admiral Sir Hugh, 296
+  Cienfuegos, 169, 344
+  Clausewitz, General Karl von, 79-80, 85, 330-31;
+    theory, 25, 27-29, 41-46, 51-56, 60-61, 73-74, 76-77, 311, 341;
+    his service, 23-24;
+    _On War_, 24, 44;
+    his war plans, 44
+  Colpoys, Admiral Sir John, 196
+  Command at sea, theory of, 91-106, 165-66
+  Commerce prevention, 95
+  Communications, maritime, 94, 165, 315-16, 335;
+    common theory of, 100-102, 118
+  Conflans, Admiral Comte de, 192, 252-53, 320, 339
+  Copenhagen, 68
+  Cornwallis, Admiral Sir William, 143, 162, 181, 183, 197-200
+  Coruna, 173
+  Cotton, Admiral Sir Charles, 181
+  Covering squadron, 283, 286-88, 291
+  Craig's expedition, 67
+  Crimea, 57, 62, 81, 258, 285-87, 300
+  Cromwell, 20, 22, 157, 163, 176
+  Cuba, 57, 103, 168, 313, 332
+  _Curieux_, 182
+
+  Dalny, 229
+  Dardanelles, 68, 139
+  Davout, Louis-Nicolas, 23
+  Deane, Colonel Richard, 176
+  Declaration of Paris, 96, 267
+  Dettingen, 246
+  Dogger Bank, 158
+  Downs, the, 139-40, 146, 176, 198, 214, 249-50, 253, 263
+  Drake, Sir Francis, 39, 159-60, 171, 173-74, 227, 244, 291, 301
+  Dumouriez, General, 254, 257
+  Dundas, Admiral Sir James, 286, 291
+  Dungeness, 176, 199
+  Dunkirk, 225, 237, 244, 246-50, 252-53
+  Duquesne, Admiral Abraham, 121
+
+  Egypt, 237-38, 240
+  Elliot Islands, 37
+
+  Ferrol, 139, 141, 266, 323
+  Finisterre, Cape, 101, 106, 139-40, 253, 256, 272
+  Flanders, 171, 246
+  Frederick the Great, 21-22, 36, 46, 54-55, 63-64, 66-67, 80, 157, 327
+
+  Gallipoli, 285
+  Ganteaume, Admiral Comte, 191, 197-98, 202, 236
+  Gardner, Admiral Lord, 197-98
+  Gibraltar, 34, 105, 139, 141, 145-46, 213, 264, 272, 318, 323, 337, 344
+  Gneisenau, Field Marshal August von, 23
+  Goltz, General von der, 75, 97
+  Guichen, Admiral Comte de, 146, 223
+
+  Hanover, 64, 246
+  Hardy, Admiral Sir Charles, 253-57
+  Havana, 57, 169
+  Havre, 252-53, 263
+  Hawke, Admiral Sir Edward, 104, 189-90, 192, 196, 235, 252-53, 320, 339
+  Henry VIII, 108-110
+  Holland, 65, 195
+  Howe, Admiral Earl, 144, 147-50, 190-191, 194, 204, 206-207
+  Howard of Effingham, Admiral Lord, 171, 173-74, 244
+
+  Iberian Peninsula, 56, 61-62, 64, 69-71, 105
+  India, 101
+  Ireland, 194, 196, 213, 215, 225-26, 240, 253, 255, 257, 263, 282
+
+  Jamaica, 142, 144, 149, 182, 207
+  Jervis, Sir John, 223, 296
+  Jomini, General Baron de, 28-30, 42, 45-47, 51-52, 56, 60, 74, 85
+
+  Kamimura, Admiral, 170
+  Keith, Admiral Lord, 236, 289
+  Kempenfelt, Admiral Richard, 137, 146-48, 150, 192-94, 196, 206, 220,
+      222-24, 227, 254, 257, 260
+  Killigrew, Admiral Henry, 213-15, 219, 224
+  Korea, 34, 57, 79-80, 82-85
+  Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Prince, 75
+  Kuantung Peninsula, 290
+
+  Lagos, 252
+  La Hogue, 180, 324, 344
+  Langara, Admiral Don Juan, 148-49
+  Leghorn, 264
+  Leith, 263
+  Liaotung Peninsula, 37, 73, 287, 292
+  Liao-yang, 82, 85
+  Light squadrons, 125
+  Ligonier, General Lord, 70
+  Limited War, 41, 46, 51-59, 72-87, 313
+  Lisbon, 68, 173
+  Lissa, 36, 179, 293
+  Lizard, the, 150, 256
+  Louisburg, 285, 287
+  Lyons, Admiral Sir Edmund, 285-86
+
+  Mack, General, 21
+  Mahan, Admiral, 131n, 169, 344
+  Maitland, General, 295
+  Malta, 139, 264
+  Manchuria, 79, 82, 258, 290, 313, 318, 329
+  Maria Theresa, 246
+  Marlborough, John, Duke of, 64
+  Maxims: "Conquest of water territory," 93;
+    "Enemy's coast our frontier," 93;
+    "Eyes of the fleet," 112, 117, 120-21;
+    "Fleet in being," 224, 231;
+    "The sea is all one," 103;
+    "Seeking out the enemy's fleet," 102, 156, 161, 164, 167-68,
+      170-71, 174, 180, 203, 324, 344-45
+  Medina-Sidonia, Duke of, 244, 249
+  Mediterranean, 95, 101, 108, 113-14, 119, 125, 139-40, 143, 179, 182,
+      198, 207, 218, 223, 247, 252, 264, 285, 322, 337
+  Medway, 38, 217
+  Melville, Lord, 199-200
+  Middleton. _See_ Barham
+  Minorca, 34, 145, 330
+  Moltke, General von, 27, 51, 55, 73-74
+  Monk, George, Duke of Albemarle, 135-37, 157, 176-77
+  Montecuculi, Prince, 24
+  Montcalm, General Marquis de, 302
+  Morbihan, 235, 252-53
+  Mukden, 83
+
+  Napoleon, 43-44, 54, 68, 77, 79, 85, 98, 251, 257-58, 338;
+    methods, 19-23, 25, 27-28, 46-48, 65, 141, 144, 157, 183, 210, 237-38,
+        240-41;
+    views on naval warfare, 56, 143, 179, 181, 191, 236;
+    his Russian campaign, 47, 52;
+    on "pygmy combinations," 67;
+    his conversion, 68-70
+  Narrow seas, 127, 202
+  Nelson, Admiral Lord, 119, 125-26, 226, 317, 322, 336;
+    his influence, 161-63, 217;
+    his use of cruisers, 113-15, 117;
+    on defensive fleet operations, 223-24, 227;
+    on blockade, 184, 186, 198-99, 208;
+    his strategy, 136, 139, 141-42, 199, 238, 281
+  New Model Army, 157, 176
+  Ney, Marshal Michael, 29
+  Nile, 180
+  Norris, Admiral Sir John, 237-38, 246, 249, 253, 281
+  North Sea, 69, 127, 139, 145, 150, 179, 195-96, 199, 207, 225, 263
+  Nottingham, Daniel Finch, Earl of, 216-17
+
+  Observation squadrons, 125
+  Offence, theory of, 31-36, 39-40
+  Orde, Admiral Sir John, 223
+  Orvilliers, Admiral Comte de, 256
+
+  Palermo, 121
+  Paris, Declaration of, 96, 267
+  Parma, Prince Alexander Farnese, Duke of, 171-73, 241, 243-44
+  Pe-chi-li, Gulf of, 73, 302
+  Persano, Admiral, 293-94
+  Philip II, 239
+  Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, 63-64, 84, 300, 327
+  Plymouth, 171, 173, 190, 214, 220, 248, 256
+  Pola, 293-94
+  Port Arthur, 80, 82-85, 170, 202, 204-205, 227-31, 290-92, 322, 340
+  Portsmouth, 195, 214, 224, 248-49, 253
+  Portugal, 65, 80, 195, 317, 323, 336
+  Privateering, 266-68
+  Prussia, 23, 49-50, 64
+  Puerto Rico, 168
+
+  Quebec, 285, 289, 301-302
+  Quiberon, 105, 180, 192, 253, 324
+
+  Raglan, General Lord, 301
+  "Real War," 25
+  Revolution, French, 19, 65
+  Rochefort, 139, 141, 182, 235, 250, 300, 312, 332
+  Rodney, Admiral Sir George B., 5, 144, 194
+  Roquefeuille, Admiral Marquis de, 247-51
+  Ross, Admiral John, 147, 149
+  Rupert, Prince, 135-36, 157
+  Russell, Admiral Edward, 225
+  Ruyter, Admiral de, 135-37
+
+  St. Helena, 277
+  St. James's fight, 177-78
+  St. Vincent, Admiral Sir John, 179, 194, 196, 272, 288, 290, 296
+  St. Vincent, Cape, 139, 182
+  San Domingo, 291, 301
+  Santa Cruz, Marquess of, 239
+  Santiago, 169, 322
+  Sampson, Admiral, 168, 322, 344
+  Sandwich, Admiral, the Earl of, 121
+  Sardinia, 139, 207
+  Saunders, Admiral Sir Charles, 289, 301
+  Saxe, Marshal, 247-50
+  Saxony, 54-55, 80
+  Scilly, 39, 149-50, 255
+  Sebastopol, 80, 285, 291
+  Seoul, 82, 85, 290, 303
+  Sharnhorst, General Gerhard von, 23
+  Shovel, Admiral Sir Cloudesley, 213-14, 224, 286
+  Sicily, 65, 207
+  Silesia, 46, 55
+  Skelligs, the, 150
+  Smyrna convoy, 225
+  Sole Bay, 38
+  Spanish Armada, 159-60, 172-74, 227, 243, 245, 255
+  Spithead, 135, 146, 192, 248
+  Stakelberg, General, 302-303
+  Strachan, Admiral Sir Richard, 125-26
+  Strategy, naval and maritime, 15;
+    major and minor, 308-309, 327-28
+
+  Tegetthoff, Admiral, 36, 293-94
+  Texel, the, 139, 146-47, 150, 197
+  Thames, the, 135-38, 214, 217, 247-48, 268
+  Theory of war, 15-30, 107-52
+  Tilbury, 247
+  Togo, Admiral, 84, 170, 202, 207, 290, 292, 303, 319, 322-24, 338
+  Torbay, 189-90, 192-93, 207
+  Torres Vedras, 36, 83
+  Torrington, Admiral Lord, 214-18, 220, 224, 226
+  Toulon, 69, 135, 139, 184, 198, 207-208, 213-14, 264, 266, 286, 296,
+      317-18, 322, 324, 337, 344
+  Tourville, Admiral Comte de, 213-14, 217, 219-20, 224-26
+  Trafalgar, 68, 118, 199, 266, 320, 324, 339
+  Trieste, 139
+  Tromp, Admiral Martin H., 175-76
+  Tsushima, 83, 319, 324, 338
+
+  Unlimited War, 40-51, 60-71
+  Ushant, 142-43, 147, 181-82, 192, 223-25, 258, 272
+  Utrecht, 246
+  Villeneuve, Admiral, 140, 142-43, 179, 182-83, 186, 197, 206, 223, 266,
+      338
+  Vladivostock, 340
+
+  Walcheren, 68-69
+  Warren, Commodore Sir John B., 235
+  Wars:
+    Anglo-American (1812), 119, 276;
+    Anglo-Dutch, 109;
+    Anglo-Spanish (1588), 109;
+    American Independence, 92, 118, 190, 193, 210, 221, 226;
+    Austro-Italian (1866), 36, 179, 293;
+    Crimean, 258, 285-88;
+    Franco-German (1870), 71, 79, 333;
+    Franco-Russian (1812), 47, 49, 51-52;
+    Russo-Japanese, 34, 38, 44, 51, 78-79, 84, 168, 170, 205, 303, 328-29;
+    Seven Years', 51, 54, 57, 63, 66, 111, 179, 189-90, 197-98, 209, 312,
+        320, 327-28, 332, 339;
+    Spanish-American, 57, 168-69, 313, 332, 344;
+    Spanish Succession, 34, 317, 323, 336
+  Wellington, Duke of, 36, 56, 61, 65, 83, 105
+  West Indies, 95, 140, 142-43, 182, 189-90, 197, 210, 222-23, 225, 247,
+      252, 255, 266-67, 285, 296
+  Western Squadron, 42, 181, 193, 252, 263, 266
+  Wight, Isle of, 136, 214, 249, 253, 257
+  Wolfe, General, 70, 200, 285, 301-302
+
+  Yalu, 85
+  Yarmouth, 263
+  Yellow Sea, 340
+
+
+
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