diff options
Diffstat (limited to '14300-h')
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/14300-h.htm | 54545 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image01.jpg | bin | 0 -> 133294 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image02.jpg | bin | 0 -> 91761 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image03.jpg | bin | 0 -> 51784 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image04.jpg | bin | 0 -> 41754 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image05.jpg | bin | 0 -> 127312 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image06.jpg | bin | 0 -> 42689 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image07.jpg | bin | 0 -> 49228 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image08.jpg | bin | 0 -> 44178 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image09.jpg | bin | 0 -> 49016 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image10.jpg | bin | 0 -> 41971 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image11.jpg | bin | 0 -> 37604 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image12.jpg | bin | 0 -> 43754 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image13.jpg | bin | 0 -> 69673 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image14.jpg | bin | 0 -> 51891 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image15.jpg | bin | 0 -> 59115 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image16.jpg | bin | 0 -> 72616 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image17.jpg | bin | 0 -> 74734 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image18.jpg | bin | 0 -> 62461 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image19.jpg | bin | 0 -> 49814 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image20.jpg | bin | 0 -> 71716 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 14300-h/images/image21.jpg | bin | 0 -> 54400 bytes |
22 files changed, 54545 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/14300-h/14300-h.htm b/14300-h/14300-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e7fc93 --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/14300-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,54545 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> + +<head> +<meta name="generator" content="HTML Tidy, see www.w3.org"> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Life Of Napoleon I +by John Holland Rose</title> +<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8"> +<style type="text/css"> +A { + TEXT-DECORATION: none; +} +P { + MARGIN-TOP: 0.75em; MARGIN-BOTTOM: 0.75em; TEXT-ALIGN: justify; +} +H1 { + TEXT-ALIGN: center; +} +H2 { + TEXT-ALIGN: center; +} +H3 { + TEXT-ALIGN: center; +} +H4 { + TEXT-ALIGN: center; +} +H5 { + TEXT-ALIGN: center; +} +H6 { + TEXT-ALIGN: center; +} + +HR { + WIDTH: 33%; +} +HR.full { + WIDTH: 100%; HEIGHT: 5px; +} +A:link { + COLOR: blue; TEXT-DECORATION: none; +} +LINK { + COLOR: blue; TEXT-DECORATION: none; +} +A:visited { + COLOR: blue; TEXT-DECORATION: none; +} +A:hover { + COLOR: red; +} + + +BODY { + MARGIN-LEFT: 7%; MARGIN-RIGHT: 8%; +} +.linenum { + LEFT: 4%; POSITION: absolute; TOP: auto; +} +.note { + MARGIN-BOTTOM: 1em; MARGIN-LEFT: 2em; MARGIN-RIGHT: 2em; +} +.blkquot { + MARGIN-LEFT: 4em; MARGIN-RIGHT: 4em; +} +.pagenum { + FONT-SIZE: smaller; LEFT: 92%; POSITION: absolute; + TEXT-ALIGN: right; +} +.newpage { + display: none; +} +.sidenote { + CLEAR: right; MARGIN-TOP: 1em; PADDING-LEFT: 1em; + FONT-SIZE: smaller; FLOAT: right; + MARGIN-BOTTOM: 1em; WIDTH: 20%; +} + +ins.correction {border-bottom-style: dotted; border-bottom-color: red; + border-bottom-width:1px; +} + +.poem { + MARGIN-LEFT: 10%; MARGIN-RIGHT: 10%; TEXT-ALIGN: left; +} + + +.poem BR { + DISPLAY: none; +} +.poem .stanza { + MARGIN: 1em 0em; +} +.poem SPAN { + DISPLAY: block; PADDING-LEFT: 3em; MARGIN: 0px; TEXT-INDENT: -3em; +} +.poem SPAN.i2 { + DISPLAY: block; MARGIN-LEFT: 2em; +} +.poem SPAN.i4 { + DISPLAY: block; MARGIN-LEFT: 4em; +} +.poem .caesura { + VERTICAL-ALIGN: -200%; +} +LI.indent { + MARGIN-LEFT: 5%; +} +</style> +</head> +<body> +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 14300 ***</div> + +<div style= +" background-color: white; color: black; border-style: ridge;"> +<center> +<h1>THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON I</h1> +</center> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Let my son often read and reflect on history: this is the only +true philosophy."—<i>Napoleon's last Instructions for the +King of Rome</i>.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<h2>THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON I</h2> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + +<center><a href="#CONTENTS"><b>CONTENTS</b></a></center> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<h4>INCLUDING NEW MATERIALS FROM THE BRITISH OFFICIAL RECORDS</h4> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<h3>BY JOHN HOLLAND ROSE, LITT.D.<br> + LATE SCHOLAR OF CHRIST'S COLLEGE,<br> + CAMBRIDGE</h3> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<h5>LONDON G. BELL AND SONS, LTD.<br> + 1910</h5> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<blockquote>POST 8VO EDITION, ILLUSTRATED<br> +<p>First Published, December 1901.<br> +Second Edition, revised, March 1902.<br> +Third Edition, revised, January 1903.<br> +Fourth Edition, revised, September 1907.<br> +Reprinted, January 1910.</p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<p>CROWN 8VO EDITION<br> +First Published, September 1904.<br> +Reprinted, October 1907; July 1910.</p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<p>DEDICATED TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD ACTON, K.C.V.O., D.C.L., +LL.D. REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF +CAMBRIDGE, IN ADMIRATION OF HIS PROFOUND HISTORICAL LEARNING, AND +IN GRATITUDE FOR ADVICE AND HELP GENEROUSLY GIVEN.</p> +</blockquote> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + <span class="newpage"><a name="page_iVII" id= +"page_iVII">[pg.VII]</a></span> + +<hr style="width: 90%;"> +<a name="PREFACE"></a> +<h3>PREFACE</h3> + +<hr style="width: 90%;"> +<p>An apology seems to be called for from anyone who gives to the +world a new Life of Napoleon I. My excuse must be that for many +years I have sought to revise the traditional story of his career +in the light of facts gleaned from the British Archives and of the +many valuable materials that have recently been published by +continental historians. To explain my manner of dealing with these +sources would require an elaborate critical Introduction; but, as +the limits of my space absolutely preclude any such attempt, I can +only briefly refer to the most important topics.</p> + +<p>To deal with the published sources first, I would name as of +chief importance the works of MM. Aulard, Chuquet, Houssaye, Sorel, +and Vandal in France; of Herren Beer, Delbrück, Fournier, +Lehmann, Oncken, and Wertheimer in Germany and Austria; and of +Baron Lumbroso in Italy. I have also profited largely by the +scholarly monographs or collections of documents due to the labours +of the "Société d'Histoire Contemporaine," the +General Staff of the French Army, of MM. Bouvier, Caudrillier, +Capitaine "J.G.," Lévy, Madelin, Sagnac, Sciout, Zivy, and +others in France; and of Herren Bailleu, Demelitsch, Hansing, +Klinkowstrom, Luckwaldt, Ulmann, and others in Germany. Some of the +recently published French Memoirs dealing with those times are not +devoid of value, though this class of literature is to be used with +caution. The new letters of Napoleon published by M. Léon +Lecestre and M. Léonce de Brotonne <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_iVIII" id="page_iVIII">[pg.VIII]</a></span> have also +opened up fresh vistas into the life of the great man; and the time +seems to have come when we may safely revise our judgments on many +of its episodes.</p> + +<p>But I should not have ventured on this great undertaking, had I +not been able to contribute something new to Napoleonic literature. +During a study of this period for an earlier work published in the +"Cambridge Historical Series," I ascertained the great value of the +British records for the years 1795-1815. It is surely discreditable +to our historical research that, apart from the fruitful labours of +the Navy Records Society, of Messrs. Oscar Browning and Hereford +George, and of Mr. Bowman of Toronto, scarcely any English work has +appeared that is based on the official records of this period. Yet +they are of great interest and value. Our diplomatic agents then +had the knack of getting at State secrets in most foreign capitals, +even when we were at war with their Governments; and our War Office +and Admiralty Records have also yielded me some interesting +"finds." M. Lévy, in the preface to his "Napoléon +intime" (1893), has well remarked that "the documentary history of +the wars of the Empire has not yet been written. To write it +accurately, it will be more important thoroughly to know foreign +archives than those of France." Those of Russia, Austria, and +Prussia have now for the most part been examined; and I think that +I may claim to have searched all the important parts of our Foreign +Office Archives for the years in question, as well as for part of +the St. Helena period. I have striven to embody the results of this +search in the present volumes as far as was compatible with limits +of space and with the narrative form at which, in my judgment, +history ought always to aim.</p> + +<p>On the whole, British policy comes out the better the <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_iIX" id="page_iIX">[pg.IX]</a></span> +more fully it is known. Though often feeble and vacillating, it +finally attained to firmness and dignity; and Ministers closed the +cycle of war with acts of magnanimity towards the French people +which are studiously ignored by those who bid us shed tears over +the martyrdom of St. Helena. Nevertheless, the splendour of the +finale must not blind us to the flaccid eccentricities that made +British statesmanship the laughing stock of Europe in 1801-3, +1806-7, and 1809. Indeed, it is questionable whether the renewal of +war between England and Napoleon in 1803 was due more to his innate +forcefulness or to the contempt which he felt for the Addington +Cabinet. When one also remembers our extraordinary blunders in the +war of the Third Coalition, it seems a miracle that the British +Empire survived that life and death struggle against a man of +superhuman genius who was determined to effect its overthrow. I +have called special attention to the extent and pertinacity of +Napoleon's schemes for the foundation of a French Colonial Empire +in India, Egypt, South Africa, and Australia; and there can be no +doubt that the events of the years 1803-13 determined, not only the +destinies of Europe and Napoleon, but the general trend of the +world's colonization.</p> + +<p>As it has been necessary to condense the story of Napoleon's +life in some parts, I have chosen to treat with special brevity the +years 1809-11, which may be called the <i>constans aetas</i> of his +career, in order to have more space for the decisive events that +followed; but even in these less eventful years I have striven to +show how his Continental System was setting at work mighty economic +forces that made for his overthrow, so that after the +<i>débâcle</i> of 1812 it came to be a struggle of +Napoleon and France <i>contra mundum</i>. <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_iX" id="page_iX">[pg.X]</a></span></p> + +<p>While not neglecting the personal details of the great man's +life, I have dwelt mainly on his public career. Apart from his +brilliant conversations, his private life has few features of +abiding interest, perhaps because he early tired of the shallowness +of Josephine and the Corsican angularity of his brothers and +sisters. But the cause also lay in his own disposition. He once +said to M. Gallois: "Je n'aime pas beaucoup les femmes, ni le +jeu—enfin rien: <i>je suis tout à fait un être +politique</i>." In dealing with him as a warrior and statesman, and +in sparing my readers details as to his bolting his food, sleeping +at concerts, and indulging in amours where for him there was no +glamour of romance, I am laying stress on what interested him +most—in a word, I am taking him at his best.</p> + +<p>I could not have accomplished this task, even in the present +inadequate way, but for the help generously accorded from many +quarters. My heartfelt thanks are due to Lord Acton, Regius +Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge, for +advice of the highest importance; to Mr. Hubert Hall of the Public +Record Office, for guidance in my researches there; to Baron +Lumbroso of Rome, editor of the "Bibliografia ragionata dell' Epoca +Napoleonica," for hints on Italian and other affairs; to Dr. +Luckwaldt, Privat Docent of the University of Bonn, and author of +"Oesterreich und die Anfänge des Befreiungs-Krieges," for his +very scholarly revision of the chapters on German affairs; to Mr. +F.H.E. Cunliffe, M.A., Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford, for +valuable advice on the campaigns of 1800, 1805, and 1806; to +Professor Caudrillier of Grenoble, author of "Pichegru," for +information respecting the royalist plot; and to Messrs. J.E. +Morris, M.A., and E.L.S. Horsburgh, B.A., for detailed +communications concerning Waterloo, <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_iXI" id="page_iXI">[pg.XI]</a></span> The nieces of the late +Professor Westwood of Oxford most kindly allowed the facsimile of +the new Napoleon letter, printed opposite p. 156 of vol. i., to be +made from the original in their possession; and Miss Lowe +courteously placed at my disposal the papers of her father relating +to the years 1813-15, as well as to the St. Helena period. I wish +here to record my grateful obligations for all these friendly +courtesies, which have given value to the book, besides saving me +from many of the pitfalls with which the subject abounds. That I +have escaped them altogether is not to be imagined; but I can +honestly say, in the words of the late Bishop of London, that "I +have tried to write true history."</p> + +<p>J.H.R.</p> + +<p>[NOTE.—The references to Napoleon's "Correspondence" in +the notes are to the official French edition, published under the +auspices of Napoleon III. The "New Letters of Napoleon" are those +edited by Léon Lecestre, and translated into English by Lady +Mary Loyd, except in a very few cases where M. Léonce de +Brotonne's still more recent edition is cited under his name. By +"F.O.," France, No.——, and "F.O.," Prussia, +No.——, are meant the volumes of <i>our</i> Foreign +Office despatches relating to France and Prussia. For the sake of +brevity I have called Napoleon's Marshals and high officials by +their names, not by their titles: but a list of these is given at +the close of vol. ii.] <span class="newpage"><a name="page_iXII" +id="page_iXII">[pg.XII]</a></span></p> + +<hr style="width: 90%;"> +<h3>PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION</h3> + +<hr style="width: 90%;"> +<p>The demand for this work so far exceeded my expectations that I +was unable to make any considerable changes in the second edition, +issued in March, 1902; and circumstances again make it impossible +for me to give the work that thorough recension which I should +desire. I have, however, carefully considered the suggestions +offered by critics, and have adopted them in some cases. Professor +Fournier of Vienna has most kindly furnished me with details which +seem to relegate to the domain of legend the famous ice catastrophe +at Austerlitz; and I have added a note to this effect on p. 50 of +vol. ii. On the other hand, I may justly claim that the publication +of Count Balmain's reports relating to St. Helena has served to +corroborate, in all important details, my account of Napoleon's +captivity.</p> + +<p>It only remains to add that I much regret the omission of Mr. +Oman's name from II. 12-13 of page viii of the Preface, an omission +rendered all the more conspicuous by the appearance of the first +volume of his "History of the Peninsular War" in the spring of this +year.</p> + +<p>J.H.R.</p> + +<p><i>October, 1902.</i></p> + +<p>Notes have been added at the end of ch. v., vol. i.; chs. xxii., +xxiii., xxviii., xxix., xxxv., vol. ii.; and an Appendix on the +Battle of Waterloo has been added on p. 577, vol. ii.<br> +<br /><br /><br /><br /> + +<a name="CONTENTS"></a><h3>CONTENTS</h3> + +<table summary="toc"> +<tr> +<td><b>CHAPTER</b></td> +<td></td> +<td align="right">page</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td><a href="#PREFACE"></a><b>PREFACE</b></td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_iVII">VII</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>NOTE ON THE REPUBLICAN CALENDAR</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_iXV">XV</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><b>VOLUME I</b></td><td></td><td align="right"></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>I. PARENTAGE AND EARLY YEARS</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i1">1</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>II. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND CORSICA</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i24 ">24</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>III. TOULON</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i44">44</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>IV. VENDÉMIAIRE</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i57">57</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>V. THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN (1796)</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i77">77</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>VI. THE FIGHTS FOR MANTUA</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i105">105</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>VII. LEOBEN TO CAMPO FORMIO</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i140">140</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>VIII. EGYPT</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i174">174</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>IX. SYRIA</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i201">201</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>X. BRUMAIRE</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i216">216</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XI. MARENGO: LUNÉVILLE</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i240">240</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XII.THE NEW INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i266">266</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XIII. THE CONSULATE FOR LIFE</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i302">302</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XIV. THE PEACE OF AMIENS</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i331">331</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XV. A FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE:<br> + ST. +DOMINGO--LOUISIANA--INDIA--AUSTRALIA</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i355">355</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XVI. NAPOLEON'S INTERVENTIONS</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i386">386</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XVII. THE RENEWAL OF WAR</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i401">401</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XVIII. EUROPE AND THE BONAPARTES</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i430">430</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XIX. THE ROYALIST PLOT</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i446">446</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XX. THE DAWN OF THE EMPIRE</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i465">465</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXI. THE BOULOGNE FLOTILLA</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i482">462</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXII. APPENDIX: REPORTS HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED ON<br> + (<i>a</i>) THE SALE OF LOUISIANA;<br> + (<i>b</i>) THE IRISH DIVISION IN +NAPOLEON'S SERVICE</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i509">509</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td></td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS, AND PLANS</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>THE SIEGE OF TOULON, 1793</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image_01">51</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE CAMPAIGNS IN NORTH ITALY</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image_02">81</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE VICTORY OF ARCOLA</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image_03">125</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF RIVOLI</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image_04">133</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>FACSIMILE OF A LETTER OF NAPOLEON TO "LA CITOYENNE TALLIEN," +1797</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i156">156</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>CENTRAL EUROPE, after the Peace of Campo Formio, 1797</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image_05">171</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>PLAN OF THE SIEGE OF ACRE, from a contemporary sketch</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image_06">205</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>THE BATTLE OF MARENGO, to illustrate Kellermann's charge</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image_07">255</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>FRENCH MAP OF THE SOUTH OF<br> + AUSTRALIA, 1807</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_i378">378</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td></td><td></td><td></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><b>VOLUME II</b></td><td></td><td align="right"></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>XXII. ULM AND TRAFALGAR</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii1">1</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXIII. AUSTERLITZ</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii29">29</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXIV. PRUSSIA AND THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii51">51</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXV. THE FALL OF PRUSSIA</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii79">79</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXVI. THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM: FRIEDLAND</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii103">103</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXVII. TILSIT</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii125">125</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXVIII. THE SPANISH RISING</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii159">159</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXIX. ERFURT</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii174">174</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXX. NAPOLEON AND AUSTRIA</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii189">189</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXXI. THE EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii208">208</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXXII. THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii231">231</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXXIII. THE FIRST SAXON CAMPAIGN</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii267">267</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXXIV. VITTORIA AND THE ARMISTICE</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii300">300</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXXV. DRESDEN AND LEIPZIG</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii329">329</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXXVI. FROM THE RHINE TO THE SEINE</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii368">368</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXXVII. THE FIRST ABDICATION</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii399">399</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXXVIII. ELBA AND PARIS</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii435">435</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XXXIX. LIGNY AND QUATRE BRAS</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii453">453</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XL. WATERLOO</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii487">487</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XLI. FROM THE ELYSÉE TO ST. HELENA</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii512">512</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>XLII. CLOSING YEARS</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii539">539</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>APPENDIX I: LIST OF THE CHIEF APPOINTMENTS<br> + AND DIGNITIES BESTOWED BY NAPOLEON</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii575">575</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>APPENDIX II: THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii577">577</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>INDEX</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii579">579</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>MAPS AND PLANS</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>BATTLE OF ULM</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image_08">15</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii39">39</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>BATTLE OF JENA</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii95">95</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii121">121</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>BATTLE OF WAGRAM</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii196">196</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER 1810</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii215">215</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii247">247</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>BATTLE OF VITTORIA</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii310">310</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii336">336</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>BATTLE OF DRESDEN</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii343">343</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>BATTLE OF LEIPZIG</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii357">357</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814</td> +<td><i>to face</i></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii383">383</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td></td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>PLAN OF THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii458">458</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>BATTLE OF LIGNY</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii465">465</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>BATTLE OF WATERLOO, about 11 o'clock a.m.</td> +<td><i>to face</i></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii490">490</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td>ST. HELENA</td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#page_ii540">540</a></td> +<td></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><a href="#FOOTNOTES"><b>FOOTNOTES</b></a></td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"></td> +<td></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><a href="#INDEX">INDEX</a></td> +<td></td> +<td align="right"></td> +<td></td> +</tr> + +</table> + + + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<h3>VOLUME I</h3> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_iXV" id= +"page_iXV">[pg.XV]</a></span> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="NOTE_ON_THE_REPUBLICAN_CALENDAR"></a> +<h2>NOTE ON THE REPUBLICAN CALENDAR</h2> + +<br> + + +<p>The republican calendar consisted of twelve months of thirty +days each, each month being divided into three "decades" of ten +days. Five days (in leap years six) were added at the end of the +year to bring it into coincidence with the solar year.</p> + +<pre> + An I began Sept. 22, 1792. + " II " " 1793. + " III " " 1794. + " IV (leap year) 1795. + + * * * * * + + " VIII began Sept. 22, 1799. + " IX " Sept. 23, 1800. + " X " " 1801. + + * * * * * + + " XIV " " 1805. + +</pre> + +<p>The new computation, though reckoned from Sept. 22, 1792, was +not introduced until Nov. 26, 1793 (An II). It ceased after Dec. +31, 1805.</p> + +<p>The months are as follows:</p> + +<pre> + Vendémiaire Sept. 22 to Oct. 21. + Brumaire Oct. 22 " Nov. 20. + Frimaire Nov. 21 " Dec. 20. + Nivôse Dec. 21 " Jan. 19. + Pluviôse Jan. 20 " Feb. 18. + Ventôse Feb. 19 " Mar. 20. + Germinal Mar. 21 " April 19. + Floréal April 20 " May 19. + Prairial May 20 " June 18. + Messidor June 19 " July 18. + Thermidor July 19 " Aug. 17. + Fructidor Aug. 18 " Sept. 16. +</pre> + +<p>Add five (in leap years six) "Sansculottides" or "Jours +complémentaires."</p> + +<p>In 1796 (leap year) the numbers in the table of months, so far +as concerns all dates between Feb. 28 and Sept. 22, will have to be +<i>reduced by one</i>, owing to the intercalation of Feb. 29, which +is not compensated for until the end of the republican year.</p> + +<p>The matter is further complicated by the fact that the +republicans reckoned An VIII as a leap year, though it is not one +in the Gregorian Calendar. Hence that year ended on Sept. 22, and +An IX and succeeding years began on Sept. 23. Consequently in the +above table of months the numbers of all days from +Vendémiaire 1, An IX (Sept. 23, 1800), to Nivôse 10, +An XIV (Dec. 31, 1805), inclusive, will have to be <i>increased by +one</i>, except only in the next leap year between Ventôse 9, +An XII, and Vendémiaire 1, An XIII (Feb. 28-Sept, 23, 1804), +when the two Revolutionary aberrations happen to neutralize each +other. <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i1" id= +"page_i1">[pg.1]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="THE_LIFE_OF_NAPOLEON_I"></a> +<h2>THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON I</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER I</h2> + +<center>PARENTAGE AND EARLY YEARS</center> + +<br> + + +<p>"I was born when my country was perishing. Thirty thousand +French vomited upon our coasts, drowning the throne of Liberty in +waves of blood, such was the sight which struck my eyes." This +passionate utterance, penned by Napoleon Buonaparte at the +beginning of the French Revolution, describes the state of Corsica +in his natal year. The words are instinct with the vehemence of the +youth and the extravagant sentiment of the age: they strike the +keynote of his career. His life was one of strain and stress from +his cradle to his grave.</p> + +<p>In his temperament as in the circumstances of his time the young +Buonaparte was destined for an extraordinary career. Into a +tottering civilization he burst with all the masterful force of an +Alaric. But he was an Alaric of the south, uniting the untamed +strength of his island kindred with the mental powers of his +Italian ancestry. In his personality there is a complex blending of +force and grace, of animal passion and mental clearness, of +northern common sense with the promptings of an oriental +imagination; and this union in his nature of seeming opposites +explains many of the mysteries of his life. Fortunately for lovers +of romance, genius cannot be wholly analyzed, even by the most +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i2" id= +"page_i2">[pg.2]</a></span> adroit historical philosophizer or the +most exacting champion of heredity. But in so far as the sources of +Napoleon's power can be measured, they may be traced to the +unexampled needs of mankind in the revolutionary epoch and to his +own exceptional endowments. Evidently, then, the characteristics of +his family claim some attention from all who would understand the +man and the influence which he was to wield over modern Europe.</p> + +<p>It has been the fortune of his House to be the subject of +dispute from first to last. Some writers have endeavoured to trace +its descent back to the Cæsars of Rome, others to the +Byzantine Emperors; one genealogical explorer has tracked the +family to Majorca, and, altering its name to Bonpart, has +discovered its progenitor in the Man of the Iron Mask; while the +Duchesse d'Abrantès, voyaging eastwards in quest of its +ancestors, has confidently claimed for the family a Greek origin. +Painstaking research has dispelled these romancings of historical +<i>trouveurs</i>, and has connected this enigmatic stock with a +Florentine named "William, who in the year 1261 took the surname of +<i>Bonaparte</i> or <i>Buonaparte</i>. The name seems to have been +assumed when, amidst the unceasing strifes between Guelfs and +Ghibellines that rent the civic life of Florence, William's party, +the Ghibellines, for a brief space gained the ascendancy. But +perpetuity was not to be found in Florentine politics; and in a +short time he was a fugitive at a Tuscan village, Sarzana, beyond +the reach of the victorious Guelfs. Here the family seems to have +lived for wellnigh three centuries, maintaining its Ghibelline and +aristocratic principles with surprising tenacity. The age was not +remarkable for the virtue of constancy, or any other virtue. +Politics and private life were alike demoralized by unceasing +intrigues; and amidst strifes of Pope and Emperor, duchies and +republics, cities and autocrats, there was formed that type of +Italian character which is delineated in the pages of Macchiavelli. +From the depths of debasement of that cynical age the Buonapartes +were saved by their poverty, and by the isolation <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i3" id="page_i3">[pg.3]</a></span> of their +life at Sarzana. Yet the embassies discharged at intervals by the +more talented members of the family showed that the gifts for +intrigue were only dormant; and they were certainly transmitted in +their intensity to the greatest scion of the race.</p> + +<p>In the year 1529 Francis Buonaparte, whether pressed by poverty +or distracted by despair at the misfortunes which then overwhelmed +Italy, migrated to Corsica. There the family was grafted upon a +tougher branch of the Italian race. To the vulpine characteristics +developed under the shadow of the Medici there were now added +qualities of a more virile stamp. Though dominated in turn by the +masters of the Mediterranean, by Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, by +the men of Pisa, and finally by the Genoese Republic, the islanders +retained a striking individuality. The rock-bound coast and +mountainous interior helped to preserve the essential features of +primitive life. Foreign Powers might affect the towns on the +sea-board, but they left the clans of the interior comparatively +untouched. Their life centred around the family. The Government +counted for little or nothing; for was it not the symbol of the +detested foreign rule? Its laws were therefore as naught when they +conflicted with the unwritten but omnipotent code of family honour. +A slight inflicted on a neighbour would call forth the warning +words—"Guard thyself: I am on my guard." Forthwith there +began a blood feud, a vendetta, which frequently dragged on its +dreary course through generations of conspiracy and murder, until, +the principals having vanished, the collateral branches of the +families were involved. No Corsican was so loathed as the laggard +who shrank from avenging the family honour, even on a distant +relative of the first offender. The murder of the Duc d'Enghien by +Napoleon in 1834 sent a thrill of horror through the Continent. To +the Corsicans it seemed little more than an autocratic version of +the <i>vendetta traversale<a name="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1_1"><sup>[1]</sup></a></i>. <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i4" id="page_i4">[pg.4]</a></span></p> + +<p>The vendetta was the chief law of Corsican society up to +comparatively recent times; and its effects are still visible in +the life of the stern islanders. In his charming romance, +"Colomba," M. Prosper Mérimée has depicted the +typical Corsican, even of the towns, as preoccupied, gloomy, +suspicious, ever on the alert, hovering about his dwelling, like a +falcon over his nest, seemingly in preparation for attack or +defence. Laughter, the song, the dance, were rarely heard in the +streets; for the women, after acting as the drudges of the +household, were kept jealously at home, while their lords smoked +and watched. If a game at hazard were ventured upon, it ran its +course in silence, which not seldom was broken by the shot or the +stab—first warning that there had been underhand play. The +deed always preceded the word.</p> + +<p>In such a life, where commerce and agriculture were despised, +where woman was mainly a drudge and man a conspirator, there grew +up the typical Corsican temperament, moody and exacting, but withal +keen, brave, and constant, which looked on the world as a +fencing-school for the glorification of the family and the clan<a +name="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2"><sup>[2]</sup></a>. +Of this<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i5" id= +"page_i5">[pg.5]</a></span> type Napoleon was to be the supreme +exemplar; and the fates granted him as an arena a chaotic France +and a distracted Europe.</p> + +<p>Amidst that grim Corsican existence the Buonapartes passed their +lives during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Occupied as +advocates and lawyers with such details of the law as were of any +practical importance, they must have been involved in family feuds +and the oft-recurring disputes between Corsica and the suzerain +Power, Genoa. As became dignitaries in the municipality of Ajaccio, +several of the Buonapartes espoused the Genoese side; and the +Genoese Senate in a document of the year 1652 styled one of them, +Jérome, "Egregius Hieronimus di Buonaparte, procurator +Nobilium." These distinctions they seem to have little coveted. +Very few families belonged to the Corsican <i>noblesse</i>, and +their fiefs were unimportant. In Corsica, as in the Forest Cantons +of Switzerland and the Highlands of Scotland, class distinctions +were by no means so coveted as in lands that had been thoroughly +feudalized; and the Buonapartes, content with their civic dignities +at Ajaccio and the attachment of their partisans on their country +estates, seem rarely to have used the prefix which implied +nobility. Their life was not unlike that of many an old Scottish +laird, who, though possibly <i>bourgeois</i> in origin, yet by +courtesy ranked as chieftain among his tenants, and was ennobled by +the parlance of the countryside, perhaps all the more readily +because he refused to wear the honours that came from over the +Border.</p> + +<p>But a new influence was now to call forth all the powers of this +tough stock. In the middle of the eighteenth century we find the +head of the family, Charles Marie Buonaparte, aglow with the flame +of Corsican patriotism then being kindled by the noble career of +Paoli. This gifted patriot, the champion of the islanders, first +against the Genoese and later against the French, desired to cement +by education the framework of the Corsican Commonwealth and founded +a university. It <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i6" id= +"page_i6">[pg.6]</a></span> was here that the father of the future +French Emperor received a training in law, and a mental stimulus +which was to lift his family above the level of the <i>caporali</i> +and attorneys with whom its lot had for centuries been cast. His +ambition is seen in the endeavour, successfully carried out by his +uncle, Lucien, Archdeacon of Ajaccio, to obtain recognition of +kinship with the Buonapartes of Tuscany who had been ennobled by +the Grand Duke. His patriotism is evinced in his ardent support of +Paoli, by whose valour and energy the Genoese were finally driven +from the island. Amidst these patriotic triumphs Charles confronted +his destiny in the person of Letizia Ramolino, a beautiful girl, +descended from an honourable Florentine family which had for +centuries been settled in Corsica. The wedding took place in 1764, +the bridegroom being then eighteen, and the bride fifteen years of +age. The union, if rashly undertaken in the midst of civil strifes, +was yet well assorted. Both parties to it were of patrician, if not +definitely noble descent, and came of families which combined the +intellectual gifts of Tuscany with the vigour of their later island +home<a name="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_3_3"><sup>[3]</sup></a>. From her mother's race, the +Pietra Santa family, Letizia imbibed the habits of the most +backward and savage part of Corsica, where vendettas were rife and +education was almost unknown. Left in ignorance in her early days, +she yet was accustomed to hardships, and often showed the fertility +of resource which such a life always develops. Hence, at the time +of her marriage, she possessed a firmness of will far beyond her +years; and her strength and fortitude enabled her to survive the +terrible adversities of her early days, as also to meet with quiet +matronly dignity the extraordinary honours showered on her as the +mother of the French<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i7" id= +"page_i7">[pg.7]</a></span> Emperor. She was inured to habits of +frugality, which reappeared in the personal tastes of her son. In +fact, she so far retained her old parsimonious habits, even amidst +the splendours of the French Imperial Court, as to expose herself +to the charge of avarice. But there is a touching side to all this. +She seems ever to have felt that after the splendour there would +come again the old days of adversity, and her instincts were in one +sense correct. She lived on to the advanced age of eighty-six, and +died twenty-one years after the break-up of her son's +empire—a striking proof of the vitality and tenacity of her +powers.</p> + +<p>A kindly Providence veiled the future from the young couple. +Troubles fell swiftly upon them both in private and in public life. +Their first two children died in infancy. The third, Joseph, was +born in 1768, when the Corsican patriots were making their last +successful efforts against their new French oppressors: the fourth, +the famous Napoleon, saw the light on August 15th, 1769, when the +liberties of Corsica were being finally extinguished. Nine other +children were born before the outbreak of the French Revolution +reawakened civil strifes, amidst which the then fatherless family +was tossed to and fro and finally whirled away to France.</p> + +<p>Destiny had already linked the fortunes of the young Napoleon +Buonaparte with those of France. After the downfall of Genoese rule +in Corsica, France had taken over, for empty promises, the claims +of the hard-pressed Italian republic to its troublesome island +possession. It was a cheap and practical way of restoring, at least +in the Mediterranean the shattered prestige of the French Bourbons. +They had previously intervened in Corsican affairs on the side of +the Genoese. Yet in 1764 Paoli appealed to Louis XV. for +protection. It was granted, in the form of troops that proceeded +quietly to occupy the coast towns of the island under cover of +friendly assurances. In 1768, before the expiration of an informal +truce, Marbeuf, the French commander, <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i8" id="page_i8">[pg.8]</a></span> commenced hostilities +against the patriots<a name="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_4_4"><sup>[4]</sup></a>. In vain did Rousseau and many +other champions of popular liberty protest against this bartering +away of insular freedom: in vain did Paoli rouse his compatriots to +another and more unequal struggle, and seek to hold the mountainous +interior. Poor, badly equipped, rent by family feuds and clan +schisms, his followers were no match for the French troops; and +after the utter break-up of his forces Paoli fled to England, +taking with him three hundred and forty of the most determined +patriots. With these irreconcilables Charles Buonaparte did not +cast in his lot, but accepted the pardon offered to those who +should recognize the French sway. With his wife and their little +child Joseph he returned to Ajaccio; and there, shortly afterwards, +Napoleon was born. As the patriotic historian, Jacobi, has finely +said, "The Corsican people, when exhausted by producing martyrs to +the cause of liberty, produced Napoleon Buonaparte<a name= +"FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5"><sup>[5]</sup></a>."</p> + +<p>Seeing that Charles Buonaparte had been an ardent adherent of +Paoli, his sudden change of front has exposed him to keen censure. +He certainly had not the grit of which heroes are made. His seems +to have been an ill-balanced nature, soon buoyed up by +enthusiasms,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i9" id= +"page_i9">[pg.9]</a></span> and as speedily depressed by their +evaporation; endowed with enough of learning and culture to be a +Voltairean and write second-rate verses; and with a talent for +intrigue which sufficed to embarrass his never very affluent +fortunes. Napoleon certainly derived no world-compelling qualities +from his father: for these he was indebted to the wilder strain +which ran in his mother's blood. The father doubtless saw in the +French connection a chance of worldly advancement and of liberation +from pecuniary difficulties; for the new rulers now sought to gain +over the patrician families of the island. Many of them had +resented the dictatorship of Paoli; and they now gladly accepted +the connection with France, which promised to enrich their country +and to open up a brilliant career in the French army, where +commissions were limited to the scions of nobility.</p> + +<p>Much may be said in excuse of Charles Buonaparte's decision, and +no one can deny that Corsica has ultimately gained much by her +connection with France. But his change of front was open to the +charge that it was prompted by self-interest rather than by +philosophic foresight. At any rate, his second son throughout his +boyhood nursed a deep resentment against his father for his +desertion of the patriots' cause. The youth's sympathies were with +the peasants, whose allegiance was not to be bought by baubles, +whose constancy and bravery long held out against the French in a +hopeless guerilla warfare. His hot Corsican blood boiled at the +stories of oppression and insult which he heard from his humbler +compatriots. When, at eleven years of age, he saw in the military +college at Brienne the portrait of Choiseul, the French Minister +who had urged on the conquest of Corsica, his passion burst forth +in a torrent of imprecations against the traitor; and, even after +the death of his father in 1785, he exclaimed that he could never +forgive him for not following Paoli into exile.</p> + +<p>What trifles seem, at times, to alter the current of human +affairs! Had his father acted thus, the young Napoleon would in all +probability have entered the <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i10" id="page_i10">[pg.10]</a></span> military or naval +service of Great Britain; he might have shared Paoli's enthusiasm +for the land of his adoption, and have followed the Corsican hero +in his enterprises against the French Revolution, thenceforth +figuring in history merely as a greater Marlborough, crushing the +military efforts of democratic France, and luring England into a +career of Continental conquest. Monarchy and aristocracy would have +gone unchallenged, except within the "natural limits" of France; +and the other nations, never shaken to their inmost depths, would +have dragged on their old inert fragmentary existence.</p> + +<p>The decision of Charles Buonaparte altered the destiny of +Europe. He determined that his eldest boy, Joseph, should enter the +Church, and that Napoleon should be a soldier. His perception of +the characters of his boys was correct. An anecdote, for which the +elder brother is responsible, throws a flood of light on their +temperaments. The master of their school arranged a mimic combat +for his pupils—Romans against Carthaginians. Joseph, as the +elder was ranged under the banner of Rome, while Napoleon was told +off among the Carthaginians; but, piqued at being chosen for the +losing side, the child fretted, begged, and stormed until the less +bellicose Joseph agreed to change places with his exacting junior. +The incident is prophetic of much in the later history of the +family.</p> + +<p>Its imperial future was opened up by the deft complaisance now +shown by Charles Buonaparte. The reward for his speedy submission +to France was soon forthcoming. The French commander in Corsica +used his influence to secure the admission of the young Napoleon to +the military school of Brienne in Champagne; and as the father was +able to satisfy the authorities not only that he was without +fortune, but also that his family had been noble for four +generations, Napoleon was admitted to this school to be educated at +the charges of the King of France (April, 1779). He was now, at the +tender age of nine, a stranger in a strange land, among a people +whom he detested as the oppressors of his countrymen. <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i11" id="page_i11">[pg.11]</a></span> Worst +of all, he had to endure the taunt of belonging to a subject race. +What a position for a proud and exacting child! Little wonder that +the official report represented him as silent and obstinate; but, +strange to say, it added the word "imperious." It was a tough +character which could defy repression amidst such surroundings. As +to his studies, little need be said. In his French history he read +of the glories of the distant past (when "Germany was part of the +French Empire"), the splendours of the reign of Louis XIV., the +disasters of France in the Seven Years' War, and the "prodigious +conquests of the English in India." But his imagination was kindled +from other sources. Boys of pronounced character have always owed +far more to their private reading than to their set studies; and +the young Buonaparte, while grudgingly learning Latin and French +grammar, was feeding his mind on Plutarch's "Lives"—in a +French translation. The artful intermingling of the actual and the +romantic, the historic and the personal, in those vivid sketches of +ancient worthies and heroes, has endeared them to many minds. +Rousseau derived unceasing profit from their perusal; and Madame +Roland found in them "the pasture of great souls." It was so with +the lonely Corsican youth. Holding aloof from his comrades in +gloomy isolation, he caught in the exploits of Greeks and Romans a +distant echo of the tragic romance of his beloved island home. The +librarian of the school asserted that even then the young soldier +had modelled his future career on that of the heroes of antiquity; +and we may well believe that, in reading of the exploits of +Leonidas, Curtius, and Cincinnatus, he saw the figure of his own +antique republican hero, Paoli. To fight side by side with Paoli +against the French was his constant dream. "Paoli will return," he +once exclaimed, "and as soon as I have strength, I will go to help +him: and perhaps together we shall be able to shake the odious yoke +from off the neck of Corsica."</p> + +<p>But there was another work which exercised a great influence on +his young mind—the "Gallic War" of <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i12" id="page_i12">[pg.12]</a></span> Cæsar. To +the young Italian the conquest of Gaul by a man of his own race +must have been a congenial topic, and in Cæsar himself the +future conqueror may dimly have recognized a kindred spirit. The +masterful energy and all-conquering will of the old Roman, his keen +insight into the heart of a problem, the wide sweep of his mental +vision, ranging over the intrigues of the Roman Senate, the +shifting politics of a score of tribes, and the myriad +administrative details of a great army and a mighty +province—these were the qualities that furnished the chief +mental training to the young cadet. Indeed, the career of +Cæsar was destined to exert a singular fascination over the +Napoleonic dynasty, not only on its founder, but also on Napoleon +III.; and the change in the character and career of Napoleon the +Great may be registered mentally in the effacement of the portraits +of Leonidas and Paoli by those of Cæsar and Alexander. Later +on, during his sojourn at Ajaccio in 1790, when the first shadows +were flitting across his hitherto unclouded love for Paoli, we hear +that he spent whole nights poring over Cæsar's history, +committing many passages to memory in his passionate admiration of +those wondrous exploits. Eagerly he took Cæsar's side as +against Pompey, and no less warmly defended him from the charge of +plotting against the liberties of the commonwealth<a name= +"FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6"><sup>[6]</sup></a>. It +was a perilous study for a republican youth in whom the military +instincts were as ingrained as the genius for rule.</p> + +<p>Concerning the young Buonaparte's life at Brienne there exist +few authentic records and many questionable anecdotes. Of these +last, that which is the most credible and suggestive relates his +proposal to his schoolfellows to construct ramparts of snow during +the sharp winter of 1783-4. According to his schoolfellow, +Bourrienne, these mimic fortifications were planned by Buonaparte, +who also directed the methods of attack and defence: or, as others +say, he reconstructed the walls according to the needs of modern +war. In either case, the incident <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i13" id="page_i13">[pg.13]</a></span> bespeaks for him great +power of organization and control. But there were in general few +outlets for his originality and vigour. He seems to have disliked +all his comrades, except Bourrienne, as much as they detested him +for his moody humours and fierce outbreaks of temper. He is even +reported to have vowed that he would do as much harm as possible to +the French people; but the remark smacks of the story-book. Equally +doubtful are the two letters in which he prays to be removed from +the indignities to which he was subjected at Brienne<a name= +"FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7"><sup>[7]</sup></a>. In +other letters which are undoubtedly genuine, he refers to his +future career with ardour, and writes not a word as to the bullying +to which his Corsican zeal subjected him. Particularly noteworthy +is the letter to his uncle begging him to intervene so as to +prevent Joseph Buonaparte from taking up a military career. Joseph, +writes the younger brother, would make a good garrison officer, as +he was well formed and clever at frivolous compliments—"good +therefore for society, but for a fight——?"</p> + +<p>Napoleon's determination had been noticed by his teachers. They +had failed to bend his will, at least on important points. In +lesser details his Italian adroitness seems to have been of +service; for the officer who inspected the school reported of him: +"Constitution, health excellent: character submissive, sweet, +honest, grateful: conduct very regular: has always distinguished +himself by his application to mathematics: knows history and +geography passably: very weak in accomplishments. He will be an +excellent seaman: is worthy to enter the School at Paris." To the +military school at Paris he was accordingly sent in due course, +entering there in October, 1784. The change from the semi-monastic +life at Brienne to the splendid edifice which fronts the Champ de +Mars had less effect than might<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i14" id="page_i14">[pg.14]</a></span> have been expected in a +youth of fifteen years. Not yet did he become French in sympathy. +His love of Corsica and hatred of the French monarchy steeled him +against the luxuries of his new surroundings. Perhaps it was an +added sting that he was educated at the expense of the monarchy +which had conquered his kith and kin. He nevertheless applied +himself with energy to his favourite studies, especially +mathematics. Defective in languages he still was, and ever +remained; for his critical acumen in literature ever fastened on +the matter rather than on style. To the end of his days he could +never write Italian, much less French, with accuracy; and his tutor +at Paris not inaptly described his boyish composition as resembling +molten granite. The same qualities of directness and impetuosity +were also fatal to his efforts at mastering the movements of the +dance. In spite of lessons at Paris and private lessons which he +afterwards took at Valence, he was never a dancer: his bent was +obviously for the exact sciences rather than the arts, for the +geometrical rather than the rhythmical: he thought, as he moved, in +straight lines, never in curves.</p> + +<p>The death of his father during the year which the youth spent at +Paris sharpened his sense of responsibility towards his seven +younger brothers and sisters. His own poverty must have inspired +him with disgust at the luxury which he saw around him; but there +are good reasons for doubting the genuineness of the memorial which +he is alleged to have sent from Paris to the second master at +Brienne on this subject. The letters of the scholars at Paris were +subject to strict surveillance; and, if he had taken the trouble to +draw up a list of criticisms on his present training, most +assuredly it would have been destroyed. Undoubtedly, however, he +would have sympathized with the unknown critic in his complaint of +the unsuitableness of sumptuous meals to youths who were destined +for the hardships of the camp. At Brienne he had been dubbed "the +Spartan," an instance of that almost uncanny faculty of schoolboys +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i15" id= +"page_i15">[pg.15]</a></span> to dash off in a nickname the salient +features of character. The phrase was correct, almost for +Napoleon's whole life. At any rate, the pomp of Paris served but to +root his youthful affections more tenaciously in the rocks of +Corsica.</p> + +<p>In September, 1785, that is, at the age of sixteen, Buonaparte +was nominated for a commision as junior lieutenant in La +Fère regiment of artillery quartered at Valence on the +Rhone. This was his first close contact with real life. The rules +of the service required him to spend three months of rigorous drill +before he was admitted to his commission. The work was exacting: +the pay was small, viz., 1,120 francs, or less than £45, a +year; but all reports agree as to his keen zest for his profession +and the recognition of his transcendent abilities by his superior +officers.<a name="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_8_8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> There it was that he mastered +the rudiments of war, for lack of which many generals of noble +birth have quickly closed in disaster careers that began with +promise: there, too, he learnt that hardest and best of all +lessons, prompt obedience. "To learn obeying is the fundamental art +of governing," says Carlyle. It was so with Napoleon: at Valence he +served his apprenticeship in the art of conquering and the art of +governing.</p> + +<p>This spring-time of his life is of interest and importance in +many ways: it reveals many amiable qualities, which had hitherto +been blighted by the real or fancied scorn of the wealthy cadets. +At Valence, while shrinking from his brother officers, he sought +society more congenial to his simple tastes and restrained +demeanour. In a few of the best bourgeois families of Valence he +found happiness. There, too, blossomed the tenderest, purest idyll +of his life. At the country house of a cultured lady who had +befriended him in his solitude, he saw his first love, Caroline de +Colombier. It was a passing fancy; but to her all the passion of +his southern nature welled forth. She seems<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i16" id="page_i16">[pg.16]</a></span> to have returned +his love; for in the stormy sunset of his life at St. Helena he +recalled some delicious walks at dawn when Caroline and he +had—eaten cherries together. One lingers fondly over these +scenes of his otherwise stern career, for they reveal his capacity +for social joys and for deep and tender affection, had his lot been +otherwise cast. How different might have been his life, had France +never conquered Corsica, and had the Revolution never burst forth! +But Corsica was still his dominant passion. When he was called away +from Valence to repress a riot at Lyons, his feelings, distracted +for a time by Caroline, swerved back towards his island home; and +in September, 1786, he had the joy of revisiting the scenes of his +childhood. Warmly though he greeted his mother, brothers and +sisters, after an absence of nearly eight years, his chief delight +was in the rocky shores, the verdant dales and mountain heights of +Corsica. The odour of the forests, the setting of the sun in the +sea "as in the bosom of the infinite," the quiet proud independence +of the mountaineers themselves, all enchanted him. His delight +reveals almost Wertherian powers of "sensibility." Even the family +troubles could not damp his ardour. His father had embarked on +questionable speculations, which now threatened the Buonapartes +with bankruptcy, unless the French Government proved to be +complacent and generous. With the hope of pressing one of the +family claims on the royal exchequer, the second son procured an +extension of furlough and sped to Paris. There at the close of 1787 +he spent several weeks, hopefully endeavouring to extract money +from the bankrupt Government. It was a season of disillusionment in +more senses than one; for there he saw for himself the seamy side +of Parisian life, and drifted for a brief space about the giddy +vortex of the Palais Royal. What a contrast to the limpid life of +Corsica was that turbid frothy existence—already swirling +towards its mighty plunge!</p> + +<p>After a furlough of twenty-one months he rejoined his regiment, +now at Auxonne. There his health suffered <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i17" id="page_i17">[pg.17]</a></span> considerably, not +only from the miasma of the marshes of the river Saône, but +also from family anxieties and arduous literary toils. To these +last it is now needful to refer. Indeed, the external events of his +early life are of value only as they reveal the many-sidedness of +his nature and the growth of his mental powers.</p> + +<p>How came he to outgrow the insular patriotism of his early +years? The foregoing recital of facts must have already suggested +one obvious explanation. Nature had dowered him so prodigally with +diverse gifts, mainly of an imperious order, that he could scarcely +have limited his sphere of action to Corsica. Profoundly as he +loved his island, it offered no sphere commensurate with his varied +powers and masterful will. It was no empty vaunt which his father +had uttered on his deathbed that his Napoleon would one day +overthrow the old monarchies and conquer Europe.<a name= +"FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> +Neither did the great commander himself overstate the peculiarity +of his temperament, when he confessed that his instincts had ever +prompted him that his will must prevail, and that what pleased him +must of necessity belong to him. Most spoilt children harbour the +same illusion, for a brief space. But all the buffetings of fortune +failed to drive it from the young Buonaparte; and when despair as +to his future might have impaired the vigour of his domineering +instincts, his mind and will acquired a fresh rigidity by coming +under the spell of that philosophizing doctrinaire, Rousseau.</p> + +<p>There was every reason why he should early be attracted by this +fantastic thinker. In that notable work, "Le Contrat Social" +(1762), Rousseau called attention to the antique energy shown by +the Corsicans in defence of their liberties, and in a startlingly +prophetic phrase he exclaimed that the little island would one day +astonish Europe. The source of this predilection of Rousseau for +Corsica is patent. Born and reared at Geneva, he felt a Switzer's +love for a people which was<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i18" +id="page_i18">[pg.18]</a></span> "neither rich nor poor but +self-sufficing "; and in the simple life and fierce love of liberty +of the hardy islanders he saw traces of that social contract which +he postulated as the basis of society. According to him, the +beginnings of all social and political institutions are to be found +in some agreement or contract between men. Thus arise the clan, the +tribe, the nation. The nation may delegate many of its powers to a +ruler; but if he abuse such powers, the contract between him and +his people is at an end, and they may return to the primitive +state, which is founded on an agreement of equals with equals. +Herein lay the attractiveness of Rousseau for all who were +discontented with their surroundings. He seemed infallibly to +demonstrate the absurdity of tyranny and the need of returning to +the primitive bliss of the social contract. It mattered not that +the said contract was utterly unhistorical and that his argument +teemed with fallacies. He inspired a whole generation with +detestation of the present and with longings for the golden age. +Poets had sung of it, but Rousseau seemed to bring it within the +grasp of long-suffering mortals.</p> + +<p>The first extant manuscript of Napoleon, written at Valence in +April, 1786, shows that he sought in Rousseau's armoury the logical +weapons for demonstrating the "right" of the Corsicans to rebel +against the French. The young hero-worshipper begins by noting that +it is the birthday of Paoli. He plunges into a panegyric on the +Corsican patriots, when he is arrested by the thought that many +censure them for rebelling at all. "The divine laws forbid revolt. +But what have divine laws to do with a purely human affair? Just +think of the absurdity—divine laws universally forbidding the +casting off of a usurping yoke!... As for human laws, there cannot +be any after the prince violates them." He then postulates two +origins for government as alone possible. Either the people has +established laws and submitted itself to the prince, or the prince +has established laws. In the first case, the prince is engaged by +the very nature of his office to execute the covenants. In the +second <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i19" id= +"page_i19">[pg.19]</a></span> case, the laws tend, or do not tend, +to the welfare of the people, which is the aim of all government: +if they do not, the contract with the prince dissolves of itself, +for the people then enters again into its primitive state. Having +thus proved the sovereignty of the people, Buonaparte uses his +doctrine to justify Corsican revolt against France, and thus +concludes his curious medley: "The Corsicans, following all the +laws of justice, have been able to shake off the yoke of the +Genoese, and may do the same with that of the French. Amen."</p> + +<p>Five days later he again gives the reins to his melancholy. +"Always alone, though in the midst of men," he faces the thought of +suicide. With an innate power of summarizing and balancing thoughts +and sensations, he draws up arguments for and against this act. He +is in the dawn of his days and in four months' time he will see "la +patrie," which he has not seen since childhood. What joy! And +yet—how men have fallen away from nature: how cringing are +his compatriots to their conquerors: they are no longer the enemies +of tyrants, of luxury, of vile courtiers: the French have corrupted +their morals, and when "la patrie" no longer survives, a good +patriot ought to die. Life among the French is odious: their modes +of life differ from his as much as the light of the moon differs +from that of the sun.—A strange effusion this for a youth of +seventeen living amidst the full glories of the spring in +Dauphiné. It was only a few weeks before the ripening of +cherries. Did that cherry-idyll with Mdlle. de Colombier lure him +back to life? Or did the hope of striking a blow for Corsica stay +his suicidal hand? Probably the latter; for we find him shortly +afterwards tilting against a Protestant minister of Geneva who had +ventured to criticise one of the dogmas of Rousseau's evangel.</p> + +<p>The Genevan philosopher had asserted that Christianity, by +enthroning in the hearts of Christians the idea of a Kingdom not of +this world, broke the unity of civil society, because it detached +the hearts of its converts from the State, as from all earthly +things. To this the <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i20" id= +"page_i20">[pg.20]</a></span> Genevan minister had successfully +replied by quoting Christian teachings on the subject at issue. But +Buonaparte fiercely accuses the pastor of neither having +understood, nor even read, "Le Contrat Social": he hurls at his +opponent texts of Scripture which enjoin obedience to the laws: he +accuses Christianity of rendering men slaves to an anti-social +tyranny, because its priests set up an authority in opposition to +civil laws; and as for Protestantism, it propagated discords +between its followers, and thereby violated civic unity. +Christianity, he argues, is a foe to civil government, for it aims +at making men happy in this life by inspiring them with hope of a +future life; while the aim of civil government is "to lend +assistance to the feeble against the strong, and by this means to +allow everyone to enjoy a sweet tranquillity, the road of +happiness." He therefore concludes that Christianity and civil +government are diametrically opposed.</p> + +<p>In this tirade we see the youth's spirit of revolt flinging him +not only against French law, but against the religion which +sanctions it. He sees none of the beauty of the Gospels which +Rousseau had admitted. His views are more rigid than those of his +teacher. Scarcely can he conceive of two influences, the spiritual +and the governmental, working on parallel lines, on different parts +of man's nature. His conception of human society is that of an +indivisible, indistinguishable whole, wherein materialism, tinged +now and again by religious sentiment and personal honour, is the +sole noteworthy influence. He finds no worth in a religion which +seeks to work from within to without, which aims at transforming +character, and thus transforming the world. In its headlong quest +of tangible results his eager spirit scorns so tardy a method: he +will "compel men to be happy," and for this result there is but one +practicable means, the Social Contract, the State. Everything which +mars the unity of the Social Contract shall be shattered, so that +the State may have a clear field for the exercise of its beneficent +despotism. Such is Buonaparte's political and religious creed at +the age of seventeen, and such it <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i21" id="page_i21">[pg.21]</a></span> remained (with many +reservations suggested by maturer thought and self-interest) to the +end of his days. It reappears in his policy anent the Concordat of +18222, by which religion was reduced to the level of handmaid to +the State, as also in his frequent assertions that he would never +have quite the same power as the Czar and the Sultan, because he +had not undivided sway over the consciences of his people.<a name= +"FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> +In this boyish essay we may perhaps discern the fundamental reason +of his later failures. He never completely understood religion, or +the enthusiasm which it can evoke; neither did he ever fully +realize the complexity of human nature, the many-sidedness of +social life, and the limitations that beset the action even of the +most intelligent law-maker.<a name="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_11_11"><sup>[11]</sup></a></p> + +<p>His reading of Rousseau having equipped him for the<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i22" id="page_i22">[pg.22]</a></span> study +of human society and government, he now, during his first sojourn +at Auxonne (June, 1788—September, 1789), proceeds to ransack +the records of the ancient and modern world. Despite ill-health, +family troubles, and the outbreak of the French Revolution, he +grapples with this portentous task. The history, geography, +religion, and social customs of the ancient Persians, Scythians, +Thracians, Athenians, Spartans, Egyptians, and +Carthaginians—all furnished materials for his +encyclopædic note-books. Nothing came amiss to his +summarizing genius. Here it was that he gained that knowledge of +the past which was to astonish his contemporaries. Side by side +with suggestions on regimental discipline and improvements in +artillery, we find notes on the opening episodes of Plato's +"Republic," and a systematic summary of English history from the +earliest times down to the Revolution of 1688. This last event +inspired him with special interest, because the Whigs and their +philosophic champion, Locke, maintained that James II. had violated +the original contract between prince and people. Everywhere in his +notes Napoleon emphasizes the incidents which led to conflicts +between dynasties or between rival principles. In fact, through all +these voracious studies there appear signs of his determination to +write a history of Corsica; and, while inspiriting his kinsmen by +recalling the glorious past, he sought to weaken the French +monarchy by inditing a "Dissertation sur l'Autorité Royale." +His first sketch of this work runs as follows:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"23 October, 1788. Auxonne.</p> + +<p>"This work will begin with general ideas as to the origin and +the enhanced prestige of the name of king. Military rule is +favourable to it: this work will afterwards enter into the details +of the usurped authority enjoyed by the Kings of the twelve +Kingdoms of Europe.</p> + +<p>"There are very few Kings who have not deserved dethronement<a +name="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_12_12"><sup>[12]</sup></a>."</p> +</div> + +<p>This curt pronouncement is all that remains of the<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i23" id="page_i23">[pg.23]</a></span> +projected work. It sufficiently indicates, however, the aim of +Napoleon's studies. One and all they were designed to equip him for +the great task of re-awakening the spirit of the Corsicans and of +sapping the base of the French monarchy.</p> + +<p>But these reams of manuscript notes and crude literary efforts +have an even wider source of interest. They show how narrow was his +outlook on life. It all turned on the regeneration of Corsica by +methods which he himself prescribed. We are therefore able to +understand why, when his own methods of salvation for Corsica were +rejected, he tore himself away and threw his undivided energies +into the Revolution.</p> + +<p>Yet the records of his early life show that in his character +there was a strain of true sentiment and affection. In him Nature +carved out a character of rock-like firmness, but she adorned it +with flowers of human sympathy and tendrils of family love. At his +first parting from his brother Joseph at Autun, when the elder +brother was weeping passionately, the little Napoleon dropped a +tear: but that, said the tutor, meant as much as the flood of tears +from Joseph. Love of his relatives was a potent factor of his +policy in later life; and slander has never been able wholly to +blacken the character of a man who loved and honoured his mother, +who asserted that her advice had often been of the highest service +to him, and that her justice and firmness of spirit marked her out +as a natural ruler of men. But when these admissions are freely +granted, it still remains true that his character was naturally +hard; that his sense of personal superiority made him, even as a +child, exacting and domineering; and the sequel was to show that +even the strongest passion of his youth, his determination to free +Corsica from France, could be abjured if occasion demanded, all the +force of his nature being thenceforth concentrated on vaster +adventures. <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i24" id= +"page_i24">[pg.24]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER II</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND CORSICA</center> + +<br> + + +<p>"They seek to destroy the Revolution by attacking my person: I +will defend it, for I am the Revolution." Such were the words +uttered by Buonaparte after the failure of the royalist plot of +1804. They are a daring transcript of Louis XIV.'s "L'état, +c'est moi." That was a bold claim, even for an age attuned to the +whims of autocrats: but this of the young Corsican is even more +daring, for he thereby equated himself with a movement which +claimed to be wide as humanity and infinite as truth. And yet when +he spoke these words, they were not scouted as presumptuous folly: +to most Frenchmen they seemed sober truth and practical good sense. +How came it, one asks in wonder, that after the short space of +fifteen years a world-wide movement depended on a single life, that +the infinitudes of 1789 lived on only in the form, and by the +pleasure, of the First Consul? Here surely is a political +incarnation unparalleled in the whole course of human history. The +riddle cannot be solved by history alone. It belongs in part to the +domain of psychology, when that science shall undertake the study, +not merely of man as a unit, but of the aspirations, moods, and +whims of communities and nations. Meanwhile it will be our far +humbler task to strive to point out the relation of Buonaparte to +the Revolution, and to show how the mighty force of his will +dragged it to earth.</p> + +<p>The first questions that confront us are obviously these. Were +the lofty aims and aspirations of the <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i25" id="page_i25">[pg.25]</a></span> Revolution +attainable? And, if so, did the men of 1789 follow them by +practical methods? To the former of these questions the present +chapter will, in part at least, serve as an answer. On the latter +part of the problem the events described in later chapters will +throw some light: in them we shall see that the great popular +upheaval let loose mighty forces that bore Buonaparte on to +fortune.</p> + +<p>Here we may notice that the Revolution was not a simple and +therefore solid movement. It was complex and contained the seeds of +discord which lurk in many-sided and militant creeds. The theories +of its intellectual champions were as diverse as the motives which +spurred on their followers to the attack on the outworn abuses of +the age.</p> + +<p>Discontent and faith were the ultimate motive powers of the +Revolution. Faith prepared the Revolution and discontent +accomplished it. Idealists who, in varied planes of thought, +preached the doctrine of human perfectibility, succeeded in slowly +permeating the dull toiling masses of France with hope. Omitting +here any notice of philosophic speculation as such, we may briefly +notice the teachings of three writers whose influence on +revolutionary politics was to be definite and practical. These were +Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau. The first was by no means a +revolutionist, for he decided in favour of a mixed form of +government, like that of England, which guaranteed the State +against the dangers of autocracy, oligarchy, and mob-rule. Only by +a ricochet did he assail the French monarchy. But he re-awakened +critical inquiry; and any inquiry was certain to sap the base of +the <i>ancien régime</i> in France. Montesquieu's teaching +inspired the group of moderate reformers who in 1789 desired to +re-fashion the institutions of France on the model of those of +England. But popular sentiment speedily swept past these Anglophils +towards the more attractive aims set forth by Voltaire.</p> + +<p>This keen thinker subjected the privileged classes, especially +the titled clergy, to a searching fire of <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i26" id="page_i26">[pg.26]</a></span> philosophic bombs +and barbed witticisms. Never was there a more dazzling succession +of literary triumphs over a tottering system. The satirized classes +winced and laughed, and the intellect of France was conquered, for +the Revolution. Thenceforth it was impossible that peasants who +were nominally free should toil to satisfy the exacting needs of +the State, and to support the brilliant bevy of nobles who flitted +gaily round the monarch at Versailles. The young King Louis XVI., +it is true, carried through several reforms, but he had not enough +strength of will to abolish the absurd immunities from taxation +which freed the nobles and titled clergy from the burdens of the +State. Thus, down to 1789, the middle classes and peasants bore +nearly all the weight of taxation, while the peasants were also +encumbered by feudal dues and tolls. These were the crying +grievances which united in a solid phalanx both thinkers and +practical men, and thereby gave an immense impetus to the levelling +doctrines of Rousseau.</p> + +<p>Two only of his political teachings concern us here, namely, +social equality and the unquestioned supremacy of the State; for to +these dogmas, when they seemed doomed to political bankruptcy, +Napoleon Buonaparte was to act as residuary legatee. According to +Rousseau, society and government originated in a social contract, +whereby all members of the community have equal rights. It matters +not that the spirit of the contract may have evaporated amidst the +miasma of luxury. That is a violation of civil society; and members +are justified in reverting at once to the primitive ideal. If the +existence of the body politic be endangered, force may be used: +"Whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to +do so by the whole body; which means nothing else than that he +shall be forced to be free." Equally plausible and dangerous was +his teaching as to the indivisibility of the general will. Deriving +every public power from his social contract, he finds it easy to +prove that the sovereign power, <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i27" id="page_i27">[pg.27]</a></span> vested in all the +citizens, must be incorruptible, inalienable, unrepresentable, +indivisible, and indestructible. Englishmen may now find it +difficult to understand the enthusiasm called forth by this +quintessence of negations; but to Frenchman recently escaped from +the age of privilege and warring against the coalition of kings, +the cry of the Republic one and indivisible was a trumpet call to +death or victory. Any shifts, even that of a dictatorship, were to +be borne, provided that social equality could be saved. As +republican Rome had saved her early liberties by intrusting +unlimited powers to a temporary dictator, so, claimed Rousseau, a +young commonwealth must by a similar device consult Nature's first +law of self-preservation. The dictator saves liberty by temporarily +abrogating it: by momentary gagging of the legislative power he +renders it truly vocal.</p> + +<p>The events of the French Revolution form a tragic commentary on +these theories. In the first stage of that great movement we see +the followers of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau marching in an +undivided host against the ramparts of privilege. The walls of the +Bastille fall down even at the blast of their trumpets. Odious +feudal privileges disappear in a single sitting of the National +Assembly; and the <i>Parlements</i>, or supreme law courts of the +provinces, are swept away. The old provinces themselves are +abolished, and at the beginning of 1790 France gains social and +political unity by her new system of Departments, which grants full +freedom of action in local affairs, though in all national concerns +it binds France closely to the new popular government at Paris. But +discords soon begin to divide the reformers: hatred of clerical +privilege and the desire to fill the empty coffers of the State +dictate the first acts of spoliation. Tithes are abolished: the +lands of the Church are confiscated to the service of the State; +monastic orders are suppressed; and the Government undertakes to +pay the stipends of bishops and priests. Furthermore, their +subjection to the State is definitely secured by the Civil +Constitution of the Clergy (July, <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i28" id="page_i28">[pg.28]</a></span> 1790) which invalidates +their allegiance to the Pope. Most of the clergy refuse: these are +termed non-jurors or orthodox priests, while their more complaisant +colleagues are known as constitutional priests. Hence arises a +serious schism in the Church, which distracts the religious life of +the land, and separates the friends of liberty from the champions +of the rigorous equality preached by Rousseau.</p> + +<p>The new constitution of 1791 was also a source of discord. In +its jealousy of the royal authority, the National Assembly seized +very many of the executive functions of government. The results +were disastrous. Laws remained without force, taxes went +uncollected, the army was distracted by mutinies, and the monarchy +sank slowly into the gulf of bankruptcy and anarchy. Thus, in the +course of three years, the revolutionists goaded the clergy to +desperation, they were about to overthrow the monarchy, every month +was proving their local self-government to be unworkable, and they +themselves split into factions that plunged France into war and +drenched her soil by organized massacres.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;"> +<p>We know very little about the impression made on the young +Buonaparte by the first events of the Revolution. His note-book +seems even to show that he regarded them as an inconvenient +interference with his plans for Corsica. But gradually the +Revolution excites his interest. In September, 1789, we find him on +furlough in Corsica sharing the hopes of the islanders that their +representatives in the French National Assembly will obtain the +boon of independence. He exhorts his compatriots to favour the +democratic cause, which promises a speedy deliverance from official +abuses. He urges them to don the new tricolour cockade, symbol of +Parisian triumph over the old monarchy; to form a club; above all, +to organize a National Guard. The young officer knew that military +power was passing from the royal army, now honeycombed with +discontent, to the National Guard. Here surely was Corsica's means +of <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i29" id= +"page_i29">[pg.29]</a></span> salvation. But the French governor of +Corsica intervenes. The club is closed, and the National Guard is +dispersed. Thereupon Buonaparte launches a vigorous protest against +the tyranny of the governor and appeals to the National Assembly of +France for some guarantee of civil liberty. His name is at the head +of this petition, a sufficiently daring step for a junior +lieutenant on furlough. But his patriotism and audacity carry him +still further. He journeys to Bastia, the official capital of his +island, and is concerned in an affray between the populace and the +royal troops (November 5th, 1789). The French authorities, +fortunately for him, are nearly powerless: he is merely requested +to return to Ajaccio; and there he organizes anew the civic force, +and sets the dissident islanders an example of good discipline by +mounting guard outside the house of a personal opponent.</p> + +<p>Other events now transpired which began to assuage his +opposition to France. Thanks to the eloquent efforts of Mirabeau, +the Corsican patriots who had remained in exile since 1768 were +allowed to return and enjoy the full rights of citizenship. Little +could the friends of liberty at Paris, or even the statesman +himself, have foreseen all the consequences of this action: it +softened the feelings of many Corsicans towards their conquerors; +above all, it caused the heart of Napoleon Buonaparte for the first +time to throb in accord with that of the French nation. His +feelings towards Paoli also began to cool. The conduct of this +illustrious exile exposed him to the charge of ingratitude towards +France. The decree of the French National Assembly, which restored +him to Corsican citizenship, was graced by acts of courtesy such as +the generous French nature can so winningly dispense. Louis XVI. +and the National Assembly warmly greeted him, and recognized him as +head of the National Guard of the island. Yet, amidst all the +congratulations, Paoli saw the approach of anarchy, and behaved +with some reserve. Outwardly, however, concord seemed to be +assured, when on July 14th, 1790, he landed in Corsica; but the +hatred long <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i30" id= +"page_i30">[pg.30]</a></span> nursed by the mountaineers and +fisherfolk against France was not to be exorcised by a few +demonstrations. In truth, the island was deeply agitated. The +priests were rousing the people against the newly decreed Civil +Constitution of the Clergy; and one of these disturbances +endangered the life of Napoleon himself. He and his brother Joseph +chanced to pass by when one of the processions of priests and +devotees was exciting the pity and indignation of the townsfolk. +The two brothers, who were now well known as partisans of the +Revolution, were threatened with violence, and were saved only by +their own firm demeanour and the intervention of peacemakers.</p> + +<p>Then again, the concession of local self-government to the +island, as one of the Departments of France, revealed unexpected +difficulties. Bastia and Ajaccio struggled hard for the honour of +being the official capital. Paoli favoured the claims of Bastia, +thereby annoying the champions of Ajaccio, among whom the +Buonapartes were prominent. The schism was widened by the +dictatorial tone of Paoli, a demeanour which ill became the chief +of a civic force. In fact, it soon became apparent that Corsica was +too small a sphere for natures so able and masterful as those of +Paoli and Napoleon Buonaparte.</p> + +<p>The first meeting of these two men must have been a scene of +deep interest. It was on the fatal field of Ponte Nuovo. Napoleon +doubtless came there in the spirit of true hero-worship. But +hero-worship which can stand the strain of actual converse is rare +indeed, especially when the expectant devotee is endowed with keen +insight and habits of trenchant expression. One phrase has come +down to us as a result of the interview; but this phrase contains a +volume of meaning. After Paoli had explained the disposition of his +troops against the French at Ponte Nuovo, Buonaparte drily remarked +to his brother Joseph, "The result of these dispositions was what +was inevitable."<a name="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_13_13"><sup>[13]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i31" id="page_i31">[pg.31]</a></span></p> + +<p>For the present, Buonaparte and other Corsican democrats were +closely concerned with the delinquencies of the Comte de +Buttafuoco, the deputy for the twelve nobles of the island to the +National Assembly of France. In a letter written on January 23rd, +1791, Buonaparte overwhelms this man with a torrent of +invective.—He it was who had betrayed his country to France +in 1768. Self-interest and that alone prompted his action then, and +always. French rule was a cloak for his design of subjecting +Corsica to "the absurd feudal <i>régime</i>" of the barons. +In his selfish royalism he had protested against the new French +constitution as being unsuited to Corsica, "though it was exactly +the same as that which brought us so much good and was wrested from +us only amidst streams of blood."—The letter is remarkable +for the southern intensity of its passion, and for a certain +hardening of tone towards Paoli. Buonaparte writes of Paoli as +having been ever "surrounded by enthusiasts, and as failing to +understand in a man any other passion than fanaticism for liberty +and independence," and as duped by Buttafuoco in 1768.<a name= +"FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14"><sup>[14]</sup></a> +The phrase has an obvious reference to the Paoli of 1791, +surrounded by men who had shared his long exile and regarded the +English constitution as their model. Buonaparte, on the contrary, +is the accredited champion of French democracy, his furious epistle +being printed by the Jacobin Club of Ajaccio. <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i32" id="page_i32">[pg.32]</a></span></p> + +<p>After firing off this tirade Buonaparte returned to his regiment +at Auxonne (February, 1791). It was high time; for his furlough, +though prolonged on the plea of ill-health, had expired in the +preceding October, and he was therefore liable to six months' +imprisonment. But the young officer rightly gauged the weakness of +the moribund monarchy; and the officers of his almost mutinous +regiment were glad to get him back on any terms. Everywhere in his +journey through Provence and Dauphiné, Buonaparte saw the +triumph of revolutionary principles. He notes that the peasants are +to a man for the Revolution; so are the rank and file of the +regiment. The officers are aristocrats, along with three-fourths of +those who belong to "good society": so are all the women, for +"Liberty is fairer than they, and eclipses them." The Revolution +was evidently gaining completer hold over his mind and was somewhat +blurring his insular sentiments, when a rebuff from Paoli further +weakened his ties to Corsica. Buonaparte had dedicated to him his +work on Corsica, and had sent him the manuscript for his approval. +After keeping it an unconscionable time, the old man now coldly +replied that he did not desire the honour of Buonaparte's +panegyric, though he thanked him heartily for it; that the +consciousness of having done his duty sufficed for him in his old +age; and, for the rest, history should not be written in youth. A +further request from Joseph Buonaparte for the return of the +slighted manuscript brought the answer that he, Paoli, had no time +to search his papers. After this, how could hero-worship +subsist?</p> + +<p>The four months spent by Buonaparte at Auxonne were, indeed, a +time of disappointment and hardship. Out of his slender funds he +paid for the education of his younger brother, Louis, who shared +his otherwise desolate lodging. A room almost bare but for a +curtainless bed, a table heaped with books and papers, and two +chairs—such were the surroundings of the lieutenant in the +spring of 1791. He lived on bread that he might rear his brother +for the army, and that he might buy <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i33" id="page_i33">[pg.33]</a></span> books, overjoyed when +his savings mounted to the price of some coveted volume.</p> + +<p>Perhaps the depressing conditions of his life at Auxonne may +account for the acrid tone of an essay which he there wrote in +competition for a prize offered by the Academy of Lyons on the +subject—"What truths and sentiments ought to be inculcated to +men for their happiness." It was unsuccessful; and modern readers +will agree with the verdict of one of the judges that it was +incongruous in arrangement and of a bad and ragged style. The +thoughts are set forth in jerky, vehement clauses; and, in place of +the <i>sensibilité</i> of some of his earlier effusions, we +feel here the icy breath of materialism. He regards an ideal human +society as a geometrical structure based on certain well-defined +postulates. All men ought to be able to satisfy certain elementary +needs of their nature; but all that is beyond is questionable or +harmful. The ideal legislator will curtail wealth so as to restore +the wealthy to their true nature—and so forth. Of any +generous outlook on the wider possibilities of human life there is +scarcely a trace. His essay is the apotheosis of social mediocrity. +By Procrustean methods he would have forced mankind back to the +dull levels of Sparta: the opalescent glow of Athenian life was +beyond his ken. But perhaps the most curious passage is that in +which he preaches against the sin and folly of ambition. He +pictures Ambition as a figure with pallid cheeks, wild eyes, hasty +step, jerky movements and sardonic smile, for whom crimes are a +sport, while lies and calumnies are merely arguments and figures of +speech. Then, in words that recall Juvenal's satire on Hannibal's +career, he continues: "What is Alexander doing when he rushes from +Thebes into Persia and thence into India? He is ever restless, he +loses his wits, he believes himself God. What is the end of +Cromwell? He governs England. But is he not tormented by all the +daggers of the furies?"—The words ring false, even for this +period of Buonaparte's life; and one can readily <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i34" id="page_i34">[pg.34]</a></span> +understand his keen wish in later years to burn every copy of these +youthful essays. But they have nearly all survived; and the +diatribe against ambition itself supplies the feather wherewith +history may wing her shaft at the towering flight of the imperial +eagle.<a name="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_15_15"><sup>[15]</sup></a></p> + +<p>At midsummer he is transferred, as first lieutenant, to another +regiment which happened to be quartered at Valence; but his second +sojourn there is remarkable only for signs of increasing devotion +to the revolutionary cause. In the autumn of 1791 he is again in +Corsica on furlough, and remains there until the month of May +following. He finds the island rent by strifes which it would be +tedious to describe. Suffice it to say that the breach between +Paoli and the Buonapartes gradually widened owing to the dictator's +suspicion of all who favoured the French Revolution. The young +officer certainly did nothing to close the breach. Determined to +secure his own election as lieutenant-colonel in the new Corsican +National Guard, he spent much time in gaining recruits who would +vote for him. He further assured his success by having one of the +commissioners, who was acting in Paoli's interest, carried off from +his friends and detained at the Buonapartes' house in +Ajaccio—his first <i>coup</i><a name="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a +href="#Footnote_16_16"><sup>[16]</sup></a> Stranger events were to +follow. At Easter, when the people were excited by the persecuting +edicts against the clergy and the closing of a monastery, there was +sharp fighting between the populace and<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i35" id="page_i35">[pg.35]</a></span> Buonaparte's +companies of National Guards. Originating in a petty quarrel, which +was taken up by eager partisans, it embroiled the whole of the town +and gave the ardent young Jacobin the chance of overthrowing his +enemies. His plans even extended to the seizure of the citadel, +where he tried to seduce the French regiment from its duty to +officers whom he dubbed aristocrats. The attempt was a failure. The +whole truth can, perhaps, scarcely be discerned amidst the tissue +of lies which speedily enveloped the affair; but there can be no +doubt that on the second day of strife Buonaparte's National Guards +began the fight and subsequently menaced the regular troops in the +citadel. The conflict was finally stopped by commissioners sent by +Paoli; and the volunteers were sent away from the town.</p> + +<p>Buonaparte's position now seemed desperate. His conduct exposed +him to the hatred of most of his fellow-citizens and to the rebukes +of the French War Department. In fact, he had doubly sinned: he had +actually exceeded his furlough by four months: he was technically +guilty, first of desertion, and secondly of treason. In ordinary +times he would have been shot, but the times were extraordinary, +and he rightly judged that when a Continental war was brewing, the +most daring course was also the most prudent, namely, to go to +Paris. Thither Paoli allowed him to proceed, doubtless on the +principle of giving the young madcap a rope wherewith to hang +himself.</p> + +<p>On his arrival at Marseilles, he hears that war has been +declared by France against Austria; for the republican Ministry, +which Louis XVI. had recently been compelled to accept, believed +that war against an absolute monarch would intensify revolutionary +fervour in France and hasten the advent of the Republic. Their +surmises were correct. Buonaparte, on his arrival at Paris, +witnessed the closing scenes of the reign of Louis XVI. On June +20th he saw the crowd burst into the Tuileries, when for some hours +it insulted the king and queen. Warmly though he had espoused the +principles of the <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i36" id= +"page_i36">[pg.36]</a></span> Revolution, his patrician blood +boiled at the sight of these vulgar outrages, and he exclaimed: +"Why don't they sweep off four or five hundred of that +<i>canaille</i> with cannon? The rest would then run away fast +enough." The remark is significant. If his brain approved the +Jacobin creed, his instincts were always with monarchy. His career +was to reconcile his reason with his instincts, and to impose on +weary France the curious compromise of a revolutionary +Imperialism.</p> + +<p>On August 10th, from the window of a shop near the Tuileries, he +looked down on the strange events which dealt the <i>coup de +grâce</i> to the dying monarchy. Again the chieftain within +him sided against the vulture rabble and with the well-meaning +monarch who kept his troops to a tame defensive. "If Louis XVI." +(so wrote Buonaparte to his brother Joseph) "had mounted his horse, +the victory would have been his—so I judge from the spirit +which prevailed in the morning." When all was over, when Louis +sheathed his sword and went for shelter to the National Assembly, +when the fierce Marseillais were slaughtering the Swiss Guards and +bodyguards of the king, Buonaparte dashed forward to save one of +these unfortunates from a southern sabre. "Southern comrade, let us +save this poor wretch.—Are you of the +south?—Yes.—Well, we will save him."</p> + +<p>Altogether, what a time of disillusionment this was to the young +officer. What depths of cruelty and obscenity it revealed in the +Parisian rabble. What folly to treat them with the Christian +forbearance shown by Louis XVI. How much more suitable was +grapeshot than the beatitudes. The lesson was stored up for future +use at a somewhat similar crisis on this very spot.</p> + +<p>During the few days when victorious Paris left Louis with the +sham title of king, Buonaparte received his captain's commission, +which was signed for the king by Servan, the War Minister. Thus did +the revolutionary Government pass over his double breach of +military discipline at Ajaccio. The revolutionary motto, "La +carrière ouverte aux talents," was never more conspicuously +illustrated<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i37" id= +"page_i37">[pg.37]</a></span> than in the facile condoning of his +offences and in this rapid promotion. It was indeed a time fraught +with vast possibilities for all republican or Jacobinical officers. +Their monarchist colleagues were streaming over the frontiers to +join the Austrian and Prussian invaders. But National Guards were +enrolling by tens of thousands to drive out the Prussian and +Austrian invaders; and when Europe looked to see France fall for +ever, it saw with wonder her strength renewed as by enchantment. +Later on it learnt that that strength was the strength of +Antæus, of a peasantry that stood firmly rooted in their +native soil. Organization and good leadership alone were needed to +transform these ardent masses into the most formidable soldiery; +and the brilliant military prospects now opened up certainly knit +Buonaparte's feelings more closely with the cause of France. Thus, +on September 21st, when the new National Assembly, known as the +Convention, proclaimed the Republic, we may well believe that +sincere convictions no less than astute calculations moved him to +do and dare all things for the sake of the new democratic +commonwealth.<a name="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_17_17"><sup>[17]</sup></a></p> + +<p>For the present, however, a family duty urges him to return to +Corsica. He obtains permission to escort home his sister Elise, and +for the third time we find him on furlough in Corsica. This laxity +of military discipline at such a crisis is explicable only on the +supposition that the revolutionary chiefs knew of his devotion to +their cause and believed that his influence in the island would +render his informal services there more valuable than his +regimental duties in the army then invading Savoy. For the word +Republic, which fired his imagination, was an offence to Paoli and +to most of the islanders; and the<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i38" id="page_i38">[pg.38]</a></span> phrase "Republic one +and indivisible," ever on the lips of the French, seemed to promise +that the island must become a petty replica of France—France +that was now dominated by the authors of the vile September +massacres. The French party in the island was therefore rapidly +declining, and Paoli was preparing to sever the union with France. +For this he has been bitterly assailed as a traitor. But, from +Paoli's point of view, the acquisition of the island by France was +a piece of rank treachery; and his allegiance to France was +technically at an end when the king was forcibly dethroned and the +Republic was proclaimed. The use of the appellation "traitor" in +such a case is merely a piece of childish abuse. It can be +justified neither by reference to law, equity, nor to the popular +sentiment of the time. Facts were soon to show that the islanders +were bitterly opposed to the party then dominant in France. This +hostility of a clannish, religious, and conservative populace +against the bloodthirsty and atheistical innovators who then lorded +it over France was not diminished by the action of some six +thousand French volunteers, the off-scourings of the southern +ports, who were landed at Ajaccio for an expedition against +Sardinia. In their zeal for Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, +these <i>bonnets rouges</i> came to blows with the men of Ajaccio, +three of whom they hanged. So fierce was the resentment caused by +this outrage that the plan of a joint expedition for the liberation +of Sardinia from monarchical tyranny had to be modified; and +Buonaparte, who was again in command of a battalion of Corsican +guards, proposed that the islanders alone should proceed to attack +the Madalena Isles.</p> + +<p>These islands, situated between Corsica and Sardinia, have a +double interest to the historical student. One of them, Caprera, +was destined to shelter another Italian hero at the close of his +career, the noble self-denying Garibaldi: the chief island of the +group was the objective of Buonaparte's first essay in regular +warfare. After some delays the little force set sail under the +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i39" id= +"page_i39">[pg.39]</a></span> command of Cesari-Colonna, the nephew +of Paoli. According to Buonaparte's own official statement at the +close of the affair, he had successfully landed his men near the +town to be assailed, and had thrown the Sardinian defences into +confusion, when a treacherous order from his chief bade him to +cease firing and return to the vessels. It has also been stated +that this retreat was the outcome of a secret understanding between +Paoli and Cesari-Colonna that the expedition should miscarry. This +seems highly probable. A mutiny on board the chief ship of the +flotilla was assigned by Cesari-Colonna as the cause of his order +for a retreat; but there are mutinies and mutinies, and this one +may have been a trick of the Paolists for thwarting Buonaparte's +plan and leaving him a prisoner. In any case, the young officer +only saved himself and his men by a hasty retreat to the boats, +tumbling into the sea a mortar and four cannon. Such was the ending +to the great captain's first military enterprise.</p> + +<p>On his return to Ajaccio (March 3rd, 1793), Buonaparte found +affairs in utter confusion. News had recently arrived of the +declaration of war by the French Republic against England and +Holland. Moreover, Napoleon's young brother, Lucien, had secretly +denounced Paoli to the French authorities at Toulon; and three +commissioners were now sent from Paris charged with orders to +disband the Corsican National Guards, and to place the Corsican +dictator under the orders of the French general commanding the army +of Italy.<a name="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_18_18"><sup>[18]</sup></a></p> + +<p>A game of truly Macchiavellian skill is now played. The French +commissioners, among whom the Corsican deputy, Salicetti, is by far +the most able, invite Paoli to repair to Toulon, there to concert +measures for the defence of Corsica. Paoli, seeing through the ruse +and discerning a guillotine, pleads that his age makes the journey +impossible; but with his friends he quietly<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i40" id="page_i40">[pg.40]</a></span> prepares for +resistance and holds the citadel of Ajaccio. Meanwhile the +commissioners make friendly overtures to the old chief; in these +Napoleon participates, being ignorant of Lucien's action at Toulon. +The sincerity of these overtures may well be called in question, +though Buonaparte still used the language of affection to his +former idol. However this may be, all hope of compromise is dashed +by the zealots who are in power at Paris. On April 2nd they order +the French commissioners to secure Paoli's person, by whatever +means, and bring him to the French capital. At once a cry of +indignation goes up from all parts of Corsica; and Buonaparte draws +up a declaration, vindicating Paoli's conduct and begging the +French Convention to revoke its decree.<a name= +"FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19"><sup>[19]</sup></a> +Again, one cannot but suspect that this declaration was intended +mainly, if not solely, for local consumption. In any case, it +failed to cool the resentment of the populace; and the partisans of +France soon came to blows with the Paolists.</p> + +<p>Salicetti and Buonaparte now plan by various artifices to gain +the citadel of Ajaccio from the Paolists, but guile is three times +foiled by guile equally astute. Failing here, the young captain +seeks to communicate with the French commissioners at Bastia. He +sets out secretly, with a trusty shepherd as companion, to cross +the island: but at the village of Bocognano he is recognized and +imprisoned by the partisans of Paoli. Some of the villagers, +however, retain their old affection to the Buonaparte family, which +here has an ancestral estate, and secretly set him free. He returns +to Ajaccio, only to find an order for his arrest issued by the +Corsican patriots. This time he escapes by timely concealment in +the grotto of a friend's garden; and from the grounds of another +family connection he finally glides away in a vessel to a point of +safety, whence he reaches Bastia.<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i41" id="page_i41">[pg.41]</a></span> Still, though a +fugitive, he persists in believing that Ajaccio is French at heart, +and urges the sending of a liberating force. The French +commissioners agree, and the expedition sails—only to meet +with utter failure. Ajaccio, as one man, repels the partisans of +France; and, a gale of wind springing up, Buonaparte and his men +regain their boats with the utmost difficulty. At a place hard by, +he finds his mother, uncle, brothers and sisters. Madame +Buonaparte, with the extraordinary tenacity of will that +characterized her famous son, had wished to defend her house at +Ajaccio against the hostile populace; but, yielding to the urgent +warnings of friends, finally fled to the nearest place of safety, +and left the house to the fury of the populace, by whom it was +nearly wrecked.</p> + +<p>For a brief space Buonaparte clung to the hope of regaining +Corsica for the Republic, but now only by the aid of French troops. +For the islanders, stung by the demand of the French Convention +that Paoli should go to Paris, had rallied to the dictator's side; +and the aged chief made overtures to England for alliance. The +partisans of France, now menaced by England's naval power, were in +an utterly untenable position. Even the steel-like will of +Buonaparte was bent. His career in Corsica was at an end for the +present; and with his kith and kin he set sail for France.</p> + +<p>The interest of the events above described lies, not in their +intrinsic importance, but in the signal proof which they afford of +Buonaparte's wondrous endowments of mind and will. In a losing +cause and in a petty sphere he displays all the qualities which, +when the omens were favourable, impelled him to the domination of a +Continent. He fights every inch of ground tenaciously; at each +emergency he evinces a truly Italian fertility of resource, gliding +round obstacles or striving to shatter them by sheer audacity, +seeing through men, cajoling them by his insinuations or overawing +them by his mental superiority, ever determined to try the fickle +jade Fortune to the very utmost, and retreating only before<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i42" id="page_i42">[pg.42]</a></span> +the inevitable. The sole weakness discoverable in this nature, +otherwise compact of strength, is an excess of will-power over all +the faculties that make for prudence. His vivid imagination only +serves to fire him with the full assurance that he must prevail +over all obstacles.</p> + +<p>And yet, if he had now stopped to weigh well the lessons of the +past, hitherto fertile only in failures and contradictions, he must +have seen the powerlessness of his own will when in conflict with +the forces of the age; for he had now severed his connection with +the Corsican patriots, of whose cause he had only two years before +been the most passionate champion. It is evident that the schism +which finally separated Buonaparte and Paoli originated in their +divergence of views regarding the French Revolution. Paoli accepted +revolutionary principles only in so far as they promised to base +freedom on a due balance of class interests. He was a follower of +Montesquieu. He longed to see in Corsica a constitution similar to +that of England or to that of 1791 in France. That hope vanished +alike for France and Corsica after the fall of the monarchy; and +towards the Jacobinical Republic, which banished orthodox priests +and guillotined the amiable Louis, Paoli thenceforth felt naught +but loathing: "We have been the enemies of kings," he said to +Joseph Buonaparte; "let us never be their executioners." +Thenceforth he drifted inevitably into alliance with England.</p> + +<p>Buonaparte, on the other hand, was a follower of Rousseau, whose +ideas leaped to power at the downfall of the monarchy. Despite the +excesses which he ever deplored, this second Revolution appeared to +him to be the dawn of a new and intelligent age. The clear-cut +definitions of the new political creed dovetailed in with his own +rigid views of life. Mankind was to be saved by law, society being +levelled down and levelled up until the ideals of Lycurgus were +attained. Consequently he regarded the Republic as a mighty agency +for the social regeneration not only of France, but of all peoples. +His insular sentiments were gradually merged in these vaster <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i43" id="page_i43">[pg.43]</a></span> +schemes. Self-interest and the differentiating effects of party +strifes undoubtedly assisted the mental transformation; but it is +clear that the study of the "Social Contract" was the touchstone of +his early intellectual growth. He had gone to Rousseau's work to +deepen his Corsican patriotism: he there imbibed doctrines which +drew him irresistibly into the vortex of the French Revolution, and +of its wars of propaganda and conquest. <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i44" id="page_i44">[pg.44]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER III</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>TOULON</center> + +<br> + + +<p>When Buonaparte left Corsica for the coast of Provence, his +career had been remarkable only for the strange contrast between +the brilliance of his gifts and the utter failure of all his +enterprises. His French partisanship had, as it seemed, been the +ruin of his own and his family's fortunes. At the age of +twenty-four he was known only as the unlucky leader of forlorn +hopes and an outcast from the island around which his fondest +longings had been entwined. His land-fall on the French coast +seemed no more promising; for at that time Provence was on the +verge of revolt against the revolutionary Government. Even towns +like Marseilles and Toulon, which a year earlier had been noted for +their republican fervour, were now disgusted with the course of +events at Paris. In the third climax of revolutionary fury, that of +June 2nd, 1793, the more enlightened of the two republican +factions, the Girondins, had been overthrown by their opponents, +the men of the Mountain, who, aided by the Parisian rabble, seized +on power. Most of the Departments of France resented this violence +and took up arms. But the men of the Mountain acted with +extraordinary energy: they proclaimed the Girondins to be in league +with the invaders, and blasted their opponents with the charge of +conspiring to divide France into federal republics. The Committee +of Public Safety, now installed in power at Paris, decreed a +<i>levée enmasse</i> of able-bodied patriots to defend the +sacred soil of the Republic, and the "organizer of victory," +Carnot, soon drilled into a terrible efficiency the hosts that +sprang<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i45" id= +"page_i45">[pg.45]</a></span> from the soil. On their side the +Girondins had no organization whatever, and were embarrassed by the +adhesion of very many royalists. Consequently their wavering groups +speedily gave way before the impact of the new, solid, central +power.</p> + +<p>A movement so wanting in definiteness as that of the Girondins +was destined to slide into absolute opposition to the men of the +Mountain: it was doomed to become royalist. Certainly it did not +command the adhesion of Napoleon. His inclinations are seen in his +pamphlet, "Le Souper de Beaucaire," which he published in August, +1793. He wrote it in the intervals of some regimental work which +had come to hand: and his passage through the little town of +Beaucaire seems to have suggested the scenic setting of this little +dialogue. It purports to record a discussion between an +officer—Buonaparte himself—two merchants of Marseilles, +and citizens of Nîmes and Montpellier. It urges the need of +united action under the lead of the Jacobins. The officer reminds +the Marseillais of the great services which their city has rendered +to the cause of liberty. Let Marseilles never disgrace herself by +calling in the Spanish fleet as a protection against Frenchmen. Let +her remember that this civil strife was part of a fight to the +death between French patriots and the despots of Europe. That was, +indeed, the practical point at issue; the stern logic of facts +ranged on the Jacobin side all clear-sighted men who were +determined that the Revolution should not be stamped out by the +foreign invaders. On the ground of mere expediency, men must rally +to the cause of the Jacobinical Republic. Every crime might be +condoned, provided that the men now in power at Paris saved the +country. Better their tyranny than the vengeance of the emigrant +<i>noblesse</i>. Such was the instinct of most Frenchmen, and it +saved France.</p> + +<p>As an <i>exposé</i> of keen policy and all-dominating +opportunism, "Le Souper de Beaucaire" is admirable. In a national +crisis anything that saves the State is justifiable—that is +its argument. The men of the Mountain are <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i46" id="page_i46">[pg.46]</a></span> abler and stronger +than the Girondins: therefore the Marseillais are foolish not to +bow to the men of the Mountain. The author feels no sympathy with +the generous young Girondins, who, under the inspiration of Madame +Roland, sought to establish a republic of the virtues even while +they converted monarchical Europe by the sword. Few men can now +peruse with undimmed eyes the tragic story of their fall. But the +scenes of 1793 had transformed the Corsican youth into a dry-eyed +opportunist who rejects the Girondins as he would have thrown aside +a defective tool: nay, he blames them as "guilty of the greatest of +crimes."<a name="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_20_20"><sup>[20]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Nevertheless Buonaparte was alive to the miseries of the +situation. He was weary of civil strifes, in which it seemed that +no glory could be won. He must hew his way to fortune, if only in +order to support his family, which was now drifting about from +village to village of Provence and subsisting on the slender sums +doled out by the Republic to Corsican exiles.</p> + +<p>He therefore applied, though without success, for a regimental +exchange to the army of the Rhine. But while toiling through his +administrative drudgery in Provence, his duties brought him near to +Toulon, where the Republic was face to face with triumphant +royalism. The hour had struck: the man now appeared.</p> + +<p>In July, 1793, Toulon joined other towns of the south in +declaring against Jacobin tyranny; and the royalists of the town, +despairing of making headway against the troops of the Convention, +admitted English and Spanish squadrons to the harbour to hold the +town for Louis XVII, (August 28th). This event shot an electric +thrill through France. It was the climax of a long series of +disasters. Lyons had hoisted the white flag of the Bourbons, and +was making a desperate defence against the forces of the<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i47" id="page_i47">[pg.47]</a></span> +Convention: the royalist peasants of La Vendée had several +times scattered the National Guards in utter rout: the Spaniards +were crossing the Eastern Pyrenees: the Piedmontese were before the +gates of Grenoble; and in the north and on the Rhine a doubtful +contest was raging.</p> + +<p>Such was the condition of France when Buonaparte drew near to +the republican forces encamped near Ollioules, to the north-west of +Toulon. He found them in disorder: their commander, Carteaux, had +left the easel to learn the art of war, and was ignorant of the +range of his few cannon; Dommartin, their artillery commander, had +been disabled by a wound; and the Commissioners of the Convention, +who were charged to put new vigour into the operations, were at +their wits' end for lack of men and munitions. One of them was +Salicetti, who hailed his coming as a godsend, and urged him to +take Dommartin's place. Thus, on September 16th, the thin, sallow, +threadbare figure took command of the artillery.</p> + +<p>The republicans menaced the town on two sides. Carteaux with +some 8,000 men held the hills between Toulon and Ollioules, while a +corps 3,000 strong, under Lapoype, observed the fortress on the +side of La Valette. Badly led though they were, they wrested the +valley north of Mount Faron from the allied outposts, and nearly +completed the besiegers' lines (September 18th). In fact, the +garrison, which comprised only 2,000 British troops, 4,000 +Spaniards, 1,500 French royalists, together with some Neapolitans +and Piedmontese, was insufficient to defend the many positions +around the city on which its safety depended. Indeed, General Grey +wrote to Pitt that 50,000 men were needed to garrison the place; +but, as that was double the strength of the British regular army +then, the English Minister could only hold out hopes of the arrival +of an Austrian corps and a few hundred British.<a name= +"FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_21_21"><sup>[21]</sup></a></p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i48" id= +"page_i48">[pg.48]</a></span> Before Buonaparte's arrival the +Jacobins had no artillery: true, they had a few field-pieces, four +heavier guns and two mortars, which a sergeant helplessly surveyed; +but they had no munitions, no tools, above all no method and no +discipline. Here then was the opportunity for which he had been +pining. At once he assumes the tone of a master. "You mind your +business, and let me look after mine," he exclaims to officious +infantrymen; "it is artillery that takes fortresses: infantry gives +its help." The drudgery of the last weeks now yields fruitful +results: his methodical mind, brooding over the chaos before him, +flashes back to this or that detail in some coast fort or magazine: +his energy hustles on the leisurely Provençaux, and in a few +days he has a respectable park of artillery—fourteen cannon, +four mortars, and the necessary stores. In a brief space the +Commissioners show their approval of his services by promoting him +to the rank of <i>chef de bataillon</i>.</p> + +<p>By this time the tide was beginning to turn in favour of the +Republic. On October 9th Lyons fell before the Jacobins. The news +lends a new zest to the Jacobins, whose left wing had (October 1st) +been severely handled by the allies on Mount Faron. Above all, +Buonaparte's artillery can be still further strengthened. "I have +despatched," he wrote to the Minister of War, "an intelligent +officer to Lyons, Briançon, and Grenoble, to procure what +might be useful to us. I have requested the Army of Italy to +furnish us with the cannon now useless for the defence of Antibes +and Monaco.... I have established at Ollioules an arsenal with 80 +workers. I have requisitioned horses from Nice right to Valence +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i49" id= +"page_i49">[pg.49]</a></span>and Montpellier.... I am having 5,000 +gabions made every day at Marseilles." But he was more than a mere +organizer. He was ever with his men, animating them by his own +ardour: "I always found him at his post," wrote Doppet, who now +succeeded Carteaux; "when he needed rest he lay on the ground +wrapped in his cloak: he never left the batteries." There, amidst +the autumn rains, he contracted the febrile symptoms which for +several years deepened the pallor of his cheeks and furrowed the +rings under his eyes, giving him that uncanny, almost spectral, +look which struck a chill to all who saw him first and knew not the +fiery energy that burnt within. There, too, his zeal, his unfailing +resource, his bulldog bravery, and that indefinable quality which +separates genius from talent speedily conquered the hearts of the +French soldiery. One example of this magnetic power must here +suffice. He had ordered a battery to be made so near to Fort +Mulgrave that Salicetti described it as within a pistol-shot of the +English guns. Could it be worked, its effect would be decisive. But +who could work it? The first day saw all its gunners killed or +wounded, and even the reckless Jacobins flinched from facing the +iron hail. "Call it <i>the battery of the fearless</i>," ordered +the young captain. The generous French nature was touched at its +tenderest point, personal and national honour, and the battery +thereafter never lacked its full complement of gunners, living and +dead.</p> + +<p>The position at Fort Mulgrave, or the Little Gibraltar, was, +indeed, all important; for if the republicans seized that +commanding position, the allied squadrons could be overpowered, or +at least compelled to sail away; and with their departure Toulon +must fall.</p> + +<p>Here we come on to ground that has been fiercely fought over in +wordy war. Did Bonaparte originate the plan of attack? Or did he +throw his weight and influence into a scheme that others beside him +had designed? Or did he merely carry out orders as a subordinate? +According to the Commissioner Barras, the<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i50" id="page_i50">[pg.50]</a></span> last was the case. +But Barras was with the eastern wing of the besiegers, that is, +some miles away from the side of La Seyne and L'Eguillette, where +Buonaparte fought. Besides, Barras' "Mémoires" are so +untruthful where Buonaparte is concerned, as to be unworthy of +serious attention, at least on these points.<a name= +"FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22"><sup>[22]</sup></a> +The historian M. Jung likewise relegates Buonaparte to a quite +subordinate position.<a name="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_23_23"><sup>[23]</sup></a> But his narrative omits some +of the official documents which show that Buonaparte played a very +important part in the siege. Other writers claim that Buonaparte's +influence on the whole conduct of operations was paramount and +decisive. Thus, M. Duruy quotes the letter of the Commissioners to +the Convention: "We shall take care not to lay siege to Toulon by +ordinary means, when we have a surer means to reduce it, that is, +by burning the enemy's fleet.... We are only waiting for the +siege-guns before taking up a position whence we may reach the +ships with red-hot balls; and we shall see if we are not masters of +Toulon." But this very letter disproves the Buonapartist claim. It +was written on September 13th. Thus, <i>three days before +Buonaparte's arrival</i>, the Commissioners had fully decided on +attacking the Little Gibraltar; and the claim that Buonaparte +originated the plan can only be sustained by antedating his arrival +at Toulon.<a name="FNanchor_24_24"></a> <a href= +"#Footnote_24_24"><sup>[24]</sup></a> In fact, every experienced +officer among besiegers and besieged saw the weak point of the +defence: early in September Hood and Mulgrave began the +fortification of the heights behind L'Eguillette. In face of these +facts, the assertion that Buonaparte was the first to design the +movements which secured the <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i51" id="page_i51">[pg.51]</a></span> surrender of Toulon +must be relegated to the domain of hero-worship. (See note on p. +56.)</p> + +<center><a name="image_01"><img alt="THE SIEGE OF TOULON, 1793" +src="images/image01.jpg" width="604" height="392"></a></center> + +<p>[THE SIEGE OF TOULON, 1793, from "L'Histoire de France depuis la +Révolution de 1789," by Emmanuel Toulougeon. Paris, An. XII. +[1803].<br> +A. Fort Mulgrave.<br> +A'. Promontory of L'Eguillette.<br> +1 and 2. Batteries.<br> +3. Battery "Hommes sans Peur."<br> +The black and shaded rectangles are the Republican and Allied +positions respectively.]</p> + +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i52" id= +"page_i52">[pg.52]</a></span> + +<p>Carteaux having been superseded by Doppet, more energy was +thrown into the operations. Yet for him Buonaparte had scarcely +more respect. On November 15th an affair of outposts near Fort +Mulgrave showed his weakness. The soldiers on both sides eagerly +took up the affray; line after line of the French rushed up towards +that frowning redoubt: O'Hara, the leader of the allied troops, +encouraged the British in a sortie that drove back the blue-coats; +whereupon Buonaparte headed the rallying rush to the gorge of the +redoubt, when Doppet sounded the retreat. Half blinded by rage and +by the blood trickling from a slight wound in his forehead, the +young Corsican rushed back to Doppet and abused him in the language +of the camp: "Our blow at Toulon has missed, because +a—— has beaten the retreat." The soldiery applauded +this revolutionary licence, and bespattered their chief with +similar terms.</p> + +<p>A few days later the tall soldierly Dugommier took the command: +reinforcements began to pour in, finally raising the strength of +the besiegers to 37,000 men. Above all, the new commander gave +Buonaparte <i>carte blanche</i> for the direction of the artillery. +New batteries accordingly began to ring the Little Gibraltar on the +landward side; O'Hara, while gallantly heading a sortie, fell into +the republicans' hands, and the defenders began to lose heart. The +worst disappointment was the refusal of the Austrian Court to +fulfil its promise, solemnly given in September, to send 5,000 +regular troops for the defence of Toulon.</p> + +<p>The final conflict took place on the night of December 16-17, +when torrents of rain, a raging wind, and flashes of lightning +added new horrors to the strife. Scarcely had the assailants left +the sheltering walls of La Seyne, than Buonaparte's horse fell +under him, shot dead: whole companies went astray in the darkness: +yet the first column of 2,000 men led by Victor rush at the +palisades of Fort Mulgrave, tear them down, and sweep into the +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i53" id= +"page_i53">[pg.53]</a></span> redoubt, only to fall in heaps before +a second line of defence: supported by the second column, they +rally, only to yield once more before the murderous fire. In +despair, Dugommier hurries on the column of reserve, with which +Buonaparte awaits the crisis of the night. Led by the gallant young +Muiron, the reserve sweeps into the gorge of death; Muiron, +Buonaparte, and Dugommier hack their way through the same +embrasure: their men swarm in on the overmatched red-coats and +Spaniards, cut them down at their guns, and the redoubt is won.</p> + +<p>This event was decisive. The Neapolitans, who were charged to +hold the neighbouring forts, flung themselves into the sea; and the +ships themselves began to weigh anchor; for Buonaparte's guns soon +poured their shot on the fleet and into the city itself. But even +in that desperate strait the allies turned fiercely to bay. On the +evening of December 17th a young officer, who was destined once +more to thwart Buonaparte's designs, led a small body of picked men +into the dockyard to snatch from the rescuing clutch of the +Jacobins the French warships that could not be carried off. Then +was seen a weird sight. The galley slaves, now freed from their +chains and clustering in angry groups, menaced the intruders. Yet +the British seamen spread the combustibles and let loose the demon +of destruction. Forthwith the flames shot up the masts, and licked +up the stores of hemp, tar, and timber: and the explosion of two +powder-ships by the Spaniards shook the earth for many miles +around. Napoleon ever retained a vivid mental picture of the scene, +which amid the hated calm of St. Helena he thus described: "The +whirlwind of flames and smoke from the arsenal resembled the +eruption of a volcano, and the thirteen vessels blazing in the +roads were like so many displays of fireworks: the masts and forms +of the vessels were distinctly traced out by the flames, which +lasted many hours and formed an unparalleled spectacle."<a name= +"FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25"><sup>[25]</sup></a> +The sight struck horror to the<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i54" id="page_i54">[pg.54]</a></span> hearts of the royalists +of Toulon, who saw in it the signal of desertion by the allies; and +through the lurid night crowds of panic-stricken wretches thronged +the quays crying aloud to be taken away from the doomed city. The +glare of the flames, the crash of the enemy's bombs, the explosion +of the two powder-ships, frenzied many a soul; and scores of those +who could find no place in the boats flung themselves into the sea +rather than face the pikes and guillotines of the Jacobins. Their +fears were only too well founded; for a fortnight later +Fréron, the Commissioner of the Convention, boasted that two +hundred royalists perished daily.</p> + +<p>It remains briefly to consider a question of special interest to +English readers. Did the Pitt Ministry intend to betray the +confidence of the French royalists and keep Toulon for England? The +charge has been brought by certain French writers that the British, +after entering Toulon with promise that they would hold it in +pledge for Louis XVII., nevertheless lorded it over the other +allies and revealed their intention of keeping that stronghold. +These writers aver that Hood, after entering Toulon as an equal +with the Spanish admiral, Langara, laid claim to entire command of +the land forces; that English commissioners were sent for the +administration of the town; and that the English Government refused +to allow the coming of the Comte de Provence, who, as the elder of +the two surviving brothers of Louis XVI., was entitled to act on +behalf of Louis XVII.<a name="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_26_26"><sup>[26]</sup></a> The facts in the main are +correct, but the interpretation put upon them may well be +questioned. Hood certainly acted with much arrogance towards the +Spaniards. But when the more courteous O'Hara arrived to take +command of the British, Neapolitan, and Sardinian troop, <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i55" id="page_i55">[pg.55]</a></span> +the new commander agreed to lay aside the question of supreme +command. It was not till November 30th that the British Government +sent off any despatch on the question, which meanwhile had been +settled at Toulon by the exercise of that tact in which Hood seems +signally to have been lacking. The whole question was personal, not +national.</p> + +<p>Still less was the conduct of the British Government towards the +Comte de Provence a proof of its design to keep Toulon. The records +of our Foreign Office show that, before the occupation of that +stronghold for Louis XVII., we had declined to acknowledge the +claims of his uncle to the Regency. He and his brother, the Comte +d'Artois, were notoriously unpopular in France, except with +royalists of the old school; and their presence at Toulon would +certainly have raised awkward questions about the future +government. The conduct of Spain had hitherto been similar.<a name= +"FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27"><sup>[27]</sup></a> +But after the occupation of Toulon, the Court of Madrid judged the +presence of the Comte de Provence in that fortress to be advisable; +whereas the Pitt Ministry adhered to its former belief, insisted on +the difficulty of conducting the defence if the Prince were present +as Regent, instructed Mr. Drake, our Minister at Genoa, to use +every argument to deter him from proceeding to Toulon, and +privately ordered our officers there, in the last resort, to refuse +him permission to land. The instructions of October 18th to the +royal commissioners at Toulon show that George III. and his +Ministers believed they would be compromising the royalist cause by +recognizing a regency; and certainly any effort by the allies to +prejudice the future settlement would at once have shattered any +hopes of a general rally to the royalist side.<a name= +"FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28"><sup>[28]</sup></a> +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i56" id= +"page_i56">[pg.56]</a></span></p> + +<p>Besides, if England meant to keep Toulon, why did she send only +2,200 soldiers? Why did she admit, not only 6,900 Spaniards, but +also 4,900 Neapolitans and 1,600 Piedmontese? Why did she accept +the armed help of 1,600 French royalists? Why did she urgently +plead with Austria to send 5,000 white-coats from Milan? Why, +finally, is there no word in the British official despatches as to +the eventual keeping of Toulon; while there are several references +to <i>indemnities</i> which George III. would require for the +expenses of the war—such as Corsica or some of the French +West Indies? Those despatches show conclusively that England did +not wish to keep a fortress that required a permanent garrison +equal to half of the British army on its peace footing; but that +she did regard it as a good base of operations for the overthrow of +the Jacobin rule and the restoration of monarchy; whereupon her +services must be requited with some suitable indemnity, either one +of the French West Indies or Corsica. These plans were shattered by +Buonaparte's skill and the valour of Dugommier's soldiery; but no +record has yet leaped to light to convict the Pitt Ministry of the +perfidy which Buonaparte, in common with nearly all Frenchmen, +charged to their account.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i57" +id="page_i57">[pg.57]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>VENDÉMIAIRE</center> + +<br> + + +<p>The next period of Buonaparte's life presents few features of +interest. He was called upon to supervise the guns and stores for +the Army of Italy, and also to inspect the fortifications and +artillery of the coast. At Marseilles his zeal outstripped his +discretion. He ordered the reconstruction of the fortress which had +been destroyed during the Revolution; but when the townsfolk heard +the news, they protested so vehemently that the work was stopped +and an order was issued for Buonaparte's arrest. From this +difficulty the friendship of the younger Robespierre and of +Salicetti, the Commissioners of the Convention, availed to rescue +him; but the incident proves that his services at Toulon were not +so brilliant as to have raised him above the general level of +meritorious officers, who were applauded while they prospered, but +might be sent to the guillotine for any serious offence.</p> + +<p>In February, 1794, he was appointed at Nice general in command +of the artillery of the Army of Italy, which drove the Sardinian +troops from several positions between Ventimiglia and Oneglia. +Thence, swinging round by passes of the Maritime Alps, they +outflanked the positions of the Austro-Sardinian forces at the Col +di Tenda, which had defied all attack in front. Buonaparte's share +in this turning operation seems to have been restricted to the +effective handling of artillery, and the chief credit here rested +with Masséna, who won the first of his laurels in the +country of his birth. He was of humble parentage; <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i58" id="page_i58">[pg.58]</a></span> yet +his erect bearing, proud animated glance, curt penetrating speech, +and keen repartees, proclaimed a nature at once active and wary, an +intellect both calculating and confident. Such was the man who was +to immortalize his name in many a contest, until his glory paled +before the greater genius of Wellington.</p> + +<p>Much of the credit of organizing this previously unsuccessful +army belongs to the younger Robespierre, who, as Commissioner of +the Convention, infused his energy into all departments of the +service. For some months his relations to Buonaparte were those of +intimacy; but whether they extended to complete sympathy on +political matters may be doubted. The younger Robespierre held the +revolutionary creed with sufficient ardour, though one of his +letters dated from Oneglia suggests that the fame of the Terror was +hurtful to the prospects of the campaign. It states that the whole +of the neighbouring inhabitants had fled before the French +soldiers, in the belief that they were destroyers of religion and +eaters of babies: this was inconvenient, as it prevented the supply +of provisions and the success of forced loans. The letter suggests +that he was a man of action rather than of ideas, and probably it +was this practical quality which bound Buonaparte in friendship to +him. Yet it is difficult to fathom Buonaparte's ideas about the +revolutionary despotism which was then deluging Paris with blood. +Outwardly he appeared to sympathize with it. Such at least is the +testimony of Marie Robespierre, with whom Buonaparte's sisters were +then intimate. "Buonaparte," she said, "was a republican: I will +even say that he took the side of the Mountain: at least, that was +the impression left on my mind by his opinions when I was at +Nice.... His admiration for my elder brother, his friendship for my +younger brother, and perhaps also the interest inspired by my +misfortunes, gained for me, under the Consulate, a pension of 3,600 +francs."<a name="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_29_29"><sup>[29]</sup></a> Equally noteworthy is the +later declaration of Napoleon that<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i59" id="page_i59">[pg.59]</a></span> Robespierre was the +"scapegoat of the Revolution."<a name="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_30_30"><sup>[30]</sup></a> It appears probable, then, +that he shared the Jacobinical belief that the Terror was a +necessary though painful stage in the purification of the body +politic. His admiration of the rigour of Lycurgus, and his dislike +of all superfluous luxury, alike favour this supposition; and as he +always had the courage of his convictions, it is impossible to +conceive him clinging to the skirts of the terrorists merely from a +mean hope of prospective favours. That is the alternative +explanation of his intimacy with young Robespierre. Some of his +injudicious admirers, in trying to disprove his complicity with the +terrorists, impale themselves on this horn of the dilemma. In +seeking to clear him from the charge of Terrorism, they stain him +with the charge of truckling to the terrorists. They degrade him +from the level of St. Just to that of Barrère.</p> + +<p>A sentence in one of young Robespierre's letters shows that he +never felt completely sure about the young officer. After +enumerating to his brother Buonaparte's merits, he adds: "He is a +Corsican, and offers only the guarantee of a man of that nation who +has resisted the caresses of Paoli and whose property has been +ravaged by that traitor." Evidently, then, Robespierre regarded +Buonaparte with some suspicion as an insular Proteus, lacking those +sureties, mental and pecuniary, which reduced a man to dog-like +fidelity.</p> + +<p>Yet, however warily Buonaparte picked his steps along the slopes +of the revolutionary volcano, he was destined to feel the scorch of +the central fires. He had recently been intrusted with a mission to +the Genoese Republic, which was in a most difficult position. It +was subject to pressure from three sides; from English men-of-war +that had swooped down on a French frigate, the "Modeste," in +Genoese waters; and from actual invasion by the French on the west +and by the Austrians<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i60" id= +"page_i60">[pg.60]</a></span> on the north. Despite the great +difficulties of his task, the young envoy bent the distracted Doge +and Senate to his will. He might, therefore, have expected +gratitude from his adopted country; but shortly after he returned +to Nice he was placed under arrest, and was imprisoned in a fort +near Antibes.</p> + +<p>The causes of this swift reverse of fortune were curiously +complex. The Robespierres had in the meantime been guillotined at +Paris (July 28th, or Thermidor 10th); and this "Thermidorian" +reaction alone would have sufficed to endanger Buonaparte's head. +But his position was further imperilled by his recent strategic +suggestions, which had served to reduce to a secondary +<i>rôle</i> the French Army of the Alps. The operations of +that force had of late been strangely thwarted; and its leaders, +searching for the paralyzing influence, discovered it in the advice +of Buonaparte. Their suspicions against him were formulated in a +secret letter to the Committee of Public Safety, which stated that +the Army of the Alps had been kept inactive by the intrigues of the +younger Robespierre and of Ricord. Many a head had fallen for +reasons less serious than these. But Buonaparte had one infallible +safeguard: he could not well be spared. After a careful examination +of his papers, the Commissioners, Salicetti and Albitte, +provisionally restored him to liberty, but not, for some weeks, to +his rank of general (August 20th, 1794). The chief reason assigned +for his liberation was the service which his knowledge and talents +might render to the Republic, a reference to the knowledge of the +Italian coast-line which he had gained during the mission to +Genoa.</p> + +<p>For a space his daring spirit was doomed to chafe in comparative +inactivity, in supervising the coast artillery. But his faults were +forgotten in the need which was soon felt for his warlike prowess. +An expedition was prepared to free Corsica from "the tyranny of the +English"; and in this Buonaparte sailed, as general commanding the +artillery. With him were two friends, Junot and Marmont, who had +clung to him through his <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i61" +id="page_i61">[pg.61]</a></span> recent troubles; the former was to +be helped to wealth and fame by Buonaparte's friendship, the latter +by his own brilliant gifts.<a name="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_31_31"><sup>[31]</sup></a> In this expedition their +talent was of no avail. The French were worsted in an engagement +with the British fleet, and fell back in confusion to the coast of +France. Once again Buonaparte's Corsican enterprises were +frustrated by the ubiquitous lords of the sea: against them he now +stored up a double portion of hate, for in the meantime his +inspectorship of coast artillery had been given to his +fellow-countryman, Casabianca.</p> + +<p>The fortunes of these Corsican exiles drifted hither and thither +in many perplexing currents, as Buonaparte was once more to +discover. It was a prevalent complaint that there were too many of +them seeking employment in the army of the south; and a note +respecting the career of the young officer made by General +Schérer, who now commanded the French Army of Italy, shows +that Buonaparte had aroused at least as much suspicion as +admiration. It runs: "This officer is general of artillery, and in +this arm has sound knowledge, but has somewhat too much ambition +and intriguing habits for his advancement." All things considered, +it was deemed advisable to transfer him to the army which was +engaged in crushing the Vendéan revolt, a service which he +loathed and was determined, if possible, to evade. Accompanied by +his faithful friends, Marmont and Junot, as also by his young +brother Louis, he set out for Paris (May, 1795).</p> + +<p>In reality Fortune never favoured him more than when she removed +him from the coteries of intriguing Corsicans on the coast of +Provence and brought him to<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i62" +id="page_i62">[pg.62]</a></span> the centre of all influence. An +able schemer at Paris could decide the fate of parties and +governments. At the frontiers men could only accept the decrees of +the omnipotent capital. Moreover, the Revolution, after passing +through the molten stage, was now beginning to solidify, an +important opportunity for the political craftsman. The spring of +the year 1795 witnessed a strange blending of the new fanaticism +with the old customs. Society, dammed up for a time by the Spartan +rigour of Robespierre, was now flowing back into its wonted +channels. Gay equipages were seen in the streets; theatres, +prosperous even during the Terror, were now filled to overflowing; +gambling, whether in money or in stocks and <i>assignals</i>, was +now permeating all grades of society; and men who had grown rich by +amassing the confiscated State lands now vied with bankers, +stock-jobbers, and forestallers of grain in vulgar ostentation. As +for the poor, they were meeting their match in the gilded youth of +Paris, who with clubbed sticks asserted the right of the rich to be +merry. If the <i>sansculottes</i> attempted to restore the days of +the Terror, the National Guards of Paris were ready to sweep them +back into the slums. Such was their fate on May 20th, shortly after +Buonaparte's arrival at Paris. Any dreams which he may have +harboured of restoring the Jacobins to power were dissipated, for +Paris now plunged into the gaieties of the <i>ancien +régime</i>. The Terror was remembered only as a horrible +nightmare, which served to add zest to the pleasures of the +present. In some circles no one was received who had not lost a +relative by the guillotine. With a ghastly merriment characteristic +of the time, "victim balls" were given, to which those alone were +admitted who could produce the death warrant of some family +connection: these secured the pleasure of dancing in costumes which +recalled those of the scaffold, and of beckoning ever and anon to +their partners with nods that simulated the fall of the severed +head. It was for this, then, that the amiable Louis, the majestic +Marie Antoinette, the Minerva-like Madame <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i63" id="page_i63">[pg.63]</a></span> Roland, the +Girondins vowed to the utter quest of liberty, the tyrant-quelling +Danton, the incorruptible Robespierre himself, had felt the fatal +axe; in order that the mimicry of their death agonies might tickle +jaded appetites, and help to weave anew the old Circean spells. So +it seemed to the few who cared to think of the frightful sacrifices +of the past, and to measure them against the seemingly hopeless +degradation of the present.</p> + +<p>Some such thoughts seem to have flitted across the mind of +Buonaparte in those months of forced inactivity. It was a time of +disillusionment. Rarely do we find thenceforth in his +correspondence any gleams of faith respecting the higher +possibilities of the human race. The golden visions of youth now +vanish along with the <i>bonnet rouge</i> and the jargon of the +Terror. His bent had ever been for the material and practical: and +now that faith in the Jacobinical creed was vanishing, it was more +than ever desirable to grapple that errant balloon to substantial +facts. Evidently, the Revolution must now trust to the clinging of +the peasant proprietors to the recently confiscated lands of the +Church and of the emigrant nobles. If all else was vain and +transitory, here surely was a solid basis of material interests to +which the best part of the manhood of France would tenaciously +adhere, defying alike the plots of reactionaries and the forces of +monarchical Europe. Of these interests Buonaparte was to be the +determined guarantor. Amidst much that was visionary in his later +policy he never wavered in his championship of the new peasant +proprietors. He was ever the peasants' General, the peasants' +Consul, the peasants' Emperor.</p> + +<p>The transition of the Revolution to an ordinary form of polity +was also being furthered by its unparalleled series of military +triumphs. When Buonaparte's name was as yet unknown, except in +Corsica and Provence, France practically gained her "natural +boundaries," the Rhine and the Alps. In the campaigns of 1793-4, +the soldiers of Pichegru, Kléber, Hoche, and Moreau overran +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i64" id= +"page_i64">[pg.64]</a></span> the whole of the Low Countries and +chased the Germans beyond the Rhine; the Piedmontese were thrust +behind the Alps; the Spaniards behind the Pyrenees. In quick +succession State after State sued for peace: Tuscany in February, +1795; Prussia in April; Hanover, Westphalia, and Saxony in May; +Spain and Hesse-Cassel in July; Switzerland and Denmark in +August.</p> + +<p>Such was the state of France when Buonaparte came to seek his +fortunes in the Sphinx-like capital. His artillery command had been +commuted to a corresponding rank in the infantry—a step that +deeply incensed him. He attributed it to malevolent intriguers; but +all his efforts to obtain redress were in vain. Lacking money and +patronage, known only as an able officer and facile intriguer of +the bankrupt Jacobinical party, he might well have despaired. He +was now almost alone. Marmont had gone off to the Army of the +Rhine; but Junot was still with him, allured perhaps by Madame +Permon's daughter, whom he subsequently married. At the house of +this amiable hostess, an old friend of his family, Buonaparte found +occasional relief from the gloom of his existence. The future +Madame Junot has described him as at this time untidy, unkempt, +sickly, remarkable for his extreme thinness and the almost yellow +tint of his visage, which was, however, lit up by "two eyes +sparkling with keenness and will-power"—evidently a Corsican +falcon, pining for action, and fretting its soaring spirit in that +vapid town life. Action Buonaparte might have had, but only of a +kind that he loathed. He might have commanded the troops destined +to crush the brave royalist peasants of La Vendée. But, +whether from scorn of such vulture-work, or from an instinct that a +nobler quarry might be started at Paris, he refused to proceed to +the Army of the West, and on the plea of ill-health remained in the +capital. There he spent his time deeply pondering on politics and +strategy. He designed a history of the last two years, and drafted +a plan of campaign for the Army of <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i65" id="page_i65">[pg.65]</a></span> Italy, which, later on, +was to bear him to fortune. Probably the geographical insight which +it displayed may have led to his appointment (August 20th, 1795) to +the topographical bureau of the Committee of Public Safety. His +first thought on hearing of this important advancement was that it +opened up an opportunity for proceeding to Turkey to organize the +artillery of the Sultan; and in a few days he sent in a formal +request to that effect—the first tangible proof of that +yearning after the Orient which haunted him all through life. But, +while straining his gaze eastwards, he experienced a sharp rebuff. +The Committee was on the point of granting his request, when an +examination of his recent conduct proved him guilty of a breach of +discipline in not proceeding to his Vendéan command. On the +very day when one department of the Committee empowered him to +proceed to Constantinople, the Central Committee erased his name +from the list of general officers (September 15th).</p> + +<p>This time the blow seemed fatal. But Fortune appeared to compass +his falls only in order that he might the more brilliantly tower +aloft. Within three weeks he was hailed as the saviour of the new +republican constitution. The cause of this almost magical change in +his prospects is to be sought in the political unrest of France, to +which we must now briefly advert.</p> + +<p>All through this summer of 1795 there were conflicts between +Jacobins and royalists. In the south the latter party had signally +avenged itself for the agonies of the preceding years, and the +ardour of the French temperament seemed about to drive that hapless +people from the "Red Terror" to a veritable "White Terror," when +two disasters checked the course of the reaction. An attempt of a +large force of emigrant French nobles, backed up by British money +and ships, to rouse Brittany against the Convention was utterly +crushed by the able young Hoche; and nearly seven hundred prisoners +were afterwards shot down in cold blood (July). Shortly before this +blow, the little prince styled Louis XVII. succumbed to the brutal +treatment <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i66" id= +"page_i66">[pg.66]</a></span>of his gaolers at the Temple in Paris; +and the hopes of the royalists now rested on the unpopular Comte de +Provence. Nevertheless, the political outlook in the summer of 1795 +was not reassuring to the republicans; and the Commission of +Eleven, empowered by the Convention to draft new organic laws, drew +up an instrument of government, which, though republican in form, +seemed to offer all the stability of the most firmly rooted +oligarchy. Some such compromise was perhaps necessary; for the +Commonwealth was confronted by three dangers, anarchy resulting +from the pressure of the mob, an excessive centralization of power +in the hands of two committees, and the possibility of a <i>coup +d'état</i> by some pretender or adventurer. Indeed, the +student of French history cannot fail to see that this is the +problem which is ever before the people of France. It has presented +itself in acute though diverse phases in 1797,1799,1814, 1830, +1848, 1851, and in 1871. Who can say that the problem has yet found +its complete solution?</p> + +<p>In some respects the constitution which the Convention voted in +August, 1795, was skilfully adapted to meet the needs of the time. +Though democratic in spirit, it granted a vote only to those +citizens who had resided for a year in some dwelling and had paid +taxes, thus excluding the rabble who had proved to be dangerous to +any settled government. It also checked the hasty legislation which +had brought ridicule on successive National Assemblies. In order to +moderate the zeal for the manufacture of decrees, which had often +exceeded one hundred a month, a second or revising chamber was now +to be formed on the basis of age; for it had been found that the +younger the deputies the faster came forth the fluttering flocks of +decrees, that often came home to roost in the guise of curses. A +senatorial guillotine, it was now proposed, should thin out the +fledglings before they flew abroad at all. Of the seven hundred and +fifty deputies of France, the two hundred and fifty oldest men were +to form the Council of Ancients, having powers to amend or reject +the proposals <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i67" id= +"page_i67">[pg.67]</a></span> emanating from the Council of Five +Hundred. In this Council were the younger deputies, and with them +rested the sole initiation of laws. Thus the young deputies were to +make the laws, but the older deputies were to amend or reject them; +and this nice adjustment of the characteristics of youth and age, a +due blending of enthusiasm with caution, promised to invigorate the +body politic and yet guard its vital interests. Lastly, in order +that the two Councils should continuously represent the feelings of +France, one third of their members must retire for re-election +every year, a device which promised to prevent any violent change +in their composition, such as might occur if, at the end of their +three years' membership, all were called upon to resign at +once.</p> + +<p>But the real crux of constitution builders had hitherto been in +the relations of the Legislature to the Executive. How should the +brain of the body politic, that is, the Legislature, be connected +with the hand, that is, the Executive? Obviously, so argued all +French political thinkers, the two functions were distinct and must +be kept separate. The results of this theory of the separation of +powers were clearly traceable in the course of the Revolution. When +the hand had been left almost powerless, as in 1791-2, owing to +democratic jealousy of the royal Ministry, the result had been +anarchy. The supreme needs of the State in the agonies of 1793 had +rendered the hand omnipotent: the Convention, that is, the brain, +was for some time powerless before its own instrument, the two +secret committees. Experience now showed that the brain must +exercise a general control over the hand, without unduly hampering +its actions. Evidently, then, the deputies of France must intrust +the details of administration to responsible Ministers, though some +directing agency seemed needed as a spur to energy and a check +against royalist plots. In brief, the Committee of Public Safety, +purged of its more dangerous powers, was to furnish the model for a +new body of five members, termed the Directory. This <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i68" id="page_i68">[pg.68]</a></span> +organism, which was to give its name to the whole period 1795-1799, +was not the Ministry. There was no Ministry as we now use the term. +There were Ministers who were responsible individually for their +departments of State: but they never met for deliberation, or +communicated with the Legislature; they were only heads of +departments, who were responsible individually to the Directors. +These five men formed a powerful committee, deliberating in private +on the whole policy of the State and on all the work of the +Ministers. The Directory had not, it is true, the right of +initiating laws and of arbitrary arrest which the two committees +had freely exercised during the Terror. Its dependence on the +Legislature seemed also to be guaranteed by the Directors being +appointed by the two legislative Councils; while one of the five +was to vacate his office for re-election every year. But in other +respects the directorial powers were almost as extensive as those +wielded by the two secret committees, or as those which Bonaparte +was to inherit from the Directory in 1799. They comprised the +general control of policy in peace and war, the right to negotiate +treaties (subject to ratification by the legislative councils), to +promulgate laws voted by the Councils and watch over their +execution, and to appoint or dismiss the Ministers of State.</p> + +<p>Such was the constitution which was proclaimed on September +22nd, 1795, or 1st Vendémiaire, Year IV., of the +revolutionary calendar. An important postscript to the original +constitution now excited fierce commotions which enabled the young +officer to repair his own shattered fortunes. The Convention, +terrified at the thought of a general election, which might send up +a malcontent or royalist majority, decided to impose itself on +France for at least two years longer. With an effrontery +unparalleled in parliamentary annals, it decreed that the law of +the new constitution, requiring the re-election of one-third of the +deputies every year, should now be applied to itself; and that the +rest of its members should sit in the forthcoming Councils. At once +a cry of disgust and rage arose from <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i69" id="page_i69">[pg.69]</a></span> all who were weary of +the Convention and all its works. "Down with the two-thirds!" was +the cry that resounded through the streets of Paris. The movement +was not so much definitely royalist as vaguely malcontent. The many +were enraged by the existing dearth and by the failure of the +Revolution to secure even cheap bread. Doubtless the royalists +strove to drive on the discontent to the desired goal, and in many +parts they tinged the movement with an unmistakably Bourbon tint. +But it is fairly certain that in Paris they could not alone have +fomented a discontent so general as that of Vendémiaire. +That they would have profited by the defeat of the Convention is, +however, equally certain. The history of the Revolution proves that +those who at first merely opposed the excesses of the Jacobins +gradually drifted over to the royalists. The Convention now found +itself attacked in the very city which had been the chosen abode of +Liberty and Equality. Some thirty thousand of the Parisian National +Guards were determined to give short shrift to this Assembly that +clung so indecently to life; and as the armies were far away, the +Parisian malcontents seemed masters of the situation. Without doubt +they would have been but for their own precipitation and the energy +of Buonaparte.</p> + +<p>But how came he to receive the military authority which was so +potently to influence the course of events? We left him in +Fructidor disgraced: we find him in the middle of +Vendémiaire leading part of the forces of the Convention. +This bewildering change was due to the pressing needs of the +Republic, to his own signal abilities, and to the discerning eye of +Barras, whose career claims a brief notice.</p> + +<p>Paul Barras came of a Provençal family, and had an +adventurous life both on land and in maritime expeditions. Gifted +with a robust frame, consummate self-assurance, and a ready tongue, +he was well equipped for intrigues, both amorous and political, +when the outbreak of the Revolution gave his thoughts a more +serious turn. Espousing the ultra-democratic side, he yet <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i70" id="page_i70">[pg.70]</a></span> +contrived to emerge unscathed from the schisms which were fatal to +less dextrous trimmers. He was present at the siege of Toulon, and +has striven in his "Mémoires" to disparage Buonaparte's +services and exalt his own. At the crisis of Thermidor the +Convention intrusted him with the command of the "army of the +interior," and the energy which he then displayed gained for him +the same position in the equally critical days of +Vendémiaire. Though he subsequently carped at the conduct of +Buonaparte, his action proved his complete confidence in that young +officer's capacity: he at once sent for him, and intrusted him with +most important duties. Herein lies the chief chance of immortality +for the name of Barras; not that, as a terrorist, he slaughtered +royalists at Toulon; not that he was the military chief of the +Thermidorians, who, from fear of their own necks, ended the +supremacy of Robespierre; not even that he degraded the new +<i>régime</i> by a cynical display of all the worst vices of +the old; but rather because he was now privileged to hold the +stirrup for the great captain who vaulted lightly into the +saddle.</p> + +<p>The present crisis certainly called for a man of skill and +determination. The malcontents had been emboldened by the timorous +actions of General Menou, who had previously been intrusted with +the task of suppressing the agitation. Owing to a praiseworthy +desire to avoid bloodshed, that general wasted time in parleying +with the most rebellious of the "sections" of Paris. The Convention +now appointed Barras to the command, while Buonaparte, Brune, +Carteaux, Dupont, Loison, Vachot, and Vézu were charged to +serve under him.<a name="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_32_32"><sup>[32]</sup></a> Such was the decree of the +Convention, which therefore refutes Napoleon's later claim that he +was in command, and that of his admirers that he was second in +command.</p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i71" id= +"page_i71">[pg.71]</a></span> Yet, intrusted from the outset by +Barras with important duties, he unquestionably became the +animating spirit of the defence. "From the first," says +Thiébault, "his activity was astonishing: he seemed to be +everywhere at once: he surprised people by his laconic, clear, and +prompt orders: everybody was struck by the vigour of his +arrangements, and passed from admiration to confidence, from +confidence to enthusiasm." Everything now depended on skill and +enthusiasm. The defenders of the Convention, comprising some four +or five thousand troops of the line, and between one and two +thousand patriots, gendarmes, and Invalides, were confronted by +nearly thirty thousand National Guards. The odds were therefore +wellnigh as heavy as those which menaced Louis XVI. on the day of +his final overthrow. But the place of the yielding king was now +filled by determined men, who saw the needs of the situation. In +the earlier scenes of the Revolution, Buonaparte had pondered on +the efficacy of artillery in street-fighting—a fit subject +for his geometrical genius. With a few cannon, he knew that he +could sweep all the approaches to the palace; and, on Barras' +orders, he despatched a dashing cavalry officer, Murat—a name +destined to become famous from Madrid to Moscow—to bring the +artillery from the neighbouring camp of Sablons. Murat secured them +before the malcontents of Paris could lay hands on them; and as the +"sections" of Paris had yielded up their own cannon after the +affrays of May, they now lacked the most potent force in +street-fighting. Their actions were also paralyzed by divided +counsels: their commander, an old general named Danican, moved his +men hesitatingly; he wasted precious minutes in parleying, and thus +gave time to Barras' small but compact force to fight them in +detail. Buonaparte had skilfully disposed his cannon to bear on the +royalist columns that threatened the streets north of the +Tuileries. But for some time the two parties stood face to face, +seeking to cajole or intimidate one another. As the autumn +afternoon waned, shots were fired from some houses near the church +of <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i72" id= +"page_i72">[pg.72]</a></span> St. Roch, where the malcontents had +their headquarters.<a name="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_33_33"><sup>[33]</sup></a> At once the streets became +the scene of a furious fight; furious but unequal; for Buonaparte's +cannon tore away the heads of the malcontent columns. In vain did +the royalists pour in their volleys from behind barricades, or from +the neighbouring houses: finally they retreated on the barricaded +church, or fled down the Rue St. Honoré. Meanwhile their +bands from across the river, 5,000 strong, were filing across the +bridges, and menaced the Tuileries from that side, until here also +they melted away before the grapeshot and musketry poured into +their front and flank. By six o'clock the conflict was over. The +fight presents few, if any, incidents which are authentic. The +well-known engraving of Helman, which shows Buonaparte directing +the storming of the church of St. Roch is unfortunately quite +incorrect. He was not engaged there, but in the streets further +east: the church was not stormed: the malcontents held it all +through the night, and quietly surrendered it next morning.</p> + +<p>Such was the great day of Vendémiaire. It cost the lives +of about two hundred on each side; at least, that is the usual +estimate, which seems somewhat incongruous with the stories of +fusillading and cannonading at close quarters, until we remember +that it is the custom of memoir-writers and newspaper editors to +trick out the details of a fight, and in the case of civil warfare +to minimise the bloodshed. Certainly the Convention acted with +clemency in the hour of victory: two only of the rebel leaders were +put to death; and it is pleasing to remember that when Menou was +charged with treachery, Buonaparte used his influence to procure +his freedom.</p> + +<p>Bourrienne states that in his later days the victor deeply +regretted his action in this day of Vendémiaire. The +assertion seems incredible. The "whiff of grapeshot" crushed a +movement which could have led only to present anarchy, and probably +would have brought<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i73" id= +"page_i73">[pg.73]</a></span> France back to royalism of an odious +type. It taught a severe lesson to a fickle populace which, +according to Mme. de Staël, was hungering for the spoils of +place as much as for any political object. Of all the events of his +post-Corsican life, Buonaparte need surely never have felt +compunctions for Vendémiaire.<a name="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a +href="#Footnote_34_34"><sup>[34]</sup></a></p> + +<p>After four signal reverses in his career, he now enters on a +path strewn with glories. The first reward for his signal services +to the Republic was his appointment to be second in command of the +army of the interior; and when Barras resigned the first command, +he took that responsible post. But more brilliant honours were soon +to follow, the first of a social character, the second purely +military.</p> + +<p>Buonaparte had already appeared timidly and awkwardly at the +<i>salon</i> of the voluptuous Barras, where the fair but frail +Madame Tallien—Notre Dame de Thermidor she was +styled—dazzled Parisian society by her classic features and +the uncinctured grace of her attire. There he reappeared, not in +the threadbare uniform that had attracted the giggling notice of +that giddy throng, but as the lion of the society which his talents +had saved. His previous attempts to gain the hand of a lady had +been unsuccessful. He had been refused, first by Mlle. Clary, +sister of his brother Joseph's wife, and quite recently by Madame +Permon. Indeed, the scarecrow young officer had not been a +brilliant match. But now he saw at that <i>salon</i> a charming +widow, Josephine de Beauharnais, whose husband had perished in the +Terror. The ardour of his southern temperament, long repressed by +his privations, speedily rekindles in her presence: his stiff, +awkward manners thaw under her smiles: his silence vanishes when +she praises his military gifts: he admires her tact, her sympathy, +her beauty: he<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i74" id= +"page_i74">[pg.74]</a></span> determines to marry her. The lady, on +her part, seems to have been somewhat terrified by her uncanny +wooer: she comments questioningly on his "violent tenderness almost +amounting to frenzy": she notes uneasily his "keen inexplicable +gaze which imposes even on our Directors": How would this eager +nature, this masterful energy, consort with her own "Creole +nonchalance"? She did well to ask herself whether the general's +almost volcanic passion would not soon exhaust itself, and turn +from her own fading charms to those of women who were his equals in +age. Besides, when she frankly asked her own heart, she found that +she loved him not: she only admired him. Her chief consolation was +that if she married him, her friend Barras would help to gain for +Buonaparte the command of the Army of Italy. The advice of Barras +undoubtedly helped to still the questioning surmises of Josephine; +and the wedding was celebrated, as a civil contract, on March 9th, +1796. With a pardonable coquetry, the bride entered her age on the +register as four years less than the thirty-four which had passed +over her: while her husband, desiring still further to lessen the +disparity, entered his date of birth as 1768.</p> + +<p>A fortnight before the wedding, he had been appointed to command +the Army of Italy: and after a honeymoon of two days at Paris, he +left his bride to take up his new military duties. Clearly, then, +there was some connection between this brilliant fortune and his +espousal of Josephine. But the assertion that this command was the +"dowry" offered by Barras to the somewhat reluctant bride is more +piquant than correct. That the brilliance of Buonaparte's prospects +finally dissipated her scruples may be frankly admitted. But the +appointment to a command of a French army did not rest with Barras. +He was only one of the five Directors who now decided the chief +details of administration. His colleagues were Letourneur, Rewbell, +La Réveillière-Lépeaux, and the great Carnot; +and, as a matter of fact, it was the last-named who chiefly decided +the appointment in question. <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i75" id="page_i75">[pg.75]</a></span> He had seen and +pondered over the plan of campaign which Buonaparte had designed +for the Army of Italy; and the vigour of the conception, the +masterly appreciation of topographical details which it displayed, +and the trenchant energy of its style had struck conviction to his +strategic genius. Buonaparte owed his command, not to a backstairs +intrigue, as was currently believed in the army, but rather to his +own commanding powers. While serving with the Army of Italy in +1794, he had carefully studied the coast-line and the passes +leading inland; and, according to the well-known savant, Volney, +the young officer, shortly after his release from imprisonment, +sketched out to him and to a Commissioner of the Convention the +details of the very plan of campaign which was to carry him +victoriously from the Genoese Riviera into the heart of Austria.<a +name="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_35_35"><sup>[35]</sup></a> While describing this +masterpiece of strategy, says Volney, Buonaparte spoke as if +inspired. We can fancy the wasted form dilating with a sense of +power, the thin sallow cheeks aglow with enthusiasm, the hawk-like +eyes flashing at the sight of the helpless Imperial quarry, as he +pointed out on the map of Piedmont and Lombardy the features which +would favour a dashing invader and carry him to the very gates of +Vienna. The splendours of the Imperial Court at the Tuileries seem +tawdry and insipid when compared with the intellectual grandeur +which lit up that humble lodging at Nice with the first rays that +heralded the dawn of Italian liberation.</p> + +<p>With the fuller knowledge which he had recently acquired, he now +in January, 1796, elaborated this plan of campaign, so that it at +once gained Carnot's admiration. The Directors forwarded it to +General Schérer, who was in command of the Army of Italy, +but promptly received the "brutal" reply that the man who had +drafted the plan ought to come and carry it out. Long dissatisfied +with Schérer's inactivity and constant complaints, the +Directory now took him at his word, and replaced him<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i76" id="page_i76">[pg.76]</a></span> by +Buonaparte. Such is the truth about Buonaparte's appointment to the +Army of Italy.</p> + +<p>To Nice, then, the young general set out (March 21st) +accompanied, or speedily followed, by his faithful friends, Marmont +and Junot, as well as by other officers of whose energy he was +assured, Berthier, Murat, and Duroc. How much had happened since +the early summer of 1795, when he had barely the means to pay his +way to Paris! A sure instinct had drawn him to that hot-bed of +intrigues. He had played a desperate game, risking his commission +in order that he might keep in close touch with the central +authority. His reward for this almost superhuman confidence in his +own powers was correspondingly great; and now, though he knew +nothing of the handling of cavalry and infantry save from books, he +determined to lead the Army of Italy to a series of conquests that +would rival those of Cæsar. In presence of a will so stubborn +and genius so fervid, what wonder that a friend prophesied that his +halting-place would be either the throne or the scaffold? <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i77" id= +"page_i77">[pg.77]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER V</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN</center> + +<p>(1796)</p> + +<br> + + +<p>In the personality of Napoleon nothing is more remarkable than +the combination of gifts which in most natures are mutually +exclusive; his instincts were both political and military; his +survey of a land took in not only the geographical environment but +also the material welfare of the people. Facts, which his foes +ignored, offered a firm fulcrum for the leverage of his will: and +their political edifice or their military policy crumbled to ruin +under an assault planned with consummate skill and pressed home +with relentless force.</p> + +<p>For the exercise of all these gifts what land was so fitted as +the mosaic of States which was dignified with the name of +Italy?</p> + +<p>That land had long been the battle-ground of the Bourbons and +the Hapsburgs; and their rivalries, aided by civic dissensions, had +reduced the people that once had given laws to Europe into a +condition of miserable weakness. Europe was once the battle-field +of the Romans: Italy was now the battle-field of Europe. The +Hapsburgs dominated the north, where they held the rich Duchy of +Milan, along with the great stronghold of Mantua, and some +scattered imperial fiefs. A scion of the House of Austria reigned +at Florence over the prosperous Duchy of Tuscany. Modena and Lucca +were under the general control of the Court of Vienna. The south of +the peninsula, along with Sicily, was swayed by Ferdinand IV., a +descendant of the Spanish <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i78" +id="page_i78">[pg.78]</a></span> Bourbons, who kept his people in a +condition of mediæval ignorance and servitude; and this +dynasty controlled the Duchy of Parma. The Papal States were also +sunk in the torpor of the Middle Ages; but in the northern +districts of Bologna and Ferrara, known as the "Legations," the +inhabitants still remembered the time of their independence, and +chafed under the irritating restraints of Papal rule. This was seen +when the leaven of French revolutionary thought began to ferment in +Italian towns. Two young men of Bologna were so enamoured of the +new ideas, as to raise an Italian tricolour flag, green, white, and +red, and summon their fellow-citizens to revolt against the rule of +the Pope's legate (November, 1794). The revolt was crushed, and the +chief offenders were hanged; but elsewhere the force of democracy +made itself felt, especially among the more virile peoples of +Northern Italy. Lombardy and Piedmont throbbed with suppressed +excitement. Even when the King of Sardinia, Victor Amadeus III., +was waging war against the French Republic, the men of Turin were +with difficulty kept from revolt; and, as we have seen, the +Austro-Sardinian alliance was powerless to recover Savoy and Nice +from the soldiers of liberty or to guard the Italian Riviera from +invasion.</p> + +<p>In fact, Bonaparte—for he henceforth spelt his name +thus—detected the political weakness of the Hapsburgs' +position in Italy. Masters of eleven distinct peoples north of the +Alps, how could they hope permanently to dominate a wholly alien +people south of that great mountain barrier? The many failures of +the old Ghibelline or Imperial party in face of any popular impulse +which moved the Italian nature to its depths revealed the +artificiality of their rule. Might not such an impulse be imparted +by the French Revolution? And would not the hopes of national +freedom and of emancipation from feudal imposts fire these peoples +with zeal for the French cause? Evidently there were vast +possibilities in a democratic propaganda. At the outset Bonaparte's +racial sympathies were warmly aroused for the liberation of<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i79" id="page_i79">[pg.79]</a></span> +Italy; and though his judgment was to be warped by the promptings +of ambition, he never lost sight of the welfare of the people +whence he was descended. In his "Memoirs written at St. Helena" he +summed up his convictions respecting the Peninsula in this +statesmanlike utterance: "Italy, isolated within its natural +limits, separated by the sea and by very high mountains from the +rest of Europe, seems called to be a great and powerful nation.... +Unity in manners, language, literature ought finally, in a future +more or less remote, to unite its inhabitants under a single +government.... Rome is beyond doubt the capital which the Italians +will one day choose." A prophetic saying: it came from a man who, +as conqueror and organizer, awakened that people from the torpor of +centuries and breathed into it something of his own indomitable +energy.</p> + +<p>And then again, the Austrian possessions south of the Alps were +difficult to hold for purely military reasons. They were separated +from Vienna by difficult mountain ranges through which armies +struggled with difficulty. True, Mantua was a formidable +stronghold, but no fortress could make the Milanese other than a +weak and straggling territory, the retention of which by the Court +of Vienna was a defiance to the gospel of nature of which Rousseau +was the herald and Bonaparte the militant exponent.</p> + +<p>The Austro-Sardinian forces were now occupying the pass which +separates the Apennines from the Maritime Alps north of the town of +Savona. They were accordingly near the headwaters of the Bormida +and the Tanaro, two of the chief affluents of the River Po: and +roads following those river valleys led, the one north-east, in the +direction of Milan, the other north-west towards Turin, the +Sardinian capital. A wedge of mountainous country separated these +roads as they diverged from the neighbourhood of Montenotte. Here +obviously was the vulnerable point of the Austro-Sardinian +position. Here therefore Bonaparte purposed to deliver his first +strokes, foreseeing that, should he sever the allies, he would +have<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i80" id= +"page_i80">[pg.80]</a></span> in his favour every advantage both +political and topographical.</p> + +<p>All this was possible to a commander who could overcome the +initial difficulties. But these difficulties were enormous. The +position of the French Army of Italy in March, 1796, was +precarious. Its detachments, echelonned near the coast from Savona +to Loano, and thence to Nice, or inland to the Col di Tende, +comprised in all 42,000 men, as against the Austro-Sardinian forces +amounting to 52,000 men.[36] Moreover, the allies occupied strong +positions on the northern slopes of the Maritime Alps and +Apennines, and, holding the inner and therefore shorter curve, they +could by a dextrous concentration have pushed their more widely +scattered opponents on to the shore, where the republicans would +have been harassed by the guns of the British cruisers. Finally, +Bonaparte's troops were badly equipped, worse clad, and were not +paid at all. On his arrival at Nice at the close of March, the +young commander had to disband one battalion for mutinous +conduct.<a name="FNanchor_37_37"></a> <a href= +"#Footnote_37_37"><sup>[37]</sup></a> For a brief space it seemed +doubtful how the army would receive this slim, delicate-looking +youth, known hitherto only as a skilful artillerist at Toulon and +in the streets of Paris. But he speedily gained the respect and +confidence of the rank and file, not only by stern punishment of +the mutineers, but by raising money from a local banker, so as to +make good some of the long arrears of pay. Other grievances he +rectified by prompt reorganization of the commissariat and kindred +departments. But, above all, by his burning words he thrilled them: +"Soldiers, you are half starved and half naked. The Government owes +you much, but can do nothing for you. Your patience and courage are +honourable to you, but they procure you neither advantage nor +glory.</p> + +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i81" id= +"page_i81">[pg.81]</a></span> + +<center><a name="image_02"><img alt= +"MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE CAMPAIGNS IN NORTH ITALY" src= +"images/image02.jpg" width="552" height="381"><br> + <font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>MAP TO +ILLUSTRATE THE CAMPAIGNS IN NORTH ITALY</small></font></a></center> + +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i82" id= +"page_i82">[pg.82]</a></span> + +<p>I am about to lead you into the most fertile valleys of the +world: there you will find flourishing cities and teeming +provinces: there you will reap honour, glory, and riches. Soldiers +of the Army of Italy, will you lack courage?" Two years previously +so open a bid for the soldiers' allegiance would have conducted any +French commander forthwith to the guillotine. But much had changed +since the days of Robespierre's supremacy; Spartan austerity had +vanished; and the former insane jealousy of individual pre-eminence +was now favouring a startling reaction which was soon to install +the one supremely able man as absolute master of France.</p> + +<p>Bonaparte's conduct produced a deep impression alike on troops +and officers. From Masséna his energy and his trenchant +orders extorted admiration: and the tall swaggering Augereau shrank +beneath the intellectual superiority of his gaze. Moreover, at the +beginning of April the French received reinforcements which raised +their total to 49,300 men, and gave them a superiority of force; +for though the allies had 52,000, yet they were so widely scattered +as to be inferior in any one district. Besides, the Austrian +commander, Beaulieu, was seventy-one years of age, had only just +been sent into Italy, with which land he was ill acquainted, and +found one-third of his troops down with sickness.<a name= +"FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_38_38"><sup>[38]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Bonaparte now began to concentrate his forces near Savona. +Fortune favoured him even before the campaign commenced. The snows +of winter, still lying on the mountains, though thawing on the +southern slopes, helped to screen his movements from the enemy's +outposts; and the French vanguard pushed along the coastline even +as far as Voltri. This movement was designed to coerce the Senate +of Genoa into payment of a fine for its acquiescence in the seizure +of a French vessel by a British cruiser within its neutral +roadstead; but it served to alarm Beaulieu, who, breaking up his +cantonments,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i83" id= +"page_i83">[pg.83]</a></span> sent a strong column towards that +city. At the time this circumstance greatly annoyed Bonaparte, who +had hoped to catch the Imperialists dozing in their winter +quarters. Yet it is certain that the hasty move of their left flank +towards Voltri largely contributed to that brilliant opening of +Bonaparte's campaign, which his admirers have generally regarded as +due solely to his genius.<a name="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_39_39"><sup>[39]</sup></a> For, when Beaulieu had thrust +his column into the broken coast district between Genoa and Voltri, +he severed it dangerously far from his centre, which marched up the +valley of the eastern branch of the Bormida to occupy the passes of +the Apennines north of Savona. This, again, was by no means in +close touch with the Sardinian allies encamped further to the west +in and beyond Ceva. Beaulieu, writing at a later date to Colonel +Graham, the English <i>attaché</i> at his headquarters, +ascribed his first disasters to Argenteau, his lieutenant at +Montenotte, who employed only a third of the forces placed under +his command. But division of forces was characteristic of the +Austrians in all their operations, and they now gave a fine +opportunity to any enterprising opponent who should crush their +weak and unsupported centre. In obedience to orders from Vienna, +Beaulieu assumed the offensive; but he brought his chief force to +bear on the French vanguard at Voltri, which he drove in with some +loss. While he was occupying Voltri, the boom of cannon echoing +across the mountains warned his outposts that the real +campaign<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i84" id= +"page_i84">[pg.84]</a></span> was opening in the broken country +north of Savona.<a name="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_40_40"><sup>[40]</sup></a> There the weak Austrian +centre had occupied a ridge or plateau above the village of +Montenotte, through which ran the road leading to Alessandria and +Milan. Argenteau's attack partly succeeded: but the stubborn +bravery of a French detachment checked it before the redoubt which +commanded the southern prolongation of the heights named +Monte-Legino.<a name="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_41_41"><sup>[41]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Such was the position of affairs when Bonaparte hurried up. On +the following day (April 12th), massing the French columns of +attack under cover of an early morning mist, he moved them to their +positions, so that the first struggling rays of sunlight revealed +to the astonished Austrians the presence of an army ready to crush +their front and turn their flanks. For a time the Imperialists +struggled bravely against the superior forces in their front; but +when Masséna pressed round their right wing, they gave way +and beat a speedy retreat to save themselves from entire capture. +Bonaparte took no active share in the battle: he was, very +properly, intent on the wider problem of severing the +Austrians<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i85" id= +"page_i85">[pg.85]</a></span> from their allies, first by the +turning movement of Masséna, and then by pouring other +troops into the gap thus made. In this he entirely succeeded. The +radical defects in the Austrian dispositions left them utterly +unable to withstand the blows which he now showered upon them. The +Sardinians were too far away on the west to help Argenteau in his +hour of need: they were in and beyond Ceva, intent on covering the +road to Turin: whereas, as Napoleon himself subsequently wrote, +they should have been near enough to their allies to form one +powerful army, which, at Dego or Montenotte, would have defended +both Turin and Milan. "United, the two forces would have been +superior to the French army: separated, they were lost."</p> + +<p>The configuration of the ground favoured Bonaparte's plan of +driving the Imperialists down the valley of the Bormida in a +north-easterly direction; and the natural desire of a beaten +general to fall back towards his base of supplies also impelled +Beaulieu and Argenteau to retire towards Milan. But that would +sever their connections with the Sardinians, whose base of +supplies, Turin, lay in a north-westerly direction.</p> + +<p>Bonaparte therefore hurled his forces at once against the +Austrians and a Sardinian contingent at Millesimo, and defeated +them, Augereau's division cutting off the retreat of twelve hundred +of their men under Provera. Weakened by this second blow, the +allies fell back on the intrenched village of Dego. Their position +was of a strength proportionate to its strategic importance; for +its loss would completely sever all connection between their two +main armies save by devious routes many miles in their rear. They +therefore clung desperately to the six mamelons and redoubts which +barred the valley and dominated some of the neighbouring heights. +Yet such was the superiority of the French in numbers that these +positions were speedily turned by Masséna, whom Bonaparte +again intrusted with the movement on the enemy's flank and rear. A +strange event followed. The victors, while pillaging the country +for the supplies <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i86" id= +"page_i86">[pg.86]</a></span> which Bonaparte's sharpest orders +failed to draw from the magazines and stores on the sea-coast, were +attacked in the dead of night by five Austrian battalions that had +been ordered up to support their countrymen at Dego. These, after +straying among the mountains, found themselves among bands of the +marauding French, whom they easily scattered, seizing Dego itself. +Apprised of this mishap, Bonaparte hurried up more troops from the +rear, and on the 15th recovered the prize which had so nearly been +snatched from his grasp. Had Beaulieu at this time thrown all his +forces on the French, he might have retrieved his first +misfortunes: but foresight and energy were not to be found at the +Austrian headquarters: the surprise at Dego was the work of a +colonel; and for many years to come the incompetence of their aged +commanders was to paralyze the fine fighting qualities of the +"white-coats." In three conflicts they had been outmanoeuvred and +outnumbered, and drew in their shattered columns to Acqui.</p> + +<p>The French commander now led his columns westward against the +Sardinians, who had fallen back on their fortified camp at Ceva, in +the upper valley of the Tanaro. There they beat off one attack of +the French. A check in front of a strongly intrenched position was +serious. It might have led to a French disaster, had the Austrians +been able to bring aid to their allies. Bonaparte even summoned a +council of war to deliberate on the situation. As a rule, a council +of war gives timid advice. This one strongly advised a second +attack on the camp—a striking proof of the ardour which then +nerved the republican generals. Not yet were they +<i>condottieri</i> carving out fortunes by their swords: not yet +were they the pampered minions of an autocrat, intent primarily on +guarding the estates which his favour had bestowed. Timidity was +rather the mark of their opponents. When the assault on the +intrenchments of Ceva was about to be renewed, the Sardinian forces +were discerned filing away westwards. Their general indulged the +fond hope of holding the French at bay at several<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i87" id="page_i87">[pg.87]</a></span> +strong natural positions on his march. He was bitterly to rue his +error. The French divisions of Sérurier and Dommartin closed +in on him, drove him from Mondovi, and away towards Turin.</p> + +<p>Bonaparte had now completely succeeded. Using to the full the +advantage of his central position between the widely scattered +detachments of his foes, he had struck vigorously at their natural +point of junction, Montenotte, and by three subsequent +successes—for the evacuation of Ceva can scarcely be called a +French victory—had forced them further and further apart +until Turin was almost within his power.</p> + +<p>It now remained to push these military triumphs to their natural +conclusion, and impose terms of peace on the House of Savoy, which +was secretly desirous of peace. The Directors had ordered Bonaparte +that he should seek to detach Sardinia from the Austrian alliance +by holding out the prospect of a valuable compensation for the loss +of Savoy and Nice in the fertile Milanese.<a name= +"FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42"><sup>[42]</sup></a> +The prospect of this rich prize would, the Directors surmised, +dissolve the Austro-Sardinian alliance, as soon as the allies had +felt the full vigour of the French arms. Not that Bonaparte himself +was to conduct these negotiations. He was to forward to the +Directory all offers of submission. Nay, he was not empowered to +grant on his own responsibility even an armistice. He was merely to +push the foe hard, and feed his needy soldiers on the conquered +territory. He was to be solely a general, never a negotiator.</p> + +<p>The Directors herein showed keen jealousy or striking ignorance +of military affairs. How could he keep the Austrians quiet while +envoys passed between Turin and Paris? All the dictates of common +sense required him to grant an armistice to the Court of Turin +before the Austrians could recover from their recent disasters. But +the King of Sardinia drew him from a perplexing situation by +instructing Colli to make overtures for an armistice as<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i88" id="page_i88">[pg.88]</a></span> +preliminary to a peace. At once the French commander replied that +such powers belonged to the Directory; but as for an armistice, it +would only be possible if the Court of Turin placed in his hands +three fortresses, Coni, Tortona, and Alessandria, besides +guaranteeing the transit of French armies through Piedmont and the +passage of the Po at Valenza. Then, with his unfailing belief in +accomplished facts, Bonaparte pushed on his troops to Cherasco.</p> + +<p>Near that town he received the Piedmontese envoys; and from the +pen of one of them we have an account of the general's behaviour in +his first essay in diplomacy. His demeanour was marked by that +grave and frigid courtesy which was akin to Piedmontese customs. In +reply to the suggestions of the envoys that some of the conditions +were of little value to the French, he answered: "The Republic, in +intrusting to me the command of an army, has credited me with +possessing enough discernment to judge of what that army requires, +without having recourse to the advice of my enemy." Apart, however, +from this sarcasm, which was uttered in a hard and biting voice, +his tone was coldly polite. He reserved his home thrust for the +close of the conference. When it had dragged on till considerably +after noon with no definite result, he looked at his watch and +exclaimed: "Gentlemen, I warn you that a general attack is ordered +for two o'clock, and that if I am not assured that Coni will be put +in my hands before nightfall, the attack will not be postponed for +one moment. It may happen to me to lose battles, but no one shall +ever see me lose minutes either by over-confidence or by sloth." +The terms of the armistice of Cherasco were forthwith signed (April +28th); they were substantially the same as those first offered by +the victor. During the luncheon which followed, the envoys were +still further impressed by his imperturbable confidence and +trenchant phrases; as when he told them that the campaign was the +exact counterpart of what he had planned in 1794; or described a +council of war as a convenient device for covering cowardice or +irresolution <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i89" id= +"page_i89">[pg.89]</a></span> in the commander; or asserted that +nothing could now stop him before the walls of Mantua.<a name= +"FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_43_43"><sup>[43]</sup></a></p> + +<p>As a matter of fact, the French army was at that time so +disorganized by rapine as scarcely to have withstood a combined and +vigorous attack by Beaulieu and Colli. The republicans, long +exposed to hunger and privations, were now revelling in the fertile +plains of Piedmont. Large bands of marauders ranged the +neighbouring country, and the regiments were often reduced to mere +companies. From the grave risks of this situation Bonaparte was +rescued by the timidity of the Court of Turin, which signed the +armistice at Cherasco eighteen days after the commencement of the +campaign. A fortnight later the preliminaries of peace were signed +between France and the King of Sardinia, by which the latter +yielded up his provinces of Savoy and Nice, and renounced the +alliance with Austria. Great indignation was felt in the +Imperialist camp at this news; and it was freely stated that the +Piedmontese had let themselves be beaten in order to compass a +peace that had been tacitly agreed upon in the month of January.<a +name="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_44_44"><sup>[44]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Even before this auspicious event, Bonaparte's despatches to the +Directors were couched in almost imperious terms, which showed that +he felt himself the master of the situation. He advised them as to +their policy towards Sardinia, pointing out that, as Victor Amadeus +had yielded up three important fortresses, he was practically in +the hands of the French: "If you do not accept peace with him, if +your plan is to dethrone him, you must amuse him for a few +decades<a name="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_45_45"><sup>[45]</sup></a> and must warn me: I then +seize Valenza and march on Turin." In military affairs the young +general showed that he would brook no interference from Paris. He +requested the Directory to draft 15,000 men from Kellermann's<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i90" id="page_i90">[pg.90]</a></span> +Army of the Alps to reinforce him: "That will give me an army of +45,000 men, of which possibly I may send a part to Rome. If you +continue your confidence and approve these plans, I am sure of +success: Italy is yours." Somewhat later, the Directors proposed to +grant the required reinforcements, but stipulated for the retention +of part of the army in the Milanese <i>under the command of +Kellermann</i>. Thereupon Bonaparte replied (May 14th) that, as the +Austrians had been reinforced, it was highly impolitic to divide +the command. Each general had his own way of making war. +Kellermann, having more experience, would doubtless do it better: +but both together would do it very badly.</p> + +<p>Again the Directors had blundered. In seeking to subject +Bonaparte to the same rules as had been imposed on all French +generals since the treason of Dumouriez in 1793, they were +doubtless consulting the vital interests of the Commonwealth. But, +while striving to avert all possibilities of Cæsarism, they +now sinned against that elementary principle of strategy which +requires unity of design in military operations. Bonaparte's retort +was unanswerable, and nothing more was heard of the luckless +proposal.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the peace with the House of Savoy had thrown open the +Milanese to Bonaparte's attack. Holding three Sardinian fortresses, +he had an excellent base of operations; for the lands restored to +the King of Sardinia were to remain subject to requisitions for the +French army until the general peace. The Austrians, on the other +hand, were weakened by the hostility of their Italian subjects, +and, worst of all, they depended ultimately on reinforcements drawn +from beyond the Alps by way of Mantua. In the rich plains of +Lombardy they, however, had one advantage which was denied to them +among the rocks of the Apennines. Their generals could display the +tactical skill on which they prided themselves, and their splendid +cavalry had some chance of emulating the former exploits of the +Hungarian and Croatian horse. They therefore awaited the onset of +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i91" id= +"page_i91">[pg.91]</a></span> the French, little dismayed by recent +disasters, and animated by the belief that their antagonist, +unversed in regular warfare, would at once lose in the plains the +bubble reputation gained in ravines. But the country in the second +part of this campaign was not less favourable to Bonaparte's +peculiar gifts than that in which he had won his first laurels as +commander. Amidst the Apennines, where only small bodies of men +could be moved, a general inexperienced in the handling of cavalry +and infantry could make his first essays in tactics with fair +chances of success. Speed, energy, and the prompt seizure of a +commanding central position were the prime requisites; the handling +of vast masses of men was impossible. The plains of Lombardy +facilitated larger movements; but even here the numerous broad +swift streams fed by the Alpine snows, and the network of +irrigating dykes, favoured the designs of a young and daring leader +who saw how to use natural obstacles so as to baffle and ensnare +his foes. Bonaparte was now to show that he excelled his enemies, +not only in quickness of eye and vigour of intellect, but also in +the minutiæ of tactics and in those larger strategic +conceptions which decide the fate of nations. In the first place, +having the superiority of force, he was able to attack. This is an +advantage at all times: for the aggressor can generally mislead his +adversary by a series of feints until the real blow can be +delivered with crushing effect. Such has been the aim of all great +leaders from the time of Epaminondas and Alexander, Hannibal and +Cæsar, down to the age of Luxembourg, Marlborough, and +Frederick the Great. Aggressive tactics were particularly suited to +the French soldiery, always eager, active, and intelligent, and now +endowed with boundless enthusiasm in their cause and in their +leader.</p> + +<p>Then again he was fully aware of the inherent vice of the +Austrian situation. It was as if an unwieldy organism stretched a +vulnerable limb across the huge barrier of the Alps, exposing it to +the attack of a <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i92" id= +"page_i92">[pg.92]</a></span> compacter body. It only remained for +Bonaparte to turn against his foes the smaller geographical +features on which they too implicitly relied. Beaulieu had retired +beyond the Po and the Ticino, expecting that the attack on the +Milanese would be delivered across the latter stream by the +ordinary route, which crossed it at Pavia. Near that city the +Austrians occupied a strong position with 26,000 men, while other +detachments patrolled the banks of the Ticino further north, and +those of the Po towards Valenza, only 5,000 men being sent towards +Piacenza. Bonaparte, however, was not minded to take the ordinary +route. He determined to march, not as yet on the north of the River +Po, where snow-swollen streams coursed down from the Alps, but +rather on the south side, where the Apennines throw off fewer +streams and also of smaller volume. From the fortress of Tortona he +could make a rush at Piacenza, cross the Po there, and thus gain +the Milanese almost without a blow. To this end he had stipulated +in the recent terms of peace that he might cross the Po at Valenza; +and now, amusing his foes by feints on that side, he vigorously +pushed his main columns along the southern bank of the Po, where +they gathered up all the available boats. The vanguard, led by the +impetuous Lannes, seized the ferry at Piacenza, before the Austrian +horse appeared, and scattered a squadron or two which strove to +drive them back into the river (May 7th).</p> + +<p>Time was thus gained for a considerable number of French to +cross the river in boats or by the ferry. Working under the eye of +their leader, the French conquered all obstacles: a bridge of boats +soon spanned the stream, and was defended by a <i>tête de +pont</i>; and with forces about equal in number to Liptay's +Austrians, the republicans advanced northwards, and, after a tough +struggle, dislodged their foes from the village of Fombio. This +success drove a solid wedge between Liptay and his +commander-in-chief, who afterwards bitterly blamed him, first for +retreating, and secondly for not reporting his retreat to +headquarters. <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i93" id= +"page_i93">[pg.93]</a></span> It would appear, however, that Liptay +had only 5,000 men (not the 8,000 which Napoleon and French +historians have credited to him), that he was sent by Beaulieu to +Piacenza too late to prevent the crossing by the French, and that +at the close of the fight on the following day he was completely +cut off from communicating with his superior. Beaulieu, with his +main force, advanced on Fombio, stumbled on the French, where he +looked to find Liptay, and after a confused fight succeeded in +disengaging himself and withdrawing towards Lodi, where the +high-road leading to Mantua crossed the River Adda. To that stream +he directed his remaining forces to retire. He thereby left Milan +uncovered (except for the garrison which held the citadel), and +abandoned more than the half of Lombardy; but, from the military +point of view, his retreat to the Adda was thoroughly sound. Yet +here again a movement strategically correct was marred by tactical +blunders. Had he concentrated all his forces at the nearest point +of the Adda which the French could cross, namely Pizzighetone, he +would have rendered any flank march of theirs to the northward +extremely hazardous; but he had not yet sufficiently learned from +his terrible teacher the need of concentration; and, having at +least three passages to guard, he kept his forces too spread out to +oppose a vigorous move against any one of them. Indeed, he +despaired of holding the line of the Adda, and retired eastwards +with a great part of his army.</p> + +<p>Consequently, when Bonaparte, only three days after the seizure +of Piacenza, threw his almost undivided force against the town of +Lodi, his passage was disputed only by the rearguard, whose anxiety +to cover the retreat of a belated detachment far exceeded their +determination to defend the bridge over the Adda. This was a narrow +structure, some eighty fathoms long, standing high above the swift +but shallow river. Resolutely held by well-massed troops and +cannon, it might have cost the French a severe struggle: but the +Imperialists were badly handled: some were posted in and around the +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i94" id= +"page_i94">[pg.94]</a></span> town which was between the river and +the advancing French; and the weak walls of Lodi were soon +escaladed by the impetuous republicans. The Austrian commander, +Sebottendorf, now hastily ranged his men along the eastern bank of +the river, so as to defend the bridge and prevent any passage of +the river by boats or by a ford above the town. The Imperialists +numbered only 9,627 men; they were discouraged by defeats and by +the consciousness that no serious stand could be attempted before +they reached the neighbourhood of Mantua; and their efforts to +break down the bridge were now frustrated by the French, who, +posted behind the walls of Lodi on the higher bank of the stream, +swept their opponents' position with a searching artillery fire. +Having shaken the constancy of his foes and refreshed his own +infantry by a brief rest in Lodi, Bonaparte at 6 p.m. secretly +formed a column of his choicest troops and hurled it against the +bridge. A hot fire of grapeshot and musketry tore its front, and +for a time the column bent before the iron hail. But, encouraged by +the words of their young leader, generals, corporals, and +grenadiers pressed home their charge. This time, aided by +sharp-shooters who waded to islets in the river, the assailants +cleared the bridge, bayoneted the Austrian cannoneers, attacked the +first and second lines of supporting foot, and, when reinforced, +compelled horse and foot to retreat towards Mantua.<a name= +"FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_46_46"><sup>[46]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Such was the affair of Lodi (May 10th). A legendary<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i95" id="page_i95">[pg.95]</a></span> +glamour hovers around all the details of this conflict and invests +it with fictitious importance. Beaulieu's main force was far away, +and there was no hope of entrapping anything more than the rear of +his army. Moreover, if this were the object, why was not the flank +move of the French cavalry above Lodi pushed home earlier in the +fight? This, if supported by infantry, could have outflanked the +enemy while the perilous rush was made against the bridge; and such +a turning movement would probably have enveloped the Austrian force +while it was being shattered in front. That is the view in which +the strategist, Clausewitz, regards this encounter. Far different +was the impression which it created among the soldiers and +Frenchmen at large. They valued a commander more for bravery of the +bull-dog type than for any powers of reasoning and subtle +combination. These, it is true, Bonaparte had already shown. He now +enchanted the soldiery by dealing a straight sharp blow. It had a +magical effect on their minds. On the evening of that day the +French soldiers, with antique republican <i>camaraderie</i>, +saluted their commander as <i>le petit caporal</i> for his personal +bravery in the fray, and this endearing phrase helped to +immortalize the affair of the bridge of Lodi.<a name= +"FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47"><sup>[47]</sup></a> +It shot a thrill of exultation through France. With pardonable +exaggeration, men told how he charged at the head of the column, +and, with Lannes, was the first to reach the opposite side; and +later generations have figured him charging before his tall +grenadiers—a feat that was actually performed by Lannes, +Berthier, Masséna, Cervoni, and Dallemagne. It was all one. +Bonaparte alone was the hero of the day. He reigned supreme in the +hearts of the soldiers, and he saw the importance of this conquest. +At St. Helena he confessed to Montholon that it was the victory of +Lodi which fanned his ambition into a steady flame.</p> + +<p>A desire of stimulating popular enthusiasm throughout Italy +impelled the young victor to turn away from his real objective, the +fortress of Mantua, to the political<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i96" id="page_i96">[pg.96]</a></span> capital of Lombardy. +The people of Milan hailed their French liberators with enthusiasm: +they rained flowers on the bronzed soldiers of liberty, and pointed +to their tattered uniforms and worn-out shoes as proofs of their +triumphant energy: above all, they gazed with admiration, not +unmixed with awe, at the thin pale features of the young commander, +whose plain attire bespoke a Spartan activity, whose ardent gaze +and decisive gestures proclaimed a born leader of men. Forthwith he +arranged for the investment of the citadel where eighteen hundred +Austrians held out: he then received the chief men of the city with +easy Italian grace; and in the evening he gave a sumptuous ball, at +which all the dignity, wealth, and beauty of the old Lombard +capital shone resplendent. For a brief space all went well between +the Lombards and their liberators. He received with flattering +distinction the chief artists and men of letters, and also sought +to quicken the activity of the University of Pavia. Political clubs +and newspapers multiplied throughout Lombardy; and actors, authors, +and editors joined in a pæan of courtly or fawning praise, to +the new Scipio, Cæsar, Hannibal, and Jupiter.</p> + +<p>There were other reasons why the Lombards should worship the +young victor. Apart from the admiration which a gifted race ever +feels for so fascinating a combination of youthful grace with +intellectual power and martial prowess, they believed that this +Italian hero would call the people to political activity, perchance +even to national independence. For this their most ardent spirits +had sighed, conspired, or fought during the eighty-three years of +the Austrian occupation. Ever since the troublous times of Dante +there had been prophetic souls who caught the vision of a new +Italy, healed of her countless schisms, purified from her social +degradations, and uniting the prowess of her ancient life with the +gentler arts of the present for the perfection of her own powers +and for the welfare of mankind. The gleam of this vision had shone +forth even amidst the thunder claps of the French Revolution; and +now that the storm <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i97" id= +"page_i97">[pg.97]</a></span> had burst over the plains of +Lombardy, ecstatic youths seemed to see the vision embodied in the +person of Bonaparte himself. At the first news of the success at +Lodi the national colours were donned as cockades, or waved +defiance from balconies and steeples to the Austrian garrisons. All +truly Italian hearts believed that the French victories heralded +the dawn of political freedom not only for Lombardy, but for the +whole peninsula.</p> + +<p>Bonaparte's first actions increased these hopes. He abolished +the Austrian machinery of government, excepting the Council of +State, and approved the formation of provisional municipal councils +and of a National Guard. At the same time, he wrote guardedly to +the Directors at Paris, asking whether they proposed to organize +Lombardy as a republic, as it was much more ripe for this form of +government than Piedmont. Further than this he could not go; but at +a later date he did much to redeem his first promises to the people +of Northern Italy.</p> + +<p>The fair prospect was soon overclouded by the financial measures +urged on the young commander from Paris, measures which were +disastrous to the Lombards and degrading to the liberators +themselves. The Directors had recently bidden him to press hard on +the Milanese, and levy large contributions in money, provisions, +and objects of art, seeing that they did not intend to keep this +country.[48] Bonaparte accordingly issued a proclamation (May +19th), imposing on Lombardy the sum of twenty million francs, +remarking that it was a very light sum for so fertile a country. +Only two days before he had in a letter to the Directors described +it as exhausted by five years of war. As for the assertion that the +army needed this sum, it may be compared with his private +notification to the Directory, three days after his proclamation, +that they might speedily count on six to eight millions of the +Lombard contribution, as lying<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i98" id="page_i98">[pg.98]</a></span> ready at their +disposal, "it being over and above what the army requires." This is +the first definite suggestion by Bonaparte of that system of +bleeding conquered lands for the benefit of the French Exchequer, +which enabled him speedily to gain power over the Directors. +Thenceforth they began to connive at his diplomatic irregularities, +and even to urge on his expeditions into wealthy districts, +provided that the spoils went to Paris; while the conqueror, on his +part, was able tacitly to assume that tone of authority with which +the briber treats the bribed.<a name="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_49_49"><sup>[49]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The exaction of this large sum, and of various requisites for +the army, as well as the "extraction" of works of art for the +benefit of French museums, at once aroused the bitterest feelings. +The loss of priceless treasures, such as the manuscript of Virgil +which had belonged to Petrarch, and the masterpieces of Raphael and +Leonardo da Vinci, might perhaps have been borne: it concerned only +the cultured few, and their effervescence was soon quelled by +patrols of French cavalry. Far different was it with the peasants +between Milan and Pavia. Drained by the white-coats, they now +refused to be bled for the benefit of the blue-coats of France. +They rushed to arms. The city of Pavia defied the attack of a +French column until cannon battered in its gates. Then the +republicans rushed in, massacred all the armed men for some hours, +and glutted their lust and rapacity. By order of Bonaparte, the +members of the municipal council were condemned to execution; but a +delay occurred before this ferocious order was carried out, and it +was subsequently mitigated. Two hundred hostages were, however, +sent away into France as a guarantee for the good behaviour of the +unfortunate city: whereupon the chief announced to the Directory +that this would serve as a useful lesson to the peoples of +Italy.</p> + +<p>In one sense this was correct. It gave the Italians a true +insight into French methods; and painful emotions thrilled the +peoples of the peninsula when they realized<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i99" id="page_i99">[pg.99]</a></span> at what a price +their liberation was to be effected. Yet it is unfair to lay the +chief blame on Bonaparte for the pillage of Lombardy. His actions +were only a development of existing revolutionary customs; but +never had these demoralizing measures been so thoroughly enforced +as in the present system of liberation and blackmail. Lombardy was +ransacked with an almost Vandal rapacity. Bonaparte desired little +for himself. His aim ever was power rather than wealth. Riches he +valued only as a means to political supremacy. But he took care to +place the Directors and all his influential officers deeply in his +debt. To the five <i>soi-disant</i> rulers of France he sent one +hundred horses, the finest that could be found in Lombardy, to +replace "the poor creatures which now draw your carriages";<a name= +"FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50"><sup>[50]</sup></a> +to his officers his indulgence was passive, but usually effective. +Marmont states that Bonaparte once reproached him for his +scrupulousness in returning the whole of a certain sum which he had +been commissioned to recover. "At that time," says Marmont, "we +still retained a flower of delicacy on these subjects." This Alpine +gentian was soon to fade in the heats of the plains. Some generals +made large fortunes, eminently so Masséna, first in plunder +as in the fray. And yet the commander, who was so lenient to his +generals, filled his letters to the Directory with complaints about +the cloud of French commissioners, dealers, and other civilian +harpies who battened on the spoil of Lombardy. It seems impossible +to avoid the conclusion that this indulgence towards the soldiers +and severity towards civilians was the result of a fixed +determination to link indissolubly to his fortunes the generals and +rank and file. The contrast in his behaviour was often startling. +Some of the civilians he imprisoned: others he desired to shoot; +but as the hardiest robbers had generally made to themselves +friends of the military mammon of unrighteousness, they escaped +with a fine ridiculously out of proportion to their actual gains.<a +name="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_51_51"><sup>[51]</sup></a> <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i100" id="page_i100">[pg.100]</a></span></p> + +<p>The Dukes of Parma and Modena were also mulcted. The former of +these, owing to his relationship with the Spanish Bourbons, with +whom the Directory desired to remain on friendly terms, was +subjected to the fine of merely two million francs and twenty +masterpieces of art, these last to be selected by French +commissioners from the galleries of the duchy; but the Duke of +Modena, who had assisted the Austrian arms, purchased his pardon by +an indemnity of ten million francs, and by the cession of twenty +pictures, the chief artistic treasures of his States.<a name= +"FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52"><sup>[52]</sup></a> +As Bonaparte naïvely stated to the Directors, the duke had no +fortresses or guns; consequently these could not be demanded from +him.</p> + +<p>From this degrading work Bonaparte strove to wean his soldiers +by recalling them to their nobler work of carrying on the +enfranchisement of Italy. In a proclamation (May 20th) which even +now stirs the blood like a trumpet call, he bade his soldiers +remember that, though much had been done, a far greater task yet +awaited them. Posterity must not reproach them for having found +their Capua in Lombardy. Rome was to be freed: the Eternal City was +to renew her youth and show again the virtues of her ancient +worthies, Brutus and Scipio. Then France would give a glorious +peace to Europe; then their fellow-citizens would say of each +champion of liberty as he returned to his hearth: "He was of the +Army of Italy." By such stirring words did he entwine with the love +of liberty that passion for military glory which was destined to +strangle the Republic.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the Austrians had retired behind the banks of the +Mincio and the walls of its guardian fortress, Mantua. Their +position was one of great strength. The river, which carries off +the surplus waters of Lake Garda, joins the River Po after a course +of some thirty miles. Along with the tongue-like cavity occupied by +its parent lake, the river forms the chief inner barrier to all +invaders of Italy. From the earliest times down to those<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i101" id= +"page_i101">[pg.101]</a></span> of the two Napoleons, the banks of +the Mincio have witnessed many of the contests which have decided +the fortunes of the peninsula. On its lower course, where the river +widens out into a semicircular lagoon flanked by marshes and +backwaters, is the historic town of Mantua. For this position, if +we may trust the picturesque lines of Mantua's noblest son,<a name= +"FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53"><sup>[53]</sup></a> +the three earliest races of Northern Italy had striven; and when +the power of imperial Rome was waning, the fierce Attila pitched +his camp on the banks of the Mincio, and there received the pontiff +Leo, whose prayers and dignity averted the threatening torrent of +the Scythian horse.</p> + +<p>It was by this stream, famed in war as in song, that the +Imperialists now halted their shattered forces, awaiting +reinforcements from Tyrol. These would pass down the valley of the +Adige, and in the last part of their march would cross the lands of +the Venetian Republic. For this action there was a long-established +right of way, which did not involve a breach of the neutrality of +Venice. But, as some of the Austrian troops had straggled on to the +Venetian territory south of Brescia, the French commander had no +hesitation in openly violating Venetian neutrality by the +occupation of that town (May 26th). Augereau's division was also +ordered to push on towards the west shore of Lake Garda, and there +collect boats as if a crossing were intended. Seeing this, the +Austrians seized the small Venetian fortress of Peschiera, which +commands the exit of the Mincio from the lake, and Venetian +neutrality was thenceforth wholly disregarded.</p> + +<p>By adroit moves on the borders of the lake, Bonaparte now sought +to make Beaulieu nervous about his communications with Tyrol +through the river valley of the Adige; he completely succeeded: +seeking to guard the important positions on that river between +Rivoli and Roveredo, Beaulieu so weakened his forces on the Mincio, +that at Borghetto and Valeggio he had only two battalions and ten +squadrons of horse, or about two thousand<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i102" id="page_i102">[pg.102]</a></span> men. Lannes' +grenadiers, therefore, had little difficulty in forcing a passage +on May 30th, whereupon Beaulieu withdrew to the upper Adige, highly +satisfied with himself for having victualled the fortress of Mantua +so that it could withstand a long siege. This was, practically, his +sole achievement in the campaign. Outnumbered, outgeneralled, +bankrupt in health as in reputation, he soon resigned his command, +but not before he had given signs of "downright dotage."<a name= +"FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_54"><sup>[54]</sup></a> +He had, however, achieved immortality: his incapacity threw into +brilliant relief the genius of his young antagonist, and therefore +appreciably affected the fortunes of Italy and of Europe.</p> + +<p>Bonaparte now despatched Masséna's division northwards, +to coop up the Austrians in the narrow valley of the upper Adige, +while other regiments began to close in on Mantua. The +peculiarities of the ground favoured its investment. The +semicircular lagoon which guards Mantua on the north, and the +marshes on the south side, render an assault very difficult; but +they also limit the range of ground over which sorties can be made, +thereby lightening the work of the besiegers; and during part of +the blockade Napoleon left fewer than five thousand men for this +purpose. It was clear, however, that the reduction of Mantua would +be a tedious undertaking, such as Bonaparte's daring and +enterprising genius could ill brook, and that his cherished design +of marching northwards to effect a junction with Moreau on the +Danube was impossible. Having only 40,400 men with him at +midsummer, he had barely enough to hold the line of the Adige, to +blockade Mantua, and to keep open his communications with +France.</p> + +<p>At the command of the Directory he turned southward against +feebler foes. The relations between the Papal States and the French +Republic had been hostile since the assassination of the French +envoy, Basseville, at Rome, in the early days of 1793; but the +Pope, Pius VI., had confined himself to anathemas against the +revolutionists and prayers for the success of the First +Coalition.</p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i103" id= +"page_i103">[pg.103]</a></span> This conduct now drew upon him a +sharp blow. French troops crossed the Po and seized Bologna, +whereupon the terrified cardinals signed an armistice with the +republican commander, agreeing to close all their States to the +English, and to admit a French garrison to the port of Ancona. The +Pope also consented to yield up "one hundred pictures, busts, +vases, or statues, as the French Commissioners shall determine, +among which shall especially be included the bronze bust of Junius +Brutus and the marble bust of Marcus Brutus, together with five +hundred manuscripts." He was also constrained to pay 15,500,000 +francs, besides animals and goods such as the French agents should +requisition for their army, exclusive of the money and materials +drawn from the districts of Bologna and Ferrara. The grand total, +in money, and in kind, raised from the Papal States in this +profitable raid, was reckoned by Bonaparte himself as 34,700,000 +francs,<a name="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_55_55"><sup>[55]</sup></a> or about; +£1,400,000—a liberal assessment for the life of a +single envoy and the <i>bruta fulmina</i> of the Vatican.</p> + +<p>Equally lucrative was a dash into Tuscany. As the Grand Duke of +this fertile land had allowed English cruisers and merchants +certain privileges at Leghorn, this was taken as a departure from +the neutrality which he ostensibly maintained since the signature +of a treaty of peace with France in 1795. A column of the +republicans now swiftly approached Leghorn and seized much valuable +property from British merchants. Yet the invaders failed to secure +the richest of the hoped-for plunder; for about forty English +merchantmen sheered off from shore as the troops neared the +seaport, and an English frigate, swooping down, carried off two +French vessels almost under the eyes of Bonaparte himself. This +last outrage gave, it is true, a slight excuse for the levying of +requisitions in Leghorn and its environs; yet, according to the +memoir-writer, Miot de Melito, this unprincipled action must be +attributed not to Bonaparte, but to the urgent needs of the French +treasury and the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i104" id= +"page_i104">[pg.104]</a></span> personal greed of some of the +Directors. Possibly also the French commissioners and agents, who +levied blackmail or selected pictures, may have had some share in +the shaping of the Directorial policy: at least, it is certain that +some of them, notably Salicetti, amassed a large fortune from the +plunder of Leghorn. In order to calm the resentment of the Grand +Duke, Bonaparte paid a brief visit to Florence. He was received in +respectful silence as he rode through the streets where his +ancestors had schemed for the Ghibelline cause. By a deft mingling +of courtesy and firmness the new conqueror imposed his will on the +Government of Florence, and then sped northward to press on the +siege of Mantua. <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i105" id= +"page_i105">[pg.105]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER VI</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE FIGHTS FOR MANTUA</center> + +<br> + + +<p>The circumstances which recalled Bonaparte to the banks of the +Mincio were indeed serious. The Emperor Francis was determined at +all costs to retain his hold on Italy by raising the siege of that +fortress; and unless the French commander could speedily compass +its fall, he had the prospect of fighting a greatly superior army +while his rear was threatened by the garrison of Mantua. Austria +was making unparalleled efforts to drive this presumptuous young +general from a land which she regarded as her own political +preserve. Military historians have always been puzzled to account +for her persistent efforts in 1796-7 to re-conquer Lombardy. But, +in truth, the reasons are diplomatic, not military, and need not be +detailed here. Suffice it to say that, though the Hapsburg lands in +Swabia were threatened by Moreau's Army of the Rhine, Francis +determined at all costs to recover his Italian possessions.</p> + +<p>To this end the Emperor now replaced the luckless Beaulieu by +General Würmser, who had gained some reputation in the Rhenish +campaigns; and, detaching 25,000 men from his northern armies to +strengthen his army on the Adige, he bade him carry the +double-headed eagle of Austria victoriously into the plains of +Italy. Though too late to relieve the citadel of Milan, he was to +strain every nerve to relieve Mantua; and, since the latest reports +represented the French as widely dispersed for the plunder of +Central Italy, the Emperor indulged the highest hopes of +Würmser's success.<a name="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_56_56"><sup>[56]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i106" id="page_i106">[pg.106]</a></span> Possibly this might +have been attained had the Austrian Emperor and staff understood +the absolute need of concentration in attacking a commander who had +already demonstrated its supreme importance in warfare. Yet the +difficulties of marching an army of 47,000 men through the narrow +defile carved by the Adige through the Tyrolese Alps, and the wide +extent of the French covering lines, led to the adoption of a plan +which favoured rapidity at the expense of security. Würmser +was to divide his forces for the difficult march southward from +Tyrol into Italy. In defence of this arrangement much could be +urged. To have cumbered the two roads, which run on either side of +the Adige from Trient towards Mantua, with infantry, cavalry, +artillery, and the countless camp-followers, animals, and wagons +that follow an army, would have been fatal alike to speed of +marching and to success in mountain warfare. Even in the campaign +of 1866 the greatest commander of this generation carried out his +maxim, "March in separate columns: unite for fighting." But +Würmser and the Aulic Council<a name="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a +href="#Footnote_57_57"><sup>[57]</sup></a> at Vienna neglected to +insure that reunion for attack, on which von Moltke laid such +stress in his Bohemian campaign. The Austrian forces in 1796 were +divided by obstacles which could not quickly be crossed, namely, by +Lake Garda and the lofty mountains which tower above the valley of +the Adige. Assuredly the Imperialists were not nearly strong enough +to run any risks. The official Austrian returns show that the total +force assembled in Tyrol for the invasion of Italy amounted to +46,937 men, not to the 60,000 as pictured by the imagination of +Thiers and other French historians. As Bonaparte had in +Lombardy-Venetia fully 45,000 men (including 10,000 now<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i107" id="page_i107">[pg.107]</a></span> +engaged in the siege of Mantua), scattered along a front of fifty +miles from Milan to Brescia and Legnago, the incursion of +Würmser's force, if the French were held to their separate +positions by diversions against their flanks, must have proved +decisive. But the fault was committed of so far dividing the +Austrians that nowhere could they deal a crushing blow. +Quosdanovich with 17,600 men was to take the western side of Lake +Garda, seize the French magazines at Brescia, and cut their +communications with Milan and France: the main body under +Würmser, 24,300 strong, was meanwhile to march in two columns +on either bank of the Adige, drive the French from Rivoli and push +on towards Mantua: and yet a third division, led by Davidovich from +the district of Friuli on the east, received orders to march on +Vicenza and Legnago, in order to distract the French from that +side, and possibly relieve Mantua if the other two onsets +failed.</p> + +<p>Faulty as these dispositions were, they yet seriously +disconcerted Bonaparte. He was at Montechiaro, a village situated +on the road between Brescia and Mantua, when, on July 29th, he +heard that the white-coats had driven in Masséna's vanguard +above Rivoli on the Adige, were menacing other positions near +Verona and Legnago, and were advancing on Brescia. As soon as the +full extent of the peril was manifest, he sent off ten despatches +to his generals, ordering a concentration of troops—these, of +course, fighting so as to delay the pursuit—towards the +southern end of Lake Garda. This wise step probably saved his +isolated forces from disaster. It was at that point that the +Austrians proposed to unite their two chief columns and crush the +French detachments. But, by drawing in the divisions of +Masséna and Augereau towards the Mincio, Bonaparte speedily +assembled a formidable array, and held the central position between +the eastern and western divisions of the Imperialists. He gave up +the important defensive line of the Adige, it is true; but by +promptly rallying on the Mincio, he occupied a base that was +defended on <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i108" id= +"page_i108">[pg.108]</a></span> the north by the small fortress of +Peschiera and the waters of Lake Garda. Holding the bridges over +the Mincio, he could strike at his assailants wherever they should +attack; above all, he still covered the siege of Mantua. Such were +his dispositions on July 29th and 30th. On the latter day he heard +of the loss of Brescia, and the consequent cutting of his +communications with Milan. Thereupon he promptly ordered +Sérurier, who was besieging Mantua, to make a last vigorous +effort to take that fortress, but also to assure his retreat +westwards if fortune failed him. Later in the day he ordered him +forthwith to send away his siege-train, throwing into the lake or +burying whatever he could not save from the advancing +Imperialists.</p> + +<p>This apparently desperate step, which seemed to forebode the +abandonment not only of the siege of Mantua, but of the whole of +Lombardy, was in reality a masterstroke. Bonaparte had perceived +the truth, which the campaigns of 1813 and 1870 were abundantly to +illustrate—that the possession of fortresses, and +consequently their siege by an invader, is of secondary importance +when compared with a decisive victory gained in the open. When +menaced by superior forces advancing towards the south of Lake +Garda, he saw that he must sacrifice his siege works, even his +siege-train, in order to gain for a few precious days that +superiority in the field which the division of the Imperialist +columns still left to him.</p> + +<p>The dates of these occurrences deserve close scrutiny; for they +suffice to refute some of the exorbitant claims made at a later +time by General Augereau, that only his immovable firmness forced +Bonaparte to fight and to change his dispositions of retreat into +an attack which re-established everything. This extraordinary +assertion, published by Augereau after he had deserted Napoleon in +1814, is accompanied by a detailed recital of the events of July +30th-August 5th, in which Bonaparte appears as the dazed and +discouraged commander, surrounded by pusillanimous generals, and +urged on to <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i109" id= +"page_i109">[pg.109]</a></span> fight solely by the confidence of +Augereau. That the forceful energy of this general had a great +influence in restoring the <i>morale</i> of the French army in the +confused and desperate movements which followed may freely be +granted. But his claims to have been the main spring of the French +movements in those anxious days deserve a brief examination. He +asserts that Bonaparte, "devoured by anxieties," met him at +Roverbella late in the evening of July 30th, and spoke of retiring +beyond the River Po. The official correspondence disproves this +assertion. Bonaparte had already given orders to Sérurier to +retire beyond the Po with his artillery train; but this was +obviously an attempt to save it from the advancing Austrians; and +the commander had ordered the northern part of the French besieging +force to join Augereau between Roverbella and Goito. Augereau +further asserts that, after he had roused Bonaparte to the need of +a dash to recover Brescia, the commander-in-chief remarked to +Berthier, "In that case we must raise the siege of Mantua," which +again he (Augereau) vigorously opposed. This second statement is +creditable neither to Augereau's accuracy nor to his sagacity. The +order for the raising of the siege had been issued, and it was +entirely necessary for the concentration of French troops, on which +Bonaparte now relied as his only hope against superior force. Had +Bonaparte listened to Augereau's advice and persisted still in +besieging Mantua, the scattered French forces must have been +crushed in detail. Augereau's words are those of a mere fighter, +not of a strategist; and the timidity which he ungenerously +attributed to Bonaparte was nothing but the caution which a +superior intellect saw to be a necessary prelude to a victorious +move.</p> + +<p>That the fighting honours of the ensuing days rightly belong to +Augereau may be frankly conceded. With forces augmented by the +northern part of the besiegers of Mantua, he moved rapidly +westwards from the Mincio against Brescia, and rescued it from the +vanguard of Quosdanovich (August 1st). On the previous day other +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i110" id= +"page_i110">[pg.110]</a></span> Austrian detachments had also, +after obstinate conflicts, been worsted near Salo and Lonato. +Still, the position was one of great perplexity: for though +Masséna's division from the Adige was now beginning to come +into touch with Bonaparte's chief force, yet the fronts of +Würmser's columns were menacing the French from that side, +while the troops of Quosdanovich, hovering about Lonato and Salo, +struggled desperately to stretch a guiding hand to their comrades +on the Mincio.</p> + +<p>Würmser was now discovering his error. Lured towards Mantua +by false reports that the French were still covering the siege, he +had marched due south when he ought to have rushed to the rescue of +his hard-pressed lieutenant at Brescia. Entering Mantua, he enjoyed +a brief spell of triumph, and sent to the Emperor Francis the news +of the capture of 40 French cannon in the trenches, and of 139 more +on the banks of the Po. But, while he was indulging the fond hope +that the French were in full retreat from Italy, came the startling +news that they had checked Quosdanovich at Brescia and Salo. +Realizing his errors, and determining to retrieve them before all +was lost, he at once pushed on his vanguard towards Castiglione, +and easily gained that village and its castle from a French +detachment commanded by General Valette.</p> + +<p>The feeble defence of so important a position threw Bonaparte +into one of those transports of fury which occasionally dethroned +his better judgment. Meeting Valette at Montechiaro, he promptly +degraded him to the ranks, refusing to listen to his plea of having +received a written order to retire. A report of General Landrieux +asserts that the rage of the commander-in-chief was so extreme as +for the time even to impair his determination. The outlook was +gloomy. The French seemed about to be hemmed in amidst the broken +country between Castiglione, Brescia, and Salo. A sudden attack on +the Austrians was obviously the only safe and honourable course. +But no one knew precisely their numbers or their position. +Uncertainty ever preyed on Bonaparte's <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i111" id="page_i111">[pg.111]</a></span> ardent +imagination. His was a mind that quailed not before visible +dangers; but, with all its powers of decisive action, it retained +so much of Corsican eeriness as to chafe at the unknown,<a name= +"FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_58"><sup>[58]</sup></a> +and to lose for the moment the faculty of forming a vigorous +resolution. Like the python, which grips its native rock by the +tail in order to gain its full constricting power, so Bonaparte +ever needed a groundwork of fact for the due exercise of his mental +force.</p> + +<p>One of a group of generals, whom he had assembled about him near +Montechiaro, proposed that they should ascend the hill which +dominated the plain. Even from its ridge no Austrians were to be +seen. Again the commander burst forth with petulant reproaches, and +even talked of retiring to the Adda. Whereupon, if we may trust the +"Memoirs" of General Landrieux, Augereau protested against retreat, +and promised success for a vigorous charge. "I wash my hands of it, +and I am going away," replied Bonaparte. "And who will command, if +you go?" inquired Augereau. "You," retorted Bonaparte, as he left +the astonished circle.</p> + +<p>However this may be, the first attack on Castiglione was +certainly left to this determined fighter; and the mingling of +boldness and guile which he showed on the following day regained +for the French not only the village, but also the castle, perched +on a precipitous rock. Yet the report of Colonel Graham, who was +then at Marshal Würmser's headquarters, somewhat dulls the +lustre of Augereau's exploit; for the British officer asserts that +the Austrian position had been taken up quite by haphazard, and +that fewer than 15,000 white-coats were engaged in this first +battle of Castiglione. Furthermore, the narratives of this +<i>mêlée</i> written by Augereau himself and by two +other generals, Landrieux and Verdier, who<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i112" id="page_i112">[pg.112]</a></span> were +disaffected towards Bonaparte, must naturally be received with much +reserve. The effect of Augereau's indomitable energy in restoring +confidence to the soldiers and victory to the French tricolour was, +however, generously admitted by the Emperor Napoleon; for, at a +later time when complaints were being made about Augereau, he +generously exclaimed: "Ah, let us not forget that he saved us at +Castiglione."<a name="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_59_59"><sup>[59]</sup></a></p> + +<p>While Augereau was recovering this important position, confused +conflicts were raging a few miles further north at Lonato. +Masséna at first was driven back by the onset of the +Imperialists; but while they were endeavouring to envelop the +French, Bonaparte arrived, and in conjunction with Masséna +pushed on a central attack such as often wrested victory from the +enemy. The white-coats retired in disorder, some towards Gavardo, +others towards the lake, hotly followed by the French. In the +pursuit towards Gavardo, Bonaparte's old friend, Junot, +distinguished himself by his dashing valour. He wounded a colonel, +slew six troopers, and, covered with wounds, was finally overthrown +into a ditch. Such is Bonaparte's own account. It is gratifying to +know that the wounds neither singly nor collectively were +dangerous, and did not long repress Junot's activity. A tinge of +romance seems, indeed, to have gilded many of these narratives; and +a critical examination of the whole story of Lonato seems to +suggest doubts whether the victory was as decisive as historians +have often represented. If the Austrians were "thrown back on Lake +Garda and Desenzano,"<a name="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_60_60"><sup>[60]</sup></a> it is difficult to see why +the pursuers did not drive them into the lake. As a matter of fact, +nearly all the beaten troops escaped to Gavardo, while others +joined their comrades engaged in the blockade of Peschiera.</p> + +<p>A strange incident serves to illustrate the hazards of<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i113" id= +"page_i113">[pg.113]</a></span> war and the confusion of this part +of the campaign. A detachment of the vanquished Austrian forces +some 4,000 strong, unable to join their comrades at Gavardo or +Peschiera, and yet unharmed by the victorious pursuers, wandered +about on the hills, and on the next day chanced near Lonato to come +upon a much smaller detachment of French. Though unaware of the +full extent of their good fortune, the Imperialists boldly sent an +envoy to summon the French commanding officer to surrender. When +the bandage was taken from his eyes, he was abashed to find himself +in the presence of Bonaparte, surrounded by the generals of his +staff. The young commander's eyes flashed fire at the seeming +insult, and in tones vibrating with well-simulated passion he +threatened the envoy with condign punishment for daring to give +such a message to the commander-in-chief at his headquarters in the +midst of his army. Let him and his men forthwith lay down their +arms. Dazed by the demand, and seeing only the victorious chief and +not the smallness of his detachment, 4,000 Austrians surrendered to +1,200 French, or rather to the address and audacity of one +master-mind.</p> + +<p>Elated by this augury of further victory, the republicans +prepared for the decisive blow. Würmser, though checked on +August 3rd, had been so far reinforced from Mantua as still to +indulge hopes of driving the French from Castiglione and cutting +his way through to rescue Quosdanovich. He was, indeed, in honour +bound to make the attempt; for the engagement had been made, with +the usual futility that dogged the Austrian councils, to reunite +their forces and <i>fight the French on the 7th of August</i>. +These cast-iron plans were now adhered to in spite of their +dislocation at the hands of Bonaparte and Augereau. Würmser's +line stretched from near the village of Médole in a +north-easterly direction across the high-road between Brescia and +Mantua; while his right wing was posted in the hilly country around +Solferino. In fact, his extreme right rested on the tower-crowned +heights of Solferino, where the forces of Austria two <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i114" id="page_i114">[pg.114]</a></span> +generations later maintained so desperate a defence against the +onset of Napoleon III. and his liberating army.</p> + +<p>Owing to the non-arrival of Mezaros' corps marching from +Legnago, Würmser mustered scarcely twenty-five thousand men on +his long line; while the very opportune approach of part of +Sérurier's division, under the lead of Fiorella, from the +south, gave the French an advantage even in numbers. Moreover, +Fiorella's advance on the south of Würmser's weaker flank, +that near Médole, threatened to turn it and endanger the +Austrian communications with Mantua. The Imperialists seem to have +been unaware of this danger; and their bad scouting here as +elsewhere was largely responsible for the issue of the day. +Würmser's desire to stretch a helping hand to Quosdanovich +near Lonato and his confidence in the strength of his own right +wing betrayed him into a fatal imprudence. Sending out feelers +after his hard-pressed colleague on the north, he dangerously +prolonged his line, an error in which he was deftly encouraged by +Bonaparte, who held back his own left wing. Meanwhile the French +were rolling in the other extremity of the Austrian line. Marmont, +dashing forward with the horse artillery, took the enemy's left +wing in flank and silenced many of their pieces. Under cover of +this attack, Fiorella's division was able to creep up within +striking distance; and the French cavalry, swooping round the rear +of this hard-pressed wing, nearly captured Würmser and his +staff. A vigorous counterattack by the Austrian reserves, or an +immediate wheeling round of the whole line, was needed to repulse +this brilliant flank attack; but the Austrian reserves had been +expended in the north of their line; and an attempt to change +front, always a difficult operation, was crushed by a headlong +charge of Masséna's and Augereau's divisions on their +centre. Before these attacks the whole Austrian line gave way; and, +according to Colonel Graham, nothing but this retreat, undertaken +"without orders," saved the whole force from being cut<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i115" id="page_i115">[pg.115]</a></span> +off. The criticisms of our officer sufficiently reveal the cause of +the disaster. The softness and incapacity of Würmser, the +absence of a responsible second in command, the ignorance of the +number and positions of the French, the determination to advance +towards Castiglione and to wait thereabouts for Quosdanovich until +a battle could be fought with combined forces on the 7th, the +taking up a position almost by haphazard on the +Castiglione-Médole line, and the failure to detect +Fiorella's approach, present a series of defects and blunders which +might have given away the victory to a third-rate opponent.<a name= +"FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_61_61"><sup>[61]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The battle was by no means sanguinary: it was a series of +manoeuvres rather than of prolonged conflicts. Hence its interest +to all who by preference dwell on the intellectual problems of +warfare rather than on the details of fighting. Bonaparte had +previously shown that he could deal blows with telling effect. The +ease and grace of his moves at the second battle of Castiglione now +redeemed the reputation which his uncertain behaviour on the four +preceding days had somewhat compromised.</p> + +<p>A complete and authentic account of this week of confused +fighting has never been written. The archives of Vienna have not as +yet yielded up all their secrets; and the reputations of so many +French officers were over-clouded by this prolonged +<i>mêlée</i> as to render even the victors' accounts +vague and inconsistent. The aim of historians everywhere to give a +clear and vivid account, and the desire of Napoleonic enthusiasts +to represent their hero as always thinking clearly and acting +decisively, have fused trusty ores and worthless slag into an alloy +which has passed for true metal. But no student of Napoleon's +"Correspondence," of the "Memoirs" of Marmont, and of the recitals +of Augereau, Dumas, Landrieux, Verdier, Despinois and others, can +hope wholly to unravel the complications arising from the almost +continuous conflicts that extended over a dozen leagues of hilly +country. War is not always dramatic, however much the readers<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i116" id= +"page_i116">[pg.116]</a></span> of campaigns may yearn after +thrilling narratives. In regard to this third act of the Italian +campaign, all that can safely be said is that Bonaparte's intuition +to raise the siege of Mantua, in order that he might defeat in +detail the relieving armies, bears the imprint of genius: but the +execution of this difficult movement was unequal, even at times +halting; and the French army was rescued from its difficulties only +by the grand fighting qualities of the rank and file, and by the +Austrian blunders, which outnumbered those of the republican +generals.</p> + +<p>Neither were the results of the Castiglione cycle of battles +quite so brilliant as have been represented. Würmser and +Quasdanovich lost in all 17,000 men, it is true: but the former had +re-garrisoned and re-victualled Mantua, besides capturing all the +French siege-train. Bonaparte's primary aim had been to reduce +Mantua, so that he might be free to sweep through Tyrol, join hands +with Moreau, and overpower the white-coats in Bavaria. The aim of +the Aulic Council and Würmser had been to relieve Mantua and +restore the Hapsburg rule over Lombardy. Neither side had +succeeded. But the Austrians could at least point to some +successes; and, above all, Mantua was in a better state of defence +than when the French first approached its walls: and while Mantua +was intact, Bonaparte was held to the valley of the Mincio, and +could not deal those lightning blows on the Inn and the Danube +which he ever regarded as the climax of the campaign. Viewed on its +material side, his position was no better than it was before +Würmser's incursion into the plains of Venetia.<a name= +"FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_62_62"><sup>[62]</sup></a></p> + +<p>With true Hapsburg tenacity, Francis determined on further +efforts for the relief of Mantua. Apart from the promptings of +dynastic pride, his reasons for thus<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i117" id="page_i117">[pg.117]</a></span> obstinately +struggling against Alpine gorges, Italian sentiment, and +Bonaparte's genius, are wellnigh inscrutable; and military writers +have generally condemned this waste of resources on the Brenta, +which, if hurled against the French on the Rhine, would have +compelled the withdrawal of Bonaparte from Italy for the defence of +Lorraine. But the pride of the Emperor Francis brooked no surrender +of his Italian possessions, and again Würmser was spurred on +from Vienna to another invasion of Venetia. It would be tedious to +give an account of Würmser's second attempt, which belongs +rather to the domain of political fatuity than that of military +history. Colonel Graham states that the Austrian rank and file +laughed at their generals, and bitterly complained that they were +being led to the shambles, while the officers almost openly +exclaimed: "We must make peace, for we don't know how to make war." +This was again apparent. Bonaparte forestalled their attack. Their +divided forces fell an easy prey to Masséna, who at Bassano +cut Würmser's force to pieces and sent the +<i>débris</i> flying down the valley of the Brenta. Losing +most of their artillery, and separated in two chief bands, the +Imperialists seemed doomed to surrender: but Würmser, doubling +on his pursuers, made a dash westwards, finally cutting his way to +Mantua. There again he vainly endeavoured to make a stand. He was +driven from his positions in front of St. Georges and La Favorita, +and was shut up in the town itself. This addition to the numbers of +the garrison was no increase to its strength; for the fortress, +though well provisioned for an ordinary garrison, could not support +a prolonged blockade, and the fevers of the early autumn soon began +to decimate troops worn out by forced marches and unable to endure +the miasma ascending from the marshes of the Mincio.</p> + +<p>The French also were wearied by their exertions in the fierce +heats of September. Murmurs were heard in the ranks and at the mess +tables that Bonaparte's reports of these exploits were tinged by +favouritism and by undue severity against those whose fortune had +been less <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i118" id= +"page_i118">[pg.118]</a></span> conspicuous than their merits. One +of these misunderstandings was of some importance. Masséna, +whose services had been brilliant at Bassano but less felicitous +since the crossing of the Adige, reproached Bonaparte for denying +praise to the most deserving and lavishing it on men who had come +in opportunely to reap the labours of others. His written protest, +urged with the old republican frankness, only served further to +cloud over the relations between them, which, since Lonato, had not +been cordial.<a name="FNanchor_63_63"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_63_63"><sup>[63]</sup></a> Even thus early in his career +Bonaparte gained the reputation of desiring brilliant and entire +success, and of visiting with his displeasure men who, from +whatever cause, did not wrest from Fortune her utmost favours. That +was his own mental attitude towards the fickle goddess. After +entering Milan he cynically remarked to Marmont: "Fortune is a +woman; and the more she does for me, the more I will require of +her." Suggestive words, which explain at once the splendour of his +rise and the rapidity of his fall.</p> + +<p>During the few weeks of comparative inaction which ensued, the +affairs of Italy claimed his attention. The prospect of an Austrian +re-conquest had caused no less concern to the friends of liberty in +the peninsula than joy to the reactionary coteries of the old +sovereigns. At Rome and Naples threats against the French were +whispered or openly vaunted. The signature of the treaties of peace +was delayed, and the fulminations of the Vatican were prepared +against the sacrilegious spoilers. After the Austrian war-cloud had +melted away, the time had come to punish prophets of evil. The Duke +of Modena was charged with allowing a convoy to pass from his State +to the garrison of Mantua, and with neglecting to pay the utterly +impossible fine to which Bonaparte had condemned him. The men of +Reggio and Modena were also encouraged to throw off his yoke and to +confide in the French. Those of Reggio succeeded; but in the city +of Modena itself the ducal troops repressed the rising. Bonaparte +accordingly asked the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i119" id= +"page_i119">[pg.119]</a></span> advice of the Directory; but his +resolution was already formed. Two days after seeking their +counsel, he took the decisive step of declaring Modena and Reggio +to be under the protection of France. This act formed an +exceedingly important departure in the history of France as well as +in that of Italy. Hitherto the Directory had succeeded in keeping +Bonaparte from active intervention in affairs of high policy. In +particular, it had enjoined on him the greatest prudence with +regard to the liberated lands of Italy, so as not to involve France +in prolonged intervention in the peninsula, or commit her to a war +<i>à outrance</i> with the Hapsburgs; and its warnings were +now urged with all the greater emphasis because news had recently +reached Paris of a serious disaster to the French arms in Germany. +But while the Directors counselled prudence, Bonaparte forced their +hand by declaring the Duchy of Modena to be under the protection of +France; and when their discreet missive reached him, he expressed +to them his regret that it had come too late. By that time (October +24th) he had virtually founded a new State, for whose security +French honour was deeply pledged. This implied the continuance of +the French occupation of Northern Italy and therefore a +prolongation of Bonaparte's command.</p> + +<p>It was not the Duchy of Modena alone which felt the invigorating +influence of democracy and nationality. The Papal cities of Bologna +and Ferrara had broken away from the Papal sway, and now sent +deputies to meet the champions of liberty at Modena and found a +free commonwealth. There amidst great enthusiasm was held the first +truly representative Italian assembly that had met for many +generations; and a levy of 2,800 volunteers, styled the Italian +legion, was decreed. Bonaparte visited these towns, stimulated +their energy, and bade the turbulent beware of his vengeance, which +would be like that of "the exterminating angel." In a brief space +these districts were formed into the Cispadane Republic, destined +soon to be merged into a yet larger creation. A new life breathed +from Modena and Bologna into <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i120" id="page_i120">[pg.120]</a></span> Central Italy. The +young republic forthwith abolished all feudal laws, decreed civic +equality, and ordered the convocation at Bologna of a popularly +elected Assembly for the Christmas following. These events mark the +first stage in the beginning of that grand movement, <i>Il +Risorgimento,</i> which after long delays was finally consummated +in 1870.</p> + +<p>This period of Bonaparte's career may well be lingered over by +those who value his invigorating influence on Italian life more +highly than his military triumphs. At this epoch he was still the +champion of the best principles of the Revolution; he had +overthrown Austrian domination in the peninsula, and had shaken to +their base domestic tyrannies worse than that of the Hapsburgs. His +triumphs were as yet untarnished. If we except the plundering of +the liberated and conquered lands, an act for which the Directory +was primarily responsible, nothing was at this time lacking to the +full orb of his glory. An envoy bore him the welcome news that the +English, wearied by the intractable Corsicans, had evacuated the +island of his birth; and he forthwith arranged for the return of +many of the exiles who had been faithful to the French Republic. +Among these was Salicetti, who now returned for a time to his old +insular sphere; while his former <i>protégé</i> was +winning a world-wide fame. Then, turning to the affairs of Central +Italy, the young commander showed his diplomatic talents to be not +a whit inferior to his genius for war. One instance of this must +here suffice. He besought the Pope, who had broken off the +lingering negotiations with France, not to bring on his people the +horrors of war.<a name="FNanchor_64_64"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_64_64"><sup>[64]</sup></a> The beauty of this appeal, as +also of a somewhat earlier appeal to the Emperor Francis at Vienna, +is, however, considerably marred by other items which now stand +revealed in Bonaparte's instructive correspondence. After hearing +of the French defeats in Germany, he knew that the Directors could +spare him very few of the 25,000 troops whom he demanded as +reinforcements.</p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i121" id= +"page_i121">[pg.121]</a></span> He was also aware that the Pope, +incensed at his recent losses in money and lands, was seeking to +revivify the First Coalition. The pacific precepts addressed by the +young Corsican to the Papacy must therefore be viewed in the light +of merely mundane events and of his secret advice to the French +agent at Rome: "The great thing is to gain time.... Finally, the +game really is for us to throw the ball from one to the other, so +as to deceive this old fox."<a name="FNanchor_65_65"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_65_65"><sup>[65]</sup></a></p> + +<p>From these diplomatic amenities the general was forced to turn +to the hazards of war. Gauging Bonaparte's missive at its true +worth, the Emperor determined to re-conquer Italy, an enterprise +that seemed well within his powers. In the month of October victory +had crowned the efforts of his troops in Germany. At Würzburg +the Archduke Charles had completely beaten Jourdan, and had thrown +both his army and that of Moreau back on the Rhine. Animated by +reviving hopes, the Imperialists now assembled some 60,000 strong. +Alvintzy, a veteran of sixty years, renowned for his bravery, but +possessing little strategic ability, was in command of some 35,000 +men in the district of Friuli, north of Trieste, covering that +seaport from a threatened French attack. With this large force he +was to advance due west, towards the River Brenta, while +Davidovich, marching through Tyrol by the valley of the Adige, was +to meet him with the remainder near Verona. As Jomini has observed, +the Austrians gave themselves infinite trouble and encountered +grave risks in order to compass a junction of forces which they +might quietly have effected at the outset. Despite all Bonaparte's +lessons, the Aulic Council still clung to its old plan of +enveloping the foe and seeking to bewilder them by attacks +delivered from different sides. Possibly also they were emboldened +by the comparative smallness of Bonaparte's numbers to repeat this +hazardous manoeuvre. <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i122" id= +"page_i122">[pg.122]</a></span> The French could muster little more +than 40,000 men; and of these at least 8,000 were needed opposite +Mantua.</p> + +<p>At first the Imperialists gained important successes; for though +the French held their own on the Brenta, yet their forces in the +Tyrol were driven down the valley of the Adige with losses so +considerable that Bonaparte was constrained to order a general +retreat on Verona. He discerned that from this central position he +could hold in check Alvintzy's troops marching westwards from +Vicenza and prevent their junction with the Imperialists under +Davidovich, who were striving to thrust Vaubois' division from the +plateau of Rivoli.</p> + +<p>But before offering battle to Alvintzy outside Verona, Bonaparte +paid a flying visit to his men posted on that plateau in order to +rebuke the wavering and animate the whole body with his own +dauntless spirit. Forming the troops around him, he addressed two +regiments in tones of grief and anger. He reproached them for +abandoning strong positions in a panic, and ordered his chief staff +officer to inscribe on their colours the ominous words: "They are +no longer of the Army of Italy."<a name="FNanchor_66_66"></a><a +href="#Footnote_66_66"><sup>[66]</sup></a> Stung by this reproach, +the men begged with sobs that the general would test their valour +before disgracing them for ever. The young commander, who must have +counted on such a result to his words, when uttered to French +soldiers, thereupon promised to listen to their appeals; and their +bravery in the ensuing fights wiped every stain of disgrace from +their colours. By such acts as these did he nerve his men against +superior numbers and adverse fortune.</p> + +<p>Their fortitude was to be severely tried at all points. Alvintzy +occupied a strong position on a line of hills at Caldiero, a few +miles to the east of Verona. His right wing was protected by the +spurs of the Tyrolese Alps, while his left was flanked by the +marshes which stretch between the rivers Alpon and Adige; and he +protected his front by cannon skilfully ranged along the hills. All +the bravery of Masséna's troops failed to dislodge the +right<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i123" id= +"page_i123">[pg.123]</a></span> wing of the Imperialists. The +French centre was torn by the Austrian cannon and musketry. A +pitiless storm of rain and sleet hindered the advance of the French +guns and unsteadied the aim of the gunners; and finally they +withdrew into Verona, leaving behind 2,000 killed and wounded, and +750 prisoners (November 12th). This defeat at Caldiero—for it +is idle to speak of it merely as a check—opened up a gloomy +vista of disasters for the French; and Bonaparte, though he +disguised his fears before his staff and the soldiery, forthwith +wrote to the Directors that the army felt itself abandoned at the +further end of Italy, and that this fair conquest seemed about to +be lost. With his usual device of under-rating his own forces and +exaggerating those of his foes, he stated that the French both at +Verona and Rivoli were only 18,000, while the grand total of the +Imperialists was upwards of 50,000. But he must have known that for +the present he had to deal with rather less than half that number. +The greater part of the Tyrolese force had not as yet descended the +Adige below Roveredo; and allowing for detachments and losses, +Alvintzy's array at Caldiero barely exceeded 20,000 effectives.</p> + +<p>Bonaparte now determined to hazard one of the most daring +turning movements which history records. It was necessary at all +costs to drive Alvintzy from the heights of Caldiero before the +Tyrolese columns should overpower Vaubois' detachment at Rivoli and +debouch in the plains west of Verona. But, as Caldiero could not be +taken by a front attack, it must be turned by a flanking movement. +To any other general than Bonaparte this would have appeared +hopeless; but where others saw nothing but difficulties, his eye +discerned a means of safety. South and south-east of those hills +lies a vast depression swamped by the flood waters of the Alpon and +the Adige. Morasses stretch for some miles west of the village of +Arcola, through which runs a road up the eastern bank of the Alpon, +crossing that stream at the aforenamed village and leading to the +banks of the Adige opposite the village of Ronco; another causeway, +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i124" id= +"page_i124">[pg.124]</a></span> diverging from the former a little +to the north of Ronco, leads in a north-westerly direction towards +Porcil. By advancing from Ronco along these causeways, and by +seizing Arcola, Bonaparte designed to outflank the Austrians and +tempt them into an arena where the personal prowess of the French +veterans would have ample scope, and where numbers would be of +secondary importance. Only heads of columns could come into direct +contact; and the formidable Austrian cavalry could not display its +usual prowess. On these facts Bonaparte counted as a set-off to his +slight inferiority in numbers.</p> + +<p>In the dead of night the divisions of Augereau and +Masséna retired through Verona. Officers and soldiers were +alike deeply discouraged by this movement, which seemed to presage +a retreat towards the Mincio and the abandonment of Lombardy. To +their surprise, when outside the gate they received the order to +turn to the left down the western bank of the Adige. At Ronco the +mystery was solved. A bridge of boats had there been thrown across +the Adige; and, crossing this without opposition, Augereau's troops +rapidly advanced along the causeway leading to Arcola and menaced +the Austrian rear, while Masséna's column denied north-west, +so as directly to threaten his flank at Caldiero. The surprise, +however, was by no means complete; for Alvintzy himself purposed to +cross the Adige at Zevio, so as to make a dash on Mantua, and in +order to protect his flank he had sent a detachment of Croats to +hold Arcola. These now stoutly disputed Augereau's progress, +pouring in from the loopholed cottages volleys which tore away the +front of every column of attack. In vain did Augereau, seizing the +colours, lead his foremost regiment to the bridge of Arcola. +Riddled by the musketry, his men fell back in disorder. In vain did +Bonaparte himself, dismounting from his charger, seize a flag, +rally these veterans and lead them towards the bridge. The Croats, +constantly reinforced, poured in so deadly a fire as to check the +advance: Muiron, Marmont, and a handful of gallant men still +pressed on, thereby screening the body <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i125" id="page_i125">[pg.125]</a></span> of their chief; +but Muiron fell dead, and another officer, seizing Bonaparte, +sought to drag him back from certain death. The column wavered +under the bullets, fell back to the further side of the causeway, +and in the confusion the commander fell into the deep dyke at the +side. Agonized at the sight, the French rallied, while Marmont and +Louis Bonaparte rescued their beloved chief from capture or from a +miry death, and he retired to Ronco, <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i126" id="page_i126">[pg.126]</a></span> soon followed by the +wearied troops.<a name="FNanchor_67_67"></a> <a href= +"#Footnote_67_67"><sup>[67]</sup></a></p> + +<center><a name="image_03"><img alt= +"PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE VICTORY OF ARCOLA" src="images/image03.jpg" +width="348" height="426"><br> +<font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>PLAN TO +ILLUSTRATE THE VICTORY OF ARCOLA</small></font></a></center> + +<p>This memorable first day of fighting at Arcola (November 15th) +closed on the strange scene of two armies encamped on dykes, +exhausted by an almost amphibious conflict, like that waged by the +Dutch "Beggars" in their war of liberation against Spain. Though at +Arcola the republicans had been severely checked, yet further west +Masséna had held his own; and the French movement as a whole +had compelled Alvintzy to suspend any advance on Verona or on +Mantua, to come down from the heights of Caldiero, and to fight on +ground where his superior numbers were of little avail. This was +seen on the second day of fighting on the dykes opposite Arcola, +which was, on the whole, favourable to the smaller veteran force. +On the third day Bonaparte employed a skilful ruse to add to the +discouragement of his foes. He posted a small body of horsemen +behind a spinney near the Austrian flank, with orders to sound +their trumpets as if for a great cavalry charge. Alarmed by the +noise and by the appearance of French troops from the side of +Legnago and behind Arcola, the demoralized white-coats suddenly +gave way and retreated for Vicenza.</p> + +<p>Victory again declared for the troops who could dare the +longest, and whose general was never at a loss in face of any +definite danger. Both armies suffered severely in these desperate +conflicts;<a name="FNanchor_68_68"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_68_68"><sup>[68]</sup></a> but, while the Austrians +felt<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i127" id= +"page_i127">[pg.127]</a></span> that the cup of victory had been +snatched from their very lips, the French soldiery were dazzled by +this transcendent exploit of their chief. They extolled his +bravery, which almost vied with the fabulous achievement of +Horatius Cocles, and adored the genius which saw safety and victory +for his discouraged army amidst swamps and dykes. Bonaparte +himself, with that strange mingling of the practical and the +superstitious which forms the charm of his character, ever +afterwards dated the dawn of his fortune in its full splendour from +those hours of supreme crisis among the morasses of Arcola. But we +may doubt whether this posing as the favourite of fortune was not +the result of his profound knowledge of the credulity of the vulgar +herd, which admires genius and worships bravery, but grovels before +persistent good luck.</p> + +<p>Though it is difficult to exaggerate the skill and bravery of +the French leader and his troops, the failure of his opponents is +inexplicable but for the fact that most of their troops were unable +to manoeuvre steadily in the open, that Alvintzy was inexperienced +as a commander-in-chief, and was hampered throughout by a bad plan +of campaign. Meanwhile the other Austrian army, led by Davidovich, +had driven Vaubois from his position at Rivoli; and had the +Imperialist generals kept one another informed of their moves, or +had Alvintzy, disregarding a blare of trumpets and a demonstration +on his flank and rear, clung to Arcola for two days +longer—the French would have been nipped between superior +forces. But, as it was, the lack of accord in the Austrian +movements nearly ruined the Tyrolese wing, which pushed on +triumphantly towards Verona, while Alvintzy was retreating +eastwards. Warned just in time, Davidovich hastily retreated to +Roveredo, leaving a whole battalion in the hands of the French. To +crown this chapter of blunders, Würmser, whose sortie after +Caldiero might have been most effective, tardily essayed to break +through the blockaders, when both his colleagues were in retreat. +How different were these ill-assorted moves<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i128" id="page_i128">[pg.128]</a></span> from those of +Bonaparte. His maxims throughout this campaign, and his whole +military career, were: (1) divide for foraging, concentrate for +fighting; (2) unity of command is essential for success; (3) time +is everything. This firm grasp of the essentials of modern warfare +insured his triumph over enemies who trusted to obsolete methods +for the defence of antiquated polities.<a name= +"FNanchor_69_69"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_69_69"><sup>[69]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The battle of Arcola had an important influence on the fate of +Italy and Europe. In the peninsula all the elements hostile to the +republicans were preparing for an explosion in their rear which +should reaffirm the old saying that Italy was the tomb of the +French. Naples had signed terms of peace with them, it is true; but +the natural animosity of the Vatican against its despoilers could +easily have leagued the south of Italy with the other States that +were working secretly for their expulsion. While the Austrians were +victoriously advancing, these aims were almost openly avowed, and +at the close of the year 1796 Bonaparte moved south to Bologna in +order to guide the Italian patriots in their deliberations and +menace the Pope with an invasion of the Roman States. From this the +Pontiff was for the present saved by new efforts on the part of +Austria. But before describing the final attempt of the Hapsburgs +to wrest Italy from their able adversary, it will be well to notice +his growing ascendancy in diplomatic affairs.</p> + +<p>While Bonaparte was struggling in the marshes of Arcola, the +Directory was on the point of sending to Vienna an envoy, General +Clarke, with proposals for an armistice preliminary to negotiations +for peace with Austria. This step was taken, because France was +distracted by open revolt in the south, by general discontent in +the west, and by the retreat of her Rhenish armies, now flung back +on the soil of the Republic by the Austrian Arch-duke Charles. +Unable to support large<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i129" +id="page_i129">[pg.129]</a></span> forces in the east of France out +of its bankrupt exchequer, the Directory desired to be informed of +the state of feeling at Vienna. It therefore sent Clarke with +offers, which might enable him to look into the political and +military situation at the enemy's capital, and see whether peace +could not be gained at the price of some of Bonaparte's conquests. +The envoy was an elegant and ambitious young man, descended from an +Irish family long settled in France, who had recently gained +Carnot's favour, and now desired to show his diplomatic skill by +subjecting Bonaparte to the present aims of the Directory.</p> + +<p>The Directors' secret instructions reveal the plans which they +then harboured for the reconstruction of the Continent. Having +arranged an armistice which should last up to the end of the next +spring, Clarke was to set forth arrangements which might suit the +House of Hapsburg. He might discuss the restitution of all their +possessions in Italy, and the acquisition of the Bishopric of +Salzburg and other smaller German and Swabian territories: or, if +she did not recover the Milanese, Austria might gain the northern +parts of the Papal States as compensation; and the Duke of +Tuscany—a Hapsburg—might reign at Rome, yielding up his +duchy to the Duke of Parma; while, as this last potentate was a +Spanish Bourbon, France might for her good offices to this House +gain largely from Spain in America.<a name="FNanchor_70_70"></a><a +href="#Footnote_70_70"><sup>[70]</sup></a> In these and other +proposals two methods of bargaining are everywhere prominent. The +great States are in every case to gain at the expense of their +weaker neighbours; Austria is to be appeased; and France is to reap +enormous gains ultimately at the expense of smaller Germanic or +Italian States. These facts should clearly be noted. Napoleon was +afterwards deservedly blamed for carrying out these unprincipled +methods; but, at the worst, he only developed them from those of +the Directors, who, with the cant of<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i130" id="page_i130">[pg.130]</a></span> Liberty, Equality, +and Fraternity on their lips, battened on the plunder of the +liberated lands, and cynically proposed to share the spoil of +weaker States with the potentates against whom they publicly +declaimed as tyrants.</p> + +<p>The chief aim of these negotiations, so Clarke was assured, was +to convince the Court of Vienna that it would get better terms by +treating with France directly and alone, rather than by joining in +the negotiations which had recently been opened at Paris by +England. But the Viennese Ministers refused to allow Clarke to +proceed to their capital, and appointed Vicenza as the seat of the +deliberations.</p> + +<p>They were brief. Through the complex web of civilian intrigue, +Bonaparte forthwith thrust the mailed hand of the warrior. He had +little difficulty in proving to Clarke that the situation was +materially altered by the battle of Arcola. The fall of Mantua was +now only a matter of weeks. To allow its provisions to be +replenished for the term of the armistice was an act that no +successful general could tolerate. For that fortress the whole +campaign had been waged, and three Austrian armies had been hurled +back into Tyrol and Friuli. Was it now to be provisioned, in order +that the Directory might barter away the Cispadane Republic? He +speedily convinced Clarke of the fatuity of the Directors' +proposals. He imbued him with his own contempt for an armistice +that would rob the victors of their prize; and, as the Court of +Vienna still indulged hopes of success in Italy, Clarke's +negotiations at Vicenza came to a speedy conclusion.</p> + +<p>In another important matter the Directory also completely +failed. Nervous as to Bonaparte's ambition, it had secretly ordered +Clarke to watch his conduct and report privately to Paris. Whether +warned by a friend at Court, or forearmed by his own sagacity, +Bonaparte knew of this, and in his intercourse with Clarke deftly +let the fact be seen. He quickly gauged Clarke's powers, and the +aim of his mission. "He is a spy," he remarked a little later to +Miot, "whom the Directory have set <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i131" id="page_i131">[pg.131]</a></span> upon me: he is a man +of no talent—only conceited." The splendour of his +achievements and the mingled grace and authority of his demeanour +so imposed on the envoy that he speedily fell under the influence +of the very man whom he was to watch, and became his enthusiastic +adherent.</p> + +<p>Bonaparte was at Bologna, supervising the affairs of the +Cispadane Republic, when he heard that the Austrians were making a +last effort for the relief of Mantua. Another plan had been drawn +up by the Aulic Council at Vienna. Alvintzy, after recruiting his +wearied force at Bassano, was quickly to join the Tyrolese column +at Roveredo, thereby forming an army of 28,000 men wherewith to +force the position of Rivoli and drive the French in on Mantua: +9,000 Imperialists under Provera were also to advance from the +Brenta upon Legnago, in order to withdraw the attention of the +French from the real attempt made by the valley of the Adige; while +10,000 others at Bassano and elsewhere were to assail the French +front at different points and hinder their concentration. It will +be observed that the errors of July and November, 1796, were now +yet a third time to be committed: the forces destined merely to +make diversions were so strengthened as not to be merely light +bodies distracting the aim of the French, while Alvintzy's main +force was thereby so weakened as to lack the impact necessary for +victory.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, the Imperialists at first threw back their foes +with some losses; and Bonaparte, hurrying northwards to Verona, was +for some hours in a fever of uncertainty as to the movements and +strength of the assailants. Late at night on January 13th he knew +that Provera's advance was little more than a demonstration, and +that the real blow would fall on the 10,000 men marshalled by +Joubert at Monte Baldo and Rivoli. Forthwith he rode to the latter +place, and changed retreat and discouragement into a vigorous +offensive by the news that 13,000 more men were on the march to +defend the strong position of Rivoli.<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i132" id="page_i132">[pg.132]</a></span></p> + +<p>The great defensive strength of this plateau had from the first +attracted his attention. There the Adige in a sharp bend westward +approaches within six miles of Lake Garda. There, too, the +mountains, which hem in the gorge of the river on its right bank, +bend away towards the lake and leave a vast natural amphitheatre, +near the centre of which rises the irregular plateau that commands +the exit from Tyrol. Over this plateau towers on the north Monte +Baldo, which, near the river gorge, sends out southward a sloping +ridge, known as San Marco, connecting it with the plateau. At the +foot of this spur is the summit of the road which leads the +traveller from Trent to Verona; and, as he halts at the top of the +zigzag, near the village of Rivoli, his eye sweeps over the winding +gorge of the river beneath, the threatening mass of Monte Baldo on +the north, and on the west of the village he gazes down on a +natural depression which has been sharply furrowed by a torrent. +The least experienced eye can see that the position is one of great +strength. It is a veritable parade ground among the mountains, +almost cut off from them by the ceaseless action of water, and +destined for the defence of the plains of Italy. A small force +posted at the head of the winding roadway can hold at bay an army +toiling up from the valley; but, as at Thermopylae, the position is +liable to be outflanked by an enterprising foe, who should scale +the footpath leading over the western offshoots of Monte Baldo, +and, fording the stream at its foot, should then advance eastwards +against the village. This, in part, was Alvintzy's plan, and having +nearly 28,000 men,<a name="FNanchor_71_71"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_71_71"><sup>[71]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i133" id="page_i133">[pg.133]</a></span> he doubted not that +his enveloping tactics must capture Joubert's division of 10,000 +men. So daunted was even this brave general by the superior force +of his foes that he had ordered a retreat southwards when an +aide-de-camp arrived at full gallop and ordered him to hold Rivoli +at all costs. Bonaparte's arrival at 4 a.m. explained the order, +and an attack made during the darkness wrested from the Austrians +the chapel on the San Marco ridge which stands on the ridge above +the zigzag track. The reflection of the Austrian watch-fires in the +wintry sky showed him their general position. To an unskilled +observer the wide sweep of the glare portended ruin for the French. +To the eye of Bonaparte the sight brought hope. It proved that his +foes were still bent on their old plan of enveloping him: and from +information which he treacherously received from Alvintzy's staff +he <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i134" id= +"page_i134">[pg.134]</a></span> must have known that that commander +had far fewer than the 45,000 men which he ascribed to him in +bulletins.</p> + +<center><a name="image_04"><img alt="THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF RIVOLI" +src="images/image04.jpg" width="351" height="319"><br> +<font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>THE +NEIGHBOURHOOD OF RIVOLI</small></font></a></center> + +<p>Yet the full dawn of that January day saw the Imperialists +flushed with success, as their six separate columns drove in the +French outposts and moved towards Rivoli. Of these, one was on the +eastern side of the Adige and merely cannonaded across the valley: +another column wound painfully with most of the artillery and +cavalry along the western bank, making for the village of Incanale +and the foot of the zigzag leading up to Rivoli: three others +denied over Monte Baldo by difficult paths impassable to cannon: +while the sixth and westernmost column, winding along the ridge +near Lake Garda, likewise lacked the power which field-guns and +horsemen would have added to its important turning movement. Never +have natural obstacles told more potently on the fortunes of war +than at Rivoli; for on the side where the assailants most needed +horses and guns they could not be used; while on the eastern edge +of their broken front their cannon and horse, crowded together in +the valley of the Adige, had to climb the winding road under the +plunging fire of the French infantry and artillery. Nevertheless, +such was the ardour of the Austrian attack, that the tide of battle +at first set strongly in their favour. Driving the French from the +San Marco ridge and pressing their centre hard between Monte Baldo +and Rivoli, they made it possible for their troops in the valley to +struggle on towards the foot of the zigzag; and on the west their +distant right wing was already beginning to threaten the French +rear. Despite the arrival of Masséna's troops from Verona +about 9 a.m., the republicans showed signs of unsteadiness. Joubert +on the ground above the Adige, Berthier in the centre, and +Masséna on the left, were gradually forced back. An Austrian +column, advancing from the side of Monte Baldo by the narrow +ravine, stole round the flank of a French regiment in front of +Masséna's division, and by a vigorous charge sent it flying +in a panic which promised to spread to another regiment thus +uncovered. This was too much <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i135" id="page_i135">[pg.135]</a></span> for the veteran, +already dubbed "the spoilt child of victory "; he rushed to its +captain, bitterly upbraided him and the other officers, and finally +showered blows on them with the flat of his sword. Then, riding at +full speed to two tried regiments of his own division, he ordered +them to check the foe; and these invincible heroes promptly drove +back the assailants. Even so, however, the valour of the best +French regiments and the skill of Masséna, Berthier, and +Joubert barely sufficed to hold back the onstreaming tide of +white-coats opposite Rivoli.</p> + +<p>Yet even at this crisis the commander, confident in his central +position, and knowing his ability to ward off the encircling swoops +of the Austrian eagle, maintained that calm demeanour which moved +the wonder of smaller minds. His confidence in his seasoned troops +was not misplaced. The Imperialists, overburdened by long marches +and faint now for lack of food, could not maintain their first +advantage. Some of their foremost troops, that had won the broken +ground in front of St. Mark's Chapel, were suddenly charged by +French horse; they fled in panic, crying out, "French cavalry!" and +the space won was speedily abandoned to the tricolour. This sudden +rebuff was to dash all their hopes of victory; for at that crisis +of the day the chief Austrian column of nearly 8,000 men was +struggling up the zigzag ascent leading from the valley of the +Adige to the plateau, in the fond hope that their foes were by this +time driven from the summit. Despite the terrible fire that tore +their flanks, the Imperialists were clutching desperately at the +plateau, when Bonaparte put forth his full striking power. He could +now assail the crowded ranks of the doomed column in front and on +both flanks. A charge of Leclerc's horse and of Joubert's infantry +crushed its head; volleys of cannon and musketry from the plateau +tore its sides; an ammunition wagon exploded in its midst; and the +great constrictor forthwith writhed its bleeding coils back into +the valley, where it lay crushed and helpless for the rest of the +fight. <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i136" id= +"page_i136">[pg.136]</a></span></p> + +<p>Animated by this lightning stroke of their commander, the French +turned fiercely towards Monte Baldo and drove back their opponents +into the depression at its foot. But already at their rear loud +shouts warned them of a new danger. The western detachment of the +Imperialists had meanwhile worked round their rear, and, ignorant +of the fate of their comrades, believed that Bonaparte's army was +caught in a trap. The eyes of all the French staff officers were +now turned anxiously on their commander, who quietly remarked, "We +have them now." He knew, in fact, that other French troops marching +up from Verona would take these new foes in the rear; and though +Junot and his horsemen failed to cut their way through so as to +expedite their approach, yet speedily a French regiment burst +through the encircling line and joined in the final attack which +drove these last assailants from the heights south of Rivoli, and +later on compelled them to surrender.</p> + +<p>Thus closed the desperate battle of Rivoli (January 14th). +Defects in the Austrian position and the opportune arrival of +French reinforcements served to turn an Austrian success into a +complete rout. Circumstances which to a civilian may seem singly to +be of small account sufficed to tilt the trembling scales of +warfare, and Alvintzy's army now reeled helplessly back into Tyrol +with a total loss of 15,000 men and of nearly all its artillery and +stores. Leaving Joubert to pursue it towards Trent, Bonaparte now +flew southwards towards Mantua, whither Provera had cut his way. +Again his untiring energy, his insatiable care for all probable +contingencies, reaped a success which the ignorant may charge to +the account of his fortune. Strengthening Augereau's division by +light troops, he captured the whole of Provera's army at La +Favorita, near the walls of Mantua (January 16th). The natural +result of these two dazzling triumphs was the fall of the fortress +for which the Emperor Francis had risked and lost five armies. +Würmser surrendered Mantua on February 2nd with 18,000 men and +immense supplies of arms and stores. <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i137" id="page_i137">[pg.137]</a></span> The close of this +wondrous campaign was graced by an act of clemency. Generous terms +were accorded to the veteran marshal, whose fidelity to blundering +councillors at Vienna had thrown up in brilliant relief the +prudence, audacity, and resourcefulness of the young war-god.</p> + +<p>It was now time to chastise the Pope for his support of the +enemies of France. The Papalini proved to be contemptible as +soldiers. They fled before the republicans, and a military +promenade brought the invaders to Ancona, and then inland to +Tolentino, where Pius VI. sued for peace. The resulting treaty +signed at that place (February 19th) condemned the Holy See to +close its ports to the allies, especially to the English; to +acknowledge the acquisition of Avignon by France, and the +establishment of the Cispadane Republic at Bologna, Ferrara, and +the surrounding districts; to pay 30,000,000 francs to the French +Government; and to surrender 100 works of art to the victorious +republicans.</p> + +<p>It is needless to describe the remaining stages in Bonaparte's +campaign against Austria. Hitherto he had contended against fairly +good, though discontented and discouraged troops, badly led, and +hampered by the mountain barrier which separated them from their +real base of operations. In the last part of the war he fought +against troops demoralized by an almost unbroken chain of +disasters. The Austrians were now led by a brave and intelligent +general, the Archduke Charles; but he was hampered by rigorous +instructions from Vienna, by senile and indolent generals, by the +indignation or despair of the younger officers at the official +favouritism which left them in obscurity, and by the apathy of +soldiers who had lost heart. Neither his skill nor the natural +strength of their positions in Friuli and Carinthia could avail +against veterans flushed with victory and marshalled with unerring +sagacity. The rest of the war only served to emphasize the truth of +Napoleon's later statement, that the moral element constitutes +three-fourths of an army's strength. The barriers offered by the +River Tagliamento and the many <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i138" id="page_i138">[pg.138]</a></span> commanding heights +of the Carnic and the Noric Alps were as nothing to the triumphant +republicans; and from the heights that guard the province of +Styria, the genius of Napoleon flashed as a terrifying portent to +the Court of Vienna and the potentates of Central Europe. When the +tricolour standards were nearing the town of Leoben, the Emperor +Francis sent envoys to sue for peace;<a name= +"FNanchor_72_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72_72"><sup>[72]</sup></a> +and the preliminaries signed there, within one hundred miles of the +Austrian capital, closed the campaign which a year previously had +opened with so little promise for the French on the narrow strip of +land between the Maritime Alps and the petty township of +Savona.</p> + +<p>These brilliant results were due primarily to the consummate +leadership of Bonaparte. His geographical instincts discerned the +means of profiting by natural obstacles and of turning them when +they seemed to screen his opponents. Prompt to divine their plans, +he bewildered them by the audacity of his combinations, which +overbore their columns with superior force at the very time when he +seemed doomed to succumb. Genius so commanding had not been +displayed even by Frederick or Marlborough. And yet these brilliant +results could not have been achieved by an army which rarely +exceeded 45,000 men without the strenuous bravery and tactical +skill of the best generals of division, Augereau, Masséna, +and Joubert, as well as of officers who had shown their worth in +many a doubtful fight; Lannes, the hero of Lodi and Arcola; +Marmont, noted for his daring advance of the guns at Castiglione; +Victor, who justified his name by hard fighting at La Favorita; +Murat, the <i>beau sabreur</i>, and Junot, both dashing cavalry +generals; and many more whose daring earned them a soldier's death +in order to gain glory for France and<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i139" id="page_i139">[pg.139]</a></span> liberty for Italy. +Still less ought the soldiery to be forgotten; those troops, whose +tattered uniforms bespoke their ceaseless toils, who grumbled at +the frequent lack of bread, but, as Masséna observed, never +<i>before</i> a battle, who even in retreat never doubted the +genius of their chief, and fiercely rallied at the longed-for sign +of fighting. The source of this marvellous energy is not hard to +discover. Their bravery was fed by that wellspring of hope which +had made of France a nation of free men determined to free the +millions beyond their frontiers. The French columns were "equality +on the march"; and the soldiery, animated by this grand enthusiasm, +found its militant embodiment in the great captain who seemed about +to liberate Italy and Central Europe. <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i140" id="page_i140">[pg.140]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER VII</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>LEOBEN TO CAMPO FORMIO</center> + +<br> + + +<p>In signing the preliminaries of peace at Leoben, which formed in +part the basis for the Treaty of Campo Formio, Bonaparte appears as +a diplomatist of the first rank. He had already signed similar +articles with the Court of Turin and with the Vatican. But such a +transaction with the Emperor was infinitely more important than +with the third-rate powers of the peninsula. He now essays his +first flight to the highest levels of international diplomacy. In +truth, his mental endowments, like those of many of the greatest +generals, were no less adapted to success in the council-chamber +than on the field of battle; for, indeed, the processes of thought +and the methods of action are not dissimilar in the spheres of +diplomacy and war. To evade obstacles on which an opponent relies, +to multiply them in his path, to bewilder him by feints before +overwhelming him by a crushing onset, these are the arts which +yield success either to the negotiator or to the commander.</p> + +<p>In imposing terms of peace on the Emperor at Leoben (April 18th, +1797), Bonaparte reduced the Directory, and its envoy, Clarke, who +was absent in Italy, to a subordinate <i>rôle</i>. As +commander-in-chief, he had power only to conclude a brief +armistice, but now he signed the preliminaries of peace. His excuse +to the Directory was ingenious. While admitting the irregularity of +his conduct, he pleaded the isolated position of his army, and the +absence of Clarke, and that, under the circumstances, his act had +been merely "a military operation." He could also urge that he had +in his rear a disaffected <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i141" +id="page_i141">[pg.141]</a></span> Venetia, and that he believed +the French armies on the Rhine to be stationary and unable to cross +that river. But the very tardy advent of Clarke on the scene +strengthens the supposition that Bonaparte was at the time by no +means loth to figure as the pacifier of the Continent. Had he known +the whole truth, namely, that the French were gaining a battle on +the east bank of the Rhine while the terms of peace were being +signed at Leoben, he would most certainly have broken off the +negotiations and have dictated harsher terms at the gates of +Vienna. That was the vision which shone before his eyes three years +previously, when he sketched to his friends at Nice the plan of +campaign, beginning at Savona and ending before the Austrian +capital; and great was his chagrin at hearing the tidings of +Moreau's success on April 20th. The news reached him on his return +from Leoben to Italy, when he was detained for a few hours by a +sudden flood of the River Tagliamento. At once he determined to +ride back and make some excuse for a rupture with Austria; and only +the persistent remonstrances of Berthier turned him from this mad +resolve, which would forthwith have exhibited him to the world as +estimating more highly the youthful promptings of destiny than the +honour of a French negotiator.</p> + +<p>The terms which he had granted to the Emperor were lenient +enough. The only definitive gain to France was the acquisition of +the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium), for which troublesome +possession the Emperor was to have compensation elsewhere. Nothing +absolutely binding was said about the left, or west, bank of the +Rhine, except that Austria recognized the "constitutional limits" +of France, but reaffirmed the integrity of "The Empire."<a name= +"FNanchor_73_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73_73"><sup>[73]</sup></a> +These were contradictory statements; for France had declared the +Rhine to be her natural boundary, and the old "Empire" included +Belgium, Trèves, and Luxemburg. But, for the interpretation +of these vague formularies, the following secret and all-important +articles were appended. While the<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i142" id="page_i142">[pg.142]</a></span> Emperor renounced +that part of his Italian possessions which lay to the west of the +Oglio, he was to receive all the mainland territories of Venice +east of that river, including Dalmatia and Istria, Venice was also +to cede her lands west of the Oglio to the French Government; and +in return for these sacrifices she was to gain the three legations +of Romagna, Ferrara, and Bologna—the very lands which +Bonaparte had recently formed into the Cispadane Republic! For the +rest, the Emperor would have to recognize the proposed Republic at +Milan, as also that already existing at Modena, "compensation" +being somewhere found for the deposed duke.</p> + +<p>From the correspondence of Thugut, the Austrian Minister, it +appears certain that Austria herself had looked forward to the +partition of the Venetian mainland territories, and this was the +scheme which Bonaparte <i>actually proposed to her at Leoben</i>. +Still more extraordinary was his proposal to sacrifice, ostensibly +to Venice but ultimately to Austria, the greater part of the +Cispadane Republic. It is, indeed, inexplicable, except on the +ground that his military position at Leoben was more brilliant than +secure. His uneasiness about this article of the preliminaries is +seen in his letter of April 22nd to the Directors, which explains +that the preliminaries need not count for much. But most +extraordinary of all was his procedure concerning the young Lombard +Republic. He seems quite calmly to have discussed its retrocession +to the Austrians, and that, too, after he had encouraged the +Milanese to found a republic, and had declared that every French +victory was "a line of the constitutional charter."<a name= +"FNanchor_74_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74_74"><sup>[74]</sup></a> +The most reasonable explanation is that Bonaparte over-estimated +the military strength of Austria, and undervalued the energy of the +men of Milan, Modena, and Bologna, of whose levies he spoke most +contemptuously. Certain it is that he desired to disengage himself +from their affairs so as to be free for the grander visions of +oriental<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i143" id= +"page_i143">[pg.143]</a></span> conquest that now haunted his +imagination. Whatever were his motives in signing the preliminaries +at Leoben, he speedily found means for their modification in the +ever-enlarging area of negotiable lands.</p> + +<p>It is now time to return to the affairs of Venice. For seven +months the towns and villages of that republic had been a prey to +pitiless warfare and systematic rapacity, a fate which the weak +ruling oligarchy could neither avert nor avenge. In the western +cities, Bergamo and Brescia, whose interests and feelings linked +them with Milan rather than Venice, the populace desired an +alliance with the nascent republic on the west and a severance from +the gloomy despotism of the Queen of the Adriatic. Though glorious +in her prime, she now governed with obscurantist methods inspired +by fear of her weakness becoming manifest; and Bonaparte, tearing +off the mask which hitherto had screened her dotage, left her +despised by the more progressive of her own subjects. Even before +he first entered the Venetian territory, he set forth to the +Directory the facilities for plunder and partition which it +offered. Referring to its reception of the Comte de Provence (the +future Louis XVIII.) and the occupation of Peschiera by the +Austrians, he wrote (June 6th, 1796):</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"If your plan is to extract five or six million francs from +Venice, I have expressly prepared for you this sort of rupture with +her.... If you have intentions more pronounced, I think that you +ought to continue this subject of contention, instruct me as to +your desires, and wait for the favourable opportunity, which I will +seize according to circumstances, for we must not have everybody on +our hands at the same time."</p> +</div> + +<p>The events which now transpired in Venetia gave him excuses for +the projected partition. The weariness felt by the Brescians and +Bergamesques for Venetian rule had been artfully played on by the +Jacobins of Milan and by the French Generals Kilmaine and +Landrieux; and an effort made by the Venetian officials to repress +the growing discontent brought about disturbances in <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i144" id="page_i144">[pg.144]</a></span> +which some men of the "Lombard legion" were killed. The complicity +of the French in the revolt is clearly established by the Milanese +journals and by the fact that Landrieux forthwith accepted the +command of the rebels at Bergamo and Brescia.<a name= +"FNanchor_75_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75_75"><sup>[75]</sup></a> +But while these cities espoused the Jacobin cause, most of the +Venetian towns and all the peasantry remained faithful to the old +Government. It was clear that a conflict must ensue, even if +Bonaparte and some of his generals had not secretly worked to bring +it about. That he and they did so work cannot now be disputed. The +circle of proof is complete. The events at Brescia and Bergamo were +part of a scheme for precipitating a rupture with Venice; and their +success was so far assured that Bonaparte at Leoben secretly +bargained away nearly the whole of the Venetian lands. Furthermore, +a fortnight before the signing of these preliminaries, he had +suborned a vile wretch, Salvatori by name, to issue a proclamation +purporting to come from the Venetian authorities, which urged the +people everywhere to rise and massacre the French. It was issued on +April 5th, though it bore the date of March 20th. At once the Doge +warned his people that it was a base fabrication, But the mischief +had been done. On Easter Monday (April 17th) a chance affray in +Verona let loose the passions which had been rising for months +past: the populace rose in fury against the French detachment +quartered on them: and all the soldiers who could not find shelter +in the citadel, even the sick in the hospitals, fell victims to the +craving for revenge for the humiliations and exactions of the last +seven months.<a name="FNanchor_76_76"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_76_76"><sup>[76]</sup></a> Such was Easter-tide at +Verona—<i>les Pâques véronaises</i>—an +event<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i145" id= +"page_i145">[pg.145]</a></span> that recalls the Sicilian Vespers +of Palermo in its blind southern fury.</p> + +<p>The finale somewhat exceeded Bonaparte's expectations, but he +must have hailed it with a secret satisfaction. It gave him a good +excuse for wholly extinguishing Venice as an independent power. +According to the secret articles signed at Leoben, the city of +Venice was to have retained her independence and gained the +Legations. But her contumacy could now be chastised by +annihilation. Venice could, in fact, indemnify the Hapsburgs for +the further cessions which France exacted from them elsewhere; and +in the process Bonaparte would free himself from the blame which +attached to his hasty signature of the preliminaries at Leoben.<a +name="FNanchor_77_77"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_77_77"><sup>[77]</sup></a> He was now determined to +secure the Rhine frontier for France, to gain independence, under +French tutelage, not only for the Lombard Republic, but also for +Modena and the Legations. These were his aims during the +negotiations to which he gave the full force of his intellect +during the spring and summer of 1797.</p> + +<p>The first thing was to pour French troops into Italy so as to +extort better terms: the next was to declare war on Venice. For +this there was now ample justification; for, apart from the +massacre at Verona, another outrage had been perpetrated. A French +corsair, which had persisted in anchoring in a forbidden part of +the harbour of Venice, had been riddled by the batteries and +captured. For this act, and for the outbreak at Verona, the Doge +and Senate offered ample reparation: but Bonaparte refused to +listen to these envoys, "dripping with French blood," and haughtily +bade Venice evacuate her mainland territories.<a name= +"FNanchor_78_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78_78"><sup>[78]</sup></a> +For various reasons he decided to use guile rather than force. He +found in Venice a secretary of the French legation, Villetard by +name, who could be trusted dextrously to undermine the crumbling +fabric of the oligarchy.<a name="FNanchor_79_79"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_79_79"><sup>[79]</sup></a> This man persuaded<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i146" id= +"page_i146">[pg.146]</a></span> the terrified populace that nothing +would appease the fury of the French general but the deposition of +the existing oligarchy and the formation of a democratic +municipality. The people and the patricians alike swallowed the +bait; and the once haughty Senate tamely pronounced its own doom. +Disorders naturally occurred on the downfall of the ancient +oligarchy, especially when the new municipality ordered the removal +of Venetian men-of-war into the hands of the French and the +introduction of French troops by help of Venetian vessels. A +mournful silence oppressed even the democrats when 5,000 French +troops entered Venice on board the flotilla. The famous State, +which for centuries had ruled the waters of the Levant, and had +held the fierce Turks at bay, a people numbering 3,000,000 souls +and boasting a revenue of 9,000,000 ducats, now struck not one blow +against conquerors who came in the guise of liberators.</p> + +<p>On the same day Bonaparte signed at Milan a treaty of alliance +with the envoys of the new Venetian Government. His friendship was +to be dearly bought. In secret articles, which were of more import +than the vague professions of amity which filled the public +document, it was stipulated that the French and Venetian Republics +should come to an understanding as to the <i>exchange</i> of +certain territories, that Venice should pay a contribution in money +and in materials of war, should aid the French navy by furnishing +three battleships and two frigates, and should enrich the museums +of her benefactress by 20 paintings and 500 manuscripts. While he +was signing these conditions of peace, the Directors were +despatching from Paris a declaration of war against Venice. Their +decision was already obsolete: it was founded on Bonaparte's +despatch of April 30th; but in the interval their proconsul had +wholly changed the situation by overthrowing the rule of the Doge +and Senate, and by setting up a democracy, through which he could +extract the wealth of that land. The Directors' declaration of war +was accordingly stopped at Milan, and no more was heard of it. They +were thus forcibly <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i147" id= +"page_i147">[pg.147]</a></span> reminded of the truth of his +previous warning that things would certainly go wrong unless they +consulted him on all important details.<a name= +"FNanchor_80_80"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_80_80"><sup>[80]</sup></a></p> + +<p>This treaty of Milan was the fourth important convention +concluded by the general, who, at the beginning of the campaign of +1796, had been forbidden even to sign an armistice without +consulting Salicetti!</p> + +<p>It was speedily followed by another, which in many respects +redounds to the credit of the young conqueror. If his conduct +towards Venice inspires loathing, his treatment of Genoa must +excite surprise and admiration. Apart from one very natural +outburst of spleen, it shows little of that harshness which might +have been expected from the man who had looked on Genoa as the +embodiment of mean despotism. Up to the summer of 1796 Bonaparte +seems to have retained something of his old detestation of that +republic; for at midsummer, when he was in the full career of his +Italian conquests, he wrote to Faypoult, the French envoy at Genoa, +urging him to keep open certain cases that were in dispute, and +three weeks later he again wrote that the time for Genoa had not +yet come. Any definite action against this wealthy city was, +indeed, most undesirable during the campaign; for the bankers of +Genoa supplied the French army with the sinews of war by means of +secret loans, and their merchants were equally complaisant in +regard to provisions. These services were appreciated by Bonaparte +as much as they were resented by Nelson; and possibly the succour +which Genoese money and shipping covertly rendered to the French +expeditions for the recovery of Corsica may have helped to efface +from Bonaparte's memory the associations clustering around the +once-revered name of Paoli. From ill-concealed hostility he drifted +into a position of tolerance and finally of friendship<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i148" id="page_i148">[pg.148]</a></span> +towards Genoa, provided that she became democratic. If her +institutions could be assimilated to those of France, she might +prove a valuable intermediary or ally.</p> + +<p>The destruction of the Genoese oligarchy presented no great +difficulties. Both Venice and Genoa had long outlived their power, +and the persistent violation of their neutrality had robbed them of +that last support of the weak, self-respect. The intrigues of +Faypoult and Salicetti were undermining the influence of the Doge +and Senate, when the news of the fall of the Venetian oligarchy +spurred on the French party to action, But the Doge and Senate +armed bands of mountaineers and fishermen who were hostile to +change; and in a long and desperate conflict in the narrow streets +of Genoa the democrats were completely worsted (May 23rd). The +victors thereupon ransacked the houses of the opposing faction and +found lists of names of those who were to have been proscribed, +besides documents which revealed the complicity of the French +agents in the rising. Bonaparte was enraged at the folly of the +Genoese democrats, which deranged his plans. As he wrote to the +Directory, if they had only remained quiet for a fortnight, the +oligarchy would have collapsed from sheer weakness. The murder of a +few Frenchmen and Milanese now gave him an excuse for intervention. +He sent an aide-de-camp, Lavalette, charged with a vehement +diatribe against the Doge and Senate, which lost nothing in its +recital before that august body. At the close a few senators called +out, "Let us fight": but the spirit of the Dorias flickered away +with these protests; and the degenerate scions of mighty sires +submitted to the insults of an aide-de-camp and the dictation of +his master.</p> + +<p>The fate of this ancient republic was decided by Bonaparte at +the Castle of Montebello, near Milan, where he had already drawn up +her future constitution. After brief conferences with the Genoese +envoys, he signed with them the secret convention which placed +their republic—soon to be renamed the Ligurian +Republic—under the protection of France and substituted for +the <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i149" id= +"page_i149">[pg.149]</a></span> close patrician rule a moderate +democracy. The fact is significant. His military instincts had now +weaned him from the stiff Jacobinism of his youth; and, in +conjunction with Faypoult and the envoys, he arranged that the +legislative powers should be intrusted to two popularly elected +chambers of 300 and 150 members, while the executive functions were +to be discharged by twelve senators, presided over by a Doge; these +officers were to be appointed by the chambers: for the rest, the +principles of religious liberty and civic equality were recognized, +and local self-government was amply provided for. Cynics may, of +course, object that this excellent constitution was but a means of +insuring French supremacy and of peacefully installing Bonaparte's +regiments in a very important city; but the close of his +intervention may be pronounced as creditable to his judgment as its +results were salutary to Genoa. He even upbraided the demagogic +party of that city for shivering in pieces the statue of Andrea +Doria and suspending the fragments on some of the innumerable trees +of liberty recently planted.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Andrea Doria," he wrote, "was a great sailor and a great +statesman. Aristocracy was liberty in his time. The whole of Europe +envies your city the honour of having produced that celebrated man. +You will, I doubt not, take pains to rear his statue again: I pray +you to let me bear a part of the expense which that will entail, +which I desire to share with those who are most zealous for the +glory and welfare of your country."</p> +</div> + +<p>In contrasting this wise and dignified conduct with the hatred +which most Corsicans still cherished against Genoa, Bonaparte's +greatness of soul becomes apparent and inspires the wish: <i>Utinam +semper sic fuisses!</i></p> + +<p>Few periods of his life have been more crowded with momentous +events than his sojourn at the Castle of Montebello in May-July, +1797. Besides completing the downfall of Venice and reinvigorating +the life of Genoa, he was deeply concerned with the affairs of the +Lombard or Cisalpine Republic, with his family concerns, <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i150" id= +"page_i150">[pg.0]</a></span> with the consolidation of his own +power in French politics, and with the Austrian negotiations. We +will consider these affairs in the order here indicated.</p> + +<p>The future of Lombardy had long been a matter of concern to +Bonaparte. He knew that its people were the <i>fittest</i> in all +Italy to benefit by <i>constitutional rule</i>, but it must be +dependent on France. He felt little confidence in the Lombards if +left to themselves, as is seen in his conversation with Melzi and +Miot de Melito at the Castle of Montebello. He was in one of those +humours, frequent at this time of dawning splendour, when +confidence in his own genius betrayed him into quite piquant +indiscretions. After referring to the Directory, he turned abruptly +to Melzi, a Lombard nobleman:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"As for your country, Monsieur de Melzi, it possesses still +fewer elements of republicanism than France, and can be managed +more easily than any other. You know better than anyone that we +shall do what we like with Italy. But the time has not yet come. We +must give way to the fever of the moment. We are going to have one +or two republics here of our own sort. Monge will arrange that for +us."</p> +</div> + +<p>He had some reason for distrusting the strength of the democrats +in Italy. At the close of 1796 he had written that there were three +parties in Lombardy, one which accepted French guidance, another +which desired liberty even with some impatience, and a third +faction, friendly to the Austrians: he encouraged the first, +checked the second, and repressed the last. He now complained that +the Cispadanes and Cisalpines had behaved very badly in their first +elections, which had been conducted in his absence; for they had +allowed clerical influence to override all French predilections. +And, a little later, he wrote to Talleyrand that the genuine love +of liberty was feeble in Italy, and that, as soon as French +influences were withdrawn, the Italian Jacobins would be murdered +by the populace. The sequel was to justify his misgivings, and +therefore to refute the charges of those <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i151" id="page_i151">[pg.151]</a></span> who see in his +conduct respecting the Cisalpine Republic nothing but calculating +egotism. The difficulty of freeing a populace that had learnt to +hug its chains was so great that the temporary and partial success +which his new creation achieved may be regarded as a proof of his +political sagacity.</p> + +<p>After long preparations by four committees, which Bonaparte kept +at Milan closely engaged in the drafting of laws, the constitution +of the Cisalpine Republic was completed. It was a miniature of that +of France, and lest there should be any further mistakes in the +elections, Bonaparte himself appointed, not only the five Directors +and the Ministers whom they were to control, but even the 180 +legislators, both Ancients and Juniors. In this strange fashion did +democracy descend on Italy, not mainly as the work of the people, +but at the behest of a great organizing genius. It is only fair to +add that he summoned to the work of civic reconstruction many of +the best intellects of Italy. He appointed a noble, Serbelloni, to +be the first President of the Cisalpine Republic, and a scion of +the august House of the Visconti was sent as its ambassador to +Paris. Many able men that had left Lombardy during the Austrian +occupation or the recent wars were attracted back by Bonaparte's +politic clemency; and the festival of July 9th at Milan, which +graced the inauguration of the new Government, presented a scene of +civic joy to which that unhappy province had long been a stranger. +A vast space was thronged with an enormous crowd which took up the +words of the civic oath uttered by the President. The Archbishop of +Milan celebrated Mass and blessed the banners of the National +Guards; and the day closed with games, dances, and invocations to +the memory of the Italians who had fought and died for their +nascent liberties. Amidst all the vivas and the clash of bells +Bonaparte took care to sound a sterner note. On that very day he +ordered the suppression of a Milanese club which had indulged in +Jacobinical extravagances, and he called on the people "to show to +the <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i152" id= +"page_i152">[pg.152]</a></span> world by their wisdom, energy, and +by the good organization of their army, that modern Italy has not +degenerated and is still worthy of liberty."</p> + +<p>The contagion of Milanese enthusiasm spread rapidly. Some of the +Venetian towns on the mainland now petitioned for union with the +Cisalpine Republic; and the deputies of the Cispadane, who were +present at the festival, urgently begged that their little State +might enjoy the same privilege. Hitherto Bonaparte had refused +these requests, lest he should hamper the negotiations with +Austria, which were still tardily proceeding; but within a month +their wish was gratified, and the Cispadane State was united to the +larger and more vigorous republic north of the River Po, along with +the important districts of Como, Bergamo, Brescia, Crema, and +Peschiera. Disturbances in the Swiss district of the Valteline soon +enabled Bonaparte to intervene on behalf of the oppressed peasants, +and to merge this territory also in the Cisalpine Republic, which +consequently stretched from the high Alps southward to Rimini, and +from the Ticino on the west to the Mincio on the east.<a name= +"FNanchor_81_81"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_81_81"><sup>[81]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Already, during his sojourn at the Castle of Montebello, +Bonaparte figured as the all-powerful proconsul of the French +Republic. Indeed, all his surroundings—his retinue of +complaisant generals, and the numerous envoys and agents who +thronged his ante-chambers to beg an audience—befitted a +Sulla or a Wallenstein, rather than a general of the regicide +Republic. Three hundred Polish soldiers guarded the approaches to +the castle; and semi-regal state was also observed in its spacious +corridors and saloons. There were to be seen Italian nobles, +literati, and artists, counting it the highest honour to visit the +liberator of their land; and to them Bonaparte behaved with that +mixture of affability and inner reserve,<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i153" id="page_i153">[pg.153]</a></span> of seductive +charm alternating with incisive cross-examination which proclaimed +at once the versatility of his gifts, the keenness of his +intellect, and his determination to gain social, as well as +military and political, supremacy. And yet the occasional +abruptness of his movements, and the strident tones of command +lurking beneath his silkiest speech, now and again reminded +beholders that he was of the camp rather than of the court. To his +generals he was distant; for any fault even his favourite officers +felt the full force of his anger; and aides-de-camp were not often +invited to dine at his table. Indeed, he frequently dined before +his retinue, almost in the custom of the old Kings of France.</p> + +<p>With him was his mother, also his brothers, Joseph and Louis, +whom he was rapidly advancing to fortune. There, too, were his +sisters; Elise, proud and self-contained, who at this period +married a noble but somewhat boorish Corsican, Bacciocchi; and +Pauline, a charming girl of sixteen, whose hand the all-powerful +brother offered to Marmont, to be by him unaccountably refused, +owing, it would seem, to a prior attachment. This lively and +luxurious young creature was not long to remain unwedded. The +adjutant-general, Leclerc, became her suitor; and, despite his +obscure birth and meagre talents, speedily gained her as his bride. +Bonaparte granted her 40,000 francs as her dowry; +and—significant fact—the nuptials were privately +blessed by a priest in the chapel of the Palace of Montebello.</p> + +<p>There, too, at Montebello was Josephine.</p> + +<p>Certainly the Bonapartes were not happy in their loves: the one +dark side to the young conqueror's life, all through this brilliant +campaign, was the cruelty of his bride. From her side he had in +March, 1796, torn himself away, distracted between his almost +insane love for her and his determination to crush the chief enemy +of France: to her he had written long and tender letters even +amidst the superhuman activities of his campaign. Ten long +despatches a day had not prevented him covering as <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i154" id="page_i154">[pg.154]</a></span> +many sheets of paper with protestations of devotion to her and with +entreaties that she would likewise pour out her heart to him. Then +came complaints, some tenderly pleading, others passionately +bitter, of her cruelly rare and meagre replies. The sad truth, that +Josephine cares much for his fame and little for him himself, that +she delays coming to Italy, these and other afflicting details rend +his heart. At last she comes to Milan, after a passionate outburst +of weeping—at leaving her beloved Paris. In Italy she shows +herself scarcely more than affectionate to her doting spouse. +Marlborough's letters to his peevish duchess during the Blenheim +campaign are not more crowded with maudlin curiosities than those +of the fierce scourge of the Austrians to his heartless fair. He +writes to her agonizingly, begging her to be less lovely, less +gracious, less good—apparently in order that he may love her +less madly: but she is never to be jealous, and, above all, never +to weep: for her tears burn his blood: and he concludes by sending +millions of kisses, and also to her dog! And this mad effusion came +from the man whom the outside world took to be of steel-like +coldness: yet his nature had this fevered, passionate side, just as +the moon, where she faces the outer void, is compact of ice, but +turns a front of molten granite to her blinding, all-compelling +luminary.</p> + +<p>Undoubtedly this blazing passion helped to spur on the lover to +that terrific energy which makes the Italian campaign unique even +amidst the Napoleonic wars. Beaulieu, Würmser, and Alvintzy +were not rivals in war; they were tiresome hindrances to his +unsated love. On the eve of one of his greatest triumphs he penned +to her the following rhapsody:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I am far from you, I seem to be surrounded by the blackest +night: I need the lurid light of the thunder-bolts which we are +about to hurl on our enemies to dispel the darkness into which your +absence has plunged me. Josephine, you wept when we parted: you +wept! At that thought all my being trembles. But be consoled! +Würmser shall pay dearly for the tears which I have seen you +shed."</p> +</div> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i155" id= +"page_i155">[pg.155]</a></span> What infatuation! to appease a +woman's fancied grief, he will pile high the plains of Mincio with +corpses, recking not of the thousand homes where bitter tears will +flow. It is the apotheosis of sentimental egotism and social +callousness. And yet this brain, with its moral vision hopelessly +blurred, judged unerringly in its own peculiar plane. What power it +must have possessed, that, unexhausted by the flames of love, it +grasped infallibly the myriad problems of war, scanning them the +more clearly, perchance, in the white heat of its own passion.</p> + +<p>At last there came the time of fruition at Montebello: of +fruition, but not of ease or full contentment; for not only did an +average of eight despatches a day claim several hours, during which +he jealously guarded his solitude; but Josephine's behaviour served +to damp his ardour. As, during the time of absence, she had +slighted his urgent entreaties for a daily letter, so too, during +the sojourn at Montebello, she revealed the shallowness and +frivolity of her being. Fêtes, balls, and receptions, +provided they were enlivened by a light crackle of compliments from +an admiring circle, pleased her more than the devotion of a genius. +She had admitted, before marriage, that her "Creole +<i>nonchalance</i>" shrank wearily away from his keen and ardent +nature; and now, when torn away from the <i>salons</i> of Paris, +she seems to have taken refuge in entertainments and lap-dogs.<a +name="FNanchor_82_82"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_82_82"><sup>[82]</sup></a> Doubtless even at this period +Josephine evinced something of that warm feeling which deepened +with ripening years and lit up her later sorrows with a mild +radiance; but her recent association with Madame Tallien and that +giddy <i>cohue</i> had accentuated her habits of feline +complaisance to all and sundry. Her facile fondnesses certainly +welled forth far too widely to carve out a single channel of love +and mingle with the deep torrent of Bonaparte's early passion. In +time, therefore, his affections strayed into many other courses; +and it would seen that even in the later part of this Italian epoch +his conduct was irregular.</p> + +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i156" id= +"page_i156">[pg.156]</a></span> <br> +<ins class="correction" title= +"Transcriber's note:The fascimile is missing from the original">FACSIMILE +OF A LETTER OF NAPOLEON TO "LA CITOYENNE TALLIEN, (missing)" 1797</ins><br> + + +<p>For this Josephine had herself mainly to thank. At last she +awakened to the real value and greatness of the love which her +neglect had served to dull and tarnish, but then it was too late +for complete reunion of souls: the Corsican eagle had by that time +soared far beyond reach of her highest flutterings.<a name= +"FNanchor_83_83"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_83_83"><sup>[83]</sup></a></p> + +<p>At Montebello, as also at Passeriano, whither the Austrian +negotiations were soon transferred, Bonaparte, though strictly +maintaining the ceremonies of his proconsular court, yet showed the +warmth of his social instincts. After the receptions of the day and +the semi-public dinner, he loved to unbend in the evening. +Sometimes, when Josephine formed a party of ladies for +<i>vingt-et-un</i>, he would withdraw to a corner and indulge in +the game of <i>goose</i>; and bystanders noted with amusement that +his love of success led him to play tricks and cheat in order not +to "fall into the pit." At other times,<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i157" id="page_i157">[pg.157]</a></span> if the +conversation languished, he proposed that each person should tell a +story; and when no Boccaccio-like facility inspired the company, he +sometimes launched out into one of those eerie and thrilling +recitals, such as he must often have heard from the +<i>improvisatori</i> of his native island. Bourrienne states that +Bonaparte's realism required darkness and daggers for the full +display of his gifts, and that the climax of his dramatic monologue +was not seldom enhanced by the screams of the ladies, a +consummation which gratified rather than perturbed the accomplished +actor.</p> + +<p>A survey of Bonaparte's multifarious activity in Italy enables +the reader to realize something of the wonder and awe excited by +his achievements. Like an Athena he leaped forth from the +Revolution, fully armed for every kind of contest. His mental +superiority impressed diplomats as his strategy baffled the +Imperialist generals; and now he was to give further proofs of his +astuteness by intervening in the internal affairs of France.</p> + +<p>In order to understand Bonaparte's share in the <i>coup +d'état</i> of Fructidor, we must briefly review the course +of political events at Paris. At the time of the installation of +the Directory the hope was widely cherished that the Revolution was +now entirely a thing of the past. But the unrest of the time was +seen in the renewal of the royalist revolts in the west, and in the +communistic plot of Babeuf for the overthrow of the whole existing +system of private property. The aims of these desperadoes were +revealed by an accomplice; the ringleaders were arrested, and after +a long trial Babeuf was guillotined and his confederates were +transported (May, 1797). The disclosure of these +ultra-revolutionary aims shocked not only the bourgeois, but even +the peasants who were settled on the confiscated lands of the +nobles and clergy. The very class which had given to the events of +1789 their irresistible momentum was now inclined to rest and be +thankful; and in this swift revulsion of popular feeling the +royalists began to gain <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i158" +id="page_i158">[pg.158]</a></span> ground. The elections for the +renewal of a third part of the Councils resulted in large gains for +them, and they could therefore somewhat influence the composition +of the Directory by electing Barthélemy, a constitutional +royalist. Still, he could not overbear the other four regicide +Directors, even though one of these, Carnot, also favoured moderate +opinions more and more. A crisis therefore rapidly developed +between the still Jacobinical Directory and the two legislative +Councils, in each of which the royalists, or moderates, had the +upper hand. The aim of this majority was to strengthen the royalist +elements in France by the repeal of many revolutionary laws. Their +man of action was Pichegru, the conqueror of Holland, who, abjuring +Jacobinism, now schemed with a club of royalists, which met at +Clichy, on the outskirts of Paris. That their intrigues aimed at +the restoration of the Bourbons had recently been proved. The +French agents in Venice seized the Comte d'Entraigues, the +confidante of the <i>soi-disant</i> Louis XVIII.; and his papers, +when opened by Bonaparte, Clarke, and Berthier at Montebello, +proved that there was a conspiracy in France for the recall of the +Bourbons. With characteristic skill, Bonaparte held back these +papers from the Directory until he had mastered the difficulties of +the situation. As for the count, he released him; and in return for +this signal act of clemency, then very unusual towards an +<i>émigré</i>, he soon became the object of his +misrepresentation and slander.</p> + +<p>The political crisis became acute in July, when the majority of +the Councils sought to force on the Directory Ministers who would +favour moderate or royalist aims. Three Directors, Barras, La +Réveillière-Lépeaux, and Rewbell, refused to +listen to these behests, and insisted on the appointment of +Jacobinical Ministers even in the teeth of a majority of the +Councils. This defiance of the deputies of France was received with +execration by most civilians, but with jubilant acclaim by the +armies; for the soldiery, far removed from the partisan strifes of +the capital, still retained their strongly <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i159" id="page_i159">[pg.159]</a></span> republican +opinions. The news that their conduct towards Venice was being +sharply criticised by the moderates in Paris aroused their +strongest feelings, military pride and democratic ardour.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, Bonaparte's conduct was eminently cautious and +reserved. In the month of May he sent to Paris his most trusted +aide-de-camp, Lavalette, instructing him to sound all parties, to +hold aloof from all engagements, and to report to him +dispassionately on the state of public opinion.<a name= +"FNanchor_84_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84_84"><sup>[84]</sup></a> +Lavalette judged the position of the Directory, or rather of the +Triumvirate which swayed it, to be so precarious that he cautioned +his chief against any definite espousal of its cause; and in +June-July, 1797, Bonaparte almost ceased to correspond with the +Directors except on Italian affairs, probably because he looked +forward to their overthrow as an important step towards his own +supremacy. There was, however, the possibility of a royalist +reaction sweeping all before it in France and ranging the armies +against the civil power. He therefore waited and watched, fully +aware of the enhanced importance which an uncertain situation gives +to the outsider who refuses to show his hand.</p> + +<p>Duller eyes than his had discerned that the constitutional +conflict between the Directory and the Councils could not be +peaceably adjusted. The framers of the constitution had designed +the slowly changing Directory as a check on the Councils, which +were renewed to the extent of one-third every year; but, while +seeking to put a regicide drag on the parliamentary coach, they had +omitted to provide against a complete overturn. The Councils could +not legally override the Directory; neither could the Directory +veto the decrees of the Councils, nor, by dissolving them, compel +an appeal to the country. This defect in the constitution had been +clearly pointed out by Necker, and it now drew from Barras the +lament: <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i160" id= +"page_i160">[pg.160]</a></span></p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Ah, if the constitution of the Year III., which offers so many +sage precautions, had not neglected one of the most important; if +it had foreseen that the two great powers of the State, engaged in +heated debates, must end with open conflicts, when there is no high +court of appeal to arrange them; if it had sufficiently armed the +Directory with the right of dissolving the Chamber!"<a name= +"FNanchor_85_85"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_85_85"><sup>[85]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>As it was, the knot had to be severed by the sword: not, as yet, +by Bonaparte's trenchant blade: he carefully drew back; but where +as yet he feared to tread, Hoche rushed in. This ardently +republican general was inspired by a self-denying patriotism, that +flinched not before odious duties. While Bonaparte was culling +laurels in Northern Italy, Hoche was undertaking the most necessary +task of quelling the Vendéan risings, and later on braved +the fogs and storms of the Atlantic in the hope of rousing all +Ireland in revolt. His expedition to Bantry Bay in December, 1796, +having miscarried, he was sent into the Rhineland. The conclusion +of peace by Bonaparte at Leoben again dashed his hopes, and he +therefore received with joy the orders of the Directory that he +should march a large part of his army to Brest for a second +expedition to Ireland. The Directory, however, intended to use +those troops nearer home, and appointed him Minister of War (July +16th). The choice was a good one; Hoche was active, able, and +popular with the soldiery; but he had not yet reached the thirtieth +year of his age, the limit required by the constitution. On this +technical defect the majority of the Councils at once fastened; and +their complaints were redoubled when a large detachment of his +troops came within the distance of the capital forbidden to the +army. The moderates could therefore accuse the triumvirs and Hoche +of conspiracy against the laws; he speedily resigned the Ministry +(July 22nd), and withdrew his troops into Champagne, and finally to +the Rhineland. <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i161" id= +"page_i161">[pg.161]</a></span></p> + +<p>Now was the opportunity for Bonaparte to take up the +<i>rôle</i> of Cromwell which Hoche had so awkwardly played. +And how skilfully the conqueror of Italy plays it—through +subordinates. He was too well versed in statecraft to let his sword +flash before the public gaze. By this time he had decided to act, +and doubtless the fervid Jacobinism of the soldiery was the chief +cause determining his action. At the national celebration on July +14th he allowed it to have free vent, and thereupon wrote to the +Directory, bitterly reproaching them for their weakness in face of +the royalist plot: "I see that the Clichy Club means to march over +my corpse to the destruction of the Republic." He ended the +diatribe by his usual device, when he desired to remind the +Government of his necessity to them, of offering his resignation, +in case they refused to take vigorous measures against the +malcontents. Yet even now his action was secret and indirect. On +July 27th he sent to the Directors a brief note stating that +Augereau had requested leave to go to Paris, "where his affairs +call him"; and that he sent by this general the originals of the +addresses of the army, avowing its devotion to the constitution. No +one would suspect from this that Augereau was in Bonaparte's +confidence and came to carry out the <i>coup d'état</i>. The +secret was well preserved. Lavalette was Bonaparte's official +representative; and his neutrality was now maintained in accordance +with a note received from his chief: "Augereau is coming to Paris: +do not put yourself in his power: he has sown disorder in the army: +he is a factious man."</p> + +<p>But, while Lavalette was left to trim his sails as best he +might, Augereau was certain to act with energy. Bonaparte knew well +that his Jacobinical lieutenant, famed as the first swordsman of +the day, and the leader of the fighting division of the army, would +do his work thoroughly, always vaunting his own prowess and +decrying that of his commander. It was so. Augereau rushed to +Paris, breathing threats of slaughter against the royalists. +Checked for a time by the calculating <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i162" id="page_i162">[pg.162]</a></span> <i>finesse</i> +of the triumvirs, he prepared to end matters by a single blow; and, +when the time had come, he occupied the strategic points of the +capital, drew a cordon of troops round the Tuileries, where the +Councils sat, invaded the chambers of deputies and consigned to the +Temple the royalists and moderates there present, with their +leader, Pichegru. Barthélemy was also seized; but Carnot, +warned by a friend, fled during the early hours of this eventful +day—September 4th (or 18 Fructidor). The mutilated Councils +forthwith annulled the late elections in forty-nine Departments, +and passed severe laws against orthodox priests and the unpardoned +<i>émigrés</i> who had ventured to return to France. +The Directory was also intrusted with complete power to suppress +newspapers, to close political clubs, and to declare any commune in +a state of siege. Its functions were now wellnigh as extensive and +absolute as those of the Committee of Public Safety, its powers +being limited only by the incompetence of the individual Directors +and by their paralyzing consciousness that they ruled only by +favour of the army. They had taken the sword to solve a political +problem: two years later they were to fall by that sword.<a name= +"FNanchor_86_86"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_86_86"><sup>[86]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Augereau fully expected that he would be one of the two +Directors who were elected in place of Carnot and +Barthélemy; but the Councils had no higher opinion of his +civic capacity than Bonaparte had formed; and, to his great +disgust, Merlin of Douai and François of Neufchâtel +were chosen. The last scenes of the <i>coup d'état</i> +centred around the transportation of the condemned deputies. One of +the early memories of the future Duc de Broglie recalled the sight +of the "<i>députés fructidorisés</i> +travelling in closed carriages, railed up like cages," to the +seaport whence they were to sail to the lingering agonies of a +tropical prison in French Guiana.</p> + +<p>It was a painful spectacle: the indignation was great, but the +consternation was greater still. Everybody<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i163" id="page_i163">[pg.163]</a></span> foresaw the +renewal of the Reign of Terror and resignedly prepared for it.</p> + +<p>Such were the feelings, even of those who, like Madame de +Staël and her friend Benjamin Constant, had declared before +the <i>coup d'état</i> that it was necessary to the +salvation of the Republic. That accomplished woman was endowed with +nearly every attribute of genius except political foresight and +self-restraint. No sooner had the blow been dealt than she fell to +deploring its results, which any fourth-rate intelligence might +have foreseen. "Liberty was the only power really +conquered"—such was her later judgment on Fructidor. Now that +Liberty fled affrighted, the errant enthusiasms of the gifted +authoress clung for a brief space to Bonaparte. Her eulogies on his +exploits, says Lavalette, who listened to her through a dinner in +Talleyrand's rooms, possessed all the mad disorder and exaggeration +of inspiration; and, after the repast was over, the votaress +refused to pass out before an aide-de-camp of Bonaparte! The +incident is characteristic both of Madame de Staël's moods and +of the whims of the populace. Amidst the disenchantments of that +time, when the pursuit of liberty seemed but an idle quest, when +royalists were the champions of parliamentary rule and republicans +relied on military force, all eyes turned wearily away from the +civic broils at Paris to the visions of splendour revealed by the +conqueror of Italy. Few persons knew how largely their new +favourite was responsible for the events of Fructidor; all of them +had by heart the names of his victories; and his popularity flamed +to the skies when he recrossed the Alps, bringing with him a +lucrative peace with Austria.</p> + +<p>The negotiations with that Power had dragged on slowly through +the whole summer and far into the autumn, mainly owing to the hopes +of the Emperor Francis that the disorder in France would filch from +her the meed of victory. Doubtless that would have been the case, +had not Bonaparte, while striking down the royalists at Paris +through his lieutenant, remained <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i164" id="page_i164">[pg.164]</a></span> at the head of his +victorious legions in Venetia ready again to invade Austria, if +occasion should arise.</p> + +<p>In some respects, the <i>coup d'état</i> of Fructidor +helped on the progress of the negotiations. That event postponed, +if it did not render impossible, the advent of civil war in France; +and, like Pride's Purge in our civil strifes, it installed in power +a Government which represented the feelings of the army and of its +chief. Moreover, it rid him of the presence of Clarke, his former +colleague in the negotiations, whose relations with Carnot aroused +the suspicions of Barras and led to his recall. Bonaparte was now +the sole plenipotentiary of France. The final negotiations with +Austria and the resulting treaty of Campo Formio may therefore be +considered as almost entirely his handiwork.</p> + +<p>And yet, at this very time, the head of the Foreign Office at +Paris was a man destined to achieve the greatest diplomatic +reputation of the age. Charles Maurice de Talleyrand seemed +destined for the task of uniting the society of the old +<i>régime</i> with the France of the Revolution. To review +his life would be to review the Revolution. With a reforming zeal +begotten of his own intellectual acuteness and of resentment +against his family, which had disinherited him for the crime of +lameness, he had led the first assaults of 1789 against the +privileges of the nobles and of the clerics among whom his lot had +perforce been cast. He acted as the head of the new +"constitutional" clergy, and bestowed his episcopal blessing at the +Feast of Pikes in 1790; but, owing to his moderation, he soon fell +into disfavour with the extreme men who seized on power. After a +sojourn in England and the United States, he came back to France, +and on the suggestion of Madame de Staël was appointed +Minister for Foreign Affairs (July, 1797). To this post he brought +the highest gifts: his early clerical training gave a keen edge to +an intellect naturally subtle and penetrating: his intercourse with +Mirabeau gave him a grip on the essentials of sound policy and +diplomacy: his sojourn abroad widened his vision, and imbued him +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i165" id= +"page_i165">[pg.165]</a></span> with an admiration for English +institutions and English moderation. Yet he loved France with a +deep and fervent love. For her he schemed; for her he threw over +friends or foes with a Macchiavellian facility. Amidst all the +glamour of the Napoleonic Empire he discerned the dangers that +threatened France; and he warned his master—as uselessly as +he warned reckless nobles, priestly bigots, and fanatical Jacobins +in the past, or the unteachable zealots of the restored monarchy. +His life, when viewed, not in regard to its many sordid details, +but to its chief guiding principle, was one long campaign against +French <i>élan</i> and partisan obstinacy; and he sealed it +with the quaint declaration in his will that, on reviewing his +career, he found he had never abandoned a party before it had +abandoned itself. Talleyrand was equipped with a diversity of +gifts: his gaze, intellectual yet composed, blenched not when he +uttered a scathing criticism or a diplomatic lie: his deep and +penetrating voice gave force to all his words, and the curl of his +lip or the scornful lifting of his eyebrows sometimes disconcerted +an opponent more than his biting sarcasm. In brief, this +disinherited noble, this unfrocked priest, this disenchanted +Liberal, was the complete expression of the inimitable society of +the old <i>régime</i>, when quickened intellectually by +Voltaire and dulled by the Terror. After doing much to destroy the +old society, he was now to take a prominent share in its +reconstruction on a modern basis.<a name="FNanchor_87_87"></a><a +href="#Footnote_87_87"><sup>[87]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Such was the man who now commenced his chief life-work, the task +of guiding Napoleon. "The mere name of Bonaparte is an aid which +ought to smooth away all my difficulties"—these were the +obsequious terms in which he began his correspondence with the +great general. In reality, he distrusted him; but whether from +diffidence, or from the weakness of his own position, which as yet +was little more than that of the head clerk of his department, he +did nothing to assert the predominance of civil<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i166" id="page_i166">[pg.166]</a></span> +over military influence in the negotiations now proceeding.</p> + +<p>Two months before Talleyrand accepted office, Bonaparte had +enlarged his original demands on Austria, and claimed for France +the whole of the lands on the left or west bank of the Rhine, and +for the Cisalpine Republic all the territory up to the River Adige. +To these demands the Court of Vienna offered a tenacious resistance +which greatly irritated him. "These people are so slow," he +exclaimed, "they think that a peace like this ought to be meditated +upon for three years first."</p> + +<p>Concurrently with the Franco-Austrian negotiations, overtures +for a peace between France and England were being discussed at +Lille. Into these it is impossible to enter farther than to notice +that in these efforts Pitt and the other British Ministers (except +Grenville) were sincerely desirous of peace, and that negotiations +broke down owing to the masterful tone adopted by the Directory. It +was perhaps unfortunate that Lord Malmesbury was selected as the +English negotiator, for his behaviour in the previous year had been +construed by the French as dilatory and insincere. But the +Directors may on better evidence be charged with postponing a +settlement until they had struck down their foes within France. +Bonaparte's letters at this time show that he hoped for the +conclusion of a peace with England, doubtless in order that his own +pressure on Austria might be redoubled. In this he was to be +disappointed. After Fructidor the Directory assumed overweening +airs. Talleyrand was bidden to enjoin on the French +plenipotentiaries the adoption of a loftier tone. Maret, the French +envoy at Lille, whose counsels had ever been on the side of +moderation, was abruptly replaced by a "Fructidorian"; and a +decisive refusal was given to the English demand for the retention +of Trinidad and the Cape, at the expense of Spain and the Batavian +Republic respectively. Indeed, the Directory intended to press for +the cession of the Channel Islands to France and of <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i167" id="page_i167">[pg.167]</a></span> +Gibraltar to Spain, and that, too, at the end of a maritime war +fruitful in victories for the Union Jack.<a name= +"FNanchor_88_88"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_88_88"><sup>[88]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Towards the King of Sardinia the new Directory was equally +imperious. The throne of Turin was now occupied by Charles Emmanuel +IV. He succeeded to a troublous heritage. Threatened by democratic +republics at Milan and Genoa, and still more by the effervescence +of his own subjects, he strove to gain an offensive and defensive +alliance with France, as the sole safeguard against revolution. To +this end he offered 10,000 Piedmontese for service with Bonaparte, +and even secretly covenanted to cede the island of Sardinia to +France. But these offers could not divert Barras and his colleagues +from their revolutionary policy. They spurned the alliance with the +House of Savoy, and, despite the remonstrances of Bonaparte, they +fomented civil discords in Piedmont such as endangered his +communications with France. Indeed, the Directory after Fructidor +was deeply imbued with fear of their commander in Italy. To +increase his difficulties was now their paramount<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i168" id="page_i168">[pg.168]</a></span> +desire; and under the pretext of extending liberty in Italy, they +instructed Talleyrand to insist on the inclusion of Venice and +Friuli in the Cisalpine Republic. Austria must be content with +Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia, must renounce all interest in the +fate of the Ionian Isles, and find in Germany all compensation for +her losses in Italy. Such was the ultimatum of the Directory +(September 16th). But a loophole of escape was left to Bonaparte; +the conduct of these negotiations was confided solely to him, and +he had already decided their general tenor by giving his +provisional assent to the acquisition by Austria of the east bank +of the Adige and the city of Venice. From these terms he was +disinclined to diverge. He was weary of "this old Europe": his gaze +was directed towards Corfu, Malta, and Egypt; and when he received +the official ultimatum, he saw that the Directory desired a renewal +of the war under conditions highly embarrassing for him. "Yes: I +see clearly that they are preparing defeats for me," he exclaimed +to his aide-de-camp Lavalette. They angered him still more when, on +the death of Hoche, they intrusted their Rhenish forces, numbering +120,000 men, to the command of Augereau, and sent to the Army of +Italy an officer bearing a manifesto written by Augereau concerning +Fructidor, which set forth the anxiety felt by the Directors +concerning Bonaparte's political views. At this Bonaparte fired up +and again offered his resignation (September 25th):</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"No power on earth shall, after this horrible and most +unexpected act of ingratitude by the Government, make me continue +to serve it. My health imperiously demands calm and repose.... My +recompense is in my conscience and in the opinion of posterity. +Believe me, that at any time of danger, I shall be the first to +defend the Constitution of the Year III."</p> +</div> + +<p>The resignation was of course declined, in terms most flattering +to Bonaparte; and the Directors prepared to ratify the treaty with +Sardinia.</p> + +<p>Indeed, the fit of passion once passed, the determination <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i169" id= +"page_i169">[pg.169]</a></span> to dominate events again possessed +him, and he decided to make peace, despite the recent instructions +of the Directory that no peace would be honourable which sacrificed +Venice to Austria. There is reason to believe that he now regretted +this sacrifice. His passionate outbursts against Venice after the +<i>Pâques véronaises</i>, his denunciations of "that +fierce and bloodstained rule," had now given place to some feelings +of pity for the people whose ruin he had so artfully compassed; and +the social intercourse with Venetians which he enjoyed at +Passeriano, the castle of the Doge Manin, may well have inspired +some regard for the proud city which he was now about to barter +away to Austria. Only so, however, could he peacefully terminate +the wearisome negotiations with the Emperor. The Austrian envoy, +Count Cobenzl, struggled hard to gain the whole of Venetia, and the +Legations, along with the half of Lombardy.<a name= +"FNanchor_89_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89_89"><sup>[89]</sup></a> +From these exorbitant demands he was driven by the persistent +vigour of Bonaparte's assaults. The little Corsican proved himself +an expert in diplomatic wiles, now enticing the Imperialist on to +slippery ground, and occasionally shocking him by calculated +outbursts of indignation or bravado. After many days spent in +intellectual fencing, the discussions were narrowed down to Mainz, +Mantua, Venice, and the Ionian Isles. On the fate of these islands +a stormy discussion arose, Cobenzl stipulating for their complete +independence, while Bonaparte passionately claimed them for France. +In one of these sallies his vehement gestures overturned a cabinet +with a costly vase; but the story that he smashed the vase, as a +sign of his power to crush the House of Austria, is a later +refinement on the incident, about which Cobenzl merely reported to +Vienna—"He behaved like a fool." Probably his dextrous +disclosure of the severe terms which the Directory ordered him to +extort was far more effective than this boisterous +<i>gasconnade</i>. Finally, after threatening an immediate<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i170" id= +"page_i170">[pg.170]</a></span> attack on the Austrian positions, +he succeeded on three of the questions above named, but at the +sacrifice of Venice to Austria.</p> + +<p>The treaty was signed on October 17th at the village of Campo +Formio. The published articles may be thus summarized: Austria +ceded to the French Republic her Belgic provinces. Of the once +extensive Venetian possessions France gained the Ionian Isles, +while Austria acquired Istria, Dalmatia, the districts at the mouth +of the Cattaro, the city of Venice, and the mainland of Venetia as +far west as Lake Garda, the Adige, and the lower part of the River +Po. The Hapsburgs recognized the independence of the now enlarged +Cisalpine Republic. France and Austria agreed to frame a treaty of +commerce on the basis of "the most favoured nation." The Emperor +ceded to the dispossessed Duke of Modena the territory of Breisgau +on the east of the Rhine. A congress was to be held at Rastadt, at +which the plenipotentiaries of France and of the Germanic Empire +were to regulate affairs between these two Powers.</p> + +<p>Secret articles bound the Emperor to use his influence in the +Empire to secure for France the left bank of the Rhine; while +France was to use her good offices to procure for the Emperor the +Archbishopric of Salzburg and the Bavarian land between that State +and the River Inn. Other secret articles referred to the +indemnities which were to be found in Germany for some of the +potentates who suffered by the changes announced in the public +treaty.</p> + +<p>The bartering away of Venice awakened profound indignation. +After more than a thousand years of independence, that city was +abandoned to the Emperor by the very general who had promised to +free Italy. It was in vain that Bonaparte strove to soothe the +provisional government of that city through the influence of a +Venetian Jew, who, after his conversion, had taken the famous name +of Dandolo. Summoning him to Passeriano, he explained to him the +hard necessity which now dictated the transfer of Venice to +Austria. <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i171" id= +"page_i171">[pg.171]</a></span></p> + +<center><a name="image_05"><img alt= +"CENTRAL EUROPE, after the Peace of Campo Formio, 1797 " src= +"images/image05.jpg" width="418" height="636"><br> +<font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>CENTRAL EUROPE, +after the Peace of Campo Formio, 1797</small></font></a></center> + +<p>[CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER THE PEACE OF CAMPO FORMIO, 1797<br> +The boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire are indicated by thick +dots. The Austrian Dominions are indicated by vertical lines. The +Prussian Dominions are indicated by horizontal lines. The +Ecclesiastical States are indicated by dotted areas.]</p> + +France could not now <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i172" id= +"page_i172">[pg.172]</a></span> shed any more of her best blood for +what was, after all, only "a moral cause": the Venetians therefore +must cultivate resignation for the present and hope for the future. +The advice was useless. The Venetian democrats determined on a last +desperate venture. They secretly sent three deputies, among them +Dandolo, with a large sum of money wherewith to bribe the Directors +to reject the treaty of Campo Formio. This would have been quite +practicable, had not their errand become known to Bonaparte. +Alarmed and enraged at this device, which, if successful, would +have consigned him to infamy, he sent Duroc in chase; and the +envoys, caught before they crossed the Maritime Alps, were brought +before the general at Milan. To his vehement reproaches and threats +they opposed a dignified silence, until Dandolo, appealing to his +generosity, awakened those nobler feelings which were never long +dormant. Then he quietly dismissed them—to witness the +downfall of their beloved city.<br> +<br> + + +<p><i>Acribus initiis, ut ferme talia, incuriosa fine</i>; these +cynical words, with which the historian of the Roman Empire blasted +the movements of his age, may almost serve as the epitaph to +Bonaparte's early enthusiasms. Proclaiming at the beginning of his +Italian campaigns that he came to free Italy, he yet finished his +course of almost unbroken triumphs by a surrender which his +panegyrists have scarcely attempted to condone. But the fate of +Venice was almost forgotten amidst the jubilant acclaim which +greeted the conqueror of Italy on his arrival at Paris. All France +rang with the praises of the hero who had spread liberty throughout +Northern and Central Italy, had enriched the museums of Paris with +priceless masterpieces of art, whose army had captured 150,000 +prisoners, and had triumphed in 18 pitched battles—for +Caldiero was now reckoned as a French victory—and 47 smaller +engagements. The Directors, shrouding their hatred and fear of the +masterful proconsul under their Roman togas, greeted him with +uneasy effusiveness. The climax of the official comedy was <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i173" id= +"page_i173">[pg.173]</a></span> reached when, at the reception of +the conqueror, Barras, pointing northwards, exclaimed: "Go there +and capture the giant corsair that infests the seas: go punish in +London outrages that have too long been unpunished": whereupon, as +if overcome by his emotions, he embraced the general. Amidst +similar attentions bestowed by the other Directors, the curtain +falls on the first, or Italian, act of the young hero's career, +soon to rise on oriental adventures that were to recall the +exploits of Alexander. <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i174" +id="page_i174">[pg.174]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER VIII</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>EGYPT</center> + +<br> + + +<p>Among the many misconceptions of the French revolutionists none +was more insidious than the notion that the wealth and power of the +British people rested on an artificial basis. This mistaken belief +in England's weakness arose out of the doctrine taught by the +<i>Economistes</i> or <i>Physiocrates</i> in the latter half of +last century, that commerce was not of itself productive of wealth, +since it only promoted the distribution of the products of the +earth; but that agriculture was the sole source of true wealth and +prosperity. They therefore exalted agriculture at the expense of +commerce and manufactures, and the course of the Revolution, which +turned largely on agrarian questions, tended in the same direction. +Robespierre and St. Just were never weary of contrasting the +virtues of a simple pastoral life with the corruptions and weakness +engendered by foreign commerce; and when, early in 1793, +Jacobinical zeal embroiled the young Republic with England, the +orators of the Convention confidently prophesied the downfall of +the modern Carthage. Kersaint declared that "the credit of England +rests upon fictitious wealth: ... bounded in territory, the public +future of England is found almost wholly in its bank, and this +edifice is entirely supported by naval commerce. It is easy to +cripple this commerce, and especially so for a power like France, +which stands alone on her own riches."<a name= +"FNanchor_90_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90_90"><sup>[90]</sup></a> +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i175" id= +"page_i175">[pg.175]</a></span></p> + +<p>Commercial interests played a foremost part all through the +struggle. The official correspondence of Talleyrand in 1797 proves +that the Directory intended to claim the Channel Islands, the north +of Newfoundland, and all our conquests in the East Indies made +since 1754, besides the restitution of Gibraltar to Spain.<a name= +"FNanchor_91_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91_91"><sup>[91]</sup></a> +Nor did these hopes seem extravagant. The financial crisis in +London and the mutiny at the Nore seemed to betoken the exhaustion +of England, while the victories of Bonaparte raised the power of +France to heights never known before. Before the victory of Duncan +over the Dutch at Camperdown (October 11th, 1797), Britain seemed +to have lost her naval supremacy.</p> + +<p>The recent admission of State bankruptcy at Paris, when +two-thirds of the existing liabilities were practically expunged, +sharpened the desire of the Directory to compass England's ruin, an +enterprise which might serve to restore French credit and would +certainly engage those vehement activities of Bonaparte that could +otherwise work mischief in Paris. On his side he gladly accepted +the command of the <i>Army of England</i>.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"The people of Paris do not remember anything," he said to +Bourrienne. "Were I to remain here long, doing nothing, I should be +lost. In this great Babylon everything wears out: my glory has +already disappeared. This little Europe does not supply enough of +it for me. I must seek it in the East: all great fame comes from +that quarter. However, I wish first to make a tour along the +[northern] coast to see for myself what may be attempted. If the +success of a descent upon England appear doubtful, as I suspect it +will, the Army of England shall become the Army of the East, and I +go to Egypt."<a name="FNanchor_92_92"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_92_92"><sup>[92]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>In February, 1798, he paid a brief visit to Dunkirk and the +Flemish coast, and concluded that the invasion of England was +altogether too complicated to be hazarded<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i176" id="page_i176">[pg.176]</a></span> except as a +last desperate venture. In a report to the Government (February +23rd) he thus sums up the whole situation:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Whatever efforts we make, we shall not for some years gain the +naval supremacy. To invade England without that supremacy is the +most daring and difficult task ever undertaken.... If, having +regard to the present organization of our navy, it seems impossible +to gain the necessary promptness of execution, then we must really +give up the expedition against England, <i>be satisfied with +keeping up the pretence of it</i>, and concentrate all our +attention and resources on the Rhine, in order to try to deprive +England of Hanover and Hamburg:<a name="FNanchor_93_93"></a><a +href="#Footnote_93_93"><sup>[93]</sup></a> ... or else undertake an +eastern expedition which would menace her trade with the Indies. +And if none of these three operations is practicable, I see nothing +else for it but to conclude peace with England."</p> +</div> + +<p>The greater part of his career serves as a commentary on these +designs. To one or other of them he was constantly turning as +alternative schemes for the subjugation of his most redoubtable +foe. The first plan he now judged to be impracticable; the second, +which appears later in its fully matured form as his Continental +System, was not for the present feasible, because France was about +to settle German affairs at the Congress of Rastadt; to the third +he therefore turned the whole force of his genius.</p> + +<p>The conquest of Egypt and the restoration to France of her +supremacy in India appealed to both sides of Bonaparte's nature. +The vision of the tricolour floating above the minarets of Cairo +and the palace of the Great Mogul at Delhi fascinated a mind in +which the mysticism of the south was curiously blent with the +practicality and passion for details that characterize the northern +races. To very few men in the world's history has it been granted +to dream grandiose dreams and all but<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i177" id="page_i177">[pg.177]</a></span> realize them, to use +by turns the telescope and the microscope of political survey, to +plan vast combinations of force, and yet to supervise with infinite +care the adjustment of every adjunct. Cæsar, in the old +world, was possibly the mental peer of Bonaparte in this majestic +equipoise of the imaginative and practical qualities; but of +Cæsar we know comparatively little; whereas the complex +workings of the greatest mind of the modern world stand revealed in +that storehouse of facts and fancies, the "Correspondance de +Napoléon." The motives which led to the Eastern Expedition +are there unfolded. In the letter which he wrote to Talleyrand +shortly before the signature of the peace of Campo Formio occurs +this suggestive passage:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"The character of our nation is to be far too vivacious amidst +prosperity. If we take for the basis of all our operations true +policy, which is nothing else than the calculation of combinations +and chances, we shall long be <i>la grande nation</i> and the +arbiter of Europe. I say more: we hold the balance of Europe: we +will make that balance incline as we wish; and, if such is the +order of fate, I think it by no means impossible that we may in a +few years attain those grand results of which the heated and +enthusiastic imagination catches a glimpse, and which the extremely +cool, persistent, and calculating man will alone attain."</p> +</div> + +<p>This letter was written when Bonaparte was bartering away Venice +to the Emperor in consideration of the acquisition by France of the +Ionian Isles. Its reference to the vivacity of the French was +doubtless evoked by the orders which he then received to +"revolutionize Italy." To do that, while the Directory further +extorted from England Gibraltar, the Channel Islands, and her +eastern conquests, was a programme dictated by excessive vivacity. +The Directory lacked the practical qualities that selected one +great enterprise at a time and brought to bear on it the needful +concentration of effort. In brief, he selected the war against +England's eastern commerce as his next sphere of action; for it +offered "an arena vaster, more necessary <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i178" id="page_i178">[pg.178]</a></span> and +resplendent" than war with Austria; "if we compel the [British] +Government to a peace, the advantages we shall gain for our +commerce in both hemispheres will be a great step towards the +consolidation of liberty and the public welfare."<a name= +"FNanchor_94_94"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_94_94"><sup>[94]</sup></a></p> + +<p>For this eastern expedition he had already prepared. In May, +1797, he had suggested the seizure of Malta from the Knights of St. +John; and when, on September 27th, the Directory gave its assent, +he sent thither a French commissioner, Poussielgue, on a +"commercial mission," to inspect those ports, and also, doubtless, +to undermine the discipline of the Knights. Now that the British +had retired from Corsica, and France disposed of the maritime +resources of Northern Italy, Spain, and Holland, it seemed quite +practicable to close the Mediterranean to those "intriguing and +enterprising islanders," to hold them at bay in their dull northern +seas, to exhaust them by ruinous preparations against expected +descents on their southern coasts, on Ireland, and even on +Scotland, while Bonaparte's eastern conquests dried up the sources +of their wealth in the Orient: "Let us concentrate all our activity +on our navy and destroy England. That done, Europe is at our +feet."<a name="FNanchor_95_95"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_95_95"><sup>[95]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But he encountered opposition from the Directory. They still +clung to their plan of revolutionizing Italy; and only by playing +on their fear of the army could he bring these civilians to assent +to the expatriation of 35,000 troops and their best generals. On La +Réveillière-Lépeaux<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i179" id="page_i179">[pg.179]</a></span> the young +commander worked with a skill that veiled the choicest irony. This +Director was the high-priest of a newly-invented cult, termed +<i>Théo-philanthropie</i>, into the dull embers of which he +was still earnestly blowing. To this would-be prophet Bonaparte now +suggested that the eastern conquests would furnish a splendid field +for the spread of the new faith; and La Réveillière +was forthwith converted from his scheme of revolutionizing Europe +to the grander sphere of moral proselytism opened out to him in the +East by the very chief who, on landing in Egypt, forthwith +professed the Moslem creed.</p> + +<p>After gaining the doubtful assent of the Directory, Bonaparte +had to face urgent financial difficulties. The dearth of money was, +however, met by two opportune interventions. The first of these was +in the affairs of Rome. The disorders of the preceding year in that +city had culminated at Christmas in a riot in which General Duphot +had been assassinated; this outrage furnished the pretext desired +by the Directory for revolutionizing Central Italy. Berthier was at +once ordered to lead French troops against the Eternal City. He +entered without resistance (February 15th, 1798), declared the +civil authority of the Pope at an end, and proclaimed the +<i>restoration</i> of the Roman Republic. The practical side of the +liberating policy was soon revealed. A second time the treasures of +Rome, both artistic and financial, were rifled; and, as Lucien +Bonaparte caustically remarked in his "Memoirs," the chief duty of +the newly-appointed consuls and quæstors was to superintend +the packing up of pictures and statues designed for Paris. Berthier +not only laid the basis of a large private fortune, but showed his +sense of the object of the expedition by sending large sums for the +equipment of the armada at Toulon. "In sending me to Rome," wrote +Berthier to Bonaparte, "you appoint me treasurer to the expedition +against England. I will try to fill the exchequer."</p> + +<p>The intervention of the Directory in the affairs of Switzerland +was equally lucrative. The inhabitants of<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i180" id="page_i180">[pg.180]</a></span> the district of +Vaud, in their struggles against the oppressive rule of the Bernese +oligarchy, had offered to the French Government the excuse for +interference: and a force invading that land, overpowered the +levies of the central cantons.<a name="FNanchor_96_96"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_96_96"><sup>[96]</sup></a> The imposition of a +centralized form of government modelled on that of France, the +wresting of Geneva from this ancient confederation, and its +incorporation with France, were not the only evils suffered by +Switzerland. Despite the proclamation of General Brune that the +French came as friends to the descendants of William Tell, and +would respect their independence and their property, French +commissioners proceeded to rifle the treasuries of Berne, +Zürich, Solothurn, Fribourg, and Lucerne of sums which +amounted in all to eight and a half million francs; fifteen +millions were extorted in forced contributions and plunder, besides +130 cannon and 60,000 muskets which also became the spoils of the +liberators.<a name="FNanchor_97_97"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_97_97"><sup>[97]</sup></a> The destination of part of +the treasure was already fixed; on April 13th Bonaparte wrote an +urgent letter to General Lannes, directing him to expedite the +transit of the booty to Toulon, where three million francs were +forthwith expended on the completion of the armada.</p> + +<p>This letter, and also the testimony of Madame de Staël, +Barras, Bourrienne, and Mallet du Pan, show that he must have been +a party to this interference in Swiss affairs, which marks a +debasement, not only of Bonaparte's character, but of that of the +French army and people. It drew from Coleridge, who previously had +seen in the Revolution the dawn of a nobler era, an indignant +protest against the prostitution of the ideas of 1789:</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Oh France that mockest Heaven, +adulterous, blind,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Are these thy boasts, champion of +human kind?</span><br> +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i181" id="page_i181">[pg.181]</a></span> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">To mix with Kings in the low lust +of sway,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yell in the hunt and join the +murderous prey? ...</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">The sensual and the dark rebel in +vain</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Slaves by their own compulsion. In +mad game</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">They burst their manacles: but wear +the name</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Of Freedom, graven on a heavier +chain."</span><br> +</p> + +<p>The occupation by French troops of the great central bastion of +the European system seemed a challenge, not only to idealists, but +to German potentates. It nearly precipitated a rupture with Vienna, +where the French tricolour had recently been torn down by an angry +crowd. But Bonaparte did his utmost to prevent a renewal of war +that would blight his eastern prospects; and he succeeded. One last +trouble remained. At his final visit to the Directory, when crossed +about some detail, he passionately threw up his command. Thereupon +Rewbell, noted for his incisive speech, drew up the form of +resignation, and presenting it to Bonaparte, firmly said, "Sign, +citizen general." The general did not sign, but retired from the +meeting apparently crestfallen, but really meditating a <i>coup +d'état</i>. This last statement rests on the evidence of +Mathieu Dumas, who heard it through General Desaix, a close friend +of Bonaparte; and it is clear from the narratives of Bourrienne, +Barras, and Madame Junot that, during his last days in Paris, the +general was moody, preoccupied, and fearful of being poisoned.</p> + +<p>At last the time of preparation and suspense was at an end. The +aims of the expedition as officially defined by a secret decree on +April 12th included the capture of Egypt and the exclusion of the +English from "all their possessions in the East to which the +general can come"; Bonaparte was also to have the isthmus of Suez +cut through; to "assure the <i>free and exclusive</i> possession of +the Red Sea to the French Republic"; to improve the condition of +the natives of Egypt, and to cultivate good relations with the +Grand Signior. Another secret decree empowered Bonaparte to seize +Malta. To these schemes he added another of truly colossal +dimensions. After <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i182" id= +"page_i182">[pg.182]</a></span> conquering the East, he would rouse +the Greeks and other Christians of the East, overthrow the Turks, +seize Constantinople, and "take Europe in the rear."</p> + +<p>Generous support was accorded to the <i>savants</i> who were +desirous of exploring the artistic and literary treasures of Egypt +and Mesopotamia. It has been affirmed by the biographer of Monge +that the enthusiasm of this celebrated physicist first awakened +Bonaparte's desire for the eastern expedition; but this seems to +have been aroused earlier by Volney, who saw a good deal of +Bonaparte in 1791. In truth, the desire to wrest the secrets of +learning from the mysterious East seems always to have spurred on +his keenly inquisitive nature. During the winter months of 1797-8 +he attended the chemical lectures of the renowned Berthollet; and +it was no perfunctory choice which selected him for the place in +the famous institute left vacant by the exile of Carnot. The manner +in which he now signed his orders and proclamations—Member of +the Institute, General in Chief of the Army of the +East—showed his determination to banish from the life of +France that affectation of boorish ignorance by which the +Terrorists had rendered themselves uniquely odious.</p> + +<p>After long delays, caused by contrary winds, the armada set sail +from Toulon. Along with the convoys from Marseilles, Genoa, and +Civita Vecchia, it finally reached the grand total of 13 ships of +the line, 7 frigates, several gunboats, and nearly 300 transports +of various sizes, conveying 35,000 troops. Admiral Brueys was the +admiral, but acting under Bonaparte. Of the generals whom the +commander-in-chief took with him, the highest in command were the +divisional generals Kléber, Desaix, Bon, Menou, Reynier, for +the infantry: under them served 14 generals, a few of whom, as +Marmont, were to achieve a wider fame. The cavalry was commanded by +the stalwart mulatto, General Alexandre Dumas, under whom served +Leclerc, the husband of Pauline Bonaparte, along with two men +destined to world-wide renown, Murat and Davoust. The artillery +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i183" id= +"page_i183">[pg.183]</a></span> was commanded by Dommartin, the +engineers by Caffarelli: and the heroic Lannes was quarter-master +general.</p> + +<p>The armada appeared off Malta without meeting with any incident. +This island was held by the Knights of St. John, the last of those +companies of Christian warriors who had once waged war on the +infidels in Palestine. Their courage had evaporated in luxurious +ease, and their discipline was a prey to intestine schisms and to +the intrigues carried on with the French Knights of the Order. A +French fleet had appeared off Valetta in the month of March in the +hope of effecting a surprise; but the admiral, Brueys, judging the +effort too hazardous, sent an awkward explanation, which only +served to throw the knights into the arms of Russia. One of the +chivalrous dreams of the Czar Paul was that of spreading his +influence in the Mediterranean by a treaty with this Order. It +gratified his crusading ardour and promised to Russia a naval base +for the partition of Turkey which was then being discussed with +Austria: to secure the control of the island, Russia was about to +expend 400,000 roubles, when Bonaparte anticipated Muscovite +designs by a prompt seizure.<a name="FNanchor_98_98"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_98_98"><sup>[98]</sup></a> An excuse was easily found +for a rupture with the Order: some companies of troops were +disembarked, and hostilities commenced.</p> + +<p>Secure within their mighty walls, the knights might have held +the intruders at bay, had they not been divided by internal +disputes: the French knights refused to fight against their +countrymen; and a revolt of the native Maltese, long restless under +the yoke of the Order, now helped to bring the Grand Master to a +surrender. The evidence of the English consul, Mr. Williams, seems +to show that the discontent of the natives was even more potent +than the influence of French gold in bringing about this result.<a +name="FNanchor_99_99"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_99_99"><sup>[99]</sup></a> At any rate, one of the<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i184" id= +"page_i184">[pg.184]</a></span> strongest places in Europe admitted +a French garrison, after so tame a defence that General Caffarelli, +on viewing the fortifications, remarked to Bonaparte: "Upon my +word, general, it is lucky there was some one in the town to open +the gates to us."</p> + +<p>During his stay of seven days at Malta, Bonaparte revealed the +vigour of those organizing powers for which the half of Europe was +soon to present all too small an arena. He abolished the Order, +pensioning off those French knights who had been serviceable: he +abolished the religious houses and confiscated their domains to the +service of the new government: he established a governmental +commission acting under a military governor: he continued +provisionally the existing taxes, and provided for the imposition +of customs, excise, and octroi dues: he prepared the way for the +improvement of the streets, the erection of fountains, the +reorganization of the hospitals and the post office. To the +university he gave special attention, rearranging the curriculum on +the model of the more advanced <i>écoles centrales</i> of +France, but inclining the studies severely to the exact sciences +and the useful arts. On all sides he left the imprint of his +practical mind, that viewed life as a game at chess, whence bishops +and knights were carefully banished, and wherein nothing was left +but the heavy pieces and subservient pawns.</p> + +<p>After dragging Malta out of its mediaeval calm and plunging it +into the full swirl of modern progress, Bonaparte set sail for +Egypt. His exchequer was the richer by all the gold and silver, +whether in bullion or in vessels, discoverable in the treasury of +Malta or in the Church of St. John. Fortunately, the silver gates +of this church had been coloured over, and thus escaped the fate of +the other treasures.<a name="FNanchor_100_100"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_100_100"><sup>[100]</sup></a> On the voyage to +Alexandria<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i185" id= +"page_i185">[pg.185]</a></span> he studied the library of books +which he had requested Bourrienne to purchase for him. The +composition of this library is of interest as showing the strong +trend of his thoughts towards history, though at a later date he +was careful to limit its study in the university and schools which +he founded. He had with him 125 volumes of historical works, among +which the translations of Thucydides, Plutarch, Tacitus, and Livy +represented the life of the ancient world, while in modern life he +concentrated his attention chiefly on the manners and institutions +of peoples and the memoirs of great generals—as Turenne, +Condé, Luxembourg, Saxe, Marlborough, Eugène, and +Charles XII. Of the poets he selected the so-called Ossian, Tasso, +Ariosto, Homer, Virgil, and the masterpieces of the French theatre; +but he especially affected the turgid and declamatory style of +Ossian. In romance, English literature was strongly represented by +forty volumes of novels, of course in translations. Besides a few +works on arts and sciences, he also had with him twelve volumes of +"Barclay's Geography," and three volumes of "Cook's Voyages," which +show that his thoughts extended to the antipodes; and under the +heading of Politics he included the Bible, the Koran, the Vedas, a +Mythology, and Montesquieu's "Esprit des Lois"! The composition and +classification of this library are equally suggestive. Bonaparte +carefully searched out the weak places of the organism which he was +about to attack—in the present campaign, Egypt and the +British Empire. The climate and natural products, the genius of its +writers and the spirit of its religion—nothing came amiss to +his voracious intellect, which assimilated the most diverse +materials and pressed them all into his service. Greek mythology +provided allusions for the adornment of his proclamations, the +Koran would dictate his behaviour towards the Moslems, and the +Bible was to be his guide-book concerning the Druses and Armenians. +All three were therefore grouped together under the head of +Politics.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i186" id= +"page_i186">[pg.186]</a></span></p> + +<p>And this, on the whole, fairly well represents his mental +attitude towards religion: at least, it was his work-a-day +attitude. There were moments, it is true, when an overpowering +sense of the majesty of the universe lifted his whole being far +above this petty opportunism: and in those moments, which, in +regard to the declaration of character, may surely be held to +counterbalance whole months spent in tactical shifts and diplomatic +wiles, he was capable of soaring to heights of imaginative +reverence. Such an episode, lighting up for us the recesses of his +mind, occurred during his voyage to Egypt. The <i>savants</i> on +board his ship, "L'Orient," were discussing one of those questions +which Bonaparte often propounded, in order that, as arbiter in this +contest of wits, he might gauge their mental powers. Mental +dexterity, rather than the Socratic pursuit after truth, was the +aim of their dialectic; but on one occasion, when religion was +being discussed, Bonaparte sounded a deeper note: looking up into +the midnight vault of sky, he said to the philosophizing atheists: +"Very ingenious, sirs, but who made all that?" As a retort to the +tongue-fencers, what could be better? The appeal away from words to +the star-studded canopy was irresistible: it affords a signal proof +of what Carlyle has finely called his "instinct for nature" and his +"ineradicable feeling for reality." This probably was the true man, +lying deep under his Moslem shifts and Concordat bargainings.</p> + +<p>That there was a tinge of superstition in Bonaparte's nature, +such as usually appears in gifted scions of a coast-dwelling +family, cannot be denied;<a name="FNanchor_101_101"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_101_101"><sup>[101]</sup></a> but his usual attitude +towards religion was that of the political mechanician, not of the +devotee, and even while professing the forms of fatalistic belief, +he really subordinated them to his own designs. To this profound +calculation of the credulity of mankind we may probably refer his +allusions to his star. The present writer<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i187" id="page_i187">[pg.187]</a></span> regards it as +almost certain that his star was invoked in order to dazzle the +vulgar herd. Indeed, if we may trust Miot de Melito, the First +Consul once confessed as much to a circle of friends. +"Cæsar," he said, "was right to cite his good fortune and to +appear to believe in it. That is a means of acting on the +imagination of others without offending anyone's self-love." A +strange admission this; what boundless self-confidence it implies +that he should have admitted the trickery. The mere acknowledgment +of it is a proof that he felt himself so far above the plane of +ordinary mortals that, despite the disclosure, he himself would +continue to be his own star. For the rest, is it credible that this +analyzing genius could ever have seriously adopted the astrologer's +creed? Is there anything in his early note-books or later +correspondence which warrants such a belief? Do not all his +references to his star occur in proclamations and addresses +intended for popular consumption?</p> + +<p>Certainly Bonaparte's good fortune was conspicuous all through +these eastern adventures, and never more so than when he escaped +the pursuit of Nelson. The English admiral had divined his aim. +Setting all sail, he came almost within sight of the French force +near Crete, and he reached Alexandria barely two days before his +foes hove in sight. Finding no hostile force there, he doubled back +on his course and scoured the seas between Crete, Sicily, and the +Morca, until news received from a Turkish official again sent him +eastwards. On such trifles does the fate of empires sometimes +depend.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile events were crowding thick and fast upon Bonaparte. To +free himself from the terrible risks which had menaced his force +off the Egyptian coast, he landed his troops, 35,000 strong, with +all possible expedition at Marabout near Alexandria, and, directing +his columns of attack on the walls of that city, captured it by a +rush (July 2nd).</p> + +<p>For this seizure of neutral territory he offered no excuse other +than that the Beys, who were the real rulers <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i188" id="page_i188">[pg.188]</a></span> of +Egypt, had favoured English commerce and were guilty of some +outrages on French merchants. He strove, however, to induce the +Sultan of Turkey to believe that the French invasion of Egypt was a +friendly act, as it would overthrow the power of the Mamelukes, who +had reduced Turkish authority to a mere shadow. This was the +argument which he addressed to the Turkish officials, but it proved +to be too subtle even for the oriental mind fully to appreciate. +Bonaparte's chief concern was to win over the subject population, +which consisted of diverse races. At the surface were the +Mamelukes, a powerful military order, possessing a magnificent +cavalry, governed by two Beys, and scarcely recognizing the vague +suzerainty claimed by the Porte. The rivalries of the Beys, Murad +and Ibrahim, produced a fertile crop of discords in this governing +caste, and their feuds exposed the subject races, both Arabs and +Copts, to constant forays and exactions. It seemed possible, +therefore, to arouse them against the dominant caste, provided that +the Mohammedan scruples of the whole population were carefully +respected. To this end, the commander cautioned his troops to act +towards the Moslems as towards "Jews and Italians," and to respect +their muftis and imams as much as "rabbis and bishops." He also +proclaimed to the Egyptians his determination, while overthrowing +Mameluke tyranny, to respect the Moslem faith: "Have we not +destroyed the Pope, who bade men wage war on Moslems? Have we not +destroyed the Knights of Malta, because those fools believed it to +be God's will to war against Moslems?" The French soldiers were +vastly amused by the humour of these proceedings, and the liberated +people fully appreciated the menaces with which Bonaparte's +proclamation closed, backed up as these were by irresistible +force.<a name="FNanchor_102_102"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_102_102"><sup>[102]</sup></a></p> + +<p>After arranging affairs at Alexandria, where the gallant<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i189" id= +"page_i189">[pg.189]</a></span> Kléber was left in command, +Bonaparte ordered an advance into the interior. Never, perhaps, did +he show the value of swift offensive action more decisively than in +this prompt march on Damanhour across the desert. The other route +by way of Rosetta would have been easier; but, as it was longer, he +rejected it, and told off General Menou to capture that city and +support a flotilla of boats which was to ascend the Nile and meet +the army on its march to Cairo. On July 4th the first division of +the main force set forth by night into the desert south of +Alexandria. All was new and terrible; and, when the rays of the sun +smote on their weary backs, the murmurings of the troops grew loud. +This, then, was the land "more fertile than Lombardy," which was +the goal of their wanderings. "See, there are the six acres of land +which you are promised," exclaimed a waggish soldier to his comrade +as they first gazed from ship-board on the desert east of +Alexandria; and all the sense of discipline failed to keep this and +other gibes from the ears of staff officers even before they +reached that city. Far worse was their position now in the shifting +sand of the desert, beset by hovering Bedouins, stung by scorpions, +and afflicted by intolerable thirst. The Arabs had filled the +scanty wells with stones, and only after long toil could the +sappers reach the precious fluid beneath. Then the troops rushed +and fought for the privilege of drinking a few drops of muddy +liquor. Thus they struggled on, the succeeding divisions faring +worst of all. Berthier, chief of the staff, relates that a glass of +water sold for its weight in gold. Even brave officers abandoned +themselves to transports of rage and despair which left them +completely prostrate.<a name="FNanchor_103_103"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_103_103"><sup>[103]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But Bonaparte flinched not. His stern composure offered the best +rebuke to such childish sallies; and when out of a murmuring group +there came the bold remark, "Well, General, are you going to take +us to India thus," he abashed the speaker and his comrades by the +quick<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i190" id= +"page_i190">[pg.190]</a></span> retort, "No, I would not undertake +that with such soldiers as you." French honour, touched to the +quick, reasserted itself even above the torments of thirst; and the +troops themselves, when they tardily reached the Nile and slaked +their thirst in its waters, recognized the pre-eminence of his will +and his profound confidence in their endurance. French gaiety had +not been wholly eclipsed even by the miseries of the desert march. +To cheer their drooping spirits the commander had sent some of the +staunchest generals along the line of march. Among them was the +gifted Caffarelli, who had lost a leg in the Rhenish campaign: his +reassuring words called forth the inimitable retort from the ranks: +"Ah! he don't care, not he: he has one leg in France." Scarcely +less witty was the soldier's description of the prowling Bedouins, +who cut off stragglers and plunderers, as "The mounted highway +police."</p> + +<p>After brushing aside a charge of 800 Mamelukes at Chebreiss, the +army made its way up the banks of the Nile to Embabeh, opposite +Cairo. There the Mamelukes, led by the fighting Bey, Murad, had +their fortified camp; and there that superb cavalry prepared to +overwhelm the invaders in a whirlwind rush of horse (July 21st, +1798). The occasion and the surroundings were such as to inspire +both sides with deperate resolution. It was the first fierce shock +on land of eastern chivalry and western enterprise since the days +of St. Louis; and the ardour of the republicans was scarcely less +than that which had kindled the soldiers of the cross. Beside the +two armies rolled the mysterious Nile; beyond glittered the slender +minarets of Cairo; and on the south there loomed the massy +Pyramids. To the forty centuries that had rolled over them, +Bonaparte now appealed, in one of those imaginative touches which +ever brace the French nature to the utmost tension of daring and +endurance. Thus they advanced in close formation towards the +intrenched camp of the Mamelukes. The divisions on the left at once +rushed at its earthworks, silenced its feeble artillery, and +slaughtered the fellahin inside. <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i191" id="page_i191">[pg.191]</a></span></p> + +<p>But the other divisions, now ranged in squares, while gazing at +this exploit, were assailed by the Mamelukes. From out the haze of +the mirage, or from behind the ridges of sand and the scrub of the +water-melon plants that dotted the plain, some 10,000 of these +superb horsemen suddenly appeared and rushed at the squares +commanded by Desaix and Reynier. Their richly caparisoned chargers, +their waving plumes, their wild battle-cries, and their marvellous +skill with carbine and sword, lent picturesqueness and terror to +the charge. Musketry and grapeshot mowed down their front coursers +in ghastly swathes; but the living mass swept on, wellnigh +overwhelming the fronts of the squares, and then, swerving aside, +poured through the deadly funnel between. Decimated here also by +the steady fire of the French files, and by the discharges of the +rear face, they fell away exhausted, leaving heaps of dead and +dying on the fronts of the squares, and in their very midst a score +of their choicest cavaliers, whose bravery and horsemanship had +carried them to certain death amidst the bayonets. The French now +assumed the offensive, and Desaix's division, threatening to cut +off the retreat of Murad's horsemen, led that wary chief to draw +off his shattered squadrons; others sought, though with terrible +losses, to escape across the Nile to Ibrahim's following. That +chief had taken no share in the fight, and now made off towards +Syria. Such was the battle of the Pyramids, which gained a colony +at the cost of some thirty killed and about ten times as many +wounded: of the killed about twenty fell victims to the cross fire +of the two squares.<a name="FNanchor_104_104"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_104_104"><sup>[104]</sup></a></p> + +<p>After halting for a fortnight at Cairo to recruit his weary +troops and to arrange the affairs of his conquest, Bonaparte +marched eastwards in pursuit of Ibrahim and drove him into Syria, +while Desaix waged an arduous but successful campaign against Murad +in Upper Egypt. But the victors were soon to learn the uselessness +of<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i192" id= +"page_i192">[pg.192]</a></span> merely military triumphs in Egypt. +As Bonaparte returned to complete the organization of the new +colony, he heard that Nelson had destroyed his fleet.</p> + +<p>On July 3rd, before setting out from Alexandria, the French +commander gave an order to his admiral, though it must be added +that its authenticity is doubtful:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"The admiral will to-morrow acquaint the commander-in-chief by a +report whether the squadron can enter the port of Alexandria, or +whether, in Aboukir Roads, bringing its broadside to bear, it can +defend itself against the enemy's superior force; and in case both +these plans should be impracticable, he must sail for Corfu ... +leaving the light ships and the flotilla at Alexandria."</p> +</div> + +<p>Brueys speedily discovered that the first plan was beset by +grave dangers: the entrance to the harbour of Alexandria, when +sounded, proved to be most difficult for large ships—such was +his judgment and that of Villeneuve and Casabianca—and the +exit could be blocked by a single English battleship. As regards +the alternatives of Aboukir or Corfu, Brueys went on to state: "My +firm desire is to be useful to you in every possible way: and, as I +have already said, every post will suit me well, provided that you +placed me there in an active way." By this rather ambiguous phrase +it would seem that he scouted the alternative of Corfu as +consigning him to a degrading inactivity; while at Aboukir he held +that he could be actively useful in protecting the rear of the +army. In that bay he therefore anchored his largest ships, trusting +that the dangers of the approach would screen him from any sudden +attack, but making also special preparations in case he should be +compelled to fight at anchor.<a name="FNanchor_105_105"></a><a +href="#Footnote_105_105"><sup>[105]</sup></a> His decision was +probably less sound than that of Bonaparte, who, while<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i193" id="page_i193">[pg.193]</a></span> +marching to Cairo, and again during his sojourn there, ordered him +to make for Corfu or Toulon; for the general saw clearly that the +French fleet, riding in safety in those well-protected roadsteads, +would really dominate the Mediterranean better than in the open +expanse of Aboukir. But these orders did not reach the admiral +before the blow fell; and it is, after all, somewhat ungenerous to +censure Brueys for his decision to remain at Aboukir and risk a +fight rather than comply with the dictates of a prudent but +inglorious strategy.</p> + +<p>The British admiral, after sweeping the eastern Mediterranean, +at last found the French fleet in Aboukir Bay, about ten miles from +the Rosetta mouth of the Nile. It was anchored under the lee of a +shoal which would have prevented any ordinary admiral from +attacking, especially at sundown. But Nelson, knowing that the head +ship of the French was free to swing at anchor, rightly concluded +that there must be room for British ships to sail between Brueys' +stationary line and the shallows. The British captains thrust five +ships between the French and the shoal, while the others, passing +down the enemy's line on the seaward side, crushed it in detail; +and, after a night of carnage, the light of August 2nd dawned on a +scene of destruction unsurpassed in naval warfare. Two French ships +of the line and two frigates alone escaped: one, the gigantic +"Orient," had blown up with the spoils of Malta on board: the rest, +eleven in number, were captured or burnt.</p> + +<p>To Bonaparte this disaster came as a bolt from the blue. Only +two days before, he had written from Cairo to Brueys that all the +conduct of the English made him believe them to be inferior in +numbers and fully satisfied with blockading Malta. Yet, in order to +restore the <i>morale</i> of his army, utterly depressed by this +disaster,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i194" id= +"page_i194">[pg.194]</a></span> he affected a confidence which he +could no longer feel, and said: "Well! here we must remain or +achieve a grandeur like that of the ancients."<a name= +"FNanchor_106_106"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_106_106"><sup>[106]</sup></a> He had recently assured +his intimates that after routing the Beys' forces he would return +to France and strike a blow direct at England. Whatever he may have +designed, he was now a prisoner in his conquest. His men, even some +of his highest officers, as Berthier, Bessières, Lannes, +Murat, Dumas, and others, bitterly complained of their miserable +position. But the commander, whose spirits rose with adversity, +took effective means for repressing such discontent. To the +last-named, a powerful mulatto, he exclaimed: "You have held +seditious parleys: take care that I do not perform my duty: your +six feet of stature shall not save you from being shot": and he +offered passports for France to a few of the most discontented and +useless officers, well knowing that after Nelson's victory they +could scarcely be used. Others, again, out-Heroding Herod, +suggested that the frigates and transports at Alexandria should be +taken to pieces and conveyed on camels' backs to Suez, there to be +used for the invasion of India.<a name="FNanchor_107_107"></a><a +href="#Footnote_107_107"><sup>[107]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The versatility of Bonaparte's genius was never more marked than +at this time of discouragement. While his enemies figured him and +his exhausted troops as vainly seeking to escape from those arid +wastes; while Nelson was landing the French prisoners in order to +increase his embarrassment about food, Bonaparte and his +<i>savants</i> were developing constructive powers of the highest +order, which made the army independent of Europe. It was a vast +undertaking. Deprived of most of their treasure and many of their +mechanical appliances by the loss of the fleet, the <i>savants</i> +and engineers had, as it were, to start from the beginning. Some +strove to meet the difficulties of food-supply by extending the +cultivation of corn and rice, or by the construction of large ovens +and bakeries, or of windmills for grinding<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i195" id="page_i195">[pg.195]</a></span> corn. Others +planted vineyards for the future, or sought to appease the +ceaseless thirst of the soldiery by the manufacture of a kind of +native beer. Foundries and workshops began, though slowly, to +supply tools and machines; the earth was rifled of her treasures, +natron was wrought, saltpetre works were established, and gunpowder +was thereby procured for the army with an energy which recalled the +prodigies of activity of 1793.</p> + +<p>With his usual ardour in the cause of learning, Bonaparte +several times a week appeared in the chemical laboratory, or +witnessed the experiments performed by Berthollet and Monge. +Desirous of giving cohesion to the efforts of his <i>savants</i>, +and of honouring not only the useful arts but abstruse research, he +united these pioneers of science in a society termed the Institute +of Egypt. On August 23rd, 1798, it was installed with much ceremony +in the palace of one of the Beys, Monge being president and +Bonaparte vice-president. The general also enrolled himself in the +mathematical section of the institute. Indeed, he sought by all +possible means to aid the labours of the <i>savants</i>, whose +dissertations were now heard in the large hall of the harem that +formerly resounded only to the twanging of lutes, weary jests, and +idle laughter. The labours of the <i>savants</i> were not confined +to Cairo and the Delta. As soon as the victories of Desaix in Upper +Egypt opened the middle reaches of the Nile to peaceful research, +the treasures of Memphis were revealed to the astonished gaze of +western learning. Many of the more portable relics were transferred +to Cairo, and thence to Rosetta or Alexandria, in order to grace +the museums of Paris. The <i>savants</i> proposed, but sea-power +disposed, of these treasures. They are now, with few exceptions, in +the British Museum.</p> + +<p>Apart from archæology, much was done to extend the bounds +of learning. Astronomy gained much by the observations of General +Caffarelli. A series of measurements was begun for an exact survey +of Egypt: the geologists and engineers examined the course of<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i196" id= +"page_i196">[pg.196]</a></span> the Nile, recorded the progress of +alluvial deposits at its mouth or on its banks, and therefrom +calculated the antiquity of divers parts of the Delta. No part of +the great conqueror's career so aptly illustrates the truth of his +noble words to the magistrates of the Ligurian Republic: "The true +conquests, the only conquests which cost no regrets, are those +achieved over ignorance."</p> + +<p>Such, in brief outline, is the story of the renascence in Egypt. +The mother-land of science and learning, after a wellnigh barren +interval of 1,100 years since the Arab conquest, was now developed +and illumined by the application of the arts with which in the dim +past she had enriched the life of barbarous Europe. The repayment +of this incalculable debt was due primarily to the enterprise of +Bonaparte. It is one of his many titles to fame and to the homage +of posterity. How poor by the side of this encyclopaedic genius are +the gifts even of his most brilliant foes! At that same time the +Archduke Charles of Austria was vegetating in inglorious ease on +his estates. As for Beaulieu and Würmser, they had subsided +into their native obscurity. Nelson, after his recent triumph, +persuading himself that "Bonaparte had gone to the devil," was +bending before the whims of a professional beauty and the odious +despotism of the worst Court in Europe. While the admiral tarnished +his fame on the Syren coast of Naples, his great opponent bent all +the resources of a fertile intellect to retrieve his position, and +even under the gloom of disaster threw a gleam of light into the +dark continent. While his adversaries were merely generals or +admirals, hampered by a stupid education and a narrow nationality, +Bonaparte had eagerly imbibed the new learning of his age and saw +its possible influence on the reorganization of society. He is not +merely a general. Even when he is scattering to the winds the proud +chivalry of the East, and is prescribing to Brueys his safest +course of action, he finds time vastly to expand the horizon of +human knowledge. <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i197" id= +"page_i197">[pg.197]</a></span></p> + +<p>Nor did he neglect Egyptian politics. He used a native council +for consultation and for the promulgation of his own ideas. +Immediately after his entry into Cairo he appointed nine sheikhs to +form a divan, or council, consulting daily on public order and the +food-supplies of the city. He next assembled a general divan for +Egypt, and a smaller council for each province, and asked their +advice concerning the administration of justice and the collection +of taxes.<a name="FNanchor_108_108"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_108_108"><sup>[108]</sup></a> In its use of oriental +terminology, this scheme was undeniably clever; but neither French, +Arabs, nor Turks were deceived as to the real government, which +resided entirely in Bonaparte; and his skill in reapportioning the +imposts had some effect on the prosperity of the land, enabling it +to bear the drain of his constant requisitions. The welfare of the +new colony was also promoted by the foundation of a mint and of an +Egyptian Commercial Company.</p> + +<p>His inventive genius was by no means exhausted by these varied +toils. On his journey to Suez he met a camel caravan in the desert, +and noticing the speed of the animals, he determined to form a +camel corps; and in the first month of 1799 the experiment was made +with such success that admission into the ranks of the camelry came +to be viewed as a favour. Each animal carried two men with their +arms and baggage: the uniform was sky-blue with a white turban; and +the speed and precision of their movements enabled them to deal +terrible blows, even at distant tribes of Bedouins, who bent before +a genius that could outwit them even in their own deserts.</p> + +<p>The pleasures of his officers and men were also met by the +opening of the Tivoli Gardens; and there, in sight of the Pyramids, +the life of the Palais Royal took root: the glasses clinked, the +dice rattled, and heads reeled to the lascivious movements of the +eastern dance; and Bonaparte himself indulged a passing passion +for<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i198" id= +"page_i198">[pg.198]</a></span> the wife of one of his officers, +with an openness that brought on him a rebuke from his stepson, +Eugène Beauharnais. But already he had been rendered +desperate by reports of the unfaithfulness of Josephine at Paris; +the news wrung from him this pathetic letter to his brother +Joseph—the death-cry of his long drooping idealism:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I have much to worry me privately, for the veil is entirely +torn aside. You alone remain to me; your affection is very dear to +me: nothing more remains to make me a misanthrope than to lose her +and see you betray me.... Buy a country seat against my return, +either near Paris or in Burgundy. I need solitude and isolation: +grandeur wearies me: the fount of feeling is dried up: glory itself +is insipid. At twenty-nine years of age I have exhausted +everything. It only remains to me to become a thorough egoist."<a +name="FNanchor_109_109"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_109_109"><sup>[109]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>Many rumours were circulated as to Bonaparte's public appearance +in oriental costume and his presence at a religious service in a +mosque. It is even stated by Thiers that at one of the chief +festivals he repaired to the great mosque, repeated the prayers +like a true Moslem, crossing his legs and swaying his body to and +fro, so that he "edified the believers by his orthodox piety." But +the whole incident, however attractive scenically and in point of +humour, seems to be no better authenticated than the religious +results about which the historian cherished so hopeful a belief. +The truth seems to be that the general went to the celebration of +the birth of the Prophet as an interested spectator, at the house +of the sheik, El Bekri. Some hundred sheikhs were there present: +they swayed their bodies to and fro while the story of Mahomet's +life was recited; and Bonaparte afterwards partook of an oriental +repast. But he never forgot his dignity so far as publicly to +appear in a turban and loose trousers, which he donned only once +for the amusement of his staff.<a name="FNanchor_110_110"></a><a +href="#Footnote_110_110"><sup>[110]</sup></a> That he<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i199" id="page_i199">[pg.199]</a></span> +endeavoured to pose as a Moslem is beyond doubt. Witness his +endeavour to convince the imams at Cairo of his desire to conform +to their faith. If we may believe that dubious compilation, "A +Voice from St. Helena," he bade them consult together as to the +possibility of admission of men, who were not circumcised and did +not abstain from wine, into the true fold. As to the latter +disability, he stated that the French were poor cold people, +inhabitants of the north, who could not exist without wine. For a +long time the imams demurred to this plea, which involved greater +difficulties than the question of circumcision: but after long +consultations they decided that both objections might be waived in +consideration of a superabundance of good works. The reply was +prompted by an irony no less subtle than that which accompanied the +claim, and neither side was deceived in this contest of wits.</p> + +<p>A rude awakening soon came. For some few days there had been +rumours that the division under Desaix which was fighting the +Mamelukes in Upper Egypt had been engulfed in those sandy wastes; +and this report fanned to a flame the latent hostility against the +unbelievers. From many minarets of Cairo a summons to arms took the +place of the customary call to prayer: and on October 21st the +French garrison was so fiercely and suddenly attacked as to leave +the issue doubtful. Discipline and grapeshot finally prevailed, +whereupon a repression of oriental ferocity cowed the spirits of +the townsfolk and of the neighbouring country. Forts were +constructed in Cairo and at all the strategic points along the +lower Nile, and Egypt seemed to be conquered.</p> + +<p>Feeling sure now of his hold on the populace, Bonaparte, at the +close of the year, undertook a journey to Suez and the Sinaitic +peninsula. It offered that combination of utility and romance which +ever appealed to him. At Suez he sought to revivify commerce by +lightening the customs' dues, by founding a branch of his Egyptian +commercial company, and by graciously <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i200" id="page_i200">[pg.200]</a></span> receiving a +deputation of the Arabs of Tor who came to sue for his +friendship.<a name="FNanchor_111_111"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_111_111"><sup>[111]</sup></a> Then, journeying on, he +visited the fountains of Moses; but it is not true that (as stated +by Lanfrey) he proceeded to Mount Sinai and signed his name in the +register of the monastery side by side with that of Mahomet. On his +return to the isthmus he is said to have narrowly escaped from the +rising tide of the Red Sea. If we may credit Savary, who was not of +the party, its safety was due to the address of the commander, who, +as darkness fell on the bewildered band, arranged his horsemen in +files, until the higher causeway of the path was again discovered. +North of Suez the traces of the canal dug by Sesostris revealed +themselves to the trained eye of the commander. The observations of +his engineers confirmed his conjecture, but the vast labour of +reconstruction forbade any attempt to construct a maritime canal. +On his return to Cairo he wrote to the Imam of Muscat, assuring him +of his friendship and begging him to forward to Tippoo Sahib a +letter offering alliance and deliverance from "the iron yoke of +England," and stating that the French had arrived on the shores of +the Red Sea "with a numerous and invincible army." The letter was +intercepted by a British cruiser; and the alarm caused by these +vast designs only served to spur on our forces to efforts which +cost Tippoo his life and the French most of their Indian +settlements. <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i201" id= +"page_i201">[pg.201]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER IX</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>SYRIA</center> + +<br> + + +<p>Meanwhile Turkey had declared war on France, and was sending an +army through Syria for the recovery of Egypt, while another +expedition was assembling at Rhodes. Like all great captains, +Bonaparte was never content with the defensive: his convictions and +his pugnacious instincts alike urged him to give rather than to +receive the blow; and he argued that he could attack and destroy +the Syrian force before the cessation of the winter's gales would +allow the other Turkish expedition to attempt a disembarkation at +Aboukir. If he waited in Egypt, he might have to meet the two +attacks at once, whereas, if he struck at Jaffa and Acre, he would +rid himself of the chief mass of his foes. Besides, as he explained +in his letter of February 10th, 1799, to the Directors, his seizure +of those towns would rob the English fleet of its base of supplies +and thereby cripple its activities off the coast of Egypt. So far, +his reasons for the Syrian campaign are intelligible and sound. But +he also gave out that, leaving Desaix and his Ethiopian +supernumeraries to defend Egypt, he himself would accomplish the +conquest of Syria and the East: he would raise in revolt the +Christians of the Lebanon and Armenia, overthrow the Turkish power +in Asia, and then march either on Constantinople or Delhi.</p> + +<p>It is difficult to take this quite seriously, considering that +he had only 12,000 men available for these adventures; and with +anyone but Bonaparte they might be dismissed as utterly Quixotic. +But in his case we must seek for some practical purpose; for he +never divorced <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i202" id= +"page_i202">[pg.202]</a></span> fancy from fact, and in his best +days imagination was the hand-maid of politics and strategy rather +than the mistress. Probably these gorgeous visions were bodied +forth so as to inspirit the soldiery and enthrall the imagination +of France. He had already proved the immense power of imagination +over that susceptible people. In one sense, his whole expedition +was but a picturesque drama; and an imposing climax could now be +found in the plan of an Eastern Empire, that opened up dazzling +vistas of glory and veiled his figure in a grandiose mirage, beside +which the civilian Directors were dwarfed into ridiculous +puppets.</p> + +<p>If these vast schemes are to be taken seriously, another +explanation of them is possible, namely, that he relied on the +example set by Alexander the Great, who with a small but +highly-trained army had shattered the stately dominions of the +East. If Bonaparte trusted to this precedent, he erred. True, +Alexander began his enterprise with a comparatively small force: +but at least he had a sure base of operations, and his army in +Thessaly was strong enough to prevent Athens from exchanging her +sullen but passive hostility for an offensive that would endanger +his communications by sea. The Athenian fleet was therefore never +the danger to the Macedonians that Nelson and Sir Sidney Smith were +to Bonaparte. Since the French armada weighed anchor at Toulon, +Britain's position had became vastly stronger. Nelson was lord of +the Mediterranean: the revolt in Ireland had completely failed: a +coalition against France was being formed; and it was therefore +certain that the force in Egypt could not be materially +strengthened. Bonaparte did not as yet know the full extent of his +country's danger; but the mere fact that he would have to bear the +pressure of England's naval supremacy along the Syrian coast should +have dispelled any notion that he could rival the exploits of +Alexander and become Emperor of the East.<a name= +"FNanchor_112_112"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_112_112"><sup>[112]</sup></a> <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i203" id="page_i203">[pg.203]</a></span></p> + +<p>From conjectures about motives we turn to facts. Setting forth +early in February, the French captured most of the Turkish advanced +guard at the fort of El Arisch, but sent their captives away on +condition of not bearing arms against France for at least one year. +The victors then marched on Jaffa, and, in spite of a spirited +defence, took it by storm (March 7th). Flushed with their triumph +over a cruel and detested foe, the soldiers were giving up the city +to pillage and massacre, when two aides-de-camp promised quarter to +a large body of the defenders, who had sought refuge in a large +caravanserai; and their lives were grudgingly spared by the +victors. Bonaparte vehemently reproached his aides-de-camp for +their ill-timed clemency. What could he now do with these 2,500 or +3,000 prisoners? They could not be trusted to serve with the +French; besides, the provisions scarcely sufficed for Bonaparte's +own men, who began to complain loudly at sharing any with Turks and +Albanians. They could not be sent away to Egypt, there to spread +discontent: and only 300 Egyptians were so sent away.<a name= +"FNanchor_113_113"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_113_113"><sup>[113]</sup></a> Finally, on the demand of +his generals and troops, the remaining prisoners were shot down on +the seashore. There is, however, no warrant for the malicious +assertion that Bonaparte readily gave the fatal order. On the +contrary, he delayed it for<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i204" id="page_i204">[pg.204]</a></span> three days, until +the growing difficulties and the loud complaints of his soldiers +wrung it from him as a last resort.</p> + +<p>Moreover, several of the victims had already fought against him +at El Arisch, and had violated their promise that they would fight +no more against the French in that campaign. M. Lanfrey's assertion +that there is no evidence for the identification is untenable, in +view of a document which I have discovered in the Records of the +British Admiralty. Inclosed with Sir Sidney Smith's despatches is +one from the secretary of Gezzar, dated Acre, March 1st, 1799, in +which the Pacha urgently entreats the British commodore to come to +his help, because his (Gezzar's) troops had failed to hold El +Arisch, and the <i>same troops</i> had also abandoned Gaza and were +in great dread of the French at Jaffa. Considered from the military +point of view, the massacre at Jaffa is perhaps defensible; and +Bonaparte's reluctant assent contrasts favourably with the conduct +of many commanders in similar cases. Perhaps an episode like that +at Jaffa is not without its uses in opening the eyes of mankind to +the ghastly shifts by which military glory may have to be won. The +alternative to the massacre was the detaching of a French battalion +to conduct their prisoners to Egypt. As that would seriously have +weakened the little army, the prisoners were shot.</p> + +<p>A deadlier foe was now to be faced. Already at El Arisch a few +cases of the plague had appeared in Kléber's division, which +had come from Rosetta and Damietta; and the relics of the +retreating Mameluke and Turkish forces seem also to have bequeathed +that disease as a fatal legacy to their pursuers. After Jaffa the +malady attacked most battalions of the army; and it may have +quickened Bonaparte's march towards Acre. Certain it is that he +rejected Kléber's advice to advance inland towards Nablus, +the ancient Shechem, and from that commanding centre to dominate +Palestine and defy the power of Gezzar.<a name= +"FNanchor_114_114"></a> <a href= +"#Footnote_114_114"><sup>[114]</sup></a></p> + +<center><a name="image_06"><img alt= +"PLAN OF THE SIEGE OF ACRE, from a contemporary sketch" src= +"images/image06.jpg" width="345" height="455"><br> +<font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>PLAN OF THE +SIEGE OF ACRE, from a contemporary +sketch</small></font></a></center> + +<p>Always prompt to strike at the <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i205" id="page_i205">[pg.205]</a></span> heart, the +commander-in-chief determined to march straight on Acre, where that +notorious Turkish pacha sat intrenched behind weak walls and the +ramparts of terror which his calculating ferocity had reared around +him. Ever since the age of the Crusades that seaport <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i206" id="page_i206">[pg.206]</a></span> +had been the chief place of arms of Palestine; but the harbour was +now nearly silted up, and even the neighbouring roadstead of Hayfa +was desolate. The fortress was formidable only to orientals. In his +work, "Les Ruines," Volney had remarked about Acre: "Through all +this part of Asia bastions, lines of defence, covered ways, +ramparts, and in short everything relating to modern fortification +are utterly unknown; and a single thirty-gun frigate would easily +bombard and lay in ruins the whole coast." This judgment of his +former friend undoubtedly lulled Bonaparte into illusory +confidence, and the rank and file after their success at Jaffa +expected an easy triumph at Acre.</p> + +<p>This would doubtless have happened but for British help. Captain +Miller, of H.M.S. "Theseus," thus reported on the condition of Acre +before Sir Sidney Smith's arrival:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I found almost every embrasure empty except those towards the +sea. Many years' collection of the dirt of the town thrown in such +a situation as completely covered the approach to the gate from the +only guns that could flank it and from the sea ... none of their +batteries have casemates, traverses, or splinter-proofs: they have +many guns, but generally small and defective—the carriages in +general so." <a name="FNanchor_115_115"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_115_115"><sup>[115]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>Captain Miller's energy made good some of these defects; but the +place was still lamentably weak when, on March 15th, Sir Sidney +Smith arrived. The English squadron in the east of the +Mediterranean had, to Nelson's chagrin, been confided to the +command of this ardent young officer, who now had the good fortune +to capture off the promontory of Mount Carmel seven French vessels +containing Bonaparte's siege-train. This event had a decisive +influence on the fortunes of the siege and of the whole campaign. +The French cannon were now hastily mounted on the very walls that +they had been intended to breach; while the gun vessels reinforced +the two English frigates, and were<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i207" id="page_i207">[pg.207]</a></span> ready to pour a +searching fire on the assailants in their trenches or as they +rushed against the walls. These had also been hastily strengthened +under the direction of a French royalist officer named +Phélippeaux, an old schoolfellow of Bonaparte, and later on +a comrade of Sidney Smith, alike in his imprisonment and in his +escape from the clutches of the revolutionists. Sharing the lot of +the adventurous young seaman, Phélippeaux sailed to the +Levant, and now brought to the defence of Acre the science of a +skilled engineer. Bravely seconded by British officers and seamen, +he sought to repair the breach effected by the French field-pieces, +and constructed at the most exposed points inner defences, before +which the most obstinate efforts of the storming parties melted +away. Nine times did the assailants advance against the breaches +with the confidence born of unfailing success and redoubled by the +gaze of their great commander; but as often were they beaten back +by the obstinate bravery of the British seamen and Turks.</p> + +<p>The monotony was once relieved by a quaint incident. In the +course of a correspondence with Bonaparte, Sir Sidney Smith is said +to have shown his annoyance by sending him a challenge to a duel. +It met with the very proper reply that he would fight, if the +English would send out <i>a Marlborough</i>.</p> + +<p>During these desperate conflicts Bonaparte detached a +considerable number of troops inland to beat off a large Turkish +and Mameluke force destined for the relief of Acre and the invasion +of Egypt. The first encounter was near Nazareth, where Junot +displayed the dash and resource which had brought him fame in +Italy; but the decisive battle was fought in the Plain of +Esdraëlon, not far from the base of Mount Tabor. There +Kléber's division of 2,000 men was for some hours hard +pressed by a motley array of horse and foot drawn from diverse +parts of the Sultan's dominions. The heroism of the burly Alsacian +and the toughness of his men barely kept off the fierce rushes of +the Moslem <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i208" id= +"page_i208">[pg.208]</a></span> horse and foot. At last Bonaparte's +cannon were heard. The chief, marching swiftly on with his troops +drawn up in three squares, speedily brushed aside the enveloping +clouds of orientals; finally, by well-combined efforts the French +hurled back the enemy on passes, some of which had been seized by +the commander's prescience. At the close of this memorable day +(April 15th) an army of nearly 30,000 men was completely routed and +dispersed by the valour and skilful dispositions of two divisions +which together amounted to less than a seventh of that number. No +battle of modern times more closely resembles the exploits of +Alexander than this masterly concentration of force; and possibly +some memory of this may have prompted the words of +Kléber—"General, how great you are!"—as he met +and embraced his commander on the field of battle. Bonaparte and +his staff spent the night at the Convent of Nazareth; and when his +officers burst out laughing at the story told by the Prior of the +breaking of a pillar by the angel Gabriel at the time of the +Annunciation, their untimely levity was promptly checked by the +frown of the commander.</p> + +<p>The triumph seemed to decide the Christians of the Lebanon to +ally themselves with Bonaparte, and they secretly covenanted to +furnish 12,000 troops at his cost; but this question ultimately +depended on the siege of Acre. On rejoining their comrades before +Acre, the victors found that the siege had made little progress: +for a time the besiegers relied on mining operations, but with +little success; though Phélippeaux succumbed to a sunstroke +(May 1st), his place was filled by Colonel Douglas, who foiled the +efforts of the French engineers and enabled the place to hold out +till the advent of the long-expected Turkish succours. On May 7th +their sails were visible far out on an almost windless sea. At once +Bonaparte made desperate efforts to carry the "mud-hole" by storm. +Led with reckless gallantry by the heroic Lannes, his troops gained +part of the wall and planted the tricolour on the north-east tower; +but all further progress was checked by English blue-jackets, <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i209" id= +"page_i209">[pg.209]</a></span> whom the commodore poured into the +town; and the Turkish reinforcements, wafted landwards by a +favouring breeze, were landed in time to wrest the ramparts from +the assailants' grip. On the following day an assault was again +attempted: from the English ships Bonaparte could be clearly seen +on Richard Coeur de Lion's mound urging on the French; but though, +under Lannes' leadership, they penetrated to the garden of Gezzar's +seraglio, they fell in heaps under the bullets, pikes, and +scimitars of the defenders, and few returned alive to the camp. +Lannes himself was dangerously wounded, and saved only by the +devotion of an officer.</p> + +<p>Both sides were now worn out by this extraordinary siege. "This +town is not, nor ever has been, defensible according to the rules +of art; but according to every other rule it must and shall be +defended"—so wrote Sir Sidney Smith to Nelson on May 9th. But +a fell influence was working against the besiegers; as the season +advanced, they succumbed more and more to the ravages of the +plague; and, after failing again on May 10th, many of their +battalions refused to advance to the breach over the putrid remains +of their comrades. Finally, Bonaparte, after clinging to his +enterprise with desperate tenacity, on the night of May 20th gave +orders to retreat.</p> + +<p>This siege of nine weeks' duration had cost him severe losses, +among them being Generals Caffarelli and Bon: but worst of all was +the loss of that reputation for invincibility which he had hitherto +enjoyed. His defeat at Caldiero, near Verona, in 1796 had been +officially converted into a victory: but Acre could not be termed +anything but a reverse. In vain did the commander and his staff +proclaim that, after dispersing the Turks at Mount Tabor, the +capture of Acre was superfluous; his desperate efforts in the early +part of May revealed the hollowness of his words. There were, it is +true, solid reasons for his retreat. He had just heard of the +breaking out of the war of the Second Coalition against France; and +revolts in Egypt also demanded his <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i210" id="page_i210">[pg.210]</a></span> presence.<a name= +"FNanchor_116_116"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_116_116"><sup>[116]</sup></a> But these last events +furnished a damning commentary on his whole Syrian enterprise, +which had led to a dangerous diffusion of the French forces. And +for what? For the conquest of Constantinople or of India? That +dream seems to have haunted Bonaparte's brain even down to the +close of the siege of Acre. During the siege, and later, he was +heard to inveigh against "the miserable little hole" which had come +between him and his destiny—the Empire of the East; and it is +possible that ideas which he may at first have set forth in order +to dazzle his comrades came finally to master his whole being. +Certainly the words just quoted betoken a quite abnormal wilfulness +as well as a peculiarly subjective notion of fatalism. His +"destiny" was to be mapped out by his own prescience, decided by +his own will, gripped by his own powers. Such fatalism had nothing +in common with the sombre creed of the East: it was merely an +excess of individualism: it was the matured expression of that +feature of his character, curiously dominant even in childhood, +that <i>what he wanted he must of necessity have</i>. How strange +that this imperious obstinacy, this sublimation of western +willpower, should not have been tamed even by the overmastering +might of Nature in the Orient!</p> + +<p>As for the Empire of the East, the declared hostility of the +tribes around Nablus had shown how futile were Bonaparte's efforts +to win over Moslems: and his earlier Moslem proclamations were +skilfully distributed by Sir Sidney Smith among the Christians of +Syria, and served partly to neutralize the efforts which Bonaparte +made to win them over.<a name="FNanchor_117_117"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_117_117"><sup>[117]</sup></a> Vain indeed was the effort +to conciliate the Moslems in Egypt, and yet in Syria to arouse the +Christians against the Commander of the Faithful. Such religious +opportunism smacked of the Parisian boulevards: it utterly ignored +the tenacity of belief of the East, where the creed is the very +life. The outcome of all that <i>finesse</i> was seen in the +closing days of the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i211" id= +"page_i211">[pg.211]</a></span> siege and during the retreat +towards Jaffa, when the tribes of the Lebanon and of the +Nablûs district watched like vultures on the hills and +swooped down on the retreating columns. The pain of +disillusionment, added to his sympathy with the sick and wounded, +once broke down Bonaparte's nerves. Having ordered all horsemen to +dismount so that there might be sufficient transport for the sick +and maimed, the commander was asked by an equerry which horse he +reserved for his own use. "Did you not hear the order," he +retorted, striking the man with his whip, "everyone on foot." +Rarely did this great man mar a noble action by harsh treatment: +the incident sufficiently reveals the tension of feelings, always +keen, and now overwrought by physical suffering and mental +disappointment.</p> + +<p>There was indeed much to exasperate him. At Acre he had lost +nearly 5,000 men in killed, wounded, and plague-stricken, though he +falsely reported to the Directory that his losses during the whole +expedition did not exceed 1,500 men: and during the terrible +retreat to Jaffa he was shocked, not only by occasional suicides of +soldiers in his presence, but by the utter callousness of officers +and men to the claims of the sick and wounded. It was as a rebuke +to this inhumanity that he ordered all to march on foot, and his +authority seems even to have been exerted to prevent some attempts +at poisoning the plague-stricken. The narrative of J. Miot, +commissary of the army, shows that these suggestions originated +among the soldiery at Acre when threatened with the toil of +transporting those unfortunates back to Egypt; and, as his +testimony is generally adverse to Bonaparte, and he mentions the +same horrible device, when speaking of the hospitals at Jaffa, as a +camp rumour, it may be regarded as scarcely worthy of credence.<a +name="FNanchor_118_118"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_118_118"><sup>[118]</sup></a></p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i212" id= +"page_i212">[pg.212]</a></span> Undoubtedly the scenes were +heartrending at Jaffa; and it has been generally believed that the +victims of the plague were then and there put out of their miseries +by large doses of opium. Certainly the hospitals were crowded with +wounded and victims of the plague; but during the seven days' halt +at that town adequate measures were taken by the chief medical +officers, Desgenettes and Larrey, for their transport to Egypt. +More than a thousand were sent away on ships, seven of which were +fortunately present; and 800 were conveyed to Egypt in carts or +litters across the desert.<a name="FNanchor_119_119"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_119_119"><sup>[119]</sup></a> Another fact suffices to +refute the slander mentioned above. From the despatch of Sir Sidney +Smith to Nelson of May 30th, 1799, it appears that, when the +English commodore touched at Jaffa, he found some of the abandoned +ones <i>still alive</i>: "We have found seven poor fellows in the +hospital and will take care of them." He also supplied the French +ships conveying the wounded with water, provisions, and stores, of +which they were much in need, and allowed them to proceed to their +destination. It is true that the evidence of Las Cases at St. +Helena, eagerly cited by Lanfrey, seems to show that some of the +worst cases in the Jaffa hospitals were got rid of by opium; but +the admission by Napoleon that the administering of opium was +justifiable occurred in one of those casuistical discussions which +turn, not on facts, but on motives. Conclusions drawn from such +conversations, sixteen years or more after the supposed occurrence, +must in any case give ground before the evidence of contemporaries, +which proves that every care was taken of the sick and wounded, +that the proposals of poisoning first came from the soldiery, that +Napoleon both before and after Jaffa set the noble example of +marching on foot so that there might be sufficiency of transport, +that nearly all the unfortunates arrived in Egypt and in fair +condition,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i213" id= +"page_i213">[pg.213]</a></span> and that seven survivors were found +alive at Jaffa by English officers.<a name= +"FNanchor_120_120"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_120_120"><sup>[120]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The remaining episodes of the Eastern Expedition may be briefly +dismissed. After a painful desert march the army returned to Egypt +in June; and, on July 25th, under the lead of Murat and Lannes, +drove into the sea a large force of Turks which had effected a +landing in Aboukir Bay. Bonaparte was now weary of gaining triumphs +over foes whom he and his soldiers despised. While in this state of +mind, he received from Sir Sidney Smith a packet of English and +German newspapers giving news up to June 6th, which brought him +quickly to a decision. The formation of a powerful coalition, the +loss of Italy, defeats on the Rhine, and the schisms, disgust, and +despair prevalent in France—all drew his imagination +westwards away from the illusory Orient; and he determined to leave +his army to the care of Kléber and sail to France.</p> + +<p>The morality of this step has been keenly discussed. The rank +and file of the army seem to have regarded it as little less than +desertion,<a name="FNanchor_121_121"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_121_121"><sup>[121]</sup></a> and the predominance of +personal motives in this important decision can scarcely be denied. +His private aim in undertaking the Eastern Expedition, that of +dazzling the imagination of the French people and of exhibiting the +incapacity of the Directory, had been abundantly realized. His +eastern enterprise had now shrunk to practical and prosaic +dimensions, namely, the consolidation of French power in Egypt. +Yet, as will appear in later chapters, he did not give up his +oriental schemes; though at St. Helena he once oddly spoke of the +Egyptian expedition as an "exhausted enterprise," it is clear that +he worked hard<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i214" id= +"page_i214">[pg.214]</a></span> to keep his colony. The career of +Alexander had for him a charm that even the conquests of +Cæsar could not rival; and at the height of his European +triumphs, the hero of Austerlitz was heard to murmur: "J'ai +manqué à ma fortune à Saint-Jean d'Acre."<a +name="FNanchor_122_122"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_122_122"><sup>[122]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In defence of his sudden return it may be urged that he had more +than once promised the Directory that his stay in Egypt would not +exceed five months; and there can be no doubt that now, as always, +he had an alternative plan before him in case of failure or +incomplete success in the East. To this alternative he now turned +with that swiftness and fertility of resource which astonished both +friends and foes in countless battles and at many political +crises.</p> + +<p>It has been stated by Lanfrey that his appointment of +Kléber to succeed him was dictated by political and personal +hostility; but it may more naturally be considered a tribute to his +abilities as a general and to his influence over the soldiery, +which was only second to that of Bonaparte and Desaix. He also +promised to send him speedy succour; and as there seemed to be a +probability of France regaining her naval supremacy in the +Mediterranean by the union of the fleet of Bruix with that of +Spain, he might well hope to send ample reinforcements. He probably +did not know the actual facts of the case, that in July Bruix +tamely followed the Spanish squadron to Cadiz, and that the +Directory had ordered Bruix to withdraw the French army from Egypt. +But, arguing from the facts as known to him, Bonaparte might well +believe that the difficulties of France would be fully met by his +own return, and that Egypt could be held with ease. The duty of a +great commander is to be at the post of greatest danger, and that +was now on the banks of the Rhine or Mincio.</p> + +<p>The advent of a south-east wind, a rare event there at that +season of the year, led him hastily to embark at Alexandria in the +night of August 22nd-23rd. His two frigates bore with him some of +the greatest sons of France; his chief of the staff, Berthier, +whose ardent love for Madame Visconti had been repressed by +his<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i215" id= +"page_i215">[pg.215]</a></span> reluctant determination to share +the fortunes of his chief; Lannes and Murat, both recently wounded, +but covered with glory by their exploits in Syria and at Aboukir; +his friend Marmont, as well as Duroc, Andréossi, +Bessières, Lavalette, Admiral Gantheaume, Monge, and +Berthollet, his secretary Bourrienne, and the traveller Denon. He +also left orders that Desaix, who had been in charge of Upper +Egypt, should soon return to France, so that the rivalry between +him and Kléber might not distract French councils in Egypt. +There seems little ground for the assertion that he selected for +return his favourites and men likely to be politically serviceable +to him. If he left behind the ardently republican Kléber, he +also left his old friend Junot: if he brought back Berthier and +Marmont, he also ordered the return of the almost Jacobinical +Desaix. Sir Sidney Smith having gone to Cyprus for repairs, +Bonaparte slipped out unmolested. By great good fortune his +frigates eluded the English ships cruising between Malta and Cape +Bon, and after a brief stay at Ajaccio, he and his comrades landed +at Fréjus (October 9th). So great was the enthusiasm of the +people that, despite all the quarantine regulations, they escorted +the party to shore. "We prefer the plague to the Austrians," they +exclaimed; and this feeling but feebly expressed the emotion of +France at the return of the Conqueror of the East.</p> + +<p>And yet he found no domestic happiness. Josephine's +<i>liaison</i> with a young officer, M. Charles, had become +notorious owing to his prolonged visits to her country house, La +Malmaison. Alarmed at her husband's return, she now hurried to meet +him, but missed him on the way; while he, finding his home at Paris +empty, raged at her infidelity, refused to see her on her return, +and declared he would divorce her. From this he was turned by the +prayers of Eugène and Hortense Beauharnais, and the tears of +Josephine herself. A reconciliation took place; but there was no +reunion of hearts, and Mme. Reinhard echoed the feeling of +respectable society when she wrote that he should have divorced her +outright. Thenceforth he lived for Glory alone.<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i216" id= +"page_i216">[pg.216]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER X</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>BRUMAIRE</center> + +<br> + + +<p>Rarely has France been in a more distracted state than in the +summer of 1799. Royalist revolts in the west and south rent the +national life. The religious schism was unhealed; education was at +a standstill; commerce had been swept from the seas by the British +fleets; and trade with Italy and Germany was cut off by the war of +the Second Coalition.</p> + +<p>The formation of this league between Russia, Austria, England, +Naples, Portugal, and Turkey was in the main the outcome of the +alarm and indignation aroused by the reckless conduct of the +Directory, which overthrew the Bourbons at Naples, erected the +Parthenopæan Republic, and compelled the King of Sardinia to +abdicate at Turin and retire to his island. Russia and Austria took +a leading part in forming the Coalition. Great Britain, ever +hampered by her inept army organization, offered to supply money in +place of the troops which she could not properly equip.</p> + +<p>But under the cloak of legitimacy the monarchical Powers +harboured their own selfish designs. This Nessus' cloak of the +First Coalition soon galled the limbs of the allies and rendered +them incapable of sustained and vigorous action. Yet they gained +signal successes over the raw conscripts of France. In July, 1799, +the Austro-Russian army captured Mantua and Alessandria; and in the +following month Suvoroff gained the decisive victory of Novi and +drove the remains of the French forces towards Genoa. The next +months were far more favourable to the tricolour flag, for, owing +to <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i217" id= +"page_i217">[pg.217]</a></span> Austro-Russian jealousies, +Masséna was able to gain an important victory at Zurich over +a Russian army. In the north the republicans were also in the end +successful. Ten days after Bonaparte's arrival at Fréjus, +they compelled an Anglo-Russian force campaigning in Holland to the +capitulation of Alkmaar, whereby the Duke of York agreed to +withdraw all his troops from that coast. Disgusted by the conduct +of his allies, the Czar Paul withdrew his troops from any active +share in the operations by land, thenceforth concentrating his +efforts on the acquisition of Corsica, Malta, and posts of vantage +in the Adriatic. These designs, which were well known to the +British Government, served to hamper our naval strength in those +seas, and to fetter the action of the Austrian arms in Northern +Italy.<a name="FNanchor_123_123"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_123_123"><sup>[123]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Yet, though the schisms of the allies finally yielded a victory +to the French in the campaigns of 1799, the position of the +Republic was precarious. The danger was rather internal than +external. It arose from embarrassed finances, from the civil war +that burst out with new violence in the north-west, and, above all, +from a sense of the supreme difficulty of attaining political +stability and of reconciling liberty with order. The struggle +between the executive and legislative powers which had been rudely +settled by the <i>coup d'état</i> of Fructidor, had been +postponed, not solved. Public opinion was speedily ruffled by the +Jacobinical violence which ensued. The stifling of liberty of the +press and the curtailment of the right of public meeting served +only to instill new energy into the party of resistance in the +elective Councils, and to undermine a republican government that +relied on Venetian methods of rule. Reviewing the events of those +days, Madame de Staël finely remarked that only the free +consent of the people could breathe life into political +institutions; and that the monstrous system of guaranteeing freedom +by despotic means served only to manufacture governments<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i218" id= +"page_i218">[pg.218]</a></span> that had to be wound up at +intervals lest they should stop dead.<a name= +"FNanchor_124_124"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_124_124"><sup>[124]</sup></a> Such a sarcasm, coming +from the gifted lady who had aided and abetted the stroke of +Fructidor, shows how far that event had falsified the hopes of the +sincerest friends of the Revolution. Events were therefore now +favourable to a return from the methods of Rousseau to those of +Richelieu; and the genius who was skilfully to adapt republicanism +to autocracy was now at hand. Though Bonaparte desired at once to +attack the Austrians in Northern Italy, yet a sure instinct +impelled him to remain at Paris, for, as he said to Marmont: "When +the house is crumbling, is it the time to busy oneself with the +garden? A change here is indispensable."</p> + +<p>The sudden rise of Bonaparte to supreme power cannot be +understood without some reference to the state of French politics +in the months preceding his return to France. The position of +parties had been strangely complicated by the unpopularity of the +Directors. Despite their illegal devices, the elections of 1798 and +1799 for the renewal of a third part of the legislative Councils +had signally strengthened the anti-directorial ranks. Among the +Opposition were some royalists, a large number of constitutionals, +whether of the Feuillant or Girondin type, and many deputies, who +either vaunted the name of Jacobins or veiled their advanced +opinions under the convenient appellation of "patriots." Many of +the deputies were young, impressionable, and likely to follow any +able leader who promised to heal the schisms of the country. In +fact, the old party lines were being effaced. The champions of the +constitution of 1795 (Year III.) saw no better means of defending +it than by violating electoral liberties—always in the sacred +name of Liberty; and the Directory, while professing to hold the +balance between the extreme parties, repressed them by turns with a +vigour which rendered them popular and official moderation +odious.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i219" id= +"page_i219">[pg.219]</a></span></p> + +<p>In this general confusion and apathy the dearth of statesmen was +painfully conspicuous. Only true grandeur of character can defy the +withering influences of an age of disillusionment; and France had +for a time to rely upon Sieyès. Perhaps no man has built up +a reputation for political capacity on performances so slight as +the Abbé Sieyès. In the States General of 1789 he +speedily acquired renown for oracular wisdom, owing to the brevity +and wit of his remarks in an assembly where such virtues were rare. +But the course of the Revolution soon showed the barrenness of his +mind and the timidity of his character. He therefore failed to +exert any lasting influence upon events. In the time of the Terror +his insignificance was his refuge. His witty reply to an inquiry +how he had then fared—"J'ai vécu "—sufficiently +characterizes the man. In the Directorial period he displayed more +activity. He was sent as French ambassador to Berlin, and plumed +himself on having persuaded that Court to a neutrality favourable +to France. But it is clear that the neutrality of Prussia was the +outcome of selfish considerations. While Austria tried the hazards +of war, her northern rival husbanded her resources, strengthened +her position as the protectress of Northern Germany, and dextrously +sought to attract the nebula of middle German States into her own +sphere of influence. From his task of tilting a balance which was +already decided, Sieyès was recalled to Paris in May, 1799, +by the news of his election to the place in the Directory vacated +by Rewbell. The other Directors had striven, but in vain, to +prevent his election: they knew well that this impracticable +theorist would speedily paralyze the Government; for, when +previously elected Director in 1795, he had refused to serve, on +the ground that the constitution was thoroughly bad. He now +declared his hostility to the Directory, and looked around for some +complaisant military chief who should act as his tool and then be +cast away. His first choice, Joubert, was killed at the battle of +Novi. Moreau seems then to have been looked <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i220" id="page_i220">[pg.220]</a></span> on +with favour; he was a republican, able in warfare and singularly +devoid of skill or ambition in political matters. Relying on +Moreau, Sieyès continued his intrigues, and after some +preliminary fencing gained over to his side the Director Barras. +But if we may believe the assertions of the royalist, Hyde de +Neuville, Barras was also receiving the advances of the royalists +with a view to a restoration of Louis XVIII., an event which was +then quite within the bounds of probability. For the present, +however, Barras favoured the plans of Sieyès, and helped him +to get rid of the firmly republican Directors, La +Réveillière-Lépeaux and Merlin, who were +deposed (30th Prairial).<a name="FNanchor_125_125"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_125_125"><sup>[125]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The new Directors were Gohier, Roger Ducos, and Moulin; the +first, an elderly respectable advocate; the second, a Girondin by +early associations, but a trimmer by instinct, and therefore easily +gained over by Sieyès; while the recommendation of the +third, Moulin, seem to have been his political nullity and some +third-rate military services in the Vendéan war. Yet the +Directory of Prairial was not devoid of a spasmodic energy, which +served to throw back the invaders of France. Bernadotte, the fiery +Gascon, remarkable for his ardent gaze, his encircling masses of +coal-black hair, and the dash of Moorish blood which ever aroused +Bonaparte's respectful apprehensions, was Minister of War, and +speedily formed a new army of 100,000 men: Lindet undertook to +re-establish the finances by means of progressive taxes: the Chouan +movement in the northern and western departments was repressed by a +law legalising the seizure of hostages; and there seemed some hope +that France would roll back the tide of invasion, keep her "natural +frontiers," and return to normal methods of government.</p> + +<p>Such was the position of affairs when Bonaparte's arrival +inspired France with joy and the Directory with ill-concealed +dread. As in 1795, so now in 1799, he appeared at Paris when French +political life was in a<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i221" +id="page_i221">[pg.221]</a></span> stage of transition. If ever the +Napoleonic star shone auspiciously, it was in the months when he +threaded his path between Nelson's cruisers and cut athwart the +maze of Sieyès' intrigues. To the philosopher's "J'ai +vécu" he could oppose the crushing retort "J'ai vaincu."</p> + +<p>The general, on meeting the thinker at Gohier's house, +studiously ignored him. In truth, he was at first disposed to oust +both Sieyès and Barras from the Directory. The latter of +these men was odious to him for reasons both private and public. In +time past he had had good reasons for suspecting Josephine's +relations with the voluptuous Director, and with the men whom she +met at his house. During the Egyptian campaign his jealousy had +been fiercely roused in another quarter, and, as we have seen, led +to an almost open breach with his wife. But against Barras he still +harboured strong suspicions; and the frequency of his visits to the +Director's house after returning from Egypt was doubtless due to +his desire to sound the depths of his private as well as of his +public immorality. If we may credit the <i>embarras de +mensonges</i> which has been dignified by the name of Barras' +"Memoirs," Josephine once fled to his house and flung herself at +his knees, begging to be taken away from her husband; but the story +is exploded by the moral which the relator clumsily tacks on, as to +the good advice which he gave her.<a name="FNanchor_126_126"></a><a +href="#Footnote_126_126"><sup>[126]</sup></a> While Bonaparte seems +to have found no grounds for suspecting Barras on this score, he +yet discovered his intrigues with various malcontents; and he saw +that Barras, holding the balance of power in the Directory between +the opposing pairs of colleagues, was intriguing to get the highest +possible price for the betrayal of the Directory and of the +constitution of 1795.</p> + +<p>For Sieyès the general felt dislike but respect. He soon +saw the advantage of an alliance with so learned a thinker, so +skilful an intriguer, and so weak a man. It was, indeed, necessary; +for, after making vain overtures to Gohier for the alteration of +the law which excluded from the Directory men of less than forty +years of age,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i222" id= +"page_i222">[pg.222]</a></span> the general needed the alliance of +Sieyès for the overthrow of the constitution. In a short +space he gathered around him the malcontents whom the frequent +crises had deprived of office, Roederer, Admiral Bruix, +Réal, Cambacérès, and, above all, Talleyrand. +The last-named; already known for his skill in diplomacy, had +special reasons for favouring the alliance of Bonaparte and +Sieyès: he had been dismissed from the Foreign Office in the +previous month of July because in his hands it had proved to be too +lucrative to the holder and too expensive for France. It was an +open secret that, when American commissioners arrived in Paris a +short time previously, for the settlement of various disputes +between the two countries, they found that the negotiations would +not progress until 250,000 dollars had changed hands. The result +was that hostilities continued, and that Talleyrand soon found +himself deprived of office, until another turn of the revolutionary +kaleidoscope should restore him to his coveted place.<a name= +"FNanchor_127_127"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_127_127"><sup>[127]</sup></a> He discerned in the +Bonaparte-Sieyès combination the force that would give the +requisite tilt now that Moreau gave up politics.</p> + +<p>The army and most of the generals were also ready for some +change, only Bernadotte and Jourdan refusing to listen to the new +proposals; and the former of these came "with sufficiently bad +grace" to join Bonaparte at the time of action. The police was +secured through that dextrous trimmer, the regicide Fouché, +who now turned against the very men who had recently appointed him +to office. Feeling sure of the soldiery and police, the innovators +fixed the 18th of Brumaire as the date of their enterprise. There +were many conferences at the houses of the conspirators; and one of +the few vivid touches which relieve the dull tones of the +Talleyrand "Memoirs" reveals the consciousness of these men that +they were conspirators. Late on a night in the middle of Brumaire, +Bonaparte came to Talleyrand's house to arrange details of the +<i>coup d'état,</i> when the noise of<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i223" id="page_i223">[pg.223]</a></span> +carriages stopping outside caused them to pale with fear that their +plans were discovered. At once the diplomatist blew out the lights +and hurried to the balcony, when he found that their fright was due +merely to an accident to the carriages of the revellers and +gamesters returning from the Palais Royal, which were guarded by +gendarmes. The incident closed with laughter and jests; but it +illustrates the tension of the nerves of the political gamesters, +as also the mental weakness of Bonaparte when confronted by some +unknown danger. It was perhaps the only weak point in his +intellectual armour; but it was to be found out at certain crises +of his career.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile in the legislative Councils there was a feeling of +vague disquiet. The Ancients were, on the whole, hostile to the +Directory, but in the Council of Five Hundred the democratic ardour +of the younger deputies foreboded a fierce opposition. Yet there +also the plotters found many adherents, who followed the lead now +cautiously given by Lucien Bonaparte. This young man, whose +impassioned speeches had marked him out as an irreproachable +patriot, was now President of that Council. No event could have +been more auspicious for the conspirators. With Sieyès, +Barras, and Ducos, as traitors in the Directory, with the Ancients +favourable, and the junior deputies under the presidency of Lucien, +the plot seemed sure of success.</p> + +<p>The first important step was taken by the Council of Ancients, +who decreed the transference of the sessions of the Councils to St. +Cloud. The danger of a Jacobin plot was urged as a plea for this +motion, which was declared carried without the knowledge either of +the Directory as a whole, or of the Five Hundred, whose opposition +would have been vehement. The Ancients then appointed Bonaparte to +command the armed forces in and near Paris. The next step was to +insure the abdication of Gohier and Moulin. Seeking to entrap +Gohier, then the President of the Directory, Josephine invited him +to breakfast on the morning of 18th Brumaire; but Gohier, +suspecting a snare, remained at his official <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i224" id="page_i224">[pg.224]</a></span> +residence, the Luxemburg Palace. None the less the Directory was +doomed; for the two defenders of the institution had not the +necessary quorum for giving effect to their decrees. Moulin +thereupon escaped, and Gohier was kept under guard—by +Moreau's soldiery!<a name="FNanchor_128_128"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_128_128"><sup>[128]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Meanwhile, accompanied by a brilliant group of generals, +Bonaparte proceeded to the Tuileries, where the Ancients were +sitting; and by indulging in a wordy declamation he avoided taking +the oath to the constitution required of a general on entering upon +a new command. In the Council of Five Hundred, Lucien Bonaparte +stopped the eager questions and murmurs, on the pretext that the +session was only legal at St. Cloud.</p> + +<p>There, on the next day (19th Brumaire or 10th November), a far +more serious blow was to be struck. The overthrow of the Directory +was a foregone conclusion. But with the Legislature it was far +otherwise, for its life was still whole and vigorous. Yet, while +amputating a moribund limb, the plotters did not scruple to +paralyze the brain of the body politic.</p> + +<p>Despite the adhesion of most of the Ancients to his plans, +Bonaparte, on appearing before them, could only utter a succession +of short, jerky phrases which smacked of the barracks rather than +of the Senate. Retiring in some confusion, he regains his presence +of mind among the soldiers outside, and enters the hall of the Five +Hundred, intending to intimidate them not only by threats, but by +armed force. At the sight of the uniforms at the door, the +republican enthusiasm of the younger deputies catches fire. They +fiercely assail him with cries of "Down with the tyrant! down with +the Dictator! outlaw him!" In vain Lucien Bonaparte commands order. +Several deputies rush at the general, and fiercely shake him by the +collar. He turns faint with excitement and chagrin; but Lefebvre +and a few grenadiers rushing up drag him from the hall. He comes +forth like a somnambulist (says an onlooker), pursued by<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i225" id= +"page_i225">[pg.225]</a></span> the terrible cry, "Hors la loi!" +Had the cries at once taken form in a decree, the history of the +world might have been different. One of the deputies, General +Augereau, fiercely demands that the motion of outlawry be put to +the vote. Lucien Bonaparte refuses, protests, weeps, finally throws +off his official robes, and is rescued from the enraged deputies by +grenadiers whom the conspirators send in for this purpose. +Meanwhile Bonaparte and his friends were hastily deliberating, when +one of their number brought the news that the deputies had declared +the general an outlaw. The news chased the blood from his cheek, +until Sieyès, whose <i>sang froid</i> did not desert him in +these civilian broils, exclaims, "Since they outlaw you, they are +outlaws." This revolutionary logic recalls Bonaparte to himself. He +shouts, "To arms!" Lucien, too, mounting a horse, appeals to the +soldiers to free the Council from the menaces of some deputies +armed with daggers, and in the pay of England, who are terrorising +the majority. The shouts of command, clinched by the adroit +reference to daggers and English gold, cause the troops to waver in +their duty; and Lucien, pressing his advantage to the utmost, draws +a sword, and, holding it towards his brother, exclaims that he will +stab him if ever he attempts anything against liberty. Murat, +Leclerc, and other generals enforce this melodramatic appeal by +shouts for Bonaparte, which the troops excitedly take up. The drums +sound for an advance, and the troops forthwith enter the hall. In +vain the deputies raise the shout, "Vive la République," and +invoke the constitution. Appeals to the law are overpowered by the +drum and by shouts for Bonaparte; and the legislators of France fly +pell-mell from the hall through doors and windows.<a name= +"FNanchor_129_129"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_129_129"><sup>[129]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Thus was fulfilled the prophecy which eight years<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i226" id="page_i226">[pg.226]</a></span> +previously Burke had made in his immortal work on the French +Revolution. That great thinker had predicted that French liberty +would fall a victim to the first great general who drew the eyes of +all men upon himself. "The moment in which that event shall happen, +the person who really commands the army is your master, the master +of your king, the master of your Assembly, the master of your whole +republic."</p> + +<p>Discussions about the <i>coup d'état</i> of Brumaire +generally confuse the issue at stake by ignoring the difference +between the overthrow of the Directory and that of the Legislature. +The collapse of the Directory was certain to take place; but few +expected that the Legislature of France would likewise vanish. For +vanish it did: not for nearly half a century had France another +free and truly democratic representative assembly. This result of +Brumaire was unexpected by several of the men who plotted the +overthrow of unpopular Directors, and hoped for the nipping of +Jacobinical or royalist designs. Indeed, no event in French history +is more astonishing than the dispersal of the republican deputies, +most of whom desired a change of <i>personnel</i> but not a +revolution in methods of government. Until a few days previously +the Councils had the allegiance of the populace and of the +soldiers; the troops at St. Cloud were loyal to the constitution, +and respected the persons of the deputies until they were deluded +by Lucien. For a few minutes the fate of France trembled in the +balance; and the conspirators knew it.<a name= +"FNanchor_130_130"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_130_130"><sup>[130]</sup></a> Bonaparte confessed it by +his incoherent gaspings; Sieyès had his carriage ready, with +six horses, for flight; the terrible cry, "Hors la loi!" if raised +against Bonaparte in the heart of Paris, would certainly have +roused the populace to fury in the cause of liberty and have swept +the conspirators to the guillotine. But, as it was, the affair was +decided in the solitudes of St. Cloud by Lucien and a battalion of +soldiers.</p> + +<p>Efforts have frequently been made to represent the<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i227" id="page_i227">[pg.227]</a></span> +events of Brumaire as inevitable and to dovetail them in with a +pretended philosophy of history. But it is impossible to study them +closely without observing how narrow was the margin between the +success and failure of the plot, and how jagged was the edge of an +affair which philosophizers seek to fit in with their symmetrical +explanations. In truth, no event of world-wide importance was ever +decided by circumstances so trifling. "There is but one step from +triumph to a fall. I have seen that in the greatest affairs a +little thing has always decided important events"—so wrote +Bonaparte three years before his triumph at St. Cloud: he might +have written it of that event. It is equally questionable whether +it can be regarded as saving France from anarchy. His admirers, it +is true, have striven to depict France as trodden down by invaders, +dissolved by anarchy, and saved only by the stroke of Brumaire. But +she was already triumphant: it was quite possible that she would +peacefully adjust her governmental difficulties: they were +certainly no greater than they had been in and since the year 1797: +Fouché had closed the club of the Jacobins: the Councils had +recovered their rightful influence, and, but for the plotters of +Brumaire, might have effected a return to ordinary government of +the type of 1795-7. This was the real blow; that the vigorous +trunk, the Legislature, was struck down along with the withering +Directorial branch.</p> + +<p>The friends of liberty might well be dismayed when they saw how +tamely France accepted this astounding stroke. Some allowance was +naturally to be made, at first, for the popular apathy: the +Jacobins, already discouraged by past repression, were partly dazed +by the suddenness of the blow, and were also ignorant of the aims +of the men who dealt it; and while they were waiting to see the +import of events, power passed rapidly into the hands of Bonaparte +and his coadjutors. Such is an explanation, in part at least, of +the strange docility now shown by a populace which still vaunted +its loyalty to the democratic republic. But there is another <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i228" id= +"page_i228">[pg.228]</a></span> explanation, which goes far deeper. +The revolutionary strifes had wearied the brain of France and had +predisposed it to accept accomplished facts. Distracted by the talk +about royalist plots and Jacobin plots, cowering away from the +white ogre and the red spectre, the more credulous part of the +populace was fain to take shelter under the cloak of a great +soldier, who at least promised order. Everything favoured the +drill-sergeant theory of government. The instincts developed by a +thousand years of monarchy had not been rooted out in the last +decade. They now prompted France to rally round her able man; and, +abandoning political liberty as a hopeless quest, she obeyed the +imperious call which promised to revivify the order and brilliance +of her old existence with the throbbing blood of her new life.</p> + +<p>The French constitution was now to be reconstructed by a +self-appointed commission which sat with closed doors. This strange +ending to all the constitution-building of a decade was due to the +adroitness of Lucien Bonaparte. At the close of that eventful day, +the 19th of Brumaire, he gathered about him in the deserted hall at +St. Cloud some score or so of the dispersed deputies known to be +favourable to his brother, declaimed against the Jacobins, whose +spectral plot had proved so useful to the real plotters, and +proposed to this "Rump" of the Council the formation of a +commission who should report on measures that were deemed necessary +for the public safety. The measures were found to be the deposition +of the Directory, the expulsion of sixty-one members from the +Councils, the nomination of Sieyès, Roger Ducos, and +Bonaparte as provisional Consuls and the adjournment of the +Councils for four months. The Consuls accordingly took up their +residence in the Luxemburg Palace, just vacated by the Directors, +and the drafting of a constitution was confided to them and to an +<i>interim</i> commission of fifty members chosen equally from the +two Councils.</p> + +<p>The illegality of these devices was hidden beneath a cloak of +politic clemency. To this commission the <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i229" id="page_i229">[pg.229]</a></span> Consuls, or +rather Bonaparte—for his will soon dominated that of +Sieyès—proposed two most salutary changes. He desired +to put an end to the seizure of hostages from villages suspected of +royalism; and also to the exaction of taxes levied on a progressive +scale, which harassed the wealthy without proportionately +benefiting the exchequer. These two expedients, adopted by the +Directory in the summer of 1799, were temporary measures adopted to +stem the tide of invasion and to crush revolts; but they were +regarded as signs of a permanently terrorist policy, and their +removal greatly strengthened the new consular rule. The blunder of +nearly all the revolutionary governments had been in continuing +severe laws after the need for them had ceased to be pressing. +Bonaparte, with infinite tact, discerned this truth, and, as will +shortly appear, set himself to found his government on the support +of that vast neutral mass which was neither royalist nor Jacobin, +which hated the severities of the reds no less than the abuses of +the <i>ancien régime</i>.</p> + +<p>While Bonaparte was conciliating the many, Sieyès was +striving to body forth the constitution which for many years had +been nebulously floating in his brain. The function of the Socratic +[Greek: maieutaes] was discharged by Boulay de la Meurthe, who with +difficulty reduced those ideas to definite shape. The new +constitution was based on the principle: "Confidence comes from +below, power from above." This meant that the people, that is, all +adult males, were admitted only to the preliminary stages of +election of deputies, while the final act of selection was to be +made by higher grades or powers. The "confidence" required of the +people was to be shown not only towards their nominees, but towards +those who were charged with the final and most important act of +selection. The winnowing processes in the election of +representatives were to be carried out on a decimal system. The +adult voters meeting in their several districts were to choose +one-tenth of their number, this tenth being named the Notabilities +of the Commune. These, some five or <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i230" id="page_i230">[pg.230]</a></span> six hundred thousand +in number, meeting in their several Departments, were thereupon to +choose one-tenth of their number; and the resulting fifty or sixty +thousand men, termed Notabilities of the Departments, were again to +name one-tenth of their number, who were styled Notabilities of the +Nation. But the most important act of selection was still to +come—from above. From this last-named list the governing +powers were to select the members of the legislative bodies and the +chief officials and servants of the Government.</p> + +<p>The executive now claims a brief notice. The well-worn theory of +the distinction of powers, that is, the legislative and executive +powers, was maintained in Sieyès' plan. At the head of the +Government the philosopher desired to enthrone an august personage, +the Grand Elector, who was to be selected by the Senate. This Grand +Elector was to nominate two Consuls, one for peace, the other for +war; they were to nominate the Ministers of State, who in their +turn selected the agents of power from the list of Notabilities of +the Nation. The two Consuls and their Ministers administered the +executive affairs. The Senate, sitting in dignified ease, was +merely to safeguard the constitution, to elect the Grand Elector, +and to select the members of the <i>Corps Législatif</i> +(proper) and the Tribunate.</p> + +<p>Distrust of the former almost superhuman activity in law-making +now appeared in divisions, checks, and balances quite ingenious in +their complexity. The Legislature was divided into three councils: +the <i>Corps Législatif</i>, properly so called, which +listened in silence to proposals of laws offered by the Council of +State and criticised or orally approved by the Tribunate.<a name= +"FNanchor_131_131"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_131_131"><sup>[131]</sup></a> These three bodies were +not only divided, but were placed in opposition, especially the two +talking bodies, which<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i231" id= +"page_i231">[pg.231]</a></span> resembled plaintiff and defendant +pleading before a gagged judge. But even so the constitution was +not sufficiently guarded against Jacobins or royalists. If by any +chance a dangerous proposal were forced through these mutually +distrustful bodies, the Senate was charged with the task of vetoing +it, and if the Grand Elector, or any other high official, strove to +gain a perpetual dictatorship, the Senate was at once to +<i>absorb</i> him into its ranks.</p> + +<p>Moreover, lest the voters should send up too large a proportion +of Jacobins or royalists, the first selection of members of the +great Councils and the chief functionaries for local affairs was to +be made by the Consuls, who thus primarily exercised not only the +"power from above," but also the "confidence" which ought to have +come from below. Perhaps this device was necessary to set in motion +Sieyès' system of wheels within wheels; for the Senate, +which was to elect the Grand Elector, by whom the executive +officers were indirectly to be chosen, was in part self-sufficient: +the Consuls named the first members, who then co-opted, that is, +chose the new members. Some impulse from without was also needed to +give the constitution life; and this impulse was now to come. Where +Sieyès had only contrived wheels, checks, regulator, break, +and safety-valve, there now rushed in an imperious will which not +only simplified the parts but supplied an irresistible motive +power.</p> + +<p>The complexity of much of the mechanism, especially that +relating to popular election and the legislature, entirely suited +Bonaparte. But, while approving the triple winnowing, to which +Sieyès subjected the results of manhood suffrage, and the +subordination of the legislative to the executive authority,<a +name="FNanchor_132_132"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_132_132"><sup>[132]</sup></a> the general expressed his +entire disapproval of the limitations of the Grand Elector's +powers. The name was anti-republican: let it be changed to First +Consul. And whereas Sieyès<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i232" id="page_i232">[pg.232]</a></span> condemned his grand +functionary to the repose of a <i>roi fainéant</i>, +Bonaparte secured to him practically all the powers assigned by +Sieyès to the Consuls for Peace and for War. Lastly, +Bonaparte protested against the right of absorbing him being given +to the Senate. Here also he was successful; and thus a delicately +poised bureaucracy was turned into an almost unlimited +dictatorship.</p> + +<p>This metamorphosis may well excite wonder. But, in truth, +Sieyès and his colleagues were too weary and sceptical to +oppose the one "intensely practical man." To Bonaparte's trenchant +reasons and incisive tones the theorist could only reply by a +scornful silence broken by a few bitter retorts. To the +irresistible power of the general he could only oppose the subtlety +of a student. And, indeed, who can picture Bonaparte, the greatest +warrior of the age, delegating the control of all warlike +operations to a Consul for War while Austrian cannon were +thundering in the county of Nice and British cruisers were +insulting the French coasts? It was inevitable that the reposeful +Grand Elector should be transformed into the omnipotent First +Consul, and that these powers should be wielded by Bonaparte +himself.<a name="FNanchor_133_133"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_133_133"><sup>[133]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The extent of the First Consul's powers, as finally settled by +the joint commission, was as follows. He had the direct and sole +nomination of the members of the general administration, of those +of the departmental and municipal councils, and of the +administrators, afterwards called prefects and sub-prefects. He +also appointed all military and naval officers, ambassadors and +agents sent to foreign Powers, and the judges in civil and criminal +suits, except the <i>juges de paix</i> and, later on, the members +of the <i>Cour de Cassation</i>. He therefore controlled the army, +navy, and diplomatic service, as well as the general +administration. He also signed treaties, though these might be +discussed, and must be ratified, by the legislative bodies. The +three Consuls were to reside in the Tuileries palace; but, apart +from the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i233" id= +"page_i233">[pg.233]</a></span> enjoyment of 150,000 francs a year, +and occasional consultation by the First Consul, the position of +these officials was so awkward that Bonaparte frankly remarked to +Roederer that it would have been better to call them Grand +Councillors. They were, in truth, supernumeraries added to the +chief of the State, as a concession to the spirit of equality and +as a blind to hide the reality of the new despotism. All three were +to be chosen for ten years, and were re-eligible.</p> + +<p>Such is an outline of the constitution of 1799 (Year VIII.). It +was promulgated on December 15th, 1799, and was offered to the +people for acceptance, in a proclamation which closed with the +words: "Citizens, the Revolution is confined to the principles +which commenced it. It is finished." The news of this last fact +decided the enthusiastic acceptance of the constitution. In a +<i>plébiscite</i>, or mass vote of the people, held in the +early days of 1800, it was accepted by an overwhelming majority, +viz., by 3,011,007 as against only 1,562 negatives. No fact so +forcibly proves the failure of absolute democracy in France; and, +whatever may be said of the methods of securing this national +acclaim, it was, and must ever remain, the soundest of Bonaparte's +titles to power. To a pedant who once inquired about his genealogy +he significantly replied: "It dates from Brumaire."</p> + +<p>Shortly before the <i>plébiscite</i>, Sieyès and +Ducos resigned their temporary commissions as Consuls: they were +rewarded with seats in the Senate; and Sieyès, in +consideration of his constitutional work, received the estate of +Crosne from the nation.</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Sieyès à Bonaparte a +fait present du trône,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Sous un pompeux débris +croyant l'ensevelir.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bonaparte à Sieyès a +fait present de Crosne</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Pour le payer et +l'avilir."</span><br> + + +<p>The sting in the tail of Lebrun's epigram struck home. +Sieyès' acceptance of Crosne was, in fact, his acceptance of +notice to quit public affairs, in which he had always <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i234" id="page_i234">[pg.234]</a></span> +moved with philosophic disdain. He lived on to the year 1836 in +dignified ease, surveying with Olympian calm the storms of French +and Continental politics.</p> + +<p>The two new Consuls were Cambacérès and Lebrun. +The former was known as a learned jurist and a tactful man. He had +voted for the death of Louis XVI., but his subsequent action had +been that of a moderate, and his knowledge of legal affairs was +likely to be of the highest service to Bonaparte, who intrusted him +with a general oversight of legislation. His tact was seen in his +refusal to take up his abode in the Tuileries, lest, as he remarked +to Lebrun, he might have to move out again soon. The third Consul, +Lebrun, was a moderate with leanings towards constitutional +royalty. He was to prove another useful satellite to Bonaparte, who +intrusted him with the general oversight of finance and regarded +him as a connecting link with the moderate royalists. The chief +secretary to the Consuls was Maret, a trusty political agent, who +had striven for peace with England both in 1793 and in 1797.</p> + +<p>As for the Ministers, they were now reinforced by Talleyrand, +who took up that of Foreign Affairs, and by Berthier, who brought +his powers of hard work to that of War, until he was succeeded for +a time by Carnot. Lucien Bonaparte, and later Chaptal, became +Minister of the Interior, Gaudin controlled Finance, Forfait the +Navy, and Fouché the Police. The Council of State was +organized in the following sections; that of <i>War</i>, which was +presided over by General Brune: <i>Marine</i>, by Admiral +Gantheaume: <i>Finance</i>, by Defermon: <i>Legislation</i>, by +Boulay de la Meurthe: the <i>Interior</i>, by Roederer.</p> + +<p>The First Consul soon showed that he intended to adopt a +non-partisan and thoroughly national policy. That had been, it is +true, the aim of the Directors in their policy of balance and +repression of extreme parties on both sides. For the reasons above +indicated, they had failed: but now a stronger and more tactful +grasp was to succeed in a feat which naturally became easier every +year that removed the passions of the revolutionary epoch further +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i235" id= +"page_i235">[pg.235]</a></span> into the distance. Men cannot for +ever perorate, and agitate and plot. A time infallibly comes when +an able leader can successfully appeal to their saner instincts: +and that hour had now struck. Bonaparte's appeal was made to the +many, who cared not for politics, provided that they themselves +were left in security and comfort: it was urged quietly, +persistently, and with the reserve power of a mighty prestige and +of overwhelming military force. Throughout the whole of the +Consulate, a policy of moderation, which is too often taken for +weakness, was strenuously carried through by the strongest man and +the greatest warrior of the age.</p> + +<p>The truly national character of his rule was seen in many ways. +He excluded from high office men who were notorious regicides, +excepting a few who, like Fouché, were too clever to be +dispensed with. The constitutionals of 1791 and even declared +royalists were welcomed back to France, and many of the +Fructidorian exiles also returned.<a name="FNanchor_134_134"></a><a +href="#Footnote_134_134"><sup>[134]</sup></a> The list of +<i>émigrés</i> was closed, so that neither political +hatred nor private greed could misrepresent a journey as an act of +political emigration. Equally generous and prudent was the +treatment of Roman Catholics. Toleration was now extended to +orthodox or non-juring priests, who were required merely to +<i>promise</i> allegiance to the new constitution. By this act of +timely clemency, orthodox priests were allowed to return to France, +and they were even suffered to officiate in places where no +opposition was thereby aroused.</p> + +<p>While thus removing one of the chief grievances of the Norman, +Breton and Vendéan peasants, who had risen as much for their +religion as for their king, he determined to crush their revolts. +The north-west, and indeed parts of the south of France, were still +simmering with rebellions and brigandage. In Normandy a daring and +able leader named Frotté headed a considerable band of +malcontents, and still more formidable were the<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i236" id="page_i236">[pg.236]</a></span> +Breton "Chouans" that followed the peasant leader Georges Cadoudal. +This man was a born leader. Though but thirty years of age, his +fierce courage had long marked him out as the first fighter of his +race and creed. His features bespoke a bold, hearty spirit, and his +massive frame defied fatigue and hardship. He struggled on; and in +the autumn of 1799 fortune seemed about to favour the "whites": the +revolt was spreading; and had a Bourbon prince landed in Brittany +before Bonaparte returned from Egypt, the royalists might quite +possibly have overthrown the Directory. But Bonaparte's daring +changed the whole aspect of affairs. The news of the stroke of +Brumaire gave the royalists pause. At first they believed that the +First Consul would soon call back the king, and Bonaparte skilfully +favoured this notion: he offered a pacification, of which some of +the harassed peasants availed themselves. Georges himself for a +time advised a reconciliation, and a meeting of the royalist +leaders voted to a man that they desired "to have the king and you" +(Bonaparte). One of them, Hyde de Neuville, had an interview with +the First Consul at Paris, and has left on record his surprise at +seeing the slight form of the man whose name was ringing through +France. At the first glance he took him for a rather poorly dressed +lackey; but when the general raised his eyes and searched him +through and through with their eager fire, the royalist saw his +error and fell under the spell of a gaze which few could endure +unmoved. The interview brought no definite result.</p> + +<p>Other overtures made by Bonaparte were more effective. True to +his plan of dividing his enemies, he appealed to the clergy to end +the civil strife. The appeal struck home to the heart or the +ambitions of a cleric named Bernier. This man was but a village +priest of La Vendée: yet his natural abilities gained him an +ascendancy in the councils of the insurgents, which the First +Consul was now victoriously to exploit. Whatever may have been +Bernier's motives, he certainly acted with some <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i237" id="page_i237">[pg.237]</a></span> +duplicity. Without forewarning Cadoudal, Bourmont, Frotté, +and other royalist leaders, he secretly persuaded the less +combative leaders to accept the First Consul's terms; and a +pacification was arranged (January 18th), In vain did Cadoudal rage +against this treachery: in vain did he strive to break the +armistice. Frotté in Normandy was the last to capitulate and +the first to feel Bonaparte's vengeance: on a trumped-up charge of +treachery he was hurried before a court-martial and shot. An order +was sent from Paris for his pardon; but a letter which Bonaparte +wrote to Brune on the day of the execution contains the ominous +phrase: <i>By this time Frotté ought to be shot</i>; and a +recently published letter to Hédouville expresses the belief +that <i>the punishment of that desperate leader will doubtless +contribute to the complete pacification of the West</i>.<a name= +"FNanchor_135_135"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_135_135"><sup>[135]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In the hope of gaining over the Chouans, Bonaparte required +their chiefs to come to Paris, where they received the greatest +consideration. In Bernier the priest, Bonaparte discerned +diplomatic gifts of a high order, which were soon to be tested in a +far more important negotiation. The nobles, too, received +flattering attentions which touched their pride and assured their +future insignificance. Among them was Count Bourmont, the Judas of +the Waterloo campaign.</p> + +<p>In contrast with the priest and the nobles, Georges Cadoudal +stood firm as a rock. That suave tongue spoke to him of glory, +honour, and the fatherland: he heeded it not, for he knew it had +ordered the death of Frotté. There stood these fighters +alone, face to face, types of the north and south, of past and +present, fiercest and toughest of living men, their stern wills +racked in wrestle for two hours. But southern craft was foiled by +Breton steadfastness, and Georges went his way unshamed. Once +outside the palace, his only words to his friend, Hyde de Neuville, +were: "What a mind I had to strangle him in these arms!" Shadowed +by<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i238" id= +"page_i238">[pg.238]</a></span> Bonaparte's spies, and hearing that +he was to be arrested, he fled to England; and Normandy and +Brittany enjoyed the semblance of peace.<a name= +"FNanchor_136_136"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_136_136"><sup>[136]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Thus ended the civil war which for nearly seven years had rent +France in twain. Whatever may be said about the details of +Bonaparte's action, few will deny its beneficent results on French +life. Harsh and remorseless as Nature herself towards individuals, +he certainly, at this part of his career, promoted the peace and +prosperity of the masses. And what more can be said on behalf of a +ruler at the end of a bloody revolution?</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the First Consul had continued to develop +Sieyès' constitution in the direction of autocracy. The +Council of State, which was little more than an enlarged Ministry, +had been charged with the vague and dangerous function of +"developing the sense of laws" on the demand of the Consuls; and it +was soon seen that this Council was merely a convenient screen to +hide the operations of Bonaparte's will. On the other hand, a blow +was struck at the Tribunate, the only public body which had the +right of debate and criticism. It was now proposed (January, 1800) +that the time allowed for debate should be strictly limited. This +restriction to the right of free discussion met with little +opposition. One of the most gifted of the new tribunes, Benjamin +Constant, the friend of Madame de Staël, eloquently pleaded +against this policy of distrust which would reduce the Tribunate to +a silence that would be <i>heard by Europe</i>. It was in vain. The +rabid rhetoric of the past had infected France with a foolish fear +of all free debate. The Tribunate signed its own death warrant; and +the sole result of its feeble attempt at opposition was that Madame +de Staël's <i>salon</i> was forthwith deserted by the Liberals +who had there found inspiration; while the gifted authoress herself +was officially requested to retire into the country.</p> + +<p>The next act of the central power struck at freedom<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i239" id="page_i239">[pg.239]</a></span> of +the press. As a few journals ventured on witticisms at the expense +of the new Government, the Consuls ordered the suppression of all +the political journals of Paris except thirteen; and three even of +these favoured papers were suppressed on April 7th. The reason +given for this despotic action was the need of guiding public +opinion wisely during the war, and of preventing any articles +"contrary to the respect due to the social compact, to the +sovereignty of the people, and to the glory of the armies." By a +finely ironical touch Rousseau's doctrine of the popular +sovereignty was thus invoked to sanction its violation. The +incident is characteristic of the whole tendency of events, which +showed that the dawn of personal rule was at hand. In fact, +Bonaparte had already taken the bold step of removing to the +Tuileries, and that too, on the very day when he ordered public +mourning for the death of Washington (February 7th). No one but the +great Corsican would have dared to brave the comments which this +coincidence provoked. But he was necessary to France, and all men +knew it. At the first sitting of the provisional Consuls, Ducos had +said to him: "It is useless to vote about the presidence; it +belongs to you of right"; and, despite the wry face pulled by +Sieyès, the general at once took the chair. Scarcely less +remarkable than the lack of energy in statesmen was the confusion +of thought in the populace. Mme. Reinhard tells us that after the +<i>coup d'état</i> people <i>believed they had returned to +the first days of liberty</i>. What wonder, then, that the one able +and strong-willed man led the helpless many and re-moulded +Sieyès' constitution in a fashion that was thus happily +parodied:</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"J'ai, pour les fous, d'un +Tribunat</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Conservé la +figure;</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Pour les sots je laisse un +Sénat,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Mais ce n'est qu'en +peinture;</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">A ce stupide magistrat</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Ma volonté +préside;</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Et tout le Conseil +d'Etat</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Dans mon sabre +réside."</span><br> + <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i240" id= +"page_i240">[pg.i240]</a></span> <br> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XI</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>MARENGO: LUNÉVILLE</center> + +<br> + + +<p>Reserving for the next chapter a description of the new civil +institutions of France, it will be convenient now to turn to +foreign affairs. Having arranged the most urgent of domestic +questions, the First Consul was ready to encounter the forces of +the Second Coalition. He had already won golden opinions in France +by endeavouring peacefully to dissolve it. On the 25th of December, +1799, he sent two courteous letters, one to George III., the other +to the Emperor Francis, proposing an immediate end to the war. The +close of the letter to George III. has been deservedly admired: +"France and England by the abuse of their strength may, for the +misfortune of all nations, be long in exhausting it: but I venture +to declare that the fate of all civilized nations is concerned in +the termination of a war which kindles a conflagration over the +whole world." This noble sentiment touched the imagination of +France and of friends of peace everywhere.</p> + +<p>And yet, if the circumstances of the time be considered, the +first agreeable impressions aroused by the perusal of this letter +must be clouded over by doubts. The First Consul had just seized on +power by illegal and forcible means, and there was as yet little to +convince foreign States that he would hold it longer than the men +whom he had displaced. Moreover, France was in a difficult +position. Her treasury was empty; her army in Italy was being edged +into the narrow coast-line near Genoa; and her oriental forces were +shut up in their new conquest. Were not the appeals to Austria and +England <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i241" id= +"page_i241">[pg.241]</a></span> merely a skillful device to gain +time? Did his past power in Italy and Egypt warrant the belief that +he would abandon the peninsula and the new colony? Could the man +who had bartered away Venetia and seized Malta and Egypt be fitly +looked upon as the sacred'r peacemaker? In diplomacy men's words +are interpreted by their past conduct and present circumstances, +neither of which tended to produce confidence in Bonaparte's +pacific overtures; and neither Francis nor George III. looked on +the present attempt as anything but a skilful means of weakening +the Coalition.</p> + +<p>Indeed, that league was, for various reasons, all but dissolved +by internal dissensions. Austria was resolved to keep all the +eastern part of Piedmont and the greater part of the Genoese +Republic. While welcoming the latter half of this demand, George +III.'s Ministers protested against the absorption of so great a +part of Piedmont as an act of cruel injustice to the King of +Sardinia. Austria was annoyed at the British remonstrances and was +indignant at the designs of the Czar on Corsica. Accordingly no +time could have been better chosen by Bonaparte for seeking to +dissolve the Coalition, as he certainly hoped to do by these two +letters. Only the staunch support of legitimist claims by England +then prevented the Coalition from degenerating into a scramble for +Italian territories.<a name="FNanchor_137_137"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_137_137"><sup>[137]</sup></a> And, if we may trust the +verdict of contemporaries and his own confession at St. Helena, +Bonaparte never expected any other result from these letters than +an increase of his popularity in France. This was enhanced by the +British reply, which declared that His Majesty could not place his +reliance on "general professions of pacific dispositions": France +had waged aggressive war, levied exactions, and overthrown +institutions in neighbouring States; and the British Government +could not as yet discern any abandonment of this system: something +more was required for<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i242" id= +"page_i242">[pg.242]</a></span> a durable peace: "The best and most +natural pledge of its reality and permanence would be the +restoration of that line of princes which for so many centuries +maintained the French nation in prosperity at home and in +consideration and respect abroad." This answer has been sharply +criticised, and justly so, if its influence on public opinion be +alone considered. But a perusal of the British Foreign Office +Records reveals the reason for the use of these stiffly legitimist +claims. Legitimacy alone promised to stop the endless shiftings of +the political kaleidoscope, whether by France, Austria, or Russia. +Our ambassador at Vienna was requested to inform the Government of +Vienna of the exact wording of the British reply:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"As a proof of the zeal and steadiness with which His Majesty +adheres to the principles of the Confederacy, and as a testimony of +the confidence with which he anticipates a similar answer from His +Imperial Majesty, to whom an overture of a similar nature has +without doubt been made."</p> +</div> + +<p>But this correct conduct, while admirably adapted to prop up the +tottering Coalition, was equally favourable to the consolidation of +Bonaparte's power. It helped to band together the French people to +resist the imposition of their exiled royal house by external +force. Even George III. thought it "much too strong," though he +suggested no alteration. At once Bonaparte retorted in a masterly +note; he ironically presumed that His Britannic Majesty admitted +the right of nations to choose their form of government, since only +by that right did he wear the British crown; and he invited him not +to apply to other peoples a principle which would recall the +Stuarts to the throne of Great Britain.</p> + +<p>Bonaparte's diplomatic game was completely won during the +debates on the King's speech at Westminster at the close of +January, 1800. Lord Grenville laboriously proved that peace was +impossible with a nation whose war was against all order, religion, +and morality; and he cited examples of French lawlessness from +Holland and <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i243" id= +"page_i243">[pg.243]</a></span> Switzerland to Malta and Egypt. +Pitt declared that the French Revolution was the severest trial +which Providence had ever yet inflicted on the nations of the +earth; and, claiming that there was no security in negotiating with +France, owing to her instability, he summed up his case in the +Ciceronian phrase: <i>Pacem nolo quia infida</i>. Ministers carried +the day by 260 votes to 64; but they ranged nearly the whole of +France on the side of the First Consul. No triumph in the field was +worth more to him than these Philippics, which seemed to challenge +France to build up a strong Government in order that the Court of +St. James might find some firm foundation for future +negotiations.</p> + +<p>Far more dextrous was the conduct of the Austrian diplomatists. +Affecting to believe in the sincerity of the First Consul's +proposal for peace, they so worded their note as to draw from him a +reply that he was prepared to discuss terms of peace on the basis +of the Treaty of Campo Formio.<a name="FNanchor_138_138"></a><a +href="#Footnote_138_138"><sup>[138]</sup></a> As Austria had since +then conquered the greater part of Italy, Bonaparte's reply +immediately revealed his determination to reassert French supremacy +in Italy and the Rhineland. The action of the Courts of Vienna and +London was not unlike that of the sun and the wind in the +proverbial saw. Viennese suavity induced Bonaparte to take off his +coat and show himself as he really was: while the conscientious +bluster of Grenville and Pitt made the First Consul button up his +coat, and pose as the buffeted peacemaker.</p> + +<p>The allies had good grounds for confidence. Though Russia had +withdrawn from the Second Coalition yet the Austrians continued +their victorious advance in Italy. In April, 1800, they severed the +French forces near Savona, driving back Suchet's corps towards +Nice, while the other was gradually hemmed in behind the redoubts +of Genoa. There the Imperialist advance was stoutly stayed. +Masséna, ably seconded by Oudinot and Soult, who now gained +their first laurels as generals, maintained<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i244" id="page_i244">[pg.244]</a></span> a most +obstinate resistance, defying alike the assaults of the +white-coats, the bombs hurled by the English squadron, and the +deadlier inroads of famine and sickness. The garrison dwindled by +degrees to less than 10,000 effectives, but they kept double the +number of Austrians there, while Bonaparte was about to strike a +terrible blow against their rear and that of Melas further west. It +was for this that the First Consul urged Masséna to hold out +at Genoa to the last extremity, and nobly was the order obeyed.</p> + +<p>Suchet meanwhile defended the line of the River Var against +Melas. In Germany, Moreau with his larger forces slowly edged back +the chief Austrian army, that of General Kray, from the defiles of +the Black Forest, compelling it to fall back on the intrenched camp +at Ulm.</p> + +<p>On their side, the Austrians strove to compel Masséna to +a speedy surrender, and then with a large force to press on into +Nice, Provence, and possibly Savoy, surrounding Suchet's force, and +rousing the French royalists of the south to a general +insurrection. They also had the promise of the help of a British +force, which was to be landed at some point on the coast and take +Suchet in the flank or rear.<a name="FNanchor_139_139"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_139_139"><sup>[139]</sup></a> Such was the plan, daring +in outline and promising great things, provided that everything +went well. If Masséna surrendered, if the British War Office +and Admiralty worked up to time, if the winds were favourable, and +if the French royalists again ventured on a revolt, then France +would be crippled, perhaps conquered. As for the French occupation +of Switzerland and Moreau's advance into Swabia, that was not to +prevent the prosecution of the original Austrian plan of advancing +against Provence and wresting Nice and<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i245" id="page_i245">[pg.245]</a></span> Savoy from the +French grasp. This scheme has been criticised as if it were based +solely on military considerations; but it was rather dictated by +schemes of political aggrandizement. The conquest of Nice and Savoy +was necessary to complete the ambitious schemes of the Hapsburgs, +who sought to gain a large part of Piedmont at the expense of the +King of Sardinia, and after conquering Savoy and Nice, to thrust +that unfortunate king to the utmost verge of the peninsula, which +the prowess of his descendants has ultimately united under the +Italian tricolour.</p> + +<p>The allied plan sinned against one of the elementary rules of +strategy; it exposed a large force to a blow from the rear, namely, +from Switzerland. The importance of this immensely strong central +position early attracted Bonaparte's attention. On the 17th of +March he called his secretary, Bourrienne (so the latter states), +and lay down with him on a map of Piedmont: then, placing pins +tipped, some with red, others with black wax, so as to denote the +positions of the troops, he asked him to guess where the French +would beat their foes:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"How the devil should I know?" said Bourrienne. "Why, look here, +you fool," said the First Consul: "Melas is at Alessandria with his +headquarters. There he will remain until Genoa surrenders. He has +at Alessandria his magazines, his hospitals, his artillery, his +reserves. Crossing the Alps here (at the Great St. Bernard), I +shall fall upon Melas, cut off his communications with Austria, and +meet him here in the plains of the River Scrivia at San +Giuliano."</p> +</div> + +<p>I quote this passage as showing how readily such stories of +ready-made plans gain credence, until they come to be tested by +Napoleon's correspondence. There we find no strategic soothsaying, +but only a close watching of events as they develop day by day. In +March and April he kept urging on Moreau the need of an early +advance, while he considered the advantages offered by the St. +Gotthard, Simplon, and Great St. Bernard passes for his own army. +On April 27th he decided <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i246" +id="page_i246">[pg.246]</a></span> against the first (except for a +detachment), because Moreau's advance was too slow to safeguard his +rear on that route. He now preferred the Great St. Bernard, but +still doubted whether, after crossing, he should make for Milan, or +strike at Masséna's besiegers, in case that general should +be very hard pressed. Like all great commanders, he started with a +general plan, but he arranged the details as the situation +required. In his letter of May 19th, he poured scorn on Parisian +editors who said he prophesied that in a month he would be at +Milan. "That is not in my character. Very often I do <i>not</i> say +what I know: but never do I say what will be."</p> + +<p>The better to hide his purpose, he chose as his first base of +operations the city of Dijon, whence he seemed to threaten either +the Swabian or the Italian army of his foes. But this was not +enough. At the old Burgundian capital he assembled his staff and a +few regiments of conscripts in order to mislead the English and +Austrian spies; while the fighting battalions were drafted by +diverse routes to Geneva or Lausanne. So skilful were these +preparations that, in the early days of May, the greater part of +his men and stores were near the lake of Geneva, whence they were +easily transferred to the upper valley of the Rhone. In order that +he might have a methodical, hard-working coadjutor he sent Berthier +from the office of the Ministry of War, where he had displayed less +ability than Bernadotte, to be commander-in-chief of the "army of +reserve." In reality Berthier was, as before in Italy and Egypt, +chief of the staff; but he had the titular dignity of commander +which the constitution of 1800 forbade the First Consul to +assume.</p> + +<p>On May 6th Bonaparte left Paris for Geneva, where he felt the +pulse of every movement in both campaigns. At that city, on hearing +the report of his general of engineers, he decided to take the +Great St. Bernard route into Italy, as against the Simplon. With +redoubled energy, he now supervised the thousands of <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i247" id="page_i247">[pg.247]</a></span> +details that were needed to insure success: for, while prone to +indulging in grandiose schemes, he revelled in the work which alone +could bring them within his grasp: or, as Wellington once remarked, +"Nothing was too great or too small for his proboscis." The +difficulties of sending a large army over the Great St. Bernard +were indeed immense. That pass was chosen because it presented only +five leagues of ground impracticable for carriages. But those five +leagues tested the utmost powers of the army and of its chiefs. +Marmont, who commanded the artillery, had devised the ingenious +plan of taking the cannon from their carriages and placing them in +the hollowed-out trunks of pine, so that the trunnions fitting into +large notches kept them steady during the ascent over the snow and +the still more difficult descent.<a name="FNanchor_140_140"></a><a +href="#Footnote_140_140"><sup>[140]</sup></a> The labour of +dragging the guns wore out the peasants; then the troops were +invited—a hundred at a time—to take a turn at the +ropes, and were exhilarated by martial airs played by the bands, or +by bugles and drums sounding the charge at the worst places of the +ascent.</p> + +<p>The track sometimes ran along narrow ledges where a false step +meant death, or where avalanches were to be feared. The elements, +however, were propitious, and the losses insignificant. This was +due to many causes: the ardour of the troops in an enterprise which +appealed to French imagination and roused all their activities; the +friendliness of the mountaineers; and the organizing powers of +Bonaparte and of his staff; all these may be cited as elements of +success. They present a striking contrast to the march of +Hannibal's army over one of the western passes of the Alps. His +motley host struggled over a long stretch of mountains in the short +days of October over unknown paths, in one part swept away by a +fall of the cliff, and ever and anon beset by clouds of treacherous +Gauls. Seeing that the great Carthaginian's difficulties began long +before he reached the Alps, that<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i248" id="page_i248">[pg.248]</a></span> he was encumbered by +elephants, and that his army was composed of diverse races held +together only by trust in the prowess of their chief, his exploit +was far more wonderful than that of Bonaparte, which, indeed, more +nearly resembles the crossing of the St. Bernard by Francis I. in +1515. The difference between the conditions of Hannibal's and +Bonaparte's enterprises may partly be measured by the time which +they occupied. Whereas Hannibal's march across the Alps lasted +fifteen days, three of which were spent in the miseries of a forced +halt amidst the snow, the First Consul's forces took but seven +days. Whereas the Carthaginian army was weakened by hunger, the +French carried their full rations of biscuit; and at the head of +the pass the monks of the Hospice of St. Bernard served out the +rations of bread, cheese, and wine which the First Consul had +forwarded, and which their own generosity now doubled. The +hospitable fathers themselves served at the tables set up in front +of the Hospice.</p> + +<p>After insuring the regular succession of troops and stores, +Bonaparte himself began the ascent on May 20th. He wore the gray +overcoat which had already become famous; and his features were +fixed in that expression of calm self-possession which he ever +maintained in face of difficulty. The melodramatic attitudes of +horse and rider, which David has immortalized in his great +painting, are, of course, merely symbolical of the genius of +militant democracy prancing over natural obstacles and wafted +onwards and upwards by the breath of victory. The living figure was +remarkable only for stern self-restraint and suppressed excitement; +instead of the prancing war-horse limned by David, his beast of +burden was a mule, led by a peasant; and, in place of victory, he +had heard that Lannes with the vanguard had found an unexpected +obstacle to his descent into Italy. The narrow valley of the Dora +Baltea, by which alone they could advance, was wellnigh blocked by +the fort of Bard, which was firmly held by a small Austrian +garrison and defied all the efforts of <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i249" id="page_i249">[pg.249]</a></span> Lannes and +Berthier. This was the news that met the First Consul during his +ascent, and again at the Hospice. After accepting the hospitality +of the monks, and spending a short time in the library and chapel, +he resumed his journey; and on the southern slopes he and his staff +now and again amused themselves by sliding down the tracks which +the passage of thousands of men had rendered slippery. After +halting at Aosta, he proceeded down the valley to the fort of +Bard.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile some of his foot-soldiers had worked their way round +this obstacle by a goat-track among the hills and had already +reached Ivrea lower down the valley. Still the fort held out +against the cannonade of the French. Its commanding position seemed +to preclude all hope of getting the artillery past it; and without +artillery the First Consul could not hope for success in the plains +of Piedmont. Unable to capture the fort, he bethought him of +hurrying by night the now remounted guns under the cover of the +houses of the village. For this purpose he caused the main street +to be strewn with straw and dung, while the wheels of the cannon +were covered over so as to make little noise. They were then +dragged quietly through the village almost within pistol shot of +the garrison: nevertheless, the defenders took alarm, and, firing +with musketry and grenades, exploded some ammunition wagons and +inflicted other losses; yet 40 guns and 100 wagons were got past +the fort.</p> + +<p>How this unfailing resource contrasts with the heedless +behaviour of the enemy! Had they speedily reinforced their +detachment at Bard, there can be little doubt that Bonaparte's +movements could have been seriously hampered. But, up to May 21st, +Melas was ignorant that his distant rear was being assailed, and +the 3,000 Austrians who guarded the vale of the Dora Baltea were +divided, part being at Bard and others at Ivrea. The latter place +was taken by a rush of Lannes' troops on May 22nd, and Bard was +blockaded by part of the French rearguard. <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i250" id="page_i250">[pg.250]</a></span> Bonaparte's +army, if the rearguard be included, numbered 41,000 men. Meanwhile, +farther east, a French force of 15,000 men, drawn partly from +Moreau's army and led by Moncey, was crossing the St. Gotthard pass +and began to drive back the Austrian outposts in the upper valley +of the Ticino; and 5,000 men, marching over the Mont Cenis pass, +threatened Turin from the west. The First Consul's aim now was to +unite the two chief forces, seize the enemy's magazines, and compel +him to a complete surrender. This daring resolve took shape at +Aosta on the 24th, when he heard that Melas was, on the 19th, still +at Nice, unconscious of his doom. The chance of ending the war at +one blow was not to be missed, even if Masséna had to shift +for himself.</p> + +<p>But already Melas' dream of triumph had vanished. On the 21st, +hearing the astonishing news that a large force had crossed the St. +Bernard, he left 18,000 men to oppose Suchet on the Var, and +hurried back with the remainder to Turin. At the Piedmontese +capital he heard that he had to deal with the First Consul; but not +until the last day of May did he know that Moncey was forcing the +St. Gotthard and threatening Milan. Then, realizing the full extent +of his danger, he hastily called in all the available troops in +order to fight his way through to Mantua. He even sent an express +to the besiegers of Genoa to retire on Alessandria; but +negotiations had been opened with Masséna for the surrender +of that stronghold, and the opinion of Lord Keith, the English +admiral, decided the Austrian commander there to press the siege to +the very end. The city was in the direst straits. Horses, dogs, +cats, and rats were at last eagerly sought as food: and at every +sortie crowds of the starving inhabitants followed the French in +order to cut down grass, nettles, and leaves, which they then +boiled with salt.<a name="FNanchor_141_141"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_141_141"><sup>[141]</sup></a> A revolt threatened by the +wretched townsfolk was averted by Masséna ordering his +troops to fire on every gathering of more than four men. At<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i251" id= +"page_i251">[pg.251]</a></span> last, on June 4th, with 8,000 +half-starved soldiers he marched through the Austrian posts with +the honours of war. The stern warrior would not hear of the word +surrender or capitulation. He merely stated to the allied +commanders that on June 4th his troops would evacuate Genoa or +clear their path by the bayonet.</p> + +<p>Bonaparte has been reproached for not marching at once to +succour Masséna: the charge of desertion was brought by +Masséna and Thiébault, and has been driven home by +Lanfrey with his usual skill. It will, however, scarcely bear a +close examination. The Austrians, at the first trustworthy news of +the French inroads into Piedmont and Lombardy, were certain to +concentrate either at Turin or Alessandria. Indeed, Melas was +already near Turin, and would have fallen on the First Consul's +flank had the latter marched due south towards Genoa.<a name= +"FNanchor_142_142"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_142_142"><sup>[142]</sup></a> Such a march, with only +40,000 men, would have been perilous: and it could at most only +have rescued a now reduced and almost famishing garrison. Besides, +he very naturally expected the besiegers of Genoa to retreat now +that their rear was threatened.</p> + +<p>Sound policy and a desire to deal a dramatic stroke spurred on +the First Consul to a more daring and effective plan; to clear +Lombardy of the Imperialists and seize their stores; then, after +uniting with Moncey's 15,000 troops, to cut off the retreat of all +the Austrian forces west of Milan.</p> + +<p>On entering Milan he was greeted with wild acclaim by the +partisans of France (June 2nd); they extolled the energy and +foresight that brought two armies, as it were down from the clouds, +to confound their oppressors. Numbers of men connected with the +Cisalpine Republic had been proscribed, banished, or imprisoned by +the <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i252" id= +"page_i252">[pg.252]</a></span> Austrians; and their friends now +hailed him as the restorer of their republic. The First Consul +spent seven days in selecting the men who were to rebuild the +Cisalpine State, in beating back the eastern forces of Austria +beyond the River Adda, and in organizing his troops and those of +Moncey for the final blow. The military problems, indeed, demanded +great care and judgment. His position was curiously the reverse of +that which he had occupied in 1796. Then the French held Tortona, +Alessandria, and Valenza, and sought to drive back the Austrians to +the walls of Mantua. Now the Imperialists, holding nearly the same +positions, were striving to break through the French lines which +cut them off from that city of refuge; and Bonaparte, having forces +slightly inferior to his opponents, felt the difficulty of +frustrating their escape.</p> + +<p>Three routes were open to Melas. The most direct was by way of +Tortona and Piacenza along the southern bank of the Po, through the +difficult defile of Stradella: or he might retire towards Genoa, +across the Apennines, and regain Mantua by a dash across the +Modenese: or he might cross the Po at Valenza and the Ticino near +Pavia. All these roads had to be watched by the French as they +cautiously drew towards their quarry. Bonaparte's first move was to +send Murat with a considerable body of troops to seize Piacenza and +to occupy the defile of Stradella. These important posts were +wrested from the Austrian vanguard; and this success was crowned on +June 9th by General Lannes' brilliant victory at Montebello over a +superior Austrian force marching from Genoa towards Piacenza, which +he drove back towards Alessandria. Smaller bodies of French were +meanwhile watching the course of the Ticino, and others seized the +magazines of the enemy at Cremona.</p> + +<p>After gaining precious news as to Melas' movements from an +intercepted despatch, Bonaparte left Milan on June 9th, and +proceeded to Stradella. There he waited for news of Suchet and +Masséna from the side of Savona and Ceva; for their forces, +if united, might <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i253" id= +"page_i253">[pg.253]</a></span> complete the circle which he was +drawing around the Imperialists.<a name="FNanchor_143_143"></a><a +href="#Footnote_143_143"><sup>[143]</sup></a> He hoped that +Masséna would have joined Suchet near Savona; but owing to +various circumstances, for which Masséna was in no wise to +blame, their junction was delayed; and Suchet, though pressing on +towards Acqui, was unable to cut off the Austrian retreat on Genoa. +Yet he so harassed the corps opposed to him in its retreat from +Nice that only about 8,000 Austrians joined Melas from that +quarter.<a name="FNanchor_144_144"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_144_144"><sup>[144]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Doubtless, Melas' best course would still have been to make a +dash for Genoa and trust to the English ships. But this plan galled +the pride of the general, who had culled plenteous laurels in Italy +until the approach of Bonaparte threatened to snatch the whole +chaplet from his brow. He and his staff sought to restore their +drooping fortunes by a bold rush against the ring of foes that were +closing around. Never has an effort of this kind so nearly +succeeded and yet so wholly failed.</p> + +<p>The First Consul, believing that the Austrians were bent solely +on flight, advanced from Stradella, where success would have been +certain, into the plains of Tortona, whence he could check any move +of theirs southwards on Genoa. But now the space which he occupied +was so great as to weaken his line at any one point; while his foes +had the advantage of the central position.<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i254" id="page_i254">[pg.254]</a></span> Bonaparte was +also forced to those enveloping tactics which had so often proved +fatal to the Austrians four years previously; and this curious +reversal of his usual tactics may account for the anxiety which he +betrayed as he moved towards Marengo. He had, however, recently +been encouraged by the arrival of Desaix from Paris after his +return from Egypt. This dashing officer and noble man inspired him +with a sincere affection, as was seen by the three hours of eager +converse which he held with him on his arrival, as also by his +words to Bourrienne: "He is quite an antique character." Desaix +with 5,300 troops was now despatched on the night of June 13th +towards Genoa to stop the escape of the Austrians in that +direction. This eccentric move has been severely criticised: but +the facts, as then known by Bonaparte, seemed to show that Melas +was about to march on Genoa. The French vanguard under Gardane had +in the afternoon easily driven the enemy's front from the village +of Marengo; and Gardane had even reported that there was no bridge +over the River Bormida by which the enemy could debouch into the +plain of Marengo. Marmont, pushing on later in the evening, had +discovered that there was at least one well-defended bridge; and +when early next morning Gardane's error was known, the First +Consul, with a blaze of passion against the offender, sent a +courier in hot haste to recall Desaix. Long before he could arrive, +the battle of Marengo had begun: and for the greater part of that +eventful day, June the 14th, the French had only 18000 men +wherewith to oppose the onset of 31,000 Austrians.<a name= +"FNanchor_145_145"></a> <a href= +"#Footnote_145_145"><sup>[145]</sup></a></p> + +<p>As will be seen by the accompanying map, the village of Marengo +lies in the plain that stretches eastwards from the banks of the +River Bormida towards the hilly country of Stradella.</p> + +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i255" id= +"page_i255">[pg.255]</a></span> + +<center><a name="image_07"><img alt= +"THE BATTLE OF MARENGO, to illustrate Kellermann's charge" src= +"images/image07.jpg" width="487" height="341"><br> +<font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>THE BATTLE OF +MARENGO, to illustrate Kellermann's +charge</small></font></a></center> + +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i256" id= +"page_i256">[pg.256]</a></span> + +<p>The village lies on the high-road leading eastwards from the +fortress of Alessandria, the chief stronghold of north-western +Italy. The plain is cut up by numerous obstacles. Through Marengo +runs a stream called the Fontanone. The deep curves of the Bormida, +the steep banks of the Fontanone, along with the villages, +farmsteads, and vineyards scattered over the plain, all helped to +render an advance exceedingly difficult in face of a determined +enemy; and these natural features had no small share in deciding +the fortunes of the day.</p> + +<p>Shortly after dawn Melas began to pour his troops across the +Bormida, and drove in the French outposts on Marengo: but there +they met with a tough resistance from the soldiers of Victor's +division, while Kellermann, the son of the hero of Valmy, performed +his first great exploit by hurling back some venturesome Austrian +horsemen into the deep bed of the Fontanone. This gave time to +Lannes to bring up his division, 5,000 strong, into line between +Marengo and Castel Ceriolo. But when the full force of the Austrian +attack was developed about 10 a.m., the Imperialists not only +gained Marengo, but threw a heavy column, led by General Ott, +against Lannes, who was constrained to retire, contesting every +inch of the ground. Thus, when, an hour later, Bonaparte rode up +from the distant rear, hurrying along his Consular Guard, his eye +fell upon his battalions overpowered in front and outflanked on +both wings. At once he launched his Consular Guard, 1,000 strong, +against Ott's triumphant ranks. Drawn up in square near Castel +Ceriolo, it checked them for a brief space, until, plied by cannon +and charged by the enemy's horse, these chosen troops also began to +give ground. But at this crisis Monnier's division of 3,600 men +arrived, threw itself into the fight, held up the flood of +white-coats around the hamlet of Li Poggi, while Carra St. Cyr +fastened his grip on Castel Ceriolo. Under cover of this welcome +screen, Victor and Lannes restored some order to their divisions +and checked for a time the onsets of <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i257" id="page_i257">[pg.257]</a></span> the enemy. Slowly +but surely, however, the impact of the Austrian main column, +advancing along the highroad, made them draw back on San +Giuliano.</p> + +<p>By 2 p.m. the battle seemed to be lost for the French; except on +the north of their line they were in full retreat, and all but five +of their cannon were silenced. Melas, oppressed by his weight of +years, by the terrific heat, and by two slight wounds, retired to +Alessandria, leaving his chief of the staff, Zach, to direct the +pursuit. But, unfortunately, Melas had sent back 2,200 horsemen to +watch the district between Alessandria and Acqui, to which latter +place Suchet's force was advancing. To guard against this remoter +danger, he weakened his attacking force at the critical time and +place; and now, when the Austrians approached the hill of San +Giuliano with bands playing and colours flying, their horse was not +strong enough to complete the French defeat. Still, such was the +strength of their onset that all resistance seemed unavailing, +until about 5 p.m. the approach of Desaix breathed new life and +hope into the defence. At once he rode up to the First Consul; and +if vague rumours may be credited, he was met by the eager question: +"Well, what do you think of it?" To which he replied: "The battle +is lost, but there is time to gain another." Marmont, who heard the +conversation, denies that these words were uttered; and they +presume a boldness of which even Desaix would scarcely have been +guilty to his chief. What he unquestionably did urge was the +immediate use of artillery to check the Austrian advance: and +Marmont, hastily reinforcing his own five guns with thirteen +others, took a strong position and riddled the serried ranks of the +enemy as, swathed in clouds of smoke and dust, they pressed blindly +forward. The First Consul disposed the troops of Desaix behind the +village and a neighbouring hill; while at a little distance on the +French left, Kellermann was ready to charge with his heavy cavalry +as opportunity offered.</p> + +<p>It came quickly. Marmont's guns unsteadied Zach's <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i258" id="page_i258">[pg.258]</a></span> +grenadiers: Desaix's men plied them with musketry; and while they +were preparing for a last effort, Kellermann's heavy cavalry +charged full on their flank. Never was surprise more complete. The +column was cut in twain by this onset; and veterans, who but now +seemed about to overbear all obstacles, were lying mangled by +grapeshot, hacked by sabres, flying helplessly amidst the +vineyards, or surrendering by hundreds. A panic spread to their +comrades; and they gave way on all sides before the fiercely +rallying French. The retreat became a rout as the recoiling columns +neared the bridges of the Bormida: and night closed over a scene of +wild confusion, as the defeated army, thrust out from the shelter +of Marengo, flung itself over the river into the stronghold of +Alessandria.</p> + +<p>Such was the victory of Marengo. It was dearly bought; for, +apart from the heavy losses, amounting on either side to about +one-third of the number engaged, the victors sustained an +irreparable loss in the death of Desaix, who fell in the moment +when his skill and vigour snatched victory from defeat. The victory +was immediately due to Kellermann's brilliant charge; and there can +be no doubt, in spite of Savary's statements, that this young +officer made the charge on his own initiative. Yet his onset could +have had little effect, had not Desaix shaken the enemy and left +him liable to a panic like that which brought disaster to the +Imperialists at Rivoli. Bonaparte's dispositions at the crisis were +undoubtedly skilful; but in the first part of the fight his conduct +was below his reputation. We do not hear of him electrifying his +disordered troops by any deed comparable with that of Cæsar, +when, shield in hand, he flung himself among the legionaries to +stem the torrent of the Nervii. At the climax of the fight he +uttered the words "Soldiers, remember it is my custom to bivouac on +the field of battle"—tame and egotistical words considering +the gravity of the crisis.</p> + +<p>On the evening of the great day, while paying an exaggerated +compliment to Bessières and the cavalry of <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i259" id="page_i259">[pg.259]</a></span> +the Consular Guard, he merely remarked to Kellermann: "You made a +very good charge"; to which that officer is said to have replied: +"I am glad you are satisfied, general: for it has placed the crown +on your head." Such pettiness was unworthy of the great captain who +could design and carry through the memorable campaign of Marengo. +If the climax was not worthy of the inception, yet the campaign as +a whole must be pronounced a masterpiece. Since the days of +Hannibal no design so daring and original had startled the world. A +great Austrian army was stopped in its victorious career, was +compelled to turn on its shattered communications, and to fight for +its existence some 120 miles to the rear of the territory which it +seemed to have conquered. In fact, the allied victories of the past +year were effaced by this march of Bonaparte's army, which, in less +than a month after the ascent of the Alps, regained Nice, Piedmont, +and Lombardy, and reduced the Imperialists to the direst +straits.</p> + +<p>Staggered by this terrific blow, Melas and his staff were ready +to accept any terms that were not deeply humiliating; and Bonaparte +on his side was not loth to end the campaign in a blaze of glory. +He consented that the Imperial troops should retire to the east of +the Mincio, except at Peschiera and Mantua, which they were still +to occupy. These terms have been variously criticised: Melas has +been blamed for cowardice in surrendering the many strongholds, +including Genoa, which his men firmly held. Yet it must be +remembered that he now had at Alessandria less than 20,000 +effectives, and that 30,000 Austrians in isolated bodies were +practically at the mercy of the French between Savona and Brescia. +One and all they could now retire to the Mincio and there resume +the defence of the Imperial territories. The political designs of +the Court of Vienna on Piedmont were of course shattered; but it +now recovered the army which it had heedlessly sacrificed to +territorial greed. Bonaparte has also been blamed for the lenience +of his terms. Severer conditions could <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i260" id="page_i260">[pg.260]</a></span> doubtless have +been extorted; but he now merged the soldier in the statesman. He +desired peace for the sake of France and for his own sake. After +this brilliant stroke peace would be doubly grateful to a people +that longed for glory but also yearned to heal the wounds of eight +years' warfare. His own position as First Consul was as yet +ill-established; and he desired to be back at Paris so as to curb +the restive Tribunate, overawe Jacobins and royalists, and rebuild +the institutions of France.</p> + +<p>Impelled by these motives, he penned to the Emperor Francis an +eloquent appeal for peace, renewing his offer of treating with +Austria on the basis of the treaty of Campo Formio.<a name= +"FNanchor_146_146"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_146_146"><sup>[146]</sup></a> But Austria was not as yet +so far humbled as to accept such terms; and it needed the +master-stroke of Moreau at the great battle of Hohenlinden +(December 2nd, 1800), and the turning of her fortresses on the +Mincio by the brilliant passage of the Splügen in the depths +of winter by Macdonald—a feat far transcending that of +Bonaparte at the St. Bernard—to compel her to a peace. A +description of these events would be beyond the scope of this work; +and we now return to consider the career of Bonaparte as a +statesman.</p> + +<p>After a brief stay at Milan and Turin, where he was received as +the liberator of Italy, the First Consul crossed the Alps by the +Mont Cenis pass and was received with rapturous acclaim at Lyons +and Paris. He had been absent from the capital less than two +calendar months.</p> + +<p>He now sent a letter to the Czar Paul, offering that, if the +French garrison of Malta were compelled by famine to evacuate that +island, he would place it in the hands of the Czar, as Grand Master +of the Knights of St. John. Rarely has a "Greek gift" been more +skilfully tendered. In the first place, Valetta was so closely +blockaded by Nelson's cruisers and invested by the native +Maltese<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i261" id= +"page_i261">[pg.261]</a></span> that its surrender might be +expected in a few weeks; and the First Consul was well aware how +anxiously the Czar had been seeking to gain a foothold at Malta, +whence he could menace Turkey from the south-east. In his wish +completely to gain over Russia, Bonaparte also sent back, well-clad +and well-armed, the prisoners taken from the Russian armies in +1799, a step which was doubly appreciated at Petersburg because the +Russian troops which had campaigned with the Duke of York in +Holland were somewhat shabbily treated by the British Government in +the Channel Islands, where they took up their winter quarters. +Accordingly the Czar now sent Kalicheff to Paris, for the formation +of a Franco-Russian alliance. He was warmly received. Bonaparte +promised in general terms to restore the King of Sardinia to his +former realm and the Pope to his States. On his side, the Czar sent +the alluring advice to Bonaparte to found a dynasty and thereby put +an end to the revolutionary principles which had armed Europe +against France. He also offered to recognize the natural frontiers +of France, the Rhine and the Maritime Alps, and claimed that German +affairs should be regulated under his own mediation. When both +parties were so complaisant, a bargain was easily arranged. France +and Russia accordingly joined hands in order to secure predominance +in the affairs of Central and Southern Europe, and to +counterbalance England's supremacy at sea.</p> + +<p>For it was not enough to break up the Second Coalition and +recover Northern Italy. Bonaparte's policy was more than European; +it was oceanic. England must be beaten on her own element: then and +then only could the young warrior secure his grasp on Egypt and +return to his oriental schemes. His correspondence before and after +the Marengo campaign reveals his eagerness for a peace with Austria +and an alliance with Russia. His thoughts constantly turn to Egypt. +He bargains with Britain that his army there may be revictualled, +and so words his claim that troops can easily <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i262" id="page_i262">[pg.262]</a></span> be +sent also. Lord Grenville refuses (September 10th); whereupon +Bonaparte throws himself eagerly into further plans for the +destruction of the islanders. He seeks to inflame the Czar's wrath +against the English maritime code. His success for the time is +complete. At the close of 1800 the Russian Emperor marshals the +Baltic Powers for the overthrow of England's navy, and outstrips +Bonaparte's wildest hopes by proposing a Franco-Russian invasion of +India with a view to "dealing his enemy a mortal blow." This plan, +as drawn up at the close of 1800, arranged for the mustering of +35,000 Russians at Astrakan; while as many French were to fight +their way to the mouth of the Danube, set sail on Russian ships for +the Sea of Azov, join their allies on the Caspian Sea, sail to its +southern extremity, and, rousing the Persians and Afghans by the +hope of plunder, sweep the British from India. The scheme received +from Bonaparte a courteous perusal; but he subjected it to several +criticisms, which led to less patient rejoinders from the irascible +potentate. Nevertheless, Paul began to march his troops towards the +lower Volga, and several polks of Cossacks had crossed that river +on the ice, when the news of his assassination cut short the +scheme.<a name="FNanchor_147_147"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_147_147"><sup>[147]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The grandiose schemes of Paul vanished with their fantastic +contriver; but the <i>rapprochement</i> of Russia to revolutionary +France was ultimately to prove an event of far-reaching importance; +for the eastern power thereby began to exert on the democracy of +western Europe that subtle, semi-Asiatic influence which has so +powerfully warped its original character.</p> + +<p>The dawn of the nineteenth century witnessed some startling +rearrangements on the political chess-board.</p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i263" id= +"page_i263">[pg.263]</a></span> While Bonaparte brought Russia and +France to sudden amity, the unbending maritime policy of Great +Britain leagued the Baltic Powers against the mistress of the seas. +In the autumn of 1800 the Czar Paul, after hearing of our capture +of Malta, forthwith revived the Armed Neutrality League of 1780 and +opposed the forces of Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark to the +might of England's navy. But Nelson's brilliant success at +Copenhagen and the murder of the Czar by a palace conspiracy +shattered this league only four months after its formation, and the +new Czar, Alexander, reverted for a time to friendship with +England.<a name="FNanchor_148_148"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_148_148"><sup>[148]</sup></a> This sudden ending to the +first Franco-Russia alliance so enraged Bonaparte that he caused a +paragraph to be inserted in the official "Moniteur," charging the +British Government with procuring the assassination of Paul, an +insinuation that only proclaimed his rage at this sudden rebuff to +his hitherto successful diplomacy. Though foiled for a time, he +never lost sight of the hoped-for alliance, which, with a deft +commixture of force and persuasion, he gained seven years later +after the crushing blow of Friedland.</p> + +<p>Dread of a Franco-Russian alliance undoubtedly helped to compel +Austria to a peace. Humbled by Moreau at the great battle of +Hohenlinden, the Emperor Francis opened negotiations at +Lunéville in Lorraine. The subtle obstinacy of Cobenzl there +found its match in the firm yet suave diplomacy of Joseph +Bonaparte, who wearied out Cobenzl himself, until the march of +Moreau towards Vienna compelled Francis to accept the River Adige +as his boundary in Italy. The other terms of the treaty (February +9th, 1801) were practically the same as those of the treaty of +Campo Formio, save that the Hapsburg Grand Duke of Tuscany was<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i264" id= +"page_i264">[pg.264]</a></span> compelled to surrender his State to +a son of the Bourbon Duke of Parma. He himself was to receive +"compensation" in Germany, where also the unfortunate Duke of +Modena was to find consolation in the district of the Breisgau on +the Upper Rhine. The helplessness of the old Holy Roman Empire was, +indeed, glaringly displayed; for Francis now admitted the right of +the French to interfere in the rearrangement of that medley of +States. He also recognized the Cisalpine, Ligurian, Helvetic, and +Batavian Republics, as at present constituted; but their +independence, and the liberty of their peoples to choose what form +of government they thought fit, were expressly stipulated.</p> + +<p>The Court of Naples also made peace with France by the treaty of +Florence (March, 1801), whereby it withdrew its troops from the +States of the Church, and closed its ports to British and Turkish +ships; it also renounced in favour of the French Republic all its +claims over a maritime district of Tuscany known as the +Présidii, the little principality of Piombino, and a port in +the Isle of Elba. These cessions fitted in well with Napoleon's +schemes for the proposed elevation of the heir of the Duchy of +Parma to the rank of King of Tuscany or Etruria. The King of Naples +also pledged himself to admit and support a French corps in his +dominions. Soult with 10,000 troops thereupon occupied Otranto, +Taranto, and Brindisi, in order to hold the Neapolitan Government +to its engagements, and to facilitate French intercourse with +Egypt.</p> + +<p>In his relations with the New World Bonaparte had also +prospered. Certain disputes between France and the United States +had led to hostilities in the year 1798. Negotiations for peace +were opened in March, 1800, and led to the treaty of Morfontaine, +which enabled Bonaparte to press on the Court of Madrid the scheme +of the Parma-Louisiana exchange, that promised him a magnificent +empire on the banks of the Mississippi.</p> + +<p>These and other grandiose designs were confided only to +Talleyrand and other intimate counsellors. But, even <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i265" id="page_i265">[pg.265]</a></span> to +the mass of mankind, the transformation scene ushered in by the +nineteenth century was one of bewildering brilliance. Italy from +the Alps to her heel controlled by the French; Austria compelled to +forego all her Italian plans; Switzerland and Holland dominated by +the First Consul's influence; Spain following submissively his +imperious lead; England, despite all her naval triumphs, helpless +on land; and France rapidly regaining more than all her old +prestige and stability under the new institutions which form the +most enduring tribute to the First Consul's glory. <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i266" id= +"page_i266">[pg.266]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XII</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE NEW INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE</center> + +<br> + + +<p>"We have done with the romance of the Revolution: we must now +commence its history. We must have eyes only for what is real and +practicable in the application of principles, and not for the +speculative and hypothetical." Such were the memorable words of +Bonaparte to his Council of State at one of its early meetings. +They strike the keynote of the era of the Consulate. It was a +period of intensely practical activity that absorbed all the +energies of France and caused the earlier events of the Revolution +to fade away into a seemingly remote past. The failures of the +civilian rulers and the military triumphs of Bonaparte had exerted +a curious influence on the French character, which was in a mood of +expectant receptivity. In 1800 everything was in the transitional +state that favours the efforts of a master builder; and one was now +at hand whose constructive ability in civil affairs equalled his +transcendent genius for war.</p> + +<p>I propose here briefly to review the most important works of +reconstruction which render the Consulate and the early part of the +Empire for ever famous. So vast and complex were Bonaparte's +efforts in this field that they will be described, not +chronologically, but subject by subject. The reader will, however, +remember that for the most part they went on side by side, even +amidst the distractions caused by war, diplomacy, colonial +enterprises, and the myriad details of a vast administration. What +here appears as a series of canals was in reality a mighty river of +enterprise rolling in undivided volume <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i267" id="page_i267">[pg.267]</a></span> and fed by the +superhuman vitality of the First Consul. It was his inexhaustible +curiosity which compelled functionaries to reveal the secrets of +their office: it was his intelligence that seized on the salient +points of every problem and saw the solution: it was his ardour and +mental tenacity which kept his Ministers and committees hard at +work, and by toil of sometimes twenty hours a day supervised the +results: it was, in fine, his passion for thoroughness, his +ambition for France, that nerved every official with something of +his own contempt of difficulties, until, as one of them said, "the +gigantic entered into our very habits of thought."<a name= +"FNanchor_149_149"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_149_149"><sup>[149]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The first question of political reconstruction which urgently +claimed attention was that of local government. On the very day +when it was certain that the nation had accepted the new +constitution, the First Consul presented to the Legislature a draft +of a law for regulating the affairs of the Departments. It must be +admitted that local self-government, as instituted by the men of +1789 in their Departmental System, had proved a failure. In that +time of buoyant hope, when every difficulty and abuse seemed about +to be charmed away by the magic of universal suffrage, local +self-government of a most advanced type had been intrusted to an +inexperienced populace. There were elections for the commune or +parish, elections for the canton, elections for the district, +elections for the Department, and elections for the National +Assembly, until the rustic brain, after reeling with excitement, +speedily fell back into muddled apathy and left affairs generally +to the wire-pullers of the nearest Jacobin club. A time of great +confusion ensued. Law went according to local opinion, and the +national taxes were often left unpaid. In the Reign of Terror this +lax system was replaced by the despotism of the secret<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i268" id="page_i268">[pg.268]</a></span> +committees, and the way was thus paved for a return to organized +central control, such as was exercised by the Directory.</p> + +<p>The First Consul, as successor to the Directory, therefore found +matters ready to his hand for a drastic measure of centralization, +and it is curious to notice that the men of 1789 had unwittingly +cleared the ground for him. To make way for the "supremacy of the +general will," they abolished the <i>Parlements</i>, which had +maintained the old laws, customs, and privileges of their several +provinces, and had frequently interfered in purely political +matters. The abolition of these and other privileged corporations +in 1789 unified France and left not a single barrier to withstand +either the flood of democracy or the backwash of reaction. +Everything therefore favoured the action of the First Consul in +drawing all local powers under his own control. France was for the +moment weary of elective bodies, that did little except waste the +nation's taxes; and though there was some opposition to the new +proposal, it passed on February 16th, 1800 (28 Pluviose, an, +viii).</p> + +<p>It substituted local government by the central power for local +self-government. The local divisions remained the same, except that +the "districts," abolished by the Convention, were now +reconstituted on a somewhat larger scale, and were termed +<i>arrondissements</i>, while the smaller communes, which had been +merged in the cantons since 1795, were also revived. It is +noteworthy that, of all the areas mapped out by the Constituent +Assembly in 1789-90, only the Department and canton have had a +continuous existence—a fact which seems to show the peril of +tampering with well-established boundaries, and of carving out a +large number of artificial districts, which speedily become the +<i>corpus vile</i> of other experimenters. Indeed, so little was +there of effective self-government that France seems to have sighed +with relief when order was imposed by Bonaparte in the person of a +Prefect. This important official, a miniature First Consul, was to +administer the affairs <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i269" +id="page_i269">[pg.269]</a></span> of the Department, while +sub-prefects were similarly placed over the new +<i>arrondissements</i>, and mayors over the communes. The mayors +were appointed by the First Consul in communes of more than 5,000 +souls: by the prefects in the smaller communes: all were alike +responsible to the central power.</p> + +<p>The rebound from the former electoral system, which placed all +local authority ultimately in the hands of the voters, was +emphasized by Article 75 of the constitution, which virtually +raised officials beyond reach of prosecution. It ran thus: "The +agents of the Government, other than the Ministers, cannot be +prosecuted for facts relating to their duties except by a decision +of the Council of State: in that case the prosecution takes place +before the ordinary tribunals." Now, as this decision rested with a +body composed almost entirely of the higher officials, it will be +seen that the chance of a public prosecution of an official became +extremely small. France was therefore in the first months of 1800 +handed over to a hierarchy of officials closely bound together by +interest and <i>esprit de corps</i>; and local administration, +after ten years of democratic experiments, practically reverted to +what it had been under the old monarchy. In fact, the powers of the +Prefects were, on the whole, much greater than those of the royal +Intendants: for while the latter were hampered by the provincial +<i>Parlements</i>, the nominees of the First Consul had to deal +with councils that retained scarce the shadow of power. The real +authority in local matters rested with the Prefects. The old +elective bodies survived, it is true, but their functions were now +mainly advisory; and, lest their advice should be too copious, the +sessions of the first two bodies were limited to a fortnight a +year. Except for a share in the assessment of taxation, their +existence was merely a screen to hide the reality of the new +central despotism.<a name="FNanchor_150_150"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_150_150"><sup>[150]</sup></a> Beneficent it may<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i270" id= +"page_i270">[pg.270]</a></span> have been; and the choice of +Prefects was certainly a proof of Bonaparte's discernment of real +merit among men of all shades of opinion; but for all that, it was +a despotism, and one that has inextricably entwined itself with the +whole life of France.<a name="FNanchor_151_151"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_151_151"><sup>[151]</sup></a></p> + +<p>It seems strange that this law should not have aroused fierce +opposition; for it practically gagged democracy in its most +appropriate and successful sphere of action, local self-government, +and made popular election a mere shadow, except in the single act +of the choice of the local <i>juges de paix</i>. This was foreseen +by the Liberals in the Tribunate: but their power was small since +the regulations passed in January: and though Daunou, as +"reporter," sharply criticised this measure, yet he lamely +concluded with the advice that it would be dangerous to reject it. +The Tribunes therefore passed the proposal by 71 votes to 25: and +the Corps Législatif by 217 to 68.</p> + +<p>The results of this new local government have often been +considered so favourable as to prove that the genius of the French +people requires central control rather than self-government. But it +should be noted that the conditions of France from 1790 to 1800 +were altogether hostile to the development of free institutions. +The fierce feuds at home, the greed and the class jealousies +awakened by confiscation, the blasts of war and the blight of +bankruptcy, would have severely tested the firmest of local +institutions; they were certain to wither so delicate an organism +as an absolute democracy, which requires peace, prosperity, and +infinite patience for its development. Because France then came to +despair of her local self-government, it did not follow that she +would fail after Bonaparte's return had restored her prestige and +prosperity. But the national<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i271" id="page_i271">[pg.271]</a></span> <i>élan</i> +forbade any postponement or compromise; and France forthwith +accepted the rule of an able official hierarchy as a welcome +alternative to the haphazard acts of local busybodies. By many able +men the change has been hailed as a proof of Bonaparte's marvellous +discernment of the national character, which, as they aver, longs +for brilliance, order, and strong government, rather than for the +steep and thorny paths of liberty. Certainly there is much in the +modern history of France which supports this opinion. Yet perhaps +these characteristics are due very largely to the master craftsman, +who fashioned France anew when in a state of receptivity, and thus +was able to subject democracy to that force which alone has been +able to tame it—the mighty force of militarism.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;"> +<p>The return to a monarchical policy was nowhere more evident than +in the very important negotiations which regulated the relations of +Church and State and produced the <i>Concordat</i> or treaty of +peace with the Roman Catholic Church. But we must first look back +at the events which had reduced the Roman Catholic Church in France +to its pitiable condition.</p> + +<p>The conduct of the revolutionists towards the Church of France +was actuated partly by the urgent needs of the national exchequer, +partly by hatred and fear of so powerful a religious corporation. +Idealists of the new school of thought, and practical men who +dreaded bankruptcy, accordingly joined in the assault on its +property and privileges: its tithes were confiscated, the religious +houses and their property were likewise absorbed, and its lands +were declared to be the lands of the nation. A budget of public +worship was, it is true, designed to support the bishops and +priests; but this solemn obligation was soon renounced by the +fiercer revolutionists. Yet robbery was not their worst offence. In +July, 1790, they passed a law called the Civil Constitution of the +Clergy, which aimed at subjecting the Church to the State. It +compelled bishops and priests to seek election <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i272" id="page_i272">[pg.272]</a></span> by +the adult males of their several Departments and parishes, and +forced them to take a stringent oath of obedience to the new order +of things. All the bishops but four refused to take an oath which +set at naught the authority of the Pope: more than 50,000 priests +likewise refused, and were ejected from their livings: the +recusants were termed <i>orthodox</i> or <i>non-juring</i> priests, +and by the law of August, 1792, they were exiled from France, while +their more pliable or time-serving brethren who accepted the new +decree were known as <i>constitutionals</i>. About 12,000 of the +constitutionals married, while some of them applauded the extreme +Jacobinical measures of the Terror. One of them shocked the +faithful by celebrating the mysteries, having a <i>bonnet rouge</i> +on his head, holding a pike in his hand, while his wife was +installed near the altar.<a name="FNanchor_152_152"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_152_152"><sup>[152]</sup></a> Outrages like these were +rare: but they served to discredit the constitutional Church and to +throw up in sharper relief the courage with which the orthodox +clergy met exile and death for conscience' sake. Moreover, the +time-serving of the constitutionals was to avail them little: +during the Terror their stipends were unpaid, and the churches were +for the most part closed. After a partial respite in 1795-6, the +<i>coup d'état</i> of Fructidor (1797) again ushered in two +years of petty persecutions; but in the early summer of 1799 +constitutionals were once more allowed to observe the Christian +Sunday, and at the time of Bonaparte's return from Egypt their +services were more frequented than those of the Theophilanthropists +on the <i>décadis</i>. It was evident, then, that the +anti-religious <i>furor</i> had burnt itself out, and that France +was turning back to her old faith. Indeed, outside Paris and a few +other large towns, public opinion mocked at the new cults, and in +the country districts the peasantry clung with deep affection to +their old orthodox priests, often following them into the forests +to receive their services and forsaking those of their +supplanters.</p> + +<p>Such, then, was the religious state of France in 1799:<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i273" id= +"page_i273">[pg.273]</a></span> her clergy were rent by a +formidable schism; the orthodox priests clung where possible to +their parishioners, or lived in destitution abroad; the +constitutional priests, though still frowned on by the Directory, +were gaining ground at the expense of the Theophilanthropists, +whose expiring efforts excited ridicule. In fine, a nation weary of +religious experiments and groping about for some firm anchorage in +the midst of the turbid ebb-tide and its numerous backwaters.<a +name="FNanchor_153_153"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_153_153"><sup>[153]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Despite the absence of any deep religious belief, Bonaparte felt +the need of religion as the bulwark of morality and the cement of +society. During his youth he had experienced the strength of +Romanism in Corsica, and during his campaigns in Italy he saw with +admiration the zeal of the French orthodox priests who had accepted +exile and poverty for conscience' sake. To these outcasts he +extended more protection than was deemed compatible with correct +republicanism; and he received their grateful thanks. After +Brumaire he suppressed the oath previously exacted from the clergy, +and replaced it by a <i>promise</i> of fidelity to the +constitution. Many reasons have been assigned for this conduct, but +doubtless his imagination was touched by the sight of the majestic +hierarchy of Rome, whose spiritual powers still prevailed, even +amidst the ruin of its temporal authority, and were slowly but +surely winning back the ground lost in the Revolution. An influence +so impalpable yet irresistible, that inherited from the Rome of the +Cæsars the gift of organization and the power of maintaining +discipline, in which the Revolution was so signally lacking, might +well be the ally of the man who now dominated the Latin peoples. +The pupil of Cæsar could certainly not neglect the aid of the +spiritual hierarchy, which was all that remained of the old Roman +grandeur.</p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i274" id= +"page_i274">[pg.274]</a></span> Added to this was his keen instinct +for reality, which led him to scorn such whipped-up creeds as +Robespierre's Supreme Being and that amazing hybrid, +Theophilanthropy, offspring of the Goddess of Reason and La +Réveillière-Lépeaux. Having watched their +manufacture, rise and fall, he felt the more regard for the faith +of his youth, which satisfied one of the most imperious needs of +his nature, a craving for certainty. Witness this crushing retort +to M. Mathieu: "What is your Theophilanthropy? Oh, don't talk to me +of a religion which only takes me for this life, without telling me +whence I come or whither I go." Of course, this does not prove the +reality of Napoleon's religion; but it shows that he was not devoid +of the religious instinct.</p> + +<p>The victory of Marengo enabled Bonaparte to proceed with his +plans for an accommodation with the Vatican; and he informed one of +the Lombard bishops that he desired to open friendly relations with +Pope Pius VII., who was then about to make his entry into Rome. +There he received the protection of the First Consul, and soon +recovered his sovereignty over his States, excepting the +Legations.</p> + +<p>The negotiations between Paris and the Vatican were transacted +chiefly by a very able priest, Bernier by name, who had gained the +First Consul's confidence during the pacification of Brittany, and +now urged on the envoys of Rome the need of deferring to all that +was reasonable in the French demands. The negotiators for the +Vatican were Cardinals Consalvi and Caprara, and Monseigneur +Spina—able ecclesiastics, who were fitted to maintain +clerical claims with that mixture of suppleness and firmness which +had so often baffled the force and craft of mighty potentates. The +first difficulty arose on the question of the resignation of +bishops of the Gallican Church: Bonaparte demanded that, whether +orthodox or constitutionals, they must resign their sees into the +Pope's hands; failing that, they must be deposed by the papal +authority. Sweeping as this proposal seemed, Bonaparte claimed that +bishops of both sides must resign, <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i275" id="page_i275">[pg.275]</a></span> in order that a +satisfactory selection might be made. Still more imperious was the +need that the Church should renounce all claim to her confiscated +domains. All classes of the community, so urged Bonaparte, had made +immense sacrifices during the Revolution; and now that peasants +were settled on these once clerical lands, the foundations of +society would be broken up by any attempt to dispossess them.</p> + +<p>To both of these proposals the Court of Rome offered a tenacious +resistance. The idea of compelling long-persecuted bishops to +resign their sees was no less distasteful than the latter proposal, +which involved acquiescence in sacrilegious robbery. At least, +pleaded Mgr. Spina, let tithes be re-established. To this request +the First Consul deigned no reply. None, indeed, was possible +except a curt refusal. Few imposts had been so detested as the +tithe; and its reimposition would have wounded the peasant class, +on which the First Consul based his authority. So long as he had +their support he could treat with disdain the scoffs of the +philosophers and even the opposition of his officers; but to have +wavered on the subject of tithe and of the Church lands might have +been fatal even to the victor of Marengo.<a name= +"FNanchor_154_154"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_154_154"><sup>[154]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In fact, the difficulty of effecting any compromise was +enormous. In seeking to reconcile the France of Rousseau and +Robespierre to the unchanging policy of the Vatican, the "heir to +the Revolution" was essaying a harder task than any military +enterprise. To slay men has ever been easier than to mould their +thoughts anew; and Bonaparte was now striving not only to remould +French thought but also to fashion anew the ideas of the Eternal +City. He soon perceived that this latter enterprise was more +difficult than the former. The Pope and his councillors rejoiced at +the signs of his repentance, but required to see the fruits +thereof. Instead of first-fruits they received unheard-of +demands—the surrender of the three<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i276" id="page_i276">[pg.276]</a></span> Legations of +Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, the renunciation of all tithes and +Church lands in France, and the acceptance of a compromise with +schismatics. What wonder that the replies from Rome were couched in +the <i>non possumus</i> terms which form the last refuge of the +Vatican. Finding that negotiations made no progress, Bonaparte +intrusted Berthier and Murat to pay a visit to Rome and exercise a +discreet but burdensome pressure in the form of requisitions for +the French troops in the Papal States.</p> + +<p>The ratification of peace with Austria gave greater weight to +his representations at Rome, and he endeavoured to press on the +signature of the Concordat, so as to startle the world by the +simultaneous announcement of the pacification of the Continent and +of the healing of the great religious schism in France. But the +clerical machinery worked too slowly to admit of this projected +<i>coup de théâtre</i>. In Bonaparte's proposals of +February 25th, 1801, there were several demands already found to be +inadmissible at the Vatican;<a name="FNanchor_155_155"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_155_155"><sup>[155]</sup></a> and matters came to a +deadlock until the Pope invested Spina with larger powers for +negotiating at Paris. Consalvi also proceeded to Paris, where he +was received in state with other ambassadors at the Tuileries, the +sight of a cardinal's robe causing no little sensation. The First +Consul granted him a long interview, speaking at first somewhat +seriously, but gradually becoming more affable and gracious. Yet as +his behaviour softened his demands stiffened; and at the close of +the audience he pressed Consalvi to sign a somewhat unfavourable +version of the compact within five days, otherwise the negotiations +would be at an end and a <i>national religion would be +adopted</i>—an enterprise for which the auguries promised +complete success. At a later interview he expressed the same +resolution in homely phrase: when Consalvi pressed him to take a +firm stand against the "constitutional" intruders, he laughingly +remarked that he could do no more until he knew how he stood with +Rome; for "you<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i277" id= +"page_i277">[pg.277]</a></span> know that when one cannot arrange +matters with God, one comes to terms with the devil."<a name= +"FNanchor_156_156"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_156_156"><sup>[156]</sup></a></p> + +<p>This dalliance with the "constitutionals" might have been more +than an astute ruse, and Consalvi knew it. In framing a national +Church the First Consul would have appealed not only to the old +Gallican feeling, still strong among the clerics and laity, but +also to the potent force of French nationality. The experiment +might have been managed so as to offend none but the strictest +Catholics, who were less to be feared than the free-thinkers. +Consalvi was not far wrong when, writing of the official world at +Paris, he said that only Bonaparte really desired a Concordat.</p> + +<p>The First Consul's motives in seeking the alliance of Rome have, +very naturally, been subjected to searching criticism; and in +forcing the Concordat on France, and also on Rome, he was certainly +undertaking the most difficult negotiation of his life.<a name= +"FNanchor_157_157"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_157_157"><sup>[157]</sup></a> But his preference for the +Roman connection was an act of far-reaching statecraft. He saw that +a national Church, unrecognized by Rome, was a mere half-way house +between Romanism and Protestantism; and he disliked the latter +creed because of its tendency to beget sects and to impair the +validity of the general will. He still retained enough of +Rousseau's doctrine to desire that the general will should be +uniform, provided that it could be controlled by his own will. Such +uniformity in the sphere of religion was impossible unless he had +the support of the Papacy. Only by a bargain with Rome could he +gain the support of a solid ecclesiastical phalanx. Finally, by +erecting a French national Church, he would not only have +perpetuated schism at home, but would have disqualified himself for +acting the part of Charlemagne over central and southern Europe. To +re-fashion Europe in a cosmopolitan mould he needed a clerical +police that was more than merely French. To achieve those grander +designs the successor of Cæsar would need the aid of the<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i278" id= +"page_i278">[pg.278]</a></span> successor of Peter; and this aid +would be granted only to the restorer of Roman Catholicism in +France, never to the perpetuator of schism.</p> + +<p>These would seem to be the chief reasons why he braved public +opinion in Paris and clung to the Roman connection, bringing +forward his plan of a Gallican Church only as a threatening move +against the clerical flank. When the Vatican was obdurate he +coquetted with the "constitutional" bishops, allowing them every +facility for free speech in a council which they held at Paris at +the close of June, 1801. He summoned to the Tuileries their +president, the famous Grégoire, and showed him signal marks +of esteem. "Put not your trust in princes" must soon have been the +thought of Grégoire and his colleagues: for a fortnight +later Bonaparte carried through his treaty with Rome and shelved +alike the congress and the church of the "constitutionals."</p> + +<p>It would be tedious to detail all the steps in this complex +negotiation, but the final proceedings call for some notice. When +the treaty was assuming its final form, Talleyrand, the polite +scoffer, the bitter foe of all clerical claims, found it desirable +to take the baths at a distant place, and left the threads of the +negotiation in the hands of two men who were equally determined to +prevent its signature, Maret, Secretary of State, and Hauterive, +who afterwards become the official archivist of France. These men +determined to submit to Consalvi a draft of the treaty differing +widely from that which had been agreed upon; and that, too, when +the official announcement had been made that the treaty was to be +signed immediately. In the last hours the cardinal found himself +confronted with unexpected conditions, many of which he had +successfully repelled. Though staggered by this trickery, which +compelled him to sign a surrender or to accept an open rupture, +Consalvi fought the question over again in a conference that lasted +twenty-four hours; he even appeared at the State dinner given on +July 14th by the First Consul, who informed him before the other +guests that it was a question of "my draft of the treaty or none +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i279" id= +"page_i279">[pg.279]</a></span> at all." Nothing baffled the +patience and tenacity of the Cardinal; and finally, by the good +offices of Joseph Bonaparte, the objectionable demands thrust +forward at the eleventh hour were removed or altered.</p> + +<p>The question has been discussed whether the First Consul was a +party to this device. Theiner asserts that he knew nothing of it: +that it was an official intrigue got up at the last moment by the +anti-clericals so as to precipitate a rupture. In support of this +view, he cites letters of Maret and Hauterive as inculpating these +men and tending to free Bonaparte from suspicion of complicity. But +the letters cannot be said to dissipate all suspicion. The First +Consul had made this negotiation peculiarly his own: no officials +assuredly would have dared secretly to foist their own version of +an important treaty; or, if they did, this act would have been the +last of their career. But Bonaparte did not disgrace them; on the +contrary, he continued to honour them with his confidence. +Moreover, the First Consul flew into a passion with his brother +Joseph when he reported that Consalvi could not sign the document +now offered to him, and tore in pieces the articles finally +arranged with the Cardinal. On the return of his usually calm +intelligence, he at last allowed the concessions to stand, with the +exception of two; but in a scrutiny of motives we must assign most +importance, not to second and more prudent thoughts, but to the +first ebullition of feelings, which seem unmistakably to prove his +knowledge and approval of Hauterive's device. We must therefore +conclude that he allowed the antagonists of the Concordat to make +this treacherous onset, with the intention of extorting every +possible demand from the dazed and bewildered Cardinal.<a name= +"FNanchor_158_158"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_158_158"><sup>[158]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i280" id="page_i280">[pg.280]</a></span></p> + +<p>After further delays the Concordat was ratified at Eastertide, +1802. It may be briefly described as follows: The French Government +recognized that the Catholic apostolic and Roman religion was the +religion of the great majority of the French people, "especially of +the Consuls"; but it refused to declare it to be the religion of +France, as was the case under the <i>ancien régime</i>. It +was to be freely and publicly practised in France, subject to the +police regulations that the Government judged necessary for the +public tranquillity. In return for these great advantages, many +concessions were expected from the Church. The present bishops, +both orthodox and constitutional, were, at the Pope's invitation, +to resign their sees; or, failing that, new appointments were to be +made, as if the sees were vacant. The last proviso was necessary; +for of the eighty-one surviving bishops affected by this decision +as many as thirteen orthodox and two "constitutionals" offered +persistent but unavailing protests against the action of the Pope +and First Consul.</p> + +<p>A new division of archbishoprics and bishoprics was now made, +which gave in all sixty sees to France. The First Consul enjoyed +the right of nomination to them, whereupon the Pope bestowed +canonical investiture. The archbishops and bishops were all to take +an oath of fidelity to the constitution. The bishops nominated the +lower clerics provided that they were acceptable to the Government: +all alike bound themselves to watch over governmental interests. +The stability of France was further assured by a clause granting +complete and permanent security to the holders of the confiscated +Church lands—a healing and salutary compromise which restored +peace to every village and soothed the qualms of many a troubled +conscience. On its side, the State undertook to furnish suitable +stipends to the clergy, a promise which<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i281" id="page_i281">[pg.281]</a></span> was fulfilled +in a rather niggardly spirit. For the rest, the First Consul +enjoyed the same consideration as the Kings of France in all +matters ecclesiastical; and a clause was added, though Bonaparte +declared it needless, that if any succeeding First Consul were not +a Roman Catholic, his prerogatives in religious matters should be +revised by a Convention. A similar Concordat was passed a little +later for the pacification of the Cisalpine Republic.</p> + +<p>The Concordat was bitterly assailed by the Jacobins, especially +by the military chiefs, and had not the infidel generals been for +the most part sundered by mutual jealousies they might perhaps have +overthrown Bonaparte. But their obvious incapacity for civil +affairs enabled them to venture on nothing more than a few coarse +jests and clumsy demonstrations. At the Easter celebration at Notre +Dame in honour of the ratification of the Concordat, one of them, +Delmas by name, ventured on the only protest barbed with telling +satire: "Yes, a fine piece of monkery this, indeed. It only lacked +the million men who got killed to destroy what you are striving to +bring back." But to all protests Bonaparte opposed a calm behaviour +that veiled a rigid determination, before which priests and +soldiers were alike helpless.</p> + +<p>In subsequent articles styled "organic," Bonaparte, without +consulting the Pope, made several laws that galled the orthodox +clergy. Under the plea of legislating for the police of public +worship, he reaffirmed some of the principles which he had been +unable to incorporate in the Concordat itself. The organic articles +asserted the old claims of the Gallican Church, which forbade the +application of Papal Bulls, or of the decrees of "foreign" synods, +to France: they further forbade the French bishops to assemble in +council or synod without the permission of the Government; and this +was also required for a bishop to leave his diocese, even if he +were summoned to Rome. Such were the chief of the organic articles. +Passed under the plea of securing public tranquillity, they proved +a fruitful source of discord, which during the Empire became so +acute as to weaken Napoleon's <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i282" id="page_i282">[pg.282]</a></span> authority. In +matters religious as well as political, he early revealed his chief +moral and mental defect, a determination to carry his point by +whatever means and to require the utmost in every bargain. While +refusing fully to establish Roman Catholicism as the religion of +the State, he compelled the Church to surrender its temporalities, +to accept the regulations of the State, and to protect its +interests. Truly if, in Chateaubriand's famous phrase, he was the +"restorer of the altars," he exacted the uttermost farthing for +that restoration.</p> + +<p>In one matter his clear intelligence stands forth in marked +contrast to the narrow pedantry of the Roman Cardinals. At a time +of reconciliation between orthodox and "constitutionals," they +required from the latter a complete and public retractation of +their recent errors. At once Bonaparte intervened with telling +effect. So condign a humiliation, he argued, would altogether mar +the harmony newly re-established. "The past is past: and the +bishops and prefects ought to require from the priests only the +declaration of adhesion to the Concordat, and of obedience to the +bishop nominated by the First Consul and instituted by the Pope." +This enlightened advice, backed up by irresistible power, carried +the day, and some ten thousand constitutional priests were quietly +received back into the Roman communion, those who had contracted +marriages being compelled to put away their wives. Bonaparte took a +deep interest in the reconstruction of dioceses, in the naming of +churches, and similar details, doubtless with the full +consciousness that the revival of the Roman religious discipline in +France was a more important service than any feat of arms.</p> + +<p>He was right: in healing a great schism in France he was dealing +a deadly blow at the revolutionary feeling of which it was a +prominent manifestation. In the words of one of his Ministers, "The +Concordat was the most brilliant triumph over the genius of +Revolution, and all the following successes have without exception +resulted from it."<a name="FNanchor_159_159"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_159_159"><sup>[159]</sup></a> After this testimony it is +needless to ask why<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i283" id= +"page_i283">[pg.283]</a></span> Bonaparte did not take up with +Protestantism. At St. Helena, it is true, he asserted that the +choice of Catholicism or Protestantism was entirely open to him in +1801, and that the nation would have followed him in either +direction: but his religious policy, if carefully examined, shows +no sign of wavering on this subject, though he once or twice made a +strategic diversion towards Geneva, when Rome showed too firm a +front. Is it conceivable that a man who, as he informed Joseph, was +systematically working to found a dynasty, should hesitate in the +choice of a governmental creed? Is it possible to think of the +great champion of external control and State discipline as a +defender of liberty of conscience and the right of private +judgment?</p> + +<p>The regulation of the Protestant cult in France was a far less +arduous task. But as Bonaparte's aim was to attach all cults to the +State, he decided to recognize the two chief Protestant bodies in +France, Calvinists and Lutherans, allowing them to choose their own +pastors and to regulate their affairs in consistories. The pastors +were to be salaried by the State, but in return the Government not +only reserved its approval of every appointment, but required the +Protestant bodies to have no relations whatever with any foreign +Power or authority. The organic articles of 1802, which defined the +position of the Protestant bodies, form a very important landmark +in the history of the followers of Luther and Calvin. Persecuted by +Louis XIV. and XV., they were tolerated by Louis XVI.; they gained +complete religious equality<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i284" id="page_i284">[pg.284]</a></span> in 1789, and after a +few years of anarchy in matters of faith, they found themselves +suddenly and stringently bound to the State by the organizing +genius of Bonaparte.</p> + +<p>In the years 1806-1808 the position of the Jews was likewise +defined, at least for all those who recognized France as their +country, performed all civic duties, and recognized all the laws of +the State. In consideration of their paying full taxes and +performing military service, they received official protection and +their rabbis governmental support.</p> + +<p>Such was Bonaparte's policy on religious subjects. There can be +little doubt that its motive was, in the main, political. This +methodizing genius, who looked on the beliefs and passions, the +desires and ambitions of mankind, as so many forces which were to +aid him in his ascent, had already satisfied the desires for +military glory and material prosperity; and in his bargain with +Rome he now won the support of an organized priesthood, besides +that of the smaller Protestant and Jewish communions. That he +gained also peace and quietness for France may be granted, though +it was at the expense of that mental alertness and independence +which had been her chief intellectual glory; but none of his +intimate acquaintances ever doubted that his religion was only a +vague sentiment, and his attendance at mass merely a compliment to +his "sacred gendarmerie."<a name="FNanchor_160_160"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_160_160"><sup>[160]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Having dared and achieved the exploit of organizing religion in +a half-infidel society, the First Consul was ready to undertake the +almost equally hazardous task of establishing an order of social +distinction, and that too in the very land where less than eight +years previously every title qualified its holder for the +guillotine. For his new experiment, the Legion of Honour, he could +adduce only one precedent in the acts of the last twelve years.</p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i285" id= +"page_i285">[pg.285]</a></span> The whole tendency had been towards +levelling all inequalities. In 1790 all titles of nobility were +swept away; and though the Convention decreed "arms of honour" to +brave soldiers, yet its generosity to the deserving proved to be +less remarkable than its activity in guillotining the unsuccessful. +Bonaparte, however, adduced its custom of granting occasional +modest rewards as a precedent for his own design, which was to be +far more extended and ambitious.</p> + +<p>In May, 1802, he proposed the formation of a Legion of Honour, +organized in fifteen cohorts, with grand officers, commanders, +officers, and legionaries. Its affairs were to be regulated by a +council presided over by Bonaparte himself. Each cohort received +"national domains" with 200,000 francs annual rental, and these +funds were disbursed to the members on a scale proportionate to +their rank. The men who had received "arms of honour" were, <i>ipso +facto</i> to be legionaries; soldiers "who had rendered +considerable services to the State in the war of liberty," and +civilians "who by their learning, talents, and virtues contributed +to establish or to defend the principles of the Republic," might +hope for the honour and reward now held out. The idea of rewarding +merit in a civilian, as well as among the military caste which had +hitherto almost entirely absorbed such honours, was certainly +enlightened; and the names of the famous <i>savants</i> Laplace, +Monge, Berthollet, Lagrange, Chaptal, and of jurists such as +Treilhard and Tronchet, imparted lustre to what would otherwise +have been a very commonplace institution. Bonaparte desired to call +out all the faculties of the nation; and when Dumas proposed that +the order should be limited to soldiers, the First Consul replied +in a brilliant and convincing harangue:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"To do great things nowadays it is not enough to be a man of +five feet ten inches. If strength and bravery made the general, +every soldier might claim the command. The general who does great +things is he who also possesses civil qualities. The soldier knows +no law but force, sees nothing but it, and measures everything by +it. The civilian, on the other hand, <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i286" id="page_i286">[pg.286]</a></span> only looks to the +general welfare. The characteristic of the soldier is to wish to do +everything despotically: that of the civilian is to submit +everything to discussion, truth, and reason. The superiority thus +unquestionably belongs to the civilian."</p> +</div> + +<p>In these noble words we can discern the secret of Bonaparte's +supremacy both in politics and in warfare. Uniting in his own +person the ablest qualities of the statesman and the warrior, he +naturally desired that his new order of merit should quicken the +vitality of France in every direction, knowing full well that the +results would speedily be felt in the army itself. When admitted to +its ranks, the new member swore:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"To devote himself to the service of the Republic, to the +maintenance of the integrity of its territory, the defence of its +government, laws, and of the property which they have consecrated; +to fight by all methods authorized by justice, reason, and law, +against every attempt to re-establish the feudal +<i>régime</i> or to reproduce the titles and qualities +thereto belonging; and finally to strive to the uttermost to +maintain liberty and equality."</p> +</div> + +<p>It is not surprising that the Tribunate, despite the recent +purging of its most independent members, judged liberty and +equality to be endangered by the method of defence now proposed. +The members bitterly criticised the scheme as a device of the +counter-revolution; but, with the timid inconsequence which was +already sapping their virility, they proceeded to pass by fifty-six +votes to thirty-eight a measure of which they had so accurately +gauged the results. The new institution was, indeed, admirably +suited to consolidate Bonaparte's power. Resting on the financial +basis of the confiscated lands, it offered some guarantee against +the restoration of the old monarchy and feudal nobility; while, by +stimulating that love of distinction and brilliance which is +inherent in every gifted people, it quietly began to graduate +society and to group it around the Paladins of a new Gaulish +chivalry. The people had recently cast off the overlordship of the +old Frankish nobles, but admiration of merit (the ultimate <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i287" id= +"page_i287">[pg.287]</a></span> source of all titles of +distinction) was only dormant even in the days of Robespierre; and +its insane repression during the Terror now begat a corresponding +enthusiasm for all commanding gifts. Of this inevitable reaction +Bonaparte now made skillful use. When Berlier, one of the leading +jurists of France, objected to the new order as leading France back +to aristocracy, and contemptuously said that crosses and ribbons +were the toys of monarchy, Bonaparte replied:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Well: men are led by toys. I would not say that in a rostrum, +but in a council of wise men and statesmen one ought to speak one's +mind. I don't think that the French love liberty and equality: the +French are not at all changed by ten years of revolution: they are +what the Gauls were, fierce and fickle. They have one +feeling—honour. We must nourish that feeling: they must have +distinctions. See how they bow down before the stars of +strangers."<a name="FNanchor_161_161"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_161_161"><sup>[161]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>After so frank an exposition of motives to his own Council of +State, little more need be said. We need not credit Bonaparte or +the orators of the Tribunate with any superhuman sagacity when he +and they foresaw that such an order would prepare the way for more +resplendent titles. The Legion of Honour, at least in its highest +grades, was the chrysalis stage of the Imperial <i>noblesse</i>. +After all, the new Charlemagne might plead that his new creation +satisfied an innate craving of the race, and that its durability +was the best answer to hostile critics. Even when, in 1814, his +Senators were offering the crown of France to the heir of the +Bourbons, they expressly stipulated that the Legion of Honour +should not be abolished: it has survived all the shocks of French +history, even the vulgarizing associations of the Second +Empire.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;"> +<p>The same quality of almost pyramidal solidity characterizes +another great enterprise of the Napoleonic period, the codification +of French law.</p> + +<p>The difficulties of this undertaking consisted mainly<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i288" id= +"page_i288">[pg.288]</a></span> in the enormous mass of decrees +emanating from the National Assemblies, relative to political, +civil, and criminal affairs. Many of those decrees, the offspring +of a momentary enthusiasm, had found a place in the codes of laws +which were then compiled; and yet sagacious observers knew that +several of them warred against the instincts of the Gallic race. +This conviction was summed up in the trenchant statement of the +compilers of the new code, in which they appealed from the ideas of +Rousseau to the customs of the past: "New theories are but the +maxims of certain individuals: the old maxims represent the sense +of centuries." There was much force in this dictum. The overthrow +of Feudalism and the old monarchy had not permanently altered the +French nature. They were still the same joyous, artistic, +clan-loving people whom the Latin historians described: and pride +in the nation or the family was as closely linked with respect for +a doughty champion of national and family interests as in the days +of Cæsar. Of this Roman or quasi-Gallic reaction Napoleon was +to be the regulator; and no sphere of his activities bespeaks his +unerring political sagacity more than his sifting of the old and +the new in the great code which was afterwards to bear his +name.</p> + +<p>Old French law had been an inextricable labyrinth of laws and +customs, mainly Roman and Frankish in origin, hopelessly tangled by +feudal customs, provincial privileges, ecclesiastical rights, and +the later undergrowth of royal decrees; and no part of the +legislation of the revolutionists met with so little resistance as +their root and branch destruction of this exasperating jungle. +Their difficulties only began when they endeavoured to apply the +principles of the Rights of Man to political, civil, and criminal +affairs. The chief of these principles relating to criminal law +were that law can only forbid actions that are harmful to society, +and must only impose penalties that are strictly necessary. To +these epoch-making pronouncements the Assembly added, in 1790, that +crimes should be visited only on the guilty individual, not on the +family; and that <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i289" id= +"page_i289">[pg.289]</a></span> penalties must be proportioned to +the offences. The last two of these principles had of late been +flagrantly violated; but the general pacification of France now +permitted a calm consideration of the whole question of criminal +law, and of its application to normal conditions.</p> + +<p>Civil law was to be greatly influenced by the Rights of Man; but +those famous declarations were to a large extent contravened in the +ensuing civil strifes, and their application to real life was +rendered infinitely more difficult by that predominance of the +critical over the constructive faculties which marred the efforts +of the revolutionary Babel-builders. Indeed, such was the ardour of +those enthusiasts that they could scarcely see any difficulties. +Thus, the Convention in 1793 allowed its legislative committee just +one month for the preparation of a code of civil law. At the close +of six weeks Cambacérès, the reporter of the +committee, was actually able to announce that it was ready. It was +found to be too complex. Another commission was ordered to +reconstruct it: this time the Convention discovered that the +revised edition was too concise. Two other drafts were drawn up at +the orders of the Directory, but neither gave satisfaction. And +thus it was reserved for the First Consul to achieve what the +revolutionists had only begun, building on the foundations and with +the very materials which their ten years' toil had prepared.</p> + +<p>He had many other advantages. The Second Consul, +Cambacérès, was at his side, with stores of legal +experience and habits of complaisance that were of the highest +value. Then, too, the principles of personal liberty and social +equality were yielding ground before the more autocratic maxims of +Roman law. The view of life now dominant was that of the warrior +not of the philosopher. Bonaparte named Tronchet, Bigot de +Préameneu, and the eloquent and learned Portalis for the +redaction of the code. By ceaseless toil they completed their first +draft in four months. Then, after receiving the criticisms of the +Court of Cassation and the Tribunals of Appeal, it came before the +Council of State for the decision of <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i290" id="page_i290">[pg.290]</a></span> its special +committee on legislation. There it was subjected to the scrutiny of +several experts, but, above all, to Bonaparte himself. He presided +at more than half of the 102 sittings devoted to this criticism; +and sittings of eight or nine hours were scarcely long enough to +satisfy his eager curiosity, his relentless activity, and his +determined practicality.</p> + +<p>From the notes of Thibaudeau one of the members of this revising +committee, we catch a glimpse of the part there played by the First +Consul. We see him listening intently to the discussions of the +jurists, taking up and sorting the threads of thought when a tangle +seemed imminent, and presenting the result in some striking +pattern. We watch his methodizing spirit at work on the cumbrous +legal phraseology, hammering it out into clear, ductile French. We +feel the unerring sagacity, which acted as a political and social +touchstone, testing, approving, or rejecting multifarious details +drawn from old French law or from the customs of the Revolution; +and finally we wonder at the architectural skill which worked the +2,281 articles of the Code into an almost unassailable pile. To the +skill and patience of the three chief redactors that result is, of +course, very largely due: yet, in its mingling of strength, +simplicity, and symmetry, we may discern the projection of +Napoleon's genius over what had hitherto been a legal chaos.</p> + +<p>Some blocks of the pyramid were almost entirely his own. He +widened the area of French citizenship; above all, he strengthened +the structure of the family by enhancing the father's authority. +Herein his Corsican instincts and the requirements of statecraft +led him to undo much of the legislation of the revolutionists. +Their ideal was individual liberty: his aim was to establish public +order by autocratic methods. They had sought to make of the family +a little republic, founded on the principles of liberty and +equality; but in the new code the paternal authority reappeared no +less strict, albeit less severe in some details than that of the +<i>ancien régime.</i> The family was thenceforth modelled on +the idea dominant <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i291" id= +"page_i291">[pg.291]</a></span> in the State, that authority and +responsible action pertained to a single individual. The father +controlled the conduct of his children: his consent was necessary +for the marriage of sons up to their twenty-fifth year, for that of +daughters up to their twenty-first year; and other regulations were +framed in the same spirit.<a name="FNanchor_162_162"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_162_162"><sup>[162]</sup></a> Thus there was rebuilt in +France the institution of the family on an almost Roman basis; and +these customs, contrasting sharply with the domestic anarchy of the +Anglo-Saxon race, have had a mighty influence in fashioning the +character of the French, as of the other Latin peoples, to a +ductility that yields a ready obedience to local officials, +drill-sergeants, and the central Government.</p> + +<p>In other respects Bonaparte's influence on the code was equally +potent. He raised the age at which marriage could be legally +contracted to that of eighteen for men, and fifteen for women, and +he prescribed a formula of obedience to be repeated by the bride to +her husband; while the latter was bound to protect and support the +wife.<a name="FNanchor_163_163"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_163_163"><sup>[163]</sup></a></p> + +<p>And yet, on the question of divorce, Bonaparte's action was +sufficiently ambiguous to reawaken Josephine's fears; and the +detractors of the great man have some ground for declaring that his +action herein was dictated by personal considerations. Others again +may point to the declarations of the French National Assemblies +that<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i292" id= +"page_i292">[pg.292]</a></span> the law regarded marriage merely as +a civil contract, and that divorce was to be a logical sequel of +individual liberty, "which an indissoluble tie would annul." It is +indisputable that extremely lax customs had been the result of the +law of 1792, divorce being allowed on a mere declaration of +incompatibility of temper.<a name="FNanchor_164_164"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_164_164"><sup>[164]</sup></a> Against these scandals +Bonaparte firmly set his face. But he disagreed with the framers of +the new Code when they proposed altogether to prohibit divorce, +though such a proposition might well have seemed consonant with his +zeal for Roman Catholicism. After long debates it was decided to +reduce the causes which could render divorce possible from nine to +four—adultery, cruelty, condemnation to a degrading penalty, +and mutual consent—provided that this last demand should be +persistently urged after not less than two years of marriage, and +in no case was it to be valid after twenty years of marriage.<a +name="FNanchor_165_165"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_165_165"><sup>[165]</sup></a></p> + +<p>We may also notice here that Bonaparte sought to surround the +act of adoption with much solemnity, declaring it to be one of the +grandest acts imaginable. Yet, lest marriage should thereby be +discouraged, celibates were expressly debarred from the privileges +of adopting heirs. The precaution shows how keenly this able ruler +peered into the future. Doubtless, he surmised that in the future +the population of France would cease to expand at the normal rate, +owing to the working of the law compelling the equal division of +property among all the children of a family. To this law he was +certainly opposed. Equality in regard to the bequest of property +was one of the sacred maxims of revolutionary jurists, who had +limited the right of free disposal by bequest to one-tenth of each +estate: nine-tenths being of necessity divided equally among the +direct heirs. Yet so strong was the reaction in favour of the Roman +principle of paternal authority, that Bonaparte and a majority of +the drafters of the new Code scrupled not to assail that maxim, and +to claim for the father larger discretionary<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i293" id="page_i293">[pg.293]</a></span> +powers over the disposal of his property. They demanded that the +disposable share should vary according to the wealth of the +testator—a remarkable proposal, which proves him to be +anything but the unflinching champion of revolutionary legal ideas +which popular French histories have generally depicted him.</p> + +<p>This proposal would have re-established liberty of bequest in +its most pernicious form, granting almost limitless discretionary +power to the wealthy, while restricting or denying it to the +poor.<a name="FNanchor_166_166"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_166_166"><sup>[166]</sup></a> Fortunately for his +reputation in France, the suggestion was rejected; and the law, as +finally adopted, fixed the disposable share as one-half of the +property, if there was but one heir; one-third, if there were two +heirs; one-fourth, if there were three; and so on, diminishing as +the size of the family increased. This sliding scale, varying +inversely with the size of the family, is open to an obvious +objection: it granted liberty of bequest only in cases where the +family was small, but practically lapsed when the family attained +to patriarchal dimensions. The natural result has been that the +birth-rate has suffered a serious and prolonged check in France. It +seems certain that the First Consul foresaw this result. His +experience of peasant life must have warned him that the law, even +as now amended, would stunt the population of France and ultimately +bring about that [Greek: oliganthrôpia] which saps all great +military enterprises. The great captain did all in his power to +prevent the French settling down in a self-contained national life; +he strove to stir them up to world-wide undertakings, and for the +success of his future imperial schemes a redundant population was +an absolute necessity.</p> + +<p>The Civil Code became law in 1804: after undergoing some slight +modifications and additions, it was, in 1807 renamed the Code +Napoléon. Its provisions had already, in 1806, been adopted +in Italy. In 1810 Holland, and the newly-annexed coast-line of the +North Sea as far as Hamburg, and even Lübeck on the +Baltic,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i294" id= +"page_i294">[pg.294]</a></span> received it as the basis of their +laws, as did the Grand Duchy of Berg in 1811. Indirectly it has +also exerted an immense influence on the legislation of Central and +Southern Germany, Prussia, Switzerland, and Spain: while many of +the Central and South American States have also borrowed its +salient features.</p> + +<p>A Code of Civil Procedure was promulgated in France in 1806, one +of Commerce in 1807, of "Criminal Instruction" in 1808, and a Penal +Code in 1810. Except that they were more reactionary in spirit than +the Civil Code, there is little that calls for notice here, the +Penal Code especially showing little advance in intelligence or +clemency on the older laws of France. Even in 1802, officials +favoured severity after the disorders of the preceding years. When +Fox and Romilly paid a visit to Talleyrand at Paris, they were +informed by his secretary that:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"In his opinion nothing could restore good morals and order in +the country but 'la roue et la religion de nos ancêtres.' He +knew, he said, that the English did not think so, but we knew +nothing of the people. Fox was deeply shocked at the idea of +restoring the wheel as a punishment in France."<a name= +"FNanchor_167_167"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_167_167"><sup>[167]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>This horrible punishment was not actually restored: but this +extract from Romilly's diary shows what was the state of feeling in +official circles at Paris, and how strong was the reaction towards +older ideas. The reaction was unquestionably emphasized by +Bonaparte's influence, and it is noteworthy that the Penal and +other Codes, passed during the Empire, were more reactionary than +the laws of the Consulate. Yet, even as First Consul, he exerted an +influence that began to banish the customs and traditions of the +Revolution, except in the single sphere of material interests; and +he satisfied the peasants' love of land and money in order that he +might the more securely triumph over revolutionary ideals and draw +France insensibly back to the age of Louis XIV.</p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i295" id= +"page_i295">[pg.295]</a></span> While the legislator must always +keep in reserve punishment as the <i>ultima ratio</i> for the +lawless, he will turn by preference to education as a more potent +moralizing agency; and certainly education urgently needed +Bonaparte's attention. The work of carrying into practice the grand +educational aims of Condorcet and his coadjutors in the French +Convention was enough to tax the energies of a Hercules. Those +ardent reformers did little more than clear the ground for future +action: they abolished the old monastic and clerical training, and +declared for a generous system of national education in primary, +secondary, and advanced schools. But amid strifes and bankruptcy +their aims remained unfulfilled. In 1799 there were only +twenty-four elementary schools open in Paris, with a total +attendance of less than 1,000 pupils; and in rural districts +matters were equally bad. Indeed, Lucien Bonaparte asserted that +scarcely any education was to be found in France. Exaggerated +though this statement was, in relation to secondary and advanced +education, it was proximately true of the elementary schools. The +revolutionists had merely traced the outlines of a scheme: it +remained for the First Consul to fill in the details, or to leave +it blank.</p> + +<p>The result can scarcely be cited as a proof of his educational +zeal. Elementary schools were left to the control and supervision +of the communes and of the <i>sous-préfets</i>, and +naturally made little advance amidst an apathetic population and +under officials who cared not to press on an expensive enterprise. +The law of April 30th, 1802, however, aimed at improving the +secondary education, which the Convention had attempted to give in +its <i>écoles centrales</i>. These were now reconstituted +either as <i>écoles secondaires</i> or as +<i>lycées</i>. The former were local or even private +institutions intended for the most promising pupils of the commune +or group of communes; while the <i>lycées</i>, far fewer in +number, were controlled directly by the Government. In both of +these schools great prominence was given to the exact and applied +sciences. The aim of the instruction was not to awaken thought and +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i296" id= +"page_i296">[pg.296]</a></span> develop the faculties, but rather +to fashion able breadwinners, obedient citizens, and enthusiastic +soldiers. The training was of an almost military type, the pupils +being regularly drilled, while the lessons began and ended with the +roll of drums. The numbers of the <i>lycées</i> and of their +pupils rapidly increased; but the progress of the secondary and +primary schools, which could boast no such attractions, was very +slow. In 1806 only 25,000 children were attending the public +primary schools. But two years later elementary and advanced +instruction received a notable impetus from the establishment of +the University of France.</p> + +<p>There is no institution which better reveals the character of +the French Emperor, with its singular combination of greatness and +littleness, of wide-sweeping aims with official pedantry. The +University, as it existed during the First Empire, offers a +striking example of that mania for the control of the general will +which philosophers had so attractively taught and Napoleon so +profitably practised. It is the first definite outcome of a desire +to subject education and learning to wholesale regimental methods, +and to break up the old-world bowers of culture by State-worked +steam-ploughs. His aims were thus set forth:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I want a teaching body, because such a body never dies, but +transmits its organization and spirit. I want a body whose teaching +is far above the fads of the moment, goes straight on even when the +government is asleep, and whose administration and statutes become +so national that one can never lightly resolve to meddle with +them.... There will never be fixity in politics if there is not a +teaching body with fixed principles. As long as people do not from +their infancy learn whether they ought to be republicans or +monarchists, Catholics or sceptics, the State will never form a +nation: it will rest on unsafe and shifting foundations, always +exposed to changes and disorders."</p> +</div> + +<p>Such being Napoleon's designs, the new University of France was +admirably suited to his purpose. It was not a local university: it +was the sum total of all the public <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i297" id="page_i297">[pg.297]</a></span> teaching bodies of +the French Empire, arranged and drilled in one vast instructional +array. Elementary schools, secondary schools, <i>lycées</i>, +as well as the more advanced colleges, all were absorbed in and +controlled by this great teaching corporation, which was to +inculcate the precepts of the Catholic religion, fidelity to the +Emperor and to his Government, as guarantees for the welfare of the +people and the unity of France. For educational purposes, France +was now divided into seventeen Academies, which formed the local +centres of the new institution. Thus, from Paris and sixteen +provincial Academies, instruction was strictly organized and +controlled; and within a short time of its institution (March, +1808), instruction of all kinds, including that of the elementary +schools, showed some advance. But to all those who look on the +unfolding of the mental and moral faculties as the chief aim of +true <i>education</i>, the homely experiments of Pestalozzi offer a +far more suggestive and important field for observation than the +barrack-like methods of the French Emperor. The Swiss reformer +sought to train the mind to observe, reflect, and think; to assist +the faculties in attaining their fullest and freest expression; and +thus to add to the richness and variety of human thought. The +French imperial system sought to prune away all mental +independence, and to train the young generation in neat and +serviceable <i>espalier</i> methods: all aspiring shoots, +especially in the sphere of moral and political science, were +sharply cut down. Consequently French thought, which had been the +most ardently speculative in Europe, speedily became vapid and +mechanical.</p> + +<p>The same remark is proximately true of the literary life of the +First Empire. It soon began to feel the rigorous methods of the +Emperor. Poetry and all other modes of expression of lofty thought +and rapt feeling require not only a free outlet but natural and +unrestrained surroundings. The true poet is at home in the forest +or on the mountain rather than in prim <i>parterres</i>. The +philosopher sees most clearly and reasons most<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i298" id="page_i298">[pg.298]</a></span> +suggestively, when his faculties are not cramped by the need of +observing political rules and police regulations. And the +historian, when he is tied down to a mere investigation and recital +of facts, without reference to their meaning, is but a sorry fowl +flapping helplessly with unequal wings.</p> + +<p>Yet such were the conditions under which the literature of +France struggled and pined. Her poets, a band sadly thinned already +by the guillotine, sang in forced and hollow strains until the +return of royalism begat an imperialist fervour in the +soul-stirring lyrics of Béranger: her philosophy was dumb; +and Napoleonic history limped along on official crutches, until +Thiers, a generation later, essayed his monumental work. In the +realm of exact and applied science, as might be expected, splendid +discoveries adorned the Emperor's reign; but if we are to find any +vitality in the literature of that period, we must go to the ranks, +not of the panegyrists, but of the opposition. There, in the pages +of Madame de Staël and Chateaubriand, we feel the throb of +life. Genius will out, of its own native force: but it cannot be +pressed out, even at a Napoleon's bidding. In vain did he endeavour +to stimulate literature by the reorganization of the Institute, and +by granting decennial prizes for the chief works and discoveries of +the decade. While science prospered, literature languished: and one +of his own remarks, as to the desirability of a public and +semi-official criticism of some great literary work, seems to +suggest a reason for this intellectual malaise:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"The public will take interest in this criticism; perhaps it +will even take sides: it matters not, as its attention will be +fixed on these interesting debates: it will talk about grammar and +poetry: taste will be improved, and our aim will be fulfilled: +<i>out of that will come poets and grammarians</i>."</p> +</div> + +<p>And so it came to pass that, while he was rescuing a nation from +chaos and his eagles winged their flight to Naples, Lisbon, and +Moscow, he found no original thinker worthily to hymn his praises; +and the chief literary triumphs of <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i299" id="page_i299">[pg.299]</a></span> his reign came from +Chateaubriand, whom he impoverished, and Madame de Staël, whom +he drove into exile.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;"> +<p>Such are the chief laws and customs which are imperishably +associated with the name of Napoleon Bonaparte. In some respects +they may be described as making for progress. Their establishment +gave to the Revolution that solidity which it had previously +lacked. Among so "inflammable" a people as the French—the +epithet is Ste. Beuve's—it was quite possible that some of +the chief civil conquests of the last decade might have been lost, +had not the First Consul, to use his own expressive phrase, "thrown +in some blocks of granite." We may intensify his metaphor and +assert that out of the shifting shingle of French life he +constructed a concrete breakwater, in which his own will acted as +the binding cement, defying the storms of revolutionary or royalist +passion which had swept the incoherent atoms to and fro, and had +carried desolation far inland. Thenceforth France was able to work +out her future under the shelter of institutions which +unquestionably possess one supreme merit, that of durability. But +while the chief civic and material gains of the Revolution were +thus perpetuated, the very spirit and life of that great movement +were benumbed by the personality and action of Napoleon. The +burning enthusiasm for the Rights of Man was quenched, the passion +for civic equality survived only as the gibbering ghost of what it +had been in 1790, and the consolidation of revolutionary France was +effected by a process nearly akin to petrifaction.</p> + +<p>And yet this time of political and intellectual reaction in +France was marked by the rise of the greatest of her modern +institutions. There is the chief paradox of that age. While barren +of literary activity and of truly civic developments, yet it was +unequalled in the growth of institutions. This is generally the +characteristic of epochs when the human faculties, long congealed +by untoward restraints, suddenly burst their barriers and run riot +in a spring-tide of hope. The time of disillusionment or <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i300" id= +"page_i300">[pg.300]</a></span> despair which usually supervenes +may, as a rule, be compared with the numbing torpor of winter, +necessary doubtless in our human economy, but lacking the charm and +vitality of the expansive phase. Often, indeed, it is disgraced by +the characteristics of a slavish populace, a mean selfishness, a +mad frivolity, and fawning adulation on the ruler who dispenses +<i>panem et circenses</i>. Such has been the course of many a +political reaction, from the time of degenerate Athens and imperial +Rome down to the decay of Medicean Florence and the orgies of the +restored Stuarts.</p> + +<p>The fruitfulness of the time of monarchical reaction in France +may be chiefly attributed to two causes, the one general, the other +personal; the one connected with the French Revolution, the other +with the exceptional gifts of Bonaparte. In their efforts to create +durable institutions the revolutionists had failed: they had +attempted too much: they had overthrown the old order, had +undertaken crusades against monarchical Europe, and striven to +manufacture constitutions and remodel a deeply agitated society. +They did scarcely more than trace the outlines of the future social +structure. The edifice, which should have been reared by the +Directory, was scarcely advanced at all, owing to the singular +dullness of the new rulers of France. But the genius was at hand. +He restored order, he rallied various classes to his side, he +methodized local government, he restored finance and credit, he +restored religious peace and yet secured the peasants in their +tenure of the confiscated lands, he rewarded merit with social +honours, and finally he solidified his polity by a comprehensive +code of laws which made him the keystone of the now rounded arch of +French life.</p> + +<p>His methods in this immense work deserve attention: they were +very different from those of the revolutionary parties after the +best days of 1789 were past. The followers of Rousseau worked on +rigorous <i>a priori</i> methods. If institutions and sentiments +did not square with the principles of their master, they were swept +away or were forced into conformity with the new evangel. A <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i301" id= +"page_i301">[pg.301]</a></span> correct knowledge of the "Contrat +Social" and keen critical powers were the prime requisites of +Jacobinical statesmanship. Knowledge of the history of France, the +faculty of gauging the real strength of popular feelings, tact in +conciliating important interests, all were alike despised. +Institutions and class interests were as nothing in comparison with +that imposing abstraction, the general will. For this alone could +philosophers legislate and factions conspire.</p> + +<p>From these lofty aims and exasperating methods Bonaparte was +speedily weaned. If victorious analysis led to this; if it could +only pull down, not reconstruct; if, while legislating for the +general will, Jacobins harassed one class after another and +produced civil war, then away with their pedantries in favour of +the practical statecraft which attempted one task at a time and +aimed at winning back in turn the alienated classes. Then, and then +alone, after civic peace had been re-established, would he attempt +the reconstruction of the civil order in the same tentative manner, +taking up only this or that frayed end at once, trusting to time, +skill, and patience to transform the tangle into a symmetrical +pattern. And thus, where Feuillants, Girondins, and Jacobins had +produced chaos, the practical man and his able helpers succeeded in +weaving ineffaceable outlines. As to the time when the change took +place in Bonaparte's brain from Jacobinism to aims and methods that +may be called conservative, we are strangely ignorant. But the +results of this mental change will stand forth clear and solid for +many a generation in the customs, laws, and institutions of his +adopted country. If the Revolution, intellectually considered, +began and ended with analysis, Napoleon's faculties supplied the +needed synthesis. Together they made modern France. <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i302" id= +"page_i302">[pg.302]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XIII</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE CONSULATE FOR LIFE</center> + +<br> + + +<p>With the view of presenting in clear outlines the chief +institutions of Napoleonic France, they have been described in the +preceding chapter, detached from their political setting. We now +return to consider the events which favoured the consolidation of +Bonaparte's power.</p> + +<p>No politician inured to the tricks of statecraft could more +firmly have handled public affairs than the man who practically +began his political apprenticeship at Brumaire. Without apparent +effort he rose to the height whence the five Directors had so +ignominiously fallen; and instinctively he chose at once the policy +which alone could have insured rest for France, that of balancing +interests and parties. His own political views being as yet +unknown, dark with the excessive brightness of his encircling +glory, he could pose as the conciliator of contending factions. The +Jacobins were content when they saw the regicide +Cambacérès become Second Consul; and friends of +constitutional monarchy remembered that the Third Consul, Lebrun, +had leanings towards the Feuillants of 1791. Fouché at the +inquisitorial Ministry of Police, and Merlin, Berlier, Real, and +Boulay de la Meurthe in the Council of State seemed a barrier to +all monarchical schemes; and the Jacobins therefore remained quiet, +even while Catholic worship was again publicly celebrated, while +Vendean rebels were pardoned, and plotting +<i>émigrés</i> were entering the public service.</p> + +<p>Many, indeed, of the prominent terrorists had settled profitably +on the offices which Bonaparte had multiplied <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i303" id="page_i303">[pg.303]</a></span> +throughout France, and were therefore dumb: but some of the less +favoured ones, angered by the stealthy advance of autocracy, wove a +plot for the overthrow of the First Consul. Chief among them were a +braggart named Demerville, a painter, Topino Lebrun, a sculptor, +Ceracchi, and Aréna, brother of the Corsican deputy who had +shaken Bonaparte by the collar at the crisis of Brumaire. These men +hit upon the notion that, with the aid of one man of action, they +could make away with the new despot. They opened their hearts to a +penniless officer named Harel, who had been dismissed from the +army; and he straightway took the news to Bonaparte's private +secretary, Bourrienne. The First Consul, on hearing of the matter, +at once charged Bourrienne to supply Harel with money to buy +firearms, but not to tell the secret to Fouché, of whose +double dealings with the Jacobins he was already aware. It became +needful, however, to inform him of the plot, which was now +carefully nursed by the authorities. The arrests were planned to +take place at the opera on October 10th. About half an hour after +the play had begun, Bonaparte bade his secretary go into the lobby +to hear the news. Bourrienne at once heard the noise caused by a +number of arrests: he came back, reported the matter to his master, +who forthwith returned to the Tuileries. The plot was over.<a name= +"FNanchor_168_168"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_168_168"><sup>[168]</sup></a></p> + +<p>A more serious attempt was to follow. On the 3rd day of +Nivôse (December 24th, 1800), as the First<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i304" id="page_i304">[pg.304]</a></span> +Consul was driving to the opera to hear Haydn's oratorio, "The +Creation," his carriage was shaken by a terrific explosion. A bomb +had burst between his carriage and that of Josephine, which was +following. Neither was injured, though many spectators were killed +or wounded. "Josephine," he calmly said, as she entered the box, +"those rascals wanted to blow me up: send for a copy of the music." +But under this cool demeanour he nursed a determination of +vengeance against his political foes, the Jacobins. On the next day +he appeared at a session of the Council of State along with the +Ministers of Police and of the Interior, Fouché and Chaptal. +The Aréna plot and other recent events seemed to point to +wild Jacobins and anarchists as the authors of this outrage: but +Fouché ventured to impute it to the royalists and to +England.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"There are in it," Bonaparte at once remarked, "neither nobles, +nor Chouans, nor priests. They are men of September +(<i>Septembriseurs</i>), wretches stained with blood, ever +conspiring in solid phalanx against every successive government. We +must find a means of prompt redress."</p> +</div> + +<p>The Councillors at once adopted this opinion, Roederer hotly +declaring his open hostility to Fouché for his reputed +complicity with the terrorists; and, if we may credit the <i>on +dit</i> of Pasquier, Talleyrand urged the execution of +Fouché within twenty-four hours. Bonaparte, however, +preferred to keep the two cleverest and most questionable schemers +of the age, so as mutually to check each other's movements. A day +later, when the Council was about to institute special proceedings, +Bonaparte again intervened with the remark that the action of the +tribunal would be too slow, too restricted: a signal revenge was +needed for so foul a crime, rapid as lightning:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Blood must be shed: as many guilty must be shot as the innocent +who had perished—some fifteen or twenty—and two hundred +banished, so that the Republic might profit by that event to purge +itself."</p> +</div> + +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i305" id= +"page_i305">[pg.i305]</a></span> + +<p>This was the policy now openly followed. In vain did some +members of the usually obsequious Council object to this summary +procedure. Roederer, Boulay, even the Second Consul himself, now +perceived how trifling was their influence when they attempted to +modify Bonaparte's plans, and two sections of the Council speedily +decided that there should be a military commission to judge +suspects and "deport" dangerous persons, and that the Government +should announce this to the Senate, Corps Législatif, and +Tribunate. Public opinion, meanwhile, was carefully trained by the +official "Moniteur," which described in detail various so-called +anarchist attempts; but an increasing number in official circles +veered round to Fouché's belief that the outrage was the +work of the royalists abetted by England. The First Consul himself, +six days after the event, inclined to this version. Nevertheless, +at a full meeting of the Council of State, on the first day of the +year 1801, he brought up a list of "130 villains who were troubling +the public peace," with a view to inflicting summary punishment on +them. Thibaudeau, Boulay, and Roederer haltingly expressed their +fears that all the 130 might not be guilty of the recent outrage, +and that the Council had no powers to decide on the proscription of +individuals. Bonaparte at once assured them that he was not +consulting them about the fate of individuals, but merely to know +whether they thought an exceptional measure necessary. The +Government had only</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Strong presumptions, not proofs, that the terrorists were the +authors of this attempt. <i>Chouannerie</i> and emigration are +surface ills, terrorism is an internal disease. The measure ought +to be taken independently of the event. It is only the occasion of +it. We banish them (the terrorists) for the massacres of September +2nd, May 31st, the Babeuf plot, and every subsequent attempt."<a +name="FNanchor_169_169"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_169_169"><sup>[169]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>The Council thereupon unanimously affirmed the need of an +exceptional measure, and adopted a suggestion of<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i306" id="page_i306">[pg.306]</a></span> +Talleyrand (probably emanating from Bonaparte) that the Senate +should be invited to declare by a special decision, called a +<i>senatus consultum</i>, whether such an act were "preservative of +the constitution." This device, which avoided the necessity of +passing a law through two less subservient bodies, the Tribunate +and Corps Législatif, was forthwith approved by the +guardians of the constitution. It had far-reaching results. The +complaisant Senate was brought down from its constitutional +watchtower to become the tool of the Consuls; and an easy way for +further innovations was thus dextrously opened up through the very +portals which were designed to bar them out.</p> + +<p>The immediate results of the device were startling. By an act of +January 4th, 1801, as many as 130 prominent Jacobins were "placed +under special surveillance outside the European territory of the +Republic"—a specious phrase for denoting a living death +amidst the wastes of French Guiana or the Seychelles. Some of the +threatened persons escaped, perhaps owing to the connivance of +Fouché; some were sent to the Isle of Oléron; but the +others were forthwith despatched to the miseries of captivity in +the tropics. Among these were personages so diverse as Rossignol, +once the scourge of France with his force of Parisian cut-throats, +and Destrem, whose crime was his vehement upbraiding of Bonaparte +at St. Cloud. After this measure had taken effect, it was +discovered by judicial inquiry that the Jacobins had no connection +with the outrage, which was the work of royalists named +Saint-Réjant and Carbon. These were captured, and on January +31st, 1801, were executed; but their fate had no influence whatever +on the sentence of the transported Jacobins. Of those who were sent +to Guiana and the Seychelles, scarce twenty saw France again.<a +name="FNanchor_170_170"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_170_170"><sup>[170]</sup></a></p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i307" id= +"page_i307">[pg.307]</a></span> Bonaparte's conduct with respect to +plots deserves close attention. Never since the age of the Borgias +have conspiracies been so skilfully exploited, so cunningly +countermined. Moreover, his conduct with respect to the +Aréna and Nivôse affairs had a wider significance; for +he now quietly but firmly exchanged the policy of balancing parties +for one which crushed the extreme republicans, and enhanced the +importance of all who were likely to approve or condone the +establishment of personal rule.</p> + +<p>It is now time to consider the effect which Bonaparte's foreign +policy had on his position in France. Reserving for a later chapter +an examination of the Treaty of Amiens, we may here notice the +close connection between Bonaparte's diplomatic successes and the +perpetuation of his Consulate. All thoughtful students of history +must have observed the warping influence which war and diplomacy +have exerted on democratic institutions. The age of Alcibiades, the +doom of the Roman Republic, and many other examples might be cited +to show that free institutions can with difficulty survive the +strain of a vast military organization or the insidious results of +an exacting diplomacy. But never has the gulf between democracy and +personal rule been so quickly spanned as by the commanding genius +of Bonaparte.</p> + +<p>The events which disgusted both England and France with war have +been described above. Each antagonist had parried the attacks of +the other. The blow which Bonaparte had aimed at Britain's commerce +by his eastern expedition had been foiled; and a considerable +French force was shut up in Egypt. His plan of relieving his +starving garrison in Malta, by concluding a maritime truce, had +been seen through by us; and after a blockade of two years, Valetta +fell (September, 1800). But while Great<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i308" id="page_i308">[pg.308]</a></span> Britain +regained more than all her old power in the Mediterranean, she +failed to make any impression on the land-power of France. The +First Consul in the year 1801 compelled Naples and Portugal to give +up the English alliance and to exclude our vessels and goods. In +the north the results of the war had been in favour of the +islanders. The Union Jack again waved triumphant on the Baltic, and +all attempts of the French to rouse and support an Irish revolt had +signally failed. Yet the French preparations for an invasion of +England strained the resources of our exchequer and the patience of +our people. The weary struggle was evidently about to close in a +stalemate.</p> + +<p>For political and financial reasons the two Powers needed +repose. Bonaparte's authority was not as yet so firmly founded that +he could afford to neglect the silent longings of France for peace; +his institutions had not as yet taken root; and he needed money for +public works and colonial enterprises. That he looked on peace as +far more desirable for France than for England at the present time +is clear from a confidential talk which he had with Roederer at the +close of 1800. This bright thinker, to whom he often unbosomed +himself, took exception to his remark that England could not wish +for peace; whereupon the First Consul uttered these memorable +words:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"My dear fellow, England ought not to wish for peace, because we +are masters of the world. Spain is ours. We have a foothold in +Italy. In Egypt we have the reversion to their tenure. Switzerland, +Holland, Belgium—that is a matter irrevocably settled, on +which we have declared to Prussia, Russia, and the Emperor that +<i>we alone</i>, if it were necessary, would make war on all, +namely, that there shall be no Stadholder in Holland, and that we +will keep Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine. A stadholder in +Holland would be as bad as a Bourbon in the St. Antoine suburb."<a +name="FNanchor_171_171"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_171_171"><sup>[171]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i309" id= +"page_i309">[pg.309]</a></span> The passage is remarkable, not only +for its frank statement of the terms on which England and the +Continent might have peace, but also because it discloses the rank +undergrowth of pride and ambition that is beginning to overtop his +reasoning faculties. Even before he has heard the news of Moreau's +great victory of Hohenlinden, he equates the military strength of +France with that of the rest of Europe: nay, he claims without a +shadow of doubt the mastery of the world: he will wage, if +necessary, a double war, against England for a colonial empire, and +against Europe for domination in Holland and the Rhineland. It is +naught to him that that double effort has exhausted France in the +reigns of Louis XIV. and Louis XV. Holland, Switzerland, Italy, +shall be French provinces, Egypt and the Indies shall be her +satrapies, and <i>la grande nation</i> may then rest on her +glories.</p> + +<p>Had these aims been known at Westminster, Ministers would have +counted peace far more harmful than war. But, while ambition +reigned at Paris, dull common sense dictated the policy of Britain. +In truth, our people needed rest: we were in the first stages of an +industrial revolution: our cotton and woollen industries were +passing from the cottage to the factory; and a large part of our +folk were beginning to cluster in grimy, ill-organized townships. +Population and wealth advanced by leaps and bounds; but with them +came the nineteenth-century problems of widening class distinctions +and uncertainty of employment. The food-supply was often +inadequate, and in 1801 the price of wheat in the London market +ranged from £6 to £8 the quarter; the quartern loaf +selling at times for as much as 1s. 10-1/2d.<a name= +"FNanchor_172_172"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_172_172"><sup>[172]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The state of the sister island was even worse. The discontent of +Ireland had been crushed by the severe repression which followed +the rising of 1798; and the bonds connecting the two countries were +forcibly tightened by the Act of Union of 1800. But rest and reform +were urgently needed if this political welding was to acquire solid +strength, and rest and reform were alike<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i310" id="page_i310">[pg.310]</a></span> denied. The +position of the Ministry at Westminster was also precarious. The +opposition of George III. to the proposals for Catholic +Emancipation, to which Pitt believed himself in honour bound, led +to the resignation in February, 1801, of that able Minister. In the +following month Addington, the Speaker of the House of Commons, +with the complacence born of bland obtuseness, undertook to fill +his place. At first, the Ministry was treated with the tolerance +due to the new Premier's urbanity, but it gradually faded away into +contempt for his pitiful weakness in face of the dangers that +threatened the realm.</p> + +<p>Certain unofficial efforts in the cause of peace had been made +during the year 1800, by a Frenchman, M. Otto, who had been charged +to proceed to London to treat with the British Government for the +exchange of prisoners. For various reasons his tentative proposals +as to an accommodation between the belligerents had had no issue: +but he continued to reside in London, and quietly sought to bring +about a good understanding. The accession of the Addington Ministry +favoured the opening of negotiations, the new Secretary for Foreign +Affairs, Lord Hawkesbury, announcing His Majesty's desire for +peace. Indeed, the one hope of the new Ministry, and of the king +who supported it as the only alternative to Catholic Emancipation, +was bound up with the cause of peace. In the next chapter it will +appear how disastrous were the results of that strange political +situation, when a morbidly conscientious king clung to the weak +Addington, and jeopardised the interests of Britain, rather than +accept a strong Minister and a measure of religious equality.</p> + +<p>Napoleon received Hawkesbury's first overtures, those of March +21st, 1801, with thinly veiled scorn; but the news of Nelson's +victory at Copenhagen and of the assassination of the Czar Paul, +the latter of which wrung from him a cry of rage, ended his hopes +of crushing us; and negotiations were now formally begun. On the +14th of April, Great Britain demanded that the French<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i311" id="page_i311">[pg.311]</a></span> +should evacuate Egypt, while she herself would give up Minorca, but +retain the following conquests: Malta, Tobago, Martinique, +Trinidad, Essequibo, Demerara, Berbice, Ceylon, and (a little +later) Curaçoa; while, if the Cape of Good Hope were +restored to the Dutch, it was to be a free port: an indemnity was +also to be found for the Prince of Orange for the loss of his +Netherlands. These claims were declared by Bonaparte to be +inadmissible. He on his side urged the far more impracticable +demand of the <i>status quo ante bellum</i> in the East and West +Indies and in the Mediterranean; which would imply the surrender, +not only of our many naval conquests, but also of our gains in +Hindostan at the expense of the late Tippoo Sahib's dominions. In +the ensuing five months the British Government gained some +noteworthy successes in diplomacy and war. It settled the disputes +arising out of the Armed Neutrality League; there was every +prospect of our troops defeating those of France in Egypt; and our +navy captured St. Eustace and Saba in the West Indies.</p> + +<p>As a set-off to our efforts by sea, Bonaparte instigated a war +between Spain and Portugal, in order that the latter Power might be +held as a "guarantee for the general peace." Spain, however, merely +waged a "war of oranges," and came to terms with her neighbour in +the Treaty of Badajoz, June 6th, 1801, whereby she gained the small +frontier district of Olivenza. This fell far short of the First +Consul's intentions. Indeed, such was his annoyance at the conduct +of the Court of Madrid and the complaisance of his brother Lucien +Bonaparte, who was ambassador there, that he determined to make +Spain bear a heavy share of the English demands. On June 22nd, +1801, he wrote to his brother at Madrid:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I have already caused the English to be informed that I will +never depart, as regards Portugal, from the <i>ultimatum</i> +addressed to M. d'Araujo, and that the <i>status quo ante +bellum</i> for Portugal must amount, for Spain, to the restitution +of Trinidad; for France, to the restitution of Martinique and<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i312" id= +"page_i312">[pg.312]</a></span> Tobago; and for Batavia [Holland], +to that of Curaçoa and some other small American isles."<a +name="FNanchor_173_173"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_173_173"><sup>[173]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>In other words, if Portugal at the close of this whipped-up war +retained her present possessions, then England must renounce her +claims to Trinidad, Martinique, Tobago, Curaçoa, etc.: and +he summed up his contention in the statement that "in signing this +treaty Charles IV. has consented to the loss of Trinidad." Further +pressure on Portugal compelled her to cede part of Northern Brazil +to France and to pay her 20,000,000 francs.</p> + +<p>A still more striking light is thrown on Bonaparte's diplomatic +methods by the following question, addressed to Lord Hawkesbury on +June 15th:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"If, supposing that the French Government should accede to the +arrangements proposed for the East Indies by England, and should +adopt the <i>status quo ante bellum</i> for Portugal, the King of +England would consent to the re-establishment of the <i>status +quo</i> in the Mediterranean and in America."</p> +</div> + +<p>The British Minister in his reply of June 25th explained what +the phrase <i>status quo ante bellum</i> in regard to the +Mediterranean would really imply. It would necessitate, not merely +the evacuation of Egypt by the French, but also that of the Kingdom +of Sardinia (including Nice), the Duchy of Tuscany, and the +independence of the rest of the peninsula. He had already offered +that we should evacuate Minorca; but he now stated that, if France +retained her influence over Italy, England would claim Malta as a +set-off to the vast extension of French territorial influence, and +in order to protect English commerce in those seas: for the rest, +the British Government could not regard the maintenance of the +integrity of Portugal as an equivalent to the surrender by Great +Britain of her West Indian conquests, especially as France had +acquired further portions of Saint Domingo. Nevertheless he offered +to restore Trinidad to Spain, if she would reinstate Portugal in +the frontier strip of Olivenza; and, on<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i313" id="page_i313">[pg.313]</a></span> August 5th, he +told Otto that we would give up Malta if it became independent.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile events were, on the whole, favourable to Great +Britain. She made peace with Russia on favourable terms; and in the +Mediterranean, despite a first success gained by the French Admiral +Linois at Algesiras, a second battle brought back victory to the +Union Jack. An attack made by Nelson on the flotilla at Boulogne +was a failure (August 15th). But at the close of August the French +commander in Egypt, General Menou, was constrained to agree to the +evacuation of Egypt by his troops, which were to be sent back to +France on English vessels. This event had been expected by +Bonaparte, and the secret instruction which he forwarded to Otto at +London shows the nicety of his calculation as to the advantages to +be reaped by France owing to her receiving the news while it was +still unknown in England. He ordered Otto to fix October the 2nd +for the close of the negotiations:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"You will understand the importance of this when you reflect +that Menou may possibly not be able to hold out in Alexandria +beyond the first of Vendémiaire (September 22nd); that, at +this season, the winds are fair to come from Egypt, and ships reach +Italy and Trieste in very few days. Thus it is necessary to push +them [the negotiations] to a conclusion before Vendémiaire +10."</p> +</div> + +<p>The advantages of an irresponsible autocrat in negotiating with +a Ministry dependent on Parliament have rarely been more signally +shown. Anxious to gain popularity, and unable to stem the popular +movement for peace, Addington and Hawkesbury yielded to this +request for a fixed limit of time; and the preliminaries of peace +were signed at London on October 1st, 1801, the very day before the +news arrived there that one of our demands was rendered useless by +the actual surrender of the French in Egypt.<a name= +"FNanchor_174_174"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_174_174"><sup>[174]</sup></a></p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i314" id= +"page_i314">[pg.314]</a></span> The chief conditions of the +preliminaries were as follows: Great Britain restored to France, +Spain, and the Batavian Republic all their possessions and colonies +recently conquered by her except Trinidad and Ceylon. The Cape of +Good Hope was given back to the Dutch, but remained open to British +and French commerce. Malta was to be restored to the Order of St. +John, and placed under the guarantee and protection of a third +Power to be agreed on in the definitive treaty. Egypt returned to +the control of the Sublime Porte. The existing possessions of +Portugal (that is, exclusive of Olivenza) were preserved intact. +The French agreed to loose their hold on the Kingdom of Naples and +the Roman territory; while the British were also to evacuate Porto +Ferrajo (Elba) and the other ports and islands which they held in +the Mediterranean and Adriatic. The young Republic of the Seven +Islands (Ionian Islands) was recognized by France: and the +fisheries on the coasts of Newfoundland and the adjacent isles were +placed on their former footing, subject to "such arrangements as +shall appear just and reciprocally useful."</p> + +<p>It was remarked as significant of the new docility of George +III., that the empty title of "King of France," which he and his +predecessors had affected, was now formally resigned, and the +<i>fleurs de lys</i> ceased to appear on the royal arms.</p> + +<p>Thus, with three exceptions, Great Britain had given way on +every point of importance since the first declaration of her +claims; the three exceptions were Trinidad and Ceylon, which she +gained from the allies of France; and Egypt, the recovery of which +from the French was already achieved, though it was unknown at +London. On every detail but these Bonaparte had gained a signal +diplomatic success. His skill and tenacity bade fair to recover for +France, Martinique, Tobago, and Santa Lucia, then in British hands, +as well as the French stations in<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i315" id="page_i315">[pg.315]</a></span> India. The only +British gains, after nine years of warfare, fruitful in naval +triumphs, but entailing an addition of £290,000,000 to the +National Debt, were the islands of Trinidad and the Dutch +possessions in Ceylon. And yet in the six months spent in +negotiations the general course of events had been favourable to +the northern Power. What then had been lacking? Certainly not +valour to her warriors, nor good fortune to her flag; but merely +brain power to her rulers. They had little of that foresight, +skill, and intellectual courage, without which even the exploits of +a Nelson are of little permanent effect.</p> + +<p>Reserving for treatment in the next chapter the questions +arising from these preliminaries and the resulting Peace of Amiens, +we turn now to consider their bearing on Bonaparte's position as +First Consul. The return of peace after an exhausting war is always +welcome; yet the patriotic Briton who saw the National Debt more +than doubled, with no adequate gain in land or influence, could not +but contrast the difference in the fortunes of France. That Power +had now gained the Rhine boundary; her troops garrisoned the +fortresses of Holland and Northern Italy; her chief dictated his +will to German princelings and to the once free Switzers; while the +Court of Madrid, nay, the Eternal City herself, obeyed his behests. +And all this prodigious expansion had been accomplished at little +apparent cost to France herself; for the victors' bill had been +very largely met out of the resources of the conquered territories. +It is true that her nobles and clergy had suffered fearful losses +in lands and treasure, while her trading classes had cruelly felt +the headlong fall in value of her paper notes: but in a land +endowed with a bounteous soil and climate such losses are soon +repaired, and the signature of the peace with England left France +comparatively prosperous. In October the First Consul also +concluded peace with Russia, and came to a friendly understanding +with the Czar on Italian affairs and the question of indemnities +for the dispossessed German Princes.<a name= +"FNanchor_175_175"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_175_175"><sup>[175]</sup></a></p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i316" id= +"page_i316">[pg.316]</a></span> Bonaparte now strove to extend the +colonies and commerce of France, a topic to which we shall return +later on, and to develop her internal resources. The chief roads +were repaired, and ceased to be in the miserable condition in which +the abolition of the <i>corvées</i> in 1789 had left them: +canals were dug to connect the chief river systems of France, or +were greatly improved; and Paris soon benefited from the +construction of the Scheldt and Oise canal, which brought the +resources of Belgium within easy reach of the centre of France. +Ports were deepened and extended; and Marseilles entered on golden +vistas of prosperity soon to be closed by the renewal of war with +England. Communications with Italy were facilitated by the +improvement of the road between Marseilles and Genoa, as also of +the tracks leading over the Simplon, Mont Cenis, and Mont +Genèvre passes: the roads leading to the Rhine and along its +left bank also attested the First Consul's desire, not only to +extend commerce, but to protect his natural boundary on the east. +The results of this road-making were to be seen in the campaign of +Ulm, when the French forces marched from Boulogne to the Black +Forest at an unparalleled speed.</p> + +<p>Paris in particular felt his renovating hand. With the abrupt, +determined tones which he assumed more and more on reaching +absolute power, he one day said to Chaptal at Malmaison:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I intend to make Paris the most beautiful capital of the world: +I wish that in ten years it should number two millions of +inhabitants." "But," replied his Minister of the Interior, "one +cannot improvise population; ... as it is, Paris would scarcely +support one million"; and he instanced the want of good drinking +water. "What are your plans for giving water to Paris?" Chaptal +gave two alternatives—artesian wells or the bringing of water +from the River Ourcq to Paris. "I adopt the latter plan: go home +and order five hundred men to set to work to-morrow at La Villette +to dig the canal."</p> +</div> + +<p>Such was the inception of a great public work which cost more +than half a million sterling. The provisioning of Paris also +received careful attention, a large reserve <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i317" id="page_i317">[pg.317]</a></span> of +wheat being always kept on hand for the satisfaction of "a populace +which is only dangerous when it is hungry." Bonaparte therefore +insisted on corn being stored and sold in large quantities and at a +very low price, even when considerable loss was thereby entailed.<a +name="FNanchor_176_176"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_176_176"><sup>[176]</sup></a> But besides supplying +<i>panem</i> he also provided <i>circenses</i> to an extent never +known even in the days of Louis XV. State aid was largely granted +to the chief theatres, where Bonaparte himself was a frequent +attendant, and a willing captive to the charms of the actress Mlle. +Georges.</p> + +<p>The beautifying of Paris was, however, the chief means employed +by Bonaparte for weaning its populace from politics; and his +efforts to this end were soon crowned with complete success. Here +again the events of the Revolution had left the field clear for +vast works of reconstruction such as would have been impossible but +for the abolition of the many monastic institutions of old Paris. +On or near the sites of the famous Feuillants and Jacobins he now +laid down splendid thoroughfares; and where the constitutionals or +reds a decade previously had perorated and fought, the fashionable +world of Paris now rolled in gilded cabriolets along streets whose +names recalled the Italian and Egyptian triumphs of the First +Consul. Art and culture bowed down to the ruler who ordered the +renovation of the Louvre, which now became the treasure-house of +painting and sculpture, enriched by masterpieces taken from many an +Italian gallery. No enterprise has more conspicuously helped to +assure the position of Paris as the capital of the world's culture +than Bonaparte's grouping of the nation's art treasures in a +central and magnificent building. In the first year of his Empire +Napoleon gave orders for the construction of vast galleries which +were to connect the northern pavilion of the Tuileries with the +Louvre and form a splendid façade to the new Rue de Rivoli. +Despite the expense, the work was pushed on until it was suddenly +arrested by the downfall of the Empire, and was left to the great +man's nephew to complete. Though it is<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i318" id="page_i318">[pg.318]</a></span> possible, as +Chaptal avers, that the original design aimed at the formation of a +central fortress, yet to all lovers of art, above all to the +hero-worshipping Heine, the new Louvre was a sure pledge of +Napoleon's immortality.</p> + +<p>Other works which combined beauty with utility were the +prolongation of the quays along the left bank of the Seine, the +building of three bridges over that river, the improvement of the +Jardin des Plantes, together with that of other parks and open +spaces, and the completion of the Conservatoire of Arts and Trades. +At a later date, the military spirit of the Empire received signal +illustration in the erection of the Vendôme column, the Arc +de Triomphe, and the consecration, or desecration, of the Madeleine +as a temple of glory.</p> + +<p>Many of these works were subsequent to the period which we are +considering; but the enterprises of the Emperor represent the +designs of the First Consul; and the plans for the improvement of +Paris formed during the Consulate were sufficient to inspire the +Parisians with lively gratitude and to turn them from political +speculations to scenes of splendour and gaiety that recalled the +days of Louis XIV. If we may believe the testimony of Romilly, who +visited Paris in 1802, the new policy had even then attained its +end.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"The quiet despotism, which leaves everybody who does not wish +to meddle with politics (and few at present have any such wish) in +the full and secure enjoyment of their property and of their +pleasures, is a sort of paradise, compared with the agitation, the +perpetual alarms, the scenes of infamy, of bloodshed, which +accompanied the pretended liberties of France."</p> +</div> + +<p>But while acknowledging the material benefits of Bonaparte's +rule, the same friend of liberty notes with concern:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"That he [Bonaparte] meditates the gaining fresh laurels in war +can hardly be doubted, if the accounts which one hears of his +restless and impatient disposition be true."</p> +</div> + +<p>However much the populace delighted in this new <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i319" id="page_i319">[pg.319]</a></span> +<i>régime</i>, the many ardent souls who had dared and +achieved so much in the sacred quest of liberty could not refrain +from protesting against the innovations which were restoring +personal rule. Though the Press was gagged, though as many as +thirty-two Departments were subjected to the scrutiny of special +tribunals, which, under the guise of stamping out brigandage, +frequently punished opponents of the Government, yet the voice of +criticism was not wholly silenced. The project of the Concordat was +sharply opposed in the Tribunate, which also ventured to declare +that the first sections of the Civil Codes were not conformable to +the principles of 1789 and to the first draft of a code presented +to the Convention. The Government thereupon refused to send to the +Tribunate any important measures, but merely flung them a mass of +petty details to discuss, as "<i>bones to gnaw</i>" until the time +for the renewal by lot of a fifth of its members should come round. +During a discussion at the Council of State, the First Consul +hinted with much frankness at the methods which ought to be adopted +to quell the factious opposition of the Tribunate:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"One cannot work with an institution so productive of disorder. +The constitution has created a legislative power composed of three +bodies. None of these branches has any right to organize itself: +that must be done by the law. Therefore we must make a body which +shall organize the manner of deliberations of these three branches. +The Tribunate ought to be divided into five sections. The +discussion of laws will take place secretly in each section: one +might even introduce a discussion between these sections and those +of the Council of State. Only the reporter will speak publicly. +Then things will go on reasonably."</p> +</div> + +<p>Having delivered this opinion, <i>ex cathedra</i>, he departed +(January 7th, 1802) for Lyons, there to be invested with supreme +authority in the reconstituted Cisalpine, or as it was now termed, +Italian Republic<a name="FNanchor_177_177"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_177_177"><sup>[177]</sup></a></p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i320" id= +"page_i320">[pg.320]</a></span> Returning at the close of the +month, radiant with the lustre of this new dignity, he was able to +bend the Tribunate and the <i>Corps Législatif</i> to his +will. The renewal of their membership by one-fifth served as the +opportunity for subjecting them to the more pliable Senate. This +august body of highly-paid members holding office for life had the +right of nominating the new members; but hitherto the retiring +members had been singled out by lot. Roederer, acting on a hint of +the time-serving Second Consul, now proposed in the Council of +State that the retiring members of those Chambers should +thenceforth be appointed by the Senate, and not by lot; for the +principle of the lot, he quaintly urged, was hostile to the right +of election which belonged to the Senate. Against such conscious +sophistry all the bolts of logic were harmless. The question was +left undecided, in order that the Senate might forthwith declare in +favour of its own right to determine every year not only the +elections to, but the exclusions from, the Tribunate and the +<i>Corps Législatif</i>. A <i>senatus consultant</i> of +March legalized this monstrous innovation, which led to the +exclusion from the Tribunate of zealous republicans like Benjamin +Constant, Isnard, Ganilh, Daunou, and Chénier. The infusion +of the senatorial nominees served to complete the nullity of these +bodies; and the Tribunate, the lineal descendant of the terrible +Convention, was gagged and bound within eight years of the stilling +of Danton's mighty voice.</p> + +<p>In days when civic zeal was the strength of the French Republic, +the mere suggestion of such a violation of liberty would have cost +the speaker his life. But since the rise of Bonaparte, civic +sentiments had yielded place to the military spirit and to +boundless pride in the nation's glory. Whenever republican feelings +were outraged, there were sufficient distractions to dissipate any +of the sombre broodings which Bonaparte so heartily disliked; and +an event of international importance now came to still the voice of +political criticism. <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i321" id= +"page_i321">[pg.321]</a></span></p> + +<p>The signature of the definitive treaty of peace with Great +Britain (March 25th, 1802) sufficed to drown the muttered +discontent of the old republican party under the paeans of a +nation's joy. The jubilation was natural. While Londoners were +grumbling at the sacrifices which Addington's timidity had +entailed, all France rang with praises of the diplomatic skill +which could rescue several islands from England's grip and yet +assure French supremacy on the Continent. The event seemed to call +for some sign of the nation's thankfulness to the restorer of peace +and prosperity. The hint having been given by the tactful +Cambacérès to some of the members of the Tribunate, +this now docile body expressed a wish that there should be a +striking token of the national gratitude; and a motion to that +effect was made by the Senate to the <i>Corps Législatif +anà</i> to the Government itself.</p> + +<p>The form which the national memorial should take was left +entirely vague. Under ordinary circumstances the outcome would have +been a column or a statue: to a Napoleon it was monarchy.</p> + +<p>The Senate was in much doubt as to the fit course of action. The +majority desired to extend the Consulate for a second term of ten +years, and a formal motion to that effect was made on May 7th. It +was opposed by a few, some of whom demanded the prolongation for +life. The president, Tronchet, prompted by Fouché and other +republicans, held that only the question of prolonging the +Consulate for another term of ten years was before the Senate: and +the motion was carried by sixty votes against one: the dissentient +voice was that of the Girondin Lanjuinais. The report of this vote +disconcerted the First Consul, but he replied with some constraint +that as the people had invested him with the supreme magistrature, +he would not feel assured of its confidence unless the present +proposal were also sanctioned by its vote: "You judge that I owe +the people another sacrifice: I will give it if the people's voice +orders what your vote now authorizes." But before the mass vote of +the people was taken, an important change had been made in the +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i322" id= +"page_i322">[pg.322]</a></span> proposal itself. It was well known +that Bonaparte was dissatisfied with the senatorial offer: and at a +special session of the Council of State, at which Ministers were +present, the Second Consul urged that they must now decide how, +when, and <i>on what question</i> the people were to be consulted. +The whole question recently settled by the Senate was thus reopened +in a way that illustrated the advantage of multiplying councils and +of keeping them under official tutelage. The Ministers present +asserted that the people disapproved of the limitations of time +imposed by the Senate; and after some discussion +Cambacérès procured the decision that the +consultation of the people should be on the questions whether the +First Consul should hold his power for life, and whether he should +nominate his successor.</p> + +<p>To the latter part of this proposal the First Consul offered a +well-judged refusal. To consult the people on the restoration of +monarchy would, as yet, have been as inopportune as it was +superfluous. After gaining complete power, Bonaparte could be well +assured as to the establishment of an hereditary claim. The former +and less offensive part of the proposal was therefore submitted to +the people; and to it there could be only one issue amidst the +prosperity brought by the peace, and the surveillance exercised by +the prefects and the grateful clergy now brought back by the +Concordat. The Consulate for Life was voted by the enormous +majority of more than 3,500,000 affirmative votes against 8,374 +negatives. But among these dissentients were many honoured names: +among military men Carnot, Drouot, Mouton, and Bernard opposed the +innovation; and Lafayette made the public statement that he could +not vote for such a magistracy unless political liberty were +guaranteed. A <i>senatus consultum</i> of August 1st forthwith +proclaimed Napoleon Bonaparte Consul for Life and ordered the +erection of a Statue of Peace, holding in one hand the victor's +laurel and in the other the senatorial decree.</p> + +<p>On the following day Napoleon—for henceforth he <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i323" id= +"page_i323">[pg.323]</a></span> generally used his Christian name +like other monarchs—presented to the Council of State a +project of an organic law, which virtually amounted to a new +constitution. The mere fact of its presentation at so early a date +suffices to prove how completely he had prepared for the recent +change and how thoroughly assured he was of success. This important +measure was hurried through the Senate, and, without being +submitted to the Tribunate or <i>Corps Législatif</i>, still +less to the people, for whose sanction he had recently affected so +much concern—was declared to be the fundamental law of the +State.</p> + +<p>The fifth constitution of revolutionary France may be thus +described. It began by altering the methods of election. In place +of Sieyès' lists of notabilities, Bonaparte proposed a +simpler plan. The adult citizens of each canton were thenceforth to +meet, for electoral purposes, in primary assemblies, to name two +candidates for the office of <i>juge de paix</i> (i.e., magistrate) +and town councillor, and to choose the members of the "electoral +colleges" for the <i>arrondissement</i> and for the Department. In +the latter case only the 600 most wealthy men of the Department +were eligible. An official or aristocratic tinge was to be imparted +to these electoral colleges by the infusion of members selected by +the First Consul from the members of the Legion of Honour. Fixity +of opinion was also assured by members holding office for life; +and, as they were elected in the midst of the enthusiasm aroused by +the Peace of Amiens, they were decidedly Bonapartist.</p> + +<p>The electoral colleges had the following powers: they nominated +two candidates for each place vacant in the merely consultative +councils of their respective areas, and had the equally barren +honour of presenting two candidates for the Tribunate—the +final act of <i>selection</i> being decided by the executive, that +is, by the First Consul. Corresponding privileges were accorded to +the electoral colleges of the Department, save that these +plutocratic bodies had the right of presenting candidates for +admission to the Senate. The lists of candidates for the +<i>Corps</i> <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i324" id= +"page_i324">[pg.324]</a></span> <i>Législatif</i> were to be +formed by the joint action of the electoral colleges, namely, those +of the Departments and those of the <i>arrondissements</i>. But as +the resulting councils and parliamentary bodies had only the shadow +of power, the whole apparatus was but an imposing machine for +winnowing the air and threshing chaff.</p> + +<p>The First Consul secured few additional rights or attributes, +except the exercise of the royal prerogative of granting pardon. +But, in truth, his own powers were already so large that they were +scarcely susceptible of extension. The three Consuls held office +for life, and were <i>ex officio</i> members of the Senate. The +second and third Consuls were nominated by the Senate on the +presentation of the First Consul: the Senate might reject two names +proposed by him for either office, but they must accept his third +nominee. The First Consul might deposit in the State archives his +proposal as to his successor: if the Senate rejected this proposal, +the second and third Consuls made a suggestion; and if it were +rejected, one of the two whom they thereupon named must be elected +by the Senate. The three legislative bodies lost practically all +their powers, those of the <i>Corps Législatif</i> going to +the Senate, those of the Council of State to an official Cabal +formed out of it; while the Tribunate was forced to <i>debate +secretly in five sections</i>, where, as Bonaparte observed, +<i>they might jabber as they liked</i>.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, the attributes of the Senate were signally +enhanced. It was thenceforth charged, not only with the +preservation of the republican constitution, but with its +interpretation in disputed points, and its completion wherever it +should be found wanting. Furthermore, by means of organic +<i>senatus consulta</i> it was empowered to make constitutions for +the French colonies, or to suspend trial by jury for five years in +any Department, or even to declare it outside the limits of the +constitution. It now gained the right of being consulted in regard +to the ratification of treaties, previously enjoyed by the <i>Corps +Législatif.</i> Finally, it could dissolve the <i>Corps +Législatif</i> and the Tribunate. But this formidable +machinery was <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i325" id= +"page_i325">[pg.325]</a></span> kept under the strict control of +the chief engineer: all these powers were set in motion on the +initiative of the Government; and the proposals for its laws, or +<i>senatus consulta,</i> were discussed in the Cabal of the Council +of State named by the First Consul. This precaution might have been +deemed superfluous by a ruler less careful about details than +Napoleon; the composition of the Senate was such as to assure its +pliability; for though it continued to renew its ranks by +co-optation, yet that privilege was restricted in the following +way: from the lists of candidates for the Senate sent up by the +electoral colleges of the Departments, Napoleon selected three for +each seat vacant; one of those three must be chosen by the Senate. +Moreover, the First Consul was to be allowed directly to nominate +forty members in addition to the eighty prescribed by the +constitution of 1799. Thus, by direct or indirect means, the Senate +soon became a strict Napoleonic preserve, to which only the most +devoted adherents could aspire. And yet, such is the vanity of +human efforts, it was this very body which twelve years later was +to vote his deposition.<a name="FNanchor_178_178"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_178_178"><sup>[178]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The victory of action over talk, of the executive over the +legislature, of the one supremely able man over the discordant and +helpless many, was now complete. The process was startlingly swift; +yet its chief stages are not difficult to trace. The orators of the +first two National Assemblies of France, after wrecking the old +royal authority, were constrained by the pressure of events to +intrust the supervision of the executive powers to important +committees, whose functions grew with the intensity of the national +danger. Amidst the agonies of 1793, when France was menaced by the +First Coalition, the Committee of Public Safety leaped forth as the +ensanguined champion of democracy; and, as the crisis, developed in +intensity, this terrible body and the Committee of General Security +virtually governed France.</p> + +<p>After the repulse of the invaders and the fall of Robespierre, +the return to ordinary methods was marked by the<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i326" id="page_i326">[pg.326]</a></span> +institution of the Directory, when five men, chosen by the +legislature, controlled the executive powers and the general policy +of the Republic: that compromise was forcibly ended by the stroke +of Brumaire. Three Consuls then seized the reins, and two years +later a single charioteer gripped the destinies of France. His +powers were, in fact, ultimately derived from those of the secret +committees of the terrorists. But, unlike the supremacy of +Robespierre, that of Napoleon could not be disputed; for the +general, while guarding all the material boons which the Revolution +had conferred, conciliated the interests and classes whereon the +civilian had so brutally trampled. The new autocracy therefore +possessed a solid strength which that of the terrorists could never +possess. Indeed, it was more absolute than the dictatorial power +that Rousseau had outlined. The philosopher had asserted that, +while silencing the legislative power, the dictator really made it +vocal, and that he could do everything but make laws. But Napoleon, +after 1802, did far more: he suppressed debates and yet drew laws +from his subservient legislature. Whether, then, we regard its +practical importance for France and Europe, or limit our view to +the mental sagacity and indomitable will-power required for its +accomplishment, the triumph of Napoleon in the three years +subsequent to his return from Egypt is the most stupendous recorded +in the history of civilized peoples.</p> + +<p>The populace consoled itself for the loss of political liberty +by the splendour of the fête which heralded the title of +First Consul for Life, proclaimed on August 15th: that day was also +memorable as being the First Consul's thirty-third birthday, the +festival of the Assumption, and the anniversary of the ratification +of the Concordat. The decorations and fireworks were worthy of so +remarkable a confluence of solemnities. High on one of the towers +of Notre Dame glittered an enormous star, and at its centre there +shone the sign of the Zodiac which had shed its influence over his +first hours of life. The myriads of spectators who gazed at that +natal emblem <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i327" id= +"page_i327">[pg.327]</a></span> might well have thought that his +life's star was now at its zenith. Few could have dared to think +that it was to mount far higher into unknown depths of space, +blazing as a baleful portent to kings and peoples; still less was +there any Cassandra shriek of doom as to its final headlong fall +into the wastes of ocean. All was joy and jubilation over a career +that had even now surpassed the records of antique heroism, that +blended the romance of oriental prowess with the beneficent toils +of the legislator, and prospered alike in war and peace.</p> + +<p>And yet black care cast one shadow over that jubilant festival. +There was a void in the First Consul's life such as saddened but +few of the millions of peasants who looked up to him as their +saviour. His wife had borne him no heir: and there seemed no +prospect that a child of his own would ever succeed to his glorious +heritage. Family joys, it seemed, were not for him. Suspicions and +bickerings were his lot. His brothers, in their feverish desire for +the establishment of a Bonapartist dynasty, ceaselessly urged that +he should take means to provide himself with a legitimate heir, in +the last resort by divorcing Josephine. With a consideration for +her feelings which does him credit, Napoleon refused to countenance +such proceedings. Yet it is certain that from this time onwards he +kept in view the desirability, on political grounds, of divorcing +her, and made this the excuse for indulgence in amours against +which Josephine's tears and reproaches were all in vain.</p> + +<p>The consolidation of personal rule, the institution of the +Legion of Honour, and the return of very many of the emigrant +nobles under the terms of the recent amnesty, favoured the growth +of luxury in the capital and of Court etiquette at the Tuileries +and St. Cloud. At these palaces the pomp of the <i>ancien +régime</i> was laboriously copied. General Duroc, stiff +republican though he was, received the appointment of Governor of +the Palace; under him were chamberlains and prefects of the palace, +who enforced a ceremonial that struggled to be monarchical. The +gorgeous liveries and sumptuous garments <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i328" id="page_i328">[pg.328]</a></span> of the reign of +Louis XV. speedily replaced the military dress which even civilians +had worn under the warlike Republic. High boots, sabres, and +regimental headgear gave way to buckled shoes, silk stockings, +Court rapiers, and light hats, the last generally held under the +arm. Tricolour cockades were discarded, along with the +revolutionary jargon which <i>thou'd</i> and <i>citizen'd</i> +everyone; and men began to purge their speech of some of the +obscene terms which had haunted clubs and camps.</p> + +<p>It was remarked, however, that the First Consul still clung to +the use of the term <i>citizen</i>, and that amidst the surprising +combinations of colours that flecked his Court, he generally wore +only the uniform of a colonel of grenadiers or of the light +infantry of the consular guard. This conduct resulted partly from +his early dislike of luxury, but partly, doubtless, from a +conviction that republicans will forgive much in a man who, like +Vespasian, discards the grandeur which his prowess has won, and +shines by his very plainness. To trifling matters such as these +Napoleon always attached great importance; for, as he said to +Admiral Malcolm at St. Helena: "In France trifles are great things: +reason is nothing."<a name="FNanchor_179_179"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_179_179"><sup>[179]</sup></a> Besides, genius so +commanding as his little needed the external trappings wherewith +ordinary mortals hide their nullity. If his attire was simple, it +but set off the better the play of his mobile features, and the +rich, unfailing flow of his conversation. Perhaps no clearer and +more pleasing account of his appearance and his conduct at a +reception has ever been given to the world than this sketch of the +great man in one of his gentler moods by John Leslie Foster, who +visited Paris shortly after the Peace of Amiens:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"He is about five feet seven inches high, delicately and +gracefully made; his hair a dark brown crop, thin and lank; his +complexion smooth, pale, and sallow; his eyes gray, but very +animated; his eye-brows light brown, thin and projecting. All his +features, particularly his mouth and nose, fine, sharp,<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i329" id="page_i329">[pg.329]</a></span> +defined, and expressive beyond description; expressive of what? Not +of anything<i>percé</i> as the prints expressed him, still +less of anything <i>méchant</i>; nor has he anything of that +eye whose bend doth awe the world. The true expression of his +countenance is a pleasing melancholy, which, whenever he speaks, +relaxes into the most agreeable and gracious smile you can +conceive. To this you must add the appearance of deep and intense +thought, but above all the predominating expression a look of calm +and tranquil resolution and intrepidity which nothing human could +discompose. His address is the finest I have ever seen, and said by +those who have travelled to exceed not only every Prince and +Potentate now in being, but even all those whose memory has come +down to us. He has more unaffected dignity than I could conceive in +man. His address is the gentlest and most prepossessing you can +conceive, which is seconded by the greatest fund of levée +conversation that I suppose any person ever possessed. He speaks +deliberately, but very fluently, with particular emphasis, and in a +rather low tone of voice. While he speaks, his features are still +more expressive than his words."<a name="FNanchor_180_180"></a><a +href="#Footnote_180_180"><sup>[180]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>In contrast with this intellectual power and becoming simplicity +of attire, how stupid and tawdry were the bevies of soulless women +and the dumb groups of half-tamed soldiers! How vapid also the +rules of etiquette and precedence which starched the men and +agitated the minds of their consorts! Yet, while soaring above +these rules with easy grace, the First Consul imposed them rigidly +on the crowd of eager courtiers. On these burning questions he +generally took the advice of M. de Rémusat, whose tact and +acquaintance with Court customs were now of much service; while the +sprightly wit of his young wife attracted Josephine, as it has all +readers of her piquant but rather spiteful memoirs. In her pages we +catch a glimpse of the life of that singular Court; the attempts at +aping the inimitable manners of<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i330" id="page_i330">[pg.330]</a></span> the <i>ancien +régime</i>; the pompous nullity of the second and third +Consuls; the tawdry magnificence of the costumes; the studied +avoidance of any word that implied even a modicum of learning or a +distant acquaintance with politics; the nervous preoccupation about +Napoleon's moods and whims; the graceful manners of Josephine that +rarely failed to charm away his humours, except when she herself +had been outrageously slighted for some passing favourite; above +all, the leaden dullness of conversation, which drew from Chaptal +the confession that life there was the life of a galley slave. And +if we seek for the hidden reason why a ruler eminently endowed with +mental force and freshness should have endured so laboured a +masquerade, we find it in his strikingly frank confession to Madame +de Rémusat: <i>It is fortunate that the French are to be +ruled through their vanity.</i><span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i331" id="page_i331">[pg.331]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XIV</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE PEACE OF AMIENS</center> + +<br> + + +<p>The previous chapter dealt in the main with the internal affairs +of France and the completion of Napoleon's power: it touched on +foreign affairs only so far as to exhibit the close connection +between the First Consul's diplomatic victory over England and his +triumph over the republican constitution in his adopted country. +But it is time now to review the course of the negotiations which +led up to the Treaty of Amiens.</p> + +<p>In order to realize the advantages which France then had over +England, it will be well briefly to review the condition of our +land at that time. Our population was far smaller than that of the +French Republic. France, with her recent acquisitions in Belgium, +the Rhineland, Savoy, Nice, and Piedmont, numbered nearly +40,000,000 inhabitants: but the census returns of Great Britain for +1801 showed only a total of 10,942,000 souls, while the numbers for +Ireland, arguing from the rather untrustworthy return of 1813, may +be reckoned at about six and a half millions. The prodigious growth +of the English-speaking people had not as yet fully commenced +either in the motherland, the United States, or in the small and +struggling settlements of Canada and Australia. Its future +expansion was to be assured by industrial and social causes, and by +the events considered in this and in subsequent chapters. It was a +small people that had for several months faced with undaunted front +the gigantic power of Bonaparte and that of the Armed Neutrals.</p> + +<p>This population of less than 18,000,000 souls, of which <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i332" id= +"page_i332">[pg.332]</a></span> nearly one-third openly resented +the Act of Union recently imposed on Ireland, was burdened by a +National Debt which amounted to £537,000,000, and entailed a +yearly charge of more than £20,000,000 sterling. In the years +of war with revolutionary France the annual expenditure had risen +from £19,859,000 (for 1792) to the total of +£61,329,000, which necessitated an income tax of 10 per cent. +on all incomes of £200 and upwards. Yet, despite party feuds, +the nation was never stronger, and its fleets had never won more +brilliant and solid triumphs. The chief naval historian of France +admits that we had captured no fewer than 50 ships of the line, and +had lost to our enemies only five, thereby raising the strength of +our fighting line to 189, while that of France had sunk to 47.<a +name="FNanchor_181_181"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_181_181"><sup>[181]</sup></a> The prowess of Sir Arthur +Wellesley was also beginning to revive in India the ancient lustre +of the British arms; but the events of 1802-3 were to show that our +industrial enterprise, and the exploits of our sailors and +soldiers, were by themselves of little avail when matched in a +diplomatic contest against the vast resources of France and the +embodied might of a Napoleon.</p> + +<p>Men and institutions were everywhere receiving the imprint of +his will. France was as wax under his genius. The sovereigns of +Spain, Italy, and Germany obeyed his <i>fiat</i>. Even the stubborn +Dutch bent before him. On the plea of defeating Orange intrigues, +he imposed a new constitution on the Batavian Republic whose +independence he had agreed to respect. Its Directory was now +replaced by a Regency which relieved the deputies of the people of +all responsibility. A <i>plébiscite</i> showed 52,000 votes +against, and 16,000 for, the new <i>régime</i>; but, as +350,000 had not voted, their silence was taken for consent, and +Bonaparte's will became law (September, 1801).</p> + +<p>We are now in a position to appreciate the position of France +and Great Britain. Before the signature of the preliminaries of +peace at London on October 1st, 1801,<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i333" id="page_i333">[pg.333]</a></span> our Government had +given up its claims to the Cape, Malta, Tobago, Martinique, +Essequibo, Demerara, Berbice, and Curaçoa, retaining of its +conquests only Trinidad and Ceylon.</p> + +<p>A belated attempt had, indeed, been made to retain Tobago. The +Premier and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Hawkesbury, were led by the +French political agent in London, M. Otto, to believe that, in the +ensuing negotiations at Amiens, every facility would be given by +the French Government towards its retrocession to us, and that this +act would be regarded as the means of indemnifying Great Britain +for the heavy expense of supporting many thousands of French and +Dutch prisoners. The Cabinet, relying on this promise as binding +between honourable men, thereupon endeavoured to obtain the assent +of George III. to the preliminaries in their ultimate form, and +only the prospect of regaining Tobago by this compromise induced +the King to give it. When it was too late, King and Ministers +realized their mistake in relying on verbal promises and in failing +to procure a written statement.<a name="FNanchor_182_182"></a><a +href="#Footnote_182_182"><sup>[182]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The abandonment by Ministers of their former claim to Malta is +equally strange. Nelson, though he held Malta to be useless as a +base for the British fleet watching Toulon, made the memorable +statement: "I consider Malta as a most important outwork to India." +But a despatch from St. Petersburg, stating that the new Czar had +concluded a formal treaty of alliance with the Order of St. John +settled in Russia, may have convinced Addington and his colleagues +that it would be better to forego all claim to Malta in order to +cement the newly won friendship of Russia. Whatever may have been +their motive, British Ministers consented to cede the island to the +Knights of St. John under the protection of some third Power.</p> + +<p>The preliminaries of peace were further remarkable for<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i334" id= +"page_i334">[pg.334]</a></span> three strange omissions. They did +not provide for the renewal of previous treaties of peace between +the late combatants. War is held to break all previous treaties; +and by failing to require the renewal of the treaties of 1713, +1763, and 1783, it was now open to Spain and France to cement, +albeit in a new form, that Family Compact which it had long been +the aim of British diplomacy to dissolve: the failure to renew +those earlier treaties rendered it possible for the Court of Madrid +to alienate any of its colonies to France, as at that very time was +being arranged with respect to Louisiana.</p> + +<p>The second omission was equally remarkable. No mention was made +of any renewal of commercial intercourse between England and +France. Doubtless a complete settlement of this question would have +been difficult. British merchants would have looked for a renewal +of that enlightened treaty of commerce of 1786-7, which had aroused +the bitter opposition of French manufacturers. But the question +might have been broached at London, and its omission from the +preliminaries served as a reason for shelving it in the definitive +treaty—a piece of folly which at once provoked the severest +censure from British manufacturers, who thereby lost the markets of +France, and her subject States, Holland, Spain, Switzerland, Genoa, +and Etruria.</p> + +<p>And, finally, the terms of peace provided no compensation either +for the French royal House or for the dispossessed House of Orange. +Here again, it would have been very difficult to find a recompense +such as the Bourbons could with dignity have accepted; and the +suggestion made by one of the royalist exiles to Lord Hawkesbury, +that Great Britain should seize Crete and hand it over to them, +will show how desperate was their case.<a name= +"FNanchor_183_183"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_183_183"><sup>[183]</sup></a> Nevertheless, some effort +should have been made by a Government which had so often proclaimed +its championship of the legitimist cause. Still more glaring was +the omission of any stipulation for an indemnity for<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i335" id="page_i335">[pg.335]</a></span> +the House of Orange, now exiled from the Batavian Republic. That +claim, though urged at the outset, found no place in the +preliminaries; and the mingled surprise and contempt felt in the +<i>salons</i> of Paris at the conduct of the British Government is +shown in a semiofficial report sent thence by one of its secret +agents:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I cannot get it into my head that the British Ministry has +acted in good faith in subscribing to preliminaries of peace, +which, considering the respective position of the parties, would be +harmful to the English people.... People are persuaded in France +that the moderation of England is only a snare put in Bonaparte's +way, and it is mainly in order to dispel it that our journals have +received the order to make much of the advantages which must accrue +to England from the conquests retained by her; but the journalists +have convinced nobody, and it is said openly that if our European +conquests are consolidated by a general peace, France will, within +ten years, subjugate all Europe, Great Britain included, despite +all her vast dominions in India. Only within the last few days have +people here believed in the sincerity of the English preliminaries +of peace, and they say everywhere that, after having gloriously +sailed past the rocks that Bonaparte's cunning had placed in its +track, the British Ministry has completely foundered at the mouth +of the harbour. People blame the whole structure of the peace as +betraying marks of feebleness in all that concerns the dignity and +the interests of the King; ... and we cannot excuse its neglect of +the royalists, whose interests are entirely set aside in the +preliminaries. Men are especially astonished at England's +retrocession of Martinique without a single stipulation for the +colonists there, who are at the mercy of a government as rapacious +as it is fickle. All the owners of colonial property are very +uneasy, and do not hide their annoyance against England on this +score."<a name="FNanchor_184_184"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_184_184"><sup>[184]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>This interesting report gives a glimpse into the real thought of +Paris such as is rarely afforded by the tamed or venal Press. As +Bonaparte's spies enabled him to feel every throb of the French +pulse, he must at once have seen how great was the prestige which +he gained by<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i336" id= +"page_i336">[pg.336]</a></span> these first diplomatic successes, +and how precarious was the foothold of the English Ministers on the +slippery grade of concession to which they had been lured. +Addington surely should have remembered that only the strong man +can with safety recede at the outset, and that an act of concession +which, coming from a master mind, is interpreted as one of noble +magnanimity, will be scornfully snatched from a nerveless hand as a +sign of timorous complaisance. But the public statements and the +secret avowals of our leaders show that they wished "to try the +experiment of peace," now that France had returned to ordinary +political conditions and Jacobinism was curbed by Bonaparte. +"Perhaps," wrote Castlereagh, "France, satisfied with her recent +acquisitions, will find her interest in that system of internal +improvement which is necessarily connected with peace."<a name= +"FNanchor_185_185"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_185_185"><sup>[185]</sup></a> There is no reason for +doubting the sincerity of this statement. Our policy was distinctly +and continuously complaisant: France regained her colonies: she was +not required to withdraw from Switzerland and Holland. Who could +expect, from what was then known of Bonaparte's character, that a +peace so fraught with glory and profit would not satisfy French +honour and his own ambition?</p> + +<p>Peace, then, was an "experiment." The British Government wished +to see whether France would turn from revolution and war to +agriculture and commerce, whether her young ruler be satisfied with +a position of grandeur and solid power such as Louis XIV. had +rarely enjoyed. Alas! the failure of the experiment was patent to +all save the blandest optimists long before the Preliminaries of +London took form in the definitive Treaty of Amiens. Bonaparte's +aim now was to keep our Government strictly to the provisional +terms of peace which it had imprudently signed. Even before the +negotiations were opened at Amiens, he ordered Joseph Bonaparte to +listen to no proposal concerning the King of Sardinia and the +ex-Stadholder of Holland,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i337" +id="page_i337">[pg.337]</a></span> and asserted that the "internal +affairs of the Batavian Republic, of Germany, of Helvetia, and of +the Italian Republics" were "absolutely alien to the discussions +with England." This implied that England was to be shut out from +Continental politics, and that France was to regulate the affairs +of central and southern Europe. This observance of the letter was, +however, less rigid where French colonial and maritime interests +were at stake. Dextrous feelers were put forth seawards, and it was +only when these were repulsed that the French negotiators encased +themselves in their preliminaries.</p> + +<p>The task of reducing those articles to a definitive treaty +devolved, on the British side, on the Marquis Cornwallis, a gouty, +world-weary old soldier, chiefly remembered for the surrender which +ended the American War. Nevertheless, he had everywhere won respect +for his personal probity in the administration of Indian affairs, +and there must also have been some convincing qualities in a +personality which drew from Napoleon at St. Helena the remark: "I +do not believe that Cornwallis was a man of first-rate abilities: +but he had talent, great probity, sincerity, and never broke his +word.... He was a man of honour—a true Englishman."</p> + +<p>Against Lord Cornwallis, and his far abler secretary, Mr. Merry, +were pitted Joseph Bonaparte and his secretaries. The abilities of +the eldest of the Bonapartes have been much underrated. Though he +lacked the masterful force and wide powers of his second brother, +yet at Lunéville Joseph proved himself to be an able +diplomatist, and later on in his tenure of power at Naples and +Madrid he displayed no small administrative gifts. Moreover, his +tact and kindliness kindled in all who knew him a warmth of +friendship such as Napoleon's sterner qualities rarely inspired. +The one was loved as a man: for the other, even his earlier +acquaintances felt admiration and devotion, but always mingled with +a certain fear of the demi-god that would at times blaze forth. +This was the dread personality that urged Talleyrand and Joseph +Bonaparte to their utmost <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i338" +id="page_i338">[pg.338]</a></span> endeavours and steeled them +against any untoward complaisance at Amiens.</p> + +<p>The selection of so honourable a man as Cornwallis afforded no +slight guarantee for the sincerity of our Government, and its +sincerity will stand the test of a perusal of its despatches. +Having examined all those that deal with these negotiations, the +present writer can affirm that the official instructions were in no +respect modified by the secret injunctions: these referred merely +to such delicate and personal topics as the evacuation of Hanover +by Prussian troops and the indemnities to be sought for the House +of Orange and the House of Savoy. The circumstances of these two +dispossessed dynasties were explained so as to show that the former +Dutch Stadholder had a very strong claim on us, as well as on +France and the Batavian Republic; while the championship of the +House of Savoy by the Czar rendered the claims of that ancient +family on the intervention of George III. less direct and personal +than those of the Prince of Orange. Indeed, England would have +insisted on the insertion of a clause to this effect in the +preliminaries had not other arrangements been on foot at Berlin +which promised to yield due compensation to this unfortunate +prince. Doubtless the motives of the British Ministers were good, +but their failure to insert such a clause fatally prejudiced their +case all through the negotiations at Amiens.</p> + +<p>The British official declaration respecting Malta was clear and +practical. The island was to be restored to the Knights of the +Order of St. John and placed under the protection of a third Power +other than France and England. But the reconstitution of the Order +was no less difficult than the choice of a strong and disinterested +protecting Power. Lord Hawkesbury proposed that Russia be the +guaranteeing Power. No proposal could have been more reasonable. +The claims of the Czar to the protectorate of the Order had been so +recently asserted by a treaty with the knights that no other +conclusion seemed feasible. And, in order to assuage <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i339" id="page_i339">[pg.339]</a></span> +the grievances of the islanders and strengthen the rule of the +knights, the British Ministry desired that the natives of Malta +should gain a foothold in the new constitution. The lack of civil +and political rights had contributed so materially to the overthrow +of the Order that no reconstruction of that shattered body could be +deemed intelligent, or even honest, which did not cement its +interests with those of the native Maltese. The First Consul, +however, at once demurred to both these proposals. In the course of +a long interview with Cornwallis at Paris,<a name= +"FNanchor_186_186"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_186_186"><sup>[186]</sup></a> he adverted to the danger +of bringing Russia's maritime pressure to bear on Mediterranean +questions, especially as her sovereigns "had of late shown +themselves to be such unsteady politicians." This of course +referred to the English proclivities of Alexander I., and it is +clear that Bonaparte's annoyance with Alexander was the first +unsettling influence which prevented the solution of the Maltese +question. The First Consul also admitted to Cornwallis that the +King of Naples, despite his ancient claims of suzerainty over +Malta, could not be considered a satisfactory guarantor, as between +two Great Powers; and he then proposed that the tangle should be +cut by blowing up the fortifications of Valetta.</p> + +<p>The mere suggestion of such an act affords eloquent proof of the +difficulties besetting the whole question. To destroy works of vast +extent, which were the bulwark of Christendom against the Barbary +pirates, would practically have involved the handing over of +Valetta to those pests of the Mediterranean; and from Malta as a +new base of operations they could have spread devastation along the +coasts of Sicily and Italy. This was the objection which Cornwallis +at once offered to an<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i340" id= +"page_i340">[pg.340]</a></span> other-wise specious proposal: he +had recently received papers from Major-General Pigot at Malta, in +which the same solution of the question was examined in detail. The +British officer pointed out that the complete dismantling of the +fortifications would expose the island, and therefore the coasts of +Italy, to the rovers; yet he suggested a partial demolition, which +seems to prove that the British officers in command at Malta did +not contemplate the retention of the island and the infraction of +the peace.</p> + +<p>Our Government, however, disapproved of the destruction of the +fortifications of Valetta as wounding the susceptibilities of the +Czar, and as in no wise rendering impossible the seizure of the +island and the reconstruction of those works by some future +invader. In fact, as the British Ministry now aimed above all at +maintaining good relations with the Czar, Bonaparte's proposal +could only be regarded as an ingenious device for sundering the +Anglo-Russian understanding. The French Minister at St. Petersburg +was doing his utmost to prevent the <i>rapprochement</i> of the +Czar to the Court of St James, and was striving to revive the +moribund league of the Armed Neutrals. That last offer had "been +rejected in the most peremptory manner and in terms almost +bordering upon derision." Still there was reason to believe that +the former Anglo-Russian disputes about Malta might be so far +renewed as to bring Bonaparte and Alexander to an understanding. +The sentimental Liberalism of the young Czar predisposed him +towards a French alliance, and his whole disposition inclined him +towards the brilliant opportunism of Paris rather than the frigid +legitimacy of the Court of St. James. The Maltese affair and the +possibility of reopening the Eastern Question were the two sources +of hope to the promoters of a Franco-Russian alliance; for both +these questions appealed to the chivalrous love of adventure and to +the calculating ambition so curiously blent in Alexander's nature. +Such, then, was the motive which doubtless prompted Bonaparte's +proposal concerning Valetta; such also were the reasons which +certainly dictated its rejection by Great Britain. <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i341" id= +"page_i341">[pg.341]</a></span></p> + +<p>In his interview with the First Consul at Paris, and in the +subsequent negotiations at Amiens with Joseph Bonaparte, the +question of Tobago and England's money claim for the support of +French prisoners was found to be no less thorny than that of Malta. +The Bonapartes firmly rejected the proposal for the retention of +Tobago by England in lieu of her pecuniary demand. A Government +which neglected to procure the insertion of its claim to Tobago +among the Preliminaries of London could certainly not hope to +regain that island in exchange for a concession to France that was +in any degree disputable. But the two Bonapartes and Talleyrand now +took their stand solely on the preliminaries, and politely waved on +one side the earlier promises of M. Otto as unauthorized and +invalid, They also closely scrutinized the British claim to an +indemnity for the support of French prisoners. Though theoretically +correct, it was open to an objection, which was urged by Bonaparte +and Talleyrand with suave yet incisive irony. They suggested that +the claim must be considered in relation to a counter-claim, soon +to be sent from Paris, for the maintenance of all prisoners taken +by the French from the various forces subsidized by Great Britain, +a charge which "would probably not leave a balance so much in +favour of His [Britannic] Majesty as His Government may have looked +forward to." This retort was not so terrible as it appeared; for +most of the papers necessary for the making up of the French +counterclaim had been lost or destroyed during the Revolution. Yet +the threat told with full effect on Cornwallis, who thereafter +referred to the British claim as a "hopeless debt."<a name= +"FNanchor_187_187"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_187_187"><sup>[187]</sup></a> The officials of Downing +Street drew a distinction between prisoners from armies merely +subsidized by us and those taken from foreign forces actually under +our control; but it is clear that Cornwallis ceased to press the +claim. In fact, the British case was mismanaged from beginning to +end: the accounts for the maintenance of French and Dutch prisoners +were, in the first instance, wrongly drawn up; and there seems to +have been little<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i342" id= +"page_i342">[pg.342]</a></span> or no notion of the seriousness of +the counter-claim, which came with all the effect of a volley from +a masked battery, destructive alike to our diplomatic reputation +and to our hope of retaining Tobago.</p> + +<p>It is impossible to refer here to all the topics discussed at +Amiens. The determination of the French Government to adopt a +forward colonial and oceanic policy is clearly seen in its +proposals made at the close of the year 1801. They were: (1) the +abolition of salutes to the British flag on the high seas; (2) an +<i>absolute</i> ownership of the eastern and western coasts of +Newfoundland in return for a proposed cession of the isles of St. +Pierre and Miquelon to us—which would have practically ceded +to France <i>in full sovereignty</i> all the best fishing coasts of +that land, with every prospect of settling the interior, in +exchange for two islets devastated by war and then in British +hands; (3) the right of the French to a share in the whale fishery +in those seas; (4) the establishment of a French fishing station in +the Falkland Isles; and (5) the extension of the French districts +around the towns of Yanaon and Mahé in India.<a name= +"FNanchor_188_188"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_188_188"><sup>[188]</sup></a> To all these demands Lord +Cornwallis opposed an unbending opposition. Weak as our policy had +been on other affairs, it was firm as a rock on all maritime and +Indian questions. In fact, the events to be described in the next +chapter, which led to the consolidation of British power in +Hindostan, would in all probability never have occurred but for the +apprehensions excited by these French demands; and our masterful +proconsul in Bengal, the Marquis Wellesley, could not have pursued +his daring and expensive schemes of conquest, annexation, and +forced alliances, had not the schemes of the First Consul played +into the hands of the soldiers at Calcutta and weakened the +protests of the dividend-hunters of Leadenhall Street.</p> + +<p>The persistence of French demands for an increase of influence +in Newfoundland and the West and East Indies, the vastness of her +expedition to Saint Domingo<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i343" id="page_i343">[pg.343]</a></span> and the +thinly-veiled designs of her Australian expedition (which we shall +notice in the next chapter), all served to awaken the suspicions of +the British Government. The negotiations consequently progressed +but slowly. From the outset they were clogged by the suspicion of +bad faith. Spain and Holland, smarting under the conditions of a +peace which gave to France all the glory and to her allies all the +loss, delayed sending their respective envoys to the conferences at +Amiens, and finally avowed their determination to resist the +surrender of Trinidad and Ceylon. In fact, pressure had to be +exerted from Paris and London before they yielded to the +inevitable. This difficulty was only one of several: there then +remained the questions whether Portugal and Turkey should be +admitted to share in the treaty, as England demanded; or whether +they should sign a separate peace with France. The First Consul +strenuously insisted on the exclusion of those States, though their +interests were vitally affected by the present negotiations, He saw +that a separate treaty with the Sublime Porte would enable him, not +only to extract valuable trading concessions in the Black Sea +trade, but also to cement a good understanding with Russia on the +Eastern Question, which was now being adroitly reopened by French +diplomacy. Against the exclusion of Turkey from the negotiations at +Amiens, Great Britain firmly but vainly protested. In fact, +Talleyrand had bound the Porte to a separate agreement which +promised everything for France and nothing for Turkey, and seemed +to doom the Sublime Porte to certain humiliation and probable +partition.<a name="FNanchor_189_189"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_189_189"><sup>[189]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Then there were the vexed questions of the indemnities claimed +by George III. for the Houses of Orange and of Savoy. In his +interview with Cornwallis, Bonaparte had effusively promised to do +his utmost for the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i344" id= +"page_i344">[pg.344]</a></span> ex-Stadholder, though he refused to +consider the case of the King of Sardinia, who, he averred, had +offended him by appealing to the Czar. The territorial interests of +France in Italy doubtless offered a more potent argument to the +First Consul: after practically annexing Piedmont and dominating +the peninsula, he could ill brook the presence on the mainland of a +king whom he had already sacrificed to his astute and masterful +policy. The case of the Prince of Orange was different. He was a +victim to the triumph of French and democratic influence in the +Dutch Netherlands. George III. felt a deep interest in this +unfortunate prince and made a strong appeal to the better instincts +of Bonaparte on his behalf. Indeed, it is probable that England had +acquiesced in the consolidation of French influence at the Hague, +in the hope that her complaisance would lead the First Consul to +assure him some position worthy of so ancient a House. But though +Cornwallis pressed the Batavian Republic on behalf of its exiled +chief, yet the question was finally adjourned by the XVIIIth clause +of the definitive Treaty of Amiens; and the scion of that famous +House had to take his share in the forthcoming scramble for the +clerical domains of Germany.<a name="FNanchor_190_190"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_190_190"><sup>[190]</sup></a></p> + +<p>For the still more difficult cause of the House of Savoy the +British Government made honest but unavailing efforts, firmly +refusing to recognize the newest creations of Bonaparte in Italy, +namely, the Kingdom of Etruria and the Ligurian Republic, until he +indemnified the House of Savoy. Our recognition was withheld for +the reasons that prompt every bargainer to refuse satisfaction to +his antagonist until an equal concession is accorded. This game was +played by both Powers at Amiens, and with little other result than +mutual exasperation. Yet<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i345" +id="page_i345">[pg.345]</a></span> here, too, the balance of gain +naturally accrued to Bonaparte; for he required the British +Ministry to recognize existing facts in Etruria and Liguria, while +Cornwallis had to champion the cause of exiles and of an order that +seemed for ever to have vanished. To pit the non-existent against +the actual was a task far above the powers of British +statesmanship; yet that was to be its task for the next decade, +while the forces of the living present were to be wielded by its +mighty antagonist. Herein lay the secret of British failures and of +Napoleon's extraordinary triumphs.</p> + +<p>Leaving, for a space, the negotiations at Amiens, we turn to +consider the events which transpired at Lyons in the early weeks of +1802, events which influenced not only the future of Italy, but the +fortunes of Bonaparte.</p> + +<p>It will be remembered that, after the French victories of +Marengo and Hohenlinden, Austria agreed to terms of peace whereby +the Cisalpine, Ligurian, Helvetic, and Batavian Republics were +formally recognized by her, though a clause expressly stipulated +that they were to be independent of France. A vain hope! They +continued to be under French tutelage, and their strongholds in the +possession of French troops.</p> + +<p>It now remained to legalize French supremacy in the Cisalpine +Republic, which comprised the land between the Ticino and the +Adige, and the Alps and the Rubicon. The new State received a +provisional form of government after Marengo, a small council being +appointed to supervise civil affairs at the capital, Milan. With it +and with Marescalchi, the Cisalpine envoy at Paris, Bonaparte had +concerted a constitution, or rather he had used these men as a +convenient screen to hide its purely personal origin. Having, for +form's sake, consulted the men whom he had himself appointed, he +now suggested that the chief citizens of that republic should +confer with him respecting their new institutions. His Minister at +Milan thereupon proposed that they should cross the Alps for that +purpose, assembling, not at Paris, where their dependence on the +First Consul's will might provoke too <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i346" id="page_i346">[pg.346]</a></span> much comment, +but at Lyons. To that city, accordingly, there repaired some 450 of +the chief men of Northern Italy, who braved the snows of a most +rigorous December, in the hope of consolidating the liberties of +their long-distracted country. And thus was seen the strange +spectacle of the organization of Lombardy, Modena, and the +Legations being effected in one provincial centre of France, while +at another of her cities the peace of Europe and the fortunes of +two colonial empires were likewise at stake. Such a conjunction of +events might well impress the imagination of men, bending the +stubborn will of the northern islanders, and moulding the Italian +notables to complete complaisance. And yet, such power was there in +the nascent idea of Italian nationality, that Bonaparte's +proposals, which, in his absence, were skilfully set forth by +Talleyrand, met with more than one rebuff from the Consulta at +Lyons.</p> + +<p>Bitterly it opposed the declaration that the Roman Catholic +religion was the religion of the Cisalpine Republic and must be +maintained by a State budget. Only the first part of this proposal +could be carried: so keen was the opposition to the second part +that, as a preferable plan, property was set apart for the support +of the clergy; and clerical discipline was subjected to the State, +on terms somewhat similar to those of the French Concordat.<a name= +"FNanchor_191_191"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_191_191"><sup>[191]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Secular affairs gave less trouble. The apparent success of the +French constitution furnished a strong motive for adopting one of a +similar character for the Italian State; and as the proposed +institutions had been approved at Milan, their acceptance by a +large and miscellaneous body was a foregone conclusion. Talleyrand +also took the most unscrupulous care that the affair of the +Presidency should be judiciously settled. On December 31st, 1801, +he writes to Bonaparte from Lyons:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"The opinion of the Cisalpines seems not at all decided as to +the choice to be made: they will gladly receive the man<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i347" id="page_i347">[pg.347]</a></span> +whom you nominate: a President in France and a Vice-President at +Milan would suit a large number of them."</p> +</div> + +<p>Four days later he confidently assures the First Consul:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"They will do what you want without your needing even to show +your desire. What they think you desire will immediately become +law."<a name="FNanchor_192_192"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_192_192"><sup>[192]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>The ground having been thus thoroughly worked, Bonaparte and +Josephine, accompanied by a brilliant suite, arrived at Lyons on +January 11th, and met with an enthusiastic reception. Despite the +intense cold, followed by a sudden thaw, a brilliant series of +fêtes, parades, and receptions took place; and several +battalions of the French Army of Egypt, which had recently been +conveyed home on English ships, now passed in review before their +chief. The impressionable Italians could not mistake the aim of +these demonstrations; and, after general matters had been arranged +by the notables, the final measures were relegated to a committee +of thirty. The desirability of this step was obvious, for urgent +protests had already been raised in the Consulta against the +appointment of a foreigner as President of the new State. When a +hubbub arose on this burning topic:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Some officers of the regiments in garrison at Lyons appeared in +the hall and imposed silence upon all parties. Notwithstanding +this, Count Melzi was actually chosen President by the majority of +the Committee of Thirty; but he declined the honour, and suggested +in significant terms that, to enable him to render any service to +the country, the committee had better fix upon General Bonaparte as +their Chief Magistrate. This being done, Bonaparte immediately +appointed Count Melzi Vice-President."<a name= +"FNanchor_193_193"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_193_193"><sup>[193]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>Bonaparte's determination to fill this important<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i348" id="page_i348">[pg.348]</a></span> +position is clearly seen in his correspondence. On the 2nd and 4th +of Pluviôse (January 22nd and 24th), he writes from +Lyons:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"All the principal affairs of the Consulta are settled. I count +on being back at Paris in the course of the decade."</p> + +<p>"To-morrow I shall review the troops from Egypt. On the 6th [of +Pluviôse] all the business of the Consulta will be finished, +and I shall probably set out on my journey on the 7th."</p> +</div> + +<p>The next day, 5th Pluviôse, sees the accomplishment of his +desires:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"To-day I have reviewed the troops on the Place Bellecour; the +sun shone as it does in Floréal. The Consulta has named a +committee of thirty individuals, which has reported to it that, +considering the domestic and foreign affairs of the Cisalpine, it +was indispensable to let me discharge the first magistracy, until +circumstances permit and I judge it suitable to appoint a +successor."</p> +</div> + +<p>These extracts prove that the acts of the Consulta could be +planned beforehand no less precisely than the movements of the +soldiery, and that even so complex a matter as the voting of a +constitution and the choice of its chief had to fall in with the +arrangements of this methodizing genius. Certainly civilization had +progressed since the weary years when the French people groped +through mists and waded in blood in order to gain a perfect polity: +that precious boon was now conferred on a neighbouring people in so +sure a way that the plans of their benefactor could be infallibly +fixed and his return to Paris calculated to the hour.</p> + +<p>The final address uttered by Bonaparte to the Italian notables +is remarkable for the short, sharp sentences, which recall the +tones of the parade ground. Passing recent events in rapid review, +he said, speaking in his mother tongue:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"...Every effort had been made to dismember you: the protection +of France won the day: you have been recognized<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i349" id="page_i349">[pg.349]</a></span> at +Lunéville. One-fifth larger than before, you are now more +powerful, more consolidated, and have wider hopes. Composed of six +different nations, you will be now united under a constitution the +best possible for your social and material condition. ... The +selections I have made for your chief offices have been made +independently of all idea of party or feeling of locality. As for +that of President, I have found no one among you with sufficient +claims on public opinion, sufficiently free from local feelings, +and who had rendered great enough services to his country, to +intrust it to him.... Your people has only local feelings: it must +now rise to national feelings."</p> +</div> + +<p>In accordance with this last grand and prophetic remark, the +name Italian was substituted for that of Cisalpine: and thus, for +the first time since the Middle Ages, there reappeared on the map +of Europe that name, which was to evoke the sneers of diplomatists +and the most exalted patriotism of the century. If Bonaparte had +done naught else, he would deserve immortal glory for training the +divided peoples of the peninsula for a life of united activity.</p> + +<p>The new constitution was modelled on that of France; but the +pretence of a democratic suffrage was abandoned. The right of +voting was accorded to three classes, the great proprietors, the +clerics and learned men, and the merchants. These, meeting in their +several "Electoral Colleges," voted for the members of the +legislative bodies; a Tribunal was also charged with the +maintenance of the constitution. By these means Bonaparte +endeavoured to fetter the power of the reactionaries no less than +the anti-clerical fervour of the Italian Jacobins. The blending of +the new and the old which then began shows the hand of the master +builder, who neither sweeps away materials merely because they are +old, nor rejects the strength that comes from improved methods of +construction: and, however much we may question the +disinterestedness of his motives in this great enterprise, there +can be but one opinion as to the skill of the methods and the +beneficence of the results in Italy.<a name= +"FNanchor_194_194"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_194_194"><sup>[194]</sup></a></p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i350" id= +"page_i350">[pg.350]</a></span> The first step in the process of +Italian unification had now been taken at Lyons. A second soon +followed. The affairs of the Ligurian Republic were in some +confusion; and an address came from Genoa begging that their +differences might be composed by the First Consul. The spontaneity +of this offer may well be questioned, seeing that Bonaparte found +it desirable, in his letter of February 18th, 1802, to assure the +Ligurian authorities that they need feel no disquietude as to the +independence of their republic. Bonaparte undertook to alter their +constitution and nominate their Doge.</p> + +<p>That the news of the events at Lyons excited the liveliest +indignation in London is evident from Hawkesbury's despatch of +February 12th, 1802, to Cornwallis:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"The proceedings at Lyons have created the greatest alarm in +this country, and there are many persons who were pacifically +disposed, who since this event are desirous of renewing the war. It +is impossible to be surprised at this feeling when we consider the +inordinate ambition, the gross breach of faith, and the inclination +to insult Europe manifested by the First Consul on this occasion. +The Government here are desirous of avoiding to take notice of +these proceedings, and are sincerely desirous to conclude the +peace, if it can be obtained on terms consistent with our +honour."</p> +</div> + +<p>Why the Government should have lagged behind the far surer +instincts of English public opinion it is difficult to say. +Hawkesbury's despatch of four days later supplies an excuse for his +contemptible device of pretending not to see this glaring violation +of the Treaty of Lunéville. Referring to the events at +Lyons, he writes:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Extravagant and unjustifiable as they are in themselves, [they] +must have led us to believe that the First Consul would<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i351" id="page_i351">[pg.351]</a></span> +have been more anxious than ever to have closed his account with +this country."</p> +</div> + +<p>Doubtless that was the case, but only on condition that England +remained passive while French domination was extended over all +neighbouring lands. If our Ministers believed that Bonaparte feared +the displeasure of Austria, they were completely in error. Thanks +to the utter weakness of the European system, and the rivalry of +Austria and Prussia, he was now able to concentrate his +ever-increasing power and prestige on the negotiations at Amiens, +which once more claim our attention.</p> + +<p>Far from being sated by the prestige gained at Lyons, he seemed +to grow more exacting with victory. Moreover, he had been cut to +the quick by some foolish articles of a French +<i>émigré</i> named Peltier, in a paper published at +London: instead of treating them with the contempt they deserved, +he magnified these ravings of a disappointed exile into an event of +high policy, and fulminated against the Government which allowed +them. In vain did Cornwallis object that the Addington Cabinet +could not venture on the unpopular act of curbing freedom of the +Press in Great Britain. The First Consul, who had experienced no +such difficulty in France, persisted now, as a year later, in +considering every uncomplimentary reference to himself as an +indirect and semiofficial attack.</p> + +<p>To these causes we may attribute the French demands of February +4th: contradicting his earlier proposal for a temporary Neapolitan +garrison of Malta, Bonaparte now absolutely refused either to grant +that necessary protection to the weak Order of St. John, or to join +Great Britain in an equal share of the expenses—£20,000 +a year—which such a garrison would entail. The astonishment +and indignation aroused at Downing Street nearly led to an +immediate rupture of the negotiations; and it needed all the +patience of Cornwallis and the suavity of Joseph Bonaparte to +smooth away the asperities caused by Napoleon's direct +intervention. It needs only a <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i352" id="page_i352">[pg.352]</a></span> slight acquaintance +with the First Consul's methods of thought and expression to +recognize in the Protocol of February 4th the incisive speech of an +autocrat confident in his newly-consolidated powers and irritated +by the gibes of Peltier.<a name="FNanchor_195_195"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_195_195"><sup>[195]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The good sense of the two plenipotentiaries at Amiens before +long effected a reconciliation. Hawkesbury, writing from Downing +Street, warned Cornwallis that if a rupture were to take place it +must not be owing to "any impatience on our part": and he, in his +turn, affably inquired from Joseph Bonaparte whether he had any +more practicable plan than that of a Neapolitan garrison, which he +had himself proposed. No plan was forthcoming other than that of a +garrison of 1,000 Swiss mercenaries; and as this was open to grave +objections, the original proposal was finally restored. On its +side, the Court of St. James still refused to blow up the +fortifications at Valetta; and rather than destroy those works, +England had already offered that the independence of Malta should +be guaranteed by the Great Powers—Great Britain, France, +Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia: to this arrangement France +soon assented. Later on we demanded that the Neapolitan garrison +should remain in Malta for three years after the evacuation of the +island by the British troops; whereas France desired to limit the +period to one year. To this Cornwallis finally assented, with the +proviso that, "if the Order of St. John shall not have raised a +sufficient number of men, the Neapolitan troops shall remain until +they shall be relieved by an adequate force, to be agreed upon by +the guaranteeing Powers." The question of the garrison having been +arranged, other details gave less trouble, and the Maltese question +was settled in the thirteen conditions added to Clause X. of the +definitive treaty.</p> + +<p>Though this complex question was thus adjusted by March 17th, +other matters delayed a settlement. <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i353" id="page_i353">[pg.353]</a></span></p> + +<p>Hawkesbury still demanded a definite indemnity for the Prince of +Orange, but Cornwallis finally assented to Article XVIII. of the +treaty, which vaguely promised "an adequate compensation." +Cornwallis also persuaded his chief to waive his claims for the +direct participation of Turkey in the treaty. The British demand +for an indemnity for the expense of supporting French prisoners was +to be relegated to commissioners—who never met. Indeed, this +was the only polite way of escaping from the untenable position +which our Government had heedlessly taken upon this topic.</p> + +<p>It is clear from the concluding despatches of Cornwallis that he +was wheedled by Joseph Bonaparte into conceding more than the +British Government had empowered him to do; and, though the "secret +and most confidential" despatch of March 22nd cautioned him against +narrowing too much the ground of a rupture, if a rupture should +still occur, yet three days later, and <i>after the receipt of this +despatch</i>, he signed the terms of peace with Joseph Bonaparte, +and two days later with the other signatory Powers.<a name= +"FNanchor_196_196"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_196_196"><sup>[196]</sup></a> It may well be doubted +whether peace would ever have been signed but for the skill of +Joseph Bonaparte in polite cajolery and the determination of +Cornwallis to arrive at an understanding. In any case the final act +of signature was distinctly the act, not of the British Government, +but of its plenipotentiary.</p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i354" id= +"page_i354">[pg.354]</a></span> That fact is confirmed by his +admission, on March 28th, that he had yielded where he was ordered +to remain inflexible. At St. Helena, Napoleon also averred that +after Cornwallis had definitely pledged himself to sign the treaty +as it stood on the night of March 24th, he received instructions in +a contrary sense from Downing Street; that nevertheless he held +himself bound by his promise and signed the treaty on the following +day, observing that his Government, if dissatisfied, might refuse +to ratify it, but that, having pledged his word, he felt bound to +abide by it. This story seems consonant with the whole behaviour of +Cornwallis, so creditable to him as a man, so damaging to him as a +diplomatist. The later events of the negotiation aroused much +annoyance at Downing Street, and the conduct of Cornwallis met with +chilling disapproval.</p> + +<p>The First Consul, on the other hand, showed his appreciation of +his brother's skill with unusual warmth; for when they appeared +together at the opera in Paris, he affectionately thrust his elder +brother to the front of the State box to receive the plaudits of +the audience at the advent of a definite peace. That was surely the +purest and noblest joy which the brothers ever tasted.</p> + +<p>With what feelings of pride, not unmixed with awe, must the +brothers have surveyed their career. Less than nine years had +elapsed since their family fled from Corsica, and landed on the +coast of Provence, apparently as bankrupt in their political hopes +as in their material fortunes. Thrice did the fickle goddess cast +Napoleon to the ground in the first two years of his new life, only +that his wondrous gifts and sublime self-confidence might tower +aloft the more conspicuously, bewildering alike the malcontents of +Paris, the generals of the old Empire, the peoples of the Levant, +and the statesmen of Britain. Of all these triumphs assuredly the +last was not the least. The Peace of Amiens left France the +arbitress of Europe, and, by restoring to her all her lost +colonies, it promised to place her in the van of the oceanic and +colonizing peoples. <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i355" id= +"page_i355">[pg.355]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XV</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>A FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE</center> + +<p>ST. DOMINGO—LOUISIANA—INDIA—AUSTRALIA</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Il n'y a rien dans l'histoire du monde de comparable aux forces +navales de l'Angleterre, à l'étendue et à la +richesse de son commerce, à la masse de ses dettes, de ses +défenses, de ses moyens, et à la fragilité des +bases sur lesquelles repose l'édifice immense de sa +fortune."—BARON MALOUET, <i>Considérations historiques +sur l'Empire de la Mer</i>.</p> +</div> + +<br> + + +<p>There are abundant reasons for thinking that Napoleon valued the +Peace of Amiens as a necessary preliminary to the restoration of +the French Colonial Empire. A comparison of the dates at which he +set on foot his oceanic schemes will show that they nearly all had +their inception in the closing months of 1801 and in the course of +the following year. The sole important exceptions were the +politico-scientific expedition to Australia, the ostensible purpose +of which insured immunity from the attacks of English cruisers even +in the year 1800, and the plans for securing French supremacy in +Egypt, which had been frustrated in 1801 and were, to all +appearance, abandoned by the First Consul according to the +provisions of the Treaty of Amiens. The question whether he really +relinquished his designs on Egypt is so intimately connected with +the rupture of the Peace of Amiens that it will be more fitly +considered in the following chapter. It may not, however, be out of +place to offer some proofs as to the value which Bonaparte set on +the valley of the Nile and the Isthmus of Suez. A letter from a spy +at Paris, preserved in the <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i356" id="page_i356">[pg.356]</a></span> archives of our +Foreign Office, and dated July 10th, 1801, contains the following +significant statement with reference to Bonaparte: "Egypt, which is +considered here as lost to France, is the only object which +interests his personal ambition and excites his revenge." Even at +the end of his days, he thought longingly of the land of the +Pharaohs. In his first interview with the governor of St. Helena, +the illustrious exile said emphatically: "Egypt is the most +important country in the world." The words reveal a keen perception +of all the influences conducive to commercial prosperity and +imperial greatness. Egypt, in fact, with the Suez Canal, which his +imagination always pictured as a necessary adjunct, was to be the +keystone of that arch of empire which was to span the oceans and +link the prairies of the far west to the teeming plains of India +and the far Austral Isles.</p> + +<p>The motives which impelled Napoleon to the enterprises now to be +considered were as many-sided as the maritime ventures themselves. +Ultimately, doubtless, they arose out of a love of vast +undertakings that ministered at once to an expanding ambition and +to that need of arduous administrative toils for which his mind +ever craved in the heyday of its activity. And, while satiating the +grinding powers of his otherwise morbidly restless spirit, these +enterprises also fed and soothed those imperious, if unconscious, +instincts which prompt every able man of inquiring mind to reclaim +all possible domains from the unknown or the chaotic. As Egypt had, +for the present at least, been reft from his grasp, he turned +naturally to all other lands that could be forced to yield their +secrets to the inquirer, or their comforts to the benefactors of +mankind. Only a dull cynicism can deny this motive to the man who +first unlocked the doors of Egyptian civilization; and it would be +equally futile to deny to him the same beneficent aims with regard +to the settlement of the plains of the Mississippi, and the coasts +of New Holland.</p> + +<p>The peculiarities of the condition of France furnished another +powerful impulse towards colonization. In the <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i357" id="page_i357">[pg.357]</a></span> +last decade her people had suffered from an excess of mental +activity and nervous excitement. From philosophical and political +speculation they must be brought back to the practical and prosaic; +and what influence could be so healthy as the turning up of new +soil and other processes that satisfy the primitive instincts? Some +of these, it was true, were being met by the increasing peasant +proprietary in France herself. But this internal development, +salutary as it was, could not appease the restless spirits of the +towns or the ambition of the soldiery. Foreign adventures and +oceanic commerce alone could satisfy the Parisians and open up new +careers for the Prætorian chiefs, whom the First Consul alone +really feared.</p> + +<p>Nor were these sentiments felt by him alone. In a paper which +Talleyrand read to the Institute of France in July, 1797, that +far-seeing statesman had dwelt upon the pacifying influences +exerted by foreign commerce and colonial settlements on a too +introspective nation. His words bear witness to the keenness of his +insight into the maladies of his own people and the sources of +social and political strength enjoyed by the United States, where +he had recently sojourned. Referring to their speedy recovery from +the tumults of their revolution, he said: "The true Lethe after +passing through a revolution is to be found in the opening out to +men of every avenue of hope.—Revolutions leave behind them a +general restlessness of mind, a need of movement." That need was +met in America by man's warfare against the forest, the flood, and +the prairie. France must therefore possess colonies as intellectual +and political safety-valves; and in his graceful, airy style he +touched on the advantages offered by Egypt, Louisiana, and West +Africa, both for their intrinsic value and as opening the door of +work and of hope to a brain-sick generation.</p> + +<p>Following up this clue, Bonaparte, at a somewhat later date, +remarked the tendency of the French people, now that the +revolutionary strifes were past, to settle down contentedly on +their own little plots; and he<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i358" id="page_i358">[pg.358]</a></span> emphasized the need +of a colonial policy such as would widen the national life. The +remark has been largely justified by events; and doubtless he +discerned in the agrarian reforms of the Revolution an influence +unfavourable to that racial dispersion which, under wise guidance, +builds up an oceanic empire. The grievances of the <i>ancien +régime</i> had helped to scatter on the shores of the St. +Lawrence the seeds of a possible New France. Primogeniture was ever +driving from England her younger sons to found New Englands and +expand the commerce of the motherland. Let not France now rest at +home, content with her perfect laws and with the conquest of her +"natural frontiers." Let her rather strive to regain the first +place in colonial activity which the follies of Louis XV. and the +secular jealousy of Albion had filched from her. In the effort she +would extend the bounds of civilization, lay the ghost of +Jacobinism, satisfy military and naval adventures, and +unconsciously revert to the ideas and governmental methods of the +age of <i>le grand monarque</i>.</p> + +<p>The French possessions beyond the seas had never shrunk to a +smaller area than in the closing years of the late war with +England. The fact was confessed by the First Consul in his letter +of October 7th, 1801, to Decrès, the Minister for the Navy +and the Colonies: "Our possessions beyond the sea, which are now in +our power, are limited to Saint Domingo, Guadeloupe, the Isle of +France (Mauritius), the Isle of Bourbon, Senegal, and Guiana." +After rendering this involuntary homage to the prowess of the +British navy, Bonaparte proceeded to describe the first measures +for the organization of these colonies: for not until March 25th, +1802, when the definitive treaty of peace was signed, could the +others be regained by France.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;"> +<p>First in importance came the re-establishment of French +authority in the large and fertile island of Hayti, or St. Domingo. +It needs an effort of the imagination for the modern reader to +realize the immense <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i359" id= +"page_i359">[pg.i359]</a></span> importance of the West Indian +islands at the beginning of the century, whose close found them +depressed and half bankrupt. At the earlier date, when the name +Australia was unknown, and the half-starved settlement in and +around Sydney represented the sole wealth of that isle of +continent; when the Cape of Good Hope was looked on only as a port +of call; when the United States numbered less than five and a half +million souls, and the waters of the Mississippi rolled in +unsullied majesty past a few petty Spanish stations—the +plantations of the West Indies seemed the unfailing mine of +colonial industry and commerce. Under the <i>ancien +régime</i>, the trade of the French portion of San Domingo +is reported to have represented more than half of her oceanic +commerce. But during the Revolution the prosperity of that colony +reeled under a terrible blow.</p> + +<p>The hasty proclamation of equality between whites and blacks by +the French revolutionists, and the refusal of the planters to +recognize that decree as binding, led to a terrible servile revolt, +which desolated the whole of the colony. Those merciless strifes +had, however, somewhat abated under the organizing power of a man, +in whom the black race seemed to have vindicated its claims to +political capacity. Toussaint l'Ouverture had come to the front by +sheer sagacity and force of character. By a deft mixture of force +and clemency, he imposed order on the vapouring crowds of negroes: +he restored the French part of the island to comparative order and +prosperity; and with an army of 20,000 men he occupied the Spanish +portion. In this, as in other matters, he appeared to act as the +mandatory of France; but he looked to the time when France, beset +by European wars, would tacitly acknowledge his independence. In +May, 1801, he made a constitution for the island, and declared +himself governor for life, with power to appoint his successor. +This mimicry of the consular office, and the open vaunt that he was +the "Bonaparte of the Antilles," incensed Bonaparte; and the haste +with which, on the day after the Preliminaries of London, he <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i360" id= +"page_i360">[pg.360]</a></span> prepared to overthrow this +contemptible rival, tells its own tale.</p> + +<p>Yet Corsican hatred was tempered with Corsican guile. Toussaint +had requested that the Haytians should be under the protection of +their former mistress. Protection was the last thing that Bonaparte +desired; but he deemed it politic to flatter the black chieftain +with assurances of his personal esteem and gratitude for the "great +services which you have rendered to the French people. If its flag +floats over St. Domingo it is due to you and your brave +blacks"—a reference to Toussaint's successful resistance to +English attempts at landing. There were, it is true, some points in +the new Haytian constitution which contravened the sovereign rights +of France, but these were pardonable in the difficult circumstances +which had pressed on Toussaint: he was now, however, invited to +amend them so as to recognize the complete sovereignty of the +motherland and the authority of General Leclerc, whom Bonaparte +sent out as captain-general of the island. To this officer, the +husband of Pauline Bonaparte, the First Consul wrote on the same +day that there was reported to be much ferment in the island +against Toussaint, that the obstacles to be overcome would +therefore be much less formidable than had been feared, provided +that activity and firmness were used. In his references to the +burning topic of slavery, the First Consul showed a similar +reserve. The French Republic having abolished it, he could not, as +yet, openly restore an institution flagrantly opposed to the Rights +of Man. Ostensibly therefore he figured as the champion of +emancipation, assuring the Haytians in his proclamation of November +8th, 1801, that they were all free and all equal in the sight of +God and of the French Republic: "If you are told, 'These forces are +destined to snatch your liberty from you,' reply, 'The Republic has +given us our liberty: it will not allow it to be taken from us.'" +Of a similar tenor was his public declaration a fortnight later, +that at St. Domingo and Guadeloupe everybody was free and <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i361" id= +"page_i361">[pg.361]</a></span> would remain free. Very different +were his private instructions. On the last day of October he +ordered Talleyrand to write to the British Government, asking for +their help in supplying provisions from Jamaica to this expedition +destined to "destroy the new Algiers being organized in American +waters"; and a fortnight later he charged him to state his resolve +to destroy the government of the blacks at St. Domingo; that if he +had to postpone the expedition for a year, he would be "obliged to +constitute the blacks as French"; and that "the liberty of the +blacks, if recognized by the Government, would always be a support +for the Republic in the New World." As he was striving to cajole +our Government into supporting his expedition, it is clear that in +the last enigmatic phrase he was bidding for that support by the +hint of a prospective restoration of slavery at St. Domingo. A +comparison of his public and private statements must have produced +a curious effect on the British Ministers, and many of the +difficulties during the negotiations at Amiens doubtless sprang out +of their knowledge of his double-dealing in the West Indies.</p> + +<p>The means at the First Consul's disposal might have been +considered sufficient to dispense with these paltry devices; for +when the squadrons of Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, and Toulon had +joined their forces, they mustered thirty-two ships of the line and +thirty-one frigates, with more than 20,000 troops on board. So +great, indeed, was the force as to occasion strong remonstrances +from the British Government, and a warning that a proportionately +strong fleet would be sent to watch over the safety of our West +Indies.<a name="FNanchor_197_197"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_197_197"><sup>[197]</sup></a> The size of the French +armada and the warnings which Toussaint received from Europe +induced that wily dictator to adopt stringent precautionary +measures. He persuaded<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i362" id= +"page_i362">[pg.362]</a></span> the blacks that the French were +about to enslave them once more, and, raising the spectre of +bondage, he quelled sedition, ravaged the maritime towns, and +awaited the French in the interior, in confident expectation that +yellow fever would winnow their ranks and reduce them to a level +with his own strength.</p> + +<p>His hopes were ultimately realized, but not until he himself +succumbed to the hardihood of the French attack. Leclerc's army +swept across the desolated belt with an ardour that was redoubled +by the sight of the mangled remains of white people strewn amidst +the negro encampments, and stormed Toussaint's chief stronghold at +Crête-à-Pierrot. The dictator and his factious +lieutenants thereupon surrendered (May 8th, 1802), on condition of +their official rank being respected—a stipulation which both +sides must have regarded as unreal and impossible. The French then +pressed on to secure the subjection of the whole island before the +advent of the unhealthy season, which Toussaint eagerly awaited. It +now set in with unusual virulence; and in a few days the conquerors +found their force reduced to 12,000 effectives. Suspecting +Toussaint's designs, Leclerc seized him. He was empowered to do so +by Bonaparte's orders of March 16th, 1802:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Follow your instructions exactly, and as soon as you have done +with Toussaint, Christopher, Dessalines, and the chief brigands, +and the masses of the blacks are disarmed, send to the continent +all the blacks and the half-castes who have taken part in the civil +troubles."</p> +</div> + +<p>Toussaint was hurried off to France, where he died a year later +from the hardships to which he was exposed at the fort of Joux +among the Juras.</p> + +<p>Long before the cold of a French winter claimed the life of +Toussaint, his antagonist fell a victim to the sweltering heats of +the tropics. On November 2nd, 1802, Leclerc succumbed to the +unhealthy climate and to his ceaseless anxieties. In the Notes +dictated at St. Helena, Napoleon submitted Leclerc's memory to +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i363" id= +"page_i363">[pg.363]</a></span> some strictures for his +indiscretion in regard to the proposed restoration of slavery. The +official letters of that officer expose the injustice of the +charge. The facts are these. After the seeming submission of St. +Domingo, the First Consul caused a decree to be secretly passed at +Paris (May 20th, 1802), which prepared to re-establish slavery in +the West Indies; but Decrès warned Leclerc that it was not +for the present to be applied to St. Domingo unless it seemed to be +opportune. Knowing how fatal any such proclamation would be, +Leclerc suppressed the decree; but General Richepanse, who was now +governor of the island of Guadeloupe, not only issued the decree, +but proceeded to enforce it with rigour. It was this which caused +the last and most desperate revolts of the blacks, fatal alike to +French domination and to Leclerc's life. His successor, Rochambeau, +in spite of strong reinforcements of troops from France and a +policy of the utmost rigour, succeeded no better. In the island of +Guadeloupe the rebels openly defied the authority of France; and, +on the renewal of war between England and France, the remains of +the expedition were for the most part constrained to surrender to +the British flag or to the insurgent blacks. The island recovered +its so-called independence; and the sole result of Napoleon's +efforts in this sphere was the loss of more than twenty generals +and some 30,000 troops.</p> + +<p>The assertion has been repeatedly made that the First Consul +told off for this service the troops of the Army of the Rhine, with +the aim of exposing to the risks of tropical life the most +republican part of the French forces. That these furnished a large +part of the expeditionary force cannot be denied; but if his design +was to rid himself of political foes, it is difficult to see why he +should not have selected Moreau, Masséna, or Augereau, +rather than Leclerc. The fact that his brother-in-law was +accompanied by his wife, Pauline Bonaparte, for whom venomous +tongues asserted that Napoleon cherished a more than brotherly +affection, <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i364" id= +"page_i364">[pg.364]</a></span> will suffice to refute the slander. +Finally, it may be remarked that Bonaparte had not hesitated to +subject the choicest part of his Army of Italy and his own special +friends to similiar risks in Egypt and Syria. He never hesitated to +sacrifice thousands of lives when a great object was at stake; and +the restoration of the French West Indian Colonies might well seem +worth an army, especially as St. Domingo was not only of immense +instrinsic value to France in days when beetroot sugar was unknown, +but was of strategic importance as a base of operations for the +vast colonial empire which the First Consul proposed to rebuild in +the basin of the Mississippi.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;"> +<p>The history of the French possessions on the North American +continent could scarcely be recalled by ardent patriots without +pangs of remorse. The name Louisiana, applied to a vast territory +stretching up the banks of the Mississippi and the Missouri, +recalled the glorious days of Louis XIV., when the French flag was +borne by stout <i>voyageurs</i> up the foaming rivers of Canada and +the placid reaches of the father of rivers. It had been the +ambition of Montcalm to connect the French stations on Lake Erie +with the forts of Louisiana; but that warrior-statesman in the +West, as his kindred spirit, Dupleix, in the East, had fallen on +the evil days of Louis XV., when valour and merit in the French +colonies were sacrificed to the pleasures and parasites of +Versailles. The natural result followed. Louisiana was yielded up +to Spain in 1763, in order to reconcile the Court of Madrid to +cessions required by that same Peace of Paris. Twenty years later +Spain recovered from England the provinces of eastern and western +Florida; and thus, at the dawn of the nineteenth century, the red +and yellow flag waved over all the lands between California, New +Orleans, and the southern tip of Florida.<a name= +"FNanchor_198_198"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_198_198"><sup>[198]</sup></a> <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i365" id="page_i365">[pg.365]</a></span></p> + +<p>Many efforts were made by France to regain her old Mississippi +province; and in 1795, at the break up of the First Coalition, the +victorious Republic pressed Spain to yield up this territory, where +the settlers were still French at heart. Doubtless the weak King of +Spain would have yielded; but his chief Minister, Godoy, clung +tenaciously to Louisiana, and consented to cede only the Spanish +part of St. Domingo—a diplomatic success which helped to earn +him the title of the Prince of the Peace. So matters remained until +Talleyrand, as Foreign Minister, sought to gain Louisiana from +Spain before it slipped into the horny fists of the +Anglo-Saxons.</p> + +<p>That there was every prospect of this last event was the +conviction not only of the politicians at Washington, but also of +every iron-worker on the Ohio and of every planter on the +Tennessee. Those young but growing settlements chafed against the +restraints imposed by Spain on the river trade of the lower +Mississippi—the sole means available for their exports in +times when the Alleghanies were crossed by only two tracks worthy +the name of roads. In 1795 they gained free egress to the Gulf of +Mexico and the right of bonding their merchandise in a special +warehouse at New Orleans. Thereafter the United States calmly +awaited the time when racial vigour and the exigencies of commerce +should yield to them the possession of the western prairies and the +little townships of Arkansas and New Orleans. They reckoned without +taking count of the eager longing of the French for their former +colony and the determination of Napoleon to give effect to this +honourable sentiment.</p> + +<p>In July, 1800, when his negotiations with the United<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i366" id="page_i366">[pg.366]</a></span> +States were in good train, the First Consul sent to Madrid +instructions empowering the French Minister there to arrange a +treaty whereby France should receive Louisiana in return for the +cession of Tuscany to the heir of the Duke of Parma. This young man +had married the daughter of Charles IV. of Spain; and, for the +aggrandizement of his son-in-law, that <i>roi fainéant</i>, +was ready, nay eager, to bargain away a quarter of a continent; and +he did so by a secret convention signed at St. Ildefonso on October +7th, 1800.</p> + +<p>But though Charles rejoiced over this exchange, Godoy, who was +gifted with some insight into the future, was determined to +frustrate it. Various events occurred which enabled this wily +Minister, first to delay, and then almost to prevent, the odious +surrender. Chief among these was the certainty that the transfer +from weak hands to strong hands would be passionately resented by +the United States; and until peace with England was fully assured, +and the power of Toussaint broken, it would be folly for the First +Consul to risk a conflict with the United States. That they would +fight rather than see the western prairies pass into the First +Consul's hands was abundantly manifest. It is proved by many +patriotic pamphlets. The most important of these—"An Address +to the Government of the United States on the Cession of Louisiana +to the French," published at Philadelphia in 1802—quoted +largely from a French <i>brochure</i> by a French Councillor of +State. The French writer had stated that along the Mississippi his +countrymen would find boundless fertile prairies, and as for the +opposition of the United States—"a nation of pedlars and +shopkeepers"—that could be crushed by a French alliance with +the Indian tribes. The American writer thereupon passionately +called on his fellow-citizens to prevent this transfer: "France is +to be dreaded only, or chiefly, on the Mississippi. The Government +must take Louisiana before it passes into her hands. The iron is +now hot: command us to rise as one man and strike." These and other +like protests at last stirred <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i367" id="page_i367">[pg.367]</a></span> the placid +Government at Washington; and it bade the American Minister at +Paris to make urgent remonstrances, the sole effect of which was to +draw from Talleyrand the bland assurance that the transfer had not +been seriously contemplated.<a name="FNanchor_199_199"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_199_199"><sup>[199]</sup></a></p> + +<p>By the month of June, 1802, all circumstances seemed to smile on +Napoleon's enterprise: England had ratified the Peace of Amiens, +Toussaint had delivered himself up to Leclerc: France had her +troops strongly posted in Tuscany and Parma, and could, if +necessary, forcibly end the remaining scruples felt at Madrid; +while the United States, with a feeble army and a rotting navy, +were controlled by the most peaceable and Franco-phil of their +presidents, Thomas Jefferson. The First Consul accordingly ordered +an expedition to be prepared, as if for the reinforcement of +Leclerc in St. Domingo, though it was really destined for New +Orleans; and he instructed Talleyrand to soothe or coerce the Court +of Madrid into the final act of transfer. The offer was therefore +made by the latter (June 19th) in the name of the First Consul that +<i>in no case would Louisiana ever be alienated to a Third +Power</i>. When further delays supervened, Bonaparte, true to his +policy of continually raising his demands, required that Eastern +and Western Florida should also be ceded to him by Spain, on +condition that the young King of Etruria (for so Tuscany was now to +be styled) should regain his father's duchy of Parma.<a name= +"FNanchor_200_200"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_200_200"><sup>[200]</sup></a></p> + +<p>A word of explanation must here find place as to this singular +proposal. Parma had long been under French control; and, in March, +1801, by the secret Treaty of Madrid, the ruler of that duchy, +whose death seemed imminent, was to resign his claims thereto, +provided that his son should gain Etruria—as had been already +provided for at St. Ildefonso and Lunéville. The duke was, +however, allowed to keep his duchy until his death,<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i368" id="page_i368">[pg.368]</a></span> +which occurred on October 9th, 1802; and it is stated by our envoy +in Paris to have been hastened by news of that odious bargain.<a +name="FNanchor_201_201"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_201_201"><sup>[201]</sup></a> His death now furnished +Bonaparte with a good occasion for seeking to win an immense area +in the New World at the expense of a small Italian duchy, which his +troops could at any time easily overrun. This consideration seems +to have occurred even to Charles IV.; he refused to barter the +Floridas against Parma. The re-establishment of his son-in-law in +his paternal domains was doubtless desirable, but not at the cost +of so exacting a heriot as East and West Florida.</p> + +<p>From out this maze of sordid intrigues two or three facts +challenge our attention. Both Bonaparte and Charles IV. regarded +the most fertile waste lands then calling for the plough as fairly +exchanged against half a million of Tuscans; but the former feared +the resentment of the United States, and sought to postpone a +rupture until he could coerce them by overwhelming force. It is +equally clear that, had he succeeded in this enterprise, France +might have gained a great colonial empire in North America +protected from St. Domingo as a naval and military base, while that +island would have doubly prospered from the vast supplies poured +down the Mississippi; but this success he would have bought at the +expense of a <i>rapprochement</i> between the United States and +their motherland, such as a bitter destiny was to postpone to the +end of the century.</p> + +<p>The prospect of an Anglo-American alliance might well give pause +even to Napoleon. Nevertheless, he resolved to complete this vast +enterprise, which, if successful, would have profoundly affected +the New World and the relative importance of the French and English +peoples. The Spanish officials at New Orleans, in pursuance of +orders from Madrid, now closed the lower Mississippi to vessels of +the United States (October, 1802). At once a furious outcry arose +in the States against an act which not only violated their treaty +rights, but<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i369" id= +"page_i369">[pg.369]</a></span> foreshadowed the coming grip of the +First Consul. For this outburst he was prepared: General Victor was +at Dunkirk, with five battalions and sixteen field-pieces, ready to +cross the Atlantic, ostensibly for the relief of Leclerc, but +really in order to take possession of New Orleans.<a name= +"FNanchor_202_202"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_202_202"><sup>[202]</sup></a> But his plan was foiled by +the sure instincts of the American people, by the disasters of the +St. Domingo expedition, and by the restlessness of England under +his various provocations. Jefferson, despite his predilections for +France, was compelled to forbid the occupation of Louisiana: he +accordingly sent Monroe to Paris with instructions to effect a +compromise, or even to buy outright the French claims on that land. +Various circumstances favoured this mission. In the first week of +the year 1803 Napoleon received the news of Leclerc's death and the +miserable state of the French in St. Domingo; and as the tidings +that he now received from Egypt, Syria, Corfu, and the East +generally, were of the most alluring kind, he tacitly abandoned his +Mississippi enterprise in favour of the oriental schemes which were +closer to his heart. In that month of January he seems to have +turned his gaze from the western hemisphere towards Turkey, Egypt, +and India. True, he still seemed to be doing his utmost for the +occupation of Louisiana, but only as a device for sustaining the +selling price of the western prairies.</p> + +<p>When the news of this change of policy reached the ears of +Joseph and Lucien Bonaparte, it aroused their bitterest opposition. +Lucien plumed himself on having struck the bargain with Spain which +had secured that vast province at the expense of an Austrian +archduke's<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i370" id= +"page_i370">[pg.370]</a></span> crown; and Joseph knew only too +well that Napoleon was freeing himself in the West in order to be +free to strike hard in Europe and the East. The imminent rupture of +the Peace of Amiens touched him keenly: for that peace was his +proudest achievement. If colonial adventures must be sought, let +them be sought in the New World, where Spain and the United States +could offer only a feeble resistance, rather than in Europe and +Asia, where unending war must be the result of an aggressive +policy.</p> + +<p>At once the brothers sought an interview with Napoleon. He +chanced to be in his bath, a warm bath perfumed with scents, where +he believed that tired nature most readily found recovery. He +ordered them to be admitted, and an interesting family discussion +was the result. On his mentioning the proposed sale, Lucien at once +retorted that the Legislature would never consent to this +sacrifice. He there touched the wrong chord in Napoleon's nature: +had he appealed to the memories of <i>le grand monarque</i> and of +Montcalm, possibly he might have bent that iron will; but the +mention of the consent of the French deputies roused the spleen of +the autocrat, who, from amidst the scented water, mockingly bade +his brother go into mourning for the affair, which he, and he +alone, intended to carry out. This gibe led Joseph to threaten that +he would mount the tribune in the Chambers and head the opposition +to this unpatriotic surrender. Defiance flashed forth once more +from the bath; and the First Consul finally ended their bitter +retorts by spasmodically rising as suddenly falling backwards, and +drenching Joseph to the skin. His peals of scornful laughter, and +the swooning of the valet, who was not yet fully inured to these +family scenes, interrupted the argument of the piece; but, when +resumed a little later, <i>à sec</i>, Lucien wound up by +declaring that, if he were not his brother, he would be his enemy. +"My enemy! That is rather strong," exclaimed Napoleon. "You my +enemy! I would break you, see, like this box"—and he dashed +his snuff-box on the carpet. It did <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i371" id="page_i371">[pg.371]</a></span> not break: but the +portrait of Josephine was detached and broken. Whereupon Lucien +picked up the pieces and handed them to his brother, remarking: "It +is a pity: meanwhile, until you can break me, it is your wife's +portrait that you have broken."<a name="FNanchor_203_203"></a><a +href="#Footnote_203_203"><sup>[203]</sup></a></p> + +<p>To Talleyrand, Napoleon was equally unbending: summoning him on +April 11th, he said:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Irresolution and deliberation are no longer in season. I +renounce Louisiana. It is not only New Orleans that I cede: it is +the whole colony, without reserve; I know the price of what I +abandon. I have proved the importance I attach to this province, +since my first diplomatic act with Spain had the object of +recovering it. I renounce it with the greatest regret: to attempt +obstinately to retain it would be folly. I direct you to negotiate +the affair."<a name="FNanchor_204_204"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_204_204"><sup>[204]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>After some haggling with Monroe, the price agreed on for this +territory was 60,000,000 francs, the United States also covenanting +to satisfy the claims which many of their citizens had on the +French treasury. For this paltry sum the United States gained a +peaceful title to the debatable lands west of Lake Erie and to the +vast tracts west of the Mississippi. The First Consul carried out +his threat of denying to the deputies of France any voice in this +barter. The war with England sufficed to distract their attention; +and France turned sadly away from the western prairies, which her +hardy sons had first opened up, to fix her gaze, first on the +Orient, and thereafter on European conquests. No more was heard of +Louisiana, and few references were permitted to the disasters in +St. Domingo; for Napoleon abhorred any mention of a <i>coup +manqué</i>, and strove to banish from the imagination of +France those dreams of a trans-Atlantic Empire which had drawn him, +as they were destined sixty years later to draw his nephew, to the +verge of war with<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i372" id= +"page_i372">[pg.372]</a></span> the rising republic of the New +World. In one respect, the uncle was more fortunate than the +nephew. In signing the treaty with the United States, the First +Consul could represent his conduct, not as a dexterous retreat from +an impossible situation, but as an act of grace to the Americans +and a blow to England. "This accession of territory," he said, +"strengthens for ever the power of the United States, and I have +just given to England a maritime rival that sooner or later will +humble her pride."<a name="FNanchor_205_205"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_205_205"><sup>[205]</sup></a></p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;"> +<p>In the East there seemed to be scarcely the same field for +expansion as in the western hemisphere. Yet, as the Orient had ever +fired the imagination of Napoleon, he was eager to expand the +possessions of France in the Indian Ocean. In October, 1801, these +amounted to the Isle of Bourbon and the Isle of France; for the +former French possessions in India, namely, Pondicherry, +Mahé, Karikal, Chandernagore, along with their factories at +Yanaon, Surat, and two smaller places, had been seized by the +British, and were not to be given back to France until six months +after the definitive treaty of peace was signed. From these scanty +relics it seemed impossible to rear a stable fabric: yet the First +Consul grappled with the task. After the cessation of hostilities, +he ordered Admiral Gantheaume with four ships of war to show the +French flag in those seas, and to be ready in due course to take +over the French settlements in India. Meanwhile he used his utmost +endeavours in the negotiations at Amiens to gain an accession of +land for Pondicherry, such as would make it a possible base for +military enterprise. Even before those negotiations began he +expressed to Lord Cornwallis his desire for such an extension; and +when the British plenipotentiary urged the cession of Tobago to +Great Britain, he offered to exchange it for an<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i373" id="page_i373">[pg.373]</a></span> +establishment or territory in India.<a name= +"FNanchor_206_206"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_206_206"><sup>[206]</sup></a> Herein the First Consul +committed a serious tactical blunder; for his insistence on this +topic and his avowed desire to negotiate direct with the Nabob +undoubtedly aroused the suspicions of our Government.</p> + +<p>Still greater must have been their concern when they learnt that +General Decaen was commissioned to receive back the French +possessions in India; for that general in 1800 had expressed to +Bonaparte his hatred of the English, and had begged, even if he had +to wait ten years, that he might be sent where he could fight them, +especially in India. As was his wont, Bonaparte said little at the +time; but after testing Decaen's military capacity, he called him +to his side at midsummer, 1802, and suddenly asked him if he still +thought about India. On receiving an eager affirmative, he said, +"Well, you will go." "In what capacity?" "As captain-general: go to +the Minister of Marine and of the Colonies and ask him to +communicate to you the documents relating to this expedition." By +such means did Bonaparte secure devoted servants. It is scarcely +needful to add that the choice of such a man only three months +after the signature of the Treaty of Amiens proves that the First +Consul only intended to keep that peace as long as his forward +colonial policy rendered it desirable.<a name= +"FNanchor_207_207"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_207_207"><sup>[207]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Meanwhile our Governor-General, Marquis Wellesley, was +displaying an activity which might seem to be dictated by knowledge +of Bonaparte's designs. There was, indeed, every need of vigour. +Nowhere had French and British interests been so constantly in +collision as in India. In 1798 France had intrigued with Tippoo +Sahib at Seringapatam, and arranged a treaty for the purpose of +expelling the British nation from India. When in 1799 French hopes +were dashed by Arthur Wellesley's capture of that city and the +death of Tippoo, there still remained<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i374" id="page_i374">[pg.374]</a></span> some prospect of +overthrowing British supremacy by uniting the restless Mahratta +rulers of the north and centre, especially Scindiah and Holkar, in +a powerful confederacy. For some years their armies, numbering some +60,000 men, had been drilled and equipped by French adventurers, +the ablest and most powerful of whom was M. Perron. Doubtless it +was with the hope of gaining their support that the Czar Paul and +Bonaparte had in 1800 formed the project of invading India by way +of Persia. And after the dissipation of that dream, there still +remained the chance of strengthening the Mahratta princes so as to +contest British claims with every hope of success. Forewarned by +the home Government of Bonaparte's eastern designs, our able and +ambitious Governor-General now prepared to isolate the Mahratta +chieftains, to cut them off from all contact with France, and, if +necessary, to shatter Scindiah's army, the only formidable native +force drilled by European methods.</p> + +<p>Such was the position of affairs when General Decaen undertook +the enterprise of revivifying French influences in India.</p> + +<p>The secret instructions which he received from the First Consul, +dated January 15th, 1803, were the following:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"To communicate with the peoples or princes who are most +impatient under the yoke of the English Company.... To send home a +report six months after his arrival in India, concerning all +information that he shall have collected, on the strength, the +position, and the feeling of the different peoples of India, as +well as on the strength and position of the different English +establishments; ... his views, and hopes that he might have of +finding support, in case of war, so as to be able to maintain +himself in the Peninsula.... Finally, as one must reason on the +hypothesis that we should not be masters of the sea and could hope +for slight succour,"</p> +</div> + +<p>Decaen is to seek among the French possessions or elsewhere a +place serving as a <i>point d'appui</i>, where in the last resort +he could capitulate and thus gain the means <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i375" id="page_i375">[pg.375]</a></span> of +being transported to France with arms and baggage. Of this <i>point +d'appui</i> he will</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"strive to take possession after the first months ... whatever +be the nation to which it belongs, Portuguese, Dutch, or +English.... If war should break out between England and France +before the 1st of Vendémiaire, Year XIII. (September 22nd, +1804), and the captain general is warned of it before receiving the +orders of the Government, he has <i>carte blanche</i> to fall back +on the Ile de France and the Cape, or to remain in India.... It is +now considered impossible that we should have war with England +without dragging in Holland. One of the first cares of the +captain-general will be to gain control over the Dutch, Portuguese, +and Spanish establishments, and of their resources. The +captain-general's mission is at first one of observation, on +political and military topics, with the small forces that he takes +out, and an occupation of <i>comptoirs</i> for our commerce: but +the First Consul, if well informed by him, will perhaps be able +some day to put him in a position to acquire that great glory which +hands down the memory of men beyond the lapse of centuries."<a +name="FNanchor_208_208"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_208_208"><sup>[208]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>Had these instructions been known to English statesmen, they +would certainly have ended the peace which was being thus +perfidiously used by the First Consul for the destruction of our +Indian Empire. But though their suspicions were aroused by the +departure of Decaen's expedition and by the activity of French +agents in India, yet the truth remained half hidden, until, at a +later date, the publication of General Decaen's papers shed a flood +of light on Napoleon's policy.</p> + +<p>Owing to various causes, the expedition did not set sail from +Brest until the beginning of March, 1803. The date should be +noticed. It proves that at this time Napoleon judged that a rupture +of peace was not imminent; and when he saw his miscalculation, he +sought to delay the war with England as long as possible in order +to allow time for Decaen's force at least to reach the Cape, +then<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i376" id= +"page_i376">[pg.376]</a></span> in the hands of the Dutch. The +French squadron was too weak to risk a fight with an English fleet; +it comprised only four ships of war, two transports, and a few +smaller vessels, carrying about 1,800 troops.<a name= +"FNanchor_209_209"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_209_209"><sup>[209]</sup></a> The ships were under the +command of Admiral Linois, who was destined to be the terror of our +merchantmen in eastern seas. Decaen's first halt was at the Cape, +which had been given back by us to the Dutch East India Company on +February 21st, 1803. The French general found the Dutch officials +in their usual state of lethargy: the fortifications had not been +repaired, and many of the inhabitants, and even of the officials +themselves, says Decaen, were devoted to the English. After +surveying the place, doubtless with a view to its occupation as the +<i>point d'appui</i> hinted at in his instructions, he set sail on +the 27th of May, and arrived before Pondicherry on the 11th of +July.<a name="FNanchor_210_210"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_210_210"><sup>[210]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In the meantime important events had transpired which served to +wreck not only Decaen's enterprise, but the French influence in +India. In Europe the flames of war had burst forth, a fact of which +both Decaen and the British officials were ignorant; but the +Governor of Fort St. George (Madras), having, before the 15th of +June, "received intelligence which appeared to indicate the +certainty of an early renewal of hostilities between His Majesty +and France," announced that he must postpone the restitution of +Pondicherry to the French, until he should have the authority of +the Governor-General for such action.<a name= +"FNanchor_211_211"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_211_211"><sup>[211]</sup></a> <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i377" id="page_i377">[pg.377]</a></span></p> + +<p>The Marquis Wellesley was still less disposed to any such +restitution. French intervention in the affairs of Switzerland, +which will be described later on, had so embittered Anglo-French +relations that on October the 17th, 1802, Lord Hobart, our Minister +of War and for the Colonies, despatched a "most secret" despatch, +stating that recent events rendered it necessary to postpone this +retrocession. At a later period Wellesley received contrary orders, +instructing him to restore French and Dutch territories; but he +judged that step to be inopportune considering the gravity of +events in the north of India. So active was the French propaganda +at the Mahratta Courts, and so threatening were their armed +preparations, that he redoubled his efforts for the consolidation +of British supremacy. He resolved to strike at Scindiah, unless he +withdrew his southern army into his own territories; and, on +receiving an evasive answer from that prince, who hoped by +temporizing to gain armed succours from France, he launched the +British forces against him. Now was the opportunity for Arthur +Wellesley to display his prowess against the finest forces of the +East; and brilliantly did the young warrior display it. The +victories of Assaye in September, and of Argaum in November, +scattered the southern Mahratta force, but only after desperate +conflicts that suggested how easily a couple of Decaen's battalions +might have turned the scales of war.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, in the north, General Lake stormed Aligarh, and drove +Scindiah's troops back to Delhi. Disgusted at the incapacity and +perfidy that surrounded him, Perron threw up his command; and +another conflict near Delhi yielded that ancient seat of Empire to +our trading Company. In three months the results of the toil of +Scindiah, the restless ambition of Holkar, <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i378" id="page_i378">[pg.378]</a></span> the training of +European officers, and the secret intrigues of Napoleon, were all +swept to the winds.</p> + +<br> +<ins class="correction" title= +"Transcriber's note:The map is missing in the original">[Illustration (missing): +FRENCH MAP OF THE SOUTH OF AUSTRALIA, 1807]</ins><br> +<p>Wellesley now annexed the land around Delhi and Agra, besides +certain coast districts which cut off the Mahrattas from the sea, +also stipulating for the complete exclusion of French agents from +their States. Perron was allowed to return to France; and the +brusque reception accorded him from Bonaparte may serve to measure +the height of the First Consul's hopes, the depth of his +disappointment, and his resentment against a man who was daunted by +a single disaster.<a name="FNanchor_212_212"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_212_212"><sup>[212]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Meanwhile it was the lot of Decaen to witness, in inglorious +inactivity, the overthrow of all his hopes. Indeed, he barely +escaped the capture which Wellesley designed for his whole force, +as soon as he should hear of the outbreak of war in Europe; but by +secret and skilful measures all the French ships, except one +transport, escaped to their appointed rendezvous, the Ile de +France. Enraged by these events, Decaen and Linois determined to +inflict every possible injury on their foes. The latter soon swept +from the eastern seas British merchantmen valued at a million +sterling, while the general ceased not to send emissaries into +India to encourage the millions of natives to shake off the yoke of +"a few thousand English."</p> + +<p>These officers effected little, and some of them were handed +over to the English authorities by the now obsequious potentates. +Decaen also endeavoured to carry out the First Consul's design of +occupying strategic points in the Indian Ocean. In the autumn of +1803 he sent a fine cruiser to the Imaum of Muscat, to induce him +to cede a station for commercial purposes at that port. But +Wellesley, forewarned by our agent at<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i379" id="page_i379">[pg.379]</a></span> Bagdad, had made a +firm alliance with the Imaum, who accordingly refused the request +of the French captain. The incident, however, supplies another link +in the chain of evidence as to the completeness of Napoleon's +oriental policy, and yields another proof of the vigour of our +great proconsul at Calcutta, by whose foresight our Indian Empire +was preserved and strengthened.<a name="FNanchor_213_213"></a><a +href="#Footnote_213_213"><sup>[213]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Bonaparte's enterprises were by no means limited to well-known +lands. The unknown continent of the Southern Seas appealed to his +imagination, which pictured its solitudes transformed by French +energy into a second fatherland. Australia, or New Holland, as it +was then called, had long attracted the notice of French explorers, +but the English penal settlements at and near Sydney formed the +only European establishment on the great southern island at the +dawn of the nineteenth century.</p> + +<p>Bonaparte early turned his eyes towards that land. On his voyage +to Egypt he took with him the volumes in which Captain Cook +described his famous discoveries; and no sooner was he firmly +installed as First Consul than he planned with the Institute of +France a great French expedition to New Holland. The full text of +the plan has never been published: probably it was suppressed or +destroyed; and the sole public record relating to it is contained +in the official account of the expedition published at the French +Imperial Press in 1807.<a name="FNanchor_214_214"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_214_214"><sup>[214]</sup></a> According to this +description, the aim was solely geographical and scientific. The +First Consul and the Institute of France desired that the ships +should proceed to Van Diemen's Land, explore its rivers, and then +complete the survey of the south coast of the continent, so as +to<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i380" id= +"page_i380">[pg.380]</a></span> see whether behind the islands of +the Nuyts Archipelago there might be a channel connecting with the +Gulf of Carpentaria, and so cutting New Holland in half. They were +then to sail west to "Terre Leeuwin," ascend the Swan River, +complete the exploration of Shark's Bay and the north-western +coasts, and winter in Timor or Amboyne. Finally, they were to coast +along New Guinea and the Gulf of Carpentaria, and return to France +in 1803.</p> + +<p>In September, 1800, the ships, having on board twenty-three +scientific men, set sail from Havre under the command of Commodore +Baudin. They received no molestation from English cruisers, it +being a rule of honour to give Admiralty permits to all members of +genuinely scientific and geographical parties. Nevertheless, even +on its scientific side, this splendidly-equipped expedition +produced no results comparable with those achieved by Lieutenant +Bass or by Captain Flinders. The French ships touched at the Ile de +France, and sailed thence for Van Diemen's Land. After spending a +long time in the exploration of its coasts and in collecting +scientific information, they made for Sydney in order to repair +their ships and gain relief for their many invalids. Thence, after +incidents which will be noticed presently, they set sail in +November, 1802, for Bass Strait and the coast beyond. They seem to +have overlooked the entrance to Port Phillip—a discovery +effected by Murray in 1801, but not made public till three years +later—and failed to notice the outlet of the chief Australian +river, which is obscured by a shallow lake.</p> + +<p>There they were met by Captain Flinders, who, on H.M.S. +"Investigator," had been exploring the coast between Cape Leeuwin +and the great gulfs which he named after Lords St. Vincent and +Spencer. Flinders was returning towards Sydney, when, in the long +desolate curve of the bay which he named from the incident +Encounter Bay, he saw the French ships. After brief and guarded +intercourse the explorers separated, the French proceeding to +survey the gulfs whence the "Investigator" had just sailed; while +Flinders, after a<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i381" id= +"page_i381">[pg.381]</a></span> short stay at Sydney and the +exploration of the northern coast and Torres Strait, set out for +Europe.<a name="FNanchor_215_215"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_215_215"><sup>[215]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Apart from the compilation of the most accurate map of Australia +which had then appeared, and the naming of several features on its +coasts—<i>e.g.</i>, Capes Berrouilli and Gantheaume, the Bays +of Rivoli and of Lacépède, and the Freycinet +Peninsula, which are still retained—the French expedition +achieved no geographical results of the first importance.</p> + +<p>Its political aims now claim attention. A glance at the +accompanying map will show that, under the guise of being an +emissary of civilization, Commodore Baudin was prepared to claim +half the continent for France. Indeed, his final inquiry at Sydney +about the extent of the British claims on the Pacific coast was so +significant as to elicit from Governor King the reply that the +whole of Van Diemen's Land and of the coast from Cape Howe on the +south of the mainland to Cape York on the north was British +territory. King also notified the suspicious action of the French +Commander to the Home Government;<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i382" id="page_i382">[pg.382]</a></span> and when the French +sailed away to explore the coast of southern and central Australia +he sent a ship to watch their proceedings. When, therefore, +Commodore Baudin effected a landing on King Island, the Union Jack +was speedily hoisted and saluted by the blue-jackets of the British +vessel; for it was rumoured that French officers had said that King +Island would afford a good station for the command of Bass Strait +and the seizure of British ships. This was probably mere gossip. +Baudin in his interviews with Governor King at Sydney disclaimed +any intention of seizing Van Diemen's Land; but he afterwards +stated that <i>he did not know what were the plans of the French +Government with regard to that island</i>.<a name= +"FNanchor_216_216"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_216_216"><sup>[216]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Long before this dark saying could be known at Westminster, the +suspicions of our Government had been aroused; and, on February +13th, 1803, Lord Hobart penned a despatch to Governor King bidding +him to take every precaution against French annexations, and to +form settlements in Van Diemen's Land and at Port Phillip. The +station of Risden was accordingly planted on the estuary of the +Derwent, a little above the present town of Hobart; while on the +shores of Port Phillip another expedition sent out from the mother +country sought, but for the present in vain, to find a suitable +site. The French cruise therefore exerted on the fortunes of the +English and French peoples an influence such as has frequently +accrued from their colonial rivalry: it spurred on the island Power +to more vigorous efforts than she would otherwise have put forth, +and led to the discomfiture of her continental rival. The plans of +Napoleon for the acquisition of Van Diemen's Land and the middle of +Australia had an effect like that which the ambition of Montcalm, +Dupleix, Lally, and Perron has exerted on the ultimate destiny of +many a vast and fertile territory. <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i383" id="page_i383">[pg.383]</a></span></p> + +<p>Still, in spite of the destruction of his fleet at Trafalgar, +Napoleon held to his Australian plans. No fact, perhaps, is more +suggestive of the dogged tenacity of his will than his order to +Péron and Freycinet to publish through the Imperial Press at +Paris an exhaustive account of their Australian voyage, accompanied +by maps which claimed half of that continent for the tricolour +flag. It appeared in 1807, the year of Tilsit and of the plans for +the partition of Portugal and her colonies between France and +Spain. The hour seemed at last to have struck for the assertion of +French supremacy in other continents, now that the Franco-Russian +alliance had durably consolidated it in Europe. And who shall say +that, but for the Spanish Rising and the genius of Wellington, a +vast colonial empire might not have been won for France, had +Napoleon been free to divert his energies away from this "old +Europe" of which he professed to be utterly weary?</p> + +<p>His whole attitude towards European and colonial politics +revealed a statesmanlike appreciation of the forces that were to +mould the fortunes of nations in the nineteenth century. He saw +that no rearrangement of the European peoples could be permanent. +They were too stubborn, too solidly nationalized, to bear the yoke +of the new Charlemagne. "I am come too late," he once exclaimed to +Marmont; "men are too enlightened, there is nothing great left to +be done." These words reveal his sense of the artificiality of his +European conquests. His imperial instincts could find complete +satisfaction only among the docile fate-ridden peoples of Asia, +where he might unite the functions of an Alexander and a Mahomet: +or, failing that, he would carve out an empire from the vast +southern lands, organizing them by his unresting powers and ruling +them as œkist and as despot. This task would possess a +permanence such as man's conquests over Nature may always enjoy, +and his triumphs over his fellows seldom or never. The political +reconstruction of Europe was at best one of an infinite number of +such changes, always progressing and <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i384" id="page_i384">[pg.384]</a></span> never completed; +while the peopling of new lands and the founding of States belonged +to that highest plane of political achievement wherein schemes of +social beneficence and the dictates of a boundless ambition could +maintain an eager and unending rivalry. While a strictly European +policy could effect little more than a raking over of +long-cultivated parterres, the foundation of a new colonial empire +would be the turning up of the virgin soil of the limitless +prairie.</p> + +<p>If we inquire by the light of history why these grand designs +failed, the answer must be that they were too vast fitly to consort +with an ambitious European policy. His ablest adviser noted this +fundamental defect as rapidly developing after the Peace of Amiens, +when "he began to sow the seeds of new wars which, after +overwhelming Europe and France, were to lead him to his ruin." This +criticism of Talleyrand on a man far greater than himself, but who +lacked that saving grace of moderation in which the diplomatist +excelled, is consonant with all the teachings of history. The +fortunes of the colonial empires of Athens and Carthage in the +ancient world, of the Italian maritime republics, of Portugal and +Spain, and, above all, the failure of the projects of Louis XIV. +and Louis XV. serve to prove that only as the motherland enjoys a +sufficiency of peace at home and on her borders can she send forth +in ceaseless flow those supplies of men and treasure which are the +very life-blood of a new organism. That beneficent stream might +have poured into Napoleon's Colonial Empire, had not other claims +diverted it into the barren channels of European warfare. The same +result followed as at the time of the Seven Years' War, when the +double effort to wage great campaigns in Germany and across the +oceans sapped the strength of France, and the additions won by +Dupleix and Montcalm fell away from her flaccid frame.</p> + +<p>Did Napoleon foresee a similar result? His conduct in regard to +Louisiana and in reference to Decaen's expedition proves that he +did, but only when it was too late. As soon as he saw that his +policy was about to provoke <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i385" id="page_i385">[pg.385]</a></span> another war with +Britain long before he was ready for it, he decided to forego his +oceanic schemes and to concentrate his forces on his European +frontiers. The decision was dictated by a true sense of imperial +strategy. But what shall we say of his sense of imperial diplomacy? +The foregoing narrative and the events to be described in the next +chapters prove that his mistake lay in that overweening belief in +his own powers and in the pliability of his enemies which was the +cause of his grandest triumphs and of his unexampled overthrow. +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i386" id= +"page_i386">[pg.386]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XVI</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>NAPOLEON'S INTERVENTIONS</center> + +<br> + + +<p>War, said St. Augustine, is but the transition from a lower to a +higher state of peace. The saying is certainly true for those wars +that are waged in defence of some great principle or righteous +cause. It may perhaps be applied with justice to the early +struggles of the French revolutionists to secure their democratic +Government against the threatened intervention of monarchical +States. But the danger of vindicating the cause of freedom by armed +force has never been more glaringly shown than in the struggles of +that volcanic age. When democracy had gained a sure foothold in the +European system, the war was still pushed on by the triumphant +republicans at the expense of neighbouring States, so that, even +before the advent of Bonaparte, their polity was being strangely +warped by the influence of military methods of rule. The brilliance +of the triumphs won by that young warrior speedily became the +greatest danger of republican France; and as the extraordinary +energy developed in her people by recent events cast her feeble +neighbours to the ground, Europe cowered away before the +ever-increasing bulk of France. In their struggles after democracy +the French finally reverted to the military type of Government, +which accords with many of the cherished instincts of their race: +and the military-democratic compromise embodied in Napoleon endowed +that people with the twofold force of national pride and of +conscious strength springing from their new institutions.</p> + +<p>With this was mingled contempt for neighbouring <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i387" id="page_i387">[pg.387]</a></span> +peoples who either could not or would not gain a similar +independence and prestige. Everything helped to feed this +self-confidence and contempt for others. The venerable fabric of +the Holy Roman Empire was rocking to and fro amidst the spoliations +of its ecclesiastical lands by lay princes, in which its former +champions, the Houses of Hapsburg and Hohenzollern, were the most +exacting of the claimants. The Czar, in October, 1801, had come to +a profitable understanding with France concerning these +"secularizations." A little later France and Russia began to draw +together on the Eastern Question in a way threatening to Turkey and +to British influence in the Levant.<a name= +"FNanchor_217_217"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_217_217"><sup>[217]</sup></a> In fact, French diplomacy +used the partition of the German ecclesiastical lands and the +threatened collapse of the Ottoman power as a potent means of +busying the Continental States and leaving Great Britain isolated. +Moreover, the great island State was passing through ministerial +and financial difficulties which robbed her of all the fruits of +her naval triumphs and made her diplomacy at Amiens the +laughing-stock of the world. When monarchical ideas were thus +discredited, it was idle to expect peace. The struggling upwards +towards a higher plane had indeed begun; democracy had effected a +lodgment in Western Europe; but the old order in its bewildered +gropings after some sure basis had not yet touched bottom on that +rock of nationality which was to yield a new foundation for +monarchy amidst the strifes of the nineteenth century. Only when +the monarchs received the support of their French-hating subjects +could an equilibrium of force and of enthusiasms yield the +long-sought opportunity for a durable peace.<a name= +"FNanchor_218_218"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_218_218"><sup>[218]</sup></a></p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i388" id= +"page_i388">[pg.388]</a></span> The negotiations at Amiens had +amply shown the great difficulty of the readjustment of European +affairs. If our Ministers had manifested their real feelings about +Napoleon's presidency of the Italian Republic, war would certainly +have broken forth. But, as has been seen, they preferred to assume +the attitude of the ostrich, the worst possible device both for the +welfare of Europe and the interests of Great Britain; for it +convinced Napoleon that he could safely venture on other +interventions; and this he proceeded to do in the affairs of Italy, +Holland, and Switzerland.</p> + +<p>On September 21st, 1802, appeared a <i>senatus consultum</i> +ordering the incorporation of Piedmont in France. This important +territory, lessened by the annexation of its eastern parts to the +Italian Republic, had for five months been provisionally +administered by a French general as a military district of France. +Its definite incorporation in the great Republic now put an end to +all hopes of restoration of the House of Savoy. For the King of +Sardinia, now an exile in his island, the British Ministry had made +some efforts at Amiens; but, as it knew that the Czar and the First +Consul had agreed on offering him some suitable indemnity, the hope +was cherished that the new sovereign, Victor Emmanuel I., would be +restored to his mainland possessions. That hope was now at an end. +In vain did Lord Whitworth, our ambassador at Paris, seek to help +the Russian envoy to gain a fit indemnity. Sienna and its lands +were named, as if in derision; and though George III. and the Czar +ceased not to press the claims of the House of Savoy, yet no more +tempting offer came from Paris,<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i389" id="page_i389">[pg.389]</a></span> except a hint that +some part of European Turkey might be found for him; and the young +ruler nobly refused to barter for the petty Siennese, or for some +Turkish pachalic, his birthright to the lands which, under a +happier Victor Emmanuel, were to form the nucleus of a United +Italy.<a name="FNanchor_219_219"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_219_219"><sup>[219]</sup></a> A month after the +absorption of Piedmont came the annexation of Parma. The heir to +that duchy, who was son-in-law to the King of Spain, had been +raised to the dignity of King of Etruria; and in return for this +aggrandizement in Europe, Charles IV. bartered away to France the +whole of Louisiana. Nevertheless, the First Consul kept his troops +in Parma, and on the death of the old duke in October, 1802, Parma +and its dependencies were incorporated in the French Republic.</p> + +<p>The naval supremacy of France in the Mediterranean was also +secured by the annexation of the Isle of Elba with its excellent +harbour of Porto Ferrajo. Three deputies from Elba came to Paris to +pay their respects to their new ruler. The Minister of War was +thereupon charged to treat them with every courtesy, to entertain +them at dinner, to give them 3,000 francs apiece, and to hint that +on their presentation to Bonaparte they might make a short speech +expressing the pleasure of their people at being united with +France. By such deft rehearsals did this master in the art of +scenic displays weld Elba on to France and France to himself.</p> + +<p>Even more important was Bonaparte's intervention in Switzerland. +The condition of that land calls for some explanation. For wellnigh +three centuries the Switzers had been grouped in thirteen cantons, +which differed widely in character and constitution. The Central or +Forest Cantons still retained the old Teutonic custom of regulating +their affairs in their several folk-moots, at which every +householder appeared fully armed. Elsewhere the confederation had +developed less admirable customs, and the richer lowlands +especially were under the hereditary control of rich burgher +families. There<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i390" id= +"page_i390">[pg.390]</a></span> was no constitution binding these +States in any effective union. Each of the cantons claimed a +governmental sovereignty that was scarcely impaired by the +deliberations of the Federal Diet. Besides these sovereign States +were others that held an ill-defined position as allies; among +these were Geneva, Basel, Bienne, Saint Gall, the old imperial city +of Mühlhausen in Alsace, the three Grisons, the principality +of Neufchâtel, and Valais on the Upper Rhone. Last came the +subject-lands, Aargau, Thurgau, Ticino, Vaud, and others, which +were governed in various degrees of strictness by their cantonal +overlords. Such was the old Swiss Confederacy: it somewhat +resembled that chaotic Macedonian league of mountain clans, +plain-dwellers, and cities, which was so profoundly influenced by +the infiltration of Greek ideas and by the masterful genius of +Philip. Switzerland was likewise to be shaken by a new political +influence, and thereafter to be controlled by the greatest +statesman of the age.</p> + +<p>On this motley group of cantons and districts the French +Revolution exerted a powerful influence; and when, in 1798, the +people of Vaud strove to throw off the yoke of Berne, French +troops, on the invitation of the insurgents, invaded Switzerland, +quelled the brave resistance of the central cantons, and ransacked +the chief of the Swiss treasuries. After the plunderers came the +constitution-mongers, who forthwith forced on Switzerland democracy +of the most French and geometrical type: all differences between +the sovereign cantons, allies, and subject-lands were swept away, +and Helvetia was constituted as an indivisible +republic—except Valais, which was to be independent, and +Geneva and Mühlhausen, which were absorbed by France. The +subject districts and non-privileged classes benefited considerably +by the social reforms introduced under French influence; but a +constitution recklessly transferred from Paris to Berne could only +provoke loathing among a people that never before had submitted to +foreign dictation. Moreover, the new order of things violated the +most elementary <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i391" id= +"page_i391">[pg.391]</a></span> needs of the Swiss, whose racial +and religious instincts claimed freedom of action for each district +or canton.</p> + +<p>Of these deep-seated feelings the oligarchs of the plains, no +less than the democrats of the Forest Cantons, were now the +champions; while the partisans of the new-fangled democracy were +held up to scorn as the supporters of a cast-iron centralization. +It soon became clear that the constitution of 1798 could be +perpetuated only by the support of the French troops quartered on +that unhappy land; for throughout the years 1800 and 1801 the +political see-saw tilted every few months, first in favour of the +oligarchic or federal party, then again towards their unionist +opponents. After the Peace of Lunéville, which recognized +the right of the Swiss to adopt what form of government they +thought fit, some of their deputies travelled to Paris with the +draft of a constitution lately drawn up by the Chamber at Berne, in +the hope of gaining the assent of the First Consul to its +provisions and the withdrawal of French troops. They had every +reason for hope: the party then in power at Berne was that which +favoured a centralized democracy, and their plenipotentiary in +Paris, a thorough republican named Stapfer, had been led to hope +that Switzerland would now be allowed to carve out its own destiny. +What, then, was his surprise to find the First Consul increasingly +enamoured of federalism. The letters written by Stapfer to the +Swiss Government at this time are highly instructive.<a name= +"FNanchor_220_220"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_220_220"><sup>[220]</sup></a></p> + +<p>On March 10th, 1801, he wrote:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"What torments us most is the cruel uncertainty as to the real +aims of the French Government. Does it want to federalize us in +order to weaken us and to rule more surely by our divisions: or +does it really desire our independence and welfare, and is its +delay only the result of its doubts as to the true wishes of the +Helvetic nation?"</p> +</div> + +<p>Stapfer soon found that the real cause of delay was the<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i392" id= +"page_i392">[pg.392]</a></span> non-completion of the cession of +Valais, which Bonaparte urgently desired for the construction of a +military road across the Simplon Pass; and as the Swiss refused +this demand, matters remained at a standstill. "The whole of Europe +would not make him give up a favourite scheme," wrote Stapfer on +April 10th; "the possession of Valais is one of the matters closest +to his heart."</p> + +<p>The protracted pressure of a French army of occupation on that +already impoverished land proved irresistible; and some important +modifications of the Swiss project of a constitution, on which the +First Consul insisted, were inserted in the new federal compact of +May, 1801. Switzerland was now divided into seventeen cantons; and +despite the wish of the official Swiss envoys for a strongly +centralized government, Bonaparte gave large powers to the cantonal +authorities. His motives in this course of action have been +variously judged. In giving greater freedom of movement to the +several cantons, he certainly adopted the only statesmanlike +course: but his conduct during the negotiation, his retention of +Valais, and the continued occupation of Switzerland by his troops, +albeit in reduced numbers, caused many doubts as to the sincerity +of his desire for a final settlement.</p> + +<p>The unionist majority at Berne soon proceeded to modify his +proposals, which they condemned as full of defects and +contradictions; while the federals strove to keep matters as they +were. In the month of October their efforts succeeded, thanks to +the support of the French ambassador and soldiery; they dissolved +the Assembly, annulled its recent amendments; and their influence +procured for Reding, the head of the oligarchic party, the office +of Landamman, or supreme magistrate. So reactionary, however, were +their proceedings, that the First Consul recalled the French +general as a sign of his displeasure at his help recently offered +to the federals. Their triumph was brief: while their chiefs were +away at Easter, 1802, the democratic unionists effected another +<i>coup d'état</i>—it was the fourth—and +promulgated one more constitution. This change seems also to have +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i393" id= +"page_i393">[pg.393]</a></span> been brought about with the +connivance of the French authorities:<a name= +"FNanchor_221_221"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_221_221"><sup>[221]</sup></a> their refusal to listen to +Stapfer's claims for a definite settlement, as well as their +persistent hints that the Swiss could not by themselves arrange +their own affairs, argued a desire to continue the epoch of +quarterly <i>coups d'état</i>.</p> + +<p>The victory of the so-called democrats at Berne now brought the +whole matter to the touch. They appealed to the people in the first +Swiss <i>plébiscite</i>, the precursor of the famous +<i>referendum</i>. It could now be decided without the interference +of French troops; for the First Consul had privately declared to +the new Landamman, Dolder, that he left it to his Government to +decide whether the foreign soldiery should remain as a support or +should evacuate Switzerland.<a name="FNanchor_222_222"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_222_222"><sup>[222]</sup></a> After many searchings of +heart, the new authorities decided to try their fortunes +alone—a response which must have been expected at Paris, +where Stapfer had for months been urging the removal of the French +forces. For the first time since the year 1798 Switzerland was +therefore free to declare her will. The result of the +<i>plébiscite</i> was decisive enough, 72,453 votes being +cast in favour of the latest constitution, and 92,423 against it. +Nothing daunted by this rebuff, and, adopting a device which the +First Consul had invented for the benefit of Dutch liberty, the +Bernese leaders declared that the 167,172 adult voters who had +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i394" id= +"page_i394">[pg.394]</a></span> not voted at all must reckon as +approving the new order of things. The flimsiness of this pretext +was soon disclosed. The Swiss had had enough of electioneering +tricks, hole-and-corner revolutions, and paper compacts. They +rushed to arms; and if ever Carlyle's appeal away from ballot-boxes +and parliamentary tongue-fencers to the primæval <i>mights of +man</i> can be justified, it was in the sharp and decisive +conflicts of the early autumn of 1802 in Switzerland. The troops of +the central authorities, marching forth from Berne to quell the +rising ferment, sustained a repulse at the foot of Mont Pilatus, as +also before the walls of Zürich; and, the revolt of the +federals ever gathering force, the Helvetic authorities were driven +from Berne to Lausanne. There they were planning flight across the +Lake of Geneva to Savoy, when, on October 15th, the arrival of +Napoleon's aide-de-camp, General Rapp, with an imperious +proclamation dismayed the federals and promised to the discomfited +unionists the mediation of the First Consul for which they had +humbly pleaded.<a name="FNanchor_223_223"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_223_223"><sup>[223]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Napoleon had apparently viewed the late proceedings in +Switzerland with mingled feelings of irritation and amused +contempt. "Well, there you are once more in a Revolution" was his +hasty comment to Stapfer at a diplomatic reception shortly after +Easter; "try and get tired of all that." It is difficult, however, +to believe that so keen-sighted a statesman could look forward to +anything but commotions for a land that was being saddled with an +impracticable constitution, and whence the controlling French +forces were withdrawn at that very crisis. He was certainly +prepared for the events of September: many times he had quizzingly +asked Stapfer how the constitution was faring, and he must have +received with quiet amusement the solemn reply that there could be +no doubt as to its brilliant success. When the truth flashed<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i395" id= +"page_i395">[pg.395]</a></span> on Stapfer he was dumbfoundered, +especially as Talleyrand at first mockingly repulsed any suggestion +of the need of French mediation, and went on to assure him that his +master had neither counselled nor approved the last constitution, +the unfitness of which was now shown by the widespread +insurrection. Two days later, however, Napoleon altered his tone +and directed Talleyrand vigorously to protest against the acts and +proclamations of the victorious federals as "the most violent +outrage to French honour." On the last day of September he issued a +proclamation to the Swiss declaring that he now revoked his +decision not to mingle in Swiss politics, and ordered the federal +authorities and troops to disperse, and the cantons to send +deputies to Paris for the regulation of their affairs under his +mediation. Meanwhile he bade the Swiss live once more in hope: +their land was on the brink of a precipice, but it would soon be +saved! Rapp carried analogous orders to Lausanne and Berne, while +Ney marched in with a large force of French troops that had been +assembled near the Swiss frontiers.</p> + +<p>So glaring a violation of Swiss independence and of the +guaranteeing Treaty of Lunéville aroused indignation +throughout Europe. But Austria was too alarmed at Prussian +aggrandizement in Germany to offer any protest; and, indeed, +procured some trifling gains by giving France a free hand in +Switzerland.<a name="FNanchor_224_224"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_224_224"><sup>[224]</sup></a> The Court of Berlin, then +content to play the jackal to the French lion, revealed to the +First Consul the appeals for help privately made to Prussia by the +Swiss federals:<a name="FNanchor_225_225"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_225_225"><sup>[225]</sup></a> the Czar, influenced +doubtless by his compact with France concerning German affairs, and +by the advice of his former tutor, the Swiss Laharpe, offered no +encouragement; and it was left to Great Britain to make the sole +effort then attempted for the cause of Swiss independence. For some +time past the cantons had made appeals to<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i396" id="page_i396">[pg.396]</a></span> the British +Government, which now, in response, sent an English agent, Moore, +to confer with their chiefs, and to advance money and promise +active support if he judged that a successful resistance could be +attempted.<a name="FNanchor_226_226"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_226_226"><sup>[226]</sup></a> The British Ministry +undoubtedly prepared for an open rupture with France on this +question. Orders were immediately sent from London that no more +French or Dutch colonies were to be handed back; and, as we have +seen, the Cape of Good Hope and the French settlements in India +were refused to the Dutch and French officers who claimed their +surrender.</p> + +<p>Hostilities, however, were for the present avoided. In face of +the overwhelming force which Ney had close at hand, the chiefs of +the central cantons shrank from any active opposition; and Moore, +finding on his arrival at Constance that they had decided to +submit, speedily returned to England. Ministers beheld with anger +and dismay the perpetuation of French supremacy in that land; but +they lacked the courage openly to oppose the First Consul's action, +and gave orders that the stipulated cessions of French and Dutch +colonies should take effect.</p> + +<p>The submission of the Swiss and the weakness of all the Powers +encouraged the First Consul to impose his will on the deputies from +the cantons, who assembled at Paris at the close of the year 1802. +He first caused their aims and the capacity of their leaders to be +sounded in a Franco-Swiss Commission, and thereafter assembled them +at St. Cloud on Sunday, December 12th. He<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i397" id="page_i397">[pg.397]</a></span> harangued them +at great length, hinting very clearly that the Swiss must now take +a far lower place in the scale of peoples than in the days when +France was divided into sixty fiefs, and that union with her could +alone enable them to play a great part in the world's affairs: +nevertheless, as they clung to independence he would undertake in +his quality of mediator to end their troubles, and yet leave them +free. That they could attain unity was a mere dream of their +metaphysicians: they must rely on the cantonal organization, always +provided that the French and Italian districts of Vaud and the +upper Ticino were not subject to the central or German cantons: to +prevent such a dishonour he would shed the blood of 50,000 +Frenchmen: Berne must also open its golden book of the privileged +families to include four times their number. For the rest, the +Continental Powers could not help them, and England had "no right +to meddle in Swiss affairs." The same menace was repeated in more +strident tones on January 29th:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I tell you that I would sacrifice 100,000 men rather than allow +England to meddle in your affairs: if the Cabinet of St. James +uttered a single word for you, it would be all up with you, I would +unite you to France: if that Court made the least insinuation of +its fears that I would be your Landamman, I would make myself your +Landamman."</p> +</div> + +<p>There spake forth the inner mind of the man who, whether as +child, youth, lieutenant, general, Consul, or Emperor, loved to +bear down opposition.<a name="FNanchor_227_227"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_227_227"><sup>[227]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In those days of superhuman activity, when he was carving out +one colonial Empire in the New World and preparing to found another +in India, when he was outwitting the Cardinals, rearranging the map +of Germany,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i398" id= +"page_i398">[pg.398]</a></span> breathing new life into French +commerce and striving to shackle that of Britain, he yet found time +to utter some of the sagest maxims as to the widely different needs +of the Swiss cantons. He assured the deputies that he spoke as a +Corsican and a mountaineer, who knew and loved the clan system. His +words proved it. With sure touch he sketched the characteristics of +the French and Swiss people. Switzerland needed the local freedom +imparted by her cantons: while France required unity, Switzerland +needed federalism: the French rejected this last as damaging their +power and glory; but the Swiss did not ask for glory; they needed +"political tranquillity and obscurity": moreover, a simple pastoral +people must have extensive local rights, which formed their chief +distraction from the monotony of life: democracy was a necessity +for the forest cantons; but let not the aristocrats of the towns +fear that a wider franchise would end their influence, for a people +dependent on pastoral pursuits would always cling to great families +rather than to electoral assemblies: let these be elected on a +fairly wide basis. Then again, what ready wit flashed forth in his +retort to a deputy who objected to the Bernese Oberland forming +part of the Canton of Berne: "Where do you take your cattle and +your cheese?"—"To Berne."—"Whence do you get your +grain, cloth, and iron?"—"From Berne."—"Very well: 'To +Berne, from Berne'—you consequently belong to Berne." The +reply is a good instance of that canny materialism which he so +victoriously opposed to feudal chaos and monarchical +ineptitude.</p> + +<p>Indeed, in matters great as well as small his genius pierced to +the heart of a problem: he saw that the democratic unionists had +failed from the rigidity of their centralization, while the +federals had given offence by insufficiently recognizing the new +passion for social equality.<a name="FNanchor_228_228"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_228_228"><sup>[228]</sup></a> He now prepared to +federalize Switzerland<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i399" id= +"page_i399">[pg.399]</a></span> on a moderately democratic basis; +for a policy of balance, he himself being at the middle of the +see-saw, was obviously required by good sense as well as by +self-interest. Witness his words to Roederer on this subject:</p> + +<p>"While satisfying the generality, I cause the patricians to +tremble. In giving to these last the appearance of power, I oblige +them to take refuge at my side in order to find protection. I let +the people threaten the aristocrats, so that these may have need of +me. I will give them places and distinctions, but they will hold +them from me. This system of mine has succeeded in France. See the +clergy. Every day they will become, in spite of themselves, more +devoted to my government than they had foreseen."</p> + +<p>How simple and yet how subtle is this statecraft; simplicity of +aim, with subtlety in the choice of means: this is the secret of +his success.</p> + +<p>After much preliminary work done by French commissioners and the +Swiss deputies in committee, the First Consul summed up the results +of their labours in the Act of Mediation of February 19th, 1803, +which constituted the Confederation in nineteen cantons, the +formerly subject districts now attaining cantonal dignity and +privileges. The forest cantons kept their ancient folk-moots, while +the town cantons such as Berne, Zürich, and Basel were +suffered to blend their old institutions with democratic customs, +greatly to the chagrin of the unionists, at whose invitation +Bonaparte had taken up the work of mediation.</p> + +<p>The federal compact was also a compromise between the old and +the new. The nineteen cantons were to enjoy sovereign powers under +the shelter of the old federal pact. Bonaparte saw that the fussy +imposition of French governmental forms in 1798 had wrought +infinite harm, and he now granted to the federal authorities merely +the powers necessary for self-defence: the federal forces were to +consist of 15,200 men—a number less than that which by old +treaty Switzerland had to furnish to France. The central power was +vested in a <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i400" id= +"page_i400">[pg.400]</a></span> Landamman and other officers +appointed yearly by one of the six chief cantons taken in rotation; +and a Federal Diet, consisting of twenty-five deputies—one +from each of the small cantons, and two from each of the six larger +cantons—met to discuss matters of general import, but the +balance of power rested with the cantons: further articles +regulated the Helvetic debt and declared the independence of +Switzerland—as if a land could be independent which furnished +more troops to the foreigner than it was allowed to maintain for +its own defence. Furthermore, the Act breathed not a word about +religious liberty, freedom of the Press, or the right of petition: +and, viewing it as a whole, the friends of freedom had cause to +echo the complaint of Stapfer that "the First Consul's aim was to +annul Switzerland politically, but to assure to the Swiss the +greatest possible domestic happiness."</p> + +<p>I have judged it advisable to give an account of Franco-Swiss +relations on a scale proportionate to their interest and +importance; they exhibit, not only the meanness and folly of the +French Directory, but the genius of the great Corsican in skilfully +blending the new and the old, and in his rejection of the fussy +pedantry of French theorists and the worst prejudices of the Swiss +oligarchs. Had not his sage designs been intertwined with subtle +intrigues which assured his own unquestioned supremacy in that +land, the Act of Mediation might be reckoned among the grandest and +most beneficent achievements. As it is, it must be regarded as a +masterpiece of able but selfish statecraft, which contrasts +unfavourably with the disinterested arrangements sanctioned by the +allies for Switzerland in 1815. <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i401" id="page_i401">[pg.401]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XVII</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE RENEWAL OF WAR</center> + +<br> + + +<p>The re-occupation of Switzerland by the French in October, 1802, +was soon followed by other serious events, which convinced the +British Ministry that war was hardly to be avoided. Indeed, before +the treaty was ratified, ominous complaints had begun to pass +between Paris and London.</p> + +<p>Some of these were trivial, others were highly important. Among +the latter was the question of commercial intercourse. The British +Ministry had neglected to obtain any written assurance that trade +relations should be resumed between the two countries; and the +First Consul, either prompted by the protectionist theories of the +Jacobins, or because he wished to exert pressure upon England in +order to extort further concessions, determined to restrict trade +with us to the smallest possible dimensions. This treatment of +England was wholly exceptional, for in his treaties concluded with +Russia, Portugal, and the Porte, Napoleon had procured the +insertion of clauses which directly fostered French trade with +those lands. Remonstrances soon came from the British Government +that "strict prohibitions were being enforced to the admission of +British commodities and manufactures into France, and very vigorous +restrictions were imposed on British vessels entering French +ports"; but, in spite of all representations, we had the +mortification of seeing the hardware of Birmingham, and the +ever-increasing stores of cotton and woollen goods, shut out from +France and her subject-lands, as well as <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i402" id="page_i402">[pg.402]</a></span> from the French +colonies which we had just handed back.</p> + +<p>In this policy of commercial prohibition Napoleon was confirmed +by our refusal to expel the Bourbon princes. He declined to accept +our explanation that they were not officially recognized, and could +not be expelled from England without a violation of the rights of +hospitality; and he bitterly complained of the personal attacks +made upon him in journals published in London by the French +<i>émigrés</i>. Of these the most acrid, namely, +those of Peltier's paper, "L'Ambigu," had already received the +reprobation of the British Ministry; but, as had been previously +explained at Amiens, the Addington Cabinet decided that it could +not venture to curtail the liberty of the Press, least of all at +the dictation of the very man who was answering the pop-guns of our +unofficial journals by double-shotted retorts in the official +"Moniteur." Of these last His Majesty did not deign to make any +formal complaint; but he suggested that their insertion in the +organ of the French Government should have prevented Napoleon from +preferring the present protests.</p> + +<p>This wordy war proceeded with unabated vigour on both sides of +the Channel, the British journals complaining of the Napoleonic +dictatorship in Continental affairs, while the "Moniteur" bristled +with articles whose short, sharp sentences could come only from the +First Consul. The official Press hitherto had been characterized by +dull decorum, and great was the surprise of the older Courts when +the French official journals compared the policy of the Court of +St. James with the methods of the Barbary rovers and the designs of +the Miltonic Satan.<a name="FNanchor_229_229"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_229_229"><sup>[229]</sup></a> Nevertheless, our Ministry +prosecuted and convicted Peltier for libel, an act which, at the +time, produced an excellent impression at Paris.<a name= +"FNanchor_230_230"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_230_230"><sup>[230]</sup></a></p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i403" id= +"page_i403">[pg.403]</a></span> But more serious matters were now +at hand. Newspaper articles and commercial restrictions were not +the cause of war, however much they irritated the two peoples.</p> + +<p>The general position of Anglo-French affairs in the autumn of +1802 is well described in the official instructions given to Lord +Whitworth when he was about to proceed as ambassador to Paris. For +this difficult duty he had several good qualifications. During his +embassy at St. Petersburg he had shown a combination of tact and +firmness which imposed respect, and doubtless his composure under +the violent outbreaks of the Czar Paul furnished a recommendation +for the equally trying post at Paris, which he filled with a +<i>sang froid</i> that has become historic. Possibly a more genial +personality might have smoothed over some difficulties at the +Tuileries: but the Addington Ministry, having tried geniality in +the person of Cornwallis, naturally selected a man who was +remarkable for his powers of quiet yet firm resistance.</p> + +<p>His first instructions of September 10th, 1802, are such as +might be drawn up between any two Powers entering on a long term of +peace. But the series of untoward events noticed above overclouded +the political horizon; and the change finds significant expression +in the secret instructions of November 14th. He is now charged to +state George III.'s determination "never to forego his right of +interfering in the affairs of the Continent on any occasion in +which the interests of his own dominions or those of Europe in +general may appear to him to require it." A French despatch is then +quoted, as admitting that, for every considerable gain of France on +the Continent, Great Britain had some claim to compensation: and +such a claim, it was hinted, might now be proffered after the +annexation of Piedmont and Parma. Against the continued occupation +of Holland by French troops and their invasion of Switzerland, +Whitworth was to make moderate but firm remonstrances, but in such +a way as not to commit us finally. He was to employ <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i404" id="page_i404">[pg.404]</a></span> an +equal discretion with regard to Malta. As Russia and Prussia had as +yet declined to guarantee the arrangements for that island's +independence, it was evident that the British troops could not yet +be withdrawn.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"His Majesty would certainly be justified in claiming the +possession of Malta, as some counterpoise to the acquisitions of +France, since the conclusion of the definitive treaty: but it is +not necessary to decide now whether His Majesty will be disposed to +avail himself of his pretensions in this respect."</p> +</div> + +<p>Thus between September 10th and November 14th we passed from a +distinctly pacific to a bellicose attitude, and all but formed the +decision to demand Malta as a compensation for the recent +aggrandizements of France. To have declared war at once on these +grounds would certainly have been more dignified. But, as our +Ministry had already given way on many topics, a sudden declaration +of war on Swiss and Italian affairs would have stultified its +complaisant conduct on weightier subjects. Moreover, the whole +drift of eighteenth-century diplomacy, no less than Bonaparte's own +admission, warranted the hope of securing Malta by way of +"compensation." The adroit bargainer, who was putting up German +Church lands for sale, who had gained Louisiana by the +Parma-Tuscany exchange, and still professed to the Czar his good +intentions as to an "indemnity" for the King of Sardinia, might +well be expected to admit the principle of compensation in +Anglo-French relations when these were being jeopardized by French +aggrandizement; and, as will shortly appear, the First Consul, +while professing to champion international law against perfidious +Albion, privately admitted her right to compensation, and only +demurred to its practical application when his oriental designs +were thereby compromised.</p> + +<p>Before Whitworth proceeded to Paris, sharp remonstrances had +been exchanged between the French and British Governments. To our +protests against Napoleon's interventions in neighbouring States, +he retorted <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i405" id= +"page_i405">[pg.405]</a></span> by demanding "the whole Treaty of +Amiens and nothing but that treaty." Whereupon Hawkesbury answered: +"The state of the Continent at the period of the Treaty of Amiens, +and nothing but that state." In reply Napoleon sent off a +counterblast, alleging that French troops had evacuated Taranto, +that Switzerland had requested his mediation, that German affairs +possessed no novelty, and that England, having six months +previously waived her interest in continental affairs, could not +resume it at will. The retort, which has called forth the +admiration of M. Thiers, is more specious than convincing. +Hawkesbury's appeal was, not to the sword, but to law; not to +French influence gained by military occupations that contravened +the Treaty of Lunéville, but to international equity.</p> + +<p>Certainly, the Addington Cabinet committed a grievous blunder in +not inserting in the Treaty of Amiens a clause stipulating the +independence of the Batavian and Helvetic Republics. Doubtless it +relied on the Treaty of Lunéville, and on a Franco-Dutch +convention of August, 1801, which specified that French troops were +to remain in the Batavian Republic only up to the time of the +general peace. But it is one thing to rely on international law, +and quite another thing, in an age of violence and chicanery, to +hazard the gravest material interests on its observance. Yet this +was what the Addington Ministry had done: "His Majesty consented to +make numerous and most important restitutions to the Batavian +Government on the consideration of that Government being +independent and not being subject to any foreign control."<a name= +"FNanchor_231_231"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_231_231"><sup>[231]</sup></a> Truly, the restoration of +the Cape of Good Hope and of other colonies to the Dutch, solely in +reliance on the observance of international law by Napoleon and +Talleyrand, was, as the event proved, an act of singular credulity. +But, looking at this matter fairly and squarely, it must be allowed +that Napoleon's reply evaded the essence of the British complaint; +it was merely an <i>argumentum ad hominem</i>; it convicted<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i406" id= +"page_i406">[pg.406]</a></span> the Addington Cabinet of weakness +and improvidence; but in equity it was null and void, and in +practical politics it betokened war.</p> + +<p>As Napoleon refused to withdraw his troops from Holland, and +continued to dominate that unhappy realm, it was clear that the +Cape of Good Hope would speedily be closed to our ships—a +prospect which immensely enhanced the value of the overland route +to India, and of those portals of the Orient, Malta and Egypt. To +the Maltese Question we now turn, as also, later on, to the Eastern +Question, with which it was then closely connected.</p> + +<p>Many causes excited the uneasiness of the British Government +about the fate of Malta. In spite of our effort not to wound the +susceptibilities of the Czar, who was protector of the Order of St. +John, that sensitive young ruler had taken umbrage at the article +relating to that island. He now appeared merely as one of the six +Powers guaranteeing its independence, not as the sole patron and +guarantor, and he was piqued at his name appearing after that of +the Emperor Francis!<a name="FNanchor_232_232"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_232_232"><sup>[232]</sup></a> For the present +arrangement the First Consul was chiefly to blame; but the Czar +vented his displeasure on England. On April 28th, 1802, our envoy +at Paris, Mr. Merry, reported as follows:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Either the Russian Government itself, or Count Markoff alone +personally, is so completely out of humour with us for not having +acted in strict concert with them, or him, or in conformity to +their ideas in negotiating the definitive treaty [of Amiens], that +I find he takes pains to turn it into ridicule, and particularly to +represent the arrangement we have made for Malta as impracticable +and consequently as completely null."</p> +</div> + +<p>The despatches of our ambassador at St. Petersburg, Lord St. +Helens, and of his successor, Admiral Warren, are of the same +tenor. They report the Czar's annoyance with England over the +Maltese affair, and his refusal to listen even to the joint +Anglo-French request,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i407" id= +"page_i407">[pg.407]</a></span> of November 18th, 1802, for his +guarantee of the Amiens arrangements.<a name= +"FNanchor_233_233"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_233_233"><sup>[233]</sup></a> A week later Alexander +announced that he would guarantee the independence of Malta, +provided that the complete sovereignty of the Knights of St. John +was recognized—that is, without any participation of the +native Maltese in the affairs of that Order—and that the +island should be garrisoned by Neapolitan troops, paid by France +and England, until the Knights should be able to maintain their +independence. This reopening of the question discussed, <i>ad +nauseam</i>, at Amiens proved that the Maltese Question would long +continue to perplex the world. The matter was still further +complicated by the abolition of the Priories, Commanderies, and +property of the Order of St. John by the French Government in the +spring of 1802—an example which was imitated by the Court of +Madrid in the following autumn; and as the property of the Knights +in the French part of Italy had also lapsed, it was difficult to +see how the scattered and impoverished Knights could form a stable +government, especially if the native Maltese were not to be +admitted to a share in public affairs. This action of France, +Spain, and Russia fully warranted the British Government in not +admitting into the fortress the 2,000 Neapolitan troops that +arrived in the autumn of 1802. Our evacuation of Malta was +conditioned by several stipulations, five of which had not been +fulfilled.<a name="FNanchor_234_234"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_234_234"><sup>[234]</sup></a> But the difficulties +arising out of the reconstruction of this moribund Order were as +nothing when compared<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i408" id= +"page_i408">[pg.408]</a></span> with those resulting from the +reopening of a far vaster and more complex question—the +"eternal" Eastern Question.</p> + +<p>Rarely has the mouldering away of the Turkish Empire gone on so +rapidly as at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Corruption +and favouritism paralyzed the Government at Constantinople; +masterful pachas, aping the tactics of Ali Pacha, the virtual ruler +of Albania, were beginning to carve out satrapies in Syria, Asia +Minor, Wallachia, and even in Roumelia itself. Such was the state +of Turkey when the Sultan and his advisers heard with deep concern, +in October, 1801, that the only Power on whose friendship they +could firmly rely was about to relinquish Malta. At once he sent an +earnest appeal to George III. begging him not to evacuate the +island. This despatch is not in the archives of our Foreign Office; +but the letter written from Malta by Lord Elgin, our ambassador at +Constantinople, on his return home, sufficiently shows that the +Sultan was conscious of his own weakness and of the schemes of +partition which were being concocted at Paris. Bonaparte had +already begun to sound both Austria and Russia on this subject, +deftly hinting that the Power which did not early join in the +enterprise would come poorly off. For the present both the rulers +rejected his overtures; but he ceased not to hope that the anarchy +in Turkey, and the jealousy which partition schemes always arouse +among neighbours, would draw first one and then the other into his +enterprise.<a name="FNanchor_235_235"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_235_235"><sup>[235]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The young Czar's disposition was at that period restless and +unstable, free from the passionate caprices of his ill-fated +father, and attuned by the fond efforts of the Swiss democrat +Laharpe, to the loftiest aspirations of the France of 1789. Yet the +son of Paul I. could hardly free himself from the instincts of a +line of conquering Czars; his frank blue eyes, his graceful yet +commanding figure, his high broad forehead and close<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i409" id="page_i409">[pg.409]</a></span> +shut mouth gave promise of mental energy; and his splendid physique +and love of martial display seemed to invite him to complete the +campaigns of Catherine II. against the Turks, and to wash out in +the waves of the Danube the remorse which he still felt at his +unwitting complicity in a parricidal plot. Between his love of +liberty and of foreign conquest he for the present wavered, with a +strange constitutional indecision that marred a noble character and +that yielded him a prey more than once to a masterful will or to +seductive projects. He is the Janus of Russian history. On the one +side he faces the enormous problems of social and political reform, +and yet he steals many a longing glance towards the dome of St. +Sofia. This instability in his nature has been thus pointedly +criticised by his friend Prince Czartoryski:<a name= +"FNanchor_236_236"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_236_236"><sup>[236]</sup></a></p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Grand ideas of the general good, generous sentiments, and the +desire to sacrifice to them a part of the imperial authority, had +really occupied the Emperor's mind, but they were rather a young +man's fancies than a grown man's decided will. The Emperor liked +forms of liberty, as he liked the theatre: it gave him pleasure and +flattered his vanity to see the appearances of free government in +his Empire: but all he wanted in this respect was forms and +appearances: he did not expect them to become realities. He would +willingly have agreed that every man should be free, on the +condition that he should voluntarily do only what the Emperor +wished."</p> +</div> + +<p>This later judgment of the well-known Polish nationalist is +probably embittered by the disappointments which he experienced at +the Czar's hands; but it expresses the feeling of most observers of +Alexander's early career, and it corresponds with the conclusion +arrived at by Napoleon's favourite aide-de-camp, Duroc, who went to +congratulate the young Czar on his accession and to entice him into +oriental schemes—that there was nothing to hope and nothing +to fear from the Czar. The <i>mot</i> was deeply true.<a name= +"FNanchor_237_237"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_237_237"><sup>[237]</sup></a></p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i410" id= +"page_i410">[pg.410]</a></span> From these oriental schemes the +young Czar was, for the time, drawn aside towards the nobler path +of social reform. The saving influence on this occasion was exerted +by his old tutor, Laharpe. The ex-Director of Switzerland readily +persuaded the Czar that Russia sorely needed political and social +reform. His influence was powerfully aided by a brilliant group of +young men, the Vorontzoffs, the Strogonoffs, Novossiltzoff, and +Czartoryski, whose admiration for western ideas and institutions, +especially those of Britain, helped to impel Alexander on the path +of progress. Thus, when Napoleon was plying the Czar with notes +respecting Turkey, that young ruler was commencing to bestow system +on his administration, privileges on the serfs, and the feeble +beginnings of education on the people.</p> + +<p>While immersed in these beneficent designs, Alexander heard with +deep chagrin of the annexation of Piedmont and Parma, and that +Napoleon refused to the King of Sardinia any larger territory than +the Siennese. This breach of good faith cut the Czar to the quick. +It was in vain that Napoleon now sought to lure him into Turkish +adventures by representing that France should secure the Morea for +herself, that other parts of European Turkey might be apportioned +to Victor Emmanuel I. and the French Bourbons. This cold-blooded +proposal, that ancient dynasties should be thrust from the homes of +their birth into alien Greek or Moslem lands, wounded the Czar's +monarchical sentiments. He would none of it; nor did he relish the +prospect of seeing the French in the Morea, whence they could +complete the disorder of Turkey and seize on Constantinople. He saw +whither Napoleon was leading him. He drew back abruptly, and even +notified to our ambassador, Admiral Warren, that <i>England had +better keep Malta.</i><a name="FNanchor_238_238"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_238_238"><sup>[238]</sup></a></p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i411" id= +"page_i411">[pg.411]</a></span> Alexander also, on January 19th, +1803 (O.S.), charged his ambassador at Paris to declare that the +existing system of Europe must not be further disturbed, that each +Government should strive for peace and the welfare of its own +people; that the frequent references of Napoleon to the approaching +dissolution of Turkey were ill-received at St. Petersburg, where +they were considered the chief cause of England's anxiety and +refusal to disarm. He also suggested that the First Consul by some +public utterance should dispel the fears of England as to a +partition of the Ottoman Empire, and thus assure the peace of the +world.<a name="FNanchor_239_239"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_239_239"><sup>[239]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Before this excellent advice was received, Napoleon astonished +the world by a daring stroke. On the 30th of January the "Moniteur" +printed in full the bellicose report of Colonel Sebastiani on his +mission to Algiers, Egypt, Syria, and the Ionian Isles. As that +mission was afterwards to be passed off as merely of a commercial +character, it will be well to quote typical passages from the +secret instructions which the First Consul gave to his envoy on +September 5th, 1802:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"He will proceed to Alexandria: he will take note of what is in +the harbour, the ships, the forces which the British as well as the +Turks have there, the state of the fortifications, the state of the +towers, the account of all that has passed since our departure both +at Alexandria and in the whole of Egypt: finally, the present state +of the Egyptians.... He will proceed to St. Jean d'Acre, will +recommend the convent of Nazareth to Djezzar: will inform him that +the agent of the [French] Republic is to appear at Acre: will find +out about the fortifications he has had made: will walk along them +himself, if there be no danger."</p> +</div> + +<p>Fortifications, troops, ships of war, the feelings of the +natives, and the protection of the Christians—these subjects +were to be Sebastiani's sole care. Commerce was not once named. The +departure of this officer had already alarmed our Government. Mr. +Merry, our <i>chargé<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i412" id="page_i412">[pg.412]</a></span> d'affaires</i> in +Paris, had warned it as to the real aims in view, in the following +"secret despatch:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"PARIS, <i>September 25th,</i> 1802.</p> + +<p>" ... I have learnt from good authority that he [Sebastiani] was +accompanied by a person of the name of Jaubert (who was General +Bonaparte's interpreter and confidential agent with the natives +during the time he commanded in Egypt), who has carried with him +regular powers and instructions, prepared by M. Talleyrand, to +treat with Ibrahim-Bey for the purpose of creating a fresh and +successful revolt in Egypt against the power of the Porte, and of +placing that country again under the direct or indirect dependence +of France, to which end he has been authorized to offer assistance +from hence in men and money. The person who has confided to me this +information understands that the mission to Ibrahim-Bey is confided +solely to M. Jaubert, and that his being sent with Colonel +Sebastiani has been in order to conceal the real object of it, and +to afford him a safe conveyance to Egypt, as well as for the +purpose of assisting the Colonel in his transactions with the +Regencies of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli."<a name= +"FNanchor_240_240"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_240_240"><sup>[240]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>Merry's information was correct: it tallied with the secret +instructions given by Napoleon to Sebastiani: and our Government, +thus forewarned, at once adopted a stiffer tone on all +Mediterranean and oriental questions. Sebastiani was very coldly +received by our officer commanding in Egypt, General Stuart, who +informed him that no orders had as yet come from London for our +evacuation of that land. Proceeding to Cairo, the commercial +emissary proposed to mediate between the Turkish Pacha and the +rebellious Mamelukes, an offer which was firmly declined.<a name= +"FNanchor_241_241"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_241_241"><sup>[241]</sup></a> In vain did Sebastiani +bluster and cajole by turns. The Pacha refused to allow him to go +on to Assouan, the headquarters of the insurgent Bey, and the +discomfited envoy made his way<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i413" id="page_i413">[pg.413]</a></span> back to the coast +and took ship for Acre. Thence he set sail for Corfu, where he +assured the people of Napoleon's wish that there should be an end +to their civil discords. Returning to Genoa, and posting with all +speed to Paris, he arrived there on January 25th, 1803. Five days +later that gay capital was startled by the report of his mission, +which was printed in full in the "Moniteur." It described the +wretched state of the Turks in Egypt—the Pacha of Cairo +practically powerless, and on bad terms with General Stuart, the +fortifications everywhere in a ruinous state, the 4,430 British +troops cantoned in and near Alexandria, the Turkish forces beneath +contempt. "Six thousand French would at present be enough to +conquer Egypt." And as to the Ionian islands, "I do not stray from +the truth in assuring you that these islands will declare +themselves French as soon as an opportunity shall offer itself."<a +name="FNanchor_242_242"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_242_242"><sup>[242]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Such were the chief items of this report. Various motives have +been assigned for its publication. Some writers have seen in it a +crushing retort to English newspaper articles. Others there are, as +M. Thiers, who waver between the opinion that the publication of +this report was either a "sudden unfortunate incident," or a +protest against the "latitude" which England allowed herself in the +execution of the Treaty of Amiens.</p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i414" id= +"page_i414">[pg.414]</a></span> A consideration of the actual state +of affairs at the end of January, 1803, will perhaps guide us to an +explanation which is more consonant with the grandeur of Napoleon's +designs. At that time he was all-powerful in the Old World. As +First Consul for Life he was master of forty millions of men: he +was President of the Italian Republic: to the Switzers, as to the +Dutch, his word was law. Against the infractions of the Treaty of +Lunéville, Austria dared make no protest. The Czar was +occupied with domestic affairs, and his rebuff to Napoleon's +oriental schemes had not yet reached Paris. As for the British +Ministry, it was trembling from the attacks of the Grenvilles and +Windhams on the one side, and from the equally vigorous onslaughts +of Fox, who, when the Government proposed an addition to the armed +forces, brought forward the stale platitude that a large standing +army "was a dangerous instrument of influence in the hands of the +Crown." When England's greatest orator thus impaired the unity of +national feeling, and her only statesman, Pitt, remained in studied +seclusion, the First Consul might well feel assured of the +impotence of the Island Power, and view the bickering of her +politicians with the same quiet contempt that Philip felt for the +Athens of Demosthenes.</p> + +<p>But while his prospects in Europe and the East were roseate, the +western horizon bulked threateningly with clouds. The news of the +disasters in St. Domingo reached Paris in the first week of the +year 1803, and shortly afterwards came tidings of the ferment in +the United States and the determination of their people to resist +the acquisition of Louisiana by France. If he persevered with this +last scheme, he would provoke war with that republic and drive it +into the arms of England. From that blunder his statecraft +instinctively saved him, and he determined to sell Louisiana to the +United States.</p> + +<p>So unheroic a retreat from the prairies of the New World must be +covered by a demonstration towards the banks of the Nile and of the +Indus. It was ever his plan to cover retreat in one direction by +brilliant diversions in <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i415" +id="page_i415">[pg.415]</a></span> another: only so could he +enthrall the imagination of France, and keep his hold on her +restless capital. And the publication of Sebastiani's report, with +its glowing description of the fondness cherished for France alike +by Moslems, Syrian Christians, and the Greeks of Corfu; its +declamation against the perfidy of General Stuart; and its +incitation to the conquest of the Levant, furnished him with the +motive power for effecting a telling transformation scene and +banishing all thoughts of losses in the West.<a name= +"FNanchor_243_243"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_243_243"><sup>[243]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The official publication of this report created a sensation even +in France, and was not the <i>bagatelle</i> which M. Thiers has +endeavoured to represent it.<a name="FNanchor_244_244"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_244_244"><sup>[244]</sup></a> But far greater was the +astonishment at Downing Street, not at the facts disclosed by the +report—for Merry's note had prepared our Ministers for +them—but rather at the official avowal of hostile designs. At +once our Government warned Whitworth that he must insist on our +retaining Malta. He was also to protest against the publication of +such a document, and to declare that George III. could not "enter +into any further discussion relative to Malta until he received a +satisfactory explanation." Far from offering it, Napoleon at once +complained of our non-evacuation of Alexandria and Malta.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Instead of that garrison [of Alexandria] being a means of +protecting Egypt, it was only furnishing him with a pretence<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i416" id= +"page_i416">[pg.416]</a></span> for invading it. This he should not +do, whatever might be his desire to have it as a colony, because he +did not think it worth the risk of a war, in which he might perhaps +be considered the aggressor, and by which he should lose more than +he could gain, since sooner or later Egypt would belong to France, +either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish Empire, or by some +arrangement with the Porte.... Finally," he asked, "why should not +the mistress of the seas and the mistress of the land come to an +arrangement and govern the world?"</p> +</div> + +<p>A subtler diplomatist than Whitworth would probably have taken +the hint for a Franco-British partition of the world: but the +Englishman, unable at that moment to utter a word amidst the +torrent of argument and invective, used the first opportunity +merely to assure Napoleon of the alarm caused in England by +Sebastiani's utterance concerning Egypt. This touched the First +Consul at the wrong point, and he insisted that on the evacuation +of Malta the question of peace or war must depend. In vain did the +English ambassador refer to the extension of French power on the +Continent. Napoleon cut him short: "I suppose you mean Piedmont and +Switzerland: ce sont des——: vous n'avez pas le droit +d'en parler à cette heure." Seeing that he was losing his +temper, Lord Whitworth then diverted the conversation.<a name= +"FNanchor_245_245"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_245_245"><sup>[245]</sup></a></p> + +<p>This long tirade shows clearly what were the aims of the First +Consul. He desired peace until his eastern plans were fully +matured. And what ruler would not desire to maintain a peace so +fruitful in conquests—that perpetuated French influence in +Italy, Switzerland, and Holland, that enabled France to prepare for +the dissolution of the Turkish Empire and to intrigue with the +Mahrattas? Those were the conditions on which England could enjoy +peace: she must recognize the arbitrament of France in the affairs +of all neighbouring States, she must make no claim for compensation +in the Mediterranean, and she must endure to be officially +informed<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i417" id= +"page_i417">[pg.417]</a></span> that she alone could not maintain a +struggle against France.<a name="FNanchor_246_246"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_246_246"><sup>[246]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But George III. was not minded to sink to the level of a Charles +II. Whatever were the failings of our "farmer king," he was keenly +alive to national honour and interests. These had been deeply +wounded, even in the United Kingdom itself. Napoleon had been +active in sending "commercial commissioners" into our land. Many of +them were proved to be soldiers: and the secret instructions sent +by Talleyrand to one of them at Dublin, which chanced to fall into +the hands of our Government, showed that they were charged to make +plans of the harbours, and of the soundings and moorings.<a name= +"FNanchor_247_247"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_247_247"><sup>[247]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Then again, the French were almost certainly helping Irish +conspirators. One of these, Emmett, already suspected of complicity +in the Despard conspiracy which aimed at the King's life, had, +after its failure, sought shelter in France. At the close of 1802 +he returned to his native land and began to store arms in a house +near Rathfarnham. It is doubtful whether the authorities were aware +of his plans, or, as is more probable, let the plot come to a head. +The outbreak did not take place till the following July (after the +renewal of war), when Emmett and some of his accomplices, along +with Russell, who stirred up sedition in Ulster, paid for their +folly with their lives. They disavowed any connection with France, +but they must have based their hope of success on a promised French +invasion of our coasts.<a name="FNanchor_248_248"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_248_248"><sup>[248]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The dealings of the French commercial commissioners and the +beginnings of the Emmett plot increased the tension caused by +Napoleon's masterful foreign policy; and the result was seen in the +King's message to<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i418" id= +"page_i418">[pg.418]</a></span> Parliament on March 8th, 1803. In +view of the military preparations and of the wanton defiance of the +First Consul's recent message to the Corps Législatif, +Ministers asked for the embodiment of the militia and the addition +of 10,000 seamen to the navy. After Napoleon's declaration to our +ambassador that France was bringing her forces on active service up +to 480,000 men, the above-named increase of the British forces +might well seem a reasonable measure of defence. Yet it so aroused +the spleen of the First Consul that, at a public reception of +ambassadors on March 13th, he thus accosted Lord Whitworth:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"'So you are determined to go to war.' 'No, First Consul,' I +replied, 'we are too sensible of the advantage of peace.' 'Why, +then, these armaments? Against whom these measures of precaution? I +have not a single ship of the line in the French ports, but if you +wish to arm I will arm also: if you wish to fight, I will fight +also. You may perhaps kill France, but will never intimidate her.' +'We wish,' said I, 'neither the one nor the other. We wish to live +on good terms with her.' 'You must respect treaties then,' replied +he; 'woe to those who do not respect treaties. They shall answer +for it to all Europe.' He was too agitated to make it advisable to +prolong the conversation: I therefore made no answer, and he +retired to his apartment, repeating the last phrase."<a name= +"FNanchor_249_249"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_249_249"><sup>[249]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>This curious scene shows Napoleon in one of his weaker petulant +moods: it left on the embarrassed spectators no impression of +outraged dignity, but rather of the over-weening self-assertion of +an autocrat who could push on hostile preparations, and yet flout +the ambassador of the Power that took reasonable precautions in +return. The slight offered to our ambassador, though hotly resented +in Britain, had no direct effect on the negotiations, as the First +Consul soon took the opportunity of tacitly apologizing for the +occurrence; but indirectly the matter was infinitely important. By +that utterance he nailed his colours to the mast with respect<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i419" id= +"page_i419">[pg.419]</a></span> to the British evacuation of Malta. +With his keen insight into the French nature, he knew that "honour" +was its mainspring, and that his political fortunes rested on the +satisfaction of that instinct. He could not now draw back without +affronting the prestige of France and undermining his own position. +In vain did our Government remind him of his admission that "His +Majesty should keep a compensation out of his conquests for the +important acquisitions of territory made by France upon the +Continent."<a name="FNanchor_250_250"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_250_250"><sup>[250]</sup></a> That promise, although +official, was secret. Its violation would, at the worst, only +offend the officials of Whitehall. Whereas, if he now acceded to +their demand that Malta should be the compensation, he at once +committed that worst of all crimes in a French statesman, of +rendering himself ludicrous. In this respect, then, the scene of +March 13th at the Tuileries was indirectly the cause of the +bloodiest war that has desolated Europe.</p> + +<p>Napoleon now regarded the outbreak of hostilities as probable, +if not certain. Facts are often more eloquent than diplomatic +assurances, and such facts are not wanting. On March 6th Decaen's +expedition had set sail from Brest for the East Indies with no +anticipation of immediate war. On March 16th a fast brig was sent +after him with orders that he should return with all speed from +Pondicherry to the Mauritius. Napoleon's correspondence also shows +that, as early as March 11th, that is, after hearing of George +III.'s message to Parliament, he expected the outbreak of +hostilities: on that day he ordered the formation of flotillas at +Dunkirk and Cherbourg, and sent urgent messages to the sovereigns +of Russia, Prussia, and Spain, inveighing against England's +perfidy. The envoy despatched to St. Petersburg was specially +charged to talk to the Czar on philosophic questions, and to urge +him to free the seas from England's tyranny.</p> + +<p>Much as Addington and his colleagues loved peace, they were now +convinced that it was more hazardous than open war. Malta was the +only effectual bar to a<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i420" +id="page_i420">[pg.420]</a></span> French seizure of Egypt or an +invasion of Turkey from the side of Corfu. With Turkey partitioned +and Egypt in French hands, there would be no security against +Napoleon's designs on India. The British forces evacuated the Cape +of Good Hope on February 21st, 1803; they set sail from Alexandria +on the 17th of the following month. By the former act we yielded up +to France the sea route to India—for the Dutch at the Cape +were but the tools of the First Consul: by the latter we left Malta +as the sole barrier against a renewed land attack on our Eastern +possessions. The safety of our East Indian possessions was really +at stake, and yet Europe was asked to believe that the question was +whether England would or would not evacuate Malta. This was the +French statement of the case: it was met by the British plea that +France, having declared her acceptance of the principle of +compensation for us, had no cause for objecting to the retention of +an island so vital to our interests.</p> + +<p>Yet, while convinced of the immense importance of Malta, the +Addington Cabinet did not insist on retaining it, if the French +Government would "suggest some other <i>equivalent security</i> by +which His Majesty's object in claiming the permanent possession of +Malta may be accomplished and the independence of the island +secured conformably to the spirit of the 10th Article of the Treaty +of Amiens."<a name="FNanchor_251_251"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_251_251"><sup>[251]</sup></a> To the First Consul was +therefore left the initiative in proposing some other plan which +would safeguard British interests in the Levant; and, with this +qualifying explanation, the British ambassador was charged to +present to him the following proposals for a new treaty: Malta to +remain in British hands, the Knights to be indemnified for any +losses of property which they may thereby sustain: Holland and +Switzerland to be evacuated by French troops: the island of Elba to +be confirmed to France, and the King of Etruria to be acknowledged +by Great Britain: the Italian and Ligurian Republics also to be +acknowledged, if "an<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i421" id= +"page_i421">[pg.421]</a></span> arrangement is made in Italy for +the King of Sardinia, which shall be satisfactory to him."</p> + +<p>Lord Whitworth judged it better not to present these demands +point blank, but gradually to reveal their substance. This course, +he judged, would be less damaging to the friends of peace at the +Tuileries, and less likely to affront Napoleon. But it was all one +and the same. The First Consul, in his present state of highly +wrought tension, practically ignored the suggestion of an +<i>equivalent security,</i> and declaimed against the perfidy of +England for daring to infringe the treaty, though he had offered no +opposition to the Czar's proposals respecting Malta, which weakened +the stability of the Order and sensibly modified that same +treaty.</p> + +<p>Talleyrand was more conciliatory; and there is little doubt +that, had the First Consul allowed his brother Joseph and his +Foreign Minister wider powers, the crisis might have been peaceably +passed. Joseph Bonaparte urgently pressed Whitworth to be satisfied +with Corfu or Crete in place of Malta; but he confessed that the +suggestion was quite unauthorized, and that the First Consul was so +enraged on the Maltese Question that he dared not broach it to +him.<a name="FNanchor_252_252"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_252_252"><sup>[252]</sup></a> Indeed, all through these +critical weeks Napoleon's relations to his brothers were very +strained, they desiring peace in Europe so that Louisiana might +even now be saved to France, while the First Consul persisted in +his oriental schemes. He seems now to have concentrated his +energies on the task of postponing the rupture to a convenient date +and of casting on his foes the odium of the approaching war. He +made no proposal that could reassure Britain as to the security of +the overland routes; and he named no other island which could be +considered as an equivalent to Malta.</p> + +<p>To many persons his position has seemed logically unassailable; +but it is difficult to see how this view can be held. The Treaty of +Amiens had twice over been rendered, in a technical sense, null and +void by the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i422" id= +"page_i422">[pg.422]</a></span> action of Continental Powers. +Russia and Prussia had not guaranteed the state of things arranged +for Malta by that treaty; and the action of France and Spain in +confiscating the property of the Knights in their respective lands +had so far sapped the strength of the Order that it could never +again support the expense of the large garrison which the lines +around Valetta required.</p> + +<p>In a military sense, this was the crux of the problem; for no +one affected to believe that Malta was rendered secure by the +presence at Valetta of 2,000 troops of the King of Naples, whose +realm could within a week be overrun by Murat's division. This +obvious difficulty led Lord Hawkesbury to urge, in his notes of +April 13th and later, that British troops should garrison the chief +fortifications of Valetta and leave the civil power to the Knights: +or, if that were found objectionable, that we should retain +complete possession of the island for ten years, provided that we +were left free to negotiate with the King of Naples for the cession +of Lampedusa, an islet to the west of Malta. To this last proposal +the First Consul offered no objection; but he still inflexibly +opposed any retention of Malta, even for ten years, and sought to +make the barren islet of Lampedusa appear an equivalent to Malta. +This absurd contention had, however, been exploded by Talleyrand's +indiscreet confession "that the re-establishment of the Order of +St. John was not so much the point to be discussed as that of +suffering Great Britain to acquire a <i>possession in the +Mediterranean</i>."<a name="FNanchor_253_253"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_253_253"><sup>[253]</sup></a></p> + +<p>This, indeed, was the pith and marrow of the whole question, +whether Great Britain was to be excluded from that great +sea—save at Gibraltar and Lampedusa—looking on idly at +its transformation into a French lake by the seizure of Corfu, the +Morea, Egypt, and Malta itself; or whether she should retain some +hold on the overland route to the East. The difficulty was frankly +pointed out by Lord Whitworth; it was as frankly admitted by Joseph +Bonaparte; it was recognized by Talleyrand; and Napoleon's desire +for a durable peace must have been<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i423" id="page_i423">[pg.423]</a></span> slight when he +refused to admit England's claim effectively to safeguard her +interests in the Levant, and ever fell back on the literal +fulfilment of a treaty which had been invalidated by his own +deliberate actions.</p> + +<p>Affairs now rapidly came to a climax. On April 23rd the British +Government notified its ambassador that, if the present terms were +not granted within seven days of his receiving them, he was to +leave Paris. Napoleon was no less angered than surprised by the +recent turn of events. In place of timid complaisance which he had +expected from Addington, he was met with open defiance; but he now +proposed that the Czar should offer his intervention between the +disputants. The suggestion was infinitely skilful. It flattered the +pride of the young autocrat and promised to yield gains as +substantial as those which Russian mediation had a year before +procured for France from the intimidated Sultan; it would help to +check the plans for an Anglo-Russian alliance then being mooted at +St. Petersburg, and, above all, it served to gain time.</p> + +<p>All these advantages were to a large extent realized. Though the +Czar had been the first to suggest our retention of Malta, he now +began to waver. The clearness and precision of Talleyrand's notes, +and the telling charge of perfidy against England, made an +impression which the cumbrous retorts of Lord Hawkesbury and the +sailor-like diplomacy of Admiral Warren failed to efface.<a name= +"FNanchor_254_254"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_254_254"><sup>[254]</sup></a> And the Russian +Chancellor, Vorontzoff, though friendly to England, and desirous of +seeing her firmly established at Malta, now began to complain of +the want of clearness in her policy. The Czar emphasized this +complaint, and suggested that, as Malta could not be the real cause +of dispute, the British Government should formulate distinctly its +grievances and so set the matter in train for a<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i424" id="page_i424">[pg.424]</a></span> +settlement. The suggestion was not complied with. To draw up a long +list of complaints, some drawn from secret sources and exposing the +First Consul's schemes, would have exasperated his already ruffled +temper; and the proposal can only be regarded as an adroit means of +justifying Alexander's sudden change of front.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile events had proceeded apace at Paris. On April 26th +Joseph Bonaparte made a last effort to bend his brother's will, but +only gained the grudging concession that Napoleon would never +consent to the British retention of Malta for a longer time than +three or four years. As this would have enabled him to postpone the +rupture long enough to mature his oriental plans, it was rejected +by Lord Whitworth, who insisted on ten years as the minimum. The +evident determination of the British Government speedily to +terminate the affair, one way or the other, threw Napoleon into a +paroxysm of passion; and at the diplomatic reception of May 1st, +from which Lord Whitworth discreetly absented himself, he +vehemently inveighed against its conduct. Fretted by the absence of +our ambassador, for whom this sally had been intended, he returned +to St. Cloud, and there dictated this curious epistle to +Talleyrand:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I desire that your conference [with Lord Whitworth] shall not +degenerate into a conversation. Show yourself cold, reserved, and +even somewhat proud. If the [British] note contains the word +<i>ultimatum</i> make him feel that this word implies war; if it +does not contain this word, make him insert it, remarking to him +that we must know where we are, that we are tired of this state of +anxiety.... Soften down a little at the end of the conference, and +invite him to return before writing to his Court."</p> +</div> + +<p>But this careful rehearsal was to avail nothing; our stolid +ambassador was not to be cajoled, and on May 2nd, that is, seven +days after his presenting our ultimatum, he sent for his passports. +He did not, however, set out immediately. Yielding to an urgent +request, he delayed his departure in order to hear the French reply +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i425" id= +"page_i425">[pg.425]</a></span> to the British ultimatum.<a name= +"FNanchor_255_255"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_255_255"><sup>[255]</sup></a> It notified sarcastically +that Lampedusa was not in the First Consul's power to bestow, that +any change with reference to Malta must be referred by Great +Britain to the Great Powers for their concurrence, and that Holland +would be evacuated as soon as the terms of the Treaty of Amiens +were complied with. Another proposal was that Malta should be +transferred to Russia—the very step which was proposed at +Amiens and was rejected by the Czar: on that account Lord Whitworth +now refused it as being merely a device to gain time. The sending +of his passports having been delayed, he received one more despatch +from Downing Street, which allowed that our retention of Malta for +ten years should form a secret article—a device which would +spare the First Consul's susceptibilities on the point of honour. +Even so, however, Napoleon refused to consider a longer tenure than +two or three years. And in this he was undoubtedly encouraged by +the recent despatch from St. Petersburg, wherein the Czar promised +his mediation in a sense favourable to France. This unfortunate +occurrence completed the discomfiture of the peace party at the +Consular Court, and in a long and heated discussion in a council +held at St. Cloud on May 11th all but Joseph Bonaparte and +Talleyrand voted for the rejection of the British demands.</p> + +<p>On the next day Lord Whitworth left Paris. During his journey to +Calais he received one more proposal, that France should hold the +peninsula of Otranto for ten years if Great Britain retained Malta +for that period; but if this suggestion was made in good faith, +which is doubtful, its effect was destroyed by a rambling diatribe +which Talleyrand, at his master's orders, sent shortly +afterwards.<a name="FNanchor_256_256"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_256_256"><sup>[256]</sup></a> In any case it was looked +upon by our ambassador as a last attempt to gain time for the<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i426" id= +"page_i426">[pg.426]</a></span> concentration of the French naval +forces. He crossed the Straits of Dover on May 17th, the day before +the British declaration of war was issued.</p> + +<p>On May 22nd, 1803, appeared at Paris the startling order that, +as British frigates had captured two French merchantmen on the +Breton coast, all Englishmen between eighteen and sixty years of +age who were in France should be detained as prisoners of war. The +pretext for this unheard-of action, which condemned some 10,000 +Britons to prolonged detention, was that the two French ships were +seized prior to the declaration of war. This is false: they were +seized on May 18th, that is, on the day on which the British +Government declared war, three days after an embargo had been laid +on British vessels in French ports, and seven days after the First +Consul had directed his envoy at Florence to lay an embargo on +English ships in the ports of Tuscany.<a name= +"FNanchor_257_257"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_257_257"><sup>[257]</sup></a> It is therefore obvious +that Napoleon's barbarous decree merely marked his disappointment +at the failure of his efforts to gain time and to deal the first +stroke. How sorely his temper was tried by the late events is clear +from the recital of the Duchesse d'Abrantès, who relates +that her husband, when ordered to seize English residents, found +the First Consul in a fury, his eyes flashing fire; and when Junot +expressed his reluctance to carry out this decree, Napoleon +passionately exclaimed: "Do not trust too far to my friendship: as +soon as I conceive doubt as to yours, mine is gone."</p> + +<p>Few persons in England now cherished any doubts as to the First +Consul's hatred of the nation which stood between him and his +oriental designs. Ministers alone knew the extent of those plans: +but every ploughboy could feel the malice of an act which cooped up +innocent travellers on the flimsiest of pretexts. National ardour, +and, alas, national hatred were deeply stirred.<a name= +"FNanchor_258_258"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_258_258"><sup>[258]</sup></a> The<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i427" id="page_i427">[pg.427]</a></span> +Whigs, who had paraded the clemency of Napoleon, were at once +helpless, and found themselves reduced to impotence for wellnigh a +generation; and the Tories, who seemed the exponents of a national +policy, were left in power until the stream of democracy, dammed up +by war in 1793 and again in 1803, asserted its full force in the +later movement for reform.</p> + +<p>Yet the opinion often expressed by pamphleteers, that the war of +1803 was undertaken to compel France to abandon her republican +principles, is devoid of a shred of evidence in its favour. After +1802 there were no French republican principles to be combated; +they had already been jettisoned; and, since Bonaparte had crushed +the Jacobins, his personal claims were favourably regarded at +Whitehall, Addington even assuring the French envoy that he would +welcome the establishment of hereditary succession in the First +Consul's family.<a name="FNanchor_259_259"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_259_259"><sup>[259]</sup></a> But while Bonaparte's own +conduct served to refute the notion that the war of 1803 was a war +of principles, his masterful policy in Europe and the Levant +convinced every well-informed man that peace was impossible; and +the rupture was accompanied by acts and insults to the "nation of +shopkeepers" that could be avenged only by torrents of blood. +Diatribes against perfidious Albion filled the French Press and +overflowed into splenetic pamphlets, one of which bade odious +England tremble under the consciousness of her bad faith and the +expectation of swift and condign chastisement. Such was the spirit +in which these nations rushed to arms; and the conflict was +scarcely to cease until Napoleon was flung out into the solitudes +of the southern Atlantic.</p> + +<p>The importance of the rupture of the Peace of Amiens will be +realized if we briefly survey Bonaparte's position<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i428" id="page_i428">[pg.428]</a></span> +after that treaty was signed. He had regained for his adopted +country a colonial empire and had given away not a single French +island. France was raised to a position of assured strength far +preferable to the perilous heights attained later on at Tilsit. In +Australia there was a prospect that the tricolour would wave over +areas as great and settlements as prosperous as those of New South +Wales and the infant town of Sydney. From the Ile de France and the +Cape of Good Hope as convenient bases of operations, British India +could easily be assailed; and a Franco-Mahratta alliance promised +to yield a victory over the troops of the East India Company. In +Europe the imminent collapse of the Turkish Empire invited a +partition, whence France might hope to gain Egypt and the Morea. +The Ionian Isles were ready to accept French annexation; and, if +England withdrew her troops from Malta, the fate of the weak Order +of St. John could scarcely be a matter of doubt.</p> + +<p>For the fulfilment of these bright hopes one thing alone was +needed, a policy of peace and naval preparation. As yet Napoleon's +navy was comparatively weak. In March, 1803, he had only +forty-three line-of-battle ships, ten of which were on distant +stations; but he had ordered twenty-three more to be +built—ten of them in Holland; and, with the harbours of +France, Holland, Flanders, and Northern Italy at his disposal, he +might hope, at the close of 1804, to confront the flag of St. +George with a superiority of force. That was the time which his +secret instructions to Decaen marked out for the outbreak of the +war that would yield to the tricolour a world-wide supremacy.</p> + +<p>These schemes miscarried owing to the impetuosity of their +contriver. Hustled out of the arena of European politics, and +threatened with French supremacy in the other Continents, England +forthwith drew the sword; and her action, cutting athwart the +far-reaching web of the Napoleonic intrigues, forced France to +forego her oceanic plans, to muster her forces on the Straits of +Dover, and thereby to yield to the English race the <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i429" id="page_i429">[pg.429]</a></span> +supremacy in Louisiana, India, and Australia, leaving also the +destinies of Egypt to be decided in a later age. Viewed from the +standpoint of racial expansion, the renewal of war in 1803 is the +greatest event of the century.</p> + +<p>[Since this chapter was printed, articles on the same subject +have appeared in the "Revue Historique" (March-June, 1901) by M. +Philippson, which take almost the same view as that here presented. +I cannot, however, agree with the learned writer that Napoleon +wanted war. I think he did not, <i>until his navy was ready</i>; +but it was not in him to give way.]</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>NOTE TO THE FIFTH EDITION</p> + +<p>M. Coquelle, in a work which has been translated into English by +Mr. Gordon D. Knox (G. Bell and Sons, Ltd.), has shown clearly that +the non-evacuation of Holland by Napoleon's troops and the +subjection of that Republic to French influence formed the chief +causes of war. I refer my readers to that work for details of the +negotiations in their final stages.</p> +</div> + +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i430" id= +"page_i430">[pg.i430]</a></span> <br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XVIII</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>EUROPE AND THE BONAPARTES</center> + +<br> + + +<p>The disappointment felt by Napoleon at England's interruption of +his designs may be measured, first by his efforts to postpone the +rupture, and thereafter by the fierce energy which he threw into +the war. As has been previously noted, the Czar had responded to +the First Consul's appeal for mediation in notes which seemed to +the British Cabinet unjustly favourable to the French case. +Napoleon now offered to recognize the arbitration of the Czar on +the questions in dispute, and suggested that meanwhile Malta should +be handed over to Russia to be held in pledge: he on his part +offered to evacuate Hanover, Switzerland, and Holland, if the +British would suspend hostilities, to grant an indemnity to the +King of Sardinia, to allow Britain to occupy Lampedusa, and fully +to assure "the independence of Europe," if France retained her +present frontiers. But when the Russian envoy, Markoff, urged him +to crown these proposals by allowing Britain to hold Malta for a +certain time, thereafter to be agreed upon, he firmly refused to do +so on his own initiative, for that would soil his honour: but he +would view with resignation its cession to Britain if that proved +to be the award of Alexander. Accordingly Markoff wrote to his +colleague at London, assuring him that the peace of the world was +now once again assured by the noble action of the First Consul.<a +name="FNanchor_260_260"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_260_260"><sup>[260]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Were these proposals prompted by a sincere desire to assure a +lasting peace, or were they put forward as a<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i431" id="page_i431">[pg.431]</a></span> +device to gain time for the completion of the French naval +preparations? Evidently they were completely distrusted by the +British Government, and with some reason. They were nearly +identical with the terms formulated in the British ultimatum, which +Napoleon had rejected. Moreover, our Foreign Office had by this +time come to suspect Alexander. On June 23rd Lord Hawkesbury wrote +that it might be most damaging to British interests to place Malta +"at the hazard of the Czar's arbitration"; and he informed the +Russian ambassador, Count Vorontzoff, that the aim of the French +had obviously been merely to gain time, that their explanations +were loose and unsatisfactory, and their demands inadmissible, and +that Great Britain could not acknowledge the present territories of +the French Republic as permanent while Malta was placed in +arbitration. In fact, our Government feared that, when Malta had +been placed in Alexander's hands, Napoleon would lure him into +oriental adventures and renew the plans of an advance on India. +Their fears were well founded.</p> + +<p>Napoleon's preoccupation was always for the East: on February +21st, 1803, he had charged his Minister of Marine to send arms and +ammunition to the Suliotes and Maniotes then revolting against the +Sultan; and at midsummer French agents were at Ragusa to prepare +for a landing at the mouth of the River Cattaro.<a name= +"FNanchor_261_261"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_261_261"><sup>[261]</sup></a> With Turkey rent by +revolt, Malta placed as a pledge in Russian keeping, and Alexander +drawn into the current of Napoleon's designs, what might not be +accomplished? Evidently the First Consul could expect more from +this course of events than from barren strifes with Nelson's ships +in the Straits of Dover. For <i>us</i>, such a peace was far more +risky than war. And yet, if the Czar's offer were too stiffly +repelled, public opinion would everywhere be alienated, and in that +has always lain half the strength of England's policy.<a name= +"FNanchor_262_262"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_262_262"><sup>[262]</sup></a> Ministers therefore +declared that,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i432" id= +"page_i432">[pg.432]</a></span> while they could not accept +Russia's arbitration without appeal, they would accede to her +mediation if it concerned all the causes of the present war. This +reasonable proposal was accepted by the Czar, but received from +Napoleon a firm refusal. He at once wrote to Talleyrand, August +23rd, 1803, directing that the Russian proposals should be made +known to Haugwitz, the Prussian Foreign Minister:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Make him see all the absurdity of it: tell him that England +will never get from me any other treaty than that of Amiens: that +<i>I will never suffer her to have anything in the +Mediterranean</i>; that I will not treat with her about the +Continent; that I am resolved to evacuate Holland and Switzerland; +but that I will never stipulate this in an article."</p> +</div> + +<p>As for Russia, he continued, she talked much about the integrity +of Turkey, but was violating it by the occupation of the Ionian +Isles and her constant intrigues in Wallachia. These facts were +correct: but the manner in which he stated them clearly revealed +his annoyance that the Czar would not wholly espouse the French +cause. Talleyrand's views on this question may be seen in his +letter to Bonaparte, when he assures his chief that he has now +reaped from his noble advance to the Russian Emperor the sole +possible advantage—"that of proving to Europe by a grand act +of frankness your love of peace and to throw upon England the whole +blame for the war." It is not often that a diplomatist so clearly +reveals the secrets of his chief's policy.<a name= +"FNanchor_263_263"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_263_263"><sup>[263]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The motives of Alexander were less questionable. His chief +desire at that time was to improve the lot of his people. War would +disarrange these noble designs: France would inevitably overrun the +weaker Continental States: England would retaliate by enforcing her +severe maritime code; and the whole world would be rent in twain by +this strife of the elements.</p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i433" id= +"page_i433">[pg.433]</a></span> These gloomy forebodings were soon +to be realized. Holland was the first to suffer. And yet one effort +was made to spare her the horrors of war. Filled with commiseration +for her past sufferings, the British Government at once offered to +respect her neutrality, provided that the French troops would +evacuate her fortresses and exact no succour either in ships, men, +or money.<a name="FNanchor_264_264"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_264_264"><sup>[264]</sup></a> But such forbearance was +scarcely to be expected from Napoleon, who not only had a French +division in that land, supported at its expense, but also relied on +its maritime resources.<a name="FNanchor_265_265"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_265_265"><sup>[265]</sup></a> The proposal was at once +set aside at Paris. Napoleon's decision to drag the Batavian +Republic into the war arose, however, from no spasm of the war +fever; it was calmly stated in the secret instructions issued to +General Decaen in the preceding January. "It is now considered +impossible that we could have war with England, without dragging +Holland into it." Holland was accordingly once more ground between +the upper and the nether millstone, between the Sea Power and the +Land Power, pouring out for Napoleon its resources in men and +money, and losing to the masters of the sea its ships, foreign +commerce, and colonies.</p> + +<p>Equally hard was the treatment of Naples. In spite of the Czar's +plea that its neutrality might be respected, this kingdom was at +once occupied by St. Cyr with troops that held the chief positions +on the "heel" of Italy. This infraction of the Treaty of Florence +was to be justified by a proclamation asserting that, as England +had retained Malta, the balance of power required that France +should hold these positions as long as England held Malta.<a name= +"FNanchor_266_266"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_266_266"><sup>[266]</sup></a> This action punished the +King and Queen of Naples for their supposed subservience to English +policy; and, while lightening the burdens of the French exchequer, +it compelled England to keep a large fleet in the Mediterranean for +the protection of Egypt, and<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i434" id="page_i434">[pg.434]</a></span> thereby weakened her +defensive powers in the Straits of Dover. To distract his foes, and +compel them to extend their lines, was ever Napoleon's aim both in +military and naval strategy; and the occupation of Taranto, +together with the naval activity at Toulon and Genoa, left it +doubtful whether the great captain determined to strike at London +or to resume his eastern adventures. His previous moves all seemed +to point towards Egypt and India; and the Admiralty instructions of +May 18th, 1803, to Nelson, reveal the expectation of our Government +that the real blow would fall on the Morea and Egypt. Six weeks +later our admiral reported the activity of French intrigues in the +Morea, which was doubtless intended to be their halfway house to +Egypt—"when sooner or later, farewell India."<a name= +"FNanchor_267_267"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_267_267"><sup>[267]</sup></a> Proofs of Napoleon's +designs on the Morea were found by Captain Keats of H.M.S. "Superb" +on a French vessel that he captured, a French corporal having on +him a secret letter from an agent at Corfu, dated May 23rd, 1803. +It ended thus:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I have every reason to believe that we shall soon have a +revolution in the Morea, as we desire. I have close relations with +Crepacchi, and we are in daily correspondence with all the chiefs +of the Morea: we have even provided them with munitions of war."<a +name="FNanchor_268_268"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_268_268"><sup>[268]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>On the whole, however, it seems probable that Napoleon's chief +aim now was London and not Egypt; but his demonstrations eastwards +were so skilfully maintained as to convince both the English +Government and Nelson that his real aim was Egypt or Malta. For +this project the French <i>corps d'armée</i> in the "heel" +of Italy held a commanding position. Ships alone were wanting; and +these he sought to compel the King of Naples to furnish. As early +as April 20th, 1803, our <i>charge d'affaires</i> at<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i435" id="page_i435">[pg.435]</a></span> +Naples, Mr. à Court, reported that Napoleon was pressing on +that Government a French alliance, on the ground that:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"The interests of the two countries are the same: it is the +intention of France to shut every port to the English, from Holland +to the Turkish dominions, to prevent the exportation of her +merchandise, and to give a mortal blow to her commerce, for there +she is most vulnerable. Our joint forces may wrest from her hands +the island of Malta. The Sicilian navy may convoy and protect the +French troops in the prosecution of such a plan, and the most happy +result may be augured to their united exertions."</p> +</div> + +<p>Possibly the King and his spirited but whimsical consort, Queen +Charlotte, might have bent before the threats which accompanied +this alluring offer; but at the head of the Neapolitan +administration was an Englishman, General Acton, whose talents and +force of will commanded their respect and confidence. To the +threats of the French ambassador he answered that France was strong +and Naples was weak; force might overthrow the dynasty; but nothing +would induce it to violate its neutrality towards England. So +unwonted a defiance aroused Napoleon to a characteristic revenge. +When his troops were quartered on Southern Italy, and were draining +the Neapolitan resources, the Queen wrote appealing to his clemency +on behalf of her much burdened people. In reply he assured her of +his desire to be agreeable to her: but how could he look on Naples +as a neutral State, when its chief Minister was an Englishman? This +was "the real reason that justified all the measures taken towards +Naples."<a name="FNanchor_269_269"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_269_269"><sup>[269]</sup></a> The brutality and +falseness of this reply had no other effect than to embitter Queen +Charlotte's hatred against the arbiter of the world's destinies, +before whom she and her consort refused to bow, even when, three +years later, they were forced to seek shelter behind the girdle of +the inviolate sea. <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i436" id= +"page_i436">[pg.436]</a></span></p> + +<p>Hanover also fell into Napoleon's hands. Mortier with 25,000 +French troops speedily overran that land and compelled the Duke of +Cambridge to a capitulation. The occupation of the Electorate not +only relieved the French exchequer of the support of a considerable +corps; it also served to hold in check the Prussian Court, always +preoccupied about Hanover; and it barred the entrance of the Elbe +and Weser to British ships, an aim long cherished by Napoleon. To +this we retorted by blockading the mouths of those rivers, an act +which must have been expected by Napoleon, and which enabled him to +declaim against British maritime tyranny. In truth, the beginnings +of the Continental System were now clearly discernible. The shores +of the Continent from the south of Italy to the mouth of the Elbe +were practically closed to English ships, while by a decree of July +15th <i>any vessel whatsoever</i> that had cleared from a British +port was to be excluded from all harbours of the French Republic. +Thus all commercial nations were compelled, slowly but inevitably, +to side with the master of the land or the mistress of the +seas.</p> + +<p>In vain did the King of Prussia represent to Napoleon that +Hanover was not British territory, and that the neutrality of +Germany was infringed and its interests damaged by the French +occupation of Hanover and Cuxhaven. His protest was met by an offer +from Napoleon to evacuate Hanover, Taranto and Otranto, only at the +time when England should "evacuate Malta and the Mediterranean"; +and though the special Prussian envoy, Lombard, reported to his +master that Napoleon was "truth, loyalty, and friendship +personified," yet he received not a word that betokened real regard +for the susceptibilities of Frederick William III. or the commerce +of his people.<a name="FNanchor_270_270"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_270_270"><sup>[270]</sup></a> For the present, neither +King nor Czar ventured on further remonstrances; but the First +Consul had sown seeds of discord which were to bear fruit in the +Third Coalition.</p> + +<p>Having quartered 60,000 French troops on Naples<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i437" id="page_i437">[pg.437]</a></span> +and Hanover, Napoleon could face with equanimity the costs of the +war. Gigantic as they were, they could be met from the purchase +money of Louisiana, the taxation and voluntary gifts of the French +dominions, the subsidies of the Italian and Ligurian Republics, and +a contribution which he now exacted from Spain.</p> + +<p>Even before the outbreak of hostilities he had significantly +reminded Charles IV. that the Spanish marine was deteriorating, and +her arsenals and dockyards were idle: "But England is not asleep; +she is ever on the watch and will never rest until she has seized +on the colonies and commerce of the world."<a name= +"FNanchor_271_271"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_271_271"><sup>[271]</sup></a> For the present, however, +the loss of Trinidad and the sale of Louisiana rankled too deeply +to admit of Spain entering into another conflict, whence, as +before, Napoleon would doubtless gain the glory and leave to her +the burden of territorial sacrifices. In spite of his shameless +relations to the Queen of Spain, Godoy, the Spanish Minister, was +not devoid of patriotism; and he strove to evade the obligations +which the treaty of 1796 imposed on Spain in case of an +Anglo-French conflict. He embodied the militia of the north of +Spain and doubtless would have defied Bonaparte's demands, had +Russia and Prussia shown any disposition to resist French +aggressions. But those Powers were as yet wholly devoted to private +interests; and when Napoleon threatened Charles IV. and Godoy with +an inroad of 80,000 French troops unless the Spanish militia were +dissolved and 72,000,000 francs were paid every year into the +French exchequer, the Court of Madrid speedily gave way. Its +surrender was further assured by the thinly veiled threat that +further resistance would lead to the exposure of the <i>liaison</i> +between Godoy and the Queen. Spain therefore engaged to pay the +required sum—more than double the amount stipulated in +1796—to further the interests of French commerce and to bring +pressure to bear on Portugal. At the close of the year the Court of +Lisbon, yielding to the threats of France and Spain, consented to +purchase its neutrality by the<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i438" id="page_i438">[pg.438]</a></span> payment of a million +francs a month to the master of the Continent.<a name= +"FNanchor_272_272"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_272_272"><sup>[272]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Meanwhile the First Consul was throwing his untiring energies +into the enterprise of crushing his redoubtable foe. He pushed on +the naval preparations at all the dockyards of France, Holland, and +North Italy; the great mole that was to shelter the roadstead at +Cherbourg was hurried forward, and the coast from the Seine to the +Rhine became "a coast of iron and bronze"—to use Marmont's +picturesque phrase—while every harbour swarmed with small +craft destined for an invasion. Troops were withdrawn from the +Rhenish frontiers and encamped along the shores of Picardy; others +were stationed in reserve at St. Omer, Montreuil, Bruges, and +Utrecht; while smaller camps were formed at Ghent, +Compiègne, and St. Malo. The banks of the Elbe, Weser, +Scheldt, Somme, and Seine—even as far up as Paris +itself—rang with the blows of shipwrights labouring to +strengthen the flotilla of flat-bottomed vessels designed for the +invasion of England. Troops, to the number of 50,000 at Boulogne +under Soult, 30,000 at Etaples, and as many at Bruges, commanded by +Ney and Davoust respectively, were organized anew, and by constant +drill and exposure to the elements formed the tough nucleus of the +future Grand Army, before which the choicest troops of Czar and +Kaiser were to be scattered in headlong rout. To all these +many-sided exertions of organization and drill, of improving +harbours and coast fortifications, of ship-building, testing, +embarking, and disembarking, the First Consul now and again applied +the spur of his personal supervision; for while the warlike +enthusiasm which he had aroused against perfidious Albion of itself +achieved wonders, yet work was never so strenuous and exploits so +daring as under the eyes of the great captain himself. He therefore +paid frequent visits to the north coast, surveying with critical +eyes the works at Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk,<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i439" id="page_i439">[pg.439]</a></span> +Ostend, and Antwerp. The last-named port engaged his special +attention. Its position at the head of the navigable estuary of the +Scheldt, exactly opposite the Thames, marked it out as the natural +rival of London; he now encouraged its commerce and ordered the +construction of a dockyard fitted to contain twenty-five +battleships and a proportionate number of frigates and sloops. +Antwerp was to become the great commercial and naval emporium of +the North Sea. The time seemed to favour the design; Hamburg and +Bremen were blockaded, and London for a space was menaced by the +growing power of the First Consul, who seemed destined to restore +to the Flemish port the prosperity which the savagery of Alva had +swept away with such profit to Elizabethan London. But grand as +were Napoleon's enterprises at Antwerp, they fell far short of his +ulterior designs. He told Las Cases at St. Helena that the dockyard +and magazines were to have been protected by a gigantic fortress +built on the opposite side of the River Scheldt, and that Antwerp +was to have been "a loaded pistol held at the head of England."</p> + +<p>In both lands warlike ardour rose to the highest pitch. French +towns and Departments freely offered gifts of gunboats and +battleships. And in England public men vied with one another in +their eagerness to equip and maintain volunteer regiments. +Wordsworth, who had formerly sung the praises of the French +Revolution, thus voiced the national defiance:</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"No parleying now! In Britain is +one breath;</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">We all are with you now from shore +to shore;</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Ye men of Kent, 'tis victory or +death."</span><br> + + +<p>In one respect England enjoyed a notable advantage. Having +declared war before Napoleon's plans were matured, she held the +command of the seas, even against the naval resources of France, +Holland, and North Italy. The first months of the war witnessed the +surrender of St. Lucia and Tobago to our fleets; and before the +close of the year Berbice, Demerara, Essequibo, together with <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i440" id= +"page_i440">[pg.440]</a></span> nearly the whole of the French St. +Domingo force, had capitulated to the Union Jack. Our naval +supremacy in the Channel now told with full effect. Frigates were +ever on the watch in the Straits to chase any French vessels that +left port. But our chief efforts were to blockade the enemy's +ships. Despite constant ill-health and frequent gales, Nelson clung +to Toulon. Admiral Cornwallis cruised off Brest with a fleet +generally exceeding fifteen sail of the line and several smaller +vessels: six frigates and smaller craft protected the coast of +Ireland; six line-of-battle ships and twenty-three lesser vessels +were kept in the Downs under Lord Keith as a central reserve force, +to which the news of all events transpiring on the enemy's coast +was speedily conveyed by despatch boats; the newly invented +semaphore telegraphs were also systematically used between the Isle +of Wight and Deal to convey news along the coast and to London. +Martello towers were erected along the coast from Harwich to +Pevensey Bay, at the points where a landing was easy. Numerous +inventors also came forward with plans for destroying the French +flotilla, but none was found to be serviceable except the rockets +of Colonel Congreve, which inflicted some damage at Boulogne and +elsewhere. Such were the dispositions of our chief naval forces: +they comprised 469 ships of war, and over 700 armed boats, of all +sizes.<a name="FNanchor_273_273"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_273_273"><sup>[273]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Our regular troops and militia mustered 180,000 strong; while +the volunteers, including 120,000 men armed with pikes or similar +weapons, numbered 410,000. Of course little could be hoped from +these last in a conflict with French veterans; and even the +regulars, in the absence of any great generals—for Wellesley +was then in India—might have offered but a poor resistance to +Napoleon's military machine. Preparations were, however, made for a +desperate resistance. Plans were quietly framed for the transfer of +the Queen and the royal family<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i441" id="page_i441">[pg.441]</a></span> to Worcester, along +with the public treasure, which was to be lodged in the cathedral; +while the artillery and stores from Woolwich arsenal were to be +conveyed into the Midlands by the Grand Junction Canal.<a name= +"FNanchor_274_274"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_274_274"><sup>[274]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The scheme of coast-defence which General Dundas had drawn up in +1796 was now again set in action. It included, not only the +disposition of the armed forces, but plans for the systematic +removal of all provisions, stores, animals, and fodder from the +districts threatened by the invader; and it is clear that the +country was far better prepared than French writers have been +willing to admit. Indeed, so great was the expense of these +defensive preparations that, when Nelson's return from the West +Indies disconcerted the enemy's plans, Fox merged the statesman in +the partisan by the curious assertion that the invasion scare had +been got up by the Pitt Ministry for party purposes.<a name= +"FNanchor_275_275"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_275_275"><sup>[275]</sup></a> Few persons shared that +opinion. The nation was animated by a patriotism such as had never +yet stirred the sluggish veins of Georgian England. The Jacobinism, +which Dundas in 1796 had lamented as paralyzing the nation's +energy, had wholly vanished; and the fatality which dogged the +steps of Napoleon was already discernible. The mingled hatred and +fear which he inspired outside France was beginning to solidify the +national resistance: after uniting rich and poor, English and Scots +in a firm phalanx in the United Kingdom, the national principle was +in turn to vivify Spain, Russia, and Germany, and thus to assure +his overthrow.</p> + +<p>Reserving for consideration in another chapter the later +developments of the naval war, it will be convenient now to turn to +important events in the history of the Bonaparte family.</p> + +<p>The loves and intrigues of the Bonapartes have furnished +material enough to fill several volumes devoted to light gossip, +and naturally so. Given an ambitious family, styled <i>parvenus</i> +by the ungenerous, shooting aloft<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i442" id="page_i442">[pg.442]</a></span> swiftly as the +flames of Vesuvius, ardent as its inner fires, and stubborn as its +hardened lava—given also an imperious brother determined to +marry his younger brothers and sisters, not as they willed, but as +he willed—and it is clear that materials are at hand +sufficient to make the fortunes of a dozen comediettas.</p> + +<p>To the marriage of Pauline Bonaparte only the briefest reference +need here be made. The wild humour of her blood showed itself +before her first marriage; and after the death of her husband, +General Leclerc, in San Domingo, she privately espoused Prince +Borghese before the legal time of mourning had expired, an +indiscretion which much annoyed Napoleon (August, 1803). Ultimately +this brilliant, frivolous creature resided in the splendid mansion +which now forms the British embassy in Paris. The case of Louis +Bonaparte was somewhat different. Nurtured as he had been in his +early years by Napoleon, he had rewarded him by contracting a +dutiful match with Hortense Beauharnais (January, 1802); but that +union was to be marred by a grotesquely horrible jealousy which the +young husband soon conceived for his powerful brother.</p> + +<p>For the present, however, the chief trouble was caused by +Lucien, whose address had saved matters at the few critical minutes +of Brumaire. Gifted with a strong vein of literary feeling and +oratorical fire he united in his person the obstinacy of a +Bonaparte, the headstrong feelings of a poet, and the dogmatism of +a Corsican republican. His presumptuous conduct had already +embroiled him with the First Consul, who deprived him of his +Ministry and sent him as ambassador to Madrid.<a name= +"FNanchor_276_276"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_276_276"><sup>[276]</sup></a> He further sinned, first +by hurrying on peace with Portugal—it is said for a handsome +present from Lisbon—and later by refusing to marry the widow +of the King of Etruria. In this he persisted, despite the urgent +representations of Napoleon and Joseph: "You know very well that I +am a republican, and that a queen is not what suits me, an ugly +queen too!"—"What a pity your answer was<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i443" id="page_i443">[pg.443]</a></span> +not cut short, it would have been quite Roman," sneered Joseph at +his younger brother, once the Brutus of the Jacobin clubs. But +Lucien was proof against all the splendours of the royal match; he +was madly in love with a Madame Jouberthon, the deserted wife of a +Paris stockbroker; and in order to checkmate all Napoleon's +attempts to force on a hated union, he had secretly married the +lady of his choice at the village of Plessis-Chamant, hard by his +country house (October 26th, 1803).</p> + +<p>The letter which divulged the news of this affair reached the +First Consul at St. Cloud on an interesting occasion.<a name= +"FNanchor_277_277"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_277_277"><sup>[277]</sup></a> It was during a so-called +family concert, to which only the choicest spirits had been +invited, whence also, to Josephine's chagrin, Napoleon had excluded +Madame Tallien and several other old friends, whose reputation +would have tainted the air of religion and morality now pervading +the Consular Court. While this select company was enjoying the +strains of the chamber music, and Napoleon alone was dozing, +Lucien's missive was handed in by the faithful if indiscreet Duroc. +A change came over the scene. At once Napoleon started up, called +out "Stop the music: stop," and began with nervous strides and +agitated gestures to pace the hall, exclaiming "Treason! it is +treason!" Round-eyed, open-mouthed wonder seized on the +disconcerted musicians, the company rose in confusion, and +Josephine, following her spouse, besought him to say what had +happened. "What has happened—why—Lucien has married +his—mistress."<a name="FNanchor_278_278"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_278_278"><sup>[278]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The secret cause for this climax of fashionable comedy is to be +sought in reasons of state. The establishment of hereditary power +was then being secretly and anxiously discussed. Napoleon had no +heirs: Joseph's children were girls: Lucien's first marriage also +had naught but<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i444" id= +"page_i444">[pg.444]</a></span> female issue: the succession must +therefore devolve on Lucien's children by a second marriage. But a +natural son had already been born to him by Madame Jouberthon; and +his marriage now promised to make this bastard the heir to the +future French imperial throne. That was the reason why Napoleon +paced the hall at St. Cloud, "waving his arms like a semaphore," +and exclaiming "treason!" Failing the birth of sons to the two +elder brothers, Lucien's marriage seriously endangered the +foundation of a Napoleonic dynasty; besides, the whole affair would +yield excellent sport to the royalists of the Boulevard St. +Germain, the snarling Jacobins of the back streets, and the +newspaper writers of hated Albion.</p> + +<p>In vain were negotiations set on foot to make Lucien divorce his +wife. The attempt only produced exasperation, Joseph himself +finally accusing Napoleon of bad faith in the course of this +affair. In the following springtime Lucien shook off the dust of +France from his feet, and declared in a last letter to Joseph that +he departed, hating Napoleon. The moral to this curious story was +well pointed by Joseph Bonaparte: "Destiny seems to blind us, and +intends, by means of our own faults, to restore France some day to +her former rulers." <a name="FNanchor_279_279"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_279_279"><sup>[279]</sup></a></p> + +<p>At the very time of the scene at St. Cloud, fortune was +preparing for the First Consul another matrimonial trouble. His +youngest brother, Jerome, then aged nineteen years, had shown much +aptitude for the French navy, and was serving on the American +station, when a quarrel with the admiral sent him flying in disgust +to the shore. There, at Baltimore, he fell in love with Miss +Paterson, the daughter of a well-to-do merchant, and sought her +hand in marriage. In vain did the French consul remind him that, +were he five years older, he would still need the consent of his +mother. The headstrong nature of his race brooked no opposition, +and he secretly espoused the young lady at her father's +residence.</p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i445" id= +"page_i445">[pg.445]</a></span> Napoleon's ire fell like a blasting +wind on the young couple; but after waiting some time, in hopes +that the storm would blow over, they ventured to come to Europe. +Thereupon Napoleon wrote to Madame Mère in these terms:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Jerome has arrived at Lisbon with the woman with whom he +lives.... I have given orders that Miss Paterson is to be sent back +to America.... If he shows no inclination to wash away the +dishonour with which he has stained my name, by forsaking his +country's flag on land and sea for the sake of a wretched woman, I +will cast him off for ever."<a name="FNanchor_280_280"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_280_280"><sup>[280]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>The sequel will show that Jerome was made of softer stuff than +Lucien; and, strange to say, his compliance with Napoleon's +dynastic designs provided that family with the only legitimate male +heirs that were destined to sustain its wavering hopes to the end +of the century.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i446" id= +"page_i446">[pg.446]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XIX</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE ROYALIST PLOT</center> + +<br> + + +<p>From domestic comedy, France turned rapidly in the early months +of 1804 to a sombre tragedy—the tragedy of the Georges +Cadoudal plot and the execution of the Duc d'Enghien.</p> + +<p>There were varied reasons why the exiled French Bourbons should +compass the overthrow of Napoleon. Every month that they delayed +action lessened their chances of success. They had long clung to +the hope that his Concordat with the Pope and other +anti-revolutionary measures betokened his intention to recall their +dynasty. But in February, 1803, the Comte de Provence received +overtures which showed that Bonaparte had never thought of playing +the part of General Monk. The exiled prince, then residing at +Warsaw, was courteously but most firmly urged by the First Consul +to renounce both for himself and for the other members of his House +all claims to the throne of France, in return for which he would +receive a pension of two million francs a year. The notion of +sinking to the level of a pensionary of the French Republic touched +Bourbon pride to the quick and provoked this spirited reply:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"As a descendant of St. Louis, I shall endeavour to imitate his +example by respecting myself even in captivity. As successor to +Francis I., I shall at least aspire to say with him: 'We have lost +everything but our honour."'</p> +</div> + +<p>To this declaration the Comte d'Artois, his son, the Duc de +Berri, Louis Philippe of Orleans, his two sons, and the two +Condés gave their ardent assent; and the same <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i447" id="page_i447">[pg.447]</a></span> +loyal response came from the young Condé, the Duc d'Enghien, +dated Ettenheim, March 22nd, 1803. Little did men think when they +read this last defiance to Napoleon that within a year its author +would be flung into a grave in the moat of the Castle of +Vincennes.</p> + +<p>Scarcely had the echoes of the Bourbon retorts died away than +the outbreak of war between England and France raised the hopes of +the French royalist exiles in London; and their nimble fancy +pictured the French army and nation as ready to fling themselves at +the feet of Louis XVIII. The future monarch did not share these +illusions. In the chilly solitudes of Warsaw he discerned matters +in their true light, and prepared to wait until the vaulting +ambition of Napoleon should league Europe against him. Indeed, when +the plans of the forward wing in London were explained to him, with +a view of enlisting his support, he deftly waved aside the +embarrassing overtures by quoting the lines:</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 15.5em;">"Et pour être +approuvés</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">De semblables projets veulent +être achevés,"</span><br> + + +<p>a cautious reply which led his brother, then at Edinburgh, +scornfully to contemn his <i>feebleness</i> as unworthy of any +further confidences.<a name="FNanchor_281_281"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_281_281"><sup>[281]</sup></a> In truth, the Comte +d'Artois, destined one day to be Charles X. of France, was not +fashioned by nature for a Fabian policy of delay: not even the +misfortunes of exile could instill into the watertight compartments +of his brain the most elementary notions of prudence. Daring, +however, attracts daring; and this prince had gathered around him +in our land the most desperate of the French royalists, whose +hopes, hatreds, schemes, and unending requests for British money +may be scanned by the curious in some thirty<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i448" id="page_i448">[pg.448]</a></span> +large volumes of letters bequeathed by their factotum the Comte de +Puisaye, to the British Museum. Unfortunately this correspondence +throws little light on the details of the plot which is fitly +called by the name of Georges Cadoudal.</p> + +<p>This daring Breton was, in fact, the only man of action on whom +the Bourbon princes could firmly rely for an enterprise that +demanded a cool head, cunning in the choice of means, and a +remorseless hand. Pichegru it is true, lived near London, but saw +little of the <i>émigrés</i>, except the venerable +Condé. Dumouriez also was in the great city, but his name +was too generally scorned in France for his treachery in 1793 to +warrant his being used. But there were plenty of swashbucklers who +could prepare the ground in France, or, if fortune favoured, might +strike the blow themselves; and a small committee of French +royalists, which had the support of that furious royalist, Mr. +Windham, M.P., began even before the close of 1802 to discuss plans +for the "removal" of Bonaparte. Two of their tools, Picot and Le +Bourgeois by name, plunged blindly into a plot, and were arrested +soon after they set foot in France. Their boyish credulity seems to +have suggested to the French authorities the sending of an agent so +as to entrap not only French <i>émigrés</i>, but also +English officials and Jacobinical generals.</p> + +<p>The <i>agent provocateur</i> has at all times been a favourite +tool of continental Governments: but rarely has a more finished +specimen of the class been seen than Méhée de la +Touche. After plying the trade of an assassin in the September +massacres of 1792, and of a Jacobin spy during the Terror, he had +been included by Bonaparte among the Jacobin scapegoats who +expiated the Chouan outrage of Nivôse. Pining in the +weariness of exile, he heard from his wife that he might be +pardoned if he would perform some service for the Consular +Government. At once he consented, and it was agreed that he should +feign royalism, should worm himself into the secrets of the +<i>émigrés</i> at London, and act as intermediary +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i449" id= +"page_i449">[pg.449]</a></span> between them and the discontented +republicans of Paris.</p> + +<p>The man who seems to have planned this scheme was the +ex-Minister of Police. Fouché had lately been deprived by +Bonaparte of the inquisitorial powers which he so unscrupulously +used. His duties were divided between Régnier, the Grand +Judge and Minister of Justice, and Réal, a Councillor of +State, who watched over the internal security of France. These men +had none of the ability of Fouché, nor did they know at the +outset what Méhée was doing in London. It may, +therefore, be assumed that Méhée was one of +Fouché's creatures, whom he used to discredit his successor, +and that Bonaparte welcomed this means of quickening the zeal of +the official police, while he also wove his meshes round plotting +<i>émigrés</i>, English officials, and French +generals.<a name="FNanchor_282_282"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_282_282"><sup>[282]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Among these last there was almost chronic discontent, and +Bonaparte claimed to have found out a plot whereby twelve of them +should divide France into as many portions, leaving to him only +Paris and its environs. If so, he never made any use of his +discovery. In fact, out of this group of malcontents, Moreau, +Bernadotte, Augereau, Macdonald, and others, he feared only the +hostility of the first. The victor of Hohenlinden lived in sullen +privacy near to Paris, refusing to present himself at the Consular +Court, and showing his contempt for those who donned a courtier's +uniform. He openly mocked at the Concordat; and when the Legion of +Honour was instituted, he bestowed a collar of honour upon his dog. +So keen was Napoleon's resentment at this raillery that he even +proposed to send him a challenge to a duel in the Bois de +Boulogne.<a name="FNanchor_283_283"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_283_283"><sup>[283]</sup></a> The challenge, of course, +was not sent; a show of reconciliation was assumed between the two +warriors; but Napoleon retained a covert dislike of the man +whose<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i450" id= +"page_i450">[pg.450]</a></span> brusque republicanism was applauded +by a large portion of the army and by the <i>frondeurs</i> of +Paris.</p> + +<p>The ruin of Moreau, and the confusion alike of French royalists +and of the British Ministry, could now be assured by the +encouragement of a Jacobin-Royalist conspiracy, in which English +officials should be implicated. Moreau was notoriously incapable in +the sphere of political intrigue: the royalist coteries in London +presented just the material on which the <i>agent provocateur</i> +delights to work; and some British officials could, doubtless, with +equal ease be drawn into the toils. Méhée de la +Touche has left a highly spiced account of his adventures; but it +must, of course, be received with distrust.<a name= +"FNanchor_284_284"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_284_284"><sup>[284]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Proceeding first to Guernsey, he gained the confidence of the +Governor, General Doyle; and, fortified by recommendations from +him, he presented himself to the <i>émigrés</i> at +London, and had an interview with Lord Hawkesbury and the +Under-Secretaries of State, Messrs. Hammond and Yorke. He found it +easy to inflame the imagination of the French exiles, who clutched +at the proposed union between the irreconcilables, the extreme +royalists, and the extreme republicans; and it was forthwith +arranged that Napoleon's power, which rested on the support of the +peasants, in fact of the body of France, should be crushed by an +enveloping move of the tips of the wings.</p> + +<p>Méhée's narrative contains few details and dates, +such as enable one to test his assertions. But I have examined the +Puisaye Papers,<a name="FNanchor_285_285"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_285_285"><sup>[285]</sup></a> and also the Foreign and +Home Office archives, and have found proofs of the complicity of +our Government, which it will be well to present here connectedly. +Taken singly they are inconclusive, but collectively their +importance is considerable. In our Foreign Office Records (France, +No 70) there is a letter, dated London, August 30th, 1803, from the +Baron de Roll, the factotum of the exiled Bourbons, to Mr. Hammond, +our Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, asking<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i451" id= +"page_i451">[pg.451]</a></span> him to call on the Comte d'Artois +at his residence, No. 46, Baker Street. That the deliberations at +that house were not wholly peaceful appears from a long secret +memorandum of October 24th, 1803, in which the Comte d'Artois +reviews the career of "that <i>miserable adventurer</i>" +(Bonaparte), so as to prove that his present position is precarious +and tottering. He concludes by naming those who desired his +overthrow—Moreau, Reynier, Bernadotte, Simon, Masséna, +Lannes, and Férino: Sieyès, Carnot, Chénier, +Fouché, Barras, Tallien, Rewbel, Lamarque, and Jean de Bry. +Others would not attack him "corps à corps," but disliked +his supremacy. These two papers prove that our Government was aware +of the Bourbon plot. Another document, dated London, November 18th, +1803, proves its active complicity. It is a list of the French +royalist officers "who had set out or were ready to set out." All +were in our pay, two at six shillings, five at four shillings, and +nine at two shillings a day. It would be indelicate to reveal the +names, but among them occurs that of Joachim P.J. Cadoudal. The +list is drawn up and signed by Frieding—a name that was +frequently used by Pichegru as an <i>alias</i>. In his handwriting +also is a list of "royalist officers for whom I demand a year's pay +in advance"—five generals, thirteen <i>chefs de +légion</i>, seventeen <i>chefs de bataillon</i>, and +nineteen captains. The pay claimed amounts to £3,110 +15<i>s.</i><a name="FNanchor_286_286"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_286_286"><sup>[286]</sup></a> That some, at least, of +our Admiralty officials also aided Cadoudal is proved by a "most +secret" letter, dated Admiralty Office, July 31st, 1803, from E. +N[epean] to Admiral Montagu in the Downs, charging him to help the +bearer, Captain Wright, in the execution of "a very important +service," and to provide for him "one of the best of the hired +cutters or luggers under your orders." Another "most secret" +Admiralty letter, of January 9th, 1804, orders a<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i452" id="page_i452">[pg.452]</a></span> +frigate or large sloop to be got ready to convey secretly "an +officer of rank and consideration" (probably Pichegru) to the +French coast. Wright carried over the conspirators in several +parties, until chance threw him into Napoleon's power and consigned +him to an ignominious death, probably suicide.</p> + +<p>Finally, there is the letter of Mr. Arbuthnot, Parliamentary +Secretary at the Foreign Office (dated March 12th, 1804), to Sir +Arthur Paget, in which he refers to the "sad result of all our fine +projects for the re-establishment of the Bourbons: ... we are, of +course, greatly apprehensive for poor Moreau's safety."<a name= +"FNanchor_287_287"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_287_287"><sup>[287]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In face of this damning evidence the ministerial denials of +complicity must be swept aside.<a name="FNanchor_288_288"></a><a +href="#Footnote_288_288"><sup>[288]</sup></a> It is possible, +however, that the plot was connived at, not by the more respectable +chiefs, but by young and hot-headed officials. Even in the summer +of 1803 that Cabinet was already tottering under the attacks of the +Whigs and the followers of Pitt. The blandly respectable Addington +and Hawkesbury with his "vacant grin "<a name= +"FNanchor_289_289"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_289_289"><sup>[289]</sup></a> were evidently no match +for Napoleon; and Arbuthnot himself dubs Addington "a poor wretch +universally despised and laught at," and pronounces the Cabinet +"the most inefficient that ever curst a country." I judge, +therefore, that our official aid to the conspirators was limited to +the Under-Secretaries of the Foreign, War, and Admiralty Offices. +Moreover, the royalist plans, <i>as revealed to our officials</i>, +mainly concerned a rising in Normandy and Brittany. Our Government +would not have paid the salaries of fifty-four royalist<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i453" id="page_i453">[pg.453]</a></span> +officers—many of them of good old French families—if it +had been only a question of stabbing Napoleon. The lists of those +officers were drawn up here in November, 1803, that is, three +months after Georges Cadoudal had set out for Normandy and Paris to +collect his desperadoes; and it seems most probable that the +officers of the "royal army" were expected merely to clinch +Cadoudal's enterprise by rekindling the flame of revolt in the +north and west. French agents were trying to do the same in +Ireland, and a plot for the murder of George III. was thought to +have been connived at by the French authorities. But, when all is +said, the British Government must stand accused of one of the most +heinous of crimes. The whole truth was not known at Paris; but it +was surmised; and the surmise was sufficient to envenom the whole +course of the struggle between England and Napoleon.</p> + +<p>Having now established the responsibility of British officials +in this, the most famous plot of the century, we return to describe +the progress of the conspiracy and the arts employed by Napoleon to +defeat it. His tool, Méhée de la Touche, after +entrapping French royalists and some of our own officials in +London, proceeded to the Continent in order to inveigle some of our +envoys. He achieved a brilliant success. He called at Munich, in +order, as he speciously alleged, to arrange with our ambassador +there the preparations for the royalist plot. The British envoy, +who bore the honoured name of Francis Drake, was a zealous +intriguer closely in touch with the <i>émigrés</i>: +he was completely won over by the arts of Méhée: he +gave the spy money, supplied him with a code of false names, and +even intrusted him with a recipe for sympathetic ink. Thus +furnished, Méhée proceeded to Paris, sent his briber +a few harmless bulletins, took his information to the police, and, +<i>at Napoleon's dictation</i>, gave him news that seriously misled +our Government and Nelson.<a name="FNanchor_290_290"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_290_290"><sup>[290]</sup></a></p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i454" id= +"page_i454">[pg.454]</a></span> The same trick was tried on Stuart, +our ambassador at Vienna, who had a tempting offer from a French +agent to furnish news from every French despatch to or from Vienna. +Stuart had closed with the offer, when suddenly the man was seized +at the instance of the French ambassador, and his papers were +searched.<a name="FNanchor_291_291"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_291_291"><sup>[291]</sup></a> In this case there were +none that compromised Stuart, and his career was not cut short in +the ignominious manner that befell Drake, over whom there may be +inscribed as epitaph the warning which Talleyrand gave to young +aspirants—"et surtout pas trop de zèle."</p> + +<p>Thus, while the royalists were conspiring the overthrow of +Napoleon, he through his agents was countermining their clumsy +approach to his citadel, and prepared to blow them sky high when +their mines were crowded for the final rush. The royalist plans +matured slowly owing to changes which need not be noticed. Georges +Cadoudal quitted London, and landed at Biville, a smuggler's haunt +not far from Dieppe, on August 23rd, 1803. Thence he made his way +to Paris, and spent some months in striving to enlist trusty +recruits. It has been stated that the plot never aimed at +assassination, but at the overpowering of the First Consul's +escort, and the seizure of his person, during one of his journeys. +Then he was to be forcibly transferred to the northern coast on +relays of horses, and hurried over to England.<a name= +"FNanchor_292_292"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_292_292"><sup>[292]</sup></a> But, though the plotters +threw the veil of decency over their enterprise by calling it +kidnapping, they undoubtedly meant murder. Among Drake's papers +there is a hint that the royalist emissaries were <i>at first</i> +to speak only of the seizure and deportation of the First +Consul.</p> + +<p>Whatever may have been their precise aims, they were certainly +known to Napoleon and his police. On November 1st, 1803, he wrote +to Régnier:<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i455" id= +"page_i455">[pg.455]</a></span></p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"You must not be in a hurry about the arrests: when the author +[Méhée] has given in all the information, we will +draw up a plan with him, and will see what is to be done. I wish +him to write to Drake, and, in order to make him trustful, inform +him that, before the great blow can be dealt, he believes he +[Méhée] can promise to have seized on the table of +the First Consul, in his secret room, notes written in his own hand +relating to his great expedition, and every other important +document."</p> +</div> + +<p>Napoleon revelled in the details of his plan for hoisting the +engineers with their own petards.<a name="FNanchor_293_293"></a><a +href="#Footnote_293_293"><sup>[293]</sup></a> But he knew full well +that the plot, when fully ripe, would yield far more than the +capture of a few Chouans. He must wait until Moreau was implicated. +The man selected by the <i>émigrés</i> to sound +Moreau was Pichegru, and this choice was the sole instance of +common sense displayed by them. It was Pichegru who had marked out +the future fortune of Moreau in the campaign of 1793, and yet he +had seemed to be the victim of that general's gross ingratitude at +Fructidor. Who then so fitted as he to approach the victor of +Hohenlinden? Through a priest named David and General Lajolais, an +interview was arranged; and shortly after Pichegru's arrival in +France, these warriors furtively clasped hands in the capital which +had so often resounded with their praises (January, 1804). They met +three or four times, and cleared away some of the misunderstandings +of the past. But he would have nothing to do with Georges, and when +Pichegru mooted the overthrow of Bonaparte and the restoration of +the Bourbons, he firmly warned him: "Do with Bonaparte what you +will, but do not ask me to put a Bourbon in his place."</p> + +<p>From this resolve Moreau never receded. But his calculating +reserve did not save him. Already several suspects had been +imprisoned in Normandy. At Napoleon's suggestion five of them were +condemned to death,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i456" id= +"page_i456">[pg.456]</a></span> in the hope of extorting a +confession; and the last a man named Querelle, gratified his +gaolers by revealing (February 14th) not only the lodging of +Georges in Paris, but the intention of other conspirators, among +whom was a French prince, to land at Biville. The plot was now +coming to a head, and so was the counter-plot. On the next day +Moreau was arrested by order of Napoleon, who feigned the utmost +grief and surprise at seeing the victor of Hohenlinden mixed up +with royalist assassins in the pay of England.<a name= +"FNanchor_294_294"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_294_294"><sup>[294]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Elated by this success, and hoping to catch the Comte d'Artois +himself, Napoleon forthwith despatched to that cliff one of his +most crafty and devoted servants, Savary, who commanded the +<i>gendarmerie d'élite.</i> Tricked out in suitable +disguises, and informed by a smuggler as to the royalist signals, +Savary eagerly awaited the royal quarry, and when Captain Wright's +vessel hove in sight, he used his utmost arts to imitate the +signals that invited a landing. But the crew were not to be lured +to shore; and after fruitless endeavours he returned to +Paris—in time to take part in the murder of the Duc +d'Enghien.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the police were on the tracks of Pichegru and Georges. +On the last day of February the general was seized in bed in the +house of a treacherous friend: but not until the gates of Paris had +been closed, and domiciliary visits made, was Georges taken, and +then only after a desperate affray (March 9th). The arrest of the +two Polignacs and the Marquis de Rivière speedily +followed.</p> + +<p>Hitherto Napoleon had completely outwitted his foes. He knew +well enough that he was in no danger.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I have run no real risks," he wrote to Melzi, "for the police +had its eyes on all these machinations, and I have the consolation +of not finding reason to complain of a single man<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i457" id="page_i457">[pg.457]</a></span> +among all those I have placed in this huge administration, Moreau +stands alone." <a name="FNanchor_295_295"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_295_295"><sup>[295]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>But now, at the moment of victory, when France was swelling with +rage against royalist assassins, English gold, and Moreau's +treachery, the First Consul was hurried into an enterprise which +gained him an imperial crown and flecked the purple with innocent +blood.</p> + +<p>There was living at Ettenheim, in Baden, not far from the Rhine, +a young prince of the House of Condé, the Duc d'Enghien. +Since the disbanding of the corps of Condé he had been +tranquilly enjoying the society of the Princess Charlotte de Rohan, +to whom he had been secretly married. Her charms, the attractions +of the chase, the society of a small circle of French +<i>émigrés</i>, and an occasional secret visit to the +theatre at Strassburg, formed the chief diversions to an otherwise +monotonous life, until he was fired with the hope of a speedy +declaration of war by Austria and Russia against Napoleon. Report +accused him of having indiscreetly ventured in disguise far into +France; but he indignantly denied it. His other letters also prove +that he was not an accomplice of the Cadoudal-Pichegru conspiracy. +But Napoleon's spies gave information which seemed to implicate him +in that enterprise. Chief among them was Méhée, who, +at the close of February, hovered about Ettenheim and heard that +the duke was often absent for many days at a time.</p> + +<p>Napoleon received this news on March 1st, and ordered the +closest investigation to be made. One of his spies reported that +the young duke associated with General Dumouriez. In reality the +general was in London, and the spy had substituted the name of a +harmless old gentleman called Thumery. When Napoleon saw the name +of Dumouriez with that of the young duke his rage knew no bounds. +"Am I a dog to be beaten to death in the street? Why was I not +warned that they were assembling at Ettenheim? Are my<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i458" id="page_i458">[pg.458]</a></span> +murderers sacred beings? They attack my very person. I'll give them +war for war." And he overwhelmed with reproaches both Réal +and Talleyrand for neglecting to warn him of these traitors and +assassins clustering on the banks of the Rhine. The seizure of +Georges Cadoudal and the examination of one of his servants helped +to confirm Napoleon's surmise that he was the victim of a plot of +which the duke and Dumouriez were the real contrivers, while +Georges was their tool. Cadoudal's servant stated that there often +came to his master's house a mysterious man, at whose entry not +only Georges but also the Polignacs and Rivière always +arose. This convinced Napoleon that the Duc d'Enghien was directing +the plot, and he determined to have the duke and Dumouriez seized. +That they were on German soil was naught to him. Talleyrand +promised that he could soon prevail on the Elector to overlook this +violation of his territory, and the question was then discussed in +an informal council. Talleyrand, Réal, and Fouché +advised the severest measures. Lebrun spoke of the outcry which +such a violation of neutral territory would arouse, but bent before +the determination of the First Consul; and the regicide +Cambacérès alone offered a firm opposition to an +outrage which must embroil France with Germany and Russia. Despite +this protest, Napoleon issued his orders and then repaired to the +pleasing solitudes of La Malmaison, where he remained in almost +complete seclusion. The execution of the orders was now left to +Generals Ordener and Caulaincourt, who arranged the raid into +Baden; to Murat, who was now Governor of Paris; and to the devoted +and unquestioning Savary and Réal.</p> + +<p>The seizure of the duke was craftily effected. Troops and +gendarmes were quietly mustered at Strassburg: spies were sent +forward to survey the ground; and as the dawn of the 15th of March +was lighting up the eastern sky, thirty Frenchmen encircled +Enghien's abode. His hot blood prompted him to fight, but on the +advice of a friend he quietly surrendered, was haled away to +Strassburg, <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i459" id= +"page_i459">[pg.459]</a></span> and thence to the castle of +Vincennes on the south-east of Paris. There everything was ready +for his reception on the evening of March 20th. The pall of secrecy +was spread over the preparations. The name of Plessis was assigned +to the victim, and Harel, the governor of the castle, was left +ignorant of his rank.<a name="FNanchor_296_296"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_296_296"><sup>[296]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Above all, he was to be tried by a court-martial of officers, a +form of judgment which was summary and without appeal; whereas the +ordinary courts of justice must be slow and open to the public +gaze. It was true that the Senate had just suspended trial by jury +in the case of attempts against the First Consul's life—a +device adopted in view of the Moreau prosecution. But the certainty +of a conviction was not enough: Napoleon determined to strike +terror into his enemies, such as a swift and secret blow always +inspires. He had resolved on a trial by court-martial when he still +believed Enghien to be an accomplice of Dumouriez; and when, late +on Saturday, March 17th, that mistake was explained, his purpose +remained unshaken—unshaken too by the high mass of Easter +Sunday, March 18th, which he heard in state at the Chapel of the +Tuileries. On the return journey to Malmaison Josephine confessed +to Madame de Rémusat her fears that Bonaparte's will was +unalterably fixed: "I have done what I could, but I fear his mind +is made up." She and Joseph approached him once more in the park +while Talleyrand was at his side. "I fear that cripple," she said, +as they came near, and Joseph drew the Minister aside. All was in +vain. "Go away; you are a child; you don't understand public +duties." This was Josephine's final repulse.</p> + +<p>On March 20th Napoleon drew up the form of questions to be put +to the prisoner. He now shifted the ground of accusation. Out of +eleven questions only the last three referred to the duke's +connection with the Cadoudal plot.<a name="FNanchor_297_297"></a><a +href="#Footnote_297_297"><sup>[297]</sup></a> For in the meantime +he had found in <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i460" id= +"page_i460">[pg.460]</a></span> the duke's papers proofs of his +having offered his services to the British Government for the +present war,<a name="FNanchor_298_298"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_298_298"><sup>[298]</sup></a> his hopes of participation +in a future Continental war, but nothing that could implicate him +in the Cadoudal plot. The papers were certainly disappointing; and +that is doubtless the reason why, after examining them on March +19th, he charged Réal "to take secret cognizance of these +papers, along with Desmarest. One must prevent any talk on the more +or less of charges contained in these papers." The same fact +doubtless led to their abstraction along with the <i>dossier</i> of +the proceedings of the court-martial.<a name= +"FNanchor_299_299"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_299_299"><sup>[299]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The task of summoning the officers who were to form the +court-martial was imposed on Murat. But when this bluff, hearty +soldier received this order, he exclaimed: "What! are they trying +to soil my uniform! I will not allow it! Let him appoint them +himself if he wants to." But a second and more imperious mandate +compelled him to perform this hateful duty. The seven senior +officers of the garrison of Paris now summoned were ordered not to +separate until judgment was passed.<a name= +"FNanchor_300_300"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_300_300"><sup>[300]</sup></a> At their head was General +Hulin, who had shown such daring in the assault on the Bastille; +and thus one of the early heroes of the Revolution had the evening +of his days shrouded over with the horrors of a midnight murder. +Finally, the First Consul charged Savary, who had just returned to +Paris from Biville, furious at being baulked of his prey, to +proceed to Vincennes with a band of his gendarmes for the carrying +out of the sentence.</p> + +<p>The seven officers as yet knew nothing of the nature of their +mission, or of martial law. "We had not," wrote<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i461" id="page_i461">[pg.461]</a></span> +Hulin long afterwards, "the least idea about trials; and, worst of +all, the reporter and clerk had scarcely any more experience."<a +name="FNanchor_301_301"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_301_301"><sup>[301]</sup></a> The examination of the +prisoner was curt in the extreme. He was asked his name, date and +place of birth, whether he had borne arms against France and was in +the pay of England. To the last questions he answered decisively in +the affirmative, adding that he wished to take part in the new war +against France.</p> + +<p>His replies were the same as he made in his preliminary +examination, which he closed with the written and urgent request +for a personal interview with Napoleon. To this request the court +proposed to accede; but Savary, who had posted himself behind +Hulin's chair, at once declared this step to be <i>inopportune</i>. +The judges had only one chance of escape from their predicament, +namely, to induce the duke to invalidate his evidence: this he +firmly refused to do, and when Hulin warned him of the danger of +his position, he replied that he knew it, and wished to have an +interview with the First Consul.</p> + +<p>The court then passed sentence, and, "in accordance with article +(blank) of the law (blank) to the following effect (blank) +condemned him to suffer death." Ashamed, as it would seem, of this +clumsy condemnation, Hulin was writing to Bonaparte to request for +the condemned man the personal interview which he craved, when +Savary took the pen from his hands, with the words: "Your work is +done: the rest is my business."<a name="FNanchor_302_302"></a><a +href="#Footnote_302_302"><sup>[302]</sup></a> The duke was +forthwith led out into the moat of the castle, where a few torches +shed their light on the final scene of this sombre tragedy: he +asked for a priest, but this was denied him: he then bowed his head +in prayer, lifted those noble features towards the soldiers, begged +them not to miss their aim, and fell, shot through the heart. Hard +by was a grave, which, in accordance with orders received on the +previous day, the governor had caused to be made ready; into this +the body was thrown pell-mell, and the earth<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i462" id="page_i462">[pg.462]</a></span> +closed over the remains of the last scion of the warlike House of +Condé.</p> + +<p>Twelve years later loving hands disinterred the bones and placed +them in the chapel of the castle. But even then the world knew not +all the enormity of the crime. It was reserved for clumsy +apologists like Savary to provoke replies and further +investigations. The various excuses which throw the blame on +Talleyrand, and on everyone but the chief actor, are sufficiently +disposed of by the ex-Emperor's will. In that document Napoleon +brushed away the excuses which had previously been offered to the +credulity or malice of his courtiers, and took on himself the +responsibility for the execution:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I caused the Duc d'Enghien to be arrested and judged, because +it was necessary for the safety, the interest, and the honour of +the French people when the Comte d'Artois, by his own confession, +was supporting sixty assassins at Paris. In similar circumstances I +would act in the same way again."<a name="FNanchor_303_303"></a><a +href="#Footnote_303_303"><sup>[303]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i463" id= +"page_i463">[pg.463]</a></span> The execution of the Duc d'Enghien +is one of the most important incidents of this period, so crowded +with momentous events. The sensation of horror which it caused can +be gauged by the mental agony of Madame de Rémusat and of +others who had hitherto looked on Bonaparte as the hero of the age +and the saviour of the country. His mother hotly upbraided him, +saying it was an atrocious act, the stain of which could never be +wiped out, and that he had yielded to the advice of enemies' eager +to tarnish his fame.<a name="FNanchor_304_304"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_304_304"><sup>[304]</sup></a> Napoleon said nothing, but +shut himself up in his cabinet, revolving these terrible words, +which doubtless bore fruit in the bitter reproaches later to be +heaped upon Talleyrand for his share in the tragedy. Many royalists +who had begun to rally to his side now showed their indignation at +the deed. Chateaubriand, who was about to proceed as the envoy of +France to the Republic of Valais, at once offered his resignation +and assumed an attitude of covert defiance. And that was the +conduct of all royalists who were not dazzled by the glamour of +success or cajoled by Napoleon's favours. Many of his friends +ventured to show their horror of this Corsican vendetta; and a +<i>mot</i> which was plausibly, but it seems wrongly, attributed to +Fouché, well sums up the general opinion of that callous +society: "It was worse than a crime—it was a blunder."</p> + +<p>Scarcely had Paris recovered from this sensation when, on April +6th, Pichegru was found strangled in<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i464" id="page_i464">[pg.464]</a></span> prison; and men +silently but almost unanimously hailed it as the work of Napoleon's +Mamelukes. This judgment, however natural after the Enghien affair, +seems to be incorrect. It is true the corpse bore marks which +scarcely tallied with suicide: but Georges Cadoudal, whose cell was +hard by, heard no sound of a scuffle; and it is unlikely that so +strong a man as Pichegru would easily have succumbed to assailants. +It is therefore more probable that the conqueror of Holland, +shattered by his misfortunes and too proud to undergo a public +trial, cut short a life which already was doomed. Never have +plotters failed more ignominiously and played more completely into +the hands of their enemy. A <i>mot</i> of the Boulevards wittily +sums up the results of their puny efforts: "They came to France to +give her a king, and they gave her an Emperor."<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i465" id= +"page_i465">[pg.465]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XX</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE DAWN OF THE EMPIRE</center> + +<br> + + +<p>For some time the question of a Napoleonic dynasty had been +freely discussed; and the First Consul himself had latterly +confessed his intentions to Joseph in words that reveal his +super-human confidence and his caution: "I always intended to end +the Revolution by the establishment of heredity: but I thought that +such a step could not be taken before the lapse of five or six +years." Events, however, bore him along on a favouring tide. Hatred +of England, fear of Jacobin excesses, indignation at the royalist +schemes against his life, and finally even the execution of +Enghien, helped on the establishment of the Empire. Though moderate +men of all parties condemned the murder, the remnants of the +Jacobin party hailed it with joy. Up to this time they had a +lingering fear that the First Consul was about to play the part of +Monk. The pomp of the Tuileries and the hated Concordat seemed to +their crooked minds but the prelude to a recall of the Bourbons, +whereupon priestcraft, tithes, and feudalism would be the order of +the day. Now at last the tragedy of Vincennes threw a lurid light +into the recesses of Napoleon's ambition; and they exclaimed, "He +is one of us." It must thenceforth be war to the knife between the +Bourbons and Bonaparte; and his rule would therefore be the best +guarantee for the perpetual ownership of the lands confiscated +during the Revolution.<a name="FNanchor_305_305"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_305_305"><sup>[305]</sup></a></p> + +<p>To a materialized society that great event had come to<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i466" id= +"page_i466">[pg.466]</a></span> be little more than a big land +investment syndicate, of which Bonaparte was now to be the sole and +perpetual director. This is the inner meaning of the references to +the Social Contract which figure so oddly among the petitions for +hereditary rule. The Jacobins, except a few conscientious +stalwarts, were especially alert in the feat of making extremes +meet. Fouché, who now wriggled back into favour and office, +appealed to the Senate, only seven days after the execution, to +establish hereditary power as the only means of ending the plots +against Napoleon's life; for, as the opportunist Jacobins argued, +if the hereditary system were adopted, conspiracies to murder would +be meaningless, when, even if they struck down one man, they must +fail to shatter the system that guaranteed the Revolution.</p> + +<p>The cue having been thus dextrously given, appeals and petitions +for hereditary rule began to pour in from all parts of France. The +grand work of the reorganization of France certainly furnished a +solid claim on the nation's gratitude. The recent promulgation of +the Civil Code and the revival of material prosperity redounded to +Napoleon's glory; and with equal truth and wit he could claim the +diadem as a fit reward <i>for having revived many interests while +none had been displaced.</i> Such a remark and such an exploit +proclaim the born ruler of men. But the Senate overstepped all +bounds of decency when it thus addressed him: "You are founding a +new era: but you ought to make it last for ever: splendour is +nothing without duration." The Greeks who fawned on Persian satraps +did not more unman themselves than these pensioned sycophants, who +had lived through the days of 1789 but knew them not. This fulsome +adulation would be unworthy of notice did it not convey the most +signal proof of the danger which republics incur when men lose +sight of the higher aims of life and wallow among its sordid +interests.<a name="FNanchor_306_306"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_306_306"><sup>[306]</sup></a></p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i467" id= +"page_i467">[pg.467]</a></span> After the severe drilling of the +last four years, the Chambers voted nearly unanimously in favour of +a Napoleonic dynasty. The Corps Législatif was not in +session, and it was not convoked. The Senate, after hearing +Fouché's unmistakable hints, named a commission of its +members to report on hereditary rule, and then waited on events. +These were decided mainly in private meetings of the Council of +State, where the proposal met with some opposition from +Cambacérès, Merlin, and Thibaudeau. But of what avail +are private remonstrances when in open session opponents are dumb +and supporters vie in adulation? In the Tribunate, on April 23rd, +an obscure member named Curée proposed the adoption of the +hereditary principle. One man alone dared openly to combat the +proposal, the great Carnot; and the opposition of Curée to +Carnot might have recalled to the minds of those abject champions +of popular liberty the verse that glitters amidst the literary +rubbish of the Roman Empire:</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Victrix causa deis placuit, sed +victa Catoni."</span><br> + + +<p>The Tribunate named a commission to report; it was favourable to +the Bonapartes. The Senate voted in the same sense, three Senators +alone, among them Grégoire, Bishop of Blois, voting against +it. Sieyès and Lanjuinais were absent; but the well-salaried +lord of the manor of Crosne must have read with amused contempt the +resolution of this body, which he had designed to be the +<i>guardian of the republican constitution</i>:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"The French have conquered liberty: they wish to preserve their +conquest: they wish for repose after victory. They will owe this +glorious repose to the hereditary rule of a single man, who, raised +above all, is to defend public liberty, maintain equality, and +lower his fasces before the sovereignty of the people that +proclaims him."</p> +</div> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i468" id= +"page_i468">[pg.468]</a></span> In this way did France reduce to +practice the dogma of Rousseau with regard to the occasional and +temporary need of a dictator.<a name="FNanchor_307_307"></a><a +href="#Footnote_307_307"><sup>[307]</sup></a></p> + +<p>When the commonalty are so obsequious, any title can be taken by +the one necessary man. Napoleon at first affected to doubt whether +the title of Stadtholder would not be more seemly than that of +Emperor; and in one of the many conferences held on this topic, +Miot de Melito advocated the retention of the term Consul for its +grand republican simplicity. But it was soon seen that the term +Emperor was the only one which satisfied Napoleon's ambition and +French love of splendour. Accordingly a <i>senatus consultum</i> of +May 18th, 1804, formally decreed to him the title of Emperor of the +French. As for his former colleagues, Cambacérès and +Lebrun, they were stultified with the titles of Arch-chancellor and +Arch-treasurer of the Empire: his brother Joseph received the title +of Grand Elector, borrowed from the Holy Roman Empire, and oddly +applied to an hereditary empire where the chief <i>had</i> been +appointed: Louis was dubbed Constable: two other grand dignities, +those of Arch-chancellor of State and High Admiral, were not as yet +filled, but were reserved for Napoleon's relatives by marriage, +Eugène Beauharnais and Murat. These six grand dignitaries of +the new Empire were to be irresponsible and irremovable, and, along +with the Emperor, they formed the Grand Council of the Empire.</p> + +<p>On lesser individuals the rays of the imperial diadem cast a +fainter glow. Napoleon's uncle, Cardinal Fesch, became Grand +Almoner; Berthier, Grand Master of the Hounds; Talleyrand, Grand +Chamberlain; Duroc, Grand Marshal of the Palace; and Caulaincourt, +Master of the Horse, the acceptance of which title seemed to the +world to convict him of full complicity in the schemes for the +murder of the Duc d'Enghien. For the rest, the Emperor's mother was +to be styled <i>Madame Mère</i>; his sisters became Imperial +Highnesses, with their several establishments of ladies-in-waiting; +and Paris fluttered<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i469" id= +"page_i469">[pg.469]</a></span> with excitement at each successive +step upwards of expectant nobles, regicides, generals, and +stockjobbers towards the central galaxy of the Corsican family, +which, ten years before, had subsisted on the alms of the Republic +one and indivisible.</p> + +<p>It remained to gain over the army. The means used were profuse, +in proportion as the task was arduous. The following generals were +distinguished as Marshals of the Empire (May 19th): Berthier, +Murat, Masséna, Augereau, Lannes, Jourdan, Ney, Soult, +Brune, Davoust, Bessières, Moncey, Mortier, and Bernadotte; +two marshal's bâtons were held in reserve as a reward for +future service, and four aged generals, Lefebvre, Serrurier, +Pérignon, and Kellerman (the hero of Valmy), received the +title of honorary marshals. In one of his conversations with +Roederer, the Emperor frankly avowed his reasons for showering +these honours on his military chiefs; it was in order to assure the +imperial dignity to himself; for how could they object to this, +when they themselves received honours so lofty?<a name= +"FNanchor_308_308"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_308_308"><sup>[308]</sup></a> The confession affords a +curious instance of Napoleon's unbounded trust in the most +elementary, not to say the meanest, motives of human conduct. +Suitable rewards were bestowed on officers of the second rank. But +it was at once remarked that determined and outspoken republicans +like Suchet, Gouvion St. Cyr, and Macdonald, whose talents and +exploits far outstripped those of many of the marshals, were +excluded from their ranks. St. Cyr was at Taranto, and Macdonald, +after an enforced diplomatic mission to Copenhagen, was received on +his recall with much coolness.<a name="FNanchor_309_309"></a><a +href="#Footnote_309_309"><sup>[309]</sup></a> Other generals who +had given umbrage at the Tuileries were more effectively broken in +by a term of diplomatic banishment. Lannes at Lisbon and Brune<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i470" id= +"page_i470">[pg.470]</a></span> at Constantinople learnt a little +diplomacy and some complaisance to the head of the State, and were +taken back to Napoleon's favour. Bernadotte, though ever suspected +of Jacobinism and feared for the forceful ambition that sprang from +the blending of Gascon and Moorish blood in his veins, was now also +treated with the consideration due to one who had married Joseph +Bonaparte's sister-in-law: he received at Napoleon's hands the +house in Paris which had formerly belonged to Moreau: the exile's +estate of Grosbois, near Paris, went to reward the ever faithful +Berthier. Augereau, half cured of his Jacobinism by the disfavour +of the Directory, was now drilling a small French force and Irish +volunteers at Brest. But the Grand Army, which comprised the pick +of the French forces, was intrusted to the command of men on whom +Napoleon could absolutely rely, Davoust, Soult, and Ney; and, in +that splendid force, hatred of England and pride in Napoleon's +prowess now overwhelmed all political considerations.</p> + +<p>These arrangements attest the marvellous foresight and care +which Napoleon brought to bear on all affairs: even if the +discontented generals and troops had protested against the adoption +of the Empire and the prosecution of Moreau, they must have been +easily overpowered. In some places, as at Metz, the troops and +populace fretted against the Empire and its pretentious pomp; but +the action of the commanders soon restored order. And thus it came +to pass that even the soldiery that still cherished the Republic +raised not a musket while the Empire was founded, and Moreau was +accused of high treason.</p> + +<p>The record of the French revolutionary generals is in the main a +gloomy one. If in 1795 it had been prophesied that all those +generals who bore the tricolour to victory would vanish or bow +their heads before a Corsican, the prophet would speedily have +closed his croakings for ever. Yet the reality was even worse. +Marceau and Hoche died in the Rhineland: Kléber and Desaix +fell on the same day, by assassination and in battle: <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i471" id="page_i471">[pg.471]</a></span> +Richepanse, Leclerc, and many other brave officers rotted away in +San Domingo: Pichegru died a violent death in prison: Carnot was +retiring into voluntary exile: Masséna and Macdonald were +vegetating in inglorious ease: others were fast descending to the +rank of flunkeys; and Moreau was on his trial for high treason.</p> + +<p>Even the populace, dazzled with glitter and drunk with +sensations, suffered some qualms at seeing the victor of +Hohenlinden placed in the dock; and the grief of the scanty +survivors of the Army of the Rhine portended trouble if the forms +of justice were too much strained. Trial by jury had been recently +dispensed with in cases that concerned the life of Napoleon. +Consequently the prisoner, along with Georges and his confederates, +could be safely arraigned before judges in open court; and in that +respect the trial contrasted with the midnight court-martial of +Vincennes. Yet in no State trial have judges been subjected to more +official pressure for the purpose of assuring a conviction.<a name= +"FNanchor_310_310"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_310_310"><sup>[310]</sup></a> The cross examination of +numerous witnesses proved that Moreau had persistently refused his +help to the plot; and the utmost that could be urged against him +was that he desired Napoleon's overthrow, had three interviews with +Pichegru, and did not reveal the plot to the authorities. That is +to say, he was guilty of passively conniving at the success of a +plot which a "good citizen" ought to have denounced.</p> + +<p>For these reasons the judges sentenced him to two years' +imprisonment. This judgment excessively annoyed Napoleon, who +desired to use his imperial prerogative of pardon on Moreau's life, +not on a mere term of imprisonment; and with a show of clemency +that veiled a hidden irritation, he now released him provided that +he retired to the United States.<a name="FNanchor_311_311"></a><a +href="#Footnote_311_311"><sup>[311]</sup></a> To that land of free +men the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i472" id= +"page_i472">[pg.472]</a></span> victor of Hohenlinden retired with +a dignity which almost threw a veil over his past incapacity and +folly; and, for the present at least, men could say that the end of +his political career was nobler than Pompey's, while Napoleon's +conduct towards his rival lacked the clemency which graced the +triumph of Cæsar.</p> + +<p>As for the actual conspirators, twenty of them were sentenced to +death on June 10th, among them being the elder of the two +Polignacs, the Marquis de Rivière, and Georges Cadoudal. +Urgent efforts were made on behalf of the nobles by Josephine and +"Madame Mère"; and Napoleon grudgingly commuted their +sentence to imprisonment. But the plebeian, Georges Cadoudal, +suffered death for the cause that had enlisted all the fierce +energies of his youth and manhood. With him perished the bravest of +Bretons and the last man of action of the royalists. Thenceforth +Napoleon was not troubled by Bourbon plotters; and doubtless the +skill with which his agents had nursed this silly plot and sought +to entangle all waverers did far more than the strokes of the +guillotine to procure his future immunity. Men trembled before a +union of immeasurable power with unfathomable craft such as +recalled the days of the Emperor Tiberius.</p> + +<p>Indeed, Napoleon might now almost say that his chief foes were +the members of his own household. The question of hereditary +succession had already reawakened and intensified all the fierce +passions of the Emperor's relatives. Josephine saw in it the fatal +eclipse of a divorce sweeping towards the dazzling field of her new +life, and Napoleon is known to have thrice almost decided on this +step. She no longer had any hopes of bearing a child; and she is +reported by the compiler of the Fouché "Memoirs" to have +clutched at that absurd device, a supposititious child, which +Fouché had taken care to ridicule in advance. Whatever be +the truth of this rumour, she certainly used all her powers over +Napoleon and over <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i473" id= +"page_i473">[pg.473]</a></span> her daughter Hortense, the spouse +of Louis Bonaparte, to have their son recognized as first in the +line of direct succession. But this proposal, which shelved both +Joseph and Louis, was not only hotly resented by the eldest +brother, who claimed to be successor designate, it also aroused the +flames of jealousy in Louis himself. It was notorious that he +suspected Napoleon of an incestuous passion for Hortense, of which +his fondness for the little Charles Napoleon was maliciously urged +as proof; and the proposal, when made with trembling eagerness by +Josephine, was hurled back by Louis with brutal violence. To the +clamour of Louis and Joseph the Emperor and Josephine seemed +reluctantly to yield.</p> + +<p>New arrangements were accordingly proposed. Lucien and Jerome +having, for the present at least, put themselves out of court by +their unsatisfactory marriages, Napoleon appeared to accept a +reconciliation with Joseph and Louis, and to place them in the +order of succession, as the Senate recommended. But he still +reserved the right of adopting the son of Louis and of thus +favouring his chances of priority. Indeed, it must be admitted that +the Emperor at this difficult crisis showed conjugal tact and +affection, for which he has received scant justice at the hands of +Josephine's champions. "How could I divorce this good wife," he +said to Roederer, "because I am becoming great?" But fate seemed to +decree the divorce, which, despite the reasonings of his brothers, +he resolutely thrust aside; for the little boy on whose life the +Empress built so many fond hopes was to be cut off by an early +death in the year 1807.</p> + +<p>Then there were frequent disputes between Napoleon and Joseph. +Both of them had the Corsican's instinct in favour of +primogeniture; and hitherto Napoleon had in many ways deferred to +his elder brother. Now, however, he showed clearly that he would +brook not the slightest interference in affairs of State. And +truly, if we except Joseph's diplomatic services, he showed no +commanding gifts such as could raise him aloft along <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i474" id="page_i474">[pg.474]</a></span> +with the bewildering rush of Napoleon's fortunes. The one was an +irrepressible genius, the other was a man of culture and talent, +whose chief bent was towards literature, amours, and the art of +<i>dolce far niente</i>, except when his pride was touched: then he +was capable of bursts of passion which seemed to impose even on his +masterful second brother. Lucien, Louis, and even the youthful +Jerome, had the same intractable pride which rose defiant even +against Napoleon. He was determined that his brothers should now +take a subordinate rank, while they regarded the dynasty as largely +due to their exertions at or after Brumaire, and claimed a +proportionate reward. Napoleon, however, saw that a dynasty could +not thus be founded. As he frankly said to Roederer, a dynasty +could only take firm root in France among heirs brought up in a +palace: "I have never looked on my brothers as the natural heirs to +power: I only consider them as men fit to ward off the evils of a +minority."</p> + +<p>Joseph deeply resented this conduct. He was a Prince of the +Empire, and a Grand Elector; but he speedily found out that this +meant nothing more than occasionally presiding at the Senate, and +accordingly indulged in little acts of opposition that enraged the +autocrat. In his desire to get his brother away from Paris, the +Emperor had already recommended him to take up the profession of +arms; for he could not include him in the succession, and place +famous marshals under him if he knew nothing of an army. Joseph +perforce accepted the command of a regiment, and at thirty-six +years of age began to learn drill near Boulogne.<a name= +"FNanchor_312_312"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_312_312"><sup>[312]</sup></a> This piece of burlesque +was one day to prove infinitely regrettable. After the disaster of +Vittoria, Napoleon doubtless wished that Joseph had for ever had +free play in the tribune of the Senate rather than have dabbled in +military affairs. But in the spring and summer of 1804 the Emperor +noted his every word; so that, when he ventured to suggest that +Josephine should not be crowned at the coming<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i475" id="page_i475">[pg.475]</a></span> +coronation, Napoleon's wrath blazed forth. Why should Joseph speak +of <i>his</i> rights and <i>his</i> interests? Who had won power? +Who deserved to enjoy power? Power was his (Napoleon's) mistress, +and he dared Joseph to touch her. The Senate or Council of State +might oppose him for ten years, without his becoming a tyrant: "To +make me a tyrant one thing alone is necessary—a movement of +my family."<a name="FNanchor_313_313"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_313_313"><sup>[313]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The family, however, did not move. As happened with all the +brothers except Lucien, Joseph gave way at the critical moment. +After threatening at the Council of State to resign his Grand +Electorate and retire to Germany if his wife were compelled to bear +Josephine's train at the coronation, he was informed by the Emperor +that either he must conduct himself dutifully as the first subject +of the realm, or retire into private life, or oppose—and be +crushed. The argument was unanswerable, and Joseph yielded. To save +his own and his wife's feelings, the wording of the official +programme was altered: she was <i>to support Josephine's +mantle</i>, not <i>to bear her train</i>.</p> + +<p>In things great and small Napoleon carried his point. Although +Roederer pleaded long and earnestly that Joseph and Louis should +come next to the Emperor in the succession, and inserted a clause +in the report which he was intrusted to draw up, yet by some +skilful artifice this clause was withdrawn from the constitutional +act on which the nation was invited to express its opinion: and +France assented to a <i>plébiscite</i> for the establishment +of the Empire in Napoleon's family, which passed over Joseph and +Louis, as well as Lucien and Jerome, and vested the succession in +the natural or adopted son of Napoleon, and in the heirs male of +Joseph or Louis. Consequently these princes had no place in the +succession, except by virtue of the <i>senatus consultant</i> of +May 18th, which gave them a legal right, it is true, but without +the added sanction of the popular vote. More than three and a half +million votes were<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i476" id= +"page_i476">[pg.476]</a></span> cast for the new arrangement, a +number which exceeded those given for the Consulate and the +Consulate for Life. As usual, France accepted accomplished +facts.</p> + +<p>Matters legal and ceremonial were now approaching completion for +the coronation. Negotiations had been proceeding between the +Tuileries and the Vatican, Napoleon begging and indeed requiring +the presence of the Pope on that occasion. Pius VII. was troubled +at the thought of crowning the murderer of the Duc d'Enghien; but +he was scarcely his own master, and the dextrous hints of Napoleon +that religion would benefit if he were present at Notre Dame seem +to have overcome his first scruples, besides quickening the hope of +recovering the north of his States. He was to be disappointed in +more ways than one. Religion was to benefit only from the enhanced +prestige given to her rites in the coming ceremony, not in the +practical way that the Pope desired. And yet it was of the first +importance for Napoleon to receive the holy oil and the papal +blessing, for only so could he hope to wean the affections of +royalists from their uncrowned and exiled king. Doubtless this was +one of the chief reasons for the restoration of religion by the +Concordat, as was shrewdly seen at the time by Lafayette, who +laughingly exclaimed: "Confess, general, that your chief wish is +for the little phial."<a name="FNanchor_314_314"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_314_314"><sup>[314]</sup></a> The sally drew from the +First Consul an obscene disclaimer worthy of a drunken ostler. +Nevertheless, the little phial was now on its way.</p> + +<p>In order to divest the meeting of Pope and Emperor of any +awkward ceremony, Napoleon arranged that it should take place on +the road between Fontainebleau and Nemours, as a chance incident in +the middle of a day's hunting. The benevolent old pontiff was +reclining in his carriage, weary with the long journey through the +cold of an early winter, when he was startled to see the retinue of +his host. The contrast in every way was striking. The figure of the +Emperor had now attained the fullness which betokens abounding +health and strength: his face<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i477" id="page_i477">[pg.477]</a></span> was slightly flushed +with the hunt and the consciousness that he was master of the +situation, and his form on horseback gained a dignity from which +the shortness of his legs somewhat detracted when on foot. As he +rode up attired in full hunting costume, he might have seemed the +embodiment of triumphant strength. The Pope, on the other hand, +clad in white garments and with white silk shoes, gave an +impression of peaceful benevolence, had not his intellectual +features borne signs of the protracted anxieties of his +pontificate. The Emperor threw himself from his horse and advanced +to meet his guest, who on his side alighted, rather unwillingly, in +the mud to give and receive the embrace of welcome. Meanwhile +Napoleon's carriage had been driven up: footmen were holding open +both doors, and an officer of the Court politely handed Pius VII. +to the left door, while the Emperor, entering by the right, took +the seat of honour, and thus settled once for all the vexed +question of social precedence.<a name="FNanchor_315_315"></a><a +href="#Footnote_315_315"><sup>[315]</sup></a></p> + +<p>During the Pope's sojourn at Fontainebleau, Josephine breathed +to him her anxiety as to her marriage; it having been only a civil +contract, she feared its dissolution, and saw in the Pope's +intervention a chance of a firmer union with her consort. The +pontiff comforted her and required from Napoleon the due +solemnization of his marriage; it was therefore secretly performed +by Napoleon's uncle, Cardinal Fesch, two days before the +coronation.<a name="FNanchor_316_316"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_316_316"><sup>[316]</sup></a></p> + +<p>It was not enough, however, that the successor of St. Peter +should grace the coronation with his presence:<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i478" id="page_i478">[pg.478]</a></span> +the Emperor sought to touch the imagination of men by figuring as +the successor of Charlemagne. We here approach one of the most +interesting experiments of the modern world, which, if successful, +would profoundly have altered the face of Europe and the character +of its States. Even in its failure it attests Napoleon's vivid +imagination and boundless mental resources. He aspired to be more +than Emperor of the French: he wished to make his Empire a +cosmopolitan realm, whose confines might rival those of the Holy +Roman Empire of one thousand years before, and embrace scores of +peoples in a grand, well-ordered European polity.</p> + +<p>Already his dominions included a million of Germans in the +Rhineland, Italians of Piedmont, Genoa, and Nice, besides +Savoyards, Genevese, and Belgians. How potent would be his +influence on the weltering chaos of German and Italian States, if +these much-divided peoples learnt to look on him as the successor +to the glories of Charlemagne! And this honour he was now to claim. +However delusive was the parallel between the old semi-tribal +polity and modern States where the peoples were awakening to a +sense of their nationality, Napoleon was now in a position to clear +the way for his great experiment. He had two charms wherewith to +work, material prosperity and his gift of touching the popular +imagination. The former of these was already silently working in +his favour: the latter was first essayed at the coronation.</p> + +<p>Already, after a sojourn at Boulogne, he had visited +Aix-la-Chapelle, the city where Charlemagne's relics are entombed, +and where Victor Hugo in some of his sublimest verse has pictured +Charles V. kneeling in prayer to catch the spirit of the +mediæval hero. Thither went Napoleon, but in no suppliant +mood; for when Josephine was offered the arm-bones of the great +dead, she also proudly replied that she would not deprive the city +of that precious relic, especially as she had the support of an arm +as great as that of Charlemagne.<a name="FNanchor_317_317"></a><a +href="#Footnote_317_317"><sup>[317]</sup></a> The insignia and the +sword of that monarch were now brought to<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i479" id="page_i479">[pg.479]</a></span> Paris, and shed +on the ceremony of coronation that historic gleam which was needed +to redeem it from tawdry commonplace.</p> + +<p>All that money and art could do to invest the affair with pomp +and circumstance had already been done. The advice of the new +Master of the Ceremonies, M. de Ségur, and the hints of the +other nobles who had rallied to the new Empire, had been carefully +collated by the untiring brain that now watched over France. The +sum of 1,123,000 francs had been expended on the coronation robes +of Emperor and Empress, and far more on crowns and tiaras. The +result was seen in costumes of matchless splendour; the Emperor +wore a French coat of red velvet embroidered in gold, a short cloak +adorned with bees and the collar of the Legion of Honour in +diamonds; and at the archbishop's palace he assumed the long purple +robe of velvet profusely ornamented with ermine, while his brow was +encircled by a wreath of laurel, meed of mighty conquerors. In the +pommel of his sword flashed the famous Pitt diamond, which, after +swelling the family fortune of the British statesman, fell to the +Regent of France, and now graced the coronation of her Dictator. +The Empress, radiant with joy at her now indissoluble union, bore +her splendours with an easy grace that charmed all beholders and +gave her an almost girlish air. She wore a robe of white satin, +trimmed with silver and gold and besprinkled with golden bees: her +waist and shoulders glittered with diamonds, while on her brows +rested a diadem of the finest diamonds and pearls valued at more +than a million francs.<a name="FNanchor_318_318"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_318_318"><sup>[318]</sup></a> The curious might remember +that for a necklace of less than twice that value the fair fame of +Marie Antoinette had been clouded over and the House of Bourbon +shaken to its base.</p> + +<p>The stately procession began with an odd incident: Napoleon and +Josephine, misled apparently by the<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i480" id="page_i480">[pg.480]</a></span> all-pervading +splendour of the new state carriage, seated themselves on the wrong +side, that is, in the seats destined for Joseph and Louis: the +mistake was at once made good, with some merriment; but the +superstitious saw in it an omen of evil.<a name= +"FNanchor_319_319"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_319_319"><sup>[319]</sup></a> And now, amidst much +enthusiasm and far greater curiosity, the procession wound along +through the Rue Nicaise and the Rue St. Honoré—streets +where Bonaparte had won his spurs on the day of +Vendémiaire—over the Pont-Neuf, and so to the +venerable cathedral, where the Pope, chilled by long waiting, was +ready to grace the ceremony. First he anointed Emperor and Empress +with the holy oil; then, at the suitable place in the Mass he +blessed their crowns, rings, and mantles, uttering the traditional +prayers for the possession of the virtues and powers which each +might seem to typify. But when he was about to crown the Emperor, +he was gently waved aside, and Napoleon with his own hands crowned +himself. A thrill ran through the august assembly, either of pity +for the feelings of the aged pontiff or of admiration at the "noble +and legitimate pride" of the great captain who claimed as wholly +his own the crown which his own right arm had won. Then the +<i>cortège</i> slowly returned to the middle of the nave, +where a lofty throne had been reared.</p> + +<p>Another omen now startled those who laid store by trifles. It +was noticed that the sovereigns in ascending the steps nearly fell +backwards under the weight of their robes and trains, though in the +case of Josephine the anxious moment may have been due to the +carelessness, whether accidental or studied, of her +"mantle-bearers." But to those who looked beneath the surface of +things was not this an all-absorbing portent, that all this +religious pomp should be removed by scarcely eleven years from the +time when this same nave echoed to the shouts and gleamed with the +torches of the worshippers of the newly enthroned Goddess of +Reason?</p> + +<p>Revolutionary feelings were not wholly dead, but they now vented +themselves merely in gibes. On the night<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i481" id="page_i481">[pg.481]</a></span> before the +coronation the walls of Paris were adorned with posters announcing: +<i>The last Representation of the French Revolution—for the +Benefit of a poor Corsican Family.</i> And after the event there +were inquiries why the new throne had no <i>glands d'or;</i> the +answer suggested because it was <i>sanglant</i>.[320] Beyond these +quips and jests the Jacobins and royalists did not go. When the +phrase <i>your subjects</i> was publicly assigned to the Corps +Législatif by its courtier-like president, Fontanes, there +was a flutter of wrath among those who had hoped that the new +Empire was to be republican. But it quickly passed away; and no +Frenchman, except perhaps Carnot, made so manly a protest as the +man of genius at Vienna, who had composed the "Sinfonia +Eroïca," and with grand republican simplicity inscribed it, +"Beethoven à Bonaparte." When the master heard that his +former hero had taken the imperial crown, he tore off the +dedication with a volley of curses on the renegade and tyrant; and +in later years he dedicated the immortal work to the <i>memory</i> +of a great man.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i482" id= +"page_i482">[pg.482]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXI</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE BOULOGNE FLOTILLA</center> + +<br> + + +<p>The establishment of the Empire, as has been seen, provoked few +signs of opposition from the French armies, once renowned for their +Jacobinism; and by one or two instances of well-timed clemency, the +Emperor gained over even staunch republicans. Notably was this the +case with a brave and stalwart colonel, who, enraged at the first +volley of cheers for the Empire, boldly ordered "Silence in the +ranks." At once Napoleon made him general and appointed him one of +his aides-de-camp; and this brave officer, Mouton by name, was +later to gain glory and the title of Comte de Lobau in the Wagram +campaign. These were the results of a timely act of generosity, +such as touches the hearts of any soldiery and leads them to shed +their blood like water. And so when Napoleon, after the coronation, +distributed to the garrison of Paris their standards, topped now by +the imperial eagles, the great Champ de Mars was a scene of wild +enthusiasm. The thunderous shouts that acclaimed the prowess of the +new Frankish leader were as warlike as those which ever greeted the +hoisting of a Carolingian King on the shields of his lieges. +Distant nations heard the threatening din and hastened to muster +their forces for the fray.</p> + +<p>As yet only England was at war with the Emperor. Against her +Napoleon now prepared to embattle the might of his vast Empire. The +preparations on the northern coast were now wellnigh complete, and +there was only one question to be solved—how to "leap the +ditch." It seems strange to us now that no attempt <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i483" id="page_i483">[pg.483]</a></span> +was made to utilize the great motive force of the nineteenth +century—steam power. And the French memoir-writers, Marmont, +Bourrienne, Pasquier, and Bausset, have expressed their surprise +that so able a chief as Napoleon should have neglected this potent +ally.</p> + +<p>Their criticisms seem to be prompted by later reflections rather +than based on an accurate statement of facts. In truth, the +nineteenth-century Hercules was still in his cradle. Henry Bell had +in 1800 experimented with a steamer on the Clyde; but it aroused +the same trembling curiosity as Trevithick's first locomotive, or +as Fulton's first paddle-boat built on the Seine in 1803. In fact, +this boat of the great American inventor was so weak that, when at +anchor, it broke in half during a gale, thus ridding itself of the +weight of its cumbrous engine. With his usual energy, Fulton built +a larger and stronger craft, which not only carried the machinery, +but, in August, 1803, astonished the members of the French +Institute by moving, though with much circumspection.</p> + +<p>Fulton, however, was disappointed, and if we may judge from the +scanty records of his life, he never offered this invention to +Napoleon.<a name="FNanchor_321_321"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_321_321"><sup>[321]</sup></a> He felt the need of better +machinery, and as this could only be procured in England, he gave +the order to a Birmingham firm, which engined his first successful +boat, the "Clermont," launched on the Hudson in 1807. But for the +war, perhaps, Fulton would have continued to live in Paris and made +his third attempt there. He certainly never offered his imperfect +steamship to the First Consul. Probably the fact that his first +boat foundered when at anchor in the Seine would have procured him +a rough reception, if he had offered to equip the whole of the +Boulogne flotilla with an invention which had sunk its first +receptacle and propelled the second boat at a snail's pace.</p> + +<p>Besides, he had already met with one repulse from Napoleon. He +had offered, first to the Directory and later to the First Consul, +a boat which he claimed would "deliver France and the world from +British oppression."</p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i484" id= +"page_i484">[pg.484]</a></span> This was a sailing vessel, which +could sink under water and then discharge under a hostile ship a +"carcass" of gunpowder or <i>torpedo</i>—another invention of +his fertile brain. The Directory at once repulsed him. Bonaparte +instructed Monge, Laplace, and Volney to report on this submarine +or "plunging" boat, which had a partial success. It succeeded in +blowing up a small vessel in the harbour at Brest in July, 1801; +but the Commission seems to have reported unfavourably on its +utility for offensive purposes. In truth, as Fulton had not then +applied motive power to this invention, the name "plunging boat" +conveyed an exaggerated notion of its functions, which were more +suited to a life of ascetic contemplation than of destructive +activity.</p> + +<p>It appears that the memoir-writers named above have confused the +two distinct inventions of Fulton just referred to. In the latter +half of 1803 he repaired to England, and later on to the United +States, and after the year 1803 he seems to have had neither the +will nor the opportunity to serve Napoleon. In England he offered +his torpedo patent to the English Admiralty, expressing his hatred +of the French Emperor as a "wild beast who ought to be hunted +down." Little was done with the torpedo in England, except to blow +up a vessel off Walmer as a proof of what it could do. It is +curious also that when Bell offered his paddle-boat to the +Admiralty it was refused, though Nelson is said to have spoken in +its favour. The official mind is everywhere hostile to new +inventions; and Marmont suggestively remarks that Bonaparte's +training as an artillerist, and his experience of the inconvenience +and expense resulting from the adoption of changes in that arm, had +no slight influence in setting him against all innovations.</p> + +<p>But, to resume our description of the Boulogne flotilla, it may +be of interest to give some hitherto unpublished details about the +flat-bottomed boats, and then to pass in brief review Napoleon's +plans for assuring a temporary command of the Channel.</p> + +<p>It is clear that he at first relied almost solely on the <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i485" id= +"page_i485">[pg.485]</a></span> flotilla. After one of his visits +to Boulogne, he wrote on November 23rd, 1803, to Admiral Gantheaume +that he would soon have on the northern coast 1,300 flat-bottomed +boats able to carry 100,000 men, while the Dutch flotilla would +transport 60,000. "Do you think it will take us to the English +coast? Eight hours of darkness which favour us would decide the +fate of the universe." There is no mention of any convoying fleet: +the First Consul evidently believed that the flotilla could beat +off any attack at sea. This letter offers a signal proof of his +inability, at least at that time, to understand the risks of naval +warfare. But though his precise and logical mind seems then to have +been incapable of fully realizing the conditions of war on the +fickle, troublous, and tide-swept Channel, his admirals urgently +warned him against trusting to shallow, flat-bottomed boats to beat +the enemy out at sea; for though these <i>praams</i> in their +coasting trips repelled the attacks of British cruisers, which +dared not come into shallow waters, it did not follow that they +would have the same success in mid-Channel, far away from coast +defences and amidst choppy waves that must render the guns of +keelless boats wellnigh useless.<a name="FNanchor_320_320"></a><a +href="#Footnote_320_320"><sup>[320]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The present writer, after going through the reports of our +admiral stationed in the Downs, is convinced that our seamen felt a +supreme contempt for the flat-bottomed boats when at sea. After the +capture of one of them, by an English gun-brig, Admiral Montagu +reported, November 23rd, 1803:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"It is impossible to suppose for an instant that anything +effective can be produced by such miserable tools, equally +ill-calculated for the grand essentials in a maritime formation, +battle and speed: that floored as this wretched vessel is, she +cannot hug the wind, but must drift bodily to leeward, which<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i486" id= +"page_i486">[pg.486]</a></span> indeed was the cause of her +capture; for, having got a little to leeward of Boulogne Bay, it +was impossible to get back and she was necessitated to steer large +for Calais. On the score of battle, she has one long 18-pounder, +without breeching or tackle, traversing on a slide, which can only +be fired stem on. The 8-pounder is mounted aft, but is a fixture: +so that literally, if one of our small boats was to lay alongside +there would be nothing but musketry to resist, and those +[<i>sic</i>] placed in the hands of poor wretches weakened by the +effect of seasickness, exemplified when this gun-boat was +captured—the soldiers having retreated to the hold, incapable +of any energy or manly exertion.... In short, Sir, these vessels in +my mind are completely contemptible and ridiculous, and I therefore +conclude that the numbers collected at Boulogne are to keep our +attention on the <i>qui vive</i>, and to gloss over the real attack +meditated from other points."</p> +</div> + +<p>The vessel which provoked the contempt of our admiral was not +one of the smallest class: she was 58-1/3 ft. long, 14-1/2 ft. +wide, drew 3 ft. forward and 4 ft. aft: her sides rose 3 ft. above +the water, and her capacity was 35 tons. The secret intelligence of +the Admiralty for the years 1804 and 1805 also shows that Dutch +sailors were equally convinced of the unseaworthiness of these +craft: Admiral Verhuell plainly told the French Emperor that, +however flatterers might try to persuade him of the feasibility of +the expedition, "nothing but disgrace could be expected." The same +volume (No. 426) contains a report of the capture of two of the +larger class of French <i>chaloupes</i> off Cape La Hogue. Among +the prisoners was a young French royalist named La Bourdonnais: +when forced by the conscription to enter Napoleon's service, he +chose to serve with the <i>chaloupes</i> "because of his conviction +that all these flotillas were nothing but bugbears and would never +attempt the invasion so much talked of and in which so few persons +really believe." The same was the opinion of the veteran General +Dumouriez, who, now an exile in England, drew up for our Government +a long report on the proposed invasion and the means of thwarting +it. The <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i487" id= +"page_i487">[pg.487]</a></span> reports of our spies also prove +that all experienced seamen on the Continent declared Napoleon's +project to be either a ruse or a foolhardy venture.</p> + +<p>The compiler of the Ney "Memoirs," who was certainly well +acquainted with the opinions of that Marshal, then commanding the +troops at Boulogne, also believed that the flotilla was only able +to serve as a gigantic ferry.<a name="FNanchor_322_322"></a><a +href="#Footnote_322_322"><sup>[322]</sup></a> The French admirals +were still better aware of the terrible risks to their crowded +craft in a fight out at sea. They also pointed out that the +difference in the size, draught, and speed of the boats must cause +the dispersion of the flotilla, when its parts might fall a prey to +the more seaworthy vessels of the enemy. Indeed, the only chance of +crossing without much loss seemed to be offered by a protracted +calm, when the British cruisers would be helpless against a +combined attack of a cloud of row-boats. The risks would be greater +during a fog, when the crowd of boats must be liable to collision, +stranding on shoals, and losing their way. Even the departure of +this quaint armada presented grave difficulties: it was found that +the whole force could not clear the harbour in a single tide; and a +part of the flotilla must therefore remain exposed to the British +fire before the whole mass could get under way. For all these +reasons Bruix, the commander of the flotilla, and Decrès, +Minister of Marine, dissuaded Napoleon from attempting the descent +without the support of a powerful covering fleet.</p> + +<p>Napoleon's correspondence shows that, by the close of the year +1803, he had abandoned that first fatuous scheme which gained him +from the wits of Paris the soubriquet of "Don Quixote de la +Manche."<a name="FNanchor_323_323"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_323_323"><sup>[323]</sup></a> On the 7th of December he +wrote to Gantheaume, maritime prefect at Toulon, urging him to +press on the completion of his nine ships of the line and five +frigates, and sketching plans of a naval combination that promised +to insure<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i488" id= +"page_i488">[pg.488]</a></span> the temporary command of the +Channel. Of these only two need be cited here:</p> + +<p>1. "The Toulon squadron will set out on 20th <i>nivôse</i> +(January 10th, 1804), will arrive before Cadiz (or Lisbon), will +find there the Rochefort squadron, will sail on without making +land, between Brest and the Sorlingues, will touch at Cape La +Hogue, and will pass in forty-eight hours before Boulogne: thence +it will continue to the mouth of the Scheldt (there procuring +masts, cordage, and all needful things)—or perhaps to +Cherbourg.</p> + +<p>2. "The Rochefort squadron will set out on 20th +<i>nivôse,</i> will reach Toulon the 20th +<i>pluviôse:</i> the united squadrons will set sail in +<i>ventôse</i>, and arrive in <i>germinal</i> before +Boulogne—that is rather late. In any case the Egyptian +Expedition will cover the departure of the Toulon squadron: +everything will be managed <i>so that Nelson will first sail for +Alexandria</i>."</p> + +<p>These schemes reveal the strong and also the weak qualities of +Napoleon. He perceived the strength of the central position which +France enjoyed on her four coasts; and he now contrived all his +dispositions, both naval and political, so as to tempt Nelson away +eastwards from Toulon during the concentration of the French fleet +in the Channel; and for this purpose he informed the military +officers at Toulon that their destination was Taranto and the +Morea. It was to these points that he wished to decoy Nelson; for +this end had he sent his troops to Taranto, and kept up French +intrigues in Corfu, the Morea, and Egypt; it was for this purpose +that he charged that wily spy Méhée to inform Drake +that the Toulon fleet was to take 40,000 French troops to the +Morea, and that the Brest fleet, with 200 highly trained Irish +officers, was intended solely for Ireland. But, while displaying +consummate guile, he failed to allow for the uncertainties of +operations conducted by sea. Ignoring the patent fact that the +Toulon fleet was blockaded by Nelson, and that of Rochefort by +Collingwood, he fixed the dates of their departure and junction as +though he were ordering the movements of a <i>corps +d'armée</i> in Provence; and this craving for certainty was +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i489" id= +"page_i489">[pg.489]</a></span> to mar his naval plans and dog his +footsteps with the shadow of disaster.<a name= +"FNanchor_324_324"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_324_324"><sup>[324]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The plan of using the Toulon fleet to cover an invasion of +England was not entirely new. As far back as the days of De +Tourville, a somewhat similar plan had been devised: the French +Channel and Atlantic fleets under that admiral were closely to +engage Russell off the Isle of Wight, while the Toulon squadron, +sailing northwards, was to collect the French transports on the +coasts of Normandy for the invasion of England. Had Napoleon +carefully studied French naval history, he would have seen that the +disaster of La Hogue was largely caused by the severe weather which +prevented the rendezvous, and brought about a hasty and ill-advised +alteration in the original scheme. But of all subjects on which he +spoke as an authority, there was perhaps not one that he had so +inadequately studied as naval strategy: yet there was none wherein +the lessons of experience needed so carefully to be laid to +heart.</p> + +<p>Fortune seemed to frown on Napoleon's naval schemes: yet she was +perhaps not unkind in thwarting them in their first stages. Events +occurred which early suggested a deviation from the combinations +noticed above. In the last days of 184893, hearing that the English +were about to attack Martinique, he at once wrote to Gantheaume, +urging him to despatch the Toulon squadron under Admiral +Latouche-Tréville for the rescue of this important island. +The commander of the troops, Cervoni, was to be told that the +expedition aimed at the Morea, so that spies might report this news +to Nelson, and it is clear from our admiral's despatches that the +ruse half succeeded. Distracted, however, by the thought that the +French might, after all, aim at Ireland, Nelson clung<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i490" id="page_i490">[pg.490]</a></span> to +the vicinity of Toulon, and his untiring zeal kept in harbour the +most daring admiral in the French navy, who, despite his advanced +age, excited an enthusiasm that none other could arouse.</p> + +<p>To him, in spite of his present ill-fortune, Napoleon intrusted +the execution of a scheme bearing date July 2nd, 1804. Latouche was +ordered speedily to put to sea with his ten ships of the line and +four frigates, to rally a French warship then at Cadiz, release the +five ships of the line and four frigates blockaded at Rochefort by +Collingwood, and then sweep the Channel and convoy the flotilla +across the straits. This has been pronounced by Jurien de la +Gravière the best of all Napoleon's plans: it exposed ships +that had long been in harbour only to a short ocean voyage, and it +was free from the complexity of the later and more grandiose +schemes.</p> + +<p>But fate interposed and carried off the intrepid commander by +that worst of all deaths for a brave seaman, death by disease in +harbour, where he was shut up by his country's foes (August +20th).</p> + +<p>Villeneuve was thereupon appointed to succeed him, while +Missiessy held command at Rochefort. The choice of Villeneuve has +always been considered strange; and the riddle is not solved by the +declaration of Napoleon that he considered that Villeneuve at the +Nile showed his <i>good fortune</i> in escaping with the only +French ships which survived that disaster. A strange reason this: +to appoint an admiral commander of an expedition that was to change +the face of the world because his good fortune consisted in +escaping from Nelson!<a name="FNanchor_325_325"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_325_325"><sup>[325]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Napoleon now began to widen his plans. According to the scheme +of September 29th, three expeditions were now to set out; the first +was to assure the safety of the French West Indies; the second was +to recover the Dutch colonies in those seas and reinforce the +French troops still holding out in part of St. Domingo; while<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i491" id= +"page_i491">[pg.491]</a></span> the third had as its objective West +Africa and St. Helena. The Emperor evidently hoped to daze us by +simultaneous attacks in Africa, America, and also in Asiatic +waters. After these fleets had set sail in October and November, +1804, Ireland was to be attacked by the Brest fleet now commanded +by Gantheaume. Slipping away from the grip of Cornwallis, he was to +pass out of sight of land and disembark his troops in Lough Swilly. +These troops, 18,000 strong, were under that redoubtable fighter, +Augereau; and had they been landed, the history of the world might +have been different. Leaving them to revolutionize Ireland, +Gantheaume was to make for the English Channel, touch at Cherbourg +for further orders, and proceed to Boulogne to convoy the flotilla +across: or, if the weather prevented this, as was probable in +January, he was to pass on to the Texel, rally the seven Dutch +battleships and the transports with their 25,000 troops, beat back +down the English Channel and return to Ireland. Napoleon counted on +the complete success of one or other of Gantheaume's moves: +"Whether I have 30,000 or 40,000 men in Ireland, or whether I am +both in England and Ireland, the war is ours."<a name= +"FNanchor_326_326"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_326_326"><sup>[326]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The objections to the September combination are fairly obvious. +It was exceedingly improbable that the three fleets could escape at +the time and in the order which Napoleon desired, or that crews +enervated by long captivity in port would succeed in difficult +operations when thrust out into the wintry gales of the Atlantic +and the Channel. Besides, success could only be won after a serious +dispersion of French naval resources; and the West Indian +expeditions must be regarded as prompted quite as much by a +colonial policy as by a determination to overrun England or +Ireland.<a name="FNanchor_327_327"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_327_327"><sup>[327]</sup></a></p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i492" id= +"page_i492">[pg.492]</a></span> At any rate, if the Emperor's aim +was merely to distract us by widely diverging attacks, that could +surely have been accomplished without sending twenty-six sail of +the line into American and African waters, and leaving to +Gantheaume so disproportionate an amount of work and danger. This +September combination may therefore be judged distinctly inferior +to that of July, which, with no scattering of the French forces, +promised to decoy Nelson away to the Morea and Egypt, while the +Toulon and Rochefort squadrons proceeded to Boulogne.</p> + +<p>The September schemes hopelessly miscarried. Gantheaume did not +elude Cornwallis, and remained shut up in Brest. Missiessy escaped +from Rochefort, sailed to the West Indies, where he did some damage +and then sailed home again. "He had taken a pawn and returned to +his own square."<a name="FNanchor_328_328"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_328_328"><sup>[328]</sup></a> Villeneuve slipped out +from Toulon (January 19th, 1805), while Nelson was sheltering from +westerly gales under the lee of Sardinia; but the storm which +promised to renew his reputation for good luck speedily revealed +the weakness of his ships and crews.</p> + +<p>"My fleet looked well at Toulon," he wrote to Decrès, +Minister of Marine, "but when the storm came on, things changed at +once. The sailors were not used to storms: they were lost among the +mass of soldiers: these from sea-sickness lay in heaps about the +decks: it was impossible to work the ships: hence yard-arms were +broken and sails were carried away: our losses resulted as much +from clumsiness and inexperience as from defects in the materials +delivered by the arsenals."<a name="FNanchor_329_329"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_329_329"><sup>[329]</sup></a></p> + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_i493" id= +"page_i493">[pg.493]</a></span> Inexperience and sea-sickness were +factors that found no place in Napoleon's calculations; but they +compelled Villeneuve to return to Toulon to refit; and there Nelson +closed on him once more.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile events were transpiring which seemed to add to +Napoleon's naval strength and to the difficulties of his foes. On +January 4th, 1805, he concluded with Spain a treaty which added her +naval resources to those of France, Holland, and Northern Italy. +The causes that led to an open rupture between England and Spain +were these. Spain had been called upon by Napoleon secretly to pay +him the stipulated sum of 72,000,000 francs a year (see p. 437), +and she reluctantly consented. This was, of course, a covert act of +hostility against England; and the Spanish Government was warned at +the close of 1803 that, if this subsidy continued to be paid to +France, it would constitute "at any future period, when +circumstances may render it necessary, a just cause of war" between +England and Spain. Far from complying with this reasonable +remonstrance, the Spanish Court yielded to Napoleon's imperious +order to repair five French warships that had taken refuge in +Ferrol from our cruisers, and in July, 1804, allowed French seamen +to travel thither overland to complete the crews of these vessels. +Thus for some months our warships had to observe Ferrol, as if it +were a hostile port.</p> + +<p>Clearly, this state of things could not continue; and when the +protests of our ambassador at Madrid were persistently evaded or +ignored, he was ordered, in the month of September, to leave that +capital unless he received satisfactory assurances. He did not +leave until November 10th, and before that time a sinister event +had taken place. The British Ministry determined that Spanish +treasure-ships from South America should not<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i494" id="page_i494">[pg.494]</a></span> be +allowed to land at Cadiz the sinews of war for France, and sent +orders to our squadrons to stop those ships. Four frigates were +told off for that purpose. On the 5th of October they sighted the +four rather smaller Spanish frigates that bore the ingots of Peru, +and summoned them to surrender, thereafter to be held in pledge. +The Spaniards, nobly resolving to yield only to overwhelming force, +refused; and in the ensuing fight one of their ships blew up, +whereupon the others hauled down their flags and were taken to +England. Resenting this action, Spain declared war on December +12th, 1804.</p> + +<p>Stripped of all the rodomontade with which French historians +have enveloped this incident, the essential facts are as follows. +Napoleon compelled Spain by the threat of invasion to pay him a +large subsidy: England declared this payment, and accompanying +acts, to be acts of war; Spain shuffled uneasily between the two +belligerents but continued to supply funds to Napoleon and to +shelter and repair his warships; thereupon England resolved to cut +off her American subsidies, but sent a force too small to preclude +the possibility of a sea-fight; the fight took place, with a +lamentable result, which changed the covert hostility of Spain into +active hostility.</p> + +<p>Public opinion and popular narratives are, however, fashioned by +sentiment rather than founded on evidence; accordingly, Britain's +prestige suffered from this event. The facts, as currently +reported, seemed to convict her of an act of piracy; and few +persons on the Continent or among the Whig coteries of Westminster +troubled to find out whether Spain had not been guilty of acts of +hostility and whether the French Emperor was not the author of the +new war. Undoubtedly it was his threatening pressure on Spain that +had compelled her to her recent action: but that pressure had been +for the most part veiled by diplomacy, while Britain's retort was +patent and notorious. Consequently, every version of this incident +that was based merely on newspaper reports condemned her conduct as +brutally piratical; and only those who have delved into archives +have discovered the real <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i495" +id="page_i495">[pg.495]</a></span> facts of the case.<a name= +"FNanchor_330_330"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_330_330"><sup>[330]</sup></a> Napoleon's letter to the +King of Spain quoted on p. 437 shows that even before the war he +was seeking to drag him into hostilities with England, and he +continued to exert a remorseless pressure on the Court of Madrid; +it left two alternatives open to England, either to see Napoleon +close his grip on Spain and wield her naval resources when she was +fully prepared for war, or to precipitate the rupture. It was the +alternative, <i>mutatis mutandis</i>, presented to George III. and +the elder Pitt in 1761, when the King was for delay and his +Minister was for war at once. That instance had proved the father's +foresight; and now at the close of 1804 the younger Pitt might +flatter himself that open war was better than a treacherous +peace.</p> + +<p>In lieu of a subsidy Spain now promised to provide from +twenty-five to twenty-nine sail of the line, and to have them ready +by the close of March. On his side, Napoleon agreed to guarantee +the integrity of the Spanish dominions, and to regain Trinidad for +her. The sequel will show how his word was kept.</p> + +<p>The conclusion of this alliance placed the hostile navies almost +on an equality, at least on paper. But, as the equipment of the +Spanish fleet was very slow, Napoleon for the present adhered to +his plan of September, 1804, with the result already detailed. Not +until March 2nd, 1805, do we find the influence of the Spanish +alliance observable in his naval schemes. On that date he issued +orders to Villeneuve and Gantheaume, which assigned to the latter +most of the initiative, as also the chief<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i496" id="page_i496">[pg.496]</a></span> command after +their assumed junction. Gantheaume, with the Brest fleet, after +eluding the blockaders, was to proceed first to Ferrol, capture the +British ships off that port and, reinforced by the French and +Spanish ships there at anchor, proceed across the Atlantic to the +appointed rendezvous at Martinique. The Toulon squadron under +Villeneuve was at the same time to make for Cadiz, and, after +collecting the Spanish ships, set sail for the West Indies. Then +the armada was to return with all speed to Boulogne, where Napoleon +expected it to arrive between June 10th and July 10th.<a name= +"FNanchor_331_331"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_331_331"><sup>[331]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Diverse judgments have been passed on this, the last and +grandest of Napoleon's naval combinations. On the one hand, it is +urged that, as the French fleets had seen no active service, a long +voyage was necessary to impart experience and efficiency before +matters were brought to the touch in the Straits of Dover; and as +Britain and France both regarded their West Indian islands as their +most valued possessions, a voyage thither would be certain to draw +British sails in eager pursuit. Finally, those islands dotted over +a thousand miles of sea presented a labyrinth wherein it would be +easy for the French to elude Nelson's cruisers.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, it may be urged that the success of the plan +depended on too many <i>ifs</i>. Assuming that the Toulon and Brest +squadrons escaped the blockaders, their subsequent movements would +most probably be reported by some swift frigate off Gibraltar or +Ferrol. The chance of our divining the French plans was surely as +great as that Gantheaume and Villeneuve would unite in the West +Indies, ravage the British possessions, and return in undiminished +force. The English fleets, after weary months of blockade, were +adepts at scouting; their wings covered with ease a vast space, +their frigates rapidly signalled news to the flagship, and their +concentration was swift and decisive. Prompt to note every varying +puff of wind, they bade fair to overhaul their enemies when the +chase began in earnest, and when<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i497" id="page_i497">[pg.497]</a></span> once the battle was +joined, numbers counted for little: the English crews, inured to +fights on the ocean, might be trusted to overwhelm the foe by their +superior experience and discipline, hampered as the French now were +by the lumbering and defective warships of Spain.</p> + +<p>Napoleon, indeed, amply discounted the chances of failure of his +ultimate design, the command of the Channel. The ostensible aims of +the expedition were colonial. The French fleets were to take on +board 11,908 soldiers, of whom three-fourths were destined for the +West Indies; and, in case Gantheaume did not join Villeneuve at +Martinique, the latter was ordered, after waiting forty days, to +set sail for the Canaries, there to intercept the English convoys +bound for Brazil and the East Indies.</p> + +<p>In the spring and summer of 1805 Napoleon's correspondence +supplies copious proof of the ideas and plans that passed through +his brain. After firmly founding the new Empire, he journeyed into +Piedmont, thence to Milan for his coronation as King of Italy, and +finally to Genoa. In this absence of three months from Paris +(April-July) many lengthy letters to Decrès attest the +alternations of his hopes and fears. He now keeps the possibility +of failure always before him: his letters no longer breathe the +crude confidence of 1803: and while facing the chances of failure +in the West Indies, his thoughts swing back to the Orient:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"According to all the news that I receive, five or six thousand +men in the [East] Indies would ruin the English Company. Supposing +that our [West] Indian expedition is not fully successful, and I +cannot reach the grand end which will demolish all the rest, I +think we must arrange the [East] Indian expedition for September. +We have now greater resources for it than some time ago."<a name= +"FNanchor_332_332"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_332_332"><sup>[332]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>How tenacious is his will! He here recurs to the plan laid down +before Decaen sailed to the East Indies in<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i498" id="page_i498">[pg.498]</a></span> March, 1803. +Even the prospects of a continental coalition fail to dispel that +gorgeous dream. But amid much that is visionary we may discern this +element of practicality: in case the blow against England misses +the mark, Napoleon has provided himself with a splendid alternative +that will banish all thought of failure.</p> + +<p>It is needless to recount here the well-known details of +Villeneuve's voyage and Nelson's pursuit. The Toulon and Cadiz +fleets got clear away to the West Indies, and after a last glance +towards the Orient, Nelson set out in pursuit. On the 4th of June +the hostile fleets were separated by only a hundred miles of sea; +and Villeneuve, when off Antigua, hearing that Nelson was so close, +decided forthwith to return to Europe. After disembarking most of +his troops and capturing a fleet of fourteen British merchantmen, +he sailed for Ferrol, in pursuance of orders just received from +Napoleon, which bade him rally fifteen allied ships at that port, +and push on to Brest, where he must release Gantheaume.</p> + +<p>In this gigantic war game, where the Atlantic was the +chess-board, and the prize a world-empire, the chances were at this +time curiously even. Fortune had favoured Villeneuve but checked +Gantheaume. Villeneuve successfully dodged Nelson in the West +Indies, but ultimately the pursuer divined the enemy's scheme of +returning to Europe, and sent a swift brig to warn the Admiralty, +which was thereby informed of the exact position of affairs on July +8th, that is, twelve days before Napoleon himself knew of the state +of affairs. On July 20th, the French Emperor heard, <i>through +English newspapers</i>, that his fleet was on its return voyage: +and his heart beat high with hope that Villeneuve would now gather +up his squadrons in the Bay of Biscay and appear before Boulogne in +overwhelming force; for he argued that, even if Villeneuve should +keep right away from Brest, and leave blockaders and blockaded face +to face, he would still be at least sixteen ships stronger than any +force that could be brought against him.</p> + +<p>But Napoleon was now committing the blunder which <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i499" id="page_i499">[pg.499]</a></span> he +so often censured in his inferiors. He was "making pictures" to +himself, pictures in which the gleams of fortune were reserved for +the tricolour flag, and gloom and disaster shrouded the Union Jack; +he conceived that Nelson had made for Jamaica, and that the British +squadrons were engaged in chasing phantom French fleets around +Ireland or to the East Indies. "We have not to do," he said, "with +a far-seeing, but with a very proud, Government."</p> + +<p>In reality, Nelson was nearing the coast of Portugal, Cornwallis +had been so speedily reinforced as to marshal twenty-eight ships of +the line off Brest, while Calder was waiting for Villeneuve off +Cape Finisterre with a fleet of fifteen battleships. Thus, when +Villeneuve neared the north-west of Spain, his twenty ships of the +line were confronted by a force which he could neither overwhelm +nor shake off. The combat of July 22nd, fought amidst a dense haze, +was unfavourable to the allies, two Spanish ships of the line +striking their colours to Calder before the gathering fog and gloom +of night separated the combatants: on the next two days Villeneuve +strove to come to close quarters, but Calder sheered off; thereupon +the French, unable then to make Ferrol, put into Vigo, while +Calder, ignorant of their position, joined Cornwallis off Brest. +This retreat of the British admiral subjected him to a +court-martial, and consternation reigned in London when Villeneuve +was known to be on the Spanish coast unguarded; but the fear was +needless; though the French admiral succeeded in rallying the +Ferrol squadron, yet, as he was ordered to avoid Ferrol, he put +into Corunna, and on August 15th he decided to sail for Cadiz.</p> + +<p>To realize the immense importance of this decision we must +picture to ourselves the state of affairs just before this +time.</p> + +<p>Nelson, delayed by contrary winds and dogged by temporary +ill-luck, had made for Gibraltar, whence, finding that no French +ships had passed the straits, he doubled back in hot haste +northwards, and there is clear <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i500" id="page_i500">[pg.500]</a></span> proof that his +speedy return to the coast of Spain spread dismay in official +circles at Paris. "This unexpected union of forces undoubtedly +renders every scheme of invasion impracticable for the present," +wrote Talleyrand to Napoleon on August 2nd, 1805.<a name= +"FNanchor_333_333"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_333_333"><sup>[333]</sup></a> Missing Villeneuve off +Ferrol, Nelson joined Cornwallis off Ushant on the very day when +the French admiral decided to make for Cadiz. Passing on to +Portsmouth, the hero now enjoyed a few days of well-earned repose, +until the nation called on him for his final effort.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile Napoleon had arrived on August 3rd at Boulogne, where +he reviewed a line of soldiery nine miles long. The sight might +well arouse his hopes of assured victory. He had ground for hoping +that Villeneuve would soon be in the Channel. Not until August 8th +did he receive news of the fight with Calder, and he took pains to +parade it as an English defeat. He therefore trusted that, in the +spirit of his orders to Villeneuve dated July the 26th, that +admiral would sail to Cadiz, gather up other French and Spanish +ships, and return to Ferrol and Brest with a mighty force of some +sixty sail of the line:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I count on your zeal for my service, on your love for the +fatherland, on your hatred of this Power which for forty +generations has oppressed us, and which a little daring and +perseverance on your part will for ever reduce to the rank of the +small Powers: 150,000 soldiers ... and the crews complete are +embarked on 2,000 craft of the flotilla, which, despite the English +cruisers, forms a long line of broadsides from Etaples to Cape +Grisnez. Your voyage, and it alone, makes us without any doubt +masters of England."</p> +</div> + +<p>Austria and Russia were already marshalling their forces for the +war of the Third Coalition. Yet, though menaced by those Powers, to +whom he had recently offered the most flagrant provocations, this +astonishing man was intent only on the ruin of England, and +secretly<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i501" id= +"page_i501">[pg.501]</a></span> derided their preparations. "You +need not" (so he wrote to Eugène, Viceroy of Italy) +"contradict the newspaper rumours of war, but make fun of them.... +Austria's actions are probably the result of fear."—Thus, +even when the eastern horizon lowered threateningly with clouds, he +continued to pace the cliffs of Boulogne, or gallop restlessly +along the strand, straining his gaze westward to catch the first +glimpse of his armada. That horizon was never to be flecked with +Villeneuve's sails: they were at this time furled in the harbour of +Cadiz.</p> + +<p>Unmeasured abuse has been showered upon Villeneuve for his +retreat to that harbour. But it must be remembered that in both of +Napoleon's last orders to him, those of July 16th and 26th, he was +required to sail to Cadiz under certain conditions. In the first +order prescribing alternative ways of gaining the mastery of the +Channel, that step was recommended solely as a last alternative in +case of misfortune: he was directed not to enter the long and +difficult inlet of Ferrol, but, after collecting the squadron +there, to cast anchor at Cadiz. In the order of July 26th he was +charged positively to repair to Cadiz: "My intention is that you +rally at Cadiz the Spanish ships there, disembark your sick, and, +without stopping there more than four days at most, again set sail, +return to Ferrol, etc." Villeneuve seems not to have received these +last orders, but he alludes to those of July 16th.<a name= +"FNanchor_334_334"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_334_334"><sup>[334]</sup></a></p> + +<p>These, then, were probably the last instructions he received +from Napoleon before setting sail from the roads of Corunna on +August 13th. The censures passed on his retreat to Cadiz are +therefore based on the supposition that he received instructions +which he did not receive.<a name="FNanchor_335_335"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_335_335"><sup>[335]</sup></a> He expressly based his +move to Cadiz on Napoleon's orders of July 16th. The mishaps which +the Emperor then contemplated as necessitating such a step had, in +Villeneuve's eyes, actually happened. The<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i502" id="page_i502">[pg.502]</a></span> admiral +considered the fight of July 22nd <i>la malheureuse affaire;</i> +his ships were encumbered with sick; they worked badly; on August +15th a north-east gale carried away the top-mast of a Spanish ship; +and having heard from a Danish merchantman the news—false +news, as it afterwards appeared—that Cornwallis with +twenty-five ships was to the north, he turned and scudded before +the wind. He could not divine the disastrous influence of his +conduct on the plan of invasion. He did not know that his master +was even then beginning to hesitate between a dash on London or a +campaign on the Danube, and that the events of the next few days +were destined to tilt the fortunes of the world. Doubtless he ought +to have disregarded the Emperor's words about Cadiz and to have +struggled on to Brest, as his earlier and wider orders enjoined. +But the Emperor's instructions pointed to Cadiz as the rendezvous +in case of misfortune or great difficulty. As a matter of fact, +Napoleon on July 26th ordered the Rochefort squadron to <i>meet +Villeneuve at Cadiz;</i> and it is clear that by that date Napoleon +had decided on that rendezvous, apparently because it could be more +easily entered and cleared than Ferrol, and was safer from attack. +But, as it happened, the Rochefort squadron had already set sail +and failed to sight an enemy or friend for several weeks.</p> + +<p>Such are the risks of naval warfare, in which even the greatest +geniuses at times groped but blindly. Nelson was not afraid to +confess the truth. The French Emperor, however, seems never to have +made an admission which would mar his claim to strategic +infallibility. Even now, when the Spanish ships were proved to clog +the enterprise, he persisted in merely counting numbers, and in +asserting that Villeneuve might still neutralize the force of +Calder and Cornwallis. These hopes he cherished up to August 23rd, +when, as the next chapter will show, he faced right about to +confront Austria. His Minister of Marine, who had more truly gauged +the difficulties of all parts of the naval enterprise, continued +earnestly to warn him of the terrible risk of burdening +Villeneuve's <span class="newpage"><a name="page_i503" id= +"page_i503">[pg.503]</a></span> ships with the unseaworthy craft of +Spain and of trusting to this ill-assorted armada to cover the +invasion now that their foes had divined its secret. The Emperor +bitterly upbraided his Minister for his timidity, and in the +presence of Daru, Intendant General of the army, indulged in a +dramatic soliloquy against Villeneuve for his violation of orders: +"What a navy! What an admiral! What sacrifices for nothing! My +hopes are frustrated—- Daru, sit down and +write"—whereupon it is said that he traced out the plans of +the campaign which was to culminate at Ulm and Austerlitz.<a name= +"FNanchor_336_336"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_336_336"><sup>[336]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The question has often been asked whether Napoleon seriously +intended the invasion of England. Certainly the experienced seamen +of England, France, and Holland, with few exceptions, declared that +the flat-bottomed boats were unseaworthy, and that a frightful +disaster must ensue if they were met out at sea by our ships. When +it is further remembered that our coasts were defended by batteries +and martello towers, that several hundreds of pinnaces and +row-boats were ready to attack the flotilla before it could attempt +the disembarkation of horses, artillery, and stores, and that +180,000 regulars and militia, aided by 400,000 volunteers, were +ready to defend our land, the difficulties even of capturing London +will be obvious. And the capture of the capital would not have +decided the contest. Napoleon seems to have thought it would. In +his voyage to St. Helena he said: "I put all to the hazard; I +entered into no calculations as to the manner in which I was to +return; I trusted all to the impression the occupation of the +capital would have occasioned."<a name="FNanchor_337_337"></a><a +href="#Footnote_337_337"><sup>[337]</sup></a>—But, as has +been shown above (p. 441),<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i504" +id="page_i504">[pg.504]</a></span> plans had been secretly drawn up +for the removal of the Court and the national treasure to +Worcester; the cannon of Woolwich were to be despatched into the +Midlands by canal; and our military authorities reckoned that the +systematic removal of provisions and stores from all the districts +threatened by the enemy would exhaust him long before he overran +the home counties. Besides, the invasion was planned when Britain's +naval power had been merely evaded, not conquered. Nelson and +Cornwallis and Calder would not for ever be chasing phantom fleets; +they would certainly return, and cut Napoleon from his base, the +sea.</p> + +<p>Again, if Napoleon was bent solely on the invasion of England, +why should he in June, 1805, have offered to Russia and Austria so +gratuitous an affront as the annexation of the Ligurian Republic? +He must have known that this act would hurry them into war. Thiers +considers the annexation of Genoa a "grave fault" in the Emperor's +policy—but many have doubted whether Napoleon did not intend +Genoa to be the gate leading to a new avenue of glory, now that the +success of his naval dispositions was doubtful. Marbot gives the +general opinion of military circles when he says that the Emperor +wanted to provoke a continental war in order to escape the ridicule +which the failure of his Boulogne plans would otherwise have +aroused. "The new coalition came just at the right moment to get +him out of an annoying situation." The compiler of the +Fouché "Memoirs," which, though not genuine, may be accepted +as generally correct, took the same view. He attributes to Napoleon +the noteworthy words: "I may fail by sea, but not by land; besides, +I shall be able to strike the blow before the old coalition +machines are ready: the kings have neither activity nor decision of +character: I do not fear old Europe." The Emperor also remarked to +the Council of State that the expense of all the<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i505" id="page_i505">[pg.505]</a></span> +preparations at Boulogne was fully justified by the fact that they +gave him "fully twenty days' start over all enemies.... A pretext +had to be found for raising the troops and bringing them together +without alarming the Continental Powers: and that pretext was +afforded me by the projected descent upon England."<a name= +"FNanchor_338_338"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_338_338"><sup>[338]</sup></a></p> + +<p>It is also quite possible that his aim was Ireland as much as +England. It certainly was in the plan of September, 1804: and +doubtless it still held a prominent place in his mind, except +during the few days when he pictured Calder vanquished and Nelson +scouring the West Indies. Then he doubtless fixed his gaze solely +upon London. But there is much indirect evidence which points to +Ireland as forming at least a very important part of his scheme. +Both Nelson and Collingwood believed him to be aiming at Ireland.<a +name="FNanchor_339_339"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_339_339"><sup>[339]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But indeed Napoleon is often unfathomable. Herein lies much of +the charm of Napoleonic studies. He is at once the Achilles, the +Mercury, and the Proteus of the modern world. The ease with which +his mind grasped all problems and suddenly concentrated its force +on some new plan may well perplex posterity as it dazed his +contemporaries. If we were dealing with any other man than +Napoleon, we might safely say that an invasion of England, before +the command of the sea had been secured, was infinitely less likely +than a descent on Ireland. The landing of a <i>corps +d'armée</i> there would have provoked a revolution; and +British ascendancy would have vanished in a week. Even had Nelson +returned and swept the seas, Ireland would have been lost to the +United Kingdom; and Britain, exhausted also by the expenses which +the Boulogne preparations had compelled her to make for the defence +of London, must have succumbed.</p> + +<p>If ever Napoleon intended risking all his fortunes on<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i506" id= +"page_i506">[pg.506]</a></span> the conquest of England, it can be +proved that his mind was gradually cleared of illusions. He trusted +that a popular rising would overthrow the British Government: +people and rulers showed an accord that had never been known since +the reign of Queen Anne. He believed, for a short space, that the +flotilla could fight sea-going ships out at sea: the converse was +proved up to the hilt. Finally, he trusted that Villeneuve, when +burdened with Spanish ships, would outwit and outmanoeuvre +Nelson!</p> + +<p>What then remained after these and many other disappointments? +Surely that scheme alone was practicable, in which the command of +the sea formed only an unimportant factor. For the conquest of +England it was an essential factor. In Ireland alone could Napoleon +find the conditions on which he counted for success—a +discontented populace that would throng to the French eagles, and a +field of warfare where the mere landing of 20,000 veterans would +decide the campaign.<a name="FNanchor_340_340"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_340_340"><sup>[340]</sup></a></p> + +<p>And yet it is, on the whole, certain that his expedition for +Ireland was meant merely to distract and paralyze the defenders of +Great Britain, while he dealt the chief blow at London. Instinct +and conviction alike prompted him to make imposing feints that +should lead his enemy to lay bare his heart, and that heart was our +great capital. His indomitable will scorned the word +<i>impossible</i>—"a word found only in the dictionary of +fools"; he felt England to be the sole barrier to his ambitions; +and to crush her power he was ready to brave, not only her stoutest +seamen, but also her guardian angels, the winds and storms. Both +the man and the occasion were unique in the world's history and +must not be judged according to tame probabilities. For his honour +was at stake. He was so deeply pledged to make use of the vast +preparations at his northern ports that, had all his complex +dispositions worked smoothly,<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_i507" id="page_i507">[pg.507]</a></span> he would certainly +have attempted a dash at London; and only after some adequate +excuse could he consent to give up that adventure.</p> + +<p>The excuse was now furnished by Villeneuve's retreat to Cadiz; +and public opinion, ignorant of Napoleon's latest instructions on +that subject, and knowing only the salient facts of the case, laid +on that luckless admiral the whole burden of blame for the failure +of the scheme of invasion. With front unabashed and a mind +presaging certain triumphs, Napoleon accordingly wheeled his +legions eastward to prosecute that alluring alternative, the +conquest of England through the Continent.<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_i508" id="page_i508">[pg.508]</a></span> <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_i509" id= +"page_i509">[pg.509]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="APPENDIX"></a> +<h2>APPENDIX</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<p>[<i>The two following State Papers have never before been +published</i>]</p> + +<br> + + +<p>No. I. is a despatch from Mr. Thornton, our <i>chargé +d'affaires</i> at Washington, relative to the expected transfer of +the vast region of Louisiana from Spain to France (see ch. xv. of +this vol.).</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">[In "F O.," America, No. +35.]</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"WASHINGTON,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"26 <i>Jany.</i>, 1802.</span><br> + + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"MY LORD,</p> + +<p>" ... About four years ago, when the rumour of the transfer of +Louisiana to France was first circulated, I put into Mr. +Pickering's hands for his perusal a despatch written by Mr. Fauchet +about the year 1794, which with many others was intercepted by one +of H.M. ships. In that paper the French Minister urged to his +Government the absolute necessity of acquiring Louisiana or some +territory in the vicinity of the United States in order to obtain a +permanent influence in the country, and he alluded to a memorial +written some years before by the Count du Moutier to the same +effect, when he was employed as His Most Christian Majesty's +Minister to the United States. The project seems therefore to have +been long in the contemplation of the French Government, and +perhaps no period is more favourable than the present for carrying +it into execution.</p> + +<p>"When I paid my respects to the Vice-President, Mr. Burr, on his +arrival at this place, he, of his own accord, directed conversation +to this topic. He owned that he had made some exertion indirectly +to discover the truth of the report, and thought he had reason to +believe it. He appeared to think that the great armament destined +by France to St. Domingo, had this ulterior object in view, and +expressed much apprehension that the transfer and colonization of +Louisiana were meditated by her with the concurrence or +acquiescence of His Maj'<sup>s</sup> Gov<sup>t</sup>. It was +impossible for me to give any opinion on this part of the measure, +which, whatever may be its ultimate tendency, presents at first +view nothing but danger to His Maj'<sup>s</sup> Trans-Atlantic +possessions.</p> + +<br> +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_i510" id= +"page_i510">[pg.i510]</a></span> + +<p>"Regarding alone the aim of France to acquire a preponderating +influence in the councils of the United States, it may be very well +doubted whether the possession of Louisiana, and the means which +she would chuse to employ are calculated to secure that end. +Experience seems now to have sanctioned the opinion that if the +provinces of Canada had been restored to France at the Peace of +Paris, and if from that quarter she had been left to press upon the +American frontier, to harass the exterior settlements and to mingle +in the feuds of the Indian Tribes, the colonies might still have +preserved their allegiance to the parent country and have retained +their just jealousy of that system of encroachment adopted by +France from the beginning of the last century. The present project +is but a continuance of the same system; and neither her power nor +her present temper leave room for expectation that she will pursue +it with less eagerness or greater moderation than before. Whether, +therefore, she attempt to restrain the navigation of the +Mississippi or limit the freedom of the port of New Orleans; +whether she press upon the Western States with any view to +conquest, or seduce them by her principles of fraternity (for which +indeed they are well prepared) she must infallibly alienate the +Atlantic States and force them into a straiter connection with +Great Britain.</p> + +<p>"I have scarcely met with a person under whatever party he may +rank himself, who does not dread this event, and who would not +prefer almost any neighbours to the French: and it seems perfect +infatuation in the Administration of this country that they chuse +the present moment for leaving that frontier almost defenceless by +the reduction of its military establishment.</p> + +<p>"I have, etc.,</p> + +<p>"[Signed] EDW'D THORNTON."</p> +</div> + +<hr style="width: 45%;"> +<p>No. II. is a report in "F.O.," France, No. 71, by one of our +spies in Paris on the doings of the Irish exiles there, especially +O'Connor, whom Napoleon had appointed General of Division in +Marshal Augereau's army, then assembling at Brest for the +expedition to Ireland. After stating O'Connor's appointment, the +report continues:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"About eighty Irishmen were sent to Morlaix to be formed into a +company of officers and taught how they were to discipline and +instruct their countrymen when they landed in Ireland. McShee, +Général de Brigade, commands them. He and Blackwell +are, I believe, the only persons among them of any consequence, who +have seen actual service. Emmett's brother and McDonald, who were +jealous of the attention paid to O'Connor, would not go to <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i511" id= +"page_i511">[pg.511]</a></span></p> + +<p>Morlaix. They were prevailed on to go to Brest towards the end +of May, and there to join General Humbert. Commandant Dalton, a +young man of Irish extraction, and lately appointed to a situation +in the Army at Boulogne, translated everything between O'Connor and +the War Department at Paris. There is no Irish Committee at Paris +as is reported. O'Connor and General Hartry, an old Irishman who +has been long in the French service, are the only persons applied +to by the French Government, O'Connor for the expedition, and +Hartry for the Police, etc., of the Irish in France.</p> + +<p>"O'Connor, though he had long tried to have an audience of +Bonaparte, never saw him till the 20th of May [1805], when he was +presented to him at the levee by Marshal Augereau. The Emperor and +the Empress complimented him on his dress and military appearance, +and Bonaparte said to him <i>Venez me voir en particulier demain +matin.</i> O'Connor went and was alone with him near two hours. On +that day Bonaparte did not say a word to him respecting his +intention on England; all their conversation regarded Ireland. +O'Connor was with him again on the Thursday and Friday following. +Those three audiences are all that O'Connor ever had in private +with Bonaparte.</p> + +<p>"He told me on the Saturday evening that he should go to Court +the next morning to take public leave of the Emperor and leave +Paris as soon as he had received 10,000 livres which Maret was to +give him for his travelling expenses, etc., and which he was to +have in a day or two. His horses and all his servants but one had +set off for Brest some time before.</p> + +<p>"Bonaparte told O'Connor, when speaking of the prospect of a +continental War, 'la Russie peut-être pourroit envoyer cette +année 100,000 hommes contre la France, mais j'ai pour cela +assez de monde à ma disposition: je ferois même +marcher, s'il le faut, une armée contre la Ruissie, et si +l'Empereur d'Allemagne refusoit un passage à cette +armée dans son pays, je la ferois passer malgré lui.' +He afterwards said—'il y a plusieurs moyens de +détruire l'Anglterre, mais celui de lui ôter Irlande +est bon. Je vous donnerai 25,000 bonnes troupes et s'il en arrive +seulement 15,000, ce sera assez. Vous aurez aussi 150,000 fusils +pour armer vos compatriotes, et un parc d'artillerie +légère, des pièces de 4 et de 6 livres, et +toutes les provisions de guerre nécessaires.'</p> + +<p>"O'Connor endeavoured to persuade Bonaparte that the best way to +conquer England was first to go to Ireland, and thence to England +with 200,000 Irishmen. Bonaparte said he did not think that would +do; <i>d'ailleurs,</i> he added, <i>ce seroit trop long</i>. They +agreed that all the English in Ireland should be exterminated as +the whites had been in St. Domingo. Bonaparte assured him that, as +soon as he had formed an Irish army, he should be Commander in +Chief of the French and Irish forces. Bonaparte directed O'Connor +to try to gain over to his interest Laharpe, the Emperor <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_i512" id= +"page_i512">[pg.512]</a></span> of Russia's tutor. Laharpe had +applied for a passport to go to St. Pétersbourg. He says he +will do everything in his power to engage the Emperor to go to war +with Bonaparte. Laharpe breathes nothing but vengeance against +Bonaparte, who, besides other injuries, turned his back on him in +public and would not speak to him. Laharpe was warned of O'Connor's +intended visit, and went to the country to avoid seeing him: The +Senator Garat is to go to Brest with O'Connor to write a +constitution for Ireland. O'Connor is getting out of favor with the +Irish in France; they begin to suspect his ambitious and selfish +views. There was a coolness between Admiral Truguet and him for +some time previous to Truguet's return to Brest. Augereau had given +a dinner to all the principal officers of his army then at Paris. +Truguet invited all of them to dine with him, two or three days +after, except O'Connor. O'Connor told me he would never forgive him +for it."</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<h3>VOLUME II</h3> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii1" id= +"page_ii1">[pg.1]</a></span> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXII</h2> +<hr style="width: 65%;"> + +<center>ULM AND TRAFALGAR</center> + +<br> + + +<p>"Napoleon is the only man in Europe that knows the value of +time."—Czartoryski.</p> + +<br> + + +<p>Before describing the Continental campaign which shattered the +old European system to its base, it will be well to take a brief +glance at the events which precipitated the war of the Third +Coalition. Even at the time of Napoleon's rupture with England, his +highhanded conduct towards the Italian Republic, Holland, +Switzerland, and in regard to the Secularizations in Germany, had +exposed him to the hostility of Russia, Sweden, and Austria; but as +yet it took the form of secret resentment. The last-named Power, +under the Ministry of Count Cobenzl, had relapsed into a tame and +undignified policy, which the Swedish Ambassador at Vienna +described as "one of fear and hope—fear of the power of +France, and hope to obtain favours from her." <a name= +"FN2anchor1_1"></a><a href="#Foot2note_1_1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> At +Berlin, Frederick William clung nervously to neutrality, even +though the French occupation of Hanover was a threat to Prussia's +influence in North Germany. The Czar Alexander was, at present, +wrapt up in home <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii2" id= +"page_ii2">[pg.2]</a></span> affairs; and the only monarch who as +yet ventured to show his dislike of the First Consul was the King +of Sweden. In the autumn of 1803 Gustavus IV. defiantly refused +Napoleon's proposals for a Franco-Swedish alliance, baited though +they were with the offer of Norway as an eventual prize for Sweden, +and a subsidy for every Swedish warship serving against England. +And it was not the dislike of a proud nature to receive money which +prompted his refusal; for Gustavus, while in Germany, hinted to +Drake that he desired to have pecuniary help from England for the +defence of his province of Pomerania.<a name="FN2anchor2_2"></a> <a +href="#Foot2note_2_2"><sup>[2]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But a doughtier champion of European independence was soon to +enter the field. The earlier feelings of respect and admiration +which the young Czar had cherished towards Napoleon were already +overclouded, when the news of the execution of the Duc d'Enghien at +once roused a storm of passion in his breast. The chivalrous +protection which he loved to extend to smaller States, the +guarantee of the Germanic system which the Treaty of Teschen had +vested in him, above all, his horror at the crime, led him to offer +an emphatic protest. The Russian Court at once went into mourning, +and Alexander expressed both to the German Diet and to the French +Government his indignation at the outrage. It was ever Napoleon's +habit to return blow with blow; and he now instructed Talleyrand to +reply that in the D'Enghien affair he had acted solely on the +defensive, and that Russia's complaint "led him to ask if, at the +time when England was compassing the assassination of Paul I., the +authors of the plot had been known to be one league beyond the +[Russian] frontiers, every effort would not have been made to have +them seized?" Never has a poisoned dart been more deftly sped at +the weak spot of an enemy's armour. The Czar, ever haunted by the +thought of his complicity in a parricidal plot, was deeply wounded +by this malicious taunt, and all the more so <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii3" id="page_ii3">[pg.3]</a></span> +because, as the death of Paul had been officially ascribed to a +fit, the insult could not be flung back.<a name="FN2anchor3_3"></a> +<a href="#Foot2note_3_3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> The only reply was to +break off all diplomatic relations with Napoleon; and this took +place in the summer of 1804. <a name="FN2anchor4_4"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_4_4"><sup>[4]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Yet war was not to break out for more than a year. This delay +was due to several causes. Austria could not be moved from her +posture of timid neutrality. In fact, Francis II. and Cobenzl saw +in Napoleon's need of a recognition of his new imperial title a +means of assuring a corresponding change of title for the Hapsburg +Dominions. Francis had long been weary of the hollow dignity of +Elective Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. The faded pageantry of +Ratisbon and Frankfurt was all that remained of the glories of the +realm of Charlemagne: the medley of States which owned him as +elected lord cared not for the decrees of this ghostly realm; and +Goethe might well place in the mouth of his jovial toper, in the +cellar scene of "Faust," the words:</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 10em;">"Dankt Gott mit jedem +Morgen</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Dass Ihr nicht braucht für's +Röm'sche Reich zu sorgen!"</span><br> + + +<p>In that bargaining and burglarious age, was it not better to +build a more lasting habitation than this venerable ruin? Would not +the hereditary dominions form a more lasting shelter from the +storm? Such were doubtless the thoughts that prompted the +assumption of the title of Hereditary Emperor of Austria (August +11th, 1804). The letter-patent, in which this change was announced, +cited as parallels "the example of the Imperial Court of Russia in +the last century and of the new sovereign of France." Both +references gave umbrage to Alexander, who saw no parallel between +the assumption of the title of Emperor by Peter the Great and the +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii4" id= +"page_ii4">[pg.4]</a></span> game of follow-the-leader played by +Francis to Napoleon.<a name="FN2anchor5_5"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_5_5"><sup>[5]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Prussian complaisance to the French Emperor was at this time to +be expected. Frederick William III. reigned over 10,000,000 +subjects; he could marshal 248,000 of the best trained troops in +Europe, and his revenue was more fruitful than that of the great +Frederick. Yet the effective power of Prussia had sadly waned; for +her policy was now marked by an enervating indecision. In the +autumn of 1804, however, the Prussian King was for a time spurred +into action by the news that Sir George Rumbold, British envoy at +Hamburg, had been seized on the night of October 24th, by French +troops, and carried off to Paris. This aggression upon the Circle +of Lower Saxony, of which Frederick William was Director, aroused +lively indignation at Berlin; and the King at once wrote to +Napoleon a request for the envoy's liberation as a proof of his +"friendship and high consideration...a seal on the past and a +pledge for the future."</p> + +<p>To this appeal Napoleon returned a soothing answer that Sir +George would at once be released, though England was ever violating +the rights of neutrals, and her agents were conspiring against his +life. The Emperor, in fact, saw that he had taken a false step, +which might throw Prussia into the arms of England and Russia. For +this latter Power had already (May, 1804) offered her armed help to +the Court of Berlin in case the French should violate any other +German territory.<a name="FN2anchor6_6"></a> <a href= +"#Foot2note_6_6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> But the King was easily soothed; +and when, in the following spring, Napoleon sent seven Golden +Eagles of the Legion of Honour to the Court of Berlin, seven Black +Eagles of the renowned Prussian Order were sent in return—an +occurrence which led Gustavus IV. to return his Order of the Black +Eagle with the remark that he could not recognize "Napoleon and his +like" as comrades in an Order of Chivalry and Religion.<a name= +"FN2anchor7_7"></a> <a href="#Foot2note_7_7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> +Napoleon's aim was achieved: <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii5" id="page_ii5">[pg.5]</a></span> Prussia was sundered +from any league in which Gustavus IV. was a prominent member.</p> + +<p>Thus, the chief steps in the formation of the Third Coalition +were taken by Sweden, England, and Russia. Early in 1804 Gustavus +proposed a League of the Powers; and, on the advent of the Pitt +Ministry to office, overtures began to pass between St. Petersburg +and London for an alliance. Important proposals were made by Pitt +and our Foreign Minister, the Earl of Harrowby, in a note of June +26th, 1804, in which hopes were expressed that Russia, England, +Austria, Sweden, and if possible Prussia, might be drawn together. +<a name="FN2anchor8_8"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_8_8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> Alexander and Czartoryski were +already debating the advantages of an alliance with England. Their +aims were certainly noble. International law and the rights of the +weak States bordering on France were to be championed, and it was +suggested by Czartoryski that disputes should be settled, not by +force, but by arbitration. <a name="FN2anchor9_9"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_9_9"><sup>[9]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The statement of these exalted ideas was intrusted to a special +envoy to London, M. Novossiltzoff, who propounded to Pitt the +scheme of a European polity where the States should be independent +and enjoy institutions "founded on the sacred rights of humanity." +With this aim in view, the Czar desired to curb the power of +Napoleon, bring back France to her old limits, and assure the peace +of Europe on a firm basis, namely on the principle of the +<i>balance of power</i>. Pitt and Lord Harrowby having agreed to +these proposals, details were discussed at the close of 1804. None +of the allies were, in any case, to make a separate peace; and +England (said M. Novossiltzoff) must not only use her own troops, +but grant subsidies to enable the Powers to set on foot effective +forces.</p> + +<p>This last sentence claims special notice, as it disposes of the +well-worn phrase, that the Third Coalition was <i>built up</i> by +Pitt's gold. On the contrary, Russia was the first to set forth the +need of English subsidies, which Pitt <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii6" id="page_ii6">[pg.6]</a></span> was by no means +eager to supply. The phrase used by French historians is doubtless +correct in so far as English gold enabled our allies to arm +efficiently; but it is wholly false if it implies that the Third +Coalition was merely trumped up by our money, and that the Russian, +Austrian, and Swedish Governments were so many automatic machines +which, if jogged with coins, would instantly supply armies to the +ready money purchaser. This is practically the notion still +prevalent on the Continent; and it is clearly traceable to the +endless diatribes against Pitt's gold with which Napoleon seasoned +his bulletins, and to the caricatures which he <i>ordered to be +drawn</i>. The following was his direction to his Minister of +Police, Fouché: "Have caricatures made—an Englishman +purse in hand, <i>entreating the various Powers to take his money. +This is the real direction to give the whole business.</i>" How +well he knew mankind: he rightly counted on its gullibility where +pictures were concerned; and the direction which he thus gave to +public opinion bids fair to persist, in spite of every exposure of +the trickery. <a name="FN2anchor10_10"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_10_10"><sup>[10]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But, to return to the plans of the allies, Holland, Switzerland, +and Italy were to be liberated from their "enslavement to France," +and strengthened so as to provide barriers to future aggressions: +the King of Sardinia was to be restored to his mainland +possessions, and receive in addition the Ligurian, or Genoese, +Republic. <a name="FN2anchor11_11"></a> <a href= +"#Foot2note_11_11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii7" id="page_ii7">[pg.7]</a></span></p> + +<p>On all essential topics the British Government was in full +accord with the views of the Czar, and Pitt insisted on the need of +a system of international law which should guarantee the Continent +against further rapacious acts. But Europe was not destined to find +peace on these principles until after ten years of desolating +war.</p> + +<p>Various causes hindered the formation of this league. On January +2nd, 1805, Napoleon sent to George III. an offer of peace; and +those persons who did not see that this was a device for +discovering the course of negotiations believed that he ardently +desired it. We now know that the offer was despatched a week after +he had ordered Missiessy to ravage the British West Indies. <a +name="FN2anchor12_12"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_12_12"><sup>[12]</sup></a> And, doubtless, his object +was attained when George III. replied in the speech from the throne +(January 15th) that he could not entertain the proposal without +reference to the Powers with whom he was then engaged in +confidential intercourse, and especially the Emperor of Russia. Yet +the British Government discussed with the Czar the basis for a +future pacification of Europe; and the mission of Novossiltzoff at +midsummer to Berlin, on his way to Paris, was the answer, albeit a +belated one, to Napoleon's New Year's pacific appeal. We shall now +see why this delay occurred, and what acts of the French Emperor +finally dispelled all hopes of peace.</p> + +<p>The delay was due to differences between Russia and England +respecting Malta and our maritime code. The Czar insisted on our +relinquishing Malta and relaxing the rigours of the right of search +for deserters from our navy. To this the Pitt Ministry demurred, +seeing that Malta was our only means of protecting the +Mediterranean States, and our only security against French +aggressions in the Levant, while the right of searching neutral +vessels <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii8" id= +"page_ii8">[pg.8]</a></span> was necessary to prevent the +enfeebling of our navy. <a name="FN2anchor13_13"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_13_13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> Negotiations were nearly +broken off even after a treaty between the two Powers had been +brought to the final stage on April 11th, 1805; but in July (after +the Czar had recorded his solemn protest against our keeping Malta) +it was ratified, and formed the basis for the Third Coalition. The +aims of the allies were to bring about the expulsion of French +troops from North Germany; to assure the independence of the +Republics of Holland and Switzerland; and to reinstate the King of +Sardinia in Piedmont. Half a million of men were to be set in +motion, besides the forces of Great Britain; and the latter Power, +as a set-off to her lack of troops, agreed to subsidize her allies +to the extent of; £1,250,000 a year for every 100,000 men +actually employed in the war. It was further stipulated that a +European Congress at the close of the war should endeavour to fix +more surely the principles of the Law of Nations and establish a +federative system. Above all, the allies bound themselves not to +hinder the popular wish in France respecting the form of +government—a clause which deprived the war of the Third +Coalition of that monarchical character which had pervaded the +league of 1793 and, to a less extent, that of 1799. <a name= +"FN2anchor14_14"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_14_14"><sup>[14]</sup></a></p> + +<p>What was the attitude of Napoleon towards this <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii9" id="page_ii9">[pg.9]</a></span> +league? He certainly took little pains to conciliate the Czar. In +fact, his actions towards Russia were almost openly provocative. +Thus, while fully aware of the interest which Alexander felt in the +restoration of the King of Sardinia, he sent the proposal that that +unlucky King should receive the Ionian Isles and Malta as +indemnities for his losses, and that too when Russia looked upon +Corfu as her own. To this offer the Czar deigned not a word in +reply. Napoleon also sent an envoy to the Shah of Persia with an +offer of alliance, so as to check the advances of Russia on the +shores of the Caspian. <a name="FN2anchor15_15"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_15_15"><sup>[15]</sup></a></p> + +<p>On the other hand, he used every effort to allure Prussia, by +secretly offering her Hanover, and that too as early as the close +of July. <a name="FN2anchor16_16"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_16_16"><sup>[16]</sup></a> For a brief space, also, he +took some pains to conciliate Austria. This indeed was necessary: +for the Court of Vienna had already (November 6th, 1804) framed a +secret agreement with Russia to make war on Napoleon if he +committed any new aggression in Italy or menaced any part of the +Turkish Empire. <a name="FN2anchor17_17"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_17_17"><sup>[17]</sup></a> Yet this act was really +defensive. Francis desired only to protect himself against +Napoleon's ambition, and, had he been treated with consideration, +would doubtless have clung to peace.</p> + +<p>For a time Napoleon humoured that Court, even as regards the +changes now mooted in Italy. On January 1st, 1805, he wrote to +Francis, stating that he was about to proclaim Joseph Bonaparte +King of Italy, if the latter would renounce his claim to the crown +of France, and so keep the governments of France and Italy +separate, as the Treaty of Lunéville required; that this +action would enfeeble his (Napoleon's) power, but would carry its +own recompense if it proved agreeable to the Emperor Francis. <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii10" id= +"page_ii10">[pg.10]</a></span></p> + +<p>But it soon appeared that Joseph was by no means inclined to +accept the crown of Lombardy if it entailed the sacrifice of all +hope of succeeding to the French Empire. He had already demurred to +<i>le vilain titre de roi</i>, and on January 27th announced his +final rejection of the offer. Napoleon then proposed to Louis that +he should hold that crown in trust for his son; but the suggestion +at once rekindled the flames of jealousy which ever haunted Louis; +and, after a violent scene, the Emperor thrust his brother from the +room.</p> + +<p>Perhaps this anger was simulated. He once admitted that his rage +only mounted this high—pointing to his chin; and the refusals +of his brothers were certainly to be expected. However that may be, +he now resolved to assume that crown himself, appointing as Viceroy +his step-son, Eugène Beauharnais. True, he announced to the +French Senate that the realms of France and Italy would be kept +separate: but neither the Italian deputies, who had been summoned +to Paris to vote this dignity to their master, nor the servile +Senate, nor the rulers of Europe, were deceived. Thus, when in the +early summer Napoleon reviewed a large force that fought over again +in mimic war the battle of Marengo; when, amidst all the pomp and +pageantry that art could devise, he crowned himself in the +cathedral of Milan with the iron circlet of the old Lombard Kings, +using the traditional formula: "God gave it me, woe to him who +touches it"; when, finally, he incorporated the Ligurian Republic +in the French Empire, Francis of Austria reluctantly accepted the +challenges thus threateningly cast down, and began to arm. <a name= +"FN2anchor18_18"></a><a href="#Foot2note_18_18"><sup>[18]</sup></a> +The records of our Foreign Office show conclusively that the +Hapsburg ruler felt himself girt with difficulties: the Austrian +army was as yet ill <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii11" id= +"page_ii11">[pg.11]</a></span> organized: the reforms after which +the Archduke Charles had been striving were ill received by the +military clique; and the sole result had been to unsettle rather +than strengthen the army, and to break down the health of the +Archduke. <a name="FN2anchor19_19"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_19_19"><sup>[19]</sup></a> Yet the intention of Napoleon +to treat Italy as a French province was so insultingly paraded that +Francis felt war to be inevitable, and resolved to strike a blow +while the French were still entangled in their naval schemes. He +knew well the dangers of war; he would have eagerly welcomed any +sign of really peaceful intentions at Paris; but no signs were +given; in fact, French agents were sent into Switzerland to +intrigue for a union of that land with France. Here again the pride +of the Hapsburgs was cut to the quick, and they disdained to submit +to humiliations such as were eating the heart out of the Prussian +monarchy.</p> + +<p>The Czar, too, was far from eager for war. He had sent +Novossiltzoff to Berlin <i>en route</i> for Paris, in the hope of +coming to terms with Napoleon, when the news of the annexation of +Genoa ended the last hopes of a compromise. "This man is +insatiable," exclaimed Alexander; "his ambition knows no bounds; he +is a scourge of the world; he wants war; well, he shall have it, +and the sooner the better," The Czar at once ordered all +negotiations to be broken off. Novossiltzoff, on July 10th, +declared to Baron Hardenberg, the successor of Haugwitz at the +Prussian Foreign Office, that Napoleon had now passed the utmost +limits of the Czar's patience; and he at once returned his French +passports. In forwarding them to the French ambassador at Berlin, +Hardenberg expressed the deep regret of the Prussian monarch at the +breakdown of this most salutary negotiation—a phrase which +showed that the patience of Berlin was nearly exhausted. <a name= +"FN2anchor20_20"></a><a href="#Foot2note_20_20"><sup>[20]</sup></a> +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii12" id= +"page_ii12">[pg.12]</a></span></p> + +<p>Clearly, then, the Third Coalition was not cemented by English +gold, but by Napoleon's provocations. While England and Russia +found great difficulty in coming to an accord, and Austria was +arming only from fear, the least act of complaisance on his part +would have unravelled this ill-knit confederacy. But no such action +was forthcoming. All his letters written in North Italy after his +coronation are puffed up with incredible insolence. Along with +hints to Eugène to base politics on dissimulation and to +seek only to be feared, we find letters to Ministers at Paris +scorning the idea that England and Russia can come to terms, and +asserting that the annexation of Genoa concerns England alone; but +if Austria wants to find a pretext for war, she may now find +it.</p> + +<p>Then he hurries back to Fontainebleau, covering the distance +from Turin in eighty-five hours; and, after a brief sojourn at St. +Cloud, he reaches Boulogne. There, on August the 22nd, he hears +that Austria is continuing to arm: a few hours later comes the news +that Villeneuve has turned back to Cadiz. Fiercely and trenchantly +he resolves this fateful problem. He then sketches to Talleyrand +the outlines of his new policy. He will again press, and this time +most earnestly, his offer of Hanover to Prussia as the price of her +effective alliance against the new coalition. Perhaps this new +alliance will strangle the coalition at its birth; at any rate it +will paralyze Austria. Accordingly, he despatches to Berlin his +favourite aide-de-camp, General Duroc, to persuade the King that +his alliance will save the Continent from war. <a name= +"FN2anchor21_21"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_21_21"><sup>[21]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Meanwhile the Hapsburgs were completely deceived. <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii13" id="page_ii13">[pg.13]</a></span> +They imagined Napoleon to be wholly immersed in his naval +enterprise, and accordingly formed a plan of campaign, which, +though admirable against a weak and guileless foe, was fraught with +danger if the python's coils were ready for a spring. As a matter +of fact, he was far better prepared than Austria. As late as July +7th, the Court of Vienna had informed the allies that its army +would not be ready for four months; yet the nervous anxiety of the +Hapsburgs to be beforehand with Napoleon led them to hurry on war: +and on August 9th they secretly gave their adhesion to the +Russo-British alliance.</p> + +<p>Then, too, by a strange fatuity, their move into Bavaria was to +be made with a force of only 59,000 men, while their chief masses, +some 92,000 strong, were launched into Italy against the +strongholds on the Mincio. To guard the flanks of these armies, +Austria had 34,000 men in Tyrol; but, apart from raw recruits, +there were fewer than 20,000 soldiers in the rest of that vast +empire. In fact, the success of the autumn campaign was known to +depend on the help of the Russians, who were expected to reach the +banks of the Inn before the 20th of October, while it was thought +that the French could not possibly reach the Danube till twenty +days later. <a name="FN2anchor22_22"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_22_22"><sup>[22]</sup></a> It was intended, however, to +act most vigorously in Italy, and to wage a defensive campaign on +the Danube.</p> + +<p>Such was the plan concocted at Vienna, mainly under the +influence of the Archduke Charles, who took the <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii14" id="page_ii14">[pg.14]</a></span> +command of the army in Italy, while that of the Danube was assigned +to the Archduke Ferdinand and Mack, the new Quarter-Master-General. +This soldier had hitherto enjoyed a great reputation in Austria, +probably because he was the only general who had suffered no great +defeat. Amidst the disasters of 1797 he seemed the only man able to +retrieve the past, and to be shut out from command by Thugut's +insane jealousy of his "transcendent abilities." <a name= +"FN2anchor23_23"></a><a href="#Foot2note_23_23"><sup>[23]</sup></a> +Brave he certainly was: but his mind was always swayed by +preconceived notions; he belonged to the school of "manoeuvre +strategists," of whom the Duke of Brunswick was the leader; and he +now began the campaign of 1805 with the fixed purpose of holding a +commanding military position. Such a position the Emperor Francis +and Mack had discovered in the weak fortress of Ulm and the line of +the River Iller. Towards these points of vantage the Austrians now +began to move.</p> + +<p>The first thing was to gain over the Elector of Bavaria. The +Court of Vienna, seeking to persuade or compel that prince to join +the Coalition, made overtures (September 3rd to 6th) with which he +dallied for a day or two until an opportunity came of escaping to +the fortress of Würzburg. Mack thereupon crossed the River Inn +and sought, but in vain, to cut off the Bavarian troops from that +stronghold. Accordingly, the Austrian leader marched on to Ulm, +where he arrived in the middle of September; and, not satisfied +with holding this advanced position, he pushed on his outposts to +the chief defiles of the Black Forest, while other regiments held +the valley of the River Iller and strengthened the fortress of +Memmingen. Doubtless this would have been good strategy, had his +forces been equal in numbers to those of Napoleon. At that time the +Black Forest was the only <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii15" +id="page_ii15">[pg.15]</a></span> <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii16" id="page_ii16">[pg.16]</a></span> physical barrier +between France and Southern Germany; the Rhine was then practically +a French river; and, only by holding the passes of that range could +the Austrians hope to screen Swabia from invasion on the side of +Alsace.</p> + +<center><a name="image_08"><img alt="BATTLE OF ULM" src= +"images/image08.jpg" width="526" height="362"><br> + <font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>BATTLE OF +ULM</small></font></a></center> + +<p>But Mack forgot two essential facts. Until the Russians arrived, +he was too weak to hold so advanced a position in what was hostile +ground, now that Bavaria and the other South German States obeyed +Napoleon's summons to range themselves on his side. Further, he was +dangerously exposed on the north, as a glance at the map will show. +Ulm and the line of the Iller formed a strong defence against the +south-west: but on the north that position is singularly open: it +can be turned from the valleys of the Main, the Neckar, and the +Altmühl, all of which conduct an invader to the regions east +of Ulm. Indeed, it passes belief how even the Aulic Council could +have ignored the dangers of that position. Possibly the fact that +Ulm had been stoutly held by Kray in 1796 now induced them to +overrate its present importance; but at that time the fortified +camp of Ulm was the central knot of vast operations, whereas now it +was but an advanced outpost. <a name="FN2anchor24_24"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_24_24"><sup>[24]</sup></a> If Francis and his advisers +were swayed by historical reminiscences it is strange that they +forgot the fate of Melas in Piedmont. The real parallel had been +provided, not by Kray, but by the general who was cut off at +Marengo. Indeed, in its broad outlines, the campaign of Ulm +resembles that of Marengo. Against foes who had thrust their +columns far from their base, Napoleon now, as in 1800, determined +to deal a crushing blow. On the part of the Austrians we notice the +same misplaced confidence, the same lack of timely news, and the +same inability to understand Napoleon's plan until his dispositions +are complete; while his strategy and tactics in 1805 recall to +one's mind the masterly simplicity of design, the subtlety and +energy of execution, which led up to his triumph in the plains of +Piedmont. <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii17" id= +"page_ii17">[pg.17]</a></span></p> + +<p>Meanwhile the allies were dissipating their strength. A Russian +corps, acting from Corfu as a base, and an English expedition from +Malta, were jointly to attack St. Cyr in the south of Italy, raise +the country at his rear and compel him to surrender. This plan was +left helplessly flapping in the air by a convention which Napoleon +imposed on the Neapolitan ambassador. On September 21st Talleyrand +induced that envoy to guarantee the neutrality of the kingdom of +Naples, all belligerents being excluded from its domains. +Consequently St. Cyr's corps evacuated that land and brought a +welcome reinforcement to Masséna on the Mincio. Equally +skilful was Napoleon's action as regards Hanover. On that side also +the allies planned a formidable expedition. From the fortress of +Stralsund in Swedish Pomerania, a force of Russians and Swedes, +which Gustavus burned to command, was to march into Hanover, and, +when strengthened by an Anglo-Hanoverian corps, drive the French +from the Low Countries. It is curious to contrast the cumbrous +negotiations concerning this expedition—the quarrels about +the command, the anxiety at the outset lest Villeneuve should +perhaps sail into the Baltic, the delays of the British War Office, +the remonstrances of the Czar, and the efforts to avert the +jealousy of Prussia—with the serene indifference of Napoleon +as to the whole affair. He knew full well that the war would not be +decided by diversions at the heel of Italy or on the banks of the +Ems, but by the shock of great masses of men on the Danube. He +denuded Hanover of French troops, except at its southern fortress +of Hameln, so that he could overwhelm the levies of Austria before +the Russians came up. In brief, while the Coalition sought, like a +Briareus, to envelop him on all sides, he prepared to deal a blow +at its heart.</p> + +<p>As the first part of the campaign depended almost entirely on +problems of time and space, it will be well to follow the chief +movements of the hostile forces somewhat closely. The Austrian plan +aimed at forestalling the French in the occupation of Swabia; and +its <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii18" id= +"page_ii18">[pg.18]</a></span> apparent success puffed up Mack with +boundless confidence. At Ulm he threw up extensive outworks to +strengthen that obsolete fortress, extended his lines to Memmingen +far on the south, and trusted that the Muscovites would come up +long before the French eagles hovered above the sources of the +Danube. But at that time the Russian vanguard had not reached Linz +in Upper Austria, and not before October 10th did it appear on the +banks of the River Inn. <a name="FN2anchor25_25"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_25_25"><sup>[25]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Far from being the last to move, the French Emperor outstripped +his enemies in the speed of his preparations. Whereas the Austrians +believed he would not be able to reach the Danube in force before +November 10th, he intended to have 200,000 men in Germany by +September 18th. But he knew not at first the full extent of his +good fortune: it did not occur to him that the Austrians would +cross the Inn: all he asks Talleyrand, on August 23rd, is that such +news may appear in the "Moniteur" as will gain him twenty days and +give General Bertrand time to win over Bavaria, while "I make my +200,000 men pirouette into Germany." On August 29th the <i>Army of +England</i> became the <i>Grand Army</i>, composed of seven corps, +led by Bernadotte, Marmont, Davoust, Soult, Lannes, Ney and +Augereau. The cavalry was assigned to Murat; while Bessières +was in command of the Imperial Guard, now numbering some 10,000 +men.</p> + +<p>Already the greater part of this vast array was beginning to +move inland; Davoust and Soult left some regiments, 30,000 strong, +to guard the flotilla, and Marmont detached 14,000 men to defend +the coasts of Holland; but the other corps on September 2nd began +their march Rhine-wards in almost their full strength. On that day +Bernadotte broke up his cantonments in Hanover, and began his march +towards the Main, on which so much was to turn. The Elector of +Hesse-Cassel now espoused Napoleon's cause. Thus, without meeting +any opposition, Bernadotte's columns reached Würzburg at the +close of <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii19" id= +"page_ii19">[pg.19]</a></span> September; there the Elector of +Bavaria welcomed the Marshal and gave him the support of his 20,000 +troops; and at that stronghold he was also joined by Marmont.</p> + +<p>In order to mislead the Austrians, Napoleon remained up to +September 23rd at St. Cloud or Paris; and during his stay appeared +a <i>Senatus Consultum</i> ordering that, after January 1st, 1806, +France should give up its revolutionary calendar and revert to the +Gregorian. He then set out for Strassburg, as though the chief +blows were to be dealt through the passes of the Black Forest at +the front of Mack's line of defence; and, to encourage that general +in this belief, Murat received orders to show his horsemen in the +passes held by Mack's outposts, but to avoid any serious +engagements. This would give time for the other corps to creep up +to the enemy's rear. Mack, meanwhile, had heard of the forthcoming +junction of the French and Bavarians at Würzburg, but opined +that it threatened Bohemia. <a name="FN2anchor26_26"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_26_26"><sup>[26]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Accordingly, he still clung to his lines, contenting himself +with sending a cavalry regiment to observe Bernadotte's movements; +but neither he nor his nominal chief, the Archduke Ferdinand, +divined the truth. Indeed, so far did they rely on the aid of the +Russians as to order back some regiments sent from Italy by the +more sagacious Archduke Charles; but 11,000 troops from Tyrol +reached the Swabian army. That force was now spread out so as to +hold the bridges of the Danube between Ingolstadt and Ulm; and on +October 7th the Austrians were disposed as follows: 18,000 men +under Kienmayer were guarding Ingolstadt, Neuburg, Donauwörth, +Günzburg, and lesser points, while Mack had about 35,000 men +at Ulm and along the line of the Iller; the arrival of other +detachments brought the Austrian total to upwards of 70,000 men. +Against this long scattered line <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii20" id="page_ii20">[pg.20]</a></span> Napoleon led greatly +superior forces. <a name="FN2anchor27_27"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_27_27"><sup>[27]</sup></a> The development of his plans +proceeded apace. Though Prussia had proclaimed her strict +neutrality, he did not scruple to violate it by sending +Bernadotte's corps through her principality of Ansbach, which lay +in their path. He charged Bernadotte to "offer many assurances +favourable to Prussia, and testify all possible affection and +respect for her—and then rapidly cross her land, asserting +the impossibility of doing anything else." Accordingly, that +Marshal was lavish in his regrets and apologies, but ordered his +columns to defile past the battalions and squadrons of Prussia, +that were powerless to resent the outrage. <a name= +"FN2anchor28_28"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_28_28"><sup>[28]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The news of this trespass on Prussian territory reached the ears +of Frederick William at a critical time, when the Czar sent to +Berlin a kind of ultimatum, intimating that, even if Prussia +deserted the cause of European independence, Russian troops must +nevertheless pass through part of Prussian Poland. Stung by this +note from his usually passive demeanour, the King sent off an +answer that such a step would entail a Franco-Prussian alliance +against the violators of his territory, when the news came that +Napoleon had actually done at Ansbach what Alexander had announced +his intention of doing in the east. The revulsion of feeling was +violent: for a short space the King declared he would dismiss Duroc +and make war on Napoleon for this insult, but in the end he called +a cabinet council and invited the Czar to come to Berlin. <a name= +"FN2anchor29_29"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_29_29"><sup>[29]</sup></a></p> + +<p>While the Gallophil counsellors, Haugwitz and <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii21" id="page_ii21">[pg.21]</a></span> +Lombard, were using all their arts to hinder the Prusso-Russian +understanding, the meshes were being woven fast around Mack and the +Archduke Ferdinand. Bernadotte's corps, after making history in its +march, was detached to the south-east so as to hold in check the +Russian vanguard, and to give plenty of room to the troops that +were to cut off Mack from Austria, a move which may be compared +with the march of Bonaparte to Milan before he essayed the capture +of Melas. Both steps bespeak his desire to have ample space at his +back before circling round his prey.</p> + +<p>On October 6th the corps of Soult and Lannes, helped by Murat's +powerful cavalry, cut the Austrian lines on the Danube at +Donauwörth, and gained a firm footing on the right bank. Over +the crossing thus secured far in Mack's rear, the French poured in +dense array, and marched south and south-west towards the back of +the Austrian positions, while Ney's corps marched to seize the +chief bridges over the Danube.</p> + +<p>A study of the processes of Mack's brain at this time is not +without interest. It shows the danger of intrusting the fate of an +army to a man who cannot weigh evidence. Mack was not ignorant of +the course of events, though his news generally came late. The +mischief was that his brain warped the news. On October 6th he +wrote to Vienna that the enemy seemed about to aim a blow at his +communications: on October 7th, when he heard of the loss of +Donauwörth, he described it as an unfortunate event, which no +one thought to be possible. The Archduke now urged the need of an +immediate retreat towards Munich, and marched in an easterly +direction on Günzburg: another Austrian division of 8,000 men +moved on Wertingen, where, on October 8th, it was furiously +attacked by the troops of Murat and Lannes. At first the +Imperialists firmly kept their ranks; but the unequal contest +closed with a hasty flight, which left 2,000 men in the hands of +the French Then Murat, pressing on through the woods, cut off +Mack's retreat to Augsburg. Yet that general still took <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii22" id= +"page_ii22">[pg.22]</a></span> a cheerful view of his position. On +that same day he wrote from Günzburg that, as soon as the +enemy had passed over the Lech, he would cross the Danube and cut +their communications at Nördlingen. He wrote thus when Ney's +corps was striving to seize the Danube bridges below Ulm. If Mack +were to march north-east against the French communications it was +of the utmost importance for him to hold the chief of these +bridges: but Ney speedily seized three of them, and on the 9th was +able to draw closer the toils around Ulm.</p> + +<p>From his position at Augsburg the French Emperor now directed +the final operations; and, as before Marengo, he gave most heed to +that side by which he judged his enemy would strive to break +through, in this case towards Kempten and Tyrol. This would +doubtless have been Mack's safest course; for he was strong enough +to brush aside Soult, gain Tyrol, seal up its valleys against +Napoleon, and carry reinforcements to the Archduke Charles. But he +was still intent on his Nördlingen scheme, even after the loss +of the Danube bridges exposed his march thither to flank attacks +from the four French corps now south of the river. Nevertheless, +Napoleon's miscalculation of Mack's plans, or, as Thiers has +striven to prove, a misunderstanding of his orders by Murat, gave +the Austrians a chance such as fortune rarely bestows. <a name= +"FN2anchor30_30"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_30_30"><sup>[30]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In spite of Ney's protests, one of his divisions, that led by +Dupont, had been left alone to guard the northern bank of the +Danube, a position where it might have been overwhelmed by an +enterprising foe. What is more extraordinary, Dupont, with only +6,000 men, was charged to advance on Ulm, and carry it by storm. On +the 11th he accordingly advanced against Mack's fortified camp +north of that city. The Austrians met him in force, and, despite +the utmost heroism of his troops, finally wrested the village of +Hasslach from his grasp; later in the day a cloud of their +horsemen, swooping <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii23" id= +"page_ii23">[pg.23]</a></span> round his right wing, cut up his +tired troops, took 1,000 prisoners, and left 1,500 dead and wounded +on the field. Among the booty was found a despatch of Napoleon +ordering Dupont to carry Ulm by storm—which might have shown +them that the French Emperor believed that city to be all but +deserted. <a name="FN2anchor31_31"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_31_31"><sup>[31]</sup></a> In truth, Napoleon's +miscalculation opened for Mack a path of safety; and had he at once +marched away to the north, the whole aspect of affairs might have +changed. The Russian vanguard was on the banks of the Inn: all the +French, except the relics of Dupont's division, were south of the +Danube, and a few vigorous blows at their communications might have +greatly embarrassed troops that had little artillery, light stores +of ammunition, and lived almost entirely on the produce of the +country. We may picture to ourselves the fierce blows that, in such +a case, Frederick the Great would have rained on his assailants as +he wheeled round on their rear and turned their turning movements. +With Frederick matched against Napoleon, the Lech and the Danube +would have witnessed a very cyclone of war.</p> + +<p>But Mack was not Frederick: and he had to do with a foe who +speedily made good an error. On October 13th, when Mack seemed +about to cut off the French from the Main, he received news through +Napoleon's spies that the English had effected a landing at +Boulogne, and a revolution had broken out in France. The tidings +found easy entrance into a brain that had a strange bias towards +pleasing falsities and rejected disagreeable facts. At once he +leaped to the conclusion that the moves of Soult, Murat, Lannes, +Marmont, and Ney round his rear were merely desperate efforts to +cut back a way to Alsace. He therefore held fast to his lines, made +only feeble efforts to clear the northern road, and despatched +reinforcements to Memmingen. The next day brought other news; that +Memmingen had been invested by <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii24" id="page_ii24">[pg.24]</a></span> Soult; that Ney by a +brilliant dash across the Danube at Elchingen had routed an +Austrian division there, and was threatening Ulm from the +north-east; and that the other French columns were advancing from +the south-east. Yet Mack, still viewing these facts in the twilight +of his own fancies, pictured them as the efforts of despair, not as +the drawing in of the hunter's toils.</p> + +<p>He was now almost alone in his reading of events. The Archduke +Ferdinand, though nominally in supreme command, had hitherto +deferred to Mack's age and experience, as the Emperor Francis +enjoined. But he now urged the need of instantly marching away to +the north with all available forces. Still Mack clung to his notion +that it was the French who were in sore straits; and he forbade the +evacuation of Ulm; whereupon the Archduke, with Schwarzenberg, +Kollowrath, Gyulai, and all whose instincts or rank prompted and +enabled them to defy the madman's authority, assembled 1,500 +horsemen and rode off by the northern road. It was high time; for +Ney, firmly established at Elchingen, was pushing on his vanguard +towards the doomed city: Murat and Lannes were charged to support +him on the north bank, while across the river Marmont, and further +south Soult, cut off the retreat on Tyrol.</p> + +<p>At last the scales fell from Mack's eyes. Even now he protested +against the mere mention of surrender. But again he was +disappointed. Ney stormed the Michaelsberg north of Ulm, a position +on which the Austrians had counted; and on October 17th the hapless +commander agreed to terms of capitulation, whereby his troops were +to march out and lay down their arms in six days' time, if an +Austro-Russian army able to raise the siege did not come on the +scene. These conditions were afterwards altered by the captor, who, +wheedling his captive with a few bland words, persuaded him to +surrender on the 20th on condition that Ney and his corps remained +before Ulm until the 25th. This was Mack's last offence against his +country and his profession; his assent to this wily compromise at +once <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii25" id= +"page_ii25">[pg.25]</a></span> set free the other French corps for +offensive operations; and that too when every day was precious to +Austria, Russia, and Prussia.</p> + +<p>On October 20th the French Emperor, with a brilliant staff, +backed by the solid wall of his Guard and flanked by eight columns +of his troops, received the homage of the vanquished. First came +their commander, who, bowed down by grief, handed his sword to the +victor with the words, "Here is the unfortunate Mack." Then there +filed out to the foot of the Michaelsberg 20,000 foot and 3,000 +horse, who laid down their arms before the Emperor, some with +defiant rage, the most part in stolid dejection, while others flung +them away with every sign of indecent joy. <a name= +"FN2anchor32_32"></a><a href="#Foot2note_32_32"><sup>[32]</sup></a> +As if the elements themselves conspired to enhance the brilliance +of Napoleon's triumph, the sun, which had been obscured for days by +storm-clouds and torrents of rain, now shone brightly forth, +bathing the scene in the mild radiance of autumn, lighting up the +French forces disposed on the slopes of that natural amphitheatre, +while it cast deep shadows from the long trail of the vanquished +beneath. The French were electrified by the sight: the fatigues of +their forced marches through the dusty heats of September, and the +slush, swamps, and torrents of the last few days were all +forgotten, and they hailed with jubilant shouts the chief whose +sagacity had planned and achieved a triumph hitherto unequalled in +the annals of war. "Our Emperor," said they, "has found out a new +way of making war: he no longer makes it with our arms, but with +our legs." <a name="FN2anchor33_33"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_33_33"><sup>[33]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Meanwhile the other Austrian detachments were being hunted down. +Only a few men escaped from Memmingen into Tyrol: the division, +which, if properly <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii26" id= +"page_ii26">[pg.26]</a></span> supported, might have cut a way +through to Nördlingen three days earlier, was now overwhelmed +by the troops of Murat and Lannes; out of 13,000 foot-soldiers very +few escaped. Most of the horsemen succeeded in joining the Archduke +Ferdinand, on whose track Murat now flung himself with untiring +energy. The <i>beau sabreur</i> swept through part of Ansbach in +pursuit, came up with Ferdinand near Nuremberg, and defeated his +squadrons, their chief, with about 1,700 horse and some 500 mounted +artillerymen, finally reaching the shelter of the Bohemian +Mountains. All the rest of Mack's great array had been +engulfed.</p> + +<p>Thus closed the first scene of the War of the Third Coalition. +Hasty preparations, rash plans, and, above all, Mack's fatal +ingenuity in reading his notions into facts—these were the +causes of a disaster which ruined the chances of the allies. The +Archduke Charles, who had been foiled by Masséna's stubborn +defence, was at once recalled from Italy in order to cover Vienna; +and, worst of all, the Court of Berlin now delayed drawing the +sword.</p> + +<p>Yet, even amidst the unstinted boons that she showered on +Napoleon by land, Fortune rudely baffled him at sea. When he was +hurrying from Ulm towards the River Inn, to carry the war into +Austria, he heard that the French navy had been shattered. +Trafalgar was fought the day after Mack's army filed out of Ulm. +The greatest sea-fight of the century was the outcome of Napoleon's +desire that his ships should carry succour to his troops in Italy. +For this voyage the Emperor was about to substitute Admiral Rosily +for Villeneuve: and the unfortunate admiral, divining that resolve, +sought by a bold stroke to retrieve his fortunes. He put to sea, +and Trafalgar was the result. It would be superfluous to describe +this last and most splendid of Nelson's exploits; but a few words +as to the bearing of this great victory on the events of that time +may not be out of place. It is certain that Villeneuve at Trafalgar +fought under more favourable conditions than in the conflict <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii27" id= +"page_ii27">[pg.27]</a></span> of July 22nd. He had landed his very +numerous sick, his crews had been refreshed and reinforced, and, +above all, the worst of the Spanish ships had been replaced by +seaworthy and serviceable craft. Yet out of the thirty-three sail +of the line, he lost eighteen to an enemy that numbered only +twenty-seven sail; and that fact alone absolves him from the charge +of cowardice in declining to face Cornwallis and Calder in July +with ships that were cumbered with sick and badly needed +refitting.</p> + +<p>Then again: it is often stated that Trafalgar saved England from +invasion. To refute this error it is merely needful to remind the +reader that all immediate fear of invasion was over, when, at the +close of August, Napoleon wheeled the Grand Army against Austria. +Not until the Continent was conquered could the landing in Kent +become practicable. That opportunity occurred two years later, +after Tilsit; then, in truth, the United Kingdom was free from +panic because Trafalgar had practically destroyed the French navy. +For these islands, then, the benefits of Trafalgar were +prospective. But, for the British Empire, they were immediate. +Every French, Dutch, and Spanish colony that now fell into our +hands was in great measure the fruit of Nelson's victory, which +heralded the second and vaster stage of imperial growth.</p> + +<p>Finally, the decisive advantage which Britain now gained over +Napoleon at sea compelled him, if he would realize the world-wide +schemes ever closest to his heart, to adopt the method of warfare +against us which he had all along contemplated as an effective +alternative. As far back as February, 1798, he pointed out that +there were three ways of attacking and ruining England, either a +direct invasion, or a French control of North Germany which would +ruin British commerce, or an expedition to the Indies. After +Trafalgar the first of these alternatives was impossible, and the +last receded for a time into the background. The second now took +the first place in his thoughts; he could only bring England to his +feet and gain a world-empire by shutting <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii28" id="page_ii28">[pg.28]</a></span> out her goods +from the whole of the Continent, and thus condemning her to +industrial strangulation. In a word, Trafalgar necessitated the +adoption of the Continental System, which was built up by the +events now to be described.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>Note to the Third Edition.—An American critic has charged +me with inconsistency in saying that the Third Coalition was not +built up by English gold, because I state (p. 5) that the first +advances were made by England to Russia. I ought to have used the +phrase "the first <i>written</i> proposals that I have found were +made," etc. Czartoryski's "Memoirs" (vol. ii., chs. ii.-iii.), to +which I referred my readers for details, show clearly that +Alexander and his advisers looked on a rupture with France as +inevitable, but wished to temporize for some three months or so, +until certain matters were cleared up; they therefore cautiously +sounded the position at Vienna and London. This passage from +Czartoryski (vol. ii., ch. iii.) proves that Russia wanted the +English alliance:</p> + +<p>"After the diplomatic rupture consequent upon the execution of +the Duc d'Enghien, it became indispensable to come to an +understanding with the only Power, except Russia, which thought +herself strong enough to contend with France—to ascertain as +thoroughly as possible what were her inclinations and designs, the +principles of her policy, and those which she could be led to adopt +in certain contingencies. It would have been a great advantage to +obtain the concurrence in our views of so powerful a State as +England, and to strive with her for the same objects; but for this +it was necessary, not only to make sure of her present +inclinations, but to weigh well the possibilities of the future +after the death of George III. and the fall of the Pitt Ministry. +We had to make England understand that the wish to fight Napoleon +was not in itself sufficient to establish an indissoluble bond +between her Government and that of St. Petersburg...."</p> + +<p>In "F.O.," Russia, No. 55, is a despatch of our ambassador at +St. Petersburg, Admiral Warren, of June 30, 1804, in which he +reports Czartoryski's concern at rumours of negotiations between +England and France: "The prince [Czartoryski] remarked that he +could not suppose, after what had passed between the two Courts, +and the manner in which the Emperor [Alexander] had explained +himself to England, and after the measures which Russia had since +proposed, that Great Britain would make a peace at once by +herself."</p> + +<p>Of these earlier negotiations I have found no trace; but +obviously the first proposals for an alliance must have come from +Russia. Sweden was the first to propose a monarchical league +against Napoleon. (See my article in the "Revue +Napoléonienne" for June, 1902.)</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii29" id= +"page_ii29">[pg.29]</a></span> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXIII</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>AUSTERLITZ</center> + +<br> + + +<p>After the capitulation of Ulm, the French Emperor marched +against the Russian army, which, as he told his troops, <i>English +gold had brought from the ends of the earth.</i> As is generally +the case with coalitions, neither of the allies was ready in time +or sent its full quota. In place of the 54,000 which Alexander had +covenanted to send to Austria's support, he sent as yet only +46,000; and of these 8,000 were detached into Podolia in order to +watch the warlike moves of the Turks, whom the French had stirred +up against the Muscovite.</p> + +<p>But Alexander had another and weightier excuse for not denuding +his realm of troops, namely, the ambiguous policy of Prussia. Up to +the middle of October this great military Power clung to her +somewhat threatening neutrality, an attitude not unlike that of the +Scandinavian States, which, in 1691, remained deaf to the +entreaties of William of Orange to take up the cause of European +freedom against Louis XIV., and were dubbed the Third Party. It +would seem, however, that the Prussian King had some grounds for +his conduct: he feared the Polish influence which Czartoryski +wielded over the Czar, and saw in the Russian request for a right +of way through Prussian Poland a deep-laid scheme for the seizure +of that territory. Indeed, the letters of Czartoryski prove that +such a plan was pressed forward, and found much favour with the +Czar, though at the last moment he prudently shelved it. <a name= +"FN2anchor34_34"></a> <a href="#Foot2note_34_34"><sup>[34]</sup></a> +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii30" id= +"page_ii30">[pg.30]</a></span></p> + +<p>For a time the hesitations of Prussia were ended by Napoleon's +violation of Ansbach, and by Alexander's frank explanations at +Potsdam; but meanwhile the delays caused by Prussia's suspicions +had marred the Austrian plans. A week's grace granted by Napoleon, +or a week gained by the Russians on their actual marching time, +would have altered the whole situation in Bavaria—and Prussia +would have drawn the sword against France to avenge the insult at +Ansbach.</p> + +<p>On October 10th Hardenberg informed the Austrian ambassador, +Metternich, that Frederick William was on the point of declaring +for the allies. Nothing, however, was done until Alexander reached +Potsdam, and the first news that he received on his arrival +(October 25th) was of the surrender of Ulm. Nevertheless, the +influence of the Czar checkmated the efforts of Haugwitz and the +French party, and kept that Government to its resolve, which on +November 3rd took the form of the Treaty of Potsdam between Russia, +Austria, and Prussia. Frederick William pledged himself to offer +the armed mediation of Prussia, and, if it were refused by +Napoleon, to join the allies. The Prussian demands were as follows: +indemnities for the King of Sardinia in Lombardy, Liguria, and +Parma; the independence of Naples, Holland, Germany, and +Switzerland; and the Mincio as Austria's boundary in Italy. <a +name="FN2anchor35_35"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_35_35"><sup>[35]</sup></a></p> + +<p>An envoy was to offer these terms to Napoleon, and to bring back +a definite answer within one month from the time of his departure, +and in the meantime 180,000 Prussians prepared to threaten his +flank and rear. Alexander also secretly pledged himself to use his +influence with George III. to gain Hanover for Frederick William at +the close of the war, England meanwhile subsidizing Prussia and her +Saxon allies on the usual scale. The Czar afterwards accompanied +the King and Queen to the crypt of the Great Frederick, kissed the +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii31" id= +"page_ii31">[pg.31]</a></span> tomb, and, as he took his leave of +their majesties, cast a significant look at the altar. <a name= +"FN2anchor36_36"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_36_36"><sup>[36]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Did he fear the peace-loving tendencies of the King, or the +treachery of Haugwitz? It is difficult to see good faith in every +detail of the treaty. Apart from the strange assumption that +England would subsidize Prussia and also give up Hanover, the +manner in which the armed mediation was to be offered left several +loopholes for escape. After the surrender of Ulm, speedy and +vigorous action was needed to restore the balance; yet a month's +delay was bargained for. Then, too, Haugwitz, who was charged with +this most important mission, deferred his departure for ten days on +the plea that Prussia's forces could not be ready before the middle +of December. Such was the statement of the leisurely Duke of +Brunswick; but it can scarcely be reconciled with Frederick +William's threat, a month earlier, of immediate war against the +Russians if they entered his lands. Yet now that monarch approved +of the delay. Haugwitz therefore did not set out till November +14th, and by that time Napoleon was master of Vienna, and the +allies were falling back into Moravia.</p> + +<p>We now turn to the scene of war. For the first time in modern +history the Hapsburg capital had fallen into the hands of a foreign +foe. Napoleon now installed himself at the stately palace of +Schönbrunn, while Francis was fleeing to Olmütz and the +Archdukes Charles and John were struggling in the defiles of the +Alps to disengage themselves from the vanguard of Masséna. +The march of the French on Vienna, and thence northwards to +Brünn, led to only one incident of general interest, namely, +the filching away from the Austrians of the bridge over the Danube +to the north of Vienna. As it nears the city, that great river +spreads out into several channels, the largest being on the north. +The wooden bridge further up the river having been burnt by the +Russian rearguard, there remained only the<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii32" id="page_ii32">[pg.32]</a></span> bridge or +bridges, opposite the city, on the possession of which Napoleon set +much store. He therefore charged Murat and Lannes to secure them if +possible.</p> + +<p>Murat was smarting under the Emperor's displeasure for a rash +advance on Vienna which had wellnigh cost the existence of +Mortier's corps on the other bank. Indeed, only by the most +resolute bravery did the remnant of that corps hew its way through +overwhelming numbers. Murat, who should have kept closely in touch +with Mortier by a flotilla of boats, was eager to retrieve his +fault, and, with Lannes, Bertrand, and an officer of engineers, he +now approached the first part of the bridge as if for a parley +during an informal armistice which had just been discussed but not +concluded. The French Marshals had disposed the grenadiers of +General Oudinot, a body of men as renowned as their leader for +fighting qualities, behind some thickets that spread along the +southern bank and partly screened the approach. The plank barricade +at the southern end was now thrown down, and the four Frenchmen +advanced. An Austrian mounted sentinel fired his carbine and +galloped away to the main bridge; thereupon the four men advanced, +called to the officer there in command as if for a parley, and +stopped him in the act of firing the gunpowder stored beneath the +bridge, with the assurance that an armistice was, or was about to +be, concluded.</p> + +<p>Reaching the northern end they repeated their tale, and claimed +to see the commander. While the defenders were hesitating, +Oudinot's grenadiers were rapidly marching forward. As soon as they +were seen, the Austrians prepared once more to fire the bridge. +Again they were implored to desist, as peace was as good as signed. +But when the grenadiers had reached the northern bank, the mask was +dropped: fresh troops were hurrying up and the chance of saving the +bridge from their grasp was now lost. By these means did Murat and +Lannes secure an undisputed passage to the northern bank, for which +four years later the French had desperately to fight. Napoleon was +delighted at Murat's exploit, which greatly furthered his<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii33" id= +"page_ii33">[pg.33]</a></span> pursuit of the allies, and he at +once restored that Marshal to high favour. But those who placed +gentlemanly conduct above the glamour of a trickster's success were +not slow, even then, to express their disapproval of this act of +perfidy.<a name="FN2anchor37_37"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_37_37"><sup>[37]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The prolonged retreat into Moravia, the unexpected feebleness of +the Hapsburg arms, and the lack of supplies weighed heavily on +Alexander's spirits, as is shown in his letter from Olmütz to +the King of Prussia on November 19th: "Our position is more than +critical: we stand almost alone against the French, who are close +on our heels. As for the Austrian army, it does not exist.... If +your armies advance, the whole position will alter at once."<a +name="FN2anchor38_38"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_38_38"><sup>[38]</sup></a> A few days later, however, +when 27,000 more Russians were at hand, including his Imperial +Guard, the Czar passed from the depths of depression to the heights +of confidence. The caution of his wary commander, Kutusoff, who +urged a Fabian policy of delay and retreat, now began to weary him. +To retire into northern Hungary seemed ignominious. And though +Frederick William held to his resolve of not drawing the sword +before December 15th, and by that time the Archduke Charles with a +large army was expected below Vienna, yet the susceptible young +autocrat spurned the behests of irksome prudence. In vain did +Kutusoff and Schwarzenberg urge the need of delay and retreat: +Alexander gave more heed to the rash counsels of his younger +officers. An advance was ordered on Brünn, and a successful +cavalry skirmish at Wischau confirmed the Czar in his change from +the strategy of Fabius to that of Varro.</p> + +<p>Napoleon, who was now at Brünn, had already divined this +change in the temper of his foe, and called back his<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii34" id="page_ii34">[pg.34]</a></span> men +with the express purpose of humouring Alexander's latest mood and +tempting him on to a decisive battle. He saw clearly the advantage +of fighting at once. The renewed offers of an armistice, which he +received from the prudent Francis, might alone have convinced him +of this; and they came in time to give him an argument, telling +enough to daunt the Prussian envoy, who was now drawing near to his +headquarters.</p> + +<p>After proceeding towards Vienna and being sent back to +Brünn, Haugwitz arrived there on November 29th.<a name= +"FN2anchor39_39"></a><a href="#Foot2note_39_39"><sup>[39]</sup></a> +Of the four hours' private conference that ensued with Napoleon we +have but scanty records, and those by Haugwitz himself, who had +every reason for warping the truth. He states that he was received +with icy coldness, and at once saw that the least threat of hostile +pressure by Prussia would drive Napoleon to make a separate peace +with Austria. But after the first hour the Emperor appeared to +thaw: he discussed the question of a Continental peace and laid +aside all resentment at Prussia's conduct: finally, he gave a +general assent to her proposals, on two conditions, namely, that +the allied force then in Hanover should not be allowed by Prussia +to invade Holland, and that the French garrison in the fortress of +Hameln, now compassed about by Prussians, should be provisioned. To +both of these requests Haugwitz assented, and pledged the word of +his King, an act of presumption which that monarch was to +repudiate.</p> + +<p>While exceeding his instructions on this side, Haugwitz did +practically nothing to advance the chief business of his mission. +Either his own fears, or the crafty mixture of threats and flattery +that cajoled so many envoys, led him to neglect the interests of +Prussia, and to play into the hands of the very man whose ambition +he was sent to check. After the interview, when the envoy had +retired to his lodging, Caulaincourt came up in haste to warn him +that a battle was imminent, that his personal safety might be +endangered, and that Napoleon requested<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii35" id="page_ii35">[pg.35]</a></span> him to repair to +Vienna, where he might consult with Talleyrand on affairs of State. +Horses and an escort were ready, and Haugwitz set out for that +city, where he arrived on November 30th, only to find that +Talleyrand was strictly forbidden to do more than entertain him +with commonplaces. Thus, the all-important question as to the +action of Prussia's legions was again postponed, even when 150,000 +Prussians and Saxons were ready to march against the French +communications.</p> + +<p>Napoleon's letter of November 30th to Talleyrand reveals his +secret anxiety at this time. In truth, the crisis was terrible. +With a superior force in front, with the Archdukes Ferdinand and +Charles threatening to raise Bohemia and Hungary on his flanks, +while two Prussian armies were about to throw themselves on his +rear, his position was fully as serious as that of Hannibal before +Cannæ, from which the Carthaginian freed himself only by that +staggering blow. Did that example inspire the French Emperor, or +did he take counsel from his own boundless resources of brain and +will? Certain it is that, after a passing fit of discouragement, he +braced himself for a final effort, and staked all on the effect of +one mighty stroke. In order to hurry on the battle he feigned +discouragement and withdrew his lines from Austerlitz to the +Goldbach. Already he had sent General Savary to the Czar with +proposals for a short truce.<a name="FN2anchor40_40"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_40_40"><sup>[40]</sup></a> The word truce now spelt +guile; its offer through Savary, whose hands were stained with the +blood of the Duc d'Enghien, was in itself an insult, and Alexander +gave that envoy the coolest reception. In return he sent Prince +Dolgoruki, the leader of the bellicose youths now high in favour, +who proudly declared to the French Emperor the wishes of his master +for the independence of Europe—adding among other things that +Holland must be free and have Belgium added to it.</p> + +<p>This suggestion greatly amused Napoleon, who replied that Russia +ought now to think of her own advantages<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii36" id="page_ii36">[pg.36]</a></span> on the side of +Turkey. The answer convinced the Czar that Napoleon dreaded a +conflict in his dangerously advanced position. He knew not his +antagonist's resources. Napoleon had hurried up every available +regiment. Bernadotte's corps was recalled from the frontier of +Bohemia; Friant's division of 4,000 men was ordered up from +Pressburg; and by forced marches it also was nigh at hand on the +night of December 1st, worn with fatigue after covering an immense +space in two days, but ready to do excellent service on the +morrow.<a name="FN2anchor41_41"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_41_41"><sup>[41]</sup></a> By this timely concentration +Napoleon raised his forces to a total of at least 73,000 men, while +the enemy founded their plan on the assumption that Napoleon had +less than 50,000, and would scarcely resist the onset of superior +forces.</p> + +<p>Their plan was rash, even for an army which numbered about +80,000 men. The Austrian General Weyrother had convinced the Czar +that an energetic advance of his left wing, which rested on the +southern spurs of the Pratzenberg, would force back Napoleon's +right, which was ranged between the villages of Kobelnitz and +Sokelnitz, and so roll up his long line that stretched beyond +Schlapanitz. This move, if successful, would not only win the day, +but decide the campaign, by cutting off the French from their +supplies coming from the south and driving them into the exhausted +lands around Olmütz. Such was Weyrother's scheme, which +enchanted the Czar and moved the fears of the veteran Kutusoff: it +was expounded to the Russian and Austrian generals after midnight +on December the 2nd. Strong in the great central hill, the +Pratzenberg, and the cover of its village at the foot, the Czar had +no fear for his centre: to his right or northern wing he gave still +less heed, as it rested firmly on villages and was powerful in +cavalry and artillery; but his left wing, comprising fully +two-fifths of the allied army, was expected easily to defeat +Napoleon's weak and scattered right, and so decide the day. +Kutusoff<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii37" id= +"page_ii37">[pg.37]</a></span> saw the peril of massing so great a +force there and weakening the centre, but sadly held his peace.</p> + +<p>Napoleon had already divined their secret. In his order of +battle he took his troops into his confidence, telling them that, +while the enemy marched to turn his right, they would expose their +flank to his blows. To announce this beforehand was strangely bold, +and it has been thought that he had the plan from some traitor on +the enemy's staff. No proof of this has been given; and such an +explanation seems superfluous to those who have observed Napoleon's +uncanny power of fathoming his adversary's designs. The idea of +withdrawing one wing in order to tempt the foe unduly to prolong +his line on that side, and then to crush it at the centre, or sever +it from the centre, is common both to Castiglione and Austerlitz. +It is true, the peculiarities of the ground, the ardour of the +Russian attack, and the vastness of the operations lent to the +present conflict a splendour and a horror which Castiglione lacked. +But the tactics which won both battles were fundamentally the +same.</p> + +<p>He had studied the ground in front of Austerlitz; and the +priceless gift of strategic imagination revealed to him what a rash +and showy leader would be certain to do on that ground;<a name= +"FN2anchor42_42"></a><a href="#Foot2note_42_42"><sup>[42]</sup></a> +he tempted him to it, and the announcement of the enemy's plan to +the French soldiery supplied the touch of good comradeship which +insured their utmost devotion on the morrow. At midnight, as he +returned from visiting the outposts, the soldiers greeted him with +a weird illumination: by a common impulse they tore down the straw +from their rude shelters and held aloft the burning wisps on long +poles, dancing the while in honour of the short gray-coated figure, +and shouting, "It is the anniversary of the coronation. Long live +the Emperor." Thus was the great day ushered in. The welkin glowed +with this tribute of an army's <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii38" id="page_ii38">[pg.38]</a></span> heroworship: the +frost-laden clouds echoed back the multitudinous acclaim; and the +Russians, as they swung forward their left, surmised that, after +all, the French would stand their ground and fight, whilst others +saw in the flare a signal that Napoleon was once more about to +retreat.</p> + +<p>December the 2nd may well be the most famous day of the +Napoleonic calendar: it was the day of his coronation, it was the +day of Austerlitz, and, a generation later, another Napoleon chose +it for his <i>coup d'état</i>. The "sun of Austerlitz," +which the nephew then hailed, looked down on a spectacle far +different from that which he wished to gild with borrowed +splendour. Struggling dimly through dense banks of mist, it shone +on the faces of 73,000 Frenchmen resolved to conquer or to die: it +cast weird shadows before the gray columns of Russia and the +white-coats of Austria as they pressed in serried ranks towards the +frozen swamps of the Goldbach. At first the allies found little +opposition; and Kienmayer's horse cleared the French from Tellnitz +and the level ground beyond. But Friant's division, hurrying up +from the west, restored the fight and drove the first assailants +from the village. Others, however, were pressing on, twenty-nine +battalions strong, and not all the tenacious bravery of Davoust's +soldiery availed to hold that spot. Nor was it necessary. +Napoleon's plan was to let the allied left compromise itself on +this side, while he rained the decisive blows at its joint with the +centre on the southern spur of the Pratzenberg.</p> + +<p>For this reason he reduced Davoust to defensive tactics, for +which his stubborn methodical genius eminently fitted him, until +the French centre had forced the Russians from the plateau. +Opposite or near that height he had posted the corps of Soult and +Bernadotte, supporting them with the grenadiers of Oudinot and the +Imperial Guard. Confronting these imposing forces was the Russian +centre, weakened by the heavy drafts sent towards Tellnitz, but +strong in its position and in the experience of its leader +Kutusoff. Caution urged him to <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii39" id="page_ii39">[pg.39]</a></span> hold back his men to +the last moment, until the need of giving cohesion to the turning +movement led the Czar impatiently to order his advance. Scarcely +had the Russians descended beyond Pratzen when they were exposed to +a furious attack. Vandamme, noted even then as one of the hardest +hitters in the army, was leading his division of Soult's corps up +the northern slopes of the plateau; by a sidelong slant his men cut +off a detachment of Russians in the village, and, aided by the +brigade of Thiébault, swarmed up the hill at a speed which +surprised and unsteadied its defenders. Oudinot's grenadiers and +the Imperial Guard were ready to sustain Soult: but the men of his +corps had the glory of seizing the plateau and driving back the +Russians. Yet these returned to the charge. Alexander and Kutusoff +saw the importance of the heights, and brought up a great part of +their reserves. Soon the divisions of</p> + +<center><a name="image_09"><img alt="BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ" src= +"images/image09.jpg" width="351" height="303"><br> + <font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>BATTLE OF +AUSTERLITZ</small></font></a></center> + +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii40" id= +"page_ii40">[pg.40]</a></span> Vandamme and St. Hilaire were borne +back; and it needed all the grand fighting powers of their troops +to hold up against the masses of howling Russians. For two hours +the battle there swayed to and fro; and Thiébault has +censured Napoleon for the lack of support, and Soult for his +apathy, during this soldiers' battle.<br> +<br> + + +<p>But the Emperor was awaiting the development of events on the +wings. A sharp fight of all arms was raging on the plain further to +the north. There the allies at first gained ground, the Austrian +horse well maintaining its old fame: but the infantry of Lannes' +corps, supported by powerful artillery ranged on a small conical +hill, speedily checked their charges; the French horse, marshalled +by Murat and Kellermann somewhat after the fashion of the British +cavalry at Waterloo, so as to support the squares and dash through +the intervals in pursuit, soon made most effective charges upon the +dense squadrons of the allies, and finally a general advance of +Lannes and Murat overthrew the wavering lines opposite and chased +them back towards the small town of Austerlitz.</p> + +<p>Thus by noon the lines of fighting swerved till they ranged +along the course of the Littawa stream, save where the allies had +thrust forward a long and apparently successful wedge beyond +Tellnitz. The Czar saw the danger of this almost isolated wing, and +sought to keep touch with it; but the defects of the allied plan +were now painfully apparent. Napoleon, having the interior lines, +while his foes were scattered over an irregular arc, could +reinforce his hard-pressed right. There Davoust was being slowly +borne back, when the march of Duroc with part of the Imperial Guard +restored the balance on that side. The French centre also was +strengthened by the timely arrival of part of Bernadotte's corps. +That Marshal detached a division towards the northern slopes of the +plateau; for he divined that there his master would need every man +to deal the final blows.<a name="FN2anchor43_43"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_43_43"><sup>[43]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii41" id="page_ii41">[pg.41]</a></span></p> + +<p>In truth, Alexander and Kutusoff were struggling hard to regain +the Pratzenberg. Four times did the Muscovites fling themselves on +the French centre, and not without some passing gleams of success. +Here occurred the most famous cavalry fight of the war. The Russian +Guards, mounted on superb horses, had cut up two of Vandamme's +battalions, when Rapp rode to their rescue with the chasseurs of +the French Imperial Guard. These choice bodies of horsemen met with +a terrible shock, which threw the Russians into disorder. Rallied +by other squadrons, these now overthrew their assailants and seemed +about to overpower them, when Bessières with the heavy +cavalry of the Guard fell on the flank of the Muscovite horse and +drove their lines, horse and foot, into the valley beyond.</p> + +<p>Assured of his centre, Napoleon now launched Soult's corps down +the south-western spurs of the plateau upon the flank and rear of +the allied left: this unexpected onset was decisive: the French, +sweeping down the slopes with triumphant shouts, cut off several +battalions on the banks of the Goldbach, scattered others in +headlong flight towards Brünn, and drove the greater part down +to the Lake of Tellnitz. Here the troubles of the allies +culminated. A few gained the narrow marshy gap between the two +lakes; but dense bodies found no means of escape save the frozen +surface of the upper lake. In some parts the ice bore the weight of +the fugitives; but where they thronged pell-mell, or where it was +cut up by the plunging fire of the French cannon on the heights, +crowds of men sank to destruction. The victors themselves stood +aghast at this spectacle; and, for the credit of human nature be it +said, many sought to save their drowning foes. Among others, the +youthful Marbot swam to a floe to help bring a Russian officer to +land, a chivalrous exploit which called forth the praise of +Napoleon. The Emperor brought this glorious day to a fitting close +by visiting the ground most thickly strewn with his wounded,<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii42" id= +"page_ii42">[pg.42]</a></span> and giving directions for their +treatment or removal. As if satisfied with the victory, he gave +little heed to the pursuit. In truth, never since Marlborough cut +the Franco-Bavarian army in twain at Blenheim, had there been a +battle so terrible in its finale, and so decisive in its results as +this of the three Emperors, which cost the allies 33,000 men and +186 cannon.</p> + +<p>The Emperors Alexander and Francis fled eastwards into the +night. Between them there was now a tacit understanding that the +campaign was at an end. On that night Francis sent proposals for a +truce; and in two days' time Napoleon agreed to an armistice +(signed on December 6th) on condition that Francis would send away +the Russian army and entirely exclude that of Prussia from his +territories. A contribution of 100,000,000 francs was also laid +upon the Hapsburg dominions. On the next day Alexander pledged +himself to withdraw his army at once; and Francis proceeded to +treat for peace with Napoleon. This was an infraction of the +treaties of the Third Coalition, which prescribed that no separate +peace should be made.</p> + +<p>Under the circumstances, the conduct of the Hapsburgs was +pardonable: but the seeming break-up of the coalition furnished the +Court of Berlin with a good reason for declining to bear the burden +alone. It was not Austerlitz that daunted Frederick William; for, +after hearing of that disaster, he wrote that he would be true to +his pledge given on November 3rd. But then, on the decisive day +(December 15th), came the news of the defection of Austria, the +withdrawal of Alexander's army, and the closing of the Hapsburg +lands to a Prussian force. These facts absolved Frederick William +from his obligations to those Powers, and allowed him with perfect +good faith to keep his sword in the scabbard. The change, it is +true, sadly dulled the warlike ardour of his army; but it could not +be called desertion of Russia and Austria.<a name= +"FN2anchor44_44"></a><a href="#Foot2note_44_44"><sup>[44]</sup></a> +The disgrace came later, when,<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii43" id="page_ii43">[pg.43]</a></span> on Christmas Day, +Haugwitz reached Berlin, and described to the King and Ministers +his interview with Napoleon in the palace of Schönbrunn, and +the treaty which the victor then and there offered to Prussia at +the sword's point.</p> + +<p>For most men a great victory such as Austerlitz would have +brought a brief spell of rest, especially after the ceaseless toils +and anxieties of the previous fortnight. Yet now, after ridding +himself of all fear of Austria, Napoleon at once used every device +of his subtle statecraft to dissolve the nascent coalition. And +Fortune had willed that, when flushed with triumph, he should have +to deal with a timorous time-server.</p> + +<p>It is the curse of a policy of keeping up a dainty balance in a +hurricane that it unmans the balancer, until at last the peacemaker +resembles a juggler. A decade of compromise and evasion of +difficulties had enfeebled the spirit of Prussia, until the hardest +trial for her King was to take any step that could not be retraced. +He had often spoken "feelingly, if not energetically," of the +predicaments of his position between France, England, and Russia.<a +name="FN2anchor45_45"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_45_45"><sup>[45]</sup></a> And, as in the case of that +other <i>bon père de famille</i>, Louis XVI., whom Nature +framed for a farmhouse and Fate tossed into a revolution, his lack +of foresight and resolution took the heart out of his advisers and +turned statesmen into trimmers. Even before the news of Austerlitz +reached the ears of Talleyrand and Haugwitz at Vienna, the bearer +of Prussia's ultimatum was posing as the friend of France. On all +occasions he wore the cordon of the Legion of Honour; and while the +hosts of East and West were in the death-grapple on the +Pratzenberg, he strove to convince the French Foreign Minister that +the Prussians had entered Hanover only in order to keep the peace +in North Germany; that, as<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii44" +id="page_ii44">[pg.44]</a></span> Russians had traversed Prussian +territory, the French would, of course, be equally free to do so; +that Frederick William objected to the descent of any English force +in Hanover, which belonged <i>de facto</i> to France; and finally +that the Treaty of Potsdam was not a treaty at all, but merely a +declaration with the "offer of Prussia's good offices and of +mediation, but without any mingling of hostile intentions." Well +might Talleyrand write to Napoleon: "I am very satisfied with M. +Haugwitz."<a name="FN2anchor46_46"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_46_46"><sup>[46]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Napoleon's victory over Prussian diplomacy was therefore won, +even before the lightning-stroke of Austerlitz blasted the Third +Coalition. Haugwitz began his conference with the victor at +Schönbrunn on December 13th, by offering Frederick William's +congratulations on his triumph at Austerlitz, to which the Emperor +replied by a sarcastic query whether, if the result of that battle +had been different, he would have spoken at all about the +friendship of his master.<a name="FN2anchor47_47"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_47_47"><sup>[47]</sup></a> After thus disconcerting the +envoy and upbraiding him with the Treaty of Potsdam, Napoleon +unmasked his battery by offering Prussia the Electorate of Hanover +in return for the comparatively petty sacrifices of Ansbach to +Bavaria, and Cleves and Neufchâtel to France. For the loss of +these outlying districts Prussia could buy that long-coveted +land.<a name="FN2anchor48_48"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_48_48"><sup>[48]</sup></a> The envoy was dazzled by this +glittering offer, and by others that followed. The conqueror +proposed an offensive and defensive alliance, whereby France and +Prussia mutually guaranteed their lands along with prospective +additions in Germany and Italy; and the Court of Berlin was also to +uphold the independence of Turkey.</p> + +<p>Such were the terms that Napoleon peremptorily required Haugwitz +to sign within a few hours: and the bearer of Prussia's ultimatum +on December 15th signed<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii45" +id="page_ii45">[pg.45]</a></span> this Treaty of Schönbrunn, +which degraded the would-be arbitress of Europe to her former +position of well-fed follower of France. This was the news which +Haugwitz brought back to his astonished King. His reception was of +the coolest; for Frederick William was an honest man, who sought +peace, prosperity, and the welfare of his people, and now saw +himself confronted by the alternative of war or national +humiliation. In truth, every turn and double of his course was now +leading him deeper into the discredit and ruin which will be +described in the next chapter.</p> + +<p>Leaving for the present that unhappy King amidst his increasing +perplexities, we return to the affairs of Austria. Mack's disaster +alone had cast that Government into the depths of despair, and we +learn from Lord Gower, our ambassador at St. Petersburg, that he +had seen copies of letters written by the Emperor Francis to +Napoleon "couched in terms of humility and submission unworthy of a +great monarch," to which the latter replied in a tone of +superiority and affected commiseration, and with a demand for the +Hapsburg lands in Venetia and Swabia.<a name= +"FN2anchor49_49"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_49_49"><sup>[49]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The same tone of whining dejection was kept up by Cobenzl and +other Austrian Ministers, even before Austerlitz, when Prussia was +on the point of drawing the sword; and they sent offers of peace, +when it was rather for their foe to sue for it. After that battle, +and, still more so, after signing the armistice of December 6th, +they were at the conqueror's mercy; and Napoleon knew it. After +probing the inner weakness of the Berlin Court, he now pressed with +merciless severity on the Hapsburgs. He proposed to tear away their +Swabian and Tyrolese lands and their share of the spoils of Venice. +In vain did the Austrian plenipotentiaries struggle against these +harsh terms, pleading for Tyrol and Dalmatia, and pointing out the +impossibility of raising 100,000,000 francs from territories +ravaged by war. In vain did they proffer a claim to Hanover for one +of<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii46" id= +"page_ii46">[pg.46]</a></span> their Archdukes: though Talleyrand +urged the advantage of this step as dissolving the Anglo-Austrian +alliance, yet Napoleon refused to hear of it; for at that time he +was offering that Electorate to Haugwitz.<a name= +"FN2anchor50_50"></a><a href="#Foot2note_50_50"><sup>[50]</sup></a> +Still less would he hear a word in favour of the Court of Naples, +whose conduct had aroused his resentment. The utmost that the +Austrian envoys could wring from him was the reduction of the war +contribution to 40,000,000 francs.</p> + +<p>The terms finally arranged in the Treaty of Pressburg (December +26th, 1805) may be thus summarized: Austria recognized the recent +acquisitions and changes of title made by Napoleon in Italy, and +ceded to him her parts of Venetia, Istria, and Dalmatia. She +recognized the title of King now bestowed by Napoleon on the +Electors of Bavaria and Würtemberg, a change which was not to +invalidate their membership of the "Germanic Confederation." To +those potentates and to the Elector (now Grand Duke) of Baden, the +Hapsburgs ceded all their scattered Swabian domains, while Bavaria +also gained Tyrol and Vorarlberg. As a slight compensation for +these grievous losses, Austria gained Salzburg, whose Elector was +to receive from Bavaria the former principality of Würzburg. +The domains and revenues of the Teutonic and Maltese Orders were +secularized, so as to furnish appanages to some other princes of +the Hapsburg House; and another blow was dealt at the Germanic +system by the declaration that Napoleon guaranteed the full and +entire sovereignty of the rulers of Bavaria, Würtemberg, and +Baden. In fact, as will appear in the next chapter, Napoleon now +usurped the place in Germany previously held by the Hapsburgs, and +extended his influence as far east as the River Inn, and, on the +south, down to the remote city of Ragusa on the Adriatic.</p> + +<p>But it is one thing to win a brilliant diplomatic triumph, and +quite another thing to secure a firm and lasting peace. The Peace +of Pressburg raised Napoleon to<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii47" id="page_ii47">[pg.47]</a></span> heights of power +never dreamt of by Louis XIV.: but his pre-eminence was at best +precarious. When by moderate terms he might have secured the +alliance of Austria and severed her friendship with England, he +chose to place his heel on her neck and drive her to secret but +irreconcilable hatred.</p> + +<p>And his choice was deliberate. Two months earlier, Talleyrand +had sent him a memorandum on the subject of a Franco-Austrian +alliance, which is instinct with statesmanlike foresight. He stated +that there were four Great Powers—France, Great Britain, +Russia, and Austria: he excluded Prussia, whose rise to greatness +under Frederick the Great was but temporary. Austria, he claimed, +must remain a Great Power. She had opposed revolutionary France; +but with Imperial France she had no lasting quarrel. Rather did her +manifest destiny clash with that of Russia on the lower Danube, +where the approaching break-up of the Ottoman Power must bring +those States into conflict. It was good policy, then, to give a +decided but friendly turn of Hapsburg policy towards the east. Let +Napoleon frankly approach the Emperor Francis and say in effect: "I +never sought this war with you, but I have conquered: I wish to +restore complete harmony between us: and, in order to remove all +causes of dispute, you must give up your Swabian, Tyrolese, and +Venetian lands: of these Tyrol shall fall to a prince of your +choice, and Venice (along with Trieste and Istria) shall form an +aristocratic Republic under a magistrate nominated in the first +instance by me. As a set-off to these losses, you shall receive +Moldavia, Wallachia, and northern Bulgaria. If the Russians object +to this and attack you, I will be your ally." Such was Talleyrand's +proposal.<a name="FN2anchor51_51"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_51_51"><sup>[51]</sup></a></p> + +<p>It is easy to criticise it in many details; but there can be +little doubt that its adoption by Napoleon would have<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii48" id="page_ii48">[pg.48]</a></span> +laid a firmer foundation for French supremacy than was afforded by +the Treaties of Pressburg and Tilsit. Austria would not have been +deeply wounded, as she now was by the transfer of her faithful +Tyrolese to the detested rule of Bavaria, and by the undisguised +triumph of Napoleon in Italy and along the Adriatic. Moreover, the +erection of Tyrol and Venetia into separate States would have been +a wise concession to those clannish societies; and Austria could +not have taken up the championship of outraged Tyrolese sentiment, +which she assumed four years later. Instead of figuring as the +leader of German nationality, she would have been on the worst of +terms with the Czar over the Eastern Question; and their discord +would have enabled France to dictate her own terms as to the +partition of the Sultan's dominions. Talleyrand had no specific for +dissolving the traditional friendship of England and Austria, and +we may imagine the joy with which he heard from the Hapsburg envoys +the demand for Hanover, at a time when English gold was pouring +into the empty coffers at Vienna. Here was the sure means of +embroiling England and Austria for a generation at least. But this +further chance of preventing future coalitions was likewise +rejected by Napoleon, who deliberately chose to make Austria a +deadly foe, and to aggrandize her rival Prussia.<a name= +"FN2anchor52_52"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_52_52"><sup>[52]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Why did Napoleon reject Talleyrand's plan? Unquestionably, I +think, because he had resolved to build up a Continental System, +which should "hermetically seal" the coasts of Europe against +English commerce. If he was to realize those golden visions of his +youth, ships, colonies, and an Eastern empire, which, even amidst +the glories of Austerlitz, he placed far above any European +triumph, he must extend his coast system and subject or conciliate +the maritime States. Of these the most important were Prussia and +Russia. The seaborne commerce of Austria was insignificant, and +could<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii49" id= +"page_ii49">[pg.49]</a></span> easily be controlled from his vassal +lands of Venetia and Dalmatia. To the would-be conqueror of England +the friendship or hatred of Austria seemed unimportant: he +preferred to depress this now almost land-locked Power, and to draw +tight the bonds of union with Prussia, always provided that she +excluded British goods.<a name="FN2anchor53_53"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_53_53"><sup>[53]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The same reason led him to hope for a Russian alliance. Only by +the help of Russia and Prussia could he shut England out from the +Baltic; and, to win that help, he destined Hanover for Prussia and +the Danubian States for the Czar. For the founder of the +Continental System such a choice was natural; but, viewed from the +standpoint of Continental politics, his treatment of Austria was a +serious blunder. His frightful pressure on her motley lands endowed +them with a solidity which they had never known before; and in less +than four years, the conqueror had cause to regret having driven +the Hapsburgs to desperation. It may even be questioned whether +Austerlitz itself was not a misfortune to him. Just before that +battle he thought of treating Austria leniently, taking only Verona +and Legnago, and exchanging Venetia against Salzburg. This would +have detached her from the Coalition, and made a friend of a Power +that is naturally inclined to be conservative.</p> + +<p>After Austerlitz, he rushed to the other extreme and forced the +Hapsburgs to a hostility in which the Marie Louise marriage was +only a forced and uneasy truce. His motives are not, in my +judgment, to be assigned to mere lust of domination, but rather to +a reasoned though exaggerated conviction of the need of Prussia and +Russia to his Continental System. Above all things, he now sought +to humble England, so that finally he might be free for his +long-deferred Oriental enterprise. This is the irony of his career, +that, though he preferred the career of Alexander the Great to that +of Cæsar; though he placed his victory at Austerlitz far +below the triumph<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii50" id= +"page_ii50">[pg.50]</a></span> of the great Macedonian at Issus +which assured the conquest of the Orient, yet he felt himself +driven to the very measures which tethered him to <i>cette vieille +Europe</i> and which finally roused the Continent against him.</p> + +<p>Among his errors of judgment, assuredly his behaviour to Austria +in 1805 was not the least. The recent history of Europe supplies a +suggestive contrast. Two generations after Austerlitz, the Hapsburg +Power was shattered by the disaster of Königgrätz, and +once more lost all influence in Germany and Italy. But the victor +then showed consideration for the vanquished. Bismarck had pondered +over the lessons of history, because, as he said, <i>history +teaches one how far one may safely go</i>. He therefore persuaded +King William to forego claims that would have embittered the +rivalry of Prussia and Austria. Nay! he recurred to Talleyrand's +policy of encouraging the Hapsburgs to seek in the Balkan Peninsula +compensation for their losses in the west: and within fifteen years +the basis of the Triple Alliance was firmly laid. Napoleon, on the +other hand, for lack of that statesmanlike moderation which +consecrates victory and cements the fabric of an enduring Empire, +soon saw the political results of Austerlitz swept away by the +rising tide of the nations' wrath. In less than nine years the +Austrians and their allies were masters of Paris.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION.—The account given on p. 41 of +the drowning of numbers of Russians at the close of the Battle of +Austerlitz was founded upon the testimony of Napoleon and many +French generals; the facts, as related by Lejeune, seemed quite +convincing; the Czar Alexander also asserted at Vienna in 1815 that +20,000 Russians had been drowned there. But the local evidence +(kindly furnished to me by Professor Fournier of Vienna) seems to +prove that the story is a myth. Both lakes were drained only a few +days after the battle, <i>at Napoleon's orders</i>; in the lower +lake not a single corpse was found; in the upper lake 150 corpses +of horses, but only two, some say three, of men, were found. +Probably Napoleon invented the catastrophe for the sake of dramatic +effect, and others followed the lead given in his bulletin. The +Czar may have adopted the story because it helped to excuse his +defeat. (See my article in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for July, +1902.)</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXIV</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii51" id="page_ii51">[pg.51]</a></span> + +<center>PRUSSIA AND THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE</center> + +<br> + + +<p>An eminent German historian, who has striven to say some kind +words about Frederick William's Government before the collapse at +Jena, prefaces his apology by the axiom that from a Prussian +monarch one ought to expect, not French, English, or Russian +policy, but only Prussian policy. The claim may well be challenged. +Doubtless, there are some States concerning which it would be true. +Countries such as Great Britain and Spain, whose areas are clearly +defined by nature, may with advantage be self-contained until their +peoples overflow into new lands: before they become world Powers, +they may gain in strength by being narrowly national. But there are +other States whose fortunes are widely different. They represent +some principle of life or energy, in the midst of mere political +wreckage. If the binding power, which built up an older organism, +should decline, as happened to the Holy Roman Empire after the +religious wars, fragments will fall away and join bodies to which +they are now more akin.</p> + +<p>Of the States that throve among the crumbling masses of the old +Empire the chief was Brandenburg-Prussia. She had a twofold energy +which the older organism lacked: she was Protestant and she was +national; she championed the new creed cherished by the North +Germans, and she felt, though dimly as yet, the strength that came +from an almost single kin. Until she seized on part of the spoils +of Poland, her Slavonic subjects were for the most part germanized +Slavs; and even<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii52" id= +"page_ii52">[pg.52]</a></span> after acquiring Posen and Warsaw at +the close of the eighteenth century, she could still claim to be +the chief Germanic State. A generation earlier, Frederick the Great +had seen this to be the source of her strength. His policy was not +merely Prussian: in effect, if not in aim, it was German. His +victory at Rossbach over a great polyglot force of French and +Imperialists first awakened German nationality to a thrill of +conscious life; and the last success of his career was the +championship of the lesser German princes against the encroachments +of the Hapsburgs. In fact, it seems now a mere commonplace to +assert that Prussia has prospered most when, as under Frederick the +Great and William the Great, her policy has been truly German, and +that she has fallen back most in the years 1795-1806 and 1848-1852, +when the subservience of her Frederick Williams to France and +Austria has lost them the respect and support of the rest of the +Fatherland. A State that would attract other fragments of the same +nation must be attractive, and it must be broadly national if it is +to attract. If Stein and Bismarck had been merely Prussians, if +Cavour's policy had been narrowly Sardinian, would their States +ever have served as the rallying centres for the Germany and Italy +of to-day?</p> + +<p>The difficulties which beset Frederick William III. in 1805 were +not entirely of his own making. His predecessor of the same +ill-omened name, when nearing the close of his inglorious reign, +made the Peace of Basel (1795), which began to place the policy of +Berlin at the beck and call of the French revolutionists. But the +present ruler had assured Prussia's subservience to France at the +time of the Secularizations, when he gained Erfurt, Eichsfeld, +Hildesheim, Paderborn, and a great part of the straggling bishopric +of Münster. Even at that time of shameless rapacity, there +were those who saw that the gain of half a million of subjects to +Prussia was a poor return for the loss of self-respect that befell +all who shared in the sacrilegious plunder bartered away by +Bonaparte and Talleyrand. Frederick William III.<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii53" id="page_ii53">[pg.53]</a></span> was +even suspected of a leaning towards French methods of Government; +and a Prussian statesman said to the French ambassador:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"You have only the nobles against you: the King and the people +are openly for France. The revolution which you have made from +below upwards will be slowly effected in Prussia from above +downwards: the King is a democrat after his fashion: he is always +striving to curtail the privileges of the nobles, but by slow +means. In a few years feudal rights will cease to exist in +Prussia."<a name="FN2anchor54_54"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_54_54"><sup>[54]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>Could the King have carried out these much-needed reforms, he +might perhaps have opposed a solid society to the renewed might of +France. But he failed to set his house in order before the storm +burst; and in 1803 he so far gave up his championship of North +German affairs as to allow the French to occupy Hanover, a land +that he and his Ministers had long coveted.</p> + +<p>We saw in the last chapter that Hanover was the bait whereby +Napoleon hooked the Prussian envoy, Haugwitz, at Schönbrunn; +and that the very man who had been sent to impose Prussia's will +upon the French Emperor returned to Berlin bringing peace and +dishonour. The surprise and annoyance of Frederick William may be +imagined. On all sides difficulties were thickening around him. +Shortly before the return of Haugwitz to Berlin, the Russian troops +campaigning in Hanover had been placed under the protection of +Prussia; and the King himself had offered to our Minister, Lord +Harrowby, to protect Cathcart's Anglo-Hanoverian corps which, +<i>with the aid of Prussian troops</i>, was restoring the authority +of George III. in that Electorate.</p> + +<p>Moreover, Frederick William could not complain of any shabby +treatment from our Government. Knowing that he was set on the +acquisition of Hanover and could only be drawn into the Coalition +by an equally attractive offer, the Pitt Ministry had proposed +through Lord Harrowby<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii54" id= +"page_ii54">[pg.54]</a></span> the cession to Prussia at the +general peace of the lands south-west of the Duchy of Cleves, +"bounded by a frontier line drawn from Antwerp to Luxemburg," and +connected with the rest of her territories.<a name= +"FN2anchor55_55"></a><a href="#Foot2note_55_55"><sup>[55]</sup></a> +This plan, which would have planted Prussia firmly at Antwerp, +Liège, Luxemburg, and Cologne, also aimed at installing the +Elector of Salzburg in the rest of the new Rhenish acquisitions of +France; while the equipoise of the Powers was to be adjusted by the +cession of Salzburg, the Papal Legations, and the line of the +Mincio to Austria, she in her turn giving up part of her Dalmatian +lands to Russia. Prussia was to be the protectress of North Germany +and regard any incursion of the French, "north of the Maine or at +least of the Lahn," as an act of war. Great Britain, after +subsidizing Prussia for 100,000 troops on the usual scale, pledged +herself to restore all her conquests made, or to be made, during +the war, with the exception of the Cape of Good Hope: but no +questions were to be raised about that desirable colony, or Malta, +or the British maritime code.<a name="FN2anchor56_56"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_56_56"><sup>[56]</sup></a></p> + +<p>At the close of 1805, then, Frederick William was face to face +with the offers of England and those brought by Haugwitz from +Napoleon. That is, he had to choose between the half of Belgium and +the Rhineland as offered by England, or Hanover as a gift from +Napoleon. The former gain was the richer, but apparently the more +risky, for it entailed the hatred of France: the latter seemed to +secure the friendship of the conqueror, though at the expense of +the claims of honour and a naval<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii55" id="page_ii55">[pg.55]</a></span> war with England. His +confidential advisers, Lombard, Beyme, and Haugwitz, were +determined to gain the Electorate, preferably at Napoleon's hands; +while his Foreign Minister, Hardenberg, a Hanoverian by birth, +desired to assure the union of his native land with Prussia by more +honourable means, and probably by means of an exchange with George +III., which will be noticed presently. In his opposition to French +influence, Hardenberg had the support of the more patriotic +Prussians, who sought to safeguard Prussia's honour, and to avert +war with England. The difficulty in accepting the Electorate at the +point of Napoleon's sword was not merely on the score of morality: +it was due to the presence of a large force of English, +Hanoverians, and Russians on the banks of the Weser, and to the +protection which the Prussian Government had offered to those +troops against any French attack, always provided that they did not +move against Holland and retired behind the Prussian battalions.<a +name="FN2anchor57_57"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_57_57"><sup>[57]</sup></a> The indignation of British +officers at this last order is expressed by Christian Ompteda, of +the King's German Legion, in a letter to his brother at Berlin: "My +dear fellow, if this sort of thing goes on, the Continent will soon +be irrecoverably lost. The Russian and English armies will not long +creep for refuge under the contemptible Prussian cloak. We are +here, 40,000 of the best and bravest troops. A swift move on +Holland only would have opened the road to certain success.... And +this is Lombard's and Haugwitz's work!"<a name= +"FN2anchor58_58"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_58_58"><sup>[58]</sup></a></p> + +<p>What meanwhile were George III.'s Ministers doing? At this +crisis English policy suffered a terrible blow. Death struck down +the "stately column" that held up the swaying fortunes of our race. +William Pitt, long failing in health, was sore-stricken by the news +of Austerlitz and the defection of Austria. But the popular version +as to the cause of his death—that <i>Austerlitz killed +Pitt</i>—is more melodramatic than correct. Among the many +causes that broke that <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii56" +id="page_ii56">[pg.56]</a></span> unbending spirit, the news of the +miserable result of the Hanoverian Expedition was the last and +severest. The files of our Foreign Office papers yield touching +proof of the hopes which the Cabinet cherished, even after Vienna +was in Napoleon's hands. Harrowby was urged to do everything in his +power—short of conceding Hanover—to bring Prussia into +the field, in which case "nearly 300,000 men will be available in +North Germany at the beginning of the next campaign, which will +include 70,000 British and Hanoverian troops employed there or in +maritime enterprises."<a name="FN2anchor59_59"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_59_59"><sup>[59]</sup></a> To this hope Pitt clung, even +after hearing the news of Austerlitz, and it was doubtless this +which enabled him to bear that last journey from Bath to Putney +Heath, with less fatigue and far more quickly than had been +expected. He arrived home on Saturday night, January 11th. On the +following Wednesday his friend, George Rose, called on him and +found that a serious change for the worse had set in.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"On the Sunday he was better, and continued improving till +Monday in the afternoon, when Lord Castlereagh insisted on seeing +him, and, having obtained access to him, entered (Lord Hawkesbury +being also present) on points of public business of the most +serious importance (principally respecting the bringing home the +British troops from the Continent), which affected him visibly that +evening and the next day, and this morning the effect was more +plainly observed: ... his countenance is extremely changed, his +voice weak, and his body almost wasted."</p> +</div> + +<p>It is clear also from the medical evidence which the diarist +gives that the news from Hanover was the cause of this sudden +change. On the previous Sunday, that is, just after the fatigue of +the three days' journey, the physicians "thought there was a +reasonable prospect of Mr. Pitt's recovery, that the probability +was in favour of it, and that, if his complaint should not take an +unfavourable turn, he might be able to attend to business in about +a<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii57" id= +"page_ii57">[pg.57]</a></span> month."<a name= +"FN2anchor60_60"></a><a href="#Foot2note_60_60"><sup>[60]</sup></a> +That unfavourable turn took place when the heroic spirit lost all +hope under the distressing news from Berlin and Hanover. +Austerlitz, it is true, had depressed him. Yet that, after all, did +not concern British honour and the dearest interests of his +master.</p> + +<p>But, that Frederick William, from whom he had hoped so much, to +whom he was on the point of advancing a great subsidy, should now +fall away, should talk of peace with Napoleon and claim Hanover, +should forbid an invasion of Holland and request the British forces +to evacuate North Germany—this was a blow to George III., to +our military prestige, and to the now tottering Ministry. How could +he face the Opposition, already wellnigh triumphant in the sad +Melville business, with a King's Speech in which this was the chief +news? Losing hope, he lost all hold on life: he sank rapidly: in +the last hours his thoughts wandered away to Berlin and Lord +Harrowby. "What is the wind?" he asked. "East; that will do; that +will bring him fast," he murmured. And, on January 23rd, about half +an hour before he breathed his last, the servant heard him say: "My +country: oh my country."<a name="FN2anchor61_61"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_61_61"><sup>[61]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Thus sank to rest, amidst a horror of great darkness, the +statesman whose noon had been calm and glorious. Only a superficial +reading of his career can represent him as eager for war and a foe +to popular progress. His best friends knew full well his pride in +the great financial achievements of 1784-6, his resolute clinging +to peace in 1792, and his longing for a pacification in 1796, 1797, +and 1800, provided it could be gained without detriment to our +allies and to the vital interests of Britain. His defence lies +buried amidst the documents of our Record Office, and has not yet +fully seen the light. For he was a reserved man, the warmth of +whose nature blossomed forth only to a few friends, or on such +occasions as his inspired speech on the emancipation of slaves. To +outsiders he had more than the usual fund of English<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii58" id="page_ii58">[pg.58]</a></span> +coldness: he wrote no memoirs, he left few letters, he had scant +means of influencing public opinion; and he viewed with lofty +disdain the French clamour that it was he who made and kept up the +war. "I know it," he said; "the Jacobins cry louder than we can, +and make themselves heard."<a name="FN2anchor62_62"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_62_62"><sup>[62]</sup></a> He was, in fact, a typical +champion of our rather dumb and stolid race, that plods along to +the end of the appointed stage, scarcely heeding the cloud of +stinging flies. Both the people and its champion were ill fitted to +cope with Napoleon. None of our statesmen had the Latin tact and +the histrionic gifts needful to fathom his guile, to arouse the +public opinion of Europe against him, or to expose his +double-dealing.</p> + +<p>But Pitt was unfortunate above all of them. It was his fate to +begin his career in an age of mediocrities and to finish it in an +almost single combat with the giant. He was no match for Napoleon. +The Coalition, which the Czar and he did so much to form, was a +house of cards that fell at the conqueror's first touch; and the +Prussian alliance now proved to be a broken reed. His notions of +strategy were puerile. The French Emperor was not to be beaten by +small forces tapping at his outworks; and Austria might reasonably +complain that our neglect to attack the rear of the Grand Army in +Flanders exposed her to the full force of its onset on the Danube. +But though his genius pales before the fiery comet of Napoleon, it +shines with a clear and steady radiance when viewed beside that of +the Continental statesmen of his age. They flickered for a brief +space and set. His was the rare virtue of dauntless courage and +unswerving constancy. By the side of their wavering groups he +stands forth like an Abdiel:</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Unshaken, unseduced, +unterrified,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">His loyalty he kept, his love, his +zeal:</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Nor number nor example with him +wrought</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">To swerve from truth or change his +constant mind,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Though single."</span><br> + + +<p>While English statesmanship was essaying the task of<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii59" id="page_ii59">[pg.59]</a></span> +forming a Coalition Ministry under Fox and Grenville, Napoleon with +untiring activity was consolidating his position in Germany, Italy, +and France. In Germany he allied his family by marriage with the +now royal Houses of Bavaria and Würtemberg. He chased the +Bourbons of Naples from their Continental domains. In France he +found means to mitigate a severe financial crisis, and to +strengthen his throne by a new order of hereditary nobility. In a +word, he became the new Charlemagne.</p> + +<p>The exaltation of the South German dynasties had long been a +favourite project with Napoleon, who saw in the hatred of the House +of Bavaria for Austria a sure basis for spreading French influence +into the heart of Germany. Not long after the battle of Austerlitz, +the Elector of Bavaria, while out shooting, received from a French +courier a letter directed to "Sa Majesté <i>le Roi</i> de +Bavière et de Suabe."<a name="FN2anchor63_63"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_63_63"><sup>[63]</sup></a> This letter was despatched +six days after a formal request was sent through Duroc, that the +Elector would give his daughter Augusta in marriage to +Eugène Beauharnais. The affair had been mooted in October: +it was clinched by the victory of Austerlitz; and after Napoleon's +arrival at Munich on the last day of the year, the final details +were arranged. The bridegroom was informed of it in the following +laconic style: "I have arrived at Munich. I have arranged your +marriage with the Princess Augusta. It has been announced. This +morning the princess visited me, and I spoke with her for a long +time. She is very pretty. You will find herewith her portrait on a +cup; but she is much better looking." The wedding took place at +Munich as soon as the bridegroom could cross the Alps; and Napoleon +delayed his departure for France in order to witness the ceremony +which linked him with an old reigning family. At the same time he +arranged a match between Jerome Bonaparte and Princess Catherine of +Würtemberg. This was less expeditious, partly because, in the +case of a Bonaparte, Napoleon judged it needful to sound the<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii60" id= +"page_ii60">[pg.60]</a></span> measure of his obedience. But Jerome +had been broken in: he had thrown over Miss Paterson, and, after a +delay of a year and a half, obeyed his brother's behests, and +strengthened the ties connecting Swabia with France. A third +alliance was cemented by the marriage of the heir to the Grand +Duchy of Baden with Stéphanie de Beauharnais, niece of +Josephine.</p> + +<p>In the early part of 1806 Napoleon might flatter himself with +his brilliant success as a match-maker. Yet, after all, he was less +concerned with the affairs of Hymen than with those of Mars and +Mercury. He longed to be at Paris for the settlement of finances; +and he burned to hear of the expulsion of the Bourbons from Naples. +For this last he had already sent forth his imperious mandates from +Vienna; and, after a brief sojourn at the Swabian capitals, he set +out for Paris, where he arrived incognito at midnight of January +26th. During his absence of one hundred and twenty-five days he had +captured or destroyed two armies, stricken a mighty coalition to +the heart, shattered the Hapsburg Power, and revolutionized the +Germanic system by establishing two Napoleonic kingdoms in its +midst.</p> + +<p>Yet, as if nothing had been done, and all his hopes and thoughts +lay in the future, he summoned his financial advisers to a council +for eight o'clock in the morning. Scarcely did he deign to notice +their congratulations on his triumphs. "We have," he said, "to deal +with more serious questions: it seems that the greatest dangers of +the State were not in Austria: let us hear the report of the +Minister of the Treasury." It then appeared that +Barbé-Marbois had been concerned in risky financial concerns +with the Court of Spain, through a man named Ouvrard. The Minister +therefore was promptly dismissed, and Mollien then and there +received his post. The new Minister states in his memoirs that the +money, which had sufficed to carry the French armies from the +English Channel to the Rhine, had been raised on extravagant terms, +largely on loans on the national domains. In fact, it had been an +open question whether victory<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii61" id="page_ii61">[pg.61]</a></span> would come promptly +enough to avert a wholesale crash at Paris.</p> + +<p>So bad were the finances that, though 40,000,000 francs were +poured every year into France as subsidies from Italy and Spain, +yet loans of 120,000,000 francs had been incurred in order to meet +current expenses.<a name="FN2anchor64_64"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_64_64"><sup>[64]</sup></a> It would exceed the limits of +our space to describe by what forceful means Napoleon restored the +financial equilibrium and assuaged the commercial crisis resulting +from the war with England. Mollien soon had reason to know that, so +far from avoiding Continental wars, the Emperor thenceforth seemed +almost to provoke them, and that the motto—<i>War must +support war</i>—fell far short of the truth. Napoleon's wars, +always excepting his war with England, supported the burdens of an +armed peace. In this respect his easy and gainful triumph over +Austria was a disaster for France and Europe. It beckoned him on to +Jena and Tilsit.</p> + +<p>While reducing his finances to order and newspaper editors to +servility, the conqueror received news of the triumph of his arms +in Southern Italy. There the Bourbons of Naples had mortally +offended him. After concluding a convention for the peaceable +withdrawal of St. Cyr's corps and the strict observance of +neutrality by the kingdom of Naples, Ferdinand IV. and his Queen +Caroline welcomed the arrival at their capital of an Anglo-Russian +force of 20,000 men, and intrusted the command of these and of the +Neapolitan troops to General Lacy.<a name="FN2anchor65_65"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_65_65"><sup>[65]</sup></a> This force, it is true, +did little except weaken the northward march of Masséna; but +the violation of neutrality by the Bourbons galled Napoleon. At +Vienna he refused to listen to the timid pleading of the Hapsburgs +on their behalf, and as soon as peace was signed at<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii62" id="page_ii62">[pg.62]</a></span> +Pressburg he put forth a bulletin stating that St. Cyr was marching +on Naples to hurl from the throne that guilty woman who had so +flagrantly violated all that is sacred among men. France would +fight for thirty years rather than pardon her atrocious act of +perfidy: the Queen of Naples had ceased to reign: let her go to +London and form a committee of sympathetic ink with Drake, +Spencer-Smith, Taylor, and Wickham.</p> + +<p>This diatribe was not the first occasion on which the conqueror +had proved that he was no gentleman. In his brutal letter of +January 2nd, 1805, to Queen Caroline, he told her that, if she was +the cause of another war, she and her children would beg their +bread all through Europe. That and similar outbursts afford some +excuse for the conduct of the Bourbons in the autumn of 1805. They +infringed the neutrality which their ambassador had engaged to +observe: but it is to be remembered that Napoleon's invasion of the +Neapolitan States in 1803 was a gross violation of international +law, which the French Foreign Office sought to cloak by fabricating +two secret articles of the Treaty of Amiens.<a name= +"FN2anchor66_66"></a><a href="#Foot2note_66_66"><sup>[66]</sup></a> +And though troth should doubtless be kept, even with a law-breaker, +yet its violation becomes venial when the latter adopts the tone of +a bully. For the present he triumphed. Joseph Bonaparte invaded +Naples in force, and on January 13th the King, Queen, and Court set +sail for Palermo. The Anglo-Russian divisions re-embarked and +sailed away for Malta and Corfu. One of the Neapolitan strongholds, +Gaëta, held out till the middle of July. Elsewhere the Bourbon +troops gave little trouble.</p> + +<p>The conquest of Naples enabled Napoleon to extend his experiment +of a federation of Bonapartist Kings. He announced to Miot de +Melito, now appointed one of Joseph's administrators, his +intentions in an interview at the Tuileries on January 28th. Joseph +was to be King of Naples, if he accepted the honour quickly. If +not, the Emperor would adopt a son, as in the case of +Eugène,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii63" id= +"page_ii63">[pg.63]</a></span> and make him King.—"I don't +need a wife to have an heir. It is by my pen that I get +children."—But Joseph must also show himself worthy of the +honour. Let him despise fatigue, get wounded, break a leg.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Look at me. The recent campaign, agitation, and movement have +made me fat. I believe that if all the kings coalesced against me, +I should get a quite ridiculous stomach.... You have heard my +words. I can no longer have relatives in obscurity. Those who will +not rise with me, shall no longer be of my family. I am making a +family of kings attached to my federative system."<a name= +"FN2anchor67_67"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_67_67"><sup>[67]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>The threat having had its effect, Joseph was proclaimed King of +Naples by a decree of Napoleon. "Keep a firm hand: I only ask one +thing of you: be entirely the master there."<a name= +"FN2anchor68_68"></a><a href="#Foot2note_68_68"><sup>[68]</sup></a> +Such was the advice given to his amiable brother, who after +enjoying a military promenade southwards was charged to undertake +the conquest of Sicily. It mattered little that the overthrow of +the Neapolitan Bourbons offended the Czar, who had undertaken the +protection of that House.</p> + +<p>As though intent on browbeating Alexander by an exhibition of +his power, Napoleon lavished Italian titles on his Marshals and +statesmen. Talleyrand became Prince of Benevento; and Bernadotte, +Prince of Ponte-Corvo (two Papal enclaves in Neapolitan soil). To +these and other titles were attached large domains (not divisible +at death), which enabled his paladins and their successors to +support their new dignities with pomp and splendour; especially was +this so with the two titles which his bargains with Prussia and +Bavaria enabled him to bestow. Thanks to the complaisance of their +Kings, the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii64" id= +"page_ii64">[pg.64]</a></span> Grand Duchy of Berg and Cleves was +granted to Murat, while the energetic and trusty Berthier was +rewarded with the Principality of Neufchâtel and a truly +princely fortune.<a name="FN2anchor69_69"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_69_69"><sup>[69]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Thus was founded the Napoleonic nobility; and thus was fulfilled +Mme. de Staël's prophecy that the priests and nobles would be +the <i>caryatides</i> of the future throne. The change was brought +about skilfully. It took place when pride in Napoleon's exploits +was at its height, and when the "Gazette de France" asserted:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"France is henceforth the arbitress of Europe.... Civilization +would have perished in Europe, if forth from the ruins there had +not arisen one of these men before whom the world keeps silence, +and to whom Providence seems to intrust its destinies."<a name= +"FN2anchor70_70"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_70_70"><sup>[70]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>This adulation, which recalls that of the Court of Augustus or +Tiberius, gives the measure of French thought. In truth, Napoleon +showed profound insight into human nature when he judged the hatred +of an order of nobility to be a mere passing spasm of revolutionary +fever; and he evinced equal good sense in restoring that order +through the chiefs of the one truly popular institution in France, +the army. Besides, the new titles were not taken from French +domains, which would have revived the idea of feudal dependence in +France: they were the fruit of Napoleon's great victory; and the +sound of distant names like Benevento, Berg, and Dalmatia skilfully +flattered the pride of <i>la grande nation</i>.</p> + +<p>It is now time to return to the affairs of Prussia and to point +out the chief stages in her downward course. On January 3rd, 1806, +an important State Council was held at Berlin in order to decide on +certain modifications to the Schönbrunn Treaty with Napoleon. +The chief change resolved on was as follows: Instead of the<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii65" id= +"page_ii65">[pg.65]</a></span> cessions of territory being +immediate and absolute, as proposed by Napoleon, they were not to +take effect before the general peace. Until that took place, +Frederick William resolved to occupy Hanover provisionally, +meanwhile answering to France for the tranquillity of the north of +Germany.<a name="FN2anchor71_71"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_71_71"><sup>[71]</sup></a> The Prussian Government +therefore gave strong hints that the presence of a British force +there was objectionable, and the troops were withdrawn.<a name= +"FN2anchor72_72"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_72_72"><sup>[72]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Napoleon was to be less pliable. And yet Haugwitz assured the +Prussian King and council that he had looked Napoleon through and +through, and had discerned an unexpressed wish to deal easily with +Prussia. As to his acceptance of these changes in the +Schönbrunn Treaty, Haugwitz felt no doubt whatever, at least +so his foe, Hardenberg, states. But the Prussian Ministers were now +proposing, not the offensive and defensive treaty of alliance that +Napoleon required, but rather a mediation for peace between France +and England. They were, in fact, striving to steer halfway between +Napoleon and George III.—and gain Hanover. Verily, here was a +belief in half measures passing that of women.</p> + +<p>The envoy despatched to assure Napoleon's assent to these new +conditions was the very man who had quailed before the Emperor at +Schönbrunn. Count Haugwitz set out on January 14th for Munich +and thence for Paris; but long before any definite news was +received from him, the Court of Berlin decided, on the strength of +a few oily compliments from the French ambassador, Laforest, to +regard the acceptance of Napoleon as fully assured. Accordingly, on +January 24th, the Government resolved to place the Prussian army on +a peace-footing and recall the troops from Franconia, as a daily +saving of 100,000 thalers might thereby be effected. Never was +there a greater act of extravagance. As soon as the retreat and +demobilizing of the Prussian forces was announced, the French +troops in Bavaria and Franconia began to press forward, while +others poured across the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii66" +id="page_ii66">[pg.66]</a></span> Rhine. Affecting to ignore these +threatening moves, the Prussian Court strove peaceably to acquire +Hanover by secretly offering George III. a re-arrangement of +territories, whereby the Hanoverian lands east of the Weser, along +with a few districts west of Hameln and Nienburg, should pass to +Prussia. Frederick William proposed to keep Minden and Ravensburg, +but to cede East Frisia and all the rest of his Westphalian +possessions to King George, who would retain the electoral dignity +for these new lands.<a name="FN2anchor73_73"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_73_73"><sup>[73]</sup></a> The only reply that our ruler +deigned to this offer was that he trusted:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"His Prussian Majesty will follow the honourable dictates of his +own heart, and will demonstrate to the world that he will not set +the dreadful example of indemnifying himself at the expense of a +third party, whose sentiments and conduct towards him and his +subjects have been uniformly friendly and pacifick."<a name= +"FN2anchor74_74"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_74_74"><sup>[74]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>But by the close of February this appeal fell on deaf ears. +Frederick William had decided to comply with Napoleon's terms and +was about to take formal possession of Hanover.</p> + +<p>The conqueror was far from taking that easy view of the changes +made in the Schönbrunn Treaty which the discerning Haugwitz +had trustfully expected. At first, every effort was made by +Talleyrand to delay his interview with the Emperor, evidently in +the hope that the subtle flattery of Laforest at Berlin would lead +to the demobilization of the Prussian forces. This fatal step was +known at Paris before February 6th, when Haugwitz was received by +the Emperor; and the knowledge that Prussia was at his mercy +decided the conqueror's tone. He began by some wheedling words as +to the ability shown by Haugwitz in the Schönbrunn +negotiation:<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii67" id= +"page_ii67">[pg.67]</a></span></p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"If anyone but myself had treated with you I should have thought +him bought over by you; but, let me confess to you, the treaty was +due to your talents and merit. You were in my eyes the first +statesman in Europe, and covered yourself with immortal glory."</p> +</div> + +<p>Before that interview, forsooth, he had decided to make war on +Prussia; and only Haugwitz had induced him to offer her peace and +the gift of Hanover. Why, then, had that treaty been so criticised +at Berlin? Why had the French ambassador been slighted? Why was +Hardenberg high in favour? Why had not the King dismissed that tool +of England? Here the envoy strove to stem the rising torrent of the +Emperor's wrath; his words were at once swept aside; and the deluge +flowed on. As Prussia had not ratified the treaty pure and simple, +she was in a state of war with France; for she still had Russian +and English troops on her soil. Here again Haugwitz observed that +those forces were withdrawing, and that the Prussians were entering +Hanover in force. The storm burst forth anew. What right had +Prussia thus to carry into effect a treaty which she had not +ratified? If her forces entered Hanover, his troops should +forthwith occupy Ansbach, Cleves, and Neufchâtel: if +Frederick William meant to have Hanover, he should pay dearly for +it. But he would allow Haugwitz to see Talleyrand, so as to prevent +an immediate war.<a name="FN2anchor75_75"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_75_75"><sup>[75]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The calm of the Foreign Minister was as dangerous as the bluster +of the Emperor. Talleyrand was no friend to Prussia. He had long +known Napoleon's determination to press on a war between England +and Prussia, and he lent himself to the plan of undermining the +Hohenzollerns. The scales now fell from the envoy's eyes. He saw +that his country stood friendless before an exacting creditor, who +now claimed further sacrifices—or Prussia's life-blood. The +Emperor's threats were partly fictitious; and when Haugwitz was +thoroughly frightened<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii68" id= +"page_ii68">[pg.68]</a></span> and ready to concede almost +anything, Napoleon came to the real point at issue, and demanded +that the whole of the German coast-line on the North Sea should be +closed to English commerce. With this stringent clause superadded, +Hanover was now handed over to Prussia. Never was a Greek gift more +skilfully offered. The present of Hanover on those terms implied +for the recipient Russia's disapproval and the hostility of +England.<a name="FN2anchor76_76"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_76_76"><sup>[76]</sup></a></p> + +<p>This was the news brought by Haugwitz to Berlin. Frederick +William was now on the horns of the very dilemma which he had +sought to avoid. Either he must accept Napoleon's terms, or defy +the conqueror to almost single combat. The irony of his position +was now painfully apparent. In his longing for peace and +retrenchment he had dismissed his would-be allies, and had sent his +own soldiers grumbling to their homes. Moreover, he was tied by his +previous action. If he accepted peace from Napoleon at Christmas, +when 300,000 men could have disputed the victor's laurels, how much +more must he accept it now! He not only gave way on this point: he +even complied with Napoleon's wishes by keeping Hardenberg at a +distance. He did not dismiss him—the friendship of the +spirited Queen Louisa forbade that: but Hardenberg yielded up to +Haugwitz the guidance of foreign affairs, and was granted unlimited +leave of absence.</p> + +<p>Popular feeling was deeply moved by this craven compliance with +French behests. The officers of the Berlin garrison serenaded the +patriotic statesman, while Haugwitz twice had his windows smashed. +Public opinion, it is true, counted for little in Prussia. The +rigorous separation of classes, the absence of popular education, +the complete subjection of the journals to Government,<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii69" id="page_ii69">[pg.69]</a></span> and +the mutual jealousy of soldiers and civilians, prevented any +general expression of opinion in that almost feudal society.</p> + +<p>But when the people of Ansbach piteously begged not to be handed +over to Bavaria, and forthwith saw their land occupied by the +French before Prussia had ratified the cession of that +principality; when the North Germans found that the gain of Hanover +by Prussia was at the price of war with England and the ruin of +their commerce; when it was seen that Frederick William and +Haugwitz had clipped the wings of the Prussian eagle till it +shunned a fight with the Gallic cock, a feeling of shame and +indignation arose which proved that the limits of endurance had +been reached. Observers saw that, after all, the old German feeling +was not dead; it was only torpid; and forces were beginning to work +which threatened ruin to the Hohenzollerns if they again tarnished +the national honour.<a name="FN2anchor77_77"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_77_77"><sup>[77]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Meanwhile the first overtures for peace were exchanged between +Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. In the spring of 1806 there +seemed some ground for hope that Europe might find repose, at least +on land, after fourteen years of almost constant war. France was no +longer Jacobinical. Under Napoleon she had quickly fallen into line +with the monarchical States, and the questions now at stake merely +related to boundaries and the balance of power. The bellicose +ardour of the Czar had melted away at Austerlitz. The seizure of +Hanover by Prussia moved him but little, and he sought to compose +the resulting strife. As for the other Powers, they were either +helpless or torpid. The King of Sweden was venting his spleen upon +Prussia. Italy, South Germany, Holland, and Spain were at +Napoleon's beck; and the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii70" +id="page_ii70">[pg.70]</a></span> policy of England under the new +Grenville-Fox Ministry inclined strongly towards peace. There +seemed, then, every chance of founding the supremacy of France upon +lasting foundations, if the claims of Britain and Austria received +reasonable satisfaction. Napoleon also seems to have wanted peace +for the consolidation of his power in Europe and the extension of +his colonies and commerce. As at the close of all his land +campaigns, his thoughts turned to the East, and on January 31st, +1806, he issued orders to Decrès which, far from showing any +despair as to the French navy, foreshadowed a vigorous naval and +colonial policy; while his moves on the Dalmatian coast, and the +despatch of Sebastiani on a mission to the Porte, revealed the +magnetic attraction which the Levant still had for him.</p> + +<p>A peculiar interest therefore attaches to the negotiations for +peace in 1806, especially as they were pushed on by that generous +orator, Fox, who had so long pleaded for a good understanding with +France. On February 20th, 1806, he disclosed to Talleyrand the +details of a supposed plot for the murder of the French Emperor, +which some person had proposed to him, an offer which he rejected +with horror, at the same time ordering the man to be expelled from +the kingdom. It is more than probable that the whole thing was got +up by the French police as a test of the esteem which Fox had +always expressed for Bonaparte.</p> + +<p>The experiment having turned out well, Talleyrand assured Fox of +the pacific desires of the French Emperor as recently stated to the +Corps Législatif, namely, that peace could be had on the +terms of the Treaty of Amiens. Fox at once clasped the outstretched +hand, but stated that the negotiations must be in concert with +Russia, and the treaty such as our allies could honourably accept. +To this Talleyrand, on April 1st, gave a partial assent, adding +that Napoleon was convinced that the rupture of the Peace of Amiens +was due solely to the refusal of France to grant a treaty of +commerce. France and England could now come to satisfactory<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii71" id= +"page_ii71">[pg.71]</a></span> terms, if England would be content +with the sovereignty of the seas, and not interfere with +Continental affairs.<a name="FN2anchor78_78"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_78_78"><sup>[78]</sup></a> France desired, not a truce, +but a durable peace.</p> + +<p>To this Fox assented, but traversed the French claim that +Russia's participation would imply her mediation. Peace could only +come from an honourable understanding between all the Powers +actually at war. Talleyrand denied that Russia was at war with +France, as the Third Coalition had lapsed; but Fox held his ground, +and declared there must be peace with England <i>and Russia</i>, or +not at all: otherwise France would be seen to aim at "excluding us +from any connection with the Continental Powers of Europe."<a name= +"FN2anchor79_79"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_79_79"><sup>[79]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Such a beginning was disappointing: it showed that Napoleon and +Talleyrand were intent on sowing distrust between England and +Russia, who were mutually pledged not to make peace separately; and +for a time all overtures ceased between London and Paris, until it +was known that a Russian envoy was going to Paris. Hitherto the +French Foreign Office had won brilliant successes by skilfully +separating and embittering allies. But now it seemed that their +tactics were foiled. Two firm and trusty allies yet remained, +Britain and Russia. To Czartoryski our Foreign Minister had +expressed his desire that the former offensive alliance should now +take a solely defensive character: "If we cannot reduce the +enormous power of France, it will always be something to stop its +progress." To these opinions the Russian Minister gave a cordial +assent, and despatched a special envoy to London to concert terms +of peace along with the British Ministry, while Oubril, "a safe man +on whose prudence and principles the two allied Courts may safely +rely," was despatched to Vienna and Paris. <a name= +"FN2anchor80_80"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_80_80"><sup>[80]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii72" id="page_ii72">[pg.72]</a></span></p> + +<p>Oubril proceeded to Vienna, where he had long discussions with +the British and French ambassadors: Fox also requested that Lord +Yarmouth, one of the many hundreds of Englishmen still kept under +restraint in France, might have his freedom and repair at once to +Paris for a preliminary discussion with Talleyrand. The request +being granted, the prisoner left the depot at Verdun, and, early in +June, saw that Minister in his first flush of pride at the new +title of Prince of Benevento. At that time Paris was intoxicated +with Napoleon's glory. The French were lords of Franconia, whence +they levied heavy exactions: in Italy they defied the Pope's +authority. <a name="FN2anchor81_81"></a> <a href= +"#Foot2note_81_81"><sup>[81]</sup></a> They were firmly installed at +Ancona, despite repeated protests of Pius VII. King Joseph with an +army of 45,000 men was planning the expulsion of the Bourbons from +Sicily. And in these early days of June, Louis Bonaparte was +declared King of Holland.</p> + +<p>Yet Talleyrand was not so dazzled by this splendour as to slight +the idea of peace with England; and when Lord Yarmouth stated that +George III. would above all things require the restoration of +Hanover, the Minister, after a delay in which he consulted his +master, stated that that would make no difficulty. As to the other +questions, namely, Sicily and the maintenance of the Turkish +Empire, he replied: "You hold Sicily, we do not ask it of you: if +we possessed it, it might much + +<ins class="correction" title= +"Transcriber's note: original reads 'in-increase'">increase</ins> +our difficulties"; and as regards Turkey he advised that England +should speedily gain the guarantee of its integrity from +France—"for much is being prepared, but nothing is yet done." +After reporting these views at Downing Street, Lord Yarmouth +returned to Paris for further discussions, with the general +understanding that the principle of <i>uti possidetis</i> should +form their basis—except as regards Hanover. He now was +informed by Talleyrand that the negotiations with Russia were to be +kept separate, and that Napoleon had other <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii73" id="page_ii73">[pg.73]</a></span> views about +Sicily, as he looked on its conquest as necessary for Joseph's +security on the mainland.</p> + +<p>Surprised at this change, our envoy stated that he could not +discuss any terms of peace in which Sicily was not kept for the +Bourbons; whereupon Talleyrand replied that things were altered, +and that we ought to be content with regaining Hanover from Prussia +and keeping Malta and the Cape of Good Hope. On Lord Yarmouth +declining to proceed further until the French claims to Sicily were +renounced, the offer of the Hanse Towns (Lübeck, Hamburg, and +Bremen) was made for his Sicilian Majesty; and on the refusal of +that bait, Dalmatia, Ragusa, and Albania were proposed.</p> + +<p>As Napoleon had offered to guarantee the integrity of the +Turkish Empire, Lord Yarmouth showed some indignation at a proposal +which would have begun its partition; and, but for the expected +arrival of Oubril, would have broken off the negotiation. On July +8th he saw the Russian envoy and found him a man of straw. Oubril +approved everything. He was glad that France would give back +Hanover to England, because that would sever the Franco-Prussian +union and make the Court of Berlin dependent on Russia. He even +thought it might be well for the Hanse Towns to go to the +Neapolitan Bourbons, provided those towns were placed under the +Czar's protection. But even better was the proposal that those +Bourbons should have Dalmatia and neighbouring lands; for that +would drive a wedge between Napoleon and Turkey. Such was the gist +of this curious interview. Desirous of testing the accuracy of his +account of it, Lord Yarmouth read it over to Oubril at their next +interview, when the Russian envoy added the following written +corrections:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"N.B.M. d'Oubril believes, though he has no directions on this +subject, that it would be suitable to Russia, and even advantageous +for the assuring their own independence, that Hamburg and +Lübeck should pass under the suzerainty of Russia.—N.B. +Although M. d'Oubril has a positive order to insist on the +preservation of Sicily for the King of Naples, yet<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii74" id="page_ii74">[pg.74]</a></span> he +is of opinion that the acquisition of Venetia, Istria, Dalmatia, +and Albania" [should be an establishment for his Sicilian +Majesty].<a name="FN2anchor82_82"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_82_82"><sup>[82]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>That a reed shaken by every breeze should bow before Napoleon's +will was not surprising; and late at night on July 20th Lord +Yarmouth heard that the Russian envoy had just signed a separate +peace with France, whereby the independence of the Ionian Isles was +recognized (Russia keeping only 4,000 troops in Corfu), and Germany +was to be evacuated by the French. But the sting was in the tail: +for a secret article stipulated that Ferdinand IV. should cede +Sicily to Joseph Bonaparte and receive the Balearic Isles from +Napoleon's ally, Spain.</p> + +<p>Such was the news which our envoy heard, after forcing his way +to Oubril's presence, just as the latter was hurrying off to St. +Petersburg. At that city an important change had taken place; +Czartoryski had retired in favour of Baron Budberg, who was less +favourable to a close alliance with England; and it appears certain +that Oubril would not have broken through his instructions had he +not known of this change. What other motives led him to break faith +with England, Sicily, and Spain are not clearly known. He claimed +that the new order of things in Germany rendered it highly +important to get the French troops out of that land. Doubtless this +was so; but even that benefit would have been dearly bought at the +price of disgrace to the Czar.<a name="FN2anchor83_83"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_83_83"><sup>[83]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii75" id="page_ii75">[pg.75]</a></span></p> + +<p>Leaving for the present Oubril to face his indignant master, we +turn to notice an epoch-making change, the details of which were +settled at Paris in the midst of the negotiations with England and +Russia. On July 17th was quietly signed the Act of the +Confederation of the Rhine, that destroyed the old Germanic +Empire.</p> + +<p>Some such event had long been expected. The Holy Roman Empire, +after a thousand years of life, had been stricken unto death at +Austerlitz. The seizure of Hanover by Prussia had led the King of +Sweden to declare that he, for his Pomeranian lands, would take no +more share in the deliberations of the senile Diet at Ratisbon +which took no notice of that outrage. Moreover, Ratisbon was now +merely the second city of Bavaria, whose King might easily deny to +that body its local habitation; and the use of the term Germanic +Confederation in the Treaty of Pressburg sounded the death-knell of +an Empire which Voltaire with equal wit and truth had described as +neither holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire. In the new age of trenchant +realities how could that venerable figment survive—where the +election of the Emperor was a sham, his coronation a mere parade of +tattered robes before a crowd of landless Serenities, and where the +Diet was largely concerned with regulating the claims of the envoys +of princes to sit on seats of red cloth or on the less honourable +green cloth, or with apportioning the traditional thirty-seven +dishes of the imperial banquet so that the last should be borne by +a Westphalian envoy?<a name="FN2anchor84_84"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_84_84"><sup>[84]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Among these spectral survivals of an outworn life the incursion +of Napoleon across the Rhine had aroused a<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii76" id="page_ii76">[pg.76]</a></span> panic not unlike +that which the sturdy form of Æneas cast on the gibbering +shades of the Greeks in the mourning fields of Hades. And when, on +August 1st, 1806, the heir to the Revolution notified to the Diet +at Ratisbon that neither he nor the States of South and Central +Germany any longer recognized the existence of the old Empire, +feebler protests arose than came from the straining throats of the +scared comrades of Agamemnon. The Diet itself uttered no audible +sound. The Emperor, Francis II., forthwith declared that he laid +down his crown, absolved all the electors and princes from their +allegiance, and retired within the bounds of the Austrian +Empire.</p> + +<p>Thus feebly flickered out the light which had shed splendour on +mediæval Christendom. Kindled in the basilica of St. Peter's +on Christmas Day of the year 800 in an almost mystical union of +spiritual and earthly power, by the blessing of Pope Leo on Karl +the Great, it was now trodden under foot by the chief of a more +than Frankish State, who aspired to unquestioned sway over a +dominion as great as that of the mediæval hero. For Napoleon, +as Protector of the Rhenish Confederation, now controlled most of +the German lands that acknowledged Charlemagne, while his hold on +Italy was immeasurably stronger. Further parallels between two ages +and systems so unlike as those of Charlemagne and his imitator are +of course superficial; and Napoleon's attempt at impressing the +imagination of the Germans seems to us to smack of unreality. Yet +we must remember that they were then the most impressionable and +docile of nations, that his attempt was made with much skill, and +that none of the appointed guardians of the old Empire raised a +voice in protest while he imposed a constitution on the fifteen +Princes of the new Confederation.</p> + +<p>They included the rulers of South Germany, as well as Dalberg +the Arch-Chancellor, who now took the title of Prince Primate, the +Grand-Duke of Berg, the Landgrave, now Grand-Duke, of +Hesse-Darmstadt, two Princes<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii77" id="page_ii77">[pg.77]</a></span> of the House of +Nassau, and seven lesser potentates. In some cases German laws were +abolished in favour of the <i>Code Napoléon</i>. A close +offensive and defensive alliance was framed between France and +these States, that were to furnish in all 63,000 troops at the +bidding of the Protector. Napoleon also gained some control over +their fiscal and commercial codes—an important advantage, in +view of the Continental System, that was soon to take definite +form.<a name="FN2anchor85_85"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_85_85"><sup>[85]</sup></a></p> + +<p>As a set-off to this surrender of all questions of foreign +policy and many internal rights, what did these rulers receive? As +happened almost uniformly in Napoleon's aggrandizements, he struck +a bargain extremely serviceable to himself, less so to those whose +support he sought, and in which the losses fell crushingly on the +weak. His statecraft in this respect was more cynical than that of +the crowned robbers who had degraded eighteenth-century politics +into a game of grab. Their robberies were at least direct and +straightforward. It was reserved for Napoleon at the Treaty of +Campo Formio to win huge gains mostly at the expense of a weak +third party, namely, Venice. He pursued the same profitable tactics +in the Secularizations, when France and the greater German Powers +gained enormously at the final cost of the Church lands and the +little States; and now he ground up the German domains that were to +cement his new Rhenish system.</p> + +<p>There were still numbers of Imperial Counts and Knights, as well +as free cities, that had not been absorbed in 1803. The survivors +were now wiped out by Napoleon for the benefit of his Rhenish +underlings, the spoliation being veiled under the term +<i>Mediatization</i>. The euphemism claims a brief explanation. In +old German law the nobles and cities that gained local independence +by shaking off the control of the local potentate were termed +<i>immediate</i>, because they owed allegiance directly to the +Emperor, without any feudal <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii78" id="page_ii78">[pg.78]</a></span> intermediary: if by +mischance they fell under that hated control they were said to be +<i>mediatized</i>. This term was now applied to acts that subjected +the knight, or city, not to feudal control, but to complete +absorption by the king or prince of Napoleon's creation. Six +Imperial or Free Cities survived the Secularizations, namely, the +three Hanse towns, and Augsburg, Frankfurt, and Nuremberg. The +northern towns still held their ancient rights; but Augsburg and +Nuremberg now fell to the King of Bavaria, and Frankfurt was +bestowed by Napoleon on Dalberg, the Prince Primate of the +Confederation.</p> + +<p>German life began to lose much of the quaint diversity beloved +of artists and poets; but it also gained much. No longer did the +Count of Limburg-Styrum parade his army of one colonel, six +officers, and two privates in the valley of the Roehr: he and his +passed under the sway of Murat, and the lapse of these pigmy forces +made a national army possible in the dim future. No more did the +Imperial lawyers at Wetzlar browse on evergreen lawsuits: justice +was administered after the concise methods of Napoleon. The crops +of the Swabian peasant were now comparatively safe from the deer of +His Translucency of the castle hard by; for the spirit of the +French Revolution breathed upon the old game laws and robbed them +of their terrors. And the German patriot of to-day must still +confess that the first impulse for reform, however questionable its +motives and brutal its application, came from the new +Charlemagne.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>NOTE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.—In a volume of Essays entitled +"Napoleonic Studies" (George Bell and Sons, 1904) I have treated +somewhat fully the questions of Pitt's Continental policy, and of +Napoleon's relations to the new thought of the age, in two Essays, +entitled "Pitt's Plans for the Settlement of Europe" and +"Wordsworth, Schiller, Fichte, and the Idealist Revolt against +Napoleon."<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii79" id= +"page_ii79">[pg.79]</a></span></p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXV</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE FALL OF PRUSSIA</center> + +<br> + + +<p>We now turn to consider the influence which the founding of the +Rhenish Confederation exerted on the international problems which +were being discussed at Paris. Having gained this diplomatic +victory, Napoleon, it seems, might well afford to be lenient to +Prussia, to the Czar, even to England. Would he seize this +opportunity, and soothe the fears of these Powers by a few timely +concessions, or would he press them all the harder because the +third of Germany was now under his control? Here again he was at +the parting of the ways.</p> + +<p>As the only obstacles to the conclusion of a durable peace with +England were Sicily and Hanover, it may be well to examine here the +bearing of these questions on the peace of Europe and Napoleon's +future.</p> + +<p>It is clear from his letters to Joseph that he had firmly +resolved to conquer Sicily. Before his brother had reached Naples +he warned him to prepare for the expulsion of the Bourbons from +that island. For that purpose the French pushed on into Calabria +and began to make extensive preparations—at the very time +when Talleyrand stated to Lord Yarmouth that the French did not +want Sicily. But the English forces defending that island prepared +to deal a blow that would prevent a French descent. A force of +about 5,000 men under Sir John Stuart landed in the Bay of St. +Euphemia: and when, on the 4th of July, 1806, Reynier led 7,000 +troops against them in full assurance of victory, his choicest +battalions sank before the fierce bayonet charge<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii80" id="page_ii80">[pg.80]</a></span> of +the British: in half an hour the French were in full retreat, +leaving half their numbers on the field.</p> + +<p>The moral effect of this victory was very great. Hitherto our +troops, except in Egypt, had had no opportunity of showing their +splendid qualities. More than half a century had passed since at +Minden a British force had triumphed over a French force in Europe; +and Napoleon expressed the current opinion when he declared to +Joseph his joy that at last the <i>slow and clumsy English</i> had +ventured on the mainland.<a name="FN2anchor86_86"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_86_86"><sup>[86]</sup></a> Moreover, the success at +Maida, the general rising of the Calabrias that speedily followed, +and Stuart's capture of Reggio, Cortone, and other towns, with +large stores and forty cannon destined for the conquest of Sicily, +scattered to the winds the French hope of carrying Sicily by a +<i>coup de main</i>.</p> + +<p>If there was any chance of the Russian and British Governments +deserting the cause of the Bourbons, it was ended by the news from +the Mediterranean; and Napoleon now realized that the mastery of +that sea—"<i>the principal and constant aim of my +policy</i>"—had once more slipped from his grasp! On their +side the Bourbons were unduly elated by a further success which was +more brilliant than solid. Queen Caroline, excited at the capture +of Capri by Sir Sidney Smith, sought to rouse all her lost +provinces: she intrigued behind the back of the King and of General +Acton, while the knight-errant succeeded in paralyzing the plans of +Sir John Stuart.<a name="FN2anchor87_87"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_87_87"><sup>[87]</sup></a> Meanwhile Masséna, +after reducing the fortress of Gaëta to surrender, marched +southward with a large force, and the British and Bourbon forces +re-embarked for Sicily, leaving the fierce peasants and bandits of +Calabria to the mercies of the conquerors. But Maida was not fought +in vain. Sicily thenceforth was safe, the British army regained +something of its ancient fame, and the hope of resisting Napoleon +was strengthened both at St. Petersburg and London.<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii81" id="page_ii81">[pg.81]</a></span></p> + +<p>Peace can rarely be attained unless one of the combatants is +overcome or both are exhausted. But neither Great Britain nor +France was in this position. By sea our successes had been as +continuous as those of Napoleon over our allies on land. In January +we captured the Cape from the Dutch: in February the French force +at St. Domingo surrendered to Sir James Duckworth: Admiral Warren +in March closed the career of the adventurous Linois; and early in +July a British force seized great treasure at Buenos Ayres, whence, +however, it was soon obliged to retire. After these successes Fox +could not but be firm. He refused to budge from the standpoint of +<i>uti possidetis</i> which our envoy had stated as the basis of +negotiations: and the Earl of Lauderdale, who was sent to support +and finally to supersede the Earl of Yarmouth, at once took a firm +tone which drew forth a truculent rejoinder. If that was to be the +basis, wrote Clarke, the French plenipotentiary, then France would +require Moravia, Styria, the whole of Austria (Proper), and +Hanover, and in that case leave England her few colonial +conquests.</p> + +<p>This reply of August 8th nearly severed the negotiations on the +spot: but Talleyrand persistently refused to grant the passports +which Lauderdale demanded—evidently in the hope that the +Czar's ratification of Oubril's treaty would cause us to give up +Sicily.<a name="FN2anchor88_88"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_88_88"><sup>[88]</sup></a> He was in error. On September +3rd the news reached Paris that Alexander scornfully rejected his +envoy's handiwork. Nevertheless, Napoleon refused to forego his +claims to Sicily; and the closing days of Fox were embittered by +the thought that this negotiation, the last hope of a career +fruitful in disappointments, was doomed to failure. After using his +splendid eloquence for fifteen years in defence of the Revolution +and its "heir," he came to the bitter conclusion that liberty had +miscarried in France, and that that land had bent beneath the<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii82" id= +"page_ii82">[pg.82]</a></span> yoke in order the more completely to +subjugate the Continent. He died on September 13th.</p> + +<p>French historians, following an article in the "Moniteur" of +November 26th, have often asserted that the death of Fox and the +accession to power of the warlike faction changed the character of +the negotiations.<a name="FN2anchor89_89"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_89_89"><sup>[89]</sup></a> Nothing can be further from +the truth. Not long before his end, Fox thus expressed to his +nephew his despair of peace:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"We can in honour do nothing without the full and <i>bonâ +fide</i> consent of the Queen and Court of Naples; but, even +exclusive of that consideration and of the great importance of +Sicily, it is not so much the value of the point in dispute as the +manner in which the French fly from their word that disheartens me. +It is not Sicily, but the shuffling, insincere way in which they +act, that shows me that they are playing a false game; and in that +case it would be very imprudent to make any concessions, which by +any possibility could be thought inconsistent with our honour, or +could furnish our allies with a plausible pretence for suspecting, +reproaching, or deserting us."</p> +</div> + +<p>It is further to be noted that Lauderdale stayed on at Paris +three weeks after the death of Fox; that he put forward no new +demand, but required that Talleyrand should revert to his first +promise of renouncing all claim to Sicily, and should treat +conjointly with England and Russia. It was in vain. Napoleon's +final concessions were that the Bourbons, after losing Sicily, +should have the Balearic Isles and be pensioned <i>by Spain</i>; +that Russia should hold Corfu (as she already did); and that we +should recover Hanover from Prussia, and keep Malta, the Cape, +Tobago, and the three French towns in India; but, except Hanover, +all of these were in our power. On Sicily he would not bate one jot +of his pretensions. The negotiations were therefore broken off on +October 6th, twelve days after Napoleon left Paris to marshal his +troops against Prussia.<a name="FN2anchor90_90"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_90_90"><sup>[90]</sup></a> The whole affair +revealed<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii83" id= +"page_ii83">[pg.83]</a></span> Napoleon's determination to trick +the allies into signing separate and disadvantageous treaties, and +thus to regain by craft the ground which he had lost in fair fight +at Maida.</p> + +<p>If Sicily was the rock of stumbling between us and Napoleon, +Hanover was the chief cause of the war between France and Prussia. +During the negotiations at Paris, Lord Yarmouth privately informed +Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador, that Talleyrand made no +difficulty about the restitution of Hanover to George III. The +news, when forwarded to Berlin at the close of July, caused a +nervous flutter in ministerial circles, where every effort was +being made to keep on good terms with France.</p> + +<p>Even before this news arrived, the task was far from easy. +Murat, when occupying his new Duchy of Berg, pushed on his troops +into the old Church lands of Essen and Werden. Prussia looked on +these districts as her own, and the sturdy patriot Blücher at +once marched in his soldiers, tore down Murat's proclamations, and +restored the Prussian eagle with blare of trumpet and beat of +drum.<a name="FN2anchor91_91"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_91_91"><sup>[91]</sup></a> A collision was with +difficulty averted by the complaisance of Frederick William, who +called back his troops and referred the question to lawyers; but +even the King was piqued when the Grand-Duke of Berg sent him a +letter of remonstrance on Blücher's conduct, commencing with +the familiar address, <i>Mon frère</i>.</p> + +<p>Blücher meanwhile and the soldiery were eating out their +hearts with rage, as they saw the French pouring across the Rhine, +and constructing a bridge of boats at Wesel; and had they known +that that important stronghold, the key of North Germany, was +quietly declared to be a French garrison town, they would probably +have forced the hands of the King.<a name="FN2anchor92_92"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_92_92"><sup>[92]</sup></a> For at this time +Frederick William and Haugwitz were alarmed by the formation of the +Rhenish Confederation, and were not wholly reassured by Napoleon's +suggestion that the abolition of the old<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii84" id="page_ii84">[pg.84]</a></span> Empire must be +an advantage to Prussia. They clutched eagerly, however, at his +proposal that Prussia should form a league of the North German +States, and made overtures to the two most important States, Saxony +and Hesse-Cassel. During a few halcyon days the King even proposed +to assume the title <i>Emperor of Prussia</i>, from which, however, +the Elector of Saxony ironically dissuaded him. This castle in the +air faded away when news reached Berlin at the beginning of August +that Napoleon was seeking to bring the Elector of Hesse-Cassel into +the Rhenish Confederation, and was offering as a bait the domains +of some Imperial Knights and the principality of Fulda, now held by +the Prince of Orange, a relative of Frederick William. Moreover, +the moves of the French troops in Thuringia were so threatening to +Saxony that the Court of Dresden began to scout the project of a +North German Confederation.</p> + +<p>Still, the King and Haugwitz tried to persuade themselves that +Napoleon meant well for Prussia, that England had been doing her +utmost to make bad blood between the two allies, and that "great +results could not be attained without some friction." In this hope +they were encouraged by the French ambassador, the man who had +enticed Prussia to her demobilization. He was charged by Talleyrand +to report at Berlin that "peace with England would be made, as well +as with Russia, if France had consented to the restitution of +Hanover.—I have renewed," added Laforest, "the assurance that +the Emperor [Napoleon] would never yield on this point."</p> + +<p>And yet at that very time the French Foreign Office was at work +upon a Project of a Treaty in which the restitution of Hanover to +George III. was expressly named and received the assent of +Napoleon.<a name="FN2anchor93_93"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_93_93"><sup>[93]</sup></a> The Prussian ambassador, +Lucchesini, had some inkling of<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii85" id="page_ii85">[pg.85]</a></span> this from French +sources,<a name="FN2anchor94_94"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_94_94"><sup>[94]</sup></a> as well as from Lord +Yarmouth, and on July 28th penned a despatch which fell like a +thunderbolt on the optimists of Berlin. It crossed on the +way—such is the irony of diplomacy—a despatch from +Berlin that required him to show unlimited confidence in Napoleon. +From confidence the King now rushed to the opposite extreme, and +saw Napoleon's hand in all the friction of the last few weeks.</p> + +<p>Here again he was wrong; for the French Emperor had held back +Murat and the other hot-bloods of the army who were longing to +measure swords with Prussia.<a name="FN2anchor95_95"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_95_95"><sup>[95]</sup></a> His correspondence proves +that his first thoughts were always in the Mediterranean. For one +page that he wrote about German affairs he wrote twenty to Joseph +or Eugène on the need of keeping a firm hand and punishing +Calabrian rebels—"shoot three men in every +village"—above all, on the plans for conquering Sicily. It +was therefore with real surprise that on August 16th-18th he learnt +from a purloined despatch of Lucchesini that the latter suspected +him of planning with the Czar the partition of Prussian Poland. He +treated the matter with contempt, and seems to have thought that +Prussia would meekly accept the morsels which he proposed to throw +to her in place of Hanover. But he misread the character of +Frederick William, if he thought so grievous an insult would be +passed over, and he knew not the power of the Prussian Queen to +kindle the fire of patriotism.</p> + +<p>Queen Louisa was at this time thirty years of age and in the +flower of that noble matronly beauty which bespoke a pure and +exalted being. As daughter of a poverty-stricken prince of +Mecklenburg-Strelitz, her youth had been spent in the homeliest +fashion, until her charms won the heart of the Crown Prince of +Prussia. Her first entry into Berlin was graced by an act that +proclaimed a loving nature. When a group of children dressed in +white greeted her with verses of welcome, she<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii86" id="page_ii86">[pg.86]</a></span> +lifted up and kissed their little leader, to the scandal of stiff +dowagers, and the joy of the citizens. The incident recalls the +easy grace and disregard of etiquette shown by Marie Antoinette at +Versailles in her young bridal days; and, in truth, these queens +have something in common, besides their loveliness and their +misfortunes. Both were mated with cold and uninspiring consorts. +Destiny had refused both to Frederick William and to Louis XVI. the +power of exciting feelings warmer than the esteem and respect due +to a worthy man; and all the fervour of loyalty was aroused by +their queens.</p> + +<p>Louisa was a North German Marie Antoinette, but more staid and +homely than the vivacious daughter of Maria Theresa. Neither did +she interfere much in politics, until the great crash came: even +when the blow was impending, and the patriotic statesmen, with whom +she sympathized, begged the King to remove Haugwitz, she +disappointed them by withholding the entreaties which her instincts +urged but her wifely obedience restrained. Her influence as yet was +that of a noble, fascinating woman, who softened the jars +occasioned by the King's narrow and pedantic nature, and purified +the Court from the grossness of the past. But in the dark days that +were to come, her faith and enthusiasm breathed new force into a +down-trodden people; and where all else was shattered, the King and +Queen still held forth the ideal of that first and strongest of +Teutonic institutions, a pure family life.</p> + +<p>The "Memoirs" of Hardenberg show that the Queen quietly upheld +the patriotic cause;<a name="FN2anchor96_96"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_96_96"><sup>[96]</sup></a> and in the tone of the letter +that Frederick William wrote to the Czar (August 8th) there is +something of feminine resentment against the French Emperor: after +recounting his grievances at Napoleon's hands, he continued:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"If the news be true, if he be capable of perfidy so black,<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii87" id= +"page_ii87">[pg.87]</a></span> be convinced, Sire, that it is not +merely a question about Hanover between him and me, but that he has +decided to make war against me at all costs. He wants no other +Power beside his own.... Tell me, Sire, I conjure you, if I may +hope that your troops will be within reach of succour for me, and +if I may count on them in case of aggression."</p> +</div> + +<p>Alexander wrote a cheering response, advising him to settle his +differences with England and Sweden, and assuring him of help. +Whereupon the King replied (September 6th) that he had reopened the +North Sea rivers to British ships and hoped for peace and pecuniary +help from London. He concluded thus:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Meanwhile, Bonaparte has left me at my ease: for not only does +he not enter into any explanation about my armaments, but he has +even forbidden his Ministers to give and receive any explanations +whatever. It appears, then, that it is I who am to take the +initiative. My troops are marching on all sides to hasten that +moment."<a name="FN2anchor97_97"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_97_97"><sup>[97]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>These last sentences are the handwriting on the wall for the +<i>ancien régime</i> in Prussia. Taking the bland assurances +of Talleyrand and the studied indifference of Laforest as signs +that Napoleon might be caught off his guard, Prussia continued her +warlike preparations; and in order to gain time Lucchesini was +recalled and replaced by an envoy who was to enter into lengthy +explanations. The trick did not deceive Napoleon, who on September +3rd had heard with much surprise that Russia meant to continue the +war. At once he saw the germ of a new Coalition, and bent his +energies to the task of conciliating Austria, and of fomenting the +disputes between Russia and Turkey. Towards Frederick William his +tone was that of a friend who grieves at an unexpected quarrel. +How—he exclaimed to Lucchesini on the ambassador's +departure—how could the King credit him with encouraging the +intrigues of a fussy ambassador at Cassel or the bluster of +Murat?<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii88" id= +"page_ii88">[pg.88]</a></span></p> + +<p>As for Hanover, he had intended sending some one to Berlin to +propose an equivalent for it in case England still made its +restitution a <i>sine quâ non</i> of peace. "But," he added, +"if your young officers and your women at Berlin want war, I am +preparing to satisfy them. Yet my ambition turns wholly to Italy. +She is a mistress whose favours I will share with no one. I will +have all the Adriatic. The Pope shall be my vassal, and I will +conquer Sicily. On North Germany I have no claims: I do not object +to the Hanse towns entering your confederation. As to the inclusion +of Saxony in it, my mind is not yet made up."<a name= +"FN2anchor98_98"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_98_98"><sup>[98]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Indeed, the tenor of his private correspondence proves that +before the first week of September he did not expect a new +Coalition. He believed that England and Russia would give way +before him, and that Prussia would never dare to stir. For the +Court of Berlin he had a sovereign contempt, as for the "old +coalition machines" in general. His conduct of affairs at this time +betokens, not so much desire for war as lack of imagination where +other persons' susceptibilities are concerned. It is probable that +he then wanted peace with England and peace on the Continent; for +his diplomacy won conquests fully as valuable as the booty of his +sword, and only in a naval peace could he lay the foundations of +that oriental empire which, he assured O'Meara at St. Helena, held +the first place in his thoughts after the overthrow of Austria. But +it was not in his nature to make the needful concessions. "<i>I +must follow my policy in a geometrical line</i>" he said to +Lucchesini. England might have Hanover and a few colonies if she +would let Sicily go to a Bonaparte: as for Prussia, she might +absorb half-a-dozen neighbouring princelings.</p> + +<p>That is the gist of Napoleon's European policy in the summer of +1806; and the surprise which he expressed to Mollien at the +rejection of his offers is probably genuine. Sensitive to the least +insult himself, his bluntness of <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii89" id="page_ii89">[pg.89]</a></span> perception respecting +the honour of others might almost qualify him to rank with +Aristotle's man devoid of feeling. It is perfectly true that he did +not make war on Prussia in 1806 any more than on England in 1803. +He only made peace impossible.<a name="FN2anchor99_99"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_99_99"><sup>[99]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The condition on which Prussia now urgently insisted was the +entire evacuation of Germany by French troops. This Napoleon +refused to concede until Frederick William demobilized his army, a +step that would have once more humbled him in the eyes of this +people. It might even have led to his dethronement. For an incident +had just occurred in Bavaria that fanned German sentiment to a +flame. A bookseller of Nuremberg, named Palm, was proved by French +officers to have sold an anonymous pamphlet entitled "Germany in +her deep Humiliation." It was by no means of a revolutionary type, +and the worthy man believed it to be a mistake when he was arrested +by the military authorities. He was wrong. Napoleon had sent orders +that a terrible example must be made in order to stop the sale of +patriotic German pamphlets. Palm was therefore haled away to +Braunau, an Austrian town then held by French troops, was tried by +martial law and shot (August 25th). Never did the Emperor commit a +greater blunder. The outrage sent a thrill of indignation through +the length and breadth of Germany. Instead of quenching, it +inflamed the national sentiment, and thus rendered doubly difficult +any peaceful compromise between Frederick William and Napoleon. The +latter was now looked upon as a tyrant by the citizen class which +his reforms were designed to conciliate: and Frederick William +became almost the champion of Germany when he demanded the +withdrawal of the French troops.</p> + +<p>Unfortunately, the King refused to appoint Ministers who +inspired confidence. With Hardenberg in place of Haugwitz, men +would have felt sure that the sword<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii90" id="page_ii90">[pg.90]</a></span> would not again be +tamely sheathed; great efforts were made to effect this change, but +met with a chilling repulse from the King.<a name= +"FN2anchor100_100"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_100_100"><sup>[100]</sup></a> It is true that Haugwitz +and Beyme now expressed the bitterest hatred of Napoleon, as well +they might for a man who had betrayed their confidence. But, none +the less, the King's refusal to change his men along with his +policy was fatal. Both at St. Petersburg and London no trust was +felt in Prussia as long as Haugwitz was at the helm. The man who +had twice steered the ship of state under Napoleon's guns might do +it again; and both England and Russia waited to see some +irrevocable step taken before they again risked an army for that +prince of waverers.</p> + +<p>Grenville rather tardily sent Lord Morpeth to arrange an +alliance, but only after he should receive a solemn pledge that +Hanover would be restored. That envoy approached the Prussian +headquarters just in time to be swept away in the torrent of +fugitives from Jena. As for Russia, she had awaited the arrival of +a Prussian officer at St. Petersburg to concert a plan of campaign. +When he arrived he had no plan; and the Czar, perplexed by the +fatuity of his ally, and the hostility of the Turks, refused to +march his troops forthwith into Prussia.<a name= +"FN2anchor101_101"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_101_101"><sup>[101]</sup></a> Equally disappointing was +the conduct of Austria. This Power, bleeding from the wounds of +last year and smarting under the jealousy of Russia, refused to +move until the allies had won a victory. And so, thanks to the +jealousies of the old monarchies, Frederick William had no Russian +or Austrian troops at his side, no sinews of war from London to +invigorate his preparations, when he staked his all in the high +places of Thuringia. He gained, it is true, the support of Saxony +and Weimar; but this brought less than 21,000 men to his side.<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii91" id= +"page_ii91">[pg.91]</a></span></p> + +<p>On the other hand, Napoleon, as Protector of the Rhenish +Confederation, secured the aid of 25,000 South Germans, as well as +an excellent fortified base at Würzburg. His troops, holding +the citadels of Passau and Braunau on the Austrian frontier, kept +the Hapsburgs quiet; and 60,000 French and Dutch troops at Wesel +menaced the Prussians in Hanover. Above all, his forces already in +Germany were strengthened until, in the early days of October, some +200,000 men were marching from the Main towards the Duchy of +Weimar. Soult and Ney led 60,000 men from Amberg towards Baireuth +and Hof: Bernadotte and Davoust, with 90,000, marched towards +Schleitz, while Lannes and Augereau, with 46,000, moved by a road +further to the left towards Saalfeld.</p> + +<p>The progress of these dense columns near together and through a +hilly country presented great difficulties, which only the +experience of the officers, the energy and patience of the men, and +the genius of their great leader could overcome. Meanwhile Napoleon +had quietly left Paris on September 25th. Travelling at his usual +rapid rate, he reached Mainz on the 28th: he was at Würzburg +on October 2nd; there he directed the operations, confident that +the impact of his immense force would speedily break the Prussians, +drive them down the valley of the Saale and thus detach the Elector +of Saxony from an alliance that already was irksome.</p> + +<p>The French, therefore, had a vast mass of seasoned fighters, a +good base of operations, and a clear plan of attack. The Prussians, +on the contrary, could muster barely 128,000 men, including the +Saxons, for service in the field; and of these 27,000 with +Rüchel were on the frontier of Hesse-Cassel seeking to assure +the alliance of the Elector. The commander-in-chief was the +septuagenarian Duke of Brunswick, well known for his failure at +Valmy in 1792 and his recent support to the policy of complaisance +to France. His appointment aroused anger and consternation; and +General Kalckreuth expressed to Gentz the general opinion when he +said that the Duke was quite incompetent for such a<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii92" id="page_ii92">[pg.92]</a></span> +command: "His character is not strong enough, his mediocrity, +irresolution, and untrustworthiness would ruin the best +undertaking." The Duke himself was aware of his incompetence. Why +then, we ask, did he accept the command? The answer is startling; +but it rests on the evidence of General von Müffling:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"The Duke of Brunswick had accepted the command <i>in order to +avert war</i>. I can affirm this with perfect certainty, since I +have heard it from his own lips more than once. He was fully aware +of the weaknesses of the Prussian army and the incompetence of its +officers."<a name="FN2anchor102_102"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_102_102"><sup>[102]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>Thus there was seen the strange sight of a diffident, +peace-loving King accompanying the army and sharing in all the +deliberations; while these were nominally presided over by a +despondent old man who still intrigued to preserve peace, and +shifted on to the King the responsibility of every important act. +And yet there were able generals who could have acted with effect, +even if they fell short of the opinion hopefully bruited by General +Rüchel, that "several were equal to M. de Bonaparte." Events +were to prove that Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, and Blücher +rivalled the best of the French Marshals; but in this war their +lights were placed under bushels and only shone forth when the +official covers had been shattered. Scharnhorst, already renowned +for his strategic and administrative genius, took part in some of +the many councils of war where everything was discussed and little +was decided; but his opinion had no weight, for on October 7th he +wrote: "What we ought to do I know right well, what we <i>shall</i> +do only the gods know."<a name="FN2anchor103_103"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_103_103"><sup>[103]</sup></a> He evidently referred to +the need of concentration. At that time the thin Prussian lines +were spread out over a front of eighty-five miles, the Saxons being +near Gera, the chief army, under Brunswick, at Erfurth, while +Rüchel was so far distant on the west that he could only come +up at Jena just one hour too late to avert disaster.<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii93" id="page_ii93">[pg.93]</a></span></p> + +<p>And yet with these weak and scattered forces, Prince Hohenlohe +proposed a bold move forward to the Main. Brunswick, on the other +hand, counselled a prudent defensive; but he could not, or would +not, enforce his plan; and the result was an oscillation between +the two extremes. Had he massed all his forces so as to command the +valleys of the Saale and Elster near Jena and Gera, the campaign +might possibly have been prolonged until the Russians came up. As +it was, the allies dulled the ardour of their troops by marches, +counter-marches, and interminable councils-of-war, while Napoleon's +columns were threading their way along those valleys at the average +rate of fifteen miles a day, in order to turn the allied left and +cut the connection between Prussia and Saxony.<a name= +"FN2anchor104_104"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_104_104"><sup>[104]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The first serious fighting was on October the 10th at Saalfeld, +where Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia with a small force sought +to protect Hohenlohe's flank march westwards on Jena. The task was +beyond the strength even of this flower of Prussian chivalry. He +was overpowered by the weight and vigour of Lannes' attack, and +when already wounded in a cavalry <i>mêlée</i> was +pierced through the body by an officer to whom he proudly refused +to surrender. The death of this hero, the "Alcibiades" of Prussia, +cast a gloom over the whole army, and mournful faces at +headquarters seemed to presage yet worse disasters. Perhaps it was +some inkling of this discouragement, or a laudable desire to stop +"an impolitic war," that urged Napoleon two days later to pen a +letter to the King of Prussia urging him to make peace before he +was crushed, as he assuredly would be. In itself the letter seems +admirable—until one remembers the circumstances of the case. +The King had pledged his word to the Czar to make war; if, +therefore, he now made peace and sent the Russians back, he would +once more stand condemned of preferring dishonourable ease to the +noble<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii94" id= +"page_ii94">[pg.94]</a></span> hazards of an affair of honour. As +Napoleon was aware of the union of the King and Czar, this letter +must be regarded as an attempt to dissolve the alliance and tarnish +Frederick William's reputation. It was viewed in that light by that +monarch; and there is not a hint in Napoleon's other letters that +he really expected peace.</p> + +<p>He was then at Gera, pushing forward his corps towards Naumburg +so as to cut off the Prussians from Saxony and the Elbe. Great as +was his superiority, these movements occasioned such a dispersion +of his forces as to invite attack from enterprising foes; but he +despised the Prussian generals as imbeciles, and endeavoured to +unsteady their rank and file by seizing and burning their military +stores at the latter town. He certainly believed that they were all +in retreat northwards, and great was his surprise when he heard +from Lannes early on October 13th that his scouts, after scaling +the hills behind Jena in a dense mist, had come upon the Prussian +army. The news was only partly correct. It was only Hohenlohe's +corps: for the bulk of that army, under Brunswick, was retreating +northwards, and nearly stumbled upon the corps of Davoust and +Bernadotte behind Naumburg.</p> + +<p>Lannes also was in danger on the Landgrafenberg. This is a lofty +hill which towers above the town of Jena and the narrow winding +vale of the Saale; while its other slopes, to the north and west, +rise above and dominate the broken and irregular plateau on which +Hohenlohe's force was encamped. Had the Prussians attacked his +weary regiments in force, they might easily have hurled them into +the Saale. But Hohenlohe had received orders to retire northwards +in the rear of Brunswick, as soon as he had rallied the detachment +of Rüchel near Weimar, and was therefore indisposed to venture +on the bold offensive which now was his only means of safety. The +respite thus granted was used by the French to hurry every +available regiment up the slopes north and west of Jena. Late in +the afternoon, Napoleon <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii95" +id="page_ii95">[pg.95]</a></span> himself ascended the +Landgrafenberg to survey the plateau; while a pastor of the town +was compelled to show a path further north which leads to the same +plateau through a gulley called the Rau-thal.<a name= +"FN2anchor105_105"></a> <a href= +"#Foot2note_105_105"><sup>[105]</sup></a></p> + +<center><a name="image_10"><img alt="BATTLE OF JENA" src= +"images/image10.jpg" width="346" height="266"><br> + <font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>BATTLE OF +JENA</small></font></a></center> + +<p>On the south the heights sink away into a wider valley, the +Mühl-thal, along which runs the road to Weimar; and on this +side too their wooded brows are broken by gulleys, up one of which +runs a winding track known as the Schnecke or Snail. Villages and +woods diversified the plateau and hindered the free use of that +extended line formation on which the Prussians relied, while +favouring the operations of dense columns preceded by clouds of +skirmishers by which Napoleon so often hewed his way to victory. +His greatest advantage, however, lay in the ignorance of his foes. +Hohenlohe, believing that he was confronted only by Lannes' corps, +took little thought about what was going on in his front, and <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii96" id= +"page_ii96">[pg.96]</a></span> judging the Mühl-thal approach +alone to be accessible, posted his chief force on this side. So +insufficient a guard was therefore kept on the side of the +Landgrafenberg that the French, under cover of the darkness, not +only crowned the summit densely with troops, but dragged up whole +batteries of cannon.</p> + +<p>The toil was stupendous: in one of the steep hollow tracks a +number of cannon and wagons stuck fast; but the Emperor, making his +rounds at midnight, brought the magic of his presence to aid the +weary troops and rebuke the officers whose negligence had caused +this block. Lantern in hand, he went up and down the line to direct +the work; and Savary, who saw this scene, noted the wonder of the +men, as they caught sight of the Emperor, the renewed energy of +their blows at the rocks, and their whispers of surprise that +<i>he</i> should come in person when their officers were asleep. +The night was far spent when, after seeing the first wagon right +through the narrow steep, he repaired to his bivouac amidst his +Guards on the summit, and issued further orders before snatching a +brief repose. By such untiring energy did he assure victory. Apart +from its immense effect on the spirits of his troops, his vigilance +reaped a rich reward. Jena was won by a rapid concentration of +troops, and the prompt seizure of a commanding position almost +under the eyes of an unenterprising enemy. The corps of Soult and +Ney spent most of the night and early morning in marching towards +Jena and taking up their positions on the right or north wing, +while Lannes and the Guard held the central height, and Augereau's +corps in the Mühl-thal threatened the Saxons and Prussians +guarding the Schnecke.<a name="FN2anchor106_106"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_106_106"><sup>[106]</sup></a></p> + +<p>A dense fog screened the moves of the assailants early on the +morrow, and, after some confused but obstinate fighting, the French +secured their hold on the plateau not only above the town of Jena, +where their onset took the Prussians by surprise, but also above +the Mühl-thal, where the enemy were in force.<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii97" id="page_ii97">[pg.97]</a></span></p> + +<p>By ten o'clock the fog lifted, and the warm rays of the autumn +sun showed the dense masses of the French advancing towards the +middle of the plateau. Hohenlohe now saw the full extent of his +error and despatched an urgent message to Rüchel for aid. It +was too late. The French centre, led by Lannes, began to push back +the Prussian lines on the village named Vierzehn Heiligen. It was +in vain that Hohenlohe's choice squadrons flung themselves on the +serried masses in front: the artillery and musketry fire disordered +them, while French dragoons were ready to profit by their +confusion. The village was lost, then retaken by a rally of the +Prussians, then lost again when Ney was reinforced; and when the +full vigour of the French attack was developed by the advance of +Soult and Augereau on either wing, Napoleon launched his reserves, +his Guard, and Murat's squadrons on the disordered lines. The +impact was irresistible, and Hohenlohe's force was swept away. Then +it was that Rüchel's force drew near, and strove to stem the +rout. Advancing steadily, as if on parade, his troops for a brief +space held up the French onset; but neither the dash of the +Prussian horse nor the bravery of the foot-soldiers could dam that +mighty tide, which laid low the gallant leader and swept his lines +away into the general wreck.<a name="FN2anchor107_107"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_107_107"><sup>[107]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In the headlong flight before Murat's horsemen, the fugitives +fell in with another beaten array, that of Brunswick. At Jena the +Prussians, if defeated, were not disgraced: before the first shot +was fired their defeat was a mathematical certainty. At the crisis +of the battle they had but 47,400 men at hand, while Napoleon then +disposed of 83,600 combatants.<a name="FN2anchor108_108"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_108_108"><sup>[108]</sup></a> But at Auerstädt +they were driven back and disgraced. There they had a<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii98" id="page_ii98">[pg.98]</a></span> +decided superiority in numbers, having more than 35,000 of their +choicest troops, while opposite to them stood only the 27,000 men +of Davoust's corps.</p> + +<p>Hitherto Davoust had been remarkable rather for his dog-like +devotion to Napoleon than for any martial genius; and the brilliant +Marmont had openly scoffed at his receiving the title of Marshal. +But, under his quiet exterior and plodding habits, there lay +concealed a variety of gifts which only needed a great occasion to +shine forth and astonish the world.<a name= +"FN2anchor109_109"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_109_109"><sup>[109]</sup></a> The time was now at hand. +Frederick William and Brunswick were marching from Auerstädt +to make good their retreat on the Elbe, when their foremost +horsemen, led by the gallant Blücher, saw a solid wall of +French infantry loom through the morning fog. It was part of +Davoust's corps, strongly posted in and around the village of +Hassenhausen.</p> + +<p>At once Blücher charged, only to be driven back with severe +loss. Again he came on, this time supported by infantry and cannon: +again he was repulsed; for Davoust, aided by the fog, had seized +the neighbouring heights which commanded the high road, and held +them with firm grip. Determined to brush aside or crush this +stubborn foe, the Duke of Brunswick now led heavy masses along the +narrow defile; but the steady fire of the French laid him low, with +most of the officers; and as the Prussians fell back, Davoust swung +forward his men to threaten their flanks. The King was dismayed at +these repeated checks, and though the Prussian reserves under +Kalckreuth could have been called up to overwhelm the hard-pressed +French by the weight of numbers, yet he judged it better to draw +off his men and fall back on Hohenlohe for support.</p> + +<p>But what a support! Instead of an army, it was a<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii99" id="page_ii99">[pg.99]</a></span> +terrified mob flying before Murat's sabres, that met them halfway +between Auerstädt and Weimar. Threatened also by Bernadotte's +corps on their left flank, the two Prussian armies now melted away +in one indistinguishable torrent, that was stemmed only by the +sheltering walls of Erfurt, Magdeburg, and of fortresses yet more +remote.</p> + +<p>Of the twin battles of Jena and Auerstädt, the latter was +unquestionably the more glorious for the French arms. That Napoleon +should have beaten an army of little more than half his numbers is +in no way remarkable. What is strange is that so consummate a +leader should have been entirely ignorant of the distribution of +the enemy's forces, and should have left Davoust with only 27,000 +men exposed to the attack of Brunswick with nearly 40,000.<a name= +"FN2anchor110_110"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_110_110"><sup>[110]</sup></a> In his bulletins, as in +the "Relation Officielle," the Emperor sought to gloze over his +error by magnifying Hohenlohe's corps into a great army and +attenuating Davoust's splendid exploit, which in his private +letters he warmly praised. The fact is, he had made all his +dispositions in the belief that he had the main body of the +Prussians before him at Jena.</p> + +<p>That is why, on the afternoon of the 13th, he hastily sent to +recall Murat's horse and Bernadotte's corps from Naumburg and its +vicinity; and in consequence Bernadotte took no very active part in +the fighting. For this he has been bitterly blamed, on the strength +of an assertion that Napoleon during the night of the 13th-14th +sent him an order to support Davoust. This order has never been +produced, and it finds no place in the latest and fullest +collection of French official despatches, which, however, contains +some that fully exonerate Bernadotte.<a name= +"FN2anchor111_111"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_111_111"><sup>[111]</sup></a> Unfortunately for +Bernadotte's fame, the tattle of <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii100" id="page_ii100">[pg.100]</a></span>memoir writers is +more attractive and gains more currency than the prosaic facts of +despatches.</p> + +<p>Fortune plays an immense part in warfare; and never did she +favour the Emperor more than on October the 14th, 1806. Fortune and +the skill and bravery of Davoust and his corps turned what might +have been an almost doubtful conflict into an overwhelming victory. +Though Napoleon was as ignorant of the movements of Brunswick as he +was of the flank march of Blücher at Waterloo, yet the +enterprise and tenacity of Davoust and Lannes yielded him, on the +Thuringian heights, a triumph scarcely paralleled in the annals of +war. It is difficult to overpraise those Marshals for the energy +with which they clung to the foe and brought on a battle under +conditions highly favourable to the French: without their efforts, +the Prussian army could never have been shattered on a single +day.</p> + +<p>The flood of invasion now roared down the Thuringian valleys and +deluged the plains of Saxony and Brandenburg. Rivers and ramparts +were alike helpless to stay that all-devouring tide. On October the +16th, 16,000 men surrendered at Erfurt to Murat: then, spurring +eastward, <i>le beau sabreur</i> rushed on the wreck of Hohenlohe's +force, and with the aid of Lannes' untiring corps compelled it to +surrender at Prenzlau.<a name="FN2anchor112_112"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_112_112"><sup>[112]</sup></a> Blücher meanwhile +stubbornly retreated to the north; but, with Murat, Soult, and +Bernadotte dogging his steps, he finally threw himself into +Lübeck, where, after a last desperate effort, he surrendered +to overpowering numbers (November 7th).</p> + +<p>Here the gloom of defeat was relieved by gleams of heroism; but +before the walls of other Prussian strongholds disaster was +blackened by disgrace. Held by timid old men or nerveless pedants, +they scarcely waited for a vigorous attack. A few cannon-shots, or +even a<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii101" id= +"page_ii101">[pg.101]</a></span> demonstration of cavalry, +generally brought out the white flag. In quick succession, Spandau, +Stettin, Küstrin, Magdeburg, and Hameln opened their gates, +the governor of the last-named being mainly concerned about +securing his future retiring pension from the French as soon as +Hanover passed into their keeping.</p> + +<p>Amidst these shameful surrenders the capital fell into the hands +of Davoust (October 25th). Varnhagen von Ense had described his +mingled surprise and admiration at seeing those "lively, impudent, +mean-looking little fellows," who had beaten the splendid soldiers +trained in the school of Frederick the Great. His wonder was +natural; but all who looked beneath the surface well knew that +Prussia was overthrown before the first shot was fired. She was the +victim of a deadening barrack routine, of official apathy or +corruption, and of a degrading policy which dulled the enthusiasm +of her sons.</p> + +<p>Thirteen days after the great battle, Napoleon himself entered +Berlin in triumph. It was the first time that he allowed himself a +victor's privilege, and no pains were spared to impress the +imagination of mankind by a parade of his choicest troops. First +came the foot grenadiers and chasseurs of the Imperial Guard: +behind the central group marched other squadrons and battalions of +these veterans, already famed as the doughtiest fighters of their +age. In their midst came the mind of this military +machine—Napoleon, accompanied by three Marshals and a +brilliant staff. Among them men noted the plain, soldierlike +Berthier, the ever trusty and methodical chief of the staff. At his +side rode Davoust, whose round and placid face gave little promise +of his rapid rush to the front rank among the French paladins. +There too was the tall, handsome, threatening form of Augereau, +whose services at Jena, meritorious as they were, scarcely +maintained his fame at the high level to which it soared at +Castiglione. Then came Napoleon's favourite aide-de-camp, Duroc, a +short, stern, war-hardened man, well known in Berlin, where twice +he had sought to rivet close the bonds of the French alliance.<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii102" id= +"page_ii102">[pg.102]</a></span></p> + +<p>Above all, the gaze of the awe-struck crowd was fixed on the +figure of the chief, now grown to the roundness of robust health +amidst toils that would have worn most men to a shadow; and on the +face, no longer thin with the unsatisfied longings of youth, but +square and full with toil requited and ambition wellnigh +sated—a visage redeemed from the coarseness of the epicure's +only by the knitted brows that bespoke ceaseless thought, and by +the keen, melancholy, unfathomable eyes.</p> + +<br> + + +<p>NOTE ADDED TO THE FOURTH EDITION</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>Several facts of considerable interest and importance respecting +the Anglo-French negotiations of 1806 have been brought to light by +M. Coquelle in his recently published work "Napoleon and England, +1803-1813," chapters xi.-xvii. (George Bell and Sons, 1904).<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii103" id= +"page_ii103">[pg.103]</a></span></p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXVI</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM: FRIEDLAND</center> + +<br> +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I know full well that London is a corner of the world, and that +Paris is its centre."—<i>Letter of Napoleon</i>, August 18th, +1806.</p> +</div> + +<p>On the 21st of November, 1806, Napoleon issued at Berlin the +decree which proclaimed open and unrelenting war on English +industry and commerce, a war that was to embroil the whole +civilized world and cease only with his overthrow. After reciting +his complaints against the English maritime code, he declared the +British Isles to be in a state of blockade, interdicted all +commerce with them, threatened seizure and imprisonment to English +goods and subjects wherever found by French or allied troops, +forbade all trade in English and colonial wares, and excluded from +French and allied ports any ship that had touched at those of Great +Britain; while any ship that connived at the infraction of the +present decree was to be held a good prize of war.<a name= +"FN2anchor113_113"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_113_113"><sup>[113]</sup></a> This ukase, which was +binding for France, Italy, Switzerland, Holland, and the Rhenish +Confederation, formed the foundation of the Continental System, a +term applicable to the sum total of the measures that aimed at +ruining England by excluding her goods from the Continent.</p> + +<p>The plan of strangling Britain by her own wealth was not +peculiar to Napoleon. In common with much of his political +stock-in-trade he had it from the Jacobins, who stoutly maintained +that England's wealth was fictitious and would collapse as soon as +her commerce was<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii104" id= +"page_ii104">[pg.104]</a></span> attacked in the Indies and +excluded from the Rhine and Elbe. At first the fulminations of +Parisian legislators fell idly on the stately pile of British +industry; but when the young Bonaparte appeared on the scene, the +commercial warfare became serious. As soon as his victories in +Italy widened the sphere of French influence, the Directory banned +the entry of all our products, counting all cotton and woollen +goods as English unless the contrary could be proved by +certificates of origin.<a name="FN2anchor114_114"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_114_114"><sup>[114]</sup></a> Public opinion in France, +which, unless held in by an intelligent monarch, has always swung +towards protection or prohibition, welcomed that vigorous measure; +and great was the outcry of manufacturers when it was rumoured in +1802 that Napoleon was about to make a commercial treaty with the +national enemy. Tradition and custom, therefore, were all on his +side, when, after Trafalgar, he concentrated all his energy on his +"coast-system."<a name="FN2anchor115_115"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_115_115"><sup>[115]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Ostensibly the Berlin Decree was a retort to our Order in +Council of May 16th, 1806, which declared all the coast between +Brest and the Elbe in a state of blockade; and French historians +have defended it on this ground, asserting that it was a necessary +reply to England's aggressive action.<a name= +"FN2anchor116_116"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_116_116"><sup>[116]</sup></a> But this plea can scarcely +be maintained. The aggressor, surely, was the man who forced +Prussia to close the neutral North German coast to British goods +(February, 1806). Besides, there is indirect proof that Napoleon +looked on our blockade of the northern coasts as not unreasonable. +In his subsequent negotiations with us, he raised no protest +against it, and made no difficulty about our maritime code: if we +would<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii105" id= +"page_ii105">[pg.105]</a></span> let him seize Sicily, we might, it +seems, have re-enacted that code in all its earlier stringency. Far +from doing so, Fox and his successors relaxed the blockade of North +Germany; and by an order dated September 25th, the coast between +the Elbe and the Ems was declared free.</p> + +<p>Napoleon's grievance against us was thereby materially lessened, +and his protest against fictitious blockades in the preamble of the +Berlin Decree really applied only to our action on the coast +between the Helder and Brest, where our cruisers were watching the +naval preparations still going on. His retort in the interests of +outraged law was certainly curious; he declared our 3,000 miles of +coast in a state of blockade—a mere <i>brutum fulmen</i> in +point of fact, but designed to give a show of legality to his +Continental System. Yet, apart from this thin pretext, he troubled +very little about law. Indeed, blockade is an act of war; and its +application to this or that part or coast depends on the will and +power of the belligerents. Napoleon frankly recognized that fact; +and, however much his preambles appealed to law, his conduct was +decided solely by expediency. When he wanted peace (along with +Sicily) he said nothing about our maritime claims: when the war +went on, he used them as a pretext for an action that was ten times +as stringent.</p> + +<p>The gauntlet thrown down by him at Berlin was promptly taken up +by Great Britain. An Order in Council of January 7th, 1807, forbade +neutrals to trade between the ports of France and her allies, or +between ports that observed the Berlin Decree, under pain of +seizure and confiscation of the ship and cargo. In return Napoleon +issued from Warsaw (January 27th) a decree, ordering the seizure in +the Hanse Towns of all English goods and colonial produce. By way +of reprisal England reimposed a strict blockade on the North German +coast (March 11th); and after the Peace of Tilsit laid the +Continent at the feet of Napoleon, he frankly told the diplomatic +circle at Fontainebleau that he would no longer allow any +commercial or political relations between the Continent and +England.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii106" id= +"page_ii106">[pg.106]</a></span> "The sea must be subdued by the +land." In these words Napoleon pithily summed up his enterprise; +and whatever may be thought of the means which he adopted, the +design is not without grandeur. Granted that Britannia ruled the +waves, yet he ruled the land; and the land, as the active fruitful +element, must overpower the barren sea. Such was the notion: it was +fallacious, as will appear later on; but it appealed strongly to +the French imagination as providing an infallible means of humbling +the traditional foe. Furthermore, it placed in Napoleon's hands a +potent engine of government, not only for assuring his position in +France, but for extending his sway over North Germany and all +coasts that seemed needful to the success of the experiment.</p> + +<p>Indirectly also it seems to have fed, without satisfying, his +ever-growing love of power. Here we touch on the difficult question +of motive; and it is perhaps impossible, except for dogmatists, to +determine whether the enterprises that led to his ruin—the +partition of Portugal, which slid easily into the occupation of +Spain, together with his Moscow adventure—were prompted by +ambition or by a semi-fatalistic feeling that they were necessary +to the complete triumph of his Continental System. He himself, with +a flash of almost uncanny insight, once remarked to Roederer that +his ambition was different from that of other men: for they were +slaves to it, whereas it was so interwoven with the whole texture +of his being as to interfere with no single process of thought and +will. Whether that is possible is a question for psychologists and +casuists; but every open-minded student of Napoleon's career must +at times pause in utter doubt, whether this or that act was +prompted by mad ambition, or followed naturally, perhaps +inevitably, from that world-embracing postulate, the Continental +System.</p> + +<p>England also derived some secondary advantages from this war of +the elements. In order to stalemate her mighty foe, she pushed on +her colonial conquests so as to control the resources of the +tropics, and thus prevent<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii107" +id="page_ii107">[pg.107]</a></span> that deadly tilting of the +balance landwards which Napoleon strove to effect. And fate decreed +that the conquests of English seamen and settlers were to be more +enduring than those of Napoleon's legions. While the French were +gaining barren victories beyond the Vistula and Ebro, our seamen +seized French and Dutch colonies and our pioneers opened up the +interior of Australia and South Africa.</p> + +<p>We also used our maritime monopoly to depress neutral commerce. +We have not space to discuss the complex question of the rights of +neutrals in time of war, which would involve an examination of the +"rule of 1756" and the compromises arrived at after the two Armed +Neutrality Leagues. Suffice it to say that our merchants had +recently been indignant at the comparative immunity enjoyed by +neutral ships, and had pressed for more vigorous action against +such as traded to French ports.<a name="FN2anchor117_117"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_117_117"><sup>[117]</sup></a> Yet the statement +that our Orders in Council were determined by the clamour of the +mercantile class is an exaggeration: they were reprisals against +Napoleon's acts, following them in almost geometrical gradations. +To his domination over the industrial resources of the Continent we +had nothing to oppose but our manufacturing skill, our supremacy in +the tropics, and our control of the sea. The methods used on both +sides were alike brutal, and, when carried to their logical +conclusion at the close of the year, crushed the neutrals between +the upper and the nether millstone. But it is difficult to see what +other alternative was open to an insular State that was +all-powerful at sea and weak on land. Our very existence was bound +up with maritime commerce; and an abandonment of the carrying +trade<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii108" id= +"page_ii108">[pg.108]</a></span> to neutrals would have been the +tamest of surrenders, at a time when surrender meant political +extinction.</p> + +<p>We turn now to follow the chief steps in Napoleon's onward +march, which enabled him to impose his system on nearly the whole +of the Continent. While encamped in the Prussian capital he decreed +the deposition of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, and French and Dutch +troops forthwith occupied that Electorate. Towards Saxony he acted +with politic clemency; and on December 11th, 1806, the Elector +accepted the French alliance, entered the Confederation of the +Rhine, and received the title of King.<a name= +"FN2anchor118_118"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_118_118"><sup>[118]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Meanwhile Frederick William, accompanied by his grief-stricken +consort, was striving to draw together an army in his eastern +provinces. Some overtures with a view to peace had been made after +Jena; but Napoleon finally refused to relax his pursuit unless the +Prussians retired beyond the Vistula, and yielded up to him all the +western parts of the kingdom, with their fortresses. Besides, he +let it be known that Prussia must join him in a close alliance +against Russia, with a view to checking her ambitious projects +against Turkey; for the Czar, resenting the Sultan's deposition of +the hospodars of the Danubian Principalities, an act suggested by +the French, had sent an army across the River Pruth, even when the +Porte timidly revoked its objectionable firman.<a name= +"FN2anchor119_119"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_119_119"><sup>[119]</sup></a> The Eastern Question +having been thus reopened, Napoleon suggested a Franco-Prussian +alliance so as to avert a Russian conquest of the Balkan Peninsula. +But now, as ever, his terms to Prussia were too exacting. The King +deigned not to stoop to such humiliation, but resolved to stake his +all on the courage of his troops and the fidelity of the Czar.</p> + +<p>The Russians, though delayed by their distrust of Haugwitz, and +by their insensate war with Turkey, were now marching, 73,000 +strong, into Prussian Poland, but were too late to save the +Silesian fortresses, most of<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii109" id="page_ii109">[pg.109]</a></span> which surrendered +to the French. The fighting in the open also went against the +allies, though at Pultusk, a town north of Warsaw, the Russians +claimed that the contest had been drawn in their favour.</p> + +<p>At the close of the year the armies went into winter-quarters. +It was high time. The French were ill supplied for a winter +campaign amid the desolate wastes of Poland. Snow and rain, frosts +and thaws had turned the wretched tracks into muddy swamps, where +men sank to their knees, horses to their bellies, and carriages +beyond their axles. The carriage conveying Talleyrand was a whole +night stuck fast, in spite of the efforts of ten horses to drag it +out. The opinion of the soldiery on Poland and the Poles is well +expressed by that prince of <i>raconteurs</i>, Marbot: "Weather +frightful, victuals very scarce, no wine, beer detestable, water +muddy, no bread, lodgings shared with cows and pigs. 'And they call +this their country,' said our soldiers."</p> + +<p>Yet Polish patriotism had been a mighty power in the world; and +Napoleon, ever on the watch for the weak places of his foes, saw +how effective a lever it might be. This had been his constant +practice: he had pitted Italians against Austrians, Copts against +Mamelukes, Druses against Turks, Irish against English, South +Germans against the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns, and for the most +part with success. But, except in the case of the Italian people +and the South German princes, he rarely, if ever, bestowed boons +proportionate to the services rendered. It is very questionable +whether he felt more warmly for Irish nationalists than for Copts +and Druses.<a name="FN2anchor120_120"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_120_120"><sup>[120]</sup></a> Except in regard to his +Italian kindred, none of the nationalist aspirations that were to +mould the history of the century touched a responsive chord in his +nature. In this, as in other affairs of state, he held "true<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii110" id= +"page_ii110">[pg.110]</a></span> policy" to be "nothing else than +the calculation of combinations and chances."</p> + +<p>It was in this spirit that he surveyed the Polish Question. +Arising out of the partitions of that unhappy land by Russia, +Austria, and Prussia, it had distracted the repose of Europe +scarcely less than the French Revolution; and now the heir to the +Revolution, after hewing his way through the weak monarchies of +Central Europe, was about to probe this ulcer of Christendom. As +usual, nothing had been done to forestall him. Czartoryski had +begged Alexander to declare Russian Poland an autonomous kingdom +united with Russia only by the golden link of the crown, but this +timely proposal was rejected;<a name="FN2anchor121_121"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_121_121"><sup>[121]</sup></a> and the Czar +displayed the weakness of his judgment and the strength of his +vanity by plunging into war with Turkey and Persia, at a time when +Poland was opening her arms to the victor of a hundred fights. It +was, therefore, easy for Napoleon to surround Russia with foes; +and, as will shortly appear, he took steps to invigorate even the +remote Persian Empire.</p> + +<p>But, above all, he spurred on the Poles to take up arms. His +encouragements were discreetly vague. True, he countenanced Polish +proclamations, which spoke grandiloquently of national liberty; but +proclamations he ever viewed as the <i>ballons d'essai</i> of +politics. He also warned Murat not to promise the Poles too much: +"My greatness does not depend on the aid of a few thousand Poles. +Let them show a firm resolve to be independent: let them pledge +themselves to support the King that will be given to them, and then +I will see what is to be done."</p> + +<p>There were two reasons for this caution. His Marshals found no +very general disposition among the Poles to take up arms for +France; and he desired not to offend Austria by revolutionizing +Galicia and her districts south and east of Warsaw. Already the +Hapsburgs were nervously mustering their troops, and Napoleon had +no wish to tempt fortune by warring against three Powers a +thousand<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii111" id= +"page_ii111">[pg.111]</a></span> miles away from his own frontiers. +He therefore calmed the Court of Vienna by promising that he would +discourage any rising in Austrian Poland, and he held forth the +prospect of regaining Silesia. This tempting offer was made +secretly and conditionally; and evoked no expression of thanks, but +rather a redoubling of precautions. Yet, despite the efforts of +England and Russia, the Hapsburg ruler refused to join the allies: +he preferred to play the waiting game which had ruined Prussia.<a +name="FN2anchor122_122"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_122_122"><sup>[122]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The campaign was reopened amidst terrible weather by a daring +move of Bennigsen's Russians westwards, in the hope of saving +Danzig and Graudenz from the French. At first a screen of forests +well concealed his advance. But, falling in with Bernadotte near +the River Passarge, his progress was checked and his design +revealed. At once Napoleon prepared to march northwards and throw +the Russians into the sea, a plan which in its turn was foiled by +the seizure of a French despatch by Cossacks. Bennigsen, now aware +of his danger, at once retreated towards Königsberg, but at +Eylau turned on his pursuers and fought the bloodiest battle fought +in Europe since Malplaquet. The numbers on both sides were probably +about equal, numbering some 75,000 men, the Russians having a +slight superiority in men and still more in<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii112" id="page_ii112">[pg.112]</a></span> artillery. +Driven from Eylau on the night of February 7th after confused +fighting, the Muscovite withdrew to a strong position formed by an +irregular line of hills, which he crowned with cannon.</p> + +<p>As the dawn peered through the snow-laden clouds, guns began to +deal death amongst the hostile masses, and heavy columns moved +forward. Davoust, on the French right, began to push back the +Russians on that side, whereupon Napoleon ordered Augereau's corps +to complete the advantage by driving in the enemy's centre. +Gallantly the French advanced. Their leading regiment, the 14th, +had seized a hillock which commanded the enemy's lines,<a name= +"FN2anchor123_123"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_123_123"><sup>[123]</sup></a> when, amidst a whirlwind +of snow that beat in their faces, a deadly storm of grape and +canister almost annihilated the corps. Its shattered lines fell +back, leaving the 14th to its fate. But a cloud of Cossacks now +swept on the retiring companies, stabbing with their long spears; +and it was a scanty band that found safety in their former +position. Russian cannon and cavalry also stopped the advance of +Davoust, and the fighting for a time resolved itself into confused +but murderous charges at close quarters. As if to increase the +horrors of the scene, snowstorms again swept over the field, dazing +the French and shrouding with friendly wings the fierce charges of +Cossacks. Yet the Grand Army fought on with devoted heroism; and +the chief, determined to snatch at victory, launched eighty +squadrons of horse against the Russian centre. Sweeping aside the +Cossacks, and defying the cannon that riddled their files, they +poured upon the first line of Russian infantry: for a time they +were stemmed, but, finding some weaker places, the cuirassiers +burst through, only to be thrown back by the second line; and, when +furiously charged by Cossacks, they fell back in disorder. "These +Russians fight like bulls," said the French. The simile was just. +Even while Murat was hacking at their centre a column of 4,000 +Russian grenadiers, <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii113" id= +"page_ii113">[pg.113]</a></span> detaching itself from their +mangled line, marched straight forward on the village of Eylau. +With the same blind courage that nerved Solmes' division at +Steinkirk, they beat aside the French light horse and foot, and +were now threatening the cemetery where Napoleon and his staff were +standing.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I never was so much struck with anything in my life," said +General Bertrand at St. Helena, "as by the Emperor at Eylau when he +was almost trodden under foot by the Russian column. He kept his +ground as the Russians advanced, saying frequently, 'What +boldness.'"</p> +</div> + +<p>But, when all around him trembled, and Berthier ordered up the +horses as if for retreat, he himself quietly signalled for his +Guards. These sturdy troops, long fuming at their inaction, marched +forward with a stern joy. As at Steinkirk the French Household +Brigade disdained to fire on the bull-dogs, so now the Guards +rushed on the Muscovites with the cold steel. The shock was +terrible; but the pent-up fury of the French carried all before it, +and the grenadiers were wellnigh destroyed. The battle might still +have ended in a French victory; for Davoust was obstinately holding +the village which he had seized in the morning, and even threatened +the rear of Bennigsen's centre. But when both sides were wellnigh +exhausted, the Prussian General Lestocq with 8,000 men, urged on by +the counsels of Scharnhorst, hurried up from the side of +Königsberg, marched straight on Davoust, and checked his +forward movements. Ney followed Lestocq, but at so great a distance +that his arrival at nightfall served only to secure the French +left.</p> + +<p>Thus darkness closed over some 100,000 men, who wearily clung to +their posts, and over snowy wastes where half that number lay dead, +dying, or disabled. Well might Ney exclaim: "What a massacre, and +without any issue!" Each side claimed the victory, and, as is usual +in such cases, began industriously to minimize its own and to +magnify the enemy's losses. The truth seems to<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii114" id="page_ii114">[pg.114]</a></span> +be that both sides had about 25,000 men <i>hors de combat</i>; but, +as Bennigsen lacked tents, supplies, and above all, the dauntless +courage of Napoleon, he speedily fell back, and this enabled the +Emperor to claim a decisive victory.<a name= +"FN2anchor124_124"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_124_124"><sup>[124]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Exhausted by this terrific strife, the combatants now relaxed +their efforts for a brief space; but while Napoleon used the time +of respite in hurrying up troops from all parts of his vast +dominions, the allies did little to improve their advantage. This +inertness is all the more strange as Prussia and Russia came to +closer accord in the Treaty of Bartenstein (April 26th, 1807).<a +name="FN2anchor125_125"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_125_125"><sup>[125]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The two monarchs now recur to the generous scheme of a European +peace, for which the Czar and William Pitt had vainly struggled two +years before. The present war is to be fought out to the end, not +so as to humble France and interfere in her internal concerns, but +in order to assure to Europe the blessings of a solid peace based +on the claims of justice and of national independence. France must +be satisfied with reasonable boundaries, and Prussia be restored to +the limits of 1805 or their equivalent. Germany is to be freed from +the dictation of the French, and become a "constitutional +federation," with a boundary "parallel to the Rhine." Austria is to +be asked to join the present league, regaining Tyrol and the Mincio +frontier. England and Sweden must be rallied to the common cause. +The allies will also take steps to cause Denmark to join the +league. For the rest, the integrity of Turkey is to be maintained, +and the future of Italy decided in concert with Austria and<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii115" id= +"page_ii115">[pg.115]</a></span> +England, the Kings of Sardinia and Naples being restored. Even +should Austria, England, and Sweden not join them, yet Russia and +Prussia will continue the struggle and not lay down their arms save +by mutual consent.</p> + +<p>Had all the Powers threatened by Napoleon at once come forward +and acted with vigour, these ends might, even now, have been +attained. But Austria merely renewed her offers of mediation, a +well-meaning but hopeless proposal. England, a prey to official +incapacity, joined the league, promised help in men and money, and +did little or nothing except send fruitless expeditions to +Alexandria and the Dardanelles with the aim of forcing the Turks to +a peace with Russia. In Sicily we held our own against Joseph's +generals, but had no men to spare for a diversion against Marmont's +forces in Dalmatia, which Alexander urged. Still less could we send +from our own shores any force for the effective aid of Prussia. +Though we had made peace with that Power, and ordinary prudence +might have dictated the taking of steps to save the coast +fortresses, Danzig and Colberg, from the French besiegers, yet our +efforts were limited to the despatch of a few cruisers to the +former stronghold. Even more urgent was the need of rescuing +Stralsund, the chief fortress of Swedish Pomerania. Such an +expedition clearly offered great possibilities with the minimum of +risk. From the Isle of Rügen Mortier's corps could be +attacked; and when Stralsund was freed, a dash on Stettin, then +weakly held by the French, promised an easy success that would +raise the whole of North Germany in Napoleon's rear.<a name= +"FN2anchor126_126"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_126_126"><sup>[126]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But arguments were thrown away upon the Grenville Ministry, +which clung to its old plan of doing<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii116" id="page_ii116">[pg.116]</a></span> nothing and of +doing it expensively. The Foreign Secretary, Lord Howick, replied +that the allies must not expect any considerable aid from our land +forces. Considering that the Income or War Tax of 2s. in the +£ had yielded close on £20,000,000, and that the army +numbered 192,000 men (exclusive of those in India), this +declaration did not shed lustre on the Ministry of all the Talents. +That bankrupt Cabinet, however, was dismissed by George III. in +March, 1807, because it declined to waive the question of Catholic +Emancipation, and its place was filled by the Duke of Portland, +with Canning as Foreign Minister. Soon it was seen that Pitt's +cloak had fallen on worthy shoulders, and a new vigour began to +inspirit our foreign policy. Yet the bad results of frittering away +our forces on distant expeditions could not be wiped out at once. +In fact, our military expert, Lord Cathcart, reported that only +some 12,000 men could at present be spared for service in the +Baltic; and, as it would be beneath our dignity to send so small a +force, it would be better to keep it at home ready to menace any +part of the French coast. As to Stralsund, he thought that plan was +more feasible, but that, even there, the allies would not make head +against Mortier's corps.<a name="FN2anchor127_127"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_127_127"><sup>[127]</sup></a></p> + +<p>This is a specimen of the reasoning that was fast rendering +Britain contemptible alike to friends and foes. It is not +surprising that such timorous selfishness should have at last moved +the Czar to say to our envoy: "Act where you please, provided that +you act at all."<a name="FN2anchor128_128"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_128_128"><sup>[128]</sup></a> In the end the new +Ministry did venture to act: it engaged to send 20,000 men to the +succour of Stralsund; but, with the fatality that then dogged our +steps, that decision was<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii117" +id="page_ii117">[pg.117]</a></span> formed on June the 17th, three +days after the Coalition was shattered by the mighty blow of +Friedland.</p> + +<p>In striking contrast to the faint-hearted measures of the allies +was the timely energy of Napoleon in bringing up reinforcements. +These were drawn partly from Mortier's corps in Pomerania, now +engaged in watching the Swedes, who made a truce; partly from the +Bavarians and Saxons; but mostly from French troops already in +Central Germany, their places being taken by Italians, Spaniards, +Swiss, and Dutch. In France a new levy of conscripts was +ordered—the third since the outbreak of war with Prussia. The +Turks were encouraged to press on the war against Russia and +England; and a mission was sent to the Shah of Persia to strengthen +his arms against the Czar. To this last we will now advert.</p> + +<p>For some time past Napoleon had been coquetting with Persia, and +an embassy from the Shah now came to the castle of Finkenstein, a +beautiful seat not far from the Vistula, where the Emperor spent +the months of spring. A treaty was drawn up, and General Gardane +was deputed to draw closer the bonds of friendship with the Court +of Teheran. The instructions secretly issued to this officer are of +great interest. He is ordered to proceed to Persia by way of +Constantinople, to concert an alliance between Sultan and Shah, to +redouble Persia's efforts against her "natural enemy," Russia, and +to examine the means of invading India. For this purpose a number +of officers are sent with him to examine the routes from Egypt or +Syria to Delhi, as also to report on the harbours in Persia with a +view to a maritime expedition, either by way of Suez or the Cape of +Good Hope. The Shah is to be induced to form a corps of 12,000 men, +drilled on the European model and armed with weapons sold by +France. This force will attack the Russians in Georgia and serve +later in an expedition to India. With a view to the sending of +20,000 French troops to India, Gardane is to communicate with the +Mahratta princes and prepare for this enterprise by every possible +means.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii118" id= +"page_ii118">[pg.118]</a></span></p> + +<p>We may note here that Gardane proceeded to Persia and was urging +on the Shah to more active measures against Russia when the news of +the Treaty of Tilsit diverted his efforts towards the east. At the +close of the year, he reported to Napoleon that, for the march +overland from Syria to the Ganges, Cyprus was an indispensable base +of supplies: he recommended the route Bir, Mardin, Teheran, Herat, +Cabul, and Peshawur: forty to fifty thousand French troops would be +needed, and thirty or forty thousand Persians should also be taken +up. Nothing came of these plans; but it is clear that, even when +Napoleon was face to face with formidable foes on the Vistula, his +thoughts still turned longingly to the banks of the Ganges.<a name= +"FN2anchor129_129"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_129_129"><sup>[129]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The result of Napoleon's activity and the supineness of his foes +were soon apparent. Danzig surrendered to the French on May the +24th, and Neisse in Silesia a little later; and it was not till the +besiegers of these fortresses came up to swell the French host that +Bennigsen opened the campaign. He was soon to rue the delay. His +efforts to drive the foe from the River Passarge were promptly +foiled, and he retired in haste to his intrenched camp at +Heilsberg. There, on June the 10th, he turned fiercely at bay and +dealt heavy losses to the French vanguard. In vain did Soult's +corps struggle up towards the intrenchments; his men were mown down +by grapeshot and musketry: in vain did Napoleon, who hurried up in +the afternoon, launch the fusiliers of the Guard and a division of +Lannes' corps. The Muscovites held firm, and the day closed +ominously for the French. It was Eylau over again on a small +scale.</p> + +<p>But Bennigsen was one of those commanders who, after fighting +with great spirit, suffer a relapse. Despite the entreaties of his +generals, he had retreated after Eylau;<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii119" id="page_ii119">[pg.119]</a></span> and now, +after a day of inaction, his columns filed off towards +Königsberg under cover of the darkness. In excuse for this +action it has been urged that he had but two days' supply of bread +in the camp, and that a forward move of Davoust's corps round his +right flank threatened to cut him off from his base of supplies, +Königsberg.<a name="FN2anchor130_130"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_130_130"><sup>[130]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The first excuse only exposes him to greater censure. The +Russian habit at that time usually was to live almost from hand to +mouth; but that a carefully-prepared position like that of +Heilsberg should be left without adequate supplies is unpardonable. +On the two next days the rival hosts marched northward, the one to +seize, the other to save, Königsberg. They were separated by +the winding vale of the Alle. But the course of this river favoured +Napoleon as much as it hindered Bennigsen. The Alle below Heilsberg +makes a deep bend towards the north-east, then northwards again +towards Friedland, where it comes within forty miles of +Königsberg, but in its lower course flows north-east until it +joins the Pregel.</p> + +<p>An army marching from Heilsberg to the old Prussian capital by +the right bank would therefore easily be outstripped by one that +could follow the chord of the arc instead of the irregular arc +itself. Napoleon was in this fortunate position, while the Russians +plodded amid heavy rains over the semicircular route further to the +east. Their mistake in abandoning Heilsberg was now obvious. The +Emperor halted at Eylau on the 13th for news of the Prussians in +front and of Bennigsen on his right flank. Against the former he +hurled his chief masses under the lead of Murat in the hope of +seizing Königsberg at one blow.<a name="FN2anchor131_131"></a> +<a href="#Foot2note_131_131"><sup>[131]</sup></a> But, foreseeing +that the Russians would probably pass over the Alle at Friedland he +despatched Lannes to Domnau to see whether they had already crossed +in force. Clearly, then, Napoleon <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii120" id="page_ii120">[pg.120]</a></span> did not foresee +what the morrow had in store for him: his aim was to drive a solid +wedge between Bennigsen and the defenders of Königsberg, to +storm that city first, and then to turn on Bennigsen. The claim of +some of Napoleon's admirers that he laid a trap for the Russians at +Friedland, as he had done at Austerlitz, is therefore refuted by +the Emperor's own orders.</p> + +<p>None the less did Bennigsen walk into a trap, and one of his own +choosing. Anxious to thrust himself between Napoleon and the old +Prussian capital, he crossed the river at Friedland and sought to +strengthen his position on the left bank by driving Lannes' +vanguard back on Domnau, by throwing three bridges over the stream, +and by crowning the hills on the right bank with a formidable +artillery. But he had to deal with a tough and daring opponent. +Throughout the winter Lannes had been a prey to ill-health and +resentment at his chief's real or fancied injustice: but the heats +of summer re-awakened his thirst for glory and restored him to his +wonted vigour. Calling up the Saxon horse, Grouchy's dragoons, and +Oudinot's grenadiers, he held his ground through the brief hours of +darkness. Before dawn he posted his 10,000 troops among the woods +and on the plateau of Posthenen that lies to the west of Friedland +and strove to stop the march of 40,000 Russians. After four hours +of fighting, his men were about to be thrust back, when the +divisions of Verdier and Dupas—the latter from Mortier's +corps—shared the burden of the fight until the sun was at its +zenith. When once more the fight was doubtful, the dense columns of +Ney and Victor were to be seen, and by desperate efforts the French +vanguard held its ground until this welcome aid arrived.</p> + +<p>Napoleon, having received Lannes' urgent appeals for help, now +rode up in hot haste, and in response to the cheers of his weary +troops repeatedly exclaimed: "Today is a lucky day, the anniversary +of Marengo." Their ardour was excited to the highest pitch, Oudinot +saluting his chief with the words: "Quick, sire! my grenadiers can +hold no longer: but give me reinforcements and I'll <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii121" id="page_ii121">[pg.121]</a></span> +pitch the</p> + +<center><a name="image_11"><img alt="BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND" src= +"images/image11.jpg" width="346" height="346"><br> + <font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>BATTLE OF +FRIEDLAND</small></font></a></center> + +Russians into the river."<a name="FN2anchor132_132"></a> <a href= +"#Foot2note_132_132"><sup>[132]</sup></a> The Emperor cautiously +gave them pause: the fresh troops marched to the front and formed +the first line, those who had fought for nine hours now forming the +supports. Ney held the post of honour in the woods on the right +flank, nearly above Friedland; behind him was the corps of +Bernadotte, which, since the disabling of that Marshal by a wound +had been led by General Victor: there too were the dragoons of +Latour-Maubourg, and the imposing masses of the Guard. In the +centre, but bending in towards the rear, stood the remnant of +Lannes' indomitable corps, now condemned for a time to comparative +inactivity; <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii122" id= +"page_ii122">[pg.122]</a></span> and defensive tactics were also +enjoined on Mortier and Grouchy on the left wing, until Ney and +Victor should decide the fortunes of the second fight. The +Russians, as if bent on favouring Napoleon's design, continued to +deploy in front of Friedland, keeping up the while a desultory +fight; and Bennigsen, anxious now about his communications with +Königsberg, detached 6,000 men down the right bank of the +river towards Wehlau. Only 46,000 men were thus left to defend +Friedland against a force that now numbered 80,000: yet no works +were thrown up to guard the bridges—and this after the +arrival of Napoleon with strong reinforcements was known by the +excitement along the enemy's front.<br> +<br> + + +<p>Nevertheless, as late as 3 p.m., Napoleon was in doubt whether +he should not await the arrival of Murat. At his instructions, +Berthier ordered that Marshal to leave Soult at Königsberg and +hurry back with Davoust and the cavalry towards Friedland: "If I +perceive at the beginning of this fight that the enemy is in too +great force, I might be content with cannonading to-day and +awaiting your arrival." But a little later the Emperor decides for +instant attack. The omens are all favourable. If driven back the +Russians will fight with their backs to a deep river. Besides, +their position is cut in twain by a mill-stream which flows in a +gulley, and near the town is dammed up so as to form a small lake. +Below this lies Friedland in a deep bend of the river itself. Into +this <i>cul-de-sac</i> he will drive the Russian left, and fling +their broken lines into the lake and river.</p> + +<p>At five o'clock a salvo of twenty guns opened the second and +greater battle of Friedland. To rush on the Muscovite van and clear +it from the wood of Sortlack was for Ney's leading division the +work of a moment; but on reaching the open ground their ranks were +ploughed by the shot of the Russian guns ranged on the hills beyond +the river. Staggered by this fire, the division was wavering, when +the Russian Guards and their choicest squadrons of horse charged +home with deadly effect. But Ney's second division, led by the +gallant<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii123" id= +"page_ii123">[pg.123]</a></span> Dupont, hurried up to restore the +balance, while Latour-Maubourg's dragoons fell on the enemy's +horsemen and drove them pell-mell towards Friedland.</p> + +<p>The Russian artillery fared little better: Napoleon directed +Sénarmont with thirty-six guns to take it in flank and it +was soon overpowered. Freed now from the Russian grapeshot and +sabres, Ney held on his course like a torrent that masters a dam, +reached the upper part of the lake, and threw the bewildered foe +into its waters or into the town. Friedland was now a death-trap: +huddled together, plied by shell, shot and bayonet, the Russians +fought from street to street with the energy of despair, but little +by little were driven back on the bridges. No help was to be found +there; for Sénarmont, bringing up his guns, swept the +bridges with a terrific fire: when part of the Russian left and +centre had fled across, they burst into flames, a signal that +warned their comrades further north of their coming doom. On that +side, too, a general advance of the French drove the enemy back +towards the steep banks of the river. But on those open plains the +devotion and prowess of the Muscovite cavalry bore ampler fruit: +charging the foe while in the full swing of victory, these gallant +riders gave time for the infantry to attempt the dangers of a deep +ford: hundreds were drowned, but others, along with most of the +guns, stole away in the darkness down the left bank of the +river.</p> + +<p>On the morrow Bennigsen's army was a mass of fugitives +straggling towards the Pregel and fighting with one another for a +chance to cross its long narrow bridge. Even on the other side they +halted not, but wandered on towards the Niemen, no longer an army +but an armed mob. On its banks they were joined by the defenders of +Königsberg, who after a stout stand cut their way through +Soult's lines and made for Tilsit. There, behind the broad stream +of the Niemen, the fugitives found rest.</p> + +<p>It will always be a mystery why Bennigsen held on to Friedland +after French reinforcements arrived; and<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii124" id="page_ii124">[pg.124]</a></span> the feeling +of wonder and exasperation finds expression in the report of our +envoy, Lord Hutchinson, founded on the information of two British +officers who were at the Russian headquarters:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Many of the circumstances attending the Battle of Friedland are +unexampled in the annals of war. We crossed the River Alle, not +knowing whether we had to contend with a corps or the whole French +army. From the commencement of the battle it was manifest that we +had a great deal to lose and probably little to gain: ... General +Bennigsen would, I believe, have retired early in the day from +ground which he ought never to have occupied; but the corps in our +front made so vigorous a resistance that, though occasionally we +gained a little ground, yet we were never able to drive them from +the woods or the village of Heinrichsdorf."<a name= +"FN2anchor133_133"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_133_133"><sup>[133]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>This evidence shows the transcendent services of Lannes, +Oudinot, and Grouchy in the early part of the day; and it is clear +that, as at Jena, no great battle would have been fought at all but +for the valour and tenacity with which Lannes clung to the foe +until Napoleon came up.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii125" +id="page_ii125">[pg.125]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXVII</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>TILSIT</center> + +<br> + + +<p>Even now matters were not hopeless for the allies. Crowds of +stragglers rejoined the colours at Tilsit, and Tartar +reinforcements were near at hand. The gallant Gneisenau was still +holding out bravely at Kolberg against Brune's divisions; and two +of the Silesian fortresses had not yet surrendered. Moreover, +Austria seemed about to declare against Napoleon, and there were +hopes that before long England would do something. But, above all, +since the war was for Prussia solely an affair of honour,<a name= +"FN2anchor134_134"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_134_134"><sup>[134]</sup></a> it deeply concerned +Alexander's good name not to desert an ally to whom he was now +pledged by all the claims of chivalry until satisfactory terms +could be gained.</p> + +<p>But Alexander's nature had not as yet been strengthened by +misfortune and religious convictions: it was a sunny background of +flickering enthusiasms, flecked now and again by shadows of eastern +cunning or darkened by warlike ambitions—a nature in which +the sentimentalism of Rousseau and the passions of a Boyar +alternately gained the mastery. No realism is more crude than that +of the disillusionized idealist; and for months the young Czar had +seen his dream of a free and happy Europe fade away amidst the +smoke of Napoleon's guns and the mists of English muddling. At +first he blenched not even at the news of Friedland. In an <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii126" id= +"page_ii126">[pg.126]</a></span> interview with our ambassador, +Lord Gower, on June the 17th, he bitterly upbraided him with our +inactivity in the Baltic and the Mediterranean, and the +non-fulfilment of our promise of a loan; as for himself, "he would +never stoop to Bonaparte: he would rather retire to Kazan or even +to Tobolsk." But five days later, acting under pressure from his +despairing generals, some of whom reminded him of his father's +fate, he arranged an armistice with the conqueror.<a name= +"FN2anchor135_135"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_135_135"><sup>[135]</sup></a> Five days only were +allowed in which Prussia might decide to follow his example or +proceed with the war alone. She accepted the inevitable on the +following day.</p> + +<p>The international situation was now strangely like that which +followed immediately upon the battle of Austerlitz. Then it was +Prussia, now it was Austria, that played the part of the cautious +friend at the very time when the beaten allies were meditating +surrender. For some time past the Court of Vienna had been offering +its services for mediation: they were well received at London, with +open disappointment by Prussia, and with ill-concealed annoyance by +Napoleon. As at the time when Haugwitz came to him to dictate +Prussia's terms, so now the Emperor kept the Austrian envoy waiting +without an answer, until the blow of Friedland was dealt.<a name= +"FN2anchor136_136"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_136_136"><sup>[136]</sup></a> Even then Austria seemed +about to enter the lists, when news arrived of the conclusion of +the armistice at Tilsit. This enabled her to sheathe her sword with +no loss of honour; but, as was the case with Prussia at the close +of 1805, her conduct was seen to be timid and time-serving; and it +merited the secret rebuke of Canning that she "was (as usual) just +ten days too late in her determination, or the world might have +been saved."<a name="FN2anchor137_137"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_137_137"><sup>[137]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii127" id="page_ii127">[pg.127]</a></span></p> + +<p>Whether Austria had been beguiled by the recent diplomatic +caresses of Napoleon may well be doubted; for they were obviously +aimed at keeping her quiet until he had settled scores with Prussia +and Russia. His advances only began on the eve of the last war, and +the sharpness of the transition from threats to endearments could +not be smoothed over even by Talleyrand's finesse.<a name= +"FN2anchor138_138"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_138_138"><sup>[138]</sup></a> When the slaughter at +Eylau placed him in peril, he again bade Talleyrand soothe the +Austrian envoy with assurances that, if his master was anxious to +maintain the integrity of Turkey, France would maintain it; or if +he desired to share in an eventual partition, France would also +arrange that to his liking.<a name="FN2anchor139_139"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_139_139"><sup>[139]</sup></a> But as the prospects for +the campaign improved, Napoleon's tone hardened. On March the 14th +he states that he has enough men to keep Austria quiet and to "get +rid of the Russians in a month." And now he looks on an alliance +with the Hapsburgs merely as giving a short time of quiet, whereas +an alliance with Russia would be "very advantageous."<a name= +"FN2anchor140_140"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_140_140"><sup>[140]</sup></a> He had also felt the value +of alliance with Prussia, as his repeated overtures during the +campaign testify; but when Frederick William persistently rejected +all accommodation with the man who had so deeply outraged his +kingly honour, he turned finally to Alexander.</p> + +<p>The Czar was made of more pliable stuff. Moreover, he now +cherished one sentiment that brought him into sympathy with +Napoleon, namely, hatred of England. He certainly had grave cause +for complaint. We had done nothing to help the allies in the Polish +campaign except to send a few cruisers and 60,000 muskets, which +last did not reach the Swedish and Russian ports until the war was +over. True, we had gone out of our way<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii128" id="page_ii128">[pg.128]</a></span> to attack +Constantinople at his request; but that attack had failed; and our +attitude towards his Turkish policy was one of veiled suspicion, +varied with moral lectures.<a name="FN2anchor141_141"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_141_141"><sup>[141]</sup></a> As for the loan of five +millions sterling which the Czar had asked us to guarantee, we had +put him off, our envoy finally reminding him that it had been of +the first importance to help Austria to move. Worst of all, our +cruisers had seized some Russian merchantmen coming out of French +ports, and despite protests from St. Petersburg the legality of +that seizure was maintained. Thus, in a war which concerned our +very existence we had not rendered him a single practical service, +and yet strained the principles of maritime law at the expense of +Russian commerce.<a name="FN2anchor142_142"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_142_142"><sup>[142]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Over against our policy of blundering delay there was that of +Napoleon, prompt, keen, and ever victorious. The whole war had +arisen out of the conflict of these two Powers; and Napoleon had +never ceased to declare that it was essentially a struggle between +England and the Continent. After Eylau Alexander was proof against +these arguments; but now the triumphant energy of Napoleon and the +stolid apathy of England brought about a quite bewildering change +in Russian policy. Delicate advances having been made by the two +Emperors, an interview was arranged to take place on a raft moored +in the middle of the River Niemen (June 25th).</p> + +<p>"I hate the English as much as you do, and I will second you in +all your actions against them." Such are said to have been the +words with which Alexander greeted Napoleon as they stepped on to +the raft. Whereupon the conqueror replied: "In that case all can be +arranged and peace is made."<a name="FN2anchor143_143"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_143_143"><sup>[143]</sup></a> As the two Emperors were +unaccompanied at that first interview, it is difficult to see on +what evidence this story rests. It is most<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii129" id="page_ii129">[pg.129]</a></span> unlikely that +either Emperor would divulge the remarks of the other on that +occasion; and the words attributed to Alexander seem highly +impolitic. For what was his position at this time? He was striving +to make the best of a bad case against an opponent whose genius he +secretly feared. Besides, we know for certain that he was most +anxious to postpone his rupture with England for some months.<a +name="FN2anchor144_144"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_144_144"><sup>[144]</sup></a> All desire for an +immediate break was on Napoleon's side.</p> + +<p>We can therefore only guess at what transpired, from the vague +descriptions of the two men themselves. They are characteristic +enough: "I never had more prejudices against anyone than against +<i>him</i>," said Alexander afterwards; "but, after three-quarters +of an hour of conversation, they all disappeared like a dream"; and +later he exclaimed: "Would that I had seen him sooner: the veil is +torn aside and the time of error is past." As for Napoleon, he +wrote to Josephine: "I have just seen the Emperor Alexander: I have +been very pleased with him: he is a very handsome, good, and young +Emperor: he has an intellect above what is commonly attributed to +him."<a name="FN2anchor145_145"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_145_145"><sup>[145]</sup></a> The tone of these remarks +strikes the keynote of all the conversations that followed. At the +next day's conference, also held in the sumptuous pavilion erected +on the raft, the King of Prussia was present; but towards him +Napoleon's demeanour was cold and threatening. He upbraided him +with the war, lectured him on the duty of a king to his people, and +bade him dismiss Hardenberg. Frederick William listened for the +most part in silence; his nature was too stiff and straightforward +to practise any Byzantine arts; but when his trusty Minister was +attacked, he protested that he should not know how to replace him. +Napoleon<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii130" id= +"page_ii130">[pg.130]</a></span> had foreseen the plea and at once +named three men who would give better advice. Among them was the +staunch patriot Stein!</p> + +<p>From the ensuing conferences the King was almost wholly +excluded. They were held in a part of the town of Tilsit which was +neutralized for that purpose, as also for the guards and +diplomatists of the three sovereigns. There, too, lived the two +Emperors in closest intercourse, while on most days the Prussian +King rode over from a neighbouring village to figure as a sad, +reproachful guest at the rides, parades, and dinners that cemented +the new Franco-Russian alliance. Yet, amid all the melodious +raptures of Alexander over Napoleon's newly discovered virtues, it +is easy to detect the clinging ground-tone of Muscovite ambition. +An event had occurred which excited the hopes of both Emperors. At +the close of May, the Sultan Selim was violently deposed by the +Janissaries who clamoured for more vigorous measures against the +Russians. Never did news come more opportunely for Napoleon than +this, which reached him at Tilsit on, or before, June the 24th. He +is said to have exclaimed to the Czar with a flash of dramatic +fatalism: "It is a decree of Providence which tells me that the +Turkish Empire can no longer exist."<a name= +"FN2anchor146_146"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_146_146"><sup>[146]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Certain it is that the most potent spell exerted by the great +conqueror over his rival was a guarded invitation to share in some +future partition of the Turkish Empire. That scheme had fascinated +Napoleon ever since the year 1797, when he gazed on the Adriatic. +Though laid aside for a time in 1806, when he roused the Turks +against Russia, it was never lost sight of; and now, on the basis +of a common hatred of England and a common desire to<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii131" id="page_ii131">[pg.131]</a></span> +secure the spoils of the Ottoman Power, the stately fabric of the +Franco-Russian alliance was reared.</p> + +<p>On his side, Alexander required some assurance that Poland +should not be reconstituted in its integrity—a change that +would tear from Russia the huge districts stretching almost up to +Riga, Smolensk, and Kiev, which were still Polish in sympathy. Here +Napoleon reassured him, at least in part. He would not re-create +the great kingdom of Poland: he would merely carve out from Prussia +the greater part of her Polish possessions.</p> + +<p>These two important questions being settled, it only remained +for the Czar to plead for the King of Prussia, to acknowledge +Napoleon's domination as Emperor of the West, while he himself, as +autocrat of the East, secured a better western boundary for Russia. +At first he strove to gain for Frederick William the restoration of +several of his lands west of the Elbe. This championship was not +wholly disinterested; for it is now known that the Czar had set his +heart on a great part of Prussian Poland.</p> + +<p>In truth, he was a sufficiently good disciple of the French +revolutionists to plead very cogently his claims to a "natural +frontier." He disliked a "dry frontier": he must have a riverine +boundary: in fact, he claimed the banks of the Lower Niemen, and, +further south, the course of the rivers Wavre, Narew and Bug. To +this claim he had perhaps been encouraged by some alluring words of +Napoleon that thenceforth the Vistula must be the boundary of their +empires. But his ally was now determined to keep Russia away from +the old Polish capital; and in strangely prophetic words he pointed +out that the Czar's claims would bring the Russian eagles within +sight of Warsaw, which would be too clear a sign that that city was +destined to pass under the Russian rule.<a name= +"FN2anchor147_147"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_147_147"><sup>[147]</sup></a> Divining also that +Alexander's plea for the restoration by France of some of Prussia's +western lands was linked with a plan which would give Russia some +of her eastern <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii132" id= +"page_ii132">[pg.132]</a></span> districts,<a name= +"FN2anchor148_148"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_148_148"><sup>[148]</sup></a> Napoleon resolved to press +hard on Prussia from the west. While handing over to the Czar only +the small district around Bialystock, he remorselessly thrust +Prussia to the east of the Elbe.</p> + +<p>From this neither the arguments of the Czar nor the entreaties +of Queen Louisa availed to move him. And yet, in the fond hope that +her tears might win back Magdeburg, that noble bulwark of North +German independence, the forlorn Queen came to Tilsit to crave this +boon (July 6th). It was a terrible ordeal to do this from the man +who had repeatedly insulted her in his official journals, figuring +her, first as a mailed Amazon galloping at the head of her +regiment, and finally breathing forth scandals on her spotless +reputation.</p> + +<p>Yet, for the sake of her husband and her people, she braced +herself up to the effort of treating him as a gentleman and +appealing to his generosity. If she was able to conceal her +loathing, this was scarcely so with her devoted lady in waiting, +the Countess von Voss, who has left us an acrid account of +Napoleon's visit to the Queen at the miller's house at Tilsit.<a +name="FN2anchor149_149"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_149_149"><sup>[149]</sup></a></p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"He is excessively ugly, with a fat swollen sallow face, very +corpulent, besides short and entirely without figure. His great +eyes roll gloomily around; the expression of his features is +severe; he looks like the incarnation of fate: only his mouth is +well shaped, and his teeth are good. He was extremely polite, +talked to the Queen a long time alone.... Again, after dinner, he +had a long conversation with the Queen, who also seemed pretty well +satisfied with the result."<a name="FN2anchor150_150"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_150_150"><sup>[150]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii133" id="page_ii133">[pg.133]</a></span></p> +</div> + +<br> + + +<p>Queen Louisa's verdict about his appearance was more favourable; +she admired his head "as that of a Cæsar." With winsome +boldness inspired by patriotism, she begged for Magdeburg. Taken +aback by her beauty and frankness, Napoleon had recourse to +compliments about her dress. "Are we to talk about fashion, at such +a time?" was her reply. Again she pleaded, and again he fell back +on vapidities. Nevertheless, her appeals to his generosity seemed +to be thawing his statecraft, when the entrance of that unlucky +man, her husband, gave the conversation a colder tone. The dinner, +however, passed cheerfully enough; and, according to French +accounts, Napoleon graced the conclusion of dessert by offering her +a rose. Her woman's wit flew to the utterance: "May I consider it a +token of friendship, and that you grant my request for Magdeburg?" +But he was on his guard, parried her onset with a general remark as +to the way in which such civilities should be taken, and turned the +conversation. Then, as if he feared the result of a second +interview, he hastened to end matters with the Prussian +negotiators.<a name="FN2anchor151_151"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_151_151"><sup>[151]</sup></a></p> + +<p>He thus described the interview in a letter to Josephine:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I have had to be on my guard against her efforts to oblige me +to some concessions for her husband; but I have been gallant, and +have held to my policy."</p> +</div> + +<p>This was only too clear on the following day, when the Queen +again dined with the sovereigns.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Napoleon," says the Countess von Voss, "seemed malicious and +spiteful, and the conversation was brief and constrained. After +dinner the Queen again conversed apart with him. On taking leave +she said to him that she went away feeling it deeply that he should +have deceived her. My poor Queen: she is quite in despair."<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii134" id= +"page_ii134">[pg.134]</a></span></p> +</div> + +<br> + + +<p>When conducted to her carriage by Talleyrand and Duroc, she sank +down overcome by emotion. Yet, amid her tears and humiliation, the +old Prussian pride had flashed forth in one of her replies as the +rainbow amidst the rain-storm. When Napoleon expressed his surprise +that she should have dared to make war on him with means so utterly +inadequate, she at once retorted: "Sire, I must confess to Your +Majesty, the glory of Frederick the Great had misled us as to our +real strength"—a retort which justly won the praise of that +fastidious connoisseur, Talleyrand, for its reminder of Prussia's +former greatness and the transitoriness of all human grandeur.<a +name="FN2anchor152_152"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_152_152"><sup>[152]</sup></a></p> + +<p>On that same day (July 7th) the Treaty of Tilsit was signed. Its +terms may be thus summarized. Out of regard for the Emperor of +Russia, Napoleon consented to restore to the King of Prussia the +province of Silesia, and the old Prussian lands between the Elbe +and Niemen. But the Polish lands seized by Prussia in the second +and third partitions were (with the exception of the Bialystock +district, now gained by Russia) to form a new State called the +Duchy of Warsaw. Of this duchy the King of Saxony was constituted +ruler. Danzig, once a Polish city, was now declared a free city +under the protection of the Kings of Prussia and Saxony, but the +retention there of a French garrison until the peace made it +practically a French fortress. Saxe-Coburg, Oldenburg, and +Mecklenburg-Schwerin were restored to their dukes, but the two last +were to be held by French troops until England made peace with +France. With this aim in view, Napoleon accepted Alexander's +mediation for the conclusion of a treaty of peace with England, +provided that she accepted that mediation within one month of the +ratification of the present treaty.</p> + +<p>On his side, the Czar now recognized the recent changes in +Naples, Holland, and Germany; among the last of these was the +creation of the Kingdom of <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii135" id="page_ii135">[pg.135]</a></span> Westphalia for +Jerome Bonaparte out of the Prussian lands west of the Elbe, the +Duchy of Brunswick, and the Electorate of Hesse-Cassel. Holland +gained East Frisia at the expense of Prussia. As regards Turkey, +the Czar pledged himself to cease hostilities at once, to accept +the mediation of Napoleon in the present dispute, and to withdraw +Russian troops from the Danubian Provinces as soon as peace was +concluded with the Sublime Porte. Finally, the two Emperors +mutually guaranteed the integrity of their possessions and placed +their ceremonial and diplomatic relations on a footing of complete +equality.</p> + +<p>Such were the published articles of the Treaty of Tilsit. Even +if this had been all, the European system would have sustained the +severest blow since the Thirty Years' War. The Prussian monarchy +was suddenly bereft of half its population, and now figured on the +map as a disjointed land, scarcely larger than the possessions of +the King of Saxony, and less defensible than Jerome Bonaparte's +Kingdom of Westphalia; while the Confederation of the Rhine, soon +to be aggrandized by the accession of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, +seemed to doom the House of Hohenzollern to lasting +insignificance.<a name="FN2anchor153_153"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_153_153"><sup>[153]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But the published treaty was by no means all. There were also +secret articles, the chief of which were that the Cattaro +district—to the west of Montenegro—and the Ionian +Islands should go to France, and that the Czar would recognize +Joseph Bonaparte as King of Sicily when Ferdinand of Naples should +have received "an indemnity such as the Balearic Isles, or Crete, +or their equivalent." Also, if Hanover should eventually be annexed +to the Kingdom of Westphalia, a Westphalian district with a +population of from three to four hundred thousand souls would be +retroceded to Prussia. Finally, the chiefs of the Houses of +Orange-Nassau, Hesse-Cassel, and Brunswick were to receive pensions +from Murat and Jerome Bonaparte, who dispossessed them.</p> + +<p>Most important of all was the secret treaty of alliance<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii136" id= +"page_ii136">[pg.136]</a></span> with Russia, also signed on July +7th, whereby the two Emperors bound themselves to make common cause +in any war that either of them might undertake against any European +Power, employing, if need be, the whole of their respective forces. +Again, if England did not accept the Czar's mediation, or if she +did not, by the 1st of December, 1807, recognize the perfect +equality of all flags at sea, and restore her conquests made from +France and her allies since 1805, then Russia would make war on +her. In that case, the present allies will "summon the three Courts +of Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Lisbon to close their ports against +the English and declare war against England. If any one of the +three Courts refuse, it shall be treated as an enemy by the high +contracting parties, and if Sweden refuse, <i>Denmark shall be +compelled to declare war on her</i>." Pressure would also be put on +Austria to follow the same course. But if England made peace +betimes, she might recover Hanover, on restoring her conquests in +the French, Spanish, and Dutch colonies. Similarly, if Turkey +refused the mediation of Napoleon, he would in that case help +Russia to drive the Turks from Europe—"the city of +Constantinople and the province of Roumelia alone excepted."<a +name="FN2anchor154_154"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_154_154"><sup>[154]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The naming of the city of Constantinople, which is in Roumelia, +betokens a superfluity of prudence. But it helps to confirm the +statement of Napoleon's secretary, M. Méneval, that the +future of that city led to a decided difference of opinion between +the Emperors. After one of their discussions, Napoleon stayed +poring over a map, and finally exclaimed, "Constantinople! Never! +It is the empire of the world." Doubtless it was on this subject +that Alexander cherished some secret annoyance. Certain it is that, +despite all his professions of devotion to Napoleon, he went back +to St. Petersburg ill at ease and possessed with a certain awe of +the conqueror. For what had he gained? He received a small slice +of<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii137" id= +"page_ii137">[pg.137]</a></span> Prussian Poland, and the prospect +of aggrandizement on the side of Turkey and Sweden, Finland being +pointed out as an easy prey. For these future gains he was to close +his ports to England and see his commerce, his navy, and his +seaboard suffer. It is not surprising that before leaving Tilsit he +remarked to Frederick William that "the most onerous condition +imposed by Napoleon was common to Russia and Prussia."<a name= +"FN2anchor155_155"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_155_155"><sup>[155]</sup></a></p> + +<p>This refers to the compulsion put upon them to join Napoleon's +Continental System. In the treaty signed with Prussia on July 9th, +Napoleon not only wrested away half her lands, but required the +immediate closing of all her ports to British vessels. We may also +note here that, by the extraordinary negligence of the Prussian +negotiator, Marshal Kalckreuth, the subsequent convention as to the +evacuation of Prussia by the French troops left open a loophole for +its indefinite occupation. Each province or district was to be +evacuated when the French requisitions had been satisfied.<a name= +"FN2anchor156_156"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_156_156"><sup>[156]</sup></a> The exaction of impossible +sums would therefore enable the conquerors, quite legally, to keep +their locust swarms in that miserable land. And that was the policy +pursued for sixteen months.</p> + +<p>Why this refinement of cruelty to his former ally? Why not have +annexed Prussia outright? Probably there were two reasons against +annexation: first, that his army could live on her in a way that +would not be possible with his own subjects or allies; second, that +the army of occupation would serve as a guarantee both for Russia's +good faith and for the absolute exclusion of British goods from +Prussia.<a name="FN2anchor157_157"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_157_157"><sup>[157]</sup></a> This had long been his +aim. He now<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii138" id= +"page_ii138">[pg.138]</a></span> attained it, but only by war that +bequeathed a legacy of war, and a peace that was no peace.</p> + +<p>Napoleon's behaviour at Tilsit has generally been regarded, at +least in England, as prompted by an insane lust of power; and the +treaty has been judged as if its aim was the domination of the +Continent. But another explanation, though less sweeping and +attractive, seems more consonant with the facts of the case.</p> + +<p>He hoped that, before so mighty a confederacy as was framed at +Tilsit, England would bend the knee, give up not only her maritime +claims but her colonial conquests, and humbly take rank with Powers +that had lived their day. The conqueror who had thrice crumpled up +the Hapsburg States, and shattered Prussia in a day, might well +believe that the men of Downing Street, expert only in missing +opportunities and exasperating their friends, would not dare to +defy the forces of united Europe, but would bow before his prowess +and grant peace to a weary world. In his letter of July 6th, 1807, +to the Czar, he advised the postponement of the final summons to +the British Government, because it would "give five months in which +the first exasperation will die down in England, and she will have +time to understand the immense consequences that would result from +so imprudent a struggle." Neither Napoleon nor Alexander was deaf +to generous aspirations. They both desired peace, so that their +empires might expand and consolidate. Above all, France was weary +of war; and by peace the average Frenchman meant, not respite from +Continental strifes that yielded a surfeit of barren glories, but +peace with England. The words of Lucchesini, the former Prussian +ambassador in Paris, on this subject are worth quoting:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"The war with England was at bottom the only one in which the +French public took much interest, since the evils it inflicted on +France were felt every moment: nothing was<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii139" id="page_ii139">[pg.139]</a></span> spoken of so +decidedly among all classes of the people as the wish to have done +with that war; and when one spoke of peace at Paris, one always +meant peace with England: peace with the others was as indifferent +to the public as the victories or the conquests of Bonaparte."<a +name="FN2anchor158_158"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_158_158"><sup>[158]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>If the French middle classes longed for a maritime peace so that +coffee and sugar might become reasonably cheap, how much more would +their ruler, whose heart was set on colonies and a realm in the +Orient? In Poland he had cheered his troops with the thought that +they were winning back the French colonial empire; and, as we have +seen, he was even then preparing the ground in Persia for a future +invasion of India. These plans could only be carried out after a +time of peace that should rehabilitate the French navy. +Humanitarian sentiment, patriotism, and even the promptings of a +wider ambition, therefore bade him strive for a general +pacification, such as he seemed to have assured at Tilsit.</p> + +<p>But the means which he adopted were just those that were +destined to defeat this aim. Where he sought to intimidate, he only +aroused a more stubborn resistance: where he should have allayed +national fears, he redoubled them. He did not understand our +people: he saw not that, behind our official sluggishness and +muddling, there was a quenchless national vitality, which, if +directed by a genius, could defy a world-wide combination. If, +instead of making secret compacts with the Czar and trampling on +Prussia; if, instead of intriguing with the Sultan and the Shah, +and thus reawakening our fears respecting Egypt and India, he had +called a Congress and submitted all the present disputes to general +discussion, there is reason to think that Great Britain would have +received his overtures. George III.'s Ministers had favoured the +proposal of a Congress when put forward by Austria in the spring;<a +name="FN2anchor159_159"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_159_159"><sup>[159]</sup></a> and they would +doubtless<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii140" id= +"page_ii140">[pg.140]</a></span> have welcomed it from Napoleon +after Friedland, had they not known of far-reaching plans which +rendered peace more risky than open war. This great genius had, in +fact, one fatal defect; he had little faith except in outward +compulsion; and his superabundant energy of menace against England +blighted the hopes of peace which he undoubtedly cherished.</p> + +<p>Long before Alexander's offer of mediation was forwarded to +London, our Ministers had taken a sudden and desperate resolution. +They determined to compel Denmark to join England and Sweden, and +to hold the fleet at Copenhagen as a gauge of Danish fidelity.</p> + +<p>That momentous resolve was formed on or just before July the +16th, in consequence of news that had arrived from Memel and +Tilsit. The exact purport of that news, and the manner of its +acquisition, have been one of the puzzles of modern history. But +the following facts seem to furnish a solution. Our Foreign Office +Records show that our agent at Tilsit, Mr. Mackenzie, who was on +confidential terms with General Bennigsen, left post haste for +England immediately after the first imperial interview; and the +news which he brought, together with reports of the threatening +moves of the French on Holstein, clinched the determination of our +Government to checkmate the Franco-Russian aims by bringing strong +pressure to bear on Denmark. To keep open the mouth of the Baltic +was an urgent necessity, otherwise we should lose touch with the +Anglo-Swedish forces campaigning against the French near +Stralsund.<a name="FN2anchor160_160"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_160_160"><sup>[160]</sup></a> Furthermore, it should be +noted that Denmark held the balance in naval affairs. France and +her allies now had fifty-nine sail of the line ready for sea: the +compact with the Czar would give her twenty-four more; and if +Napoleon seized the eighteen Danish and nine Portuguese +battleships, his fighting strength would be nearly equal to<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii141" id= +"page_ii141">[pg.141]</a></span> our own.<a name= +"FN2anchor161_161"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_161_161"><sup>[161]</sup></a> Canning therefore +determined, on July 16th, to compel Denmark to side with us, or at +least to observe a neutrality favourable to the British cause; and, +to save her honour, he proposed to send an irresistible naval +force.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Denmark's safety," he wrote on July 16th, "is to be found, +under the present circumstances of the world, only in a balance of +opposite dangers. For it is not to be disguised that the influence +which France has acquired from recent events over the North of +Europe, might, unless balanced by the naval power of Great Britain, +leave to Denmark no other option than that of compliance with the +demands of Bonaparte."<a name="FN2anchor162_162"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_162_162"><sup>[162]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p><i>A balance of opposite dangers!</i> In this phrase Canning +summed up his policy towards Denmark. Threatened by Napoleon on the +land, she was to be threatened by us from the sea; and Canning +hoped that these opposite forces would, at least, secure Danish +neutrality, without which Sweden must succumb in her struggle +against France. That some compulsion would be needed had long been +clear. In fact, the use of compulsion had first been recommended by +the Russian and Prussian Governments, which had gone so far as to +include in the Treaty of Bartenstein a proposal of common action, +along with England, Austria and Sweden, <i>to compel Denmark to +side with the allies against Napoleon</i>.<a name= +"FN2anchor163_163"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_163_163"><sup>[163]</sup></a> To this resolve England +still clung, despite the defection of the Czar. In truth, his +present conduct made the case for the coercion of Denmark +infinitely more urgent.</p> + +<p>As to the reality of Napoleon's designs on Denmark, there can be +no doubt. After his return to France, he wrote from St. Cloud, +directing Talleyrand to express his displeasure that Denmark had +not fulfilled her <i>promises</i>: "Whatever my desire to treat +Denmark well, I cannot hinder her suffering from having allowed the +Baltic to be violated [by the English expedition to<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii142" id="page_ii142">[pg.142]</a></span> +Stralsund]; and, if England refuses Russia's mediation, Denmark +must choose either to make war against England, or against me."<a +name="FN2anchor164_164"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_164_164"><sup>[164]</sup></a> Whence it is clear that +Denmark had given Napoleon grounds for hoping that she would +declare the Baltic a <i>mare clausum</i>.</p> + +<p>The British Government had so far fathomed these designs as to +see the urgency of the danger. Accordingly it proposed to Denmark a +secret defensive alliance, the chief terms of which were the +handing over of the Danish fleet, to be kept as a "sacred pledge" +by us till the peace, a subsidy of £100,000 paid to Denmark +for that fleet, and the offer of armed assistance in case she +should be attacked by France. This offer of defensive alliance was +repulsed, and the Danish Prince Royal determined to resist even the +mighty armada which was now nearing his shores. Towards the close +of August, eighty-eight British ships were in the Sound and the +Belt; and when the transports from Rügen and Stralsund joined +those from Yarmouth, as many as 15,400 troops were at hand, under +the command of Lord Cathcart. A landing was effected near +Copenhagen, and offers of alliance were again made, including the +deposit of the Danish fleet; "but if this offer is rejected now, it +cannot be repeated. The captured property, public and private, must +then belong to the captors: and the city, when taken, must share +the fate of conquered places." The Danes stoutly repelled offers +and threats alike: the English batteries thereupon bombarded the +city until the gallant defenders capitulated (September 7th). The +conditions hastily concluded by our commanders were that the +British forces should occupy the citadel and dockyard for six +weeks, should take possession of the ships and naval stores, and +thereupon evacuate Zealand.</p> + +<p>These terms were scrupulously carried out; and at the close of +six weeks our forces sailed away with the<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii143" id="page_ii143">[pg.143]</a></span> Danish fleet, +including fifteen sail of the line, fifteen frigates, and +thirty-one small vessels. This end to the expedition was keenly +regretted by Canning. In a lengthy Memorandum he left it on record +that he desired, not merely Denmark's fleet, but her alliance. In +his view nothing could save Europe but a firm Anglo-Scandinavian +league, which would keep open the Baltic and set bounds to the +designs of the two Emperors. Only by such an alliance could Sweden +be saved from Russia and France. Indeed, foreseeing the danger to +Sweden from a French army acting from Zealand as a base, Canning +proposed to Gustavus that he should occupy that island, or, failing +that, receive succour from a British force on his own shore of the +Sound. But both offers were declined. The final efforts made to +draw Denmark into our alliance were equally futile, and she kept up +hostilities against us for nearly seven years. Thus Canning's +scheme of alliance with the Scandinavian States failed. Britain +gained, it is true, a further safeguard against invasion; but our +statesman, while blaming the precipitate action of our commanders +in insisting solely upon the surrender of the fleet, declared that +that action, apart from an Anglo-Danish alliance, was "an act of +great injustice."<a name="FN2anchor165_165"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_165_165"><sup>[165]</sup></a></p> + +<p>And as such it has been generally regarded, that is, by those +who did not, and could not, know the real state of the case. In one +respect our action was unpardonable: it was not the last desperate +effort of a long period of struggle: it came after a time of +selfish torpor fatal alike to our reputation and the interests of +our allies. After protesting their inability to help them, +Ministers belied their own words by the energy with which they +acted against a small State. And the prevalent opinion found +expression in the protests uttered in Parliament that it<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii144" id= +"page_ii144">[pg.144]</a></span> would have been better to face the +whole might of the French, Russian, and Danish navies than to +emulate the conduct of those who had overrun and despoiled +Switzerland.</p> + +<p>Moreover, our action did not benefit Sweden, but just the +reverse. Cathcart's force, that had been helping the Swedes in the +defence of their Pomeranian province, was withdrawn in order to +strengthen our hands against Copenhagen. Thereupon the gallant +Gustavus, overborne by the weight of Marshal Brune's corps, sued +for an armistice. It was granted only on the condition that +Stralsund should pass into Brune's hands (August 20th); and the +Swedes, unable even to hold Rügen, were forced to give up that +island also. Sick in health and weary of a world that his +chivalrous instincts scorned, Gustavus withdrew his forces into +Sweden. Even there he was menaced. The hostilities which Denmark +forthwith commenced against England and Sweden exposed his southern +coasts; but he now chose to lean on the valour of his own subjects +rather than on the broken reed of British assistance, and awaited +the attacks of the Danes on the west and of the Russians on his +province of Finland.</p> + +<p>The news from Copenhagen also furnished the Czar with a good +excuse for hostilities with England. For such an event he had +hitherto been by no means desirous. On his return from Tilsit to +St. Petersburg he found the nobility and merchants wholly opposed +to a rupture with the Sea Power, the former disdaining to clasp the +hand of the conqueror of Friedland, the latter foreseeing ruin from +the adoption of the Continental System; and when Napoleon sent +Savary on a special mission to the Czar's Court, the Empress-Mother +and nobles alike showed their abhorrence of "the executioner of the +Duc d'Enghien." In vain were imperial favours lavished on this +envoy. He confessed to Napoleon that only the Czar and the new +Foreign Minister, Romantzoff, were favourable to France; and it was +soon obvious that their ardour for a partition of Turkey must +disturb<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii145" id= +"page_ii145">[pg.145]</a></span> the warily balancing policy which +Napoleon adopted as soon as the Czar's friendship seemed +assured.</p> + +<p>The dissolution of this artificial alliance was a task far +beyond the powers of British statesmanship. To Alexander's offer of +mediation between France and England Canning replied that we +desired first to know what were "the just and equitable terms on +which France intended to negotiate," and secondly what were the +secret articles of the Treaty of Tilsit. That there were such was +obvious; for the published treaty made no mention of the Kings of +Sardinia and of the two Sicilies, in whom Alexander had taken so +deep an interest. But the second request annoyed the Czar; and this +feeling was intensified by our action at Copenhagen. Yet, though he +pronounced it an act of "unheard-of violence," the Russian official +notes to our Government were so far reassuring that Lord +Castlereagh was able to write to Lord Cathcart (September 22nd): +"Russia does not show any disposition to resent or to complain of +what we have done at Copenhagen.... The tone of the Russian cabinet +has become much more conciliatory to us since they heard of your +operations at Copenhagen."<a name="FN2anchor166_166"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_166_166"><sup>[166]</sup></a> It would seem, however, +that this double-dealing was prompted by naval considerations. The +Czar desired to temporize until his Mediterranean squadron should +gain a place of safety and his Baltic ports be encased in ice; but +on 27th October (8th November, N.S.) he broke off all +communications with us, and adopted the Continental System.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, at the other extremity of Europe, events were +transpiring that served as the best excuse for our harshness +towards Denmark. Even before our fleet sailed for the Sound, +Napoleon was weaving his plans for the destruction of Portugal. It +is clear that he designed to strike her first before taking any +action against<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii146" id= +"page_ii146">[pg.146]</a></span> Denmark. During his return journey +from Tilsit to Paris, he directed Talleyrand to send orders to +Lisbon for the closing of all Portuguese ports against British +goods by September the 1st—"in default of which I declare war +on Portugal." He also ordered the massing of 20,000 French troops +at Bayonne in readiness to join the Spanish forces that were to +threaten the little kingdom.<a name="FN2anchor167_167"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_167_167"><sup>[167]</sup></a></p> + +<p>What crime had Portugal committed? She had of late been +singularly passive: anxiously she looked on at the gigantic strifes +that were engulfing the smaller States one by one. Her conduct +towards Napoleon had been far less provocative than that of Denmark +towards England. Threatened with partition by him and Spain in +1801, she had eagerly snatched at peace, and on the rupture of the +Peace of Amiens was fain to purchase her neutrality at the cost of +a heavy subsidy to France, which she still paid in the hope of +prolonging her "existence on sufferance."<a name= +"FN2anchor168_168"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_168_168"><sup>[168]</sup></a> That hope now faded +away.</p> + +<p>As far back as February, 1806, Napoleon had lent a ready ear to +the plans which Godoy, the all-powerful Minister at Madrid, had +proposed for the partition of Portugal; and, in the month of July +following, Talleyrand held out to our plenipotentiary at Paris the +threat that, unless England speedily made peace with France, +Napoleon would annex Switzerland—"but still less can we +alter, for any other consideration, our intention of invading +Portugal. The army destined for that purpose is already assembling +at Bayonne." A year's respite was gained for the House of Braganza +by the campaigns of Jena and Friedland. But now, with the tenacity +of his nature, the Emperor returned to the plan, actually tried in +1801 and prepared for in 1806, of crushing our faithful ally in +order to compel us to make peace. On this occasion he counted on +certain success, as may be seen<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii147" id="page_ii147">[pg.147]</a></span> by the following +extract from the despatch of the Portuguese ambassador at Paris to +his Government:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"On Sunday afternoon [August 2nd] there was a diplomatic +Levée. The Emperor came up to me as I stood in the circle, +and in a low voice said: 'Have you written to your Court? Have you +despatched a courier with my final determination?'—I replied +in the affirmative.—'Very well,' said the Emperor, 'then by +this time your Court knows that she must break with England before +the 1st of September. It is the only way to accelerate +peace.'—As the place did not permit discussion on my part, I +answered: 'I should think, Sire, that England must now be sincerely +anxious to make peace.'—'Oh,' replied the Emperor, 'we are +very certain of that: however, in all cases, you must break either +with England or France before the 1st of September.'—He then +turned about and addressed himself to the Danish Minister, as far +as I could judge to the same purport."<a name= +"FN2anchor169_169"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_169_169"><sup>[169]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>Equally confident is Napoleon's tone in the lately published +letter of September 7th:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"As soon as I received news of the English expedition against +Copenhagen,<a name="FN2anchor170_170"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_170_170"><sup>[170]</sup></a> I caused Portugal to be +informed that all her ports must be closed to England, and I massed +an army of 40,000 men at Bayonne to join the Spaniards in enforcing +this action, if necessary. But a letter I have just received from +the Prince Regent [of Portugal] leads me to presume that this last +measure will not be necessary, that the Portuguese ports will be +closed to the English by the time this is read, and that Portugal +will have declared war against England. On the other hand, my +flotilla will be ready for action on 1st October, and I shall have +a large army at Boulogne, ready to attempt a <i>coup de main</i> on +England."</p> +</div> + +<p>The letter concludes by ordering that all British diplomatists +are to be driven <i>out of Europe</i>, and that Sweden<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii148" id="page_ii148">[pg.148]</a></span> +must make common cause with France and Russia. Such were the means +to be used for forcing affrighted Peace again to visit this +distracted earth.</p> + +<p>In truth, the fate of the British race seemed for the time to +hang upon the events at Copenhagen and Lisbon. Very much depended +on the action of the Prince Regent of Portugal. Had he tamely +submitted to Napoleon's ukase and placed his fleet and his vast +colonial empire at the service of France, it is doubtful whether +even the high-souled Canning would not have stooped to surrender in +face of odds so overwhelming. The young statesman's anxiety as to +the action of Portugal is attested by many a long and minutely +corrected despatch to Viscount Strangford, our envoy at Lisbon. +But, fortunately for us, Napoleon committed the blunder which so +often marred his plans: he pushed them too far: he required the +Prince Regent to adopt a course of conduct repellent to an +honourable man, namely, to confiscate the merchandise and property +of British merchants who had long trusted the good faith of the +House of Braganza. To this last demand the prince opposed a +dignified resistance, though on all other points he gave way. This +will appear from Lord Strangford's despatch of August 13th:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>" ... The Portuguese Ministers place all their hopes of being +able to ward off this terrible blow in the certainty which they +entertain of England being obliged to enter into negotiations for a +general peace.... The very existence of the Portuguese Monarchy +depends on the celerity with which England shall meet the pacific +interference of the Emperor of Russia. The Prince Regent gives the +most solemn promise that he will not on any account consent to the +measure of confiscating the property of British subjects residing +under his protection. But I think that if France could be induced +to give up this point, and limit her demands to the exclusion of +British commerce from Portugal, the Government of this country +would accede to them...."</p> +</div> + +<p>A week later he states that Portugal begged England to put up +with a temporary rupture, and reports that a<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii149" id="page_ii149">[pg.149]</a></span> +quantity of diamonds had been taken out of the Treasury and sent to +Paris to be distributed in presents to persons supposed to possess +influence over the minds of Bonaparte and Talleyrand. It would be +interesting to trace the history of these diamonds. But, as +Napoleon had recently awarded sums amounting in all to 26,582,000 +francs from out of the estates confiscated in Poland,<a name= +"FN2anchor171_171"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_171_171"><sup>[171]</sup></a> signs of sudden affluence +were widespread in Paris and rendered it difficult to detect the +receivers of the gems. Talleyrand was the usual recipient of such +<i>douceurs</i>. But on August the 14th he had retired from the +Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gaining the title of Vice +Grand-Elector; and, if we are to be guided, not by the statements +of his personal foes, Hauterive and Pasquier, but by the +determination which he is known to have formed at Tilsit, that he +would not be "the executioner of Europe," we may judge that he +disapproved of the barbarous treatment meted out to Prussia and now +planned against Portugal.<a name="FN2anchor172_172"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_172_172"><sup>[172]</sup></a></p> + +<p>As has been stated above, the partition of this kingdom had been +planned by Godoy in concert with Napoleon early in 1806. That +pampered minion of the Spanish Court, angry at the shelving of +plans which promised to yield him a third of Portugal, called Spain +to arms while Napoleon was marching to Jena, an affront which the +conqueror seemed to overlook but never really forgave. Now, +however, he appeared wholly to enter into Godoy's scheme; and, +while the Prince Regent of<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii150" id="page_ii150">[pg.150]</a></span> Portugal was +appealing to his pity, the Emperor (September 25th, 1807) charged +Duroc to confer with Godoy's confidential agent at Paris, Don +Izquierdo. "...As for Portugal, I make no difficulty about granting +to the King of Spain a suzerainty over Portugal, and even taking +part of it away for the Queen of Etruria and the Prince of the +Peace [Godoy]." Duroc was also to point out the difficulty, now +that "all Italy" belonged to Napoleon, of allowing "that +deformity," the kingdom of Etruria, to disfigure the peninsula. The +change would in fact, doubly benefit the French Emperor. It would +enable him completely to exclude British commerce from the port of +Leghorn, where it was trickling in alarmingly, and also to place +the mouths of the Tagus and Douro in the hands of obedient +vassals.</p> + +<p>Such was the scheme in outline. Despite the offer of the Prince +Regent to obey all Napoleon's behests except that relating to the +seizure of British subjects and their property, war was irrevocably +resolved on by October the 12th.<a name="FN2anchor173_173"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_173_173"><sup>[173]</sup></a> And on October the +27th a secret convention was signed at the Palace of Fontainebleau +for arranging "the future lot of Portugal by a healthy policy and +conformably to the interests of France and Spain." Portugal was now +to be divided into three very unequal parts: the largest portion, +comprising Estremadura, Beira, and Tras-os Montes, was reserved for +a future arrangement at the general peace, but meanwhile was to be +held by France: Algarve and Alemtejo were handed over to Godoy; +while the diminutive province of Entre Minho e Douro was flung as a +sop to the young King of Etruria and his mother, a princess of the +House of Spain, to console them for the loss of Etruria. A vague +promise was made that the House of Braganza might be reinstated in +the first of these three portions, in case England restored +Gibraltar, Trinidad, and other colonies taken by her from Spain or +her allies; and Napoleon guaranteed to the King of Spain his +possessions in Europe, exclusive<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii151" id="page_ii151">[pg.151]</a></span> of the Balearic +Isles, offering also to recognize him as Emperor of the Two +Americas.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile Junot was leading his army corps from Bayonne towards +Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, to give effect to this healthful +arrangement. This general, whom it was desirable to remove from +Paris on account of his rather too open <i>liaison</i> with one of +the Bonaparte princesses, was urged to the utmost speed and address +by the Emperor. He must cover the whole 200 leagues in thirty-five +days; lack of provisions must not hinder the march, for "20,000 men +can live anywhere, even in a desert"; and, above all, as the Prince +Regent had again offered to declare war on England, he (Junot) +could represent that he came as an ally: "I have already informed +you that my intention in authorizing you to enter that land as an +ally was to enable you to seize its fleet, but that my mind was +fully made up to take possession of Portugal."<a name= +"FN2anchor174_174"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_174_174"><sup>[174]</sup></a> Lisbon, in fact, was to be +served as Venice was ten years before, the lion donning the skin of +the fox so as to effect a peaceful seizure. But that ruse could +hardly succeed twice. The Prince Regent had his ships ready for +flight. The bluff and headstrong Junot, nicknamed "the tempest" by +the army, was too artless to catch the prince by guile; but he +hurried his soldiers over mountains and through flooded gorges +until, on November 30th, 1,500 tattered, shoeless, famished +grenadiers straggled into Lisbon—to find that the royal +quarry had flown.</p> + +<p>The Prince Regent took this momentous resolve with the utmost +reluctance. For many weeks he had clung to the hope that Napoleon +would spare him; and though he accepted a convention with England, +whereby he gained the convoy of our men-of-war across the Atlantic +and the promise of aggrandizement in South America, he still +continued to temporize, and that too, when a<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii152" id="page_ii152">[pg.152]</a></span> +British fleet was at hand in the Tagus strong enough to thwart the +designs of the Russian squadron there present to prevent his +departure. When the French were within two days' march of Lisbon, +Lord Strangford feared that the Portuguese fleet would be delivered +into their hands; and only after a trenchant declaration that +further vacillation would be taken as a sign of hostility to Great +Britain, did the Prince Regent resolve to seek beyond the seas the +independence which was denied to him in his own realm.<a name= +"FN2anchor175_175"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_175_175"><sup>[175]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Few scenes are more pathetic than the departure of the House of +Braganza from the cradle of its birth. Love for the Prince Regent +as a man, mingled with pity for the demented Queen, held the +populace of Lisbon in tearful silence as the royal family and +courtiers filed along the quays, followed by agonized groups of +those who had decided to share their trials. But silence gave way +to wails of despair as the exiles embarked on the heaving estuary +and severed the last links with Europe. Slowly the fleet began to +beat down the river in the teeth of an Atlantic gale. Near the +mouth the refugees were received with a royal salute by the British +fleet, and under its convoy they breasted the waves of the ocean +and the perils of the future.</p> + +<p>The conduct of England towards Denmark and that of Napoleon +towards Portugal call for a brief comparison. Those small kingdoms +were the victims of two powerful States whose real or fancied +interests prompted them to the domination of the land and of the +sea. But when we compare the actions of the two Great Powers, +important differences begin to reveal themselves. England had far +more cause for complaint against Denmark than Napoleon<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii153" id="page_ii153">[pg.153]</a></span> +had against Portugal. The hostility of the Danes to the recent +coalition was notorious. To compel them to change their policy +without loss of national honour, we sent the most powerful armada +that had ever left our shores, with offers of alliance and a demand +that their fleet, the main object of Napoleon's designs, should be +delivered up to be held in deposit. The offer was refused, and we +seized the fleet. The act was brutal, but it was at least open and +above board, and the capitulation of September 7th was scrupulously +observed, even when the Danes prepared to renew hostilities.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, the demands of Napoleon on the Court of +Lisbon were such as no honourable prince could accept; they were +relentlessly pressed on in spite of the offer of the Prince Regent +to meet him in every particular save one; the appeals of the victim +were deliberately used by the aggressor to further his own +rapacious designs; and the enterprise fell short of ending in a +massacre only because the glamour of the French arms so dazzled the +susceptible people of the south that, for the present, they sank +helplessly away at the sight of two battalions of spectres. +Finally, Portugal was partitioned—or rather it was kept +entirely by Napoleon; for, after the promises of partition had done +their work, the sleeping partners in the transaction were quietly +shelved, and it was then seen that Portugal had finally served as +the bait for ensnaring Spain. To this subject we shall return in +the next chapter.</p> + +<p>In Italy also, the Juggernaut car of the Continental System +rolled over the small States. The Kingdom of Etruria, which in 1802 +had served as an easy means of buying the whole of Louisiana from +the Spanish Bourbons, was now wrested from that complaisant House, +and in December was annexed to the French Empire.</p> + +<p>The Pope also passed under the yoke. For a long time the +relations between Pius VII. and Napoleon had been strained. Gentle +as the Pontiff was by nature, he had declined to exclude all +British merchandise from his States, or to accept an alliance with +Eugène and Joseph.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii154" +id="page_ii154">[pg.154]</a></span> He also angered Napoleon by +persistently refusing to dissolve the marriage of Jerome Buonaparte +with Miss Paterson; and an interesting correspondence ensued, +culminating in a long diatribe which Eugène was charged to +forward to the Vatican as an extract from a private letter of +Napoleon to himself.<a name="FN2anchor176_176"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_176_176"><sup>[176]</sup></a> Pius VII. was to be +privately warned that Napoleon had done more good to religion than +the Pope had done harm. Christ had said that His Kingdom was not of +this world. Why then did the Pope set himself above Christ? Why did +he refuse to render to Cæsar that which was +Cæsar's?—A fortnight later the Emperor advised +Eugène to despatch troops in the direction of +Bologna—"and if the Pope commits an imprudence, it will be a +fine opportunity for depriving him of the Roman States."</p> + +<p>No imprudence was committed. Yet, in the following January, +Napoleon ordered his troops to occupy Rome, alleging that the +Eternal City was a hotbed of intrigues fomented by England and the +ex-Queen of Naples, that Neapolitan rebels had sought an asylum in +the Papal States, and that, though he had no wish to deprive the +Pope of his territories, yet he must include him in his "system." +When Pius VII. refused to commit himself to a policy which would +involve war with England, Napoleon ordered that his lands east of +the Apennines should be annexed to the Kingdom of Italy (April 2nd, +1808). Napoleon thus gained complete control over the Adriatic +coasts, which, along with the island of Corfu, had long engaged his +most earnest attention.<a name="FN2anchor177_177"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_177_177"><sup>[177]</sup></a></p> + +<p>True to his aim of forcing or enticing all maritime States into +a mighty confederacy for the humiliation of England, Napoleon had +given most heed to lands<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii155" +id="page_ii155">[pg.155]</a></span> possessing extensive seaboards. +Northern Italy, Holland, Naples, North Germany, Prussia, Russia, +Portugal, Spain, Denmark, and Central Italy had, in turn, adopted +his system. On Austria he exerted a less imperious pressure; for +her coast-line of Trieste and Croatia was so easily controlled by +his Italian and Dalmatian territories that English merchandise with +difficulty found admittance. Yet, in order to carry out there also +his policy of "Thorough," he brought the arguments of Paris and St. +Petersburg to bear on the Court of Vienna; and on February 18th, +1808, Austria was enrolled in a league that might well be called +continental; for in the spring of that year it embraced every land +save Sweden and Turkey.</p> + +<p>His activity at this time almost passes belief. While he +fastened his grip on the Continent, gallicized the institutions of +Italy and Germany, and almost daily instructed his brothers in the +essentials of successful statecraft, he found time to turn his +thoughts once more to the East, and to mark every device of England +for lengthening her lease of life. Noticing that we had annulled +our blockade of the Elbe and Weser, with the aim of getting our +goods introduced there by neutral ships, Napoleon charged his +Finance Minister, Gaudin, to prepare a decree for pressing hard on +neutrals who had touched at any of our ports or carried wares that +could be proved to be of British origin.<a name= +"FN2anchor178_178"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_178_178"><sup>[178]</sup></a></p> + +<p>He was perfectly correct in his surmise that English goods were +about to be sent into the Continent extensively on neutral vessels. +After the consequences of the Treaty of Tilsit had been fully +developed, that was almost their only means of entry. "In August, +September and October, British commerce lay prostrate and +motionless until a protecting and self-defensive system was +interposed by our Orders in Council."<a name= +"FN2anchor179_179"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_179_179"><sup>[179]</sup></a> The first of these ordered +reprisals against the new Napoleonic States (November 4th): a week +later came a second<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii156" id= +"page_ii156">[pg.156]</a></span> which declared that, as the Orders +of January had not induced the enemy to relax his commercial +hostilities, but these were now enforced with increased rigour, any +port whence the British flag was excluded would be treated as if it +were actually blockaded; that is, the principle of the legality of +a nominal blockade, abandoned in 1801, was now reaffirmed. The +carriage of hostile colonial products was likewise prohibited to +neutrals, though certain exceptions were allowed. Also any neutral +vessel carrying "certificates of origin"—a device for +distinguishing between British and neutral goods—was to be +considered a lawful prize of war. A third Order in Council of the +same date allowed goods to be imported into the United Kingdom from +a hostile port in neutral ships, subject to the ordinary duties, +and bonding facilities were granted for the re-exportation of such +goods to any friendly or neutral port.<a name= +"FN2anchor180_180"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_180_180"><sup>[180]</sup></a> These orders were designed +to draw neutral commerce through our ports, and to give secret +facilities for the carriage of our goods by neutrals, while +pressing upon those that obeyed Napoleon's system.</p> + +<p>The harshest of them was that which encouraged the searching of +neutral vessels for certificates of origin—a measure as +severe as the confiscation of British property by Napoleon, which +it was designed to defeat. And we may note here that the friction +resulting from our Orders in Council and our enforcement of the +right of search led to the United States passing a Non-Intercourse +Act (December 23rd, 1807) that preluded active hostilities against +us. It also led Napoleon to confiscate all American ships in his +harbours after April 17th, 1808.</p> + +<p>The November Orders in Council soon drew a reply from Napoleon. +He heard of them during a progress through the north of Italy, and +from Milan he flung<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii157" id= +"page_ii157">[pg.157]</a></span> back his retort, the famous Milan +Decrees of November 23rd and December 17th. He thereby declared +every neutral ship, which submitted to those orders, to be +denationalized and good prize of war; and the same doom was +pronounced against every vessel sailing to or from any port in the +United Kingdom or its colonies or possessions. But these measures +were not to affect ships of those States that compelled Great +Britain to respect their flag. The islanders might well be dismayed +at the prospect of a seclusion which promised to recall the +Virgilian line:</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"penitus toto divisos orbe +Britannos."</span><br> + + +<p>Yet they resolved to pit the resources of the outer world +against the militarism of Napoleon; and, drawing the resources of +the tropics to the new power-looms of Lancashire and Yorkshire, +they might well hope to pour their unequalled goods into Europe +from points of vantage such as Sicily, Gibraltar, the Channel +Islands, and Heligoland. There were many Englishmen who believed +that the November Orders in Council brought nothing but harm to our +cause. They argued that our manufactured goods must find their way +into the Continent in spite of the Berlin Decrees; and they could +point to the curious fact that Bourrienne, Napoleon's agent at +Hamburg, when charged to procure 50,000 overcoats for the French +army during the Eylau campaign, was obliged to buy them from +England.<a name="FN2anchor181_181"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_181_181"><sup>[181]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The incident certainly proves the folly of the Continental +System. And if we had had to consult our manufacturing interests +alone, a policy of <i>laisser faire</i> would doubtless have been +the best. England, however, prided herself on her merchant service: +to that she looked as the nursery for the royal navy: and the +abandonment of the world's carrying trade to neutrals would have +seemed an act of high treason. Her acts of retaliation against +the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii158" id= +"page_ii158">[pg.158]</a></span> Berlin Decrees and the policy of +Tilsit were harsh and high-handed. But they were adopted during a +pitiless commercial strife; and, in warfare of so novel and +desperate a kind, acts must unfortunately be judged by their +efficacy to harm the foe rather than by the standards of morality +that hold good during peace. Outwardly, it seemed as if England +were doomed. She had lost her allies and alienated the sympathies +of neutrals. But from the sea she was able to exert on the +Napoleonic States a pressure that was gradual, cumulative, and +resistless; and the future was to prove the wisdom of the words of +Mollien: "England waged a warfare of modern times; Napoleon, that +of ancient times. There are times and cases when an anachronism is +fatal."</p> + +<p>Moreover, at the very time when the Emperor was about to +complete his great experiment by subduing Sweden and preparing for +the partition of Turkey, it sustained a fatal shock by the fierce +rising of the Spanish people against his usurped authority.<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii159" id= +"page_ii159">[pg.159]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXVIII</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE SPANISH RISING</center> + +<br> + + +<p>The relations of Spain to France during the twelve years that +preceded the rising of 1808 are marked by acts of folly and unmanly +complaisance that promised utterly to degrade a once proud and +sensitive people. They were the work of the senile and spiritless +King, Charles IV., of his intriguing consort, and, above all, of +her paramour, the all-powerful Minister Godoy. Of an ancient and +honourable family, endowed with a fine figure, courtly address, and +unscrupulous arts, this man had wormed himself into the royal +confidence; and after bringing about a favourable peace with France +in 1795, he was styled The Prince of the Peace.</p> + +<p>In the next year the meaning of the French alliance was revealed +in the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, which required Spain to furnish +troops, ships, and subsidies for the war against England, a state +of vassalage which was made harder by Napoleon. The results are +well known. After being forced by him to cede Trinidad to us at the +Peace of Amiens, she sacrificed her navy at Trafalgar, saw her +colonies and commerce decay and her finances shrivel for lack of +the golden streams formerly poured in by Mexico and Peru.</p> + +<p>In the summer of 1806, while sinking into debt and disgrace, the +Court of Madrid heard with indignation of Napoleon's design to hand +over the Balearic Isles to the Spanish Bourbons whom he had driven +from Naples and proposed to drive from Sicily. At once Spanish +pride caught fire and clutched at means<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii160" id="page_ii160">[pg.160]</a></span> of revenge.<a +name="FN2anchor182_182"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_182_182"><sup>[182]</sup></a> Godoy was further incensed +by the sudden abandonment of the plans which he had long discussed +with Napoleon for the partition of Portugal, plans which gave him +the prospect of reigning as King over the southern portion of that +realm.<a name="FN2anchor183_183"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_183_183"><sup>[183]</sup></a> Accordingly, when the +Emperor was entering upon the Jena campaign, he summoned the +Spanish people to arms in a most threatening manner. The news of +the collapse of Prussia ended his bravado. Complaisance again +reigned at Madrid, and 15,000 Spaniards were sent, at Napoleon's +demand, to serve on the borders of Denmark, while the autocrat of +the West perfected his plans against the Iberian Peninsula. As was +noted in the previous chapter, the Emperor renewed his offers of a +partition of Portugal in the early autumn of 1807; and in pursuance +of the secret Treaty of Fontainebleau, Junot's corps marched +through Spain into Portugal, where they were helped by a Spanish +corps.</p> + +<p>It is significant that, as early as October 17th, 1807, Napoleon +ordered his general to send a detailed description of the country +and of his line of march, the engineer officers being specially +charged to send sketches, "<i>which it is important to have</i>." +Other French divisions then crossed the Pyrenees, under plea of +keeping open Junot's communications with France; and spies were +sent to observe the state of the chief Spanish strongholds. Others +were charged to report on the condition of the Spanish army and the +state of public opinion; while Junot was cautioned to keep a sharp +watch on the Spanish troops in Portugal, to allow no fortress to be +in their hands, and to send all the Portuguese troops away to +France. Thus, in the early days of 1808, Napoleon had some 20,000 +troops in Portugal, about 40,000 in the north of Spain, and 12,000 +in Catalonia. By various artifices they gained admission into the +strongholds of<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii161" id= +"page_ii161">[pg.161]</a></span> Pamplona, Monjuik, Barcelona, St. +Sebastian, and Figueras, so that by the month of March the north +and west of the peninsula had passed quietly into his hands, while +the greater part of the Spanish army was doing his work in Portugal +or on the shores of the Baltic.<a name="FN2anchor184_184"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_184_184"><sup>[184]</sup></a></p> + +<p>These proceedings began to arouse alarm and discontent among the +Spanish people; but on its Government their influence was as +benumbing as that which the boa-constrictor exerts on its prey. In +vain did Charles IV. and Godoy strive to set a limit to the numbers +of the auxiliaries that poured across the Pyrenees to help them +against fabled English expeditions. In vain did they beg that the +partition of Portugal might now proceed in accordance with the +terms of the secret Treaty of Fontainebleau. The King was curtly +told that affairs were not yet ripe for the publication of that +treaty.<a name="FN2anchor185_185"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_185_185"><sup>[185]</sup></a> And the growing conviction +that he had been duped poured gall into the cup of family +bitterness that had long been full to overflowing.</p> + +<p>The scandalous relations of the Queen with Godoy had deeply +incensed the heir to the throne, Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias. His +attitude of covert opposition to his parents and their minion was +strengthened by the influence of his bride, a daughter of the +ex-Queen of Naples, and their palace was the headquarters of all +who hoped to end the degradation of the kingdom. As later events +were to prove, Ferdinand had not the qualities of courage and +magnanimity that command general homage; but it was enough for his +countrymen that he opposed the Court. In 1806 his consort died; and +on October 11th, 1807, without consulting his father, he secretly +wrote to Napoleon, requesting the hand of a Bonaparte princess in +marriage, and stating that such an alliance was the ardent wish of +all Spaniards, while they would abhor his union with a sister of +the Princess<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii162" id= +"page_ii162">[pg.162]</a></span> of the Peace. To this letter +Napoleon sent no reply. But Charles IV. had some inkling of the +fact that the prince had been treating direct with Napoleon; and +this, along with another unfilial action of the prince, furnished +an excuse for a charge of high treason. It was spitefully pressed +home and was revoked only on his humble request for the King's +pardon.</p> + +<p>Now, this "School for Scandal" was being played at Madrid at the +time when Napoleon was arranging the partition of Portugal; and the +schism in the Spanish royal House may well have strengthened his +determination to end its miserable existence and give a good +government to Spain. At the close of the so-called palace plot, +Charles IV. informed his august ally of <i>that frightful +attempt</i>, and begged him to <i>give the aid of his lights and +his counsels</i>.<a name="FN2anchor186_186"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_186_186"><sup>[186]</sup></a> The craven-hearted King +thus himself opened the door for that intervention which Napoleon +had already meditated. His resolve now rapidly hardened. At the +close of January, 1808, he wrote to Junot asking him: "If +unexpected events occurred in Spain, what would you fear from the +Spanish troops? Could you easily rid yourself of them?"<a name= +"FN2anchor187_187"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_187_187"><sup>[187]</sup></a> On February the 20th he +appointed Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, to be his Lieutenant in Spain +and commander of the French Forces. The choice of this bluff, +headstrong cavalier, who had done so much to provoke Prussia in +1806, certainly betokened a forward policy. Yet the Emperor +continued to smile on the Spanish Court, and gave a sort of half +sanction to the union of Ferdinand with a daughter of Lucien +Bonaparte.<a name="FN2anchor188_188"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_188_188"><sup>[188]</sup></a> In fact, the hope of this +alliance was now used to keep quiet the numerous partisans of +Ferdinand, while Murat advanced rapidly towards Madrid. To his +Lieutenant the Emperor wrote (March 16th): "Continue your kindly +talk. Reassure<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii163" id= +"page_ii163">[pg.163]</a></span> the King, the Prince of the Peace, +the Prince of Asturias, the Queen. The chief thing is to reach +Madrid, to rest your troops and replenish your provisions. Say that +I am about to come so as to arrange matters."</p> + +<p>As to Napoleon's real aims, Murat was in complete ignorance; and +he repeatedly complained of the lack of confidence which a +brother-in-law had a right to expect.<a name= +"FN2anchor189_189"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_189_189"><sup>[189]</sup></a> But while the Grand Duke +of Berg beamed on the Spaniards with meaningless affability, +Izquierdo, Godoy's secret agent at Paris, troubled his master with +gloomy reports of the deepening reserve and lowering threats of +Ministers at Paris. There was talk of requiring from Spain the +cession of her lands between the Pyrenees and the Ebro: there were +even dark suggestions as to the need of dethroning the Spanish +Bourbons once for all. Interpreting these hints in the light of +their own consciences, the King, Queen, and favourite saw +themselves in imagination flung forth into the Atlantic, a butt to +the scorn of mankind; and they prepared to flee to the New World +betimes, with the needful treasure.</p> + +<p>But there, too, Napoleon forestalled them. On February 21st a +secret order was sent to a French squadron to anchor off Cadiz and +stop the King and Queen of Spain if they sought to "repeat the +scene of Lisbon."<a name="FN2anchor190_190"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_190_190"><sup>[190]</sup></a> Their escape to America +would be even more favourable to England than the flight of the +Court of Lisbon had been; and Napoleon took good care that the +King, to whom he had awarded the title of Emperor of the two +Americas, should remain a prisoner in Europe. Scared, however, by +the approach of Murat and the news from Paris, Charles still +prepared for flight; and the Queen's anxiety to save her favourite +from the growing fury of the populace also bent her desires +seawards.</p> + +<p>The Court was at the palace of Aranjuez, not far from Madrid, +and it seemed easy to escape into Andalusia, and to carry away, by +guile or by force, the heir<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii164" id="page_ii164">[pg.164]</a></span> to the throne. But +Ferdinand, who hoped for deliverance at the hands of the French, +thwarted the scheme by a timely hint to his faithful guards. At +once his partisans gathered round him; and the people, rushing to +Godoy's residence, madly ransacked it in the hope of tearing to +pieces the author of the nation's ruin. After thirty-six hours' +concealment, Godoy ventured to steal forth; at once he was +discovered, was kicked and beaten; and only the intervention of +Ferdinand, prompted by the agonized entreaties of his mother, +availed to save the dregs of that wretched life. The roars of the +crowd around the palace, and the smashing of the royal carriage, +now decided the King to abdicate; and he declared that his +declining years and failing health now led him to yield the crown +to Ferdinand (March 19th, 1808).</p> + +<p>Loud was the acclaim that greeted the young King when he entered +Madrid; but the rejoicings were soon damped by the ambiguous +behaviour of Murat, who, on entering Madrid at the head of his +troops, skilfully evaded any recognition of Ferdinand as King. In +fact, Murat had received (March 21st) a letter from Charles IV.'s +daughter begging for his help to her parents at Aranjuez; and it +soon transpired that the ex-King and Queen now repented of their +abdication, which they represented as brought about by force and +therefore null and void. The Grand Duke of Berg saw the advantage +which this dispute might give to Napoleon; and he begged the +Emperor to come immediately to Madrid for the settlement of matters +on which he alone could decide. To this Napoleon replied (March +30th) commending his Lieutenant's prudence, and urging him to +escort Charles IV. to the Escurial as King, while Godoy was also to +be protected and sent to Bayonne.</p> + +<p>To this town the Emperor set out on April the 2nd, as though he +would thence proceed to Madrid. Ferdinand, meanwhile, was treated +with guarded courtesy that kept alive his hope of an alliance with +a French princess. To favour this notion, Napoleon despatched the +wariest<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii165" id= +"page_ii165">[pg.165]</a></span> of his agents, Savary, who +artfully persuaded him to meet the Emperor at Burgos. He succeeded, +and even induced him to continue his journey to Vittoria. At that +place the citizens sought to cut the traces of the royal carriage, +so much did they fear treachery if he proceeded further. Yet the +young King, beguiled by the Emperor's letter of April 16th, which +offered the hand of a French princess, prolonged his journey, +crossed the frontier, and was received by Napoleon at Bayonne +(April 20th). His arguments, proving that his father's abdication +had been voluntary, fell on deaf ears. The Emperor invited him to +dinner, and afterwards sent Savary to inform him that he must hand +back the crown to his father. To this Ferdinand returned a firm +refusal; and his advisers, Escoiquiz and Labrador, ventured to warn +the Emperor that the Spaniards would swear eternal hatred to France +if he tampered with the crown of Spain. Napoleon listened +good-humouredly, pulled Escoiquiz by the ear as a sign of his +personal regard, and added: "You are a deep fellow; but, I tell +you, the Bourbons will never let me alone." On the next day he +offered Ferdinand the throne of Etruria. It was coldly declined.<a +name="FN2anchor191_191"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_191_191"><sup>[191]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Charles IV., his Queen, and Godoy, arrived at Bayonne at the +close of April. The ex-King had offered to put himself and his +claim in Napoleon's hands, which was exactly what the Emperor +desired. The feeble creature now poured forth his bile on his +disobedient son, and peevishly bade him restore the crown. +Ferdinand assented, provided his father would really reign, and +would dismiss those advisers who were hated by the nation; but the +attempt to impose conditions called forth a flash of senile wrath, +along with the remark that "one ought to do everything <i>for</i> +the people and nothing <i>by</i> the people."</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the men of Madrid were not acting with<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii166" id="page_ii166">[pg.166]</a></span> +the passivity desired by their philosophizing monarch. At first +they had welcomed Murat as delivering them from the detested yoke +of Godoy; but the conduct of the French in their capital, and the +detention of Ferdinand at Bayonne, aroused angry feelings, which +burst forth on May the 2nd, and long defied the grapeshot of +Murat's guns and the sabres of his troopers. The news of this +so-called revolt gave Napoleon another handle against his guests. +He hurried to Charles and cowed him by well-simulated signs of +anger, which that <i>roi fainéant</i> thereupon vented on +his son, with a passion that was outdone only by the shrill gibes +of the Queen. At the close of this strange scene, the Emperor +interposed with a few stern words, threatening to treat the prince +as a rebel if he did not that very evening restore the crown to his +father. Ferdinand braved the parental taunts in stolid silence, but +before the trenchant threats of Napoleon he quailed, and broke +down.</p> + +<p>Resistance was now at an end. On that same night (May 5th) the +Emperor concluded with Godoy a convention whereby Charles IV. +agreed to hand over to Napoleon the crowns of Spain and the Indies, +on consideration that those dominions should remain intact, should +keep the Roman Catholic faith to the exclusion of all others, and +that he himself should be pensioned off with the estates of +Compiègne and Chambord, receiving a yearly income of seven +and a half million francs, payable by the French treasury. The +Spanish princes were similarly treated, Ferdinand signing away his +rights for a castle and a pension. To crown the farce, Napoleon +ordered Talleyrand to receive them at his estate of +Valençay, and amuse them with actors and the charms of +female society. Thus the choicest humorist of the age was told off +to entertain three uninteresting exiles; and the ex-Minister of +Foreign Affairs, who disapproved of the treachery of Bayonne, was +made to appear the Emperor's accomplice.</p> + +<p>Such were the means whereby Napoleon gained the crowns of Spain +and the Indies, without striking a blow.<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii167" id="page_ii167">[pg.167]</a></span></p> + +<p>His excuse for the treachery as expressed at the time was as +follows: "My action is not good from a certain point of view, I +know. But my policy demands that I shall not leave in my rear, so +near to Paris, a dynasty hostile to mine." From this and from other +similar remarks, it would seem that his resolve to dethrone the +Bourbons was taken while on his march to Jena, but was thrust down +into the abyss of his inscrutable will for a whole year, until +Junot's march to Lisbon furnished a safe means for effecting the +subjugation of Spain. This end he thenceforth pursued unswervingly +with no sign of remorse, or even of hesitation—unless we +accept as genuine the almost certainly spurious letter of March +29th, 1808. That letter represents him as blaming Murat for +entering Madrid, when he had repeatedly urged him to do so; as +asking his advice after he had all along kept him in ignorance as +to his aims; and as writing a philosophical homily on the unused +energies of the Spanish people, for whom in his genuine letters he +expressed a lofty contempt.<a name="FN2anchor192_192"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_192_192"><sup>[192]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The whole enterprise is, indeed, a masterpiece of skill, but a +masterpiece marred by ineffaceable stains of treachery. And at the +close of his life, he himself said: "I embarked very badly on the +Spanish affair, I confess: the immorality of it was too patent, the +injustice too cynical, and the whole thing wears an ugly look since +I have fallen; for the attempt is only seen in its hideous +nakedness deprived of all majesty and of the many benefits which +completed my intention."</p> + +<p>That he hoped to reform Spain is certain. Political and social +reforms had hitherto consolidated the work<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii168" id="page_ii168">[pg.168]</a></span> of conquest; +and those which he soon offered to the Spaniards might possibly +have renovated that nation, had they not been handed in at the +sword's point; but the motive was too obvious, the intervention too +insulting, to render success possible with the most sensitive +people in Europe. On May 2nd he wrote to Murat that he intended +King Joseph of Naples to reign at Madrid, and offered to Murat +either Portugal or Naples.<a name="FN2anchor193_193"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_193_193"><sup>[193]</sup></a> He chose the latter. +Joseph was allowed no choice in the matter. He was summoned from +Naples to Bayonne, and, on arriving at Pau, heard with great +surprise that he was King of Spain.</p> + +<p>Napoleon's selection was tactful. At Naples, the eldest of the +Bonapartes had effected many reforms and was generally popular; but +the treachery of Bayonne blasted all hopes of his succeeding at +Madrid. Though the grandees of Spain welcomed the new monarch with +courtly grace, though Charles IV. gave him his blessing, though +Ferdinand demeaned himself by advising his former subjects quietly +to submit, the populace willed otherwise.</p> + +<p>Every instinct of the Spanish nature was aflame with resentment. +Loathing for Charles IV., his Queen, and their favourite, whom +Napoleon richly dowered, love of the young King whom he falsely +filched away, detestation of the French troops who outraged the +rights of hospitality, and zeal for the Roman Catholic Church, +whose chief had just been robbed of half his States, goaded the +Spaniards to madness. Their indignation rumbled hoarsely for a +time, like a volcano in labour, and then burst forth in an +explosion of fury. The constitution which Napoleon presented to the +Spanish Notables at Bayonne was accepted by them, only to be flung +back with scorn by the people. The men of enlightenment who<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii169" id= +"page_ii169">[pg.169]</a></span> counselled prudence and patience +were slain by raging mobs or sought safety in flight. The rising +was at once national in its grand spontaneity and local in its +intensity. Province after province rose in arms, except the north +and centre, where 80,000 French troops held the patriots in check. +In the van of the movement was the rugged little province of +Asturias, long ago the forlorn hope of the Christians in their +desperate conflicts with the Moors. Intrenched behind their +mountains and proud of their ancient fame, the Asturians ventured +on the sublime folly of declaring war against the ruler of the West +and the lord of 900,000 warriors. Swiftly Galicia and Leon in the +north repeated the challenge; while in the south, the fertile lands +of Andalusia, Murcia, and Valencia flashed back from their +mountains the beacon lights of a national war. The former dislike +of England was forgotten. The Juntas of Asturias, Galicia, and +Andalusia sent appeals to us for help, to which Canning generously +responded; and, on July 4th, we passed at a single bound from war +with the Spanish Bourbons to an informal alliance with the people +of Spain.</p> + +<p>Napoleon now began to see the magnitude of his error. Instead of +gaining control over Spain and the Indies, he had changed +long-suffering allies into irreconcilable foes. He prepared to +conquer Spain. While Joseph was escorted to his new capital by a +small army, Napoleon from Bayonne directed the operations of his +generals. Holding the northern road from Bayonne to Burgos and +Madrid, they were to send out cautious feelers against the bands of +insurgents; for, as Napoleon wrote to Savary (July 13th): "In civil +wars it is the important posts that must be held: one ought not to +go everywhere." Weighty words, which his lieutenants in Spain were +often to disregard! Bessières in the north gained a success +at Medina de Rio Seco; but a signal disaster in the south ruined +the whole campaign. Dupont, after beating the levies of Andalusia, +penetrated into the heart of that great province, and, when +cumbered with plunder, his divided forces were surrounded, cut off +from their<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii170" id= +"page_ii170">[pg.170]</a></span> supplies, and forced to surrender +at Baylen—in all about 20,000 men (July 19th). The news that +a French army had laid down its arms caused an immense sensation in +an age when Napoleon's troops were held to be invincible. Baylen +was hailed everywhere by despairing patriots as the dawn of a new +era. And such it was to be. If Valmy proclaimed the advent of +militant democracy, the victory of Spaniards over one of the +bravest of Napoleon's generals was felt to be an even greater +portent. It ushered in the epoch of national resistance to the +overweening claims of the Emperor of the West.</p> + +<p>That truth he seems dimly to have surmised. His rage on hearing +of the capitulation was at first too deep for words. Then he burst +out: "Could I have expected that from Dupont, a man whom I loved, +and was rearing up to become a Marshal? They say he had no other +way to save the lives of his soldiers. Better, far better, to have +died with arms in their hands. Their death would have been +glorious: we should have avenged them. You can always supply the +place of soldiers. Honour alone, when once lost, can never be +regained."</p> + +<p>Moreover, the material consequences were considerable. The +Spaniards speedily threatened Madrid; and, on the advice of Savary, +Joseph withdrew from his capital after a week's sojourn, and fell +back hurriedly on the line of the Upper Ebro, where the French +rallied for a second advance.</p> + +<p>Their misfortunes did not end here. In the north-east the hardy +Catalans had risen against the invaders, and by sheer pluck and +audacity cooped them up in their ill-gotten strongholds of +Barcelona and Figueras. The men of Arragon, too, never backward in +upholding their ancient liberties, rallied to defend their capital +Saragossa. Their rage was increased by the arrival of Palafox, who +had escaped in disguise from the suite of Ferdinand at Bayonne, and +brought news of the treachery there perpetrated. Beaten outside +their ancient city, and unable to hold its crumbling walls against +the French cannon and columns of assault, the defenders yet +fiercely<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii171" id= +"page_ii171">[pg.171]</a></span> turned to bay amidst its narrow +lanes and massive monasteries. There a novel warfare was waged. +From street to street and house to house the fight eddied for days, +the Arragonese opposing to French valour the stubborn devotion ever +shown by the peoples of the peninsula in defence of their walled +cities, and an enthusiasm kindled by the zeal of their monks and +the heroism of the Maid of Saragossa. Finally, on August 10th, the +noble city shook off the grip of the 15,000 assailants, who fell +back to join Joseph's forces higher up the Ebro.</p> + +<p>Even now the Emperor did not fully realize the serious nature of +the war that was beginning. Despite Savary's warnings of the +dangers to be faced in Spain, he persisted in thinking of it as an +ordinary war that could be ended by good strategy and a few +victories. He censured Joseph and Savary for giving up the line of +the Upper Douro: he blamed them next for the evacuation of Tudela, +and summed up the situation by stating that "all the Spanish forces +are not able to overthrow 25,000 French in a reasonable +position"—adding, with stinging satire: "In war <i>men</i> +are nothing: it is <i>a man</i> who is everything."</p> + +<p>When, at the close of August, Napoleon penned these memorable +words in his palace of St. Cloud, he knew not that a <i>man</i> had +arrived on the scene of action. At the beginning of that month, Sir +Arthur Wellesley with a British force of 12,300 men landed at the +mouth of the River Mondego, and, aided by Portuguese irregulars, +began his march on Lisbon. This is not the place for a review of +the character and career of our great warrior: in truth, a volume +would be too short for the task. With fine poetic insight, Lord +Tennyson has noted in his funeral Ode the qualities that enabled +him to overcome the unexampled difficulties caused by our own +incompetent Government and by jealous, exacting, and slipshod +allies:</p> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Mourn for the man of long-enduring +blood,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">The statesman-warrior, moderate, +resolute,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Whole in himself, a common +good."</span><span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii172" id= +"page_ii172">[pg.172]</a></span><br> +<br> +</p> + +<p>Glory and vexation were soon to be his. On the 17th he drove the +French vanguard from Roliça; and when, four days later, +Junot hurried up with all his force, the British inflicted on that +presumptuous leader a signal defeat at Vimiero. So bad were Junot's +tactics that his whole force would have been cut off from Torres +Vedras, had not Wellesley's senior officer, Sir Harry Burrard, +arrived just in time to take over the command and stop the pursuit. +Thereupon Wellesley sarcastically exclaimed to his staff: +"Gentlemen, nothing now remains to us but to go and shoot +red-legged partridges." The peculiarities of our war administration +were further seen in the supersession of Burrard by Sir Hew +Dalrymple, whose chief title to fame is his signing of the +Convention of Cintra.</p> + +<p>By this strange compact the whole of Junot's force was to be +conveyed from Portugal to France on British ships, while the +Russian squadron blockaded in the Tagus was to be held by us in +pledge till the peace, the crews being sent on to Russia. The +convention itself was violently attacked by the English public; but +it has found a defender in Napier, who dwells on the advantages of +getting the French at once out of Portugal, and thus providing a +sure base for the operations in Spain. Seeing, however, that +Junot's men were demoralized by defeat, and that the nearest +succouring force was in Navarre, these excuses seem scarcely +tenable, except on the ground that, with such commanders as Burrard +and Dalrymple, it was certainly desirable to get the French +speedily away.</p> + +<p>On his side, Napoleon showed much annoyance at Junot's +acceptance of this convention, and remarked: "I was about to send +Junot to a council of war: but happily the English got the start of +me by sending their generals to one, and thus saved me from the +pain of punishing an old friend." With his customary severity to +those who had failed, he frowned on all the officers of the Army of +Portugal, and, on landing in France, they were strictly forbidden +to come to Paris. The fate of<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii173" id="page_ii173">[pg.173]</a></span> Dupont and of his +chief lieutenants, who were released by the Spaniards, was even +harder: on their return they were condemned to imprisonment. By +such means did Napoleon exact the uttermost from his troops, even +in a service so detested as that in Spain ever was.<a name= +"FN2anchor194_194"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_194_194"><sup>[194]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Despite the blunderings of our War Office, the silly vapourings +of the Spaniards, and the insane quarrels of their provincial +juntas about precedence and the sharing of English subsidies, the +summer of 1808 saw Napoleon's power stagger under terrible blows. +Not only did he lose Spain and Portugal and the subsidies which +they had meekly paid, but most of the 15,000 Spanish troops which +had served him on the shores of the Baltic found means to slip away +on British ships and put a backbone into the patriotic movements in +the north of Spain. But worst of all was the loss of that moral +strength, which he himself reckoned as three-fourths of the whole +force in war. Hitherto he had always been able to marshal the +popular impulse on his side. As the heir to the Revolution he had +appealed, and not in vain, to the democratic forces which he had +hypnotized in France but sought to stir up in his favour abroad. +Despite the efforts of Czartoryski and Stein to tear the democratic +mask from his face, it imposed on mankind until the Spanish +Revolution laid bare the truth; and at St. Helena the exile gave +his own verdict on the policy of Bayonne: "It was the Spanish ulcer +which ruined me."</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION.—For a careful account of the +Convention of Cintra in its military and political aspects, see Mr. +Oman's recently published "History of the Peninsular War," vol. i., +pp. 268-278, 291-300. I cannot, however, agree with the learned +author that that Convention was justifiable on military grounds, +after so decisive a victory as Vimiero.<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii0" id="page_ii0">[pg.0]</a></span></p> +</div> + +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii174" id= +"page_ii174">[pg.174]</a></span> <br> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXIX</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>ERFURT</center> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"At bottom the great question is—who shall have +Constantinople?"—NAPOLEON, May 31st, 1808.</p> +</div> + +<br> + + +<p>The Spanish Rising made an immense rent in Napoleon's plans. It +opened valuable markets for British goods both in the Peninsula and +in South and Central America, and that too at the very time when +the Continental System was about to enfold us in its deadly grip.<a +name="FN2anchor195_195"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_195_195"><sup>[195]</sup></a> And finally it disarranged +schemes that reached far beyond Europe. To these we must now +briefly recur.</p> + +<p>Even amidst his greatest military triumphs Napoleon's gaze +turned longingly towards the East; and no sooner did he force peace +on the conquered than his thoughts centred once more on his navy +and colonies, on Egypt and India. The Treaty of Tilsit gave him +leisure to renew these designs. The publication in 1807 of his +official Atlas of Australia, in which he claimed nearly half that +continent for France, proves that he never accepted Trafalgar as a +death-blow to his maritime and colonial aspirations. And the ardour +of his desire for the conquest of India is seen in the letter which +he wrote to the Czar on February 2nd, 1808. After expressing<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii175" id= +"page_ii175">[pg.175]</a></span> his desire for the glory and +expansion of Russia, and advising the Czar to conquer Finland, he +proceeds:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"An army of 50,000 men, Russians, French, and perhaps a few +Austrians, that penetrated by way of Constantinople into Asia, +would not reach the Euphrates before England would tremble and bow +the knee before the Continent. I am ready in Dalmatia. Your Majesty +is ready on the Danube. A month after we came to an agreement the +army could be on the Bosporus.... By the 1st of May our troops can +be in Asia, and at the same time those of Your Majesty, at +Stockholm. Then the English, threatened in the Indies, and chased +from the Levant, will be crushed under the weight of events with +which the atmosphere will be charged."<a name= +"FN2anchor196_196"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_196_196"><sup>[196]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>There were several reasons why Napoleon should urge on this +scheme. He was irritated by the continued resistance of Great +Britain, and thought to terrify us into surrender by means of those +oriental enterprises which convinced our statesmen that we must +fight on for dear life. He also desired to restore the harmony of +his relations with Alexander. For, in truth, the rapturous +harmonies of Tilsit had soon been marred by discord. Alexander did +not withdraw his troops from the Danubian provinces; whereupon +Napoleon declined to evacuate Silesia; and the friction resulting +from this wary balancing of interests was increased, when, at the +close of 1807, a formal proposal was sent from Paris that, if +Russia retained those provinces, Silesia should be at the disposal +of France.<a name="FN2anchor197_197"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_197_197"><sup>[197]</sup></a> The dazzling vistas opened +up to Alexander's gaze at Tilsit were thus shrouded by a sordid and +distasteful bargain, which he hotly repelled. To repair this false +step, Napoleon now wrote the alluring letter quoted above; and the +Czar exclaimed on perusing it: "Ah, this is the language of +Tilsit."</p> + +<p>Yet, it may be questioned whether Napoleon desired to press on +an immediate partition of the Ottoman<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii176" id="page_ii176">[pg.176]</a></span> Power. His letter +invited the Czar to two great enterprises, the conquest of Finland +and the invasion of Persia and India. The former by itself was +destined to tax Russia's strength. Despite Alexander's offer of a +perpetual guarantee for the Finnish constitution and customs, that +interesting people opposed a stubborn resistance. Napoleon must +also have known that Russia's forces were then wholly unequal to +the invasion of India; and his invitation to Alexander to engage in +two serious enterprises certainly had the effect of postponing the +partition of Turkey. Delay was all in his favour, if he was to gain +the lion's share of the spoils. Russian troops were ready on the +banks of the Danube; but he was not as yet fully prepared. His hold +on Dalmatia, Ragusa, and Corfu was not wholly assured. Sicily and +Malta still defied him; and not until he seized Sicily could he +gain the control of the Mediterranean—"the constant aim of my +policy." Only when that great sea had become a French lake could he +hope to plant himself firmly in Albania, Thessaly, Greece, Crete, +Egypt, and Syria.</p> + +<p>For the present, then, the Czar was beguiled with the prospect +of an eastern expedition; and, while Russian troops were +overrunning Finland, Napoleon sought to conquer Sicily and reduce +Spain to the rank of a feudatory State. From this wider point of +view, he looked on the Iberian Peninsula merely as a serviceable +base for a greater enterprise, the conquest of the East. This is +proved by a letter that he wrote to Decrès, Minister of +Marine and of the Colonies, from Bayonne on May 17th, 1808, when +the Spanish affair seemed settled: "There is not much news from +India. England is in great penury there, and the arrival of an +expedition [from France] would ruin that colony from top to bottom. +The more I reflect on this step, the less inconvenience I see in +taking it." Two days later he wrote to Murat that money must be +found for naval preparations at the Spanish ports: "I must have +ships, for I intend striking a heavy blow towards the end of the +season." But at<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii177" id= +"page_ii177">[pg.177]</a></span> the close of June he warned +Decrès that as Spanish affairs were going badly, he must +postpone his design of despatching a fleet far from European +waters.<a name="FN2anchor198_198"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_198_198"><sup>[198]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Spain having proved to be, not a meek purveyor of fleets, but a +devourer of French armies, there was the more need of a close +accord with the Czar. Napoleon desired, not only to assure a +further postponement of the Turkish enterprise, but also to hold +Austria and Germany in check. The former Power, seeing Napoleon in +difficulties, pushed on apace her military organization; and +Germany heaved with suppressed excitement at the news of the +Spanish Rising. The dormant instinct of German nationality had +already shown signs of awakening. In the early days of 1808 the +once cosmopolitan philosopher, Fichte, delivered at Berlin within +sound of the French drums his "Addresses to the German Nation," in +which he dwelt on the unquenchable strength of a people that +determined at all costs to live free.</p> + +<p>On the philosopher's theme the Spaniards now furnished a +commentary written with their life-blood. Thinkers and soldiers +were alike moved by the stories of Baylen and Saragossa. Varnhagen +von Ense relates how deep was the excitement of the quaint sage, +Jean Paul Richter, who "doubted not that the Germans would one day +rise against the French as the Spaniards had done, and that Prussia +would revenge its insults and give freedom to Germany.... I proved +to him how hollow and weak was Napoleon's power: how deeply rooted +was the opposition to it. The Spaniards were the refrain to +everything, and we always returned to them."</p> + +<p>The beginnings of a new civic life were then being laid in +Prussia by Stein. Called by the King to be<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii178" id="page_ii178">[pg.178]</a></span> virtually a +civic dictator, this great statesman carried out the most drastic +reforms. In October, 1807, there appeared at Memel the decrees of +emancipation which declared the abolition of serfdom with all its +compulsory and menial services. The old feudal society was further +invigorated by the admission of all classes to the holding of land +or to any employment, while trade monopolies were similarly swept +away. Municipal self-government gave new zest and energy to civic +life; and the principle that the army "ought to be the union of all +the moral and physical energies of the nation" was carried out by +the military organizer Scharnhorst, who conceived and partly +realized the idea that all able-bodied men should serve their time +with the colours and then be drafted into a reserve. This military +reform excited Napoleon's distrust, and he forced the King to agree +by treaty (September, 1808) that the Prussian army should never +exceed 42,000 men, a measure which did not hinder the formation of +an effective reserve, and was therefore complied with to the +letter, if not in spirit.</p> + +<p>In fact, in the previous month a plan of a popular insurrection +had been secretly discussed by Stein, Scharnhorst, and other +patriotic Ministers. The example of the Spaniards was everywhere to +be followed, and, if Austria sent forth her legions on the Danube +and England helped in Hanover, there seemed some prospect of +shaking off the Napoleonic yoke. The scheme miscarried, and largely +owing to the interception of a letter in which Stein imprudently +referred to the exasperation of public feeling in Germany and the +lively hope excited by the events in Spain and the preparations of +Austria. Napoleon caused the letter to be printed in the "Moniteur" +of September 8th, and sequestered Stein's property in Westphalia. +He also kept his grip on Prussia; for while withdrawing most of his +troops from that exhausted land, he retained French garrisons in +Stettin, Glogau, and Küstrin. Holding these fortresses on the +strong defensive line of the Oder, he might smile at the puny +efforts of Prussian patriots and hope speedily to crush<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii179" id="page_ii179">[pg.179]</a></span> +the Spanish rebels, provided he could count on the loyal support of +Alexander in holding Austria in check.</p> + +<p>To gain this support and to clear away the clouds that bulked on +their oriental horizon, Napoleon urgently desired an interview with +his ally. For some months it had been proposed; but the Spanish +Rising and the armaments of Austria made it essential.</p> + +<p>The meeting took place at Erfurt (September 27th). The +Thuringian city was ablaze with uniforms, and the cannon thundered +salvoes of welcome as the two potentates and their suites entered +the ancient walls and filed through narrow streets redolent of old +German calm, an abode more suited to the speculations of a Luther +than to the world-embracing schemes of the Emperors of the West and +East. With them were their chief warriors and Ministers, personages +who now threw into the shade the new German kings. There, too, were +the lesser German princes, some of them to grace the Court of the +man who had showered lands and titles on them, others to hint a +wish for more lands and higher titles. In truth, the title of king +was tantalizingly common; and if we may credit a story of the time, +the French soldiery had learnt to despise it. For, on one occasion, +when the guard of honour, deceived by the splendour of the King of +Würtemberg's chariot, was about to deliver the triple salute +accorded only to the two Emperors, the officer in command angrily +exclaimed: "Be quiet: it's only a king."</p> + +<p>The Emperors at Erfurt devoted the mornings to personal +interviews, the afternoons to politics, the evenings to receptions +and the theatre. The actors of the Comédie Française +had been brought from Paris, and played to the Emperors and a +parterre of princes the masterpieces of the French stage, +especially those which contained suitable allusions. A notable +incident occurred on the recital of the line in the "Oedipe" of +Voltaire:</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"L'amitié d'un grand homme +est un bienfait des dieux."</span><br> + + +<p>As if moved by a sudden inspiration, Alexander arose<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii180" id="page_ii180">[pg.180]</a></span> +and warmly pressed the hand of Napoleon, who was then half-dozing +at his side.<a name="FN2anchor199_199"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_199_199"><sup>[199]</sup></a> On the surface, indeed, +everything was friendship and harmony. With urbane facility, the +Czar accompanied his ally to the battlefield of Jena, listened to +the animated description of the victor, and then joined in the +chase in a forest hard by.</p> + +<p>But beneath these brilliant shows there lurked suspicions and +fears. Alexander was annoyed that Napoleon retained French +garrisons in the fortresses on the Oder and claimed an impossible +sum as indemnity from Prussia. This was not the restoration of +Prussia's independence, for which he, Alexander, had pleaded; and +while the French eagles were at Küstrin, the Russian frontier +could not be deemed wholly safe.<a name="FN2anchor200_200"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_200_200"><sup>[200]</sup></a> Then again the Czar +had been secretly warned by Talleyrand against complaisance to the +French Emperor. "Sire, what are you coming here for? It is for you +to save Europe, and you will only succeed in that by resisting +Napoleon. The French are civilized, their sovereign is not. The +sovereign of Russia is civilized, her people are not. Therefore the +sovereign of Russia must be the ally of the French people."<a name= +"FN2anchor201_201"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_201_201"><sup>[201]</sup></a> We may doubt whether this +symmetrical proposition would have had much effect, if Alexander +had not received similar warnings from his own ambassador at Paris; +and it would seem that too much importance has been assigned to +what is termed Talleyrand's <i>treachery</i> at Erfurt.<a name= +"FN2anchor202_202"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_202_202"><sup>[202]</sup></a> Affairs of high policy are +determined, not so much by the logic of words as by the sterner +logic of facts. Ever since Tilsit, Napoleon had been prodigal of +promises to his ally, but of little else. The alluring visions set +forth in his letter of February 2nd were as visionary as ever; and +Romantzoff<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii181" id= +"page_ii181">[pg.181]</a></span> expressed the wish of his +countrymen in his remark to Champagny: "We have come to Erfurt to +set a limit to this conduct." It was evident that if Napoleon had +his way completely, the partition of Turkey would take place at the +time and in the manner desired by him; this the Czar was determined +to prevent, and therefore turned a deaf ear to his ally's proposal +that they should summon Austria to explain her present ambiguous +behaviour and frankly to recognize Joseph Bonaparte as King of +Spain. If Austria put a stop to her present armaments, the +supremacy of Napoleon in Central Europe would be alarmingly great. +Clearly it was not to Russia's interest to weaken the only +buffer-state that remained between her and the Empire of the +West.</p> + +<p>These fears were quietly fed by a special envoy of the Court of +Vienna, Baron Vincent, who brought complimentary notes to the two +Emperors and remained to feel the pulse of European policy. It +boded peace for Austria for the present. Despite Napoleon's eager +arguments that England would never make peace until Austria +accepted the present situation in Spain, Alexander quietly but +firmly refused to take any steps to depress the Hapsburg Power. The +discussions waxed warm; for Napoleon saw that, unless the Court of +Vienna were coerced, England would persist in aiding the Spanish +patriots; and Alexander showed an unexpected obstinacy. Napoleon's +plea, that peace could only be assured by the entire discouragement +of England, Austria, and the Spanish "rebels," had no effect on +him: in fact, he began to question the sincerity of a peacemaker +whose methods were war and intimidation. Finding arguments useless, +Napoleon had recourse to anger. At the end of a lively discussion, +he threw his cap on the ground and stamped on it. Alexander +stopped, looked at him with a meaning smile, and said quietly: "You +are violent: as for me, I am obstinate: anger gains nothing from +me: let us talk, let us reason, or I go." He moved towards the +door, whereupon Napoleon called him back—and they +reasoned.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii182" id= +"page_ii182">[pg.182]</a></span></p> + +<p>It was of no avail. Though Alexander left his ally a free hand +in Spain, he refused to join him in a diplomatic menace to Austria; +and Napoleon saw that "those devilish Spanish affairs" were at the +root of this important failure, which was to cost him the war on +the Danube in the following year.</p> + +<p>As a set-off to this check, he disappointed Alexander respecting +Prussia and Turkey. He refused to withdraw his troops from the +fortresses on the Oder, and grudgingly consented to lower his +pecuniary claims on Prussia from 140,000,000 francs to 120,000,000. +Towards the Czar's Turkish schemes he showed little more +complaisance. After sharp discussions it was finally settled that +Russia should gain the Danubian provinces, but not until the +following year. France renounced all mediation between Alexander +and the Porte, but required him to maintain the integrity of all +the other Turkish possessions, which meant that the partition of +Turkey was to be postponed until it suited Napoleon to take up his +oriental schemes in earnest. The golden visions of Tilsit were thus +once more relegated to a distant future, and the keenness of the +Czar's disappointment may be measured by his striking statement +quoted by Caulaincourt in one of his earlier reports from St. +Petersburg: "Let the world be turned upside down provided that +Russia gains Constantinople and the Dardanelles."<a name= +"FN2anchor203_203"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_203_203"><sup>[203]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The Erfurt interview left another hidden sore. It was there that +the divorce from Josephine was officially discussed, with a view to +a more ambitious alliance. Persistent as the rumours of a divorce +had been for seven years past, they seem to have emanated, not from +the husband, but from jealous sisters-in-law, intriguing relatives, +and officious Ministers. To the most meddlesome of these +satellites, Fouché, who had ventured to suggest to Josephine +the propriety of sacrificing herself for the good of the State, +Napoleon had lately administered a severe rebuke. But now he caused +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii183" id= +"page_ii183">[pg.183]</a></span> Talleyrand and Caulaincourt to +sound the Czar as to the feasibility of an alliance with one of his +sisters. The response was equally vague and discreet. Alexander +expressed his gratification at the friendship which proffered such +a request and his desire for the founding of a Napoleonic House. +Further than this he did not go: and eight days after his return to +St. Petersburg his only marriageable sister, Catherine, was +affianced to the heir to the Duchy of Oldenburg. This event, it is +true, was decided by the Dowager Empress; but no one, least of all +Napoleon, could harbour any doubts as to its significance.</p> + +<p>In truth, Napoleon's chief triumphs at Erfurt were social and +literary. His efforts to dazzle German princes and denationalize +two of her leading thinkers were partly successful. Goethe and +Wieland bowed before his greatness. To the former Napoleon granted +a lengthy interview. He flattered the aged poet at the outset by +the words, "You are a man": he then talked about several works in a +way that Goethe thought very just; and he criticised one passage of +the poet's youthful work, "Werther," as untrue to nature, with +which Goethe agreed. On Voltaire's "Mahomet" he heaped censure, for +its unworthy portraiture of the conqueror of the East and its +ineffective fatalism. "These pieces belong to an obscure age. +Besides, what do they mean with their fatalism? Politics is +fatalism." The significance of this saying was soon to be +emphasized, so that misapprehension was impossible. After +witnessing Voltaire's "La Mort de César," Napoleon suggested +that the poet ought to write a tragedy in a grander style than +Voltaire's, so as to show how the world would have benefited if the +great Roman had had time to carry out his vast plans.</p> + +<p>Finally, Goethe was invited to come to Paris, where he would +find abundant materials for his poetic creations. Fortunately, +Goethe was able to plead his age in excuse; and the world was +therefore spared the sight of a great genius saddled with an +imperial commission and<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii184" +id="page_ii184">[pg.184]</a></span> writing a Napoleonized version +of Cæsar's exploits and policy. But the pressing character of +the invitation reveals the Emperor's dissatisfaction with his +French poetasters and his intention to denationalize German +literature. He had a dim perception that Teutonic idealism was a +dangerous foe, inasmuch as it kept alive the sense of nationality +which he was determined to obliterate. He was right. The last and +most patriotic of Schiller's works, "Wilhelm Tell," the impassioned +discourses of Fichte, the efforts of the new patriotic league, the +Tugendbund, and last, but not least, the memory of the murdered +Palm, all these were influences that baffled bayonets and +diplomacy. Conquer and bargain as he might, he could not grapple +with the impalpable forces of the era that was now dawning. The +younger generation throbbed responsive to the teachings of Fichte, +the appeals of Stein, and the exploits of the Spaniards; it was +blind to the splendours of Erfurt: and it heard with grief, but +with no change of conviction, that Goethe and Wieland had accepted +from Napoleon the cross of the Legion of Honour, and that too on +the anniversary of the Battle of Jena.</p> + +<p>After thus finally belittling the two poets, he shot a parting +shaft at German idealism in his farewell to the academicians. He +bade them beware of idealogues as dangerous dreamers and disguised +materialists. Then, raising his voice, he exclaimed: "Philosophers +plague themselves with weaving systems: they will never find a +better one than Christianity, which, reconciling man with himself, +also assures public order and repose. Your idealogues destroy every +illusion; and the time of illusions is for peoples and individuals +alike the time of happiness. I carry one away, that you will think +kindly of me." He then mounted his carriage and drove away to Paris +to resume his conquest of Spain.<a name="FN2anchor204_204"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_204_204"><sup>[204]</sup></a><span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii185" id= +"page_ii185">[pg.185]</a></span></p> + +<p>The last diplomatic proceeding at Erfurt was the drawing up of a +secret convention which assigned Finland and the Danubian Provinces +to Russia, and promised Russia's help to Napoleon in case Austria +should attack him. The Czar also recognized Joseph Bonaparte as +King of Spain and joined Napoleon in a joint note to George III. +summoning him to make peace. On the same day (October 12th) that +note was drawn up and despatched to London. In reply, Canning +stated our willingness to treat for peace, provided that it should +include all parties: that, although bound by no formal treaty to +Ferdinand VII. and the Spanish people, yet we felt ourselves none +the less pledged to them, and presumed that they, as well as our +other allies, would be admitted to the negotiations. Long before +this reply reached Paris, Napoleon had left for Spain. But on +November 19th, he charged Champagny to state that the Spanish +rebels could no more be admitted than the Irish insurgents: as for +the other parties to the dispute he would not refuse to admit +"either the King reigning in Sweden, or the King reigning in +Sicily, or the King reigning in Brazil." This insulting reply +sufficiently shows the insincerity of his overtures and the +peculiarity of his views of monarchy. The Spaniards were rebels +because they refused to recognize the forced abdication of their +young King; and the rulers of Sweden, Naples and Portugal, were +Kings as long as it suited Napoleon to tolerate them, and no +longer. It is needless to add that our Government refused to desert +the Spaniards; and in his reply to St. Petersburg, Canning +expressed George III.'s deep regret that Alexander should +sanction</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"An usurpation unparalleled in the history of the world.... If +these be the principles to which the Emperor of Russia has +inviolably attached himself ... deeply does His Majesty [George +III.] lament a determination by which the sufferings<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii186" id="page_ii186">[pg.186]</a></span> +of Europe must be aggravated and prolonged. But not to His Majesty +is to be attributed the continuance of the calamities of war, by +the disappointment of all hope of such a peace as would be +compatible with justice and honour."<a name= +"FN2anchor205_205"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_205_205"><sup>[205]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>No open-minded person can peruse the correspondence on this +subject without concluding that British policy, if lacking the +breadth, grip and <i>finesse</i> that marked that of France and +Russia, yet possessed the sterling merits of manly truthfulness and +staunch fidelity. The words quoted above were the words of Canning, +but the spirit that animated them was that of George III. His +storm-tossed life was now verging towards the dread bourne of +insanity; but it was given to him to make this stern yet +half-pleading appeal to the Czar's better nature. And who shall say +that the example of constancy which the aged King displayed amidst +the gathering gloom of his public and private life did not +ultimately bear fruit in the later and grander phase of Alexander's +character and career?</p> + +<p>Meanwhile Napoleon was bursting through the Spanish defence. The +patriots, puffed up with their first successes, had been indulging +in dreams of an invasion of France; and their provincial juntas +quarrelled over the sharing of the future spoils as over the +apportionment of English arms and money. Their awakening was +terrible. With less than 90,000 raw troops they were attacked by +250,000 men led by the greatest warrior of the age. Everywhere they +were routed, and at a last fight at the pass over the Somosierra +mountain, the superiority of the French was strikingly shown. While +the Spaniards were pouring down grapeshot on the struggling masses +of the assailants, the Emperor resolved to hurl his light Polish +horse uphill at the death-dealing guns. Dashingly was the order +obeyed. Some forty or fifty riders bit the<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii187" id="page_ii187">[pg.187]</a></span> dust, but the +rest swept on, sabred the gunners, and decided the day. The +Spaniards, amazed at these unheard-of tactics, took to their heels, +and nothing now stayed Napoleon's entry into Madrid (December 4th). +There he strove to popularize Joseph's rule by offering several +desirable reforms, such as the abolition of feudal laws and of the +Inquisition. It was of no avail. The Spaniards would have none of +them at his hands.</p> + +<p>After a brief stay in Madrid, he turned to crush Sir John Moore. +That brave soldier, relying on the empty promises of the patriots, +had ventured into the heart of Leon with a British force of 26,000 +men. If he could not save Madrid, he could at least postpone a +French conquest of the south. In this he succeeded; his chivalrous +daring drew on him the chief strength of the invaders; and when +hopelessly outnumbered he beat a lion-like retreat to Corunna. +There he turned and dealt the French a blow that closed his own +career with glory and gained time for his men to embark in +safety.</p> + +<p>While the red-coats saw the snowy heights of Galicia fade into +the sky, Napoleon was spurring back to the Pyrenees. He had +received news that portended war with Austria; and, cherishing the +strange belief that Spain was conquered, he rushed back to Paris to +confront the Hapsburg Power. But Spain was not conquered. Scattered +her armies were in the open, and even brave Saragossa fell in +glorious ruins under Lannes' persistent attacks. But the patriots +fiercely rallied in the mountains, and Napoleon was to find out the +truth of the Roman historian's saying: "In no land does the +character of the people and the nature of the country help to +repair disasters more readily than in Spain."</p> + +<p>There was another reason for Napoleon's sudden return. Rumours +had reached him as to the <i>rapprochement</i> of those usually +envious rivals, Talleyrand and Fouché, who now walked arm in +arm, held secret conclaves, and seemed to have some understanding +with Murat. Were they plotting to bring this ambitious man and his +still more ambitious and vindictive consort from<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii188" id="page_ii188">[pg.188]</a></span> +the despised throne at Naples to seize on power at Paris while the +Emperor was engulfed in the Spanish quagmire? A story ran that +Fouché had relays of horses ready between Naples and Paris +for this enterprise.<a name="FN2anchor206_206"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_206_206"><sup>[206]</sup></a> But where Fouché +and Talleyrand are concerned, truth lurks at the bottom of an +unfathomable well.</p> + +<p>All that we know for certain is that Napoleon flew back to Paris +in a towering rage, and that, after sharply rebuking Fouché, +he subjected the Prince of Benevento to a violent tirade: just as +he (Talleyrand) had first advised the death of the Duc d'Enghien +and then turned that event to his sovereign's discredit, so now, +after counselling the overthrow of the Spanish dynasty, he was +making the same underhand use of the miscarriage of that +enterprise. The Grand Chamberlain stood as if unmoved until the +storm swept by, and then coldly remarked to the astonished circle: +"What a pity that so great a man has been so badly brought up." +Nevertheless, the insult rankled deep in his being, there to be +nursed for five years, and then in the fullness of time to dart +forth with a snake-like revenge. In 1814 and 1815 men saw that not +the least serious result of Napoleon's Spanish policy was the +envenoming of his relations with the two cleverest of living +Frenchmen.</p> + +<br> + + +<p>NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION.—In the foregoing narrative, +describing the battle of the Somosierra, I followed the usually +accepted account, which assigns the victory solely to the credit of +the Polish horsemen. But Mr. Oman has shown ("History of the +Peninsular War," vol. i., pp. 459-461) that their first charge +failed, and that only when a brigade of French infantry skirmished +right up to the crest, did a second effort of the Poles, supported +by cavalry of the Guard, secure the pass. Napier's description +(vol. i., p. 267), based on the French bulletin, is incorrect.<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii189" id= +"page_ii189">[pg.189]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXX</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>NAPOLEON AND AUSTRIA</center> + +<br> + + +<p>"Never maltreat an enemy by halves": such was the sage advice of +Prussia's warrior King Frederick the Great, who instinctively saw +the folly of half measures in dealing with a formidable foe. The +only statesmanlike alternatives were, to win his friendship by +generous treatment, or to crush him to the earth so that he could +not rise to deal another blow.</p> + +<p>As we have seen, Napoleon deliberately took the perilous middle +course with the Hapsburgs after Austerlitz. He tore away from them +their faithful Tyrolese along with all their Swabian lands, and he +half crippled them in Italy by leaving them the line of the Adige +instead of the Mincio. Later on, he compelled Austria to join the +Continental System, to the detriment of her commerce and revenue; +and his thinly veiled threats at Erfurt nerved her to strike home +as soon as she saw him embarked on the Spanish enterprise. She had +some grounds for confidence. The blows showered on the Hapsburg +States had served to weld them more closely together; reforms +effected in the administration under the guidance of the able and +high-spirited minister, Stadion, promised to reinvigorate the whole +Empire; and army reforms, championed by the Archduke Charles, had +shelved the petted incapables of the Court and opened up +undreamt-of vistas of hope even to the common soldier. Moreover, it +was certain that the Tyrolese would revolt against the cast-iron +Liberalism now imposed on them from Munich, which interfered with +their cherished customs and church festivals.<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii190" id= +"page_ii190">[pg.190]</a></span></p> + +<p>Throughout Germany, too, there were widespread movements for +casting off the yoke of Napoleon. The benefits gained by the +adoption of his laws were already balanced by the deepening +hardships entailed by the Continental System; and the national +German sentiment, which Napoleon ever sought to root out, +persistently clung to Berlin and Vienna. A new thrill of resentment +ran through Germany when Napoleon launched a decree of proscription +against Stein, who had resigned office on November 24th. It was +dated from Madrid (December 16th, 1808), and ordered that "the man +named Stein," for seeking to excite troubles in Germany, should be +held an enemy of France and the Confederation of the Rhine, and +suffer confiscation of his property and seizure of his person, +wherever he might be. The great statesman thereupon fled into +Austria, where all the hopes of German nationalists now centred.<a +name="FN2anchor207_207"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_207_207"><sup>[207]</sup></a></p> + +<p>On April the 6th the Archduke Charles issued a proclamation in +which the new hopes of reformed Austria found eloquent expression: +"The freedom of Europe has sought refuge beneath your banners. +Soldiers, your victories will break her chains: your German +brothers who are now in the ranks of the enemy wait for their +deliverance." These hopes were premature. Austria was too late or +too soon: she was too late to overpower the Bavarians, or to catch +the French forces leaderless, and too soon to gain the full benefit +from her recent army reforms and from the diversion promised by +England on the North Sea.<a name="FN2anchor208_208"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_208_208"><sup>[208]</sup></a> But our limits of space +render it impossible adequately to describe the course of the +struggle on the Danube or of the Tyrolese rising.</p> + +<p>Napoleon, hurrying from Paris, found his forces spread<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii191" id= +"page_ii191">[pg.191]</a></span> out over a front of sixty miles +from Ratisbon to positions south of Augsburg, and it needed all his +skill to mass them before the Archduke's blows fell. Thanks to +Austrian slowness the danger was averted, and a difficult +retrograde movement was speedily changed into a triumphant +offensive. Five successive days saw as many French victories, the +chief of which, at Eckmühl (April 22nd), forced the Archduke +with the Austrian right wing northwards towards Ratisbon, which was +stormed on the following day, Charles now made for the Böhmer +Wald, while his left wing on the south of the Danube fell back +towards the Inn. Pushing his advantage to the utmost, the victor +invaded Austria and forced Vienna to surrender (May 13th).</p> + +<p>At that city Napoleon issued (May 17th) a decree which reveals +the excess of his confidence. It struck down the temporal power of +the Pope, and annexed to the French Empire the part of the Papal +States which he had spared the year before. The form of the decree +was as remarkable as its substance. With an effrontery only +equalled by its historical falsity, it cited the example of +"Charlemagne, my august predecessor, Emperor of the French"; and, +after exalting the Imperial dignity, it proceeded to lower the +Popes to the position of Bishops of Rome. The subordination of the +spiritual to the civil power was also assured by the assigning of a +yearly stipend of 2,000,000 francs to the Pope.</p> + +<p>When Pius VII. protested against the seizure of his States, and +hurled a bull of excommunication at the spoliator, Napoleon issued +orders which led to his arrest; and shortly after midsummer the +unfortunate pontiff was hurried away from Rome to Florence.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile Napoleon had experienced an unlooked-for reverse. +Though so far cowed by his defeats in Bavaria as to send Napoleon a +cringing request for peace, to which the victor deigned no reply, +the Archduke Charles obstinately clung to the northern bank of the +Danube opposite the capital, and inflicted a severe defeat on the +Emperor when the latter sought to drive him from<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii192" id="page_ii192">[pg.192]</a></span> +Aspern-Essling (May 21st-22nd). Had the Austrian commander had that +remorseless resolve which ever prompted Napoleon to wrest from +Fortune her utmost favours, the white-coats might have driven their +foes into the river; for at the close of both of those days of +carnage they had a clear advantage. A French disaster was in fact +averted only by the combined efforts of Napoleon, Masséna, +Lannes, and General Mouton; and even they were for a time dismayed +by the frightful losses, and by the news that the bridges, over +which alone they could retire, had been swept away by trees and +barges sent down the flooded stream. But, as at Eylau, Napoleon's +iron will imposed on his foes, and, under cover of darkness, the +French were withdrawn into the island of Lobau, after losing some +25,000 men.<a name="FN2anchor209_209"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_209_209"><sup>[209]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Among them was that prince of vanguard leaders, Lannes. On +hearing that his old friend was mortally wounded, the Emperor +hurried to him, and tenderly embraced him. The interview, says +Marbot, who was supporting the Marshal's shoulders, was most +affecting, both these stern warriors displaying genuine emotion. +And yet, it is reported that, after Lannes was removed to +Ebersdorf, his last words were those of reproach to the Emperor for +his ambition. At that time, however, the patient was delirious, and +the words, if really uttered, were meaningless; but the inventor of +the anecdote might plead that it was consonant with the recent +tenor of the Marshal's thoughts. Like all thoughtful soldiers, who +placed France before Napoleon, Lannes was weary of these endless +wars. After Jena his heart was not in the work; and<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii193" id="page_ii193">[pg.193]</a></span> +he wrote thus about Napoleon during the siege of Danzig: "I have +always been the victim of my attachment to him. He only loves you +by fits and starts, that is, when he has need of you." His +presentiment was true. He was a victim to a war that was the +outcome solely of Napoleon's Continental System, and not of the +needs of France. He passed away, leaving a brilliant military fame +and a reputation for soldierly republican frankness which was fast +vanishing from the camps and <i>salons</i> of the Empire.<a name= +"FN2anchor210_210"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_210_210"><sup>[210]</sup></a></p> + +<p>As yet, however, Napoleon's genius and the martial ardour of his +soldiers sufficed to overbear the halting efforts of Austria and +her well-wishers. On retiring into Lobau Island he put forth to the +utmost his extraordinary powers of organization. Boats brought vast +supplies of stores and ammunition from Vienna, which the French +still held. The menacing front of Masséna and Davoust +imposed on the enemy. Reinforcements were hurried up from Bavaria. +Tyrol was denuded of Franco-Bavarian troops, so that the peasants, +under the lead of the brave innkeeper, Hofer, were able to organize +a systematic defence. And a French army which had finally beaten +the Austrians in Venetia, now began to drive them back into +Hungary. In Poland the white-coats were held in check, and the +Franco-Russian compact deterred Frederick William from making any +move against France such as Prussian patriots ardently +counselled.</p> + +<p>To have done so would have been madness, unless England sent +powerful aid on the side of Hanover; and that aid was not +forthcoming. Yet the patriotic ardour of the Germans led to two +daring efforts against the French. Schill, with a Prussian cavalry +regiment, sought to seize Magdeburg, and failing there moved north +in hopes of British help. His adventurous ride was ended by +Napoleon's Dutch and North German troops, who closed in on him at +Stralsund, and, on May 31st, cut to pieces his brave troop. Schill +met a warrior's death:<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii194" +id="page_ii194">[pg.194]</a></span> most of the survivors were sent +to the galleys in France. Undeterred by this failure, the young +Duke of Brunswick sought to rouse Saxony and Westphalia by a +dashing cavalry raid (June); but, beyond showing the weakness of +Jerome Bonaparte's rule and the general hatred of the French, he +effected little: with his 2,000 followers he was finally saved by +British cruisers (August). Had the British expedition, which in the +ensuing autumn rotted away on Walcheren, been landed at Stralsund, +or in Hanover during the spring, it is certain that Germany would +have risen in Napoleon's rear; and in that case, the doubtful +struggle which closed at Wagram might have ended very +differently.<a name="FN2anchor211_211"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_211_211"><sup>[211]</sup></a></p> + +<p>All hopes for European independence centred in Wellesley and the +Archduke Charles. Although there was no formal compact between +England and Austria, yet the Hapsburgs rested their hopes largely +on the diversions made by our troops. In the early part of the +Peninsular campaign of 1809, these hopes were brilliantly +fulfilled. Wellesley moved against Soult at Oporto, and, by a +dextrous crossing of that river in his rear, compelled him to beat +a calamitous retreat on Spain, with the loss of all his cannon and +stores. The French reached Lugo an armed rabble, and were greeted +there with jeers and execrations by the men of Ney's corps. The two +Marshals themselves took up the quarrel, and so fierce were the +taunts of Ney that Soult drew his sword and a duel was barely +averted.<a name="FN2anchor212_212"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_212_212"><sup>[212]</sup></a> An appearance of concord +was restored during their operations in Galicia and Asturias: but +no opportunity was missed of secretly thwarting the hated rival; +and here, as all through the Peninsular War, the private jealousies +of the French leaders fatally compromised the success of their +arms. Wellesley, seeing that the operations in Galicia would never +decide the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii195" id= +"page_ii195">[pg.195]</a></span> war, began to prepare a deadly +blow at the centre of French authority, Madrid.</p> + +<p>While Wellesley thrust a thin wedge into the heart of Spain, the +Archduke Charles was overthrown on the banks of the Danube. After +drawing in reinforcements from France, the Rhenish Confederation, +and Eugène's army of Italy, the French Emperor disposed of +180,000 highly-trained troops, whom he massed in the Lobau Island, +or on the right shore of the Danube. Every preparation was made for +deceiving the Austrians as to the point of crossing and with +complete success. With great labour the defenders threw up +intrenchments facing the north side of the island. But, on a thick +stormy night (July 4th), six bridges of boats were quickly swung +across the stream lower down, that is, on the east side of Lobau, +while a furious cannonade on the north side misled their foes. The +crossing was effected without loss by Oudinot and Masséna; +and sunrise saw the whole French army advancing rapidly northwards, +thereby outflanking the Austrian earthworks, which were now +evacuated.</p> + +<p>Charles was outmanoeuvred and outnumbered. His brother, the +Archduke John, was at Pressburg with 20,000 men, watched hitherto +by Davoust. But the French Marshal cleverly withdrew his corps, +leaving only enough men to impose on that unenterprising leader. +Other Austrian detachments were also far away at the critical time, +and thus Napoleon had a superiority of force of about 50,000 men. +Nevertheless, the defence at Wagram was most obstinate (July 6th). +Holding his own on the hills behind the Russbach, the Archduke +swung forward his right in such strength as to drive back +Masséna on Aspern; but his weakened centre was now pushed +back and endangered by the persistent vigour of Macdonald's onset. +This success at the centre gave time for Davoust to wrest Neusiedel +from the white-coats, a movement which would have been stopped or +crushed, had the Archduke John obeyed his brother's orders and +marched from the side of Pressburg on Napoleon's unguarded right +flank. Finally, after an obstinate stand, the <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii196" id="page_ii196">[pg.196]</a></span> +Austrians fell back in good order, effectively covering their +retreat by a murderous artillery fire. A total loss of some 50,000 +men, apportioned nearly equally on either side, was the chief +result of this terrible day. It was not remarkable for brilliant +tactics; and, as at Aspern, the Austrians fully equalled their foes +in courage.</p> + +<center><a name="image_12"><img alt="BATTLE OF WAGRAM" src= +"images/image12.jpg" width="361" height="356"><br> + <font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>BATTLE OF +WAGRAM</small></font></a></center> + +<p>Such was the battle of Wagram, one of the greatest of all time, +if the number of combatants be counted, but one of the least +decisive in its strictly military results. If we may compare +Austerlitz with Blenheim, Wagram may with equal fitness be matched +with the vast slaughter of Malplaquet exactly a century before. The +French now felt the hardening of the national defence of Austria +and the falling off in their own fighting powers. Marmont tells +how, at the close of the day, the approach of the Archduke John's +scouts struck panic into the conquerors, so that for a time the +plain on the east was covered with runaway conscripts and +disconcerted plunderers. The incident proved the deterioration of +the Grand Army from the times of Ulm and Jena. Raw conscripts +raised before their time and<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii197" id="page_ii197">[pg.197]</a></span> hurriedly drafted +into the line had impaired its steadiness, and men noted as another +ominous fact that few unwounded prisoners were taken from the +Austrians, and only nine guns and one colour. In fact, the only +reputation enhanced was that of Macdonald, who for his great +services at the centre enjoyed the unique honour of receiving a +Marshal's bâton from Napoleon on the field of battle.</p> + +<p>Had the Archduke Charles been made of the same stuff as +Wellington, the campaign might still have been retrieved. But +softness and irresolution were the characteristics of Austria's +generals no less than of her rulers.<a name= +"FN2anchor213_213"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_213_213"><sup>[213]</sup></a> The Hapsburg armies were +still led with the old leisurely <i>insouciance</i>; and their +counsels swayed to and fro under the wavering impulses of a +seemingly decrepit dynasty. Francis had many good qualities: he was +a good husband and father, and his kindly manners endeared him to +the Viennese even in the midst of defeat. But he was capricious and +shortsighted; anything outside of the well-worn ruts of routine +vexed and alarmed him; and it is a supreme proof of the greatness +and courage of his reforming Minister, Stadion, that his +innovations should have been tolerated for so long. Now that +disasters were shaking his throne he began to suspect the reformer; +and Stadion confessed to the publicist, Gentz, that it was +impossible to reckon on the Emperor for a quarter of an hour +together, unless one stayed by him all the twenty-four +hours.—"After a great defeat, he will take himself off at +once and will calmly commend us to God."—This was what now +happened. Another failure at Znaim so daunted the Archduke that he +sued for an armistice (July 12th). For this there was some excuse. +The latest news both from Spain and Prussia inspired the hope that, +if time were gained, important diversions might be made in both +quarters.</p> + +<p>As we have seen, Sir Arthur Wellesley opened the<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii198" id="page_ii198">[pg.198]</a></span> +campaign with a brilliant success, and then prepared to strike at +the heart of the French power. The memorable campaign of Talavera +was the result. Relying on promises of aid from the Spanish Junta +and from their cross-grained commander, Cuesta, he led a small +British force up the valley of the Tagus to seize Madrid, while the +chief French armies were engaged in distant provinces. In one sense +he achieved his aim. He compelled the enemy to loose their hold on +those provinces and concentrate to save the capital. And before +they fully effected their concentration, he gave battle to King +Joseph and Marshals Jourdan and Victor at Talavera (July 28th). +Skilfully posting the Spaniards behind intrenchments and in gardens +where their raw levies could fight with every advantage, he +extended his thin red lines—he had only 17,000 British +troops—along a ridge stretching up to a plateau that +dominated the broken ground north of the town. On that hill +Wellesley planted his left: and all the efforts of Victor to turn +that wing or to break it by charges across the intervening ravine +were bloodily beaten off.</p> + +<p>The fierce heat served but to kindle French and British to +greater fury. Finally, the dashing charge of our 23rd dragoons and +the irresistible advance of the 48th regiment of foot overthrew the +enemy's centre; and as the day waned, the 30,000 French retired, +with a loss of 17 cannon and of 7,000 men in killed, wounded, and +prisoners. Had the other Spanish armies now offered the support +which Wellesley expected, he would doubtless have seized Madrid. He +had written three days before Talavera: "With or without a battle +we shall be at Madrid soon." But his allies now failed him utterly: +they did not hold the mountain passes which confronted Soult in his +march from Salamanca into the valley of the Tagus; and they left +the British forces half starving.—"We are here worse off than +in a hostile country," wrote our commander; "never was an army so +ill used: we had no assistance from the Spanish army: we were +obliged to unload our ammunition and<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii199" id="page_ii199">[pg.199]</a></span> our treasure in +order to employ the cars in the removal of our sick and wounded." +Meanwhile Soult, with 50,000 men, was threading his way easily +through the mountains and threatened to cut us off from Portugal: +but by a rapid retreat Wellesley saved his army, vowing that he +would never again trust Spanish offers of help.<a name= +"FN2anchor214_214"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_214_214"><sup>[214]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Far more dispiriting was the news that reached the Austrian +negotiators from the North Sea. There the British Government +succeeded in eclipsing all its former achievements in forewarning +foes and disgusting its friends. Very early in the year, the men of +Downing Street knew that Austria was preparing to fight Napoleon +and built her hopes of success, partly on the Peninsular War, +partly on a British descent in Hanover, where everything was ripe +for revolution. Unfortunately, we were still, formally, at war with +her: and the conclusion of the treaty of peace was so long delayed +at Vienna that July was almost gone before the Austrian +ratification reached London, and our armada set sail from Dover.<a +name="FN2anchor215_215"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_215_215"><sup>[215]</sup></a> The result is well known. +Official favouritism handed over the command of 40,000 troops to +the Earl of Chatham, who wasted precious days in battering +down<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii200" id= +"page_ii200">[pg.200]</a></span> the walls of Flushing when he +should have struck straight at the goal now aimed at, Antwerp. That +fortress was therefore ready to beat him off; and he finally +withdrew his army into the Isle of Walcheren, into whose +fever-laden swamps Napoleon had refused to send a single French +soldier. A tottering remnant was all that survived by the close of +the year: and the climax of our national disgrace was reached when +a court-martial acquitted the commanders. Napoleon would have had +them shot.</p> + +<p>Helpless as the old monarchies were to cope with Napoleon, a +wild longing for vengeance was beginning to throb among the +peoples. It showed itself in a remarkable attempt on his life +during a review at Schönbrunn. A delicate youth named Staps, +son of a Thuringian pastor, made his way to the palace, armed with +a long knife, intending to stab him while he read a petition +(October 12th). Berthier and Rapp, noting the lad's importunity, +had him searched and brought before Napoleon. "What did you mean to +do with that knife?" asked the Emperor. "Kill you," was the reply. +"You are an idiot or an Illuminat." "I am not an idiot and do not +know what an Illuminat is." "Then you are diseased." "No, I am +quite well." "Why do you wish to kill me?" "Because you are the +curse of my Fatherland." "You are a fanatic; I will forgive you and +spare your life." "I want no forgiveness." "Would you thank me if I +pardoned you?" "I would seek to kill you again." The quiet firmness +with which Staps gave these replies and then went to his doom made +a deep impression on Napoleon; and he sought to hurry on the +conclusion of peace with these odd Germans whom he could conquer +but not convince.</p> + +<p>The Emperor Francis was now resigned to his fate, but he refused +to hear of giving up his remaining sea-coast in Istria. On this +point Metternich strove hard to bend Napoleon's will, but received +as a final answer: "Then war is unavoidable."<a name= +"FN2anchor216_216"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_216_216"><sup>[216]</sup></a> In fact, the victor +knew<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii201" id= +"page_ii201">[pg.201]</a></span> that Austria was in his power. The +Archduke Charles had thrown up his command, the soldiery were +depressed, and a great part of the Empire was in the hands of the +French. England's efforts had failed; and of all the isolated +patriotic movements in Germany only that of the Tyrolese +mountaineers still struggled on. Napoleon could therefore dictate +his own terms in the Treaty of Schönbrunn (October 14th), +which he announced as complete, when as yet Francis had not signed +it.<a name="FN2anchor217_217"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_217_217"><sup>[217]</sup></a> Austria thereby recognized +Joseph as King of Spain, and ceded Salzburg and the Inn-viertel to +Napoleon, to be transferred by him to Bavaria. To the French Empire +she yielded up parts of Austrian Friuli and Carinthia, besides +Carniola, the city and district of Trieste, and portions of Croatia +and Dalmatia to the south of the River Save. Her spoils of the old +Polish lands now went to aggrandize the Duchy of Warsaw, a small +strip of Austrian Gallicia also going to Russia. Besides losing +3,500,000 subjects, Austria was mulcted in an indemnity of +£3,400,000, and again bound herself to exclude all British +products. By a secret clause she agreed to limit her army to +150,000 men.</p> + +<p>Perhaps the severest loss was the abandonment of the faithful +Tyrolese. After Aspern, the Emperor Francis promised that he would +never lay down his arms until they were re-united with his Empire. +This promise now went the way of the many fond hopes of reform and +championship of German nationality which her ablest men had lately +cherished, and the Empire settled down in torpor and bankruptcy. In +dumb wrath and despair Austrian patriots looked on, while the +Tyrolese were beaten down by French, Bavarian, and Italian forces. +Hofer finally took to the hills, was betrayed by a friend, and was +taken to Mantua. Some of the officers who there tried him desired +to spare his life, but a special despatch of Napoleon<a name= +"FN2anchor218_218"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_218_218"><sup>[218]</sup></a> ordered his execution, and +the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii202" id= +"page_ii202">[pg.202]</a></span> brave mountaineer fell, with the +words on his lips: "Long live the Emperor Francis." Tyrol, +meanwhile, was parcelled out between Bavaria, Illyria, and the +Kingdom of Italy; but bullets and partitions were of no avail +against the staunch patriotism of her people, and the Tyrolese +campaign boded ill for Napoleon if monarchs, generals, and +statesmen should ever be inspired by the sturdy faith and hardihood +of that noble peasantry.</p> + +<p>As yet, however, prudence and timidity reigned supreme. Though +the Czar uttered some snappish words at the threatening increase to +the Duchy of Warsaw, he still posed as Napoleon's ally. The Swedes, +weary of their hopeless strifes with France, Russia, and Denmark, +deposed the still bellicose Gustavus IV.; and his successor, +Charles XIII., made peace with those Powers, retaining Swedish +Pomerania, but only at the cost of submitting to the Continental +System. Prussia seemed, to official eyes, utterly cowed. The +Hapsburgs, having failed in their bold championship of the cause of +reform and of German nationality, now fell back into a policy +marked by timid opportunism and decorously dull routine.</p> + +<p>The change was marked by the retirement of Stadion, a man whose +enterprising character, no less than his enthusiasm for reform, ill +fitted him for the time of compromise and subservience now at hand. +He it was who had urged Austria forward in the paths of progress +and had sought safety in the people: he was the Stein of Austria. +But now, on the eve of peace, he earnestly begged to be allowed to +resign the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Emperor Francis +thereupon summoned to that seemingly thankless office a young +diplomatist, who was destined to play a foremost part in the mighty +drama of Napoleon's overthrow, and thereafter to wield by his +astute policy almost as great an influence in Central and Southern +Europe as the autocrat himself.</p> + +<p>Metternich was born at Coblentz in 1773, and was therefore four +years the junior of Napoleon. He came of an old family of the +Rhineland, and his father's position in the service of the old +Empire secured him early entrance<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii203" id="page_ii203">[pg.203]</a></span> into the +diplomatic circle. After acting as secretary to the Imperial +delegates at the Congress of Rastatt, he occupied the post of +Austrian ambassador successively at the Courts of Dresden and +Berlin; and in 1806 he was suddenly called to take up the embassy +in Paris. There he displayed charms of courtly tact, and lively and +eloquent conversation, which won Napoleon's admiration and esteem. +He was looked on as a Gallophil; and, like Bismarck at a later +crisis, he used his social gifts and powers of cajolery so as to +gain a correct estimate of the characters of his future +opponents.</p> + +<p>Yet, besides these faculties of finesse and intrigue—and +the Miltonic Belial never told lies with more winsome +grace—Metternich showed at times a manly composure and +firmness, even when Napoleon unmasked a searching fire of +diplomatic questions and taunts. Of this he had given proof shortly +before the outbreak of the late war, and his conduct had earned the +thanks of the other ambassadors for giving the French Emperor a +lesson in manners, while the autocrat liked him none the less, but +rather the more, for standing up to him. But now, after the war, +all was changed; craft was more serviceable than fortitude; and the +gay Rhinelander brought to the irksome task of subservience to the +conqueror a courtly <i>insouciance</i> under which he nursed the +hope of ultimate revenge.—"From the day when peace is +signed," he wrote to the Emperor Francis on August 10th, 1809, "we +must confine our system to tacking and turning, and flattering. +Thus alone may we possibly preserve our existence, till the day of +general deliverance."<a name="FN2anchor219_219"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_219_219"><sup>[219]</sup></a> This was to be the general +drift of Austrian policy for the next four years; and it may be +granted that only by bending before the blast could that +sore-stricken monarchy be saved from destruction. An opportunity +soon occurred of + +<ins class="correction" title= +"Transcriber's note: original reads 'carrying-ing'">carrying</ins>the +new system into effect. Metternich offered the conqueror an +Austrian Archduchess as a bride.</p> + +<p>After the humiliation of the Hapsburgs and of the Spanish +patriots, nothing seemed wanting to Napoleon's<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii204" id="page_ii204">[pg.204]</a></span> +triumph but an heir who should found a durable dynasty. This aim +was now to be reached. As soon as the Emperor returned to Paris, +his behaviour towards Josephine showed a marked reserve. The +passage communicating between their private apartments was closed, +and the gleams of triumphant jealousy that flashed from her +sisters-in-law warned Josephine of her approaching doom. The +divorce so long bruited by news-mongers was at hand. The Emperor +broke the tidings to his consort in the private drawing-room of the +Tuileries on November 30th, and strove to tone down the harshness +of his decision by basing it on the imperative needs of the State. +But she spurned the dictates of statecraft. With all her faults, +she was affectionate and tender; she was a woman first and an +Empress afterwards; she now clung to Napoleon, not merely for the +splendour of the destiny which he had opened to her, but also from +genuine love.</p> + +<p>Their relations had curiously changed. At the outset she had +slighted his mad devotion by her shallow coldness and occasional +infidelities, until his lava-like passion petrified. Thenceforth it +was for her to woo, and woo in vain. For years past she had to +bemoan the waning of his affection and his many conjugal sins. And +now the chasm, which she thought to have spanned by the religious +ceremony on the eve of the coronation, yawned at her feet. The +woman and the Empress in her shrank back from the black void of the +future; and with piteous reproaches she flung back the orders of +the Emperor and the soothings of the husband. Napoleon, it would +seem, had nerved himself against such an outbreak. In vain did +Josephine sink down at his feet with heart-rending cries that she +would never survive the disgrace: failing to calm her himself, he +opened the door and summoned the prefect of the palace, Bausset, +and bade him bear her away to her private apartments. Down the +narrow stairs she was borne, the Emperor lifting her feet and +Bausset supporting her shoulders, until, half fainting, she was +left to the sympathies of her women<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii205" id="page_ii205">[pg.205]</a></span> and the attentions +of Corvisart. But hers was a wound that no sympathy or skill could +cure.<a name="FN2anchor220_220"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_220_220"><sup>[220]</sup></a></p> + +<p>On his side, Napoleon felt the wrench. Not only the ghost of his +early love, but his dislike of new associates and novel ways cried +out against the change. "In separating myself from my wife," +Napoleon once said to Talleyrand, "I renounce much. I should have +to study the tastes and habits of a young woman. Josephine +accommodates herself to everything: she understands me +perfectly."<a name="FN2anchor221_221"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_221_221"><sup>[221]</sup></a> But his boundless +triumphs, his alliance with the Czar and total overthrow of the +Bourbons and the Pope, had fed the fires of his ambition. He +aspired to give the <i>mot d'ordre</i> to the universe; and he +scrupled not to put aside a consort who could not help him to found +a dynasty. Yet it was not without pangs of sorrow and remorse. His +laboured, panting breath and almost gasping words left on Bausset +the impression that he was genuinely affected; and, consummate +actor though he was, we may well believe that he felt the parting +from his early associations. Underneath his generally cold exterior +he hid a nervous nature, dominated by an inflexible will, but which +now and again broke through all restraint, bathing the beloved +object with sudden tenderness or blasting a foe with fiery passion. +And it would seem that Josephine's pangs had power to reawaken the +feelings of his more generous youth. The ceremony of divorce took +place on December 15th Josephine declaring with agonized pride that +she gave her assent for the welfare of France.</p> + +<p>Already the new marriage negotiations had begun. They are unique +even amidst the frigid annals of royal betrothals. The French +ambassador, Caulaincourt, was charged to make definite overtures at +St. Petersburg for the hand of the Czar's younger sister; the +conditions could easily be arranged; religion need be no +difficulty; but time was pressing; the Emperor had need of an heir; +"we are counting the minutes here," ran the despatch;<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii206" id="page_ii206">[pg.206]</a></span> +and an answer was expected from St. Petersburg after an interval of +<i>two days</i>.<a name="FN2anchor222_222"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_222_222"><sup>[222]</sup></a> The request caused +Alexander the greatest perplexity. He parried it with the reply, +correct enough in form as in fact, that the disposal of his sister +rested with the Dowager Empress. But her hostility to Napoleon was +well known. After the half overtures of Erfurt she had at once +betrothed her elder daughter to the Duke of Oldenburg. No similar +escape was now possible for the younger one: but, after leaving +Napoleon's request unanswered until February 4th, the reply was +then despatched that the tender age of the princess, she being only +twenty years old, formed an insuperable obstacle.</p> + +<p>Some such answer had long been expected at Paris. Metternich +asserts in his "Memoirs" that Napoleon had caused Laborde, one of +his diplomatic agents at Vienna, tentatively to sound that Court as +to his betrothal with the Archduchess Marie Louise. But the French +archives show that the first hint came from Metternich, who saw in +it a means of weakening the Franco-Russian alliance and saving +Austria from further disasters.<a name="FN2anchor223_223"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_223_223"><sup>[223]</sup></a> A little later the +Countess Metternich was at Paris; and great was her surprise when, +on January 2nd, 1810, Josephine informed her that she favoured a +marriage between Napoleon and Marie Louise. "I spoke to him of it +yesterday," she said; "his choice is not yet fixed; but he thinks +that this would be his choice if he were sure of its being +accepted." Thereafter the Countess received the most flattering +attentions at Court, a proof that the Hapsburg match was now +favoured, even though the coyness of the Czar was as yet +unknown.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii207" id= +"page_ii207">[pg.207]</a></span></p> + +<p>At the close of January a Privy Council was held at the +Tuileries to decide on the imperial bride. The votes were nearly +equal: four voted for Austria, four for Saxony, and three for +Russia. After listening quietly to the arguments, Napoleon summed +up the discussion by pronouncing firmly and warmly in favour of +Austria. The marriage contract was therefore drawn up on February +7th; and Berthier was despatched to Vienna to claim the hand of +Marie Louise. He entered that city over the ruins of the old +ramparts, which were now being dismantled in accordance with the +French demands.</p> + +<p>The marriage took place at Vienna by proxy; the bride was +conducted to Paris; and the final ceremony took place at Notre Dame +on April 2nd, but not until the union had been consummated. Such +were Napoleon's second wooing and wedding. Nevertheless, he showed +himself an attentive and even indulgent spouse, and he remarked at +St. Helena that if Josephine was all grace and charm, Marie Louise +was innocence and nature herself.</p> + +<p>The Austrian marriage was an event of the first importance. It +gained a few years' respite for the despairing Hapsburgs, and gave +tardy satisfaction to Talleyrand's statesmanlike scheme of a +Franco-Austrian alliance which should be in the best sense +conservative. Had Napoleon taken this step after Austerlitz in the +way that his counsellor advised, possibly Europe might have reached +a condition of stable equilibrium, always provided that he gave up +his favourite scheme of partitioning Turkey. But that was not to +be; and when Austria finally yielded up Marie Louise as an +unpicturesque Iphigenia on the marriage altar, she did so only as a +desperate device for appeasing an inexorable destiny. And, strange +to say, she succeeded. For Alexander took offence at the marriage +negotiations; and thus was opened a breach in the Franco-Russian +alliance which other events were rapidly to widen, until Western +and Central Europe hurled themselves against the East, and reached +Moscow.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii208" id= +"page_ii208">[pg.208]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXXI</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT</center> + +<br> + + +<p>Napoleon's star had now risen to its zenith. After his marriage +with a daughter of the most ancient of continental dynasties, +nothing seemed lacking to his splendour. He had humbled Pope and +Emperor alike: Germany crouched at his feet: France, Italy, and the +Confederation of the Rhine gratefully acknowledged the benefits of +his vigorous sway: the Czar was still following the lead given at +Erfurt: Sweden had succumbed to the pressure of the two Emperors: +and Turkey survived only because it did not yet suit Napoleon to +shear her asunder: he must first complete the commercial ruin of +England and drive Wellington into the sea. Then events would at +last be ripe for the oriental schemes which the Spanish Rising had +postponed.</p> + +<p>He might well hope that England's strength was running out: near +the close of 1810 the three per cent. consols sank to sixty-five, +and the declared bankruptcies averaged 250 a month. The failure of +the Walcheren expedition had led to terrible loss of men and +treasure, and had clouded over the reputation of her leaders. After +mutual recriminations Canning and Castlereagh resigned office and +fought a duel. Shortly afterwards the Premier, the Duke of +Portland, fell ill and resigned: his place was taken by Mr. +Perceval, a man whose sole recommendation for the post was his +conscientious Toryism and powers of dull plodding. Ruled by an +ill-assorted Ministry and a King whose reason was now hopelessly +overclouded, weakened by the strangling grip of the Continental +System, England seemed on the<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii209" id="page_ii209">[pg.209]</a></span> verge of ruin; +and, encouraged alike by the factious conduct of our parliamentary +Opposition and by Soult's recent conquest of Andalusia, Napoleon +bent himself to the final grapple by extending his coast system, +and by sending Masséna and his choicest troops into Spain to +drive the leopards into the sea.</p> + +<p>The limits of our space prevent any description of the ensuing +campaign of Torres Vedras; and we must refer our readers to the +ample canvas of Napier if they would realize the sagacity of +Wellington in constructing to the north of Lisbon that mighty +<i>tête de pont</i> for the Sea Power against +Masséna's veteran army. After dealing the staggering blow of +Busaco at that presumptuous Marshal, our great leader fell back, +through a tract which he swept bare of supplies, on this sure +bulwark, and there watched the French host of some 65,000 men waste +away amidst the miseries of hunger and the rains and diseases of +autumn. At length, in November, Masséna drew off to +positions near Santarem, where he awaited the succour which +Napoleon ordered Soult to bring. It was in vain: Soult, puffed up +by his triumphs in Andalusia, was resolved to play his own game and +reduce Badajoz; he won his point but marred the campaign; and, at +last, foiled by Wellington's skilful tactics, Masséna beat a +retreat northwards out of Portugal after losing some 35,000 men +(March, 1811). Wellington's success bore an immeasurable harvest of +results. The unmanly whinings of the English Opposition were +stilled; the replies of the Czar to Napoleon's demands grew firmer; +and the patriots of the Peninsula stiffened their backs in a +resistance so stubborn, albeit unskilful, that 370,000 French +troops utterly failed to keep Wellington in check, and to stamp out +the national defence in the summer of 1811.</p> + +<p>In truth, Napoleon had exasperated the Spaniards no less than +their <i>soi disant</i> king, by a series of provocations extending +over the year 1810. On the plea that Spain must herself meet the +expenses of the war, he erected the four northern provinces into +commands for<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii210" id= +"page_ii210">[pg.210]</a></span> French generals, who were +independent of his brother's authority and levied all the taxes +over that vast area (February). On May 29th he withdrew Burgos and +Valladolid from Joseph's control, and divided the greater part of +Spain for military and administrative purposes into districts that +were French satrapies in all but name. The decree was doubly +disastrous: it gave free play to the feuds of the French chiefs; +and it seemed to the Spaniards to foreshadow a speedy partition of +Spain. The surmise was correct. Napoleon intended to unite to +France the lands between the Pyrenees and the Ebro. Indeed, in his +conception, the conquest of Portugal was mainly desirable because +it would provide his brother with an indemnity in the west for the +loss of his northern provinces. Joseph's protests against such a +partition of the land, which Napoleon had sworn at Bayonne to keep +intact, were disregarded; but letters on this subject fell into the +hands of the Spanish guerillas and were published by order of the +Regency at Cadiz. Despised by the Spaniards, flouted by Napoleon, +set at defiance by the French satraps, and reduced wellnigh to +bankruptcy, the puppet King felt his position insupportable, and, +hurrying to Paris, tendered his resignation of the crown (May, +1811). In his anxiety to huddle up the scandal, Napoleon appeased +his brother, promised him one-fourth of the taxes levied by the +French commanders, and coaxed or drove him to resume his thankless +task at Madrid. But the doggedness of the Emperor's resolve may be +measured by the fact that, even when on the brink of war with +Russia, he defied Spanish national sentiment by annexing Catalonia +to France (March, 1812).</p> + +<p>It seems strange that Napoleon did not himself proceed to Spain +in order to direct the operations in person and thus still the +jealousies of the Marshals which so hampered his armies. Wellington +certainly feared his coming. At a later date he told Earl Stanhope +that Napoleon was vastly superior to any of his Marshals: "There +was nothing like him. He suited a French army<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii211" id="page_ii211">[pg.211]</a></span> +so exactly.... His presence on the field made a difference of +40,000 men."<a name="FN2anchor224_224"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_224_224"><sup>[224]</sup></a> That estimate is certainly +modest if one looks not merely at tactics but at the strategy of +the whole Peninsular War. But the Emperor did not again come into +Spain. At the outset of 1810 he prepared to do so; but, as soon as +the Austrian marriage was arranged, he abandoned this salutary +project.</p> + +<p>There were thenceforth several reasons why he should remain in +or near Paris. His attentions to his young wife, and his desire to +increase the splendour of the Court, counted for much. Yet more +important was it to curb the clericals (now incensed at the +imprisonment of the Pope), and sharply to watch the intrigues of +the royalists and other malcontents. Public opinion, also, still +needed to be educated; the constant drain of men for the wars and +the increase in the price of necessaries led to grumblings in the +Press, which claimed the presence of his Argus eye and the adoption +of a very stringent censorship.<a name="FN2anchor225_225"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_225_225"><sup>[225]</sup></a> But, above all, there +was the commercial war with England. This could be directed best +from Paris, where he could speedily hear of British endeavours to +force goods into Germany, Holland, or Italy, and of any change in +our maritime code.</p> + +<p>Important as was the war in Spain, it was only one phase of his +world-wide struggle with the mistress of the seas; and he judged +that if she bled to death under his Continental System, the +Peninsular War must subside into a guerilla strife, Spain +thereafter figuring merely as a greater Vendée. Accordingly, +the year 1810 sees the climax of his great commercial +experiment.</p> + +<p>The first land to be sacrificed to this venture was<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii212" id="page_ii212">[pg.212]</a></span> +Holland. For many months the Emperor had been discontented with his +brother Louis, who had taken into his head the strange notion that +he reigned there by divine right. As Napoleon pathetically said at +St. Helena, when reviewing the conduct of his brothers, "If I made +one a king, he imagined that he was <i>King by the grace of +God</i>. He was no longer my lieutenant: he was one enemy more for +me to watch." A singular fate for this king-maker, that he should +be forgotten and the holy oil alone remembered! Yet Louis probably +used that mediæval notion as a shield against his brother's +dictation. The tough Bonaparte nature brooked not the idea of mere +lieutenancy. He declined to obey orders from the brother whom he +secretly detested. He flatly refused to be transferred from the +Hague to Madrid, or to put in force the burdensome decrees of the +Continental System.</p> + +<p>On his side, Napoleon upbraided him with governing too softly, +and with seeking popularity where he should seek control. After the +Walcheren expedition, he chid him severely for allowing the English +fleet ever to show its face in the Scheldt; for "the fleets of that +Power ought to find nothing but rocks of iron" in that river, +"which was as important to France as the Thames to England."<a +name="FN2anchor226_226"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_226_226"><sup>[226]</sup></a> But the head and front of +his offending was that British goods still found their way into +Holland. In vain did the Emperor forbid that American ships which +had touched at English ports should be debarred from those of +Holland. In vain did he threaten to close the Scheldt and Rhine to +Dutch barges. Louis held on his way, with kindly patience towards +his merchants, and with a Bonapartist obstinacy proof against +fraternal advice or threats. At last, early in 1810, Napoleon sent +troops to occupy Walcheren and neighbouring Dutch lands. It seemed +for a time as though this was but a device to extort favourable +terms of peace from England in return for an offer that France +would not annex Holland. Negotiations to this effect were set on +foot through<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii213" id= +"page_ii213">[pg.213]</a></span> the medium of Ouvrard and +Labouchere, son-in-law of the banker Baring: Fouché also, +without the knowledge of his master, ventured to put forth a +diplomatic feeler as to a possible Anglo-French alliance against +the United States, an action for which he was soon very properly +disgraced.<a name="FN2anchor227_227"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_227_227"><sup>[227]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The negotiation failed, as it deserved to do. Our objections +were, not merely to the absurd proposal that we should give up our +maritime code if Napoleon would abstain from annexing Holland and +the Hanseatic towns, but still more against the man himself and his +whole policy. We had every reason to distrust the good faith of the +man who had betrayed the Turks at Tilsit, Portugal at +Fontainebleau, and the Spaniards at Bayonne. To pause in the +strife, to relax our hold on our new colonies, and to desert the +Spaniards, in order to preserve the merely titular independence of +Holland and the Hanse Towns, would have been an act of singular +simplicity. Nor does Napoleon seem to have expected it. He wrote to +his Foreign Minister, Champagny, on March 20th, 1810: "From not +having made peace sooner, England has lost Naples, Spain, Portugal, +and the market of Trieste. If she delays much longer, she will lose +Holland, the Hanse Towns, and Sicily." And surely this Sibylline +conduct of his required that he should annex these lands and all +Europe in order to exact a suitable price from the exhausted +islanders. Such was the corollary of the Continental System.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile Louis, nettled by the inquisitions of the French +<i>douaniers</i>, and by the order of his brother to seize all +American ships in Dutch ports, was drawing on himself further +reproaches and threats: "Louis, you are incorrigible ... you do not +want to reign for any length of time. States are governed by reason +and policy, and not by acrimony and weakness." Twenty thousand +French troops were approaching Amsterdam to bring him to<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii214" id= +"page_ii214">[pg.214]</a></span> reason, when the young ruler +decided to be rid of this royal mummery. On the night of July 1st +he fled from Haarlem, and travelled swiftly and secretly eastwards +until he reached Teplitz, in Bohemia. The ignominy of this flight +rested on the brother who had made kingship a mockery. The refugee +left behind him the reputation of a man who, lovable by nature but +soured by domestic discords, sought to shield his subjects from the +ruin into which the rigid application of the Continental System was +certain to plunge them. That fate now befell the unhappy little +land. On July 9th it was annexed to the French Empire, and all the +commercial decrees were carried out as rigidly at Rotterdam as at +Havre.</p> + +<p>At the close of the year, Napoleon's coast system was extended +to the borders of Holstein by the annexation of Oldenburg, the +northern parts of Berg, Westphalia, and Hanover, along with +Lauenburg and the Hanse Towns, Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck. +The little Swiss Republic of Valais was also absorbed in the +Empire.</p> + +<p>This change in North Germany, which carried the French flag to +the shores of the Baltic, was his final expedient for assuring +England's commercial ruin. As far back as February, 1798, he had +recommended the extension of French influence over the Hanse Towns +as a means of reducing his most redoubtable foe to surrender, and +now there were two special reasons for this annexation. First, the +ships of Oldenburg had been largely used for conveying British +produce into North Germany;<a name="FN2anchor228_228"></a> <a href= +"#Foot2note_228_228"><sup>[228]</sup></a> and secondly, the French +commercial code was so rigorous that no officials with even the +semblance of independence could be trusted with its execution. On +August 5th a decree had been promulgated at the Trianon, near +Versailles, which imposed enormous duties on every important +colonial product. Cotton—especially that from +America—sugar, tea, coffee, cocoa, and other articles were +subjected to dues, generally of half their value and irrespective +of their place of production. <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii215" id="page_ii215">[pg.215]</a></span></p> + +<center><a name="image_13"><img alt="CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER 1810" +src="images/image13.jpg" width="345" height="455"><br> + <font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>CENTRAL EUROPE +AFTER 1810</small></font></a></center> + +<p>Traders were ordered to declare their possession of all colonial +wares and to pay the duty, under pain of confiscation. Depôts +of such goods within four days' distance from the frontiers of the +Empire were held to be clandestine; and troops were sent forthwith +into Germany, Switzerland, and Spain to seize such stores, a +proceeding which aroused the men of Stuttgart, <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii216" id="page_ii216">[pg.216]</a></span> +Frankfurt, and Berne to almost open resistance. It is difficult to +see the reason for this decree, except on the supposition that the +Continental System did not stop British imports, and that all +tropical products were British.</p> + +<p>Napoleon's own correspondence shows that he believed this to be +so. At that same time he issued orders that all colonial produce +found at Stettin should be confiscated because it was evidently +English property brought on American ships. He further recommended +Murat and Eugène to press hard on such wares in order to +replenish their exchequers and raise funds for restoring their +commerce. Eugène must, however, be careful to tax American +and colonial cotton most heavily, while letting in that of the +Levant on favourable terms.</p> + +<p>Jerome, too, was bidden rigorously to enforce the Trianon tariff +in Westphalia; and the hint was to be passed on to Prussia and the +Rhenish Confederation that, by subjecting colonial goods to these +enormous imposts, those States would gain several millions of +francs "and the loss would fall partly on English commerce and +partly on the smugglers."<a name="FN2anchor229_229"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_229_229"><sup>[229]</sup></a> In fact, all his acts and +words at this time reveal the densest ignorance, not only of +political economy, but of the elementary facts of commerce, as when +he imagined that officials, who were sufficiently hard worked with +watching a nimble host of some 100,000 smugglers along an immense +frontier, would also be able to distinguish between Syrian and +American cottons, and to exact 800 francs from 100 kilogrammes of +the latter, as against 400 francs from the former, or that six +times as much could ever be levied on Chinese teas as on other +teas! Such a tariff called for a highly drilled army of those +sufficiently rare individuals, honest <i>douaniers</i>, endowed +also with Napoleonic activity and omniscience. But, as Chaptal<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii217" id= +"page_ii217">[pg.217]</a></span> remarked, the Emperor had never +thought much about the needs of commerce, and he despised merchants +as persons who had "neither a faith nor a country, whose sole +object was gain." His own notion about commerce was that he could +"make it manoeuvre like a regiment"; and this military conception +of trade led him to entertain the fond hope that exchequers +benefited by confiscation and prohibitive tariffs, that a "national +commerce" could be speedily built up by cutting off imports, and +that the burden of loss in the present commercial war fell on +England and not on the continental consumer.</p> + +<p>Such was the penalty which the great man paid for scorning all +new knowledge as <i>idéalogie</i>. The principles set forth +by Quesnay, Turgot, and Adam Smith were to him mere sophistical +juggling. He once said to Mollien: "I seek the good that is +practical, not the ideal best: the world is very old: we must +profit by its experience: it teaches that old practices are worth +more than new theories: you are not the only one who knows trade +secrets."<a name="FN2anchor230_230"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_230_230"><sup>[230]</sup></a> This was his general +attitude towards the exponents of new financial or commercial +views. Indeed, we can hardly think of this great champion of +external control and state intervention favouring the open-handed +methods of <i>laisser faire</i>. Unhappy France, that gave this +motto to the world but let her greatest ruler emphasize her recent +reaction towards commercial mediævalism! Luckless Emperor, +who aspired to found the United States of Europe, but outraged the +principle which most surely and lastingly works for international +harmony, that of Free Trade!</p> + +<p>While the Trianon tariff sought to hinder the import of +England's colonial products, or, failing that, to reap a golden +harvest from them, Napoleon further endeavoured to terrify +continental dealers from accepting any of her manufactures. His +Fontainebleau decree of October 18th, 1810, ordered that all such +goods should be seized and publicly burnt; and five weeks later +special tribunals were instituted for enforcing these ukases and +for trying<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii218" id= +"page_ii218">[pg.218]</a></span> all persons, whether smugglers +caught red-handed or shopkeepers who inadvertently offered for sale +the cottons of Lancashire or the silks of Bengal.</p> + +<p>The canon was now complete. It only remained to convert the +world to the new gospel of pacific war. The results were soon +clearly visible in a sudden rise of prices throughout France, +Germany, and Italy. Raw cotton now fetched 10 to 11 francs, sugar 6 +to 7 francs, coffee 8 francs, and indigo 21 francs, per pound, or +on the average about ten times the prices then ruling at London.<a +name="FN2anchor231_231"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_231_231"><sup>[231]</sup></a> The reason for this +advantage to the English consumer and manufacturer is clear. +England swayed the tropics and held the seas; and, having a +monopoly of colonial produce, she could import it easily and +abundantly, while the continental purchaser had ultimately to pay +for the risks incurred by his shopkeeper, by British merchants, and +by their smugglers, who "ran in" from Heligoland, Jersey, or +Sicily. These classes vied in their efforts to prick holes in the +continental decrees. Bargees and women, dogs and hearses, were +pressed into service against Napoleon. The last-named device was +for a time tried with much success near Hamburg, until the French +authorities, wondering at the strange increase of funerals in a +river-side suburb, peered into the hearses, and found them stuffed +full with bales of British merchandise. This gruesome plan failing, +others were tried. Large quantities of sand were brought from the +seashore, until, unfortunately for the housewives, some inquisitive +official found that it hailed from the West Indies.</p> + +<p>Or again, devious routes were resorted to. Sugar was smuggled +from London into Germany by way of Salonica, that being now almost +the only neutral port open to British commerce. Thence it was borne +in panniers on the backs of mules over the Balkans to Belgrade, +where it was transferred to barges and carried up the Danube. +Another illicit trade route was from the desolate shores of +Dalmatia through Hungary. The writer of a <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii219" id="page_ii219">[pg.219]</a></span> pamphlet, +"England, Ireland, and America," states that his firm then employed +500 horses on and near that coast in carrying British goods into +Central Europe, and that the cost of getting them into France was +"about £28 per cwt., or more than fifty times the present +freight to Calcutta." In fact, the result of the Emperor's economic +experiments may be summed up in the statement of Chaptal that the +general run of prices in France was higher by one-third than it was +before 1789.</p> + +<p>Now the merest tyro might see that the difference in price above +the normal level was paid by the consumer. The colonial producer, +the British merchant and shipper were certainly harassed, and trade +was dislocated; but, as Mollien observed, commerce soon adapted +itself to altered conditions; and merchants never parted with their +wares without getting hard cash or resorting to the primitive +method of barter. Money was also frequently melted down in France +and Germany so as to effect bargains with England in bars of metal. +And so, in one way or another, trade was carried on, with infinite +discomfort and friction, it is true; but it never wholly ceased +even between England and France direct.</p> + +<p>In fact, Napoleon so clung to the old mercantilist craze of +stimulating exports in order that they might greatly exceed the +imports, as to favour the sending of agricultural produce to +England, provided that such cargoes comprised manufactured goods. +He allowed this privilege not only to his Empire but also to the +Kingdom of Italy.<a name="FN2anchor232_232"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_232_232"><sup>[232]</sup></a> The difficulty was that +England would not receive the manufactured goods of her enemies; +and, as corn and cheese could not be exported to England, unless a +certain proportion of silk and cloths went with them, the latter +were got up so as to satisfy the French customs officers and then +cast into the sea. It is needless to add that this export of +manufactures to England, on which Napoleon prided himself, was +limited to showy but worthless articles, which were made solely +<i>ad usum delphinorum</i>.<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii220" id="page_ii220">[pg.220]</a></span></p> + +<p>It was fortunate for us that Napoleon entertained these crude +ideas on political economy; for his action opened for us a loophole +of escape from a very serious difficulty. At that time our fast +growing population was barely fed by our own wheat even after good +seasons; and Providence afflicted us in 1809 and 1810 with very +poor harvests. In 1810 the average price was 103 shillings the +quarter, the highest ever known except in 1800 and 1801; and as +commerce was dislocated by the Continental System and hand-labour +was being largely replaced by the new power-looms and improved +spinning machinery, the outlook would have been hopeless, had not +our great enemy allowed us to import continental corn. This device, +which he imagined would impoverish us to enrich his own States, was +the greatest aid that he could have rendered to our hard-pressed +social system; and readers of Charlotte Brontë's realistic +sketches of the Luddite rioting in Yorkshire may imagine what would +have befallen England if, besides lack of work and low wages, there +had been the added horrors of a bread famine. But fortunately the +curious commercial notions harboured by our foe enabled us in the +winter of 1810-11 to get supplies of corn not only from Prussia and +Poland but even from Italy and France.</p> + +<p>In one sense this incident has been misunderstood. It has been +referred to by Porter<a name="FN2anchor233_233"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_233_233"><sup>[233]</sup></a> and other hopeful persons +as proof positive that as long as we can buy corn we shall get it, +even from our enemies. It proves nothing of the sort. Napoleon's +correspondence and his whole policy with regard to licences, which +we shall presently examine, shows clearly that he believed he would +greatly benefit his own States and impoverish our people by selling +us large stores of corn at a very high price. There is no hint in +any of his letters that he ever framed the notion of +<i>starving</i> us into surrender. All that he looked to was the +draining away of our wealth by cutting off our exports, and by +allowing imports to enter our harbours much as usual. As long as he +prevented us selling<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii221" id= +"page_ii221">[pg.221]</a></span> our produce, he heeded little how +much we bought from his States: in fact, the more we bought, the +sooner we should be bankrupt—such was his notion.</p> + +<p>It is strange that he never sought to cut off our corn-supplies. +They were then drawn almost entirely from the Baltic ports. The +United States and Canada had as yet only sent us a few driblets of +corn. La Plata and the Cape of Good Hope were quite undeveloped; +and our settlements in New South Wales were at that time often +troubled by dearth. The plan of sealing up the cornfields of Europe +from Riga to Trieste would have been feasible, at least for a few +weeks; French troops held Danzig and Stettin; Russia, Prussia, and +Denmark were at his beck and call; and an imperial decree +forbidding the export of corn from France and her allied States to +the United Kingdom could hardly have failed to reduce us to +starvation and surrender in the very critical winter of 1810-11. +But that strange mental defect of clinging with ever increasing +tenacity to preconceived notions led Napoleon to allow and even to +favour exports of corn to us in the time of our utmost need; and +Britain survived the strain.<a name="FN2anchor234_234"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_234_234"><sup>[234]</sup></a></p> + +<p>What folly, however, to refer to the action of this man of one +economic idea as being likely to determine the conduct of +continental statesmen in some future naval war with England. In +truth, the urgency of the problem of our national food-supply in +time of a great war can only be fully understood by those who have +studied the Napoleonic era. England then grew nearly enough corn +for her needs; her fleets swept the seas; and Napoleon's economic +hobby left her foreign food-supply unhampered at the severest +crisis. Yet, even so, the price of the quartern loaf rose to more +than fifteenpence, and we<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii222" +id="page_ii222">[pg.222]</a></span> were brought to the verge of +civil war. A comparison of that time with the conditions that now +prevail must yield food for reflection to all but the case-hardened +optimists.</p> + +<p>But already Napoleon was convinced that the Continental System +must be secretly relaxed in special cases. Despite the fulsome +addresses which some Chambers of Commerce sent up, he knew that his +seaports were in the depths of distress, and that French cotton +manufacturers could not hope to compete with those of Lancashire +now that his own tariff had doubled the price of raw cotton and +dyes in France. He therefore hit upon the curious device of +allowing continental merchants to buy licences for the privilege of +secretly evading his own decrees. The English Government seems to +have been the first to issue similar secret permits; but Napoleon +had scarcely signed his Berlin Decree for the blockade of England +before he connived at its infraction. When sugar, coffee, and other +comforts became scarce, they were secretly imported from perfidious +Albion for the imperial table. The final stage was reached in July, +1810, when licences to import forbidden goods were secretly sold to +favoured merchants, and many officials—among them +Bourrienne—reaped a rich harvest from the sale of these +imperial indulgences. Merchants were so eager to evade the hated +laws that they offered high prices to the treasury and +<i>douceurs</i> to officials for the coveted boon; and as much as +£40,000 is said to have been paid for a single licence.</p> + +<p>On both sides of the Channel this device was abhorred, but its +results were specially odious in Napoleon's States, where the +burdens to be evaded were far heavier than those entailed by the +Orders in Council. In fact, the Continental System was now seen to +be an organized hypocrisy, which, in order to ruin the mistress of +the seas, exposed the peoples to burdens more grievous than those +borne by England, and left all but the wealthiest merchants a prey +to a grinding fiscal tyranny. And the sting of it all was its +social injustice; for while the poor<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii223" id="page_ii223">[pg.223]</a></span> were severely +punished, sometimes with death, for smuggling sugar or tobacco, +Napoleon and the favoured few who could buy licences often imported +these articles in large quantities. What wonder, then, that Russia +and Sweden should decline long to endure these gratuitous +hardships, and should seek to evade the behests of the imperial +smuggler of the Tuileries!</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, as no inventive people can ever be thrown wholly +on its own resources without deriving some benefit, we find that +France met the crisis with the cheery patience and unflagging +ingenuity which she has ever evinced. In a great Empire which +embraced all the lands between Hamburg, Bayonne, and Rome, not to +mention Illyria and Dalmatia, a great variety of products might +readily reward the inventor and the husbandman. Tobacco, rice, and +cotton could be reared in the southern portions. Valiant efforts +were also made to get Asiatic produce overland, so as to disappoint +the English cruisers; and the coffee of Arabia was taxed very +lightly, so as to ruin the American producer. When the fragrant +berry became more and more scarce, chicory was discovered by good +patriots to be a palatable substitute, and scientific men sought to +induce French manufacturers to use the isatis plant instead of +indigo. Prizes were offered by the State and by local Chambers of +Commerce to those who should make up for the lack of tropical goods +and dyes.</p> + +<p>A notable discovery was made by Chaptal and Delessert, who +improved on Markgraf's process of procuring sugar from beetroot and +made it a practical success. Napoleon also hoped that a chemical +substitute for indigo had been found, and exclaimed to a doleful +deputation of merchants, who came to the Tuileries in the early +summer of 1811, that chemistry would soon revolutionize commerce as +completely as the discovery of the compass had done. Besides, the +French Empire was the richest country in the world, and could +almost do without foreign commerce, at least until England had +given way; and that would soon come to pass; for the pressure of +events would soon<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii224" id= +"page_ii224">[pg.224]</a></span> compel London merchants to throw +their sugar and indigo into the Thames.<a name= +"FN2anchor235_235"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_235_235"><sup>[235]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In reality, he placed commerce far behind agriculture, which he +considered to be the basis of a nation's wealth and a nation's +health. But he also took a keen interest in manufactures. The silk +industry at Lyons found in him a generous patron. He ordered that +the best scientific training should there be given, so as to +improve the processes of manufacture; and, as silk of nearly all +kinds could be produced in France and Italy, Lyons was +comparatively prosperous. When, however, it suffered from the +general rise of prices and from the impaired buying power of the +community, he adopted heroic remedies. He ordered that all ships +leaving France should carry silk fabrics equal in value to +one-fourth of the whole freight; but whether these stuffs went to +adorn women or mermaids seems an open question. Or again, on the +advice of Chaptal, the Emperor made large purchases of surplus +stocks of Lyons silk, Rouen cottons, and Ste. Antoine furniture, so +as to prevent an imminent collapse of credit and a recrudescence of +Jacobinism in those industrial centres; for as he said: "I fear a +rising brought about by want of bread: I had rather fight an army +of 200,000 men than that."<a name="FN2anchor236_236"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_236_236"><sup>[236]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In the main, this policy of giving <i>panem et circenses</i> was +successful in France; at least, it kept her quiet. The national +feeling ran strongly in favour of commercial prohibition. In 1787 +Arthur Young found the cotton-workers of the north furious at the +recent inroads of Lancashire cottons, while the wine-growers of the +Garonne were equally favourable to the enlightened Anglo-French +commercial treaty of 1786. It was Napoleon's lot to win the favour +of the rigid<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii225" id= +"page_ii225">[pg.225]</a></span> protectionists, while not +alienating that of the men of the Gironde, who saw in him the +champion of agrarian liberty against the feudal nobles. Moreover, +the nation still cherished the pathetic belief that the war was due +to Albion's perfidy respecting Malta, and burned with a desire to +chastise the recreant islanders. For these reasons, Frenchmen +endured the drain of men and money with but little show of +grumbling.</p> + +<p>They were tired of the wars. <i>We have had enough glory</i>, +they said, even in the capital itself, and an acute German observer +describes the feeling there as curiously mixed. Parisian gaiety +often found vent in lampoons against the Emperor; and much satire +at his expense might with safety be indulged in among a crowd, +provided it were seasoned with wit. The people seemed not to fear +Napoleon, as he was feared in Germany: the old revolutionary party +was still active and might easily become far more dangerous than +the royalist coteries of the Boulevard St. Germain. For the rest, +they were all so accustomed to political change that they looked on +his government as provisional, and put up with him only as long as +the army triumphed abroad and he could make his power felt at home. +Such was the impression of Paris gained by Varnhagen von Ense. +Public opinion in the provinces seems to have been more favourable +to Napoleon; and, on the whole, pride in the army and in the +vigorous administration which that nation loves, above all, hatred +of England and the hope of wresting from her the world's empire, +led the French silently to endure rigorous press laws, increased +taxes, war prices, licences, and chicory.</p> + +<p>For Germans the hardships were much greater and the alleviations +far less. They had no deep interest in Malta or in the dominion of +the seas; and political economy was then only beginning to dawn on +the Teutonic mind. The general trend of German thought had inclined +towards the <i>Everlasting Nay</i>, until Napoleon flashed across +its ken. For a time he won the admiration of the chief thinkers of +Germany by brushing away the feudal<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii226" id="page_ii226">[pg.226]</a></span> cobwebs from her +fair face. He seemed about to call her sons to a life of public +activity; and in the famous soliloquy of Faust, in which he feels +his way from word to thought, from thought to might, and from might +to action, we may discern the literary projection of the influence +exerted by the new Charlemagne on that nation of dreamers.<a name= +"FN2anchor237_237"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_237_237"><sup>[237]</sup></a> But the promise was +fulfilled only in the most harshly practical way, namely, by +cutting off all supplies of tobacco and coffee; and when +Teufelsdröckh himself, admirer though he was of the French +Revolution, found that the summons for his favourite +beverage—the "dear melancholy coffee, that begets fancies," +of Lessing—produced only a muddy decoction of acorns, there +was the risk of his tendencies earthwards taking a very practically +revolutionary turn.</p> + +<p>In truth, the German universities were the leaders of the +national reaction against the Emperor of the West. Fichte's +pleading for a truly national education had taken effect. +Elementary instruction was now being organized in Prussia; and the +divorce of thought from action, which had so long sterilized German +life, was ended by the foundation of the University of Berlin by +Humboldt. Thus, in 1810, the year of Prussia's deepest woe, when +her brave Queen died of a stricken heart, when French soldiers and +<i>douaniers</i> were seizing and burning colonial wares, her +thinkers came into closer touch with her men of action, with +mutually helpful results. Thinkers ceased to be mere dreamers, and +Prussian officials gained a wider outlook on life. The life of +beneficent activity, to which Napoleon might have summoned the +great majority of Germans, dawned on them from Berlin, not from +Paris.</p> + +<p>His influence was more and more oppressive. The final results of +his commercial decrees on the trade of Hamburg were thus described +by Perthes, a well-known writer and bookseller of that town: "Of +the 422 sugar-boiling houses, few now stood open: the printing of +cottons had ceased entirely: the tobacco-dressers were<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii227" id="page_ii227">[pg.227]</a></span> +driven away by the Government. The imposition of innumerable taxes, +door and window, capitation and land taxes, drove the inhabitants +to despair." But the same sagacious thinker was able to point the +moral of it all, and prove to his friends that their present trials +were due to the selfish particularism of the German States: "It was +a necessity that some great power should arise in the midst of the +degenerate selfishness of the times and also prove victorious, for +there was nothing vigorous to oppose it. Napoleon is an historical +necessity."<a name="FN2anchor238_238"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_238_238"><sup>[238]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Thus, both in the abodes of learning and in the centres of +industry men were groping after a higher unity and a firmer +political organization, which, after the Napoleonic deluge had +swept by, was to lay the foundation of a New Germany.</p> + +<p>To all appearances, however, Napoleon's power seemed to be more +firmly established than ever in the ensuing year. On March 20th, +1811, a son was born to him. At the crisis of this event, he +revealed the warmth of his family instincts. On hearing that the +life of mother or infant might have to be sacrificed, he exclaimed +at once, "Save the mother."<a name="FN2anchor239_239"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_239_239"><sup>[239]</sup></a> When the danger was past, +he very considerately informed Josephine, stating, "he has my +chest, my mouth and my eyes. I trust that he will fulfil his +destiny." That destiny was mapped out in the title conferred on the +child, "King of Rome," which was designed to recall the title "King +of the Romans," used in the Holy Roman Empire.</p> + +<p>Napoleon resolved that the old elective dignity should now be +renewed in a strictly hereditary Empire, vaster than that of +Charlemagne. Paris was to be its capital, Rome its second city, and +the future Emperors were always to be crowned a second time at +Rome. Furthermore, lest the mediæval dispute as to the +supremacy of Emperor or Pope in Rome should again vex mankind, the +Papacy was virtually annexed: the status of the pontiff was defined +in the most Erastian sense, imperial funds were<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii228" id="page_ii228">[pg.228]</a></span> +assigned for his support, and he was bidden to maintain two +palaces, "the one necessarily at Paris, the other at Rome."</p> + +<p>It is impossible briefly to describe the various conflicts +between Pius VII. and Napoleon. Though now kept in captivity by +Napoleon, the Pope refused to ratify these and other ukases of his +captor; and the credit which Napoleon had won by his wordly-wise +Concordat was now lost by his infraction of many of its clauses and +by his harsh treatment of a defenceless old man. It is true that +Pius had excommunicated Napoleon; but that was for the crime of +annexing the Papal States, and public opinion revolted at the +spectacle of an all-powerful Emperor now consigning to captivity +the man who in former years had done so much to consolidate his +authority. After the disasters of the Russian campaign, he sought +to come to terms with the pontiff; but even then the bargain struck +at Fontainebleau was so hard that his prisoner, though unnerved by +ill-health, retracted the unholy compromise. Whereupon Napoleon +ordered that the cardinals who advised this step should be seized +and carried away from Fontainebleau. Few of Napoleon's actions were +more harmful than this series of petty persecutions; and among the +influences that brought about his fall, we may reckon the dignified +resistance of the pontiff, whose meekness threw up in sharp relief +the pride and arrogance of his captor. The Papacy stooped, but only +to conquer.</p> + +<p>For the present, everything seemed to favour the new +Charlemagne. Never had the world seen embodied might like that of +Napoleon's Empire; and well might he exclaim at the birth of the +King of Rome, "Now begins the finest epoch of my reign." All the +auguries seemed favourable. In France, the voice of opposition was +all but hushed. Italians, Swiss, and even some Spaniards, helped to +keep down Prussia. Dutchmen and Danes had hunted down Schill for +him at Stralsund. Polish horsemen had charged up the Somosierra +Pass against the Spanish guns, and did valiant service on the<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii229" id= +"page_ii229">[pg.229]</a></span> bloody field of Albuera. The +Confederation of the Rhine could send forth 150,000 men to fight +his battles. The Hapsburgs were his vassals, and only faint shadows +of discord as yet clouded his relations with Alexander. One of his +Marshals, Bernadotte, had been chosen to succeed to the crown of +Sweden; and at the other end of Europe, it seemed that Wellington +and the Spanish patriots must ultimately succumb to superior +numbers.</p> + +<p>Surely now was the time for the fulfilment of those glowing +oriental designs beside which his European triumphs seemed pale. In +the autumn of 1810 he sent agents carefully to inspect the +strongholds of Egypt and Syria, and his consuls in the Levant were +ordered to send a report every six months on the condition of the +Turkish Empire.<a name="FN2anchor240_240"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_240_240"><sup>[240]</sup></a> Above all, he urged on the +completion of dockyards and ships of war. Vast works were pushed on +at Antwerp and Cherbourg: ships and gunboats were to be built at +every suitable port from the Texel to Naples and Trieste; and as +the result of these labours, the Emperor counted on having 104 +ships of the line, which would cover the transports from the +Mediterranean, Cherbourg, Boulogne and the Scheldt, and threaten +England with an array of 200,000 fighting men.<a name= +"FN2anchor241_241"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_241_241"><sup>[241]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In March, 1811, this plan was modified, possibly because, as in +1804, he found the difficulties of a descent on our coasts greater +than he first imagined. He now seeks merely to weary out the +English in the present year. But in the next year, or in 1813, he +will send an expedition of 40,000 men from the Scheldt, as if to +menace Ireland; and, having thrown us off our guard, he will divide +that force into four parts for the recovery of the French and Dutch +colonies in the West Indies. He counts also on having a part of his +army in Spain free for service elsewhere: it must be sent to seize +Sicily or Egypt.</p> + +<p>But this was not all. His thoughts also turn to the Cape of Good +Hope. Eight thousand men are to sail from Brest to seize that point +of vantage at which he had<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii230" id="page_ii230">[pg.230]</a></span> gazed so longingly +in 1803. Of these plans, the recovery of Egypt evidently lay +nearest to his heart. He orders the storage at Toulon of everything +needful for an Egyptian expedition, along with sixty gun-vessels of +light draught suitable for the navigation of the Nile or of the +lakes near the coast.<a name="FN2anchor242_242"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_242_242"><sup>[242]</sup></a> Decrès is charged +to send models of these craft; and we may picture the eager +scrutiny which they received. For the Orient was still the pole to +which Napoleon's whole being responded. Turned away perforce by +wars with Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Spain, it swung round +towards Egypt and India on the first chance of European peace, only +to be driven back by some untoward shock nearer home. In 1803 he +counted on the speedy opening of a campaign on the Ganges. In 1811 +he proposes that the tricolour shall once more wave on the citadel +of Cairo, and threaten India from the shores of the Red Sea. But a +higher will than his disposed of these events, and ordained that he +should then be flung back from Russia and fight for his Empire in +the plains of Saxony.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii231" id= +"page_ii231">[pg.231]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXXII</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN</center> + +<br> + + +<p>Two mighty and ambitious potentates never fully trust one +another. Under all the shows of diplomatic affection, there remains +a thick rind of reserve or fear. Especially must that be so with +men who spring from a fierce untamed stock. Despite the training of +Laharpe, Alexander at times showed the passions and finesse of a +Boyar. And who shall say that the early Jacobinism and later +culture of Napoleon was more than a veneer spread all too thinly +over an Italian <i>condottiere</i> of the Renaissance age? These +men were too expert at wiles really to trust to the pompous +assurances of Tilsit and Erfurt. De Maistre tells us that Napoleon +never partook of Alexander's repasts on the banks of the Niemen. +For him Muscovite cookery was suspect.</p> + +<p>Amidst the glories of Erfurt, Oudinot saw an incident that +revealed the Czar's hidden feelings. During one of their rides, the +Emperors were stopped by a dyke, which Napoleon's steed refused to +take; accordingly the Marshal had to help it across; but the Czar, +proud of his horsemanship, finally cleared the obstacle with a +splendid bound, though at the cost of a shock which broke his +sword-belt. The sword fell to the ground, and Oudinot was about to +hand it to Alexander, when Napoleon quickly said: "Keep that sword +and bring it to me later": then, turning to the Czar, he added: +"You have no objection, Sire?" A look of surprise and distrust +flashed across the Czar's features; but, resuming his easy bearing, +he gave his assent. Later in the day, Napoleon sent his own sword +to Alexander, and thus<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii232" +id="page_ii232">[pg.232]</a></span> came off easily best from an +incident which threatened at first to throw him into the shade. The +affair shows the ready wit and mental superiority of the one man no +less than the veiled reserve and uneasiness of the other.</p> + +<p>At the close of 1809, Alexander confessed his inner feeling to +Czartoryski. Napoleon, he said, was a man who would not scruple to +use any means so long as he gained his end: his mental strength was +unquestioned: in the worst troubles he was cool and collected: his +fits of passion were only meant to intimidate: his every act was +the result of calculation: it was absurd to say that his prodigious +exertions would drive him mad: his health was splendid and was +equal to any effort provided that he had eight hours' sleep every +day. The impression left on the ex-Minister was that Alexander +understood his ally thoroughly and <i>feared him greatly</i>.<a +name="FN2anchor243_243"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_243_243"><sup>[243]</sup></a></p> + +<p>A few days later came Napoleon's request for the hand of the +Czar's sister, a request which Alexander declined with many +expressions of goodwill and regret. What, then, was his surprise to +find that, before the final answer had been returned, Napoleon was +in treaty for the hand of an Austrian Archduchess.<a name= +"FN2anchor244_244"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_244_244"><sup>[244]</sup></a> This time it was for him +to feel affronted. And so this breathless search for a bride left +sore feelings at both capitals, at Paris because the Czar declined +Napoleon's request, at St. Petersburg because the imperial wooer +was off on another scent before the first had given out.</p> + +<p>Alexander's annoyance was increased by his ally's doubtful +behaviour about Poland. After the recent increase of the Duchy of +Warsaw he had urged Napoleon to make a declaration that "the +Kingdom of Poland shall never be re-established." This matter was +being discussed side by side with the matrimonial overtures;<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii233" id= +"page_ii233">[pg.233]</a></span> and, after their collapse, +Napoleon finally declined to give this assurance which Alexander +felt needful for checking the rising hopes of Poles and +Lithuanians. The utmost the French Emperor would do was to promise, +<i>in a secret clause</i>, that he would never aid any other Power +or any popular movement that aimed at the re-establishment of that +kingdom.<a name="FN2anchor245_245"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_245_245"><sup>[245]</sup></a> In fact, as the Muscovite +alliance was on the wane, he judged it bad policy to discourage the +Poles, who might do so much for him in case of a Franco-Russian +war. He soon begins to face seriously the prospect of such an +event. At the close of 1810 he writes that the Russians are +intrenching themselves on the Dwina and Dniester, which "shows a +bad spirit."</p> + +<p>But the great difficulty is Russia's imperfect observation of +the Continental System. He begs the Czar to close his ports against +English ships: 600 of them are wandering about the Baltic, after +being repulsed from its southern shores, in the hope of getting +into Russian harbours. Let Alexander seize their cargoes, and +England, now at her last gasp, must give in. Five weeks later he +returns to the charge. It is not enough to seize British ships; the +hated wares get in under American, Swedish, Spanish, and +Portuguese, <i>even under French flags</i>. Of the 2,000 ships that +entered the Baltic in 1810, not one was really a neutral: they were +all charged with English goods, with false papers and <i>forged +certificates of origin manufactured in London</i>.<a name= +"FN2anchor246_246"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_246_246"><sup>[246]</sup></a> Any other unit among +earth's millions would have been convinced of the futility of the +whole enterprise, now that his own special devices were being +turned against him. It was not enough to conquer and enchain the +Continent. Every customs officer must be an expert in manufactures, +groceries, documents, and the water-marks of paper, if he was to +detect the new "frauds of the neutral flags."<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii234" id= +"page_ii234">[pg.234]</a></span></p> + +<p>But Napoleon knew not the word impossible—"a word that +exists only in the dictionary of fools." In fact, his mind, +naturally unbending, was now working more and more in self-made +grooves. Of these the deepest was his commercial warfare; and he +pushed on, reckless of Europe and reckless of the Czar. In the +middle of December he annexed the North Sea coast of Germany, +including Oldenburg. The heir to this duchy had married Alexander's +sister, whose hand Napoleon had claimed at Erfurt. The duke, it is +true, was offered the district of Erfurt as an indemnity; but that +proposal only stung the Czar the more. The deposition of the duke +was not merely a personal affront; it was an infraction of the +Treaty of Tilsit which had restored him to his duchy.</p> + +<p>A fortnight later, when as yet he knew not of the Oldenburg +incident, Alexander himself broke that treaty.<a name= +"FN2anchor247_247"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_247_247"><sup>[247]</sup></a> At the close of 1810 he +declined to admit land-borne goods on the easy terms arranged at +Tilsit, but levied heavy dues on them, especially on the +<i>articles de luxe</i> that mostly hailed from France. Some such +step was inevitable. Unable to export freely to England, Russia had +not money enough to buy costly French goods without disordering the +exchange and ruining her credit. While seeking to raise revenue on +French manufactures, the Czar resolved to admit on easy terms all +colonial goods, especially American. English goods he would shut +out as heretofore; and he claimed that this new departure was well +within the limits of the Treaty of Tilsit. Far different was +Napoleon's view: "Here is a great planet taking a wrong direction. +I do not understand its course at all."<a name= +"FN2anchor248_248"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_248_248"><sup>[248]</sup></a> Such were his first words +on reading the text of the new ukase. A fatalistic tone now haunts +his references to Russia's policy. On April 2nd he writes: "If +Alexander does not quickly stop the impetus which has been given, +he will be carried away by it next year; and thus war will take +place in spite of him, <i>in spite of me</i>, in spite of the +interests of France and Russia.<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii235" id="page_ii235">[pg.235]</a></span> ... It is an +operatic scene, of which the English are the shifters." What +madness! As if Russia's craving for colonial wares and solvency +were a device of the diabolical islanders.<a name= +"FN2anchor249_249"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_249_249"><sup>[249]</sup></a> As if his planetary simile +were anything more than a claim that he was the centre of the +universe and his will its guiding and controlling power.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, Russia held on her way. In vain did Alexander +explain to his ally the economic needs of his realm, protest his +fidelity to the Continental System, and beg some consideration for +the Duke of Oldenburg. It was evident that the Emperor of the West +would make no real concession. In fact, the need of domination was +the quintessence of his being. And Maret, Duc de Bassano, who was +now his Foreign Minister, or rather, we should say, the man who +wrote and signed his despatches, revealed the psychological cause +of the war which cost the lives of nearly a million of men, in a +note to Lauriston, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg. +Napoleon, he wrote, cared little about interviews or negotiations +unless the movements of his 450,000 men caused serious concern in +Russia, recalled her to the Continental System as settled at +Tilsit, and "brought her back to the state of inferiority in which +she was then."<a name="FN2anchor250_250"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_250_250"><sup>[250]</sup></a></p> + +<p>This was, indeed, the gist of the whole question. Napoleon saw +that Alexander was slipping out of the leading strings of Tilsit, +and that he was likely to come off best from that bargain, which +was intended to confirm the supremacy of the Western Empire. For +both potentates that treaty had been, at bottom, nothing more than +a truce. Napoleon saw in it a means of subjecting the Continent to +his commercial code, and of preparing for a Franco-Russian +partition of Turkey. The Czar hailed it as a breathing space +wherein he could reorganize his army, conquer Finland, and stride +towards the Balkans. The Erfurt interview prolonged the truce;<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii236" id= +"page_ii236">[pg.236]</a></span> for Napoleon felt the supreme need +of stamping out the Spanish Rising and of postponing the partition +of Turkey which his ally was eager to begin. By the close of 1811 +both potentates had exhausted all the benefits likely to accrue +from their alliance.<a name="FN2anchor251_251"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_251_251"><sup>[251]</sup></a> Napoleon flattered himself +that the conquest of Spain was wellnigh assured, and that England +was in her last agonies. On the other hand, Russia had recovered +her military strength, had gained Finland and planted her foot on +the Lower Danube, and now sought to shuffle off Napoleon's +commercial decrees. In fine, the monarch, who at Tilsit had figured +as mere clay in the hands of the Corsican potter, had proved +himself to be his equal both in cunning and tenacity. The seeming +dupe of 1807 now promised to be the victor in statecraft.</p> + +<p>Then there was the open sore of Poland. The challenge, on this +subject, was flung down by Napoleon at a diplomatic reception on +his birthday, August 15th, 1811. Addressing the Russian envoy, he +exclaimed: "I am not so stupid as to think that it is Oldenburg +which troubles you. I see that Poland is the question: you +attribute to me designs in favour of Poland. I begin to think that +you wish to seize it. No: if your army were encamped on Montmartre, +I would not cede an inch of the Warsaw territory, not a village, +not a windmill." His fears as to Russia's designs were far-fetched. +Alexander's sounding of the Poles was a defensive measure, +seriously undertaken only after Napoleon's refusal to discourage +the Polish nationalists. But it suited the French Emperor to aver +that the quarrel was about Poland rather than the Continental +System, and the scene just described is a good specimen of his +habit of cool calculation even in seemingly chance outbursts of +temper. His rhapsody gained him the ardent support of the Poles, +and was vague enough to cause no great alarm to Austria and +Prussia.<a name="FN2anchor252_252"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_252_252"><sup>[252]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii237" id="page_ii237">[pg.237]</a></span></p> + +<p>On the next day Napoleon sketched to his Ministers the general +plan of campaign against Russia. The whole of the Continent was to +be embattled against her. On the Hapsburg alliance he might well +rely. But the conduct of Prussia gave him some concern. For a time +she seemed about to risk a war <i>à outrance</i>, such as +Stein, Fichte, and the staunch patriots of the Tugendbund ardently +craved. Indeed, Napoleon's threats to this hapless realm seemed for +a time to portend its annihilation. The King, therefore, sent +Scharnhorst first to St. Petersburg and then to Vienna with secret +overtures for an alliance. They were virtually refused. Prudence +was in the ascendant at both capitals; and, as will presently +appear, the more sagacious Prussians soon came to see that a war, +in which Napoleon could be enticed into the heart of Russia, might +deal a mortal blow at his overgrown Empire. Certainly it was quite +impossible for Prussia to stay the French advance. A guerilla +warfare, such as throve in Spain, must surely be crushed in her +open plains; and the diffident King returned Gneisenau's plan of a +rising of the Prussian people against Napoleon with the chilling +comment, "Very good as poetry."</p> + +<p>Thus, when Napoleon wound up his diplomatic threats by an +imperious summons to side with him or against him, Frederick +William was fain to abide by his terms, sending 20,000 troops +against Russia, granting free passage to Napoleon's army, and +furnishing immense supplies of food and forage, the payment of +which was to be settled by some future arrangement (February, +1812). These conditions seemed to thrust Prussia down to the lowest +circle of the Napoleonic Inferno; and great was the indignation of +her patriots. They saw not that only by stooping before the western +blast could Prussia be saved. To this topic we shall recur +presently, when we treat of the Russian plan of campaign.</p> + +<p>Sweden was less tractable than Napoleon expected.<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii238" id="page_ii238">[pg.238]</a></span> +He had hoped that the deposition of his personal enemy, Gustavus +IV., the enthronement of a feeble old man, Charles XIII., and the +choice of Bernadotte as heir to the Swedish crown, would bring that +land back to its traditional alliance with France. But, on +accepting his new dignity, Bernadotte showed his customary +independence of thought by refusing to promise that he would never +bear arms against France—a refusal that cost him his +principality of Ponte Corvo. He at once adopted a forward +Scandinavian policy; and, as the Franco-Russian alliance waned, he +offered Swedish succour to Napoleon if he would favour the +acquisition of Norway by the Court of Stockholm.</p> + +<p>The Emperor had himself mooted this project in 1802, but he now +returned a stern refusal (February 25th, 1811), and bade Sweden +enforce the Continental System under pain of the occupation of +Swedish Pomerania by French troops. Even this threat failed to bend +the will of Bernadotte, and the Swedes preferred to forego their +troublesome German province rather than lose their foreign +commerce. In the following January, Napoleon carried out his +threat, thereby throwing Sweden into the arms of Russia. By the +treaty of March-April, 1812, Bernadotte gained from Alexander the +prospect of acquiring Norway, in return for the aid of Sweden in +the forthcoming war against Napoleon. This was the chief diplomatic +success gained by Alexander; for though he came to terms with +Turkey two months later (retaining Bessarabia), the treaty was +ratified too late to enable him to concentrate all his forces +against the Napoleonic host that was now flooding the plains of +Prussia.<a name="FN2anchor253_253"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_253_253"><sup>[253]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii239" id="page_ii239">[pg.239]</a></span></p> + +<p>The results of this understanding with the Court of Stockholm +were seen in the Czar's note presented at Paris at the close of +April. He required of Napoleon the evacuation of Swedish Pomerania +by French troops and a friendly adjustment of Franco-Swedish +disputes, the evacuation of Prussia by the French, the reduction of +their large garrison at Danzig, and the recognition of Russia's +right to trade with neutrals. If these terms were accorded by +France, Alexander was ready to negotiate for an indemnity for the +Duke of Oldenburg and a mitigation of the Russian customs dues on +French goods.<a name="FN2anchor254_254"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_254_254"><sup>[254]</sup></a> The reception given by +Napoleon to these reasonable terms was unpromising. "You are a +gentleman," he exclaimed to Prince Kurakin, "—and yet you +dare to present to me such proposals?—You are acting as +Prussia did before Jena." Alexander had already given up all hope +of peace. A week before that scene, he had left St. Petersburg for +the army, knowing full well that Napoleon's cast-iron will might be +shivered by a mighty blow, but could never be bent by +diplomacy.</p> + +<p>On his side, Napoleon sought to overawe his eastern rival by a +display of imposing force. Lord of a dominion that far excelled +that of the Czar in material resources, suzerain of seven kingdoms +and thirty principalities, he called his allies and vassals about +him at Dresden, and gave to the world the last vision of that +imperial splendour which dazzled the imagination of men.</p> + +<p>It was an idle display. In return for secret assurances that he +might eventually regain his Illyrian provinces, the Emperor Francis +had pledged himself by treaty to send 30,000 men to guard +Napoleon's flank in Volhynia. But everyone at St. Petersburg knew +that this aid, along with that of Prussia, was forced and hollow.<a +name="FN2anchor255_255"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_255_255"><sup>[255]</sup></a> The <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii240" id="page_ii240">[pg.240]</a></span> +example of Spain and the cautious strategy of Wellington had +dissolved the spell of French invincibility; and the Czar was +resolved to trust to the toughness of his people and the defensive +strength of his boundless plains. The time of the Macks, the +Brunswicks, the Bennigsens was past: the day of Wellington and of +truly national methods of warfare had dawned.</p> + +<p>Yet the hosts now moving against Alexander bade fair to +overwhelm the devotion of his myriad subjects and the awful +solitudes of his steppes. It was as if Peter the Hermit had arisen +to impel the peoples of Western and Central Europe once more +against the immobile East. Frenchmen to the number of 200,000 +formed the kernel of this vast body: 147,000 Germans from the +Confederation of the Rhine followed the new Charlemagne: nearly +80,000 Italians under Eugène formed an Army of Observation: +60,000 Poles stepped eagerly forth to wrest their nation's liberty +from the Muscovite grasp; and Illyrians, Swiss, and Dutch, along +with a few Spaniards and Portuguese, swelled the Grand Army to a +total of 600,000 men. Nor was this all. Austria and Prussia sent +their contingents, amounting in all to 50,000 men, to guard +Napoleon's flanks on the side of Volhynia and Courland. And this +mighty mass, driven on by Napoleon's will, gained a momentum which +was to carry its main army to Moscow.</p> + +<p>After reviewing his vassals at Dresden, and hurrying on the +arrangements for the transport of stores, Napoleon journeyed to the +banks of the Niemen. On all sides were to be seen signs of the +passage of a mighty host, broken-down carts, dead horses, wrecked +villages, and dense columns of troops that stripped Prussia +wellnigh bare. Yet, despite these immense preparations, no hint of +discouragement came from the Czar's headquarters. On arriving at +the Niemen, Napoleon issued to the Grand Army a proclamation which +was virtually a declaration of war. In it there occurred the +fatalistic<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii241" id= +"page_ii241">[pg.241]</a></span> remark: "Russia is drawn on by +fate: her destinies must be fulfilled." Alexander's words to his +troops breathed a different spirit: "God fights against the +aggressor."</p> + +<p>Much that is highly conjectural has been written about the plans +of campaign of the two Emperors. That of Napoleon may be briefly +stated: it was to find out the enemy's chief forces, divide them, +or cut them from their communications, and beat them in detail. In +other words, he never started with any set plan of campaign, other +than the destruction of the chief opposing force. But, in the +present instance, it may be questioned whether he had not sought by +his exasperating provocations to drive Prussia into alliance with +the Czar. In that case, Alexander would have been bound in honour +to come to the aid of his ally. And if the Russians ventured across +the Niemen, or the Vistula, as Napoleon at first believed they +would,<a name="FN2anchor256_256"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_256_256"><sup>[256]</sup></a> his task would doubtless +have been as easy as it proved at Friedland. Many Prussian +officers, so Müffling asserts, believed that this was the aim +of French diplomacy in the early autumn of 1811, and that the best +reply was an unconditional surrender. On the other hand, there is +the fact that St. Marsan, Napoleon's ambassador at Berlin, assured +that Government, on October 29th, that his master did not wish to +destroy Prussia, but laid much stress on the supplies which she +could furnish him—a support that would enable the Grand Army +to advance on the Niemen <i>like a rushing stream</i>.</p> + +<p>The metaphor was strangely imprudent. It almost invited Prussia +to open wide her sluices and let the flood foam away on to the +sandy wastes of Lithuania; and we may fancy that the more +discerning minds at Berlin now saw the advantage of a policy which +would entice the French into the wastes of Muscovy. It is strange +that Napoleon's Syrian adage, "Never make war against a desert," +did not now recur to his mind. But he gradually steeled himself to +the conviction that war with Alexander was<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii242" id="page_ii242">[pg.242]</a></span> inevitable, +and that the help of Austria and Prussia would enable him to beat +back the Muscovite hordes into their eastern steppes. For a time he +had unquestionably thought of destroying Prussia before he attacked +the Czar; but he finally decided to postpone her fate until he had +used her for the overthrow of Russia.<a name= +"FN2anchor257_257"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_257_257"><sup>[257]</sup></a></p> + +<p>After the experiences of Austerlitz and Friedland, the +advantages of a defensive campaign could not escape the notice of +the Czar. As early as October, 1811, when Scharnhorst was at St. +Petersburg, he discussed these questions with him; and not all that +officer's pleading for the cause of Prussian independence induced +Alexander to offer armed help unless the French committed a wanton +aggression on Königsberg. Seeing that there was no hope of +bringing the Russians far to the west, Scharnhorst seems finally to +have counselled a Fabian strategy for the ensuing war; and, when at +Vienna, he drew up a memoir in this sense for the guidance of the +Czar.<a name="FN2anchor258_258"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_258_258"><sup>[258]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Alexander was certainly much in need of sound guidance. Though +Scharnhorst had pointed out the way of salvation, a strategic +tempter was soon at hand in the person of General von Phull, an +uncompromising theorist who planned campaigns with an unquestioning +devotion to abstract principles. Untaught by the catastrophes of +the past, Alexander once more let his enthusiasm for<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii243" id="page_ii243">[pg.243]</a></span> +theories and principles lead him to the brink of the abyss. Phull +captivated him by setting forth the true plan of a defensive +campaign which he had evolved from patient study of the Seven +Years' War. Everything depended on the proper selection of +defensive positions and the due disposition of the defending +armies. There must be two armies of defence, and at least one great +intrenched camp. One army must oppose the invader on a line near, +or leading up to, the camp; while the other army must manoeuvre on +his rear or flanks. And the camp must be so placed as to stretch +its protecting influence over one, or more, important roads. It +need not be on any one of them: in fact, it was better that it +should be some distance away; for it thus fulfilled better the +all-important function of a "flanking position."</p> + +<p>Such a position Phull had discovered at Drissa in a curve of the +River Dwina. It was sufficiently far from the roads leading from +the Niemen to St. Petersburg and to Moscow efficiently to protect +them both. There, accordingly, he suggested that vast earthworks +should be prepared; for there, at that artificial Torres Vedras, +Russia's chief force might await the Grand Army, while the other +force harassed its flank or rear.<a name="FN2anchor259_259"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_259_259"><sup>[259]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Napoleon had not probed this absurdity to its inmost depths: but +he early found out that the Russians were in two widely separated +armies; and this sufficed to decide his movements and the early +part of the campaign. Having learnt that one army was near Vilna, +and the other in front of the marshes of the Pripet, he sought to +hold them apart by a rapid irruption into the intervening space, +and thereafter to destroy them piecemeal. Never was a visionary +theory threatened by a more terrible realism. For Napoleon at +midsummer was mustering a third of a million of men on the banks of +the Niemen, while the Russians, with little more than half those +numbers as yet available for the fighting-line, had them<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii244" id= +"page_ii244">[pg.244]</a></span> spread out over an immense space, +so as to facilitate those flanking operations on which Phull set +such store.<a name="FN2anchor260_260"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_260_260"><sup>[260]</sup></a></p> + +<p>On the morn of June 23rd, three immense French columns wound +their way to the pontoon bridges hastily thrown over the Niemen +near Kovno; and loud shouts of triumph greeted the great leader as +the vanguard set foot on Lithuanian soil. No Russians were seen +except a few light horsemen, who galloped up, inquired of the +engineers why they were building the bridges, and then rode hastily +away. During three days the Grand Army filed over the river and +melted away into the sandy wastes. No foe at first contested their +march, but neither were they met by the crowds of downtrodden +natives whom their fancy pictured as thronging to welcome the +liberators. In truth, the peasants of Lithuania had no very close +racial affinity to the Poles, whose offshoots were found chiefly +among the nobles and the wealthier townsfolk. Solitude, the sultry +heat of a Russian mid-summer, and drenching thunderstorms depressed +the spirits of the invaders. The miserable cart tracks were at once +cut up by the passage of the host, and 10,000 horses perished of +fatigue or of disease caused by the rank grass, in the fifty miles' +march from the Niemen to Vilna.</p> + +<p>The difficulties of the transport service began at once, and +they were to increase with every day's march. With his usual +foresight, Napoleon had ordered the collection of immense stores of +all kinds at Danzig, his chief base of supplies. Two million pairs +of boots were required for the wear and tear of a long campaign, +and all preparations were on the same colossal scale. In this +connection it is noteworthy that no small proportion of the cloaks +and boots came from England, as the industrial<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii245" id="page_ii245">[pg.245]</a></span> +resources of the Continent were wholly unequal to supplying the +crusaders of the Continental System.</p> + +<p>A great part of those stores never reached the troops in Russia. +The wherries sent from Danzig to the Niemen were often snapped up +by British cruisers, and the carriage of stores from the Niemen +entailed so frightful a waste of horseflesh that only the most +absolute necessaries could keep pace with the army in its rapid +advance. The men were thus left without food except such as +marauding could extort. In this art Napoleon's troops were experts. +Many miles of country were scoured on either side of the line of +march, and the Emperor, on reaching Vilna, had to order Ney to send +out cavalry patrols to gather in the stragglers, who were +committing "horrible devastations" and would "fall into the hands +of the Cossacks."</p> + +<p>At Vilna the Grand Army met with a more cheering reception than +heretofore. Deftly placing his Polish regiments in front and +chasing the retiring Russians beyond the town, Napoleon then +returned to find a welcome in the old Lithuanian capital. The old +men came forth clad in the national garb, and it seemed that that +province, once a part of the great Polish monarchy, would break +away from the empire of the Czars and extend Napoleon's influence +to within a few miles of Smolensk.<a name="FN2anchor261_261"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_261_261"><sup>[261]</sup></a> The newly-formed Diet +at Warsaw also favoured this project: it constituted itself into a +general confederation, declared the Kingdom of Poland to be +restored, and sent a deputation to Napoleon at Vilna begging him to +utter the creative words: "Let the Kingdom of Poland exist." The +Emperor gave a guarded answer. He declared that he loved the Poles, +he commended them for their patriotism, which was "the first duty +of civilized man," but added that only by a unanimous effort could +they now compel their enemies to recognize their rights; and that, +having guaranteed the integrity of the Austrian Empire, he could +not sanction any movement which would disturb its remaining Polish provinces.<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii246" id= +"page_ii246">[pg.246]</a></span></p> + +<br> + + +<p>This diplomatic reply chilled his auditors. +But what would have been their feelings had they known that the +calling of the Diet at Warsaw, and the tone of its address to +Napoleon; had all been sketched out five weeks before by the +imperial stage manager himself? Yet such was the case.</p> + +<p>The scene-shifter was the Abbé de Pradt, Archbishop of +Malines, whom Napoleon sent as ambassador to Warsaw, with elaborate +instructions as to the summoning of the Diet, the whipping-up of +Polish enthusiasm, the revolutionizing of Russian Poland, and the +style of the address to him. Nay, his passion for the regulation of +details even led him to inform the ambassador that the imperial +reply would be one of praise of Polish patriotism and of warning +that Polish liberty could only be won by their "zeal and their +efforts." The trickery was like that which he had played upon the +Poles shortly before Eylau. In effect, he said now, as then: "Pour +out your blood for me first, and I will do something for you." But +on this occasion the scenic setting was more impressive, the rush +of the Poles to arms more ardent, the diplomatic reply more +astutely postponed, and the finale more awful.<a name= +"FN2anchor262_262"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_262_262"><sup>[262]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Still, the Poles marched on; but their devotion became more +questioning. The feelings of the Lithuanians were also ruffled by +Napoleon's reply to the Polish deputies: nor were they consoled by +his appointment of seven magnates to regulate the affairs of the +districts of Lithuania, under the ægis of French +commissioners, who proved to be the real governors. Worst of all +was the marauding of Napoleon's troops, who, after their long +habituation to the imperial maxim that "war must support war," +could not now see the need of enduring the<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii247" id="page_ii247">[pg.247]</a></span></p> + +<center><a name="image_14"><img alt="CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA" src= +"images/image14.jpg" width="551" height="387"><br> + <font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>CAMPAIGN IN +RUSSIA</small></font></a></center> + +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii248" id= +"page_ii248">[pg.248]</a></span> pangs of hunger in order that +Lithuanian enthusiasm might not cool.<br> +<br> + + +<p>Meanwhile the war had not progressed altogether as he desired. +His aim had been to conceal his advance across the Niemen, to +surprise the two chief Russian armies while far separated, and thus +to end the war on Lithuanian soil by a blow such as he had dealt at +Friedland. The Russian arrangements seemed to favour his plan. +Their two chief arrays, that led by the Czar and by General Barclay +de Tolly, some 125,000 strong north of Vilna, and that of Prince +Bagration mustering now about 45,000 effectives, in the province of +Volhynia, were labouring to carry out the strategy devised by +Phull. The former was directly to oppose the march of Napoleon's +main army, while the smaller Russian force was to operate on its +flanks and rear. Such a plan could only have succeeded in the good +old times when war was conducted according to ceremonious +etiquette; it courted destruction from Napoleon. At Vilna the +Emperor directed the movements that were to ensnare Bagration. +Already he had urged on the march of Davoust, who was to circle +round from the north, and the advance of Jerome Bonaparte's +Westphalians, who were bidden to hurry on eastwards from the town +of Grodno on the Upper Niemen. Their convergence would drive +Bagration into the almost trackless marshes of the Pripet, whence +his force would emerge, if at all, as helpless units.</p> + +<p>Such was Napoleon's plan, and it would have succeeded but for a +miscalculation in the time needed for Jerome's march. Napoleon +underrated the difficulties of his advance or else overrated his +brother's military capacity. The King of Westphalia was delayed a +few days at Grodno by bad weather and other difficulties; thus +Bagration, who had been ordered by the Czar to retire, was able to +escape the meshes closing around him by a speedy retreat to +Bobruisk, whence he moved northwards. Napoleon was enraged at this +loss of a priceless opportunity, and addressed vehement reproaches +to Jerome for his slowness and "small-mindedness." The +youngest<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii249" id= +"page_ii249">[pg.249]</a></span> of the Bonapartes resented this +rebuke which ignored the difficulties besetting a rapid advance. +The prospect of being subjected to that prince of martinets, +Davoust, chafed his pride; and, throwing up his command, he +forthwith returned to the pleasures of Cassel.</p> + +<p>By great good fortune, Bagration's force had escaped from the +snares strewn in its path by the strategy of Phull and the +counter-moves of Napoleon. The fickle goddess also favoured the +rescue of the chief Russian army from imminent peril at Drissa. In +pursuance of Phull's scheme, the Czar and Barclay de Tolly fell +back with that army towards the intrenched camp on the Dwina. But +doubts had already begun to haunt their minds as to the wisdom of +Phull's plans. In fact, the bias of Barclay's nature was towards +the proven and the practical. He came of a Scottish family which +long ago had settled in Livonia, and had won prosperity and esteem +in the trade of Riga. His ancestry and his early surroundings +therefore disposed him to the careful weighing of evidence and +distrust of vague theories. His thoroughness in military +organization during the war in Finland and his unquestioned probity +and open-mindedness, had recently brought him high into favour with +the Czar, who made him War Minister. He had no wide acquaintance +with the science of warfare, and has been judged altogether +deficient in a wide outlook on events and in those masterly +conceptions which mark the great warrior.<a name= +"FN2anchor263_263"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_263_263"><sup>[263]</sup></a> But nations are sometimes +ruined by lofty genius, while at times they may be saved by humdrum +prudence; and Barclay's common sense had no small share in saving +Russia.</p> + +<p>Two months before the Grand Army passed the Niemen, he had +expressed the hope that God would send retreat to the Russian +armies; and we may safely attribute to his influence with the Czar +the timely order to Bagration to desist from flanking tactics and +beat a retreat while yet there was time. That portion of Phull's +strategy having<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii250" id= +"page_ii250">[pg.250]</a></span> signally failed, Alexander +naturally became more suspicious about the Drissa plan; and during +the retirement from Vilna, he ordered a survey of the works to be +made by Phull's adjutant, a young German named Clausewitz, who was +destined to win a name as an authority in strategy. This officer +was unable conscientiously to present a cheering report. He found +the camp deficient in many respects. Nevertheless, Alexander still +clung to the hope of checking the French advance before these great +intrenchments.</p> + +<p>On his arrival there, on July 8th, this hope also was dashed. +Michaud, a young Sardinian engineer, pointed out several serious +defects in their construction. Barclay also protested against +shutting up a large part of the defending army in a camp which +could easily be blockaded by Napoleon's vast forces. Finally, as +the Russian reserves stationed there proved to be disappointingly +weak both in numbers and efficiency, the Czar determined to +evacuate the camp, intrust the sole command to Barclay, and retire +to his northern capital. It is said that, before he left the army, +the Grand Duke Constantine, a friend of the French cause, made a +last effort to induce him to come to terms with Napoleon, now that +the plan of campaign had failed. If so, Alexander repelled the +attempt. Pride as a ruler and a just resentment against Napoleon +prevented any compromise; and probably he now saw that safety for +himself and ruin for his foe lay in the firm adoption of that +Fabian policy of retreat and delay, which Scharnhorst had advocated +and Barclay was now determined to carry out.</p> + +<p>Though still hampered by the intrigues of Constantine, +Bennigsen, and other generals, who hated him as a foreigner and +feigned to despise him as a coward, Barclay at once took the step +which he had long felt to be necessary; he ordered a retreat which +would bring him into touch with Bagration. Accordingly, leaving +Wittgenstein with 25,000 men to hold Oudinot's corps in check on +the middle Dwina, he marched eastwards towards Vitepsk. True, he +left St. Petersburg open to<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii251" id="page_ii251">[pg.251]</a></span> attack; but it was +not likely that Napoleon, when the summer was far spent, would +press so far north and forego his usual plan of striking at the +enemy's chief forces. He would certainly seek to hinder the +junction of the two Russian armies, as soon as he saw that this was +Barclay's aim. Such proved to be the case. Napoleon soon penetrated +his design, and strove to frustrate it by a rapid move from Vilna +towards Polotsk on Barclay's flank, but he failed to cut into his +line of march, and once more had to pursue.</p> + +<p>Despite the heavy shrinkage in the Grand Army caused by a +remorseless rush through a country wellnigh stripped of supplies, +the Emperor sought to force on a general engagement. He hoped to +catch Barclay at Vitepsk. "The whole Russian army is at +Vitepsk—we are on the eve of great events," he writes on July +25th. But the Russians skilfully withdrew by night from their +position in front of that town, which he entered on July 28th. +Chagrined and perplexed, the chief stays a fortnight to organize +supplies and stores, while his vanguard presses on to envelop the +Russians at Smolensk. Again his hopes revive when he hears that +Barclay and Bagration are about to join near that city. In fact, +those leaders there concluded that strategic movement to the rear +which was absolutely necessary if they were not to be overwhelmed +singly. They viewed the retreat in a very different light. To the +cautious Barclay it portended a triumph long deferred, but sure: +while the more impulsive Muscovite looked upon the constant falling +back as a national disgrace.</p> + +<p>The feelings of the soldiery also forbade a spiritless +abandonment of the holy city of the Upper Dnieper that stands as +sentinel to Russia Proper. On these feelings Napoleon counted, and +rightly. He was now in no haste to strike: the blow must be +crushing and final. At last he hears that Davoust, the leader whose +devotion and methodical persistence merit his complete trust, has +bridged the River Dnieper below the city, and has built ovens for +supplying the host with bread. And having<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii252" id="page_ii252">[pg.252]</a></span> now drawn up +troops and supplies from the rear, he pushes on to end the +campaign.</p> + +<p>Barclay was still for retreat; but religious sentiment and +patriotism bade the defenders stand firm behind those crumbling +walls, while + +<ins class="correction" title= +"Transcriber's note: original reads 'Bragation'">Bagration</ins> +secured the line of retreat. The French, ranged around on the low +hills which ring it on the south, looked for an easy triumph, and +Napoleon seems to have felt an excess of confidence. At any rate, +his dispositions were far from masterly. He made no serious effort +to threaten the Russian communications with Moscow, nor did he wait +for his artillery to overwhelm the ramparts and their defenders. +The corps of Ney, Davoust, and Poniatowski, with Murat's cavalry +and the Imperial Guard posted in reserve, promised an easy victory, +and the dense columns of foot moved eagerly to the assault. They +were received with a terrific fire. Only after three hours' +desperate fighting did they master the southern suburbs, and at +nightfall the walls still defied their assaults. Yet in the +meantime Napoleon's cannon had done their work. The wooden houses +were everywhere on fire; a speedy retreat alone could save the +garrison from ruin; and amidst a whirlwind of flame and smoke +Barclay drew off his men to join Bagration on the road to Moscow +(August 17th).</p> + +<p>Once more, then, the Russian army had slipped from Napoleon's +grasp, though this time it dealt him a loss of 12,000 in killed or +wounded. And the momentous question faced him whether he should +halt, now that summer was on the wane, or snatch under the walls of +Moscow the triumph which Vilna, Vitepsk, and Smolensk had promised +and denied. It is stated by that melodramatic narrator, Count +Philip Ségur, that on entering Vitepsk, the Emperor +exclaimed: "The campaign of 1812 is ended, that of 1813 will do the +rest." But the whole of Napoleon's "Correspondence" refutes the +anecdote. Besides, it was not Napoleon's habit to go into winter +quarters in July, or to rest before he had defeated the enemy's +main army.<a name="FN2anchor264_264"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_264_264"><sup>[264]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii253" id="page_ii253">[pg.253]</a></span></p> + +<p>At Smolensk the question wore another aspect. Napoleon told +Metternich at Dresden that he would not in the present year advance +beyond Smolensk, but would organize Lithuania during winter and +advance again in the spring of 1813, adding: "My enterprise is one +of those of which the solution is to be found in patience." A +policy of masterly inactivity certainly commended itself to his +Marshals. But the desire to crush the enemy's rear drew Ney and +Murat into a sharp affair at Valutino or Lubino: the French lost +heavily, but finally gained the position: and the hope that the foe +were determined to fight the decisive battle at Dorogobuzh lured +Napoleon on, despite his earlier decision.<a name= +"FN2anchor265_265"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_265_265"><sup>[265]</sup></a> Besides, his position +seemed less hazardous than it was before Austerlitz. The Grand Army +was decidedly superior to the united forces of Barclay and +Bagration. On the Dwina, Oudinot held the Russians at bay; and when +he was wounded, his successor, Gouvion St. Cyr, displayed a +tactical skill which enabled<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii254" id="page_ii254">[pg.254]</a></span> him easily to foil +a mere fighter like Wittgenstein. On the French right flank, +affairs were less promising; for the ending of the Russo-Turkish +war now left the Russian army of the Pruth free to march into +Volhynia. But, for the present, Napoleon was able to summon up +strong reserves under Victor, and assure his rear.</p> + +<p>With full confidence, then, he pressed onwards to wrest from +Fortune one last favour. It was granted to him at Borodino. There +the Russians made a determined stand. National jealousy of Barclay, +inflamed by his protracted retreat, had at last led to his being +superseded by Kutusoff; and, having about 110,000 troops, the old +fighting general now turned fiercely to bay. His position on the +low convex curve of hills that rise behind the village of Borodino +was of great strength. On his right was the winding valley of the +Kolotza, an affluent of the Moskwa, and before his centre and left +the ground sloped down to a stream. On this more exposed side the +Russians had hastily thrown up earthworks, that at the centre being +known as the Great Redoubt, though it had no rear defences.</p> + +<p>Napoleon halted for two days, until his gathering forces +mustered some 125,000 men, and he now prepared to end the war at a +blow. After surveying the Russian position, he saw Kutusoff's error +in widely extending his lines to the north; and while making feints +on that side, so as to prevent any concentration of the Muscovite +array, he planned to overwhelm the more exposed centre and left, by +the assaults of Davoust and Poniatowski on the south, and of Ney's +corps and Eugène's Italians on the redoubts at the centre. +Davoust begged to be allowed to outflank the Russian left; but +Napoleon refused, perhaps owing to a fear that the Russians might +retreat early in the day, and decided on dealing direct blows at +the left and centre. As the 7th of September dawned with all the +splendour of a protracted summer, cannon began to thunder against +the serried arrays ranged along the opposing slopes, and Napoleon's +columns moved against the redoubts and woods that sheltered the +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii255" id= +"page_ii255">[pg.255]</a></span> Muscovite lines. The defence was +most obstinate. Time after time the smaller redoubts were taken and +retaken; and while, on the French right centre, the tide of battle +surged up and down the slope, the Great Redoubt dealt havoc among +Eugène's Italians, who bravely but, as it seemed, hopelessly +struggled up that fatal rise.</p> + +<p>Then was seen a soul-stirring sight. Of a sudden, a mass of +Cuirassiers rushed forth from the invaders' ranks, flung itself +uphill, and girdled the grim earthwork with a stream of flashing +steel There, for a brief space, it was stayed by the tough +Muscovite lines, until another billow of horsemen, marshalled by +Grouchy and Chastel, swept all before it, took the redoubt on its +weak reverse, and overwhelmed its devoted defenders.<a name= +"FN2anchor266_266"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_266_266"><sup>[266]</sup></a> In vain did the Russian +cavalry seek to save the day: Murat's horsemen were not to be +denied, and Kutusoff was at last fain to draw back his mangled +lines, but slowly and defiantly, under cover of a crushing +artillery fire.</p> + +<p>Thus ended the bloodiest fight of the century. For several hours +800 cannon had dealt death among the opposing masses; the Russians +lost about 40,000 men, and, whatever Napoleon said in his +bulletins, the rents in his array were probably nearly as great. He +has been censured for not launching his Guard at the wavering foe +at the climax of the fight; and the soldiery loudly blamed its +commander, Bessières, for dissuading his master from this +step. But to have sacrificed those veterans to Russian cannon would +have been a perilous act.<a name="FN2anchor267_267"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_267_267"><sup>[267]</sup></a> His Guard was the solid +kernel of his army: on it he could always rely, even when French +regulars dissolved, as often happened after long marches, into +bands of unruly marauders; and its value was to be found out +during<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii256" id= +"page_ii256">[pg.256]</a></span> the retreat. More fitly may +Napoleon be blamed for not seeking earlier in the day to turn the +Russian left, and roll that long line up on the river. Here, as at +Smolensk, he resorted to a frontal attack, which could only yield +success at a frightful cost. The day brought little glory to the +generals, except to Ney, Murat, and Grouchy. For his valour in the +<i>mêlée</i>, Ney received the title of Prince de la +Moskwa.</p> + +<p>A week before this Pyrrhic triumph, Napoleon had heard of a +terrible reverse to French arms in Spain. His old friend, Marmont, +who had won the Marshal's baton after Wagram, measured his strength +with Wellington in the plains of Leon with brilliant success until +a false move near Salamanca exposed him to a crushing rejoinder, +and sent his army flying back towards Burgos. Madrid was now +uncovered and was occupied for a time by the English army (August +13th). Thus while Napoleon was gasping at Moscow, his brother was +expelled from Madrid, until the recall of Soult from Andalusia gave +the French a superiority in the centre of Spain which forced +Wellington to retire to Ciudad Rodrigo. He lost the fruits of his +victory, save that Andalusia was freed: but he saved his army for +the triumphant campaign of 1813. Had Napoleon shown the like +prudence by beating a timely retreat from Moscow, who can say that +the next hard-fought fights in Silesia and Saxony would not have +once more crowned his veterans with decisive triumph?</p> + +<p>As it was, the Grand Army toiled on through heat, dust, and the +smoke of burning villages, to gain peace and plenty at Moscow. But +when, on September the 14th, the conqueror entered that city with +his vanguard, solitude reigned almost unbroken. A few fanatics, +clinging to the tradition that the Kremlin was impregnable, idly +sought to defend it; but troops, officials, nobles, merchants, and +the great mass of the people were gone, and the military stores had +been burnt or removed. Rostopchin, the governor, had released the +prisoners and broken the fire engines. Flames speedily burst +forth,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii257" id= +"page_ii257">[pg.257]</a></span> and Bausset, the Prefect of +Napoleon's Palace, affirms that while looking forth from the +Kremlin he saw the flames burst forth in several districts in quick +succession; and that a careful examination of cellars often proved +them to be stored with combustibles, vitriol in one case being +swallowed by a French soldier who took it for brandy! If all this +be true, it proves that the Muscovites were determined to fire +their capital. But their writers have as stoutly affirmed that the +fires were caused by French and Polish plunderers.<a name= +"FN2anchor268_268"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_268_268"><sup>[268]</sup></a> Three days later, the +powers of the air and the demons of drink and frenzy raged +uncontrolled; and Napoleon himself barely escaped from the +whirlwinds of flame that enveloped the Kremlin and nearly scorched +to death the last members of his staff. For several hours the +conflagration was fanned by an equinoctial gale, and when, on the +20th, it died down, convicts or plunderers kindled it anew.</p> + +<p>Yet the army did not want for shelter, and, as Sergeant +Bourgogne remarks, if every house had been gutted there were still +the caves and cellars that promised protection from the cold of +winter. The real problem was now, as ever, the food-supply. The +Russians had swept the district wellnigh bare; and though the Grand +Army feasted for a fortnight on dainties and drink, yet bread, +flour, and meat were soon very scarce. In vain did the Emperor seek +to entice the inhabitants back; they knew the habits of the +invaders only too well; and despite several distant raids, which +sometimes cost the French dear, the soldiery began to suffer.</p> + +<p>October wore on with delusive radiance, but brought no peace. +Soon after the great conflagration at Moscow, Napoleon sent secret +and alluring overtures to Alexander, offering to leave Russia a +free hand in regard to Turkey, inclusive of Constantinople, which +he had hitherto strictly<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii258" +id="page_ii258">[pg.258]</a></span> reserved, and hinting that +Polish affairs might also be arranged to the Czar's liking.<a name= +"FN2anchor269_269"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_269_269"><sup>[269]</sup></a> But Alexander refused +tamely to accept the fruits of victory from the man who, he +believed, had burnt holy Moscow, and clung to his vow never to +treat with his rival as long as a single French soldier stood on +Russian soil. His resolve saved Europe. Yet it cost him much to +defy the great conqueror to the death: he had so far feared the +capture of St. Petersburg as to request that the Cronstadt fleet +might be kept in safety in England.<a name= +"FN2anchor270_270"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_270_270"><sup>[270]</sup></a> But gradually he came to +see that the sacrifice of Moscow had saved his empire and lured +Napoleon to his doom. Kutusoff also played a waiting game. +Affecting a wish for peace, he was about secretly to meet +Napoleon's envoy, Lauriston, when the Russian generals and our +commissioner, Sir R. Wilson, intervened, and required that it +should be a public step. It seems likely, however, that Kutusoff +was only seeking to entrap the French into barren negotiations; he +knew that an answer could not come from the banks of the Neva until +winter began to steal over the northern steppes.</p> + +<p>Slowly the truth begins to dawn on Napoleon that Moscow is not +<i>the heart of Russia</i>, as he had asserted to De Pradt that it +was. Gradually he sees that that primitive organism had no heart, +that its almost amorphous life was widespread through myriads of +village communes, vegetating apart from Moscow or Petersburg, and +that his march to the old capital was little more than a +sword-slash through a pond.<a name="FN2anchor271_271"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_271_271"><sup>[271]</sup></a> Had he set himself to +study with his former care the real nature of the hostile organism, +he would certainly never have ventured beyond Smolensk in the +present year. But he had<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii259" +id="page_ii259">[pg.259]</a></span> now merged the thinker in the +conqueror, and—sure sign of coming disaster—his mind no +longer accurately gauged facts, it recast them in its own +mould.</p> + +<p>By long manipulation of men and events, it had framed a dogma of +personal infallibility. This vice had of late been growing on him +apace. It was apparent even in trifles. The Countess Metternich +describes how, early in 1810, he persisted in saying that Kaunitz +was her brother, in spite of her frequent disclaimers of that +honour; and, somewhat earlier, Marmont noticed with half-amused +dismay that when the Emperor gave a wrong estimate of the numbers +of a certain corps, no correction had the slightest effect on him; +his mind always reverted to the first figure. In weightier matters +this peculiarity was equally noticeable. His clinging to +preconceived notions, however unfair or burdensome they were to +Britain, Prussia, or Austria, had been the underlying cause of his +wars with those Powers. And now this same defect, burnt into his +being by the blaze of a hundred victories, held him to Moscow for +five weeks, in the belief that Russia was stricken unto death, and +that the facile Czar whom he had known at Tilsit would once more +bend the knee. An idle hope. "I have learnt to know him now," said +the Czar, "Napoleon or I; I or Napoleon; we cannot reign side by +side." Buoyed up by religious faith and by his people's heroism, +Alexander silently defied the victor of Moscow and rebuked Kutusoff +for receiving the French envoy.</p> + +<p>At last, on October 18th, the Russians threw away the scabbard +and surprised Murat's force some forty miles south of Moscow, +inflicting a loss of 3,000 men. But already, a day or two earlier, +Napoleon had realized the futility of his hope of peace and had +resolved to retreat. The only alternative was to winter at Moscow, +and he judged that the state of French and Spanish affairs rendered +such a course perilous. He therefore informed Maret that the Grand +Army would go into winter quarters between the Dnieper and the +Dwina.<a name="FN2anchor272_272"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_272_272"><sup>[272]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii260" id="page_ii260">[pg.260]</a></span></p> + +<p>There is no hint in his letters that he anticipated a disastrous +retreat. The weather hitherto had been "as fine as that at +Fontainebleau in September," and he purposed retiring by a more +southerly route which had not been exhausted by war. Full of +confidence, then, he set out on the 19th, with 115,000 men, +persuaded that he would easily reach friendly Lithuania and his +winter quarters "before severe cold set in." The veil was rudely +torn from his eyes when, south of Malo-Jaroslavitz, his Marshals +found the Russians so strongly posted that any further attack +seemed to be an act of folly. Eugène's corps had suffered +cruelly in an obstinate fight in and around that town, and the +advice of Berthier, Murat, and Bessières was against its +renewal. For an hour or more the Emperor sat silently gazing at a +map. The only prudent course now left was to retreat north and then +west by way of Borodino, <i>over his devastated line of +advance</i>.<a name="FN2anchor273_273"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_273_273"><sup>[273]</sup></a> Back, then, towards +Borodino the army mournfully trudged (October 26th):</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Everywhere (says Labaume) we saw wagons abandoned for want of +horses to draw them. Those who bore along with them the spoils of +Moscow trembled for their riches; but we were disquieted most of +all at seeing the deplorable state of our cavalry. The villages +which had but lately given us shelter were level with the ground: +under their ashes were the bodies of hundreds of soldiers and +peasants.... But most horrible was the field of Borodino, where we +saw the forty thousand men, who had perished there, yet lying +unburied."</p> +</div> + +<p>For a time, Kutusoff forbore to attack the sore-stricken host; +but, early in November, the Russian horse began to infest the line +of march, and at Viasma their <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii261" id="page_ii261">[pg.261]</a></span> gathering forces +were barely held off: had Kutusoff aided his lieutenants, he might +have decimated his famished foes.</p> + +<p>Hitherto the weather had been singularly mild and open, so much +so that the superstitious peasants looked on it as a sign that God +was favouring Napoleon. But, at last, on November the 6th, the +first storm of winter fell on the straggling array, and completed +its miseries. The icy blasts struck death to the hearts of the +feeble; and the puny fighting of man against man was now merged in +the awful struggle against the powers of the air. Drifts of snow +blotted out the landscape; the wandering columns often lost the +road and thousands forthwith ended their miseries. Except among the +Old Guard all semblance of military order was now lost, and +battalions melted away into groups of marauders.</p> + +<p>The search for food and fuel became furious, even when the +rigour of the cold abated. The behaviour of Bourgogne, a sergeant +in the Imperial Guard, may serve to show by what shifts a hardy +masterful nature fought its way through the wreckage of humanity +around: "If I could meet anybody in the world with a loaf, I would +make him give me half—nay, I would kill him so as to get the +whole." These were his feelings: he acted on them by foraging in +the forest and seizing a pot in which an orderly was secretly +cooking potatoes for his general. Bourgogne made off with the +potatoes, devoured most of them half-boiled, returned to his +comrades and told them he had found nothing. Taking his place near +their fire, he scooped out his bed in the snow, lay under his +bearskin, and clasped his now precious knapsack, while the others +moaned with hunger. Yet, as his narrative shows, he was not +naturally a heartless man: in such a situation man is apt to sink +to the level of the wolf. The best food obtainable was horseflesh, +and hungry throngs rushed at every horse that fell, disputing its +carcass with the packs of dogs or wolves that hung about the line +of march.<a name="FN2anchor274_274"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_274_274"><sup>[274]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii262" id="page_ii262">[pg.262]</a></span></p> + +<p>Smolensk was now the thought dearest to every heart; and, buoyed +with the hope of rest and food, the army tottered westwards as it +had panted eastwards through the fierce summer heats with Moscow as +its cynosure. The hope that clung about Smolensk was but a cruel +mirage. The wreck of that city offered poor shelter; the stores +were exhausted by the vanguard; and, to the horror of +Eugène's Italians, men swarmed out of that fancied abode of +plenty and pounced on every horse that stumbled to its doom on the +slippery banks of the Dnieper. With inconceivable folly, Napoleon, +or his staff, had provided no means for roughing the horses' shoes. +The Cossacks, when they knew this, exclaimed to Wilson: "God has +made Napoleon forget that there was a winter here."</p> + +<p>Disasters now thickened about the Grand Army. During his halt at +Smolensk (November 9th-14th), Napoleon heard that Victor's force on +the Dwina had been worsted by the Russians, and there was ground +for fearing that the Muscovite army of the Ukraine would cut into +the line of retreat. The halt at Smolensk also gave time for +Kutusoff to come up parallel with the main force, and had he +pressed on with ordinary speed and showed a tithe of his wonted +pugnacity, he might have captured the Grand Army and its leader. As +it was, his feeble attack on the rearguard at Krasnoe only gave Ney +an opportunity of showing his dauntless courage. The "bravest of +the brave" fought his way through clouds<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii263" id="page_ii263">[pg.263]</a></span> of Cossacks, +crossed the Dnieper, though with the loss of all his guns, and +rejoined the main body. Napoleon was greatly relieved on hearing of +the escape of this Launcelot of the Imperial chivalry. He ordered +cannon to be fired at suitable intervals so as to forward the news +if it were propitious; and on hearing their distant boomings, he +exclaimed to his officers: "I have more than 400,000,000 francs in +the cellars of the Tuileries, and would gladly have given the whole +for the ransom of my faithful companion in arms."<a name= +"FN2anchor275_275"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_275_275"><sup>[275]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Far greater was the danger at the River Beresina. The Russian +army of the south had seized the bridge at Borisoff on which +Napoleon's safety depended, and Oudinot vainly struggled to wrest +it back. The Muscovites burnt it under his eyes. Such was the news +which Napoleon heard at Bobr on November 24th. It staggered him; +for, with his usual excess of confidence, he had destroyed his +pontoons on the banks of the Dnieper; and now there was no means of +crossing a river, usually insignificant, but swollen by floods and +bridged only by half-thawed ice. Yet French resource was far from +vanquished. General Corbineau, finding from some peasants that the +river was fordable three leagues above Borisoff, brought the news +to Oudinot, who forthwith prepared to cross there. Napoleon, coming +up on the 26th, approved the plan, and cheeringly said to his +Marshal, "Well, you shall be my locksmith and open that passage for +me."<a name="FN2anchor276_276"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_276_276"><sup>[276]</sup></a></p> + +<p>To deceive the foe, the Emperor told off a regiment or two +southwards with a long tail of camp-followers that were taken to be +an army. And this wily move, harmonizing with recent demonstrations +of the Austrians on the side of Minsk, convinced the Muscovite +leader that Napoleon was minded to clasp hands with them.<a name= +"FN2anchor277_277"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_277_277"><sup>[277]</sup></a> While the Russians +patrolled the river on the south, French sappers were working, +often neck deep in the water, to throw two light bridges across the +stream higher up. By heroic toil,<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii264" id="page_ii264">[pg.264]</a></span> which to most of +them brought death, the bridges were speedily finished, and, as the +light of November 26th was waning Oudinot's corps of 7,000 men +gained a firm footing on the homeward side. But they were observed +by Russian scouts, and when on the next day Napoleon and other +corps had struggled across, the enemy came up, captured a whole +division, and on the morrow strove to hurl the invaders into the +river. Victor and the rearguard staunchly kept them at bay; but at +one point the Russian army of the Dwina temporarily gained ground +and swept the bridges and their approaches with artillery fire.</p> + +<p>Then the panic-stricken throngs of wounded and stragglers, women +and camp-followers, writhed and fought their way until the frail +planks were piled high with living and dead. To add to the horrors, +one bridge gave way under the weight of the cannon. The rush for +the one remaining bridge became yet more frantic and the day closed +amidst scenes of unspeakable woe. Stout swimmers threw themselves +into the stream, only to fall victims to the ice floes and the +numbing cold. At dawn of the 29th, the French rearguard fired the +bridge to cover the retreat. Then a last, loud wail of horror arose +from the farther bank, and despair or a loathing of life drove many +to end their miseries in the river or in the flames.</p> + +<p>Such was the crossing of the Beresina. The ghastly tale was told +once more with renewed horrors when the floods of winter abated and +laid bare some 12,000 corpses along the course of that fatal +stream. It would seem that if Napoleon, or his staff, had hurried +on the camp-followers to cross on the night of the 27th to the +28th, those awful scenes would not have happened, for on that night +the bridges <i>were not used at all</i>. Grosser carelessness than +this cannot be conceived; and yet, even after this shocking +blunder, the devotion of the soldiers to their chief found touching +expression. When he was suffering from cold in the wretched bivouac +west of the river, officers went round calling for dry wood +for<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii265" id= +"page_ii265">[pg.265]</a></span> his fire; and shivering men were +seen to offer precious sticks, with the words, "Take it for the +Emperor."<a name="FN2anchor278_278"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_278_278"><sup>[278]</sup></a></p> + +<p>On that day Napoleon wrote to Maret that possibly he would leave +the army and hurry on to Paris. His presence there was certainly +needed, if his crown was to be saved. On November 6th, the day of +the first snowstorm, he heard of the Quixotic attempt of a French +republican, General Malet, to overthrow the Government at Paris. +With a handful of followers, but armed with a false report of +Napoleon's capture in Russia, this man had apprehended several +officials, until the scheme collapsed of sheer inanity.<a name= +"FN2anchor279_279"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_279_279"><sup>[279]</sup></a> "How now, if we were at +Moscow," exclaimed the Emperor, on hearing this curious news; and +he saw with chagrin that some of his generals merely shrugged their +shoulders. After crossing the Beresina, he might hope that the +worst was over and that the stores at Vilna and Kovno would suffice +for the remnant of his army. The cold for a time had been less +rigorous. The behaviour of Prussia and Austria was, in truth, more +important than the conduct of the retreat. Unless those Powers were +kept to their troth, not a Frenchman would cross the Elbe.</p> + +<p>At Smorgoni, then, on December the 5th, he informed his Marshals +that he left them in order to raise 300,000 men; and, intrusting +the command to Murat, he hurried away. His great care was to +prevent the extent of the disaster being speedily known. "Remove +all strangers from Vilna," he wrote to Maret: "the army is not fine +to look upon just now." The precaution was much needed. Frost set +in once more, and now with unending grip. Vilna offered a poor +haven of refuge. The stores were soon plundered, and, as the +Cossacks drew near, Murat and the remnant of the Grand Army +decamped in pitiable panic. Amidst ever deepening misery they +struggled on, until, of the 600,000 men who had proudly crossed the +Niemen for the conquest of Russia, only 20,000 famished, +frost-bitten, unarmed spectres staggered across the bridge of Kovno +in the middle of December. The<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii266" id="page_ii266">[pg.266]</a></span> auxiliary corps +furnished by Austria and Prussia fell back almost unscathed. But +the remainder of that mighty host rotted away in Russian prisons or +lay at rest under Nature's winding-sheet of snow.<a name= +"FN2anchor280_280"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_280_280"><sup>[280]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii267" id="page_ii267">[pg.267]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXXIII</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE FIRST SAXON CAMPAIGN</center> + +<br> + + +<p>Despite the loss of the most splendid army ever marshalled by +man, Napoleon abated no whit of his resolve to dominate Germany and +dictate terms to Russia. At Warsaw, in his retreat, he informed De +Pradt that there was but one step from the sublime <i>to the +ridiculous</i>, that is, from the advance on Moscow to the retreat. +At Dresden he called on his allies, Austria and Prussia, to repel +the Russians; and at Paris he strained every nerve to call the +youth of the Empire to arms. The summons met with a ready response: +he had but to stamp his foot when the news from East Prussia looked +ominous, and an array of 350,000 conscripts was promised by the +Senate (January 10th).</p> + +<p>In truth, his genius had enthralled the mind of France. The +magnificence of his aims, his hitherto triumphant energy, and the +glamour of his European supremacy had called forth all the +faculties of the French and Italian peoples, and set them pulsating +with ecstatic activity. He knew by instinct all the intricacies of +their being, which his genius controlled with the easy decisiveness +of a master-key. The rude shock of the Russian disaster served but +to emphasize the thoroughness of his domination, and the dumb +trustfulness of his forty-three millions of subjects.</p> + +<p>And yet their patience might well have been exhausted. His +military needs had long ago drawn in levies the year before they +were legally liable; but the mighty swirl of the Moscow campaign +now sucked 150,000 lads of under twenty years of age into the<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii268" id= +"page_ii268">[pg.268]</a></span> devouring vortex. In the Dutch and +German provinces of his Empire the number of those who evaded the +clutches of the conscription was very large. In fact, the number of +"refractory conscripts" in the whole realm amounted to 40,000. +Large bands of them ranged the woods of Brittany and La +Vendée, until mobile columns were sent to sweep them into +the barracks.</p> + +<p>But in nearly the whole of France (Proper), Napoleon's name was +still an unfailing talisman, appealing as it did to the two +strongest instincts of the Celt, the clinging to the soil and the +passion for heroic enterprise. Thus it came about that the +peasantry gave up their sons to be "food for cannon" with the same +docility that was shown by soldiers who sank death-stricken into a +snowy bed with no word of reproach to the author of their miseries. +A like obsequiousness was shown by the officials and legislators of +France, who meekly listened to the Emperor's reproaches for their +weakness in the Malet affair, and heard with mild surprise his +denunciation against republican idealogy—<i>the cloudy +metaphysics to which all the misfortunes of our fair France may be +attributed</i>. No tongue dared to utter the retort which must have +fermented in every brain.<a name="FN2anchor281_281"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_281_281"><sup>[281]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But his explanations and appeals did not satisfy every +Frenchman. Many were appalled at the frightful drain on the +nation's strength. They asked in private how the deficit of 1812 +and the further expenses of 1813 were to be met, even if he +allotted the communal domains to the service of the State. They +pointed to allies ruined or lost; to Spain, where Joseph's throne +still tottered from the shock of Salamanca; to Poland, lying +mangled at the feet of the Muscovites; to Italy, desolated by the +loss of her bravest sons; to the Confederation of the Rhine, +equally afflicted and less resigned; to Austria<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii269" id="page_ii269">[pg.269]</a></span> +and Prussia, where timid sovereigns and calculating Courts alone +kept the peoples true to the hated French alliance. Only by a +change of system, they averred, could the hatred of Europe be +appeased, and the formation of a new and vaster Coalition avoided. +Let Napoleon cease to force his methods of commercial warfare on +the Continent: let him make peace on honourable terms with Russia, +where the chief Minister, Romantzoff, was ready to meet him +halfway: let him withdraw his garrisons from Prussian fortresses, +soothe the susceptibilities of Austria—and events would tend +to a solid and honourable peace.</p> + +<p>To all promptings of prudence Napoleon was deaf. His instincts +and his experience of the Kings prevented him yielding on any +important point. He determined to carry on the war from the Tagus +to the Vistula, to bolster up Joseph in Spain, to keep his +garrisons fast rooted in every fortress as far east as Danzig. +Russia and Prussia, he said, had more need of peace than France. If +he began by giving up towns, they would demand kingdoms, whereas by +yielding nothing he would intimidate them. And if they did form a +league, their forces would be thinly spread out over an immense +space; he would easily dispose of their armies when they were not +aided by the climate; and a single victory would undo the clumsy +knot (<i>ce noeud mal assorti</i>).<a name= +"FN2anchor282_282"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_282_282"><sup>[282]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In truth, if he left Spain out of his count, the survey of the +military position was in many ways reassuring. England's power was +enfeebled by the declaration of war by the United States. In +Central Europe his position was still commanding. He held nearly +all the fortresses of Prussia, and though he had lost a great army, +that loss was spread out very largely over Poles, Germans, +Italians, and smaller peoples. Many of the best French troops and +all his ablest generals had survived. His<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii270" id="page_ii270">[pg.270]</a></span> Guard could +therefore be formed again, and the brains of his army were also +intact. The war had brought to light no military genius among the +Russians; and all his past experience of the "old coalition +machines" warranted the belief that their rusty cogwheels, even if +oiled by English subsidies, would clank slowly along and break down +at the first exceptional strain. Such had been the case at Marengo, +at Austerlitz, at Friedland. Why should not history repeat +itself?</p> + +<p>While he was guiding his steps solely by the light of past +experience, events were occurring that heralded the dawn of a new +era for Central Europe. On the 30th of December, the Prussian +General Yorck, who led the Prussian corps serving previously under +Macdonald in Courland, concluded the Convention of Tauroggen with +the Russians, stipulating that this corps should hold the district +around Memel and Tilsit as neutral territory, until Frederick +William's decision should be known. Strictly considered, this +convention was a grave breach of international law and an act of +treachery towards Napoleon. The King at first viewed it in that +light; but to all his subjects it seemed a noble and patriotic +action. To continue the war with Russia for the benefit of Napoleon +would have been an act of political suicide.</p> + +<p>Yet, for some weeks, Frederick William waited on events; and +these events decided for war, not against Russia, but against +France. The Prussian Chancellor, Hardenberg, did his best to +hoodwink the French at Berlin, and quietly to play into the hands +of the ardent German patriots. After publishing an official rebuke +to Yorck, he secretly sent Major Thile to reassure him. He did +more: in order to rescue the King from French influence, still +paramount at Berlin, he persuaded him to set out for Breslau, on +the pretext of raising there another contingent for service under +Napoleon. The ruse completely succeeded: it deceived the French +ambassador, St. Marsan: it fooled even Napoleon himself. With his +now invariable habit of taking for granted that events would march +according to his word of command, the<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii271" id="page_ii271">[pg.271]</a></span> Emperor assumed +that this was for the raising of the corps of 30,000 men which he +had requested Frederick William to provide, and said to Prince +Hatzfeld (January 29th): "Your King is going to Breslau: I think it +a timely step." Such was Napoleon's frame of mind, even after he +heard of Yorck's convention with the Russians. That event he +considered "the worst occurrence that could happen." Yet neither +that nor the patriotic ferment in Prussia reft the veil from his +eyes. He still believed that the Prussians would follow their King, +and that the King would obey him. On February the 3rd he wrote to +Maret, complaining that 2,000 Prussian horsemen were shutting +themselves up in Silesian towns, "as if they were afraid of us, +instead of helping us and covering their country."</p> + +<p>Once away from Berlin, Frederick William found himself launched +on a resistless stream of national enthusiasm. At heart he was no +less a patriot than the most ardent of the university students; but +he knew far better than they the awful risks of war with the French +Empire. His little kingdom of 4,700,000 souls, with but +half-a-dozen strongholds it could call its own, a realm ravaged by +Napoleon's troops alike in war and peace until commerce and credit +were but a dim memory—such a land could ill afford to defy an +empire ten times as populous and more than ten times as powerful. +True, the Russians were pouring in under the guise of friendship; +but the bitter memories of Tilsit forbade any implicit trust in +Alexander. And, if the dross had been burnt out of his nature by a +year of fiery trial, could his army, exhausted by that frightful +winter campaign and decimated by the diseases which Napoleon's +ghastly array scattered broadcast in its flight, ever hope, even +with the help of Prussia's young levies, to cope with the united +forces of Napoleon and Austria?</p> + +<p>For at present it seemed that the Court of Vienna would hold +fast to the French alliance. There Metternich was all-powerful, and +the keystone of his system was a guarded but profit-seeking +subservience to<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii272" id= +"page_ii272">[pg.272]</a></span> Napoleon. Not that the Emperor +Francis and he loved the French potentate; but they looked on him +now as a pillar of order, as a barrier against Jacobinism in +France, against the ominous pan-Germanism preached by Prussian +enthusiasts, and against Muscovite aggandizement in Turkey and +Poland. Great was their concern, first at the Russo-Turkish peace +which installed the Muscovites at the northern mouth of the Danube, +and still more at the conquering swoops of the Russian eagle on +Warsaw and Posen. How could they now hope to gain from Turkey the +set-off to the loss of Tyrol and Illyria on which they had recently +been counting, and how save any of the Polish lands from the grip +of Russia? For the present Russia was more to be feared than +Napoleon. Her influence seemed the more threatening to the policy +of balance on which the fortunes of the Hapsburgs were delicately +poised.</p> + +<p>Only by degrees were these fears and jealousies laid to rest. It +needed all the address of a British envoy, Lord Walpole, who +repaired secretly to Vienna and held out the promise of tempting +gains, to assuage these alarms, and turn Austria's gaze once more +on her lost provinces, Tyrol, Illyria, and Venetia. For the +present, however, nothing came of these overtures; and when the +French discovered Walpole's presence at Vienna, Metternich begged +him to leave.<a name="FN2anchor283_283"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_283_283"><sup>[283]</sup></a></p> + +<p>For the present, then, Austria assumed a neutral attitude. A +truce was concluded with Russia, and a special envoy was sent to +Paris to explain the desire of the Emperor Francis to act as +mediator, with a view to the conclusion of a general peace. The +latest researches into Austrian policy show that the Kaiser desired +an<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii273" id= +"page_ii273">[pg.273]</a></span> honourable peace for all parties +concerned, and that Metternich may have shared his views. But, +early in the negotiations, Napoleon showed flashes of distrust as +to the sincerity of his father-in-law, and Austria gradually +changed her attitude. The change was to be fatal to Napoleon. But +the question whether it was brought about by Napoleon's obstinacy, +or Metternich's perfidy, or the force of circumstances, must be +postponed for the present, while we consider events of equal +importance and of greater interest.</p> + +<p>While Austria balanced and Frederick William negotiated, the +sterner minds of North Germany rushed in on the once sacred ground +of diplomacy and statecraft. The struggle against Napoleon was +prepared for by the exile Stein, and war was first proclaimed by a +professor.</p> + +<p>Among the many influences that urged on the Czar to a war for +the liberation of Prussia and Europe, not the least was that +wielded at his Court in the latter half of 1812 by the staunch +German patriot, Stein. His heroic spirit never quailed, even in the +darkest hour of Prussia's humiliation; and he now pointed out +convincingly that the only sure means of overthrowing Napoleon was +to raise Germany against him. To remain on a tame defensive at +Warsaw would be to court another French invasion in 1813. The +safety of Russia called for a pursuit of the French beyond the Elbe +and a rally of the Germans against the man they detested. The +appeal struck home. It revived Alexander's longings for the +liberation of Europe, which he had buried at Tilsit; and it agreed +with the promptings of an ambitious statecraft. Only by +overthrowing Napoleon's supremacy in Germany could the Czar gain a +free hand for a lasting settlement of the Polish Question. The +eastern turn given to his policy in 1807 was at an end—but +not before Russia had taken another step towards the Bosphorus. +With one leg planted at the mouth of the Danube, the Colossus now +prepared to stride over Central Europe. The aims of Catherine II. +in 1792<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii274" id= +"page_ii274">[pg.274]</a></span> were at last to be realized. While +Europe was wrestling with Revolutionary France, the Muscovite grasp +was to tighten on Poland. It is not surprising that Alexander, on +January 13th, commented on the "brilliance of the present +situation," or that he decided to press onward. He gave little heed +to the Gallophil counsels of Romantzoff or the dolorous warnings of +the German-hating Kutusoff; and, on January 18th, he empowered +Stein provisionally to administer in his name the districts of +Prussia (Proper) when occupied by Russian troops.</p> + +<p>So irregular a proceeding could only be excused by dire +necessity and by success. It was more than excused; it was +triumphantly justified. Four days later Stein arrived at +Königsberg, in company with the patriotic poet, Arndt. The +Estates, or Provincial Assemblies, of East and West Prussia were +summoned, and they heartily voted supplies for forming a Landwehr +or militia, as well as a last line of defence called the Landsturm. +This step, unique in the history of Prussia, was taken apart from, +almost in defiance of, the royal sanction: it was, in fact, due to +the masterful will of Stein, who saw that a great popular impulse, +and it alone, could overcome the inertia of King and officials. +That impulse he himself originated, and by virtue of powers +conferred on him by the Emperor Alexander. And the ball thus set +rolling at Königsberg was to gather mass and momentum until, +thanks to the powerful aid of Wellington in the South, it overthrew +Napoleon at Paris.</p> + +<p>The action of the exile was furthered by the word of a thinker +and seer. A worthy professor at the University of Breslau, named +Steffens, had long been meditating on some means of helping his +country. The arrival of Frederick William had kindled a flame of +devotion which perplexed that modest and rather pedantic ruler. But +he so far responded to it as to allow Hardenberg to issue (February +3rd) an appeal for volunteers to "reinforce the ranks of the old +defenders of the country." The appeal was entirely vague: it did +not specify whether<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii275" id= +"page_ii275">[pg.275]</a></span> they would serve against the +nominal enemy, Russia, or the real enemy, Napoleon. Pondering this +weighty question, as did all good patriots, Steffens heard, in the +watches of the night, the voice of conscience declare: "Thou must +declare war against Napoleon." At his early morning lecture on +Physics, which was very thinly attended, he told the students that +he would address them at eleven on the call for volunteers. That +lecture was thronged; and to the sea of eager faces Steffens spoke +forth the thought that simmered in every brain, the burning desire +for <i>war with Napoleon</i>. He offered himself as a recruit: 200 +students from Breslau and 258 from the University of Berlin soon +flocked to the colours, and that, too, chiefly from the classes +which of yore had detested the army. Thanks to the teachings of +Fichte and the still deeper lessons of adversity, the mind of +Germany was now ranged on the side of national independence and +against an omnivorous imperialism.</p> + +<p>Where the mind led the body followed, yet still somewhat +haltingly. In truth, the King and his officials were in a difficult +position. They distrusted the Russians, who seemed chiefly eager to +force Frederick William into war with France and to arrange the +question of a frontier afterwards. But the eastern frontier was a +question of life and death for Prussia. If Alexander kept the whole +of the great Duchy of Warsaw, the Hohenzollern States would be +threatened from the east as grievously as ever they were on the +west by the French at Magdeburg. And the Czar seemed resolved to +keep the whole of Poland. He told the Prussian envoy, Knesebeck, +that, while handing over to Frederick William the whole of Saxony, +Russia must retain all the Polish lands, a resolve which would have +planted the Russian standards almost on the banks of the Oder. Nay, +more: Knesebeck detected among the Russian officials a strong, +though as yet but half expressed, longing for the whole of Prussia +east of the lower Vistula.</p> + +<p>For his part, Frederick William cherished lofty hopes.<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii276" id= +"page_ii276">[pg.276]</a></span> He knew that the Russian troops +had suffered horribly from privations and disease, that as yet they +mustered only 40,000 effectives on the Polish borders, and that +they urgently needed the help of Prussia. He therefore claimed +that, if he joined Russia in a war against Napoleon, he must +recover the whole of what had been Prussian Poland, with the +exception of the district of Bialystock ceded at Tilsit.<a name= +"FN2anchor284_284"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_284_284"><sup>[284]</sup></a> It seemed, then, that the +Polish Question would once more exert on the European concert that +dissolving influence which had weakened the Central Powers ever +since the days of Valmy. Had Napoleon now sent to Breslau a subtle +schemer like Savary, the apple of discord might have been thrown in +with fatal results. But the fortunes of his Empire then rested on a +Piedmontese nobleman, St. Marsan, who showed a singular credulity +as to Prussia's subservience. He accepted all Hardenberg's +explanations (including a thin official reproof to Steffens), and +did little or nothing to countermine the diplomatic approaches of +Russia. The ground being thus left clear, it was possible for the +Czar to speak straight to the heart of Frederick William. This he +now did. Knesebeck was set aside; and Alexander, meeting the +Prussian demands halfway, promised in a treaty, signed at Kalisch +on February 27th, to leave Prussia all her present territories, and +to secure for her the equivalent, in a "statistical, financial, and +geographical sense," of the lands which she had lost since 1806, +along with a territory adapted to connect Prussia Proper with the +province of Silesia.<a name="FN2anchor285_285"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_285_285"><sup>[285]</sup></a></p> + +<p>It seems certain that Stein's influence weighed much with +Alexander in this final compromise, which postponed the irritating +question of the eastern frontier and bent all the energies of two +great States to the War of Liberation. Stein was sent to Frederick +William at Breslau; but the King hardly deigned to see him,<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii277" id= +"page_ii277">[pg.277]</a></span> and the greatest of German +patriots was suffered to remain in a garret of that city during a +wearisome attack of fever. But he lived through disease and +official neglect as he triumphed over Slavonic intrigues; and he +had at hand that salve of many an able man—the knowledge +that, even while he himself was slighted, his plans were adopted +with beneficent and far-reaching results.</p> + +<p>The Russo-Prussian alliance was firmly upheld by Lord Cathcart, +the British ambassador to Russia, who reached headquarters on March +the 2nd. For the present, Great Britain did not definitely join the +allies; but the discussions on the Hanoverian Question, which had +previously sundered us from Prussia, soon proved that wisdom had +been learnt in the school of adversity. The Hohenzollerns now +renounced all claims to Hanover, though they showed some repugnance +to our Prince-Regent's demand that the Electorate should receive +some territorial gain.</p> + +<p>Thus the two questions on which Napoleon had counted as certain +to clog the wheels of the Coalition, as they had done in the past, +were removed, and the way was cleared for a compact firmer than any +which Europe had hitherto known. On March 17th a Russo-Prussian +Convention was concluded at Breslau whereby those Powers agreed to +deliver Germany from France, to dissolve the Confederation of the +Rhine, and to summon the German princes and people to help them; +every prince that refused would suffer the loss of his States; and +arrangements were made for the provisional administration of the +lands which the allies should occupy. Frederick William also +appealed to his people and to his army, and instituted that coveted +order of merit, the Iron Cross.</p> + +<p>But there was small need of appeals and decorations. The people +rushed to arms with an ardour that rivalled the <i>levée en +masse</i> of France in 1793. Nobles and students, professors and +peasants, poets and merchants, shouldered their muskets. Housewives +and maidens<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii278" id= +"page_ii278">[pg.278]</a></span> brought their scanty savings or +their treasured trinkets as offerings for the altar of the +Fatherland. One incident deserves special notice. A girl, Nanny by +name, whose ringlets were her only wealth, shore them off, sold +them, and brought the price of them, two thalers, for the sacred +cause. A noble impulse thrilled through Germany. Volunteers came +from far, many of whom were to ride with Lützow's irregular +horse in his wild ventures. Most noteworthy of these was the gifted +young poet, Korner, a Saxon by birth, who now forsook a life of +ease, radiant with poetic promise, at the careless city of Vienna, +to follow the Prussian eagle. "A great time calls for great +hearts," he wrote to his father: "am I to write vaudevilles when I +feel within me the courage and strength for joining the actors on +the stage of real life?" Alas! for him the end was to be swift and +tragic. Not long after inditing an ode to his sword, he fell in a +skirmish near Hamburg.</p> + +<p>Germany mourned his loss; but she mourned still more that her +greatest poet, Goethe, felt no throb of national enthusiasm. The +great Olympian was too much wrapped up in his lofty speculations to +spare much sympathy for struggling mortals below: "Shake your +chains, if you will: the man (Napoleon) is too strong for you: you +will not break them." Such was his unprophetic utterance at Dresden +to the elder Korner. Men who touched the people's pulse had no such +doubts. "Ah! those were noble times," wrote Arndt: "the fresh young +hope of life and honour sang in all hearts; it echoed along every +street; it rolled majestically down every chancel." The sight of +Germans thronging from all parts into Silesia to fight for their +Prussian champions awakened in him the vision of a United Germany, +which took form in the song, "What is the German's Fatherland?"<a +name="FN2anchor286_286"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_286_286"><sup>[286]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Against this ever-rising tide of national enthusiasm Napoleon +pitted the resources which Gallic devotion still yielded up to his +demands. They were surprisingly<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii279" id="page_ii279">[pg.279]</a></span> great. In less +than half a year, after the loss of half a million of men, a new +army nearly as numerous was marshalled under the imperial eagles. +Thirty thousand tried troops were brought from Spain, thereby +greatly relieving the pressure on Wellington. Italy and the +garrison towns of the Empire sent forth a vast number. But the +majority were young, untrained troops; and it was remarked that the +conscripts born in the years of the Terror, 1793-4, had not the +stamina of the earlier levies. Brave they were, superbly brave; and +the Emperor sought by every means to breathe into them his own +indomitable spirit. One of them has described how, on handing them +their colours, he made a brief speech; and, at the close, rising in +his stirrups and stretching forth his hand, he shot at them the +question: "'You swear to guard them?' I felt, as we all felt, that +he snatched from our very navel the cry, 'Yes, we swear.'" Truly, +the Emperor could make boys heroes, but he could never repair the +losses of 1812. Guns he possessed to the number of a thousand in +his arsenals; but he lacked the thousands of skilled artillerymen: +youths he could find and horses he could buy: but not for many a +month had he the resistless streams of horsemen that poured over +Prussia after Jena, or swept into the Great Redoubt at Borodino. +Nevertheless, the energy which embattled a new host within five +months of a seemingly overwhelming disaster, must be considered the +most extraordinary event of an age fertile in marvels. "The +imagination sinks back confounded," says Pasquier, "when one thinks +of all the work to be done and the resources of all kinds to be +found, in order to raise, clothe, and equip such an army in so +short a time."</p> + +<p>While immersed in this prodigious task, the Emperor heard, with +some surprise but with no dismay, the news of Prussia's armaments +and disaffection. At first he treats it as a passing freak which +will vanish with firm treatment. "Remain at Berlin as long as you +can," he writes to Eugène, March 5th. "Make examples for +the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii280" id= +"page_ii280">[pg.280]</a></span> sake of discipline. At the least +insult, whether from a village or a town, were it from Berlin +itself, burn it down." The chief thing that still concerns him is +the vagueness of Eugène's reports, which leave him no option +but to get news about his troops in Germany from <i>the English +newspapers</i>. "Do not forget," he writes again on March 14th, +"that Prussia has only four millions of people. She never in her +most prosperous times had more than 150,000 troops. She will not +have more than 40,000 now." That, indeed, was the number to which +he had limited her after Tilsit; and he was unable to conceive that +Scharnhorst's plan of passing men into a reserve would send triple +that force into the field.<a name="FN2anchor287_287"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_287_287"><sup>[287]</sup></a> As for the Russians, he +writes, they are thinned by disease, and must spread out widely in +order to besiege the many fortresses between the Vistula and the +Elbe. Indeed, he assures his ally, the King of Bavaria, that it +will be good policy to let them advance: "The farther they advance, +the more certain is their ruin." Sixty thousand troops were being +led by Bertrand from Italy into Bavaria.<a name= +"FN2anchor288_288"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_288_288"><sup>[288]</sup></a> These, along with the +corps of Eugène and Davoust, would crush the Russian +columns. And, while the allies were busy in Saxony, Napoleon +proposed to mass a great force under the shelter of the Harz +Mountains, cross the Elbe near Havelberg, make a rush for the +relief of Stettin, and stretch a hand to the large French force +beleaguered at Danzig.</p> + +<p>Such was his first plan. It was upset by the rapidity of the +Cossacks and the general uprising of Prussia. Augereau's corps was +driven from Berlin by a force of Cossacks led by Tettenborn; and +this daring free lance, a native of Hamburg, thereupon made a dash +for the liberation of his city. For the time he was completely +successful: the fury of the citizens against the French<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii281" id="page_ii281">[pg.281]</a></span> +<i>douaniers</i> gave the Cossacks and patriots an easy triumph +there and throughout Hanover. This news caused Napoleon grave +concern. The loss of the great Hanse Town opened a wide door for +English goods, English money, and English troops into Germany. It +must be closed at all costs: and, with severe rebukes to +Eugène and Lauriston, who were now holding the line of the +middle Elbe, he charged Davoust (March 18th) to hold the long +winding course of that river between Magdeburg and Hamburg. The +advance of this determined leader was soon to change the face of +affairs in North Germany.</p> + +<p>Shortly before Napoleon left Paris for the seat of war, he +received the new Austrian ambassador, Prince Schwarzenberg (April +9th). With a jocular courtesy that veiled the deepest irony, he +complimented him on having waged <i>a fine campaign in</i> 1812. +Austria's present requests were not reassuring. While professing +the utmost regard for the welfare of Napoleon, she renewed her +offer of mediation in a more pressing way. In fact, Metternich's +aim now was to free Austria from the threatening pressure of +Napoleon on the west and of Russia on the east. She must now assure +to Europe a lasting peace—"not a mere truce in disguise, like +all former treaties with Napoleon"—but a peace that would +restrict the power of France and "establish a balance of power +among the chief States."<a name="FN2anchor289_289"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_289_289"><sup>[289]</sup></a> Such was the secret aim of +Austria's mediation. Obviously, it gave her many advantages. While +posing as mediator, she could claim her share in the territorial +redistribution which must accompany the peace. The blessing awarded +to the peacemaker must be tangible and immediate.</p> + +<p>Napoleon's reply to the ambassador was carefully guarded. War +was not to his interest. It would cost more blood than the Moscow +campaign. The great hindrance to any settlement would be England. +Russia also seemed disposed to a fight <i>à outrance</i>; +but if the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii282" id= +"page_ii282">[pg.282]</a></span> Czar wanted peace, it was for him, +not for France, to take the initiative: "I cannot take the +initiative: that would be like capitulating as if I were in a fort: +it is for the others to send me their proposals." And he expressed +his resolve to accept no disadvantageous terms in these notable +words: "If I concluded a dishonourable peace, it would be my +overthrow. I am a new man; I must pay the more heed to public +opinion, because I stand in need of it. The French have lively +imaginations: they love fame and excitement, and are nervous. Do +you know the prime cause of the fall of the Bourbons? It dates from +Rossbach." Benevolent assurances as to Napoleon's desire for peace +and for the assembly of a Congress were all that Schwarzenberg +could gain; and his mission was barren of result, except to +increase suspicions on both sides.</p> + +<p>In fact, Napoleon was playing his cards at Vienna. He had sent +Count Narbonne thither on a special mission, the purport of which +stands revealed in the envoy's "verbal note" of April 7th. In that +note Austria was pressed to help France with 100,000 men, against +Russia and Prussia, in case they should open hostilities; her +reward was to be the rich province of Silesia. As for the rest of +Prussia, two millions of that people were to be assigned to Saxony, +Frederick William being thrust to the east of the lower Vistula, +and left with one million subjects.<a name= +"FN2anchor290_290"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_290_290"><sup>[290]</sup></a> Such was the glittering +prize dangled before Metternich. But even the prospect of regaining +the province torn away by the great Frederick moved him not. He +judged the establishment of equilibrium in Europe to be preferable +to a mean triumph over Prussia. To her and to the Czar he had +secretly held out hopes of succour in case Napoleon should prove +intractable: and to this course of action he still clung. True, he +trampled on <i>la petite morale</i> in neglecting to aid his +nominal ally, Napoleon. But to abandon him, if he remained +obdurate, was, after all, but an act of treachery to an individual +who had slight claims on Austria, and<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii283" id="page_ii283">[pg.283]</a></span> whose present +offer was alike immoral and insulting. Four days later Metternich +notified to Russia and Prussia that the Emperor Francis would now +proceed with his task of armed mediation.<a name= +"FN2anchor291_291"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_291_291"><sup>[291]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Austria's overtures for a general peace met with no +encouragement at London. Her envoy, Count Wessenberg, was now +treated with the same cold reserve that had been accorded to Lord +Walpole at Vienna early in the year. On April 9th Castlereagh +informed him that all hope of peace had failed since the "Ruler of +France" had declared to the Legislative Body that <i>the French +Dynasty reigned and would continue to reign in Spain, and that he +had already stated all the sacrifices that he could consent to make +for peace</i>.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Whilst he [Napoleon] shall continue to declare that none of the +territories arbitrarily incorporated into the French Empire shall +become matter of negotiation, it is in vain to hope that His +Imperial Majesty's beneficent intentions can by negotiation be +accomplished. It is for His Imperial Majesty to consider, after a +declaration in the nature of a defiance from the Ruler of France, a +declaration highly insulting to His Imperial Majesty when his +intervention for peace had been previously accepted, whether the +moment is not arrived for all the Great Powers of Europe to act in +concert for their common interests and honour. To obtain for their +States what may deserve the name of peace they must look again to +establish an Equilibrium in Europe."</p> +</div> + +<p>Finally, the British Government refused to lend itself to a +negotiation which must weaken and distract the efforts of Russia +and Prussia.<a name="FN2anchor292_292"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_292_292"><sup>[292]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii284" id="page_ii284">[pg.284]</a></span></p> + +<p>For the present Napoleon indulged the hope that the bribe of +Silesia would range Austria's legions side by side with his own, +and with Poniatowski's Poles. Animated with this hope, he left +Paris before the dawn of April 15th; and, travelling at furious +speed, his carriage rolled within the portals of Mainz in less than +forty hours. There he stayed for a week, feeling every throb of the +chief arteries of his advance. They beat full and fast; the only +bad symptom was the refusal of Saxony to place her cavalry at his +disposal. But, at the close of the week, Austria's attitude gave +him concern. It was clear that she had not swallowed the bait of +Silesia, and that her troops could not be counted on.</p> + +<p>At once he takes precautions. His troops in Italy are to be made +ready, the strongholds of the Upper Danube strengthened, and his +German vassals are closely to watch the policy of Vienna.<a name= +"FN2anchor293_293"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_293_293"><sup>[293]</sup></a> He then proceeds to +Weimar. There, on April 29th, he mounts his war-horse and gazes +with searching eyes into the columns that are winding through the +Thuringian vales towards Leipzig. The auguries seem favourable. The +men are full of ardour: the line of march is itself an inspiration; +and the veterans cheer the young conscripts with tales of the great +day of Jena and Auerstadt.</p> + +<p>At the close of April the military situation was as follows. +Eugène Beauharnais, who commanded the relics of the Grand +Army, after suffering a reverse at Mockern, had retired to the line +of the Elbe; and French garrisons were thus left isolated in +Danzig, Modlin, Zamosc, Glogau, Küstrin, and Stettin.<a name= +"FN2anchor294_294"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_294_294"><sup>[294]</sup></a> Napoleon's first plan of +an advance direct to Stettin and Danzig having miscarried, he now +sought to gather an<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii285" id= +"page_ii285">[pg.285]</a></span> immense force as secretly as +possible near the Main, speedily to reinforce Eugène, crush +the heads of the enemy's columns, and, rolling them up in disorder, +carry the war to the banks of the Oder, and relieve his beleaguered +garrisons by way of Leipzig and Torgau. The plan would have the +further advantage of bringing a formidable force near to the +Austrian frontier, and holding fast the Hapsburgs and Saxons to the +French alliance.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the allied army was pressing westwards with no less +determination. The Czar and King had addressed a menacing summons +to the King of Saxony to join them, but, receiving no response, +invaded his States. Thereupon Frederick Augustus fled into Bohemia, +relying on an offer from Vienna which guaranteed him his German +lands if he would join the Hapsburgs in their armed mediation.<a +name="FN2anchor295_295"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_295_295"><sup>[295]</sup></a> For the present, however, +Saxony was to be the battlefield of the two contending principles +of nationality and Napoleonic Imperialism.</p> + +<p>They clashed together on the historic ground of Lützen. Not +only the associations of the place, but the reputation of the +leaders helped to kindle the enthusiasm of the rank and file. On +the one side was the great conqueror himself, with faculties and +prestige undimmed even by the greatest disaster recorded in the +annals of civilized nations. He was opposed by men no less +determined than himself. The illness and finally the death of the +obstinate old Kutusoff had stopped the intrigues of the Slav peace +party, hitherto strong in the Russian camp: and the command now +devolved on Wittgenstein, a more energetic man, whose heart was in +his work.</p> + +<p>But the most inspiring influence was that of Blücher. The +staunch patriot seemed to embody the best qualities of the old +<i>régime</i> and of the new era. The rigour learnt in the +school of Frederick the Great was vivified by the fresh young +enthusiasm of the dawning age of nationality. Not that the old +soldier could<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii286" id= +"page_ii286">[pg.286]</a></span> appreciate the lofty teachings of +Fichte the philosopher and Schleiermacher the preacher. But his +lack of learning—he could never write a despatch without +strange torturings of his mother-tongue—was more than made up +by a quenchless love of the Fatherland, by a robust common sense, +which hit straight at the mark where subtler minds strayed off into +side issues, by a comradeship that endeared him to every private, +and by a courage that never quailed. And all these gifts, homely +but invaluable in a people's war, were wrought to utmost tension by +an all-absorbing passion, hatred of Napoleon. In the dark days +after Jena, when, pressed back to the Baltic, his brave followers +succumbed to the weight of numbers, he began to store up vials of +fury against the insolent conqueror. Often he beguiled the weary +hours with lunging at an imaginary foe, calling +out—<i>Napoleon</i>. And this almost Satanic hatred bore the +old man through seven years of humiliation; it gave him at +seventy-two years of age the energy of youth; far from being sated +by triumphs in Saxony and Champagne, it nerved him with new +strength after the shocks to mind and body which he sustained at +Ligny; it carried him and his army through the miry lanes of Wavre +on to the sunset radiance of Waterloo.</p> + +<p>What he lacked in skill and science was made up by his able +coadjutors, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the former pre-eminent in +organization, the latter in strategy. After organizing Prussia's +citizen army, it was Scharnhorst's fate to be mortally wounded in +the first battle; but his place, as chief of staff, was soon filled +by Gneisenau, in whose nature the sternness of the warrior was +happily blended with the coolness of the scientific thinker. The +accord between him and Blücher was close and cordial; and the +latter, on receiving the degree of doctor of laws from the +University of Oxford, wittily acknowledged his debt to the +strategist. "Well," said he, "if I am to be a doctor, they must +make Gneisenau an apothecary; for he makes up the pills and I then +administer them."<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii287" id= +"page_ii287">[pg.287]</a></span></p> + +<p>On these resolute chiefs and their 33,000 Prussians fell the +brunt of the fighting near Lützen. Wittgenstein, with his +35,000 Russians, showed less energy; but if a fourth Russian corps +under Miloradovitch, then on the Elster, had arrived in time, the +day might have closed with victory for the allies. Their plan was +to cross a stream, called the Floss Graben, some five miles to the +south of Lützen, storm the villages of Gross Görschen, +Rahna, and Starsiedel, held by the French vanguard, and, cutting +into Napoleon's line of march towards Lützen and Leipzig, +throw it into disorder and rout. But their great enemy had recently +joined his array to that of Eugène: he was in force, and was +then planning a turning movement on the north, similar to that +which threatened his south flank. Ney, on whom fell Blücher's +first blows, had observed the preparations, and one of his +divisions, that of Souham, had strengthened the village of Gross +Görschen for an obstinate defence. The French position is thus +described by Lord Cathcart, who was then present at the allied +headquarters:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"The country is uncovered and open, but with much variety of +hill and valley, and much intersected by hollow ways and +millstreams, the former not discernible till closely approached. +The enemy, placed behind a long ridge and in a string of villages, +with a hollow way in front, and a stream sufficient to float timber +on the left, waited the near approach of the allies. He had an +immense quantity of ordnance: the batteries in the open country +were supported by masses of infantry in solid squares. The plan of +our operations was to attack Gross Görschen with artillery and +infantry, and meanwhile to pierce the line, to the enemy's right of +the villages, with a strong column of cavalry in order to cut off +the troops in the villages from support.... The cavalry of the +Prussian Reserve, to whose lot this attack fell, made it with great +gallantry; but the showers of grapeshot and musketry to which they +were exposed in reaching the hollow way made it impracticable for +them to penetrate; and, the enemy appearing determined to hold the +villages at any expense, the affair assumed the most expensive +character of attack and defence of a post repeatedly taken, lost, +and retaken. The cavalry made several attempts to break<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii288" id="page_ii288">[pg.288]</a></span> +the enemy's line, and in some of their attacks succeeded in +breaking into the squares and cutting down the infantry. Late in +the evening, Bonaparte, having called in the troops from [the side +of] Leipzig and collected all his reserves, made an attack on the +right of the allies, supported by the fire of several batteries +advancing. The vivacity of this movement made it expedient to +change the front of our nearest brigades on our right; and, as the +whole cavalry from our left was ordered to the right to turn this +attack, I was not without hopes of witnessing the destruction of +Bonaparte and of all his army; but before the cavalry could arrive, +it became so dark that nothing could be seen but the flashes of the +guns."<a name="FN2anchor296_296"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_296_296"><sup>[296]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>The desperate fight thus closed with a slight advantage to the +French, due to the timely advance of Eugène with Macdonald's +corps against the right flank of the wearied allies, when it was +too late for them to make any counter-move. These had lost +severely, and among the fallen was Scharnhorst, whose wound proved +to be mortal. But Blücher, far from being daunted by defeat or +by a wound, led seven squadrons of horse against the victors after +nightfall, threw them for a brief space into a panic, and nearly +charged up to the square which sheltered Napoleon. The Saxon +Captain von Odeleben, who was at the French headquarters, states +that the Emperor was for a few minutes quite dazed by the daring of +this stroke; and he now had too few squadrons to venture on any +retaliation. Both sides were, in fact, exhausted. The allies had +lost 10,000 men killed and wounded, but no prisoners or guns: the +French losses were nearly as heavy, and five guns and 800 prisoners +fell into Blücher's hands. Both armies camped on the field of +battle; but, as the supplies of ammunition of the allies had run +low, and news came to hand that<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii289" id="page_ii289">[pg.289]</a></span> Lauriston had +dislodged Kleist from Leipzig, it was decided to retreat towards +Dresden.</p> + +<p>Napoleon cautiously followed them, leaving behind Ney's corps, +which had suffered frightfully at Gross Görschen; and he +strove to inspirit the conscripts, many of whom had shown +unsteadiness, by proclaiming to the army that the victory of +Lützen would rank above Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, and +Borodino.</p> + +<p>Far from showing dejection, Alexander renewed to Cathcart his +assurance of persevering in the war. At Dresden our envoy was again +assured (May 7th) that the allies would not give in, but that +"Austria will wear the cloak of mediation till the time her immense +force is ready to act, the 24th instant. Count Stadion is hourly +expected here: he will bring proposals of terms of peace and +similar ones will be sent to the French headquarters. Receiving and +refusing these proposals will occupy most of the time." In fact, +Metternich was on the point of despatching from Vienna two envoys, +Stadion to the allies, Count Bubna to Napoleon, with the offer of +Austria's armed mediation.</p> + +<p>It found him in no complaisant mood. He had entered Dresden as a +conqueror: he had bitterly chidden the citizens for their support +of the Prussian volunteers, and ordered them to beg their own King +to return from Bohemia. To that hapless monarch he had sent an +imperious mandate to come back and order the Saxon troops, who +obstinately held Torgau, forthwith to hand it over to the French. +On all sides his behests were obeyed, the Saxon troops grudgingly +ranging themselves under the French eagles. And while he was +tearing Saxony away from the national cause, he was summoned by +Austria to halt. The victor met the request with a flash of +defiance. After a reproachful talk with Bubna, on May 17th, he +wrote two letters to the Emperor Francis. In the more official note +he assured him that he desired peace, and that he assented to the +opening of a Congress with that aim in view, in which England, +Russia, Prussia, and even the Spanish<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii290" id="page_ii290">[pg.290]</a></span> insurgents might +take part. He therefore proposed that an armistice should be +concluded for the needful preparations. But in the other letter he +assured his father-in-law that he was ready to die at the head of +all the generous men of France rather than become the sport of +England. His resentment against Austria finds utterance in his +despatch of the same day, in which he bids Caulaincourt seek an +interview at once with the Czar: "The essential thing is to have a +talk with him.... My intention is to build him a golden bridge so +as to deliver him from the intrigues of Metternich. If I must make +sacrifices, I prefer to make them to a straightforward enemy, +rather than to the profit of Austria, which Power has betrayed my +alliance, and, under the guise of mediator, means to claim the +right of arranging everything." Caulaincourt is to remind Alexander +how badly Austria behaved to him in 1812, and to suggest that if he +treats at once before losing another battle, he can retire with +honour and <i>with good terms for Prussia, without any intervention +from Austria</i>.</p> + +<p>His other letters of this time show that it is on the Hapsburgs +that his resentment will most heavily fall. Eugène, who had +recently departed to organize the forces in Italy, is urged to +threaten Austria with not fewer than 80,000 men, and to give out +that he will soon have 150,000 men under arms. And, while straining +every nerve in Germany, France, and Italy, Napoleon asserts that +there will be an armistice for the conclusion of a general peace.<a +name="FN2anchor297_297"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_297_297"><sup>[297]</sup></a> But the allies were not to +be duped into a peace that was no peace. They had good grounds for +expecting the eventual aid of Austria; and when Caulaincourt craved +an interview, the Czar refused his request, thus bringing affairs +once more to the arbitrament of the sword. The only effect of +Caulaincourt's mission, and of Napoleon's bitter words to Bubna, +was to alarm Austria.</p> + +<p>On their side, the allies desired to risk no further<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii291" id="page_ii291">[pg.291]</a></span> +check; and they had therefore taken up a strong position near +Bautzen, where they could receive reinforcements and effectually +cover Silesia. Their extreme left rested on the spurs of the +Lusatian mountains, while their long front of some four miles in +extent stretched northwards along a ridge that rose between the +River Spree and an affluent, and bent a convex threatening brow +against that river and town. There they were joined by Barclay, +whose arrival brought their total strength to 82,000 men. But again +Napoleon had the advantage in numbers. Suddenly calling in Ney's +and Lauriston's force of 60,000 men, which had been sent north so +as to threaten Berlin, he confronted the allies with at least +130,000 men.<a name="FN2anchor298_298"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_298_298"><sup>[298]</sup></a></p> + +<p>On the first day of fighting (May 20th) the French seized the +town of Bautzen, but failed to drive the allies from the hilly, +wooded ground on the south. The fighting on the next day was far +more serious. At dawn of a beautiful spring morning, in a country +radiant with verdure and diversified by trim villages, the thunder +of cannon and the sputter of skirmishers' lines presaged a stubborn +conflict. The allied sovereigns from the commanding ridge at their +centre could survey all the enemy's movements on the hills +opposite; and our commissary, Colonel (afterwards Sir Hudson) Lowe, +has thus described his view of Napoleon, who was near the French +centre:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"He was about fifty paces in front of the others, accompanied by +one of his marshals, with whom he walked backwards and forwards for +nearly an hour. He was dressed in a plain uniform coat and a star +[<i>sic</i>], with a plain hat, different from that of his marshals +and generals, which was feathered. In the rear, and to the left of +the ridge on which he stood, were his reserves. They were formed in +lines of squadrons and battalions, appearing like a large column of +battalions: their number must have been between 15,000 and +20,000.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii292" id= +"page_ii292">[pg.292]</a></span></p> + +<p>After he had retired from the eminence, several of the +battalions were observed to be drawn off to his left, and to be +replaced by others from the rear: the masses of his reserves +appeared to suffer scarcely any diminution.... Those troops which +were to act against our right continued their march: the others, +opposite our centre, planted themselves about midway on the slope, +which descended from the ridge towards our position; and, under the +protection of the guns that crowned the ridge, they appeared to set +our cavalry at defiance.... Yet there was no forward movement in +that part. To turn and overthrow our flanks, particularly the right +one, appeared now to be their main object."</p> +</div> + +<p>This was the case. Napoleon was employing his usual tactics of +assailing the allies everywhere by artillery and musketry fire, so +as to keep them in their already very extended position until he +could deliver a decisive blow. This was dealt, though somewhat +tardily, by Ney with his huge corps at the allied right, where +Barclay's 5,000 Russians were outmatched and driven back. The +village of Preititz was lost, and with it the allies' +communications were laid bare. It was of the utmost importance to +recover the village; and Blücher, at the right centre, hard +pressed though he was, sent down Kleist's brigade, which helped to +wrench the prize from that Marshal's grasp. But Ney was too strong +to be kept off, even by the streams of cannon-shot poured upon his +dense columns. With the help of Lauriston's corps, he again slowly +pressed on, began to envelop the allies' right, and threatened to +cut off their retreat. Blücher was also furiously assailed by +Marmont and Bertrand. On the left, it is true, the Russians had +beaten back Oudinot with heavy loss; but, as Napoleon had not yet +seriously drawn on his reserves, the allied chiefs decided to draw +off their hard-pressed troops from this unequal contest, where +victory was impossible and delay might place everything in +jeopardy.</p> + +<p>The retirement began late in the afternoon. Covered by the fire +of a powerful artillery from successive crests, and by the charges +of their dauntless cavalry, the allies<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii293" id="page_ii293">[pg.293]</a></span> beat off +every effort of the French to turn the retreat into a rout. In vain +did Napoleon press the pursuit. As at Lützen, he had cause to +mourn the loss in the plains of Russia of those living waves that +had swept his enemies from many a battlefield. But now their +columns refused to melt away. They filed off, unbroken and defiant, +under the covering wings of Uhlans and Cossacks.<a name= +"FN2anchor299_299"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_299_299"><sup>[299]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The next day witnessed the same sight, the allies drawing +steadily back, showering shot from every post of vantage, and +leaving not a prisoner or a caisson in the conquerors' hands. +"What!" said Napoleon, "after such a butchery, no results? no +prisoners?" Scarcely had he spoken these words, when a cannon-ball +tore through his staff, killing one general outright, wounding +another, and shattering the frame of Duroc, Duc de Friuli. Napoleon +was deeply affected by this occurrence. He dismounted, went into +the cottage where Duroc was taken, and for some time pressed his +hand in silence. Then he uttered the words: "Duroc, there is +another world where we shall meet again." To which the Grand +Marshal made reply: "Yes, sire; but it will be in thirty years, +when you have triumphed over your enemies and realized all the +hopes of your country." After a long pause of painful silence, the +Emperor mournfully left the man for whom he felt, perhaps, the +liveliest sympathy and affection he ever bestowed. Under Duroc's +cold, reserved exterior the Emperor knew that there beat a true +heart, devoted and loyal ever since they had first met at Toulon. +He received no one else for the rest of that night, and a hush of +awe fell on the camp at the unwonted signs of grief of their great +leader.</p> + +<p>Possibly this loss strengthened the Emperor's desire for a +truce, a feeling not lessened by a mishap befalling one of his +divisions, which fell into an ambush laid by<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii294" id="page_ii294">[pg.294]</a></span> +the Prussians at Hainau, and lost 1,500 men and 18 guns.</p> + +<p>For their part, the allies equally desired a suspension of arms. +Their forces were in much confusion. Alexander had superseded +Wittgenstein by Barclay, who now insisted on withdrawing the +Russians into Poland. To this the Prussian staff offered the most +strenuous resistance. Such a confession of weakness, urged +Müffling, would dishearten the troops and intimidate the +Austrian statesmen who had promised speedy succour. Let the allies +cling to the sheltering rampart of the Riesengebirge, where they +might defy Napoleon's attacks and await the white-coats. The +fortress of Schweidnitz would screen their retreat, and the +Landwehr of Silesia would make good the gaps in their ranks. +Towards Schweidnitz, then, the Czar ordered Barclay to retreat.</p> + +<p>There two disappointments awaited them. The fortifications, +dismantled by the French in 1807, were still in disrepair, and the +20,000 muskets bought in Austria for the Silesian levies were +without touch-holes! Again Barclay declared that he must retreat +into Poland, and only the offer of a truce by Napoleon deterred him +from that step, which must have compromised the whole military and +political situation. What would not Napoleon have given to know the +actual state of things at the allied headquarters?<a name= +"FN2anchor300_300"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_300_300"><sup>[300]</sup></a> But no spy warned him of +the truth; and as his own instincts prompted him to turn aside, so +as to prepare condign chastisement for Austria, he continued to +treat for an armistice.</p> + +<p>"Nothing," he wrote to Eugène on June 2nd, "can be more +perfidious than that Court. If I granted her present demands, she +would afterwards ask for Italy and Germany. Certainly she shall +have nothing from me." Events served to strengthen his resolve. The +French entered Breslau in triumph, and raised the siege of Glogau. +The coalition seemed to be tottering. That the punishment dealt to +the allies and Austria might be severe and final, he only needed a +few weeks for the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii295" id= +"page_ii295">[pg.295]</a></span> reorganization of his once +formidable cavalry. Then he could vent his rage upon Austria. Then +he could overthrow the Hungarian horse, and crumple up the +ill-trained Austrian foot. A short truce, he believed, was useless: +it would favour the allies more than the French. And, under the +specious plea that the discussion of a satisfactory peace must take +up at least forty days, he ordered his envoy, Caulaincourt, to +insist on a space of time which would admit of the French forces +being fully equipped in Saxony, Bavaria, and Illyria. "If," he +wrote to Caulaincourt on June 4th, "we did not wish to treat with a +view to peace, we should not be so stupid as to treat for an +armistice at the present time." And he urged him to insist on the +limit of July 20th, "always on the same reasoning, namely, that we +must have forty full days to see if we can come to an +understanding." Far different was his secret warning to General +Clarke, the Minister of War. To him he wrote on June 2nd:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"If I can, I will wait for the month of September to deal great +blows. I wish then to be in a position to crush my enemies, though +it is possible that, when Austria sees me about to do so, she may +make use of her pathetic and sentimental style, in order to +recognize the chimerical and ridiculous nature of her pretensions. +I have wished to write you this letter so that you may thoroughly +know my thoughts once for all."</p> +</div> + +<p>And to Maret, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, he wrote on the +same day:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"We must gain time, and to gain time without displeasing +Austria, we must use the same language we have used for the last +six months—that we can do everything if Austria is our +ally.... Work on this, beat about the bush, and gain time.... You +can embroider on this canvas for the next two months, and find +matter for sending twenty couriers."<a name= +"FN2anchor301_301"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_301_301"><sup>[301]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>In such cases, where Napoleon's diplomatic assurances<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii296" id= +"page_ii296">[pg.296]</a></span> are belied by his secret military +instructions, no one who has carefully studied his career can doubt +which course would be adopted. The armistice was merely the pause +that would be followed by a fiercer onset, unless the allies and +Austria bent before his will. Of this they gave no sign even after +the blow of Bautzen. In the negotiations concerning the armistice +they showed no timidity; and when, on June 4th, it was signed at +Poischwitz up to July 20th, Napoleon felt some doubts whether he +had not shown too much complaisance.</p> + +<p>It was so: in granting a suspension of arms he had signed his +own death warrant.</p> + +<p>The news that reached him at Dresden in the month of June helped +to stiffen his resolve once more. Davoust and Vandamme had +succeeded in dispersing the raw levies of North Germany and in +restoring Napoleon's authority at the mouths of the Elbe and Weser; +and in this they now had the help of the Danes.</p> + +<p>For some time the allies had been seeking to win over Denmark. +But there was one insurmountable barrier in the way, the ambition +of Bernadotte. As we have seen, he was desirous of signalizing his +prospective succession to the Swedish throne by bringing to his +adopted country a land that would amply recompense it for the loss +of Finland.<a name="FN2anchor302_302"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_302_302"><sup>[302]</sup></a> This could only be found +in Norway, then united with Denmark; and this was the price of +Swedish succour, to which the Czar had assented during the war of +1812. For reasons which need not be detailed here, Swedish help was +not then forthcoming. But early in 1813 it was seen that a +diversion caused by the landing of 30,000 Swedes in North Germany +might be most valuable, and it was especially desired by the +British Government. Still, England was loth to gain the alliance of +Bernadotte at the price of Norway, which must drive Denmark into +the arms of France. Castlereagh, therefore, sought to tempt him by +the offer of our recent conquest of Guadeloupe. Or, if he must have +Norway,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii297" id= +"page_ii297">[pg.297]</a></span> would not Denmark give her assent +if she received Swedish Pomerania and Lübeck? Bernadotte +himself once suggested that he would be satisfied with the +Bishopric of Trondjem, the northern part of Norway, if he could +gain no compensation for Denmark in Germany.<a name= +"FN2anchor303_303"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_303_303"><sup>[303]</sup></a></p> + +<p>This offer was tentatively made. It was all one. Denmark would +not hear of the cession of Norway or any part of it; and in the +course of the negotiations with England she even put in a claim to +the Hanse Towns, which was at once rejected. As Denmark was +obdurate, Bernadotte insisted that Sweden should gain the whole of +Norway as the price of her help to the allies. By the treaty of +Stockholm (March 3rd, 1813) we acceded to the Russo-Swedish compact +of the previous year, which assigned Norway to Sweden: we also +promised to cede Guadeloupe to Bernadotte, and to pay +£1,000,000 towards the support of the Swedish troops serving +against Napoleon.<a name="FN2anchor304_304"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_304_304"><sup>[304]</sup></a> In the middle of May it +was known at Copenhagen that nothing was to be hoped for from +Russia and England. The Danes, therefore, ranged themselves on the +French side, with results that were to prove fatal to the welfare +of their kingdom.</p> + +<p>Thus the bargain which Bernadotte drove with the allies leagued +Denmark against them, and thereby hindered the liberation of North +Germany. But, such is the irony of fate, the transfer of Norway +from Denmark to Sweden has had a permanence in which Napoleon's +territorial arrangements have been signally lacking.</p> + +<p>Bernadotte landed at Stralsund with 24,000 men, on May 18th. But +the organization of his troops for the campaign was so slow that he +could send no effective help to the Cossacks and patriots at +Hamburg. His seeming lethargy at once aroused the Czar's +suspicions. This the Swedish Prince Royal speedily detected; +and,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii298" id= +"page_ii298">[pg.298]</a></span> on hearing of the armistice, he +feared that another Tilsit would be the result. In a passionate +letter, of June 10th, he begged Alexander not to accept peace: "To +accept a peace dictated by Napoleon is to rear a sepulchre for +Europe: and if this misfortune happens, only England and Sweden can +remain intact."</p> + +<p>This was the real Bernadotte. Those who called him a disguised +friend of Napoleon little knew the depth of his hatred for the +Emperor, a hatred which was even then compassing the earth for +means of overthrowing him, and saw in the person of a lonely French +exile beyond the Atlantic an instrument of vengeance. Already he +had bidden his old comrade in arms, Moreau, to come over and direct +the people's war against the tyrant who had exiled him; and the +victor of Hohenlinden was soon to land at Stralsund and spend his +last days in serving against the tricolour.</p> + +<p>For the present the prospects of the allies seemed gloomy +indeed. In the south-east they had lost all the land up to Breslau +and Glogau; and in North Germany Davoust began to turn Hamburg into +a great fortress. This was in obedience to Napoleon's orders. "I +shall never feel assured," the Emperor wrote to his Marshal, "until +Hamburg can be looked on as a stronghold provisioned for several +months and prepared in every way for a long defence."—The +ruin of commercial interests was nought to him; and when Savary +ventured to hint at the discontent caused in French mercantile +circles by these steps, he received a sharp rebuke: " ... The +cackling of the Paris bankers matters very little to me. I am +having Hamburg fortified. I am having a naval arsenal formed there. +Within a few months it will be one of my strongest fortresses. I +intend to keep a standing army of 15,000 men there."<a name= +"FN2anchor305_305"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_305_305"><sup>[305]</sup></a> His plan was ruthlessly +carried out. The wealth of Hamburg was systematically extorted in +order to furnish means for a completer subjection. Boundless +exactions, robbery of<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii299" id= +"page_ii299">[pg.299]</a></span> the bank, odious oppression of all +classes, these were the first steps. Twenty thousand persons were +thereafter driven out, first the young and strong as being +dangerous, then the old and weak as being useless; and a once +prosperous emporium of trade became Napoleon's chief northern +stronghold, a centre of hope for French and Danes, and a stimulus +to revenge for every patriotic Teuton.<a name= +"FN2anchor306_306"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_306_306"><sup>[306]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Yet the patriots were not cast down by recent events. Their one +desire was for the renewal of war: their one fear was that the +diplomatists would once more barter away German independence. "Our +people," cried Karl Müller, "is still too lazy because it is +too wealthy. Let us learn, as the Russians did, to go round and +burn, and then find ourselves dagger and poison, as the Spaniards +did. Against those two peoples Napoleon's troops could effect +nothing." And while gloom and doubt hung over Germany, a cheering +ray shot forth once more from the south-west. At the close of June +came the news that Wellington had utterly routed the French at +Vittoria.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii300" id= +"page_ii300">[pg.300]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXXIV</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>VITTORIA AND THE ARMISTICE</center> + +<br> + + +<p>It would be beyond the scope of this work to describe in detail +the campaign that culminated at Vittoria. Our task must be limited +to showing what was the position of affairs at the close of 1812, +what were the Emperor's plans for holding part, at least, of Spain, +and why they ended in utter failure.</p> + +<p>The causes, which had all along weakened the French operations +in Spain, operated in full force during the campaign of 1812. The +jealousy of the Marshals, and, still more, their insubordination to +King Joseph, prevented that timely concentration of force by which +the Emperor won his greatest triumphs. Discordant aims and grudging +co-operation marked their operations. Military writers have often +been puzzled to account for the rash moves of Marmont, which +brought on him the crushing blow of Salamanca. Had he waited but a +few days before pressing Wellington hard, he would have been +reinforced by King Joseph with 14,000 men.<a name= +"FN2anchor307_307"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_307_307"><sup>[307]</sup></a> But he preferred to risk +all on a last dashing move rather than to wait for the King and +contribute, as second in command, to securing a substantial +success.</p> + +<p>The correspondence of Joseph before and after Salamanca is +instructive. We see him unable to move quickly to the support of +Marmont, because the French Army of the North neglects to send him +the detachment needed for the defence of Madrid; and when, on +hearing the news of Salamanca, he orders Soult to<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii301" id="page_ii301">[pg.301]</a></span> +evacuate Andalusia so as to concentrate forces for the recovery of +the capital, his command is for some time disobeyed. When, at last, +Joseph, Soult, and Suchet concentrate their forces for a march on +Madrid, Wellington is compelled to retire. Pushing on his rear with +superior forces, Joseph then seeks to press on a battle; but again +Soult moves so slowly that Wellington is able to draw off his men +and make good his retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo.<a name= +"FN2anchor308_308"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_308_308"><sup>[308]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Apparently Joseph came off victor from the campaign of 1812; but +the withdrawal of French troops towards Madrid and the valley of +the Douro had fatal consequences. The south was at once lost to the +French; and the sturdy mountaineers of Biscay, Navarre, and Arragon +formed large bands whose persistent daring showed that the north +was far from conquered. Encouraged by the presence of a small +British force, they seized on most of the northern ports; and their +chief, Mina, was able to meet the French northern army on almost +equal terms. In the east, Suchet held his own against the Spaniards +and an Anglo-Sicilian expedition. But in regard to the rest of +Spain, Soult's gloomy prophecy was fulfilled: "The loss of +Andalusia and the raising of the siege of Cadiz are events whose +results will be felt throughout the whole of Europe."</p> + +<p>The Spanish Cortes, or Parliament, long cooped up in Cadiz, now +sought to put in force the recently devised democratic +constitution. It was hailed with joy by advanced thinkers in the +cities, and with loathing by the clergy, the nobles, the wealthy, +and the peasants. But, though the Cortes sowed the seeds of +political discord, they took one very commendable step. They +appointed Wellington generalissimo of all the Spanish armies; and, +in a visit which he paid to the Cortes at Christmastide, he +prepared for a real co-operation of Spanish forces in the next +campaign.</p> + +<p>At that time Napoleon was uneasily looking into the<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii302" id="page_ii302">[pg.302]</a></span> +state of Spanish affairs. As soon as he mastered the contents of +the despatches from Madrid he counselled a course of action that +promised, at any rate, to postpone the overthrow of his power. The +advice is set forth in letters written on January 4th and February +12th by the Minister of War, General Clarke; for Napoleon had +practically ceased to correspond with his brother. In the latter of +these despatches Clarke explained in some detail the urgent need of +acting at once, while the English were inactive, so as to stamp out +the ever-spreading flame of revolt in the northern provinces. Two +French armies, that of the North and the so-called "Army of +Portugal," were to be told off for this duty; and Joseph was +informed that his armies of the south and of the centre would for +the present suffice to hold the British in check. As to Joseph's +general course of action, it was thus prescribed:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"The Emperor commands me to reiterate to your Majesty that the +use of Valladolid as a residence and as headquarters is an +indispensable preliminary. From that place must be sent out on the +Burgos road, and on other fit points, the troops which are to +strengthen or to second the army of the north. Madrid, and even +Valencia, form parts of this system only as posts to be held by +your extreme left, not as places to be kept by a concentration of +forces.... To occupy Valladolid and Salamanca, to use the utmost +exertion to pacify Navarre and Arragon to keep the communication +with France rapid and safe, to be always ready to take the +offensive—these are the Emperor's instructions for the +campaign, and the principles on which all its operations ought to +be founded...."<a name="FN2anchor309_309"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_309_309"><sup>[309]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>A fortnight later, Clarke bade the King threaten Ciudad Rodrigo +so as to make Wellington believe that the French would invade +Portugal. He was also to lay heavy contributions on Madrid and +Toledo. In fact, the capital was to be held only as long as it +could be squeezed.</p> + +<p>Such were the plans. They show clearly that the<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii303" id="page_ii303">[pg.303]</a></span> +Emperor was impressed with the need of crushing the rising in the +north of Spain; for he ordered as great a force against Mina and +his troublesome bands as he deemed necessary to watch the +Portuguese frontier. Clausel was charged to stamp out the northern +rising, and Napoleon seems to have judged that this hardy fighter +would end this tedious task before Wellington dealt any serious +blows. The miscalculation was to be fatal. Mina was not speedily to +be beaten, nor was the British general the slow unenterprising +leader that the Emperor took him to be. And then again, in spite of +all the experiences of the past, Napoleon failed to allow for the +delays caused by the capture of his couriers, or by their long +detours. Yet, never were these more serious. Clarke's first urgent +despatch, that of January 4th, did not reach the King until +February 16th.<a name="FN2anchor310_310"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_310_310"><sup>[310]</sup></a> When its directions were +being doubtfully obeyed, those quoted above arrived on March 12th, +and led to changes in the disposition of the troops. Thus the +forces opposed to Wellington were weakened in order to crush the +northern revolt, and yet these detachments were only sent north at +the close of March for a difficult enterprise which was not to be +completed before the British leader threw his sword decisively into +the scales of war.</p> + +<p>Joseph has been severely blamed for his tardy action: but, in +truth, he was in a hopeless <i>impasse</i>: on all sides he saw the +walls of his royal prison house closing in. The rebels in the north +cut off the French despatches, thus forestalling his movements and +delaying by some weeks his execution of Napoleon's plans. Worst of +all, the Emperor withdrew the pith and marrow of his forces: 1,200 +officers, 6,000 non-commissioned officers, and some 24,000 of the +most seasoned soldiers filed away towards France to put strength +and firmness into the new levies of the line, or to fill out again +the skeleton battalions and squadrons of the Imperial Guard.<a +name="FN2anchor311_311"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_311_311"><sup>[311]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii304" id="page_ii304">[pg.304]</a></span></p> + +<p>It is strange that Napoleon did not withdraw all his troops from +Spain. They still exceeded 150,000 men; and yet, after he had flung +away army after army, the Spaniards were everywhere in arms, except +in Valencia. The north defied all the efforts of Clausel for +several weeks, until he declared that it would take 50,000 men +three months to crush the mountaineers.<a name= +"FN2anchor312_312"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_312_312"><sup>[312]</sup></a> Above all, Wellington was +known to be mustering a formidable force on the Portuguese borders. +In truth, Napoleon seems long to have been afflicted with political +colour blindness in Spanish affairs. Even now he only dimly saw the +ridiculous falsity of his brother's position—a parvenu among +the proudest nobility in the world, a bankrupt King called upon to +keep up regal pomp before a ceremonious race, a benevolent ruler +forced to levy heavy loans and contributions on a sensitive +populace whose goodwill he earnestly strove to gain, an easy-going +epicure spurred on to impetuous action by orders from Paris which +he dared not disregard and could not execute, a peace-loving +valetudinarian upon whom was thrust the task of controlling testy +French Marshals, and of holding a nation in check and Wellington at +bay.</p> + +<p>The concentration on which Napoleon laid such stress would +doubtless have proved a most effective step had the French forces +on the Douro been marshalled by an able leader. But here, again, +the situation had been fatally compromised by the recall of the +ablest of the French commanders in Spain. Wellington afterwards +said that Soult was second only to Masséna among the French +Marshals pitted against him. He had some defects. "He did not quite +understand a field of battle: he was an excellent tactician, knew +very well how to bring his troops up to the field, but not so well +how to use them when he had brought them up."<a name= +"FN2anchor313_313"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_313_313"><sup>[313]</sup></a> But the fact remains that, +with the exception of his Oporto failure,<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii305" id="page_ii305">[pg.305]</a></span> Soult came +with credit, if not glory, out of every campaign waged against +Wellington. Yet he was now recalled.</p> + +<p>Indeed, this vain and ambitious man had mortally offended King +Joseph. After Salamanca he had treated him with gross disrespect. +Not only did he, at first, refuse to move from Andalusia, but he +secretly revealed to six French generals his fears that Joseph was +betraying the French cause by treating with the Spanish national +government at Cadiz. He even warned Clarke of the King's supposed +intentions, in a letter which by chance fell into Joseph's hands.<a +name="FN2anchor314_314"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_314_314"><sup>[314]</sup></a> The hot blood of the +Bonapartes boiled at this underhand dealing, and he at once +despatched Colonel Desprez to Napoleon to demand Soult's instant +recall. The Emperor, who was then at Moscow, temporized. Perhaps he +was not sorry to have in Spain so vigilant an informer; and he made +the guarded reply that Soult's suspicions did not much surprise +him, that they were shared by many other French generals, who +thought King Joseph preferred Spain to France, and that he could +not recall Soult, as he had "the only military head in Spain." The +threatening war-cloud in Central Europe led Napoleon to change his +resolve. Soult was recalled, but not disgraced, and, after the +death of Bessières, he received the command of the Imperial +Guard.</p> + +<p>The commander who now bore the brunt of responsibility was +Jourdan, who acted as major-general at the King's side, a post +which he had held once before, but had forfeited owing to his +blunders in the summer of 1809. The victor of Fleurus was now +fifty-one years of age, and his failing health quite unfitted him +for the Herculean tasks of guiding refractory generals, and of +propping up a tottering monarchy. For Jourdan's talents Napoleon +had expressed but scanty esteem, whereas on many occasions he +extolled the abilities of Suchet, who was now holding down Valencia +and Catalonia. Certainly Suchet's tenacity and administrative skill +rendered<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii306" id= +"page_ii306">[pg.306]</a></span> his stay in those rich provinces +highly desirable. But the best talent was surely needed on +Wellington's line of advance, namely, at Valladolid. To the +shortcomings and mishaps of Joseph and Jourdan in that quarter may +be chiefly ascribed the collapse of the French power.</p> + +<p>In fact, the only part of Spain that now really interested +Napoleon was the north and north-east. So long as he firmly held +the provinces north of the Ebro, he seems to have cared little +whether Joseph reigned, or did not reign, at Madrid. All that +concerned him was to hold the British at bay from the line of the +Douro, while French authority was established in the north and +north-east. This he was determined to keep; and probably he had +already formed the design, later on to be mooted to Ferdinand VII. +at Valençay, of restoring him to the throne of Spain and of +indemnifying him with Portugal for the loss of the north-eastern +provinces. This scheme may even have formed part of a plan of +general pacification; for at Dresden, on May 17th, he proposed to +Austria the admission of representatives of the Spanish +<i>insurgents</i> to the European Congress. But it is time to turn +from the haze of conjecture to the sharp outlines of Wellington's +campaign.<a name="FN2anchor315_315"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_315_315"><sup>[315]</sup></a></p> + +<p>While the French cause in Spain was crumbling to pieces, that of +the patriots was being firmly welded together by the organizing +genius of Wellington. By patient efforts, he soon had the Spanish +and Portuguese contingents in an efficient condition: and, as large +reinforcements had come from England, he was able early in May to +muster 70,000 British and Portuguese troops and 30,000 Spaniards +for a move eastwards. Murray's force tied Suchet fast to the +province of Valencia; Clausel was fully employed in Navarre, and +thus Joseph's army on the Douro was left far too weak to stem +Wellington's tide of war. Only some 45,000 French were ready in the +districts between Salamanca and <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii307" id="page_ii307">[pg.307]</a></span> Valladolid. Others +remained in the basin of the Tagus in case the allies should burst +in by that route.</p> + +<p>Wellington kept up their illusions by feints at several points, +while he prepared to thrust a mighty force over the fords of the +Tormes and Esla. He completely succeeded. While Joseph and Jourdan +were haltingly mustering their forces in Leon, the allies began +that series of rapid flanking movements on the north which decided +the campaign. Swinging forward his powerful left wing he manoeuvred +the French out of one strong position after another. The Tormes, +the Esla, the Douro, the Carrion, the Pisuerga, none of these +streams stopped his advance. Joseph nowhere showed fight; he +abandoned even the castle of Burgos, and, fearing to be cut off +from France, retired behind the upper Ebro.</p> + +<p>The official excuse given for this rapid retreat was the lack of +provisions: but the diaries of two British officers, Tomkinson and +Simmons, show that they found the country between the Esla and the +Ebro for the most part well stocked and fertile. Simmons, who was +with the famous Light Division, notes that the Rifles did not fire +a shot after breaking up their winter quarters, until they +skirmished with the French in the hills near the source of the +Ebro. The French retreat was really necessary in order to bring the +King's forces into touch with the corps of Generals Clausel and +Foy, in Navarre and Biscay respectively. Joseph had already sent +urgent orders to call in these corps; for, as he explained to +Clarke, the supreme need now was to beat Wellington; that done, the +partisan warfare would collapse.</p> + +<p>But Clausel and Foy took their orders, not from the King, but +from Paris; and up to June 5th, Joseph heard not a word from +Clausel. At last, on June 15th, that general wrote from Pamplona +that he had received Joseph's commands of May 30th and June 7th, +and would march to join him. Had he at once called in his mobile +columns and covered with all haste the fifty miles that separated +him from the King, the French army would have been the stronger by +at least 14,000 men. But his<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii308" id="page_ii308">[pg.308]</a></span> concentration was +a work of some difficulty, and he finally drew near to Vittoria on +June 22nd, when the French cause was irrecoverably lost.<a name= +"FN2anchor316_316"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_316_316"><sup>[316]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Wellington, meanwhile, had foreseen the supreme need of +despatch. Early in the year he had urged our naval authorities to +strengthen our squadron on the north of Spain, so that he might in +due course make Santander his base of supplies. Naval support was +not forthcoming to the extent that he expected;<a name= +"FN2anchor317_317"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_317_317"><sup>[317]</sup></a> but after leaving Burgos +he was able to make some use of the northern ports, thereby +shortening his line of communications. In fact, the Vittoria +campaign illustrates the immense advantages gained by a leader, who +is sure of his rear and of one flank, over an enemy who is ever +nervous about his communications. The British squadron acted like a +covering force on the north to Wellington: it fed the guerilla +warfare in Biscay, and menaced Joseph with real though invisible +dangers. This explains, in large measure, why our commander moved +forward so rapidly, and pushed forward his left wing with such +persistent daring. Mountain fastnesses and roaring torrents stayed +not the advance of his light troops on that side. Near the sources +of the Ebro, the French again felt their communications with France +threatened, and falling back from the main stream, up the defile +carved out by a tributary, the Zadora, they halted wearily in the +basin of Vittoria.</p> + +<p>There Joseph and Jourdan determined to fight. As usual, there +had been recriminations at headquarters. "Jourdan, ill and angry, +kept his room; and the King was equally invisible."<a name= +"FN2anchor318_318"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_318_318"><sup>[318]</sup></a> Few orders were given. The +town was packed with convoys and vehicles of all kinds,<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii309" id="page_ii309">[pg.309]</a></span> +and it was not till dawn of that fatal midsummer's day that the +last convoy set out for France, under the escort of 3,000 troops. +Nevertheless, Joseph might hope to hold his own. True, he had but +70,000 troops at hand, or perhaps even fewer; yet on the evening of +the 19th he heard that Clausel had set out from Pamplona.</p> + +<p>At once he bade him press on his march, but that message fell +into the enemy's hands.<a name="FN2anchor319_319"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_319_319"><sup>[319]</sup></a> Relying, then, on help +which was not to arrive, Joseph confronted the allied army. It +numbered, in all, 83,000 men, though Napier asserts that not more +than 60,000 took part in the fighting. The French left wing rested +on steep hills near Puebla, which tower above the River Zadora, and +leave but a narrow defile. Their centre held a less precipitous +ridge, which trends away to the north parallel to the middle +reaches of that stream. Higher up its course, the Zadora describes +a sharp curve that protects the ridge on its northern flank; and if +a daring foe drove the defenders away from these heights, they +could still fall back on two lower ridges nearer Vittoria. But +these natural advantages were not utilized to the full. The bridges +opposite the French front were not broken, and the defenders were +far too widely spread out. Their right wing, consisting of the +"Army of Portugal" under General Reille, guarded the bridge north +of Vittoria, and was thus quite out of touch with the main force +that held the hills five miles away to the west.</p> + +<p>The dawn broke heavily; the air was thick with rain and driving +mists, under cover of which Hill's command moved up against the +steeps of Puebla. A Spanish brigade, under General Morillo, nimbly +scaled those slopes on the south-west, gained a footing near the +summit, and, when reinforced, firmly held their ground. Meanwhile +the rest of Hill's troops threaded their way <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii310" id="page_ii310">[pg.310]</a></span> +beneath through the pass of Puebla, and, after a tough fight, +wrested the village of Subijana from the foe. In vain did Joseph +and Jourdan bring up troops from the centre; the British and +Spaniards were not to be driven either from the village or from the +heights. Wellington's main array was also advancing to attack the +French centre occupying the ridge behind the Zadora; and Graham, +after making a long détour to the north through very broken +country, sought to surprise Reille and drive him from the bridge +north of Vittoria. In this advance the guidance of the Spanish +irregulars, under Colonel Longa, was of priceless value. So well +was Graham covered by their bands, that, up to the moment of +attack, Reille knew not that a British division was also at hand. +At the centre, too, a Spanish peasant informed Wellington that the +chief bridge of Tres Puentes</p> + +<center><a name="image_15"><img alt="BATTLE OF VITTORIA" src= +"images/image15.jpg" width="420" height="377"><br> + <font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>BATTLE OF +VITTORIA</small></font></a></center> + +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii311" id= +"page_ii311">[pg.311]</a></span> was unguarded, and guided Kempt's +brigade through rocky ground to within easy charging distance.<br> +<br> + + +<p>The bridge was seized, Joseph's outposts were completely turned, +and time was given for the muster of Picton's men. Stoutly they +breasted the slopes, and unsteadied the weakened French centre, +which was also assailed on its northern flank. At the same time +Joseph's left wing began to waver under Hill's repeated onslaughts; +and, distracted by the distant cannonade, which told of a stubborn +fight between Graham and Reille, the King now began to draw in his +lines towards Vittoria. For a time the French firmly held the +village of Arinez, but Picton's men were not to be denied. They +burst through the rearguard, and the battle now became a running +fight, extending over some five miles of broken country. At the +last slopes, close to Vittoria, the defenders made a last heroic +stand, and their artillery dealt havoc among the assailants; but +our fourth division, rushing forward into the smoke, carried a hill +that commanded their left, and the day was won. Nothing now +remained for the French but a speedy retreat, while the gallant +Reille could still hold Graham's superior force at bay.</p> + +<p>There, too, the fight at last swirled back, albeit with many a +rallying eddy, into Vittoria. That town was no place of refuge, but +a death-trap; for Graham had pushed on a detachment to Durana, on +the high-road leading direct to France, and thus blocked the main +line of retreat. Joseph's army was now in pitiable plight. Pent up +in the choked streets of Vittoria, torn by cannon-shot from the +English lines, the wreckage of its three armies for a time surged +helplessly to and fro, and then broke away eastwards towards +Pamplona. On that side only was safety to be found, for British +hussars scoured the plain to the north-east, lending wings to the +flight. The narrow causeway, leading through marshes, was soon +blocked, and panic seized on all: artillerymen cut their traces and +fled; carriages crowded with women, once called gay, but now +frantic with terror, wagons laden<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii312" id="page_ii312">[pg.312]</a></span> with ammunition, +stores, treasure-chests, and the booty amassed by generals and +favourites during five years of warfare and extortion, all were +left pell-mell. Jourdan's Marshal's baton was taken, and was sent +by Wellington to the Prince Regent, who acknowledged it by +conferring on the victor the title of Field-Marshal.</p> + +<p>Richly was the title deserved. After four years of battling with +superior numbers, the British leader at last revealed the full +majesty of his powers now that the omens were favourable. In six +weeks he marched more than five hundred miles, crossed six rivers, +and, using the Navarrese revolt as the anvil, dealt the +hammer-stroke of Vittoria. It cost Napoleon 151 pieces of cannon, +nearly all the stores piled up for his Peninsular +campaigns—and Spain itself.<a name="FN2anchor320_320"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_320_320"><sup>[320]</sup></a></p> + +<p>As for Joseph, he left his carriage and fled on horseback +towards France, reaching St. Jean de Luz "with only a napoleon +left." He there also assured his queen that he had always preferred +a private station to the grandeur and agitations of public life.<a +name="FN2anchor321_321"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_321_321"><sup>[321]</sup></a> This, indeed, was one of +the many weak points of his brother's Spanish policy. It rested on +the shoulders of an amiable man who was better suited to the ease +of Naples than to the Herculean toils of Madrid. Napoleon now saw +the magnitude of his error. On July 1st he bade Soult leave Dresden +at once for Paris. There he was to call on Clarke, with him repair +to Cambacérès; and, as Lieutenant-General, take steps +to re-establish the Emperor's affairs in Spain. A Regency was to +govern in place of Joseph, who was ordered to remain, according to +the state of affairs, either at Burgos(!) or St. Sebastian or +Bayonne.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"All the follies in Spain" (he wrote to Cambacérès +on that<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii313" id= +"page_ii313">[pg.313]</a></span> day) "are due to the mistaken +consideration I have shown the King, who not only does not know how +to command, but does not even know his own value enough to leave +the military command alone."</p> +</div> + +<p>And to Savary he wrote two days later:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"It is hard to imagine anything so inconceivable as what is now +going on in Spain. The King could have collected 100,000 picked +men: <i>they might have beaten the whole of England</i>."</p> +</div> + +<p>Reflection, however, showed him that the fault was his own; that +if, as had occurred to him when he left Paris, he had intrusted the +supreme command in Spain to Soult, the disaster would never have +happened.<a name="FN2anchor322_322"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_322_322"><sup>[322]</sup></a> His belief in Soult's +capacity was justified by the last events of the Peninsular War. +But neither his splendid rally of the scattered French forces, nor +the skilful movements of Clausel and Suchet, nor the stubborn +defence of Pamplona and San Sebastian, could now save the French +cause. The sole result of these last operations was to restore the +lustre of the French arms and to keep 150,000 men in Spain when the +scales of war were wavering in the plains of Saxony.</p> + +<p>Napoleon's letters betray the agitation which he felt even at +the first vague rumours of the disaster of Vittoria. On the first +three days of July he penned at Dresden seven despatches on that +topic in a style so vehement that the compilers of the +"Correspondance de Napoléon" have thought it best to omit +them. He further enjoined the utmost reserve, and ordered the +official journals merely to state that, after a brisk engagement at +Vittoria, the French army was concentrating in Arragon, and that +the British had captured about a hundred guns and wagons left +behind in the town for lack of horses.</p> + +<p>There was every reason for hiding the truth. He saw how +seriously it must weaken his chances of browbeating the Eastern +Powers, and of punishing Austria for her<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii314" id="page_ii314">[pg.314]</a></span> armed +mediation. Hitherto there seemed every chance of his succeeding. +The French standards flew on all the fortresses of the Elbe and +Oder. Hamburg was fast becoming a great French camp, and Denmark +was ranged on the side of France.</p> + +<p>Indeed, on reviewing the situation on June 4th, the German +publicist, Gentz, came to the conclusion that the Emperor Francis +would probably end his vacillations by some inglorious compromise. +The Kaiser desired peace; but he also wished to shake off the +irksome tutelage of his son-in-law, and regain Illyria. For the +present he wavered. Before the news of Lützen reached him, he +undoubtedly encouraged the allies: but that reverse brought about a +half left turn towards Napoleon. "Boney's success at Lützen," +wrote Sir G. Jackson in his Diary, "has made Francis reconsider his +half-formed resolutions." Here was the chief difficulty for the +allies. Their fortunes, and the future of Europe, rested largely on +the decision of a man whose natural irresolution of character had +been increased by adversity. Fortunately, the news from Spain +finally helped to incline him towards war; but for some weeks his +decision remained the unknown quantity in European politics. +Fortunately, too, he was amenable to the gentle but determining +pressure of the kind which Metternich could so skilfully exert. +That statesman, as usual, schemed and balanced. He saw that Austria +had much to gain by playing the waiting game. Her forces were +improving both in numbers and efficiency, and under cover of her +offer of armed mediation were holding strong positions in Bohemia. +In fact, she was regaining her prestige, and might hope to impose +her will on the combatants at the forthcoming European Congress at +Prague. Metternich, therefore, continued to pose as the well-wisher +of both parties and the champion of a reasonable and therefore +durable compromise.</p> + +<p>He had acted thus, not only in his choice of measures, but in +his selection of men. He had sent to Napoleon's headquarters at +Dresden Count Bubna, whose sincere<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii315" id="page_ii315">[pg.315]</a></span> and resolute +striving for peace served to lull animosity and suspicions in that +place. But to the allied headquarters, now at Reichenbach, he had +despatched Count Stadion, who worked no less earnestly for war. +While therefore the Courts of St. Petersburg, Berlin, and London +hoped, from Stadion's language, that Austria meant to draw the +sword, Napoleon inclined to the belief that she would never do more +than rattle her scabbard, and would finally yield to his +demands.</p> + +<p>Stadion's letters to Metternich show that he feared this result. +He pressed him to end the seesaw policy of the last six months. +"These people are beaten owing to our faults, our half wishes, our +half measures, and presently they will get out of the scrape and +leave us to pay the price." As for Austria's forthcoming demand of +Illyria, who would guarantee that the French Emperor would let her +keep it six months, if he remained master of Germany and Italy? +Only by a close union with the allies could she be screened from +Napoleon's vengeance, which must otherwise lead to her utter +destruction. Let, then, all timid counsellors be removed from the +side of the Emperor Francis. "I cling to my oft-expressed +conviction that we are no longer masters of our own affairs, and +that the tide of events will carry us along."<a name= +"FN2anchor323_323"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_323_323"><sup>[323]</sup></a> If we may judge from +Metternich's statements in his "Memoirs," written many years later, +he was all along in secret sympathy with these views. But his +actions and his official despatches during the first six weeks of +the armistice bore another complexion; they were almost colourless, +or rather, they were chameleonic. At Dresden they seemed, on the +whole, to be favourable to France: at Reichenbach, when coloured by +Stadion, they were thought to hold out the prospect of another +European coalition.</p> + +<p>A new and important development was given to Austrian policy +when, on June 7th, Metternich drew up the conditions on which +Austria would insist as the basis<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii316" id="page_ii316">[pg.316]</a></span> of her armed +mediation. They were as follows: (1) Dissolution of the Duchy of +Warsaw; (2) A consequent reconstruction of Prussia, with the +certainty of recovering Danzig; (3) Restitution of the Illyrian +provinces, including Dalmatia, to Austria; (4) Re-establishment of +the Hanse Towns, and an eventual arrangement as to the cession of +the other parts of the 32nd military division [the part of North +Germany annexed by Napoleon in 1810]. To these were added two other +conditions on which Austria would lay great stress, namely: (5) +Dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine; (6) Reconstruction +of Prussia conformably with her territorial extent previous to +1805.</p> + +<p>At first sight these terms seem favourable to the allied cause; +but they were much less extensive than the proposals submitted by +Alexander in the middle of May. Therefore, when they were set forth +to the allies at Reichenbach, they were unfavourably received, and +for some days suspicion of Austria overclouded the previous +goodwill. It was removed only by the labours of Stadion and by the +tact which Metternich displayed during an interview with the Czar +at Opotschna (June 17th).</p> + +<p>Alexander came there prejudiced against Metternich as a past +master in the arts of double-dealing: he went away convinced that +he meant well for the allies. "What will become of us," asked the +Czar, "if Napoleon accepts your mediation?" To which the statesman +replied: "If he refuses it, the truce will be at an end, and you +will find us in the ranks of your allies. If he accepts it, the +negotiations will prove to a certainty that Napoleon is neither +wise nor just; and the issue will be the same." Alexander knew +enough of his great enemy's character to discern the sagacity of +Metternich's forecast; and both Frederick William and he agreed to +the Austrian terms.<a name="FN2anchor324_324"></a> <a href= +"#Foot2note_324_324"><sup>[324]</sup></a> Accordingly, on June 27th, +a treaty<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii317" id= +"page_ii317">[pg.317]</a></span> was secretly signed at +Reichenbach, wherein Austria pledged herself to an active alliance +with Russia and Prussia in case Napoleon should not, by the end of +the armistice, have acceded to her four <i>conditiones sine quibus +non.</i> To these was now added a demand for the evacuation of all +Polish and Prussian fortresses by French troops, a stipulation +which it was practically certain that Napoleon would refuse.<a +name="FN2anchor325_325"></a> <a href= +"#Foot2note_325_325"><sup>[325]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The allies meanwhile were gaining the sinews of war from +England. The Czar had informed Cathcart at Kalisch that, though he +did not press our Government for subsidies, yet he would not be +able to wage a long campaign without such aid. On June 14th and +15th, our ambassador signed treaties with Russia and Prussia, +whereby we agreed to aid the former by a yearly subsidy of +£1,133,334, and the latter by a sum of half that amount, and +to meet all the expenses of the Russian fleet then in our harbours. +The Czar and the King of Prussia bound themselves to maintain in +the field (exclusive of garrisons) 160,000 and 80,000 men +respectively.<a name="FN2anchor326_326"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_326_326"><sup>[326]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii318" id="page_ii318">[pg.318]</a></span></p> + +<p>There was every reason for these preparations. Everything showed +that Napoleon was bent on browbeating the allies. On June 17th +Napoleon's troops destroyed or captured Lützow's volunteers at +Kitzen near Leipzig. The excuse for this act was that Lützow +had violated the armistice; but he had satisfied Nisas, the French +officer there in command, that he was loyally observing it. +Nevertheless, his brigade was cut to pieces. The protests of the +allies received no response except that Lützow's men might be +exchanged—as if they had been captured in fair fight. +Finally, Napoleon refused to hear the statement of Nisas in his own +justification, reproached him for casting a slur on the conduct of +French troops, and deprived him of his command.<a name= +"FN2anchor327_327"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_327_327"><sup>[327]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But it was Napoleon's bearing towards Metternich, in an +interview held on June 26th at the Marcolini Palace at Dresden, +that most clearly revealed the inflexibility of his policy. +Ostensibly, the interview was fixed in order to arrange the forms +of the forthcoming Congress that was to insure the world's peace. +In reality, however, Napoleon hoped to intimidate the Austrian +statesman, and to gather from him the results of his recent +interview with the Czar. Carrying his sword at his side and his hat +under his arm, he received Metternich in state. After a few studied +phrases about the health of the Emperor Francis, his brow clouded +and he plunged <i>in medias res</i>: "So you too want war: well, +you shall have it. I have beaten the Russians at Bautzen: now you +wish your turn to come. Be it so, the rendezvous shall be in +Vienna. Men are incorrigible: experience is lost upon you. Three +times I have replaced the Emperor Francis on his throne. I have +promised always to live<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii319" +id="page_ii319">[pg.319]</a></span> at peace with him: I have +married his daughter. At the time I said to myself—you are +perpetrating a folly; but it was done, and now I repent of it."</p> + +<p>Metternich saw his advantage: his adversary had lost his temper +and forgotten his dignity. He calmly reminded Napoleon that peace +depended on him; that his power must be reduced within reasonable +limits, or he would fall in the ensuing struggle. No matador +fluttered the cloak more dextrously. Napoleon rushed on. No +coalition should daunt him: he could overpower any number of +men—everything except the cold of Russia—and the losses +of that campaign had been made good. He then diverged into stories +about that war, varied by digressions as to his exact knowledge of +Austria's armaments, details of which were sent to him daily. To +end this wandering talk, Metternich reminded him that his troops +now were not men but boys. Whereupon the Emperor passionately +replied: "You do not know what goes on in the mind of a soldier; a +man such as I does not take much heed of the lives of a million of +men,"—and he threw aside his hat. Metternich did not pick it +up.</p> + +<p>Napoleon noticed the unspoken defiance, and wound up by saying: +"When I married an Archduchess I tried to weld the new with the +old, Gothic prejudices with the institutions of my century: I +deceived myself, and this day I see the whole extent of my error. +It may cost me my throne, but I will bury the world beneath its +ruins." In dismissing Metternich, the Emperor used the device +which, shortly before the rupture with England in 1803, he had +recommended Talleyrand to employ upon Whitworth, namely, after +trying intimidation to resort to cajolery. Touching the Minister on +the shoulder, he said quietly: "Well, now, do you know what will +happen? You will not make war on me?" To which came the quick +reply: "You are lost, Sire; I had the presentiment of it when I +came: now, in going, I have the certainty." In the anteroom the +generals crowded around the illustrious visitor. Berthier had +previously begged<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii320" id= +"page_ii320">[pg.320]</a></span> him to remember that Europe, and +France, urgently needed peace; and now, on conducting him to his +carriage, he asked him whether he was satisfied with Napoleon. +"Yes," was the answer, "he has explained everything to me: it is +all over with the man."<a name="FN2anchor328_328"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_328_328"><sup>[328]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Substantially, this was the case. Napoleon's resentment against +Austria, not unnatural under the circumstances, had hurried him +into outbursts that revealed the inner fires of his passion. In a +second interview, on June 30th, he was far more gracious, and +allowed Austria to hope that she would gain Illyria. He also +accepted Austria's mediation; and it was stipulated that a Congress +should meet at Prague for the discussion of a general pacification. +Metternich appeared highly pleased with this condescension, but he +knew by experience that Napoleon's caresses were as dangerous as +his wrath; and he remained on his guard. The Emperor soon disclosed +his real aim. In gracious tones he added: "But this is not all: I +must have a prolongation of the armistice. How can we between July +5th and 20th end a negotiation which ought to embrace the whole +world?" He proposed August 20th as the date of its expiration. To +this Metternich demurred because the allies already thought the +armistice too long for their interests. August 10th was finally +agreed on, but not without much opposition on the part of the +allied generals, who insisted that such a prolongation would +greatly embarrass them.</p> + +<p>Outwardly, this new arrangement seemed to portend peace: but it +is significant that on June 28th Napoleon<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii321" id="page_ii321">[pg.321]</a></span> wrote to +Eugène that all the probabilities appeared for war; and on +June 30th he wrote his father-in-law a cold and almost threatening +letter.<a name="FN2anchor329_329"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_329_329"><sup>[329]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Late on that very evening came to hand the first report of the +disaster of Vittoria. Despite all Napoleon's precautions, the news +leaked out at Dresden. Bubna's despatches of July 5th, 6th, and 7th +soon made it known to the Emperor Francis, then at Brandeis in +Bohemia. Thence it reached the allied monarchs and Bernadotte on +July 12th at Trachenberg in the midst of negotiations which will be +described presently. The effect of the news was very great. The +Czar at once ordered a Te Deum to be sung: "It is the first +instance," wrote Cathcart, "of a Te Deum having been sung at this +Court for a victory in which the forces of the Russian Empire were +not engaged."<a name="FN2anchor330_330"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_330_330"><sup>[330]</sup></a> But its results were more +than ceremonial: they were practical. Our envoy, Thornton, who +followed Bernadotte to Trachenberg, states that Bubna had learnt +that Wellington had completely routed three French corps with a +<i>débandade</i> like that of the retreat from Moscow. +Thornton adds: "The Prince Royal [Bernadotte] thinks that the +French army will be very soon withdrawn from Silesia and that +Buonaparte must soon commence his retreat nearer the Rhine. I have +no doubt of its effect upon Austria. This is visible in the answer +of the Emperor [Francis] to the Prince, which came to-day from the +Austrian head-quarters." That letter, dated July 9th, was indeed of +the most cordial character. It expressed great pleasure at hearing +that "the obstacles which seemed to hinder the co-operation of the +forces under your Royal Highness are now removed. I regard this +co-operation as one of the surest supports of the cause which the +Powers may once more be called on to defend by a war which can only +offer chances of success unless sustained by the greatest<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii322" id= +"page_ii322">[pg.322]</a></span> and most unanimous measures."<a +name="FN2anchor331_331"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_331_331"><sup>[331]</sup></a> Further than this Francis +could scarcely go without pledging himself unconditionally to an +alliance; and doubtless it was the news of Vittoria that evoked +these encouraging assurances.</p> + +<p>It is even more certain that the compact of Trachenberg also +helped to end the hesitations of Austria. This compact arose out of +the urgent need of adopting a general plan of campaign, and, above +all, of ending the disputes between the allied sovereigns and +Bernadotte. The Prince Royal of Sweden had lost their confidence +through his failure to save Hamburg from the French and Danes. Yet, +on his side, he had some cause for complaint. In the previous +summer, Alexander led him to expect the active aid of 35,000 +Russian troops for a campaign in Norway: but, mainly at the +instance of England, he now landed in Pomerania and left Sweden +exposed to a Danish attack on the side of Norway. He therefore +suggested an interview with the allied sovereigns, a request which +was warmly seconded by Castlereagh.<a name= +"FN2anchor332_332"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_332_332"><sup>[332]</sup></a> Accordingly it took place +at Trachenberg, a castle north of Breslau, with the happiest +results. The warmth of the great Gascon's manner cleared away all +clouds, and won the approval of Frederick William.</p> + +<p>There was signed the famous compact, or plan, of Trachenberg +(July 12th). It bound the allies to turn their main forces against +Napoleon's chief army, wherever it was: those allied corps that +threatened his flanks or communications were to act on the line +that most directly cut into them: and the salient bastion of +Bohemia was expressly named as offering the greatest advantages for +attacking Napoleon's main force. The first and third of these +axioms were directly framed so as to encourage Austria: the second +aimed at concentrating Bernadotte's force on the main struggle and +preventing his waging war merely against Denmark.<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii323" id= +"page_ii323">[pg.323]</a></span></p> + +<p>The plan went even further: 100,000 allied troops were to be +sent into Bohemia, as soon as the armistice should cease, so as to +form in all an army of 200,000 men. On the north, Bernadotte, after +detaching a corps towards Hamburg, was to advance with a +Russo-Prusso-Swedish army of 70,000 men towards the middle course +of the Elbe, his objective being Leipzig; and the rest of the +allied forces, those remaining in Silesia, were to march towards +Torgau, and thus threaten Napoleon's positions in Saxony from the +East. This plan of campaign was an immense advance on those of the +earlier coalitions. There was no reliance here on lines and camps: +the days of Mack and Phull were past: the allies had at last learnt +from Napoleon the need of seeking out the enemy's chief army, and +of flinging at it all the available forces. Politically, also, the +compact deserves notice. In concerting a plan of offensive +operations from Bohemia, the allies were going far to determine the +conduct of Austria.</p> + +<p>On that same day the peace Congress was opened at Prague. Its +proceedings were farcical from the outset. Only Anstett and +Humboldt, the Russian and Prussian envoys, were at hand; and at the +appointment of the former, an Alsatian by birth, Napoleon expressed +great annoyance. The difficulties about the armistice also gave him +the opportunity, which he undoubtedly sought, of further delaying +negotiations. In vain did Metternich point out to the French envoy, +Narbonne, at Prague, that these frivolous delays must lead to war +if matters were not amicably settled by August 10th, at midnight.<a +name="FN2anchor333_333"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_333_333"><sup>[333]</sup></a> In vain did Narbonne and +Caulaincourt beg their master to seize this opportunity for +concluding a safe and <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii324" +id="page_ii324">[pg.324]</a></span> honourable peace. It was not +till the middle of July that he appointed them his +plenipotentiaries at the Congress; and, even then, he retained the +latter at Dresden, while the former fretted in forced inaction at +Prague. "I send you more <i>powers</i> than <i>power</i>," wrote +Maret to Narbonne with cynical jauntiness: "you will have your +hands tied, but your legs and mouth free so that you may walk about +and dine."<a name="FN2anchor334_334"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_334_334"><sup>[334]</sup></a> At last, on the 26th, +Caulaincourt received his instructions; but what must have been the +anguish of this loyal son of France to see that Napoleon was +courting war with a united Europe. Austria, said his master, was +acting as mediator: and the mediator ought not to look for gains: +she had made no sacrifice and deserved to gain nothing at all: her +claims were limitless; and every concession granted by France would +encourage her to ask for more: he was disposed to make peace with +Russia on satisfactory terms so as to punish Austria for her bad +faith in breaking the alliance of 1812.<a name= +"FN2anchor335_335"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_335_335"><sup>[335]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Such trifling with the world's peace seems to belong, not to the +sphere of history, but to the sombre domain of Greek tragedy, where +mortals full blown with pride rush blindly on the embossed bucklers +of fate. For what did Austria demand of him? She proposed to leave +him master of all the lands from the swamps of the Ems down to the +Roman Campagna: Italy was to be his, along with as much of the +Iberian Peninsula as he could hold. His control of Illyria, North +Germany, and the Rhenish Confederation he must give up. But France, +Belgium, Holland, and Italy would surely form a noble realm for a +man who had lost half a million of men, and was even now losing +Spain. Yet his correspondence proves that, even so, he thought +little of his foes, and, least of all, of the Congress at +Prague.</p> + +<p>Leaving his plenipotentiaries tied down to the discussion of +matters of form, he set out from Dresden on<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii325" id="page_ii325">[pg.325]</a></span> +July 24th for a visit to Mainz, where he met the Empress and +reviewed his reserves. Every item of news fed his warlike resolve. +Soult, with nearly 100,000 men, was about to relieve Pamplona (so +he wrote to Caulaincourt): the English were retiring in confusion: +12,000 veteran horsemen from his armies in Spain would soon be on +the Rhine; but they could not be on the Elbe before September. If +the allies wanted a longer armistice, he (Napoleon) would agree to +it: if they wished to fight, he was equally ready, even against the +Austrians as well.<a name="FN2anchor336_336"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_336_336"><sup>[336]</sup></a> To Davoust, at Hamburg, he +expressed himself as if war was certain; and he ordered Clarke, at +Paris, to have 110,000 muskets made by the end of the year, so +that, in all, 400,000 would be ready. Letters about the Congress +are conspicuous by their absence; and everything proves that, as he +wrote to Clarke at the beginning of the armistice, he purposed +striking his great blows in September. Little by little we see the +emergence of his final plan—<i>to overthrow Russia and +Prussia, while, for a week or two, he amused Austria with separate +overtures at Prague</i>.</p> + +<p>But, during eight years of adversity, European statesmen had +learnt that disunion spelt disaster; and it was evident that +Napoleon's delays were prompted solely by the need of equipping and +training his new cavalry brigades. As for the Congress, no one took +it seriously. Gentz, who was then in close contact with Metternich, +saw how this tragi-comedy would end. "We believe that on his return +to Dresden, Napoleon will address to this Court a solemn Note in +which he will accuse everybody of the delays which he himself has +caused, and will end up by proclaiming a sort of ultimatum. Our +reply will be a declaration of war."<a name= +"FN2anchor337_337"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_337_337"><sup>[337]</sup></a></p> + +<p>This was what happened. As July wore on and brought no peaceful +overtures, but rather a tightening of<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii326" id="page_ii326">[pg.326]</a></span> +Napoleon's coils in Saxony, Bavaria, and Illyria, the Emperor +Francis inclined towards war. As late as July 18th he wrote to +Metternich that he was still for peace, provided that Illyria could +be gained.<a name="FN2anchor338_338"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_338_338"><sup>[338]</sup></a> But the French military +preparations decided him, a few days later, to make war, unless +every one of the Austrian demands should be conceded by August +10th. His counsellors had already come to that conclusion, as our +records prove. On July 20th Stadion wrote to Cathcart urging him to +give pecuniary aid to General Nugent, who would wait on him to +concert means for rousing a revolt against Napoleon in Tyrol and +North Italy; and our envoy agreed to give £5,000 a month for +the "support of 5,000 Austrians acting in communication with our +squadron in the Adriatic." This step met with Metternich's +approval; and, when writing to Stadion from Prague (July 25th), he +counselled Cathcart to send a despatch to Wellington and urge him +to make a vigorous move against the south of France. He +(Metternich) would have the letter sent safely through Switzerland +and the south of France direct to our general.<a name= +"FN2anchor339_339"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_339_339"><sup>[339]</sup></a></p> + +<p>With the solemn triflings of the Congress we need not concern +ourselves. The French plenipotentiaries saw clearly that their +master "would allow of no peace but that which he should himself +dictate with his foot on the enemy's neck." Yet they persevered in +their thankless task, for "who could tell whether the Emperor, when +he found himself placed between highly favourable conditions and +the fear of having 200,000 additional troops against him, might not +hesitate; whether just one grain of common sense, one spark of +wisdom, might not enter his head?" Alas! That<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii327" id="page_ii327">[pg.327]</a></span> +brain was now impervious to advice; and the young De Broglie, from +whom we quote this extract, sums up the opinion of the French +plenipotentiaries in the trenchant phrase, "the devil was in +him."<a name="FN2anchor340_340"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_340_340"><sup>[340]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But there was method in his madness. In the Dresden interview he +had warned Metternich that not till the eleventh hour would he +disclose his real demands. And now was the opportunity of trying +the effect of a final act of intimidation. On August 4th he was +back again in Dresden: on the next day he dictated the secret +conditions on which he would accept Austria's mediation; and, on +August 6th, Caulaincourt paid Metternich a private visit to find +out what Austria's terms really were. After a flying visit to the +Emperor Francis at Brandeis, the Minister brought back as an +ultimatum the six terms drawn up on June 7th (see p. 316); and to +these he now added another which guaranteed the existing +possessions of every State, great or small.</p> + +<p>Napoleon was taken aback by this boldness, which he attributed +to the influence of Spanish affairs and to English intrigues.<a +name="FN2anchor341_341"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_341_341"><sup>[341]</sup></a> On August 9th he summoned +Bubna<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii328" id= +"page_ii328">[pg.328]</a></span> and offered to give up the Duchy +of Warsaw—provided that the King of Saxony gained an +indemnity—also the Illyrian Provinces (but without Istria), +as well as Danzig, if its fortifications were destroyed. As for the +Hanse Towns and North Germany, he would not hear of letting them +go. Bubna thought that Austria would acquiesce. But she had said +her last word: she saw that Napoleon was trifling with her until he +had disposed of Russia and Prussia. And, at midnight of August +10th, beacon fires on the heights of the Riesengebirge flashed the +glad news to the allies in Silesia that they might begin to march +their columns into Bohemia. The second and vaster Act in the drama +of liberation had begun.</p> + +<p>Did Napoleon remember, in that crisis of his destiny, that it +was exactly twenty-one years since the downfall of the old French +monarchy, when he looked forth on the collapse of the royalist +defence at the Tuileries and the fruitless bravery of the Swiss +Guards? <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii329" id= +"page_ii329">[pg.329]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXXV</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>DRESDEN AND LEIPZIG</center> + +<br> + + +<p>The militant Revolution had now attained its majority. It had to +confront an embattled Europe. Hitherto the jealousies or fears of +the Eastern Powers had prevented any effective union. The +Austro-Prussian league of 1792 was of the loosest description owing +to the astute neutrality of the Czarina Catherine. In 1798 and 1805 +Prussia seemed to imitate her policy, and only after Austria had +been crushed did the army of Frederick the Great try conclusions +with Napoleon. In the Jena and Friedland campaigns, the Hapsburgs +played the part of the sulking Achilles, and met their natural +reward in 1809. The war of 1812 marshalled both Austria and Prussia +as vassal States in Napoleon's crusade against Russia. But it also +brought salvation, and Napoleon's fateful obstinacy during the +negotiations at Prague virtually compelled his own father-in-law to +draw the sword against him. Ostensibly, the points at issue were +finally narrowed down to the control of the Confederation of the +Rhine, the ownership of North Germany, and a few smaller points. +But really there was a deeper cause, the character of Napoleon.</p> + +<p>The vindictiveness with which he had trampled on his foes, his +almost superhuman lust of domination, and the halting way in which +he met all overtures for a compromise—this it was that drove +the Hapsburgs into an alliance with their traditional foes. His +conduct may be explained on diverse grounds, as springing from the +vendetta instincts of his race, or from his still viewing events +through the distorting medium of the Continental<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii330" id="page_ii330">[pg.330]</a></span> +System, or from his ingrained conviction that, at bottom, rulers +are influenced only by intimidation.</p> + +<p>In any case, he had now succeeded in bringing about the very +thing which Charles James Fox had declared to be impossible. In +opening the negotiations for peace with France in April, 1806, our +Foreign Minister had declared to Talleyrand that "the project of +combining the whole of Europe against France is to the last degree +chimerical." Yet Great Britain and the Spanish patriots, after +struggling alone against the conqueror from 1808 to 1812, saw +Russia, Sweden, Prussia, and Austria, successively range themselves +on their side. It is true, the Germans of the Rhenish +Confederation, the Italians, Swiss, and Danes were still enrolled +under the banners of the new Charlemagne; but, with the exception +of the last, they fought wearily or questioningly, as for a cause +that promised naught but barren triumphs and unending strife.</p> + +<p>Truly, the years that witnessed Napoleon's fall were fruitful in +paradox. The greatest political genius of the age, for lack of the +saving grace of moderation, had banded Europe against him: and the +most calculating of commanders had also given his enemies time to +frame an effective military combination. The Prussian General von +Boyen has told us in his Memoirs how dismayed ardent patriots were +at the conclusion of the armistice in June, and how slow even the +wiser heads were to see that it would benefit their cause. If +Napoleon needed it in order to train his raw conscripts and +organize new brigades of cavalry, the need of the allies was even +greater. Their resources were far less developed than his own. At +Bautzen, their army was much smaller; and Boyen states that had the +Emperor pushed them hard, driven the Russians back into Poland and +called the Poles once more to arms, the allies must have been in +the most serious straits.<a name="FN2anchor342_342"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_342_342"><sup>[342]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Napoleon, it is true, gained much by the armistice. His +conscripts profited immensely by the training of<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii331" id="page_ii331">[pg.331]</a></span> +those nine weeks: his forces now threatened Austria on the side of +Bavaria and Illyria, as well as from the newly intrenched camp +south of Dresden: his cavalry was re-recovering its old efficiency: +Murat, in answer to his imperious summons, ended his long +vacillations and joined the army at Dresden on August 14th.</p> + +<p>Above all, the French now firmly held that great military +barrier, the River Elbe. Napoleon's obstinacy during the armistice +was undoubtedly fed by his boundless confidence in the strength of +his military position. In vain did his Marshals remind him that he +was dangerously far from France; that, if Austria drew the sword, +she could cut him off from the Rhine, and that the Saale, or even +the Rhine itself, would be a safer line of defence.—Ten +battles lost, he retorted, would scarcely force him to that last +step. True, he now exposed his line of communications with France; +but if the art of war consisted in never running any risk, glory +would be the prize of mediocre minds. He must have a complete +triumph. The question was not of abandoning this or that province: +his political superiority was at stake. At Marengo, Austerlitz, and +Wagram, he was in greater danger. His forces now were not <i>in the +air</i>; they rested on the Elbe, on its fortresses, and on Erfurt. +Dresden was the pivot on which all his movements turned. His +enemies were spread out on a circumference stretching from Prague +to Berlin, while he was at the centre; and, operating on interior +and therefore shorter lines, he could outmarch and outmanoeuvre +them. "<i>But</i>," he concluded, "<i>where I am not my lieutenants +must wait for me without trusting anything to chance</i>. The +allies cannot long act together on lines so extended, and can I not +reasonably hope sooner or later to catch them in some false move? +If they venture between my fortified lines of the Elbe and the +Rhine, I will enter Bohemia and thus take them in the rear."<a +name="FN2anchor343_343"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_343_343"><sup>[343]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The plan promised much. The central intrenched<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii332" id="page_ii332">[pg.332]</a></span> +camps of Dresden and Pirna, together with the fortresses of +Königstein above, and of Torgau below, the Saxon capital, gave +great strategic advantages. The corps of St. Cyr at Königstein +and those of Vandamme, Poniatowski, and Victor further to the east, +watched the defiles leading from Bohemia. The corps of Macdonald, +Lauriston, Ney, and Marmont held in check Blücher's army of +Silesia. On Napoleon's left, and resting on the fortresses of +Wittenberg and Magdeburg, the corps of Oudinot, Bertrand, and +Reynier threatened Berlin and Bernadotte's army of the north +cantonned in its neighbourhood; while Davoust at Hamburg faced +Bernadotte's northern detachments and menaced his communications +with Stralsund. Davoust certainly was far away, and the loss of +this ablest of Napoleon's lieutenants was severely to be felt in +the subsequent complicated moves; with this exception, however, +Napoleon's troops were well in hand and had the advantage of the +central position, while the allies were, as yet, spread out on an +extended arc.</p> + +<p>But Napoleon once more made the mistake of underrating both the +numbers and the abilities of his foes. By great exertions they now +had close on half a million of men under arms, near the banks of +the Oder and the Elbe, or advancing from Poland and Hungary. True, +many of these were reserves or raw recruits, and Colonel Cathcart +doubted whether the Austrian reserves were then in existence.<a +name="FN2anchor344_344"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_344_344"><sup>[344]</sup></a> But the best authorities +place the total at 496,000 men and 1,443 cannon. Moreover, as was +agreed on at Trachenberg, 77,000 Russians and 49,000 Prussians now +marched from Glatz and Schweidnitz into Bohemia, and speedily came +into touch with the 110,000 Austrians now ranged behind the River +Eger. The formation of this allied Grand Army was a masterly step. +Napoleon did not hear of it before August 16th, and it was not +until a week later that he realized how vast were the forces that +would threaten his rear. For the present his plan was to hold the +Bohemian<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii333" id= +"page_ii333">[pg.333]</a></span> passes south of Bautzen and Pirna, +so as to hinder any invasion of Saxony, while he threw himself in +great force on the Army of Silesia, now 95,000 strong, though he +believed it to number only 50,000.<a name="FN2anchor345_345"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_345_345"><sup>[345]</sup></a> While he was crushing +Blücher, his lieutenants, Oudinot, Reynier, and Bertrand, were +charged to drive Bernadotte's scattered corps from Berlin; +whereupon Davoust was to cut him off from the sea and relieve the +French garrisons at Stettin and Küstrin. Thus Napoleon +proposed to act on the offensive in the open country towards Berlin +and in Silesia, remaining at first on the defensive at Dresden and +in the Lusatian mountains. This was against the advice of Marmont, +who urged him to strike first at Prague, and not to intrust his +lieutenants with great undertakings far away from Dresden. The +advice proved to be sound; but it seems certain that Napoleon +intended to open the campaign by a mighty blow dealt at +Blücher, and then to lead a great force through the Lusatian +defiles into Bohemia and drive the allies before him towards +Vienna.</p> + +<p>But what did he presume that the allied forces in Bohemia would +be doing while he overwhelmed Blücher in Silesia? Would not +Dresden and his communications with France be left open to their +blows? He decided to run this risk. He had 100,000 men among the +Lusatian hills between Bautzen and Zittau. St. Cyr's corps was +strongly posted at Pirna and the small fortress of Königstein, +while his light troops watched the passes north of Teplitz and +Karlsbad. If the allies sought to invade Saxony, they would, so +Napoleon thought, try to force the Zittau road, which presented few +natural difficulties. If they threatened Dresden by the passages +further west, Vandamme would march from near Zittau to reinforce +St. Cyr, or, if need be, the Emperor himself would hurry back from +Silesia with his Guards. If the enemy invaded Bavaria, <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii334" id="page_ii334">[pg.334]</a></span> +Napoleon wished them <i>bon voyage</i>: they would soon come back +faster than they went; for, in that case, he would pour his columns +down from Zittau towards Prague and Vienna. The thought that he +might for a time be cut off from France troubled him not: "400,000 +men," he said, "resting on a system of strongholds, on a river like +the Elbe, are not to be turned." In truth, he thought little about +the Bohemian army. If 40,000 Russians had entered Bohemia, they +would not reach Prague till the 25th; so he wrote to St. Cyr On the +17th, the day when hostilities could first begin; and he evidently +believed that Dresden would be safe till September. Its defence +seemed assured by the skill of that master of defensive warfare, +St. Cyr, by the barrier of the Erz Mountains, and still more by +Austrian slowness.</p> + +<p>Of this characteristic of theirs he cherished great hopes. Their +finances were in dire disorder; and Fouché, who had just +returned from a tour in the Hapsburg States, reported that the best +way of striking at that Power would be "to affect its paper +currency, on which all its armaments depend."<a name= +"FN2anchor346_346"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_346_346"><sup>[346]</sup></a> And truly if the transport +of a great army over a mountain range had depended solely on the +almost bankrupt exchequer at Vienna, Dresden would have been safe +until Michaelmas; but, beside the material aid brought by the +Russians and Prussians into Bohemia, England also gave her +financial support. In pursuance of the secret article agreed on at +Reichenbach, Cathcart now advanced £250,000 at once; and the +knowledge that our financial support was given to the federative +paper notes issued by the allies enabled the Court of Vienna +privately to raise loans and to wage war with a vigour wholly +unexpected by Napoleon.<a name="FN2anchor347_347"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_347_347"><sup>[347]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Certainly the allied Grand Army suffered from no<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii335" id="page_ii335">[pg.335]</a></span> +lack of advisers. The Czar, the Emperor Francis, and the King of +Prussia were there; as a compliment to Austria, the command was +intrusted to Field-Marshal Schwarzenberg, a man of diplomatic +ability rather than of military genius. By his side were the +Russians, Wittgenstein, Barclay, and Toll, the Prussian Knesebeck, +the Swiss Jomini, and, above all, Moreau.</p> + +<p>The last-named, as we have seen, came over on the inducement of +Bernadotte, and was received with great honour by the allied +sovereigns. Jomini also was welcomed for his knowledge of the art +of war. This great writer had long served as a French general; but +the ill-treatment that he had lately suffered at Berthier's hands +led him, on August 14th, to quit the French service and pass over +to the allies. His account of his desertion, however, makes it +clear that he had not penetrated Napoleon's designs, for the best +of all reasons, because the Emperor kept them to himself to the +very last moment.<a name="FN2anchor348_348"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_348_348"><sup>[348]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The second part of the campaign opens with the curious sight of +immense forces, commanded by experienced leaders, acting in +complete ignorance of the moves of the enemy only some fifty miles +away. Leaving Bautzen on August 17th, Napoleon proceeded eastwards +to Görlitz, turned off thence to Zittau, and hearing a false +rumour that the Russo-Prussian force in Bohemia was only 40,000 +strong, returned to Görlitz with the aim of crushing +Blücher. Disputes about the armistice had given that +enterprising leader the excuse for entering the neutral zone before +its expiration; and he had had sharp affairs with Macdonald and Ney +near Löwenberg on the River Bober. Napoleon hurried up with +his Guards, eager to catch Blücher;<a name= +"FN2anchor349_349"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_349_349"><sup>[349]</sup></a> the French were now<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii336" id= +"page_ii336">[pg.336]</a></span> 140,000 strong, while the allies +had barely 95,000 at hand. But the Prussian veteran, usually as +daring as a lion, was now wily as a fox. Under cover of stiff +outpost affairs, he skilfully withdrew to the south-east, hoping to +lure the French into the depths of Silesia and so give time to +Schwarzenberg to seize Dresden.</p> + +<center><a name="image_16"><img alt="THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813" src= +"images/image16.jpg" width="517" height="406"><br> + <font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>THE CAMPAIGN OF +1813</small></font></a></center> + +<p>But Napoleon was not to be drawn further afield. Seeing that his +foes could not be forced to a pitched battle, he intrusted the +command to Macdonald, and rapidly withdrew with Ney and his Guard +towards Görlitz; for he now saw the possible danger to Dresden +if Schwarzenberg struck home. If, however, that leader remained on +the defensive, the Emperor determined to fall back on what had all +along been his second plan, and make a rush through the Lusatian +defiles on Prague.<a name="FN2anchor350_350"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_350_350"><sup>[350]</sup></a> But a<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii337" id="page_ii337">[pg.337]</a></span> +despatch from St. Cyr, which reached him at Görlitz late at +night on the 23rd, showed that Dresden was in serious danger from +the gathering masses of the allies. This news consigned his second +plan to the limbo of vain hopes. Yet, as will appear a little +later, his determination to defend by taking the offensive soon +took form in yet a third design for the destruction of the +allies.</p> + +<p>It is a proof of the quenchless pugnacity of his mind that he +framed this plan during the fatigues of the long forced march back +towards Dresden, amidst pouring rain and the discouragement of +knowing that his raid into Silesia had ended merely in the +fruitless wearying of his choicest troops. Accompanied by the Old +Guard, the Young Guard, a division of infantry, and +Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, he arrived at Stolpen, south-east of +Dresden, before dawn of the 25th. Most of the battalions had +traversed forty miles in little more than forty-eight hours, and +that, too, after a partial engagement at Löwenberg, and +despite lack of regular rations. Leaving him for a time, we turn to +glance at the fortunes of the war in Brandenburg and Silesia.</p> + +<p>Napoleon had bidden Oudinot, with his own corps and those of +Reynier and Bertrand, in all about 70,000 men, to fight his way to +Berlin, disperse the Landwehr and the "mad rabble" there, and, if +the city resisted, set it in flames by the fire of fifty howitzers. +That Marshal found that a tough resistance awaited him, although +the allied commander-in-chief, Bernadotte, moved with the utmost +caution, as if he were bent on justifying Napoleon's recent sneer +that he would "only make a show" (<i>piaffer</i>). It is true that +the position of the Swedish Prince, with Davoust threatening his +rear, was far from safe; but he earned the dislike of the Prussians +by playing the <i>grand seigneur</i>.<a name= +"FN2anchor351_351"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_351_351"><sup>[351]</sup></a> Meanwhile most of the<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii338" id= +"page_ii338">[pg.338]</a></span> defence was carried out by the +Prussians, who flooded the flat marshy land, thus delaying +Oudinot's advance and compelling him to divide his corps. +Nevertheless, it seemed that Bernadotte was about to evacuate +Berlin.</p> + +<p>At this there was general indignation, which found vent in the +retort of the Prussian General, von Bülow: "Our bones shall +bleach in front of Berlin, not behind it." Seeing an opportune +moment while Oudinot's other corps were as yet far off, Bülow +sharply attacked Reynier's corps of Saxons at Grossbeeren, and +gained a brilliant success, taking 1,700 prisoners with 26 guns, +and thus compelling Oudinot's scattered array to fall back in +confusion on Wittenberg (August 23rd).<a name= +"FN2anchor352_352"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_352_352"><sup>[352]</sup></a> Thither the Crown Prince +cautiously followed him. Four days later, a Prussian column of +Landwehr fought a desperate fight at Hagelberg with Girard's +conscripts, finally rushing on them with wolf-like fury, stabbing +and clubbing them, till the foss and the lanes of the town were +piled high with dead and wounded. Scarce 1,700 out of Girard's +9,000 made good their flight to Magdeburg. The failures at +Grossbeeren and Hagelberg reacted unfavourably on Davoust. That +leader, advancing into Mecklenburg, had skirmished with Walmoden's +corps of Hanoverians, British, and Hanseatics; but, hearing of the +failure of the other attempts on Berlin, he fell back and confined +himself mainly to a defensive which had never entered into the +Emperor's designs on that side, or indeed on any side.</p> + +<p>Even when Napoleon left Macdonald facing Blücher in +Silesia, his orders were, not merely to keep the allies in check: +if possible Macdonald was to attack him and drive him beyond the +town of Jauer.<a name="FN2anchor353_353"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_353_353"><sup>[353]</sup></a> This was what the French +Marshal attempted to do on the 26th of<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii339" id="page_ii339">[pg.339]</a></span> August. The +conditions seemed favourable to a surprise. Blücher's army was +stationed amidst hilly country deeply furrowed by the valleys of +the Katzbach and the "raging Neisse."<a name= +"FN2anchor354_354"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_354_354"><sup>[354]</sup></a> Less than half of the +allied army of 95,000 men was composed of Prussians: the Russians +naturally obeyed his orders with some reluctance, and even his own +countryman, Yorck, grudgingly followed the behests of the "hussar +general."</p> + +<p>Macdonald also hoped to catch the allies while they were +sundered by the deep valley of the Neisse. The Prussians with the +Russian corps led by Sacken were to the east of the Neisse near the +village of Eichholz, the central point of the plateau north of +Jauer, which was the objective of the French right wing; while +Langeron's Russian corps was at Hennersdorf, some three miles away +and on the west of that torrent. On his side, Blücher was +planning an attack on Macdonald, when he heard that the French had +crossed the Neisse near its confluence with the Katzbach, and were +struggling up the streaming gullies that led to Eichholz.</p> + +<p>Driving rain-storms hid the movements on both sides, and as +Souham, who led the French right, had neglected to throw out +flanking scouts, the Prussian staff-officer, Muffling, was able to +ride within a short distance of the enemy's columns and report to +his chief that they could be assailed before their masses were +fully deployed on the plateau. While Souham's force was still +toiling up, Sacken's artillery began to ply it with shot, and had +Yorck charged quickly with his corps of Prussians, the day might +have been won forthwith. But that opinionated general insisted on +leisurely deploying his men. Souham was therefore able to gain a +foothold on the plateau: Sebastiani's men dragged up twenty-four +light cannon: and at times the devoted bravery of the French +endangered the defence. But the defects in their position slowly +but surely told against them, and the vigour of their attack spent +itself. Their cavalry was exhausted by the mud: their muskets were +rendered wellnigh<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii340" id= +"page_ii340">[pg.340]</a></span> useless by the ceaseless rain; and +when Blücher late in the afternoon headed a dashing charge of +Prussian and Russian horsemen, the wearied conscripts gave way, +fled pell-mell down the slopes, and made for the fords of the +Neisse and the Katzbach, where many were engulfed by the swollen +waters. Meanwhile the Russians on the allied left barely kept off +Lauriston's onsets, and on that side the day ended in a drawn +fight. Macdonald, however, seeing Lauriston's rear threatened by +the advance of the Prussians over the Katzbach, retreated during +the night with all his forces. On the next few days, the allies, +pressing on his wearied and demoralized troops, completed their +discomfiture, so that Blücher, on the 1st of September, was +able thus to sum up the results of the battle and the +pursuit—two eagles, 103 cannon, 18,000 men, and a vast +quantity of ammunition and stores captured, and Silesia entirely +freed from the foe.<a name="FN2anchor355_355"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_355_355"><sup>[355]</sup></a></p> + +<p>We now return to the events that centred at Dresden. When, on +August 21st and 22nd, the allies wound their way through the passes +of the Erz, they were wholly ignorant of Napoleon's whereabouts. +The generals, Jomini and Toll, who were acquainted with the plan of +operations agree in stating that the aim of the allies was to seize +Leipzig. The latter asserts that they believed Napoleon to be +there, while the Swiss strategist saw in this movement merely a +means of effecting a junction with Bernadotte's army, so as to cut +off Napoleon from the Rhine.<a name="FN2anchor356_356"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_356_356"><sup>[356]</sup></a> Unaware that the rich +prize of Dresden was left almost within their grasp by Napoleon's +eastward move, the allies plodded on towards Freiberg and Chemnitz, +when, on the 23rd, the capture of one of St. Cyr's despatches +flashed the truth upon them.</p> + +<p>At once they turned eastwards towards Dresden; but<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii341" id="page_ii341">[pg.341]</a></span> +so slow was their progress over the wretched cross-roads now cut up +by the rains, that not till the early morning of the 25th did the +heads of their columns appear on the heights south-west of the +Saxon capital. Yet, even so, the omens were all in their favour. On +their right, Wittgenstein had already carried the French lines at +Pirna, and was now driving in St. Cyr's outposts towards Dresden. +The daring spirits at Schwarzenberg's headquarters therefore begged +him to push on the advantage already gained, while Napoleon was +still far away. Everything, they asserted, proved that the French +were surprised; Dresden could not long hold out against an attack +by superior numbers: its position in a river valley dominated by +the southern and western slopes, which the allies strongly held, +was fatal to a prolonged defence: the thirteen redoubts hastily +thrown up by the French could not long keep an army at bay, and of +these only five were on the left side of the Elbe on which the +allies were now encamped.</p> + +<p>Against these manly counsels the voice of prudence pleaded for +delay. It was not known how strong were St. Cyr's forces in Dresden +and in the intrenched camp south of the city. Would it not +therefore be better to await the development of events? Such was +the advice of Toll and Moreau, the latter warning the Czar, with an +earnestness which we may deem fraught with destiny for +himself—"Sire, if we attack, we shall lose 20,000 men and +break our nose."<a name="FN2anchor357_357"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_357_357"><sup>[357]</sup></a> The multitude of +counsellors did not tend to safety. Distracted by the strife of +tongues, Schwarzenberg finally took refuge in that last resort of +weak minds, a tame compromise. He decided to wait until further +corps reached the front, and at four o'clock of the <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii342" id="page_ii342">[pg.342]</a></span> +following afternoon <i>to push forward five columns for a general +reconnaissance in force</i>. As Jomini has pointed out, this plan +rested on sheer confusion of thought. If the commander meant merely +to find out the strength of the defenders, that could be +ascertained at once by sending forward light troops, screened by +skirmishers, at the important points. If he wished to attack in +force, his movement was timed too late in the day safely to effect +a lodgment in a large city held by a resolute foe. Moreover, the +postponement of the attack for thirty hours gave time for the +French Emperor to appear on the scene with his Guards.</p> + +<p>As we have seen, Napoleon reached Stolpen, a town distant some +sixteen miles from Dresden, very early on the morning of the 25th. +His plans present a telling contrast to the slow and clumsy +arrangements of the allies. He proposed to hurl his Guards at their +rear and cut them off from Bohemia. Crossing the Elbe at +Königstein, he would recover the camp of Pirna, hold the +plateau further west and intercept Schwarzenberg's retreat.<a name= +"FN2anchor358_358"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_358_358"><sup>[358]</sup></a> For the success of this +plan he needed a day's rest for his wearied Guards and the +knowledge that Dresden could hold out for a short time. His +veterans could perhaps dispense with rest; where their Emperor went +they would follow; but Dresden was the unknown quantity. Shortly +after midnight of the 25th and 26th, he heard from St. Cyr that +Dresden would soon be attacked in such force that a successful +defence was doubtful.</p> + +<p>At once he changed his plan and at 1 a.m. sent off four +despatches ordering his Guards and all available troops to succour +St. Cyr. Vandamme's corps alone was now charged with the task of +creeping round the enemy's rear, while the Guards long before dawn +resumed their march through the rain and mud. The Emperor followed +and passed them at a gallop, reaching the capital at 9 a.m. with +Latour-Maubourg's cuirassiers; and, early in the afternoon, the +bearskins of the Guards were seen on the heights east of Dresden, +while the dark <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii343" id= +"page_ii343">[pg.343]</a></span> masses of the allies were +gathering on the south and west for their reconnaissance in +force.</p> + +<center><a name="image_17"><img alt="BATTLE OF DRESDEN" src= +"images/image17.jpg" width="521" height="391"><br> + <font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>BATTLE OF +DRESDEN</small></font></a></center> + +<p>Lowering clouds and pitiless rain robbed the scene of all +brilliance, but wreathed it with a certain sombre majesty. On the +one side was the fair city, the centre of German art and culture, +hastily girdled with redoubts and intrenchments manned now by some +120,000 defenders. Fears and murmurings had vanished as soon as the +Emperor appeared; and though in many homes men still longed for the +triumph of the allies, yet loyalty to their King and awe of +Napoleon held the great mass of the citizens true to his alliance. +As for the French soldiery, their enthusiasm was unbounded. As +regiment after regiment tramped in wearily from the east over the +Elbe bridge and the men saw that well-known figure in the gray +overcoat, fatigues and discomforts were forgotten; thunderous +shouts of "Vive l'Empereur" rent the air and rolled along the +stream, carrying inspiration to the defenders, doubt and dismay to +the hostile lines. Yet these too were being strengthened, until +they finally<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii344" id= +"page_ii344">[pg.344]</a></span> mustered close on 200,000 men, who +crowned the slopes south of Dresden with a war-cloud that promised +to sweep away its hasty defences—had not Napoleon been +there.</p> + +<p>The news of his arrival shook the nerves of the Russian Emperor, +and it was reserved for the usually diffident King of Prussia to +combat all notion of retreat. Schwarzenberg's reconnaissance in +force therefore took place punctually at four o'clock, when the +French, after a brief rest, were well prepared to meet them. The +Prussians had already seized the "Great Garden" which lines the +Pirna road; and from this point of vantage they now sought to drive +St. Cyr from the works thrown up on its flank and rear. But their +masses were torn by a deadly fire and finally fell back shattered. +The Russians, on their right, fared no better. At the allied centre +and left, the attack at one time promised success. Under cover of a +heavy cannonade from their slopes, the Austrians carried two +redoubts: but, with a desperate charge, the Old Guard drove in +through the gorges of these works and bayoneted the victors of an +hour. As night fell, the assailants drew off baffled, after +sustaining serious losses.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, the miseries of the night, the heavy rains of the +dawning day and the knowledge of the strength of the enemy's +position in front and of Vandamme's movement in their rear, failed +to daunt their spirits. If they were determined, Napoleon was +radiant with hope. His force, though smaller, held the inner line +and spread over some three miles; while the concave front of the +allies extended over double that space, and their left wing was +separated from the centre by the stream and defile of Plauen. From +his inner position he could therefore readily throw an overpowering +mass on any part of their attenuated array. He prepared to do so +against their wings. At those points everything promised success to +his methods of attack.</p> + +<p>Never, perhaps, in all modern warfare has the musket been so +useless as amidst the drenching rains which beat<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii345" id="page_ii345">[pg.345]</a></span> +upon the fighters at the Katzbach and before Dresden. So defective +was its firing arrangement then that after a heavy storm only a +feeble sputter came from whole battalions of foot: and on those two +eventful days the honours lay with the artillery and <i>l'arme +blanche</i>. As for the infantrymen, they could effect little +except in some wild snatches of bayonet work at close quarters. +This explains the course of events both at the Katzbach on the +26th, and at Dresden on the following day. The allied centre was +too strongly posted on the slopes south of Dresden to be assailed +with much hope of success. But, against the Russian vanguard on the +allied right, Napoleon launched Mortier's corps and Nansouty's +cavalry with complete success, until Wittgenstein's masses on the +heights stayed the French onset. Along the centre, some thousand +cannon thundered against one another, but with no very noteworthy +result, save that Moreau had his legs carried away by a shot from a +field battery that suddenly opened upon the Czar's suite. It was +the first shot that dealt him this fatal wound, but several other +balls fell among the group until Alexander and his staff moved +away.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the great blow was struck by Napoleon at the allied +left. There the Austrian wing was sundered from the main force by +the difficult defile of Plauen; and it was crushed by one of the +Emperor's most brilliant combinations. Directing Victor with 20,000 +men of all arms to engage the white-coats in front, he bade Murat, +with 10,000 horsemen, steal round near the bank of the Elbe and +charge their flank and rear. The division of Count Metzko bore the +brunt of this terrible onset. Nobly it resisted. Though not one +musket in fifty would fire, the footmen in one place beat off two +charges of Latour-Maubourg's cuirassiers, until he headed his line +with lancers, who mangled their ranks and opened a way for the +sword.<a name="FN2anchor359_359"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_359_359"><sup>[359]</sup></a> Then all was +slaughter;<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii346" id= +"page_ii346">[pg.346]</a></span> and as Murat's squadrons raged +along their broken lines, 10,000 footmen, cut off from the main +body, laid down their arms. News of this disaster on the left and +the sound of Vandamme's cannon thundering among the hills west of +Pirna decided the allied sovereigns and Schwarzenberg to prepare +for a timely retreat into Bohemia. Yet so bold a front did they +keep at the centre and right that the waning light showed the +combatants facing each other there on even terms.</p> + +<p>During the night, the rumbling of wagons warned Marmont's scouts +that the enemy were retreating;<a name="FN2anchor360_360"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_360_360"><sup>[360]</sup></a> and the Emperor, +coming up at break of day, ordered that Marshal and St. Cyr to +press directly on their rear, while Murat pursued the fugitives +along the Freiburg road further to the west. The outcome of these +two days of fighting was most serious for the allies. They lost +35,000 men in killed, wounded and prisoners—a natural result +of their neglect to seize Fortune's bounteous favours on the 25th; +a result, too, of Napoleon's rapid movements and unerring sagacity +in profiting by the tactical blunders of his foes.</p> + +<p>It was the last of his great victories. And even here the golden +fruit which he hoped to cull crumbled to bitter dust in his grasp. +As has been pointed out, he had charged General Vandamme, one of +the sternest fighters in the French army, to undertake with 38,000 +men a task which he himself had previously hoped to achieve with +more than double that number. This was to seize Pirna and the +plateau to the west, which commands the three roads leading towards +Teplitz in Bohemia. The best of these roads crosses the Erzgebirge +by way of Nollendorf and the gorge leading down to Kulm, the other +by the Zinnwald pass, while between them is a third and yet more +difficult track. Vandamme<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii347" +id="page_ii347">[pg.347]</a></span> was to take up a position west +or south-west of Pirna so as to cut off the retreat of the foe.</p> + +<p>Accordingly, he set out from Stolpen at dawn of the 26th, and on +the next two days fought his way far round the rear of the allied +Grand Army. A Russian force of 14,000 men, led by the young Prince +Eugène of Würtemberg and Count Ostermann, sought in +vain to stop his progress: though roughly handled on the 28th by +the French, the Muscovites disengaged themselves, fell back ever +fighting to the Nollendorf pass, and took up a strong position +behind the village of Kulm. There they received timely support from +the forces of the Czar and Frederick William, who, after crossing +by the Zinnwald pass, heard the firing on the east and divined the +gravity of the crisis. Unless they kept Vandamme at bay, the Grand +Army could with difficulty struggle through into Bohemia. But now, +with the supports hastily sent him, Ostermann finally beat back +Vandamme's utmost efforts. The defenders little knew what favours +Fortune had in store.</p> + +<p>A Prussian corps under Kleist was slowly plodding up the middle +of the three defiles, when, at noonday of the 29th, an order came +from the King to hurry over the ridge and turn east to the support +of Ostermann. This was impossible: the defile was choked with +wagons and artillery: but one of Kleist's staff-officers proposed +the daring plan of plunging at once into cross tracks and cutting +into Vandamme's rear. This novel and romantic design was carried +out. While, then, the French general was showering his blows +against the allies below Kulm, the Prussians swarmed down from the +heights of Nollendorf on his rear. Even so, the French struggled +stoutly for liberty. Their leader, scorning death or surrender, +flung himself with his braves on the Russians in front, but was +borne down and caught, fighting to the last. Several squadrons +rushed up the steeps against the Prussians and in part hewed their +way through. Four thousand footmen held their own on a natural +stronghold until their bullets failed, and the survivors <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii348" id= +"page_ii348">[pg.348]</a></span> surrendered. Many more plunged +into the woods and met various fates, some escaping through to +their comrades, others falling before Kleist's rearguard. Such was +the disaster of Kulm. Apart from the unbending heroism shown by the +conquered, it may be called the Caudine Forks of modern war. A +force of close on 40,000 men was nearly destroyed: it lost all its +cannon and survived only in bands of exhausted stragglers.<a name= +"FN2anchor361_361"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_361_361"><sup>[361]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Who is to be blamed for this disaster? Obviously, it could not +have occurred had Vandamme kept in touch with the nearest French +divisions: otherwise, these could have closed in on Kleist's rear +and captured him. Napoleon clearly intended to support Vandamme by +the corps of St. Cyr, who, early on the 28th, was charged to +co-operate with that general, while Mortier covered Pirna. But on +that same morning the Emperor rode to Pirna, found that St. Cyr, +Marmont, and Murat were sweeping in crowds of prisoners, and +directed Berthier to order Vandamme to "penetrate into Bohemia and +overwhelm the Prince of Würtemberg."<a name= +"FN2anchor362_362"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_362_362"><sup>[362]</sup></a> Then, without waiting to +organize the pursuit, he forthwith returned to Dresden, either +because, as some say, the rains of the previous days had struck a +chill to his system, or as Marmont, with more reason, asserts, +because of his concern at the news of Macdonald's disaster on the +Katzbach. Certain it is that he recalled his Old Guard to Dresden, +busied himself with plans for a march on Berlin, and at 5.30 next +morning directed Berthier to order St. Cyr to "pursue the foe to +Maxen and in all directions that he has taken." This order led St. +Cyr westwards, in pursuit of Barclay's Russians, who had diverged +sharply in that direction in order to escape Vandamme.</p> + +<p>The eastern road to Teplitz was thus left comparatively clear, +while the middle road was thronged with pursuers<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii349" id="page_ii349">[pg.349]</a></span> +and pursued.<a name="FN2anchor363_363"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_363_363"><sup>[363]</sup></a> No directions were given +by Napoleon to warn Vandamme of the gap thus left in his rear: +neither was Mortier at Pirna told to press on and keep in touch +with Vandamme now that St. Cyr was some eight miles away to the +west. Doubtless St. Cyr and Mortier ought to have concerted +measures for keeping in touch with Vandamme, and they deserve +censure for their lack of foresight; but it was not usual, even for +the Marshals, to take the initiative when the Emperor was near at +hand. To sum up: the causes of Vandamme's disaster were, firstly, +his rapid rush into Bohemia in quest of the Marshal's baton which +was to be his guerdon of victory: secondly, the divergence of St. +Cyr westward in pursuance of Napoleon's order of the 29th to pursue +the enemy towards Maxen: thirdly, the neglect of St. Cyr and +Mortier to concert measures for the support of Vandamme along the +Nollendorf road: but, above all, the return of Napoleon to Dresden, +and his neglect to secure a timely co-operation of his forces along +the eastern line of pursuit.<a name="FN2anchor364_364"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_364_364"><sup>[364]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The disaster at Kulm ruined Napoleon's campaign. While Vandamme +was making his last stand, his master at Dresden was drawing up a +long Note as to the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii350" id= +"page_ii350">[pg.350]</a></span> respective advantages of a march +on Berlin or on Prague. He decided on the former course, which +would crush the national movement in Prussia, and bring him into +touch with Davoust and the French garrisons at Küstrin and +Stettin. "Then, if Austria begins her follies again, I shall be at +Dresden with a united army."</p> + +<p>He looked on Austria as cowed by the blows dealt her south of +Dresden, which would probably bring her to sue for peace, and he +hoped that one more great battle would end the war. The mishaps to +Macdonald and Vandamme dispelled these dreams. Still, with +indomitable energy, he charged Ney to take command of Oudinot's +army (a post of which this unfortunate leader begged to be +relieved) and to strike at Berlin. He ordered Friant with a column +of the Old Guard to march to Bautzen and drive in Macdonald's +stragglers with the butt ends of muskets.<a name= +"FN2anchor365_365"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_365_365"><sup>[365]</sup></a> Then, hearing how pressing +was the danger of this Marshal, he himself set out secretly with +the cavalry of the Guard in hope of crushing Blücher. But +again that leader retreated (September 4th and 5th), and once more +the allied Grand Army thrust its columns through the Erz and +threatened Dresden. Hurrying back in the worst of humours to defend +that city, Napoleon heard bad news from the north. On September 6th +Ney had been badly beaten at Dennewitz. In truth, that brave +fighter was no tactician: his dispositions were worse than those of +Oudinot, and the obstinate bravery of the Prussians, led by +Bülow and Tauenzien, wrested a victory from superior numbers. +Night alone saved Ney's army from complete dissolution: as it was, +he lost some 9,000 killed and wounded, 15,000 prisoners along with +eighty cannon, and frankly summed up the situation thus to his +master: "I have been totally beaten, and still do not know whether +my army has reassembled."<a name="FN2anchor366_366"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_366_366"><sup>[366]</sup></a> Ultimately his<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii351" id="page_ii351">[pg.351]</a></span> +army assembled and fell back behind the Elbe at Torgau.</p> + +<p>Thus, in a fortnight (August 23rd-September 6th), Napoleon had +gained a great success at Dresden, while, on the circumference of +operations, his lieutenants had lost five +battles—Grossbeeren, Hagelberg, Katzbach, Kulm, and +Dennewitz. The allies could therefore contract that circumference, +come into closer touch, and threaten his central intrenched camps +at Pirna and Dresden. Yet still, in pursuance of a preconcerted +plan, they drew back where he advanced in person. Thus, when he +sought to drive back Schwarzenberg's columns into Bohemia, that +leader warily retired to the now impregnable passes; and the +Emperor fell back on Dresden, wearied and perplexed. As he said to +Marmont: "The chess-board is very confused: it is only I who can +know where I am." Yet once more he plunged into the Erzgebirge, +engaged in a fruitless skirmish in the defile above Kulm, and again +had to lead his troops back to Pirna and Dresden. A third move +against Blücher led to the same wearisome result.</p> + +<p>The allies, having worn down the foe, planned a daring move. +Blücher persuaded the allied sovereigns to strike from Bohemia +at Leipzig, thus turning the flank of the defensive works that the +French had thrown up south of Dresden, and cutting their +communications with France. He himself would march north-west, join +the northern army, and thereafter meet them at Leipzig. This +rendezvous he kept, as later he staunchly kept troth with +Wellington at Waterloo; and we may detect here, as in 1815, the +strategic genius of Gneisenau as the prime motive force.</p> + +<p>Leaving a small force to screen his former positions at Bautzen, +the veteran, with 65,000 men, stealthily set out on his flank march +towards Wittenberg, threw two<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii352" id="page_ii352">[pg.352]</a></span> pontoon bridges +over the Elbe at Wartenburg, about ten miles above that fortress, +drove away Bertrand's battalions who hindered the crossing, and +threw up earthworks to protect the bridges (October 3rd). This +done, he began to feel about for Bernadotte, and came into touch +with him south of Dessau. By this daring march he placed two +armies, amounting to 160,000 men, on the north of Napoleon's lines; +and his personal influence checked, even if it did not wholly stop, +the diplomatic loiterings of the Swedish Crown Prince.<a name= +"FN2anchor368_368"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_368_368"><sup>[368]</sup></a> Bernadotte's hesitations +were finally overcome by the news that Blücher was marching +south towards Leipzig. Finally he gave orders to follow him; but we +may judge how easy would have been the task of overthrowing +Bernadotte's discordant array if Napoleon could have carried out +his project of September 30th.</p> + +<p>As it was, the disaster of Kulm kept the Emperor tethered for +some days within a few leagues of Dresden, while Bülow and +Blücher saved the campaign for the allies in the north, +thereby exciting a patriotic ferment which drove Jerome Bonaparte +from Cassel and kept Davoust to the defensive around Hamburg. There +the skilful moves of Walmoden with a force of Russians, British, +Swedes, and North Germans kept in check the ablest of the French +Marshals, and prevented his junction with the Emperor, for which +the latter never ceased to struggle.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the Grand Army of the allies, strengthened by the +approach from Poland of 50,000 Russians of the Army of Reserve, was +creeping through the western passes of the Erz into the plains +south of Leipzig. This move was not unexpected by Napoleon. The +importance of that city was obvious. Situated in the midst of the +fertile Saxon plain, the centre of a great system of<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii353" id= +"page_ii353">[pg.353]</a></span>roads, its position and its wealth +alike marked it out as the place likely to be seized by a daring +foe who should seek to cut Napoleon off from France.</p> + +<p>As fortune turned against him, he became ever more nervous about +Leipzig. Yet, for the present, the northward march of Blücher +rivetted his attention. It puzzled him. Even as late as October 2nd +he had not fathomed Blücher's real aim<a name= +"FN2anchor369_369"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_369_369"><sup>[369]</sup></a>. But four days later he +heard that the Prussian leader had crossed the Elbe. At once he +hurried north-west with the Guard to crush him, and to resume the +favourite project of threatening Berllin and join hands with +Davoust. Charging St-Cyr with the defence of Dresden, and Murat +with the defence of Leipzig, he took his stand at Düben, a +small town on the Mulde, nearly midway between Leipzig and +Wittenberg. Thence he reinforced Ney's army, and ordered that +Marshal northwards to fall on the rear of Bernadotte and +Blücher; while he himself waited in a moated castle at +Düben to learn the issue of events.</p> + +<p>The saxon Colonel, von Odeleben, has left us a vivid picture of +the great man's restlessness during those four days. Surrounded by +maps and despatches, and waited on by watchful geographer and +apprehensive secretary, he spent much of the time scrawling large +letters on a sheet of paper, uneasily listening for the tramp of a +courier. In truth, few days of his life were more critical that +those spent amidst the rains, swamps, and fogs of Düben. Could +he have caught Bernadotte and Blücher far apart, he might have +overwhelmed them singly, and then have carried the war into the +heart of Prussia. But he knows that Dresden and Leipzig are far +from safe. The news from that side begins to alarm him: and <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii354" id= +"page_ii354">[pg.354]</a></span> though, on the north, Ney, +Bertrand, and Reynier cut up the rearguard of the allies, he learns +with some disquiet that Blücher is withdrawing westwards +behind the River Saale, a move which betokens a wish to come into +touch with Schwarzenberg near Leipzig.</p> + +<p>Yet this disconcerting thought spurs him on to one of his most +daring designs. "As a means of upsetting all their plans, I will +march to the Elbe. There I have the advantage, since I have +Hamburg, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau, and Dresden."<a name= +"FN2anchor370_370"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_370_370"><sup>[370]</sup></a> What faith he had in the +defensive capacities of a great river line dotted with fortresses! +His lieutenants did not share it. Caulaincourt tells us that his +plan of dashing at Berlin roused general consternation at +headquarters, and that the staff came in a body to beg him to give +it up, and march back to protect Leipzig. Reluctantly he abandons +it, and then only to change it for one equally venturesome. He will +crush Bernadotte and Blücher, or throw them beyond the Elbe, +and then, himself crossing the Elbe, ascend its right bank, recross +it at Torgau, and strike at Schwarzenberg's rear near Leipzig.</p> + +<p>The plan promised well, provided that his men were walking +machines, and that Schwarzenberg did nothing in the interval. But +gradually the truth dawns on him that, while he sits weaving plans +and dictating despatches—he sent off six in the small hours +of October 12th—Blücher and Schwarzenberg are drawing +near to Leipzig. On that day he prepared to fall back on that city, +a resolve strengthened on the morrow by the capture of one of the +enemy's envoys, who reported that they had great hopes of detaching +Bavaria from the French cause.</p> + +<p>The news was correct. Five days earlier, the King of Bavaria had +come to terms with Austria, offering to<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii355" id="page_ii355">[pg.355]</a></span> place 36,000 +troops at her disposal, while she, in return, guaranteed his +complete sovereignty and a full territorial indemnity for any +districts that he might be called on to restore to the Hapsburgs.<a +name="FN2anchor371_371"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_371_371"><sup>[371]</sup></a> Napoleon knew not as yet +the full import of the news, and it is quite incorrect to allege, +as some heedless admirers have done, that this was the only thing +that stayed his conquering march northwards.<a name= +"FN2anchor372_372"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_372_372"><sup>[372]</sup></a> His retreat to Leipzig was +arranged before he heard the first rumour as to Bavaria's +defection. But the tidings saddened his men on their miry march +southwards; and, strange to say, the Emperor published it to all +his troops at Leipzig on the 15th, giving it as the cause why they +were about to fall back on the Rhine.</p> + +<p>There was much to depress the Emperor when, on the 14th, he drew +near to Leipzig. With him came the King and Queen of Saxony, who +during the last days had resignedly moved along in the tail of this +comet, which had blasted their once smiling realm. Outside the city +they parted, the royal pair seeking shelter under its roofs, while +the Emperor pressed on to Murat's headquarters near Wachau. There, +too the news was doubtful. The King of Naples had not, on that day, +shown his old prowess. Though he disposed of larger masses of +horsemen than those which the allies sent out to reconnoitre, he +chose his ground of attack badly, and led his brigades in so loose +an array that, after long swayings to and fro, the fight closed +with advantage to the allies.<a name="FN2anchor373_373"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_373_373"><sup>[373]</sup></a> It was not without +reason that Napoleon on that night received his Marshals rather +coolly at his modest quarters in the village of Reudnitz. Leaning +against the stove, he ran over several names of those who were now +slack in their duty; and when Augereau<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii356" id="page_ii356">[pg.356]</a></span> was +announced, he remarked that he was not the Augereau of Castiglione. +"Ah! give me back the old soldiers of Italy, and I will show you +that I am," retorted the testy veteran.</p> + +<p>As a matter of fact, Napoleon was not the old Napoleon, not even +the Napoleon of Dresden. There he had overwhelmed the foe by a +rapid concentration. Now nothing decisive was done on the 15th, and +time was thereby given the allies to mature their plans. Early on +that day Blücher heard that on the morrow Schwarzenberg would +attack Leipzig from the south-east, but would send a corps +westwards to threaten it on the side of Lindenau. The Prussian +leader therefore hurried on from the banks of the Saale, and at +night the glare of his watch-fires warned Marmont that Leipzig +would be assailed also from the north-west. Yet, despite the +warnings which Napoleon received from his Marshal, he refused to +believe that the north side was seriously threatened; and, as late +as the dawn of the 16th, he bade his troops there to be ready to +march through Leipzig and throw themselves on the masses of +Schwarzenberg.<a name="FN2anchor374_374"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_374_374"><sup>[374]</sup></a> Had Napoleon given those +orders on the 15th, all might have gone well; for all his available +forces, except Ney's and Reynier's corps, were near at hand, making +a total of nearly 150,000 men, while Schwarzenberg had as yet not +many more. But those orders on the 16th were not only belated: they +contributed to the defeat on the north side.</p> + +<p>The Emperor's thoughts were concentrated on the south. There his +lines stretched in convex front along undulating ground near Wachau +and Liebertwolkwitz, about a league to the south and south-east of +the town. His right was protected by the marshy ground of the small +river Pleisse; his centre stretched across the roads leading +towards Dresden, while his left rested on a small stream, the +Parthe, which curves round towards the<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii357" id="page_ii357">[pg.357]</a></span> north-west +and forms a natural defence to the town on the north. Yet to +cautious minds his position seemed unsafe; he had in his rear a +town whose old walls were of no military value, a town on which +several roads converged from the north, east, and south, but from +which, in case of defeat, he could retire westward only by one +road, that leading over the now flooded streams of the Pleisse and +the Elster. But the great captain himself thought only of victory. +He had charged Macdonald and Ney to march from Taucha to his +support: Marmont was to do the same; and, with these concentrated +forces acting against the far more extended array of Schwarzenberg, +he counted on overthrowing him on the morrow, and then crushing the +disunited forces of Blücher and Bernadotte. <a name= +"FN2anchor375_375"></a> <a href= +"#Foot2note_375_375"><sup>[375]</sup></a></p> + +<center><a name="image_18"><img alt="BATTLE OF LEIPZIG" src= +"images/image18.jpg" width="529" height="401"><br> + <font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>BATTLE OF +LEIPZIG</small></font></a></center> + +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii358" id= +"page_ii358">[pg.358]</a></span> + +<p>The Emperor and Murat were riding along the ridge near +Liebertwolkwitz, when, at nine o'clock, three shots fired in quick +succession from the allies on the opposite heights, opened the +series of battles fitly termed the Battle of the Nations. For six +hours a furious cannonade shook the earth, and the conflict surged +to and fro with little decisive result; but when Macdonald's corps +struck in from the north-east, the allies began to give ground. +Thereupon Napoleon launched two cavalry corps, those of +Latour-Maubourg and Pajol, against the allied centre.</p> + +<p>Then was seen one of the most superb sights of war. Rising +quickly from behind the ridge, 12,000 horsemen rode in two vast +masses against a weak point in the opposing lines. They were led by +the King of Naples with all his wonted dash. Panting up the muddy +slopes opposite, they sabred the gunners, enveloped the Russian +squares, and the three allied sovereigns themselves had to beat a +hasty retreat to avoid capture. But the horses were soon spent by +the furious pace at which Murat careered along; and a timely charge +by Pahlen's Cossacks and the Silesian cuirassiers, brought up from +the allied reserves beyond the Pleisse, drove the French brigades +back in great disorder, with the loss of their able corps leaders. +The allies by a final effort regained all the lost ground, and the +day here ended in a drawn fight, with the loss of about 20,000 men +to either side.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, on the west side of Leipzig, Bertrand had beaten off +the attack of Giulay's Austrian corps on the village of Lindenau. +But, further north, Marmont sustained a serious reverse. In +obedience to Napoleon's order, he was falling back towards Leipzig, +when he was sharply attacked by Yorck's corps at Möckern. +Between that village and Eutritzsch further east the French Marshal +offered a most obstinate resistance. Blücher, hoping to +capture his whole corps, begged Sir Charles Stewart to ride back to +Bernadotte and request his succour. The British envoy found the +Swedish Prince at Halle and conjured him to make every exertion not +to be the only<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii359" id= +"page_ii359">[pg.359]</a></span> leader left out of the battle.<a +name="FN2anchor376_376"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_376_376"><sup>[376]</sup></a> It was in vain: his army +was too far away; and only after the village of Möckern had +been repeatedly taken and re-taken, was Marmont finally driven out +by Yorck's Prussians.<a name="FN2anchor377_377"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_377_377"><sup>[377]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In truth, Marmont lacked the support of Ney's corps, which +Berthier had led him to expect if he were attacked in force. But +the orders were vague or contradictory. Ney had been charged to +follow Macdonald and impart irresistible momentum to the onset +which was to have crushed Schwarzenberg's right wing. He therefore +only detached one weak division to cover Marmont's right flank, and +with the other divisions marched away south, when an urgent message +from Möckern recalled him to that side of Leipzig, with the +result that his 15,000 men spent the whole day in useless marches +and counter-marches.<a name="FN2anchor378_378"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_378_378"><sup>[378]</sup></a> The mishap was most +serious. Had he strengthened Macdonald's outflanking move, the +right wing of the allied Grand Army might have been shattered. Had +he reinforced Marmont effectively, the position on the north might +have been held. As it was, the French fell back from Möckern +in confusion, losing 53 cannon; but they had inflicted on Yorck's +corps a loss of 8,000 men out of 21,000. Relatively to the forces +engaged, Albuera and Möckern are the bloodiest battles of the +Napoleonic wars.</p> + +<p>On the whole, Napoleon had dealt the allies heavier losses than +he had sustained. But they could replace them. On the morrow +Bennigsen was near at hand on the east with 41,000 Russians of the +Army of Reserve; Colloredo's Austrian corps had also come up; and, +in the north, Bernadotte's Army of the North, 60,000 strong,<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii360" id= +"page_ii360">[pg.360]</a></span> was known to be marching from +Halle to reinforce Blücher. Napoleon, however, could only +count on Reynier's corps of 15,000 men, mostly Saxons, who marched +in from Düben. St. Cyr's corps of 27,000 men was too far away, +at Dresden; and Napoleon must have bitterly rued his rashness in +leaving that Marshal isolated on the south-east, while Davoust was +also cut off at Hamburg. He now had scarcely 150,000 effectives +left after the slaughter of the 16th; and of these, the German +divisions were murmuring at the endless marches and privations. +Everything helped to depress men's minds. On that Sabbath morning +all was sombre desolation around Leipzig, while within that city +naught was heard but the groans of the wounded and the lamentations +of the citizens. Still Napoleon's spirit was unquenched. Amidst the +steady rain he paced restlessly with Murat along the dykes of the +Pleisse. The King assured him that the enemy had suffered enormous +losses. Then, the dreary walk ended, the Emperor shut himself in +his tent. His resolve was taken. He would try fortune once more.<a +name="FN2anchor379_379"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_379_379"><sup>[379]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Among the prisoners was the Austrian General Merveldt, over whom +Napoleon had gained his first diplomatic triumph, that at Leoben. +He it was, too, who had brought the first offers of an armistice +after Austerlitz. These recollections touched the superstitious +chords in the great Corsican's being; for in times of stress the +strongest nature harks back to early instincts. This harbinger of +good fortune the Emperor now summoned and talked long and earnestly +with him.<a name="FN2anchor380_380"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_380_380"><sup>[380]</sup></a> First, he complimented him +on his efforts of the previous day to turn<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii361" id="page_ii361">[pg.361]</a></span> the French +left at Dölitz; next, he offered to free him on parole in +order to return to the allied headquarters with proposals for an +armistice. Then, after giving out that he had more than 200,000 men +round Leipzig, he turned to the European situation. Why had Austria +deserted him? At Prague she might have dictated terms to Europe. +But the English did not want peace. To this Merveldt answered that +they needed it sorely, but it must be not a truce, but a peace +founded on the equilibrium of Europe.—"Well," replied +Napoleon, "let them give me back my isles and I will give them back +Hanover; I will also re-establish the Hanse Towns and the annexed +departments [of North Germany].... But how treat with England, who +wishes to bind me not to build more than thirty ships of the line +in my ports?"<a name="FN2anchor381_381"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_381_381"><sup>[381]</sup></a></p> + +<p>As for the Confederation of the Rhine, those States might secede +that chose to do so: but never would he cease to protect those that +wanted his protection. As to giving Holland its independence, he +saw a great difficulty: that land would then fall under the control +of England. Italy ought to be under one sovereign; that would suit +the European system. As he had abandoned Spain, that question was +thereby decided. Why then should not peace be the result of an +armistice?—The allied sovereigns thought differently, and at +once waved aside the proposal. No answer was sent.</p> + +<p>In fact, they had Napoleon in their power, as he surmised. Late +on that Sunday, he withdrew his drenched and half-starved troops +nearer to Leipzig; for Blücher had gained ground on the north +and threatened the French line of retreat. Why the Emperor did not +retreat during the night must remain a mystery. All the peoples of +Europe were now closing in on him. On the north<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii362" id="page_ii362">[pg.362]</a></span> +were Prussians, Russians, Swedes, and a few British troops. To the +south-east were the dense masses of the allied Grand Army drawn +from all the lands between the Alps and the Urals; and among +Bennigsen's array on the east of Leipzig were to be seen the +Bashkirs of Siberia, whose bows and arrows gained them from the +French soldiery the sobriquet of <i>les Amours</i>.</p> + +<p>To this ring of 300,000 fighters Napoleon could oppose scarcely +half as many. Yet the French fought on, if not for victory, yet for +honour; and, under the lead of Prince Poniatowski, whose valour on +the 16th had gained him the coveted rank of a Marshal of France, +the Poles once more clutched desperately at the wraith of their +national independence. Napoleon took his stand with his staff on a +hill behind Probstheyde near a half-ruined windmill, fit emblem of +his fortunes; while, further south, the three allied monarchs +watched from a higher eminence the vast horse-shoe of smoke slowly +draw in towards the city. In truth, this immense conflict baffles +all description. On the north-east, the Crown Prince of Sweden +gradually drove his columns across the Parthe, while Blücher +hammered at the suburbs.</p> + +<p>Near the village of Paunsdorf, the allies found a weak place in +the defence, where Reynier's Saxons showed signs of disaffection. +Some few went over to the Russians in the forenoon, and about 3 +p.m. others marched over with loud hurrahs. They did not exceed +3,000 men, with 19 cannon, but these pieces were at once +effectively used against the French. Napoleon hurried towards the +spot with part of his Guards, who restored the fight on that side. +But it was only for a time. The defence was everywhere +overmatched.</p> + +<p>Even the inspiration of his presence and the desperate efforts +of Murat, Poniatowski, Victor, Macdonald, and thousands of nameless +heroes, barely held off the masses of the allied Grand Army. On the +north and north-east, Marmont and Ney were equally overborne.<a +name="FN2anchor382_382"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_382_382"><sup>[382]</sup></a> Worst of all, the supply +of cannon balls was<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii363" id= +"page_ii363">[pg.363]</a></span> running low. With pardonable +exaggeration the Emperor afterwards wrote to Clarke: "If I had then +had 30,000 rounds, I should to-day be the master of the world."</p> + +<p>At nightfall, the chief returned weary and depressed to the +windmill, and instructed Berthier to order the retreat. Then, +beside a watch-fire, he sank down on a bench into a deep slumber, +while his generals looked on in mournful silence. All around them +there surged in the darkness the last cries of battle, the groans +of the wounded, and the dull rumble of a retreating host. After a +quarter of an hour he awoke with a start and threw an astonished +look on his staff; then, recollecting himself, he bade an officer +repair to the King of Saxony and tell him the state of affairs.</p> + +<p>Early next morning, he withdrew into Leipzig, and, after paying +a brief visit to the King, rode away towards the western gate. It +was none too soon. The conflux of his still mighty forces streaming +in by three high roads, produced in all the streets of the town a +crush which thickened every hour. The Prussians and Swedes were +breaking into the northern suburbs, while the white-coats drove in +the defenders on the south. Slowly and painfully the throng of +fugitives struggled through the town towards the western gate. On +that side the confusion became ever worse, as the shots of the +allies began to whiz across the arches and causeway that led over +the Pleisse and the Elster, while the hurrahs of the Russians drew +near on the north. Ammunition wagons, gendarmes, women, grenadiers +and artillery, cavalry and cattle, the wounded, the dying, Marshals +and sutlers, all were wedged into an indistinguishable throng that +fought for a foothold on that narrow road of safety;<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii364" id="page_ii364">[pg.364]</a></span> +and high above the din came the clash of merry bells from the +liberated suburbs, bells that three days before had rung forced +peals of triumph at Napoleon's orders, but now bade farewell for +ever to French domination. To increase the rout, a temporary bridge +thrown over the Elster broke down under the crush; and the rush for +the roadway became more furious. In despair of reaching it, +hundreds threw themselves into the flooded stream, but few reached +the further shore: among the drowned was that flower of Polish +chivalry, Prince Poniatowski.</p> + +<p>But this mishap was soon to be outdone. A corporal of engineers, +in the absence of his chief, had received orders to blow up the +bridge outside the western gate, as soon as the pursuers were at +hand; but, alarmed by the volleys of Sacken's Russians, whom +Blücher had sent to work round by the river courses north-west +of the town, the bewildered subaltern fired the mine while the +rearguard and a great crowd of stragglers were still on the eastern +side.<a name="FN2anchor383_383"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_383_383"><sup>[383]</sup></a> This was the climax of +this day of disaster, which left in the hands of the allies as many +as thirty generals, including Lauriston and Reynier, and 33,000 of +the rank and file, along with 260 cannon<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii365" id="page_ii365">[pg.365]</a></span> and 870 +ammunition wagons. From the village of Lindenau Napoleon gazed back +at times over the awesome scene, but in general he busied himself +with reducing to order the masses that had struggled across. The +Old Guard survived, staunch as ever, and had saved its 120 cannon, +but the Young Guard was reduced to a mere wreck. Amidst all the +horrors of that day, the Emperor maintained a stolid composure, but +observers saw that he was bathed in sweat. Towards evening, he +turned and rode away westwards; and from the weary famished files, +many a fierce glance and muttered curse shot forth as he passed by. +Men remembered that it was exactly a year since the Grand Army +broke up from Moscow.</p> + +<p>Yet, despite the ravages of typhus, the falling away of the +German States and the assaults of the allied horse, the retreating +host struggled stoutly on towards the Rhine. At Hanau it swept +aside an army of Bavarians and Austrians that sought to bar the +road to France; and, early in November, 40,000 armed men, with a +larger number of unarmed stragglers, filed across the bridge at +Mainz. Napoleon had not only lost Germany; he left behind in its +fortresses as many as 190,000 troops, of whom nearly all were +French; and of the 1,300 cannon with which he began the second part +of the campaign, scarce 200 were now at hand for the defence of his +Empire.</p> + +<p>The causes of this immense disaster are not far to seek. They +were both political and military. In staking all on the possession +of the line of the Elbe, Napoleon was engulfing himself in a +hostile land. At the first signs of his overthrow, the national +spirit of Germany was certain to inflame the Franconians and +Westphalians in his rear, and imperil his communications. In regard +to strategy, he committed the same blunder as that perpetrated by +Mack in 1805. He trusted to a river line that could easily be +turned by his foes. As soon as Austria declared against him, his +position on the Elbe was fully as perilous as Mack's lines of the +Iller at Ulm.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii366" id= +"page_ii366">[pg.366]</a></span></p> + +<p>And yet, in spite of the obvious danger from the great mountain +bastion of Bohemia that stretched far away in his rear, the Emperor +kept his troops spread out from Königstein to Hamburg, and +ventured on long and wearying marches into Silesia, and north to +Düben, which left his positions in Saxony almost at the mercy +of the allied Grand Army.<a name="FN2anchor384_384"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_384_384"><sup>[384]</sup></a> By emerging from the +mighty barrier of the Erzgebirge, that army compelled him three +times to give up his offensive moves and hastily to fall back into +the heart of Saxony.</p> + +<p>The plain truth is that he was out-generalled by the allies. The +assertion may seem to savour of profanity. Yet, if words have any +meaning, the phrase is literally correct. His aim was primarily to +maintain himself on the line of the Elbe, but also, though in the +second place, to keep up his communication with France. Their aim +was to leave him the Elbe line, but to cut him off from France. +Even at the outset they planned to strike at Leipzig: their attack +on Dresden was an afterthought, timidly and slowly carried out. As +long, however, as their Grand Army clung to the Erz mountains, they +paralyzed his movements to the east and north, which merely played +into their hands.</p> + +<p>As regards the execution of the allied plans, the honours must +unquestionably rest with Blücher and Gneisenau. Their tactful +retreats before Napoleon in Silesia, their crushing blow at +Macdonald, above all, their daring flank march to Wartenburg and +thence to Halle, are exploits of a very high order; and doubtless +it was the emergence of this unsuspected volcanic force from the +unbroken flats of continental mediocrity that nonplussed Napoleon +and led to the results described above. Truly heroic was +Blücher's determination to push on to Leipzig, even when the +enemy was seizing the Elbe bridges in his rear. The veteran saw +clearly that a junction with Schwarzenberg<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii367" id="page_ii367">[pg.367]</a></span> near Leipzig +was the all-important step, and that it must bring back the French +to that point. His judgment was as sound as his strokes were +trenchant; and, owing to the illusions which Napoleon still +cherished as to the saving strength of the Elbe line, the French +arrived on that mighty battlefield half-famished and wearied by +fruitless marches and countermarches. Of all Napoleon's campaigns, +that of the second part of 1813 must rank as by far the weakest in +conception, the most fertile in blunders, and the most disastrous +in its results for France.</p> + +<br> + + +<p>NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION.—In order not to overcrowd these +chapters with diplomatic details, I have made only the briefest +reference to the Treaties signed at Teplitz on Sept. 9th, 1813, +with Russia and Prussia, which cemented the fourth great Coalition; +but it will be well to describe them here.</p> + +<p>A way having been paved for a closer union by the Treaty of +Kalisch (see p. 276) and by that of Reichenbach (see p. 317), it +was now agreed (1) that Austria and Prussia should be restored as +nearly as possible to the position which they held in 1805; (2) +that the Confederation of the Rhine should be dissolved; (3) and +that "full and unconditional independence" should be accorded to +the princes of the other German States. This last clause was firmly +but vainly opposed by Stein and the German Unionist party. +Austria's help was so sorely needed that she could dictate her +terms, and she began to scheme for the creation of a sort of +<i>Fürstenbund</i>, or League of Princes, under her hegemony. +The result was seen in her Treaty of October 7th, 1813, with +Bavaria, which detached that State from the French alliance and +assured the success of Metternich's plans for Germany (see pp. +354-355). The smaller States soon followed the lead given by +Bavaria; and the reconstruction of Germany on the Austrian plan was +further assured by the Treaty of Chaumont (see pp. 402-403). Thus +the dire need of Austrian help felt by Russia and Prussia +throughout the campaigns of 1813-1814 had no small share in +moulding the future of Europe.<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii368" id="page_ii368">[pg.368]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXXVI</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>FROM THE RHINE TO THE SEINE</center> + +<br> + + +<p>"The Emperor Napoleon must become King of France. Up to now all +his work has been done for the Empire. He lost the Empire when he +lost his army. When he no longer makes war for the army, he will +make peace for the French people, and then he will become King of +France."—Such were the words of the most sagacious of French +statesmen to Schwarzenberg. They were spoken on April 15th, 1813, +when it still seemed likely that Napoleon would meet halfway the +wishes of Austria. Such, at least, was Talleyrand's ardent hope. He +saw the innate absurdity of attempting to browbeat Austria, and +strangle the infant Hercules of German nationality, after the Grand +Army had been lost in Russia.</p> + +<p>If this was reasonable in the spring of 1813, it was an +imperative necessity at the close of the year. Napoleon had in the +meantime lost 400,000 men: and he could not now say, as he did to +Metternich of his losses in Russia, that "nearly half were +Germans." The men who had fallen in Saxony, or who bravely held out +in the Polish, German, and Spanish fortresses, were nearly all +French. They were, what the <i>triarii</i> were to the Roman +legion, the reserves of the fighting manhood of France. That +unhappy land was growing restless under its disasters. In Spain, +Wellington had blockaded Pamplona, stormed St. Sebastian, thrown +Soult back on the Pyrenees in a series of desperate conflicts, and +planted the British flag on the soil of France, eleven days before +Napoleon was overthrown at Leipzig. Then,<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii369" id="page_ii369">[pg.369]</a></span> pressing +northwards, in compliance with the urgent appeals of the allied +sovereigns, our great commander assailed the lines south of the +Nivelle, on which the French had been working for three months, +drove the enemy out of them and back over the river, with a loss of +4,200 men and 51 guns (November 10th).<a name= +"FN2anchor385_385"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_385_385"><sup>[385]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The same tale was told in the north. The allies were welcomed by +the secondary German princes, who, in return for compacts +guaranteeing their sovereignty, promised to raise contingents that +amounted in all to upwards of a quarter of a million of men. +Bernadotte marched against the Danes and cut off Davoust in +Hamburg, where that Marshal bravely held out to the end of the war. +Elsewhere in the north Napoleon's domination quickly mouldered +away. Bülow, aided by a small British force, invaded Holland +early in November; and, with the old cry of <i>Orange boven</i>, +the Dutch tore down the French tricolour and welcomed back the +Prince of Orange. In Italy, Eugène remained faithful to his +step-father and repulsed all the overtures of the allies: but +Murat, whose allegiance had already been shaken by the secret +offers of the allies, now began to show signs of going over to +them, as he did at the dawn of the New Year.<a name= +"FN2anchor386_386"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_386_386"><sup>[386]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii370" id="page_ii370">[pg.370]</a></span></p> + +<p>Meanwhile Napoleon had arrived at Paris (November 9th). He found +his capital sunk in depression, and indignant at the author of its +miseries. Peace was the dearest wish of all. Marie Louise confessed +it by her tears, Cambacérès by his tactful reserve, +and the people by their cries, while the sullen demeanour or bitter +words of the Marshals showed that their patience was exhausted. +Evidently a scapegoat was needed: it was found in the person of +Maret, Duc de Bassano, whose devotion to Napoleon had reduced the +Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a highly paid clerkship. For the +crime of not bending his master's inflexible will at Dresden, he +was now cast as a sop to the peace party; and his portfolio was +intrusted to Caulaincourt, Duc de Vicenza (November 20th). The +change was salutary. The new Minister, when ambassador at St. +Petersburg, had been highly esteemed by the Czar for his frank, +chivalrous demeanour. Our countrywoman, Lady Burghersh, afterwards +testified to his personal charm: "I never saw a countenance so +expressive of kindness, sweetness, and openness."<a name= +"FN2anchor387_387"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_387_387"><sup>[387]</sup></a> And these gifts were +fortified by a manly intelligence, a profound love of France, and +by devotion to her highest interests. The first of her interests +was obviously peace; and there now seemed some chance of his +conferring this boon on her and on the world at large.</p> + +<p>On November the 8th and 9th Metternich had two interviews at +Frankfurt with Baron St. Aignan, a brother-in-law of Caulaincourt, +and formerly the French envoy at Weimar. The Austrian Minister +assured him of the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii371" id= +"page_ii371">[pg.371]</a></span> moderation of the allies, +especially of England, and of their wish for a lasting peace +founded on the principle of the balance of power. France must give +up all control of Spain, Italy, and Germany, and return to her +natural frontiers, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. Lord +Aberdeen, our ambassador to Austria, and Count Nesselrode, the +Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, were present at the second +interview, and assented to this statement, the latter pledging his +word that it had the approval of Prussia. Aberdeen added his +assurance that England was prepared to relax her maritime code and +sacrifice many of her conquests in order to attain a durable peace. +To these Frankfurt overtures Napoleon charged Maret to answer in +vaguely favourable terms, and to suggest the meeting of a European +Congress at Mannheim. The effect of this Note (November 16th) was +marred by the strange statement—"a peace based on the +independence of all nations, both from the continental and the +maritime point of view, has always been the constant object of the +desires and policy of the Emperor [Napoleon]."<a name= +"FN2anchor388_388"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_388_388"><sup>[388]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Metternich in reply pointed out that the French Government had +not accepted the proposed terms as a basis for negotiations. The +new Foreign Minister, Caulaincourt, sent off (December 2nd) an +acceptance which was far more frank and satisfactory; but the day +before he penned it, the allies had virtually withdrawn their +offer, as they had told him they would do if it was not speedily +accepted. They had all along decided not to stay the military +operations; and, as these were still flowing strongly in their +favour, they could not be expected to keep open an offer which was +exceedingly favourable to<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii372" +id="page_ii372">[pg.372]</a></span> Napoleon even at the time when +it was made, that is, before the support of the Dutch, of the +Swiss, and of Murat was fully assured.</p> + +<p>It may be well to pause for a moment to inquire what were the +views of the allied Governments, and of Napoleon himself, at this +crisis when Europe was seething in the political crucible. Had +Metternich the full assent of those Governments when he offered the +French Emperor the natural frontiers? Here we must separate the +views of Lord Aberdeen from those of the British Cabinet, as +represented by its Foreign Minister, Lord Castlereagh: and we must +also distinguish between the Emperor Alexander and his Minister, +Nesselrode, a man of weak character, in whom he had little +confidence. Certainly the British Cabinet was not disposed to leave +Antwerp in Napoleon's hands.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"This nation," wrote Castlereagh to Aberdeen on November 13th, +"is likely to view with disfavour any peace which does not confine +France within her ancient limits.... We are still ready to +encounter, with our allies, the hazards of peace, if peace can be +made on the basis proposed, satisfactorily executed [<i>sic</i>]; +and we are not inclined to go out of our way to interfere in the +internal government of France, however much we might desire to see +it placed in more pacific hands. But I am satisfied we must not +encourage our allies to patch up an imperfect arrangement. If they +will do so, we must submit; but it should appear, in that case, to +be their own act, and not ours.... I must particularly entreat you +to keep your attention upon Antwerp. The destruction of that +arsenal is essential to our safety. To leave it in the hands of +France is little short of imposing upon Great Britain the charge of +a perpetual war establishment."<a name="FN2anchor389_389"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_389_389"><sup>[389]</sup></a><span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii373" id= +"page_ii373">[pg.373]</a></span></p> +</div> + +<p>Thenceforth British policy inclined, though tentatively and with +some hesitations, to the view that it was needful in the interests +of peace to bring France back to the limits of 1791, that is, of +withdrawing from her, not only Holland, the Rhineland and Italy, +but also Belgium, Savoy, and Nice. The Prussian patriots were far +more decided. They were determined that France should not dominate +the Rhineland and overawe Germany from the fortresses of Mainz, +Coblenz, and Wesel. On this subject Arndt spoke forth with no +uncertain sound in a pamphlet—"The Rhine, Germany's river, +not her boundary"—which proved that the French claim to the +Rhine frontier was consonant neither with the teachings of history +nor the distribution of the two peoples. The pamphlet had an +immense effect in stirring up Germans to attack the cherished +French doctrine of the natural frontiers, and it clinched the claim +which he had put forward in his "Fatherland" song of the year +before. It bade Germans strive for Trèves and Cologne, aye, +even for Strassburg and Metz. Hardenberg and Stein, differing on +most points, united in praising this work. Even before it appeared, +the former chafed at the thought of Napoleon holding the left bank +of the Rhine. On hearing of Metternich's Frankfurt offer to the +French Emperor, he wrote in his diary: "Propositions of peace +without my assent—Rhine, Alps, Pyrenees: a mad business."<a +name="FN2anchor390_390"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_390_390"><sup>[390]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Frederick William's views were less pronounced: in fact, his +proneness to see a lion in every path earned for him the +<i>sobriquet</i> of Cassandra in his Chancellor's diary. But in the +main he was swayed by the Czar; and that autocrat was now +determined to dictate at Paris a peace that would rid him of all +prospect of his great rival's revenge. Vanity and fear alike +prescribed such a course of action. He longed to lead<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii374" id="page_ii374">[pg.374]</a></span> +his magnificent Guards to Paris, there to display his clemency in +contrast to the action of the French at Moscow; and this sentiment +was fed by fear of Napoleon. The latter motive was concealed, of +course, but Lord Aberdeen gauged its power during a private +interview that he had with Alexander at Freiburg (December 24th): +"He talked with great freedom: he is more decided than ever as to +the necessity of perseverance, and puts little trust in the fair +promises of Bonaparte.—'<i>So long as he lives there can be +no security</i>'—he repeated it two or three times."<a name= +"FN2anchor391_391"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_391_391"><sup>[391]</sup></a> We can therefore +understand his concern lest the Frankfurt terms should be accepted +outright by Napoleon. Metternich, however, assured him that the +French Emperor would not assent;<a name="FN2anchor392_392"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_392_392"><sup>[392]</sup></a> and, as in regard to +the Prague Congress, he was substantially correct.</p> + +<p>Here again we touch on the disputed question whether Metternich +played a fair game against Napoleon, or whether he tempted him to +play with loaded dice while his throne was at stake. The latter +supposition for a long time held the field; but it is untenable. On +several occasions the Austrian statesman warned Napoleon, or his +trusty advisers, that the best course open to him was to sign peace +at once. He did so at Dresden, and he did so now. On November 10th +he sent Caulaincourt a letter, of which these are the most +important sentences:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>" ... M. de St. Aignan will speak to you of my conversations +[with him]. I expect nothing from them, but I shall have done my +duty. France will never sign a more fortunate peace than that which +the Powers will make to-day, and tomorrow if they have reverses. +New successes may extend their views.... I do not doubt that the +approach of the allied armies to the frontiers of France may +facilitate the formation of great armaments by her Government. The +questions will become problematical for the civilized world; but +the Emperor Napoleon will not make peace. There is my profession of +faith, and I shall never be happier than if I am wrong."<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii375" id= +"page_ii375">[pg.375]</a></span></p> +</div> + +<p>The letter rings true in every part. Metternich made no secret +of sending it, but allowed Lord Aberdeen to see it.<a name= +"FN2anchor393_393"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_393_393"><sup>[393]</sup></a> And by good fortune it +reached Caulaincourt about the time when he assumed the portfolio +of Foreign Affairs. Its substance must therefore have been known to +Napoleon; and the tone of the Frankfurt proposals ought to have +convinced him of the need of speedily making peace while Austria +held out the olive branch from across the Rhine. But Metternich's +gloomy forecast was only too true. During his sojourn at Paris he +had tested the rigidity of that cast-iron will.</p> + +<p>In fact, no one who knew the Emperor's devotion to Italy could +believe that he would give up Piedmont and Liguria. His own +despatches show that he never contemplated such a surrender. On +November 20th he gave orders for the enrolling of 46,000 Frenchmen +<i>of mature age</i>—"not Italians or Belgians"—who +were to reinforce Eugène and help him to defend Italy; that, +too, at a time when the defence of Champagne and Languedoc was +about to devolve on lads of eighteen.</p> + +<p>He was equally determined not to give up Holland. On the +possession of this maritime and industrious community he had always +laid great stress. He once remarked to Roederer that the ruin of +the French Bourbons was due to three events—the Battle of +Rossbach, the affair of the diamond necklace, and the victory of +Anglo-Prussian influence over that of France in Dutch affairs +(1787). He even appealed to Nature to prove that that land must +form part of the French Empire. "Holland," said one of his +Ministers in 1809, "is the alluvium of the Rhine, Meuse, and +Scheldt—in other words, one of the great arteries of the +Empire." Before the last battle at Leipzig he told Merveldt that he +could not grant Holland its independence, for it would fall under +the tutelage of England. And even while his Empire was crumbling +away after that disaster, he wrote to his<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii376" id="page_ii376">[pg.376]</a></span> mother: +"Holland is a French country, <i>and will remain so for +ever</i>."<a name="FN2anchor394_394"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_394_394"><sup>[394]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Russia, Prussia, and Britain were equally determined that the +Dutch should be independent; and if Metternich wavered on the +subject of Dutch independence, his hesitation was at an end by the +middle of December, for a memorandum of the Russian diplomatist, +Pozzo di Borgo, states that Metternich then regarded the Rhine +boundary as ending at Düsseldorf: "after that town the river +takes the name of Waal."<a name="FN2anchor395_395"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_395_395"><sup>[395]</sup></a> Such juggling with +geography was surely superfluous; for by that time the Frankfurt +terms had virtually lapsed, owing to Napoleon's belated acceptance; +and Metternich had joined the other allied Governments that now +demanded a more thorough solution of the boundary question.</p> + +<p>In fact, the allies were now able to make political capital out +of their recent moderation.<a name="FN2anchor396_396"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_396_396"><sup>[396]</sup></a> On December 1st they +issued an appeal to the French nation to the following effect: "We +do not make war on France, but we are casting off the yoke which +your Government imposed on our countries. We hoped to have found +peace before touching your soil: we now go to find it there."</p> + +<p>If the sovereigns hoped by means of this declaration to separate +France from Napoleon, they erred. To cross the Rhine was to attack, +not Napoleon, but the French Revolution. Belgium and the Rhine +boundary had been won by Dumouriez, Jourdain, Pichegru, and Moreau, +at a time when Bonaparte's name was unknown outside Corsica and +Provence. France had looked on wearily at Napoleon's wars in +Germany, Spain, and Russia: they concerned him, not her. But when +the "sacred soil" was threatened, citizens began to close their +ranks: they ceased their declamations against the crushing taxes +and youth-slaying conscription: they submitted<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii377" id="page_ii377">[pg.377]</a></span> +to heavier taxes and levies of still younger lads. In fact, by +doffing the mask of Charlemagne, the Emperor became once more the +Bonaparte of the days of Marengo.</p> + +<p>He counted on some such change in public opinion; and it enabled +him to defy with impunity the beginnings of a Parliamentary +opposition. The Senate had been puffily obsequious, as usual; but +the Corps Législatif had mistaken its functions. Summoned to +vote new taxes, it presumed to give advice. A commission of its +members agreed to a report on the existing situation, drawn up by +Lainé, which gave the Emperor great offence. Its crime lay +in its outspoken requests that peace should be concluded on the +basis of the natural frontiers, that the rigours of the +conscription should be abated, and that the laws which guaranteed +the free exercise of political rights should be maintained intact. +The Emperor was deeply incensed, and, despite the advice of his +Ministers, determined to dissolve the Chamber forthwith (December +31st). Not content with this exercise of arbitrary power, he +subjected its members to a barrack-like rebuke at the official +reception on New Year's Day.—He had convoked them to do good, +and they had done evil. Two battles lost in Champagne would not +have been so harmful as their last action. What was their mandate +compared with his? France had twice chosen <i>him</i> by some +millions of votes: while <i>they</i> were nominated only by a few +hundreds apiece. They had flung mud at him: but he was a man who +might be slain, never dishonoured. He would fight for the nation, +hurl back the foe, and conclude an honourable peace. Then, for +their shame, he would print and circulate their report.—Such +was the gist of this diatribe, which he shot forth in strident +tones and with flashing eyes. He had the copies of the report +destroyed, and dismissed the deputies to their homes throughout +France.</p> + +<p>The country, in the main, took his side; and doubtless the +national instinct was sound; for the allies had crossed the Rhine, +and France once more was in danger.<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii378" id="page_ii378">[pg.378]</a></span> As in 1793, when +the nation welcomed the triumph of the dare-devil Jacobins over the +respectable parliamentary Girondins, as promising a vigorous rule +and the expulsion of the monarchical invaders, so now the soldiers +and peasants, if not the middle classes, rejoiced at the +discomfiture of the talkers by the one necessary man of action. The +general feeling was pithily expressed by an old peasant: "It's no +longer a question of Bonaparte. Our soil is invaded: let us go and +fight."</p> + +<p>This was the feeling which the Emperor ruthlessly exploited. He +decreed the enrolment of a great force of National Guards, exacted +further levies for the regular army, and ordered a <i>levée +en masse</i> for the eastern Departments. The difficulties in his +way were enormous. But he flung himself at the task with +incomparable <i>verve</i>. Soldiers were wanting: youths were +dragged forth, even from the royalist districts of the extreme +north and west and south. Money was wanting: it was extorted from +all quarters, and Napoleon not only lavished 55,000,000 francs from +his own private hoard, but seized that of his parsimonious +mother.<a name="FN2anchor397_397"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_397_397"><sup>[397]</sup></a> Cannon, muskets, uniforms +were wanting: their manufacture was pushed on with feverish haste: +Napoleon ordered his War Office to "procure all the cloth in +France, good and bad," so as to have 200,000 uniforms ready by the +end of February; and he counted on having half a million of +effectives in the field at the close of spring.</p> + +<p>Among these he reckoned—so, at least, he wrote to +Melzi—"nearly 200,000" French soldiers from Arragon, +Catalonia, and at Bayonne. Even if we allow for his desire to +encourage his officials in Italy, the estimate is curious. +Wellington at that time, it is true, had lessened his numbers by +sending back across the Pyrenees all his Spanish troops, whose +atrocities endangered that good understanding with the French +peasantry which our great leader, for political motives, was +determined<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii379" id= +"page_ii379">[pg.379]</a></span> to cultivate.<a name= +"FN2anchor398_398"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_398_398"><sup>[398]</sup></a> Yet, despite the shrinkage +in numbers, he drove the French from the banks of the River Nive, +and inflicted on them severe losses in desperate conflicts near +Bayonne (December 9th-13th). In fact, the intrenched camp in front +of that town was now the sole barrier to Wellington's advance +northwards, and it was with difficulty that Soult clung to this +position. The peasantry, too, finding that they were far better +treated by Wellington's troops than by their own soldiers, began to +favour the allied cause, with results that will shortly appear. Yet +these disquieting symptoms did not daunt Napoleon; for he now based +his hopes of resisting the British advance on a compact which he +had concluded with Ferdinand VII., the rightful King of Spain.</p> + +<p>As soon as he returned to St. Cloud after the Leipzig campaign +he made secret overtures to that unhappy exile;<a name= +"FN2anchor399_399"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_399_399"><sup>[399]</sup></a> and by the Treaty of +Valençay (December 11th, 1813) he agreed to recognize him as +King of the whole of Spain, provided that British and French troops +evacuated that land. His imagination ran riot in picturing the +results of this treaty. Ferdinand was to enter Spain; Suchet, then +playing a losing game in Catalonia, was quietly to withdraw his +columns through the Pyrenees, while Wellington would have his base +of operations cut from under him, and thenceforth be a negligeable +quantity.<a name="FN2anchor400_400"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_400_400"><sup>[400]</sup></a> These pleasing fancies all +rested on the <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii380" id= +"page_ii380">[pg.380]</a></span> acceptance of the new treaty by +the Spanish Regency and Cortès. But, alas for Napoleon! they +at once rejected it, declaring null and void all acts of Ferdinand +while he was a prisoner, and forbidding all negotiations with +France while French troops remained in the Peninsula (January +8th).</p> + +<p>Equally disappointing were affairs in Italy. On the 11th of +January, Murat made an alliance with Austria, and promised to aid +her with a corps of 30,000 Neapolitans, while she guaranteed him +his throne and a slice of the Roman territory. Napoleon directed +Eugène, as soon as this bad news was confirmed, to prepare +to fall back on the Alps. But, in order to clog Murat's movements, +the Emperor resolved to make use of the spiritual power, which for +six years he had slighted. He gave orders that the aged Pope should +be released from his detention at Fontainebleau, and hurried +secretly to Rome. "Let him burst on that place like a clap of +thunder," he wrote to Savary (January 21st). But this stagey device +was not to succeed. Even now Napoleon insisted on conditions with +which Pius VII. could not conscientiously comply, and he was still +detained at Tarrascon when his captor was setting out for Elba.</p> + +<p>Three days after Murat's desertion, Denmark fell away from +Napoleon. Overborne by the forces of Bernadotte, the little kingdom +made peace with England and Sweden, agreeing to yield up Norway to +the latter Power in consideration of recovering an indemnity in +Germany. To us the Danes ceded Heligoland. Thus, within three +months of the disaster at Leipzig, all Napoleon's allies forsook +him, and all but the Danes were now about to fight against +him—a striking proof of the artificiality of his +domination.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii381" id= +"page_ii381">[pg.381]</a></span></p> + +<p>By this time it was clear that even France would soon be +stricken to the heart unless Napoleon speedily concentrated his +forces. On the north and east the allies were advancing with a +speed that nonplussed the Emperor. Accustomed to sluggish movements +on their part, he had not expected an invasion in force before the +spring, and here it was in the first days of January. Bülow +and Graham had overrun Holland. The allies, with the exception of +the Czar, had no scruples about infringing the neutrality of +Switzerland, as Napoleon had consistently done, and the +constitution, which he had imposed upon that land eleven years +before, now straightway collapsed. Detaching a strong corps +southwards to hold the Simplon and Great St. Bernard Passes and +threaten Lyons, Schwarzenberg led the allied Grand Army into France +by way of Basel, Belfort, and Langres. The prompt seizure of the +Plateau of Langres was an important success. The allies thereby +turned the strong defensive lines of the Vosges Mountains, and of +the Rivers Moselle and Meuse, so that Blücher, with his "Army +of Silesia," was able rapidly to advance into Lorraine, and drive +Victor from Nancy. Toul speedily surrendered, and the sturdy +veteran then turned to the south-west, in order to come into touch +with Schwarzenberg's columns. Neither leader delayed before the +eastern fortresses. The allies had learnt from Napoleon to invest +or observe them and press on, a course which their vast superiority +of force rendered free from danger. Schwarzenberg, on the 25th, had +150,000 men between Langres, Chaumont, and Bar-sur-Aube; while +Blücher, with about half those numbers, crossed the Marne at +St. Dizier, and was drawing near to Brienne. In front of them were +the weak and disheartened corps of Marmont, Ney, Victor, and +Macdonald, mustering in all about 50,000 men. Desertions to the +allies were frequent, and Blücher, wishing to show that the +war was practically over, dismissed both deserters and prisoners to +their homes.<a name="FN2anchor401_401"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_401_401"><sup>[401]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But the war was far from over: it had not yet begun.<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii382" id="page_ii382">[pg.382]</a></span> +Hitherto Napoleon had hurried on the preparations from Paris, but +the urgency of the danger now beckoned him eastwards. As before, he +left the Empress as Regent of France, but appointed King Joseph as +Lieutenant-General of France. On Sunday, January 23rd, he held the +last reception. It was in the large hall of the Tuileries, where +the Parisian rabble had forced Louis XVI. to don the <i>bonnet +rouge</i>. Another dynasty was now tottering to its fall; but none +could have read its doom in the faces of the obsequious courtiers, +or of the officers of the Parisian National Guards, who offered +their homage to the heir of the Revolution.</p> + +<p>He came forward with the Empress and the King of Rome, a +flaxen-haired child of three winters, clad in the uniform of the +National Guard. Taking the boy by the hand into the midst of the +circle, he spoke these touching words: "Gentlemen,—I am about +to set out for the army. I intrust to you what I hold dearest in +the world—my wife and my son. Let there be no political +divisions." He then carried him amidst his dignitaries and +officers, while sobs and shouts bespoke the warmth of the feelings +kindled by this scene. And never, surely, since the young Maria +Theresa appealed in person to the Hungarian magnates to defend her +against rapacious neighbours, had any monarch spoken so straight to +the hearts of his lieges. The secret of his success is not far to +seek. He had not commanded as Emperor: he had appealed as a father +to fathers and mothers.</p> + +<p>It is painful to have to add that many who there swore to defend +him were even then beginning to plot his overthrow. Most painful of +all is it to remember that when, before dawn of the 25th, Marie +Louise bade him farewell, it was her last farewell: for she, too, +deserted him in his misfortunes, refused to share his exile, and +ultimately degraded herself by her connection with Count +Neipperg.</p> + +<p>Heedless of all that the future might bring, and concentrating +his thoughts on the problems of the present, the great warrior +journeyed rapidly eastwards to <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii383" id="page_ii383">[pg.383]</a></span> +Châlons-sur-Marne, and opened the most glorious of his +campaigns. + +<ins class="correction" title= +"Transcriber's note:The Illustration is missing in the original">[Illustration (missing): +THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814 <i>to face</i>]</ins> And yet it began with +disaster. At Brienne, among the scenes of his school-days, he +assailed Blücher in the hope of preventing the junction of the +Army of Silesia with that of Schwarzenberg further south (January +29th). After sharp fighting, the Prussians were driven from the +castle and town. But the success was illusory. Blücher +withdrew towards Bar-sur-Aube, in order to gain support from +Schwarzenberg, and, three days later, turned the tables on Napoleon +while the latter was indulging in hopes that the allies were about +to treat seriously for peace.<a name="FN2anchor402_402"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_402_402"><sup>[402]</sup></a> Nevertheless, though +surprised by greatly superior numbers, the 40,000 French clung +obstinately to the village of La Rothière until their thin +lines were everywhere driven in or outflanked, with the loss of 73 +cannon and more than 3,000 prisoners. Each side lost about 5,000 +killed and wounded—a mere trifle to the allies, but a grave +disaster to the defenders.</p> + +<p>The Emperor was much discouraged. He had put forth his full +strength, exposed his own person to the hottest fire, so as to +encourage his men, and yet failed to prevent the union of the +allied armies, or to hold the line of the River Aube. Early on the +morrow he left the castle of Brienne, and took the road for Troyes; +while Marmont, with a corps now reduced to less than 3,000 men, +bravely defended the passage of the Voire at Rosnay, and, after +delaying the pursuit, took post at Arcis-sur-Aube. The means of +defence, both moral and material, seemed wellnigh exhausted. When, +on February 3rd, Napoleon entered Troyes, scarcely a single +<i>vivat</i> was heard. Even the old troops were cast down by +defeat and hunger, while as many as 6,000 conscripts are said to +have deserted. The inhabitants refused to supply the necessaries of +life except upon requisition. "The army is perishing of famine," +writes the Emperor at Troyes. Again at Nogent: "Twelve men have +died of hunger, though we have used fire and sword to get food on +our way here." And, now, into the space left undefended<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii384" id="page_ii384">[pg.384]</a></span> +between the Marne and the Aube, Blücher began to thrust his +triumphant columns, with no barrier to check him until he neared +the environs of Paris. Once more the Prussian and Russian officers +looked on the war as over, and invited one another to dinner at the +Palais-Royal in a week's time.<a name="FN2anchor403_403"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_403_403"><sup>[403]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But it was on this confidence of the old hussar-general that +Napoleon counted. He knew his proneness to daring movements, and +the strong bias of Schwarzenberg towards delay: he also divined +that they would now separate their forces, Blücher making +straight for Paris, while other columns would threaten the capital +by way of Troyes and Sens. That was why he fell back on Troyes, so +as directly to oppose the latter movement, "or so as to return and +manoeuvre against Blücher and stay his march."<a name= +"FN2anchor404_404"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_404_404"><sup>[404]</sup></a> Another motive was his +expectation of finding at Nogent the 15,000 veterans whom he had +ordered Soult to send northwards. And doubtless the final reason +was his determination to use the sheltering curve of the Seine, +which between Troyes and Nogent flows within twenty miles of the +high-road that Blücher must use if he struck at Paris. At many +a crisis Napoleon had proved the efficacy of a great river line. +From Rivoli to Friedland his career abounds in examples of riverine +tactics. The war of 1813 was one prolonged struggle for the line of +the Elbe. He still continued the war because he could not yet bring +himself to sign away the Rhenish fortresses: and he now hoped to +regain that "natural boundary" by blows showered on divided enemies +from behind the arc of the Seine.</p> + +<p>With wonderful prescience he had guessed at the general plan of +the allies. But he could scarcely have dared to hope that on that +very day (February 2nd) they were holding a council of war at +Brienne, and formally resolved that Blücher should march +north-west on Paris with about 50,000 men, while the allied +Grand<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii385" id= +"page_ii385">[pg.385]</a></span> +Army of nearly three times those numbers was to diverge +south-west towards Bar-sur-Seine and Sens. So unequal a partition +of forces seemed to court disaster. It is true that the allies had +no magazines of supplies: they could not march in an undivided host +through a hostile land where the scanty defenders themselves were +nearly starving. If, however, they decided to move at all, it was +needful to allot the more dangerous task to a powerful force. Above +all, it was necessary to keep their main armies well in touch with +one another and with the foe. Yet these obvious precautions were +not taken. In truth, the separation of the allies was dictated more +by political jealousy than by military motives. To these political +affairs we must now allude; for they had no small effect in leading +Napoleon on to an illusory triumph and an irretrievable overthrow. +We will show their influence, first on the conduct of the allies, +and then on the actions of Napoleon.</p> + +<p>The alarm of Austria at the growing power of Russia and Prussia +was becoming acute. She had drawn the sword only because Napoleon's +resentment was more to be feared than Alexander's ambition. But all +had changed since then. The warrior who, five months ago, still had +his sword at the throat of Germany, was now being pursued across +the dreary flats of Champagne. And his eastern rival, who then +plaintively sued for Austria's aid, now showed a desire to +establish Russian control over all the Polish lands, indemnifying +Prussia for losses in that quarter by the acquisition of Saxony. +Both of these changes would press heavily on Austria from the +north; and she was determined to prevent them as far as possible. +Then there was the vexed question of the reconstruction of Germany +to which we shall recur later on. Smaller matters, involving the +relations of the allies to Bernadotte, Denmark, and Switzerland +further complicated the situation: but, above all, there was the +problem of the future limits and form of government of France.</p> + +<p>On that topic there were two chief parties: those who<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii386" id= +"page_ii386">[pg.386]</a></span> desired merely to clip Napoleon's +wings, and those who sought to bring back France to her old +boundaries. The Emperor Francis was still disposed to leave him the +"natural frontiers," provided he gave up all control of Germany, +Holland, and Italy. On the other side were the Czar and the forward +wing of the Prussian patriots. Frederick William was more cautious, +but in the main he deferred to the Czar's views on the boundary +question. Still, so powerful was the influence of the Emperor +Francis, Metternich, and Schwarzenberg, that the two parties were +evenly balanced and beset by many suspicions and fears, until the +arrival of the British Foreign Minister, Castlereagh, began to +restore something like confidence and concord.</p> + +<p>The British Cabinet had decided that, as none of our three +envoys then at the allied headquarters had much diplomatic +experience, our Minister should go in person to supervise the +course of affairs. He reached head-quarters in the third week of +January, and what Thiers has called the proud simplicity of his +conduct, contrasting as it did with the uneasy finesse of +Metternich and Nesselrode, imparted to his counsels a weight which +they merited from their disinterestedness. Great Britain was in a +very strong position. She had borne the brunt of the struggle +before the present coalition took shape: apart from some modest +gains to Hanover, she was about to take no part in the ensuing +territorial scramble: she even offered to give up many of her +oceanic conquests, provided that the European settlement would be +such as to guarantee a lasting peace.<a name= +"FN2anchor405_405"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_405_405"><sup>[405]</sup></a> And this, the British +Minister came to see, could not be attained while Napoleon reigned +over a Great France: the only sure pledge of peace would be the +return of that country to its old frontiers, and preferably to its +ancient dynasty.</p> + +<p>On the question of boundaries the Czar's views were not clearly +defined; they were personal rather than territorial. He was +determined to get rid of Napoleon; but<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii387" id="page_ii387">[pg.387]</a></span> he would not, +as yet, hear of the re-establishment of the Bourbons. He disliked +that dynasty in general, and Louis XVIII. in particular. Bernadotte +seemed to him a far fitter successor to Napoleon than the gouty old +gentleman who for three and twenty years had been morosely flitting +about Europe and issuing useless proclamations.</p> + +<p>Here, indeed, was Napoleon's great chance: there was no man fit +to succeed him, and he knew it. Scarcely anyone but Bernadotte +himself agreed with the Czar as to the fitness of the choice just +named. To the allies the Prince Royal of Sweden was suspect for his +loiterings, and to Frenchmen he seemed a traitor. We find that +Stein disagreed with the Czar on this point, and declared that the +Bourbons were the only alternative to Napoleon. Assuredly, this was +not because the great German loved that family, but simply because +he saw that their very mediocrity would be a pledge that France +would not again overflow her old limits and submerge Europe.</p> + +<p>Here, then, was the strength of Castlereagh's position. Amidst +the warping disputes and underhand intrigues his claims were clear, +disinterested, and logically tenable. Besides, they were so urged +as to calm the disputants. He quietly assured Metternich that +Britain would resist the absorption of the whole of Poland and +Saxony by Russia and Prussia; and on his side the Austrian +statesman showed that he would not oppose the return of the +Bourbons to France "from any family considerations," provided that +that act came as the act of the French nation.<a name= +"FN2anchor406_406"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_406_406"><sup>[406]</sup></a> And this was a proviso on +which our Government and Wellington already laid great stress.</p> + +<p>Castlereagh's straightforward behaviour had an immense influence +in leading Metternich to favour a more drastic solution of the +French question than he had previously advocated. The Frankfurt +proposals were now quietly waived, and Metternich came to see the +need of withdrawing Belgium from France and intrusting it to +the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii388" id= +"page_ii388">[pg.388]</a></span> House of Orange. Still, the +Austrian statesman was for concluding peace with Napoleon as soon +as might be, though he confessed in his private letters that peace +did not depend on the Châtillon parleys. Some persons, he +wrote, wanted the Bourbons back: still more wished for a Regency +(<i>i.e.</i>, Marie Louise as Regent for Napoleon II.): others +said: "Away with Napoleon, no peace is possible with him": the +masses cried out for peace, so as to end the whole affair: but +added Metternich: "The riddle will be solved before or in Paris."<a +name="FN2anchor407_407"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_407_407"><sup>[407]</sup></a> There spoke the discreet +opportunist, always open to the logic of facts and the persuasion +of Castlereagh.</p> + +<p>Our Minister found the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia far less +tractable; and he only partially succeeded in lulling their +suspicions that Metternich was hand and glove with Napoleon. So +deep was the Czar's distrust of the Austrian statesman and +commander-in-chief that he resolved to brush aside Metternich's +diplomatic <i>pourparlers</i>, to push on rapidly to Paris, and +there dictate peace.<a name="FN2anchor408_408"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_408_408"><sup>[408]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But it was just this eagerness of the Czar and the Prussians to +reach Paris which kept alive Austrian fears. A complete triumph to +their arms would seal the doom of Poland and Saxony; and it has +been thought that Schwarzenberg, who himself longed for peace, not +only sought to save Austrian soldiers by keeping them back, but +that at this time he did less than his duty in keeping touch with +Blücher. Several times during the ensuing days the charge of +treachery was hurled by the Prussians against the Austrians, and +once at least by Frederick William himself. But it seems more +probable that Metternich and Schwarzenberg held their men back<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii389" id= +"page_ii389">[pg.389]</a></span> merely for prudential motives +until the resumption of the negotiations with France should throw +more light on the tangled political jungle through which the allies +were groping. It is significant that while Schwarzenberg cautiously +felt about for Napoleon's rearguard, of which he lost touch for two +whole days, Metternich insisted that the peace Congress must be +opened. Caulaincourt had for several days been waiting near the +allied head-quarters; and, said the Austrian Minister, it would be +a breach of faith to put him off any longer now that Castlereagh +had arrived. Only when Austria threatened to withdraw from the +Coalition did Alexander concede this point, and then with a very +bad grace; for the resumption of the negotiations virtually tied +him to the neighbourhood of Châtillon-sur-Seine, the town +fixed for the Congress, while Blücher was rapidly moving +towards Paris with every prospect of snatching from the imperial +brow the coveted laurel of a triumphal entry.</p> + +<p>To prevent this interference with his own pet plans, the +susceptible autocrat sent off from Bar-sur-Seine (February 7th) an +order that Blücher was not to enter Paris, but must await the +arrival of the sovereigns. The order was needless. Napoleon, goaded +to fury by the demands which the allies on that very day formulated +at Châtillon, flung himself upon Blücher and completely +altered the whole military situation. But before describing this +wonderful effort, we must take a glance at the diplomatic overtures +which spurred him on.</p> + +<p>The Congress of Châtillon opened on February 5th, and on +that day Castlereagh gained his point, that questions about our +maritime code should be completely banished from the discussions. +Two days later the allies declared that France must withdraw within +the boundaries of 1791, with the exception of certain changes made +for mutual convenience and of some colonial retrocessions that +England would grant to France. The French plenipotentiary, +Caulaincourt, heard this demand with a quiet but strained +composure: he reminded them that at Frankfurt they had proposed to +leave France the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii390" id= +"page_ii390">[pg.390]</a></span> Rhine and the Alps; he inquired +what colonial sacrifices England was prepared to make if she cooped +up France in her old limits in Europe. To this our +plenipotentiaries Aberdeen, Cathcart, and Stewart refused to reply +until he assented to the present demand of the allies. He very +properly refused to do this; and, despite his eagerness to come to +an arrangement and end the misfortunes of France, referred the +matter to his master.<a name="FN2anchor409_409"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_409_409"><sup>[409]</sup></a></p> + +<p>What were Napoleon's views on these questions? It is difficult +to follow the workings of his mind before the time when +Caulaincourt's despatch flashed the horrible truth upon him that he +might, after all, leave France smaller and weaker than he found +her. Then the lightnings of his wrath flash forth, and we see the +tumult and anguish of that mighty soul: but previously the +storm-wrack of passion and the cloud-bank of his clinging will are +lit up by few gleams of the earlier piercing intelligence. On +January the 4th he had written to Caulaincourt that the policy of +England and the personal rancour of the Czar would drag Austria +along. If Fortune betrayed him (Napoleon) he would give up the +throne: never would he sign any shameful peace. But he added: "You +must see what Metternich wants: it is not to Austria's interest to +push matters to the end." In the accompanying instructions to his +plenipotentiary, he seems to assent to the Alpine and Rhenish +frontiers, but advises him to sign the preliminaries as vaguely as +possible, "<i>as we have everything to gain by delay</i>." The +Rhine frontier must be so described as to leave France the Dutch +fortresses: and Savona and Spezzia must also count as on the French +side of the Alps. These, be it observed, are his notions<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii391" id= +"page_ii391">[pg.391]</a></span> when he has not heard of the +defection of Murat, or the rejection of his Spanish bargain by the +Cortès.</p> + +<p>Twelve days later he proposes to Metternich an armistice, and +again suggests that it is not to Austria's interest to press +matters too far. But the allies are too wary to leave such a matter +to Metternich: at Teplitz they bound themselves to common action; +and the proposal only shows them the need of pushing on fast while +their foe is still unprepared. Once more his old optimism asserts +itself. The first French success, that at Brienne, leads him to +hope that the allies will now be ready to make peace. Even after +the disaster at La Rothière, he believes that the mere +arrival of Caulaincourt at the allied headquarters will foment the +discords which there exist.<a name="FN2anchor410_410"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_410_410"><sup>[410]</sup></a> Then, writing amidst the +unspeakable miseries at Troyes (February 4th), he upbraids +Caulaincourt for worrying him about "powers and instructions when +it is still doubtful if the enemy wants to negotiate. His terms, it +seems, are determined on beforehand. As soon as you have them, you +have the power to accept them or to refer them to me within +twenty-four hours."</p> + +<p>After midnight, he again directs him to accept the terms, if +acceptable: "in the contrary case we will run the risks of a +battle; even the loss of Paris, and all that will ensue." Later on +that day he allows Maret to send a despatch giving Caulaincourt +"carte blanche" to conclude peace.<a name="FN2anchor411_411"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_411_411"><sup>[411]</sup></a> But the +plenipotentiary dared not take on himself the responsibility of +accepting the terms offered by the allies two days later. The last +despatch was too vague to enable him to sign away many thousands of +square miles of territory: it contradicted the tenor of Napoleon's +letters, which empowered him to assent to nothing less than the +Frankfurt terms. And thus was to slip away<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii392" id="page_ii392">[pg.392]</a></span> one more +chance of bringing about peace—a peace that would strip the +French Empire of frontier lands and alien peoples, but leave it to +the peasants' ruler, Napoleon.</p> + +<p>In truth, the Emperor's words and letters breathed nothing but +warlike resolve. Famine and misery accompany him on his march to +Nogent, and there, on the 7th, he hears tidings that strike despair +to every heart but his. An Anglo-German force is besieging the +staunch old Carnot in Antwerp; Bülow has entered Brussels; +Belgium is lost: Macdonald's weak corps is falling back on Epernay, +hard pressed by Yorck, while Blücher is heading for Paris. +Last of all comes on the morrow Caulaincourt's despatch announcing +that the allies now insist on France returning to the limits of +1791.</p> + +<p>Never, surely, since the time of Job did calamity shower her +blows so thickly on the head of mortal man: and never were they met +with less resignation and more undaunted defiance. After receiving +the black budget of news the Emperor straightway shut himself up. +For some time his Marshals left him alone: but, as Caulaincourt's +courier was waiting for the reply, Berthier and Maret ventured to +intrude on his grief. He tossed them the letter containing the +allied terms. A long silence ensued, while they awaited his +decision. As he spoke not a word, they begged him to give way and +grant peace to France. Then his pent-up feelings burst forth: +"What, you would have me sign a treaty like that, and trample under +foot my coronation oath! Unheard-of disasters may have snatched +from me the promise to renounce my conquests: but, give up those +made before me—never! God keep me from such a disgrace. Reply +to Caulaincourt since you wish it, but tell him that I reject this +treaty. I prefer to run the uttermost risks of war." He threw +himself on his camp bed. Maret waited by his side, and gained from +him in calmer moments permission to write to Caulaincourt in terms +that allowed the negotiation to proceed. At dawn on the 9th Maret +came back hoping to gain assent to<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii393" id="page_ii393">[pg.393]</a></span> despatches that he +had been drawing up during the night. To his surprise he found the +Emperor stretched out over large charts, compass in hand. "Ah, +there you are," was his greeting; "now it's a question of very +different matters. I am going to beat Blücher: if I succeed, +the state of affairs will entirely change, and then we will +see."</p> + +<p>The tension of his feelings at this time, when rage and +desperation finally gave way to a fixed resolve to stake all on a +blow at Blücher's flank, finds expression in a phrase which +has been omitted from the official correspondence.<a name= +"FN2anchor412_412"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_412_412"><sup>[412]</sup></a> In one of the five letters +which he wrote to Joseph on the 9th, he remarked: "Pray the Madonna +of armies to be for us: Louis, who is a saint, may engage to give +her a lighted candle." A curiously sarcastic touch, probably due to +his annoyance at the <i>Misereres</i> and "prayers forty hours +long" at Paris which he bade his Ministers curtail. Or was it a +passing flash of that religious sentiment which he professed in his +declining years?</p> + +<p>He certainly counted on victory over Blücher. A week +earlier, he had foreseen the chance that that leader would expose +his flank: on the 7th he charged Marmont to occupy Sézanne, +where he would be strongly supported; on the afternoon of the 9th +he set out from Nogent to reinforce his Marshal; and on the morrow +Marmont and Ney fell upon one of Blücher's scattered columns +at Champaubert. It was a corps of Russians, less than 5,000 strong, +with no horsemen and but twenty-four cannon; the Muscovites offered +a stout resistance, but only 1,500 escaped.<a name= +"FN2anchor413_413"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_413_413"><sup>[413]</sup></a> Blücher's line of +march was now cut in twain. He himself was at Vertus with the last +column; his foremost corps, under Sacken, was west of Montmirail, +while Yorck was far to the north of that village observing +Macdonald's movements along the Château-Thierry road.</p> + +<p>The Emperor with 20,000 men might therefore hope<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii394" id="page_ii394">[pg.394]</a></span> +to destroy these corps piecemeal. Leaving Marmont along with +Grouchy's horse to hold Blücher in check on the east, he +struck westwards against Sacken's Russians near Montmirail. The +shock was terrible; both sides were weary with night marches on +miry roads, along which cannon had to be dragged by double teams: +yet, though footsore and worn with cold and hunger, the men fought +with sustained fury, the French to stamp out the barbarous invaders +who had wasted their villages, the Russians to hold their position +until Yorck's Prussians should stretch a succouring hand from the +north. Many a time did the French rush at the village of Marchais +held by Sacken: they were repeatedly repulsed, until, as darkness +came on, Ney and Mortier with the Guard stormed a large farmhouse +on their left. Then, at last, Sacken's men drew off in sore plight +north-west across the fields, where Yorck's tardy advent alone +saved them from destruction. The next day completed their +discomfiture. Napoleon and Mortier pursued both allied corps to +Château-Thierry and, after sharp fighting in the streets of +that place, drove them across the Marne. The townsfolk hailed the +advent of their Emperor with unbounded joy: they had believed him +to be at Troyes, beaten and dispirited; and here he was delivering +them from the brutal licence of the eastern soldiery. Nothing was +impossible to him.</p> + +<p>Next it was Blücher's turn. Leaving Mortier to pursue the +fugitives of Sacken and Yorck along the Soissons road, Napoleon +left Château-Thierry late at night on the 13th, following the +mass of his troops to reinforce Marmont. That Marshal had yielded +ground to Blücher's desperate efforts, but was standing at bay +at Vauchamps, when Napoleon drew near to the scene of the unequal +fight. Suddenly a mighty shout of "Vive l'Empereur" warned the +assailants that they now had to do with Napoleon. Yet no +precipitation weakened the Emperor's blow: not until his cavalry +greatly outnumbered that of the allies did he begin the<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii395" id="page_ii395">[pg.395]</a></span> +chief attack. Stoutly it was beaten off by the allied squares: but +Drouot's artillery ploughed through their masses, while swarms of +horsemen were ready to open out those ghastly furrows. There was +nothing for it but retreat, and that across open country, where the +charges and the pounding still went on. But nothing could break +that stubborn infantry: animated by their leader, the Prussians and +Russians plodded steadily eastwards, until, as darkness drew on, +they found Grouchy's horse barring the road before Etoges. +"Forward" was still the veteran's cry: and through the cavalry they +cut their way: through hostile footmen that had stolen round to the +village they also burst, and at last found shelter near +Bergères. "Words fail me," wrote Colonel Hudson Lowe, "to +express my admiration at their undaunted and manly behaviour."</p> + +<p>This gallant retreat shed lustre over the rank and file. But the +sins of the commanders had cost the allies dear. In four days the +army of Silesia lost fully 15,000 men, and its corps were driven +far asunder by Napoleon's incursion. His brilliant moves and +trenchant strokes astonished the world. With less than 30,000 men +he had burst into Blücher's line of march, and scattered in +flight 50,000 warriors advancing on Paris in full assurance of +victory. It was not chance, but science, that gave him these +successes. Acting from behind the screen of the Seine, he had +thrown his small but undivided force against scattered portions of +a superior force. It was the strategy of Lonato and Castiglione +over again; and the enthusiasm of those days bade fair to +revive.</p> + +<p>His men, who previously had tramped downheartedly over wastes of +snow and miry cross-roads, now marched with head erect as in former +days; the villagers, far from being cowed by the brutalities of the +Cossacks, formed bands to hang upon the enemies' rear and entrap +their foragers. Above all, Paris was herself once more. Before he +began these brilliant moves, he had to upbraid +Cambacérès for his unmanly conduct. "I see that +instead of sustaining the Empress, you are discouraging <span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii396" id= +"page_ii396">[pg.396]</a></span>her. Why lose your head thus? What +mean these <i>Miserere</i> and these prayers of forty hours? Are +you going mad at Paris?" Now the capital again breathed defiance to +the foe, and sent the Emperor National Guards. Many of these from +Brittany, it is true, came "in round hats and <i>sabots</i>": they +had no knapsacks: but they had guns, and they fought.</p> + +<p>Could he have pursued Blücher on the morrow he might +probably have broken up even that hardy infantry, now in dire +straits for want of supplies. But bad news came to hand from the +south-west. Under urgent pressure from the Czar, Schwarzenberg had +pushed forward two columns from Troyes towards Paris: one of them +had seized the bridge over the Seine at Bray, a day's march below +Nogent: the other was nearing Fontainebleau. Napoleon was furious +at the neglect of Victor to guard the crossing at Bray, and +reluctantly turned away from Blücher to crush these columns. +His men marched or were carried in vehicles, by way of Meaux and +Guignes, to reinforce Victor: on the 17th they drove back the +outposts of Schwarzenberg's centre, while Macdonald and Oudinot +marched towards Nogent to threaten his right. These rapid moves +alarmed the Austrian commander, whose left, swung forward on +Fontainebleau, was in some danger of being cut off. He therefore +sued for an armistice. It was refused; and the request drew from +Napoleon a letter to his brother Joseph full of contempt for the +allies (February 18th). "It is difficult," he writes, "to be so +cowardly as that! He [Schwarzenberg] had constantly, and in the +most insulting terms, refused a suspension of arms of any kind, ... +and yet these wretches at the first check fall on their knees. I +will grant no armistice till my territory is clear of them." He +adds that he now expected to gain the "natural frontiers" offered +by the allies at Frankfurt—the minimum that he could accept +with honour; and he closes with these memorable words, which flash +a searchlight on his pacific professions of thirteen months later: +"If I had agreed to the old<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii397" id="page_ii397">[pg.397]</a></span> boundaries, I +should have rushed to arms two years later, telling the nation that +I had signed not a peace, but a capitulation."<a name= +"FN2anchor414_414"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_414_414"><sup>[414]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The events of the 18th strengthened his resolve. He then +attacked the Crown Prince of Würtemberg on the north side of +the Seine, opposite Montereau, overthrew him by the weight of the +artillery of the Guard, whereupon a brilliant charge of Pajol's +horsemen wrested the bridge from the South Germans and restored to +the Emperor the much-needed crossing over the river. Napoleon's +activity on that day was marvellous. He wrote or dictated eleven +despatches, six of them long before dawn, gave instructions to an +officer who was to encourage Eugène to hold firm in Italy, +fought a battle, directed the aim of several cannon, and wound up +the day by severe rebukes to Marshal Victor and two generals for +their recent blunders. Thus, on a brief winter's day, he fills the +<i>rôle</i> of Emperor, organizer, tactician, cannoneer, and +martinet; in fact, he crowns it by pardoning Victor, when that +brave man vows that he cannot live away from the army, and will +fight as a common soldier among the Guards: he then and there +assigns to him two divisions of the Guard. To the artillerymen the +<i>camaraderie</i> of the Emperor gave a new zest: and when they +ventured to reproach him for thus risking his life, he replied with +a touch of the fatalism which enthralls a soldier's mind: "Ah! +don't fear: the ball is not cast that will kill me."</p> + +<p>Yes: Napoleon displayed during these last ten days a fertility +of resource, a power to drive back the tide of events, that have +dazzled posterity, as they dismayed his foes. We may seek in vain +for a parallel, save perhaps in the careers of Hannibal and +Frederick. Alexander the Great's victories were won over Asiatics: +Cæsar's magnificent rally of his wavering bands against the +onrush of the Nervii was but one effort of disciplined valour +crushing the impetuosity of the barbarian. Marlborough and +Wellington often triumphed over great<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii398" id="page_ii398">[pg.398]</a></span>odds and turned the +course of history. But their star had never set so low as that of +Napoleon's after La Rothière, and never did it rush to the +zenith with a splendour like that which blinded the trained hosts +of Blücher and Schwarzenberg. Whatever the mistakes of these +leaders, and they were great, there is something that defies +analysis in Napoleon's sudden transformation of his beaten +dispirited band into a triumphant array before which four times +their numbers sought refuge in retreat. But it is just this +transcendent quality that adds a charm to the character and career +of Napoleon. Where analysis fails, there genius begins.<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii399" id= +"page_ii399">[pg.399]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXXVII</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>THE FIRST ABDICATION</center> + +<br> + + +<p>It now remained to be seen whether Napoleon would make a wise +use of his successes. While the Grand Army drew in its columns +behind the sheltering line of the Seine at Troyes, the French +Emperor strove to reap in diplomacy the fruits of his military +prowess. In brief, he sought to detach Austria from the Coalition. +From Nogent he wrote, on February 21st, to the Emperor Francis, +dwelling on the impolicy of Austria continuing the war. Why should +she subordinate her policy to that of England and to the personal +animosities of the Czar? Why should she see her former Belgian +provinces handed over to a Protestant Dutch Prince about to be +allied with the House of Brunswick by marriage? France would never +give up Belgium; and he, as French Emperor, would never sign a +peace that would drive her from the Rhine and exclude her from the +circle of the Great Powers. But if Austria really wished for the +equilibrium of Europe, he (Napoleon) was ready to forget the past +and make peace on the basis of the Frankfurt terms.<a name= +"FN2anchor415_415"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_415_415"><sup>[415]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Had these offers been rather less exacting, and reached the +allied headquarters a week earlier, they might have led to the +break up of the Coalition. For the political<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii400" id="page_ii400">[pg.400]</a></span> +situation of the allies had been even more precarious than that of +their armies. The pretensions of the Czar had excited indignation +and alarm. Swayed to and fro between the counsels of his old tutor, +Laharpe, now again at his side, and his own autocratic instincts, +he declared that he would push on to Paris, consult the will of the +French people by a plébiscite, and abide by its decision, +even if it gave a new lease of power to Napoleon. But side by side +with this democratic proposal came another of a more despotic type, +that the military Governor of Paris must be a Russian officer.</p> + +<p>The amusement caused by these odd notions was overshadowed by +alarm. Metternich, Castlereagh, and Hardenberg saw in them a ruse +for foisting on France either Bernadotte, or an orientalized +Republic, or a Muscovite version of the Treaty of Tilsit. Then +again, on February 9th, Alexander sent a mandate to the +plenipotentiaries at Châtillon, requesting that their +sessions should be suspended, though he had recently agreed at +Langres to enter into negotiations with France, provided that the +military operations were not suspended. Evidently, then, he was +bent on forcing the hands of his allies, and Austria feared that he +might at the end of the war insist on her taking Alsace, as a +set-off to the loss of Eastern Galicia which he wished to absorb. +So keen was the jealousy thus aroused, that at Troyes Metternich +and Hardenberg signed a secret agreement to prevent the Czar +carrying matters with a high hand at Paris (February 14th); and on +the same day they sent him a stiff Note requesting the resumption +of the negotiations with Napoleon. Indeed, Austria formally +threatened to withdraw her troops from the war, unless he limited +his aims to the terms propounded by the allies at Châtillon. +Alexander at first refused; but the news of Blücher's +disasters shook his determination, and he assented on that day, +provided that steps were at once taken to lighten the pressure on +the Russian corps serving under Blücher. Thus, by February +14th, the crisis was over.<a name="FN2anchor416_416"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_416_416"><sup>[416]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii401" id="page_ii401">[pg.401]</a></span></p> + +<p>Schwarzenberg cautiously pushed on three columns to attract the +thunderbolts that otherwise would have destroyed the Silesian Army +root and branch; and he succeeded. True, his vanguard was beaten at +Montereau; but, by drawing Napoleon south and then east of the +Seine, he gave time to Blücher to strengthen his shattered +array and resume the offensive. Meanwhile Bülow, with the +northern army, began to draw near to the scene of action, and on +the 23rd the allies took the wise step of assigning his corps, +along with those of Winzingerode, Woronzoff, and Strogonoff, to the +Prussian veteran. The last three corps were withdrawn from the army +of Bernadotte, and that prince was apprized of the fact by the Czar +in a rather curt letter.</p> + +<p>The diplomatic situation had also cleared up before Napoleon's +letter reached the Emperor Francis. The negotiations with +Caulaincourt were resumed at Châtillon on February the 17th; +and there is every reason to think that Austria, England, Prussia, +and perhaps even Russia would now gladly have signed peace with +Napoleon on the basis of the French frontiers of 1791, provided +that he renounced all claims to interference in the affairs of +Europe outside those limits.<a name="FN2anchor417_417"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_417_417"><sup>[417]</sup></a></p> + +<p>These demands would certainly have been accepted by the French +plenipotentiary had he listened to his own pacific promptings. But +he was now in the most painful position. Maret had informed him, +the day after Montmirail, that Napoleon was set on keeping the +Rhenish and Alpine frontiers.<a name="FN2anchor418_418"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_418_418"><sup>[418]</sup></a> He could, therefore, +do nothing but temporize. He knew how precarious was the military +supremacy just snatched by his master, and trusted that a few days +more would bring wisdom before it was too late. But his efforts for +delay were useless.</p> + +<p>While he was marking time, Napoleon was sending him despatches +instinct with pride. "I have made 30,000 to 40,000 prisoners," he +wrote on the 17th: "I have taken<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii402" id="page_ii402">[pg.402]</a></span> 200 cannon, a +great number of generals, and destroyed several armies, almost +without striking a blow. I yesterday checked Schwarzenberg's army, +which I hope to destroy before it recrosses my frontier." And two +days later, after hearing the allied terms, he wrote that they +would make the blood of every Frenchman boil with indignation, and +that he would dictate <i>his</i> ultimatum at Troyes or +Châtillon. Of course, Caulaincourt kept these diatribes to +himself, but his painfully constrained demeanour betrayed the +secret that he longed for peace and that his hands were tied.</p> + +<p>On all sides proofs were to be seen that Napoleon would never +give up Belgium and the Rhine frontier. When the allies (at the +suggestion of Schwarzenberg, and <i>with the approval of the +Czar</i>) sued for an armistice, he forbade his envoys to enter +into any parleys until the allies agreed to accept the "natural +frontiers" as the basis for a peace, and retired in the meantime on +Alsace, Lorraine, and Holland.<a name="FN2anchor419_419"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_419_419"><sup>[419]</sup></a> These last conditions +he agreed three days later to relax; but on the first point he was +inexorable, and he knew that the military commissioners appointed +to arrange the truce had no power to agree to the <i>political</i> +article which he made a <i>sine quâ non</i>.</p> + +<p>Accordingly, no armistice was concluded, and his unbending +attitude made a bad impression on the Emperor Francis, who, on the +27th, replied to his son-in-law in terms which showed that his +blows were welding the Coalition more firmly together.<a name= +"FN2anchor420_420"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_420_420"><sup>[420]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In fact, while the plenipotentiaries at Châtillon were +exchanging empty demands, a most important compact was taking form +at Chaumont: it was dated from the 1st of March, but definitively +signed on the 9th. Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia +thereby bound themselves not to treat singly with France for peace, +but to continue the war until France was brought back to her old +frontiers, and the complete independence of<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii403" id="page_ii403">[pg.403]</a></span> Germany, +Holland, Switzerland, and Spain was secured. Each of the four +Powers must maintain 150,000 men in the field (exclusive of +garrisons); and Britain agreed to aid her allies with equal yearly +subsidies amounting in all to £5,000,000 for the year 1814.<a +name="FN2anchor421_421"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_421_421"><sup>[421]</sup></a> The treaty would be only +defensive if Napoleon accepted the allied terms formulated at +Châtillon: otherwise it would be offensive and hold good, if +need be, for twenty years.</p> + +<p>Undoubtedly this compact was largely the work of Castlereagh, +whose tact and calmness had done wonders in healing schisms; but so +intimate a union could never have been formed among previously +discordant allies but for their overmastering fear of Napoleon. +Such a treaty was without parallel in European history; and the +stringency of its clauses serves as the measure of the prowess and +perversity of the French Emperor. It is puerile to say, as Mollien +does, that England bribed the allies to this last effort. +Experiences of the last months had shown them that peace could not +be durable as long as Napoleon remained in a position to threaten +Germany. Even now they were ready to conclude it with Napoleon on +the basis of the old frontiers of France, provided that he assented +before the 11th of March; but the most pacific of their leaders saw +that the more they showed their desire for peace, the more they +strengthened Napoleon's resolve to have it only on terms which they +saw to be fraught with future danger.<a name= +"FN2anchor422_422"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_422_422"><sup>[422]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii404" id="page_ii404">[pg.404]</a></span></p> + +<p>While the conferences at Châtillon followed one another in +fruitless succession, Blücher, with 48,000 effectives, was +once more resuming the offensive. Napoleon heard the news at Troyes +(February 25th). He was surprised at the veteran's temerity: he had +pictured him crushed and helpless beyond Chalons, and had cherished +the hope of destroying Schwarzenberg.—"If," he wrote to +Clarke on the morrow, "I had had a pontoon bridge, the war would be +over, and Schwarzenberg's army would no longer exist.... For want +of boats, I could not pass the Seine at the necessary points. It +was not 50 boats that I needed, only 20."—With this +characteristic outburst against his War Minister, whose neglect to +send up twenty boats from Paris had changed the world's history, +the Emperor turned aside to overwhelm Blücher. The Prussian +commander was near the junction of the Seine and the Aube; and +seemed to offer his flank as unguardedly as three weeks before.</p> + +<p>Napoleon sent Ney, Victor, and Arrighi northwards to fall on his +rear, and on the 27th repaired to Arcis-sur-Aube to direct the +operations. What, then, was his annoyance when, in pursuance of the +allied plan formed on the 23rd, Blücher skilfully retired +northwards, withdrew beyond the Marne and broke the bridges behind +him. Then after failing to drive Marmont and Mortier from Meaux and +the line of the Ourcq, the Prussian leader marched towards +Soissons, near which town he expected to meet the northern army of +the allies. For some hours he was in grave danger: Marmont hung on +his rear, and Napoleon with 35,000 hardy troops was preparing to +turn his right flank. In fact, had he not broken the bridge over +the Marne at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and thereby delayed<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii405" id= +"page_ii405">[pg.405]</a></span> the Emperor thirty-six hours, he +would probably have been crushed before he could cross the River +Aisne. His men were dead beat by marching night and day over roads +first covered by snow and now deep in slush: for a week they had +had no regular rations, and great was their joy when, at the close +of the 2nd, they drew near to the 42,000 troops that Bülow and +Winzingerode mustered near the banks of the Aisne and Vesle.</p> + +<p>On that day Napoleon, when delayed at La Ferté, conceived +the daring idea of rushing on the morrow after Blücher, who +was "very embarrassed in the mire," and then of carrying the war +into Lorraine, rescuing the garrisons of Verdun, Toul, and Metz, +and rousing the peasantry of the east of France against the +invaders. It mattered not that Schwarzenberg had dealt Oudinot and +Gérard a severe check at Bar-sur-Aube, as soon as Napoleon's +back was turned. That cautious leader would be certain, he thought, +to beat a retreat towards the Rhine as soon as his rear was +threatened; and Napoleon pictured France rising as in 1793, shaking +off her invaders and dictating a glorious peace.</p> + +<p>Far different was the actual situation. Blücher was not to +be caught; a sharp frost on the 3rd improved the roads; and his +complete junction with the northern army was facilitated by the +surrender of Soissons on that same afternoon. This fourth-rate +fortress was ill-prepared to withstand an attack; and, after a +short bombardment by Winzingerode, two allied officers made their +way to the Governor, praised his bravery, pointed out the +uselessness of further resistance, and offered to allow the +garrison to march out with the honours of war and rejoin the +Emperor, where they could fight to more advantage. The Governor, +who bore the ill-starred name of Moreau, finally gave way, and his +troops, nearly all Poles, marched out at 4 p.m., furious at his +"treason"; for the distant thunder of Marmont's cannon was already +heard on the side of Oulchy. Rumour said that they were the +Emperor's cannon, but rumour lied. At dawn Napoleon's troops had +begun to cross the temporary<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii406" id="page_ii406">[pg.406]</a></span> bridge over the +Marne, thirty-five miles away; but by great exertions his outposts +on that evening reached Rocourt, only some twenty miles south of +Soissons.<a name="FN2anchor423_423"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_423_423"><sup>[423]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The fact deserves notice: for it disposes of the strange +statement of Thiers that the surrender of Soissons was, next to +Waterloo, the most fatal event in the annals of France. The gifted +historian, as also, to some extent, M. Houssaye, assumed that, had +Soissons held out, Blücher and Bülow could not have +united their forces. But Bülow had not relied solely on the +bridge at Soissons for the union of the armies; on the 2nd he had +thrown a bridge over the Aisne at Vailly, some distance above that +city, and another on the third near to its eastern suburb.<a name= +"FN2anchor424_424"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_424_424"><sup>[424]</sup></a> It is clear, then, that +the two armies, numbering in all over 100,000 men, could have +joined long before Napoleon, Marmont, and Mortier were in a +position to attack. Before the Emperor heard of the surrender, he +had marched to Fismes, and had detached Corbineau to occupy Rheims, +evidently with the aim of cutting Blücher's communications +with Schwarzenberg, and opening up the way to Verdun and Metz.</p> + +<p>For that plan was now his dominant aim, while the repulse of +Blücher was chiefly of importance because it would enable him +to stretch a hand eastwards to his beleaguered garrisons.<a name= +"FN2anchor425_425"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_425_425"><sup>[425]</sup></a> But Blücher was not +to be thus disposed of. While withdrawing from Soissons to the +natural fortress of Laon, he heard that Napoleon had crossed the +Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, and was making for Craonne. Above that town +there rises a long narrow ridge or plateau, which Blücher +ordered his Russian corps to occupy. There was fought one of the +bloodiest battles of the war (March 7th). The aim of the allies was +to await the French attack on the plateau, while 10,000 horsemen +and sixty guns worked round and fell on their rear.<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii407" id= +"page_ii407">[pg.407]</a></span></p> + +<p>The plan failed, owing to a mistake in the line of march of this +flanking force: and the battle resolved itself into a soldiers' +fight. Five times did Ney lead his braves up those slopes, only to +be hurled back by the dogged Muscovites. But the Emperor now +arrived; a sixth attack by the cavalry and artillery of the Guard +battered in the defence; and Blücher, hearing that the flank +move had failed, ordered a retreat on Laon. This confused and +desperate fight cost both sides about 7,000 men, nearly a fourth of +the numbers engaged. Victor, Grouchy, and six French generals were +among the wounded.<a name="FN2anchor426_426"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_426_426"><sup>[426]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Nevertheless, Napoleon struggled on: he called up Marmont and +Mortier, gave out that he was about to receive other large +reinforcements, and bade his garrisons in Belgium and Lorraine fall +on the rear of the foe. One more victory, he thought, would end the +war, or at least lower the demands of the allies. It was not to be. +Blücher and Bülow held the strong natural citadel of +Laon; and all Napoleon's efforts on March the 9th and 10th failed +to storm the southern approaches. Marmont fared no better on the +east; and when, at nightfall, the weary French fell back, the +Prussians resolved to try a night attack on Marmont's corps, which +was far away from the main body. Never was a surprise more +successful; Marmont was quite off his guard; horse and foot fled in +wild confusion, leaving 2,500 prisoners and forty-five cannon in +the hands of the victorious Yorck. Could the allies have pressed +home their advantage, the result must have been decisive; but +Blücher had fallen ill, and a halt was called.<a name= +"FN2anchor427_427"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_427_427"><sup>[427]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Alone, among the leaders in this campaign, the Emperor remained +unbroken. All the allied leaders<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii408" id="page_ii408">[pg.408]</a></span> had at one time or +another bent under his blows; and the French Marshals seemed +doomed, as in 1813, to fail wherever their Emperor was not. Ney, +Victor, and Mortier had again evinced few of the qualities of a +commander, except bravery. Augereau was betraying softness and +irresolution in the Lyonnais in front of a smaller Austrian force. +Suchet and Davoust were shut up in Catalonia and Hamburg. St. Cyr +and Vandamme were prisoners. Soult had kept a bold front near +Bayonne: but now news was to hand that Wellington had surprised and +routed him at Orthez. On the Seine, Macdonald and Oudinot failed to +hold Troyes against the masses of Schwarzenberg. Of all the French +Marshals, Marmont had distinguished himself the most in this +campaign, and now at Laon he had been caught napping. Yet, while +all others failed, Napoleon seemed invincible. Even after Marmont's +disaster, the allies forbore to attack the chief; and, just as a +lion that has been beaten off by a herd of buffaloes stalks away, +mangled but full of fight and unmolested, so the Emperor drew off +in peace towards Soissons. Thence he marched on Rheims, gained a +victory over a Russian division there, and hoped to succour his +Lorraine garrisons, when, on the 17th, the news of Schwarzenberg's +advance towards Paris led him southwards once more.</p> + +<p>Yielding to the remonstrances of the Czar, the Austrian leader +had purposed to march on the French capital, if everything went +well; but he once more drew back on receiving news of Napoleon's +advance against his right flank. While preparing to retire towards +Brienne, he heard that his great antagonist had crossed that river +at Plancy with less than 20,000 troops. To retrace his steps, fall +upon this handful of weary men with 100,000, and drive them into +the river, was not a daring conception: but so accustomed were the +allies to dalliance and delay that a thrill of surprise ran through +the host when he began to call up its retiring columns for a +fight.<a name="FN2anchor428_428"></a> +<a href="#Foot2note_428_428"><sup>[428]</sup></a><span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii409" id= +"page_ii409">[pg.409]</a></span></p> + +<p>Napoleon also was surprised: he believed the Grand Army to be in +full retreat, and purposed then to dash on Vitry and Verdun. +<a name="FN2anchor429_429"></a> +<a href="#Foot2note_429_429"><sup>[429]</sup></a> +But the allies gave him plenty of time to draw up Macdonald's and +Oudinot's corps, while they themselves were still so widely +sundered as at first scarcely to stay his onset. The fighting +behind Arcis was desperate: Napoleon exposed his person freely to +snatch victory from the deepening masses in front. At one time a +shell burst in front of him, and his staff shivered as they saw his +figure disappear in the cloud of smoke and dust; but he arose +unhurt, mounted another charger and pressed on the fight. It was in +vain: he was compelled to draw back his men to the town (March +20th). On the morrow a bold attack by Schwarzenberg could have +overwhelmed Napoleon's 30,000 men; but his bold front imposed on +the Austrian leader, while the French were drawn across the river, +only the rearguard suffering heavily from the belated attack of the +allies. With the loss of 4,000 men, Napoleon fell back northwards +into the wasted plains of Sézanne. Hope now vanished from +every breast but his. And surely if human weakness had ever found a +place in that fiery soul, it might now have tempted him to sue for +peace. He had flung himself first north, then south, in order to +keep for France the natural frontiers that he might have had as a +present last November; he had failed; and now he might with honour +accept the terms of the victors. But once more he was too late.</p> + +<p>The negotiations at Châtillon had ended on March<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii410" id= +"page_ii410">[pg.410]</a></span> 19th, that is, nine days later +than had been originally fixed by the allies. The extension of time +was due mainly to their regard and pity for Caulaincourt; and, +indeed, he was in the most pitiable position, a plenipotentiary +without full powers, a Minister kept partly in the dark by his +sovereign, and a patriot unable to rescue his beloved France from +the abyss towards which Napoleon's infatuation was hurrying her. He +knew the resolve of the allies far better than his master's +intentions. It was from Lord Aberdeen that he heard of the failure +of the parleys for an armistice: from him also he learnt that +Napoleon had written a "passionate" letter to Kaiser Francis, and +he expressed satisfaction that the reply was firm and decided.<a +name="FN2anchor430_430"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_430_430"><sup>[430]</sup></a> His private intercourse at +Châtillon with the British plenipotentiaries was frank and +friendly, as also with Stadion. He received frequent letters from +Metternich, advising him quickly to come to terms with the +allies;<a name="FN2anchor431_431"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_431_431"><sup>[431]</sup></a> and the Austrian Minister +sent Prince Esterhazy to warn him that the allies would never +recede from their demand of the old frontiers for France, not even +if the fortune of war drove them across the Rhine for a time. "Is +there, then, no means to enlighten Napoleon as to his true +situation, or to save him if he persists in destroying himself? Has +he irrevocably staked his own and his son's fate on the last +cannon?"—Let Napoleon, then, accept the allied proposal by +sending a counter-project, differing only very slightly from +theirs, and peace would be made.<a name="FN2anchor432_432"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_432_432"><sup>[432]</sup></a> Caulaincourt needed +no spur. "He works tooth and nail for a peace," wrote Stewart, "as +far as depends on him. He dreads Bonaparte's successes even more +than ours, lest they should make him more impracticable."<a name= +"FN2anchor433_433"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_433_433"><sup>[433]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii411" id="page_ii411">[pg.411]</a></span></p> + +<p>But, unfortunately, his latest and most urgent appeal to the +Emperor reached the latter just after the Pyrrhic victory at +Craonne, which left him more stubborn than ever. Far from meeting +the allies halfway, he let fall words that bespoke only injured +pride: "If one must receive lashes," he said within hearing of the +courier, "it is not for me to offer my back to them." On the morrow +he charged Maret to reply to his distressed plenipotentiary that he +(Napoleon) knew best what the situation demanded; the demand of the +allies that France should retire within her old frontiers was only +their <i>first word:</i> Caulaincourt must get to know their +ultimatum: if this was their ultimatum, he must reject it. He +(Napoleon) would possibly give up Dutch Brabant and the fortresses +of Wesel, Castel (opposite Mainz), and Kehl, but would make no +substantial changes on the Frankfurt terms. Still, Caulaincourt +struggled on. When the session of March 10th was closing, he +produced a declaration offering to give up all Napoleon's claims to +control lands beyond the natural limits.</p> + +<p>The others divined that it was his own handiwork, drawn up in +order to spin out the negotiations and leave his master a few days +of grace.<a name="FN2anchor434_434"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_434_434"><sup>[434]</sup></a> They respected his +intentions, and nine days of grace were gained; but the only answer +that Napoleon vouchsafed to Caulaincourt's appeals was the missive +of March 17th from Rheims: "I have received your letters of the +13th. I charge the Duke of Bassano to answer them in detail. I give +you directly the power to make the concessions which would be +indispensable to keep up the activity of the negotiations, and to +get to know at last the ultimatum of the allies, it being well +understood that the treaty would have for result the evacuation of +our territory and the release of all prisoners on both sides." The +instructions<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii412" id= +"page_ii412">[pg.412]</a></span> which he charged the Duke of +Bassano to send to Caulaincourt were such as a victor might have +dictated. The allies must evacuate his territory and give up all +the fortresses as soon as the preliminaries of peace were signed: +if the negotiations were to break off they had better break off on +this question. He himself would cease to control lands beyond the +natural frontiers, and would recognize the independence of Holland: +as regards Belgium, he would refuse to cede it to a prince of the +House of Orange, but he hinted that it might well go to a French +prince as an indemnity—evidently Joseph Bonaparte was meant. +If this concession were made, he expected that all the French +colonies, including the Ile de France, would be restored. Nothing +definite was said about the Rhine frontier.</p> + +<p>The courier who carried these proposals from Rheims to +Châtillon was twice detained by the Russians, and had not +reached the town when the Congress came to an end (March 19th). +Their only importance, therefore, is to show that, despite all the +warnings in which the Prague negotiations were so fruitful, +Napoleon clung to the same threatening and dilatory tactics which +had then driven Austria into the arms of his foes. He still +persisted in looking on the time limit of the allies as +meaningless, on their ultimatum as their <i>first word</i>, from +which they would soon shuffle away under the pressure of his +prowess—and this, too, when Caulaincourt was daily warning +him that the hours were numbered, that nothing would change the +resolve of his foes, and that their defeats only increased their +exasperation against him.</p> + +<p>If anything could have increased this exasperation, it was the +discovery that he was playing with them all the time. On the 20th +the allied scouts brought to head-quarters a despatch written by +Maret the day before to Caulaincourt which contained this damning +sentence: "The Emperor's desires remain entirely vague on +everything relating to the delivering up of the strongholds, +Antwerp, Mayence, and Alessandria, if you should be obliged to +consent to these cessions, as he has the<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii413" id="page_ii413">[pg.413]</a></span> intention, +even after the ratification of the treaty, to take counsel from the +military situation of affairs. Wait for the last moment."<a name= +"FN2anchor435_435"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_435_435"><sup>[435]</sup></a> Peace, then, was to be +patched up for Napoleon's convenience and broken by him at the +first seasonable opportunity. Is it surprising that on that same +day the Ministers of the Powers decided to have no more +negotiations with Napoleon, and that Metternich listened not +unfavourably to the emissary of the Bourbons, the Count de +Vitrolles, whom he had previously kept at arm's length?</p> + +<p>In truth, Napoleon was now about to stake everything on a plan +from which other leaders would have recoiled, but which, in his +eyes, promised a signal triumph. This was to rally the French +garrisons in Lorraine and throw himself on Schwarzenberg's rear. It +was, indeed, his only remaining chance. With his band of barely +40,000 men, kept up to that number by the arrival of levies that +impaired its solidity, he could scarcely hope to beat back the +dense masses now marshalled behind the Aube, the Seine, and the +Marne.</p> + +<p>A glance at the map will show that behind those rivers the +allies could creep up within striking distance of Paris, while from +his position north of the Aube he could attack them only by +crossing one or other of those great streams, the bridges of which +were in their hands. He still held the central position; but it was +robbed of its value if he could not attack. Warfare for him was +little else than the art of swift and decisive attack; or, as he +tersely phrased it, "The art of war is to march<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii414" id="page_ii414">[pg.414]</a></span> +twelve leagues, fight a battle, and march twelve more in pursuit." +As this was now impossible against the fronts and flanks of the +allies, it only remained to threaten the rear of the army which was +most likely to be intimidated by such a manoeuvre. And this was +clearly the army led by Schwarzenberg. From Blücher and +Bülow naught but defiance to the death was to be expected, and +their rear was supported by the Dutch strongholds.</p> + +<p>But the Austrians had shown themselves as soft in their strategy +as in their diplomacy. Everyone at the allied headquarters knew +that Schwarzenberg was unequal to the load of responsibility thrust +on him, that the incursion of a band of Alsatian peasants on his +convoys made him nervous, and that he would not move on Paris as +long as his "communications were exposed to a movement by Chalons +and Vitry."<a name="FN2anchor436_436"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_436_436"><sup>[436]</sup></a> What an effect, then, +would be produced on that timid commander by an "Imperial +Vendée" in Alsace, Lorraine, and Franche-Comté!</p> + +<p>And such a rising might then have become fierce and widespread. +The east and centre were the strongholds of French democracy, as +they had been the hotbed of feudal and monarchical abuses; and at +this very time the Bourbon princes declared themselves at Nancy and +Bordeaux. The tactless Comte d'Artois was at Nancy, striving to +whip up royalist feeling in Lorraine, and his eldest son, the Duc +d'Angoulême, entered Bordeaux with the British red-coats +(March 12th).</p> + +<p>To explain how this last event was possible we must retrace our +steps. After Soult was driven by Wellington from the mountains at +the back of the town of Orthez, he drew back his shattered troops +over the River Adour, and then turned sharply to the east in order +to join hands with Suchet's corps. This move, excellent as it was +in a military sense, left Bordeaux open to the British; and +Wellington forthwith sent Beresford northwards with 12,000 troops +to occupy that great city. He met with a warm greeting from the +French royalists, as<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii415" id= +"page_ii415">[pg.415]</a></span> also did the Duc +d'Angoulême, who arrived soon after. The young prince at once +proclaimed Louis XVIII. King of France, and allowed the royalist +mayor to declare that the allies were advancing to Paris merely in +order to destroy Napoleon and replace him by the rightful monarch. +Strongly as Wellington's sympathies ran with the aim of this +declaration, he emphatically repudiated it. Etiquette compelled him +to do so; for the allies were still negotiating with Napoleon; and +his own tact warned him that the Bourbons must never come into +France under the cloak of the allies.</p> + +<p>The allied sovereigns had as yet done nothing to favour their +cause; and the wiser heads among the French royalists saw how +desirable it was that the initiative should come from France. The +bad effects of the Bordeaux manifesto were soon seen in the +rallying of National Guards and peasants to the tricolour against +the hated <i>fleur-de-lys;</i> and Beresford's men could do little +more than hold their own.<a name="FN2anchor437_437"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_437_437"><sup>[437]</sup></a> If that was the case in +the monarchical south, what might not Napoleon hope to effect in +the east, now that the Bourbon "chimæra" threatened to become +a fact?</p> + +<p>The news as to the state of Paris was less satisfactory. That +fickle populace cheered royalist allusions at the theatres, hissed +off an "official" play that represented Cossack marauders,<a name= +"FN2anchor438_438"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_438_438"><sup>[438]</sup></a> and caused such alarm to +Savary that he wrote to warn his master of the inability of the +police to control the public if the war rolled on towards Paris. +Whether Savary's advice was honestly stupid, or whether, as +Lavalette hints, Talleyrand's intrigues were undermining his +loyalty to Napoleon, it is difficult to say. But certainly the +advice gave Napoleon an additional reason for flinging himself on +Schwarzenberg's rear and drawing him back into Lorraine. He had +reason to hope that Augereau, reinforced by some of Suchet's +troops, would march towards Dijon and threaten the<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii416" id="page_ii416">[pg.416]</a></span> +Austrians on the south, while he himself pressed on them from the +north-east. In that case, would not Austria make peace, and leave +Alexander and Blücher at his mercy? And might he not hope to +cut off the Comte d'Artois, and possibly also catch Bernadotte, who +had been angling unsuccessfully for popular support in the +north-east?</p> + +<p>But, while basing all his hopes on the devotion of the French +peasantry and the pacific leanings of Austria, the French Emperor +left out of count the eager hatred of the Czar and the Prussians. +"Blücher would be mad if he attempted any serious movement," +so Napoleon wrote to Berthier on the 20th, apparently on the +strength of his former suggestion that Joseph should persuade +Bernadotte to desert the allies and attack Blücher's rear.<a +name="FN2anchor439_439"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_439_439"><sup>[439]</sup></a> At least, it is difficult +to find any other reason for Napoleon's strange belief that +Blücher would sit still while his allies were being beaten; +unless, indeed, we accept Marmont's explanation that Napoleon's +brain now rejected all unpleasing news and registered wishes as +facts.</p> + +<p>Fortune seemed to smile on his enterprise. Though he failed to +take Vitry from the allied garrison, yet near St. Dizier he fell on +a Prussian convoy, captured 800 men and 400 wagons filled with +stores. Everywhere he ordered the tocsin to proclaim a +<i>levée en masse</i>, and sent messengers to warn his +Lorraine garrisons to cut their way to his side. His light troops +spread up the valley of the Marne towards Chaumont, capturing +stores and couriers; and he seized this opportunity, when he +pictured the Austrians as thoroughly demoralized, to send +Caulaincourt from Doulevant with offers to renew the negotiations +for peace (March 25th).<a name="FN2anchor440_440"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_440_440"><sup>[440]</sup></a> But while<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii417" id="page_ii417">[pg.417]</a></span> +Napoleon awaits the result of these proposals, his rear is +attacked: he retraces his steps, falls on the assailants, and finds +that they belong to Blücher. But how can Prussians be there in +force? Is not Blücher resting on the banks of the Aisne? And +where is Schwarzenberg? The Emperor pushes a force on to Vitry to +solve this riddle, and there the horrible truth unfolds itself +little by little that he stands on the brink of ruin.</p> + +<p>It is a story instinct with an irony like that of the +infatuation of King Oedipus in the drama of Sophocles. Every step +that the warrior has taken to snatch at victory increases the +completeness of the disaster. The Emperor Francis, scared by the +approach of the French horsemen, and not wishing to fall into the +hands of his son-in-law, has withdrawn with Metternich to +Dijon.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii418" id= +"page_ii418">[pg.418]</a></span></p> + +<p>Napoleon's letter to him is lost.<a name= +"FN2anchor441_441"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_441_441"><sup>[441]</sup></a> Metternich, well guarded +by Castlereagh, is powerless to meet Caulaincourt's offer, and +their flight leaves Schwarzenberg under the influence of the +Czar.<a name="FN2anchor442_442"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_442_442"><sup>[442]</sup></a> Moreover, Blücher has +not been idle. While Napoleon is hurrying eastwards to Vitry, the +Prussian leader drives back Marmont's weak corps, his vanguard +crosses the Marne near Epernay on the 23rd, his Cossacks capture a +courier bearing a letter written on that day by Napoleon to Marie +Louise. It ends thus: "I have decided to march towards the Marne, +in order to push the enemy's army further from Paris, and to draw +near to my fortresses. I shall be this evening at St. Dizier. +Adieu, my friend! Embrace my son." Warned by this letter of +Napoleon's plan, Blücher pushes on; his outposts on the morrow +join hands with those of Schwarzenberg, and send a thrill of vigour +into the larger force.</p> + +<p>That leader, held at bay by Macdonald's rearguard, was groping +after Napoleon, when the capture of a French despatch, and the news +forwarded by Blücher, informed him of the French Emperor's +eastward march. A council of war was therefore held at Pougy on the +afternoon of the 23rd, when the Czar and the bolder spirits led +Schwarzenberg to give up his communications with Switzerland, and +stake everything on joining Blücher, and following Napoleon's +40,000 with an array of 180,000 men. But the capture of another +French despatch a few hours later altered the course of events once +more. This time it was a budget of official news from Paris to +Napoleon, describing the exhaustion of the finances, the discontent +of the populace, and the sensation caused by Wellington's successes +and the capture of Bordeaux. These glad tidings inspired Alexander +with a far more incisive plan—to march on Paris. This +suggestion had been pressed on him on the 17th<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii419" id="page_ii419">[pg.419]</a></span> +by Baron de Vitrolles, a French royalist agent, at the close of a +long interview; and now its advantages were obvious. Accordingly, +at Sommepuis, on the 24th, he convoked his generals, Barclay, +Volkonski, Toll, and Diebitsch, to seek their advice. Barclay was +for following Napoleon, but the two last voted for the advance to +Paris, Toll maintaining that only 10,000 horsemen need be left +behind to screen their movements. The Czar signified his warm +approval of this plan; a little later the King of Prussia gave his +assent, and Schwarzenberg rather doubtfully deferred to their +wishes. Thus the result of Napoleon's incursion on the rear of the +allies signally belied his expectations. Instead of compelling the +enemy to beat a retreat on the Rhine, it left the road open to his +capital.<a name="FN2anchor443_443"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_443_443"><sup>[443]</sup></a></p> + +<p>At dawn on the 25th, then, the allied Grand Army turned to the +right-about, while Blücher's men marched joyfully on the +parallel road from Chalons. Near La Fère-Champenoise, on +that day, a cloud of Russian and Austrian horse harassed Marmont's +and Mortier's corps, and took 2,500 prisoners and fifty cannon. +Further to the north, Blücher's Cossacks swooped on a division +of 4,500 men, mostly National Guards, that guarded a large convoy. +Stoutly the French formed in squares, and beat them off again and +again. Thereupon Colonel Hudson Lowe rode away southwards, to beg +reinforcements from Wrede's Bavarians.</p> + +<p>They, too, failed to break that indomitable infantry. The 180 +wagons had to be left behind; but the recruits plodded on, and +seemed likely to break through to<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii420" id="page_ii420">[pg.420]</a></span> Marmont, when the +Czar came on the scene. At once he ordered up artillery, riddled +their ranks with grapeshot, and when their commander, Pacthod, +still refused to surrender, threatened to overwhelm their battered +squares by the cavalry of his Guard. Pacthod thereupon ordered his +square to surrender. Another band also grounded arms; but the men +in the last square fought on, reckless of life, and were beaten +down by a whirlwind of sabring, stabbing horsemen, whose fury the +generous Czar vainly strove to curb. "I blushed for my very nature +as a man," wrote Colonel Lowe, "at witnessing this scene of +carnage." The day was glorious for France, but it cost her, in all, +more than 5,000 killed and wounded, 4,000 prisoners, and 80 cannon, +besides the provisions and stores designed for Napoleon's army.<a +name="FN2anchor444_444"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_444_444"><sup>[444]</sup></a> Nothing but the wreck of +Marmont's and Mortier's corps, about 12,000 men in all, now barred +the road to Paris. Meeting with no serious resistance, the allies +crossed the Marne at Meaux, and on the 29th reached Bondy, within +striking distance of the French capital.</p> + +<p>In that city the people were a prey, first to sheer incredulity, +then to the wildest dismay. To them history was but a melodrama and +war a romance. Never since the time of Jeanne d'Arc had a foreign +enemy come within sight of their spires. For ramparts they had +octroi walls, and in place of the death-dealing defiance of 1792 +they now showed only the spasmodic vehemence or ironical +resignation of an over-cultivated stock. As M. Charles de +Rémusat finely remarks on their varying moods, "The +despotism which makes a constant show of prosperity gives men +little fortitude to meet adversity." Doubtless the royalists, with +Talleyrand as their<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii421" id= +"page_ii421">[pg.421]</a></span> factotum, worked to paralyze the +defence; but they formed a small minority, and the masses would +have fought for Napoleon had he been present to direct everything. +But he was far away, rushing back through Champagne to retrieve his +blunder, and in his place they had Joseph. The ex-King of Spain was +not the man for the hour. He was no hero to breathe defiance into a +bewildered crowd, nor was he well seconded. Clarke, and Moncey, the +commander of the 12,000 National Guards, had not armed one-half of +that doubtful militia. Marmont and Mortier were at hand, and, with +the garrison and National Guards, mustered some 42,000 men.</p> + +<p>But what were these against the trained host of more than +100,000 men now marching against the feeble barriers on the north +and east? Moreover, Joseph and the Council of Regency had +dispirited the defenders by causing the Empress Regent and the +infant King of Rome to leave the capital along with the treasure. +In Joseph's defence it should be said that Napoleon had twice +warned him to transfer the seat of Government to the south of the +Loire if the allies neared Paris, and in no case to allow the +Empress and the King of Rome to be captured. "Do not leave the side +of my son: I had rather know that he was in the Seine than in the +hands of the enemies of France." The Emperor's views as to the +effect of the capture of Paris were also well known. In January he +remarked to Mollien, the Minister of the Treasure, "My dear fellow, +if the enemy reaches the gates of Paris, the Empire is no more."<a +name="FN2anchor445_445"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_445_445"><sup>[445]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Oppressed by these gloomy omens, the defenders awaited the onset +of the allies at Montreuil, Romainville Pantin, and on the northern +plain (March 30th). At some points French valour held up +successfully against the dense masses; but in the afternoon +Marmont, seeing his thin lines overlapped, and in imminent danger +of<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii422" id= +"page_ii422">[pg.422]</a></span> being cut off at Belleville, sent +out a request for a truce, as Joseph had empowered him to do if +affairs proved to be irretrievable. At all points resistance was +hopeless; Mortier was hard pressed on the north-east; at the Clichy +gate Moncey and his National Guards fought only for honour; and so, +after a whole day of sanguinary conflicts, the great city +surrendered on honourable terms.</p> + +<p>And thus ended the great impulse which had gone forth from Paris +since 1789, which had flooded the plains of Germany, the plateaux +of Spain, the cities of Italy, and the steppes of Russia, levelling +the barriers of castes and creeds, and binding men in a new and +solid unity. The reaction against that great centrifugal and +international movement had now become centripetal and profoundly +national. Thanks to Napoleon's statecraft, the peoples of Europe +from the Volga to the Tagus were now embattled in a mighty phalanx, +and were about to enter in triumph the city that only twenty-five +years before had heralded the dawn of their nascent liberties.</p> + +<p>And what of Napoleon, in part the product and in part the cause, +of this strange reaction? By a strange Nemesis, his military genius +and his overweening contempt of Schwarzenberg drew him aside at the +very time when the allies could strike with deadly effect at the +heart of his centralized despotism. On the 29th he hears of +disaffection at Paris, of the disaster at La Fère +Champenoise, and of the loss of Lyons by Augereau. He at once sees +the enormity of his blunder. His weary Guards and he seek to +annihilate space. They press on by the unguarded road by way of +Troyes and Fontainebleau, thereby cutting off all chance of the +Emperor Francis and Metternich sending messages from Dijon to +Paris. By incredible exertions the men cover seventeen leagues on +the 29th and reach Troyes.</p> + +<p>Napoleon, accompanied by Caulaincourt, Drouot, Flahaut, and +Lefebvre, rushes on, wearing out horses at every stage: at +Fontainebleau on the 30th he hears that <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii423" id="page_ii423">[pg.423]</a></span>his consort +has left Paris; at Essonne, that the battle is raging. Late at +night, near Athis, he meets a troop of horse under General +Belliard: eagerly he questions this brave officer, and learns that +Joseph has left Paris, and that the battle is over. "Forward then +to Paris: everywhere where I am not they act stupidly."—"But, +sire," says the general, "it is too late: Paris has +capitulated."</p> + +<p>The indomitable will is not yet broken. He must go on; he will +sound the tocsin, rouse the populace, tear up the capitulation, and +beat the insolent enemy. The sight of Mortier's troops, a little +further on, at last burns the truth into his brain: he sends on +Caulaincourt with full powers to treat for peace, and then sits up +for the rest of the night, poring over his maps and measuring the +devotion of his Guard against the inexorable bounds of time and +space. He is within ten miles of Paris, and sees the glare of the +enemy's watch-fires all over the northern sky.</p> + +<p>On the morrow he hears that the allied sovereigns are about to +enter Paris, and Marmont warns him by letter that public opinion +has much changed since the withdrawal, first of the Empress, and +then of Joseph, Louis, and Jerome. This was true. The people were +disgusted by their flight; Blücher now had eighty cannon +planted on the heights of Montmartre; and men knew that he would +not spare Paris if she hazarded a further effort. And thus, when, +on that same morning, the Czar, with the King of Prussia on his +right, and Schwarzenberg on his left, rode into Paris at the head +of the Russian and Prussian Guards, they met with nothing worse +than sullen looks on the part of the masses, while knots of +enthusiastic royalists shouted wildly for the Bourbons, and women +flung themselves to kiss the boots of the liberating Emperor. The +Bourbon party, however, was certainly in the minority; but at +places along the route their demonstrations were effective enough +to influence an impressionable populace, and to delight the +conquerors.—"The white cockade appeared very +universally:"—wrote Stewart with suspicious<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii424" id="page_ii424">[pg.424]</a></span> +emphasis—"many of the National Guards, whom I saw, wore +them."<a name="FN2anchor446_446"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_446_446"><sup>[446]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Fearing that the Elysée Palace had been mined, the Czar +installed himself at Talleyrand's mansion, opposite the Place de la +Concorde; and forthwith there took place a most important private +Council. The two monarchs were present, along with Nesselrode and +Napoleon's Corsican enemy, Pozzo di Borgo. Princes Schwarzenberg +and Lichtenstein represented Austria; while Talleyrand and Dalberg +were there to plead for the House of Bourbon: De Pradt and Baron +Louis were afterwards summoned. The Czar opened the deliberations +by declaring that there were three courses open, to make peace with +Napoleon, to accept Marie Louise as Regent for her son, or to +recall the Bourbons.<a name="FN2anchor447_447"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_447_447"><sup>[447]</sup></a> The first he declared to +be impossible; the second was beset by the gravest difficulties; +and, while stating the objections to the Bourbons, he let it be +seen that he now favoured this solution, provided that it really +was the will of France. He then called on Talleyrand to speak; and +that pleader set forth the case of the Bourbons with his usual +skill. The French army, he said, was more devoted to its own glory +than to Napoleon. France longed for peace, and she could only find +it with due sureties under her old dynasty. If the populace had not +as yet declared for the Bourbons, who could wonder at that, when +the allies persisted in negotiating with Napoleon? But let them +declare that they will no more treat with him, and France would at +once show her real desires. For himself, he would answer for the +Senate. The Czar was satisfied; Frederick William assented; the +Austrian princes said not a word on behalf of the<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii425" id="page_ii425">[pg.425]</a></span> +claims of Marie Louise; and the cause of the House of Bourbon +easily triumphed.<a name="FN2anchor448_448"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_448_448"><sup>[448]</sup></a></p> + +<p>On the morrow appeared in the "Journal des Débats" a +decisive proclamation, signed by Alexander <i>on behalf of all the +allied Powers;</i> but we must be permitted to doubt whether the +Emperor Francis, if present, would have allowed it to appear, +especially if his daughter were present in Paris as Regent. The +proclamation set forth that the allies would never again treat with +"Napoleon Bonaparte" or any member of his family; that they would +respect the integrity of France as it existed under its lawful +kings, and would recognize and guarantee the constitution which the +French nation should adopt.</p> + +<p>Accordingly, they invited the Senate at once to appoint a +Provisional Government. Talleyrand, as Grand Elector of the Empire, +had the power to summon that guardian of the commonwealth, whose +vote would clearly be far more expeditious than the +<i>plébiscite</i> on which Alexander had previously set his +heart. Of the 140 Senators only 64 assembled, but over them +Talleyrand's influence was supreme. He spake, and they silently +registered his suggestions. Thus it was that the august body, +taught by ten years of despotism to bend gracefully before every +breeze, fulfilled its last function in the Napoleonic +<i>régime</i> by overthrowing the very constitution which it +had been expressly charged to uphold. The date was the 1st of +April. Talleyrand, Dalberg, Beurnonville, Jaucourt, and +l'Abbé de Montesquiou at once formed a Provisional +Government; but the soul of it was Talleyrand. The Czar gave the +word, and Talleyrand acted as scene-shifter. The last tableau of +this constitutional farce was reached on the following day, when +the Senate and the Corps Législatif declared that Napoleon +had ceased to reign.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii426" id= +"page_ii426">[pg.426]</a></span></p> + +<p>Such was the ex-bishop's revenge for insults borne for many a +year with courtly tact, but none the less bitterly felt. Napoleon +and he had come to regard each other with instinctive antipathy; +but while the diplomatist hid his hatred under the cloak of irony, +the soldier blurted forth his suspicions. Before leaving Paris, the +Emperor had wound up his last Council-meeting by a diatribe against +enemies left in the citadel; and his words became all the hotter +when he saw that Talleyrand, who was then quietly conversing with +Joseph in a corner, took no notice of the outburst. From Champagne +he sent off an order to Savary to arrest the ex-Minister, but that +functionary took upon himself to disregard the order. Probably +there was some understanding between them. And thus, after steering +past many a rock, the patient schemer at last helped Europe to +shipwreck that mighty adventurer when but a league or two from +port.</p> + +<p>But all was not over yet. Napoleon had fallen back on +Fontainebleau, in front of which town he was assembling a force of +nearly 60,000 men. Marie Louise, with the Ministers, was at Blois, +and desired to make her way to the side of her consort. Had she +done so, and had her father been present at Paris, a very +interesting and delicate situation would have been the result; and +we may fancy that it would have needed all Metternich's finesse and +Castlereagh's common sense to keep the three monarchs united. But +Francis was still at Dijon; and Metternich and Castlereagh did not +reach Paris until April 10th; so that everything in these important +days was decided by the Czar and Talleyrand, both of them +irreconcilable foes of Napoleon. It was in vain that Caulaincourt +(April 1st) begged the Czar to grant peace to Napoleon on the basis +of the old frontiers. "Peace with him would only be a truce," was +the reply.</p> + +<p>The victor did not repulse the idea of a Regency so absolutely, +and the faithful Minister at once hurried to Fontainebleau to +persuade his master to abdicate in favour of his son. Napoleon +repulsed the offer with disdain: rather than <i>that</i>, he would +once more try the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii427" id= +"page_ii427">[pg.427]</a></span> hazards of war. He knew that the +Old and the Young Guard, still nearly 9,000 strong in all, burned +to revenge the insult to French pride; and at the close of a review +held on the 3rd in the great court of the palace, they shouted, "To +Paris!" and swore to bury themselves under its ruins. It needed not +the acclaim of his veterans to prompt him to the like resolve. +When, on April 1st, he received a Verbal Note from Alexander, +stating that the allies would no longer treat with him, except on +his private and family concerns, he exclaimed to Marmont, at the +line of the Essonne, that he must fight, for it was a necessity of +his position. He also proposed to that Marshal to cross the Seine +and attack the allies, forgetting that the Marne, with its bridges +held by them, was in the way. Marmont, endowed with a keen and +sardonic intelligence, had already seen that his master was more +and more the victim of illusions, never crediting the existence of +difficulties that he did not actually witness. And when, on the +3rd, or perhaps earlier, offers came from the royalists, the +Marshal promised to help them in the way that will shortly +appear.</p> + +<p>Napoleon's last overtures to the Czar came late on the following +day. On that morning he had a long and heated discussion with +Berthier, Ney, Oudinot, and Lefebvre. Caulaincourt and Maret were +present as peacemakers. The Marshals upbraided Napoleon with the +folly of marching on Paris. Angered by their words Napoleon at last +said: "The army will obey me." "No," retorted Ney, "it will obey +its commanders."</p> + +<p>Macdonald, who had just arrived with his weary corps, took up +their case with his usual frankness. "Our horses," he said, "can go +no further: we have not enough ammunition for one skirmish, and no +means of procuring more. If we fail, as we probably shall, the +whole of France will be destroyed. We can still impose on the +enemy: let us retain our attitude.... We have had enough of war +without kindling civil war." Finally the Emperor gave way, and drew +up a declaration couched<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii428" +id="page_ii428">[pg.428]</a></span> in these terms: "The allied +Powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon was the sole +obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor +Napoleon, faithful to his oaths, declares that he is ready to +descend from the throne, to leave France, and even give up his +life, for the good of the fatherland, inseparable from the rights +of his son, of those of the regency of the Empress and of the +maintenance of the laws of the Empire."<a name= +"FN2anchor449_449"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_449_449"><sup>[449]</sup></a></p> + +<p>A careful reading of this document will show that it was not an +act of abdication, but merely a conditional offer to abdicate, +which would satisfy those undiplomatic soldiers and gain time. +Macdonald also relates that, after drawing it up, the Emperor threw +himself on the sofa, struck his thigh, and said: "Nonsense, +gentlemen! let us leave all that alone and march to-morrow, we +shall beat them." But they held him to his promise; and +Caulaincourt, Ney, and Macdonald straightway proceeding to Paris, +beset the Czar with many entreaties and some threats to recognize +the Regency.</p> + +<p>In their interview, late at night on the 4th, they seemed to +make a great impression, especially when they reminded him of his +promise not to force any government on France. Next, the Czar +called in the members of the Provisional Government, and heard +their arguments that a Regency must speedily give way before the +impact of the one masterful will. Yet again Alexander listened to +the eloquence of Caulaincourt, and finally to the pleadings of the +now anxious provisionals. So the night wore on at Talleyrand's +mansion, the Czar finally stating that, after hearing the Prussian +monarch's advice, he would give his decision. And shortly before +dawn came the news that Marmont's corps had marched over to the +enemy. "You see," said Alexander to Pozzo di Borgo, "it is +Providence that wills it: no more doubt or hesitation now."<a name= +"FN2anchor450_450"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_450_450"><sup>[450]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii429" id="page_ii429">[pg.429]</a></span></p> + +<p>On that same night, in fact, Marmont's corps of 12,000 men was +brought from Essonne within the lines of the allies, by the +Marshal's generals. Marmont himself was then in Paris, having been +induced by Ney and Macdonald to come with them, so as to hinder the +carrying out of his treasonable design; but his generals, who were +in the secret, were alarmed by the frequency of Napoleon's +couriers, and carried out the original plan. Thus, at dawn of the +5th, the rank and file found themselves amidst the columns and +squadrons of the allies. It was now too late to escape; the men +swore at their leaders with helpless fury; and 12,000 men were thus +filched from Napoleon's array.<a name="FN2anchor451_451"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_451_451"><sup>[451]</sup></a></p> + +<p>If this conduct be viewed from the personal standpoint, it must +be judged a base betrayal of an old friend and benefactor; and it +is usually regarded in that light alone. And yet Marmont might +plead that his action was necessary to prevent Napoleon sacrificing +his troops, and perhaps also his capital, to a morbid pride and +desire for revenge. The Marshal owed something to France. The +Chambers had pronounced his master's abdication, and Paris seemed +to acquiesce in their decision: Bordeaux and Lyons had now +definitely hoisted the white flag: Wellington had triumphed in the +south; Schwarzenberg marshalled 140,000 men around the capital; and +Marmont knew, perhaps, better than any of the Marshals, the +obstinacy of that terrible will which had strewn the roads between +Moscow, Paris, and Lisbon with a million of corpses. Was it not +time that this should end? And would it end as long as Napoleon saw +any chance of snatching a temporary success?</p> + +<p>However we may regard Marmont's conduct, there can be no doubt +that it helped on Napoleon's fall. The Czar was too subtle a +diplomatist to attach much importance to Napoleon's declaration +cited above. He<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii430" id= +"page_ii430">[pg.430]</a></span> must have seen in it a device to +gain time. But he himself also wished for a few more hours' respite +before flinging away the scabbard; and we may regard his lengthy +balancings between the pleas of Caulaincourt and Talleyrand as +prompted partly by a wish to sip to the full the sweets of revenge +for the occupation of Moscow, but mainly by the resolve to mark +time until Marmont's corps had been brought over.</p> + +<p>Now that the head was struck off Napoleon's lance, the Czar +repulsed all notion of a Regency, but declared that he was ready to +grant generous terms to Napoleon if the latter abdicated outright. +"Now, when he is in trouble," he said, "I will become once more his +friend and will forget the past." In conferences with Napoleon's +representatives, Alexander decided that Napoleon must keep the +title of Emperor, and receive a suitable pension. The islands of +Corfu, Corsica, and Elba were considered for his future abode: the +last offered the fewest objections; and though Metternich later on +protested against the choice of Elba, the Czar felt his honour +pledged to this arrangement.<a name="FN2anchor452_452"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_452_452"><sup>[452]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Napoleon himself now began to yield to the inevitable. On +hearing the news of Marmont's defection, he sat for some time as if +stupefied, then sadly remarked: "The ungrateful man: well! he will +be more unhappy than I." But once more, on the 6th, the fighting +instinct comes uppermost. He plans to retire with his faithful +troops beyond the Loire, and rally the corps of Augereau, Suchet, +and Soult. "Come," he cries to his generals, "let us march to the +Alps." Not one of them speaks in reply. "Ah," replies the Emperor +to their unspoken thoughts; "you want repose: have it then. Alas! +you know not how many disappointments and dangers await you on your +beds of down." He then wrote his formal abdication:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"The allied Powers having declared that the Emperor was<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii431" id= +"page_ii431">[pg.431]</a></span> the sole obstacle to the +re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor, faithful to his +oaths, declares that he renounces, for himself and his heirs, the +thrones of France and Italy, and that there is no sacrifice, not +even that of life, which he is not ready to make for the interest +of France."</p> +</div> + +<p>The allies made haste to finish the affair; for even now they +feared that the caged lion would burst his bars. Indeed, the trusty +secretary Fain asserts that when on Easter Monday, the 11th, +Caulaincourt brought back the allies' ratification of this deed, +Napoleon's first demand was to retract the abdication. It would be +unjust, however, to lay too much stress on this strange conduct; +for at that time the Emperor's mind was partly unhinged by +maddening tumults.</p> + +<p>His anguish increased when he heard the final terms of the +allies. They allotted to him the isle of Elba; to his consort and +heir, the duchies of Parma, Placentia and Guastalla, and two +millions of francs as an annual subsidy, divided equally between +himself and her. They were to keep the title of Emperor and +Empress; but their son would bear the name of Duke of Parma, etc. +The other Bonapartes received an annual subsidy of 2,500,000 +francs, this and the former sum being paid by France. Four hundred +soldiers might accompany him to Elba. A "suitable establishment" +was to be provided for Eugène outside of France.<a name= +"FN2anchor453_453"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_453_453"><sup>[453]</sup></a> For some hours Napoleon +refused to ratify this compact. All hope of resistance was vain, +for Oudinot, Victor, Lefebvre, and, finally, Ney and Berthier, had +gone over to the royalists: even the soldiery began to waver. But a +noble pride held back the mighty conqueror from accepting Elba and +signing a money compact. It is not without a struggle that a +Cæsar sinks to the level of a Sancho Panza.</p> + +<p>He then talked to Caulaincourt with the insight that always +illumined his judgments. Marie Louise ought to have Tuscany, he +said: Parma would not befit her<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii432" id="page_ii432">[pg.432]</a></span> dignity. Besides, +if she had to traverse other States to come to him, would she ever +do so? He next talked of his Marshals. Masséna's were the +greatest exploits: but Suchet had shown himself the wisest both in +war and administration. Soult was able, but too ambitious. Berthier +was honest, sensible, the model of a chief of the staff; and "yet +he has now caused me much pain." Not a word escaped him about +Davoust, still manfully struggling at Hamburg. Not one of his +Ministers, he complained, had come from Blois to bid him farewell. +He then spoke of his greatest enemy—England. "She has done me +much harm, doubtless, but I have left in her flanks a poisoned +dart. It is I who have made this debt, that will ever burden, if +not crush, future generations." Finally, he came back to the +hateful compact which Caulaincourt pressed him in vain to sign. How +could he take money from the allies. How could he leave France so +small, after receiving her so great!</p> + +<p>That same night he sought to end his life. On February the 8th +he had warned his brother Joseph that he would do so if Paris were +captured. During the retreat from Moscow he had carried about a +phial which was said to contain opium, and he now sought to end his +miseries. But Caulaincourt, his valet Constant, and the surgeon +Ivan were soon at hand with such slight cures as were possible. +After violent sickness the Emperor sank into deep prostration; but, +when refreshed by tea, and by the cool air of dawning day, he +gradually revived. "Fate has decided," he exclaimed: "I must live +and await all that Providence has in store for me."<a name= +"FN2anchor454_454"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_454_454"><sup>[454]</sup></a> He then signed the treaty +with the allies, presented Macdonald with the sword of Murad Bey, +and calmly began to prepare for his departure.</p> + +<p>Marie Louise did not come to see him. Her decision to do so was +overruled by her father, in obedience to whose behests she repaired +from Blois to Rambouillet.<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii433" id="page_ii433">[pg.433]</a></span></p> + +<p>There, guarded by Cossacks, she saw Francis, Alexander, and +Frederick William in turn. What passed between them is not known: +but the result was that, on April 23rd, she set out for Vienna, +whence she finally repaired to Parma; she manifested no great +desire to see her consort at Elba, but soon consoled herself with +the Count de Neipperg.</p> + +<p>No doubts as to her future conduct, no qualms of conscience as +to the destiny of France now ruffled Napoleon's mind. Like a sky +cleared by a thunderstorm, once more it shone forth with clear +radiance. Those who saw him now were astonished at his calmness, +except in some moments when he declaimed at his wife and child +being kept from him by Austrian schemes. Then he stormed and wept +and declared that he would seek refuge in England, which General +Köller, the Austrian commissioner appointed to escort him to +Elba, strongly advised him to do. But for the most part he showed +remarkable composure. When Bausset sought to soothe him by +remarking that France would still form one of the finest of realms, +he replied: "<i>with remarkable serenity</i>—'I abdicate and +I yield nothing.'"<a name="FN2anchor455_455"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_455_455"><sup>[455]</sup></a> The words hide a world of +meaning: they inclose the secret of the Hundred Days.</p> + +<p>On the 20th, he bade farewell to his Guard: in thrilling words +he told them that his mission thenceforth would be to describe to +posterity the wonders they had achieved: he then embraced General +Petit, kissed the war-stained banner, and, wafted on his way by the +sobs of these unconquered heroes, set forth for the Mediterranean. +In the central districts, and as far as Lyons, he was often greeted +by the well-known shouts, but, further south, the temper of the +people changed.</p> + +<p>At Orange they cursed him to his face, and hurled stones at the +windows of the carriage; Napoleon, protected by Bertrand, sat +huddled up in the corner, "apparently very much frightened." After +forcing a way through the rabble, the Emperor, when at a safe +distance,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii434" id= +"page_ii434">[pg.434]</a></span> donned a plain great coat, a +Russian cloak, and a plain round hat with a white cockade: in this +or similar disguises he sought to escape notice at every village or +town, evincing, says the British Commissioner, Colonel Campbell, +"much anxiety to save his life."</p> + +<p>By a détour he skirted the town of Avignon, where the mob +thirsted for his blood; and by another device he disappointed the +people of Orgon, who had prepared an effigy of him in uniform, +smeared with blood, and placarded with the words: "Voilà +donc l'odieux tyran! Tôt ou tard le crime est puni."<a name= +"FN2anchor456_456"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_456_456"><sup>[456]</sup></a> In this humiliating way he +hurried on towards the coast, where a British frigate, the +"Undaunted," was waiting for him. There some suspicious delays +ensued, which aroused the fears of the allied commissioners, +especially as bands of French soldiers began to draw near after the +break-up of Eugène's army.<a name="FN2anchor457_457"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_457_457"><sup>[457]</sup></a></p> + +<p>At last, on the 28th, accompanied by Counts Bertrand and Drouot, +he set sail from Fréjus. It was less than fifteen years +since he had landed there crowned with the halo of his oriental +adventures.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii435" id= +"page_ii435">[pg.435]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXXVIII</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>ELBA AND PARIS</center> + +<br> + + +<p>If it be an advantage to pause in the midst of the rush of life +and take one's bearings afresh, then Napoleon was fortunate in +being drifted to the quiet eddy of Elba. He there had leisure to +review his career, to note where he had served his generation and +succeeded, where also he had dashed himself fruitlessly against the +fundamental instincts of mankind. Undoubtedly he did essay this +mental stock-taking. He remarked to the conscientious Drouot that +he was wrong in not making peace at the Congress of Prague; that +trust in his own genius and in his soldiery led him astray; "but +those who blame me have never drunk of Fortune's intoxicating cup." +When a turn of her wheel brought him uppermost again, he confessed +that at Elba he had heard, as in a tomb, the verdict of posterity; +and there are signs that his maturer convictions thenceforth strove +to curb the old domineering instincts that had wrecked his +life.</p> + +<p>Introspection, however, was alien to his being; he was made for +the camp rather than the study; his critical powers, if turned in +for a time on himself, quickly swung back to work upon men and +affairs; and they found the needed exercise in organizing his +Liliputian Empire and surveying the course of European politics. In +the first weeks he was up at dawn, walking or riding about Porto +Ferrajo and its environs, planning better defences, or tracing out +new roads and avenues of mulberry trees. "I have never seen a man," +wrote Campbell, "with so much activity and restless perseverance: +he appears to take pleasure in perpetual movement, and in seeing +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii436" id= +"page_ii436">[pg.436]</a></span>those who accompany him sink under +fatigue." About seven hundred of his Guards were brought over on +British transports; and these, along with Corsicans and Tuscans, +guarded him against royalist plotters, real or supposed. In a short +time he purchased a few small vessels, and annexed the islet of +Pianosa. These affairs and the formation of an Imperial Court for +the delectation of his mother and his sister Pauline, who now +joined him, served to drive away ennui; but he bitterly resented +the Emperor Francis's refusal to let his wife and son come to him. +Whether Marie Louise would have come is more than doubtful, for her +relations to Count Neipperg were already notorious; but the +detention of his son was a heartless action that aroused general +sympathy for the lonely man. The Countess Walewska paid him a visit +for some days, bringing the son whom she had borne him.<a name= +"FN2anchor458_458"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_458_458"><sup>[458]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Meanwhile Europe was settling down uneasily on its new political +foundations. Considering that France had been at the mercy of the +allies, she had few just grounds of complaint against them. The +Treaties of Paris (May 30th, 1814) left her with rather wider +bounds than those of 1791; and she kept the art treasures reft by +Napoleon. Perfidious Albion yielded up all her French colonial +conquests, except Mauritius, Tobago, and St. Lucia. Britons +grumbled at the paltry gains brought by a war that had cost more +than £600,000,000: but Castlereagh justified the policy of +conciliation. "It is better," said he, "for France to be commercial +and pacific than a warlike and conquering State." We insisted on +her ceding Belgium to the House of Orange, while we retained the +Dutch colonies conquered by us, the Cape, Demerara, and +Curaçoa—paying £6,000,000 for them.<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii437" id= +"page_ii437">[pg.437]</a></span></p> + +<p>The loss of the Netherlands, the Rhineland, and Italy galled +French pride. Loud were the murmurs of the throngs of soldiers that +came from the fortresses of Germany, or the prisons of Spain, +Russia, and England—70,000 crossed over from our shores +alone—at the harshness of the allies and the pusillanimity of +the Bourbons. The return from war to peace is always hard; and now +these gaunt warriors came back to a little France that perforce +discharged them or placed them on half-pay. Perhaps they might have +been won over by a tactful Court: but the Bourbons, especially that +typical <i>émigré</i>, the Comte d'Artois, were +nothing if not tactless, witness their shelving of the Old Guard +and formation of the Maison du Roi, a privileged and highly paid +corps of 6,000 nobles and royalist gentlemen. The peasants, too, +were uneasy, especially those who held the lands of nobles +confiscated in the Revolution. To indemnify the former owners was +impossible in face of the torrent of exorbitant claims that flowed +in. And the year 1814, which began as a soul-stirring epic, ended +with sordid squabbles worthy of a third-rate farce.</p> + +<p>Moreover, at this very time, the former allies seemed on the +brink of war. The limits of our space admit only of the briefest +glance at the disputes of the Powers at the Congress of Vienna. The +storm centre of Europe was the figure of the Czar. To our +ambassador at Vienna, Sir Charles Stewart, he declared his resolve +to keep western Poland and never to give up 7,000,000 of his +"Polish subjects."<a name="FN2anchor459_459"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_459_459"><sup>[459]</sup></a> Strange to say, he +ultimately gained the assent of Prussia to this objectionable +scheme, provided that she acquired the whole of Saxony, while +Frederick Augustus was to be transplanted to the Rhineland with +Bonn as capital. To these proposals<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii438" id="page_ii438">[pg.438]</a></span> Austria, England, +and France offered stern opposition, and framed a secret compact +(January 3rd, 1815) to resist them, if need be, with armies +amounting to 450,000 men. But, though swords were rattled in their +scabbards, they were not drawn. When news reached Vienna of the +activity of Bonapartists in France and of Murat in Italy, the +Powers agreed (February 8th) to the Saxon-Polish compromise which +took shape in the map of Eastern Europe. The territorial +arrangements in the west were evidently inspired by the wish to +build up bulwarks against France. Belgium was tacked on to Holland; +Germany was huddled into a Confederation, in which the princes had +complete sovereign powers; and the Kingdom of Sardinia grew to more +than its former bulk by recovering Savoy and Nice and gaining +Genoa.</p> + +<p>This piling up of artificial barriers against some future +Napoleon was to serve the designs of the illustrious exile himself. +The instinct of nationality, which his blows had aroused to full +vigour, was now outraged by the sovereigns whom it carried along to +victory. Belgians strongly objected to Dutch rule, and German +"Unitarians," as Metternich dubbed them, spurned a form of union +which subjected the Fatherland to Austria and her henchmen. Hardest +of all was the fate of Italy. After learning the secret of her +essential unity under Napoleon, she was now parcelled out among her +former rulers; and thrills of rage shot through the peninsula when +the Hapsburgs settled down at Venice and Milan, while their scions +took up the reins at Modena, Parma, and Florence.</p> + +<p>It was on this popular indignation that Murat now built his +hopes. After throwing over Napoleon, he had looked to find favour +with the allies; but his movements in 1814 had been so suspicious +that the fate of his kingdom remained hanging in the balance. The +Bourbons of Paris and Madrid strove hard to effect his overthrow; +but Austria and England, having tied their hands early in 1814 by +treaties with him, could only wait and watch <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii439" id= +"page_ii439">[pg.439]</a></span>in the hope that the impetuous +soldier would take a false step. He did so in February, 1815, when +he levied forces, summoned Louis XVIII. to declare whether he was +at war with him, and prepared to march into Northern Italy.</p> + +<p>The disturbed state of the peninsula caused the Powers much +uneasiness as to the presence of Napoleon at Elba. Louis XVIII. in +his despatches, and Talleyrand in private conversations, two or +three times urged his removal to the Azores; but, with the +exception of Castlereagh, who gave a doubtful assent, the +plenipotentiaries scouted the thought of it. Metternich entirely +opposed it, and the Czar would certainly have objected to the +reversal of his Elba plan, had Talleyrand made a formal proposal to +that effect. But he did not do so. The official records of the +Congress contain not a word on the subject. Equally unfounded were +the newspaper rumours that the Congress was considering the +advisability of removing Napoleon to St. Helena. On this topic the +official records are also silent; and we have the explicit denial +of the Duke of Wellington (who reached Vienna on the 1st of +February to relieve Castlereagh) that "the Congress ever had any +intention of removing Bonaparte from Elba to St. Helena."<a name= +"FN2anchor460_460"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_460_460"><sup>[460]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Napoleon's position was certainly one of unstable equilibrium, +that tended towards some daring enterprise or inglorious +bankruptcy. The maintenance of his troops cost him more than +1,000,000 francs a year, while his revenue was less than half of +that sum. He ought to<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii440" id= +"page_ii440">[pg.440]</a></span> have received 2,000,000 francs a +year from Louis XVIII.; but that monarch, while confiscating the +property of the Bonapartes in France, paid not a centime of the +sums which the allies had pledged him to pay to the fallen House. +Both the Czar and our envoy, Castlereagh, warmly reproached +Talleyrand with his master's shabby conduct; to which the +plenipotentiary replied that it was dangerous to furnish Napoleon +with money as long as Italy was in so disturbed a state. +Castlereagh, on his return to England by way of Paris, again +pressed the matter on Louis XVIII., who promised to take the matter +in hand. But he was soon quit of it: for, as he wrote to Talleyrand +on March 7th, Bonaparte's landing in France <i>spared him the +trouble</i>.<a name="FN2anchor461_461"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_461_461"><sup>[461]</sup></a></p> + +<p>To assert, however, that Napoleon's escape from Elba was +prompted by a desire to avoid bankruptcy, is to credit him with +respectable <i>bourgeois</i> scruples by which he was never +troubled. Though "Madame Mère" and Pauline complained +bitterly to Campbell of the lack of funds at Elba, the Emperor +himself was far from depressed. "His spirits seem of late," wrote +Campbell on December 28th, "rather to rise, and not to yield in the +smallest degree to the pressure of pecuniary difficulties." Both +Campbell and Lord John Russell, who then paid the Emperor a flying +visit, thought that he was planning some great move, and warned our +Ministers.<a name="FN2anchor462_462"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_462_462"><sup>[462]</sup></a> But they shared the view +of other wiseacres, that Italy would be his goal, and that too, +when Campbell's despatches teemed with remarks made to him by +Napoleon as to the certainty of an outbreak in France. Here are two +of them:<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii441" id= +"page_ii441">[pg.441]</a></span></p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>He said that there would be a violent outbreak, similar to the +Revolution, in consequence of their present humiliation: every man +in France considers the Rhine to be the natural frontier of France, +and nothing can alter this opinion. If the spirit of the nation is +roused into action nothing can oppose it. It is like a torrent.... +The present Government of France is too feeble: the Bourbons should +make war as soon as possible so as to establish themselves upon the +throne. It would not be difficult to recover Belgium. It is only +for the British troops there that the French army has the smallest +awe" (<i>sic</i>).</p> +</div> + +<p>His final resolve to put everything to the hazard was formed +about February 13th, when, shortly after receiving tidings as to +the unrest in Italy, the discords of the Powers, and the resolve of +the allied sovereigns to leave Vienna on the 20th, he heard news of +the highest importance from France. On that day one of his former +officials, Fleury de Chaboulon, landed in Elba, and informed him of +the hatching of a plot by military malcontents, under the lead of +Fouché, for the overthrow of Louis XVIII.<a name= +"FN2anchor463_463"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_463_463"><sup>[463]</sup></a> Napoleon at once +despatched his informant to Naples, and ordered his brig, +"L'Inconstant," to be painted like an English vessel. Most +fortunately for him, Campbell on the 16th set sail for +Tuscany—"for his health and on private affairs"—on the +small war-vessel, "Partridge," to which the British Government had +intrusted the supervision of Napoleon. Captain Adye, of that +vessel, promised, after taking Campbell to Leghorn, to return and +cruise off Elba. He called at Porto Ferrajo on the 24th, and to +Bertrand's question, when he was to bring Campbell back, returned +the undiplomatic answer that it was fixed for the 26th. The news +seems to have decided Napoleon to escape on that day, when the +"Partridge" would be absent at Leghorn. Meanwhile Campbell, alarmed +by the news of the preparations at Elba, was sending off a request +to Genoa that another British warship should be sent to frustrate +the designs of the "restless villain."<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii442" id="page_ii442">[pg.442]</a></span></p> + +<p>But it was now too late. On that Sunday night at 9 p.m., the +Emperor, with 1,050 officers and men, embarked at Porto Ferrajo on +the "Inconstant" and six smaller craft. Favoured by the light airs +that detained the British vessel, his flotilla glided away +northwards; and not before the 28th did Adye and Campbell find that +the imperial eagle had flown. Meanwhile Napoleon had eluded the +French guard-ship, "Fleur-de-Lys," and ordered his vessels to +scatter. On doubling the north of Corsica, he fell in with another +French cruiser, the "Zephyr," which hailed his brig and inquired +how the great man was. "Marvellously well," came the reply, +suggested by Napoleon himself to his captain. The royalist cruiser +passed on contented. And thus, thanks to the imbecility of the old +Governments and of their servants, Napoleon was able to land his +little force safely in the Golfe de Jouan on the afternoon of March +1st.<a name="FN2anchor464_464"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_464_464"><sup>[464]</sup></a> Is it surprising that +foreigners, who had not yet fathomed the eccentricities of British +officialdom, should have believed that we connived at Napoleon's +escape? It needed the blood shed at Waterloo to wipe out the +misconception.</p> + +<p>"I shall reach Paris without firing a shot." Such was the +prophecy of Napoleon to his rather questioning followers as they +neared the coast of Provence. It seemed the wildest of dreams. +Could the man, who had been wellnigh murdered by the rabble of +Avignon and Orgon, hope to march in peace through that royalist +province? And, if he ever reached the central districts where men +loved him better, would the soldiery dare to disobey the commands +of Soult, the new Minister of War, of Ney, Berthier, Macdonald, St. +Cyr, Suchet, Augereau, and of many more who were now honestly +serving the Bourbons? The King and his brothers had no fears. They +laughed at the folly of this rash intruder.</p> + +<p>At first their confidence seemed justified. Napoleon's overtures +to the officer and garrison of Antibes were repulsed, and the small +detachment which he sent<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii443" +id="page_ii443">[pg.443]</a></span> there was captured. Undaunted +by this check, he decided to hurry on by way of Grasse towards +Grenoble, thus forestalling the news of his first failure, and +avoiding the royalist districts of the lower Rhone.</p> + +<p>Napoleon was visibly perturbed as he drew near to Grenoble. +There the officer in command, General Marchand, had threatened to +exterminate this "band of brigands"; and his soldiers as yet showed +no signs of defection. But, by some bad management, only one +battalion held the defile of Laffray on the south. As the +bear-skins of the Guard came in sight, the royalist ranks swerved +and drew back. Then the Emperor came forward, and ordered his men +to lower their arms. "There he is: fire on him," cried a royalist +officer. Not a shot rang out.—"Soldiers," said the well-known +voice, "if there is one among you who wishes to kill his Emperor, +he can do so. Here I am." At once a great shout of "Vive +l'Empereur" burst forth: and the battalion broke into an +enthusiastic rush towards the idol of the soldiery.</p> + +<p>That scene decided the whole course of events. A little later, a +young noble, Labédoyère, leads over his regiment; at +Grenoble the garrison stands looking on and cheering while the +Bonapartists batter in the gates; and the hero is borne in amidst a +whirlwind of cheers. At Lyons, the Comte d'Artois and Macdonald +seek safety in flight; and soldiers and workmen welcome their chief +with wild acclaim; but amidst the wonted cries are heard threats of +"The Bourbons to the guillotine," "Down with the priests!"</p> + +<p>The shouts were ominous: they showed that the Jacobins meant to +use Napoleon merely as a tool for the overthrow of the Bourbons. +The "have-nots" cheered him, but the "haves" shivered at his +coming, for every thinking man knew that it implied war with +Europe.<a name="FN2anchor465_465"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_465_465"><sup>[465]</sup></a> Napoleon saw the danger of +relying merely on malcontents and sought to arouse a truly national +feeling. He therefore on March 13th issued a series of popular<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii444" id= +"page_ii444">[pg.444]</a></span> decrees, that declared the rule of +the Bourbons at an end, dissolved the Senate and Chamber of +Deputies, and summoned the "electoral colleges" of the Empire to a +great assembly, or Champ de Mai, at Paris. He further proscribed +the white flag, ordered the wearing of the tri-colour cockade, +disbanded the hated "Maison du Roi," abolished feudal titles, and +sequestered the domains of the Bourbon princes. In brief, he acted +as the Bonaparte of 1799. He then set forth for Paris, at the head +of 14,000 men.</p> + +<p>Ney was at the same time marching with 6,000 men from +Besançon. He had lately assured Louis XVIII. that Napoleon +deserved to be brought to Paris in an iron cage. But now his +soldiers kept a sullen silence. At Bourg the leading regiment +deserted; and while beset by difficulties, the Marshal received +from Napoleon the assurance that he would be received as he was on +the day after the Moskwa (Borodino). This was enough. He drew his +troops around him, and, to their lively joy, declared for the +Emperor (March 14th). Napoleon was as good as his word. Never prone +to petty malice, he now received with equal graciousness those +officers who flung themselves at his feet, and those who staunchly +served the King to the very last. Before this sunny magnanimity the +last hopes of the Bourbons melted away. Greeted on all sides by +soldiers and peasants, the enchanter advances on Paris, whence the +King and Court beat a hasty retreat towards Lille.</p> + +<p>Crowds of peasants line and almost block the road from +Fontainebleau to catch a glimpse of the gray coat; and, to expedite +matters, he drives on in a cabriolet with his faithful +Caulaincourt. Escorted by a cavalcade of officers he enters Paris +after nightfall; but there the tone of the public is cool and +questioning, until the front of the Tuileries facing the river is +reached.<a name="FN2anchor466_466"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_466_466"><sup>[466]</sup></a> Then a mighty shout arises +from the throng of jubilant half-pay officers as the well-known +figure alights: he passes in,<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii445" id="page_ii445">[pg.445]</a></span> and is half +carried up the grand staircase, "his eyes half closed," says +Lavalette, "his hands extended before him like a blind man, and +expressing his joy only by a smile." Ladies are there also, who +have spent the weary hours of waiting in stripping off +<i>fleurs-de-lys</i>, and gleefully exposing the N's and golden +bees concealed by cheap Bourbon upholstery. Anon they fly back to +this task; the palace wears its wonted look; and the brief spell of +Bourbon rule seems gone for ever.</p> + +<p>To his contemporaries this triumph of Napoleon appeared a +miracle before which the voice of criticism must be dumb. And yet, +if we remember the hollowness of the Bourbon restoration, the +tactlessness of the princes and the greed of their partisans, it +seems strange that the house of cards reared by the Czar and +Talleyrand remained standing even for eleven months. Napoleon +correctly described the condition of France when he said to his +comrades on the "Inconstant": "There is no historic example that +induces me to venture on this bold enterprise: but I have taken +into account the surprise that will seize on men, the state of +public feeling, the resentment against the allies, the love of my +soldiers, in fine, all the Napoleonic elements that still germinate +in our beautiful France."<a name="FN2anchor467_467"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_467_467"><sup>[467]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Still less was he deceived by the seemingly overwhelming impulse +in his favour. He looked beyond the hysteria of welcome to the cold +and critical fit which follows; and he saw danger ahead. When +Mollien complimented him on his return, he replied, alluding to the +general indifference at the departure of the Bourbons: "My dear +fellow! People have let me come, just as they let the others go." +The remark reveals keen insight into the workings of French public +opinion. The whole course of the Revolution had shown how easy it +was to destroy a Government, how difficult to rebuild. In truth, +the events of March, 1815, may be called the epilogue of the +revolutionary drama. The royal House had offended the two most +powerful of French interests, the military<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii446" id="page_ii446">[pg.446]</a></span> and the +agrarian, so that soldiers and peasants clutched eagerly at +Napoleon as a mighty lever for its overthrow.</p> + +<p>The Emperor wisely formed his Ministry before the first +enthusiasm cooled down. Maret again became Secretary of State; +Decrès took the Navy; Gaudin the finances; Mollien was +coaxed back to the Treasury, and Davoust reluctantly accepted the +Ministry of War. Savary declined to be burdened with the Police, +and Napoleon did not press him: for that clever intriguer, +Fouché, was pointed out as the only man who could rally the +Jacobins around the imperial throne: to him, then, Napoleon +assigned this important post, though fully aware that in his hands +it was a two-edged tool. Carnot was finally persuaded to become +Minister for Home Affairs.</p> + +<p>Napoleon's fate, however, was to be decided, not at Paris, but +by the statesmen assembled at Vienna. There time was hanging +somewhat heavily, and the news of Napoleon's escape was welcomed at +first as a grateful diversion. Talleyrand asserted that Napoleon +would aim at Italy, but Metternich at once remarked: "He will make +straight for Paris." When this prophecy proved to be alarmingly +true, a drastic method was adopted to save the Bourbons. The +plenipotentiaries drew up a declaration that Bonaparte, having +broken the compact which established him at Elba—the only +legal title attaching to his existence—had placed himself +outside the bounds of civil and social relations, and, as an enemy +and disturber of the peace of the world, was consigned to "public +prosecution" (March 13th).<a name="FN2anchor468_468"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_468_468"><sup>[468]</sup></a> The rigour of this decree +has been generally condemned. But, after all, it did not exceed in +harshness Napoleon's own act of proscription against Stein; it was +a desperate attempt to stop the flight of<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii447" id="page_ii447">[pg.447]</a></span> the imperial +eagle to Paris and to save France from war with Europe.</p> + +<p>Public considerations were doubtless commingled with the +promptings of personal hatred. We are assured that Talleyrand was +the author of this declaration, which had the complete approval of +the Czar. But Napoleon had one enemy more powerful than Alexander, +more insidious than Talleyrand, and that was—his own past. +Everywhere the spectre of war rose up before the imagination of +men. The merchant pictured his ships swept off by privateers: the +peasant saw his homestead desolate: the housewife dreamt of her +larder emptied by taxes, and sons carried off for the war. At +Berlin, wrote Jackson, all was agitation, and everybody said that +<i>the work of last year would have to be done over again</i>.</p> + +<p>In England the current of public feeling was somewhat weakened +by the drifts and eddies of party politics. Many of the Whigs made +a popular hero of Napoleon, some from a desire to overthrow the +Liverpool Ministry that proscribed him; others because they +believed, or tried to believe, that the return of Napoleon +concerned only France, and that he would leave Europe alone if +Europe left him alone. Others there were again, as Hazlitt, who +could not ignore the patent fact that Napoleon was an international +personage and had violated a European compact, yet nevertheless +longed for his triumph over the bad old Governments and did not +trouble much as to what would come next. But, on the whole, the +judgment of well-informed people may be summed up in the conclusion +of that keen lawyer, Crabb Robinson: "The question is, peace with +Bonaparte now, or war with him in Germany two years hence."<a name= +"FN2anchor469_469"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_469_469"><sup>[469]</sup></a> The matter came to a test +on April 28th, when Whitbread's motion against war was rejected by +273 to 72.<a name="FN2anchor470_470"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_470_470"><sup>[470]</sup></a></p> + +<p>If that was the general opinion in days when Ministers and +diplomatists alone knew the secrets of the game, it was certain +that the initiated, who remembered his<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii448" id="page_ii448">[pg.448]</a></span> wrongheaded +refusals to make peace even in the depressing days of 1814, would +strive to crush him before he could gather all his strength. In +vain did he protest that he had learnt by sad experience and was a +changed man. They interpreted his pacific speeches by their +experience of his actions; and thus his overweening conduct in the +past blotted out all hope of his crowning a romantic career by a +peaceful and benignant close. The declaration of outlawry was +followed, on March 25th, by the conclusion of treaties between the +Powers, which virtually renewed those framed at Chaumont. In quick +succession the smaller States gave in their adhesion; and thus the +coalition which tact and diplomacy had dissolved was revivified by +the fears which the mighty warrior aroused. Napoleon made several +efforts to sow distrust among the Powers; and chance placed in his +hands a veritable apple of discord.</p> + +<p>The Bourbons in their hasty flight from Paris had left behind +several State papers, among them being the recent secret compact +against Russia and Prussia. Napoleon promptly sent this document to +the Czar at Vienna; but his hopes of sundering the allies were soon +blighted. Though Alexander and Metternich had for months refused to +exchange a word or a look, yet the news of Napoleon's adventure +brought about a speedy reconciliation; and when the compromising +paper from Paris was placed in the Czar's hands, he took the noble +revenge of sending for Metternich, casting it into the fire, and +adjuring the Minister to forget recent disputes in the presence of +their common enemy. Napoleon strove to detach Austria from the +Coalition, as did also Fouché on his own account; but the +overtures led to no noteworthy result, except that Napoleon, on +finding out Fouché's intrigue, threatened to have him +shot—a threat which that necessary tool treated with quiet +derision.</p> + +<p>A few acts of war occurred at once; but Austria and Russia +pressed for delay, the latter with the view of overthrowing Murat. +That potentate now drew the sword on behalf of Napoleon, and +summoned the Italians<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii449" id= +"page_ii449">[pg.449]</a></span> to struggle for their +independence. But he was quickly overpowered at Tolentino (May +3rd), and fled from his kingdom, disguised as a sailor, to Toulon. +There he offered his sword to Napoleon; but the Emperor refused his +offer and blamed him severely, alleging that he had compromised the +fortunes of France by rendering peace impossible. The charge must +be pronounced not proven. The allies had taken their resolve to +destroy Napoleon on March 13th, and Murat's adventure merely +postponed the final struggle for a month or so.</p> + +<p>Napoleon used this time of respite to form his army and stamp +out opposition in France. The French royalist bands gave him little +trouble. In the south-west the <i>fleur-de-lys</i> was speedily +beaten down; but in La Vendée royalism had its roots +deep-seated. Headed by the two Larochejacqueleins, the peasants +made a brave fight; and 20,000 regulars failed to break them up +until the month of June was wearing on. What might not those 20,000 +men, detained in La Vendée, have effected on the crest of +Waterloo?</p> + +<p>Napoleon's preoccupation, however, was the conduct of the +Jacobins in France, who had been quickened to immense energy by the +absurdities of the royalist reaction and felt that they had the new +ruler in their power. A game of skill ensued, which took up the +greater part of the "Hundred Days" of Napoleon's second reign. His +conduct proved that he was not sure of success. He felt out of +touch with this new liberty-loving France, so different from the +passively devoted people whom he had left in 1814; he bridled his +impetuous nature, reasoning with men, inviting criticism, and +suggesting doubts as to his own proposals, in a way that contrasted +curiously with the old sledge-hammer methods.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"He seemed," writes Mollien, "habitually calm, pensive, and +preserved without affectation a serious dignity, with little of +that old audacity and self-confidence which had never met with +insuperable obstacles.... As his thoughts were cramped in a narrow +space girt with precipices instead of soaring freely over a vast +horizon of power, they became laborious and <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii450" id= +"page_ii450">[pg.450]</a></span></p> +</div> + +painful.... A kind of lassitude, that he had never known before, +took hold of him after some hours of work." + +<p>This Pegasus in harness chafed at the unwonted yoke; and at +times the old instincts showed themselves. On one occasion, when +the subject turned on the new passion for liberty, he said to +Lavalette with a question in his voice: "All this will last two or +three years?" "Your Majesty," replied the Minister, "must not +believe that. It will last for ever."</p> + +<p>The first grave difficulty was to frame a constitution, +especially as his Lyons decrees led men to believe that it would +emanate from the people, and be sanctioned by them in a great +<i>Champ de Mai</i>. Perhaps this was impossible. A great part of +France was a prey to civil strifes; and it was a skilful device to +intrust the drafting of a constitution to Benjamin Constant.</p> + +<p>This brilliant writer and talker had now run through the whole +gamut of political professions. A pronounced Jacobin and +free-thinker during the Consulate, he subsequently retired to +Germany, where he unlearnt his politics, his religion, and his +philosophy. The sight of Napoleon's devastations made him a +supporter of the throne and altar, compelled him to recast his +treatises, and drove him to consort with the quaint circle of +pietists who prayed and grovelled with Madame de Krudener. +Returning to France at the Restoration, he wielded his facile pen +in the cause of the monarchy, and fluttered after the fading charms +of Madame Récamier, confiding to his friend, De Broglie, +that he knew not whether to trust most to divine or satanic +agencies for success in this lawless chase. In March, 1815, he +thundered in the Press against the brigand of Elba—until the +latter won him over in the space of a brief interview, and +persuaded him to draft, with a few colleagues, the final +constitution of the age.</p> + +<p>Not that Constant had a free hand: he worked under imperial +inspiration. The present effort was named the Additional +Act—additional, that is, to the Constitutions of the Empire +(April 22nd, 1815). It established a<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii451" id="page_ii451">[pg.451]</a></span> Chamber of Peers +nominated by Napoleon, with hereditary rights, and a Chamber of +Representatives elected on the plan devised in August, 1802. The +Emperor was to nominate all the judges, including the <i>juges de +paix;</i> the jury system was maintained, and liberty of the Press +was granted. The Chambers also gained somewhat wider control over +the Ministers.<a name="FN2anchor471_471"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_471_471"><sup>[471]</sup></a></p> + +<p>This Act called forth a hail of criticisms. When the Council of +State pointed out that there was no guarantee against +confiscations, Napoleon's eyes flashed fire, and he burst +forth:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"You are pushing me in a way that is not mine. You are weakening +and chaining me. France looks for me and does not find me. Public +opinion was excellent: now it is execrable. France is asking what +has come to the Emperor's arm, this arm which she needs to master +Europe. Why speak to me of goodness, abstract justice, and of +natural laws? The first law is necessity: the first justice is the +public safety."</p> +</div> + +<p>The councillors quailed under this tirade and conceded the +point—though we may here remark that Napoleon showed a wise +clemency towards his foes, and confiscated the estates of only +thirteen of them.</p> + +<p>Public opinion became more and more "execrable." Some historians +have asserted that the decline of Napoleon's popularity was due, +not to the Additional Act, but to the menaces of war from a united +Europe: this may be doubted. Miot de Melito, who was working for +the Emperor in the West, states that "never had a political error +more immediate effects" than that Act; and Lavalette, always a +devoted adherent, asserts that<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii452" id="page_ii452">[pg.452]</a></span>Frenchmen +thenceforth "saw only a despot in the Emperor and forgot about the +enemy."</p> + +<p>As a display of military enthusiasm, the <i>Champ de Mai</i>, of +June 1st, recalled the palmy days gone by. Veterans and conscripts +hailed their chief with jubilant acclaim, as with a few burning +words he handed them their eagles. But the people on the outskirts +cheered only when the troops cheered. Why should they, or the +"electors" of France, cheer? They had hoped to give her a +constitution; and they were now merely witnesses to Napoleon's oath +that he would obey the constitution of his own making. As a civic +festival, it was a mockery in the eyes of men who remembered the +"Feast of Pikes," and were not to be dazzled by the waving of +banners and the gorgeous costumes of Napoleon and his brothers. The +opening of the Chambers six days later gave an outlet to the +general discontent. The report that Napoleon designed his brother +Lucien for the Presidency of the Lower House is incorrect. That +honest democrat Lanjuinais was elected. Everything portended a +constitutional crisis, when the summons to arms rang forth; and the +chief, warning the deputies not to imitate the Greeks of the late +Empire by discussing abstract propositions while the battering-ram +thundered at their gates, cut short these barren debates by that +appeal to the sword which had rarely belied his hopes. <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii453" id= +"page_ii453">[pg.45]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XXXIX</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>LIGNY AND QUATRE BRAS</center> + +<br> + + +<p>A less determined optimist than Napoleon might well have hoped +for success over the forces of the new coalition. True, they seemed +overwhelmingly great. But many a coalition had crumbled away under +the alchemy of his statecraft; and the jealousies that had raged at +the Congress of Vienna inspired the hope that Austria, and perhaps +England, might speedily be detached from their present allies. +Strange as it seems to us, the French people opined that Napoleon's +escape from Elba was due to the connivance of the British +Government; and Captain Mercer states that, even at Waterloo, many +of the French clung to the belief that the British resistance would +be a matter of form. Napoleon cherished no such illusion: but he +certainly hoped to surprise the British and Prussian forces in +Belgium, and to sever at one blow an alliance which he judged to be +ill cemented. Thereafter he would separate Austria from Russia, a +task that was certainly possible if victory crowned the French +eagles.<a name="FN2anchor472_472"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_472_472"><sup>[472]</sup></a></p> + +<p>His military position was far stronger than it had been since +the Moscow campaign. The loss of Germany and Spain had really added +to his power. No longer were his veterans shut up in the fortresses +of Europe from Danzig to Antwerp, from Hamburg to Ragusa; and the +Peninsular War no longer engulfed great armies of his choicest +troops. In the eyes of Frenchmen he<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii454" id="page_ii454">[pg.454]</a></span> was not beaten in +1814; he was only tripped up by a traitor when on the point of +crushing his foes. And, now that peace had brought back garrisons +and prisoners of war, as many as 180,000 well-trained troops were +ranged under the imperial eagles. He hoped by the end of June to +have half a million of devoted soldiers ready for the field.</p> + +<p>The difficulties that beset him were enough to daunt any mind +but his. Some of the most experienced Marshals were no longer at +his side. St. Cyr, Macdonald, Oudinot, Victor, Marmont, and +Augereau remained true to Louis XVIII. Berthier, on hearing of +Napoleon's return from Elba, forthwith retired into Germany, and, +in a fit of frenzy, threw himself from the window of a house in +Bamberg while a Russian corps was passing through that town. Junot +had lost his reason. Masséna and Moncey were too old for +campaigning; Mortier fell ill before the first shots were fired. +Worst of all, the unending task of army organization detained +Davoust at Paris. Certainly he worked wonders there; but, as in +1813 and 1814, Napoleon had cause to regret the absence of a +lieutenant equally remarkable for his acuteness of perception and +doggedness of purpose, for a good fortune that rarely failed, and a +devotion that never faltered. Doubtless it was this last priceless +quality, as well as his organizing gifts, that marked him out as +the ideal Minister of War and Governor of Paris. Besides him he +left a Council charged with the government during his absence, +composed of Princes Joseph and Lucien and the Ministers.</p> + +<p>But, though the French army of 1815 lacked some of the names far +famed in story, numbers of zealous and able officers were ready to +take their place. The first and second corps were respectively +assigned to Drouet, Count d'Erlon, and Reille, the former of whom +was the son of the postmaster of Varennes, who stopped Louis XVI.'s +flight. Vandamme commanded the third corps; Gérard, the +fourth; Rapp, the fifth; while the sixth fell to Mouton, better +known as Count Lobau. Rapp's corps was charged with the defence of +Alsace; other forces, led by Brune, Decaen, and Clausel, protected +the southern <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii455" id= +"page_ii455">[pg.455]</a></span>borders, while Suchet guarded the +Alps; but the rest of these corps were gradually drawn together +towards the north of France, and the addition of the Guard, 20,800 +strong, brought the total of this army to 125,000 men.</p> + +<p>There was one post which the Emperor found it most difficult to +fill, that of Chief of the Staff. There the loss of Berthier was +irreparable. While lacking powers of initiative, he had the faculty +of lucidly and quickly drafting Napoleon's orders, which insures +the smooth working of the military machine. Who should succeed this +skilful and methodical officer? After long hesitation Napoleon +chose Soult. In a military sense the choice was excellent. The Duke +of Dalmatia had a glorious military record; in his nature activity +was blended with caution, ardour with method; but he had little +experience of the special duties now required of him; and his +orders were neither drafted so clearly nor transmitted so promptly +as those of Berthier.</p> + +<p>The concentration of this great force proceeded with surprising +swiftness; and, in order to lull his foes into confidence, the +Emperor delayed his departure from Paris to the last moment +possible. As dawn was flushing the eastern sky, on June 12th, he +left his couch, after four hours' sleep, entered his landau, and +speedily left his slumbering capital behind. In twelve hours he was +at Laon. There he found that Grouchy's four cavalry brigades were +not sharing in the general advance owing to Soult's neglect to send +the necessary orders. The horsemen were at once hurried on, several +regiments covering twenty leagues at a stretch and exhausting their +steeds. On the 14th the army was well in hand around Beaumont, +within striking distance of the Prussian vanguard, from which it +was separated by a screen of dense woods. There the Emperor mounted +his charger and rode along the ranks, raising such a storm of +cheers that he vainly called out: "Not so loud, my children, the +enemy will hear you." There, too, on this anniversary of Marengo +and Friedland, he inspired his men by a stirring appeal on behalf +of the independence of Poles,<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii456" id="page_ii456">[pg.456]</a></span> Italians, the +smaller German States, and, above all, of France herself. "For +every Frenchman of spirit the time has come to conquer or die."</p> + +<p>What, meanwhile, was the position of the allies? An +Austro-Sardinian force threatened the south-east of France. Mighty +armies of 170,000 Russians and 250,000 Austrians were rolling +slowly on towards Lorraine and Alsace respectively; 120,000 +Prussians, under Blücher, were cantoned between Liège +and Charleroi; while Wellington's composite array of British, +German, and Dutch-Belgian troops, about 100,000 strong, lay between +Brussels and Mons.<a name="FN2anchor473_473"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_473_473"><sup>[473]</sup></a> The original plan of these +two famous leaders was to push on rapidly into France; but the +cautious influences of the Military Council sitting at Vienna +prevailed, and it was finally decided not to open the campaign +until the Austrians and Russians should approach the frontiers of +France. Even as late as June 15th we find Wellington writing to the +Czar in terms that assume a co-operation of all the allies in +simultaneous moves towards Paris—movements which +Schwarzenberg had led him to expect <i>would begin about the 20th +of June</i>.<a name="FN2anchor474_474"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_474_474"><sup>[474]</sup></a></p> + +<p>From this prolonged and methodical warfare Europe was saved by +Napoleon's vigorous offensive. His political instincts impelled him +to strike at Brussels, where he hoped that the populace would +declare for union with France and severance from the detested +Dutch. In this war he must not only conquer armies, he must win +over public opinion; and how could he gain it so well as in the +guise of a popular liberator?<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii457" id="page_ii457">[pg.457]</a></span></p> + +<p>But there were other advantages to be gained in Belgium. By +flinging himself on Wellington and the Prussians, and driving them +asunder, he would compel Louis XVIII. to another undignified +flight; and he would disorganize the best prepared armies of his +foes, and gain the material resources of the Low Countries. He +seems even to have cherished the hope that a victory over +Wellington would dispirit the British Government, unseat the +Ministry, and install in power the peace-loving Whigs.</p> + +<p>And this victory was almost within his grasp. While his host +drew near to the Prussian outposts south of Charleroi and Thuin, +the allies were still spread out in cantonments that extended over +one hundred miles, namely, from Liège on Blücher's left +to Audenarde on Wellington's right. This wide dispersion of troops, +when an enterprising foe was known to be almost within striking +distance, has been generally condemned. Thus General Kennedy, in +his admirable description of Waterloo, admits that there was an +"absurd extension" of the cantonments. Wellington, however, was +bound to wait and to watch the three good high-roads, by any one of +which Napoleon might advance, namely, those of Tournay, Mons, and +Charleroi. The Duke had other causes for extending his lines far to +the west: he desired to cover the roads from Ostend, whence he was +expecting reinforcements, and to stretch a protecting wing over the +King of France at Ghent.</p> + +<p>There are many proofs, however, that Wellington was surprised by +Napoleon. The narratives of Sir Hussey Vivian and Captain Mercer +show that the final orders for our advance were carried out with a +haste and flurry that would not have happened if the army had been +well in hand, or if Wellington had been fully informed of +Napoleon's latest moves.<a name="FN2anchor475_475"></a> <a href= +"#Foot2note_475_475"><sup>[475]</sup></a> There is a wild story that +the Duke was duped by Fouché, on whom he was relying for +news <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii458" id= +"page_ii458">[pg.458]</a></span> from Paris. But it seems far more +likely that he was misled by the tidings sent to Louis XVIII. at +Ghent by zealous royalists in France, the general purport of which +was that Napoleon <i>would wage a defensive campaign</i>. <a name= +"FN2anchor476_476"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_476_476"><sup>[476]</sup></a> On the 13th June, +Wellington wrote: "I have accounts</p> + +<center><a name="image_19"><img alt="PLAN OF THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN" +src="images/image19.jpg" width="349" height="438"><br> + <font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>PLAN OF THE +WATERLOO CAMPAIGN</small></font></a></center> + +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii459" id= +"page_ii459">[pg.459]</a></span> from Paris of the 10th, on which +day he [Bonaparte] was still there; and I judge from his speech to +the Legislature that his departure was not likely to be immediate. +I think we are now too strong for him here." And, in later years, +he told Earl Stanhope that Napoleon "was certainly wrong in +attacking at all"; for the allied armies must soon have been in +great straits for want of food if they had advanced into France, +exhausted as she was by the campaign of 1814. "But," he added, "the +fact is, Bonaparte never in his life had patience for a defensive +war."<br> +<br> + + +<p>The Duke's forces would, at the outset of the campaign, have +been in less danger, if the leaders at the Prussian outposts, Pirch +II. and Dörnberg of the King's German Legion, had warned him +of the enemy's massing near the Sambre early on the 15th. By some +mischance this was not done; and our leader only heard from +Hardinge, at the Prussian headquarters, that the enemy seemed about +to begin the offensive. He therefore waited for more definite news +before concentrating upon any one line.</p> + +<p>About 6 p.m. on the 15th he ordered his divisions and brigades +to concentrate at Vilvorde, Brussels, Ninove, Grammont, Ath, +Braine-le-Comte, Hal, and Nivelles—the first four of which +were somewhat remote, while the others were chosen with a view to +defending the roads leading northwards from Mons. Not a single +British brigade was posted on the Waterloo-Charleroi road, which +was at that time guarded only by a Dutch-Belgian division, a fact +which supports Mr. Ropes's contention that no definite plan of +co-operation had been formed by the allied leaders. Or, if there +was one, the Duke certainly refused to act upon it until he had +satisfied himself that the chief attack was not by way of Mons or +Ath. More definite news reached Brussels near midnight of the 15th, +whereupon he gave a general left turn to his advance, namely, +<i>towards Nivelles</i>.</p> + +<p>Clausewitz maintains that he should already have removed his +headquarters to Nivelles; had he done so and hurried up all +available troops towards the<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii460" id="page_ii460">[pg.460]</a></span> Soignies-Quatre +Bras line, his Waterloo fame would certainly have gained in +solidity. A dash of romance was added by his attending the Duchess +of Richmond's ball at Brussels on the night of the 15th-16th; +lovers of the picturesque will always linger over the scene that +followed with its "hurrying to and fro and tremblings of distress"; +but the more prosaic inquirer may doubt whether Wellington should +not then have been more to the front, feeling every throb of +Bellona's pulse.<a name="FN2anchor477_477"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_477_477"><sup>[477]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Blücher's army, comprising 90,000 men, also covered a great +stretch of country. The first corps, that of Ziethen, held the +bridges of the Sambre at and near Charleroi; but the corps of Pirch +I. and Thielmann were at Namur and Ciney; while, owing to a lack of +stringency in the orders sent by Gneisenau, chief of the staff, to +Bülow, his corps of 32,000 men was still at Liège. +Early on the 15th, Pirch I. and Thielmann began hastily to advance +towards Sombref; and Ziethen, with 32,000 men, prepared to hold the +line of the Sambre as long as possible. His chief of staff, General +Reiche, states that one-third of the Prussians were new troops, +drafted in from the Landwehr; but all the corps gloried in their +veteran Field-Marshal, and were eager to fight.</p> + +<p>Such, then, was the general position. Wellington was unaware of +his danger; Blücher was straining every nerve to get his army +together; while 32,000 Prussians were exposed to the attack of +nearly four times their number. It is clear that, had all gone well +with the French advance, the fortunes of Wellington and +Blücher must have been desperate. But, though the +concentration of 125,000 French troops near Beaumont and Maubeuge +had been effected with masterly skill (except that Gérard's +and D'Erlon's corps were late), the final moves did not work quite +smoothly. An accident to the officer who was to order Vandamme's +corps to march at 2 a.m. on the 15th caused a long delay to that +eager<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii461" id= +"page_ii461">[pg.461]</a></span> fighter.<a name= +"FN2anchor478_478"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_478_478"><sup>[478]</sup></a> The 4th corps, that of +Gérard, was also disturbed and delayed by an untoward event. +General Bourmont, whose old Vendéan opinions seemed to have +melted away completely before the sun of Napoleon's glory, rewarded +his master by deserting with several officers to the Prussians, +very early on that morning. The incident was really of far less +importance than is assigned to it in the St. Helena Memoirs, which +falsely ascribe it to the 14th: the Prussians were already on the +<i>qui vive</i> before Bourmont's desertion; but it clogged the +advance of Gérard's corps and fostered distrust among the +rank and file. When, on the morrow, Gérard rejoined his +chief at the mill of Fleurus, the latter reminded him that he had +answered for Bourmont's fidelity with his own head; and, on the +general protesting that he had seen Bourmont fight with the utmost +devotion, Napoleon replied: "Bah! A man who has been a white will +never become a blue: and a blue will never be a white." Significant +words, that show the Emperor's belief in the ineradicable strength +of instinct and early training.<a name="FN2anchor479_479"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_479_479"><sup>[479]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Despite these two mishaps, the French on the morning of the 15th +succeeded in driving Ziethen's men from the banks of the Sambre +about Thuin, while Napoleon in person broke through their line at +Charleroi. After suffering rather severely, the defenders fell back +on Gilly, whither Napoleon and his main force followed them; while +the left wing of the French advance, now intrusted to Ney, was +swung forward against the all-important position of Quatre +Bras.</p> + +<p>We here approach one of the knotty questions of the campaign. +Why did not Ney occupy the cross-roads in force on the evening of +the 15th? We may note first that not till the 11th had Napoleon +thought fit to summon Ney to the army, so that the Marshal did not +come up till the afternoon of this very day. He at once had an +interview with the Emperor, who, according to General Gourgaud, +gave the Marshal verbal orders to take command of the<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii462" id="page_ii462">[pg.462]</a></span> +corps of Reille and D'Erlon, to push on northwards, take up a +position at Quatre Bras, and throw out advanced posts beyond on the +Brussels and Namur roads; but it seems unlikely that the Emperor +would have given one of the most venturesome of his Marshals an +absolute order to push on so far in advance, unless the French +right wing had driven the Prussians back beyond the Sombref +position. Otherwise, Ney would have been dangerously far in advance +of the main body and exposed to blows either from the Prussians or +the British.</p> + +<p>However this may be, Ney certainly felt insecure, and did not +push on with his wonted dash; while, fortunately for the allies, an +officer was at hand Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who saw the need +of holding Quatre Bras at all costs.<a name= +"FN2anchor480_480"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_480_480"><sup>[480]</sup></a> The young leader imposed +on the foe by making the most of his men—they were but 4,500 +all told, and had only ten bullets apiece—and he succeeded. +For once, Ney was prudent to a fault, and did not push home the +attack. In his excuse it may be said that the men of Reille's +corps, on whom he had to rely—for D'Erlon's corps was still +far to the rear—had been marching and fighting ever since +dawn, and were too weary for another battle. Moreover, the roar of +cannon on the south-east warned him that the right wing of the +French advance was hotly engaged between Gilly and Fleurus; until +it beat back the Prussians, his own position was dangerously "in +the air"; and, as but two hours of daylight remained, he drew back +on Frasnes. He is also said to have sent word to the Emperor that +"he was occupying Quatre Bras by an advanced guard, and that his +main body was close behind." If he deceived his chief by any such +report, he deserves the severest censure; but the words<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii463" id="page_ii463">[pg.463]</a></span> +quoted above were written later at St. Helena by General Gourgaud, +when Ney had come to figure as the scapegoat of the campaign.<a +name="FN2anchor481_481"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_481_481"><sup>[481]</sup></a> Ney sent in a report on +that evening; but it has been lost.<a name= +"FN2anchor482_482"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_482_482"><sup>[482]</sup></a> Judging from the orders +issued by Napoleon and Soult early on the 16th, there was much +uncertainty as to Ney's position. The Emperor's letter bids him +post his first division "two leagues in front of les Quatres +Chemins"; but Soult's letter to Grouchy states that Ney is ordered +<i>to advance to the cross-roads</i>. Confusion was to be expected +from the circumstances of the case. Ney did not know his +staff-officers, and he hastily took command of the left wing when +in the midst of operations whose success, as Janin points out, +largely depended on that of the right. He therefore played a +cautious game, when, as we now know, caution meant failure and +daring spelt safety.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the French right wing, of which Grouchy had received +the command, though Napoleon in person was its moving force, had +been pressing the Prussians hard near Gilly. Yet here, too, the +assailants were weakened by the absence of the corps of Vandamme +and Gérard. Irritated by Ziethen's skilful withdrawal, the +Emperor at last launched his cavalry at the Prussian rear +battalions, four of which were severely handled before they reached +the covert of a wood. With the loss, on the whole, of nearly 2,000 +men, the Prussians fell back towards Ligny, while Grouchy's +vanguard bivouacked near the village of Fleurus.</p> + +<p>Napoleon might well be satisfied with the work done on June +15th: he rode back to his headquarters at Charleroi, "exhausted +with fatigue," after spending wellnigh eighteen hours in the +saddle, but confident that he had sundered the allies. This was +certainly his aim now, as it had been in the campaign of 1796. +After two decisive blows at their points of connection, he purposed +driving them on divergent lines of retreat, just as he had driven +the Austrians and Sardinians down the roads that <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii464" id="page_ii464">[pg.464]</a></span> +bifurcate near Montenotte. True, there were in Belgium no mountain +spurs to prevent their reunion; but the roads on which they were +operating were far more widely divergent.<a name= +"FN2anchor483_483"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_483_483"><sup>[483]</sup></a> He also thought lightly of +Wellington and Blücher. The former he had pronounced +"incapable and unwise"; as for Blücher, he told Campbell at +Elba that he was "no general"; but that he admired the pluck with +which "the old devil" came on again after a thrashing.</p> + +<p>Unclouded confidence is seen in every phrase of the letters that +he penned at Charleroi early on the 16th. He informs Ney that he +intends soon to attack the Prussians at Sombref, <i>if he finds +them there</i>, to clear the road as far as Gembloux, and then to +decide on his further actions as the case demands. Meanwhile Ney is +to sweep the road in front of Quatre Bras, placing his first +division two leagues beyond that position, if it seemed desirable, +with a view to marching on Brussels during the night with his whole +force of about 50,000 men. The Guard is to be kept in reserve as +much as possible, so as to support either Napoleon on the Gembloux +road, or Ney on the Brussels road; and "if any skirmish takes place +with the English, it is preferable that the work should fall on the +Line rather than on the Guard." As for the Prussian resistance, +Napoleon rated it almost as lightly as that of the English; for he +regards it as probable that he will in the evening <i>march on +Brussels with his Guard</i>.</p> + +<p>While he pictured his enemies hopelessly scattered or in +retreat, they were beginning to muster at the very points which he +believed to be within his grasp. At 11 a.m. only Ziethen's corps, +now but 28,000 strong, was in position at Sombref, but the corps of +Pirch I. and Thielmann came up shortly after midday. Had Napoleon +pushed on early on the 16th, he must easily have gained the +Ligny-Sombref position. What, then, caused the delay in the French +attack? It can be traced to the slowness of Gérard's +advance, to the Emperor's misconception of the situation, and to +his despatch to Grouchy. <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii465" +id="page_ii465">[pg.465]</a></span></p> + +<center><a name="image_20"><img alt="BATTLE OF LIGNY" src= +"images/image20.jpg" width="536" height="417"><br> + <font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>BATTLE OF +LIGNY</small></font></a></center> + +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii466" id= +"page_ii466">[pg.466]</a></span> + +<p>In this he reckoned the Prussians at 40,000 men, and ordered +Grouchy to repair with the French right wing to Sombref.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>" ... I shall be at Fleurus between 10 and 11 a.m.: I shall +proceed to Sombref, leaving my Guard, both infantry and cavalry, at +Fleurus: I would not take it to Sombref, unless it should be +necessary. If the enemy is at Sombref, I mean to attack him: I mean +to attack him even at Gembloux, and to gain this position also, my +aim being, after having known about these two positions, to set out +to-night, and to operate with my left wing, under the command of +Marshal Ney, against the English."</p> +</div> + +<p>The Emperor did not reach Fleurus until close on 11 a.m., and +was undoubtedly taken aback to find Grouchy still there, held in +check by the enemy strongly posted around Ligny. Grouchy has been +blamed for not having already attacked them; but surely his orders +bound him to wait for the Emperor before giving battle: besides, +the corps of Gérard, which had been assigned to him was +still far away in the rear towards Châtelet.<a name= +"FN2anchor484_484"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_484_484"><sup>[484]</sup></a> The absence of +Gérard, and the uncertainty as to the enemy's aims, annoyed +the Emperor. He mounted the windmill situated on the outskirts of +Fleurus to survey the enemy's position.</p> + +<p>It was a fair scene that lay before him. Straight in front ran +the high-road which joined the Namur-Nivelles +<i>chaussée</i>, some six miles away to the north-east. On +either side stretched cornfields, whose richness bore witness alike +to the toils and the warlike passions of mankind. Further ahead +might be seen the dark lines of the enemy ranged along slopes that +formed an irregular amphitheatre, dotted with the villages of Bry +and Sombref. In the middle distance, from out a hollow that lay +concealed, rose the steeples and a few of the higher roofs of +Ligny. Further to the left and on higher ground lay<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii467" id="page_ii467">[pg.467]</a></span> +St. Amand, with its outlying hamlets. All was bathed in the +shimmering, sultry heat of midsummer, the harbinger, as it proved, +of a violent thunderstorm. The Prussian position was really +stronger than it seemed. Napoleon could not fully see either the +osier beds that fringed the Ligny brook, or its steep banks, or the +many strong buildings of Ligny itself. He saw the Prussians on the +slope behind the village, and was at first puzzled by their exposed +position. "The old fox keeps to earth," he was heard to mutter. And +so he waited until matters should clear up, and Gérard's +arrival should give him strength to compass Blücher's utter +overthrow while in the act of stretching a feeler towards +Wellington. From the time when the Emperor came on the scene to the +first swell of the battle's roar, there was a space of more than +four hours.</p> + +<p>This delay was doubly precious to the allies. It gave +Blücher time to bring up the corps of Pirch I. and Thielmann +under cover of the high ground near Sombref, thereby raising his +total force to about 87,000 men; and it enabled the two allied +commanders to meet and hastily confer on the situation. Wellington +had left Brussels that morning at 8 o'clock, and thanks to Ney's +inaction, was able to reach the crest south of Quatre Bras a little +after 10, long before the enemy showed any signs of life. There he +penned a note to Blücher, asking for news from him before +deciding on his operations for the day.<a name= +"FN2anchor485_485"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_485_485"><sup>[485]</sup></a> He then galloped over to +the windmill of Bussy to meet Blücher.<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii468" id="page_ii468">[pg.468]</a></span></p> + +<p>It was an anxious meeting; the heads of the advancing French +columns were already in sight; and the Duke saw with dismay the +position of the Prussians on a slope that must expose them to the +full force of Napoleon's cannon—or, as he whispered to +Hardinge, "they will be damnably mauled if they fight here."<a +name="FN2anchor486_486"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_486_486"><sup>[486]</sup></a> In more decorous terms, +but to the same effect, he warned Gneisenau, and said nothing to +encourage him to hold fast to his position. Neither did he lead him +to expect aid from Quatre Bras. The utmost that Gneisenau could get +from him was the promise, "Well! I will come provided I am not +attacked myself." Did these words induce the Prussians to accept +battle at Ligny? It is impossible to think so. Everything tends to +show that Blücher had determined to fight there. The risk was +great; for, as we learn from General Reiche, the position was seen +to admit of no vigorous offensive blows against the French. But +fortune smiled on the veteran Field-Marshal, and averted what might +have been an irretrievable disaster.<a name= +"FN2anchor487_487"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_487_487"><sup>[487]</sup></a></p> + +<p>It would seem that the inequalities of the ground hid the +strength of Pirch I. and Thielmann; for Napoleon still believed +that he had ranged against him at Ligny only a single corps. At 2 +p.m. Soult informed Ney that the enemy had united a <i>corps</i> +between Sombref and Bry, and that in half an hour Grouchy would +attack it. Ney was therefore to beat back the foes at Quatre-Bras, +and then turn to envelop the Prussians. <i>But if these were driven +in first, the Emperor would move towards Ney to hasten his +operations</i>.<a name="FN2anchor488_488"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_488_488"><sup>[488]</sup></a> Not until the battle was +about to begin does the Emperor seem to have realized that he was +in presence of superior forces.<a name="FN2anchor489_489"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_489_489"><sup>[489]</sup></a> But after 2 p.m.<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii469" id= +"page_ii469">[pg.469]</a></span> their masses drew down over the +slopes of Bry and Sombref, their foremost troops held the villages +of Ligny and St. Amand, while their left crowned the ridge of +Tongrines. Napoleon reformed his lines, which had hitherto been at +right angles to the main road through Fleurus. Vandamme's corps +moved off towards St. Amand; and Gérard, after ranging his +corps parallel to that road, began to descend towards Ligny, +Grouchy meanwhile marshalling the cavalry to protect their flank +and rear. Behind all stood the imposing mass of the Imperial Guard +on the rising ground near Fleurus.</p> + +<p>The fiercest shock of battle fell upon the corps of Vandamme and +Gérard. Three times were Gérard's men driven back by +the volleys of the Prussians holding Ligny. But the French cannon +open fire with terrific effect. Roofs crumble away, and buildings +burst into flame. Once more the French rush to the onset, and a +furious hand-to-hand scuffle ensues. Half stifled by heat, smoke, +and dust, the rival nations fight on, until the defenders give way +and fall back on the further part of the village behind the brook; +but, when reinforced, they rally as fiercely as ever, and drive the +French over its banks; lane, garden, and attic once more become the +scene of struggles where no man thinks of giving or taking +quarter.</p> + +<p>Higher up the stream, at St. Amand, Vandamme's troops fared no +better; for Blücher steadily fed that part of his array. In so +doing, however, he weakened his reserves behind Ligny, thereby +unwittingly favouring Napoleon's design of breaking the Prussian +centre, and placing its wreckage and the whole of their right wing +between two fires. The Emperor expected that, by 6 o'clock, Ney +would have driven back the Anglo-Dutch forces, and would be ready +to envelop the Prussian right. That was the purport of Soult's +despatch of 3.15 p.m. to Ney: "This army [the Prussian] is lost, if +you act with vigour. The fate of France is in your hands."</p> + +<p>But at 5.30, when part of the Imperial Guard was about<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii470" id= +"page_ii470">[pg.470]</a></span> to strengthen Gérard for +the decisive blow at the Prussian centre, Vandamme sent word that a +hostile force of some twenty or thirty thousand men was marching +towards Fleurus. This strange apparition not only unsteadied the +French left: it greatly perplexed the Emperor. As he had ordered +first Ney and then D'Erlon to march, not on Fleurus, but against +the rear of the Prussian right wing, he seems to have concluded +that this new force must be that of Wellington about to deal the +like deadly blow against the French rear.<a name= +"FN2anchor490_490"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_490_490"><sup>[490]</sup></a> Accordingly he checked the +advance of the Guard until the riddle could be solved. After the +loss of nearly two hours it was solved by an aide-de-camp, who +found that the force was D'Erlon's, and that it had retired.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the battle had raged with scarcely a pause, the French +guns working frightful havoc among the dense masses on the opposite +slope. And yet, by withdrawing troops to his right, Blücher +had for a time overborne Vandamme's corps and part of the Young +Guard, unconscious that his insistence on this side jeopardized the +whole Prussian army. His great adversary had long marked the +immense extension of its concave front, the massing of its troops +against St. Amand, and the remoteness of its left wing, which +Grouchy's horsemen still held in check; and he now planned that, +while Blücher assailed St. Amand and its hamlets, the Imperial +Guard should crush the Prussian centre at Ligny, thrust its +fragments back towards St. Amand, and finally shiver the greater +part of the Prussian army on the anvil which D'Erlon's corps would +provide further to the west. He now felt assured of victory; for +the corps of Lobau was nearing Fleurus to take the place of the +Imperial Guard; and the Prussians had no supports. "They have no +reserve," he remarked,<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii471" +id="page_ii471">[pg.471]</a></span> as he swept the hostile +position with his glass. This was true: their centre consisted of +troops that for four hours had been either torn by artillery or +exhausted by the fiendish strife in Ligny.</p> + +<p>And now, as if the pent-up powers of Nature sought to cow +rebellious man into awe and penitence, the artillery of the sky +pealed forth. Crash after crash shook the ground; flash upon flash +rent the sulphur-laden rack; darkness as of night stole over the +scene; and a deluge of rain washed the blood-stained earth. The +storm served but to aid the assailants in their last and fiercest +efforts. Amidst the gloom the columns of the Imperial Guard crept +swiftly down the slope towards Ligny, gave new strength to +Gérard's men, and together with them broke through the +defence. A little higher up the stream, Milhaud's cuirassiers +struggled across, and, animated by the Emperor's presence, poured +upon the shattered Prussian centre. No timely help could it now +receive either from Blücher or Thielmann; for the darkness of +the storm had shrouded from view the beginnings of the onset, and +Thielmann had just suffered from a heedless assault on Grouchy's +wing.</p> + +<p>As the thunder-clouds rolled by, the gleams of the setting sun +lit up the field and revealed to Blücher the full extent of +his error.<a name="FN2anchor491_491"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_491_491"><sup>[491]</sup></a> His army was cut in twain. +In vain did he call in his troops from St. Amand: in vain did he +gallop back to his squadrons between Bry and Sombref and lead them +forward. Their dashing charge was suddenly checked at the brink of +a hollow way; steady volleys tore away their front; and the +cuirassiers completed their discomfiture. Blücher's charger +was struck by a bullet, and in his fall badly bruised the +Field-Marshal; but his trusty adjutant, Nostitz, managed to hide +him in the twilight, while the cuirassiers swept onwards up the +hill. Other Prussian squadrons, struggling to save the day, now +charged home and drove back the steel-clad ranks. Some Uhlans and +mounted Landwehr reached<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii472" +id="page_ii472">[pg.472]</a></span> the place where the hero lay; +and Nostitz was able to save that precious life. Sorely battered, +but still defiant like their chief, the Prussian cavalry covered +the retreat at the centre; the wings fell back in good order, the +right holding on to the village of Bry till past midnight; but +several battalions of disaffected troops broke up and did not +rejoin their comrades. About 14,000 Prussians and 11,000 French lay +dead or wounded on that fatal field.<a name= +"FN2anchor492_492"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_492_492"><sup>[492]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Napoleon, as he rode back to Fleurus after nightfall, could +claim that he had won a great victory. Yet he had not achieved the +results portrayed in Soult's despatch of 3.15 to Ney. This was due +partly to Ney's failure to fulfil his part of the programme, and +partly to the apparition of D'Erlon's corps, which led to the +postponement of Napoleon's grand attack on Ligny.</p> + +<p>The mystery as to the movements of D'Erlon and his 20,000 men +has never been fully cleared up. The evidence collected by Houssaye +leaves little doubt that, as soon as the Emperor realized the +serious nature of the conflict at Ligny, he sent orders to D'Erlon, +whose vanguard was then near Frasnes, to diverge and attack +Blücher's exposed flank. That is to say, D'Erlon was now +called on to deal the decisive blow which had before been assigned +to Ney, who was now warned, though very tardily, not to rely on the +help of D'Erlon's corps. Misunderstanding his order, D'Erlon made +for Fleurus, and thus alarmed Napoleon and delayed his final blow +for wellnigh two hours. Moreover, at 6 p.m., when D'Erlon might +have assailed Blücher's right with crushing effect, he +received an urgent command from Ney to return. Assuredly he should +not have hesitated now that St. Amand was almost within +cannon-shot, while Quatre Bras could scarcely be reached before +nightfall; but he was under<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii473" id="page_ii473">[pg.473]</a></span> Ney's command; +and, taking a rather pedantic view of the situation, he obeyed his +immediate superior. Lastly, no one has explained why the Emperor, +as soon as he knew the errant corps to be that of D'Erlon, did not +recall him at once, bidding him fall on the exposed wing of the +Prussians. Doubtless he assumed that D'Erlon would now fulfil his +instructions and march against Bry; but he gave no order to this +effect, and the unlucky corps vanished.</p> + +<p>At that time a desperate conflict was drawing to a close at +Quatre Bras. Ney had delayed his attack until 2 p.m.; for, firstly, +Reille's corps alone was at hand—D'Erlon's rearguard early on +that morning being still near Thuin—and, secondly, the +Marshal heard at 10 a.m. that Prussian columns were marching +westwards from Sombref, a move that would endanger his rear behind +Frasnes. Furthermore, the approach to Quatre Bras was flanked by +the extensive Bossu Wood, and by a spinney to the right of the +highway. Reille therefore counselled caution, lest the affair +should prove to be "a Spanish battle where the English show +themselves only when it is time." When, however, Reille's corps +pushed home the attack, the weakness of the defence was speedily +revealed. After a stout stand, the 7,000 Dutch-Belgians under the +Prince of Orange were driven from the farm of Gémioncourt, +which formed the key of the position, and many of them fled from +the field.</p> + +<p>But at this crisis the Iron Duke himself rode up; and the +arrival of a Dutch-Belgian brigade and of Picton's division of +British infantry, about 3 p.m., sufficed to snatch victory from the +Marshal's grasp.<a name="FN2anchor493_493"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_493_493"><sup>[493]</sup></a> He now opened a +destructive artillery fire on our front, to which the weak +Dutch-Belgian batteries could but feebly reply. Nothing, however, +could daunt the hardihood of Picton's men. Shaking off the fatigue +of a twelve hours' march from Brussels under a burning sun, they +steadily moved<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii474" id= +"page_ii474">[pg.474]</a></span> down through the tall crops of rye +towards the farm and beat off a fierce attack of Piré's +horsemen. On the allied left, the 95th Rifles (now the Rifle +Brigade) and Brunswickers kept a clutch on the Namur road which +nothing could loosen. But our danger was mainly at the centre. +Under cover of the farmhouse, French columns began to drive in our +infantry, whose ammunition was already running low. Wellington +determined to crush this onset by a counter-attack in line of +Picton's division, the "fighting division" of the Peninsula. With +threatening shouts they advanced to the charge; and before that +moving wall the foe fell back in confusion beyond the rivulet.</p> + +<p>Still, the French drove back the Dutch in the wood, and the +Brunswickers on its eastern fringe, killing the brave young Duke of +Brunswick as he attempted to rally his raw recruits. Into the gap +thus left the French horsemen pushed forward, making little +impression upon our footmen, but compelling them to keep in a close +formation, which exposed them in the intervals between the charges +to heavy losses from the French cannon.</p> + +<p>So the afternoon wore on. Between 5 and 6 o'clock our weary +troops were reinforced by Alten's division. A little later, a +brigade of Kellermann's heavy cavalry came up from the rear and +renewed Ney's striking power—but again too late. Already he +was maddened by the tidings that D'Erlon's corps had been ordered +off towards Ligny, and next by Napoleon's urgent despatch of 3.15 +p.m. bidding him envelop Blücher's right. Blind with +indignation at this seeming injustice, he at once sent an +imperative summons to D'Erlon to return towards Quatre Bras, and +launched a brigade of Kellermann's cuirassiers at those stubborn +squares.</p> + +<p>The attack nearly succeeded. The horsemen rushed upon our 69th +Regiment just when the Prince of Orange had foolishly ordered it +back into line, caught it in confusion, and cut it up badly. +Another regiment, the 33rd, fled into the wood, but afterwards +re-formed; the other squares beat off the onset. The torrent, +however, only<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii475" id= +"page_ii475">[pg.475]</a></span> swerved aside: on it rushed almost +to the cross-roads, there to be stopped by a flanking fire from the +wood and from the 92nd (Gordon) Highlanders lining the roadway in +front.—"Ninety-second, don't fire till I tell you," exclaimed +the Duke. The volley rang out when the horsemen were but thirty +paces off. The effect was magical. Their front was torn asunder, +and the survivors made off in a panic that spread to Foy's +battalions of foot and disordered the whole array.<a name= +"FN2anchor494_494"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_494_494"><sup>[494]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Ney still persisted in his isolated assaults; but reinforcements +were now at hand that brought up Wellington's total to 31,000 men, +while the French were less than 21,000. At nightfall the Marshal +drew back to Frasnes; and there D'Erlon's errant corps at last +appeared. Thanks to conflicting orders, it had oscillated between +two battles and taken part in neither of them.</p> + +<p>Such was the bloody fight of Quatre Bras. It cost Wellington +4,600 killed and wounded, mainly from the flower of the British +infantry, three Highland regiments losing as many as 878 men. The +French losses were somewhat lighter. Few conflicts better deserve +the name of soldiers' battles. On neither side was the generalship +brilliant. Twilight set in before an adequate force of British +cavalry and artillery approached the field where their comrades on +foot had for five hours held up in unequal contest against cannon, +sabre, and lance. The victory was due to the strange power of the +British soldier to save the situation when it seems past hope.</p> + +<p>Still less did it redound to the glory of Ney. Once more he had +merited the name of bravest of the brave. At the crisis of the +fight, when the red squares in front defied his utmost efforts, he +brandished his sword in helpless wrath, praying that the bullets +that flew by might strike him down. The rage of battle had, in +fact, partly obscured his reason. He was now a fighter, scarcely a +commander; and to this cause we may attribute his neglect +adequately to support Kellermann's charge. Had this been done, +Quatre Bras might have ended like<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii476" id="page_ii476">[pg.476]</a></span> Marengo. Far more +serious, however, was his action in countermanding the Emperor's +orders' by recalling D'Erlon to Quatre Bras; for, as we have seen, +it robbed his master of the decisive victory that he had the right +to expect at Ligny. Yet this error must not be unduly magnified. It +is true that Napoleon at 3.15 sent a despatch to Ney bidding him +envelop Blücher's flank; but the order did not reach him until +some time after 5, when the allies were pressing him hard, and when +he had just heard of D'Erlon's deflection towards the Emperor's +battle.<a name="FN2anchor495_495"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_495_495"><sup>[495]</sup></a> He must have seen that his +master misjudged the situation at Quatre Bras; and in such +circumstances a Marshal of France was not without excuse when he +corrected an order which he saw to be based on a misunderstanding. +Some part of the blame must surely attach to the slow-paced D'Erlon +and to the Emperor himself, who first underrated the difficulties +both at Ligny and Quatre Bras, and then changed his plans when Ney +was in the midst of a furious fight.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, the general results obtained on June the 16th were +enormously in favour of Napoleon. He had inflicted losses on the +Prussians comparable with those of Jena-Auerstädt; and he +retired to rest at Fleurus with the conviction that they must +hastily fall back on their immediate bases of supply, Namur and +Liège, leaving Wellington at his mercy. The rules of war and +the dictates of humdrum prudence certainly prescribed this course +for a beaten army, especially as Bülow's corps was known to be +on the Liège road.</p> + +<p>Scarcely had the Prussian retreat begun in the darkness, when +officers pressed up to Gneisenau, on whom now devolved all +responsibility, for instructions as to the line of march. At once +he gave the order to push northwards to Tilly. General Reiche +thereupon pointed out that this village was not marked upon the +smaller maps with which colonels were provided; whereupon the +command was given to march towards the town of Wavre, farther +distant on the same road. An officer was posted at the<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii477" id="page_ii477">[pg.477]</a></span> +junction of roads to prevent regiments straying towards Namur; but +some had already gone too far on this side to be recalled—a +fact which was to confuse the French pursuers on the morrow. The +greater part of Thielmann's corps had fallen back on Gembloux; but, +with these exceptions, the mass of the Prussians made for Tilly, +near which place they bivouacked. Early on the next morning their +rearguard drew off from Sombref; and, thanks to the inertness of +their foes, the line of retreat remained unknown. During the march +to Wavre, their columns were cheered by the sight of the dauntless +old Field-Marshal, who was able to sit a horse once more. +Thielmann's corps did not leave Gembloux till 2 p.m., but reached +Wavre in safety. Meanwhile Bülow's powerful corps was marching +unmolested from the Roman road near Hannut to a position two miles +east of Wavre, where it arrived at nightfall. Equally fortunate was +the reserve ammunition train, which, unnoticed by the French +cavalry, wound northwards by cross-roads through Gembloux, and +reached the army by 5 p.m.<a name="FN2anchor496_496"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_496_496"><sup>[496]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In his "Commentaries," written at St. Helena, Napoleon sharply +criticised the action of Gneisenau in retreating northwards to +Wavre, because that town is farther distant from Wellington's line +of retreat than Sombref is from Quatre Bras, and is connected with +it only by difficult cross-roads. He even asserted that the +Prussians ought to have made for Quatre Bras, a statement which +presumes that Gneisenau could have rallied his army sufficiently +after Ligny to file away on the Quatre Bras <i>chaussée</i> +in front of Napoleon's victorious legions. But the Prussian army +was virtually cut in half, and could not have reunited so as to +attempt the perilous flank<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii478" id="page_ii478">[pg.478]</a></span> march across +Napoleon's front. We shall, therefore, probably not be far wrong if +we say of this criticism that the wish was father to the thought. A +march on Quatre Bras would have been a safe means of throwing away +the Prussian army.<a name="FN2anchor497_497"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_497_497"><sup>[497]</sup></a></p> + +<p>To the present writer it seems probable that Gneisenau's action, +in the first instance, was undertaken as the readiest means of +reuniting the Prussian wings. But Gneisenau cannot have been blind +to the advantages of a reunion with Wellington, which a northerly +march would open out. The report which he sent to his Sovereign +from Wavre shows that by that time he believed the Prussian +position to be "not disadvantageous"; while in a private letter +written at noon on the 17th he expressly states that the Duke will +accept battle at Waterloo if the Prussians help him with two army +corps. Gneisenau's only doubts seem to have been whether Wellington +would fight and whether his own ammunition would be to hand in +time. Until he was sure on these two points caution was certainly +necessary.</p> + +<p>The results of this prompt rally of the Prussians were +infinitely enhanced by the fact that Wellington soon found it out, +while Napoleon did not grasp its full import until he was in the +thick of the battle of Waterloo. To the final steps that led up to +this dramatic finale we must now briefly refer.</p> + +<p>It is strange that Gneisenau, on the night of the 16th, took no +steps to warn his allies of the Prussian retreat, and merely left +them to infer it from his last message, that he must do so if he +were not succoured. Müffling,<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii479" id="page_ii479">[pg.479]</a></span> indeed, says that +a Prussian officer was sent, but was shot by the French on the +British left wing. Seeing, however, that Wellington had beaten back +Ney's forces before the Prussian retreat began, the story may be +dismissed as a lame excuse of Gneisenau's neglect.<a name= +"FN2anchor498_498"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_498_498"><sup>[498]</sup></a></p> + +<p>From the risk of being crushed by Napoleon, the Anglo-Dutch +forces were saved by the vigilance of their leader and the +supineness of the enemy. After a brief rest at Genappe, the Duke +was back at the front at dawn, and despatched two cavalry patrols +towards Sombref to find out the results of the battle. The patrol, +which was accompanied by the Duke's aide-de-camp, Colonel Gordon, +came into touch with the Prussian rear. On his return soon after +10, the staff-officer, Basil Jackson, was at once sent to bid +Picton immediately prepare to fall back on Waterloo, an order which +that veteran received very sulkily.<a name= +"FN2anchor499_499"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_499_499"><sup>[499]</sup></a> Shortly after Gordon's +return, a Prussian orderly galloped up and confirmed the news of +their retreat, which drew from the Duke the remark: "Blücher +has had a d——d good licking and gone back to Wavre.... +As he has gone back, we must go too." The infantry now began to +file off by degrees behind hedges or under cover of a screen of +cavalry and skirmishers, these keeping Ney's men busy in front, +until the bulk of the army was well through the narrow and crowded +street of Genappe.</p> + +<p>And how came it that Napoleon and Ney missed this golden +opportunity? In the first case, it was due to their chiefs of +staff, who had not sent overnight any tidings as to the results of +their respective battles. Until Count Flahaut returned to the +Imperial headquarters about 8 a.m., Napoleon knew nothing as to the +position of affairs at Quatre Bras; while a similar carelessness on +Soult's part left Ney powerless to attempt anything against +Wellington until somewhat later in the morning.<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii480" id= +"page_ii480">[pg.480]</a></span></p> + +<p>But Napoleon's inaction lasted nearly up to 11.30. How is this +to be accounted for? In reply, some attribute his conduct to +illness of body and torpor of mind—a topic that will engage +our attention presently; others assert that the army urgently +needed rest; but the effective cause was his belief that the +Prussians were retreating eastwards away from Wellington. This was +the universal belief at headquarters. He had ordered Grouchy to +follow them at dawn; Grouchy's lieutenant, Pajol, struck to the +south-east, and by 4 a.m. reported that Blücher was heading +for Namur. Such was the news that the Emperor heard from Grouchy +about 8 a.m.—he refused to grant him an audience earlier. +Forthwith he dictated a letter to Ney to the following effect: that +the Prussians had been routed and were being pursued towards Namur; +that the British could not attack him (Ney) at Quatre Bras, for the +Emperor would in that case march on their flank and destroy them in +an instant; that he heard with pain how isolated Ney's troops had +been on the 16th, and ordered him to close up his divisions and +occupy Quatre Bras. If he could not effect that task, he must warn +the Emperor, who would then come. Finally, he warned him that "the +present day is needed to finish this operation, to complete the +munitions of war, to rally stragglers and call in detachments."</p> + +<p>A singular day's programme this for the man who had trebled the +results of the victory of Jena by the remorseless energy of the +pursuit. After dictating this despatch, he ordered Lobau to take a +division of infantry for the support of Pajol on the Namur road. He +then set out for St. Amand in his carriage. On arriving at the +place of carnage he mounted his horse and rode slowly over the +battle-field, seeing to the needs of the wounded of both nations +with kindly care, and everywhere receiving the enthusiastic acclaim +of his soldiery. This done, he dismounted and talked long and +earnestly with Grouchy, Gérard, and others on the state of +political parties at Paris. They listened with <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii481" id= +"page_ii481">[pg.481]</a></span>ill-concealed restlessness. At +Fleurus Grouchy asked for definite orders, and received the brusque +reply that he must wait. But now, towards 11 o'clock, the Emperor +hears that Wellington is still at Quatre Bras, that Pajol has +captured eight Prussian guns on the Namur road, and that Excelmans +has seen masses of the enemy at Gembloux. At once he turns from +politics to war.</p> + +<p>His plan is formed. While he himself falls on the British, +Grouchy is to pursue the Prussians with the corps of Gérard +and Vandamme, the division of Teste (from Lobau's command), and the +cavalry corps of Pajol, Excelmans, and Milhaud. The Marshal begged +to be relieved of the task, setting forth the danger of pursuing +foes that were now reunited and far away. It was in vain. About +11.30 the Emperor developed his verbal instructions in a written +order penned by Bertrand. It bade Grouchy proceed to Gembloux with +the forces stated above (except Milhaud's corps and a division of +Vandamme's corps, which were to follow Napoleon) to reconnoitre on +the roads leading to Namur and Maestricht, to pursue the enemy, and +inform the Emperor as to their intentions. If they have evacuated +Namur, it is to be occupied by the National Guards. "It is +important to know what Blücher and Wellington mean to do, and +whether they propose reuniting their armies in order to cover +Brussels and Liège, by trying their fortune in another +battle...."<a name="FN2anchor500_500"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_500_500"><sup>[500]</sup></a></p> + +<p>As Napoleon's fate was to depend largely on an intelligent +carrying out of this order, we may point out that it consisted of +two chief parts, the general aim and the means of carrying out that +aim. The aim was to find out the direction of the Prussians' +retreat, and to prevent them joining Wellington, whether for the +defence of Brussels or of Liège. The means were an advance +to Gembloux and scouting along the Namur and Maestricht roads. The +chance that the allies might reunite for the defence of Brussels +was alluded to, but no measures were prescribed as to scouting in +that direction: these<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii482" id= +"page_ii482">[pg.482]</a></span> were left to Grouchy's discretion. +It must be confessed that the order was not wholly clear. To name +the towns of Brussels and Liège (which are sixty miles +apart) was sufficiently distracting; and to suggest that only the +eastern and south-eastern roads should be explored was certain to +limit Grouchy's immediate attention to those roads alone. For he +distrusted alike his own abilities and the power of the force +placed at his disposal; and an officer thus situated is sure to +inclose himself in the strict letter of his instructions. This was +what he did, with disastrous results.</p> + +<p>Grouchy had hitherto held no important command. As a cavalry +general he had done brilliant service; but now he was launched on a +duty that called for strategic insight. His force was scarcely +equal to the work. True, it was strong for scouting, having nearly +6,000 light horse; but the 27,000 footmen of Vandamme's and +Gérard's corps had been exhausted by the deadly strife in +the villages and were expecting a day's rest. Their commanders also +resented being placed under Grouchy. In fact, leaders and men +disliked the task, and set about it in a questioning, grumbling +way. The infantry did not start till about 3 o'clock and only +reached Gembloux late that evening—nine miles in six hours! +The cavalry, too, was so badly handled by Excelmans around Gembloux +that Thielmann's corps slipped away northward. The rain fell in +torrents, obscuring the view; but it seems strange that the +direction of the Prussian retreat was not surmised until about +nightfall.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, on the French left wing, Ney had been equally lax. He +must have received Napoleon's order to occupy Quatre Bras, "if +there was only a rearguard there," a little before 10 a.m.; but he +took no steps beyond futile skirmishing, and apparently knew not +that the British were slipping away.</p> + +<p>About 2 p.m., when the British cavalry was ready to turn rein, +the Duke and Sir H. Vivian saw the glint of cuirasses along the +Sombref road. It was the vanguard of the Emperor's advance. Furious +that his foes were<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii483" id= +"page_ii483">[pg.483]</a></span> escaping from his clutches, +Napoleon had left his carriage and was pressing on with the +foremost horsemen. To Ney he sent an imperative summons to advance, +and when that Marshal came up, greeted him with the words "You have +ruined France." But it was time for deeds, not words; and he now +put forth all his strength. At once he flung his powerful cavalry +at the British rear; and even now it might have gone hard with +Wellington had not the lowering clouds burst in a deluge of rain. +Quickly the road was ploughed up; and the cornfields became +impassable for the French horsemen.</p> + +<p>While the pursuers struggled in the mire and aimed wildly +through the pelting haze, the British rearguard raced for safety. +Says Captain Mercer of the artillery: "We galloped for our lives +through the storm, striving to gain the hamlets, Lord Uxbridge +urging us on, crying 'Make haste; for God's sake gallop, or you +will be taken.'"<a name="FN2anchor501_501"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_501_501"><sup>[501]</sup></a> Gaining on the pursuit, +they reached Genappe, and, filing over its bridge and up the narrow +street, prepared to check the French. At this time the Emperor +galloped up, drenched to the skin, his gray overcoat streaming with +rain, his hat bent out of all shape by the storm.<a name= +"FN2anchor502_502"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_502_502"><sup>[502]</sup></a> He was once more the +artillery officer of Toulon. "Fire on them," he shouted to his +gunners, "they are English." A sharp skirmish ensued, in which our +7th Hussars, charging down into the village, were worsted by the +French lancers, "an arm," says Cotton, "with which we were quite +unacquainted." In their retreat they were saved by the Life Guards, +whose weight and strength carried all before them.</p> + +<p>At last, on the ridge of Waterloo, Wellington's force turned at +bay. Napoleon, coming up at 6.30 to the brow of the opposite slope, +ordered a strong force to advance into the sodden clay of the +valley. It was promptly torn by a heavy cannonade; and the truth +was borne in on him that the British had escaped him for that +day.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii484" id= +"page_ii484">[pg.484]</a></span></p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="NAPOLEONS_HEALTH_IN_THE_WATERLOO_CAMPAIGN"></a> + +<h2>NAPOLEON'S HEALTH IN THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN</h2> + +<br> + + +<p>As many writers assert that Napoleon at this time was but the +shadow of his former self, we must briefly review the evidence of +contemporaries on this subject; for if the assertion be true, the +Battle of Waterloo deserves little notice.</p> + +<p>It seems that for some time past there had been a slight falling +off in his mental and bodily powers; but when it began and how far +it progressed is matter of doubt. Some observers, including +Chaptal, date it from the hardships of the retreat from Moscow. +This is very doubtful. He ended that campaign in a better state of +health than he had enjoyed during the advance. Besides, in none of +his wars did he show such vitality and fertility of resource as in +the desperate struggle of 1814, which Wellington pronounced his +masterpiece. After this there seems to have been a period of +something like relapse at Elba. In September, 1814, Sir Neil +Campbell reported: "Napoleon seems to have lost all habits of study +and sedentary application. He occasionally falls into a state of +inactivity never known before, and sometimes reposes in his bedroom +of late for several hours in the day; takes exercise in a carriage +and not on horseback. His health excellent and his spirits not at +all depressed" ("F.O.," France, No. 114). During his ten months at +Elba he became very stout and his cheeks puffy.</p> + +<p>On his return to France he displayed his old activity; and the +most credible witnesses assert that his faculties showed no marked +decline. Guizot, who saw a good deal of him, writes: "I perceive in +the intellect and conduct of Napoleon during the Hundred Days no +sign of enfeebling: I find in his judgment and actions his +accustomed qualities." In a passage quoted above (p. 449) Mollien +notes that his master was a prey to lassitude after some hours of +work, but he says nothing on the subject of disease; and in a man +of forty-six, who had lived a hard life and a "fast" life, we +should not expect to find the capacity for the sustained +intellectual efforts of the Consulate. Méneval noticed +nothing worse in his master's condition than a tendency to +"réverie": he detected no disease. The statement of Pasquier +that his genius and his physical powers were in a profound decline +is a manifest exaggeration, uttered by a man who did not once see +him before Waterloo, who was driven from Paris by him, and strove +to discourage his supporters. Still less can we accept the +following melodramatic description, by Thiébault, of +Napoleon's appearance on Sunday, June 11th: "His look, once so +formidable and piercing, had lost its strength and even its +steadiness: his face had lost all expression and all its force: his +mouth, compressed, had none of its former witchery: and his gait +was as perplexed as his demeanour and gestures were <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii485" id= +"page_ii485">[pg.485]</a></span>undecided: the ordinary pallor of +his skin was replaced by a strongly pronounced greenish tinge which +struck me."</p> + +<p>Let us follow this wreck of a man to the war and see what he +accomplished. At dawn on June 12th he entered his landau and drove +to Laon, a distance of some seventy miles. On the next day he got +through an immense amount of work, and proceeded to Beaumont. On +the 15th of June he was up at dawn, mounted his horse, and remained +on horseback, directing the operations against the Prussians, for +nearly eighteen hours. This time was broken by one spell of rest. +Near Charleroi, says Baudus, an officer of Soult's staff, he was +overcome by sleep and heeded not the cheers of a passing column: at +this Baudus was indignant, but most unjustly so. Napoleon needed +these snatches of sleep as a relief to prolonged mental tension. At +night he returned to Charleroi, "overcome with fatigue." On the +next day he was still very weary, says Ségur; he did not +exert himself until the battle of Ligny began at 2.30; but he then +rode about till nightfall, through a time of terrible heat. Fatigue +showed itself again early on the morrow, when he declined to see +Grouchy before 8 a.m. Yet his review of the troops and his long +discussions on Parisian politics were clearly due, not to torpor, +but to the belief that he had sundered the allies, and could occupy +Brussels at will; for when he found out his mistake, he showed all +the old energy, riding with the vanguard from Quatre Bras to La +Belle Alliance through the violent rain.</p> + +<p>Whatever, then, were his ailments, they were not incompatible +with great and sustained activity. What were those ailments? He is +said to have suffered from intermittent affections of the lower +bowel, of the bladder, and of the skin, the two last resulting in +ischury (Dorsey Gardner's "Quatre Bras, Ligny, and Waterloo," pp. +31-37; O'Connor Morris, pp. 164-166, note). The list is formidable; +but it contains its own refutation. A man suffering from these +diseases, unless in their earliest and mildest stages, could not +have done what Napoleon did. Ischury, if at all pronounced, is a +bar to horse exercise. Doubtless his long rides aggravated any +trouble that he had in this respect, for Pétiet, who was +attached to the staff, noticed that he often dismounted and sat +before a little table that was brought to him for the convenience +of examining maps; but Pétiet thought this was due, not to +ill health (about which he says nothing), but to his corpulence +("Souvenirs militaires," pp. 196 and 212). Prince Jerome and a +surgeon of the imperial staff assured Thiers that Napoleon was +suffering from a disease of the bladder; but this was contradicted +by the valet, Marchand; and if he really was suffering from all, or +any one, of the maladies named above, it is very strange that the +surgeon allowed him to expose himself to the torrential rain of the +night of the 17th-18th for a purpose which a few trusty officers +could equally well have discharged (see next chapter). Furthermore, +Baron Larrey, Chief Surgeon of the army, who saw Napoleon before +the campaign <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii486" id= +"page_ii486">[pg.486]</a></span> began and during its course, +<i>says not a word about the Emperor's health</i> ("Relation +médicale des Campagnes, 1815-1840," pp. 5-11).</p> + +<p>Again, the intervals of drowsiness on the 15th and 18th of June, +on which the theory of physical collapse is largely based, may be +explained far more simply. Napoleon had long formed the habit of +working a good deal at night and of seeking repose during a busy +day by brief snatches of slumber. The habit grew on him at Elba; +and this, together with his activity since daybreak, accounts for +his sleeping near Charleroi. The same explanation probably holds +good as to his occasional drowsiness at Waterloo. He scarcely +closed his eyes before 3.30 a.m.; and he cannot have been +physically fit for the unexpectedly long and severe strain of that +Sunday. That he began the day well we know from a French soldier +named Barral (grandfather of the author of "L'Epopée de +Waterloo"), who looked at him carefully at 9.30 a.m., and wrote: +"He seemed to me in very good health, extraordinarily active and +preoccupied." Decoster, the peasant guide who was with Napoleon the +whole day, afterwards told Sir W. Scott that he was calm and +confident up to the crisis. Gourgaud, who clung to him during the +flight to Paris and thence to Rochefort, notes nothing more serious +than great fatigue; Captain Maitland, when he received him on board +the "Bellerophon," thought him "a remarkably strong, well-built +man." During the voyage to St. Helena he suffered from nothing +worse than <i>mal de mer</i>; he ate meat in exceptional quantity, +even in the tropics.</p> + +<p>Very noteworthy, too, is Lavalette's narrative. When he saw +Napoleon before his departure from Paris to the Belgian frontier, +he found him suffering from depression and a pain in the chest; but +he avers that, on the return from Waterloo, apart from one +"frightful epileptic laugh," Napoleon speedily settled down to his +ordinary behaviour: not a word is added as to his health. (Sir W. +Scott, "Life of Napoleon," vol. viii., p. 496; Gourgaud, "Campagne +de 1815," and "Journal de St. Hélène," vol. ii., +Appendix 32; "Narrative of Captain Maitland," p. 208; Lavalette, +"Mems.," ch. xxxiii.; Houssaye ridicules the stories of his +ill-health.)</p> + +<p>What is the upshot of it all? The evidence seems to show that, +whatever was Napoleon's condition before the campaign, he was in +his usual health amidst the stern joys of war. And this is +consonant with his previous experience: he throve on events which +wore ordinary beings to the bone: the one thing that he could not +endure was the worry of parliamentary opposition, which aroused a +nervous irritation not to be controlled and concealed without +infinite effort. During the campaign we find very few trustworthy +proofs of his decline and much that points to energy of resolve and +great rallying power after exertion. If he was suffering from three +illnesses, they were assuredly of a highly intermittent nature. +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii487" id= +"page_ii487">[pg.487]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XL</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>WATERLOO</center> + +<br> + + +<p>Would Wellington hold on to his position? This was the thought +that troubled the Emperor on the night after the wild chase from +Quatre Bras. Before retiring to rest at the Caillou farm, he went +to the front with Bertrand and a young officer, Gudin by name, and +peered at the enemy's fires dimly seen through the driving sheets +of rain. Satisfied that the allies were there, he returned to the +farm, dictated a few letters on odious parliamentary topics, and +then sought a brief repose. But the same question drove sleep from +his eyes. At one o'clock he was up again and with the faithful +Bertrand plashed to the front through long rows of drenched +recumbent forms. Once more they strained their ears to catch +through the hiss of the rain some sound of a muffled retirement. +Strange thuds came now and again from the depths of the wood of +Hougoumont: all else was still. At last, over the slope on the +north-east crowned by the St. Lambert Wood there stole the first +glimmer of gray; little by little the murky void bodied forth dim +shapes, and the watch-fires burnt pale against the orient gleams. +It was enough. He turned back to the farm. Wellington could +scarcely escape him now.</p> + +<p>While the Emperor was making the round of his outposts, a +somewhat cryptic despatch from Grouchy reached headquarters. The +Marshal reported from Gembloux, at 10 p.m. of the 17th, that part +of the Prussians had retired towards Wavre, seemingly with a view +to joining Wellington; that their centre, led by Blücher, had +fallen back on Perwez in the direction of Liège; while a +column<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii488" id= +"page_ii488">[pg.488]</a></span> with artillery had made for Namur; +if he found the enemy's chief force to be on the Liège +<i>chaussée</i>, he would pursue them along that road; if +towards Wavre, he would follow them thither "in order that they may +not gain Brussels, and so as to separate them from Wellington." +This last phrase ought surely to have convinced Napoleon that +Grouchy had not fully understood his instructions; for to march on +Wavre would not stop the Prussians joining Wellington, if they were +in force.<a name="FN2anchor503_503"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_503_503"><sup>[503]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Moreover, Napoleon now knew, what Grouchy did not know, that the +Prussians were in force at Wavre. It seems strange that the Emperor +did not send this important news to his Marshal; but perhaps we may +explain this by his absence at the outposts. As it was, no clear +statement of the facts of the case was sent off to Grouchy <i>until +10 a.m. of the 18th</i>. He then informed his Marshal that, +according to all the reports, three bodies of Prussians had made +for Wavre. Grouchy "must therefore move thither—in order to +approach us, to put yourself within the sphere of our operations, +and to keep up your communications with us, pushing before you +those bodies of Prussians which have taken this direction and which +may have stopped at Wavre, where you ought to arrive as soon as +possible." Grouchy, however, was not to neglect Blücher's +troops that were on his right, but must pick up their stragglers +and keep up his communications with Napoleon.</p> + +<p>Such was the letter; and again we must pronounce it far from +clear. Grouchy was not bidden to throw all his efforts on the side +of Wavre; and he was not told whether he must attack the enemy at +that town, or interpose a wedge between them and Wellington, or +support Napoleon's right. Now Napoleon would certainly have +prescribed an immediate concentration of Grouchy's force towards +the north-west for one of the last two objects, had he believed +Blücher about to attempt a flank march<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii489" id="page_ii489">[pg.489]</a></span> against the +chief French army. Obviously it had not yet entered his thoughts +that so daring a step would be taken by a foe whom he pictured as +scattered and demoralized by defeat.<a name= +"FN2anchor504_504"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_504_504"><sup>[504]</sup></a></p> + +<p>As we have seen, the Prussians were not demoralized; they had +not gone off in three directions; and Blücher was not making +for Liège. He was at Wavre and was planning a master-stroke. +At midnight, he had sent to Wellington, through Müffling, a +written promise that at dawn he would set the corps of Bülow +in motion against Napoleon's right; that of Pirch I. was to follow; +while the other two corps would also be ready to set out. +Wellington received this despatch about 3 a.m. of the 18th, and +thereupon definitely resolved to offer battle. A similar message +was sent off from Wavre at 9.30 a.m., but with a postscript, in +which we may discern Gneisenau's distrust of Wellington, begging +Müffling to find out accurately whether the Duke really had +determined to fight at Waterloo. Meanwhile Bülow's corps had +begun its march from the south-east of Wavre, but with extreme +slowness, which was due to a fire at Wavre, to the crowded state of +the narrow road, and also to the misgivings of Gneisenau. It +certainly was not owing to fear of Grouchy; for at that time the +Prussian leaders believed that only 15,000 French were on their +track. Not until midday, when the cannonade on the west grew to a +roar, did Gneisenau decide to send forward Ziethen's corps towards +Ohain, on Wellington's left; but thereafter the defence of the Dyle +against Grouchy was left solely to Thielmann's corps.<a name= +"FN2anchor505_505"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_505_505"><sup>[505]</sup></a> <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii490" id="page_ii490">[pg.490]</a></span></p> + +<ins class="correction" title= +"Transcriber's note: The Illustration is missing in the original">[Illustration: (missing) +BATTLE OF WATERLOO, about 11 o'clock a.m. <i>to face</i>]</ins> +<p>While this storm was brewing in the east, everything in front of +the Emperor seemed to portend a prosperous day. High as he rated +Wellington's numbers, he had no doubt as to the result. "The +enemy's army," he remarked just after breakfast, "outnumbers ours +by more than a fourth; nevertheless we have ninety chances out of a +hundred in our favour." Ney, who then chanced to come in, quickly +remarked: "No doubt, sire, if Wellington were simple enough to wait +for you; but I come to inform you that he is retreating." "You have +seen wrong," was the retort, "the time is gone for that." Soult did +not share his master's assurance of victory, and once more begged +him to recall some of Grouchy's force; to which there came the +brutal reply: "Because you have been beaten by Wellington you think +him a great general. And I tell you that Wellington is a bad +general, that the English are bad troops, and that this will be the +affair of a <i>déjeuner</i>." "I hope it may," said Soult. +Reille afterwards came in, and, finding how confident the Emperor +was, mentioned the matter to D'Erlon, who advised his colleague to +return and caution him. "What is the use," rejoined Reille; "he +would not listen to us."</p> + +<p>In truth, Napoleon was in no mood to receive advice. He admitted +on the voyage to St. Helena that "he had not exactly reconnoitred +Wellington's position."<a name="FN2anchor506_506"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_506_506"><sup>[506]</sup></a> And, indeed, there seemed +to be nothing much to reconnoitre. The Mont St. Jean, or Waterloo, +position does not impress the beholder with any sense of strength. +The so-called valley, separating the two arrays, is a very shallow +depression, nowhere more than fifty feet below the top of the +northern slope. It is divided about halfway across by an undulation +that affords good cover to assailants about to attack La Haye +Sainte. Another slight rise crosses the vale halfway between this +farm and Hougoumont, and facilitates the approach to that part of +the ridge. In fact, only on their extreme left could the defenders +feel much security; for there the<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii491" id="page_ii491">[pg.491]</a></span> slope is steeper, +besides being protected in front by marshy ground, copses, and the +hamlets of Papelotte, La Haye, and Smohain.</p> + +<p>Napoleon paid little attention to the left wing of the allies. +The centre and right centre were evidently Wellington's weak +points, and there, especially near the transverse rise, our leader +chiefly massed his troops. Yet there, too, the defence had some +advantages. The front of the centre was protected by La Haye +Sainte, "a strong stone and brick building," says Cotton, "with a +narrow orchard in front and a small garden in the rear, both of +which were hedged around, except on the east side of the garden, +where there was a strong wall running along the high-road." It is +generally admitted that Wellington gave too little attention to +this farm, which Napoleon saw to be the key of the allied position. +Loopholes were made in its south and east walls, but none in the +western wall, and half of the barn-door opening on the fields had +been torn off for firewood by soldiers overnight. The place was +held at first by 376 men of the King's German Legion, who threw up +a barricade at the barn-door, as also on the high-road outside the +orchard; but, as the sappers and carpenters were removed to +Hougoumont, little could be done.</p> + +<p>Far stronger was the château of Hougoumont, which had been +built with a view to defence. The outbuildings were now loopholed, +and scaffolds were erected to enable our men to fire over the +garden walls which commanded the orchard. The defence was intrusted +to the light companies of the second battalions of Coldstreams and +Foot Guards (now the Grenadier Guards); while the wood in front was +held by Nassauers and Hanoverians. Chassé's Dutch-Belgians +were posted at the village of Braine la Leud to give further +security to Wellington's right.<a name="FN2anchor507_507"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_507_507"><sup>[507]</sup></a> Napoleon's intention +was to pierce the allied<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii492" +id="page_ii492">[pg.492]</a></span> centre behind La Haye Sainte, +where their lines were thin. But he did not know that behind the +crest ran a sunken cross-road, which afforded excellent cover, and +that the ground, sloping away towards Wellington's rear, screened +his second line and reserves.</p> + +<p>It was this peculiarity of the ground, so different from that of +the exposed slope behind Ligny, that helped the great master of +defensive tactics secretly to meet and promptly to foil every onset +of his mighty antagonist.</p> + +<p>While under-estimating the strength of Wellington's position +Napoleon over-rated his numbers. As we have seen, he remarked that +the allies exceeded the French by more than a fourth. Now, as his +own numbers were fully 74,000, he credited the allies with upwards +of 92,000. In reality, they were not more than 67,000, as +Wellington had left 17,000 at Hal; but if this powerful detachment +had been included, Napoleon's estimate would not have been far +wrong. At St. Helena he gave out that his despatch of cavalry +towards Hal had induced Wellington to weaken his army to this +extent; but Houssaye has shown that the statement is an entire +fabrication. The Emperor certainly believed that all Wellington's +troops were close at hand.<a name="FN2anchor508_508"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_508_508"><sup>[508]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The Duke, on his side, would doubtless have retreated had he +known that the Prussian advance would be as slow<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii493" id="page_ii493">[pg.493]</a></span> +as it was. His composite forces, in which five languages were +spoken, were unfit for a long contest with Napoleon's army. The +Dutch-Belgian troops, numbering 17,000, were known to be +half-hearted; the 2,800 Nassauers, who had served under Soult in +1813, were not above suspicion; the 11,000 Hanoverians and 5,900 +Brunswickers were certain to do their best, but they were mostly +raw troops. In fact, Wellington could thoroughly rely only on his +23,990 British troops and the 5,800 men of the King's German +Legion; and among our men there was a large proportion of recruits +or drafts from militia battalions. Events were to prove that this +motley gathering could hold its own while at rest; but during the +subsequent march to Paris Wellington passed the scathing judgment +that, with the exception of his Peninsular men, it was "the worst +equipped army, with the worst staff, ever brought together."<a +name="FN2anchor509_509"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_509_509"><sup>[509]</sup></a> This was after he had lost +De Lancey, Picton, Ponsonby, and many other able officers; but on +the morning of the 18th there was no lack of skill in the placing +of the troops, witness General Kennedy's arrangement of Alten's +division so that it might readily fall into the "chequer" pattern, +which proved so effective against the French horsemen.</p> + +<p>Napoleon's confidence seemed to be well founded: he had 246 +cannon against the allies' 156, and his preponderance in cavalry of +the line was equally great. Above all, there were the 13,000 +footmen of the Imperial Guard, flanked by 3,000 cavaliers. The +effective strength of the two armies has been reckoned by Kennedy +as in the proportion of four to seven. Why, then, did he not +attack<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii494" id= +"page_ii494">[pg.494]</a></span> at once? There were two good +reasons: first that his men had scattered widely overnight in +search of food and shelter, and now assembled very slowly on the +plateau; second, that the rain did not abate until 8 a.m., and even +then slight drizzles came on, leaving the ground totally unfit for +the movements of horse and artillery. Leaving the troops time to +form and the ground to improve, the Emperor consulted his charts +and took a brief snatch of sleep. He then rode to the front; and, +as the gray-coated figure passed along those imposing lines, the +enthusiasm found vent in one rolling roar of "Vive l'Empereur," +which was wafted threateningly to the thinner array of the allies. +There the leader received no whole-hearted acclaim save from the +men who knew him; but among these there was no misgiving. "If," +wrote Major Simmons of the 95th, "you could have seen the proud and +fierce appearance of the British at that tremendous moment, there +was not one eye but gleamed with joy."<a name= +"FN2anchor510_510"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_510_510"><sup>[510]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The first shots were fired at 11.50 to cover the assault on the +wood of Hougoumont by Prince Jerome Bonaparte's division of +Reille's corps. The Nassauers and Hanoverians briskly replied, and +Cleeve's German battery opened fire with such effect that the +leading column fell back. Again the assailants came on in greater +force under shelter of a tremendous cannonade: this time they +gained a lodgment, and step by step drove the defenders back +through the copse. Though checked for a time by the Guards, they +mastered the wood south of the house by about one o'clock. There +they should have stopped. Napoleon's orders were for them to gain a +hold only on the wood and throw out a good line of skirmishers: all +that he wanted on this side was to prevent any turning movement +from Wellington's advanced outposts. Reille also sent orders not to +attack the château; but the Prince and his men rushed on at +those massive walls, only to meet with a bloody repulse. A second +attack fared no better; and though some 12,000 of Reille's men +finally<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii495" id= +"page_ii495">[pg.495]</a></span>attacked the mansion on three +sides, yet our Guards, when reinforced, beat off every onset of +wellnigh ten times their numbers.</p> + +<p>For some time the Emperor paid little heed to this waste of +energy; at 2 p.m. he recalled Jerome to his side. He now saw the +need of husbanding his resources; for a disaster had overtaken the +French right centre. He had fixed one o'clock for a great attack on +La Haye Sainte by D'Erlon's corps of nearly 20,000 men. But a delay +occurred owing to a cause that we must now describe.</p> + +<p>Before his great battery of eighty guns belched forth at the +centre and blotted out the view, he swept the horizon with his +glass, and discerned on the skirts of the St. Lambert wood, six +miles away, a dark object. Was it a spinney, or a body of troops? +His staff officers could not agree; but his experienced eye +detected a military formation. Thereupon some of the staff asserted +that they must be Blücher's men, others that they were +Grouchy's. Here he could scarcely be in a doubt. Not long after 10 +a.m. he received from Grouchy a despatch, dated from Gembloux at 3 +a.m., reporting that the Prussians were retiring in force on +Brussels to concentrate or to join Wellington, and that he +(Grouchy) was on the point of starting for Sart-à-Walhain +and Wavre. He said nothing as to preventing any flank march that +the enemy might make from Wavre with a view to joining their allies +straightway. Therefore he was not to be looked for on this side of +Wavre, and those troops must consequently be Prussians.<a name= +"FN2anchor511_511"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_511_511"><sup>[511]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii496" id="page_ii496">[pg.496]</a></span></p> + +<p>All doubts were removed when a Prussian hussar officer, captured +by Marbot's vedettes near Lasne, was brought to Napoleon. He bore a +letter from Bülow to Müffling, stating that the former +was on the march to attack the French right wing. In reply to +Napoleon's questions the captain stated that Bülow's whole +corps was in motion, but wisely said nothing about the other two +corps that were following. Such as it was, the news in no way +alarmed the Emperor. As Bülow was about to march against the +French flank, Grouchy must march on his flank and take his corps +<i>en flagrant délit</i>. That is the purport of the +postscript added to a rather belated reply that was about to be +sent off to Grouchy at 1 p.m. It did not reach him till 5 p.m., too +late to influence the result, even had he desisted from his attack +on Wavre, which he did not.<a name="FN2anchor512_512"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_512_512"><sup>[512]</sup></a></p> + +<p>We return to the Emperor's actions at half-past one. Domont's +and Subervie's light horsemen were sent out towards Frischermont to +observe the Prussians; the great battery of eighty guns, placed on +the intermediate rise, now opened fire; and under cover of its +deadly blasts D'Erlon's four divisions dipped down into the valley. +They were ranged in closely packed battalions spread out in a front +of some two hundred men, a formation that Napoleon had not +suggested, but did not countermand. The left column, that of Alix, +was supported by cavalry on its flank. Part of this division gained +the orchard of La Haye Sainte, and attacked the farm buildings on +all sides. From his position hard by a great elm above the farm, +Wellington had marked this onset, and now sent down a Hanoverian +battalion to succour their compatriots; but in the cutting of the +main road it was charged and routed by Milhaud's cuirassiers, who +pursued them up the slope until the rally sounded. Farther to the +east, the French seemed still surer of victory. Bylandt's +Dutch-Belgians, some 3,000 strong,<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii497" id="page_ii497">[pg.497]</a></span> after suffering +heavily in their cruelly exposed position, wavered at the approach +of Donzelot's column, and finally broke into utter rout, pelted in +their flight with undeserved gibes from the British in their rear. +These consisted of Picton's division, the heroes of Quatre Bras. +Here they had as yet sustained little loss, thanks to the shelter +of the hollow cross-road and a hedge.</p> + +<p>The French columns now topped the ridge, uttering shouts of +triumph, and began to deploy into line for the final charge. This +was the time, as Picton well knew, to pour in a volley and dash on +with the cold steel; but as he cheered on his men, a bullet struck +him in the temple and cut short his brilliant career. His tactics +were successful at some points while at others our thin lines +barely held up against the masses. Certainly no decisive result +could have been gained but for the timely onset of Ponsonby's Union +Brigade—the 1st Royal Dragoons, the Scots Greys, and the +Inniskillings.</p> + +<p>At the time when Lord Uxbridge gave the order, "Royals and +Inniskillings charge, the Greys support," Alix's division was +passing the cross-road. But as the Royals dashed in, "the head of +the column was seized with a panic, gave us a fire which brought +down about twenty men, then went instantly about and endeavoured to +regain the opposite side of the hedges; but we were upon and +amongst them, and had nothing to do but press them down the slope." +So wrote Captain Clark Kennedy, who sabred the French colour-bearer +and captured the eagle. Equally brilliant was the charge of the +Inniskillings, in the centre of the brigade. They rode down +Donzelot's division, jostled its ranks into a helpless mass, and +captured a great number of prisoners. The Scots Greys, too, +succouring the hard-pressed Gordons, fell fiercely on Marcognet's +division. "Both regiments," wrote Major Winchester of the 92nd, +"charged together, calling out 'Scotland for ever'; the Scots Greys +actually walked over this column, and in less than three minutes it +was totally destroyed. The grass field, which was only an instant +before as green and smooth as Phoenix<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii498" id="page_ii498">[pg.498]</a></span> Park, was covered +with killed and wounded, knapsacks, arms, and +accoutrements."[513]</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, on the left of the brigade, Vandeleur's horse and +some Dutch-Belgian dragoons drove back Durutte's men past +Papelotte. On its right, the 2nd Life Guards cut up the cuirassiers +while disordered by the sudden dip of the hollow cross-road; and +further to the west, the 1st Dragoon Guards and 1st Life Guards met +them at the edge of the plateau, clashed furiously, burst through +them, and joined in the wild charge of Ponsonby's brigade up the +opposite slope, cutting the traces of forty French cannon and +sabring the gunners.</p> + +<p>But Napoleon was awaiting the moment for revenge, and now sent +forward a solid force of lancers and dragoons, who fell on our +disordered bands with resistless force, stabbing the men and +overthrowing their wearied steeds. Here fell the gallant Ponsonby +with hundreds of his men, and, had not Vandeleur's horse checked +the pursuit, very few could have escaped. Still, this brigade had +saved the day. Two of D'Erlon's columns had gained a hold on the +ridge, until the sudden charge of our horsemen turned victory into +a disastrous rout that cost the French upwards of 5,000 men.</p> + +<p>As if exhausted by this eager strife, both armies relaxed their +efforts for a space and re-formed their lines. Wellington ordered +Lambert's brigade of 2,200 Peninsular veterans, who had only +arrived that morning, to fill the gaps on his left. The Emperor, +too, was uneasy, as he showed by taking copious pinches of snuff. +He mounted his horse and rode to the front, receiving there the +cheers of his blood-stained lancers and battered infantry. Having +received another despatch from Grouchy which gave no hope of his +speedy arrival, he ordered his cannon once more to waste the +British lines and bombard Hougoumont, while Ney led two of +D'Erlon's brigades that were the least shaken to resume the +attack<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii499" id= +"page_ii499">[pg.499]</a></span> on La Haye Sainte. Once more they +were foiled at the farm buildings by the hardy Germans, to whom +Wellington had sent a timely reinforcement.<a name= +"FN2anchor514_514"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_514_514"><sup>[514]</sup></a> At Hougoumont also the +Guards held firm, despite the fierce conflagration in the barn and +part of the chapel. But while his best troops everywhere stood +their ground, the Duke saw with concern the gaps in his fighting +line. Many of the Dutch-Belgians had made off to the rear; and +Jackson, when carrying an order to a reserve Dutch battery to +advance—an order that was disobeyed—saw what had become +of these malingerers. "I peeped into the skirts of the forest and +truly felt astonished: entire companies seemed there with regularly +piled arms, fires blazing under cooking kettles, while the men lay +about smoking!"[515]</p> + +<p>Far different was the scene at the front. There the third act of +the drama was beginning. After half an hour of the heaviest +cannonade ever known, Wellington's faithful troops were threatened +by an avalanche of cavalry, and promptly fell into the "chequer" +disposition previously arranged for the most exposed division, that +of Alten. Napoleon certainly hoped either to crush Wellington +outright by a mighty onset of horse, or to strip him bare for the +<i>coup de grâce</i>. At the Caillou farm in the morning he +said: "I will use my powerful artillery; my cavalry shall charge; +and I will advance with my Old Guard." The use of cavalry on a +grand scale was no new thing in his wars. By it he had won notable +advantages, above all at Dresden; and he believed that footmen, +when badly shaken by artillery, could not stand before his +squadrons. The French cavalry, 15,000 strong at the outset, had as +yet suffered little, and the way had been partly cleared by the +last<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii500" id= +"page_ii500">[pg.500]</a></span> assaults on Hougoumont and La Haye +Sainte, where the defenders were wholly occupied in +self-defence.</p> + +<p>But Ney certainly pressed the first charge too soon. Doubtless +he was misled by the retirement of our first line a little way +behind the crest to gain some slight shelter from the iron storm. +Looking on this prudent move as a sign of retreat he led forward +the cuirassiers of Milhaud; and as these splendid brigades trotted +forward, the <i>chasseurs à cheval</i> of the Guard and +"red" lancers joined them. More than 5,000 strong, these horsemen +rode into the valley, formed at the foot of the slope, and then, +under cover of their artillery, began to breast the slope. At its +crest the guns of the allies opened on them point-blank; but, +despite their horrible losses, they swept on, charged through the +guns and down the reverse slope towards the squares. Volley after +volley now tore through with fearful effect, and the survivors +swerved to the intervals. Their second and third lines fared little +better; astonished at so stout a stand, where they looked to find +only a few last despairing efforts, they fell into faltering +groups.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"As to the so-called charges," says Basil Jackson, "I do not +think that on a single occasion actual collision occurred. I many +times saw the cuirassiers come on with boldness to within some +twenty or thirty yards of a square, when, seeing the steady +firmness of our men, they invariably edged away and retired. +Sometimes they would halt and gaze at the triple row of bayonets, +when two or three brave officers would advance and strive to urge +the attack, raising their helmets aloft on their sabres—but +all in vain, as no efforts could make the men close with the +terrible bayonets, and meet certain destruction."<a name= +"FN2anchor516_516"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_516_516"><sup>[516]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>After the fire of the rear squares had done its work, our +cavalry fell on the wavering masses; and, as they rode off, the +gunners ran forth from the squares and plied them with shot. In a +few minutes the mounted host that seemed to have swallowed up the +footmen was<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii501" id= +"page_ii501">[pg.501]</a></span> gone, the red and blue chequers +stood forth triumphant, and the guns that should have been spiked +dealt forth death. Down below, the confused mass shaped itself for +a new charge while its supports routed our horsemen.</p> + +<p>In this second attack Ney received a powerful reinforcement. The +Emperor ordered the advance of Kellermann and of Guyot with the +heavy cavalry of the Guard, thus raising the number of horsemen to +about 10,000. At the head of these imposing masses Ney again +mounted the slope. But Wellington had strengthened his line by +fresh troops, ordering up also Mercer's battery of six 9-pounders, +to support two Brunswick regiments that wavered ominously as the +French cannon-balls tore through them. Would these bewildered lads +stand before the wave of horsemen already topping the crest? It +seemed impossible. But just then Mercer's men thundered up between +them with the guns, took post behind the raised cross-road, and +opened on the galloping horsemen with case-shot. At once the front +was strewn with steeds and men; and gunners and infantry riddled +the successive ranks, that rushed on only to pile up writhing heaps +and bar retreat to the survivors in front. Some of these sought +safety by a dash through the guns, while the greater number +struggled and even laid about with their sabres to hew their way +out of this <i>battue</i>.</p> + +<p>Elsewhere the British artillery was too exposed to be defended, +and the gunners again fled back to the squares. Once more the +cavalry surrounded our footmen, like "heavy surf breaking on a +coast beset with isolated rocks, against which the mountainous wave +dashes with furious uproar, breaks, divides, and runs hissing and +boiling far beyond." Yet, as before, it failed to break those +stubborn blocks, and a perplexing pause occurred, varied by partial +and spasmodic rushes. "Will those English never show us their +backs"—exclaimed the Emperor, as he strained his eyes to +catch the first sign of rout "I fear," replied Soult, "they will be +cut to pieces first." For the present, it was the cavalry that<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii502" id= +"page_ii502">[pg.502]</a></span> gave way. Foiled by that +indomitable infantry, they were again charged by British and German +hussars and driven into the valley.</p> + +<p>Once more Ney led on his riders, gathering up all his reserves. +But the Duke had now brought up Adam's brigade and Duplat's King's +Germans to the space behind Hougoumont; their fire took the +horsemen in flank: the blasts of grape and canister were as deadly +as before: one and all, the squares held firm, beating back onset +after onset: and by 6 o'clock the French cavalry fell away utterly +exhausted.<a name="FN2anchor517_517"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_517_517"><sup>[517]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Who is to be held responsible for these wasteful attacks, and +why was not French infantry at hand to hold the ground which the +cavaliers seemed to have won? Undoubtedly, Ney began the first +attack somewhat too early; but Napoleon himself strengthened the +second great charge by the addition of Kellermann's and Guyot's +brigades, doubtless in the belief that the British, of whose +tenacity he had never had direct personal proof, must give way +before so mighty a mass. Moreover, time after time it seemed that +the attacks were triumphant; the allied guns on the right centre, +except Mercer's, were nine or ten times taken, their front squares +as often enveloped; and more than once the cry of victory was +raised by the Emperor's staff.</p> + +<p>Why, then, was not the attack clinched by infantry? To +understand this we must review the general situation. Hougoumont +still defied the attacks of nearly the whole of Reille's corps, and +the effective part of D'Erlon's corps was hotly engaged at and near +La Haye Sainte. Above all, the advent of the Prussians on the +French right now made itself felt. After ceaseless toil, in which +the soldiers were cheered on by Blücher in person, their +artillery was got across the valley of the Lasne; and at 4.30 +Bülow's vanguard debouched from the wood behind Frischermont. +Lobau's corps of 7,800 men, which, according to Janin, was about to +support Ney, now swung round to<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii503" id="page_ii503">[pg.503]</a></span> the right to check +this advance.<a name="FN2anchor518_518"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_518_518"><sup>[518]</sup></a> Towards 5 o'clock the +Prussian cannon opened fire on the horsemen of Domont and Subervie, +who soon fell back on Lobau.</p> + +<p>Bülow pressed on with his 30,000 men, and, swinging forward +his left wing, gained a footing in the village of Planchenoit, +while Lobau fell back towards La Belle Alliance. This took place +between 5.30 and 6 o'clock, and accounts for Napoleon's lack of +attention to the great cavalry charges. To break the British +squares was highly desirable; but to ward off the Prussians from +his rear was an imperative necessity. He therefore ordered Duhesme +with the 4,000 footmen of the Young Guard to regain Planchenoit. +Gallantly they advanced at the charge, and drove their weary and +half-famished opponents out into the open.</p> + +<p>Satisfied with this advantage, the Emperor turned his thoughts +to the British and bade Ney capture La Haye Sainte at all costs. +Never was duty more welcome. Mistakes and failures could now be +atoned by triumph or a soldier's death. Both had as yet eluded his +search. Three horses had been struck to the ground under him, but, +dauntless as ever, he led Donzelot's men, with engineers, against +the farm. Begrimed with smoke, hoarse with shouting, he breathed +the lust of battle into those half-despondent ranks; and this time +he succeeded. For five hours the brave Germans had held out, +beating off rush after rush, until now they had but three or four +bullets apiece left. The ordinary British ammunition did not fit +their rifles; and their own reserve supply could not be found at +the rear. Still, even when firing ceased, bayonet-thrusts and +missiles kept off the assailants for a space, even from the +half-destroyed barn-door, until Frenchmen mounted the roof of the +stables and burst through the chief gateway: then Baring and his +brave<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii504" id= +"page_ii504">[pg.504]</a></span> fellows fled through the house to +the garden. "No pardon to these green devils" was now the cry, and +those who could not make off to the ridge were bayoneted to a +man.<a name="FN2anchor519_519"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_519_519"><sup>[519]</sup></a></p> + +<p>This was a grave misfortune for the allies. French sharpshooters +now lined the walls of the farm and pushed up the ridge, pressing +our front very hard, so that, for a time, the space behind La Haye +Sainte was practically bare of defenders. This was the news that +Kennedy took to Wellington. He received it with the calm that +bespoke a mighty soul; for, as Sir A. Frazer observed, however +indifferent or apparently careless he might appear at the beginning +of battles, as the crisis came he rose superior to all that could +be imagined. Such was his demeanour now. Riding to the Brunswickers +posted in reserve, he led them to the post of danger; Kennedy +rallied the wrecks of Alten's division and brought up Germans from +the left wing; the cavalry of Vandeleur and Vivian, moving in from +the extreme left, also helped to steady the centre; and the +approach of Chassé's Dutch-Belgian brigade, lately called in +from Braine-la-Leud, strengthened our supports.</p> + +<p>Had Napoleon promptly launched his Old and Middle Guard at +Wellington's centre, victory might still have crowned the French +eagles. But to Ney's request for more troops he returned the +petulant answer: "Troops? where do you want me to get them from? Am +I to make them?" At this time the Prussians were again masters of +Planchenoit. Once more, then, he turned on them, and sent in two +battalions, one of the Old, the other of the Middle Guard. In a +single rush with the bayonet these veterans mastered the place and +drove Bülow's men a quarter of a mile beyond, while Lobau +regained ground further north. But the head of Pirch's corps was +near at hand to strengthen Bülow; while, after<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii505" id="page_ii505">[pg.505]</a></span> +long delays caused by miry lanes and an order from Blücher to +make for Planchenoit, Ziethen's corps began to menace the French +right at Smohain. Reiche soon opened fire with sixteen cannon, +somewhat relieving the pressure on Wellington's left.<a name= +"FN2anchor520_520"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_520_520"><sup>[520]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Still the Emperor was full of hope. He did not know of the +approach of Pirch and Ziethen. Now and again the muttering of +Grouchy's guns was heard on the east, and despite that Marshal's +last despatch, Napoleon still believed that he would come up and +catch the Prussians. Satisfied, then, with holding off Bülow +for a while, he staked all on a last effort with the Old and Middle +Guard. Leaving two battalions of these in Planchenoit, and three +near Rossomme as a last reserve, he led forward nine battalions +formed in hollow squares. A thrill ran through the line regiments, +some of whom were falling back, as they saw the bearskins move +forward; and, to revive their spirits, the Emperor sent on +Labédoyère with the news that Grouchy was at +hand.</p> + +<p>Thus the tension of hope long deferred, which renders Waterloo +unique among battles, rose to its climax. Each side had striven +furiously for eight hours in the belief that the Prussians, or +Grouchy, must come; and now, at the last agony, came the assurance +that final triumph was at hand. The troops of D'Erlon and Reille +once more clutched at victory on the crest behind La Haye Sainte or +beneath the walls of Hougoumont, while the squares of the Guard +struck obliquely across the vale in the track of the great cavalry +charges. On the rise south-west of La Haye Sainte, Napoleon halted +one battalion and handed over to Ney the command of the remaining +eight, that hailed him as they passed with enthusiastic shouts. Two +aides-de-camp just then galloped up from the right to tell him of +the Prussian advance, but he refused to listen to them and bent his +eyes on the Guards.<a name="FN2anchor521_521"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_521_521"><sup>[521]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii506" id="page_ii506">[pg.506]</a></span></p> + +<p>Under cover of a whirlwind of shot the veterans pressed on. +Having suffered very little at Ligny, they numbered fully 4,000, +and formed at first one column, some seventy men in width. The +front battalions headed for a point a little to the west of the +present Belgian monument, while for some unexplained reason the +rear portion diverged to the left, and breasted the slope later +than the others and nearer Hougoumont. Flanked by light guns that +opened a brisk fire, and most gallantly supported by Donzelot's +division close on their right, the leading column struggled on, +despite the grape and canister which poured from the batteries of +Bolton and Bean, making it wave "like corn blown by the wind." +Friant, the Commander of the Old Guard, was severely wounded; Ney's +horse fell under him, but the gallant fighter rose undaunted, and +waved on his men anew. And now they streamed over the ridge and +through the British guns in full assurance of triumph. Few troops +seemed to be before them; for Maitland's men (2nd and 3rd +battalions of the 1st Foot Guards) had lain down behind the bank of +the cross-road to get some shelter from the awful cannonade. "Stand +up, Guards, and make ready," exclaimed the Duke when the French +were but sixty paces away. The volley that flashed from their +lengthy front staggered the column, and seemed to force it bodily +back. In vain did the French officers wave their swords and attempt +to deploy into line. Mangled in front by Maitland's brigade, on its +flank by our 33rd and 69th Regiments drawn up in square, and by the +deadly salvos of Chassé's Dutch-Belgians,<a name= +"FN2anchor522_522"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_522_522"><sup>[522]</sup></a> that stately array shrank +and shrivelled up. "Now's the time, my boys," shouted Lord Saltoun; +and the thin red line, closing with the mass, drove it pell-mell +down the slope.</p> + +<p>Near the foot the victors fell under the fire of the rear +portion of the Imperial Guards, who, undaunted by their comrades' +repulse, rolled majestically upwards. Colborne now wheeled the 52nd +(Oxfordshire) Regiment on the<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii507" id="page_ii507">[pg.507]</a></span> crest in a line +nearly parallel to their advance, and opened a deadly fire on their +flank, which was hotly returned; Maitland's men, re-forming on the +crest, gave them a volley in front; and some Hanoverians at the +rear of Hougoumont also galled their rear. Seizing the favourable +moment when the column writhed in anguish, Colborne cheered his men +to the charge, and, aided by the second 95th Rifles, utterly +overthrew the last hope of France. Continuing his advance, and now +supported by the 71st Regiment, he swept our front clear as far as +the orchard of La Haye Sainte.<a name="FN2anchor523_523"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_523_523"><sup>[523]</sup></a><span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii508" id= +"page_ii508">[pg.508]</a></span></p> + +<p>The Emperor had at first watched the charge with feelings of +buoyant hope; for Friant, who came back wounded, reported that +success was certain. As the truth forced itself on him, he turned +pale as a corpse. "Why! they are in confusion," he exclaimed; "all +is lost for the present." A thrill of agony also shot through the +French lines. Donzelot's onset had at one time staggered Halkett's +brigade; but the hopes aroused by the charge of the Guard and the +rumour of Grouchy's approach gave place to dismay when the veterans +fell back and Ziethen's Prussians debouched from Papelotte. To the +cry of "The Guard gives way," there succeeded shouts of "treason." +The Duke, noting the confusion, waved on his whole line to the +longed-for advance. Menaced in front by the thin red line, and in +rear by Colborne's glorious charge, D'Erlon's divisions broke up in +general rout. For a time, three rocks stood boldly forth above this +disastrous ebb. They were the battalions of the Guard previously +repulsed, and that had rallied around the Emperor on the rise south +of La Haye Sainte. In front of them the three regiments of Adam's +brigade stopped to re-form; but at the Duke's command—"Go on, +go on: they will not stand"—Colborne charged them, and they +gave way.</p> + +<p>And now, as the sun shot its last gleams over the field, the +swords of the British horsemen were seen to flash and fall with +relentless vigour. The brigades of Vandeleur and Vivian, well +husbanded during the day, had been slipped upon the foe. The effect +was electrical. The retreat became a rout that surged wildly around +the last squares of the Guard. In one of them Napoleon took refuge +for a space, still hoping to effect a rally, while outside Ney +rushed from band to band, brandishing<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii509" id="page_ii509">[pg.509]</a></span> a broken sword, +foaming with fury, and launching at the runaways the taunt, +"Cowards! have you forgotten how to die?"<a name= +"FN2anchor524_524"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_524_524"><sup>[524]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But panic now reigned supreme. Adam's brigade was at hand to +support our horsemen; and shortly after nine there knelled from +Planchenoit the last stroke of doom, the shouts of Prussians at +last victorious over the stubborn defence. "The Guard dies and does +not surrender"—such are the words attributed by some to +Michel, by others to Cambronne before he was stretched senseless on +the ground.<a name="FN2anchor525_525"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_525_525"><sup>[525]</sup></a> Whether spoken or not, +some such thought prompted whole companies to die for the honour of +their flag. And their chief, why did he not share their glorious +fate? Gourgaud says that Soult forced him from the field. If so +(and Houssaye discredits the story) Soult never served his master +worse. The only dignified course was to act up to his recent +proclamation that the time had come for every Frenchman of spirit +to conquer or die. To belie those words by an ignominious flight +was to court the worst of sins in French political life, +ridicule.</p> + +<p>And the flight was ignominious. Wellington's weary troops, after +several times mistaking friends for foes in the dusk, halted south +of Rossomme and handed over the pursuit to the Prussians, many of +whom had fought but little and now drank deep the draught of +revenge. By the light of the rising moon Gneisenau led on his +horsemen in a pursuit compared with which that of Jena was tame. At +Genappe Napoleon hoped to make a stand: but the place was packed +with wagons and thronged with men struggling to get at the narrow +bridge. At the blare of the Prussian trumpets, the panic became +frightful; the Emperor left his carriage and took to horse as the +hurrahs drew near. Seven times did the French form bivouacs, and +seven times were they driven out and away. At Quatre Bras he once +more sought to<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii510" id= +"page_ii510">[pg.510]</a></span> gather a few troops; but ere he +could do so the Uhlans came on. With tears trickling down his +pallid cheeks, he resumed his flight over another field of carnage, +where ghastly forms glinted on all sides under the pale light of +dawn. After further futile efforts at Charleroi, he hurried on +towards Paris, followed at some distance by groups amounting to +about 10,000 men, the sorry remnant still under arms of the host +that fought at Waterloo: 25,000 lay dead or wounded there: some +thousands were taken prisoners: the rest were scattering to their +homes. Wellington lost 10,360 killed and wounded, of whom 6,344 +were British: the Prussian loss was about 6,000 men.</p> + +<p>The causes of Napoleon's overthrow are not hard to find. The +lack of timely pursuit of Blücher and Wellington on the 17th +enabled those leaders to secure posts of vantage and to form an +incisive plan which he did not fully fathom even at the crisis of +the battle. Full of overweening contempt of Wellington, he began +the fight heedlessly and wastefully. When the Prussians came on, he +underrated their strength and believed to the very end that Grouchy +would come up and take them between two fires. But, in the absence +of prompt, clear, and detailed instructions, that Marshal was left +a prey to his fatal notion that Wavre was the one point to be aimed +at and attacked. Despite the heavy cannonade on the west he +persisted in this strange course; while Napoleon staked everything +on a supreme effort against Wellington. This last was an act of +appalling hardihood; but he explained to Cockburn on the voyage to +St. Helena that, still confiding in Grouchy's approach, he felt no +uneasiness at the Prussian movements, "which were, in fact, already +checked, and that he considered the battle to have been, on the +whole, rather in his favour than otherwise." The explanation has +every appearance of sincerity. But would any other great commander +have staked his last reserve and laid bare his rear solely in +reliance on the ability of an almost untried leader who had sent +not a single word that justified the hopes now placed in him?<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii511" id= +"page_ii511">[pg.511]</a></span></p> + +<p>We here touch the weak points in Napoleon's intellectual armour. +Gifted with almost superhuman insight and energy himself, he too +often credited his paladins with possessing the same divine +afflatus. Furthermore, he had a supreme contempt for his enemies. +Victorious in a hundred fights over second-rate opponents in his +youth, he could not now school his hardened faculties to the +caution needed in a contest with Wellington, Gneisenau, and +Blücher. Only after he had ruined himself and France did he +realize his own errors and the worth of the allied leaders. During +the voyage to England he confessed to Bertrand: "The Duke of +Wellington is fully equal to myself in the management of an army, +<i>with the advantage of possessing more prudence</i>."<a name= +"FN2anchor526_526"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_526_526"><sup>[526]</sup></a> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>NOTE ADDED TO THE FOURTH EDITION.—I have discussed several +of the vexed questions of the Waterloo Campaign in an Essay, "The +Prussian Co-operation at Waterloo," in my volume entitled +"Napoleonic Studies" (George Bell and Sons, 1904). In that Essay I +have pointed out the inaccuracy or exaggeration of the claims put +forward by some German writers to the effect that (1) Wellington +played Blücher false at Ligny, (2) that he did not expect +Prussian help until late in the day at Waterloo, (3) that the share +of credit for the victory rested in overwhelming measure with +Blücher and Gneisenau.<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii512" id="page_ii512">[pg.512]</a></span></p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XLI</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>FROM THE ELYSÉE TO ST. HELENA</center> + +<br> + + +<p>Napoleon was far from accepting Waterloo as a final blow. At +Philippeville on the day after the battle, he wrote to his brother +Joseph that he would speedily have 300,000 men ready to defend +France: he would harness his guns with carriage-horses, raise +100,000 conscripts, and arm them with muskets taken from the +royalists and malcontent National Guards: he would arouse +Dauphiné, Lyonnais, and Burgundy, and overwhelm the enemy. +"But the people must help me and not bewilder me.... Write to me +what effect this horrible piece of bad luck has had on the Chamber. +I believe the deputies will feel convinced that their duty in this +crowning moment is to rally round me and save France."<a name= +"FN2anchor527_527"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_527_527"><sup>[527]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The tenacious will, then, is only bent, not broken. Waterloo is +merely a greater La Rothière, calling for a mightier +defensive effort than that of 1814. Such are his intentions, even +when he knows not that Grouchy is escaping from the Prussians. The +letter breathes a firm resolve. He has no scruples as to the +wickedness of spurring on a wearied people to a conflict with +Europe. As yet he forms no magnanimous resolve to take leave of a +nation whom his genius may once more excite to a fatal frenzy. He +still seems unable to conceive of France happy and prosperous apart +from himself. In indissoluble union they will struggle on and defy +the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii513" id= +"page_ii513">[pg.513]</a></span> world.</p> + +<p>Such was the frame of mind in which he reached the Elysée +Palace early on the 21st of June. For a time he was much agitated. +"Oh, my God!" he exclaimed to Lavalette, raising his eyes to heaven +and walking up and down the room. But after taking a warm +bath—his unfailing remedy for fatigue—he became calm +and discussed with the Ministers plans of a national defence. The +more daring advised the prorogation of the Chambers and the +declaration of a state of siege in Paris; but others demurred to a +step that would lead to civil war. The Council dragged on at great +length, the Emperor only once rousing himself from his weariness to +declare that all was not lost; that <i>he</i>, and not the +Chambers, could save France. If so, he should have gone to the +deputies, thrilled them with that commanding voice, or dissolved +them at once. Montholon states that this course was recommended by +Cambacérès, Carnot, and Maret, but that most of the +Ministers urged him not to expose his wearied frame to the storms +of an excited assembly. At St. Helena he told Gourgaud that, +despite his fatigue, he would have made the effort had he thought +success possible, but he did not.<a name="FN2anchor528_528"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_528_528"><sup>[528]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The Chamber of Deputies meanwhile was acting with vigour. +Agonized by the tales of disaster already spread abroad by wounded +soldiers, it eagerly assented to Lafayette's proposal to sit in +permanence and declare any attempt at dissolution an act of high +treason. So unblenching a defiance, which recalled the Tennis Court +Oath of twenty-six years before, struck the Emperor almost dumb +with astonishment. Lucien bade him prepare for a <i>coup +d'état</i>: but Napoleon saw that the days for such an act +were passed. He had squandered the physical and moral resources +bequeathed by the Revolution. Its armies were mouldering under the +soil of Spain, Russia, Germany, and Belgium; and a decade of +reckless ambition had worn to tatters Rousseau's serviceable theory +of a military dictatorship. Exhausted France was turning<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii514" id= +"page_ii514">[pg.514]</a></span> away from him to the prime source +of liberty, her representatives.</p> + +<p>These were doubtless the thoughts that coursed through his brain +as he paced with Lucien up and down the garden of the +Elysée. A crowd of <i>fédérés</i> and +workmen outside cheered him frantically. He saluted them with a +smile; but, says Pasquier, "the expression of his eyes showed the +sadness that filled his soul." True, he might have led that +unthinking rabble against the Chambers; but that would mean civil +war, and from this he shrank. Still Lucien bade him strike. "Dare," +he whispered with Dantonesque terseness. "Alas," replied his +brother, "I have dared only too much already." Davoust also opined +that it was too late now that the deputies had firmly seized the +reins and were protected by the National Guards of Paris.</p> + +<p>And so Napoleon let matters drift. In truth, he was "bewildered" +by the disunion of France. It was a France that he knew not, a land +given over to <i>idéalogues</i> and traitors. His own +Minister, Fouché, was working to sap his power, and yet he +dared not have him shot! What wonder that the helpless autocrat +paced restlessly to and fro, or sat as in a dream! In the evening +Carnot went to the Peers, Lucien to the Deputies, to appeal for a +united national effort against the Coalition, but the simple +earnestness of the one and the fraternal fervour of the other alike +failed. When Lucien finally exclaimed against any desertion of +Napoleon, Lafayette fiercely shot at him the long tale of costly +sacrifices which France had offered up at the shrine of Napoleon's +glory, and concluded: "We have done enough for him: our duty is to +save <i>la patrie</i>."</p> + +<p>On the morrow came the news that Grouchy had escaped from the +Prussians; and that the relics of Napoleon's host were rallying at +Laon. But would not this encouragement embolden the Emperor to +crush the contumacious Chambers? Evidently the case was urgent. He +must abdicate, or they would dethrone him—such was the +purport of their message to the Elysée; but, as<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii515" id="page_ii515">[pg.515]</a></span> +an act of grace, they allowed him <i>an hour</i> in which to +forestall their action. Shortly after midday, on the advice of his +Ministers, he took the final step of his official career. Lucien +and Carnot begged him for some time to abdicate only in favour of +his son;<a name="FN2anchor529_529"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_529_529"><sup>[529]</sup></a> and he did so, but with +the bitter remark: "My son! What a chimera! No, it is for the +Bourbons that I abdicate! They at least are not prisoners at +Vienna."</p> + +<p>The deputies were of his opinion. Despite frantic efforts of the +Bonapartists, they passed over Napoleon II. without any effective +recognition, and at once appointed an executive Commission of +five—Carnot, Caulaincourt, Fouché, Grenier, and +Quinette. Three of them were regicides, and Fouché was +chosen their President. We can gauge Napoleon's wrath at seeing +matters thus promptly rolled back to where they were before +Brumaire by his biting comment that he had made way for the King of +Rome, not for a Directory which included one traitor and two +babies. His indignation was just. An abdication forced on by +<i>idéalogues</i> was hateful; to be succeeded by +Fouché seemed an unforgivable insult; but he touched the +lowest depth of humiliation on the 25th, when he received from that +despicable schemer an order to leave Paris.</p> + +<p>He obeyed on that first Sunday after Waterloo, driving off +quietly to Malmaison, there to be joined by Hortense Beauharnais +and a few faithful friends. At that ill-omened abode, where +Josephine had breathed her last shortly after his first abdication, +he spent four uneasy days. At times he was full of fight. He sent +to the "Moniteur" a proclamation urging the army to make "some +efforts more, and the Coalition will be dissolved." The manifesto +was suppressed by Fouché's orders.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the invaders pressed on rapidly towards +Compiègne. They met with no attempts at a national rising, a +fact which proves the welcome accorded to Napoleon in March to have +been mainly the outcome of<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii516" id="page_ii516">[pg.516]</a></span> military devotion +and of the dislike generally felt for the Bourbons. It is a libel +on the French people to suppose that a truly national impulse in +his favour would have vanished with a single defeat. In vain did +the Provisional Government sue for an armistice that would stay the +advance. Wellington refused outright; but Blücher declared +that he would consider the matter if Napoleon were handed over to +him, <i>dead or alive</i>. On hearing of this, Wellington at once +wrote his ally a private remonstrance, which drew from Gneisenau a +declaration that, as the Duke was held back <i>by parliamentary +considerations and by the wish to prolong the life of the villain +whose career had extended England's power</i>, the Prussians would +see to it that Napoleon was handed over to them for execution +conformably to the declaration of the Congress of Vienna.<a name= +"FN2anchor530_530"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_530_530"><sup>[530]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But the Provisional Government acted honestly towards Napoleon. +On the 26th Fouché sent General Becker to watch over him and +advise him to set out for Rochefort, <i>en route</i> to the United +States, for which purpose passports were being asked from +Wellington. Becker found the ex-Emperor a prey to quickly varying +moods. At one time he seemed "sunk into a kind of <i>mollesse</i>, +and very careful about his ease and comfort": he ate hugely at +meals: or again he affected a rather coarse joviality, showing his +regard for Becker by pulling his ear. His plans varied with his +moods. He declared he would throw himself into the middle of France +and fight to the end, or that he would take ship at Rochefort with +Bertrand and Savary alone, and steal past the English squadron; but +when Mme. Bertrand exclaimed that this would be cruel to her, he +readily gave up the scheme.<a name="FN2anchor531_531"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_531_531"><sup>[531]</sup></a></p> + +<p>It is not easy to gauge his feelings at this time. Apart from +one outburst to Lavalette of pity for France, he<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii517" id="page_ii517">[pg.517]</a></span> +seems not to have realized how unspeakably disastrous his influence +had been on the land which he found in a victoriously expansive +phase, and now left prostrate at the feet of the allies and the +Bourbons. Hatred and contempt of the upper classes for their +"fickle" desertion of him, these, if we may judge from his frequent +allusions to the topic during the voyage, were the feelings +uppermost in his mind; and this may explain why he wavered between +the thought of staking all on a last effort against the allies and +the plan of renewing in America the career now closed to him in +Europe.</p> + +<p>He certainly was not a prey to torpor and dumb despair. His +brain still clutched eagerly at public affairs, as if unable to +realize that they had slipped beyond his control; and his behaviour +showed that he was still <i>un être politique</i>, with whom +power was all in all. He evinced few signs of deep emotion on +bidding farewell to his devoted followers: but whether this +resulted from inner hardness, or resentment at his fall, or a sense +of dignified prudence, it is impossible to say. When Denon, the +designer of his medals, sobbed on bidding him adieu, he remarked: +<i>Mon cher, ne nous attendrissons pas: il faut dans les crises +comme celle-ci se conduire avec froid</i>. This surely was one +source of his power over an emotional people: his feelings were the +servant, not the master, of his reason.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the Prussians were drawing near to Paris. Early on the +29th they were at Argenteuil, and Blücher detached a flying +column to seize the bridge of Chatou over the Seine near Malmaison +and carry off Napoleon on the following night. But Davoust and +Fouché warded off the danger. While the Marshal had the +nearest bridges of the Seine barricaded or burnt, Fouché on +the night of the 28th-29th sent an order to Napoleon to leave at +once for Rochefort and set sail with two frigates, even though the +English passports had not arrived.</p> + +<p>He received the news calmly, and then with unusual animation +requested Becker to submit to the Government a scheme for rapidly +rallying the troops around<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii518" id="page_ii518">[pg.518]</a></span> Paris, whereupon +he, <i>as General Bonaparte</i>, would surprise first Blücher +and then Wellington—they were two days' marches apart: then, +after routing the foe, he would resume his journey to the coast. +The Commission would have none of it. The reports showed that the +French troops were so demoralized that success was not to be hoped +for.<a name="FN2anchor532_532"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_532_532"><sup>[532]</sup></a> And if a second Montmirail +were snatched from Blücher, would it bring more of glory to +Napoleon or of useless bloodshed to France? Those who look on the +world as an arena for the exploits of heroes at the cost of +ordinary mortals may applaud the scheme. But could men who were +responsible to France regard it as anything but a final proof of +Napoleon's perverse optimism, or a flash of his unquenchable +ambition, or a last mad bid for power? He showed signs of anger on +hearing of their refusal, but set out for Rochefort at 6 p.m.; and +thus the Prussians were cheated of their prey by a few hours. +Bertrand, Savary, Gourgaud, and Becker accompanied him.</p> + +<p>The cheers of troops and people at Niort, and again at +Rochefort, where he arrived on July 3rd, re-awakened his fighting +instincts; and as the westerly winds precluded all hope of the two +frigates slipping quickly down either of the practicable outlets so +as to elude the British cruisers, he again sought permission to +take command of the French forces, now beginning to fall back from +Paris behind the line of the Loire. Again his offer was refused; +and messages came thick and fast bidding Becker get him away from +the mainland. Such was the desire of his best friends. Paris +capitulated to the allies on July 4th, and both French royalists +and Prussians were eager to get hold of him. Thus, while he sat +weaving plans of a campaign on the Loire, the tottering Government +at Paris pressed on his embarkation, hinting that force would be +used should further delays ensue. Sadly, then, on July 8th, he went +on board the "Saale," moored near L'Ile d'Aix, opposite the mouth +of the Charente.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii519" id= +"page_ii519">[pg.519]</a></span></p> + +<p>He was now in sore straits. The orders from Paris expressly +forbade his setting foot again on the mainland, and most of the +great towns had already hoisted the white flag. In front of him was +the Bay of Biscay, swept by British cruisers, which the French +naval officers had scant hopes of escaping. There was talk among +Napoleon's suite, which now included Montholon, Las Cases, and +Lallemand, of attempting flight from the Gironde, or in the hold of +a small Danish sloop then at Rochefort, or on two fishing boats +moored to the north of L'Ile de Ré; but these plans were +given up in consequence of the close watch kept by our cruisers at +all points. The next day brought with it a despatch from Paris +ordering the ex-Emperor to set sail within twenty-four hours.</p> + +<p>On the morrow Napoleon sent Savary and Las Cases with a letter +to H.M.S. "Bellerophon," then cruising off the main +channel—that between the islands of Oléron and +Ré—asking whether the permits for Napoleon's voyage to +America had arrived, or his departure would be prevented. Savary +also inquired whether his passage on a merchant-ship would be +stopped. The commander, Captain Maitland, had received strict +orders to intercept Napoleon; but, seeking to gain time and to +bring Admiral Hotham up with other ships, he replied that he would +oppose the frigates by force: neither could he permit Napoleon to +set sail on a merchant-ship until he had the warrant of his admiral +for so doing. The "Bellerophon," "Myrmidon," and "Slaney" now drew +closer in to guard the middle channel, while a corvette watched +each of the difficult outlets on the north and south.<a name= +"FN2anchor533_533"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_533_533"><sup>[533]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Three days of sorrow and suspense now ensued. On<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii520" id="page_ii520">[pg.520]</a></span> +the 12th came the news of the entry of Louis XVIII. into Paris, the +collapse of the Provisional Government, and the general hoisting of +the <i>fleur-de-lys</i> throughout France. On the 13th Joseph +Bonaparte came for a last interview with his brother on the Ile +d'Aix. Montholon states that the ex-King offered to change places +with the ex-Emperor and thus allow him the chance of escaping on a +neutral ship from the Gironde. Gourgaud does not refer to any such +offer, nor does Bertrand in his letter of July 14th to Joseph. In +any case, it was not put to the test; for royalism was rampant on +the mainland, and two of our cruisers hovered about the Gironde. +Sadly the two brothers parted, and for ever. Then the other schemes +were again mooted only to be given up once more; and late on the +13th Napoleon dictated the following letter, to be taken by +Gourgaud to the Prince Regent:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Exposed to the factions which distract my country and to the +enmity of the greatest Powers of Europe, I have closed my political +career, and I come, like Themistocles, to throw myself upon the +hospitality of the British people. I put myself under the +protection of their laws, which I claim from your Royal Highness, +as the most powerful, the most constant, and the most generous of +my enemies."<a name="FN2anchor534_534"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_534_534"><sup>[534]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>On the 14th Gourgaud and Las Cases took this letter to the +"Bellerophon," whereupon Maitland assured them that he would convey +Napoleon to England, Gourgaud preceding them on the "Slaney"; but +that the ex-Emperor <i>would be entirely at the disposal of our +Government</i>. This last was made perfectly clear to Las Cases, +who understood English, though at first he feigned not<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii521" id="page_ii521">[pg.521]</a></span> +to do so; but, unfortunately, Maitland did not exact from him a +written acknowledgment of this understanding. Gourgaud was +transferred to the "Slaney," which soon set sail for Torbay, while +Las Cases reported to Napoleon on L'Ile d'Aix what had happened. +Thereupon Bertrand wrote to Maitland that Napoleon would come on +board on the morrow:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>" ... If the Admiral, in consequence of the demand that you have +addressed to him, sends you the permits for the United States, His +Majesty will go there with pleasure; but in default of them, he +will go voluntarily to England as a private individual to enjoy the +protection of the laws of your country."</p> +</div> + +<p>Now, either Las Cases misinterpreted Maitland's words and acts, +or Napoleon hoped to impose on the captain by the statements just +quoted. Maitland had not sent to Hotham for permits; he held out no +hopes of Napoleon's going to America; he only promised to take him +to England <i>to be at the disposal of the Prince Regent</i>. +Napoleon, taking no notice of the last stipulation, now promised to +go to England, not as Emperor, but as a private individual. He took +this step soon after dawn on the 15th, when any lingering hopes of +his escape were ended by the sight of Admiral Hotham's ship, +"Superb," in the offing. On leaving the French brig, "Epervier," he +was greeted with the last cheers of <i>Vive l'Empereur</i>, cheers +that died away almost in a wail as his boat drew near to the +"Bellerophon." There he was greeted respectfully, but without a +salute. He wore the green uniform, with gold and scarlet facings, +of a colonel of the Chasseurs à Cheval of the Guard, with +white waistcoat and military boots; and Maitland thought him "a +remarkably strong, well-built man." Keeping up a cheerful +demeanour, he asked a number of questions about the ship, and +requested to be shown round even thus early, while the men were +washing the decks. He inquired whether the "Bellerophon" would have +worsted the two French frigates and acquiesced in Maitland's +affirmative reply. He expressed admiration of all that <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii522" id= +"page_ii522">[pg.522]</a></span>he saw, including the portrait of +Maitland's wife hanging in the cabin; and the captain felt the full +force of that seductive gift of pleasing, which was not the least +important of the great man's powers.</p> + +<p>He was accompanied by General and Mme. Bertrand, the former a +tall, slim, good-looking man, of refined manners and domestic +habits, though of a sensitive and hasty temper; his wife, a lady of +slight figure, but stately carriage, the daughter of a Irishman +named Dillon, who lost his life in the Revolution. Her vivacious +manners bespoke a warm impulsive nature, that had revelled in the +splendour of her high ceremonial station and now seemed strained +beyond endurance by the trials threatening her and her three +children. The Bertrands had been with Napoleon at Elba, and enjoyed +his complete confidence. Younger than they were General (Count) +Montholon and his wife—he, a short but handsome man, his +consort, a sweet unassuming woman—who showed their devotion +to the ex-Emperor by exchanging a life of luxury for exile in his +service. Count Las Cases, a small man, whose thin eager face and +furtive glances revealed his bent for intrigue, was the eldest of +the party. He had been a naval officer, had then lived in England +as an <i>émigré</i>, but after the Peace of Amiens +took civil service under Napoleon; he now brought with him his son, +a lad of fifteen, fresh from the Lycée. We need not notice +the figures of Savary and Lallemand, as they were soon to part +company. Maingaud the surgeon, Marchand the head valet, several +servants, and the bright little boy of the Montholons completed the +list.</p> + +<p>The voyage passed without incident. Napoleon's health and +appetite were on the whole excellent, and he suffered less than the +rest from sea-sickness. The delicate Las Cases, who had donned his +naval uniform, was in such distress as to move the mirth of the +crew, whereupon Napoleon sharply bade him appear in plain clothes +so as not to disgrace the French navy. For the great man himself +the crew soon felt a very real regard, witness the final confession +of one of them to Maitland: <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii523" id="page_ii523">[pg.523]</a></span> "Well, they may +abuse that man as much as they like, but if the people of England +knew him as well as we do, they would not hurt a hair of his +head."—What a tribute this to the mysterious power of +genius!</p> + +<p>On passing Ushant, he remained long upon deck, silent and +abstracted, casting melancholy looks at the land he was never more +to see. As they neared Torbay, the exile was loud in praise of the +beauty of the scene, which he compared with that of Porto Ferrajo. +Whatever misgivings he felt before embarking on the "Bellerophon" +had apparently disappeared. He had been treated with every courtesy +and had met with only one rebuff. He prompted Mme. Bertrand, who +spoke English well, to sound Maitland as to the acceptance of a box +containing his (Napoleon's) portrait set in diamonds. This the +captain very properly refused.<a name="FN2anchor535_535"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_535_535"><sup>[535]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In Torbay troubles began to thicken upon the party. Gourgaud +rejoined them on the 24th: he had not been allowed to land. Orders +came on the 26th for the "Bellerophon" to proceed to Plymouth; and +the rumour gained ground that St. Helena would be their +destination. It was true. On July 31st, Sir Henry Bunbury, +Secretary to the Admiralty, and Lord Keith, Admiral in command at +Plymouth, laid before him in writing the decision of our +Government, that, in order to prevent any further disturbance to +the peace of Europe, it had been decided to restrain his +liberty—"to whatever extent may be necessary for securing +that first and paramount object"—and that St. Helena would be +his place of residence, as it was healthy, and would admit of a +smaller degree of restraint than might be necessary elsewhere.</p> + +<p>Against this he made a lengthy protest, declaring that he was +not a prisoner of war, that he came as a passenger on the +"Bellerophon" "after a previous negotiation with the commander," +that he demanded the rights of a British citizen, and wished to +settle in a country house far from the sea, where he would submit +to the surveillance of a commissioner over his actions and<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii524" id= +"page_ii524">[pg.524]</a></span> correspondence. St. Helena would +kill him in three months, for he was wont to ride twenty leagues a +day; he preferred death to St. Helena. Maitland's conduct had been +a deliberate snare. To deprive him (Napoleon) of his liberty would +be an eternal disgrace to England; for in coming to our shores he +had offered the Prince Regent the finest page of his +history.—Our officials then bowed and withdrew. He recalled +Keith, and when the latter remarked that to go to St. Helena was +better than being sent to Louis XVIII. or to Russia, the captive +exclaimed "Russia! God keep me from that."<a name= +"FN2anchor536_536"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_536_536"><sup>[536]</sup></a></p> + +<p>It is unnecessary to traverse his statements at length. The +foregoing recital of facts will have shown that he was completely +at the end of his resources, and that Maitland had not made a +single stipulation as to his reception in England. Indeed, Napoleon +never reproached Maitland; he left that to Las Cases to do; and the +captain easily refuted these insinuations, with the approval of +Montholon. If there was any misunderstanding, it was certainly due +to Las Cases.<a name="FN2anchor537_537"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_537_537"><sup>[537]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Indeed, the thought of Napoleon settling dully down in the +Midlands is ludicrous. How could a man who revelled in vast +schemes, whose mind preyed on itself if there were no facts and +figures to grind, or difficulties to overcome, ever sink to the +level of a Justice Shallow? And if he longed for repose, would the +Opposition in England and the malcontents in France have let him +rest? Inevitably he would become a rallying point for all the +malcontents of Europe. Besides, our engagements to the allies bound +us to guard him securely; and we were under few personal +obligations to a man who, during the Peace of Amiens, persistently +urged us to drive forth the Bourbons from our land, who at its +close forcibly detained 10,000 Britons in defiance of the law of +nations, and whose ambition added £600,000,000 to our +National Debt.</p> + +<p>Ministers had decided on St. Helena by July 28th.<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii525" id="page_ii525">[pg.525]</a></span> +Their decision was clinched by a Memorandum of General Beatson, +late Governor of the island, dated July 29th, recommending St. +Helena, because all the landing places were protected by batteries, +and the semaphores recently placed on the lofty cliffs would enable +the approach of a rescue squadron to be descried sixty miles off, +and the news to be speedily signalled to the Governor's House. +Napoleon's appeal and protests were accordingly passed over; and, +in pursuance of advice just to hand from Castlereagh at Paris, +Ministers decided to treat him, not as our prisoner, but as the +prisoner of all the Powers. A Convention was set in hand as to his +detention; it was signed on August 2nd at Paris, and bound the +other Powers to send Commissioners as witnesses to the safety of +the custody.<a name="FN2anchor538_538"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_538_538"><sup>[538]</sup></a></p> + +<p>His departure from Plymouth was hastened by curious incidents. +Crowds of people assembled there to see the great man, and shoals +of boats—Maitland says more than a thousand on fine +days—struggled and jostled to get as near the "Bellerophon" +as the guard-boats would allow. Two or three persons were drowned; +but still the swarm pressed on. Many of the men wore +carnations—a hopeful sign this seemed to Las Cases—and +the women waved their handkerchiefs when he appeared on the poop or +at the open gangway. Maitland was warned that a rescue would be +attempted on the night of the 3rd-4th; and certainly the +Frenchmen<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii526" id= +"page_ii526">[pg.526]</a></span> were very restless at that time. +They believed that if Napoleon could only set foot on shore he must +gain the rights of Habeas Corpus.<a name="FN2anchor539_539"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_539_539"><sup>[539]</sup></a> And there seemed some +chance of his gaining them. Very early on August 4th a man came +down from London bringing a subpoena from the Court of King's Bench +to compel Lord Keith and Captain Maitland to produce the person of +Napoleon Bonaparte for attendance in London as witness in a trial +for libel then pending. It appears that some one was to be sued for +a libel on a naval officer, censuring his conduct in the West +Indies; and it was suggested that if he (the defendant) could get +Napoleon's evidence to prove that the French ships were at that +time unserviceable, his case would be strengthened. An attorney +therefore came down to Plymouth armed with a subpoena, with which +he chased Keith on land and chased him by sea, until his panting +rowers were foiled by the stout crew of the Admiral's barge. Keith +also found means to let Maitland know how matters stood early on +the 4th, whereupon the "Bellerophon" stood out to sea, her +guard-boat keeping at a distance the importunate man with the +writ.</p> + +<p>The whole affair looks very suspicious. What defendant in a +plain straightforward case would ever have thought of so +far-fetched a device as that of getting the ex-Emperor to declare +on oath that his warships in the West Indies had been unseaworthy? +The tempting thought that it was a trick of some enterprising +journalist in search of "copy " must also be given up as a glaring +anachronism. On the other hand, it is certain that Napoleon's +well-wishers in London and Plymouth were moving heaven and earth to +get him ashore, or delay his departure.<a name= +"FN2anchor540_540"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_540_540"><sup>[540]</sup></a> In common with +Sieyès, Lavalette, and Las<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii527" id="page_ii527">[pg.527]</a></span> Cases, he had +hoped much from the peculiarities of English law; and on July 28th +he dictated to Las Cases a paper, "suited to serve as a basis to +jurists," which the latter says he managed to send ashore.<a name= +"FN2anchor541_541"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_541_541"><sup>[541]</sup></a> If this be true, Napoleon +himself may have spurred on his friends to the effort just +described. Or else the plan may have occurred to some of his +English admirers who wished to embarrass the Ministry. If so, their +attempt met with the fate that usually befalls the efforts of our +anti-national cliques on behalf of their foreign heroes: it did +them harm: the authorities acted more promptly than they would +otherwise have done: the "Bellerophon" put to sea a few days before +the Frenchmen expected, with the result that they were exposed to a +disagreeable cruise until the "Northumberland" (the ship destined +for the voyage in place of the glorious old "Bellerophon") was +ready to receive them on board.<a name="FN2anchor542_542"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_542_542"><sup>[542]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Dropping down from Portsmouth, the newer ship met the +"Bellerophon" and "Tonnant," Lord Keith's ship,<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii528" id="page_ii528">[pg.528]</a></span> +off the Start. The transhipment took place on the 7th, under the +lee of Berry Head, Torbay. After dictating a solemn protest against +the compulsion put upon him, the ex-Emperor thanked Maitland for +his honourable conduct, spoke of his having hoped to buy a small +estate in England where he might end his days in peace, and +declaimed bitterly against the Government.</p> + +<p>Rear-Admiral Sir George Cockburn, of the "Northumberland," then +came by official order to search his baggage and that of his suite, +so as to withdraw any large sums of money that might be thereafter +used for effecting an escape. Savary and Marchand were present +while this was done by Cockburn's secretary with as much delicacy +as possible: 4,000 gold Napoleons (80,000 francs) were detained to +provide a fund for part maintenance of the illustrious exile. The +diamond necklace which Hortense had handed to him at Malmaison was +at that time concealed on Las Cases, who continued to keep it as a +sacred trust. The ex-Emperor's attendants were required to give up +their swords during the voyage. Montholon states that when the same +request was made by Keith to Napoleon, the only reply was a flash +of anger from his eyes, under which the Admiral's tall figure +shrank away, and his head, white with years, fell on his breast. +Alas, for the attempt at melodrama! <i>Maitland was expressly told +by Lord Keith not to proffer any such request to the fallen +chief</i>.</p> + +<p>Apart from one or two exclamations that he would commit suicide +rather than go to St. Helena, Napoleon had behaved with a calm and +serenity that contrasted with the peevish gloom of his officers and +the spasms of Mme. Bertrand. This unhappy lady, on learning their +fate, raved in turn against Maitland, Gourgaud, Napoleon, and +against her husband for accompanying him, and ended by trying to +throw herself from a window. From this she was pulled back, +whereupon she calmed down and secretly urged Maitland to write to +Lord Keith to prevent Bertrand accompanying his master. The captain +did so, but of course the Admiral declined<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii529" id="page_ii529">[pg.529]</a></span> to interfere. +Her shrill complaints against Napoleon had, however, been heard on +the other side of the thin partition, and fanned the dislike which +Montholon and Gourgaud had conceived for her, and in part for her +husband. These were the officers whom he selected as companions of +exile. Las Cases was to go as secretary, and his son as page.</p> + +<p>Savary, Lallemand, and Planat having been proscribed by Louis +XVIII., were detained by our Government, and subsequently interned +at Malta. On taking leave of Napoleon they showed deep emotion, +while he bestowed the farewell embrace with remarkable composure. +The surgeon, Maingaud, now declined to proceed to St. Helena, +alleging that he had wanted to go to America only because his uncle +there was to leave him a legacy! At the same time Bertrand asked +that O'Meara, the surgeon of the "Bellerophon," might accompany +Napoleon to St. Helena. As Maingaud's excuse was very lame, and +O'Meara had had one or two talks with Napoleon <i>in Italian</i>, +Keith and Maitland should have seen that there was some +understanding between them; but the Admiral consented to the +proposed change. As to O'Meara's duplicity, we may quote from Basil +Jackson's "Waterloo and St. Helena": "I <i>know</i> that he +[O'Meara] was <i>fully enlisted</i> for Napoleon's service during +the voyage from Rochefort to England." The sequel will show how +disastrous it was to allow this man to go with the ex-Emperor.</p> + +<p>In the Admiral's barge that took him to the "Northumberland" the +ex-Emperor "appeared to be in perfect good humour," says Keith, +"talking of Egypt, St. Helena, of my former name being Elphinstone, +and many other subjects, and joking with the ladies about being +seasick."<a name="FN2anchor543_543"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_543_543"><sup>[543]</sup></a> In this firm +matter-of-fact way did Napoleon<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii530" id="page_ii530">[pg.530]</a></span> accept the +extraordinary change in his fortunes. At no time of his life, +perhaps, was he so great as when, forgetting his own headlong fall, +he sought to dispel the smaller griefs of Mmes. Bertrand and +Montholon. A hush came over the crew as Napoleon mounted the side +and set foot on the deck of the ship that was to bear him away to a +life of exile. It was a sight that none could behold unmoved, as +the great man uncovered, received the salute, and said with a firm +voice: "Here I am, General, at your orders."</p> + +<p>The scene was rich, not only in personal interest and pathos, +but also in historic import. It marks the end of a cataclysmic +epoch and the dawn of a dreary and confused age. We may picture the +Muse of History, drawn distractedly from her abodes on the banks of +the Seine, gazing in wonder on that event taking place under the +lee of Berry Head, her thoughts flashing back, perchance, to the +days when William of Orange brought his fleet to shore at that same +spot and baffled the designs of the other great ruler of France. +The glory of that land is now once more to be shrouded in gloom. +For a time, like an uneasy ghost, Clio will hover above the scenes +of Napoleon's exploits and will find little to record but promises +broken and development arrested by his unteachable successors.</p> + +<p>But the march of Humanity is only clogged: it is not stayed. Ere +long it breaks away into untrodden paths amidst the busy hives of +industry or in the track of the colonizing peoples. The Muse +follows in perplexity: her course at first seems dull and +purposeless: her story, when it bids farewell to Napoleon, suffers +a bewildering fall in dramatic interest: but at length new and +varied fields open out to view. Democracy, embattled for seven sad +years by Napoleon against her sister, Nationality, little by little +awakens to a<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii531" id= +"page_ii531">[pg.531]</a></span> consciousness of the mistake that +has blighted his fortune and hers, and begins to ally herself with +the ill-used champion of the Kings. Industry, starved by War, +regains her strength and goes forth on a career of conquest more +enduring than that of the great warrior. And the peoples that come +to the front are not those of the Latin race, whom his wars have +stunted, but those of the untamable Teutonic stock, the lords of +the sea and the leaders of Central Europe.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;"> +<p>The treatment of the ex-Emperor henceforth differed widely from +that which had been hastily arranged by the Czar for his sojourn at +Elba. In that case he retained the title of Emperor; he reigned +over the island, and was free to undertake coasting trips. As these +generous arrangements had entailed on Europe the loss of more than +80,000 men in killed and wounded, it is not surprising that the +British Ministers should now have insisted on far stricter rules, +especially as they and their Commissioner had been branded as +accomplices in the former escape. His comfort and dignity were now +subordinated to security. As the title of Emperor would enable him +to claim privileges incompatible with any measure of surveillance, +it was firmly and consistently denied to him; while he as +persistently claimed it, and doubtless for the same reason. He was +now to rank as a General not on active service; and Cockburn +received orders, while treating him with deference and assigning to +him the place of honour at table, to abstain from any +acknowledgment of the imperial dignity. Napoleon soon put this +question to the test by rising from dinner before the others had +finished; but, with the exception of his suite, the others did not +accompany him on deck. At this he was much piqued, as also at +seeing that the officers did not uncover in his presence on the +quarter-deck; but when Cockburn's behaviour in this respect was +found to be quietly consistent, the anger of the exiles began to +wear off—or rather it was thrust down.</p> + +<p>One could wish that the conduct of our Government<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii532" id="page_ii532">[pg.532]</a></span> +in this matter had been more chivalrous. It is true that we had +only on two occasions acknowledged the imperial title, namely +during the negotiations of 1806 and 1814; and to recognize it after +his public outlawry would have been rather illogical, besides +feeding the Bonapartists with hopes which, in the interests of +France, it was well absolutely to close. Ministers might also urge +that he himself had offered to live in England <i>as a private +individual</i>, and that his transference to St. Helena, which +allowed of greater personal liberty than could be accorded in +England, did not alter the essential character of his detention. +Nevertheless, their decision is to be regretted. The zeal of his +partisans, far from being quenched, was inflamed by what they +conceived to be a gratuitous insult; and these feelings, artfully +worked upon by tales, medals, and pictures of the modern Prometheus +chained to the rock, had no small share in promoting unrest in +France.</p> + +<p>Apart from this initial friction, Napoleon's relations to the +Admiral and officers were fairly cordial. He chatted with him at +the dinner-table and during the hour's walk that they afterwards +usually took on the quarter-deck. His conversations showed no signs +of despair or mental lethargy. They ranged over a great variety of +topics, general and personal. He discussed details of navigation +and shipbuilding with a minuteness of knowledge that surprised the +men of the sea.</p> + +<p>From his political conversations with Cockburn we may cull the +following remarks. He said that he really meant to invade England +in 1803-5, and to dictate terms of peace at London. He stoutly +defended his execution of the Duc d'Enghien, and named none of the +paltry excuses that his admirers were later on to discover for that +crime. Referring to recent events, he inveighed against the French +Liberals, declared that he had humoured the Chambers far too much, +and dilated on the danger of representative institutions on the +Continent. However much a Parliament might suit England, it was, he +declared, highly perilous in Continental States. With<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii533" id="page_ii533">[pg.533]</a></span> +respect to the future of France, he expressed the conviction that, +as soon as the armies of occupation were withdrawn, there would be +a general insurrection owing to the strong military bias of the +people and their hatred of the Bourbons, now again brought back by +devastating hordes of foreigners.<a name="FN2anchor544_544"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_544_544"><sup>[544]</sup></a></p> + +<p>This last observation probably explains the general buoyancy of +his bearing. He did not consider the present settlement as final; +and doubtless it was his boundless fund of hope that enabled him to +triumph over the discomforts of the present, which left his +companions morose and snappish. "His spirits are even," wrote +Glover, the Admiral's secretary, at the equator, "and he appears +perfectly unconcerned about his fate."<a name= +"FN2anchor545_545"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_545_545"><sup>[545]</sup></a> His recreations were +chess, which he played with more vehemence than skill, and games of +hazard, especially <i>vingt-et-un</i>: he began to learn "le wisth" +from our officers. Sometimes he and Gourgaud amused themselves by +extracting the square and cube roots of numbers; he also began to +learn English from Las Cases. On some occasions he diverted his +male companions with tales of his adventures, both military and +amorous. His interest in the ship and in the events of the voyage +did not flag. When a shark was caught and hauled up, "Bonaparte +with the eagerness of a schoolboy scrambled on the poop to see +it."</p> + +<p>His health continued excellent. Despite his avoidance of +vegetables and an excessive consumption of meat, he suffered little +from indigestion, except during a few days of fierce sirocco wind +off Madeira. He breakfasted about 10 on meat and wine, and remained +in his cabin reading, dictating, or learning English, until about 3 +p.m., when he played games and took exercise preparatory to dinner +at 5. After a full meal, in which he partook by preference of the +most highly dressed dishes of meat, he walked the deck for an hour +or more. On one evening, the Admiral begged to be excused owing to +a heavy<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii534" id= +"page_ii534">[pg.534]</a></span> equatorial rain-storm; but the +ex-Emperor went up as usual, saying that the rain would not hurt +him any more than the sailors; and it did not. The incident claims +some notice: for it proves that, whatever later writers may say as +to his decline of vitality in 1815, he himself was unaware of it, +and braved with impunity a risk that a vigorous naval officer +preferred to avoid. Moreover, the mere fact that he was able to +keep up a heavy meat diet all through the tropics bespeaks a +constitution of exceptional strength, unimpaired as yet by the +internal malady which was to be his doom.</p> + +<p>That one element of conviviality was not wanting at meals will +appear from the official return of the consumption of wine at the +Admiral's table by his seven French guests and six British +officers: Port, 20 dozen; Claret, 45 dozen; Madeira, 22 dozen; +Champagne, 13 dozen; Sherry, 7 dozen; Malmsey, 5 dozen.<a name= +"FN2anchor546_546"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_546_546"><sup>[546]</sup></a> The "Peruvian" had been +detached from the squadron to Guernsey to lay in a stock of French +wines specially for the exiles; and 15 dozen of +claret—Napoleon's favourite beverage—were afterwards +sent on shore at St. Helena for his use.</p> + +<p>Doubtless the evenness of his health, which surprised Cockburn, +Warden, and O'Meara alike, was largely due to his iron will. He +knew that his exile must be<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii535" id="page_ii535">[pg.535]</a></span> disagreeable, but +he had that useful faculty of encasing himself in the present, +which dulls the edge of care. Besides, his tastes were not so +exacting, or his temperament so volatile, as to shroud him in the +gloom that besets weaker natures in time of trouble. Alas for him, +it was far otherwise with his companions. The impressionable young +Gourgaud, the thought-wrinkled Las Cases, the bright +pleasure-loving Montholons, the gloomy Grand Marshal, Bertrand, and +his mercurial consort, over whose face there often passed "a gleam +of distraction"—these were not fashioned for a life of +adversity. Thence came the long spells of <i>ennui</i>, broken by +flashes of temper, that marked the voyage and the sojourn at St. +Helena.</p> + +<p>The storm-centre was generally Mme. Bertrand; her varying moods, +that proclaimed her Irish-Creole parentage, early brought on her +the hostility of the others, including Napoleon; and as the +discovery of her little plot to prevent Bertrand going to St. +Helena gave them a convenient weapon, the voyage was for her one +long struggle against covert intrigues, thinly veiled sarcasms, +sea-sickness, and despair. At last she has to keep to her cabin, +owing to some nervous disorder. On hearing of this Napoleon remarks +that it is better she should die—such is Gourgaud's report of +his words. Unfortunately, she recovers: after ten days she +reappears, receives the congratulations of the officers in the +large cabin where Napoleon is playing chess with Montholon. He +receives her with a stolid stare and goes on with the game. After a +time the Admiral hands her to her seat at the dinner-table, on the +ex-Emperor's left. Still no recognition from her chief! But the +claret bottle that should be in front of him is not there: she +reaches over and hands it to him. Then come the looked-for words: +"Ah! comment se porte madame?"—That is all.<a name= +"FN2anchor547_547"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_547_547"><sup>[547]</sup></a></p> + +<p>For Bertrand, even in his less amiable moods, Bonaparte ever had +the friendly word that feeds the well-spring of devotion. On the +"Bellerophon," when they<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii536" +id="page_ii536">[pg.536]</a></span> hotly differed on a trivial +subject, Bertrand testily replied to his dogmatic statements: "Oh! +if you reply in that manner, there is an end of all argument." Far +from taking offence at this retort, Napoleon soothed him and +speedily restored him to good temper—a good instance of his +forbearance to those whom he really admired.</p> + +<p>Certainly the exiles were not happy among themselves. Even the +amiable Mme. Montholon was the cause of one quarrel at table. After +leaving Funchal, Cockburn states that a Roman Catholic priest there +has offered to accompany the ex-Emperor. Napoleon replies in a way +that proves his utter indifference; but the ladies launch out on +the subject of religion. The discussion waxes hot, until the +impetuous Gourgaud shoots out the remark that Montholon is wanting +in respect for his wife. Whereupon the Admiral ends the scene by +rising from table. Sir George Bingham, Colonel of the 53rd Regiment +sailing in the squadron, passes the comment in his diary: "It is +not difficult to see that envy, hatred, and all uncharitableness +are firmly rooted in Napoleon's family, and that their residence in +St. Helena will be rendered very uncomfortable by it."<a name= +"FN2anchor548_548"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_548_548"><sup>[548]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Intrigues there are of kaleidoscopic complexity, either against +the superior Bertrands or the rising influence of Las Cases. This +official has but yesterday edged his way into the Emperor's inner +circle, and Gourgaud frankly reminds him of the fact: "'If I have +come [with the Emperor] it is because I have followed him for four +years, except at Elba. I have saved his life; and one loves those +whom one has obliged.... But you, sir, he did not know you even by +sight: then, why this great devotion of yours?'—I see around +me," he continues, "many intrigues and deceptions. Poor Gourgaud, +<i>qu'allais-tu faire dans cette galère</i>?"<a name= +"FN2anchor549_549"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_549_549"><sup>[549]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The young aide-de-camp's influence is not allowed to<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii537" id="page_ii537">[pg.537]</a></span> +wane for lack of self-advertisement. Thus, when the battle of +Waterloo is mentioned at table, he at once gives his version of it, +and stoutly maintains that, <i>whatever Napoleon may say to the +contrary</i>, he (Napoleon) did mistake the Prussian army for +Grouchy's force: and, waxing eloquent on this theme, he exclaims to +his neighbour, Glover, "that at one time he [Gourgaud] might have +taken the Duke of Wellington prisoner, but he <i>desisted from it, +knowing the effusion of blood it would have occasioned</i>."<a +name="FN2anchor550_550"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_550_550"><sup>[550]</sup></a>—It is charitable to +assume that this utterance was inspired by some liquid stronger +than the alleged "stale water that had been to India and back."</p> + +<p>On the whole, was there ever an odder company of shipmates since +the days of Noah? A cheery solid Admiral, a shadowy Captain Ross +who can navigate but does not open his lips, a talkative creature +of the secretary type, the soldierly Bingham, the graceful courtly +Montholons, the young General who out-gascons the Gascons, the +wire-drawn subtle Las Cases, the melancholy Grand Marshal and his +spasmodic consort—all of them there to guard or cheer that +pathetic central figure, the world's conqueror and world's +exile.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile France was feeling the results of his recent +enterprise. Enormous armies began to hold her down until the +Bourbons, whose nullity was a pledge for peace, should be firmly +re-established. Blücher, baulked of his wish to shoot +Bonaparte, was with difficulty dissuaded by the protests of +Wellington and Louis XVIII. from blowing up the Pont de Jéna +at Paris; and the fierce veteran voiced the general opinion of +Germans, including Metternich, that France must be partitioned, or +at least give back Alsace and Lorraine to the Fatherland. Even Lord +Liverpool, our cautious Premier, wrote on July 15th that, if +Bonaparte remained at large, the allies ought to retain all the +northern fortresses as a security.<a name="FN2anchor551_551"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_551_551"><sup>[551]</sup></a> But the knowledge +that the warrior was in our power led <span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii538" id="page_ii538">[pg.538]</a></span> our statesmen +to bear less hardly on France. From the outset Wellington sought to +bring the allies to reason, and on August 11th he wrote a despatch +that deserves to rank among his highest titles to fame. While +granting that France was still left "in too great strength for the +rest of Europe," he pointed out that "revolutionary France is more +likely to distress the world, than France, however strong in her +frontier, under a regular Government; and that is the situation in +which we ought to endeavour to place her."</p> + +<p>This generous and statesmanlike judgment, consorting with that +of the Czar, prevailed over the German policy of partition; and it +was finally arranged by the Treaty of Paris of November 20th, 1815, +that France should surrender only the frontier strips around +Marienburg, Saarbrücken, Landau, and Chambéry, also +paying war indemnities and restoring to their lawful owners all the +works of art of which Napoleon had rifled the chief cities of the +continent. In one respect these terms were extraordinarily lenient. +Great Britain, after bearing the chief financial strain of the war, +might have claimed some of the French colonies which she restored +in 1814, or at least have required the surrender of the French +claims on part of the Newfoundland coast. Even this last was not +done, and alone of the States that had suffered loss of valuable +lives, we exacted no territorial indemnity for the war of 1815.<a +name="FN2anchor552_552"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_552_552"><sup>[552]</sup></a> In truth, our Ministers +were content with placing France and her ancient dynasty in an +honourable position, in the hope that Europe would thus at last +find peace; and the forty years of almost unbroken rest that +followed justified their magnanimity.</p> + +<p>But there was one condition fundamental to the Treaty of Paris +and essential to the peace of Europe, namely, that Napoleon should +be securely guarded at St. Helena.<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii539" id="page_ii539">[pg.539]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<h2>CHAPTER XLII</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<center>CLOSING YEARS</center> + +<br> + + +<p>After a voyage of sixty-seven days the exiles sighted St. +Helena—"that black wart rising out of the ocean," as Surgeon +Henry calls it. Blank dismay laid hold of the more sensitive as +they gazed at those frowning cliffs. What Napoleon's feelings were +we know not. Watchful curiosity seemed to be uppermost; for as they +drew near to Jamestown, he minutely scanned the forts through a +glass. Arrangements having been made for his reception, he landed +in the evening of the 17th October, so as to elude the gaze of the +inhabitants, and entered a house prepared for him in the town.</p> + +<p>On the morrow he was up at dawn, and rode with Cockburn and +Bertrand to Longwood, the residence of the Lieutenant-Governor. The +orders of our East India Company, to which the island then +belonged, forbade his appropriation of Plantation House, the +Governor's residence; and a glance at the accompanying map will +show the reason of this prohibition. This house is situated not far +from creeks that are completely sheltered from the south-east trade +winds, whence escape by boat would be easy; whereas Longwood is +nearer the surf-beaten side and offers far more security. After +conferring with Governor Wilks and others, Cockburn decided on this +residence.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"At Longwood," wrote Cockburn, "an extent of level ground, +easily to be secured by sentries, presents itself, perfectly +adapted for horse exercise, carriage exercise, or for pleasant +walking, which is not to be met with in all the other parts<span +class="newpage"><a name="page_ii540" id= +"page_ii540">[pg.540]</a></span> of the island. The house is +certainly small; but ... I trust the carpenters of the +'Northumberland' will in a little time be able to make such +additions to the house as will render it, if not as good as might +be wished, yet at least as commodious as necessary."<a name= +"FN2anchor553_553"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_553_553"><sup>[553]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<center><a name="image_21"><img alt="ST. HELENA" src= +"images/image21.jpg" width="531" height="469"><br> + <font color="#000000" face="ARIAL" size="2"><small>ST. +HELENA</small></font></a></center> + +<p>"Napoleon," wrote Glover, "seemed well satisfied with the +situation of Longwood, and expressed a desire to occupy it as soon +as possible." As he disliked the publicity of the house in +Jamestown, Cockburn suggested on their return that he should reside +at a pretty little bungalow, not far from the town, named "The +Briars." He readily assented, and took up his abode there for seven +weeks, occupying a small adjoining annexe, while Las Cases and his +son established themselves in the two<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii541" id="page_ii541">[pg.541]</a></span> garrets. A marquee +was erected to serve as dining-room. It was a narrow space for the +lord of the Tuileries, but he seems to have been not unhappy. There +he dictated Memoranda to Las Cases or Gourgaud in the mornings, and +often joined the neighbouring family of the Balcombes for dinner +and the evening. Mr. Balcombe, an elderly merchant, was appointed +purveyor to the party; he and his wife were most hospitable, and +their two daughters, of fifteen and fourteen years, frequently +beguiled Napoleon's evening hours with games of whist or naïve +questions. On one supreme occasion, in order to please the younger +girl, Napoleon played at blindman's buff; at such times she +ventured to call him "Boney"; and, far from taking offence at this +liberty, he delighted in her glee. It is such episodes as these +that reveal the softer traits of his character, which the dictates +of policy had stunted but not eradicated.<a name= +"FN2anchor554_554"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_554_554"><sup>[554]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In other respects, the time at "The Briars" was dull and +monotonous, and he complained bitterly to Cockburn of the +inadequate accommodation. The most exciting times were on the +arrival of newspapers from Europe. The reports just to hand of +riots in England and royalist excesses in France fed his hopes of +general disorders or revolutions which might lead to his recall. He +believed the Jacobins would yet lord it over the Continent. "It is +only I who can tame them."</p> + +<p>Equally noteworthy are his comments on the trials of +Labédoyère and Ney for their treason to Louis XVIII. +He has little pity for them. "One ought never to break one's word," +he remarked to Gourgaud, "and I despise traitors." On hearing that +Labédoyère was condemned to death, he at first shows +more feeling: but he comes round to the former view: +"Labédoyère acted like a man without honour," and +"Ney dishonoured himself."<a name="FN2anchor555_555"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_555_555"><sup>[555]</sup></a></p> + +<p>We may hereby gauge <span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii542" +id="page_ii542">[pg.542]</a></span> the value which Napoleon laid +on fidelity. For him it is the one priceless virtue. He esteems +those who staunchly oppose him, and seeks to gain them over by +generosity: for those who <i>come over</i> he ever has a secret +contempt; for those who desert him, hatred. Doubtless that is why +he heard the news of Ney's execution unmoved. Brilliantly brave as +the Marshal was, he had abandoned him in 1814, and Louis XVIII. in +the Hundred Days. The tidings of Murat's miserable fate, at the +close of his mad expedition to Calabria, leave Napoleon equally +cold.—"I announce the fatal news," writes Gourgaud, "to His +Majesty, whose expression remains unchanged, and who says that +Murat must have been mad to attempt a venture like +that."—Here again his thoughts seem to fly back to Murat's +defection in 1814. Later on, he says he loved him for his brilliant +bravery, and therefore pardoned his numerous follies. But his +present demeanour shows that he never forgave that of 1814.<a name= +"FN2anchor556_556"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_556_556"><sup>[556]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Meanwhile, thanks to the energy of Cockburn and his sailors, +Longwood was ready for the party (December 9th, 1815), and the +Admiral hoped that their complaints would cease. The new abode +contained five rooms for Napoleon's use, three for the Montholons, +two for the Las Cases, and one for Gourgaud: it was situated on a +plateau 1,730 feet above the sea: the air there was bracing, and on +the farther side of the plain dotted with gum trees stretched the +race-course, a mile and a half of excellent turf. The only obvious +drawbacks were the occasional mists, and the barren precipitous +ravines that flank the plateau on all sides. Seeing, however, that +Napoleon disliked the publicity of Jamestown, the isolation of +Longwood could hardly be alleged as a serious grievance. The +Bertrands occupied Hutt's Gate, a small villa about a mile +distant.</p> + +<p>The limits within which Napoleon might take exercise +unaccompanied by a British officer formed a roughly<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii543" id="page_ii543">[pg.543]</a></span> +triangular space having a circumference of about twelve miles. +Outside of those bounds he must be so accompanied; and if a strange +ship came in sight, he was to return within bounds. The letters of +the whole party must be supervised by the acting Governor. This is +the gist of the official instructions. Napoleon's dislike of being +accompanied by a British officer led him nearly always to restrict +himself to the limits and generally to the grounds of Longwood.</p> + +<p>And where, we may ask, could a less unpleasant place of +detention have been found? In Europe he must inevitably have +submitted to far closer confinement. For what safeguards could +there have been proof against a subtle intellect and a personality +whose charm fired thousands of braves in both hemispheres with the +longing to start him once more on his adventures? The Tower of +London, the eyrie of Dumbarton Castle, even Fort William itself, +were named as possible places of detention. Were they suited to +this child of the Mediterranean? He needed sun; he needed exercise; +he needed society. All these he could have on the plateau of +Longwood, in a singularly equable climate, where the heat of the +tropics is assuaged by the south-east trade wind, and plants of the +sub-tropical and temperate zones alike flourish.<a name= +"FN2anchor557_557"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_557_557"><sup>[557]</sup></a></p> + +<p>But nothing pleased the exiles. They moped during the rains; +they shuddered at the yawning ravines; they groaned at the sight of +the red-coats; above all, they realized that escape was hopeless in +face of Cockburn's watchful care. His first steps on arriving at +the island were to send on to the Cape seventy-five foreigners +whose<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii544" id= +"page_ii544">[pg.544]</a></span> presence was undesirable. He also +despatched the "Peruvian" to hoist the British flag on the +uninhabited island, Ascension, in order, as he wrote to the +Admiralty, "to prevent America or any other nation from planting +themselves [<i>sic</i>] there ... for the purpose of favouring +sooner or later the escape of General Bonaparte." Four ships of war +were also kept at St. Helena, and no merchantmen but those of the +East India Company were to touch there except under stress of +weather or when in need of water.</p> + +<p>These precautions early provoked protests from the exiles. +Bertrand had no wish to draw them up in the trenchant style that +the ex-Emperor desired; but Gourgaud's "Journal" shows that he was +driven on to the task (November 5th). It only led to a lofty +rejoinder from Cockburn, in which he declined to relax his system, +but expressed the wish to render their situation "as little +disagreeable as possible." On December 21st, Montholon returned to +the charge with a letter dictated by Napoleon, complaining that +Longwood was the most barren spot on the island, always deluged +with rain or swathed in mist; that O'Meara was not to count as a +British officer when they went beyond the limits, and had been +reprimanded by the Admiral for thus acting; and that the treatment +of the exiles would excite the indignation of all times and all +people. To this the Admiral sent a crushing rejoinder, declining to +explain why he had censured O'Meara or any other British subject: +he asserted that Longwood was "the most pleasant as well as the +most healthy spot of this most healthful island," expressed the +hope that, when the rains had ceased, the party would change their +opinion of Longwood, and declared that the treatment of the party +would "obtain the admiration of future ages, as well as of every +unprejudiced person of the present."</p> + +<p>We now know that the Admiral's trust in the judicial +impartiality of future ages was a piece of touching credulity, and +that the next generation, like his own, was greedily to swallow +sensational slander and to neglect the prosaic<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii545" id="page_ii545">[pg.545]</a></span> +truth. But, arguing from present signs, he might well believe that +Montholon's letter was a tissue of falsehoods; for that officer +soon confessed to him that "it was written in a moment of petulance +of the General [Bonaparte] ... and that he [Montholon] considered +the party to be in point of fact vastly well off and to have +everything necessary for them, though anxious that there should be +no restrictions as to the General going unattended by an officer +wherever he pleased throughout the island."<a name= +"FN2anchor558_558"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_558_558"><sup>[558]</sup></a> On the last point Cockburn +was inflexible.</p> + +<p>The Admiral's responsibility was now nearly at an end. On April +14th, 1816, there landed at St. Helena Sir Hudson Lowe, the new +Governor, who was to take over the powers wielded both by Cockburn +and Wilks. The new arrival, on whom the storms of calumny were +thenceforth persistently to beat, had served with distinction in +many parts. Born in 1769, within one month of Napoleon, he early +entered our army, and won his commission by service in Corsica and +Elba, his linguistic and military gifts soon raising him to the +command of a corps of Corsican exiles who after 1795 enlisted in +our service. With these "Corsican Rangers" Lowe campaigned in Egypt +and finally at Capri, their devotion to him nerving them to a +gallant but unavailing defence of this islet against a superior +force of Murat's troops in 1808.<a name="FN2anchor559_559"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_559_559"><sup>[559]</sup></a> In 1810 Lowe and his +Corsicans captured the Isle of Santa Maura, which he thereafter +governed to the full satisfaction of the inhabitants. Early in 1813 +he was ordered to Russia, and thereafter served as +<i>attaché</i> on Blücher's staff in the memorable +advance to the Rhine and the Seine. He brought the news of +Napoleon's first abdication to England, was knighted by the Prince +Regent, and received Russian and Prussian orders of distinction for +his<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii546" id= +"page_ii546">[pg.546]</a></span> services. At the close of 1814 he +was appointed Quartermaster-General of our forces in the +Netherlands and received flattering letters of congratulation from +Blücher and Gneisenau, the latter expressing his appreciation +of "Your rare military talents, your profound judgment on the great +operations of war, and your imperturbable <i>sang froid</i> in the +day of battle. These rare qualities and your honourable character +will link me to you eternally." In 1822, when O'Meara was +slandering Lowe's character, the Czar Alexander met his +step-daughter, the Countess Balmain, at Verona, and in reference to +Sir Hudson's painful duties at St. Helena, said of him: "Je +l'estime beaucoup. Je l'ai connu dans les temps critiques."<a name= +"FN2anchor560_560"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_560_560"><sup>[560]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Lowe's firmness of character, command of foreign languages, and +intimate acquaintance with Corsicans, seemed to mark him out as the +ideal Governor of St. Helena in place of the mild and scholarly +Wilks. And yet the appointment was in some ways unfortunate. Though +a man of sterling worth, Lowe was reserved, and had little +acquaintance with the ways of courtiers. Moreover, the +superstitious might deem that all the salient events of his career +proclaimed him an evil genius dogging the steps of Napoleon; and, +as superstition laid increasing hold on the great Corsican in his +later years, we may reasonably infer that this feeling intensified, +if it did not create, the repugnance which he ever manifested to +<i>la figure sinistre</i> of the Governor. Lowe also at first +shrank from an appointment that must bring on him the intrigues of +Napoleon and of his partisans in England. Only a man of high rank +and commanding influence could hope to live down such attacks; and +Lowe had neither rank nor influence. He was the son of an army +surgeon, and was almost unknown in the country which for +twenty-eight years he had served abroad.</p> + +<p>His first visits to Longwood were unfortunate. Cockburn and he +arranged to go at 9 a.m., the time when Napoleon frequently went +for a drive. On their arrival they were informed that the Emperor +was indisposed<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii547" id= +"page_ii547">[pg.547]</a></span> and could not see them until 4 +p.m. of the next day, and it soon appeared that the early hour of +their call was taken as an act of rudeness. On the following +afternoon Lowe and Cockburn arranged to go in together to the +presence; but as Lowe advanced to the chamber, Bertrand stepped +forward, and a valet prevented the Admiral's entrance, an act of +incivility which Lowe did not observe. Proceeding alone, the new +Governor offered his respects in French; but on Napoleon remarking +that he must know Italian, for he had commanded a regiment of +Corsicans, they conversed in Napoleon's mother-tongue. The +ex-Emperor's first serious observation, which bore on the character +of the Corsicans, was accompanied by a quick searching glance: +"They carry the stiletto: are they not a bad people?"—Lowe +saw the snare and evaded it by the reply: "They do not carry the +stiletto, having abandoned that custom in our service: I was very +well satisfied with them." They then conversed a short time about +Egypt and other topics. Napoleon afterwards contrasted him +favourably with Cockburn: "This new Governor is a man of very few +words, but he appears to be a polite man: however, it is only from +a man's conduct for some time that you can judge of him."<a name= +"FN2anchor561_561"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_561_561"><sup>[561]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Cockburn was indignant at the slight put upon him by Napoleon +and Bertrand, which succeeded owing to Lowe's want of ready +perception; but he knew that the cause of the exiles' annoyance was +his recent firm refusal to convey Napoleon's letter of complaint +direct to the Prince Regent, without the knowledge of the Ministry. +Failing to bend the Admiral, they then sought to cajole the +retiring Governor, Wilks, who, having borne little of the +responsibility of their custody, was proportionately better liked. +First Bertrand, and then Napoleon, requested him to take this +letter <i>without the knowledge of the new Governor</i>. Wilks at +once repelled the request, remarking to Bertrand that such attempts +at evasion must lead to greater stringency in the future. And +this<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii548" id= +"page_ii548">[pg.548]</a></span> was the case.<a name= +"FN2anchor562_562"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_562_562"><sup>[562]</sup></a> The incident naturally +increased Lowe's suspicion of the ex-Emperor.</p> + +<p>At first there was an uneasy truce between them. Gourgaud, +though cast down at the departure of the "adorable" Miss Wilks, +found strength enough to chronicle in his "Journal" the results of +a visit paid by Las Cases to Lowe at Plantation House (April 26th): +the Governor received the secretary very well and put all his +library at the disposal of the party; but the diarist also notes +that Napoleon took amiss the reception of any of his people by the +Governor. This had been one of the unconscious crimes of the +Admiral. With the hope of brightening the sojourn of the exiles, he +had given several balls, at which Mmes. Bertrand and Montholon +shone resplendent in dresses that cast into the shade those of the +officers' wives. Their triumph was short-lived. When <i>la grande +Maréchale</i> ventured to desert the Emperor's table on +these and other festive occasions, her growing fondness for the +English drew on her sharp rebukes from the ex-Emperor and a request +not to treat Longwood as if it were an inn.<a name= +"FN2anchor563_563"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_563_563"><sup>[563]</sup></a> Many jottings in +Gourgaud's diary show that the same policy was thenceforth strictly +maintained. Napoleon kept up the essentials of Tuileries etiquette, +required the attendance of his courtiers, and jealously checked any +familiarity with Plantation House or Jamestown.</p> + +<p>On some questions Lowe was more pliable than the home +Government, notably in the matter of the declarations signed by +Napoleon's followers. But in one matter he was proof against all +requests from Longwood: this was the extension of the twelve-mile +limit. It afterwards became the custom to speak as if Lowe could +have granted this. Even the Duke of Wellington declared to Stanhope +that he considered Lowe a stupid man, suspicious and jealous, who +might very well have let Napoleon go freely about the island +provided that<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii549" id= +"page_ii549">[pg.549]</a></span> the six or seven landing-places +were well guarded and that Napoleon showed himself to a British +officer every night and morning. Now, it is futile to discuss +whether such liberty would have enabled Napoleon to pass off as +someone else and so escape. What is certain is that our Government, +believing he could so escape, <i>imposed rules which Lowe was not +free to relax</i>.</p> + +<p>Napoleon realized this perfectly well, but in the interview of +April 30th, 1816, he pressed Lowe for an extension of the limits, +saying that he hated the sight of our soldiers and longed for +closer intercourse with the inhabitants. Other causes of friction +occurred, such as Lowe's withdrawal of the privilege, rather laxly +granted by Cockburn to Bertrand, of granting passes for interviews +with Napoleon; or again a tactless invitation that Lowe sent to +"General Bonaparte" to meet the wife of the Governor-General of +India at dinner at Plantation House. But in the midst of the +diatribe which Napoleon shortly afterwards shot forth at his +would-be host—a diatribe besprinkled with taunts that Lowe +was sent to be his <i>executioner</i>—there came a sentence +which reveals the cause of his fury: "If you cannot extend my +limits, you can do nothing for me."<a name= +"FN2anchor564_564"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_564_564"><sup>[564]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Why this wish for wider limits? It did not spring from a desire +for longer drives; for the plateau offered nearly all the best +ground in the island for such exercise. Neither was it due to a +craving for wider social intercourse. There can be little doubt +that he looked on an extension of limits as a necessary prelude to +attempts at escape and as a means of influencing the slaves at the +outlying plantations. Gourgaud names several instances of gold +pieces being given to slaves, and records the glee shown by his +master on once slipping away from the sentries and the British +officer. These feelings and attempts were perfectly natural on +Napoleon's part; but it was equally natural that the Governor +should regard them as part of a plan of escape or rescue—a +matter that will engage our closer attention presently.<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii550" id= +"page_ii550">[pg.550]</a></span></p> + +<p>Napoleon had only two more interviews with Lowe namely, on July +17th and August 18th. In the former of these he was more +conciliatory; but in the latter, at which Admiral Sir Pulteney +Malcolm was present, he assailed the Governor with the bitterest +taunts. Lowe cut short the painful scene by saying: "You make me +smile, sir." "How smile, sir?" "You force me to smile: your +misconception of my character and the rudeness of your manners +excite my pity. I wish you good day." The Admiral also retired.<a +name="FN2anchor565_565"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_565_565"><sup>[565]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Various causes have been assigned for the hatred that Napoleon +felt for Lowe. His frequents taunts that he was no general, but +only a leader of Corsican deserters, suggests one that has already +been referred to. It has also been suggested that Lowe was not a +gentleman, and references have been approvingly made to comparisons +of his physiognomy with that of the devil, and of his eye with +"that of a hyæna caught in a trap." As to this we will cite +the opinion of Lieutenant (later Colonel) Basil Jackson, who was +unknown to Lowe before 1816, and was on friendly terms with the +inmates both of Longwood and of Plantation House:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"He [Lowe] stood five feet seven, spare in make, having good +features, fair hair, and eyebrows overhanging his eyes: his look +denoted penetration and firmness, his manner rather abrupt, his +gait quick, his look and general demeanour indicative of energy and +decision. He wrote or dictated rapidly, and was fond of writing, +was well read in military history, spoke French and Italian with +fluency, was warm and steady in his friendships, and popular both +with the inhabitants of the isle and the troops. His portrait, +prefixed to Mr. Forsyth's book, is a perfect likeness."<a name= +"FN2anchor566_566"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_566_566"><sup>[566]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii551" id="page_ii551">[pg.551]</a></span></p> +</div> + +<p>If overhanging eyebrows, a penetrating glance, and rather abrupt +manners be thought to justify comparisons with the devil or a +hyæna, the art of historical portraiture will assuredly have +to be learnt over again in conformity with impressionist methods. +That Lowe was a gentleman is affirmed by Mrs. Smith +(<i>née</i> Grant), who, in later years, <i>when prejudiced +against him by O'Meara's slanders</i>, met him at Colombo without +at first knowing his name:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"I was taken in to dinner by a grave, particularly gentlemanly +man, in a General's uniform, whose conversation was as agreeable as +his manner. He had been over half the world, knew all celebrities, +and contrived without display to say a great deal one was willing +to hear.... Years before, with our Whig principles and prejudices, +we had cultivated in our Highland retirement a horror of the great +Napoleon's gaoler. The cry of party, the feeling for the prisoner, +the book of Surgeon O'Meara, had all worked my woman's heart to +such a pitch of indignation that this maligned name [Lowe] was an +offence. We were to hold the owner in abhorrence. Speak to him, +never! Look at him, sit in the same room with him, never! None were +louder than I, more vehement; yet here was I beside my bugbear and +perfectly satisfied with my position. It was a good lesson."<a +name="FN2anchor567_567"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_567_567"><sup>[567]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>The real cause of Napoleon's hatred of Lowe is hinted at by Sir +George Bingham in his Diary (April 19th). After mentioning +Napoleon's rudeness to Cockburn on parting with him, he +proceeds:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"You have no idea of the dirty little intrigues of himself +[Napoleon] and his set: if Sir H. Lowe has firmness enough not to +give way to them, he will in a short time treat him in the same +manner. For myself, it is said I am a favourite [of Napoleon], +though I do not understand the claim I have to such."<a name= +"FN2anchor568_568"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_568_568"><sup>[568]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii552" id="page_ii552">[pg.552]</a></span></p> +</div> + +<br> + + +<p>Yes! Lowe's offence lay not in his manners, not even in his +features, but in his firmness. Napoleon soon saw that all his +efforts to bend him were in vain. Neither in regard to the Imperial +title, nor the limits, nor the transmission of letters to Europe, +would the Governor swerve a hair's breadth from his instructions. +At the risk of giving a surfeit of quotations, we must cite two +more on this topic. Basil Jackson, when at Paris in 1828, chanced +to meet Montholon, and was invited to his Château de +Frémigny; during his stay the conversation turned upon their +sojourn at St. Helena, to the following effect:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"He [Montholon] enlarged upon what he termed <i>la politique de +Longwood</i>, spoke not unkindly of Sir Hudson Lowe, allowing he +had a difficult task to execute, since an angel from Heaven, as +Governor, could not have pleased them. When I more than hinted that +nothing could justify detraction and departure from truth in +carrying out a policy, he merely shrugged his shoulders and +reiterated: '<i>C'était notre politique; et que +voulez-vous?</i>' That he and the others respected Sir Hudson Lowe, +I had not the shadow of a doubt: nay, in a conversation with +Montholon at St. Helena, when speaking of the Governor, he observed +that Sir Hudson was an officer who would always have distinguished +employment, as all Governments were glad of the services of a man +of his calibre.</p> + +<p>"Happening to mention that, owing to his inability to find an +officer who could understand and speak French, the Governor was +disposed to employ me as orderly officer at Longwood, Montholon +said it was well for me that I was not appointed to the post, as +they did not want a person in that capacity who could understand +them; in fact, he said, we should have found means to get rid of +you, and perhaps ruined you."<a name="FN2anchor569_569"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_569_569"><sup>[569]</sup></a><span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii553" id= +"page_ii553">[pg.553]</a></span></p> +</div> + +<br> + + +<p>Las Cases also, <i>in a passage that he found it desirable to +suppress when he published his "Journal"</i> wrote as follows +(November 30th, 1815):</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"We are possessed of moral arms only: and in order to make the +most advantageous use of these it was necessary to reduce into <i>a +system</i> our demeanour, our words, our sentiments, <i>even our +privations</i>, in order that we might thereby excite a lively +interest in a large portion of the population of Europe, and that +the Opposition in England might not fail to attack the Ministry on +the violence of their conduct towards us."<a name= +"FN2anchor570_570"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_570_570"><sup>[570]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>We are now able to understand the real nature of the struggle +that went on between Longwood and Plantation House. Napoleon and +his followers sought by every means to bring odium upon Lowe, and +to furnish the Opposition at Westminster with toothsome details +that might lead to the disgrace of the Governor, the overthrow of +the Ministry, and the triumphant release of the ex-Emperor. On the +other hand, the knowledge of the presence of traitors on the +island, and of possible rescuers hovering about on the horizon, +kept Lowe ever at work "unravelling the intricate plotting +constantly going on at Longwood," until his face wore the +preoccupied worried look that Surgeon Henry describes.</p> + +<p>That both antagonists somewhat overacted their parts does not +surprise us when we think of the five years thus spent within a +narrow space and under a tropical sun. Lowe was at times pedantic, +witness his refusal to forward to Longwood books inscribed to the +"Emperor Napoleon," and his suspicions as to the political +significance of green and white beans offered by Montholon to the +French Commissioner, Montchenu. But such incidents can be +paralleled from the lives of most officials who bear a heavy burden +of responsibility. And who has ever borne a heavier burden?<a name= +"FN2anchor571_571"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_571_571"><sup>[571]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii554" id="page_ii554">[pg.554]</a></span></p> + +<p>Napoleon also, in his calmer moods, regretted the violence of +his language to the Governor. He remarked to Montholon: "This is +the second time in my life that I have spoilt my affairs with the +English. Their phlegm leads me on, and I say more than I ought. I +should have done better not to have replied to him." This reference +to his attack on Whitworth in 1803 flashes a ray of light on the +diatribe against Lowe. In both cases, doubtless, the hot southron +would have bridled his passion sooner, had it produced any visible +effect on the colder man of the north. Nevertheless, the scene of +August 18th, 1816, had an abiding influence on his relations with +the Governor. For the rest of that weary span of years they never +exchanged a word.</p> + +<p>Lowe's official reports prove that he did not cease to consult +the comfort of the exiles as far as it was possible. The building +of the new house, however, remained in abeyance, as Napoleon +refused to give any directions on the subject: and the much-needed +repairs to Longwood were stopped owing to his complaints of the +noise of the workmen. But by ordering the claret that the +ex-Emperor preferred, and by sending occasional presents of game to +Longwood, Lowe sought to keep up the ordinary civilities of life; +and when the home Government sought to limit the annual cost of the +Longwood household to £8,000, Lowe took upon himself to +increase that sum by one half.</p> + +<p>Napoleon's behaviour in this last affair is noteworthy. On +hearing of the need for greater economy, he readily assented, sent +away seven servants, and ordered a <span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii555" id="page_ii555">[pg.555]</a></span> reduction in the +consumption of wine. A day or two later, however, he gave orders +that some of his silver plate should be sold in order "to provide +those little comforts denied them." Balcombe was accordingly sent +for, and, on expressing regret to Napoleon at the order for sale, +received the reply: "<i>What is the use of plate when you have +nothing to eat off it?</i>" Lowe quietly directed Balcombe to seal +up the plate sent to him, and to advance money up to its value +(£250); but other portions of the plate were broken and sold +later on. O'Meara reveals the reason for these proceedings in his +letter of October 10th: "In this he [Napoleon] has also a wish to +excite odium against the Governor by saying that he has been +obliged to sell his plate in order to provide against starvation, +<i>as he himself told me was his object</i>."<a name= +"FN2anchor572_572"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_572_572"><sup>[572]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Another incident that embittered the relations between Napoleon +and the Governor was the arrival from England of more stringent +regulations for his custody. The chief changes thus brought about +(October 9th, 1816) were a restriction of the limits from a +twelve-mile to an eight-mile circumference and the posting of a +ring of sentries at a slight distance from Longwood at sunset +instead of at 9 p.m.<a name="FN2anchor573_573"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_573_573"><sup>[573]</sup></a> The latter change is to be +regretted; for it marred the pleasure of Napoleon's evening strolls +in his garden; but, as the Governor pointed out, the three hours +after sunset had been the easiest time for escape. The restriction +of limits was needful, not only in order to save our troops the +labour of watching a wide area that was scarcely ever used for +exercise, but also to prevent underhand intercourse with +slaves.<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii556" id= +"page_ii556">[pg.556]</a></span></p> + +<p>Was there really any need for these "nation-degrading" rules, as +O'Meara called them? Or were they imposed in order to insult the +great man? A reference to the British archives will show that there +was some reason for them. Schemes of rescue were afoot that called +for the greatest vigilance.</p> + +<p>As we have seen (page 527, note), a letter had on August 2nd, +1815, been directed to Mme. Bertrand (really for Napoleon) at +Plymouth, stating that the writer had placed sums of money with +well-known firms of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charlestown +on his behalf, and that he (Napoleon) had only to make known his +wishes "<i>avec le thé de la Chine ou les mousselines de +l'Inde</i>": for the rest, the writer hoped much from English +merchantmen. This letter, after wide wanderings, fell into our +hands and caused our Government closely to inspect all letters and +merchandise that passed into, or out of, St. Helena. Its attention +was directed specially to the United States. There the Napoleonic +cult had early taken root, thanks to his overthrow of the kings and +his easy sale of Louisiana; the glorifying haze of distance +fostered its growth; and now the martyrdom of St. Helena brought it +to full maturity. Enthusiasm and money alike favoured schemes of +rescue.</p> + +<p>In our St. Helena Records (No. 4) are reports as to two of them. +Forwarded by the Spanish Ambassador at Washington, the first +reached Madrid on May 9th, 1816, and stated that a man named +Carpenter had offered to Joseph Bonaparte (then in the States) to +rescue Napoleon, and had set sail on a ship for that purpose. This +was at once made known to Lord Bathurst, our Minister for War and +the Plantations, who forwarded it to Lowe. In August of that year +our Foreign Office also received news that four schooners and other +smaller vessels had set sail from Baltimore on June 14th with 300 +men under an old French naval officer, named Fournier, ostensibly +to help Bolivar, but really to rescue Bonaparte. These fast-sailing +craft were to lie out of sight of the island by day,<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii557" id="page_ii557">[pg.557]</a></span> +creep up at night to different points, and send boats to shore; +from each of these a man, <i>in English uniform</i>, was to land +and proceed to Longwood, warning Napoleon of the points where the +boats would be ready to receive him. The report concludes: +"Considerable sums in gold and diamonds will be put at his disposal +to bribe those who may be necessary to him. They seem to flatter +themselves of a certain co-operation on the part of certain +individuals domiciled or employed at St. Helena."<a name= +"FN2anchor574_574"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_574_574"><sup>[574]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Bathurst sent on to Lowe a copy of this intelligence. Forsyth +does not name the affair, though he refers to other warnings, +received at various times by Bathurst and forwarded to the +Governor, that there were traitors in the island who had been won +over by Napoleon's gold to aid his escape.<a name= +"FN2anchor575_575"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_575_575"><sup>[575]</sup></a> I cannot find out that the +plans described above were put to the test, though suspicious +vessels sometimes appeared and were chased away by our cruisers. +But when we are considering the question whether Bathurst and Lowe +were needlessly strict or not, the point at issue is <i>whether +plans of escape or rescue existed, and if so, whether they knew of +them</i>. As to this there cannot be the shadow of doubt; and it is +practically certain that they were the cause of the new regulations +of October 9th, 1816.</p> + +<p>We have now traced the course of events during the first +critical twelvemonth; we have seen how friction burst into a flame, +how the chafing of that masterful spirit against all restraint +served but to tighten the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii558" +id="page_ii558">[pg.558]</a></span> inclosing grasp, and how the +attempts of his misguided friends in America and Europe changed a +fairly lax detention into actual custody. It is a vain thing to toy +with the "might-have-beens" of history; but we can fancy a man less +untamable than Napoleon frankly recognizing that he had done with +active life by assuming a feigned name (<i>e.g.</i>, that of +Colonel Muiron, which he once thought of) and settling down in that +equable retreat to the congenial task of compiling his personal and +military Memoirs. If he ever intended to live as a country squire +in England, there were equal facilities for such a life in St. +Helena, with no temptations to stray back into politics. The +climate was better for him than that of England, and the +possibilities for exercise greater than could there have been +allowed. Books there were in abundance—2,700 of them at last: +he had back files of the "Moniteur" for his writings, and copies of +"The Times" came regularly from Plantation House: a piano had been +bought in England for £120. Finally there were the six +courtiers whose jealous devotion, varying moods, and frequent +quarrels furnished a daily comedietta that still charms +posterity.</p> + +<p>What then was wanting? Unfortunately everything was wanting. He +cared not for music, or animals, or, in recent years, for the +chase. He himself divulged the secret, in words uttered to Gallois +in the days of his power: "<i>Je n'aime pas beaucoup les femmes, ni +le jeu—enfin rien: je suis tout à fait un être +politique!</i>"—He never ceased to love politics and power. +At St. Helena he pictured himself as winning over the English, had +he settled there. Ah! if I were in England, he said, I should have +conquered all hearts.<a name="FN2anchor576_576"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_576_576"><sup>[576]</sup></a> And assuredly he would +have done so. How could men so commonplace as the Prince Regent, +Liverpool, Castlereagh, and Bathurst have made head against the +influence of a truly great and enthralling personality? Or if he +had gone to the United States, who would have competed with him for +the Presidency?<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii559" id= +"page_ii559">[pg.559]</a></span></p> + +<p>As it was, he chose to remain indoors, in order to figure as the +prisoner of Longwood,<a name="FN2anchor577_577"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_577_577"><sup>[577]</sup></a> and spent his time between +intrigues against Lowe and dictation of Memoirs. On the subject of +Napoleon's writings we cannot here enter, save to say that his +critiques of Cæsar, Turenne, and Frederick the Great, are of +great interest and value; that the records of his own campaigns, +though highly suggestive, need to be closely checked by the +original documents, seeing that he had not all the needful facts +and figures at hand; and that his record of political events is in +the main untrustworthy: it is an elaborate device for enhancing the +Napoleonic tradition and assuring the crown to the King of +Rome.</p> + +<p>We turn, then, to take a brief glance at his last years. The +first event that claims notice is the arrest of Las Cases. This +subtle intriguer had soon earned the hatred of Montholon and +Gourgaud, who detested "the little Jesuit" for his Malvolio-like +airs of importance and the hints of Napoleon that he would have +ceremonial precedence over them. His rapid rise into favour was due +to his conversational gifts, literary ability, and thorough +knowledge of the English people and language. This last was +specially important. Napoleon very much wished to learn our +language, as he hoped that any mail might bring news of the triumph +of the Whigs and an order for his own departure for England. His +studies with Las Cases were more persevering than successful, as +will be seen from the following curious letter, written apparently +in the watches of the night: it has been recently re-published by +M. de Brotonne.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"COUNT LASCASES,</p> + +<p>"Since sixt week y learn the English and y do not any progress. +Sixt week do fourty and two day. If might have learn fivty word, +for day, i could know it two thousands and two hundred. It is in +the dictionary more of fourty thousand: even he could most twenty; +bot much of tems. For know it<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii560" id="page_ii560">[pg.560]</a></span> or hundred and +twenty week, which do more two years. After this you shall agree +that the study one tongue is a great labour who it must do into the +young aged."</p> +</div> + +<p>How much farther Napoleon progressed in his efforts to absorb +our language by these mathematical methods we do not know; for no +other English letter of his seems to be extant. The arrest and +departure of his tutor soon occurred, and there are good grounds +for assigning this ultimately to the jealousy of the less cultured +Generals. Thus, we find Gourgaud asserting that Las Cases has come +to St. Helena solely "in order to get talked about, write +anecdotes, and make money." Montholon also did his best to render +the secretary's life miserable, and on one occasion predicted to +Gourgaud that Las Cases would soon leave the island.<a name= +"FN2anchor578_578"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_578_578"><sup>[578]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The forecast speedily came true. The secretary intrusted to his +servant, a dubious mulatto named Scott, two letters for Europe sewn +up in a waistcoat: one of them was a long letter to Lucien +Bonaparte. The servant showed the letters to his father, who in +some alarm revealed the matter to the Governor. It is curious as +illustrating the state of suspicion then prevalent at St. Helena, +that Las Cases accused the Scotts of being tools of the Governor; +that Lowe saw in the affair the frayed end of a Longwood scheme; +while the residents there suspected Las Cases of arranging matters +as a means of departure from the island. There was much to justify +this last surmise. Las Cases and his son were unwell; their +position in the household was very uncomfortable; and for a skilled +intriguer to intrust an important letter to a slave, who was +already in the Governor's black books, was truly a singular +proceeding. Besides, after the arrest, when the Governor searched +Las Cases' papers in his presence, they were found to be in +good<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii561" id= +"page_ii561">[pg.561]</a></span> order, among them being parts of +his "Journal." Napoleon himself thought Las Cases guilty of a piece +of extraordinary folly, though he soon sought to make capital out +of the arrest by comparing the behaviour of our officers and their +orderlies with "South Sea savages dancing around a prisoner that +they are about to devour."<a name="FN2anchor579_579"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_579_579"><sup>[579]</sup></a> After a short detention at +Ross Cottage, <i>when he declined the Governor's offer that he +should return to Longwood</i>, the secretary was sent to the Cape, +and thence made his way to France, where a judicious editing of his +"Memoirs" and "Journal" gained for their compiler a rich +reward.</p> + +<p>Gourgaud is the next to leave. The sensitive young man has long +been tormented by jealousy. His diary becomes the long-drawn sigh +of a generous but vain nature, when soured by real or fancied +neglect. Though often unfair to Napoleon, whose egotism the +slighted devotee often magnifies into colossal proportions, the +writer unconsciously bears witness to the wondrous fascination that +held the little Court in awe. The least attention shown to the +Montholons costs "Gogo" a fit of spleen or a sleepless night, +scarcely to be atoned for on the morrow by soothing words, by +chess, or reversi, or help at the manuscript of "Waterloo." Again +and again Napoleon tries to prove to him that the Montholons ought +to have precedence: it is in vain. At last the crisis comes: it is +four years since the General saved the Emperor from a Cossack's +lance at Brienne, and the recollection renders his present +"humiliations" intolerable. He challenges Montholon to a duel; +Napoleon strictly forbids it; and the aggrieved officer seeks +permission to depart.</p> + +<p>Napoleon grants his request. It seems that the chief is weary of +his moody humours; he further owes him a<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii562" id="page_ii562">[pg.562]</a></span> grudge for +writing home to his mother frank statements of the way in which the +Longwood exiles are treated. These letters were read by Lowe and +Bathurst, and their general purport seems to have been known in +French governmental circles, where they served as an antidote to +the poisonous stories circulated by Napoleon and his more +diplomatic followers. Clearly nothing is to be made of Gourgaud; +and so he departs (February 13th, 1818). Bidding a tearful adieu, +he goes with Basil Jackson to spend six weeks with him at a cottage +near Plantation House, when he is astonished at the delicate +reserve shown by the Governor. He then sets sail for England. The +only money he has is <i>£100</i> advanced by Lowe. Napoleon's +money he has refused to accept.<a name="FN2anchor580_580"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_580_580"><sup>[580]</sup></a></p> + +<p>And yet he did not pass out of his master's life. Landing in +England on May 1st, he had a few interviews with our officials, in +which he warned them that Napoleon's escape would be quite easy, +and gave a hint as to O'Meara being the tool of Napoleon. But soon +the young General came into touch with the leaders of the +Opposition. No change in his sentiments is traceable until August +25th, when he indited a letter to Marie Louise, asserting that +Napoleon was dying "in the torments of the longest and most +frightful agony," a prey to the cruelty of England! To what are we +to attribute this change of front? The editors of Gourgaud's +"Journal" maintain that there was no change; they hint that the +"Journal" may have been an elaborate device for throwing dust into +Lowe's eyes; and they point to the fact that before leaving the +island Gourgaud received secret instructions from Napoleon bidding +him convey to Europe several small letters sewn into the soles of +his boots. Whether he acted on these instructions may be doubted; +for at his departure he gave his word of honour to Lowe that he was +not the bearer of any paper, pamphlet, or letter from Longwood. +Furthermore, we hear nothing of these secret letters afterwards; +and he allowed<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii563" id= +"page_ii563">[pg.563]</a></span> nearly four months to elapse in +England before he wrote to Marie Louise. The theory referred to +above seems quite untenable in face of these facts.<a name= +"FN2anchor581_581"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_581_581"><sup>[581]</sup></a></p> + +<p>How, then, are we to explain Gourgaud's conduct at St. Helena +and afterwards? Now, in threading the mendacious labyrinths of St. +Helena literature it is hard ever to find a wholly satisfactory +clue; but Basil Jackson's "Waterloo and St. Helena" (p. 103) seems +to supply it in the following passage:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"To finish about Gourgaud, I may add that on his reaching +England, after one or two interviews with the Under-Secretary of +State, he fell into the hands of certain Radicals of note, who +represented to him the folly of his conduct in turning against +Napoleon; that, as his adherent, he was really somebody, whereas he +was only ruining himself by appearing inimical. In short, they so +worked upon the poor weak man, that he was induced to try and make +it appear that he was still <i>l'homme de l'Empereur:</i> this he +did by inditing a letter to Marie Louise, in which he inveighed +against the treatment of Napoleon at the hands of the Government +and Sir H. Lowe, which being duly published, Gourgaud fell to zero +in the opinion of all right-minded persons."</p> +</div> + +<p>This seems consonant with what we know of Gourgaud's character: +frank, volatile, and sensitive, he could never have long sustained +a policy of literary and diplomatic deceit. He was not a compound +of Chatterton and Fouché. His "Journal" is the artless +outpouring of wounded vanity and brings us close to the heart of +the hero-worshipper and his hero. At times the idol falls and is +shivered but love places it on the shrine again and again, until +the fourth anniversary of Brienne finds the spell broken. Even +before he leaves St. Helena the old fascination is upon him once +more; and then Napoleon seeks to utilize his devotion for the +purpose of a political mission. Gourgaud declines the +<i>rôle</i> of agent, pledges his word to the Governor, and +keeps it; but, thanks to<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii564" +id="page_ii564">[pg.564]</a></span> British officialism or the +seductions of the Opposition, hero-worship once more gains the day +and enrolls him beside Las Cases and Montholon. This we believe to +be the real Gourgaud, a genuine, lovable, but flighty being, as +every page of his "Journal" shows.</p> + +<p>One cannot but notice in passing the extraordinary richness of +St. Helena literature. Nearly all the exiles kept diaries or +memoirs, or wrote them when they returned to Europe. And, on the +other hand, of all the 10,000 Britons whom Napoleon detained in +France for eleven years, not one has left a record that is ever +read to-day. Consequently, while the woes of Napoleon have been set +forth in every civilized tongue, the world has forgotten the +miseries causelessly inflicted on 10,000 English families. The +advantages possessed by a memoir-writing nation over one that is +but half articulate could not be better illustrated. For the dumb +Britons not a single tear is ever shed; whereas the voluble inmates +of Longwood used their pens to such effect that half the world +still believes them to have been bullied twice a week by Lowe, +plied with gifts of poisoned coffee, and nearly eaten up by rats at +night. On this last topic we are treated to tales of part of a +slave's leg being eaten off while he slept at Longwood—nay, +of a horse's leg also being gnawed away at night—so that our +feelings are divided between pity for the sufferers and envy at the +soundness of their slumbers.</p> + +<p>Longwood was certainly far from being a suitable abode; but a +word from Napoleon would have led to the erection of the new house +on a site that he chose to indicate. The materials had all been +brought from England; but the word was not spoken until a much +later time; and the inference is inevitable that he preferred to +remain where he was so that he could represent himself as lodged in +<i>cette grange insalubre.</i><a name="FN2anchor582_582"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_582_582"><sup>[582]</sup></a><span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii565" id="page_ii565">[pg.565]</a></span> +The third of the Longwood household to depart was the surgeon, +OMeara. The conduct of this British officer in facilitating +Napoleon's secret correspondence has been so fully exposed by +Forsyth and Seaton that we may refer our readers to their works for +proofs of his treachery. Gourgaud's "Journal" reveals the secret +influence that seduced him. Chancing once to refer to the power of +money over Englishmen, Napoleon remarked that that was why we did +not want him to draw sums from Europe, and continued: "<i>Le +docteur n'est si bien pour moi que depuis que je lui donne mon +argent. Ah! j'en suis bien sûr, de celui-là!"</i><a +name="FN2anchor583_583"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_583_583"><sup>[583]</sup></a> This disclosure enables us +to understand why the surgeon, after being found out and dismissed +from the service, sought to blacken the character of Sir Hudson +Lowe by every conceivable device. The wonder is that he succeeded +in imposing his version of facts on a whole generation.</p> + +<p>The next physician who resided at Longwood, Dr. Stokoe, was +speedily cajoled into disobeying the British regulations and +underwent official disgrace. An attempt was then made, through +Montholon, to bribe his successor, Dr. Verling, who indignantly +repelled it and withdrew from his duty.<a name= +"FN2anchor584_584"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_584_584"><sup>[584]</sup></a></p> + +<p>There can be no doubt that Napoleon found pleasure in these +intrigues. In his last interview with Stürmer, the Austrian +Commissioner at St. Helena, Gourgaud said, in reference to this +topic: "However unhappy he [Napoleon] is here, he secretly enjoys +the importance attached to his custody, the interest that the +Powers take in it, and the care taken to collect his least words." +Napoleon also once remarked to Gourgaud that it was better to be at +St. Helena than as he was at Elba.<a name="FN2anchor585_585"></a><a +href="#Foot2note_585_585"><sup>[585]</sup></a> Of the same +general<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii566" id= +"page_ii566">[pg.566]</a></span> tenour are his striking remarks, +reported by Las Cases at the close of his first volume:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Our situation here may even have its attractions. The universe +is looking at us. We remain the martyrs of an immortal cause: +millions of men weep for us, the fatherland sighs, and Glory is in +mourning. We struggle here against the oppression of the gods, and +the longings of the nations are for us.... Adversity was wanting to +my career. If I had died on the throne amidst the clouds of my +omnipotence, I should have remained a problem for many men: to-day, +thanks to misfortune, they can judge of me naked as I am."</p> +</div> + +<p>In terseness of phrase, vividness of fancy, and keenness of +insight into the motives that sway mankind, this passage is worthy +of Napoleon. He knew that his exile at St. Helena would dull the +memory of the wrongs which he had done to the cause of liberty, and +that from that lonely peak would go forth the legend of the new +Prometheus chained to the rock by the kings and torn every day by +the ravening vulture. The world had rejected his gospel of force; +but would it not thrill responsive to the gospel of pity now to be +enlisted in his behalf? His surmise was amazingly true. The world +was thrilled. The story worked wonders, not directly for him, but +for his fame and his dynasty. The fortunes of his race began to +revive from the time when the popular imagination transfigured +Napoleon the Conqueror into Napoleon the Martyr. Viewed in this +light, and thrown up into telling relief against the sinister +policy of the Holy Alliance of the monarchs, the dreary years spent +at St. Helena were not the least successful of his career. Without +them there could have been no second Napoleonic Empire.</p> + +<p>Not that his life there was a "long-drawn agony." His health was +fairly good. There were seasons of something like enjoyment, when +he gave himself up to outdoor recreations. Such a time was the +latter part of 1819 and the first half of 1820: we may call it the +Indian summer of his life, for he was then possessed with a passion +for gardening. Lightly clad and protected by a <span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii567" id="page_ii567">[pg.567]</a></span> +broad-brimmed hat, he went about, sometimes spade in hand, +superintending various changes in the grounds at Longwood and +around the new house which was being erected for him hard by. Or at +other times he used the opportunity afforded by the excavations to +show how infantry might be so disposed on a hastily raised slope as +to bring a terrific fire to bear on attacking cavalry. Marshalling +his followers at dawn by the sound of a bell, he made them all, +counts, valets, and servants, dig trenches as if for the front +ranks, and throw up the earth for the rear ranks: then, taking his +stand in front, as the shortest man, and placing the tallest at the +rear (his Swiss valet, Noverraz), he triumphantly showed how the +horsemen might be laid low by the rolling volleys of ten ranks.<a +name="FN2anchor586_586"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_586_586"><sup>[586]</sup></a> In May or June he took +once more to horse exercise, and for a time his health benefited +from all this activity. His relations with the Governor were +peaceful, if not cordial, and the limits were about this time +extended.</p> + +<p>Indoors there were recreations other than work at the Memoirs. +He often played chess and billiards, at the latter using his hand +instead of the cue! Dinner was generally at a very late hour, and +afterwards he took pleasure in reading aloud. Voltaire was the +favourite author, and Montholon afterwards confessed to Lord +Holland that the same plays, especially "Zaïre," were read +rather too often.</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Napoleon slept himself when read to, but he was very observant +and jealous if others slept while he read. He watched his audience +vigilantly, and <i>'Mme. Montholon, vous dormez'</i> was a frequent +ejaculation in the course of reading. He was animated with all that +he read, especially poetry, enthusiastic at beautiful passages, +impatient of faults, and full of ingenious and lively remarks on +style."<a name="FN2anchor587_587"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_587_587"><sup>[587]</sup></a></p> +</div> + +<p>During this same halcyon season two priests, who had been +selected by the Bonapartes, arrived in the<span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii568" id="page_ii568">[pg.568]</a></span> island, as +also a Corsican doctor, Antommarchi. Napoleon was disappointed with +all three. The doctor, though a learned anatomist, knew little of +chemistry, and at an early interview with Napoleon passed a +catechism on this subject so badly that he was all but chased from +the room. The priests came off little better. The elder of them, +Buonavita by name, had lived in Mexico, and could talk of little +else: he soon fell ill, and his stay in St. Helena was short. The +other, a Corsican named Vignali, having neither learning, culture, +nor dialectical skill, was tolerated as a respectable adjunct to +the household, but had little or no influence over the master. This +is to be regretted on many grounds, and partly because his +testimony throws no light on Napoleon's religious views.</p> + +<p>Here we approach a problem that perhaps can never be cleared up. +Unfathomable on many sides of his nature, Napoleon is nowhere more +so than when he confronts the eternal verities. That he was a +convinced and orthodox Catholic few will venture to assert. At Elba +he said to Lord Ebrington: "<i>Nous ne savons d'où nous +venons, ce que nous deviendrons</i>": the masses ought to have some +"fixed point of faith whereon to rest their thoughts."—"<i>Je +suis Catholique parce que mon père l'étoit, et parce +que c'étoit la religion de la France</i>." He also once or +twice expressed to Campbell scorn of the popular creed: and during +his last voyage, as we have seen, he showed not the slightest +interest in the offer of a priest at Funchal to accompany him. At +St. Helena the party seems to have limited the observances of +religion to occasional reading of the Bible. When Mme. Montholon +presented her babe to the Emperor, he teasingly remarked that Las +Cases was the most suitable person to christen the infant; to which +the mother at once replied that Las Cases was not a good enough +Christian for that.</p> + +<p>Judging from the entries in Gourgaud's "Journal," this young +General pondered more than the rest on religious questions; and to +him Napoleon unbosomed his thoughts.—Matter,<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii569" id="page_ii569">[pg.569]</a></span> +he says, is everywhere and pervades everything; life, thought, and +the soul itself are but properties of matter, and death ends all. +When Gourgaud points to the majestic order of the universe as +bearing witness to a Creator, Napoleon admits that he believes in +"superior intelligences": he avers that he would believe in +Christianity if it had been the original and universal creed: but +then the Mohammedans "follow a religion simpler and more adapted to +their morality than ours." In ten years their founder conquered +half the world, which Christianity took three hundred years to +accomplish. Or again, he refers to the fact that Laplace, Monge, +Berthollet, and Lagrange were all atheists, though they did not +proclaim the fact; as for himself, he finds the idea of God to be +natural; it has existed at all times and among all peoples. But +once or twice he ends this vague talk with the remarkable +confession that the sight of myriad deaths in war has made him a +materialist. "Matter is everything."—"Vanity of vanities!"<a +name="FN2anchor588_588"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_588_588"><sup>[588]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Mirrored as these dialogues are in the eddies of Gourgaud's +moods, they may tinge his master's theology with too much of gloom: +but, after all, they are by far the most lifelike record of +Napoleon's later years, and they show us a nature dominated by the +tangible. As for belief in the divine Christ, there seems not a +trace. A report has come down to us, enshrined in Newman's prose, +that Napoleon once discoursed of the ineffable greatness of Christ, +contrasting His enduring hold on the hearts of men with the +evanescent rule of Alexander and Cæsar. One hopes that the +words were uttered; but they conflict with Napoleon's undoubted +statements. Sometimes he spoke in utter uncertainty; at others, as +one who wished to believe in Christianity and might perhaps be +converted. But in the political testament designed for his son, the +only reference to religion is of the diplomatic description that we +should expect from the author<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii570" id="page_ii570">[pg.570]</a></span> of the +"Concordat": "Religious ideas have more influence than certain +narrow-minded philosophers are willing to believe: they are capable +of rendering great services to Humanity. By standing well with the +Pope, an influence is still maintained over the consciences of a +hundred millions of men."</p> + +<p>Equally vague was Napoleon's own behaviour as his end drew nigh. +For some time past a sharp internal pain—the stab of a +penknife, he called it—had warned him of his doom; in April, +1821, when vomiting and prostration showed that the dread ancestral +malady was drawing on apace, he bade the Abbé Vignali +prepare the large dining-room of Longwood as a <i>chapelle +ardente</i>; and, observing a smile on Antommarchi's face, the sick +man hotly rebuked his affectation of superiority. Montholon, on his +return to England, informed Lord Holland that extreme unction was +administered before the end came, Napoleon having ordered that this +should be done as if solely on Montholon's responsibility, and that +the priest, when questioned on the subject, was to reply that he +had acted on Montholon's orders, without having any knowledge of +the Emperor's wishes. It was accordingly administered, but +apparently he was insensible at the time.<a name= +"FN2anchor589_589"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_589_589"><sup>[589]</sup></a> In his will, also, he +declared that he died in communion with the Apostolical Roman +Church, in whose bosom he was born. There, then, we must leave this +question, shrouded in the mystery that hangs around so much of his +life.</p> + +<p>The decease of a great man is always affecting: but the death of +the hero who had soared to the zenith of military glory and civic +achievement seems to touch the very nadir of calamity. Outliving +his mighty Empire, girt around by a thousand miles of imprisoning +ocean, guarded by his most steadfast enemies, his son a captive at +the Court of the Hapsburgs, and his Empress openly faithless, he +sinks from sight like some battered derelict. And Nature is more +pitiless than man. The Governor<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii571" id="page_ii571">[pg.571]</a></span> urges on him the +best medical advice: but he will have none of it. He feels the grip +of cancer, the disease which had carried off his father and was to +claim the gay Caroline and Pauline. At times he surmises the truth: +at others he calls out "<i>le foie</i>" "<i>le foie</i>." Meara had +alleged that his pains were due to a liver complaint brought on by +his detention at St. Helena; Antommarchi described the illness as +gastric fever (<i>febbre gastrica pituitosa</i>); and not until Dr. +Arnott was called in on the 1st of April was the truth fully +recognized.</p> + +<p>At the close of the month the symptoms became most distressing, +aggravated as they were by the refusal of the patient to take +medicine or food, or to let himself be moved. On May 4th, at Dr. +Arnott's insistence, some calomel was secretly administered and +with beneficial results, the patient sleeping and even taking some +food. This was his last rally: on the morrow, while a storm was +sweeping over the island, and tearing up large trees, his senses +began to fail: Montholon thought he heard the words <i>France, +armée, tête d'armée, Joséphine</i>: he +lingered on insensible for some hours: the storm died down: the sun +bathed the island in a flood of glory, and, as it dipped into the +ocean, the great man passed away.</p> + +<p>By the Governor's orders Dr. Arnott remained in the room until +the body could be medically examined—a precaution which, as +Montchenu pointed out, would prevent any malicious attempt on the +part of the Longwood servants to cause death to appear as the +result of poisoning. The examination, conducted in the presence of +seven medical men and others, proved that all the organs were sound +except the ulcerated stomach; the liver was rather large, but +showed no signs of disease; the heart, on the other hand, was +rather under the normal size. Far from showing the emaciation that +usually results from prolonged inability to take food, the body was +remarkably stout—a fact which shows that that tenacious will +had its roots in an abnormally firm vitality.<a name= +"FN2anchor590_590"></a><a href= +"#Foot2note_590_590"><sup>[590]</sup></a><span class="newpage"><a +name="page_ii572" id="page_ii572">[pg.572]</a></span></p> + +<p>After being embalmed, the body was laid out in state, and all +beholders were struck with the serene and beautiful expression of +the face: the superfluous flesh sank away after death, leaving the +well-proportioned features that moved the admiration of men during +the Consulate.</p> + +<p>Clad in his favourite green uniform, he fared forth to his +resting-place under two large weeping willow trees in a secluded +valley: the coffin, surmounted by his sword and the cloak he had +worn at Marengo, was borne with full military honours by grenadiers +of the 20th and 66th Regiments before a long line of red-coats; and +their banners, emblazoned with the names of "Talavera," "Albuera," +"Pyrenees," and "Orthez," were lowered in a last salute to our +mighty foe. Salvos of artillery and musketry were fired over the +grave: the echoes rattled upwards from ridge to ridge and leaped +from the splintery peaks far into the wastes of ocean to warn the +world beyond that the greatest warrior and administrator of all the +ages had sunk to rest.</p> + +<p>His ashes were not to remain in that desolate nook: in a clause +of his will he expressed the desire that they should rest by the +banks of the Seine among the people he had loved so well. In 1840 +they were disinterred in presence of Bertrand, Gourgaud, and +Marchand, and borne to France. Paris opened her arms to receive the +mighty dead; and Louis Philippe, on whom he had<span class= +"newpage"><a name="page_ii573" id="page_ii573">[pg.573]</a></span> +once prophesied that the crown of France would one day rest, +received the coffin in state under the dome of the +<i>Invalides</i>. There he reposes, among the devoted people whom +by his superhuman genius he raised to bewildering heights of glory, +only to dash them to the depths of disaster by his monstrous +errors.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;"> +<p>Viewing his career as a whole, it seems just and fair to assert +that the fundamental cause of his overthrow is to be found, not in +the failings of the French, for they served him with a fidelity +that would wring tears of pity from Rhadamanthus; not in the +treachery of this or that general or politician, for that is little +when set against the loyalty of forty millions of men; but in the +character of the man and of his age. Never had mortal man so grand +an opportunity of ruling over a chaotic Continent: never had any +great leader antagonists so feeble as the rulers who opposed his +rush to supremacy. At the dawn of the nineteenth century the old +monarchies were effete: insanity reigned in four dynasties, and +weak or time-serving counsels swayed the remainder. For several +years their counsellors and generals were little better. With the +exception of Pitt and Nelson, who were carried off by death, and of +Wellington, who had but half an army, Napoleon never came face to +face with thoroughly able, well-equipped, and stubborn opponents +until the year 1812.</p> + +<p>It seems a paradox to say that this excess of good fortune +largely contributed to his ruin: yet it is true. His was one of +those thick-set combative natures that need timely restraint if +their best qualities are to be nurtured and their domineering +instincts curbed. Just as the strongest Ministry prances on to ruin +if the Opposition gives no effective check, so it was with +Napoleon. Had he in his early manhood taken to heart the lessons of +adversity, would he have ventured at the same time to fight +Wellington in Spain and the Russian climate in the heart of the +steppes? Would he have spurned the offers of an advantageous peace +made to him from Prague in 1813? Would he have let slip the chance +of keeping the<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii574" id= +"page_ii574">[pg.574]</a></span> "natural frontiers" of France +after Leipzig, and her old boundaries, when brought to bay in +Champagne? Would he have dared the uttermost at all points at +Waterloo? In truth, after his fortieth year was past, the fervid +energies of youth hardened in the mould of triumph; and thence came +that fatal obstinacy which was his bane at all those crises of his +career. For in the meantime the cause of European independence had +found worthy champions—smaller men than Napoleon, it is true, +but men who knew that his determination to hold out everywhere and +yield nothing must work his ruin. Finally, the same clinging to +unreal hopes and the same love of fight characterized his life in +St. Helena; so that what might have been a time of calm and +dignified repose was marred by fictitious clamours and petty +intrigues altogether unworthy of his greatness.</p> + +<p>For, in spite of his prodigious failure, he was superlatively +great in all that pertains to government, the quickening of human +energies, and the art of war. His greatness lies, not only in the +abiding importance of his best undertakings, but still more in the +Titanic force that he threw into the inception and accomplishment +of all of them—a force which invests the storm-blasted +monoliths strewn along the latter portion of his career with a +majesty unapproachable by a tamer race of toilers. After all, the +verdict of mankind awards the highest distinction, not to prudent +mediocrity that shuns the chance of failure and leaves no lasting +mark behind, but to the eager soul that grandly dares, mightily +achieves, and holds the hearts of millions even amidst his ruin and +theirs. Such a wonder-worker was Napoleon. The man who bridled the +Revolution and remoulded the life of France, who laid broad and +deep the foundations of a new life in Italy, Switzerland, and +Germany, who rolled the West in on the East in the greatest +movement known since the Crusades and finally drew the yearning +thoughts of myriads to that solitary rock in the South Atlantic, +must ever stand in the very forefront of the immortals of human +story.</p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="APPENDIX_I"></a> + +<h2>APPENDIX I</h2> + +<p>LIST OF THE CHIEF APPOINTMENTS AND DIGNITIES BESTOWED BY +NAPOLEON</p> + +<p>[<i>An asterisk is affixed to the names of his +Marshals</i>.]</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Arrighi. Duc de +Padua.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Augereau. Duc de +Castiglione.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Bernadotte. Prince de Ponte +Corvo.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Berthier. Chief of the +Staff. Prince de Neufchâtel. Prince</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">de Wagram.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Bessières. Duc +d'Istria. Commander of the Old Guard.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Bonaparte, Joseph. (King of +Naples.) King of Spain.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">" Louis. +King of Holland.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">" Jerome. +King of Westphalia.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Brune.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Cambacérès. +Arch-Chancellor. Duc de Parma.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Caulaincourt. Duc de +Vicenza. Master of the Horse. Minister</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 3.5em;">of Foreign Affairs +(1814).</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Champagny. Duc de +Cadore. Minister of Foreign Affairs</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 3.5em;">(1807-11).</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Chaptal. Minister of the +Interior. Comte de Chanteloupe.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Clarke. Minister of +War. Duc de Feltre.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Daru. Comte.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Davoust. Duc +d'Auerstädt. Prince d'Eckmühl.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Drouet. Comte +d'Erlon.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Drouot. Comte. +Aide-Major of the Guard.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Duroc. Grand Marshal of the +Palace. Duc de Friuli.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Eugène +(Beauharnais). Viceroy of Italy.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Fesch (Cardinal). Grand +Almoner.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Fouché. Minister of +Police (1804-10). Duc d'Otranto.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Grouchy. Comte.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Jomini. Baron.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Jourdan. Comte.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Junot. Duc +d'Abrantès.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Kellermann. Duc de +Valmy.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Lannes. Duc de Montebello.</span> +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii575" id= +"page_ii575">[pg.575]</a></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Larrey. Baron.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Latour-Maubourg. +Baron.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Lauriston. +Comte.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Lavalette. Comte. +Minister of Posts.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Lefebvre. Duc de +Danzig.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Macdonald. Duc de +Taranto.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Maret. Minister of Foreign +Affairs (1811-14.) Duc de Bassano.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Marmont. Duc de +Ragusa.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Masséna. (Duc de +Rivoli.) Prince d'Essling.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Miot. Comte de +Melito.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Méneval. +Baron.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Mollien. Comte. +Minister of the Treasury.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Moncey. Duc de +Conegliano.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Montholon. +Comte.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Mortier. Duc de +Treviso.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Mouton. Comte de +Lobau.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Murat. (Grand Duc de Berg.) +King of Naples.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Ney. (Duc d'Elchingen.) +Prince de la Moskwa.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Oudinot. Duc de +Reggio.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Pajol. Baron.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Pasquier, Duc de. Prefect +of Police.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Pérignon.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Poniatowski.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Rapp. Comte.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Reynier. Duc de +Massa.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Rémusat. +Chamberlain.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Savary. Duc de +Rovigo. Minister of Police (1810-14).</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Sébastiani. +Comte.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Sérurier.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Soult. Duc de +Dalmatia.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*St. Cyr, Marquis de.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Suchet. Duc +d'Albufera.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Talleyrand. Minister of +Foreign Affairs (1799-1807). Grand</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 3.5em;">Chamberlain (1804-8). +Prince de Benevento.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Vandamme. Comte.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">*Victor. Duc de +Belluno.</span><br> + + +<p><span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii576" id= +"page_ii576">[pg.576]</a></span></p> + +<br> + + +<p>APPENDIX II</p> + +<p>THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO</p> + +<br> + + +<p>Some critics have blamed me for underrating the +<i>rôle</i> of the Prussians at Waterloo; but after careful +study I have concluded that it has been overrated by some recent +German writers. We now know that the Prussian advance was retarded +by Gneisenau's deep-rooted suspicion of Wellington, and that no +direct aid was given to the British left until nearly the end of +the battle. Napoleon always held that he could readily have kept +off the Prussians at Planchenoit, that the main battle throughout +was against Wellington, and that it was decided by the final charge +of British cavalry. The Prussians did not wholly capture +Planchenoit until the French opposing Wellington were in full +flight. But, of course, Blücher's advance and onset made the +victory the overwhelming triumph that it was.</p> + +<p>An able critic in the "Saturday Review" of May 10, 1902, has +charged me with neglecting to say that the French left wing (Foy's +and Bachelu's divisions) supported the French cavalry at the close +of the great charges. I stated (p. 502) that French infantry was +not "at hand to hold the ground which the cavaliers seemed to have +won." Let me cite the exact words of General Foy, written in his +Journal a few days after the battle (M. Girod de L'Ain's "Vie +militaire du General Foy," p. 278): "Alors que la cavalerie +française faisait cette longue et terrible charge, le feu de +notre artillerie était déjà moins nourri, et +notre infanterie ne fit aucun mouvement. Quand la cavalerie fut +rentrée, et que l'artillerie anglaise, qui avait +cessé de tirer pendant une demi-heure, eut recommencé +son feu, on donna ordre aux divisions Foy et Bachelu d'avancer +droit aux carrés qui s'y étaient avancés +pendant la charge de cavalerie et qui ne s'étaient pas +repliés. L'attaque fut formée en colonnes par +échelons de régiment, Bachelu formant les +échelons les plus avancés. Je tenis par ma gauche +à la haie [de Hougoumont]: j'avais sur mon front un +bataillon en tirailleurs. Près de joindre les Anglais, nous +avons reçu un feu très vif de mitraille et de +mousqueterie. C'était une grêle de mort. Les +carrés ennemis avaient le premier rang genoux en terre et +présentaient une haie<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii577" id="page_ii577">[pg.577]</a></span> de +baïonettes. Les colonnes de la 1're division ont pris la fuite +les premières: leur mouvement a entrainé celui de mes +colonnes. En ce moment j'ai été +blessé...."</p> + +<p>This shows that the advance of the French infantry was far too +late to be of the slightest use to the cavalry. The British lines +had been completely re-formed.<span class="newpage"><a name= +"page_ii578" id="page_ii578">[pg.578]</a></span></p> + +<br> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="FOOTNOTES"></a> + +<h2>FOOTNOTES :</h2> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> + +<b>FOOTNOTES TO VOLUME I</b> + + + +<hr style="width:65%;"> +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> +<hr style=" width:65%"> <br> +<a name="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1">[1]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>From a French work, "Moeurs et Coûtumes des Corses" +(Paris, 1802), I take the following incident. A priest, charged +with the duty of avenging a relative for some fourteen years, met +his enemy at the gate of Ajaccio and forthwith shot him, under the +eyes of an official—who did nothing. A relative of the +murdered man, happening to be near, shot the priest. Both victims +were quickly buried, the priest being interred under the altar of +the church, "because of his sacred character." See too Miot de +Melito, "Mémoires," vol. i., ch. xiii., as to the utter +collapse of the jury system in 1800-1, because no Corsican would +"deny his party or desert his blood."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2">[2]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>As to the tenacity of Corsican devotion, I may cite a curious +proof from the unpublished portion of the "Memoirs of Sir Hudson +Lowe." He was colonel in command of the Royal Corsican Rangers, +enrolled during the British occupation of Corsica, and gained the +affections of his men during several years of fighting in Egypt and +elsewhere. When stationed at Capri in 1808 he relied on his +Corsican levies to defend that island against Murat's attacks; and +he did not rely in vain. Though confronted by a French Corsican +regiment, they remained true to their salt, even during a truce, +when they could recognize their compatriots. The partisan instinct +was proof against the promises of Murat's envoys and the shouts +even of kith and kin.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3">[3]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>The facts as to the family of Napoleon's mother are given in +full detail by M. Masson in his "Napoléon Inconnu," ch. i. +They correct the statement often made as to her "lowly," "peasant" +origin. Masson also proves that the house at Ajaccio, which is +shown as Napoleon's birthplace, is of later construction, though on +the same site.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4">[4]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Jacobi, "Hist. de la Corse," vol. ii., ch. viii. The whole +story is told with prudent brevity by French historians, even by +Masson and Chuquet. The few words in which Thiers dismisses this +subject are altogether misleading.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5">[5]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Much has been written to prove that Napoleon was born in 1768, +and was really the eldest surviving son. The reasons, stated +briefly, are: (1) that the first baptismal name of Joseph +Buonaparte was merely <i>Nabulione</i> (Italian for +<i>Napoleon</i>), and that <i>Joseph</i> was a later addition to +his name on the baptismal register of January 7th, 1768, at Corte; +(2) certain statements that Joseph was born at Ajaccio; (3) +Napoleon's own statement at his marriage that he was born in 1768. +To this it maybe replied that: (<i>a</i>) other letters and +statements, still more decisive, prove that Joseph was born at +Corte in 1768 and Napoleon at Ajaccio in 1769; (<i>b</i>) +Napoleon's entry in the marriage register was obviously designed to +lessen the disparity of years of his bride, who, on her side, +subtracted four years from her age. See Chuquet, "La Jeunesse de +Napoléon," p. 65.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6">[6]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Nasica, "Mémoires," p. 192.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7">[7]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Both letters are accepted as authentic by Jung, "Bonaparte et +son Temps," vol. i., pp. 84, 92; but Masson, "Napoléon +Inconnu," vol. i., p. 55, tracking them to their source, discredits +them, as also from internal evidence.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8">[8]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Chaptal, "Mes Souvenirs sur Napoléon," p. 177.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9">[9]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Joseph Buonaparte, "Mems.," vol. i., p. 29. So too Miot de +Melito, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. x.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10">[10]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Chaptal, "Souvenirs sur Napoléon," p. 237. See too +Masson, "Napoléon Inconnu," vol. i., p. 158, note.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11">[11]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>In an after-dinner conversation on January 11th, 1803, with +Roederer, Buonaparte exalted Voltaire at the expense of Rousseau in +these significant words: "The more I read Voltaire, the more I like +him: he is always reasonable, never a charlatan, never a fanatic: +he is made for mature minds. Up to sixteen years of age I would +have fought for Rousseau against all the friends of Voltaire. Now +it is the contrary. <i>I have been especially disgusted with +Rousseau since I have seen the East. Savage man is a dog.</i>" +("Oeuvres de Roederer," vol. iii., p. 461.)</p> + +<p>In 1804 he even denied his indebtedness to Rousseau. During a +family discussion, wherein he also belittled Corsica, he called +Rousseau "a babbler, or, if you prefer it, an eloquent enough +<i>idéalogue</i>. I never liked him, nor indeed well +understood him: truly I had not the courage to read him all, +because I thought him for the most part tedious." (Lucien +Buonaparte, "Mémoires," vol. ii., ch. xi.)</p> + +<p>His later views on Rousseau are strikingly set forth by +Stanislas Girardin, who, in his "Memoirs," relates that Buonaparte, +on his visit to the tomb of Rousseau, said: "'It would have been +better for the repose of France that this man had never been born.' +'Why, First Consul?' said I. 'He prepared the French Revolution.' +'I thought it was not for you to complain of the Revolution.' +'Well,' he replied, 'the future will show whether it would not have +been better for the repose of the world that neither I nor Rousseau +had existed.'" Méneval confirms this remarkable +statement.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12">[12]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Masson, "Napoléon Inconnu," vol. ii., p. 53.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13">[13]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Joseph Buonaparte, "Mémoires," vol. i, p. 44.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14">[14]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>M. Chuquet, in his work "La Jeunesse de Napoléon" (Paris, +1898), gives a different opinion: but I think this passage shows a +veiled hostility to Paoli. Probably we may refer to this time an +incident stated by Napoleon at St. Helena to Lady Malcolm ("Diary," +p. 88), namely, that Paoli urged on him the acceptance of a +commission in the British army: "But I preferred the French, +because I spoke the language, was of their religion, understood and +liked their manners, and I thought the Revolution a fine time for +an enterprising young man. Paoli was angry—we did not speak +afterwards." It is hard to reconcile all these statements.</p> + +<p>Lucien Buonaparte states that his brother seriously thought for +a time of taking a commission in the forces of the British East +India Company; but I am assured by our officials that no record of +any application now exists.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15">[15]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>The whole essay is evidently influenced by the works of the +democrat Raynal, to whom Buonaparte dedicated his "Lettres sur la +Corse." To the "Discours de Lyons" he prefixed as motto the words +"Morality will exist when governments are free," which he modelled +on a similar phrase of Raynal. The following sentences are also +noteworthy: "Notre organisation animale a des besoins +indispensables: manger, dormir, engendrer. Une nourriture, une +cabane, des vêtements, une femme, sont donc une stricte +nécessité pour le bonheur. Notre organisation +intellectuelle a des appétits non moins impérieux et +dont la satisfaction est beaucoup plus précieuse. C'est dans +leur entier développement que consiste vraiment le bonheur. +Sentir et raisonner, voilà proprement le fait de +l'homme."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16">[16]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Nasica; Chuquet, p. 248.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17">[17]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>His recantation of Jacobinism was so complete that some persons +have doubted whether he ever sincerely held it. The doubt argues a +singular <i>naïveté</i> it is laid to rest by +Buonaparte's own writings, by his eagerness to disown or destroy +them, by the testimony of everyone who knew his early career, and +by his own confession: "There have been good Jacobins. At one time +every man of spirit was bound to be one. I was one myself." +(Thibaudeau, "Mémoires sur le Consulat," p. 59.)</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18">[18]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>I use the term <i>commissioner</i> as equivalent to the French +<i>représentant en mission,</i> whose powers were almost +limitless.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19">[19]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See this curious document in Jung, "Bonaparte et son Temps," +vol. ii., p. 249. Masson ignores it, but admits that the Paolists +and partisans of France were only seeking to dupe one another.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20">[20]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Buonaparte, when First Consul, was dunned for payment by the +widow of the Avignon bookseller who published the "Souper de +Beaucaire." He paid her well for having all the remaining copies +destroyed. Yet Panckoucke in 1818 procured one copy, which +preserved the memory of Buonaparte's early Jacobinism.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21">[21]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>I have chiefly followed the careful account of the siege given +by Cottin in his "Toulon et les Anglais en 1793" (Paris, 1898).</p> + +<p>The following official figures show the weakness of the British +army. In December, 1792, the parliamentary vote was for 17,344 men +as "guards and garrisons," besides a few at Gibraltar and Sydney. +In February, 1793, 9,945 additional men were voted and 100 +"independent companies": Hanoverians were also embodied. In +February, 1794, the number of British regulars was raised to +60,244. For the navy the figures were: December, 1792, 20,000 +sailors and 5,000 marines; February, 1793, 20,000 <i>additional</i> +seamen; for 1794, 73,000 seamen and 12,000 marines. ("Ann. +Reg.")</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22">[22]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Barras' "Mémoires" are not by any means wholly his. They +are a compilation by Rousselin de Saint-Albin from the Barras +papers.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23">[23]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Jung, "Bonaparte et son Temps," vol. ii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24">[24]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>M.G. Duruy's elaborate plea (Barras, "Mems.," Introduction, pp. +69-79) rests on the supposition that his hero arrived at Toulon on +September 7th. But M. Chuquet has shown ("Cosmopolis," January, +1897) that he arrived there not earlier than September 16th. So too +Cottin, ch, xi.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25">[25]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>As the burning of the French ships and stores has been said to +be solely due to the English, we may note that, <i>as early as +October 3rd</i>, the Spanish Foreign Minister, the Duc d'Alcuida, +suggested it to our ambassador, Lord St. Helens: "If it becomes +necessary to abandon the harbour, these vessels shall be sunk or +set on fire in order that the enemy may not make use of them; for +which purpose preparations shall be made beforehand."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26">[26]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiers, ch. xxx.; Cottin, "L'Angleterre et les Princes."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27">[27]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Lord Grenville's despatch of August 9th, 1793, to Lord St. +Helens ("F.O. Records, Spain," No. 28), printed by M. Cottin, p. +428. He does not print the more important despatch of October 22nd, +where Grenville asserts that the admission of the French princes +would tend to invalidate the constitution of 1791, for which the +allies were working.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28">[28]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>A letter of Lord Mulgrave to Mr. Trevor, at Turin ("F. +O.Records, Sardinia," No. 13), states that he had the greatest +difficulty in getting on with the French royalists: "You must not +send us one <i>émigré</i> of any sort—they +would be a nuisance: they are all so various and so violent, +whether for despotism, constitution, or republic, that we should be +distracted with their quarrels; and they are so assuming, forward, +dictatorial, and full of complaints, that no business could go on +with them. Lord Hood is averse to receiving any of them."</p> + +<p>NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION.—From the information which Mr. +Spenser Wilkinson has recently supplied in his article in "The +Owens College Hist. Essays" (1902), it would seem that Buonaparte's +share in deciding the fate of Toulon was somewhat larger than has +here been stated; for though the Commissioners saw the supreme need +of attacking the fleet, they do not seem, as far as we know, to +have perceived that the hill behind Fort L'Eguillette was the key +of the position. Buonaparte's skill and tenacity certainly led to +the capture of this height.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29">[29]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Jung, "Bonaparte et son Temps," vol. ii., p. 430.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30">[30]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Mémorial," ch. ii., November, 1815. See also Thibaudeau, +"Mémoires sur le Consulat," vol. i., p. 59.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31">[31]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Marmont (1774-1852) became sub-lieutenant in 1789, served with +Buonaparte in Italy, Egypt, etc., received the title Duc de Ragusa +in 1808, Marshal in 1809; was defeated by Wellington at Salamanca +in 1812, deserted to the allies in 1814. Junot (1771-1813) entered +the army in 1791; was famed as a cavalry general in the wars +1796-1807; conquered Portugal in 1808, and received the title Duc +d'Abrantès; died mad.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32">[32]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>M. Zivy, "Le treize Vendémiaire," pp.60-62, quotes the +decree assigning the different commands. A MS. written by +Buonaparte, now in the French War Office Archives, proves also that +it was Barras who gave the order to fetch the cannon from the +Sablons camp.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33">[33]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Buonaparte afterwards asserted that it was he who had given the +order to fire, and certainly delay was all in favour of his +opponents.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34">[34]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>I caution readers against accepting the statement of Carlyle +("French Revolution," vol. iii. <i>ad fin</i>.) that "the thing we +specifically call French Revolution is blown into space by the +whiff of grapeshot." On the contrary, it was perpetuated, though in +a more organic and more orderly governmental form.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35">[35]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Chaptal, "Mes Souvenirs sur Napoléon," p. 198.</p> +</div> + +<p>[Footntoe 36: Koch, "Mémoires de Masséna," vol. +ii., p. 13, credits the French with only 37,775 men present with +the colours, the Austrians with 32,000, and the Sardinians with +20,000. All these figures omit the troops in garrison or guarding +communications.]</p> + +<a name="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37">[37]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Napoleon's "Correspondence," March 28th, 1796.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38">[38]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See my articles on Colonel Graham's despatches from Italy in the +"Eng. Hist. Review" of January and April, 1899.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39">[39]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Thus Mr. Sargent ("Bonaparte's First Campaign") says that +Bonaparte was expecting Beaulieu to move on Genoa, and saw herein a +chance of crushing the Austrian centre. But Bonaparte, in his +despatch of April 6th to the Directory, referring to the French +advance towards Genoa, writes: "J'ai été très +fâché et extrêmement mécontent de ce +mouvement sur Gênes, d'autant plus déplacé +qu'il a obligé cette république à prendre une +attitude hostile, et a réveillé l'ennemi que j'aurais +pris tranquille: ce sont des hommes de plus qu'il nous en +coûtera." For the question how far Napoleon was indebted to +Marshal Maillebois' campaign of 1745 for his general design, see +the brochure of M. Pierron. His indebtedness has been proved by M. +Bouvier ("Bonaparte en Italie," p. 197) and by Mr. Wilkinson +("Owens Coll. Hist. Essays").</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40">[40]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Nelson was then endeavouring to cut off the vessels conveying +stores from Toulon to the French forces. The following extracts +from his despatches are noteworthy. January 6th, 1796: "If the +French mean to carry on the war, they must penetrate into Italy. +Holland and Flanders, with their own country, they have entirely +stripped: Italy is the gold mine, and if once entered, is without +the means of resistance." Then on April 28th, after Piedmont was +overpowered by the French: "We English have to regret that we +cannot always decide the fate of Empires on the Sea." Again, on May +16th: "I very much believe that England, who commenced the war with +all Europe for her allies, will finish it by having nearly all +Europe for her enemies."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41">[41]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>The picturesque story of the commander (who was not Rampon, but +Fornésy) summoning the defenders of the central redoubt to +swear on their colours and on the cannon that they would defend it +to the death has been endlessly repeated by historians. But the +documents which furnish the only authentic details show that there +was in the redoubt no cannon and no flag. Fornésy's words +simply were: "C'est ici, mes amis, qu'il faut vaincre ou +mourir"—surely much grander than the histrionic oath. (See +"Mémoires de Masséna," Vol. ii.; "Pièces +Just.," No. 3; also Bouvier, <i>op. cit.</i>)</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42">[42]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Jomini, vol. viii., p. 340; "Pièces Justifs."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43">[43]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Un Homme d'autrefois," par Costa de Beauregard.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44">[44]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>These were General Beaulieu's words to Colonel Graham on May +22nd.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45">[45]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Periods of ten days, which, in the revolutionary calendar, +superseded the week.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46">[46]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>I have followed the accounts given by Jomini, vol. viii., pp. +120-130; that by Schels in the "Oest. Milit. Zeitschrift" for 1825, +vol. ii.; also Bouvier "Bonaparte en Italie," ch. xiii.; and J.G.'s +"Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97." Most French accounts, being +based on Napoleon's "Mémoires," vol. iii., p. 212 <i>et +seq</i>., are a tissue of inaccuracies. Bonaparte affected to +believe that at Lodi he defeated an army of sixteen thousand men. +Thiers states that the French cavalry, after fording the river at +Montanasso, influenced the result: but the official report of May +11th, 1796, expressly states that the French horse could not cross +the river at that place till the fight was over. See too +Desvernois, "Mems.," ch, vii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47">[47]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Bouvier (p. 533) traces this story to Las Cases and discredits +it.</p> +</div> + +<p>[Footnote: 48 Directorial despatch of May 7th, 1796. The date +rebuts the statement of M. Aulard, in M. Lavisse's recent volume, +"La Révolution Française," p. 435, that Bonaparte +suggested to the Directory the pillage of Lombardy.]</p> + +<a name="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49">[49]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," June 6th, 1797.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50">[50]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," June 1st, 1796.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51">[51]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Gaffarel, "Bonaparte et les Républiques Italiennes," p. +22.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52">[52]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," May 17th, 1796.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53">[53]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Virgil, Aeneid, x. 200.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_54_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_54">[54]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Colonel Graham's despatches.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_55_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_55">[55]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," June 26th, 1796.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_56_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_56">[56]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Despatch of Francis to Würmser, July 14th, 1796.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_57_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_57">[57]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Jomini (vol. viii., p. 305) blames Weyrother, the chief of +Würmser's staff, for the plan. Jomini gives the precise +figures of the French on July 25th: Masséna had 15,000 men +on the upper Adige; Augereau, 5,000 near Legnago; Sauret, 4,000 at +Salo; Sérurier, 10,500 near Mantua; and with others at and +near Peschiera the total fighting strength was 45,000. So "J.G.," +p. 103.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_58_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_58">[58]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Thiébault's amusing account ("Memoirs," vol. i., ch. +xvi.) of Bonaparte's contempt for any officer who could not give +him definite information, and of the devices by which his orderlies +played on this foible. See too Bourrienne for Bonaparte's dislike +of new faces.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_59_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_59">[59]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Marbot, "Mémoires," ch. xvi. J.G., in his recent work, +"Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97," p. 115, also defends +Augereau.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_60_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_60">[60]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Jomini, vol. viii., p. 321.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_61_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_61">[61]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"English Hist. Review," January, 1899</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_62_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_62">[62]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Such is the judgment of Clausewitz ("Werke," vol. iv.), and it +is partly endorsed by J.G. in his "Etudes sur la Campagne de +1796-97." St. Cyr, in his "Memoirs" on the Rhenish campaigns, also +blames Bonaparte for not having <i>earlier</i> sent away his +siege-train to a place of safety. Its loss made the resumed siege +of Mantua little more than a blockade.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_63_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_63">[63]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Koch, "Mémoires de Masséna," vol. i., p. 199.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_64_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_64">[64]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," October 21st, 1796.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_65_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_65">[65]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," October 24th, 1796. The same policy was employed +towards Genoa. This republic was to be lulled into security until +it could easily be overthrown or absorbed.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_66_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_66">[66]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Ordre du Jour," November 7th, 1796.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_67_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_67">[67]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Marmont, "Mémoires," vol. i., p. 237. I have followed +Marmont's narrative, as that of the chief actor in this strange +scene. It is less dramatic than the usual account, as found in +Thiers, and therefore is more probable. The incident illustrates +the folly of a commander doing the work of a sergeant. Marmont +points out that the best tactics would have been to send one +division to cross the Adige at Albaredo, and so take Arcola in the +rear. Thiers' criticism, that this would have involved too great a +diffusion of the French line, is refuted by the fact that on the +third day a move on that side induced the Austrians to evacuate +Arcola.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_68_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_68">[68]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Koch, "Mémoires de Masséna," vol. i., p. 255, in +his very complete account of the battle, gives the enemy's losses +as upwards of 2,000 killed or wounded, and 4,000 prisoners with 11 +cannon. Thiers gives 40,000 as Alvintzy's force before the +battle—an impossible number. See <i>ante</i>.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_69_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_69">[69]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>The Austrian official figures for the loss in the three days at +Arcola give 2,046 killed and wounded, 4,090 prisoners, and 11 +cannon. Napoleon put it down as 13,000 in all! See Schels in "Oest. +Milit. Zeitschrift" for 1829.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_70_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_70">[70]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>A forecast of the plan realized in 1801-2, whereby Bonaparte +gained Louisiana for a time.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_71_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71_71">[71]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Estimates of the Austrian force differ widely. Bonaparte guessed +it at 45,000, which is accepted by Thiers; Alison says 40,000; +Thiébault opines that it was 75,000; Marmont gives the total +as 26,217. The Austrian official figures are 28,022 <i>before</i> +the fighting north of Monte Baldo. See my article in the "Eng. +Hist. Review" for April, 1899. I have largely followed the +despatches of Colonel Graham, who was present at this battle. As +"J.G." points out (<i>op.cit.</i> , p. 237), the French had 1,500 +horse and some forty cannon, which gave them a great advantage over +foes who could make no effective use of these arms.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_72_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72_72">[72]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>This was doubtless facilitated by the death of the Czarina, +Catherine II., in November, 1796. She had been on the point of +entering the Coalition against France. The new Czar Paul was at +that time for peace. The Austrian Minister Thugut, on hearing of +her death, exclaimed, "This is the climax of our disasters."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_73_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73_73">[73]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Hüffer, "Oesterreich und Preussen," p. 263.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_74_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74_74">[74]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Moniteur," 20 Floreal, Year V.; Sciout, "Le Directoire," vol. +ii., ch. vii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_75_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75_75">[75]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Landrieux's letter on the subject in Koch's "Mémoires +de Masséna," vol. ii.; "Pièces Justif.," <i>ad +fin.</i>; and Bonaparte's "Corresp.," letter of March 24th, 1797. +The evidence of this letter, as also of those of April 9th and +19th, is ignored by Thiers, whose account of Venetian affairs is +misleading. It is clear that Bonaparte contemplated partition long +before the revolt of Brescia.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_76_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76_76">[76]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Botta, "Storia d'Italia," vol. ii., chs. x., etc.; Daru, "Hist. +de Venise," vol. v.; Gaffarel, "Bonaparte et les Républiques +Italiennes," pp. 137-139; and Sciout, "Le Directoire," vol ii., +chs. v. and vii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_77_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77_77">[77]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Sorel, "Bonaparte et Hoche en 1797," p. 65.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_78_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78_78">[78]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of April 30th, 1797.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_79_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79_79">[79]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of May 13th, 1797.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_80_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80_80">[80]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>It would even seem, from Bonaparte's letter of July 12th, 1797, +that not till then did he deign to send on to Paris the terms of +the treaty with Venice. He accompanied it with the cynical +suggestion that they could do what they liked with the treaty, and +even annul it!</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_81_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81_81">[81]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>The name <i>Italian</i> was rejected by Bonaparte as too +aggressively nationalist; but the prefix <i>Cis</i>—applied +to a State which stretched southward to the Rubicon—was a +concession to Italian nationality. It implied that Florence or Rome +was the natural capital of the new State.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_82_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82_82">[82]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Arnault's "Souvenirs d'un sexagénaire" (vol. iii., p. +31) and Levy's "Napoléon intime," p. 131.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_83_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83_83">[83]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>For the subjoined version of the accompanying new letter of +Bonaparte (referred to in my Preface) I am indebted to Mr. H.A.L. +Fisher, in the "Eng. Hist. Rev.," July, 1900:</p> + +<div class="blkquot"> +<p>"Milan, 29 Thermidor [l'an IV.]</p> + +<p>"À LA CITOYENNE TALLIEN</p> + +<p>"Je vous dois des remerciements, belle citoyenne, pour le +souvenir que vous me conservez et pour les choses aimables +contenues dans votre apostille. Je sais bien qu'en vous disant que +je regrette les moments heureux que j'ai passé dans votre +société je ne vous répète que ce que +tout le monde vous dit. Vous connaître c'est ne plus pouvoir +vous oublier: être loin de votre aimable personne lorsque +l'on a goûté les charmes de votre +société c'est désirer vivement de s'en +rapprocher; mais l'on dit que vous allez en Espagne. Fi! c'est +très vilain à moins que vous ne soyez de retour avant +trois mois, enfin que cet hiver nous ayons le bonheur de vous voir +à Paris. Allez donc en Espagne visiter la caverne de Gil +Blas. Moi je crois aussi visiter toutes les antiquités +possibles, enfin que dans le cours de novembre jusqu'à +février nous puissions raconter sans cesse. Croyez-moi avec +toute la considération, je voulais dire le respect, mais je +sais qu'en général les jolies femmes n'aiment pas ce +mot-là.</p> + +<p>"BONAPARTE.</p> + +<p>"Mille e mille chose à Tallien."</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Footnote_84_84"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_84_84">[84]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lavalette, "Méms.," ch. xiii.; Barras, "Méms.," +vol. ii., pp. 511-512; and Duchesse d'Abrantès, +"Méms.," vol. i., ch. xxviii.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Footnote_85_85"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_85_85">[85]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Barras, "Méms.," vol. ii., ch, xxxi.; Madame de +Staël, "Directoire," ch. viii.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Footnote_86_86"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_86_86">[86]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Mémoires de Gohier"; Roederer, "Oeuvres," tome iii., p. +294.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Footnote_87_87"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_87_87">[87]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Brougham, "Sketches of Statesmen"; Ste. Beuve, "Talleyrand"; +Lady Blennerhasset, "Talleyrand."</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Footnote_88_88"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_88_88">[88]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Instructions of Talleyrand to the French envoys (September +11th); also Ernouf's "Maret, Duc de Bassano," chs. xxvii. and +xxviii., for the <i>bona fides</i> of Pitt in these +negotiations.</p> + +<p>It seems strange that Baron du Casse, in his generally fair +treatment of the English case, in his "Négociations +relatives aux Traités de Lunéville et d'Amiens," +should have prejudiced his readers at the outset by referring to a +letter which he attributes to Lord Malmesbury. It bears no date, no +name, and purports to be "Une Lettre de Lord Malmesbury, +oubliée à Lille." How could the following sentences +have been penned by Malmesbury, and written to Lord +Grenville?—"Mais enfin, outre les regrets sincères de +Méot et des danseuses de l'Opéra, j'eus la +consolation de voir en quittant Paris, que des Français et +une multitude de nouveaux convertés à la +réligion catholique m'accompagnaient de leurs voeux, de +leurs prières, et presque de leurs larmes.... +L'évènement de Fructidor porta la désolation +dans le coeur de tous les bons ennemis de la France. Pour ma part, +j'en fut consterné: <i>je ne l'avais point +prévu</i>." It is obviously the clumsy fabrication of a +Fructidorian, designed for Parisian consumption: it was translated +by a Whig pamphleteer under the title "The Voice of Truth!"—a +fit sample of that partisan malevolence which distorted a great +part of our political literature in that age.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Footnote_89_89"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_89_89">[89]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bonaparte's letters of September 28th and October 7th to +Talleyrand.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Footnote_90_90"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_90_90">[90]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See too Marsh's "Politicks of Great Britain and France," +ch.xiii.; "Correspondence of W.A. Miles on the French Revolution," +letters of January 7th and January 18th, 1793; also Sybel's "Europe +during the French Revolution," vol. ii.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Footnote_91_91"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_91_91">[91]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Pallain, "Le Ministère de Talleyrand sous le Directoire," +p. 42.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Footnote_92_92"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_92_92">[92]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bourrienne, "Memoirs," vol. i., ch. xii. See too the despatch of +Sandoz-Rollin to Berlin of February 28th, 1798, in Bailleu's +"Preussen und Frankreich," vol. i., No. 150.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Footnote_93_93"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_93_93">[93]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>The italics are my own. I wish to call attention to the +statement in view of the much-debated question whether in 1804-5 +Napoleon intended to invade our land, <i>unless he gained maritime +supremacy</i>. See Desbrière's "Projets de +Débarquement aux Iles Britanniques," vol. i., <i>ad +fin</i>.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Footnote_94_94"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_94_94">[94]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of October 10th, 1797; see too those of August 16th and +September 13th.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Footnote_95_95"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_95_95">[95]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>The plan of menacing diverse parts of our coasts was kept up by +Bonaparte as late as April 13th, 1798. In his letter of this date +he still speaks of the invasion of England and Scotland, and +promises to return from Egypt in three or four months, so as to +proceed with the invasion of the United Kingdom. Boulay de la +Meurthe, in his work, "Le Directoire et l'Expédition +d'Egypte," ch. i., seems to take this promise seriously. In any +case the Directors' hopes for the invasion of Ireland were dashed +by the premature rising of the Irish malcontents in May, 1798. For +Poussielgue's mission to Malta, see Lavalette's "Mems.," ch. +xiv.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Footnote_96_96"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_96_96">[96]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Mallet du Pan states that three thousand Vaudois came to Berne +to join in the national defence: "Les cantons démocratiques +sont les plus fanatisés contre les Français"—a +suggestive remark.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Footnote_97_97"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_97_97">[97]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Dändliker, "Geschichte der Schweiz," vol. iii., p. 350 +(edition of 1895); also Lavisse, "La Rév. Franç.," p. +821.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Footnote_98_98"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_98_98">[98]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Correspondance," No. 2676.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Footnote_99_99"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_99_99">[99]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Foreign Office Records," Malta (No. 1). Mr. Williams states in +his despatch of June 30th, 1798, that Bonaparte knew there were +four thousand Maltese in his favour, and that most of the French +knights were publicly known to be so; but he adds: "I do believe +the Maltees [<i>sic</i>] have given the island to the French in +order to get rid of the knighthood."</p> +</div> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_100_100"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_100_100">[100]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>I am indebted for this fact to the Librarian of the Priory of +the Knights of St. John, Clerkenwell.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_101_101"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_101_101">[101]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See, for a curious instance, Chaptal, "Mes Souvenirs," p. +243.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_102_102"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_102_102">[102]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>The Arab accounts of these events, drawn up by Nakoula and +Abdurrahman, are of much interest. They have been well used by M. +Dufourcq, editor of Desvernois' "Memoirs," for many suggestive +footnotes.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_103_103"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_103_103">[103]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Desgenettes, "Histoire médicale de l'Armée +d'Orient" (Paris, 1802); Belliard, "Mémoires," vol. i.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_104_104"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_104_104">[104]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>I have followed chiefly the account of Savary, Duc de Rovigo, +"Mems.," ch. iv. See too Desvernois, "Mems.," ch. iv.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_105_105"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_105_105">[105]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See his orders published in the "Correspondance officielle et +confid. de Nap. Bonaparte, Egypte," vol. i. (Paris, 1819, p. 270). +They rebut Captain Mahan's statement ("Influence of Sea Power upon +the Fr. Rev. and Emp.," vol. i., p. 263) as to Brueys' "delusion +and lethargy" at Aboukir. On the contrary, though enfeebled by +dysentery and worried by lack of provisions and the insubordination +of his marines, he certainly did what he could under the +circumstances. See his letters in the Appendix of Jurien de la +Graviere, "Guerres Maritimes," vol. i.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_106_106"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_106_106">[106]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Desvernois, "Mems.," ch. v.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_107_107"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_107_107">[107]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p><i>Ib.</i>, ch. vi.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_108_108"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_108_108">[108]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Order of July 27th, 1798.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_109_109"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_109_109">[109]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Ducasse, "Les Rois, Frères de Napoléon," p. 8.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_110_110"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_110_110">[110]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Mémoires de Napoléon," vol. ii.; Bourrienne, +"Mems.," vol. i., ch. xvii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_111_111"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_111_111">[111]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Méms. de Berthier."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_112_112"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_112_112">[112]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>On November 4th, 1798, the French Government forwarded to +Bonaparte, in triplicate copies, a despatch which, after setting +forth the failure of their designs on Ireland, urged him either (1) +to remain in Egypt, of which they evidently disapproved, or (2) to +march towards India and co-operate with Tippoo Sahib, or (3) to +advance on Constantinople in order that France might have a share +in the partition of Turkey, which was then being discussed between +the Courts of Petersburg and Vienna. No copy of this despatch seems +to have reached Bonaparte before he set out for Syria (February +10th). This curious and perhaps guileful despatch is given in full +by Boulay de la Meurthe, "Le Directoire et l'Expédition +d'Egypte," Appendix, No. 5.</p> + +<p>On the whole, I am compelled to dissent from Captain Mahan +("Influence of Sea Power," vol. i., pp. 324-326), and to regard the +larger schemes of Bonaparte in this Syrian enterprise as +visionary.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_113_113"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_113_113">[113]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Berthier, "Mémoires"; Belliard, "Bourrienne et ses +Erreurs," also corrects Bourrienne. As to the dearth of food, +denied by Lanfrey, see Captain Krettly, "Souvenirs +historiques."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_114_114"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_114_114">[114]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Emouf, "Le General Kléber," p. 201.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_115_115"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_115_115">[115]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Admiralty Records," Mediterranean, No. 19.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_116_116"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_116_116">[116]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," No. 4124; Lavalette, "Mems.," ch. xxi.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_117_117"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_117_117">[117]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Sidney Smith's "Despatch to Nelson" of May 30th, 1799.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_118_118"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_118_118">[118]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>J. Miot's words are: "Mais s'il en faut croire cette voix +publique, trop souvent organe de la vérite tardive, qu'en +vain les grands espèrent enchaîner, c'est un fait trop +avéré que quelques blessés du Mont Carmel et +une grande partie des malades à l'hôpital de Jaffa ont +péri par les médicaments qui leur ont +été administrés." Can this be called +evidence?</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_119_119"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_119_119">[119]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Larrey, "Relation historique"; Lavalette, "Mems.," ch. xxi.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_120_120"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_120_120">[120]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Belliard, "Bourrienne et ses Erreurs"; also a letter of +d'Aure, formerly Intendant General of this army, to the "Journal +des Débats" of April 16th, 1829, in reply to Bourrienne.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_121_121"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_121_121">[121]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"On disait tout haut qu'il se sauvait lâchement," Merme in +Guitry's "L'Armée en Egypte." But Bonaparte had prepared for +this discouragement and worse eventualities by warning +Kléber in the letter of August 22nd, 1799, that if he lost +1,500 men by the plague he was free to treat for the evacuation of +Egypt.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_122_122"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_122_122">[122]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Lucien Bonaparte, "Mémoires," vol. ii., ch. xiv.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_123_123"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_123_123">[123]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>In our "Admiralty Records" (Mediterranean, No. 21) are documents +which prove the reality of Russian designs on Corsica.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_124_124"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_124_124">[124]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Consid. sur la Rév. Française," bk. iii., ch. +xiii. See too Sciout, "Le Directoire," vol. iv., chs. +xiii.-xiv.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_125_125"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_125_125">[125]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>La Réveillière-Lépeaux, "Mems.," vol. ii., +ch. xliv.; Hyde de Neuville, vol. i., chs. vi.-vii.; Lavisse, +"Rév. Française," p. 394.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_126_126"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_126_126">[126]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Barras, "Mems.," vol. iv., ch. ii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_127_127"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_127_127">[127]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Hist. of the United States" (1801-1813), by H. Adams, vol. i., +ch. xiv., and Ste. Beuve's "Talleyrand."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_128_128"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_128_128">[128]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Gohier, "Mems.," vol. i.; Lavalette's "Mems.," ch. xxii.; +Roederer, "OEuvres," vol. iii., p. 301; Madelin's "Fouché," +p. 267.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_129_129"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_129_129">[129]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>For the story about Aréna's dagger, raised against +Bonaparte see Sciout, vol. iv., p. 652. It seems due to Lucien +Bonaparte. I take the curious details about Bonaparte's sudden +pallor from Roederer ("Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 302), who heard it +from Montrond, Talleyrand's secretary. So Aulard, "Hist, de la +Rév. Fr.," p. 699.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_130_130"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_130_130">[130]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Napoleon explained to Metternich in 1812 why he wished to +silence the <i>Corps Législatif</i>; "In France everyone +runs after applause: they want to be noticed and applauded.... +Silence an Assembly, which, if it is anything, must be +deliberative, and you discredit it."—Metternich's "Memoirs," +vol. i., p. 151.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_131_131"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_131_131">[131]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>This was still further assured by the first elections under the +new system being postponed till 1801; the functionaries chosen by +the Consuls were then placed on the lists of notabilities of the +nation without vote. The constitution was put in force Dec. 25th, +1799.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_132_132"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_132_132">[132]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Roederer, "Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 303. He was the go-between +for Bonaparte and Sieyès.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_133_133"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_133_133">[133]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See the "Souvenirs" of Mathieu Dumas for the skilful manner in +which Bonaparte gained over the services of this constitutional +royalist and employed him to raise a body of volunteer horse.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_134_134"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_134_134">[134]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites de Napoléon," February 21st, +1800; "Mémoires du Général d'Andigné," +ch. xv.; Madelin's "Fouché," p. 306.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_135_135"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_135_135">[135]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Georges Cadoudal," par son neveu, G. de Cadoudal; Hyde de +Neuville, vol. i., p. 305.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_136_136"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_136_136">[136]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Talleyrand, "Mems.," vol. i., part ii.; Marmont, bk. v.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_137_137"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_137_137">[137]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," Austria, No. 58; "Castlereagh's Despatches," v. <i>ad +init.</i> Bowman, in his excellent monograph, "Preliminary Stages +of the Peace of Amiens" (Toronto, 1899), has not noted this.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_138_138"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_138_138">[138]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Nap. Correspond.," February 27th 1800; Thugut, "Briefe" vol. +ii., pp. 444-446; Oncken, "Zeitalter," vol. ii. p. 45.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_139_139"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_139_139">[139]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>A Foreign Office despatch, dated Downing Street, February 8th, +1800, to Vienna, promised a loan and that 15,000 or 20,000 British +troops should be employed in the Mediterranean to act in concert +with the Austrians there, and to give "support to the royalist +insurrections in the southern provinces of France." No differences +of opinion respecting Piedmont can be held a sufficient excuse for +the failure of the British Government to fulfil this +promise—a failure which contributed to the disaster at +Marengo.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_140_140"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_140_140">[140]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiers attributes this device to Bonaparte; but the First +Consul's bulletin of May 24th ascribes it to Marmont and +Gassendi.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_141_141"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_141_141">[141]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Marbot, "Mems.," ch. ix.; Allardyce, "Memoir of Lord Keith," ch. +xiii.; Thiébault's "Journal of the Blockade of Genoa."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_142_142"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_142_142">[142]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>That Melas expected such a march is clear from a letter of his +of May 23rd, dated from Savillan, to Lord Keith, which I have found +in the "Brit. Admiralty Records" (Mediterranean, No. 22), where he +says: "L'ennemi a cerné le fort de Bard et s'est +avancé jusque sous le château d'Ivrée. Il est +clair que son but est de délivrer Masséna."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_143_143"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_143_143">[143]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Bonaparte did not leave Milan till June 9th: see +"Correspondance" and the bulletin of June 10th. Jomini places his +departure for the 7th, and thereby confuses his description for +these two days. Thiers dates it on June 8th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_144_144"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_144_144">[144]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Lord W. Bentinck reported to the Brit. Admiralty ("Records," +Meditn., No. 22), from Alessandria, on June 15th: "I am sorry to +say that General Elsnitz's corps, which was composed of the +grenadiers of the finest regiments in the (Austrian) army, arrived +here in the most deplorable condition. His men had already suffered +much from want of provisions and other hardships. He was pursued in +his retreat by Genl. Suchet, who had with him about 7,000 men. +There was an action at Ponte di Nava, in which the French failed; +and it will appear scarcely credible, when I tell your Lordship, +that the Austrians lost in this retreat, from fatigue only, near +5,000 men; and I have no doubt that Genl. Suchet will notify this +to the world as a great victory."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_145_145"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_145_145">[145]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>The inaccuracy of Marbot's "Mémoires" is nowhere more +glaring than in his statement that Marengo must have gone against +the French if Ott's 25,000 Austrians from Genoa had joined their +comrades. As a matter of fact, Ott, with 16,000 men, had +<i>already</i> fought with Lannes at Montebello; and played a great +part in the battle of Marengo.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_146_146"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_146_146">[146]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," vol. vi., p. 365. Fournier, "Hist. Studien und +Skizzen," p. 189, argues that the letter was written from Milan, +and dated from Marengo for effect.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_147_147"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_147_147">[147]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Czartoryski's "Memoirs," ch. xi., and Driault's "La Question +d'Orient," ch. iii. The British Foreign Office was informed of the +plan. In its records (No. 614) is a memoir (pencilled on the back +January 31st, 1801) from a M. Leclerc to Mr. Flint, referring the +present proposal back to that offered by M. de St. Génie to +Catherine II., and proposing that the first French step should be +the seizure of Socotra and Perim.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_148_148"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_148_148">[148]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Garden, "Traités," vol. vi., ch. xxx.; Captain Mahan's +"Life of Nelson," vol. ii., ch. xvi.; Thiers, "Consulate," bk. ix. +For the assassination of the Czar Paul see "Kaiser Paul's Ende," +von R.R. (Stuttgart, 1897); also Czartoryski's "Memoirs," chs. +xiii.-xiv. For Bonaparte's offer of a naval truce to us and his +overture of December, 1800, see Bowman, <i>op. cit</i>.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_149_149"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_149_149">[149]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Pasquier, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. ii., p. 299. So too Mollien, +"Mems.": "With an insatiable activity in details, a restlessness of +mind always eager for new cares, he not only reigned and governed, +he continued to administer not only as Prime Minister, but more +minutely than each Minister."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_150_150"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_150_150">[150]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Lack of space prevents any account of French finances and the +establishment of the Bank of France. But we may note here that the +collection of the national taxes was now carried out by a +State-appointed director and his subordinates in every +Department—a plan which yielded better results than former +slipshod methods. The <i>conseil général</i> of the +Department assessed the direct taxes among the smaller areas. +"Méms." de Gaudin, Duc de Gaëte.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_151_151"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_151_151">[151]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Edmond Blanc, "Napoléon I; ses Institutions," p. 27.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_152_152"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_152_152">[152]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Theiner, "Hist. des deux Concordats," vol. i., p. 21.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_153_153"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_153_153">[153]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Thibaudeau estimated that of the population of 35,000,000 the +following assortment might be made: Protestants, Jews, and +Theophilanthropists, 3,000,000; Catholics, 15,000,000, equally +divided between orthodox and constitutionals; and as many as +17,000,000 professing no belief whatever.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_154_154"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_154_154">[154]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Roederer, "Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 475. On the discontent of +the officers, see Pasquier's "Mems.," vol. i., ch. vii.; also +Marmont's "Mems.," bk. vi.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_155_155"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_155_155">[155]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See the drafts in Count Boulay de la Meurthe's +"Négociation du Concordat," vol. ii., pp. 58 and 268.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_156_156"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_156_156">[156]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Theiner, vol. i., pp. 193 and 196.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_157_157"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_157_157">[157]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Méneval, "Mems.," vol. i., p. 81.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_158_158"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_158_158">[158]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiers omits any notice of this strange transaction. Lanfrey +describes it, but unfortunately relies on the melodramatic version +given in Consalvi's "Memoirs," which were written many years later +and are far less trustworthy than the Cardinal's letters written at +the time. In his careful review of all the documentary evidence, +Count Boulay de la Meurthe (vol. iii., p. 201, note) concludes that +the new project of the Concordat (No. VIII.) was drawn up by +Hauterive, was "submitted immediately to the approbation of the +First Consul," and thereupon formed the basis of the long and +heated discussion of July 14th between the Papal and French +plenipotentiaries. A facsimile of this interesting document, with +all the erasures, is appended at the end of his volume.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_159_159"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_159_159">[159]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Pasquier, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. vii. Two of the organic articles +portended the abolition of the revolutionary calendar. The first +restored the old names of the days of the week; the second ordered +that Sunday should be the day of rest for all public functionaries. +The observance of <i>décadis</i> thenceforth ceased; but the +months of the revolutionary calendar were observed until the close +of the year 1805. Theophilanthropy was similarly treated: when its +votaries applied for a building, their request was refused on the +ground that their cult came within the domain of philosophy, not of +any actual religion! A small number of priests and of their +parishioners refused to recognize the Concordat; and even to-day +there are a few of these <i>anti-concordataires</i>.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_160_160"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_160_160">[160]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Chaptal, "Souvenirs," pp. 237-239. Lucien Bonaparte, "Mems.," +vol. ii., p. 201, quotes his brother Joseph's opinion of the +Concordat: "Un pas rétrograde et irréfléchi de +la nation qui s'y soumettait."]</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_161_161"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_161_161">[161]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Thibaudeau, "Consulat," ch. xxvi.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_162_162"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_162_162">[162]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Code Napoléon," art. 148.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_163_163"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_163_163">[163]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>In other respects also Bonaparte's influence was used to depress +the legal status of woman, which the men of 1789 had done so much +to raise. In his curious letter of May 15th, 1807, on the +Institution at Ecouen, we have his ideas on a sound, useful +education for girls: "... We must begin with religion in all its +severity. Do not admit any modification of this. Religion is very +important in a girls' public school: it is the surest guarantee for +mothers and husbands. We must train up believers, not reasoners. +The weakness of women's brains, the unsteadiness of their ideas, +their function in the social order, their need of constant +resignation and of a kind of indulgent and easy charity—all +can only be attained by religion." They were to learn a little +geography and history, but no foreign language; above all, to do +plenty of needlework.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_164_164"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_164_164">[164]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Sagnac, "Législation civile de la Rév. Fr.," p. +293.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_165_165"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_165_165">[165]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Divorce was suppressed in 1816, but was re-established in +1884.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_166_166"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_166_166">[166]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Sagnac, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 352.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_167_167"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_167_167">[167]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"The Life of Sir S. Romilly," vol. i., p. 408.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_168_168"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_168_168">[168]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Madelin in his "Fouché," ch. xi., shows how Bonaparte's +private police managed the affair. Harel was afterwards promoted to +the governorship of the Castle of Vincennes: the four talkers, whom +he and the police had lured on, were executed after the affair of +Nivôse. That dextrous literary flatterer, the poet Fontanes, +celebrated the "discovery" of the Aréna plot by publishing +anonymously a pamphlet ("A Parallel between Caesar, Cromwell, Monk, +and Bonaparte") in which he decided that no one but Caesar deserved +the honour of a comparison with Bonaparte, and that certain +destinies were summoning him to a yet higher title. The pamphlet +appeared under the patronage of Lucien Bonaparte, and so annoyed +his brother that he soon despatched him on a diplomatic mission to +Madrid as a punishment for his ill-timed suggestions.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_169_169"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_169_169">[169]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Thibaudeau, <i>op. cit</i>., vol. ii., p. 55. Miot de Melito, +ch. xii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_170_170"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_170_170">[170]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>It seems clear, from the evidence so frankly given by Cadoudal +in his trial in 1804, as well as from his expressions when he heard +of the affair of Nivôse, that the hero of the Chouans had no +part in the bomb affair. He had returned to France, had empowered +St. Réjant to buy arms and horses, "dont je me servirai plus +tard"; and it seems certain that he intended to form a band of +desperate men who were to waylay, kidnap, or kill the First Consul +in open fight. This plan was deferred by the bomb explosion for +three years. As soon as he heard of this event, he exclaimed: "I'll +bet that it was that—— St. Réjant. He has upset +all my plans." (See "Georges Cadoudal," par G. de Cadoudal.)</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_171_171"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_171_171">[171]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Roederer, "Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 352. For these negotiations +see Bowman's "Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens" (Toronto, +1899).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_172_172"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_172_172">[172]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Porter, "Progress of the Nation," ch. xiv.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_173_173"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_173_173">[173]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"New Letters of Napoleon I." See too his letter of June +17th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_174_174"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_174_174">[174]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Cornwallis Correspondence," vol. iii., pp. 380-382. Few records +exist of the negotiations between Lord Hawkesbury and M. Otto at +London. I have found none in the Foreign Office archives. The +general facts are given by Garden, "Traités," vol. vii., ch. +xxxi.; only a few of the discussions were reduced to writing. This +seriously prejudiced our interests at Amiens.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_175_175"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_175_175">[175]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Lefebvre, "Cabinets de l'Europe," ch. iv</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_176_176"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_176_176">[176]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Chaptal. "Mes Souvenirs," pp. 287, 291, and 359.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_177_177"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_177_177">[177]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Chapter XIV. of this work.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_178_178"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_178_178">[178]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Thibaudeau, <i>op. cit</i>., ch. xxvi.; Lavisse, +"Napoléon," ch. i.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_179_179"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_179_179">[179]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"A Diary of St. Helena," by Lady Malcolm, p. 97.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_180_180"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_180_180">[180]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"The Two Duchesses," edited by Vere Foster, p. 172. Lord +Malmesbury ("Diaries," vol. iv., p. 257) is less favourable: "When +B. is out of his ceremonious habits, his language is often coarse +and vulgar."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_181_181"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_181_181">[181]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Jurien de la Graviere, "Guerres Maritimes," vol. ii., chap. +vii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_182_182"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_182_182">[182]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>These facts were fully acknowledged later by Otto: see his +despatch of January 6th, 1802, to Talleyrand, published by Du Casse +in his "Négociations relatives au Traité d'Amiens," +vol. iii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_183_183"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_183_183">[183]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," France, No. 59. The memoir is dated October 19th, +1801.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_184_184"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_184_184">[184]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," France, No. 59.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_185_185"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_185_185">[185]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Castlereagh, "Letters and Despatches," Second Series, vol. i., +p. 62, and the speeches of Ministers on November 3rd, 1801.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_186_186"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_186_186">[186]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Cornwallis, "Correspondence," vol. iii., despatch of December +3rd, 1801. The feelings of the native Maltese were strongly for +annexation to Britain, and against the return of the Order at all. +They sent a deputation to London (February, 1802), which was +shabbily treated by our Government so as to avoid offending +Bonaparte. (See "Correspondence of W.A. Miles," vol. ii., pp. +323-329, who drew up their memorial.)</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_187_187"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_187_187">[187]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Cornwallis's despatches of January 10th and 23rd, 1802.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_188_188"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_188_188">[188]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Project of a treaty forwarded by Cornwallis to London on +December 27th, 1801, in the Public Record Office, No. 615.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_189_189"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_189_189">[189]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See the "Paget Papers," vol. ii. France gained the right of +admission to the Black Sea: the despatches of Mr. Merry from Paris +in May, 1802, show that France and Russia were planning schemes of +partition of Turkey. ("F.O.," France, No. 62.)</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_190_190"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_190_190">[190]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>The despatches of March 14th and 22nd, 1802, show how strong was +the repugnance of our Government to this shabby treatment of the +Prince of Orange; and it is clear that Cornwallis exceeded his +instructions in signing peace on those terms. (See Garden, vol. +vii., p. 142.) By a secret treaty with Prussia (May, 1802), France +procured Fulda for the House of Orange.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_191_191"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_191_191">[191]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Pasolini, "Memorie," <i>ad init</i>.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_192_192"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_192_192">[192]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites de Talleyrand à Napoléon" +(Paris, 1889).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_193_193"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_193_193">[193]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Mr. Jackson's despatch of February 17th, 1802, from Paris. +According to Miot de Melito ("Mems.," ch. xiv.), Bonaparte had +offered the post of President to his brother Joseph, but fettered +it by so many restrictions that Joseph declined the honour.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_194_194"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_194_194">[194]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Roederer tells us ("OEuvres," vol. iii., p. 428) that he had +drawn up two plans of a constitution for the Cisalpine; the one +very short and leaving much to the President, the other precise and +detailed. He told Talleyrand to advise Bonaparte to adopt the +former as it was "<i>short and</i>"—he was about to add +"<i>clear</i>" when the diplomatist cut him short with the words, +"<i>Yes: short and obscure!</i>"</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_195_195"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_195_195">[195]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Napoleon's letter of February 2nd, 1802, to Joseph Bonaparte; +see too Cornwallis's memorandum of February 18th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_196_196"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_196_196">[196]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>It is only fair to Cornwallis to quote the letter, marked +"Private," which he received from Hawkesbury at the same time that +he was bidden to stand firm:</p> + +<p>"DOWNING STREET, <i>March 22nd</i>, 1802.</p> + +<p>"I think it right to inform you that I have had a confidential +communication with Otto, who will use his utmost endeavours to +induce his Government to agree to the articles respecting the +Prince of Orange and the prisoners in the shape in which they are +now proposed. I have very little doubt of his success, and I should +hope therefore that you will soon be released. I need not remind +you of the importance of sending your most expeditious messenger +the moment our fate is determined. The Treasury is almost +exhausted, and Mr. Addington cannot well make his loan in the +present state of uncertainty."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_197_197"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_197_197">[197]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See the British notes of November 6th-16th, 1801, in the +"Cornwallis Correspondence," vol. iii. In his speech in the House +of Lords, May 13th, 1802, Lord Grenville complained that we had had +to send to the West Indies in time of peace a fleet double as large +as that kept there during the late war.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_198_198"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_198_198">[198]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>For these and the following negotiations see Lucien Bonaparte's +"Mémoires," vol. ii., and Garden's "Traités de Paix," +vol. iii., ch. xxxiv. The Hon. H. Taylor, in "The North American +Review" of November, 1898, has computed that the New World was thus +divided in 1801:</p> + +<pre> + Spain 7,028,000 square miles. + Great Britain 3,719,000 " " + Portugal 3,209,000 " " + United States 827,000 " " + Russia 577,000 " " + France 29,000 " " +</pre> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_199_199"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_199_199">[199]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"History of the United States, 1801-1813," by H. Adams, vol. i, +p. 409.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_200_200"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_200_200">[200]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Napoleon's letter of November 2nd, 1802.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_201_201"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_201_201">[201]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Merry's despatch of October 21st, 1802.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_202_202"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_202_202">[202]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>The instructions which he sent to Victor supply an interesting +commentary on French colonial policy: "The system of this, as of +all our other colonies, should be to concentrate its commerce in +the national commerce: it should especially aim at establishing its +relations with our Antilles, so as to take the place in those +colonies of the American commerce.... The captain-general should +abstain from every innovation favourable to strangers, who should +be restricted to such communications as are absolutely +indispensable to the prosperity of Louisiana."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_203_203"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_203_203">[203]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Lucien Bonaparte, "Mémoires," vol. ii., ch. ix. He +describes Josephine's alarm at this ill omen at a time when rumours +of a divorce were rife.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_204_204"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_204_204">[204]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Harbé-Marbois, "Hist. de Louisiana," quoted by H. Adams, +<i>op. cit.</i>, vol. ii., p. 27; Roloff, "Napoleon's Colonial +Politik."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_205_205"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_205_205">[205]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., ch. xxxiv. See too +Roederer, "Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 461, for Napoleon's expressions +after dinner on January 11th, 1803: "Maudit sucre, maudit +café, maudites colonies."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_206_206"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_206_206">[206]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Cornwallis, "Correspondence," vol. iii., despatch of December +3rd, 1801.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_207_207"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_207_207">[207]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See the valuable articles on General Decaen's papers in the +"Revue historique" of 1879 and of 1881.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_208_208"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_208_208">[208]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Dumas' "Précis des Événements Militaires," +vol. xi., p. 189. The version of these instructions presented by +Thiers, book xvi., is utterly misleading.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_209_209"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_209_209">[209]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Lord Whitworth, our ambassador in Paris, stated (despatch of +March 24th, 1803) that Decaen was to be quietly reinforced by +troops in French pay sent out by every French, Spanish, or Dutch +ship going to India, so as to avoid attracting notice. ("England +and Napoleon," edited by Oscar Browning, p. 137.)</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_210_210"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_210_210">[210]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See my article, "The French East India Expedition at the Cape," +and unpublished documents in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." of January, +1900. French designs on the Cape strengthened our resolve to +acquire it, as we prepared to do in the summer of 1805.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_211_211"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_211_211">[211]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Wellesley, "Despatches," vol. iii., Appendix, despatch of August +1st, 1803. See too Castlereagh's "Letters and Despatches," Second +Series, vol. i., pp. 166-176, for Lord Elgin's papers and others, +all of 1802, describing the utter weakness of Turkey, the +probability of Egypt falling to any invader, of Caucasia and Persia +being menaced by Russia, and the need of occupying Aden as a check +to any French designs on India from Suez.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_212_212"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_212_212">[212]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Wellesley's despatch of July 13th, 1804: with it he inclosed an +intercepted despatch, dated Pondicherry, August 6th, 1803, a +"Mémoire sur l'Importance actuelle de l'Inde et les moyens +les plus efficaces d'y rétablir la Nation Française +dans son ancienne splendeur." The writer, Lieutenant Lefebvre, set +forth the unpopularity of the British in India and the immense +wealth which France could gain from its conquest.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_213_213"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_213_213">[213]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>The report of the Imaum is given in Castlereagh's "Letters," +Second Series, vol. i., p. 203.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_214_214"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_214_214">[214]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Voyage de Découverte aux Terres Australes sur les +Corvettes, le Géographe et le Naturaliste," +rédigé par M.F. Péron (Paris, 1807-15). From +the Atlas the accompanying map has been copied.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_215_215"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_215_215">[215]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>His later mishaps may here be briefly recounted. Being compelled +to touch at the Ile de France for repairs to his ship, he was there +seized and detained as a spy by General Decaen, until the +chivalrous intercession of the French explorer, Bougainville, +finally availed to procure his release in the year 1810. The +conduct of Decaen was the more odious, as the French crews during +their stay at Sydney in the autumn of 1802, when the news of the +Peace of Amiens was as yet unknown, had received not only much help +in the repair of their ships, but most generous personal +attentions, officials and private persons at Sydney agreeing to put +themselves on short rations in that season of dearth in order that +the explorers might have food. Though this fact was brought to +Decaen's knowledge by the brother of Commodore Baudin, he none the +less refused to acknowledge the validity of the passport which +Flinders, as a geographical explorer, had received from the French +authorities, but detained him in captivity for seven years. For the +details see "A Voyage of Discovery to the Australian Isles," by +Captain Flinders (London, 1814), vol. ii., chs. vii.-ix. The names +given by Flinders on the coasts of Western and South Australia have +been retained owing to the priority of his investigation: but the +French names have been kept on the coast between the mouth of the +Murray and Bass Strait for the same reason.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_216_216"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_216_216">[216]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Baudin's letter to King of December 23rd, 1803, in vol. v. +(Appendix) of "Historical Records of New South Wales," and the +other important letters and despatches contained there, as also +<i>ibid</i>., pp. 133 and 376.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_217_217"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_217_217">[217]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Mr. Merry's ciphered despatch from Paris, May 7th, 1802.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_218_218"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_218_218">[218]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>It is impossible to enter into the complicated question of the +reconstruction of Germany effected in 1802-3. A general agreement +had been made at Rastadt that, as an indemnity for the losses of +German States in the conquest of the Rhineland by France, they +should receive the ecclesiastical lands of the old Empire. The +Imperial Diet appointed a delegation to consider the whole +question; but before this body assembled (on August 24th, 1802), a +number of treaties had been secretly made at Paris, with the +approval of Russia, which favoured Prussia and depressed Austria. +Austria received the archbishoprics of Trent and Brixen: while her +Archdukes (formerly of Tuscany and Modena) were installed in +Salzburg and Breisgau. Prussia, as the <i>protégé</i> +of France, gained Hildesheim, Paderborn, Erfurt, the city of +Münster, etc. Bavaria received Würzburg, Bamberg, +Augsburg, Passau, etc. See Garden, "Traités," vol. vii., ch. +xxxii.; "Annual Register" of 1802, pp. 648-665; Oncken, "Consulat +und Kaiserthum," vol. ii.; and Beer's "Zehn Jahre Oesterreichischer +Politik."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_219_219"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_219_219">[219]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>The British notes of April 28th and May 8th, 1803, again +demanded a suitable indemnity for the King of Sardinia.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_220_220"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_220_220">[220]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See his letters of January 28th, 1801, February 27th, March +10th, March 25th, April 10th, and May 16th, published in a work, +"Bonaparte, Talleyrand et Stapfer" (Zürich, 1869).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_221_221"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_221_221">[221]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Daendliker, "Geschichte der Schweiz," vol. iii., p. 418; +Muralt's "Reinhard," p. 55; and Stapfer's letter of April 28th: +"Malgré cette apparente neutralité que le +gouvernement français déclare vouloir observer pour +le moment, différentes circonstances me persuadent qu'il a +vu avec plaisir passer la direction des affaires des mains de la +majorité du Sénat [helvétique] dans celles de +la minorité du Petit Conseil."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_222_222"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_222_222">[222]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., p. 10. Mr. Merry, our +<i>chargé d'affaires</i> at Paris, reported July 21st; "M. +Stapfer makes a boast of having obtained the First Consul's consent +to withdraw the French troops entirely from Switzerland. I learn +from some well-disposed Swiss who are here that such a consent has +been given; but they consider it only as a measure calculated to +increase the disturbances in their country and to furnish a pretext +for the French to enter it again."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_223_223"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_223_223">[223]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Reding, in a pamphlet published shortly after this time, gave +full particulars of his interviews with Bonaparte at Paris, and +stated that he had fully approved of his (Reding's) federal plans. +Neither Bonaparte nor Talleyrand ever denied this.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_224_224"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_224_224">[224]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See "Paget Papers," vol. ii., despatches of October 29th, 1802, +and January 28th, 1803.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_225_225"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_225_225">[225]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Napoleon avowed this in his speech to the Swiss deputies at St. +Cloud, December 12th, 1802.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_226_226"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_226_226">[226]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Lord Hawkesbury's note of October 10th, 1802, the appeal of the +Swiss, and the reply of Mr. Moore from Constance, are printed in +full in the papers presented to Parliament, May 18th, 1803.</p> + +<p>The Duke of Orleans wrote from Twickenham a remarkable letter to +Pitt, dated October 18th, 1802, offering to go as leader to the +Swiss in the cause of Swiss and of European independence: "I am a +natural enemy to Bonaparte and to all similar +Governments....England and Austria can find in me all the +advantages of my being a French prince. Dispose of me, Sir, and +show me the way. I will follow it." See Stanhope's "Life of Pitt," +vol. iii., ch. xxxiii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_227_227"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_227_227">[227]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Roederer, "Œuvres," vol. iii., p. 454, for the curious +changes which Napoleon prescribed in the published reports of these +speeches; also Stapfer's despatch of February 3rd, 1803, which is +more trustworthy than the official version in Napoleon's +"Correspondance." This, however, contains the menacing sentence: +"It is recognized by Europe that Italy and Holland, as well as +Switzerland, are at the disposition of France."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_228_228"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_228_228">[228]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>It is only fair to say that they had recognized their mistake +and had recently promised equality of rights to the formerly +subject districts and to all classes. See Muralt's "Reinhard," p. +113.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_229_229"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_229_229">[229]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See, <i>inter alia</i>, the "Moniteur" of August 8th, October +9th, November 6th, 1802; of January 1st and 9th, February 19th, +1803.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_230_230"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_230_230">[230]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Lord Whitworth's despatches of February 28th and March 3rd, +1803, in Browning's "England and Napoleon."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_231_231"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_231_231">[231]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Secret instructions to Lord Whitworth, November 14th, 1802.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_232_232"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_232_232">[232]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Foreign Office Records," Russia, No. 50.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_233_233"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_233_233">[233]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>In his usually accurate "Manuel historique de Politique +Etrangère" (vol. ii., p. 238), M. Bourgeois states that in +May, 1802, Lord St. Helens succeeded in persuading the Czar +<i>not</i> to give his guarantee to the clause respecting Malta. +Every despatch that I have read runs exactly counter to this +statement: the fact is that the Czar took umbrage at the treaty and +refused to listen to our repeated requests for his guarantee. +Thiers rightly states that the British Ministry pressed the Czar to +give his guarantee, but that France long neglected to send her +application. Why this neglect if she wished to settle matters?</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_234_234"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_234_234">[234]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Castlereagh's "Letters and Despatches," Second Series, vol. i., +pp. 56 and 69; Dumas' "Evénements," ix. 91.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_235_235"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_235_235">[235]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Mémoire of Francis II. to Cobenzl (March 31st, 1801), in +Beer, "Die Orientalische Politik Oesterreichs," Appendix.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_236_236"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_236_236">[236]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Memoirs," vol. i., ch. xiii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_237_237"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_237_237">[237]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Ulmann's "Russisch-Preussische Politik, 1801-1806," pp. +10-12.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_238_238"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_238_238">[238]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Warren reported (December 10th, 1802) that Vorontzoff warned him +to be very careful as to the giving up of Malta; and, on January +19th, Czartoryski told him that "the Emperor wished the English to +keep Malta." Bonaparte had put in a claim for the Morea to +indemnify the Bourbons and the House of Savoy. ("F.O.," Russia, No. +51.)</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_239_239"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_239_239">[239]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Browning's "England and Napoleon," pp. 88-91.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_240_240"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_240_240">[240]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," France, No. 72.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_241_241"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_241_241">[241]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>We were undertaking that mediation. Lord Elgin's despatch from +Constantinople, January 15th, 1803, states that he had induced the +Porte to allow the Mamelukes to hold the province of Assouan. +(Turkey, No. 38.)</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_242_242"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_242_242">[242]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Papers presented to Parliament on May 18th, 1803. I pass over +the insults to General Stuart, as Sebastiani on February 2nd +recanted to Lord Whitworth everything he had said, or had been made +to say, on that topic, and mentioned Stuart "in terms of great +esteem." According to Méneval ("Mems.," vol i., ch. iii.), +Jaubert, who had been with Sebastiani, saw a proof of the report, +as printed for the "Moniteur," and advised the omission of the most +irritating passages; but Maret dared not take the responsibility +for making such omissions. Lucien Bonaparte ("Mems.," vol. ii., ch. +ix.) has another version—less credible, I think—that +Napoleon himself dictated the final draft of the report to +Sebastiani; and when the latter showed some hesitation, the First +Consul muttered, as the most irritating passages were read out: +"Parbleu, nous verrons si ceci—si cela—ne +décidera pas John Bull à guerroyer." Joseph was much +distressed about it, and exclaimed: "Ah, mon pauvre traité +d'Amiens! Il ne tient plus qu'à un fil."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_243_243"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_243_243">[243]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>So Adams's "Hist, of the U.S.," vol. ii., pp. 12-21.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_244_244"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_244_244">[244]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Miot de Melito, "Mems.," vol. i, ch. xv., quotes the words of +Joseph Bonaparte to him: "Let him [Napoleon] once more drench +Europe with blood in a war that he could have avoided, and which, +but for the outrageous mission on which he sent his Sebastiani, +would never have occurred."</p> + +<p>Talleyrand laboured hard to persuade Lord Whitworth that +Sebastiani's mission was "solely commercial": Napoleon, in his long +conversation with our ambassador, "did not affect to attribute it +to commercial motives only," but represented it as necessitated by +our infraction of the Treaty of Amiens. This excuse is as insincere +as the former. The instructions to Sebastiani were drawn up on +September 5th, 1802, when the British Ministry was about to fulfil +the terms of the treaty relative to Malta and was vainly pressing +Russia and Prussia for the guarantee of its independence</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_245_245"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_245_245">[245]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Despatch of February 21st.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_246_246"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_246_246">[246]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"View of the State of the Republic," read to the Corps +Législatif on February 21st, 1803.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_247_247"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_247_247">[247]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Papers presented to Parliament May 18th, 1803. See too Pitt's +speech, May 23rd, 1803.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_248_248"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_248_248">[248]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Russell's proclamation of July 22nd to the men of Antrim +that "he doubted not but the French were then fighting in +Scotland." ("Ann. Reg.," 1803, p. 246.) This document is ignored by +Plowden ("Hist. of Ireland, 1801-1810").</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_249_249"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_249_249">[49:]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Despatch of March 14th, 1803. Compare it with the very mild +version in Napoleon's "Corresp.," No. 6636.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_250_250"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_250_250">[250]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Lord Hawkesbury to General Andreossy, March 10th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_251_251"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_251_251">[251]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth, April 4th, 1803.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_252_252"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_252_252">[252]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Despatches of April 11th and 18th, 1803.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_253_253"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_253_253">[253]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Whitworth to Hawkesbury, April 23rd.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_254_254"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_254_254">[254]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Czartoryski ("Mems.," vol. i., ch. xiii.) calls him "an +excellent admiral but an indifferent diplomatist—a perfect +representative of the nullity and incapacity of the Addington +Ministry which had appointed him. The English Government was seldom +happy in its ambassadors." So Earl Minto's "Letters," vol. iii., p. +279.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_255_255"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_255_255">[255]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Lord Malmesbury's "Diaries" (vol. iv., p. 253) as to the bad +results of Whitworth's delay.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_256_256"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_256_256">[256]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Note of May 12th, 1803: see "England and Napoleon," p. 249.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_257_257"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_257_257">[257]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," vol. viii., No. 6743.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_258_258"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_258_258">[258]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Romilly's letter to Dumont, May 31st, 1803 ("Memoirs," vol. +i.).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_259_259"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_259_259">[259]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," November 3rd, 1802. In +his letter of May 3rd, 1803, to Lord Whitworth, M. Huber reports +Fouché's outspoken warning in the Senate to Bonaparte: "Vous +êtes vous-même, ainsi que nous, un résultat de +la révolution, et la guerre remet tout en problême. On +vous flatte en vous faisant compter sur les principes +révolutionnaires des autres nations: <i>le résultat +de notre révolution les a anéantis partout.</i>"</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_260_260"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_260_260">[260]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>A copy of this letter, with the detailed proposals, is in our +Foreign Office archives (Russia, No. 52).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_261_261"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_261_261">[261]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Bourgeois, "Manuel de Politique Etrangère," vol. ii., p. +243.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_262_262"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_262_262">[262]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Castlereagh's "Letters and Despatches," Second Series, vol. +i., pp. 75-82, as to the need of conciliating public opinion, even +by accepting Corfu as a set-off for Malta, provided a durable peace +could thus be secured.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_263_263"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_263_263">[263]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," August 21st, 1803.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_264_264"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_264_264">[264]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., p. 191.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_265_265"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_265_265">[265]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Holland was required to furnish 16,000 troops and maintain +18,000 French, to provide 10 ships of war and 350 gunboats.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_266_266"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_266_266">[266]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," May 23rd, 1803.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_267_267"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_267_267">[267]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Nelson's letters of July 2nd. See too Mahan's "Life of Nelson," +vol. ii., pp. 180-188, and Napoleon's letters of November 24th, +1803, encouraging the Mamelukes to look to France.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_268_268"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_268_268">[268]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Foreign Office Records," Sicily and Naples, No. 55, July +25th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_269_269"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_269_269">[269]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of July 28th, 1803.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_270_270"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_270_270">[270]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Nap. Corresp.," August 23rd, 1803, and Oncken, ch. v.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_271_271"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_271_271">[271]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," vol. viii., No. 6627.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_272_272"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_272_272">[272]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Lefebvre, "Cabinets de l'Europe," ch. viii.; "Nap. Corresp.," +vol. viii., Nos. 6979, 6985, 7007, 7098, 7113.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_273_273"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_273_273">[273]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>The French and Dutch ships in commission were: ships of the +line, 48; frigates, 37; corvettes, 22; gun-brigs, etc., 124; +flotilla, 2,115. (See "Mems. of the Earl of St. Vincent," vol. ii., +p. 218.)</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_274_274"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_274_274">[274]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Pellew's "Life of Lord Sidmouth," vol. ii., p. 239.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_275_275"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_275_275">[275]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Stanhope's "Life of Pitt," vol. iv., p. 213.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_276_276"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_276_276">[276]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Roederer, "OEuvres," vol. iii., p. 348; Méneval, vol. i., +ch. iv.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_277_277"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_277_277">[277]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Lucien ("Mems.," vol. iii., pp. 315-320) says at Malmaison; but +Napoleon's "Correspondance" shows that it was at St. Cloud. Masson +(" Nap. et sa Famille," ch. xii.) throws doubt on the story.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_278_278"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_278_278">[278]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p><i>Ibid</i>., p. 318. The scene was described by Murat: the real +phrase was <i>coquine</i>, but it was softened down by Murat to +<i>maîtresse</i>.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_279_279"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_279_279">[279]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Miot de Melito, "Mems.," vol. 1., ch. xv. Lucien settled in the +Papal States, where he, the quondam Jacobin and proven libertine, +later on received from the Pope the title of Prince de Canino.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_280_280"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_280_280">[280]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites de Napoléon," April 22nd, +1805.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_281_281"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_281_281">[281]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Pasquier, "Mems.," vol. i., p. 167, and Boulay de la Meurthe, +"Les dernières Années du duc d'Enghien," p. 299. An +intriguing royalist of Neufchâtel, Fauche-Borel, had been to +England in 1802 to get the help of the Addington Ministry, but +failed. See Caudrillier's articles in the "Revue Historique," Nov., +1900—March, 1901.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_282_282"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_282_282">[282]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Madelin's "Fouché," vol. i., p. 368, minimizes +Fouché's <i>rôle</i> here.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_283_283"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_283_283">[283]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Desmarest, "Témoignages historiques," pp. 78-82.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_284_284"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_284_284">[284]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Alliance des Jacobins de France avec le Ministère +Anglais."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_285_285"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_285_285">[285]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Brit. Mus., "Add. MSS.," Nos. 7976 <i>et seq</i>.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_286_286"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_286_286">[286]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>In our Records (France, No. 71) is a letter of Count Descars, +dated London, March 25th, 1805, to Lord Mulgrave, Minister for War, +rendering an account for various sums advanced by our Government +for the royalist "army."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_287_287"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_287_287">[287]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 96.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_288_288"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_288_288">[288]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Parl. Debates," April, 1804 (esp. April 16th). The official +denial is, of course, accepted by Alison, ch. xxxviii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_289_289"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_289_289">[289]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>The expression is that of George III., who further remarked that +all the ambassadors despised Hawkesbury. (Rose, "Diaries," vol. +ii., p. 157.) Windham's letter, dated Beaconsfield, August 16th, +1803, in the Puisaye Papers, warned the French +<i>émigrés</i> that they must not count on any aid +from Ministers, who had "at all times shown such feebleness of +spirit, that they can scarcely dare to lift their eyes to such aims +as you indicate. ("Add. MSS.," No. 7976.)</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_290_290"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_290_290">[290]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See in chapter xxi., p. 488. Our envoy, Spencer Smith, at +Stuttgart, was also taken in by a French spy, Captain Rosey, whose +actions were directed by Napoleon. See his letter (No. 7669).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_291_291"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_291_291">[291]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," Austria, No. 68 (October 31st, 1803).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_292_292"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_292_292">[292]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Lavalette, "Mems.," ch. xxiii.; "Georges Cadoudal," by Georges +de Cadoudal (Paris, 1887).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_293_293"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_293_293">[293]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See his letter of January 24th, 1804, to Réal, +instructing him to tell Méhée what falsehoods are to +find a place in Méhée's next bulletin to Drake! "Keep +on continually with the affair of my portfolio."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_294_294"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_294_294">[294]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Miot de Melito, vol. i., ch. xvi.; Pasquier, vol. i., ch. vii. +See also Desmarest, "Quinze ans de la haute police": his claim that +the police previously knew nothing of the plot is refuted by +Napoleon's letters (e.g., that of November 1st, 1803); as also by +Guilhermy, "Papiers d'un Emigré," p. 122.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_295_295"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_295_295">[295]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Ségur, "Mems.," ch. x. Bonaparte to Murat and Harel, +March 20th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_296_296"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_296_296">[296]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter to Réal, "Corresp.," No. 7639.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_297_297"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_297_297">[297]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>The original is in "F.O." (Austria, No. 68).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_298_298"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_298_298">[298]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Pasquier, "Mémoires," vol. i., p. 187.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_299_299"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_299_299">[299]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>The Comte de Mosbourg's notes in Count Murat's "Murat" (Paris, +1897), pp. 437-445, prove that Savary did not draw his instructions +for the execution of the duke merely from Murat, but from Bonaparte +himself, who must therefore be held solely responsible for the +composition and conduct of that court. Masson's attempt ("Nap. et +sa Famille," ch. xiv.) to inculpate Murat is very weak.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_300_300"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_300_300">[300]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Hulin in "Catastrophe du duc d'Enghien," p. 118.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_301_301"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_301_301">[301]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Dupin in "Catastrophe du duc d'Enghien," pp. 101, 123.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_302_302"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_302_302">[302]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>The only excuse which calls for notice here is that Napoleon at +the last moment, when urged by Joseph to be merciful, gave way, and +despatched orders late at night to Réal to repair to +Vincennes. Réal received some order, the exact purport of +which is unknown: it was late at night and he postponed going till +the morrow. On his way he met Savary, who came towards Paris +bringing the news of the duke's execution. Réal's first +words, on hearing this unexpected news, were: "How is that +possible? I had so many questions to put to the duke: his +examination might disclose so much. Another thing gone wrong; the +First Consul will be furious." These words were afterwards repeated +to Pasquier both by Savary and by Real: and, unless Pasquier lied, +the belated order sent to Réal was not a pardon (and +Napoleon on his last voyage said to Cockburn it was not), but +merely an order to extract such information from the duke as would +compromise other Frenchmen. Besides, if Napoleon had despatched an +order for the duke's <i>pardon</i>, why was not that order produced +as a sign of his innocence and Réal's blundering? Why did he +shut himself up in his private room on March 20th, so that even +Josephine had difficulty in gaining entrance? And if he really +desired to pardon the duke, how came it that when, at noon of March +21st, Réal explained that he arrived at Vincennes too late, +the only words that escaped Napoleon's lips were "C'est bien"? (See +Méneval, vol. i, p. 296.) Why also was his countenance the +only one that afterwards showed no remorse or grief? Caulaincourt, +when he heard the results of his raid into Baden, fainted with +horror, and when brought to by Bonaparte, overwhelmed him with +reproaches. Why also had the grave been dug beforehand? Why, +finally, were Savary and Réal not disgraced? No satisfactory +answer to these questions has ever been given. The "Catastrophe du +duc d'Enghien" and Count Boulay de la Meurthe's "Les +dernières Années du duc d'Enghien" and Napoleon's +"Correspondance" give all the documents needed for forming a +judgment on this case. The evidence is examined by Mr. Fay in "The +American Hist. Rev.," July and Oct., 1898. For the rewards to the +murderers see Masson, "Nap. et sa Famille," chap. xiii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_303_303"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_303_303">[303]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Ducasse, "Les Rois Frères de Nap.," p. 9.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_304_304"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_304_304">[304]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Miot de Melito; vol. ii., ch. i.; Pasquier, vol. i., ch. ix.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_305_305"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_305_305">[305]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>I cannot agree with M. Lanfrey, vol. ii., ch. xi., that the +Empire was not desired by the nation. It seems to me that this +writer here attributes to the apathetic masses his own unrivalled +acuteness of vision and enthusiasm for democracy. Lafayette well +sums up the situation in the remark that he was more shocked at the +submission of all than at the usurpation of one man ("Mems.," vol. +v., p. 239).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_306_306"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_306_306">[306]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Aulard, "Rév. Française," p. 772, for the +opposition.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_307_307"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_307_307">[307]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Roederer, "Œuvres," vol. iii., p. 513.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_308_308"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_308_308">[308]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Macdonald, "Souvenirs," ch. xii.; Ségur, "Mems.," ch. +vii. When Thiébault congratulated Masséna on his new +title, the veteran scoffingly replied: "Oh, there are fourteen of +us." (Thiébault, "Mems.," ch. vii., Eng. edit.) See too +Marmont ("Mems.," vol. ii., p. 227) on his own exclusion and the +inclusion of Bessières.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_309_309"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_309_309">[309]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Chaptal, "Souvenirs," p. 262. For Moreau's popularity see +Madelin's "Fouché," vol. i., p. 422.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_310_310"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_310_310">[310]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>At the next public audience Napoleon upbraided one of the +judges, Lecourbe, who had maintained that Moreau was innocent, and +thereafter deprived him of his judgeship. He also disgraced his +brother, General Lecourbe, and forbade his coming within forty +leagues of Paris. ("Lettres inédites de Napoléon," +August 22nd and 29th, 1805.)</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_311_311"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_311_311">[311]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Miot de Melito, vol ii., ch. i.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_312_312"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_312_312">[312]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Napoleon to Roederer, "Œuvres," vol. iii., p. 514.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_313_313"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_313_313">[313]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Lafayette, "Mems.," vol. v., p. 182.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_314_314"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_314_314">[314]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Mémoires de Savary, Duc de Rovigo." So Bourrienne, who +was informed by Rapp, who was present (vol. ii., ch. xxxiii.). The +"Moniteur" (4th Frimaire, Year XIII.) asserted that the Pope took +the right-hand seat; but I distrust its version.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_315_315"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_315_315">[315]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Mme. de Rémusat, vol. i., ch. x. As the +<i>curé</i> of the parish was not present, even as witness, +this new contract was held by the Bonapartes to lack full validity. +It is certain, however, that Fesch always maintained that the +marriage could only be annulled by an act of arbitrary authority. +For Napoleon's refusal to receive the communion on the morning of +the coronation, lest he, being what he was, should be guilty of +sacrilege and hypocrisy, see Ségur.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_316_316"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_316_316">[316]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Ségur, ch. xi.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_317_317"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_317_317">[317]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>F. Masson's "Joséphine, Impératrice et Reine," p. +229. For the Pitt diamond, see Yule's pamphlet and Sir M. Grant +Duff's "Diary," June 30, 1888.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_318_318"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_318_318">[318]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>De Bausset, "Court de Napoléon," ch. ii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_319_319"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_319_319">[319]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Foreign Office Records," Intelligences, No. 426.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_320_320"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_320_320">[320]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Life of Fulton," by Colden(1817); also one by Reigart +(1856).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_321_321"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_321_321">[321]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Jurien de la Gravière, "Guerres Maritimes," vol. ii., p. +75; Chevalier, "Hist. de la Marine Française," p. 105; Capt. +Desbrière's "Projets de Débarquement aux Iles +Britanniques," vol. i. The accompanying engraving shows how +fantastic were some of the earlier French schemes of invasion.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_322_322"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_322_322">[322]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Mémoires du Maréchal Ney," bk. vii., ch. i.; so +too Marmont, vol. ii., p. 213; Mahan, "Sea Power," ch. xv.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_323_323"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_323_323">[323]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Roederer, "OEuvres," vol. iii., p. 494.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_324_324"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_324_324">[324]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Colonel Campbell, our Commissioner at Elba, noted in his diary +(December 5th, 1814): "As I have perceived in many conversations, +Napoleon has no idea of the difficulties occasioned by winds and +tides, but judges of changes of position in the case of ships as he +would with regard to troops on land."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_325_325"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_325_325">[325]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Jurien de la Gravière, vol. ii., p. 88, who says: "His +mild and melancholy disposition, his sad and modest behaviour, ill +suited the Emperor's ambitious plans."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_326_326"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_326_326">[326]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," No. 8063. See too No. 7996 for Napoleon's plan of +carrying a howitzer in the bows of his gun vessels so that his +projectiles might <i>burst in the wood</i>. Already at Boulogne he +had uttered the prophetic words: "We must have shells that will +shiver the wooden sides of ships."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_327_327"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_327_327">[327]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>James, "Naval History," vol. iii., p. 213, and Chevalier, p. +115, imply that Villeneuve's fleet from Toulon, after scouring the +West Indies, was to rally the Rochefort force and cover the +Boulogne flotilla: but this finds no place in Napoleon's September +plan, which required Gantheaume first to land troops in Ireland and +then convoy the flotilla across if the weather were favourable, or +if it were stormy to beat down the Channel with the troops from +Holland. See O'Connor Morris, "Campaigns of Nelson," p. 121.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_328_328"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_328_328">[328]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Colomb, "Naval Warfare," p. 18.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_329_329"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_329_329">[329]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Jurien de la Gravière, vol. ii., p. 100. Nelson was aware +of the fallacies that crowded Napoleon's brain: "Bonaparte has +often made his boast that our fleet would be worn out by keeping +the sea, and that his was kept in order and increasing by staying +in port; but he now finds, I fancy, if emperors hear truth, that +his fleet suffers more in a night than ours in one +year."—Nelson to Collingwood, March 13th, 1805.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_330_330"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_330_330">[330]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 276-290; also Capt. +Mahan, "Influence of Sea Power, etc.," vol. ii., ch. xv. <i>ad +fin</i>. He quotes the opinion of a Spanish historian, Don +José de Couto: "If all the circumstances are properly +weighed ... we shall see that all the charges made against England +for the seizure of the frigates may be reduced to want of proper +foresight in the strength of the force detailed to effect +it."—In the Admiralty secret letters (1804-16) I have found +the instructions to Sir J. Orde, with the Swiftsure, Polyphemus, +Agamemnon, Ruby, Defence, Lively, and two sloops, to seize the +treasure-ships. No fight seems to have been expected.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_331_331"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_331_331">[331]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," No. 8379; Mahan, <i>ibid</i>., vol. ii., p. 149.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_332_332"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_332_332">[332]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of April 29th, 1805. I cannot agree with Mahan (p. 155) +that this was intended only to distract us.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_333_333"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_333_333">[333]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," p. 121.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_334_334"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_334_334">[334]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Jurien de la Gravière, vol. ii., p. 367.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_335_335"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_335_335">[335]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiers writes, most disingenuously, as though Napoleon's letters +of August 13th and 22nd could have influenced Villeneuve.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_336_336"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_336_336">[336]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Dupin, "Voyages dans la Grande Bretagne" (tome i., p. 244), who +had the facts from Daru. But, as Méneval sensibly says +("Mems.," vol. i., ch. v.), it was not Napoleon's habit +dramatically to dictate his plans so far in advance. Certainly, +<i>in military matters,</i> he always kept his imagination +subservient to facts. Not until September 22nd, did he make any +written official notes on the final moves of his chief corps; +besides, the Austrians did not cross the Inn till September +8th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_337_337"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_337_337">[337]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Diary of General Bingham, in "Blackwood's Magazine," October, +1896. The accompanying medal, on the reverse of which are the words +"frappée à Londres, en 1804," affords another proof +of his intentions.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_338_338"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_338_338">[338]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>Marbot, "Mems.," ch. xix; Fouché, "Mems.," part 1; Miot +de Melito, "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. i.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_339_339"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_339_339">[339]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>See Nelson's letters of August 25th, 1803, and May 1st, 1804; +also Collingwood's of July 21st, 1805.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Footnote_340_340"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor_340_340">[340]</a> +<div class="note"> +<p>In "F.O.," France, No. 71, is a report of a spy on the interview +of Napoleon with O'Connor, whom he made General of Division. See +Appendix, p. 510.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<br> + +<b>FOOTNOTES TO VOLUME II</b> + +<a name="Foot2note_1_1"></a><a href="#FN2anchor1_1">[1]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Armfeldt to Drake, December 24th, 1803 ("F.O.," Bavaria, No. +27).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_2_2"></a><a href="#FN2anchor2_2">[2]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Drake's despatch of December 15th, 1803, <i>ib</i>.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_3_3"></a><a href="#FN2anchor3_3">[3]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Czartoryski, "Memoirs," vol. ii., ch. ii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_4_4"></a><a href="#FN2anchor4_4">[4]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>The Czar's complaints were: the exile of the King of Sardinia, +the re-occupation of S. Italy by the French, the changes in Italy, +the violation of the neutrality of Baden, the occupation of +Cuxhaven by the French, and the levying of ransom from the Hanse +Towns to escape the same fate ("F.O.," Russia, No. 56).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_5_5"></a><a href="#FN2anchor5_5">[5]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lord Harrowby to Admiral Warren ("F.O.," Russia, No. 56).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_6_6"></a><a href="#FN2anchor6_6">[6]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Garden, "Traités" vol. viii., p. 302; Ulmann, +"Russisch-Preussische Politik," p. 117</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_7_7"></a><a href="#FN2anchor7_7">[7]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See the letter in the "Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 170.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_8_8"></a><a href="#FN2anchor8_8">[8]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," Russia, No. 55. See note on p. 28.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_9_9"></a><a href="#FN2anchor9_9">[9]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Czartoryski's "Mems.," vol. ii., chs. ii.-iv.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_10_10"></a><a href="#FN2anchor10_10">[10]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites de Napoléon" (May 30th, +1805).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_11_11"></a><a href="#FN2anchor11_11">[11]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See Novossiltzoff's Report in Czartoryski's "Memoirs," vol. ii., +ch. iv., and Pitt's note developing the Russian proposals in +Garden's "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 317-323, or Alison, App. +to ch. xxxix. A comparison of these two memoranda will show that on +Continental questions there was no difference such as Thiers +affected to see between the generous policy of Russia and the "cold +egotism" of Pitt. As Czartoryski has proved in his "Memoirs" (vol. +ii., ch. x.) Thiers has erred in assigning importance to a mere +first draft of a conversation which Czartoryski had with that +ingenious schemer, the Abbé Piatoli. The official proposals +sent from St. Petersburg to London were very different; +<i>e.g.</i>, the proposal of Alexander with regard to the French +frontiers was this: "The first object is to bring back France into +its ancient limits or such other ones as might appear most suitable +to the general tranquillity of Europe." It is, therefore, futile to +state that this was solely the policy of Pitt after he had +"remodelled" the Russian proposals.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_12_12"></a><a href="#FN2anchor12_12">[12]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," No. 8231. See too Bourrienne, Miot de Melito, vol. +ii., ch. iv., and Thiers, bk. xxi.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_13_13"></a><a href="#FN2anchor13_13">[13]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>This refusal has been severely criticised. But the knowledge of +the British Government that Napoleon was still persevering with his +schemes against Turkey, and that the Russians themselves, from +their station at Corfu, were working to gain a foothold on the +Albanian coast, surely prescribed caution ("F.O.," Russia, Nos. 55 +and 56, despatches of June 26th and October 10th, 1804). It was +further known that the Austrian Government had proposed to the Czar +plans that were hostile to Turkey, and were not decisively rejected +at St. Petersburg; and it is clear from the notes left by +Czartoryski that the prospect of gaining Corfu, Moldavia, parts of +Albania, and the precious prize of Constantinople was kept in view. +Pitt agreed to restore the conquests made from France (Despatch of +April 22nd).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_14_14"></a><a href="#FN2anchor14_14">[14]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 328-333. It is clear +that Gustavus IV. was the ruler who insisted on making the +restoration of the Bourbons the chief aim of the Third Coalition. +In our "F.O. Records" (Sweden, No. 177) is an account (August 20th, +1804) of a conversation of Lord Harrowby with the Swedish +ambassador, who stated that such a declaration would "palsy the +arms of France." Our Foreign Minister replied that it would "much +more certainly palsy the arms of England: that we made war because +France was become too powerful for the peace of Europe."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_15_15"></a><a href="#FN2anchor15_15">[15]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," No. 8329.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_16_16"></a><a href="#FN2anchor16_16">[16]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bailleu, "Preussen und Frankreich," vol. ii., p. 354.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_17_17"></a><a href="#FN2anchor17_17">[17]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiers (bk. xxi.) gives the whole text.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_18_18"></a><a href="#FN2anchor18_18">[18]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>The annexation of the Ligurian or Genoese Republic took place on +June 4th, the way having been prepared there by Napoleon's former +patron, Salicetti, who liberally dispensed bribes. A little later +the Republic of Lucca was bestowed on Elisa Bonaparte and her +spouse, now named Prince Bacciochi. Parma, hitherto administered by +a French governor, was incorporated in the French Empire about the +same time.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_19_19"></a><a href="#FN2anchor19_19">[19]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Paget to Lord Mulgrave (March 19th, 1805).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_20_20"></a><a href="#FN2anchor20_20">[20]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Beer, "Zehn Jahre oesterreich. Politik (1801-1810)." The notes +of Novossiltzoff and Hardenberg are printed in Sir G. Jackson's +"Diaries," vol i., App.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_21_21"></a><a href="#FN2anchor21_21">[21]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See Bignon, vol. iv., pp. 271 and 334. Probably Napoleon knew +through Laforest and Talleyrand that Russia had recently urged that +George III. should offer Hanover to Prussia. Pitt rejected the +proposal. Prussia paid more heed to the offer of Hanover from +Napoleon than to the suggestions of Czartoryski that she might +receive it from its rightful owner, George III. Yet Duroc did not +succeed in gaining more from Frederick William than the promise of +his neutrality (see Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., pp. +339-346). Sweden was not a member of the Coalition, but made +treaties with Russia and England.</p> + +<p>The high hopes nursed by the Pitt Ministry are seen in the +following estimate of the forces that would be launched against +France: Austria, 250,000; Russia, 180,000; Prussia, 100,000 (Pitt +then refused to subsidize more than 100,000); Sweden, 16,000; +Saxony, 16,000; Hesse and Brunswick, 16,000; Mecklenburg, 3,000; +King of Sardinia, 25,000; Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden, +25,000; Naples, 20,000. In a P.S. he adds that the support of the +King of Sardinia would not be needed, and that England had private +arrangements with Naples as to subsidies. This Memoir is not dated, +but it must belong to the beginning of September, before the +defection of Bavaria was known ("F.O.," Prussia, No. 70).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_22_22"></a><a href="#FN2anchor22_22">[22]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," Russia, No. 57; Gower's note of July 22nd, 1805.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_23_23"></a><a href="#FN2anchor23_23">[23]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Colonel Graham's despatches, which undoubtedly influenced the +Pitt Ministry in favouring the appointment of Mack to the present +command. Paget ("Papers," vol. ii., p. 238) states that the Iller +position was decided on by Francis. The best analysis of Mack's +character is in Bernhardi's "Memoirs of Count Toll" (vol. i., p. +121). The State Papers are in Burke's "Campaign of 1805," App.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_24_24"></a><a href="#FN2anchor24_24">[24]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Marmont, "Mems.," vol. ii., p. 310.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_25_25"></a><a href="#FN2anchor25_25">[25]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See "Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 224; also Schönhals "Der +Krieg 1805 in Deutschland," p. 67.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_26_26"></a><a href="#FN2anchor26_26">[26]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," No. 9249. See too No. 9254 for the details of the +enveloping moves which Napoleon then (September 22nd) accurately +planned twenty-five days before the final blows were dealt: yet No. +9299 shows that, even on September 30th, he believed Mack would +hurry back to the Inn. Beer, p. 145.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_27_27"></a><a href="#FN2anchor27_27">[27]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Rüstow, "Der Krieg 1805." Hormayr, "Geschichte Hofers" +(vol. i., p. 96), states that, in framing with Russia the plan of +campaign, the Austrians forgot to allow for the difference (twelve +days) between the Russian and Gregorian calendars. The Russians +certainly were eleven days late.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_28_28"></a><a href="#FN2anchor28_28">[28]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," No 9319; Sir G. Jackson's "Diaries," vol. i., p. +334.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_29_29"></a><a href="#FN2anchor29_29">[29]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p><i>Ibid</i>.; also Metternich, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. iii. For +Prussia's protest to Napoleon, which pulverized the French excuses, +see Garden, vol. ix., p. 69.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_30_30"></a><a href="#FN2anchor30_30">[30]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Schönhals; Ségur, ch. xvi., exculpates Murat and +Ney.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_31_31"></a><a href="#FN2anchor31_31">[31]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Schönhals, p. 73. Thiers states that Dupont's 6,000 gained +a victory over 25,000 Austrians detached from the 60,000 who +occupied Ulm!</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_32_32"></a><a href="#FN2anchor32_32">[32]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Marmont, vol. ii., p. 320; Lejeune, "Memoirs," vol. i., ch. +iii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_33_33"></a><a href="#FN2anchor33_33">[33]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiers, bk. xxii. During Mack's interview with Napoleon (see +"Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 235), when the Emperor asked him why +he did not cut his way through to Ansbach, he replied, "Prussia +would have declared against us." To which the Emperor retorted: +"Ah! the Prussians do not declare so quickly."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_34_34"></a><a href="#FN2anchor34_34">[34]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Alexandre I et Czartoryski," pp. 32-34.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_35_35"></a><a href="#FN2anchor35_35">[35]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See these terms compared with the Anglo-Russian treaty of April +11th, 1805, in the Appendix of Dr. Hansing's "Hardenberg und die +dritte Coalition" (Berlin, 1899).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_36_36"></a><a href="#FN2anchor36_36">[36]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Häusser, vol. ii., p. 617 (4th. edit.); Lettow-Vorbeck, +"Der Krieg von 1806-1807," vol. i., <i>ad init</i>.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_37_37"></a><a href="#FN2anchor37_37">[37]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>For the much more venial stratagem which Kutusoff played on +Murat at Hollabrunn, see Thiers, bk. xxiii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_38_38"></a><a href="#FN2anchor38_38">[38]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lord Harrowby, then on a special mission to Berlin, reports +(November 24th) that this appeal of the Czar had been "coolly +received," and no Prussian troops would enter Bohemia until it was +known how Prussia's envoy to Napoleon, Count Haugwitz, had been +received.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_39_39"></a><a href="#FN2anchor39_39">[39]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiers says December 1st, which is corrected by Napoleon's +letter of November 30th to Talleyrand.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_40_40"></a><a href="#FN2anchor40_40">[40]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiébault, vol. ii., ch. viii.; Ségur, ch. xviii.; +York von Wartenburg, "Nap. als Feldherr," vol. i., p. 230.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_41_41"></a><a href="#FN2anchor41_41">[41]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Davoust's reports of December 2nd and 5th in his "Corresp."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_42_42"></a><a href="#FN2anchor42_42">[42]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Ségur, Thiébault, and Lejeune all state that +Napoleon in the previous advance northwards had foretold that a +great battle would soon be fought opposite Austerlitz, and +explained how he would fight it.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_43_43"></a><a href="#FN2anchor43_43">[43]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiébault wrongly attributes this succour to Lannes: for +that Marshal, who had just insulted and challenged Soult, +Thiébault had a manifest partiality. Savary, though hostile +to Bernadotte, gives him bare justice on this move.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_44_44"></a><a href="#FN2anchor44_44">[44]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Harrowby evidently thought that Prussia's conduct would depend +on events. Just before the news of Austerlitz arrived, he wrote to +Downing Street: "The eyes of this Government are turned almost +exclusively on Moravia. It is there the fate of this negotiation +must be decided." Yet he reports that 192,000 Prussians are under +arms ("F.O.," Prussia, No. 70).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_45_45"></a><a href="#FN2anchor45_45">[45]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Jackson, "Diaries," vol. i., p. 137.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_46_46"></a><a href="#FN2anchor46_46">[46]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," pp. 205-208.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_47_47"></a><a href="#FN2anchor47_47">[47]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Metternich, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. iii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_48_48"></a><a href="#FN2anchor48_48">[48]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Hanover, along with a few districts of Bavarian Franconia, would +bring to Prussia a gain of 989,000 inhabitants, while she would +lose only 375,000. Neufchâtel had offered itself to Frederick +I. of Prussia in 1688, and its proposed barter to France troubled +Hardenberg ("Mems.," vol. ii., p. 421).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_49_49"></a><a href="#FN2anchor49_49">[49]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Gower to Lord Harrowby from Olmütz, November 25th, in "F.O. +Records," Russia, No. 59.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_50_50"></a><a href="#FN2anchor50_50">[50]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites de Tall.," p. 216.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_51_51"></a><a href="#FN2anchor51_51">[51]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Printed for the first time in full in "Lettres inédites +de Tall.," pp. 156-174. On December 5th Talleyrand again begged +Napoleon to strengthen Austria as "a needful bulwark against the +barbarians, the Russians."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_52_52"></a><a href="#FN2anchor52_52">[52]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>I dissent, though with much diffidence, from M. Vandal +("Napoléon et Alexandre," vol. i., p. 9) in regard to +Talleyrand's proposal.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_53_53"></a><a href="#FN2anchor53_53">[53]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Napoleon to Talleyrand (December 14th, 1805): "Sûr de la +Prusse, l'Autriche en passera par où je voudrai. Je ferai +également prononcer la Prusse contre l'Angleterre."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_54_54"></a><a href="#FN2anchor54_54">[54]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Report of M. Otto, August, 1799.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_55_55"></a><a href="#FN2anchor55_55">[55]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Czartoryski ("Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xii.) states that England +offered Holland to Prussia. I find no proof of this in our Records. +The districts between Antwerp and Cleves are Belgian, not Dutch; +and we never wavered in our support of the House of Orange.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_56_56"></a><a href="#FN2anchor56_56">[56]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>These proposals, dated October 27th, 1805, were modified +somewhat on the news of Mack's disaster and the Treaty of Potsdam. +Hardenberg assured Harrowby (November 24th) that, despite England's +liberal pecuniary help, Frederick William felt great difficulty in +assenting to the proposed territorial arrangements ("F.O.," +Prussia, No. 70).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_57_57"></a><a href="#FN2anchor57_57">[57]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Hardenberg's "Memoirs," vol. ii., pp. 377, 382.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_58_58"></a><a href="#FN2anchor58_58">[58]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Ompteda, p. 188. The army returned in February, 1806.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_59_59"></a><a href="#FN2anchor59_59">[59]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," Prussia, No. 70 (November 23rd).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_60_60"></a><a href="#FN2anchor60_60">[60]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Diaries of Right Hon. G. Rose," vol. ii., pp. 223-224.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_61_61"></a><a href="#FN2anchor61_61">[61]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p><i>Ib.</i>, pp. 233-283; Rosebery, "Life of Pitt," p. 258.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_62_62"></a><a href="#FN2anchor62_62">[62]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lord Malmesbury's "Diary," vol. iv., p. 114.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_63_63"></a><a href="#FN2anchor63_63">[63]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of December 27th, 1805; Jackson, "Diaries," vol. ii., p. +387.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_64_64"></a><a href="#FN2anchor64_64">[64]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Mollien, "Mems.," vol. i. <i>ad fin</i>., and vol. ii., p. 80, +for the budget of 1806; also, Fiévée, "Mes Relations +avec Bonaparte," vol. ii., pp. 180-203.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_65_65"></a><a href="#FN2anchor65_65">[65]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>The Court of Naples asserted that in the Convention with France +its ambassador, the Comte de Gallo, exceeded his powers in +promising neutrality. See Lucchesini's conversation with Gentz, +quoted by Garden, "Traités," vol. x., p. 129.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_66_66"></a><a href="#FN2anchor66_66">[66]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See my article in the "Eng. Hist. Rev.," April, 1900.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_67_67"></a><a href="#FN2anchor67_67">[67]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Ducasse, "Les Rois Frères de Napoléon," p. 11.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_68_68"></a><a href="#FN2anchor68_68">[68]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of February 7th, 1806. On the same day he blames Junot, +then commander of Parma, for too great lenience to some rebels near +that city. The Italians were a false people, who only respected a +strong Government. Let him, then, burn two large villages so that +no trace remained, shoot the priest of one village, and send three +or four hundred of the guilty to the galleys. "Trust my old +experience of the Italians."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_69_69"></a><a href="#FN2anchor69_69">[69]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>For a list of the chief Napoleonic titles, see Appendix, <i>ad +fin</i>.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_70_70"></a><a href="#FN2anchor70_70">[70]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>January 2nd, 1802; so too Fiévée, "Mes Relations +avec Bonaparte," vol. ii., p. 210, who notes that, by founding an +order of nobility, Napoleon ended his own isolation and attached to +his interests a powerful landed caste.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_71_71"></a><a href="#FN2anchor71_71">[71]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Hardenberg's "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 390-394.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_72_72"></a><a href="#FN2anchor72_72">[72]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Hardenberg to Harrowby on January 7th, "Prussia," No. 70.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_73_73"></a><a href="#FN2anchor73_73">[73]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>I have not found a copy of this project; but in "Prussia," No. +70 (forwarded by Jackson on January 27th, 1806), there is a +detailed "Mémoire explicatif," whence I extract these +details, as yet unpublished, I believe. Neither Hardenberg, Garden, +Jackson, nor Paget mentions them.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_74_74"></a><a href="#FN2anchor74_74">[74]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Records, "Prussia," No. 70, dated February 21st.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_75_75"></a><a href="#FN2anchor75_75">[75]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Hardenberg, "Mems.," vol. ii., pp. 463-469; "Nap. Corresp.," No. +9742, for Napoleon's thoughts as to peace, when he heard of Fox +being our Foreign Minister.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_76_76"></a><a href="#FN2anchor76_76">[76]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See "Nap. Corresp.," Nos. 9742, 9773, 9777, for his views as to +the weakness of England and Prussia. This treaty of February 15th, +1806, confirmed the cession of Neufchâtel and Cleves to +France, and of Ansbach to Bavaria; but did not cede any Franconian +districts to Prussia's Baireuth lands. See Hardenberg, +"Mémoires," vol. ii., p. 483, for the text of the +treaty.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_77_77"></a><a href="#FN2anchor77_77">[77]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>The strange perversity of Haugwitz is nowhere more shown than in +his self-congratulation at the omission of the adjectives +<i>offensive et défensive</i> from the new treaty of +alliance between France and Prussia (Hardenberg, vol. ii., p. 481). +Napoleon was now not pledged to help Prussia in the war which +George III. declared against her on April 20th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_78_78"></a><a href="#FN2anchor78_78">[78]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>It is noteworthy that in all the negotiations that followed, +Napoleon never raised any question about our exacting maritime +code, which proves how hollow were his diatribes against the tyrant +of the seas at other times.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_79_79"></a><a href="#FN2anchor79_79">[79]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Despatch of April 20th, 1806, in Papers presented to Parliament +on December 22nd, 1806.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_80_80"></a><a href="#FN2anchor80_80">[80]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Czartoryski's "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xiii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_81_81"></a><a href="#FN2anchor81_81">[81]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"I do not intend the Court of Rome to mix any more in politics" +(Nap. to the Pope, February 13th, 1806).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_82_82"></a><a href="#FN2anchor82_82">[82]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>I translate literally these N.B.'s as pasted in at the end of +Yarmouth's Memoir of July 8th ("France," No. 73). As Oubril's +instructions have never, I believe, been published, the passage +given above is somewhat important as proving how completely he +exceeded his powers in bartering away Sicily. The text of the +Oubril Treaty is given by De Clercq, vol. ii., p. 180. The secret +articles required Russia to help France in inducing the Court of +Madrid to cede the Balearic Isles to the Prince Royal of Naples; +the dethroned King and Queen were not to reside there, and Russia +was to recognize Joseph Bonaparte as King of the Two Sicilies.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_83_83"></a><a href="#FN2anchor83_83">[83]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>In conversing with our ambassador, Mr. Stuart, Baron Budberg +excused Oubril's conduct on the ground of his nervousness under the +threats of the French plenipotentiary, General Clarke, who scarcely +let him speak, and darkly hinted at many other changes that must +ensue if Russia did not make peace; Switzerland was to be annexed, +Germany overrun, and Turkey partitioned. That Clarke was a master +in diplomatic hectoring is well known; but, from private inquiries, +Stuart discovered that the Czar, in his private conference with +Oubril, seemed more inclined towards peace than Czartoryski: when +therefore the latter resigned, Oubril might well give way before +Clarke's bluster. (Stuart's Despatch of August 9th, 1806, F.O., +Russia, No. 63; also see Czartoryski's "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xiv.; +and Martens, "Traités," Suppl. vol. iv.)</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_84_84"></a><a href="#FN2anchor84_84">[84]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Memoirs of Karl Heinrich, Knight of Lang."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_85_85"></a><a href="#FN2anchor85_85">[85]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Garden, vol. ix., pp. 157, 189, 255.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_86_86"></a><a href="#FN2anchor86_86">[86]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," Nos. 10522 and 10544. For a French account see the +"Mems." of Baron Desvernois, p. 288.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_87_87"></a><a href="#FN2anchor87_87">[87]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O. Records," Naples, No. 73.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_88_88"></a><a href="#FN2anchor88_88">[88]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>This was on Napoleon's advice. He wrote to Talleyrand from +Rambouillet on August 18th, to give as an excuse for the delay, +"The Emperor is hunting and will not be back before the end of the +week."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_89_89"></a><a href="#FN2anchor89_89">[89]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>So too Napoleon said at St. Helena to Las Cases: "Fox's death +was one of the fatalities of my career."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_90_90"></a><a href="#FN2anchor90_90">[90]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Despatches of September 26th and October 6th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_91_91"></a><a href="#FN2anchor91_91">[91]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bailleu, "Frankreich und Preussen," Introd.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_92_92"></a><a href="#FN2anchor92_92">[92]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Decree of July 26th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_93_93"></a><a href="#FN2anchor93_93">[93]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See "Corresp." No. 10604, note; also Talleyrand's letter of +August 4th ("Lettres inédites," p. 245), showing the +indemnities that might be offered to Prussia after the loss of +Hanover: they included, of course, little States, Anhalt, Lippe, +Waldeck, etc.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_94_94"></a><a href="#FN2anchor94_94">[94]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Gentz, "Ausgew. Schriften," vol. v., p. 252. Conversation with +Lucchesini.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_95_95"></a><a href="#FN2anchor95_95">[95]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," Nos. 10575, 10587, 10633.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_96_96"></a><a href="#FN2anchor96_96">[96]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Mems.," vol. iii., pp. 115, <i>et seq.</i> The Prusso-Russian +convention of July, by which these Powers mutually guaranteed the +integrity of their States, was mainly the work of Hardenberg.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_97_97"></a><a href="#FN2anchor97_97">[97]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bailleu, pp. 540-552. See too Fournier's "Napoleon," vol. ii., +p. 106.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_98_98"></a><a href="#FN2anchor98_98">[98]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bailleu, pp. 556-557. So too Napoleon's letter of September 5th +to Berthier is the first hint of his thought of a Continental +war.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_99_99"></a><a href="#FN2anchor99_99">[99]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Queen Louisa said to Gentz (October 9th) that war had been +decided on, not owing to selfish calculations, but the sentiment of +honour (Garden, "Traités," vol. x., p. 133).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_100_100"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor100_100">[100]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>A memorial was handed in to him on September 2nd. It was signed +by the King's brothers, Henry and William, also by the leader of +the warlike party, Prince Louis Ferdinand, by Generals Rüchel +and Phull, and by the future dictator, Stein. The King rebuked all +of them. See Pertz, "Stein," vol. i., p. 347.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_101_101"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor101_101">[101]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," Russia, No. 64. Stuart's despatches of September 30th +and October 21st.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_102_102"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor102_102">[102]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Müffling, "Aus meinem Leben."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_103_103"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor103_103">[103]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lettow-Vorbeck, "Der Krieg von 1806-7," p. 163.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_104_104"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor104_104">[104]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See Prince Hohenlohe's "Letters on Strategy" (p. 62, Eng. ed.) +for the effect of this rapid marching; Foucart's "Campagne de +Prusse," vol. i., pp. 323-343; also Lord Fitzmaurice's "Duke of +Brunswick."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_105_105"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor105_105">[105]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Höpfner, vol. i.p. 383; and Lettow-Vorbeck, vol. i., p. +345.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_106_106"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor106_106">[106]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Foucart, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 606-623.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_107_107"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor107_107">[107]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Marbot says Rüchel was killed: but he recovered from his +wound, and did good service the next spring.</p> + +<p>Vernet's picture of Napoleon inspecting his Guards at Jena +before their charge seems to represent the well-known incident of a +soldier calling out "<i>en avant</i>"; whereupon Napoleon sharply +turned and bade the man wait till he had commanded in twenty +battles before he gave him advice.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_108_108"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor108_108">[108]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Foucart, p. 671.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_109_109"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor109_109">[109]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lang thus describes four French Marshals whom he saw at Ansbach: +"Bernadotte, a very tall dark man, with fiery eyes under thick +brows; Mortier, still taller, with a stupid sentinel look; +Lefebvre, an old Alsatian camp-boy, with his wife, former +washerwoman to the regiment; and Davoust, a little smooth-pated, +unpretending man, who was never tired of waltzing."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_110_110"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor110_110">[110]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Davoust, "Opérations du 3'me Corps," pp. 31-32. French +writers reduce their force to 24,000, and raise Brunswick's total +to 60,000. Lehmann's "Scharnhorst," vol. i., p. 433, gives the +details.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_111_111"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor111_111">[111]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Foucart, pp. 604-606, 670, and 694-697, who only blames him for +slowness. But he set out from Naumburg before dawn, and, though +delayed by difficult tracks, was near Apolda at 4 p.m., and took +1,000 prisoners.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_112_112"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor112_112">[112]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>For this service, as for his exploits at Austerlitz, Napoleon +gave few words of praise. Lannes' remonstrance is printed by +General Thoumas, "Le Maréchal Lannes," p. 169. The Emperor +secretly disliked Lannes for his very independent bearing.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_113_113"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor113_113">[113]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Nap. Corresp.," November 21st, 1807; Baron Lumbroso's +"Napoleone I e l'Inghilterra," p. 103; Garden, vol. x., p. 307.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_114_114"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor114_114">[114]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>This decree, of 10 Brumaire, an V, is printed in full, and +commented on by Lumbroso, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 49. See too Sorel, +"L'Europe et la Rév. Fr.," vol. iii., p. 389; and my +article, "Napoleon and English Commerce," in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." +of October, 1893.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_115_115"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor115_115">[115]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>This phrase occurs, I believe, first in the conversation of +Napoleon on May 1st, 1803: "We will form a more complete +coast-system, and England shall end by shedding tears of blood" +(Miot de Melito, "Mems.," vol. i., chap. xiv.).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_116_116"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor116_116">[116]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p><i>E.g.</i>, Fauchille, "Du Blocus maritime," pp. 93 <i>et +seq.</i></p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_117_117"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor117_117">[117]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See especially the pamphlet "War in Disguise, or the Frauds of +the Neutral Flags" (1805), by J. Stephen. It has been said that +this pamphlet was a cause of the Orders in Council. The whole +question is discussed by Manning, "Commentaries on the Law of +Nations" (1875); Lawrence, "International Law"; Mahan, "Infl. of +Sea Power," vol. ii., pp. 274-277; Mollien, vol. iii., p. 289 +(first edit.); and Chaptal, p. 275.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_118_118"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor118_118">[118]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Hausser, vol. iii., p. 61 (4th edit.). The Saxon federal +contingent was fixed at 20,000 men.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_119_119"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor119_119">[119]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Papers presented to Parliament, December 22nd, 1806.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_120_120"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor120_120">[120]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>After the interview of November 28th, 1801, Cornwallis reports +that Napoleon "expressed a wish that we could agree to remove +disaffected persons from either country ... and declared his +willingness to send away United Irishmen" ("F.O. Records," No. +615).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_121_121"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor121_121">[121]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Czartoryski, "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xv.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_122_122"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor122_122">[122]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>In our "F.O. Records," Prussia, No. 74, is a report of +Napoleon's reply to a deputation at Warsaw (January, 1807): "I warn +you that neither I nor any French prince cares for your Polish +throne: I have crowns to give and don't know what to do with them. +You must first of all think of giving bread to my +soldiers—'Bread, bread, bread.' ... I cannot support my +troops in this country, where there is no one besides nobles and +miserable peasants. Where are your great families? They are all +sold to Russia. It is Czartoryski who wrote to Kosciusko not to +come back to Poland." And when a Galician deputy asked him of the +fate of his province, he turned on him: "Do you think that I will +draw on myself new foes for one province." Nevertheless, the +enthusiasm of the Poles was not wholly chilled. Their contingents +did good service for him. Somewhat later, female devotion brought a +beautiful young Polish lady to act as his mistress, primarily with +the hope of helping on the liberation of her land, and then as a +willing captive to the charm which he exerted on all who approached +him. Their son was Count + +<ins class="correction" title= +"Transcriber's note: original reads 'Walewski'">Walewska</ins>.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_123_123"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor123_123">[123]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Marbot, ch. xxviii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_124_124"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor124_124">[124]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lettow-Vorbeck estimates the French loss at more than 24,000; +that of the Russians as still heavier, but largely owing to the bad +commissariat and wholesale straggling. On this see Sir R. Wilson's +"Campaign in Poland," ch. i.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_125_125"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor125_125">[125]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Napoleon on February 13th charged Bertrand to offer <i>verbally, +but not in writing</i>, to the King of Prussia a separate peace, +without respect to the Czar. Frederick William was to be restored +to his States east of the Elbe. He rejected the offer, which would +have broken his engagements to the Czar. Napoleon repeated the +offer on February 20th, which shows that, at this crisis, he did +wish for peace with Prussia. See "Nap. Corresp.," No. 11810; and +Hausser, vol. iii., p. 74.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_126_126"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor126_126">[126]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"I have been repeatedly pressed by the Prussian and Russian +Governments," wrote Lord Hutchinson, our envoy at Memel, March 9th, +1807, "on the subject of a diversion to be made by British troops +against Mortier.... Stettin is a large place with a small garrison +and in a bad state of defence" ("F.O.," Prussia, No. 74). in 1805 +Pitt promised to send a British force to Stralsund (see p. 17).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_127_127"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor127_127">[127]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lord Cathcart's secret report to the War Office, dated April +22nd, 1807, dealt with the appeal made by Lord Hutchinson, and with +a <i>Projet</i> of Dumouriez, both of whom strongly urged the +expedition to Stralsund. On May 30th Castlereagh received a report +from a Hanoverian officer, Kuckuck, stating that Hanover and Hesse +were ripe for revolt, and that Hameln might easily be seized if the +North Germans were encouraged by an English force ("Castlereagh +Letters," vol. vi., pp. 169 and 211).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_128_128"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor128_128">[128]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," Russia, No. 69.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_129_129"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor129_129">[129]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Correspond.," No. 12563; also "La Mission du Gen. Gardane en +Perse," par le comte de Gardane. Napoleon in his proclamation of +December 2nd, 1806, told the troops that their victories had won +for France her Indian possessions and the Cape of Good Hope.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_130_130"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor130_130">[130]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Wilson, "Campaign in Poland"; "Opérations du 3'me Corps +[Davoust's], 1806-1807," p. 199.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_131_131"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor131_131">[131]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," Nos. 12749 and 12751. Lejeune, in his "Memoirs," +also shows that Napoleon's chief aim was to seize +Königsberg.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_132_132"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor132_132">[132]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Memoirs of Oudinot," ch. i</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_133_133"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor133_133">[133]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>The report is dated Memel, June 21st, 1807, in "F.O.," Prussia, +No. 74. Hutchinson thinks the Russians had not more than 45,000 men +engaged at Friedland, and that their losses did not exceed 15,000: +but there were "multitudes of stragglers." Lettow-Vorbeck gives +about the same estimates. Those given in the French bulletin are +grossly exaggerated.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_134_134"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor134_134">[134]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>On June 17th, 1807, Queen Louisa wrote to her father: " ... we +fall with honour. The King has proved that he prefers honour to +shameful submission." On June 23rd Bennigsen professed a wish to +fight, while secretly advising surrender (Hardenberg, "Mems.," vol. +iii., p. 469).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_135_135"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor135_135">[135]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," Russia, No. 69. Soult told Lord Holland ("Foreign +Reminiscences," p. 185) that Bennigsen was plotting to murder the +Czar, and he (S.) warned him of it.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_136_136"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor136_136">[136]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," p. 468; also Garden, +vol. x., pp. 205-210; and "Ann. Reg." (1807), pp. 710-724, for the +British replies to Austria.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_137_137"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor137_137">[137]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Canning to Paget ("Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 324). So too +Canning's despatch of July 21st to Gower (Russia, No. 69).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_138_138"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor138_138">[138]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Stadion saw through it. See Beer, p. 243.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_139_139"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor139_139">[139]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Nap. Corresp.," No. 11918.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_140_140"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor140_140">[140]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p><i>Ib.</i>, No. 12028. This very important letter seems to me to +refute M. Vandal's theory ("Nap. et Alexandre," ch. i.), that +Napoleon was throughout seeking for an alliance with +<i>Austria</i>, or Prussia, or Russia.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_141_141"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor141_141">[141]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Canning to Paget, May 16th, 1807 ("Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. +290).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_142_142"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor142_142">[142]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Garden, vol. x., pp. 214-218; and Gower's despatch of June 17th. +1807 (Russia, No. 69).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_143_143"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor143_143">[143]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>All references to the story rest ultimately on Bignon, "Hist. de +France" (vol. vi., p. 316), who gives no voucher for it. For the +reasons given above I must regard the story as suspect. Among a +witty, phrase-loving people like the French, a good <i>mot</i> is +almost certain to gain credence and so pass into history.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_144_144"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor144_144">[144]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Tatischeff, "Alexandre I et Napoléon" (pp. 144-148).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_145_145"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor145_145">[145]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Reports of Savary and Lesseps, quoted by Vandal, <i>op. +cit.</i>, p. 61; "Corresp.," No. 12825.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_146_146"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor146_146">[146]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Vandal, p. 73, says that the news reached Napoleon at a review +when Alexander was by his side. If so, the occasion was carefully +selected with a view to effect; for the news reached him on, or +before, June 24th (see "Corresp.," No. 12819). Gower states that +the news reached Tilsit as early as the 15th; and Hardenberg +secretly proposed a policy of partition of Turkey on June 23rd +("Mems.," vol. iii., p. 463). Hardenberg resigned office on July +4th, as Napoleon refused to treat through him.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_147_147"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor147_147">[147]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," No. 12862, letter of July 6th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_148_148"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor148_148">[148]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Tatischeff (pp. 146-148 and 163-168) proves from the Russian +archives that these schemes were Alexander's, and were in the main +opposed by Napoleon. This disproves Vandal's assertion (p. 101) +that Napoleon pressed Alexander to take the Memel and Polish +districts.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_149_149"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor149_149">[149]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Erinnerungen der Gräfin von Voss."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_150_150"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor150_150">[150]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Probably this refers not to the restitution of Silesia, which he +politely offered to her (though he had previously granted it on the +Czar's request), but to Madgeburg and its environs west of the +Elbe. On July 7th he said to Goltz, the Prussian negotiator, "I am +sorry if the Queen took as positive assurances the <i>phrases +de</i> <i>politesse</i> that one speaks to ladies" (Hardenberg's +"Mems.," vol. iii., p. 512).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_151_151"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor151_151">[151]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See the new facts published by Bailleu in the "Hohenzollern +Jahrbuch" (1899). The "rose" story is not in any German source.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_152_152"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor152_152">[152]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>In his "Memoirs" (vol. i., pt. iii.) Talleyrand says that he +repeated this story several times at the Tuileries, until Napoleon +rebuked him for it.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_153_153"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor153_153">[153]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Before Tilsit Prussia had 9,744,000 subjects; afterwards only +4,938,000. See her frontiers in map on p. 215.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_154_154"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor154_154">[154]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>The exact terms of the secret articles and of the secret treaty +have only been known since 1890, when, owing to the labours of MM. +Fournier, Tatischeff, and Vandal, they saw the light.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_155_155"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor155_155">[155]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Gower's despatch of July 12th. "F.O.," Russia, No. 69.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_156_156"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor156_156">[156]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>De Clercq, "Traités," vol. ii., pp. 223-225; Garden, vol. +x., p. 233 and 277-290. Our envoy, Jackson, reported from Memel on +July 28th: "Nothing can exceed the insolence and extortions of the +French. No sooner is one demand complied with than a fresh one is +brought forward."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_157_157"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor157_157">[157]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>That he seriously thought in November, 1807, of leaving to +Prussia less than half of her already cramped territories, is clear +from his instructions to Caulaincourt, his ambassador to the Czar: +"Is it not to Prussia's interest for her to place herself, at once, +and with entire resignation, among the inferior Powers?" A new +treaty was to be framed, under the guise of <i>interpreting</i> +that of Tilsit, Russia keeping the Danubian Provinces, and Napoleon +more than half of Prussia (Vandal, vol. i., p. 509).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_158_158"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor158_158">[158]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lucchesini to Gentz in October, 1806, in Gentz's +"Ausgewählte Schriften," vol. v., p. 257.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_159_159"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor159_159">[159]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See Canning's reply to Stahremberg's Note, on April 25th, 1807, +in the "Ann. Reg.," p. 724.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_160_160"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor160_160">[160]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>For Mackenzie's report and other details gleaned from our +archives, see my article "A British Agent at Tilsit," in the "Eng. +Hist. Rev." of October, 1901.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_161_161"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor161_161">[161]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>James, "Naval History," vol. iv., p. 408.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_162_162"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor162_162">[162]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," Denmark, No. 53.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_163_163"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor163_163">[163]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Garden, vol. x., p. 408.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_164_164"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor164_164">[164]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," No. 12962; see too No. 12936, ordering the 15,000 +Spanish troops now serving him near Hamburg to form the nucleus of +Bernadotte's army of observation, which, "in case of events," was +to be strengthened by as many Dutch.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_165_165"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor165_165">[165]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," Denmark, No. 53. I published this Memorandum of Canning +and other unpublished papers in an article, "Canning and Denmark," +in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." of January, 1896. The terms of the +capitulation were, it seems, mainly decided on by Sir Arthur +Wellesley, who wrote to Canning (September 8th): "I might have +carried our terms higher ... had not our troops been needed at +home" ("Well. Despatches," vol. iii., p. 7).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_166_166"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor166_166">[166]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Castlereagh's "Corresp.," vol. vi. So too Gower reported from +St. Petersburg on October 1st that public opinion was "decidedly +averse to war with England, ... and it appears to me that the +English name was scarcely ever more popular in Russia than at the +present time."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_167_167"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor167_167">[167]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letters of July 19th and 29th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_168_168"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor168_168">[168]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>The phrase is that of Viscount Strangford, our ambassador at +Lisbon ("F.O.," Portugal, No. 55). So Baumgarten, "Geschichte +Spaniens," vol. i., p. 136.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_169_169"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor169_169">[169]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Report of the Portuguese ambassador, Lourenço de Lima, +dated August 7th, 1807, inclosed by Viscount Strangford ("F.O.," +Portugal, No. 55).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_170_170"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor170_170">[170]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>This statement as to the date of the summons to Portugal is +false: it was July 19th when he ordered it to be sent, that is, +long before the Copenhagen news reached him.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_171_171"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor171_171">[171]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," No. 12839.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_172_172"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor172_172">[172]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See Lady Blennerhasset's "Talleyrand," vol. ii., ch. xvi., for a +discussion of Talleyrand's share in the new policy. This question, +together with many others, cannot be solved, owing to Talleyrand's +destruction of most of his papers. In June, 1806, he advised a +partition of Portugal; and in the autumn he is said to have +favoured the overthrow of the Spanish Bourbons. But there must +surely be some connection between Napoleon's letter to him of July +19th, 1807, on Portuguese affairs and the resignation which he +persistently offered on their return to Paris. On August 10th he +wrote to the Emperor that that letter would be the last act of his +Ministry ("Lettres inédites de Tall.," p. 476). He was +succeeded by Champagny.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_173_173"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor173_173">[173]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," Nos. 13235, 37, 43.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_174_174"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor174_174">[174]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," Nos. 13314 and 13327. So too, to General Clarke, his +new Minister of War, he wrote: "Junot may say anything he pleases, +so long as he gets hold of the fleet" ("New Letters of Nap.," +October 28th, 1807).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_175_175"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor175_175">[175]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Strangford's despatches quite refute Thiers' confident statement +that the Portuguese answers to Napoleon were planned in concert +with us. I cannot find in our archives a copy of the +Anglo-Portuguese Convention signed by Canning on October 22nd, +1807; but there are many references to it in his despatches. It +empowered us to occupy Madeira; and our fleet did so at the close +of the year. In April next we exchanged it for the Azores and +Goa.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_176_176"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor176_176">[176]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," July 22nd, 1807.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_177_177"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor177_177">[177]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Between September 1st, 1807, and November 23rd, 1807, he wrote +eighteen letters on the subject of Corfu, which he designed to be +his base of operations as soon as the Eastern Question could be +advantageously reopened. On February 8th, 1808, he wrote to Joseph +that Corfu was more important than Sicily, and that "<i>in the +present state of Europe, the loss of Corfu would be the greatest of +disasters</i>." This points to his proposed partition of +Turkey.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_178_178"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor178_178">[178]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of October 13th, 1807.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_179_179"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor179_179">[179]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Ann. Register" for 1807, pp. 227, 747.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_180_180"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor180_180">[180]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p><i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 749-750. Another Order in Council (November +25th) allowed neutral ships a few more facilities for colonial +trade, and Prussian merchantmen were set free (<i>ibid.</i>, pp. +755-759). In April, 1809, we further favoured the carrying of +British goods on neutral ships, especially to or from the United +States.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_181_181"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor181_181">[181]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bourrienne, "Memoirs." The case against the Orders in Council is +fairly stated by Lumbroso, and by Alison, ch. 50.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_182_182"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor182_182">[182]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Gower reported (on September 22nd) that the Spanish ambassador +at St. Petersburg had been pleading for help there, so as to avenge +this insult.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_183_183"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor183_183">[183]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Baumgarten, "Geschichte Spaniens," vol. i., p. 138.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_184_184"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor184_184">[184]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Nap. Corresp." of October 17th and 31st, November 13th, +December 23rd, 1807, and February 20th, 1808; also Napier, +"Peninsular War," bk. i., ch. ii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_185_185"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor185_185">[185]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of January 10th, 1808.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_186_186"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor186_186">[186]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of Charles IV. to Napoleon of October 29th, 1807, +published in "Murat, Lieutenant de l'Empereur en Espagne," Appendix +viii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_187_187"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor187_187">[187]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"New Letters of Napoleon."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_188_188"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor188_188">[188]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," letter of February 25th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_189_189"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor189_189">[189]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Murat in 1814 told Lord Holland ("Foreign Reminiscences," p. +131) he had had no instructions from Napoleon.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_190_190"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor190_190">[190]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiers, notes to bk. xxix.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_191_191"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor191_191">[191]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la +Révolution d'Espagne, par Nellerto"; also "The Journey of +Ferdinand VII. to Bayonne," by Escoiquiz.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_192_192"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor192_192">[192]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," No. 13696. A careful comparison of this laboured, +halting effusion, with the curt military + +<ins class="correction" title= +"Transcriber's note: original reads 'syle'">style</ins> of the +genuine letters—and especially with Nos. 93, 94, and 100 of +the "New Letters"—must demonstrate its non-authenticity. +Thiers' argument to the contrary effect is rambling and weak. Count +Murat in his recent monograph on his father pronounces the letter a +fabrication of St. Helena or later. It was first published in the +"Mémorial de St. Hélène," an untrustworthy +compilation made by Las Cases after Napoleon's death from notes +taken at St. Helena.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_193_193"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor193_193">[193]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Napoleon had at first intended the Spanish crown for Louis, to +whom he wrote on March 27th: "The climate of Holland does not suit +you. Besides, Holland can never rise from her ruins." Louis +declined, on the ground that his call to Holland had been from +heaven, and not from Napoleon!</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_194_194"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor194_194">[194]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Memoirs of Thiébault and De Broglie; so, too, De Rocca, +"La Guerre en Espagne."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_195_195"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor195_195">[195]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See the letter of an Englishman from Buenos Ayres of September +27th, 1809, in "Cobbett's Register" for 1810 (p. 256), stating that +the new popular Government there was driven by want of funds, "not +from their good wishes to England," to open their ports to all +foreign commerce on moderate duties.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_196_196"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor196_196">[196]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Vandal, "Napoléon et Alexandre," ch. vii. It is not +published in the "Correspondence" or in the "New Letters."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_197_197"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor197_197">[197]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Vandal, "Napoléon et Alexandre," vol. i., ch. iv., and +App. II.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_198_198"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor198_198">[198]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>In the conversations which Metternich had with Napoleon and +Talleyrand on and after January 22nd, 1808, he was convinced that +the French Emperor intended to partition Turkey as soon as it +suited him to do so, which would be after he had subjected Spain. +Napoleon said to him: "When the Russians are at Constantinople you +will need France to help you against them."—"Metternich +Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 188.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_199_199"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor199_199">[199]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>So Soult told Lord Holland ("Foreign Reminiscences," p. +171).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_200_200"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor200_200">[200]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Vandal, vol. i., p. 384.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_201_201"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor201_201">[201]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Metternich, "Mems.," vol. ii. p. 298 (Eng. edit.).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_202_202"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor202_202">[202]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>I think that Beer (pp. 330-340) errs somewhat in ranking +Talleyrand's work at Erfurt at that statesman's own very high +valuation, which he enhanced in later years: see Greville's +"Mems.," Second Part, vol. ii., p. 193.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_203_203"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor203_203">[203]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Vandal, vol. i., p. 307.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_204_204"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor204_204">[204]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Sklower, "L'Entrevue de Napoléon avec Goethe"; Mrs. +Austin's "Germany from 1760 to 1814"; Oncken, bk. vii., ch. i. For +Napoleon's dispute with Wieland about Tacitus see Talleyrand, +"Mems.," vol. i., pt. 5. When the Emperors' carriages were ready +for departure, Talleyrand whispered to Alexander: "Ah! si Votre +Majesté pouvait se tromper de voiture."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_205_205"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor205_205">[205]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," Russia, No. 74, despatch of December 9th, 1808. On +January 14th, 1809, Canning signed a treaty of alliance with the +Spanish people, both sides agreeing never to make peace with +Napoleon except by common consent. It was signed when the Spanish +cause seemed desperate; but it was religiously observed.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_206_206"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor206_206">[206]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Madelin's "Fouché," vol. ii., p. 80; Pasquier, vol. i., +pp. 353-360.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_207_207"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor207_207">[207]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Seeley, "Life and Times of Stein," vol. ii., p. 316; Hausser, +vol. iii., p. 219 (4th edition).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_208_208"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor208_208">[208]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Our F.O. Records show that we wanted to help Austria; but a long +delay was caused by George III.'s insisting that she should make +peace with us first. Canning meanwhile sent £250,000 in +silver bars to Trieste. But in his note of April 20th he assured +the Court of Vienna that our treasury had been "nearly exhausted" +by the drain of the Peninsular War. (Austria, No. 90.)</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_209_209"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor209_209">[209]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>For the campaign see the memoirs of Macdonald, Marbot, Lejeune, +Pelet and Marmont. The last (vol. iii., p. 216) says that, had the +Austrians pressed home their final attacks at Aspern, a disaster +was inevitable; or had Charles later on cut the French +communications near Vienna, the same result must have followed. But +the investigations of military historians leave no doubt that the +Austrian troops were too exhausted by their heroic exertions, and +their supplies of ammunition too much depleted, to warrant any +risky moves for several days; and by that time reinforcements had +reached Napoleon. See too Angelis' "Der Erz-Herzog Karl."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_210_210"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor210_210">[210]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Thoumas, "Le Maréchal Lannes," pp. 205, 323 <i>et +seq.</i> Desvernois ("Mems.," ch. xii.) notes that after Austerlitz +none of Napoleon's wars had the approval of France.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_211_211"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor211_211">[211]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>For the Walcheren expedition see Alison, vol. viii.; James, vol. +iv.; as also for Gambier's failure at Rochefort. The letters of Sir +Byam Martin, then cruising off Danzig, show how our officers wished +to give timely aid to Schill ("Navy Records," vol. xii.).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_212_212"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor212_212">[212]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Captain Boothby's "A Prisoner of France," ch. iii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_213_213"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor213_213">[213]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>For Charles's desire to sue for peace after the first battles on +the Upper Danube, see Häusser, vol. iii., p. 341; also, after +Wagram, <i>ib.</i>, pp. 412-413.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_214_214"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor214_214">[214]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Napier, bk. viii., chs. ii. and iii. In the App. of vol. iii. of +"Wellington's Despatches" is Napoleon's criticism on the movements +of Joseph and the French marshals. He blames them for their want of +<i>ensemble</i>, and for the precipitate attack which Victor +advised at Talavera. He concluded: "As long as you attack good +troops like the English in good positions, without reconnoitring +them, you will lead men to death <i>en pure perte</i>."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_215_215"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor215_215">[215]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>An Austrian envoy had been urging promptitude at Downing Street. +On June 1st he wrote to Canning: "The promptitude of the enemy has +always been the key to his success. A long experience has proved +this to the world, which seems hitherto not to have profited by +this knowledge." On July 29th Canning acknowledged the receipt of +the Austrian ratification of peace with us, "accompanied by the +afflicting intelligence of the armistice concluded on the 12th +instant between the Austrian and French armies."</p> + +<p>Napoleon at St. Helena said to Montholon that, had 6,000 British +troops pushed rapidly up the banks of the Scheldt on the day that +the expedition reached Flushing, they could easily have taken +Antwerp, which was then very weakly held. See, too, other opinions +quoted by Alison, ch. lx.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_216_216"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor216_216">[216]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Beer, p. 441.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_217_217"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor217_217">[217]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Vandal, vol. ii., p. 161; Metternich, vol. i., p. 114.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_218_218"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor218_218">[218]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of February 10th, 1810, quoted by Lanfrey. See, too, the +"Mems." of Prince Eugène, vol. vi., p. 277.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_219_219"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor219_219">[219]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 365 (Eng. ed.).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_220_220"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor220_220">[220]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bausset, "Mems.," ch. xix.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_221_221"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor221_221">[221]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Mme. de Rémusat, "Mems.," ch. xxvii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_222_222"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor222_222">[222]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Tatischeff, "Alexandre et Napoléon," p. 519. Welschinger, +"Le Divorce de Napoléon," ch. ii.; he also examines the +alleged irregularities of the religious marriage with Josephine; +Fesch and most impartial authorities brushed them aside as a flimsy +excuse.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_223_223"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor223_223">[223]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Metternich's despatch of December 25th, 1809, in his "Mems.," +vol. ii., § 150. The first hints were dropped by him to +Laborde on November 29th (Vandal, vol. ii., pp. 204, 543): they +reached Napoleon's ears about December 15th. For the influence of +these marriage negotiations in preparing for Napoleon's rupture +with the Czar, see chap, xxxii. of this work.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_224_224"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor224_224">[224]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Conversations with the Duke of Wellington," p. 9. The +disobedience of Ney and Soult did much to ruin Masséna's +campaign, and he lost the battle of Fuentès d'Onoro mainly +through that of Bessières. Still, as he failed to satisfy +Napoleon's maxim, "Succeed: I judge men only by results," he was +disgraced.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_225_225"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor225_225">[225]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Decree of February 5th, 1810. See Welschinger, "La Censure sous +le premier Empire," p. 31. For the seizure of Madame de +Staël's "Allemagne" and her exile, see her preface to "Dix +Années d'Exil."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_226_226"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor226_226">[226]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Mollien, "Mems.," vol. iii., p. 183.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_227_227"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor227_227">[227]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Fouché retired to Italy, and finally settled at Aix. His +place at the Ministry of Police was taken by Savary, Duc de Rovigo. +See Madelin's "Fouché," chap. xx.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_228_228"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor228_228">[228]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Porter, "Progress of the Nation," p. 388.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_229_229"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor229_229">[229]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letters of August 6th, 7th, 29th. The United States had just +repealed their Non-Intercourse Act of 1807. For their relations +with Napoleon and England, see Channing's "The United States of +America," chs. vi. and vii.; also the Anglo-American correspondence +in Cobbett's "Register for 1809 and 1810."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_230_230"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor230_230">[230]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Mollien, "Mems." vol. i., p. 316.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_231_231"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor231_231">[231]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Tooke, "Hist. of Prices," vol. i., p. 311; Mollien, vol. iii., +pp. 135, 289; Pasquier, vol. i., p. 295; Chaptal, p. 275.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_232_232"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor232_232">[232]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of August 6th, 1810, to Eugène.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_233_233"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor233_233">[233]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Progress of the Nation," p. 148.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_234_234"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor234_234">[234]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>So Mollien, vol. iii., p. 135: "One knows that his powerful +imagination was fertile in illusions: as soon as they had seduced +him, he sought with a kind of good faith to enhance their prestige, +and he succeeded easily in persuading many others of what he had +convinced himself. He braved business difficulties as he braved +dangers in war."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_235_235"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor235_235">[235]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Miot de Melito, vol. ii., ch. xv. For some favourable symptoms +in French industry, see Lumbroso, pp. 165-226, and Chaptal, p. 287. +They have been credited to the Continental System; but surely they +resulted from the internal free trade and intelligent +administration which France had enjoyed since the Revolution.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_236_236"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor236_236">[236]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Nap. Corresp.," May 8th, 1811.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_237_237"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor237_237">[237]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Goethe published the first part of "Faust," <i>in full</i>, +early in 1808.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_238_238"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor238_238">[238]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Baur, "Stein und Perthes," p. 85.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_239_239"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor239_239">[239]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lavalette, "Mems.," ch. xxv.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_240_240"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor240_240">[240]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letters of October 10th and 13th, 1810, and January 1st, +1811.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_241_241"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor241_241">[241]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of September 17th, 1810.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_242_242"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor242_242">[242]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of March 8th, 1811. For a fuller treatment of the +commercial struggle between Great Britain and Napoleon see my +articles, "Napoleon and British Commerce" and "Britain's Food +Supply during the French War," in a volume entitled "Napoleonic +Studies" (George Bell and Sons, 1904).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_243_243"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor243_243">[243]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Czartoryski, "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xvii. At this time he was +taken back to the Czar's favour, and was bidden to hope for the +re-establishment of Poland by the Czar as soon as Napoleon made a +blunder.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_244_244"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor244_244">[244]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Tatischeff, p. 526; Vandal, vol. ii., ch. vii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_245_245"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor245_245">[245]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," No. 16178; Vandal, vol. ii., ch. vii. The +<i>exposé</i> of December 1st, 1809, had affirmed that +Napoleon did not intend to re-establish Poland. But this did not +satisfy Alexander.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_246_246"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor246_246">[246]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letters of October 23rd and December 2nd, 1810.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_247_247"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor247_247">[247]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Vandal, vol. ii., p. 529.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_248_248"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor248_248">[248]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Tatischeff, p. 555.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_249_249"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor249_249">[249]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Vandal, vol. ii., p. 535, admits that we had no hand in it. But +the Czar naturally became more favourable to us, and at the close +of 1811 secretly gave entry to our goods.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_250_250"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor250_250">[250]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Quoted by Garden, vol. xiii., p. 171.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_251_251"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor251_251">[251]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bernhardi's "Denkwürdigkeiten des Grafen von Toll," vol. i. +p. 223.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_252_252"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor252_252">[252]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Czartoryski, vol. ii., ch. xvii. At Dresden, in May, 1812, +Napoleon admitted to De Pradt, his envoy at Warsaw that Russia's +lapse from the Continental System was the chief cause of war; +"Without Russia, the Continental System is absurdity."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_253_253"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor253_253">[253]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>For the overtures of Russia and Sweden to us and their +exorbitant requests for loans, see Mr. Hereford George's account in +his careful and systematic study, "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia," +ch. iv. It was not till July, 1812, that we formally made peace +with Russia and Sweden, and sent them pecuniary aid. We may note +here that Napoleon, in April, 1812, sent us overtures for peace, if +we would acknowledge Joseph as King of Spain and Murat as King of +Naples, and withdraw our troops from the Peninsula and Sicily: +Napoleon would then evacuate Spain. Castlereagh at once refused an +offer which would have left Napoleon free to throw his whole +strength against Russia (Garden, vol. xiii., pp. 215, 254).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_254_254"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor254_254">[254]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Garden, vol. xiii., p. 329.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_255_255"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor255_255">[255]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Hereford George, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 34-37. Metternich +("Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 517, Eng. ed.) shows that Napoleon had +also been holding out to Austria the hope of gaining Servia, +Wallachia and Moldavia (the latter of which were then overrun by +Russian troops), if she would furnish 60,000 troops: but Metternich +resisted successfully.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_256_256"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor256_256">[256]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See his words to Metternich at Dresden, Metternich's "Mems.," +vol. i., p. 152; as also that he would not advance beyond Smolensk +in 1812.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_257_257"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor257_257">[257]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. i., p. 226; Stern, "Abhandlungen," pp. +350-366; Müffling, "Aus meinem Leben"; L'Abbé de Pradt, +"L'histoire de l'Ambassade de Varsovie."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_258_258"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor258_258">[258]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Erinnerungen des Gen. von Boyen," vol. ii., p. 254. This, and +other facts that will later be set forth, explode the story foisted +by the Prussian General von dem Knesebeck in his old age on +Müffling. Knesebeck declared that his mission early in 1812 to +the Czar, which was to persuade him to a peaceful compromise with +Napoleon, was directly controverted by the secret instructions +which he bore from Frederick William to Alexander. He described +several midnight interviews with the Czar at the Winter Palace, in +which he convinced him that by war with Napoleon, and by enticing +him into the heart of Russia, Europe would be saved. Lehmann has +shown ("Knesebeck und Schön") that this story is contradicted +by all the documentary evidence. It may be dismissed as the +offspring of senile vanity.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_259_259"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor259_259">[259]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Toll," vol. i., pp. 256 <i>et seq.</i> Müffling was +assured by Phull in 1819 that the Drissa plan was only part of a +grander design which had never had a fair chance!</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_260_260"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor260_260">[260]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bernhardi's "Toll" (vol. i., p. 231) gives Barclay's chief "army +of the west" as really mustering only 127,000 strong, along with +9,000 Cossacks; Bagration, with the second "army of the west," +numbered at first only 35,000, with 4,000 Cossacks; while +Tormasov's corps observing Galicia was about as strong. Clausewitz +gives rather higher estimates.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_261_261"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor261_261">[261]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Labaume, "Narrative of 1812," and Ségur.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_262_262"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor262_262">[262]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See the long letter of May 28th, 1812, to De Pradt; also the Duc +de Broglie's "Memoirs" (vol. i., ch. iv.) for the hollowness of +Napoleon's Polish policy. Bignon, "Souvenirs d'un Diplomate" (ch. +xx.), errs in saying that Napoleon charged De Pradt—"Tout +agiter, tout enflammer." At St. Helena, Napoleon said to Montholon +("Captivity," vol. iii., ch. iii.): "Poland and its resources were +but poetry in the first months of the year 1812."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_263_263"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor263_263">[263]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Toll," vol. i., p. 239; Wilson, "Invasion of Russia," p. +384.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_264_264"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor264_264">[64:]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>We may here also clear aside the statements of some writers who +aver that Napoleon intended to strike at St. Petersburg. Perhaps he +did so for a time. On July 9th he wrote at Vilna that he proposed +to march <i>both on Moscow and St. Petersburg</i>. But that was +while he still hoped that Davoust would entrap Bagration, and while +Barclay's retreat on Drissa seemed likely to carry the war into the +north. Napoleon always aimed first at the enemy's army; and +Barclay's retreat from Drissa to Vitepsk, and thence to Smolensk, +finally decided Napoleon's move towards Moscow. If he had any +preconceived scheme—and he always regulated his moves by +events rather than by a cast-iron plan—it was to strike at +Moscow. At Dresden he said to De Pradt: "I must finish the war by +the end of September.... I am going to Moscow: one or two battles +will settle the business. I will burn Tula, and Russia will be at +my feet. Moscow is the heart of that Empire. I will wage war with +Polish blood." De Pradt's evidence is not wholly to be trusted; but +I am convinced that Napoleon never seriously thought of taking +200,000 men to the barren tracts of North Russia late in the +summer, while the English, Swedish, and Russian fleets were ready +to worry his flank and stop supplies.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_265_265"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor265_265">[265]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of August 24th to Maret; so too Labaume's "Narrative," +and Garden, vol. xiii., p. 418. Mr. George thinks that Napoleon +decided on August 21st to strike at Moscow on grounds of general +policy.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_266_266"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor266_266">[266]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Labaume, "Narrative"; Lejeune's "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. vi.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_267_267"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor267_267">[267]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Marbot's "Mems." Bausset, a devoted servant to Napoleon, refutes +the oft-told story that he was ill at Borodino. He had nothing +worse than a bad cold. It is curious that such stories are told +about Napoleon after every battle when his genius did not shine. In +this case, it rests on the frothy narrative of Ségur, and is +out of harmony with those of Gourgaud and Pelet. Clausewitz +justifies Napoleon's caution in withholding his Guard.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_268_268"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor268_268">[268]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bausset, "Cour de Napoléon." Tolstoi ("War and Liberty") +asserts that the fires were the work of tipsy pillagers. So too +Arndt, "Mems.," p. 204. Dr. Tzenoff, in a scholarly monograph +(Berlin, 1900), comes to the same conclusion. Lejeune and Bourgogne +admit both causes.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_269_269"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor269_269">[269]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Garden, vol. xiii., p. 452; vol. xiv., pp. 17-19.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_270_270"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor270_270">[270]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Cathcart, p. 41; see too the Czar's letters in Sir Byam Martin's +"Despatches," vol. ii., p. 311. This fact shows the frothiness of +the talk indulged in by Russians in 1807 as to "our rapacity and +perfidy" in seizing the Danish fleet.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_271_271"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor271_271">[271]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p><i>E.g.</i>, the migration of Rostopchin's serfs <i>en masse</i> +from their village, near Moscow, rather than come under French +dominion (Wilson, "French Invasion of Russia," p. 179).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_272_272"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor272_272">[272]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of October 16th; see too his undated notes ("Corresp.," +No. 19237). Bausset and many others thought the best plan would be +to winter at Moscow. He also says that the Emperor's favourite book +while at Moscow was Voltaire's "History of Charles XII."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_273_273"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor273_273">[273]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lejeune, vol. ii., chap. vi. As it chanced, Kutusoff had +resolved on retreat, if Napoleon attacked him. This is perhaps the +only time when Napoleon erred through excess of prudence. Fezensac +noted at Moscow that he would not see or hear the truth.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_274_274"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor274_274">[274]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>It has been constantly stated by Napoleon, and by most French +historians of this campaign, that his losses were mainly due to an +exceptionally severe and early winter. The statement will not bear +examination. Sharp cold usually sets in before November 6th in +Russia at latitude 55°; the severe weather which he then +suffered was succeeded by alternate thaws and slighter frosts until +the beginning of December, when intense cold is always expected. +Moreover, the bulk of the losses occurred before the first +snowstorm. The Grand Army which marched on Smolensk and Moscow may +be estimated at 400,000 (including reinforcements). At Viasma, +<i>before severe cold set in</i>, it had dwindled to 55,000. We may +note here the curious fact, substantiated by Alison, that the +French troops stood the cold better than the Poles and North +Germans. See too N. Senior's "Conversations," vol. i., p. 239.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_275_275"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor275_275">[275]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bausset, "Cour de Napoléon"; Wilson, pp. 271-277.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_276_276"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor276_276">[276]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Oudinot, "Mémoires."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_277_277"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor277_277">[277]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Hereford George, pp. 349-350.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_278_278"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor278_278">[278]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bourgogne, ch. viii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_279_279"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor279_279">[279]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Pasquier, vol. ii., <i>ad init.</i></p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_280_280"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor280_280">[280]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Colonel Desprez, who accompanied the retreat, thus described to +King Joseph its closing scenes: "The truth is best expressed by +saying that <i>the army is dead</i>. The Young Guard was 8,000 +strong when we left Moscow: at Vilna it scarcely numbered 400.... +The corps of Victor and Oudinot numbered 30,000 men when they +crossed the Beresina: two days afterwards they had melted away like +the rest of the army. Sending reinforcements only increased the +losses."</p> + +<p>The following French official report, a copy of which I have +found in our F.O. Records (Russia, No. 84), shows how frightful +were the losses after Smolensk. But it should be noted that the +rank and file in this case numbered only 300 at Smolensk, and had +therefore lost more than half their numbers—and this in a +regiment of the Guard.</p> + +<p><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">GARDE IMPÉRIALE: 6^ME +RÉGIMENT DE TIRAILLEURS.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>l^ère Division. Situation +à l'époque du 19 Décembre, +1812</i>.</span><br> +</p> + +<p><br> +|——————-+——————+—————-+—————-+—————+—————+————|<br> + +| | Perte depuis le départ de Smolensk |<br> +| ++——————+—————-+—————-+—————+—————+————|<br> + +|Présents sous|Restés sur |Blessés qui|Morts +de |Restés en |Total des|Reste |<br> +|les armes au |le champ |n'ont pu |froid ou de|en arrière +|Pertes |présents|<br> +|départ de |de bataille |suivre, |misère +|gelés, ou | |sous les|<br> +|Smolensk | |restés au | |pour cause | |armes |<br> +| | |pouvoir de | |de maladie | | |<br> +| | |l'ennemi | |au pouvoir | | |<br> +| | | | |de l'ennemi| | |<br> +|——-+———-+———+——-+———+——+———+——+———+——+——-+—-+——+—-|<br> + +| Off.|Tr. | Off. |Tr. | Off. |Tr. | Off. |Tr. | Off. |Tr. | +Off.|Tr.|Off.|Tr.|<br> +| 31 |300 | — |13 | 4 |52 | — |24 | 13 |201 | 17|290| +14|10 |<br> +|——-+———-+———+——-+———+——+———+——+———+——+——-+—-+——+—-|<br> + +</p> + +<p><br> +<span style="margin-left: 12em;"><i>Signé</i> le Colonel +Major Commandant</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 19.5em;">le dit Regiment. +CARRÉ.</span><br> +</p> + +<p><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Les autres régiments sont +plus</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ou moins dans le même +état.</span></p> +</div> + +<br> + <a name="Foot2note_281_281"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor281_281">[281]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," December 20th, 1812. For the so-called Concordat of +1813, concluded with the captive Pius VII. at Fontainebleau, see +"Corresp." of January 25th, 1813. The Pope repudiated it at the +first opportunity. Napoleon wanted him to settle at Avignon as a +docile subject of the Empire.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_282_282"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor282_282">[282]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Mollien, vol. iii., <i>ad fin.</i> For his vague offers to +mitigate the harsh terms of Tilsit for Prussia, and to grant her a +political existence if she would fight for him, see Hardenberg, +"Mems.," vol. iv., p. 350.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_283_283"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor283_283">[283]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Walpole reports (December 19th and 22nd, 1812) Metternich's envy +of the Russian successes and of their occupation of the left bank +of the Danube. Walpole said he believed Alexander would grant +Austria a set-off against this; but Metternich seemed entirely +Bonapartist ("F.O.," Russia, No. 84). See too the full account, +based on documentary evidence, in Luckwaldt's "Oesterreich und die +Anfange des Befreiungskrieges" (Berlin, 1898).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_284_284"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor284_284">[284]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Hardenberg, "Mems.," vol. iv., p. 366.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_285_285"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor285_285">[285]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Oncken, "Oesterreich und Preussen," vol. ii.; Garden, vol. xiv., +p. 167; Seeley's "Stein," vol. ii., ch. iii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_286_286"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor286_286">[286]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Arndt, "Wanderungen"; Steffens, "Was ich erlebte."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_287_287"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor287_287">[287]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>At this time she had only 61,500 men ready for the fighting +line; but she had 28,000 in garrison and 32,000 in Pomerania and +Prussia (Proper), according to Scharnhorst's report contained in +"F.O.," Russia, No. 85.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_288_288"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor288_288">[288]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letters of March 2nd and 11th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_289_289"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor289_289">[289]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Metternich's "Memoirs," vol. i., p. 159; Luckwaldt, <i>op. +cit.</i>, ch. vi.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_290_290"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor290_290">[290]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See the whole note in Luckwaldt, Append. No. 4.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_291_291"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor291_291">[291]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Oncken, <i>op. cit.</i>, vol. ii., p. 205. So too Metternich's +letter to Nesselrode of April 21st ("Memoirs," vol. i., p. 405, +Eng. ed.): "I beg of you to continue to confide in me. If Napoleon +will be foolish enough to fight, let us endeavour not to meet with +a reverse, which I feel to be only too possible. One battle lost +for Napoleon, and all Germany will be under arms."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_292_292"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor292_292">[292]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," Austria, No. 105. Doubtless, as Oncken has pointed out +with much acerbity, Castlereagh's knowledge that Austria would +suggest the modification of our maritime claims contributed to his +refusal to consider her proposal for a general peace: but I am +convinced, from the tone of our records, that his chief motive was +his experience of Napoleon's intractability and a sense of loyalty +to our Spanish allies: we were also pledged to help Sweden and +Russia.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_293_293"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor293_293">[293]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letters of April 24th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_294_294"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor294_294">[294]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Napoleon's troops in Thorn surrendered on April 17th; those in +Spandau on April 24th (Fain, "Manuscrit de 1813," vol. ii., ch. +i.).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_295_295"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor295_295">[295]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Oncken, vol. ii., p. 272.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_296_296"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor296_296">[296]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Cathcart's report in "F.O.," Russia, No. 85. Müffling ("Aus +meinem Leben") regards the delay in the arrival of Miloradovitch, +and the preparations for defence which the French had had time to +make at Gross Görschen, as the causes of the allies' failure. +The chief victim on the French side was Bessières, commander +of the Guard.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_297_297"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor297_297">[297]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," Nos. 20017-20031. For his interview with Bubna, see +Luckwaldt, p. 257.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_298_298"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor298_298">[298]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. iii., pp. 490-492. Marmont gives the +French 150,000; Thiers says 160,000.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_299_299"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor299_299">[299]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>In his bulletin Napoleon admitted having lost 11,000 to 12,000 +killed and wounded in the two days at Bautzen; his actual losses +were probably over 20,000. He described the allies as having +150,000 to 160,000 men, nearly double their actual numbers.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_300_300"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor300_300">[300]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Müffling, "Aus meinem Leben."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_301_301"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor301_301">[301]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites." So too his letters to Eugène +of June 11th and July 1st; and of June 11th, 17th, July 6th and +29th, to Augereau, who was to threaten Austria from Bavaria.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_302_302"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor302_302">[302]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See his conversation with our envoy, Thornton, reported by the +latter in the "Castlereagh Letters," 2nd series, vol. iv., p. +314.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_303_303"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor303_303">[303]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Castlereagh Letters," 2nd series, vol. iv., p. 344.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_304_304"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor304_304">[304]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Garden, vol. xiv., p. 356. We also stipulated that Sweden should +not import slaves into Guadeloupe, and should repress the slave +trade. When, at the Congress of Vienna, that island was given back +to France, we paid Bernadotte a money indemnity.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_305_305"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor305_305">[305]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites de Napoléon," June 18th, 1813. +See too that of July 16th, <i>ibid.</i></p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_306_306"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor306_306">[306]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letters of F. Perthes.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_307_307"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor307_307">[307]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Joseph to Marmont, July 21st, 1812.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_308_308"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor308_308">[308]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Méms. du Roi Joseph," vols. viii. and ix.; Napier, book +xix., ch. v.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_309_309"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor309_309">[309]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Mémoires du Roi Joseph," vol. ix., p. 195.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_310_310"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor310_310">[310]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Napier and Alison say March 18th, which is refuted by the +"Méms. du Roi Joseph," vol. ix., p. 131.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_311_311"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor311_311">[311]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p><i>Ibid.</i>, vol. ix., p. 464.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_312_312"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor312_312">[312]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>As a matter of fact he had 50,000 there for three months, and +did not succeed. See Clarke's letter to Clausel, "Méms. du +Roi Joseph," vol. ix., p. 251.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_313_313"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor313_313">[313]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Stanhope's "Conversations with Wellington," p. 20.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_314_314"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor314_314">[314]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Mémoires du Roi Joseph," vol. ix., p. 60.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_315_315"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor315_315">[315]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiers, bk. xlix.; "Nap. Corresp.," No. 20019; Baumgarten vol +i., p. 577.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_316_316"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor316_316">[316]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Mémoires du Roi Joseph," vol. ix., pp. 284, 294. +Joseph's first order to Clausel was sent under protection of <i>an +escort of 1,500 men</i>.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_317_317"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor317_317">[317]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See Lord Melville's complaint as to Wellington's unreasonable +charges on this head in the "Letters of Sir B. Martin" ("Navy +Records," 1898).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_318_318"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor318_318">[318]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Miot de Melito, vol. ii., ch. xviii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_319_319"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor319_319">[319]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Clausel afterwards complained that if he had received any order +to that effect he could have pushed on so as to be at Vittoria +("Méms. du Roi Joseph," vol. ix., p. 454). The muster-rolls +of the French were lost at Vittoria. Napier puts their force at +70,000; Thiers at 54,000; Jourdan at 50,000.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_320_320"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor320_320">[320]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Wellington's official account of the fight states that the +French got away only two of their cannon; and Simmons, "A British +Rifleman," asserts that the last of these was taken near Pamplona +on the 24th. Wellington generously assigned much credit to the +Spanish troops—far more than Napier will allow.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_321_321"></a> <a href= +"#FN2anchor321_321">[321]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Ducasse, "Les rois, frères de Napoléon."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_322_322"></a> <a href= +"#FN2anchor322_322">[322]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites de Napoléon," July 1st, 3rd, +15th, and 20th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_323_323"></a> <a href= +"#FN2anchor323_323">[323]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Stadion to Metternich, May 30th, June 2nd and 8th; in Luckwaldt, +p. 382.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_324_324"></a> <a href= +"#FN2anchor324_324">[324]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Cathcart's "most secret" despatch of June 4⁄16 from +Reichenbach. Just a month earlier he reported that the Czar's +proposals to Austria included all these terms in an absolute form, +and also the separation of Holland from France, the restoration of +the Bourbons to Spain, and "L'Italie libre dans toutes ses parties +du Gouvernement et de l'influence de la France." Such were also +Metternich's <i>private</i> wishes, with the frontier of the Oglio +on the S.W. for Austria. See Oncken, vol. ii., p. 644. The official +terms were in part due to the direct influence of the Emperor +Francis.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_325_325"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor325_325">[325]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>In a secret article of the Treaty we promised to advance to +Austria a subsidy of £500,000 as soon as she should join the +allies.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_326_326"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor326_326">[326]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Martens, vol. ix., pp. 568-575. Our suspicion of Prussia +reappears (as was almost inevitable after her seizure of Hanover), +not only in the smallness of the sum accorded to her—for we +granted £2,000,000 in all to the Swedish, Hanseatic, and +Hanoverian contingents—but also in the stipulation that she +should assent to the eventual annexation of the formerly Prussian +districts of East Frisia and Hildesheim to Hanover. We also refused +to sign the Treaty of Reichenbach until she, most unwillingly, +assented to this prospective cession. This has always been thought +in Germany a mean transaction; but, as Castlereagh pointed out, +those districts were greatly in the way of the development of +Hanover. Prussia was to have an indemnity for the sacrifice; and we +bore the chief burden in the issue of "federative paper notes," +which enabled the allies to prepare for the campaign ("Castlereagh +Papers," 2nd series, vol. iv., p. 355; 3rd series, vol. i., pp. +7-17; and "Bath Archives," vol. ii., p. 86). Moreover, we were then +sending 30,000 muskets to Stralsund and Colberg for the use of +Prussian troops (Despatch from "F.O.," July 28th, to Thornton, +"Sweden," No. 79). On July 6th we agreed to pay the cost of a +German Legion of 10,000 men under the Czar's orders. Its Commissary +was Colonel Lowe.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_327_327"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor327_327">[327]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>For the official reports see Garden, vol. xiv., pp. 486-499; +also Bausset's account, "Cour de Napoléon."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_328_328"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor328_328">[328]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Any account of a private interview between two astute schemers +must be accepted with caution; and we may well doubt whether +Metternich really was as firm, not to say provocative, as he +afterwards represented in his "Memoirs." But, on the whole, his +account is more trustworthy than that of Fain, Napoleon's +secretary, in his "Manuscrit de 1813," vol. ii., ch. ii. Fain +places the interview on June 28th; in "Napoleon's Corresp." it is +reprinted, but assigned to June 23rd. The correct date is shown by +Oncken to have been June 26th. Bignon's account of it (vol. xii., +ch. iv.) is marked by his usual bias.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_329_329"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor329_329">[329]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Cathcart reported, on July 8th, that Schwarzenberg had urged an +extension of the armistice, so that Austria might meet the "vast +and unexpected" preparations of France ("Russia," No. 86).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_330_330"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor330_330">[330]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Russia," No. 86.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_331_331"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor331_331">[331]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Thornton's despatch of July 12th ("Castlereagh Papers," 2nd +Series, vol. iv., <i>ad fin.</i>).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_332_332"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor332_332">[332]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p><i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 383 and 405.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_333_333"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor333_333">[333]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>For details see Oncken, Luckwaldt, Thiers, Fain, and the "Mems." +of the Duc de Broglie; also Gentz, "Briefe an Pilat," of July +16th-22nd, 1813. Humboldt, the Prussian ambassador, reported on +July 13th to Berlin that Metternich looked on war as quite +unavoidable, and on the Congress merely as a means of convincing +the Emperor Francis of the impossibility of gaining a lasting +peace.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_334_334"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor334_334">[334]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiers; Ernouf's "Maret, Duc de Bassano," p. 571.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_335_335"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor335_335">[335]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bignon "Hist. de France," vol. xii., p. 199; Lefebvre, "Cabinets +de l'Europe," vol. v., p. 555.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_336_336"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor336_336">[336]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of July 29th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_337_337"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor337_337">[337]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Gentz to Sir G. Jackson, August 4th ("Bath Archives," vol. ii., +p. 199). For a version flattering to Napoleon, see Ernouf's "Maret" +(pp. 579-587), which certainly exculpates the Minister.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_338_338"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor338_338">[338]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Metternich, "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 546 (Eng. ed.).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_339_339"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor339_339">[339]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," Russia, No. 86. A letter of General Nugent (July 27th), +from Prague, is inclosed. When he (N.) expressed to Metternich the +fear that Caulaincourt's arrival there portended peace, M. replied +that this would make no alteration, "as the proposals were such +that they certainly would not be accepted, and they would even be +augmented."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_340_340"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor340_340">[340]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Souvenirs du Duc de Broglie," vol. i., ch. v.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_341_341"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor341_341">[341]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>British aims at this time are well set forth in the instructions +and the accompanying note to Lord Aberdeen, our ambassador +designate at Vienna, dated Foreign Office, August 6th, 1813: " ... +Your Lordship will collect from these instructions that a general +peace, in order to provide adequately for the tranquillity and +independence of Europe, ought, in the judgment of His Majesty's +Government, to confine France at least within the Pyrenees, the +Alps, and the Rhine: and if the other Great Powers of Europe should +feel themselves enabled to contend for such a Peace, Great Britain +is fully prepared to concur with them in such a line of policy. If, +however, the Powers most immediately concerned should determine, +rather than encounter the risks of a more protracted struggle, to +trust for their own security to a more imperfect arrangement, it +never has been the policy of the British Government to attempt to +dictate to other States a perseverance in war, which they did not +themselves recognize to be essential to their own as well as to the +common safety." As regards details, we desired to see the +restoration of Venetia to Austria, of the Papal States to the Pope, +of the north-west of Italy to the King of Sardinia, but trusted +that "a liberal establishment" might be found for Murat in the +centre of Italy. Napoleon knew that we desired to limit France to +the "natural frontiers" and that we were resolved to insist on our +maritime claims. As our Government took this unpopular line, and +went further than Austria in its plans for restricting French +influence, he had an excellent opportunity for separating the +Continental Powers from us. But he gave out that those Powers were +bought by England, and that we were bent on humiliating France.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_342_342"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor342_342">[342]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Boyen, "Erinnerungen," Pt. III., p. 66.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_343_343"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor343_343">[343]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Fain, vol. ii., p. 27. The italicized words are given thus by +him; but they read like a later excuse for Napoleon's failures.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_344_344"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor344_344">[344]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany," p. 195.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_345_345"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor345_345">[345]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>In his letters of August 16th to Macdonald and Ney he assumed +that the allies might strike at Dresden, or even as far west as +Zwickau: but meanwhile he would march "pour enlever +Blücher."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_346_346"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor346_346">[346]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites de Napoléon." The Emperor +forwarded this suggestion to Savary (August 11th): it doubtless +meant an issue of false paper notes, such as had been circulated in +Russia the year before.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_347_347"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor347_347">[347]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Cathcart, "Commentaries," p. 206.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_348_348"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor348_348">[348]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Extrait d'un Mémoire sur la Campagne de 1813." With +characteristic inaccuracy Marbot remarks that the defection of +Jomini, <i>with Napoleon's plans</i>, was "a disastrous blow." The +same is said by Dedem de Gelder, p. 328.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_349_349"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor349_349">[349]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>The Emperor's eagerness is seen by the fact that on August 21st +he began dictating despatches, at Lauban, at 3 a.m. On the previous +day he had dictated seventeen despatches; twelve at Zittau, four +after his ride to Görlitz, and one more on his arrival at +Lauban at midnight.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_350_350"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor350_350">[350]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letters of August 23rd to Berthier.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_351_351"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor351_351">[351]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Boyen, vol. iii., p. 85. But see Wiehr, "Nap. und Bernadotte in +1813," who proves how risky was B.'s position, with the Oder +fortresses, held by the French, on one flank, and Davoust and the +Danes on the other. He disposes of many of the German slanders +against Bernadotte.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_352_352"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor352_352">[352]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Hausser, pp. 260-267. Oudinot's "Memoirs" throw the blame on the +slowness of Bertrand in effecting the concentration on Grossbeeren +and on the heedless impetuosity of Reynier. Wiehr (pp. 74-116) +proves from despatches that Bernadotte meant to attack the French +<i>south of Berlin</i>: he discredits the "bones" anecdote.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_353_353"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor353_353">[353]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letters of August 23rd.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_354_354"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor354_354">[354]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>So called to distinguish it from the two other Neisses in +Silesia.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_355_355"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor355_355">[355]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Blasendorfs "Blücher"; Müffling's "Aus meinem Leben" +and "Campaigns of the Silesian Army in 1813 and 1814"; Bertin's "La +Campagne de 1813." Hausser assigns to the French close on 60,000 at +the battle; to the allies about 70,000.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_356_356"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor356_356">[356]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Jomini, "Vie de Napoléon," vol. iv., p. 380; "Toll," vol. +iii., p. 124.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_357_357"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor357_357">[357]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Toll," vol. iii., p. 144. Cathcart reports (p. 216) that Moreau +remarked to him: "We are already on Napoleon's communications; the +possession of the town [Dresden] is no object; it will fall of +itself at a future time." If Moreau said this seriously it can only +be called a piece of imbecility. The allies were far from safe +until they had wrested from Napoleon one of his strong places on +the Elbe; it was certainly not enough to have seized Pirna.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_358_358"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor358_358">[358]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp." No. 20461.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_359_359"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor359_359">[359]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Cathcart's "Commentaries," p. 230: Bertin, "La Campagne de +1813," p. 109; Marmont, "Mems.," bk. xvii.; Sir Evelyn Wood's +"Achievements of Cavalry."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_360_360"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor360_360">[360]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>It is clear from Napoleon's letters of the evening of the 27th +that he was not quite pleased with the day's work, and thought the +enemy would hold firm, or even renew the attack on the morrow. They +disprove Thiers' wild statements about a general pursuit on that +evening, thousands of prisoners swept up, etc.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_361_361"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor361_361">[361]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Vandamme on the 28th received a reinforcement of eighteen +battalions, and thenceforth had in all sixty-four; yet Marbot +credits him with only 20,000 men.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_362_362"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor362_362">[362]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiers gives Berthier's despatch in full. See also map, p. +336.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_363_363"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor363_363">[363]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Marmont, bk. xvii., p. 158. He and St. Cyr ("Mems.," vol. iv., +pp. 120-123) agree as to the confusion of their corps when crowded +together on this road. Napoleon's aim was to insure the capture of +all the enemy's cannon and stores; but his hasty orders had the +effect of blocking the pursuit on the middle road. St. Cyr sent to +headquarters for instruction; but these were now removed to +Dresden; hence the fatal delay.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_364_364"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor364_364">[364]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiers has shown that Mortier did not get the order from +Berthier to support Vandamme <i>until August 30th</i>. The same is +true of St. Cyr, who did not get it till 11.30 a.m. on that day. +St. Cyr's best defence is Napoleon's letter of September 1st to him +("Lettres inédites de Napoléon"): "That unhappy +Vandamme, who seems to have killed himself, had not a sentinel on +the mountains, nor a reserve anywhere.... I had given him positive +orders to intrench himself on the heights, to encamp his troops on +them, and only to send isolated parties of men into Bohemia to +worry the enemy and collect news." With this compare Napoleon's +approving statement of August 29th to Murat ("Corresp.," No. +20486): "Vandamme was marching on Teplitz <i>with all his +corps</i>."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_365_365"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor365_365">[365]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites de Napoléon," September 3rd.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_366_366"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor366_366">[366]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Häusser, vol. iv., p. 343, and Boyen, "Erinnerungen," vol. +ii., pp. 345-357, for Bernadotte's suspicious delays on this day; +also Marmont, bk. xviii., for a critique on Ney. Napoleon sent for +Lejeune, then leading a division of Ney's army, to explain the +disaster; but when Lejeune reached the headquarters at Dohna, south +of Dresden, the Emperor bade him instantly return—a proof of +his impatience and anger at these reverses.</p> +</div> + +<p>[Footnote 367: Thornton, our envoy at Bernadotte's headquarters, +wrote to Castlereagh that that leader's desire was to spare the +Swedish corps; he expected that Bernadotte would aim at the French +crown ("Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. i., pp. 48-59). See +too Boyen, vol. ii., p. 378.]</p> + +<a name="Foot2note_368_368"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor368_368">[368]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of October 10th to Reynier. This and his letter to Maret +seem to me to refute Bernhardi's contention ("Toll," vol. iii., pp. +385-388) that Napoleon only meant to drive the northern allies +across the Elbe, and then to turn on Schwarzenberg. The Emperor's +plans shifted every few hours: but the plan of crossing the Elbe in +great force was distinctly prepared for.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_369_369"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor369_369">[369]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiers asserts that he had. But if so, how could the Emperor +have written to Macdonald (October 2nd) that the Silesian army had +made a move on Grossenhain: "It appears that this is so as to +attack the intrenched camp [ at Dresden] by the side of the plain, +by the roads of Berlin and Meissen."? On the same day he scoffs at +Lefebre-Desnoëttes for writing that Bernadotte had crossed the +Elbe, and retorts that if he had, it would be so much the worse for +him: the war would soon be over.}</p> + +<p><a name="Foot2note_370_370"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor370_370">[370]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of October 10th to Reynier. This and his letter to Maret +seem to me to refute Bernhardi's contention ("Toll," vol. iii., pp. +385-388) that Napoleon only meant to drive the northern allies +across the Elbe, and then to turn on Schwarzenberg. The Emperor's +plans shifted every few hours: but the plan of crossing the Elbe in +great force was distinctly prepared for.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Foot2note_371_371"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor371_371">[371]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Martens, "Traités," vol. ix., p. 610. This secret bargain +cut the ground from under the German unionists, like Stein, who +desired to make away with the secondary princes, or strictly to +limit their powers.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Foot2note_372_372"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor372_372">[372]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiers and Bernhardi ("Toll," vol. iii., p. 388) have disposed +of this fiction.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Foot2note_373_373"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor373_373">[373]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Sir E. Wood, "Achievements of Cavalry."</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Foot2note_374_374"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor374_374">[374]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Corresp.," No. 20814. Marmont, vol. v., p. 281, acutely remarks +that Napoleon now regarded as true only that which entered into his +combinations and his thoughts.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Foot2note_375_375"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor375_375">[375]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bernadotte was only hindered from retreat across the Elbe by the +remonstrances of his officers, by the forward move of Blücher, +and by the fact that the Elbe bridges were now held by the French. +For the council of war at Köthen on October 14th, see Boyen, +vol. ii., p. 377.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Foot2note_376_376"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor376_376">[376]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Müffling, "Campaign of 1813."</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Foot2note_377_377"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor377_377">[377]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Colonel Lowe, who was present, says it was won and lost five +times (unpublished "Memoirs").</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Foot2note_378_378"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor378_378">[378]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Napoleon's bulletin of October 16th, 1813, blames Ney for this +waste of a great corps; but it is clear, from the official orders +published by Marmont (vol. v., pp. 373-378), that Napoleon did not +expect any pitched battle on the north side on the 16th. He thought +Bertrand's corps would suffice to defend the north and west, and +left the defence on that side in a singularly vague state.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Foot2note_379_379"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor379_379">[379]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Dedem de Gelder, "Mems.," p. 345, severely blames Napoleon's +inaction on the 17th; either he should have attacked the allies +before Bennigsen and Bernadotte came up, or have retreated while +there was time.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Foot2note_380_380"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor380_380">[380]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lord Burghersh, Sir George Jackson, Odeleben, and Fain all +assign this conversation to the night of the 16th; but Merveldt's +official account of it (inclosed with Lord Cathcart's despatches), +gives it as on October 17th, at 2 p.m. ("F.O.," Russia, No. 86). I +follow this version rather than that given by Fain.</p> +</div> + +<br> +<br> +<p><a name="Foot2note_381_381"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor381_381">[381]</a></p> + +<div class="note"> +<p>That the British Ministers did not intend anything of the kind, +even in the hour of triumph, is seen by Castlereagh's despatch of +November 13th, 1813, to Lord Aberdeen, our envoy at the Austrian +Court: "We don't wish to impose any dishonourable condition upon +France, which limiting the number of her ships would be: but she +must not be left in possession of this point [Antwerp]" +("Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. i., p. 76).</p> +</div> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_382_382"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor382_382">[382]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Boyen describes the surprising effects of the fire of the +British rocket battery that served in Bernadotte's army. Captain +Bogue brought it forward to check the charge of a French column +against the Swedes. He was shot down, but Lieutenant Strangways +poured in so hot a fire that the column was "blown asunder like an +ant-heap," the men rushing back to cover amidst the loud laughter +of the allies.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_383_383"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor383_383">[383]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>The premature explosion was of course due, not to Napoleon, but +to the flurry of a serjeant and the skilful flanking move of +Sacken's light troops, for which see Cathcart and Marmont. The +losses at Leipzig were rendered heavier by Napoleon's humane +refusal to set fire to the suburbs so as to keep off the allies. He +rightly said he could have saved many thousand French had he done +so. This is true. But it is strange that he had given no order for +the construction of other bridges. Pelet and Fain affirm that he +gave a verbal order; but, as Marbot explains, Berthier, the Chief +of the Staff, had adopted the pedantic custom of never acting on +anything less than <i>a written order</i>, which was not given. The +neglect to secure means for retreat is all the stranger as the +final miseries at the Beresina were largely due to official +blundering of the same kind. Wellington's criticism on Napoleon's +tactics at Leipzig is severe (despatch of January 10th, 1814): "If +Bonaparte had not placed himself in a position that every other +officer would have avoided, and remained in it longer than was +consistent with any ideas of prudence, he would have retired in +such a state that the allies could not have ventured to approach +the Rhine."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_384_384"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor384_384">[384]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Sir Charles Stewart wrote (March 22nd, 1814): "On the Elbe +Napoleon was quite insane, and his lengthened stay there was the +cause of the Battle of Leipzig and all his subsequent misfortunes" +("Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 373).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_385_385"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor385_385">[385]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Napier, vol. v., pp. 368-378.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_386_386"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor386_386">[386]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>On November 10th Lord Aberdeen, our ambassador at the Austrian +Court, wrote to Castlereagh: " ... As soon as he [Murat] received +the last communication addressed to him by Prince Metternich and +myself at Prague, he wrote to Napoleon and stated that the affairs +of his kingdom absolutely demanded his presence. Without waiting +for any answer, he immediately began his journey, and did not halt +a moment till he arrived at Basle. While on the road he sent a +cyphered dispatch to Prince Cariati, his Minister at Vienna, in +which he informs him that he hopes to be at Naples on the 4th of +this month: that he burns with desire to revenge himself of +[<i>sic</i>] all the injuries he has received from Bonaparte, and +to connect himself with the cause of the allies in contending for a +just and stable peace. He proposes to declare war on the instant of +his arrival." Again, on December 19th, Aberdeen writes: "You may +consider the affair of Murat as settled.... It will probably end in +Austria agreeing to his having a change of frontier on the Papal +territory, just enough to satisfy his vanity and enable him to show +something to his people. I doubt much if it will be possible, with +the claims of Sicily, Sardinia, and Austria herself in the north of +Italy, to restore to him the three Legations: but something +adequate must be done" ("Austria," No. 102). The disputes between +Murat and Napoleon will be cleared up in Baron Lumbroso's +forthcoming work, "Murat." Meanwhile see Bignon, vol. xiii., pp. +181 <i>et seq.</i>; Desvernois, "Mems.," ch. xx.; and Chaptal (p. +305), for Fouché's treacherous advice to Murat.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_387_387"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor387_387">[387]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lady Burghersh's "Journal," p. 182.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_388_388"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor388_388">[388]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Fain, "Manuscrit de 1814," pp. 48-63. Ernouf, "Vie de Maret," p. +606, states that Napoleon touched up Maret's note; the sentence +quoted above is doubtless the Emperor's. The same author proves +that Maret's advice had always been more pacific than was supposed, +and that now, in his old position of Secretary of State, he gave +Caulaincourt valuable help during the negotiations at +Châtillon.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_389_389"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor389_389">[389]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. i., p. 74. This was +written, of course, before he heard of the Frankfurt proposals; but +it anticipates them in a remarkable way. Thiers states that +Castlereagh, after hearing of them, sent Aberdeen new instructions. +I cannot find any in our archives. This letter warned Aberdeen +against any compromise on the subject of Antwerp; but it is clear +that Castlereagh, when he came to the allied headquarters, was a +partisan of peace, as compared with the Czar and the Prussian +patriots. Schwarzenberg wrote (January 26th) at Langres: "We ought +to make peace here: our Kaiser, also Stadion, Metternich, even +Castlereagh, are fully of this opinion—but Kaiser +Alexander!"</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_390_390"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor390_390">[390]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Fournier, "Der Congress von Châtillon," p. 242.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_391_391"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor391_391">[391]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Castlereagh Papers," <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 112.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_392_392"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor392_392">[392]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Metternich. "Memoirs," vol. i., p. 214.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_393_393"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor393_393">[393]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," Austria, No. 102.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_394_394"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor394_394">[394]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites" (November 6th, 1813).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_395_395"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor395_395">[395]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>The memorandum is endorsed, "Extract of Instructions delivered +to me by Gen. Pozzo di Borgo, 18 Dec, 1813" ("Russia," No. 92).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_396_396"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor396_396">[396]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Metternich's letter to Hudelist, in Fournier, p. 242.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_397_397"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor397_397">[397]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Houssaye's "1814," p. 14; Metternich, "Memoirs," vol. i., p. +308.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_398_398"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor398_398">[398]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Our success and everything depend upon our moderation and +justice," he wrote to Lord Bathurst (Napier, bk. xxiii., ch. +ii.).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_399_399"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor399_399">[399]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites" (November 12th). The date is +important: it refutes Napier's statement (bk. xxiii., ch. iv.) that +the Emperor had planned that Ferdinand should enter Spain early in +November when the disputes between Wellington and the Cortès +at Madrid were at their height. Bignon (vol. xiii., p. 88 <i>et +seq.</i>) says that Talleyrand's indiscretion revealed the +negotiations to the Spanish Cortès and Wellington; but our +general's despatches show that he did not hear of them before +January 9th or 10th. He then wrote: "I have long suspected that +Bonaparte would adopt this expedient; and if he had had less pride +and more common sense, it would have succeeded."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_400_400"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor400_400">[400]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>On January 14th the Emperor ordered Soult, as soon as the +ratification of the + +<ins class="correction" title= +"Transcriber's note: original reads 'treatry'">treaty</ins> was +known, to set out northwards from Bayonne "with all his army, only +leaving what is necessary to form a screen." Suchet was likewise to +hurry with 10,000 foot, <i>en poste</i>, and two-thirds of his +horse, to Lyons. On the 22nd the Emperor blames both Marshals for +not sending off the infantry, though the Spanish treaty had +<i>not</i> been ratified. After long delays Ferdinand set out for +Spain on March 13th, when the war was almost over.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_401_401"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor401_401">[401]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Houssaye's "1814," ch. ii.; Müffling's "Campaign of +1814."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_402_402"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor402_402">[402]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of January 31st to Joseph.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_403_403"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor403_403">[403]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Méms. de Langeron" in Houssaye, p. 62; but see +Müffling.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_404_404"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor404_404">[404]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of February 2nd to Clarke.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_405_405"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor405_405">[405]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Metternich said of Castlereagh, "I can't praise him enough: his +views are most peaceful, in our sense" (Fournier, p. 252).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_406_406"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor406_406">[406]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, January 22nd and 30th, 1814.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_407_407"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor407_407">[407]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter to Hudelist (February 3rd), in Fournier, p. 255.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_408_408"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor408_408">[408]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Stewart's Mem. of January 27th, 1814, in "Castlereagh Papers," +vol. ix., p. 535. On that day Hardenberg noted in his diary: +"Discussion on the plan of operations, and misunderstandings. +Intrigue of Stein to get the army straight to Paris, as the Czar +wants. The Austrians oppose this: others don't know what they want" +(Fournier, p. 361).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_409_409"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor409_409">[409]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Stewart's notes in "Castlereagh Papers," pp. 541-548. On +February 17th Castlereagh promised to give back all our conquests +in the West Indies, except Tobago, and to try to regain for France +Guadaloupe and Cayenne from Sweden and Portugal; also to restore +all the French possessions east of the Cape of Good Hope except the +Iles de France (Mauritius) and de Bourbon (Fournier, p. 381).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_410_410"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor410_410">[410]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letters of January 31st and February 2nd to Joseph.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_411_411"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor411_411">[411]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Printed in Napoleon's "Corresp." of February 17th. I cannot +agree with Ernouf, "Vie de Maret," and Fournier, that Caulaincourt +could have signed peace merely on Maret's "carte blanche" despatch. +The man who had been cruelly duped by Napoleon in the D'Enghien +affair naturally wanted an explicit order now.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_412_412"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor412_412">[412]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Given by Ducasse, "Les Rois Frères de Napoléon," +p. 64.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_413_413"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor413_413">[413]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Hausser, p. 503. According to Napoleon, 6,000 men and forty +cannon were captured!</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_414_414"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor414_414">[414]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of February 18th, 1814.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_415_415"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor415_415">[415]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>At Elba Napoleon told Colonel Campbell that he would have made +peace at Châtillon had not England insisted on his giving up +Antwerp, and that England was therefore the cause of the war +continuing. This letter, however, proves that he was as set on +retaining Mainz as Antwerp. Caulaincourt then wished him to make +peace while he could do so with credit ("Castlereagh Papers," vol. +ix., p. 287).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_416_416"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor416_416">[416]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Fournier, pp. 132-137, 284-294, 299.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_417_417"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor417_417">[417]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See Metternich's letter to Stadion of February 15th in Fournier, +pp. 319, 327.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_418_418"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor418_418">[418]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Houssaye, p. 102.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_419_419"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor419_419">[419]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Instructions of February 24th to Flahaut, "Corresp.," No. 21359; +Hardenberg's "Diary," in Fournier, pp. 363-364.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_420_420"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor420_420">[420]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Fournier, pp. 170, 385.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_421_421"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor421_421">[421]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p><i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 178-181, 304; Martens, vol. ix., p. 683. +Castlereagh, vol. ix., p. 336, calls it "my treaty," and adds that +England was practically supplying 300,000 men to the Coalition. One +secret article invited Spain and Sweden to accede to the treaty; +another stated that Germany was to consist of a federation of +sovereign princes, that Holland must receive a "suitable" military +frontier, and that Italy, Spain, and Switzerland must be +independent, that is, of France; a third bound the allies to keep +their armies on a war footing for a suitable time after the +peace.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_422_422"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor422_422">[422]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See his instructions of March 2nd to Caulaincourt: "Nothing will +bring France to do anything that degrades her national character +and deposes her from the rank she has held in the world for +centuries." But it was precisely that rank which the allies were +resolved to assign to her, neither more nor less. The joint allied +note of February 29th to the negotiators at Châtillon bade +them "announce to the French negotiator that you are ready to +discuss, in a spirit of conciliation, every modification that he +might be authorized to propose"; but that any essential departure +from the terms already proposed by them must lead to a rupture of +the negotiations.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_423_423"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor423_423">[423]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letters of March 2nd, 3rd, 4th, to Clarke.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_424_424"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor424_424">[424]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Houssaye, p. 156, note. So too Müffling, "Aus meinem +Leben," shows that Blücher could have crossed the Aisne there +or at Pontavaire or Berry-au-Bac.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_425_425"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor425_425">[425]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See Napoleon's letters to Clarke of March 4th-6th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_426_426"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor426_426">[426]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Houssaye, pp. 176-188.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_427_427"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor427_427">[427]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Müffling says that Blücher and Gneisenau feared an +attack by <i>Bernadotte</i> on their rear. Napoleon on February +25th advised Joseph to try and gain over that prince, who had some +very suspicious relations with the French General Maison in +Belgium. Probably Gneisenau wished to spare his men for political +reasons.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_428_428"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor428_428">[428]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. iv., p. 697. Lord Burghersh wrote from +Troyes (March 12th): "I am convinced this army will not be risked +in a general action.... S. would almost wish to be back upon the +Rhine." So again on the 19th he wrote to Colonel Hudson Lowe from +Pougy: "I cannot say much for our activity; I am unable to explain +the causes of our apathy—the facts are too evident to be +disputed. We have been ten days at Troyes, one at Pont-sur-Seine, +two at Arcis, and are now at this place. We go tomorrow to Brienne" +("Unpublished Mems. of Sir H. Lowe"). Stewart wittily said that +Napoleon came to Arcis to feel Schwarzenberg's pulse.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_429_429"></a> +<a href="#FN2anchor429_429">[429]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letters of March 20th to Clarke.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_430_430"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor430_430">[430]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., pp. 325, 332.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_431_431"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor431_431">[431]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>These letters were written in pairs—the one being +official, the other confidential. Caulaincourt's replies show that +he appreciated them highly (see Fain, Appendix).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_432_432"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor432_432">[432]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>From Caulaincourt's letter of March 3rd to Napoleon; Bignon, +vol. xiii., p. 379.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_433_433"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor433_433">[433]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 555.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_434_434"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor434_434">[434]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., pp. 335, 559. Caulaincourt's +project of March 15th much resembled that dictated by Napoleon +three days later; Austria was to have Venetia as far as the Adige, +the kingdom of Italy to go to Eugène, and the duchy of +Warsaw to the King of Saxony, etc. The allies rejected it (Fain, p. +388).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_435_435"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor435_435">[435]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Fournier, p. 232, rebuts, and I think successfully, Houssaye's +objections (p. 287) to its genuineness. Besides, the letter is on +the same moral level with the instructions of January 4th to +Caulaincourt, and resembles them in many respects. No forger could +have known of those instructions. At Elba, Napoleon admitted that +he was wrong in not making peace at this time. "<i>Mais je me +croyais assez fort pour ne pas la faire, et je me suis +trompé</i>" (Lord Holland's "Foreign Rem.," p. 319). The +same writer states (p. 296) that he saw the official correspondence +about Châtillon: it gave him the highest opinion of +Caulaincourt, but N.'s conduct was "full of subterfuge and +artifice."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_436_436"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor436_436">[436]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Castlereagh to Clancarty, March 18th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_437_437"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor437_437">[437]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Napier, bk. xxiv., ch. iii. Wellington seems to have thought +that the allies would probably make peace with Napoleon.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_438_438"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor438_438">[438]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Broglie, "Mems.," bk. iii., ch. i.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_439_439"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor439_439">[439]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Letter of February 25th to Joseph. Thiébault gives us an +odd story that Bernadotte sent an agent, Rainville, to persuade +Davoust to join him in attacking the rear of the allies; but that +Rainville's nerve so forsook him in Davoust's presence that he +turned and bolted for his life!</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_440_440"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor440_440">[440]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Caulaincourt to Metternich on March 25th: "Arrived only this +[last] night near the Emperor, His Majesty has ... given me all the +powers necessary to sign peace with the Ministers of the allied +Courts" (Fain, p. 345; Ernouf, "Vie de Maret," p. 634).</p> + +<p>Thiers does not mention these overtures of Napoleon, which are +surely most characteristic. His whole eastward move was motived by +them. Efforts have been made (<i>e.g.</i>, by M. de Bacourt in +Talleyrand's "Mems.," pt. vii., app. 4) to prove that on the 25th +Napoleon was ready to agree to all the allied terms, and thus +concede more than was done by Louis XVIII. But there is no proof +that he meant to do anything of the sort. The terms of +Caulaincourt's note were perfectly vague. Moreover, even on the +28th, when Napoleon was getting alarmed, he had an interview with a +captured Austrian diplomatist, Wessenberg, whom he set free in +order that he might confer with the Emperor Francis. He told the +envoy that France would yet give him support: he wanted the natural +frontiers, but would probably make peace on less favourable terms, +as he wished to end the war: "I am ready to renounce all the French +colonies if I can thereby keep the mouth of the Scheldt for France. +England will not insist on my sacrificing Antwerp if Austria does +not support her" (Arneth's "Wessenberg," vol. i., p. 188). This +extract shows no great desire to meet the allied terms, but rather +to separate Austria from her allies. According to Lady Burghersh +("Journals," p. 216), Napoleon admitted to Wessenberg that his +position was desperate. I think this was a pleasing fiction of that +envoy. There is no proof that Napoleon was wholly cast down till +the 29th, when he heard of La Fère Champenoise (Macdonald's +"Souvenirs").</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_441_441"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor441_441">[441]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bignon, vol. xiii., pp. 436, 437.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_442_442"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor442_442">[442]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>On hearing of their withdrawal Stein was radiant with joy: "Now, +he said, the Czar will go on to Paris, and all will soon be at an +end" (Tourgueneff quoted by Häusser, vol. iv., p. 553).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_443_443"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor443_443">[443]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. iv., pp. 737 <i>et seq.</i>; Houssaye, +pp. 354-362; also Nesselrode's communication published in +Talleyrand's "Mems." Thielen and Radetzky have claimed that the +initiative in this matter was Schwarzenberg's; and Lord Burghersh, +in his despatch of March 25th ("Austria," No. 110), agrees with +them. Stein supports Toll's claim. I cannot agree with Houssaye (p. +407) that "Napoleon had resigned himself to the sacrifice of +Paris." His intercepted letter, and also the official letters, Nos. +21508, 21513, 21516, 21526, 21538, show that he believed the allies +would retreat and that his communications with Paris would be +safe.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_444_444"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor444_444">[444]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>I take this account largely from Sir Hudson Lowe's unpublished +memoirs. Napoleon blamed Marmont for not marching to Rheims as he +was ordered to do. At Elba, Napoleon told Colonel Campbell that +Marmont's disobedience spoilt the eastern movement, and ruined the +campaign. But had Marmont and Mortier joined Napoleon at Vitry, +Paris would have been absolutely open to the allies.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_445_445"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor445_445">[445]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Houssaye, pp. 485 <i>et seq.</i>; Napoleon's letters of February +8th and March 16th; Mollien, vol. iv., p. 128. In Napoleon's letter +of April 2nd to Joseph ("New Letters") there is not a word of +reproach to Joseph for leaving Paris.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_446_446"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor446_446">[446]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 420; Pasquier, vol. iii., ch. +xiii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_447_447"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor447_447">[447]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>We do not know definitely why Alexander dropped Bernadotte so +suddenly. On March 17th he had assured the royalist agent, Baron de +Vitrolles, that he would not hear of the Bourbons, and that he had +first thought of establishing Bernadotte in France, and then +Eugène. We do know, however, that Bernadotte had made +suspicious overtures to the French General Maison in Belgium +("Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., pp. 383, 445, 512).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_448_448"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor448_448">[448]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>De Pradt, "Restauration de la Royauté, le 31 Mars, 1814"; +Pasquier, vol. iii., ch. xiii. Vitrolles ("Mems.," vol. i., pp. +95-101) says that Metternich assured him on March 15th that Austria +would not insist on the Regency of Marie Louise, but would listen +to the wishes of France.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_449_449"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor449_449">[449]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>For the first draft of this Declaration, see "Corresp.," No. +21555 (note).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_450_450"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor450_450">[450]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Pasquier, vol. iii., ch. xv.; Macdonald, "Souvenirs."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_451_451"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor451_451">[451]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Houssaye, pp. 593-623; Marmont, vol. vi., pp. 254-272; +Macdonald, chs. xxvii.-xxviii. At Elba, Napoleon told Lord +Ebrington that Marmont's troops were among the best, and his +treachery ruined everything ("Macmillan's Mag.," Dec, 1894).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_452_452"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor452_452">[452]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Pasquier, vol. iii., ch. xvi.; "Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., +p. 442. Alison wrongly says that <i>Napoleon</i> chose Elba.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_453_453"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor453_453">[453]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Martens, vol. ix., p. 696.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_454_454"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor454_454">[454]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Thiers and Constant assign this event to the night of 11th-12th. +I follow Fain and Macdonald in referring it to the next night.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_455_455"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor455_455">[455]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bausset, "Cour de Napoléon."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_456_456"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor456_456">[456]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Sir Neil Campbell's "Journal," p. 192.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_457_457"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor457_457">[457]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Ussher, "Napoleon's Last Voyages," p. 29.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_458_458"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor458_458">[458]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>A quondam Jacobin, Pons (de l'Hérault), Commissioner of +Mines at Elba, has left "Souvenirs de l'Ile d'Elbe," which are of +colossal credulity. In chap. xi. he gives tales of plots to murder +Napoleon—some of them very silly. In part ii., chap, i., he +styles him "essentiellement réligieux," and a most +tender-hearted man, who was compelled by prudence to hide his +sensibility! Yet Campbell's official reports show that Pons, <i>at +that time</i>, was far from admiring Napoleon.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_459_459"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor459_459">[459]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," Austria, No. 117. Talleyrand, in his letters to Louis +XVIII., claims to have broken up the compact of the Powers. But it +is clear that fear of Russia was more potent than Talleyrand's +<i>finesse</i>. Before the Congress began Castlereagh and +Wellington advised friendship with France so as to check "undue +pretensions" elsewhere.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_460_460"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor460_460">[460]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Stanhope's "Conversations," p. 26. In our archives ("Russia," +No. 95) is a suspicious letter of Pozzo di Borgo, dated Paris, July +10/22, 1814, to Castlereagh (it is not in his Letters) containing +this sentence: "<i>L'existence de Napoléon</i>, comme il +était aisé à prévoir, est un +inconvénient qui se rencontre partout." For Fouché's +letter to Napoleon, begging him voluntarily to retire to the New +World, see Talleyrand's "Mems.," pt. vii., app. iv. Lafayette +("Mems.," vol. v., p. 345) asserts that French royalists were +plotting his assassination. Brulart, Governor of Corsica, was +suspected by Napoleon, but, it seems, wrongly (Houssaye's "1815," +p. 172).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_461_461"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor461_461">[461]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Pallain, "Correspondance de Louis XVIII avec Talleyrand," pp. +307, 316.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_462_462"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor462_462">[462]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Recollections," p. 16; "F.O.," France, No. 114. The facts given +above seem to me to refute the statements often made that the +allies violated the Elba arrangement and so justified his escape. +The facts prove that the allies sought to compel Louis XVIII. to +pay Napoleon the stipulated sum, and that the Emperor welcomed the +non-payment. His words to Lord Ebrington on December 6th breathe +the conviction that France would soon rise.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_463_463"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor463_463">[463]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Fleury de Chaboulon's "Mems.," vol. i., pp. 105-140; Lafayette, +vol. v., p. 355.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_464_464"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor464_464">[464]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Campbell's "Journal"; Peyrusse, "Mémorial," p. 275.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_465_465"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor465_465">[465]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Houssaye's "1815," p. 277.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_466_466"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor466_466">[466]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Guizot, "Mems.," ch. iii.; De Broglie, "Mems.," bk. ii., ch. +ii.; Fleury, vol. i., p. 259.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_467_467"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor467_467">[467]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Peyrusse, "Mémorial," p. 277.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_468_468"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor468_468">[468]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>As Wellington pointed out ("Despatches," May 5th, 1815), the +phrase "il s'est livré à la vindicte publique" +denotes public justice, <i>not</i> public vengeance. At St. Helena, +Napoleon told Gourgaud that he came back <i>too soon</i> from Elba, +<i>believing that the Congress had dissolved!</i> (Gourgaud's +"Journals," vol. ii., p. 323.)</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_469_469"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor469_469">[469]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Diary," April 15th and 18th, 1815.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_470_470"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor470_470">[470]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Parl. Debates"; Romilly's "Diary," vol. ii., p. 360.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_471_471"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor471_471">[471]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Napoleon told Cockburn during his last voyage that he bestowed +this constitution, not because it was a wise measure, but as a +needful concession to popular feeling. The continental peoples were +not fit for representative government as England was ("Last Voyages +of Nap.," pp. 115, 137). So, too, he said to Gourgaud he was wrong +in summoning the Chambers at all "<i>especially as I meant to +dismiss them as soon as I was a conqueror</i>" (Gourgaud, +"Journal," vol. i., p. 93).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_472_472"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor472_472">[472]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Mercer's "Waterloo Campaign," vol. i., p. 352. For Fleury de +Chaboulon's mission to sound Austria, see his "Mems.," vol. ii., +and Madelin's "Fouché," ch. xxv.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_473_473"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor473_473">[473]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>In the "English Hist. Review" for July, 1901, I have published +the correspondence between Sir Hudson Lowe (Quartermaster-General +of our forces in Belgium up to May, 1815) and Gneisenau, +Müffling, and Kleist. These two last were <i>most +reluctant</i> to send forward Prussian troops into Belgium to guard +the weak frontier fortresses from a <i>coup de main</i>: but Lowe's +arguments prevailed, thus deciding the main features of the +war.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_474_474"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor474_474">[474]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," France, No. 116. On June 9th the Duke charged Stuart, +our envoy at Ghent, to defend this course, on the ground that +Blücher and he had many raw troops, and could not advance into +France with safety and invest fortresses until the Russians and +Austrians co-operated.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_475_475"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor475_475">[475]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Sir H. Vivian states ("Waterloo Letters," No. 70) that the Duke +intended to give a ball on June 21st, the anniversary of Vittoria. +See too Sir E. Wood's "Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign," ch. +ii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_476_476"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor476_476">[476]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," France, No. 115. A French royalist sent a report, dated +June 1st, recommending "point d'engagement avec Bonaparte.... Il +faut user l'armée de Bonaparte: elle ne peut plus se +recruter."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_477_477"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor477_477">[477]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Ropes's "Campaign of Waterloo," ch. v.; Chesney, "Waterloo +Lectures," p. 100; Sir H. Maxwell's "Wellington" (vol. ii., p. 14); +and O'Connor Morris, "Campaign of 1815," p. 97.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_478_478"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor478_478">[478]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Janin, "Campagne de Waterloo," p. 7.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_479_479"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor479_479">[479]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Pétiet, "Souvenirs militaires," p. 195.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_480_480"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor480_480">[480]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Credit is primarily due to Constant de Rebecque, a Belgian, +chief of staff to the Prince of Orange, for altering the point of +concentration from Nivelles, as ordered by Wellington, to Quatre +Bras; also to General Perponcher for supporting the new movement. +The Belgian side of the campaign has been well set forth by Boulger +in "The Belgians at Waterloo" (1901).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_481_481"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor481_481">[481]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Gourgaud, "Campagne de 1815," ch. iv.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_482_482"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor482_482">[482]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Houssaye, "1815," pp. 133-138, 186, notes.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_483_483"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor483_483">[483]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Hamley, "Operations of War," p. 187.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_484_484"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor484_484">[484]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>For Gérard's delays see Houssaye, p. 158, and Horsburgh, +"Waterloo," p. 36. Napoleon's tardiness is scarcely noticed by +Houssaye or by Gourgaud; but it has been censured by Jomini, +Charras, Clausewitz, and Lord Wolseley.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_485_485"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor485_485">[485]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Ollech (p. 125) sees in it a conditional offer of help to +Blücher. But on what ground? It states that the Prince of +Orange has one division at Quatre Bras and other troops at +Nivelles: that the British reserve would reach Genappe at noon, and +their cavalry Nivelles at the same hour. How could Blücher +hope for help from forces so weak and scattered? See too Ropes +(note to ch. x.). Horsburgh (ch. v.) shows that Wellington believed +his forces to be more to the front than they were: he traces the +error to De Lancey, chief of the staff. But it is fair to add that +Wellington thought very highly of De Lancey, and after his death at +Waterloo severely blamed subordinates.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_486_486"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor486_486">[486]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Stanhope, "Conversations," p. 109.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_487_487"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor487_487">[487]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Reiche, "Memoiren," vol. ii., p. 183.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_488_488"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor488_488">[488]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>The term <i>corps</i> is significant. Not till 3.15 did Soult +use the term <i>armée</i> in speaking of Blücher's +forces. The last important sentence of the 2 p.m. despatch is not +given by Houssaye (p. 159), but is printed by Ropes (p. 383), +Siborne (vol. i., p. 453), Charras (vol. i., p. 136), and Ollech +(p. 131). It proves that <i>as late as 2 p.m.</i> Napoleon expected +an easy victory over the Prussians.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_489_489"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor489_489">[489]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>The best authorities give the Prussians 87,000 men, and the +French 78,000; but the latter estimate includes the corps of Lobau, +10,000 strong, which did not reach Fleurus till dark.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_490_490"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor490_490">[490]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>I follow Houssaye's solution of this puzzle as the least +unsatisfacty, but it does not show why Napoleon should have been so +perplexed. D'Erlon debouched from the wood of Villers Perwin +<i>exactly where he might have been expected</i>. Was Napoleon +puzzled because the corps was heading south-east instead of +east?</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_491_491"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor491_491">[491]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Delbrück ("Gneisenau," vol. ii., p. 190) shows how the +storm favoured the attack.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_492_492"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor492_492">[492]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>I here follow Delbrück's "Gneisenau" (vol. ii., p. 194) and +Charras (vol. i., p. 163). Reiche ("Mems.," vol ii., p. 193) says +that his corps of 30,800 men lost 12,480 on the 15th and 16th: he +notes that Blücher and Nostitz probably owed their escape to +the plainness of their uniforms and headgear.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_493_493"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor493_493">[493]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Waterloo Letters," Nos. 163 and 169, prove that the time was 3 +p.m. and not 3.30; see also Kincaid's account in Fitchett's +"Wellington's Men" (p. 120).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_494_494"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor494_494">[494]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Waterloo Letters," No. 169.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_495_495"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor495_495">[495]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See Houssaye, p. 205, for the sequence of these events.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_496_496"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor496_496">[496]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Ollech, pp. 167-171. Colonel Basil Jackson, in his "Waterloo and +St. Helena" (printed for private circulation), p. 64, states that +he had been employed in examining and reporting on the Belgian +roads, and did so on the road leading south from Wavre. This report +had been sent to Gneisenau, and must have given him greater +confidence on the night of the 16th.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_497_497"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor497_497">[497]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>O'Connor Morris, p. 176, approves Napoleon's criticism, and +censures Gneisenau's move on Wavre: but surely Wavre combined more +advantages than any other position. It was accessible for the whole +Prussian army (including Bülow); it was easily defensible (as +the event proved); and it promised a reunion with Wellington for +the defence of Brussels. Houssaye says (p. 233) that Gneisenau did +not at once foresee the immense consequences of his action. Of +course he did not, because he was not sure of Wellington; but he +took all the steps that might lead to immense consequences, if all +went well.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_498_498"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor498_498">[498]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Müffling, "Passages," p. 238: Charras, vol. i., p. 226, +discredits it.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_499_499"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor499_499">[499]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Basil Jackson, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 24; Cotton, "A Voice from +Waterloo," p. 20.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_500_500"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor500_500">[500]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Grouchy suppressed this despatch, but it was published in +1842.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_501_501"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor501_501">[501]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Mercer, vol. i., p. 270.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_502_502"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor502_502">[502]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Pétiet, "Souvenirs militaires," p. 204.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_503_503"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor503_503">[503]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Ropes, pp. 212, 246, 359. I follow the "received" version of +this despatch. For a comparison of it with the "Grouchy" version +see Horsburgh, p. 155, note.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_504_504"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor504_504">[504]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Ropes, pp. 266, 288; Houssaye, p. 316, with a good note.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_505_505"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor505_505">[505]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Ollech, pp. 187-192; Delbrück's "Gneisenau," vol. ii., p. +205. I cannot credit the story told by Hardinge in 1837 to Earl +Stanhope ("Conversations," p. 110), that, on the night of the 16th +June, Gneisenau sought to dissuade Blücher from joining +Wellington. Hardinge only had the story at second hand, and wrongly +assigns it to Wavre. On the afternoon of the 17th Gneisenau ordered +Ziethen <i>to keep open communications with Wellington</i> (Ollech, +p. 170). The story that Wellington rode over to Wavre on the night +of the 18th on his horse "Copenhagen" is of course a myth.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_506_506"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor506_506">[506]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Blackwood's Magazine," October, 1896; "Cornhill," January, +1901.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_507_507"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor507_507">[507]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Beamish's "King's German Legion," vol. ii., p. 352. Sir Hussey +Vivian asserts that the allied position was by no means strong; but +General Kennedy, in his "Notes on Waterloo" (p. 68), pronounces it +"good and well occupied." A year previously Wellington noted it as +a good position. Sir Hudson Lowe then suggested that it should be +fortified: "Query, in respect to the construction of a work at Mt. +Jean, being the commanding point at the junction of two principal +chaussées" ("Unpublished Memoirs").</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_508_508"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor508_508">[508]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Wellington has been censured by Clausewitz, Kennedy and Chesney +for leaving so large a force at Hal. Perhaps he desired to protect +the King of France at Ghent, though he was surely relieved of +responsibility by his despatch of June 18th, 3 a.m., begging the +Duc de Berri to retire with the King to Antwerp. It seems to me +more likely that he was so confident of an early advance of the +Prussians (see his other despatch of the same hour and Sir A. +Frazer's statement—"Letters," p. 553—"We expected the +Prussian co-operation early in the day") as to assume that Napoleon +would stake all on an effort against his right; and in that case +the Hal force would have crushed the French rear, though it was +very far off.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_509_509"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor509_509">[509]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Wellington to Earl Bathurst, June 25th, 1815. The Earl of +Ellesmere, who wrote under the Duke's influence, stated that not +more than 7,000 of the British troops had seen a shot fired. This +is incorrect. Picton's division, still 5,000 strong, was almost +wholly composed of tried troops; and Lambert's brigade counted +2,200 veterans; many of the Guards had seen fire, and the 52nd was +a seasoned regiment. Tomkinson (p. 296) reckons all the 5,220 +British and 1,730 King's German troopers as "efficient," and +Wellington himself, so Mercer affirms, told Blücher he had +6,000 of the finest cavalry in the world.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_510_510"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor510_510">[510]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"A British Rifleman," p. 367.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_511_511"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor511_511">[511]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>I distrust the story told by Zenowicz, and given by Thiers, that +Napoleon at 10 a.m. was awaiting Grouchy with impatience; also +Marbot's letter referred to in his "Memoirs," <i>ad fin.</i>, in +which he says the Emperor bade him push on boldly towards Wavre, as +the troops near St. Lambert "could be nothing else than the corps +of Grouchy." Grouchy's despatch and the official reply show that +Napoleon knew Grouchy to be somewhere between Gembloux and Wavre. +Besides, Bülow's report (Ollech, p. 192) states that, while at +St. Lambert, he sent out two strong patrols to the S.W., and was +not observed by the French, "who appeared to have no idea of our +existence." This completely disposes of Marbot's story.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_512_512"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor512_512">[512]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Houssaye, ch. vii. In the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for October, 1900, +p. 815, Mr. H. George gives a proof of this, citing the time it +took him to pace the roads by which Grouchy might have +advanced.</p> +</div> + +<p>[Footnote 513 "Waterloo Letters," pp. 60-63, 70-77, 81-84, 383. +The whole brigade was hardly 1,000 sabres strong. Sir E. Wood, pp. +126-146; Siborne, vol. ii., pp. 20-45.]</p> + +<a name="Foot2note_514_514"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor514_514">[514]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Houssaye, pp. 354, 499, admits the repulse.</p> +</div> + +<p>[Footnote 515 B. Jackson, p. 34. Müffling says the +defaulters numbered 10,000! While sympathizing with the efforts of +Dutch-Belgian writers on behalf of their kin, I must accept +Jackson's evidence as conclusive here. See also Mr. Oman's article +in "Nineteenth Century," Oct., 1900.]</p> + +<a name="Foot2note_516_516"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor516_516">[516]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>B. Jackson, p. 35; "Waterloo Letters," pp. 129-144, 296; Cotton, +p. 79.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_517_517"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor517_517">[517]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Houssaye, pp. 365, 371-376; Kennedy, pp. 117-120; Mercer, vol. +i., pp. 311-324.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_518_518"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor518_518">[518]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Gourgaud (ch. vi.) states that the time of Lobau's move was +4.30, though he had reconnoitred on his right earlier. Napoleon's +statements on this head at St. Helena are conflicting. One says +that Lobau moved at 1.30, another at 4.30. Perhaps Janin's +statement explains why Lobau did nothing definite till the later +hour.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_519_519"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor519_519">[519]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Baring's account ("King's German Legion," App. xxi.) shows that +the farm was taken about the time of the last great cavalry charge. +Kennedy (p. 122) and Ompteda (<i>ad fin.</i>) are equally explicit; +and the evidence of the French archives adduced by Houssaye (p. +378) places the matter beyond doubt.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_520_520"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor520_520">[520]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Ollech, pp. 243-246. Reiche's exorbitant claims (vol. ii., pp. +209-215) are refuted by "Waterloo Letters," p. 22.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_521_521"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor521_521">[521]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lacoste (Decoster), Napoleon's Flemish guide, told this to Sir +W. Scott, "Life of Napoleon," vol. viii., p. 496.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_522_522"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor522_522">[522]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See Boulger's "The Belgians at Waterloo" (1901), p. 33.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_523_523"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor523_523">[523]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>The formation and force of the French Guards in this attack have +been much discussed. Thiers omits all notice of the second column; +Houssaye limits its force to a single battalion, but his account is +not convincing. On p. 385 he says nine battalions of the Guard +advanced into the valley, but, on p. 389, he accounts only for six. +Other authorities agree that eight joined in the attack. As to +their formation, Houssaye advances many proofs that it was in +hollow squares. Here is one more. On the 19th Basil Jackson rode +along the slope and ridge near the back of Hougoumont and talked +with some of the wounded of the Imperial Guard. "As they lay they +formed large squares, of which the centres were hollow" (p. 57). +Maitland ("Waterloo Letters," p. 244.) says: "There was one great +column at first, which separated into two parts." Gawler (p. 292) +adds that: "The second column was subdivided in two parts, close +together, and that <i>its whole flank was much longer than the +front of our 52nd regiment</i>." It is difficult to reconcile all +this with the attack in hollow squares; but probably the squares +(or oblongs?) followed each other so closely as to seem like a +serried column. None of our men could see whether the masses were +solid or hollow, but naturally assumed them to be solid, and hence +greatly over-estimated their strength. A column made up of hollow +squares is certainly an odd formation, but perhaps is not +unsuitable to withstand cavalry and overthrow infantry.</p> + +<p>I cannot accept Houssaye's statement (p. 393) that the French +squares attacked our front at four different places, from the 52nd +regiment on our right to the Brunswickers in our centre, a quarter +of a mile to the east. The only evidence that favours this is +Macready's ("Waterloo Letters," p. 330); he says that the men who +attacked his square (30th and 73rd regiments) were of the Middle +Guard; for their wounded said so; but Kelly, of the same square, +thought they were Donzelot's men, who certainly attacked there. +Siborne, seemingly on the strength of Macready's statement, says +that part of the Guards' column diverged thither: but this is +unlikely. Is it credible that the Guards, less than 4,000 strong, +should have spread their attacks over a quarter of a mile of front? +Was not the column the usual method of attack? I submit, then, that +my explanation of the Guard attacking in hollow oblongs, formed in +two chief columns, harmonizes the known facts. See Petit's +"Relation" in "Eng. Hist. Rev.," April, 1903.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_524_524"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor524_524">[524]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Janin, p. 45.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_525_525"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor525_525">[525]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bertrand at St. Helena said he <i>heard</i> Michel utter these +words (Montholon, vol. iii., ch. iv.).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_526_526"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor526_526">[526]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Maitland's "Narrative," p. 222. Basil Jackson, who knew Gourgaud +well at St. Helena, learnt from him that he could not finish his +account of Waterloo, "as Napoleon could never decide on the best +way of ending the great battle: that he (Gourgaud) had suggested no +less than six different ways, but none were satisfactory" +("Waterloo and St. Helena," p, 102). Gourgaud's "Journal" shows +that Napoleon blamed in turn the rain, Ney, Grouchy, Vandamme, +Guyot, and Soult; but he ends—"it was a fatality; for in +spite of all, I should have won that battle."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_527_527"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor527_527">[527]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Lettres inédites de Napoléon."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_528_528"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor528_528">[528]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Gourgaud, "Journal inédit de Ste. Hélène," +vol. ii., p. 321, small edit.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_529_529"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor529_529">[529]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lucien, "Mems.," vol. iii., p. 327.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_530_530"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor530_530">[530]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Stuart's despatch of June 28th, "F.O.," France, No. 117; +Gneisenau to Müffling, June 27th, "Passages," App.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_531_531"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor531_531">[531]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Croker ("Papers," vol. iii., p. 67) had this account from +Jaucourt, who had it from Becker.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_532_532"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor532_532">[532]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Ollech, pp. 350-360. The French cavalry success near Versailles +was due to exceptional circumstances.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_533_533"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor533_533">[533]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Maitland's "Narrative," pp. 23-39, disproves Thiers' assertion +that Napoleon was not expected there. Maitland's letter of July +10th to Hotham ("F.O.," France, No. 126, not in the "Narrative") +ends: "It appears to me from the anxiety the bearers express to get +away, that they are very hard pressed by the Government at Paris." +Hotham's instructions of July 8th to Maitland were most stringent. +See my Essay in "Napoleonic Studies" (1904).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_534_534"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor534_534">[534]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>The date of the letter disproves Las Cases' statement that it +was written <i>after</i> his second interview with Maitland, and +<i>in consequence of</i> the offers Maitland had made!</p> + +<p>Napoleon's reference to Themistocles has been much admired. But +why? The Athenian statesman was found to have intrigued with Persia +against Athens in time of peace; he fled to the Persian monarch and +was richly rewarded <i>as a renegade</i>. No simile could have been +less felicitous.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_535_535"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor535_535">[535]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Narrative," p. 244. [This work has been republished by Messrs. +Blackwood, 1904.]</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_536_536"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor536_536">[536]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," France, No. 126; Allardyce, "Mems. of Lord Keith."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_537_537"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor537_537">[537]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Maitland, pp. 206, 239-242; Montholon, vol. i., ch. iii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_538_538"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor538_538">[538]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. ii., pp. 434,438. +Beatson's Mem. is in "F.O.," France, No. 123. This and other facts +refute Lord Holland's statement ("Foreign Reminiscences," p. 196) +that the Government was treating for the transfer of St. Helena +from the East India Company <i>early in</i> 1815.—Why does +Lord Rosebery, "Napoleon: last Phase," p. 58, write that Lord +Liverpool thought that Napoleon should either (1) be handed over to +Louis XVIII. to be treated as a rebel; or (2) treated as vermin; or +(3) that we would (regretfully) detain him? In his letters to +Castlereagh at Paris, Liverpool expressly says it would be better +for us, rather than any other Power, to detain him, and writes not +a word about treating him as vermin. Lord Rosebery is surely aware +that our Government and Wellington did their best <i>to preclude +the possibility of the Prussians treating him as vermin</i>.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_539_539"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor539_539">[539]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Keith's letter of August 1st, in "F.O.," France, No. 123: "The +General and many of his suite have an idea that if they could but +put foot on shore, no power could remove them, and they are +determined to make the attempt if at all possible: they are +becoming most refractory."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_540_540"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor540_540">[540]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>In our Colonial Office archives, St. Helena, No. 1, is a letter +of August 2nd, 1815, from an Italian subject of Napoleon +(addressed</p> +</div> + +to Mme. Bertrand, but really for him), stating that £16,000 +had been placed in good hands for his service, one-fourth of which +would be at once intrusted to firms at New York, Boston, +"Philadelfi," and Charlestown, to provide means for effecting his +escape, and claiming again "le plus beau trône de l'univers." +It begs him to get his departure from Plymouth put off, for a plot +had been formed by discontented British officers to get rid of the +Premier and one other Minister. Napoleon must not build any hopes +on the Prince Regent: "Le Silène de cette isle.... Je fonds +donc mon espoir avant tout sur les navires marchands, Anglais comme +autres, par l'apas du gain." The writer's name is illegible: so is +the original postmark: the letter probably came from London: it +missed Mme. Bertrand at Plymouth, followed her to St. Helena, and +was opened by Sir G. Cockburn, who sent it back to our Government. +I have published it <i>in extenso</i> in my volume, "Napoleonic +Studies " (1904), as also an accompanying letter from Miss McKinnon +of Binfield, Berks, to Napoleon, stating that her mother, still +living, had known him and given him hospitality when a lieutenant +at Valence.]<br> +<br> + <a name="Foot2note_541_541"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor541_541">[541]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Las Cases, "Mémorial," vol, i., pp. 55, 65.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_542_542"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor542_542">[542]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>I wish I had space to give a whole chapter to the relations +between Napoleon and the Whigs, and to show how their championship +of him worked mischief on both sides in 1803-21, enticing him on to +many risky ventures, and ruining the cause of Reform in England for +a generation.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_543_543"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor543_543">[543]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"F.O.," France, No. 123. Keith adds: "I accompanied him to look +at the accommodation on board the 'Northumberland,' with which he +appeared to be well satisfied, saying, 'the apartments are +convenient, and you see I carry my little tent-bed with me.'" The +volume also contains the letter of Maingaud, etc. Bertrand +requested permission from our Government to return in a year; +Gourgaud, when his duty to his aged mother recalled him; O'Meara +stipulated that he should still be a British surgeon on full pay +and active service.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_544_544"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor544_544">[544]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Extract from a Diary of Sir G. Cockburn," pp. 21, 51, 94.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_545_545"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor545_545">[545]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Napoleon's last Voyages," p. 163.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_546_546"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor546_546">[546]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>I found this return in "Admiralty Secret Letters," 1804-16.</p> + +<p>Lord Rosebery, in his desire to apologize for our treatment of +Napoleon at every point, says ("Nap.: last Phase," p. 64): "They +[the exiles] were packed like herrings in a barrel. The +'Northumberland,' it was said, had been arrested on her way back +from India in order to convey Napoleon: all the water on board, it +was alleged, had also been to India, was discoloured and tainted, +as well as short in quantity."—On the contrary, the diary of +Glover, in "Last Voyages of Nap.," p. 91, shows that the ship was +in the Medway in July, and was fitted out at Portsmouth (where it +was usual to keep supplies of water): also (p. 99) that Captain +Ross gave up his cabin to the Bertrands, and Glover his to the +Montholons: Gourgaud and Las Cases slept in the after cabin until +cabins could be built for them. We have already seen (p. 529) that +Napoleon was well satisfied with his own room. Water, wine, cattle, +and fruit were taken in at Funchal in spite of the storm.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_547_547"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor547_547">[547]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., pp. 47, 59 (small edition); "Last +Voyages of Nap.," p. 198.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_548_548"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor548_548">[548]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Sir G. Bingham's Diary in "Blackwood's Mag.," October, 1896, and +"Cornhill," January, 1901.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_549_549"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor549_549">[549]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., p. 64.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_550_550"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor550_550">[550]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Last Voyages," p. 130.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_551_551"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor551_551">[551]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. ii., pp. 423, 433, 505; +Seeley's "Stein," vol. iii., pp. 333-344.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_552_552"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor552_552">[552]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See Gourgaud's "Journal," vol. ii., p. 315, for Napoleon's view +as to our stupidity then: "In their place I would have stipulated +that I alone could sail and trade in the eastern seas. It is +ridiculous for them to leave Batavia (Java) to the Dutch and L'Ile +de Bourbon to the French."</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_553_553"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor553_553">[553]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Forsyth, "Captivity of Napoleon," vol. i., p. 218. Plantation +House was also the centre of the semaphores of the island.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_554_554"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor554_554">[554]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Mrs. Abell ("Betsy" Balcombe), "Recollections," ch. vii. These +were compiled twenty-five years later, and are not, as a rule, +trustworthy, but the "blindman's buff" is named by Glover. Balcombe +later on infringed the British regulations, along with O'Meara.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_555_555"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor555_555">[555]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., pp. 77, 94, 136, 491.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_556_556"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor556_556">[556]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., pp. 135, 298. See too "Cornhill" +for January, 1901.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_557_557"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor557_557">[557]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Surgeon Henry of the 66th, in "Events of a Military Life," ch. +xxviii., writes that he found side by side at Plantation House the +tea shrub and the English golden-pippin, the bread-fruit tree and +the peach and plum, the nutmeg overshadowing the gooseberry. In ch. +xxxi. he notes the humidity of the uplands as a drawback, "but the +inconvenience is as nothing compared with the comfort, fertility, +and salubrity which the clouds bestow." He found that the soldiers +enjoyed far better health at Deadwood Camp, behind Longwood, than +down in Jamestown.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_558_558"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor558_558">[558]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Despatch of Jan. 12th, 1816, in Colonial Office, St. Helena, No. +1.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_559_559"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor559_559">[559]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lord Rosebery ("Napoleon: last Phase," p. 67), following French +sources, assigns the superiority of force to Lowe; but the official +papers published by Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 397-416, show that the +reverse was the case. Lowe had 1,362 men; the French, about +3,000.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_560_560"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor560_560">[560]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>From a letter in the possession of Miss Lowe.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_561_561"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor561_561">[561]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 139-147.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_562_562"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor562_562">[562]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>See the interview in "Monthly Rev.," Jan., 1901.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_563_563"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor563_563">[563]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Bingham's Diary in "Cornhill" for Jan., 1901; Gourgaud, vol. i., +pp. 152, 168.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_564_564"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor564_564">[564]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 171-177.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_565_565"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor565_565">[565]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lowe's version (Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 247-251) is fully borne +out by Admiral Malcolm's in Lady Malcolm's "Diary of St. Helena," +pp. 55-65; Gourgaud was not present.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_566_566"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor566_566">[566]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>B. Jackson's "Waterloo and St. Helena," pp. 90-91. The assertion +in the article on B. Jackson, in the "Dict. of Nat. Biography," +that he was related to Lowe, and therefore partial to him, is +incorrect. Miss Lowe assures me that he did not see her father +before the year 1815.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_567_567"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor567_567">[567]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Mems. of a Highland Lady," p. 459.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_568_568"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor568_568">[568]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>In "Blackwood's," Oct., 1896, and "Cornhill," Jan., 1901. I +cannot accept Stürmer's hostile verdict on Lowe as that of an +impartial witness. The St. Helena Records show that Stürmer +persisted in evading the Governor's regulations by secretly meeting +the French Generals. He was afterwards recalled for his +irregularities. Balmain, the Russian, and Montchenu, the French +Commissioner, are fair to him. The latter constantly pressed Lowe +<i>to be stricter with Napoleon</i>! See M. Firmin-Didot's edition +of Montchenu's reports in "La Captivité de Ste. +Hélène," especially App. iii. and viii.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_569_569"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor569_569">[569]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Waterloo and St. Helena," p. 104.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_570_570"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor570_570">[570]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lowe had the "Journal" copied out when it came into his hands in +Dec., 1816. This passage is given by Forsyth, vol. i., p. 5, and by +Seaton, "Sir H. Lowe and Napoleon," p. 52.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_571_571"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor571_571">[571]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>An incident narrated to the present writer by Sir Hudson Lowe's +daughter will serve to show how anxious was his supervision of all +details and all individuals on the island. A British soldier was +missed from the garrison; and as this occurred at the time when +Napoleon remained in strict seclusion, fear was felt that treachery +had enabled him to make off in the soldier's uniform. The mystery +was solved a few days after, when a large shark was caught near the +shore, and on its being cut open the remains of the soldier were +found!</p> + +<p>It should be remembered that Lowe prevailed on the slave-owners +of the island to set free the children of slaves born there on and +after Christmas Day, 1818.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_572_572"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor572_572">[572]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Quoted by Forsyth, vol. i., p. 289. This letter of course finds +no place in O'Meara's later malicious production, "A Voice from St. +Helena"; the starvation story is there repeated <i>as if it were +true</i>!—That Napoleon was fastidious to the last is proved +by the archives of our India Office, which contain the entry (Dec. +11th, 1820): "The storekeeper paid in the sum of £105 on +account of 48 dozen of champagne rejected by General Bonaparte" +(Sir G. Birdwood's "Report on the Old Records of the India Office," +p. 97).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_573_573"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor573_573">[573]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 330-343, 466-475.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_574_574"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor574_574">[574]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>I have quoted this <i>in extenso</i> in "The Owens College +Historical Essays." May not the words "domiciled" and "employed" +have aroused Lowe's suspicions of Balcombe and O'Meara? Napoleon +always said that he did not wish to escape, and hoped only for a +change of Ministry in England. But what responsible person could +trust his words after Elba, where he repeatedly told Campbell that +he had done with the world and was a dead man?</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_575_575"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor575_575">[575]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Forsyth, vol. i., p. 310, vol. ii., p. 142, vol. iii., pp. 151, +250; Montholon, "Captivity of Napoleon," vol. iii., ch. v.; +Firmin-Didot, App. vi. The schemes named by Forsyth are ridiculed +by Lord Rosebery ("Last Phase," p. 103). But would he have ignored +them, had he been in Bathurst's place?</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_576_576"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor576_576">[576]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., p. 105.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_577_577"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor577_577">[577]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>He said to Gourgaud that, <i>if he had the whole island for +exercise he would not go out</i> (Gourgaud's "Journal," vol. ii., +p. 299).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_578_578"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor578_578">[578]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Gourgaud's "Journal," vol. i., pp. 262-270, 316. Yet Montholon +("Captivity of Napoleon," vol. i., ch. xiii.), afterwards wrote of +Las Cases' departure: "<i>We all loved the well-informed and good +man, whom we had pleasure in venerating as a Mentor.... He was an +immense loss to us!</i>"</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_579_579"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor579_579">[579]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Gourgaud, vol. i., p. 278; Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 381-384, vol. +ii., p. 74. Bonaparte wanted this "Journal" to be given back to +him: but Las Cases would not hear of this, as it contained "<i>ses +pensées</i>." It was kept under seal until Napoleon's death, +and then restored to the compiler.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_580_580"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor580_580">[580]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Henry, vol. ii., p. 48; B. Jackson, pp. 99-101; quoted by +Seaton, pp. 159-162.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_581_581"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor581_581">[581]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Forsyth, vol. iii., p. 40; Gourgaud's "Journal," vol. ii., pp. +531-537.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_582_582"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor582_582">[582]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Apostille" of April 27th, 1818. As to the new house, see +Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 212, 270; vol. iii., pp. 51,257; it was ready +when Napoleon's illness became severe (Jan., 1821).</p> + +<p>If the plague of rats was really very bad, why is it that +Gourgaud made so little of it?</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_583_583"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor583_583">[583]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Journal" of Oct. 4th, 1817. On the return voyage to England +Mme. Bertrand told Surgeon Henry that secret letters had constantly +passed between Longwood and England, through two military officers; +but the passage above quoted shows who was the culprit.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_584_584"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor584_584">[584]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Forsyth, vol. iii., pp. 153, 178-181.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_585_585"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor585_585">[585]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Stürmer's "Report" of March 14th, 1818; Gourgaud's +"Journal" of Sept. 11th and 14th, 1817.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_586_586"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor586_586">[586]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Described by Bertrand to Lowe on May 12th, 1821 ("St. Helena +Records," No. 32).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_587_587"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor587_587">[587]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lord Holland, "Foreign Reminiscences," p. 305.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_588_588"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor588_588">[588]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Gourgaud, vol. i., pp. 297, 540, 546; vol. ii., pp. 78, 130, +409, 425. See Las Cases, "Mémorial," vol. iv., p. 124, for +Napoleon's defence of polygamy. See an Essay on Napoleon's religion +in my "Napoleonic Studies" (1904).</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_589_589"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor589_589">[589]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>Lord Holland's "Foreign Reminiscences," p. 316; Colonel +Gorrequer's report in "Cornhill" of Feb., 1901.</p> +</div> + +<a name="Foot2note_590_590"></a><a href= +"#FN2anchor590_590">[590]</a> + +<div class="note"> +<p>"Colonial Office Records," St. Helena, No. 32; Henry, "Events of +a Military Life," vol. ii., pp. 80-84: h also states that +Antommarchi, when about to sign the report agreed on by the English +doctors, was called aside by Bertrand and Montholon, and thereafter +declined to sign it: Antommarchi afterwards issued one of his own, +laying stress on cancer <i>and enlarged liver</i>, thus keeping up +O'Meara's theory that the illness was due to the climate of St. +Helena and want of exercise. In our records is a letter of +Montholon to his wife of May 6th, 1821, which admits the contrary: +"C'est dans notre malheur une grande consolation pour nous d'avoir +acquis la preuve que sa mort n'est, et n'a pu être, en aucune +manière le résultat de sa captivité." Yet, on +his return to Europe, Montholon stoutly maintained that the liver +complaint endemic to St. Helena had been the death of his master. +It is, however, noteworthy that on his death-bed Napoleon urged +Bertrand to be reconciled to Lowe. He and Montholon accordingly +went to Plantation House, where, according to all appearance, the +dead past was buried.</p> +</div> + +<span class="newpage"><a name="page_ii579" id= +"page_ii579">[pg.579]</a></span> <br> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="INDEX"></a><h3>INDEX</h3> + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> + + + + + + + + + + + + +<ul> + +<li>Abdication, the Second, ii. +<a href="#page_ii515">515</a>.</li> + +<li>Abell, Mrs., ii. +<a href="#page_ii541">541</a>.</li> + +<li>Aberdeen, Lord, ii. +<a href="#page_ii361">361</a>, +<a href="#page_ii369">369</a>, +<a href="#page_ii371">371</a>, +<a href="#page_ii372">372</a>, +<a href="#page_ii374">374-375</a>, +<a href="#page_ii390">390</a>, +<a href="#page_ii410">410</a>.</li> + +<li>Aboukir, i. +<a href="#page_i192">192-193</a>, +<a href="#page_i201">201</a>.</li> + +<li>Aboukir, battle of, i. +<a href="#page_i213">213</a>.</li> + +<li>Abrantès, Duchesse d', i. +<a href="#page_i426">416</a>.</li> + +<li>Acre, i. +<a href="#page_i201">201</a>, +<a href="#page_i204">204-210</a>, +<a href="#page_ii413">413</a>.</li> + +<li>Acton, Gen., i. +<a href="#page_i435">435</a>.</li> + +<li>Adams, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii502">502</a>, +<a href="#page_ii508">508</a>.</li> + +<li>Adda River, i. +<a href="#page_i93">93</a>.</li> +<li>Addington, i. +<a href="#page_i310">310</a>, +<a href="#page_i321">321</a>, +<a href="#page_i402">402</a>, +<a href="#page_i420">420-427</a>, +<a href="#page_i452">452</a>.</li> + +<li>Additional Act, the, ii. +<a href="#page_ii450">450-451</a>.</li> + +<li>Adige, i. +<a href="#page_i101">101</a>, +<a href="#page_i107">107</a>, +<a href="#page_i122">122</a>, +<a href="#page_i123">123</a>, +<a href="#page_i124">124</a>, +<a href="#page_i132">132</a>; + <li class=indent>River, i. +<a href="#page_i263">263</a>.</li> + +<li>Adye, Capt., ii. +<a href="#page_ii441">441-442</a>.</li> + +<li>Ajaccio, i. +<a href="#page_i4">4-6</a>, +<a href="#page_i12">12</a>, +<a href="#page_i30">30-32</a>, +<a href="#page_i34">34</a>, +<a href="#page_i36">36</a>, +<a href="#page_i38">38-41</a>, +<a href="#page_i215">215</a>.</li> + +<li>Alessandria, i. +<a href="#page_i88">88</a>, +<a href="#page_i250">250-258</a>, +<a href="#page_i259">259</a>.</li> + +<li>Alexander I., i. +<a href="#page_i339">339</a>.</li> + +<li>Alexander, Czar, i. +<a href="#page_i263">263</a>, +<a href="#page_i333">333</a>, +<a href="#page_i338">338-340</a>, +<a href="#page_i387">387-388</a>, +<a href="#page_i395">395</a>, +<a href="#page_i406">405-408</a>, +<a href="#page_i419">419-425</a>, +<a href="#page_i430">430-432</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii1">1-3</a>, +<a href="#page_ii5">5-11</a>, +<a href="#page_ii20">20</a>, +<a href="#page_ii29">29-31</a>, +<a href="#page_ii33">33-36</a>, +<a href="#page_ii42">42</a>, +<a href="#page_ii58">58</a>, +<a href="#page_ii63">63</a>, +<a href="#page_ii81">81</a>, +<a href="#page_ii82">82</a>, +<a href="#page_ii86">86-87</a>, + <a href="#page_ii90">90</a>, + <a href="#page_ii108">108</a>, + <a href="#page_ii110">110</a>, + <a href="#page_ii114">114-116</a>, + <a href="#page_ii125">125-132</a>, + <a href="#page_ii134">134-137</a>, + <a href="#page_ii144">144-145</a>, + <a href="#page_ii175">175</a>, + <a href="#page_ii179">179-183</a>, + <a href="#page_ii185">185-186</a>, + <a href="#page_ii202"></a>, + <a href="#page_ii205">205-207</a>, + <a href="#page_ii209">209</a>, + <a href="#page_ii229">299</a>, + <a href="#page_ii231">231-236</a>, + <a href="#page_ii241">241-243</a>, + <a href="#page_ii258">258-259</a>, + <a href="#page_ii273">273-276</a>, + <a href="#page_ii285">285</a>, + <a href="#page_ii290">290</a>, + <a href="#page_ii296">296-297</a>, + <a href="#page_ii316">316-318</a>, + <a href="#page_ii321">321-322</a>, + <a href="#page_ii335">335</a>, + <a href="#page_ii344">344-345</a>, + <a href="#page_ii347">347</a>, + <a href="#page_ii372">372</a>, + <a href="#page_ii374">374</a>, + <a href="#page_ii381">381</a>, + <a href="#page_ii386">386-388</a>, + <a href="#page_ii400">400</a>, + <a href="#page_ii408">408</a>, + <a href="#page_ii415">415-420</a>, + <a href="#page_ii423">423-424</a>, + <a href="#page_ii426">426-430</a>, + <a href="#page_ii433">433</a>, + <a href="#page_ii437">437</a>, + <a href="#page_ii447">447</a>, + <a href="#page_ii448">448</a>, + <a href="#page_ii538">538</a>, + <a href="#page_ii546">546</a>.</li> + +<li>Alexander the Great, i. +<a href="#page_i33">33</a>, +<a href="#page_i202">202</a>, +<a href="#page_i213">213</a>.</li> + +<li>Alexandria, i. +<a href="#page_i187">187-189</a>, +<a href="#page_i192">192</a>, +<a href="#page_i214">214</a>.</li> + +<li>Algesiras, i. +<a href="#page_i313">313</a>.</li> + +<li>Alix, Gen., ii. + <a href="#page_ii496">496</a>, + <a href="#page_ii497">497</a>.</li> + +<li>Alkmaar, i. +<a href="#page_i217">217</a>.</li> + +<li>Alps, the, i. +<a href="#page_i92">92</a>.</li> + +<li>Alten, Gen., ii. + <a href="#page_ii474">474</a>, + <a href="#page_ii499">499</a>, + <a href="#page_ii504">504</a>.</li> + +<li>Alvintzy, i. +<a href="#page_i121">121</a>, +<a href="#page_i131">131-136</a>.</li> + +<li>Amiens, Treaty of, i. +<a href="#page_i331">331</a>, +<a href="#page_i336">336-354</a>, +<a href="#page_i405">405</a>.</li> + +<li><i>Ancien régime, L'</i>, i. +<a href="#page_i25">25</a>, +<a href="#page_i27">27</a>, +<a href="#page_i31">31</a>.</li> + +<li>Andréossi, i. +<a href="#page_i215">215</a>.</li> + +<li>Angoulême, Duc d', ii. +<a href="#page_ii414">414-415</a>.</li> + +<li>Ansbach, ii. + <a href="#page_ii20">20</a>, + <a href="#page_ii30">30</a>, + <a href="#page_ii44">44</a>.</li> + +<li>Antibes, i. +<a href="#page_i60">60</a>; +ii. + <a href="#page_ii442">442</a>.</li> + +<li>Antigua, i. +<a href="#page_i498">498</a>.</li> + +<li>Antommarchi, ii. + <a href="#page_ii568">568</a>, + <a href="#page_ii570">570</a>.</li> + +<li>Antwerp, i. +<a href="#page_i439">439</a>; +ii. + <a href="#page_ii399">399</a>.</li> + +<li>Apennines, i. +<a href="#page_i90">90</a>, +<a href="#page_i91">91</a>, +<a href="#page_i92">92</a>.</li> + +<li>Arcis, battle of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii409">409</a>.</li> + +<li>Arcola, i. +<a href="#page_i123">123-128</a>.</li> + +<li>Aréna, i. +<a href="#page_i303">303-304</a>, +<a href="#page_i307">307</a>.</li> + +<li>Argaum, i. +<a href="#page_i377">377</a>.</li> + +<li>Arisch, El, i. +<a href="#page_i203">203-204</a>.</li> + +<li>Armed Neutrality League, i. +<a href="#page_i263">263</a>, +<a href="#page_i331">331</a>.</li> + +<li>Armenia, i. +<a href="#page_i201">201</a>.</li> + +<li>Arndt, ii. + <a href="#page_ii274">274</a>, + <a href="#page_ii278">278</a>, + <a href="#page_ii373">373</a>.</li> + +<li>Arnott, Dr., ii. + <a href="#page_ii571">571</a>.</li> + +<li>Arrighi, ii. + <a href="#page_ii404">404</a>.</li> + +<li>Arrondissements, i. +<a href="#page_i268">268</a>, +<a href="#page_i269">269</a>, +<a href="#page_i323">323-324</a>.</li> + +<li>Artois, Comte d', i. +<a href="#page_i54">54-55</a>, +<a href="#page_i451">451</a>, +<a href="#page_i456">456</a>, +<a href="#page_i462">462</a>; +ii. + <a href="#page_ii414">414</a>, + <a href="#page_ii416">416</a>, + <a href="#page_ii437">437</a>, + <a href="#page_ii443">443</a>.</li> + +<li>Aspern-Essling, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii192">192</a>.</li> + +<li>Assaye, i. +<a href="#page_i377">377</a>.</li> + +<li>Assignats, i. +<a href="#page_i62">62</a>.</li> + +<li>Astrakan, i. +<a href="#page_i262">262</a>.</li> + +<li>Auerstädt, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii97">97</a>, + <a href="#page_ii98">98</a>.</li> + +<li>Augereau, i. +<a href="#page_i82">82</a>, +<a href="#page_i85">85</a>, +<a href="#page_i101">101</a>, +<a href="#page_i108">108-115</a>, +<a href="#page_i124">124</a>, +<a href="#page_i138">138</a>, +<a href="#page_i161">161</a>, +<a href="#page_i162">162</a>, +<a href="#page_i168">168</a>, +<a href="#page_i449">449</a>, +<a href="#page_i469">469-470</a>, +<a href="#page_i491">491</a>, +<a href="#page_i511">511</a> (App.); +ii. +<a href="#page_ii18">18</a>, + <a href="#page_ii91">91</a>, + <a href="#page_ii96">96</a>, + <a href="#page_ii97">97</a>, + <a href="#page_ii101">101</a>, + <a href="#page_ii112">112</a>, + <a href="#page_ii295">295</a>, + <a href="#page_ii355">355-356</a>, + <a href="#page_ii408">408</a>, + <a href="#page_ii415">415</a>, + <a href="#page_ii422">422</a>, + <a href="#page_ii454">454</a>.</li> + +<li>Aulic Council, i. +<a href="#page_i106">106</a>, +<a href="#page_i121">121</a>, +<a href="#page_i131">131</a>.</li> + +<li>Austerlitz, battle of, + <a href="#page_ii37">37-42</a>.</li> + +<li>Australia, i. +<a href="#page_i379">379-385</a>, +<a href="#page_i428">428</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii107">107</a>, + <a href="#page_ii174">174</a>.</li> + +<li>Austria, i. +<a href="#page_i35">35</a>, +<a href="#page_i37">37</a>, +<a href="#page_i52">52</a>, +<a href="#page_i56">56</a>, +<a href="#page_i57">57</a>, +<a href="#page_i77">77</a>, +<a href="#page_i79">79</a>, + <a href="#page_i87">87</a>, + <a href="#page_i89">89</a>, + <a href="#page_i96">96</a>, + <a href="#page_i100">100</a>, + <a href="#page_i101">101</a>, + <a href="#page_i105">105</a>, + <a href="#page_i120">120</a>, + <a href="#page_i128">128</a>, + <a href="#page_i129">129</a>, + <a href="#page_i137">137</a>, + <a href="#page_i163">163</a>, + <a href="#page_i164">164</a>, + <a href="#page_i166">166-170</a>, + <a href="#page_i183">183</a>, + <a href="#page_i216">216</a>, + <a href="#page_i219">219</a>, + <a href="#page_i240">240</a>, + <a href="#page_i263">263</a>, + <a href="#page_i265">265</a>, + <a href="#page_i352">352</a>, + <a href="#page_i395">395</a>, + <a href="#page_i414">414</a>, + <a href="#page_i500">500</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii1">1-3</a>, + <a href="#page_ii5">5-6</a>, + <a href="#page_ii9">9-11</a>, + <a href="#page_ii12">12</a>, + <a href="#page_ii13">13-14</a>, + <a href="#page_ii18">18-26</a>, + <a href="#page_ii30">30-31</a>, + <a href="#page_ii42">42</a>, + <a href="#page_ii45">45-50</a>, + <a href="#page_ii58">58</a>, + <a href="#page_ii90">90-91</a>, + <a href="#page_ii110">110-111</a>, + <a href="#page_ii114">114-115</a>, + <a href="#page_ii126">126-128</a>, + <a href="#page_ii155">155</a>, + <a href="#page_ii177">177-182</a>, + <a href="#page_ii187">187</a>, + <a href="#page_ii189">189-202</a>, + <a href="#page_ii206">206-207</a>, + <a href="#page_ii271">271-272</a>, + <a href="#page_ii281">281-284</a>, + <a href="#page_ii289">289-290</a>, + <a href="#page_ii294">294-296</a>, + <a href="#page_ii315">315-317</a>, + <a href="#page_ii324">324-328</a>, + <a href="#page_ii331">331</a>, + <a href="#page_ii354">354-355</a>, + <a href="#page_ii365">365</a>, + <a href="#page_ii380">380</a>, + <a href="#page_ii385">385-389</a>, + <a href="#page_ii399">399-400</a>, + <a href="#page_ii402">402-403</a>, + <a href="#page_ii438">438</a>, + <a href="#page_ii453">453</a>.</li> + +<li>Austrian Netherlands, i. +<a href="#page_i141">141</a>.</li> + +<li>Auxonne, i. +<a href="#page_i22">22</a>, + <a href="#page_i32">32-33</a>.</li> + +<li>Avignon, i. +<a href="#page_i137">137</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> + +<li>Babeuf, i. +<a href="#page_i157">157</a>, +<a href="#page_i305">305</a>.</li> + +<li>Bacciocchi, i. +<a href="#page_i153">153</a>.</li> + +<li>Badajoz, Treaty of, i. +<a href="#page_i311">311</a>.</li> + +<li>Baden, ii. +<a href="#page_ii46">46</a>, + <a href="#page_ii60">60</a>.</li> + +<li>Bagration, ii. +<a href="#page_ii244">244</a>, + <a href="#page_ii248">248-249</a>, + <a href="#page_ii251">251-252</a>.</li> + +<li>Balcombe, Mr., ii. +<a href="#page_ii541">541</a>, + <a href="#page_ii555">555</a>.</li> + +<li>Balearic Isles, ii. +<a href="#page_ii74">74</a> + +<li>Balmain, ii. +<a href="#page_ii552">522</a>.</li> + +<li>Barbé-Marbois, ii. +<a href="#page_ii60">60</a>.</li> + +<li>Barclay, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii244">244</a>, + <a href="#page_ii248">248-254</a>, + <a href="#page_ii291">291-292</a>, + <a href="#page_ii294">294</a>, + <a href="#page_ii335">335</a>, + <a href="#page_ii419">419</a>.</li> + +<li>Barras, i. +<a href="#page_i49">49</a>, + <a href="#page_i50">50</a>, + <a href="#page_i69">69</a>, + <a href="#page_i70">70</a>, + <a href="#page_i71">71</a>, + <a href="#page_i74">74</a>, + <a href="#page_i158">158</a>, + <a href="#page_i159">159</a>, + <a href="#page_i160">160</a>, + <a href="#page_i167">167</a>, + <a href="#page_i173">173</a>, + <a href="#page_i180">180-181</a>, + <a href="#page_i220">220-221</a>, + <a href="#page_i223">223</a>, + <a href="#page_i451">451</a>.</li> + +<li>Barrère, i. +<a href="#page_i59">59</a>.</li> + +<li>Bartenstein, Treaty of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii141">141</a>.</li> + +<li>Barthélemy, i. +<a href="#page_i158">158</a>, + <a href="#page_i162">162</a>.</li> + +<li>Bassano, i. +<a href="#page_i117">117</a>.</li> + +<li>Bastia, i. +<a href="#page_i30">30</a>, + <a href="#page_i41">41</a>.</li> + +<li>Batavian Republic. <i>See</i> Holland. + +<li>Bathurst, Earl, ii. +<a href="#page_ii493">493</a>, + <a href="#page_ii556">556</a>, + <a href="#page_ii557">557</a>, + <a href="#page_ii558">558</a>, + <a href="#page_ii562">562</a>.</li> + +<li>Baudin, Commodore, ii. +<a href="#page_ii380">380-382</a>.</li> + +<li>Baudus, Col., ii. +<a href="#page_ii485">485</a>.</li> + +<li>Bausset, i. +<a href="#page_i483">483</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii204">204</a>, + <a href="#page_ii255">255</a>, + <a href="#page_ii257">257</a>, + <a href="#page_ii433">433</a>.</li> + +<li>Bautzen, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii291">291-293</a>.</li> + +<li>Bavaria, ii. +<a href="#page_ii46">46</a>, + <a href="#page_ii59">59</a>, + <a href="#page_ii65">65</a>, + <a href="#page_ii69">69</a>, + <a href="#page_ii189">189-191</a>, + <a href="#page_ii201">201</a>, + <a href="#page_ii354">354-355</a>.</li> + +<li>Baylen, ii. +<a href="#page_ii177">177</a>.</li> + +<li>Baylen, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii170">170</a>.</li> + +<li>Bayonne, Conventions of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii166">166</a>, +<a href="#page_ii379">379</a> (battles of). + +<li>Beatson, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii525">525</a>.</li> + +<li>Beauharnais, Eugène, i. +<a href="#page_i215">215</a>, + <a href="#page_i468">468</a>, + <a href="#page_i501">501</a>; +ii. + <a href="#page_ii10">10</a>, + <a href="#page_ii12">12</a>, + <a href="#page_ii85">85</a>, + <a href="#page_ii154">154</a>, + <a href="#page_ii195">195</a>, + <a href="#page_ii216">216</a>, + <a href="#page_ii254">254-255</a>, + <a href="#page_ii260">260</a>, + <a href="#page_ii279">279-281</a>, + <a href="#page_ii284">284-285</a>, + <a href="#page_ii287">287</a>, + <a href="#page_ii294">294</a>, + <a href="#page_ii369">369</a>, + <a href="#page_ii375">375</a>, + <a href="#page_ii380">380</a>, + <a href="#page_ii397">397</a>, + <a href="#page_ii411">411</a>.</li> + +<li>Beauharnais, Hortense, i. +<a href="#page_i215">215</a>, +<a href="#page_i442">442</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii515">515</a>.</li> + +<li>Beaulieu, i. + <a href="#page_i82">82</a>, + <a href="#page_i83">83</a>, + <a href="#page_i85">85</a>, + <a href="#page_i86">86</a>, + <a href="#page_i92">92</a>, + <a href="#page_i93">93</a>, + <a href="#page_i101">101</a>, + <a href="#page_i102">102</a>.</li> + +<li>Becker, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii516">516-518</a>.</li> + +<li>Beethoven, i. +<a href="#page_i481">481</a>.</li> + +<li>Beet-root, ii. +<a href="#page_ii223">223</a>.</li> + +<li>Belgium, i. +<a href="#page_i141">141</a>, + <a href="#page_i308">308</a>; +ii. + <a href="#page_ii35">35</a>, + <a href="#page_ii54">54</a>, + <a href="#page_ii373">373</a>, + <a href="#page_ii387">387</a>, + <a href="#page_ii392">392</a>, + <a href="#page_ii399">399</a>, + <a href="#page_ii402">402</a>, + <a href="#page_ii412">412</a>, + <a href="#page_ii436">436</a>, + <a href="#page_ii438">438</a>, + <a href="#page_ii441">441</a>, + <a href="#page_ii456">456-457</a>.</li> + +<li>Belliard, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii423">423</a>.</li> + +<li>Bennigsen, Gen., ii. + <a href="#page_ii111">111</a>, + <a href="#page_ii114">114</a>, + <a href="#page_ii118">118-120</a>, + <a href="#page_ii123">123-124</a>, + <a href="#page_ii126">126</a>, + <a href="#page_ii140">140</a>, + <a href="#page_ii250">250</a>, + <a href="#page_ii359">359</a>, + <a href="#page_ii362">362</a>.</li> + +<li>Beresford, ii. +<a href="#page_ii414">414-415</a>.</li> + +<li>Beresina, crossing of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii264">264</a>.</li> + +<li>Berg, Grand Duchy of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii64">64</a>.</li> + +<li>Berlier, i. +<a href="#page_i302">302</a>.</li> + +<li>Berlin, +<li class=indent>decree of, +ii. +<a href="#page_ii103">103-105</a>; </li> + <li class=indent>University of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii226">226</a>, + <a href="#page_ii275">275</a>.</li> + +<li>Bernadotte, i. +<a href="#page_i220">220</a>, + <a href="#page_i222">222</a>, + <a href="#page_i246">246</a>, + <a href="#page_i449">449</a>, + <a href="#page_i451">451</a>, + <a href="#page_i469">469-470</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii18">18-21</a>, + <a href="#page_ii36">36</a>, + <a href="#page_ii38">38</a>, + <a href="#page_ii40">40</a>, + <a href="#page_ii63">63</a>, + <a href="#page_ii91">91</a>, + <a href="#page_ii94">94</a>, + <a href="#page_ii99">99-100</a>, + <a href="#page_ii111">111</a>, + <a href="#page_ii142">142</a>, + <a href="#page_ii229">229</a>, + <a href="#page_ii238">238</a>, + <a href="#page_ii296">296-298</a>, + <a href="#page_ii321">321-323</a>, + <a href="#page_ii332">332-333</a>, + <a href="#page_ii335">335</a>, + <a href="#page_ii337">337-338</a>, + <a href="#page_ii350">350</a>, + <a href="#page_ii352">352</a>, + <a href="#page_ii353">353-354</a>, + <a href="#page_ii357">357-360</a>, + <a href="#page_ii362">362</a>, + <a href="#page_ii369">369</a>, + <a href="#page_ii380">380</a>, + <a href="#page_ii387">387</a>, + <a href="#page_ii401">401</a>, + <a href="#page_ii416">416</a>, + <a href="#page_ii424">424</a>.</li> + +<li>Bernard, Prince, ii. +<a href="#page_ii462">462</a>.</li> + +<li>Berne, i. +<a href="#page_i180">180</a>, + <a href="#page_i391">391-395</a>, + <a href="#page_i398">398-399</a>.</li> + +<li>Bernier, i. +<a href="#page_i236">236</a>, + <a href="#page_i274">274</a>.</li> + +<li>Berthier, i. +<a href="#page_i76">76</a>, + <a href="#page_i95">95</a>, + <a href="#page_i109">109</a>, + <a href="#page_i134">134</a>, + <a href="#page_i135">135</a>, + <a href="#page_i158">158</a>, + <a href="#page_i179">179</a>, + <a href="#page_i194">194</a>, + <a href="#page_i214">214</a>, + <a href="#page_i234">234</a>, + <a href="#page_i246">246</a>, + <a href="#page_i249">249</a>, + <a href="#page_i276">276</a>, + <a href="#page_i468">468-470</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii64">64</a>, + <a href="#page_ii113">113</a>, + <a href="#page_ii200">200</a>, + <a href="#page_ii207">207</a>, + <a href="#page_ii260">260</a>, + <a href="#page_ii335">335</a>, + <a href="#page_ii348">348</a>, + <a href="#page_ii363">363</a>, + <a href="#page_ii364">364</a>, + <a href="#page_ii392">392</a>, + <a href="#page_ii416">416</a>, + <a href="#page_ii427">427</a>, + <a href="#page_ii431">431</a>, + <a href="#page_ii432">432</a>, + <a href="#page_ii454">454</a>, + <a href="#page_ii455">455</a>.</li> + +<li>Berthollet, i. +<a href="#page_i182">182</a>, + <a href="#page_i195">195</a>, + <a href="#page_i215">25</a>, + <a href="#page_i285">285</a>, + <a href="#page_i487">487</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii569">569</a>.</li> +<li>Bertrand, ii. +<a href="#page_ii18">18</a>, + <a href="#page_ii32">32</a>, + <a href="#page_ii113">113</a>, + <a href="#page_ii280">280</a>, + <a href="#page_ii292">292</a>, + <a href="#page_ii332">332-333</a>, + <a href="#page_ii337">337-338</a>, + <a href="#page_ii354">354</a>, + <a href="#page_ii358">358</a>, + <a href="#page_ii359">359</a>, + <a href="#page_ii433">433</a>, + <a href="#page_ii434">434</a>, + <a href="#page_ii441">441</a>, + <a href="#page_ii481">481</a>, + <a href="#page_ii487">487</a>, + <a href="#page_ii516">516</a>, + <a href="#page_ii520">520-524</a>, + <a href="#page_ii529">529-530</a>, + <a href="#page_ii535">535-537</a>, + <a href="#page_ii539">539</a>, + <a href="#page_ii542">542</a>, + <a href="#page_ii544">544</a>, + <a href="#page_ii547">547</a>, + <a href="#page_ii567">567</a>, + <a href="#page_ii572">572</a>.</li> +<li>Bertrand, Mme., ii. +<a href="#page_ii522">522</a>, + <a href="#page_ii523">523</a>, + <a href="#page_ii527">527</a>, + <a href="#page_ii528">528</a>, + <a href="#page_ii529">529-530</a>, + <a href="#page_ii535">535-537</a>, + <a href="#page_ii542">542</a>, + <a href="#page_ii548">548</a>.</li> +<li>Bessarabia, ii. +<a href="#page_ii238">238</a>.</li> +<li>Bessières, i. +<a href="#page_i194">194</a>, + <a href="#page_i215">215</a>, + <a href="#page_i258">258</a>, + <a href="#page_i469">469-470</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii18">18</a>, + <a href="#page_ii41">41</a>, + <a href="#page_ii169">169</a>, + <a href="#page_ii211">211</a>, + <a href="#page_ii255">255</a>, + <a href="#page_ii260">260</a>, + <a href="#page_ii288">288</a>.</li> +<li>Beyme, ii. +<a href="#page_ii90">90</a>.</li> +<li>Bialystock, ii. +<a href="#page_ii134">134</a>.</li> +<li>Bingham, Sir George, ii. +<a href="#page_ii536">536</a>, + <a href="#page_ii548">548</a>, + <a href="#page_ii551">551</a>.</li> +<li>Black Forest, ii. +<a href="#page_ii14">14-16</a>.</li> +<li>Blücher, ii. +<a href="#page_ii83">83</a>, + <a href="#page_ii92">92</a>, + <a href="#page_ii98">98</a>, + <a href="#page_ii100">100</a>, + <a href="#page_ii285">285-286</a>, + <a href="#page_ii288">288</a>, + <a href="#page_ii292">292</a>, + <a href="#page_ii332">332-333</a>, + <a href="#page_ii335">335-336</a>, + <a href="#page_ii338">338-340</a>, + <a href="#page_ii350">350-352</a>, + <a href="#page_ii353">353-354</a>, + <a href="#page_ii356">356</a>, + <a href="#page_ii358">358</a>, + <a href="#page_ii360">360</a>, + <a href="#page_ii361">361</a>, + <a href="#page_ii362">362</a>, + <a href="#page_ii364">364</a>, + <a href="#page_ii366">366</a>, + <a href="#page_ii381">381-384</a>, + <a href="#page_ii389">389</a>, + <a href="#page_ii392">392-396</a>, + <a href="#page_ii401">401</a>, + <a href="#page_ii404">404-407</a>, + <a href="#page_ii414">414</a>, + <a href="#page_ii416">416-419</a>, + <a href="#page_ii423">423</a>, + <a href="#page_ii456">456-457</a>, + <a href="#page_ii460">460</a>, + <a href="#page_ii467">467-473</a>, + <a href="#page_ii476">476-477</a>, + <a href="#page_ii479">479</a>, + <a href="#page_ii480">480</a>, + <a href="#page_ii481">481</a>, + <a href="#page_ii489">489</a>, + <a href="#page_ii502">502</a>, + <a href="#page_ii510">510</a>, + <a href="#page_ii516">516-518</a>, + <a href="#page_ii537">537</a>, + <a href="#page_ii545">545</a>, + <a href="#page_ii546">546</a>.</li> +<li>Bologna, i. +<a href="#page_i78">78</a>, + <a href="#page_i103">103</a>, + <a href="#page_i119">119</a>, + <a href="#page_i128">128</a>, + <a href="#page_ii131">131</a>.</li> +<li>Bon, i. +<a href="#page_i182">182</a>, + <a href="#page_i209">209</a>.</li> +<li>Bonaparte, Caroline, ii. +<a href="#page_ii571">571</a>.</li> +<li>Bonaparte, Charles, i. +<a href="#page_i5">5-10</a>.</li> +<li>Bonaparte, Elise, i. +<a href="#page_i37">37</a>, + <a href="#page_i153">153</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii10">10</a>.</li> +<li>Bonaparte family, the, i. +<a href="#page_i2">2-12</a>, + <a href="#page_i17">17</a>.</li> +<li>Bonaparte, Jerome, i. +<a href="#page_i444">444-445</a>, + <a href="#page_i473">473=474</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii135">135</a>, + <a href="#page_ii154">154</a>, + <a href="#page_ii194">194</a>, + <a href="#page_ii216">216</a>, + <a href="#page_ii248">248-249</a>, + <a href="#page_ii352">352</a>, + <a href="#page_ii423">423</a>, + <a href="#page_ii485">485</a>, + <a href="#page_ii494">494-495</a>.</li> +<li>Bonaparte, Joseph, i. +<a href="#page_i7">7</a>, + <a href="#page_i10">10</a>, + <a href="#page_i13">13</a>, + <a href="#page_i23">23</a>, + <a href="#page_i30">30</a>, + <a href="#page_i32">32</a>, + <a href="#page_i73">3</a>, + <a href="#page_i153">153</a>, + <a href="#page_i341">341</a>, + <a href="#page_i351">351-354</a>, + <a href="#page_i369">369-371</a>, + <a href="#page_i424">424-426</a>, + <a href="#page_i443">443-444</a>, + <a href="#page_i465">465</a>, + <a href="#page_i468">468</a>, + <a href="#page_i473">473-475</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii9">9-10</a>, + <a href="#page_ii62">62</a>, + <a href="#page_ii63">63</a>, + <a href="#page_ii85">85</a>, + <a href="#page_ii135">135</a>, + <a href="#page_ii168">168</a>, + <a href="#page_ii169">169-171</a>, + <a href="#page_ii181">181</a>, + <a href="#page_ii185">185</a>, + <a href="#page_ii198">198</a>, + <a href="#page_ii201">201</a>, + <a href="#page_ii210">210</a>, + <a href="#page_ii269">269</a>, + <a href="#page_ii300">300-304</a>, + <a href="#page_ii305">305-313</a>, + <a href="#page_ii382">382</a>, + <a href="#page_ii393">393</a>, + <a href="#page_ii396">396</a>, + <a href="#page_ii412">412</a>, + <a href="#page_ii416">416</a>, + <a href="#page_ii421">421-422</a>, + <a href="#page_ii423">423</a>, + <a href="#page_ii454">454</a>, + <a href="#page_ii512">512</a>, + <a href="#page_ii520">520</a>.</li> +<li>Bonaparte, Josephine, i. +<a href="#page_i73">73-74</a>, + <a href="#page_i153">153-156</a>, + <a href="#page_i215">215</a>, + <a href="#page_i221">221</a>, + <a href="#page_i304">304</a>, + <a href="#page_i327">327</a>, + <a href="#page_i329">329</a>, + <a href="#page_i459">459</a>, + <a href="#page_i462">462</a>, + <a href="#page_i472">472-474</a>, + <a href="#page_i477">477-480</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii129">129</a>, + <a href="#page_ii133">133</a>, + <a href="#page_ii182">182</a>, + <a href="#page_ii204">204-207</a>, + <a href="#page_ii515">515</a>, + <a href="#page_ii571">571</a>.</li> +<li>Bonaparte, Letizia (Madame Mère), i. +<a href="#page_i5">5-7</a>, + <a href="#page_i23">23</a>, + <a href="#page_i41">41</a>, + <a href="#page_i468">468</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii440">440</a>.</li> +<li>Bonaparte, Louis, i. +<a href="#page_i32">32</a>, + <a href="#page_i61">61</a>, + <a href="#page_i125">125</a>, + <a href="#page_i153">153</a>, + <a href="#page_i442">442</a>, + <a href="#page_i468">468</a>, + <a href="#page_i473">473-475</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii10">10</a>, + <a href="#page_ii168">168</a>, + <a href="#page_ii212">212-214</a>, + <a href="#page_ii393">393</a>, + <a href="#page_ii423">423</a>.</li> +<li>Bonaparte, Lucien, i. +<a href="#page_i21">21</a>, + <a href="#page_i31">31</a>, + <a href="#page_i39">39</a>, + <a href="#page_i40">40</a>, + <a href="#page_i179">179</a>, + <a href="#page_i214">214</a>, + <a href="#page_i223">223-226</a>, + <a href="#page_i228">228</a>, + <a href="#page_i234">234</a>, + <a href="#page_i295">295</a>, + <a href="#page_i311">311</a>, + <a href="#page_i369">369-371</a>, + <a href="#page_i442">442-444</a>, + <a href="#page_i473">473-475</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii162">162</a>, + <a href="#page_ii452">452</a>, + <a href="#page_ii454">454</a>, + <a href="#page_ii513">513</a>, + <a href="#page_ii514">514</a>, + <a href="#page_ii560">560</a>.</li> +<li>Bonaparte, Pauline, i. +<a href="#page_i153">153</a>, + <a href="#page_i360">360</a>, + <a href="#page_i363">363</a>, + <a href="#page_i442">442</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii436">436</a>, + <a href="#page_ii440">440</a>, + <a href="#page_ii571">571</a>.</li> +<li>Borghese, Prince, i. +<a href="#page_i442">442</a>.</li> +<li>Borodino, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii254">254-256</a>.</li> +<li>Boulay de la Meurthe, i. +<a href="#page_i229">229</a>, + <a href="#page_i234">234</a>, + <a href="#page_i302">302</a>, + <a href="#page_i305">305</a>.</li> +<li>Boulogne, i. +<a href="#page_i313">313</a>, + <a href="#page_i485">485-503</a>.</li> +<li>Bourbon, Ile de, i. +<a href="#page_i358">358</a>, + <a href="#page_i372">372</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii390">390</a>, + <a href="#page_ii538">538</a>.</li> +<li>Bourgogne, Serg., ii. +<a href="#page_ii257">257</a>, + <a href="#page_ii261">261</a>.</li> +<li>Bourmont, Gen., i. +<a href="#page_i237">237</a>; +ii. <a href="#page_i461">461</a>.</li> +<li>Bourrienne, i. +<a href="#page_i12">12</a>, + <a href="#page_i13">13</a>, + <a href="#page_i72">72</a>, + <a href="#page_i175">175</a>, + <a href="#page_i180">180-181</a>, + <a href="#page_i215">215</a>, + <a href="#page_i245">245</a>, + <a href="#page_i303">303</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii157">157</a>, + <a href="#page_ii222">222</a>.</li> +<li>Boyen, Gen. von, ii. +<a href="#page_ii330">330</a>.</li> +<li>Breisgau, i. +<a href="#page_i170">170</a>, + <a href="#page_i263">263</a>.</li> +<li>Brescia, i. +<a href="#page_i101">101</a>, + <a href="#page_i107">107</a>, + <a href="#page_i108">108</a>, + <a href="#page_i109">109</a>, + <a href="#page_i113">113</a>, + <a href="#page_i143">143</a>, + <a href="#page_i144">144</a>, + <a href="#page_i259">259</a>.</li> +<li>Breslau, Convention of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii277">277</a>.</li> +<li>Brest, i. +<a href="#page_i160">160</a>, + <a href="#page_i375">375</a>.</li> +<li>Brienne, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii383">383</a>.</li> +<li>Brienne, Napoleon at, i. +<a href="#page_i10">10-14</a>.</li> +<li>Broglie, Duc de, i. +<a href="#page_i162">162</a>; +ii. <a href="#page_ii246">246</a>, + <a href="#page_ii327">327</a>, + <a href="#page_ii450">450</a>.</li> +<li>Brueys, Admiral, i. +<a href="#page_i182">182-183</a>, + <a href="#page_i192">192</a>, + <a href="#page_i229">229</a>.</li> +<li>Bruix, i. +<a href="#page_i214">214</a>, + <a href="#page_i487">487</a>.</li> +<li>Brulart, ii. +<a href="#page_ii439">439</a>.</li> +<li>Brumaire, <i>coup d'état</i> of, i. +<a href="#page_i222">22-228</a>.</li> +<li>Brune, Marshal, i. +<a href="#page_i70">70</a>, + <a href="#page_i180">180</a>, + <a href="#page_i237">237</a>, + <a href="#page_i469">469</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii144">144</a>, + <a href="#page_ii454">454</a>.</li> +<li>Brunswick, Duke of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii31">31</a>, + <a href="#page_ii91">91-94</a>, + <a href="#page_ii97">97-98</a>, + <a href="#page_ii100">100</a>.</li> +<li>Brunswick-Oels, Duke of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii194">194</a>, + <a href="#page_ii474">474</a>.</li> +<li>Bubna, Count, ii. +<a href="#page_ii289">289-290</a>, + <a href="#page_ii314">314</a>, + <a href="#page_ii321">321</a>, + <a href="#page_ii328">328</a>.</li> +<li>Budberg, Baron, ii. +<a href="#page_ii74">74</a>.</li> +<li>Bülow, Gen. von, ii. +<a href="#page_ii338">338</a>, + <a href="#page_ii350">350</a>, + <a href="#page_ii352">352</a>, + <a href="#page_ii381">381</a>, + <a href="#page_ii392">392</a>, + <a href="#page_ii401">401</a>, + <a href="#page_ii405">405</a>, + <a href="#page_ii414">414</a>, + <a href="#page_ii460">460</a>, + <a href="#page_ii489">489</a>, + <a href="#page_ii495">495</a>, + <a href="#page_ii496">486</a>, + <a href="#page_ii502">502</a>, + <a href="#page_ii503">503</a>, + <a href="#page_ii504">504</a>.</li> +<li>Buonavita, ii. +<a href="#page_ii568">568</a>.</li> +<li>Burghersh, Lady, ii. +<a href="#page_ii370">370</a>, + <a href="#page_ii417">417</a>.</li> +<li>Burghersh, Lord, ii. +<a href="#page_ii360">360</a>, +<a href="#page_ii419">419</a>.</li> +<li>Busaco, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii209">209</a>.</li> +<li>Buttafuoco, Comte de, i. +<a href="#page_i31">31</a>.</li> +<li>Bylandt, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii496">496</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> +<li>Cadiz, i. +<a href="#page_i499">499-502</a>, +<a href="#page_i507">507</a>.</li> +<li>Cadoudal, Georges, i. +<a href="#page_i236">236-238</a>, +<a href="#page_i446">446</a>, +<a href="#page_i453">352-456</a>, +<a href="#page_i458">458</a>, +<a href="#page_i471">471-472</a>.</li> +<li>Cæsar, i. +<a href="#page_i187">187</a>.</li> +<li>Caffarelli, i. +<a href="#page_i183">183-184</a>, +<a href="#page_i190">190</a>, +<a href="#page_i195">195</a>, +<a href="#page_i209">209</a>.</li> +<li>Cairo, i. +<a href="#page_i189">189-191</a>, +<a href="#page_i197">197-199</a>.</li> +<li>Calder, i. +<a href="#page_i499">499</a>, +<a href="#page_i502">502-504</a>.</li> +<li>Caldiero, i. +<a href="#page_i122">122</a>, +<a href="#page_i123">123</a>.</li> +<li>Cambacérès, i. +<a href="#page_i222">222</a>, +<a href="#page_i234">234</a>, +<a href="#page_i289">289</a>, +<a href="#page_i302">302</a>, +<a href="#page_i321">321-322</a>, +<a href="#page_i458">458</a>, +<a href="#page_i467">467-468</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii312">312</a>, +<a href="#page_ii370">370</a>, +<a href="#page_ii395">395</a>, +<a href="#page_ii513">513</a>.</li> +<li>Cambronne, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii509">509</a>.</li> +<li>Camel corps, i. +<a href="#page_i197">197</a>.</li> +<li>Campbell, Col., i. +<a href="#page_i489">489</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii420">420</a>, +<a href="#page_ii434">434</a>, +<a href="#page_ii435">435</a>, +<a href="#page_ii440">440-442</a>.</li> +<li>Campbell, Sir Neil, ii. +<a href="#page_ii484">484</a>, +<a href="#page_ii485">485</a>.</li> +<li>Camperdown, i. +<a href="#page_i175">175</a>.</li> +<li>Campo Formio, Treaty of, i. +<a href="#page_i170">170-172</a>, +<a href="#page_i263">263</a>.</li> +<li>Canning, ii. +<a href="#page_ii116">116</a>, +<a href="#page_ii126">126</a>, +<a href="#page_ii141">141-143</a>, +<a href="#page_ii145">145</a>, +<a href="#page_ii148">148</a>, +<a href="#page_ii152">152</a>, +<a href="#page_ii169">169</a>, +<a href="#page_ii185">185-186</a>, +<a href="#page_ii190">190</a>, +<a href="#page_ii199">199</a>, +<a href="#page_ii208">208</a>.</li> +<li>Cape of Good Hope, i. +<a href="#page_i166">166</a>, +<a href="#page_i311">311-312</a>, +<a href="#page_i314">314</a>, +<a href="#page_i333">333</a>, +<a href="#page_i375">375</a>, +<a href="#page_i396">396</a>, +<a href="#page_i405">405-406</a>, +<a href="#page_i420">420</a>, +<a href="#page_i428">428</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii54">54</a>, +<a href="#page_ii73">73</a>, +<a href="#page_ii81">81</a>, +<a href="#page_ii82">82</a>, +<a href="#page_ii221">221</a>, +<a href="#page_ii229">229</a>, +<a href="#page_ii436">436</a>.</li> +<li>Caprara, i. +<a href="#page_i274">274</a>.</li> +<li>Capri, i. +<a href="#page_i4">4</a> ; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii80">80</a>, +<a href="#page_ii545">545</a>.</li> +<li>Carmel, Mount, i. +<a href="#page_i206">206</a>.</li> +<li>Carnot, i. +<a href="#page_i74">74</a>, +<a href="#page_i75">75</a>, +<a href="#page_i162">162</a>, +<a href="#page_i234">232</a>, +<a href="#page_i322">322</a>, +<a href="#page_i451">451</a>, +<a href="#page_i467">467</a>, +<a href="#page_i471">471</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii446">446</a>, +<a href="#page_ii513">513</a>, +<a href="#page_ii515">515</a>.</li> +<li>Carteaux, i. +<a href="#page_i47">47</a>, +<a href="#page_i49">49</a>, +<a href="#page_i52">52</a>, +<a href="#page_i70">70</a>.</li> +<li>Castiglione, i. +<a href="#page_i110">110</a>.</li> +<li>Castlereagh, i. +<a href="#page_i336">336</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii56">56</a>, +<a href="#page_ii116">116</a>, +<a href="#page_ii145">145</a>, +<a href="#page_ii208">208</a>, +<a href="#page_ii283">283</a>, +<a href="#page_ii296">296</a>, +<a href="#page_ii322">322</a>, +<a href="#page_ii361">361</a>, +<a href="#page_ii369">369</a>, + <a href="#page_ii372">372</a>, +<a href="#page_ii386">386-389</a>, +<a href="#page_ii390">390</a>, +<a href="#page_ii400">400</a>, +<a href="#page_ii403">403</a>, +<a href="#page_ii410">410-411</a>, +<a href="#page_ii426">426</a>, +<a href="#page_ii436">436</a>, +<a href="#page_ii437">437</a>, +<a href="#page_ii439">439-440</a>, +<a href="#page_ii525">525</a>, + <a href="#page_ii558">558</a>.</li> +<li>Catalonia, annexation of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii210">210</a>.</li> +<li>Cathcart, Lord, ii. +<a href="#page_ii116">116</a>, +<a href="#page_ii144">144-145</a>, +<a href="#page_ii277">277</a>, +<a href="#page_ii287">287-288</a>, +<a href="#page_ii316">316-317</a>, +<a href="#page_ii321">321</a>, +<a href="#page_ii326">326</a>, + <a href="#page_ii332">332</a>, +<a href="#page_ii334">334</a>, +<a href="#page_ii364">364</a>, + <a href="#page_ii390">390</a>.</li> +<li>Catherine II., i. +<a href="#page_i138">138</a>; ii. +<a href="#page_i273">273</a>.</li> +<li>Cattaro, i. +<a href="#page_i170">170</a>.</li> +<li>Caulaincourt, i. +<a href="#page_i458">458</a>, +<a href="#page_i462">462</a>, +<a href="#page_i468">468</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii34">34</a>, +<a href="#page_ii182">182-183</a>, +<a href="#page_ii205">205</a>, +<a href="#page_ii290">290</a>, +<a href="#page_ii295">295</a>, +<a href="#page_ii323">323-324</a>, + <a href="#page_ii327">327</a>, +<a href="#page_ii354">354</a>, +<a href="#page_ii370">370-371</a>, +<a href="#page_ii374">374-375</a>, +<a href="#page_ii389">389-392</a>, +<a href="#page_ii401">401</a>, +<a href="#page_ii410">410-413</a>, +<a href="#page_ii416">416-418</a>, + <a href="#page_ii422">422</a>, +<a href="#page_ii423">423</a>, +<a href="#page_ii426">426-428</a>, +<a href="#page_ii431">431-432</a>, +<a href="#page_ii444">444</a>, +<a href="#page_ii515">515</a>.</li> +<li>Certificates of origin, ii. +<a href="#page_ii104">104</a>, +<a href="#page_ii156">156</a>, +<a href="#page_ii233">233</a>.</li> +<li>Cervoni, i. +<a href="#page_i95">95</a>.</li> +<li>Ceva, i. +<a href="#page_i85">85</a>, +<a href="#page_i86">86</a>, +<a href="#page_i87">87</a>.</li> +<li>Ceylon, i. +<a href="#page_i311">311-312</a>, +<a href="#page_i314">314-315</a>, +<a href="#page_i333">333</a>, +<a href="#page_i343">343</a>.</li> +<li>Chaboulon, Fleury de, ii. +<a href="#page_ii441">441</a>.</li> +<li>Chamber of Peers, ii. +<a href="#page_ii451">451</a>.</li> +<li>Chamber of Representatives, ii. +<a href="#page_ii451">451</a>.</li> +<li>Champ de Mai. ii. +<a href="#page_ii444">444</a>, +<a href="#page_ii450">450</a>, +<a href="#page_ii452">452</a>.</li> +<li>Champagny, ii. +<a href="#page_ii149">149</a>, +<a href="#page_ii181">181</a>, +<a href="#page_ii185">185</a>, +<a href="#page_ii213">213</a>.</li> +<li>Champaubert, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii393">393</a>.</li> +<li>Channel Islands, the, i. +<a href="#page_i166">166</a>, +<a href="#page_i175">175</a>.</li> +<li>Chaptal, i. +<a href="#page_i234">234</a>, +<a href="#page_i285">285</a>, +<a href="#page_i304">304-306</a>, +<a href="#page_i316">316</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii216">216</a>, +<a href="#page_ii219">219</a>, +<a href="#page_ii224">224</a>, +<a href="#page_ii484">484</a>.</li> +<li>Charlemagne, i. +<a href="#page_i478">478-479</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii191">191</a>, +<a href="#page_ii227">227-228</a>.</li> +<li>Charles, Archduke, i. +<a href="#page_i121">121</a>, +<a href="#page_i137">137</a>, +<a href="#page_i196">196</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii11">11</a>, +<a href="#page_ii13">13-14</a>, +<a href="#page_ii22">22</a>, +<a href="#page_ii26">26</a>, +<a href="#page_ii31">31-33</a>, + <a href="#page_ii35">35</a>, +<a href="#page_ii189">189-192</a>, +<a href="#page_ii194">194-195</a>, +<a href="#page_ii201">201</a>.</li> +<li>Charles IV., ii. +<a href="#page_ii159">159</a>, +<a href="#page_ii161">161-166</a>.</li> +<li>Charles XIII., ii. +<a href="#page_ii202">202</a>, +<a href="#page_ii238">238</a>.</li> +<li>Charlotte, Queen, i. +<a href="#page_i435">435</a>.</li> +<li>Chassé, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii491">491</a>, +<a href="#page_ii504">504</a>, +<a href="#page_ii506">506</a>.</li> +<li>Chastel, ii. +<a href="#page_ii255">255</a>.</li> +<li>Chateaubriand, i. +<a href="#page_i282">282</a>, +<a href="#page_i298">298</a>, +<a href="#page_i463">463</a>.</li> +<li>Chatham, Earl, ii. +<a href="#page_ii199">199</a>.</li> +<li>Châtillon, Congress of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii389">389-392</a>, +<a href="#page_ii400">400</a>, +<a href="#page_ii409">409-412</a>.</li> +<li>Chaumont, Treaty of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii402">402-403</a>, +<a href="#page_ii448">448</a>.</li> +<li>Chénier, i. +<a href="#page_i451">451</a>.</li> +<li>Cherasco, i. +<a href="#page_i88">88</a>, +<a href="#page_i89">89</a>.</li> +<li>Chouans, i. +<a href="#page_i305">305-307</a>.</li> +<li>Cintra, Convention of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii172">172</a>.</li> +<li>Cisalpine Republic, i. +<a href="#page_i142">142</a>, +<a href="#page_i151">151-152</a>, +<a href="#page_i166">166</a>, +<a href="#page_i168">168-170</a>, +<a href="#page_i251">251-252</a>, +<a href="#page_i264">264</a>, +<a href="#page_i319">319</a>, + <a href="#page_i345">345-349</a>.</li> +<li>Cispadane Republic, i. +<a href="#page_i119">119-120</a>, +<a href="#page_i131">131</a>, +<a href="#page_i142">142</a>, +<a href="#page_i149">149</a>, +<a href="#page_i152">152</a>.</li> +<li>Ciudad Rodrigo, +ii. +<a href="#page_ii302">302</a>.</li> +<li>Clarke, Gen., i. +<a href="#page_i128">128</a>, +<a href="#page_i129">129</a>, +<a href="#page_i130">130</a>, +<a href="#page_i140">140</a>, +<a href="#page_i158">158</a>, +<a href="#page_i164">164</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii74">74</a>, +<a href="#page_ii295">295</a>, +<a href="#page_ii302">302-303</a>, + <a href="#page_ii325">325</a>, +<a href="#page_ii363">363</a>, +<a href="#page_ii404">404</a>, +<a href="#page_ii421">421</a>.</li> +<li>Clausel, ii. +<a href="#page_ii303">30-304</a>, +<a href="#page_ii306">306-307</a>, +<a href="#page_ii309">309</a>, +<a href="#page_ii313">313</a>, +<a href="#page_ii454">454</a>.</li> +<li>Clausewitz, ii. +<a href="#page_ii244">244</a>, +<a href="#page_ii250">250</a>, +<a href="#page_ii255">255</a> <i>n.</i>, +<a href="#page_ii459">459</a>, +<a href="#page_ii466">466</a>, +<a href="#page_ii492">492</a>.</li> +<li>Clichy Club, i. +<a href="#page_i158">158</a>, +<a href="#page_i161">161</a>.</li> +<li>Cleves, ii. +<a href="#page_ii44">44</a>.</li> +<li>Coalition, Second, +<a href="#page_ii209">209</a>, +<a href="#page_ii213">213</a>, +<a href="#page_ii216">216</a>, +<a href="#page_ii240">240-243</a>.</li> +<li>Coalition, Third, i. +<a href="#page_i500">500</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii1">1</a>, +<a href="#page_ii5">5-12</a>, +<a href="#page_ii42">42</a>, +<a href="#page_ii58">58</a>.</li> +<li>Cobenzl, Count, i. +<a href="#page_i162">162</a>, +<a href="#page_i263">263</a> ; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii1">1</a>, +<a href="#page_ii3">3</a>, +<a href="#page_ii45">45</a>.</li> +<li>Cockburn, Admiral, ii. +<a href="#page_ii451">451</a>, +<a href="#page_ii510">510</a>, +<a href="#page_ii527">527</a>, +<a href="#page_ii528">528</a>, +<a href="#page_ii531">531-532</a>, +<a href="#page_ii534">534-535</a>, +<a href="#page_ii539">539-549</a>, + <a href="#page_ii545">545</a>, +<a href="#page_ii547">547</a>.</li> +<li>Code Napoleon, i. +<a href="#page_i287">287-294</a>, +<a href="#page_i466">466</a> ; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii77">77</a>.</li> +<li>Coffee, price of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii218">218</a>, +<a href="#page_ii223">223</a>.</li> +<li>Collingwood, i. +<a href="#page_i488">488</a>.</li> +<li>Colloredo, ii. +<a href="#page_ii359">359</a>.</li> +<li>Commercial prohibition, i. +<a href="#page_i401">401-402</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii104">104-106</a>, +<a href="#page_ii156">156-157</a>, +<a href="#page_ii217">217-220</a>, +<a href="#page_ii224">224</a>.</li> +<li>Committee of Public Safety, i. +<a href="#page_i44">44</a>, +<a href="#page_i65">65</a>, +<a href="#page_i67">67</a>, +<a href="#page_i162">167</a>.</li> +<li>Concordat, the (of 1802), i. +<a href="#page_i21">21</a>, +<a href="#page_i271">271-284</a>, +<a href="#page_i476">476</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii570">570</a>.</li> +<li>Condorcet, i. +<a href="#page_i295">295</a>.</li> +<li>Confederation of the Rhine, ii. +<a href="#page_ii75">75-78</a>, +<a href="#page_ii83">83-84</a>, +<a href="#page_ii91">91</a>, +<a href="#page_ii103">103</a>, +<a href="#page_ii135">135</a>, +<a href="#page_ii195">195</a>, +<a href="#page_ii229">229</a>, +<a href="#page_ii240">240</a>, +<a href="#page_ii277">277</a>, +<a href="#page_ii316">316</a>, +<a href="#page_ii324">324</a>, +<a href="#page_ii329">329-330</a>.</li> +<li>Coni, i. +<a href="#page_i88">88</a>.</li> +<li>Consalvi, Cardinal, i. +<a href="#page_i274">274-279</a>.</li> +<li>Constant, Benjamin, i. +<a href="#page_i163">163</a>, +<a href="#page_i238">238</a>, +<a href="#page_i320">320</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii450">450</a>.</li> +<li>Constant (the Valet), ii. +<a href="#page_ii432">432</a>.</li> +<li>Constantine, Grand Duke, ii. +<a href="#page_ii250">250</a>.</li> +<li>Constantinople, i. +<a href="#page_i182">182</a>, +<a href="#page_i201">201-203</a>, +<a href="#page_i210">210</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii128">128</a>, +<a href="#page_ii136">136</a>, +<a href="#page_ii175">175</a>.</li> +<li>Constitution of 1795, i. +<a href="#page_i66">66</a>, +<a href="#page_i159">159</a>, +<a href="#page_i218">218</a>, +<a href="#page_i221">221</a>.</li> +<li>Constitution of 1799 (Year VIII.), i. +<a href="#page_i229">229-233</a>, +<a href="#page_i238">238</a>.</li> +<li>Constitutional priests, i. +<a href="#page_i28">28</a>, +<a href="#page_i164">164</a>, +<a href="#page_i272">272</a>, +<a href="#page_i273">273-277</a>, +<a href="#page_i282">282</a>.</li> +<li>Consul, First, powers of, i. +<a href="#page_i231">231-233</a>.</li> +<li>Consulate for life, i. +<a href="#page_i321">321-324</a>, + <a href="#page_i326">326</a>.</li> +<li>Continental System, i. +<a href="#page_i176">176</a>, + <a href="#page_i436">436</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii28">28</a>, + <a href="#page_ii48">48</a>, + <a href="#page_ii49">49</a>, + <a href="#page_ii77">77</a>, + <a href="#page_ii103">103-107</a>, + <a href="#page_ii144">144</a>, + <a href="#page_ii153">153-158</a>, + <a href="#page_ii174">174</a>, + <a href="#page_ii189">189-190</a>, + <a href="#page_ii193">193</a>, +<a href="#page_ii211">211-223</a>, +<a href="#page_ii233">233-235</a>, +<a href="#page_ii236">236-237</a>.</li> +<li>"Contrat Social, Le," i. + <a href="#page_i17">17</a>, +<a href="#page_i20">20</a>, +<a href="#page_i26">26</a>, + <a href="#page_i43">43</a>, + <a href="#page_i466">466</a>.</li> +<li>Convention, the, i. +<a href="#page_i37">37</a>, + <a href="#page_i40">40</a>, + <a href="#page_i54">54</a>, + <a href="#page_i57">57</a>, + <a href="#page_i58">58</a>, + <a href="#page_i66">66</a>, + <a href="#page_i67">67</a>, + <a href="#page_i68">68</a>, + <a href="#page_i69">69</a>, + <a href="#page_i72">72</a>, +<a href="#page_i289">289</a>.</li> +<li>Copenhagen, bombardment of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii142">142</a>.</li> +<li>Corbineau, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii263">263</a>.</li> +<li>Corfu, i. +<a href="#page_i168">168</a>, + <a href="#page_i192">192-193</a>, + <a href="#page_i413">413</a>, + <a href="#page_i420">420-422</a>, + <a href="#page_i434">434</a>, +<a href="#page_i488">488</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii17">17</a>, + <a href="#page_ii62">62</a>, + <a href="#page_ii82">82</a>, + <a href="#page_ii154">154</a>, + <a href="#page_ii430">430</a>.</li> +<li>Cornwallis, Lord, i. +<a href="#page_i337">337</a>, +<a href="#page_i341">341</a>, +<a href="#page_i343">343</a>, +<a href="#page_i350">350-354</a>, +<a href="#page_i372">372</a>.</li> +<li>Cornwallis, Admiral, i. +<a href="#page_i440">440</a>, +<a href="#page_i491">491-492</a>, +<a href="#page_i499">499</a>, +<a href="#page_i502">502-504</a>.</li> +<li>Coronation, i. +<a href="#page_i476">476-477</a>, +<a href="#page_i479">479-480</a>.</li> +<li>Corps Législatif, i. +<a href="#page_i230">230</a>, +<a href="#page_i270">270</a>, +<a href="#page_i305">305</a>, +<a href="#page_i320">320</a>, +<a href="#page_ii321">321-324</a> ; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii377">377</a>.</li> +<li>Corsica, i. +<a href="#page_i1">1</a>, +<a href="#page_i3">3-11</a>, +<a href="#page_i14">14</a>, +<a href="#page_i16">16</a>, +<a href="#page_i17">17</a>, +<a href="#page_i22">22</a>, +<a href="#page_i23">23</a>, +<a href="#page_i28">28-32</a>, +<a href="#page_i34">34-35</a>, +<a href="#page_i37">37</a>, +<a href="#page_i38">38-43</a>, +<a href="#page_i56">56</a>, +<a href="#page_i60">60</a>, +<a href="#page_i61">61</a>, +<a href="#page_i217">217</a>, +<a href="#page_i241">241</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii430">430</a>.</li> +<li>Cortès, ii. +<a href="#page_ii301">301</a>, +<a href="#page_ii379">379</a>, +<a href="#page_ii380">380</a>.</li> +<li>Corvisart, ii. +<a href="#page_ii205">205</a>.</li> +<li>Cotton, ii. +<a href="#page_ii483">483</a>, +<a href="#page_ii491">491</a>.</li> +<li>Cotton, price of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii218">218</a>.</li> +<li>Council of Ancients, i. +<a href="#page_i66">66</a>, +<a href="#page_i223">223-224</a>.</li> +<li>Council of Five Hundred, i. +<a href="#page_i67">67</a>, +<a href="#page_i158">158</a>, +<a href="#page_i162">162</a>, +<a href="#page_i217">217</a>, +<a href="#page_i223">223-226</a>.</li> +<li>Council of State, i. +<a href="#page_i230">230</a>, +<a href="#page_i234">234</a>, +<a href="#page_i238">238</a>, +<a href="#page_i266">266</a>, +<a href="#page_i269">269</a>, +<a href="#page_i287">287</a>, +<a href="#page_i304">304-306</a>, +<a href="#page_i320">320</a>, +<a href="#page_i467">467</a>, +<a href="#page_i475">475</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii451">451</a>.</li> +<li>Court, Mr. à, i. +<a href="#page_i435">435</a>.</li> +<li>Craonne, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii406">406-407</a>, +<a href="#page_ii411">411</a>.</li> +<li>Croatia, ii. +<a href="#page_ii201">201</a>.</li> +<li>Croker, ii. +<a href="#page_ii516">516</a>.</li> +<li>Cromwell, i. +<a href="#page_i33">33</a>.</li> +<li>Cuesta, ii. +<a href="#page_ii198">198</a>.</li> +<li>Curaçoa, i. +<a href="#page_i311">311-312</a>, +<a href="#page_i333">333</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii436">436</a>.</li> +<li>Cyprus, i. +<a href="#page_i215">215</a>.</li> +<li>Czartoryski, i. +<a href="#page_i262">262</a>, +<a href="#page_i409">409-410</a>, +<a href="#page_i423">423</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii5">5-9</a>, +<a href="#page_ii29">29</a>, +<a href="#page_ii54">54</a>, +<a href="#page_ii71">71</a>, +<a href="#page_ii74">74</a>, +<a href="#page_ii110">110</a>, +<a href="#page_ii232">232</a>.</li> +</ul><ul> + +<li>Dalberg, ii. +<a href="#page_ii424">424-425</a>.</li> +<li>Dallemagne, i. +<a href="#page_i95">95</a>.</li> +<li>Dalmatia, i. +<a href="#page_i142">142</a>, +<a href="#page_ii168">168-170</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii45">45-48</a>, +<a href="#page_ii201">201</a>.</li> +<li>Dandolo, i. +<a href="#page_i170">170-172</a>.</li> +<li>Danton, i. +<a href="#page_i63">63</a>.</li> +<li>Dantzig, siege of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii284">284</a>.</li> +<li>Danubian provinces, ii. +<a href="#page_ii47">47</a>, +<a href="#page_ii135">135</a>, +<a href="#page_ii138">138</a>, +<a href="#page_ii185">185</a>.</li> +<li>Daru, i. +<a href="#page_i503">503</a>.</li> +<li>David, i. +<a href="#page_i248">248</a>.</li> +<li>Davidovich, i. +<a href="#page_i107">107</a>, +<a href="#page_i121">121</a>, +<a href="#page_i122">122</a>, +<a href="#page_i127">127</a>.</li> +<li>Davoust, i. +<a href="#page_i182">182</a>, +<a href="#page_i438">438</a>, +<a href="#page_i469">469-470</a>; <br /> +ii. +<a href="#page_ii18">18</a>, +<a href="#page_ii38">38</a>, +<a href="#page_ii91">91</a>, +<a href="#page_ii94">94</a>, +<a href="#page_ii98">98-100</a>, +<a href="#page_ii112">112</a>, <br /> +<a href="#page_ii113">113</a>, +<a href="#page_ii119">119</a>, +<a href="#page_ii122">122</a>, +<a href="#page_ii193">193</a>, +<a href="#page_ii195">195</a>, +<a href="#page_ii248">248-249</a>, <br /> +<a href="#page_ii251">251-252</a>, +<a href="#page_ii280">280</a>, +<a href="#page_ii296">296</a>, +<a href="#page_ii298">298-299</a>, +<a href="#page_ii325">3235</a>, +<a href="#page_ii332">332</a>, <br /> +<a href="#page_ii337">337-338</a>, +<a href="#page_ii350">350</a>, +<a href="#page_ii352">352</a>, +<a href="#page_ii360">360</a>, +<a href="#page_ii369">369</a>, +<a href="#page_ii408">408</a>, <br /> +<a href="#page_ii416">416</a>, +<a href="#page_ii432">432</a>, +<a href="#page_ii446">446</a>, +<a href="#page_ii454">454</a>, +<a href="#page_ii514">514</a>, +<a href="#page_ii517">517</a>.</li> +<li>Decaen, Gen., i. +<a href="#page_i373">373-375</a>, +<a href="#page_i378">378</a>, +<a href="#page_i381">381</a>, +<a href="#page_i419">419</a>, +<a href="#page_i433">433</a>; <br /> +ii. +<a href="#page_ii454">454</a>.</li> +<li>Decoster, ii. +<a href="#page_ii486">486</a>.</li> +<li>Decrès, i. +<a href="#page_i358">358</a>, +<a href="#page_i363">363</a>, +<a href="#page_i487">487</a>, +<a href="#page_i497">497</a>; <br /> +ii. +<a href="#page_ii176">176</a>, +<a href="#page_ii446">446</a>.</li> +<li>Dedem de Gelder, +ii. +<a href="#page_ii360">360</a>.</li> +<li>Defermon, i. +<a href="#page_i234">234</a>.</li> +<li>Dego, i. +<a href="#page_i85">85</a>, +<a href="#page_i86">86</a>.</li> +<li>Delhi, i. +<a href="#page_i201">201</a>.</li> +<li>Demerara, i. +<a href="#page_i311">311-312</a>, +<a href="#page_i333">333</a>, +<a href="#page_i439">439</a>; <br /> +ii. +<a href="#page_ii436">436</a>.</li> +<li>D'Enghien, Duc, i. +<a href="#page_i446">446</a>, +<a href="#page_i457">457-463</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii532">532</a>.</li> +<li>Denmark, i. +<a href="#page_i64">64</a>, +<a href="#page_i263">253</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii114">114</a>, +<a href="#page_ii136">136</a>, +<a href="#page_ii140">140-144</a>, +<a href="#page_ii152">152-153</a>, +<a href="#page_ii221">221</a>, +<a href="#page_ii296">296-297</a>, +<a href="#page_ii380">380</a>.</li> +<li>Dennewitz, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii350">350</a>.</li> +<li>Denon, i. +<a href="#page_i215">215</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii517">517</a>.</li> +<li>Departments, French, +i. +<a href="#page_i27">27</a>.</li> +<li>D'Erlon, Count, +ii. +<a href="#page_ii454">454</a>, +<a href="#page_ii460">460</a>, +<a href="#page_ii462">462</a>, +<a href="#page_ii470">470</a>, +<a href="#page_ii472">472-473</a>, +<a href="#page_ii474">474-476</a>, +<a href="#page_ii490">490</a>, +<a href="#page_ii495">495</a>, +<a href="#page_ii498">498</a>, +<a href="#page_ii502">502</a>, +<a href="#page_ii505">505</a>, +<a href="#page_ii508">508</a>.</li> +<li>Desaix, i. +<a href="#page_i181">181</a>, +<a href="#page_i182">182</a>, +<a href="#page_i191">191</a>, +<a href="#page_i199">199</a>, +<a href="#page_i214">214-215</a>, +<a href="#page_i254">254</a>, +<a href="#page_i259">259</a>.</li> +<li>Desgenettes, i. +<a href="#page_i212">212</a>.</li> +<li>Desprez, Col., ii. +<a href="#page_ii305">305</a>.</li> +<li>Diebitsch, ii. +<a href="#page_ii419">419</a>.</li> +<li>Dijon, i. +<a href="#page_i246">246</a>.</li> +<li>Directors, the, i. +<a href="#page_i97">97</a>, +<a href="#page_i104">104</a>, +<a href="#page_i146">146</a>, +<a href="#page_i218">218-224</a>, +<a href="#page_i226">226</a>.</li> +<li>Directory, the, i. +<a href="#page_i67">67</a>, +<a href="#page_i68">68</a>, +<a href="#page_i75">75</a>, +<a href="#page_i87">87</a>, +<a href="#page_i97">97</a>, +<a href="#page_i98">98</a>, +<a href="#page_i99">99</a>, +<a href="#page_i119">119</a>, +<a href="#page_i129">129</a>, +<a href="#page_i130">130</a>, +<a href="#page_i140">140</a>, +<a href="#page_i143">143</a>, +<a href="#page_i148">148</a>, +<a href="#page_i157">157-160</a>, +<a href="#page_i167">167-172</a>, +<a href="#page_i177">177-181</a>, +<a href="#page_i214">214</a>, +<a href="#page_i228">228</a>, +<a href="#page_i300">300</a>, +<a href="#page_i326">326</a>.</li> +<li>Divorce, i. +<a href="#page_i292">292</a>.</li> +<li>Divorce, the Imperial, + ii. +<a href="#page_ii327">327</a>.</li> +<li>Dolder, i. +<a href="#page_i393">393</a>.</li> +<li>Dommartin, i. +<a href="#page_i47">47</a>, +<a href="#page_i87">87</a>, +<a href="#page_i183">183</a>.</li> +<li>Domont, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii496">496</a>, +<a href="#page_ii503">503</a>.</li> +<li>Donzelot, ii. +<a href="#page_ii497">497</a>, +<a href="#page_ii503">503</a>, +<a href="#page_ii506">506</a>, +<a href="#page_ii507">507</a>, +<a href="#page_ii508">508</a>.</li> +<li>Doppet, i. +<a href="#page_i49">49</a>, +<a href="#page_i52">52</a>.</li> +<li>Dörnberg, ii. +<a href="#page_ii459">459</a>.</li> +<li>Douglas, Col., i. +<a href="#page_i208">208</a>.</li> +<li>Drake, Francis, i. +<a href="#page_i55">55</a>, +<a href="#page_i453">453-454</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii2">2</a>, +<a href="#page_ii62">62</a>.</li> +<li>Dresden, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii342">342-347</a>.</li> +<li>Drissa, camp of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii243">243</a>, +<a href="#page_ii249">249-250</a>.</li> +<li>Drouot, ii. +<a href="#page_ii395">395</a>, +<a href="#page_ii422">422</a>, +<a href="#page_ii434">434</a>.</li> +<li>Ducos, Roger, i. +<a href="#page_i220">220</a>, +<a href="#page_i223">223</a>, +<a href="#page_i228">228</a>, +<a href="#page_i233">233</a>, +<a href="#page_i239">239</a>.</li> +<li>Dugommier, i. +<a href="#page_i52">52</a>, +<a href="#page_i53">53</a>.</li> +<li>Duhesme, ii. +<a href="#page_ii503">503</a>.</li> +<li>Dumas, Gen., i. +<a href="#page_i115">115</a>, +<a href="#page_i182">182</a>, +<a href="#page_i194">194</a>, +<a href="#page_i285">285</a>.</li> +<li>Dumouriez, Gen., i. +<a href="#page_i90">90</a>, +<a href="#page_i457">457-459</a>, +<a href="#page_i486">486</a>.</li> +<li>Dundas, i. +<a href="#page_i441">441</a>.</li> +<li>Dunkirk, i. +<a href="#page_i175">175</a>.</li> +<li>Duphot, i. +<a href="#page_i179">179</a>.</li> +<li>Dupont, Gen., i. +<a href="#page_i70">70</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii22">22-23</a>, +<a href="#page_ii123">123</a>, +<a href="#page_ii169">169-170</a>, +<a href="#page_ii173">173</a>.</li> +<li>Duroc, i. + +<a href="#page_i76">76</a>, +<a href="#page_i172">172</a>, +<a href="#page_i215">215</a>, +<a href="#page_i327">327</a>, +<a href="#page_i409">409</a>, +<a href="#page_i443">443</a>, +<a href="#page_i468">468</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii12">12</a>, +<a href="#page_ii20">20</a>, +<a href="#page_ii40">40</a>, +<a href="#page_ii59">59</a>, +<a href="#page_ii101">101</a>, +<a href="#page_ii134">134</a>, +<a href="#page_ii150">150</a>, +<a href="#page_ii293">293</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> +<li>Eastern Question, i. +<a href="#page_i340">340</a>, +<a href="#page_i406">406</a>, +<a href="#page_i408">408-409</a>, +<a href="#page_i428">428</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii47">47-48</a>, +<a href="#page_ii108">108</a>.</li> +<li>East Indies, i. +<a href="#page_i497">497-499</a>.</li> +<li>Ebrington, Lord, ii. +<a href="#page_ii568">568</a>.</li> +<li>Eckmühl, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii191">191</a>.</li> +<li>Economists, i. +<a href="#page_i174">174</a>.</li> +<li>Education, national, i. +<a href="#page_i295">295-298</a>.</li> +<li>Egypt, i. +<a href="#page_i168">168</a>, +<a href="#page_i175">175-200</a>, +<a href="#page_i201">201-203</a>, +<a href="#page_i261">261</a>, +<a href="#page_i312">312-313</a>, +<a href="#page_i314">314</a>, +<a href="#page_i355">355</a>, +<a href="#page_i369">369</a>, +<a href="#page_i411">411-416</a>, +<a href="#page_i420">420-422</a>, +<a href="#page_i434">434</a>, +<a href="#page_i488">488</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii139">139</a>, +<a href="#page_ii174">174</a>, +<a href="#page_ii176">176</a>, +<a href="#page_ii229">229</a>, +<a href="#page_ii529">529</a>.</li> +<li>Elba, i. +<a href="#page_i264">264</a>, +<a href="#page_i314">314</a>, +<a href="#page_i389">389</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii430">430</a>, +<a href="#page_ii435">435-442</a>.</li> +<li>Elchingen, ii. +<a href="#page_ii24">24</a>.</li> +<li>Ellesmere, Earl of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii493">493</a>.</li> +<li>Emmett, i. +<a href="#page_i510">510</a> (App.). +<li>England, i. +<a href="#page_i22">22</a>, +<a href="#page_i25">25</a>, +<a href="#page_i39">39</a>, +<a href="#page_i41">41</a>, +<a href="#page_i42">42</a>, +<a href="#page_i46">46</a>, +<a href="#page_i48">48</a>, +<a href="#page_i54">54-56</a>, +<a href="#page_i166">166-167</a>, +<a href="#page_i174">174</a>, +<a href="#page_i178">178</a>, +<a href="#page_i200">200</a>, +<a href="#page_i216">216</a>, +<a href="#page_i240">240</a>, +<a href="#page_i261">261</a>, +<a href="#page_i265">265</a>, +<a href="#page_i307">307-315</a>, +<a href="#page_i321">321</a>, +<a href="#page_i331">331-338</a>, +<a href="#page_i350">350-354</a>, +<a href="#page_i358">358</a>, +<a href="#page_i361">361-363</a>, +<a href="#page_i364">364</a>, +<a href="#page_i372">372-378</a>, +<a href="#page_i387">387-388</a>, +<a href="#page_i401">401-408</a>, +<a href="#page_i413">413-438</a>, +<a href="#page_i436">436-441</a>, +<a href="#page_i450">450-454</a>, +<a href="#page_i460">460-461</a>, +<a href="#page_i509">509-510</a> (App.); +ii. +<a href="#page_ii2">2</a>, +<a href="#page_ii4">4-9</a>, +<a href="#page_ii48">48</a>, +<a href="#page_ii55">55-58</a>, +<a href="#page_ii65">65-67</a>, +<a href="#page_ii69">69-74</a>, +<a href="#page_ii81">81-83</a>, +<a href="#page_ii87">87-89</a>, +<a href="#page_ii90">90</a>, +<a href="#page_ii104">104-107</a>, +<a href="#page_ii114">114-115</a>, +<a href="#page_ii125">125-128</a>, +<a href="#page_ii136">136</a>, +<a href="#page_ii138">138-148</a>, +<a href="#page_ii155">155-158</a>, +<a href="#page_ii185">185-186</a>, +<a href="#page_ii190">190</a>, +<a href="#page_ii199">199-200</a>, +<a href="#page_ii208">208</a>, +<a href="#page_ii211">211-212</a>, +<a href="#page_ii216">216-223</a>, +<a href="#page_ii229">229</a>, +<a href="#page_ii233">233</a>, +<a href="#page_ii283">283</a>, +<a href="#page_ii317">317</a>, +<a href="#page_ii322">322</a>, +<a href="#page_ii327">327-328</a>, +<a href="#page_ii334">334</a>, +<a href="#page_ii361">361</a>, +<a href="#page_ii372">372</a>, +<a href="#page_ii386">386-387</a>, +<a href="#page_ii389">389</a>, +<a href="#page_ii399">399</a>, +<a href="#page_ii402">402-403</a>, +<a href="#page_ii417">417</a>, +<a href="#page_ii432">432</a>, +<a href="#page_ii436">436-438</a>, +<a href="#page_ii447">447</a>, +<a href="#page_ii453">453</a>, +<a href="#page_ii532">532</a>, +<a href="#page_ii538">538-539</a>.</li> +<li>England, invasion of, i. +<a href="#page_i175">175-178</a>, +<a href="#page_i438">438-441</a>, +<a href="#page_i482">482</a>, +<a href="#page_i485">485-499</a>.</li> +<li>Ense, Varnhagen von, ii. +<a href="#page_ii101">101</a>, +<a href="#page_ii177">177</a>, +<a href="#page_ii225">225</a>.</li> +<li>Erfurt, meeting at, ii. +<a href="#page_ii179">179-185</a>, +<a href="#page_ii189">189</a>, +<a href="#page_ii231">231</a>, +<a href="#page_ii235">235</a>.</li> +<li>Escoiquiz, ii. +<a href="#page_ii165">165</a>.</li> +<li>Esterhazy, Prince, ii. +<a href="#page_ii410">410</a>.</li> +<li>Etruria, kingdom of, i. +<a href="#page_i264">264</a>, +<a href="#page_i334">334</a>, +<a href="#page_i389">389</a>, +<a href="#page_i420">420</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii150">150</a>, +<a href="#page_ii153">153-158</a>.</li> +<li>Eugène, Prince, of Wurtemberg, ii. +<a href="#page_ii347">347-348</a>.</li> +<li>Eylau, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii111">111-114</a>.</li> +<li>Excelmans, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii481">481-482</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> + +<li>Fain, ii. +<a href="#page_ii360">360</a>, +<a href="#page_ii364">364</a>, +<a href="#page_ii371">371</a>.</li> +<li>Faypoult, i. +<a href="#page_i148">148</a>.</li> +<li>Ferdinand, Archduke, ii. +<a href="#page_ii14">14-16</a>, +<a href="#page_ii19">19</a>, +<a href="#page_ii21">21</a>, +<a href="#page_ii24">24</a>, +<a href="#page_ii35">35</a>.</li> +<li>Ferdinand, Prince Louis, ii. +<a href="#page_ii93">93</a>.</li> +<li>Ferdinand IV., i. +<a href="#page_i77">77</a>.</li> +<li>Ferdinand VII. (Spain), ii. +<a href="#page_ii161">161-166</a>, +<a href="#page_ii379">379-380</a>.</li> +<li>Ferrara, i. + <a href="#page_i78">78</a>, +<a href="#page_i119">119</a>.</li> +<li>Fesch, Cardinal, i. +<a href="#page_i468">468</a>, +<a href="#page_i477">477</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii206">206</a>.</li> +<li>Feudalism, i. +<a href="#page_i120">120</a>, +<a href="#page_i288">288</a>; ii. +<a href="#page_i77">77-78</a>, +<a href="#page_i178">178</a>, +<a href="#page_i187">187</a>.</li> +<li>Fichte, ii. +<a href="#page_ii177">177</a>, +<a href="#page_ii184">184</a>, +<a href="#page_ii226">226</a>, +<a href="#page_ii237">237</a>, +<a href="#page_ii286">286</a>.</li> +<li>Finland, ii. +<a href="#page_ii175">175</a>, +<a href="#page_ii176">176</a>, +<a href="#page_ii185">185</a>, +<a href="#page_ii235">235-236</a>.</li> +<li>Fiorella, i. +<a href="#page_i114">114</a>.</li> +<li>Flahaut, Count, ii. +<a href="#page_ii422">422</a>, +<a href="#page_ii479">479</a>.</li> +<li>Flinders, Capt., i. +<a href="#page_i380">380-381</a>.</li> +<li>Florence, i. +<a href="#page_i77">77</a>, +<a href="#page_i104">104</a>.</li> +<li>Florence, Buonapartes at, i. +<a href="#page_i2">2</a>, +<a href="#page_i6">6</a>.</li> +<li>Florence, Treaty of, i. +<a href="#page_i264">264</a>.</li> +<li>Florida, i. +<a href="#page_i364">364</a>, +<a href="#page_i368">368</a>.</li> +<li>Flotilla, the Boulogne, i. +<a href="#page_i483">483-499</a>.</li> +<li>Fombio, i. +<a href="#page_i92">92</a>, +<a href="#page_i93">93</a>.</li> +<li>Fontainebleau, Convention of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii150">150</a>, +<a href="#page_ii160">160</a>.</li> +<li>Fontainebleau, decree of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii217">217</a>.</li> +<li>Fontanes, i. +<a href="#page_i481">481</a>.</li> +<li>Forfait, i. +<a href="#page_i234">234</a>.</li> +<li>Forsyth, ii. +<a href="#page_ii540">540</a>, +<a href="#page_ii550">550</a>, +<a href="#page_ii555">555</a>, +<a href="#page_ii557">557</a>.</li> +<li>Fouché, i. +<a href="#page_i227">227</a>, +<a href="#page_i234">234</a>, +<a href="#page_i302">302</a>, +<a href="#page_i304">304</a>, +<a href="#page_i427">427</a>, +<a href="#page_i449">449</a>, +<a href="#page_i451">451</a>, +<a href="#page_i463">463</a>, +<a href="#page_i466">466-467</a>, +<a href="#page_i472">472</a>, +<a href="#page_i504">504</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii6">6</a>, +<a href="#page_ii182">182</a>, +<a href="#page_ii187">187-188</a>, +<a href="#page_ii213">213</a>, +<a href="#page_ii334">334</a>, +<a href="#page_ii439">439</a>, +<a href="#page_ii446">446</a>, +<a href="#page_ii448">448</a>, +<a href="#page_ii514">514</a>, +<a href="#page_ii515">515</a>, +<a href="#page_ii517">517</a>.</li> +<li>Fox, i. +<a href="#page_i294">294</a>, +<a href="#page_i414">414</a>, +<a href="#page_i441">441</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii59">59</a>, +<a href="#page_ii70">70-72</a>, +<a href="#page_ii81">81</a>, +<a href="#page_ii83">83</a>, +<a href="#page_ii105">105</a>, +<a href="#page_ii330">330</a>.</li> +<li>Foy, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii307">307</a>.</li> +<li>France, i. +<a href="#page_ii314">314</a>.</li> +<li>France, Ile de, i. +<a href="#page_i358">358</a>, +<a href="#page_i372">372</a>, +<a href="#page_i380">380</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii390">390</a>, +<a href="#page_ii412">412</a>.</li> +<li>France, Protestantism in, i. +<a href="#page_i283">283-284</a>.</li> +<li>France, University of, i. +<a href="#page_i296">296-297</a>.</li> +<li>Francis II., Emperor, i. +<a href="#page_i105">105</a>, +<a href="#page_i117">117</a>, +<a href="#page_i120">120</a>, +<a href="#page_i121">121</a>, +<a href="#page_i140">140-142</a>, +<a href="#page_i170">170</a>, +<a href="#page_i263">163</a>, +<a href="#page_i264">264</a>, +<a href="#page_i406">406</a>, +<a href="#page_i482">482</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii3">3</a>, +<a href="#page_ii9">9-10</a>, +<a href="#page_ii14">14-16</a>, +<a href="#page_ii34">34</a>, +<a href="#page_ii42">42</a>, +<a href="#page_ii76">76</a>, +<a href="#page_ii197">197</a>, +<a href="#page_ii200">200-203</a>, +<a href="#page_ii239">239</a>, +<a href="#page_ii272">272-273</a>, +<a href="#page_ii283">283</a>, +<a href="#page_ii289">289</a>, +<a href="#page_ii314">314-315</a>, +<a href="#page_ii321">321</a>, +<a href="#page_ii326">326</a>, +<a href="#page_ii335">335</a>, +<a href="#page_ii386">386-388</a>, +<a href="#page_ii399">399</a>, +<a href="#page_ii410">410</a>, +<a href="#page_ii417">417</a>, +<a href="#page_ii422">422</a>, +<a href="#page_ii426">426</a>, +<a href="#page_ii433">433</a>, +<a href="#page_ii436">436</a>.</li> +<li>Frazer, Sir A., ii. +<a href="#page_ii492">492</a>.</li> +<li>Frederick William III., ii. +<a href="#page_ii4">4</a>, +<a href="#page_ii30">30-32</a>, +<a href="#page_ii33">33</a>, +<a href="#page_ii42">42-45</a>, +<a href="#page_ii51">51-55</a>, +<a href="#page_ii65">65</a>, +<a href="#page_ii83">83-87</a>, +<a href="#page_ii89">89-94</a>, +<a href="#page_ii98">98-100</a>, +<a href="#page_ii108">108</a>, +<a href="#page_ii127">127</a>, +<a href="#page_ii129">129-131</a>, +<a href="#page_ii177">177-178</a>, +<a href="#page_ii237">237</a>, +<a href="#page_ii270">270-271</a>, +<a href="#page_ii273">273-277</a>, +<a href="#page_ii285">285</a>, +<a href="#page_ii316">316-317</a>, +<a href="#page_ii335">335</a>, +<a href="#page_ii344">344-345</a>, +<a href="#page_ii347">347</a>, +<a href="#page_ii373">373</a>, +<a href="#page_ii386">386-388</a>, +<a href="#page_ii433">433</a>.</li> +<li>French Colonies, i. +<a href="#page_i357">357-383</a>.</li> +<li>French Republic, the, i. +<a href="#page_i38">38</a>, +<a href="#page_i42">42</a>, +<a href="#page_i45">45</a>, +<a href="#page_i48">48</a>.</li> +<li>Fréjus, i. +<a href="#page_i215">215-217</a>.</li> +<li>Fréron, i. +<a href="#page_i54">54</a>.</li> +<li>Friant, ii. +<a href="#page_ii36">36</a>, +<a href="#page_ii38">38</a>, +<a href="#page_ii350">350</a>, +<a href="#page_ii506">506</a>.</li> +<li>Friedland, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii119">119-124</a>.</li> +<li>Frotté, i. +<a href="#page_i235">235</a>, +<a href="#page_i237">237</a>.</li> +<li>Fructidor, <i>coup d'état</i>, i. +<a href="#page_i157">157</a>, +<a href="#page_i161">161-164</a>, +<a href="#page_i217">217</a>, +<a href="#page_i272">272</a>.</li> +<li>Fulton, i. +<a href="#page_i483">483-484</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> + +<li>Gallican Church, i. +<a href="#page_i274">274</a>.</li> +<li>Gallois, M., ii. +<a href="#page_ii558">558</a>.</li> +<li>Gantheaume, Admiral, i. +<a href="#page_i215">215</a>, +<a href="#page_i234">234</a>, +<a href="#page_i372">372</a>, +<a href="#page_i485">485</a>, +<a href="#page_i487">487</a>, +<a href="#page_i489">489</a>, +<a href="#page_i491">491-492</a>, +<a href="#page_i495">495-498</a>.</li> +<li>Garda, Lake, i. +<a href="#page_i100">100</a>, +<a href="#page_i101">101</a>, +<a href="#page_i106">106</a>, +<a href="#page_i108">108</a>, +<a href="#page_i112">112</a>.</li> +<li>Gardane, Gen., i. +<a href="#page_i254">254</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii117">117-118</a>.</li> +<li>Gaudin, i. +<a href="#page_i234">234</a>, +<a href="#page_i270">270</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii446">446</a>.</li> +<li>Geneva, i. +<a href="#page_i180">180</a>, +<a href="#page_i246">246</a>, +<a href="#page_i390">390</a>.</li> +<li>Genoa, i. +<a href="#page_i5">5</a>, +<a href="#page_i7">7</a>, +<a href="#page_i55">55</a>, +<a href="#page_i59">59</a>, +<a href="#page_i60">60</a>, +<a href="#page_i75">75</a>, +<a href="#page_i82">82</a>, +<a href="#page_i83">83</a>, +<a href="#page_i121">121</a>, +<a href="#page_i147">147</a>, +<a href="#page_i182">182</a>, +<a href="#page_i216">216</a>, +<a href="#page_i241">241</a>, +<a href="#page_i243">243</a>, +<a href="#page_i250">250</a>, +<a href="#page_i334">334</a>, +<a href="#page_i504">504</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii11">11-12</a>.</li> +<li>Gentz, ii. +<a href="#page_ii91">91</a>, +<a href="#page_ii314">314</a>, +<a href="#page_ii323">323</a>.</li> +<li>Gérard, ii. +<a href="#page_ii454">454</a>, +<a href="#page_ii460">460-461</a>, +<a href="#page_ii463">463</a>, +<a href="#page_ii466">466</a>, +<a href="#page_ii469">469-471</a>, +<a href="#page_ii480">480-482</a>.</li> +<li>Gezzar, i. +<a href="#page_i204">204-209</a>.</li> +<li>Gibraltar, i. +<a href="#page_i167">167</a>, +<a href="#page_i175">175</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii150">150</a>.</li> +<li>Girard, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii338">338</a>.</li> +<li>Girondins, i. +<a href="#page_i44">44-46</a>, +<a href="#page_i63">63</a>, +<a href="#page_i218">218</a>, +<a href="#page_i301">301</a>.</li> +<li>Glover, ii. +<a href="#page_ii533">533</a>, +<a href="#page_ii534">534</a>, +<a href="#page_ii540">540</a>, +<a href="#page_ii541">541</a>.</li> +<li>Gneisenau, ii. +<a href="#page_ii92">92</a>, +<a href="#page_ii125">125</a>, +<a href="#page_ii237">237</a>, +<a href="#page_ii286">286</a>, +<a href="#page_ii351">351</a>, +<a href="#page_ii366">366</a>, +<a href="#page_ii456">456</a>, +<a href="#page_ii460">460</a>, +<a href="#page_ii468">468</a>, +<a href="#page_ii476">476-479</a>, +<a href="#page_ii481">481</a>, +<a href="#page_ii509">509</a>, +<a href="#page_ii516">516</a>, +<a href="#page_ii546">546</a>.</li> +<li>Godoy, i. +<a href="#page_i365">365-368</a>, +<a href="#page_i437">437</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii146">146</a>, +<a href="#page_ii149">149-150</a>, +<a href="#page_ii159">159-161</a>, +<a href="#page_ii163">163-166</a>.</li> +<li>Goethe, ii. +<a href="#page_ii3">3</a>, +<a href="#page_ii183">183-184</a>, +<a href="#page_ii278">278</a>.</li> +<li>Gohier, i. +<a href="#page_i220">220</a>, +<a href="#page_i221">221</a>, +<a href="#page_i223">223-224</a>.</li> +<li>Gourgaud, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii451">451</a>, +<a href="#page_ii461">461</a>, +<a href="#page_ii463">463</a>, +<a href="#page_ii486">486</a>, +<a href="#page_ii503">503</a>, +<a href="#page_ii509">509</a>, +<a href="#page_ii513">513</a>, +<a href="#page_ii518">518</a>, +<a href="#page_ii520">520-524</a>, +<a href="#page_ii528">528</a>, +<a href="#page_ii529">529</a>, +<a href="#page_ii533">533</a>, +<a href="#page_ii535">535-537</a>, +<a href="#page_ii541">541</a>, +<a href="#page_ii542">542</a>, +<a href="#page_ii544">544</a>, +<a href="#page_ii548">548</a>, +<a href="#page_ii549">549</a>, +<a href="#page_ii560">560</a>, +<a href="#page_ii561">561-564</a>, +<a href="#page_ii569">569</a>, +<a href="#page_ii572">572</a>.</li> +<li>Government, local, i. +<a href="#page_i267">267-271</a>.</li> +<li>Gower, Lord Leveson, ii. +<a href="#page_ii45">45</a>, +<a href="#page_ii126">126</a>, +<a href="#page_ii128">128</a>, +<a href="#page_ii130">130</a>, +<a href="#page_ii145">145</a>, +<a href="#page_ii160">160</a>.</li> +<li>Graham, i. +<a href="#page_i83">83</a>, +<a href="#page_i111">111</a>, +<a href="#page_i114">114</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii310">310</a>, +<a href="#page_ii381">381</a>.</li> +<li>Great Britain. <i>See</i> England. +<li>Great St. Bernard, i. +<a href="#page_i245">245-248</a>.</li> +<li>Grégoire, i. +<a href="#page_i467">467</a>.</li> +<li>Grenoble, Napoleon at, ii. +<a href="#page_ii443">443</a>.</li> +<li>Grenville, Lord, i. +<a href="#page_i55">55</a>, +<a href="#page_i166">166</a>, +<a href="#page_i242">242</a>, +<a href="#page_i414">414</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii59">59</a>.</li> +<li>Gross Görschen, ii. +<a href="#page_ii287">287-289</a>.</li> +<li>Grossbeeren, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii338">338</a>.</li> +<li>Grouchy, ii. +<a href="#page_ii120">120</a>, +<a href="#page_ii124">124</a>, +<a href="#page_ii255">255-256</a>, +<a href="#page_ii395">395</a>, +<a href="#page_ii407">407</a>, +<a href="#page_ii455">455</a>, +<a href="#page_ii463">463</a>, +<a href="#page_ii464">464</a>, +<a href="#page_ii466">466</a>, +<a href="#page_ii469">469</a>, +<a href="#page_ii470">470</a>, +<a href="#page_ii480">480</a>, +<a href="#page_ii481">480</a>, +<a href="#page_ii482">482</a>, +<a href="#page_ii485">485</a>, +<a href="#page_ii487">487-489</a>, +<a href="#page_ii495">495</a>, +<a href="#page_ii496">496</a>, +<a href="#page_ii505">505</a>, +<a href="#page_ii508">508</a>, +<a href="#page_ii510">510</a>, +<a href="#page_ii514">514</a>.</li> +<li>Guadeloupe, i. +<a href="#page_i358">358</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii296">286-297</a>.</li> +<li>Guards, National, i. +<a href="#page_i62">62</a>, +<a href="#page_i69">69</a>, +<a href="#page_i71">71</a>.</li> +<li>Gudin, ii. +<a href="#page_ii487">487</a>.</li> +<li>Guiana, French, i. +<a href="#page_i358">358</a>.</li> +<li>Guizot, ii. +<a href="#page_ii484">484</a>.</li> +<li>Gustavus IV., ii. +<a href="#page_ii2">2</a>, +<a href="#page_ii4">4</a>, +<a href="#page_ii5">5</a>, +<a href="#page_ii144">144</a>, +<a href="#page_ii202">202</a>, +<a href="#page_ii238">238</a>.</li> +<li>Guyot, ii. +<a href="#page_ii501">501</a>, +<a href="#page_ii502">502</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> + +<li>Hagelberg, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii338">338</a>.</li> +<li>Hainau, ambush at, ii. +<a href="#page_ii294">294</a>.</li> +<li>Hal, Wellington's force at, ii. +<a href="#page_ii492">492</a>.</li> +<li>Halkett, ii. +<a href="#page_ii508">508</a>.</li> +<li>Hamburg. <i>See</i> Hanse Towns. +<li>Hameln, ii. +<a href="#page_ii34">34</a>.</li> +<li>Hammond, Lord, i. +<a href="#page_i450">450</a>.</li> +<li>Hanau, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii365">365</a>.</li> +<li>Hanover, i. +<a href="#page_i64">64</a>, +<a href="#page_i176">176</a>, +<a href="#page_i436">436</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii9">9</a>, +<a href="#page_ii17">17</a>, +<a href="#page_ii30">30</a>, +<a href="#page_ii34">34</a>, +<a href="#page_ii44">44</a>, +<a href="#page_ii45">45-48</a>, +<a href="#page_ii53">53-57</a>, +<a href="#page_ii65">65-69</a>, +<a href="#page_ii82">82-85</a>, +<a href="#page_ii88">88</a>, +<a href="#page_ii91">91</a>, +<a href="#page_ii135">135</a>, +<a href="#page_ii199">199</a>, +<a href="#page_ii277">277</a>, +<a href="#page_ii317">317</a>, +<a href="#page_ii361">361</a>, +<a href="#page_ii386">386</a>.</li> +<li>Hanse Towns, i. +<a href="#page_i176">176</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii73">73-74</a>, +<a href="#page_ii213">213</a>, +<a href="#page_ii214">214</a> (annexation of); +<a href="#page_ii226">226</a>, +<a href="#page_ii280">280-281</a>, +<a href="#page_ii297">297-299</a>, +<a href="#page_ii316">316</a>, +<a href="#page_ii361">361</a>, +<a href="#page_ii369">369</a>.</li> +<li>Hardenberg, ii. +<a href="#page_ii11">11</a>, +<a href="#page_ii55">55</a>, +<a href="#page_ii65">65</a>, +<a href="#page_ii68">68</a>, +<a href="#page_ii89">89</a>, +<a href="#page_ii129">129</a>, +<a href="#page_ii270">270</a>, +<a href="#page_ii274">274</a>, +<a href="#page_ii276">276</a>, +<a href="#page_ii373">373</a>, +<a href="#page_ii400">400</a>.</li> +<li>Hardinge, ii. +<a href="#page_ii459">459</a>, +<a href="#page_ii468">468</a>, +<a href="#page_ii489">489</a>.</li> +<li>Harel, i. +<a href="#page_i459">459</a>.</li> +<li>Harrowby, Earl of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii5">5</a>, +<a href="#page_ii42">42</a>, +<a href="#page_ii53">53</a>, +<a href="#page_ii56">56</a>, +<a href="#page_ii57">57</a>.</li> +<li>Hasslach, ii. +<a href="#page_ii22">22</a>.</li> +<li>Hatzfeld, Prince, ii. +<a href="#page_ii271">271</a>.</li> +<li>Haugwitz, i. +<a href="#page_i432">432</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii20">20</a>, +<a href="#page_ii30">30-31</a>, +<a href="#page_ii34">34</a>, +<a href="#page_ii43">43-46</a>, +<a href="#page_ii53">53-55</a>, +<a href="#page_ii65">65-69</a>, +<a href="#page_ii83">83-84</a>, +<a href="#page_ii86">86</a>, +<a href="#page_ii89">89-90</a>.</li> +<li>Hauterive, i. +<a href="#page_i278">278-279</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii149">149</a>.</li> +<li>Hawkesbury, Lord, i. +<a href="#page_i310">310</a>, +<a href="#page_i312">312-314</a>, +<a href="#page_i333">333-334</a>, +<a href="#page_i338">338-340</a>, +<a href="#page_i350">350-354</a>, +<a href="#page_i396">396</a>, + <a href="#page_i405">405</a>, +<a href="#page_i422">422</a>, +<a href="#page_i431">431</a>, +<a href="#page_i450">450</a>, +<a href="#page_i452">452</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii56">56</a>.</li> +<li>Hayti. <i>See</i> <li>Domingo. +<li>Hazlitt, ii. +<a href="#page_ii447">447</a>.</li> +<li>Heilsberg, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii118">118-119</a>.</li> +<li>Heligoland, ii. +<a href="#page_ii380">380</a>.</li> +<li>Helvetic Republic. <i>See</i> Switzerland. +<li>Henry, Surgeon, +ii. +<a href="#page_ii539">539</a>, +<a href="#page_ii543">543</a>, +<a href="#page_ii553">553</a>, +<a href="#page_ii571">571</a>.</li> +<li>Hesse-Cassel, i. +<a href="#page_i64">64</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii84">84</a>.</li> +<li>Hill, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii309">309</a>.</li> +<li>Hobart, Lord, i. +<a href="#page_i377">377</a>, +<a href="#page_i382">382</a>.</li> +<li>Hoche, i. +<a href="#page_i63">63</a>, +<a href="#page_i65">65</a>, +<a href="#page_i160">160</a>, +<a href="#page_i168">168</a>.</li> +<li>Hofer, ii. +<a href="#page_ii193">193</a>, +<a href="#page_ii201">201-202</a>.</li> +<li>Hohenlinden, i. +<a href="#page_i260">260</a>.</li> +<li>Hohenlohe, ii. +<a href="#page_ii93">93-97</a>, +<a href="#page_ii97">97-100</a>.</li> +<li>Holkar, i. +<a href="#page_i374">374</a>, +<a href="#page_i377">377</a>.</li> +<li>Holland, i. +<a href="#page_i39">39</a>, +<a href="#page_i166">166</a>, +<a href="#page_i178">178</a>, +<a href="#page_i242">242</a>, +<a href="#page_i265">265</a>, +<a href="#page_i293">293</a>, +<a href="#page_i308">308</a>, +<a href="#page_i314">314-315</a>, +<a href="#page_i327">327</a>, +<a href="#page_i334">334-338</a>, +<a href="#page_i344">344</a>, +<a href="#page_i345">345</a>, +<a href="#page_i376">376-377</a>, +<a href="#page_i403">403</a>, +<a href="#page_i405">405</a>, +<a href="#page_i416">416</a>, +<a href="#page_i420">420</a>, +<a href="#page_i425">425</a>, +<a href="#page_i428">428</a>, +<a href="#page_i433">433</a>, +<a href="#page_i438">438</a>, +<a href="#page_i485">485-486</a>, +<a href="#page_i493">493</a>, +<a href="#page_i503">503</a>, +ii. +<a href="#page_ii1">1</a>, +<a href="#page_ii6">6</a>, +<a href="#page_ii8">8</a>, +<a href="#page_ii18">18</a>, +<a href="#page_ii30">30</a>, +<a href="#page_ii35">35</a>, +<a href="#page_ii54">54</a>, +<a href="#page_ii55">55</a>, +<a href="#page_ii69">69</a>, +<a href="#page_ii103">109</a>, +<a href="#page_ii134">134</a>, +<a href="#page_ii135">135-137</a>, +<a href="#page_ii212">212-214</a>, +<a href="#page_ii361">361</a>, +<a href="#page_ii369">369</a>, +<a href="#page_ii373">373</a>, +<a href="#page_ii375">375-376</a>, +<a href="#page_ii381">381</a>, +<a href="#page_ii403">403</a>, +<a href="#page_ii412">412</a>, +<a href="#page_ii436">436-438</a>.</li> +<li>Holland, Lord, ii. +<a href="#page_ii126">126</a>, +<a href="#page_ii413">413</a>, +<a href="#page_ii567">567</a>, +<a href="#page_ii570">570</a>.</li> +<li>Holy Alliance, ii. +<a href="#page_ii566">566</a>.</li> +<li>Holy Roman Empire, i. +<a href="#page_i141">141</a>, +<a href="#page_i170">170</a>, +<a href="#page_i264">264</a>, +<a href="#page_i387">387</a>, +<a href="#page_i478">478</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii75">75-76</a>.</li> +<li>Hood, Admiral, i. +<a href="#page_i50">50</a>, +<a href="#page_i54">54-55</a>.</li> +<li>Hostages, law of, i. +<a href="#page_i220">220</a>, +<a href="#page_i229">229</a>.</li> +<li>Hotham, Admiral, ii. + <a href="#page_ii519">519-521</a>.</li> +<li>Hougoumont, ii. +<a href="#page_ii490">490-491</a>, +<a href="#page_ii499">499</a>, +<a href="#page_ii500">500-505</a>.</li> +<li>Howick, Earl, ii. +<a href="#page_ii116">116</a>.</li> +<li>Hulin, <li>Gen., i. + <a href="#page_i460">460-461</a>.</li> +<li>Humbert, Gen., i. +<a href="#page_i511">511</a> (App.). +<li>Humboldt, ii. +<a href="#page_ii226">226</a>, +<a href="#page_ii323">323</a>.</li> +<li>Hutchinson, Lord, ii. +<a href="#page_ii124">124</a>.</li> +<li>Hyde de Neuville, i. +<a href="#page_i220">220</a>, +<a href="#page_i236">236-237</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> + +<li>Ibrahim, i. +<a href="#page_i188">188-191</a>.</li> +<li>Illyria, ii. +<a href="#page_ii315">315-316</a>, +<a href="#page_ii320">320</a>, +<a href="#page_ii324">324</a>, +<a href="#page_ii326">326</a>, +<a href="#page_ii328">328</a>.</li> +<li>Imam of Muscat, i. +<a href="#page_i200">200</a>.</li> +<li>India, i. +<a href="#page_i176">176</a>, +<a href="#page_i189">189</a>, +<a href="#page_i194">194</a>, +<a href="#page_i200">200</a>, +<a href="#page_i210">210</a>, +<a href="#page_i262">262</a>, +<a href="#page_i342">342</a>, +<a href="#page_i372">372-379</a>, +<a href="#page_i396">396</a>, +<a href="#page_i419">419-420</a>, +<a href="#page_i428">428-429</a>, +<a href="#page_i431">431</a>, +<a href="#page_i434">434</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii117">117-118</a>, +<a href="#page_ii139">139</a>, +<a href="#page_ii174">174-176</a>, +<a href="#page_ii230">230</a>.</li> +<li>Ionian Isles, the, i. +<a href="#page_i168">168-179</a>, +<a href="#page_i177">177</a>, +<a href="#page_i314">314</a>, +<a href="#page_i428">428</a>, +<a href="#page_i432">432</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii9">9</a>, +<a href="#page_ii74">74</a>, +<a href="#page_ii135">135</a>.</li> +<li>Ireland, i. +<a href="#page_i160">160</a>, +<a href="#page_i202">202-203</a>, +<a href="#page_i309">309</a>, +<a href="#page_i331">331-332</a>, +<a href="#page_i417">417</a>, +<a href="#page_i488">488-489</a>, +<a href="#page_i491">491</a>, +<a href="#page_i505">505-506</a>, +<a href="#page_i510">510-512</a> (App.); +ii. +<a href="#page_ii229">229</a>.</li> +<li>Iron Cross, Order of the, ii. +<a href="#page_ii277">277</a>.</li> +<li>Istria, i. +<a href="#page_i142">142</a>, +<a href="#page_i168">168-170</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii46">46-47</a>.</li> +<li>Italian Republic, i. +<a href="#page_i388">388</a>, +<a href="#page_i420">420</a>.</li> +<li>Italy, i. +<a href="#page_i77">77</a>, +<a href="#page_i79">79</a>, +<a href="#page_i96">96</a>, +<a href="#page_i100">100</a>, +<a href="#page_i213">213</a>, +<a href="#page_i263">263</a>, +<a href="#page_i265">265</a>, +<a href="#page_i345">345-349</a>, +<a href="#page_i388">388</a>, +<a href="#page_i433">433-435</a>, +<a href="#page_i438">438</a>, +<a href="#page_i493">493</a>, +<a href="#page_i497">497</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii1">1</a>, +<a href="#page_ii6">6</a>, +<a href="#page_ii10">10-11</a>, +<a href="#page_ii17">17</a>, +<a href="#page_ii46">46-48</a>, +<a href="#page_ii69">69</a>, +<a href="#page_ii88">88</a>, +<a href="#page_ii103">103</a>, +<a href="#page_ii150">150</a>, +<a href="#page_ii154">154</a>, +<a href="#page_ii202">202</a>, +<a href="#page_ii324">324</a>, +<a href="#page_ii361">361</a>, +<a href="#page_ii373">373</a>, +<a href="#page_ii375">375</a>, +<a href="#page_ii380">380</a>, +<a href="#page_ii397">397</a>, +<a href="#page_ii411">411</a>, +<a href="#page_ii438">438-439</a>, +<a href="#page_ii440">440</a>.</li> +<li>Italy, army of, i. +<a href="#page_i57">57</a>, +<a href="#page_i61">61</a>, +<a href="#page_i64">64</a>, +<a href="#page_i74">74</a>, +<a href="#page_i75">75</a>, +<a href="#page_i76">76</a>, +<a href="#page_i80">80</a>, +<a href="#page_i82">82</a>, +<a href="#page_i122">122</a>.</li> +<li>Izquierdo, Don, ii. +<a href="#page_ii150">150</a>, +<a href="#page_ii163">163</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> + +<li>Jackson, Col. Basil, ii. +<a href="#page_ii477">477</a>, +<a href="#page_ii479">479</a>, +<a href="#page_ii499">499</a>, +<a href="#page_ii500">500</a>, +<a href="#page_ii507">507</a>, +<a href="#page_ii529">529</a>, +<a href="#page_ii550">550</a>, +<a href="#page_ii552">552</a>, +<a href="#page_ii563">563</a>.</li> +<li>Jackson, Sir G., ii. +<a href="#page_ii43">43</a>, +<a href="#page_ii314">314</a>, +<a href="#page_ii360">360</a>, +<a href="#page_ii447">447</a>.</li> +<li>Jacobins, the, i. +<a href="#page_i31">31</a>, +<a href="#page_i35">35</a>, +<a href="#page_i37">37</a>, +<a href="#page_i42">42</a>, +<a href="#page_i45">45</a>, +<a href="#page_i47">47</a>, +<a href="#page_i49">49</a>, +<a href="#page_i53">53</a>, +<a href="#page_i59">59</a>, +<a href="#page_i63">63</a>, +<a href="#page_i64">64</a>, +<a href="#page_i69">69</a>, +<a href="#page_i149">149</a>, +<a href="#page_i161">161</a>, +<a href="#page_i218">218</a>, +<a href="#page_i223">223</a>, +<a href="#page_i226">226-228</a>, +<a href="#page_i260">260</a>, +<a href="#page_i267">267</a>, +<a href="#page_i281">281</a>, +<a href="#page_i301">301</a>, +<a href="#page_i302">302-306</a>, +<a href="#page_i401">401</a>, +<a href="#page_i427">427</a>, +<a href="#page_i465">465-466</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii449">449</a>.</li> +<li>Jaffa, i. +<a href="#page_i201">201</a>, +<a href="#page_i203">203-204</a>, +<a href="#page_i211">211-213</a>.</li> +<li>Jamaica, i. +<a href="#page_i361">361</a>.</li> +<li>Janin, Count, ii. +<a href="#page_ii502">502</a>.</li> +<li>Jaubert, i. +<a href="#page_i412">412</a>.</li> +<li>Java, ii. +<a href="#page_ii538">538</a>.</li> +<li>Jefferson, i. +<a href="#page_i367">367</a>, +<a href="#page_i369">369</a>.</li> +<li>Jena, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii94">94-97</a>.</li> +<li>Jews, the, i. +<a href="#page_i284">284</a>.</li> +<li>John, Archduke, +ii. +<a href="#page_ii195">195-196</a>.</li> +<li>Jomini, ii. +<a href="#page_ii335">335</a>, +<a href="#page_ii340">340</a>, +<a href="#page_ii342">342</a>, +<a href="#page_ii466">466</a>.</li> +<li>Jonan, Golfe de, + ii. +<a href="#page_ii442">442</a>.</li> +<li>Joubert, i. +<a href="#page_i131">131</a>, +<a href="#page_i135">135</a>, +<a href="#page_i138">138</a>, +<a href="#page_i219">219</a>.</li> +<li>Jouberthon, Madame, i. +<a href="#page_i443">443</a>.</li> +<li>Jourdan, i. +<a href="#page_i222">222</a>, +<a href="#page_i469">469-470</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii198">198</a>, +<a href="#page_ii305">305</a>, +<a href="#page_ii307">307</a>, +<a href="#page_ii308">308-310</a>, +<li><i>Juges de paix</i>, i +<a href="#page_i270">270</a>, +<a href="#page_i323">323</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii451">451</a>.</li> +<li>Junot, i. +<a href="#page_i60">60</a>, +<a href="#page_i61">61</a>, +<a href="#page_i76">76</a>, +<a href="#page_i112">112</a>, +<a href="#page_i136">136</a>, +<a href="#page_i138">138</a>, +<a href="#page_i207">207</a>, +<a href="#page_i426">426</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii151">151</a>, +<a href="#page_ii160">160</a>, +<a href="#page_ii162">162</a>, +<a href="#page_ii172">172</a>, +<a href="#page_ii454">454</a>.</li> +<li>Junot, Madame, i. +<a href="#page_i64">64</a>, +<a href="#page_i181">181</a>, +<a href="#page_i426">426</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> + +<li>Kalckreuth, ii. +<a href="#page_ii91">91</a>, +<a href="#page_ii137">137</a>.</li> +<li>Kalisch, Treaty of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii276">276-277</a>.</li> +<li>Katzbach, battle of the, ii. +<a href="#page_ii339">339</a>.</li> +<li>Keith, Lord, i. +<a href="#page_i250">250-251</a>, +<a href="#page_i440">440</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii526">526</a>, +<a href="#page_ii528">528</a>, +<a href="#page_ii529">529-530</a>.</li> +<li>Kellermann, i. +<a href="#page_i89">89</a>, +<a href="#page_i90">90</a>, +<a href="#page_i256">256</a>, +<a href="#page_i258">258-259</a>, +<a href="#page_i469">469</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii40">40</a>, +<a href="#page_ii474">474</a>, +<a href="#page_ii501">501</a>, +<a href="#page_ii502">502</a>.</li> +<li>Kennedy, Gen., +ii. +<a href="#page_ii457">457</a>, +<a href="#page_ii492">492</a>, +<a href="#page_ii493">493</a>, +<a href="#page_ii504">504</a>.</li> +<li>Kilmaine, i. +<a href="#page_i143">143</a>.</li> +<li>King's German Legion, +ii. +<a href="#page_ii493">493</a>, +<a href="#page_ii502">502</a>.</li> +<li>Kléber, i. +<a href="#page_i63">63</a>, +<a href="#page_i182">182</a>, +<a href="#page_i189">189</a>, +<a href="#page_i204">204</a>, +<a href="#page_i207">207-208</a>, +<a href="#page_i213">213</a>, +<a href="#page_i215">215</a>.</li> +<li>Kleist, ii. +<a href="#page_ii292">292</a>, +<a href="#page_ii347">347-348</a>, +<a href="#page_ii456">456</a>.</li> +<li>Knesebeck, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii242">242</a>, +<a href="#page_ii275">275</a>, +<a href="#page_ii276">276</a>, +<a href="#page_ii335">335</a>.</li> +<li>Koran, i. +<a href="#page_i185">185</a>.</li> +<li>Körner, ii. +<a href="#page_ii278">278</a>.</li> +<li>Krasnoe, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii262">262</a>.</li> +<li>Kray, Gen., i. +<a href="#page_i244">244</a>.</li> +<li>Krudener, Madame de, ii. +<a href="#page_ii450">450</a>.</li> +<li>Kulm, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii347">347-349</a>.</li> +<li>Kurakin, Prince, ii. +<a href="#page_ii239">239</a>.</li> +<li>Kutusoff, ii. +<a href="#page_ii33">33</a>, +<a href="#page_ii36">36</a>, +<a href="#page_ii38">38</a>, +<a href="#page_ii39">39</a>, +<a href="#page_ii254">254-255</a>, +<a href="#page_ii258">258-262</a>, +<a href="#page_ii274">274</a>, +<a href="#page_ii285">285</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> + +<li>Labaume, ii. +<a href="#page_ii245">245</a>, +<a href="#page_ii253">253</a>, +<a href="#page_ii260">260</a>.</li> +<li>Labédoyère, ii. +<a href="#page_ii505">505</a>, +<a href="#page_ii541">541</a>.</li> +<li>Laborde, ii. +<a href="#page_ii206">206</a>.</li> +<li>Labouchere, ii. +<a href="#page_ii213">213</a>.</li> +<li>Labrador, ii. +<a href="#page_ii165">165</a>.</li> +<li>Lafayette, i. +<a href="#page_i476">476</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii439">439</a>, +<a href="#page_ii513">513</a>, +<a href="#page_ii514">513</a>.</li> +<li>La Fère Champenoise, battle of, +ii. +<a href="#page_ii419">419-420</a>, +<a href="#page_ii422">422</a>.</li> +<li>La Fère regiment, the, +i. +<a href="#page_i15">15-17</a>.</li> +<li>Laffray, defile of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii443">443</a>.</li> +<li>Laforest, ii. +<a href="#page_ii65">65</a>, +<a href="#page_ii66">66</a>, +<a href="#page_ii84">84</a>, +<a href="#page_ii87">87</a>.</li> +<li>Lagrange, i. +<a href="#page_i285">285</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii569">569</a>.</li> +<li>Laharpe, i. +<a href="#page_i395">395</a>, +<a href="#page_i408">408</a>, +<a href="#page_i512">512</a> (App.); +ii. +<a href="#page_ii231">231</a>, +<a href="#page_ii400">400</a>.</li> +<li>La Haye Sainte, +ii. +<a href="#page_ii490">490-491</a>, +<a href="#page_ii495">495</a>, +<a href="#page_ii496">496</a>, +<a href="#page_ii499">499</a>, +<a href="#page_ii500">500-505</a>, +<a href="#page_ii507">507</a>, +<a href="#page_ii508">508</a>.</li> +<li>Lainé, ii. +<a href="#page_ii377">377</a>.</li> +<li>Lajolais, Gen., i. +<a href="#page_i455">455</a>.</li> +<li>Lake, Gen., i. +<a href="#page_i377">377</a>.</li> +<li>Lallemand, Count, ii. +<a href="#page_ii519">519</a>, +<a href="#page_ii529">529</a>.</li> +<li>Lambert, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii493">493</a>, +<a href="#page_ii498">498</a>.</li> +<li>Lampedusa, i. +<a href="#page_i422">422</a>, +<a href="#page_i425">425</a>.</li> +<li>Lancey, De, ii. +<a href="#page_ii467">467</a>, +<a href="#page_ii493">493</a>.</li> +<li>Landrieux, i. +<a href="#page_i110">110</a>, +<a href="#page_i111">111</a>, +<a href="#page_i115">115</a>, +<a href="#page_i143">143</a>, +<a href="#page_i144">144</a>.</li> +<li>Langeron, Gen. ii. +<a href="#page_ii339">339</a>.</li> +<li>Lanjuinais, i. +<a href="#page_i321">321</a>, +<a href="#page_i467">467</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii452">452</a>.</li> +<li>Lannes, i. +<a href="#page_i92">92</a>, +<a href="#page_i95">95</a>, +<a href="#page_i102">102</a>, +<a href="#page_i138">138</a>, +<a href="#page_i183">183</a>, +<a href="#page_i194">194</a>, +<a href="#page_i209">209</a>, +<a href="#page_i213">213</a>, +<a href="#page_i215">215</a>, +<a href="#page_i249">249</a>, +<a href="#page_i252">252</a>, +<a href="#page_i256">256</a>, +<a href="#page_i451">451</a>, +<a href="#page_i469">469</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii18">18</a>, +<a href="#page_ii21">21</a>, +<a href="#page_ii24">24</a>, +<a href="#page_ii26">26</a>, +<a href="#page_ii32">32</a>, +<a href="#page_ii40">40</a>, +<a href="#page_ii91">91</a>, +<a href="#page_ii94">94-97</a>, +<a href="#page_ii100">100</a>, +<a href="#page_ii118">118-124</a>, +<a href="#page_ii192">192-193</a>.</li> +<li>Laplace, i. +<a href="#page_i285">285</a>, +<a href="#page_i484">484</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii569">569</a>.</li> +<li>Larochejacquelein, ii. +<a href="#page_ii449">449</a>.</li> +<li>La Rothière, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii383">383</a>.</li> +<li>Larrey, i. +<a href="#page_i212">212</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii485">485</a>.</li> +<li>Las Cases, Count, i. +<a href="#page_ii212">212</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii519">519</a>, +<a href="#page_ii520">520-524</a>, +<a href="#page_ii527">527</a>, +<a href="#page_ii528">528</a>, +<a href="#page_ii529">529</a>, +<a href="#page_ii533">533</a>, +<a href="#page_ii535">535-537</a>, +<a href="#page_ii541">541</a>, +<a href="#page_ii542">542</a>, +<a href="#page_ii548">548</a>, +<a href="#page_ii553">553</a>, +<a href="#page_ii559">559-561</a>, +<a href="#page_ii564">564</a>, +<a href="#page_ii566">566</a>, +<a href="#page_ii568">568</a>.</li> +<li>Latouche-Tréville, i. +<a href="#page_i489">489-490</a>.</li> +<li>Latour-Maubourg, ii. +<a href="#page_ii123">123</a>, +<a href="#page_ii337">337</a>, +<a href="#page_ii342">342</a>, +<a href="#page_ii345">345</a>, +<a href="#page_ii358">358</a>.</li> +<li>Lauderdale, Earl of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii81">81-82</a>.</li> +<li>Lauriston, ii. +<a href="#page_ii235">235</a>, +<a href="#page_ii258">258</a>, +<a href="#page_ii281">281</a>, +<a href="#page_ii291">291</a>, +<a href="#page_ii332">332</a>, +<a href="#page_ii340">340</a>, +<a href="#page_ii364">364</a>.</li> +<li>Lavalette, i. +<a href="#page_i148">148</a>, +<a href="#page_i159">159</a>, +<a href="#page_i161">161</a>, +<a href="#page_i163">263</a>, +<a href="#page_i168">268</a>, +<a href="#page_i215">215</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii415">415</a>, +<a href="#page_ii445">445</a>, +<a href="#page_ii450">450</a>, +<a href="#page_ii451">451</a>, +<a href="#page_ii486">486</a>, +<a href="#page_ii513">513</a>, +<a href="#page_ii516">516</a>, +<a href="#page_ii526">526</a>.</li> +<li>Lebanon, i. +<a href="#page_i201">201</a>, +<a href="#page_i211">211</a>.</li> +<li>Lebrun, i. +<a href="#page_i234">234</a>, +<a href="#page_i302">302</a>, +<a href="#page_i458">458</a>, +<a href="#page_i468">468</a>.</li> +<li>Leclerc, i. +<a href="#page_i135">135</a>, +<a href="#page_i182">182</a>, +<a href="#page_i225">225</a>, +<a href="#page_i360">360-363</a>.</li> +<li>Lefebvre, i. +<a href="#page_i469">469</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii422">422</a>.</li> +<li>Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, ii. +<a href="#page_ii353">353</a>, +<a href="#page_ii422">422</a>, +<a href="#page_ii427">427</a>, +<a href="#page_ii431">431</a>.</li> +<li>Legations, i. +<a href="#page_i78">78</a>, +<a href="#page_i142">142</a>, +<a href="#page_i145">145</a>, +<a href="#page_i169">169</a>, +<a href="#page_i275">275</a>, +<a href="#page_i346">346</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii54">54</a>.</li> +<li>Leghorn, i. +<a href="#page_ii103">103</a>.</li> +<li>Legion of Honour, i. +<a href="#page_i284">284-287</a>, +<a href="#page_i327">327</a>, +<a href="#page_i449">449</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii184">184</a>.</li> +<li>Législatif Corps, i. +<a href="#page_i467">467</a>, +<a href="#page_i481">481</a>.</li> +<li>Legnago, i. +<a href="#page_i107">107</a>, +<a href="#page_i114">114</a>, +<a href="#page_i126">126</a>, +<a href="#page_i131">131</a>.</li> +<li>Leipzig, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii356">356-363</a>.</li> +<li>Lejeune, ii. +<a href="#page_ii37">37</a>, +<a href="#page_ii192">192</a>, +<a href="#page_ii257">257</a>, +<a href="#page_ii351">251</a>.</li> +<li>Leoben, i. +<a href="#page_i138">138</a>, +<a href="#page_i140">`40</a>, +<a href="#page_i145">145</a>.</li> +<li>Lépeaux-Réveillière, La, i. +<a href="#page_i74">74</a>, +<a href="#page_i158">158</a>, +<a href="#page_i178">178</a>, +<a href="#page_i220">220</a>, +<a href="#page_i274">274</a>.</li> +<li>Lestocq, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii113">113</a>.</li> +<li>Letourneur, i. +<a href="#page_i74">74</a>.</li> +<li>Liberty of the press, i. +<a href="#page_i239">239</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii211">211</a>, +<a href="#page_ii451">451</a>.</li> +<li>Licences, commercial, ii. +<a href="#page_ii220">220</a>, +<a href="#page_ii222">222-223</a>.</li> +<li>Lichtenstein, ii. +<a href="#page_ii424">424</a>.</li> +<li>Ligny, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii468">468-473</a>.</li> +<li>Ligurian Republic, i. +<a href="#page_i148">148</a>, +<a href="#page_i264">264</a>, +<a href="#page_i345">345</a>, +<a href="#page_i420">420</a>, +<a href="#page_i504">504</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii6">6</a>, +<a href="#page_ii10">10</a>.</li> +<li>Lille, i. +<a href="#page_i164">164</a>, +<a href="#page_i166">166-167</a>.</li> +<li>Lindet, i. +<a href="#page_i220">220</a>.</li> +<li>Linois, Admiral, i. +<a href="#page_i313">313</a>, +<a href="#page_i376">376</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii81">81</a>.</li> +<li>Liptay, i. +<a href="#page_i92">92</a>, +<a href="#page_i93">93</a>.</li> +<li>Lithuania, ii. +<a href="#page_ii244">244-246</a>, +<a href="#page_ii248">248</a>.</li> +<li>Liverpool, Earl of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii447">447</a>, +<a href="#page_ii525">525</a>, +<a href="#page_ii537">537</a>, +<a href="#page_ii538">538</a>.</li> +<li>Lobau, ii. +<a href="#page_ii469">469</a>, +<a href="#page_ii480">480-482</a>, +<a href="#page_ii502">502</a>, +<a href="#page_ii503">503</a>, +<a href="#page_ii504">504</a>.</li> +<li>Lobau, Isle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii192">192-193</a>, +<a href="#page_ii195">195</a>.</li> +<li>Lodi, battle of, i. +<a href="#page_i93">93-95</a>, +<a href="#page_i97">97</a>.</li> +<li>Loison, i. +<a href="#page_i70">70</a>.</li> +<li>Lombardy, i. +<a href="#page_i90">90</a>, +<a href="#page_i91">91</a>, +<a href="#page_i96">96</a>, +<a href="#page_i142">142</a>, +<a href="#page_i436">436</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii21">21</a>, +<a href="#page_ii55">55</a>.</li> +<li>Lonato, i. +<a href="#page_i110">110</a>, +<a href="#page_i112">112</a>, +<a href="#page_i113">113</a>.</li> +<li>London, Preliminaries of, i. +<a href="#page_i314">314</a>, +<a href="#page_i331">331-336</a>.</li> +<li>Louis, Baron, ii. +<a href="#page_ii424">424</a>.</li> +<li>Louis XIV., i. +<a href="#page_i24">24</a>, +<a href="#page_i283">283</a>.</li> +<li>Louis XV., i. +<a href="#page_i283">283</a>, +<a href="#page_i364">364</a>.</li> +<li>Louis XVI., i. +<a href="#page_i26">26</a>, +<a href="#page_i29">29</a>, +<a href="#page_i35">35-36</a>, +<a href="#page_i42">42</a>, +<a href="#page_i71">71</a>, +<a href="#page_i283">283</a>.</li> +<li>Louis XVII, i. +<a href="#page_i54">54-55</a>, +<a href="#page_i65">65</a>.</li> +<li>Louis XVIII., ii. +<a href="#page_ii415">415</a>, +<a href="#page_ii424">424-435</a>, +<a href="#page_ii439">439-440</a>, +<a href="#page_ii457">457-458</a>, +<a href="#page_ii537">537</a>, +<a href="#page_ii541">541</a>, +<a href="#page_ii542">542</a>.</li> +<li>Louisa, Queen, ii. +<a href="#page_ii85">85-86</a>, +<a href="#page_ii125">125</a>, +<a href="#page_ii132">132-134</a>, +<a href="#page_ii226">226</a>.</li> +<li>Louisiana, i. +<a href="#page_i264">264</a>, +<a href="#page_i334">334</a>, +<a href="#page_i364">364-372</a>, +<a href="#page_i414">414</a>, +<a href="#page_i421">421</a>, +<a href="#page_i509">509-510</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii153">153</a>.</li> +<li>Lowe, Sir Hudson, i. +<a href="#page_i4">4</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii291">291</a>, +<a href="#page_ii359">359</a>, +<a href="#page_ii395">395</a>, +<a href="#page_ii409">409</a>, +<a href="#page_ii419">419-420</a>, +<a href="#page_ii456">456</a>, +<a href="#page_ii492">492</a>, +<a href="#page_ii545">545</a>, +<a href="#page_ii561">561-566</a>, +<a href="#page_ii570">570</a>, +<a href="#page_ii572">572</a>.</li> +<li>Lucca, i. +<a href="#page_i77">77</a>.</li> +<li>Lucchesini, ii. +<a href="#page_ii83">83-85</a>, +<a href="#page_ii87">87</a>, +<a href="#page_ii138">138</a>.</li> +<li>Lucerne, i. +<a href="#page_i180">180</a>.</li> +<li>Luddite riot, ii. +<a href="#page_ii220">220</a>.</li> +<li>Lunéville, Treaty of, i. +<a href="#page_i263">263</a>.</li> +<li>Lützen, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii285">285</a>, +<a href="#page_ii287">287-289</a>.</li> +<li>Lützow, ii. +<a href="#page_ii278">278</a>, +<a href="#page_ii318">318</a>.</li> +<li>Luxemburg, i. +<a href="#page_i141">141</a>.</li> +<li>Lycées, i. +<a href="#page_i295">295-297</a>.</li> +<li>Lyons, i. +<a href="#page_i16">16</a>, +<a href="#page_i46">46</a>, +<a href="#page_i48">48</a>, +<a href="#page_i319">319</a>.</li> +<li>Lyons, Consulta of, i. +<a href="#page_i346">346-348</a>.</li> +<li>Macdonald, i. +<a href="#page_i260">260</a>, +<a href="#page_i449">449</a>, +<a href="#page_i469">469</a>, +<a href="#page_i471">471</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii192">192</a>, +<a href="#page_ii195">195</a>, +<a href="#page_ii197">197</a>, +<a href="#page_ii270">270</a>, +<a href="#page_ii288">288</a>, +<a href="#page_ii332">332</a>, +<a href="#page_ii335">335-336</a>, +<a href="#page_ii338">338-340</a>, +<a href="#page_ii357">357</a>, +<a href="#page_ii362">362</a>, +<a href="#page_ii381">381</a>, +<a href="#page_ii392">392</a>, +<a href="#page_ii393">393-394</a>, +<a href="#page_ii408">408</a>, +<a href="#page_ii409">409</a>, +<a href="#page_ii418">418</a>, +<a href="#page_ii427">427</a>, +<a href="#page_ii428">428</a>, +<a href="#page_ii443">443</a>, +<a href="#page_ii454">454</a>.</li> +<li>Mack, ii. +<a href="#page_ii14">14-16</a>, +<a href="#page_ii18">18-26</a>, +<a href="#page_ii365">365</a>.</li> +<li>Mackenzie, Mr., +ii. +<a href="#page_ii140">140</a>.</li> +<li>Madalena Isles, the, i. +<a href="#page_i38">38-39</a>.</li> +<li>Madras, i. +<a href="#page_i376">376</a>.</li> +<li>Mahrattas, the, i. +<a href="#page_i374">374</a>, +<a href="#page_i377">377-378</a>, +<a href="#page_i416">416</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii117">117</a>.</li> +<li>Maida, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii79">79-80</a>.</li> +<li>Maingaud, ii. +<a href="#page_ii529">529</a>.</li> +<li>Maitland, Capt., ii. +<a href="#page_ii486">486</a>, +<a href="#page_ii519">519</a>, +<a href="#page_ii520">520-524</a>, +<a href="#page_ii525">525</a>, +<a href="#page_ii526">536</a>, +<a href="#page_ii529">529-530</a>.</li> +<li>Maitland, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii506">506</a>, +<a href="#page_ii507">507</a>.</li> +<li>Malcolm, Sir Pulteney, ii. +<a href="#page_ii550">550</a>.</li> +<li>Malet Conspiracy, the, ii. +<a href="#page_ii265">265</a>, +<a href="#page_ii267">267</a>.</li> +<li>Mallet du Pan, i. +<a href="#page_i180">180</a>.</li> +<li>Malmaison, Napoleon at, ii. +<a href="#page_ii515">515-518</a>.</li> +<li>Malmesbury, Lord, i. +<a href="#page_i166">166-167</a>.</li> +<li>Malo-Jaroslavitz, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii260">260</a>.</li> +<li>Malta, i. +<a href="#page_i168">168</a>, +<a href="#page_i181">181</a>, +<a href="#page_i217">217</a>, +<a href="#page_i260">260-263</a>, +<a href="#page_i307">307</a>, +<a href="#page_i311">311-312</a>, +<a href="#page_i314">314</a>, +<a href="#page_i333">333</a>, +<a href="#page_i338">338-341</a>, +<a href="#page_i351">351-353</a>, +<a href="#page_i404">404</a>, +<a href="#page_i406">406-408</a>, +<a href="#page_i415">415-416</a>, +<a href="#page_i419">419-425</a>, +<a href="#page_i430">430-431</a>, +<a href="#page_i434">434</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii7">7-9</a>, +<a href="#page_ii17">17</a>, +<a href="#page_ii54">54</a>, +<a href="#page_ii62">62</a>, +<a href="#page_ii73">73</a>, +<a href="#page_ii225">225</a>.</li> +<li>Mamelukes, i. +<a href="#page_i188">188-191</a>, +<a href="#page_i199">199</a>, +<a href="#page_i412">412</a>.</li> +<li>Manin, i. +<a href="#page_i169">169</a>.</li> +<li>Mantua, i. +<a href="#page_i77">77</a>, +<a href="#page_i79">79</a>, +<a href="#page_i89">89</a>, +<a href="#page_i90">90</a>, +<a href="#page_i95">95</a>, +<a href="#page_i100">100</a>, +<a href="#page_i101">101</a>, +<a href="#page_i102">102</a>, +<a href="#page_i105">105-118</a>, +<a href="#page_i124">124</a>, +<a href="#page_i130">130</a>, +<a href="#page_i131">131</a>, +<a href="#page_i136">136</a>, +<a href="#page_i216">216</a>, +<a href="#page_i259">259</a>.</li> +<li>Marbot, i. +<a href="#page_i254">254</a>, +<a href="#page_i504">504</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii41">41</a>, +<a href="#page_ii192">192</a>, +<a href="#page_ii335">335</a>, +<a href="#page_ii364">364</a>, +<a href="#page_ii495">495</a>, +<a href="#page_ii496">496</a>.</li> +<li>Marchand (the valet), ii. +<a href="#page_ii485">485</a>, +<a href="#page_ii572">572</a>.</li> +<li>Marchand, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii443">443</a>, +<a href="#page_ii528">528</a>.</li> +<li>Marengo, battle of, i. +<a href="#page_i254">254-260</a>.</li> +<li>Maret, i. +<a href="#page_i166">166-167</a>, +<a href="#page_i278">278-279</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii235">235</a>, +<a href="#page_ii259">259</a>, +<a href="#page_ii265">265</a>, +<a href="#page_ii271">271</a>, +<a href="#page_ii295">295</a>, +<a href="#page_ii370">370</a>, +<a href="#page_ii371">371</a>, +<a href="#page_ii391">391-392</a>, +<a href="#page_ii401">401</a>, +<a href="#page_ii411">411</a>, +<a href="#page_ii412">412</a>, +<a href="#page_ii446">446</a>, +<a href="#page_ii513">513</a>.</li> +<li>Marie Louise, ii. +<a href="#page_ii206">206-207</a>, +<a href="#page_ii227">227</a>, +<a href="#page_ii370">370</a>, +<a href="#page_ii382">382</a>, +<a href="#page_ii388">388</a>, +<a href="#page_ii418">418</a>, +<a href="#page_ii426">426</a>, +<a href="#page_ii431">431</a>, +<a href="#page_ii432">432-433</a>, +<a href="#page_ii436">436</a>, +<a href="#page_ii562">562-563</a>.</li> +<li>Marmont, i. +<a href="#page_i60">60</a>, +<a href="#page_i61">61</a>, +<a href="#page_i64">64</a>, +<a href="#page_i76">76</a>, +<a href="#page_i99">99</a>, +<a href="#page_i114">114</a>, +<a href="#page_i124">124</a>, +<a href="#page_i126">126</a>, +<a href="#page_i138">138</a>, +<a href="#page_i153">153</a>, +<a href="#page_i215">215</a>, +<a href="#page_i247">247</a>, +<a href="#page_i257">257</a>, +<a href="#page_i483">483</a>, +<a href="#page_i484">484</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii18">18</a>, +<a href="#page_ii115">115</a>, +<a href="#page_ii192">192</a>, +<a href="#page_ii256">256</a>, +<a href="#page_ii259">259</a>, +<a href="#page_ii292">292</a>, +<a href="#page_ii300">300</a>, +<a href="#page_ii332">332-333</a>, +<a href="#page_ii348">348-349</a>, +<a href="#page_ii351">351</a>, +<a href="#page_ii356">356</a>, +<a href="#page_ii357">357</a>, +<a href="#page_ii358">358-359</a>, +<a href="#page_ii362">362</a>, +<a href="#page_ii364">364</a>, +<a href="#page_ii381">381</a>, +<a href="#page_ii383">383</a>, +<a href="#page_ii393">393=394</a>, +<a href="#page_ii404">404</a>, +<a href="#page_ii406">406</a>, +<a href="#page_ii407">407-408</a>, +<a href="#page_ii418">418</a>, +<a href="#page_ii420">420-421</a>, +<a href="#page_ii423">423</a>, +<a href="#page_ii427">427</a>, +<a href="#page_ii429">429-430</a>, +<a href="#page_ii454">454</a>.</li> +<li>Marseilles, i. +<a href="#page_i35">35</a>, +<a href="#page_i45">45</a>, +<a href="#page_i49">49</a>, +<a href="#page_i57">57</a>, +<a href="#page_i182">182</a>.</li> +<li>Martinique, i. +<a href="#page_i311">311-312</a>, +<a href="#page_i314">314</a>, +<a href="#page_i333">333</a>, +<a href="#page_i496">496-497</a>.</li> +<li>Masséna, i. +<a href="#page_i57">57</a>, +<a href="#page_i82">82</a>, +<a href="#page_i84">84</a>, +<a href="#page_i85">85</a>, +<a href="#page_i95">95</a>, +<a href="#page_i102">102</a>, +<a href="#page_i107">107</a>, +<a href="#page_i110">110</a>, +<a href="#page_i112">112</a>, +<a href="#page_i114">114</a>, +<a href="#page_i117">117</a>, +<a href="#page_i118">118</a>, +<a href="#page_i122">122</a>, +<a href="#page_i124">124</a>, +<a href="#page_i134">134</a>, +<a href="#page_i135">135</a>, +<a href="#page_i138">138</a>, +<a href="#page_i217">217</a>, +<a href="#page_i243">243-244</a>, +<a href="#page_i250">250</a>, +<a href="#page_i451">451</a>, +<a href="#page_i469">469</a>, +<a href="#page_i471">471</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii17">17</a>, +<a href="#page_ii26">26</a>, +<a href="#page_ii31">31</a>, +<a href="#page_ii61">61</a>, +<a href="#page_ii80">80</a>, +<a href="#page_ii192">192-193</a>, +<a href="#page_ii195">195</a>, +<a href="#page_ii209">209</a>, +<a href="#page_ii304">304</a>, +<a href="#page_ii432">432</a>, +<a href="#page_ii454">454</a>.</li> +<li>Mauritius, ii. +<a href="#page_ii436">436</a>.</li> +<li>Mediatization, ii. +<a href="#page_ii77">77</a>.</li> +<li>Méhée de la Touche, i. +<a href="#page_i449">449-450</a>, +<a href="#page_i453">453-455</a>, +<a href="#page_i457">457</a>.</li> +<li>Melas, i. +<a href="#page_i244">244-245</a>, +<a href="#page_i249">249-259</a>.</li> +<li>Melito, Miot de, i. +<a href="#page_i103">103</a>, +<a href="#page_i130">130</a>, +<a href="#page_i150">150</a>, +<a href="#page_i187">187</a>, +<a href="#page_i468">468</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii62">62</a>, +<a href="#page_ii451">451</a>.</li> +<li>Melzi, i. +<a href="#page_i150">150</a>, +<a href="#page_i456">456</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii378">378</a>.</li> +<li>Memel, decrees of, +ii. +<a href="#page_ii178">178</a>.</li> +<li>Memmingen, ii. +<a href="#page_ii14">14</a>, +<a href="#page_ii18">18</a>, +<a href="#page_ii23">23-24</a>.</li> +<li>Memphis, i. +<a href="#page_i195">195</a>.</li> +<li>Mercer, Capt., ii. +<a href="#page_ii453">453</a>, +<a href="#page_ii457">457</a>, +<a href="#page_ii483">483</a>, +<a href="#page_ii501">501</a>, +<a href="#page_ii502">502</a>.</li> +<li>Merlin, i. +<a href="#page_i302">302</a>.</li> +<li>Merry, Mr., i. +<a href="#page_i337">337</a>, +<a href="#page_i393">393</a>, +<a href="#page_i406">406</a>, +<a href="#page_i411">411-412</a>.</li> +<li>Menou, Gen., i. +<a href="#page_i70">70</a>, +<a href="#page_i182">182</a>, +<a href="#page_i189">189</a>, +<a href="#page_i313">313</a>.</li> +<li>Merveldt, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii360">360-361</a>, +<a href="#page_ii375">375</a>.</li> +<li>Metternich, ii. +<a href="#page_ii177">177</a>, +<a href="#page_ii200">200</a>, +<a href="#page_ii202">202-203</a>, +<a href="#page_ii206">206</a>, +<a href="#page_ii241">241</a>, + <a href="#page_ii253">253</a>, +<a href="#page_ii271">271-272</a>, + <a href="#page_ii273">273</a>, +<a href="#page_ii281">281-283</a>, +<a href="#page_ii289">289-290</a>, +<a href="#page_ii314">314-316</a>, +<a href="#page_ii318">318-320</a>, +<a href="#page_ii323">323</a>, +<a href="#page_ii325">325-327</a>, +<a href="#page_ii368">368</a>, +<a href="#page_ii370">370-371</a>, +<a href="#page_ii374">374-376</a>, +<a href="#page_ii386">386-389</a>, +<a href="#page_ii391">391</a>, +<a href="#page_ii400">400</a>, +<a href="#page_ii410">410</a>, +<a href="#page_ii413">413</a>, +<a href="#page_ii417">417-418</a>, +<a href="#page_ii422">422</a>, +<a href="#page_ii426">426</a>, +<a href="#page_ii438">438-439</a>, +<a href="#page_ii446">446</a>, +<a href="#page_ii448">448</a>, +<a href="#page_ii537">537</a>.</li> +<li>Milan, i. + <a href="#page_i77">77</a>, +<a href="#page_i79">79</a>, +<a href="#page_i93">93</a>, +<a href="#page_i96">96</a>, +<a href="#page_i105">105</a>, +<a href="#page_i107">107</a>, +<a href="#page_i108">108</a>, +<a href="#page_i143">143</a>, +<a href="#page_i146">146</a>, +<a href="#page_i151">151</a>, +<a href="#page_i172">172</a>.</li> +<li>Milan decrees, ii. +<a href="#page_ii157">157</a>.</li> +<li>Milhaud, Count, ii. +<a href="#page_ii471">471</a>, +<a href="#page_ii481">481-182</a>, +<a href="#page_ii496">496</a>, +<a href="#page_ii500">500</a>.</li> +<li>Miller, Capt., i. +<a href="#page_i206">206</a>.</li> +<li>Millesimo, i. +<a href="#page_i85">85</a>.</li> +<li>Miloradovitch, ii. +<a href="#page_ii287">287</a>.</li> +<li>Mina, ii. +<a href="#page_ii301">301</a>, +<a href="#page_ii303">303</a>.</li> +<li>Mincio, i. +<a href="#page_i100">100</a>, +<a href="#page_i101">101</a>, +<a href="#page_i105">105</a>, +<a href="#page_i107">107</a>, +<a href="#page_i108">108</a>, +<a href="#page_i109">109</a>, +<a href="#page_i110">110</a>.</li> +<li>Minto, Earl, i. +<a href="#page_i423">423</a>.</li> +<li>Miquelon, i. +<a href="#page_i342">342</a>.</li> +<li>Mirabeau, i. +<a href="#page_i29">29</a>.</li> +<li>Missiessy, i. +<a href="#page_i490">490</a>, +<a href="#page_i492">492</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii7">7</a>.</li> +<li>Möckern, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii359">359</a>.</li> +<li>Modena, i. +<a href="#page_i77">77</a>, +<a href="#page_i118">118</a>, +<a href="#page_i119"></a>, +<a href="#page_i145">145</a>, +<a href="#page_i170">170</a>, +<a href="#page_i264">264</a>, +<a href="#page_i346">346</a>.</li> +<li>Modena, Duke of, i. +<a href="#page_i100">100</a>.</li> +<li>Mollien, i. +<a href="#page_i267">267</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii60">60</a>, +<a href="#page_ii88">88</a>, +<a href="#page_ii217">217</a>, +<a href="#page_ii269">269</a>, +<a href="#page_ii421">421</a>, +<a href="#page_ii445">445</a>, +<a href="#page_ii449">449</a>, +<a href="#page_ii484">484</a>.</li> +<li>Moltke, Von, i. +<a href="#page_i106">106</a>.</li> +<li>Moncey, i. +<a href="#page_i250">250</a>, +<a href="#page_i469">469</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii421">421-422</a>, +<a href="#page_ii454">454</a>.</li> +<li>Mondovi, i. +<a href="#page_i87">87</a>.</li> +<li>Monge, i. +<a href="#page_i150">150</a>, +<a href="#page_i182">182</a>, +<a href="#page_i195">195</a>, +<a href="#page_i215">215</a>, +<a href="#page_i285">285</a>, +<a href="#page_i484">484</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii569">569</a>.</li> +<li>Monroe, i. +<a href="#page_i369">369</a>.</li> +<li>Montagu, Admiral, i. +<a href="#page_i485">485</a>.</li> +<li>Montchenu, ii. +<a href="#page_ii552">552</a>, +<a href="#page_ii553">553</a>, +<a href="#page_ii571">571</a>.</li> +<li>Montebello, Castle of, i. +<a href="#page_i148">148</a>, +<a href="#page_i158">158</a>, +<a href="#page_i252">252</a>.</li> +<li>Montechiaro, i. +<a href="#page_i107">107</a>, +<a href="#page_i110">110</a>.</li> +<li>Montenotte, i. +<a href="#page_i79">79</a>, +<a href="#page_i83">83</a>, +<a href="#page_i84">84</a>, +<a href="#page_i85">85</a>.</li> +<li>Montereau, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii397">397</a>.</li> +<li>Montesquieu, i. +<a href="#page_i25">25</a>, +<a href="#page_i27">27</a>, +<a href="#page_i42">42</a>, +<a href="#page_i185">185</a>.</li> +<li>Montholon, ii. +<a href="#page_ii513">513</a>, +<a href="#page_ii519">519-529</a>, +<a href="#page_ii535">535-537</a>, +<a href="#page_ii542">542</a>, +<a href="#page_ii544">544</a>, +<a href="#page_ii545">545</a>, +<a href="#page_ii552">552</a>, +<a href="#page_ii553">553</a>, +<a href="#page_ii557">557</a>, +<a href="#page_ii560">560</a>, +<a href="#page_ii561">561</a>, +<a href="#page_ii564">564</a>, +<a href="#page_ii567">567</a>, +<a href="#page_ii570">570</a>, +<a href="#page_ii572">572</a>.</li> +<li>Montholon, Mme., ii. +<a href="#page_ii530">530</a>, +<a href="#page_ii536">536</a>, +<a href="#page_ii542">542</a>, +<a href="#page_ii548">548</a>.</li> +<li>Montmirail, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii394">394</a>.</li> +<li>Morea, the, i. +<a href="#page_i410">410</a>, +<a href="#page_i422">422</a>, +<a href="#page_i488">488-489</a>.</li> +<li>Moreau, i. +<a href="#page_i63">63</a>, +<a href="#page_i102">102</a>, +<a href="#page_i105">105</a>, +<a href="#page_i141">141</a>, +<a href="#page_i219">219</a>, +<a href="#page_i244">244-245</a>, +<a href="#page_i449">449-452</a>, +<a href="#page_i470">470-472</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii298">298</a>, +<a href="#page_ii335">335</a>, +<a href="#page_ii341">341</a>, +<a href="#page_ii345">345</a>.</li> +<li>Morfontaine, i. +<a href="#page_i264">264</a>.</li> +<li>Morillo, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii309">309</a>.</li> +<li>Mortier, i. +<a href="#page_i469">469</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii115">115</a>, +<a href="#page_ii117">117</a>, +<a href="#page_ii120">120</a>, +<a href="#page_ii345">345</a>, +<a href="#page_ii349">349</a>, +<a href="#page_ii394">394</a>, +<a href="#page_ii404">404</a>, +<a href="#page_ii406">406</a>, +<a href="#page_ii408">408</a>, +<a href="#page_ii420">420-421</a>, +<a href="#page_ii422">422-423</a>, +<a href="#page_ii454">254</a>.</li> +<li>Moscow, burning of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii256">256-257</a>.</li> +<li>Moulin, i. +<a href="#page_i220">220</a>, +<a href="#page_i223">223-224</a>.</li> +<li>Mouton, i. +<a href="#page_i482">482</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii192">192</a>. <i>See</i> Lobau.</li> +<li>Müffling, Gen. von, ii. +<a href="#page_ii92">92</a>, +<a href="#page_ii241">241</a>, +<a href="#page_ii243">243</a>, +<a href="#page_ii294">294</a>, +<a href="#page_ii339">339</a>, +<a href="#page_ii456">456</a>, +<a href="#page_ii479">479</a>, +<a href="#page_ii489">489</a>, +<a href="#page_ii496">496</a>, +<a href="#page_ii499">499</a>.</li> +<li>Muiron, i. +<a href="#page_i53">53</a>, +<a href="#page_i124">124</a>, +<a href="#page_i125">125</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii558">558</a>.</li> +<li>Murad, i. +<a href="#page_ii188">188-191</a>.</li> +<li>Murat, i. +<a href="#page_i71">71</a>, +<a href="#page_i76">76</a>, +<a href="#page_i138">138</a>, +<a href="#page_i182">182</a>, +<a href="#page_i194">194</a>, +<a href="#page_i213">213</a>, +<a href="#page_i215">215</a>, +<a href="#page_i225">225</a>, +<a href="#page_i252">252</a>, +<a href="#page_i276">276</a>, +<a href="#page_i422">422</a>, +<a href="#page_i458">458</a>, +<a href="#page_i460">460</a>, +<a href="#page_i468">468-469</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii19">19</a>, +<a href="#page_ii21">21</a>, +<a href="#page_ii22">22</a>, +<a href="#page_ii24">24</a>, +<a href="#page_ii26">26</a>, +<a href="#page_ii32">32</a>, +<a href="#page_ii40">40</a>, +<a href="#page_ii64">64</a>, +<a href="#page_ii83">83</a>, +<a href="#page_ii85">85</a>, +<a href="#page_ii97">97</a>, +<a href="#page_ii100">100</a>, +<a href="#page_ii112">112</a>, +<a href="#page_ii119">119</a>, +<a href="#page_ii122">122</a>, +<a href="#page_ii135">135</a>, +<a href="#page_ii162">162-164</a>, +<a href="#page_ii166">166-168</a>, +<a href="#page_ii176">176</a>, +<a href="#page_ii187">187</a>, +<a href="#page_ii216">216</a>, +<a href="#page_ii252">252-256</a>, +<a href="#page_ii259">259</a>, +<a href="#page_ii260">260</a>, +<a href="#page_ii265">265</a>, +<a href="#page_ii328">328</a>, +<a href="#page_ii331">331</a>, +<a href="#page_ii345">345-346</a>, +<a href="#page_ii348">348</a>, +<a href="#page_ii353">353</a>, +<a href="#page_ii355">355</a>, +<a href="#page_ii358">358</a>, +<a href="#page_ii362">362</a>, +<a href="#page_ii369">369-370</a>, +<a href="#page_ii380">380</a>, +<a href="#page_ii438">438</a>, +<a href="#page_ii448">448</a>, +<a href="#page_ii449">449</a>, +<a href="#page_ii542">542</a>, +<a href="#page_ii545">545</a>.</li> +<li>Muscat, i. +<a href="#page_i378">378-379</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> + +<li>Nablûs, i. +<a href="#page_i204">204</a>.</li> +<li>Nansouty, ii. +<a href="#page_ii345">345</a>.</li> +<li>Naples, i. +<a href="#page_i128">128</a>, +<a href="#page_i196">196</a>, +<a href="#page_i216">216</a>, +<a href="#page_i264">264</a>, +<a href="#page_i308">308</a>, +<a href="#page_i314">314</a>, +<a href="#page_i433">433</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii30">30</a>, +<a href="#page_ii59">59</a>, +<a href="#page_ii60">60</a>, +<a href="#page_ii61">61</a>, +<a href="#page_ii63">63</a>, +<a href="#page_ii115">115</a>, +<a href="#page_ii134">134</a>.</li> +<li>Napoleon, first abdication of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii430">430</a>.</li> +<li>Narbonne, ii. +<a href="#page_ii323">323-324</a>.</li> +<li>National Assembly, i. +<a href="#page_i27">27</a>, +<a href="#page_i28">28</a>, +<a href="#page_i29">29</a>, +<a href="#page_i36">36</a>.</li> +<li>National Guard, i. +<a href="#page_i28">28-29</a>, +<a href="#page_i34">34-35</a>, +<a href="#page_i39">39</a>, +<a href="#page_i62">62</a>, +<a href="#page_i71">71</a>.</li> +<li>Nazareth, i. +<a href="#page_i207">207</a>.</li> +<li>Necker, i. +<a href="#page_i159">159</a>.</li> +<li>Neipperg, Count de, ii. +<a href="#page_ii382">382</a>, +<a href="#page_ii433">433</a>, +<a href="#page_ii436">436</a>.</li> +<li>Nelson, i. +<a href="#page_i84">84</a>, +<a href="#page_i187">187</a>, +<a href="#page_i192">192-194</a>, +<a href="#page_i196">196</a>, +<a href="#page_i202">202</a>, +<a href="#page_i206">206</a>, +<a href="#page_i263">263</a>, +<a href="#page_i310">310</a>, +<a href="#page_i313">313</a>, +<a href="#page_i333">333</a>, +<a href="#page_i434">434</a>, +<a href="#page_i440">440</a>, +<a href="#page_i453">453</a>, +<a href="#page_i484">484</a>, +<a href="#page_i488">488</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii573">573</a>.</li> +<li>Nepean, i. +<a href="#page_i451">451</a>.</li> +<li>Nesselrode, Count, ii. +<a href="#page_ii371">371</a>, +<a href="#page_ii372">372</a>, +<a href="#page_ii424">424</a>.</li> +<li>Neufch^acirc;tel, ii. +<a href="#page_ii44">44</a>.</li> +<li>Newfoundland, i. +<a href="#page_i175">175</a>, +<a href="#page_i314">314</a>, +<a href="#page_i342">342</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii538">538</a>.</li> +<li>Ney, i. +<a href="#page_i396">396</a>, +<a href="#page_i438">438</a>, +<a href="#page_i469">469-470</a>, +<a href="#page_i487">487</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii18">18</a>, +<a href="#page_ii21">21</a>, +<a href="#page_ii24">24</a>, +<a href="#page_ii91">91</a>, +<a href="#page_ii96">96</a>, +<a href="#page_ii97">97</a>, +<a href="#page_ii113">113</a>, +<a href="#page_ii120">120-122</a>, +<a href="#page_ii194">194</a>, +<a href="#page_ii211">211</a>, +<a href="#page_ii245">345</a>, +<a href="#page_ii252">252-256</a>, +<a href="#page_ii262">262-263</a>, +<a href="#page_ii287">287</a>, +<a href="#page_ii289">289</a>, +<a href="#page_ii291">291-292</a>, +<a href="#page_ii322">322</a>, +<a href="#page_ii335">335</a>, +<a href="#page_ii350">350</a>, +<a href="#page_ii353">353</a>, +<a href="#page_ii354">354</a>, +<a href="#page_ii356">356</a>, +<a href="#page_ii359">359</a>, +<a href="#page_ii362">362</a>, +<a href="#page_ii381">381</a>, +<a href="#page_ii404">404</a>, +<a href="#page_ii407">407</a>, +<a href="#page_ii408">408</a>, +<a href="#page_ii427">427</a>, +<a href="#page_ii428">428</a>, +<a href="#page_ii431">431</a>, +<a href="#page_ii444">444</a>, +<a href="#page_ii461">461-463</a>, +<a href="#page_ii466">466</a>, +<a href="#page_ii467">467</a>, +<a href="#page_ii469">469</a>, +<a href="#page_ii472">472</a>, +<a href="#page_ii473">473-479</a>, +<a href="#page_ii482">482-483</a>, +<a href="#page_ii490">490</a>, +<a href="#page_ii498">498</a>, +<a href="#page_ii500">500-505</a>, +<a href="#page_ii541">541</a>, +<a href="#page_ii542">542</a>.</li> +<li>Nisas, ii. +<a href="#page_ii318">318</a>.</li> +<li>Nice, i. +<a href="#page_i48">48</a>, +<a href="#page_i57">57</a>, +<a href="#page_i60">60</a>, +<a href="#page_i76">76</a>, +<a href="#page_i78">78</a>, +<a href="#page_i80">80</a>, +<a href="#page_i87">87</a>, +<a href="#page_i232">232</a>, +<a href="#page_i243">243</a>, +<a href="#page_i244">244-245</a>, +<a href="#page_i312">312</a>.</li> +<li>Nile, battle of the, i. +<a href="#page_i192">192-194</a>.</li> +<li>Nivelle, battle of the, ii. +<a href="#page_ii369">369</a>.</li> +<li>Nivôse, affair of, i. +<a href="#page_i303">303-306</a>.</li> +<li>Non-intercourse Act, ii. +<a href="#page_ii156">156</a>.</li> +<li>Non-jurors, i. +<a href="#page_i28">28</a>, +<a href="#page_i272">272</a>.</li> +<li>Norway, ii. +<a href="#page_ii2">2</a>, +<a href="#page_ii238">238</a>, +<a href="#page_ii296">296-297</a>, +<a href="#page_ii380">380</a>.</li> +<li>Noverraz, ii. +<a href="#page_ii567">567</a>.</li> +<li>Novi, i. +<a href="#page_i216">216</a>, +<a href="#page_i219">219</a>.</li> +<li>Novossiltzoff, ii. +<a href="#page_ii5">5</a>, +<a href="#page_ii7">7</a>, +<a href="#page_ii11">11</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> +<li>O'Connor, i. +<a href="#page_i510">510-512</a> (App.). +<li>Odeleben, Col. von, ii. +<a href="#page_ii288">288</a>, +<a href="#page_ii353">353</a>, +<a href="#page_ii360">360</a>.</li> +<li>Oglio, i. +<a href="#page_i142">142</a>.</li> +<li>O'Hara, i. +<a href="#page_i52">52</a>, +<a href="#page_i54">54</a>.</li> +<li>Oldenburg, ii. +<a href="#page_ii134">134-135</a>.</li> +<li>Oldenburg, annexation of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii214">214</a>, +<a href="#page_ii234">234-236</a>.</li> +<li>Oldenburg, Duchy of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii183">183</a>, +<a href="#page_ii206">206</a>.</li> +<li>Old Guard, ii. +<a href="#page_ii471">471</a>, +<a href="#page_ii504">504-507</a>.</li> +<li>Olivenza, i. +<a href="#page_i311">311</a>, +<a href="#page_i314">314</a>.</li> +<li>O'Meara, ii. +<a href="#page_ii529">529-530</a>, +<a href="#page_ii534">534</a>, +<a href="#page_ii541">541</a>, +<a href="#page_ii544">544</a>, +<a href="#page_ii546">546</a>, +<a href="#page_ii551">551</a>, +<a href="#page_ii555">555</a>, +<a href="#page_ii562">562</a>, +<a href="#page_ii565">565</a>, +<a href="#page_ii571">571</a>, +<a href="#page_ii572">572</a>.</li> +<li>Ompteda, ii. +<a href="#page_ii55">55</a>.</li> +<li>Oporto, ii. +<a href="#page_ii194">194</a>.</li> +<li>Orange, Prince of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii467">467</a>, +<a href="#page_ii473">473</a>.</li> +<li>Ordener, Gen., i. +<a href="#page_i458">458</a>.</li> +<li>Orders in Council, ii. +<a href="#page_ii105">105-107</a>, +<a href="#page_ii155">155-157</a>, +<a href="#page_ii222">222</a>.</li> +<li>"Organic" articles, i. +<a href="#page_i281">281</a>.</li> +<li>Orleans, New, i. +<a href="#page_i364">364</a>, +<a href="#page_i368">368-369</a>, +<a href="#page_i510">510</a> (App.). +<li>Orthez, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii414">414</a>.</li> +<li>Ossian, i. +<a href="#page_i185">185</a>.</li> +<li>Ostermann, ii. +<a href="#page_ii347">347</a>.</li> +<li>Otto, i. +<a href="#page_i256">256</a>, +<a href="#page_i310">310</a>, +<a href="#page_i313">313</a>, +<a href="#page_i314">314</a>, +<a href="#page_i333">333</a>, +<a href="#page_i341">341</a>.</li> +<li>Oubril, ii. +<a href="#page_ii71">71-75</a>, +<a href="#page_ii81">81</a>.</li> +<li>Oudinot, i. +<a href="#page_i243">243</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii32">32</a>, +<a href="#page_ii38">38-39</a>, +<a href="#page_ii120">120</a>, +<a href="#page_ii124">124</a>, +<a href="#page_ii195">195</a>, +<a href="#page_ii231">231</a>, +<a href="#page_ii250">250</a>, +<a href="#page_ii253">253</a>, +<a href="#page_ii263">263-264</a>, +<a href="#page_ii266">266</a>, +<a href="#page_ii292">292</a>, +<a href="#page_ii332">332-333</a>, +<a href="#page_ii337">337-338</a>, +<a href="#page_ii350">350</a>, +<a href="#page_ii408">408</a>, +<a href="#page_ii409">409</a>, +<a href="#page_ii427">427</a>, +<a href="#page_ii431">431</a>, +<a href="#page_ii454">454</a>.</li> +<li>Ouvrard, ii. +<a href="#page_ii60">60</a>, +<a href="#page_ii213">213</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> + +<li>Pacthod, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii420">420</a>.</li> +<li>Pahlen, ii. +<a href="#page_ii358">358</a>.</li> +<li>Pajol, ii. +<a href="#page_ii358">358</a>, +<a href="#page_ii397">397</a>, +<a href="#page_ii480">480</a>, +<a href="#page_ii481">481</a>.</li> +<li>Palais Royal, the, i. +<a href="#page_i16">16</a>.</li> +<li>Palm, ii. +<a href="#page_ii89">89</a>, +<a href="#page_ii184">184</a>.</li> +<li>Paoli, i. +<a href="#page_i5">5</a>, +<a href="#page_i18">18</a>, +<a href="#page_i29">29</a>, +<a href="#page_i30">30</a>, +<a href="#page_i31">31</a>, +<a href="#page_i34">34</a>, +<a href="#page_i35">35</a>, +<a href="#page_i38">38-42</a>, +<a href="#page_i59">59</a>.</li> +<li>Papal States, i. +<a href="#page_i78">78</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii154">154</a>, +<a href="#page_ii228">228</a>.</li> +<li>Paris, i. +<a href="#page_i13">13-16</a>, +<a href="#page_i35">35-36</a>, +<a href="#page_i44">44-47</a>, +<a href="#page_i62">62</a>, +<a href="#page_i64">64</a>, +<a href="#page_i66">66</a>, +<a href="#page_i172">172</a>, +<a href="#page_i260">260</a>.</li> +<li>Paris, Treaties of (1814), +ii. +<a href="#page_ii436">436</a>.</li> +<li>Paris, Treaty of (1815), + ii. +<a href="#page_ii538">538</a>.</li> +<li>Parlements, i. +<a href="#page_i27">27</a>, +<a href="#page_i268">268</a>, +<a href="#page_i269">269</a>.</li> +<li>Parma, i. +<a href="#page_i78">78</a>, +<a href="#page_i366">366-369</a>, +<a href="#page_i389">389</a>.</li> +<li>Parma, Duke of, i. +<a href="#page_i100">100</a>, +<a href="#page_i129">129</a>, +<a href="#page_i264">264</a>.</li> +<li>Parthenopæan Republic, i. +<a href="#page_i216">216</a>.</li> +<li>Pasquier, i. +<a href="#page_i267">267</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii149">149</a>, +<a href="#page_ii279">279</a>, +<a href="#page_ii484">484</a>, +<a href="#page_ii514">514</a>.</li> +<li>Passeriano, i. +<a href="#page_i156">156</a>, +<a href="#page_i169">169-170</a>.</li> +<li>Paterson, Miss, i. +<a href="#page_i414">414-415</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii154">154</a>.</li> +<li>Paul, Czar, i. +<a href="#page_i183">183</a>, +<a href="#page_i217">217</a>, +<a href="#page_i260">260-263</a>, +<a href="#page_i310">310</a>.</li> +<li>Pavia, i. +<a href="#page_i92">92</a>, +<a href="#page_i96">96</a>, +<a href="#page_i98">98</a>.</li> +<li>Pelet, ii. +<a href="#page_ii364">364</a>.</li> +<li>Peltier, i. +<a href="#page_i402">402</a>.</li> +<li>Peninsular War, ii. +<a href="#page_ii171">171-173</a>, +<a href="#page_ii186">186-188</a>, +<a href="#page_ii194">194</a>, +<a href="#page_ii197">197-199</a>, +<a href="#page_ii209">209-211</a>, +<a href="#page_ii300">300-313</a>, +<a href="#page_ii368">368-369</a>.</li> +<li>Perim, i. +<a href="#page_i262">262</a>.</li> +<li>Permoa, Madame, i. +<a href="#page_i64">64</a>, +<a href="#page_i73">73</a>.</li> +<li>Perponcher, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii462">462</a>.</li> +<li>Perron, i. +<a href="#page_i364">364</a>, +<a href="#page_i377">377</a>.</li> +<li>Persia, i. +<a href="#page_i262">262</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii9">9</a>, +<a href="#page_ii110">110</a>.</li> +<li>Persia, Shah of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii117">117-118</a>.</li> +<li>Perthes, ii. +<a href="#page_ii299">299</a>.</li> +<li>Peschiera, i. +<a href="#page_i101">101</a>, +<a href="#page_i112">112</a>, +<a href="#page_i113">113</a>.</li> +<li>Pétiet, ii. +<a href="#page_ii485">485</a>.</li> +<li>Petit, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii433">433</a>.</li> +<li>Phélippeaux, i. +<a href="#page_i207">207-208</a>.</li> +<li>Phillip, Port, i. +<a href="#page_i380">380</a>, +<a href="#page_i382">382</a>.</li> +<li>Phull, Gen. von, ii. +<a href="#page_ii242">242-243</a>, +<a href="#page_ii248">248-250</a>.</li> +<li>Piacenza, i. +<a href="#page_i92">92</a>, +<a href="#page_i93">93</a>.</li> +<li>Pichegru, i. +<a href="#page_i63">63</a>, +<a href="#page_i158">158</a>, +<a href="#page_i162">162</a>, +<a href="#page_i451">451</a>, +<a href="#page_i456">456-457</a>, +<a href="#page_i463">463-464</a>, +<a href="#page_i471">471</a>.</li> +<li>Picton, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii311">311</a>, +<a href="#page_ii473"></a>, +<a href="#page_ii479">479</a>, +<a href="#page_ii490">490</a>, +<a href="#page_ii493">493</a>, +<a href="#page_ii497">497</a>.</li> +<li>Piedmont, i. +<a href="#page_i47">47</a>, +<a href="#page_i64">64</a>, +<a href="#page_i241">241</a>, +<a href="#page_i245">245</a>.</li> +<li>Piombino, i. +<a href="#page_i264">264</a>.</li> +<li>Pirch I., ii. +<a href="#page_ii460">460</a>, +<a href="#page_ii464">464</a>, +<a href="#page_ii467">467</a>, +<a href="#page_ii468">468</a>, +<a href="#page_ii489">489</a>, +<a href="#page_ii504">504</a>, +<a href="#page_ii505">505</a>.</li> +<li>Pirch II., ii. +<a href="#page_ii459">459</a>.</li> +<li>Pitt, i. +<a href="#page_i54">54-56</a>, +<a href="#page_i166">166-167</a>, +<a href="#page_i243">243</a>, +<a href="#page_i310">310</a>, +<a href="#page_i414">414</a>, +<a href="#page_i441">441</a>, +<a href="#page_i452">452</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii5">5</a>, +<a href="#page_ii7">7</a>, +<a href="#page_ii13">13</a>, +<a href="#page_ii14">14</a>, +<a href="#page_ii53">53</a>, +<a href="#page_ii55">55-58</a>, +<a href="#page_ii573">573</a>.</li> +<li>Pope Pius VI., i. +<a href="#page_i78">78</a>, +<a href="#page_i102">102</a>, +<a href="#page_i103">103</a>, +<a href="#page_i120">120</a>, +<a href="#page_i121">121</a>, +<a href="#page_i137">137</a>, +<a href="#page_i179">179</a>, +<a href="#page_i261">261</a>.</li> +<li>Pope Pius VII., i. +<a href="#page_i274">274-277</a>, +<a href="#page_i280">280-281</a>, +<a href="#page_i467">467-476</a>, +<a href="#page_i480">480</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii72">72</a>, +<a href="#page_ii88">88</a>, +<a href="#page_ii153">153-154</a>, +<a href="#page_ii191">191</a>, +<a href="#page_ii211">211</a>, +<a href="#page_ii227">227-228</a>, +<a href="#page_ii380">380</a>.</li> +<li>Pizzighetone, i. +<a href="#page_i93">93</a>.</li> +<li>Plague, the, i. +<a href="#page_i204">204</a>, +<a href="#page_i209">209-212</a>.</li> +<li>Po, River, i. +<a href="#page_i79">79</a>, +<a href="#page_i88">88</a>, +<a href="#page_i92">92</a>, +<a href="#page_i100">100</a>.</li> +<li>Poischwitz, Armistice of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii296">296</a>, +<a href="#page_ii320">320</a>.</li> +<li>Poland, ii. +<a href="#page_ii109">109-111</a>, +<a href="#page_ii131">131-132</a>, +<a href="#page_ii193">193</a>, +<a href="#page_ii201">201</a>, +<a href="#page_ii232">232-233</a>, +<a href="#page_ii236">236</a>, +<a href="#page_ii244">244-246</a>, +<a href="#page_ii272">272</a>, +<a href="#page_ii273">273-274</a>, +<a href="#page_ii294">294</a>, +<a href="#page_ii330">330</a>, +<a href="#page_ii387">387-388</a>, +<a href="#page_ii437">437</a>.</li> +<li>Polignacs, i. +<a href="#page_i456">456</a>, +<a href="#page_i458">458</a>, +<a href="#page_i472">472</a>.</li> +<li>Pondicherry, i. +<a href="#page_i372">372</a>.</li> +<li>Poniatowski, ii. +<a href="#page_ii252">252</a>, +<a href="#page_ii254">254</a>, +<a href="#page_ii284">284</a>, +<a href="#page_ii332">332</a>, +<a href="#page_ii362">362</a>, +<a href="#page_ii364">364</a>. +</li> +<li>Pons (de l'Hérault), ii. +<a href="#page_ii436">436</a>.</li> +<li>Ponsonby, ii. +<a href="#page_ii490">490</a>, +<a href="#page_ii493">493</a>, +<a href="#page_ii497">497</a>, +<a href="#page_ii498">498</a>.</li> +<li>Portalis, i. +<a href="#page_i289">289</a>.</li> +<li>Portland, Duke of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii116">116</a>, +<a href="#page_ii208">208</a>.</li> +<li>Porto Ferrajo, ii. +<a href="#page_ii435">435</a>, +<a href="#page_ii441">441-442</a>.</li> +<li>Portugal, i. +<a href="#page_i216">216</a>, +<a href="#page_i308">308</a>, +<a href="#page_i311">311-312</a>, +<a href="#page_i437">437-438</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii106">106</a>, +<a href="#page_ii145">145-153</a>, +<a href="#page_ii160">160</a>, +<a href="#page_ii170">170-171</a>, +<a href="#page_ii209">209-210</a>, +<a href="#page_ii306">306</a>.</li> +<li>Potsdam, Treaty of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii30">30</a>, +<a href="#page_ii44">44</a>.</li> +<li>Poussielgue, i. +<a href="#page_i178">178</a>.</li> +<li>Power-looms, ii. +<a href="#page_ii220">220</a>.</li> +<li>Pozzo di Borgo, ii. +<a href="#page_ii376">376</a>, +<a href="#page_ii424">424</a>, +<a href="#page_ii428">428</a>, +<a href="#page_ii439">439</a>.</li> + +<li><i>Praams</i>, i. +<a href="#page_i485">485-486</a>.</li> + +<li>Pradt, Abbé de, ii. +<a href="#page_ii246">246</a>, +<a href="#page_ii253">253</a>, +<a href="#page_ii258">258</a>, +<a href="#page_ii267">267</a>, +<a href="#page_ii424">424</a>.</li> + +<li>Prague, Congress of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii323">323-324</a>, +<a href="#page_ii326">326</a>, +<a href="#page_ii329">329</a>, +<a href="#page_ii435">435</a>.</li> + +<li>Prefect, office of, i. +<a href="#page_i268">268</a>, +<a href="#page_i269">269</a>.</li> + +<li>Press, the, i. +<a href="#page_i319">319</a>.</li> + +<li>Press, liberty of the, i. +<a href="#page_i239">239</a> ; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii211">211</a>, +<a href="#page_ii451">451</a>.</li> + +<li>Pressburg, Treaty of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii46">46-48</a>.</li> + +<li>Priests, orthodox, i. +<a href="#page_i272">272</a>, +<a href="#page_i273">273-277</a>, +<a href="#page_i282">282</a>.</li> + +<li>Provence, i. +<a href="#page_i32">32</a>, +<a href="#page_i44">44</a>, +<a href="#page_i244">244</a>.</li> + +<li>Provence, Comte de, i. +<a href="#page_i54">54-55</a>, +<a href="#page_i66">66</a>, +<a href="#page_i143">143</a>.</li> + +<li>Provera, i. +<a href="#page_i85">85</a>, +<a href="#page_i131">131</a>, +<a href="#page_i136">136</a>.</li> + +<li>Prussia, i. +<a href="#page_i37">37</a>, +<a href="#page_i64">64</a>, +<a href="#page_i219">219</a>, +<a href="#page_i263">263</a>, +<a href="#page_i352">352</a>, +<a href="#page_i422">422</a>, +<a href="#page_i436">436</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii1">1</a>, +<a href="#page_ii4">4-5</a>, +<a href="#page_ii9">9</a>, +<a href="#page_ii11">11</a>, +<a href="#page_ii20">20</a>, +<a href="#page_ii29">29-30</a>, +<a href="#page_ii34">34</a>, +<a href="#page_ii42">42-45</a>, +<a href="#page_ii48">48</a>, +<a href="#page_ii49">49</a>, +<a href="#page_ii51">51-55</a>, +<a href="#page_ii64">64-69</a>, +<a href="#page_ii83">83-101</a>, +<a href="#page_ii110">110</a>, +<a href="#page_ii114">114-115</a>, +<a href="#page_ii126">126-127</a>, +<a href="#page_ii131">131-132</a>, +<a href="#page_ii134">134-137</a>, +<a href="#page_ii177">177-178</a>, +<a href="#page_ii182">182</a>, +<a href="#page_ii193">193</a>, +<a href="#page_ii221">221</a>, +<a href="#page_ii226">226</a>, +<a href="#page_ii237">237-240</a>, +<a href="#page_ii241">241</a>, +<a href="#page_ii269">269-271</a>, +<a href="#page_ii273">273-278</a>, +<a href="#page_ii280">280</a>, +<a href="#page_ii282">282</a>, +<a href="#page_ii316">316-317</a>, +<a href="#page_ii385">385-389</a>, +<a href="#page_ii402">402-403</a>, +<a href="#page_ii423">423-424</a>, +<a href="#page_ii437">437</a>, +<a href="#page_ii448">448</a>.</li> + +<li>Public works, i. +<a href="#page_i316">316-317</a>.</li> + +<li>Puisaye Papers, i. +<a href="#page_i450">450</a>, +<a href="#page_i452">452</a>.</li> + +<li>Pyrenees, battle of the, ii. +<a href="#page_ii368">368</a>.</li> + +<li>Pyramids, battle of the, i. +<a href="#page_i190">190-191</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> + + +<li>Quatre Bras, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii473">473-475</a>, +<a href="#page_ii509">509</a>.</li> + +<li>Quosdanovich, i. +<a href="#page_i107">107</a>, +<a href="#page_i109">109</a>, +<a href="#page_i110">110</a>, +<a href="#page_i114">114</a>, +<a href="#page_i115">115</a>, +<a href="#page_i116">116</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> + + +<li>Rapp, ii. +<a href="#page_ii41">41</a>, +<a href="#page_ii454">454</a>.</li> + +<li>Rastadt, Congress of, i. +<a href="#page_i170">170</a>, +<a href="#page_i176">176</a>.</li> + +<li>Ratisbon, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii191">191</a>.</li> + +<li>Raynal, M., i. +<a href="#page_i34">34</a>.</li> + +<li>Réal, i. +<a href="#page_i222">222</a>, +<a href="#page_i302">302</a>, +<a href="#page_i449">449</a>, +<a href="#page_i458">458</a>, +<a href="#page_i460">460</a>, +<a href="#page_i462">462-463</a>.</li> + +<li>Rebecque, Constant de, ii. +<a href="#page_ii462">462</a>.</li> + +<li>Reding, i. +<a href="#page_i392">392-394</a>.</li> + +<li>Red Sea, i. +<a href="#page_i181">181</a>, +<a href="#page_i200">200</a>.</li> + +<li>Reggio, i. +<a href="#page_i118">118</a>.</li> + +<li>Regnier, i. +<a href="#page_i449">449</a>, +<a href="#page_i454">454</a>.</li> + +<li>Reiche, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii460">460</a>, +<a href="#page_ii468">468</a>, +<a href="#page_ii476">476</a>, +<a href="#page_ii505">505</a>.</li> + +<li>Reichenbach, Treaty of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii317">317</a>.</li> + +<li>Reille, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii309">309-311</a>, +<a href="#page_ii454">454</a>, +<a href="#page_ii462">462</a>, +<a href="#page_ii473">473</a>, +<a href="#page_ii490">490</a>, +<a href="#page_ii494">494</a>, +<a href="#page_ii495">495</a>, +<a href="#page_ii505">505</a>.</li> + +<li>Religion, Napoleon's, i. +<a href="#page_i19">19-21</a>.</li> + +<li>Rémusat, Madame de, i. +<a href="#page_i329">329-330</a>, +<a href="#page_i459">459</a>.</li> + +<li>Revolution, French, i. +<a href="#page_i465">465-466</a>.</li> + +<li>Rewbell, i. +<a href="#page_i74">74</a>, +<a href="#page_i158">158</a>, +<a href="#page_i181">181</a>, +<a href="#page_i219">219</a>, +<a href="#page_i451">451</a>.</li> + +<li>Reynier, i. +<a href="#page_i182">182</a>, +<a href="#page_i191">191</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii79">79-80</a>, +<a href="#page_ii332">332-333</a>, +<a href="#page_ii337">337-338</a>, +<a href="#page_ii354">354</a>, +<a href="#page_ii356">356</a>, +<a href="#page_ii360">360</a>, +<a href="#page_ii362">362</a>, +<a href="#page_ii364">364</a>.</li> + +<li>Richter, Jean Paul, ii. +<a href="#page_ii177">177</a>.</li> + +<li>Rivière, Marquis de, i. +<a href="#page_i456">456</a>, +<a href="#page_i458">458</a>.</li> + +<li>Rivoli, battle of, i. +<a href="#page_i131">131-136</a>.</li> + +<li>Robespierre, i. +<a href="#page_i57">57</a>, +<a href="#page_i59">59</a>, +<a href="#page_i60">60</a>, +<a href="#page_i62">62</a>, +<a href="#page_i63">63</a>, +<a href="#page_i70">70</a>, +<a href="#page_i82">82</a>, +<a href="#page_i174">174</a>.</li> + +<li>Robespierre, the younger, i. +<a href="#page_i57">57</a>, +<a href="#page_i58">58</a>, +<a href="#page_i59">59</a>, +<a href="#page_i60">60</a>.</li> + +<li>Roederer, i. +<a href="#page_i222">222</a>, +<a href="#page_i233">233-234</a>, +<a href="#page_i304">304-305</a>, +<a href="#page_i308">308</a>, +<a href="#page_i399">399</a>, +<a href="#page_i473">473</a>; + ii. +<a href="#page_ii375">375</a>.</li> + +<li>Rohan, Charlotte de, i. +<a href="#page_i457">457</a>.</li> + +<li>Roland, Mme., i. +<a href="#page_i46">46</a>.</li> + +<li>Roll, Baron de, i. +<a href="#page_i450">450</a>.</li> + +<li>Roman Catholic Church, i. +<a href="#page_i271">271</a>.</li> + +<li>Romantzoff, ii. +<a href="#page_ii144">144</a>, +<a href="#page_ii180">180</a>, +<a href="#page_ii269">269</a>, +<a href="#page_ii274">274</a>.</li> + +<li>Rome, i. +<a href="#page_i100">100</a>, +<a href="#page_i129">129</a>, +<a href="#page_i179">179</a>, +<a href="#page_i275">275-277</a>.</li> + +<li>Rome, <li>King of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii227">227</a>, +<a href="#page_ii382">382</a>, +<a href="#page_ii421">421</a>.</li> + +<li>Romilly, i. +<a href="#page_i294">294</a>, +<a href="#page_i318">318</a>.</li> + +<li>Rose, George, ii. +<a href="#page_ii56">56</a>.</li> + +<li>Rosetta, i. +<a href="#page_i189">189</a>.</li> + +<li>Rossbach, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii282">282</a>.</li> + +<li>Rousseau, i. +<a href="#page_i17">17-21</a>, +<a href="#page_i25">25</a>, +<a href="#page_i26">26-27</a>, +<a href="#page_i42">42-43</a>.</li> + +<li>Rüchel, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii91">91-92</a>, +<a href="#page_ii94">94</a>, +<a href="#page_ii97">97</a>.</li> + +<li>Rue St. Honoré, i. +<a href="#page_i72">72</a>.</li> + +<li>Rumbold, Sir George, ii. +<a href="#page_ii4">4</a>.</li> + +<li>Russell, Lord John, ii. +<a href="#page_ii440">440</a>.</li> + +<li>Russia, i. +<a href="#page_i183">183</a>, +<a href="#page_i216">216</a>, +<a href="#page_i243">243</a>, +<a href="#page_i260">260-263</a>, +<a href="#page_i315">315</a>, +<a href="#page_i333">333</a>, +<a href="#page_i339">339-340</a>, +<a href="#page_i352">352</a>, +<a href="#page_i387">387</a>, +<a href="#page_i422">422</a>, +<a href="#page_i425">425</a>, +<a href="#page_i430">430-432</a>, +<a href="#page_i458">458</a>, +<a href="#page_i500">500</a>, +<a href="#page_i511">511</a> (App.); +ii. +<a href="#page_ii1">1</a>, +<a href="#page_ii4">4-13</a>, +<a href="#page_ii29">29-30</a>, +<a href="#page_ii47">47-48</a>, +<a href="#page_ii54">54</a>, +<a href="#page_ii86">86</a>, +<a href="#page_ii87">87</a>, +<a href="#page_ii90">90</a>, +<a href="#page_ii110">110</a>, +<a href="#page_ii114">114-115</a>, +<a href="#page_ii130">130-132</a>, +<a href="#page_ii134">134-137</a>, +<a href="#page_ii185">185</a>, +<a href="#page_ii221">221</a>, +<a href="#page_ii223">223</a>, +<a href="#page_ii233">233</a>, +<a href="#page_ii269">269</a>, +<a href="#page_ii270">270-272</a>, +<a href="#page_ii273">273</a>, +<a href="#page_ii275">275-276</a>, +<a href="#page_ii282">282</a>, +<a href="#page_ii317">317</a>, +<a href="#page_ii385">385-389</a>, +<a href="#page_ii402">402-403</a>, +<a href="#page_ii448">448</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> +<li>Saalfeld, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii93">93</a>.</li> + +<li>Sacken, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii339">339</a>, +<a href="#page_ii364">364</a>, +<a href="#page_ii393">393-394</a>.</li> + +<li>St. Aignan, Baron, ii. +<a href="#page_ii370">370</a>, +<a href="#page_ii374">374</a>.</li> + +<li>St. Cloud, i. +<a href="#page_i223">223-227</a>, +<a href="#page_i225">225</a>. + +<li>St. Cyr, i. +<a href="#page_i469">469</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii17">17</a>, +<a href="#page_ii61">61-62</a>, +<a href="#page_ii253">253</a>, +<a href="#page_ii332">332-334</a>, +<a href="#page_ii337">337</a>, +<a href="#page_ii340">340-349</a>, +<a href="#page_ii353">353</a>, +<a href="#page_ii360">360</a>, +<a href="#page_ii408">408</a>, +<a href="#page_ii454">454</a>.</li> + +<li>St. Domingo, i. +<a href="#page_i312">312</a>, +<a href="#page_i358">358-364</a>, +<a href="#page_i368">368</a>, +<a href="#page_i440">440</a>, +<a href="#page_i490">490</a>, +<a href="#page_i509">509</a> (App.) ; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii81">81</a>.</li> + +<li>St. Gotthard, i. +<a href="#page_i245">245-250</a>.</li> + +<li>St. Helena, ii. +<a href="#page_ii439">439</a>, +<a href="#page_ii539">539-574</a>.</li> + +<li>St, Ildefonso, Convention of, i. +<a href="#page_i366">366</a>.</li> + +<li>St. John, Knights of. <i>See</i> Malta. + +<li>St. Just, i. +<a href="#page_i59">59</a>, +<a href="#page_i174">174</a>.</li> + +<li>St. Lucia, i. +<a href="#page_i439">439</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii436">436</a>.</li> + +<li>St. Marsan, ii. +<a href="#page_ii241">241</a>, +<a href="#page_ii270">270</a>, +<a href="#page_ii276">277</a>.</li> + +<li>St. Pierre, i. +<a href="#page_i342">342</a>.</li> + +<li>Salamanca, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii256">256</a>, +<a href="#page_ii300">300</a>.</li> + +<li>Salicetti, i. +<a href="#page_i39">39-40</a>, +<a href="#page_i47">47</a>, +<a href="#page_i49">49</a>, +<a href="#page_i57">57</a>, +<a href="#page_i60">60</a>, +<a href="#page_i104">104</a>, +<a href="#page_i121">121</a>, +<a href="#page_i147">147</a>, +<a href="#page_i148">148</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii10">10</a>.</li> + +<li>Salo, i. +<a href="#page_i110">110</a>.</li> + +<li>Salvatori, i. +<a href="#page_i144">144</a>.</li> + +<li>Salzburg, i. +<a href="#page_i129">129</a>, +<a href="#page_i170">170</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii46">46</a>, +<a href="#page_ii54">54</a>, +<a href="#page_ii201">201</a>.</li> + +<li>Saragossa, ii. +<a href="#page_ii170">170</a>, +<a href="#page_ii177">177</a>.</li> + +<li>Sardinia, i. +<a href="#page_i38">38-39</a>, +<a href="#page_i54">54-57</a>, +<a href="#page_i78">78</a>, +<a href="#page_i83">83</a>, +<a href="#page_i85">85</a>, +<a href="#page_i86">86</a>, +<a href="#page_i87">87</a>, +<a href="#page_i89">89</a>, +<a href="#page_i90">90</a>, +<a href="#page_i167">167-168</a>, +<a href="#page_i216">216</a>, +<a href="#page_i241">241</a>, +<a href="#page_i245">245</a>, +<a href="#page_i261">261</a>, +<a href="#page_i312">312</a>, +<a href="#page_i388">388</a>, +<a href="#page_i430">430</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii6">6</a>, +<a href="#page_ii8">8</a>, +<a href="#page_ii30">30</a>, +<a href="#page_ii115">115</a>.</li> + +<li>Sarzana, i. +<a href="#page_i2">2</a>, +<a href="#page_i3">3</a>.</li> + +<li>Savary, i. +<a href="#page_i200">200</a>, +<a href="#page_i258">258</a>, +<a href="#page_i456">456</a>, +<a href="#page_i458">458</a>, +<a href="#page_i460">460-463</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii35">35</a>, +<a href="#page_ii41">41</a>, +<a href="#page_ii96">96</a>, +<a href="#page_ii144">144</a>, +<a href="#page_ii165">1665</a>, +<a href="#page_ii170">170-171</a>, +<a href="#page_ii298">298</a>, +<a href="#page_ii313">313</a>, +<a href="#page_ii334">334</a>, +<a href="#page_ii380">380</a>, +<a href="#page_ii415">415</a>, +<a href="#page_ii426">426</a>, +<a href="#page_ii446">446</a>, +<a href="#page_ii516">516</a>, +<a href="#page_ii519">519</a>, +<a href="#page_ii528">528</a>, +<a href="#page_ii529">529</a>.</li> + +<li>Savona, i. +<a href="#page_i79">79</a>, +<a href="#page_i80">80</a>, +<a href="#page_i82">82</a>, +<a href="#page_i83">83</a>, +<a href="#page_i84">84</a>, +<a href="#page_i243">2443</a>, +<a href="#page_i259">259</a>.</li> + +<li>Savoy, i. +<a href="#page_i37">37</a>, +<a href="#page_i78">78</a>, +<a href="#page_i89">89</a>, +<a href="#page_i244">244-245</a>.</li> + +<li>Savoy, House of, i. +<a href="#page_i87">87</a>, +<a href="#page_i90">90</a>, +<a href="#page_i338">338</a>, +<a href="#page_i344">344</a>, +<a href="#page_i388">388</a>.</li> + +<li>Saxony, i. +<a href="#page_i64">64</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii84">84</a>, +<a href="#page_ii88">88</a>, +<a href="#page_ii91">91</a>, +<a href="#page_ii93">93</a>, +<a href="#page_ii108">108</a>, +<a href="#page_ii134">134-135</a>, +<a href="#page_ii194">194</a>, +<a href="#page_ii207">207</a>, +<a href="#page_ii275">275</a>, +<a href="#page_ii284">284-285</a>, +<a href="#page_ii289">289</a>, +<a href="#page_ii295">295</a>, +<a href="#page_ii355">355</a>, +<a href="#page_ii366">366</a>, +<a href="#page_ii385">385</a>, +<a href="#page_ii387">387-388</a>, +<a href="#page_ii411">411</a>, +<a href="#page_ii437">437</a>.</li> + +<li>Scharnhorst, ii. +<a href="#page_ii92">92</a>, +<a href="#page_ii178">178</a>, +<a href="#page_ii237">237</a>, +<a href="#page_ii242">242</a>, +<a href="#page_ii250">250</a>, +<a href="#page_ii280">280</a>, +<a href="#page_ii286">286</a>.</li> + +<li>Schérer, i. +<a href="#page_i61">61</a>, +<a href="#page_i75">75</a>.</li> + +<li>Schill, ii. +<a href="#page_ii193">193</a>.</li> + +<li>Schiller, ii. +<a href="#page_ii184">184</a>.</li> + +<li>Schleiermacher, ii. +<a href="#page_ii286">286</a>.</li> + +<li>Schönbrunn, Treaty of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii43">43-45</a>, +<a href="#page_ii201">201</a>.</li> + +<li>Schwarzenberg, Prince, ii. +<a href="#page_ii24">24</a>, +<a href="#page_ii281">281-282</a>, +<a href="#page_ii321">321</a>, +<a href="#page_ii335">335-336</a>, +<a href="#page_ii341">341-346</a>, +<a href="#page_ii351">351</a>, +<a href="#page_ii354">354</a>, +<a href="#page_ii356">356</a>, +<a href="#page_ii366">366</a>, +<a href="#page_ii368">368</a>, +<a href="#page_ii373">373</a>, +<a href="#page_ii381">381</a>, +<a href="#page_ii383">383</a>, +<a href="#page_ii384">384</a>, +<a href="#page_ii386">386-389</a>, +<a href="#page_ii396">396</a>, +<a href="#page_ii402">402</a>, +<a href="#page_ii404">404-405</a>, +<a href="#page_ii408">408-409</a>, +<a href="#page_ii413">413-414</a>, +<a href="#page_ii417">417</a>, +<a href="#page_ii418">418</a>, +<a href="#page_ii423">423-434</a>, +<a href="#page_ii429">429</a>, +<a href="#page_ii456">456</a>.</li> + +<li>Scindiah, i. +<a href="#page_i374">374</a>, +<a href="#page_i377">377-378</a>.</li> + +<li>Sebastiani, Gen., i. +<a href="#page_i411">411-413</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii339">339</a>.</li> + +<li>Sebottendorf, i. +<a href="#page_i94">94</a>.</li> + +<li>Secularizations, i. +<a href="#page_i387">387-388</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii52">52</a>.</li> + +<li>Ségur, Count, ii. +<a href="#page_ii37">37</a>, +<a href="#page_ii245">245</a>, +<a href="#page_ii252">252</a>, +<a href="#page_ii485">485</a>.</li> + +<li>Ségur, Mme. de, i. +<a href="#page_i479">479</a>.</li> + +<li>Sénarmont, ii. +<a href="#page_ii123">123</a>.</li> + +<li>Senate, i. +<a href="#page_i230">230-232</a>, +<a href="#page_i287">287</a>, +<a href="#page_i305">305-306</a>, +<a href="#page_i320">320</a>, +<a href="#page_i321">321-325</a>, +<a href="#page_i466">466-468</a>, +<a href="#page_i475">475</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii377">377</a>, +<a href="#page_ii425">425</a>, +<a href="#page_ii444">444</a>.</li> + +<li><i>Senatus Consultum</i>, i. +<a href="#page_i306">306</a>, +<a href="#page_i322">322</a>, +<a href="#page_i324">324-325</a>, +<a href="#page_i468">468</a>.</li> + +<li>Senegal, i. +<a href="#page_i358">358</a>.</li> + +<li>Sérurier, i. +<a href="#page_i87">87</a>, +<a href="#page_i108">108</a>, +<a href="#page_i114">114</a>, +<a href="#page_i469">469</a>.</li> + +<li>Servan, i. +<a href="#page_i36">36</a>.</li> + +<li>Sicily, i. +<a href="#page_i77">77</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii72">72-74</a>, +<a href="#page_ii79">79-83</a>, +<a href="#page_ii85">85</a>, +<a href="#page_ii88">88</a>, +<a href="#page_ii135">135</a>, +<a href="#page_ii176">176</a>, +<a href="#page_ii213">213</a>.</li> + +<li>Sièyes, i. +<a href="#page_i219">219-226</a>, +<a href="#page_i228">228-233</a>, +<a href="#page_i451">451</a>, +<a href="#page_i467">467</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii526">526</a>.</li> + +<li>Silesia, ii. +<a href="#page_ii282">282</a>, +<a href="#page_ii284">284</a>, +<a href="#page_ii291">291</a>, +<a href="#page_ii294">294</a>.</li> + +<li>Silesia, army of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii332">332</a>, +<a href="#page_ii338">338-340</a>, +<a href="#page_ii381">381</a>, +<a href="#page_ii395">395</a>.</li> + +<li>Silk industry, ii. +<a href="#page_ii224">224</a>.</li> + +<li>Simmons, Major, ii. +<a href="#page_ii307">307</a>, +<a href="#page_ii494">494</a>.</li> + +<li>Simplon, i. +<a href="#page_i245">245</a>, +<a href="#page_i246">246</a>, +<a href="#page_i316">316</a>.</li> + +<li>Sinai, Mount, i. +<a href="#page_i200">200</a>.</li> + +<li>Slavery, in French colonies, i. +<a href="#page_i360">360-363</a>.</li> + +<li>Smith, Sir Sidney, i. +<a href="#page_i202">202</a>, +<a href="#page_i204">204-215</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii80">80</a>.</li> + +<li>Smolensk, ii. +<a href="#page_ii251">251-252</a>.</li> + +<li>Smorgoni, ii. +<a href="#page_ii265">265</a>.</li> + +<li>Socotra, i. <a href="#page_i262">262</a>.</li> + +<li>Soissons, surrender of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii405">405-406</a>.</li> + +<li>Sommepuis, council at, ii. +<a href="#page_ii419">419</a>.</li> + +<li>Somosierra, battle of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii186">186</a>.</li> + +<li>Souham, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii287">287</a>, +<a href="#page_ii339">339</a>.</li> + +<li>Soult, i. +<a href="#page_i243">243</a>, +<a href="#page_i469">469-470</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii18">18</a>, +<a href="#page_ii21">21</a>, +<a href="#page_ii38">38-41</a>, +<a href="#page_ii91">91</a>, +<a href="#page_ii96">96</a>, +<a href="#page_ii97">97</a>, +<a href="#page_ii100"></a>, +<a href="#page_ii122">122</a>, +<a href="#page_ii126">126</a>, +<a href="#page_ii180">180</a>, +<a href="#page_ii194">194</a>, +<a href="#page_ii198">198</a>, +<a href="#page_ii209">209</a>, +<a href="#page_ii256">256</a>, +<a href="#page_ii300">300-301</a>, +<a href="#page_ii304">304-306</a>, +<a href="#page_ii312">312-313</a>, +<a href="#page_ii325">325</a>, +<a href="#page_ii368">368</a>, +<a href="#page_ii379">379</a>, +<a href="#page_ii384">384</a>, +<a href="#page_ii408">408</a>, +<a href="#page_ii414">414</a>, +<a href="#page_ii432">432</a>, +<a href="#page_ii455">455</a>, +<a href="#page_ii469">469</a>, +<a href="#page_ii472">472</a>, +<a href="#page_ii479">479</a>, +<a href="#page_ii490">490</a>, +<a href="#page_ii501">501</a>, +<a href="#page_ii509">509</a>.</li> + +<li>"Souper de Beaucaire, Le," i. +<a href="#page_i45">45-46</a>.</li> + +<li>Spain, i. +<a href="#page_i46">46-47</a>, +<a href="#page_i54">54-56</a>, +<a href="#page_i64">64</a>, +<a href="#page_i129">129</a>, +<a href="#page_i166">166</a>, +<a href="#page_i178">178</a>, +<a href="#page_i214">214</a>, +<a href="#page_i264">264</a>, +<a href="#page_i265">265</a>, +<a href="#page_i294">294</a>, +<a href="#page_i308">308</a>, +<a href="#page_i311">311-312</a>, +<a href="#page_i314">314-315</a>, +<a href="#page_i334">334</a>, +<a href="#page_i352">352</a>, +<a href="#page_i364">364-370</a>, +<a href="#page_i422">422</a>, +<a href="#page_i437">437-438</a>, +<a href="#page_i493">493-496</a>; +ii. +<a href="#page_ii69">69</a>, +<a href="#page_ii74">74</a>, +<a href="#page_ii106">106</a>, +<a href="#page_ii146">146</a>, +<a href="#page_ii149">149-151</a>, +<a href="#page_ii153">153</a>, +<a href="#page_ii176">176</a>, +<a href="#page_ii177">177</a>, +<a href="#page_ii181">181-182</a>, +<a href="#page_ii186">186-187</a>, +<a href="#page_ii209">209-211</a>, +<a href="#page_ii215">215</a>, +<a href="#page_ii300">300</a>, +<a href="#page_ii361">361</a>, +<a href="#page_ii368">368</a>, +<a href="#page_ii379">379</a>, +<a href="#page_ii403">403</a>.</li> + +<li>Spina, Monseigneur, i. +<a href="#page_i274">274-276</a>.</li> + +<li>Stadion, Count, ii. +<a href="#page_ii197">197</a>, +<a href="#page_ii202">202</a>, +<a href="#page_ii289">289</a>, +<a href="#page_ii315">315</a>, +<a href="#page_ii326">326</a>, +<a href="#page_ii410">410</a>.</li> + + +<li>Staël, Madame de, i. +<a href="#page_i73">73</a>, +<a href="#page_i163">163-164</a>, +<a href="#page_i180">180</a>, +<a href="#page_i217">217</a>, +<a href="#page_i298">298</a>.</li> + +<li>Stapfer, i. + <a href="#page_i391">391-395</a>, + <a href="#page_i400">400</a>.</li> + +<li>Staps, ii. + <a href="#page_ii200">200</a>.</li> + +<li>Steffens, ii. + <a href="#page_ii274">274-275</a>, + <a href="#page_ii276">276</a>.</li> + +<li>Stein, ii. + <a href="#page_ii130">130</a>, + <a href="#page_ii177">177</a>, + <a href="#page_ii190">190</a>, + <a href="#page_ii237">237</a>, + <a href="#page_ii273">273-274</a>, + <a href="#page_ii276">276-277</a>, + <a href="#page_ii373">373</a>, + <a href="#page_ii387">387</a>.</li> + +<li>Stewart, Sir Charles, ii. + <a href="#page_ii358">358</a>, + <a href="#page_ii366">366</a>, + <a href="#page_ii390">390</a>, + <a href="#page_ii410">410</a>, + <a href="#page_ii423">423</a>, + <a href="#page_ii437">437</a>.</li> + +<li>Stockholm, Treaty of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii297">297</a>.</li> + +<li>Stokoe, Dr., ii. + <a href="#page_ii565">565</a>.</li> + +<li>Stradella, i. + <a href="#page_i252">252</a>.</li> + +<li>Stralsund, battle at, ii. + <a href="#page_ii193">193</a>.</li> + +<li>Strangford, Viscount, ii. + <a href="#page_ii146">146-148</a>, + <a href="#page_ii152">152</a>.</li> + +<li>Stuart, Sir John, i. + <a href="#page_i412">412</a>; +ii. + <a href="#page_ii79">79-80</a>.</li> + +<li>Stürmer, ii. + <a href="#page_ii565">565</a>.</li> + +<li>Subervie, Gen., ii. + <a href="#page_ii496">496</a>, + <a href="#page_ii502">502</a>.</li> + +<li>Suchet, Marshal, i. + <a href="#page_i243">243-244</a>, + <a href="#page_i250">250-257</a>, + <a href="#page_i469">469</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii300">300-301</a>, + <a href="#page_ii305">305-306</a>, + <a href="#page_ii313">313</a>, + <a href="#page_ii379">379-380</a>, + <a href="#page_ii408">408</a>, + <a href="#page_ii414">414</a>, + <a href="#page_ii415">415</a>, + <a href="#page_ii455">455</a>.</li> + +<li>Suez, i. + <a href="#page_i181">181</a>, + <a href="#page_i194">194</a>, + <a href="#page_i197">197</a>, + <a href="#page_i199">199</a>.</li> + + <li>Sugar, price of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii218">218</a>.</li> + + <li>Suvoroff, i. + <a href="#page_i216">216</a>.</li> + + <li>Swabia, i. + <a href="#page_i244">244</a>, + <a href="#page_i246">246</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii45">45-48</a>.</li> + + <li>Sweden, i. + <a href="#page_i263">263</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii1">1-2</a>, + <a href="#page_ii5">5-6</a>, + <a href="#page_ii13">13</a>, + <a href="#page_ii114">114</a>, + <a href="#page_ii136">136</a>, + <a href="#page_ii140">140-141</a>, + <a href="#page_ii143">143-144</a>, + <a href="#page_ii208">208</a>, + <a href="#page_ii223">223</a>, + <a href="#page_ii237">237-239</a>, + <a href="#page_ii296">292-298</a>, + <a href="#page_ii322">322</a>, + <a href="#page_ii380">380</a>.</li> + + <li>Swiss Guards, the, i. + <a href="#page_i36">36</a>.</li> + + <li>Switzerland, i. + <a href="#page_i64">64</a>, + <a href="#page_i179">179</a>, + <a href="#page_i243">243</a>, + <a href="#page_i244">244</a>, + <a href="#page_i265">265</a>, + <a href="#page_i294">294</a>, + <a href="#page_i308">308</a>, + <a href="#page_i334">334</a>, + <a href="#page_i336">336</a>, + <a href="#page_i377">377</a>, + <a href="#page_i389">389-400</a>, + <a href="#page_i403">403</a>, + <a href="#page_i405">405</a>, + <a href="#page_i416">416</a>, + <a href="#page_i420">420</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii1">1</a>, + <a href="#page_ii6">6</a>, + <a href="#page_ii8">8</a>, + <a href="#page_ii103">103</a>, + <a href="#page_ii215">215</a>, + <a href="#page_ii381">381</a>, + <a href="#page_ii403">403</a>.</li> + + <li>Sydney, i. + <a href="#page_i379">379-382</a>.</li> + + <li>Syria, i. + <a href="#page_i201">201-215</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii229">229</a>.</li> + </ul> + <ul> + + <li>Tabor, Mount, i. + <a href="#page_i207">207</a>.</li> + + <li>Talavera, battle of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii198">198-199</a>.</li> + + <li>Talleyrand, i. + <a href="#page_i150">150</a>, + <a href="#page_i163">163-166</a>, + <a href="#page_i168">168</a>, + <a href="#page_i175">175</a>, + <a href="#page_i177">177</a>, + <a href="#page_i222">222</a>, + <a href="#page_i234">234</a>, + <a href="#page_i278">278</a>, + <a href="#page_i294">294</a>, + <a href="#page_i304">304</a>, + <a href="#page_i306">306</a>, + <a href="#page_i337">337</a>, + <a href="#page_i341">341-343</a>, + <a href="#page_i357">357</a>, + <a href="#page_i361">361</a>, + <a href="#page_i365">365-371</a>, + <a href="#page_i395">395</a>, + <a href="#page_i417">417</a>, + <a href="#page_i423">423-426</a>, + <a href="#page_i432">432</a>, + <a href="#page_i458">458</a>, + <a href="#page_i459">459</a>, + <a href="#page_i463">463</a>, + <a href="#page_i468">468</a>, + <a href="#page_i500">500</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii18">18</a>, + <a href="#page_ii35">35</a>, + <a href="#page_ii44">44</a>, + <a href="#page_ii46">46</a>, + <a href="#page_ii47">47-49</a>, + <a href="#page_ii63">63</a>, + <a href="#page_ii66">66-67</a>, + <a href="#page_ii70">70-72</a>, + <a href="#page_ii79">79</a>, + <a href="#page_ii82">82-84</a>, + <a href="#page_ii87">87</a>, + <a href="#page_ii127">127</a>, + <a href="#page_ii141">141</a>, + <a href="#page_ii146">146</a>, + <a href="#page_ii149">149</a>, + <a href="#page_ii166">166</a>, + <a href="#page_ii180">180-182</a>, + <a href="#page_ii187">187</a>, + <a href="#page_ii205">205</a>, + <a href="#page_ii368">368</a>, + <a href="#page_ii415">415</a>, + <a href="#page_ii424">424-426</a>, + <a href="#page_ii437">437</a>, + <a href="#page_ii439"><439-440</a>, + <a href="#page_ii446">446-447</a>.</li> + + <li>Tallien, i. + <a href="#page_i156">156</a>, + <a href="#page_i451">451</a>.</li> + + <li>Tallien, Madame, i. + <a href="#page_i73">73</a>, + <a href="#page_i155">155</a>, + <a href="#page_i443">443</a>.</li> + + <li>Tauenzien, ii. + <a href="#page_ii350">350</a>.</li> + + <li>Terror, the, i. + <a href="#page_i58">58</a>, + <a href="#page_i59">59</a>, + <a href="#page_i62">62</a>, + <a href="#page_i68">68</a>, + <a href="#page_i267">267</a>.</li> + + <li>Tettenborn, ii. + <a href="#page_ii280">280</a>.</li> + + <li>Théo-philanthropie, i. + <a href="#page_i179">179</a>, + <a href="#page_i272">272</a>, + <a href="#page_i273">273-277</a>.</li> + + <li>Thibaudeau, i. + <a href="#page_i290">290</a>, + <a href="#page_i305">305</a>, + <a href="#page_i467">467</a>.</li> + + <li>Thiébault, i. + <a href="#page_i71">71</a>, + <a href="#page_i111">111</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii37">37</a>, + <a href="#page_ii39">39</a>, + <a href="#page_ii40">40</a>, + <a href="#page_ii416">416</a>, + <a href="#page_ii484">484</a>.</li> + + <li>Thielmann, Gen., ii. + <a href="#page_ii460">460</a>, + <a href="#page_ii467">467</a>, + <a href="#page_ii468">468</a>, + <a href="#page_ii471">471</a>, + <a href="#page_ii477">477</a>, + <a href="#page_ii482">482</a>, + <a href="#page_ii489">489</a>.</li> + + <li>Thornton, Mr., ii. + <a href="#page_ii318">318</a>, + <a href="#page_ii321">321-322</a>, + <a href="#page_ii352">352</a>.</li> + + <li>Thugut, i. + <a href="#page_i142">142</a>.</li> + + <li>Ticino, i, + <a href="#page_i92">92</a>.</li> + + <li>Tilsit, ii. + <a href="#page_ii123">123</a>, + <a href="#page_ii126">126-128</a>.</li> + + <li>Tilsit, Treaty of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii134">134-137</a>, + <a href="#page_ii145">145</a>, + <a href="#page_ii155">155</a>.</li> + + <li>Tippoo Sahib, i. + <a href="#page_i200">200</a>, + <a href="#page_i373">373</a>.</li> + + <li>Tobago, i. + <a href="#page_i311">311-312</a>, + <a href="#page_i314">314</a>, + <a href="#page_i333">333</a>, + <a href="#page_i341">341</a>, + <a href="#page_i439">439</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii390">390</a>, +<a href="#page_ii436">436</a>.</li> + + <li>Tolentino, i. + <a href="#page_i137">137</a>.</li> + + <li>Toll, ii. + <a href="#page_ii335">335</a>, + <a href="#page_ii340">340</a>, + <a href="#page_ii341">341</a>, + <a href="#page_ii419">419</a>.</li> + + <li>Tomkinson, Col., ii. + <a href="#page_ii307">307</a>, + <a href="#page_ii493">493</a>.</li> + + <li>Tormassov, ii. + <a href="#page_ii244">244</a>.</li> + + <li>Torres Vedras, ii. + <a href="#page_ii209">209</a>.</li> + + <li>Tortona, i. + <a href="#page_i88">88</a>, + <a href="#page_i252">252</a>.</li> + + <li>Toulon, i. + <a href="#page_i39">39</a>, + <a href="#page_i40">40</a>, + <a href="#page_i44">44</a>, + <a href="#page_i46">46-56</a>, + <a href="#page_i70">70</a>, + <a href="#page_i80">80</a>, + <a href="#page_i180">180-182</a>.</li> + + <li>Toussaint l'Ouverture, i. + <a href="#page_i359">359-362</a>, + <a href="#page_i367">367</a>.</li> + + <li>Trachenberg, compact of, ii. + + <a href="#page_ii321">321-323</a>, + <a href="#page_ii332">332</a>.</li> + + <li>Trafalgar, battle of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii26">26-28</a>.</li> + + <li>Trèves, i. + <a href="#page_i141">141</a>.</li> + + <li>Trianon Decree, the, ii. + <a href="#page_ii214">214</a>, + <a href="#page_ii216">216</a>.</li> + + <li>Tribunate, i. + <a href="#page_i230">230</a>, + <a href="#page_i238">238</a>, + <a href="#page_i270">270</a>, + <a href="#page_i286">286-287</a>, + <a href="#page_i305">305</a>, + <a href="#page_i319">319-324</a>, + <a href="#page_i467">467</a>.</li> + + <li>Trieste, i. + <a href="#page_i121">121</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii201">201</a>.</li> + + <li>Trinidad, i. + <a href="#page_i166">166</a>, + <a href="#page_i311">311-312</a>, + <a href="#page_i314">314-315</a>, + <a href="#page_i333">333</a>, +<a href="#page_i343">343</a>, + <a href="#page_i495">495</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii150">150</a>.</li> + + <li>Tronchet, i. + <a href="#page_i289">289</a>, + <a href="#page_i321">321</a>.</li> + + <li>Tugendbund, ii. + <a href="#page_ii184">184</a>, + <a href="#page_ii237">237</a>.</li> + + <li>Tuileries, i. + <a href="#page_i71">71</a>, + <a href="#page_i162">162</a>.</li> + + <li>Turin, i. + <a href="#page_i79">79</a>, + <a href="#page_i85">85</a>, + <a href="#page_i87">87</a>, + <a href="#page_i89">89</a>, + <a href="#page_i250">250</a>.</li> + + <li>Turkey, i. + <a href="#page_i65">65</a>, + <a href="#page_i183">183</a>, + <a href="#page_i188">188</a>, + <a href="#page_i201">201</a>, + <a href="#page_i216">216</a>, + <a href="#page_i261">261</a>, + <a href="#page_i343">343</a>, + <a href="#page_i389">389</a>, + <a href="#page_i408">408-410</a>, + <a href="#page_i420">420</a>, + <a href="#page_i428">428</a>, + <a href="#page_i431">431-432</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii44">44</a>, + <a href="#page_ii72">72-73</a>, + <a href="#page_ii108">108</a>, + <a href="#page_ii110">110</a>, + <a href="#page_ii114">114</a>, + <a href="#page_ii130">130-131</a>, + <a href="#page_ii135">135-137</a>, + <a href="#page_ii175">175-176</a>, + <a href="#page_ii181">181</a>, + <a href="#page_ii182">182</a>, + <a href="#page_ii207">207</a>, + <a href="#page_ii208">208</a>, + <a href="#page_ii236">236</a>, + <a href="#page_ii238">238</a>, + <a href="#page_ii272">272</a>.</li> + + <li>Tuscany, i. + <a href="#page_i64">64</a>, + <a href="#page_i103">103</a>, + <a href="#page_i129">129</a>, + <a href="#page_i263">263</a>, + <a href="#page_i264">264</a>, + <a href="#page_i312">312</a>, + <a href="#page_ii366">366-369</a>.</li> + + <li>Tyrol, i. + <a href="#page_i101">101</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii45">45-48</a>, + <a href="#page_ii193">193</a>.</li> + + <li>Tyrolese, ii. + <a href="#page_ii189">189</a>, + <a href="#page_ii201">201</a>.</li> + </ul> + <ul> + + <li>Ulm, ii. + <a href="#page_ii14">14-16</a>, + <a href="#page_ii18">18-20</a>.</li> + + <li>United States, i. + <a href="#page_i264">264</a>, + <a href="#page_i365">365-372</a>, + <a href="#page_i509">509-510</a> (App.); + ii. + <a href="#page_ii156">156</a>, + <a href="#page_ii212">212-213</a>, + <a href="#page_ii221">221</a>, + <a href="#page_ii269">269</a>.</li> + + <li>Uxbridge, Lord, ii. + <a href="#page_ii483">483</a>.</li> + </ul> + <ul> + + <li>Valais, i. +<a href="#page_i392">392</a>; ii. + <a href="#page_i214">214</a>.</li> + + <li>Valeggio, i. + <a href="#page_i101">101</a>.</li> + + <li>Valençay, Treaty of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii379">379</a>.</li> + + <li>Valence, i. + <a href="#page_i14">14-16</a>, + <a href="#page_i18">18</a>.</li> + + <li>Valenza, i. + <a href="#page_i88">88</a>, + <a href="#page_i89">89</a>, + <a href="#page_i92">82</a>.</li> + + <li>Valetta, i. + <a href="#page_i110">110</a>.</li> + + <li>Valteline, i. + <a href="#page_i152">152</a>.</li> + + <li>Valutino, battle of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii253">253</a>.</li> + + <li>Vandamme, ii. + <a href="#page_ii39">39-40</a>, + <a href="#page_ii41">41</a>, + <a href="#page_ii296">296</a>, + <a href="#page_ii332">332-333</a>, + <a href="#page_ii342">342</a>, + <a href="#page_ii344">344</a>, + <a href="#page_ii346">346-349</a>, + <a href="#page_ii408">408</a>, + <a href="#page_ii454">454</a>, + <a href="#page_ii460">460</a>, + <a href="#page_ii463">463</a>, + <a href="#page_ii469">469</a>, + <a href="#page_ii470">470</a>.</li> + + <li>Vandeleur, ii. + <a href="#page_ii498">498</a>, + <a href="#page_ii504">504</a>, + <a href="#page_ii508">508</a>.</li> + + <li>Van Diemen's Land, i. + <a href="#page_i379">379-382</a>.</li> + + <li>Vaubois, i. + <a href="#page_i122">122</a>, + <a href="#page_i127">127</a>.</li> + + <li>Vauchamps, battle of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii394">394</a>.</li> + + <li>Vaud, i. + <a href="#page_i180">180</a>, + <a href="#page_i397">397</a>.</li> + + <li>Vendée, La, i. + <a href="#page_i47">47</a>, + <a href="#page_i61">61</a>, + <a href="#page_i64">64</a>, + <a href="#page_i65">65</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii268">268</a>, + <a href="#page_ii449">449</a>.</li> + + <li>Vendémiaire, the affair of, i. + <a href="#page_i68">68-73</a>.</li> + + <li>Vendetta, i. + <a href="#page_i3">3</a>, + <a href="#page_i4">4</a>.</li> + + <li>Venetia, ii. + <a href="#page_ii45">45-48</a>, + <a href="#page_ii438">438</a>.</li> + + <li>Venice, i. + <a href="#page_i101">101</a>, + <a href="#page_i142">142</a>, + <a href="#page_i168">168-172</a>.</li> + + <li>Verdier, i. + <a href="#page_i111">111</a>, + <a href="#page_i115">115</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii120">120</a>.</li> + + <li>Verling, Dr., ii. + <a href="#page_ii565">565</a>.</li> + + <li>Verona, i. + <a href="#page_i122">122</a>, + <a href="#page_i124">124</a>, + <a href="#page_i144">144</a>, + <a href="#page_i145">145</a>.</li> + + <li>Viasma, battle of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii260">260</a>.</li> + + <li>Vicenza, i. + <a href="#page_i126">126</a>.</li> + + <li>Victor, Gen., i. + <a href="#page_i52">51</a>, + <a href="#page_i138">138</a>, + <a href="#page_i369">369</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii120">120-122</a>, + <a href="#page_ii198">198</a>, + <a href="#page_ii254">254</a>, + <a href="#page_ii264">264</a>, + <a href="#page_ii266">266</a>, + <a href="#page_ii332">332</a>, + <a href="#page_ii345">345</a>, + <a href="#page_ii362">362</a>, + <a href="#page_ii381">381</a>, + <a href="#page_ii396">396</a>, + <a href="#page_ii397">397</a>, + <a href="#page_ii404">404</a>, + <a href="#page_ii407">407</a>, + <a href="#page_ii408">408</a>, + <a href="#page_ii431">431</a>, + <a href="#page_ii454">454</a>.</li> + + <li>Victor Amadeus III., i. + <a href="#page_i78">78</a>.</li> + + <li>Vienna, Congress of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii437">437-439</a>, + <a href="#page_ii453">453</a>.</li> + + <li>Villeneuve, i. + <a href="#page_i490">490-493</a>, + <a href="#page_i495">495-503</a>, + <a href="#page_i506">506</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii12">12</a>, + <a href="#page_ii26">26-27</a>.</li> + + <li>Vimiero, battle of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii172">172</a>.</li> + + <li>Vincent, Baron, ii. + <a href="#page_ii181">181</a>.</li> + + <li>Visconti, i. + <a href="#page_i151">151</a>.</li> + + <li>Vitrolles, Count de; ii. + <a href="#page_ii413">413</a>, + <a href="#page_ii419">419</a>.</li> + + <li>Vittoria, battle of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii308">308-313</a>.</li> + + <li>Vivian, Sir Hussey, ii. + <a href="#page_ii457">457</a>, + <a href="#page_ii482">482</a>, + <a href="#page_ii491">491</a>, + <a href="#page_ii508">508</a>.</li> + + <li>Volney, i. + <a href="#page_i75">75</a>, + <a href="#page_i182">182</a>, + <a href="#page_i206">206</a>, + <a href="#page_i484">484</a>.</li> + + <li>Voltaire, i. + <a href="#page_i21">21</a>, + <a href="#page_i25">25-27</a>; +ii. + <a href="#page_ii179">179</a>, + <a href="#page_ii567">567</a>.</li> + + <li>Voltri, i. + <a href="#page_i82">82</a>, + <a href="#page_i83">83</a>.</li> + + <li>Voss, Countess von, ii. + <a href="#page_ii132">132-133</a>.</li> + </ul> + <ul> + <li>Wagram, battle of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii195">195-197</a>.</li> + + <li>Walcheren, expedition of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii200">200</a>.</li> + + <li>Walewska, Countess of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii111">111</a>, + <a href="#page_ii436">436</a>.</li> + + <li>Walmoden, Gen., ii. + <a href="#page_ii352">352</a>.</li> + + <li>Walpole, Lord, ii. + <a href="#page_ii272">272</a>, + <a href="#page_ii283">283</a>.</li> + + <li>Warden, Surgeon, ii. + <a href="#page_ii534">534</a>.</li> + + <li>Warren, Admiral, i. + <a href="#page_i406">406</a>, + <a href="#page_i410">410</a>, + <a href="#page_i423">423</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii81">81</a>.</li> + + <li>Warsaw, Duchy of, ii. + <a href="#page_ii134">134</a>, + <a href="#page_ii411">411</a>.</li> + + <li>Waterloo, the position at, ii. + <a href="#page_ii490">490-492</a>.</li> + + <li>Wavre, movement on, ii. + <a href="#page_ii488">488</a>.</li> + + <li>Wellesley, Marquis, i. + <a href="#page_i373">373</a>, + <a href="#page_i377">377-379</a>, + <a href="#page_i440">440</a>.</li> + + <li>Wellesley, Sir Arthur. <i>See</i> Wellington. + + <li>Wellington, i. + <a href="#page_i332">332</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii143">143</a>, + <a href="#page_ii171">171-172</a>, + <a href="#page_ii194">194-197</a>, + <a href="#page_ii209">209</a>, + <a href="#page_ii229">229</a>, + <a href="#page_ii256">256</a>, + <a href="#page_ii299">299</a>, + <a href="#page_ii301">301-304</a>, + <a href="#page_ii306">306</a>, + <a href="#page_ii364">364</a>, + <a href="#page_ii368">368</a>, + <a href="#page_ii378">378-349</a>, + <a href="#page_ii414">414-415</a>, + <a href="#page_ii418">418</a>, + <a href="#page_ii429">427</a>, + <a href="#page_ii437">437</a>, + <a href="#page_ii439">439</a>, + <a href="#page_ii446">446</a>, + <a href="#page_ii456">456</a>, + <a href="#page_ii460">460</a>, + <a href="#page_ii464">464</a>, + <a href="#page_ii473">473-475</a>, + <a href="#page_ii481">481</a>, + <a href="#page_ii489">489</a>, + <a href="#page_ii499">499</a>, + <a href="#page_ii501">501</a>, + <a href="#page_ii504">504</a>, + <a href="#page_ii506">506-511</a>, + <a href="#page_ii516">516</a>, + <a href="#page_ii537">537-538</a>, + <a href="#page_ii548">548</a>, + <a href="#page_ii573">573</a>.</li> + + <li>Wertingen, ii. + <a href="#page_ii21">21</a>.</li> + + <li>Wessenberg, Count, ii. + <a href="#page_ii283">283</a>, + <a href="#page_ii417">417</a>.</li> + + <li>West Indies, i. + <a href="#page_i490">490-492</a>, + <a href="#page_i496">496-499</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii229">229</a>, + <a href="#page_ii390">390</a>.</li> + + <li>West Indies, French, ii. + <a href="#page_ii56">56</a>.</li> + + <li>Westphalia, ii. + <a href="#page_ii134">134</a>, + <a href="#page_ii194">194</a>.</li> + + <li>Weyrother, ii. + <a href="#page_ii36">36</a>.</li> + + <li>Whigs, the, i. + <a href="#page_i22">22</a>, + <a href="#page_i167">167</a>, + <a href="#page_i427">427</a>, + <a href="#page_i452">452</a>, + <a href="#page_i494">494</a>; + ii. + <a href="#page_ii209">209</a>, + <a href="#page_ii447">447</a>, + <a href="#page_ii457">457</a>, + <a href="#page_ii527">527</a>, + <a href="#page_ii559">559</a>.</li> + + <li>Whitbread, Mr., M.P., ii. + <a href="#page_ii447">447</a>.</li> + + <li>Whitworth, Lord, i. + <a href="#page_i403">403-404</a>, + <a href="#page_i415">415-416</a>, + <a href="#page_i418">418-425</a>.</li> + + <li>Wieland, ii. + <a href="#page_ii183">183-184</a>.</li> + + <li>Wilks, Governor, ii + <a href="#page_ii539">539</a>, + <a href="#page_ii545">545</a>, + <a href="#page_ii546">546</a>, + <a href="#page_ii547">547</a>.</li> + + <li>Wilson, Sir R., ii. + <a href="#page_ii258">258</a>, + <a href="#page_ii262">262</a>.</li> + + <li>Windham, i. + <a href="#page_i452">452</a>.</li> + + <li>Winzingerode, ii. + <a href="#page_ii401">401</a>, + <a href="#page_ii405">405-406</a>.</li> + + <li>Wittgenstein, ii. + <a href="#page_ii250">250</a>, + <a href="#page_ii254">254</a>, + <a href="#page_ii287">287-288</a>, + <a href="#page_ii294">294</a>, + <a href="#page_ii335">335</a>, + <a href="#page_ii341">341</a>, + <a href="#page_ii345">345</a>.</li> + +<li>Wrede, ii. +<a href="#page_ii419">419</a>.</li> + +<li>Wright, Capt, i. +<a href="#page_i451">451-452</a>, +<a href="#page_i456">456</a>.</li> + +<li>Würmser, i. +<a href="#page_i105">105-107</a>, +<a href="#page_i110">110-117</a>, +<a href="#page_i127">127</a>, +<a href="#page_i136">136</a>.</li> + +<li>Würtemberg, ii. +<a href="#page_ii46">46</a>, +<a href="#page_ii59">59-60</a>.</li> + +<li>Würzburg, ii. +<a href="#page_ii46">46</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> +<li>Yarmouth, Lord, ii. +<a href="#page_ii72">72</a>, +<a href="#page_ii79">79</a>, +<a href="#page_ii81">81-83</a>, +<a href="#page_ii85">85</a>.</li> + +<li>Yorck, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii270">270</a>, +<a href="#page_ii339">339</a>, +<a href="#page_ii358">358-359</a>, +<a href="#page_ii392">392</a>, +<a href="#page_ii393">393-394</a>, +<a href="#page_ii407">407</a>.</li> + +<li>York, Duke of, i. +<a href="#page_i217">217</a>, +<a href="#page_i261">261</a>.</li> + +<li>Yorke, i. +<a href="#page_i450">450</a>.</li> + +<li>Young Guard, ii. +<a href="#page_ii503">503</a>.</li> +</ul> +<ul> +<li>Zach, i. +<a href="#page_i257">257</a>.</li> + +<li>Ziethen, Gen., ii. +<a href="#page_ii460">460</a>, +<a href="#page_ii461">461</a>, +<a href="#page_ii463">463</a>, +<a href="#page_ii464">464</a>, +<a href="#page_ii505">505</a>, +<a href="#page_ii508">508</a>.</li> + +<li>Znaim, Armistice of, ii. +<a href="#page_ii197">197</a>.</li> + +<li>Zürich, battle of, i. +<a href="#page_i180">180</a>, +<a href="#page_i217">217</a>.</li> +</ul> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<br> +<br> +<br> + + +<h5>CHISWICK PRESS: PRINTED BY CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO.</ +br> TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.</h5> + +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 14300 ***</div> +</body> +</html> + + + diff --git a/14300-h/images/image01.jpg b/14300-h/images/image01.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..7256216 --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image01.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image02.jpg b/14300-h/images/image02.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..a300edc --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image02.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image03.jpg b/14300-h/images/image03.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..43c646f --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image03.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image04.jpg b/14300-h/images/image04.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..33e559f --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image04.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image05.jpg b/14300-h/images/image05.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..43317f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image05.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image06.jpg b/14300-h/images/image06.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce27fc9 --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image06.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image07.jpg b/14300-h/images/image07.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..8be0f97 --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image07.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image08.jpg b/14300-h/images/image08.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..6c92f42 --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image08.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image09.jpg b/14300-h/images/image09.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..321e30a --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image09.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image10.jpg b/14300-h/images/image10.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..829acce --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image10.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image11.jpg b/14300-h/images/image11.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..7be1746 --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image11.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image12.jpg b/14300-h/images/image12.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..b71866e --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image12.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image13.jpg b/14300-h/images/image13.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..fdc81e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image13.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image14.jpg b/14300-h/images/image14.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..8cece13 --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image14.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image15.jpg b/14300-h/images/image15.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef6a220 --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image15.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image16.jpg b/14300-h/images/image16.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..28d950c --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image16.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image17.jpg b/14300-h/images/image17.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..46d705e --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image17.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image18.jpg b/14300-h/images/image18.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..1207606 --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image18.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image19.jpg b/14300-h/images/image19.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..14961f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image19.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image20.jpg b/14300-h/images/image20.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..b50cc30 --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image20.jpg diff --git a/14300-h/images/image21.jpg b/14300-h/images/image21.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..d947a32 --- /dev/null +++ b/14300-h/images/image21.jpg |
