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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/14120-0.txt b/14120-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..945f577 --- /dev/null +++ b/14120-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1784 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 14120 *** +Attributed to Matthew Turner (d. 1788?) and William Hammon. + +Transcribed by the Freethought Archives + +NOTE: Irregularities in orthography and punctuation have been +reproduced without emendation from the first edition of 1782. + + + + + + +ANSWER TO DR. PRIESTLEY'S LETTERS TO A PHILOSOPHICAL UNBELIEVER. + +PART I. + + + +LONDON. +MDCCLXXXII + + + + + +ADVERTISEMENT. + + +The Editor of this publication has more in object to answer Dr. Priestley +than to deliver his own sentiments upon Natural Religion, which however +he has no inclination to disguise: but he does not mean to be answerable +for them farther, than as by reason and nature he is at present +instructed. The question here handled is not so much, whether a +Deity and his attributed excellences exist, as whether there is any +Natural or Moral proof of his existence and of those attributes. +Revealed knowledge is not descanted upon; therefore Christians at least +need take no offence. Doubts upon Natural Religion have not hitherto +been looked upon as attacks upon Revelation, but rather as corroborations +of it. What the Editor believes as a Christian (if he is one is +therefore another affair, nor does he reckon himself so infallible or +incapable of alteration in his sentiments, as not at another time to +adopt different ones upon more reflexion and better information; +therefore, though he has at present little or no doubt of what he +asserts (taken upon the principles laid down) he shall hold himself +totally freed from any necessity of defending the contents of this +publication if brought into controversy; and as he has no desire of +making converts, hopes he shall not himself be marked out as an object +of persecution. + +Speculative points have always been esteemed fair matters for a free +discussion. The religion established in this country is not the +religion of Nature, but the religion of Moses and Jesus, with whom the +writer has nothing to do. He trusts therefore he shall not be received +as a malevolent disturber of such common opinions as are esteemed to +keep in order a set of low wretches so inclinable to be lawless. At +least, if he attempts to substitute better foundations for morality, +malevolence can be no just charge. Truth is his aim; and no professors +of religion will allow their system to be false. Or if he should be +thought too bold a speculator, such of the ecclesiastics as will be his +opponents may rather laugh at him than fear him. They have a thousand +ways of making their sentiments go down with the bulk of mankind, to +one this poor writer has. They are an army ready marshalled for the +support of their own thesis; they are in the habit of controversy; +pulpits are open to them as well as the press; and while the present +author will be looked upon as a miracle of hardiness for daring to put +his name to what he publishes, they can without fear or imputation lift +up their heads; and should they even be known to transgress the bounds +of good sense or politeness, they will only be esteemed as more zealous +labourers in their own vocation. + + + + + +PREFATORY ADDRESS. + + +Dr. Priestley, + +Your Letters addressed to a Philosophical Unbeliever I perused, not +because I was a Philosopher or an Unbeliever; it were presumption to +give myself the former title, and at that time I certainly did not +deserve the latter; but as I was acquainted with another, who in +reality, as far as I and others who know him can judge, deserves the +title of a Philosopher and is neither ashamed nor afraid of that of an +Unbeliever, I conceived them apt to be sent to my friend, and when I +presented them to him, he said he was the person whom he should suppose +you meant to address, if you had a particular person in view; but he +had too much understanding of the world, though much abstracted from +the dregs of it, not to conceive it more probable that you meant your +Letters to be perused by thinking men in general, Believers and +Unbelievers, to confirm the former in their creed, and to convert the +latter from their error. You shall speedily know the effect they have +had in both ways. For myself I must inform you that I was brought up a +Believer from my infancy; a Theist, if a Christian is such; for I +suppose the word will be allowed, though the equivalent term of Deist +is so generally reprobated by Christians; I had before my eyes the +example of a most amiable parent; a moral man, a Christian undoubtedly; +who, when I have been attending upon him, as much from affection as +from duty upon a sick and nearly dying bed, has prayed I might be +stedfast in the faith he held, in accents still sounding in my +intellectual ear; a parent, whom for his virtues and love of his +offspring, like a Chinese, I am tempted to worship, and I could exclaim +with the first of poets, + + _"Erit ille mihi semper Deus."_ + +With such habits of education then, such fervent advice and such +reverence for my instructor, what can have turned me from my belief; +for I confess I am turned? Immorallity it is not; that I assert has not +preceded my unbelief, and I trust never will follow it; there has not +indeed yet been time for it to follow; whether it is a probable +consequence will presently be discussed; but it is _thought_, free +thought upon the subject; when I began freely to think I proceeded +boldly to doubt; your Letters gave me the cause for thinking, and my +scepticism was exchanged for conviction; not entirely by the perusal of +your Letters; for I do not think they would quite have made me an +Atheist! but by attention to that answer from my friend, which I have +his permission to subjoin. + +In mentioning that doubts arose by reading your very Letters, which +were written to eradicate all doubts, let me not accuse you of being +unequal to the task assumed. I mean no such charge. You have in my +opinion been fully equal to the discussion, and have bandied the +argument ably, pleasingly and politely. I am certain from the extracts +you have made from Dr. Clarke, the first of other Divines, I should +have been converted from my superstition by his reasoning, even without +perusal of an answer: I pay you however the compliment of having only +brought me to doubt, and I find I am not the only person who have been +led to disbelieve by reading books expressly written to confirm the +Believer. Stackhouse's Comment upon the Bible, and Leland's View of +Deistical Writers have perhaps made as many renegado's in this country +as all the allurements of Mahometanism has in others. What can be said +to this? They were both undoubtedly men of abilities, and meant well to +the cause they had to support. All that I shall observe upon the matter +is, that what cannot bear discussion cannot be true. Reasoning in other +sciences is the way to arrive at truth: the learned for a while may +differ, but argument at last finds its force, and the controversy +usually ends in general conviction. Reasoning upon the science of +divinity will equally have its weight, and all men of letters would +long ago have got rid of all superstitious notions of a Deity, but that +men of letters are frequently men of weak nerves; such as Dr. Johnson +is well known to be, that great triumph to religionists; it requires +courage as well as sense to break the shackles of a pious education; +but if merely a resolve to reason upon their force can break them, what +can we observe in conclusion but + + _"Magnus est veritas et prevalebit."_ + +That religion or belief of a Deity cannot bear the force of argument is +well known by Divines in general, is manifest by their annexing an idea +of reproach to the very term of arguing upon the subject. These arguers +they call Free-thinkers, and this appellation has obtained, in the +understanding of pious believers, the most odious disgrace. Yet we +cannot argue without thinking; nor can we either think or argue to any +purpose without freedom. Therefore free-thinking, so far from being a +disgrace, is a virtue, a most commendable quality. How absurd, and how +cruel it is in the professors of divinity, to address the understanding +of men on the subject of their belief, and to upbraid those very men +who shall exercise their understanding in attending to their arguments! +No tyranny is greater than that of ecclesiastics. These chain down our +very ideas, other tyrants only confine our limbs. They invite us to the +argument, yet damn us to eternal punishment for the use of reason on +the subject. They give to man an essence distinct from his corporeal +appearance and this they call his soul, a very ray and particle of the +Divine Being; the principal faculty of this soul they allow to be that +of reasoning, and yet they call reason a dark lanthorn, an erroneous +vapour, a false medium, and at last the very instrument of another +fancied Being of their own to lead men into their own destruction. +_"In the image of himself made he man."_ A favourite text with +theologians; but surely they do not mean that this God Almighty of +theirs has got a face and person like a man. No; that they exclaim +against, and, when we push them for the resemblance, they confess +it is in the use of reason; it is in the soul. + +I am aware that I am not here to mix questions of Christianity with the +general question of a Divinity; subjects of a very distinct enquiry, +and which in the Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever are very +carefully separated. The subject of revelation is indeed promised +afterwards to be taken up, provided the argument in favour of Natural +Religion meets with a good reception. How, Dr. Priestley, you can judge +of that reception I am at a loss to know, otherwise than by the number +of editions you publish. It is then in the sum total just as much as if +you had said, "provided this book sells well I will write another." Yet +it may be sold to many such readers as I have been, though you will +hardly call such reception good. You that have wrote so much, to whom +it is so easy to write more, who profess a belief of revelation, such a +laborious enquirer, and so great a master of the art of reasoning, +should rather have engaged at once to prove in a subsequent publication +the truth of revealed religion in arguments, as candid and as fairly +drawn as those you have used in proof of a Deity independent of +revelation. Different as I am in qualifications from you, not very +learned, far from industrious, unused to publish, I do now promise +that when you shall have brought into light your intended letters in +behalf of revelation I will answer them. I hope you will take it as an +encouragement to write that you are sure you shall have an answer. I +mean you should, and I am sure I shall think myself greatly honoured if +you will descend so far as to reply to my present answer. I know you +have been used in controversies to have the last word, and in this I +shall not baulk your ambition; for notwithstanding any defect of my +plea in favour of atheism I mean to join issue upon your replication, +and by no means, according to the practice and language of the lawyers, +to put in a rejoinder. Should your arguments be defectively answered by +me, should your learning and your reasoning be more conspicuous than +mine, I shall bear your triumph without repining. + +I declare I am rather pleased there are so few atheists than at all +anxious to make more. I triumph in my superior light. I am like the Jew +or the Bramin who equally think themselves privileged in their superior +knowledge of the Deity. With me and with my friend the comparison holds +by way of contrast, for we are so proud in our singularity of being +atheists that we will hardly open our lips in company, when the +question is started for fear of making converts, and so lessening our +own enjoyment by a numerous division of our privilege with others. It +has indeed often been disputed, whether there is or ever was such a +character in the world as an atheist. That it should be disputed is to +me no wonder. Every thing may be, and almost every thing has been +disputed. There are few or none who will venture openly to acknowledge +themselves to be atheists. I know none among my acquaintance, except +that one friend, to whom as a Philosophical Unbeliever I presented your +Letters, and to whose answer I only mean this address as an +introduction. I shall therefore not enter here into the main argument +of Deity or no Deity. My address is only preliminary to the subject; +but I do not therefore think myself precluded from entering into some +considerations that may be thought incidental to it. I mean such +considerations as whether immorality, unhappiness or timidity +necessarily do or naturally ought to ensue from a system of atheism. +But as to the question whether there is such an existent Being as an +atheist, to put that out of all manner of doubt, I do declare upon my +honour that I am one. Be it therefore for the future remembered, that +in London in the kingdom of England, in the year of our Lord one +thousand seven hundred and eighty-one, a man has publickly declared +himself an atheist. When my friend returned me your Letters, addressing +me with a grave face he said, "I hope, if you have any doubts, these +Letters will have as good effect upon you as they have had upon me." +My countenance brightened up and I replied, "You are then, my friend, +convinced ?" "Yes, he said, I am convinced; that is, I am most +thoroughly convinced there is no such thing as a God." Behold then, +if we are to be believed, two atheists instead of one. + +Another question has been raised "whether a society of atheists can +exist?" In other words "whether honesty sufficient for the purposes +of civil society can be insured by other motives than the belief of +a Deity?" Bayle has handled that question well. [Footnote: _Pensees +sur la Comete_.] Few who know how to reason (and it is in vain to speak +or think of those who lay reason out of the case) can fail to be convinced +by the arguments of Bayle. I shall discuss the question no farther +than as it is necessarily included in the discussion of some of those +supposed results of atheism, such as I have before mentioned in the +instances of immorality, unhappiness and timidity. In my argument +upon this subject I shall carefully avoid all abuse and ridicule. +Controversies are apt to be acrimonious. You, Sir, have certainly shewn +instances to the contrary. You have charity beyond your fellows in the +ecclesiastical line, and your answerers seem not to me to have a right +in fair argument to step out of the limits you have prescribed +yourself. To dispute with you is a pleasure equal almost to that of +agreeing with another person. You have candour enough to allow it +possible that an atheist may be a moral man. Where is that other +ecclesiastic who will allow the same? Your answerers ought also to +hold themselves precluded from using ridicule in handling this subject. +I am no great supporter of Lord Shaftesbury's doctrine that ridicule +is the test of truth. I own truth can never be ridiculous, that is, +it can never be worthy of laughter, but still it may be laughed at. +To use the other term, I may say, truth can never be worthy of ridicule, +but still it may be ridiculed. Just ridicule is a sufficient test +of truth; but after all we should be driven to an inquiry, upon +the principles of reasoning, whether the ridicule were just or not. +Boldness, which is not incompatible with decency and candour, I do +hold to be an absolute requisite in all speech and argument, where +truth is the object of inquiry. Therefore when I am asked, whether +there is a God or no God, I do not mince the matter, but I boldly +answer there is none, and give my reason for my disbelief; for I +adopt my friend's answer by the publication of it. + +That mischief may ensue to society by such freedom of discussion is +also another argument for me to consider; I do not say to combat, for +though I were convinced or could not resist the argument that mischief +would ensue to society by such a discussion, yet I should think myself +intitled to enter into it. I have a right to truth, and to publish +truth, let society suffer or not suffer by it. That society which +suffers by truth should be otherwise constituted; and as I cannot well +think that truth will hurt any society rightly constituted, so I should +rather be inclined to doubt the force of the argument in case atheism +being found to be truth should apparently be proved prejudicial to such +a society. + +I come unprejudiced to the question, and when I have promised you an +answer to your future Letters in support of revelation, I have neither +anticipated your argument nor prejudged the cause. I hold myself open +to be convinced, and if I am convinced I shall say so, which is equally +answering as if I denied the force of your observations. In that sense +only I promise an answer. If I believe I shall say, I do; but I shall +not believe and tremble, confident as I am, that if I act an honest +part in life, whether there be a Deity and a future existence or not, +whatever reason I may have to rejoice in case such ideas be realised, I +can upon such an issue have none to tremble. I look upon myself to have +more reason to be temporally afraid than eternally so. Dr. Priestley or +any other Doctor can put his name boldly to a book in favour of Theism, +loudly call the supporters of a contrary doctrine to the argument, and +if no answer is produced, assert their own reasoning to be unanswerable. +In that sense their sort of reasoning has been frequently unanswerable. +Here however is an instance of a poor unknown individual, making +experience of the candour of the ecclesiastics and the equity of +the laws of England, for he ventures to subscribe his publication with +his name as well as Dr. Priestley does his Letters, to which this +publication is an answer. Perhaps he may have cause to repent of his +hardiness, but if he has, he is equally resolved to glory in his +martyrdom, as to suffer it. Whatever advantage religion has had in the +enumeration of it's martyrs, the cause of atheism may boast the same. +As to the instances of the professors of any particular form of +religion, or modification of that form, such as Christians or sects of +Christians, suffering martyrdom for their belief, I shall no more allow +them to be martyrs for theism than Pagans similarly suffering for their +belief, shall I call martyrs for atheism. Theism very likely has had +it's martyrs. I can instance one I think in Socrates, and I shall +mention Vanini as a martyr for atheism. The conduct of those two great +men in their last moments may be worth attending to. The variety of +other poor heretical wretches, who have been immolated at the shrine of +absurdity for all the possible errors of human credence, let them have +their legendary fame. I put them out of the scale in this important +inquiry. + +Not that I really think the argument to be much advanced by naming the +great supporters of one opinion or of another. In mathematics, +mechanics, natural philosophy, in literature, taste, and politics the +sentiments of great men of great genius are certainly of weight. There +are some subjects capable of demonstration, many indeed which the +ingenuity of one man can go farther to illustrate than that of another. +The force of high authority is greater in the three former sciences +than in the latter. Theism and Atheism I hold to be neither of them +strictly demonstrable. You, Dr. Priestley, agree with me in that. Still +I hold the question capable of being illustrated by argument, and I +should hold the authority of great men's names to be of more weight in +this subject, were I not necessarily forced to consider that all +education is strongly calculated to support the idea of a Deity; by +this education prejudice is introduced, and prejudice is nothing else +than a corruption of the understanding. Certain principles, call them, +if you please, data, must be agreed upon before any reasoning can take +place. Disputants must at least agree in the ideas which they annex to +the language they use. But when prejudice has made a stand, +argumentation is set at so wide a distance, through a want of fixt data +to proceed upon, that attention is in vain applied to the dispute. +Besides, the nature of the subject upon which this prejudice takes +place, is such, that the finest genius is nearly equally liable to an +undue bias with the most vulgar. To question with boldness and +indifference, whether an individual, all-forming, all-seeing and +all-governing Being exists, to whom, if he exists, we may possibly be +responsible for our actions, whose intelligence and power must be +infinitely superior to our own, requires a great conquest of former +habitude, a firmness of nerves, as well as of understanding; it will +therefore be no great wonder, if such men as Locke and Newton can be +named among the believers in a Deity. They were christians as well as +theists, so that their authority goes as far in one respect as in the +other. But if the opinions of men of great genius are to have weight, +what is to be said of modern men of genius? You, Sir, are of opinion +that the world is getting wiser as well as better. There is all the +reason in the world it should get wiser at least, since wisdom is only +a collection of experience, and there must be more experience as the +world is older. Modern Philosophers are nearly all atheists. I take the +term atheist here in the popular sense. Hume, Helvetius, Diderot, +D'Alembert. Can they not weigh against Locke and Newton, and even more +than Locke and Newton, since their store of knowledge and learning was +at hand to be added to their own, and among them are those who singly +possessed equal science in mathematics as in metaphysics? It is not +impossible, perhaps not improbable, from his course of learning and +inquiries, that if Dr. Priestley had not from his first initiation into +science been dedicated for what is called the immediate service of God, +he himself might have been one of the greatest disprovers of his +pretended divinity. + +In England you think, Sir, that atheism is not prevalent among men of +free reasoning, though you acknowledge it to be much so in other +countries. It is not the first time it has been observed that the +greater the superstition of the common people the less is that of men +of letters. In the heart of the Papal territories perhaps is the +greatest number of atheists, and in the reformed countries the greatest +number of deists. Yet it is a common observation, especially by +divines, that deism leads to atheism, and I believe the observation is +well founded. I hardly need explain here, that by deism in this sense +is meant a belief in the existence of a Deity from natural and +philosophical principles, and a disbelief in all immediate revelation +by the Deity of his own existence. Such is the force of habit, that it +is by degrees only, that even men of sense and firmness shake off one +prejudice after another. They begin by getting rid of the absurdities +of all popular religions. This leaves them simple deists, but the force +of reasoning next carries them a step farther, and whoever trusts to +this reasoning, devoid of all fear and prejudice, is very likely to end +at last in being an atheist. Nor do I admit it to be an argument either +for Revelation or Natural Religion, that the same turn for speculation +that would convert a christian into a theist, will carry him on to be +an atheist, though I know the argument has been often used. If upon +sick beds or in dying moments men revert to their old weakness and +superstitions, their falling off may afford triumph to religionists; +for my part I care not so much for the opinions of sick and dying men, +as of those who at the time are strong and healthy. But in the opinion +of the one or the other I put no great stress. My faith is in +reasoning, for though ridicule is not a complete test of truth, +reasoning I hold certainly to be so. I own belief may be imprest on the +mind otherwise than by the force of reason. The mind may be diseased. +All I shall say is that though I have formerly believed many things +without reason, and even many against it, as is very common, I hope I +shall never more. My mind (I was going to say, thank God) is sane at +present, and I intend to keep it so. I am aware that at the expression +just used some will exclaim in triumph, that the poor wretch could not +help thinking of his God at the same time he was denying him. The +observation would hold good, if it were not that we often speak and +write unpremeditately and though what is in this manner unpremeditately +expressed upon a revision should be certainly expunged, yet I chuse to +leave the expression to shew the force of habit. + +In fear lies the origin of all fancied deities, whether sole or +numberless. + + _Primus in orbe Deos fecit Timor._ + +But the great debasement of the human mind is evidenced in the instance +of attributing a merit to belief, which has come at last to be stiled a +virtue, and is dignified by the name of faith, that most pitiful of all +human qualities. When the apostle spoke of faith, hope and charity, he +might as well have exclaimed the least of the three is faith, as the +greatest is charity. + +One enthusiast cries out _un Roi_ and another _un Dieu_. The reality of +the king I admit, because I feel his power. Against my feeling and my +experience I cannot argue, for upon these sensations is built all +argument. But not all the wondrous works of the creation, as I hear the +visible operations of nature called, convince me in the least of the +existence of a Deity. By nature I mean to express the whole of what I +see and feel, that whole, I call self-existent from all eternity; I +admit a principle of intelligence and design, but I deny that principle +to be extraneous from itself. My creed in fine is the same with that of +the Roman poet; + + _"Deus est ubicunque movemur."_ + +If then I am admitted to explain my deity in this sense, I am not an +atheist, nor can any one else in the world be such. The _vis naturae_, +the perpetual industry, intelligence and provision of nature must be +apparent to all who see, feel or think. I mean to distinguish this +active, intelligent and designing principle, inherent as much in matter +as the properties of gravity or any elastic, attractive or repulsive +power, from any extraneous foreign force and design in an invisible +agent, supreme though hidden lord and maker over all effects and +appearances that present themselves to us in the course of nature. The +last supposition makes the universe and all other organised matter a +machine made or contrived by the arbitrary will of another Being, which +other Being is called God; and my theory makes a God of this universe, +or admits no other God or designing principle than matter itself and +its various organisations. + +The inquiry is said to be important. But why is it so! All truth is +important. It is a question of little importance, merely whether a man +had a maker or no, although it is of great importance to disprove the +existence of such a Deity as theologians wish to establish, because +appearances in the world go against it. Supposing however that it was +granted, that the question, whether there is a Deity or not, was as +little important as other truths, yet the question becomes important +with this reflexion, that other events may follow as deductions; such +as a particular providence, or a future state of rewards and +punishments; but whether such deductions or either of them necessarily +follow may well be queried. As to a particular providence you give up +the reality of it, and I give it up too. But I cannot give up the +argument, that if there were a God with all his allowed attributes of +wisdom, power and justice, there ought to be a particular providence to +counteract the general laws of nature, in favour of those who defend +the interposition. Though the Deity should not interfere unless there +be a worthy cause, agreeable to the Horation rule, + + _"Nec Deus interfuit nisi vindice nodus;"_ + +Yet surely from the same principles it should follow that the Deity +ought to interfere where there is a worthy cause. Here however arises +another dilemma, for if the Deity has really those attributes of power +and justice, there would never have been occasion for such temperaneous +interpositions. A particular providence must indeed prove one of these +two principles, either that God was imperfect in his design, or that +inert matter is inimical to the properties of God. If that wished for +interposition of the Deity is put off to a future existence, I cannot +help observing, that future day has been already a long while waited +for in vain, and any delay destroys some one attribute or other of the +Deity. He wants justice, or he wants the power, or the will to do good +and be just. That a future state of rewards and punishments may however +exist without a Deity, you, Dr. Priestley, allow to be no impossibility. +It may indeed be argued with apparent justness, that a principle of +reviviscence may as well be admitted as a principle of production in +the first instance: and as to rewards and punishments, judgement may be +rendered, as well as now, by Beings less than Deities. For my part I +firmly wish for such a future state, and though I cannot firmly believe +it, I am resolved to live as if such a state were to ensue. This seems, +I own, like doubting, and doubting may be said to be a miserable state +of anxiety. "Better be confident than unhinged; better confide in +ignorance than have no fixed system." So it may be argued; but I think +the result will be as people feel. Those who do not feel bold enough, +to be satisfied with their own thoughts, may abandon them and adopt the +thoughts of others. For my part I am content with my own; and not the +less so because they do not end in certainty upon matters, from the +nature of them, beyond the complete reach of human intelligence. + +There is nothing in fact important to human nature but happiness, which +is or ought to be the end or aim of our being. I mean self-happiness; +but fortunately for mankind, such is by nature our construction, that +we cannot individually be happy unless we join also in promoting the +happiness of others. Should immorality, timidity or other base +principles arise from atheism it tends immediately, I will own, to the +unhappiness of mankind. If it is asked me, "why am I honest and +honourable?" I answer, because of the satisfaction I have in being so. +"Do all people receive that satisfaction?" No, many who are ill +educated, ill-exampled and perverted, do not. I do, that is enough for +me. In short, I am well constructed, and I feel I can therefore act an +honest and honourable part without any religious motive. Did I +perceive, that belief in a Deity produced morality or inspired courage, +I might be prompted to confess, that the contrary would ensue from +atheism. But the bulk of the world has long believed, or long pretended +to believe in a Deity, yet morality and every commendable quality seem +at a stand. The believer and the unbeliever we often see equally base, +equally immoral. Superstition is certainly only the excess of religion. +That evidently is attended often with immorality and cowardice. I am +tempted to say, from observation, that the belief of a Deity is apt to +drive mankind into vice and baseness; but I check myself in the +assertion, upon considering that very few indeed are those who really +believe in a Deity out of such as pretend to do so. It is impossible +for an intellectual being to believe firmly in that of which he can +give no account, or of which he can form no conception. I hold the +Deity, the fancied Deity, at least, of whom with all his attributes +such pompous descriptions are set forth to the great terror of old +women and the amusement of young children, to be an object of which we +form (as appears when we scrutinise into our ideas) no conception and +therefore can give no account. It is said, after all this, that men do +still believe in such a Deity, I then do say in return, they do not +make use of their intellects. The moment we go into a belief beyond +what we feel, see and understand, we might as well believe in +will-with-a-whisp as in God. But I would fix morality upon a better +basis than belief in a Deity. If it has indeed at present no other +basis, it is not morality, it is selfishness, it is timidity; it is the +hope of reward, it is the dread of punishment. For a great and good +man, shew me one who loves virtue because he finds a pleasure in it, +who has acquired a taste for that pleasure by considering what and +where happiness is, who is not such a fool as to seek misery in +preference to happiness, whose honour is his Deity, whose conscience +is his judge. Put such a man in combat against the superstitious son +of Spain or Portugal, it were easy to say who would shew the truest +courage. The question might be more voluminously discussed, but I feel +already proof of conviction; if you, Dr. Priestley, do not, perhaps +some other readers may. I have nothing to do with men of low minds. +They will always have their religion or pretence of it, but I am +mistaken if it is not the gallows or the pillory that more govern +their morals than the gospel or the pulpit. + +After all, atheism may be a system only for the learned. The ignorant of +all ages have believed in God. The answer of a Philosophical Unbeliever +though written in the vulgar tongue may probably not reach the vulgar. +If argument had prevailed they were long converted from their +superstitious belief. The sentiments of atheistical philosophers have +long been published. If mischief therefore could ensue to society from +such free discussions, that mischief society must long have felt. I +think truth should never be hid, but few are those who mind it. I will +therefore take upon myself but little importance though I have presumed +to preface an answer from a Philosophical Unbeliever to Letters which +you, Dr. Priestley have written. If you deem that answer detrimental to +the interests of society, you will recollect that you invite the +proposal of objections and promise to answer all as well as you can. If +you should happen to be exasperated by the freedom of the language or +the contrariety of the sentiment, this answer will gain weight in +proportion as you lose in the credit of a tolerant Divine. Therefore if +you reply at all, reply with candour and with coolness; heed the matter +and not the man, though I subscribe my name, and am + + Reverend Sir, + Your friend, admirer, and humble servant, + WILLIAM HAMMON. + +_Oxford-Street, No._ 418. +_Jan._ 1, 1782. + + + + + + + ANSWER FROM A PHILOSOPHICAL UNBELIEVER. + + +It is the general fashion to believe in a God, the maker of all things, +or at least to pretend to such a belief, to define the nature of this +existing Deity by the attributes which are given to him, to place the +foundation of morality on this belief, and in idea at least, to connect +the welfare of civil society with the acknowledgement of such a Being. +Few however are those, who being questioned can give any tolerable +grounds for their assertions upon this subject, and hardly any two +among the learned agree in their manner of proving what each will +separately hold to be indisputably clear. The attributes of a Deity are +more generally agreed upon, though less the subject of proof, than his +existence. As to morality, those very people who are moral will not +deny, they would be so though there were not a God, and there never yet +has been a civil lawgiver, who left crimes to be punished by the author +of the universe; not even the profanation of oaths upon the sacredness +of which so much is built in society, and which yet is said to be a +more immediate offence against the Deity than any other that can be +named. + +The method which Dr. Priestley has taken to prove the existence of +a God, is by arguing from _effect_ to _cause_. He explodes that other +pretended proof _a priori_ which has so much raised the fame of +Dr. Clarke among other theologians. As to the attributes of the Deity, +Dr. Priestley is not quite so confident in his proofs there; and the +most amiable one, the most by mortals to be wished for, the _benevolence_ +of God he almost gives up, or owns at least there is not so much proof +of it as of his other attributes. His observations are divided into +several Letters, this is one answer given to the whole; for it would be +to no purpose to reply to topics upon which the writers are agreed. +What therefore is not contradicted here, Dr. Priestley may in general +take to be allowed; but to obviate doubts and to allow his argument +every force, it may be fairer perhaps to recite at full length what in +this answer is allowed to be true, what is denied as false, what meant +to be exposed as absurd, and what rejected as assertions without proof, +inadmissible or inconclusive. The conclusion will contain some +observations upon the whole. + + + TRUISMS. + + 1. "Effects have their adequate causes." + + 2. "Nothing begins to exist without a cause foreign to itself." + + 3. "No being could make himself, for that would imply that he + existed and did not exist at the same time." + + 4. If one horse, or one tree, had a cause, all had." + + 5. Something must have existed from all eternity. + + 6. "Atoms cannot be arranged, in a manner expressive of the most + exquisite design, without competent intelligence having existed + somewhere." + + 7. "The idea of a supreme author is more pleasing to a virtuous + mind, than that of a blind fate and fatherless deserted world." + + 8. "The condition of mankind is in a state of melioration, as far as + misery arises from ignorance, for as the world grows older it must + grow wiser, if wisdom arises from experience." + + 9. "All moral virtue is only a modification of benevolence." + + 10. "Virtue gives a better chance for happiness than vice." + + 11. "No instance of any revival." + + 12. "Atheists are not to think themselves quite secure with respect + to a future life." + + 13. "Thought might as well depend upon the construction of the + brain, as upon any invisible substance extraneous to the brain." + + 14. "If the works of God had a beginning, there must have been a + time when he was inactive." + + 15. "Where happiness is wanting in the creation I would rather + conclude the author had mist of his design than that he wanted + benevolence." + + + FALSE ASSERTIONS. + + 1. "A cause needs not be prior to an effect." + + 2. "If the species of man had no beginning, it would not follow that + it had no cause." + + 3. "A cause may be cotemporary with the effect." + + 4. "An atheist must believe he was introduced into the world without + design." + + + ABSURDITIES. + + 1. "A general mass of sensation consisting of various elements + borrowed from the past and the future." + + 2. "Since sensation is made up of past, present, and future, the + infant feeling for the moment only, the man recollecting what is + past and anticipating the future, and as the present sensation must + therefore in time bear a less proportion to the general mass of + sensation than it did, so at last all temporary affections, whether + of pain or pleasure become wholly inconsiderable." + + 3. "The great book of nature and the book of revelation both lie + open before us." + + 4. "A conclusion above our comprehension." + + 5. "A whole eternity already past." + + 6. "Since a finite Being cannot be infinitely happy, because he must + then be infinite in knowledge and power; and as all limitation of + happiness must consist in degree of happiness or mixture of misery, + the Deity can alone determine which mode of limitation is best." + + 7. "We have reason to be thankful for our pains and distress." + + 8. "If the divine Being had made man at first as happy as he can be + after all the feelings and ideas of a painful and laborious life, it + must have been in violation of all general laws and by a constant + and momentary interference of the Deity." + + 9. "It is better the divine agency should not be very conspicuous." + + 10. "If good prevails on the whole, creation being infinite, + happiness must be infinite, and God comprehending the whole, will + only perceive the balance of good, and that will be happiness + unmixed with misery." + + 11. "If a man is happy in the whole he is infinitely happy in the + whole of his existence." + + 12. "Although all things fall alike to all men and no distinction is + made between the righteous and the wicked, and even though the + wicked derive an advantage from their vices, yet this is consistent + with a state of moral government by a Being of infinite wisdom and + power." + + 13. "As ploughing is the means of having a harvest, though God has + predetermined whether there should be a harvest or not, so prayer is + the means of obtaining good from God, although that good is + predetermined upon; it is therefore no more absurd to pray than to + plough." + + 14. "Notwithstanding happiness is the necessary consequence of + health, yet man's happiness is more from intellectual than corporeal + feelings." + + 15. "Evil is necessarily connected with and subservient to good, + although in the next world there will be all good and no evil." + + 16. "By reason we can discover the necessary existence of a Deity, + yet to be a sceptic on that subject is the first step to be a + Christian, because reason not sufficiently proving it we fly to + revealed truth." + + 17. "The power, which a man has by the comprehensiveness of his mind + to enjoy the future, has no apparent limits." + + 18. "It is of no avail in the argument concerning the existence of a + Deity, that we have no conception of him, since it does not imply + impossibility of his existence that we have no idea at all upon the + subject." + + + INADMISSIBLE OR INCONCLUSIVE. + + 1. "The question of the existence of a Deity is important." + + 2. "A Theist has a higher sense of personal dignity than an + atheist." + + 3. "The conduct of an atheist must give concern to those who are not + so." + + 4. "An atheist believes himself to be, at his death, for ever + excluded from returning life." + + 5. "There are more atheists than unbelievers in revelation." + + 6. "Men of letters may have the same bias to incredulity as others + to credulity, because they are subject to a wrong association of + ideas, as well as other persons though in a less degree." + + 7. "Whoever first made a thing, for example a chair or a table, must + have had an adequate idea of it's nature and use." + + 8. "If a table had a designing cause, the tree from whence the wood + came, and the man who made the table must have had a designing + cause, which comprehended all the powers and properties of trees and + men." + + 9. "All the visible universe, as far as we can judge, bears the + marks of being one work, and therefore must have had a cause of + infinite power and intelligence." + + 10. "We might as well say a table had no cause, as that the world + had none." + + 11. "A Being originally and necessarily capable of comprehending + itself, it is not improper to call infinite, for we can have no idea + of any bounds to it's knowledge or power." + + 12. "A series of finite causes cannot possibly be carried back + _ad infinitum_." + + 13. "Our imagination revolts at the idea of an intellectual soul of + the universe, that is, of an intelligence resulting from + arrangement." + + 14. "The actual existence of the universe compels us to come at last + to an _originally existent and intellectual Being_, because if the + immediate maker of the universe has not existed from all eternity, + he must have derived his being and senses from one who has, and that + being we call God." + + 15. "God must be present to all his works, if we admit no power can + act but where it is, he must therefore exist every where, because + his works are every where." + + 16. "As no being can unmake or materially change himself (at least + none can annihilate himself) so God is unchangeable, for no Being + God made can change him and no other Being can exist but what God + made." + + 17. "Two infinite intelligent beings of the same kind would + coincide, therefore there can only be one God." + + 18. "Nothing can be more evident, than that plants and animals could + not have proceeded from each other from all eternity." + + 19. "That happiness is the design of the creation because health is + designed and sickness is only an exception, not a general rule is as + evident as that the design of the Mill-wright must have been, that + his machine should not be obstructed." + + 20. "As a state of sickness is comparatively rare with a state of + health, happiness the result of health, and the end of the creation + happiness, so the end of the creation is already in a great measure + answered." + + 21. "Pleasure tends to continue and propagate itself, pain to check + and exterminate itself." + + 22. "As our knowledge and power in respect to shunning pains and + procuring pleasures advance with our experience, nothing is wanting + to enable us to exterminate all pains, but a continuance of being. + + 23. "Our enjoyments continually increase in real value from infancy + to old age." + + 24. "A future moral distribution is probable, because God is + infinitely powerful and wise." + + 25. "Since reverence, gratitude, obedience, confidence are duties to + men, so they are to God; and as we pray to men, so we should pray to + God." + + 26. "Prescience, predetermination and infinite benevolence are no + argument against prayer to the Deity." + + 27. "A wish produced by nature is evidence of the thing wished for, + but a future state is wished for, therefore there is evidence of a + future state." + + 28. "As we have no idea how we came originally to be produced, for + what we know to the contrary our reproduction may be as much the + course of nature as our original production.." + + 29. "A gloom and melancholy belong more to atheists than to devout + people." + + + + + +OBSERVATIONS. + + +Dr. Priestley will hardly doubt, after this collection from his work +that it has at least been read before it is attempted to be answered. +It is in the writer's power to quote the page and line for each +assertion, but it would be stuffing this publication with unnecessary +references. Dr. Priestley will be able to know what are his own +sentiments and what not without recurring to his printed Letters. +There has been also another difficulty in classing the several exceptions +under the different heads; what is false, what is absurd, and what is +inadmissible bordering so nearly on each other. Nice distinctions +cannot in such respect be made, but the whole together form the main +argument which is to be answered. + +The first and principal assertion is, that effects have their adequate +cause; it is then added, that the universe is an effect, that it +therefore must have a cause, and to this cause in the English language +is given the name of God. This proposition is true, provided the +universe is an effect, but that is a _postulatum_ without concession +and without a proof. This _original Being_ he advances in another place +to be that only something which existed uncaused from all eternity, and +which could not have been a Being, like a man or a table, incapable of +comprehending, itself, for such existences would require another +superior Being. But if the universe is not adopted as an effect, if +it is taken as existing from all eternity, the universe becomes an +intelligent Being, and there or no where is the Deity sought after. +Such a Being we may properly speak of and reason upon. The whole is +subjected to our sensations and our experience. But of his own +_uncaused Being_ Dr. P. says we cannot properly speak. Is not that +alone an argument of there being no such thing? His friend Dr. Clarke +says, we cannot have an idea of an impossible thing. Now this +discovered Deity is allowed to be that of which we can have no idea. +So far at least it is allied to the impossible. + +As to the argument of cause and effect, the latter certainly implies +the former; but when we give the name of effect to any thing, we must +be certain it is an effect, for we may be so far mistaken perhaps as to +call that an effect which is a cause, at least what is an effect to-day +may be a cause to-morrow, as in the instance of generation; for though +a son does not beget his father, he too has his offspring in which he +may be said to live over again, and if we are to argue only from +experience, most probably that alone is the resurrection and the life +to come. But if it is contended that our experience relates only to +finite causes, or causes incapable of comprehending themselves, it must +at the same time be allowed, that all our reasoning is founded only on +experience. This Dr. P. at least allows even while he keeps reasoning +about a Deity, which he calls an infinite cause capable of comprehending +itself, though nobody is capable of comprehending it, and of which we +therefore can have no experience. Yet he will assert, that _thinking_ +persons seldom are convinced by _thinking_. This is odd language for a +reasoner. When another philosopher or divine attempts to prove a God in +their own way, Dr. Priestley can readily see his fallacies and +absurdities. Dr. Clarke, the former great champion of God Almighty, is +made very light of. He thought, foolish man, to prove the existence of +a Deity merely by our having an idea of that existence, which would go +to prove the truth of every unnatural conceit that ever entered into +the heart of man; and contended farther that it would be equally absurd +to suppose no Deity as two and two did not make four. It would indeed +be absurd, says Dr. Priestley provided we agreed that the universe is a +_caused_ existence, for God is the name we give for the cause of the +universe, which in such case must exist. It is only denying that the +universe is a caused existence, and then the absurdity is taken away. +Dr. Priestley, for the sake of making Dr. Clarke absurd, will readily +allow the denial capable of being made; and for the same purpose he +seems gravely to have taken upon himself to prove that school-boy's +difficulty, that two and two do make four, for he says, that four is +the term agreed upon in language to be given to the sum total of two +and two, and that to deny the Deity is at least not so absurd as to say +that two and two do not make four. + +Dr. Priestley says he finds no difficulty in excluding every thing from +the mind except space and duration. He allows then at least, that there +is no manifest absurdity in supposing there is no Deity, for nothing +can be proved by reasoning if the conclusion can be denied without +absurdity, nor can there be a manifest absurdity in denying the +existence of what there is no difficulty in excluding from the mind. +Yet after all he adds (somewhat inconsistently) that we cannot exclude +the idea of a Deity, if we do not exclude an existent universe. This +Deity he defines to be a most simple Being; simple and infinite; terms +which but ill agree together. + +The infinite or boundless existence of this pretended Deity is a +property more insisted upon than any other, and whatever other +properties are given to him they are all in the infinite degree. The +properties alledged to be proved are, eternity, infinite knowledge and +power, unchangeableness, unity, omnipotence, action from all eternity, +and independence. Benevolence and moral government are also ascribed to +him but confessedly with a less degree of certainty, though the most +desireable of all his given properties. Upon the subject of benevolence, +Dr. Priestley only advances, that where it is not proved by the +happiness of his creatures to exist, he would rather chuse to conclude +he mist of his design, that is, he wanted power or knowledge, than that +he wanted benevolence. If he means to argue that it is more rational to +conclude this Deity wanted power and knowledge than that he wanted +benevolence, and because Dr. Priestley fancies himself to have proved +the Deity cannot want the two former, he concludes the Deity cannot +want the latter, as the less probable for him to be deficient in, his +argument is no more a truism. As a wish, that the Deity may not want +benevolence, in that sense let him take it as agreed upon. He allows +that misery in the human species proves malevolence in the Deity, and +happiness the contrary. All the proof adduced in favour of benevolence +is in asserting that throughout the universe, good is more predominant +than evil. The infinite extent of benevolence he will allow incapable +of proof; but then it is said that the evils which mankind endure are +not so great as might be inflicted upon them; that virtue to vice, +happiness to misery, health to sickness bear at least equal proportions. +That lesser evils exist instead of greater is indeed but a poor proof +in the favour of the benevolence of an all-powerful Being. Or grant, +that good is more predominant than evil, this surely is no proof +neither of the benevolence of a kind and all-powerful Being. Yet +Dr. Priestley adds that the general benevolence of the Deity is +unquestionable. How unquestionable? It is questioned by the author +himself, and he declares he cannot prove it. After this he asks, who +will pretend to dictate to such a Being? He might in the same stile +conclude that no objection deserved a reply. The whole of this is +absurd; but when the Doctor begins to feel enthusiasm he is like the +rest of the ecclesiastical arguers. They reason themselves into +imaginary Beings with more imaginary properties and then fall down and +worship them. God is said to have made man in the image of himself. If +he has done so, man is up with him, for he in return makes God in his +own image. Much as the imagination of one man differs from another, so +differs the God of each devotee. They are all idolaters or +anthropomorphites to a man; there is none but an atheist that is not +the one or the other. + +The admission of evil into the world is an argument so exceedingly +conclusive against at least a good Deity, that it is curious to see how +Dr. Priestley studies to get rid of that difficulty. He partly denies +the fact, at least he says there is more good than evil in the world. +At last he even turns evil into good, or what ought to be the effects +of one, into what ought to be the effects of the other, as he says pain +is necessary for happiness. But if pain is, as he says, in this world +necessary for happiness, why will it not still be necessary hereafter? +He answers, because by that time we shall have experienced pain enough +for a future supply of happiness. If it is objected, why have we not +had pain enough by the time each of us are twenty or thirty years of +age, instead of waiting 'till our deaths at so many different ages? He +can only finish his argument by allowing that the ways of God are +inscrutable to man, that every thing is for the best and refer us to +_Candide_ for the rest of his philosophy; nor will he ever resolve the +question, "if evil and pain are good and necessary now, why will they +not always be so? Take a view of human existence, and who can even +allow, that there is more happiness than misery in the world? Dr. +Priestley thinks to give the turn of the scale to happiness, by making +it depend intirely upon health, notwithstanding he says in another +place that human sensations are a mass collected from the past, present +and future, and as a man grows up the present goes on to bear a less +proportion to the other two. It would indeed be a short but lame way of +proving that "happiness is the design of the creation" because health +is designed, and sickness is only an exception, not a general rule." +Many a healthy man has certainly been unhappy, or else had a man better +study health than virtue. If the mill-wright make a poor machine he is +a poor workman; God in like manner designing health and introducing +sickness is but a poor physician. In another place Dr. Priestley having +considered, that he had asserted that human sensations arise from ideas +of the past and future as well as the present, finds himself obliged to +alter his notions of happiness, so far as to say that happiness is more +intellectual than corporeal. But it is rather extraordinary to assert +at the same time, that happiness is the necessary consequence of +health, and that happiness is more from intellectual than corporeal +feelings. Surely health, if any thing, is corporeal. Another curious +fancy about pain and happiness is, that our finite nature not admitting +infinite or unlimited happiness we must leave it to the wisdom of the +Deity to determine which is best for us (since happiness must be +diminished) a little pain to be added to it or somewhat of happiness to +be taken away. It hardly requires the skill of a benevolent Deity to +determine which is best for the creatures he has made (and whom he +wishes to be as happy as their finite nature will admit) to lessen +their degree of happiness or mix therein a proportion of misery. To +conclude he asks, "how it is possible to teach children caution, but by +feeling pain?" It is easy to allow in answer, that it might not perhaps +be possible in us. But he is arguing about the benevolence of a Deity. +It was possible, he will allow, in him to have given these children +knowledge without pain, at least if he continues to him the attribute +he allows of omnipotence. + +Next he observes that parents suspend at times their benefits to their +offspring, when persuaded they are not for their good; so does the +Deity. But before this argument holds he must therefore say, it is not +for the good of man to be made happy now, and that the Deity can be +infinitely benevolent without willing either infinite or universal +happiness. Take the argument any way, it must go against his +benevolence or his power; and the same observations hold as to his love +of justice, whilst he is so tardy in punishing offenders. + +After observing that things are in an improving state, Dr. Priestley +allows, that the moral government of the universe is not perfect. From +thence he proceeds to assert, that atheists may believe it within the +course of nature, that men as moral agents may after death be +re-produced, and therefore that there may be a future state though +there be no God, because he reasons it may be in the course of nature. +This allows that the course of nature may be as it is without a God, +and that there is therefore no _natural_ proof of a Deity. His farther +argument on this head is, that "things usually happen in a state of +nature that are proper. A future state is proper. (To carry on the +supposed state of melioration and complete the moral government of the +universe.) It is therefore probable." This is an argument perhaps more +of wish than probability, but let it have such force as belongs to it. +It is not the wish of the answerer by supporting atheism to give +encouragement to immorality, but should he unwarily or with weak minds +do so, the argument of the Deity's existence is independent of such +considerations. It were better to seek another support for morality +than a belief in God; for the moral purpose in believing a Deity (an +invisible Being, maker of all, our moral governor, who will hereafter +take cognizance of our conduct,) is not a little checked by +considering, that he leaves the proof of his very existence so +ambiguous, that even men with a habit of piety upon them cannot but +have their doubts, whilst on this existence so much of the moral +purpose depends. If this is not an argument against the morality of a +Deity, it is at all events one against his _infinite_ morality though +moral is an attribute to be given to him in the infinite degree as much +as any other. + +It is said, infinite intelligence must have procured a necessary +fitness of things, and that this forms morality. "His will could not +be biassed by other influence; therefore he must have willed morality, +because necessarily fit." Then comes infinite power, and yet no +morality in the world or a very small portion of it. We cannot to any +purpose, do what we will, argue against experience. That it must be, +yet that it is not. What must be, will be. If it is not, there is no +_must_ in the case. + +It is next said, that virtue gives a better chance for happiness than +vice. This also is but a weak argument for the moral government of the +universe, unless it be for a moral government by chance. Virtue ought +to be the certain and immediate parent of happiness, if a moral +governor existed with an uncontrouled dominion. If virtue tends to +happiness, or has only a better chance of doing so, it is allowed, that +a sensible atheist should hold it right to be virtuous. The latter end +of a righteous man is certainly more likely to be happy than that of an +unrighteous one. But let an atheist be righteous, and he can be as +certain of happiness in his latter end as any other. Let another life +be desirable, as it certainly is, his doubts upon it will not prevent +it. Who could wish an end better or more happy than that of Mr. Hume, +who most indubitably was an atheist. But if an atheist be not so good +as a Theist, Dr. Priestley perhaps, will allow him to be better than +a sceptic, as any principles for systematising nature are better than +none at all. A Theist is not without his doubts as well as the sceptic; +an atheist, once firmly becoming so, will never doubt more; for we may +venture to say no miracles or new appearances will present themselves +to him to draw his belief aside. + +Still every thing is as God intended it--so asserts Dr. Priestley; and +therefore it cannot by him be denied that crimes and vices, are of his +intention. The Theist exclaims in triumph, "He that made the eye, must +he not see?" But who made the eye? Or grant that God made the eye, +which can only see in the light, must he necessarily see in the dark? +It is again asserted, "the power which formed an eye had something in +view as certainly as he that constructed a telescope. If any Being +formed any eye, grant it. But if the eye exists necessarily as a part +of nature; as much as any other matter, or combination of matter, +necessarily existed, the result of the argument is intirely different. + +It is far from being a necessary part of the atheist's creed to exclude +design from the universe. He places that design in the energy of +nature, which Dr. Priestley gives to some other extraneous Being. It is +rather inconsistent also in him to say, that an atheist rightly judging +of his own situation upon his own principles, ought not to hold himself +quite secure from a future state of responsibility and existences, and +yet to say he must in his own ideas hold himself soon to be excluded +for ever from life. + +As to the immutability of the Deity, it is difficult to guess how that +is proved, except by the argument of _Lucus a non lucendo_, because +every thing is changing here; therefore the Deity never changes; which +is neither an argument _a priori_ nor _posteriore_, but _sui generis_, +merely applicable to the Deity. + +From the imperial infinite intelligence of the Deity an argument is +formed of his unity. Dr. Priestley says, "that two _infinite_ +intelligent Beings would coincide, and therefore that there can only be +one such Being." Two parallels will never coincide. That is one of the +first axioms of Euclid, in whom Dr. Priestley believes as much as in +his bible. If the Beings are infinite in extent and magnitude they must +certainly coincide, but if they are only infinite in intelligence, it +does not seem to be necessary that they should. + +The ubiquity of God is proved in this short way: "God made every thing, +God controuls every thing. No power can act but where it is. Therefore +God is present every where." The workman must certainly be present at +his work, but when the work is done he may go about other business. If +all the properties of matter, such as gravity, elasticity and other +such existed only by the perpetual leave and agency of the Deity, it +may be argued he is in all places where matter is. Space, empty space +will still exist without him. In this mode of proof Dr. Priestley must, +contrary to the Newtonian system argue for a _Plenum_, before he proves +the ubiquity. He cannot exclude space from his mind, nor can he exclude +gravity from matter. Yet can he admit matter as well as space to be +eternal, because he will not allow the inactivity of God." "If God's +works had a beginning he must have been _for a whole eternity_ +inactive." He seems to have an odd notion of eternity, for he there +allows it could have an end. The argument would be fairer in concluding +"he must have been inactive _or doing something else_." + +The Deity set up, if not the creator of matter, is at least the matter +of it, nor will his advocates by any means allow him to be material +himself. They see some incongruity in admitting one piece of matter to +be so complete a master of another. However Dr. Priestley and other +arguers for a Deity would do well to consider, that whatever is not +matter, is a space that matter may occupy. Therefore if God is not +matter, and also is not space, he is nothing. Dr. Priestley allows +matter eternal, and its properties of gravity, elasticity, electricity +and others equally eternal. He says directly, that matter cannot exist +without it's perpetually corresponding powers. The adjustment of those +powers he places in the Deity. But as we never see matter without the +adjustment of those properties as well as the existence of them, this +drives him at last to say, the Deity must also have created matter, +according to his system eternally created it, cotemporarily with +himself. Ideas absurd and irreconcileable! + +Discoursing upon the hypothesis of "a fortuitous concourse of atoms" +Dr. Priestley asks, "what reason we have to think that small masses of +matter can have power without communication _ab extra_?" Let this +question be returned, "have we not reason to think so from attraction +the most common property in matter." To get rid of this difficulty he +will not allow an atom of matter to be possessed originally of the most +simple powers, though he is ready to allow matter to have been eternal. +A magnet according to this system must sometime have existed without +its magnetic power. He concludes there must be some original existent +Being. He shall be allowed many original existent Beings if it pleases +him. A man may be an originally existent being, as well as any other. +He is superior to other animals in this world. In like manner there may +be allowed superior Beings to man (as most probably there are) and yet +those superior Beings not have made man. + +Dr. Priestley will have it, that all bodies are moved by external +force. That does not seem quite necessary. Motion may as well be +asserted to be originally a property of matter, or its true natural +state and rest a deprivation of that property, as that rest should be +its natural state. Hume thought so and Hume was no great fool, +notwithstanding Dr. Priestley makes so light of him. In fact matter +never is, and therefore most probably never was found to be in a state +of rest. Nor has Dr. Priestley any reason to suppose gravity, elasticity +and electricity to have been imprest on bodies by a superior Being, and +not originally inherent in matter, unless to favour his own hypothesis +of a Deity. He absolutely says matter could not have had those powers +without a communication from a superior and intelligent Being. If +matter is perceived in regulated motion, it is added bluntly, that it +must be by a mover possessed of a competent intelligence, and that a +Being therefore of such power and intelligence _must_ exist. Whoever +finds no difficulty in believing the contrary will find as little +difficulty in Mr. Hume's hypothesis, that motion might as well as other +powers and properties have been originally inherent in matter, or at +least have been a necessary result of some matter acting upon another. + +It has always been a doubt with Theists, whether they can better prove +their God's existence by moral or physical considerations. Dr. +Priestley seems to think the _forte_ of the argument lies in the latter +proof, and lays particular stress upon his observation respecting cause +and effect, which therefore cannot here be so readily dismissed. He +makes great reference to the works of art. Theists are always for +turning their God into an overgrown man. Anthropomorphites has long +been a term applied to them. They give him hands and eyes nor can they +conceive him otherwise than as a corporeal Being. In which, as before +has been said, they are very right, for there can only be in the world +body and the space which bodies occupy. But granting this great workman +to have done so much, is it not quite an incontrovertible proposition, +that whoever first made a thing, as, for example, a chair or a table, +must have had an adequate idea of it's nature and use. Dr. Priestley +speaks more correctly in another part, by saying, he must have been +_capable_ of comprehending it. The nature and use of things are often +found out after they are made and by different persons than the makers +of them. Neither is there any analogy between the works of art, as a +table or house, and of nature, as a man or tree. Therefore there can be +no arguing from one to another by analogy. Hume observes that the +former works are done by reason and design, and the latter by +generation and vegetation, and therefore arguing from effect to causes, +it is probable, that the universe is generated or vegetated. At least +after all the observations about a table, it may be modestly asked, +whether there is not some difference between a table and the world? The +Doctor will also find some difficulty in explaining the propriety of +any argument of analogy between men and metals, which he does not at +other times scruple to make? + +A _gratis_ assertion is first made, that all things we see are effects; +then because we see one thing caused, every thing must have been +caused. His conclusion of the argument is still more curious, "because +every thing was caused there must have been something that was not +caused." The cause ought to be proportioned to the effect. The effect +is not infinite. Why then attribute infinity to the cause? This is +Hume's argument. Priestley calls it shortly unworthy of a philosopher. +Let others judge! But surely, with all this infinity it may be asked, +why may not there have been an infinity of causes? + +Another argument is, that being unable to account, for what is, by any +thing visible, we must have recourse to something invisible, and that +invisible power is what he calls God. Apply this argument to gravity, +and the external force that is said to cause every stone to fall is +God. But if nothing visible can to us account for the operations of +nature, why must we have recourse to what is invisible? Why necessary +to account at all for them? Or why may not visible things account for +them, although this person or another cannot tell which? + +If nothing can begin to exist of itself or by the energy of material +nature, it is more consistent to allow a plurality of Deities, than one +immediate Deity. An equality in a plurality of Deities might be +objectionable. But that is not at all necessary, rather the contrary; +and so was the Pagan theory, which is not so absurd as the modern one. +This universe or mundane system may be the work of one hand, another of +another, and so on. Where is the absurdity of that? If the universe is +applied to the solar system, there is an appearance of its being formed +by one design, and in that stile it might be said to be the work of one +hand. But this Deity is asserted to be infinite, and to have made all +other worlds and universes, though it does not appear by any unity of +design that all other worlds and universes are one work with this. + +Dr. Priestley himself allows that reason would drive us to require a +cause of the Deity. He is himself obliged to conclude, after all his +reasoning, that we must acquiesce in our inability of having any idea +on the subject; that is, how God could exist without a prior cause. At +the same time he says the Deity cannot have a cause, and therefore we +cannot reason about him. Why then all his own reasoning? We make a +Deity ourselves, fall down and worship him. It is the molten calf over +again. Idolatry is still practised. The only difference is that now we +worship idols of our imagination; before of our hands. "Still we must +necessarily rest at a Being that is infinite;" that is, when our reason +drives us to the admission of an infinite cause we must necessarily +stop finitely in our career. Not content with this conclusion he adds, +that we cannot help perceiving the existence of this cause, though he +owns that it is not an object of our conceptions. But even the Theist's +argument does not necessarily drive us to the admission of an infinite +cause. The argument is, "because there is a man, and man has +intelligence, we must necessarily admit of a Being of infinitely +superior intelligence." Would it not be nearly as well to argue, +"because there is a goose, therefore there must be a man." + +What is there more which hinders a series of finite causes to be +carried back _ad infinitum_, than that the reasoner or contemplator of +the course of nature is tired. If this eternal series could not exist, +a Deity might with some propriety be said to follow. Put the argument +into a syslogistic form. + +"The universe shews design;" + +"It is absurd to suppose an infinite succession of finite causes;" + +"Therefore there is an uncaused intelligent cause of this universe." + +Deny the second assertion and the problem is destroyed. So far from its +being difficult to suppose an eternity, it is the most difficult thing +in the world to suppose any thing but an eternity. A mind, not afraid +to think, will find it the most easy contemplation in the world to +dwell upon. It is at least a bold assertion, that _nothing can be more +evident_ than that plants and animals could not have proceeded from each +other by succession from all eternity. Surely to this may be answered, +that it is more evident that two and two make four. But Dr. Priestley +goes on to say, "that the primary cause of a man cannot be a man, any +more than the cause of a sound can be a sound." Experience shews us all +sound is an effect of a cause. Does experience shew us more of a man +than that he came from a man and a woman? To allow therefore that all +men must have come from a man and a woman is as far as we can argue +upon the subject, whilst in reasoning we trust to experience. An +argument is well built upon similarity, therefore it is probable if one +horse had a cause all horses had. But will not the argument be more +consonant to itself, in supposing all horses had the same cause, and as +one is seen to be generated from a horse and a mare so all were from +all eternity. It were a better argument in favour of a Deity or some +invisible agent to shew that a new animal came every now and then into +life, without any body's knowing how or where. + +It is allowed by Priestley and all other reasoners, that the most +capital argument that can be formed in support of any thesis is to be +built upon experience, or analogy to experience. Yet will many of these +reasoners, Dr. Priestley at least for one, contend at the same time for +the probability of a future life, when no instance can be given of any +revival whatsoever. The same will contend, that their Deity can at +pleasure form new species of animals, though in fact we never do see +new beings come into existence. We ought only to argue from experience; +and experience would teach us, that the species of all animals has +eternally existed. Grant that we do not know, whether man has been +eternal, or from a time, is it therefore because we do not know, that +we must say he came from God? That unknown Being, as he is sometimes +pompously and ridiculously called! The Devil is equally an unknown +Being. The admission of evil under a good Deity opens a ready door to +the manichean system, which seems much more rational than simple Deism. + +The following chain of reasoning, as used by Dr. Priestley, is well +linked together to prove the weight and force of experience in +reasoning, but it proves nothing more. "Chairs and tables are made by +men or beings of similar powers, because we see them made by men; and +we cannot suppose them made by a tree or come into being of themselves, +because that is against experience. No one will say one table might +make another, or that one man might make another. We see nothing come +into being without an adequate cause." Yet for this adequate cause we +are at the same time referred to a belief in a causeless secret +invisible agent, and to our own experience, for a proof of his nature. + +Dr. Priestley allows, that what is _visible_ in man may be the feat of +all his powers, for it is (as he says,) a rule in philosophy not to +multiply causes without necessity. But he affirms that what is _visible_ +in the universe cannot be the feat of intelligence. This is breaking +the very rule of reasoning which he himself has chosen to adopt; and he +gives no other reason for it, than because we do not see the universe +think as we do man. Sensible of this dilemma, soon afterwards he +inclines to allow principle of thought to the universe, for he adds, +that if we allow it, yet the universe has so much the appearance of +other works of design that we must look out for its author as much as +that of a man; and it is allowed that most probably it had the same +author. + +Every difficulty vanishes with the energy of nature, or at least is +as well accounted for as from an independent Deity. It is an usual +question to those philosophers, who maintain that the present existence +of things is the result of the force and energy of nature acting upon +herself, "why this force does not perpetually operate and produce new +appearances?" Besides that this question may be retorted upon the +supporters of a Deity, I am thoroughly persuaded, that this force is +constantly in action, and that every change which animals and +vegetables undergo, whether of dissolution or renovation, is a manifest +and undeniable proof of it. Man, and the other Beings which occupy this +terrestrial globe, are evidently suited to its present state, and an +alteration in their habitation, such as that of extreme or excessive +heat, would inevitably destroy them. This is so certain, that bones of +animals have been dug up which appertain to no species now existing, +and which must have perished from an alteration in the system of things +taking place too considerable for it to endure. Whenever the globe +shall come to that temperament fit for the life of that lost species, +whatever energy in nature produced it originally, if even it had a +beginning, will most probably be sufficient to produce it again. Is not +the reparation of vegitable life the spring equally wonderful now as +its first production? Yet this is a plain effect of the influence of +the sun, whose absence would occasion death by a perpetual winter. So +far this question from containing, in my opinion, a formidable +difficulty to the Epicurean system, I cannot help judging the continual +mutability of things as an irrefragable proof of this eternal energy of +nature. Those who ask, why the great changes in the state of things are +not more frequent, would absurdly require them to ensue within the +short space of their existence, forgetting that millions of ages are of +no importance to the whole mass of matter, though Beings of some +particular forms may find a wish and an advantage to prolong the term +of their duration under that form. + +If it is said, Nature or the energy of nature is another name for the +Deity, then may Dr. Priestley and his answerer shake hands; the one is +no more an atheist than the other. And if it is observed that the +Energy of Nature having produced men may be capable of re-producing +them, so that an atheist is not sure to escape punishment for his +crimes, it is easy to say in return, neither is a Deist sure. A good +atheist has no more reason to be afraid to be re-produced than a good +Deist or a Christian. It may be useful for both of them to be good. If +necessary let it again be repeated, that it is not at all meant in this +answer to make atheism a plea or protection for immorality. That is a +charge long and most unjustly put upon the poor undefended atheist. The +knowledge of a God and even the belief of a providence are found but +too slight a barrier against human passions, which are apt to fly out +as licentiously as they would otherwise have done. All, which this +creed can in reality produce, scarce goes beyond some exterior +exercises, which are vainly thought to reconcile man to God. It may +make men build temples, sacrifice victims, offer up prayers, or perform +something of the like nature; but never break a criminal intrigue, +restore an ill gotten wealth, or mortify the lust of man. Lust being +the source of every crime, it is evident (since it reigns as much among +idolaters and anthropomorphites, as among atheists) idolaters and +anthropomorphites must be as susceptible of all of crimes as atheists, +and neither the one set nor the other could form societies, did not a +curb, stronger then that of religion, namely human laws, repress their +perverseness. If no other remedy were applied to vice than the +remonstrances of divines, a great city such as London, would in a +fortnight's time, fall into the most horrid disorders. Whatever may be +the difference of faith, vice predominates alike with the Christian and +the Jew, with the Deist and the atheist. So like are they in their +actions, that one would think they copied one another. Religion may +make men follow ceremonies; little is the inconvenience found in them. +A great triumph truly for religion to make men baptise or fast? When +did it make men do virtuous actions for virtue's sake, or practise +fewer inventions to get rich, where riches could not be acquired +without poverty to others? The true principle most commonly seen in +human actions, and which philosophy will cure sooner than religion, is +the natural inclination of man for pleasure, or a taste contracted for +certain objects by prejudice and habit. These prevail in whatsoever +faith a man is educated, or with whatever knowledge he may store his +mind. + +But it will be said, those who commit crimes are atheists at the time +at least they do so. But an atheist cannot be superstitious, and +criminals are often so at the very moment of their crimes. Religious +persuasion men are not doubted to have when they vent their rage upon +others of a different way of thinking, when they express a dread of +danger or a zeal for ceremonies. These at least are not virtues; and +few indeed must be those, who at any time are really Theists, if their +faith is lost or forgotten every time they have a mind to indulge a +vitious passion. To support still the efficacy of religion in making +men virtuous is to oppose metaphysical reasoning to the truth of fact; +it is like the philosopher denying motion, and being refuted by one of +his scholars walking across the room. If then it is true, as history +and the whole course of human life shew it is, that men can still +plunge themselves into all sorts of crimes, though they are persuaded +of the truth of religion, which is made to inform them that God +punishes sin and rewards good actions, it cannot but be suspected that +religion even encourages crimes, by the hopes it gives of pardon +through the efficacy of prayer; at all events it must be granted, that +those who hold up a belief in God as a sufficient proof and character +of a good life are most egregiously mistaken. + +Some Theists may have lighter sense of personal dignity than some +atheists. If the Theist thinks himself allied to and connected with +the Deity he may plume himself upon his station; but how apt are +those worshipers of a God, instead of having a high sense of personal +dignity, to debase themselves into the most abject beings, dreading +even the shadow of their own phantom. An atheist feeling himself to be +a link in the grand chain of Nature, feels his relative importance and +dreads no imaginary Being. An atheist, who is so from inattention and +without intelligence, may indeed feel himself as much debased as the +meanest and most humble Theist. + +Another argument against atheists is, that where men are atheists it is +generally found that their usual turn of thinking and habits of life +have inclined to make them so. Is not this to be turned upon Theists? +But granting that the idea of a supreme author is more pleasing, and +that the argument with respect to the existence or non-existence of a +God was in _equilibrio_, it is not therefore right to conclude that the +mind ought to be determined by this or any other bias. Nor is it quite +clear if there is no God (by which term let it again be noticed, is +meant a Being of supreme intelligence, the contriver of the material +universe and yet no part of the material system) that the world in +which man inhabits is either fatherless or deserted. The wisdom of +nature supplies in reality what is only hoped for from the protection +of the Deity. If the world has so good a mother, a father may well be +spared especially such a haughty jealous, and vindictive one as God is +most generally represented to be. Dr. Priestley being clear in his +opinion; that the being of a God is capable of being proved by reason, +is not so weak as some of his fellow-labourers, who hold the powers of +reason in so low estimation as to be incapable of themselves to arrive +at almost any truth. He must however allow, if reason proves a Deity +and his attributes there was less use of revelation to prove them. But +the learned advocates of a Deity differ greatly among themselves, +whether his existence is capable of being ascertained by fixt +principles of reason. After such a difference and the instance of so +many great men in all ages, from Democritus downward, who have +confidently denied the being of a God, whose arguments the learned Dr. +Cudworth, in the last century, only by fully and fairly stating, with +all the answers in his power to give (though his zeal in religion was +never doubted) was thought by other divines to have given a weight to +atheism not well to be overturned, it is surprising that it should be +the common belief of this day, that an argument in support of atheism +cannot stand a moment, and that even no man in his senses can ever hold +such a doctrine. All that Epicurus and Lucretius have so greatly and +convincingly said is swept away in a moment by these better reasoners, +who yet scruple not to declare, with Dr. Priestley, that what they +reason about is not the subject of human understanding. But let it be +asked, is it not absurd to reason with a man about that of which that +same man asserts we have no idea at all? Yet will Dr. Priestley argue, +and say it is of no importance, whether the person with whom he argues +has a conception or not of the subject. "Having no ideas includes no +impossibility," therefore he goes on with his career of words to argue +about an unseen being with another whom he will allow to have no idea +of the subject and yet it shall be of no avail in the dispute, whether +he has or no, or whether he is capable or incapable of having any. +Reason failing, the passions are called upon, and the imagined God is +represented at one time, with all the terrors of a revengeful tyrant, +at another with all the tenderness of an affectionate parent. Shall +then such a tremendous Being with such a care for the creatures he has +made, suffer his own existence to be a perpetual doubt? If the course +of nature does not give sufficient proof, why does not the hand divine +shew itself by an extraordinary interposition of power? It is allowed +miracles ought not to be cheap or plenty. One or two at least every +thousand years might be admitted. But this is a perpetual standing +miracle, that such a Being as the depicted God, the author of nature +and all its works, should exist and yet his existence be perpetually in +doubt, or require a Jesus, a Mahomet or a Priestley to reveal it. Is +not the writing of this very answer to the last of those three great +luminaries of religion a proof, that no God, or no _such_ God at least, +exists. Hear the admirable words of the author of "The System of +Nature;" _Comment permet il qu'un mortel comme moi ose attaquer ses +droits, ses titres, son existence meme?_ + +Dr. Clarke, Mr. Hume and Helvetius, are writers whose arguments for and +against a Godhead Dr. Priestley has much noted. The former says, "the +Deity must have been infinite, if self-existent, because all things in +the universe are made by him." Are all things in the universe infinite? +Why an infinite maker of a finite work? It is juster to argue, that +whatever is self-existent must have been eternal. Nor is there any +great objection to the converse of the proposition properly taken, that +whatever is not self-existent must have been created and therefore +cannot have been eternal. If this is fair arguing, matter cannot +according to Dr. Priestley's system have been created and be eternal +also. But Dr. Priestley has no inclination to reconcile his opinions +with those of Dr. Clarke. He has chosen a fairer method, and that is, +to refute the arguments of former asserters of a Deity as well as to +establish his own. Dr. Clarke he most effectually exposes where he +enters upon the subject of space. It seems as if Dr. Clarke, having +asserted that the Deity necessarily existed, had a mind that nothing +else should necessarily exist but the Deity; and conscious that space +at least also necessarily existed, he makes universal space an +attribute of the Deity. With this reverie in his head he raises a +syllogism of complete nonsense (_vide Priestley's Letters_, P. 170.) +where he supposes space to be nothing though he also supposes it to be +an attribute of the Deity. Making it therefore an attribute of the +Deity and knowing that space is eternal and unmeasurable he takes upon +himself thereby also clearly to have proved that the Deity is so. +Exclude the Deity, space will still exist and still be eternal and +immense. Dr. Priestley knew well that Dr. Clarke's argument in this +respect was all a fallacy, and therefore he shews his sense in not +adopting it. It is in fact an abuse of terms unworthy of a scientific +reasoner. + +The only argument attempted by Dr. Clarke, why the Deity must have +had no cause, is, because it is necessary he should have none. +Dr. Clarke says roundly that necessity is the cause of the existence +of the Deity. This is very near the language of the ancients, who +held that Fate controuled the Gods. Necessity is therefore the first +God. Why then any other God than Necessity? What more has Helvetius +said than that? + +It is an old and unanswerable argument that, granting a God and his +power infinite, whatever he wills is executed; but man and other +animals are unhappy, therefore he does not will they should be happy. +Or take the argument the other way and it will equally conclude against +his power. With regard to Mr. Hume's famous observations upon the +evidence of miracles, Dr. Priestley thinks to make a short havock of +them by observing that new, and therefore miraculous appearances, are +continually presenting themselves; but although such new appearances +may be instanced, they are not contrary to former experience, only in +addition to it. With this allusion to Natural Philosophy, Dr. Priestley +thinks himself in one short sentence to have discussed all Mr. Hume's +observations upon miracles. _"Which is more likely, that the relater of +a miracle should have lied or been deceived, or that the thing related +should have existed contrary to experience prior and subsequent?"_ +Let the force of this observation be considered and believe in the +history of miracles who can! To give a finishing stroke to poor +Mr. Hume, Dr. Priestley observes that literary fame was Hume's only +motive and consolation, as he said himself, in all his laborious +enquiries and enlightened writings. At this he exclaims, "What gloomy +prospect and poor comfort he must have had at his death!" If so, +how much was he the greater man so well to have gone through that +last scene! + +The honour which Dr. Priestley gives to Helvetius, the author of that +ingenious and satisfactory work intitled "The System of Nature," does +credit to his own candour. He applauds him for speaking out, he ought +therefore to applaud this answer for the same reason. It is true he +seems to have discovered one incongruity in the reasoning of Helvetius. +The words he imputes to him are, "that nature has no object, because +nature acts necessarily; man has an object; yet man also acts +necessarily." In the same way nature might have an object though it +acted necessarily. But Helvetius adds, that the object which man has is +a necessary object. The best defence of Helvetius (not in behalf of +that passage, but of his general system) is to let him speak at large +for himself; and the following quotation Dr. Priestley and the reader +may accept as a specimen of the strength and justice of his argument, +and as the conclusion of this answer. + +"Theologians tell us, that the disorder and evil, which is seen in the +world, is not absolute and real, but relatively and apparently such, +and does not disprove the divine wisdom and goodness. But may not one +reply, that the goodness and wonderful order which they so much extol, +and on which they found their notions of those qualities in God, are in +a similar way only relative and apparent. If it be only our co-existence +with the causes which surround us, and our manner of perceiving them, +that constitute the order of nature for us, and authorise us to attribute +wisdom and goodness to the maker of what surround us, should not also +our mode of existence and perception authorise us to call what is +hurtful to us disorder, and to attribute impotence, ignorance, or +malice, to that Being which we would suppose to actuate nature. + +Some pretend that the supremely wise God can derive goodness and +happiness to us from the midst of those ills which he permits us to +undergo in this world. Are these men privy counsellors of the Divinity, +or on what do they found their romantic hopes? They will doubtless say, +that they judge of God's conduct by analogy, and that from the present +appearance of his wisdom and goodness, they have a right to infer his +future wisdom and goodness. But do not the present appearances of his +want of wisdom or goodness justify us in concluding, that he will +always want them? If they are so often manifestly deficient in this +world, what can assure us that they will abound more in the next? This +kind of language therefore rests upon no other basis than a prejudiced +imagination, and signifies, that some men, having without examination, +adopted an opinion that God is good, cannot admit that he will consent +to let his creatures remain constantly unhappy. Yet this grand +hypothesis, of the unalterable felicity of mankind hereafter, is +insufficient to justify the Divinity in permitting the present sleeting +and transitory marks of injustice and disorder. If God can have been +unjust for a moment, he has derogated, during that moment at least, +from his divine perfection, and is not unchangeably good; his justice +then is liable to temporary alteration, and, if this be the case, who +can give security for his justice and goodness continuing unalterable +in a future life, the notion of which is set up only to exculpate his +deviation from those qualities in this? + +In spite of the experience, which every instant gives the lie to that +beneficence which men suppose in God, they continue to call him good. +When we bewail the miserable victims of those disorders and calamities +that so often overwhelm our species, we are confidently told that these +ills are but apparent, and that if our short-sighted mind could fathom +the depths of divine wisdom, we should always behold the greatest +blessings result from what we denominate evil. How despicable is so +frivolous an answer! If we can find no good but in such things as +affect us in a manner which is agreeable and pleasing to our actual +existence, we shall be obliged to confess that those things which +affect us, even but for a time, in a painful manner, are as certainly +evil to us. To vindicate God's visiting mankind with these evils some +tell us, that he is just, and that they are chastisements inflicted on +mankind to punish the wrongs he has received from men. Thus a feeble +mortal has the power to irritate and injure the almighty and eternal +Being who created this world. To offend any one is, to afflict him, +to diminish in some degree his happiness, to make him feel a painful +sensation. How can man possibly disturb the felicity of the +all-powerful sovereign of nature! How can a frail creature, who +has received from God his being and his temper, act against the +inclinations of an irresistable force which never consents to sin and +disorder? Besides justice, according to the only ideas which we can +have of it, supposes a fixt desire to render every one his due. But +theologians constantly preach that God owes us nothing, that the good +things he affords are the voluntary effects of his beneficence, and +that without any violence of his equity he can dispose of his creatures +as his choice or caprice may impel him. In this doctrine I see not the +smallest shadow of justice, but the most hideous tyranny and shocking +abuse of power. In fact do we not see virtue and innocence plunged into +an abyss of misery, while wickedness rears its triumphant head under +the empire of this God whose justice is so much extalled? "This misery, +say you, is but for a time." Very well, Sirs, but your God is unjust +for a time. "He chastises whom he loves (you will say) for their own +benefit." But if he is perfectly good, why will he let them suffer at +all? "He does it, perhaps to try them" But, if he knows all things, +what occasion is there for him to try any? If he is omnipotent, why +need he vex himself about the vain design any one may form against him? +Omnipotence ought to be exempt from any such passions, as having +neither equals nor rivals. But if this God is jealous of his glory, his +titles and prerogative, why does he permit such numbers of men to +offend him? Why are any found daring enough to refuse the incense which +his pride expects? _Why am I a feeble mortal permitted to attack his +titles, his attributes, and even his existence?_ Is this permission of +punishment on me for the abuse of his grace and favour? He should never +have permitted me to abuse them. Or the grace he bestowed should have +been efficacious and have directed my steps according to his liking. +"But, say you, he makes man free." Alas? why did he present him with a +gift of which he must have foreseen the abuse? Is this faculty of free +agency, which enables me to resist his power, to corrupt and rob him of +his worshippers, and in fine to bring eternal misery on myself, a +present worthy of his infinite goodness? In consequence of the +pretended abuse of this fatal present, which an omniscient and good God +ought not to have bestowed on Beings capable of abusing it, +everlasting, inexpressible torments are reserved for the transitory +crimes of a Being made liable to commit them. Would that father be +called good, reasonable, just and kind, who put a sharp-edged and +dangerous knife into the hand of a playful, and imprudent child, whom +he before knew to be imprudent, and punished him during the remainder +of his life for cutting himself with it? Would that prince be called +just and merciful, who, not regarding any proportion between the +offence and the punishment, should perpetually exercise his power of +vengeance, over one of his subjects who, being drunk, had rashly +offended against his vanity, without causing any real harm to him, +especially, when the prince had taken pains to make him drunk? Should +we consider as almighty a monarch, whose dominions were in such +confusion and disorder, that, except a small number obedient servants, +all his subjects were every instant despising his laws, defeating his +will and insulting his person? Let ecclesiastics then acknowledge, that +their God is an assemblage of incompatible qualities, as +incomprehensible to their understanding as to mine. No: they say, in +reply to these difficulties, that wisdom and justice in God, are +qualities so much above or so unlike those qualities in us, that they +bear no relation or affinity towards human wisdom and justice. But, +pray how am I to form to myself an idea of the divine perfection, +unless it has some resemblance to those virtues which I observe in my +fellow creatures and feel in myself? If the justice of God is not the +same with human justice, why lastly do any men pretend to announce it, +comprehend and explain it to others?" + + + + + + +POSTSCRIPT. + + +Previous to this publication the editor sent the following Letter +to Dr. Priestley. + + +"Reverend Sir, + +Had you thought it impossible for man to hold different sentiments +respecting Natural religion and the proof of the existence of a God +than you do, the Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever would not have +appeared, much less would you have invited an answer by promising a +reply to every objection. Differing from you in sentiment I am the man +who enter with you in the lists; but I find myself upon consultation +with my friends under more difficulties than you were, and more to +stand in need of courage in taking up the glove, than you needed to +have in throwing it down. For this dispute is not like others in +philosophy, where the vanquished can only dread ridicule, contempt and +disappointment; here, whether victor or vanquished, your opponent has +to dread, beside ecclesiastical censure, the scourges, chains and +pillories of the courts of Law. + +I accuse you not of laying a trap for an unguarded author, but I ask +your friendly opinion, whether I can, with temporal safety at least, +maintain the contrary of your arguments in proof of a Deity and his +attributes. If I cannot, no wonder the Theist cries _Victoria!_ but +then it is a little ungenerous to ask for objections. Of you, I may +certainly expect, that you will promise to use your influence, as well +with lawyers as ecclesiastics, not to stir up a persecution against a +poor atheist in case there should be one found in the kingdom, which +people in general will not admit to be possible; or, if a persecution +could ensue, that you and your friends, favourers of free enquiry, +will at least bear the expences of it. + + I am, + Reverend Sir, + Your most humble obedient servant, + WILLIAM HAMMON. + +Oct. 23. 1781. + +_To the Reverend Dr. Priestley._ + + +To this letter Dr. Priestley sent no answer; or no answer ever came +to hand. + + +THE END. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Answer to Dr. Priestley's Letters to a +Philosophical Unbeliever, by Matthew Turner +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 14120 *** diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aeca26c --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #14120 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/14120) diff --git a/old/14120-0.txt b/old/14120-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac7952f --- /dev/null +++ b/old/14120-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1787 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 14120 *** + +Attributed to Matthew Turner (d. 1788?) and William Hammon. + +Transcribed by the Freethought Archives + +NOTE: Irregularities in orthography and punctuation have been +reproduced without emendation from the first edition of 1782. + + + + + + +ANSWER TO DR. PRIESTLEY'S LETTERS TO A PHILOSOPHICAL UNBELIEVER. + +PART I. + + + +LONDON. +MDCCLXXXII + + + + + +ADVERTISEMENT. + + +The Editor of this publication has more in object to answer Dr. Priestley +than to deliver his own sentiments upon Natural Religion, which however +he has no inclination to disguise: but he does not mean to be answerable +for them farther, than as by reason and nature he is at present +instructed. The question here handled is not so much, whether a +Deity and his attributed excellences exist, as whether there is any +Natural or Moral proof of his existence and of those attributes. +Revealed knowledge is not descanted upon; therefore Christians at least +need take no offence. Doubts upon Natural Religion have not hitherto +been looked upon as attacks upon Revelation, but rather as corroborations +of it. What the Editor believes as a Christian (if he is one is +therefore another affair, nor does he reckon himself so infallible or +incapable of alteration in his sentiments, as not at another time to +adopt different ones upon more reflexion and better information; +therefore, though he has at present little or no doubt of what he +asserts (taken upon the principles laid down) he shall hold himself +totally freed from any necessity of defending the contents of this +publication if brought into controversy; and as he has no desire of +making converts, hopes he shall not himself be marked out as an object +of persecution. + +Speculative points have always been esteemed fair matters for a free +discussion. The religion established in this country is not the +religion of Nature, but the religion of Moses and Jesus, with whom the +writer has nothing to do. He trusts therefore he shall not be received +as a malevolent disturber of such common opinions as are esteemed to +keep in order a set of low wretches so inclinable to be lawless. At +least, if he attempts to substitute better foundations for morality, +malevolence can be no just charge. Truth is his aim; and no professors +of religion will allow their system to be false. Or if he should be +thought too bold a speculator, such of the ecclesiastics as will be his +opponents may rather laugh at him than fear him. They have a thousand +ways of making their sentiments go down with the bulk of mankind, to +one this poor writer has. They are an army ready marshalled for the +support of their own thesis; they are in the habit of controversy; +pulpits are open to them as well as the press; and while the present +author will be looked upon as a miracle of hardiness for daring to put +his name to what he publishes, they can without fear or imputation lift +up their heads; and should they even be known to transgress the bounds +of good sense or politeness, they will only be esteemed as more zealous +labourers in their own vocation. + + + + + +PREFATORY ADDRESS. + + +Dr. Priestley, + +Your Letters addressed to a Philosophical Unbeliever I perused, not +because I was a Philosopher or an Unbeliever; it were presumption to +give myself the former title, and at that time I certainly did not +deserve the latter; but as I was acquainted with another, who in +reality, as far as I and others who know him can judge, deserves the +title of a Philosopher and is neither ashamed nor afraid of that of an +Unbeliever, I conceived them apt to be sent to my friend, and when I +presented them to him, he said he was the person whom he should suppose +you meant to address, if you had a particular person in view; but he +had too much understanding of the world, though much abstracted from +the dregs of it, not to conceive it more probable that you meant your +Letters to be perused by thinking men in general, Believers and +Unbelievers, to confirm the former in their creed, and to convert the +latter from their error. You shall speedily know the effect they have +had in both ways. For myself I must inform you that I was brought up a +Believer from my infancy; a Theist, if a Christian is such; for I +suppose the word will be allowed, though the equivalent term of Deist +is so generally reprobated by Christians; I had before my eyes the +example of a most amiable parent; a moral man, a Christian undoubtedly; +who, when I have been attending upon him, as much from affection as +from duty upon a sick and nearly dying bed, has prayed I might be +stedfast in the faith he held, in accents still sounding in my +intellectual ear; a parent, whom for his virtues and love of his +offspring, like a Chinese, I am tempted to worship, and I could exclaim +with the first of poets, + + _"Erit ille mihi semper Deus."_ + +With such habits of education then, such fervent advice and such +reverence for my instructor, what can have turned me from my belief; +for I confess I am turned? Immorallity it is not; that I assert has not +preceded my unbelief, and I trust never will follow it; there has not +indeed yet been time for it to follow; whether it is a probable +consequence will presently be discussed; but it is _thought_, free +thought upon the subject; when I began freely to think I proceeded +boldly to doubt; your Letters gave me the cause for thinking, and my +scepticism was exchanged for conviction; not entirely by the perusal of +your Letters; for I do not think they would quite have made me an +Atheist! but by attention to that answer from my friend, which I have +his permission to subjoin. + +In mentioning that doubts arose by reading your very Letters, which +were written to eradicate all doubts, let me not accuse you of being +unequal to the task assumed. I mean no such charge. You have in my +opinion been fully equal to the discussion, and have bandied the +argument ably, pleasingly and politely. I am certain from the extracts +you have made from Dr. Clarke, the first of other Divines, I should +have been converted from my superstition by his reasoning, even without +perusal of an answer: I pay you however the compliment of having only +brought me to doubt, and I find I am not the only person who have been +led to disbelieve by reading books expressly written to confirm the +Believer. Stackhouse's Comment upon the Bible, and Leland's View of +Deistical Writers have perhaps made as many renegado's in this country +as all the allurements of Mahometanism has in others. What can be said +to this? They were both undoubtedly men of abilities, and meant well to +the cause they had to support. All that I shall observe upon the matter +is, that what cannot bear discussion cannot be true. Reasoning in other +sciences is the way to arrive at truth: the learned for a while may +differ, but argument at last finds its force, and the controversy +usually ends in general conviction. Reasoning upon the science of +divinity will equally have its weight, and all men of letters would +long ago have got rid of all superstitious notions of a Deity, but that +men of letters are frequently men of weak nerves; such as Dr. Johnson +is well known to be, that great triumph to religionists; it requires +courage as well as sense to break the shackles of a pious education; +but if merely a resolve to reason upon their force can break them, what +can we observe in conclusion but + + _"Magnus est veritas et prevalebit."_ + +That religion or belief of a Deity cannot bear the force of argument is +well known by Divines in general, is manifest by their annexing an idea +of reproach to the very term of arguing upon the subject. These arguers +they call Free-thinkers, and this appellation has obtained, in the +understanding of pious believers, the most odious disgrace. Yet we +cannot argue without thinking; nor can we either think or argue to any +purpose without freedom. Therefore free-thinking, so far from being a +disgrace, is a virtue, a most commendable quality. How absurd, and how +cruel it is in the professors of divinity, to address the understanding +of men on the subject of their belief, and to upbraid those very men +who shall exercise their understanding in attending to their arguments! +No tyranny is greater than that of ecclesiastics. These chain down our +very ideas, other tyrants only confine our limbs. They invite us to the +argument, yet damn us to eternal punishment for the use of reason on +the subject. They give to man an essence distinct from his corporeal +appearance and this they call his soul, a very ray and particle of the +Divine Being; the principal faculty of this soul they allow to be that +of reasoning, and yet they call reason a dark lanthorn, an erroneous +vapour, a false medium, and at last the very instrument of another +fancied Being of their own to lead men into their own destruction. +_"In the image of himself made he man."_ A favourite text with +theologians; but surely they do not mean that this God Almighty of +theirs has got a face and person like a man. No; that they exclaim +against, and, when we push them for the resemblance, they confess +it is in the use of reason; it is in the soul. + +I am aware that I am not here to mix questions of Christianity with the +general question of a Divinity; subjects of a very distinct enquiry, +and which in the Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever are very +carefully separated. The subject of revelation is indeed promised +afterwards to be taken up, provided the argument in favour of Natural +Religion meets with a good reception. How, Dr. Priestley, you can judge +of that reception I am at a loss to know, otherwise than by the number +of editions you publish. It is then in the sum total just as much as if +you had said, "provided this book sells well I will write another." Yet +it may be sold to many such readers as I have been, though you will +hardly call such reception good. You that have wrote so much, to whom +it is so easy to write more, who profess a belief of revelation, such a +laborious enquirer, and so great a master of the art of reasoning, +should rather have engaged at once to prove in a subsequent publication +the truth of revealed religion in arguments, as candid and as fairly +drawn as those you have used in proof of a Deity independent of +revelation. Different as I am in qualifications from you, not very +learned, far from industrious, unused to publish, I do now promise +that when you shall have brought into light your intended letters in +behalf of revelation I will answer them. I hope you will take it as an +encouragement to write that you are sure you shall have an answer. I +mean you should, and I am sure I shall think myself greatly honoured if +you will descend so far as to reply to my present answer. I know you +have been used in controversies to have the last word, and in this I +shall not baulk your ambition; for notwithstanding any defect of my +plea in favour of atheism I mean to join issue upon your replication, +and by no means, according to the practice and language of the lawyers, +to put in a rejoinder. Should your arguments be defectively answered by +me, should your learning and your reasoning be more conspicuous than +mine, I shall bear your triumph without repining. + +I declare I am rather pleased there are so few atheists than at all +anxious to make more. I triumph in my superior light. I am like the Jew +or the Bramin who equally think themselves privileged in their superior +knowledge of the Deity. With me and with my friend the comparison holds +by way of contrast, for we are so proud in our singularity of being +atheists that we will hardly open our lips in company, when the +question is started for fear of making converts, and so lessening our +own enjoyment by a numerous division of our privilege with others. It +has indeed often been disputed, whether there is or ever was such a +character in the world as an atheist. That it should be disputed is to +me no wonder. Every thing may be, and almost every thing has been +disputed. There are few or none who will venture openly to acknowledge +themselves to be atheists. I know none among my acquaintance, except +that one friend, to whom as a Philosophical Unbeliever I presented your +Letters, and to whose answer I only mean this address as an +introduction. I shall therefore not enter here into the main argument +of Deity or no Deity. My address is only preliminary to the subject; +but I do not therefore think myself precluded from entering into some +considerations that may be thought incidental to it. I mean such +considerations as whether immorality, unhappiness or timidity +necessarily do or naturally ought to ensue from a system of atheism. +But as to the question whether there is such an existent Being as an +atheist, to put that out of all manner of doubt, I do declare upon my +honour that I am one. Be it therefore for the future remembered, that +in London in the kingdom of England, in the year of our Lord one +thousand seven hundred and eighty-one, a man has publickly declared +himself an atheist. When my friend returned me your Letters, addressing +me with a grave face he said, "I hope, if you have any doubts, these +Letters will have as good effect upon you as they have had upon me." +My countenance brightened up and I replied, "You are then, my friend, +convinced ?" "Yes, he said, I am convinced; that is, I am most +thoroughly convinced there is no such thing as a God." Behold then, +if we are to be believed, two atheists instead of one. + +Another question has been raised "whether a society of atheists can +exist?" In other words "whether honesty sufficient for the purposes +of civil society can be insured by other motives than the belief of +a Deity?" Bayle has handled that question well. [Footnote: _Pensees +sur la Comete_.] Few who know how to reason (and it is in vain to speak +or think of those who lay reason out of the case) can fail to be convinced +by the arguments of Bayle. I shall discuss the question no farther +than as it is necessarily included in the discussion of some of those +supposed results of atheism, such as I have before mentioned in the +instances of immorality, unhappiness and timidity. In my argument +upon this subject I shall carefully avoid all abuse and ridicule. +Controversies are apt to be acrimonious. You, Sir, have certainly shewn +instances to the contrary. You have charity beyond your fellows in the +ecclesiastical line, and your answerers seem not to me to have a right +in fair argument to step out of the limits you have prescribed +yourself. To dispute with you is a pleasure equal almost to that of +agreeing with another person. You have candour enough to allow it +possible that an atheist may be a moral man. Where is that other +ecclesiastic who will allow the same? Your answerers ought also to +hold themselves precluded from using ridicule in handling this subject. +I am no great supporter of Lord Shaftesbury's doctrine that ridicule +is the test of truth. I own truth can never be ridiculous, that is, +it can never be worthy of laughter, but still it may be laughed at. +To use the other term, I may say, truth can never be worthy of ridicule, +but still it may be ridiculed. Just ridicule is a sufficient test +of truth; but after all we should be driven to an inquiry, upon +the principles of reasoning, whether the ridicule were just or not. +Boldness, which is not incompatible with decency and candour, I do +hold to be an absolute requisite in all speech and argument, where +truth is the object of inquiry. Therefore when I am asked, whether +there is a God or no God, I do not mince the matter, but I boldly +answer there is none, and give my reason for my disbelief; for I +adopt my friend's answer by the publication of it. + +That mischief may ensue to society by such freedom of discussion is +also another argument for me to consider; I do not say to combat, for +though I were convinced or could not resist the argument that mischief +would ensue to society by such a discussion, yet I should think myself +intitled to enter into it. I have a right to truth, and to publish +truth, let society suffer or not suffer by it. That society which +suffers by truth should be otherwise constituted; and as I cannot well +think that truth will hurt any society rightly constituted, so I should +rather be inclined to doubt the force of the argument in case atheism +being found to be truth should apparently be proved prejudicial to such +a society. + +I come unprejudiced to the question, and when I have promised you an +answer to your future Letters in support of revelation, I have neither +anticipated your argument nor prejudged the cause. I hold myself open +to be convinced, and if I am convinced I shall say so, which is equally +answering as if I denied the force of your observations. In that sense +only I promise an answer. If I believe I shall say, I do; but I shall +not believe and tremble, confident as I am, that if I act an honest +part in life, whether there be a Deity and a future existence or not, +whatever reason I may have to rejoice in case such ideas be realised, I +can upon such an issue have none to tremble. I look upon myself to have +more reason to be temporally afraid than eternally so. Dr. Priestley or +any other Doctor can put his name boldly to a book in favour of Theism, +loudly call the supporters of a contrary doctrine to the argument, and +if no answer is produced, assert their own reasoning to be unanswerable. +In that sense their sort of reasoning has been frequently unanswerable. +Here however is an instance of a poor unknown individual, making +experience of the candour of the ecclesiastics and the equity of +the laws of England, for he ventures to subscribe his publication with +his name as well as Dr. Priestley does his Letters, to which this +publication is an answer. Perhaps he may have cause to repent of his +hardiness, but if he has, he is equally resolved to glory in his +martyrdom, as to suffer it. Whatever advantage religion has had in the +enumeration of it's martyrs, the cause of atheism may boast the same. +As to the instances of the professors of any particular form of +religion, or modification of that form, such as Christians or sects of +Christians, suffering martyrdom for their belief, I shall no more allow +them to be martyrs for theism than Pagans similarly suffering for their +belief, shall I call martyrs for atheism. Theism very likely has had +it's martyrs. I can instance one I think in Socrates, and I shall +mention Vanini as a martyr for atheism. The conduct of those two great +men in their last moments may be worth attending to. The variety of +other poor heretical wretches, who have been immolated at the shrine of +absurdity for all the possible errors of human credence, let them have +their legendary fame. I put them out of the scale in this important +inquiry. + +Not that I really think the argument to be much advanced by naming the +great supporters of one opinion or of another. In mathematics, +mechanics, natural philosophy, in literature, taste, and politics the +sentiments of great men of great genius are certainly of weight. There +are some subjects capable of demonstration, many indeed which the +ingenuity of one man can go farther to illustrate than that of another. +The force of high authority is greater in the three former sciences +than in the latter. Theism and Atheism I hold to be neither of them +strictly demonstrable. You, Dr. Priestley, agree with me in that. Still +I hold the question capable of being illustrated by argument, and I +should hold the authority of great men's names to be of more weight in +this subject, were I not necessarily forced to consider that all +education is strongly calculated to support the idea of a Deity; by +this education prejudice is introduced, and prejudice is nothing else +than a corruption of the understanding. Certain principles, call them, +if you please, data, must be agreed upon before any reasoning can take +place. Disputants must at least agree in the ideas which they annex to +the language they use. But when prejudice has made a stand, +argumentation is set at so wide a distance, through a want of fixt data +to proceed upon, that attention is in vain applied to the dispute. +Besides, the nature of the subject upon which this prejudice takes +place, is such, that the finest genius is nearly equally liable to an +undue bias with the most vulgar. To question with boldness and +indifference, whether an individual, all-forming, all-seeing and +all-governing Being exists, to whom, if he exists, we may possibly be +responsible for our actions, whose intelligence and power must be +infinitely superior to our own, requires a great conquest of former +habitude, a firmness of nerves, as well as of understanding; it will +therefore be no great wonder, if such men as Locke and Newton can be +named among the believers in a Deity. They were christians as well as +theists, so that their authority goes as far in one respect as in the +other. But if the opinions of men of great genius are to have weight, +what is to be said of modern men of genius? You, Sir, are of opinion +that the world is getting wiser as well as better. There is all the +reason in the world it should get wiser at least, since wisdom is only +a collection of experience, and there must be more experience as the +world is older. Modern Philosophers are nearly all atheists. I take the +term atheist here in the popular sense. Hume, Helvetius, Diderot, +D'Alembert. Can they not weigh against Locke and Newton, and even more +than Locke and Newton, since their store of knowledge and learning was +at hand to be added to their own, and among them are those who singly +possessed equal science in mathematics as in metaphysics? It is not +impossible, perhaps not improbable, from his course of learning and +inquiries, that if Dr. Priestley had not from his first initiation into +science been dedicated for what is called the immediate service of God, +he himself might have been one of the greatest disprovers of his +pretended divinity. + +In England you think, Sir, that atheism is not prevalent among men of +free reasoning, though you acknowledge it to be much so in other +countries. It is not the first time it has been observed that the +greater the superstition of the common people the less is that of men +of letters. In the heart of the Papal territories perhaps is the +greatest number of atheists, and in the reformed countries the greatest +number of deists. Yet it is a common observation, especially by +divines, that deism leads to atheism, and I believe the observation is +well founded. I hardly need explain here, that by deism in this sense +is meant a belief in the existence of a Deity from natural and +philosophical principles, and a disbelief in all immediate revelation +by the Deity of his own existence. Such is the force of habit, that it +is by degrees only, that even men of sense and firmness shake off one +prejudice after another. They begin by getting rid of the absurdities +of all popular religions. This leaves them simple deists, but the force +of reasoning next carries them a step farther, and whoever trusts to +this reasoning, devoid of all fear and prejudice, is very likely to end +at last in being an atheist. Nor do I admit it to be an argument either +for Revelation or Natural Religion, that the same turn for speculation +that would convert a christian into a theist, will carry him on to be +an atheist, though I know the argument has been often used. If upon +sick beds or in dying moments men revert to their old weakness and +superstitions, their falling off may afford triumph to religionists; +for my part I care not so much for the opinions of sick and dying men, +as of those who at the time are strong and healthy. But in the opinion +of the one or the other I put no great stress. My faith is in +reasoning, for though ridicule is not a complete test of truth, +reasoning I hold certainly to be so. I own belief may be imprest on the +mind otherwise than by the force of reason. The mind may be diseased. +All I shall say is that though I have formerly believed many things +without reason, and even many against it, as is very common, I hope I +shall never more. My mind (I was going to say, thank God) is sane at +present, and I intend to keep it so. I am aware that at the expression +just used some will exclaim in triumph, that the poor wretch could not +help thinking of his God at the same time he was denying him. The +observation would hold good, if it were not that we often speak and +write unpremeditately and though what is in this manner unpremeditately +expressed upon a revision should be certainly expunged, yet I chuse to +leave the expression to shew the force of habit. + +In fear lies the origin of all fancied deities, whether sole or +numberless. + + _Primus in orbe Deos fecit Timor._ + +But the great debasement of the human mind is evidenced in the instance +of attributing a merit to belief, which has come at last to be stiled a +virtue, and is dignified by the name of faith, that most pitiful of all +human qualities. When the apostle spoke of faith, hope and charity, he +might as well have exclaimed the least of the three is faith, as the +greatest is charity. + +One enthusiast cries out _un Roi_ and another _un Dieu_. The reality of +the king I admit, because I feel his power. Against my feeling and my +experience I cannot argue, for upon these sensations is built all +argument. But not all the wondrous works of the creation, as I hear the +visible operations of nature called, convince me in the least of the +existence of a Deity. By nature I mean to express the whole of what I +see and feel, that whole, I call self-existent from all eternity; I +admit a principle of intelligence and design, but I deny that principle +to be extraneous from itself. My creed in fine is the same with that of +the Roman poet; + + _"Deus est ubicunque movemur."_ + +If then I am admitted to explain my deity in this sense, I am not an +atheist, nor can any one else in the world be such. The _vis naturae_, +the perpetual industry, intelligence and provision of nature must be +apparent to all who see, feel or think. I mean to distinguish this +active, intelligent and designing principle, inherent as much in matter +as the properties of gravity or any elastic, attractive or repulsive +power, from any extraneous foreign force and design in an invisible +agent, supreme though hidden lord and maker over all effects and +appearances that present themselves to us in the course of nature. The +last supposition makes the universe and all other organised matter a +machine made or contrived by the arbitrary will of another Being, which +other Being is called God; and my theory makes a God of this universe, +or admits no other God or designing principle than matter itself and +its various organisations. + +The inquiry is said to be important. But why is it so! All truth is +important. It is a question of little importance, merely whether a man +had a maker or no, although it is of great importance to disprove the +existence of such a Deity as theologians wish to establish, because +appearances in the world go against it. Supposing however that it was +granted, that the question, whether there is a Deity or not, was as +little important as other truths, yet the question becomes important +with this reflexion, that other events may follow as deductions; such +as a particular providence, or a future state of rewards and +punishments; but whether such deductions or either of them necessarily +follow may well be queried. As to a particular providence you give up +the reality of it, and I give it up too. But I cannot give up the +argument, that if there were a God with all his allowed attributes of +wisdom, power and justice, there ought to be a particular providence to +counteract the general laws of nature, in favour of those who defend +the interposition. Though the Deity should not interfere unless there +be a worthy cause, agreeable to the Horation rule, + + _"Nec Deus interfuit nisi vindice nodus;"_ + +Yet surely from the same principles it should follow that the Deity +ought to interfere where there is a worthy cause. Here however arises +another dilemma, for if the Deity has really those attributes of power +and justice, there would never have been occasion for such temperaneous +interpositions. A particular providence must indeed prove one of these +two principles, either that God was imperfect in his design, or that +inert matter is inimical to the properties of God. If that wished for +interposition of the Deity is put off to a future existence, I cannot +help observing, that future day has been already a long while waited +for in vain, and any delay destroys some one attribute or other of the +Deity. He wants justice, or he wants the power, or the will to do good +and be just. That a future state of rewards and punishments may however +exist without a Deity, you, Dr. Priestley, allow to be no impossibility. +It may indeed be argued with apparent justness, that a principle of +reviviscence may as well be admitted as a principle of production in +the first instance: and as to rewards and punishments, judgement may be +rendered, as well as now, by Beings less than Deities. For my part I +firmly wish for such a future state, and though I cannot firmly believe +it, I am resolved to live as if such a state were to ensue. This seems, +I own, like doubting, and doubting may be said to be a miserable state +of anxiety. "Better be confident than unhinged; better confide in +ignorance than have no fixed system." So it may be argued; but I think +the result will be as people feel. Those who do not feel bold enough, +to be satisfied with their own thoughts, may abandon them and adopt the +thoughts of others. For my part I am content with my own; and not the +less so because they do not end in certainty upon matters, from the +nature of them, beyond the complete reach of human intelligence. + +There is nothing in fact important to human nature but happiness, which +is or ought to be the end or aim of our being. I mean self-happiness; +but fortunately for mankind, such is by nature our construction, that +we cannot individually be happy unless we join also in promoting the +happiness of others. Should immorality, timidity or other base +principles arise from atheism it tends immediately, I will own, to the +unhappiness of mankind. If it is asked me, "why am I honest and +honourable?" I answer, because of the satisfaction I have in being so. +"Do all people receive that satisfaction?" No, many who are ill +educated, ill-exampled and perverted, do not. I do, that is enough for +me. In short, I am well constructed, and I feel I can therefore act an +honest and honourable part without any religious motive. Did I +perceive, that belief in a Deity produced morality or inspired courage, +I might be prompted to confess, that the contrary would ensue from +atheism. But the bulk of the world has long believed, or long pretended +to believe in a Deity, yet morality and every commendable quality seem +at a stand. The believer and the unbeliever we often see equally base, +equally immoral. Superstition is certainly only the excess of religion. +That evidently is attended often with immorality and cowardice. I am +tempted to say, from observation, that the belief of a Deity is apt to +drive mankind into vice and baseness; but I check myself in the +assertion, upon considering that very few indeed are those who really +believe in a Deity out of such as pretend to do so. It is impossible +for an intellectual being to believe firmly in that of which he can +give no account, or of which he can form no conception. I hold the +Deity, the fancied Deity, at least, of whom with all his attributes +such pompous descriptions are set forth to the great terror of old +women and the amusement of young children, to be an object of which we +form (as appears when we scrutinise into our ideas) no conception and +therefore can give no account. It is said, after all this, that men do +still believe in such a Deity, I then do say in return, they do not +make use of their intellects. The moment we go into a belief beyond +what we feel, see and understand, we might as well believe in +will-with-a-whisp as in God. But I would fix morality upon a better +basis than belief in a Deity. If it has indeed at present no other +basis, it is not morality, it is selfishness, it is timidity; it is the +hope of reward, it is the dread of punishment. For a great and good +man, shew me one who loves virtue because he finds a pleasure in it, +who has acquired a taste for that pleasure by considering what and +where happiness is, who is not such a fool as to seek misery in +preference to happiness, whose honour is his Deity, whose conscience +is his judge. Put such a man in combat against the superstitious son +of Spain or Portugal, it were easy to say who would shew the truest +courage. The question might be more voluminously discussed, but I feel +already proof of conviction; if you, Dr. Priestley, do not, perhaps +some other readers may. I have nothing to do with men of low minds. +They will always have their religion or pretence of it, but I am +mistaken if it is not the gallows or the pillory that more govern +their morals than the gospel or the pulpit. + +After all, atheism may be a system only for the learned. The ignorant of +all ages have believed in God. The answer of a Philosophical Unbeliever +though written in the vulgar tongue may probably not reach the vulgar. +If argument had prevailed they were long converted from their +superstitious belief. The sentiments of atheistical philosophers have +long been published. If mischief therefore could ensue to society from +such free discussions, that mischief society must long have felt. I +think truth should never be hid, but few are those who mind it. I will +therefore take upon myself but little importance though I have presumed +to preface an answer from a Philosophical Unbeliever to Letters which +you, Dr. Priestley have written. If you deem that answer detrimental to +the interests of society, you will recollect that you invite the +proposal of objections and promise to answer all as well as you can. If +you should happen to be exasperated by the freedom of the language or +the contrariety of the sentiment, this answer will gain weight in +proportion as you lose in the credit of a tolerant Divine. Therefore if +you reply at all, reply with candour and with coolness; heed the matter +and not the man, though I subscribe my name, and am + + Reverend Sir, + Your friend, admirer, and humble servant, + WILLIAM HAMMON. + +_Oxford-Street, No._ 418. +_Jan._ 1, 1782. + + + + + + + ANSWER FROM A PHILOSOPHICAL UNBELIEVER. + + +It is the general fashion to believe in a God, the maker of all things, +or at least to pretend to such a belief, to define the nature of this +existing Deity by the attributes which are given to him, to place the +foundation of morality on this belief, and in idea at least, to connect +the welfare of civil society with the acknowledgement of such a Being. +Few however are those, who being questioned can give any tolerable +grounds for their assertions upon this subject, and hardly any two +among the learned agree in their manner of proving what each will +separately hold to be indisputably clear. The attributes of a Deity are +more generally agreed upon, though less the subject of proof, than his +existence. As to morality, those very people who are moral will not +deny, they would be so though there were not a God, and there never yet +has been a civil lawgiver, who left crimes to be punished by the author +of the universe; not even the profanation of oaths upon the sacredness +of which so much is built in society, and which yet is said to be a +more immediate offence against the Deity than any other that can be +named. + +The method which Dr. Priestley has taken to prove the existence of +a God, is by arguing from _effect_ to _cause_. He explodes that other +pretended proof _a priori_ which has so much raised the fame of +Dr. Clarke among other theologians. As to the attributes of the Deity, +Dr. Priestley is not quite so confident in his proofs there; and the +most amiable one, the most by mortals to be wished for, the _benevolence_ +of God he almost gives up, or owns at least there is not so much proof +of it as of his other attributes. His observations are divided into +several Letters, this is one answer given to the whole; for it would be +to no purpose to reply to topics upon which the writers are agreed. +What therefore is not contradicted here, Dr. Priestley may in general +take to be allowed; but to obviate doubts and to allow his argument +every force, it may be fairer perhaps to recite at full length what in +this answer is allowed to be true, what is denied as false, what meant +to be exposed as absurd, and what rejected as assertions without proof, +inadmissible or inconclusive. The conclusion will contain some +observations upon the whole. + + + TRUISMS. + + 1. "Effects have their adequate causes." + + 2. "Nothing begins to exist without a cause foreign to itself." + + 3. "No being could make himself, for that would imply that he + existed and did not exist at the same time." + + 4. If one horse, or one tree, had a cause, all had." + + 5. Something must have existed from all eternity. + + 6. "Atoms cannot be arranged, in a manner expressive of the most + exquisite design, without competent intelligence having existed + somewhere." + + 7. "The idea of a supreme author is more pleasing to a virtuous + mind, than that of a blind fate and fatherless deserted world." + + 8. "The condition of mankind is in a state of melioration, as far as + misery arises from ignorance, for as the world grows older it must + grow wiser, if wisdom arises from experience." + + 9. "All moral virtue is only a modification of benevolence." + + 10. "Virtue gives a better chance for happiness than vice." + + 11. "No instance of any revival." + + 12. "Atheists are not to think themselves quite secure with respect + to a future life." + + 13. "Thought might as well depend upon the construction of the + brain, as upon any invisible substance extraneous to the brain." + + 14. "If the works of God had a beginning, there must have been a + time when he was inactive." + + 15. "Where happiness is wanting in the creation I would rather + conclude the author had mist of his design than that he wanted + benevolence." + + + FALSE ASSERTIONS. + + 1. "A cause needs not be prior to an effect." + + 2. "If the species of man had no beginning, it would not follow that + it had no cause." + + 3. "A cause may be cotemporary with the effect." + + 4. "An atheist must believe he was introduced into the world without + design." + + + ABSURDITIES. + + 1. "A general mass of sensation consisting of various elements + borrowed from the past and the future." + + 2. "Since sensation is made up of past, present, and future, the + infant feeling for the moment only, the man recollecting what is + past and anticipating the future, and as the present sensation must + therefore in time bear a less proportion to the general mass of + sensation than it did, so at last all temporary affections, whether + of pain or pleasure become wholly inconsiderable." + + 3. "The great book of nature and the book of revelation both lie + open before us." + + 4. "A conclusion above our comprehension." + + 5. "A whole eternity already past." + + 6. "Since a finite Being cannot be infinitely happy, because he must + then be infinite in knowledge and power; and as all limitation of + happiness must consist in degree of happiness or mixture of misery, + the Deity can alone determine which mode of limitation is best." + + 7. "We have reason to be thankful for our pains and distress." + + 8. "If the divine Being had made man at first as happy as he can be + after all the feelings and ideas of a painful and laborious life, it + must have been in violation of all general laws and by a constant + and momentary interference of the Deity." + + 9. "It is better the divine agency should not be very conspicuous." + + 10. "If good prevails on the whole, creation being infinite, + happiness must be infinite, and God comprehending the whole, will + only perceive the balance of good, and that will be happiness + unmixed with misery." + + 11. "If a man is happy in the whole he is infinitely happy in the + whole of his existence." + + 12. "Although all things fall alike to all men and no distinction is + made between the righteous and the wicked, and even though the + wicked derive an advantage from their vices, yet this is consistent + with a state of moral government by a Being of infinite wisdom and + power." + + 13. "As ploughing is the means of having a harvest, though God has + predetermined whether there should be a harvest or not, so prayer is + the means of obtaining good from God, although that good is + predetermined upon; it is therefore no more absurd to pray than to + plough." + + 14. "Notwithstanding happiness is the necessary consequence of + health, yet man's happiness is more from intellectual than corporeal + feelings." + + 15. "Evil is necessarily connected with and subservient to good, + although in the next world there will be all good and no evil." + + 16. "By reason we can discover the necessary existence of a Deity, + yet to be a sceptic on that subject is the first step to be a + Christian, because reason not sufficiently proving it we fly to + revealed truth." + + 17. "The power, which a man has by the comprehensiveness of his mind + to enjoy the future, has no apparent limits." + + 18. "It is of no avail in the argument concerning the existence of a + Deity, that we have no conception of him, since it does not imply + impossibility of his existence that we have no idea at all upon the + subject." + + + INADMISSIBLE OR INCONCLUSIVE. + + 1. "The question of the existence of a Deity is important." + + 2. "A Theist has a higher sense of personal dignity than an + atheist." + + 3. "The conduct of an atheist must give concern to those who are not + so." + + 4. "An atheist believes himself to be, at his death, for ever + excluded from returning life." + + 5. "There are more atheists than unbelievers in revelation." + + 6. "Men of letters may have the same bias to incredulity as others + to credulity, because they are subject to a wrong association of + ideas, as well as other persons though in a less degree." + + 7. "Whoever first made a thing, for example a chair or a table, must + have had an adequate idea of it's nature and use." + + 8. "If a table had a designing cause, the tree from whence the wood + came, and the man who made the table must have had a designing + cause, which comprehended all the powers and properties of trees and + men." + + 9. "All the visible universe, as far as we can judge, bears the + marks of being one work, and therefore must have had a cause of + infinite power and intelligence." + + 10. "We might as well say a table had no cause, as that the world + had none." + + 11. "A Being originally and necessarily capable of comprehending + itself, it is not improper to call infinite, for we can have no idea + of any bounds to it's knowledge or power." + + 12. "A series of finite causes cannot possibly be carried back + _ad infinitum_." + + 13. "Our imagination revolts at the idea of an intellectual soul of + the universe, that is, of an intelligence resulting from + arrangement." + + 14. "The actual existence of the universe compels us to come at last + to an _originally existent and intellectual Being_, because if the + immediate maker of the universe has not existed from all eternity, + he must have derived his being and senses from one who has, and that + being we call God." + + 15. "God must be present to all his works, if we admit no power can + act but where it is, he must therefore exist every where, because + his works are every where." + + 16. "As no being can unmake or materially change himself (at least + none can annihilate himself) so God is unchangeable, for no Being + God made can change him and no other Being can exist but what God + made." + + 17. "Two infinite intelligent beings of the same kind would + coincide, therefore there can only be one God." + + 18. "Nothing can be more evident, than that plants and animals could + not have proceeded from each other from all eternity." + + 19. "That happiness is the design of the creation because health is + designed and sickness is only an exception, not a general rule is as + evident as that the design of the Mill-wright must have been, that + his machine should not be obstructed." + + 20. "As a state of sickness is comparatively rare with a state of + health, happiness the result of health, and the end of the creation + happiness, so the end of the creation is already in a great measure + answered." + + 21. "Pleasure tends to continue and propagate itself, pain to check + and exterminate itself." + + 22. "As our knowledge and power in respect to shunning pains and + procuring pleasures advance with our experience, nothing is wanting + to enable us to exterminate all pains, but a continuance of being. + + 23. "Our enjoyments continually increase in real value from infancy + to old age." + + 24. "A future moral distribution is probable, because God is + infinitely powerful and wise." + + 25. "Since reverence, gratitude, obedience, confidence are duties to + men, so they are to God; and as we pray to men, so we should pray to + God." + + 26. "Prescience, predetermination and infinite benevolence are no + argument against prayer to the Deity." + + 27. "A wish produced by nature is evidence of the thing wished for, + but a future state is wished for, therefore there is evidence of a + future state." + + 28. "As we have no idea how we came originally to be produced, for + what we know to the contrary our reproduction may be as much the + course of nature as our original production.." + + 29. "A gloom and melancholy belong more to atheists than to devout + people." + + + + + +OBSERVATIONS. + + +Dr. Priestley will hardly doubt, after this collection from his work +that it has at least been read before it is attempted to be answered. +It is in the writer's power to quote the page and line for each +assertion, but it would be stuffing this publication with unnecessary +references. Dr. Priestley will be able to know what are his own +sentiments and what not without recurring to his printed Letters. +There has been also another difficulty in classing the several exceptions +under the different heads; what is false, what is absurd, and what is +inadmissible bordering so nearly on each other. Nice distinctions +cannot in such respect be made, but the whole together form the main +argument which is to be answered. + +The first and principal assertion is, that effects have their adequate +cause; it is then added, that the universe is an effect, that it +therefore must have a cause, and to this cause in the English language +is given the name of God. This proposition is true, provided the +universe is an effect, but that is a _postulatum_ without concession +and without a proof. This _original Being_ he advances in another place +to be that only something which existed uncaused from all eternity, and +which could not have been a Being, like a man or a table, incapable of +comprehending, itself, for such existences would require another +superior Being. But if the universe is not adopted as an effect, if +it is taken as existing from all eternity, the universe becomes an +intelligent Being, and there or no where is the Deity sought after. +Such a Being we may properly speak of and reason upon. The whole is +subjected to our sensations and our experience. But of his own +_uncaused Being_ Dr. P. says we cannot properly speak. Is not that +alone an argument of there being no such thing? His friend Dr. Clarke +says, we cannot have an idea of an impossible thing. Now this +discovered Deity is allowed to be that of which we can have no idea. +So far at least it is allied to the impossible. + +As to the argument of cause and effect, the latter certainly implies +the former; but when we give the name of effect to any thing, we must +be certain it is an effect, for we may be so far mistaken perhaps as to +call that an effect which is a cause, at least what is an effect to-day +may be a cause to-morrow, as in the instance of generation; for though +a son does not beget his father, he too has his offspring in which he +may be said to live over again, and if we are to argue only from +experience, most probably that alone is the resurrection and the life +to come. But if it is contended that our experience relates only to +finite causes, or causes incapable of comprehending themselves, it must +at the same time be allowed, that all our reasoning is founded only on +experience. This Dr. P. at least allows even while he keeps reasoning +about a Deity, which he calls an infinite cause capable of comprehending +itself, though nobody is capable of comprehending it, and of which we +therefore can have no experience. Yet he will assert, that _thinking_ +persons seldom are convinced by _thinking_. This is odd language for a +reasoner. When another philosopher or divine attempts to prove a God in +their own way, Dr. Priestley can readily see his fallacies and +absurdities. Dr. Clarke, the former great champion of God Almighty, is +made very light of. He thought, foolish man, to prove the existence of +a Deity merely by our having an idea of that existence, which would go +to prove the truth of every unnatural conceit that ever entered into +the heart of man; and contended farther that it would be equally absurd +to suppose no Deity as two and two did not make four. It would indeed +be absurd, says Dr. Priestley provided we agreed that the universe is a +_caused_ existence, for God is the name we give for the cause of the +universe, which in such case must exist. It is only denying that the +universe is a caused existence, and then the absurdity is taken away. +Dr. Priestley, for the sake of making Dr. Clarke absurd, will readily +allow the denial capable of being made; and for the same purpose he +seems gravely to have taken upon himself to prove that school-boy's +difficulty, that two and two do make four, for he says, that four is +the term agreed upon in language to be given to the sum total of two +and two, and that to deny the Deity is at least not so absurd as to say +that two and two do not make four. + +Dr. Priestley says he finds no difficulty in excluding every thing from +the mind except space and duration. He allows then at least, that there +is no manifest absurdity in supposing there is no Deity, for nothing +can be proved by reasoning if the conclusion can be denied without +absurdity, nor can there be a manifest absurdity in denying the +existence of what there is no difficulty in excluding from the mind. +Yet after all he adds (somewhat inconsistently) that we cannot exclude +the idea of a Deity, if we do not exclude an existent universe. This +Deity he defines to be a most simple Being; simple and infinite; terms +which but ill agree together. + +The infinite or boundless existence of this pretended Deity is a +property more insisted upon than any other, and whatever other +properties are given to him they are all in the infinite degree. The +properties alledged to be proved are, eternity, infinite knowledge and +power, unchangeableness, unity, omnipotence, action from all eternity, +and independence. Benevolence and moral government are also ascribed to +him but confessedly with a less degree of certainty, though the most +desireable of all his given properties. Upon the subject of benevolence, +Dr. Priestley only advances, that where it is not proved by the +happiness of his creatures to exist, he would rather chuse to conclude +he mist of his design, that is, he wanted power or knowledge, than that +he wanted benevolence. If he means to argue that it is more rational to +conclude this Deity wanted power and knowledge than that he wanted +benevolence, and because Dr. Priestley fancies himself to have proved +the Deity cannot want the two former, he concludes the Deity cannot +want the latter, as the less probable for him to be deficient in, his +argument is no more a truism. As a wish, that the Deity may not want +benevolence, in that sense let him take it as agreed upon. He allows +that misery in the human species proves malevolence in the Deity, and +happiness the contrary. All the proof adduced in favour of benevolence +is in asserting that throughout the universe, good is more predominant +than evil. The infinite extent of benevolence he will allow incapable +of proof; but then it is said that the evils which mankind endure are +not so great as might be inflicted upon them; that virtue to vice, +happiness to misery, health to sickness bear at least equal proportions. +That lesser evils exist instead of greater is indeed but a poor proof +in the favour of the benevolence of an all-powerful Being. Or grant, +that good is more predominant than evil, this surely is no proof +neither of the benevolence of a kind and all-powerful Being. Yet +Dr. Priestley adds that the general benevolence of the Deity is +unquestionable. How unquestionable? It is questioned by the author +himself, and he declares he cannot prove it. After this he asks, who +will pretend to dictate to such a Being? He might in the same stile +conclude that no objection deserved a reply. The whole of this is +absurd; but when the Doctor begins to feel enthusiasm he is like the +rest of the ecclesiastical arguers. They reason themselves into +imaginary Beings with more imaginary properties and then fall down and +worship them. God is said to have made man in the image of himself. If +he has done so, man is up with him, for he in return makes God in his +own image. Much as the imagination of one man differs from another, so +differs the God of each devotee. They are all idolaters or +anthropomorphites to a man; there is none but an atheist that is not +the one or the other. + +The admission of evil into the world is an argument so exceedingly +conclusive against at least a good Deity, that it is curious to see how +Dr. Priestley studies to get rid of that difficulty. He partly denies +the fact, at least he says there is more good than evil in the world. +At last he even turns evil into good, or what ought to be the effects +of one, into what ought to be the effects of the other, as he says pain +is necessary for happiness. But if pain is, as he says, in this world +necessary for happiness, why will it not still be necessary hereafter? +He answers, because by that time we shall have experienced pain enough +for a future supply of happiness. If it is objected, why have we not +had pain enough by the time each of us are twenty or thirty years of +age, instead of waiting 'till our deaths at so many different ages? He +can only finish his argument by allowing that the ways of God are +inscrutable to man, that every thing is for the best and refer us to +_Candide_ for the rest of his philosophy; nor will he ever resolve the +question, "if evil and pain are good and necessary now, why will they +not always be so? Take a view of human existence, and who can even +allow, that there is more happiness than misery in the world? Dr. +Priestley thinks to give the turn of the scale to happiness, by making +it depend intirely upon health, notwithstanding he says in another +place that human sensations are a mass collected from the past, present +and future, and as a man grows up the present goes on to bear a less +proportion to the other two. It would indeed be a short but lame way of +proving that "happiness is the design of the creation" because health +is designed, and sickness is only an exception, not a general rule." +Many a healthy man has certainly been unhappy, or else had a man better +study health than virtue. If the mill-wright make a poor machine he is +a poor workman; God in like manner designing health and introducing +sickness is but a poor physician. In another place Dr. Priestley having +considered, that he had asserted that human sensations arise from ideas +of the past and future as well as the present, finds himself obliged to +alter his notions of happiness, so far as to say that happiness is more +intellectual than corporeal. But it is rather extraordinary to assert +at the same time, that happiness is the necessary consequence of +health, and that happiness is more from intellectual than corporeal +feelings. Surely health, if any thing, is corporeal. Another curious +fancy about pain and happiness is, that our finite nature not admitting +infinite or unlimited happiness we must leave it to the wisdom of the +Deity to determine which is best for us (since happiness must be +diminished) a little pain to be added to it or somewhat of happiness to +be taken away. It hardly requires the skill of a benevolent Deity to +determine which is best for the creatures he has made (and whom he +wishes to be as happy as their finite nature will admit) to lessen +their degree of happiness or mix therein a proportion of misery. To +conclude he asks, "how it is possible to teach children caution, but by +feeling pain?" It is easy to allow in answer, that it might not perhaps +be possible in us. But he is arguing about the benevolence of a Deity. +It was possible, he will allow, in him to have given these children +knowledge without pain, at least if he continues to him the attribute +he allows of omnipotence. + +Next he observes that parents suspend at times their benefits to their +offspring, when persuaded they are not for their good; so does the +Deity. But before this argument holds he must therefore say, it is not +for the good of man to be made happy now, and that the Deity can be +infinitely benevolent without willing either infinite or universal +happiness. Take the argument any way, it must go against his +benevolence or his power; and the same observations hold as to his love +of justice, whilst he is so tardy in punishing offenders. + +After observing that things are in an improving state, Dr. Priestley +allows, that the moral government of the universe is not perfect. From +thence he proceeds to assert, that atheists may believe it within the +course of nature, that men as moral agents may after death be +re-produced, and therefore that there may be a future state though +there be no God, because he reasons it may be in the course of nature. +This allows that the course of nature may be as it is without a God, +and that there is therefore no _natural_ proof of a Deity. His farther +argument on this head is, that "things usually happen in a state of +nature that are proper. A future state is proper. (To carry on the +supposed state of melioration and complete the moral government of the +universe.) It is therefore probable." This is an argument perhaps more +of wish than probability, but let it have such force as belongs to it. +It is not the wish of the answerer by supporting atheism to give +encouragement to immorality, but should he unwarily or with weak minds +do so, the argument of the Deity's existence is independent of such +considerations. It were better to seek another support for morality +than a belief in God; for the moral purpose in believing a Deity (an +invisible Being, maker of all, our moral governor, who will hereafter +take cognizance of our conduct,) is not a little checked by +considering, that he leaves the proof of his very existence so +ambiguous, that even men with a habit of piety upon them cannot but +have their doubts, whilst on this existence so much of the moral +purpose depends. If this is not an argument against the morality of a +Deity, it is at all events one against his _infinite_ morality though +moral is an attribute to be given to him in the infinite degree as much +as any other. + +It is said, infinite intelligence must have procured a necessary +fitness of things, and that this forms morality. "His will could not +be biassed by other influence; therefore he must have willed morality, +because necessarily fit." Then comes infinite power, and yet no +morality in the world or a very small portion of it. We cannot to any +purpose, do what we will, argue against experience. That it must be, +yet that it is not. What must be, will be. If it is not, there is no +_must_ in the case. + +It is next said, that virtue gives a better chance for happiness than +vice. This also is but a weak argument for the moral government of the +universe, unless it be for a moral government by chance. Virtue ought +to be the certain and immediate parent of happiness, if a moral +governor existed with an uncontrouled dominion. If virtue tends to +happiness, or has only a better chance of doing so, it is allowed, that +a sensible atheist should hold it right to be virtuous. The latter end +of a righteous man is certainly more likely to be happy than that of an +unrighteous one. But let an atheist be righteous, and he can be as +certain of happiness in his latter end as any other. Let another life +be desirable, as it certainly is, his doubts upon it will not prevent +it. Who could wish an end better or more happy than that of Mr. Hume, +who most indubitably was an atheist. But if an atheist be not so good +as a Theist, Dr. Priestley perhaps, will allow him to be better than +a sceptic, as any principles for systematising nature are better than +none at all. A Theist is not without his doubts as well as the sceptic; +an atheist, once firmly becoming so, will never doubt more; for we may +venture to say no miracles or new appearances will present themselves +to him to draw his belief aside. + +Still every thing is as God intended it--so asserts Dr. Priestley; and +therefore it cannot by him be denied that crimes and vices, are of his +intention. The Theist exclaims in triumph, "He that made the eye, must +he not see?" But who made the eye? Or grant that God made the eye, +which can only see in the light, must he necessarily see in the dark? +It is again asserted, "the power which formed an eye had something in +view as certainly as he that constructed a telescope. If any Being +formed any eye, grant it. But if the eye exists necessarily as a part +of nature; as much as any other matter, or combination of matter, +necessarily existed, the result of the argument is intirely different. + +It is far from being a necessary part of the atheist's creed to exclude +design from the universe. He places that design in the energy of +nature, which Dr. Priestley gives to some other extraneous Being. It is +rather inconsistent also in him to say, that an atheist rightly judging +of his own situation upon his own principles, ought not to hold himself +quite secure from a future state of responsibility and existences, and +yet to say he must in his own ideas hold himself soon to be excluded +for ever from life. + +As to the immutability of the Deity, it is difficult to guess how that +is proved, except by the argument of _Lucus a non lucendo_, because +every thing is changing here; therefore the Deity never changes; which +is neither an argument _a priori_ nor _posteriore_, but _sui generis_, +merely applicable to the Deity. + +From the imperial infinite intelligence of the Deity an argument is +formed of his unity. Dr. Priestley says, "that two _infinite_ +intelligent Beings would coincide, and therefore that there can only be +one such Being." Two parallels will never coincide. That is one of the +first axioms of Euclid, in whom Dr. Priestley believes as much as in +his bible. If the Beings are infinite in extent and magnitude they must +certainly coincide, but if they are only infinite in intelligence, it +does not seem to be necessary that they should. + +The ubiquity of God is proved in this short way: "God made every thing, +God controuls every thing. No power can act but where it is. Therefore +God is present every where." The workman must certainly be present at +his work, but when the work is done he may go about other business. If +all the properties of matter, such as gravity, elasticity and other +such existed only by the perpetual leave and agency of the Deity, it +may be argued he is in all places where matter is. Space, empty space +will still exist without him. In this mode of proof Dr. Priestley must, +contrary to the Newtonian system argue for a _Plenum_, before he proves +the ubiquity. He cannot exclude space from his mind, nor can he exclude +gravity from matter. Yet can he admit matter as well as space to be +eternal, because he will not allow the inactivity of God." "If God's +works had a beginning he must have been _for a whole eternity_ +inactive." He seems to have an odd notion of eternity, for he there +allows it could have an end. The argument would be fairer in concluding +"he must have been inactive _or doing something else_." + +The Deity set up, if not the creator of matter, is at least the matter +of it, nor will his advocates by any means allow him to be material +himself. They see some incongruity in admitting one piece of matter to +be so complete a master of another. However Dr. Priestley and other +arguers for a Deity would do well to consider, that whatever is not +matter, is a space that matter may occupy. Therefore if God is not +matter, and also is not space, he is nothing. Dr. Priestley allows +matter eternal, and its properties of gravity, elasticity, electricity +and others equally eternal. He says directly, that matter cannot exist +without it's perpetually corresponding powers. The adjustment of those +powers he places in the Deity. But as we never see matter without the +adjustment of those properties as well as the existence of them, this +drives him at last to say, the Deity must also have created matter, +according to his system eternally created it, cotemporarily with +himself. Ideas absurd and irreconcileable! + +Discoursing upon the hypothesis of "a fortuitous concourse of atoms" +Dr. Priestley asks, "what reason we have to think that small masses of +matter can have power without communication _ab extra_?" Let this +question be returned, "have we not reason to think so from attraction +the most common property in matter." To get rid of this difficulty he +will not allow an atom of matter to be possessed originally of the most +simple powers, though he is ready to allow matter to have been eternal. +A magnet according to this system must sometime have existed without +its magnetic power. He concludes there must be some original existent +Being. He shall be allowed many original existent Beings if it pleases +him. A man may be an originally existent being, as well as any other. +He is superior to other animals in this world. In like manner there may +be allowed superior Beings to man (as most probably there are) and yet +those superior Beings not have made man. + +Dr. Priestley will have it, that all bodies are moved by external +force. That does not seem quite necessary. Motion may as well be +asserted to be originally a property of matter, or its true natural +state and rest a deprivation of that property, as that rest should be +its natural state. Hume thought so and Hume was no great fool, +notwithstanding Dr. Priestley makes so light of him. In fact matter +never is, and therefore most probably never was found to be in a state +of rest. Nor has Dr. Priestley any reason to suppose gravity, elasticity +and electricity to have been imprest on bodies by a superior Being, and +not originally inherent in matter, unless to favour his own hypothesis +of a Deity. He absolutely says matter could not have had those powers +without a communication from a superior and intelligent Being. If +matter is perceived in regulated motion, it is added bluntly, that it +must be by a mover possessed of a competent intelligence, and that a +Being therefore of such power and intelligence _must_ exist. Whoever +finds no difficulty in believing the contrary will find as little +difficulty in Mr. Hume's hypothesis, that motion might as well as other +powers and properties have been originally inherent in matter, or at +least have been a necessary result of some matter acting upon another. + +It has always been a doubt with Theists, whether they can better prove +their God's existence by moral or physical considerations. Dr. +Priestley seems to think the _forte_ of the argument lies in the latter +proof, and lays particular stress upon his observation respecting cause +and effect, which therefore cannot here be so readily dismissed. He +makes great reference to the works of art. Theists are always for +turning their God into an overgrown man. Anthropomorphites has long +been a term applied to them. They give him hands and eyes nor can they +conceive him otherwise than as a corporeal Being. In which, as before +has been said, they are very right, for there can only be in the world +body and the space which bodies occupy. But granting this great workman +to have done so much, is it not quite an incontrovertible proposition, +that whoever first made a thing, as, for example, a chair or a table, +must have had an adequate idea of it's nature and use. Dr. Priestley +speaks more correctly in another part, by saying, he must have been +_capable_ of comprehending it. The nature and use of things are often +found out after they are made and by different persons than the makers +of them. Neither is there any analogy between the works of art, as a +table or house, and of nature, as a man or tree. Therefore there can be +no arguing from one to another by analogy. Hume observes that the +former works are done by reason and design, and the latter by +generation and vegetation, and therefore arguing from effect to causes, +it is probable, that the universe is generated or vegetated. At least +after all the observations about a table, it may be modestly asked, +whether there is not some difference between a table and the world? The +Doctor will also find some difficulty in explaining the propriety of +any argument of analogy between men and metals, which he does not at +other times scruple to make? + +A _gratis_ assertion is first made, that all things we see are effects; +then because we see one thing caused, every thing must have been +caused. His conclusion of the argument is still more curious, "because +every thing was caused there must have been something that was not +caused." The cause ought to be proportioned to the effect. The effect +is not infinite. Why then attribute infinity to the cause? This is +Hume's argument. Priestley calls it shortly unworthy of a philosopher. +Let others judge! But surely, with all this infinity it may be asked, +why may not there have been an infinity of causes? + +Another argument is, that being unable to account, for what is, by any +thing visible, we must have recourse to something invisible, and that +invisible power is what he calls God. Apply this argument to gravity, +and the external force that is said to cause every stone to fall is +God. But if nothing visible can to us account for the operations of +nature, why must we have recourse to what is invisible? Why necessary +to account at all for them? Or why may not visible things account for +them, although this person or another cannot tell which? + +If nothing can begin to exist of itself or by the energy of material +nature, it is more consistent to allow a plurality of Deities, than one +immediate Deity. An equality in a plurality of Deities might be +objectionable. But that is not at all necessary, rather the contrary; +and so was the Pagan theory, which is not so absurd as the modern one. +This universe or mundane system may be the work of one hand, another of +another, and so on. Where is the absurdity of that? If the universe is +applied to the solar system, there is an appearance of its being formed +by one design, and in that stile it might be said to be the work of one +hand. But this Deity is asserted to be infinite, and to have made all +other worlds and universes, though it does not appear by any unity of +design that all other worlds and universes are one work with this. + +Dr. Priestley himself allows that reason would drive us to require a +cause of the Deity. He is himself obliged to conclude, after all his +reasoning, that we must acquiesce in our inability of having any idea +on the subject; that is, how God could exist without a prior cause. At +the same time he says the Deity cannot have a cause, and therefore we +cannot reason about him. Why then all his own reasoning? We make a +Deity ourselves, fall down and worship him. It is the molten calf over +again. Idolatry is still practised. The only difference is that now we +worship idols of our imagination; before of our hands. "Still we must +necessarily rest at a Being that is infinite;" that is, when our reason +drives us to the admission of an infinite cause we must necessarily +stop finitely in our career. Not content with this conclusion he adds, +that we cannot help perceiving the existence of this cause, though he +owns that it is not an object of our conceptions. But even the Theist's +argument does not necessarily drive us to the admission of an infinite +cause. The argument is, "because there is a man, and man has +intelligence, we must necessarily admit of a Being of infinitely +superior intelligence." Would it not be nearly as well to argue, +"because there is a goose, therefore there must be a man." + +What is there more which hinders a series of finite causes to be +carried back _ad infinitum_, than that the reasoner or contemplator of +the course of nature is tired. If this eternal series could not exist, +a Deity might with some propriety be said to follow. Put the argument +into a syslogistic form. + +"The universe shews design;" + +"It is absurd to suppose an infinite succession of finite causes;" + +"Therefore there is an uncaused intelligent cause of this universe." + +Deny the second assertion and the problem is destroyed. So far from its +being difficult to suppose an eternity, it is the most difficult thing +in the world to suppose any thing but an eternity. A mind, not afraid +to think, will find it the most easy contemplation in the world to +dwell upon. It is at least a bold assertion, that _nothing can be more +evident_ than that plants and animals could not have proceeded from each +other by succession from all eternity. Surely to this may be answered, +that it is more evident that two and two make four. But Dr. Priestley +goes on to say, "that the primary cause of a man cannot be a man, any +more than the cause of a sound can be a sound." Experience shews us all +sound is an effect of a cause. Does experience shew us more of a man +than that he came from a man and a woman? To allow therefore that all +men must have come from a man and a woman is as far as we can argue +upon the subject, whilst in reasoning we trust to experience. An +argument is well built upon similarity, therefore it is probable if one +horse had a cause all horses had. But will not the argument be more +consonant to itself, in supposing all horses had the same cause, and as +one is seen to be generated from a horse and a mare so all were from +all eternity. It were a better argument in favour of a Deity or some +invisible agent to shew that a new animal came every now and then into +life, without any body's knowing how or where. + +It is allowed by Priestley and all other reasoners, that the most +capital argument that can be formed in support of any thesis is to be +built upon experience, or analogy to experience. Yet will many of these +reasoners, Dr. Priestley at least for one, contend at the same time for +the probability of a future life, when no instance can be given of any +revival whatsoever. The same will contend, that their Deity can at +pleasure form new species of animals, though in fact we never do see +new beings come into existence. We ought only to argue from experience; +and experience would teach us, that the species of all animals has +eternally existed. Grant that we do not know, whether man has been +eternal, or from a time, is it therefore because we do not know, that +we must say he came from God? That unknown Being, as he is sometimes +pompously and ridiculously called! The Devil is equally an unknown +Being. The admission of evil under a good Deity opens a ready door to +the manichean system, which seems much more rational than simple Deism. + +The following chain of reasoning, as used by Dr. Priestley, is well +linked together to prove the weight and force of experience in +reasoning, but it proves nothing more. "Chairs and tables are made by +men or beings of similar powers, because we see them made by men; and +we cannot suppose them made by a tree or come into being of themselves, +because that is against experience. No one will say one table might +make another, or that one man might make another. We see nothing come +into being without an adequate cause." Yet for this adequate cause we +are at the same time referred to a belief in a causeless secret +invisible agent, and to our own experience, for a proof of his nature. + +Dr. Priestley allows, that what is _visible_ in man may be the feat of +all his powers, for it is (as he says,) a rule in philosophy not to +multiply causes without necessity. But he affirms that what is _visible_ +in the universe cannot be the feat of intelligence. This is breaking +the very rule of reasoning which he himself has chosen to adopt; and he +gives no other reason for it, than because we do not see the universe +think as we do man. Sensible of this dilemma, soon afterwards he +inclines to allow principle of thought to the universe, for he adds, +that if we allow it, yet the universe has so much the appearance of +other works of design that we must look out for its author as much as +that of a man; and it is allowed that most probably it had the same +author. + +Every difficulty vanishes with the energy of nature, or at least is +as well accounted for as from an independent Deity. It is an usual +question to those philosophers, who maintain that the present existence +of things is the result of the force and energy of nature acting upon +herself, "why this force does not perpetually operate and produce new +appearances?" Besides that this question may be retorted upon the +supporters of a Deity, I am thoroughly persuaded, that this force is +constantly in action, and that every change which animals and +vegetables undergo, whether of dissolution or renovation, is a manifest +and undeniable proof of it. Man, and the other Beings which occupy this +terrestrial globe, are evidently suited to its present state, and an +alteration in their habitation, such as that of extreme or excessive +heat, would inevitably destroy them. This is so certain, that bones of +animals have been dug up which appertain to no species now existing, +and which must have perished from an alteration in the system of things +taking place too considerable for it to endure. Whenever the globe +shall come to that temperament fit for the life of that lost species, +whatever energy in nature produced it originally, if even it had a +beginning, will most probably be sufficient to produce it again. Is not +the reparation of vegitable life the spring equally wonderful now as +its first production? Yet this is a plain effect of the influence of +the sun, whose absence would occasion death by a perpetual winter. So +far this question from containing, in my opinion, a formidable +difficulty to the Epicurean system, I cannot help judging the continual +mutability of things as an irrefragable proof of this eternal energy of +nature. Those who ask, why the great changes in the state of things are +not more frequent, would absurdly require them to ensue within the +short space of their existence, forgetting that millions of ages are of +no importance to the whole mass of matter, though Beings of some +particular forms may find a wish and an advantage to prolong the term +of their duration under that form. + +If it is said, Nature or the energy of nature is another name for the +Deity, then may Dr. Priestley and his answerer shake hands; the one is +no more an atheist than the other. And if it is observed that the +Energy of Nature having produced men may be capable of re-producing +them, so that an atheist is not sure to escape punishment for his +crimes, it is easy to say in return, neither is a Deist sure. A good +atheist has no more reason to be afraid to be re-produced than a good +Deist or a Christian. It may be useful for both of them to be good. If +necessary let it again be repeated, that it is not at all meant in this +answer to make atheism a plea or protection for immorality. That is a +charge long and most unjustly put upon the poor undefended atheist. The +knowledge of a God and even the belief of a providence are found but +too slight a barrier against human passions, which are apt to fly out +as licentiously as they would otherwise have done. All, which this +creed can in reality produce, scarce goes beyond some exterior +exercises, which are vainly thought to reconcile man to God. It may +make men build temples, sacrifice victims, offer up prayers, or perform +something of the like nature; but never break a criminal intrigue, +restore an ill gotten wealth, or mortify the lust of man. Lust being +the source of every crime, it is evident (since it reigns as much among +idolaters and anthropomorphites, as among atheists) idolaters and +anthropomorphites must be as susceptible of all of crimes as atheists, +and neither the one set nor the other could form societies, did not a +curb, stronger then that of religion, namely human laws, repress their +perverseness. If no other remedy were applied to vice than the +remonstrances of divines, a great city such as London, would in a +fortnight's time, fall into the most horrid disorders. Whatever may be +the difference of faith, vice predominates alike with the Christian and +the Jew, with the Deist and the atheist. So like are they in their +actions, that one would think they copied one another. Religion may +make men follow ceremonies; little is the inconvenience found in them. +A great triumph truly for religion to make men baptise or fast? When +did it make men do virtuous actions for virtue's sake, or practise +fewer inventions to get rich, where riches could not be acquired +without poverty to others? The true principle most commonly seen in +human actions, and which philosophy will cure sooner than religion, is +the natural inclination of man for pleasure, or a taste contracted for +certain objects by prejudice and habit. These prevail in whatsoever +faith a man is educated, or with whatever knowledge he may store his +mind. + +But it will be said, those who commit crimes are atheists at the time +at least they do so. But an atheist cannot be superstitious, and +criminals are often so at the very moment of their crimes. Religious +persuasion men are not doubted to have when they vent their rage upon +others of a different way of thinking, when they express a dread of +danger or a zeal for ceremonies. These at least are not virtues; and +few indeed must be those, who at any time are really Theists, if their +faith is lost or forgotten every time they have a mind to indulge a +vitious passion. To support still the efficacy of religion in making +men virtuous is to oppose metaphysical reasoning to the truth of fact; +it is like the philosopher denying motion, and being refuted by one of +his scholars walking across the room. If then it is true, as history +and the whole course of human life shew it is, that men can still +plunge themselves into all sorts of crimes, though they are persuaded +of the truth of religion, which is made to inform them that God +punishes sin and rewards good actions, it cannot but be suspected that +religion even encourages crimes, by the hopes it gives of pardon +through the efficacy of prayer; at all events it must be granted, that +those who hold up a belief in God as a sufficient proof and character +of a good life are most egregiously mistaken. + +Some Theists may have lighter sense of personal dignity than some +atheists. If the Theist thinks himself allied to and connected with +the Deity he may plume himself upon his station; but how apt are +those worshipers of a God, instead of having a high sense of personal +dignity, to debase themselves into the most abject beings, dreading +even the shadow of their own phantom. An atheist feeling himself to be +a link in the grand chain of Nature, feels his relative importance and +dreads no imaginary Being. An atheist, who is so from inattention and +without intelligence, may indeed feel himself as much debased as the +meanest and most humble Theist. + +Another argument against atheists is, that where men are atheists it is +generally found that their usual turn of thinking and habits of life +have inclined to make them so. Is not this to be turned upon Theists? +But granting that the idea of a supreme author is more pleasing, and +that the argument with respect to the existence or non-existence of a +God was in _equilibrio_, it is not therefore right to conclude that the +mind ought to be determined by this or any other bias. Nor is it quite +clear if there is no God (by which term let it again be noticed, is +meant a Being of supreme intelligence, the contriver of the material +universe and yet no part of the material system) that the world in +which man inhabits is either fatherless or deserted. The wisdom of +nature supplies in reality what is only hoped for from the protection +of the Deity. If the world has so good a mother, a father may well be +spared especially such a haughty jealous, and vindictive one as God is +most generally represented to be. Dr. Priestley being clear in his +opinion; that the being of a God is capable of being proved by reason, +is not so weak as some of his fellow-labourers, who hold the powers of +reason in so low estimation as to be incapable of themselves to arrive +at almost any truth. He must however allow, if reason proves a Deity +and his attributes there was less use of revelation to prove them. But +the learned advocates of a Deity differ greatly among themselves, +whether his existence is capable of being ascertained by fixt +principles of reason. After such a difference and the instance of so +many great men in all ages, from Democritus downward, who have +confidently denied the being of a God, whose arguments the learned Dr. +Cudworth, in the last century, only by fully and fairly stating, with +all the answers in his power to give (though his zeal in religion was +never doubted) was thought by other divines to have given a weight to +atheism not well to be overturned, it is surprising that it should be +the common belief of this day, that an argument in support of atheism +cannot stand a moment, and that even no man in his senses can ever hold +such a doctrine. All that Epicurus and Lucretius have so greatly and +convincingly said is swept away in a moment by these better reasoners, +who yet scruple not to declare, with Dr. Priestley, that what they +reason about is not the subject of human understanding. But let it be +asked, is it not absurd to reason with a man about that of which that +same man asserts we have no idea at all? Yet will Dr. Priestley argue, +and say it is of no importance, whether the person with whom he argues +has a conception or not of the subject. "Having no ideas includes no +impossibility," therefore he goes on with his career of words to argue +about an unseen being with another whom he will allow to have no idea +of the subject and yet it shall be of no avail in the dispute, whether +he has or no, or whether he is capable or incapable of having any. +Reason failing, the passions are called upon, and the imagined God is +represented at one time, with all the terrors of a revengeful tyrant, +at another with all the tenderness of an affectionate parent. Shall +then such a tremendous Being with such a care for the creatures he has +made, suffer his own existence to be a perpetual doubt? If the course +of nature does not give sufficient proof, why does not the hand divine +shew itself by an extraordinary interposition of power? It is allowed +miracles ought not to be cheap or plenty. One or two at least every +thousand years might be admitted. But this is a perpetual standing +miracle, that such a Being as the depicted God, the author of nature +and all its works, should exist and yet his existence be perpetually in +doubt, or require a Jesus, a Mahomet or a Priestley to reveal it. Is +not the writing of this very answer to the last of those three great +luminaries of religion a proof, that no God, or no _such_ God at least, +exists. Hear the admirable words of the author of "The System of +Nature;" _Comment permet il qu'un mortel comme moi ose attaquer ses +droits, ses titres, son existence meme?_ + +Dr. Clarke, Mr. Hume and Helvetius, are writers whose arguments for and +against a Godhead Dr. Priestley has much noted. The former says, "the +Deity must have been infinite, if self-existent, because all things in +the universe are made by him." Are all things in the universe infinite? +Why an infinite maker of a finite work? It is juster to argue, that +whatever is self-existent must have been eternal. Nor is there any +great objection to the converse of the proposition properly taken, that +whatever is not self-existent must have been created and therefore +cannot have been eternal. If this is fair arguing, matter cannot +according to Dr. Priestley's system have been created and be eternal +also. But Dr. Priestley has no inclination to reconcile his opinions +with those of Dr. Clarke. He has chosen a fairer method, and that is, +to refute the arguments of former asserters of a Deity as well as to +establish his own. Dr. Clarke he most effectually exposes where he +enters upon the subject of space. It seems as if Dr. Clarke, having +asserted that the Deity necessarily existed, had a mind that nothing +else should necessarily exist but the Deity; and conscious that space +at least also necessarily existed, he makes universal space an +attribute of the Deity. With this reverie in his head he raises a +syllogism of complete nonsense (_vide Priestley's Letters_, P. 170.) +where he supposes space to be nothing though he also supposes it to be +an attribute of the Deity. Making it therefore an attribute of the +Deity and knowing that space is eternal and unmeasurable he takes upon +himself thereby also clearly to have proved that the Deity is so. +Exclude the Deity, space will still exist and still be eternal and +immense. Dr. Priestley knew well that Dr. Clarke's argument in this +respect was all a fallacy, and therefore he shews his sense in not +adopting it. It is in fact an abuse of terms unworthy of a scientific +reasoner. + +The only argument attempted by Dr. Clarke, why the Deity must have +had no cause, is, because it is necessary he should have none. +Dr. Clarke says roundly that necessity is the cause of the existence +of the Deity. This is very near the language of the ancients, who +held that Fate controuled the Gods. Necessity is therefore the first +God. Why then any other God than Necessity? What more has Helvetius +said than that? + +It is an old and unanswerable argument that, granting a God and his +power infinite, whatever he wills is executed; but man and other +animals are unhappy, therefore he does not will they should be happy. +Or take the argument the other way and it will equally conclude against +his power. With regard to Mr. Hume's famous observations upon the +evidence of miracles, Dr. Priestley thinks to make a short havock of +them by observing that new, and therefore miraculous appearances, are +continually presenting themselves; but although such new appearances +may be instanced, they are not contrary to former experience, only in +addition to it. With this allusion to Natural Philosophy, Dr. Priestley +thinks himself in one short sentence to have discussed all Mr. Hume's +observations upon miracles. _"Which is more likely, that the relater of +a miracle should have lied or been deceived, or that the thing related +should have existed contrary to experience prior and subsequent?"_ +Let the force of this observation be considered and believe in the +history of miracles who can! To give a finishing stroke to poor +Mr. Hume, Dr. Priestley observes that literary fame was Hume's only +motive and consolation, as he said himself, in all his laborious +enquiries and enlightened writings. At this he exclaims, "What gloomy +prospect and poor comfort he must have had at his death!" If so, +how much was he the greater man so well to have gone through that +last scene! + +The honour which Dr. Priestley gives to Helvetius, the author of that +ingenious and satisfactory work intitled "The System of Nature," does +credit to his own candour. He applauds him for speaking out, he ought +therefore to applaud this answer for the same reason. It is true he +seems to have discovered one incongruity in the reasoning of Helvetius. +The words he imputes to him are, "that nature has no object, because +nature acts necessarily; man has an object; yet man also acts +necessarily." In the same way nature might have an object though it +acted necessarily. But Helvetius adds, that the object which man has is +a necessary object. The best defence of Helvetius (not in behalf of +that passage, but of his general system) is to let him speak at large +for himself; and the following quotation Dr. Priestley and the reader +may accept as a specimen of the strength and justice of his argument, +and as the conclusion of this answer. + +"Theologians tell us, that the disorder and evil, which is seen in the +world, is not absolute and real, but relatively and apparently such, +and does not disprove the divine wisdom and goodness. But may not one +reply, that the goodness and wonderful order which they so much extol, +and on which they found their notions of those qualities in God, are in +a similar way only relative and apparent. If it be only our co-existence +with the causes which surround us, and our manner of perceiving them, +that constitute the order of nature for us, and authorise us to attribute +wisdom and goodness to the maker of what surround us, should not also +our mode of existence and perception authorise us to call what is +hurtful to us disorder, and to attribute impotence, ignorance, or +malice, to that Being which we would suppose to actuate nature. + +Some pretend that the supremely wise God can derive goodness and +happiness to us from the midst of those ills which he permits us to +undergo in this world. Are these men privy counsellors of the Divinity, +or on what do they found their romantic hopes? They will doubtless say, +that they judge of God's conduct by analogy, and that from the present +appearance of his wisdom and goodness, they have a right to infer his +future wisdom and goodness. But do not the present appearances of his +want of wisdom or goodness justify us in concluding, that he will +always want them? If they are so often manifestly deficient in this +world, what can assure us that they will abound more in the next? This +kind of language therefore rests upon no other basis than a prejudiced +imagination, and signifies, that some men, having without examination, +adopted an opinion that God is good, cannot admit that he will consent +to let his creatures remain constantly unhappy. Yet this grand +hypothesis, of the unalterable felicity of mankind hereafter, is +insufficient to justify the Divinity in permitting the present sleeting +and transitory marks of injustice and disorder. If God can have been +unjust for a moment, he has derogated, during that moment at least, +from his divine perfection, and is not unchangeably good; his justice +then is liable to temporary alteration, and, if this be the case, who +can give security for his justice and goodness continuing unalterable +in a future life, the notion of which is set up only to exculpate his +deviation from those qualities in this? + +In spite of the experience, which every instant gives the lie to that +beneficence which men suppose in God, they continue to call him good. +When we bewail the miserable victims of those disorders and calamities +that so often overwhelm our species, we are confidently told that these +ills are but apparent, and that if our short-sighted mind could fathom +the depths of divine wisdom, we should always behold the greatest +blessings result from what we denominate evil. How despicable is so +frivolous an answer! If we can find no good but in such things as +affect us in a manner which is agreeable and pleasing to our actual +existence, we shall be obliged to confess that those things which +affect us, even but for a time, in a painful manner, are as certainly +evil to us. To vindicate God's visiting mankind with these evils some +tell us, that he is just, and that they are chastisements inflicted on +mankind to punish the wrongs he has received from men. Thus a feeble +mortal has the power to irritate and injure the almighty and eternal +Being who created this world. To offend any one is, to afflict him, +to diminish in some degree his happiness, to make him feel a painful +sensation. How can man possibly disturb the felicity of the +all-powerful sovereign of nature! How can a frail creature, who +has received from God his being and his temper, act against the +inclinations of an irresistable force which never consents to sin and +disorder? Besides justice, according to the only ideas which we can +have of it, supposes a fixt desire to render every one his due. But +theologians constantly preach that God owes us nothing, that the good +things he affords are the voluntary effects of his beneficence, and +that without any violence of his equity he can dispose of his creatures +as his choice or caprice may impel him. In this doctrine I see not the +smallest shadow of justice, but the most hideous tyranny and shocking +abuse of power. In fact do we not see virtue and innocence plunged into +an abyss of misery, while wickedness rears its triumphant head under +the empire of this God whose justice is so much extalled? "This misery, +say you, is but for a time." Very well, Sirs, but your God is unjust +for a time. "He chastises whom he loves (you will say) for their own +benefit." But if he is perfectly good, why will he let them suffer at +all? "He does it, perhaps to try them" But, if he knows all things, +what occasion is there for him to try any? If he is omnipotent, why +need he vex himself about the vain design any one may form against him? +Omnipotence ought to be exempt from any such passions, as having +neither equals nor rivals. But if this God is jealous of his glory, his +titles and prerogative, why does he permit such numbers of men to +offend him? Why are any found daring enough to refuse the incense which +his pride expects? _Why am I a feeble mortal permitted to attack his +titles, his attributes, and even his existence?_ Is this permission of +punishment on me for the abuse of his grace and favour? He should never +have permitted me to abuse them. Or the grace he bestowed should have +been efficacious and have directed my steps according to his liking. +"But, say you, he makes man free." Alas? why did he present him with a +gift of which he must have foreseen the abuse? Is this faculty of free +agency, which enables me to resist his power, to corrupt and rob him of +his worshippers, and in fine to bring eternal misery on myself, a +present worthy of his infinite goodness? In consequence of the +pretended abuse of this fatal present, which an omniscient and good God +ought not to have bestowed on Beings capable of abusing it, +everlasting, inexpressible torments are reserved for the transitory +crimes of a Being made liable to commit them. Would that father be +called good, reasonable, just and kind, who put a sharp-edged and +dangerous knife into the hand of a playful, and imprudent child, whom +he before knew to be imprudent, and punished him during the remainder +of his life for cutting himself with it? Would that prince be called +just and merciful, who, not regarding any proportion between the +offence and the punishment, should perpetually exercise his power of +vengeance, over one of his subjects who, being drunk, had rashly +offended against his vanity, without causing any real harm to him, +especially, when the prince had taken pains to make him drunk? Should +we consider as almighty a monarch, whose dominions were in such +confusion and disorder, that, except a small number obedient servants, +all his subjects were every instant despising his laws, defeating his +will and insulting his person? Let ecclesiastics then acknowledge, that +their God is an assemblage of incompatible qualities, as +incomprehensible to their understanding as to mine. No: they say, in +reply to these difficulties, that wisdom and justice in God, are +qualities so much above or so unlike those qualities in us, that they +bear no relation or affinity towards human wisdom and justice. But, +pray how am I to form to myself an idea of the divine perfection, +unless it has some resemblance to those virtues which I observe in my +fellow creatures and feel in myself? If the justice of God is not the +same with human justice, why lastly do any men pretend to announce it, +comprehend and explain it to others?" + + + + + + +POSTSCRIPT. + + +Previous to this publication the editor sent the following Letter +to Dr. Priestley. + + +"Reverend Sir, + +Had you thought it impossible for man to hold different sentiments +respecting Natural religion and the proof of the existence of a God +than you do, the Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever would not have +appeared, much less would you have invited an answer by promising a +reply to every objection. Differing from you in sentiment I am the man +who enter with you in the lists; but I find myself upon consultation +with my friends under more difficulties than you were, and more to +stand in need of courage in taking up the glove, than you needed to +have in throwing it down. For this dispute is not like others in +philosophy, where the vanquished can only dread ridicule, contempt and +disappointment; here, whether victor or vanquished, your opponent has +to dread, beside ecclesiastical censure, the scourges, chains and +pillories of the courts of Law. + +I accuse you not of laying a trap for an unguarded author, but I ask +your friendly opinion, whether I can, with temporal safety at least, +maintain the contrary of your arguments in proof of a Deity and his +attributes. If I cannot, no wonder the Theist cries _Victoria!_ but +then it is a little ungenerous to ask for objections. Of you, I may +certainly expect, that you will promise to use your influence, as well +with lawyers as ecclesiastics, not to stir up a persecution against a +poor atheist in case there should be one found in the kingdom, which +people in general will not admit to be possible; or, if a persecution +could ensue, that you and your friends, favourers of free enquiry, +will at least bear the expences of it. + + I am, + Reverend Sir, + Your most humble obedient servant, + WILLIAM HAMMON. + +Oct. 23. 1781. + +_To the Reverend Dr. Priestley._ + + +To this letter Dr. Priestley sent no answer; or no answer ever came +to hand. + + +THE END. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Answer to Dr. Priestley's Letters to a +Philosophical Unbeliever, by Matthew Turner + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 14120 *** diff --git a/old/14120.txt b/old/14120.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5e56d43 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/14120.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2172 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Answer to Dr. Priestley's Letters to a +Philosophical Unbeliever, by Matthew Turner + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Answer to Dr. Priestley's Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever + +Author: Matthew Turner + +Release Date: November 22, 2004 [EBook #14120] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ANSWER TO DR. PRIESTLEY *** + + + + + + + + + + +Attributed to Matthew Turner (d. 1788?) and William Hammon. + +Transcribed by the Freethought Archives + +NOTE: Irregularities in orthography and punctuation have been +reproduced without emendation from the first edition of 1782. + + + + + + +ANSWER TO DR. PRIESTLEY'S LETTERS TO A PHILOSOPHICAL UNBELIEVER. + +PART I. + + + +LONDON. +MDCCLXXXII + + + + + +ADVERTISEMENT. + + +The Editor of this publication has more in object to answer Dr. Priestley +than to deliver his own sentiments upon Natural Religion, which however +he has no inclination to disguise: but he does not mean to be answerable +for them farther, than as by reason and nature he is at present +instructed. The question here handled is not so much, whether a +Deity and his attributed excellences exist, as whether there is any +Natural or Moral proof of his existence and of those attributes. +Revealed knowledge is not descanted upon; therefore Christians at least +need take no offence. Doubts upon Natural Religion have not hitherto +been looked upon as attacks upon Revelation, but rather as corroborations +of it. What the Editor believes as a Christian (if he is one is +therefore another affair, nor does he reckon himself so infallible or +incapable of alteration in his sentiments, as not at another time to +adopt different ones upon more reflexion and better information; +therefore, though he has at present little or no doubt of what he +asserts (taken upon the principles laid down) he shall hold himself +totally freed from any necessity of defending the contents of this +publication if brought into controversy; and as he has no desire of +making converts, hopes he shall not himself be marked out as an object +of persecution. + +Speculative points have always been esteemed fair matters for a free +discussion. The religion established in this country is not the +religion of Nature, but the religion of Moses and Jesus, with whom the +writer has nothing to do. He trusts therefore he shall not be received +as a malevolent disturber of such common opinions as are esteemed to +keep in order a set of low wretches so inclinable to be lawless. At +least, if he attempts to substitute better foundations for morality, +malevolence can be no just charge. Truth is his aim; and no professors +of religion will allow their system to be false. Or if he should be +thought too bold a speculator, such of the ecclesiastics as will be his +opponents may rather laugh at him than fear him. They have a thousand +ways of making their sentiments go down with the bulk of mankind, to +one this poor writer has. They are an army ready marshalled for the +support of their own thesis; they are in the habit of controversy; +pulpits are open to them as well as the press; and while the present +author will be looked upon as a miracle of hardiness for daring to put +his name to what he publishes, they can without fear or imputation lift +up their heads; and should they even be known to transgress the bounds +of good sense or politeness, they will only be esteemed as more zealous +labourers in their own vocation. + + + + + +PREFATORY ADDRESS. + + +Dr. Priestley, + +Your Letters addressed to a Philosophical Unbeliever I perused, not +because I was a Philosopher or an Unbeliever; it were presumption to +give myself the former title, and at that time I certainly did not +deserve the latter; but as I was acquainted with another, who in +reality, as far as I and others who know him can judge, deserves the +title of a Philosopher and is neither ashamed nor afraid of that of an +Unbeliever, I conceived them apt to be sent to my friend, and when I +presented them to him, he said he was the person whom he should suppose +you meant to address, if you had a particular person in view; but he +had too much understanding of the world, though much abstracted from +the dregs of it, not to conceive it more probable that you meant your +Letters to be perused by thinking men in general, Believers and +Unbelievers, to confirm the former in their creed, and to convert the +latter from their error. You shall speedily know the effect they have +had in both ways. For myself I must inform you that I was brought up a +Believer from my infancy; a Theist, if a Christian is such; for I +suppose the word will be allowed, though the equivalent term of Deist +is so generally reprobated by Christians; I had before my eyes the +example of a most amiable parent; a moral man, a Christian undoubtedly; +who, when I have been attending upon him, as much from affection as +from duty upon a sick and nearly dying bed, has prayed I might be +stedfast in the faith he held, in accents still sounding in my +intellectual ear; a parent, whom for his virtues and love of his +offspring, like a Chinese, I am tempted to worship, and I could exclaim +with the first of poets, + + _"Erit ille mihi semper Deus."_ + +With such habits of education then, such fervent advice and such +reverence for my instructor, what can have turned me from my belief; +for I confess I am turned? Immorallity it is not; that I assert has not +preceded my unbelief, and I trust never will follow it; there has not +indeed yet been time for it to follow; whether it is a probable +consequence will presently be discussed; but it is _thought_, free +thought upon the subject; when I began freely to think I proceeded +boldly to doubt; your Letters gave me the cause for thinking, and my +scepticism was exchanged for conviction; not entirely by the perusal of +your Letters; for I do not think they would quite have made me an +Atheist! but by attention to that answer from my friend, which I have +his permission to subjoin. + +In mentioning that doubts arose by reading your very Letters, which +were written to eradicate all doubts, let me not accuse you of being +unequal to the task assumed. I mean no such charge. You have in my +opinion been fully equal to the discussion, and have bandied the +argument ably, pleasingly and politely. I am certain from the extracts +you have made from Dr. Clarke, the first of other Divines, I should +have been converted from my superstition by his reasoning, even without +perusal of an answer: I pay you however the compliment of having only +brought me to doubt, and I find I am not the only person who have been +led to disbelieve by reading books expressly written to confirm the +Believer. Stackhouse's Comment upon the Bible, and Leland's View of +Deistical Writers have perhaps made as many renegado's in this country +as all the allurements of Mahometanism has in others. What can be said +to this? They were both undoubtedly men of abilities, and meant well to +the cause they had to support. All that I shall observe upon the matter +is, that what cannot bear discussion cannot be true. Reasoning in other +sciences is the way to arrive at truth: the learned for a while may +differ, but argument at last finds its force, and the controversy +usually ends in general conviction. Reasoning upon the science of +divinity will equally have its weight, and all men of letters would +long ago have got rid of all superstitious notions of a Deity, but that +men of letters are frequently men of weak nerves; such as Dr. Johnson +is well known to be, that great triumph to religionists; it requires +courage as well as sense to break the shackles of a pious education; +but if merely a resolve to reason upon their force can break them, what +can we observe in conclusion but + + _"Magnus est veritas et prevalebit."_ + +That religion or belief of a Deity cannot bear the force of argument is +well known by Divines in general, is manifest by their annexing an idea +of reproach to the very term of arguing upon the subject. These arguers +they call Free-thinkers, and this appellation has obtained, in the +understanding of pious believers, the most odious disgrace. Yet we +cannot argue without thinking; nor can we either think or argue to any +purpose without freedom. Therefore free-thinking, so far from being a +disgrace, is a virtue, a most commendable quality. How absurd, and how +cruel it is in the professors of divinity, to address the understanding +of men on the subject of their belief, and to upbraid those very men +who shall exercise their understanding in attending to their arguments! +No tyranny is greater than that of ecclesiastics. These chain down our +very ideas, other tyrants only confine our limbs. They invite us to the +argument, yet damn us to eternal punishment for the use of reason on +the subject. They give to man an essence distinct from his corporeal +appearance and this they call his soul, a very ray and particle of the +Divine Being; the principal faculty of this soul they allow to be that +of reasoning, and yet they call reason a dark lanthorn, an erroneous +vapour, a false medium, and at last the very instrument of another +fancied Being of their own to lead men into their own destruction. +_"In the image of himself made he man."_ A favourite text with +theologians; but surely they do not mean that this God Almighty of +theirs has got a face and person like a man. No; that they exclaim +against, and, when we push them for the resemblance, they confess +it is in the use of reason; it is in the soul. + +I am aware that I am not here to mix questions of Christianity with the +general question of a Divinity; subjects of a very distinct enquiry, +and which in the Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever are very +carefully separated. The subject of revelation is indeed promised +afterwards to be taken up, provided the argument in favour of Natural +Religion meets with a good reception. How, Dr. Priestley, you can judge +of that reception I am at a loss to know, otherwise than by the number +of editions you publish. It is then in the sum total just as much as if +you had said, "provided this book sells well I will write another." Yet +it may be sold to many such readers as I have been, though you will +hardly call such reception good. You that have wrote so much, to whom +it is so easy to write more, who profess a belief of revelation, such a +laborious enquirer, and so great a master of the art of reasoning, +should rather have engaged at once to prove in a subsequent publication +the truth of revealed religion in arguments, as candid and as fairly +drawn as those you have used in proof of a Deity independent of +revelation. Different as I am in qualifications from you, not very +learned, far from industrious, unused to publish, I do now promise +that when you shall have brought into light your intended letters in +behalf of revelation I will answer them. I hope you will take it as an +encouragement to write that you are sure you shall have an answer. I +mean you should, and I am sure I shall think myself greatly honoured if +you will descend so far as to reply to my present answer. I know you +have been used in controversies to have the last word, and in this I +shall not baulk your ambition; for notwithstanding any defect of my +plea in favour of atheism I mean to join issue upon your replication, +and by no means, according to the practice and language of the lawyers, +to put in a rejoinder. Should your arguments be defectively answered by +me, should your learning and your reasoning be more conspicuous than +mine, I shall bear your triumph without repining. + +I declare I am rather pleased there are so few atheists than at all +anxious to make more. I triumph in my superior light. I am like the Jew +or the Bramin who equally think themselves privileged in their superior +knowledge of the Deity. With me and with my friend the comparison holds +by way of contrast, for we are so proud in our singularity of being +atheists that we will hardly open our lips in company, when the +question is started for fear of making converts, and so lessening our +own enjoyment by a numerous division of our privilege with others. It +has indeed often been disputed, whether there is or ever was such a +character in the world as an atheist. That it should be disputed is to +me no wonder. Every thing may be, and almost every thing has been +disputed. There are few or none who will venture openly to acknowledge +themselves to be atheists. I know none among my acquaintance, except +that one friend, to whom as a Philosophical Unbeliever I presented your +Letters, and to whose answer I only mean this address as an +introduction. I shall therefore not enter here into the main argument +of Deity or no Deity. My address is only preliminary to the subject; +but I do not therefore think myself precluded from entering into some +considerations that may be thought incidental to it. I mean such +considerations as whether immorality, unhappiness or timidity +necessarily do or naturally ought to ensue from a system of atheism. +But as to the question whether there is such an existent Being as an +atheist, to put that out of all manner of doubt, I do declare upon my +honour that I am one. Be it therefore for the future remembered, that +in London in the kingdom of England, in the year of our Lord one +thousand seven hundred and eighty-one, a man has publickly declared +himself an atheist. When my friend returned me your Letters, addressing +me with a grave face he said, "I hope, if you have any doubts, these +Letters will have as good effect upon you as they have had upon me." +My countenance brightened up and I replied, "You are then, my friend, +convinced ?" "Yes, he said, I am convinced; that is, I am most +thoroughly convinced there is no such thing as a God." Behold then, +if we are to be believed, two atheists instead of one. + +Another question has been raised "whether a society of atheists can +exist?" In other words "whether honesty sufficient for the purposes +of civil society can be insured by other motives than the belief of +a Deity?" Bayle has handled that question well. [Footnote: _Pensees +sur la Comete_.] Few who know how to reason (and it is in vain to speak +or think of those who lay reason out of the case) can fail to be convinced +by the arguments of Bayle. I shall discuss the question no farther +than as it is necessarily included in the discussion of some of those +supposed results of atheism, such as I have before mentioned in the +instances of immorality, unhappiness and timidity. In my argument +upon this subject I shall carefully avoid all abuse and ridicule. +Controversies are apt to be acrimonious. You, Sir, have certainly shewn +instances to the contrary. You have charity beyond your fellows in the +ecclesiastical line, and your answerers seem not to me to have a right +in fair argument to step out of the limits you have prescribed +yourself. To dispute with you is a pleasure equal almost to that of +agreeing with another person. You have candour enough to allow it +possible that an atheist may be a moral man. Where is that other +ecclesiastic who will allow the same? Your answerers ought also to +hold themselves precluded from using ridicule in handling this subject. +I am no great supporter of Lord Shaftesbury's doctrine that ridicule +is the test of truth. I own truth can never be ridiculous, that is, +it can never be worthy of laughter, but still it may be laughed at. +To use the other term, I may say, truth can never be worthy of ridicule, +but still it may be ridiculed. Just ridicule is a sufficient test +of truth; but after all we should be driven to an inquiry, upon +the principles of reasoning, whether the ridicule were just or not. +Boldness, which is not incompatible with decency and candour, I do +hold to be an absolute requisite in all speech and argument, where +truth is the object of inquiry. Therefore when I am asked, whether +there is a God or no God, I do not mince the matter, but I boldly +answer there is none, and give my reason for my disbelief; for I +adopt my friend's answer by the publication of it. + +That mischief may ensue to society by such freedom of discussion is +also another argument for me to consider; I do not say to combat, for +though I were convinced or could not resist the argument that mischief +would ensue to society by such a discussion, yet I should think myself +intitled to enter into it. I have a right to truth, and to publish +truth, let society suffer or not suffer by it. That society which +suffers by truth should be otherwise constituted; and as I cannot well +think that truth will hurt any society rightly constituted, so I should +rather be inclined to doubt the force of the argument in case atheism +being found to be truth should apparently be proved prejudicial to such +a society. + +I come unprejudiced to the question, and when I have promised you an +answer to your future Letters in support of revelation, I have neither +anticipated your argument nor prejudged the cause. I hold myself open +to be convinced, and if I am convinced I shall say so, which is equally +answering as if I denied the force of your observations. In that sense +only I promise an answer. If I believe I shall say, I do; but I shall +not believe and tremble, confident as I am, that if I act an honest +part in life, whether there be a Deity and a future existence or not, +whatever reason I may have to rejoice in case such ideas he realised, I +can upon such an issue have none to tremble. I look upon myself to have +more reason to be temporally afraid than eternally so. Dr. Priestley or +any other Doctor can put his name boldly to a book in favour of Theism, +loudly call the supporters of a contrary doctrine to the argument, and +if no answer is produced, assert their own reasoning to be unanswerable. +In that sense their sort of reasoning has been frequently unanswerable. +Here however is an instance of a poor unknown individual, making +experience of the candour of the ecclesiastics and the equity of +the laws of England, for he ventures to subscribe his publication with +his name as well as Dr. Priestley does his Letters, to which this +publication is an answer. Perhaps he may have cause to repent of his +hardiness, but if he has, he is equally resolved to glory in his +martyrdom, as to suffer it. Whatever advantage religion has had in the +enumeration of it's martyrs, the cause of atheism may boast the same. +As to the instances of the professors of any particular form of +religion, or modification of that form, such as Christians or sects of +Christians, suffering martyrdom for their belief, I shall no more allow +them to be martyrs for theism than Pagans similarly suffering for their +belief, shall I call martyrs for atheism. Theism very likely has had +it's martyrs. I can instance one I think in Socrates, and I shall +mention Vanini as a martyr for atheism. The conduct of those two great +men in their last moments may be worth attending to. The variety of +other poor heretical wretches, who have been immolated at the shrine of +absurdity for all the possible errors of human credence, let them have +their legendary fame. I put them out of the scale in this important +inquiry. + +Not that I really think the argument to be much advanced by naming the +great supporters of one opinion or of another. In mathematics, +mechanics, natural philosophy, in literature, taste, and politics the +sentiments of great men of great genius are certainly of weight. There +are some subjects capable of demonstration, many indeed which the +ingenuity of one man can go farther to illustrate than that of another. +The force of high authority is greater in the three former sciences +than in the latter. Theism and Atheism I hold to be neither of them +strictly demonstrable. You, Dr. Priestley, agree with me in that. Still +I hold the question capable of being illustrated by argument, and I +should hold the authority of great men's names to be of more weight in +this subject, were I not necessarily forced to consider that all +education is strongly calculated to support the idea of a Deity; by +this education prejudice is introduced, and prejudice is nothing else +than a corruption of the understanding. Certain principles, call them, +if you please, data, must be agreed upon before any reasoning can take +place. Disputants must at least agree in the ideas which they annex to +the language they use. But when prejudice has made a stand, +argumentation is set at so wide a distance, through a want of fixt data +to proceed upon, that attention is in vain applied to the dispute. +Besides, the nature of the subject upon which this prejudice takes +place, is such, that the finest genius is nearly equally liable to an +undue bias with the most vulgar. To question with boldness and +indifference, whether an individual, all-forming, all-seeing and +all-governing Being exists, to whom, if he exists, we may possibly be +responsible for our actions, whose intelligence and power must be +infinitely superior to our own, requires a great conquest of former +habitude, a firmness of nerves, as well as of understanding; it will +therefore be no great wonder, if such men as Locke and Newton can be +named among the believers in a Deity. They were christians as well as +theists, so that their authority goes as far in one respect as in the +other. But if the opinions of men of great genius are to have weight, +what is to be said of modern men of genius? You, Sir, are of opinion +that the world is getting wiser as well as better. There is all the +reason in the world it should get wiser at least, since wisdom is only +a collection of experience, and there must be more experience as the +world is older. Modern Philosophers are nearly all atheists. I take the +term atheist here in the popular sense. Hume, Helvetius, Diderot, +D'Alembert. Can they not weigh against Locke and Newton, and even more +than Locke and Newton, since their store of knowledge and learning was +at hand to be added to their own, and among them are those who singly +possessed equal science in mathematics as in metaphysics? It is not +impossible, perhaps not improbable, from his course of learning and +inquiries, that if Dr. Priestley had not from his first initiation into +science been dedicated for what is called the immediate service of God, +he himself might have been one of the greatest disprovers of his +pretended divinity. + +In England you think, Sir, that atheism is not prevalent among men of +free reasoning, though you acknowledge it to be much so in other +countries. It is not the first time it has been observed that the +greater the superstition of the common people the less is that of men +of letters. In the heart of the Papal territories perhaps is the +greatest number of atheists, and in the reformed countries the greatest +number of deists. Yet it is a common observation, especially by +divines, that deism leads to atheism, and I believe the observation is +well founded. I hardly need explain here, that by deism in this sense +is meant a belief in the existence of a Deity from natural and +philosophical principles, and a disbelief in all immediate revelation +by the Deity of his own existence. Such is the force of habit, that it +is by degrees only, that even men of sense and firmness shake off one +prejudice after another. They begin by getting rid of the absurdities +of all popular religions. This leaves them simple deists, but the force +of reasoning next carries them a step farther, and whoever trusts to +this reasoning, devoid of all fear and prejudice, is very likely to end +at last in being an atheist. Nor do I admit it to be an argument either +for Revelation or Natural Religion, that the same turn for speculation +that would convert a christian into a theist, will carry him on to be +an atheist, though I know the argument has been often used. If upon +sick beds or in dying moments men revert to their old weakness and +superstitions, their falling off may afford triumph to religionists; +for my part I care not so much for the opinions of sick and dying men, +as of those who at the time are strong and healthy. But in the opinion +of the one or the other I put no great stress. My faith is in +reasoning, for though ridicule is not a complete test of truth, +reasoning I hold certainly to be so. I own belief may be imprest on the +mind otherwise than by the force of reason. The mind may be diseased. +All I shall say is that though I have formerly believed many things +without reason, and even many against it, as is very common, I hope I +shall never more. My mind (I was going to say, thank God) is sane at +present, and I intend to keep it so. I am aware that at the expression +just used some will exclaim in triumph, that the poor wretch could not +help thinking of his God at the same time he was denying him. The +observation would hold good, if it were not that we often speak and +write unpremeditately and though what is in this manner unpremeditately +expressed upon a revision should be certainly expunged, yet I chuse to +leave the expression to shew the force of habit. + +In fear lies the origin of all fancied deities, whether sole or +numberless. + + _Primus in orbe Deos fecit Timor._ + +But the great debasement of the human mind is evidenced in the instance +of attributing a merit to belief, which has come at last to be stiled a +virtue, and is dignified by the name of faith, that most pitiful of all +human qualities. When the apostle spoke of faith, hope and charity, he +might as well have exclaimed the least of the three is faith, as the +greatest is charity. + +One enthusiast cries out _un Roi_ and another _un Dieu_. The reality of +the king I admit, because I feel his power. Against my feeling and my +experience I cannot argue, for upon these sensations is built all +argument. But not all the wondrous works of the creation, as I hear the +visible operations of nature called, convince me in the least of the +existence of a Deity. By nature I mean to express the whole of what I +see and feel, that whole, I call self-existent from all eternity; I +admit a principle of intelligence and design, but I deny that principle +to be extraneous from itself. My creed in fine is the same with that of +the Roman poet; + + _"Deus est ubicunque movemur."_ + +If then I am admitted to explain my deity in this sense, I am not an +atheist, nor can any one else in the world be such. The _vis naturae_, +the perpetual industry, intelligence and provision of nature must be +apparent to all who see, feel or think. I mean to distinguish this +active, intelligent and designing principle, inherent as much in matter +as the properties of gravity or any elastic, attractive or repulsive +power, from any extraneous foreign force and design in an invisible +agent, supreme though hidden lord and maker over all effects and +appearances that present themselves to us in the course of nature. The +last supposition makes the universe and all other organised matter a +machine made or contrived by the arbitrary will of another Being, which +other Being is called God; and my theory makes a God of this universe, +or admits no other God or designing principle than matter itself and +its various organisations. + +The inquiry is said to be important. But why is it so! All truth is +important. It is a question of little importance, merely whether a man +had a maker or no, although it is of great importance to disprove the +existence of such a Deity as theologians wish to establish, because +appearances in the world go against it. Supposing however that it was +granted, that the question, whether there is a Deity or not, was as +little important as other truths, yet the question becomes important +with this reflexion, that other events may follow as deductions; such +as a particular providence, or a future state of rewards and +punishments; but whether such deductions or either of them necessarily +follow may well be queried. As to a particular providence you give up +the reality of it, and I give it up too. But I cannot give up the +argument, that if there were a God with all his allowed attributes of +wisdom, power and justice, there ought to be a particular providence to +counteract the general laws of nature, in favour of those who defend +the interposition. Though the Deity should not interfere unless there +be a worthy cause, agreeable to the Horation rule, + + _"Nec Deus interfuit nisi vindice nodus;"_ + +Yet surely from the same principles it should follow that the Deity +ought to interfere where there is a worthy cause. Here however arises +another dilemma, for if the Deity has really those attributes of power +and justice, there would never have been occasion for such temperaneous +interpositions. A particular providence must indeed prove one of these +two principles, either that God was imperfect in his design, or that +inert matter is inimical to the properties of God. If that wished for +interposition of the Deity is put off to a future existence, I cannot +help observing, that future day has been already a long while waited +for in vain, and any delay destroys some one attribute or other of the +Deity. He wants justice, or he wants the power, or the will to do good +and be just. That a future state of rewards and punishments may however +exist without a Deity, you, Dr. Priestley, allow to be no impossibility. +It may indeed be argued with apparent justness, that a principle of +reviviscence may as well be admitted as a principle of production in +the first instance: and as to rewards and punishments, judgement may be +rendered, as well as now, by Beings less than Deities. For my part I +firmly wish for such a future state, and though I cannot firmly believe +it, I am resolved to live as if such a state were to ensue. This seems, +I own, like doubting, and doubting may be said to be a miserable state +of anxiety. "Better be confident than unhinged; better confide in +ignorance than have no fixed system." So it may be argued; but I think +the result will be as people feel. Those who do not feel bold enough, +to be satisfied with their own thoughts, may abandon them and adopt the +thoughts of others. For my part I am content with my own; and not the +less so because they do not end in certainty upon matters, from the +nature of them, beyond the complete reach of human intelligence. + +There is nothing in fact important to human nature but happiness, which +is or ought to be the end or aim of our being. I mean self-happiness; +but fortunately for mankind, such is by nature our construction, that +we cannot individually be happy unless we join also in promoting the +happiness of others. Should immorality, timidity or other base +principles arise from atheism it tends immediately, I will own, to the +unhappiness of mankind. If it is asked me, "why am I honest and +honourable?" I answer, because of the satisfaction I have in being so. +"Do all people receive that satisfaction?" No, many who are ill +educated, ill-exampled and perverted, do not. I do, that is enough for +me. In short, I am well constructed, and I feel I can therefore act an +honest and honourable part without any religious motive. Did I +perceive, that belief in a Deity produced morality or inspired courage, +I might be prompted to confess, that the contrary would ensue from +atheism. But the bulk of the world has long believed, or long pretended +to believe in a Deity, yet morality and every commendable quality seem +at a stand. The believer and the unbeliever we often see equally base, +equally immoral. Superstition is certainly only the excess of religion. +That evidently is attended often with immorality and cowardice. I am +tempted to say, from observation, that the belief of a Deity is apt to +drive mankind into vice and baseness; but I check myself in the +assertion, upon considering that very few indeed are those who really +believe in a Deity out of such as pretend to do so. It is impossible +for an intellectual being to believe firmly in that of which he can +give no account, or of which he can form no conception. I hold the +Deity, the fancied Deity, at least, of whom with all his attributes +such pompous descriptions are set forth to the great terror of old +women and the amusement of young children, to be an object of which we +form (as appears when we scrutinise into our ideas) no conception and +therefore can give no account. It is said, after all this, that men do +still believe in such a Deity, I then do say in return, they do not +make use of their intellects. The moment we go into a belief beyond +what we feel, see and understand, we might as well believe in +will-with-a-whisp as in God. But I would fix morality upon a better +basis than belief in a Deity. If it has indeed at present no other +basis, it is not morality, it is selfishness, it is timidity; it is the +hope of reward, it is the dread of punishment. For a great and good +man, shew me one who loves virtue because he finds a pleasure in it, +who has acquired a taste for that pleasure by considering what and +where happiness is, who is not such a fool as to seek misery in +preference to happiness, whose honour is his Deity, whose conscience +is his judge. Put such a man in combat against the superstitious son +of Spain or Portugal, it were easy to say who would shew the truest +courage. The question might be more voluminously discussed, but I feel +already proof of conviction; if you, Dr. Priestley, do not, perhaps +some other readers may. I have nothing to do with men of low minds. +They will always have their religion or pretence of it, but I am +mistaken if it is not the gallows or the pillory that more govern +their morals than the gospel or the pulpit. + +After all, atheism may be a system only for the learned. The ignorant of +all ages have believed in God. The answer of a Philosophical Unbeliever +though written in the vulgar tongue may probably not reach the vulgar. +If argument had prevailed they were long converted from their +superstitious belief. The sentiments of atheistical philosophers have +long been published. If mischief therefore could ensue to society from +such free discussions, that mischief society must long have felt. I +think truth should never be hid, but few are those who mind it. I will +therefore take upon myself but little importance though I have presumed +to preface an answer from a Philosophical Unbeliever to Letters which +you, Dr. Priestley have written. If you deem that answer detrimental to +the interests of society, you will recollect that you invite the +proposal of objections and promise to answer all as well as you can. If +you should happen to be exasperated by the freedom of the language or +the contrariety of the sentiment, this answer will gain weight in +proportion as you lose in the credit of a tolerant Divine. Therefore if +you reply at all, reply with candour and with coolness; heed the matter +and not the man, though I subscribe my name, and am + + Reverend Sir, + Your friend, admirer, and humble servant, + WILLIAM HAMMON. + +_Oxford-Street, No._ 418. +_Jan._ 1, 1782. + + + + + + + ANSWER FROM A PHILOSOPHICAL UNBELIEVER. + + +It is the general fashion to believe in a God, the maker of all things, +or at least to pretend to such a belief, to define the nature of this +existing Deity by the attributes which are given to him, to place the +foundation of morality on this belief, and in idea at least, to connect +the welfare of civil society with the acknowledgement of such a Being. +Few however are those, who being questioned can give any tolerable +grounds for their assertions upon this subject, and hardly any two +among the learned agree in their manner of proving what each will +separately hold to be indisputably clear. The attributes of a Deity are +more generally agreed upon, though less the subject of proof, than his +existence. As to morality, those very people who are moral will not +deny, they would be so though there were not a God, and there never yet +has been a civil lawgiver, who left crimes to be punished by the author +of the universe; not even the profanation of oaths upon the sacredness +of which so much is built in society, and which yet is said to be a +more immediate offence against the Deity than any other that can be +named. + +The method which Dr. Priestley has taken to prove the existence of +a God, is by arguing from _effect_ to _cause_. He explodes that other +pretended proof _a priori_ which has so much raised the fame of +Dr. Clarke among other theologians. As to the attributes of the Deity, +Dr. Priestley is not quite so confident in his proofs there; and the +most amiable one, the most by mortals to be wished for, the _benevolence_ +of God he almost gives up, or owns at least there is not so much proof +of it as of his other attributes. His observations are divided into +several Letters, this is one answer given to the whole; for it would be +to no purpose to reply to topics upon which the writers are agreed. +What therefore is not contradicted here, Dr. Priestley may in general +take to be allowed; but to obviate doubts and to allow his argument +every force, it may be fairer perhaps to recite at full length what in +this answer is allowed to be true, what is denied as false, what meant +to be exposed as absurd, and what rejected as assertions without proof, +inadmissible or inconclusive. The conclusion will contain some +observations upon the whole. + + + TRUISMS. + + 1. "Effects have their adequate causes." + + 2. "Nothing begins to exist without a cause foreign to itself." + + 3. "No being could make himself, for that would imply that he + existed and did not exist at the same time." + + 4. If one horse, or one tree, had a cause, all had." + + 5. Something must have existed from all eternity. + + 6. "Atoms cannot be arranged, in a manner expressive of the most + exquisite design, without competent intelligence having existed + somewhere." + + 7. "The idea of a supreme author is more pleasing to a virtuous + mind, than that of a blind fate and fatherless deserted world." + + 8. "The condition of mankind is in a state of melioration, as far as + misery arises from ignorance, for as the world grows older it must + grow wiser, if wisdom arises from experience." + + 9. "All moral virtue is only a modification of benevolence." + + 10. "Virtue gives a better chance for happiness than vice." + + 11. "No instance of any revival." + + 12. "Atheists are not to think themselves quite secure with respect + to a future life." + + 13. "Thought might as well depend upon the construction of the + brain, as upon any invisible substance extraneous to the brain." + + 14. "If the works of God had a beginning, there must have been a + time when he was inactive." + + 15. "Where happiness is wanting in the creation I would rather + conclude the author had mist of his design than that he wanted + benevolence." + + + FALSE ASSERTIONS. + + 1. "A cause needs not be prior to an effect." + + 2. "If the species of man had no beginning, it would not follow that + it had no cause." + + 3. "A cause may be cotemporary with the effect." + + 4. "An atheist must believe he was introduced into the world without + design." + + + ABSURDITIES. + + 1. "A general mass of sensation consisting of various elements + borrowed from the past and the future." + + 2. "Since sensation is made up of past, present, and future, the + infant feeling for the moment only, the man recollecting what is + past and anticipating the future, and as the present sensation must + therefore in time bear a less proportion to the general mass of + sensation than it did, so at last all temporary affections, whether + of pain or pleasure become wholly inconsiderable." + + 3. "The great book of nature and the book of revelation both lie + open before us." + + 4. "A conclusion above our comprehension." + + 5. "A whole eternity already past." + + 6. "Since a finite Being cannot be infinitely happy, because he must + then be infinite in knowledge and power; and as all limitation of + happiness must consist in degree of happiness or mixture of misery, + the Deity can alone determine which mode of limitation is best." + + 7. "We have reason to be thankful for our pains and distress." + + 8. "If the divine Being had made man at first as happy as he can be + after all the feelings and ideas of a painful and laborious life, it + must have been in violation of all general laws and by a constant + and momentary interference of the Deity." + + 9. "It is better the divine agency should not be very conspicuous." + + 10. "If good prevails on the whole, creation being infinite, + happiness must be infinite, and God comprehending the whole, will + only perceive the balance of good, and that will be happiness + unmixed with misery." + + 11. "If a man is happy in the whole he is infinitely happy in the + whole of his existence." + + 12. "Although all things fall alike to all men and no distinction is + made between the righteous and the wicked, and even though the + wicked derive an advantage from their vices, yet this is consistent + with a state of moral government by a Being of infinite wisdom and + power." + + 13. "As ploughing is the means of having a harvest, though God has + predetermined whether there should be a harvest or not, so prayer is + the means of obtaining good from God, although that good is + predetermined upon; it is therefore no more absurd to pray than to + plough." + + 14. "Notwithstanding happiness is the necessary consequence of + health, yet man's happiness is more from intellectual than corporeal + feelings." + + 15. "Evil is necessarily connected with and subservient to good, + although in the next world there will be all good and no evil." + + 16. "By reason we can discover the necessary existence of a Deity, + yet to be a sceptic on that subject is the first step to be a + Christian, because reason not sufficiently proving it we fly to + revealed truth." + + 17. "The power, which a man has by the comprehensiveness of his mind + to enjoy the future, has no apparent limits." + + 18. "It is of no avail in the argument concerning the existence of a + Deity, that we have no conception of him, since it does not imply + impossibility of his existence that we have no idea at all upon the + subject." + + + INADMISSIBLE OR INCONCLUSIVE. + + 1. "The question of the existence of a Deity is important." + + 2. "A Theist has a higher sense of personal dignity than an + atheist." + + 3. "The conduct of an atheist must give concern to those who are not + so." + + 4. "An atheist believes himself to be, at his death, for ever + excluded from returning life." + + 5. "There are more atheists than unbelievers in revelation." + + 6. "Men of letters may have the same bias to incredulity as others + to credulity, because they are subject to a wrong association of + ideas, as well as other persons though in a less degree." + + 7. "Whoever first made a thing, for example a chair or a table, must + have had an adequate idea of it's nature and use." + + 8. "If a table had a designing cause, the tree from whence the wood + came, and the man who made the table must have had a designing + cause, which comprehended all the powers and properties of trees and + men." + + 9. "All the visible universe, as far as we can judge, bears the + marks of being one work, and therefore must have had a cause of + infinite power and intelligence." + + 10. "We might as well say a table had no cause, as that the world + had none." + + 11. "A Being originally and necessarily capable of comprehending + itself, it is not improper to call infinite, for we can have no idea + of any bounds to it's knowledge or power." + + 12. "A series of finite causes cannot possibly be carried back + _ad infinitum_." + + 13. "Our imagination revolts at the idea of an intellectual soul of + the universe, that is, of an intelligence resulting from + arrangement." + + 14. "The actual existence of the universe compels us to come at last + to an _originally existent and intellectual Being_, because if the + immediate maker of the universe has not existed from all eternity, + he must have derived his being and senses from one who has, and that + being we call God." + + 15. "God must be present to all his works, if we admit no power can + act but where it is, he must therefore exist every where, because + his works are every where." + + 16. "As no being can unmake or materially change himself (at least + none can annihilate himself) so God is unchangeable, for no Being + God made can change him and no other Being can exist but what God + made." + + 17. "Two infinite intelligent beings of the same kind would + coincide, therefore there can only be one God." + + 18. "Nothing can be more evident, than that plants and animals could + not have proceeded from each other from all eternity." + + 19. "That happiness is the design of the creation because health is + designed and sickness is only an exception, not a general rule is as + evident as that the design of the Mill-wright must have been, that + his machine should not be obstructed." + + 20. "As a state of sickness is comparatively rare with a state of + health, happiness the result of health, and the end of the creation + happiness, so the end of the creation is already in a great measure + answered." + + 21. "Pleasure tends to continue and propagate itself, pain to check + and exterminate itself." + + 22. "As our knowledge and power in respect to shunning pains and + procuring pleasures advance with our experience, nothing is wanting + to enable us to exterminate all pains, but a continuance of being. + + 23. "Our enjoyments continually increase in real value from infancy + to old age." + + 24. "A future moral distribution is probable, because God is + infinitely powerful and wise." + + 25. "Since reverence, gratitude, obedience, confidence are duties to + men, so they are to God; and as we pray to men, so we should pray to + God." + + 26. "Prescience, predetermination and infinite benevolence are no + argument against prayer to the Deity." + + 27. "A wish produced by nature is evidence of the thing wished for, + but a future state is wished for, therefore there is evidence of a + future state." + + 28. "As we have no idea how we came originally to be produced, for + what we know to the contrary our reproduction may be as much the + course of nature as our original production.." + + 29. "A gloom and melancholy belong more to atheists than to devout + people." + + + + + +OBSERVATIONS. + + +Dr. Priestley will hardly doubt, after this collection from his work +that it has at least been read before it is attempted to be answered. +It is in the writer's power to quote the page and line for each +assertion, but it would be stuffing this publication with unnecessary +references. Dr. Priestley will be able to know what are his own +sentiments and what not without recurring to his printed Letters. +There has been also another difficulty in classing the several exceptions +under the different heads; what is false, what is absurd, and what is +inadmissible bordering so nearly on each other. Nice distinctions +cannot in such respect be made, but the whole together form the main +argument which is to be answered. + +The first and principal assertion is, that effects have their adequate +cause; it is then added, that the universe is an effect, that it +therefore must have a cause, and to this cause in the English language +is given the name of God. This proposition is true, provided the +universe is an effect, but that is a _postulatum_ without concession +and without a proof. This _original Being_ he advances in another place +to be that only something which existed uncaused from all eternity, and +which could not have been a Being, like a man or a table, incapable of +comprehending, itself, for such existences would require another +superior Being. But if the universe is not adopted as an effect, if +it is taken as existing from all eternity, the universe becomes an +intelligent Being, and there or no where is the Deity sought after. +Such a Being we may properly speak of and reason upon. The whole is +subjected to our sensations and our experience. But of his own +_uncaused Being_ Dr. P. says we cannot properly speak. Is not that +alone an argument of there being no such thing? His friend Dr. Clarke +says, we cannot have an idea of an impossible thing. Now this +discovered Deity is allowed to be that of which we can have no idea. +So far at least it is allied to the impossible. + +As to the argument of cause and effect, the latter certainly implies +the former; but when we give the name of effect to any thing, we must +be certain it is an effect, for we may be so far mistaken perhaps as to +call that an effect which is a cause, at least what is an effect to-day +may be a cause to-morrow, as in the instance of generation; for though +a son does not beget his father, he too has his offspring in which he +may be said to live over again, and if we are to argue only from +experience, most probably that alone is the resurrection and the life +to come. But if it is contended that our experience relates only to +finite causes, or causes incapable of comprehending themselves, it must +at the same time be allowed, that all our reasoning is founded only on +experience. This Dr. P. at least allows even while he keeps reasoning +about a Deity, which he calls an infinite cause capable of comprehending +itself, though nobody is capable of comprehending it, and of which we +therefore can have no experience. Yet he will assert, that _thinking_ +persons seldom are convinced by _thinking_. This is odd language for a +reasoner. When another philosopher or divine attempts to prove a God in +their own way, Dr. Priestley can readily see his fallacies and +absurdities. Dr. Clarke, the former great champion of God Almighty, is +made very light of. He thought, foolish man, to prove the existence of +a Deity merely by our having an idea of that existence, which would go +to prove the truth of every unnatural conceit that ever entered into +the heart of man; and contended farther that it would be equally absurd +to suppose no Deity as two and two did not make four. It would indeed +be absurd, says Dr. Priestley provided we agreed that the universe is a +_caused_ existence, for God is the name we give for the cause of the +universe, which in such case must exist. It is only denying that the +universe is a caused existence, and then the absurdity is taken away. +Dr. Priestley, for the sake of making Dr. Clarke absurd, will readily +allow the denial capable of being made; and for the same purpose he +seems gravely to have taken upon himself to prove that school-boy's +difficulty, that two and two do make four, for he says, that four is +the term agreed upon in language to be given to the sum total of two +and two, and that to deny the Deity is at least not so absurd as to say +that two and two do not make four. + +Dr. Priestley says he finds no difficulty in excluding every thing from +the mind except space and duration. He allows then at least, that there +is no manifest absurdity in supposing there is no Deity, for nothing +can be proved by reasoning if the conclusion can be denied without +absurdity, nor can there be a manifest absurdity in denying the +existence of what there is no difficulty in excluding from the mind. +Yet after all he adds (somewhat inconsistently) that we cannot exclude +the idea of a Deity, if we do not exclude an existent universe. This +Deity he defines to be a most simple Being; simple and infinite; terms +which but ill agree together. + +The infinite or boundless existence of this pretended Deity is a +property more insisted upon than any other, and whatever other +properties are given to him they are all in the infinite degree. The +properties alledged to be proved are, eternity, infinite knowledge and +power, unchangeableness, unity, omnipotence, action from all eternity, +and independence. Benevolence and moral government are also ascribed to +him but confessedly with a less degree of certainty, though the most +desireable of all his given properties. Upon the subject of benevolence, +Dr. Priestley only advances, that where it is not proved by the +happiness of his creatures to exist, he would rather chuse to conclude +he mist of his design, that is, he wanted power or knowledge, than that +he wanted benevolence. If he means to argue that it is more rational to +conclude this Deity wanted power and knowledge than that he wanted +benevolence, and because Dr. Priestley fancies himself to have proved +the Deity cannot want the two former, he concludes the Deity cannot +want the latter, as the less probable for him to be deficient in, his +argument is no more a truism. As a wish, that the Deity may not want +benevolence, in that sense let him take it as agreed upon. He allows +that misery in the human species proves malevolence in the Deity, and +happiness the contrary. All the proof adduced in favour of benevolence +is in asserting that throughout the universe, good is more predominant +than evil. The infinite extent of benevolence he will allow incapable +of proof; but then it is said that the evils which mankind endure are +not so great as might be inflicted upon them; that virtue to vice, +happiness to misery, health to sickness bear at least equal proportions. +That lesser evils exist instead of greater is indeed but a poor proof +in the favour of the benevolence of an all-powerful Being. Or grant, +that good is more predominant than evil, this surely is no proof +neither of the benevolence of a kind and all-powerful Being. Yet +Dr. Priestley adds that the general benevolence of the Deity is +unquestionable. How unquestionable? It is questioned by the author +himself, and he declares he cannot prove it. After this he asks, who +will pretend to dictate to such a Being? He might in the same stile +conclude that no objection deserved a reply. The whole of this is +absurd; but when the Doctor begins to feel enthusiasm he is like the +rest of the ecclesiastical arguers. They reason themselves into +imaginary Beings with more imaginary properties and then fall down and +worship them. God is said to have made man in the image of himself. If +he has done so, man is up with him, for he in return makes God in his +own image. Much as the imagination of one man differs from another, so +differs the God of each devotee. They are all idolaters or +anthropomorphites to a man; there is none but an atheist that is not +the one or the other. + +The admission of evil into the world is an argument so exceedingly +conclusive against at least a good Deity, that it is curious to see how +Dr. Priestley studies to get rid of that difficulty. He partly denies +the fact, at least he says there is more good than evil in the world. +At last he even turns evil into good, or what ought to be the effects +of one, into what ought to be the effects of the other, as he says pain +is necessary for happiness. But if pain is, as he says, in this world +necessary for happiness, why will it not still be necessary hereafter? +He answers, because by that time we shall have experienced pain enough +for a future supply of happiness. If it is objected, why have we not +had pain enough by the time each of us are twenty or thirty years of +age, instead of waiting 'till our deaths at so many different ages? He +can only finish his argument by allowing that the ways of God are +inscrutable to man, that every thing is for the best and refer us to +_Candide_ for the rest of his philosophy; nor will he ever resolve the +question, "if evil and pain are good and necessary now, why will they +not always be so? Take a view of human existence, and who can even +allow, that there is more happiness than misery in the world? Dr. +Priestley thinks to give the turn of the scale to happiness, by making +it depend intirely upon health, notwithstanding he says in another +place that human sensations are a mass collected from the past, present +and future, and as a man grows up the present goes on to bear a less +proportion to the other two. It would indeed be a short but lame way of +proving that "happiness is the design of the creation" because health +is designed, and sickness is only an exception, not a general rule." +Many a healthy man has certainly been unhappy, or else had a man better +study health than virtue. If the mill-wright make a poor machine he is +a poor workman; God in like manner designing health and introducing +sickness is but a poor physician. In another place Dr. Priestley having +considered, that he had asserted that human sensations arise from ideas +of the past and future as well as the present, finds himself obliged to +alter his notions of happiness, so far as to say that happiness is more +intellectual than corporeal. But it is rather extraordinary to assert +at the same time, that happiness is the necessary consequence of +health, and that happiness is more from intellectual than corporeal +feelings. Surely health, if any thing, is corporeal. Another curious +fancy about pain and happiness is, that our finite nature not admitting +infinite or unlimited happiness we must leave it to the wisdom of the +Deity to determine which is best for us (since happiness must be +diminished) a little pain to be added to it or somewhat of happiness to +be taken away. It hardly requires the skill of a benevolent Deity to +determine which is best for the creatures he has made (and whom he +wishes to be as happy as their finite nature will admit) to lessen +their degree of happiness or mix therein a proportion of misery. To +conclude he asks, "how it is possible to teach children caution, but by +feeling pain?" It is easy to allow in answer, that it might not perhaps +be possible in us. But he is arguing about the benevolence of a Deity. +It was possible, he will allow, in him to have given these children +knowledge without pain, at least if he continues to him the attribute +he allows of omnipotence. + +Next he observes that parents suspend at times their benefits to their +offspring, when persuaded they are not for their good; so does the +Deity. But before this argument holds he must therefore say, it is not +for the good of man to be made happy now, and that the Deity can be +infinitely benevolent without willing either infinite or universal +happiness. Take the argument any way, it must go against his +benevolence or his power; and the same observations hold as to his love +of justice, whilst he is so tardy in punishing offenders. + +After observing that things are in an improving state, Dr. Priestley +allows, that the moral government of the universe is not perfect. From +thence he proceeds to assert, that atheists may believe it within the +course of nature, that men as moral agents may after death be +re-produced, and therefore that there may be a future state though +there be no God, because he reasons it may be in the course of nature. +This allows that the course of nature may be as it is without a God, +and that there is therefore no _natural_ proof of a Deity. His farther +argument on this head is, that "things usually happen in a state of +nature that are proper. A future state is proper. (To carry on the +supposed state of melioration and complete the moral government of the +universe.) It is therefore probable." This is an argument perhaps more +of wish than probability, but let it have such force as belongs to it. +It is not the wish of the answerer by supporting atheism to give +encouragement to immorality, but should he unwarily or with weak minds +do so, the argument of the Deity's existence is independent of such +considerations. It were better to seek another support for morality +than a belief in God; for the moral purpose in believing a Deity (an +invisible Being, maker of all, our moral governor, who will hereafter +take cognizance of our conduct,) is not a little checked by +considering, that he leaves the proof of his very existence so +ambiguous, that even men with a habit of piety upon them cannot but +have their doubts, whilst on this existence so much of the moral +purpose depends. If this is not an argument against the morality of a +Deity, it is at all events one against his _infinite_ morality though +moral is an attribute to be given to him in the infinite degree as much +as any other. + +It is said, infinite intelligence must have procured a necessary +fitness of things, and that this forms morality. "His will could not be +biassed by other influence; therefore he must have willed morality, +because necessarily fit. Then comes infinite power, and yet no morality +in the world or a very small portion of it. We cannot to any purpose, +do what we will, argue against experience. That it must be, yet that it +is not. What must be, will be. If it is not, there is no _must_ in the +case. + +It is next said, that virtue gives a better chance for happiness than +vice. This also is but a weak argument for the moral government of the +universe, unless it be for a moral government by chance. Virtue ought +to be the certain and immediate parent of happiness, if a moral +governor existed with an uncontrouled dominion. If virtue tends to +happiness, or has only a better chance of doing so, it is allowed, that +a sensible atheist should hold it right to be virtuous. The latter end +of a righteous man is certainly more likely to be happy than that of an +unrighteous one. But let an atheist be righteous, and he can be as +certain of happiness in his latter end as any other. Let another life +be desirable, as it certainly is, his doubts upon it will not prevent +it. Who could wish an end better or more happy than that of Mr. Hume, +who most indubitably was an atheist. But if an atheist be not so good +as a Theist, Dr. Priestley perhaps, will allow him to be better than +a sceptic, as any principles for systematising nature are better than +none at all. A Theist is not without his doubts as well as the sceptic; +an atheist, once firmly becoming so, will never doubt more; for we may +venture to say no miracles or new appearances will present themselves +to him to draw his belief aside. + +Still every thing is as God intended it--so asserts Dr. Priestley; and +therefore it cannot by him be denied that crimes and vices, are of his +intention. The Theist exclaims in triumph, "He that made the eye, must +he not see?" But who made the eye? Or grant that God made the eye, +which can only see in the light, must he necessarily see in the dark? +It is again asserted, "the power which formed an eye had something in +view as certainly as he that constructed a telescope. If any Being +formed any eye, grant it. But if the eye exists necessarily as a part +of nature; as much as any other matter, or combination of matter, +necessarily existed, the result of the argument is intirely different. + +It is far from being a necessary part of the atheist's creed to exclude +design from the universe. He places that design in the energy of +nature, which Dr. Priestley gives to some other extraneous Being. It is +rather inconsistent also in him to say, that an atheist rightly judging +of his own situation upon his own principles, ought not to hold himself +quite secure from a future state of responsibility and existences, and +yet to say he must in his own ideas hold himself soon to be excluded +for ever from life. + +As to the immutability of the Deity, it is difficult to guess how that +is proved, except by the argument of _Lucus a non lucendo_, because +every thing is changing here; therefore the Deity never changes; which +is neither an argument _a priori_ nor _posteriore_, but _sui generis_, +merely applicable to the Deity. + +From the imperial infinite intelligence of the Deity an argument is +formed of his unity. Dr. Priestley says, "that two _infinite_ +intelligent Beings would coincide, and therefore that there can only be +one such Being." Two parallels will never coincide. That is one of the +first axioms of Euclid, in whom Dr. Priestley believes as much as in +his bible. If the Beings are infinite in extent and magnitude they must +certainly coincide, but if they are only infinite in intelligence, it +does not seem to be necessary that they should. + +The ubiquity of God is proved in this short way: "God made every thing, +God controuls every thing. No power can act but where it is. Therefore +God is present every where. The workman must certainly be present at +his work, but when the work is done he may go about other business. If +all the properties of matter, such as gravity, elasticity and other +such existed only by the perpetual leave and agency of the Deity, it +may be argued he is in all places where matter is. Space, empty space +will still exist without him. In this mode of proof Dr. Priestley must, +contrary to the Newtonian system argue for a _Plenum_, before he proves +the ubiquity. He cannot exclude space from his mind, nor can he exclude +gravity from matter. Yet can he admit matter as well as space to be +eternal, because he will not allow the inactivity of God." "If God's +works had a beginning he must have been _for a whole eternity_ +inactive." He seems to have an odd notion of eternity, for he there +allows it could have an end. The argument would be fairer in concluding +"he must have been inactive _or doing something else_." + +The Deity set up, if not the creator of matter, is at least the matter +of it, nor will his advocates by any means allow him to be material +himself. They see some incongruity in admitting one piece of matter to +be so complete a master of another. However Dr. Priestley and other +arguers for a Deity would do well to consider, that whatever is not +matter, is a space that matter may occupy. Therefore if God is not +matter, and also is not space, he is nothing. Dr. Priestley allows +matter eternal, and its properties of gravity, elasticity, electricity +and others equally eternal. He says directly, that matter cannot exist +without it's perpetually corresponding powers. The adjustment of those +powers he places in the Deity. But as we never see matter without the +adjustment of those properties as well as the existence of them, this +drives him at last to say, the Deity must also have created matter, +according to his system eternally created it, cotemporarily with +himself. Ideas absurd and irreconcileable! + +Discoursing upon the hypothesis of "a fortuitous concourse of atoms" +Dr. Priestley asks, "what reason we have to think that small masses of +matter can have power without communication _ab extra_?" Let this +question be returned, "have we not reason to think so from attraction +the most common property in matter." To get rid of this difficulty he +will not allow an atom of matter to be possessed originally of the most +simple powers, though he is ready to allow matter to have been eternal. +A magnet according to this system must sometime have existed without +its magnetic power. He concludes there must be some original existent +Being. He shall be allowed many original existent Beings if it pleases +him. A man may be an originally existent being, as well as any other. +He is superior to other animals in this world. In like manner there may +be allowed superior Beings to man (as most probably there are) and yet +those superior Beings not have made man. + +Dr. Priestley will have it, that all bodies are moved by external +force. That does not seem quite necessary. Motion may as well be +asserted to be originally a property of matter, or its true natural +state and rest a deprivation of that property, as that rest should be +its natural state. Hume thought so and Hume was no great fool, +notwithstanding Dr. Priestley makes so light of him. In fact matter +never is, and therefore most probably never was found to be in a state +of rest. Nor has Dr. Priestley any reason to suppose gravity, elasticity +and electricity to have been imprest on bodies by a superior Being, and +not originally inherent in matter, unless to favour his own hypothesis +of a Deity. He absolutely says matter could not have had those powers +without a communication from a superior and intelligent Being. If +matter is perceived in regulated motion, it is added bluntly, that it +must be by a mover possessed of a competent intelligence, and that a +Being therefore of such power and intelligence _must_ exist. Whoever +finds no difficulty in believing the contrary will find as little +difficulty in Mr. Hume's hypothesis, that motion might as well as other +powers and properties have been originally inherent in matter, or at +least have been a necessary result of some matter acting upon another. + +It has always been a doubt with Theists, whether they can better prove +their God's existence by moral or physical considerations. Dr. +Priestley seems to think the _forte_ of the argument lies in the latter +proof, and lays particular stress upon his observation respecting cause +and effect, which therefore cannot here be so readily dismissed. He +makes great reference to the works of art. Theists are always for +turning their God into an overgrown man. Anthropomorphites has long +been a term applied to them. They give him hands and eyes nor can they +conceive him otherwise than as a corporeal Being. In which, as before +has been said, they are very right, for there can only be in the world +body and the space which bodies occupy. But granting this great workman +to have done so much, is it not quite an incontrovertible proposition, +that whoever first made a thing, as, for example, a chair or a table, +must have had an adequate idea of it's nature and use. Dr. Priestley +speaks more correctly in another part, by saying, he must have been +_capable_ of comprehending it. The nature and use of things are often +found out after they are made and by different persons than the makers +of them. Neither is there any analogy between the works of art, as a +table or house, and of nature, as a man or tree. Therefore there can be +no arguing from one to another by analogy. Hume observes that the +former works are done by reason and design, and the latter by +generation and vegetation, and therefore arguing from effect to causes, +it is probable, that the universe is generated or vegetated. At least +after all the observations about a table, it may be modestly asked, +whether there is not some difference between a table and the world? The +Doctor will also find some difficulty in explaining the propriety of +any argument of analogy between men and metals, which he does not at +other times scruple to make? + +A _gratis_ assertion is first made, that all things we see are effects; +then because we see one thing caused, every thing must have been +caused. His conclusion of the argument is still more curious, "because +every thing was caused there must have been something that was not +caused." The cause ought to be proportioned to the effect. The effect +is not infinite. Why then attribute infinity to the cause? This is +Hume's argument. Priestley calls it shortly unworthy of a philosopher. +Let others judge! But surely, with all this infinity it may be asked, +why may not there have been an infinity of causes? + +Another argument is, that being unable to account, for what is, by any +thing visible, we must have recourse to something invisible, and that +invisible power is what he calls God. Apply this argument to gravity, +and the external force that is said to cause every stone to fall is +God. But if nothing visible can to us account for the operations of +nature, why must we have recourse to what is invisible? Why necessary +to account at all for them? Or why may not visible things account for +them, although this person or another cannot tell which? + +If nothing can begin to exist of itself or by the energy of material +nature, it is more consistent to allow a plurality of Deities, than one +immediate Deity. An equality in a plurality of Deities might be +objectionable. But that is not at all necessary, rather the contrary; +and so was the Pagan theory, which is not so absurd as the modern one. +This universe or mundane system may be the work of one hand, another of +another, and so on. Where is the absurdity of that? If the universe is +applied to the solar system, there is an appearance of its being formed +by one design, and in that stile it might be said to be the work of one +hand. But this Deity is asserted to be infinite, and to have made all +other worlds and universes, though it does not appear by any unity of +design that all other worlds and universes are one work with this. + +Dr. Priestley himself allows that reason would drive us to require a +cause of the Deity. He is himself obliged to conclude, after all his +reasoning, that we must acquiesce in our inability of having any idea +on the subject; that is, how God could exist without a prior cause. At +the same time he says the Deity cannot have a cause, and therefore we +cannot reason about him. Why then all his own reasoning? We make a +Deity ourselves, fall down and worship him. It is the molten calf over +again. Idolatry is still practised. The only difference is that now we +worship idols of our imagination; before of our hands. "Still we must +necessarily rest at a Being that is infinite;" that is, when our reason +drives us to the admission of an infinite cause we must necessarily +stop finitely in our career. Not content with this conclusion he adds, +that we cannot help perceiving the existence of this cause, though he +owns that it is not an object of our conceptions. But even the Theist's +argument does not necessarily drive us to the admission of an infinite +cause. The argument is, "because there is a man, and man has +intelligence, we must necessarily admit of a Being of infinitely +superior intelligence." Would it not be nearly as well to argue, +"because there is a goose, therefore there must be a man." + +What is there more which hinders a series of finite causes to be +carried back _ad infinitum_, than that the reasoner or contemplator of +the course of nature is tired. If this eternal series could not exist, +a Deity might with some propriety be said to follow. Put the argument +into a syslogistic form. + +"The universe shews design;" + +"It is absurd to suppose an infinite succession of finite causes;" + +"Therefore there is an uncaused intelligent cause of this universe." + +Deny the second assertion and the problem is destroyed. So far from its +being difficult to suppose an eternity, it is the most difficult thing +in the world to suppose any thing but an eternity. A mind, not afraid +to think, will find it the most easy contemplation in the world to +dwell upon. It is at least a bold assertion, that _nothing can be more +evident_ than that plants and animals could not have proceeded from each +other by succession from all eternity. Surely to this may be answered, +that it is more evident that two and two make four. But Dr. Priestley +goes on to say, "that the primary cause of a man cannot be a man, any +more than the cause of a sound can be a sound." Experience shews us all +sound is an effect of a cause. Does experience shew us more of a man +than that he came from a man and a woman? To allow therefore that all +men must have come from a man and a woman is as far as we can argue +upon the subject, whilst in reasoning we trust to experience. An +argument is well built upon similarity, therefore it is probable if one +horse had a cause all horses had. But will not the argument be more +consonant to itself, in supposing all horses had the same cause, and as +one is seen to be generated from a horse and a mare so all were from +all eternity. It were a better argument in favour of a Deity or some +invisible agent to shew that a new animal came every now and then into +life, without any body's knowing how or where. + +It is allowed by Priestley and all other reasoners, that the most +capital argument that can be formed in support of any thesis is to be +built upon experience, or analogy to experience. Yet will many of these +reasoners, Dr. Priestley at least for one, contend at the same time for +the probability of a future life, when no instance can be given of any +revival whatsoever. The same will contend, that their Deity can at +pleasure form new species of animals, though in fact we never do see +new beings come into existence. We ought only to argue from experience; +and experience would teach us, that the species of all animals has +eternally existed. Grant that we do not know, whether man has been +eternal, or from a time, is it therefore because we do not know, that +we must say he came from God? That unknown Being, as he is sometimes +pompously and ridiculously called! The Devil is equally an unknown +Being. The admission of evil under a good Deity opens a ready door to +the manichean system, which seems much more rational than simple Deism. + +The following chain of reasoning, as used by Dr. Priestley, is well +linked together to prove the weight and force of experience in +reasoning, but it proves nothing more. "Chairs and tables are made by +men or beings of similar powers, because we see them made by men; and +we cannot suppose them made by a tree or come into being of themselves, +because that is against experience. No one will say one table might +make another, or that one man might make another. We see nothing come +into being without an adequate cause." Yet for this adequate cause we +are at the same time referred to a belief in a causeless secret +invisible agent, and to our own experience, for a proof of his nature. + +Dr. Priestley allows, that what is _visible_ in man may be the feat of +all his powers, for it is (as he says,) a rule in philosophy not to +multiply causes without necessity. But he affirms that what is _visible_ +in the universe cannot be the feat of intelligence. This is breaking +the very rule of reasoning which he himself has chosen to adopt; and he +gives no other reason for it, than because we do not see the universe +think as we do man. Sensible of this dilemma, soon afterwards he +inclines to allow principle of thought to the universe, for he adds, +that if we allow it, yet the universe has so much the appearance of +other works of design that we must look out for its author as much as +that of a man; and it is allowed that most probably it had the same +author. + +Every difficulty vanishes with the energy of nature, or at least is +as well accounted for as from an independent Deity. It is an usual +question to those philosophers, who maintain that the present existence +of things is the result of the force and energy of nature acting upon +herself, "why this force does not perpetually operate and produce new +appearances?" Besides that this question may be retorted upon the +supporters of a Deity, I am thoroughly persuaded, that this force is +constantly in action, and that every change which animals and +vegetables undergo, whether of dissolution or renovation, is a manifest +and undeniable proof of it. Man, and the other Beings which occupy this +terrestrial globe, are evidently suited to its present state, and an +alteration in their habitation, such as that of extreme or excessive +heat, would inevitably destroy them. This is so certain, that bones of +animals have been dug up which appertain to no species now existing, +and which must have perished from an alteration in the system of things +taking place too considerable for it to endure. Whenever the globe +shall come to that temperament fit for the life of that lost species, +whatever energy in nature produced it originally, if even it had a +beginning, will most probably be sufficient to produce it again. Is not +the reparation of vegitable life the spring equally wonderful now as +its first production? Yet this is a plain effect of the influence of +the sun, whose absence would occasion death by a perpetual winter. So +far this question from containing, in my opinion, a formidable +difficulty to the Epicurean system, I cannot help judging the continual +mutability of things as an irrefragable proof of this eternal energy of +nature. Those who ask, why the great changes in the state of things are +not more frequent, would absurdly require them to ensue within the +short space of their existence, forgetting that millions of ages are of +no importance to the whole mass of matter, though Beings of some +particular forms may find a wish and an advantage to prolong the term +of their duration under that form. + +If it is said, Nature or the energy of nature is another name for the +Deity, then may Dr. Priestley and his answerer shake hands; the one is +no more an atheist than the other. And if it is observed that the +Energy of Nature having produced men may be capable of re-producing +them, so that an atheist is not sure to escape punishment for his +crimes, it is easy to say in return, neither is a Deist sure. A good +atheist has no more reason to be afraid to be re-produced than a good +Deist or a Christian. It may be useful for both of them to be good. If +necessary let it again be repeated, that it is not at all meant in this +answer to make atheism a plea or protection for immorality. That is a +charge long and most unjustly put upon the poor undefended atheist. The +knowledge of a God and even the belief of a providence are found but +too slight a barrier against human passions, which are apt to fly out +as licentiously as they would otherwise have done. All, which this +creed can in reality produce, scarce goes beyond some exterior +exercises, which are vainly thought to reconcile man to God. It may +make men build temples, sacrifice victims, offer up prayers, or perform +something of the like nature; but never break a criminal intrigue, +restore an ill gotten wealth, or mortify the lust of man. Lust being +the source of every crime, it is evident (since it reigns as much among +idolaters and anthropomorphites, as among atheists) idolaters and +anthropomorphites must be as susceptible of all of crimes as atheists, +and neither the one set nor the other could form societies, did not a +curb, stronger then that of religion, namely human laws, repress their +perverseness. If no other remedy were applied to vice than the +remonstrances of divines, a great city such as London, would in a +fortnight's time, fall into the most horrid disorders. Whatever may be +the difference of faith, vice predominates alike with the Christian and +the Jew, with the Deist and the atheist. So like are they in their +actions, that one would think they copied one another. Religion may +make men follow ceremonies; little is the inconvenience found in them. +A great triumph truly for religion to make men baptise or fast? When +did it make men do virtuous actions for virtue's sake, or practise +fewer inventions to get rich, where riches could not be acquired +without poverty to others? The true principle most commonly seen in +human actions, and which philosophy will cure sooner than religion, is +the natural inclination of man for pleasure, or a taste contracted for +certain objects by prejudice and habit. These prevail in whatsoever +faith a man is educated, or with whatever knowledge he may store his +mind. + +But it will be said, those who commit crimes are atheists at the time +at least they do so. But an atheist cannot be superstitious, and +criminals are often so at the very moment of their crimes. Religious +persuasion men are not doubted to have when they vent their rage upon +others of a different way of thinking, when they express a dread of +danger or a zeal for ceremonies. These at least are not virtues; and +few indeed must be those, who at any time are really Theists, if their +faith is lost or forgotten every time they have a mind to indulge a +vitious passion. To support still the efficacy of religion in making +men virtuous is to oppose metaphysical reasoning to the truth of fact; +it is like the philosopher denying motion, and being refuted by one of +his scholars walking across the room. If then it is true, as history +and the whole course of human life shew it is, that men can still +plunge themselves into all sorts of crimes, though they are persuaded +of the truth of religion, which is made to inform them that God +punishes sin and rewards good actions, it cannot but be suspected that +religion even encourages crimes, by the hopes it gives of pardon +through the efficacy of prayer; at all events it must be granted, that +those who hold up a belief in God as a sufficient proof and character +of a good life are most egregiously mistaken. + +Some Theists may have lighter sense of personal dignity than some +atheists. If the Theist thinks himself allied to and connected with +the Deity he may plume himself upon his station; but how apt are +those worshipers of a God, instead of having a high sense of personal +dignity, to debase themselves into the most abject beings, dreading +even the shadow of their own phantom. An atheist feeling himself to be +a link in the grand chain of Nature, feels his relative importance and +dreads no imaginary Being. An atheist, who is so from inattention and +without intelligence, may indeed feel himself as much debased as the +meanest and most humble Theist. + +Another argument against atheists is, that where men are atheists it is +generally found that their usual turn of thinking and habits of life +have inclined to make them so. Is not this to be turned upon Theists? +But granting that the idea of a supreme author is more pleasing, and +that the argument with respect to the existence or non-existence of a +God was in _equilibrio_, it is not therefore right to conclude that the +mind ought to be determined by this or any other bias. Nor is it quite +clear if there is no God (by which term let it again be noticed, is +meant a Being of supreme intelligence, the contriver of the material +universe and yet no part of the material system) that the world in +which man inhabits is either fatherless or deserted. The wisdom of +nature supplies in reality what is only hoped for from the protection +of the Deity. If the world has so good a mother, a father may well be +spared especially such a haughty jealous, and vindictive one as God is +most generally represented to be. Dr. Priestley being clear in his +opinion; that the being of a God is capable of being proved by reason, +is not so weak as some of his fellow-labourers, who hold the powers of +reason in so low estimation as to be incapable of themselves to arrive +at almost any truth. He must however allow, if reason proves a Deity +and his attributes there was less use of revelation to prove them. But +the learned advocates of a Deity differ greatly among themselves, +whether his existence is capable of being ascertained by fixt +principles of reason. After such a difference and the instance of so +many great men in all ages, from Democritus downward, who have +confidently denied the being of a God, whose arguments the learned Dr. +Cudworth, in the last century, only by fully and fairly stating, with +all the answers in his power to give (though his zeal in religion was +never doubted) was thought by other divines to have given a weight to +atheism not well to be overturned, it is surprising that it should be +the common belief of this day, that an argument in support of atheism +cannot stand a moment, and that even no man in his senses can ever hold +such a doctrine. All that Epicurus and Lucretius have so greatly and +convincingly said is swept away in a moment by these better reasoners, +who yet scruple not to declare, with Dr. Priestley, that what they +reason about is not the subject of human understanding. But let it be +asked, is it not absurd to reason with a man about that of which that +same man asserts we have no idea at all? Yet will Dr. Priestley argue, +and say it is of no importance, whether the person with whom he argues +has a conception or not of the subject. "Having no ideas includes no +impossibility," therefore he goes on with his career of words to argue +about an unseen being with another whom he will allow to have no idea +of the subject and yet it shall be of no avail in the dispute, whether +he has or no, or whether he is capable or incapable of having any. +Reason failing, the passions are called upon, and the imagined God is +represented at one time, with all the terrors of a revengeful tyrant, +at another with all the tenderness of an affectionate parent. Shall +then such a tremendous Being with such a care for the creatures he has +made, suffer his own existence to be a perpetual doubt? If the course +of nature does not give sufficient proof, why does not the hand divine +shew itself by an extraordinary interposition of power? It is allowed +miracles ought not to be cheap or plenty. One or two at least every +thousand years might be admitted. But this is a perpetual standing +miracle, that such a Being as the depicted God, the author of nature +and all its works, should exist and yet his existence be perpetually in +doubt, or require a Jesus, a Mahomet or a Priestley to reveal it. Is +not the writing of this very answer to the last of those three great +luminaries of religion a proof, that no God, or no _such_ God at least, +exists. Hear the admirable words of the author of "The System of +Nature;" _Comment permet il qu'un mortel comme moi ose attaquer ses +droits, ses titres, son existence meme?_ + +Dr. Clarke, Mr. Hume and Helvetius, are writers whose arguments for and +against a Godhead Dr. Priestley has much noted. The former says, "the +Deity must have been infinite, if self-existent, because all things in +the universe are made by him." Are all things in the universe infinite? +Why an infinite maker of a finite work? It is juster to argue, that +whatever is self-existent must have been eternal. Nor is there any +great objection to the converse of the proposition properly taken, that +whatever is not self-existent must have been created and therefore +cannot have been eternal. If this is fair arguing, matter cannot +according to Dr. Priestley's system have been created and be eternal +also. But Dr. Priestley has no inclination to reconcile his opinions +with those of Dr. Clarke. He has chosen a fairer method, and that is, +to refute the arguments of former asserters of a Deity as well as to +establish his own. Dr. Clarke he most effectually exposes where he +enters upon the subject of space. It seems as if Dr. Clarke, having +asserted that the Deity necessarily existed, had a mind that nothing +else should necessarily exist but the Deity; and conscious that space +at least also necessarily existed, he makes universal space an +attribute of the Deity. With this reverie in his head he raises a +syllogism of complete nonsense (_vide Priestley's Letters_, P. 170.) +where he supposes space to be nothing though he also supposes it to be +an attribute of the Deity. Making it therefore an attribute of the +Deity and knowing that space is eternal and unmeasurable he takes upon +himself thereby also clearly to have proved that the Deity is so. +Exclude the Deity, space will still exist and still be eternal and +immense. Dr. Priestley knew well that Dr. Clarke's argument in this +respect was all a fallacy, and therefore he shews his sense in not +adopting it. It is in fact an abuse of terms unworthy of a scientific +reasoner. + +The only argument attempted by Dr. Clarke, why the Deity must have +had no cause, is, because it is necessary he should have none. +Dr. Clarke says roundly that necessity is the cause of the existence +of the Deity. This is very near the language of the ancients, who +held that Fate controuled the Gods. Necessity is therefore the first +God. Why then any other God than Necessity? What more has Helvetius +said than that? + +It is an old and unanswerable argument that, granting a God and his +power infinite, whatever he wills is executed; but man and other +animals are unhappy, therefore he does not will they should be happy. +Or take the argument the other way and it will equally conclude against +his power. With regard to Mr. Hume's famous observations upon the +evidence of miracles, Dr. Priestley thinks to make a short havock of +them by observing that new, and therefore miraculous appearances, are +continually presenting themselves; but although such new appearances +may be instanced, they are not contrary to former experience, only in +addition to it. With this allusion to Natural Philosophy, Dr. Priestley +thinks himself in one short sentence to have discussed all Mr. Hume's +observations upon miracles. _"Which is more likely, that the relater of +a miracle should have lied or been deceived, or that the thing related +should have existed contrary to experience prior and subsequent?"_ +Let the force of this observation be considered and believe in the +history of miracles who can! To give a finishing stroke to poor +Mr. Hume, Dr. Priestley observes that literary fame was Hume's only +motive and consolation, as he said himself, in all his laborious +enquiries and enlightened writings. At this he exclaims, "What gloomy +prospect and poor comfort he must have had at his death!" If so, +how much was he the greater man so well to have gone through that +last scene! + +The honour which Dr. Priestley gives to Helvetius, the author of that +ingenious and satisfactory work intitled "The System of Nature," does +credit to his own candour. He applauds him for speaking out, he ought +therefore to applaud this answer for the same reason. It is true he +seems to have discovered one incongruity in the reasoning of Helvetius. +The words he imputes to him are, "that nature has no object, because +nature acts necessarily; man has an object; yet man also acts +necessarily." In the same way nature might have an object though it +acted necessarily. But Helvetius adds, that the object which man has is +a necessary object. The best defence of Helvetius (not in behalf of +that passage, but of his general system) is to let him speak at large +for himself; and the following quotation Dr. Priestley and the reader +may accept as a specimen of the strength and justice of his argument, +and as the conclusion of this answer. + +"Theologians tell us, that the disorder and evil, which is seen in the +world, is not absolute and real, but relatively and apparently such, +and does not disprove the divine wisdom and goodness. But may not one +reply, that the goodness and wonderful order which they so much extol, +and on which they found their notions of those qualities in God, are in +a similar way only relative and apparent. If it be only our co-existence +with the causes which surround us, and our manner of perceiving them, +that constitute the order of nature for us, and authorise us to attribute +wisdom and goodness to the maker of what surround us, should not also +our mode of existence and perception authorise us to call what is +hurtful to us disorder, and to attribute impotence, ignorance, or +malice, to that Being which we would suppose to actuate nature. + +Some pretend that the supremely wise God can derive goodness and +happiness to us from the midst of those ills which he permits us to +undergo in this world. Are these men privy counsellors of the Divinity, +or on what do they found their romantic hopes? They will doubtless say, +that they judge of God's conduct by analogy, and that from the present +appearance of his wisdom and goodness, they have a right to infer his +future wisdom and goodness. But do not the present appearances of his +want of wisdom or goodness justify us in concluding, that he will +always want them? If they are so often manifestly deficient in this +world, what can assure us that they will abound more in the next? This +kind of language therefore rests upon no other basis than a prejudiced +imagination, and signifies, that some men, having without examination, +adopted an opinion that God is good, cannot admit that he will consent +to let his creatures remain constantly unhappy. Yet this grand +hypothesis, of the unalterable felicity of mankind hereafter, is +insufficient to justify the Divinity in permitting the present sleeting +and transitory marks of injustice and disorder. If God can have been +unjust for a moment, he has derogated, during that moment at least, +from his divine perfection, and is not unchangeably good; his justice +then is liable to temporary alteration, and, if this be the case, who +can give security for his justice and goodness continuing unalterable +in a future life, the notion of which is set up only to exculpate his +deviation from those qualities in this? + +In spite of the experience, which every instant gives the lie to that +beneficence which men suppose in God, they continue to call him good. +When we bewail the miserable victims of those disorders and calamities +that so often overwhelm our species, we are confidently told that these +ills are but apparent, and that if our short-sighted mind could fathom +the depths of divine wisdom, we should always behold the greatest +blessings result from what we denominate evil. How despicable is so +frivolous an answer! If we can find no good but in such things as +affect us in a manner which is agreeable and pleasing to our actual +existence, we shall be obliged to confess that those things which +affect us, even but for a time, in, a painful manner, are as certainly +evil to us. To vindicate God's visiting mankind with these evils some +tell us, that he is just, and that they, are chastisements inflicted on +mankind to punish the wrongs he has received from men. Thus a feeble +mortal has the power to irritate and injure the almighty and eternal +Being who created this world. To offend any one is, to afflict him, +to diminish in some degree his happiness, to make him feel a painful +sensation. How can man possibly disturb the felicity of the +all-powerful sovereign of nature! How can a frail creature, who +has received from God his being and his temper, act against the +inclinations of an irresistable force which never consents to sin and +disorder? Besides justice, according to the only ideas which we can +have of it, supposes a fixt desire to render every one his due. But +theologians constantly preach that God owes us nothing, that the good +things he affords are the voluntary effects of his beneficence, and +that without any violence of his equity he can dispose of his creatures +as his choice or caprice may impel him. In this doctrine I see not the +smallest shadow of justice, but the most hideous tyranny and shocking +abuse of power. In fact do we not see virtue and innocence plunged into +an abyss of misery, while wickedness rears its triumphant head under +the empire of this God whose justice is so much extalled? "This misery, +say you, is but for a time." Very well, Sirs, but your God is unjust +for a time. "He chastises whom he loves (you will say) for their own +benefit." But if he is perfectly good, why will he let them suffer at +all? "He does it, perhaps to try them" But, if he knows all things, +what occasion is there for him to try any? If he is omnipotent, why +need he vex himself about the vain design any one may form against him? +Omnipotence ought to be exempt from any such passions, as having +neither equals nor rivals. But if this God is jealous of his glory, his +titles and prerogative, why does he permit such numbers of men to +offend him? Why are any found daring enough to refuse the incense which +his pride expects? _Why am I a feeble mortal permitted to attack his +titles, his attributes, and even his existence?_ Is this permission of +punishment on me for the abuse of his grace and favour? He should never +have permitted me to abuse them. Or the grace he bestowed should have +been efficacious and have directed my steps according to his liking. +"But, say you, he makes man free." Alas? why did he present him with a +gift of which he must have foreseen the abuse? Is this faculty of free +agency, which enables me to resist his power, to corrupt and rob him of +his worshippers, and in fine to bring eternal misery on myself, a +present worthy of his infinite goodness? In consequence of the +pretended abuse of this fatal present, which an omniscient and good God +ought not to have bestowed on Beings capable of abusing it, +everlasting, inexpressible torments are reserved for the transitory +crimes of a Being made liable to commit them. Would that father be +called good, reasonable, just and kind, who put a sharp-edged and +dangerous knife into the hand of a playful, and imprudent child, whom +he before knew to be imprudent, and punished him during the remainder +of his life for cutting himself with it? Would that prince be called +just and merciful, who, not regarding any proportion between the +offence and the punishment, should perpetually exercise his power of +vengeance, over one of his subjects who, being drunk, had rashly +offended against his vanity, without causing any real harm to him, +especially, when the prince had taken pains to make him drunk? Should +we consider as almighty a monarch, whose dominions were in such +confusion and disorder, that, except a small number obedient servants, +all his subjects were every instant despising his laws, defeating his +will and insulting his person? Let ecclesiastics then acknowledge, that +their God is an assemblage of incompatible qualities, as +incomprehensible to their understanding as to mine. No: they say, in +reply to these difficulties, that wisdom and justice in God, are +qualities so much above or so unlike those qualities in us, that they +bear no relation or affinity towards human wisdom and justice. But, +pray how am I to form to myself an idea of the divine perfection, +unless it has some resemblance to those virtues which I observe in my +fellow creatures and feel in myself? If the justice of God is not the +same with human justice, why lastly do any men pretend to announce it, +comprehend and explain it to others?" + + + + + + +POSTSCRIPT. + + +Previous to this publication the editor sent the following Letter +to Dr. Priestley. + + +"Reverend Sir, + +Had you thought it impossible for man to hold different sentiments +respecting Natural religion and the proof of the existence of a God +than you do, the Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever would not have +appeared, much less would you have invited an answer by promising a +reply to every objection. Differing from you in sentiment I am the man +who enter with you in the lists; but I find myself upon consultation +with my friends under more difficulties than you were, and more to +stand in need of courage in taking up the glove, than you needed to +have in throwing it down. For this dispute is not like others in +philosophy, where the vanquished can only dread ridicule, contempt and +disappointment; here, whether victor or vanquished, your opponent has +to dread, beside ecclesiastical censure, the scourges, chains and +pillories of the courts of Law. + +I accuse you not of laying a trap for an unguarded author, but I ask +your friendly opinion, whether I can, with temporal safety at least, +maintain the contrary of your arguments in proof of a Deity and his +attributes. If I cannot, no wonder the Theist cries _Victoria!_ but +then it is a little ungenerous to ask for objections. Of you, I may +certainly expect, that you will promise to use your influence, as well +with lawyers as ecclesiastics, not to stir up a persecution against a +poor atheist in case there should be one found in the kingdom, which +people in general will not admit to be possible; or, if a persecution +could ensue, that you and your friends, favourers of free enquiry, +will at least bear the expences of it. + + I am, + Reverend Sir, + Your most humble obedient servant, + WILLIAM HAMMON. + +Oct. 23. 1781. + +_To the Reverend Dr. Priestley._ + + +To this letter Dr. Priestley sent no answer; or no answer ever came +to hand. + + +THE END. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Answer to Dr. Priestley's Letters to a +Philosophical Unbeliever, by Matthew Turner + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ANSWER TO DR. 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