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diff --git a/old/14636.txt b/old/14636.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ea92fc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/14636.txt @@ -0,0 +1,12291 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Tragic Sense Of Life, by Miguel de Unamuno + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Tragic Sense Of Life + +Author: Miguel de Unamuno + +Release Date: January 8, 2005 [EBook #14636] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRAGIC SENSE OF LIFE *** + + + + +Produced by David Starner, Martin Pettit and the PG Online Distributed +Proofreading Team + + + + + + +TRAGIC SENSE OF LIFE + +MIGUEL DE UNAMUNO + +translator, J.E. CRAWFORD FLITCH + + +DOVER PUBLICATIONS, INC + +New York + +This Dover edition, first published in 1954, is an unabridged and +unaltered republication of the English translation originally published +by Macmillan and Company, Ltd., in 1921. This edition is published by +special arrangement with Macmillan and Company, Ltd. + +The publisher is grateful to the Library of the University of +Pennsylvania for supplying a copy of this work for the purpose of +reproduction. + +_Standard Book Number: 486-20257-7 Library of Congress Catalog Card +Number: 54-4730_ + +Manufactured in the United States of America +Dover Publications, Inc. +180 Varick Street +New York, N.Y. 10014 + + + + +CONTENTS + + PAGES +INTRODUCTORY ESSAY xi-xxxii + +AUTHOR'S PREFACE xxxiii-xxxv + +I + +THE MAN OF FLESH AND BONE + + Philosophy and the concrete man--The man Kant, the man Butler, and + the man Spinoza--Unity and continuity of the person--Man an end not + a means--Intellectual necessities and necessities of the heart and + the will--Tragic sense of life in men and in peoples 1-18 + +II + +THE STARTING-POINT + + Tragedy of Paradise--Disease an element of progress--Necessity of + knowing in order to live--Instinct of preservation and instinct of + perpetuation--The sensible world and the ideal world--Practical + starting-point of all philosophy--Knowledge an end in itself?--The + man Descartes--The longing not to die 19-37 + +III + +THE HUNGER OF IMMORTALITY + + Thirst of being--Cult of immortality--Plato's "glorious + risk"--Materialism--Paul's discourse to the Athenians--Intolerance + of the intellectuals--Craving for fame--Struggle for survival 38-57 + +IV + +THE ESSENCE OF CATHOLICISM + + Immortality and resurrection--Development of idea of immortality in + Judaic and Hellenic religions--Paul and the dogma of the + resurrection--Athanasius--Sacrament of the + Eucharist--Lutheranism--Modernism--The Catholic + ethic--Scholasticism--The Catholic solution 58-78 + +V + +THE RATIONALIST DISSOLUTION + + Materialism--Concept of substance--Substantiality of the + soul--Berkeley--Myers--Spencer--Combat of life with + reason--Theological advocacy--_Odium anti-theologicum_--The + rationalist attitude--Spinoza--Nietzsche--Truth and consolation + 79-105 + +VI + +IN THE DEPTHS OF THE ABYSS + + Passionate doubt and Cartesian doubt--Irrationality of the problem + of immortality--Will and intelligence--Vitalism and + rationalism--Uncertainty as basis of faith--The ethic of + despair--Pragmatical justification of despair--Summary of preceding + criticism 106-131 + +VII + +LOVE, SUFFERING, PITY, AND PERSONALITY + + Sexual love--Spiritual love--Tragic love--Love and + pity--Personalizing faculty of love--God the Personalization of the + All--Anthropomorphic tendency--Consciousness of the Universe--What + is Truth?--Finality of the Universe 132-155 + +VIII + +FROM GOD TO GOD + + Concept and feeling of Divinity--Pantheism--Monotheism--The + rational God--Proofs of God's existence--Law of necessity--Argument + from _Consensus gentium_--The living God--Individuality and + personality--God a multiplicity--The God of Reason--The God of + Love--Existence of God 156-185 + +IX + +FAITH, HOPE, AND CHARITY + + Personal element in faith--Creative power of faith--Wishing that + God may exist--Hope the form of faith--Love and suffering--The + suffering God--Consciousness revealed through + suffering--Spiritualization of matter 186-215 + +X + +RELIGION, THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE BEYOND, AND THE APOCATASTASIS + + What is religion?--The longing for immortality--Concrete + representation of a future life--Beatific vision--St. + Teresa--Delight requisite for happiness--Degradation of + energy--Apocatastasis--Climax of the tragedy--Mystery of the Beyond + 216-259 + +XI + +THE PRACTICAL PROBLEM + + Conflict as basis of conduct--Injustice of annihilation--Making + ourselves irreplaceable--Religious value of the civil + occupation--Business of religion and religion of business--Ethic of + domination--Ethic of the cloister--Passion and culture--The Spanish + soul 260-296 + +CONCLUSION + +DON QUIXOTE IN THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN TRAGI-COMEDY + + Culture--Faust--The modern Inquisition--Spain and the scientific + spirit--Cultural achievement of Spain--Thought and language--Don + Quixote the hero of Spanish thought--Religion a transcendental + economy--Tragic ridicule--Quixotesque philosophy--Mission of Don + Quixote to-day 297-330 + + + + +INTRODUCTORY ESSAY + +DON MIGUEL DE UNAMUNO + + +I sat, several years ago, at the Welsh National Eisteddfod, under the +vast tent in which the Bard of Wales was being crowned. After the small +golden crown had been placed in unsteady equilibrium on the head of a +clever-looking pressman, several Welsh bards came on the platform and +recited little epigrams. A Welsh bard is, if young, a pressman, and if +of maturer years, a divine. In this case, as England was at war, they +were all of the maturer kind, and, while I listened to the music of +their ditties--the sense thereof being, alas! beyond my reach--I was +struck by the fact that all of them, though different, closely resembled +Don Miguel de Unamuno. It is not my purpose to enter into the wasp-nest +of racial disquisitions. If there is a race in the world over which more +sense and more nonsense can be freely said for lack of definite +information than the Welsh, it is surely this ancient Basque people, +whose greatest contemporary figure is perhaps Don Miguel de Unamuno. I +am merely setting down that intuitional fact for what it may be worth, +though I do not hide my opinion that such promptings of the inner, +untutored man are worth more than cavefuls of bones and tombfuls of +undecipherable papers. + +This reminiscence, moreover, which springs up into the light of my +memory every time I think of Don Miguel de Unamuno, has to my mind a +further value in that in it the image of Don Miguel does not appear as +evoked by one man, but by many, though many of one species, many who in +depth are but one man, one type, the Welsh divine. Now, this unity +underlying a multiplicity, these many faces, moods, and movements, +traceable to one only type, I find deeply connected in my mind with +Unamuno's person and with what he signifies in Spanish life and letters. +And when I further delve into my impression, I first realize an +undoubtedly physical relation between the many-one Welsh divines and the +many-one Unamuno. A tall, broad-shouldered, bony man, with high cheeks, +a beak-like nose, pointed grey beard, and a complexion the colour of the +red hematites on which Bilbao, his native town, is built, and which +Bilbao ruthlessly plucks from its very body to exchange for gold in the +markets of England--and in the deep sockets under the high aggressive +forehead prolonged by short iron-grey hair, two eyes like gimlets +eagerly watching the world through spectacles which seem to be purposely +pointed at the object like microscopes; a fighting expression, but of +noble fighting, above the prizes of the passing world, the contempt for +which is shown in a peculiar attire whose blackness invades even that +little triangle of white which worldly men leave on their breast for the +necktie of frivolity and the decorations of vanity, and, blinding it, +leaves but the thinnest rim of white collar to emphasize, rather than +relieve, the priestly effect of the whole. Such is Don Miguel de +Unamuno. + +Such is, rather, his photograph. For Unamuno himself is ever changing. A +talker, as all good Spaniards are nowadays, but a talker in earnest and +with his heart in it, he is varied, like the subjects of his +conversation, and, still more, like the passions which they awake in +him. And here I find an unsought reason in intellectual support of that +intuitional observation which I noted down in starting--that Unamuno +resembles the Welsh in that he is not ashamed of showing his +passions--a thing which he has often to do, for he is very much alive +and feels therefore plenty of them. But a word of caution may here be +necessary, since that term, "passion," having been diminished--that is, +made meaner--by the world, an erroneous impression might be conveyed by +what precedes, of the life and ways of Unamuno. So that it may not be +superfluous to say that Don Miguel de Unamuno is a Professor of Greek in +the University of Salamanca, an ex-Rector of it who left behind the +reputation of being a strong ruler; a father of a numerous family, and a +man who has sung the quiet and deep joys of married life with a +restraint, a vigour, and a nobility which it would be difficult to match +in any literature. _Yet_ a passionate man--or, as he would perhaps +prefer to say, _therefore_ a passionate man. But in a major, not in a +minor key; of strong, not of weak passions. + +The difference between the two lies perhaps in that the man with strong +passions lives them, while the man with weak passions is lived by them, +so that while weak passions paralyze the will, strong passions urge man +to action. It is such an urge towards life, such a vitality ever awake, +which inspires Unamuno's multifarious activities in the realm of the +mind. The duties of his chair of Greek are the first claim upon his +time. But then, his reading is prodigious, as any reader of this book +will realize for himself. Not only is he familiar with the +stock-in-trade of every intellectual worker--the Biblical, Greek, Roman, +and Italian cultures--but there is hardly anything worth reading in +Europe and America which he has not read, and, but for the Slav +languages, in the original. Though never out of Spain, and seldom out of +Salamanca, he has succeeded in establishing direct connections with most +of the intellectual leaders of the world, and in gathering an +astonishingly accurate knowledge of the spirit and literature of foreign +peoples. It was in his library at Salamanca that he once explained to +an Englishman the meaning of a particular Scotticism in Robert Burns; +and it was there that he congratulated another Englishman on his having +read _Rural Rides_, "the hall-mark," he said, "of the man of letters who +is no mere man of letters, but also a man." From that corner of Castile, +he has poured out his spirit in essays, poetry, criticism, novels, +philosophy, lectures, and public meetings, and that daily toil of press +article writing which is the duty rather than the privilege of most +present-day writers in Spain. Such are the many faces, moods, and +movements in which Unamuno appears before Spain and the world. And yet, +despite this multiplicity and this dispersion, the dominant impression +which his personality leaves behind is that of a vigorous unity, an +unswerving concentration both of mind and purpose. Bagaria, the national +caricaturist, a genius of rhythm and character which the war revealed, +but who was too good not to be overshadowed by the facile art of +Raemaekers (imagine Goya overshadowed by Reynolds!), once represented +Unamuno as an owl. A marvellous thrust at the heart of Unamuno's +character. For all this vitality and ever-moving activity of mind is +shot through by the absolute immobility of two owlish eyes piercing the +darkness of spiritual night. And this intense gaze into the mystery is +the steel axis round which his spirit revolves and revolves in +desperation; the unity under his multiplicity; the one fire under his +passions and the inspiration of his whole work and life. + + * * * * * + +It was Unamuno himself who once said that the Basque is the alkaloid of +the Spaniard. The saying is true, so far as it goes. But it would be +more accurate to say "one of the two alkaloids." It is probable that if +the Spanish character were analyzed--always provided that the +Mediterranean aspect of it be left aside as a thing apart--two main +principles would be recognized in it--_i.e._, the Basque, richer in +concentration, substance, strength; and the Andalusian, more given to +observation, grace, form. The two types are to this day socially +opposed. The Andalusian is a people which has lived down many +civilizations, and in which even illiterate peasants possess a kind of +innate education. The Basques are a primitive people of mountaineers and +fishermen, in which even scholars have a peasant-like roughness not +unlike the roughness of Scotch tweeds--or character. It is the even +balancing of these two elements--the force of the Northerner with the +grace of the Southerner--which gives the Castilian his admirable poise +and explains the graceful virility of men such as Fray Luis de Leon and +the feminine strength of women such as Queen Isabel and Santa Teresa. We +are therefore led to expect in so forcible a representative of the +Basque race as Unamuno the more substantial and earnest features of the +Spanish spirit. + +Our expectation is not disappointed. And to begin with it appears in +that very concentration of his mind and soul on the mystery of man's +destiny on earth. Unamuno is in earnest, in dead earnest, as to this +matter. This earnestness is a distinct Spanish, nay, Basque feature in +him. There is something of the stern attitude of Loyola about his +"tragic sense of life," and on this subject--under one form or another, +his only subject--he admits no joke, no flippancy, no subterfuge. A true +heir of those great Spanish saints and mystics whose lifework was +devoted to the exploration of the kingdoms of faith, he is more human +than they in that he has lost hold of the firm ground where they had +stuck their anchor. Yet, though loose in the modern world, he refuses to +be drawn away from the main business of the Christian, the saving of his +soul, which, in his interpretation, means the conquest of his +immortality, his own immortality. + +An individualist. Certainly. And he proudly claims the title. Nothing +more refreshing in these days of hoggish communistic cant than this +great voice asserting the divine, the eternal rights of the individual. +But it is not with political rights that he is concerned. Political +individualism, when not a mere blind for the unlimited freedom of civil +privateering, is but the outcome of that abstract idea of man which he +so energetically condemns as pedantic--that is, inhuman. His opposition +of the individual to society is not that of a puerile anarchist to a no +less puerile socialist. There is nothing childish about Unamuno. His +assertion that society is for the individual, not the individual for +society, is made on a transcendental plane. It is not the argument of +liberty against authority--which can be easily answered on the +rationalistic plane by showing that authority is in its turn the liberty +of the social or collective being, a higher, more complex, and +longer-living "individual" than the individual pure and simple. It is +rather the unanswerable argument of eternity against duration. Now that +argument must rest on a religious basis. And it is on a religious basis +that Unamuno founds his individualism. Hence the true Spanish flavour of +his social theory, which will not allow itself to be set down and +analyzed into principles of ethics and politics, with their inevitable +tendency to degenerate into mere economics, but remains free and fluid +and absolute, like the spirit. + +Such an individualism has therefore none of the features of that +childish half-thinking which inspires most anarchists. It is, on the +contrary, based on high thinking, the highest of all, that which refuses +to dwell on anything less than man's origin and destination. We are here +confronted with that humanistic tendency of the Spanish mind which can +be observed as the dominant feature of her arts and literature. All +races are of course predominantly concerned with man. But they all +manifest their concern with a difference. Man is in Spain a concrete +being, the man of flesh and bones, and the whole man. He is neither +subtilized into an idea by pure thinking nor civilized into a gentleman +by social laws and prejudices. Spanish art and letters deal with +concrete, tangible persons. Now, there is no more concrete, no more +tangible person for every one of us than ourself. Unamuno is therefore +right in the line of Spanish tradition in dealing predominantly--one +might almost say always--with his own person. The feeling of the +awareness of one's own personality has seldom been more forcibly +expressed than by Unamuno. This is primarily due to the fact that he is +himself obsessed by it. But in his expression of it Unamuno derives also +some strength from his own sense of matter and the material--again a +typically Spanish element of his character. Thus his human beings are as +much body as soul, or rather body and soul all in one, a union which he +admirably renders by bold mixtures of physical and spiritual metaphors, +as in _gozarse uno la carne del alma_ (to enjoy the flesh of one's own +soul). + +In fact, Unamuno, as a true Spaniard which he is, refuses to surrender +life to ideas, and that is why he runs shy of abstractions, in which he +sees but shrouds wherewith we cover dead thoughts. He is solely +concerned with his own life, nothing but his life, and the whole of his +life. An egotistical position? Perhaps. Unamuno, however, can and does +answer the charge. We can only know and feel humanity in the one human +being which we have at hand. It is by penetrating deep into ourselves +that we find our brothers in us--branches of the same trunk which can +only touch each other by seeking their common origin. This searching +within, Unamuno has undertaken with a sincerity, a fearlessness which +cannot be excelled. Nowhere will the reader find the inner +contradictions of a modern human being, who is at the same time healthy +and capable of thought set down with a greater respect for truth. Here +the uncompromising tendency of the Spanish race, whose eyes never turn +away from nature, however unwelcome the sight, is strengthened by that +passion for life which burns in Unamuno. The suppression of the +slightest thought or feeling for the sake of intellectual order would +appear to him as a despicable worldly trick. Thus it is precisely +because he does sincerely feel a passionate love of his own life that he +thinks out with such scrupulous accuracy every argument which he finds +in his mind--his own mind, a part of his life--against the possibility +of life after death; but it is also because he feels that, despite such +conclusive arguments, his will to live perseveres, that he refuses to +his intellect the power to kill his faith. A knight-errant of the +spirit, as he himself calls the Spanish mystics, he starts for his +adventures after having, like Hernan Cortes, burnt his ships. But, is it +necessary to enhance his figure by literary comparison? He is what he +wants to be, a man--in the striking expression which he chose as a title +for one of his short stories, _nothing less than a whole man_. Not a +mere thinking machine, set to prove a theory, nor an actor on the world +stage, singing a well-built poem, well built at the price of many a +compromise; but a whole man, with all his affirmations and all his +negations, all the pitiless thoughts of a penetrating mind that denies, +and all the desperate self-assertions of a soul that yearns for eternal +life. + +This strife between enemy truths, the truth thought and the truth felt, +or, as he himself puts it, between veracity and sincerity, is Unamuno's +_raison d'etre_. And it is because the "_Tragic Sense of Life_" is the +most direct expression of it that this book is his masterpiece. The +conflict is here seen as reflected in the person of the author. The book +opens by a definition of the Spanish man, the "man of flesh and bones," +illustrated by the consideration of the real living men who stood behind +the bookish figures of great philosophers and consciously or +unconsciously shaped and misshaped their doctrines in order to satisfy +their own vital yearnings. This is followed by the statement of the will +to live or hunger for immortality, in the course of which the usual +subterfuges with which this all-important issue is evaded in philosophy, +theology, or mystic literature, are exposed and the real, concrete, +"flesh and bones" character of the immortality which men desire is +reaffirmed. The Catholic position is then explained as the _vital_ +attitude in the matter, summed up in Tertullian's _Credo quia absurdum_, +and this is opposed to the critical attitude which denies the +possibility of individual survival in the sense previously defined. Thus +Unamuno leads us to his inner deadlock: his reason can rise no higher +than scepticism, and, unable to become vital, dies sterile; his faith, +exacting anti-rational affirmations and unable therefore to be +apprehended by the logical mind, remains incommunicable. From the bottom +of this abyss Unamuno builds up his theory of life. But is it a theory? +Unamuno does not claim for it such an intellectual dignity. He knows too +well that in the constructive part of his book his vital self takes the +leading part and repeatedly warns his reader of the fact, lest critical +objections might be raised against this or that assumption or +self-contradiction. It is on the survival of his will to live, after all +the onslaughts of his critical intellect, that he finds the basis for +his belief--or rather for his effort to believe. Self-compassion leads +to self-love, and this self-love, founded as it is on a universal +conflict, widens into love of all that lives and therefore wants to +survive. So, by an act of love, springing from our own hunger for +immortality, we are led to give a conscience to the Universe--that is, +to create God. + +Such is the process by which Unamuno, from the transcendental pessimism +of his inner contradiction, extracts an everyday optimism founded on +love. His symbol of this attitude is the figure of Don Quixote, of whom +he truly says that his creed "can hardly be called idealism, since he +did not fight for ideas: it was spiritualism, for he fought for the +spirit." Thus he opposes a synthetical to an analytical attitude; a +religious to an ethico-scientific ideal; Spain, his Spain--_i.e._, the +spiritual manifestation of the Spanish race--to Europe, his +Europe--_i.e._, the intellectual manifestation of the white race, which +he sees in Franco-Germany; and heroic love, even when comically +unpractical, to culture, which, in this book, written in 1912, is +already prophetically spelt Kultura. + +This courageous work is written in a style which is the man--for +Buffon's saying, seldom true, applies here to the letter. It is written +as Carlyle wrote, not merely with the brain, but with the whole soul and +the whole body of the man, and in such a vivid manner that one can +without much effort imagine the eager gesticulation which now and then +underlines, interprets, despises, argues, denies, and above all asserts. +In his absolute subservience to the matter in hand this manner of +writing has its great precedent in Santa Teresa. The differences, and +they are considerable, are not of art, absent in either case, but of +nature. They are such deep and obvious differences as obtain between the +devout, ignorant, graceful nun of sixteenth-century Avila and the +free-thinking, learned, wilful professor of twentieth-century Salamanca. +In the one case, as in the other, the language is the most direct and +simple required. It is also the least literary and the most popular. +Unamuno, who lives in close touch with the people, has enriched the +Spanish literary language by returning to it many a popular term. His +vocabulary abounds in racy words of the soil, and his writings gain from +them an almost peasant-like pith and directness which suits his own +Basque primitive nature. His expression occurs simultaneously with the +thoughts and feelings to be expressed, the flow of which, but loosely +controlled by the critical mind, often breaks through the meshes of +established diction and gives birth to new forms created under the +pressure of the moment. This feature Unamuno has also in common with +Santa Teresa, but what in the Saint was a self-ignorant charm becomes in +Unamuno a deliberate manner inspired, partly by an acute sense of the +symbolical and psychological value of word-connections, partly by that +genuine need for expansion of the language which all true original +thinkers or "feelers" must experience, but partly also by an acquired +habit of juggling with words which is but natural in a philologist +endowed with a vigorous imagination. Unamuno revels in words. He +positively enjoys stretching them beyond their usual meaning, twisting +them, composing, opposing, and transposing them in all sorts of possible +ways. This game--not wholly unrewarded now and then by striking +intellectual finds--seems to be the only relaxation which he allows his +usually austere mind. It certainly is the only light feature of a style +the merit of which lies in its being the close-fitting expression of a +great mind earnestly concentrated on a great idea. + + * * * * * + +The earnestness, the intensity, and the oneness of his predominant +passion are the main cause of the strength of Unamuno's philosophic +work. They remain his main asset, yet become also the principal cause of +his weakness, as a creative artist. Great art can only flourish in the +temperate zone of the passions, on the return journey from the torrid. +Unamuno, as a creator, has none of the failings of those artists who +have never felt deeply. But he does show the limitations of those +artists who cannot cool down. And the most striking of them is that at +bottom he is seldom able to put himself in a purely esthetical mood. In +this, as in many other features, Unamuno curiously resembles +Wordsworth--whom, by the way, he is one of the few Spaniards to read +and appreciate.[1] Like him, Unamuno is an essentially purposeful and +utilitarian mind. Of the two qualities which the work of art requires +for its inception--earnestness and detachment--both Unamuno and +Wordsworth possess the first; both are deficient in the second. Their +interest in their respective leading thought--survival in the first, +virtue in the second--is too direct, too pressing, to allow them the +"distance" necessary for artistic work. Both are urged to work by a +lofty utilitarianism--the search for God through the individual soul in +Unamuno, the search for God through the social soul in Wordsworth--so +that their thoughts and sensations are polarized and their spirit loses +that impartial transparence for nature's lights without which no great +art is possible. Once suggested, this parallel is too rich in sidelights +to be lightly dropped. This single-mindedness which distinguishes them +explains that both should have consciously or unconsciously chosen a +life of semi-seclusion, for Unamuno lives in Salamanca very much as +Wordsworth lived in the Lake District-- + + in a still retreat + Sheltered, but not to social duties lost, + +hence in both a certain proclivity towards ploughing a solitary furrow +and becoming self-centred. There are no doubt important differences. The +Englishman's sense of nature is both keener and more concrete; while the +Spaniard's knowledge of human nature is not barred by the subtle +inhibitions and innate limitations which tend to blind its more +unpleasant aspects to the eye of the Englishman. There is more courage +and passion in the Spaniard; more harmony and goodwill in the +Englishman; the one is more like fire, the other like light. For +Wordsworth, a poem is above all an essay, a means for conveying a lesson +in forcible and easily remembered terms to those who are in need of +improvement. For Unamuno, a poem or a novel (and he holds that a novel +is but a poem) is the outpouring of a man's passion, the overflow of the +heart which cannot help itself and lets go. And it may be that the +essential difference between the two is to be found in this difference +between their respective purposes: Unamuno's purpose is more intimately +personal and individual; Wordsworth's is more social and objective. Thus +both miss the temperate zone, where emotion takes shape into the moulds +of art; but while Wordsworth is driven by his ideal of social service +this side of it, into the cold light of both moral and intellectual +self-control, Unamuno remains beyond, where the molten metal is too near +the fire of passion, and cannot cool down into shape. + +Unamuno is therefore not unlike Wordsworth in the insufficiency of his +sense of form. We have just seen the essential cause of this +insufficiency to lie in the nonesthetical attitude of his mind, and we +have tried to show one of the roots of such an attitude in the very +loftiness and earnestness of his purpose. Yet, there are others, for +living nature is many-rooted as it is many-branched. It cannot be +doubted that a certain refractoriness to form is a typical feature of +the Basque character. The sense of form is closely in sympathy with the +feminine element in human nature, and the Basque race is strongly +masculine. The predominance of the masculine element--strength without +grace--is as typical of Unamuno as it is of Wordsworth. The literary +gifts which might for the sake of synthesis be symbolized in a smile are +absent in both. There is as little humour in the one as in the other. +Humour, however, sometimes occurs in Unamuno, but only in his +ill-humoured moments, and then with a curious bite of its own which adds +an unconscious element to its comic effect. Grace only visits them in +moments of inspiration, and then it is of a noble character, enhanced as +it is by the ever-present gift of strength. And as for the sense for +rhythm and music, both Unamuno and Wordsworth seem to be limited to the +most vigorous and masculine gaits. This feature is particularly +pronounced in Unamuno, for while Wordsworth is painstaking, +all-observant, and too good a "teacher" to underestimate the importance +of pleasure in man's progress, Unamuno knows no compromise. His aim is +not to please but to strike, and he deliberately seeks the naked, the +forceful, even the brutal word for truth. There is in him, however, a +cause of formlessness from which Wordsworth is free--namely, an +eagerness for sincerity and veracity which brushes aside all +preparation, ordering or planning of ideas as suspect of "dishing up," +intellectual trickery, and juggling with spontaneous truths. + + * * * * * + +Such qualities--both the positive and the negative--are apparent in his +poetry. In it, the appeal of force and sincerity is usually stronger +than that of art. This is particularly the case in his first volume +(_Poesias_, 1907), in which a lofty inspiration, a noble attitude of +mind, a rich and racy vocabulary, a keen insight into the spirit of +places, and above all the overflowing vitality of a strong man in the +force of ripeness, contend against the still awkward gait of the Basque +and a certain rebelliousness of rhyme. The dough of the poetic language +is here seen heavily pounded by a powerful hand, bent on reducing its +angularities and on improving its plasticity. Nor do we need to wait for +further works in order to enjoy the reward of such efforts, for it is +attained in this very volume more than once, as for instance in _Muere +en el mar el ave que volo del nido_, a beautiful poem in which emotion +and thought are happily blended into exquisite form. + +In his last poem, _El Cristo de Velazquez_ (1920), Unamuno undertakes +the task of giving a poetical rendering of his tragic sense of life, in +the form of a meditation on the Christ of Velazquez, the beautiful and +pathetic picture in the Prado. Why Velazquez's and not Christ himself? +The fact is that, though in his references to actual forms, Unamuno +closely follows Velazquez's picture, the spiritual interpretation of it +which he develops as the poem unfolds itself is wholly personal. It +would be difficult to find two great Spaniards wider apart than Unamuno +and Velazquez, for if Unamuno is the very incarnation of the masculine +spirit of the North--all strength and substance--Velazquez is the image +of the feminine spirit of the South--all grace and form. Velazquez is a +limpid mirror, with a human depth, yet a mirror. That Unamuno has +departed from the image of Christ which the great Sevillian reflected on +his immortal canvas was therefore to be expected. But then Unamuno has, +while speaking of Don Quixote, whom he has also freely and personally +interpreted,[2] taken great care to point out that a work of art is, for +each of us, all that we see in it. And, moreover, Unamuno has not so +much departed from Velazquez's image of Christ as delved into its +depths, expanded, enlarged it, or, if you prefer, seen in its limpid +surface the immense figure of his own inner Christ. However free and +unorthodox in its wide scope of images and ideas, the poem is in its +form a regular meditation in the manner approved by the Catholic Church, +and it is therefore meet that it should rise from a concrete, tangible +object as it is recommended to the faithful. To this concrete character +of its origin, the poem owes much of its suggestiveness, as witness the +following passage quoted here, with a translation sadly unworthy of the +original, as being the clearest link between the poetical meditation +and the main thought that underlies all the work and the life of +Unamuno. + +NUBE NEGRA + + O es que una nube negra de los cielos + ese negror le dio a tu cabellera + de nazareno, cual de mustio sauce + de una noche sin luna sobre el rio? + ?Es la sombra del ala sin perfiles + del angel de la nada negadora, + de Luzbel, que en su caida inacabable + --fondo no puede dar--su eterna cuita + clava en tu frente, en tu razon? ?Se vela, + el claro Verbo en Ti con esa nube, + negra cual de Luzbel las negras alas, + mientras brilla el Amor, todo desnudo, + con tu desnudo pecho por cendal? + +BLACK CLOUD + + Or was it then that a black cloud from heaven + Such blackness gave to your Nazarene's hair, + As of a languid willow o'er the river + Brooding in moonless night? Is it the shadow + Of the profileless wing of Luzbel, the Angel + Of denying nothingness, endlessly falling-- + Bottom he ne'er can touch--whose grief eternal + He nails on to Thy forehead, to Thy reason? + Is the clear Word in Thee with that cloud veiled + --A cloud as black as the black wings of Luzbel-- + While Love shines naked within Thy naked breast? + +The poem, despite its length, easily maintains this lofty level +throughout, and if he had written nothing else Unamuno would still +remain as having given to Spanish letters the noblest and most sustained +lyrical flight in the language. It abounds in passages of ample beauty +and often strikes a note of primitive strength in the true Old Testament +style. It is most distinctively a poem in a major key, in a group with +_Paradise Lost_ and _The Excursion_, but in a tone halfway between the +two; and, as coming from the most Northern-minded and substantial poet +that Spain ever had, wholly free from that tendency towards +grandiloquence and Ciceronian drapery which blighted previous similar +efforts in Spain. Its weakness lies in a certain monotony due to the +interplay of Unamuno's two main limitations as an artist: the absolute +surrender to one dominant thought and a certain deficiency of form +bordering here on contempt. The plan is but a loose sequence of +meditations on successive aspects of Christ as suggested by images or +advocations of His divine person, or even of parts of His human body: +Lion, Bull, Lily, Sword, Crown, Head, Knees. Each meditation is treated +in a period of blank verse, usually of a beautiful texture, the +splendour of which is due less to actual images than to the inner vigour +of ideas and the eagerness with which even the simplest facts are +interpreted into significant symbols. Yet, sometimes, this blank verse +becomes hard and stony under the stubborn hammering of a too insistent +mind, and the device of ending each meditation with a line accented on +its last syllable tends but to increase the monotony of the whole. + +Blank verse is never the best medium for poets of a strong masculine +inspiration, for it does not sufficiently correct their usual deficiency +in form. Such poets are usually at their best when they bind themselves +to the discipline of existing forms and particularly when they limit the +movements of their muse to the "sonnet's scanty plot of ground." +Unamuno's best poetry, as Wordsworth's, is in his sonnets. His _Rosario +de Sonetos Liricos_, published in 1911, contains some of the finest +sonnets in the Spanish language. There is variety in this volume--more +at least than is usual in Unamuno: from comments on events of local +politics (sonnet lii.) which savour of the more prosaic side of +Wordsworth, to meditations on space and time such as that sonnet +xxxvii., so reminiscent of Shelley's _Ozymandias of Egypt_; from a +suggestive homily to a "Don Juan of Ideas" whose thirst for knowledge is +"not love of truth, but intellectual lust," and whose "thought is +therefore sterile" (sonnet cvii.), to an exquisitely rendered moonlight +love scene (sonnet civ.). The author's main theme itself, which of +course occupies a prominent part in the series, appears treated under +many different lights and in genuinely poetical moods which truly do +justice to the inherent wealth of poetical inspiration which it +contains. Many a sonnet might be quoted here, and in particular that +sombre and fateful poem _Nihil Novum sub Sole_ (cxxiii.), which defeats +its own theme by the striking originality of its inspiration. + +So active, so positive is the inspiration of this poetry that the +question of outside influences does not even arise. Unamuno is probably +the Spanish contemporary poet whose manner owes least, if anything at +all, to modern developments of poetry such as those which take their +source in Baudelaire and Verlaine. These over-sensitive and over-refined +artists have no doubt enriched the sensuous, the formal, the +sentimental, even the intellectual aspects of verse with an admirable +variety of exquisite shades, lacking which most poetry seems +old-fashioned to the fastidious palate of modern men. Unamuno is too +genuine a representative of the spiritual and masculine variety of +Spanish genius, ever impervious to French, and generally, to +intellectual, influences, to be affected by the esthetic excellence of +this art. Yet, for all his disregard of the modern resources which it +adds to the poetic craft, Unamuno loses none of his modernity. He is +indeed more than modern. When, as he often does, he strikes the true +poetic note, he is outside time. His appeal is not in complexity but in +strength. He is not refined: he is final. + + * * * * * + +In the Preface to his _Tres Novelas Ejemplares y un Prologo_ (1921) +Unamuno says: " ... novelist--that is, poet ... a novel--that is, a +poem." Thus, with characteristic decision, he sides with the lyrical +conception of the novel. There is of course an infinite variety of +types of novels. But they can probably all be reduced to two +classes--_i.e._, the dramatic or objective, and the lyrical or +subjective, according to the mood or inspiration which predominates in +them. The present trend of the world points towards the dramatic or +objective type. This type is more in tune with the detached and +scientific character of the age. The novel is often nowadays considered +as a document, a "slice of life," a piece of information, a literary +photograph representing places and people which purse or time prevents +us from seeing with our own eyes. It is obvious, given what we now know +of him, that such a view of the novel cannot appeal to Unamuno. He is a +utilitarian, but not of worldly utilities. His utilitarianism transcends +our daily wants and seeks to provide for our eternal ones. He is, +moreover, a mind whose workings turn in spiral form towards a central +idea and therefore feels an instinctive antagonism to the dispersive +habits of thought and sensation which such detailed observation of life +usually entails. For at bottom the opposition between the lyrical and +the dramatic novel may be reduced to that between the poet and the +dramatist. Both the dramatist and the poet create in order to link up +their soul and the world in one complete circle of experience, but this +circle is travelled in opposite directions. The poet goes inwards first, +then out to nature full of his inner experience, and back home. The +dramatist goes outwards first, then comes back to himself, his harvest +of wisdom gathered in reality. It is the recognition of his own lyrical +inward-looking nature which makes Unamuno pronounce the identity of the +novel and the poem. + +Whatever we may think of it as a general theory, there is little doubt +that this opinion is in the main sound in so far as it refers to +Unamuno's own work. His novels are created within. They are--and their +author is the first to declare it so--novels which happen in the +kingdom of the spirit. Outward points of reference in time and space +are sparingly given--in fact, reduced to a bare minimum. In some of +them, as for instance _Niebla_ (1914), the name of the town in which the +action takes place is not given, and such scanty references to the +topography and general features as are supplied would equally apply to +any other provincial town of Spain. Action, in the current sense of the +word, is correspondingly simplified, since the material and local +elements on which it usually exerts itself are schematized, and in their +turn made, as it were, spiritual. Thus a street, a river of colour for +some, for others a series of accurately described shops and dwellings, +becomes in Unamuno (see _Niebla_) a loom where the passions and desires +of men and women cross and recross each other and weave the cloth of +daily life. Even the physical description of characters is reduced to a +standard of utmost simplicity. So that, in fine, Unamuno's novels, by +eliminating all other material, appear, if the boldness of the metaphor +be permitted, as the spiritual skeletons of novels, conflicts between +souls. + +Nor is this the last stage in his deepening and narrowing of the +creative furrow. For these souls are in their turn concentrated so that +the whole of their vitality burns into one passion. If a somewhat +fanciful comparison from another art may throw any light on this feature +of his work we might say that his characters are to those of Galdos, for +instance, as counterpoint music to the complex modern symphony. Joaquin +Monegro, the true hero of his _Abel Sanchez_ (1917), is the +personification of hatred. Raquel in _Dos Madres_[1] and Catalina in _El +Marques de Lumbria_[1] are two widely different but vigorous, almost +barbarous, "maternities." Alejandro, the hero of his powerful _Nada +Menos que Todo un Hombre_,[3] is masculine will, pure and unconquerable, +save by death. Further still, in most if not all of his main +characters, we can trace the dominant passion which is their whole being +to a mere variety of the one and only passion which obsesses Unamuno +himself, the hunger for life, a full life, here and after. Here is, for +instance, _Abel Sanchez_, a sombre study of hatred, a modern paraphrase +of the story of Cain. Joaquin Monegro, the Cain of the novel, has been +reading Byron's poem, and writes in his diary: "It was when I read how +Lucifer declared to Cain that he, Cain, was immortal, that I began in +terror to wonder whether I also was immortal and whether in me would be +also immortal my hatred. 'Have I a soul?' I said to myself then. 'Is +this my hatred soul?' And I came to think that it could not be +otherwise, that such a hatred cannot be the function of a body.... A +corruptible organism could not hate as I hated." + +Thus Joaquin Monegro, like every other main character in his work, +appears preoccupied by the same central preoccupation of Unamuno. In one +word, all Unamuno's characters are but incarnations of himself. But that +is what we expected to find in a lyrical novelist. + +There are critics who conclude from this observation that these +characters do not exist, that they are mere arguments on legs, +personified ideas. Here and there, in Unamuno's novels, there are +passages which lend some colour of plausibility to this view. Yet, it is +in my opinion mistaken. Unamuno's characters may be schematized, +stripped of their complexities, reduced to the mainspring of their +nature; they may, moreover, reveal mainsprings made of the same steel. +But that they are alive no one could deny who has a sense for life. The +very restraint in the use of physical details which Unamuno has made a +feature of his creative work may have led his critics to forget the +intensity of those--admirably chosen--which are given. It is significant +that the eyes play an important part in his description of characters +and in his narrative too. His sense of the interpenetration of body and +soul is so deep that he does not for one moment let us forget how bodily +his "souls" are, and how pregnant with spiritual significance is every +one of their words and gestures. No. These characters are not arguments +on legs. They truly are men and women of "flesh and bones," human, +terribly human. + +In thus emphasizing a particular feature in their nature, Unamuno +imparts to his creations a certain deformity which savours of romantic +days. Yet Unamuno is not a romanticist, mainly because Romanticism was +an esthetic attitude, and his attitude is seldom purely esthetic. For +all their show of passion, true Romanticists seldom gave their real +selves to their art. They created a stage double of their own selves for +public exhibitions. They sought the picturesque. Their form was lyrical, +but their substance was dramatic. Unamuno, on the contrary, even though +he often seeks expression in dramatic form, is essentially lyrical. And +if he is always intense, he never is exuberant. He follows the Spanish +tradition for restraint--for there is one, along its opposite tradition +for grandiloquence--and, true to the spirit of it, he seeks the maximum +of effect through the minimum of means. Then, he never shouts. Here is +an example of his quiet method, the rhythmical beauty of which is +unfortunately almost untranslatable: + +"Y asi pasaron dias de llanto y de negrura hasta que las lagrimas fueron +yendose hacia adentro y la casa fue derritiendo los negrores" (_Niebla_) +(And thus, days of weeping and mourning went by, till the tears began to +flow inward and the blackness to melt in the home). + + * * * * * + +Miguel de Unamuno is to-day the greatest literary figure of Spain. +Baroja may surpass him in variety of external experience, Azorin in +delicate art, Ortega y Gasset in philosophical subtlety, Ayala in +intellectual elegance, Valle Inclan in rhythmical grace. Even in +vitality he may have to yield the first place to that over-whelming +athlete of literature, Blasco Ibanez. But Unamuno is head and shoulders +above them all in the highness of his purpose and in the earnestness and +loyalty with which, Quixote-like, he has served all through his life his +unattainable Dulcinea. Then there is another and most important reason +which explains his position as first, _princeps_, of Spanish letters, +and it is that Unamuno, by the cross which he has chosen to bear, +incarnates the spirit of modern Spain. His eternal conflict between +faith and reason, between life and thought, between spirit and +intellect, between heaven and civilization, is the conflict of Spain +herself. A border country, like Russia, in which East and West mix their +spiritual waters, Spain wavers between two life-philosophies and cannot +rest. In Russia, this conflict emerges in literature during the +nineteenth century, when Dostoievsky and Tolstoy stand for the East +while Turgeniev becomes the West's advocate. In Spain, a country less +articulate, and, moreover, a country in which the blending of East and +West is more intimate, for both found a common solvent in centuries of +Latin civilization, the conflict is less clear, less on the surface. +To-day Ortega y Gasset is our Turgeniev--not without mixture. Unamuno is +our Dostoievsky, but painfully aware of the strength of the other side +within him, and full of misgivings. Nor is it sure that when we speak of +East in this connection we really mean East. There is a third country in +Europe in which the "Eastern" view is as forcibly put and as deeply +understood as the "Western," a third border country--England. England, +particularly in those of her racial elements conventionally named +Celtic, is closely in sympathy with the "East." Ireland is almost purely +"Eastern" in this respect. That is perhaps why Unamuno feels so strong +an attraction for the English language and its literature, and why, even +to this day, he follows so closely the movements of English thought.[4] +For his own nature, of a human being astride two enemy ideals, draws him +instinctively towards minds equally placed in opposition, yet a +co-operating opposition, to progress. Thus Unamuno, whose literary +qualities and defects make him a genuine representative of the more +masculine variety of the Spanish genius, becomes in his spiritual life +the true living symbol of his country and his time. And that he is great +enough to bear this incarnation is a sufficient measure of his +greatness. + +S. DE MADARIAGA. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] In what follows, I confess to refer not so much to the generally +admitted opinion on Wordsworth as to my own views on him and his poetry, +which I tried to explain in my essay: "The Case of Wordsworth" (_Shelley +and Calderon, and other Essays_, Constable and Co., 1920). + +[2] _Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho, explicada y comentada_, por M. de +Unamuno: Madrid, Fernando Fe, 1905. + +[3] These three novels appeared together as _Tres Novelas y un Prologo_ +Calpe, Madrid, 1921. + +[4] "Me va interesando ese Dean Inge," he wrote to me last year. + + + + +AUTHOR'S PREFACE + + +I intended at first to write a short Prologue to this English +translation of my _Del Sentimiento Tragico de la Vida_, which has been +undertaken by my friend Mr. J.E. Crawford Flitch. But upon further +consideration I have abandoned the idea, for I reflected that after all +I wrote this book not for Spaniards only, but for all civilized and +Christian men--Christian in particular, whether consciously so or +not--of whatever country they may be. + +Furthermore, if I were to set about writing an Introduction in the light +of all that we see and feel now, after the Great War, and, still more, +of what we foresee and forefeel, I should be led into writing yet +another book. And that is a thing to be done with deliberation and only +after having better digested this terrible peace, which is nothing else +but the war's painful convalescence. + +As for many years my spirit has been nourished upon the very core of +English literature--evidence of which the reader may discover in the +following pages--the translator, in putting my _Sentimiento Tragico_ +into English, has merely converted not a few of the thoughts and +feelings therein expressed back into their original form of expression. +Or retranslated them, perhaps. Whereby they emerge other than they +originally were, for an idea does not pass from one language to another +without change. + +The fact that this English translation has been carefully revised here, +in my house in this ancient city of Salamanca, by the translator and +myself, implies not merely some guarantee of exactitude, but also +something more--namely, a correction, in certain respects, of the +original. + +The truth is that, being an incorrigible Spaniard, I am naturally given +to a kind of extemporization and to neglectfulness of a filed niceness +in my works. For this reason my original work--and likewise the Italian +and French translations of it--issued from the press with a certain +number of errors, obscurities, and faulty references. The labour which +my friend Mr. J.E. Crawford Flitch fortunately imposed upon me in making +me revise his translation obliged me to correct these errors, to clarify +some obscurities, and to give greater exactitude to certain quotations +from foreign writers. Hence this English translation of my _Sentimiento +Tragico_ presents in some ways a more purged and correct text than that +of the original Spanish. This perhaps compensates for what it may lose +in the spontaneity of my Spanish thought, which at times, I believe, is +scarcely translatable. + +It would advantage me greatly if this translation, in opening up to me a +public of English-speaking readers, should some day lead to my writing +something addressed to and concerned with this public. For just as a new +friend enriches our spirit, not so much by what he gives us of himself, +as by what he causes us to discover in our own selves, something which, +if we had never known him, would have lain in us undeveloped, so it is +with a new public. Perhaps there may be regions in my own Spanish +spirit--my Basque spirit, and therefore doubly Spanish--unexplored by +myself, some corner hitherto uncultivated, which I should have to +cultivate in order to offer the flowers and fruits of it to the peoples +of English speech. + +And now, no more. + +God give my English readers that inextinguishable thirst for truth which +I desire for myself. + +MIGUEL DE UNAMUNO. + +SALAMANCA, +_April, 1921._ + + * * * * * + +TRANSLATOR'S NOTE + +Footnotes added by the Translator, other than those which merely +supplement references to writers or their works mentioned in the text, +are distinguished by his initials. + + + + +I + +THE MAN OF FLESH AND BONE + + +_Homo sum; nihil humani a me alienum puto_, said the Latin playwright. +And I would rather say, _Nullum hominem a me alienum puto_: I am a man; +no other man do I deem a stranger. For to me the adjective _humanus_ is +no less suspect than its abstract substantive _humanitas_, humanity. +Neither "the human" nor "humanity," neither the simple adjective nor the +substantivized adjective, but the concrete substantive--man. The man of +flesh and bone; the man who is born, suffers, and dies--above all, who +dies; the man who eats and drinks and plays and sleeps and thinks and +wills; the man who is seen and heard; the brother, the real brother. + +For there is another thing which is also called man, and he is the +subject of not a few lucubrations, more or less scientific. He is the +legendary featherless biped, the _zoon politikhon_ of Aristotle, +the social contractor of Rousseau, the _homo economicus_ of the +Manchester school, the _homo sapiens_ of Linnaeus, or, if you like, the +vertical mammal. A man neither of here nor there, neither of this age +nor of another, who has neither sex nor country, who is, in brief, +merely an idea. That is to say, a no-man. + +The man we have to do with is the man of flesh and bone--I, you, reader +of mine, the other man yonder, all of us who walk solidly on the earth. + +And this concrete man, this man of flesh and bone, is at once the +subject and the supreme object of all philosophy, whether certain +self-styled philosophers like it or not. + +In most of the histories of philosophy that I know, philosophic systems +are presented to us as if growing out of one another spontaneously, and +their authors, the philosophers, appear only as mere pretexts. The inner +biography of the philosophers, of the men who philosophized, occupies a +secondary place. And yet it is precisely this inner biography that +explains for us most things. + +It behoves us to say, before all, that philosophy lies closer to poetry +than to science. All philosophic systems which have been constructed as +a supreme concord of the final results of the individual sciences have +in every age possessed much less consistency and life than those which +expressed the integral spiritual yearning of their authors. + +And, though they concern us so greatly, and are, indeed, indispensable +for our life and thought, the sciences are in a certain sense more +foreign to us than philosophy. They fulfil a more objective end--that is +to say, an end more external to ourselves. They are fundamentally a +matter of economics. A new scientific discovery, of the kind called +theoretical, is, like a mechanical discovery--that of the steam-engine, +the telephone, the phonograph, or the aeroplane--a thing which is useful +for something else. Thus the telephone may be useful to us in enabling +us to communicate at a distance with the woman we love. But she, +wherefore is she useful to us? A man takes an electric tram to go to +hear an opera, and asks himself, Which, in this case, is the more +useful, the tram or the opera? + +Philosophy answers to our need of forming a complete and unitary +conception of the world and of life, and as a result of this conception, +a feeling which gives birth to an inward attitude and even to outward +action. But the fact is that this feeling, instead of being a +consequence of this conception, is the cause of it. Our +philosophy--that is, our mode of understanding or not understanding the +world and life--springs from our feeling towards life itself. And life, +like everything affective, has roots in subconsciousness, perhaps in +unconsciousness. + +It is not usually our ideas that make us optimists or pessimists, but it +is our optimism or our pessimism, of physiological or perhaps +pathological origin, as much the one as the other, that makes our ideas. + +Man is said to be a reasoning animal. I do not know why he has not been +defined as an affective or feeling animal. Perhaps that which +differentiates him from other animals is feeling rather than reason. +More often I have seen a cat reason than laugh or weep. Perhaps it weeps +or laughs inwardly--but then perhaps, also inwardly, the crab resolves +equations of the second degree. + +And thus, in a philosopher, what must needs most concern us is the man. + +Take Kant, the man Immanuel Kant, who was born and lived at Koenigsberg, +in the latter part of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the +nineteenth. In the philosophy of this man Kant, a man of heart and +head--that is to say, a man--there is a significant somersault, as +Kierkegaard, another man--and what a man!--would have said, the +somersault from the _Critique of Pure Reason_ to the _Critique of +Practical Reason_. He reconstructs in the latter what he destroyed in +the former, in spite of what those may say who do not see the man +himself. After having examined and pulverized with his analysis the +traditional proofs of the existence of God, of the Aristotelian God, who +is the God corresponding to the _zoon politikon_, the abstract +God, the unmoved prime Mover, he reconstructs God anew; but the God of +the conscience, the Author of the moral order--the Lutheran God, in +short. This transition of Kant exists already in embryo in the Lutheran +notion of faith. + +The first God, the rational God, is the projection to the outward +infinite of man as he is by definition--that is to say, of the abstract +man, of the man no-man; the other God, the God of feeling and volition, +is the projection to the inward infinite of man as he is by life, of the +concrete man, the man of flesh and bone. + +Kant reconstructed with the heart that which with the head he had +overthrown. And we know, from the testimony of those who knew him and +from his testimony in his letters and private declarations, that the man +Kant, the more or less selfish old bachelor who professed philosophy at +Koenigsberg at the end of the century of the Encyclopedia and the goddess +of Reason, was a man much preoccupied with the problem--I mean with the +only real vital problem, the problem that strikes at the very root of +our being, the problem of our individual and personal destiny, of the +immortality of the soul. The man Kant was not resigned to die utterly. +And because he was not resigned to die utterly he made that leap, that +immortal somersault,[5] from the one Critique to the other. + +Whosoever reads the _Critique of Practical Reason_ carefully and without +blinkers will see that, in strict fact, the existence of God is therein +deduced from the immortality of the soul, and not the immortality of the +soul from the existence of God. The categorical imperative leads us to a +moral postulate which necessitates in its turn, in the teleological or +rather eschatological order, the immortality of the soul, and in order +to sustain this immortality God is introduced. All the rest is the +jugglery of the professional of philosophy. + +The man Kant felt that morality was the basis of eschatology, but the +professor of philosophy inverted the terms. + +Another professor, the professor and man William James, has somewhere +said that for the generality of men God is the provider of immortality. +Yes, for the generality of men, including the man Kant, the man James, +and the man who writes these lines which you, reader, are reading. + +Talking to a peasant one day, I proposed to him the hypothesis that +there might indeed be a God who governs heaven and earth, a +Consciousness[6] of the Universe, but that for all that the soul of +every man may not be immortal in the traditional and concrete sense. He +replied: "Then wherefore God?" So answered, in the secret tribunal of +their consciousness, the man Kant and the man James. Only in their +capacity as professors they were compelled to justify rationally an +attitude in itself so little rational. Which does not mean, of course, +that the attitude is absurd. + +Hegel made famous his aphorism that all the rational is real and all the +real rational; but there are many of us who, unconvinced by Hegel, +continue to believe that the real, the really real, is irrational, that +reason builds upon irrationalities. Hegel, a great framer of +definitions, attempted with definitions to reconstruct the universe, +like that artillery sergeant who said that cannon were made by taking a +hole and enclosing it with steel. + +Another man, the man Joseph Butler, the Anglican bishop who lived at the +beginning of the eighteenth century and whom Cardinal Newman declared to +be the greatest man in the Anglican Church, wrote, at the conclusion of +the first chapter of his great work, _The Analogy of Religion_, the +chapter which treats of a future life, these pregnant words: "This +credibility of a future life, which has been here insisted upon, how +little soever it may satisfy our curiosity, seems to answer all the +purposes of religion, in like manner as a demonstrative proof would. +Indeed a proof, even a demonstrative one, of a future life, would not be +a proof of religion. For, that we are to live hereafter, is just as +reconcilable with the scheme of atheism, and as well to be accounted for +by it, as that we are now alive is: and therefore nothing can be more +absurd than to argue from that scheme that there can be no future +state." + +The man Butler, whose works were perhaps known to the man Kant, wished +to save the belief in the immortality of the soul, and with this object +he made it independent of belief in God. The first chapter of his +_Analogy_ treats, as I have said, of the future life, and the second of +the government of God by rewards and punishments. And the fact is that, +fundamentally, the good Anglican bishop deduces the existence of God +from the immortality of the soul. And as this deduction was the good +Anglican bishop's starting-point, he had not to make that somersault +which at the close of the same century the good Lutheran philosopher had +to make. Butler, the bishop, was one man and Kant, the professor, +another man. + +To be a man is to be something concrete, unitary, and substantive; it is +to be a thing--_res_. Now we know what another man, the man Benedict +Spinoza, that Portuguese Jew who was born and lived in Holland in the +middle of the seventeenth century, wrote about the nature of things. The +sixth proposition of Part III. of his _Ethic_ states: _unaquoeque res, +quatenus in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur_--that is, +Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its +own being. Everything in so far as it is in itself--that is to say, in +so far as it is substance, for according to him substance is _id quod in +se est et per se concipitur_--that which is in itself and is conceived +by itself. And in the following proposition, the seventh, of the same +part, he adds: _conatus, quo unaquoeque res in suo esse perseverare +conatur, nihil est proeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam_--that is, the +endeavour wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being is +nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself. This means that your +essence, reader, mine, that of the man Spinoza, that of the man Butler, +of the man Kant, and of every man who is a man, is nothing but the +endeavour, the effort, which he makes to continue to be a man, not to +die. And the other proposition which follows these two, the eighth, +says: _conatus, quo unaquoeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, +nullum tempus finitum, sed indefinitum involvit_--that is, The endeavour +whereby each individual thing endeavours to persist involves no finite +time but indefinite time. That is to say that you, I, and Spinoza wish +never to die and that this longing of ours never to die is our actual +essence. Nevertheless, this poor Portuguese Jew, exiled in the mists of +Holland, could never attain to believing in his own personal +immortality, and all his philosophy was but a consolation which he +contrived for his lack of faith. Just as other men have a pain in hand +or foot, heart-ache or head-ache, so he had God-ache. Unhappy man! And +unhappy fellow-men! + +And man, this thing, is he a thing? How absurd soever the question may +appear, there are some who have propounded it. Not long ago there went +abroad a certain doctrine called Positivism, which did much good and +much ill. And among other ills that it wrought was the introduction of a +method of analysis whereby facts were pulverized, reduced to a dust of +facts. Most of the facts labelled as such by Positivism were really only +fragments of facts. In psychology its action was harmful. There were +even scholastics meddling in literature--I will not say philosophers +meddling in poetry, because poet and philosopher are twin brothers, if +not even one and the same--who carried this Positivist psychological +analysis into the novel and the drama, where the main business is to +give act and motion to concrete men, men of flesh and bone, and by dint +of studying states of consciousness, consciousness itself disappeared. +The same thing happened to them which is said often to happen in the +examination and testing of certain complicated, organic, living chemical +compounds, when the reagents destroy the very body which it was proposed +to examine and all that is obtained is the products of its +decomposition. + +Taking as their starting-point the evident fact that contradictory +states pass through our consciousness, they did not succeed in +envisaging consciousness itself, the "I." To ask a man about his "I" is +like asking him about his body. And note that in speaking of the "I," I +speak of the concrete and personal "I," not of the "I" of Fichte, but of +Fichte himself, the man Fichte. + +That which determines a man, that which makes him one man, one and not +another, the man he is and not the man he is not, is a principle of +unity and a principle of continuity. A principle of unity firstly in +space, thanks to the body, and next in action and intention. When we +walk, one foot does not go forward and the other backward, nor, when we +look, if we are normal, does one eye look towards the north and the +other towards the south. In each moment of our life we entertain some +purpose, and to this purpose the synergy of our actions is directed. +Notwithstanding the next moment we may change our purpose. And in a +certain sense a man is so much the more a man the more unitary his +action. Some there are who throughout their whole life follow but one +single purpose, be it what it may. + +Also a principle of continuity in time. Without entering upon a +discussion--an unprofitable discussion--as to whether I am or am not he +who I was twenty years ago, it appears to me to be indisputable that he +who I am to-day derives, by a continuous series of states of +consciousness, from him who was in my body twenty years ago. Memory is +the basis of individual personality, just as tradition is the basis of +the collective personality of a people. We live in memory and by +memory, and our spiritual life is at bottom simply the effort of our +memory to persist, to transform itself into hope, the effort of our past +to transform itself into our future. + +All this, I know well, is sheer platitude; but in going about in the +world one meets men who seem to have no feeling of their own +personality. One of my best friends with whom I have walked and talked +every day for many years, whenever I spoke to him of this sense of one's +own personality, used to say: "But I have no sense of myself; I don't +know what that is." + +On a certain occasion this friend remarked to me: "I should like to be +So-and-so" (naming someone), and I said: "That is what I shall never be +able to understand--that one should want to be someone else. (To want to +be someone else is to want to cease to be he who one is.) I understand +that one should wish to have what someone else has, his wealth or his +knowledge; but to be someone else, that is a thing I cannot comprehend." +It has often been said that every man who has suffered misfortunes +prefers to be himself, even with his misfortunes, rather than to be +someone else without them. For unfortunate men, when they preserve their +normality in their misfortune--that is to say, when they endeavour to +persist in their own being--prefer misfortune to non-existence. For +myself I can say that as a youth, and even as a child, I remained +unmoved when shown the most moving pictures of hell, for even then +nothing appeared to me quite so horrible as nothingness itself. It was a +furious hunger of being that possessed me, an appetite for divinity, as +one of our ascetics has put it.[7] + +To propose to a man that he should be someone else, that he should +become someone else, is to propose to him that he should cease to be +himself. Everyone defends his own personality, and only consents to a +change in his mode of thinking or of feeling in so far as this change is +able to enter into the unity of his spirit and become involved in its +continuity; in so far as this change can harmonize and integrate itself +with all the rest of his mode of being, thinking and feeling, and can at +the same time knit itself with his memories. Neither of a man nor of a +people--which is, in a certain sense, also a man--can a change be +demanded which breaks the unity and continuity of the person. A man can +change greatly, almost completely even, but the change must take place +within his continuity. + +It is true that in certain individuals there occur what are called +changes of personality; but these are pathological cases, and as such +are studied by alienists. In these changes of personality, memory, the +basis of consciousness, is completely destroyed, and all that is left to +the sufferer as the substratum of his individual continuity, which has +now ceased to be personal, is the physical organism. For the subject who +suffers it, such an infirmity is equivalent to death--it is not +equivalent to death only for those who expect to inherit his fortune, if +he possesses one! And this infirmity is nothing less than a revolution, +a veritable revolution. + +A disease is, in a certain sense, an organic dissociation; it is a +rebellion of some element or organ of the living body which breaks the +vital synergy and seeks an end distinct from that which the other +elements co-ordinated with it seek. Its end, considered in itself--that +is to say, in the abstract--may be more elevated, more noble, more +anything you like; but it is different. To fly and breathe in the air +may be better than to swim and breathe in the water; but if the fins of +a fish aimed at converting themselves into wings, the fish, as a fish, +would perish. And it is useless to say that it would end by becoming a +bird, if in this becoming there was not a process of continuity. I do +not precisely know, but perhaps it may be possible for a fish to +engender a bird, or another fish more akin to a bird than itself; but a +fish, this fish, cannot itself and during its own lifetime become a +bird. + +Everything in me that conspires to break the unity and continuity of my +life conspires to destroy me and consequently to destroy itself. Every +individual in a people who conspires to break the spiritual unity and +continuity of that people tends to destroy it and to destroy himself as +a part of that people. What if some other people is better than our own? +Very possibly, although perhaps we do not clearly understand what is +meant by better or worse. Richer? Granted. More cultured? Granted +likewise. Happier? Well, happiness ... but still, let it pass! A +conquering people (or what is called conquering) while we are conquered? +Well and good. All this is good--but it is something different. And that +is enough. Because for me the becoming other than I am, the breaking of +the unity and continuity of my life, is to cease to be he who I am--that +is to say, it is simply to cease to be. And that--no! Anything rather +than that! + +Another, you say, might play the part that I play as well or better? +Another might fulfil my function in society? Yes, but it would not be I. + +"I, I, I, always I!" some reader will exclaim; "and who are you?" I +might reply in the words of Obermann, that tremendous man Obermann: "For +the universe, nothing--for myself, everything"; but no, I would rather +remind him of a doctrine of the man Kant--to wit, that we ought to think +of our fellow-men not as means but as ends. For the question does not +touch me alone, it touches you also, grumbling reader, it touches each +and all. Singular judgments have the value of universal judgments, the +logicians say. The singular is not particular, it is universal. + +Man is an end, not a means. All civilization addresses itself to man, to +each man, to each I. What is that idol, call it Humanity or call it what +you like, to which all men and each individual man must be sacrificed? +For I sacrifice myself for my neighbours, for my fellow-countrymen, for +my children, and these sacrifice themselves in their turn for theirs, +and theirs again for those that come after them, and so on in a +never-ending series of generations. And who receives the fruit of this +sacrifice? + +Those who talk to us about this fantastic sacrifice, this dedication +without an object, are wont to talk to us also about the right to live. +What is this right to live? They tell me I am here to realize I know not +what social end; but I feel that I, like each one of my fellows, am here +to realize myself, to live. + +Yes, yes, I see it all!--an enormous social activity, a mighty +civilization, a profuseness of science, of art, of industry, of +morality, and afterwards, when we have filled the world with industrial +marvels, with great factories, with roads, museums, and libraries, we +shall fall exhausted at the foot of it all, and it will subsist--for +whom? Was man made for science or was science made for man? + +"Why!" the reader will exclaim again, "we are coming back to what the +Catechism says: '_Q_. For whom did God create the world? _A_. For man.'" +Well, why not?--so ought the man who is a man to reply. The ant, if it +took account of these matters and were a person, would reply "For the +ant," and it would reply rightly. The world is made for consciousness, +for each consciousness. + +A human soul is worth all the universe, someone--I know not whom--has +said and said magnificently. A human soul, mind you! Not a human life. +Not this life. And it happens that the less a man believes in the +soul--that is to say in his conscious immortality, personal and +concrete--the more he will exaggerate the worth of this poor transitory +life. This is the source from which springs all that effeminate, +sentimental ebullition against war. True, a man ought not to wish to +die, but the death to be renounced is the death of the soul. "Whosoever +will save his life shall lose it," says the Gospel; but it does not say +"whosoever will save his soul," the immortal soul--or, at any rate, +which we believe and wish to be immortal. + +And what all the objectivists do not see, or rather do not wish to see, +is that when a man affirms his "I," his personal consciousness, he +affirms man, man concrete and real, affirms the true humanism--the +humanism of man, not of the things of man--and in affirming man he +affirms consciousness. For the only consciousness of which we have +consciousness is that of man. + +The world is for consciousness. Or rather this _for_, this notion of +finality, and feeling rather than notion, this teleological feeling, is +born only where there is consciousness. Consciousness and finality are +fundamentally the same thing. + +If the sun possessed consciousness it would think, no doubt, that it +lived in order to give light to the worlds; but it would also and above +all think that the worlds existed in order that it might give them light +and enjoy itself in giving them light and so live. And it would think +well. + +And all this tragic fight of man to save himself, this immortal craving +for immortality which caused the man Kant to make that immortal leap of +which I have spoken, all this is simply a fight for consciousness. If +consciousness is, as some inhuman thinker has said, nothing more than a +flash of light between two eternities of darkness, then there is nothing +more execrable than existence. + +Some may espy a fundamental contradiction in everything that I am +saying, now expressing a longing for unending life, now affirming that +this earthly life does not possess the value that is given to it. +Contradiction? To be sure! The contradiction of my heart that says Yes +and of my head that says No! Of course there is contradiction. Who does +not recollect those words of the Gospel, "Lord, I believe, help thou my +unbelief"? Contradiction! Of course! Since we only live in and by +contradictions, since life is tragedy and the tragedy is perpetual +struggle, without victory or the hope of victory, life is contradiction. + +The values we are discussing are, as you see, values of the heart, and +against values of the heart reasons do not avail. For reasons are only +reasons--that is to say, they are not even truths. There is a class of +pedantic label-mongers, pedants by nature and by grace, who remind me of +that man who, purposing to console a father whose son has suddenly died +in the flower of his years, says to him, "Patience, my friend, we all +must die!" Would you think it strange if this father were offended at +such an impertinence? For it is an impertinence. There are times when +even an axiom can become an impertinence. How many times may it not be +said-- + + _Para pensar cual tu, solo es preciso + no tener nada mas que inteligencia_.[8] + +There are, in fact, people who appear to think only with the brain, or +with whatever may be the specific thinking organ; while others think +with all the body and all the soul, with the blood, with the marrow of +the bones, with the heart, with the lungs, with the belly, with the +life. And the people who think only with the brain develop into +definition-mongers; they become the professionals of thought. And you +know what a professional is? You know what a product of the +differentiation of labour is? + +Take a professional boxer. He has learnt to hit with such economy of +effort that, while concentrating all his strength in the blow, he only +brings into play just those muscles that are required for the immediate +and definite object of his action--to knock out his opponent. A blow +given by a non-professional will not have so much immediate, objective +efficiency; but it will more greatly vitalize the striker, causing him +to bring into play almost the whole of his body. The one is the blow of +a boxer, the other that of a man. And it is notorious that the Hercules +of the circus, the athletes of the ring, are not, as a rule, healthy. +They knock out their opponents, they lift enormous weights, but they die +of phthisis or dyspepsia. + +If a philosopher is not a man, he is anything but a philosopher; he is +above all a pedant, and a pedant is a caricature of a man. The +cultivation of any branch of science--of chemistry, of physics, of +geometry, of philology--may be a work of differentiated specialization, +and even so only within very narrow limits and restrictions; but +philosophy, like poetry, is a work of integration and synthesis, or else +it is merely pseudo-philosophical erudition. + +All knowledge has an ultimate object. Knowledge for the sake of +knowledge is, say what you will, nothing but a dismal begging of the +question. We learn something either for an immediate practical end, or +in order to complete the rest of our knowledge. Even the knowledge that +appears to us to be most theoretical--that is to say, of least immediate +application to the non-intellectual necessities of life--answers to a +necessity which is no less real because it is intellectual, to a reason +of economy in thinking, to a principle of unity and continuity of +consciousness. But just as a scientific fact has its finality in the +rest of knowledge, so the philosophy that we would make our own has also +its extrinsic object--it refers to our whole destiny, to our attitude in +face of life and the universe. And the most tragic problem of philosophy +is to reconcile intellectual necessities with the necessities of the +heart and the will. For it is on this rock that every philosophy that +pretends to resolve the eternal and tragic contradiction, the basis of +our existence, breaks to pieces. But do all men face this contradiction +squarely? + +Little can be hoped from a ruler, for example, who has not at some time +or other been preoccupied, even if only confusedly, with the first +beginning and the ultimate end of all things, and above all of man, with +the "why" of his origin and the "wherefore" of his destiny. + +And this supreme preoccupation cannot be purely rational, it must +involve the heart. It is not enough to think about our destiny: it must +be felt. And the would-be leader of men who affirms and proclaims that +he pays no heed to the things of the spirit, is not worthy to lead them. +By which I do not mean, of course, that any ready-made solution is to be +required of him. Solution? Is there indeed any? + +So far as I am concerned, I will never willingly yield myself, nor +entrust my confidence, to any popular leader who is not penetrated with +the feeling that he who orders a people orders men, men of flesh and +bone, men who are born, suffer, and, although they do not wish to die, +die; men who are ends in themselves, not merely means; men who must be +themselves and not others; men, in fine, who seek that which we call +happiness. It is inhuman, for example, to sacrifice one generation of +men to the generation which follows, without having any feeling for the +destiny of those who are sacrificed, without having any regard, not for +their memory, not for their names, but for them themselves. + +All this talk of a man surviving in his children, or in his works, or in +the universal consciousness, is but vague verbiage which satisfies only +those who suffer from affective stupidity, and who, for the rest, may be +persons of a certain cerebral distinction. For it is possible to possess +great talent, or what we call great talent, and yet to be stupid as +regards the feelings and even morally imbecile. There have been +instances. + +These clever-witted, affectively stupid persons are wont to say that it +is useless to seek to delve in the unknowable or to kick against the +pricks. It is as if one should say to a man whose leg has had to be +amputated that it does not help him at all to think about it. And we all +lack something; only some of us feel the lack and others do not. Or they +pretend not to feel the lack, and then they are hypocrites. + +A pedant who beheld Solon weeping for the death of a son said to him, +"Why do you weep thus, if weeping avails nothing?" And the sage answered +him, "Precisely for that reason--because it does not avail." It is +manifest that weeping avails something, even if only the alleviation of +distress; but the deep sense of Solon's reply to the impertinent +questioner is plainly seen. And I am convinced that we should solve many +things if we all went out into the streets and uncovered our griefs, +which perhaps would prove to be but one sole common grief, and joined +together in beweeping them and crying aloud to the heavens and calling +upon God. And this, even though God should hear us not; but He would +hear us. The chiefest sanctity of a temple is that it is a place to +which men go to weep in common. A _miserere_ sung in common by a +multitude tormented by destiny has as much value as a philosophy. It is +not enough to cure the plague: we must learn to weep for it. Yes, we +must learn to weep! Perhaps that is the supreme wisdom. Why? Ask Solon. + +There is something which, for lack of a better name, we will call the +tragic sense of life, which carries with it a whole conception of life +itself and of the universe, a whole philosophy more or less formulated, +more or less conscious. And this sense may be possessed, and is +possessed, not only by individual men but by whole peoples. And this +sense does not so much flow from ideas as determine them, even though +afterwards, as is manifest, these ideas react upon it and confirm it. +Sometimes it may originate in a chance illness--dyspepsia, for example; +but at other times it is constitutional. And it is useless to speak, as +we shall see, of men who are healthy and men who are not healthy. Apart +from the fact there is no normal standard of health, nobody has proved +that man is necessarily cheerful by nature. And further, man, by the +very fact of being man, of possessing consciousness, is, in comparison +with the ass or the crab, a diseased animal. Consciousness is a disease. + +Among men of flesh and bone there have been typical examples of those +who possess this tragic sense of life. I recall now Marcus Aurelius, St. +Augustine, Pascal, Rousseau, _Rene, Obermann_, Thomson,[9] Leopardi, +Vigny, Lenau, Kleist, Amiel, Quental, Kierkegaard--men burdened with +wisdom rather than with knowledge. + +And there are, I believe, peoples who possess this tragic sense of life +also. + +It is to this that we must now turn our attention, beginning with this +matter of health and disease. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[5] "_Salto inmortal_." There is a play here upon the term _salto +mortal_, used to denote the dangerous aerial somersault of the acrobat, +which cannot be rendered in English.--J.E.C.F. + +[6] "_Conciencia_." The same word is used in Spanish to denote both +consciousness and conscience. If the latter is specifically intended, +the qualifying adjective "_moral_" or "_religiosa_" is commonly +added.--J.E.C.F. + +[7] San Juan de los Angeles. + +[8] To be lacking in everything but intelligence is the necessary +qualification for thinking like you. + +[9] James Thomson, author of _The City of Dreadful Night_. + + + + +II. + +THE STARTING-POINT + + +To some, perhaps, the foregoing reflections may seem to possess a +certain morbid character. Morbid? But what is disease precisely? And +what is health? + +May not disease itself possibly be the essential condition of that which +we call progress and progress itself a disease? + +Who does not know the mythical tragedy of Paradise? Therein dwelt our +first parents in a state of perfect health and perfect innocence, and +Jahwe gave them to eat of the tree of life and created all things for +them; but he commanded them not to taste of the fruit of the tree of the +knowledge of good and evil. But they, tempted by the serpent--Christ's +type of prudence--tasted of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of +good and evil, and became subject to all diseases, and to death, which +is their crown and consummation, and to labour and to progress. For +progress, according to this legend, springs from original sin. And thus +it was the curiosity of Eve, of woman, of her who is most thrall to the +organic necessities of life and of the conservation of life, that +occasioned the Fall and with the Fall the Redemption, and it was the +Redemption that set our feet on the way to God and made it possible for +us to attain to Him and to be in Him. + +Do you want another version of our origin? Very well then. According to +this account, man is, strictly speaking, merely a species of gorilla, +orang-outang, chimpanzee, or the like, more or less hydrocephalous. Once +on a time an anthropoid monkey had a diseased offspring--diseased from +the strictly animal or zoological point of view, really diseased; and +this disease, although a source of weakness, resulted in a positive gain +in the struggle for survival. The only vertical mammal at last succeeded +in standing erect--man. The upright position freed him from the +necessity of using his hands as means of support in walking; he was +able, therefore, to oppose the thumb to the other four fingers, to seize +hold of objects and to fashion tools; and it is well known that the +hands are great promoters of the intelligence. This same position gave +to the lungs, trachea, larynx, and mouth an aptness for the production +of articulate speech, and speech is intelligence. Moreover, this +position, causing the head to weigh vertically upon the trunk, +facilitated its development and increase of weight, and the head is the +seat of the mind. But as this necessitated greater strength and +resistance in the bones of the pelvis than in those of species whose +head and trunk rest upon all four extremities, the burden fell upon +woman, the author of the Fall according to Genesis, of bringing forth +larger-headed offspring through a harder framework of bone. And Jahwe +condemned her, for having sinned, to bring forth her children in sorrow. + +The gorilla, the chimpanzee, the orang-outang, and their kind, must look +upon man as a feeble and infirm animal, whose strange custom it is to +store up his dead. Wherefore? + +And this primary disease and all subsequent diseases--are they not +perhaps the capital element of progress? Arthritis, for example, infects +the blood and introduces into it scoriae, a kind of refuse, of an +imperfect organic combustion; but may not this very impurity happen to +make the blood more stimulative? May not this impure blood promote a +more active cerebration precisely because it is impure? Water that is +chemically pure is undrinkable. And may not also blood that is +physiologically pure be unfit for the brain of the vertical mammal that +has to live by thought? + +The history of medicine, moreover, teaches us that progress consists +not so much in expelling the germs of disease, or rather diseases +themselves, as in accommodating them to our organism and so perhaps +enriching it, in dissolving them in our blood. What but this is the +meaning of vaccination and all the serums, and immunity from infection +through lapse of time? + +If this notion of absolute health were not an abstract category, +something which does not strictly exist, we might say that a perfectly +healthy man would be no longer a man, but an irrational animal. +Irrational, because of the lack of some disease to set a spark to his +reason. And this disease which gives us the appetite of knowing for the +sole pleasure of knowing, for the delight of tasting of the fruit of the +tree of the knowledge of good and evil, is a real disease and a tragic +one. + +_Pantes anthropoi ton eidenai oregontai phusei_, "all men +naturally desire to know." Thus Aristotle begins his Metaphysic, and it +has been repeated a thousand times since then that curiosity or the +desire to know, which according to Genesis led our first mother to sin, +is the origin of knowledge. + +But it is necessary to distinguish here between the desire or appetite +for knowing, apparently and at first sight for the love of knowledge +itself, between the eagerness to taste of the fruit of the tree of +knowledge, and the necessity of knowing for the sake of living. The +latter, which gives us direct and immediate knowledge, and which in a +certain sense might be called, if it does not seem too paradoxical, +unconscious knowledge, is common both to men and animals, while that +which distinguishes us from them is reflective knowledge, the knowing +that we know. + +Man has debated at length and will continue to debate at length--the +world having been assigned as a theatre for his debates--concerning the +origin of knowledge; but, apart from the question as to what the real +truth about this origin may be, which we will leave until later, it is +a certainly ascertained fact that in the apparential order of things, in +the life of beings who are endowed with a certain more or less cloudy +faculty of knowing and perceiving, or who at any rate appear to act as +if they were so endowed, knowledge is exhibited to us as bound up with +the necessity of living and of procuring the wherewithal to maintain +life. It is a consequence of that very essence of being, which according +to Spinoza consists in the effort to persist indefinitely in its own +being. Speaking in terms in which concreteness verges upon grossness, it +may be said that the brain, in so far as its function is concerned, +depends upon the stomach. In beings which rank in the lowest scale of +life, those actions which present the characteristics of will, those +which appear to be connected with a more or less clear consciousness, +are actions designed to procure nourishment for the being performing +them. + +Such then is what we may call the historical origin of knowledge, +whatever may be its origin from another point of view. Beings which +appear to be endowed with perception, perceive in order to be able to +live, and only perceive in so far as they require to do so in order to +live. But perhaps this stored-up knowledge, the utility in which it had +its origin being exhausted, has come to constitute a fund of knowledge +far exceeding that required for the bare necessities of living. + +Thus we have, first, the necessity of knowing in order to live, and +next, arising out of this, that other knowledge which we might call +superfluous knowledge or knowledge _de luxe_, which may in its turn come +to constitute a new necessity. Curiosity, the so-called innate desire of +knowing, only awakes and becomes operative after the necessity of +knowing for the sake of living is satisfied; and although sometimes in +the conditions under which the human race is actually living it may not +so befall, but curiosity may prevail over necessity and knowledge over +hunger, nevertheless the primordial fact is that curiosity sprang from +the necessity of knowing in order to live, and this is the dead weight +and gross matter carried in the matrix of science. Aspiring to be +knowledge for the sake of knowledge, to know the truth for the sake of +the truth itself, science is forced by the necessities of life to turn +aside and put it itself at their service. While men believe themselves +to be seeking truth for its own sake, they are in fact seeking life in +truth. The variations of science depend upon the variations of human +needs, and men of science are wont to work, willingly or unwillingly, +wittingly or unwittingly, in the service of the powerful or in that of a +people that demands from them the confirmation of its own desires. + +But is this really a dead weight that impedes the progress of science, +or is it not rather its innermost redeeming essence? It is in fact the +latter, and it is a gross stupidity to presume to rebel against the very +condition of life. + +Knowledge is employed in the service of the necessity of life and +primarily in the service of the instinct of personal preservation. This +necessity and this instinct have created in man the organs of knowledge +and given them such capacity as they possess. Man sees, hears, touches, +tastes, and smells that which it is necessary for him to see, hear, +touch, taste, and smell in order to preserve his life. The decay or the +loss of any of these senses increases the risks with which his life is +environed, and if it increases them less in the state of society in +which we are actually living, the reason is that some see, hear, touch, +and smell for others. A blind man, by himself and without a guide, could +not live long. Society is an additional sense; it is the true common +sense. + +Man, then, in his quality of an isolated individual, only sees, hears, +touches, tastes, and smells in so far as is necessary for living and +self-preservation. If he does not perceive colours below red or above +violet, the reason perhaps is that the colours which he does perceive +suffice for the purposes of self-preservation. And the senses themselves +are simplifying apparati which eliminate from objective reality +everything that it is not necessary to know in order to utilize objects +for the purpose of preserving life. In complete darkness an animal, if +it does not perish, ends by becoming blind. Parasites which live in the +intestines of other animals upon the nutritive juices which they find +ready prepared for them by these animals, as they do not need either to +see or hear, do in fact neither see nor hear; they simply adhere, a kind +of receptive bag, to the being upon whom they live. For these parasites +the visible and audible world does not exist. It is enough for them that +the animals, in whose intestines they live, see and hear. + +Knowledge, then, is primarily at the service of the instinct of +self-preservation, which is indeed, as we have said with Spinoza, its +very essence. And thus it may be said that it is the instinct of +self-preservation that makes perceptible for us the reality and truth of +the world; for it is this instinct that cuts out and separates that +which exists for us from the unfathomable and illimitable region of the +possible. In effect, that which has existence for us is precisely that +which, in one way or another, we need to know in order to exist +ourselves; objective existence, as we know it, is a dependence of our +own personal existence. And nobody can deny that there may not exist, +and perhaps do exist, aspects of reality unknown to us, to-day at any +rate, and perhaps unknowable, because they are in no way necessary to us +for the preservation of our own actual existence. + +But man does not live alone; he is not an isolated individual, but a +member of society. There is not a little truth in the saying that the +individual, like the atom, is an abstraction. Yes, the atom apart from +the universe is as much an abstraction as the universe apart from the +atom. And if the individual maintains his existence by the instinct of +self-preservation, society owes its being and maintenance to the +individual's instinct of perpetuation. And from this instinct, or rather +from society, springs reason. + +Reason, that which we call reason, reflex and reflective knowledge, the +distinguishing mark of man, is a social product. + +It owes its origin, perhaps, to language. We think articulately--_i.e._, +reflectively--thanks to articulate language, and this language arose out +of the need of communicating our thought to our neighbours. To think is +to talk with oneself, and each one of us talks with himself, thanks to +our having had to talk with one another. In everyday life it frequently +happens that we hit upon an idea that we were seeking and succeed in +giving it form--that is to say, we obtain the idea, drawing it forth +from the mist of dim perceptions which it represents, thanks to the +efforts which we make to present it to others. Thought is inward +language, and the inward language originates in the outward. Hence it +results that reason is social and common. A fact pregnant with +consequences, as we shall have occasion to see. + +Now if there is a reality which, in so far as we have knowledge of it, +is the creation of the instinct of personal preservation and of the +senses at the service of this instinct, must there not be another +reality, not less real than the former, the creation, in so far as we +have knowledge of it, of the instinct of perpetuation, the instinct of +the species, and of the senses at the service of this instinct? The +instinct of preservation, hunger, is the foundation of the human +individual; the instinct of perpetuation, love, in its most rudimentary +and physiological form, is the foundation of human society. And just as +man knows that which he needs to know in order that he may preserve his +existence, so society, or man in so far as he is a social being, knows +that which he needs to know in order that he may perpetuate himself in +society. + +There is a world, the sensible world, that is the child of hunger, and +there is another world, the ideal world, that is the child of love. And +just as there are senses employed in the service of the knowledge of the +sensible world, so there are also senses, at present for the most part +dormant, for social consciousness has scarcely awakened, employed in the +service of the knowledge of the ideal world. And why must we deny +objective reality to the creations of love, of the instinct of +perpetuation, since we allow it to the creations of hunger or the +instinct of preservation? For if it be said that the former creations +are only the creations of our imagination, without objective value, may +it not equally be said of the latter that they are only the creations of +our senses? Who can assert that there is not an invisible and intangible +world, perceived by the inward sense that lives in the service of the +instinct of perpetuation? + +Human society, as a society, possesses senses which the individual, but +for his existence in society, would lack, just as the individual, man, +who is in his turn a kind of society, possesses senses lacking in the +cells of which he is composed. The blind cells of hearing, in their dim +consciousness, must of necessity be unaware of the existence of the +visible world, and if they should hear it spoken of they would perhaps +deem it to be the arbitrary creation of the deaf cells of sight, while +the latter in their turn would consider as illusion the audible world +which the hearing cells create. + +We have remarked before that the parasites which live in the intestines +of higher animals, feeding upon the nutritive juices which these animals +supply, do not need either to see or hear, and therefore for them the +visible and audible world does not exist. And if they possessed a +certain degree of consciousness and took account of the fact that the +animal at whose expense they live believed in a world of sight and +hearing, they would perhaps deem such belief to be due merely to the +extravagance of its imagination. And similarly there are social +parasites, as Mr. A.J. Balfour admirably observes,[10] who, receiving +from the society in which they live the motives of their moral conduct, +deny that belief in God and the other life is a necessary foundation for +good conduct and for a tolerable life, society having prepared for them +the spiritual nutriment by which they live. An isolated individual can +endure life and live it well and even heroically without in any sort +believing either in the immortality of the soul or in God, but he lives +the life of a spiritual parasite. What we call the sense of honour is, +even in non-Christians, a Christian product. And I will say further, +that if there exists in a man faith in God joined to a life of purity +and moral elevation, it is not so much the believing in God that makes +him good, as the being good, thanks to God, that makes him believe in +Him. Goodness is the best source of spiritual clear-sightedness. + +I am well aware that it may be objected that all this talk of man +creating the sensible world and love the ideal world, of the blind cells +of hearing and the deaf cells of sight, of spiritual parasites, etc., is +merely metaphor. So it is, and I do not claim to discuss otherwise than +by metaphor. And it is true that this social sense, the creature of +love, the creator of language, of reason, and of the ideal world that +springs from it, is at bottom nothing other than what we call fancy or +imagination. Out of fancy springs reason. And if by imagination is +understood a faculty which fashions images capriciously, I will ask: +What is caprice? And in any case the senses and reason are also +fallible. + +We shall have to enquire what is this inner social faculty, the +imagination which personalizes everything, and which, employed in the +service of the instinct of perpetuation, reveals to us God and the +immortality of the soul--God being thus a social product. + +But this we will reserve till later. + +And now, why does man philosophize?--that is to say, why does he +investigate the first causes and ultimate ends of things? Why does he +seek the disinterested truth? For to say that all men have a natural +tendency to know is true; but wherefore? + +Philosophers seek a theoretic or ideal starting-point for their human +work, the work of philosophizing; but they are not usually concerned to +seek the practical and real starting-point, the purpose. What is the +object in making philosophy, in thinking it and then expounding it to +one's fellows? What does the philosopher seek in it and with it? The +truth for the truth's own sake? The truth, in order that we may subject +our conduct to it and determine our spiritual attitude towards life and +the universe comformably with it? + +Philosophy is a product of the humanity of each philosopher, and each +philosopher is a man of flesh and bone who addresses himself to other +men of flesh and bone like himself. And, let him do what he will, he +philosophizes not with the reason only, but with the will, with the +feelings, with the flesh and with the bones, with the whole soul and the +whole body. It is the man that philosophizes. + +I do not wish here to use the word "I" in connection with +philosophizing, lest the impersonal "I" should be understood in place of +the man that philosophizes; for this concrete, circumscribed "I," this +"I" of flesh and bone, that suffers from tooth-ache and finds life +insupportable if death is the annihilation of the personal +consciousness, must not be confounded with that other counterfeit "I," +the theoretical "I" which Fichte smuggled into philosophy, nor yet with +the Unique, also theoretical, of Max Stirner. It is better to say "we," +understanding, however, the "we" who are circumscribed in space. + +Knowledge for the sake of knowledge! Truth for truth's sake! This is +inhuman. And if we say that theoretical philosophy addresses itself to +practical philosophy, truth to goodness, science to ethics, I will ask: +And to what end is goodness? Is it, perhaps, an end in itself? Good is +simply that which contributes to the preservation, perpetuation, and +enrichment of consciousness. Goodness addresses itself to man, to the +maintenance and perfection of human society which is composed of men. +And to what end is this? "So act that your action may be a pattern to +all men," Kant tells us. That is well, but wherefore? We must needs seek +for a wherefore. + +In the starting-point of all philosophy, in the real starting-point, the +practical not the theoretical, there is a wherefore. The philosopher +philosophizes for something more than for the sake of philosophizing. +_Primum vivere, deinde philosophari_, says the old Latin adage; and as +the philosopher is a man before he is a philosopher, he must needs live +before he can philosophize, and, in fact, he philosophizes in order to +live. And usually he philosophizes either in order to resign himself to +life, or to seek some finality in it, or to distract himself and forget +his griefs, or for pastime and amusement. A good illustration of this +last case is to be found in that terrible Athenian ironist, Socrates, of +whom Xenophon relates in his _Memorabilia_ that he discovered to +Theodata, the courtesan, the wiles that she ought to make use of in +order to lure lovers to her house so aptly, that she begged him to act +as her companion in the chase, _suntherates_, her pimp, in a +word. And philosophy is wont, in fact, not infrequently to convert +itself into a kind of art of spiritual pimping. And sometimes into an +opiate for lulling sorrows to sleep. + +I take at random a book of metaphysics, the first that comes to my hand, +_Time and Space, a Metaphysical Essay_, by Shadworth H. Hodgson. I open +it, and in the fifth paragraph of the first chapter of the first part I +read: + +"Metaphysics is, properly speaking, not a science but a philosophy--that +is, it is a science whose end is in itself, in the gratification and +education of the minds which carry it on, not in external purpose, such +as the founding of any art conducive to the welfare of life." Let us +examine this. We see that metaphysics is not, properly speaking, a +science--that is, it is a science whose end is in itself. And this +science, which, properly speaking, is not a science, has its end in +itself, in the gratification and education of the minds that cultivate +it. But what are we to understand? Is its end in itself or is it to +gratify and educate the minds that cultivate it? Either the one or the +other! Hodgson afterwards adds that the end of metaphysics is not any +external purpose, such as that of founding an art conducive to the +welfare of life. But is not the gratification of the mind of him who +cultivates philosophy part of the well-being of his life? Let the reader +consider this passage of the English metaphysician and tell me if it is +not a tissue of contradictions. + +Such a contradiction is inevitable when an attempt is made to define +humanly this theory of science, of knowledge, whose end is in itself, of +knowing for the sake of knowing, of attaining truth for the sake of +truth. Science exists only in personal consciousness and thanks to it; +astronomy, mathematics, have no other reality than that which they +possess as knowledge in the minds of those who study and cultivate them. +And if some day all personal consciousness must come to an end on the +earth; if some day the human spirit must return to the nothingness--that +is to say, to the absolute unconsciousness--from whence it sprang; and +if there shall no more be any spirit that can avail itself of all our +accumulated knowledge--then to what end is this knowledge? For we must +not lose sight of the fact that the problem of the personal immortality +of the soul involves the future of the whole human species. + +This series of contradictions into which the Englishman falls in his +desire to explain the theory of a science whose end is in itself, is +easily understood when it is remembered that it is an Englishman who +speaks, and that the Englishman is before everything else a man. Perhaps +a German specialist, a philosopher who had made philosophy his +speciality, who had first murdered his humanity and then buried it in +his philosophy, would be better able to explain this theory of a science +whose end is in itself and of knowledge for the sake of knowledge. + +Take the man Spinoza, that Portuguese Jew exiled in Holland; read his +_Ethic_ as a despairing elegiac poem, which in fact it is, and tell me +if you do not hear, beneath the disemburdened and seemingly serene +propositions _more geometrico_, the lugubrious echo of the prophetic +psalms. It is not the philosophy of resignation but of despair. And when +he wrote that the free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and +that his wisdom consists in meditating not on death but on life--homo +liber de nulla re minus quam de morte cogitat et eius sapientia non +mortis, sed vitae meditatio est (_Ethic_, Part IV., Prop. LXVII.)--when +he wrote that, he felt, as we all feel, that we are slaves, and he did +in fact think about death, and he wrote it in a vain endeavour to free +himself from this thought. Nor in writing Proposition XLII. of Part V., +that "happiness is not the reward of virtue but virtue itself," did he +feel, one may be sure, what he wrote. For this is usually the reason why +men philosophize--in order to convince themselves, even though they fail +in the attempt. And this desire of convincing oneself--that is to say, +this desire of doing violence to one's own human nature--is the real +starting-point of not a few philosophies. + +Whence do I come and whence comes the world in which and by which I +live? Whither do I go and whither goes everything that environs me? What +does it all mean? Such are the questions that man asks as soon as he +frees himself from the brutalizing necessity of labouring for his +material sustenance. And if we look closely, we shall see that beneath +these questions lies the wish to know not so much the "why" as the +"wherefore," not the cause but the end. Cicero's definition of +philosophy is well known--"the knowledge of things divine and human and +of the causes in which these things are contained," _rerum divinarum et +humanarum, causarumque quibus hae res continentur_; but in reality these +causes are, for us, ends. And what is the Supreme Cause, God, but the +Supreme End? The "why" interests us only in view of the "wherefore." We +wish to know whence we came only in order the better to be able to +ascertain whither we are going. + +This Ciceronian definition, which is the Stoic definition, is also found +in that formidable intellectualist, Clement of Alexandria, who was +canonized by the Catholic Church, and he expounds it in the fifth +chapter of the first of his _Stromata_. But this same Christian +philosopher--Christian?--in the twenty-second chapter of his fourth +_Stroma_ tells us that for the gnostic--that is to say, the +intellectual--knowledge, _gnosis_, ought to suffice, and he adds: "I +will dare aver that it is not because he wishes to be saved that he, who +devotes himself to knowledge for the sake of the divine science itself, +chooses knowledge. For the exertion of the intellect by exercise is +prolonged to a perpetual exertion. And the perpetual exertion of the +intellect is the essence of an intelligent being, which results from an +uninterrupted process of admixture, and remains eternal contemplation, a +living substance. Could we, then, suppose anyone proposing to the +gnostic whether he would choose the knowledge of God or everlasting +salvation, and if these, which are entirely identical, were separable, +he would without the least hesitation choose the knowledge of God?" May +He, may God Himself, whom we long to enjoy and possess eternally, +deliver us from this Clementine gnosticism or intellectualism! + +Why do I wish to know whence I come and whither I go, whence comes and +whither goes everything that environs me, and what is the meaning of it +all? For I do not wish to die utterly, and I wish to know whether I am +to die or not definitely. If I do not die, what is my destiny? and if I +die, then nothing has any meaning for me. And there are three solutions: +(_a_) I know that I shall die utterly, and then irremediable despair, or +(_b_) I know that I shall not die utterly, and then resignation, or +(_c_) I cannot know either one or the other, and then resignation in +despair or despair in resignation, a desperate resignation or a resigned +despair, and hence conflict. + +"It is best," some reader will say, "not to concern yourself with what +cannot be known." But is it possible? In his very beautiful poem, _The +Ancient Sage_, Tennyson said: + + Thou canst not prove the Nameless, O my son, + Nor canst thou prove the world thou movest in, + Thou canst not prove that thou art body alone, + Thou canst not prove that thou art spirit alone, + Nor canst thou prove that thou art both in one: + Nor canst thou prove thou art immortal, no, + Nor yet that thou art mortal--nay, my son, + Thou canst not prove that I, who speak with thee, + Am not thyself in converse with thyself, + For nothing worthy proving can be proven, + Nor yet disproven: wherefore thou be wise, + Cleave ever to the sunnier side of doubt, + Cling to Faith beyond the forms of Faith! + +Yes, perhaps, as the Sage says, "nothing worthy proving can be proven, +nor yet disproven"; but can we restrain that instinct which urges man to +wish to know, and above all to wish to know the things which may conduce +to life, to eternal life? Eternal life, not eternal knowledge, as the +Alexandrian gnostic said. For living is one thing and knowing is +another; and, as we shall see, perhaps there is such an opposition +between the two that we may say that everything vital is anti-rational, +not merely irrational, and that everything rational is anti-vital. And +this is the basis of the tragic sense of life. + +The defect of Descartes' _Discourse of Method_ lies not in the +antecedent methodical doubt; not in his beginning by resolving to doubt +everything, a merely intellectual device; but in his resolution to begin +by emptying himself of himself, of Descartes, of the real man, the man +of flesh and bone, the man who does not want to die, in order that he +might be a mere thinker--that is, an abstraction. But the real man +returned and thrust himself into the philosophy. + +"_Le bon sens est la chose du monde la mieux partagee_." Thus begins the +_Discourse of Method_, and this good sense saved him. He continues +talking about himself, about the man Descartes, telling us among other +things that he greatly esteemed eloquence and loved poetry; that he +delighted above all in mathematics because of the evidence and certainty +of its reasons, and that he revered our theology and claimed as much as +any to attain to heaven--_et pretendais autant qu'aucun autre a gagner +le ciel_. And this pretension--a very laudable one, I think, and above +all very natural--was what prevented him from deducing all the +consequences of his methodical doubt. The man Descartes claimed, as much +as any other, to attain to heaven, "but having learned as a thing very +sure that the way to it is not less open to the most ignorant than to +the most learned, and that the revealed truths which lead thither are +beyond our intelligence, I did not dare submit them to my feeble +reasonings, and I thought that to undertake to examine them and to +succeed therein, I should want some extraordinary help from heaven and +need to be more than man." And here we have the man. Here we have the +man who "did not feel obliged, thank God, to make a profession +(_metier_) of science in order to increase his means, and who did not +pretend to play the cynic and despise glory." And afterwards he tells us +how he was compelled to make a sojourn in Germany, and there, shut up in +a stove (_poele_) he began to philosophize his method. But in Germany, +shut up in a stove! And such his discourse is, a stove-discourse, and +the stove a German one, although the philosopher shut up in it was a +Frenchman who proposed to himself to attain to heaven. + +And he arrives at the _cogito ergo sum_, which St. Augustine had already +anticipated; but the _ego_ implicit in this enthymeme, _ego cogito, ergo +ego sum_, is an unreal--that is, an ideal--_ego_ or I, and its _sum_, +its existence, something unreal also. "I think, therefore I am," can +only mean "I think, therefore I am a thinker"; this being of the "I am," +which is deduced from "I think," is merely a knowing; this being is +knowledge, but not life. And the primary reality is not that I think, +but that I live, for those also live who do not think. Although this +living may not be a real living. God! what contradictions when we seek +to join in wedlock life and reason! + +The truth is _sum, ergo cogito_--I am, therefore I think, although not +everything that is thinks. Is not consciousness of thinking above all +consciousness of being? Is pure thought possible, without consciousness +of self, without personality? Can there exist pure knowledge without +feeling, without that species of materiality which feeling lends to it? +Do we not perhaps feel thought, and do we not feel ourselves in the act +of knowing and willing? Could not the man in the stove have said: "I +feel, therefore I am"? or "I will, therefore I am"? And to feel oneself, +is it not perhaps to feel oneself imperishable? To will oneself, is it +not to wish oneself eternal--that is to say, not to wish to die? What +the sorrowful Jew of Amsterdam called the essence of the thing, the +effort that it makes to persist indefinitely in its own being, +self-love, the longing for immortality, is it not perhaps the primal and +fundamental condition of all reflective or human knowledge? And is it +not therefore the true base, the real starting-point, of all philosophy, +although the philosophers, perverted by intellectualism, may not +recognize it? + +And, moreover, it was the _cogito_ that introduced a distinction which, +although fruitful of truths, has been fruitful also of confusions, and +this distinction is that between object, _cogito_, and subject, _sum_. +There is scarcely any distinction that does not also lead to confusion. +But we will return to this later. + +For the present let us remain keenly suspecting that the longing not to +die, the hunger for personal immortality, the effort whereby we tend to +persist indefinitely in our own being, which is, according to the tragic +Jew, our very essence, that this is the affective basis of all knowledge +and the personal inward starting-point of all human philosophy, wrought +by a man and for men. And we shall see how the solution of this inward +affective problem, a solution which may be but the despairing +renunciation of the attempt at a solution, is that which colours all the +rest of philosophy. Underlying even the so-called problem of knowledge +there is simply this human feeling, just as underlying the enquiry into +the "why," the cause, there is simply the search for the "wherefore," +the end. All the rest is either to deceive oneself or to wish to deceive +others; and to wish to deceive others in order to deceive oneself. + +And this personal and affective starting-point of all philosophy and all +religion is the tragic sense of life. Let us now proceed to consider +this. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[10] _The Foundations of Belief, being Notes Introductory to the Study +of Theology_, by the Right Hon. Arthur James Balfour London, 1895: "So +it is with those persons who claim to show by their example that +naturalism is practically consistent with the maintenance of ethical +ideals with which naturalism has no natural affinity. Their spiritual +life is parasitic: it is sheltered by convictions which belong, not to +them, but to the society of which they form a part; it is nourished by +processes in which they take no share. And when those convictions decay, +and those processes come to an end, the alien life which they have +maintained can scarce be expected to outlast them" (Chap. iv.). + + + + +III + +THE HUNGER OF IMMORTALITY + + +Let us pause to consider this immortal yearning for immortality--even +though the gnostics or intellectuals may be able to say that what +follows is not philosophy but rhetoric. Moreover, the divine Plato, when +he discussed the immortality of the soul in his _Phaedo_, said that it +was proper to clothe it in legend, _muthologein_. + +First of all let us recall once again--and it will not be for the last +time--that saying of Spinoza that every being endeavours to persist in +itself, and that this endeavour is its actual essence, and implies +indefinite time, and that the soul, in fine, sometimes with a clear and +distinct idea, sometimes confusedly, tends to persist in its being with +indefinite duration, and is aware of its persistency (_Ethic_, Part +III., Props. VI.-X.). + +It is impossible for us, in effect, to conceive of ourselves as not +existing, and no effort is capable of enabling consciousness to realize +absolute unconsciousness, its own annihilation. Try, reader, to imagine +to yourself, when you are wide awake, the condition of your soul when +you are in a deep sleep; try to fill your consciousness with the +representation of no-consciousness, and you will see the impossibility +of it. The effort to comprehend it causes the most tormenting dizziness. +We cannot conceive ourselves as not existing. + +The visible universe, the universe that is created by the instinct of +self-preservation, becomes all too narrow for me. It is like a cramped +cell, against the bars of which my soul beats its wings in vain. Its +lack of air stifles me. More, more, and always more! I want to be +myself, and yet without ceasing to be myself to be others as well, to +merge myself into the totality of things visible and invisible, to +extend myself into the illimitable of space and to prolong myself into +the infinite of time. Not to be all and for ever is as if not to be--at +least, let me be my whole self, and be so for ever and ever. And to be +the whole of myself is to be everybody else. Either all or nothing! + +All or nothing! And what other meaning can the Shakespearean "To be or +not to be" have, or that passage in _Coriolanus_ where it is said of +Marcius "He wants nothing of a god but eternity"? Eternity, +eternity!--that is the supreme desire! The thirst of eternity is what is +called love among men, and whosoever loves another wishes to eternalize +himself in him. Nothing is real that is not eternal. + +From the poets of all ages and from the depths of their souls this +tremendous vision of the flowing away of life like water has wrung +bitter cries--from Pindar's "dream of a shadow," _skias onar_, to +Calderon's "life is a dream" and Shakespeare's "we are such stuff as +dreams are made on," this last a yet more tragic sentence than +Calderon's, for whereas the Castilian only declares that our life is a +dream, but not that we ourselves are the dreamers of it, the Englishman +makes us ourselves a dream, a dream that dreams. + +The vanity of the passing world and love are the two fundamental and +heart-penetrating notes of true poetry. And they are two notes of which +neither can be sounded without causing the other to vibrate. The feeling +of the vanity of the passing world kindles love in us, the only thing +that triumphs over the vain and transitory, the only thing that fills +life again and eternalizes it. In appearance at any rate, for in +reality.... And love, above all when it struggles against destiny, +overwhelms us with the feeling of the vanity of this world of +appearances and gives us a glimpse of another world, in which destiny is +overcome and liberty is law. + +Everything passes! Such is the refrain of those who have drunk, lips to +the spring, of the fountain of life, of those who have tasted of the +fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. + +To be, to be for ever, to be without ending! thirst of being, thirst of +being more! hunger of God! thirst of love eternalizing and eternal! to +be for ever! to be God! + +"Ye shall be as gods!" we are told in Genesis that the serpent said to +the first pair of lovers (Gen. iii. 5). "If in this life only we have +hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable," wrote the Apostle (1 +Cor. xv. 19); and all religion has sprung historically from the cult of +the dead--that is to say, from the cult of immortality. + +The tragic Portuguese Jew of Amsterdam wrote that the free man thinks of +nothing less than of death; but this free man is a dead man, free from +the impulse of life, for want of love, the slave of his liberty. This +thought that I must die and the enigma of what will come after death is +the very palpitation of my consciousness. When I contemplate the green +serenity of the fields or look into the depths of clear eyes through +which shines a fellow-soul, my consciousness dilates, I feel the +diastole of the soul and am bathed in the flood of the life that flows +about me, and I believe in my future; but instantly the voice of mystery +whispers to me, "Thou shalt cease to be!" the angel of Death touches me +with his wing, and the systole of the soul floods the depths of my +spirit with the blood of divinity. + +Like Pascal, I do not understand those who assert that they care not a +farthing for these things, and this indifference "in a matter that +touches themselves, their eternity, their all, exasperates me rather +than moves me to compassion, astonishes and shocks me," and he who feels +thus "is for me," as for Pascal, whose are the words just quoted, "a +monster." + +It has been said a thousand times and in a thousand books that +ancestor-worship is for the most part the source of primitive religions, +and it may be strictly said that what most distinguishes man from the +other animals is that, in one form or another, he guards his dead and +does not give them over to the neglect of teeming mother earth; he is an +animal that guards its dead. And from what does he thus guard them? From +what does he so futilely protect them? The wretched consciousness +shrinks from its own annihilation, and, just as an animal spirit, newly +severed from the womb of the world, finds itself confronted with the +world and knows itself distinct from it, so consciousness must needs +desire to possess another life than that of the world itself. And so the +earth would run the risk of becoming a vast cemetery before the dead +themselves should die again. + +When mud huts or straw shelters, incapable of resisting the inclemency +of the weather, sufficed for the living, tumuli were raised for the +dead, and stone was used for sepulchres before it was used for houses. +It is the strong-builded houses of the dead that have withstood the +ages, not the houses of the living; not the temporary lodgings but the +permanent habitations. + +This cult, not of death but of immortality, originates and preserves +religions. In the midst of the delirium of destruction, Robespierre +induced the Convention to declare the existence of the Supreme Being and +"the consolatory principle of the immortality of the soul," the +Incorruptible being dismayed at the idea of having himself one day to +turn to corruption. + +A disease? Perhaps; but he who pays no heed to his disease is heedless +of his health, and man is an animal essentially and substantially +diseased. A disease? Perhaps it may be, like life itself to which it is +thrall, and perhaps the only health possible may be death; but this +disease is the fount of all vigorous health. From the depth of this +anguish, from the abyss of the feeling of our mortality, we emerge into +the light of another heaven, as from the depth of Hell Dante emerged to +behold the stars once again-- + + _e quindi uscimmo a riveder le stelle._ + +Although this meditation upon mortality may soon induce in us a sense of +anguish, it fortifies us in the end. Retire, reader, into yourself and +imagine a slow dissolution of yourself--the light dimming about you--all +things becoming dumb and soundless, enveloping you in silence--the +objects that you handle crumbling away between your hands--the ground +slipping from under your feet--your very memory vanishing as if in a +swoon--everything melting away from you into nothingness and you +yourself also melting away--the very consciousness of nothingness, +merely as the phantom harbourage of a shadow, not even remaining to you. + +I have heard it related of a poor harvester who died in a hospital bed, +that when the priest went to anoint his hands with the oil of extreme +unction, he refused to open his right hand, which clutched a few dirty +coins, not considering that very soon neither his hand nor he himself +would be his own any more. And so we close and clench, not our hand, but +our heart, seeking to clutch the world in it. + +A friend confessed to me that, foreseeing while in the full vigour of +physical health the near approach of a violent death, he proposed to +concentrate his life and spend the few days which he calculated still +remained to him in writing a book. Vanity of vanities! + +If at the death of the body which sustains me, and which I call mine to +distinguish it from the self that is I, my consciousness returns to the +absolute unconsciousness from which it sprang, and if a like fate +befalls all my brothers in humanity, then is our toil-worn human race +nothing but a fatidical procession of phantoms, going from nothingness +to nothingness, and humanitarianism the most inhuman thing known. + +And the remedy is not that suggested in the quatrain that runs-- + + _Cada vez que considero + que me tengo de morir, + tiendo la capa en el suelo + y no me harto de dormir._[11] + +No! The remedy is to consider our mortal destiny without flinching, to +fasten our gaze upon the gaze of the Sphinx, for it is thus that the +malevolence of its spell is discharmed. + +If we all die utterly, wherefore does everything exist? Wherefore? It is +the Wherefore of the Sphinx; it is the Wherefore that corrodes the +marrow of the soul; it is the begetter of that anguish which gives us +the love of hope. + +Among the poetic laments of the unhappy Cowper there are some lines +written under the oppression of delirium, in which, believing himself to +be the mark of the Divine vengeance, he exclaims-- + + Hell might afford my miseries a shelter. + +This is the Puritan sentiment, the preoccupation with sin and +predestination; but read the much more terrible words of Senancour, +expressive of the Catholic, not the Protestant, despair, when he makes +his Obermann say, "L'homme est perissable. Il se peut; mais perissons en +resistant, et, si le neant nous est reserve, ne faisons pas que ce soit +une justice." And I must confess, painful though the confession be, that +in the days of the simple faith of my childhood, descriptions of the +tortures of hell, however terrible, never made me tremble, for I always +felt that nothingness was much more terrifying. He who suffers lives, +and he who lives suffering, even though over the portal of his abode is +written "Abandon all hope!" loves and hopes. It is better to live in +pain than to cease to be in peace. The truth is that I could not +believe in this atrocity of Hell, of an eternity of punishment, nor did +I see any more real hell than nothingness and the prospect of it. And I +continue in the belief that if we all believed in our salvation from +nothingness we should all be better. + +What is this _joie de vivre_ that they talk about nowadays? Our hunger +for God, our thirst of immortality, of survival, will always stifle in +us this pitiful enjoyment of the life that passes and abides not. It is +the frenzied love of life, the love that would have life to be unending, +that most often urges us to long for death. "If it is true that I am to +die utterly," we say to ourselves, "then once I am annihilated the world +has ended so far as I am concerned--it is finished. Why, then, should it +not end forthwith, so that no new consciousnesses, doomed to suffer the +tormenting illusion of a transient and apparential existence, may come +into being? If, the illusion of living being shattered, living for the +mere sake of living or for the sake of others who are likewise doomed to +die, does not satisfy the soul, what is the good of living? Our best +remedy is death." And thus it is that we chant the praises of the +never-ending rest because of our dread of it, and speak of liberating +death. + +Leopardi, the poet of sorrow, of annihilation, having lost the ultimate +illusion, that of believing in his immortality-- + + _Peri l'inganno estremo + ch'eterno io mi credei_, + +spoke to his heart of _l'infinita vanita del tutto_, and perceived how +close is the kinship between love and death, and how "when love is born +deep down in the heart, simultaneously a languid and weary desire to die +is felt in the breast." The greater part of those who seek death at +their own hand are moved thereto by love; it is the supreme longing for +life, for more life, the longing to prolong and perpetuate life, that +urges them to death, once they are persuaded of the vanity of this +longing. + +The problem is tragic and eternal, and the more we seek to escape from +it, the more it thrusts itself upon us. Four-and-twenty centuries ago, +in his dialogue on the immortality of the soul, the serene Plato--but +was he serene?--spoke of the uncertainty of our dream of being immortal +and of the _risk_ that the dream might be vain, and from his own soul +there escaped this profound cry--Glorious is the risk!--_kalos +gar o kindunos_, glorious is the risk that we are able to run of our +souls never dying--a sentence that was the germ of Pascal's famous +argument of the wager. + +Faced with this risk, I am presented with arguments designed to +eliminate it, arguments demonstrating the absurdity of the belief in the +immortality of the soul; but these arguments fail to make any impression +upon me, for they are reasons and nothing more than reasons, and it is +not with reasons that the heart is appeased. I do not want to die--no; I +neither want to die nor do I want to want to die; I want to live for +ever and ever and ever. I want this "I" to live--this poor "I" that I am +and that I feel myself to be here and now, and therefore the problem of +the duration of my soul, of my own soul, tortures me. + +I am the centre of my universe, the centre of the universe, and in my +supreme anguish I cry with Michelet, "Mon moi, ils m'arrachent mon moi!" +What is a man profited if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own +soul? (Matt. xvi. 26). Egoism, you say? There is nothing more universal +than the individual, for what is the property of each is the property of +all. Each man is worth more than the whole of humanity, nor will it do +to sacrifice each to all save in so far as all sacrifice themselves to +each. That which we call egoism is the principle of psychic gravity, the +necessary postulate. "Love thy neighbour as thyself," we are told, the +presupposition being that each man loves himself; and it is not said +"Love thyself." And, nevertheless, we do not know how to love ourselves. + +Put aside the persistence of your own self and ponder what they tell +you. Sacrifice yourself to your children! And sacrifice yourself to them +because they are yours, part and prolongation of yourself, and they in +their turn will sacrifice themselves to their children, and these +children to theirs, and so it will go on without end, a sterile +sacrifice by which nobody profits. I came into the world to create my +self, and what is to become of all our selves? Live for the True, the +Good, the Beautiful! We shall see presently the supreme vanity and the +supreme insincerity of this hypocritical attitude. + +"That art thou!" they tell me with the Upanishads. And I answer: Yes, I +am that, if that is I and all is mine, and mine the totality of things. +As mine I love the All, and I love my neighbour because he lives in me +and is part of my consciousness, because he is like me, because he is +mine. + +Oh, to prolong this blissful moment, to sleep, to eternalize oneself in +it! Here and now, in this discreet and diffused light, in this lake of +quietude, the storm of the heart appeased and stilled the echoes of the +world! Insatiable desire now sleeps and does not even dream; use and +wont, blessed use and wont, are the rule of my eternity; my disillusions +have died with my memories, and with my hopes my fears. + +And they come seeking to deceive us with a deceit of deceits, telling us +that nothing is lost, that everything is transformed, shifts and +changes, that not the least particle of matter is annihilated, not the +least impulse of energy is lost, and there are some who pretend to +console us with this! Futile consolation! It is not my matter or my +energy that is the cause of my disquiet, for they are not mine if I +myself am not mine--that is, if I am not eternal. No, my longing is not +to be submerged in the vast All, in an infinite and eternal Matter or +Energy, or in God; not to be possessed by God, but to possess Him, to +become myself God, yet without ceasing to be I myself, I who am now +speaking to you. Tricks of monism avail us nothing; we crave the +substance and not the shadow of immortality. + +Materialism, you say? Materialism? Without doubt; but either our spirit +is likewise some kind of matter or it is nothing. I dread the idea of +having to tear myself away from my flesh; I dread still more the idea of +having to tear myself away from everything sensible and material, from +all substance. Yes, perhaps this merits the name of materialism; and if +I grapple myself to God with all my powers and all my senses, it is that +He may carry me in His arms beyond death, looking into these eyes of +mine with the light of His heaven when the light of earth is dimming in +them for ever. Self-illusion? Talk not to me of illusion--let me live! + +They also call this pride--"stinking pride" Leopardi called it--and they +ask us who are we, vile earthworms, to pretend to immortality; in virtue +of what? wherefore? by what right? "In virtue of what?" you ask; and I +reply, In virtue of what do we now live? "Wherefore?"--and wherefore do +we now exist? "By what right?"--and by what right are we? To exist is +just as gratuitous as to go on existing for ever. Do not let us talk of +merit or of right or of the wherefore of our longing, which is an end in +itself, or we shall lose our reason in a vortex of absurdities. I do not +claim any right or merit; it is only a necessity; I need it in order to +live. + +And you, who are you? you ask me; and I reply with Obermann, "For the +universe, nothing; for myself, everything!" Pride? Is it pride to want +to be immortal? Unhappy men that we are! 'Tis a tragic fate, without a +doubt, to have to base the affirmation of immortality upon the insecure +and slippery foundation of the desire for immortality; but to condemn +this desire on the ground that we believe it to have been proved to be +unattainable, without undertaking the proof, is merely supine. I am +dreaming ...? Let me dream, if this dream is my life. Do not awaken me +from it. I believe in the immortal origin of this yearning for +immortality, which is the very substance of my soul. But do I really +believe in it ...? And wherefore do you want to be immortal? you ask me, +wherefore? Frankly, I do not understand the question, for it is to ask +the reason of the reason, the end of the end, the principle of the +principle. + +But these are things which it is impossible to discuss. + +It is related in the book of the Acts of the Apostles how wherever Paul +went the Jews, moved with envy, were stirred up to persecute him. They +stoned him in Iconium and Lystra, cities of Lycaonia, in spite of the +wonders that he worked therein; they scourged him in Philippi of +Macedonia and persecuted his brethren in Thessalonica and Berea. He +arrived at Athens, however, the noble city of the intellectuals, over +which brooded the sublime spirit of Plato--the Plato of the gloriousness +of the risk of immortality; and there Paul disputed with Epicureans and +Stoics. And some said of him, "What doth this babbler (_spermologos_) +mean?" and others, "He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods" +(Acts xvii. 18), "and they took him and brought him unto Areopagus, +saying, May we know what this new doctrine, whereof thou speakest, is? +for thou bringest certain strange things to our ears; we would know, +therefore, what these things mean" (verses 19-20). And then follows that +wonderful characterization of those Athenians of the decadence, those +dainty connoisseurs of the curious, "for all the Athenians and strangers +which were there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell or +to hear some new thing" (verse 21). A wonderful stroke which depicts for +us the condition of mind of those who had learned from the _Odyssey_ +that the gods plot and achieve the destruction of mortals in order that +their posterity may have something to narrate! + +Here Paul stands, then, before the subtle Athenians, before the +_graeuli_, men of culture and tolerance, who are ready to welcome and +examine every doctrine, who neither stone nor scourge nor imprison any +man for professing these or those doctrines--here he stands where +liberty of conscience is respected and every opinion is given an +attentive hearing. And he raises his voice in the midst of the Areopagus +and speaks to them as it was fitting to speak to the cultured citizens +of Athens, and all listen to him, agog to hear the latest novelty. But +when he begins to speak to them of the resurrection of the dead their +stock of patience and tolerance comes to an end, and some mock him, and +others say: "We will hear thee again of this matter!" intending not to +hear him. And a similar thing happened to him at Caesarea when he came +before the Roman praetor Felix, likewise a broad-minded and cultured man, +who mitigated the hardships of his imprisonment, and wished to hear and +did hear him discourse of righteousness and of temperance; but when he +spoke of the judgement to come, Felix said, terrified (_emphobos +genomenos_): "Go thy way for this time; when I have a convenient season +I will call for thee" (Acts xxiv. 22-25). And in his audience before +King Agrippa, when Festus the governor heard him speak of the +resurrection of the dead, he exclaimed: "Thou art mad, Paul; much +learning hath made thee mad" (Acts xxvi. 24). + +Whatever of truth there may have been in Paul's discourse in the +Areopagus, and even if there were none, it is certain that this +admirable account plainly shows how far Attic tolerance goes and where +the patience of the intellectuals ends. They all listen to you, calmly +and smilingly, and at times they encourage you, saying: "That's +strange!" or, "He has brains!" or "That's suggestive," or "How fine!" or +"Pity that a thing so beautiful should not be true!" or "this makes one +think!" But as soon as you speak to them of resurrection and life after +death, they lose their patience and cut short your remarks and exclaim, +"Enough of this! we will talk about this another day!" And it is about +this, my poor Athenians, my intolerant intellectuals, it is about this +that I am going to talk to you here. + +And even if this belief be absurd, why is its exposition less tolerated +than that of others much more absurd? Why this manifest hostility to +such a belief? Is it fear? Is it, perhaps, spite provoked by inability +to share it? + +And sensible men, those who do not intend to let themselves be deceived, +keep on dinning into our ears the refrain that it is no use giving way +to folly and kicking against the pricks, for what cannot be is +impossible. The manly attitude, they say, is to resign oneself to fate; +since we are not immortal, do not let us want to be so; let us submit +ourselves to reason without tormenting ourselves about what is +irremediable, and so making life more gloomy and miserable. This +obsession, they add, is a disease. Disease, madness, reason ... the +everlasting refrain! Very well then--No! I do not submit to reason, and +I rebel against it, and I persist in creating by the energy of faith my +immortalizing God, and in forcing by my will the stars out of their +courses, for if we had faith as a grain of mustard seed we should say to +that mountain, "Remove hence," and it would remove, and nothing would be +impossible to us (Matt. xvii. 20). + +There you have that "thief of energies," as he[12] so obtusely called +Christ who sought to wed nihilism with the struggle for existence, and +he talks to you about courage. His heart craved the eternal all while +his head convinced him of nothingness, and, desperate and mad to defend +himself from himself, he cursed that which he most loved. Because he +could not be Christ, he blasphemed against Christ. Bursting with his own +self, he wished himself unending and dreamed his theory of eternal +recurrence, a sorry counterfeit of immortality, and, full of pity for +himself, he abominated all pity. And there are some who say that his is +the philosophy of strong men! No, it is not. My health and my strength +urge me to perpetuate myself. His is the doctrine of weaklings who +aspire to be strong, but not of the strong who are strong. Only the +feeble resign themselves to final death and substitute some other desire +for the longing for personal immortality. In the strong the zeal for +perpetuity overrides the doubt of realizing it, and their superabundance +of life overflows upon the other side of death. + +Before this terrible mystery of mortality, face to face with the Sphinx, +man adopts different attitudes and seeks in various ways to console +himself for having been born. And now it occurs to him to take it as a +diversion, and he says to himself with Renan that this universe is a +spectacle that God presents to Himself, and that it behoves us to carry +out the intentions of the great Stage-Manager and contribute to make the +spectacle the most brilliant and the most varied that may be. And they +have made a religion of art, a cure for the metaphysical evil, and +invented the meaningless phrase of art for art's sake. + +And it does not suffice them. If the man who tells you that he writes, +paints, sculptures, or sings for his own amusement, gives his work to +the public, he lies; he lies if he puts his name to his writing, +painting, statue, or song. He wishes, at the least, to leave behind a +shadow of his spirit, something that may survive him. If the _Imitation +of Christ_ is anonymous, it is because its author sought the eternity of +the soul and did not trouble himself about that of the name. The man of +letters who shall tell you that he despises fame is a lying rascal. Of +Dante, the author of those three-and-thirty vigorous verses (_Purg._ xi. +85-117) on the vanity of worldly glory, Boccaccio says that he relished +honours and pomps more perhaps than suited with his conspicuous virtue. +The keenest desire of his condemned souls is that they may be remembered +and talked of here on earth, and this is the chief solace that lightens +the darkness of his Inferno. And he himself confessed that his aim in +expounding the concept of Monarchy was not merely that he might be of +service to others, but that he might win for his own glory the palm of +so great prize (_De Monarchia_, lib. i., cap. i.). What more? Even of +that holy man, seemingly the most indifferent to worldly vanity, the +Poor Little One of Assisi, it is related in the _Legenda Trium Sociorum_ +that he said: _Adhuc adorabor per totum mundum!_--You will see how I +shall yet be adored by all the world! (II. _Celano_, i. 1). And even of +God Himself the theologians say that He created the world for the +manifestation of His glory. + +When doubts invade us and cloud our faith in the immortality of the +soul, a vigorous and painful impulse is given to the anxiety to +perpetuate our name and fame, to grasp at least a shadow of immortality. +And hence this tremendous struggle to singularize ourselves, to survive +in some way in the memory of others and of posterity. It is this +struggle, a thousand times more terrible than the struggle for life, +that gives its tone, colour, and character to our society, in which the +medieval faith in the immortal soul is passing away. Each one seeks to +affirm himself, if only in appearance. + +Once the needs of hunger are satisfied--and they are soon satisfied--the +vanity, the necessity--for it is a necessity--arises of imposing +ourselves upon and surviving in others. Man habitually sacrifices his +life to his purse, but he sacrifices his purse to his vanity. He boasts +even of his weaknesses and his misfortunes, for want of anything better +to boast of, and is like a child who, in order to attract attention, +struts about with a bandaged finger. And vanity, what is it but +eagerness for survival? + +The vain man is in like case with the avaricious--he takes the means for +the end; forgetting the end he pursues the means for its own sake and +goes no further. The seeming to be something, conducive to being it, +ends by forming our objective. We need that others should believe in our +superiority to them in order that we may believe in it ourselves, and +upon their belief base our faith in our own persistence, or at least in +the persistence of our fame. We are more grateful to him who +congratulates us on the skill with which we defend a cause than we are +to him who recognizes the truth or the goodness of the cause itself. A +rabid mania for originality is rife in the modern intellectual world and +characterizes all individual effort. We would rather err with genius +than hit the mark with the crowd. Rousseau has said in his _Emile_ (book +iv.): "Even though philosophers should be in a position to discover the +truth, which of them would take any interest in it? Each one knows well +that his system is not better founded than the others, but he supports +it because it is his. There is not a single one of them who, if he came +to know the true and the false, would not prefer the falsehood that he +had found to the truth discovered by another. Where is the philosopher +who would not willingly deceive mankind for his own glory? Where is he +who in the secret of his heart does not propose to himself any other +object than to distinguish himself? Provided that he lifts himself above +the vulgar, provided that he outshines the brilliance of his +competitors, what does he demand more? The essential thing is to think +differently from others. With believers he is an atheist; with atheists +he would be a believer." How much substantial truth there is in these +gloomy confessions of this man of painful sincerity! + +This violent struggle for the perpetuation of our name extends backwards +into the past, just as it aspires to conquer the future; we contend +with the dead because we, the living, are obscured beneath their shadow. +We are jealous of the geniuses of former times, whose names, standing +out like the landmarks of history, rescue the ages from oblivion. The +heaven of fame is not very large, and the more there are who enter it +the less is the share of each. The great names of the past rob us of our +place in it; the space which they fill in the popular memory they usurp +from us who aspire to occupy it. And so we rise up in revolt against +them, and hence the bitterness with which all those who seek after fame +in the world of letters judge those who have already attained it and are +in enjoyment of it. If additions continue to be made to the wealth of +literature, there will come a day of sifting, and each one fears lest he +be caught in the meshes of the sieve. In attacking the masters, +irreverent youth is only defending itself; the iconoclast or +image-breaker is a Stylite who erects himself as an image, an _icon_. +"Comparisons are odious," says the familiar adage, and the reason is +that we wish to be unique. Do not tell Fernandez that he is one of the +most talented Spaniards of the younger generation, for though he will +affect to be gratified by the eulogy he is really annoyed by it; if, +however, you tell him that he is the most talented man in Spain--well +and good! But even that is not sufficient: one of the worldwide +reputations would be more to his liking, but he is only fully satisfied +with being esteemed the first in all countries and all ages. The more +alone, the nearer to that unsubstantial immortality, the immortality of +the name, for great names diminish one another. + +What is the meaning of that irritation which we feel when we believe +that we are robbed of a phrase, or a thought, or an image, which we +believed to be our own, when we are plagiarized? Robbed? Can it indeed +be ours once we have given it to the public? Only because it is ours we +prize it; and we are fonder of the false money that preserves our +impress than of the coin of pure gold from which our effigy and our +legend has been effaced. It very commonly happens that it is when the +name of a writer is no longer in men's mouths that he most influences +his public, his mind being then disseminated and infused in the minds of +those who have read him, whereas he was quoted chiefly when his thoughts +and sayings, clashing with those generally received, needed the +guarantee of a name. What was his now belongs to all, and he lives in +all. But for him the garlands have faded, and he believes himself to +have failed. He hears no more either the applause or the silent tremor +of the heart of those who go on reading him. Ask any sincere artist +which he would prefer, whether that his work should perish and his +memory survive, or that his work should survive and his memory perish, +and you will see what he will tell you, if he is really sincere. When a +man does not work merely in order to live and carry on, he works in +order to survive. To work for the work's sake is not work but play. And +play? We will talk about that later on. + +A tremendous passion is this longing that our memory may be rescued, if +it is possible, from the oblivion which overtakes others. From it +springs envy, the cause, according to the biblical narrative, of the +crime with which human history opened: the murder of Abel by his brother +Cain. It was not a struggle for bread--it was a struggle to survive in +God, in the divine memory. Envy is a thousand times more terrible than +hunger, for it is spiritual hunger. If what we call the problem of life, +the problem of bread, were once solved, the earth would be turned into a +hell by the emergence in a more violent form of the struggle for +survival. + +For the sake of a name man is ready to sacrifice not only life but +happiness--life as a matter of course. "Let me die, but let my fame +live!" exclaimed Rodrigo Arias in _Las Mocedades del Cid_ when he fell +mortally wounded by Don Ordonez de Lara. "Courage, Girolamo, for you +will long be remembered; death is bitter, but fame eternal!" cried +Girolamo Olgiati, the disciple of Cola Montano and the murderer, +together with his fellow-conspirators Lampugnani and Visconti, of +Galeazzo Sforza, tyrant of Milan. And there are some who covet even the +gallows for the sake of acquiring fame, even though it be an infamous +fame: _avidus malae famae_, as Tacitus says. + +And this erostratism, what is it at bottom but the longing for +immortality, if not for substantial and concrete immortality, at any +rate for the shadowy immortality of the name? + +And in this there are degrees. If a man despises the applause of the +crowd of to-day, it is because he seeks to survive in renewed minorities +for generations. "Posterity is an accumulation of minorities," said +Gounod. He wishes to prolong himself in time rather than in space. The +crowd soon overthrows its own idols and the statue lies broken at the +foot of the pedestal without anyone heeding it; but those who win the +hearts of the elect will long be the objects of a fervent worship in +some shrine, small and secluded no doubt, but capable of preserving them +from the flood of oblivion. The artist sacrifices the extensiveness of +his fame to its duration; he is anxious rather to endure for ever in +some little corner than to occupy a brilliant second place in the whole +universe; he prefers to be an atom, eternal and conscious of himself, +rather than to be for a brief moment the consciousness of the whole +universe; he sacrifices infinitude to eternity. + +And they keep on wearying our ears with this chorus of Pride! stinking +Pride! Pride, to wish to leave an ineffaceable name? Pride? It is like +calling the thirst for riches a thirst for pleasure. No, it is not so +much the longing for pleasure that drives us poor folk to seek money as +the terror of poverty, just as it was not the desire for glory but the +terror of hell that drove men in the Middle Ages to the cloister with +its _acedia_. Neither is this wish to leave a name pride, but terror of +extinction. We aim at being all because in that we see the only means of +escaping from being nothing. We wish to save our memory--at any rate, +our memory. How long will it last? At most as long as the human race +lasts. And what if we shall save our memory in God? + +Unhappy, I know well, are these confessions; but from the depth of +unhappiness springs new life, and only by draining the lees of spiritual +sorrow can we at last taste the honey that lies at the bottom of the cup +of life. Anguish leads us to consolation. + +This thirst for eternal life is appeased by many, especially by the +simple, at the fountain of religious faith; but to drink of this is not +given to all. The institution whose primordial end is to protect this +faith in the personal immortality of the soul is Catholicism; but +Catholicism has sought to rationalize this faith by converting religion +into theology, by offering a philosophy, and a philosophy of the +thirteenth century, as a basis for vital belief. This and its +consequences we will now proceed to examine. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[11] Each time that I consider that it is my lot to die, I spread my +cloak upon the ground and am never surfeited with sleeping. + +[12] Nietzsche. + + + + +IV + +THE ESSENCE OF CATHOLICISM + + +Let us now approach the Christian, Catholic, Pauline, or Athanasian +solution of our inward vital problem, the hunger of immortality. + +Christianity sprang from the confluence of two mighty spiritual +streams--the one Judaic, the other Hellenic--each of which had already +influenced the other, and Rome finally gave it a practical stamp and +social permanence. + +It has been asserted, perhaps somewhat precipitately, that primitive +Christianity was an-eschatological, that faith in another life after +death is not clearly manifested in it, but rather a belief in the +proximate end of the world and establishment of the kingdom of God, a +belief known as chiliasm. But were they not fundamentally one and the +same thing? Faith in the immortality of the soul, the nature of which +was not perhaps very precisely defined, may be said to be a kind of +tacit understanding or supposition underlying the whole of the Gospel; +and it is the mental orientation of many of those who read it to-day, an +orientation contrary to that of the Christians from among whom the +Gospel sprang, that prevents them from seeing this. Without doubt all +that about the second coming of Christ, when he shall come among the +clouds, clothed with majesty and great power, to judge the quick and the +dead, to open to some the kingdom of heaven and to cast others into +Gehenna, where there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth, may be +understood in a chiliastic sense; and it is even said of Christ in the +Gospel (Mark ix. I), that there were with him some who should not taste +of death till they had seen the kingdom of God--that is, that the +kingdom should come during their generation. And in the same chapter, +verse 10, it is said of Peter and James and John, who went up with Jesus +to the Mount of Transfiguration and heard him say that he would rise +again from the dead, that "they kept that saying within themselves, +questioning one with another what the rising from the dead should mean." +And at all events the Gospel was written when this belief, the basis and +_raison d'etre_ of Christianity, was in process of formation. See Matt. +xxii. 29-32; Mark xii. 24-27; Luke xvi. 22-31; xx. 34-37; John v. 24-29; +vi. 40, 54, 58; viii. 51; xi. 25, 56; xiv. 2, 19. And, above all, that +passage in Matt. xxvii. 52, which tells how at the resurrection of +Christ "many bodies of the saints which slept arose." + +And this was not a natural resurrection. No; the Christian faith was +born of the faith that Jesus did not remain dead, but that God raised +him up again, and that this resurrection was a fact; but this did not +presuppose a mere immortality of the soul in the philosophical sense +(see Harnack, _Dogmengeschichte_, Prolegomena, v. 4). For the first +Fathers of the Church themselves the immortality of the soul was not a +thing pertaining to the natural order; the teaching of the Divine +Scriptures, as Nimesius said, sufficed for its demonstration, and it +was, according to Lactantius, a gift--and as such gratuitous--of God. +But more of this later. + +Christianity sprang, as we have said, from two great spiritual +streams--the Judaic and the Hellenic--each one of which had arrived on +its account, if not at a precise definition of, at any rate at a +definite yearning for, another life. Among the Jews faith in another +life was neither general nor clear; but they were led to it by faith in +a personal and living God, the formation of which faith comprises all +their spiritual history. + +Jahwe, the Judaic God, began by being one god among many others--the +God of the people of Israel, revealed among the thunders of the tempest +on Mount Sinai. But he was so jealous that he demanded that worship +should be paid to him alone, and it was by way of monocultism that the +Jews arrived at monotheism. He was adored as a living force, not as a +metaphysical entity, and he was the god of battles. But this God of +social and martial origin, to whose genesis we shall have to return +later, became more inward and personal in the prophets, and in becoming +more inward and personal he thereby became more individual and more +universal. He is the Jahwe who, instead of loving Israel because Israel +is his son, takes Israel for a son because he loves him (Hosea xi. 1). +And faith in the personal God, in the Father of men, carries with it +faith in the eternalization of the individual man--a faith which had +already dawned in Pharisaism even before Christ. + +Hellenic culture, on its side, ended by discovering death; and to +discover death is to discover the hunger of immortality. This longing +does not appear in the Homeric poems, which are not initial, but final, +in their character, marking not the start but the close of a +civilization. They indicate the transition from the old religion of +Nature, of Zeus, to the more spiritual religion of Apollo--of +redemption. But the popular and inward religion of the Eleusinian +mysteries, the worship of souls and ancestors, always persisted +underneath. "In so far as it is possible to speak of a Delphic theology, +among its more important elements must be counted the belief in the +continuation of the life of souls after death in its popular forms, and +in the worship of the souls of the dead."[13] There were the Titanic and +the Dionysiac elements, and it was the duty of man, according to the +Orphic doctrine, to free himself from the fetters of the body, in which +the soul was like a captive in a prison (see Rohde, _Psyche_, "Die +Orphiker," 4). The Nietzschean idea of eternal recurrence is an Orphic +idea. But the idea of the immortality of the soul was not a +philosophical principle. The attempt of Empedocles to harmonize a +hylozoistic system with spiritualism proved that a philosophical natural +science cannot by itself lead to a corroboration of the axiom of the +perpetuity of the individual soul; it could only serve as a support to a +theological speculation. It was by a contradiction that the first Greek +philosophers affirmed immortality, by abandoning natural philosophy and +intruding into theology, by formulating not an Apollonian but a +Dionysiac and Orphic dogma. But "an immortality of the soul as such, in +virtue of its own nature and condition as an imperishable divine force +in the mortal body, was never an object of popular Hellenic belief" +(Rohde, _op. cit._). + +Recall the _Phaedo_ of Plato and the neo-platonic lucubrations. In them +the yearning for personal immortality already shows itself--a yearning +which, as it was left totally unsatisfied by reason, produced the +Hellenic pessimism. For, as Pfleiderer very well observes +(_Religionsphilosophie auf geschichtliche Grundlage_, 3. Berlin, 1896), +"no people ever came upon the earth so serene and sunny as the Greeks in +the youthful days of their historical existence ... but no people +changed so completely their idea of the value of life. The Hellenism +which ended in the religious speculations of neo-pythagorism and +neo-platonism viewed this world, which had once appeared to it so joyous +and radiant, as an abode of darkness and error, and earthly existence as +a period of trial which could never be too quickly traversed." Nirvana +is an Hellenic idea. + +Thus Jews and Greeks each arrived independently at the real discovery +of death--a discovery which occasions, in peoples as in men, the +entrance into spiritual puberty, the realization of the tragic sense of +life, and it is then that the living God is begotten by humanity. The +discovery of death is that which reveals God to us, and the death of the +perfect man, Christ, was the supreme revelation of death, being the +death of the man who ought not to have died yet did die. + +Such a discovery--that of immortality--prepared as it was by the Judaic +and Hellenic religious processes, was a specifically Christian +discovery. And its full achievement was due above all to Paul of Tarsus, +the hellenizing Jew and Pharisee. Paul had not personally known Jesus, +and hence he discovered him as Christ. "It may be said that the theology +of the Apostle Paul is, in general, the first Christian theology. For +him it was a necessity; it was, in a certain sense, his substitution for +the lack of a personal knowledge of Jesus," says Weizsaecker (_Das +apostolische Zeitalter der christlichen Kirche_. Freiburg-i.-B., 1892). +He did not know Jesus, but he felt him born again in himself, and thus +he could say, "Nevertheless I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in +me."[14] And he preached the Cross, unto the Jews a stumbling-block, and +unto the Greeks foolishness (I Cor. i. 23), and the central doctrine for +the converted Apostle was that of the resurrection of Christ. The +important thing for him was that Christ had been made man and had died +and had risen again, and not what he did in his life--not his ethical +work as a teacher, but his religious work as a giver of immortality. And +he it was who wrote those immortal words: "Now if Christ be preached +that He rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no +resurrection from the dead? But if there be no resurrection of the dead, +then is Christ not risen; and if Christ be not risen, then is our +preaching vain, and your faith is also vain.... Then they also which are +fallen asleep in Christ are perished. If in this life only we have hope +in Christ, we are of all men most miserable" (I Cor. xv. 12-19). + +And it is possible to affirm that thenceforward he who does not believe +in the bodily resurrection of Christ may be Christophile but cannot be +specifically Christian. It is true that a Justin Martyr could say that +"all those are Christians who live in accordance with reason, even +though they may be deemed to be atheists, as, among the Greeks, Socrates +and Heraclitus and other such"; but this martyr, is he a martyr--that is +to say a witness--of Christianity? No. + +And it was around this dogma, inwardly experienced by Paul, the dogma of +the resurrection and immortality of Christ, the guarantee of the +resurrection and immortality of each believer, that the whole of +Christology was built up. The God-man, the incarnate Word, came in order +that man, according to his mode, might be made God--that is, immortal. +And the Christian God, the Father of Christ, a God necessarily +anthropomorphic, is He who--as the Catechism of Christian Doctrine which +we were made to learn by heart at school says--created the world for +man, for each man. And the end of redemption, in spite of appearances +due to an ethical deflection of a dogma properly religious, was to save +us from death rather than from sin, or from sin in so far as sin implies +death. And Christ died, or rather rose again, for _me_, for each one of +us. And a certain solidarity was established between God and His +creature. Malebranche said that the first man fell _in order that_ +Christ might redeem us, rather than that Christ redeemed us _because_ +man had fallen. + +After the death of Paul years passed, and generations of Christianity +wrought upon this central dogma and its consequences in order to +safeguard faith in the immortality of the individual soul, and the +Council of Nicaea came, and with it the formidable Athanasius, whose +name is still a battle-cry, an incarnation of the popular faith. +Athanasius was a man of little learning but of great faith, and above +all of popular faith, devoured by the hunger of immortality. And he +opposed Arianism, which, like Unitarian and Socinian Protestantism, +threatened, although unknowingly and unintentionally, the foundation of +that belief. For the Arians, Christ was first and foremost a teacher--a +teacher of morality, the wholly perfect man, and therefore the guarantee +that we may all attain to supreme perfection; but Athanasius felt that +Christ cannot make us gods if he has not first made himself God; if his +Divinity had been communicated, he could not have communicated it to us. +"He was not, therefore," he said, "first man and then became God; but He +was first God and then became man in order that He might the better +deify us (_theopoiese_)" (_Orat._ i. 39). It was not the Logos of +the philosophers, the cosmological Logos, that Athanasius knew and +adored;[15] and thus he instituted a separation between nature and +revelation. The Athanasian or Nicene Christ, who is the Catholic Christ, +is not the cosmological, nor even, strictly, the ethical Christ; he is +the eternalizing, the deifying, the religious Christ. Harnack says of +this Christ, the Christ of Nicene or Catholic Christology, that he is +essentially docetic--that is, apparential--because the process of the +divinization of the man in Christ was made in the interests of +eschatology. But which is the real Christ? Is it, indeed, that so-called +historical Christ of rationalist exegesis who is diluted for us in a +myth or in a social atom? + +This same Harnack, a Protestant rationalist, tells us that Arianism or +Unitarianism would have been the death of Christianity, reducing it to +cosmology and ethics, and that it served only as a bridge whereby the +learned might pass over to Catholicism--that is to say, from reason to +faith. To this same learned historian of dogmas it appears to be an +indication of a perverse state of things that the man Athanasius, who +saved Christianity as the religion of a living communion with God, +should have obliterated the Jesus of Nazareth, the historical Jesus, +whom neither Paul nor Athanasius knew personally, nor yet Harnack +himself. Among Protestants, this historical Jesus is subjected to the +scalpel of criticism, while the Catholic Christ lives, the really +historical Christ, he who lives throughout the centuries guaranteeing +the faith in personal immortality and personal salvation. + +And Athanasius had the supreme audacity of faith, that of asserting +things mutually contradictory: "The complete contradiction that exists +in the _homoousios_ carried in its train a whole army of +contradictions which increased as thought advanced," says Harnack. Yes, +so it was, and so it had to be. And he adds: "Dogma took leave for ever +of clear thinking and tenable concepts, and habituated itself to the +contra-rational." In truth, it drew closer to life, which is +contra-rational and opposed to clear thinking. Not only are judgements +of worth never rationalizable--they are anti-rational. + +At Nicaea, then, as afterwards at the Vatican, victory rested with the +idiots--taking this word in its proper, primitive, and etymological +sense--the simple-minded, the rude and headstrong bishops, the +representatives of the genuine human spirit, the popular spirit, the +spirit that does not want to die, in spite of whatever reason may say, +and that seeks a guarantee, the most material possible, for this desire. + +_Quid ad aeternitatem?_ This is the capital question. And the Creed ends +with that phrase, _resurrectionem mortuorum et vitam venturi +saeculi_--the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come. +In the cemetery of Mallona, in my native town of Bilbao, there is a +tombstone on which this verse is carved: + + _Aunque estamos en polvo convertidos, + en Ti, Senor, nuestra esperanza fia, + que tornaremos a vivir vestidos + con la carne y la piel que nos cubria._[16] + +"With the same bodies and souls that they had," as the Catechism says. +So much so, that it is orthodox Catholic doctrine that the happiness of +the blessed is not perfectly complete until they recover their bodies. +They lament in heaven, says our Brother Pedro Malon de Chaide of the +Order of St. Augustine, a Spaniard and a Basque,[17] and "this lament +springs from their not being perfectly whole in heaven, for only the +soul is there; and although they cannot suffer, because they see God, in +whom they unspeakably delight, yet with all this it appears that they +are not wholly content. They will be so when they are clothed with their +own bodies." + +And to this central dogma of the resurrection in Christ and by Christ +corresponds likewise a central sacrament, the axis of popular Catholic +piety--the Sacrament of the Eucharist. In it is administered the body of +Christ, which is the bread of immortality. + +This sacrament is genuinely realist--_dinglich_, as the Germans would +say--which may without great violence be translated "material." It is +the sacrament most genuinely _ex opere operato_, for which is +substituted among Protestants the idealistic sacrament of the word. +Fundamentally it is concerned with--and I say it with all possible +respect, but without wishing to sacrifice the expressiveness of the +phrase--the eating and drinking of God, the Eternalizer, the feeding +upon Him. Little wonder then if St. Teresa tells us that when she was +communicating in the monastery of the Incarnation and in the second year +of her being Prioress there, on the octave of St. Martin, and the +Father, Fr. Juan de la Cruz, divided the Host between her and another +sister, she thought that it was done not because there was any want of +Hosts, but because he wished to mortify her, "for I had told him how +much I delighted in Hosts of a large size. Yet I was not ignorant that +the size of the Host is of no moment, for I knew that our Lord is whole +and entire in the smallest particle." Here reason pulls one way, feeling +another. And what importance for this feeling have the thousand and one +difficulties that arise from reflecting rationally upon the mystery of +this sacrament? What is a divine body? And the body, in so far as it is +the body of Christ, is it divine? What is an immortal and immortalizing +body? What is substance separated from the accidents? Nowadays we have +greatly refined our notion of materiality and substantiality; but there +were even some among the Fathers of the Church to whom the immateriality +of God Himself was not a thing so clear and definite as it is for us. +And this sacrament of the Eucharist is the immortalizing sacrament _par +excellence_, and therefore the axis of popular Catholic piety, and if it +may be so said, the most specifically religious of sacraments. + +For what is specific in the Catholic religion is immortalization and not +justification, in the Protestant sense. Rather is this latter ethical. +It was from Kant, in spite of what orthodox Protestants may think of +him, that Protestantism derived its penultimate conclusions--namely, +that religion rests upon morality, and not morality upon religion, as in +Catholicism. + +The preoccupation of sin has never been such a matter of anguish, or at +any rate has never displayed itself with such an appearance of anguish, +among Catholics. The sacrament of Confession contributes to this. And +there persists, perhaps, among Catholics more than among Protestants +the substance of the primitive Judaic and pagan conception of sin as +something material and infectious and hereditary, which is cured by +baptism and absolution. In Adam all his posterity sinned, almost +materially, and his sin was transmitted as a material disease is +transmitted. Renan, whose education was Catholic, was right, therefore, +in calling to account the Protestant Amiel who accused him of not giving +due importance to sin. And, on the other hand, Protestantism, absorbed +in this preoccupation with justification, which in spite of its +religious guise was taken more in an ethical sense than anything else, +ends by neutralizing and almost obliterating eschatology; it abandons +the Nicene symbol, falls into an anarchy of creeds, into pure religious +individualism and a vague esthetic, ethical, or cultured religiosity. +What we may call "other-worldliness" (_Jenseitigkeit_) was obliterated +little by little by "this-worldliness" (_Diesseitigkeit_); and this in +spite of Kant, who wished to save it, but by destroying it. To its +earthly vocation and passive trust in God is due the religious +coarseness of Lutheranism, which was almost at the point of expiring in +the age of the Enlightenment, of the _Aufklaerung_, and which pietism, +infusing into it something of the religious sap of Catholicism, barely +succeeded in galvanizing a little. Hence the exactness of the remarks of +Oliveira Martins in his magnificent _History of Iberian Civilization_, +in which he says (book iv., chap, iii.) that "Catholicism produced +heroes and Protestantism produced societies that are sensible, happy, +wealthy, free, as far as their outer institutions go, but incapable of +any great action, because their religion has begun by destroying in the +heart of man all that made him capable of daring and noble +self-sacrifice." + +Take any of the dogmatic systems that have resulted from the latest +Protestant dissolvent analysis--that of Kaftan, the follower of Ritschl, +for example--and note the extent to which eschatology is reduced. And +his master, Albrecht Ritschl, himself says: "The question regarding the +necessity of justification or forgiveness can only be solved by +conceiving eternal life as the direct end and aim of that divine +operation. But if the idea of eternal life be applied merely to our +state in the next life, then its content, too, lies beyond all +experience, and cannot form the basis of knowledge of a scientific kind. +Hopes and desires, though marked by the strongest subjective certainty, +are not any the clearer for that, and contain in themselves no guarantee +of the completeness of what one hopes or desires. Clearness and +completeness of idea, however, are the conditions of comprehending +anything--_i.e._, of understanding the necessary connection between the +various elements of a thing, and between the thing and its given +presuppositions. The Evangelical article of belief, therefore, that +justification by faith establishes or brings with it assurance of +eternal life, is of no use theologically, so long as this purposive +aspect of justification cannot be verified in such experience as is +possible now" (_Rechtfertigung und Versoehnung_, vol. iii., chap. vii., +52). All this is very rational, but ... + +In the first edition of Melanchthon's _Loci Communes_, that of 1521, the +first Lutheran theological work, its author omits all Trinitarian and +Christological speculations, the dogmatic basis of eschatology. And Dr. +Hermann, professor at Marburg, the author of a book on the Christian's +commerce with God (_Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott_)--a book the +first chapter of which treats of the opposition between mysticism and +the Christian religion, and which is, according to Harnack, the most +perfect Lutheran manual--tells us in another place,[18] referring to +this Christological (or Athanasian) speculation, that "the effective +knowledge of God and of Christ, in which knowledge faith lives, is +something entirely different. Nothing ought to find a place in Christian +doctrine that is not capable of helping man to recognize his sins, to +obtain the grace of God, and to serve Him in truth. Until that +time--that is to say, until Luther--the Church had accepted much as +_doctrina sacra_ which cannot absolutely contribute to confer upon man +liberty of heart and tranquillity of conscience." For my part, I cannot +conceive the liberty of a heart or the tranquillity of a conscience that +are not sure of their perdurability after death. "The desire for the +soul's salvation," Hermann continues, "must at last have led men to the +knowledge and understanding of the effective doctrine of salvation." And +in his book on the Christian's commerce with God, this eminent Lutheran +doctor is continually discoursing upon trust in God, peace of +conscience, and an assurance of salvation that is not strictly and +precisely certainty of everlasting life, but rather certainty of the +forgiveness of sins. + +And I have read in a Protestant theologian, Ernst Troeltsch, that in the +conceptual order Protestantism has attained its highest reach in music, +in which art Bach has given it its mightiest artistic expression. This, +then, is what Protestantism dissolves into--celestial music![19] On the +other hand we may say that the highest artistic expression of +Catholicism, or at least of Spanish Catholicism, is in the art that is +most material, tangible, and permanent--for the vehicle of sounds is +air--in sculpture and painting, in the Christ of Velasquez, that Christ +who is for ever dying, yet never finishes dying, in order that he may +give us life. + +And yet Catholicism does not abandon ethics. No! No modern religion can +leave ethics on one side. But our religion--although its doctors may +protest against this--is fundamentally and for the most part a +compromise between eschatology and ethics; it is eschatology pressed +into the service of ethics. What else but this is that atrocity of the +eternal pains of hell, which agrees so ill with the Pauline +apocatastasis? Let us bear in mind those words which the _Theologica +Germanica_, the manual of mysticism that Luther read, puts into the +mouth of God: "If I must recompense your evil, I must recompense it with +good, for I am and have none other." And Christ said: "Father, forgive +them, for they know not what they do," and there is no man who perhaps +knows what he does. But it has been necessary, for the benefit of the +social order, to convert religion into a kind of police system, and +hence hell. Oriental or Greek Christianity is predominantly +eschatological, Protestantism predominantly ethical, and Catholicism is +a compromise between the two, although with the eschatological element +preponderating. The most authentic Catholic ethic, monastic asceticism, +is an ethic of eschatology, directed to the salvation of the individual +soul rather than to the maintenance of society. And in the cult of +virginity may there not perhaps be a certain obscure idea that to +perpetuate ourselves in others hinders our own personal perpetuation? +The ascetic morality is a negative morality. And, strictly, what is +important for a man is not to die, whether he sins or not. It is not +necessary to take very literally, but as a lyrical, or rather +rhetorical, effusion, the words of our famous sonnet-- + + _No me mueve, mi Dios, para quererte + el cielo que me tienes prometido,_[20] + +and the rest that follows. + +The real sin--perhaps it is the sin against the Holy Ghost for which +there is no remission--is the sin of heresy, the sin of thinking for +oneself. The saying has been heard before now, here in Spain, that to be +a liberal--that is, a heretic--is worse than being an assassin, a thief, +or an adulterer. The gravest sin is not to obey the Church, whose +infallibility protects us from reason. + +And why be scandalized by the infallibility of a man, of the Pope? What +difference does it make whether it be a book that is infallible--the +Bible, or a society of men--the Church, or a single man? Does it make +any essential change in the rational difficulty? And since the +infallibility of a book or of a society of men is not more rational than +that of a single man, this supreme offence in the eyes of reason had to +be posited. + +It is the vital asserting itself, and in order to assert itself it +creates, with the help of its enemy, the rational, a complete dogmatic +structure, and this the Church defends against rationalism, against +Protestantism, and against Modernism. The Church defends life. It stood +up against Galileo, and it did right; for his discovery, in its +inception and until it became assimilated to the general body of human +knowledge, tended to shatter the anthropomorphic belief that the +universe was created for man. It opposed Darwin, and it did right, for +Darwinism tends to shatter our belief that man is an exceptional animal, +created expressly to be eternalized. And lastly, Pius IX., the first +Pontiff to be proclaimed infallible, declared that he was irreconcilable +with the so-called modern civilization. And he did right. + +Loisy, the Catholic ex-abbe, said: "I say simply this, that the Church +and theology have not looked with favour upon the scientific movement, +and that on certain decisive occasions, so far as it lay in their power, +they have hindered it. I say, above all, that Catholic teaching has not +associated itself with, or accommodated itself to, this movement. +Theology has conducted itself, and conducts itself still, as if it were +self-possessed of a science of nature and a science of history, +together with that general philosophy of nature and history which +results from a scientific knowledge of them. It might be supposed that +the domain of theology and that of science, distinct in principle and +even as defined by the Vatican Council, must not be distinct in +practice. Everything proceeds almost as if theology had nothing to learn +from modern science, natural or historical, and as if by itself it had +the power and the right to exercise a direct and absolute control over +all the activities of the human mind" (_Autour d'un Petit Livre_, 1903, +p. 211). + +And such must needs be, and such in fact is, the Church's attitude in +its struggle with Modernism, of which Loisy was the learned and leading +exponent. + +The recent struggle against Kantian and fideist Modernism is a struggle +for life. Is it indeed possible for life, life that seeks assurance of +survival, to tolerate that a Loisy, a Catholic priest, should affirm +that the resurrection of the Saviour is not a fact of the historical +order, demonstrable and demonstrated by the testimony of history alone? +Read, moreover, the exposition of the central dogma, that of the +resurrection of Jesus, in E. Le Roy's excellent work, _Dogme et +Critique_, and tell me if any solid ground is left for our hope to build +on. Do not the Modernists see that the question at issue is not so much +that of the immortal life of Christ, reduced, perhaps, to a life in the +collective Christian consciousness, as that of a guarantee of our own +personal resurrection of body as well as soul? This new psychological +apologetic appeals to the moral miracle, and we, like the Jews, seek for +a sign, something that can be taken hold of with all the powers of the +soul and with all the senses of the body. And with the hands and the +feet and the mouth, if it be possible. + +But alas! we do not get it. Reason attacks, and faith, which does not +feel itself secure without reason, has to come to terms with it. And +hence come those tragic contradictions and lacerations of +consciousness. We need security, certainty, signs, and they give us +_motiva credibilitatis_--motives of credibility--upon which to establish +the _rationale obsequium_, and although faith precedes reason (_fides +praecedit rationem_), according to St. Augustine, this same learned +doctor and bishop sought to travel by faith to understanding (_per fidem +ad intellectum_), and to believe in order to understand (_credo ut +intelligam_). How far is this from that superb expression of +Tertullian--_et sepultus resurrexit, certum est quia impossibile +est!_--"and he was buried and rose again; it is certain because it is +impossible!" and his sublime _credo quia absurdum!_--the scandal of the +rationalists. How far from the _il faut s'abetir_ of Pascal and from the +"human reason loves the absurd" of our Donoso Cortes, which he must have +learned from the great Joseph de Maistre! + +And a first foundation-stone was sought in the authority of tradition +and the revelation of the word of God, and the principle of unanimous +consent was arrived at. _Quod apud multos unum invenitur, non est +erratum, sed traditum_, said Tertullian; and Lamennais added, centuries +later, that "certitude, the principle of life and intelligence ... is, +if I may be allowed the expression, a social product."[21] But here, as +in so many cases, the supreme formula was given by that great Catholic, +whose Catholicism was of the popular and vital order, Count Joseph de +Maistre, when he wrote: "I do not believe that it is possible to show a +single opinion of universal utility that is not true."[22] Here you have +the Catholic hall-mark--the deduction of the truth of a principle from +its supreme goodness or utility. And what is there of greater, of more +sovereign utility, than the immortality of the soul? "As all is +uncertain, either we must believe all men or none," said Lactantius; but +that great mystic and ascetic, Blessed Heinrich Seuse, the Dominican, +implored the Eternal Wisdom for one word affirming that He was love, and +when the answer came, "All creatures proclaim that I am love," Seuse +replied, "Alas! Lord, that does not suffice for a yearning soul." Faith +feels itself secure neither with universal consent, nor with tradition, +nor with authority. It seeks the support of its enemy, reason. + +And thus scholastic theology was devised, and with it its +handmaiden--_ancilla theologiae_--scholastic philosophy, and this +handmaiden turned against her mistress. Scholasticism, a magnificent +cathedral, in which all the problems of architectonic mechanism were +resolved for future ages, but a cathedral constructed of unbaked bricks, +gave place little by little to what is called natural theology and is +merely Christianity depotentialized. The attempt was even made, where it +was possible, to base dogmas upon reason, to show at least that if they +were indeed super-rational they were not contra-rational, and they were +reinforced with a philosophical foundation of Aristotelian-Neoplatonic +thirteenth-century philosophy. And such is the Thomism recommended by +Leo XIII. And now the question is not one of the enforcement of dogma +but of its philosophical, medieval, and Thomist interpretation. It is +not enough to believe that in receiving the consecrated Host we receive +the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ; we must needs negotiate all +those difficulties of transubstantiation and substance separated from +accidents, and so break with the whole of the modern rational conception +of substantiality. + +But for this, implicit faith suffices--the faith of the coalheaver,[23] +the faith of those who, like St. Teresa (_Vida_, cap. xxv. 2), do not +wish to avail themselves of theology. "Do not ask me the reason of +that, for I am ignorant; Holy Mother Church possesses doctors who will +know how to answer you," as we were made to learn in the Catechism. It +was for this, among other things, that the priesthood was instituted, +that the teaching Church might be the depositary--"reservoir instead of +river," as Phillips Brooks said--of theological secrets. "The work of +the Nicene Creed," says Harnack (_Dogmengeschichte_, ii. 1, cap. vii. +3), "was a victory of the priesthood over the faith of the Christian +people. The doctrine of the Logos had already become unintelligible to +those who were not theologians. The setting up of the Niceno-Cappadocian +formula as the fundamental confession of the Church made it perfectly +impossible for the Catholic laity to get an inner comprehension of the +Christian Faith, taking as their guide the form in which it was +presented in the doctrine of the Church. The idea became more and more +deeply implanted in men's minds that Christianity was the revelation of +the unintelligible." And so, in truth, it is. + +And why was this? Because faith--that is, Life--no longer felt sure of +itself. Neither traditionalism nor the theological positivism of Duns +Scotus sufficed for it; it sought to rationalize itself. And it sought +to establish its foundation--not, indeed, over against reason, where it +really is, but upon reason--that is to say, within reason--itself. The +nominalist or positivist or voluntarist position of Scotus--that which +maintains that law and truth depend, not so much upon the essence as +upon the free and inscrutable will of God--by accentuating its supreme +irrationality, placed religion in danger among the majority of believers +endowed with mature reason and not mere coalheavers. Hence the triumph +of the Thomist theological rationalism. It is no longer enough to +believe in the existence of God; but the sentence of anathema falls on +him who, though believing in it, does not believe that His existence is +demonstrable by rational arguments, or who believes that up to the +present nobody by means of these rational arguments has ever +demonstrated it irrefutably. However, in this connection the remark of +Pohle is perhaps capable of application: "If eternal salvation depended +upon mathematical axioms, we should have to expect that the most odious +human sophistry would attack their universal validity as violently as it +now attacks God, the soul, and Christ."[24] + +The truth is, Catholicism oscillates between mysticism, which is the +inward experience of the living God in Christ, an intransmittible +experience, the danger of which, however, is that it absorbs our own +personality in God, and so does not save our vital longing--between +mysticism and the rationalism which it fights against (see Weizsaecker, +_op. cit._); it oscillates between religionized science and +scientificized religion. The apocalyptic enthusiasm changed little by +little into neo-platonic mysticism, which theology thrust further into +the background. It feared the excesses of the imagination which was +supplanting faith and creating gnostic extravagances. But it had to sign +a kind of pact with gnosticism and another with rationalism; neither +imagination nor reason allowed itself to be completely vanquished. And +thus the body of Catholic dogma became a system of contradictions, more +or less successfully harmonized. The Trinity was a kind of pact between +monotheism and polytheism, and humanity and divinity sealed a peace in +Christ, nature covenanted with grace, grace with free will, free will +with the Divine prescience, and so on. And it is perhaps true, as +Hermann says (_loc. cit._), that "as soon as we develop religious +thought to its logical conclusions, it enters into conflict with other +ideas which belong equally to the life of religion." And this it is that +gives to Catholicism its profound vital dialectic. But at what a cost? + +At the cost, it must needs be said, of doing violence to the mental +exigencies of those believers in possession of an adult reason. It +demands from them that they shall believe all or nothing, that they +shall accept the complete totality of dogma or that they shall forfeit +all merit if the least part of it be rejected. And hence the result, as +the great Unitarian preacher Channing pointed out,[25] that in France +and Spain there are multitudes who have proceeded from rejecting Popery +to absolute atheism, because "the fact is, that false and absurd +doctrines, when exposed, have a natural tendency to beget scepticism in +those who received them without reflection. None are so likely to +believe too little as those who have begun by believing too much." Here +is, indeed, the terrible danger of believing too much. But no! the +terrible danger comes from another quarter--from seeking to believe with +the reason and not with life. + +The Catholic solution of our problem, of our unique vital problem, the +problem of the immortality and eternal salvation of the individual soul, +satisfies the will, and therefore satisfies life; but the attempt to +rationalize it by means of dogmatic theology fails to satisfy the +reason. And reason has its exigencies as imperious as those of life. It +is no use seeking to force ourselves to consider as super-rational what +clearly appears to us to be contra-rational, neither is it any good +wishing to become coalheavers when we are not coalheavers. +Infallibility, a notion of Hellenic origin, is in its essence a +rationalistic category. + +Let us now consider the rationalist or scientific solution--or, more +properly, dissolution--of our problem. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[13] Erwin Rohde, _Psyche_, "Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der +Griechen." Tuebingen, 1907. Up to the present this is the leading work +dealing with the belief of the Greeks in the immortality of the soul. + +[14] Gal. ii. 20. + +[15] On all relating to this question see, among others, Harnack, +_Dogmengeschichte_, ii., Teil i., Buch vii., cap. i. + +[16] + + Though we are become dust, + In thee, O Lord, our hope confides, + That we shall live again clad + In the flesh and skin that once covered us. + +[17] _Libra de la Conversion de la Magdelena_, part iv., chap. ix. + +[18] In his exposition of Protestant dogma in _Systematische christliche +Religion_, Berlin, 1909, one of the series entitled _Die Kultur der +Gegenwart_, published by P. Hinneberg. + +[19] The common use of the expression _musica celestial_ to denote +"nonsense, something not worth listening to," lends it a satirical +byplay which disappears in the English rendering.--J.E.C.F. + +[20] It is not Thy promised heaven, my God, that moves me to love Thee. +(Anonymous, sixteenth or seventeenth century. See _Oxford Book of +Spanish Verse_, No. 106.) + +[21] _Essai sur l'indifference en matiere de religion_, part iii., chap. +i. + +[22] _Les Soirees de Saint-Petersbourg_, x^{me} entretien. + +[23] The allusion is to the traditional story of the coalheaver whom the +devil sought to convince of the irrationality of belief in the Trinity. +The coalheaver took the cloak that he was wearing and folded it in three +folds. "Here are three folds," he said, "and the cloak though threefold +is yet one." And the devil departed baffled.--J.E.C.F. + +[24] Joseph Pohle, "Christlich Katolische Dogmatik," in _Systematische +Christliche Religion_, Berlin, 1909. _Die Kultur der Gegenwart_ series. + +[25] "Objections to Unitarian Christianity Considered," 1816, in _The +Complete Works of William Ellery Channing, D.D._, London, 1884. + + + + +V + +THE RATIONALIST DISSOLUTION + + +The great master of rationalist phenomenalism, David Hume, begins his +essay "On the Immortality of the Soul" with these decisive words: "It +appears difficult by the mere light of reason to prove the immortality +of the soul. The arguments in favour of it are commonly derived from +metaphysical, moral, or physical considerations. But it is really the +Gospel, and only the Gospel, that has brought to light life and +immortality." Which is equivalent to denying the rationality of the +belief that the soul of each one of us is immortal. + +Kant, whose criticism found its point of departure in Hume, attempted to +establish the rationality of this longing for immortality and the belief +that it imports; and this is the real origin, the inward origin, of his +_Critique of Practical Reason_, and of his categorical imperative and of +his God. But in spite of all this, the sceptical affirmation of Hume +holds good. There is no way of proving the immortality of the soul +rationally. There are, on the other hand, ways of proving rationally its +mortality. + +It would be not merely superfluous but ridiculous to enlarge here upon +the extent to which the individual human consciousness is dependent upon +the physical organism, pointing out how it comes to birth by slow +degrees according as the brain receives impressions from the outside +world, how it is temporarily suspended during sleep, swoons, and other +accidents, and how everything leads us to the rational conjecture that +death carries with it the loss of consciousness. And just as before our +birth we were not, nor have we any personal pre-natal memory, so after +our death we shall cease to be. This is the rational position. + +The designation "soul" is merely a term used to denote the individual +consciousness in its integrity and continuity; and that this soul +undergoes change, that in like manner as it is integrated so it is +disintegrated, is a thing very evident. For Aristotle it was the +substantial form of the body--the entelechy, but not a substance. And +more than one modern has called it an epiphenomenon--an absurd term. The +appellation phenomenon suffices. + +Rationalism--and by rationalism I mean the doctrine that abides solely +by reason, by objective truth--is necessarily materialist. And let not +idealists be scandalized thereby. + +The truth is--it is necessary to be perfectly explicit in this +matter--that what we call materialism means for us nothing else but the +doctrine which denies the immortality of the individual soul, the +persistence of personal consciousness after death. + +In another sense it may be said that, as we know what matter is no more +than we know what spirit is, and as matter is for us merely an idea, +materialism is idealism. In fact, and as regards our problem--the most +vital, the only really vital problem--it is all the same to say that +everything is matter as to say that everything is idea, or that +everything is energy, or whatever you please. Every monist system will +always seem to us materialist. The immortality of the soul is saved only +by the dualist systems--those which teach that human consciousness is +something substantially distinct and different from the other +manifestations of phenomena. And reason is naturally monist. For it is +the function of reason to understand and explain the universe, and in +order to understand and explain it, it is in no way necessary for the +soul to be an imperishable substance. For the purpose of explaining and +understanding our psychic life, for psychology, the hypothesis of the +soul is unnecessary. What was formerly called rational psychology, in +opposition to empirical psychology, is not psychology but metaphysics, +and very muddy metaphysics; neither is it rational, but profoundly +irrational, or rather contra-rational. + +The pretended rational doctrine of the substantiality and spirituality +of the soul, with all the apparatus that accompanies it, is born simply +of the necessity which men feel of grounding upon reason their +inexpugnable longing for immortality and the subsequent belief in it. +All the sophistries which aim at proving that the soul is substance, +simple and incorruptible, proceed from this source. And further, the +very concept of substance, as it was fixed and defined by scholasticism, +a concept which does not bear criticism, is a theological concept, +designed expressly to sustain faith in the immortality of the soul. + +William James, in the third of the lectures which he devoted to +pragmatism in the Lowell Institute in Boston, in December, 1906, and +January, 1907[26]--the weakest thing in all the work of the famous +American thinker, an extremely weak thing indeed--speaks as follows: +"Scholasticism has taken the notion of substance from common sense and +made it very technical and articulate. Few things would seem to have +fewer pragmatic consequences for us than substances, cut off as we are +from every contact with them. Yet in one case scholasticism has proved +the importance of the substance-idea by treating it pragmatically. I +refer to certain disputes about the mystery of the Eucharist. Substance +here would appear to have momentous pragmatic value. Since the accidents +of the wafer do not change in the Lord's Supper, and yet it has become +the very body of Christ, it must be that the change is in the substance +solely. The bread-substance must have been withdrawn and the Divine +substance substituted miraculously without altering the immediate +sensible properties. But though these do not alter, a tremendous +difference has been made--no less a one than this, that we who take the +sacrament now feed upon the very substance of Divinity. The +substance-notion breaks into life, with tremendous effect, if once you +allow that substances can separate from their accidents and exchange +these latter. This is the only pragmatic application of the +substance-idea with which I am acquainted; and it is obvious that it +will only be treated seriously by those who already believe in the 'real +presence' on independent grounds." + +Now, leaving on one side the question as to whether it is good +theology--and I do not say good reasoning because all this lies outside +the sphere of reason--to confound the substance of the body--the body, +not the soul--of Christ with the very substance of Divinity--that is to +say, with God Himself--it would appear impossible that one so ardently +desirous of the immortality of the soul as William James, a man whose +whole philosophy aims simply at establishing this belief on rational +grounds, should not have perceived that the pragmatic application of the +concept of substance to the doctrine of the Eucharistic +transubstantiation is merely a consequence of its anterior application +to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. As I explained in the +preceding chapter, the Sacrament of the Eucharist is simply the +reflection of the belief in immortality; it is, for the believer, the +proof, by a mystical experience, that the soul is immortal and will +enjoy God eternally. And the concept of substance was born, above all +and before all, of the concept of the substantiality of the soul, and +the latter was affirmed in order to confirm faith in the persistence of +the soul after its separation from the body. Such was at the same time +its first pragmatic application and its origin. And subsequently we +have transferred this concept to external things. It is because I feel +myself to be substance--that is to say, permanent in the midst of my +changes--that I attribute substantiality to those agents exterior to me, +which are also permanent in the midst of their changes--just as the +concept of force is born of my sensation of personal effort in putting a +thing in motion. + +Read carefully in the first part of the _Summa Theologica_ of St. Thomas +Aquinas the first six articles of question lxxv., which discuss whether +the human soul is body, whether it is something self-subsistent, whether +such also is the soul of the lower animals, whether the soul is the man, +whether the soul is composed of matter and form, and whether it is +incorruptible, and then say if all this is not subtly intended to +support the belief that this incorruptible substantiality of the soul +renders it capable of receiving from God immortality, for it is clear +that as He created it when He implanted it in the body, as St. Thomas +says, so at its separation from the body He could annihilate it. And as +the criticism of these proofs has been undertaken a hundred times, it is +unnecessary to repeat it here. + +Is it possible for the unforewarned reason to conclude that our soul is +a substance from the fact that our consciousness of our identity--and +this within very narrow and variable limits--persists through all the +changes of our body? We might as well say of a ship that put out to sea +and lost first one piece of timber, which was replaced by another of the +same shape and dimensions, then lost another, and so on with all her +timbers, and finally returned to port the same ship, with the same +build, the same sea-going qualities, recognizable by everybody as the +same--we might as well say of such a ship that it had a substantial +soul. Is it possible for the unforewarned reason to infer the simplicity +of the soul from the fact that we have to judge and unify our thoughts? +Thought is not one but complex, and for the reason the soul is nothing +but the succession of co-ordinated states of consciousness. + +In books of psychology written from the spiritualist point of view, it +is customary to begin the discussion of the existence of the soul as a +simple substance, separable from the body, after this style: There is in +me a principle which thinks, wills, and feels.... Now this implies a +begging of the question. For it is far from being an immediate truth +that there is in me such a principle; the immediate truth is that I +think, will, and feel. And I--the I that thinks, wills, and feels--am +immediately my living body with the states of consciousness which it +sustains. It is my living body that thinks, wills, and feels. How? How +you please. + +And they proceed to seek to establish the substantiality of the soul, +hypostatizing the states of consciousness, and they begin by saying that +this substance must be simple--that is, by opposing thought to +extension, after the manner of the Cartesian dualism. And as Balmes was +one of the spiritualist writers who have given the clearest and most +concise form to the argument, I will present it as he expounds it in the +second chapter of his _Curso de Filosofia Elemental_. "The human soul is +simple," he says, and adds: "Simplicity consists in the absence of +parts, and the soul has none. Let us suppose that it has three parts--A, +B, C. I ask, Where, then, does thought reside? If in A only, then B and +C are superfluous; and consequently the simple subject A will be the +soul. If thought resides in A, B, and C, it follows that thought is +divided into parts, which is absurd. What sort of a thing is a +perception, a comparison, a judgement, a ratiocination, distributed +among three subjects?" A more obvious begging of the question cannot be +conceived. Balmes begins by taking it for granted that the whole, as a +whole, is incapable of making a judgement. He continues: "The unity of +consciousness is opposed to the division of the soul. When we think, +there is a subject which knows everything that it thinks, and this is +impossible if parts be attributed to it. Of the thought that is in A, B +and C will know nothing, and so in the other cases respectively. There +will not, therefore, be _one_ consciousness of the whole thought: each +part will have its special consciousness, and there will be within us as +many thinking beings as there are parts." The begging of the question +continues; it is assumed without any proof that a whole, as a whole, +cannot perceive as a unit. Balmes then proceeds to ask if these parts A, +B, and C are simple or compound, and repeats his argument until he +arrives at the conclusion that the thinking subject must be a part which +is not a whole--that is, simple. The argument is based, as will be seen, +upon the unity of apperception and of judgement. Subsequently he +endeavours to refute the hypothesis of a communication of the parts +among themselves. + +Balmes--and with him the _a priori_ spiritualists who seek to +rationalize faith in the immortality of the soul--ignore the only +rational explanation, which is that apperception and judgement are a +resultant, that perceptions or ideas themselves are components which +agree. They begin by supposing something external to and distinct from +the states of consciousness, something that is not the living body which +supports these states, something that is not I but is within me. + +The soul is simple, others say, because it reflects upon itself as a +complete whole. No; the state of consciousness A, in which I think of my +previous state of consciousness B, is not the same as its predecessor. +Or if I think of my soul, I think of an idea distinct from the act by +which I think of it. To think that one thinks and nothing more, is not +to think. + +The soul is the principle of life, it is said. Yes; and similarly the +category of force or energy has been conceived as the principle of +movement. But these are concepts, not phenomena, not external realities. +Does the principle of movement move? And only that which moves has +external reality. Does the principle of life live? Hume was right when +he said that he never encountered this idea of himself--that he only +observed himself desiring or performing or feeling something.[27] The +idea of some individual thing--of this inkstand in front of me, of that +horse standing at my gate, of these two and not of any other individuals +of the same class--is the fact, the phenomenon itself. The idea of +myself is myself. + +All the efforts to substantiate consciousness, making it independent of +extension--remember that Descartes opposed thought to extension--are but +sophistical subtilties intended to establish the rationality of faith in +the immortality of the soul. It is sought to give the value of objective +reality to that which does not possess it--to that whose reality exists +only in thought. And the immortality that we crave is a phenomenal +immortality--it is the continuation of this present life. + +The unity of consciousness is for scientific psychology--the only +rational psychology--simply a phenomenal unity. No one can say what a +substantial unity is. And, what is more, no one can say what a substance +is. For the notion of substance is a non-phenomenal category. It is a +noumenon and belongs properly to the unknowable--that is to say, +according to the sense in which it is understood. But in its +transcendental sense it is something really unknowable and strictly +irrational. It is precisely this concept of substance that an +unforewarned mind reduces to a use that is very far from that pragmatic +application to which William James referred. + +And this application is not saved by understanding it in an idealistic +sense, according to the Berkeleyan principle that to be is to be +perceived (_esse est percipi_). To say that everything is idea or that +everything is spirit, is the same as saying that everything is matter or +that everything is energy, for if everything is idea or everything +spirit, and if, therefore, this diamond is idea or spirit, just as my +consciousness is, it is not plain why the diamond should not endure for +ever, if my consciousness, because it is idea or spirit, endures for +ever. + +George Berkeley, Anglican Bishop of Cloyne and brother in spirit to the +Anglican bishop Joseph Butler, was equally as anxious to save the belief +in the immortality of the soul. In the first words of the Preface to his +_Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge_, he tells us +that he considers that this treatise will be useful, "particularly to +those who are tainted with scepticism, or want a demonstration of the +existence and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the +soul." In paragraph cxl. he lays it down that we have an idea, or rather +a notion, of spirit, and that we know other spirits by means of our own, +from which follows--so in the next paragraph he roundly affirms--the +natural immortality of the soul. And here he enters upon a series of +confusions arising from the ambiguity with which he invests the term +notion. And after having established the immortality of the soul, almost +as it were _per saltum_, on the ground that the soul is not passive like +the body, he proceeds to tell us in paragraph cxlvii. that the existence +of God is more evident than that of man. And yet, in spite of this, +there are still some who are doubtful! + +The question was complicated by making consciousness a property of the +soul, consciousness being something more than soul--that is to say, a +substantial form of the body, the originator of all the organic +functions of the body. The soul not only thinks, feels, and wills, but +moves the body and prompts its vital functions; in the human soul are +united the vegetative, animal, and rational functions. Such is the +theory. But the soul separated from the body can have neither +vegetative nor animal functions. + +A theory, in short, which for the reason is a veritable contexture of +confusions. + +After the Renaissance and the restoration of purely rational thought, +emancipated from all theology, the doctrine of the mortality of the soul +was re-established by the newly published writings of the second-century +philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias and by Pietro Pomponazzi and +others. And in point of fact, little or nothing can be added to what +Pomponazzi has written in his _Tractatus de immortalitate animae_. It is +reason itself, and it serves nothing to reiterate his arguments. + +Attempts have not been wanting, however, to find an empirical support +for belief in the immortality of the soul, and among these may be +counted the work of Frederic W.H. Myers on _Human Personality and its +Survival of Bodily Death_. No one ever approached more eagerly than +myself the two thick volumes of this work in which the leading spirit of +the Society for Psychical Research resumed that formidable mass of data +relating to presentiments, apparitions of the dead, the phenomena of +dreams, telepathy, hypnotism, sensorial automatism, ecstasy, and all the +rest that goes to furnish the spiritualist arsenal. I entered upon the +reading of it not only without that temper of cautious suspicion which +men of science maintain in investigations of this character, but even +with a predisposition in its favour, as one who comes to seek the +confirmation of his innermost longings; but for this reason was my +disillusion all the greater. In spite of its critical apparatus it does +not differ in any respect from medieval miracle-mongering. There is a +fundamental defect of method, of logic. + +And if the belief in the immortality of the soul has been unable to find +vindication in rational empiricism, neither is it satisfied with +pantheism. To say that everything is God, and that when we die we return +to God, or, more accurately, continue in Him, avails our longing +nothing; for if this indeed be so, then we were in God before we were +born, and if when we die we return to where we were before being born, +then the human soul, the individual consciousness, is perishable. And +since we know very well that God, the personal and conscious God of +Christian monotheism, is simply the provider, and above all the +guarantor, of our immortality, pantheism is said, and rightly said, to +be merely atheism disguised; and, in my opinion, undisguised. And they +were right in calling Spinoza an atheist, for his is the most logical, +the most rational, system of pantheism. + +Neither is the longing for immortality saved, but rather dissolved and +submerged, by agnosticism, or the doctrine of the unknowable, which, +when it has professed to wish to leave religious feelings scathless, has +always been inspired by the most refined hypocrisy. The whole of the +first part of Spencer's _First Principles_, and especially the fifth +chapter entitled "Reconciliation"--that between reason and faith or +science and religion being understood--is a model at the same time of +philosophical superficiality and religious insincerity, of the most +refined British cant. The unknowable, if it is something more than the +merely hitherto unknown, is but a purely negative concept, a concept of +limitation. And upon this foundation no human feeling can be built up. + +The science of religion, on the other hand, of religion considered as an +individual and social psychic phenomenon irrespective of the +transcendental objective validity of religious affirmations, is a +science which, in explaining the origin of the belief that the soul is +something that can live disjoined from the body, has destroyed the +rationality of this belief. However much the religious man may repeat +with Schleiermacher, "Science can teach thee nothing; it is for science +to learn from thee," inwardly he thinks otherwise. + +From whatever side the matter is regarded, it is always found that +reason confronts our longing for personal immortality and contradicts +it. And the truth is, in all strictness, that reason is the enemy of +life. + +A terrible thing is intelligence. It tends to death as memory tends to +stability. The living, the absolutely unstable, the absolutely +individual, is, strictly, unintelligible. Logic tends to reduce +everything to identities and genera, to each representation having no +more than one single and self-same content in whatever place, time, or +relation it may occur to us. And there is nothing that remains the same +for two successive moments of its existence. My idea of God is different +each time that I conceive it. Identity, which is death, is the goal of +the intellect. The mind seeks what is dead, for what is living escapes +it; it seeks to congeal the flowing stream in blocks of ice; it seeks to +arrest it. In order to analyze a body it is necessary to extenuate or +destroy it. In order to understand anything it is necessary to kill it, +to lay it out rigid in the mind. Science is a cemetery of dead ideas, +even though life may issue from them. Worms also feed upon corpses. My +own thoughts, tumultuous and agitated in the innermost recesses of my +soul, once they are torn from their roots in the heart, poured out on to +this paper and there fixed in unalterable shape, are already only the +corpses of thoughts. How, then, shall reason open its portals to the +revelation of life? It is a tragic combat--it is the very essence of +tragedy--this combat of life with reason. And truth? Is truth something +that is lived or that is comprehended? + +It is only necessary to read the terrible _Parmenides_ of Plato to +arrive at his tragic conclusion that "the one is and is not, and both +itself and others, in relation to themselves and one another, are and +are not, and appear to be and appear not to be." All that is vital is +irrational, and all that is rational is anti-vital, for reason is +essentially sceptical. + +The rational, in effect, is simply the relational; reason is limited to +relating irrational elements. Mathematics is the only perfect science, +inasmuch as it adds, subtracts, multiplies, and divides numbers, but not +real and substantial things, inasmuch as it is the most formal of the +sciences. Who can extract the cube root of an ash-tree? + +Nevertheless we need logic, this terrible power, in order to communicate +thoughts and perceptions and even in order to think and perceive, for we +think with words, we perceive with forms. To think is to converse with +oneself; and speech is social, and social are thought and logic. But may +they not perhaps possess a content, an individual matter, incommunicable +and untranslatable? And may not this be the source of their power? + +The truth is that man, the prisoner of logic, without which he cannot +think, has always sought to make logic subservient to his desires, and +principally to his fundamental desire. He has always sought to hold fast +to logic, and especially in the Middle Ages, in the interests of +theology and jurisprudence, both of which based themselves on what was +established by authority. It was not until very much later that logic +propounded the problem of knowledge, the problem of its own validity, +the scrutiny of the metalogical foundations. + +"The Western theology," Dean Stanley wrote, "is essentially logical in +form and based on law. The Eastern theology is rhetorical in form and +based on philosophy. The Latin divine succeeded to the Roman advocate. +The Oriental divine succeeded to the Grecian sophist."[28] + +And all the laboured arguments in support of our hunger of immortality, +which pretend to be grounded on reason or logic, are merely advocacy and +sophistry. + +The property and characteristic of advocacy is, in effect, to make use +of logic in the interests of a thesis that is to be defended, while, on +the other hand, the strictly scientific method proceeds from the facts, +the data, presented to us by reality, in order that it may arrive, or +not arrive, as the case may be, at a certain conclusion. What is +important is to define the problem clearly, whence it follows that +progress consists not seldom in undoing what has been done. Advocacy +always supposes a _petitio principii_, and its arguments are _ad +probandum_. And theology that pretends to be rational is nothing but +advocacy. + +Theology proceeds from dogma, and dogma, _dogma_, in its +primitive and most direct sense, signifies a decree, something akin to +the Latin _placitum_, that which has seemed to the legislative authority +fitting to be law. This juridical concept is the starting-point of +theology. For the theologian, as for the advocate, dogma, law, is +something given--a starting-point which admits of discussion only in +respect of its application and its most exact interpretation. Hence it +follows that the theological or advocatory spirit is in its principle +dogmatical, while the strictly scientific and purely rational spirit is +sceptical, _skeptikos_--that is, investigative. It is so at least +in its principle, for there is the other sense of the term scepticism, +that which is most usual to-day, that of a system of doubt, suspicion, +and uncertainty, and this has arisen from the theological or advocatory +use of reason, from the abuse of dogmatism. The endeavour to apply the +law of authority, the _placitum_, the dogma, to different and sometimes +contraposed practical necessities, is what has engendered the scepticism +of doubt. It is advocacy, or what amounts to the same thing, theology, +that teaches the distrust of reason--not true science, not the science +of investigation, sceptical in the primitive and direct meaning of the +word, which hastens towards no predetermined solution nor proceeds save +by the testing of hypotheses. + +Take the _Summa Theologica_ of St. Thomas, the classical monument of the +theology--that is, of the advocacy--of Catholicism, and open it where +you please. First comes the thesis--_utrum_ ... whether such a thing be +thus or otherwise; then the objections--_ad primum sic proceditur_; next +the answers to these objections--_sed contra est_ ... or _respondeo +dicendum_.... Pure advocacy! And underlying many, perhaps most, of its +arguments you will find a logical fallacy which may be expressed _more +scholastico_ by this syllogism: I do not understand this fact save by +giving it this explanation; it is thus that I must understand it, +therefore this must be its explanation. The alternative being that I am +left without any understanding of it at all. True science teaches, above +all, to doubt and to be ignorant; advocacy neither doubts nor believes +that it does not know. It requires a solution. + +To the mentality that assumes, more or less consciously, that we must of +necessity find a solution to every problem, belongs the argument based +on the disastrous consequences of a thing. Take any book of +apologetics--that is to say, of theological advocacy--and you will see +how many times you will meet with this phrase--"the disastrous +consequences of this doctrine." Now the disastrous consequences of a +doctrine prove at most that the doctrine is disastrous, but not that it +is false, for there is no proof that the true is necessarily that which +suits us best. The identification of the true and the good is but a +pious wish. In his _Etudes sur Blaise Pascal_, A. Vinet says: "Of the +two needs that unceasingly belabour human nature, that of happiness is +not only the more universally felt and the more constantly experienced, +but it is also the more imperious. And this need is not only of the +senses; it is intellectual. It is not only for the _soul_; it is for the +_mind_ that happiness is a necessity. Happiness forms a part of truth." +This last proposition--_le bonheur fait partie de la verite_--is a +proposition of pure advocacy, but not of science or of pure reason. It +would be better to say that truth forms a part of happiness in a +Tertullianesque sense, in the sense of _credo quia absurdum_, which +means actually _credo quia consolans_--I believe because it is a thing +consoling to me. + +No, for reason, truth is that of which it can be proved that it is, that +it exists, whether it console us or not. And reason is certainly not a +consoling faculty. That terrible Latin poet Lucretius, whose apparent +serenity and Epicurean _ataraxia_ conceal so much despair, said that +piety consists in the power to contemplate all things with a serene +soul--_pacata posse mente omnia tueri_. And it was the same Lucretius +who wrote that religion can persuade us into so great evils--_tantum +religio potuit suadere malorum_. And it is true that religion--above all +the Christian religion--has been, as the Apostle says, to the Jews a +stumbling-block, and to the intellectuals foolishness.[29] The Christian +religion, the religion of the immortality of the soul, was called by +Tacitus a pernicious superstition (_exitialis superstitio_), and he +asserted that it involved a hatred of mankind (_odium generis humani_). + +Speaking of the age in which these men lived, the most genuinely +rationalistic age in the world's history, Flaubert, writing to Madame +Roger des Genettes, uttered these pregnant words: "You are right; we +must speak with respect of Lucretius; I see no one who can compare with +him except Byron, and Byron has not his gravity nor the sincerity of his +sadness. The melancholy of the ancients seems to me more profound than +that of the moderns, who all more or less presuppose an immortality on +the yonder side of the _black hole_. But for the ancients this black +hole was the infinite itself; the procession of their dreams is imaged +against a background of immutable ebony. The gods being no more and +Christ being not yet, there was between Cicero and Marcus Aurelius a +unique moment in which man stood alone. Nowhere else do I find this +grandeur; but what renders Lucretius intolerable is his physics, which +he gives as if positive. If he is weak, it is because he did not doubt +enough; he wished to explain, to arrive at a conclusion!"[30] + +Yes, Lucretius wished to arrive at a conclusion, a solution, and, what +is worse, he wished to find consolation in reason. For there is also an +anti-theological advocacy, and an _odium anti-theologicum_. + +Many, very many, men of science, the majority of those who call +themselves rationalists, are afflicted by it. + +The rationalist acts rationally--that is to say, he does not speak out +of his part--so long as he confines himself to denying that reason +satisfies our vital hunger for immortality; but, furious at not being +able to believe, he soon becomes a prey to the vindictiveness of the +_odium anti-theologicum_, and exclaims with the Pharisees: "This people +who knoweth not the law are cursed." There is much truth in these words +of Soloviev: "I have a foreboding of the near approach of a time when +Christians will gather together again in the Catacombs, because of the +persecution of the faith--a persecution less brutal, perhaps, than that +of Nero's day, but not less refined in its severity, consummated by +mendacity, derision, and all the hypocrisies." + +The anti-theological hate, the scientificist--I do not say +scientific--fury, is manifest. Consider, not the more detached +scientific investigators, those who know how to doubt, but the fanatics +of rationalism, and observe with what gross brutality they speak of +faith. Vogt considered it probable that the cranial structure of the +Apostles was of a pronounced simian character; of the indecencies of +Haeckel, that supreme incomprehender, there is no need to speak, nor yet +of those of Buechner; even Virchow is not free from them. And others work +with more subtilty. There are people who seem not to be content with +not believing that there is another life, or rather, with believing that +there is none, but who are vexed and hurt that others should believe in +it or even should wish that it might exist. And this attitude is as +contemptible as that is worthy of respect which characterizes those who, +though urged by the need they have of it to believe in another life, are +unable to believe. But of this most noble attitude of the spirit, the +most profound, the most human, and the most fruitful, the attitude of +despair, we will speak later on. + +And the rationalists who do not succumb to the anti-theological fury are +bent on convincing men that there are motives for living and +consolations for having been born, even though there shall come a time, +at the end of some tens or hundreds or millions of centuries, when all +human consciousness shall have ceased to exist. And these motives for +living and working, this thing which some call humanism, are the amazing +products of the affective and emotional hollowness of rationalism and of +its stupendous hypocrisy--a hypocrisy bent on sacrificing sincerity to +veracity, and sworn not to confess that reason is a dissolvent and +disconsolatory power. + +Must I repeat again what I have already said about all this business of +manufacturing culture, of progressing, of realizing good, truth, and +beauty, of establishing justice on earth, of ameliorating life for those +who shall come after us, of subserving I know not what destiny, and all +this without our taking thought for the ultimate end of each one of us? +Must I again declare to you the supreme vacuity of culture, of science, +of art, of good, of truth, of beauty, of justice ... of all these +beautiful conceptions, if at the last, in four days or in four millions +of centuries--it matters not which--no human consciousness shall exist +to appropriate this civilization, this science, art, good, truth, +beauty, justice, and all the rest? + +Many and very various have been the rationalist devices--more or less +rational--by means of which from the days of the Epicureans and the +Stoics it has been sought to discover rational consolation in truth and +to convince men, although those who sought so to do remained themselves +unconvinced, that there are motives for working and lures for living, +even though the human consciousness be destined some day to disappear. + +The Epicurean attitude, the extreme and grossest expression of which is +"Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," or the Horatian _carpe +diem_, which may be rendered by "Live for the day," does not differ in +its essence from the Stoic attitude with its "Accomplish what the moral +conscience dictates to thee, and afterward let it be as it may be." Both +attitudes have a common base; and pleasure for pleasure's sake comes to +the same as duty for duty's sake. + +Spinoza, the most logical and consistent of atheists--I mean of those +who deny the persistence of individual consciousness through indefinite +future time--and at the same time the most pious, Spinoza devoted the +fifth and last part of his _Ethic_ to elucidating the path that leads to +liberty and to determining the concept of happiness. The concept! +Concept, not feeling! For Spinoza, who was a terrible intellectualist, +happiness (_beatitudo_) is a concept, and the love of God an +intellectual love. After establishing in proposition xxi. of the fifth +part that "the mind can imagine nothing, neither can it remember +anything that is past, save during the continuance of the body"--which +is equivalent to denying the immortality of the soul, since a soul +which, disjoined from the body in which it lived, does not remember its +past, is neither immortal nor is it a soul--he goes on to affirm in +proposition xxiii. that "the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed +with the body, but there remains of it something which is _eternal_," +and this eternity of the mind is a certain mode of thinking. But do not +let yourselves be deceived; there is no such eternity of the individual +mind. Everything is _sub aeternitatis specie_--that is to say, pure +illusion. Nothing could be more dreary, nothing more desolating, nothing +more anti-vital than this happiness, this _beatitudo_, of Spinoza, that +consists in the intellectual love of the mind towards God, which is +nothing else but the very love with which God loves Himself (prop, +xxxvi.). Our happiness--that is to say, our liberty--consists in the +constant and eternal love of God towards men. So affirms the corollary +to this thirty-sixth proposition. And all this in order to arrive at the +conclusion, which is the final and crowning proposition of the whole +_Ethic_, that happiness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself. +The everlasting refrain! Or, to put it plainly, we proceed from God and +to God we return, which, translated into concrete language, the language +of life and feeling, means that my personal consciousness sprang from +nothingness, from my unconsciousness, and to nothingness it will return. + +And this most dreary and desolating voice of Spinoza is the very voice +of reason. And the liberty of which he tells us is a terrible liberty. +And against Spinoza and his doctrine of happiness there is only one +irresistible argument, the argument _ad hominem_. Was he happy, Benedict +Spinoza, while, to allay his inner unhappiness, he was discoursing of +happiness? Was he free? + +In the corollary to proposition xli. of this same final and most tragic +part of that tremendous tragedy of his _Ethic_, the poor desperate Jew +of Amsterdam discourses of the common persuasion of the vulgar of the +truth of eternal life. Let us hear what he says: "It would appear that +they esteem piety and religion--and, indeed, all that is referred to +fortitude or strength of mind--as burdens which they expect to lay down +after death, when they hope to receive a reward for their servitude, not +for their piety and religion in this life. Nor is it even this hope +alone that leads them; the fear of frightful punishments with which they +are menaced after death also influences them to live--in so far as their +impotence and poverty of spirit permits--in conformity with the +prescription of the Divine law. And were not this hope and this fear +infused into the minds of men--but, on the contrary, did they believe +that the soul perished with the body, and that, beyond the grave, there +was no other life prepared for the wretched who had borne the burden _of +piety_ in this--they would return to their natural inclinations, +preferring to accommodate everything to their own liking, and would +follow fortune rather than reason. But all this appears no less absurd +than it would be to suppose that a man, because he did not believe that +he could nourish his body eternally with wholesome food, would saturate +himself with deadly poisons; or than if because believing that his soul +was not eternal and immortal, he should therefore prefer to be without a +soul (_amens_) and to live without reason; all of which is so absurd as +to be scarcely worth refuting (_quae adeo absurda sunt, ut vix recenseri +mereantur_)." + +When a thing is said to be not worth refuting you may be sure that +either it is flagrantly stupid--in which case all comment is +superfluous--or it is something formidable, the very crux of the +problem. And this it is in this case. Yes! poor Portuguese Jew exiled in +Holland, yes! that he who is convinced without a vestige of doubt, +without the faintest hope of any saving uncertainty, that his soul is +not immortal, should prefer to be without a soul (_amens_), or +irrational, or idiot, that he should prefer not to have been born, is a +supposition that has nothing, absolutely nothing, absurd in it. Was he +happy, the poor Jewish intellectualist definer of intellectual love and +of happiness? For that and no other is the problem. "What does it profit +thee to know the definition of compunction if thou dost not feel it?" +says a Kempis. And what profits it to discuss or to define happiness if +you cannot thereby achieve happiness? Not inapposite in this connection +is that terrible story that Diderot tells of a eunuch who desired to +take lessons in esthetics from a native of Marseilles in order that he +might be better qualified to select the slaves destined for the harem of +the Sultan, his master. At the end of the first lesson, a physiological +lesson, brutally and carnally physiological, the eunuch exclaimed +bitterly, "It is evident that I shall never know esthetics!" Even so, +and just as eunuchs will never know esthetics as applied to the +selection of beautiful women, so neither will pure rationalists ever +know ethics, nor will they ever succeed in defining happiness, for +happiness is a thing that is lived and felt, not a thing that is +reasoned about or defined. + +And you have another rationalist, one not sad or submissive, like +Spinoza, but rebellious, and though concealing a despair not less +bitter, making a hypocritical pretence of light-heartedness, you have +Nietzsche, who discovered _mathematically_ (!!!) that counterfeit of the +immortality of the soul which is called "eternal recurrence," and which +is in fact the most stupendous tragi-comedy or comi-tragedy. The number +of atoms or irreducible primary elements being finite and the universe +eternal, a combination identical with that which at present exists must +at some future time be reproduced, and therefore that which now is must +be repeated an infinite number of times. This is evident, and just as I +shall live again the life that I am now living, so I have already lived +it before an infinite number of times, for there is an eternity that +stretches into the past--_a parte ante_--just as there will be one +stretching into the future--_a parte post_. But, unfortunately, it +happens that I remember none of my previous existences, and perhaps it +is impossible that I should remember them, for two things absolutely and +completely identical are but one. Instead of supposing that we live in a +finite universe, composed of a finite number of irreducible primary +elements, suppose that we live in an infinite universe, without limits +in space--which concrete infinity is not less inconceivable than the +concrete eternity in time--then it will follow that this system of +ours, that of the Milky Way, is repeated an infinite number of times in +the infinite of space, and that therefore I am now living an infinite +number of lives, all exactly identical. A jest, as you see, but one not +less comic--that is to say, not less tragic--than that of Nietzsche, +that of the laughing lion. And why does the lion laugh? I think he +laughs with rage, because he can never succeed in finding consolation in +the thought that he has been the same lion before and is destined to be +the same lion again. + +But if Spinoza and Nietzsche were indeed both rationalists, each after +his own manner, they were not spiritual eunuchs; they had heart, +feeling, and, above all, hunger, a mad hunger for eternity, for +immortality. The physical eunuch does not feel the need of reproducing +himself carnally, in the body, and neither does the spiritual eunuch +feel the hunger for self-perpetuation. + +Certain it is that there are some who assert that reason suffices them, +and they counsel us to desist from seeking to penetrate into the +impenetrable. But of those who say that they have no need of any faith +in an eternal personal life to furnish them with incentives to living +and motives for action, I know not well how to think. A man blind from +birth may also assure us that he feels no great longing to enjoy the +world of sight nor suffers any great anguish from not having enjoyed it, +and we must needs believe him, for what is wholly unknown cannot be the +object of desire--_nihil volitum quin praecognitum_, there can be no +volition save of things already known. But I cannot be persuaded that he +who has once in his life, either in his youth or for some other brief +space of time, cherished the belief in the immortality of the soul, will +ever find peace without it. And of this sort of blindness from birth +there are but few instances among us, and then only by a kind of strange +aberration. For the merely and exclusively rational man is an aberration +and nothing but an aberration. + +More sincere, much more sincere, are those who say: "We must not talk +about it, for in talking about it we only waste our time and weaken our +will; let us do our duty here and hereafter let come what may." But this +sincerity hides a yet deeper insincerity. May it perhaps be that by +saying "We must not talk about it," they succeed in not thinking about +it? Our will is weakened? And what then? We lose the capacity for human +action? And what then? It is very convenient to tell a man whom a fatal +disease condemns to an early death, and who knows it, not to think about +it. + + _Meglio oprando obliar, senza indagarlo, + Questo enorme mister del universo!_ + +"Better to work and to forget and not to probe into this vast mystery of +the universe!" Carducci wrote in his _Idilio Maremmano_, the same +Carducci who at the close of his ode _Sul Monte Mario_ tells us how the +earth, the mother of the fugitive soul, must roll its burden of glory +and sorrow round the sun "until, worn out beneath the equator, mocked by +the last flames of dying heat, the exhausted human race is reduced to a +single man and woman, who, standing in the midst of dead woods, +surrounded by sheer mountains, livid, with glassy eyes watch thee, O +sun, set across the immense frozen waste." + +But is it possible for us to give ourselves to any serious and lasting +work, forgetting the vast mystery of the universe and abandoning all +attempt to understand it? Is it possible to contemplate the vast All +with a serene soul, in the spirit of the Lucretian piety, if we are +conscious of the thought that a time must come when this All will no +longer be reflected in any human consciousness? + +Cain, in Byron's poem, asks of Lucifer, the prince of the intellectuals, +"Are ye happy?" and Lucifer replies, "We are mighty." Cain questions +again, "Are ye happy?" and then the great Intellectual says to him: "No; +art thou?" And further on, this same Lucifer says to Adah, the sister +and wife of Cain: "Choose betwixt love and knowledge--since there is no +other choice." And in the same stupendous poem, when Cain says that the +tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a lying tree, for "we know +nothing; at least it promised knowledge at the price of death," Lucifer +answers him: "It may be death leads to the highest knowledge"--that is +to say, to nothingness. + +To this word _knowledge_ which Lord Byron uses in the above quotations, +the Spanish _ciencia_, the French _science_, the German _Wissenschaft_, +is often opposed the word _wisdom, sabiduria, sagesse, Weisheit_. + + Knowledge comes, but Wisdom lingers, and he bears a laden breast, + Full of sad experience, moving toward the stillness of his rest, + +says another lord, Tennyson, in his _Locksley Hall_. And what is this +wisdom which we have to seek chiefly in the poets, leaving knowledge on +one side? It is well enough to say with Matthew Arnold in his +Introduction to Wordsworth's poems, that poetry is reality and +philosophy illusion; but reason is always reason and reality is always +reality, that which can be proved to exist externally to us, whether we +find in it consolation or despair. + +I do not know why so many people were scandalized, or pretended to be +scandalized, when Brunetiere proclaimed again the bankruptcy of science. +For science as a substitute for religion and reason as a substitute for +faith have always fallen to pieces. Science will be able to satisfy, and +in fact does satisfy in an increasing measure, our increasing logical or +intellectual needs, our desire to know and understand the truth; but +science does not satisfy the needs of our heart and our will, and far +from satisfying our hunger for immortality it contradicts it. Rational +truth and life stand in opposition to one another. And is it possible +that there is any other truth than rational truth? + +It must remain established, therefore, that reason--human reason--within +its limits, not only does not prove rationally that the soul is +immortal or that the human consciousness shall preserve its +indestructibility through the tracts of time to come, but that it proves +rather--within its limits, I repeat--that the individual consciousness +cannot persist after the death of the physical organism upon which it +depends. And these limits, within which I say that human reason proves +this, are the limits of rationality, of what is known by demonstration. +Beyond these limits is the irrational, which, whether it be called the +super-rational or the infra-rational or the contra-rational, is all the +same thing. Beyond these limits is the absurd of Tertullian, the +impossible of the _certum est, quia impossibile est_. And this absurd +can only base itself upon the most absolute uncertainty. + +The rational dissolution ends in dissolving reason itself; it ends in +the most absolute scepticism, in the phenomenalism of Hume or in the +doctrine of absolute contingencies of Stuart Mill, the most consistent +and logical of the positivists. The supreme triumph of reason, the +analytical--that is, the destructive and dissolvent--faculty, is to cast +doubt upon its own validity. The stomach that contains an ulcer ends by +digesting itself; and reason ends by destroying the immediate and +absolute validity of the concept of truth and of the concept of +necessity. Both concepts are relative; there is no absolute truth, no +absolute necessity. We call a concept true which agrees with the general +system of all our concepts; and we call a perception true which does not +contradict the system of our perceptions. Truth is coherence. But as +regards the whole system, the aggregate, as there is nothing outside of +it of which we have knowledge, we cannot say whether it is true or not. +It is conceivable that the universe, as it exists in itself, outside of +our consciousness, may be quite other than it appears to us, although +this is a supposition that has no meaning for reason. And as regards +necessity, is there an absolute necessity? By necessary we mean merely +that which is, and in so far as it is, for in another more +transcendental sense, what absolute necessity, logical and independent +of the fact that the universe exists, is there that there should be a +universe or anything else at all? + +Absolute relativism, which is neither more nor less than scepticism, in +the most modern sense of the term, is the supreme triumph of the +reasoning reason. + +Feeling does not succeed in converting consolation into truth, nor does +reason succeed in converting truth into consolation. But reason going +beyond truth itself, beyond the concept of reality itself, succeeds in +plunging itself into the depths of scepticism. And in this abyss the +scepticism of the reason encounters the despair of the heart, and this +encounter leads to the discovery of a basis--a terrible basis!--for +consolation to build on. + +Let us examine it. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[26] _Pragmatism, a New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking_. Popular +lectures on philosophy by William James, 1907. + +[27] _Treatise of Human Nature_, book i., part iv., sect. vi., "Of +Personal Identity": "I never can catch _myself_ at any time without a +perception, and never can observe anything but the perception." + +[28] Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, _Lectures on the History of the Eastern +Church_, lecture i., sect. iii. + +[29] 1 Cor. i. 23. + +[30] Gustave Flaubert, _Correspondance_, troisieme serie (1854-1869). +Paris, 1910. + + + + +VI + +IN THE DEPTHS OF THE ABYSS + +_Parce unicae spes totius orbis._--TERTULLIANUS, Adversus Marcionem, 5. + + +We have seen that the vital longing for human immortality finds no +consolation in reason and that reason leaves us without incentive or +consolation in life and life itself without real finality. But here, in +the depths of the abyss, the despair of the heart and of the will and +the scepticism of reason meet face to face and embrace like brothers. +And we shall see it is from this embrace, a tragic--that is to say, an +intimately loving--embrace, that the wellspring of life will flow, a +life serious and terrible. Scepticism, uncertainty--the position to +which reason, by practising its analysis upon itself, upon its own +validity, at last arrives--is the foundation upon which the heart's +despair must build up its hope. + +Disillusioned, we had to abandon the position of those who seek to give +consolation the force of rational and logical truth, pretending to prove +the rationality, or at any rate the non-irrationality, of consolation; +and we had to abandon likewise the position of those who seek to give +rational truth the force of consolation and of a motive for life. +Neither the one nor the other of these positions satisfied us. The one +is at variance with our reason, the other with our feeling. These two +powers can never conclude peace and we must needs live by their war. We +must make of this war, of war itself, the very condition of our +spiritual life. + +Neither does this high debate admit of that indecent and repugnant +expedient which the more or less parliamentary type of politician has +devised and dubbed "a formula of agreement," the property of which is to +render it impossible for either side to claim to be victorious. There +is no place here for a time-serving compromise. Perhaps a degenerate and +cowardly reason might bring itself to propose some such formula of +agreement, for in truth reason lives by formulas; but life, which cannot +be formulated, life which lives and seeks to live for ever, does not +submit to formulas. Its sole formula is: all or nothing. Feeling does +not compound its differences with middle terms. + +_Initium sapientiae timor Domini_, it is said, meaning perhaps _timor +mortis_, or it may be, _timor vitae_, which is the same thing. Always it +comes about that the beginning of wisdom is a fear. + +Is it true to say of this saving scepticism which I am now going to +discuss, that it is doubt? It is doubt, yes, but it is much more than +doubt. Doubt is commonly something very cold, of very little vitalizing +force, and above all something rather artificial, especially since +Descartes degraded it to the function of a method. The conflict between +reason and life is something more than a doubt. For doubt is easily +resolved into a comic element. + +The methodical doubt of Descartes is a comic doubt, a doubt purely +theoretical and provisional--that is to say, the doubt of a man who acts +as if he doubted without really doubting. And because it was a +stove-excogitated doubt, the man who deduced that he existed from the +fact that he thought did not approve of "those turbulent +(_brouillonnes_) and restless persons who, being called neither by birth +nor by fortune to the management of public affairs, are perpetually +devising some new reformation," and he was pained by the suspicion that +there might be something of this kind in his own writings. No, he, +Descartes, proposed only to "reform his own thoughts and to build upon +ground that was wholly his." And he resolved not to accept anything as +true when he did not recognize it clearly to be so, and to make a clean +sweep of all prejudices and received ideas, to the end that he might +construct his intellectual habitation anew. But "as it is not enough, +before beginning to rebuild one's dwelling-house, to pull it down and to +furnish materials and architects, or to study architecture oneself ... +but it is also necessary to be provided with some other wherein to lodge +conveniently while the work is in progress," he framed for himself a +provisional ethic--_une morale de provision_--the first law of which was +to observe the customs of his country and to keep always to the religion +in which, by the grace of God, he had been instructed from his infancy, +governing himself in all things according to the most moderate opinions. +Yes, exactly, a provisional religion and even a provisional God! And he +chose the most moderate opinions "because these are always the most +convenient for practice." But it is best to proceed no further. + +This methodical or theoretical Cartesian doubt, this philosophical doubt +excogitated in a stove, is not the doubt, is not the scepticism, is not +the incertitude, that I am talking about here. No! This other doubt is a +passionate doubt, it is the eternal conflict between reason and feeling, +science and life, logic and biotic. For science destroys the concept of +personality by reducing it to a complex in continual flux from moment to +moment--that is to say, it destroys the very foundation of the spiritual +and emotional life, which ranges itself unyieldingly against reason. + +And this doubt cannot avail itself of any provisional ethic, but has to +found its ethic, as we shall see, on the conflict itself, an ethic of +battle, and itself has to serve as the foundation of religion. And it +inhabits a house which is continually being demolished and which +continually it has to rebuild. Without ceasing the will, I mean the will +never to die, the spirit of unsubmissiveness to death, labours to build +up the house of life, and without ceasing the keen blasts and stormy +assaults of reason beat it down. + +And more than this, in the concrete vital problem that concerns us, +reason takes up no position whatever. In truth, it does something worse +than deny the immortality of the soul--for that at any rate would be one +solution--it refuses even to recognize the problem as our vital desire +presents it to us. In the rational and logical sense of the term +problem, there is no such problem. This question of the immortality of +the soul, of the persistence of the individual consciousness, is not +rational, it falls outside reason. As a problem, and whatever solution +it may receive, it is irrational. Rationally even the very propounding +of the problem lacks sense. The immortality of the soul is as +unconceivable as, in all strictness, is its absolute mortality. For the +purpose of explaining the world and existence--and such is the task of +reason--it is not necessary that we should suppose that our soul is +either mortal or immortal. The mere enunciation of the problem is, +therefore, an irrationality. + +Let us hear what our brother Kierkegaard has to say. "The danger of +abstract thought is seen precisely in respect of the problem of +existence, the difficulty of which it solves by going round it, +afterwards boasting that it has completely explained it. It explains +immortality in general, and it does so in a remarkable way by +identifying it with eternity--with the eternity which is essentially the +medium of thought. But with the immortality of each individually +existing man, wherein precisely the difficulty lies, abstraction does +not concern itself, is not interested in it. And yet the difficulty of +existence lies just in the interest of the existing being--the man who +exists is infinitely interested in existing. Abstract thought besteads +immortality only in order that it may kill me as an individual being +with an individual existence, and so make me immortal, pretty much in +the same way as that famous physician in one of Holberg's plays, whose +medicine, while it took away the patient's fever, took away his life at +the same time. An abstract thinker, who refuses to disclose and admit +the relation that exists between his abstract thought and the fact that +he is an existing being, produces a comic impression upon us, however +accomplished and distinguished he may be, for he runs the risk of +ceasing to be a man. While an effective man, compounded of infinitude +and finitude, owes his effectiveness precisely to the conjunction of +these two elements and is infinitely interested in existing, an abstract +thinker, similarly compounded, is a double being, a fantastical being, +who lives in the pure being of abstraction, and at times presents the +sorry figure of a professor who lays aside this abstract essence as he +lays aside his walking-stick. When one reads the Life of a thinker of +this kind--whose writings may be excellent--one trembles at the thought +of what it is to be a man. And when one reads in his writings that +thinking and being are the same thing, one thinks, remembering his life, +that that being, which is identical with thinking, is not precisely the +same thing as being a man" (_Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift_, +chap. iii.). + +What intense passion--that is to say, what truth--there is in this +bitter invective against Hegel, prototype of the rationalist!--for the +rationalist takes away our fever by taking away our life, and promises +us, instead of a concrete, an abstract immortality, as if the hunger for +immortality that consumes us were an abstract and not a concrete hunger! + +It may indeed be said that when once the dog is dead there is an end to +the rabies, and that after I have died I shall no more be tortured by +this rage of not dying, and that the fear of death, or more properly, of +nothingness, is an irrational fear, but ... Yes, but ... _Eppur si +muove!_ And it will go on moving. For it is the source of all movement! + +I doubt, however, whether our brother Kierkegaard is altogether in the +right, for this same abstract thinker, or thinker of abstractions, +thinks _in order that_ he may exist, that he may not cease to exist, or +thinks perhaps in order to forget that he will have to cease to exist. +This is the root of the passion for abstract thought. And possibly Hegel +was as infinitely interested as Kierkegaard in his own concrete, +individual existence, although the professional decorum of the +state-philosopher compelled him to conceal the fact. + +Faith in immortality is irrational. And, notwithstanding, faith, life, +and reason have mutual need of one another. This vital longing is not +properly a problem, cannot assume a logical status, cannot be formulated +in propositions susceptible of rational discussion; but it announces +itself in us as hunger announces itself. Neither can the wolf that +throws itself with the fury of hunger upon its prey or with the fury of +instinct upon the she-wolf, enunciate its impulse rationally and as a +logical problem. Reason and faith are two enemies, neither of which can +maintain itself without the other. The irrational demands to be +rationalized and reason only can operate on the irrational. They are +compelled to seek mutual support and association. But association in +struggle, for struggle is a mode of association. + +In the world of living beings the struggle for life establishes an +association, and a very close one, not only between those who unite +together in combat against a common foe, but between the combatants +themselves. And is there any possible association more intimate than +that uniting the animal that eats another and the animal that is eaten, +between the devourer and the devoured? And if this is clearly seen in +the struggle between individuals, it is still more evident in the +struggle between peoples. War has always been the most effective factor +of progress, even more than commerce. It is through war that conquerors +and conquered learn to know each other and in consequence to love each +other. + +Christianity, the foolishness of the Cross, the irrational faith that +Christ rose from the dead in order to raise us from the dead, was saved +by the rationalistic Hellenic culture, and this in its turn was saved by +Christianity. Without Christianity the Renaissance would have been +impossible. Without the Gospel, without St. Paul, the peoples who had +traversed the Middle Ages would have understood neither Plato nor +Aristotle. A purely rationalist tradition is as impossible as a +tradition purely religious. It is frequently disputed whether the +Reformation was born as the child of the Renaissance or as a protest +against it, and both propositions may be said to be true, for the son is +always born as a protest against the father. It is also said that it was +the revived Greek classics that led men like Erasmus back to St. Paul +and to primitive Christianity, which is the most irrational form of +Christianity; but it may be retorted that it was St. Paul, that it was +the Christian irrationality underlying his Catholic theology, that led +them back to the classics. "Christianity is what it has come to be," it +has been said, "only through its alliance with antiquity, while with the +Copts and Ethiopians it is but a kind of buffoonery. Islam developed +under the influence of Persian and Greek culture, and under that of the +Turks it has been transformed into a destructive barbarism."[31] + +We have emerged from the Middle Ages, from the medieval faith as ardent +as it was at heart despairing, and not without its inward and abysmal +incertitudes, and we have entered upon the age of rationalism, likewise +not without its incertitudes. Faith in reason is exposed to the same +rational indefensibility as all other faith. And we may say with Robert +Browning, + + All we have gained, then, by our unbelief + Is a life of doubt diversified by faith + For one of faith diversified by doubt. + + (_Bishop Blougram's Apology_.) + +And if, as I have said, faith, life, can only sustain itself by leaning +upon reason, which renders it transmissible--and above all transmissible +from myself to myself--that is to say, reflective and conscious--it is +none the less true that reason in its turn can only sustain itself by +leaning upon faith, upon life, even if only upon faith in reason, faith +in its availability for something more than mere knowing, faith in its +availability for living. Nevertheless, neither is faith transmissible or +rational, nor is reason vital. + +The will and the intelligence have need of one another, and the reverse +of that old aphorism, _nihil volitum quin praecognitum_, nothing is +willed but what is previously known, is not so paradoxical as at first +sight it may appear--_nihil cognitum quin praevolitum_, nothing is known +but what is previously willed. Vinet, in his study of Cousin's book on +the _Pensees_ of Pascal, says: "The very knowledge of the mind as such +has need of the heart. Without the desire to see there is no seeing; in +a great materialization of life and of thought there is no believing in +the things of the spirit." We shall see presently that to believe is, in +the first instance, to wish to believe. + +The will and the intelligence seek opposite ends: that we may absorb the +world into ourselves, appropriate it to ourselves, is the aim of the +will; that we may be absorbed into the world, that of the intelligence. +Opposite ends?--are they not rather one and the same? No, they are not, +although they may seem to be so. The intelligence is monist or +pantheist, the will monotheist or egoist. The intelligence has no need +of anything outside it to exercise itself upon; it builds its foundation +with ideas themselves, while the will requires matter. To know something +is to make this something that I know myself; but to avail myself of it, +to dominate it, it has to remain distinct from myself. + +Philosophy and religion are enemies, and because they are enemies they +have need of one another. There is no religion without some philosophic +basis, no philosophy without roots in religion. Each lives by its +contrary. The history of philosophy is, strictly speaking, a history of +religion. And the attacks which are directed against religion from a +presumed scientific or philosophical point of view are merely attacks +from another but opposing religious point of view. "The opposition which +professedly exists between natural science and Christianity really +exists between an impulse derived from natural religion blended with the +scientific investigation of nature, and the validity of the Christian +view of the world, which assures to spirit its pre-eminence over the +entire world of nature," says Ritschl (_Rechtfertgung und Versoehnung_, +iii. chap. iv. Sec. 28). Now this instinct is the instinct of rationality +itself. And the critical idealism of Kant is of religious origin, and it +is in order to save religion that Kant enlarged the limits of reason +after having in a certain sense dissolved it in scepticism. The system +of antitheses, contradictions, and antinomies, upon which Hegel +constructed his absolute idealism, has its root and germ in Kant +himself, and this root is an irrational root. + +We shall see later on, when we come to deal with faith, that faith is in +its essence simply a matter of will, not of reason, that to believe is +to wish to believe, and to believe in God is, before all and above all, +to wish that there may be a God. In the same way, to believe in the +immortality of the soul is to wish that the soul may be immortal, but to +wish it with such force that this volition shall trample reason under +foot and pass beyond it. But reason has its revenge. + +The instinct of knowing and the instinct of living, or rather of +surviving, come into conflict. In his work on the _Analysis of the +Sensations and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical_,[32] Dr. +E. Mach tells us that not even the investigator, the savant, _der +Forscher_, is exempted from taking his part in the struggle for +existence, that even the roads of science lead mouth-wards, and that in +the actual conditions of the society in which we live the pure instinct +of knowing, _der reine Erkenntnisstrieb_, is still no more than an +ideal. And so it always will be. _Primum vivere, deinde philosophari_, +or perhaps better, _primum supervivere_ or _superesse_. + +Every position of permanent agreement or harmony between reason and +life, between philosophy and religion, becomes impossible. And the +tragic history of human thought is simply the history of a struggle +between reason and life--reason bent on rationalizing life and forcing +it to submit to the inevitable, to mortality; life bent on vitalizing +reason and forcing it to serve as a support for its own vital desires. +And this is the history of philosophy, inseparable from the history of +religion. + +Our sense of the world of objective reality is necessarily subjective, +human, anthropomorphic. And vitalism will always rise up against +rationalism; reason will always find itself confronted by will. Hence +the rhythm of the history of philosophy and the alternation of periods +in which life imposes itself, giving birth to spiritual forms, with +those in which reason imposes itself, giving birth to materialist forms, +although both of these classes of forms of belief may be disguised by +other names. Neither reason nor life ever acknowledges itself +vanquished. But we will return to this in the next chapter. + +The vital consequence of rationalism would be suicide. Kierkegaard puts +it very well: "The consequence for existence[33] of pure thought is +suicide.... We do not praise suicide but passion. The thinker, on the +contrary, is a curious animal--for a few spells during the day he is +very intelligent, but, for the rest, he has nothing in common with man" +(_Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift_, chap iii., Sec. 1). + +As the thinker, in spite of all, does not cease to be a man, he employs +reason in the interests of life, whether he knows it or not. Life cheats +reason and reason cheats life. Scholastic-Aristotelian philosophy +fabricated in the interest of life a teleologic-evolutionist system, +rational in appearance, which might serve as a support for our vital +longing. This philosophy, the basis of the orthodox Christian +supernaturalism, whether Catholic or Protestant, was, in its essence, +merely a trick on the part of life to force reason to lend it its +support. But reason supported it with such pressure that it ended by +pulverizing it. + +I have read that the ex-Carmelite, Hyacinthe Loyson, declared that he +could present himself before God with tranquillity, for he was at peace +with his conscience and with his reason. With what conscience? If with +his religious conscience, then I do not understand. For it is a truth +that no man can serve two masters, and least of all when, though they +may sign truces and armistices and compromises, these two are enemies +because of their conflicting interests. + +To all this someone is sure to object that life ought to subject itself +to reason, to which we will reply that nobody ought to do what he is +unable to do, and life cannot subject itself to reason. "Ought, +therefore can," some Kantian will retort. To which we shall demur: +"Cannot, therefore ought not." And life cannot submit itself to reason, +because the end of life is living and not understanding. + +Again, there are those who talk of the religious duty of resignation to +mortality. This is indeed the very summit of aberration and insincerity. +But someone is sure to oppose the idea of veracity to that of sincerity. +Granted, and yet the two may very well be reconciled. Veracity, the +homage I owe to what I believe to be rational, to what logically we +call truth, moves me to affirm, in this case, that the immortality of +the individual soul is a contradiction in terms, that it is something, +not only irrational, but contra-rational; but sincerity leads me to +affirm also my refusal to resign myself to this previous affirmation and +my protest against its validity. What I feel is a truth, at any rate as +much a truth as what I see, touch, hear, or what is demonstrated to +me--nay, I believe it is more of a truth--and sincerity obliges me not +to hide what I feel. + +And life, quick to defend itself, searches for the weak point in reason +and finds it in scepticism, which it straightway fastens upon, seeking +to save itself by means of this stranglehold. It needs the weakness of +its adversary. + +Nothing is sure. Everything is elusive and in the air. In an outburst of +passion Lamennais exclaims: "But what! Shall we, losing all hope, shut +our eyes and plunge into the voiceless depths of a universal scepticism? +Shall we doubt that we think, that we feel, that we are? Nature does not +allow it; she forces us to believe even when our reason is not +convinced. Absolute certainty and absolute doubt are both alike +forbidden to us. We hover in a vague mean between these two extremes, as +between being and nothingness; for complete scepticism would be the +extinction of the intelligence and the total death of man. But it is not +given to man to annihilate himself; there is in him something which +invincibly resists destruction, I know not what vital faith, indomitable +even by his will. Whether he likes it or not, he must believe, because +he must act, because he must preserve himself. His reason, if he +listened only to that, teaching him to doubt everything, itself +included, would reduce him to a state of absolute inaction; he would +perish before even he had been able to prove to himself that he existed" +(_Essai sur l'indifference en matiere de religion_, iii^e partie, chap. +lxvii.). + +Reason, however, does not actually lead us to absolute scepticism. No! +Reason does not lead me and cannot lead me to doubt that I exist. +Whither reason does lead me is to vital scepticism, or more properly, to +vital negation--not merely to doubt, but to deny, that my consciousness +survives my death. Scepticism is produced by the clash between reason +and desire. And from this clash, from this embrace between despair and +scepticism, is born that holy, that sweet, that saving incertitude, +which is our supreme consolation. + +The absolute and complete certainty, on the one hand, that death is a +complete, definite, irrevocable annihilation of personal consciousness, +a certainty of the same order as the certainty that the three angles of +a triangle are equal to two right angles, or, on the other hand, the +absolute and complete certainty that our personal consciousness is +prolonged beyond death in these present or in other conditions, and +above all including in itself that strange and adventitious addition of +eternal rewards and punishments--both of these certainties alike would +make life impossible for us. In the most secret chamber of the spirit of +him who believes himself convinced that death puts an end to his +personal consciousness, his memory, for ever, and all unknown to him +perhaps, there lurks a shadow, a vague shadow, a shadow of shadow, of +uncertainty, and while he says within himself, "Well, let us live this +life that passes away, for there is no other!" the silence of this +secret chamber speaks to him and murmurs, "Who knows!..." He may not +think he hears it, but he hears it nevertheless. And likewise in some +secret place of the soul of the believer who most firmly holds the +belief in a future life, there is a muffled voice, a voice of +uncertainty, which whispers in the ear of his spirit, "Who knows!..." +These voices are like the humming of a mosquito when the south-west wind +roars through the trees in the wood; we cannot distinguish this faint +humming, yet nevertheless, merged in the clamour of the storm, it +reaches the ear. Otherwise, without this uncertainty, how could we live? + +_"Is there?" "Is there not?"_--these are the bases of our inner life. +There may be a rationalist who has never wavered in his conviction of +the mortality of the soul, and there may be a vitalist who has never +wavered in his faith in immortality; but at the most this would only +prove that just as there are natural monstrosities, so there are those +who are stupid as regards heart and feeling, however great their +intelligence, and those who are stupid intellectually, however great +their virtue. But, in normal cases, I cannot believe those who assure me +that never, not in a fleeting moment, not in the hours of direst +loneliness and grief, has this murmur of uncertainty breathed upon their +consciousness. I do not understand those men who tell me that the +prospect of the yonder side of death has never tormented them, that the +thought of their own annihilation never disquiets them. For my part I do +not wish to make peace between my heart and my head, between my faith +and my reason--I wish rather that there should be war between them! + +In the ninth chapter of the Gospel according to Mark it is related how a +man brought unto Jesus his son who was possessed by a dumb spirit, and +wheresoever the spirit took him it tore him, causing him to foam and +gnash his teeth and pine away, wherefore he sought to bring him to Jesus +that he might cure him. And the Master, impatient of those who sought +only for signs and wonders, exclaimed: "O faithless generation, how long +shall I be with you? how long shall I suffer you? bring him unto me" +(ver. 19), and they brought him unto him. And when the Master saw him +wallowing on the ground, he asked his father how long it was ago since +this had come unto him and the father replied that it was since he was & +child. And Jesus said unto him: "If thou canst believe, all things are +possible to him that believeth" (ver. 23). And then the father of the +epileptic or demoniac uttered these pregnant and immortal words: "Lord, +I believe; help thou mine unbelief!"--_Pisteyo, kyrie, boethei te +hapistia mou_ (ver. 24). + +"Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief!" A contradiction seemingly, +for if he believes, if he trusts, how is it that he beseeches the Lord +to help his lack of trust? Nevertheless, it is this contradiction that +gives to the heart's cry of the father of the demoniac its most profound +human value. His faith is a faith that is based upon incertitude. +Because he believes--that is to say, because he wishes to believe, +because he has need that his son should be cured--he beseeches the Lord +to help his unbelief, his doubt that such a cure could be effected. Of +such kind is human faith; of such kind was the heroic faith that Sancho +Panza had in his master, the knight Don Quijote de la Mancha, as I think +I have shown in my _Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho_; a faith based upon +incertitude, upon doubt. Sancho Panza was indeed a man, a whole and a +true man, and he was not stupid, for only if he had been stupid would he +have believed, without a shadow of doubt, in the follies of his master. +And his master himself did not believe in them without a shadow of +doubt, for neither was Don Quixote, though mad, stupid. He was at heart +a man of despair, as I think I have shown in my above-mentioned book. +And because he was a man of an heroical despair, the hero of that inward +and resigned despair, he stands as the eternal exemplar of every man +whose soul is the battle-ground of reason and immortal desire. Our Lord +Don Quixote is the prototype of the vitalist whose faith is based upon +uncertainty, and Sancho is the prototype of the rationalist who doubts +his own reason. + +Tormented by torturing doubts, August Hermann Francke resolved to call +upon God, a God in whom he did not believe, or rather in whom he +believed that he did not believe, imploring Him to take pity upon him, +upon the poor pietist Francke, if perchance He really existed.[34] And +from a similar state of mind came the inspiration of the sonnet entitled +"The Atheist's Prayer," which is included in my _Rosario de Sonetos +Liricos_, and closes with these lines: + + _Sufro yo a tu costa, + Dios no existiente, pues si tu existieras + existieria yo tambien de veras._[35] + +Yes, if God the guarantor of our personal immortality existed, then +should we ourselves really exist. And if He exists not, neither do we +exist. + +That terrible secret, that hidden will of God which, translated into the +language of theology, is known as predestination, that idea which +dictated to Luther his _servum arbitrium_, and which gives to Calvinism +its tragic sense, that doubt of our own salvation, is in its essence +nothing but uncertainty, and this uncertainty, allied with despair, +forms the basis of faith. Faith, some say, consists in not thinking +about it, in surrendering ourselves trustingly to the arms of God, the +secrets of whose providence are inscrutable. Yes, but infidelity also +consists in not thinking about it. This absurd faith, this faith that +knows no shadow of uncertainty, this faith of the stupid coalheaver, +joins hands with an absurd incredulity, the incredulity that knows no +shadow of uncertainty, the incredulity of the intellectuals who are +afflicted with affective stupidity in order that they may not think +about it. + +And what but uncertainty, doubt, the voice of reason, was that abyss, +that terrible _gouffre_, before which Pascal trembled? And it was that +which led him to pronounce his terrible sentence, _il faut +s'abetir_--need is that we become fools! + +All Jansenism, the Catholic adaptation of Calvinism, bears the same +impress. Port-Royal, which owed its existence to a Basque, the Abbe de +Saint-Cyran, a man of the same race as Inigo de Loyola and as he who +writes these lines, always preserved deep down a sediment of religious +despair, of the suicide of reason. Loyola also slew his reason in +obedience. + +Our affirmation is despair, our negation is despair, and from despair we +abstain from affirming and denying. Note the greater part of our +atheists and you will see that they are atheists from a kind of rage, +rage at not being able to believe that there is a God. They are the +personal enemies of God. They have invested Nothingness with substance +and personality, and their No-God is an Anti-God. + +And concerning that abject and ignoble saying, "If there were not a God +it would be necessary to invent Him," we shall say nothing. It is the +expression of the unclean scepticism of those conservatives who look +upon religion merely as a means of government and whose interest it is +that in the other life there shall be a hell for those who oppose their +worldly interests in this life. This repugnant and Sadducean phrase is +worthy of the time-serving sceptic to whom it is attributed. + +No, with all this the deep vital sense has nothing to do. It has nothing +to do with a transcendental police regimen, or with securing order--and +what an order!--upon earth by means of promises and threats of eternal +rewards and punishments after death. All this belongs to a lower +plane--that is to say, it is merely politics, or if you like, ethics. +The vital sense has to do with living. + +But it is in our endeavour to represent to ourselves what the life of +the soul after death really means that uncertainty finds its surest +foundation. This it is that most shakes our vital desire and most +intensifies the dissolvent efficacy of reason. For even if by a mighty +effort of faith we overcome that reason which tells and teaches us that +the soul is only a function of the physical organism, it yet remains +for our imagination to conceive an image of the immortal and eternal +life of the soul. This conception involves us in contradictions and +absurdities, and it may be that we shall arrive with Kierkegaard at the +conclusion that if the mortality of the soul is terrible, not less +terrible is its immortality. + +But when we have overcome the first, the only real difficulty, when we +have overcome the impediment of reason, when we have achieved the faith, +however painful and involved in uncertainty it may be, that our personal +consciousness shall continue after death, what difficulty, what +impediment, lies in the way of our imagining to ourselves this +persistence of self in harmony with our desire? Yes, we can imagine it +as an eternal rejuvenescence, as an eternal growth of ourselves, and as +a journeying towards God, towards the Universal Consciousness, without +ever an arrival, we can imagine it as ... But who shall put fetters upon +the imagination, once it has broken the chain of the rational? + +I know that all this is dull reading, tiresome, perhaps tedious, but it +is all necessary. And I must repeat once again that we have nothing to +do with a transcendental police system or with the conversion of God +into a great Judge or Policeman--that is to say, we are not concerned +with heaven or hell considered as buttresses to shore up our poor +earthly morality, nor are we concerned with anything egoistic or +personal. It is not I myself alone, it is the whole human race that is +involved, it is the ultimate finality of all our civilization. I am but +one, but all men are I's. + +Do you remember the end of that _Song of the Wild Cock_ which Leopardi +wrote in prose?--the despairing Leopardi, the victim of reason, who +never succeeded in achieving belief. "A time will come," he says, "when +this Universe and Nature itself will be extinguished. And just as of the +grandest kingdoms and empires of mankind and the marvellous things +achieved therein, very famous in their own time, no vestige or memory +remains to-day, so, in like manner, of the entire world and of the +vicissitudes and calamities of all created things there will remain not +a single trace, but a naked silence and a most profound stillness will +fill the immensity of space. And so before ever it has been uttered or +understood, this admirable and fearful secret of universal existence +will be obliterated and lost." And this they now describe by a +scientific and very rationalistic term--namely, _entropia_. Very pretty, +is it not? Spencer invented the notion of a primordial homogeneity, from +which it is impossible to conceive how any heterogeneity could +originate. Well now, this _entropia_ is a kind of ultimate homogeneity, +a state of perfect equilibrium. For a soul avid of life, it is the most +like nothingness that the mind can conceive. + + * * * * * + +To this point, through a series of dolorous reflections, I have brought +the reader who has had the patience to follow me, endeavouring always to +do equal justice to the claims of reason and of feeling. I have not +wished to keep silence on matters about which others are silent; I have +sought to strip naked, not only my own soul, but the human soul, be its +nature what it may, its destiny to disappear or not to disappear. And we +have arrived at the bottom of the abyss, at the irreconcilable conflict +between reason and vital feeling. And having arrived here, I have told +you that it is necessary to accept the conflict as such and to live by +it. Now it remains for me to explain to you how, according to my way of +feeling, and even according to my way of thinking, this despair may be +the basis of a vigorous life, of an efficacious activity, of an ethic, +of an esthetic, of a religion and even of a logic. But in what follows +there will be as much of imagination as of ratiocination, or rather, +much more. + +I do not wish to deceive anyone, or to offer as philosophy what it may +be is only poetry or phantasmagoria, in any case a kind of mythology. +The divine Plato, after having discussed the immortality of the soul in +his dialogue _Phaedo_ (an ideal--that is to say, a lying--immortality), +embarked upon an interpretation of the myths which treat of the other +life, remarking that it was also necessary to mythologize. Let us, then, +mythologize. + +He who looks for reasons, strictly so called, scientific arguments, +technically logical reflections, may refuse to follow me further. +Throughout the remainder of these reflections upon the tragic sense, I +am going to fish for the attention of the reader with the naked, +unbaited hook; whoever wishes to bite, let him bite, but I deceive no +one. Only in the conclusion I hope to gather everything together and to +show that this religious despair which I have been talking about, and +which is nothing other than the tragic sense of life itself, is, though +more or less hidden, the very foundation of the consciousness of +civilized individuals and peoples to-day--that is to say, of those +individuals and those peoples who do not suffer from stupidity of +intellect or stupidity of feeling. + +And this tragic sense is the spring of heroic achievements. + +If in that which follows you shall meet with arbitrary apothegms, +brusque transitions, inconsecutive statements, veritable somersaults of +thought, do not cry out that you have been deceived. We are about to +enter--if it be that you wish to accompany me--upon a field of +contradictions between feeling and reasoning, and we shall have to avail +ourselves of the one as well as of the other. + +That which follows is not the outcome of reason but of life, although in +order that I may transmit it to you I shall have to rationalize it after +a fashion. The greater part of it can be reduced to no logical theory or +system; but like that tremendous Yankee poet, Walt Whitman, "I charge +that there be no theory or school founded out of me" (_Myself and +Mine_). + +Neither am I the only begetter of the fancies I am about to set forth. +By no means. They have also been conceived by other men, if not +precisely by other thinkers, who have preceded me in this vale of tears, +and who have exhibited their life and given expression to it. Their +life, I repeat, not their thought, save in so far as it was thought +inspired by life, thought with a basis of irrationality. + +Does this mean that in all that follows, in the efforts of the +irrational to express itself, there is a total lack of rationality, of +all objective value? No; the absolutely, the irrevocably irrational, is +inexpressible, is intransmissible. But not the contra-rational. Perhaps +there is no way of rationalizing the irrational; but there is a way of +rationalizing the contra-rational, and that is by trying to explain it. +Since only the rational is intelligible, really intelligible, and since +the absurd, being devoid of sense, is condemned to be incommunicable, +you will find that whenever we succeed in giving expression and +intelligibility to anything apparently irrational or absurd we +invariably resolve it into something rational, even though it be into +the negation of that which we affirm. + +The maddest dreams of the fancy have some ground of reason, and who +knows if everything that the imagination of man can conceive either has +not already happened, or is not now happening or will not happen some +time, in some world or another? The possible combinations are perhaps +infinite. It only remains to know whether all that is imaginable is +possible. + +It may also be said, and with justice, that much of what I am about to +set forth is merely a repetition of ideas which have been expressed a +hundred times before and a hundred times refuted; but the repetition of +an idea really implies that its refutation has not been final. And as I +do not pretend that the majority of these fancies are new, so neither do +I pretend, obviously, that other voices before mine have not spoken to +the winds the same laments. But when yet another voice echoes the same +eternal lament it can only be inferred that the same grief still dwells +in the heart. + +And it comes not amiss to repeat yet once again the same eternal +lamentations that were already old in the days of Job and Ecclesiastes, +and even to repeat them in the same words, to the end that the devotees +of progress may see that there is something that never dies. Whosoever +repeats the "Vanity of vanities" of Ecclesiastes or the lamentations of +Job, even though without changing a letter, having first experienced +them in his soul, performs a work of admonition. Need is to repeat +without ceasing the _memento mori_. + +"But to what end?" you will ask. Even though it be only to the end that +some people should be irritated and should see that these things are not +dead and, so long as men exist, cannot die; to the end that they should +be convinced that to-day, in the twentieth century, all the bygone +centuries and all of them alive, are still subsisting. When a supposed +error reappears, it must be, believe me, that it has not ceased to be +true in part, just as when one who was dead reappears, it must be that +he was not wholly dead. + +Yes, I know well that others before me have felt what I feel and +express; that many others feel it to-day, although they keep silence +about it. Why do I not keep silence about it too? Well, for the very +reason that most of those who feel it are silent about it; and yet, +though they are silent, they obey in silence that inner voice. And I do +not keep silence about it because it is for many the thing which must +not be spoken, the abomination of abominations--_infandum_--and I +believe that it is necessary now and again to speak the thing which must +not be spoken. But if it leads to nothing? Even if it should lead only +to irritating the devotees of progress, those who believe that truth is +consolation, it would lead to not a little. To irritating them and +making them say: Poor fellow! if he would only use his intelligence to +better purpose!... Someone perhaps will add that I do not know what I +say, to which I shall reply that perhaps he may be right--and being +right is such a little thing!--but that I feel what I say and I know +what I feel and that suffices me. And that it is better to be lacking in +reason than to have too much of it. + +And the reader who perseveres in reading me will also see how out of +this abyss of despair hope may arise, and how this critical position may +be the well-spring of human, profoundly human, action and effort, and of +solidarity and even of progress. He will see its pragmatic +justification. And he will see how, in order to work, and to work +efficaciously and morally, there is no need of either of these two +conflicting certainties, either that of faith or that of reason, and how +still less is there any need--this never under any circumstances--to +shirk the problem of the immortality of the soul, or to distort it +idealistically--that is to say, hypocritically. The reader will see how +this uncertainty, with the suffering that accompanies it, and the +fruitless struggle to escape from it, may be and is a basis for action +and morals. + +And in the fact that it serves as a basis for action and morals, this +feeling of uncertainty and the inward struggle between reason on the one +hand and faith and the passionate longing for eternal life on the other, +should find their justification in the eyes of the pragmatist. But it +must be clearly stated that I do not adduce this practical consequence +in order to justify the feeling, but merely because I encounter it in my +inward experience. I neither desire to seek, nor ought I to seek, any +justification for this state of inward struggle and uncertainty and +longing; it is a fact and that suffices. And if anyone finding himself +in this state, in the depth of the abyss, fails to find there motives +for and incentives to life and action, and concludes by committing +bodily or spiritual suicide, whether he kills himself or he abandons all +co-operation with his fellows in human endeavour, it will not be I who +will pass censure upon him. And apart from the fact that the evil +consequences of a doctrine, or rather those which we call evil, only +prove, I repeat, that the doctrine is disastrous for our desires, but +not that it is false in itself, the consequences themselves depend not +so much upon the doctrine as upon him who deduces them. The same +principle may furnish one man with grounds for action and another man +with grounds for abstaining from action, it may lead one man to direct +his effort towards a certain end and another man towards a directly +opposite end. For the truth is that our doctrines are usually only the +justification _a posteriori_ of our conduct, or else they are our way of +trying to explain that conduct to ourselves. + +Man, in effect, is unwilling to remain in ignorance of the motives of +his own conduct. And just as a man who has been led to perform a certain +action by hypnotic suggestion will afterwards invent reasons which would +justify it and make it appear logical to himself and others, being +unaware all the time of the real cause of his action, so every man--for +since "life is a dream" every man is in a condition of hypnotism--seeks +to find reasons for his conduct. And if the pieces on a chessboard were +endowed with consciousness, they would probably have little difficulty +in ascribing their moves to freewill--that is to say, they would claim +for them a finalist rationality. And thus it comes about that every +philosophic theory serves to explain and justify an ethic, a doctrine of +conduct, which has its real origin in the inward moral feeling of the +author of the theory. But he who harbours this feeling may possibly +himself have no clear consciousness of its true reason or cause. + +Consequently, if my reason, which is in a certain sense a part of the +reason of all my brothers in humanity in time and space, teaches me this +absolute scepticism in respect of what concerns my longing for +never-ending life, I think that I can assume that my feeling of life, +which is the essence of life itself, my vitality, my boundless appetite +for living and my abhorrence of dying, my refusal to submit to +death--that it is this which suggests to me the doctrines with which I +try to counter-check the working of the reason. Have these doctrines an +objective value? someone will ask me, and I shall answer that I do not +understand what this objective value of a doctrine is. I will not say +that the more or less poetical and unphilosophical doctrines that I am +about to set forth are those which make me live; but I will venture to +say that it is my longing to live and to live for ever that inspires +these doctrines within me. And if by means of them I succeed in +strengthening and sustaining this same longing in another, perhaps when +it was all but dead, then I shall have performed a man's work and, above +all, I shall have lived. In a word, be it with reason or without reason +or against reason, I am resolved not to die. And if, when at last I die +out, I die out altogether, then I shall not have died out of +myself--that is, I shall not have yielded myself to death, but my human +destiny will have killed me. Unless I come to lose my head, or rather my +heart, I will not abdicate from life--life will be wrested from me. + +To have recourse to those, ambiguous words, "optimism" and "pessimism," +does not assist us in any way, for frequently they express the very +contrary of what those who use them mean to express. To ticket a +doctrine with the label of pessimism is not to impugn its validity, and +the so-called optimists are not the most efficient in action. I believe, +on the contrary, that many of the greatest heroes, perhaps the greatest +of all, have been men of despair and that by despair they have +accomplished their mighty works. Apart from this, however, and accepting +in all their ambiguity these denominations of optimism and pessimism, +that there exists a certain transcendental pessimism which may be the +begetter of a temporal and terrestrial optimism, is a matter that I +propose to develop in the following part of this treatise. + +Very different, well I know, is the attitude of our progressives, the +partisans of "the central current of contemporary European thought"; but +I cannot bring myself to believe that these individuals do not +voluntarily close their eyes to the grand problem of existence and that, +in endeavouring to stifle this feeling of the tragedy of life, they +themselves are not living a lie. + +The foregoing reflections are a kind of practical summary of the +criticism developed in the first six chapters of this treatise, a kind +of definition of the practical position to which such a criticism is +capable of leading whosoever will not renounce life and will not +renounce reason and who is compelled to live and act between these upper +and nether millstones which grind upon the soul. The reader who follows +me further is now aware that I am about to carry him into the region of +the imagination, of imagination not destitute of reason, for without +reason nothing subsists, but of imagination founded on feeling. And as +regards its truth, the real truth, that which is independent of +ourselves, beyond the reach of our logic and of our heart--of this truth +who knows aught? + +FOOTNOTES: + +[31] See Troeltsch, _Systematische christliche Religion_, in _Die Kultur +der Gegenwart_ series. + +[32] _Die Analyse der Empfindigungen und das Verhaeltniss des Physischen +zum Psychischen_, i., Sec. 12, note. + +[33] I have left the original expression here, almost without +translating it--_Existents-Consequents_. It means the existential or +practical, not the purely rational or logical, consequence. (Author's +note.) + +[34] Albrecht Ritschl: _Geschichte des Pietismus_, ii., Abt. i., Bonn, +1884, p. 251. + +[35] Thou art the cause of my suffering, O non-existing God, for if Thou +didst exist, then should I also really exist. + + + + +VII + +LOVE, SUFFERING, PITY, AND PERSONALITY + + CAIN: Let me, or happy or unhappy, learn + To anticipate my immortality. + + LUCIFER: Thou didst before I came upon thee. + + CAIN: How? + + LUCIFER: By suffering. + + BYRON: _Cain_, Act II., Scene I. + + +The most tragic thing in the world and in life, readers and brothers of +mine, is love. Love is the child of illusion and the parent of +disillusion; love is consolation in desolation; it is the sole medicine +against death, for it is death's brother. + + _Fratelli, a un tempo stesso, Amore e Morte + Ingenero la sorte_, + +as Leopardi sang. + +Love seeks with fury, through the medium of the beloved, something +beyond, and since it finds it not, it despairs. + +Whenever we speak of love there is always present in our memory the idea +of sexual love, the love between man and woman, whose end is the +perpetuation of the human race upon the earth. Hence it is that we never +succeed in reducing love either to a purely intellectual or to a purely +volitional element, putting aside that part in it which belongs to the +feeling, or, if you like, to the senses. For, in its essence, love is +neither idea nor volition; rather it is desire, feeling; it is something +carnal in spirit itself. Thanks to love, we feel all that spirit has of +flesh in it. + +Sexual love is the generative type of every other love. In love and by +love we seek to perpetuate ourselves, and we perpetuate ourselves on the +earth only on condition that we die, that we yield up our life to +others. The humblest forms of animal life, the lowest of living beings, +multiply by dividing themselves, by splitting into two, by ceasing to be +the unit which they previously formed. + +But when at last the vitality of the being that multiplies itself by +division is exhausted, the species must renew the source of life from +time to time by means of the union of two wasting individuals, by means +of what is called, among protozoaria, conjugation. They unite in order +to begin dividing again with more vigour. And every act of generation +consists in a being's ceasing to be what it was, either wholly or in +part, in a splitting up, in a partial death. To live is to give oneself, +to perpetuate oneself, and to perpetuate oneself and to give oneself is +to die. The supreme delight of begetting is perhaps nothing but a +foretaste of death, the eradication of our own vital essence. We unite +with another, but it is to divide ourselves; this most intimate embrace +is only a most intimate sundering. In its essence, the delight of sexual +love, the genetic spasm, is a sensation of resurrection, of renewing our +life in another, for only in others can we renew our life and so +perpetuate ourselves. + +Without doubt there is something tragically destructive in the essence +of love, as it presents itself to us in its primitive animal form, in +the unconquerable instinct which impels the male and the female to mix +their being in a fury of conjunction. The same impulse that joins their +bodies, separates, in a certain sense, their souls; they hate one +another, while they embrace, no less than they love, and above all they +contend with one another, they contend for a third life, which as yet is +without life. Love is a contention, and there are animal species in +which the male maltreats the female in his union with her, and other in +which the female devours the male after being fertilized by him. + +It has been said that love is a mutual selfishness; and, in fact, each +one of the lovers seeks to possess the other, and in seeking his own +perpetuation through the instrumentality of the other, though without +being at the time conscious of it or purposing it, he thereby seeks his +own enjoyment. Each one of the lovers is an immediate instrument of +enjoyment and a mediate instrument of perpetuation, for the other. And +thus they are tyrants and slaves, each one at once the tyrant and slave +of the other. + +Is there really anything strange in the fact that the deepest religious +feeling has condemned carnal love and exalted virginity? Avarice, said +the Apostle, is the root of all evil, and the reason is because avarice +takes riches, which are only a means, for an end; and therein lies the +essence of sin, in taking means for ends, in not recognizing or in +disesteeming the end. And since it takes enjoyment for the end, whereas +it is only the means, and not perpetuation, which is the true end, what +is carnal love but avarice? And it is possible that there are some who +preserve their virginity in order the better to perpetuate themselves, +and in order to perpetuate something more human than the flesh. + +For it is the suffering flesh, it is suffering, it is death, that lovers +perpetuate upon the earth. Love is at once the brother, son, and father +of death, which is its sister, mother, and daughter. And thus it is that +in the depth of love there is a depth of eternal despair, out of which +spring hope and consolation. For out of this carnal and primitive love +of which I have been speaking, out of this love of the whole body with +all its senses, which is the animal origin of human society, out of this +loving-fondness, rises spiritual and sorrowful love. + +This other form of love, this spiritual love, is born of sorrow, is +born of the death of carnal love, is born also of the feeling of +compassion and protection which parents feel in the presence of a +stricken child. Lovers never attain to a love of self abandonment, of +true fusion of soul and not merely of body, until the heavy pestle of +sorrow has bruised their hearts and crushed them in the same mortar of +suffering. Sensual love joined their bodies but disjoined their souls; +it kept their souls strangers to one another; but of this love is +begotten a fruit of their flesh--a child. And perchance this child, +begotten in death, falls sick and dies. Then it comes to pass that over +the fruit of their carnal fusion and spiritual separation and +estrangement, their bodies now separated and cold with sorrow but united +by sorrow their souls, the lovers, the parents, join in an embrace of +despair, and then is born, of the death of the child of their flesh, the +true spiritual love. Or rather, when the bond of flesh which united them +is broken, they breathe with a sigh of relief. For men love one another +with a spiritual love only when they have suffered the same sorrow +together, when through long days they have ploughed the stony ground +bowed beneath the common yoke of a common grief. It is then that they +know one another and feel one another, and feel with one another in +their common anguish, they pity one another and love one another. For to +love is to pity; and if bodies are united by pleasure, souls are united +by pain. + +And this is felt with still more clearness and force in the seeding, the +taking root, and the blossoming of one of those tragic loves which are +doomed to contend with the diamond-hard laws of Destiny--one of those +loves which are born out of due time and season, before or after the +moment, or out of the normal mode in which the world, which is custom, +would have been willing to welcome them. The more barriers Destiny and +the world and its law interpose between the lovers, the stronger is the +impulse that urges them towards one another, and their happiness in +loving one another turns to bitterness, and their unhappiness in not +being able to love freely and openly grows heavier, and they pity one +another from the bottom of their hearts; and this common pity, which is +their common misery and their common happiness, gives fire and fuel to +their love. And they suffer their joy, enjoying their suffering. And +they establish their love beyond the confines of the world, and the +strength of this poor love suffering beneath the yoke of Destiny gives +them intuition of another world where there is no other law than the +liberty of love--another world where there are no barriers because there +is no flesh. For nothing inspires us more with hope and faith in another +world than the impossibility of our love truly fructifying in this world +of flesh and of appearances. + +And what is maternal love but compassion for the weak, helpless, +defenceless infant that craves the mother's milk and the comfort of her +breast? And woman's love is all maternal. + +To love with the spirit is to pity, and he who pities most loves most. +Men aflame with a burning charity towards their neighbours are thus +enkindled because they have touched the depth of their own misery, their +own apparentiality, their own nothingness, and then, turning their newly +opened eyes upon their fellows, they have seen that they also are +miserable, apparential, condemned to nothingness, and they have pitied +them and loved them. + +Man yearns to be loved, or, what is the same thing, to be pitied. Man +wishes others to feel and share his hardships and his sorrows. The +roadside beggar's exhibition of his sores and gangrened mutilations is +something more than a device to extort alms from the passer-by. True +alms is pity rather than the pittance that alleviates the material +hardships of life. The beggar shows little gratitude for alms thrown to +him by one who hurries past with averted face; he is more grateful to +him who pities him but does not help than to him who helps but does not +pity, although from another point of view he may prefer the latter. +Observe with what satisfaction he relates his woes to one who is moved +by the story of them. He desires to be pitied, to be loved. + +Woman's love, above all, as I have remarked, is always compassionate in +its essence--maternal. Woman yields herself to the lover because she +feels that his desire makes him suffer. Isabel had compassion upon +Lorenzo, Juliet upon Romeo, Francesca upon Paolo. Woman seems to say: +"Come, poor one, thou shalt not suffer so for my sake!" And therefore is +her love more loving and purer than that of man, braver and more +enduring. + +Pity, then, is the essence of human spiritual love, of the love that is +conscious of being love, of the love that is not purely animal, of the +love, in a word, of a rational person. Love pities, and pities most when +it loves most. + +Reversing the terms of the adage _nihil volitum quin praecognitum_, I +have told you that _nihil cognitum quin praevolitum_, that we know +nothing save what we have first, in one way or another, desired; and it +may even be added that we can know nothing well save what we love, save +what we pity. + +As love grows, this restless yearning to pierce to the uttermost and to +the innermost, so it continually embraces all that it sees, and pities +all that it embraces. According as you turn inwards and penetrate more +deeply into yourself, you will discover more and more your own +emptiness, that you are not all that you are not, that you are not what +you would wish to be, that you are, in a word, only a nonentity. And in +touching your own nothingness, in not feeling your permanent base, in +not reaching your own infinity, still less your own eternity, you will +have a whole-hearted pity for yourself, and you will burn with a +sorrowful love for yourself--a love that will consume your so-called +self-love, which is merely a species of sensual self-delectation, the +self-enjoyment, as it were, of the flesh of your soul. + +Spiritual self-love, the pity that one feels for oneself, may perhaps be +called egotism; but nothing could be more opposed to ordinary egoism. +For this love or pity for yourself, this intense despair, bred of the +consciousness that just as before you were born you were not, so after +your death you will cease to be, will lead you to pity--that is, to +love--all your fellows and brothers in this world of appearance, these +unhappy shadows who pass from nothingness to nothingness, these sparks +of consciousness which shine for a moment in the infinite and eternal +darkness. And this compassionate feeling for other men, for your +fellows, beginning with those most akin to you, those with whom you +live, will expand into a universal pity for all living things, and +perhaps even for things that have not life but merely existence. That +distant star which shines up there in the night will some day be +quenched and will turn to dust and will cease to shine and cease to +exist. And so, too, it will be with the whole of the star-strewn +heavens. Unhappy heavens! + +And if it is grievous to be doomed one day to cease to be, perhaps it +would be more grievous still to go on being always oneself, and no more +than oneself, without being able to be at the same time other, without +being able to be at the same time everything else, without being able to +be all. + +If you look at the universe as closely and as inwardly as you are able +to look--that is to say, if you look within yourself; if you not only +contemplate but feel all things in your own consciousness, upon which +all things have traced their painful impression--you will arrive at the +abyss of the tedium, not merely of life, but of something more: at the +tedium of existence, at the bottomless pit of the vanity of vanities. +And thus you will come to pity all things; you will arrive at universal +love. + +In order to love everything, in order to pity everything, human and +extra-human, living and non-living, you must feel everything within +yourself, you must personalize everything. For everything that it loves, +everything that it pities, love personalizes. We only pity--that is to +say, we only love--that which is like ourselves and in so far as it is +like ourselves, and the more like it is the more we love; and thus our +pity for things, and with it our love, grows in proportion as we +discover in them the likenesses which they have with ourselves. Or, +rather, it is love itself, which of itself tends to grow, that reveals +these resemblances to us. If I am moved to pity and love the luckless +star that one day will vanish from the face of heaven, it is because +love, pity, makes me feel that it has a consciousness, more or less dim, +which makes it suffer because it is no more than a star, and a star that +is doomed one day to cease to be. For all consciousness is consciousness +of death and of suffering. + +Consciousness (_conscientia_) is participated knowledge, is co-feeling, +and co-feeling is com-passion. Love personalizes all that it loves. Only +by personalizing it can we fall in love with an idea. And when love is +so great and so vital, so strong and so overflowing, that it loves +everything, then it personalizes everything and discovers that the total +All, that the Universe, is also a Person possessing a Consciousness, a +Consciousness which in its turn suffers, pities, and loves, and +therefore is consciousness. And this Consciousness of the Universe, +which love, personalizing all that it loves, discovers, is what we call +God. And thus the soul pities God and feels itself pitied by Him; loves +Him and feels itself loved by Him, sheltering its misery in the bosom of +the eternal and infinite misery, which, in eternalizing itself and +infinitizing itself, is the supreme happiness itself. + +God is, then, the personalization of the All; He is the eternal and +infinite Consciousness of the Universe--Consciousness taken captive by +matter and struggling to free himself from it. We personalize the All +in order to save ourselves from Nothingness; and the only mystery really +mysterious is the mystery of suffering. + +Suffering is the path of consciousness, and by it living beings arrive +at the possession of self-consciousness. For to possess consciousness of +oneself, to possess personality, is to know oneself and to feel oneself +distinct from other beings, and this feeling of distinction is only +reached through an act of collision, through suffering more or less +severe, through the sense of one's own limits. Consciousness of oneself +is simply consciousness of one's own limitation. I feel myself when I +feel that I am not others; to know and to feel the extent of my being is +to know at what point I cease to be, the point beyond which I no longer +am. + +And how do we know that we exist if we do not suffer, little or much? +How can we turn upon ourselves, acquire reflective consciousness, save +by suffering? When we enjoy ourselves we forget ourselves, forget that +we exist; we pass over into another, an alien being, we alienate +ourselves. And we become centred in ourselves again, we return to +ourselves, only by suffering. + + _Nessun maggior dolore + che ricordarsi del tempo felice + nella miseria_ + +are the words that Dante puts into the mouth of Francesca da Rimini +(_Inferno_, v., 121-123); but if there is no greater sorrow than the +recollection in adversity of happy bygone days, there is, on the other +hand, no pleasure in remembering adversity in days of prosperity. + +"The bitterest sorrow that man can know is to aspire to do much and to +achieve nothing" (_polla phroneoita medenos chrateein_)--so +Herodotus relates that a Persian said to a Theban at a banquet (book +ix., chap. xvi.). And it is true. With knowledge and desire we can +embrace everything, or almost everything; with the will nothing, or +almost nothing. And contemplation is not happiness--no! not if this +contemplation implies impotence. And out of this collision between our +knowledge and our power pity arises. + +We pity what is like ourselves, and the greater and clearer our sense of +its likeness with ourselves, the greater our pity. And if we may say +that this likeness provokes our pity, it may also be maintained that it +is our reservoir of pity, eager to diffuse itself over everything, that +makes us discover the likeness of things with ourselves, the common bond +that unites us with them in suffering. + +Our own struggle to acquire, preserve, and increase our own +consciousness makes us discover in the endeavours and movements and +revolutions of all things a struggle to acquire, preserve, and increase +consciousness, to which everything tends. Beneath the actions of those +most akin to myself, of my fellow-men, I feel--or, rather, I co-feel--a +state of consciousness similar to that which lies beneath my own +actions. On hearing my brother give a cry of pain, my own pain awakes +and cries in the depth of my consciousness. And in the same way I feel +the pain of animals, and the pain of a tree when one of its branches is +being cut off, and I feel it most when my imagination is alive, for the +imagination is the faculty of intuition, of inward vision. + +Proceeding from ourselves, from our own human consciousness, the only +consciousness which we feel from within and in which feeling is +identical with being, we attribute some sort of consciousness, more or +less dim, to all living things, and even to the stones themselves, for +they also live. And the evolution of organic beings is simply a struggle +to realize fullness of consciousness through suffering, a continual +aspiration to be others without ceasing to be themselves, to break and +yet to preserve their proper limits. + +And this process of personalization or subjectivization of everything +external, phenomenal, or objective, is none other than the vital +process of philosophy in the contest of life against reason and of +reason against life. We have already indicated it in the preceding +chapter, and we must now confirm it by developing it further. + +Giovanni Baptista Vico, with his profound esthetic penetration into the +soul of antiquity, saw that the spontaneous philosophy of man was to +make of himself the norm of the universe, guided by the _instinto +d'animazione_. Language, necessarily anthropomorphic, mythopeic, +engenders thought. "Poetic wisdom, which was the primitive wisdom of +paganism," says Vico in his _Scienza Nuova_, "must have begun with a +metaphysic, not reasoned and abstract, like that of modern educated men, +but felt and imagined, such as must have been that of primitive men. +This was their own poetry, which with them was inborn, an innate +faculty, for nature had furnished them with such feelings and such +imaginations, a faculty born of the ignorance of causes, and therefore +begetting a universal sense of wonder, for knowing nothing they +marvelled greatly at everything. This poetry had a divine origin, for, +while they invented the causes of things out of their own imagination, +at the same time they regarded these causes with feelings of wonder as +gods. In this way the first men of the pagan peoples, as children of the +growing human race, fashioned things out of their ideas.... This nature +of human things has bequeathed that eternal property which Tacitus +elucidated with a fine phrase when he said, not without reason, that men +in their terror _fingunt simul creduntque_." + +And then, passing from the age of imagination, Vico proceeds to show us +the age of reason, this age of ours in which the mind, even the popular +mind, is too remote from the senses, "with so many abstractions of which +all languages are full," an age in which "the ability to conceive an +immense image of such a personage as we call sympathetic Nature is +denied to us, for though the phrase 'Dame Nature' may be on our lips, +there is nothing in our minds that corresponds with it, our minds being +occupied with the false, the non-existent." "To-day," Vico continues, +"it is naturally impossible for us to enter into the vast imagination of +these primitive men." But is this certain? Do not we continue to live by +the creations of their imagination, embodied for ever in the language +with which we think, or, rather, the language which thinks in us? + +It was in vain that Comte declared that human thought had already +emerged from the age of theology and was now emerging from the age of +metaphysics into the age of positivism; the three ages coexist, and +although antagonistic they lend one another mutual support. +High-sounding positivism, whenever it ceases to deny and begins to +affirm something, whenever it becomes really positive, is nothing but +metaphysics; and metaphysics, in its essence, is always theology, and +theology is born of imagination yoked to the service of life, of life +with its craving for immortality. + +Our feeling of the world, upon which is based our understanding of it, +is necessarily anthropomorphic and mythopeic. When rationalism dawned +with Thales of Miletus, this philosopher abandoned Oceanus and Thetis, +gods and the progenitors of gods, and attributed the origin of things to +water; but this water was a god in disguise. Beneath nature (_phhysist_) +and the world (_khosmos_), mythical and anthropomorphic creations +throbbed with life. They were implicated in the structure of language +itself. Xenophon tells us (_Memorabilia_, i., i., 6-9) that among +phenomena Socrates distinguished between those which were within the +scope of human study and those which the gods had reserved for +themselves, and that he execrated the attempt of Anaxagoras to explain +everything rationally. His contemporary, Hippocrates, regarded diseases +as of divine origin, and Plato believed that the sun and stars were +animated gods with their souls (_Philebus_, cap. xvi., _Laws_, x.), and +only permitted astronomical investigation so long as it abstained from +blasphemy against these gods. And Aristotle in his _Physics_ tells us +that Zeus rains not in order that the corn may grow, but by necessity +(_ex anharchest_). They tried to mechanize and rationalize God, but God +rebelled against them. + +And what is the concept of God, a concept continually renewed because +springing out of the eternal feeling of God in man, but the eternal +protest of life against reason, the unconquerable instinct of +personalization? And what is the notion of substance itself but the +objectivization of that which is most subjective--that is, of the will +or consciousness? For consciousness, even before it knows itself as +reason, feels itself, is palpable to itself, is most in harmony with +itself, as will, and as will not to die. Hence that rhythm, of which we +spoke, in the history of thought. Positivism inducted us into an age of +rationalism--that is to say, of materialism, mechanism, or mortalism; +and behold now the return of vitalism, of spiritualism. What was the +effort of pragmatism but an effort to restore faith in the human +finality of the universe? What is the effort of a Bergson, for example, +especially in his work on creative evolution, but an attempt to +re-integrate the personal God and eternal consciousness? Life never +surrenders. + +And it avails us nothing to seek to repress this mythopeic or +anthropomorphic process and to rationalize our thought, as if we thought +only for the sake of thinking and knowing, and not for the sake of +living. The very language with which we think prevents us from so doing. +Language, the substance of thought, is a system of metaphors with a +mythic and anthropomorphic base. And to construct a purely rational +philosophy it would be necessary to construct it by means of algebraic +formulas or to create a new language for it, an inhuman language--that +is to say, one inapt for the needs of life--as indeed Dr. Richard +Avenarius, professor of philosophy at Zuerich, attempted to do in his +_Critique of Pure Experience (Kritik der reinen Erfahrung_), in order to +avoid preconceptions. And this rigorous attempt of Avenarius, the chief +of the critics of experience, ends strictly in pure scepticism. He +himself says at the end of the Prologue to the work above mentioned: +"The childish confidence that it is granted to us to discover truth has +long since disappeared; as we progress we become aware of the +difficulties that lie in the way of its discovery and of the limitation +of our powers. And what is the end?... If we could only succeed in +seeing clearly into ourselves!" + +Seeing clearly! seeing clearly! Clear vision would be only attainable by +a pure thinker who used algebra instead of language and was able to +divest himself of his own humanity--that is to say, by an unsubstantial, +merely objective being: a no-being, in short. In spite of reason we are +compelled to think with life, and in spite of life we are compelled to +rationalize thought. + +This animation, this personification, interpenetrates our very +knowledge. "Who is it that sends the rain? Who is it that thunders?" old +Strepsiades asks of Socrates in _The Clouds_ of Aristophanes, and the +philosopher replies: "Not Zeus, but the clouds." "But," questions +Strepsiades, "who but Zeus makes the clouds sweep along?" to which +Socrates answers: "Not a bit of it; it is atmospheric whirligig." +"Whirligig?" muses Strepsiades; "I never thought of that--that Zeus is +gone and that Son Whirligig rules now in his stead." And so the old man +goes on personifying and animating the whirlwind, as if the whirlwind +were now a king, not without consciousness of his kingship. And in +exchanging a Zeus for a whirlwind--God for matter, for example--we all +do the same thing. And the reason is because philosophy does not work +upon the objective reality which we perceive with the senses, but upon +the complex of ideas, images, notions, perceptions, etc., embodied in +language and transmitted to us with our language by our ancestors. That +which we call the world, the objective world, is a social tradition. It +is given to us ready made. + +Man does not submit to being, as consciousness, alone in the Universe, +nor to being merely one objective phenomenon the more. He wishes to save +his vital or passional subjectivity by attributing life, personality, +spirit, to the whole Universe. In order to realize his wish he has +discovered God and substance; God and substance continually reappear in +his thought cloaked in different disguises. Because we are conscious, we +feel that we exist, which is quite another thing from knowing that we +exist, and we wish to feel the existence of everything else; we wish +that of all the other individual things each one should also be an "I." + +The most consistent, although the most incongruous and vacillating, +idealism, that of Berkeley, who denied the existence of matter, of +something inert and extended and passive, as the cause of our sensations +and the substratum of external phenomena, is in its essence nothing but +an absolute spiritualism or dynamism, the supposition that every +sensation comes to us, causatively, from another spirit--that is, from +another consciousness. And his doctrine has a certain affinity with +those of Schopenhauer and Hartmann. The former's doctrine of the Will +and the latter's doctrine of the Unconscious are already implied in the +Berkeleyan theory that to be is to be perceived. To which must be added: +and to cause others to perceive what is. Thus the old adage _operari +sequitur esse_ (action follows being) must be modified by saying that to +be is to act, and only that which acts--the active--exists, and in so +far as it acts. + +As regards Schopenhauer, there is no need to endeavour to show that the +will, which he posits as the essence of things, proceeds from +consciousness. And it is only necessary to read his book on the Will in +Nature to see how he attributed a certain spirit and even a certain +personality to the plants themselves. And this doctrine of his carried +him logically to pessimism, for the true property and most inward +function of the will is to suffer. The will is a force which feels +itself--that is, which suffers. And, someone will add, which enjoys. But +the capacity to enjoy is impossible without the capacity to suffer; and +the faculty of enjoyment is one with that of pain. Whosoever does not +suffer does not enjoy, just as whosoever is insensible to cold is +insensible to heat. + +And it is also quite logical that Schopenhauer, who deduced pessimism +from the voluntarist doctrine or doctrine of universal personalization, +should have deduced from both of these that the foundation of morals is +compassion. Only his lack of the social and historical sense, his +inability to feel that humanity also is a person, although a collective +one, his egoism, in short, prevented him from feeling God, prevented him +from individualizing and personalizing the total and collective +Will--the Will of the Universe. + +On the other hand, it is easy to understand his aversion from purely +empirical, evolutionist, or transformist doctrines, such as those set +forth in the works of Lamarck and Darwin which came to his notice. +Judging Darwin's theory solely by an extensive extract in _The Times_, +he described it, in a letter to Adam Louis von Doss (March 1, 1860), as +"downright empiricism" _(platter Empirismus)_. In fact, for a +voluntarist like Schopenhauer, a theory so sanely and cautiously +empirical and rational as that of Darwin left out of account the inward +force, the essential motive, of evolution. For what is, in effect, the +hidden force, the ultimate agent, which impels organisms to perpetuate +themselves and to fight for their persistence and propagation? +Selection, adaptation, heredity, these are only external conditions. +This inner, essential force has been called will on the supposition that +there exists also in other beings that which we feel in ourselves as a +feeling of will, the impulse to be everything, to be others as well as +ourselves yet without ceasing to be what we are. And it may be said +that this force is the divine in us, that it is God Himself who works in +us because He suffers in us. + +And sympathy teaches us to discover this force, this aspiration towards +consciousness, in all things. It moves and activates the most minute +living creatures; it moves and activates, perhaps, the very cells of our +own bodily organism, which is a confederation, more or less solidary, of +living beings; it moves the very globules of our blood. Our life is +composed of lives, our vital aspiration of aspirations existing perhaps +in the limbo of subconsciousness. Not more absurd than so many other +dreams which pass as valid theories is the belief that our cells, our +globules, may possess something akin to a rudimentary cellular, globular +consciousness or basis of consciousness. Or that they may arrive at +possessing such consciousness. And since we have given a loose rein to +the fancy, we may fancy that these cells may communicate with one +another, and that some of them may express their belief that they form +part of a superior organism endowed with a collective personal +consciousness. And more than once in the history of human feeling this +fancy has been expressed in the surmisal of some philosopher or poet +that we men are a kind of globules in the blood of a Supreme Being, who +possesses his own personal collective consciousness, the consciousness +of the Universe. + +Perhaps the immense Milky Way which on clear nights we behold stretching +across the heavens, this vast encircling ring in which our planetary +system is itself but a molecule, is in its turn but a cell in the +Universe, in the Body of God. All the cells of our body combine and +co-operate in maintaining and kindling by their activity our +consciousness, our soul; and if the consciousness or the souls of all +these cells entered completely into our consciousness, into the +composite whole, if I possessed consciousness of all that happens in my +bodily organism, I should feel the universe happening within myself, +and perhaps the painful sense of my limitedness would disappear. And if +all the consciousness of all beings unite in their entirety in the +universal consciousness, this consciousness--that is to say, God--is +all. + +In every instant obscure consciousnesses, elementary souls, are born and +die within us, and their birth and death constitute our life. And their +sudden and violent death constitutes our pain. And in like manner, in +the heart of God consciousnesses are born and die--but do they die?--and +their births and deaths constitute His life. + +If there is a Universal and Supreme Consciousness, I am an idea in it; +and is it possible for any idea in this Supreme Consciousness to be +completely blotted out? After I have died, God will go on remembering +me, and to be remembered by God, to have my consciousness sustained by +the Supreme Consciousness, is not that, perhaps, to be? + +And if anyone should say that God has made the universe, it may be +rejoined that so also our soul has made our body as much as, if not more +than, it has been made by it--if, indeed, there be a soul. + +When pity, love, reveals to us the whole universe striving to gain, to +preserve, and to enlarge its consciousness, striving more and more to +saturate itself with consciousness, feeling the pain of the discords +which are produced within it, pity reveals to us the likeness of the +whole universe with ourselves; it reveals to us that it is human, and it +leads us to discover our Father in it, of whose flesh we are flesh; love +leads us to personalize the whole of which we form a part. + +To say that God is eternally producing things is fundamentally the same +as saying that things are eternally producing God. And the belief in a +personal and spiritual God is based on the belief in our own personality +and spirituality. Because we feel ourselves to be consciousness, we +feel God to be consciousness--that is to say, a person; and because we +desire ardently that our consciousness shall live and be independently +of the body, we believe that the divine person lives and exists +independently of the universe, that his state of consciousness is _ad +extra_. + +No doubt logicians will come forward and confront us with the evident +rational difficulties which this involves; but we have already stated +that, although presented under logical forms, the content of all this is +not strictly rational. Every rational conception of God is in itself +contradictory. Faith in God is born of love for God--we believe that God +exists by force of wishing that He may exist, and it is born also, +perhaps, of God's love for us. Reason does not prove to us that God +exists, but neither does it prove that He cannot exist. + +But of this conception of faith in God as the personalization of the +universe we shall have more to say presently. + +And recalling what has been said in another part of this work, we may +say that material things, in so far as they are known to us, issue into +knowledge through the agency of hunger, and out of hunger issues the +sensible or material universe in which we conglomerate these things; and +that ideal things issue out of love, and out of love issues God, in whom +we conglomerate these ideal things as in the Consciousness of the +Universe. It is social consciousness, the child of love, of the instinct +of perpetuation, that leads us to socialize everything, to see society +in everything, and that shows us at last that all Nature is really an +infinite Society. For my part, the feeling that Nature is a society has +taken hold of me hundreds of times in walking through the woods +possessed with a sense of solidarity with the oaks, a sense of their dim +awareness of my presence. + +Imagination, which is the social sense, animates the inanimate and +anthropomorphizes everything; it humanizes everything and even makes +everything identical with man.[36] And the work of man is to +supernaturalize Nature--that is to say, to make it divine by making it +human, to help it to become conscious of itself, in short. The action of +reason, on the other hand, is to mechanize or materialize. + +And just as a fruitful union is consummated between the individual--who +is, in a certain sense, a society--and society, which is also an +individual--the two being so inseparable from one another that it is +impossible to say where the one begins and the other ends, for they are +rather two aspects of a single essence--so also the spirit, the social +element, which by relating us to others makes us conscious, unites with +matter, the individual and individualizing element; similarly, reason or +intelligence and imagination embrace in a mutually fruitful union, and +the Universe merges into one with God. + + * * * * * + +Is all this true? And what is truth? I in my turn will ask, as Pilate +asked--not, however, only to turn away and wash my hands, without +waiting for an answer. + +Is truth in reason, or above reason, or beneath reason, or outside of +reason, in some way or another? Is only the rational true? May there not +be a reality, by its very nature, unattainable by reason, and perhaps, +by its very nature, opposed to reason? And how can we know this reality +if reason alone holds the key to knowledge? + +Our desire of living, our need of life, asks that that may be true which +urges us to self-preservation and self-perpetuation, which sustains man +and society; it asks that the true water may be that which assuages our +thirst, and because it assuages it, that the true bread may be that +which satisfies our hunger, because it satisfies it. + +The senses are devoted to the service of the instinct of preservation, +and everything that satisfies this need of preserving ourselves, even +though it does not pass through the senses, is nevertheless a kind of +intimate penetration of reality in us. Is the process of assimilating +nutriment perhaps less real than the process of knowing the nutritive +substance? It may be said that to eat a loaf of bread is not the same +thing as seeing, touching, or tasting it; that in the one case it enters +into our body, but not therefore into our consciousness. Is this true? +Does not the loaf of bread that I have converted into my flesh and blood +enter more into my consciousness than the other loaf which I see and +touch, and of which I say: "This is mine"? And must I refuse objective +reality to the bread that I have thus converted into my flesh and blood +and made mine when I only touch it? + +There are some who live by air without knowing it. In the same way, it +may be, we live by God and in God--in God the spirit and consciousness +of society and of the whole Universe, in so far as the Universe is also +a society. + +God is felt only in so far as He is lived; and man does not live by +bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God +(Matt. iv. 4; Deut. viii. 3). + +And this personalization of the all, of the Universe, to which we are +led by love, by pity, is the personalization of a person who embraces +and comprehends within himself the other persons of which he is +composed. + +The only way to give finality to the world is to give it consciousness. +For where there is no consciousness there is no finality, finality +presupposing a purpose. And, as we shall see, faith in God is based +simply upon the vital need of giving finality to existence, of making it +answer to a purpose. We need God, not in order to understand the _why_, +but in order to feel and sustain the ultimate _wherefore_, to give a +meaning to the Universe. + +And neither ought we to be surprised by the affirmation that this +consciousness of the Universe is composed and integrated by the +consciousnesses of the beings which form the Universe, by the +consciousnesses of all the beings that exist, and that nevertheless it +remains a personal consciousness distinct from those which compose it. +Only thus is it possible to understand how in God we live, move, and +have our being. That great visionary, Emanuel Swedenborg, saw or caught +a glimpse of this in his book on Heaven and Hell _(De Coelo et Inferno_, +lii.), when he tells us: "An entire angelic society appears sometimes in +the form of a single angel, which also it hath been granted me by the +Lord to see. When the Lord Himself appears in the midst of the angels, +He doth not appear as encompassed by a multitude, but as a single being +in angelic form. Hence it is that the Lord in the Word is called an +angel, and likewise that on entire society is so called. Michael, +Gabriel, and Raphael are nothing but angelical societies, which are so +named from their functions." + +May we not perhaps live and love--that is, suffer and pity--in this +all-enveloping Supreme Person--we, all the persons who suffer and pity +and all the beings that strive to achieve personality, to acquire +consciousness of their suffering and their limitation? And are we not, +perhaps, ideas of this total Grand Consciousness, which by thinking of +us as existing confers existence upon us? Does not our existence consist +in being perceived and felt by God? And, further on, this same visionary +tells us, under the form of images, that each angel, each society of +angels, and the whole of heaven comprehensively surveyed, appear in +human form, and in virtue of this human form the Lord rules them as one +man. + +"God does not think, He creates; He does not exist, He is eternal," +wrote Kierkegaard (_Afslutende uvidens-kabelige Efterskrift_); but +perhaps it is more exact to say with Mazzini, the mystic of the Italian +city, that "God is great because His thought is action" (_Ai giovani +d'ltalia_), because with Him to think is to create, and He gives +existence to that which exists in His thought by the mere fact of +thinking it, and the impossible is the unthinkable by God. Is it not +written in the Scriptures that God creates with His word--that is to +say, with His thought--and that by this, by His Word, He made everything +that exists? And what God has once made does He ever forget? May it not +be that all the thoughts that have ever passed through the Supreme +Consciousness still subsist therein? In Him, who is eternal, is not all +existence eternalized? + +Our longing to save consciousness, to give personal and human finality +to the Universe and to existence, is such that even in the midst of a +supreme, an agonizing and lacerating sacrifice, we should still hear the +voice that assured us that if our consciousness disappears, it is that +the infinite and eternal Consciousness may be enriched thereby, that our +souls may serve as nutriment to the Universal Soul. Yes, I enrich God, +because before I existed He did not think of me as existing, because I +am one more--one more even though among an infinity of others--who, +having really lived, really suffered, and really loved, abide in His +bosom. It is the furious longing to give finality to the Universe, to +make it conscious and personal, that has brought us to believe in God, +to wish that God may exist, to create God, in a word. To create Him, +yes! This saying ought not to scandalize even the most devout theist. +For to believe in God is, in a certain sense, to create Him, although He +first creates us.[37] It is He who in us is continually creating +Himself. + +We have created God in order to save the Universe from nothingness, for +all that is not consciousness and eternal consciousness, conscious of +its eternity and eternally conscious, is nothing more than appearance. +There is nothing truly real save that which feels, suffers, pities, +loves, and desires, save consciousness; there is nothing substantial but +consciousness. And we need God in order to save consciousness; not in +order to think existence, but in order to live it; not in order to know +the why and how of it, but in order to feel the wherefore of it. Love is +a contradiction if there is no God. + +Let us now consider this idea of God, of the logical God or the Supreme +Reason, and of the vital God or the God of the heart--that is, Supreme +Love. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[36] _Todo lo humaniza, y aun lo humana_. + +[37] In the translation it is impossible to retain the play upon the +verbs _crear_, to create, and _creer_, to believe: _"Porque creer en +Dios es en cierto modo crearle, aunque El nos cree antes."_--J.E.C.F. + + + + +VIII + +FROM GOD TO GOD + + +To affirm that the religious sense is a sense of divinity and that it is +impossible without some abuse of the ordinary usages of human language +to speak of an atheistic religion, is not, I think, to do violence to +the truth; although it is clear that everything will depend upon the +concept that we form of God, a concept which in its turn depends upon +the concept of divinity. + +Our proper procedure, in effect, will be to begin with this sense of +divinity, before prefixing to the concept of this quality the definite +article and the capital letter and so converting it into "the +Divinity"--that is, into God. For man has not deduced the divine from +God, but rather he has reached God through the divine. + +In the course of these somewhat wandering but at the same time urgent +reflections upon the tragic sense of life, I have already alluded to the +_timor fecit deos_ of Statius with the object of limiting and correcting +it. It is not my intention to trace yet once again the historical +processes by which peoples have arrived at the consciousness and concept +of a personal God like the God of Christianity. And I say peoples and +not isolated individuals, for if there is any feeling or concept that is +truly collective and social it is the feeling and concept of God, +although the individual subsequently individualizes it. Philosophy may, +and in fact does, possess an individual origin; theology is necessarily +collective. + +Schleiermacher's theory, which attributes the origin, or rather the +essence, of the religious sense to the immediate and simple feeling of +dependency, appears to be the most profound and exact explanation. +Primitive man, living in society, feels himself to be dependent upon the +mysterious forces invisibly environing him; he feels himself to be in +social communion, not only with beings like himself, his fellow-men, but +with the whole of Nature, animate and inanimate, which simply means, in +other words, that he personalizes everything. Not only does he possess a +consciousness of the world, but he imagines that the world, like +himself, possesses consciousness also. Just as a child talks to his doll +or his dog as if it understood what he was saying, so the savage +believes that his fetich hears him when he speaks to it, and that the +angry storm-cloud is aware of him and deliberately pursues him. For the +newly born mind of the primitive natural man has not yet wholly severed +itself from the cords which still bind it to the womb of Nature, neither +has it clearly marked out the boundary that separates dreaming from +waking, imagination from reality. + +The divine, therefore, was not originally something objective, but was +rather the subjectivity of consciousness projected exteriorly, the +personalization of the world. The concept of divinity arose out of the +feeling of divinity, and the feeling of divinity is simply the dim and +nascent feeling of personality vented upon the outside world. And +strictly speaking it is not possible to speak of outside and inside, +objective and subjective, when no such distinction was actually felt; +indeed it is precisely from this lack of distinction that the feeling +and concept of divinity proceed. The clearer our consciousness of the +distinction between the objective and the subjective, the more obscure +is the feeling of divinity in us. + +It has been said, and very justly so it would appear, that Hellenic +paganism was not so much polytheistic as pantheistic. I do not know that +the belief in a multitude of gods, taking the concept of God in the +sense in which we understand it to-day, has ever really existed in any +human mind. And if by pantheism is understood the doctrine, not that +everything and each individual thing is God--a proposition which I find +unthinkable--but that everything is divine, then it may be said without +any great abuse of language that paganism was pantheistic. Its gods not +only mixed among men but intermixed with them; they begat gods upon +mortal women and upon goddesses mortal men begat demi-gods. And if +demi-gods, that is, demi-men, were believed to exist, it was because the +divine and the human were viewed as different aspects of the same +reality. The divinization of everything was simply its humanization. To +say that the sun was a god was equivalent to saying that it was a man, a +human consciousness, more or less, aggrandized and sublimated. And this +is true of all beliefs from fetichism to Hellenic paganism. + +The real distinction between gods and men consisted in the fact that the +former were immortal. A god came to be identical with an immortal man +and a man was deified, reputed as a god, when it was deemed that at his +death he had not really died. Of certain heroes it was believed that +they were alive in the kingdom of the dead. And this is a point of great +importance in estimating the value of the concept of the divine. + +In those republics of gods there was always some predominating god, some +real monarch. It was through the agency of this divine monarchy that +primitive peoples were led from monocultism to monotheism. Hence +monarchy and monotheism are twin brethren. Zeus, Jupiter, was in process +of being converted into an only god, just as Jahwe originally one god +among many others, came to be converted into an only god, first the god +of the people of Israel, then the god of humanity, and finally the god +of the whole universe. + +Like monarchy, monotheism had a martial origin. "It is only on the march +and in time of war," says Robertson Smith in _The Prophets of +Israel_,[38] "that a nomad people feels any urgent need of a central +authority, and so it came about that in the first beginnings of national +organization, centring in the sanctuary of the ark, Israel was thought +of mainly as the host of Jehovah. The very name of Israel is martial, +and means 'God (_El_) fighteth,' and Jehovah in the Old Testament is +Iahwe Cebaeoth--the Jehovah of the armies of Israel. It was on the +battlefield that Jehovah's presence was most clearly realized; but in +primitive nations the leader in time of war is also the natural judge in +time of peace." + +God, the only God, issued, therefore, from man's sense of divinity as a +warlike, monarchical and social God. He revealed himself to the people +as a whole, not to the individual. He was the God of a people and he +jealously exacted that worship should be rendered to him alone. The +transition from this monocultism to monotheism was effected largely by +the individual action, more philosophical perhaps than theological, of +the prophets. It was, in fact, the individual activity of the prophets +that individualized the divinity. And above all by making the divinity +ethical. + +Subsequently reason--that is, philosophy--took possession of this God +who had arisen in the human consciousness as a consequence of the sense +of divinity in man, and tended to define him and convert him into an +idea. For to define a thing is to idealize it, a process which +necessitates the abstraction from it of its incommensurable or +irrational element, its vital essence. Thus the God of feeling, the +divinity felt as a unique person and consciousness external to us, +although at the same time enveloping and sustaining us, was converted +into the idea of God. + +The logical, rational God, the _ens summum_, the _primum movens_, the +Supreme Being of theological philosophy, the God who is reached by the +three famous ways of negation, eminence and causality, _viae negationis, +eminentiae, causalitatis_, is nothing but an idea of God, a dead thing. +The traditional and much debated proofs of his existence are, at bottom, +merely a vain attempt to determine his essence; for as Vinet has very +well observed, existence is deduced from essence; and to say that God +exists, without saying what God is and how he is, is equivalent to +saying nothing at all. + +And this God, arrived at by the methods of eminence and negation or +abstraction of finite qualities, ends by becoming an unthinkable God, a +pure idea, a God of whom, by the very fact of his ideal excellence, we +can say that he is nothing, as indeed he has been defined by Scotus +Erigena: _Deus propter excellentiam non inmerito nihil vocatur_. Or in +the words of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, in his fifth Epistle, +"The divine darkness is the inaccessible light in which God is said to +dwell." The anthropomorphic God, the God who is felt, in being purified +of human, and as such finite, relative and temporal, attributes, +evaporates into the God of deism or of pantheism. + +The traditional so-called proofs of the existence of God all refer to +this God-Idea, to this logical God, the God by abstraction, and hence +they really prove nothing, or rather, they prove nothing more than the +existence of this idea of God. + +In my early youth, when first I began to be puzzled by these eternal +problems, I read in a book, the author of which I have no wish to +recall,[39] this sentence: "God is the great X placed over the ultimate +barrier of human knowledge; in the measure in which science advances, +the barrier recedes." And I wrote in the margin, "On this side of the +barrier, everything is explained without Him; on the further side, +nothing is explained, either with Him or without Him; God therefore is +superfluous." And so far as concerns the God-Idea, the God of the +proofs, I continue to be of the same opinion. Laplace is said to have +stated that he had not found the hypothesis of God necessary in order to +construct his scheme of the origin of the Universe, and it is very true. +In no way whatever does the idea of God help us to understand better the +existence, the essence and the finality of the Universe. + +That there is a Supreme Being, infinite, absolute and eternal, whose +existence is unknown to us, and who has created the Universe, is not +more conceivable than that the material basis of the Universe itself, +its matter, is eternal and infinite and absolute. We do not understand +the existence of the world one whit the better by telling ourselves that +God created it. It is a begging of the question, or a merely verbal +solution, intended to cover up our ignorance. In strict truth, we deduce +the existence of the Creator from the fact that the thing created +exists, a process which does not justify rationally His existence. You +cannot deduce a necessity from a fact, or else everything were +necessary. + +And if from the nature of the Universe we pass to what is called its +order, which is supposed to necessitate an Ordainer, we may say that +order is what there is, and we do not conceive of any other. This +deduction of God's existence from the order of the Universe implies a +transition from the ideal to the real order, an outward projection of +our mind, a supposition that the rational explanation of a thing +produces the thing itself. Human art, instructed by Nature, possesses a +conscious creative faculty, by means of which it apprehends the process +of creation, and we proceed to transfer this conscious and artistic +creative faculty to the consciousness of an artist-creator, but from +what nature he in his turn learnt his art we cannot tell. + +The traditional analogy of the watch and the watchmaker is inapplicable +to a Being absolute, infinite and eternal. It is, moreover, only another +way of explaining nothing. For to say that the world is as it is and not +otherwise because God made it so, while at the same time we do not know +for what reason He made it so, is to say nothing. And if we knew for +what reason God made it so, then God is superfluous and the reason +itself suffices. If everything were mathematics, if there were no +irrational element, we should not have had recourse to this explanatory +theory of a Supreme Ordainer, who is nothing but the reason of the +irrational, and so merely another cloak for our ignorance. And let us +not discuss here that absurd proposition that, if all the type in a +printing-press were printed at random, the result could not possibly be +the composition of _Don Quixote_. Something would be composed which +would be as good as _Don Quixote_ for those who would have to be content +with it and would grow in it and would form part of it. + +In effect, this traditional supposed proof of God's existence resolves +itself fundamentally into hypostatizing or substantivating the +explanation or reason of a phenomenon; it amounts to saying that +Mechanics is the cause of movement, Biology of life, Philology of +language, Chemistry of bodies, by simply adding the capital letter to +the science and converting it into a force distinct from the phenomena +from which we derive it and distinct from our mind which effects the +derivation. But the God who is the result of this process, a God who is +nothing but reason hypostatized and projected towards the infinite, +cannot possibly be felt as something living and real, nor yet be +conceived of save as a mere idea which will die with us. + +The question arises, on the other hand, whether a thing the idea of +which has been conceived but which has no real existence, does not exist +because God wills that it should not exist, or whether God does not will +it to exist because, in fact, it does not exist; and, with regard to the +impossible, whether a thing is impossible because God wills it so, or +whether God wills it so because, in itself and by the very fact of its +own inherent absurdity, it is impossible. God has to submit to the +logical law of contradiction, and He cannot, according to the +theologians, cause two and two to make either more or less than four. +Either the law of necessity is above Him or He Himself is the law of +necessity. And in the moral order the question arises whether falsehood, +or homicide, or adultery, are wrong because He has so decreed it, or +whether He has so decreed it because they are wrong. If the former, then +God is a capricious and unreasonable God, who decrees one law when He +might equally well have decreed another, or, if the latter, He obeys an +intrinsic nature and essence which exists in things themselves +independently of Him--that is to say, independently of His sovereign +will; and if this is the case, if He obeys the innate reason of things, +this reason, if we could but know it, would suffice us without any +further need of God, and since we do not know it, God explains nothing. +This reason would be above God. Neither is it of any avail to say that +this reason is God Himself, the supreme reason of things. A reason of +this kind, a necessary reason, is not a personal something. It is will +that gives personality. And it is because of this problem of the +relations between God's reason, necessarily necessary, and His will, +necessarily free, that the logical and Aristotelian God will always be a +contradictory God. + +The scholastic theologians never succeeded in disentangling themselves +from the difficulties in which they found themselves involved when they +attempted to reconcile human liberty with divine prescience and with the +knowledge that God possesses of the free and contingent future; and that +is strictly the reason why the rational God is wholly inapplicable to +the contingent, for the notion of contingency is fundamentally the same +as the notion of irrationality. The rational God is necessarily +necessary in His being and in His working; in every single case He +cannot do other than the best, and a number of different things cannot +all equally be the best, for among infinite possibilities there is only +one that is best accommodated to its end, just as among the infinite +number of lines that can be drawn from one point to another, there is +only one straight line. And the rational God, the God of reason, cannot +but follow in each case the straight line, the line that leads most +directly to the end proposed, a necessary end, just as the only straight +line that leads to it is a necessary line. And thus for the divinity of +God is substituted His necessity. And in the necessity of God, His free +will--that is to say, His conscious personality--perishes. The God of +our heart's desire, the God who shall save our soul from nothingness, +must needs be an arbitrary God. + +Not because He thinks can God be God, but because He works, because He +creates; He is not a contemplative but an active God. A God-Reason, a +theoretical or contemplative God, such as is this God of theological +rationalism, is a God that is diluted in His own contemplation. With +this God corresponds, as we shall see, the beatific vision, understood +as the supreme expression of human felicity. A quietist God, in short, +as reason, by its very essence, is quietist. + +There remains the other famous proof of God's existence, that of the +supposed unanimous consent in a belief in Him among all peoples. But +this proof is not strictly rational, neither is it an argument in favour +of the rational God who explains the Universe, but of the God of the +heart, who makes us live. We should be justified in calling it a +rational proof only on the supposition that we believed that reason was +identical with a more or less unanimous agreement among all peoples, +that it corresponded with the verdict of a universal suffrage, only on +the supposition that we held that _vox populi_, which is said to be _vox +Dei_, was actually the voice of reason. + +Such was, indeed, the belief of Lamennais, that tragic and ardent +spirit, who affirmed that life and truth were essentially one and the +same thing--would that they were!--and that reason was one, universal, +everlasting and holy (_Essai sur l'indifference_, partie iv., chap, +viii.). He invoked the _aut omnibus credendum est aut nemini_ of +Lactantius--we must believe all or none--and the saying of Heraclitus +that every individual opinion is fallible, and that of Aristotle that +the strongest proof consists in the general agreement of mankind, and +above all that of Pliny (_Paneg. Trajani_, lxii.), to the effect that +one man cannot deceive all men or be deceived by all--_nemo omnes, +neminem omnes fefellerunt_. Would that it were so! And so he concludes +with the dictum of Cicero (_De natura deorum_, lib. iii., cap. ii., 5 +and 6), that we must believe the tradition of our ancestors even though +they fail to render us a reason--_maioribus autem nostris, etiam nulla +ratione reddita credere_. + +Let us suppose that this belief of the ancients in the divine +interpenetration of the whole of Nature is universal and constant, and +that it is, as Aristotle calls it, an ancestral dogma (_patrios doxa_) +(_Metaphysica_, lib. vii., cap. vii.); this would prove only that there +is a motive impelling peoples and individuals--that is to say, all or +almost all or a majority of them--to believe in a God. But may it not be +that there are illusions and fallacies rooted in human nature itself? Do +not all peoples begin by believing that the sun turns round the earth? +And do we not all naturally incline to believe that which satisfies our +desires? Shall we say with Hermann[40] that, "if there is a God, He has +not left us without some indication of Himself, and if is His will that +we should find Him." + +A pious desire, no doubt, but we cannot strictly call it a reason, +unless we apply to it the Augustinian sentence, but which again is not +a reason, "Since thou seekest Me, it must be that thou hast found Me," +believing that God is the cause of our seeking Him. + +This famous argument from the supposed unanimity of mankind's belief in +God, the argument which with a sure instinct was seized upon by the +ancients, is in its essence identical with the so-called moral proof +which Kant employed in his _Critique of Practical Reason_, transposing +its application from mankind collectively to the individual, the proof +which he derives from our conscience, or rather from our feeling of +divinity. It is not a proof strictly or specifically rational, but +vital; it cannot be applied to the logical God, the _ens summum_, the +essentially simple and abstract Being, the immobile and impassible prime +mover, the God-Reason, in a word, but to the biotic God, to the Being +essentially complex and concrete, to the suffering God who suffers and +desires in us and with us, to the Father of Christ who is only to be +approached through Man, through His Son (John xiv. 6), and whose +revelation is historical, or if you like, anecdotical, but not +philosophical or categorical. + +The unanimous consent of mankind (let us suppose the unanimity) or, in +other words, this universal longing of all human souls who have arrived +at the consciousness of their humanity, which desires to be the end and +meaning of the Universe, this longing, which is nothing but that very +essence of the soul which consists in its effort to persist eternally +and without a break in the continuity of consciousness, leads us to the +human, anthropomorphic God, the projection of our consciousness to the +Consciousness of the Universe; it leads us to the God who confers human +meaning and finality upon the Universe and who is not the _ens summum_, +the _primum movens_, nor the Creator of the Universe, nor merely the +Idea-God. It leads us to the living, subjective God, for He is simply +subjectivity objectified or personality universalized--He is more than a +mere idea, and He is will rather than reason. God is Love--that is, +Will. Reason, the Word, derives from Him, but He, the Father, is, above +all, Will. + +"There can be no doubt whatever," Ritschl says (_Rechtfertigung und +Versoehnung_, iii., chap. v.), "that a very imperfect view was taken of +God's spiritual personality in the older theology, when the functions of +knowing and willing alone were employed to illustrate it. Religious +thought plainly ascribes to God affections of feeling as well. The older +theology, however, laboured under the impression that feeling and +emotion were characteristic only of limited and created personality; it +transformed, _e.g._, the religious idea of the Divine blessedness into +eternal self-knowledge, and that of the Divine wrath into a fixed +purpose to punish sin." Yes, this logical God, arrived at by the _via +negationis_, was a God who, strictly speaking, neither loved nor hated, +because He neither enjoyed nor suffered, an inhuman God, and His justice +was a rational or mathematical justice--that is, an injustice. + +The attributes of the living God, of the Father of Christ, must be +deduced from His historical revelation in the Gospel and in the +conscience of every Christian believer, and not from metaphysical +reasonings which lead only to the Nothing-God of Scotus Erigena, to the +rational or pantheistic God, to the atheist God--in short, to the +de-personalized Divinity. + +Not by the way of reason, but only by the way of love and of suffering, +do we come to the living God, the human God. Reason rather separates us +from Him. We cannot first know Him in order that afterwards we may love +Him; we must begin by loving Him, longing for Him, hungering after Him, +before knowing Him. The knowledge of God proceeds from the love of God, +and this knowledge has little or nothing of the rational in it. For God +is indefinable. To seek to define Him is to seek to confine Him within +the limits of our mind--that is to say, to kill Him. In so far as we +attempt to define Him, there rises up before us--Nothingness. + +The idea of God, formulated by a theodicy that claims to be rational, is +simply an hypothesis, like the hypotheses of ether, for example. + +Ether is, in effect, a merely hypothetical entity, valuable only in so +far as it explains that which by means of it we endeavour to +explain--light, electricity or universal gravitation--and only in so far +as these facts cannot be explained in any other way. In like manner the +idea of God is also an hypothesis, valuable only in so far as it enables +us to explain that which by means of if we endeavour to explain--the +essence and existence of the Universe--and only so long as these cannot +be explained in any other way. And since in reality we explain the +Universe neither better nor worse with this idea than without it, the +idea of God, the supreme _petitio principii_, is valueless. + +But if ether is nothing but an hypothesis explanatory of light, air, on +the other hand, is a thing that is directly felt; and even though it did +not enable us to explain the phenomenon of sound, we should nevertheless +always be directly aware of it, and, above all, of the lack of it in +moments of suffocation or air-hunger. And in the same way God Himself, +not the idea of God, may become a reality that is immediately felt; and +even though the idea of Him does not enable us to explain either the +existence or the essence of the Universe, we have at times the direct +feeling of God, above all in moments of spiritual suffocation. And this +feeling--mark it well, for all that is tragic in it and the whole tragic +sense of life is founded upon this--this feeling is a feeling of hunger +for God, of the lack of God. To believe in God is, in the first +instance, as we shall see, to wish that there may be a God, to be unable +to live without Him. + +So long as I pilgrimaged through the fields of reason in search of God, +I could not find Him, for I was not deluded by the idea of God, neither +could I take an idea for God, and it was then, as I wandered among the +wastes of rationalism, that I told myself that we ought to seek no other +consolation than the truth, meaning thereby reason, and yet for all that +I was not comforted. But as I sank deeper and deeper into rational +scepticism on the one hand and into heart's despair on the other, the +hunger for God awoke within me, and the suffocation of spirit made me +feel the want of God, and with the want of Him, His reality. And I +wished that there might be a God, that God might exist. And God does not +exist, but rather super-exists, and He is sustaining our existence, +existing us _(existiendonos)_. + +God, who is Love, the Father of Love, is the son of love in us. There +are men of a facile and external habit of mind, slaves of reason, that +reason which externalizes us, who think it a shrewd comment to say that +so far from God having made man in His image and likeness, it is rather +man who has made his gods or his God in his own image and likeness,[41] +and so superficial are they that they do not pause to consider that if +the second of these propositions be true, as in fact it is, it is owing +to the fact that the first is not less true. God and man, in effect, +mutually create one another; God creates or reveals Himself in man and +man creates himself in God. God is His own maker, _Deus ipse se facit_, +said Lactantius (_Divinarum Institutionum_, ii., 8), and we may say that +He is making Himself continually both in man and by man. And if each of +us, impelled by his love, by his hunger for divinity, creates for +himself an image of God according to his own desire, and if according to +His desire God creates Himself for each of us, then there is a +collective, social, human God, the resultant of all the human +imaginations that imagine Him. For God is and reveals Himself in +collectivity. And God is the richest and most personal of human +conceptions. + +The Master of divinity has bidden us be perfect as our Father who is in +heaven is perfect (Matt. v. 48), and in the sphere of thought and +feeling our perfection consists in the zeal with which we endeavour to +equate our imagination with the total imagination of the humanity of +which in God we form a part. + +The logical theory of the opposition between the extension and the +comprehension of a concept, the one increasing in the ratio in which the +other diminishes, is well known. The concept that is most extensive and +at the same time least comprehensive is that of being or of thing, which +embraces everything that exists and possesses no other distinguishing +quality than that of being; while the concept that is most comprehensive +and least extensive is that of the Universe, which is only applicable to +itself and comprehends all existing qualities. And the logical or +rational God, the God obtained by way of negation, the absolute entity, +merges, like reality itself, into nothingness; for, as Hegel pointed +out, pure being and pure nothingness are identical. And the God of the +heart, the God who is felt, the God of living men, is the Universe +itself conceived as personality, is the consciousness of the Universe. A +God universal and personal, altogether different from the individual God +of a rigid metaphysical monotheism. + +I must advert here once again to my view of the opposition that exists +between individuality and personality, notwithstanding the fact that the +one demands the other. Individuality is, if I may so express it, the +continent or thing which contains, personality the content or thing +contained, or I might say that my personality is in a certain sense my +comprehension, that which I comprehend or embrace within myself--which +is in a certain way the whole Universe--and that my individuality is my +extension; the one my infinite, the other my finite. A hundred jars of +hard earthenware are strongly individualized, but it is possible for +them to be all equally empty or all equally full of the same homogeneous +liquid, whereas two bladders of so delicate a membrane as to admit of +the action of osmosis and exosmosis may be strongly differentiated and +contain liquids of a very mixed composition. And thus a man, in so far +as he is an individual, may be very sharply detached from others, a sort +of spiritual crustacean, and yet be very poor in differentiating +content. And further, it is true on the other hand that the more +personality a man has and the greater his interior richness and the more +he is a society within himself, the less brusquely he is divided from +his fellows. In the same way the rigid God of deism, of Aristotelian +monotheism, the _ens summum_, is a being in whom individuality, or +rather simplicity, stifles personality. Definition kills him, for to +define is to impose boundaries, it is to limit, and it is impossible to +define the absolutely indefinable. This God lacks interior richness; he +is not a society in himself. And this the vital revelation obviated by +the belief in the Trinity, which makes God a society and even a family +in himself and no longer a pure individual. The God of faith is +personal; He is a person because He includes three persons, for +personality is not sensible of itself in isolation. An isolated person +ceases to be a person, for whom should he love? And if he does not love, +he is not a person. Nor can a simple being love himself without his love +expanding him into a compound being. + +It was because God was felt as a Father that the belief in the Trinity +arose. For a God-Father cannot be a single, that is, a solitary, God. A +father is always the father of a family. And the fact that God was felt +as a father acted as a continual incentive to conceive Him not merely +anthropomorphically--that is to say, as a man, _anthropos_--but +andromorphically, as a male, _aner_. In the popular Christian +imagination, in effect, God the Father is conceived of as a male. And +the reason is that man, _homo_, _anthropos_, as we know him, is +necessarily either a male, _vir_, _aner_, or a female, _mulier_, _gyne_. And +to these may be added the child, who is neuter. And hence in order to +satisfy imaginatively this necessity of feeling God as a perfect +man--that is, as a family--arose the cult of the God-Mother, the Virgin +Mary, and the cult of the Child Jesus. + +The cult of the Virgin, Mariolatry, which, by the gradual elevation of +the divine element in the Virgin has led almost to her deification, +answers merely to the demand of the feeling that God should be a perfect +man, that God should include in His nature the feminine element. The +progressive exaltation of the Virgin Mary, the work of Catholic piety, +having its beginning in the expression Mother of God, _theotokos_, +_deipara_, has culminated in attributing to her the status of +co-redeemer and in the dogmatic declaration of her conception without +the stain of original sin. Hence she now occupies a position between +Humanity and Divinity and nearer Divinity than Humanity. And it has been +surmised that in course of time she may perhaps even come to be regarded +as yet another personal manifestation of the Godhead. + +And yet this might not necessarily involve the conversion of the Trinity +into a Quaternity. If _pneuma_, in Greek, spirit, instead of being neuter +had been feminine, who can say that the Virgin Mary might not already +have become an incarnation or humanization of the Holy Spirit? That +fervent piety which always knows how to mould theological speculation in +accordance with its own desires would have found sufficient warranty for +such a doctrine in the text of the Gospel, in Luke's narrative of the +Annunciation where the angel Gabriel hails Mary with the words, "The +Holy Spirit shall come upon thee," _pneuma agion epeleusetai epi se_ (Luke +i. 35). And thus a dogmatic evolution would have been effected parallel +to that of the divinization of Jesus, the Son, and his identification +with the Word. + +In any case the cult of the Virgin, of the eternal feminine, or rather +of the divine feminine, of the divine maternity, helps to complete the +personalization of God by constituting Him a family. + +In one of my books (_Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho_, part ii., chap. +lxvii.) I have said that "God was and is, in our mind, masculine. In His +mode of judging and condemning men, He acts as a male, not as a human +person above the limitation of sex; He acts as a father. And to +counterbalance this, the Mother element was required, the Mother who +always forgives, the Mother whose arms are always open to the child when +he flies from the frowning brow or uplifted hand of the angry father; +the Mother in whose bosom we seek the dim, comforting memory of that +warmth and peace of our pre-natal unconsciousness, of that milky +sweetness that soothed our dreams of innocence; the Mother who knows no +justice but that of forgiveness, no law but that of love. Our weak and +imperfect conception of God as a God with a long beard and a voice of +thunder, of a God who promulgates laws and pronounces dooms, of a God +who is the Master of a household, a Roman Paterfamilias, required +counterpoise and complement, and since fundamentally we are unable to +conceive of the personal and living God as exalted above human and even +masculine characteristics, and still less as a neutral or hermaphrodite +God, we have recourse to providing Him with a feminine God, and by the +side of the God-Father we have placed the Goddess-Mother, she who always +forgives, because, since she sees with love-blind eyes, she sees always +the hidden cause of the fault and in that hidden cause the only justice +of forgiveness ..." + +And to this I must now add that not only are we unable to conceive of +the full and living God as masculine simply, but we are unable to +conceive of Him as individual simply, as the projection of a solitary I, +an unsocial I, an I that is in reality an abstract I. My living I is an +I that is really a We; my living personal I lives only in other, of +other, and by other I's; I am sprung, from a multitude of ancestors, I +carry them within me in extract, and at the same time I carry within me, +potentially, a multitude of descendants, and God, the projection of my I +to the infinite--or rather I, the projection of God to the finite--must +also be multitude. Hence, in order to save the personality of God--that +is to say, in order to save the living God--faith's need--the need of +the feeling and the imagination--of conceiving Him and; feeling Him as +possessed of a certain internal multiplicity. + +This need the pagan feeling of a living divinity obviated by polytheism. +It is the agglomeration of its gods, the republic of them, that really +constitutes its Divinity. The real God of Hellenic paganism is not so +much Father Zeus (_Jupiter_) as the whole society of gods and demi-gods. +Hence the solemnity of the invocation of Demosthenes when he invoked all +the gods and all the goddesses: _tois theohis euchomai pasi kahi pasais_. +And when the rationalizers converted the term god, _theos_, which is +properly an adjective, a quality predicated of each one of the gods, +into a substantive, and added the definite article to it, they produced +_the_ god, _o theos_, the dead and abstract god of philosophical +rationalism, a substantivized quality and therefore void of personality. +For the masculine concrete god (_el_ dios) is nothing but the neuter +abstract divine quality (_lo_ divino). Now the transition from feeling +the divinity in all things to substantivating it and converting the +Divinity into God, cannot be achieved without feeling undergoing a +certain risk. And the Aristotelian God, the God of the logical proofs, +is nothing more than the Divinity, a concept and not a living person who +can be felt and with whom through love man can communicate. This God is +merely a substantivized adjective; He is a constitutional God who +reigns but does not govern, and Knowledge is His constitutional charter. + +And even in Greco-Latin paganism itself the tendency towards a living +monotheism is apparent in the fact that Zeus was conceived of and felt +as a father, _Zeus pater_, as Homer calls him, the _Ju-piter_ or +_Ju-pater_ of the Latins, and as a father of a whole widely extended +family of gods and goddesses who together with him constituted the +Divinity. + +The conjunction of pagan polytheism with Judaic monotheism, which had +endeavoured by other means to save the personality of God, gave birth to +the feeling of the Catholic God, a God who is a society, as the pagan +God of whom I have spoken was a society, and who at the same time is +one, as the God of Israel finally became one. Such is the Christian +Trinity, whose deepest sense rationalistic deism has scarcely ever +succeeded in understanding, that deism, which though more or less +impregnated with Christianity, always remains Unitarian or Socinian. + +And the truth is that we feel God less as a superhuman consciousness +than as the actual consciousness of the whole human race, past, present, +and future, as the collective consciousness of the whole race, and still +more, as the total and infinite consciousness which embraces and +sustains all consciousnesses, infra-human, human, and perhaps, +super-human. The divinity that there is in everything, from the +lowest--that is to say, from the least conscious--of living forms, to +the highest, including our own human consciousness, this divinity we +feel to be personalized, conscious of itself, in God. And this gradation +of consciousnesses, this sense of the gulf between the human and the +fully divine, the universal, consciousness, finds its counterpart in the +belief in angels with their different hierarchies, as intermediaries +between our human consciousness and that of God. And these gradations a +faith consistent with itself must believe to be infinite, for only by an +infinite number of degrees is it possible to pass from the finite to the +infinite. + +Deistic rationalism conceives God as the Reason of the Universe, but its +logic compels it to conceive Him as an impersonal reason--that is to +say, as an idea--while deistic vitalism feels and imagines God as +Consciousness, and therefore as a person or rather as a society of +persons. The consciousness of each one of us, in effect, is a society of +persons; in me there are various I's and even the I's of those among +whom I live, live in me. + +The God of deistic rationalism, in effect, the God of the logical proofs +of His existence, the _ens realissimum_ and the immobile prime mover, is +nothing more than a Supreme Reason, but in the same sense in which we +can call the law of universal gravitation the reason of the falling of +bodies, this law being merely the explanation of the phenomenon. But +will anyone say that that which we call the law of universal +gravitation, or any other law or mathematical principle, is a true and +independent reality, that it is an angel, that it is something which +possesses consciousness of itself and others, that it is a person? No, +it is nothing but an idea without any reality outside of the mind of him +who conceives it. And similarly this God-Reason either possesses +consciousness of himself or he possesses no reality outside the mind +that conceives him. And if he possesses consciousness of himself, he +becomes a personal reason, and then all the value of the traditional +proofs disappears, for these proofs only proved a reason, but not a +supreme consciousness. Mathematics prove an order, a constancy, a reason +in the series of mechanical phenomena, but they 'do not prove that this +reason is conscious of itself. This reason is a logical necessity, but +the logical necessity does not prove the teleological or finalist +necessity. And where there is no finality there is no personality, there +is no consciousness. + +The rational God, therefore--that is to say, the God who is simply the +Reason of the Universe and nothing more--consummates his own +destruction, is destroyed in our mind in so far as he is such a God, and +is only born again in us when we feel him in our heart as a living +person, as Consciousness, and no longer merely as the impersonal and +objective Reason of the Universe. If we wish for a rational explanation +of the construction of a machine, all that we require to know is the +mechanical science of its constructor; but if we would have a reason for +the existence of such a machine, then, since it is the work not of +Nature but of man, we must suppose a conscious, constructive being. But +the second part of this reasoning is not applicable to God, even though +it be said that in Him the mechanical science and the mechanician, by +means of which the machine was constructed, are one and the same thing. +From the rational point of view this identification is merely a begging +of the question. And thus it is that reason destroys this Supreme +Reason, in so far as the latter is a person. + +The human reason, in effect, is a reason that is based upon the +irrational, upon the total vital consciousness, upon will and feeling; +our human reason is not a reason that can prove to us the existence of a +Supreme Reason, which in its turn would have to be based upon the +Supreme Irrational, upon the Universal Consciousness. And the revelation +of this Supreme Consciousness in our feeling and imagination, by love, +by faith, by the process of personalization, is that which leads us to +believe in the living God. + +And this God, the living God, your God, our God, is in me, is in you, +lives in us, and we live and move and have our being in Him. And He is +in us by virtue of the hunger, the longing, which we have for Him, He is +Himself creating the longing for Himself. And He is the God of the +humble, for in the words of the Apostle, God chose the foolish things of +the world to confound the wise, and the weak things of the world to +confound the things which are mighty (i Cor. i. 27). And God is in each +one of us in the measure in which each one feels Him and loves Him. "If +of two men," says Kierkegaard, "one prays to the true God without +sincerity of heart, and the other prays to an idol with all the passion +of an infinite yearning, it is the first who really prays to an idol, +while the second really prays to God." It would be better to say that +the true God is He to whom man truly prays and whom man truly desires. +And there may even be a truer revelation in superstition itself than in +theology. The venerable Father of the long beard and white locks who +appears among the clouds carrying the globe of the world in his hand is +more living and more real than the _ens realissimum_ of theodicy. + +Reason is an analytical, that is, a dissolving force, whenever it +transfers its activity from the form of intuitions, whether those of the +individual instinct of preservation or those of the social instinct of +perpetuation, and applies it to the essence and matter of them. Reason +orders the sensible perceptions which give us the material world; but +when its analysis is exercised upon the reality of the perceptions +themselves, it dissolves them and plunges us into a world of +appearances, a world of shadows without consistency, for outside the +domain of the formal, reason is nihilist and annihilating. And it +performs the same terrible office when we withdraw it from its proper +domain and apply it to the scrutiny of the imaginative intuitions which +give us the spiritual world. For reason annihilates and imagination +completes, integrates or totalizes; reason by itself alone kills, and it +is imagination that gives life. If it is true that imagination by itself +alone, in giving us life without limit, leads us to lose our identity in +the All and also kills us as individuals, it kills us by excess of life. +Reason, the head, speaks to us the word Nothing! imagination, the heart, +the word All! and between all and nothing, by the fusion of the all and +the nothing within us, we live in God, who is All, and God lives in us +who, without Him, are nothing. Reason reiterates, Vanity of vanities! +all is vanity! And imagination answers, Plenitude of plenitudes! all is +plenitude! And thus we live the vanity of plenitude or the plenitude of +vanity. + +And so deeply rooted in the depths of man's being is this vital need of +living a world[42] illogical, irrational, personal or divine, that those +who do not believe in God, or believe that they do not believe in Him, +believe nevertheless in some little pocket god or even devil of their +own, or in an omen, or in a horseshoe picked up by chance on the +roadside and carried about with them to bring them good luck and defend +them from that very reason whose loyal and devoted henchmen they imagine +themselves to be. + +The God whom we hunger after is the God to whom we pray, the God of the +_Pater Noster_, of the Lord's Prayer; the God whom we beseech, before +all and above all, and whether we are aware of it or not, to instil +faith into us, to make us believe in Him, to make Himself in us, the God +to whom we pray that His name may be hallowed and that His will may be +done--His will, not His reason--on earth as it is in heaven; but feeling +that His will cannot be other than the essence of our will, the desire +to persist eternally. + +And such a God is the God of love--_how_ He is it profits us not to ask, +but rather let each consult his own heart and give his imagination leave +to picture Him in the remoteness of the Universe, gazing down upon him +with those myriad eyes of His that shine in the night-darkened heavens. +He in whom you believe, reader, He is your God, He who has lived with +you and within you, who was born with you, who was a child when you were +a child, who became a man according as you became a man, who will vanish +when you yourself vanish, and who is your principle of continuity in +the spiritual life, for He is the principle of solidarity among all men +and in each man and between men and the Universe, and He is, as you are, +a person. And if you believe in God, God believes in you, and believing +in you He creates you continually. For in your essence you are nothing +but the idea that God possesses of you--but a living idea, because the +idea of a God who is living and conscious of Himself, of a +God-Consciousness, and apart from what you are in the society of God you +are nothing. + +How to define God? Yes, that is our longing. That was the longing of the +man Jacob, when, after wrestling all the night until the breaking of the +day with that divine visitant, he cried, "Tell me, I pray thee, thy +name!" (Gen. xxxii. 29). Listen to the words of that great Christian +preacher, Frederick William Robertson, in a sermon preached in Trinity +Chapel, Brighton, on the 10th of June, 1849: "And this is our +struggle--_the_ struggle. Let any true man go down into the deeps of his +own being, and answer us--what is the cry that comes from the most real +part of his nature? Is it the cry for daily bread? Jacob asked for that +in his _first_ communing with God--preservation, safety. Is it even +this--to be forgiven our sins? Jacob had a sin to be forgiven, and in +that most solemn moment of his existence he did not say a syllable about +it. Or is it this--'Hallowed be Thy name'? No, my brethren. Out of our +frail and yet sublime humanity, the demand that rises in the earthlier +hours of our religion may be this--'Save my soul'; but in the most +unearthly moments it is this--'Tell me thy name.' We move through a +world of mystery; and the deepest question is, What is the being that is +ever near, sometimes felt, never seen; that which has haunted us from +childhood with a dream of something surpassingly fair, which has never +yet been realized; that which sweeps through the soul at times as a +desolation, like the blast from the wings of the Angel of Death, +leaving us stricken and silent in our loneliness; that which has +touched us in our tenderest point, and the flesh has quivered with +agony, and our mortal affections have shrivelled up with pain; that +which comes to us in aspirations of nobleness and conceptions of +superhuman excellence? Shall we say It or He? What is It? Who is He? +Those anticipations of Immortality and God--what are they? Are they the +mere throbbings of my own heart, heard and mistaken for a living +something beside me? Are they the sound of my own wishes, echoing +through the vast void of Nothingness? or shall I call them God, Father, +Spirit, Love? A living Being within me or outside me? Tell me Thy name, +thou awful mystery of Loveliness! This is the struggle of all earnest +life."[43] + +Thus Robertson. To which I must add this comment, that Tell me thy name +is essentially the same as Save my soul! We ask Him His name in order +that He may save our soul, that He may save the human soul, that He may +save the human finality of the Universe. And if they tell us that He is +called He, that He is the _ens realissimum_ or the Supreme Being or any +other metaphysical name, we are not contented, for we know that every +metaphysical name is an X, and we go on asking Him His name. And there +is only one name that satisfies our longing, and that is the name +Saviour, Jesus. God is the love that saves. As Browning said in his +_Christmas Eve and Easter Day_, + + For the loving worm within its clod, + Were diviner than a loveless God + Amid his worlds, I will dare to say. + +The essence of the divine is Love, Will that personalizes and +eternalizes, that feels the hunger for eternity and infinity. + +It is ourselves, it is our eternity that we seek in God, it is our +divinization. It was Browning again who said, in _Saul_, + + 'Tis the weakness in strength that I cry for! my flesh that I seek + In the Godhead! + +But this God who saves us, this personal God, the Consciousness of the +Universe who envelops and sustains our consciousnesses, this God who +gives human finality to the whole creation--does He exist? Have we +proofs of His existence? + +This question leads in the first place to an enquiry into the cleaning +of this notion of existence. What is it to exist and in what sense do we +speak of things as not existing? + +In its etymological signification to exist is to be outside of +ourselves, outside of our mind: _ex-sistere_. But is there anything +outside of our mind, outside of our consciousness which embraces the sum +of the known? Undoubtedly there is. The matter of knowledge comes to us +from without. And what is the mode of this matter? It is impossible for +us to know, for to know is to clothe matter with form, and hence we +cannot know the formless as formless. To do so would be tantamount to +investing chaos with order. + +This problem of the existence of God, a problem that is rationally +insoluble, is really identical with the problem of consciousness, of the +_ex-sistentia_ and not of the _in-sistentia_ of consciousness, it is +none other than the problem of the substantial existence of the soul, +the problem of the perpetuity of the human soul, the problem of the +human finality of the Universe itself. To believe in a living and +personal God, in an eternal and universal consciousness that knows and +loves us, is to believe that the Universe exists _for_ man. For man, or +for a consciousness of the same order as the human consciousness, of the +same nature, although sublimated, a consciousness that is capable of +knowing us, in the depth of whose being our memory may live for ever. +Perhaps, as I have said before, by a supreme and desperate effort of +resignation we might succeed in making the sacrifice of our personality +provided that we knew that at our death it would go to enrich a Supreme +Personality; provided that we knew that the Universal Soul was nourished +by our souls and had need of them. We might perhaps meet death with a +desperate resignation or with a resigned despair, delivering up our soul +to the soul of humanity, bequeathing to it our work, the work that bears +the impress of our person, if it were certain that this humanity were +destined to bequeath its soul in its turn to another soul, when at long +last consciousness shall have become extinct upon this desire-tormented +Earth. But is it certain? + +And if the soul of humanity is eternal, if the human collective +consciousness is eternal, if there is a Consciousness of the Universe, +and if this Consciousness is eternal, why must our own individual +consciousness--yours, reader, mine--be not eternal? + +In the vast all of the Universe, must there be this unique anomaly--a +consciousness that knows itself, loves itself and feels itself, joined +to an organism which can only live within such and such degrees of heat, +a merely transitory phenomenon? No, it is not mere curiosity that +inspires the wish to know whether or not the stars are inhabited by +living organisms, by consciousnesses akin to our own, and a profound +longing enters into that dream that our souls shall pass from star to +star through the vast spaces of the heavens, in an infinite series of +transmigrations. The feeling of the divine makes us wish and believe +that everything is animated, that consciousness, in a greater or less +degree, extends through everything. We wish not only to save ourselves, +but to save the world from nothingness. And therefore God. Such is His +finality as we feel it. + +What would a universe be without any consciousness capable of reflecting +it and knowing it? What would objectified reason be without will and +feeling? For us it would be equivalent to nothing--a thousand times more +dreadful than nothing. + +If such a supposition is reality, our life is deprived of sense and +value. + +It is not, therefore, rational necessity, but vital anguish that impels +us to believe in God. And to believe in God--I must reiterate it yet +again--is, before all and above all, to feel a hunger for God, a hunger +for divinity, to be sensible of His lack and absence, to wish that God +may exist. And it is to wish to save the human finality of the Universe. +For one might even come to resign oneself to being absorbed by God, if +it be that our consciousness is based upon a Consciousness, if +consciousness is the end of the Universe. + +"The wicked man hath said in his heart, There is no God." And this is +truth. For in his head the righteous man may say to himself, God does +not exist! But only the wicked can say it in his heart. Not to believe +that there is a God or to believe that there is not a God, is one thing; +to resign oneself to there not being a God is another thing, and it is a +terrible and inhuman thing; but not to wish that there be a God exceeds +every other moral monstrosity; although, as a matter of fact, those who +deny God deny Him because of their despair at not finding Him. + +And now reason once again confronts us with the Sphinx-like +question--the Sphinx, in effect, is reason--Does God exist? This eternal +and eternalizing person who gives meaning--and I will add, a human +meaning, for there is none other--to the Universe, is it a substantial +something, existing independently of our consciousness, independently of +our desire? Here we arrive at the insoluble, and it is best that it +should be so. Let it suffice for reason that it cannot prove the +impossibility of His existence. + +To believe in God is to long for His existence and, further, it is to +act as if He existed; it is to live by this longing and to make it the +inner spring of our action. This longing or hunger for divinity begets +hope, hope begets faith, and faith and hope beget charity. Of this +divine longing is born our sense of beauty, of finality, of goodness. + +Let us see how this may be. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[38] Lecture I., p. 36. London, 1895, Black. + +[39] _No quiero acordarme_, a phrase that is always associated in +Spanish literature with the opening sentence of _Don Quijote: En an +lugar de la Mancha de cuyo nombre no quiero acordarme_.--J.E.C.F. + +[40] W. Hermann, _Christlich systematische Dogmatik_, in the volume +entitled _Systematische christliche Religion. Die Kultur der Gegenwart_ +series, published by P. Hinneberg. + +[41] _Dieu a fait l'homme a son image, mais l'homme le lui a bien +rendu_, Voltaire.--J.E.C.F. + +[42] _Vivir un mundo_. + +[43] _Sermons_, by the Rev. Frederick W. Robertson. First series, sermon +iii., "Jacob's Wrestling." Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebuer and Co., London, +1898. + + + + +IX + +FAITH, HOPE, AND CHARITY + +Sanctius ac reverentius visum de actis deorum credere quam +scire.--TACITUS: _Germania_, 34. + + +The road that leads us to the living God, the God of the heart, and that +leads us back to Him when we have left Him for the lifeless God of +logic, is the road of faith, not of rational or mathematical conviction. + +And what is faith? + +This is the question propounded in the Catechism of Christian Doctrine +that was taught us at school, and the answer runs: Faith is believing +what we have not seen. + +This, in an essay written some twelve years ago, I amended as follows: +"Believing what we have not seen, no! but creating what we do not see." +And I have already told you that believing in God is, in the first +instance at least, wishing that God may be, longing for the existence of +God. + +The theological virtue of faith, according to the Apostle Paul, whose +definition serves as the basis of the traditional Christian +disquisitions upon it, is "the substance of things hoped for, the +evidence of things not seen," _elpizomevon hupostasis, pragmaton +elegchos ou blepomenon_ (Heb. xi. 1). + +The substance, or rather the support and basis, of hope, the guarantee +of it. That which connects, or, rather than connects, subordinates, +faith to hope. And in fact we do not hope because we believe, but rather +we believe because we hope. It is hope in God, it is the ardent longing +that there may be a God who guarantees the eternity of consciousness, +that leads us to believe in Him. + +But faith, which after all is something compound, comprising a +cognitive, logical, or rational element together with an affective, +biotic, sentimental, and strictly irrational element, is presented to us +under the form of knowledge. And hence the insuperable difficulty of +separating it from some dogma or other. Pure faith, free from dogmas, +about which I wrote a great deal years ago, is a phantasm. Neither is +the difficulty overcome by inventing the theory of faith in faith +itself. Faith needs a matter to work upon. + +Believing is a form of knowing, even if it be no more than a knowing and +even a formulating of our vital longing. In ordinary language the term +"believing," however, is used in a double and even a contradictory +sense. It may express, on the one hand, the highest degree of the mind's +conviction of the truth of a thing, and, on the other hand, it may imply +merely a weak and hesitating persuasion of its truth. For if in one +sense believing expresses the firmest kind of assent we are capable of +giving, the expression "I believe that it is so, although I am not sure +of it," is nevertheless common in ordinary speech. + +And this agrees with what we have said above with respect to uncertainty +as the basis of faith. The most robust faith, in so far as it is +distinguished from all other knowledge that is not _pistic_ or of +faith--faithful, as we might say--is based on uncertainty. And this is +because faith, the guarantee of things hoped for, is not so much +rational adhesion to a theoretical principle as trust in a person who +assures us of something. Faith supposes an objective, personal element. +We do not so much believe something as believe someone who promises us +or assures us of this or the other thing. We believe in a person and in +God in so far as He is a person and a personalization of the Universe. + +This personal or religious element in faith is evident. Faith, it is +said, is in itself neither theoretical knowledge nor rational adhesion +to a truth, nor yet is its essence sufficiently explained by defining it +as trust in God. Seeberg says of faith that it is "the inward submission +to the spiritual authority of God, immediate obedience. And in so far as +this obedience is the means of attaining a rational principle, faith is +a personal conviction."[44] + +The faith which St. Paul defined, _pistis_ in Greek, is better +translated as trust, confidence. The word _pistis_ is derived from the +verb _peitho_, which in its active voice means to persuade and in its +middle voice to trust in someone, to esteem him as worthy of trust, to +place confidence in him, to obey. And _fidare se_, to trust, is derived +from the root _fid_--whence _fides_, faith, and also confidence. The +Greek root _pith_ and the Latin _fid_ are twin brothers. In the root of +the word "faith" itself, therefore, there is implicit the idea of +confidence, of surrender to the will of another, to a person. Confidence +is placed only in persons. We trust in Providence, which we conceive as +something personal and conscious, not in Fate, which is something +impersonal. And thus it is in the person who tells us the truth, in the +person who gives us hope, that we believe, not directly and immediately +in truth itself or in hope itself. + +And this personal or rather personifying element in faith extends even +to the lowest forms of it, for it is this that produces faith in +pseudo-revelation, in inspiration, in miracle. There is a story of a +Parisian doctor, who, when he found that a quack-healer was drawing away +his clientele, removed to a quarter of the city as distant as possible +from his former abode, where he was totally unknown, and here he gave +himself out as a quack-healer and conducted himself as such. When he was +denounced as an illegal practitioner he produced his doctor's +certificate, and explained his action more or less as follows: "I am +indeed a doctor, but if I had announced myself as such I should not +have had as large a clientele as I have as a quack-healer. Now that all +my clients know that I have studied medicine, however, and that I am a +properly qualified medical man, they will desert me in favour of some +quack who can assure them that he has never studied, but cures simply by +inspiration." And true it is that a doctor is discredited when it is +proved that he has never studied medicine and possesses no qualifying +certificate, and that a quack is discredited when it is proved that he +has studied and is a qualified practitioner. For some believe in science +and in study, while others believe in the person, in inspiration, and +even in ignorance. + +"There is one distinction in the world's geography which comes +immediately to our minds when we thus state the different thoughts and +desires of men concerning their religion. We remember how the whole +world is in general divided into two hemispheres upon this matter. One +half of the world--the great dim East--is mystic. It insists upon not +seeing anything too clearly. Make any one of the great ideas of life +distinct and clear, and immediately it seems to the Oriental to be +untrue. He has an instinct which tells him that the vastest thoughts are +too vast for the human mind, and that if they are made to present +themselves in forms of statement which the human mind can comprehend, +their nature is violated and their strength is lost. + +"On the other hand, the Occidental, the man of the West, demands +clearness and is impatient with mystery. He loves a definite statement +as much as his brother of the East dislikes it. He insists on knowing +what the eternal and infinite forces mean to his personal life, how they +will make him personally happier and better, almost how they will build +the house over his head, and cook the dinner on his hearth. This is the +difference between the East and the West, between man on the banks of +the Ganges and man on the banks of the Mississippi. Plenty of +exceptions, of course, there are--mystics in Boston and St. Louis, +hard-headed men of facts in Bombay and Calcutta. The two great +dispositions cannot be shut off from one another by an ocean or a range +of mountains. In some nations and places--as, for instance, among the +Jews and in our own New England--they notably commingle. But in general +they thus divide the world between them. The East lives in the moonlight +of mystery, the West in the sunlight of scientific fact. The East cries +out to the Eternal for vague impulses. The West seizes the present with +light hands, and will not let it go till it has furnished it with +reasonable, intelligible motives. Each misunderstands, distrusts, and in +large degree despises the other. But the two hemispheres together, and +not either one by itself, make up the total world." Thus, in one of his +sermons, spoke the great Unitarian preacher Phillips Brooks, late Bishop +of Massachusetts (_The Mystery of Iniquity and Other Sermons_, sermon +xvi.). + +We might rather say that throughout the whole world, in the East as well +as in the West, rationalists seek definition and believe in the concept, +while vitalists seek inspiration and believe in the person. The former +scrutinize the Universe in order that they may wrest its secrets from +it; the latter pray to the Consciousness of the Universe, strive to +place themselves in immediate relationship with the Soul of the World, +with God, in order that they may find the guarantee or substance of what +they hope for, which is not to die, and the evidence of what they do not +see. + +And since a person is a will, and will always has reference to the +future, he who believes, believes in what is to come--that is, in what +he hopes for. We do not believe, strictly speaking, in what is or in +what was, except as the guarantee, as the substance, of what will be. +For the Christian, to believe in the resurrection of Christ--that is to +say, in tradition and in the Gospel, which assure him that Christ has +risen, both of them personal forces--is to believe that he himself will +one day rise again by the grace of Christ. And even scientific +faith--for such there is--refers to the future and is an act of trust. +The man of science believes that at a certain future date an eclipse of +the sun will take place; he believes that the laws which have governed +the world hitherto will continue to govern it. + +To believe, I repeat, is to place confidence in someone, and it has +reference to a person. I say that I know that there is an animal called +the horse, and that it has such and such characteristics, because I have +seen it; and I say that I believe in the existence of the giraffe or the +ornithorhyncus, and that it possesses such and such qualities, because I +believe those who assure me that they have seen it. And hence the +element of uncertainty attached to faith, for it is possible that a +person may be deceived or that he may deceive us. + +But, on the other hand, this personal element in belief gives it an +effective and loving character, and above all, in religious faith, a +reference to what is hoped for. Perhaps there is nobody who would +sacrifice his life for the sake of maintaining that the three angles of +a triangle are together equal to two right angles, for such a truth does +not demand the sacrifice of our life; but, on the other hand, there are +many who have lost their lives for the sake of maintaining their +religious faith. Indeed it is truer to say that martyrs make faith than +that faith makes martyrs. For faith is not the mere adherence of the +intellect to an abstract principle; it is not the recognition of a +theoretical truth, a process in which the will merely sets in motion our +faculty of comprehension; faith is an act of the will--it is a movement +of the soul towards a practical truth, towards a person, towards +something that makes us not merely comprehend life, but that makes us +live.[45] + +Faith makes us live by showing us that life, although it is dependent +upon reason, has its well-spring and source of power elsewhere, in +something supernatural and miraculous. Cournot the mathematician, a man +of singularly well-balanced and scientifically equipped mind, has said +that it is this tendency towards the supernatural and miraculous that +gives life, and that when it is lacking, all the speculations of the +reason lead to nothing but affliction of spirit (_Traite de +l'enchainement des idees fondamentales dans les sciences et dans +l'histoire_, Sec. 329). And in truth we wish to live. + +But, although we have said that faith is a thing of the will, it would +perhaps be better to say that it is will itself--the will not to die, +or, rather, that it is some other psychic force distinct from +intelligence, will, and feeling. We should thus have feeling, knowing, +willing, and believing or creating. For neither feeling, nor +intelligence, nor will creates; they operate upon a material already +given, upon the material given them by faith. Faith is the creative +power in man. But since it has a more intimate relation with the will +than with any other of his faculties, we conceive it under the form of +volition. It should be borne in mind, however, that wishing to +believe--that is to say, wishing to create--is not precisely the same as +believing or creating, although it is its starting-point. + +Faith, therefore, if not a creative force, is the fruit of the will, and +its function is to create. Faith, in a certain sense, creates its +object. And faith in God consists in creating God; and since it is God +who gives us faith in Himself, it is God who is continually creating +Himself in us. Therefore St. Augustine said: "I will seek Thee, Lord, by +calling upon Thee, and I will call upon Thee by believing in Thee. My +faith calls upon Thee, Lord, the faith which Thou hast given me, with +which Thou hast inspired me through the Humanity of Thy Son, through the +ministry of Thy preacher" (_Confessions_, book i., chap. i.). The power +of creating God in our own image and likeness, of personalizing the +Universe, simply means that we carry God within us, as the substance of +what we hope for, and that God is continually creating us in His own +image and likeness. + +And we create God--that is to say, God creates Himself in us--by +compassion, by love. To believe in God is to love Him, and in our love +to fear Him; and we begin by loving Him even before knowing Him, and by +loving Him we come at last to see and discover Him in all things. + +Those who say that they believe in God and yet neither love nor fear +Him, do not in fact believe in Him but in those who have taught them +that God exists, and these in their turn often enough do not believe in +Him either. Those who believe that they believe in God, but without any +passion in their heart, without anguish of mind, without uncertainty, +without doubt, without an element of despair even in their consolation, +believe only in the God-Idea, not in God Himself. And just as belief in +God is born of love, so also it may be born of fear, and even of hate, +and of such kind was the belief of Vanni Fucci, the thief, whom Dante +depicts insulting God with obscene gestures in Hell (_Inf._, xxv., 1-3). +For the devils also believe in God, and not a few atheists. + +Is it not perhaps a mode of believing in God, this fury with which those +deny and even insult Him, who, because they cannot bring themselves to +believe in Him, wish that He may not exist? Like those who believe, +they, too, wish that God may exist; but being men of a weak and passive +or of an evil disposition, in whom reason is stronger than will, they +feel themselves caught in the grip of reason and haled along in their +own despite, and they fall into despair, and because of their despair +they deny, and in their denial they affirm and create the thing that +they deny, and God reveals Himself in them, affirming Himself by their +very denial of Him. + +But it will be objected to all this that to demonstrate that faith +creates its own object is to demonstrate that this object is an object +for faith alone, that outside faith it has no objective reality; just +as, on the other hand, to maintain that faith is necessary because it +affords consolation to the masses of the people, or imposes a wholesome +restraint upon them, is to declare that the object of faith is illusory. +What is certain is that for thinking believers to-day, faith is, before +all and above all, wishing that God may exist. + +Wishing that God may exist, and acting and feeling as if He did exist. +And desiring God's existence and acting conformably with this desire, is +the means whereby we create God--that is, whereby God creates Himself in +us, manifests Himself to us, opens and reveals Himself to us. For God +goes out to meet him who seeks Him with love and by love, and hides +Himself from him who searches for Him with the cold and loveless reason. +God wills that the heart should have rest, but not the head, reversing +the order of the physical life in which the head sleeps and rests at +times while the heart wakes and works unceasingly. And thus knowledge +without love leads us away from God; and love, even without knowledge, +and perhaps better without it, leads us to God, and through God to +wisdom. Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God! + +And if you should ask me how I believe in God--that is to say, how God +creates Himself in me and reveals Himself to me--my answer may, perhaps, +provoke your smiles or your laughter, or it may even scandalize you. + +I believe in God as I believe in my friends, because I feel the breath +of His affection, feel His invisible and intangible hand, drawing me, +leading me, grasping me; because I possess an inner consciousness of a +particular providence and of a universal mind that marks out for me the +course of my own destiny. And the concept of law--it is nothing but a +concept after all!--tells me nothing and teaches me nothing. + +Once and again in my life I have seen myself suspended in a trance over +the abyss; once and again I have found myself at the cross-roads, +confronted by a choice of ways and aware that in choosing one I should +be renouncing all the others--for there is no turning back upon these +roads of life; and once and again in such unique moments as these I have +felt the impulse of a mighty power, conscious, sovereign, and loving. +And then, before the feet of the wayfarer, opens out the way of the +Lord. + +It is possible for a man to feel the Universe calling to him and guiding +him as one person guides and calls to another, to hear within him its +voice speaking without words and saying: "Go and preach to all peoples!" +How do you know that the man you see before you possesses a +consciousness like you, and that an animal also possesses such a +consciousness, more or less dimly, but not a stone? Because the man acts +towards you like a man, like a being made in your likeness, and because +the stone does not act towards you at all, but suffers you to act upon +it. And in the same way I believe that the Universe possesses a certain +consciousness like myself, because its action towards me is a human +action, and I feel that it is a personality that environs me. + +Here is a formless mass; it appears to be a kind of animal; it is +impossible to distinguish its members; I only see two eyes, eyes which +gaze at me with a human gaze, the gaze of a fellow-being, a gaze which +asks for pity; and I hear it breathing. I conclude that in this formless +mass there is a consciousness. In just such a way and none other, the +starry-eyed heavens gaze down upon the believer, with a superhuman, a +divine, gaze, a gaze that asks for supreme pity and supreme love, and in +the serenity of the night he hears the breathing of God, and God touches +him in his heart of hearts and reveals Himself to him. It is the +Universe, living, suffering, loving, and asking for love. + +From loving little trifling material things, which lightly come and +lightly go, having no deep root in our affections, we come to love the +more lasting things, the things which our hands cannot grasp; from +loving goods we come to love the Good; from loving beautiful things we +come to love Beauty; from loving the true we come to love the Truth; +from loving pleasures we come to love Happiness; and, last of all, we +come to love Love. We emerge from ourselves in order to penetrate +further into our supreme I; individual consciousness emerges from us in +order to submerge itself in the total Consciousness of which we form a +part, but without being dissolved in it. And God is simply the Love that +springs from universal suffering and becomes consciousness. + +But this, it will be said, is merely to revolve in an iron ring, for +such a God is not objective. And at this point it may not be out of +place to give reason its due and to examine exactly what is meant by a +thing existing, being objective. + +What is it, in effect, to exist? and when do we say that a thing exists? +A thing exists when it is placed outside us, and in such a way that it +shall have preceded our perception of it and be capable of continuing to +subsist outside us after we have disappeared. But have I any certainty +that anything has preceded me or that anything must survive me? Can my +consciousness know that there is anything outside it? Everything that I +know or can know is within my consciousness. We will not entangle +ourselves, therefore, in the insoluble problem of an objectivity outside +our perceptions. Things exist in so far as they act. To exist is to act. + +But now it will be said that it is not God, but the idea of God, that +acts in us. To which we shall reply that it is sometimes God acting by +His idea, but still very often it is rather God acting in us by Himself. +And the retort will be a demand for proofs of the objective truth of the +existence of God, since we ask for signs. And we shall have to answer +with Pilate: What is truth? + +And having asked this question, Pilate turned away without waiting for +an answer and proceeded to wash his hands in order that he might +exculpate himself for having allowed Christ to be condemned to death. +And there are many who ask this question, What is truth? but without any +intention of waiting for the answer, and solely in order that they may +turn away and wash their hands of the crime of having helped to kill and +eject God from their own consciousness or from the consciousness of +others. + +What is truth? There are two kinds of truth--the logical or objective, +the opposite of which is error, and the moral or subjective, the +opposite of which is falsehood. And in a previous essay I have +endeavoured to show that error is the fruit of falsehood.[46] + +Moral truth, the road that leads to intellectual truth, which also is +moral, inculcates the study of science, which is over and above all a +school of sincerity and humility. Science teaches us, in effect, to +submit our reason to the truth and to know and judge of things as they +are--that is to say, as they themselves choose to be and not as we would +have them be. In a religiously scientific investigation, it is the data +of reality themselves, it is the perceptions which we receive from the +outside world, that formulate themselves in our mind as laws--it is not +we ourselves who thus formulate them. It is the numbers themselves which +in our mind create mathematics. Science is the most intimate school of +resignation and humility, for it teaches us to bow before the seemingly +most insignificant of facts. And it is the gateway of religion; but +within the temple itself its function ceases. + +And just as there is logical truth, opposed to error, and moral truth, +opposed to falsehood, so there is also esthetic truth or verisimilitude, +which is opposed to extravagance, and religious truth or hope, which is +opposed to the inquietude of absolute despair. For esthetic +verisimilitude, the expression of which is sensible, differs from +logical truth, the demonstration of which is rational; and religious +truth, the truth of faith, the substance of things hoped for, is not +equivalent to moral truth, but superimposes itself upon it. He who +affirms a faith built upon a basis of uncertainty does not and cannot +lie. + +And not only do we not believe with reason, nor yet above reason nor +below reason, but we believe against reason. Religious faith, it must be +repeated yet again, is not only irrational, it is contra-rational. +Kierkegaard says: "Poetry is illusion before knowledge; religion +illusion after knowledge. Between poetry and religion the worldly wisdom +of living plays its comedy. Every individual who does not live either +poetically or religiously is a fool" (_Afsluttende uvidenskabelig +Efterskrift_, chap. iv., sect. 2a, Sec. 2). The same writer tells us that +Christianity is a desperate sortie (_salida_). Even so, but it is only +by the very desperateness of this sortie that we can win through to +hope, to that hope whose vitalizing illusion is of more force than all +rational knowledge, and which assures us that there is always something +that cannot be reduced to reason. And of reason the same may be said as +was said of Christ: that he who is not with it is against it. That which +is not rational is contra-rational; and such is hope. + +By this circuitous route we always arrive at hope in the end. + +To the mystery of love, which is the mystery of suffering, belongs a +mysterious form, and this form is time. We join yesterday to to-morrow +with links of longing, and the now is, strictly, nothing but the +endeavour of the before to make itself the after; the present is simply +the determination of the past to become the future. The now is a point +which, if not sharply articulated, vanishes; and, nevertheless, in this +point is all eternity, the substance of time. + +Everything that has been can be only as it was, and everything that is +can be only as it is; the possible is always relegated to the future, +the sole domain of liberty, wherein imagination, the creative and +liberating energy, the incarnation of faith, has space to roam at large. + +Love ever looks and tends to the future, for its work is the work of our +perpetuation; the property of love is to hope, and only upon hopes does +it nourish itself. And thus when love sees the fruition of its desire it +becomes sad, for it then discovers that what it desired was not its true +end, and that God gave it this desire merely as a lure to spur it to +action; it discovers that its end is further on, and it sets out again +upon its toilsome pilgrimage through life, revolving through a constant +cycle of illusions and disillusions. And continually it transforms its +frustrated hopes into memories, and from these memories it draws fresh +hopes. From the subterranean ore of memory we extract the jewelled +visions of our future; imagination shapes our remembrances into hopes. +And humanity is like a young girl full of longings, hungering for life +and thirsting for love, who weaves her days with dreams, and hopes, +hopes ever, hopes without ceasing, for the eternal and predestined +lover, for him who, because he was destined for her from the beginning, +from before the dawn of her remotest memory, from before her +cradle-days, shall live with her and for her into the illimitable +future, beyond the stretch of her furthest hopes, beyond the grave +itself. And for this poor lovelorn humanity, as for the girl ever +awaiting her lover, there is no kinder wish than that when the winter of +life shall come it may find the sweet dreams of its spring changed into +memories sweeter still, and memories that shall burgeon into new hopes. +In the days when our summer is over, what a flow of calm felicity, of +resignation to destiny, must come from remembering hopes which have +never been realized and which, because they have never been realized, +preserve their pristine purity. + +Love hopes, hopes ever and never wearies of hoping; and love of God, our +faith in God, is, above all, hope in Him. For God dies not, and he who +hopes in God shall live for ever. And our fundamental hope, the root and +stem of all our hopes, is the hope of eternal life. + +And if faith is the substance of hope, hope in its turn is the form of +faith. Until it gives us hope, our faith is a formless faith, vague, +chaotic, potential; it is but the possibility of believing, the longing +to believe. But we must needs believe in something, and we believe in +what we hope for, we believe in hope. We remember the past, we know the +present, we only believe in the future. To believe what we have not seen +is to believe what we shall see. Faith, then, I repeat once again, is +faith in hope; we believe what we hope for. + +Love makes us believe in God, in whom we hope and from whom we hope to +receive life to come; love makes us believe in that which the dream of +hope creates for us. + +Faith is our longing for the eternal, for God; and hope is God's +longing, the longing of the eternal, of the divine in us, which advances +to meet our faith and uplifts us. Man aspires to God by faith and cries +to Him: "I believe--give me, Lord, wherein to believe!" And God, the +divinity in man, sends him hope in another life in order that he may +believe in it. Hope is the reward of faith. Only he who believes truly +hopes; and only he who truly hopes believes. We only believe what we +hope, and we only hope what we believe. + +It was hope that called God by the name of Father; and this name, so +comforting yet so mysterious, is still bestowed upon Him by hope. The +father gave us life and gives bread wherewith to sustain it, and we ask +the father to preserve our life for us. And if Christ was he who, with +the fullest heart and purest mouth, named with the name of Father his +Father and ours, if the noblest feeling of Christianity is the feeling +of the Fatherhood of God, it is because in Christ the human race +sublimated its hunger for eternity. + +It may perhaps be said that this longing of faith, that this hope, is +more than anything else an esthetic feeling. Possibly the esthetic +feeling enters into it, but without completely satisfying it. + +We seek in art an image of eternalization. If for a brief moment our +spirit finds peace and rest and assuagement in the contemplation of the +beautiful, even though it finds therein no real cure for its distress, +it is because the beautiful is the revelation of the eternal, of the +divine in things, and beauty but the perpetuation of momentaneity. Just +as truth is the goal of rational knowledge, so beauty is the goal of +hope, which is perhaps in its essence irrational. + +Nothing is lost, nothing wholly passes away, for in some way or another +everything is perpetuated; and everything, after passing through time, +returns to eternity. The temporal world has its roots in eternity, and +in eternity yesterday is united with to-day and to-morrow. The scenes of +life pass before us as in a cinematograph show, but on the further side +of time the film is one and indivisible. + +Physicists affirm that not a single particle of matter nor a single +tremor of energy is lost, but that each is transformed and transmitted +and persists. And can it be that any form, however fugitive it may be, +is lost? We must needs believe--believe and hope!--that it is not, but +that somewhere it remains archived and perpetuated, and that there is +some mirror of eternity in which, without losing themselves in one +another, all the images that pass through time are received. Every +impression that reaches me remains stored up in my brain even though it +may be so deep or so weak that it is buried in the depths of my +subconsciousness; but from these depths it animates my life; and if the +whole of my spirit, the total content of my soul, were to awake to full +consciousness, all these dimly perceived and forgotten fugitive +impressions would come to life again, including even those which I had +never been aware of. I carry within me everything that has passed before +me, and I perpetuate it with myself, and it may be that it all goes into +my germs, and that all my ancestors live undiminished in me and will +continue so to live, united with me, in my descendants. And perhaps I, +the whole I, with all this universe of mine, enter into each one of my +actions, or, at all events, that which is essential in me enters into +them--that which makes me myself, my individual essence. + +And how is this individual essence in each several thing--that which +makes it itself and not another--revealed to us save as beauty? What is +the beauty of anything but its eternal essence, that which unites its +past with its future, that element of it that rests and abides in the +womb of eternity? or, rather, what is it but the revelation of its +divinity? + +And this beauty, which is the root of eternity, is revealed to us by +love; it is the supreme revelation of the love of God and the token of +our ultimate victory over time. It is love that reveals to us the +eternal in us and in our neighbours. + +Is it the beautiful, the eternal, in things, that awakens and kindles +our love for them, or is it our love for things that reveals to us the +beautiful, the eternal, in them? Is not beauty perhaps a creation of +love, in the same way and in the same sense that the sensible world is a +creation of the instinct of preservation and the supersensible world of +that of perpetuation? Is not beauty, and together with beauty eternity, +a creation of love? "Though our outward man perish," says the Apostle, +"yet the inward man is renewed day by day" (2 Cor. iv. 16). The man of +passing appearances perishes and passes away with them; the man of +reality remains and grows. "For our light affliction, which is but for a +moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory" +(ver. 17). Our suffering causes us anguish, and this anguish, bursting +because of its own fullness, seems to us consolation. "While we look not +at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for +the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not +seen are eternal" (ver. 18). + +This suffering gives hope, which is the beautiful in life, the supreme +beauty, or the supreme consolation. And since love is full of suffering, +since love is compassion and pity, beauty springs from compassion and is +simply the temporal consolation that compassion seeks. A tragic +consolation! And the supreme beauty is that of tragedy. The +consciousness that everything passes away, that we ourselves pass away, +and that everything that is ours and everything that environs us passes +away, fills us with anguish, and this anguish itself reveals to us the +consolation of that which does not pass away, of the eternal, of the +beautiful. + +And this beauty thus revealed, this perpetuation of momentaneity, only +realizes itself practically, only lives through the work of charity. +Hope in action is charity, and beauty in action is goodness. + + * * * * * + +Charity, which eternalizes everything it loves, and in giving us the +goodness of it brings to light its hidden beauty, has its root in the +love of God, or, if you like, in charity towards God, in pity for God. +Love, pity, personalizes everything, we have said; in discovering the +suffering in everything and in personalizing everything, it personalizes +the Universe itself as well--for the Universe also suffers--and it +discovers God to us. For God is revealed to us because He suffers and +because we suffer; because He suffers He demands our love, and because +we suffer He gives us His love, and He covers our anguish with the +eternal and infinite anguish. + +This was the scandal of Christianity among Jews and Greeks, among +Pharisees and Stoics, and this, which was its scandal of old, the +scandal of the Cross, is still its scandal to-day, and will continue to +be so, even among Christians themselves--the scandal of a God who +becomes man in order that He may suffer and die and rise again, because +He has suffered and died, the scandal of a God subject to suffering and +death. And this truth that God suffers--a truth that appals the mind of +man--is the revelation of the very heart of the Universe and of its +mystery, the revelation that God revealed to us when He sent His Son in +order that he might redeem us by suffering and dying. It was the +revelation of the divine in suffering, for only that which suffers is +divine. + +And men made a god of this Christ who suffered, and through him they +discovered the eternal essence of a living, human God--that is, of a God +who suffers--it is only the dead, the inhuman, that does not suffer--a +God who loves and thirsts for love, for pity, a God who is a person. +Whosoever knows not the Son will never know the Father, and the Father +is only known through the Son; whosoever knows not the Son of Man--he +who suffers bloody anguish and the pangs of a breaking heart, whose soul +is heavy within him even unto death, who suffers the pain that kills and +brings to life again--will never know the Father, and can know nothing +of the suffering God. + +He who does not suffer, and who does not suffer because he does not +live, is that logical and frozen _ens realissimum_, the _primum movens_, +that impassive entity, which because of its impassivity is nothing but a +pure idea. The category does not suffer, but neither does it live or +exist as a person. And how is the world to derive its origin and life +from an impassive idea? Such a world would be but the idea of the world. +But the world suffers, and suffering is the sense of the flesh of +reality; it is the spirit's sense of its mass and substance; it is the +self's sense of its own tangibility; it is immediate reality. + +Suffering is the substance of life and the root of personality, for it +is only suffering that makes us persons. And suffering is universal, +suffering is that which unites all us living beings together; it is the +universal or divine blood that flows through us all. That which we call +will, what is it but suffering? + +And suffering has its degrees, according to the depth of its +penetration, from the suffering that floats upon the sea of appearances +to the eternal anguish, the source of the tragic sense of life, which +seeks a habitation in the depths of the eternal and there awakens +consolation; from the physical suffering that contorts our bodies to the +religious anguish that flings us upon the bosom of God, there to be +watered by the divine tears. + +Anguish is something far deeper, more intimate, and more spiritual than +suffering. We are wont to feel the touch of anguish even in the midst of +that which we call happiness, and even because of this happiness itself, +to which we cannot resign ourselves and before which we tremble. The +happy who resign themselves to their apparent happiness, to a transitory +happiness, seem to be as men without substance, or, at any rate, men who +have not discovered this substance in themselves, who have not touched +it. Such men are usually incapable of loving or of being loved, and they +go through life without really knowing either pain or bliss. + +There is no true love save in suffering, and in this world we have to +choose either love, which is suffering, or happiness. And love leads us +to no other happiness than that of love itself and its tragic +consolation of uncertain hope. The moment love becomes happy and +satisfied, it no longer desires and it is no longer love. The +satisfied, the happy, do not love; they fall asleep in habit, near +neighbour to annihilation. To fall into a habit is to begin to cease to +be. Man is the more man--that is, the more divine--the greater his +capacity for suffering, or, rather, for anguish. + +At our coming into the world it is given to us to choose between love +and happiness, and we wish--poor fools!--for both: the happiness of +loving and the love of happiness. But we ought to ask for the gift of +love and not of happiness, and to be preserved from dozing away into +habit, lest we should fall into a fast sleep, a sleep without waking, +and so lose our consciousness beyond power of recovery. We ought to ask +God to make us conscious of ourselves in ourselves, in our suffering. + +What is Fate, what is Fatality, but the brotherhood of love and +suffering? What is it but that terrible mystery in virtue of which love +dies as soon as it touches the happiness towards which it reaches out, +and true happiness dies with it? Love and suffering mutually engender +one another, and love is charity and compassion, and the love that is +not charitable and compassionate is not love. Love, in a word, is +resigned despair. + +That which the mathematicians call the problem of maxima and minima, +which is also called the law of economy, is the formula for all +existential--that is, passional--activity. In material mechanics and in +social mechanics, in industry and in political economy, every problem +resolves itself into an attempt to obtain the greatest possible +resulting utility with the least possible effort, the greatest income +with the least expenditure, the most pleasure with the least pain. And +the terrible and tragic formula of the inner, spiritual life is either +to obtain the most happiness with the least love, or the most love with +the least happiness. And it is necessary to choose between the one and +the other, and to know that he who approaches the infinite of love, the +love that is infinite, approaches the zero of happiness, the supreme +anguish. And in reaching this zero he is beyond the reach of the misery +that kills. "Be not, and thou shalt be mightier than aught that is," +said Brother Juan de los Angeles in one of his _Dialogos de la conquista +del reino de Dios_ (Dial. iii. 8). + +And there is something still more anguishing than suffering. A man about +to receive a much-dreaded blow expects to have to suffer so severely +that he may even succumb to the suffering, and when the blow falls he +feels scarcely any pain; but afterwards, when he has come to himself and +is conscious of his insensibility, he is seized with terror, a tragic +terror, the most terrible of all, and choking with anguish he cries out: +"Can it be that I no longer exist?" Which would you find most +appalling--to feel such a pain as would deprive you of your senses on +being pierced through with a white-hot iron, or to see yourself thus +pierced through without feeling any pain? Have you never felt the +horrible terror of feeling yourself incapable of suffering and of tears? +Suffering tells us that we exist; suffering tells us that those whom we +love exist; suffering tells us that the world in which we live exists; +and suffering tells us that God exists and suffers; but it is the +suffering of anguish, the anguish of surviving and being eternal. +Anguish discovers God to us and makes us love Him. + +To believe in God is to love Him, and to love Him is to feel Him +suffering, to pity Him. + +It may perhaps appear blasphemous to say that God suffers, for suffering +implies limitation. Nevertheless, God, the Consciousness of the +Universe, is limited by the brute matter in which He lives, by the +unconscious, from which He seeks to liberate Himself and to liberate us. +And we, in our turn, must seek to liberate Him. God suffers in each and +all of us, in each and all of the consciousnesses imprisoned in +transitory matter, and we all suffer in Him. Religious anguish is but +the divine suffering, the feeling that God suffers in me and that I +suffer in Him. + +The universal suffering is the anguish of all in seeking to be all else +but without power to achieve it, the anguish of each in being he that he +is, being at the same time all that he is not, and being so for ever. +The essence of a being is not only its endeavour to persist for ever, as +Spinoza taught us, but also its endeavour to universalize itself; it is +the hunger and thirst for eternity and infinity. Every created being +tends not only to preserve itself in itself, but to perpetuate itself, +and, moreover, to invade all other beings, to be others without ceasing +to be itself, to extend its limits to the infinite, but without breaking +them. It does not wish to throw down its walls and leave everything laid +flat, common and undefended, confounding and losing its own +individuality, but it wishes to carry its walls to the extreme limits of +creation and to embrace everything within them. It seeks the maximum of +individuality with the maximum also of personality; it aspires to the +identification of the Universe with itself; it aspires to God. + +And this vast I, within which each individual I seeks to put the +Universe--what is it but God? And because I aspire to God, I love Him; +and this aspiration of mine towards God is my love for Him, and just as +I suffer in being He, He also suffers in being I, and in being each one +of us. + +I am well aware that in spite of my warning that I am attempting here to +give a logical form to a system of a-logical feelings, I shall be +scandalizing not a few of my readers in speaking of a God who suffers, +and in applying to God Himself, as God, the passion of Christ. The God +of so-called rational theology excludes in effect all suffering. And the +reader will no doubt think that this idea of suffering can have only a +metaphorical value when applied to God, similar to that which is +supposed to attach to those passages in the Old Testament which +describe the human passions of the God of Israel. For anger, wrath, and +vengeance are impossible without suffering. And as for saying that God +suffers through being bound by matter, I shall be told that, in the +words of Plotinus (_Second Ennead_, ix., 7), the Universal Soul cannot +be bound by the very thing--namely, bodies or matter--which is bound by +It. + +Herein is involved the whole problem of the origin of evil, the evil of +sin no less than the evil of pain, for if God does not suffer, He causes +suffering; and if His life, since God lives, is not a process of +realizing in Himself a total consciousness which is continually becoming +fuller--that is to say, which is continually becoming more and more +God--it is a process of drawing all things towards Himself, of imparting +Himself to all, of constraining the consciousness of each part to enter +into the consciousness of the All, which is He Himself, until at last He +comes to be all in all--_panta en paot_, according to the expression of +St. Paul, the first Christian mystic. We will discuss this more fully, +however, in the next chapter on the apocatastasis or beatific union. + +For the present let it suffice to say that there is a vast current of +suffering urging living beings towards one another, constraining them to +love one another and to seek one another, and to endeavour to complete +one another, and to be each himself and others at the same time. In God +everything lives, and in His suffering everything suffers, and in loving +God we love His creatures in Him, just as in loving and pitying His +creatures we love and pity God in them. No single soul can be free so +long as there is anything enslaved in God's world, neither can God +Himself, who lives in the soul of each one of us, be free so long as our +soul is not free. + +My most immediate sensation is the sense and love of my own misery, my +anguish, the compassion I feel for myself, the love I bear for myself. +And when this compassion is vital and superabundant, it overflows from +me upon others, and from the excess of my own compassion I come to have +compassion for my neighbours. My own misery is so great that the +compassion for myself which it awakens within me soon overflows and +reveals to me the universal misery. + +And what is charity but the overflow of pity? What is it but reflected +pity that overflows and pours itself out in a flood of pity for the woes +of others and in the exercise of charity? + +When the overplus of our pity leads us to the consciousness of God +within us, it fills us with so great anguish for the misery shed abroad +in all things, that we have to pour our pity abroad, and this we do in +the form of charity. And in this pouring abroad of our pity we +experience relief and the painful sweetness of goodness. This is what +Teresa de Jesus, the mystical doctor, called "sweet-tasting suffering" +(_dolor sabroso_), and she knew also the lore of suffering loves. It is +as when one looks upon some thing of beauty and feels the necessity of +making others sharers in it. For the creative impulse, in which charity +consists, is the work of suffering love. + +We feel, in effect, a satisfaction in doing good when good superabounds +within us, when we are swollen with pity; and we are swollen with pity +when God, filling our soul, gives us the suffering sensation of +universal life, of the universal longing for eternal divinization. For +we are not merely placed side by side with others in the world, having +no common root with them, neither is their lot indifferent to us, but +their pain hurts us, their anguish fills us with anguish, and we feel +our community of origin and of suffering even without knowing it. +Suffering, and pity which is born of suffering, are what reveal to us +the brotherhood of every existing thing that possesses life and more or +less of consciousness. "Brother Wolf" St. Francis of Assisi called the +poor wolf that feels a painful hunger for the sheep, and feels, too, +perhaps, the pain of having to devour them; and this brotherhood reveals +to us the Fatherhood of God, reveals to us that God is a Father and that +He exists. And as a Father He shelters our common misery. + +Charity, then, is the impulse to liberate myself and all my fellows from +suffering, and to liberate God, who embraces us all. + +Suffering is a spiritual thing. It is the most immediate revelation of +consciousness, and it may be that our body was given us simply in order +that suffering might be enabled to manifest itself. A man who had never +known suffering, either in greater or less degree, would scarcely +possess consciousness of himself. The child first cries at birth when +the air, entering into his lungs and limiting him, seems to say to him: +You have to breathe me in order that you may live! + +We must needs believe with faith, whatever counsels reason may give us, +that the material or sensible world which the senses create for us +exists solely in order to embody and sustain that other spiritual or +imaginable world which the imagination creates for us. Consciousness +tends to be ever more and more consciousness, to intensify its +consciousness, to acquire full consciousness of its complete self, of +the whole of its content. We must needs believe with faith, whatever +counsels reason may give us, that in the depths of our own bodies, in +animals, in plants, in rocks, in everything that lives, in all the +Universe, there is a spirit that strives to know itself, to acquire +consciousness of itself, to be itself--for to be oneself is to know +oneself--to be pure spirit; and since it can only achieve this by means +of the body, by means of matter, it creates and makes use of matter at +the same time that it remains the prisoner of it. The face can only see +itself when portrayed in the mirror, but in order to see itself it must +remain the prisoner of the mirror in which it sees itself, and the image +which it sees therein is as the mirror distorts it; and if the mirror +breaks, the image is broken; and if the mirror is blurred, the image is +blurred. + +Spirit finds itself limited by the matter in which it has to live and +acquire consciousness of itself, just as thought is limited by the word +in which as a social medium it is incarnated. Without matter there is no +spirit, but matter makes spirit suffer by limiting it. And suffering is +simply the obstacle which matter opposes to spirit; it is the clash of +the conscious with the unconscious. + +Suffering is, in effect, the barrier which unconsciousness, matter, sets +up against consciousness, spirit; it is the resistance to will, the +limit which the visible universe imposes upon God; it is the wall that +consciousness runs up against when it seeks to extend itself at the +expense of unconsciousness; it is the resistance which unconsciousness +opposes to its penetration by consciousness. + +Although in deference to authority we may believe, we do not in fact +know, that we possess heart, stomach, or lungs so long as they do not +cause us discomfort, suffering, or anguish. Physical suffering, or even +discomfort, is what reveals to us our own internal core. And the same is +true of spiritual suffering and anguish, for we do not take account of +the fact that we possess a soul until it hurts us. + +Anguish is that which makes consciousness return upon itself. He who +knows no anguish knows what he does and what he thinks, but he does not +truly know that he does it and that he thinks it. He thinks, but he does +not think that he thinks, and his thoughts are as if they were not his. +Neither does he properly belong to himself. For it is only anguish, it +is only the passionate longing never to die, that makes a human spirit +master of itself. + +Pain, which is a kind of dissolution, makes us discover our internal +core; and in the supreme dissolution, which is death, we shall, at last, +through the pain of annihilation, arrive at the core of our temporal +core--at God, whom in our spiritual anguish we breathe and learn to +love. + +Even so must we believe with faith, whatever counsels reason may give +us. + +The origin of evil, as many discovered of old, is nothing other than +what is called by another name the inertia of matter, and, as applied to +the things of the spirit, sloth. And not without truth has it been said +that sloth is the mother of all vices, not forgetting that the supreme +sloth is that of not longing madly for immortality. + +Consciousness, the craving for more, more, always more, hunger of +eternity and thirst of infinity, appetite for God--these are never +satisfied. Each consciousness seeks to be itself and to be all other +consciousnesses without ceasing to be itself: it seeks to be God. And +matter, unconsciousness, tends to be less and less, tends to be nothing, +its thirst being a thirst for repose. Spirit says: I wish to be! and +matter answers: I wish not to be! + +And in the order of human life, the individual would tend, under the +sole instigation of the instinct of preservation, the creator of the +material world, to destruction, to annihilation, if it were not for +society, which, in implanting in him the instinct of perpetuation, the +creator of the spiritual world, lifts and impels him towards the All, +towards immortalization. And everything that man does as a mere +individual, opposed to society, for the sake of his own preservation, +and at the expense of society, if need be, is bad; and everything that +he does as a social person, for the sake of the society in which he +himself is included, for the sake of its perpetuation and of the +perpetuation of himself in it, is good. And many of those who seem to be +the greatest egoists, trampling everything under their feet in their +zeal to bring their work to a successful issue, are in reality men +whose souls are aflame and overflowing with charity, for they subject +and subordinate their petty personal I to the social I that has a +mission to accomplish. + +He who would tie the working of love, of spiritualization, of +liberation, to transitory and individual forms, crucifies God in matter; +he crucifies God who makes the ideal subservient to his own temporal +interests or worldly glory. And such a one is a deicide. + +The work of charity, of the love of God, is to endeavour to liberate God +from brute matter, to endeavour to give consciousness to everything, to +spiritualize or universalize everything; it is to dream that the very +rocks may find a voice and work in accordance with the spirit of this +dream; it is to dream that everything that exists may become conscious, +that the Word may become life. + +We have but to look at the eucharistic symbol to see an instance of it. +The Word has been imprisoned in a piece of material bread, and it has +been imprisoned therein to the end that we may eat it, and in eating it +make it our own, part and parcel of our body in which the spirit dwells, +and that it may beat in our heart and think in our brain and be +consciousness. It has been imprisoned in this bread in order that, after +being buried in our body, it may come to life again in our spirit. + +And we must spiritualize everything. And this we shall accomplish by +giving our spirit, which grows the more the more it is distributed, to +all men and to all things. And we give our spirit when we invade other +spirits and make ourselves the master of them. + +All this is to be believed with faith, whatever counsels reason may give +us. + + * * * * * + +And now we are about to see what practical consequences all these more +or less fantastical doctrines may have in regard to logic, to esthetics, +and, above all, to ethics--their religious concretion, in a word. And +perhaps then they will gain more justification in the eyes of the +reader who, in spite of my warnings, has hitherto been looking for the +scientific or even philosophic development of an irrational system. + +I think it may not be superfluous to recall to the reader once again +what I said at the conclusion of the sixth chapter, that entitled "In +the Depths of the Abyss"; but we now approach the practical or +pragmatical part of this treatise. First, however, we must see how the +religious sense may become concrete in the hopeful vision of another +life. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[44] Reinold Seeberg, _Christliche-protestantische Ethik_ in +_Systematische christliche Religion_, in _Die Kultur der Gegenwart_ +series. + +[45] _Cf._ St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa_, secunda secundae, quaestio iv., +art. 2. + +[46] "_Que es Verdad?_" ("What is truth?"), published in _La Espana +Moderna_, March, 1906, vol. 207 (reprinted in the edition of collected +_Ensayos_, vol. vi., Madrid, 1918). + + + + +X + +RELIGION, THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE BEYOND AND THE APOCATASTASIS + +_Kai gar isos kai malista prepei mellonta echeise apodemein diaskopein te +kai muthologein peri tes apodemias tes echei, poian tina auten oiometha +einai._--PLATO: _Phaedo_. + + +Religion is founded upon faith, hope, and charity, which in their turn +are founded upon the feeling of divinity and of God. Of faith in God is +born our faith in men, of hope in God hope in men, and of charity or +piety towards God--for as Cicero said,[47] _est enim pietas iustitia +adversum deos_--charity towards men. In God is resumed not only +Humanity, but the whole Universe, and the Universe spiritualized and +penetrated with consciousness, for as the Christian Faith teaches, God +shall at last be all in all. St. Teresa said, and Miguel de Molinos +repeated with a harsher and more despairing inflection, that the soul +must realize that nothing exists but itself and God. + +And this relation with God, this more or less intimate union with Him, +is what we call religion. + +What is religion? In what does it differ from the religious sense and +how are the two related? Every man's definition of religion is based +upon his own inward experience of it rather than upon his observation of +it in others, nor indeed is it possible to define it without in some way +or another experiencing it. Tacitus said (_Hist._ v. 4), speaking of the +Jews, that they regarded as profane everything that the Romans held to +be sacred, and that what was sacred to them was to the Romans impure: +_profana illic omnia quae apud nos sacra, rursum conversa apud illos quae +nobis incesta_. Therefore he, the Roman, describes the Jews as a people +dominated by superstition and hostile to religion, _gens superstitioni +obnoxia, religionibus adversa_, while as regards Christianity, with +which he was very imperfectly acquainted, scarcely distinguishing it +from Judaism, he deemed it to be a pernicious superstition, _existialis +superstitio_, inspired by a hatred of mankind, _odium generis humani_ +(_Ab excessu Aug._, xv., 44). And there have been many others who have +shared his opinion. But where does religion end and superstition begin, +or perhaps rather we should say at what point does superstition merge +into religion? What is the criterion by means of which we discriminate +between them? + +It would be of little profit to recapitulate here, even summarily, the +principal definitions, each bearing the impress of the personal feeling +of its definer, which have been given of religion. Religion is better +described than defined and better felt than described. But if there is +any one definition that latterly has obtained acceptance, it is that of +Schleiermacher, to the effect that religion consists in the simple +feeling of a relationship of dependence upon something above us and a +desire to establish relations with this mysterious power. Nor is there +much amiss with the statement of W. Hermann[48] that the religious +longing of man is a desire for truth concerning his human existence. And +to cut short these extraneous citations, I will end with one from the +judicious and perspicacious Cournot: "Religious manifestations are the +necessary consequence of man's predisposition to believe in the +existence of an invisible, supernatural and miraculous world, a +predisposition which it has been possible to consider sometimes as a +reminiscence of an anterior state, sometimes as an intimation of a +future destiny" (_Traite de l'enchainement des idees fondamentales dans +les sciences et dans l'histoire_, Sec. 396). And it is this problem of +human destiny, of eternal life, or of the human finality of the Universe +or of God, that we have now reached. All the highways of religion lead +up to this, for it is the very essence of all religion. + +Beginning with the savage's personalization of the whole Universe in his +fetich, religion has its roots in the vital necessity of giving human +finality to the Universe, to God, and this necessity obliges it, +therefore, to attribute to the Universe, to God, consciousness of self +and of purpose. And it may be said that religion is simply union with +God, each one interpreting God according to his own sense of Him. God +gives transcendent meaning and finality to life; but He gives it +relatively to each one of us who believe in Him. And thus God is for man +as much as man is for God, for God in becoming man, in becoming human, +has given Himself to man because of His love of him. + +And this religious longing for union with God is a longing for a union +that cannot be consummated in science or in art, but only in life. "He +who possesses science and art, has religion; he who possesses neither +science nor art, let him get religion," said Goethe in one of his +frequent accesses of paganism. And yet in spite of what he said, he +himself, Goethe...? + +And to wish that we may be united with God is not to wish that we may be +lost and submerged in Him, for this loss and submersion of self ends at +last in the complete dissolution of self in the dreamless sleep of +Nirvana; it is to wish to possess Him rather than to be possessed by +Him. When his disciples, amazed at his saying that it was impossible for +a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven, asked Jesus who then +could be saved, the Master replied that with men it was impossible but +not with God; and then said Peter, "Behold, we have forsaken all and +followed thee; what shall we have therefore?" And the reply of Jesus +was, not that they should be absorbed in the Father, but that they +should sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel +(Matt. xix. 23-26). + +It was a Spaniard, and very emphatically a Spaniard, Miguel de Molinos, +who said in his _Guia Espiritual_[49] that "he who would attain to the +mystical science must abandon and be detached from five things: first, +from creatures; second, from temporal things; third, from the very gifts +of the Holy Spirit; fourth, from himself; and fifth, he must be detached +even from God." And he adds that "this last is the completest of all, +because that soul only that knows how to be so detached is that which +attains to being lost in God, and only the soul that attains to being so +lost succeeds in finding itself." Emphatically a true Spaniard, Molinos, +and truly Spanish is this paradoxical expression of quietism or rather +of nihilism--for he himself elsewhere speaks of annihilation--and not +less Spanish, nay, perhaps even more Spanish, were the Jesuits who +attacked him, upholding the prerogatives of the All against the claims +of Nothingness. For religion is not the longing for self-annihilation, +but for self-completion, it is the longing not for death but for life. +"The eternal religion of the inward essence of man ... the individual +dream of the heart, is the worship of his own being, the adoration of +life," as the tortured soul of Flaubert was intimately aware (_Par les +champs et par les greves_, vii.). + +When at the beginning of the so-called modern age, at the Renaissance, +the pagan sense of religion came to life again, it took concrete form in +the knightly ideal with its codes of love and honour. But it was a +paganism Christianized, baptized. "Woman--_la donna_--was the divinity +enshrined within those savage breasts. Whosoever will investigate the +memorials of primitive times will find this ideal of woman in its full +force and purity; the Universe is woman. And so it was in Germany, in +France, in Provence, in Spain, in Italy, at the beginning of the modern +age. History was cast in this mould; Trojans and Romans were conceived +as knights-errant, and so too were Arabs, Saracens, Turks, the Sultan +and Saladin.... In this universal fraternity mingle angels, saints, +miracles and paradise, strangely blended with the fantasy and +voluptuousness of the Oriental world, and all baptized in the name of +Chivalry." Thus, in his _Storia della Letteratura italiana_, ii., writes +Francesco de Sanctis, and in an earlier passage he informs us that for +that breed of men "in paradise itself the lover's delight was to look +upon his lady--_Madonna_--and that he had no desire to go thither if he +might not go in his lady's company." What, in fact, was Chivalry--which +Cervantes, intending to kill it, afterwards purified and Christianized +in _Don Quixote_--but a real though distorted religion, a hybrid between +paganism and Christianity, whose gospel perhaps was the legend of +Tristan and Iseult? And did not even the Christianity of the +mystics--those knights-errant of the spirit--possibly reach its +culminating-point in the worship of the divine woman, the Virgin Mary? +What else was the Mariolatry of a St. Bonaventura, the troubadour of +Mary? And this sentiment found its inspiration in love of the fountain +of life, of that which saves us from death. + +But as the Renaissance advanced men turned from the religion of woman to +the religion of science; desire, the foundation of which was curiosity, +ended in curiosity, in eagerness to taste of the fruit of the tree of +good and evil. Europe flocked to the University of Bologna in search of +learning. Chivalry was succeeded by Platonism. Men sought to discover +the mystery of the world and of life. But it was really in order to save +life, which they had also sought to save in the worship of woman. Human +consciousness sought to penetrate the Universal Consciousness, but its +real object, whether it was aware of it or not, was to save itself. + +For the truth is that we feel and imagine the Universal +Consciousness--and in this feeling and imagination religious experience +consists--simply in order that thereby we may save our own individual +consciousnesses. And how? + +Once again I must repeat that the longing for the immortality of the +soul, for the permanence, in some form or another, of our personal and +individual consciousness, is as much of the essence of religion as is +the longing that there may be a God. The one does not exist apart from +the other, the reason being that fundamentally they are one and the same +thing. But as soon as we attempt to give a concrete and rational form to +this longing for immortality and permanence, to define it to ourselves, +we encounter even more difficulties than we encountered in our attempt +to rationalize God. + +The universal consent of mankind has again been invoked as a means of +justifying this immortal longing for immortality to our own feeble +reason. _Permanere animos arbitratur consensu nationum omnium_, said +Cicero, echoing the opinion of the ancients (_Tuscul. Quaest._, xvi., +36). But this same recorder of his own feelings confessed that, although +when he read the arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul in +the _Phaedo_ of Plato he was compelled to assent to them, as soon as he +put the book aside and began to revolve the problem in his own mind, all +his previous assent melted away, _assentio omnis illa illabitur_ (cap. +xi., 25). And what happened to Cicero happens to us all, and it happened +likewise to Swedenborg, the most daring visionary of the other world. +Swedenborg admitted that he who discourses of life after death, putting +aside all erudite notions concerning the soul and its mode of union with +the body, believes that after death he shall live in a glorious joy and +vision, as a man among angels; but when he begins to reflect upon the +doctrine of the union of the soul with the body, or upon the +hypothetical opinion concerning the soul, doubts arise in him as to +whether the soul is thus or otherwise, and when these doubts arise, his +former idea is dissipated (_De caelo et inferno_, Sec. 183). Nevertheless, +as Cournot says, "it is the destiny that awaits me, _me_ or my _person_, +that moves, perturbs and consoles me, that makes me capable of +abnegation and sacrifice, whatever be the origin, the nature or the +essence of this inexplicable bond of union, in the absence of which the +philosophers are pleased to determine that my person must disappear" +(_Traite_, etc., Sec. 297). + +Must we then embrace the pure and naked faith in an eternal life without +trying to represent it to ourselves? This is impossible; it is beyond +our power to bring ourselves or accustom ourselves to do so. And +nevertheless there are some who call themselves Christians and yet leave +almost altogether on one side this question of representation. Take any +work of theology informed by the most enlightened--that is, the most +rationalistic and liberal--Protestantism; take, for instance, the +_Dogmatik_ of Dr. Julius Kaftan, and of the 668 pages of which the sixth +edition, that of 1909, consists, you will find only one, the last, that +is devoted to this problem. And in this page, after affirming that +Christ is not only the beginning and middle but also the end and +consummation of History, and that those who are in Christ will attain to +fullness of life, the eternal life of those who are in Christ, not a +single word as to what that life may be. Half a dozen words at most +about eternal death, that is, hell, "for its existence is demanded by +the moral character of faith and of Christian hope." Its moral +character, eh? not its religious character, for I am not aware that the +latter knows any such exigency. And all this inspired by a prudent +agnostic parsimony. + +Yes, the prudent, the rational, and, some will say, the pious, +attitude, is not to seek to penetrate into mysteries that are hidden +from our knowledge, not to insist upon shaping a plastic representation +of eternal glory, such as that of the _Divina Commedia_. True faith, +true Christian piety, we shall be told, consists in resting upon the +confidence that God, by the grace of Christ, will, in some way or +another, make us live in Him, in His Son; that, as our destiny is in His +almighty hands, we should surrender ourselves to Him, in the full +assurance that He will do with us what is best for the ultimate end of +life, of spirit and of the universe. Such is the teaching that has +traversed many centuries, and was notably prominent in the period +between Luther and Kant. + +And nevertheless men have not ceased endeavouring to imagine to +themselves what this eternal life may be, nor will they cease their +endeavours so long as they are men and not merely thinking machines. +There are books of theology--or of what passes for theology--full of +disquisitions upon the conditions under which the blessed dead live in +paradise, upon their mode of enjoyment, upon the properties of the +glorious body, for without some form of body the soul cannot be +conceived. + +And to this same necessity, the real necessity of forming to ourselves a +concrete representation of what this other life may be, must in great +part be referred the indestructible vitality of doctrines such as those +of spiritualism, metempsychosis, the transmigration of souls from star +to star, and the like; doctrines which as often as they are pronounced +to be defeated and dead, are found to have come to life again, clothed +in some more or less new form. And it is merely supine to be content to +ignore them and not to seek to discover their permanent and living +essence. Man will never willingly abandon his attempt to form a concrete +representation of the other life. + +But is an eternal and endless life after death indeed thinkable? How +can we conceive the life of a disembodied spirit? How can we conceive +such a spirit? How can we conceive a pure consciousness, without a +corporal organism? Descartes divided the world into thought and +extension, a dualism which was imposed upon him by the Christian dogma +of the immortality of the soul. But is extension, is matter, that which +thinks and is spiritualized, or is thought that which is extended and +materialized? The weightiest questions of metaphysics arise practically +out of our desire to arrive at an understanding of the possibility of +our immortality--from this fact they derive their value and cease to be +merely the idle discussions of fruitless curiosity. For the truth is +that metaphysics has no value save in so far as it attempts to explain +in what way our vital longing can or cannot be realized. And thus it is +that there is and always will be a rational metaphysic and a vital +metaphysic, in perennial conflict with one another, the one setting out +from the notion of cause, the other from the notion of substance. + +And even if we were to succeed in imagining personal immortality, might +we not possibly feel it to be something no less terrible than its +negation? "Calypso was inconsolable at the departure of Ulysses; in her +sorrow she was dismayed at being immortal," said the gentle, the +mystical Fenelon at the beginning of his _Telemaque_. Was it not a kind +of doom that the ancient gods, no less than the demons, were subject +to--the deprivation of the power to commit suicide? + +When Jesus took Peter and James and John up into a high mountain and was +transfigured before them, his raiment shining as white as snow, and +Moses and Elias appeared and talked with him, Peter said to the Master: +"Master, it is good for us to be here; and let us make three +tabernacles; one for thee and one for Moses and one for Elias," for he +wished to eternalize that moment. And as they came down from the +mountain, Jesus charged them that they should tell no man what they had +seen until the Son of Man should have risen from the dead. And they, +keeping this saying to themselves, questioned one with another what this +rising from the dead should mean, as men not understanding the purport +of it. And it was after this that Jesus met the father whose son was +possessed with a dumb spirit and who cried out to him, "Lord, I believe; +help thou mine unbelief" (Mark ix.). + +Those three apostles did not understand what this rising from the dead +meant. Neither did those Sadducees who asked the Master whose wife she +should be in the resurrection who in this life had had seven husbands +(Matt. xxii.); and it was then that Jesus said that God is not the God +of the dead, but of the living. And the other life is not, in fact, +thinkable to us except under the same forms as those of this earthly and +transitory life. Nor is the mystery at all clarified by that metaphor of +the grain and the wheat that it bears, with which Paul answers the +question, "How are the dead raised up, and with what body do they come?" +(1 Cor. xv. 35). + +How can a human soul live and enjoy God eternally without losing its +individual personality--that is to say, without losing itself? What is +it to enjoy God? What is eternity as opposed to time? Does the soul +change or does it not change in the other life? If it does not change, +how does it live? And if it changes, how does it preserve its +individuality through so vast a period of time? For though the other +life may exclude space, it cannot exclude time, as Cournot observes in +the work quoted above. + +If there is life in heaven there is change. Swedenborg remarked that the +angels change, because the delight of the celestial life would gradually +lose its value if they always enjoyed it in its fullness, and because +angels, like men, love themselves, and he who loves himself experiences +changes of state; and he adds further that at times the angels are sad, +and that he, Swedenborg, discoursed with some when they were sad (_De +Caelo et Inferno_, Sec.Sec. 158, 160). In any case, it is impossible for us to +conceive life without change, change of growth or of diminution, of +sadness or of joy, of love or of hate. + +In effect, an eternal life is unthinkable and an eternal life of +absolute felicity, of beatific vision, is more unthinkable still. + +And what precisely is this beatific vision? We observe in the first +place that it is called vision and not action, something passive being +therefore presupposed. And does not this beatific vision suppose loss of +personal consciousness? A saint in heaven, says Bossuet, is a being who +is scarcely sensible of himself, so completely is he possessed by God +and immerged in His glory.... Our attention cannot stay on the saint, +because one finds him outside of himself, and subject by an unchangeable +love to the source of his being and his happiness (_Du culte qui est du +a Dieu_). And these are the words of Bossuet, the antiquietist. This +loving vision of God supposes an absorption in Him. He who in a state of +blessedness enjoys God in His fullness must perforce neither think of +himself, nor remember himself, nor have any consciousness of himself, +but be in perpetual ecstasy (_ekstasis_) outside of himself, in a +condition of alienation. And the ecstasy that the mystics describe is a +prelude of this vision. + +He who sees God shall die, say the Scriptures (Judg. xiii. 22); and may +it not be that the eternal vision of God is an eternal death, a swooning +away of the personality? But St. Teresa, in her description of the last +state of prayer, the rapture, transport, flight, or ecstasy of the soul, +tells us that the soul is borne as upon a cloud or a mighty eagle, "but +you see yourself carried away and know not whither," and it is "with +delight," and "if you do not resist, the senses are not lost, at least I +was so much myself as to be able to perceive that I was being lifted up +"--that is to say, without losing consciousness. And God "appears to be +not content with thus attracting the soul to Himself in so real a way, +but wishes to have the body also, though it be mortal and of earth so +foul." "Ofttimes the soul is absorbed--or, to speak more correctly, the +Lord absorbs it in Himself; and when He has held it thus for a moment, +the will alone remains in union with Him"--not the intelligence alone. +We see, therefore, that it is not so much vision as a union of the will, +and meanwhile, "the understanding and memory are distraught ... like one +who has slept long and dreamed and is hardly yet awake." It is "a soft +flight, a delicious flight, a noiseless flight." And in this delicious +flight the consciousness of self is preserved, the awareness of +distinction from God with whom one is united. And one is raised to this +rapture, according to the Spanish mystic, by the contemplation of the +Humanity of Christ--that is to say, of something concrete and human; it +is the vision of the living God, not of the idea of God. And in the 28th +chapter she tells us that "though there were nothing else to delight the +sight in heaven but the great beauty of the glorified bodies, that would +be an excessive bliss, particularly the vision of the Humanity of Jesus +Christ our Lord...." "This vision," she continues, "though imaginary, I +did never see with my bodily eyes, nor, indeed, any other, but only with +the eyes of the soul." And thus it is that in heaven the soul does not +see God only, but everything in God, or rather it sees that everything +is God, for God embraces all things. And this idea is further emphasized +by Jacob Boehme. The saint tells us in the _Moradas Setimas_ (vii. 2) +that "this secret union takes place in the innermost centre of the soul, +where God Himself must dwell." And she goes on to say that "the soul, I +mean the spirit of the soul, is made one with God ..."; and this union +may be likened to "two wax candles, the tips of which touch each other +so closely that there is but one light; or again, the wick, the wax, +and the light become one, but the one candle can again be separated from +the other, and the two candles remain distinct; or the wick may be +withdrawn from the wax." But there is another more intimate union, and +this is "like rain falling from heaven into a river or stream, becoming +one and the same liquid, so that the river and the rain-water cannot be +divided; or it resembles a streamlet flowing into the sea, which cannot +afterwards be disunited from it; or it may be likened to a room into +which a bright light enters through two windows--though divided when it +enters, the light becomes one and the same." And what difference is +there between this and the internal and mystical silence of Miguel de +Molinos, the third and most perfect degree of which is the silence of +thought? (_Guia Espiritual_, book i., chap. xvii., Sec. 128). Do we not +here very closely approach the view that "nothingness is the way to +attain to that high state of a mind reformed"? (book iii., chap. xx., Sec. +196). And what marvel is it that Amiel in his _Journal Intime_ should +twice have made use of the Spanish word _nada_, nothing, doubtless +because he found none more expressive in any other language? And +nevertheless, if we read our mystical doctor, St. Teresa, with care, we +shall see that the sensitive element is never excluded, the element of +delight--that is to say, the element of personal consciousness. The soul +allows itself to be absorbed in God in order that it may absorb Him, in +order that it may acquire consciousness of its own divinity. + +A beatific vision, a loving contemplation in which the soul is absorbed +in God and, as it were, lost in Him, appears either as an annihilation +of self or as a prolonged tedium to our natural way of feeling. And +hence a certain feeling which we not infrequently observe and which has +more than once expressed itself in satires, not altogether free from +irreverence or perhaps impiety, with reference to the heaven of eternal +glory as a place of eternal boredom. And it is useless to despise +feelings such as these, so wholly natural and spontaneous. + +It is clear that those who feel thus have failed to take note of the +fact that man's highest pleasure consists in acquiring and intensifying +consciousness. Not the pleasure of knowing, exactly, but rather that of +learning. In knowing a thing we tend to forget it, to convert it, if the +expression may be allowed, into unconscious knowledge. Man's pleasure, +his purest delight, is allied with the act of learning, of getting at +the truth of things, of acquiring knowledge with differentiation. And +hence the famous saying of Lessing which I have already quoted. There is +a story told of an ancient Spaniard who accompanied Vasco Nunez de +Balboa when he climbed that peak in Darien from which both the Atlantic +and the Pacific are visible. On beholding the two oceans the old man +fell on his knees and exclaimed, "I thank Thee, God, that Thou didst not +let me die without having seen so great a wonder." But if this man had +stayed there, very soon the wonder would have ceased to be wonderful, +and with the wonder the pleasure, too, would have vanished. His joy was +the joy of discovery. And perhaps the joy of the beatific vision may be +not exactly that of the contemplation of the supreme Truth, whole and +entire (for this the soul could not endure), but rather that of a +continual discovery of the Truth, of a ceaseless act of learning +involving an effort which keeps the sense of personal consciousness +continually active. + +It is difficult for us to conceive a beatific vision of mental quiet, of +full knowledge and not of gradual apprehension, as in any way different +from a kind of Nirvana, a spiritual diffusion, a dissipation of energy +in the essence of God, a return to unconsciousness induced by the +absence of shock, of difference--in a word, of activity. + +May it not be that the very condition which makes our eternal union with +God thinkable destroys our longing? What difference is there between +being absorbed by God and absorbing Him in ourself? Is it the stream +that is lost in the sea or the sea that is lost in the stream? It is all +the same. + +Our fundamental feeling is our longing not to lose the sense of the +continuity of our consciousness, not to break the concatenation of our +memories, the feeling of our own personal concrete identity, even though +we may be gradually being absorbed in God, enriching Him. Who at eighty +years of age remembers the child that he was at eight, conscious though +he may be of the unbroken chain connecting the two? And it may be said +that the problem for feeling resolves itself into the question as to +whether there is a God, whether there is a human finality to the +Universe. But what is finality? For just as it is always possible to ask +the why of every why, so it is also always possible to ask the wherefore +of every wherefore. Supposing that there is a God, then wherefore God? +For Himself, it will be said. And someone is sure to reply: What is the +difference between this consciousness and no-consciousness? But it will +always be true, as Plotinus has said (_Enn_., ii., ix., 8), that to ask +why God made the world is the same as to ask why there is a soul. Or +rather, not why, but wherefore (_dia ti_). + +For him who places himself outside himself, in an objective hypothetical +position--which is as much as to say in an inhuman position--the +ultimate wherefore is as inaccessible--and strictly, as absurd--as the +ultimate why. What difference in effect does it make if there is not any +finality? What logical contradiction is involved in the Universe not +being destined to any finality, either human or superhuman? What +objection is there in reason to there being no other purpose in the sum +of things save only to exist and happen as it does exist and happen? For +him who places himself outside himself, none; but for him who lives and +suffers and desires within himself--for him it is a question of life or +death. Seek, therefore, thyself! But in finding oneself, does not one +find one's own nothingness? "Having become a sinner in seeking himself, +man has become wretched in finding himself," said Bossuet (_Traite de la +Concupiscence_, chap. xi.). "Seek thyself" begins with "Know thyself." +To which Carlyle answers (_Past and Present_, book iii., chap. xi.): +"The latest Gospel in this world is, Know thy work and do it. 'Know +thyself': long enough has that poor 'self' of thine tormented thee; thou +wilt never get to 'know' it, I believe! Think it not thy business, this +of knowing thyself; thou art an unknowable individual: know what thou +canst work at; and work at it, like a Hercules. That will be thy better +plan." + +Yes, but what I work at, will not that too be lost in the end? And if it +be lost, wherefore should I work at it? Yes, yes, it may be that to +accomplish my work--and what is my work?--without thinking about myself, +is to love God. And what is it to love God? + +And on the other hand, in loving God in myself, am I not loving myself +more than God, am I not loving myself in God? + +What we really long for after death is to go on living this life, this +same mortal life, but without its ills, without its tedium, and without +death. Seneca, the Spaniard, gave expression to this in his _Consolatio +ad Marciam_ (xxvi.); what he desired was to live this life again: _ista +moliri_. And what Job asked for (xix. 25-7) was to see God in the flesh, +not in the spirit. And what but that is the meaning of that comic +conception of _eternal recurrence_ which issued from the tragic soul of +poor Nietzsche, hungering for concrete and temporal immortality? + +And this beatific vision which is the primary Catholic solution of the +problem, how can it be realized, I ask again, without obliteration of +the consciousness of self? Will it not be like a sleep in which we +dream without knowing what we dream? Who would wish for an eternal life +like that? To think without knowing that we think is not to be sensible +of ourselves, it is not to be ourselves. And is not eternal life perhaps +eternal consciousness, not only seeing God, but seeing that we see Him, +seeing ourselves at the same time and ourselves as distinct from Him? He +who sleeps lives, but he has no consciousness of himself; and would +anyone wish for an eternal sleep? When Circe advised Ulysses to descend +to the abode of the dead in order to consult the soothsayer Teiresias, +she told him that Teiresias alone among the shades of the dead was +possessed of understanding, for all the others flitted about like +shadows (_Odyssey_, x., 487-495). And can it be said that the others, +apart from Teiresias, had really overcome death? Is it to overcome death +to flit about like shadows without understanding? + +And on the other hand, may we not imagine that possibly this earthly +life of ours is to the other life what sleep is to waking? May not all +our life be a dream and death an awakening? But an awakening to what? +And supposing that everything is but the dream of God and that God one +day will awaken? Will He remember His dream? + +Aristotle, the rationalist, tells in his _Ethics_ of the superior +happiness of the contemplative life, _bios theoretikos_; and all +rationalists are wont to place happiness in knowledge. And the +conception of eternal happiness, of the enjoyment of God, as a beatific +vision, as knowledge and comprehension of God, is a thing of rationalist +origin, it is the kind of happiness that corresponds with the God-Idea +of Aristotelianism. But the truth is that, in addition to vision, +happiness demands delight, and this is a thing which has very little to +do, with rationalism and is only attainable when we feel ourselves +distinct from God. + +Our Aristotelian Catholic theologian, the author of the endeavour to +rationalize Catholic feeling, St. Thomas Aquinas, tells us in his +_Summa_ (_prima secundae partis, quaestio_ iv., _art_. i) that "delight is +requisite for happiness. For delight is caused by the fact of desire +resting in attained good. Hence, since happiness is nothing but the +attainment of the Sovereign Good, there cannot be happiness without +concomitant delight." But where is the delight of him who rests? To +rest, _requiescere_--is not that to sleep and not to possess even the +consciousness that one is resting? "Delight is caused by the vision of +God itself," the theologian continues. But does the soul feel itself +distinct from God? "The delight that accompanies the activity of the +understanding does not impede, but rather strengthens that activity," he +says later on. Obviously! for what happiness were it else? And in order +to save delectation, delight, pleasure, which, like pain, has always +something material in it, and which we conceive of only as existing in a +soul incarnate in a body, it was necessary to suppose that the soul in a +state of blessedness is united with its body. Apart from some kind of +body, how is delight possible? The immortality of the pure soul, without +some sort of body or spirit-covering, is not true immortality. And at +bottom, what we long for is a prolongation of this life, this life and +no other, this life of flesh and suffering, this life which we imprecate +at times simply because it comes to an end. The majority of suicides +would not take their lives if they had the assurance that they would +never die on this earth. The self-slayer kills himself because he will +not wait for death. + +When in the thirty-third canto of the _Paradiso_, Dante relates how he +attained to the vision of God, he tells us that just as a man who +beholds somewhat in his sleep retains on awakening nothing but the +impression of the feeling in his mind, so it was with him, for when the +vision had all but passed away the sweetness that sprang from it still +distilled itself in his heart. + + _Cotal son to, che quasi tutta cessa + mia visione ed ancor mi distilla + nel cuor lo dulce che nacque da essa_ + +like snow that melts in the sun-- + + _cosi la neve al sol si disigilla_. + +That is to say, that the vision, the intellectual content, passes, and +that which remains is the delight, the _passione impressa_, the +emotional, the irrational--in a word, the corporeal. + +What we desire is not merely spiritual felicity, not merely vision, but +delight, bodily happiness. The other happiness, the rationalist +_beatitude_, the happiness of being submerged in understanding, can +only--I will not say satisfy or deceive, for I do not believe that it +ever satisfied or deceived even a Spinoza. At the conclusion of his +_Ethic_, in propositions xxxv. and xxxvi. of the fifth part, Spinoza, +affirms that God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love; that +the intellectual love of the mind towards God is the selfsame love with +which God loves Himself, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far +as He can be manifested through the essence of the human mind, +considered under the form of eternity--that is to say, that the +intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love +with which God loves Himself. And after these tragic, these desolating +propositions, we are told in the last proposition of the whole book, +that which closes and crowns this tremendous tragedy of the _Ethic_, +that happiness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself, and that +our repression of our desires is not the cause of our enjoyment of +virtue, but rather because we find enjoyment in virtue we are able to +repress our desires. Intellectual love! intellectual love! what is this +intellectual love? Something of the nature of a red flavour, or a bitter +sound, or an aromatic colour, or rather something of the same sort as a +love-stricken triangle or an enraged ellipse--a pure metaphor, but a +tragic metaphor. And a metaphor corresponding tragically with that +saying that the heart also has its reasons. Reasons of the heart! loves +of the head! intellectual delight! delicious intellection!--tragedy, +tragedy, tragedy! + +And nevertheless there is something which may be called intellectual +love, and that is the love of understanding, that which Aristotle meant +by the contemplative life, for there is something of action and of love +in the act of understanding, and the beatific vision is the vision of +the total truth. Is there not perhaps at the root of every passion +something of curiosity? Did not our first parents, according to the +Biblical story, fall because of their eagerness to taste of the fruit of +the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and to be as gods, knowers +of this knowledge? The vision of God--that is to say, the vision of the +Universe itself, in its soul, in its inmost essence--would not that +appease all our longing? And this vision can fail to satisfy only men of +a gross mind who do not perceive that the greatest joy of man is to be +more man--that is, more God--and that man is more God the more +consciousness he has. + +And this intellectual love, which is nothing but the so-called platonic +love, is a means to dominion and possession. There is, in fact, no more +perfect dominion than knowledge; he who knows something, possesses it. +Knowledge unites the knower with the known. "I contemplate thee and in +contemplating thee I make thee mine"--such is the formula. And to know +God, what can that be but to possess Him? He who knows God is thereby +himself God. + +In _La Degradation de l'energie_ (iv^e partie, chap. xviii., 2) B. +Brunhes relates a story concerning the great Catholic mathematician +Cauchy, communicated to him by M. Sarrau, who had it from Pere Gratry. +While Cauchy and Pere Gratry were walking in the gardens of the +Luxumbourg, their conversation turned upon the happiness which those in +heaven would have in knowing at last, without any obscurity or +limitation, the truths which they had so long and so laboriously sought +to investigate on earth. In allusion to the study which Cauchy had made +of the mechanistic theory of the reflection of light, Pere Gratry threw +out the suggestion that one on the greatest intellectual joys of the +great geometrician in the future life would be to penetrate into the +secret of light. To which Cauchy replied that it did not appear to him +to be possible to know more about this than he himself already knew, +neither could he conceive how the most perfect intelligence could arrive +at a clearer comprehension of the mystery of reflection than that +manifested in his own explanation of it, seeing that he had furnished a +mechanistic theory of the phenomenon. "His piety," Brunhes adds, "did +not extend to a belief that God Himself could have created anything +different or anything better." + +From this narrative two points of interest emerge. The first is the idea +expressed in it as to what contemplation, intellectual love, or beatific +vision, may mean for men of a superior order of intelligence, men whose +ruling passion is knowledge; and the second is the implicit faith shown +in the mechanistic explanation of the world. + +This mechanistic tendency of the intellect coheres with the well-known +formula, "Nothing is created, nothing is lost, everything is +transformed"--a formula by means of which it has been sought to +interpret the ambiguous principle of the conservation of energy, +forgetting that practically, for us, for men, energy is utilizable +energy, and that this is continually being lost, dissipated by the +diffusion of heat, and degraded, its tendency being to arrive at a +dead-level and homogeneity. That which has value, and more than value, +reality, for us, is the differential, which is the qualitative; pure, +undifferentiated quantity is for us as if it did not exist, for it does +not act. And the material Universe, the body of the Universe, would +appear to be gradually proceeding--unaffected by the retarding action of +living organisms or even by the conscious action of man--towards a state +of perfect stability, of homogeneity (_vide_ Brunhes, _op. cit._) For, +while spirit tends towards concentration, material energy tends towards +diffusion. + +And may not this have an intimate relation with our problem? May there +not be a connection between this conclusion of scientific philosophy +with respect to a final state of stability and homogeneity and the +mystical dream of the apocatastasis? May not this death of the body of +the Universe be the final triumph of its spirit, of God? + +It is manifest that there is an intimate relation between the religious +need of an eternal life after death and the conclusions--always +provisional--at which scientific philosophy arrives with respect to the +probable future of the material or sensible Universe. And the fact is +that just as there are theologians of God and the immortality of the +soul, so there are also those whom Brunhes calls (_op. cit._, chap. +xxvi., Sec. 2) theologians of monism, and whom it would perhaps be better +to call atheologians, people who pertinaciously adhere to the spirit of +_a priori_ affirmation; and this becomes intolerable, Brunhes adds, when +they harbour the pretension of despising theology. A notable type of +these gentlemen may be found in Haeckel, who has succeeded in solving +the riddles of Nature! + +These atheologians have seized upon the principle of the conservation of +energy, the "Nothing is created, nothing is lost, everything is +transformed" formula, the theological origin of which is seen in +Descartes, and have made use of it as a means whereby we are able to +dispense with God. "The world built to last," Brunhes comments, +"resisting all wear and tear, or rather automatically repairing the +rents that appear in it--what a splendid theme for oratorical +amplification! But these same amplifications which served in the +seventeenth century to prove the wisdom of the Creator have been used in +our days as arguments for those who presume to do without Him." It is +the old story: so-called scientific philosophy, the origin and +inspiration of which is fundamentally theological or religious, ending +in an atheology or irreligion, which is itself nothing else but theology +and religion. Let us call to mind the comments of Ritschl upon this +head, already quoted in this work. + +To-day the last word of science, or rather of scientific philosophy, +appears to be that, by virtue of the degradation of energy, of the +predominance of irreversible phenomena, the material, sensible world is +travelling towards a condition of ultimate levelness, a kind of final +homogeneity. And this brings to our mind the hypothesis, not only so +much used but abused by Spencer, of a primordial homogeneity, and his +fantastic theory of the instability of the homogeneous. An instability +that required the atheological agnosticism of Spencer in order to +explain the inexplicable transition from the homogeneous to the +heterogeneous. For how, without any action from without, can any +heterogeneity emerge from perfect and absolute homogeneity? But as it +was necessary to get rid of every kind of creation, "the unemployed +engineer turned metaphysician," as Papini called him, invented the +theory of the instability of the homogeneous, which is more ... what +shall I say? more mystical, and even more mythological if you like, than +the creative action of God. + +The Italian positivist, Roberto Ardigo, was nearer the mark when, +objecting to Spencer's theory, he said that the most natural supposition +was that things always were as they are now, that always there have been +worlds in process of formation, in the nebulous stage, worlds +completely formed and worlds in process of dissolution; that +heterogeneity, in short, is eternal. Another way, it will be seen, of +not solving the riddle. + +Is this perhaps the solution? But in that case the Universe would be +infinite, and in reality we are unable to conceive a Universe that is +both eternal and limited such as that which served as the basis of +Nietzsche's theory of eternal recurrence. If the Universe must be +eternal, if within it and as regards each of its component worlds, +periods in which the movement is towards homogeneity, towards the +degradation of energy, must alternate with other periods in which the +movement is towards heterogeneity, then it is necessary that the +Universe should be infinite, that there should be scope, always and in +each world, for some action coming from without. And, in fact, the body +of God cannot be other than eternal and infinite. + +But as far as our own world is concerned, its gradual +levelling-down--or, we might say, its death--appears to be proved. And +how will this process affect the fate of our spirit? Will it wane with +the degradation of the energy of our world and return to +unconsciousness, or will it rather grow according as the utilizable +energy diminishes and by virtue of the very efforts that it makes to +retard this degradation and to dominate Nature?--for this it is that +constitutes the life of the spirit. May it be that consciousness and its +extended support are two powers in contraposition, the one growing at +the expense of the other? + +The fact is that the best of our scientific work, the best of our +industry (that part of it I mean--and it is a large part--that does not +tend to destruction), is directed towards retarding this fatal process +of the degradation of energy. And organic life, the support of our +consciousness, is itself an effort to avoid, so far as it is possible, +this fatal period, to postpone it. + +It is useless to seek to deceive ourselves with pagan paeans in praise +of Nature, for as Leopardi, that Christian atheist, said with profound +truth in his stupendous poem _La Ginestra_, Nature "gives us life like a +mother, but loves us like a step-mother." The origin of human +companionship was opposition to Nature; it was horror of impious Nature +that first linked men together in the bonds of society. It is human +society, in effect, the source of reflective consciousness and of the +craving for immortality, that inaugurates the state of grace upon the +state of Nature; and it is man who, by humanizing and spiritualizing +Nature by his industry, supernaturalizes her. + +In two amazing sonnets which he called _Redemption_, the tragic +Portuguese poet, Antero de Quental, embodied his dream of a spirit +imprisoned, not in atoms or ions or crystals, but--as is natural in a +poet--in the sea, in trees, in the forest, in the mountains, in the +wind, in all material individualities and forms; and he imagines that a +day may come when all these captive souls, as yet in the limbo of +existence, will awaken to consciousness, and, emerging as pure thought +from the forms that imprisoned them, they will see these forms, the +creatures of illusion, fall away and dissolve like a baseless vision. It +is a magnificent dream of the penetration of everything by +consciousness. + +May it not be that the Universe, our Universe--who knows if there are +others?--began with a zero of spirit--and zero is not the same as +nothing--and an infinite of matter, and that its goal is to end with an +infinite of spirit and a zero of matter? Dreams! + +May it be that everything has a soul and that this soul begs to be +freed? + + _Oh tierras de Alvargonzalez, + en el corazon de Espana, + tierras pobres, tierras tristes, + tan tristes que tienen alma!_ + +sings our poet Antonio Machado in his _Campos de Castilla_.[50] Is the +sadness of the field in the fields themselves or in us who look upon +them? Do they not suffer? But what can an individual soul in a world of +matter actually be? Is it the rock or the mountain that is the +individual? Is it the tree? + +And nevertheless the fact always remains that spirit and matter are at +strife. This is the thought that Espronceda expressed when he wrote: + + _Aqui, para vivir en santa calma, + o sobra la materia, o sobra el alma._[51] + +And is there not in the history of thought, or of human imagination if +you prefer it, something that corresponds to this process of the +reduction of matter, in the sense of a reduction of everything to +consciousness? + +Yes, there is, and its author is the first Christian mystic, St. Paul of +Tarsus, the Apostle of the Gentiles, he who because he had never with +his bodily eyes looked upon the face of the fleshly and mortal Christ, +the ethical Christ, created within himself an immortal and religious +Christ--he who was caught up into the third heaven and there beheld +secret and unspeakable things (2 Cor. xii.). And this first Christian +mystic dreamed also of a final triumph of spirit, of consciousness, and +this is what in theology is technically called the apocatastasis or +restitution. + +In 1 Cor. xv. 26-28 he tells us that "the last enemy that shall be +destroyed is death, for he hath put all things under his feet. But when +he saith all things are put under him, it is manifest that he is +excepted, which did put all things under him. And when all things shall +be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto +him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all": _hina he +ho theos panta en pasin_--that is to say, that the end is that God, +Consciousness, will end by being all in all. + +This doctrine is completed by Paul's teaching, in his Epistle to the +Ephesians, with regard to the end of the whole history of the world. In +this Epistle, as you know, he represents Christ--by whom "were all +things created, that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and +invisible" (Col. i. 16)--as the head over all things (Eph. i. 22), and +in him, in this head, we all shall be raised up that we may live in the +communion of saints and that we "may be able to comprehend with all +saints what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and height, and to +know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge" (Eph. iii. 18, 19). +And this gathering of us together in Christ, who is the head and, as it +were, the compendium, of Humanity, is what the Apostle calls the +gathering or collecting together or recapitulating of all things in +Christ, _anakephalaiosthai ta panta en Christo_. And this +recapitulation--_anakephalaiosis_, anacefaleosis--the end of the world's +history and of the human race, is merely another aspect of the +apocatastasis. The apocatastasis, God's coming to be all in all, thus +resolves itself into the anacefaleosis, the gathering together of all +things in Christ, in Humanity--Humanity therefore being the end of +creation. And does not this apocatastasis, this humanization or +divinization of all things, do away with matter? But if matter, which is +the principle of individuation, the scholastic _principium +individuationis_, is once done away with, does not everything return to +pure consciousness, which, in its pure purity, neither knows itself nor +is it anything that can be conceived or felt? And if matter be +abolished, what support is there left for spirit? + +Thus a different train of thought leads us to the same difficulties, the +same unthinkabilities. + +It may be said, on the other hand, that the apocatastasis, God's coming +to be all in all, presupposes that there was a time when He was not all +in all. The supposition that all beings shall attain to the enjoyment of +God implies the supposition that God shall attain to the enjoyment of +all beings, for the beatific vision is mutual, and God is perfected in +being better known, and His being is nourished and enriched with souls. + +Following up the track of these wild dreams, we might imagine an +unconscious God, slumbering in matter, and gradually wakening into +consciousness of everything, consciousness of His own divinity; we might +imagine the whole Universe becoming conscious of itself as a whole and +becoming conscious of each of its constituent consciousnesses, becoming +God. But in that case, how did this unconscious God begin? Is He not +matter itself? God would thus be not the beginning but the end of the +Universe; but can that be the end which was not the beginning? Or can it +be that outside time, in eternity, there is a difference between +beginning and end? "The soul of all things cannot be bound by that very +thing--that is, matter--which it itself has bound," says Plotinus +(_Enn._ ii., ix. 7). Or is it not rather the Consciousness of the Whole +that strives to become the consciousness of each part and to make each +partial consciousness conscious of itself--that is, of the total +consciousness? Is not this universal soul a monotheist or solitary God +who is in process of becoming a pantheist God? And if it is not so, if +matter and pain are alien to God, wherefore, it will be asked, did God +create the world? For what purpose did He make matter and introduce +pain? Would it not have been better if He had not made anything? What +added glory does He gain by the creation of angels or of men whose fall +He must punish with eternal torment? Did He perhaps create evil for the +sake of remedying it? Or was redemption His design, redemption complete +and absolute, redemption of all things and of all men? For this +hypothesis is neither more rational nor more pious than the other. + +In so far as we attempt to represent eternal happiness to ourselves, we +are confronted by a series of questions to which there is no +satisfactory--that is, rational--answer, and it matters not whether the +supposition from which we start be monotheist, or pantheist, or even +panentheist. + +Let us return to the Pauline apocatastasis. + +Is it not possible that in becoming all in all God completes Himself, +becomes at last fully God, an infinite consciousness embracing all +consciousnesses? And what is an infinite consciousness? Since +consciousness supposes limitation, or rather since consciousness is +consciousness of limitation, of distinction, does it not thereby exclude +infinitude? What value has the notion of infinitude applied to +consciousness? What is a consciousness that is all consciousness, +without anything outside it that is not consciousness? In such a case, +of what is consciousness the consciousness? Of its content? Or may it +not rather be that, starting from chaos, from absolute unconsciousness, +in the eternity of the past, we continually approach the apocatastasis +or final apotheosis without ever reaching it? + +May not this apocatastasis, this return of all things to God, be rather +an ideal term to which we unceasingly approach--some of us with fleeter +step than others--but which we are destined never to reach? May not the +absolute and perfect eternal happiness be an eternal hope, which would +die if it were to be realized? Is it possible to be happy without hope? +And there is no place for hope when once possession has been realized, +for hope, desire, is killed by possession. May it not be, I say, that +all souls grow without ceasing, some in a greater measure than others, +but all having to pass some time through the same degree of growth, +whatever that degree may be, and yet without ever arriving at the +infinite, at God, to whom they continually approach? Is not eternal +happiness an eternal hope, with its eternal nucleus of sorrow in order +that happiness shall not be swallowed up in nothingness? + +Follow more questions to which there is no answer. "He shall be all in +all," says the Apostle. But will His mode of being in each one be +different or will it be the same for all alike? Will not God be wholly +in one of the damned? Is He not in his soul? Is He not in what is called +hell? And in what sense is He in hell? + +Whence arise new problems, those relating to the opposition between +heaven and hell, between eternal happiness and eternal unhappiness. + +May it not be that in the end all shall be saved, including Cain and +Judas and Satan himself, as Origen's development of the Pauline +apocatastasis led him to hope? + +When our Catholic theologians seek to justify rationally--or in other +words, ethically--the dogma of the eternity of the pains of hell, they +put forward reasons so specious, ridiculous, and childish, that it would +appear impossible that they should ever have obtained currency. For to +assert that since God is infinite, an offence committed against Him is +infinite also and therefore demands an eternal punishment, is, apart +from the inconceivability of an infinite offence, to be unaware that, in +human ethics, if not in the human police system, the gravity of the +offence is measured not by the dignity of the injured person but by the +intention of the injurer, and that to speak of an infinite culpable +intention is sheer nonsense, and nothing else. In this connection those +words which Christ addressed to His Father are capable of application: +"Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do," and no man who +commits an offence against God or his neighbour knows what he does. In +human ethics, or if you like in human police regulations--that which is +called penal law and is anything but law[52] eternal punishment is a +meaningless phrase. + +"God is just and punishes us; that is all we need to know; as far as we +are concerned the rest is merely curiosity." Such was the conclusion of +Lamennais (_Essai_, etc., iv^e partie, chap, vii.), an opinion shared by +many others. Calvin also held the same view. But is there anyone who is +content with this? Pure curiosity!--to call this load that wellnigh +crushes our heart pure curiosity! + +May we not say, perhaps, that the evil man is annihilated because he +wished to be annihilated, or that he did not wish strongly enough to +eternalize himself because he was evil? May we not say that it is not +believing in the other life that makes a man good, but rather that being +good makes him believe in it? And what is being good and being evil? +These states pertain to the sphere of ethics, not of religion: or, +rather, does not the doing good though being evil pertain to ethics, and +the being good though doing evil to religion? + +Shall we not perhaps be told, on the other hand, that if the sinner +suffers an eternal punishment, it is because he does not cease to +sin?--for the damned sin without ceasing. This, however, is no solution +of the problem, which derives all its absurdity from the fact that +punishment has been conceived as vindictiveness or vengeance, not as +correction, has been conceived after the fashion of barbarous peoples. +And in the same way hell has been conceived as a sort of police +institution, necessary in order to put fear into the world. And the +worst of it is that it no longer intimidates, and therefore will have to +be shut up. + +But, on the other hand, as a religious conception and veiled in mystery, +why not--although the idea revolts our feelings--an eternity of +suffering? why not a God who is nourished by our suffering? Is our +happiness the end of the Universe? or may we possibly sustain with our +suffering some alien happiness? Let us read again in the _Eumenides_ of +that terrible tragedian, AEschylus, those choruses of the Furies in +which they curse the new gods for overturning the ancient laws and +snatching Orestes from their hands--impassioned invectives against the +Apollinian redemption. Does not redemption tear man, their captive and +plaything, from the hands of the gods, who delight and amuse themselves +in his sufferings, like children, as the tragic poet says, torturing +beetles? And let us remember the cry, "My God, my God, why hast thou +forsaken me?" + +Yes, why not an eternity of suffering? Hell is an eternalization of the +soul, even though it be an eternity of pain. Is not pain essential to +life? + +Men go on inventing theories to explain what they call the origin of +evil. And why not the origin of good? Why suppose that it is good that +is positive and original, and evil that is negative and derivatory? +"Everything that is, in so far as it is, is good," St. Augustine +affirmed. But why? What does "being good" mean? Good is good for +something, conducive to an end, and to say that everything is good is +equivalent to saying that everything is making for its end. But what is +its end? Our desire is to eternalize ourselves, to persist, and we call +good everything that conspires to this end and bad everything that tends +to lessen or destroy our consciousness. We suppose that human +consciousness is an end and not a means to something else which may not +be consciousness, whether human or superhuman. + +All metaphysical optimism, such as that of Leibnitz, and all +metaphysical pessimism, such as that of Schopenhauer, have no other +foundation than this. For Leibnitz this world is the best because it +conspires to perpetuate consciousness, and, together with consciousness, +will, because intelligence increases will and perfects it, because the +end of man is the contemplation of God; while for Schopenhauer this +world is the worst of all possible worlds, because it conspires to +destroy will, because intelligence, representation, nullifies the will +that begot it. + +And similarly Franklin, who believed in another life, asserted that he +was willing to live this life over again, the life that he had actually +lived, "from its beginning to the end"; while Leopardi, who did not +believe in another life, asserted that nobody would consent to live his +life over again. These two views of life are not merely ethical, but +religious; and the feeling of moral good, in so far as it is a +teleological value, is of religious origin also. + +And to return to our interrogations: Shall not all be saved, shall not +all be made eternal, and eternal not in suffering but in happiness, +those whom we call good and those whom we call bad alike? + +And as regards this question of good and evil, does not the malice of +him who judges enter in? Is the badness in the intention of him who does +the deed or is it not rather in that of him who judges it to be bad? But +the terrible thing is that man judges himself, creates himself his own +judge. + +Who then shall be saved? And now the imagination puts forth another +possibility--neither more nor less rational than all those which have +just been put forward interrogatively--and that is that only those are +saved who have longed to be saved, that only those are eternalized who +have lived in an agony of hunger for eternity and for eternalization. He +who desires never to die and believes that he shall never die in the +spirit, desires it because he deserves it, or rather, only he desires +personal immortality who carries his immortality within him. The man who +does not long passionately, and with a passion that triumphs over all +the dictates of reason, for his own immortality, is the man who does not +deserve it, and because he does not deserve it he does not long for it. +And it is no injustice not to give a man that which he does not know how +to desire, for "ask, and it shall be given you." It may be that to each +will be given that which he desired. And perhaps the sin against the +Holy Ghost--for which, according to the Evangelist, there is no +remission--is none other than that of not desiring God, not longing to +be made eternal. + + As is your sort of mind + So is your sort of search; you'll find + What you desire, and that's to be + A Christian, + +said Robert Browning in _Christmas Eve and Easter Day_. + +In his _Inferno_ Dante condemned the Epicureans, those who did not +believe in another life, to something more terrible than the not having +it, and that is the consciousness of not having it, and this he +expressed in plastic form by picturing them shut up in their tombs for +all eternity, without light, without air, without fire, without +movement, without life (_Inferno_, x., 10-15). + +What cruelty is there in denying to a man that which he did not or could +not desire? In the sixth book of his _AEneid_ (426-429) the gentle Virgil +makes us hear the plaintive voices and sobbing of the babes who weep +upon the threshold of Hades, + + _Continuo auditae voces, vagitus et ingens, + Infantumque animae flentes in limine primo,_ + +unhappy in that they had but entered upon life and never known the +sweetness of it, and whom, torn from their mothers' breasts, a dark day +had cut off and drowned in bitter death-- + + _Quos dulcis vitae exsortes et at ubere raptos + Abstulit atra dies et funere mersit acerbo._ + +But what life did they lose, if they neither knew life nor longed for +it? And yet is it true that they never longed for it? + +It may be said that others craved life on their behalf, that their +parents longed for them to be eternal to the end that they might be +gladdened by them in paradise. And so a fresh field is opened up for the +imagination--namely, the consideration of the solidarity and +representivity of eternal salvation. + +There are many, indeed, who imagine the human race as one being, a +collective and solidary individual, in whom each member may represent or +may come to represent the total collectivity; and they imagine salvation +as something collective. As something collective also, merit, and as +something collective sin, and redemption. According to this mode of +feeling and imagining, either all are saved or none is saved; redemption +is total and it is mutual; each man is his neighbour's Christ. + +And is there not perhaps a hint of this in the popular Catholic belief +with regard to souls in purgatory, the belief that the living may devote +suffrages and apply merits to the souls of their dead? This sense of the +transmission of merits, both to the living and the dead, is general in +popular Catholic piety. + +Nor should it be forgotten that in the history of man's religious +thought there has often presented itself the idea of an immortality +restricted to a certain number of the elect, spirits representative of +the rest and in a certain sense including them; an idea of pagan +derivation--for such were the heroes and demi-gods--which sometimes +shelters itself behind the pronouncement that there are many that are +called and few that are chosen. + +Recently, while I was engaged upon this essay, there came into my hands +the third edition of the _Dialogue sur la vie et sur la mort_, by +Charles Bonnefon, a book in which imaginative conceptions similar to +those that I have been setting forth find succinct and suggestive +expression. The soul cannot live without the body, Bonnefon says, nor +the body without the soul, and thus neither birth nor death has any real +existence--strictly speaking, there is no body, no soul, no birth, no +death, all of which are abstractions and appearances, but only a +thinking life, of which we form part and which can neither be born nor +die. Hence he is led to deny human individuality and to assert that no +one can say "I am" but only "we are," or, more correctly, "there is in +us." It is humanity, the species, that thinks and loves in us. And souls +are transmitted in the same way that bodies are transmitted. "The living +thought or the thinking life which we are will find itself again +immediately in a form analogous to that which was our origin and +corresponding with our being in the womb of a pregnant woman." Each of +us, therefore, has lived before and will live again, although he does +not know it. "If humanity is gradually raised above itself, when the +last man dies, the man who will contain all the rest of mankind in +himself, who shall say that he may not have arrived at that higher order +of humanity such as exists elsewhere, in heaven?... As we are all bound +together in solidarity, we shall all, little by little, gather the +fruits of our travail." According to this mode of imagining and +thinking, since nobody is born, nobody dies, no single soul has finished +its struggle but many times has been plunged into the midst of the human +struggle "ever since the type of embryo corresponding with the same +consciousness was represented in the succession of human phenomena." It +is obvious that since Bonnefon begins by denying personal individuality, +he leaves out of account our real longing, which is to save our +individuality; but on the other hand, since he, Bonnefon, is a personal +individual and feels this longing, he has recourse to the distinction +between the called and the chosen, and to the idea of representative +spirits, and he concedes to a certain number of men this representative +individual immortality. Of these elect he says that "they will be +somewhat more necessary to God than we ourselves." And he closes this +splendid dream by supposing that "it is not impossible that we shall +arrive by a series of ascensions at the supreme happiness, and that our +life shall be merged in the perfect Life as a drop of water in the sea. +Then we shall understand," he continues, "that everything was +necessary, that every philosophy and every religion had its hour of +truth, and that in all our wanderings and errors and in the darkest +moments of our history we discerned the light of the distant beacon, and +that we were all predestined to participate in the Eternal Light. And if +the God whom we shall find again possesses a body--and we cannot +conceive a living God without a body--we, together with each of the +myriads of races that the myriads of suns have brought forth, shall be +the conscious cells of his body. If this dream should be fulfilled, an +ocean of love would beat upon our shores and the end of every life would +be to add a drop of water to this ocean's infinity." And what is this +cosmic dream of Bonnefon's but the plastic representation of the Pauline +apocatastasis? + +Yes, this dream, which has its origin far back in the dawn of +Christianity, is fundamentally the same as the Pauline anacefaleosis, +the fusion of all men in Man, in the whole of Humanity embodied in a +Person, who is Christ, and the fusion not only of all men but of all +things, and the subsequent subjection of all things to God, in order +that God, Consciousness, may be all in all. And this supposes a +collective redemption and a society beyond the grave. + +In the middle of the eighteenth century, two pietists of Protestant +origin, Johann Jakob Moser and Friedrich Christoph Oetinger, gave a new +force and value to the Pauline anacefaleosis. Moser "declared that his +religion consisted not in holding certain doctrines to be true and in +living a virtuous life conformably therewith, but in being reunited to +God through Christ. But this demands the thorough knowledge--a knowledge +that goes on increasing until the end of life--of one's own sins and +also of the mercy and patience of God, the transformation of all natural +feelings, the appropriation of the atonement wrought by the death of +Christ, the enjoyment of peace with God in the permanent witness of the +Holy Spirit to the remission of sins, the ordering of life according to +the pattern of Christ, which is the fruit of faith alone, the drawing +near to God and the intercourse of the soul with Him, the disposition to +die in grace and the joyful expectation of the Judgement which will +bestow blessedness in the more intimate enjoyment of God and in the +_commerce with all the saints_" (Ritschl, _Geschichte des Pietismus_, +vol. iii., Sec. 43). The commerce with all the saints--that is to say, the +eternal human society. And for his part, Oetinger considers eternal +happiness not as the contemplation of God in His infinitude, but, taking +the Epistle to the Ephesians as his authority, as the contemplation of +God in the harmony of the creature with Christ. The commerce with all +the saints was, according to him, essential to the content of eternal +happiness. It was the realization of the kingdom of God, which thus +comes to be the kingdom of Man. And in his exposition of these doctrines +of the two pietists, Ritschl confesses _(op. cit._, iii., Sec. 46) that +both witnesses have with these doctrines contributed something to +Protestantism that is of like value with the theological method of +Spener, another pietist. + +We see, therefore, that the Christian, mystical, inward longing ever +since St. Paul, has been to give human finality, or divine finality, to +the Universe, to save human consciousness, and to save it by converting +all humanity into a person. This longing is expressed in the +anacefaleosis, the gathering together of all things, all things in earth +and in heaven, the visible and the invisible, in Christ, and also in the +apocatastasis, the return of all things to God, to consciousness, in +order that God may be all in all. And does not God's being all in all +mean that all things shall acquire consciousness and that in this +consciousness everything that has happened will come to life again, and +that everything that has existed in time will be eternalized? And within +the all, all individual consciousnesses, those which have been, those +that are, and those that will be, and as they have been, as they are, +and as they will be, will exist in a condition of society and +solidarity. + +But does not this awakening to consciousness of everything that has +been, necessarily involve a fusion of the identical, an amalgamation of +like things? In this conversion of the human race into a true society in +Christ, a communion of saints, a kingdom of heaven, will not individual +differences, tainted as they are with deceit and even with sin, be +obliterated, and in the perfect society will that alone remain of each +man which was the essential part of him? Would it not perhaps result, +according to Bonnefon's supposition, that this consciousness that lived +in the twentieth century in this corner of this earth would feel itself +to be the same with other such consciousnesses as have lived in other +centuries and perhaps in other worlds? + +And how can we conceive of an effective and real union, a substantial +and intimate union, soul with soul, of all those who have been? + + If any two creatures grew into one + They would do more than the world has done, + +said Browning in _The Flight of the Duchess_; and Christ has told us +that where two or three are gathered together in His name, there is He +in the midst of them. + +Heaven, then, so it is believed by many, is society, a more perfect +society than that of this world; it is human society fused into a +person. And there are not wanting some who believe that the tendency of +all human progress is the conversion of our species into one collective +being with real consciousness--is not perhaps an individual human +organism a kind of confederation of cells?--and that when it shall have +acquired full consciousness, all those who have existed will come to +life again in it. + +Heaven, so many think, is society. Just as no one can live in isolation, +so no one can survive in isolation. No one can enjoy God in heaven who +sees his brother suffering in hell, for the sin and the merit were +common to both. We think with the thoughts of others and we feel with +the feelings of others. To see God when God shall be all in all is to +see all things in God and to live in God with all things. + +This splendid dream of the final solidarity of mankind is the Pauline +anacefaleosis and apocatastasis. We Christians, said the Apostle (I Cor. +xii. 27) are the body of Christ, members of Him, flesh of His flesh and +bone of His bone (Eph. v. 30), branches of the vine. + +But in this final solidarization, in this true and supreme +_Christination_ of all creatures, what becomes of each individual +consciousness? what becomes of Me, of this poor fragile I, this I that +is the slave of time and space, this I which reason tells me is a mere +passing accident, but for the saving of which I live and suffer and hope +and believe? Granting that the human finality of the Universe is saved, +that consciousness is saved, would I resign myself to make the sacrifice +of this poor I, by which and by which alone I know this finality and +this consciousness? + +And here, facing this supreme religious sacrifice, we reach the summit +of the tragedy, the very heart of it--the sacrifice of our own +individual consciousness upon the altar of the perfected Human +Consciousness, of the Divine Consciousness. + +But is there really a tragedy? If we could attain to a clear vision of +this anacefaleosis, if we could succeed in understanding and feeling +that we were going to enrich Christ, should we hesitate for a moment in +surrendering ourselves utterly to Him? Would the stream that flows into +the sea, and feels in the freshness of its waters the bitterness of the +salt of the ocean, wish to flow back to its source? would it wish to +return to the cloud which drew its life from the sea? is not its joy to +feel itself absorbed? + +And yet.... + +Yes, in spite of everything, this is the climax of the tragedy. + +And the soul, my soul at least, longs for something else, not +absorption, not quietude, not peace, not appeasement, it longs ever to +approach and never to arrive, it longs for a never-ending longing, for +an eternal hope which is eternally renewed but never wholly fulfilled. +And together with all this, it longs for an eternal lack of something +and an eternal suffering. A suffering, a pain, thanks to which it grows +without ceasing in consciousness and in longing. Do not write upon the +gate of heaven that sentence which Dante placed over the threshold of +hell, _Lasciate ogni speranza!_ Do not destroy time! Our life is a hope +which is continually converting itself into memory and memory in its +turn begets hope. Give us leave to live! The eternity that is like an +eternal present, without memory and without hope, is death. Thus do +ideas exist, but not thus do men live. Thus do ideas exist in the +God-Idea, but not thus can men live in the living God, in the God-Man. + +An eternal purgatory, then, rather than a heaven of glory; an eternal +ascent. If there is an end of all suffering, however pure and +spiritualized we may suppose it to be, if there is an end of all desire, +what is it that makes the blessed in paradise go on living? If in +paradise they do not suffer for want of God, how shall they love Him? +And if even there, in the heaven of glory, while they behold God little +by little and closer and closer, yet without ever wholly attaining to +Him, there does not always remain something more for them to know and +desire, if there does not always remain a substratum of doubt, how shall +they not fall asleep? + +Or, to sum up, if in heaven there does not remain something of this +innermost tragedy of the soul, what sort of a life is that? Is there +perhaps any greater joy than that of remembering misery--and to remember +it is to feel it--in time of felicity? Does not the prison haunt the +freed prisoner? Does he not miss his former dreams of liberty? + + * * * * * + +Mythological dreams! it will be said. And I have not pretended that they +are anything else. But has not the mythological dream its content of +truth? Are not dream and myth perhaps revelations of an inexpressible +truth, of an irrational truth, of a truth that cannot be proven? + +Mythology! Perhaps; but, as in the days of Plato, we must needs +mythologize when we come to deal with the other life. But we have just +seen that whenever we seek to give a form that is concrete, conceivable, +or in other words, rational, to our primary, primordial, and fundamental +longing for an eternal life conscious of itself and of its personal +individuality, esthetic, logical, and ethical absurdities are multiplied +and there is no way of conceiving the beatific vision and the +apocatastasis that is free from contradictions and inconsistencies. + +And nevertheless!... + +Nevertheless, yes, we must needs long for it, however absurd it may +appear to us; nay, more, we must needs believe in it, in some way or +another, in order that we may live. In order that we may live, eh? not +in order that we may understand the Universe. We must needs believe in +it, and to believe in it is to be religious. Christianity, the only +religion which we Europeans of the twentieth century are really capable +of feeling, is, as Kierkegaard said, a desperate sortie (_Afsluttende +uvidenskabelig Efterskrift_, ii., i., cap. i.), a sortie which can be +successful only by means of the martyrdom of faith, which is, according +to this same tragic thinker, the crucifixion of reason. + +Not without reason did he who had the right to do so speak of the +foolishness of the cross. Foolishness, without doubt, foolishness. And +the American humorist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, was not altogether wide of +the mark in making one of the characters in his ingenious conversations +say that he thought better of those who were confined in a lunatic +asylum on account of religious mania than of those who, while professing +the same religious principles, kept their wits and appeared to enjoy +life very well outside of the asylums.[53] But those who are at large, +are they not really, thanks to God, mad too? Are there not mild +madnesses, which not only permit us to mix with our neighbours without +danger to society, but which rather enable us to do so, for by means of +them we are able to attribute a meaning and finality to life and society +themselves? + +And after all, what is madness and how can we distinguish it from +reason, unless we place ourselves outside both the one and the other, +which for us is impossible? + +Madness perhaps it is, and great madness, to seek to penetrate into the +mystery of the Beyond; madness to seek to superimpose the +self-contradictory dreams of our imagination upon the dictates of a sane +reason. And a sane reason tells us that nothing can be built up without +foundations, and that it is not merely an idle but a subversive task to +fill the void of the unknown with fantasies. And nevertheless.... + +We must needs believe in the other life, in the eternal life beyond the +grave, and in an individual and personal life, in a life in which each +one of us may feel his consciousness and fed that it is united, without +being confounded, with all other consciousnesses in the Supreme +Consciousness, in God; we must needs believe in that other life in order +that we may live this life, and endure it, and give it meaning and +finality. And we must needs believe in that other life, perhaps, in +order that we may deserve it, in order that we may obtain it, for it may +be that he neither deserves it nor will obtain it who does not +passionately desire it above reason and, if need be, against reason. + +And above all, we must feel and act as if an endless continuation of +our earthly life awaited us after death; and if it be that nothingness +is the fate that awaits us we must not, in the words of _Obermann_, so +act that it shall be a just fate. + +And this leads us directly to the examination of the practical or +ethical aspect of our sole problem. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[47] _De natura deorum_, lib. i., cap. 41. + +[48] _Op. cit._ + +[49] _Guia Espiritual que desembaraza al alma y la conduce por el +interior camino para alcanzar la perfecta contemplacion y el rico tesoro +de la paz interior_, book iii., chap. xviii., Sec. 185. + +[50] + + O land of Alvargonzalez, + In the heart of Spain, + Sad land, poor land, + So sad that it has a soul! + +[51] + + To living a life of blessed quiet here on earth, + Either matter or soul is a hindrance. + +[52] Eso que llaman derecho penal, y que es todo menos derecho. + +[53] _The Autocrat of the Breakfast-table._ + + + + +XI + +THE PRACTICAL PROBLEM + + L'homme est perissable. II se peut; mais perissons en resistant, + et, si le neant nous est reserve, ne faisons pas que ce soit une + justice.--SENANCOUR: _Obermann_, lettre xc. + + +Several times in the devious course of these essays I have defined, in +spite of my horror of definitions, my own position with regard to the +problem that I have been examining; but I know there will always be some +dissatisfied reader, educated in some dogmatism or other, who will say: +"This man comes to no conclusion, he vacillates--now he seems to affirm +one thing and then its contrary--he is full of contradictions--I can't +label him. What is he?" Just this--one who affirms contraries, a man of +contradiction and strife, as Jeremiah said of himself; one who says one +thing with his heart and the contrary with his head, and for whom this +conflict is the very stuff of life. And that is as clear as the water +that flows from the melted snow upon the mountain tops. + +I shall be told that this is an untenable position, that a foundation +must be laid upon which to build our action and our works, that it is +impossible to live by contradictions, that unity and clarity are +essential conditions of life and thought, and that it is necessary to +unify thought. And this leaves us as we were before. For it is precisely +this inner contradiction that unifies my life and gives it its practical +purpose. + +Or rather it is the conflict itself, it is this self-same passionate +uncertainty, that unifies my action and makes me live and work. + +We think in order that we may live, I have said; but perhaps it were +more correct to say that we think because we live, and the form of our +thought corresponds with that of our life. Once more I must repeat that +our ethical and philosophical doctrines in general are usually merely +the justification _a posteriori_ of our conduct, of our actions. Our +doctrines are usually the means we seek in order to explain and justify +to others and to ourselves our own mode of action. And this, be it +observed, not merely for others, but for ourselves. The man who does not +really know why he acts as he does and not otherwise, feels the +necessity of explaining to himself the motive of his action and so he +forges a motive. What we believe to be the motives of our conduct are +usually but the pretexts for it. The very same reason which one man may +regard as a motive for taking care to prolong his life may be regarded +by another man as a motive for shooting himself. + +Nevertheless it cannot be denied that reasons, ideas, have an influence +upon human actions, and sometimes even determine them, by a process +analogous to that of suggestion upon a hypnotized person, and this is so +because of the tendency in every idea to resolve itself into action--an +idea being simply an inchoate or abortive act. It was this notion that +suggested to Fouillee his theory of idea-forces. But ordinarily ideas +are forces which we accommodate to other forces, deeper and much less +conscious. + +But putting all this aside for the present, what I wish to establish is +that uncertainty, doubt, perpetual wrestling with the mystery of our +final destiny, mental despair, and the lack of any solid and stable +dogmatic foundation, may be the basis of an ethic. + +He who bases or thinks that he bases his conduct--his inward or his +outward conduct, his feeling or his action--upon a dogma or theoretical +principle which he deems incontrovertible, runs the risk of becoming a +fanatic, and moreover, the moment that this dogma is weakened or +shattered, the morality based upon it gives way. If, the earth that he +thought firm begins to rock, he himself trembles at the earthquake, for +we do not all come up to the standard of the ideal Stoic who remains +undaunted among the ruins of a world shattered into atoms. Happily the +stuff that is underneath a man's ideas will save him. For if a man +should tell you that he does not defraud or cuckold his best friend only +because he is afraid of hell, you may depend upon it that neither would +he do so even if he were to cease to believe in hell, but that he would +invent some other excuse instead. And this is all to the honour of the +human race. + +But he who believes that he is sailing, perhaps without a set course, on +an unstable and sinkable raft, must not be dismayed if the raft gives +way beneath his feet and threatens to sink. Such a one thinks that he +acts, not because he deems his principle of action to be true, but in +order to make it true, in order to prove its truth, in order to create +his own spiritual world. + +My conduct must be the best proof, the moral proof, of my supreme +desire; and if I do not end by convincing myself, within the bounds of +the ultimate and irremediable uncertainty, of the truth of what I hope +for, it is because my conduct is not sufficiently pure. Virtue, +therefore, is not based upon dogma, but dogma upon virtue, and it is not +faith that creates martyrs but martyrs who create faith. There is no +security or repose--so far as security and repose are obtainable in this +life, so essentially insecure and unreposeful--save in conduct that is +passionately good. + +Conduct, practice, is the proof of doctrine, theory. "If any man will do +His will--the will of Him that sent me," said Jesus, "he shall know of +the doctrine, whether it be of God or whether I speak of myself" (John +vii. 17); and there is a well-known saying of Pascal: "Begin by taking +holy water and you will end by becoming a believer." And pursuing a +similar train of thought, Johann Jakob Moser, the pietist, was of the +opinion that no atheist or naturalist had the right to regard the +Christian religion as void of truth so long as he had not put it to the +proof by keeping its precepts and commandments (Ritschl, _Geschichte des +Pietismus_, book vii., 43). + +What is our heart's truth, anti-rational though it be? The immortality +of the human soul, the truth of the persistence of our consciousness +without any termination whatsoever, the truth of the human finality of +the Universe. And what is its moral proof? We may formulate it thus: Act +so that in your own judgement and in the judgement of others you may +merit eternity, act so that you may become irreplaceable, act so that +you may not merit death. Or perhaps thus: Act as if you were to die +to-morrow, but to die in order to survive and be eternalized. The end of +morality is to give personal, human finality to the Universe; to +discover the finality that belongs to it--if indeed it has any +finality--and to discover it by acting. + +More than a century ago, in 1804, in Letter XC of that series that +constitutes the immense monody of his _Obermann_, Senancour wrote the +words which I have put at the head of this chapter--and of all the +spiritual descendants of the patriarchal Rousseau, Senancour was the +most profound and the most intense; of all the men of heart and feeling +that France has produced, not excluding Pascal, he was the most tragic. +"Man is perishable. That may be; but let us perish resisting, and if it +is nothingness that awaits us, do not let us so act that it shall be a +just fate." Change this sentence from its negative to the positive +form--"And if it is nothingness that awaits us, let us so act that it +shall be an unjust fate"--and you get the firmest basis of action for +the man who cannot or will not be a dogmatist. + +That which is irreligious and demoniacal, that which incapacitates us +for action and leaves us without any ideal defence against our evil +tendencies, is the pessimism that Goethe puts into the mouth of +Mephistopheles when he makes him say, "All that has achieved existence +deserves to be destroyed" (_denn alles was ensteht ist wert doss es +zugrunde geht_). This is the pessimism which we men call evil, and not +that other pessimism that consists in lamenting what it fears to be true +and struggling against this fear--namely, that everything is doomed to +annihilation in the end. Mephistopheles asserts that everything that +exists deserves to be destroyed, annihilated, but not that everything +will be destroyed or annihilated; and we assert that everything that +exists deserves to be exalted and eternalized, even though no such fate +is in store for it. The moral attitude is the reverse of this. + +Yes, everything deserves to be eternalized, absolutely everything, even +evil itself, for that which we call evil would lose its evilness in +being eternalized, because it would lose its temporal nature. For the +essence of evil consists in its temporal nature, in its not applying +itself to any ultimate and permanent end. + +And it might not be superfluous here to say something about that +distinction, more overlaid with confusion than any other, between what +we are accustomed to call optimism and pessimism, a confusion not less +than that which exists with regard to the distinction between +individualism and socialism. Indeed, it is scarcely possible to form a +clear idea as to what pessimism really is. + +I have just this very day read in the _Nation_ (July 6, 1912) an +article, entitled "A Dramatic Inferno," that deals with an English +translation of the works of Strindberg, and it opens with the following +judicious observations: "If there were in the world a sincere and total +pessimism, it would of necessity be silent. The despair which finds a +voice is a social mood, it is the cry of misery which brother utters to +brother when both are stumbling through a valley of shadows which is +peopled with--comrades. In its anguish it bears witness to something +that is good in life, for it presupposes sympathy ... The real gloom, +the sincere despair, is dumb and blind; it writes no books, and feels no +impulse to burden an intolerable universe with a monument more lasting +than brass." Doubtless there is something of sophistry in this +criticism, for the man who is really in pain weeps and even cries aloud, +even if he is alone and there is nobody to hear him, simply as a means +of alleviating his pain, although this perhaps may be a result of social +habits. But does not the lion, alone in the desert, roar if he has an +aching tooth? But apart from this, it cannot be denied that there is a +substance of truth underlying these remarks. The pessimism that protests +and defends itself cannot be truly said to be pessimism. And, in truth, +still less is it pessimism to hold that nothing ought to perish although +all things may be doomed to annihilation, while on the other hand it is +pessimism to affirm that all things ought to be annihilated even though +nothing may perish. + +Pessimism, moreover, may possess different values. There is a +eudemonistic or economic pessimism, that which denies happiness; there +is an ethical pessimism, that which denies the triumph of moral good; +and there is a religious pessimism, that which despairs of the human +finality of the Universe, of the eternal salvation of the individual +soul. + +All men deserve to be saved, but, as I have said in the previous +chapter, he above all deserves immortality who desires it passionately +and even in the face of reason. An English writer, H.G. Wells, who has +taken upon himself the role of the prophet (a thing not uncommon in his +country), tells us in _Anticipations_ that "active and capable men of +all forms of religious profession tend in practice to disregard the +question of immortality altogether." And this is because the religious +professions of these active and capable men to whom Wells refers are +usually simply a lie, and their lives are a lie, too, if they seek to +base them upon religion. But it may be that at bottom there is not so +much truth in what Wells asserts as he and others imagine. These active +and capable men live in the midst of a society imbued with Christian +principles, surrounded by institutions and social feelings that are the +product of Christianity, and faith in the immortality of the soul exists +deep down in their own souls like a subterranean river, neither seen nor +heard, but watering the roots of their deeds and their motives. + +It must be admitted that there exists in truth no more solid foundation +for morality than the foundation of the Catholic ethic. The end of man +is eternal happiness, which consists in the vision and enjoyment of God +_in saecula saeculorum_. Where it errs, however, is in the choice of the +means conducive to this end; for to make the attainment of eternal +happiness dependent upon believing or not believing in the Procession of +the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son and not from the Father +alone, or in the Divinity of Jesus, or in the theory of the Hypostatic +Union, or even in the existence of God, is, as a moment's reflection +will show, nothing less than monstrous. A human God--and that is the +only kind of God we are able to conceive--would never reject him who was +unable to believe in Him with his head, and it is not in his head but in +his heart that the wicked man says that there is no God, which is +equivalent to saying that he wishes that there may not be a God. If any +belief could be bound up with the attainment of eternal happiness it +would be the belief in this happiness itself and in the possibility of +it. + +And what shall we say of that other proposition of the king of pedants, +to the effect that we have not come into the world to be happy but to +fulfil our duty (_Wir sind nicht auf der Welt, um gluecklich zu sein, +sondern um unsere Schuldigkeit zu tun_)? If we are in the world _for_ +something (_um etwas_), whence can this _for_ be derived but from the +very essence of our own will, which asks for happiness and not duty as +the ultimate end? And if it is sought to attribute some other value to +this _for_, an objective value, as some Sadducean pedant would say, then +it must be recognized that the objective reality, that which would +remain even though humanity should disappear, is as indifferent to our +duty as to our happiness, is as little concerned with our morality as +with our felicity. I am not aware that Jupiter, Uranus, or Sirius would +allow their course to be affected by the fact that we are or are not +fulfilling our duty any more than by the fact that we are or are not +happy. + +Such considerations must appear to these pedants to be characterized by +a ridiculous vulgarity and a dilettante superficiality. (The +intellectual world is divided into two classes--dilettanti on the one +hand, and pedants on the other.) What choice, then, have we? The modern +man is he who resigns himself to the truth and is content to be ignorant +of the synthesis of culture--witness what Windelband says on this head +in his study of the fate of Hoelderlin (_Praeludien_, i.). Yes, these men +of culture are resigned, but there remain a few poor savages like +ourselves for whom resignation is impossible. We do not resign ourselves +to the idea of having one day to disappear, and the criticism of the +great Pedant does not console us. + +The quintessence of common sense was expressed by Galileo Galilei when +he said: "Some perhaps will say that the bitterest pain is the loss of +life, but I say that there are others more bitter; for whosoever is +deprived of life is deprived at the same time of the power to lament, +not only this, but any other loss whatsoever." Whether Galileo was +conscious or not of the humour of this sentence I do not know, but it is +a tragic humour. + +But, to turn back, I repeat that if the attainment of eternal happiness +could be bound up with any particular belief, it would be with the +belief in the possibility of its realization. And yet, strictly +speaking, not even with this. The reasonable man says in his head, +"There is no other life after this," but only the wicked says it in his +heart. But since the wicked man is possibly only a man who has been +driven to despair, will a human God condemn him because of his despair? +His despair alone is misfortune enough. + +But in any event let us adopt the Calderonian formula in _La Vida es +Sueno_: + + _Que estoy sonando y que quiero + obrar hacer bien, pues no se pierde + el hacer bien aun en suenos_[54] + +But are good deeds really not lost? Did Calderon know? And he added: + + _Acudamos a lo eterno + que es la fama vividora + donde ni duermen las dichas + no las grandezas reposan_[55] + +Is it really so? Did Calderon know? + +Calderon had faith, robust Catholic faith; but for him who lacks faith, +for him who cannot believe in what Don Pedro Calderon de la Barca +believed, there always remains the attitude of _Obermann_. + +If it is nothingness that awaits us, let us make an injustice of it; let +us fight against destiny, even though without hope of victory; let us +fight against it quixotically. + +And not only do we fight against destiny in longing for what is +irrational, but in acting in such a way that we make ourselves +irreplaceable, in impressing our seal and mark upon others, in acting +upon our neighbours in order to dominate them, in giving ourselves to +them in order that we may eternalize ourselves so far as we can. + +Our greatest endeavour must be to make ourselves irreplaceable; to make +the theoretical fact--if this expression does not involve a +contradiction in terms--the fact that each one of us is unique and +irreplaceable, that no one else can fill the gap that will be left when +we die, a practical truth. + +For in fact each man is unique and irreplaceable; there cannot be any +other I; each one of us--our soul, that is, not our life--is worth the +whole Universe. I say the spirit and not the life, for the ridiculously +exaggerated value which those attach to human life who, not really +believing in the spirit--that is to say, in their personal +immortality--tirade against war and the death penalty, for example, is a +value which they attach to it precisely because they do not really +believe in the spirit of which life is the servant. For life is of use +only in so far as it serves its lord and master, spirit, and if the +master perishes with the servant, neither the one nor the other is of +any great value. + +And to act in such a way as to make our annihilation an injustice, in +such a way as to make our brothers, our sons, and our brothers' sons, +and their sons' sons, feel that we ought not to have died, is something +that is within the reach of all. + +The essence of the doctrine of the Christian redemption is in the fact +that he who suffered agony and death was the unique man--that is, Man, +the Son of Man, or the Son of God; that he, because he was sinless, did +not deserve to have died; and that this propitiatory divine victim died +in order that he might rise again and that he might raise us up from the +dead, in order that he might deliver us from death by applying his +merits to us and showing us the way of life. And the Christ who gave +himself for his brothers in humanity with an absolute self-abnegation is +the pattern for our action to shape itself on. + +All of us, each one of us, can and ought to determine to give as much +of himself as he possibly can--nay, to give more than he can, to exceed +himself, to go beyond himself, to make himself irreplaceable, to give +himself to others in order that he may receive himself back again from +them. And each one in his own civil calling or office. The word office, +_officium_, means obligation, debt, but in the concrete, and that is +what it always ought to mean in practice. We ought not so much to try to +seek that particular calling which we think most fitting and suitable +for ourselves, as to make a calling of that employment in which chance, +Providence, or our own will has placed us. + +Perhaps Luther rendered no greater service to Christian civilization +than that of establishing the religious value of the civil occupation, +of shattering the monastic and medieval idea of the religious calling, +an idea involved in the mist of human passions and imaginations and the +cause of terrible life tragedies. If we could but enter into the +cloister and examine the religious vocation of those whom the +self-interest of their parents had forced as children into a novice's +cell and who had suddenly awakened to the life of the world--if indeed +they ever do awake!--or of those whom their own self-delusions had led +into it! Luther saw this life of the cloister at close quarters and +suffered it himself, and therefore he was able to understand and feel +the religious value of the civil calling, to which no man is bound by +perpetual vows. + +All that the Apostle said in the fourth chapter of his Epistle to the +Ephesians with regard to the respective functions of Christians in the +Church must be transferred and applied to the civil or +non-ecclesiastical life, for to-day among ourselves the +Christian--whether he know it or not, and whether he like it or not--is +the citizen, and just as the Apostle exclaimed, "I am a Roman citizen!" +each one of us, even the atheist, might exclaim "I am a Christian!" And +this demands the _civilizing_, in the sense of dis-ecclesiasticizing, of +Christianity, which was Luther's task, although he himself eventually +became the founder of a Church. + +There is a common English phrase, "the right man in the right place." To +which we might rejoin, "Cobbler, to thy last!" Who knows what is the +post that suits him best and for which he is most fitted? Does a man +himself know it better than others or do they know it better than he? +Who can measure capacities and aptitudes? The religious attitude, +undoubtedly, is to endeavour to make the occupation in which we find +ourselves our vocation, and only in the last resort to change it for +another. + +This question of the proper vocation is possibly the gravest and most +deep-seated of social problems, that which is at the root of all the +others. That which is known _par excellence_ as the social question is +perhaps not so much a problem of the distribution of wealth, of the +products of labour, as a problem of the distribution of avocations, of +the modes of production. It is not aptitude--a thing impossible to +ascertain without first putting it to the test and not always clearly +indicated in a man, for with regard to the majority of callings a man is +not born but made--it is not special aptitude, but rather social, +political, and customary reasons that determine a man's occupation. At +certain times and in certain countries it is caste and heredity; at +other times and in other places, the guild or corporation; in later +times machinery--in almost all cases necessity; liberty scarcely ever. +And the tragedy of it culminates in those occupations, pandering to +evil, in which the soul is sacrificed for the sake of the livelihood, in +which the workman works with the consciousness, not of the uselessness +merely, but of the social perversity, of his work, manufacturing the +poison that will kill him, the weapon, perchance, with which his +children will be murdered. This, and not the question of wages, is the +gravest problem. + +I shall never forget a scene of which I was a witness that took place +on the banks of the river that flows through Bilbao, my native town. A +workman was hammering at something in a shipwright's yard, working +without putting his heart into his work, as if he lacked energy or +worked merely for the sake of getting a wage, when suddenly a woman's +voice was heard crying, "Help! help!" A child had fallen into the river. +Instantly the man was transformed. With an admirable energy, +promptitude, and sang-froid he threw off his clothes and plunged into +the water to rescue the drowning infant. + +Possibly the reason why there is less bitterness in the agrarian +socialist movement than in that of the towns is that the field labourer, +although his wages and his standard of living are no better than those +of the miner or artisan, has a clearer consciousness of the social value +of his work. Sowing corn is a different thing from extracting diamonds +from the earth. + +And it may be that the greatest social progress consists in a certain +indifferentiation of labour, in the facility for exchanging one kind of +work for another, and that other not perhaps a more lucrative, but a +nobler one--for there are degrees of nobility in labour. But unhappily +it is only too seldom that a man who keeps to one occupation without +changing is concerned with making a religious vocation of it, or that +the man who changes his occupation for another does so from any +religious motive. + +And do you not know cases in which a man, justifying his action on the +ground that the professional organism to which he belongs and in which +he works is badly organized and does not function as it ought, will +evade the strict performance of his duty on the pretext that he is +thereby fulfilling a higher duty? Is not this insistence upon the +literal carrying out of orders called disciplinarianism, and do not +people speak disparagingly of bureaucracy and the Pharisaism of public +officials? And cases occur not unlike that of an intelligent and +studious military officer who should discover the deficiencies of his +country's military organization and denounce them to his superiors and +perhaps to the public--thereby fulfilling his duty--and who, when on +active service, should refuse to carry out an operation which he was +ordered to undertake, believing that there was but scant probability of +success or rather certainty of failure, so long as these deficiencies +remained unremedied. He would deserve to be shot. And as for this +question of Pharisaism ... + +And there is always a way of obeying an order while yet retaining the +command, a way of carrying out what one believes to be an absurd +operation while correcting its absurdity, even though it involve one's +own death. When in my bureaucratic capacity I have come across some +legislative ordinance that has fallen into desuetude because of its +manifest absurdity, I have always endeavoured to apply it. There is +nothing worse than a loaded pistol which nobody uses left lying in some +corner of the house; a child finds it, begins to play with it, and kills +its own father. Laws that have fallen into desuetude are the most +terrible of all laws, when the cause of the desuetude is the badness of +the law. + +And these are not groundless suppositions, and least of all in our +country. For there are many who, while they go about looking out for I +know not what ideal--that is to say, fictitious duties and +responsibilities--neglect the duty of putting their whole soul into the +immediate and concrete business which furnishes them with a living; and +the rest, the immense majority, perform their task perfunctorily, merely +for the sake of nominally complying with their duty--_para cumplir_, a +terribly immoral phrase--in order to get themselves out of a difficulty, +to get the job done, to qualify for their wages without earning them, +whether these wages be pecuniary or otherwise. + +Here you have a shoemaker who lives by making shoes, and makes them with +just enough care and attention to keep his clientele together without +losing custom. Another shoemaker lives on a somewhat higher spiritual +plane, for he has a proper love for his work, and out of pride or a +sense of honour strives for the reputation of being the best shoemaker +in the town or in the kingdom, even though this reputation brings him no +increase of custom or profit, but only renown and prestige. But there is +a still higher degree of moral perfection in this business of +shoemaking, and that is for the shoemaker to aspire to become for his +fellow-townsmen the one and only shoemaker, indispensable and +irreplaceable, the shoemaker who looks after their footgear so well that +they will feel a definite loss when he dies--when he is "dead to them," +not merely "dead"[56]--and they will feel that he ought not to have +died. And this will result from the fact that in working for them he was +anxious to spare them any discomfort and to make sure that it should not +be any preoccupation with their feet that should prevent them from being +at leisure to contemplate the higher truths; he shod them for the love +of them and for the love of God in them--he shod them religiously. + +I have chosen this example deliberately, although it may perhaps appear +to you somewhat pedestrian. For the fact is that in this business of +shoemaking, the religious, as opposed to the ethical, sense is at a very +low ebb. + +Working men group themselves in associations, they form co-operative +societies and unions for defence, they fight very justly and nobly for +the betterment of their class; but it is not clear that these +associations have any great influence on their moral attitude towards +their work. They have succeeded in compelling employers to employ only +such workmen, and no others, as the respective unions shall designate in +each particular case; but in the selection of those designated they pay +little heed to their technical fitness. Often the employer finds it +almost impossible to dismiss an inefficient workman on account of his +inefficiency, for his fellow-workers take his part. Their work, +moreover, is often perfunctory, performed merely as a pretext for +receiving a wage, and instances even occur when they deliberately +mishandle it in order to injure their employer. + +In attempting to justify this state of things, it may be said that the +employers are a hundred times more blameworthy than the workmen, for +they are not concerned to give a better wage to the man who does better +work, or to foster the general education and technical proficiency of +the workman, or to ensure the intrinsic goodness of the article +produced. The improvement of the product--which, apart from reasons of +industrial and mercantile competition, ought to be in itself and for the +good of the consumers, for charity's sake, the chief end of the +business--is not so regarded either by employers or employed, and this +is because neither the one nor the other have any religious sense of +their social function. Neither of them seek to make themselves +irreplaceable. The evil is aggravated when the business takes the +unhappy form of the impersonal limited company, for where there is no +longer any personal signature there is no longer any of that pride which +seeks to give the signature prestige, a pride which in its way is a +substitute for the craving for eternalization. With the disappearance of +the concrete individuality, the basis of all religion, the religious +sense of the business calling disappears also. + +And what has been said of employers and workmen applies still more to +members of the liberal professions and public functionaries. There is +scarcely a single servant of the State who feels the religious bearing +of his official and public duties. Nothing could be more unsatisfactory, +nothing more confused, than the feeling among our people with regard to +their duties towards the State, and this sense of duty is still further +obliterated by the attitude of the Catholic Church, whose action so far +as the State is concerned is in strict truth anarchical. It is no +uncommon thing to find among its ministers upholders of the moral +lawfulness of smuggling and contraband as if in disobeying the legally +constituted authority the smuggler and contrabandist did not sin against +the Fourth Commandment of the law of God, which in commanding us to +honour our father and mother commands us to obey all lawful authority in +so far as the ordinances of such authority are not contrary (and the +levying of these contributions is certainly not contrary) to the law of +God. + +There are many who, since it is written "In the sweat of thy face shalt +thou eat bread," regard work as a punishment, and therefore they +attribute merely an economico-political, or at best an esthetic, value +to the work of everyday life. For those who take this view--and it is +the view principally held by the Jesuits--the business of life is +twofold: there is the inferior and transitory business of winning a +livelihood, of winning bread for ourselves and our children in an +honourable, manner--and the elasticity of this honour is well known; and +there is the grand business of our salvation, of winning eternal glory. +This inferior or worldly business is to be undertaken not only so as to +permit us, without deceiving or seriously injuring our neighbours, to +live decently in accordance with our social position, but also so as to +afford us the greatest possible amount of time for attending to the +other main business of our life. And there are others who, rising +somewhat above this conception of the work of our civil occupation, a +conception which is economical rather than ethical, attain to an +esthetic conception and sense of it, and this involves endeavouring to +acquire distinction and renown in our occupation, the converting of it +into an art for art's sake, for beauty's sake. But it is necessary to +rise still higher than this, to attain to an ethical sense of our civil +calling, to a sense which derives from our religious sense, from our +hunger of eternalization. To work at our ordinary civil occupation, with +eyes fixed on God, for the love of God, which is equivalent to saying +for the love of our eternalization, is to make of this work a work of +religion. + +That saying, "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread," does not +mean that God condemned man to work, but to the painfulness of it. It +would have been no condemnation to have condemned man to work itself, +for work is the only practical consolation for having been born. And, +for a Christian, the proof that God did not condemn man to work itself +consists in the saying of the Scripture that, before the Fall, while he +was still in a state of innocence, God took man and put him in the +garden "to dress it and to keep it" (Gen. ii. 15). And how, in fact, +would man have passed his time in Paradise if he had had no work to do +in keeping it in order? And may it not be that the beatific vision +itself is a kind of work? + +And even if work were our punishment, we ought to strive to make it, the +punishment itself, our consolation and our redemption; and if we must +needs embrace some cross or other, there is for each one of us no better +cross than the cross of our own civil calling. For Christ did not say, +"Take up my cross and follow me," but "Take up thy cross and follow me": +every man his own cross, for the Saviour's cross the Saviour alone can +bear. And the imitation of Christ, therefore, does not consist in that +monastic ideal so shiningly set forth in the book that commonly bears +the name of a Kempis, an ideal only applicable to a very limited number +of persons and therefore anti-Christian; but to imitate Christ is to +take up each one his own cross, the cross of his own civil +occupation--civil and not merely religions--as Christ took up his cross, +the cross of his calling, and to embrace it and carry it, looking +towards God and striving to make each act of this calling a true prayer. +In making shoes and because he makes them a man can gain heaven, +provided that the shoemaker strives to be perfect, as a shoemaker, as +our Father in heaven is perfect. + +Fourier, the socialist dreamer, dreamed of making work attractive in his +phalansteries by the free choice of vocations and in other ways. There +is no other way than that of liberty. Wherein consists the charm of the +game of chance, which is a kind of work, if not in the voluntary +submission of the player to the liberty of Nature--that is, to chance? +But do not let us lose ourselves in a comparison between work and play. + +And the sense of making ourselves irreplaceable, of not meriting death, +of making our annihilation, if it is annihilation that awaits us, an +injustice, ought to impel us not only to perform our own occupation +religiously, from love of God and love of our eternity and +eternalization, but to perform it passionately, tragically if you like. +It ought to impel us to endeavour to stamp others with our seal, to +perpetuate ourselves in them and in their children by dominating them, +to leave on all things the imperishable impress of our signature. The +most fruitful ethic is the ethic of mutual imposition. + +Above all, we must recast in a positive form the negative commandments +which we have inherited from the Ancient Law. Thus where it is written, +"Thou shalt not lie!" let us understand, "Thou shalt always speak the +truth, in season and out of season!" although it is we ourselves, and +not others, who are judges in each case of this seasonableness. And for +"Thou shalt not kill!" let us understand, "Thou shalt give life and +increase it!" And for "Thou shalt not steal!" let us say, "Thou shalt +increase the general wealth!" And for "Thou shalt not commit adultery!" +"Thou shalt give children, healthy, strong, and good, to thy country and +to heaven!" And thus with all the other commandments. + +He who does not lose his life shall not find it. Give yourself then to +others, but in order to give yourself to them, first dominate them. For +it is not possible to dominate except by being dominated. Everyone +nourishes himself upon the flesh of that which he devours. In order that +you may dominate your neighbour you must know and love him. It is by +attempting to impose my ideas upon him that I become the recipient of +his ideas. To love my neighbour is to wish that he may be like me, that +he may be another I--that is to say, it is to wish that I may be he; it +is to wish to obliterate the division between him and me, to suppress +the evil. My endeavour to impose myself upon another, to be and live in +him and by him, to make him mine--which is the same as making myself +his--is that which gives religious meaning to human collectivity, to +human solidarity. + +The feeling of solidarity originates in myself; since I am a society, I +feel the need of making myself master of human society; since I am a +social product, I must socialize myself, and from myself I proceed to +God--who is I projected to the All--and from God to each of my +neighbours. + +My immediate first impulse is to protest against the inquisitor and to +prefer the merchant who comes to offer me his wares. But when my +impressions are clarified by reflection, I begin to see that the +inquisitor, when he acts from a right motive, treats me as a man, as an +end in myself, and if he molests me it is from a charitable wish to save +my soul; while the merchant, on the other hand, regards me merely as a +customer, as a means to an end, and his indulgence and tolerance is at +bottom nothing but a supreme indifference to my destiny. There is much +more humanity in the inquisitor. + +Similarly there is much more humanity in war than in peace. +Non-resistance to evil implies resistance to good, and to take the +offensive, leaving the defensive out of the question, is perhaps the +divinest thing in humanity. War is the school of fraternity and the bond +of love; it is war that has brought peoples into touch with one +another, by mutual aggression and collision, and has been the cause of +their knowing and loving one another. Human love knows no purer embrace, +or one more fruitful in its consequences, than that between victor and +vanquished on the battlefield. And even the purified hate that springs +from war is fruitful. War is, in its strictest sense, the sanctification +of homicide; Cain is redeemed as a leader of armies. And if Cain had not +killed his brother Abel, perhaps he would have died by the hand of Abel. +God revealed Himself above all in war; He began by being the God of +battles; and one of the greatest services of the Cross is that, in the +form of the sword-hilt, it protects the hand that wields the sword. + +The enemies of the State say that Cain, the fratricide, was the founder +of the State. And we must accept the fact and turn it to the glory of +the State, the child of war. Civilization began on the day on which one +man, by subjecting another to his will and compelling him to do the work +of two, was enabled to devote himself to the contemplation of the world +and to set his captive upon works of luxury. It was slavery that enabled +Plato to speculate upon the ideal republic, and it was war that brought +slavery about. Not without reason was Athena the goddess of war and of +wisdom. But is there any need to repeat once again these obvious truths, +which, though they have continually been forgotten, are continually +rediscovered? + +And the supreme commandment that arises out of love towards God, and the +foundation of all morality, is this: Yield yourself up entirely, give +your spirit to the end that you may save it, that you may eternalize it. +Such is the sacrifice of life. + +The individual _qua_ individual, the wretched captive of the instinct of +preservation and of the senses, cares only about preserving himself, and +all his concern is that others should not force their way into his +sphere, should not disturb him, should not interrupt his idleness; and +in return for their abstention or for the sake of example he refrains +from forcing himself upon them, from interrupting their idleness, from +disturbing them, from taking possession of them. "Do not do unto others +what you would not have them do unto you," he translates thus: I do not +interfere with others--let them not interfere with me. And he shrinks +and pines and perishes in this spiritual avarice and this repellent +ethic of anarchic individualism: each one for himself. And as each one +is not himself, he can hardly live for himself. + +But as soon as the individual feels himself in society, he feels himself +in God, and kindled by the instinct of perpetuation he glows with love +towards God, and with a dominating charity he seeks to perpetuate +himself in others, to perennialize his spirit, to eternalize it, to +unnail God, and his sole desire is to seal his spirit upon other spirits +and to receive their impress in return. He has shaken off the yoke of +his spiritual sloth and avarice. + +Sloth, it is said, is the mother of all the vices; and in fact sloth +does engender two vices--avarice and envy--which in their turn are the +source of all the rest. Sloth is the weight of matter, in itself inert, +within us, and this sloth, while it professes to preserve us by +economizing our forces, in reality attenuates us and reduces us to +nothing. + +In man there is either too much matter or too much spirit, or to put it +better, either he feels a hunger for spirit--that is, for eternity--or +he feels a hunger for matter--that is, submission to annihilation. When +spirit is in excess and he feels a hunger for yet more of it, he pours +it forth and scatters it abroad, and in scattering it abroad he +amplifies it with that of others; and on the contrary, when a man is +avaricious of himself and thinks that he will preserve himself better by +withdrawing within himself, he ends by losing all--he is like the man +who received the single talent: he buried it in order that he might not +lose it, and in the end he was bereft of it. For to him that hath shall +be given, but from him that hath but a little shall be taken away even +the little that he hath. + +Be ye perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect, we are bidden, +and this terrible precept--terrible because for us the infinite +perfection of the Father is unattainable--must be our supreme rule of +conduct. Unless a man aspires to the impossible, the possible that he +achieves will be scarcely worth the trouble of achieving. It behoves us +to aspire to the impossible, to the absolute and infinite perfection, +and to say to the Father, "Father, I cannot--help Thou my impotence." +And He acting in us will achieve it for us. + +And to be perfect is to be all, it is to be myself and to be all else, +it is to be humanity, it is to be the Universe. And there is no other +way of being all but to give oneself to all, and when all shall be in +all, all will be in each one of us. The apocatastasis is more than a +mystical dream: it is a rule of action, it is a beacon beckoning us to +high exploits. + +And from it springs the ethic of invasion, of domination, of aggression, +of inquisition if you like. For true charity is a kind of invasion--it +consists in putting my spirit into other spirits, in giving them my +suffering as the food and consolation for their sufferings, in awakening +their unrest with my unrest, in sharpening their hunger for God with my +hunger for God. It is not charity to rock and lull our brothers to sleep +in the inertia and drowsiness of matter, but rather to awaken them to +the uneasiness and torment of spirit. + +To the fourteen works of mercy which we learnt in the Catechism of +Christian Doctrine there should sometimes be added yet another, that of +awakening the sleeper. Sometimes, at any rate, and surely when the +sleeper sleeps on the brink of a precipice, it is much more merciful to +awaken him than to bury him after he is dead--let us leave the dead to +bury their dead. It has been well said, "Whosoever loves thee dearly +will make thee weep," and charity often causes weeping. "The love that +does not mortify does not deserve so divine a name," said that ardent +Portuguese apostle, Fr. Thome de Jesus,[57] who was also the author of +this ejaculation--"O infinite fire, O eternal love, who weepest when +thou hast naught to embrace and feed upon and many hearts to burn!" He +who loves his neighbour burns his heart, and the heart, like green wood, +in burning groans and distils itself in tears. + +And to do this is generosity, one of the two mother virtues which are +born when inertia, sloth, is overcome. Most of our miseries come from +spiritual avarice. + +The cure for suffering--which, as we have said, is the collision of +consciousness with unconsciousness--is not to be submerged in +unconsciousness, but to be raised to consciousness and to suffer more. +The evil of suffering is cured by more suffering, by higher suffering. +Do not take opium, but put salt and vinegar in the soul's wound, for +when you sleep and no longer feel the suffering, you are not. And to be, +that is imperative. Do not then close your eyes to the agonizing Sphinx, +but look her in the face and let her seize you in her mouth and crunch +you with her hundred thousand poisonous teeth and swallow you. And when +she has swallowed you, you will know the sweetness of the taste of +suffering. + +The way thereto in practice is by the ethic of mutual imposition. Men +should strive to impose themselves upon one another, to give their +spirits to one another, to seal one another's souls. + +There is matter for thought in the fact that the Christian ethic has +been called an ethic of slaves. By whom? By anarchists! It is anarchism +that is an ethic of slaves, for it is only the slave that chants the +praises of anarchical liberty. Anarchism, no! but _panarchism_; not the +creed of "Nor God nor master!" but that of "All gods and all masters!" +all striving to become gods, to become immortal, and achieving this by +dominating others. + +And there are so many ways of dominating. There is even a passive way, +or one at least that is apparently passive, of fulfilling at times this +law of life. Adaptation to environment, imitation, putting oneself in +another's place, sympathy, in a word, besides being a manifestation of +the unity of the species, is a mode of self-expansion, of being another. +To be conquered, or at least to seem to be conquered, is often to +conquer; to take what is another's is a way of living in him. + +And in speaking of domination, I do not mean the domination of the +tiger. The fox also dominates by cunning, and the hare by flight, and +the viper by poison, and the mosquito by its smallness, and the squid by +the inky fluid with which it darkens the water and under cover of which +it escapes. And no one is scandalized at this, for the same universal +Father who gave its fierceness, its talons, and its jaws to the tiger, +gave cunning to the fox, swift feet to the hare, poison to the viper, +diminutiveness to the mosquito, and its inky fluid to the squid. And +nobleness or ignobleness does not consist in the weapons we use, for +every species and even every individual possesses its own, but rather in +the way in which we use them, and above all in the cause in which we +wield them. + +And among the weapons of conquest must be included the weapon of +patience and of resignation, but a passionate patience and a passionate +resignation, containing within itself an active principle and antecedent +longings. You remember that famous sonnet of Milton--Milton, the great +fighter, the great Puritan disturber of the spiritual peace, the singer +of Satan--who, when he considered how his light was spent and that one +talent which it is death to hide lodged with him useless, heard the +voice of Patience saying to him, + + God doth not need + Either man's work, or his own gifts; who best + Bear his mild yoke, they serve Him best: his state + Is kingly; thousands at his bidding speed, + And post o'er land and ocean without rest; + They also serve who only stand and wait. + +They also serve who only stand and wait--yes, but it is when they wait +for Him passionately, hungeringly, full of longing for immortality in +Him. + +And we must impose ourselves, even though it be by our patience. "My cup +is small, but I drink out of my cup," said the egoistical poet of an +avaricious people.[58] No, out of my cup all drink, for I wish all to +drink out of it; I offer it to them, and my cup grows according to the +number of those who drink out of it, and all, in putting it to their +lips, leave in it something of their spirit. And while they drink out of +my cup, I also drink out of theirs. For the more I belong to myself, and +the more I am myself, the more I belong to others; out of the fullness +of myself I overflow upon my brothers, and as I overflow upon them they +enter into me. + +"Be ye perfect, as your Father is perfect," we are bidden, and our +Father is perfect because He is Himself and because He is in each one of +His children who live and move and have their being in Him. And the end +of perfection is that we all may be one (John xvii. 21), all one body in +Christ (Rom. xii. 5), and that, at the last, when all things are subdued +unto the Son, the Son himself may be subject to Him that put all things +under him, that God may be all in all. And this is to make the Universe +consciousness, to make Nature a society, and a human society. And then +shall we be able confidently to call God Father. + +I am aware that those who say that ethics is a science will say that +all this commentary of mine is nothing but rhetoric; but each man has +his own language and his own passion--that is to say, each man who knows +what passion is--and as for the man who knows it not, nothing will it +avail him to know science. + +And the passion that finds its expression in this rhetoric, the devotees +of ethical science call egotism. But this egotism is the only true +remedy for egoism, spiritual avarice, the vice of preserving and +reserving oneself and of not striving to perennialize oneself by giving +oneself. + +"Be not, and ye shall be mightier than all that is," said Fr. Juan de +los Angeles in one of his _Dialogos de la Conquista del Reina de Dios_ +(_Dial._, iii., 8); but what does this "Be not" mean? May it not mean +paradoxically--and such a mode of expression is common with the +mystics--the contrary of that which, at a first and literal reading, it +would appear to mean? Is not the whole ethic of submission and quietism +an immense paradox, or rather a great tragic contradiction? Is not the +monastic, the strictly monastic, ethic an absurdity? And by the monastic +ethic I mean that of the solitary Carthusian, that of the hermit, who +flees from the world--perhaps carrying it with him nevertheless--in +order that he may live quite alone with a God who is lonely as himself; +not that of the Dominican inquisitor who scoured Provence in search of +Albigensian hearts to burn. + +"Let God do it all," someone will say; but if man folds his arms, God +will go to sleep. + +This Carthusian ethic and that scientific ethic which is derived from +ethical science--oh, this science of ethics! rational and rationalistic +ethics! pedantry of pedantry, all is pedantry!--yes, this perhaps is +egoism and coldness of heart. + +There are some who say that they isolate themselves with God in order +that they may the better work out their salvation, their redemption; but +since sin is collective, redemption must be collective also. "The +religious is the determination of the whole, and everything outside this +is an illusion of the senses, and that is why the greatest criminal is +at bottom innocent, a good-natured man and a saint" (Kierkegaard, +_Afsluttende_, etc., ii., ii., cap. iv., sect. 2, _a_). + +Are we to understand, on the other hand, that men seek to gain the +other, the eternal life, by renouncing this the temporal life? If the +other life is anything, it must be a continuation of this, and only as +such a continuation, more or less purified, is it mirrored in our +desire; and if this is so, such as is this life of time, so will be the +life of eternity. + +"This world and the other are like the two wives of one husband--if he +pleases one he makes the other envious," said an Arab thinker, quoted by +Windelband (_Das Heilige_, in vol. ii. of _Praeludien_); but such a +thought could only have arisen in the mind of one who had failed to +resolve the tragic conflict between his spirit and the world in a +fruitful warfare, a practical contradiction. "Thy kingdom come" to us; +so Christ taught us to pray to the Father, not "May we come to Thy +kingdom"; and according to the primitive Christian belief the eternal +life was to be realized on this earth itself and as a continuation of +the earthly life. We were made men and not angels in order that we might +seek our happiness through the medium of this life, and the Christ of +the Christian Faith became, not an angelic, but a human, being, +redeeming us by taking upon himself a real and effective body and not an +appearance of one merely. And according to this same Faith, even the +highest of the angelical hierarchy adore the Virgin, the supreme symbol +of terrestrial Humanity. The angelical ideal, therefore, is not the +Christian ideal, and still less is it the human ideal, nor can it be. An +angel, moreover, is a neutral being, without sex and without country. + +It is impossible for us to feel the other life, the eternal life, I have +already repeated more than once, as a life of angelical contemplation; +it must be a life of action. Goethe said that "man must believe in +immortality, since in his nature he has a right to it." And he added: +"The conviction of our persistence arises in me from the concept of +activity. If I work without ceasing to the end, Nature is obliged (_so +ist die Natur verpflichtet_) to provide me with another form of +existence, since my actual spirit can bear no more." Change Nature to +God, and you have a thought that remains Christian in character, for the +first Fathers of the Church did not believe that the immortality of the +soul was a natural gift--that is to say, something rational--but a +divine gift of grace. And that which is of grace is usually, in its +essence, of justice, since justice is divine and gratuitous, not +natural. And Goethe added: "I could begin nothing with an eternal +happiness before me, unless new tasks and new difficulties were given me +to overcome." And true it is that there is no happiness in a vacuity of +contemplation. + +But may there not be some justification for the morality of the hermit, +of the Carthusian, the ethic of the Thebaid? Might we not say, perhaps, +that it is necessary to preserve these exceptional types in order that +they may stand as everlasting patterns for mankind? Do not men breed +racehorses, which are useless for any practical kind of work, but which +preserve the purity of the breed and become the sires of excellent +hackneys and hunters? Is there not a luxury of ethics, not less +justifiable than any other sort of luxury? But, on the other hand, is +not all this substantially esthetics, and not ethics, still less +religion? May not the contemplative, medieval, monastic ideal be +esthetical, and not religious nor even ethical? And after all, those of +the seekers after solitude who have related to us their conversation +when they were alone with God have performed an eternalizing work, they +have concerned themselves with the souls of others. And by this alone, +that it has given us an Eckhart, a Seuse, a Tauler, a Ruysbroek, a Juan +de la Cruz, a Catherine of Siena, an Angela of Foligno, a Teresa de +Jesus, is the cloister justified. + +But the chief of our Spanish Orders are the Predicadores, founded by +Domingo de Guzman for the aggressive work of extirpating heresy; the +Company of Jesus, a militia with the world as its field of operations +(which explains its history); the order of the Escuelas Pias, also +devoted to a work of an aggressive or invasive nature, that of +instruction. I shall certainly be reminded that the reform of the +contemplative Order of the Carmelites which Teresa de Jesus undertook +was a Spanish work. Yes, Spanish it was, and in it men sought liberty. + +It was, in fact, the yearning for liberty, for inward liberty, which, in +the troubled days of the Inquisition, led many choice spirits to the +cloister. They imprisoned themselves in order that they might be more +free. "Is it not a fine thing that a poor nun of San Jose can attain to +sovereignty over the whole earth and the elements?" said St. Teresa in +her _Life_. It was the Pauline yearning for liberty, the longing to +shake off the bondage of the external law, which was then very severe, +and, as Maestro Fray Luis de Leon said, very stubborn. + +But did they actually find liberty in the cloister? It is very doubtful +if they did, and to-day it is impossible. For true liberty is not to rid +oneself of the external law; liberty is consciousness of the law. Not he +who has shaken off the yoke of the law is free, but he who has made +himself master of the law. Liberty must be sought in the midst of the +world, which is the domain of the law, and of sin, the offspring of the +law. That which we must be freed from is sin, which is collective. + +Instead of renouncing the world in order that we may dominate it--and +who does not know the collective instinct of domination of those +religious Orders whose members renounce the world?--what we ought to do +is to dominate the world in order that we may be able to renounce it. +Not to seek poverty and submission, but to seek wealth in order that we +may use it to increase human consciousness, and to seek power for the +same end. + +It is curious that monks and anarchists should be at enmity with each +other, when fundamentally they both profess the same ethic and are +related by close ties of kinship. Anarchism tends to become a kind of +atheistic monachism and a religious, rather than an ethical or +economico-social, doctrine. The one party starts from the assumption +that man is naturally evil, born in original sin, and that it is through +grace that he becomes good, if indeed he ever does become good; and the +other from the assumption that man is naturally good and is subsequently +perverted by society. And these two theories really amount to the same +thing, for in both the individual is opposed to society, as if the +individual had preceded society and therefore were destined to survive +it. And both ethics are ethics of the cloister. + +And the fact that guilt is collective must not actuate me to throw mine +upon the shoulders of others, but rather to take upon myself the burden +of the guilt of others, the guilt of all men; not to merge and sink my +guilt in the total mass of guilt, but to make this total guilt my own; +not to dismiss and banish my own guilt, but to open the doors of my +heart to the guilt of all men, to centre it within myself and +appropriate it to myself. And each one of us ought to help to remedy the +guilt, and just because others do not do so. The fact that society is +guilty aggravates the guilt of each member of it. "Someone ought to do +it, but why should I? is the ever re-echoed phrase of weak-kneed +amiability. Someone ought to do it, so why not I? is the cry of some +earnest servant of man, eagerly forward springing to face some perilous +duty. Between these two sentences lie whole centuries of moral +evolution." Thus spoke Mrs. Annie Besant in her autobiography. Thus +spoke theosophy. + +The fact that society is guilty aggravates the guilt of each one, and he +is most guilty who most is sensible of the guilt. Christ, the innocent, +since he best knew the intensity of the guilt, was in a certain sense +the most guilty. In him the culpability, together with the divinity, of +humanity arrived at the consciousness of itself. Many are wont to be +amused when they read how, because of the most trifling faults, faults +at which a man of the world would merely smile, the greatest saints +counted themselves the greatest sinners. But the intensity of the fault +is not measured by the external act, but by the consciousness of it, and +an act for which the conscience of one man suffers acutely makes +scarcely any impression on the conscience of another. And in a saint, +conscience may be developed so fully and to such a degree of +sensitiveness that the slightest sin may cause him more remorse than his +crime causes the greatest criminal. And sin rests upon our consciousness +of it, it is in him who judges and in so far as he judges. When a man +commits a vicious act believing in good faith that he is doing a +virtuous action, we cannot hold him morally guilty, while on the other +hand that man is guilty who commits an act which he believes to be +wrong, even though in itself the act is indifferent or perhaps +beneficent. The act passes away, the intention remains, and the evil of +the evil act is that it corrupts the intention, that in knowingly doing +wrong a man is predisposed to go on doing it, that it blurs the +conscience. And doing evil is not the same as being evil. Evil blurs the +conscience, and not only the moral conscience but the general, psychical +consciousness. And everything that exalts and expands consciousness is +good, while that which depresses and diminishes it is evil. + +And here we might raise the question which, according to Plato, was +propounded by Socrates, as to whether virtue is knowledge, which is +equivalent to asking whether virtue is rational. + +The ethicists--those who maintain that ethics is a science, those whom +the reading of these divagations will provoke to exclaim, "Rhetoric, +rhetoric, rhetoric!"--would appear to think that virtue is the fruit of +knowledge, of rational study, and that even mathematics help us to be +better men. I do not know, but for my part I feel that virtue, like +religion, like the longing never to die--and all these are fundamentally +the same thing--is the fruit of passion. + +But, I shall be asked, What then is passion? I do not know, or rather, I +know full well, because I feel it, and since I feel it there is no need +for me to define it to myself. Nay, more; I fear that if I were to +arrive at a definition of it, I should cease to feel it and to possess +it. Passion is like suffering, and like suffering it creates its object. +It is easier for the fire to find something to burn than for something +combustible to find the fire. + +That this may appear empty and sophistical well I know. And I shall also +be told that there is the science of passion and the passion of science, +and that it is in the moral sphere that reason and life unite together. + +I do not know, I do not know, I do not know.... And perhaps I may be +saying fundamentally the same thing, although more confusedly, that my +imaginary adversaries say, only more clearly, more definitely, and more +rationally, those adversaries whom I imagine in order that I may have +someone to fight. I do not know, I do not know.... But what they say +freezes me and sounds to me as though it proceeded from emptiness of +feeling. + +And, returning to our former question, Is virtue knowledge?--Is +knowledge virtue? For they are two distinct questions. Virtue may be a +science, the science of acting rightly, without every other science +being therefore virtue. The virtue of Machiavelli is a science, and it +cannot be said that his _virtu_ is always moral virtue It is well known, +moreover, that the cleverest and the most learned men are not the best. + +No, no, no! Physiology does not teach us how to digest, nor logic how to +discourse, nor esthetics how to feel beauty or express it, nor ethics +how to be good. And indeed it is well if they do not teach us how to be +hypocrites; for pedantry, whether it be the pedantry of logic, or of +esthetics, or of ethics, is at bottom nothing but hypocrisy. + +Reason perhaps teaches certain bourgeois virtues, but it does not make +either heroes or saints. Perhaps the saint is he who does good not for +good's sake, but for God's sake, for the sake of eternalization. + +Perhaps, on the other hand, culture, or as I should say Culture--oh, +this culture!--which is primarily the work of philosophers and men of +science, is a thing which neither heroes nor saints have had any share +in the making of. For saints have concerned themselves very little with +the progress of human culture; they have concerned themselves rather +with the salvation of the individual souls of those amongst whom they +lived. Of what account in the history of human culture is our San Juan +de la Cruz, for example--that fiery little monk, as culture, in perhaps +somewhat uncultured phrase, has called him--compared with Descartes? + +All those saints, burning with religious charity towards their +neighbours, hungering for their own and others' eternalization, who went +about burning hearts, inquisitors, it may be--what have all those saints +done for the progress of the science of ethics? Did any of them discover +the categorical imperative, like the old bachelor of Koenigsberg, who, if +he was not a saint, deserved to be one? + +The son of a famous professor of ethics, one who scarcely ever opened +his lips without mentioning the categorical imperative, was lamenting to +me one day the fact that he lived in a desolating dryness of spirit, in +a state of inward emptiness. And I was constrained to answer him thus: +"My friend, your father had a subterranean river flowing through his +spirit, a fresh current fed by the beliefs of his early childhood, by +hopes in the beyond; and while he thought that he was nourishing his +soul with this categorical imperative or something of that sort, he was +in reality nourishing it with those waters which had their spring in his +childish days. And it may be that to you he has given the flower of his +spirit, his rational doctrines of ethics, but not the root, not the +subterranean source, not the irrational substratum." + +How was it that Krausism took root here in Spain, while Kantism and +Hegelianism did not, although the two latter systems are much more +profound, morally and philosophically, than the first? Because in +transplanting the first, its roots were transplanted with it. The +philosophical thought of a people or a period is, as it were, the +flower, the thing that is external and above ground; but this flower, or +fruit if you prefer it, draws its sap from the root of the plant, and +this root, which is in and under the ground, is the religious sense. The +philosophical thought of Kant, the supreme flower of the mental +evolution of the Germanic people, has its roots in the religious feeling +of Luther, and it is not possible for Kantism, especially the practical +part of it, to take root and bring forth flower and fruit in peoples who +have not undergone the experience of the Reformation and who perhaps +were incapable of experiencing it. Kantism is Protestant, and we +Spaniards are fundamentally Catholic. And if Krause struck some roots +here--more numerous and more permanent than is commonly supposed--it is +because Krause had roots in pietism, and pietism, as Ritschl has +demonstrated in his _Geschichte des Pietismus_, has specifically +Catholic roots and may be described as the irruption, or rather the +persistence, of Catholic mysticism in the heart of Protestant +rationalism. And this explains why not a few Catholic thinkers in Spain +became followers of Krause. + +And since we Spaniards are Catholic--whether we know it or not, and +whether we like it or not--and although some of us may claim to be +rationalists or atheists, perhaps the greatest service we can render to +the cause of culture, and of what is of more value than culture, +religiousness--if indeed they are not the same thing--is in endeavouring +to formulate clearly to ourselves this subconscious, social, or popular +Catholicism of ours. And that is what I have attempted to do in this +work. + +What I call the tragic sense of life in men and peoples is at any rate +our tragic sense of life, that of Spaniards and the Spanish people, as +it is reflected in my consciousness, which is a Spanish consciousness, +made in Spain. And this tragic sense of life is essentially the Catholic +sense of it, for Catholicism, and above all popular Catholicism, is +tragic. The people abhors comedy. When Pilate--the type of the refined +gentleman, the superior person, the esthete, the rationalist if you +like--proposes to give the people comedy and mockingly presents Christ +to them, saying, "Behold the man!" the people mutinies and shouts +"Crucify him! Crucify him!" The people does not want comedy but tragedy. +And that which Dante, the great Catholic, called the Divine Comedy, is +the most tragical tragedy that has ever been written. + +And as I have endeavoured in these essays to exhibit the soul of a +Spaniard, and therewithal the Spanish soul, I have curtailed the number +of quotations from Spanish writers, while scattering with perhaps too +lavish a hand those from the writers of other countries. For all human +souls are brother-souls. + +And there is one figure, a comically tragic figure, a figure in which +is revealed all that is profoundly tragic in the human comedy, the +figure of Our Lord Don Quixote, the Spanish Christ, who resumes and +includes in himself the immortal soul of my people. Perhaps the passion +and death of the Knight of the Sorrowful Countenance is the passion and +death of the Spanish people, its death and resurrection. And there is a +Quixotesque philosophy and even a Quixotesque metaphysic, there is a +Quixotesque logic, and also a Quixotesque ethic and a Quixotesque +religious sense--the religious sense of Spanish Catholicism. This is the +philosophy, this is the logic, this is the ethic, this is the religious +sense, that I have endeavoured to outline, to suggest rather than to +develop, in this work. To develop it rationally, no; the Quixotesque +madness does not submit to scientific logic. + +And now, before concluding and bidding my readers farewell, it remains +for me to speak of the role that is reserved for Don Quixote in the +modern European tragi-comedy. + +Let us see, in the next and last essay, what this may be. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[54] Act II., Scene 4: "I am dreaming and I wish to act rightly, for +good deeds are not lost, though they be wrought in dreams." + +[55] Act III., Scene 10: "Let us aim at the eternal, the glory that does +not wane, where bliss slumbers not and where greatness does not repose." + +[56] "Se _les_ muera," y no solo "se muera." + +[57] _Trabalhos de Jesus_, part i. + +[58] De Musset. + + + + +CONCLUSION + +DON QUIXOTE IN THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN TRAGI-COMEDY + +"A voice crying in the wilderness!"--ISA. xl. 3. + + +Need is that I bring to a conclusion, for the present at any rate, these +essays that threaten to become like a tale that has no ending. They have +gone straight from my hands to the press in the form of a kind of +improvization upon notes collected during a number of years, and in +writing each essay I have not had before me any of those that preceded +it. And thus they will go forth full of inward contradictions--apparent +contradictions, at any rate--like life and like me myself. + +My sin, if any, has been that I have embellished them to excess with +foreign quotations, many of which will appear to have been dragged in +with a certain degree of violence. But I will explain this another time. + +A few years after Our Lord Don Quixote had journeyed through Spain, +Jacob Boehme declared in his _Aurora_ (chap xi., Sec. 142) that he did not +write a story or history related to him by others, but that he himself +had had to stand in the battle, which he found to be full of heavy +strivings, and wherein he was often struck down to the ground like all +other men; and a little further on (Sec. 152) he adds: "Although I must +become a spectacle of scorn to the world and the devil, yet my hope is +in God concerning the life to come; in Him will I venture to hazard it +and not resist or strive against the Spirit. Amen." And like this +Quixote of the German intellectual world, neither will I resist the +Spirit. + +And therefore I cry with the voice of one crying in the wilderness, and +I send forth my cry from this University of Salamanca, a University that +arrogantly styled itself _omnium scientiarum princeps_, and which +Carlyle called a stronghold of ignorance and which a French man of +letters recently called a phantom University; I send it forth from this +Spain--"the land of dreams that become realities, the rampart of Europe, +the home of the knightly ideal," to quote from a letter which the +American poet Archer M. Huntington sent me the other day--from this +Spain which was the head and front of the Counter-Reformation in the +sixteenth century. And well they repay her for it! + +In the fourth of these essays I spoke of the essence of Catholicism. And +the chief factors in _de-essentializing_ it--that is, in +de-Catholicizing Europe--have been the Renaissance, the Reformation, and +the Revolution, which for the ideal of an eternal, ultra-terrestrial +life, have substituted the ideal of progress, of reason, of science, or, +rather, of Science with the capital letter. And last of all, the +dominant ideal of to-day, comes Culture. + +And in the second half of the nineteenth century, an age essentially +unphilosophical and technical, dominated by a myopic specialism and by +historical materialism, this ideal took a practical form, not so much in +the popularization as in the vulgarization of science--or, rather, of +pseudo-science--venting itself in a flood of cheap, popular, and +propagandist literature. Science sought to popularize itself as if it +were its function to come down to the people and subserve their +passions, and not the duty of the people to rise to science and through +science to rise to higher heights, to new and profounder aspirations. + +All this led Brunetiere to proclaim the bankruptcy of science, and this +science--if you like to call it science--did in effect become bankrupt. +And as it failed to satisfy, men continued their quest for happiness, +but without finding it, either in wealth, or in knowledge, or in power, +or in pleasure, or in resignation, or in a good conscience, or in +culture. And the result was pessimism. + +Neither did the gospel of progress satisfy. What end did progress serve? +Man would not accommodate himself to rationalism; the _Kulturkampf_ did +not suffice him; he sought to give a final finality to life, and what I +call the final finality is the real _hontos hon_. And the famous _maladie +du siecle_, which announced itself in Rousseau and was exhibited more +plainly in Senancour's _Obermann_ than in any other character, neither +was nor is anything else but the loss of faith in the immortality of the +soul, in the human finality of the Universe. + +The truest symbol of it is to be found in a creation of fiction, Dr. +Faustus. + +This immortal Dr. Faustus, the product of the Renaissance and the +Reformation, first comes into our ken at the beginning of the +seventeenth century, when in 1604 he is introduced to us by Christopher +Marlowe. This is the same character that Goethe was to rediscover two +centuries later, although in certain respects the earlier Faust was the +fresher and more spontaneous. And side by side with him Mephistopheles +appears, of whom Faust asks: "What good will my soul do thy lord?" +"Enlarge his kingdom," Mephistopheles replies. "Is that the reason why +he tempts us thus?" the Doctor asks again, and the evil spirit answers: +"_Solamen miseris socios habuisse doloris_," which, mistranslated into +Romance, is the equivalent of our proverb--"The misfortune of many is +the consolation of fools." "Where we are is hell, and where hell is +there must we ever be," Mephistopheles continues, to which Faust answers +that he thinks hell's a fable and asks him who made the world. And +finally this tragic Doctor, tortured with our torture, meets Helen, who, +although no doubt Marlowe never suspected it, is none other than +renascent Culture. And in Marlowe's _Faust_ there is a scene that is +worth the whole of the second part of the _Faust_ of Goethe. Faust says +to Helen: "Sweet Helen, make me immortal with a kiss"--and he kisses +her-- + + Her lips suck forth my soul; see where it flies! + Come, Helen, come, give me my soul again. + Here will I dwell, for Helen is in these lips, + And all is dross that is not Helena. + +Give me my soul again!--the cry of Faust, the Doctor, when, after having +kissed Helen, he is about to be lost eternally. For the primitive Faust +has no ingenuous Margaret to save him. This idea of his salvation was +the invention of Goethe. And is there not a Faust whom we all know, our +own Faust? This Faust has studied Philosophy, Jurisprudence, Medicine, +and even Theology, only to find that we can know nothing, and he has +sought escape in the open country (_hinaus ins weite Land_) and has +encountered Mephistopheles, the embodiment of that force which, ever +willing evil, ever achieves good in its own despite. This Faust has been +led by Mephistopheles to the arms of Margaret, child of the +simple-hearted people, she whom Faust, the overwise, had lost. And +thanks to her--for she gave herself to him--this Faust is saved, +redeemed by the people that believes with a simple faith. But there was +a second part, for that Faust was the anecdotical Faust and not the +categorical Faust of Goethe, and he gave himself again to Culture, to +Helen, and begot Euphorion upon her, and everything ends among mystical +choruses with the discovery of the eternal feminine. Poor Euphorion! + +And this Helen is the spouse of the fair Menelaus, the Helen whom Paris +bore away, who was the cause of the war of Troy, and of whom the ancient +Trojans said that no one should be incensed because men fought for a +woman who bore so terrible a likeness to the immortal gods. But I +rather think that Faust's Helen was that other Helen who accompanied +Simon Magus, and whom he declared to be the divine wisdom. And Faust can +say to her: Give me my soul again! + +For Helen with her kisses takes away our soul. And what we long for and +have need of is soul--soul of bulk and substance. + +But the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Revolution came, bringing +Helen to us, or, rather, urged on by Helen, and now they talk to us +about Culture and Europe. + +Europe! This idea of Europe, primarily and immediately of geographical +significance, has been converted for us by some magical process into a +kind of metaphysical category. Who can say to-day--in Spain, at any +rate--what Europe is? I only know that it is a shibboleth (_vide_ my +_Tres Ensayos_). And when I proceed to examine what it is that our +Europeanizers call Europe, it sometimes seems to me that much of its +periphery remains outside of it--Spain, of course, and also England, +Italy, Scandinavia, Russia--and hence it is reduced to the central +portion, Franco-Germany, with its annexes and dependencies. + +All this is the consequence, I repeat, of the Renaissance and the +Reformation, which, although apparently they lived in a state of +internecine war, were twin-brothers. The Italians of the Renaissance +were all of them Socinians; the humanists, with Erasmus at their head, +regarded Luther, the German monk, as a barbarian, who derived his +driving force from the cloister, as did Bruno and Campanella. But this +barbarian was their twin-brother, and though their antagonist he was +also the antagonist of the common enemy. All this, I say, is due to the +Renaissance and the Reformation, and to what was the offspring of these +two, the Revolution, and to them we owe also a new Inquisition, that of +science or culture, which turns against those who refuse to submit to +its orthodoxy the weapons of ridicule and contempt. + +When Galileo sent his treatise on the earth's motion to the Grand Duke +of Tuscany, he told him that it was meet that that which the higher +authorities had determined should be believed and obeyed, and that he +considered his treatise "as poetry or as a dream, and as such I desire +your highness to receive it." And at other times he calls it a "chimera" +or a "mathematical caprice." And in the same way in these essays, for +fear also--why not confess it?--of the Inquisition, of the modern, the +scientific, Inquisition, I offer as a poetry, dream, chimera, mystical +caprice, that which springs from what is deepest in me. And I say with +Galileo, _Eppur si muove!_ But is it only because of this fear? Ah, no! +for there is another, more tragic Inquisition, and that is the +Inquisition which the modern man, the man of culture, the European--and +such am I, whether I will or not--carries within him. There is a more +terrible ridicule, and that is the ridicule with which a man +contemplates his own self. It is my reason that laughs at my faith and +despises it. + +And it is here that I must betake me to my Lord Don Quixote in order +that I may learn of him how to confront ridicule and overcome it, and a +ridicule which perhaps--who knows?--he never knew. + +Yes, yes--how shall my reason not smile at these dilettantesque, +would-be mystical, pseudo-philosophical interpretations, in which there +is anything rather than patient study and--shall I say +scientific?--objectivity and method? And nevertheless ... _eppur si +muove!_ + +_Eppur si muove!_ And I take refuge in dilettantism, in what a pedant +would call _demi-mondaine_ philosophy, as a shelter against the pedantry +of specialists, against the philosophy of the professional philosophers. +And who knows?... Progress usually comes from the barbarian, and there +is nothing more stagnant than the philosophy of the philosophers and +the theology of the theologians. + +Let them talk to us of Europe! The civilization of Thibet is parallel +with ours, and men who disappear like ourselves have lived and are +living by it. And over all civilizations there hovers the shadow of +Ecclesiastes, with his admonition, "How dieth the wise man?--as the +fool" (ii. 16). + +Among the people of my country there is an admirable reply to the +customary interrogation, "How are you?"[59] and it is "Living." And that +is the truth--we are living, and living as much as all the rest. What +can a man ask for more? And who does not recollect the verse?-- + + _Coda vez que considero + que me tengo de morir, + tiendo la capa en el suelo + y no me harto de dormir._[60] + +But no, not sleeping, but dreaming--dreaming life, since life is a +dream. + +Among us Spaniards another phrase has very rapidly passed into current +usage, the expression "It's a question of passing the time," or "killing +the time." And, in fact, we make time in order to kill it. But there is +something that has always preoccupied us as much as or more than passing +the time--a formula which denotes an esthetical attitude--and that is, +gaining eternity, which is the formula of the religious attitude. The +truth is, we leap from the esthetic and the economic to the religious, +passing over the logical and the ethical; we jump from art to religion. + +One of our younger novelists, Ramon Perez de Ayala, in his recent novel, +_La Pata de la Raposa_, has told us that the idea of death is the trap, +and spirit the fox or the wary virtue with which to circumvent the +ambushes set by fatality, and he continues: "Caught in the trap, weak +men and weak peoples lie prone on the ground ...; to robust spirits and +strong peoples the rude shock of danger gives clear-sightedness; they +quickly penetrate into the heart of the immeasurable beauty of life, and +renouncing for ever their original hastiness and folly, emerge from the +trap with muscles taut for action and with the soul's vigour, power, and +efficiency increased a hundredfold." But let us see; weak men ... weak +peoples ... robust spirits ... strong peoples ... what does all this +mean? I do not know. What I think I know is that some individuals and +peoples have not yet really thought about death and immortality, have +not felt them, and that others have ceased to think about them, or +rather ceased to feel them. And the fact that they have never passed +through the religious period is not, I think, a matter for either men or +peoples to boast about. + +The immeasurable beauty of life is a very fine thing to write about, and +there are, indeed, some who resign themselves to it and accept it as it +is, and even some who would persuade us that there is no problem in the +"trap." But it has been said by Calderon that "to seek to persuade a man +that the misfortunes which he suffers are not misfortunes, does not +console him for them, but is another misfortune in addition."[61] And, +furthermore, "only the heart can speak to the heart," as Fray Diego de +Estella said (_Vanidad del Mundo_, cap. xxi.). + +A short time ago a reply that I made to those who reproached us +Spaniards for our scientific incapacity appeared to scandalize some +people. After having remarked that the electric light and the steam +engine function here in Spain just as well as in the countries where +they were invented, and that we make use of logarithms as much as they +do in the country where the idea of them was first conceived, I +exclaimed, "Let others invent!"--a paradoxical expression which I do not +retract. We Spaniards ought to appropriate to ourselves some of those +sage counsels which Count Joseph de Maistre gave to the Russians, a +people not unlike ourselves. In his admirable letters to Count +Rasoumowski on public education in Russia, he said that a nation should +not think the worse of itself because it was not made for science; that +the Romans had no understanding of the arts, neither did they possess a +mathematician, which, however, did not prevent them from playing their +part in the world; and in particular we should take to heart everything +that he said about that crowd of arrogant sciolists who idolize the +tastes, the fashions, and the languages of foreign countries, and are +ever ready to pull down whatever they despise--and they despise +everything. + +We have not the scientific spirit? And what of that, if we have some +other spirit? And who can tell if the spirit that we have is or is not +compatible with the scientific spirit? + +But in saying "Let others invent!" I did not mean to imply that we must +be content with playing a passive role. No. For them their science, by +which we shall profit; for us, our own work. It is not enough to be on +the defensive, we must attack. + +But we must attack wisely and cautiously. Reason must be our weapon. It +is the weapon even of the fool. Our sublime fool and our exemplar, Don +Quixote, after he had destroyed with two strokes of his sword that +pasteboard visor "which he had fitted to his head-piece, made it anew, +placing certain iron bars within it, in such a manner that he rested +satisfied with its solidity, and without wishing to make a second trial +of it, he deputed and held it in estimation of a most excellent +visor."[62] And with the pasteboard visor on his head he made himself +immortal--that is to say, he made himself ridiculous. For it was by +making himself ridiculous that Don Quixote achieved his immortality. + +And there are so many ways of making ourselves ridiculous I ... Cournot +said _(Traite de l'enchainement des idees fondamentales_, etc., Sec. 510): +"It is best not to speak to either princes or peoples of the +probabilities of death; princes will punish this temerity with disgrace; +the public will revenge itself with ridicule." True, and therefore it is +said that we must live as the age lives. _Corrumpere et corrumpi saeculum +vocatur_ (Tacitus: _Germania_ 19). + +It is necessary to know how to make ourselves ridiculous, and not only +to others but to ourselves. And more than ever to-day, when there is so +much chatter about our backwardness compared with other civilized +peoples, to-day when a parcel of shallow-brained critics say that we +have had no science, no art, no philosophy, no Renaissance, (of this we +had perhaps too much), no anything, these same critics being ignorant of +our real history, a history that remains yet to be written, the first +task being to undo the web of calumniation and protest that has been +woven around it. + +Carducci, the author of the phrase about the _contorcimenti +dell'affannosa grandiosita spagnola_, has written (in _Mosche Cochiere_) +that "even Spain, which never attained the hegemony of the world of +thought, had her Cervantes." But was Cervantes a solitary and isolated +phenomenon, without roots, without ancestry, without a foundation? That +an Italian rationalist, remembering that it was Spain that reacted +against the Renaissance in his country, should say that Spain _non ebbe +egemonia mai di pensiero_ is, however, readily comprehended. Was there +no importance, was there nothing akin to cultural hegemony, in the +Counter-Reformation, of which Spain was the champion, and which in point +of fact began with the sack of Rome by the Spaniards, a providential +chastisement of the city of the pagan popes of the pagan Renaissance? +Apart from the question as to whether the Counter-Reformation was good +or bad, was there nothing akin to hegemony in Loyola or the Council of +Trent? Previous to this Council, Italy witnessed a nefarious and +unnatural union between Christianity and Paganism, or rather, between +immortalism and mortalism, a union to which even some of the Popes +themselves consented in their souls; theological error was philosophical +truth, and all difficulties were solved by the accommodating formula +_salva fide_. But it was otherwise after the Council; after the Council +came the open and avowed struggle between reason and faith, science and +religion. And does not the fact that this change was brought about, +thanks principally to Spanish obstinacy, point to something akin to +hegemony? + +Without the Counter-Reformation, would the Reformation have followed the +course that it did actually follow? Without the Counter-Reformation +might not the Reformation, deprived of the support of pietism, have +perished in the gross rationalism of the _Aufklaerung_, of the age of +Enlightenment? Would nothing have been changed had there been no Charles +I., no Philip II., our great Philip? + +A negative achievement, it will be said. But what is that? What is +negative? what is positive? At what point in time--a line always +continuing in the same direction, from the past to the future--does the +zero occur which denotes the boundary between the positive and the +negative? Spain, which is said to be the land of knights and rogues--and +all of them rogues--has been the country most slandered by history +precisely because it championed the Counter-Reformation. And because +its arrogance has prevented it from stepping down into the public +forum, into the world's vanity fair, and publishing its own +justification. + +Let us leave on one side Spain's eight centuries of warfare against the +Moors, during which she defended Europe from Mohammedanism, her work of +internal unification, her discovery of America and the Indies--for this +was the achievement of Spain and Portugal, and not of Columbus and Vasco +da Gama--let us leave all this, and more than this, on one side, and it +is not a little thing. Is it not a cultural achievement to have created +a score of nations, reserving nothing for herself, and to have begotten, +as the Conquistadores did, free men on poor Indian slaves? Apart from +all this, does our mysticism count for nothing in the world of thought? +Perhaps the peoples whose souls Helen will ravish away with her kisses +may some day have to return to this mysticism to find their souls again. + +But, as everybody knows, Culture is composed of ideas and only of ideas, +and man is only Culture's instrument. Man for the idea, and not the idea +for man; the substance for the shadow. The end of man is to create +science, to catalogue the Universe, so that it may be handed back to God +in order, as I wrote years ago in my novel, _Amor y Pedagogia_. Man, +apparently, is not even an idea. And at the end of all, the human race +will fall exhausted at the foot of a pile of libraries--whole woods +rased to the ground to provide the paper that is stored away in +them--museums, machines, factories, laboratories ... in order to +bequeath them--to whom? For God will surely not accept them. + +That horrible regenerationist literature, almost all of it an imposture, +which the loss of our last American colonies provoked, led us into the +pedantry of extolling persevering and silent effort--and this with great +vociferation, vociferating silence--of extolling prudence, exactitude, +moderation, spiritual fortitude, synteresis, equanimity, the social +virtues, and the chiefest advocates of them were those of us who lacked +them most. Almost all of us Spaniards fell into this ridiculous mode of +literature, some more and some less. And so it befell that that +arch-Spaniard Joaquin Costa, one of the least European spirits we ever +had, invented his famous saying that we must Europeanize Spain, and, +while proclaiming that we must lock up the sepulchre of the Cid with a +sevenfold lock, Cid-like urged us to--conquer Africa! And I myself +uttered the cry, "Down with Don Quixote!" and from this blasphemy, which +meant the very opposite of what it said--such was the fashion of the +hour--sprang my _Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho_ and my cult of Quixotism +as the national religion. + +I wrote that book in order to rethink _Don Quixote_ in opposition to the +Cervantists and erudite persons, in order to make a living work of what +was and still is for the majority a dead letter. What does it matter to +me what Cervantes intended or did not intend to put into it and what he +actually did put into it? What is living in it is what I myself discover +in it, whether Cervantes put it there or not, what I myself put into and +under and over it, and what we all put into it. I wanted to hunt down +our philosophy in it. + +For the conviction continually grows upon me that our philosophy, the +Spanish philosophy, is liquescent and diffused in our literature, in our +life, in our action, in our mysticism, above all, and not in +philosophical systems. It is concrete. And is there not perhaps as much +philosophy or more in Goethe, for example, as in Hegel? The poetry of +Jorge Manrique, the Romancero, _Don Quijote_, _La Vida es Sueno_, the +_Subida al Monte Carmelo_, imply an intuition of the world and a concept +of life (_Weltanschauung und Lebensansicht_). And it was difficult for +this philosophy of ours to formulate itself in the second half of the +nineteenth century, a period that was aphilosophical, positivist, +technicist, devoted to pure history and the natural sciences, a period +essentially materialist and pessimist. + +Our language itself, like every cultured language, contains within +itself an implicit philosophy. + +A language, in effect, is a potential philosophy. Platonism is the Greek +language which discourses in Plato, unfolding its secular metaphors; +scholasticism is the philosophy of the dead Latin of the Middle Ages +wrestling with the popular tongues; the French language discourses in +Descartes, the German in Kant and in Hegel, and the English in Hume and +in Stuart Mill. For the truth is that the logical starting-point of all +philosophical speculation is not the I, neither is it representation +(_Vorstellung_), nor the world as it presents itself immediately to the +senses; but it is mediate or historical representation, humanly +elaborated and such as it is given to us principally in the language by +means of which we know the world; it is not psychical but spiritual +representation. When we think, we are obliged to set out, whether we +know it not and whether we will or not, from what has been thought by +others who came before us and who environ us. Thought is an inheritance. +Kant thought in German, and into German he translated Hume and Rousseau, +who thought in English and French respectively. And did not Spinoza +think in Judeo-Portuguese, obstructed by and contending with Dutch? + +Thought rests upon prejudgements, and prejudgements pass into language. +To language Bacon rightly ascribed not a few of the errors of the _idola +fori_. But is it possible to philosophize in pure algebra or even in +Esperanto? In order to see the result of such an attempt one has only to +read the work of Avenarius on the criticism of pure experience (_reine +Erfahrung_), of this prehuman or inhuman experience. And even Avenarius, +who was obliged to invent a language, invented one that was based upon +the Latin tradition, with roots which carry in their metaphorical +implications a content of impure experience, of human social experience. + +All philosophy is, therefore, at bottom philology. And philology, with +its great and fruitful law of analogical formations, opens wide the door +to chance, to the irrational, to the absolutely incommensurable. History +is not mathematics, neither is philosophy. And how many philosophical +ideas are not strictly owing to something akin to rhyme, to the +necessity of rightly placing a consonant! In Kant himself there is a +great deal of this, of esthetic symmetry, rhyme. + +Representation is, therefore, like language, like reason itself--which +is simply internal language--a social and racial product, and race, the +blood of the spirit, is language, as Oliver Wendell Holmes has said, and +as I have often repeated. + +It was in Athens and with Socrates that our Western philosophy first +became mature, conscious of itself, and it arrived at this consciousness +by means of the dialogue, of social conversation. And it is profoundly +significant that the doctrine of innate ideas, of the objective and +normative value of ideas, of what Scholasticism afterwards knew as +Realism, should have formulated itself in dialogues. And these ideas, +which constitute reality, are names, as Nominalism showed. Not that they +may not be more than names (_flatus vocis_), but that they are nothing +less than names. Language is that which gives us reality, and not as a +mere vehicle of reality, but as its true flesh, of which all the rest, +dumb or inarticulate representation, is merely the skeleton. And thus +logic operates upon esthetics, the concept upon the expression, upon the +word, and not upon the brute perception. + +And this is true even in the matter of love. Love does not discover that +it is love until it speaks, until it says, I love thee! In Stendhal's +novel, _La Chartreuse de Parme_, it is with a very profound intuition +that Count Mosca, furious with jealousy because of the love which he +believes unites the Duchess of Sanseverina with his nephew Fabrice, is +made to say, "I must be calm; if my manner is violent the duchess, +simply because her vanity is piqued, is capable of following Belgirate, +and then, during the journey, chance may lead to a word which will give +a name to the feelings they bear towards each other, and thereupon in a +moment all the consequences will follow." + +Even so--all things were made by the word, and the word was in the +beginning. + +Thought, reason--that is, living language--is an inheritance, and the +solitary thinker of Aben Tofail, the Arab philosopher of Guadix, is as +absurd as the ego of Descartes. The real and concrete truth, not the +methodical and ideal, is: _homo sum, ergo cogito_. To feel oneself a man +is more immediate than to think. But, on the other hand, History, the +process of culture, finds its perfection and complete effectivity only +in the individual; the end of History and Humanity is man, each man, +each individual. _Homo sum, ergo cogito; cogito ut sim Michael de +Unamuno_. The individual is the end of the Universe. + +And we Spaniards feel this very strongly, that the individual is the end +of the Universe. The introspective individuality of the Spaniard was +pointed out by Martin A.S. Hume in a passage in _The Spanish +People_,[63] upon which I commented in an essay published in _La Espana +Moderna_.[64] + +And it is perhaps this same introspective individualism which has not +permitted the growth on Spanish soil of strictly philosophical--or, +rather, metaphysical--systems. And this in spite of Suarez, whose formal +subtilties do not merit the name of philosophy. + +Our metaphysics, if we can be said to possess such a thing, has been +metanthropics, and our metaphysicians have been philologists--or, +rather, humanists--in the most comprehensive sense of the term. + +Menendez de Pelayo, as Benedetto Croce very truly said (_Estetica_, +bibliographical appendix), was inclined towards metaphysical idealism, +but he appeared to wish to take something from other systems, even from +empirical theories. For this reason Croce considers that his work +(referring to his _Historia de las ideas esteticas de Espana_) suffers +from a certain uncertainty, from the theoretical point of view of its +author, Menendez de Pelayo, which was that of a perfervid Spanish +humanist, who, not wishing to disown the Renaissance, invented what he +called Vivism, the philosophy of Luis Vives, and perhaps for no other +reason than because he himself, like Vives, was an eclectic Spaniard of +the Renaissance. And it is true that Menendez de Pelayo, whose +philosophy is certainly all uncertainty, educated in Barcelona in the +timidities of the Scottish philosophy as it had been imported into the +Catalan spirit--that creeping philosophy of common sense, which was +anxious not to compromise itself and yet was all compromise, and which +is so well exemplified in Balmes--always shunned all strenuous inward +combat and formed his consciousness upon compromises. + +Angel Ganivet, a man all divination and instinct, was more happily +inspired, in my opinion, when he proclaimed that the Spanish philosophy +was that of Seneca, the pagan Stoic of Cordoba, whom not a few +Christians regarded as one of themselves, a philosophy lacking in +originality of thought but speaking with great dignity of tone and +accent. His accent was a Spanish, Latino-African accent, not Hellenic, +and there are echoes of him in Tertullian--Spanish, too, at heart--who +believed in the corporal and substantial nature of God and the soul, and +who was a kind of Don Quixote in the world of Christian thought in the +second century. + +But perhaps we must look for the hero of Spanish thought, not in any +actual flesh-and-bone philosopher, but in a creation of fiction, a man +of action, who is more real than all the philosophers--Don Quixote. +There is undoubtedly a philosophical Quixotism, but there is also a +Quixotic philosophy. May it not perhaps be that the philosophy of the +Conquistadores, of the Counter-Reformers, of Loyola, and above all, in +the order of abstract but deeply felt thought, that of our mystics, was, +in its essence, none other than this? What was the mysticism of St. John +of the Cross but a knight-errantry of the heart in the divine warfare? + +And the philosophy of Don Quixote cannot strictly be called idealism; he +did not fight for ideas. It was of the spiritual order; he fought for +the spirit. + +Imagine Don Quixote turning his heart to religious speculation--as he +himself once dreamed of doing when he met those images in bas-relief +which certain peasants were carrying to set up in the retablo of their +village church[65]--imagine Don Quixote given up to meditation upon +eternal truths, and see him ascending Mount Carmel in the middle of the +dark night of the soul, to watch from its summit the rising of that sun +which never sets, and, like the eagle that was St. John's companion in +the isle of Patmos, to gaze upon it face to face and scrutinize its +spots. He leaves to Athena's owl--the goddess with the glaucous, or +owl-like, eyes, who sees in the dark but who is dazzled by the light of +noon--he leaves to the owl that accompanied Athena in Olympus the task +of searching with keen eyes in the shadows for the prey wherewith to +feed its young. + +And the speculative or meditative Quixotism is, like the practical +Quixotism, madness, a daughter-madness to the madness of the Cross. And +therefore it is despised by the reason. At bottom, philosophy abhors +Christianity, and well did the gentle Marcus Aurelius prove it. + +The tragedy of Christ, the divine tragedy, is the tragedy of the Cross. +Pilate, the sceptic, the man of culture, by making a mockery of it, +sought to convert it into a comedy; he conceived the farcical idea of +the king with the reed sceptre and crown of thorns, and cried "Behold +the man!" But the people, more human than he, the people that thirsts +for tragedy, shouted, "Crucify him! crucify him!" And the human, the +intra-human, tragedy is the tragedy of Don Quixote, whose face was +daubed with soap in order that he might make sport for the servants of +the dukes and for the dukes themselves, as servile as their servants. +"Behold the madman!" they would have said. And the comic, the +irrational, tragedy is the tragedy of suffering caused by ridicule and +contempt. + +The greatest height of heroism to which an individual, like a people, +can attain is to know how to face ridicule; better still, to know how to +make oneself ridiculous and not to shrink from the ridicule. + +I have already spoken of the forceful sonnets of that tragic Portuguese, +Antero de Quental, who died by his own hand. Feeling acutely for the +plight of his country on the occasion of the British ultimatum in 1890, +he wrote as follows:[66] "An English statesman of the last century, who +was also undoubtedly a perspicacious observer and a philosopher, Horace +Walpole, said that for those who feel, life is a tragedy, and a comedy +for those who think. Very well, then, if we are destined to end +tragically, we Portuguese, we who _feel_, we would far rather prefer +this terrible, but noble, destiny, to that which is reserved, and +perhaps at no very remote future date, for England, the country that +_thinks_ and _calculates_, whose destiny it is to finish miserably and +comically." We may leave on one side the assertion that the English are +a thinking and calculating people, implying thereby their lack of +feeling, the injustice of which is explained by the occasion which +provoked it, and also the assertion that the Portuguese feel, implying +that they do not think or calculate--for we twin-brothers of the +Atlantic seaboard have always been distinguished by a certain pedantry +of feeling; but there remains a basis of truth underlying this terrible +idea--namely, that some peoples, those who put thought above feeling, I +should say reason above faith, die comically, while those die tragically +who put faith above reason. For the mockers are those who die comically, +and God laughs at their comic ending, while the nobler part, the part of +tragedy, is theirs who endured the mockery. + +The mockery that underlies the career of Don Quixote is what we must +endeavour to discover. + +And shall we be told yet again that there has never been any Spanish +philosophy in the technical sense of the word? I will answer by asking, +What is this sense? What does philosophy mean? Windelband, the historian +of philosophy, in his essay on the meaning of philosophy (_Was ist +Philosophie_? in the first volume of his _Praeludien_) tells us that "the +history of the word 'philosophy' is the history of the cultural +significance of science." He continues: "When scientific thought attains +an independent existence as a desire for knowledge for the sake of +knowledge, it takes the name of philosophy; when subsequently knowledge +as a whole divides into its various branches, philosophy is the general +knowledge of the world that embraces all other knowledge. As soon as +scientific thought stoops again to becoming a means to ethics or +religious contemplation, philosophy is transformed into an art of life +or into a formulation of religious beliefs. And when afterwards the +scientific life regains its liberty, philosophy acquires once again its +character as an independent knowledge of the world, and in so far as it +abandons the attempt to solve this problem, it is changed into a theory +of knowledge itself." Here you have a brief recapitulation of the +history of philosophy from Thales to Kant, including the medieval +scholasticism upon which it endeavoured to establish religious beliefs. +But has philosophy no other office to perform, and may not its office be +to reflect upon the tragic sense of life itself, such as we have been +studying it, to formulate this conflict between reason and faith, +between science and religion, and deliberately to perpetuate this +conflict? + +Later on Windelband says: "By philosophy in the systematic, not in the +historical, sense, I understand the critical knowledge of values of +universal validity (_allgemeingiltigen Werten_)." But what values are +there of more universal validity than that of the human will seeking +before all else the personal, individual, and concrete immortality of +the soul--or, in other words, the human finality of the Universe--and +that of the human reason denying the rationality and even the +possibility of this desire? What values are there of more universal +validity than the rational or mathematical value and the volitional or +teleological value of the Universe in conflict with one another? + +For Windelband, as for Kantians and neo-Kantians in general, there are +only three normative categories, three universal norms--those of the +true or the false, the beautiful or the ugly, and the morally good or +evil. Philosophy is reduced to logics, esthetics, and ethics, +accordingly as it studies science, art, or morality. Another category +remains excluded--namely, that of the pleasing and the unpleasing, or +the agreeable and the disagreeable: in other words, the hedonic. The +hedonic cannot, according to them, pretend to universal validity, it +cannot be normative. "Whosoever throws upon philosophy," wrote +Windelband, "the burden of deciding the question of optimism and +pessimism, whosoever demands that philosophy should pronounce judgement +on the question as to whether the world is more adapted to produce pain +than pleasure, or _vice versa_--such a one, if his attitude is not +merely that of a dilettante, sets himself the fantastic task of finding +an absolute determination in a region in which no reasonable man has +ever looked for one." It remains to be seen, nevertheless, whether this +is as clear as it seems, in the case of a man like myself, who am at the +same time reasonable and yet nothing but a dilettante, which of course +would be the abomination of desolation. + +It was with a very profound insight that Benedetto Croce, in his +philosophy of the spirit in relation to esthetics as the science of +expression and to logic as the science of pure concept, divided +practical philosophy into two branches--economics and ethics. He +recognizes, in effect, the existence of a practical grade of spirit, +purely economical, directed towards the singular and unconcerned with +the universal. Its types of perfection, of economic genius, are Iago and +Napoleon, and this grade remains outside morality. And every man passes +through this grade, because before all else he must wish to be himself, +as an individual, and without this grade morality would be inexplicable, +just as without esthetics logic would lack meaning. And the discovery of +the normative value of the economic grade, which seeks the hedonic, was +not unnaturally the work of an Italian, a disciple of Machiavelli, who +speculated so fearlessly with regard to _virtu_, practical efficiency, +which is not exactly the same as moral virtue. + +But at bottom this economic grade is but the rudimentary state of the +religious grade. The religious is the transcendental economic or +hedonic. Religion is a transcendental economy and hedonistic. That which +man seeks in religion, in religious faith, is to save his own +individuality, to eternalize it, which he achieves neither by science, +nor by art, nor by ethics. God is a necessity neither for science, nor +art, nor ethics; what necessitates God is religion. And with an insight +that amounts to genius our Jesuits speak of the grand business of our +salvation. Business--yes, business; something belonging to the economic, +hedonistic order, although transcendental. We do not need God in order +that He may teach us the truth of things, or the beauty of them, or in +order that He may safeguard morality by means of a system of penalties +and punishments, but in order that He may save us, in order that He may +not let us die utterly. And because this unique longing is the longing +of each and every normal man--those who are abnormal by reason of their +barbarism or their hyperculture may be left out of the reckoning--it is +universal and normative. + +Religion, therefore, is a transcendental economy, or, if you like, +metaphysic. Together with its logical, esthetic, and ethical values, the +Universe has for man an economic value also, which, when thus made +universal and normative, is the religious value. We are not concerned +only with truth, beauty, and goodness: we are concerned also and above +all with the salvation of the individual, with perpetuation, which those +norms do not secure for us. That science of economy which is called +political teaches us the most adequate, the most economical way of +satisfying our needs, whether these needs are rational or irrational, +beautiful or ugly, moral or immoral--a business economically good may be +a swindle, something that in the long run kills the soul--and the +supreme human _need_ is the need of not dying, the need of enjoying for +ever the plenitude of our own individual limitation. And if the Catholic +eucharistic doctrine teaches that the substance of the body of Jesus +Christ is present whole and entire in the consecrated Host, and in each +part of it, this means that God is wholly and entirely in the whole +Universe and also in each one of the individuals that compose it. And +this is, fundamentally, not a logical, nor an esthetic, nor an ethical +principle, but a transcendental economic or religious principle. And +with this norm, philosophy is able to judge of optimism and pessimism. +_If the human soul is immortal, the world is economically or +hedonistically good; if not, it is bad_. And the meaning which pessimism +and optimism give to the categories of good and evil is not an ethical +sense, but an economic or hedonistic sense. Good is that which satisfies +our vital longing and evil is that which does not satisfy it. + +Philosophy, therefore, is also the science of the tragedy of life, a +reflection upon the tragic sense of it. An essay in this philosophy, +with its inevitable internal contradictions and antinomies, is what I +have attempted in these essays. And the reader must not overlook the +fact that I have been operating upon myself; that this work partakes of +the nature of a piece of self-surgery, and without any other anesthetic +than that of the work itself. The enjoyment of operating upon myself has +ennobled the pain of being operated upon. + +And as for my other claim--the claim that this is a Spanish philosophy, +perhaps _the_ Spanish philosophy, that if it was an Italian who +discovered the normative and universal value of the economic grade, it +is a Spaniard who announces that this grade is merely the beginning of +the religious grade, and that the essence of our religion, of our +Spanish Catholicism, consists precisely in its being neither a science, +nor an art, nor an ethic, but an economy of things eternal--that is to +say, of things divine: as for this claim that all this is Spanish, I +must leave the task of substantiating it to another and an historical +work. But leaving aside the external and written tradition, that which +can be demonstrated by reference to historical documents, is there not +some present justification of this claim in the fact that I am a +Spaniard--and a Spaniard who has scarcely ever been outside Spain; a +product, therefore, of the Spanish tradition of the living tradition, of +the tradition which is transmitted in feelings and ideas that dream, and +not in texts that sleep? + +The philosophy in the soul of my people appears to me as the expression +of an inward tragedy analogous to the tragedy of the soul of Don +Quixote, as the expression of a conflict between what the world is as +scientific reason shows it to be, and what we wish that it might be, as +our religious faith affirms it to be. And in this philosophy is to be +found the explanation of what is usually said about us--namely, that we +are fundamentally irreducible to _Kultur_--or, in other words, that we +refuse to submit to it. No, Don Quixote does not resign himself either +to the world, or to science or logic, or to art or esthetics, or to +morality or ethics. + +"And the upshot of all this," so I have been told more than once and by +more than one person, "will be simply that all you will succeed in doing +will be to drive people to the wildest Catholicism." And I have been +accused of being a reactionary and even a Jesuit. Be it so! And what +then? + +Yes, I know, I know very well, that it is madness to seek to turn the +waters of the river back to their source, and that it is only the +ignorant who seek to find in the past a remedy for their present ills; +but I know too that everyone who fights for any ideal whatever, although +his ideal may seem to lie in the past, is driving the world on to the +future, and that the only reactionaries are those who find themselves at +home in the present. Every supposed restoration of the past is a +creation of the future, and if the past which it is sought to restore is +a dream, something imperfectly known, so much the better. The march, as +ever, is towards the future, and he who marches is getting there, even +though he march walking backwards. And who knows if that is not the +better way!... + +I feel that I have within me a medieval soul, and I believe that the +soul of my country is medieval, that it has perforce passed through the +Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Revolution--learning from them, +yes, but without allowing them to touch the soul, preserving the +spiritual inheritance which has come down from what are called the Dark +Ages. And Quixotism is simply the most desperate phase of the struggle +between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance which was the offspring of +the Middle Ages. + +And if some accuse me of subserving the cause of Catholic reaction, +others perhaps, the official Catholics.... But these, in Spain, trouble +themselves little about anything, and are interested only in their own +quarrels and dissensions. And besides, poor folk, they have neither eyes +nor ears! + +But the truth is that my work--I was going to say my mission--is to +shatter the faith of men here, there, and everywhere, faith in +affirmation, faith in negation, and faith in abstention from faith, and +this for the sake of faith in faith itself; it is to war against all +those who submit, whether it be to Catholicism, or to rationalism, or to +agnosticism; it is to make all men live the life of inquietude and +passionate desire. + +Will this work be efficacious? But did Don Quixote believe in the +immediate apparential efficacy of his work? It is very doubtful, and at +any rate he did not by any chance put his visor to the test by slashing +it a second time. And many passages in his history show that he did not +look with much confidence to the immediate success of his design to +restore knight-errantry. And what did it matter to him so long as thus +he lived and immortalized himself? And he must have surmised, and did in +fact surmise, that his work would have another and higher efficacy, and +that was that it would ferment in the minds of all those who in a pious +spirit read of his exploits. + +Don Quixote made himself ridiculous; but did he know the most tragic +ridicule of all, the inward ridicule, the ridiculousness of a man's self +to himself, in the eyes of his own soul? Imagine Don Quixote's +battlefield to be his own soul; imagine him to be fighting in his soul +to save the Middle Ages from the Renaissance, to preserve the treasure +of his infancy; imagine him an inward Don Quixote, with a Sancho, at his +side, inward and heroical too--and tell me if you find anything comic in +the tragedy. + +And what has Don Quixote left, do you ask? I answer, he has left +himself, and a man, a living and eternal man, is worth all theories and +all philosophies. Other peoples have left chiefly institutions, books; +we have left souls; St. Teresa is worth any institution, any _Critique +of Pure Reason_. + +But Don Quixote was converted. Yes--and died, poor soul. But the other, +the real Don Quixote, he who remained on earth and lives amongst us, +animating us with his spirit--this Don Quixote was not converted, this +Don Quixote continues to incite us to make ourselves ridiculous, this +Don Quixote must never die. And the conversion of the other Don +Quixote--he who was converted only to die--was possible because he was +mad, and it was his madness, and not his death nor his conversion that +immortalized him, earning him forgiveness for the crime of having been +born.[67] _Felix culpa!_ And neither was his madness cured, but only +transformed. His death was his last knightly adventure; in dying he +stormed heaven, which suffereth violence. + +This mortal Don Quixote died and descended into hell, which he entered +lance on rest, and freed all the condemned, as he had freed the galley +slaves, and he shut the gates of hell, and tore down the scroll that +Dante saw there and replaced it by one on which was written "Long live +hope!" and escorted by those whom he had freed, and they laughing at +him, he went to heaven. And God laughed paternally at him, and this +divine laughter filled his soul with eternal happiness. + +And the other Don Quixote remained here amongst us, fighting with +desperation. And does he not fight out of despair? How is it that among +the words that English has borrowed from our language, such as _siesta, +camarilla, guerrilla_, there is to be found this word _desperdo_? Is not +this inward Don Quixote that I spoke of, conscious of his own tragic +comicness, a man of despair (_desesperado_). A _desperado_--yes, like +Pizarro and like Loyola. But "despair is the master of impossibilities," +as we learn from Salazar y Torres (_Elegir al enemigo_, Act I.), and it +is despair and despair alone that begets heroic hope, absurd hope, mad +hope. _Spero quia absurdum_, it ought to have been said, rather than +_credo_. + +And Don Quixote, who lived in solitude, sought more solitude still; he +sought the solitudes of the Pena Pobre, in order that there, alone, +without witnesses, he might give himself up to greater follies with +which to assuage his soul. But he was not quite alone, for Sancho +accompanied him--Sancho the good, Sancho the believing, Sancho the +simple. If, as some say, in Spain Don Quixote is dead and Sancho lives, +then we are saved, for Sancho, his master dead, will become a +knight-errant himself. And at any rate he is waiting for some other mad +knight to follow again. + +And there is also a tragedy of Sancho. The other Sancho, the Sancho who +journeyed with the mortal Don Quixote--it is not certain that he died, +although some think that he died hopelessly mad, calling for his lance +and believing in the truth of all those things which his dying and +converted master had denounced and abominated as lies. But neither is it +certain that the bachelor Sanson Carrasco, or the curate, or the barber, +or the dukes and canons are dead, and it is with these that the +heroical Sancho has to contend. + +Don Quixote journeyed alone, alone with Sancho, alone with his solitude. +And shall we not also journey alone, we his lovers, creating for +ourselves a Quixotesque Spain which only exists in our imagination? + +And again we shall be asked: What has Don Quixote bequeathed to +_Kultur_? I answer: Quixotism, and that is no little thing! It is a +whole method, a whole epistemology, a whole esthetic, a whole logic, a +whole ethic--above all, a whole religion--that is to say, a whole +economy of things eternal and things divine, a whole hope in what is +rationally absurd. + +For what did Don Quixote fight? For Dulcinea, for glory, for life, for +survival. Not for Iseult, who is the eternal flesh; not for Beatrice, +who is theology; not for Margaret, who is the people; not for Helen, who +is culture. He fought for Dulcinea, and he won her, for he lives. + +And the greatest thing about him was his having been mocked and +vanquished, for it was in being overcome that he overcame; he overcame +the world by giving the world cause to laugh at him. + +And to-day? To-day he feels his own comicness and the vanity of his +endeavours so far as their temporal results are concerned; he sees +himself from without--culture has taught him to objectify himself, to +alienate himself from himself instead of entering into himself--and in +seeing himself from without he laughs at himself, but with a bitter +laughter. Perhaps the most tragic character would be that of a Margutte +of the inner man, who, like the Margutte of Pulci, should die of +laughter, but of laughter at himself. _E ridera in eterno_, he will +laugh for all eternity, said the Angel Gabriel of Margutte. Do you not +hear the laughter of God? + +The mortal Don Quixote, in dying, realized his own comicness and bewept +his sins; but the immortal Quixote, realizing his own comicness, +superimposes himself upon it and triumphs over it without renouncing it. + +And Don Quixote does not surrender, because he is not a pessimist, and +he fights on. He is not a pessimist, because pessimism is begotten by +vanity, it is a matter of fashion, pure intellectual snobbism, and Don +Quixote is neither vain nor modern with any sort of modernity (still +less is he a modernist), and he does not understand the meaning of the +word "snob" unless it be explained to him in old Christian Spanish. Don +Quixote is not a pessimist, for since he does not understand what is +meant by the _joie de vivre_ he does not understand its opposite. +Neither does he understand futurist fooleries. In spite of +Clavileno,[68] he has not got as far as the aeroplane, which seems to +tend to put not a few fools at a still greater distance from heaven. Don +Quixote has not arrived at the age of the tedium of life, a condition +that not infrequently takes the form of that topophobia so +characteristic of many modern spirits, who pass their lives running at +top speed from one place to another, not from any love of the place to +which they are going, but from hatred of the place they are leaving +behind, and so flying from all places: which is one of the forms of +despair. + +But Don Quixote hears his own laughter, he hears the divine laughter, +and since he is not a pessimist, since he believes in life eternal, he +has to fight, attacking the modern, scientific, inquisitorial orthodoxy +in order to bring in a new and impossible Middle Age, dualistic, +contradictory, passionate. Like a new Savonarola, an Italian Quixote of +the end of the fifteenth century, he fights against this Modern Age that +began with Machiavelli and that will end comically. He fights against +the rationalism inherited from the eighteenth century. Peace of mind, +reconciliation between reason and faith--this, thanks to the providence +of God, is no longer possible. The world must be as Don Quixote wishes +it to be, and inns must be castles, and he will fight with it and will, +to all appearances, be vanquished, but he will triumph by making himself +ridiculous. And he will triumph by laughing at himself and making +himself the object of his own laughter. + +"Reason speaks and feeling bites" said Petrarch; but reason also bites +and bites in the inmost heart. And more light does not make more warmth. +"Light, light, more light!" they tell us that the dying Goethe cried. +No, warmth, warmth, more warmth! for we die of cold and not of darkness. +It is not the night kills, but the frost. We must liberate the enchanted +princess and destroy the stage of Master Peter.[69] + +But God! may there not be pedantry too in thinking ourselves the objects +of mockery and in making Don Quixotes of ourselves? Kierkegaard said +that the regenerate (_Opvakte_) desire that the wicked world should mock +at them for the better assurance of their own regeneracy, for the +enjoyment of being able to bemoan the wickedness of the world +(_Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift_, ii., Afsnit ii., cap. 4, +sect. 2, b). + +The question is, how to avoid the one or the other pedantry, or the one +or the other affectation, if the natural man is only a myth and we are +all artificial. + +Romanticism! Yes, perhaps that is partly the word. And there is an +advantage in its very lack of precision. Against romanticism the forces +of rationalist and classicist pedantry, especially in France, have +latterly been unchained. Romanticism itself is merely another form of +pedantry, the pedantry of sentiment? Perhaps. In this world a man of +culture is either a dilettante or a pedant: you have to take your +choice. Yes, Rene and Adolphe and Obermann and Lara, perhaps they were +all pedants.... The question is to seek consolation in disconsolation. + +The philosophy of Bergson, which is a spiritualist restoration, +essentially mystical, medieval, Quixotesque, has been called a +_demi-mondaine_ philosophy. Leave out the _demi_; call it _mondaine_, +mundane. Mundane--yes, a philosophy for the world and not for +philosophers, just as chemistry ought to be not for chemists alone. The +world desires illusion (_mundus vult decipi_)--either the illusion +antecedent to reason, which is poetry, or the illusion subsequent to +reason, which is religion. And Machiavelli has said that whosoever +wishes to delude will always find someone willing to be deluded. Blessed +are they who are easily befooled! A Frenchman, Jules de Gaultier, said +that it was the privilege of his countrymen _n'etre pas dupe_--not to be +taken in. A sorry privilege! + +Science does not give Don Quixote what he demands of it. "Then let him +not make the demand," it will be said, "let him resign himself, let him +accept life and truth as they are." But he does not accept them as they +are, and he asks for signs, urged thereto by Sancho, who stands by his +side. And it is not that Don Quixote does not understand what those +understand who talk thus to him, those who succeed in resigning +themselves and accepting rational life and rational truth. No, it is +that the needs of his heart are greater. Pedantry? Who knows!... + +And in this critical century, Don Quixote, who has also contaminated +himself with criticism, has to attack his own self, the victim of +intellectualism and of sentimentalism, and when he wishes to be most +spontaneous he appears to be most affected. And he wishes, unhappy man, +to rationalize the irrational and irrationalize the rational. And he +sinks into the despair of the critical century whose two greatest +victims were Nietzsche and Tolstoi. And through this despair he reaches +the heroic fury of which Giordano Bruno spoke--that intellectual Don +Quixote who escaped from the cloister--and becomes an awakener of +sleeping souls (_dormitantium animorum excubitor_), as the ex-Dominican +said of himself--he who wrote: "Heroic love is the property of those +superior natures who are called insane (_insano_) not because they do +not know (_no sanno_), but because they over-know (_soprasanno_)." + +But Bruno believed in the triumph of his doctrines; at any rate the +inscription at the foot of his statue in the Campo dei Fiori, opposite +the Vatican, states that it has been dedicated to him by the age which +he had foretold (_il secolo da lui divinato_). But our Don Quixote, the +inward, the immortal Don Quixote, conscious of his own comicness, does +not believe that his doctrines will triumph in this world, because they +are not of it. And it is better that they should not triumph. And if the +world wished to make Don Quixote king, he would retire alone to the +mountain, fleeing from the king-making and king-killing crowds, as +Christ retired alone to the mountain when, after the miracle of the +loaves and fishes, they sought to proclaim him king. He left the title +of king for the inscription written over the Cross. + +What, then, is the new mission of Don Quixote, to-day, in this world? To +cry aloud, to cry aloud in the wilderness. But though men hear not, the +wilderness hears, and one day it will be transformed into a resounding +forest, and this solitary voice that goes scattering over the wilderness +like seed, will fructify into a gigantic cedar, which with its hundred +thousand tongues will sing an eternal hosanna to the Lord of life and of +death. + +And now to you, the younger generation, bachelor Carrascos of a +Europeanizing regenerationism, you who are working after the best +European fashion, with scientific method and criticism, to you I say: +Create wealth, create nationality, create art, create science, create +ethics, above all create--or rather, translate--_Kultur_, and thus kill +in yourselves both life and death. Little will it all last you!... + +And with this I conclude--high time that I did!--for the present at any +rate, these essays on the tragic sense of life in men and in peoples, or +at least in myself--who am a man--and in the soul of my people as it is +reflected in mine. + +I hope, reader, that some time while our tragedy is still playing, in +some interval between the acts, we shall meet again. And we shall +recognize one another. And forgive me if I have troubled you more than +was needful and inevitable, more than I intended to do when I took up my +pen proposing to distract you for a while from your distractions. And +may God deny you peace, but give you glory! + +SALAMANCA, _In the year of grace_ 1912. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[59] "Que tal?" o "como va?" y es aquella que responde: "se vive!" + +[60] Whenever I consider that I needs must die, I stretch my cloak upon +the ground and am not surfeited with sleeping. + +[61] No es consuelo de desdichas--es otra desdicha aparte--querer a +quien las padece--persuadir que no son tales (_Gustos y diogustos no son +nies que imagination_, Act I., Scene 4). + +[62] _Don Quijote_, part i., chap, i. + +[63] Preface. + +[64] _El individualismo espanol_, in vol. clxxi., March 1, 1903. + +[65] See _El ingenioso hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha_, part ii., +chap. lviii., and the corresponding chapter in my _Vida de Don Quijote y +Sancho_. + +[66] In an article which was to have been published on the occasion of +the ultimatum, and of which the original is in the possession of the +Conde do Ameal. This fragment appeared in the Portuguese review, _A +Aguia_ (No. 3), March, 1912. + +[67] An allusion to the phrase in Calderon's _La Vida es Sueno_, "Que +delito cometi contra vosotros naciendo?"--J.E.C.F. + +[68] The wooden horse upon which Don Quixote imagined that he and Sancho +had been carried in the air. See _Don Quijote_, part ii., chaps. 40 and +41.--J.E.C.F. + +[69] _Don Quijote_, part ii., chap. 26. + + + + +INDEX + + +AEschylus, 246 +Alexander of Aphrodisias, 88 +Amiel, 18, 68, 228 +Anaxagoras, 143 +Angelo of Foligno, 289 +Antero de Quintal, 240, 315 +Ardigo, Roberto, 238 +Aristotle, 1, 21, 80, 144, 165, 171, 232, 235 +Arnold, Matthew, 103 +Athanasius, 63-65 +Avenarius, Richard, 144, 310 +de Ayala, Ramon Perez, 303 + +Bacon, 310 +Balfour, A.J., 27 +Balmes, 84, 85 +Bergson, 144, 328 +Berkeley, Bishop, 87, 146 +Besant, Mrs. A., 291 +Boccaccio, 52 +Boehme, Jacob, 227, 297 +Bonnefon, 250, 254 +Bossuet, 226, 231 +Brooks, Phillips, 76, 190 +Browning, Robert, 112, 181, 249, 254 +Brunetiere, 103, 298 +Brunhes, B., 235, 237, 238 +Bruno, 301, 329 +Buechner, 95 +Butler, Joseph, 5, 6, 87 +Byron, Lord, 94, 102, 103, 132 + +Calderon, 39, 268, 323 +Calvin, 121, 246 +Campanella, 301 +Carducci, 102, 306 +Carlyle, 231, 298 +Catherine of Sienna, 289 +Cauchy, 236 +Cervantes, 220, 306 +Channing, W.E., 78 +Cicero, 165, 216, 221 +Clement of Alexandria, 32 +Cortes, Donoso, 74 +Costa, Joaquin, 309 +Cournot, 192, 217, 222, 306 +Cowper, 43 +Croce, Benedetto, 313, 318 + +Dante, 42, 51, 140, 223, 233, 256, 295 +Darwin, 72, 147 +Descartes, 34, 86, 107, 224, 237, 293, 310, 312 +Diderot, 99 +Diego de Estella, 304 +Dionysius the Areopagite, 160 +Domingo de Guzman, 289 +Duns Scotus, 76 + +Eckhart, 289 +Empedocles, 61 +Erasmus, 112, 301 +Erigena, 160, 167 + +Fenelon, 224 +Fichte, 8, 29 +Flaubert, 94, 219 +Fouillee, 261 +Fourier, 278 +Francesco de Sanctis, 220 +Francke, August, 120 +Franklin, 248 + +Galileo, 72, 267, 302 +Ganivet, Angel, 313 +de Gaultier, Jules, 328 +Goethe, 218, 264, 288, 299, 309 +Gounod, 56 +Gratry, Pere, 236 + +Haeckel, 95 +Harnack, 59, 64, 65, 69, 75 +Hartmann, 146 +Hegel, 5, 111, 170, 294, 309, 310 +Heraclitus, 165 +Hermann, 69, 70, 77, 165, 217 +Herodotus, 140 +Hippocrates, 143 +Hodgson, S.H., 30 +Holberg, 109 +Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 257, 311 +Hume, David, 79, 86, 104, 310 +Hume, Martin A.S., 312 +Huntingdon, A.M., 298 + +James, William, 5, 81, 86 +Jansen, 121 +Juan de los Angeles, 1, 207, 286 +Juan de la Cruz, 67, 289, 293 +Justin Martyr, 63 + +Kaftan, 68, 222 +Kant, Immanuel, 3, 4, 11, 13, 67, 68, 73, 79, 114, 143, 166, 294, 310, + 311, 317 +a Kempis, 51, 99, 277 +Kierkegaard, 3, 109, 115, 123, 153, 178, 198, 257, 287, 327 +Krause, 294 + +Lactantius, 59, 74, 165, 169 +Lamarck, 147 +Lamennais, 74, 117, 165, 246 +Laplace, 161 +Leibnitz, 247 +Leo XIII., 75 +Leopardi, 44, 47, 123, 132, 240, 248 +Le Roy, 73 +Lessing, 229 +Linnaeus, 1 +Loisy, 72 +Loyola, 122, 307, 314, 324 +Loyson, Hyacinthe, 116 +Lucretius, 94, 102 +Luis de Leon, 289 +Luther, 3, 121, 270, 294, 301 + +Mach, Dr. E., 114 +Machado, Antonio, 241 +Machiavelli, 296, 326, 328 +de Maistre, Count Joseph, 74, 305 +Malebranche, 63 +Malon de Chaide, 66 +Manrique, Jorge, 309 +Marcus Aurelius, 315 +Marlowe, Christopher, 299 +Martins, Oliveira, 68 +Mazzini, 153 +Melanchthon, 69 +Menendez de Pelayo, 313 +Michelet, 45 +Miguel de Molinos, 216, 219, 228 +Mill, Stuart, 104, 310 +Milton, 284 +Moser, Johann Jacob, 252, 263 +Myers, W.H., 88 + +Nietzsche, 50, 61, 100, 231, 239, 328 +Nimesius, 59 + +Obermann, 11, 47, 259, 263, 268 +Oetinger, Friedrich Christoph, 252, 253 +Ordonez de Lara, 56 +Origen, 245 + +Papini, 238 +Pascal, 40, 45, 74, 262, 263 +Petrarch, 327 +Pfleiderer, 61 +Pius IX., 72 +Pizarro, 324 +Plato, 38, 45, 48, 61, 90, 125, 143, 216, 217, 221, 292, 310 +Pliny, 165 +Plotinus, 209, 230, 243 +Pohle, Joseph, 77 +Pomponazzi, Pietro, 88 + +Renan, 51, 68 +Ritschl, Albrecht, 68, 114, 121, 167, 238, 253, 263, 294 +Robertson, F.W., 180 +Robespierre, 41 +Rohde, Erwin, 60, 61 +Rousseau, 53, 263, 299, 310 +Ruysbroek, 289 + +Saint Augustine, 74, 192, 247 +Saint Bonaventura, 220 +Saint Francis of Assissi, 52, 210 +Saint Paul, 48, 49, 62, 94, 112, 188, 209, 225, 241, 253, 255, 270 +Saint Teresa, 67, 75, 210, 226, 228, 289, 323 +Saint Thomas Aquinas, 83, 92, 233 +Salazar y Torres, 324 +Schleiermacher, 89, 156, 217 +Schopenhauer, 146, 147, 247 +Seeberg, Reinold, 188 +Senancour, 43, 47, 260, 263, 299 +Seneca, 231, 313 +Seuse, Heinrich, 75, 289 +Shakespeare, 39 +Socrates, 29, 143, 145 +Solon, 17 +Soloviev, 95 +Spencer, Herbert, 89, 124, 238, 253 +Spener, 253 +Spinoza, Benedict, 6, 7, 22, 24, 31, 38, 40, 89, 97-99, 101, 208, 234, + 310 +Stanley, Dean, 91 +Stendhal, 311 +Stirmer, Max, 29 +Suarez, 312 +Swedenborg, 153, 221, 225 + +Tacitus, 56, 94, 142, 216, 306 +Tauler, 289 +Tennyson, Lord, 33, 103 +Tertullian, 74, 94, 104 +Thales of Miletus, 143, 317 +Thome de Jesus, 283 +Tolstoi, 328 +Troeltsch, Ernst, 70, 112 + +Velasquez, 70 +Vico, Giovanni Baptista, 142, 143 +Vinet, A., 93, 113, 160 +Virchow, 95 +Virgil, 249 +Vives, Luis, 313 +Vogt, 95 + +Walpole, Horace, 315 +Weizsaecker, 62, 77 +Wells, H.G., 265 +Whitman, Walt, 125 +Windelband, 267, 316, 317 + +Xenophon, 29, 143 + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Tragic Sense Of Life, by Miguel de Unamuno + +*** END OF THIS 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