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diff --git a/13789-h/13789-h.htm b/13789-h/13789-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..896d578 --- /dev/null +++ b/13789-h/13789-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,30871 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html> +<head> +<meta name="generator" content= +"HTML Tidy for Windows (vers 1st February 2004), see www.w3.org"> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content= +"text/html; charset=UTF-8"> +<title>Great Britain and the American Civil War, by Ephraim +Douglass Adams.</title> + +<style type="text/css"> + <!-- + P { margin-top: .75em; + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; } + blockquote {text-align: justify; + margin-left: 15%; + margin-right: 15%;} + IMG { + BORDER-RIGHT: 0px; + BORDER-TOP: 0px; + BORDER-LEFT: 0px; + BORDER-BOTTOM: 0px } + .loc { TEXT-ALIGN: right; + margin-left: 15%; + margin-right: 15%;} + .ctr { TEXT-ALIGN: center } + .rgt { float: right; + margin-top: 0em; + margin-bottom: 0em; + margin-left: -5%; + margin-right: 0%; + TEXT-ALIGN: center } + .lft { float: left; + margin-top: 0em; + margin-bottom: 0em; + margin-left: 5%; + margin-right: 0%; + TEXT-ALIGN: center } + .indx {margin-left:10%; margin-right:10%; text-align: left;} + .indx .letter {margin: 1em 0em 1em 0em;} + .indx p {margin: 0; padding-left: 3em; text-indent: -3em;} + .indx p.i1 {margin-left: 1em;} + .indx p.i2 {margin-left: 2em;} + .indx p.i3 {margin-left: 3em;} + .indx p.i4 {margin-left: 4em;} + .indx p.i5 {margin-left: 5em;} + .indx p.i6 {margin-left: 6em;} + .indx p.i7 {margin-left: 7em;} + .indx p.i8 {margin-left: 8em;} + .indx p.i9 {margin-left: 9em;} + span.pagenum + {position: absolute; left: 1%; right: 91%; font-size: 8pt;} + + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; } + HR { width: 33%; } + // --> +</style> +</head> +<body> +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 13789 ***</div> + +<a name="image01.jpg"></a> +<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image01.jpg"><img src= +"images/image01.jpg" width="55%" alt=""></a><br> +<b>LORD JOHN RUSSELL</b><br> +(<i>From Trevelyan's "Garibaldi and the Making of Italy</i>")</p> +<br> +<h2><i>EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS</i></h2> +<h1>GREAT BRITAIN<br> +AND<br> +THE AMERICAN<br> +CIVIL WAR</h1> +<h4>TWO VOLUMES BOUND AS ONE</h4> +<br> +<h3><a href="#VOLUME_I">VOLUME I.</a><br> +<a href="#VOLUME_II">VOLUME II.</a></h3> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v"></a>[V1:pg v]</span> +<h2>PREFACE</h2> +<p>This work was begun many years ago. In 1908 I read in the +British Museum many newspapers and journals for the years +1860-1865, and then planned a survey of English public opinion on +the American Civil War. In the succeeding years as a teacher at +Stanford University, California, the published diplomatic +correspondence of Great Britain and of the United States were +studied in connection with instruction given in the field of +British-American relations. Several of my students prepared +excellent theses on special topics and these have been acknowledged +where used in this work. Many distractions and other writing +prevented the completion of my original plan; and fortunately, for +when in 1913 I had at last begun this work and had prepared three +chapters, a letter was received from the late Charles Francis Adams +inviting me to collaborate with him in preparing a "Life" of his +father, the Charles Francis Adams who was American Minister to +Great Britain during the Civil War. Mr. Adams had recently returned +from England where he had given at Oxford University a series of +lectures on the Civil War and had been so fortunate as to obtain +copies, made under the scholarly supervision of Mr. Worthington C. +Ford, of a great mass of correspondence from the Foreign Office +files in the Public Record Office and from the private papers in +the possession of various families.</p> +<p>The first half of the year 1914 was spent with Mr. Adams at +Washington and at South Lincoln, in preparing the "Life." Two +volumes were completed, the first by Mr. <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_vi"></a>[V1:pg vi]</span> Adams carrying +the story to 1848, the second by myself for the period 1848 to +1860. For the third volume I analysed and organized the new +materials obtained in England and we were about to begin actual +collaboration on the most vital period of the "Life" when Mr. Adams +died, and the work was indefinitely suspended, probably wisely, +since any completion of the "Life" by me would have lacked that +individual charm in historical writing so markedly characteristic +of all that Mr. Adams did. The half-year spent with Mr. Adams was +an inspiration and constitutes a precious memory.</p> +<p>The Great War interrupted my own historical work, but in 1920 I +returned to the original plan of a work on "Great Britain and the +American Civil War" in the hope that the English materials obtained +by Mr. Adams might be made available to me. When copies were +secured by Mr. Adams in 1913 a restriction had been imposed by the +Foreign Office to the effect that while studied for information, +citations and quotations were not permissible since the general +diplomatic archives were not yet open to students beyond the year +1859. Through my friend Sir Charles Lucas, the whole matter was +again presented to the Foreign Office, with an exact statement that +the new request was in no way related to the proposed "Life" of +Charles Francis Adams, but was for my own use of the materials. +Lord Curzon, then Foreign Secretary, graciously approved the +request but with the usual condition that my manuscript be +submitted before publication to the Foreign Office. This has now +been done, and no single citation censored. Before this work will +have appeared the limitation hitherto imposed on diplomatic +correspondence will have been removed, and the date for open +research have been advanced beyond 1865, the end of the Civil +War.</p> +<p>Similar explanations of my purpose and proposed work were made +through my friend Mr. Francis W. Hirst to the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_vii"></a>[V1:pg vii]</span> owners of +various private papers, and prompt approval given. In 1924 I came +to England for further study of some of these private papers. The +Russell Papers, transmitted to the Public Record Office in 1914 and +there preserved, were used through the courtesy of the Executors of +the late Hon. Rollo Russell, and with the hearty goodwill of Lady +Agatha Russell, daughter of the late Earl Russell, the only living +representative of her father, Mr. Rollo Russell, his son, having +died in 1914. The Lyons Papers, preserved in the Muniment Room at +Old Norfolk House, were used through the courtesy of the Duchess of +Norfolk, who now represents her son who is a minor. The Gladstone +Papers, preserved at Hawarden Castle, were used through the +courtesy of the Gladstone Trustees. The few citations from the +Palmerston Papers, preserved at Broadlands, were approved by +Lieut.-Colonel Wilfred Ashley, M.P.</p> +<p>The opportunity to study these private papers has been +invaluable for my work. Shortly after returning from England in +1913 Mr. Worthington Ford well said: "The inside history of +diplomatic relations between the United States and Great Britain +may be surmised from the official archives; the tinting and shading +needed to complete the picture must be sought elsewhere." (Mass. +Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>, XLVI, p. 478.) Mr. C.F. Adams +declared (<i>ibid.</i>, XLVII, p. 54) that without these papers +"... the character of English diplomacy at that time (1860-1865) +cannot be understood.... It would appear that the commonly +entertained impressions as to certain phases of international +relations, and the proceedings and utterances of English public men +during the progress of the War of Secession, must be to some extent +revised."</p> +<p>In addition to the new English materials I have been fortunate +in the generosity of my colleague at Stanford University, Professor +Frank A. Golder, who has given to me transcripts, obtained at St. +Petersburg in 1914, of all <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_viii"></a>[V1:pg viii]</span> Russian diplomatic +correspondence on the Civil War. Many friends have aided, by +suggestion or by permitting the use of notes and manuscripts, in +the preparation of this work. I have sought to make due +acknowledgment for such aid in my foot-notes. But in addition to +those already named, I should here particularly note the courtesy +of the late Mr. Gaillard Hunt for facilities given in the State +Department at Washington, of Mr. Herbert Putnam, Librarian of +Congress, for the transcript of the Correspondence of Mason and +Slidell, Confederate Commissioners in Europe, and of Mr. Charles +Moore, Chief of Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, for the +use of the Schurz Papers containing copies of the despatches of +Schleiden, Minister of the Republic of Bremen at Washington during +the Civil War. Especially thanks are due to my friend, Mr. Herbert +Hoover, for his early interest in this work and for his generous +aid in the making of transcripts which would otherwise have been +beyond my means. And, finally, I owe much to the skill and care of +my wife who made the entire typescript for the Press, and whose +criticisms were invaluable.</p> +<p>It is no purpose of a Preface to indicate results, but it is my +hope that with, I trust, a "calm comparison of the evidence," now +for the first time available to the historian, a fairly true +estimate may be made of what the American Civil War meant to Great +Britain; how she regarded it and how she reacted to it. In brief, +my work is primarily a study in British history in the belief that +the American drama had a world significance, and peculiarly a +British one.</p> +<p class="loc">EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS.</p> +<p><i>November 25, 1924</i></p> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix"></a>[V1:pg ix]</span> +<a name="VOLUME_I"></a> +<h2>CONTENTS<br> +OF<br> +VOLUME ONE</h2> +<center> +<table summary=""> +<tr> +<td align="center">CHAPTER</td> +<td> </td> +<td align="right">PAGE</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">I.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_I">BACKGROUNDS</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">1</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">II.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_II">FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF IMPENDING CONFLICT, +1860-61</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">35</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">III.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_III">THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY, MAY, +1861</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">76</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">IV.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">BRITISH SUSPICION OF SEWARD</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">113</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">V.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_V">THE DECLARATION OF PARIS +NEGOTIATION</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">137</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">VI.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">BULL RUN; CONSUL BUNCH; COTTON, AND +MERCIER</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">172</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">VII.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">THE "TRENT"</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">203</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">VIII.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">THE BLOCKADE</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">244</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">IX.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">ENTER MR. LINDSAY</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">274</a></td> +</tr> +</table> +</center> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi"></a>[V1:pg xi]</span> +<h2>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</h2> +<h3>PART ONE</h3> +<center> +<table summary=""> +<tr> +<td><a href="#image01.jpg">LORD JOHN RUSSELL</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href= +"#image01.jpg"><i>Frontispiece</i></a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> <i>From Trevelyan's "Garibaldi +and the Making of Italy</i>"</td> +<td> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><a href="#image02.jpg">LORD LYONS (1860)</a></td> +<td align="right"><i>Facing p</i>. <a href= +"#image02.jpg">42</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> <i>From Lord Newton's "Life of +Lord Lyons" (Edward Arnold & Co</i>.)</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><a href="#image03.jpg">SIR WILLIAM GREGORY, K.C.M.G.</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image03.jpg">90</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> <i>From Lady Gregory's "Sir +William Gregory, K.C.M.G.: An Autobiography"</i> (<i>John +Murray</i>)</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><a href="#image04.jpg">WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image04.jpg">114</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> <i>From Lord Newton's "Life of +Lord Lyons"</i> (<i>Edward Arnold & Co.</i>)</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><a href="#image05.jpg">C.F. ADAMS</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image05.jpg">138</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> <i>From a photograph in the +United States Embassy, London</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><a href="#image06.jpg">JAMES M. MASON</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image06.jpg">206</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> <i>From a photograph by L.C. +Handy, Washington</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><a href="#image07.jpg">"KING COTTON BOUND"</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image07.jpg">262</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> <i>Reproduced by permission of +the Proprietors of "Punch"</i></td> +</tr> +</table> +</center> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1"></a>[V1:pg 1]</span> +<h1>GREAT BRITAIN<br> +AND THE<br> +AMERICAN CIVIL WAR</h1> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I</h2> +<h3>BACKGROUNDS</h3> +<br> +<p>In 1862, less than a year after he had assumed his post in +London, the American Minister, Charles Francis Adams, at a time of +depression and bitterness wrote to Secretary of State Seward: "That +Great Britain did, in the most terrible moment of our domestic +trial in struggling with a monstrous social evil she had earnestly +professed to abhor, coldly and at once assume our inability to +master it, and then become the only foreign nation steadily +contributing in every indirect way possible to verify its judgment, +will probably be the verdict made against her by posterity, on calm +comparison of the evidence<a name="FNanchor1"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1">[1]</a>." Very different were the views of +Englishmen. The historian, George Grote, could write: "The perfect +neutrality [of Great Britain] in this destructive war appears to me +almost a phenomenon in political history. No such forbearance has +been shown during the political history of the last two centuries. +It is the single case in which the English Government and +public--generally so meddlesome--have displayed most prudent and +commendable forbearance in spite of great temptations to the +contrary<a name="FNanchor2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2">[2]</a>." And +Sir William Harcourt, in September, 1863, declared: "Among all Lord +Russell's many titles to fame and to public gratitude, the manner +in which he has steered the vessel of State through the Scylla and +Charybdis of the American War will, I think, always stand +conspicuous<a name="FNanchor3"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_3">[3]</a>."</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2"></a>[V1:pg 2]</span> +<p>Minister Adams, in the later years of the Civil War, saw reason +somewhat to modify his earlier judgment, but his indictment of +Great Britain was long prevalent in America, as, indeed, it was +also among the historians and writers of Continental +Europe--notably those of France and Russia. To what extent was this +dictum justified? Did Great Britain in spite of her long years of +championship of personal freedom and of leadership in the cause of +anti-slavery seize upon the opportunity offered in the disruption +of the American Union, and forgetting humanitarian idealisms, react +only to selfish motives of commercial advantage and national power? +In brief, how is the American Civil War to be depicted by +historians of Great Britain, recording her attitude and action in +both foreign and domestic policy, and revealing the principles of +her statesmen, or the inspirations of her people?</p> +<p>It was to answer this question that the present work was +originally undertaken; but as investigation proceeded it became +progressively more clear that the great crisis in America was +almost equally a crisis in the domestic history of Great Britain +itself and that unless this were fully appreciated no just estimate +was possible of British policy toward America. Still more it became +evident that the American Civil War, as seen through British +spectacles, could not be understood if regarded as an isolated and +unique situation, but that the conditions preceding that +situation--some of them lying far back in the relations of the two +nations--had a vital bearing on British policy and opinion when the +crisis arose. No expanded examination of these preceding conditions +is here possible, but it is to a summary analysis of them that this +first chapter is devoted.</p> +<hr style="width: 25%;"> +<p>On the American War for separation from the Mother Country it is +unnecessary to dilate, though it should always <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_3"></a>[V1:pg 3]</span> be remembered that +both during the war and afterwards there existed a minority in +Great Britain strongly sympathetic with the political ideals +proclaimed in America--regarding those ideals, indeed, as something +to be striven for in Britain itself and the conflict with America +as, in a measure, a conflict in home politics. But independence +once acknowledged by the Treaty of Peace of 1783, the relations +between the Mother Country and the newly-created United States of +America rapidly tended to adjust themselves to lines of contact +customary between Great Britain and any other Sovereign State. Such +contacts, fixing national attitude and policy, ordinarily occur on +three main lines: governmental, determined by officials in +authority in either State whose duty it is to secure the greatest +advantage in power and prosperity for the State; commercial, +resulting, primarily, from the interchange of goods and the +business opportunities of either nation in the other's territory, +or from their rivalry in foreign trade; idealistic, the result of +comparative development especially in those ideals of political +structure which determine the nature of the State and the form of +its government. The more obvious of these contacts is the +governmental, since the attitude of a people is judged by the +formal action of its Government, and, indeed, in all three lines of +contact the government of a State is directly concerned and +frequently active. But it may be of service to a clearer +appreciation of British attitude and policy before 1860, if the +intermingling of elements required by a strict chronological +account of relations is here replaced by a separate review of each +of the three main lines of contact.</p> +<p>Once independence had been yielded to the American Colonies, the +interest of the British Government rapidly waned in affairs +American. True, there still remained the valued establishments in +the West Indies, and the less considered British possessions on the +continent to the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4"></a>[V1:pg +4]</span> north of the United States. Meanwhile, there were +occasional frictions with America arising from uncertain claims +drawn from the former colonial privileges of the new state, or from +boundary contentions not settled in the treaty of peace. Thus the +use of the Newfoundland fisheries furnished ground for an +acrimonious controversy lasting even into the twentieth century, +and occasionally rising to the danger point. Boundary disputes +dragged along through official argument, survey commissions, +arbitration, to final settlement, as in the case of the northern +limits of the State of Maine fixed at last by the Treaty of +Washington of 1842, and then on lines fair to both sides at any +time in the forty years of legal bickering. Very early, in 1817, an +agreement creditable to the wisdom and pacific intentions of both +countries, was reached establishing small and equal naval armaments +on the Great Lakes. The British fear of an American attack on +Canada proved groundless as time went on and was definitely set at +rest by the strict curb placed by the American Government upon the +restless activities of such of its citizens as sympathized with the +followers of McKenzie and Papineau in the Canadian rebellion of +1837<a name="FNanchor4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4">[4]</a>.</p> +<p>None of these governmental contacts affected greatly the British +policy toward America. But the "War of 1812," as it is termed in +the United States, "Mr. Madison's War," as it was derisively named +by Tory contemporaries in Great Britain, arose from serious +policies in which the respective governments were in definite +opposition. Briefly, this was a clash between belligerent and +neutral interests. Britain, fighting at first for the preservation +of Europe against the spread of French revolutionary influence, +later against the Napoleonic plan of Empire, held the seas in her +grasp and exercised with vigour all the accustomed rights of a +naval <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5"></a>[V1:pg 5]</span> +belligerent. Of necessity, from her point of view, and as always in +the case of the dominant naval belligerent, she stretched +principles of international law to their utmost interpretation to +secure her victory in war. America, soon the only maritime neutral +of importance, and profiting greatly by her neutrality, contested +point by point the issue of exceeded belligerent right as +established in international law. America did more; she advanced +new rules and theories of belligerent and neutral right +respectively, and demanded that the belligerents accede to them. +Dispute arose over blockades, contraband, the British "rule of +1756" which would have forbidden American trade with French +colonies in war time, since such trade was prohibited by France +herself in time of peace. But first and foremost as touching the +personal sensibilities and patriotism of both countries was the +British exercise of a right of search and seizure to recover +British sailors.</p> +<p>Moreover this asserted right brought into clear view definitely +opposed theories as to citizenship. Great Britain claimed that a +man once born a British subject could never cease to be a +subject--could never "alienate his duty." It was her practice to +fill up her navy, in part at least, by the "impressment" of her +sailor folk, taking them whenever needed, and wherever found--in +her own coast towns, or from the decks of her own mercantile +marine. But many British sailors sought security from such +impressment by desertion in American ports or were tempted to +desert to American merchant ships by the high pay obtainable in the +rapidly-expanding United States merchant marine. Many became by +naturalization citizens of the United States, and it was the duty +of America to defend them as such in their lives and business. +America ultimately came to hold, in short, that expatriation was +accomplished from Great Britain when American citizenship was +conferred. On shore they were safe, for Britain did not attempt +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6"></a>[V1:pg 6]</span> to +reclaim her subjects from the soil of another nation. But she +denied that the American flag on merchant vessels at sea gave like +security and she asserted a naval right to search such vessels in +time of peace, professing her complete acquiescence in a like right +to the American navy over British merchant vessels--a concession +refused by America, and of no practical value since no American +citizen sought service in the British merchant marine.</p> +<p>This "right of search" controversy involved then, two basic +points of opposition between the two governments. First America +contested the British theory of "once a citizen always a +citizen<a name="FNanchor5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5">[5]</a>"; +second, America denied any right whatever to a foreign naval vessel +in <i>time of peace</i> to stop and search a vessel lawfully flying +the American flag. The <i>right of search in time of war</i>, that +is, a belligerent right of search, America never denied, but there +was both then and later much public confusion in both countries as +to the question at issue since, once at war, Great Britain +frequently exercised a legal belligerent right of search and +followed it up by the seizure of sailors alleged to be British +subjects. Nor were British naval captains especially careful to +make sure that no American-born sailors were included in their +impressment seizures, and as the accounts spread of victim after +victim, the American irritation steadily increased. True, France +was also an offender, but as the weaker naval power her offence was +lost sight of in view of the, literally, thousands of <i>bona +fide</i> Americans seized by Great Britain. Here, then, was a third +cause of irritation connected with impressment, though not a point +of governmental dispute as to right, for Great Britain professed +her earnest desire to restore promptly any American-born sailors +whom her naval officers had seized through error. In fact many such +sailors were soon liberated, but a large number either continued to +serve <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7"></a>[V1:pg 7]</span> +on British ships or to languish in British prisons until the end of +the Napoleonic Wars<a name="FNanchor6"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_6">[6]</a>.</p> +<p>There were other, possibly greater, causes of the War of 1812, +most of them arising out of the conflicting interests of the chief +maritime neutral and the chief naval belligerent. The pacific +presidential administration of Jefferson sought by trade +restrictions, using embargo and non-intercourse acts, to bring +pressure on both England and France, hoping to force a better +treatment of neutrals. The United States, divided in sympathy +between the belligerents, came near to disorder and disruption at +home, over the question of foreign policy. But through all American +factions there ran the feeling of growing animosity to Great +Britain because of impressment. At last, war was declared by +America in 1812 and though at the moment bitterly opposed by one +section, New England, that war later came to be regarded as of +great national value as one of the factors which welded the +discordant states into a national unity. Naturally also, the war +once ended, its commercial causes were quickly forgotten, whereas +the individual, personal offence involved in impressment and right +of search, with its insult to national pride, became a patriotic +theme for politicians and for the press. To deny, in fact, a +British "right of search" became a national point of honour, upon +which no American statesman would have dared to yield to British +overtures.</p> +<p>In American eyes the War of 1812 appears as a "second war of +Independence" and also as of international importance in contesting +an unjust use by Britain of her control of the seas. Also, it is to +be remembered that no other war of importance was fought by America +until the Mexican War of 1846, and militant patriotism was thus +centred on the two wars fought against Great Britain. <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_8"></a>[V1:pg 8]</span> The contemporary +British view was that of a nation involved in a life and death +struggle with a great European enemy, irritated by what seemed +captious claims, developed to war, by a minor power<a name= +"FNanchor7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7">[7]</a>. To be sure there +were a few obstinate Tories in Britain who saw in the war the +opportunity of smashing at one blow Napoleon's dream of empire, and +the American "democratic system." The London <i>Times</i> urged the +government to "finish with Mr. Bonaparte and then deal with Mr. +Madison and democracy," arguing that it should be England's object +to subvert "the whole system of the Jeffersonian school." But this +was not the purpose of the British Government, nor would such a +purpose have been tolerated by the small but vigorous Whig minority +in Parliament.</p> +<p>The peace of 1814, signed at Ghent, merely declared an end of +the war, quietly ignoring all the alleged causes of the conflict. +Impressment was not mentioned, but it was never again resorted to +by Great Britain upon American ships. But the principle of right of +search in time of peace, though for another object than +impressment, was soon again asserted by Great Britain and for forty +years was a cause of constant irritation and a source of danger in +the relations of the two countries. Stirred by philanthropic +emotion Great Britain entered upon a world crusade for the +suppression of the African Slave Trade. All nations in principle +repudiated that trade and Britain made treaties with various +maritime powers giving mutual right of search to the naval vessels +of each upon the others' merchant vessels. The African Slave Trade +was in fact outlawed for the flags of all nations. But America, +smarting under the memory of impressment injuries, and maintaining +in any case the doctrine that in time of peace the national flag +protected a vessel from interference <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_9"></a>[V1:pg 9]</span> or search by the naval vessels of any +other power, refused to sign mutual right of search treaties and +denied, absolutely, such a right for any cause whatever to Great +Britain or to any other nation. Being refused a treaty, Britain +merely renewed her assertion of the right and continued to exercise +it.</p> +<p>Thus the right of search in time of peace controversy was not +ended with the war of 1812 but remained a constant sore in national +relations, for Britain alone used her navy with energy to suppress +the slave trade, and the slave traders of all nations sought +refuge, when approached by a British naval vessel, under the +protection of the American flag. If Britain respected the flag, and +sheered off from search, how could she stop the trade? If she +ignored the flag and on boarding found an innocent American vessel +engaged in legal trade, there resulted claims for damages by +detention of voyage, and demands by the American Government for +apology and reparation. The real slave trader, seized under the +American flag, never protested to the United States, nor claimed +American citizenship, for his punishment in American law for +engaging in the slave trade was death, while under the law of any +other nation it did not exceed imprisonment, fine and loss of his +vessel.</p> +<p>Summed up in terms of governmental attitude the British +contention was that here was a great international humanitarian +object frustrated by an absurd American sensitiveness on a point of +honour about the flag. After fifteen years of dispute Great Britain +offered to abandon any claim to a right of <i>search</i>, +contenting herself with a right of <i>visit</i>, merely to verify a +vessel's right to fly the American flag. America asserted this to +be mere pretence, involving no renunciation of a practice whose +legality she denied. In 1842, in the treaty settling the Maine +boundary controversy, the eighth article sought a method of escape. +Joint cruising squadrons were provided for the coast of +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10"></a>[V1:pg 10]</span> +Africa, the British to search all suspected vessels except those +flying the American flag, and these to be searched by the American +squadron. At once President Tyler notified Congress that Great +Britain had renounced the right of search. Immediately in +Parliament a clamour was raised against the Government for the +"sacrifice" of a British right at sea, and Lord Aberdeen promptly +made official disclaimer of such surrender.</p> +<p>Thus, heritage of the War of 1812 right of search in time of +peace was a steady irritant. America doubted somewhat the honesty +of Great Britain, appreciating in part the humanitarian purpose, +but suspicious of an ulterior "will to rule the seas." After 1830 +no American political leader would have dared to yield the right of +search. Great Britain for her part, viewing the expansion of +domestic slavery in the United States, came gradually to attribute +the American contention, not to patriotic pride, but to the selfish +business interests of the slave-holding states. In the end, in +1858, with a waning British enthusiasm for the cause of slave trade +suppression, and with recognition that America had become a great +world power, Britain yielded her claim to right of search or visit, +save when established by Treaty. Four years later, in 1862, it may +well have seemed to British statesmen that American slavery had +indeed been the basic cause of America's attitude, for in that year +a treaty was signed by the two nations giving mutual right of +search for the suppression of the African Slave Trade. In fact, +however, this was but an effort by Seward, Secretary of State for +the North, to influence British and European opinion against the +seceding slave states of the South.</p> +<p>The right of search controversy was, in truth, ended when +American power reached a point where the British Government must +take it seriously into account as a factor in general world policy. +That power had been steadily and rapidly advancing since 1814. From +almost the first moment <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_11"></a>[V1:pg 11]</span> of established independence +American statesmen visualized the separation of the interests of +the western continent from those of Europe, and planned for +American leadership in this new world. Washington, the first +President, emphasized in his farewell address the danger of +entangling alliances with Europe. For long the nations of Europe, +immersed in Continental wars, put aside their rivalries in this new +world. Britain, for a time, neglected colonial expansion westward, +but in 1823, in an emergency of European origin when France, +commissioned by the great powers of continental Europe, intervened +in Spain to restore the deposed Bourbon monarchy and seemed about +to intervene in Spanish America to restore to Spain her revolted +colonies, there developed in Great Britain a policy, seemingly +about to draw America and England into closer co-operation. +Canning, for Britain, proposed to America a joint declaration +against French intervention in the Americas. His argument was +against the principle of intervention; his immediate motive was a +fear of French colonial expansion; but his ultimate object was +inheritance by Britain of Spain's dying influence and position in +the new world.</p> +<p>Canning's overture was earnestly considered in America. The +ex-Presidents, Jefferson and Madison, recommended its acceptance, +but the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, opposed this, +favouring rather a separate declaration by the United States, and +of this opinion was also President Monroe. Thus arose the Monroe +Doctrine announcing American opposition to the principle of +"intervention," and declaring that the American continents were no +longer to be regarded as open to further colonization by European +nations. The British emergency situation with France, though +already quieted, caused Monroe's Message to be greeted in England +with high approval. But Canning did not so approve it for he saw +clearly that the Monroe Doctrine was a challenge <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_12"></a>[V1:pg 12]</span> not merely to +continental Europe, but to England as well and he set himself to +thwart this threatening American policy. Had Canning's policy been +followed by later British statesmen there would have resulted a +serious clash with the United States<a name= +"FNanchor8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8">[8]</a>.</p> +<p>In fact the Monroe Doctrine, imposing on Europe a self-denying +policy of non-colonial expansion toward the west, provided for the +United States the medium, if she wished to use it, for her own +expansion in territory and in influence. But for a time there was +no need of additional territory for that already hers stretched +from the Atlantic to the Rocky Mountains, two-thirds of the way +from ocean to ocean. Her population was growing fast. But four +millions at the time of the Revolution, there were thirteen +millions in 1830, and of these nearly a third were already across +the Appalachian range and were constantly pressing on towards new +lands in the South and West. The Monroe Doctrine was the first +definite notice given to Europe of America's preconceived +"destiny," but the earlier realization of that destiny took place +on lines of expansion within her own boundaries. To this there +could be no governmental objection, whether by Great Britain or any +other nation.</p> +<p>But when in the decade 1840 to 1850, the United States, to the +view of British statesmen, suddenly startled the world by entering +upon a policy of further territorial expansion, forsaking her +peaceful progress and turning toward war, there was a quick +determination on a line of British policy as regards the American +advance. The first intimation of the new American policy came in +relation to the State of Texas which had revolted from Mexico in +1836, and whose independence had been generally recognized by 1842. +To this new state Britain sent diplomatic and consular agents and +these reported two factions among the people--one <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_13"></a>[V1:pg 13]</span> seeking admission +to the American Union, one desiring the maintenance of +independence.</p> +<p>In 1841 Aberdeen had sent Lord Ashburton to America with +instructions to secure, if possible, a settlement of all matters in +dispute. Here was a genuine British effort to escape from national +irritations. But before the Treaty of 1842 was signed, even while +it was in the earlier stages of negotiation, the British Government +saw, with alarm, quite new questions arising, preventing, to its +view, that harmonious relation with the United States the desire +for which had led to the Ashburton mission. This new development +was the appearance of an American fever for territorial expansion, +turning first toward Texas, but soon voiced as a "manifest destiny" +which should carry American power and institutions to the Pacific +and even into Central America. Among these institutions was that of +slavery, detested by the public of Great Britain, yet a delicate +matter for governmental consideration since the great cotton +manufacturing interests drew the bulk of their supplies of raw +cotton from the slave-holding states of America. If Texas, herself +a cotton state, should join the United States, dependence upon +slave-grown cotton would be intensified. Also, Texas, once +acquired, what was there to prevent further American exploitation, +followed by slave expansion, into Mexico, where for long British +influence had been dominant?</p> +<p>On the fate of Texas, therefore, centred for a time the whole +British policy toward America. Pakenham, the British minister to +Mexico, urged a British pressure on Mexico to forgo her plans of +reconquering Texas, and strong British efforts to encourage Texas +in maintaining her independence. His theory foreshadowed a powerful +buffer Anglo-Saxon state, prohibiting American advance to the +south-west, releasing Britain from dependence on American cotton, +and ultimately, he hoped, leading Texas to abolish <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_14"></a>[V1:pg 14]</span> slavery, not yet +so rooted as to be ineradicable. This policy was approved by the +British Government, Pakenham was sent to Washington to watch +events, a <i>chargé</i>, Elliot, was despatched to Texas, +and from London lines were cast to draw France into the plan and to +force the acquiescence of Mexico.</p> +<p>In this brief account of main lines of governmental contacts, it +is unnecessary to recite the details of the diplomatic conflict, +for such it became, with sharp antagonisms manifested on both +sides. The basic fact was that America was bent upon territorial +expansion, and that Great Britain set herself to thwart this +ambition. But not to the point of war. Aberdeen was so incautious +at one moment as to propose to France and Mexico a triple guarantee +of the independence of Texas, if that state would acquiesce, but +when Pakenham notified him that in this case, Britain must clearly +understand that war with America was not merely possible, but +probable, Aberdeen hastened to withdraw the plan of guarantee, +fortunately not yet approved by Mexico<a name= +"FNanchor9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9">[9]</a>.</p> +<p>The solution of this diplomatic contest thus rested with Texas. +Did she wish annexation to the United States, or did she prefer +independence? Elliot, in Texas, hoped to the last moment that Texas +would choose independence and British favour. But the people of the +new state were largely emigrants from the United States, and a +majority of them wished to re-enter the Union, a step finally +accomplished in 1846, after ten years of separate existence as a +Republic. The part played by the British Government in this whole +episode was not a fortunate one. It is the duty of Governments to +watch over the interests of their subjects, and to <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_15"></a>[V1:pg 15]</span> guard the +prestige and power of the state. Great Britain had a perfect +<i>right</i> to take whatever steps she chose to take in regard to +Texas, but the steps taken appeared to Americans to be based upon a +policy antagonistic to the American expansion policy of the moment. +The Government of Great Britain appeared, indeed, to have adopted a +policy of preventing the development of the power of the United +States. Then, fronted with war, she had meekly withdrawn. The basic +British public feeling, fixing the limits of governmental policy, +of never again being drawn into war with America, not because of +fear, but because of important trade relations and also because of +essential liking and admiration, in spite of surface antagonisms, +was not appreciated in America. Lord Aberdeen indeed, and others in +governmental circles, pleaded that the support of Texan +independence was in reality perfectly in harmony with the best +interests of the United States, since it would have tended toward +the limitation of American slavery. And in the matter of national +power, they consoled themselves with prophecies that the American +Union, now so swollen in size, must inevitably split into two, +perhaps three, rival empires, a slave-holding one in the South, +free nations in North and West.</p> +<p>The fate of Texas sealed, Britain soon definitely abandoned all +opposition to American expansion unless it were to be attempted +northwards, though prophesying evil for the American madness. +Mexico, relying on past favours, and because of a sharp controversy +between the United States and Great Britain over the Oregon +territory, expected British aid in her war of 1846 against America. +But she was sharply warned that such aid would not be given, and +the Oregon dispute was settled in the Anglo-Saxon fashion of +vigorous legal argument, followed by a fair compromise. The Mexican +war resulted in the acquisition of California by the United States. +British agents in this province of <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_16"></a>[V1:pg 16]</span> Mexico, and British admirals on the +Pacific were cautioned to take no active steps in opposition.</p> +<p>Thus British policy, after Texan annexation, offered no barrier +to American expansion, and much to British relief the fear of the +extension of the American plans to Mexico and Central America was +not realized. The United States was soon plunged, as British +statesmen had prophesied, into internal conflict over the question +whether the newly-acquired territories should be slave or free.</p> +<p>The acquisition of California brought up a new problem of quick +transit between Atlantic and Pacific, and a canal was planned +across Central America. Here Britain and America acted together, at +first in amity, though the convention signed in 1850 later +developed discord as to the British claim of a protectorate over +the Atlantic end of the proposed canal at San Juan del Nicaragua. +But Britain was again at war in Europe in the middle 'fifties, and +America was deep in quarrel over slavery at home. On both sides in +spite of much diplomatic intrigue and of manifestations of national +pride there was governmental desire to avoid difficulties. At the +end of the ten-year period Britain ceded to Nicaragua her +protectorate in the canal zone, and all causes of friction, so +reported President Buchanan to Congress in 1860, were happily +removed. Britain definitely altered her policy of opposition to the +growth of American power.</p> +<p>In 1860, then, the causes of governmental antagonisms were +seemingly all at an end. Impressment was not used after 1814. The +differing theories of the two Governments on British expatriation +still remained, but Britain attempted no practical application of +her view. The right of search in time of peace controversy, first +eased by the plan of joint cruising, had been definitely settled by +the British renunciation of 1858. Opposition to American +territorial advance but briefly manifested by Britain, had ended +with <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17"></a>[V1:pg 17]</span> +the annexation of Texas, and the fever of expansion had waned in +America. Minor disputes in Central America, related to the proposed +canal, were amicably adjusted.</p> +<p>But differences between nations, varying view-points of peoples, +frequently have deeper currents than the more obvious frictions in +governmental act or policy, nor can governments themselves fail to +react to such less evident causes. It is necessary to review the +commercial relations of the two nations--later to examine their +political ideals.</p> +<p>In 1783 America won her independence in government from a +colonial status. But commercially she remained a British +colony--yet with a difference. She had formed a part of the British +colonial system. All her normal trade was with the mother country +or with other British colonies. Now her privileges in such trade +were at an end, and she must seek as a favour that which had +formerly been hers as a member of the British Empire. The direct +trade between England and America was easily and quickly resumed, +for the commercial classes of both nations desired it and profited +by it. But the British colonial system prohibited trade between a +foreign state and British colonies and there was one channel of +trade, to and from the British West Indies, long very profitable to +both sides, during colonial times, but now legally hampered by +American independence. The New England States had lumber, fish, and +farm products desired by the West Indian planters, and these in +turn offered needed sugar, molasses, and rum. Both parties desired +to restore the trade, and in spite of the legal restrictions of the +colonial system, the trade was in fact resumed in part and either +permitted or winked at by the British Government, but never to the +advantageous exchange of former times.</p> +<p>The acute stage of controversy over West Indian trade was not +reached until some thirty years after American Independence, but +the uncertainty of such trade during a <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_18"></a>[V1:pg 18]</span> long period in +which a portion of it consisted in unauthorized and unregulated +exchange was a constant irritant to all parties concerned. +Meanwhile there came the War of 1812 with its preliminary check +upon direct trade to and from Great Britain, and its final total +prohibition of intercourse during the war itself. In 1800 the bulk +of American importation of manufactures still came from Great +Britain. In the contest over neutral rights and theories, Jefferson +attempted to bring pressure on the belligerents, and especially on +England, by restriction of imports. First came a non-importation +Act, 1806, followed by an embargo on exports, 1807, but these were +so unpopular in the commercial states of New England that they were +withdrawn in 1810, yet for a short time only, for Napoleon tricked +the United States into believing that France had yielded to +American contentions on neutral rights, and in 1811 non-intercourse +was proclaimed again with England alone. On June 18, 1812, America +finally declared war and trade stopped save in a few New England +ports where rebellious citizens continued to sell provisions to a +blockading British naval squadron.</p> +<p>For eight years after 1806, then, trade with Great Britain had +steadily decreased, finally almost to extinction during the war. +But America required certain articles customarily imported and +necessity now forced her to develop her own manufactures. New +England had been the centre of American foreign commerce, but now +there began a trend toward manufacturing enterprise. Even in 1814, +however, at the end of the war, it was still thought in the United +States that under normal conditions manufactured goods would again +be imported and the general cry of "protection for home industries" +was as yet unvoiced. Nevertheless, a group of infant industries had +in fact been started and clamoured for defence now that peace was +restored. This situation was not unnoticed in Great Britain +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19"></a>[V1:pg 19]</span> where +merchants, piling up goods in anticipation of peace on the +continent of Europe and a restored market, suddenly discovered that +the poverty of Europe denied them that market. Looking with +apprehension toward the new industries of America, British +merchants, following the advice of Lord Brougham in a parliamentary +speech, dumped great quantities of their surplus goods on the +American market, selling them far below cost, or even on +extravagant credit terms. One object was to smash the budding +American manufactures.</p> +<p>This action of British merchants naturally stirred some angry +patriotic emotions in the circles where American business suffered +and a demand began to be heard for protection. But the Government +of the United States was still representative of agriculture, in +the main, and while a Tariff Bill was enacted in 1816 that Bill was +regarded as a temporary measure required by the necessity of paying +the costs of the recent war. Just at this juncture, however, +British policy, now looking again toward a great colonial empire, +sought advantages for the hitherto neglected maritime provinces of +British North America, and thought that it had found them by +encouragement of their trade with the British West Indies. The +legal status of American trade with the West Indies was now +enforced and for a time intercourse was practically suspended.</p> +<p>This British policy brought to the front the issue of protection +in America. It not only worked against a return by New England from +manufacturing to commerce, but it soon brought into the ranks of +protectionists a northern and western agricultural element that had +been accustomed to sell surplus products to West Indian planters +seeking cheap food-stuffs for their slaves. This new protectionist +element was as yet not crystallized into a clamour for "home +markets" for agriculture, but the pressure of opinion was beginning +to be felt, and by 1820 the question <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_20"></a>[V1:pg 20]</span> of West Indian trade became one of +constant agitation and demanded political action. That action was +taken on lines of retaliation. Congress in 1818 passed a law +excluding from American ports any British vessel coming from a port +access to which was denied to an American vessel, and placing under +bond in American ports British vessels with prohibition of their +proceeding to a British port to which American vessels could not +go. This act affected not merely direct trade with the West Indies, +but stopped the general custom of British ships of taking part +cargoes to Jamaica while <i>en route</i> to and from the United +States. The result was, first, compromise, later, under Huskisson's +administration at the British Board of Trade, complete abandonment +by Britain of the exclusive trade basis of her whole colonial +system.</p> +<p>The "retaliatory system" which J.Q. Adams regarded as "a new +declaration of independence," was, in fact, quickly taken up by +other non-colonial nations, and these, with America, compelled +Great Britain to take stock of her interests. Huskisson, rightly +foreseeing British prosperity as dependent upon her manufactures +and upon the carrying trade, stated in Parliament that American +"retaliation" had forced the issue. Freedom of trade in British +ports was offered in 1826 to all non-colonial nations that would +open their ports within one year on terms of equality to British +ships. J.Q. Adams, now President of the United States, delayed +acceptance of this offer, preferring a treaty negotiation, and was +rebuffed by Canning, so that actual resumption of West Indian trade +did not take place until 1830, after the close of Adams' +administration. That trade never recovered its former +prosperity.</p> +<p>Meanwhile the long period of controversy, from 1806 to 1830, had +resulted in a complete change in the American situation. It is not +a sufficient explanation of the American belief in, and practice +of, the theory of protection to attribute <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_21"></a>[V1:pg 21]</span> this alone to +British checks placed upon free commercial rivalry. Nevertheless +the progress of America toward an established system, reaching its +highest mark for years in the Tariff Bill of 1828, is distinctly +related to the events just narrated. After American independence, +the partially illegal status of West Indian trade hampered +commercial progress and slightly encouraged American manufactures +by the mere seeking of capital for investment; the neutral troubles +of 1806 and the American prohibitions on intercourse increased the +transfer of interest; the war of 1812 gave a complete protection to +infant industries; the dumping of British goods in 1815 stirred +patriotic American feeling; British renewal of colonial system +restrictions, and the twelve-year quarrel over "retaliation" gave +time for the definite establishment of protectionist ideas in the +United States. But Britain was soon proclaiming for herself and for +the world the common advantage and the justice of a great theory of +free trade. America was apparently now committed to an opposing +economic theory, the first great nation definitely to establish it, +and thus there resulted a clear-cut opposition of principle and a +clash of interests. From 1846, when free trade ideas triumphed in +England, the devoted British free trader regarded America as the +chief obstacle to a world-wide acceptance of his theory.</p> +<p>The one bright spot in America, as regarded by the British free +trader, was in the Southern States, where cotton interests, +desiring no advantage from protection, since their market was in +Europe, attacked American protection and sought to escape from it. +Also slave supplies, without protection, could have been purchased +more cheaply from England than from the manufacturing North. In +1833 indeed the South had forced a reaction against protection, but +it proceeded slowly. In 1854 it was Southern opinion that carried +through Congress the reciprocity treaty with the British American +Provinces, partly brought about, no <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_22"></a>[V1:pg 22]</span> doubt, by a Southern fear that +Canada, bitter over the loss of special advantages in British +markets by the British free trade of 1846, might join the United +States and thus swell the Northern and free states of the Union. +Cotton interests and trade became the dominant British commercial +tie with the United States, and the one great hope, to the British +minds, of a break in the false American system of protection. Thus +both in economic theory and in trade, spite of British dislike of +slavery, the export trading interests of Great Britain became more +and more directed toward the Southern States of America. Adding +powerfully to this was the dependence of British cotton +manufactures upon the American supply. The British trade attitude, +arising largely outside of direct governmental contacts, was bound +to have, nevertheless, a constant and important influence on +governmental action.</p> +<p>Governmental policy, seeking national power, conflicting trade +and industrial interests, are the favourite themes of those +historians who regard nations as determined in their relations +solely by economic causes--by what is called "enlightened +self-interest." But governments, no matter how arbitrary, and still +more if in a measure resting on representation, react both +consciously and unconsciously to a public opinion not obviously +based upon either national or commercial rivalry. Sometimes, +indeed, governmental attitude runs absolutely counter to popular +attitude in international affairs. In such a case, the historical +estimate, if based solely on evidences of governmental action, is a +false one and may do great injustice to the essential friendliness +of a people.</p> +<p>How then, did the British people, of all classes, regard America +before 1860, and in what manner did that regard affect the British +Government? Here, it is necessary to seek British opinion on, and +its reaction to, American institutions, ideals, and practices. Such +public opinion can <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_23"></a>[V1:pg 23]</span> be found in quantity sufficient to +base an estimate only in travellers' books, in reviews, and in +newspapers of the period. When all these are brought together it is +found that while there was an almost universal British criticism of +American social customs and habits of life, due to that insularity +of mental attitude characteristic of every nation, making it prefer +its own customs and criticize those of its neighbours, summed up in +the phrase "dislike of foreigners"--it is found that British +opinion was centred upon two main threads; first America as a place +for emigration and, second, American political ideals and +institutions<a name="FNanchor10"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_10">[10]</a>.</p> +<p>British emigration to America, a governmentally favoured +colonization process before the American revolution, lost that +favour after 1783, though not at first definitely opposed. But +emigration still continued and at no time, save during the war of +1812, was it absolutely stopped. Its exact amount is +unascertainable, for neither Government kept adequate statistics +before 1820. With the end of the Napoleonic wars there came great +distress in England from which the man of energy sought escape. He +turned naturally to America, being familiar, by hearsay at least, +with stories of the ease of gaining a livelihood there, and +influenced by the knowledge that in the United States he would find +people of his own blood and speech. The bulk of this earlier +emigration to America resulted from economic causes. When, in 1825, +one energetic Member of Parliament, Wilmot Horton, induced the +Government to appoint a committee to investigate the whole subject, +the result was a mass of testimony, secured from returned emigrants +or from their letters home, in which there constantly appeared one +main argument influencing the labourer type of emigrant; he +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24"></a>[V1:pg 24]</span> got +good wages, and he was supplied, as a farm hand, with good food. +Repeatedly he testifies that he had "three meat meals a day," +whereas in England he had ordinarily received but one such meal a +week.</p> +<p>Mere good living was the chief inducement for the labourer type +of emigrant, and the knowledge of such living created for this type +remaining in England a sort of halo of industrial prosperity +surrounding America. But there was a second testimony brought out +by Horton's Committee, less general, yet to be picked up here and +there as evidence of another argument for emigration to America. +The labourer did not dilate upon political equality, nor boast of a +share in government, indeed generally had no such share, but he did +boast to his fellows at home of the social equality, though not +thus expressing it, which was all about him. He was a common farm +hand, yet he "sat down to meals" with his employer and family, and +worked in the fields side by side with his "master." This, too, was +an astounding difference to the mind of the British labourer. +Probably for him it created a clearer, if not altogether universal +and true picture of the meaning of American democracy than would +have volumes of writing upon political institutions. Gradually +there was established in the lower orders of British society a +visualization of America as a haven of physical well-being and +personal social happiness.</p> +<p>This British labouring class had for long, however, no medium of +expression in print. Here existed, then, an unexpressed public +opinion of America, of much latent influence, but for the moment +largely negligible as affecting other classes or the Government. A +more important emigrating class in its influence on opinion at +home, though not a large class, was composed about equally of small +farmers and small merchants facing ruin in the agricultural and +trading crises that followed the end of the European war. The +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25"></a>[V1:pg 25]</span> +British travellers' books from 1810 to 1820 are generally written +by men of this class, or by agents sent out from co-operative +groups planning emigration. Generally they were discontented with +political conditions at home, commonly opposed to a petrified +social order, and attracted to the United States by its lure of +prosperity and content. The books are, in brief, a superior type of +emigrant guide for a superior type of emigrant, examining and +emphasizing industrial opportunity.</p> +<p>Almost universally, however, they sound the note of superior +political institutions and conditions. One wrote "A republican +finds here A Republic, and the only Republic on the face of the +earth that ever deserved the name: where all are under the +protection of equal laws; of laws made by Themselves<a name= +"FNanchor11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11">[11]</a>." Another, who +established an English colony in the Western States of Illinois, +wrote of England that he objected to "being ruled and taxed by +people who had no more right to rule and tax us than consisted in +the power to do it." And of his adopted country he concludes: "I +love the Government; and thus a novel sensation is excited; it is +like the development of a new faculty. I am become a patriot in my +old age<a name="FNanchor12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12">[12]</a>." +Still another detailed the points of his content, "I am here, lord +and master of myself and of 100 acres of land--an improvable farm, +little trouble to me, good society and a good market, and, I think, +a fine climate, only a little too hot and dry in summer; the parson +gets nothing from me; my state and road taxes and poor rates amount +to §25.00 per annum. I can carry a gun if I choose; I leave my +door unlocked at night; and I can get snuff for one cent an ounce +or a little more<a name="FNanchor13"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_13">[13]</a>."</p> +<p>From the first days of the American colonial movement +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26"></a>[V1:pg 26]</span> +toward independence there had been, indeed, a British interest in +American political principles. Many Whigs sympathized with these +principles for reasons of home political controversy. Their +sympathy continued after American independence and by its insistent +expression brought out equally insistent opposition from Tory +circles. The British home movement toward a more representative +Government had been temporarily checked by the extremes into which +French Liberalism plunged in 1791, causing reaction in England. By +1820 pressure was again being exerted by British Liberals of +intelligence, and they found arguments in such reports as those +just quoted. From that date onward, and especially just before the +passing of the Reform Bill of 1832, yet always a factor, the +example of a prosperous American democracy was an element in +British home politics, lauded or derided as the man in England +desired or not an expansion of the British franchise. In the +earlier period, however, it is to be remembered that applause of +American institutions did not mean acceptance of democracy to the +extent of manhood franchise, for no such franchise at first existed +in America itself. The debate in England was simply whether the +step forward in American democracy, was an argument for a similar +step in Great Britain.</p> +<p>Books, reviews and newspapers in Great Britain as the political +quarrel there grew in force, depicted America favourably or +otherwise according to political sympathies at home. Both before +and after the Reform Bill of 1832 this type of effort to mould +opinion, by citation of America, was widespread. Hence there is in +such writing, not so much the expression of public opinion, as of +propaganda to affect that opinion. Book upon book, review upon +review, might be quoted to illustrate this, but a few notable +examples will suffice.</p> +<p>The most widely read and reviewed book on the United +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27"></a>[V1:pg 27]</span> +States before 1840, except the humorous and flippant +characterization of America by Mrs. Trollope, was Captain Basil +Hall's three-volume work, published in 1829<a name= +"FNanchor14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14">[14]</a>. Claiming an open +mind, he expected for his adverse findings a readier credence. For +adverse to American political institutions these findings are in +all their larger applications. In every line Hall betrays himself +as an old Tory of the 'twenties, fixed in his belief, and convinced +of the perfection and unalterableness of the British Constitution. +Captain Hamilton, who wrote in 1833, was more frank in avowal of a +purpose<a name="FNanchor15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15">[15]</a>. He +states in his preface:</p> +<blockquote>"... When I found the institutions and experiences of +the United States deliberately quoted in the reformed parliament, +as affording safe precedent for British legislation, and learned +that the drivellers who uttered such nonsense, instead of +encountering merited derision, were listened to with patience and +approbation by men as ignorant as themselves, I certainly did feel +that another work on America was yet wanted, and at once determined +to undertake a task which inferior considerations would probably +have induced me to decline."</blockquote> +<p>Harriet Martineau, ardent advocate of political reform at home, +found in the United States proofs for her faith in +democracy<a name="FNanchor16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16">[16]</a>. +Captain Marryat belittled Miss Martineau, but in his six volumes +proved himself less a critic of America than an enemy of democracy. +Answering a review of his earlier volumes, published separately, he +wrote in his concluding volume: "I candidly acknowledge that the +reviewer is right in his supposition; my great object has been to +do serious injury to the cause of democracy<a name= +"FNanchor17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17">[17]</a>."</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28"></a>[V1:pg 28]</span> +<p>The fact was that British governing and intellectual classes +were suffering a recoil from the enthusiasms leading up to the step +toward democracy in the Reform of 1832. The electoral franchise was +still limited to a small minority of the population. Britain was +still ruled by her "wise men" of wealth and position. Meanwhile, +however, just at the moment when dominant Whig influence in England +carried through that step forward toward democratic institutions +which Whigs had long lauded in America, the latter country had +progressed to manhood suffrage, or as nearly all leading +Englishmen, whether Whig or Tory, regarded it, had plunged into the +rule of the mob. The result was a rapid lessening in Whig +ruling-class expression of admiration for America, even before long +to the complete cessation of such admiration, and to assertions in +Great Britain that the Reform of 1832 was "final," the last step +toward democracy which Britain could safely take. It is not strange +that the books and reviews of the period from 1830 to 1840, heavily +stress the dangers and crudity of American democracy. They were +written for what was now a nearly unanimous British reading public, +fearful lest Radical pressure for still further electoral reform +should preach the example of the United States.</p> +<p>Thus after 1832 the previous sympathy for America of one section +of the British governing class disappears. More--it is replaced by +a critical, if not openly hostile attitude. Soon, with the rapid +development of the power and wealth of the United States, +governing-class England, of all factions save the Radical, came to +view America just as it would have viewed any other rising nation, +that is, as a problem to be studied for its influence on British +prosperity and power. Again, expressions in print reflect the +changes of British view--nowhere more clearly than in travellers' +books. After 1840, for nearly a decade, these are devoted, not to +American political institutions, but to <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_29"></a>[V1:pg 29]</span> studies, many of +them very careful ones, of American industry and governmental +policy.</p> +<p>Buckingham, one-time member of Parliament, wrote nine volumes of +such description. His work is a storehouse of fact, useful to this +day to the American historical student<a name= +"FNanchor18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18">[18]</a>. George Combe, +philosopher and phrenologist, studied especially social +institutions<a name="FNanchor19"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_19">[19]</a>. Joseph Sturge, philanthropist and +abolitionist, made a tour, under the guidance of the poet Whittier, +through the Northern and Eastern States<a name= +"FNanchor20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20">[20]</a>. Featherstonaugh, +a scientist and civil engineer, described the Southern slave +states, in terms completely at variance with those of +Sturge<a name="FNanchor21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21">[21]</a>. +Kennedy, traveller in Texas, and later British consul at Galveston, +and Warburton, a traveller who came to the United States by way of +Canada, an unusual approach, were both frankly startled, the latter +professedly alarmed, at the evidences of power in America<a name= +"FNanchor22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22">[22]</a>. Amazed at the +energy, growth and prosperity of the country and alarmed at the +anti-British feeling he found in New York City, Warburton wrote +that "they [Americans] only wait for matured power to apply the +incendiary torch of Republicanism to the nations of Europe<a name= +"FNanchor23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23">[23]</a>." Soon after this +was written there began, in 1848, that great tide of Irish +emigration to America which heavily reinforced the anti-British +attitude of the City of New York, and largely changed its +character.</p> +<p>Did books dilating upon the expanding power of America reflect +British public opinion, or did they create it? It is <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_30"></a>[V1:pg 30]</span> difficult to +estimate such matters. Certainly it is not uninteresting that these +books coincided in point of time with a British governmental +attitude of opposition, though on peaceful lines, to the +development of American power, and to the adoption to the point of +faith, by British commercial classes, of free trade as opposed to +the American protective system. But governing classes were not the +British public, and to the great unenfranchised mass, finding voice +through the writings of a few leaders, the prosperity of America +made a powerful appeal. Radical democracy was again beginning to +make its plea in Britain. In 1849 there was published a study of +the United States, more careful and exact than any previous to +Bryce's great work, and lauding American political institutions. +This was Mackay's "Western World," and that there was a public +eager for such estimate is evidenced by the fact that the book went +through four British editions in 1850<a name= +"FNanchor24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24">[24]</a>. At the end of the +decade, then, there appeared once more a vigorous champion of the +cause of British democracy, comparing the results of "government by +the wise" with alleged mob rule. Mackay wrote:</p> +<blockquote>"Society in America started from the point to which +society in Europe is only yet finding. The equality of men is, to +this moment, its corner-stone ... that which develops itself as the +sympathy of class, becomes in America the general sentiment of +society.... We present an imposing front to the world; but let us +tear the picture and look at the canvas. One out of every seven of +us is a pauper. Every six Englishmen have, in addition to their +other enormous burdens, to support a seventh between them, whose +life is spent in consuming, but in adding nothing to the source of +their common subsistence."</blockquote> +<p>British governing classes then, forgoing after 1850 opposition +to the advance of American power, found themselves <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_31"></a>[V1:pg 31]</span> involved again, +as before 1832, in the problem of the possible influence of a +prosperous American democracy upon an unenfranchised public opinion +at home. Also, for all Englishmen, of whatever class, in spite of +rivalry in power, of opposing theories of trade, of divergent +political institutions, there existed a vague, though influential, +pride in the advance of a people of similar race, sprung from +British loins<a name="FNanchor25"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_25">[25]</a>. And there remained for all Englishmen also +one puzzling and discreditable American institution, slavery--held +up to scorn by the critics of the United States, difficult of +excuse among her friends.</p> +<p>Agitation conducted by the great philanthropist, Wilberforce, +had early committed British Government and people to a crusade +against the African slave trade. This British policy was clearly +announced to the world in the negotiations at Vienna in 1814-15. +But Britain herself still supported the institution of slavery in +her West Indian colonies and it was not until British humanitarian +sentiment had forced emancipation upon the unwilling sugar +planters, in 1833, that the nation was morally free to criticize +American domestic slavery. Meanwhile great emancipation societies, +with many branches, all virile and active, had grown up in England +and in Scotland. These now turned to an attack on slavery the world +over, and especially on American slavery. The great American +abolitionist, Garrison, found more support in England than in his +own country; his weekly paper, <i>The Liberator</i>, is full of +messages of cheer from British friends and societies, and of +quotations from a sympathetic, though generally provincial, British +press.</p> +<p>From 1830 to 1850 British anti-slavery sentiment was at its +height. It watched with anxiety the evidence of a developing +struggle over slavery in the United States, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_32"></a>[V1:pg 32]</span> hopeful, as each +crisis arose, that the free Northern States would impose their will +upon the Southern Slave States. But as each crisis turned to +compromise, seemingly enhancing the power of the South, and +committing America to a retention of slavery, the hopes of British +abolitionists waned. The North did indeed, to British opinion, +become identified with opposition to the expansion of slavery, but +after the "great compromise of 1850," where the elder American +statesmen of both North and South proclaimed the "finality" of that +measure, British sympathy for the North rapidly lessened. Moreover, +after 1850, there was in Britain itself a decay of general +humanitarian sentiment as regards slavery. The crusade had begun to +seem hopeless and the earlier vigorous agitators were dead. The +British Government still maintained its naval squadron for the +suppression of the African slave trade, but the British official +mind no longer keenly interested itself either in this effort or in +the general question of slavery.</p> +<p>Nevertheless American slavery and slave conditions were still, +after 1850, favourite matters for discussion, almost universally +critical, by English writers. Each renewal of the conflict in +America, even though local, not national in character, drew out a +flood of comment. In the public press this blot upon American +civilization was a steady subject for attack, and that attack was +naturally directed against the South. The London <i>Times</i>, in +particular, lost no opportunity of presenting the matter to its +readers. In 1856, a Mr. Thomas Gladstone visited Kansas during the +height of the border struggles there, and reported his observations +in letters to the <i>Times</i>. The writer was wholly on the side +of the Northern settlers in Kansas, though not hopeful that the +Kansas struggle would expand to a national conflict. He constantly +depicted the superior civilization, industry, and social excellence +of the North as compared with the South<a name= +"FNanchor26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26">[26]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33"></a>[V1:pg 33]</span> +<p>Mrs. Stowe's <i>Uncle Tom's Cabin</i> excited greater interest +in England than in America itself. The first London edition +appeared in May, 1852, and by the end of the year over one million +copies had been sold, as opposed to one hundred and fifty thousand +in the United States. But if one distinguished writer is to be +believed, this great British interest in the book was due more to +English antipathy to America than to antipathy to slavery<a name= +"FNanchor27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27">[27]</a>. This writer was +Nassau W. Senior, who, in 1857, published a reprint of his article +on "American Slavery" in the 206th number of the <i>Edinburgh +Review</i>, reintroducing in his book extreme language denunciatory +of slavery that had been cut out by the editor of the +<i>Review</i><a name="FNanchor28"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_28">[28]</a>. Senior had been stirred to write by the +brutal attack upon Charles Sumner in the United States Senate after +his speech of May 19-20, 1856, evidence, again, that each incident +of the slavery quarrel in America excited British attention.</p> +<p>Senior, like Thomas Gladstone, painted the North as all +anti-slavery, the South as all pro-slavery. Similar impressions of +British understanding (or misunderstanding) are received from the +citations of the British provincial press, so favoured by Garrison +in his <i>Liberator</i><a name="FNanchor29"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_29">[29]</a>. Yet for intellectual Britain, at +least--that Britain which was vocal and whose opinion can be +ascertained in spite of this constant interest in American slavery, +there was generally a fixed belief that slavery in the United +States was so firmly <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_34"></a>[V1:pg 34]</span> established that it could not be +overthrown. Of what use, then, the further expenditure of British +sympathy or effort in a lost cause? Senior himself, at the +conclusion of his fierce attack on the Southern States, expressed +the pessimism of British abolitionists. He wrote, "We do not +venture to hope that we, or our sons, or our grandsons, will see +American slavery extirpated, or even materially mitigated<a name= +"FNanchor30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30">[30]</a>."</p> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor1">[1]</a> +State Department, Eng., Vol. LXXIX, No. 135, March 27, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor2">[2]</a> +Walpole, <i>Russell</i>, Vol. II, p. 367.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor3">[3]</a> +<i>Life of Lady John Russell</i>, p. 197.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor4">[4]</a> +There was a revival of this fear at the end of the American Civil +War. This will be commented on later.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor5">[5]</a> +This was the position of President and Congress: yet the United +States had not acknowledged the right of an American citizen to +expatriate himself.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor6">[6]</a> +Between 1797 and 1801, of the sailors taken from American ships, +102 were retained, 1,042 were discharged, and 805 were held for +further proof. (Updyke, <i>The Diplomacy of the War of 1812</i>, p. +21.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor7">[7]</a> +The people of the British North American Provinces regarded the war +as an attempt made by America, taking advantage of the European +wars, at forcible annexation. In result the fervour of the United +Empire Loyalists was renewed, especially in Upper Canada. Thus the +same two wars which fostered militant patriotism in America against +England had the same result in Canadian sentiment against +America.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor8">[8]</a> +Temperley, "Later American Policy of George Canning" in <i>Am. +Hist. Rev.</i>, XI, 783. Also <i>Cambridge History of British +Foreign Policy</i>, Vol. II, ch. 2.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor9">[9]</a> +Much has recently been published on British policy in Texas. See my +book, <i>British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846</i>, +Johns Hopkins Press, Balt., 1910. Also Adams, Editor, <i>British +Diplomatic Correspondence concerning the Republic of Texas</i>, The +Texas State Historical Association, Austin, Texas, +1918.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_10"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor10">[10]</a> In my studies on British-American relations, +I have read the leading British reviews and newspapers, and some +four hundred volumes by British travellers. For a summary of the +British travellers before 1860 see my article "The Point of View of +the British Traveller in America," in the <i>Political Science +Quarterly</i>, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, June, 1914.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_11"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor11">[11]</a> John Melish, <i>Travels</i>, Vol. I, p. +148.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_12"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor12">[12]</a> Morris Birkbeck, <i>Letters from +Illinois</i>, London, 1818, p. 29.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_13"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor13">[13]</a> Letter in Edinburgh <i>Scotsman</i>, March, +1823. Cited by <i>Niles Register</i>, Vol. XXV, p. 39.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_14"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor14">[14]</a> <i>Travels in North America</i>, 1827-28, +London, 1829.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_15"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor15">[15]</a> Captain Thomas Hamilton, <i>Men and Manners +in America</i>, Edinburgh and London, 1833. 2 vols.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_16"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor16">[16]</a> <i>Society in America</i>, London, 1837. 3 +vols. <i>Retrospect of Western Travel</i>, London, 1838. 2 +vols.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_17"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor17">[17]</a> Captain Frederick Marryat, <i>A Diary in +America, with Remarks on Its Institutions</i>, Vol. VI, p. +293.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_18"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor18">[18]</a> James Silk Buckingham, <i>America, +Historical, Statistic and Descriptive</i>, London, 1841-43. 9 +vols.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_19"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor19">[19]</a> <i>Notes on the United States of North +America during a phrenological visit</i>, 1838-9-40, Edinburgh, +1841. 3 vols.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_20"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor20">[20]</a> <i>A Visit to the United States in 1841</i>, +London, 1842.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_21"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor21">[21]</a> George William Featherstonaugh, <i>Excursion +through the Slave States</i>, London, 1844. 2 vols.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_22"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor22">[22]</a> William Kennedy, <i>Texas: The Rise, +Progress and Prospects of the Republic of Texas</i>, London, 1841. +2 vols. George Warburton, <i>Hochelaga: or, England in the New +World</i>, London, 1845. 2 vols.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_23"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor23">[23]</a> Warburton, <i>Hochelaga</i>, 5th Edition, +Vol. II, pp. 363-4.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_24"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor24">[24]</a> Alexander Mackay, <i>The Western World: or, +Travels through the United States in 1846-47</i>, London, +1849.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_25"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor25">[25]</a> This is clearly indicated in Parliament +itself, in the debate on the dismissal by the United States in 1856 +of Crampton, the British Minister at Washington, for enlistment +activities during the Crimean War.--<i>Hansard</i>, 3rd. Ser., +CXLIII, 14-109 and 120-203.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_26"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor26">[26]</a> Gladstone's letters were later published in +book form, under the title <i>The Englishman in Kansas</i>, London, +1857.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_27"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor27">[27]</a> "The evil passions which 'Uncle Tom' +gratified in England were not hatred or vengeance [of slavery], but +national jealousy and national vanity. We have long been smarting +under the conceit of America--we are tired of hearing her boast +that she is the freest and the most enlightened country that the +world has ever seen. Our clergy hate her voluntary system--our +Tories hate her democrats--our Whigs hate her parvenus--our +Radicals hate her litigiousness, her insolence, and her ambition. +All parties hailed Mrs. Stowe as a revolter from the enemy." +Senior, <i>American Slavery</i>, p. 38.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_28"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor28">[28]</a> The reprint is without date, but the context +shows the year to be 1857.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_29"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor29">[29]</a> For example the many British expressions +quoted in reference to John Brown's raid, in <i>The Liberator</i> +for February 10, 1860, and in succeeding issues.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_30"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor30">[30]</a> Senior, <i>American Slavery</i>, p. +68.</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35"></a>[V1:pg 35]</span> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II</h2> +<h3>FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF IMPENDING CONFLICT, 1860-61.</h3> +<br> +<p>It has been remarked by the American historian, Schouler, that +immediately before the outbreak of the Civil War, diplomatic +controversies between England and America had largely been settled, +and that England, pressed from point to point, had "sullenly" +yielded under American demands. This generalization, as applied to +what were, after all, minor controversies, is in great measure +true. In larger questions of policy, as regards spheres of +influence or developing power, or principles of trade, there was +difference, but no longer any essential opposition or declared +rivalry<a name="FNanchor31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31">[31]</a>. In +theories of government there was sharp divergence, clearly +appreciated, however, only in governing-class Britain. This sense +of divergence, even of a certain threat from America to British +political institutions, united with an established opinion that +slavery was permanently fixed in the United States to reinforce +governmental indifference, sometimes even hostility, to America. +The British public, also, was largely hopeless of any change in the +institution of slavery, and its own active humanitarian interest +was waning, though still dormant--not dead. Yet the two nations, to +a degree not true of any other two world-powers, were of the same +race, had similar basic laws, read the same books, and were held in +close touch at many points by the steady flow of British emigration +to the United States.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36"></a>[V1:pg 36]</span> +<p>When, after the election of Lincoln to the Presidency, in +November, 1860, the storm-clouds of civil strife rapidly gathered, +the situation took both British Government and people by surprise. +There was not any clear understanding either of American political +conditions, or of the intensity of feeling now aroused over the +question of the extension of slave territory. The most recent +descriptions of America had agreed in assertion that at some future +time there would take place, in all probability, a dissolution of +the Union, on lines of diverging economic interests, but also +stated that there was nothing in the American situation to indicate +immediate progress in this direction. Grattan, a long-time resident +in America as British Consul at Boston, wrote:</p> +<blockquote>"The day must no doubt come when clashing objects will +break the ties of common interest which now preserve the Union. But +no man may foretell the period of dissolution.... The many +restraining causes are out of sight of foreign observation. The +Lilliputian threads binding the man mountain are invisible; and it +seems wondrous that each limb does not act for itself independently +of its fellows. A closer examination shows the nature of the +network which keeps the members of this association so tightly +bound. Any attempt to untangle the ties, more firmly fastens them. +When any one State talks of separation, the others become +spontaneously knotted together. When a section blusters about its +particular rights, the rest feel each of theirs to be common to +all. If a foreign nation hint at hostility, the whole Union becomes +in reality united. And thus in every contingency from which there +can be danger, there is also found the element of safety." Yet, he +added, "All attempts to strengthen this federal government at the +expense of the States' governments must be futile.... The federal +government exists on sufferance only. Any State may at any time +constitutionally withdraw from the Union, and thus virtually +dissolve it<a name="FNanchor32"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_32">[32]</a>."</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37"></a>[V1:pg 37]</span> +<p>Even more emphatically, though with less authority, wrote one +Charles Mackay, styled by the American press as a "distinguished +British poet," who made the usual rapid tour of the principal +cities of America in 1857-58, and as rapidly penned his +impressions:</p> +<blockquote>"Many persons in the United States talk of a +dissolution of the Union, but few believe in it.... All this is +mere bravado and empty talk. It means nothing. The Union is dear to +all Americans, whatever they may say to the contrary.... There is +no present danger to the Union, and the violent expressions to +which over-ardent politicians of the North and South sometimes give +vent have no real meaning. The 'Great West,' as it is fondly +called, is in the position even now to arbitrate between North and +South, should the quarrel stretch beyond words, or should +anti-slavery or any other question succeed in throwing any +difference between them which it would take revolvers and rifles +rather than speeches and votes to put an end to<a name= +"FNanchor33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33">[33]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The slavery controversy in America had, in short, come to be +regarded in England as a constant quarrel between North and South, +but of no immediate danger to the Union. <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_38"></a>[V1:pg 38]</span> Each outbreak of +violent American controversy produced a British comment sympathetic +with the North. The turmoil preceding and following the election of +Lincoln in 1860, on the platform of "no extension of slavery," was +very generally noted by the British press and public, as a sign +favourable to the cause of anti-slavery, but with no understanding +that Southern threat would at last be realized in definite action. +Herbert Spencer, in a letter of May 15, 1862, to his American +friend, Yeomans, wrote, "As far as I had the means of judging, the +feeling here was at first <i>very decidedly</i> on the side of the +North<a name="FNanchor34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34">[34]</a> ..." +The British metropolitan press, in nearly every issue of which for +at least two years after December, 1860, there appeared news items +and editorial comment on the American crisis, was at first nearly +unanimous in condemning the South<a name="FNanchor35"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_35">[35]</a>. The <i>Times</i>, with accustomed vigour, +led the field. On November 21, 1860, it stated:</p> +<blockquote>"When we read the speech of Mr. Lincoln on the subject +of Slavery and consider the extreme moderation of the sentiments it +expresses, the allowance that is made for the situation, for the +feelings, for the prejudices, of the South; when we see how +entirely he narrows his opposition to the single point of the +admission of Slavery into the Territories, we cannot help being +forcibly struck by the absurdity of breaking up a vast and glorious +confederacy like that of the United States from the dread and anger +inspired by the election of such a man to the office of Chief +Magistrate.... We rejoice, on higher and surer grounds, that it +[the election] has ended in the return of Mr. Lincoln. We are glad +to think that the march of Slavery, and the domineering tone which +its advocates were beginning to assume over Freedom, has been at +length arrested and silenced. We rejoice that a vast community of +our own race has at <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_39"></a>[V1:pg 39]</span> length given an authoritative +expression to sentiments which are entertained by everyone in this +country. We trust to see the American Government employed in tasks +more worthy of a State founded on the doctrines of liberty and +equality than the invention of shifts and devices to perpetuate +servitude; and we hear in this great protest of American freedom +the tardy echo of those humane doctrines to which England has so +long become a convert."</blockquote> +<p>Other leading journals, though with less of patronizing +self-complacency, struck the same note as the <i>Times</i>. The +<i>Economist</i> attributed Lincoln's election to a shift in the +sympathies of the "lower orders" in the electorate who had now +deserted their former leaders, the slave-owning aristocracy of the +South, and allied themselves with the refined and wise leaders of +the North. Lincoln, it argued, was not an extremist in any sense. +His plan of action lay within the limits of statesmanlike +moderation<a name="FNanchor36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36">[36]</a>. +The <i>Saturday Review</i> was less sure that England should +rejoice with the North. British self-esteem had suffered some hard +blows at the hands of the Democratic party in America, but at least +England knew where Democrats stood, and could count on no more +discourtesy or injustice than that inflicted in the past. The +Republican party, however, had no policy, except that of its +leader, Seward, and from him might be expected extreme +insolence<a name="FNanchor37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37">[37]</a>. +This was a very early judgment of Seward, and one upon which the +<i>Saturday Review</i> preened itself later, as wholly justified. +The <i>Spectator</i>, the only one of the four journals thus far +considered which ultimately remained constant in advocacy of the +Northern cause, was at first lukewarm in comment, regarding the +1860 election, while fought on the slavery issue, as in reality a +mere contest between parties for political power<a name= +"FNanchor38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38">[38]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40"></a>[V1:pg 40]</span> +<p>Such was the initial attitude of the English press. Each press +issue for several weeks harped on the same chord, though sounding +varying notes. If the South really means forcible resistance, said +the <i>Times</i>, it is doomed to quick suppression. "A few hundred +thousand slave-owners, trembling nightly with visions of murder and +pillage, backed by a dissolute population of 'poor whites,' are no +match for the hardy and resolute populations of the Free +States<a name="FNanchor39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39">[39]</a>," +and if the South hoped for foreign aid it should be undeceived +promptly: "Can any sane man believe that England and France will +consent, as is now suggested, to stultify the policy of half a +century for the sake of an extended cotton trade, and to purchase +the favours of Charleston and Milledgeville by recognizing what has +been called 'the isothermal law, which impels African labour toward +the tropics' on the other side of the Atlantic<a name= +"FNanchor40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40">[40]</a>?" Moreover all +Americans ought to understand clearly that British respect for the +United States "was not due to the attitude of the South with its +ruffian demonstrations in Congress.... All that is noble and +venerable in the United States is associated with its Federal +Constitution<a name="FNanchor41"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_41">[41]</a>."</p> +<p>Did the British public hold these same opinions? There is no +direct evidence available in sufficient quantity in autobiography +or letters upon which to base a conclusion. Such works are silent +on the struggle in America for the first few months and presumably +public opinion, less informed even than the press, received its +impressions from the journals customarily read. Both at this period +and all through the war, also, it should be remembered, clearly, +that most newspapers, all the reviews, in fact nearly all vehicles +of British expression, were in the early 'sixties "in the hands of +the educated classes, and these educated <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_41"></a>[V1:pg 41]</span> classes +corresponded closely with the privileged classes." The more +democratic element of British Society lacked any adequate press +representation of its opinions. "This body could express itself by +such comparatively crude methods as public meetings and +demonstrations, but it was hampered in literary and political +expression<a name="FNanchor42"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_42">[42]</a>." The opinion of the press was then, +presumably, the opinion of the majority of the educated British +public.</p> +<p>Thus British comment on America took the form, at first of +moralizations, now severe toward the South, now indifferent, yet +very generally asserting the essential justice of the Northern +position. But it was early evident that the newspapers, one and +all, were quite unprepared for the determined front soon put up by +South Carolina and other Southern States. Surprised by the violence +of Southern declarations, the only explanation found by the British +press was that political control had been seized by the uneducated +and lawless element. The <i>Times</i> characterized this element of +the South as in a state of deplorable ignorance comparable with +that of the Irish peasantry, a "poor, proud, lazy, excitable and +violent class, ever ready with knife and revolver<a name= +"FNanchor43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43">[43]</a>." The fate of the +Union, according to the <i>Saturday Review</i>, was in the hands of +the "most ignorant, most unscrupulous, and most lawless [class] in +the world--the poor or mean whites of the Slave States<a name= +"FNanchor44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44">[44]</a>." Like judgments +were expressed by the <i>Economist</i> and, more mildly, by the +<i>Spectator</i><a name="FNanchor45"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_45">[45]</a>. Subsequently some of these journals found +difficulty in this connection, in swinging round the circle to +expressions of admiration for the wise and powerful aristocracy of +the South; but all, especially <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_42"></a>[V1:pg 42]</span> the <i>Times</i>, were skilled by +long practice in the journalistic art of facing about while +claiming perfect consistency. In denial of a Southern right of +secession, also, they were nearly a unit<a name= +"FNanchor46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46">[46]</a>, though the +<i>Saturday Review</i> argued the case for the South, making a +pointed parallel between the present situation and that of the +American Colonies in seceding from England<a name= +"FNanchor47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47">[47]</a>.</p> +<p>The quotations thus far made exhibit for the leading papers an +initial confusion and ignorance difficult to harmonize with the +theory of an "enlightened press." The Reviews, by the conditions of +publication, came into action more slowly and during 1860 there +appeared but one article, in the <i>Edinburgh Review</i>, giving +any adequate idea of what was really taking place in +America<a name="FNanchor48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48">[48]</a>. +The lesser British papers generally followed the tone of the +leading journals, but without either great interest or much acumen. +In truth the depth of British newspaper ignorance, considering +their positiveness of utterance, appears utterly astonishing if +regarded from the view-point of modern historical knowledge. But is +this, after all, a matter for surprise? Was there not equal +confusion at least, possibly equal ignorance, in America itself, +certainly among the press and people of the Northern States? They +also had come by experience to discount Southern threats, and were +slow to understand that the great conflict of ideals and interests +was at last begun.</p> +<p>The British press both influenced and reflected educated class +opinion, and, in some degree, official opinion as well. Lord John +Russell at the Foreign Office and Lord Lyons, British Minister at +Washington, were exchanging anxious letters, and the latter was +sending home reports remarkable for their clear analysis of the +American controversy. Yet even he was slow to appreciate the +inevitability of secession.</p> +<br> +<a name="image02.jpg"></a> +<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image02.jpg"><img src= +"images/image02.jpg" width="55%" alt=""></a><br> +<b>LORD LYONS</b><br> +(<i>From a photograph taken at Boston, U.S.A., in 1860) (From Lord +Newton's "Life of Lord Lyons," by kind permission</i>)</p> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43"></a>[V1:pg 43]</span> +<p>Other officials, especially those in minor positions in the +United States, showed a lack of grasp of the situation similar to +that of the press. An amusing illustration of this, furnishing a +far-fetched view of causes, is supplied in a letter of February 2, +1860, from Consul Bunch, at Charleston, S.C., to Lord Lyons, the +British Minister at Washington<a name="FNanchor49"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_49">[49]</a>. Bunch wrote describing a dinner which had +been given the evening before, by the Jockey Club of Charleston. +Being called upon for a speech, he had alluded to the prizes of the +Turf at home, and had referred especially to the Plates run for the +various British colonies. Continuing, he said:</p> +<blockquote>"'... I cannot help calling your attention to the great +loss you yourselves have suffered by ceasing to be a Colonial +Dependency of Great Britain, as I am sure that if you had continued +to be so, the Queen would have had great pleasure in sending you +some Plates too.'<br> +<br> +"Of course this was meant for the broadest sort of joke, calculated +to raise a laugh after dinner, but to my amazement, the company +chose to take me literally, and applauded for about ten minutes--in +fact I could not go on for some time."</blockquote> +<p>Bunch evidently hardly knew what to make of this demonstration. +He could with difficulty believe that South Carolina wished to be +re-annexed as a colony of Great Britain, and comments upon the +episode in a somewhat humorous vein. Nevertheless in concluding his +letter, he solemnly assures Lord Lyons that</p> +<blockquote>"... The Jockey Club is composed of the 'best people' +of South Carolina--rich planters and the like. It represents, +therefore, the 'gentlemanly interest' and not a bit of universal +suffrage."</blockquote> +<p>It would be idle to assume that either in South Carolina or in +England there was, in February, 1860, any serious thought of a +resumption of colonial relations, though <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_44"></a>[V1:pg 44]</span> W.H. Russell, +correspondent of the <i>Times</i>, reported in the spring, 1861, +that he frequently heard the same sentiment in the South<a name= +"FNanchor50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50">[50]</a>. For general +official England, as for the press, the truth is that up to the +time of the secession of South Carolina no one really believed that +a final rupture was about to take place between North and South. +When, on December 20, 1860, that State in solemn convention +declared the dissolution "of the Union now existing between South +Carolina and the other States, under the name of the 'United States +of America,'" and when it was understood that other Southern States +would soon follow this example, British opinion believed and hoped +that the rupture would be accomplished peaceably. Until it became +clear that war <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45"></a>[V1:pg +45]</span> would ensue, the South was still damned by the press as +seeking the preservation of an evil institution. Slavery was even +more vigorously asserted as the ignoble and sole cause. In the +number for April, 1861, the <i>Edinburgh Review</i> attributed the +whole difficulty to slavery, asserted that British sympathy would +be with the anti-slavery party, yet advanced the theory that the +very dissolution of the Union would hasten the ultimate extinction +of slavery since economic competition with a neighbouring free +state, the North, would compel the South itself to abandon its +beloved "domestic institution<a name="FNanchor51"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_51">[51]</a>."</p> +<p>Upon receipt of the news from South Carolina, the <i>Times</i>, +in a long and carefully worded editorial, took up one by one the +alleged causes of secession, dismissed them as inadequate, and +concluded, "... we cannot disguise from ourselves that, apart from +all political complications, there is a right and a wrong in this +question, and that the right belongs, with all its advantages, to +the States of the North<a name="FNanchor52"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_52">[52]</a>." Three days later it asserted, "The North +is for freedom of discussion, the South represses freedom of +discussion with the tar-brush and the pine-fagot." And again, on +January 10, "The Southern States expected sympathy for their +undertaking from the public opinion of this country. The tone of +the press has already done much to undeceive them...."</p> +<p>In general both the metropolitan and the provincial press +expressed similar sentiments, though there were exceptions. The +<i>Dublin News</i> published with approval a long communication +addressed to Irishmen at home and abroad: "... there is no power on +earth or in heaven which can keep in peace this unholy +co-partnership.... I hope ... that the North will quietly permit +the South to retire from the confederacy and bear alone the odium +of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46"></a>[V1:pg 46]</span> +all mankind<a name="FNanchor53"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_53">[53]</a>...." The <i>Saturday Review</i> thought +that deeper than declared differences lay the ruling social +structure of the South which now visioned a re-opening of the +African Slave Trade, and the occupation by slavery of the whole +southern portion of North America. "A more ignoble basis for a +great Confederacy it is impossible to conceive, nor one in the long +run more precarious.... Assuredly it will be the Northern +Confederacy, based on principles of freedom, with a policy +untainted by crime, with a free working-class of white men, that +will be the one to go on and prosper and become the leader of the +New World<a name="FNanchor54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54">[54]</a>." +The <i>London Chronicle</i> was vigorous in denunciation. "No +country on the globe produces a blackguardism, a cowardice or a +treachery, so consummate as that of the negro-driving States of the +new Southern Confederacy"--a bit of editorial blackguardism in +itself<a name="FNanchor55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55">[55]</a>. The +<i>London Review</i> more moderately stigmatized slavery as the +cause, but was lukewarm in praise of Northern idealisms, regarding +the whole matter as one of diverging economic systems and in any +case as inevitably resulting in dissolution of the Union at some +time. The inevitable might as well come now as later and would +result in benefit to both sections as well as to the world fearing +the monstrous empire of power that had grown up in America<a name= +"FNanchor56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56">[56]</a>.</p> +<p>The great bulk of early expressions by the British press was, in +truth, definitely antagonistic to the South, and this was +particularly true of the provincial press. Garrison's +<i>Liberator</i>, advocating extreme abolition action, had long +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47"></a>[V1:pg 47]</span> made +a practice of presenting excerpts from British newspapers, speeches +and sermons in support of its cause. In 1860 there were thirty-nine +such citations; in the first months of 1861 many more, all +condemning slavery and the South. For the most part these citations +represented a comparatively unknown and uninfluential section, both +in politics and literature, of the British people. Matthew Arnold +was among the first of men of letters to record his faith that +secession was final and, as he hoped, an excellent thing for the +North, looking to the purity of race and the opportunity for +unhampered advance<a name="FNanchor57"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_57">[57]</a>. If English writers were in any way +influenced by their correspondents in the United States they may, +indeed, have well been in doubt as to the origin and prospects of +the American quarrel. Hawthorne, but recently at home again after +seven years' consulship in England, was writing that abolition was +not a Northern object in the war just begun. Whittier wrote to +<i>his</i> English friends that slavery, and slavery alone, was the +basic issue<a name="FNanchor58"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_58">[58]</a>. But literary Britain was slow to express +itself save in the Reviews. These, representing varying shades of +British upper-class opinion and presenting articles presumably more +profound than the newspaper editorials, frequently offered more +recondite origins of the American crisis. The <i>Quarterly +Review</i>, organ of extreme Conservatism, in its first article, +dwelt upon the failure of democratic institutions, a topic not here +treated at length since it will be dealt with in a separate chapter +as deserving special study. The <i>Quarterly</i> is also the first +to advance the argument that the protective tariff, advocated by +the North, was a real cause for Southern secession<a name= +"FNanchor59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59">[59]</a>; an idea made much +of later, by the elements unfriendly to the North, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_48"></a>[V1:pg 48]</span> but not hitherto +advanced. In these first issues of the Reviews for 1861, there was +frequently put forth the "Southern gentlemen" theory.</p> +<blockquote>"At a distance of three thousand miles, the Southern +planters did, indeed, bear a resemblance to the English country +gentleman which led to a feeling of kinship and sympathy with him +on the part of those in England who represented the old traditions +of landed gentility. This 'Southern gentleman' theory, containing +as it did an undeniable element of truth, is much harped upon by +certain of the reviewers, and one can easily conceive of its +popularity in the London Clubs.... The 'American,' so familiar to +British readers, during the first half of the century, through the +eyes of such travellers as Mrs. Trollope, now becomes the 'Yankee,' +and is located north of Mason and Dixon's line<a name= +"FNanchor60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60">[60]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Such portrayal was not characteristic of all Reviews, rather of +the Tory organs alone, and the Radical <i>Westminster</i> took +pains to deny the truth of the picture, asserting again and again +that the vital and sole cause of the conflict was slavery. Previous +articles are summed up in that of October, 1863, as a profession of +the <i>Westminster's</i> opinion throughout: "... the South are +fighting for liberty to found a Slave Power. Should it prove +successful, truer devil's work, if we may use the metaphor, will +rarely have been done<a name="FNanchor61"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_61">[61]</a>."</p> +<p>Fortunate would it have been for the Northern cause, if British +opinion generally sympathetic at first on anti-slavery grounds, had +not soon found cause to doubt the just basis of its sympathy, from +the trend of events in America. Lincoln had been elected on a +platform opposing the further territorial expansion of slavery. On +that point the North was fairly well united. But the great majority +of those who voted for Lincoln would have indignantly <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_49"></a>[V1:pg 49]</span> repudiated any +purpose to take active steps toward the extinction of slavery where +it already existed. Lincoln understood this perfectly, and whatever +his opinion about the ultimate fate of slavery if prohibited +expansion, he from the first took the ground that the terms of his +election constituted a mandate limiting his action. As secession +developed he rightly centred his thought and effort on the +preservation of the Union, a duty imposed by his election to the +Presidency.</p> +<p>Naturally, as the crisis developed, there were many efforts at +still another great compromise. Among the friends of the outgoing +President, Buchanan, whose term of office would not expire until +March 4, 1861, there were still some Southern leaders, like +Jefferson Davis, seeking either a complete surrender to Southern +will, or advantages for Southern security in case secession was +accomplished. Buchanan appealed hysterically to the old-time love +of the Union and to the spirit of compromise. Great congressional +committees of both Senate and House of Representatives were formed +seeking a solution. Crittenden for the border states between North +and South, where, more than anywhere else, there was division of +opinion, proposed pledges to be given to the South. Seward, +long-time champion of the anti-slavery North, was active in the +Senate in suggestion and intrigue seemingly intended to conciliate +by concessions. Charles Francis Adams, early a Free Soiler, in the +House of Representatives Committee conducted his Republican +colleagues along a path apparently leading to a guarantee of +slavery as then established<a name="FNanchor62"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_62">[62]</a>. A constitutional amendment was drafted to +this effect and received Lincoln's preliminary <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_50"></a>[V1:pg 50]</span> approval. Finally +Lincoln, in his inaugural address, March 4, 1861, declared:</p> +<blockquote>"I have no purpose, directly or indirectly to interfere +with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I +believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination +to do so."</blockquote> +<p>It should be no matter for surprise, therefore, that, as these +efforts were observed in Great Britain, a note of uncertainty began +to replace the earlier unanimity of opinion that the future of +slavery was at stake in America. This offered an easy excuse for a +switch-about of sympathy as British commercial and other interests +began to be developed, and even dismayed the ardent friends of the +anti-slavery North. Meanwhile the Government of Great Britain, from +the very first appearance of the cloud of civil war, had focused +its attention on the point of what the events in America portended +to British interests and policy. This is the business of +governments, and their agents would be condemned as inefficient did +they neglect it. But did British governmental policy go beyond this +entirely justifiable first thought for immediate British interests +to the point of positive hope that England would find an advantage +in the breaking up of the great American Republic? American +opinion, both then and later, believed Great Britain guilty of this +offence, but such criticism was tinged with the passions of the +Civil War. Yet a more impartial critic, though possibly an +unfriendly one because of his official position, made emphatic +declaration to like effect. On January 1, 1861, Baron de Brunow, +Russian Ambassador at London, reported to St. Petersburg that, "the +English Government, at the bottom of its heart, desires the +separation of North America into two republics, which will watch +each other jealously and counterbalance one the other. Then +England, on terms of peace and commerce with both, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_51"></a>[V1:pg 51]</span> would have +nothing to fear from either; for she would dominate them, +restraining them by their rival ambitions<a name= +"FNanchor63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63">[63]</a>."</p> +<p>If, however, one turns from the surmises of foreign diplomats as +to the springs of British policy, to the more authentic evidence of +official and private diplomatic correspondence, there is found no +proof for such accusations. Certainty neither Lord John Russell, +Foreign Secretary, nor Lord Lyons, British Minister at Washington, +reveal any animus against the United States. Considering his many +personal ties with leaders of both factions Lyons, from the first, +reported events with wonderful impartiality, and great clarity. On +November 12, 1860, he sent to Russell a full description of the +clamour raised in the South over the election of Lincoln, +enumerated the resignation of Federal officials (calling these +"ill-judged measures"), and expressed the opinion that Lincoln was +no Radical. He hoped the storm would blow over without damage to +the Union<a name="FNanchor64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64">[64]</a>. +Russell, for his part, was prompt to instruct Lyons and the British +consuls not "to seem to favour one party rather than the other," +and not to express opinions or to give advice, unless asked for by +the State Governments, in which case the advice should be against +all violent action as tending toward civil war<a name= +"FNanchor65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65">[65]</a>.</p> +<p>This bare statement may indeed be interpreted as indicating an +eager readiness on Russell's part to accept as final the +dissolution of the Union, but such an interpretation is not borne +out by a reading of his instructions. Rather he was perplexed, and +anxious that British agents should not gain the ill-will of either +American faction, an ill-will that would be alike detrimental in +the future, whether the Union remained unbroken or was +destroyed.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52"></a>[V1:pg 52]</span> +<p>Strict instructions against offering advice are therefore +repeated frequently<a name="FNanchor66"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_66">[66]</a>. Meanwhile the first concrete problem +requiring British action came from the seizure by South Carolina of +the Federal customs house at the port of Charleston, and the +attempt of the State authorities to collect port dues customarily +paid to Federal officials. British shipowners appealed to Consul +Bunch for instructions, he to Lyons, and the latter to the American +Secretary of State, Judge Black. This was on December 31, 1860, +while Buchanan was still President, and Black's answer was evasive, +though asserting that the United States must technically regard the +events in South Carolina as acts of violent rebellion<a name= +"FNanchor67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67">[67]</a>. Black refused to +state what action would be taken if Bunch advised British +shipowners to pay, but a way out of the embarrassment was found by +advising such payment to State authorities "under protest" as done +"under compulsion." To one of his letters to Bunch on this topic, +Lyons appended an expression indicative of his own early attitude. +"The domestic slavery of the South is a bitter pill which it will +be hard enough to get the English to swallow. But if the Slave +Trade is to be added to the dose, the least squeamish British +stomach will reject it<a name="FNanchor68"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_68">[68]</a>."</p> +<p>Nevertheless the vigorous action of South Carolina, soon +followed by other Southern States, made a deep impression on +Russell, especially when compared with the uncertainty and +irresolution manifested in the attempted compromise measures of +Northern statesmen. In a private letter to Lyons, January 10, 1861, +he wrote "I do not see how the United States can be cobbled +together again by any compromise.... I cannot see any mode of +reconciling such <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53"></a>[V1:pg +53]</span> parties as these. The best thing <i>now</i> would be +that the right to secede should be acknowledged.... I hope sensible +men will take this view.... But above all I hope no force will be +used<a name="FNanchor69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69">[69]</a>." And +again twelve days later, "I suppose the break-up of the Union is +now inevitable<a name="FNanchor70"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_70">[70]</a>." To Russell, as to most foreign observers, +it seemed that if the South with its great wealth, its enormous +extent of territory, and its five and one-half millions of +population, were determined to leave the Union, no force whatever +could compel a return. History failed to record any revolution on +so large a scale which had not succeeded. His desire, therefore, +was that the North would yield to the inevitable, and would not +plunge into a useless civil war disastrous alike to the prosperity +of America and of foreign nations. Russell's first hope was that +the South would forgo secession; his second, this accomplished, +that there would be no war, and in this sense he instructed Lyons. +The latter, less expectant of peaceful separation, and more aware +of the latent power of the North, maintained throughout his entire +service at Washington that there was at least a <i>chance</i> that +the North could subdue the South by might of arms<a name= +"FNanchor71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71">[71]</a>, but he also, +looking to British interests, saw his early duty, before war broke, +in cautious suggestions against forcible Northern action. Thus from +January to March, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_54"></a>[V1:pg 54]</span> 1861, British effort and indirect +advice were based on the hope that British trade interests might +escape the tribulations inevitable from a civil conflict in +America. Beyond that point there was no grasp of the complications +likely to arise in case of war, and no clear formulation of British +policy<a name="FNanchor72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72">[72]</a>.</p> +<p>In fact up to the middle of March, 1861, both public and +official British opinion discounted armed conflict, or at least any +determined Northern effort to recover the South. Early British +attitude was, therefore, based on a misconception. As this became +clear, public opinion began to break from a united humanitarian +pro-Northern sentiment and to show, in some quarters, quite another +face. Even as early as January the <i>Economist</i> expressed +wonder that the Northern States had not availed themselves gladly +of the chance to "shake off such an incubus, and to purify +themselves of such a stain<a name="FNanchor73"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_73">[73]</a>." and a month later professed to believe +that Great Britain would willingly permit the North to secure +compensation for loss of territory by annexing Canada--provided the +Canadians themselves desired it. This, it was argued, would +directly benefit England herself by cutting down military +expenditures<a name="FNanchor74"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_74">[74]</a>. The <i>London Press</i> indulged in +similar speculation, though from the angle of a Canadian annexation +of the Northern States, whose more sober citizens must by now be +weary of the sham of American democracy, and disgusted with the +rowdyism of political elections, which "combine the morals of a +horse race, the manners of a dog fight, the passions of a tap-room, +and the emotions of a gambling <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_55"></a>[V1:pg 55]</span> house<a name= +"FNanchor75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75">[75]</a>." Probably such +suggestions had little real purpose or meaning at the moment, but +it is interesting that this idea of a "compensation" in Canada +should have been voiced thus early. Even in the United States the +same thought had occurred to a few political leaders. Charles +Sumner held it, though too wise, politically, to advance it in the +face of the growing Northern determination to preserve the Union. +It lay at the bottom of his increasing bitterness toward his old +friend Charles Francis Adams, now busy in schemes intended, +apparently, to restore the Union by compromise, and it led Sumner +to hope for appointment as Minister to England<a name= +"FNanchor76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76">[76]</a>.</p> +<p>The chief organ of British upper-class opinion, the +<i>Times</i>, was one of the first to begin the process of "face +about," as civil war in America seemed imminent<a name= +"FNanchor77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77">[77]</a>. Viewed from the +later attitude of the <i>Times</i>, the earlier expressions of that +paper, and in truth of many British journals, seem merely the +customary platitudinous British holding up of horrified hands at +American slavery. On January 19, 1861, a strong editorial still +proclaimed the folly of South Carolina, as acting "without law, +without justice," but displayed a real dismay at the possible +consequences of war to British trade and commerce. On January 22, +the <i>Times</i> reprinted an article from the <i>Economist</i>, on +a probable cessation of cotton supply and editorially professed +great alarm, even advocating an early recognition of the Southern +confederacy if needed to maintain that supply. From this time on +there <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56"></a>[V1:pg 56]</span> +is no further note in the <i>Times</i> of the righteousness of the +Northern cause; but while it is still asserted that war would be +folly, the strength of the South, its superiority as a military +nation, are depicted.</p> +<p>A long break of nearly six weeks follows with little editorial +comment. Soon the correspondence from New York, previously written +by Bancroft Davis, and extremely favourable to the Northern cause, +was discontinued. W.H. Russell, the famous war correspondent of the +Crimea, was summoned to London and, according to his own story, +upon being given papers, clippings, and correspondence (largely +articles from the <i>New York Herald</i>) supporting the right of +the South to secede, hastily took his departure for America to +report upon the situation<a name="FNanchor78"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_78">[78]</a>. He sailed from Queenstown on March 3, and +arrived in New York on March 16. At last on March 12, the +<i>Times</i> took positive ground in favour of the justice of the +Southern cause.</p> +<blockquote>"No treachery has been at work to produce the +disruption, and the principles avowed are such as to command the +sympathies of every free and enlightened people. Such are the +widely different auspices under which the two rival Republics start +into existence. But mankind will not ultimately judge these things +by sympathies and antipathies; they will be greatly swayed by their +own interest, and the two Republics must be weighed, not by their +professions or their previous history, but by the conduct they +pursue and the position they maintain among the Powers of the +earth. Their internal institutions are their own affair; their +financial and political arrangements are emphatically ours. Brazil +is a slave-holding Empire, but by its good faith and good conduct +it has contrived to establish for itself a place in the hierarchy +of nations far superior to that of many Powers which are free from +this domestic contamination. If the Northern Confederacy of America +evinces a determination to act in a narrow, exclusive, and unsocial +spirit, while its Southern competitor <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_57"></a>[V1:pg 57]</span> extends the hand +of good fellowship to all mankind, with the exception of its own +bondsmen, we must not be surprised to see the North, in spite of +the goodness of its cause and the great negative merit of the +absence of Slavery, sink into a secondary position, and lose the +sympathy and regard of mankind."</blockquote> +<p>This to Northern view, was a sad relapse from that high moral +tone earlier addressed to the South notifying slave-holders that +England would not "stultify the policy of half a century for the +sake of an extended cotton trade<a name="FNanchor79"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_79">[79]</a>."</p> +<p>The <i>Economist</i>, with more consistency, still reported the +violence and recklessness of the South, yet in logical argument +proved to its own satisfaction the impossibility of Northern +reconquest, and urged a peaceful separation<a name= +"FNanchor80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80">[80]</a>. The +<i>Spectator</i>, even though pro-Northern, had at first small hope +of reunion by force, and offered consolation in the thought that +there would still remain a United States of America "strong, +powerful and free; all the stronger for the loss of the Black +South<a name="FNanchor81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81">[81]</a>." In +short from all quarters the public press, whatever its sympathy, +united in decrying war as a useless effort doomed to failure if +undertaken in the hope of restoring the Union. Such public opinion, +however, was not necessarily governmental opinion. The latter was +indeed more slow to make up its mind and more considerate in +expressing itself. When it became clear that in all probability the +North would fight, there was still no conception, any more than in +the United States itself, of the duration and intensity of the +conflict. Indeed, Russell yet hoped, as late as the end of January, +that no protracted war would occur. Nevertheless he was compelled +to face the situation in its relation to British commerce.</p> +<p>On February 16, Russell addressed Lyons on that aspect of +possible war which would at once call for a determination +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58"></a>[V1:pg 58]</span> of +British policy. "Above all things," he wrote, "endeavour to prevent +a blockade of the Southern coast. It would produce misery, discord, +and enmity incalculable<a name="FNanchor82"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_82">[82]</a>." Within a week Forster, a thorough friend +of the North throughout the whole war, was interrogating the +Ministry in the House of Commons in regard to the situation at +Charleston, and expressing the hope that England would not in any +way attempt to interfere<a name="FNanchor83"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_83">[83]</a>. This was the first reference in +Parliament, its sittings but just renewed after the long vacation, +to the American conflict, but British commercial interests were +being forced to a keener attention, and already men in many circles +were asking themselves what should be the proper governmental +attitude; how soon this new Southern Confederacy could justly claim +European recognition; how far and how fast European governments +ought to go in acknowledging such a claim; what ought to be the +proper policy and position of a neutral power; whether, indeed, a +declaration of neutrality ought to be issued.</p> +<p>With these questions rapidly coming to the front, it became +important for British statesmen to know something about the leaders +in this new Southern movement, the attitude of the people in +general, and the purposes of the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_59"></a>[V1:pg 59]</span> new Government. Here, +unfortunately, Lord Lyons could be no guide. The consuls in the +South, however, were in a position to give their impressions. On +February 28, 1861, Bunch wrote to Russell, describing the election +of Davis and Stephens<a name="FNanchor84"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_84">[84]</a>, to the Presidency and Vice-Presidency of +the Confederacy, and giving a personal characterization of many +members of the Government. He was rather caustic. Davis, he said, +was the only <i>able</i> man, and he, unfortunately, was a +confirmed "manifest destiny" leader, so much so in fact that Bunch +prophesied a renewal of filibustering when once the North had +acquiesced in a Southern State and the fear of the North had +passed. Bunch had no faith in any future greatness of the South, +asserting that it would be a State despised among nations for its +maintenance of slavery, and that it could not hope for any +encouragement or sympathy from the humane nations of Europe; in +fact, his entire characterization was wholly damning to the South. +Yet it is to be noted that he never for a moment questioned that +the South had already actually established its independence. This +he seems to take for granted. Thus again, and from another quarter, +there was presented the double difficulty of England in regard to +the Civil War--the difficulty of reconciling sentiments of humanity +long preached by Great Britain, with her commercial interests and +her certainty that a new State was being born.</p> +<p>For men in the Northern Government Lyons was in a position to +report, but up to the end of January he had not written in any +great detail with regard to the new administration and its make-up, +though on January 7, he had informed Russell that Seward would be +the Secretary of State and had expressed the fear that with regard +to Great Britain he would be "a dangerous Foreign Minister<a name= +"FNanchor85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85">[85]</a>." Lincoln was +still in Illinois and the constituency of the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_60"></a>[V1:pg 60]</span> Cabinet was yet +uncertain, but Seward's voice was sure to be a powerful one. +Occasionally Lyons found some opportunity to talk with him. On +February 4, 1861, in an official letter to Russell, Lyons reported +at length an interview with Seward, in which the latter had +expressed his extreme confidence that the trouble in America was +but superficial and that union sentiment in the South would soon +prevail<a name="FNanchor86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86">[86]</a>. In +a private letter of the same date, however, Lyons asserted that +Seward was indeed likely to be a very dangerous Secretary of State. +He had told Lyons that if European governments interfered to +protect their commerce, he could unite America by a foreign war in +order to resist such interference<a name="FNanchor87"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_87">[87]</a>. Again, on February 12, while himself +expressing hope that a solution might be found for the difficulties +in America, Lyons warned Russell that there were those who would +solve these difficulties by a foreign war, especially if foreign +governments refused to acknowledge a United States declaration +without formal blockade closing the Southern ports<a name= +"FNanchor88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88">[88]</a>. Writing +privately, Lyons exhibited great anxiety in regard to Seward's +attitude and suggested that the best safeguard would be close union +by England and France, for if these two governments took exactly +the same stand in regard to trade, Seward would hardly dare to +carry out his threat<a name="FNanchor89"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_89">[89]</a>.</p> +<p>Lyons' letter of February 4 called out from Russell an +instruction in which it was repeated that advice to either party +should be withheld and a strictly neutral attitude maintained, and +Russell concluded by an assertion that if the United States +attempted a jingo policy toward England, the British Cabinet would +be tolerant because of its feeling of strength but that "blustering +demonstrations" must <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_61"></a>[V1:pg 61]</span> not be carried too far<a name= +"FNanchor90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90">[90]</a>. Even as early as +December, 1860, Russell had foreseen the possibility of what he +considered a mere jingo policy for home effect in America. Now, +however, upon the repeated expression of fears from Lyons that this +might be more than mere "bunkum," Russell began to instruct Lyons +not to permit English dignity to be infringed, while at the same +time desiring him to be cautious against stirring American +antagonism. Lyons' earlier disquietude seems, indeed, to have +passed away for a time, and on February 26 he wrote that everyone +was waiting to see what Lincoln would do when inaugurated, that +there was still hope of compromise, and that in his own view this +was still possible. In this letter the tone is more important than +the matter, and so far as Lyons is concerned the tone is all +distinctly hopeful, all favourable to a resumption of normal +relations between the North and South. He at least had no hope of +disruption, and no happiness in it<a name="FNanchor91"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_91">[91]</a>.</p> +<p>Before this communication could reach England Russell had +thoroughly awakened to the seriousness of the American situation in +relation to British foreign trade. On March 9, writing privately to +Lyons, he stated, "I hope you are <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_62"></a>[V1:pg 62]</span> getting on well with the new +President. If he blockades the Southern ports we shall be in a +difficulty. But according to all American doctrine it must be an +actual blockade kept up by an efficient force<a name= +"FNanchor92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92">[92]</a>." Thus, before any +act had really occurred in America, the matter of a blockade was +occupying the attention of British statesmen. One difficulty at the +time was that there was no one in England qualified to speak for +the new administration at Washington. Dallas, the American Minister +appointed under the Buchanan administration, while, unlike some +other diplomatic representatives abroad, faithful to the cause of +the United States, was nevertheless not wholly trusted by Lincoln +or by Seward, and was thus handicapped in representing to Russell +American conditions or intentions. Indeed he had very little +communication with Russell. Adams' nomination to England was known +to Lyons on March 20, for on that day he telegraphed to Russell, +"Mr. Charles Francis Adams, of Massachusetts, is appointed Minister +in London. I think it a very good appointment<a name= +"FNanchor93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93">[93]</a>." This news was +received in London on April 2, but over six weeks were yet to +elapse before Adams reached his post. The appointment of Adams, +however, seemed to Lyons a matter of congratulation in his hope +that no vicious anti-British policy would be indulged in by Seward. +Ten days after his telegram, he wrote at length to Russell, making +an excellent statement and analysis in regard to the character of +Adams.</p> +<blockquote>"Mr. Adams is son of John Quincy Adams, the fifth P. of +the U.S., and grandson of John Adams, the second P. The grandfather +was the first Am. minister in England. The father was one of the +Plenipotentiaries who signed in London the Convention of the 3rd +July, 1815. Mr. Adams as a member of the H. of R. for one of the +districts of Mass., acted with the less violent section of the +'Republican' Party. During the last session of Congress he made a +very <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63"></a>[V1:pg 63]</span> +remarkable speech on the state of the Union, denying the +reasonableness of the complaints of the Southern States, but +stating his desire that every concession not inconsistent with +honour and principle should be made to them. He is considered to be +a man of great independence of character, and has the reputation of +being very tenacious of his own opinions. In manner he is quiet and +unassuming. He is a man of good fortune. Mrs. Adams comes of a +considerable family in Mass., of the name of Brooks. The late wife +of Mr. Edward Everett, who, as your L. is aware, has held the +offices of Minister in London and Secretary of State, was her +sister<a name="FNanchor94"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_94">[94]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Similar characterizations were being forwarded at almost the +same time by Bunch in regard to the Southern Commissioners, now +being despatched to London, but they were not so favourable. Mann, +wrote Bunch, was the son of a "bankrupt grocer." His personal +character was "not good," yet he alone of the three Commissioners +appointed had had diplomatic experience. Yancey, it was stated, was +an able lawyer, a stirring orator, and a recognized leader of the +secession movement, but he was also extremely pro-slavery in his +views, had expressed himself in favour of a renewal of the slave +trade, and throughout his career had been a "manifest destiny" man. +Of Rost, Bunch had no knowledge. In conclusion Bunch described the +extreme confidence expressed in the South in "King Cotton," and in +rather bitter criticism stated that the Southern Commissioners +thought even England, the foe of slavery, would now be compelled to +bend the knee and recognize the South in order to get +cotton<a name="FNanchor95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95">[95]</a>.</p> +<p>The Northern British Consuls on the other hand took an +astonishingly pro-Northern view of the whole situation. Archibald, +consul at New York, wrote to Russell soon after the fall of Sumter, +an exceedingly strong statement of his <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_64"></a>[V1:pg 64]</span> faith in the +power of the North and its fixed and unalterable determination to +force the South back into the Union, his confidence in Northern +success, and his belief in the justice of the Northern cause. He +ventured to suggest the proper policy for England to pursue, viz., +to offer immediately her services in mediation but wholly and +clearly on the side of the North. He stated that if England did not +feel free to offer mediation, she should at least show "such a +consistent and effective demonstration of sympathy and aid" for the +North as would help in shortening the war<a name= +"FNanchor96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96">[96]</a>. The British +Consul at Boston wrote to Russell in much the same vein. So far, +indeed, did these men go in expressing their sympathy with the +North, that Lyons, on April 27, commented to Russell that these +consuls had "taken the Northern War Fever," and that he had mildly +reproved Archibald<a name="FNanchor97"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_97">[97]</a>.</p> +<p>With the inauguration of Lincoln on March 4, and the +installation of Seward as Secretary of State, it was possible for +Lyons to become more active in his efforts to prevent a disruption +of British Trade. On March 20 he told Seward in a confidential +conversation:</p> +<blockquote>"... If the United States determined to stop by force +so important a commerce as that of Great Britain with the +cotton-growing States, I could not answer for what might +happen.<br> +<br> +"... It was, however, a matter of the greatest consequence to +England to procure cheap cotton. If a considerable rise were to +take place in the price of cotton, and British ships were to be at +the same time excluded from the Southern Ports, an immense pressure +would be put upon Her Majesty's Government to use all the means in +their power to open those ports. If Her Majesty's Government felt +it to be their duty to do so, they would naturally endeavour to +effect their object in a manner as consistent as possible, first +with their friendly feelings towards both Sections of this Country, +and secondly with <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_65"></a>[V1:pg 65]</span> the recognized principles of +International Law. As regards the latter point in particular, it +certainly appeared that the most simple, if not the only way, would +be to recognize the Southern Confederacy<a name= +"FNanchor98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98">[98]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>This was plain speaking, and Lyons' threat of recognizing the +South did not at the moment stir Seward to any retort. But five +days later, on March 25, Lyons gave a dinner to Seward and a number +of the foreign Ministers, and there Seward's violent talk about +seizing any and all ships that tried to trade with the South, even +if there was no blockade, made Lyons very anxious. As a host he +diverted the conversation lest it become too acrimonious, but he +himself told Seward</p> +<blockquote>"... that it was really a matter so very serious that I +was unwilling to discuss it; that his plan seemed to me to amount +in fact to a paper blockade of the enormous extent of coast +comprised in the seceding States; that the calling it an +enforcement of the Revenue Laws appeared to me to increase the +gravity of the measure, for it placed Foreign Powers in the dilemma +of recognizing the Southern Confederation or of submitting to the +interruption of their commerce<a name="FNanchor99"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_99">[99]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Lyons' advice to Russell was that no rebuff should be given the +Southern Commissioners when they arrived in London, but that they +be treated well. This, he thought, might open Seward's eyes to his +folly. Still Lyons did not yet fully believe that Seward would be +so vigorous as his language seemed to imply, and on March 29 he +wrote that "prudent counsels" were in the ascendant, that there +would be no interference with trade "<i>at present</i>," and that a +quieter tone was everywhere perceptible in Washington<a name= +"FNanchor100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100">[100]</a>.</p> +<p>From the point of view of the British Minister at <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_66"></a>[V1:pg 66]</span> Washington, the +danger spot in relations between the United States and Great +Britain lay in this matter of interference with trade to Southern +ports. Naturally, and as in duty bound, he sought to preserve that +trade. At first, indeed, he seems to have thought that even though +a civil war really ensued the trade might continue uninterrupted. +Certainly he bore hard and constantly on this one point, seeking to +influence not only officials at Washington but the public press. +Thus, in a letter to Bunch dated April 12, 1861, at a time when he +knew that W.H. Russell, the <i>Times</i> correspondent, would +shortly appear in Charleston, he instructed Bunch to remember that +in talking to Russell he must especially impress him with the idea +that any interruption of trade might and probably would result in a +British recognition of the South. Lyons wrote, "... the <i>only</i> +chance, if chance there still be of preventing an interruption of +the English commerce with the S. is the fear entertained here, that +it would lead to our recognizing the S.C.<a name= +"FNanchor101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101">[101]</a>" In these words +is revealed, however, as in other communications from Lyons, the +fact that he was striving to prevent an interruption of trade +rather than that he was convinced such interruption ought to result +in a British recognition of the South. Indeed, as will be seen, +when the blockade was at last declared, Lyons thought it no cause +for recognition and was most tolerant of its early +ineffectiveness.</p> +<p>While Lyons was thus keeping in close touch with Seward, the +relations between England and America at London were exceedingly +meagre. All that the American Minister Dallas knew of Russell's +intentions is summed up in his despatches to Seward of March 22 and +April 9, 1861<a name="FNanchor102"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_102">[102]</a>. On the former date, he gave an account +of an interview with Russell in which the latter simply refused to +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67"></a>[V1:pg 67]</span> +pledge himself against a recognition of the Confederacy; in the +latter, presenting a long memorial written by Seward to all of the +larger European Governments arguing in friendly spirit the cause of +the North, Dallas reported that he drew from Russell merely a +general expression of England's kindly feeling towards the United +States and her hope that there might still be a peaceful solution. +Russell again refused to make any pledge in regard to English +policy. In this interview it was tacitly agreed that it would be +better for Great Britain to await Adams' arrival before taking any +definite action, or so at least Dallas understood Russell--though +the latter later denied that any pledge of delay was given. There +is no doubt, however, that in Russell's mind, whatever he might say +to Dallas, the separation in America was an accomplished fact and +the hope of Great Britain was centred upon the idea of a peaceful +separation.</p> +<p>Up to and including April 1, indeed, Lyons had been reporting +that no definite stand was yet being taken by the American +Government. At the same time Russell was continuing his +instructions to Lyons to recommend conciliation "but never to +obtrude advice unasked<a name="FNanchor103"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_103">[103]</a>." Yet Russell was not wholly undisturbed +by the reports of Seward's quarrelsome attitude, for in a private +letter of the same date as the preceding, he wrote to Lyons, "I +rely upon your wisdom, patience, and prudence, to steer us through +the dangers of this crisis. If it can possibly be helped Mr. Seward +must not be allowed to get us into a quarrel. I shall see the +Southerners when they come, but not officially, and keep them at a +proper distance<a name="FNanchor104"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_104">[104]</a>." It is an interesting query, whether +this fear thus expressed of Seward's temper was not of distinct +benefit to the United States at the moment when the Southern +Commissioners <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68"></a>[V1:pg +68]</span> arrived in England. The inference would seem to be +clear, that in spite of Lyons' advice to treat them well, the +effect upon Russell of Seward's attitude was to treat them coolly. +Russell was indeed distinctly worried by Seward's unfriendly +attitude.</p> +<p>In the meantime the British press and public, while still +uncertain and divided as to the merits of the conflict were now +substantially a unit in accepting separation as final. The +<i>Times</i>, with judicial ponderosity declared: "The new +nationality has been brought forth after a very short period of +gestation.... and the Seceding States have now constituted +themselves a nation<a name="FNanchor105"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_105">[105]</a> ..." At the other end of the scale in +newspaper "tone," the <i>London Press</i> jeered at the Northern +American eagle as having "had his tail pulled out and his wings +clipped--yet the meek bird now holds out his claws to be pared, +with a resignation that would be degrading in the most henpecked of +domestic fowls<a name="FNanchor106"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_106">[106]</a>." Having now veered about to expressions +of confidence in the permanency of the Southern Confederacy the +<i>Times</i> was also compelled to alter its opinion of Southern +Statesmen. An editorial gave high praise to the Confederate +Congress sitting at Montgomery, stated its personnel to be far +superior to that of the Congress at Washington, yet was unable to +resist making the customary reference to manners traditionally +American;</p> +<blockquote>"With regard to the Congress itself, we cannot refrain +from quoting the <i>naïve</i> testimony of a visitor in its +favour. 'Gentlemen here [Montgomery] who have spent much time in +Washington city declare that they have never witnessed such +industry, care, propriety, courtesy, and pleasant Congressional +action. <i>Not one member has appeared in his seat under the +influence of liquors or wines</i>, not a harsh word <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_69"></a>[V1:pg 69]</span> has been uttered +in debate, and all exhibit the most unflagging energy and +determination<a name="FNanchor107"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_107">[107]</a>.'"</blockquote> +<p>The most of the British press quickly followed the lead of the +<i>Times</i>, forgot its previous dictum that the South was in the +control of "ignorant ruffians," and dilated upon the statemanlike +directness and sagacity of Southern leaders as contrasted with the +stupidity of the North, displayed in its tariff policy<a name= +"FNanchor108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108">[108]</a>. A few journals +thought that the North might eventually win in a prolonged struggle +but that such a victory would be disastrous to the principles of +federalism<a name="FNanchor109"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_109">[109]</a>, and, in any case, that this civil war +was one without "a noble cause to sustain either side<a name= +"FNanchor110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110">[110]</a>." By May nearly +all the older journals were aligned on the right of the South to +secede, and on the fact of a successful secession, though still +differing as to the basic causes and essential justice involved. In +this same month, however, there emerged a few vigorous champions of +the Northern cause and prospects. In April the <i>Spectator</i> +agreed that the Great Republic was at an end<a name= +"FNanchor111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111">[111]</a>; in May it +urged the North to fight it out with hope, asserting a chance of +ultimate victory because of superior resources and the sympathy of +all European nations<a name="FNanchor112"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_112">[112]</a>. A small newspaper of limited +circulation, the <i>Morning Star</i>, organ of John Bright, had +from the first championed the Northern cause. Now, as the armed +conflict broke in America, it was joined by a more important paper, +the <i>Daily News</i>, which set itself the task of controverting +the <i>Times</i>. Moreover the <i>Daily News</i> was all the more +influential in that it was not uncritical of the North, yet +consistently, throughout the war, expressed sympathy for the cause +and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70"></a>[V1:pg 70]</span> +principles behind the efforts of the Northern Government. Selling +for a low price, twopence-halfpenny, the <i>Daily News</i>, like +the <i>Westminster</i> among the Reviews, appealed to a broader and +more popular constituency than the older publications, especially +to a constituency not yet vocal, since still unrepresented, in +Parliament<a name="FNanchor113"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_113">[113]</a>.</p> +<p>The <i>Daily News</i> was fortunate in having, after 1862, the +best-informed New York correspondent writing to the London press. +This was an Irishman, E.L. Godkin, who, both at home and in +America, was the intimate friend of literary men, and himself, +later, a great moulder of public opinion<a name= +"FNanchor114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114">[114]</a>. Harriet +Martineau further aided the <i>Daily News</i> by contributing +pro-Northern articles, and was a power in Radical circles<a name= +"FNanchor115"></a><a href="#Footnote_115">[115]</a>. But literary +England in general, was slow to express itself with conviction, +though Robert Browning, by April, 1861, was firmly determined in +his pro-Northern sentiment. In August he was writing in letters of +the "good cause<a name="FNanchor116"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_116">[116]</a>." But Browning was a rare exception and +it was not until the Civil War had been under way for many months +that men of talent in the non-political world were drawn to make +comment or to take sides. Their influence at the outset was +negligible<a name="FNanchor117"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_117">[117]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71"></a>[V1:pg 71]</span> +<p>In spite of press utterances, or literary silence, alike +indicative of a widespread conviction that Southern independence +was assured, there still remained both in those circles where +anti-slavery sentiment was strong, and in others more neutral in +sympathy, a distaste for the newly-born State as the embodiment of +a degrading institution. Lincoln's inaugural address denying an +intention to interfere with slavery was a weapon for the friends of +the South, but it could not wholly still that issue. Even in the +<i>Times</i>, through the medium of W.H. Russell's descriptive +letters, there appeared caustic criticisms. He wrote in his +"Diary," "I declare that to me the more orderly, methodical, and +perfect the arrangements for economizing slave labour ... are, the +more hateful and odious does slavery become<a name= +"FNanchor118"></a><a href="#Footnote_118">[118]</a>," and in his +letter of May 8, from Montgomery, having witnessed an auction sale +of slaves he stated:</p> +<blockquote>"I am neither sentimentalist nor Black Republican, nor +negro worshipper, but I confess the sight caused a strange thrill +through my heart. I tried in vain to make myself familiar with the +fact that I could, for the sum of $975, become as absolutely the +owner of that mass of blood, bones, sinew, flesh and brains as of +the horse which stood by my side. There was no sophistry which +could persuade me the man was not a man--he was, indeed, by no +means my brother, but assuredly he was a fellow creature<a name= +"FNanchor119"></a><a href="#Footnote_119">[119]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>This was hard printing for the <i>Times</i>, in its new advocacy +of the South, and Russell's description was made much of by the +<i>Westminster Review</i> and other publications that soon began to +sound again the "issue" of slavery<a name= +"FNanchor120"></a><a href="#Footnote_120">[120]</a>. Yet the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72"></a>[V1:pg 72]</span> +<i>Westminster</i> itself in the same article decried the folly of +the Northern attempt at reconquest. So also thought even John +Bright at the moment, when expressing himself privately to friends +in America<a name="FNanchor121"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_121">[121]</a>.</p> +<p>Slavery, then, still remained an issue before the British +public, but of what use was it to upbraid the South, if a new world +State were in fact born? And if a State in power, why not give it +prompt recognition? The extreme British anti-slavery opponents +feared that this was just what the Government was inclined to do, +and with promptness. Here and there meetings were hurriedly called +to protest against recognition<a name="FNanchor122"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_122">[122]</a>. This fear was unfounded. Neither in +London nor at Washington was there any official inclination to +hasten recognition. Lyons had held up to Seward the logic of such +action, if British trade were illegally interfered with. By April 9 +Lyons was aware that the so-called Radical Party in the Cabinet +would probably have its way, that conciliation would no longer be +attempted, and that a coercive policy toward the South was soon to +follow. On that date he wrote to Russell stating that people in +Washington seemed so convinced that Europe would <i>not</i> +interfere to protect its trade that they were willing to venture +any act embarrassing to that trade. He himself was still insisting, +but with dwindling confidence, that the trade must not be +interfered with under any circumstances. And in a second letter of +this same date, he repeated to Russell his advice of treating the +Southern Commissioners with deference. Any rebuff to them, he +asserts again, will but increase the Northern confidence that they +may do anything without provoking the resistance of England<a name= +"FNanchor123"></a><a href="#Footnote_123">[123]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73"></a>[V1:pg 73]</span> +<p>Like a good diplomat Lyons was merely pushing the argument for +all it was worth, hoping to prevent an injury to his country, yet +if that injury did come (provided it were sanctioned by the law of +nations) he did not see in it an injury sufficient to warrant +precipitate action by Great Britain. When indeed the Southern +capture of Fort Sumter in Charleston harbour finally brought the +actual clash of arms, Lyons expressed himself with regard to other +elements in the struggle previously neglected in his +correspondence. On April 15 describing to Russell the fall of +Sumter, he stated that civil war had at last begun. The North he +believed to be very much more powerful than the South, the South +more "eager" and united as yet, but, he added, "the taint of +slavery will render the cause of the South loathsome to the +civilized world." It was true that "commercial intercourse with the +cotton States is of vital importance to manufacturing +nations<a name="FNanchor124"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_124">[124]</a>...." but Lyons was now facing an actual +situation rather than a possible one, and as will be seen later, he +soon ceased to insist that an interruption of this "commercial +intercourse" gave reasonable ground for recognition of the +South.</p> +<p>With the fall of Fort Sumter and the European recognition that a +civil war was actually under way in America, a large number of new +and vexing problems was presented to Russell. His treatment of them +furnishes the subject matter of later chapters. For the period +previous to April, 1861, British official attitude may be summed up +in the statement that the British Minister at Washington hoped +against hope that some solution might be found for the preservation +of the Union, but that at the same time, looking to future British +interests and possibly believing also that his attitude would tend +to preserve the Union, he asserted vehemently the impossibility of +any Northern interference with British trade to Southern ports. +Across <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74"></a>[V1:pg +74]</span> the water, Russell also hoped faintly that there might +be no separation. Very soon, however, believing that separation +inevitable and the disruption of the Union final, he fixed his hope +on peaceful rather than warlike secession. Even of this, however, +he had little real expectation, but neither he nor anyone else in +England, nor even in America, had any idea that the war would be a +long and severe one. It is evident that he was already considering +the arrival of that day when recognition must be granted to a new, +independent and slave-holding State. But this estimate of the +future is no proof that the Russian Ambassador's accusation of +British governmental pleasure in American disruption was +justified<a name="FNanchor125"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_125">[125]</a>. Russell, cautious in refusing to pledge +himself to Dallas, was using exactly such caution as a Foreign +Secretary was bound to exercise. He would have been a rash man who, +in view of the uncertainty and irresolution of Northern statesmen, +would have committed Great Britain in March, 1861, to a definite +line of policy.</p> +<p>On April 6, Russell was still instructing Lyons to recommend +reconciliation. April 8, Dallas communicated to Russell an +instruction from Seward dated March 9, arguing on lines of +"traditional friendship" against a British recognition of the +Confederacy. Russell again refused to pledge his Government, but on +April 12 he wrote to Lyons that British Ministers were "in no hurry +to recognize the separation as complete and final<a name= +"FNanchor126"></a><a href="#Footnote_126">[126]</a>." In the early +morning of that same day the armed conflict in America had begun, +and on the day following, April 13, the first Southern victory had +been recorded in the capture of Fort Sumter. The important question +which the man at the head of the British Foreign Office had now +immediately to decide was, what was to be England's attitude, under +international <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75"></a>[V1:pg +75]</span> law, toward the two combatants in America. In deciding +this question, neither sentiment nor ideals of morality, nor +humanitarianism need play any part; England's <i>first</i> need and +duty were to determine and announce for the benefit of her citizens +the correct position, under International law, which must be +assumed in the presence of certain definite facts.</p> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_31"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor31">[31]</a> Dr. Newton asserts that at the end of the +'fifties Great Britain made a sharp change of policy. (<i>Cambridge +History of British Foreign Policy</i>, Vol. II, p. +283.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_32"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor32">[32]</a> Thomas Colley Grattan, <i>Civilized +America</i>, 2 vols. 2nd ed., London, 1859, Vol. I, pp. 284-87. The +first edition was printed in 1859 and a third in 1861. In some +respects the work is historically untrustworthy since internal +evidence makes clear that the greater part of it was written before +1846, in which year Grattan retired from his post in Boston. In +general he wrote scathingly of America, and as his son succeeded to +the Boston consulship, Grattan probably thought it wiser to +postpone publication. I have found no review of the work which +treats it otherwise than as an up-to-date description of 1859. This +fact and its wide sale in England in 1860-61, give the work +importance as influencing British knowledge and +opinions.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_33"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor33">[33]</a> Charles Mackay, <i>Life and Liberty in +America: or, Sketches of a Tour in the United States and Canada in +1857-8</i>, one vol., New York, 1859, pp. 316-17. Mackay was at +least of sufficient repute as a poet to be thought worthy of a +dinner in Boston at which there were present, Longfellow, Holmes, +Agassiz, Lowell, Prescott, Governor Banks, and others. He preached +"hands across the seas" in his public lectures, occasionally +reading his poem "John and Jonathan"--a sort of advance copy of +Kipling's idea of the "White Man's Burden." Mackay's concluding +verse, "John" speaking, was:<br> +<br> +<blockquote>"And I have strength for nobler work<br> + Than e'er my hand has done,<br> +And realms to rule and truths to plant<br> + Beyond the rising sun.<br> +Take you the West and I the East;<br> + We'll spread ourselves abroad,<br> +With trade and spade and wholesome laws,<br> + And faith in man and God."</blockquote> +</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_34"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor34">[34]</a> Duncan, <i>Life and Letters of Herbert +Spencer</i>, Vol. I, p. 140.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_35"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor35">[35]</a> R.C. Hamilton, Manuscript Chapters and Notes +on "The English Press and the Civil War." Mr. Hamilton was at work +on this subject, as a graduate student, but left Stanford +University before completing his thesis. His notes have been of +considerable value, both for suggested citations from the English +Press, and for points of interpretation.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_36"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor36">[36]</a> <i>Economist</i>, November 24, 1860. Six +months later, however, the <i>Economist</i> pictured Lincoln as +merely an unknown "sectionalist," with no evidence of +statesmanship--<i>Economist</i>, June 1, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_37"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor37">[37]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, November 24, +1860.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_38"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor38">[38]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, November 24, +1860.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_39"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor39">[39]</a> The <i>Times</i>, November 26, +1860.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_40"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor40">[40]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, November 29, +1860.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_41"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor41">[41]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_42"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor42">[42]</a> R.L. Duffus, "Contemporary English Popular +Opinion on the American Civil War," p. 2. A thesis presented in +fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, +Stanford University, 1911. This thesis is in manuscript. It is a +valuable study of the Reviews and of the writings of men of +letters. Hereafter cited as Duffus "English Opinion."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_43"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor43">[43]</a> The <i>Times</i>, January 12, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_44"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor44">[44]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, January 12, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_45"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor45">[45]</a> <i>Economist</i>, December 8, 1860. +<i>Spectator</i>, January 19, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_46"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor46">[46]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, December 1, 1860. +<i>Times</i>, January 29, 1861. <i>Economist</i>, May 25, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_47"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor47">[47]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, January 19, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_48"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor48">[48]</a> <i>Edinburgh Review</i>, Vol. 112, p. +545.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_49"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor49">[49]</a> Lyons Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_50"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor50">[50]</a> Russell, <i>My Diary North and South</i>, +Boston, 1863, p. 134. "Then cropped out again the expression of +regret for the rebellion of 1776, and the desire that if it came to +the worst, England would receive back her erring children, or give +them a prince under whom they could secure a monarchical form of +government. There is no doubt about the earnestness with which +these things are said." Russell's <i>Diary</i> is largely a +condensation of his letters to the <i>Times</i>. In the letter of +April 30, 1861 (published May 28), he dilates to the extent of a +column on the yearning of South Carolina for a restoration of +colonial relations. But Consul Bunch on December 14, 1860, reported +a Charleston sentiment very different from that of the Jockey Club +in February. He wrote to Lyons:<br> +<br> +<blockquote>"The church bells are ringing like mad in celebration +of a<br> +newly revived festival, called 'Evacuation Day,' being the<br> +<i>nefastus ille dies</i> in which the bloody Britishers left<br> +Charleston 78 years ago. It has fallen into utter disuse for<br> +about 50 years, but is now suddenly resuscitated apropos +<i>de</i><br> +nothing at all."</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +In this same letter Bunch described a Southern patriotic +demonstration. Returning to his home one evening, he met a military +company, which from curiosity he followed, and which<br> +<br> +<blockquote>"drew up in front of the residence of a young lawyer of +my<br> +friends, after performing in whose honour, through the medium<br> +of a very brassy band, a Secession Schottische or Palmetto<br> +Polka, it clamorously demanded his presence. After a very<br> +brief interval he appeared, and altho' he is in private life<br> +an agreeable and moderately sensible young man, he succeeded,<br> +to my mind at any rate, in making most successfully, what Mr.<br> +Anthony Weller calls 'an Egyptian Mummy of his self.' the<br> +amount of balderdash and rubbish which he evacuated (<i>dia<br> +stomatos</i>) about mounting the deadly breach, falling back<br> +into the arms of his comrades and going off generally in a<br> +blaze of melodramatic fireworks, really made me so unhappy<br> +that I lost my night's rest. So soon as the speech was over<br> +the company was invited into the house to 'pour a libation to<br> +the holy cause'--in the vernacular, to take a drink and spit<br> +on the floor."</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +Evidently Southern eloquence was not tolerable to the ears of the +British consul. Or was it the din of the church bells rather than +the clamour of the orator, that offended him? (<i>Lyons +Papers</i>.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_51"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor51">[51]</a> <i>Edinburgh Review</i>, Vol. 113, p. +555.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_52"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor52">[52]</a> The <i>Times</i>, January 4, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_53"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor53">[53]</a> Letter to <i>Dublin News</i>, dated January +26, 1861. Cited in <i>The Liberator</i>, March 1, 1861. Garrison, +editor of <i>The Liberator</i>, was then earnest in advocating +"letting the South go in peace" as a good riddance.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_54"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor54">[54]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, March 2, 1861, p. +216.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_55"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor55">[55]</a> <i>London Chronicle</i>, March 14, 1861. +Cited in <i>The Liberator</i>, April 12, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_56"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor56">[56]</a> <i>London Review</i>, April 20, 1861. Cited +in Littel's <i>Living Age</i>, Vol. LXIX, p. 495. The editor of the +<i>Review</i> was a Dr. Mackay, but I have been unable to identify +him, as might seem natural from his opinions, as the Mackay +previously quoted (p. 37) who was later New York correspondent of +the <i>Times</i>.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_57"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor57">[57]</a> Matthew Arnold, <i>Letters</i>, Vol. I., p. +150. Letter to Mrs. Forster, January 28, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_58"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor58">[58]</a> Julian Hawthorne, <i>Nathaniel Hawthorne and +his Wife</i>, Vol. II, pp. 271-78. <i>Life and Letters of John +Greenleaf Whittier</i>, Vol. II, pp. 439 seq.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_59"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor59">[59]</a> <i>Quarterly Review</i>, Vol. 110, p. 282. +July, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_60"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor60">[60]</a> Duffus, "English Opinion," p. +7.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_61"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor61">[61]</a> <i>Westminster</i>, Vol. LXXX, p. +587.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_62"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor62">[62]</a> Adams' course was bitterly criticized by his +former intimate friend, Charles Sumner, but the probable purpose of +Adams was, foreseeing the certainty of secession, to exhibit so +strongly the arrogance and intolerance of the South as to create +greater unity of Northern sentiment. This was a purpose that could +not be declared and both at home and abroad his action, and that of +other former anti-slavery leaders, for the moment weakened faith +that the North was in earnest on the general issue of +slavery.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_63"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor63">[63]</a> <i>Services rendered by Russia to the +American People during the War of the Rebellion</i>, Petersburg, +1904, p. 5.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_64"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor64">[64]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV, "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States," No. 1.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_65"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor65">[65]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 6. Russell to Lyons, +December 26, 1860.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_66"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor66">[66]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Russell to Lyons, No. 9, +January 5, 1861, and No. 17, February 20, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_67"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor67">[67]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1861, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XVIII. Correspondence with U.S. Government +respecting suspension of Federal Customs House at the Port of +Charleston. Nos. 1 and 3.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_68"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor68">[68]</a> Lyons Papers. Lyons to Bunch, December 12, +1860.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_69"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor69">[69]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, The same day official +instructions were sent permitting Bunch to remain at Charleston, +but directing him, if asked to recognize South Carolina, to refer +the matter to England. F.O., Am., Vol. 754, No. 6. Russell to +Lyons, January 10, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_70"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor70">[70]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, January 22, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_71"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor71">[71]</a> This view was not shared by Lyons' +colleagues at Washington. The Russian Minister, Stoeckl, early +declared the Union permanently destroyed, and regretting the fact, +yet hoped the North would soon accept the inevitable and seek close +co-operation with the South in commerce and in foreign relations. +This view was repeated by him many times and most emphatically as +late as the first month of 1863. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to +F.O., January 29-February 10, 1863. No. 342.) It was not until +September, 1863, that Stoeckl ventured to hope for a Northern +reconquest of the South. I am indebted to Dr. Frank A. Golder, of +Stanford University, for the use of his notes and transcripts +covering all of the Russian diplomatic correspondence with the +United States, 1860-1865. In the occasional use made of this +material the English translation is mine.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_72"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor72">[72]</a> Stoeckl reported that at a dinner with +Lyons, at which he, Mercier and Seward were the guests, Seward had +asserted that if Civil War came all foreign commerce with the South +would be interrupted. To this Lyons protested that England could +not get along without cotton and that she would secure it in one +way or another. Seward made no reply. (<i>Ibid.</i>, March 25-April +9, 1861, No. 810.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_73"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor73">[73]</a> <i>Economist</i>, January 12, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_74"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor74">[74]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, February 23, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_75"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor75">[75]</a> <i>London Press</i>, March 23, 1861. Cited +in Littell's <i>Living Age</i>, Vol. LXIX, p. 438.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_76"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor76">[76]</a> Before Adams' selection as Minister to +England was decided upon, Sumner's Massachusetts friends were +urging him for the place. Longfellow was active in this interest. +<i>H.W. Longfellow</i>, by Samuel Longfellow, Vol. II, pp. +412-13.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_77"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor77">[77]</a> John Bright later declared "his conviction +that the leading journal had not published one fair, honourable, or +friendly article toward the States since Lincoln's accession to +office." Dasent, <i>Life of Delane</i>, Vol. II, p. 38. The time is +approximately correct, but the shift in policy began earlier, when +it came to be feared that the North would not submit to peaceable +secession.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_78"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor78">[78]</a> Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, Vol. I, pp. +344-45.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_79"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor79">[79]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 40.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_80"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor80">[80]</a> <i>Economist</i>, March 2, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_81"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor81">[81]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, March 16, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_82"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor82">[82]</a> Lyons Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_83"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor83">[83]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXI, p. 814. February +22, 1861. William E. Forster was of Quaker descent and had early +taken part in public meetings called to express humanitarian +sentiment. From 1850 on he was an acceptable public speaker in all +matters liberal, as free trade, social reform, and anti-slavery. +Elected to Parliament in 1859 and again in 1861 from Bradford, +where he was engaged in business as a woollen manufacturer, he +sought, after the fashion of new Members, a cause to represent and +found it in championship of the North. Having great native ability, +as shown by his later distinguished career, it was the good fortune +of the United States thus to enlist so eager a champion. Forster +and John Bright were the two leading "friends of the North" in +Parliament. The latter already had established reputation, but was +more influential out of Parliament than in it. Forster, with a +reputation to make, showed skill in debate, and soon achieved +prestige for himself and his American cause. Henry Adams, son and +private secretary of the American Minister to England, once told +the writer that he regarded Forster's services as, on the whole, +the most valuable rendered by any Englishman to the +North.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_84"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor84">[84]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 30.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_85"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor85">[85]</a> Newton, <i>Lord Lyons</i>, Vol. I, p. +30.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_86"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor86">[86]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 760, No. 40.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_87"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor87">[87]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, February +4, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_88"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor88">[88]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 760, No. 59.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_89"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor89">[89]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, February +12, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_90"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor90">[90]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States," No. 17. Russell to Lyons, February 20, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_91"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor91">[91]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 761, No. 78. Received March +11. It is curious that in the first period of the war Lyons made no +extended characterization of Lincoln. Probably his contacts with +the new President were insufficient to justify it. The first record +of personal impressions was that made by W.H. Russell and later +printed in his "Diary" but not reproduced in his letters to the +<i>Times</i>. Russell was taken to the White House. "Soon +afterwards there entered, with a shambling, loose, irregular, +almost unsteady gait, a tall, lank, lean man, considerably over six +feet in height, with stooping shoulders, long pendulous arms, +terminating in hands of extraordinary dimensions, which, however, +were far exceeded in proportion by his feet.... The impression +produced by the size of his extremities, and by his flapping and +wide-projecting ears, may be removed by the appearance of +kindliness, sagacity, and awkward bonhomie of his face ... eyes +dark, full, and deeply set, are penetrating, but full of an +expression which almost amounts to tenderness.... A person who met +Mr. Lincoln in the street would not take him to be what--according +to usages of European society--is called a 'gentleman' ... but, at +the same time, it would not be possible for the most indifferent +observer to pass him in the street without notice."--<i>My +Diary</i>, I, pp. 37-8.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_92"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor92">[92]</a> Lyons Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_93"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor93">[93]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 761.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_94"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor94">[94]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 762, No. 122. March 30, +1861. Received April 16.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_95"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor95">[95]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 37. March 21, 1861. +Received April 9.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_96"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor96">[96]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 778, No. 26. April 24, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_97"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor97">[97]</a> Russell Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_98"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor98">[98]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, March 26, +1861. Printed in Newton, <i>Lord Lyons</i>, Vol. I., p. +31.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_99"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor99">[99]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_100"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor100">[100]</a> Russell Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_101"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor101">[101]</a> Lyons Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_102"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor102">[102]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>, +1861-2, pp, 80-81.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_103"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor103">[103]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 754, No. 79. Russell to +Lyons, April 6, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_104"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor104">[104]</a> Lyons Papers, Russell to Lyons, April 6, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_105"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor105">[105]</a> The <i>Times</i>, February 26, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_106"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor106">[106]</a> <i>London Press</i>, March 30, 1861, Cited +in Littell's <i>Living Age</i>, Vol. 69, p. 379.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_107"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor107">[107]</a> The <i>Times</i>, March 26, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_108"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor108">[108]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, May 11, 1861, pp. +465-6.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_109"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor109">[109]</a> <i>Economist</i>, May 4, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_110"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor110">[110]</a> <i>Examiner</i>, January 5 and (as quoted) +April 27, 1861. Cited in Littell's <i>Living Age</i>, Vol. 68, p. +758 and Vol. 69, p. 570.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_111"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor111">[111]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, April 27, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_112"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor112">[112]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, May 4, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_113"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor113">[113]</a> These four publications, the +<i>Spectator</i>, the <i>Westminster</i>, the <i>Daily News</i>, +and the <i>Morning Star</i>, were the principal British +pro-Northern organs. In addition <i>The Liberator</i> names among +the lesser and provincial press the following: <i>Nonconformist, +British Standard, Dial, Birmingham Post, Manchester Examiner, +Newcastle Chronicle, Caledonian Mercury</i> and <i>Belfast +Whig</i>. Duffus, "English Opinion," p. 40.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_114"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor114">[114]</a> Godkin had joined the staff of the +<i>Daily News</i> in 1853. During the Crimea War he was special war +correspondent. He had travelled extensively in America in the late +'fifties and was thoroughly well informed. From 1862 to 1865 his +letters to the <i>Daily News</i> were of great value in encouraging +the British friends of the North. In 1865 Godkin became editor of +the New York <i>Nation</i>.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_115"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor115">[115]</a> W.E. Forster said of her, "It was Harriet +Martineau alone who was keeping English opinion about America on +the right side through the Press." The <i>Daily News</i> Jubilee +Edition, p. 46.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_116"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor116">[116]</a> James, <i>William Wetmore Story and His +Friends</i>, Vol. II, p. 92.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_117"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor117">[117]</a> Moncure D. Conway's <i>Autobiography</i> +asserts that two-thirds of the English authors "espoused the Union +cause, some of them actively--Professor Newman, Mill, Tom Hughes, +Sir Charles Lyell, Huxley, Tyndall, Swinburne, Lord Houghton, +Cairns, Fawcett, Frederic Harrison, Leslie Stephen, Allingham, the +Rossettis," Vol. I, p. 406. This is probably true of ultimate, +though not of initial, interest and attitude. But for many writers +their published works give no clue to their opinions on the Civil +War--as for example the works of Dickens, Thackeray, William +Morris, or Ruskin. See Duffus, "English Opinion," p. +103.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_118"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor118">[118]</a> Russell, <i>My Diary</i>, I, p. +398.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_119"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor119">[119]</a> The <i>Times</i>, May 30, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_120"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor120">[120]</a> <i>Westminster Review</i>, Vol. 76, pp. +487-509, October, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_121"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor121">[121]</a> Bright to Sumner, September 6, 1861. Cited +in Rhodes, <i>United States</i>, Vol. III, p. 509.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_122"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor122">[122]</a> A meeting held in Edinburgh, May 9, 1861, +declared that anti-slavery England ought never to recognize the +South. Reported in <i>Liberator</i>, May 31, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_123"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor123">[123]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 762, Nos. 141 and +142.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_124"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor124">[124]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 146.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_125"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor125">[125]</a> See <i>ante</i>, pp. 50-51.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_126"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor126">[126]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States." Nos. 24, 25 and 26.</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76"></a>[V1:pg 76]</span> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III</h2> +<h3>THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY, MAY, 1861</h3> +<br> +<p>In June, 1859, a short-lived Conservative Government under the +leadership of Lord Derby had been replaced by a "coalition" Liberal +Government, at the head of which stood Palmerston, but so +constituted that almost equal influence was attributed to the +Foreign Secretary, Lord John Russell. Both men had previously held +the Premiership, and, as they represented different wings of the +Whig-Liberal party, it was prophesied by political wiseacres that +personal friction would soon lead to a new disruption. Nor were the +possible elements of discord confined to these two. Gladstone, +formerly a Peelite Tory, and for a time uncertain whether to return +to the Tory fold or to join the Liberals, had yielded to +Palmerston's promise of a free hand in financial matters, and had +joined the Ministry as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Opposed to him +in a certain sense, as the rival claimant for political leadership +among the younger group, was Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Home +Secretary until July, 1861, thereafter until his death in April, +1863, Secretary for War. Acting in some degree as intermediary and +conciliator between these divergent interests stood Lord Granville, +President of Council, then a "Conservative-Liberal," especially +valuable to the Cabinet for the confidence reposed in him by Queen +Victoria and Prince Albert.</p> +<p>In 1861 Palmerston was seventy-seven years old. Long before this +he had built his popularity upon a vigorous British "patriotism," +assertive of England's honour and <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_77"></a>[V1:pg 77]</span> jealous for British advantage. Now, +however, as head of a Government requiring the most delicate +handling to maintain itself, he devoted his energies to details of +political management in which he had great skill. His ambition was, +primarily, to retain office, and in this purpose he was fortunate +because, unknown to his ministerial colleagues, he had received an +indirect pledge from Lord Derby, the Opposition leader, that there +would be, for a time at least, no determined effort to unseat him +so long as his Ministry brought forward no Bill for a further +expansion of the franchise. In the unwillingness to make any +further adventure toward an expanded democracy Palmerston was +wholly at one with Derby. Of like opinion, though less strongly so, +was Russell, whose popular nickname, "Finality John," gained by his +assertion that the Reform Bill of 1832 was England's last step +toward democracy, sufficiently indicates his stand on the franchise +question. In fact every member of the Cabinet belonged to the +"Conservative-Liberal" group, though with shades of political +faith, and none were really Liberals--far less Radicals. The +outspoken Radicals in Parliament, like John Bright, and his friend +Cobden, who had refused to take office under Palmerston, gave a +lukewarm support to the Ministry, but would not pledge themselves +to steadfast adherence. They had hopes of Gladstone, believed that +he would ultimately come into their group, but meanwhile watched +with anxiety his delighted immersion, as indeed Palmerston desired +it, in the details of financial management to the exclusion of +other questions.</p> +<p>The matter of ministerial and general British attitude toward +democracy as affecting British policy during the American Civil War +will be considered in a later chapter. In the spring of 1861 it had +not become a clear-cut British opinion and did not, so far as +historical evidence can determine, affect early governmental policy +toward America. <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78"></a>[V1:pg +78]</span> The outstanding feature of the British Government in +1861 is that it was made up of various so-called "Liberal" +elements, the representatives of each of which carried on the +business of his own department much as he pleased. Palmerston's +was, of course, the deciding opinion, whenever he cared to express +it, but this he did but rarely. His great concern was to keep his +all-star associates running smoothly together and thus to give no +occasion for parliamentary criticism and attack. It followed that +Russell, eight years the junior of Palmerston, was in foreign +affairs more powerful and independent than is customary. Indeed the +Government was at times spoken of as the "Palmerston-Russell +Ministry." These two were the leaders of the team; next came +Gladstone and Cornewall Lewis, rivals of the younger generation, +and each eager to lead when their elders should retire from +harness. Gladstone's great ability was already recognized, but his +personal political faith was not yet clear. Lewis, lacking his +rival's magnetic and emotional qualities, cold, scholarly, and +accurate in performance, was regarded as a statesman of high +promise<a name="FNanchor127"></a><a href="#Footnote_127">[127]</a>. +Other Cabinet members, as is the custom of coalitions, were more +free in opinion and action than in a strict party ministry where +one dominating personality imposes his will upon his +colleagues.</p> +<p>Lord John Russell, then, in foreign policy, was more than the +main voice of the Government; rather, save in times of extreme +crisis, governmental foreign policy was Russell's policy. This was +even more true as regards American than European affairs, for the +former were little understood, and dependence was necessarily +placed upon the man whose business it was to be familiar with them. +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79"></a>[V1:pg 79]</span> +Indeed there was little actual parliamentary or governmental +interest, before midsummer of 1861, in the American question, +attention in foreign affairs being directed toward Italian +expansion, to the difficulties related to the control of the Ionian +islands, and to the developing Danish troubles in +Schleswig-Holstein. Neither did the opposition party venture to +express a policy as regards America. Lord Derby, able but indolent, +occasionally indulged in caustic criticism, but made no attempt to +push his attack home. Malmesbury, his former Foreign Secretary, was +active and alert in French affairs, but gave no thought to +relations across the Atlantic<a name="FNanchor128"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_128">[128]</a>. Disraeli, Tory leader in the Commons, +skilfully led a strong minority in attacks on the Government's +policy, but never on the American question, though frequently urged +to do so by the friends of the South. In short for the first year +of the Civil War, 1861, the policy of Great Britain toward America +was the policy of Lord John Russell, unhampered by friend or +foe.</p> +<p>This being the case, what did Russell know about the American +crisis? Briefly, no more than has already been stated as derived +from the reports of British officials in the United States, and +from the pages of the public press. The salient facts known to +Russell were few. Lincoln's Cabinet had been named. Lincoln himself +was absolutely an unknown quantity, but it was unbelievable that a +man of his origins and history could be more than a mere +figurehead--an opinion then held as widely in America as in +England. But someone must determine American policy, and by +universal consent, this would be Seward.</p> +<p>The new Secretary of State was at the moment better known in +England than any other American statesman, with the possible +exception of Charles Sumner, whose visits and personal contacts had +established a circle of British <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_80"></a>[V1:pg 80]</span> friendships. Both men were accepted +as champions of anti-slavery, Sumner for his vigorous denunciations +and his so-called "martyrdom" under the physical violence of the +South Carolinan, Brooks; and Seward for his clever political +anti-Southern leadership in the United States Senate. But Seward's +reputation in this respect was offset by the belief that he was +anti-British in his personal sentiments, or at least that he was +very ready to arouse for political ends the customary anti-British +sentiment of his Irish constituents in the State of New York. In +1860, on the occasion of the visit to the United States of the +Prince of Wales, Seward is alleged to have stated to the Duke of +Newcastle that in case he became Secretary of State it would then +"become my duty to insult England, and I mean to do so"--a threat, +whether jocose or not, that aroused much serious and anxious +speculation in British governmental circles<a name= +"FNanchor129"></a><a href="#Footnote_129">[129]</a>. Moreover +Seward's reputation was that of a wily, clever politician, rather +unscrupulous in methods which British politicians professed to +disdain--a reputation serving to dim somewhat, as indeed it did in +America also, the sincere idealisms and patriotism of the +statesman. Altogether, Seward was regarded in Great Britain as a +rather dangerous man, yet as the inevitable guiding power in the +new Republican administration.</p> +<p>This estimate was shared by many in the United States also, but +not by all. The new American Minister to London, Charles Francis +Adams, himself a most stiffly upright politician, both regarded +Seward as the only possible leader of Republican party policy and +rejoiced that this was so, having great confidence in his chief's +integrity and wisdom. Adams himself was well suited to his new +post. He was known as having early in 1849 fought the battle of +anti-slavery as a "Free Soil Whig," and later as a leading +Republican member of Congress from Massachusetts. <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_81"></a>[V1:pg 81]</span> Principally, +however, he was suited to his post by education, family, and +character. He had been taken as a boy to Russia during his father's +ministry at St. Petersburg, and later had been educated in England. +His father and grandfather, John Quincy Adams and John Adams, both +Presidents of the United States, had both, also, been American +Ministers at London. Intensely patriotic, but having wide +acquaintance through training and study with European affairs, +especially those of Britain, and equipped with high intellectual +gifts, Adams was still further fitted to his new post by his power +of cool judgment and careful expression in critical times. His very +coolness, sometimes appearing as coldness and stiff dignity, +rendered him an especially fit agent to deal with Russell, a man of +very similar characteristics. The two men quickly learned to +respect and esteem each other, whatever clash arose in national +policies.</p> +<p>But meanwhile Adams, in April, 1861, was not yet arrived in +London. The Southern Government organized at Montgomery, Alabama, +but soon transferred to Richmond, Virginia, was headed by Jefferson +Davis as President and Alexander Stephens as Vice-President. +Neither man was well known in England, though both had long been +prominent in American politics. The little British information on +Davis, that he had served in the United States Senate and as a +Cabinet member, seemed to indicate that he was better fitted to +executive duties than his rival, Lincoln. But Davis' foreign policy +was wholly a matter for speculation, and his Cabinet consisted of +men absolutely unknown to British statesmen. In truth it was not a +Cabinet of distinction, for it was the misfortune of the South that +everywhere, as the Civil War developed, Southern gentlemen sought +reputation and glory in the army rather than in political position. +Nor did President Davis himself ever fully grasp the importance to +the South of a <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82"></a>[V1:pg +82]</span> well-considered and energetic foreign policy. At first, +indeed, home controversy compelled anxious attention to the +exclusion of other matters. Until war cemented Southern patriotism, +Davis, himself regarded as an extremist, felt it necessary in +denial of an asserted unreasonableness of personal attitude, to +appoint to office men known for their earlier moderate opinions on +both slavery and secession<a name="FNanchor130"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_130">[130]</a>. "The single exception to this general +policy<a name="FNanchor131"></a><a href="#Footnote_131">[131]</a>" +was the appointment as agents to Europe of Yancey, Rost and Mann, +all of them extreme pro-slavery men and eager secessionists. Of +these Mann was the only one with any previous diplomatic +experience. Yancey's choice was particularly inappropriate, for he +at least was known abroad as the extreme fire-eating Southern +orator, demanding for ten years past, that Southern action in +defence of states rights and Southern "interests," which now, at +last, the South was attempting<a name="FNanchor132"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_132">[132]</a>.</p> +<p>Yancey and Rost, starting on their journey on March 16, reached +London on April 29<a name="FNanchor133"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_133">[133]</a>. Meanwhile in this same month of April, +conditions in America, so long confused and uncertain, were being +rapidly clarified. The South, earlier than the North, had come to a +determined policy, for while during January and February, at the +Montgomery convention, there had been uncertainty as to actively +applying the doctrinaire right of secession, by March the party of +action had triumphed, and though there was still talk of +conferences with the North, and commissioners actually appointed, +no real expectation existed of a favourable result. In the North, +the determination of policy was more slowly developed. Lincoln was +not inaugurated <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83"></a>[V1:pg +83]</span> until March 4, and no positive pronouncement was earlier +possible. Even after that date uncertainty still prevailed. +European correspondents were reporting men like Sumner as willing +to let the South go in peace. The Mayor of New York City was +discussing the advisability of a separate secession by that +financial centre from Nation and State alike--and of setting up as +a "free town." Seward, just appointed Secretary of State, was +repudiating in both official and private talk any intention to +coerce the South by force of arms<a name="FNanchor134"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_134">[134]</a>. It is no wonder that British statesmen +were largely at sea over the American situation.</p> +<p>But on April 13, 1861, the Stars and Stripes floating over Fort +Sumter in Charleston harbour was lowered in surrender of a Federal +fortress under the armed attack of the newly-born Confederacy. That +event drove away as by magic the uncertainty of the North, and +removed the last vestiges of Southern doubt. A great wave of +militant patriotism swept over both sections<a name= +"FNanchor135"></a><a href="#Footnote_135">[135]</a>. Hurriedly both +North and South prepared for war, issuing calls for volunteers and +organizing in all accustomed warlike preparations. The news of +Sumter reached London on April 27, and that civil war seemed +certain was known on April 29. On April 17, Davis, since the South +lacked a navy, approved a proclamation offering to issue letters of +marque and reprisal. On April 19 Lincoln proclaimed a Northern +intention to treat as pirates any privateers acting under such +letters, and also gave notice of a blockade of Southern ports, to +be instituted later. Thus suddenly, so it seemed to British +officials and public after the long delay and uncertainty of +months, events in America had precipitated a state of war, though +in fact there were still to elapse other months in which both North +and South laboured to transform <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_84"></a>[V1:pg 84]</span> a peaceful society into one capable +of waging effective battle.</p> +<p>The result of this sudden change in the American horizon was to +alter, almost as quickly, the previous delay in outlining a British +policy, though, presumably, the British Government, while waiting +the turn of events, had given careful consideration to the steps +required of it in just such a situation as had now arisen. +Certainly both Lyons and Russell had been deeply anxious for some +time, and had visualized a proper British policy. The movement in +Great Britain now became rapid. On April 29, Malmesbury, in the +Lords, spoke of the news of civil war which had arrived "this +morning," and asked if the Government had tried to prevent it, or +had set on foot negotiations with other powers to check it. +Wodehouse, replying for the Government, stated that the United +States as an independent State would have resented any suggestions +from Great Britain, and that Lyons had been instructed to be +extremely careful about offering advice unless "asked for by the +contending parties themselves." Both speakers commented on the +"ties of blood" rendering Britain especially anxious in this +American quarrel, and regretted the conflict<a name= +"FNanchor136"></a><a href="#Footnote_136">[136]</a>. Malmesbury's +query as to the approach to another government, meaning France, was +evaded. That some such approach, in accordance with the earlier +advice of Lyons<a name="FNanchor137"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_137">[137]</a>, had already been made, is evident from +the fact that three days later, on May 1, Dallas learned from +Russell of the plan of joint action with France, though what that +action would be was not made clear<a name= +"FNanchor138"></a><a href="#Footnote_138">[138]</a>. As Dallas' +report was soon the basis of an American complaint shortly to be +considered, the paragraph referring to this matter is +important:</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85"></a>[V1:pg 85]</span> +<blockquote>"The solicitude felt by Lord John Russell as to the +effect of certain measures represented as likely to be adopted by +the President induced him to request me to call at his private +residence yesterday. I did so. He told me that the three +representatives of the Southern confederacy were here<a name= +"FNanchor139"></a><a href="#Footnote_139">[139]</a>; that he had +not seen them, but was not unwilling to do so, <i>unofficially</i>; +that there existed an understanding between this government and +that of France which would lead both to take the same course as to +recognition, whatever that course might be; and he then referred to +the rumour of a meditated blockade of Southern ports and their +discontinuance as ports of entry--topics on which I had heard +nothing. But as I informed him that Mr. Adams had apprised me of +his intention to be on his way hither, in the steamship 'Niagara,' +which left Boston on the 1st May, and that he would probably arrive +in less than two weeks, by the 12th or 15th instant, his lordship +acquiesced in the expediency of disregarding mere rumour, and +waiting the full knowledge to be brought by my successor. The +motion, therefore, of Mr. Gregory may be further postponed, at his +lordship's suggestion."</blockquote> +<p>May 3rd, Russell held an unofficial interview with the two +Southern commissioners in fact arrived, Yancey and Rost. As +reported by them<a name="FNanchor140"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_140">[140]</a>, Russell listened with attention to their +representation, but made no informing comment. They argued the +constitutional right of secession, depicted the firm determination +of the South, were confident of early acquiescence by the North, +and especially laid stress on the Southern desire for free trade. +Russell's own report to Lyons on this interview and on one held six +days later, May 9, is in substantial agreement, but much more is +made by him than by the Commissioners of a question put by Russell +as to a Southern plan of reviving the African slave-trade<a name= +"FNanchor141"></a><a href="#Footnote_141">[141]</a>. <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_86"></a>[V1:pg 86]</span> Yancey and Rost +denied this and asserted "that they had prohibited the slave-trade, +and did not mean to revive it." Their report to Richmond does not +depict this matter as of special significance in the interview; +Russell's report to Lyons lays stress upon it. The general result +of the interview was that Russell listened, but refused, as to +Dallas, to make any pledge on recognition. But the Southern +Commissioners came away with a feeling of confidence and were +content to wait on British action<a name="FNanchor142"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_142">[142]</a>.</p> +<p>On this same day, May 3, Russell received from the +Attorney-General a memorandum in reply to a query as to recognizing +the belligerency of the South and as to the right of the South to +issue letters of marque and reprisal. The memorandum notes that +Southern privateering would be dangerous to British commerce with +the North, but sees no help for it. "The best solution," wrote the +Attorney-General, "would be for the European nations to determine +that the war between the two Confederacies shall be carried on on +the principles of 'Justum Bellum,' and shall be conducted according +to the rules of the Treaty of Paris. Recognize the Southern States +as a Belligerent on this condition only<a name= +"FNanchor143"></a><a href="#Footnote_143">[143]</a>." The next day, +referring to this memorandum, Russell wrote Lyons that the law +officers "are of opinion that we must consider the Civil War in +America as regular war<a name="FNanchor144"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_144">[144]</a>," but he does <i>not</i> comment on the +legal advice to press the South to abandon privateering before +recognizing her belligerent rights, for this is the only meaning +that can be attached to the last sentence quoted <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_87"></a>[V1:pg 87]</span> from the +Attorney-General's memorandum. This advice, however, in view of the +opinion that there was "no help for it," was presumably but a +suggestion as to a possible diplomatic manoeuvre with little +confidence that it would succeed. The "best solution" was not the +probable one, for the South, without a navy, would not readily +yield its only naval weapon.</p> +<p>In these few days British policy was rapidly matured and +announced. The letter of May 4 to Lyons, stating the Civil War to +be a "regular war" was followed on May 6 by a formal instruction +giving Lyons advance notice of the determination reached by the +Cabinet to recognize the belligerent rights of the South. Russell +indulged in many expressions of regret and sympathy, but Lyons was +not to conceal that this British action represented the +Government's view of the actualities of the American situation. Yet +while Lyons was not to conceal this opinion he was not instructed +to notify Seward, officially, of the recognition of Southern +belligerency<a name="FNanchor145"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_145">[145]</a>. Here was a correct understanding of the +difficulty of the diplomatic position at Washington, and a +permitted avoidance by Lyons of dangerous ground<a name= +"FNanchor146"></a><a href="#Footnote_146">[146]</a>. Russell was +not then aware of the tenacity with which Seward was to cling to a +theory, not yet clearly formulated for foreign governments, that +the Civil War was a rebellion of peoples rather than a conflict of +governments, but he does appear to have understood the delicacy of +formal notification to the constituted government at +Washington<a name="FNanchor147"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_147">[147]</a>. Moreover his instructions were in line +with the British policy of refusing, at present, a recognition of +Southern sovereignty.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88"></a>[V1:pg 88]</span> +<p>On the same day, May 6, a copy of the instructions to Lyons was +sent to Cowley, British Ambassador at Paris, directing him to +request France to join, promptly, in recognizing Southern +belligerent rights. Cowley was also instructed that the blockade +and privateering required precautions by European governments, and +it was suggested that France and England unite in requesting both +belligerents to accede to the second and third articles of the +Declaration of Paris<a name="FNanchor148"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_148">[148]</a>. These articles refer to the exemption +from capture, except contraband, of enemy's goods under a neutral +flag, and of neutral goods under an enemy's flag<a name= +"FNanchor149"></a><a href="#Footnote_149">[149]</a>. This day, +also, Russell stated in Parliament that England was about to +recognize the belligerent rights of the South, and spoke of the +measure as a necessary and inevitable one. May 7, Cowley notified +Russell that Thouvenel, the French Foreign Minister, was in +complete agreement with England's policy<a name= +"FNanchor150"></a><a href="#Footnote_150">[150]</a>, and on May 9, +in a more extended communication, Cowley sent word of Thouvenel's +suggestion that both powers issue a declaration that they "intended +to abstain from all interference," and that M. de Flahault, French +Ambassador at London, had <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_89"></a>[V1:pg 89]</span> been given instructions to act in +close harmony with Russell<a name="FNanchor151"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_151">[151]</a>.</p> +<p>The rapidity of movement in formulating policy in the six days +from May 1 to May 6, seems to have taken the British public and +press somewhat by surprise, for there is a lack of newspaper +comment even after Russell's parliamentary announcement of policy +on the last-named date. But on May 9 the <i>Times</i> set the +fashion of general approval in an editorial stating that Great +Britain was now coming to see the American conflict in a new +light--as a conflict where there were in fact no such ideals +involved as had been earlier attributed to it. Southern rights were +now more clearly understood, and in any case since war, though +greatly to be regretted, was now at hand, it was England's business +to keep strictly out of it and to maintain neutrality<a name= +"FNanchor152"></a><a href="#Footnote_152">[152]</a>. This +generalization was no doubt satisfactory to the public, but in the +Government and in Parliament men who were thinking seriously of +specific difficulties realized that the two main problems +immediately confronting a British neutral policy were privateering +and blockade. The South had declared its <i>intention</i> to use +privateers. The North had declared its <i>intention</i>, first to +hang those who engaged in privateering, and second to establish a +blockade. Neither declaration had as yet been put into effect.</p> +<p>The first action of the British Government was directed toward +privateering. On May 1, Russell sent a note to the Lords +Commissioners of the Admiralty calling attention to the Southern +plan to issue letters of marque and reprisal and directing that +reinforcements be sent to the British fleet in American waters. +This was prompt action on unofficial information, for Davis' +proclamation bore date of April 17, and Lyons' despatch containing +copies of it, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90"></a>[V1:pg +90]</span> sent on April 22, was not received by Russell until May +10<a name="FNanchor153"></a><a href="#Footnote_153">[153]</a>. +Ordinary news from the United States required ten days to get into +print in London<a name="FNanchor154"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_154">[154]</a>, but official messages might be sent more +rapidly by way of telegraph to Halifax, thence by steamer to +Liverpool and by telegraph again to London. In case the telegram to +Halifax coincided with the departure of a fast vessel the time was +occasionally reduced to seven days, but never less. At the best the +exact information as to the contents of the Davis and Lincoln +proclamations of April 17 and 19 respectively, could have been +received only a few days before the order was issued to reinforce +the British fleet.</p> +<br> +<a name="image03.jpg"></a> +<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image03.jpg"><img src= +"images/image03.jpg" width="50%" alt=""></a><br> +<i>Photo: F. Hollyer</i>.<br> +<b>SIR WILLIAM GREGORY, K.C.M.G.</b><br> +(<i>From Lady Gregory's "Sir William Gregory, K.C.M.G.: An +Autobiography," by kind permission</i>)</p> +<br> +<p>The next day, May 2, Ewart, in the Commons, asked "if Privateers +sailing under the flag of an unrecognized Power will be dealt with +as Pirates," thus showing the immediate parliamentary concern at +the Davis and Lincoln proclamations. Russell stated in reply that a +British fleet had been sent to protect British interests and took +occasion to indicate British policy by adding, "we have not been +involved in any way in that contest by any act or giving any advice +in the matter, and, for God's sake, let us if possible keep out of +it<a name="FNanchor155"></a><a href="#Footnote_155">[155]</a>." May +6, Gregory, a friend of the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_91"></a>[V1:pg 91]</span> South, who had already given notice +of a motion for the recognition of the Confederacy as an +independent State, asked whether the United States had been +informed that a blockade of Southern ports would not be recognized +unless effective, and whether there would be acquiescence in the +belligerent right of the South to issue letters of marque and +reprisal<a name="FNanchor156"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_156">[156]</a>. Russell replied that Lincoln had +<i>not</i> been informed that a blockade must be effective to be +respected since the Washington Government did not need to be told +of an international rule which it had itself long proclaimed. As to +the second point, he now announced what heretofore had not been +clearly stated, that Southern privateers could not be regarded by +Great Britain as pirates, for if so regarded Britain would herself +have to treat them as pirates and would thus be unneutral. This was +in fact, in spite of Northern bitter accusations that Britain was +exhibiting governmental sympathy with the South by her tolerance of +the plan of Southern privateering, an inescapable conclusion. +Russell added, however, that the matter of privateering involved +some new questions under the Declaration of Paris upon which the +Government had not yet decided what stand to take<a name= +"FNanchor157"></a><a href="#Footnote_157">[157]</a>. It was on this +same day, in fact, that Russell had instructed Cowley to take up +with France the question of the Declaration of Paris<a name= +"FNanchor158"></a><a href="#Footnote_158">[158]</a>, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_92"></a>[V1:pg 92]</span> Privateering and +blockade, declared in America months before there was any +possibility of putting them into effect, and months before there +were any military operations in the field, forced this rapid +European action, especially the action of Great Britain, which, +more than any other European nation, feared belligerent +interference with her carrying and export trade. How was the +British Government to know that Davis would not bend every energy +in sending out privateers, and Lincoln to establish a blockade? The +respective declarations of Davis and Lincoln were the <i>first</i> +evidences offered of belligerent status. It was reasonable to +assume that here would come the first energetic efforts of the +belligerents. Nor was British governmental intelligence +sufficiently informed to be aware that Davis, in fact, controlled +few ships that could be fitted out as privateers, or that +two-thirds of the Northern navy was at the moment widely scattered +in foreign seas, making impossible a prompt blockade.</p> +<p>To the British view the immediate danger to its commercial +interests lay in this announced maritime war, and it felt the +necessity of defining its neutral position with speed. The +underlying fact of the fixity of Southern <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_93"></a>[V1:pg 93]</span> determination to +maintain secession had in the last few weeks become clearly +recognized.</p> +<p>Moreover the latest information sent by British officials in +America, some of it received just before the issue of the +Proclamation of Neutrality, some just after, was all confirmative +of the rapid approach of a great war. A letter from Bunch, at +Charleston, was received on May 10, depicting the united Southern +will to resist Northern attack, and asserting that the South had no +purpose save to conduct a strictly defensive war. Bunch was no +longer caustic; he now felt that a new nation was in process of +birth<a name="FNanchor159"></a><a href="#Footnote_159">[159]</a>. +May 4, Monson, writing from Washington, and just returned from a +trip through the South, in the course of which he had visited +Montgomery, stated "<i>no reconstruction</i> of the Union is +possible," and added that there was no danger of a servile +insurrection, a matter that now somewhat began to disturb the +British Government and public<a name="FNanchor160"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_160">[160]</a>. A few days later on, May 12, Lyons +expressed his strong sympathy with the North for reasons of +anti-slavery, law, and race, but added that he shrank from +expressions of sympathy for fear of thus encouraging the Northern +Cabinet in its plan of prosecuting civil war since such a war would +be frightful in its consequences both to America and to +England<a name="FNanchor161"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_161">[161]</a>.</p> +<p>Such reports if received before the issue of the Proclamation +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94"></a>[V1:pg 94]</span> of +Neutrality must have strengthened the feeling that prompt action +was necessary; if received later, they gave confidence that that +action had been wise. May 9, Forster asked in the Commons a series +of questions as to the application of the British Foreign +Enlistment Act in the American crisis. What would be the status of +British citizens serving on Confederate privateers? How would the +Government treat citizens who aided in equipping such privateers? +Did not the Government intend to take measures to prevent the +infringement of law in British ports? Here was pressure by a friend +of the North to hasten an official announcement of the policy +already notified to Parliament. Sir George Lewis replied stating +that the Government was about to issue a general proclamation +warning British subjects not to take any part in the war<a name= +"FNanchor162"></a><a href="#Footnote_162">[162]</a>. Similar +questions were asked by Derby in the Lords on May 10, and received +a similar answer<a name="FNanchor163"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_163">[163]</a>. The few days' delay following Russell's +statement of May 6 was due to consideration given by the Law +Officers to the exact form required. The Proclamation as issued was +dated May 13, and was officially printed in the <i>London +Gazette</i> on May 14.</p> +<p>In form and in substance the Proclamation of Neutrality did not +differ from customary usage<a name="FNanchor164"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_164">[164]</a>. It spoke of the Confederacy as "states +styling themselves the Confederate States of America," prohibited +to Englishmen enlistment on either side, or efforts to enlist +others, or equipment of ships of war, or delivery of commissions to +such ships. War vessels being equipped in British ports would be +seized and forfeited to the British Government. If a belligerent +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95"></a>[V1:pg 95]</span> +war-ship came into a British port, no change or increase of +equipment was to be permitted. If a subject violated the +Proclamation he was both punishable in British courts and forfeited +any claim to British protection. The Parliamentary discussion on +May 16 brought out more clearly and in general unanimity of opinion +the policy of the Government in application of the Proclamation; +the South was definitely recognized as a belligerent, but +recognition of independence was for the future to determine; the +right of the South to send out privateers was regretfully +recognized; such privateers could not be regarded as pirates and +the North would have no right to treat them as such, but if the +North in defiance of international opinion did so treat them, Great +Britain had at least warned its subjects that they, if engaged in +service on a Southern privateer, had no claim to British +protection; a blockade of the South to be respected must be +effective at least to the point where a vessel attempting to pass +through was likely to be captured; the plan of blockading the +entire Southern coast, with its three thousand miles of coast line, +was on the face of it ridiculous--evidence that Members of +Parliament were profoundly ignorant of the physical geography of +the Southern seaboard<a name="FNanchor165"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_165">[165]</a>.</p> +<p>The Parliamentary discussion did not reveal any partiality for +one side in the American quarrel above the other. It turned wholly +on legal questions and their probable application. On May 15 +Russell sent to Lyons the official text of the Proclamation, but +did not instruct him to communicate it officially to Seward, +leaving this rather to Lyons' discretion. This was discretionary in +diplomatic usage since in strict fact the Proclamation was +addressed to British subjects and need not be communicated +officially to the belligerents. In the result the discretion +permitted to Lyons had, an important bearing, for recognition of +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96"></a>[V1:pg 96]</span> +Southern belligerency was opposed to the theory upon which the +Northern Government was attempting to proceed. Lyons did not then, +or later, make official communication to Seward of the +Proclamation<a name="FNanchor166"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_166">[166]</a>. The fact soon appeared that the United +States seriously objected to the Proclamation of Neutrality, +protesting first, its having been issued at all, and, in the second +place, resenting what was considered its "premature" announcement +by a friendly nation. This matter developed so serious a criticism +by both American Government and public, both during and after the +Civil War, that it requires a close examination. Did the British +Government exhibit an unfriendly attitude toward the North by a +"premature" Proclamation of Neutrality?</p> +<p>On May 13 the new American Minister landed at Liverpool, and on +the morning of the fourteenth he was "ready for business" in +London<a name="FNanchor167"></a><a href="#Footnote_167">[167]</a>, +but the interview with Russell arranged for that day by Dallas was +prevented by the illness of Russell's brother, the Duke of +Bedford<a name="FNanchor168"></a><a href="#Footnote_168">[168]</a>. +All that was immediately possible was to make official notification +of arrival and to secure the customary audience with the Queen. +This was promptly arranged, and on May 16 Adams was presented, +Palmerston attending in the enforced absence of Russell. Adams' +first report to Seward was therefore brief, merely noting that +public opinion was "not exactly what we would wish." In this +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97"></a>[V1:pg 97]</span> he +referred to the utterances of the press, particularly those of the +<i>Times</i>, which from day to day and with increasing vigour +sounded the note of strict neutrality in a "non-idealistic" war. On +May 30 the <i>Times</i>, asserting that both parties in America +were bidding for English support, summed up public opinion as +follows:</p> +<blockquote>"We have been told, in fact, by Northern politicians, +that it does not become us to be indifferent, and by Southern +leaders that they are half inclined to become British once more. +Both sides are bidding for us, and both sides have their partisans +over here. On such perilous ground we cannot walk too warily.<br> +<br> +"For our own part, we are free to confess that the march of events +has induced us to regard the dispute as a more commonplace kind of +quarrel than it at first appeared to be. The real motives of the +belligerents, as the truth transpires; appear to be exactly such +motives as have caused wars in all times and countries. They are +essentially selfish motives--that is to say, they are based upon +speculations of national power, territorial aggrandizement, +political advantage, and commercial gain. Neither side can claim +any superiority of principle, or any peculiar purity of +patriotism....<br> +<br> +"We certainly cannot discover in these arguments anything to remove +the case from the common category of national or monarchical +quarrels. The representations of the North might be made word for +word by any autocrat or conqueror desirous of 'rectifying' his +frontier, consolidating his empire, or retaining a disaffected +province in subjection. The manifestos of the South might be put +forth by any State desirous of terminating an unpleasant connexion +or exchanging union for independence....<br> +<br> +"It is just such a question as has been left times out of mind in +this Old World to the decision of the sword. The sword will be the +arbitrator in the New World too; but the event teaches us plainly +enough that Republics and Democracies enjoy no exemption from the +passions and follies of humanity."</blockquote> +<p>Under these impressions Adams presented himself <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_98"></a>[V1:pg 98]</span> on May 18 for his +first interview with Russell<a name="FNanchor169"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_169">[169]</a>. He stated that he had come with the idea +that there was</p> +<blockquote>".... little to do beyond the duty of preserving the +relations actually existing between the two nations from the risk +of being unfavourably affected by the unfortunate domestic +disturbances prevailing in my own country. It was not without pain +that I was compelled to admit that from the day of my arrival I had +felt in the proceedings of both houses of Parliament, in the +language of Her Majesty's ministers, and in the tone of opinion +prevailing in private circles, more of uncertainty about this than +I had before thought possible,"</blockquote> +<p>Adams then inquired whether the replies given by Russell to +Dallas refusing to indicate a policy as to recognition of the South +implied a British purpose "to adopt a policy which would have the +effect to widen, if not to make irreparable, a breach [between +North and South] which we believed yet to be entirely manageable by +ourselves."</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99"></a>[V1:pg 99]</span> +<p>Russell here replied that "there was no such intention"; he had +simply meant to say to Dallas that the British Government "were not +disposed in any way to interfere." To this Adams answered that:</p> +<blockquote>".... it was deserving of grave consideration whether +great caution was not to be used in adopting any course that might, +even in the most indirect way, have an effect to encourage the +hopes of the disaffected in America.... It was in this view that I +must be permitted to express the great regret I had felt on +learning the decision to issue the Queen's proclamation, which at +once raised the insurgents to the level of a belligerent State, and +still more the language used in regard to it by Her Majesty's +ministers in both houses of Parliament before and since. Whatever +might be the design, there could be no shadow of doubt that the +effect of these events had been to encourage the friends of the +disaffected here. The tone of the press and of private opinion +indicated it strongly."</blockquote> +<p>Russell's answer was that Adams was placing more stress on +recent events than they deserved. The Government had taken the +advice of the Law Officers and as a result had concluded that "as a +question merely of <i>fact</i>, a war existed.... Under such +circumstances</p> +<blockquote>it seemed scarcely possible to avoid speaking of this +in the technical sense as <i>justum bellum</i>, that is, a war of +two sides, without in any way implying an opinion of its justice, +as well as to withhold an endeavour, so far as possible, to bring +the management of it within the rules of modern civilized warfare. +This was all that was contemplated by the Queen's proclamation. It +was designed to show the purport of existing laws, and to explain +to British subjects their liabilities in case they should engage in +the war."</blockquote> +<p>To this Adams answered "... that under other circumstances</p> +<blockquote>I should be very ready to give my cheerful assent to +this view of his lordship's. But I must be permitted frankly to +remark that the action taken seemed, at least to my mind, a little +more rapid than was absolutely called for by the occasion.... And +furthermore, it pronounced the insurgents to be a belligerent State +before they had ever shown their capacity to maintain any kind of +warfare whatever, except within one of their own harbours, and +under every possible advantage. It considered them a marine power +before they had ever exhibited a single privateer on the ocean.... +The rule was very clear, that whenever it became apparent that any +organized form of society had advanced so far as to prove its power +to defend and protect itself against the assaults of enemies, and +at the same time to manifest a capacity to maintain binding +relations with foreign nations, then a measure of recognition could +not be justly objected to on any side. The case was very different +when such an interference should take place, prior to the +establishment of the proof required, as to bring about a result +which would not probably have happened but for that external +agency."</blockquote> +<p>This representation by the American Minister, thus <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_100"></a>[V1:pg 100]</span> early made, +contains the whole argument advanced against the British +Proclamation of Neutrality, though there were many similar +representations made at greater length both by Adams later, and by +Seward at Washington. They are all well summarized by Bernard as "a +rejection ... of the proposition that the existence of war is a +simple matter of fact, to be ascertained as other facts are--and an +assertion ... of the dogma that there can be no war, so far as +foreign nations are concerned, and, therefore, no neutrality, so +long as there is a sovereignty <i>de jure</i><a name= +"FNanchor170"></a><a href="#Footnote_170">[170]</a>." But in this +first representation Adams, in the main, laid stress upon the +<i>haste</i> with which the Proclamation of Neutrality had been +issued, and, by inference, upon the evidence that British +sympathies were with the South.</p> +<p>One British journal was, indeed, at this very moment voicing +exactly those opinions advanced by Adams. The <i>Spectator</i> +declared that while the Proclamation, on the face of it, appeared +to be one of strict neutrality, it in reality tended "directly to +the benefit of the South<a name="FNanchor171"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_171">[171]</a>." A fortnight later this paper asserted, +"The quarrel, cover it with cotton as we may, is between freedom +and slavery, right and wrong, the dominion of God and the dominion +of the Devil, and the duty of England, we submit, is clear." She +should, even though forced to declare her neutrality, refuse for +all time to recognize the slave-holding Confederacy<a name= +"FNanchor172"></a><a href="#Footnote_172">[172]</a>. But the +<i>Spectator</i> stood nearly alone in this view. The <i>Saturday +Review</i> defended in every respect the issue of the Proclamation +and added, "In a short time, it will be necessary further to +recognize the legitimacy of the Southern Government; but the United +States have a right to require that the acknowledgment shall be +postponed until the failure of the effort <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_101"></a>[V1:pg 101]</span> which they +assert or believe that they are about to make has resulted in an +experimental proof that subjugation is impossible<a name= +"FNanchor173"></a><a href="#Footnote_173">[173]</a>." A few +provincial papers supported the view of the <i>Spectator</i>, but +they were of minor importance, and generally the press heartily +approved the Proclamation.</p> +<p>At the time of Adams' interview with Russell on May 18 he has +just received an instruction from Seward written under the +impression aroused by Dallas' report of Russell's refusal on April +8 to make any pledge as to British policy on the recognition of +Southern independence. Seward was very much disturbed by what +Russell had said to Dallas. In this instruction, dated April +27<a name="FNanchor174"></a><a href="#Footnote_174">[174]</a>, he +wrote:</p> +<blockquote>"When you shall have read the instructions at large +which have been sent to you, you will hardly need to be told that +these last remarks of his lordship are by no means satisfactory to +this government. Her Britannic Majesty's government is at liberty +to choose whether it will retain the friendship of this government +by refusing all aid and comfort to its enemies, now in flagrant +rebellion against it, as we think the treaties existing between the +two countries require, or whether the government of Her Majesty +will take the precarious benefits of a different course.<br> +<br> +<p>"You will lose no time in making known to Her Britannic +Majesty's Government that the President regards the answer of his +lordship as possibly indicating a policy that this government would +be obliged to deem injurious to its rights and derogating from its +dignity."</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Having promptly carried out these instructions, as he understood +them, Adams soon began to report an improved British attitude, and +especially in the Government, stating that this improvement was +due, in part, to the vigour now being shown by the Northern +Government, in part "to a sense that the preceding action of Her +Majesty's ministers has been construed to mean more than they +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102"></a>[V1:pg 102]</span> +intended by it<a name="FNanchor175"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_175">[175]</a>." But at Washington the American +irritation was not so easily allayed. Lyons was reporting Seward +and, indeed, the whole North, as very angry with the Proclamation +of Neutrality<a name="FNanchor176"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_176">[176]</a>. On June 14, Lyons had a long +conversation with Seward in which the latter stubbornly denied that +the South could possess any belligerent rights. Lyons left the +conference feeling that Seward was trying to divide France and +England on this point, and Lyons was himself somewhat anxious +because France was so long delaying her own Proclamation<a name= +"FNanchor177"></a><a href="#Footnote_177">[177]</a>. To meet the +situation, he and Mercier, the French Minister, went the next day, +June 15, on an official visit to Seward with the intention of +formally presenting the British Proclamation and Thouvenel's +instructions to Mercier to support it<a name= +"FNanchor178"></a><a href="#Footnote_178">[178]</a>. But Seward +"said at once that he could not receive from us a communication +founded on the assumption that</p> +<blockquote>the Southern Rebels were to be regarded as +Belligerents; that this was a determination to which the Cabinet +had come deliberately; that he could not admit that recent events +had in any respect altered the relations between Foreign Powers and +the Southern States; that he would not discuss the question with +us, but that he should give instructions to the United States +Ministers in London and Paris who would thus be enabled to state +the reasons for the course taken by their Government to Your +Lordship and to M. Thouvenel, if you should be desirous to hear +them.... He should not take Official cognizance of the recognition +of the Belligerent Rights of Southern Rebels by Great Britain and +France, unless he should be forced to do so by an Official +communication addressed to the Government of the United States +itself."</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103"></a>[V1:pg 103]</span> +<p>In the result the two Ministers submitted their papers to Seward +"for his own use only." They did not regard the moment well chosen +"to be punctilious." Lyons reported that Seward's language and +demeanour throughout the interview were "calm, friendly, and good +humoured," but the fact remained that the United States had not +been officially notified of the Proclamation of Neutrality, and +that the American Government, sensitive to popular excitement in +the matter and committed to the theory of a rebellion of peoples, +was thus left free to continue argument in London without any +necessity of making formal protest and of taking active steps to +support such protest<a name="FNanchor179"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_179">[179]</a>. The official relation was eased by the +conciliatory acquiescence of Lyons. The public anger of America, +expressed in her newspapers, astonished the British press and, +temporarily, made them more careful in comment on American affairs. +The <i>Times</i> told its readers to keep cool. "It is plain that +the utmost care and circumspection must be used by every man or +party in England to avoid giving offence to either of the two +incensed belligerents<a name="FNanchor180"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_180">[180]</a>." In answer to the Northern outcry at the +lack of British sympathy, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_104"></a>[V1:pg 104]</span> it declared "Neutrality--strict +neutrality--is all that the United States Government can +claim<a name="FNanchor181"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_181">[181]</a>."</p> +<p>While the burden of American criticism was thus directed toward +the British recognition of Southern belligerency, there were two +other matters of great moment to the American view--the attitude of +the British Government toward Southern privateers, and the hearing +given by Russell to the Confederate envoys. On the former, Seward, +on May 21, wrote to Adams: "As to the treatment of privateers in +the insurgent service, you will say that this is a question +exclusively our own. We treat them as pirates. They are our own +citizens, or persons employed by our own citizens, preying on the +commerce of our country. If Great Britain shall choose to recognize +them as lawful belligerents and give them shelter from our pursuit +and punishment, the law of nations affords an adequate and proper +remedy<a name="FNanchor182"></a><a href="#Footnote_182">[182]</a>." +This was threatening language, but was for Adams' own eye, and in +the next sentence of his letter Seward stated that avoidance of +friction on this point was easy, since in 1856 Great Britain had +invited the United States to adhere to the Declaration of Paris +everywhere abolishing privateering, and to this the United States +was now ready to accede.</p> +<p>What Seward really meant to accomplish by this was not made +clear for the question of privateering did not constitute the main +point of his belligerent letter of May 21. In fact the proposed +treatment of privateers as pirates might have resulted in very +serious complications, for though the Proclamation of Neutrality +had warned British subjects that they would forfeit any claim to +protection if they engaged in the conflict, it is obvious that the +hanging as a pirate of a British seaman would have aroused a +national outcry almost certain to have forced the Government into +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105"></a>[V1:pg 105]</span> +protest and action against America. Fortunately the cooler judgment +of the United States soon led to quiet abandonment of the plan of +treating privateers as pirates, while on the other point of giving +"shelter" to Confederate privateers Seward himself received from +Lyons assurance, even before Adams had made a protest, that no such +shelter would be available in British ports<a name= +"FNanchor183"></a><a href="#Footnote_183">[183]</a>.</p> +<p>In this same letter of May 21 Seward, writing of the rumour that +the Southern envoys were to be received by Russell "unofficially," +instructed Adams that he must use efforts to stop this and that: +"You will, in any event, desist from all intercourse whatever, +unofficial as well as official, with the British Government, so +long as it shall continue intercourse of either kind with the +domestic enemies of this country." Here was a positive instruction +as to the American Minister's conduct in a given situation, and a +very serious instruction, nearly equivalent to "taking leave" after +a rupture of diplomatic relations, but the method to be used in +avoiding if possible the necessity of the serious step was left to +Adams' discretion. Well might Adams' comment, when reporting the +outcome, that this was the "most delicate portion of my +task<a name="FNanchor184"></a><a href="#Footnote_184">[184]</a>." +Adams again went over with Russell the suspicion as to British +intentions aroused in America by the Queen's Proclamation, but +added that he had not been able to convince himself of the +existence of an unfriendly design. "But it was not to be disguised +that the fact of the continued stay of the pseudo-commissioners in +this city, and still more the knowledge that they had been admitted +to more or less interviews with his lordship, was calculated to +excite uneasiness. Indeed, it had already given great +dissatisfaction to my <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_106"></a>[V1:pg 106]</span> Government. I added, as +moderately as I could, that in all frankness any further +protraction of this relation could scarcely fail to be viewed by us +as hostile in spirit, and to require some corresponding action +accordingly." Russell replied that both France and England had long +been accustomed to receive such persons unofficially, as in the +case of "Poles, Hungarians, Italians, etc.," to hear what they had +to say. "But this did not imply recognition in their case any more +than in ours. He added that he had seen the gentlemen once some +time ago, and once more some time since; he had no expectation of +seeing them any more<a name="FNanchor185"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_185">[185]</a>."</p> +<p>For the moment, then, a matter which under Seward's instructions +might have brought on a serious crisis was averted by the tact of +Adams and the acquiescence of Russell. Yet no pledge had been +given; Russell merely stated that he had "no expectation" of +further interviews with the Southern commissioners; he was still +ready to hear from them in writing. This caused a division of +opinion between the commissioners; Yancey argued that Russell's +concession to Adams was itself a violation of the neutrality the +British Government had announced, and that it should be met by a +formal protest. But the other members insisted on a reference to +Richmond for instructions<a name="FNanchor186"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_186">[186]</a>. On the same day that Adams reported the +result to Seward he wrote privately to his son in Boston:</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107"></a>[V1:pg 107]</span> +<blockquote>"My position here thus far has not been difficult or +painful. If I had followed the course of some of my colleagues in +the diplomatic line, this country might have been on the high road +to the confederate camp before now. It did not seem to me to be +expedient so to play into the hands of our opponents. Although +there has been and is more or less of sympathy with the +slave-holders in certain circles, they are not so powerful as to +overbear the general sentiment of the people. The ministry has been +placed in rather delicate circumstances, when a small loss of power +on either extreme would have thrown them out<a name= +"FNanchor187"></a><a href="#Footnote_187">[187]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>In Adams' opinion the Liberals were on the whole more friendly, +at least, to the North than were the Conservatives, and he +therefore considered it best not to press too harshly upon the +Government.</p> +<p>But the concluding sentence of this same letter was significant: +"I wait with patience--but as yet I have not gone so far as to +engage a house for more than a month at a time...." He might +himself be inclined to view more leniently the Proclamation of +Neutrality and be able to find excuses for the alleged haste with +which it had been issued, but his instructions required strong +representations, especially on the latter point. Adams' report to +Seward of June 14, just noted, on the interview with Russell of +June 12, after treating of privateering and the Southern +commissioners, turns in greater length to the alleged pledge of +delay given by Russell to Dallas, and to the violation of that +pledge in a hasty issue of the Proclamation. He renews attack on +the line already taken on May 18<a name="FNanchor188"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_188">[188]</a>. From this time on, throughout and after +the war, this criticism was repeatedly made and with increasing +bitterness. British friends of the North joined in the American +outcry. <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108"></a>[V1:pg +108]</span> By mere reiteration it became in the popular mind on +both sides of the Atlantic an accepted and well-founded evidence of +British governmental unfriendliness in May, 1861. At the conclusion +of the Civil War, John Bright in Parliament, commenting on the +causes of American ill-will, declared that the Government of 1861, +knowing that Adams was on his way, should in mere courtesy, have +waited his arrival. Then, said Bright, the Proclamation, entirely +justifiable in itself, might have been issued without offence and +without embittering the United States<a name= +"FNanchor189"></a><a href="#Footnote_189">[189]</a>.</p> +<p>Had in fact a "pledge to wait" been given to Dallas; and was the +Proclamation hasty and premature? Russell always denied he had +given any such pledge, and the text of Dallas' report of the +interview of May 1 would seem to support that denial<a name= +"FNanchor190"></a><a href="#Footnote_190">[190]</a>. On that day +Russell for the second time told Dallas that England would not +commit herself, as yet, as regards Southern recognition, clearly +meaning a recognition of <i>sovereignty</i>, not of belligerency, +and immediately asked Dallas what the rumours of a blockade meant. +Dallas replied that he had no information on this point, and +Russell "acquiesced in the expediency of disregarding mere rumour, +and waiting the full knowledge to be brought by my successor. The +motion, therefore, of Mr. Gregory may be further postponed, at his +lordship's suggestion."</p> +<p>The unprejudiced interpretation of this report is merely that +Russell refrained from pressing Dallas about a matter--blockade--of +which Dallas knew nothing, agreeing that this would be explained by +Adams, and especially that he let Dallas understand that Gregory's +motion, which was one for <i>recognizing the independence and +sovereignty of the South</i>, would be postponed. If there was a +pledge here it was a pledge not to recognize Southern sovereignty +until after Adams' arrival.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109"></a>[V1:pg 109]</span> +<p>But even if there was no promise of delay "there can be no +question," writes the son of Adams in a brief biography of his +father, "that the proclamation of the 13th was issued with unseemly +haste.... The purpose was manifest. It was to have the status of +the Confederacy as a belligerent an accomplished fact before the +arrival of the newly accredited minister. This precipitate action +was chiefly significant as indicating an animus; that animus being +really based on ... the belief, already matured into a conviction, +that the full recognition of the Confederacy as an independent +power was merely a question of time, and probably of a very short +time<a name="FNanchor191"></a><a href="#Footnote_191">[191]</a>." +The author does not, however, support the contemporary American +contention that <i>any</i> Proclamation was contrary to +international custom and that no recognition of belligerent status +was permissible to neutrals until the "insurgents" had forced the +mother country itself to recognize the division as fully +accomplished, even while war still continued. Indeed American +practice was flatly contradictory of the argument, as in the very +pertinent example of the petty Canadian rebellion of 1837, when +President Van Buren had promptly issued a proclamation of +neutrality. It is curious that in his several replies to Seward's +complaints Russell did not quote a letter from Stevenson, the +American Minister to London, addressed to Palmerston, May 22, 1838. +Stevenson was demanding disavowal and disapproval of the "Caroline" +affair, and incidentally he asserted as an incontrovertible +principle "that civil wars are not distinguished from other wars, +as to belligerent and neutral rights; that they stand upon the same +ground, and are governed by the same principles; that whenever +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110"></a>[V1:pg 110]</span> a +portion of a State seek by force of arms to overthrow the +Government, and maintain independence, the contest becomes one +<i>de facto</i> of war<a name="FNanchor192"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_192">[192]</a>." This was as exact, and correct, a +statement of the British view as could have been desired<a name= +"FNanchor193"></a><a href="#Footnote_193">[193]</a>.</p> +<p>The American Minister, whatever his official representation, did +not then hold, privately, the view of "unfriendly animus." On July +2, 1861, his secretary son wrote: "The English are really on our +side; of that I have no doubt whatever. [Later he was less sure of +this.] But they thought that as a dissolution seemed inevitable and +as we seemed to have made up our minds to it, that their +Proclamation was just the thing to keep them straight with both +sides, and when it turned out otherwise they did their best to +correct their mistake<a name="FNanchor194"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_194">[194]</a>." The modern historical judgment of the +best American writers likewise exonerates the British Government of +"unfriendly animus<a name="FNanchor195"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_195">[195]</a>," but is still apt to refer to the +"premature" issue of the Proclamation.</p> +<p>This was also John Bright's view. But can Russell and the +Government be criticized even as exercising an unwise (not +unfriendly) haste? Henry Adams wrote that the British thought the +"dissolution seemed inevitable" and "we seemed to have made up our +minds to it." Certainly this was a justifiable conclusion from the +events in America from Lincoln's election in November, 1860, to his +inauguration in March, 1861--and even to a later date, almost in +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111"></a>[V1:pg 111]</span> +fact to the first week in April. During this period the British +Ministry preserved a strictly "hands off" policy. Then, suddenly, +actual conflict begins and at once each side in America issues +declarations, Davis on privateering, Lincoln on blockade and +piracy, indicative that <i>maritime</i> war, the form of war at +once most dangerous to British interests and most likely to draw in +British citizens, was the method first to be tried by the +contestants. Unless these declarations were mere bluff and bluster +England could not dare wait their application. She must at once +warn her citizens and make clear her position as a neutral. The +Proclamation was no effort "to keep straight with both sides"; it +was simply the natural, direct, and prompt notification to British +subjects required in the presence of a <i>de facto</i> war.</p> +<p>Moreover, merely as a matter of historical speculation, it was +fortunate that the Proclamation antedated the arrival of Adams. The +theory of the Northern administration under which the Civil War was +begun and concluded was that a portion of the people of the United +States were striving as "insurgents" to throw off their allegiance, +and that there could be no recognition of any Southern +<i>Government</i> in the conflict. In actual practice in war, the +exchange of prisoners and like matters, this theory had soon to be +discarded. Yet it was a far-seeing and wise theory nevertheless in +looking forward to the purely domestic and constitutional problem +of the return to the Union, when conquered, of the sections in +rebellion. This, unfortunately, was not clear to foreign nations, +and it necessarily complicated relations with them. Yet under that +theory Adams had to act. Had he arrived before the Proclamation of +Neutrality it is difficult to see how he could have proceeded +otherwise than to protest, officially, against any British +declaration of neutrality, declaring that his Government did not +acknowledge a state of war as existing, and threatening +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112"></a>[V1:pg 112]</span> to +take his leave. It would have been his duty to <i>prevent</i>, if +possible, the issue of the Proclamation. Dallas, fortunately, had +been left uninformed and uninstructed. Adams, fortunately, arrived +too late to prevent and had, therefore, merely to complain. The +"premature" issue of the Proclamation averted an inevitable rupture +of relations on a clash between the American theory of "no state of +war" and the international fact that war existed. Had that rupture +occurred, how long would the British Government and people have +remained neutral, and what would have been the ultimate fate of the +United States<a name="FNanchor196"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_196">[196]</a>?</p> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_127"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor127">[127]</a> Sir George Cornewall Lewis was better +informed in the early stages of the American conflict than any of +his ministerial colleagues. He was an occasional contributor to the +reviews and his unsigned article in the <i>Edinburgh</i>, April, +1861, on "The Election of President Lincoln and its Consequences," +was the first analysis of real merit in any of the +reviews.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_128"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor128">[128]</a> In his <i>Memoirs of an Ex-Minister</i>, +Malmesbury makes but three important references to the Civil War in +America.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_129"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor129">[129]</a> Adams, <i>Charles Francis Adams</i>, p. +165.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_130"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor130">[130]</a> Dodd, <i>Jefferson Davis</i>, pp. +227-8.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_131"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor131">[131]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_132"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor132">[132]</a> It was generally whispered in Southern +political circles that Davis sent Yancey abroad to get rid of him, +fearing his interference at home. If true, this is further evidence +of Davis' neglect of foreign policy.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_133"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor133">[133]</a> Du Bose, <i>Yancey</i>, p. +604.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_134"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor134">[134]</a> Adams, <i>Charles Francis Adams</i>, pp. +149-51.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_135"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor135">[135]</a> Possibly the best concise statement of the +effect on the North is given in Carl Schurz, <i>Reminiscences</i>, +Vol. II, p. 223. Or see my citation of this in <i>The Power of +Ideals in American History</i>, ch. I, "Nationality."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_136"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor136">[136]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, pp. +1207-9.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_137"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor137">[137]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 60.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_138"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor138">[138]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1861-62</i>, pp. 83-4. Dallas to Seward, May 2, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_139"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor139">[139]</a> An error. Mann did not arrive in London +until May 15. Du Bose, <i>Yancey</i>, p. 604.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_140"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor140">[140]</a> Richardson, <i>Messages and Papers of the +Confederacy</i>, Vol. II, p. 34. This report also shows that Mann +was not present at the first interview with Russell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_141"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor141">[141]</a> F.O., America, Vol. 755, No. 128, Russell +to Lyons, May 11, 1861. This document is marked "Seen by Lord +Palmerston and the Queen." The greater and essential part has been +printed in <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Civil War in United States." No. +33.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_142"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor142">[142]</a> Du Bose, <i>Yancey</i>, p. +604.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_143"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor143">[143]</a> Lyons Papers. The copy of the Memorandum +sent to Lyons is undated, but from Russell's letter to Lyons of May +4, in which it was enclosed, it is presumable that the date of May +3 for the Memorandum is correct.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_144"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor144">[144]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Russell to Lyons, May 4, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_145"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor145">[145]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 755, No. 121, Russell to +Lyons, May 6, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_146"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor146">[146]</a> It is to be remembered that the United +States had given no notice of the existence of a state of +war.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_147"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor147">[147]</a> In diplomatic usage official notification +of neutrality to a belligerent has varied, but Russell's letters +show him to have appreciated a peculiar delicacy here.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_148"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor148">[148]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1376, No. 553. Draft. +Printed in <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, <i>Lords</i>, Vol. +XXV. "Correspondence on International Maritime Law." No. +1.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_149"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor149">[149]</a> It is interesting that on this same day +Lyons was writing from Washington advocating, regretfully, because +of his sympathy with the North, a strict British neutrality:<br> +<br> +<blockquote>"The sympathies of an Englishman are naturally +inclined<br> +towards the North--but I am afraid we should find that<br> +anything like a quasi alliance with the men in office here<br> +would place us in a position which would soon become<br> +untenable. There would be no end to the exactions which they<br> +would make upon us, there would be no end to the disregard of<br> +our neutral rights, which they would show if they once felt<br> +sure of us. If I had the least hope of their being able to<br> +reconstruct the Union, or even of their being able to reduce<br> +the South to the condition of a tolerably contented or at all<br> +events obedient dependency, my feeling against Slavery might<br> +lead me to desire to co-operate with them. But I conceive all<br> +chance of this to be gone for ever."</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, May 6, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_150"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor150">[150]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1390. No. +677.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_151"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor151">[151]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 684. Printed in part in +<i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence +on International Maritime Law." No. 3.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_152"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor152">[152]</a> <i>Times</i>, May 9, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_153"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor153">[153]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States." No. 31.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_154"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor154">[154]</a> So stated by the <i>Times</i>, May 9, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_155"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor155">[155]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, pp. +1378-9. This blunt expression of Great Britain's Foreign Secretary +offers an interesting comparison with the words of the American +President Wilson, in a parallel statement at the outbreak of the +Great War in 1914. Wilson on August 3, 1914, gave a special +audience to newspaper correspondents, begging them to maintain an +attitude of calm impartiality. On August 4 he issued the first of +several neutrality proclamations in which, following the customary +language of such documents, the people were notified that +neutrality did not restrict the "full and free expression of +sympathies in public and in private." But on August 18 in an +address to the people of the United States, this legal phraseology, +required by traditional usage was negatived by Wilson's appeal that +"we must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a +curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that +might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle +before another." And three weeks later, on September 8, came the +proclamation setting aside October 4 "as a day of prayer to +Almighty God," informing Him that war existed and asking His +intervention. Possibly Russell's more blunt and pithy expression +was better suited to the forthrightness of the British +public.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_156"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor156">[156]</a> Hansard, <i>ibid</i>., pp. 1564-7. +Gregory, a "Liberal-Conservative," though never a "good party man" +was then supporting Palmerston's ministry. He was very popular in +Parliament, representing by his prominence in sport and society +alike, the "gentleman ruling class" of the House of Commons, and +was a valuable influence for the South.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_157"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor157">[157]</a> This subject is developed at length in +Chapter V on "The Declaration of Paris Negotiation."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_158"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor158">[158]</a> See <i>ante, p</i>. 88. The chronology of +these rapidly succeeding events is interesting:<br> +<br> + April 29--Malmesbury states in the Lords that "news was +received<br> + this day."<br> + May 1--Naval reinforcements sent to American +waters.<br> + May 1--Russell's interview with Dallas.<br> + May 2--Russell's plea in Parliament, "For God's sake +keep out of<br> + it."<br> + May 3--Russell's first interview with Yancey and +Rost.<br> + May 3--Attorney-General's memorandum.<br> + May 4--Russell's note to Lyons that this is a "regular +war."<br> + May 6--Cowley instructed to ask France to recognize +Southern<br> + belligerency.<br> + May 6--Lyons notified that England will recognize +Southern belligerency.<br> + May 6--Russell states in Parliament that privateers can +not be<br> + treated as pirates.<br> + [Presumably, since parliamentary sittings begin +in the late<br> + afternoons, the instructions to +diplomats were drawn before<br> + the statement in Parliament.]<br> + May 9--Russell's second interview with Yancey and +Rost.<br> + May 9--Sir George Lewis announces that a Proclamation +of Neutrality<br> + will be issued soon.<br> + May 13--The Proclamation authorized.<br> + May 13--Adams reaches Liverpool.<br> + May 14--The Proclamation officially published in the +<i>London Gazette</i>.<br> + May 14--Adams in London "ready for business."<br> +<br> +<br> +It would appear that Russell's expressions in Parliament on May 2 +indicated clearly the purpose of the Government. This was notified +to Lyons on May 4, which may be taken as the date when the +governmental position had become definitely fixed, even though +official instructions were not sent Lyons until the +6th.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_159"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor159">[159]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 50. Bunch to +Russell, April 19, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_160"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor160">[160]</a> F.O., Am., 789, Monson to Alston, received +May 21.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_161"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor161">[161]</a> F.O., Am., 763, No. 197, Lyons to Russell, +received May 26. The full statement is:<br> +<br> +<blockquote>"To an Englishman, sincerely interested in the welfare +of<br> +this country, the present state of things is peculiarly<br> +painful. Abhorrence of slavery, respect for law, more<br> +complete community of race and language, enlist his<br> +sympathies on the side of the North. On the other hand, he<br> +cannot but reflect that any encouragement to the predominant<br> +war feeling in the North cannot but be injurious to both<br> +sections of the country. The prosecution of the war can lead<br> +only to the exhaustion of the North by an expenditure of life<br> +and money on an enterprise in which success and failure would<br> +be alike disastrous. It must tend to the utter devastation of<br> +the South. It would at all events occasion a suspension of<br> +Southern cultivation which would be calamitous even more to<br> +England than to the Northern States themselves."</blockquote> +</blockquote> +<br> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_162"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor162">[162]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXII, p. +1763.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_163"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor163">[163]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 1830-34. In the general +discussion in the Lords there appeared disagreement as to the +status of privateering. Granville, Derby, and Brougham, spoke of it +as piracy. Earl Hardwicke thought privateering justifiable. The +general tone of the debate, though only on this matter of +international practice, was favourable to the North.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_164"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor164">[164]</a> For example see Hertslet, <i>Map of Europe +by Treaty</i>, Vol. I, p. 698, for the Proclamation issued in 1813 +during the Spanish-American colonial revolutions.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_165"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor165">[165]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXII, pp. +2077-2088.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_166"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor166">[166]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV, "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States." No. 35. Russell to Lyons, May 15, 1861. Another reason for +Lyons' precaution was that while his French colleague, Mercier, had +been instructed to support the British Proclamation, no official +French Proclamation was issued until June 10, and Lyons, while he +trusted Mercier, felt that this French delay needed some +explanation. Mercier told Seward, unofficially, of his instructions +and even left a copy of them, but at Seward's request made no +official communication. Lyons, later, followed the same procedure. +This method of dealing with Seward came to be a not unusual one, +though it irritated both the British and French +Ministers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_167"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor167">[167]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1861-2</i>, p. 85. Adams to Seward, May 17, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_168"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor168">[168]</a> Bedford died that day.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_169"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor169">[169]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1861-2</i>, pp. 90-96. Adams to Seward, May 21, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_170"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor170">[170]</a> Bernard, <i>The Neutrality of Great +Britain during the American Civil War</i>, p. 161. The author cites +at length despatches and documents of the period.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_171"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor171">[171]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, May 18, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_172"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor172">[172]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, June 1, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_173"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor173">[173]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, June 1, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_174"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor174">[174]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1861-2</i>, p. 82.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_175"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor175">[175]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 98. Adams to Seward, June +7, 1861. See also p. 96, Adams to Seward, May 31, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_176"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor176">[176]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 10, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_177"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor177">[177]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell, June 14, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_178"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor178">[178]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 766, No. 282. Lyons to +Russell, June 17, 1861. Seward's account, in close agreement with +that of Lyons, is in <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2</i>, p. +106. Seward to Adams, June 19, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_179"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor179">[179]</a> Bancroft in his <i>Seward</i> (II, p. 183) +prints a portion of an unpublished despatch of Seward to Dayton in +Paris, July 1, 1861, as "his clearest and most characteristic +explanation of what the attitude of the government must be in +regard to the action of the foreign nations that have recognized +the belligerency of the 'insurgents.'"<br> +<br> +<blockquote>"Neither Great Britain nor France, separately nor +both<br> +together, can, by any declaration they can make, impair the<br> +sovereignty of the United States over the insurgents, nor<br> +confer upon them any public rights whatever. From first to<br> +last we have acted, and we shall continue to act, for the<br> +whole people of the United States, and to make treaties for<br> +disloyal as well as loyal citizens with foreign nations, and<br> +shall expect, when the public welfare requires it, foreign<br> +nations to respect and observe the treaties.<br> +<br> +<br> +"We do not admit, and we never shall admit, even the<br> +fundamental statement you assume--namely, that Great Britain<br> +and France have recognized the insurgents as a belligerent<br> +party. True, you say they have so declared. We reply: Yes,<br> +but they have not declared so to us. You may rejoin: Their<br> +public declaration concludes the fact. We, nevertheless,<br> +reply: It must be not their declaration, but the fact, that<br> +concludes the fact."</blockquote> +</blockquote> +<br> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_180"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor180">[180]</a> The <i>Times</i>, June 3, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_181"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor181">[181]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, June 11, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_182"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor182">[182]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1861-2</i>, p. 87.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_183"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor183">[183]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. +56. Lyons to Russell, June 17, 1861, reporting conference with +Seward on June 15.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_184"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor184">[184]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1861-62</i>, p. 104. Adams to Seward, June 14, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_185"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor185">[185]</a> Bancroft, the biographer of Seward, takes +the view that the protests against the Queen's Proclamation, in +regard to privateering and against interviews with the Southern +commissioners were all unjustifiable. The first, he says, was based +on "unsound reasoning" (II, 177). On the second he quotes with +approval a letter from Russell to Edward Everett, July 12, 1861, +showing the British dilemma: "Unless we meant to treat them as +pirates and to hang them we could not deny them belligerent rights" +(II, 178). And as to the Southern commissioners he asserts that +Seward, later, ceased protest and writes: "Perhaps he remembered +that he himself had recently communicated, through three different +intermediaries, with the Confederate commissioners to Washington, +and would have met them if the President had not forbidden it." +Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, 179.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_186"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor186">[186]</a> Du Bose, <i>Yancey</i>, p. +606.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_187"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor187">[187]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters, +1861-1865</i>, Vol. I, p. 11. Adams to C.F. Adams, Jnr., June 14, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_188"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor188">[188]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 98. Russell's report +to Lyons of this interview of June 12, lays special emphasis on +Adams' complaint of haste. <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV, "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States," No. 52. Russell to Lyons, June 21, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_189"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor189">[189]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVII, pp. 1620-21, +March 13, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_190"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor190">[190]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 85.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_191"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor191">[191]</a> C.F. Adams, <i>Charles Francis Adams</i>, +p. 172. In preparing a larger life of his father, never printed, +the son later came to a different opinion, crediting Russell with +foresight in hastening the Proclamation to avoid possible +embarrassment with Adams on his arrival. The quotation from the +printed "Life" well summarizes, however, current American +opinion.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_192"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor192">[192]</a> <i>U.S. Documents</i>, Ser. No. 347, Doc. +183, p. 6.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_193"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor193">[193]</a> The United States Supreme Court in 1862, +decided that Lincoln's blockade proclamation of April 19, 1861, was +"itself official and conclusive evidence ... that a state of war +existed." (Moore, Int. Law Digest, I, p. 190.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_194"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor194">[194]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, p. +16. Henry Adams to C.F. Adams, Jnr.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_195"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor195">[195]</a> Rhodes, <i>History of the United +States</i>, III, p. 420 (<i>note</i>) summarizes arguments on this +point, but thinks that the Proclamation might have been delayed +without harm to British interests. This is perhaps true as a matter +of historical fact, but such fact in no way alters the compulsion +to quick action felt by the Ministry in the presence of probable +<i>immediate</i> fact.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_196"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor196">[196]</a> This was the later view of C.F. Adams, +Jnr. He came to regard the delay in his father's journey to England +as the most fortunate single incident in American foreign relations +during the Civil War.</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113"></a>[V1:pg 113]</span> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV</h2> +<h3>BRITISH SUSPICION OF SEWARD</h3> +<br> +<p>The incidents narrated in the preceding chapter have been +considered solely from the point of view of a formal American +contention as to correct international practice and the British +answer to that contention. In fact, however, there were intimately +connected wth these formal arguments and instructions of the +American Secretary of State a plan of possible militant action +against Great Britain and a suspicion, in British Governmental +circles, that this plan was being rapidly matured. American +historians have come to stigmatize this plan as "Seward's Foreign +War Panacea," and it has been examined by them in great detail, so +that there is no need here to do more than state its main features. +That which is new in the present treatment is the British +information in regard to the plan and the resultant British +suspicion of Seward's intentions.</p> +<p>The British public, as distinguished from the Government, +deriving its knowledge of Seward from newspaper reports of his +career and past utterances, might well consider him as +traditionally unfriendly to Great Britain. He had, in the 'fifties, +vigorously attacked the British interpretation of the +Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and characterized Great Britain as "the most +grasping and the most rapacious Power in the world"; he had long +prophesied the ultimate annexation of Canada to the United States; +he had not disdained, in political struggles in the State of New +York, to whip up, for the sake of votes, Irish antagonism to Great +Britain; and more especially and more recently he had been reported +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114"></a>[V1:pg 114]</span> to +have expressed to the Duke of Newcastle a belief that civil +conflict in America could easily be avoided, or quieted, by +fomenting a quarrel with England and engaging in a war against +her<a name="FNanchor197"></a><a href="#Footnote_197">[197]</a>. +Earlier expressions might easily be overlooked as emanating from a +politician never over-careful about wounding the sensibilities of +foreign nations and peoples, for he had been even more outspoken +against the France of Louis Napoleon, but the Newcastle +conversation stuck in the British mind as indicative of a probable +animus when the politician had become the statesman responsible for +foreign policy. Seward might deny, as he did, that he had ever +uttered the words alleged<a name="FNanchor198"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_198">[198]</a>, and his friend Thurlow Weed might +describe the words as "badinage," in a letter to the London +<i>Times</i><a name="FNanchor199"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_199">[199]</a>, but the "Newcastle story" continued to +be matter for frequent comment both in the Press and in private +circles.</p> +<p>British Ministers, however, would have paid little attention to +Seward's speeches intended for home political consumption, or to a +careless bit of social talk, had there not been suspicion of other +and more serious evidences of unfriendliness. Lyons was an +unusually able and well-informed Minister, and from the first he +had pictured the leadership of Seward in the new administration at +Washington, and had himself been worried by his inability to +understand what policy Seward was formulating. But, in fact, he did +not see clearly what was going on in the camp of the Republican +party now dominant in the North. The essential feature of the +situation was that Seward, generally regarded as the man whose +wisdom must guide the ill-trained Lincoln, and himself thinking +this to be his destined function, early found his authority +challenged by other leaders, and his <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_115"></a>[V1:pg 115]</span> policies not certain of +acceptance by the President. It is necessary to review, briefly, +the situation at Washington.</p> +<br> +<a name="image04.jpg"></a> +<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image04.jpg"><img src= +"images/image04.jpg" width="50%" alt=""></a><br> +<b>WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD</b><br> +(<i>From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord Lyons," by kind +permission</i>)</p> +<br> +<p>Lincoln was inaugurated as President on March 4. He had been +elected as a Republican by a political party never before in power. +Many of the leading members of this party were drawn from the older +parties and had been in administrative positions in either State or +National Governments, but there were no party traditions, save the +lately created one of opposition to the expansion of slavery to the +Territories. All was new, then, to the men now in power in the +National Government, and a new and vital issue, that of secession +already declared by seven Southern States, had to be met by a +definite policy. The important immediate question was as to whether +Lincoln had a policy, or, if not, upon whom he would depend to +guide him.</p> +<p>In the newly-appointed Cabinet were two men who, in popular +estimate, were expected to take the lead--Chase, of Ohio, the +Secretary of the Treasury, and Seward, of New York, Secretary of +State. Both were experienced in political matters and both stood +high in the esteem of the anti-slavery element in the North, but +Seward, all things considered, was regarded as the logical leading +member of the Cabinet. He had been the favoured candidate for +Republican Presidential nomination in 1860, making way for Lincoln +only on the theory that the latter as less Radical on anti-slavery, +could be more easily elected. Also, he now held that position which +by American tradition was regarded as the highest in the +Cabinet.</p> +<p>In fact, everyone at Washington regarded it as certain that +Seward would determine the policy of the new administration. +Seward's own attitude is well summed up in a despatch to his +Government, February 18, 1861, by Rudolph Schleiden, Minister from +the Republic of Bremen. He described a conversation with Seward in +regard to his relations with Lincoln:</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116"></a>[V1:pg 116]</span> +<blockquote>"Seward, however, consoled himself with the clever +remark, that there is no great difference between an elected +president of the United States and an hereditary monarch. The +latter is called to the throne through the accident of birth, the +former through the chances which make his election possible. The +actual direction of public affairs belongs to the leader of the +ruling party, here as well as in any hereditary principality.<br> +<br> +"The future President is a self-made man and there is therefore as +little doubt of his energy as of his proverbial honesty ('honest +old Abe'). It is also acknowledged that he does not lack common +sense. But his other qualities for the highest office are +practically unknown. His election may therefore be readily compared +with a lottery. It is possible that the United States has drawn the +first prize, on the other hand the gain may only have been a small +one. But unfortunately the possibility is not excluded that it may +have been merely a blank."</blockquote> +<p>The first paragraph of this quotation reports Seward's opinion; +the second is apparently Schleiden's own estimate. Two weeks later +Schleiden sent home a further analysis of Lincoln:</p> +<blockquote>"He makes the impression of a natural man of clear and +healthy mind, great good-naturedness and best intentions. He seems +to be fully conscious of the great responsibility which rests upon +him. But at the same time it appears as if he had lost some of his +famous firmness and resoluteness through the novelty of the +conditions which surround him and the hourly renewed attempts from +various sides to gain influence over him. He is therefore at +present inclined to concede double weight to the superior political +experience of his Secretary of State<a name= +"FNanchor200"></a><a href="#Footnote_200">[200]</a>."</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117"></a>[V1:pg 117]</span> +<p>This was written on March 4, and the situation was correctly +described. Seward led for the moment, but his supremacy was not +unchallenged and soon a decision was called for that in its final +solution was to completely overthrow his already matured policy +towards the seceding States. Buchanan had been pressed by South +Carolina to yield possession of federal property in that State and +especially to withdraw Federal troops from Fort Sumter in +Charleston Harbour. After some vacillation he had refused to do +this, but had taken no steps to reinforce and re-supply the weak +garrison under the command of Major Anderson. On March 5, Lincoln +learned that Sumter would soon have to be yielded unless +reinforcements were sent. There followed ten days of delay and +indecision; then on March 15 Lincoln requested from each member of +his Cabinet an opinion on what should be done. This brought to an +issue the whole question of Seward's policy and leadership.</p> +<p>For Seward's policy, like that of Buchanan, was one of +conciliatory delay, taking no steps to bring matters to an issue, +and trusting to time and a sobering second thought to bring +Southern leaders and people to a less violent attitude. He +sincerely believed in the existence of an as yet unvoiced strong +Union sentiment in the South, especially in those States which were +wavering on secession. He was holding communications, through +intermediaries, with certain Confederate "Commissioners" in +Washington, and he had agents in Virginia attempting to influence +that State against secession. To all these Southern representatives +he now conveyed assurances quite without warrant from Lincoln, that +Sumter would be evacuated, acting solely in the belief that his own +"policy" would be approved by the President. His argument in reply +to Lincoln's call for an opinion was positive against reinforcing +Fort Sumter, and it seemed to meet, for the moment, with the +approval of the majority of his Cabinet colleagues. Lincoln himself +made no pertinent comment, yet did not commit himself. <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_118"></a>[V1:pg 118]</span> There the +matter rested for a time, for the Confederate Commissioners, +regarding Seward's policy of delay as wholly beneficial to the +maturing of Southern plans, and Seward "as their cat's-paw<a name= +"FNanchor201"></a><a href="#Footnote_201">[201]</a>," did not care +to press for a decision. Moreover, Seward had given a personal +pledge that in case it were, after all, determined to reinforce +Sumter, notification of that determination would at once be given +to South Carolina. The days went by, and it was not until the last +week of March that Lincoln, disillusioned as to the feasibility of +Seward's policy of conciliation, reached the conclusion that in his +conception of his duty as President of the United States he must +defend and retain Federal forts, or attempt to retain them, for the +preservation of the Union, and decided to reinforce Fort Sumter. On +March 29, the Cabinet assembled at noon and learned Lincoln's +determination.</p> +<p>This was a sharp blow to Seward's prestige in the Cabinet; it +also threatened his "peaceful" policy. Yet he did not as yet +understand fully that either supreme leadership, or control of +policy, had been assumed by Lincoln. On April 1 he drafted that +astonishing document entitled, "Some Thoughts for the President's +Consideration," which at once reveals his alarm and his supreme +personal self-confidence. This document begins, "We are at the end +of a month's administration, and yet without a policy <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_119"></a>[V1:pg 119]</span> either domestic +or foreign." It then advocates as a domestic policy, "<i>Change The +Question Before The Public From One Upon Slavery, Or About +Slavery</i>, for a question upon <i>Union or Disunion</i>." Then in +a second section, headed "For Foreign Nations," there followed:</p> +<blockquote>"I would demand explanations from Spain and France, +categorically, at once.<br> +<br> +"I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send +agents into Canada, Mexico and Central America to rouse a vigorous +continental spirit of independence on this continent against +European intervention.<br> +<br> +"And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and +France.<br> +<br> +"Would convene Congress and declare war against them.<br> +<br> +"But whatever policy we adopt, there must be energetic prosecution +of it.<br> +<br> +"For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and +direct it incessantly.<br> +<br> +"Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while +active in it, or<br> +<br> +"Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on +it must end, and all agree and abide.<br> +<br> +"It is not in my especial province;<br> +<br> +"But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility<a name= +"FNanchor202"></a><a href="#Footnote_202">[202]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Lincoln's reply of the same day, April 1, was characteristically +gentle, yet no less positive and definite to any save one obsessed +with his own superior wisdom. Lincoln merely noted that Seward's +"domestic policy" was exactly his own, except that he did not +intend to abandon Fort Sumter. As to the warlike foreign policy +Lincoln pointed out that this would be a sharp reversal of that +already being prepared in circulars and instructions to Ministers +abroad. This was, indeed, the case, for the first instructions, +soon despatched, were drawn on lines of recalling to foreign powers +their established and long-continued friendly <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_120"></a>[V1:pg 120]</span> relations with +the United States. Finally, Lincoln stated as to the required +"guiding hand," "I remark that if this must be done, I must do +it.... I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all +the Cabinet<a name="FNanchor203"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_203">[203]</a>."</p> +<p>This should have been clear indication of Lincoln's will to +direct affairs, and even to Seward would have been sufficient had +he not, momentarily, been so disturbed by the wreck of his pacific +policy toward the South, and as yet so ignorant of the strength of +Lincoln's quiet persistence. As it was, he yielded on the immediate +issue, the relief of Sumter (though attempting to divert +reinforcements to another quarter) but did not as yet wholly yield +either his policy of conciliation and delay, nor give up +immediately his insane scheme of saving the Union by plunging it +into a foreign war. He was, in fact, still giving assurances to the +Confederate commissioners, through indirect channels, that he could +and would prevent the outbreak of civil war, and in this confidence +that his ideas would finally control Lincoln he remained up to the +second week in April. But on April 8 the first of the ships +despatched to the aid of Sumter left New York, and on that day +Governor Pickens of South Carolina was officially notified of the +Northern purpose. This threw the burden of striking the first blow +upon the South; if Southern threats were now made good, civil war +seemed inevitable, and there could be no peaceful decision of the +quarrel.</p> +<p>The reinforcements did not arrive in time. Fort Sumter, after a +day and a half of dogged fighting, was surrendered to the enemy on +April 13--for as an enemy in arms the South now stood. The fall of +Sumter changed, as in a moment, the whole attitude of the Northern +people. There was now a nearly unanimous cry for the preservation +of the Union <i>by force</i>. Yet Seward still clung, privately, to +his belief that even now the "sober second thought" of the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121"></a>[V1:pg 121]</span> +South would offer a way out toward reunion without war. In official +utterances and acts he was apparently in complete harmony with the +popular will to reconquer the South. Davis' proclamation on marque +and privateering, of April 17, was answered by the Lincoln blockade +proclamation of April 19. But Virginia had not yet officially +seceded, and until this occurred there seemed to Seward at least +one last straw of conciliation available. In this situation +Schleiden, Minister for Bremen, came to Seward on the morning of +April 24 and offered his services as a mediator<a name= +"FNanchor204"></a><a href="#Footnote_204">[204]</a>.</p> +<p>Schleiden's idea was that an armistice be agreed upon with the +South until the Northern Congress should meet in July, thus giving +a breathing spell and permitting saner second judgment to both +sides. He had consulted with his Prussian colleague, who approved, +and he found Seward favourable to the plan. Alexander H. Stephens, +Vice-President of the Confederacy, was then at Richmond, and to +him, as an old friend, Schleiden proposed to go and make the same +appeal. Seward at once took Schleiden to see Lincoln. The three +men, with Chase (and the Prussian Minister) were the only ones in +the secret. Lincoln's first comment was that he was "willing to +make an attempt of contributing to the prevention of bloodshed and +regretted that Schleiden had not gone to Richmond without +consulting him or Seward." Lincoln further stated that "he did not +have in mind any aggression against the Southern States, but merely +the safety of the Government in the Capitol and the possibility to +govern everywhere," a concluding phrase that should have +enlightened Schleiden as to Lincoln's determination to preserve the +Union. Lincoln said he could neither authorize negotiations nor +invite proposals, but that he would gladly consider any such +proposals voluntarily made. Schleiden asked for a definite +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122"></a>[V1:pg 122]</span> +statement as to whether Lincoln would recall the blockade +proclamation and sign an armistice if Davis would recall the +letters of marque proclamation, but Lincoln refused to commit +himself.</p> +<p>This was scant encouragement from the President, but Seward +still thought something might result from the venture, and on that +evening, April 24, Schleiden started for Richmond, being provided +by Seward with a pass through the Union lines. He arrived on the +afternoon of the twenty-fifth, but even before reaching the city +was convinced that his mission would be a failure. All along his +journey, at each little station, he saw excited crowds assembled +enthusiastic for secession, bands of militia training, and every +indication of preparation for war. Already, on that same day, the +Virginia secession ordinance had been published, and the State +convention had ratified the provisional constitution of the +Southern Confederacy. Schleiden immediately notified Stephens of +his presence in Richmond and desire for an interview, and was at +once received. The talk lasted three hours. Stephens was frank and +positive in asserting the belief that "all attempts to settle +peacefully the differences between the two sections were futile." +Formal letters were exchanged after this conference, but in these +the extent to which Stephens would go was to promise to use his +influence in favour of giving consideration to any indication made +by the North of a desire "for an amicable adjustment of the +questions at issue," and he was positive that there could be no +return of the South to the Union.</p> +<p>On the afternoon of April 27 Schleiden was back in Washington. +He found that three days had made a great change in the sentiment +of the Capitol. "During my short absence," he wrote, "many +thousands of volunteers had arrived from the North. There was not +only a feeling of security noticeable, but even of combativeness." +He found <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123"></a>[V1:pg +123]</span> Seward not at all disposed to pursue the matter, and +was not given an opportunity to talk to Lincoln; therefore, he +merely submitted copies of the letters that had passed between him +and Stephens, adding for himself that the South was arming +<i>because</i> of Lincoln's proclamation calling for volunteers. +Seward replied on April 29, stating his personal regards and that +he had no fault to find with Schleiden's efforts, but concluding +that Stephens' letters gave no ground for action since the "Union +of these States is the supreme as it is the organic law of this +country," and must be maintained.</p> +<p>This adventure to Richmond by the Minister of Bremen may be +regarded as Seward's last struggle to carry out his long-pursued +policy of conciliatory delay. He had not officially sent Schleiden +to Richmond, but he had grasped eagerly at the opening and had +encouraged and aided Schleiden in his journey. Now, by April 27, +hope had vanished, and Seward's "domestic policy," as set forth in +his "Thoughts for the President's Consideration" on April 1, was +discredited, and inevitably, in some measure, their author also. +The dates are important in appreciating Seward's purposes. On April +27, the day of Schleiden's return to Washington, there was sent to +Adams that "sharp" despatch, taking issue with British action as +foreshadowed by Dallas on April 9, and concluding by instructing +Adams to lose no time in warning Russell that such action would be +regarded by the United States as "injurious to its rights and +derogating from its dignity<a name="FNanchor205"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_205">[205]</a>." It appears, therefore, that Seward, +defeated on one line of "policy," eager to regain prestige, and +still obsessed with the idea that some means could yet be found to +avert <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124"></a>[V1:pg +124]</span> domestic conflict, was, on April 27, beginning to pick +at those threads which, to his excited thought, might yet save the +Union through a foreign war. He was now seeking to force the +acceptance of the second, and alternative, portion of his "Thoughts +for the President."</p> +<p>Seward's theory of the cementing effect of a foreign war was no +secret at Washington. As early as January 26 he had unfolded to +Schleiden this fantastic plan. "If the Lord would only give the +United States an excuse for a war with England, France, or Spain," +he said "that would be the best means of re-establishing internal +peace<a name="FNanchor206"></a><a href="#Footnote_206">[206]</a>." +Again, on February 10, he conversed with Schleiden on the same +topic, and complained that there was no foreign complication +offering an excuse for a break. Lyons knew of this attitude, and by +February 4 had sent Russell a warning, to which the latter had +replied on February 20 that England could afford to be patient for +a time but that too much "blustering demonstration" must not be +indulged in. But the new administration, as Lincoln had remarked in +his reply to Seward on April 1, had taken quite another line, +addressing foreign powers in terms of high regard for established +friendly relations. This was the tone of Seward's first instruction +to Adams, April 10<a name="FNanchor207"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_207">[207]</a>, in the concluding paragraph of which +Seward wrote, "The United States are not indifferent to the +circumstances of common descent, language, customs, sentiments, and +religion, which recommend a closer sympathy between themselves and +Great Britain than either might expect in its intercourse with any +other nation." True, on this basis, Seward claimed a special +sympathy from Great Britain for the United States, that is to +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125"></a>[V1:pg 125]</span> +say, the North, but most certainly the tone of this first +instruction was one of established friendship.</p> +<p>Yet now, April 27, merely on learning from Dallas that Russell +"refuses to pledge himself" on British policy, Seward resorts to +threats. What other explanation is possible except that, seeking to +save his domestic policy of conciliation and to regain his +leadership, he now was adventuring toward the application of his +"foreign war panacea" idea. Lyons quickly learned of the changed +tone, and that England, especially, was to hear American complaint. +On May 2 Lyons wrote to Russell in cypher characterizing Seward as +"arrogant and reckless toward Foreign Powers<a name= +"FNanchor208"></a><a href="#Footnote_208">[208]</a>." Evidently +Seward was making little concealment of his belligerent attitude, +and when the news was received of the speeches in Parliament of the +first week in May by which it became clear that Great Britain would +declare neutrality and was planning joint action with France, he +became much excited. On May 17 he wrote a letter home exhibiting, +still, an extraordinary faith in his own wisdom and his own foreign +policy.</p> +<blockquote>"A country so largely relying on my poor efforts to +save it had [has] refused me the full measure of its confidence, +needful to that end. I am a chief reduced to a subordinate +position, and surrounded by a guard, to see that I do not do too +much for my country, lest some advantage may revert indirectly to +my own fame.<br> +<br> +"... They have misunderstood things fearfully, in Europe, Great +Britain is in danger of sympathizing so much with the South, for +the sake of peace and cotton, as to drive us to make war against +her, as the ally of the traitors.... I am trying to get a bold +remonstrance through the Cabinet before it is too late<a name= +"FNanchor209"></a><a href="#Footnote_209">[209]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The "bold remonstrance" was the famous "Despatch No. 10," of May +21, already commented upon in the preceding <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_126"></a>[V1:pg 126]</span> chapter. But as +sent to Adams it varied in very important details from the draft +submitted by Seward to Lincoln<a name="FNanchor210"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_210">[210]</a>.</p> +<p>Seward's draft was not merely a "remonstrance"; it was a +challenge. Its language implied that the United States desired war, +and Seward's plan was to have Adams read the despatch to Russell, +give him a copy of it, and then discontinue diplomatic relations so +long as Russell held either official or unofficial intercourse with +the Southern Commissioners. This last instruction was, indeed, +retained in the final form of the despatch, but here, as elsewhere, +Lincoln modified the stiff expressions of the original. Most +important of all, he directed Adams to consider the whole despatch +as for his own guidance, relying on his discretion. The despatch, +as amended, began with the statement that the United States +"neither means to menace Great Britain nor to wound the +sensibilities of that or any other European nation.... The paper +itself is not to be read or shown to the British Secretary of +State, nor any of its positions to be prematurely, unnecessarily, +or indiscreetly made known. But its spirit will be your +guide<a name="FNanchor211"></a><a href="#Footnote_211">[211]</a>." +Thus were the teeth <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_127"></a>[V1:pg 127]</span> skilfully drawn from the threat +of war. Even the positive instructions, later in the despatch, as +to the Southern Commissioners, need not have been acted upon by +Adams had he not thought it wise to do so. But even with +alterations, the American remonstrance was so bold as to alarm +Adams. On first perusual he wrote in his diary, June 10, "The +Government seems almost ready to declare war with all the powers of +Europe, and almost instructs me to withdraw from communication with +the Ministers here in a certain contingency.... I scarcely know how +to understand Mr. Seward. The rest of the Government may be +demented for all I know; but he surely is calm and wise. My duty +here is in so far as I can do it honestly to prevent the irritation +from coming to a downright quarrel. It seems to me like throwing +the game into the hands of the enemy<a name= +"FNanchor212"></a><a href="#Footnote_212">[212]</a>."</p> +<p>Adams, a sincere admirer of Seward, was in error as to the +source of American belligerent attitude. Fortunately, his judgment +of what was wise at the moment coincided with that of +Lincoln's--though of this he had no knowledge. In the event Adams' +skilful handling of the situation resulted favourably--even to the +cessation of intercourse between Russell and the Southern +Commissioners. For his part, Lincoln, no more than earlier, was to +be hurried into foreign complications, and Seward's "foreign war +panacea" was stillborn.</p> +<p>The incident was a vital one in the Northern administration, for +Seward at last realized that the President intended to control +policy, and though it was yet long before he came to appreciate +fully Lincoln's customary calm judgment, he did understand the +relation now established between <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_128"></a>[V1:pg 128]</span> himself and his chief. +Henceforth, he obeyed orders, though free in suggestion and +criticism, always welcome to Lincoln. The latter, avowedly ignorant +of diplomacy, gladly left details to Seward, and the altered +despatch, far from making relations difficult, rendered them simple +and easy, by clearing the atmosphere. But it was otherwise with +Foreign Ministers at Washington, for even though there was soon a +"leak" of gossip informing them of what had taken place in regard +to Despatch No. 10, they one and all were fearful of a recovery of +influence by Seward and of a resumption of belligerent policy. This +was particularly true of Lord Lyons, for rumour had it that it was +against England that Seward most directed his enmity. There +resulted for British diplomats both at Washington and in London a +deep-seated suspicion of Seward, long after he had made a complete +face-about in policy. This suspicion influenced relations greatly +in the earlier years of the Civil War.</p> +<p>On May 20, the day before Seward's No. 10 was dated, Lyons wrote +a long twelve-page despatch to Russell, anxious, and very full of +Seward's warlike projects. "The President is, of course, wholly +ignorant of foreign countries, and of foreign affairs." "Seward, +having lost strength by the failure of his peace policy, is seeking +to recover influence by leading a foreign war party; no one in the +Cabinet is strong enough to combat him." Britain, Lyons thought, +should maintain a stiff attitude, prepare to defend Canada, and +make close contacts with France. He was evidently anxious to +impress upon Russell that Seward really might mean war, but he +declared the chief danger to lie in the fact of American belief +that England and France could not be driven into war with the +United States, and that they would submit to any insult. Lyons +urged some action, or declaration (he did not know what), to +correct this false impression<a name="FNanchor213"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_213">[213]</a>. <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_129"></a>[V1:pg 129]</span> Again, on the next day, May 21, +the information in his official despatch was repeated in a private +letter to Russell, but Lyons here interprets Seward's threats as +mere bluster. Yet he is not absolutely sure of this, and in any +case insists that the best preventative of war with the United +States is to show that England is ready for it<a name= +"FNanchor214"></a><a href="#Footnote_214">[214]</a>.</p> +<p>It was an anxious time for the British Minister in Washington. +May 22, he warned Sir Edmund Head, Governor of Canada, urging him +to make defensive preparation<a name="FNanchor215"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_215">[215]</a>. The following day he dilated to Russell, +privately, on "the difficulty of keeping Mr. Seward within the +bounds of decency even in ordinary social intercourse<a name= +"FNanchor216"></a><a href="#Footnote_216">[216]</a> ..." and in an +official communication of this same day he records Washington +rumours of a belligerent despatch read by Seward before the +Cabinet, of objections by other members, and that Seward's +insistence has carried the day<a name="FNanchor217"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_217">[217]</a>. That Seward was, in fact, still smarting +over his reverse is shown by a letter, written on this same May 23, +to his intimate friend and political adviser, Thurlow Weed, who had +evidently cautioned him against precipitate action. Seward wrote, +"The European phase is bad. But your apprehension that I may be too +decisive alarms me more. Will you consent, or advise us to consent, +that Adams and Dayton have audiences and compliments in the +Ministers' Audience Chamber, and Toombs' [Confederate Secretary of +State] emissaries have access to his bedroom<a name= +"FNanchor218"></a><a href="#Footnote_218">[218]</a>?"</p> +<p>Two interpretations are possible from this: either <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_130"></a>[V1:pg 130]</span> that Seward +knowing himself defeated was bitter in retrospect, or that he had +not yet yielded his will to that of Lincoln, in spite of the +changes made in his Despatch No. 10. The former interpretation +seems the more likely, for though Seward continued to write for a +time "vigorous" despatches to Adams, they none of them approached +the vigour of even the amended despatch. Moreover, the exact facts +of the Cabinet of May 21, and the complete reversal of Seward's +policy were sufficiently known by May 24 to have reached the ears +of Schleiden, who reported them in a letter to Bremen of that +date<a name="FNanchor219"></a><a href="#Footnote_219">[219]</a>. +And on the same day Seward himself told Schleiden that he did "not +fear any longer that it would come to a break with England<a name= +"FNanchor220"></a><a href="#Footnote_220">[220]</a>." On May 27 +Lyons himself, though still suspicious that an attempt was being +made to separate France and England, was able to report a better +tone from Seward<a name="FNanchor221"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_221">[221]</a>.</p> +<p>British Ministers in London were not so alarmed as was Lyons, +but they were disturbed, nevertheless, and long preserved a +suspicion of the American Secretary of State. May 23, Palmerston +wrote to Russell in comment on Lyons' despatch of May 2: "These +communications are very unpleasant. It is not at all unlikely that +either from foolish and uncalculating arrogance and +self-sufficiency or from political calculation Mr. Seward may bring +on a quarrel with us<a name="FNanchor222"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_222">[222]</a>." He believed that more troops ought +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131"></a>[V1:pg 131]</span> to +be sent to Canada, as a precautionary measure, but, he added, "the +main Force for Defence must, of course, be local"--a situation +necessarily a cause for anxiety by British Ministers. Russell was +less perturbed. He had previously expressed appreciation of Adams' +conduct, writing to Lyons: "Mr. Adams has made a very favourable +impression on my mind as a calm and judicious man<a name= +"FNanchor223"></a><a href="#Footnote_223">[223]</a>," and he now +wrote: "I do not think Mr. Seward's colleagues will encourage him +in a game of brag with England.... I am sorry Seward turns out so +reckless and ruthless. Adams seems a sensible man<a name= +"FNanchor224"></a><a href="#Footnote_224">[224]</a>." But at +Washington Lyons was again hot on the trail of warlike rumours. As +a result of a series of conversations with Northern politicians, +not Cabinet members, he sent a cipher telegram to Russell on June +6, stating: "No new event has occurred but sudden declaration of +war by the United States against Great Britain appears to me by no +means impossible, especially so long as Canada seems open to +invasion<a name="FNanchor225"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_225">[225]</a>." This was followed two days later by a +despatch dilating upon the probability of war, and ending with +Lyons' opinion of how it should be conducted. England should strike +at once with the largest possible naval force and bring the war to +an end before the United States could prepare. Otherwise, "the +spirit, the energy, and the resources of this people" would make +them difficult to overcome. England, on her part, must be prepared +to suffer severely from American privateers, and she would be +forced to help the South, at least to the extent of keeping +Southern ports open. Finally, Lyons concluded, all of this letter +and advice were extremely distasteful to him, yet he felt compelled +to write it by the seriousness of the situation. Nevertheless, he +would exert every effort and use every method to conciliate +America<a name="FNanchor226"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_226">[226]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132"></a>[V1:pg 132]</span> +<p>In truth, it was not any further belligerent talk by Seward that +had so renewed Lyons' anxiety. Rather it was the public and Press +reception of the news of the Queen's Proclamation of Neutrality. +The Northern people, counting beyond all reasonable expectation +upon British sympathy on anti-slavery grounds, had been angrily +disappointed, and were at the moment loudly voicing their vexation. +Had Seward not already been turned from his foreign war policy he +now would have received strong public support in it. But he made no +effort to utilize public excitement to his own advantage in the +Cabinet. In England, Adams was able to report on June 14 that +Russell had no intention of holding further interviews with the +Southern Commissioners<a name="FNanchor227"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_227">[227]</a>, but before anyone in Washington could +learn of this there was general knowledge of a changed tone from +the Secretary of State, and Lyons' fears were considerably allayed. +On June 15, occurred that interview between Seward, Lyons, and +Mercier, in which Seward had positively refused to receive the +Queen's Proclamation, but had throughout evinced the greatest +courtesy and goodwill. Lyons so reported the conversation<a name= +"FNanchor228"></a><a href="#Footnote_228">[228]</a>. June 15 may, +in fact, be taken as the date when Lyons ceased to be alarmed over +an immediate war. Possibly he found it a little difficult to report +so sudden a shift from stormy to fair weather. June 21, he wrote +that the "lull" was still continuing<a name= +"FNanchor229"></a><a href="#Footnote_229">[229]</a>. June 24, he at +last learned and described at length the details of Lincoln's +alteration of Despatch No. 10<a name="FNanchor230"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_230">[230]</a>. He <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_133"></a>[V1:pg 133]</span> did not know the exact date but +he expressed the opinion that "a month or three weeks ago" war was +very near--a misjudgment, since it should be remembered that war +seemed advisable to one man only--Seward; and that on this issue he +had been definitely cast down from his self-assumed leadership into +the ranks of Lincoln's lieutenants.</p> +<p>Lyons was, then, nearly a month behindhand in exact knowledge of +American foreign policy toward England, and he was in error in +thinking that an American attack on England was either imminent or +intended. Nevertheless, he surely was excusable, considering +Seward's prestige and Lincoln's lack of it, in reporting as he did. +It was long, indeed, before he could escape from suspicion of +Seward's purposes, though dropping, abruptly, further comment on +the chances of war. A month later, on July 20, he wrote that Seward +had himself asked for a confidential and unofficial interview, in +order to make clear that there never had been any intention of +stirring agitation against England. Personally, Seward took credit +for avoiding trouble "by refusing to take official cognizance of +the recognition [by England] of the belligerent rights of the +South," and he asked Lyons to explain to Russell that previous +strong language was intended merely to make foreign Powers +understand the intensity of Northern feeling<a name= +"FNanchor231"></a><a href="#Footnote_231">[231]</a>.</p> +<p>Lyons put no faith in all this but was happy to note the change, +mistakenly attributing it to England's "stiff tone," and not at all +to the veto of the President. Since Lyons himself had gone to the +utmost bounds in seeking conciliation (so he had reported), and, in +London, Russell also had taken no forward step since the issue of +the Queen's Proclamation--indeed, had rather yielded somewhat to +Adams' representations--it is not clear in what the "stiff tone" +consisted.</p> +<p>Indeed, the cause of Seward's explanation to Lyons <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_134"></a>[V1:pg 134]</span> was the receipt +of a despatch from Adams, dated June 28, in which the latter had +reported that all was now smooth sailing. He had told Russell that +the knowledge in Washington of the result of their previous +interviews had brought satisfaction, and Russell, for his part, +said that Lyons had "learned, through another member of the +diplomatic corps, that no further expression of opinion on the +subject in question would be necessary<a name= +"FNanchor232"></a><a href="#Footnote_232">[232]</a>." This +referred, presumably, to the question of British intention, for the +future, in relation to the Proclamation of Neutrality. Adams wrote: +"This led to the most frank and pleasant conversation which I have +yet had with his lordship.... I added that I believed the popular +feeling in the United States would subside the moment that all the +later action on this side was known.... My own reception has been +all that I could desire. I attach value to this, however, only as +it indicates the establishment of a policy that will keep us at +peace during the continuance of the present convulsion." In reply +to Adams' despatch, Seward wrote on July 21, the day after his +interview with Lyons, arguing at great length the American view +that the British Proclamation of Neutrality in a domestic quarrel +was not defensible in international law. There was not now, nor +later, any yielding on this point. But, for the present, this was +intended for Adams' eye alone, and Seward prefaced his argument by +a disclaimer, much as stated to Lyons, of any ill-will to Great +Britain:</p> +<blockquote>"I may add, also, for myself, that however otherwise I +may at any time have been understood, it has been an earnest and +profound solicitude to avert from foreign war; that alone has +prompted the emphatic and sometimes, perhaps, impassioned +remonstrances I have hitherto made against any form or measure of +recognition of the insurgents by the government of Great Britain. I +write in the same spirit now; and I invoke on the part of the +British government, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_135"></a>[V1:pg 135]</span> as I propose to exercise on my +own, the calmness which all counsellors ought to practise in +debates which involve the peace and happiness of mankind<a name= +"FNanchor233"></a><a href="#Footnote_233">[233]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Diplomatic correspondence couched in the form of platform +oratory leads to the suspicion that the writer is thinking, +primarily, of the ultimate publication of his despatches. Thus +Seward seems to have been laying the ground for a denial that he +had ever developed a foolish foreign war policy. History pins him +to that folly. But in another respect the interview with Lyons on +July 20 and the letter to Adams of the day following overthrow for +both Seward and for the United States the accusations sometimes +made that it was the Northern disaster at Bull Run, July 21, in the +first pitched battle with the South, which made more temperate the +Northern tone toward foreign powers<a name= +"FNanchor234"></a><a href="#Footnote_234">[234]</a>. It is true +that the despatch to Adams was not actually sent until July 26, but +internal evidence shows it to have been written on the 21st before +there was any news from the battle-field, and the interview with +Lyons on the 20th proves that the military set-back had no +influence on Seward's friendly expressions. Moreover, these +expressions officially made were but a delayed voicing of a +determination of policy arrived at many weeks earlier. The +chronology of events and despatches cited in this chapter will have +shown that the refusal of Lincoln to follow Seward's leadership, +and the consequent lessening of the latter's "high tone," preceded +any news whatever from England, lightening the first impressions. +The Administration at Washington did not on May 21, even know that +England had issued a Proclamation of Neutrality; it knew merely of +Russell's statement that one would have to be issued; and the +friendly explanations of Russell to Adams were not received in +Washington until the month following.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136"></a>[V1:pg 136]</span> +<p>In itself, Seward's "foreign war panacea" policy does not +deserve the place in history usually accorded it as a moment of +extreme crisis in British-American relations. There was never any +danger of war from it, for Lincoln nipped the policy in the bud. +The public excitement in America over the Queen's Proclamation was, +indeed, intense; but this did not alter the Governmental attitude. +In England all that the public knew was this American irritation +and clamour. The London press expressed itself a bit more +cautiously, for the moment, merely defending the necessity of +British neutrality<a name="FNanchor235"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_235">[235]</a>. But if regarded from the effect upon +British Ministers the incident was one of great, possibly even +vital, importance in the relations of the two countries. Lyons had +been gravely anxious to the point of alarm. Russell, less acutely +alarmed, was yet seriously disturbed. Both at Washington and in +London the suspicion of Seward lasted throughout the earlier years +of the war, and to British Ministers it seemed that at any moment +he might recover leadership and revert to a dangerous mood. British +attitude toward America was affected in two opposite ways; Britain +was determined not to be bullied, and Russell himself sometimes +went to the point of arrogance in answer to American complaints; +this was an unfortunate result. But more fortunate, and <i>also a +result</i>, was the British Government's determination to step +warily in the American conflict and to give no just cause, unless +on due consideration of policy, for a rupture of relations with the +United States. Seward's folly in May of 1861, from every angle but +a short-lived "brain-storm," served America well in the first years +of her great crisis.</p> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_197"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor197">[197]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 80.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_198"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor198">[198]</a> Barnes, <i>Life of Thurlow Weed</i>, II, +p. 378. Seward to Weed, December 27, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_199"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor199">[199]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 355. Weed's letter was on +the <i>Trent</i> affair, but he went out of his way to depict +Seward as attempting a bit of humour with Newcastle.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_200"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor200">[200]</a> Schleiden, a native of Schleswig, was +educated at the University of Berlin, and entered the Danish +customs service. In the German revolution of 1848 he was a delegate +from Schleswig-Holstein to the Frankfort Parliament. After the +failure of that revolution he withdrew to Bremen and in 1853 was +sent by that Republic to the United States as Minister. By 1860 he +had become one of the best known and socially popular of the +Washington diplomatic corps, holding intimate relations with +leading Americans both North and South. His reports on events +preceding and during the Civil War were examined in the archives of +Bremen in 1910 by Dr. Ralph H. Lutz when preparing his doctor's +thesis, "Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten +Staaten während des Sezessionskrieges" (Heidelberg, 1911). My +facts with regard to Schleiden are drawn in part from this thesis, +in part from an article by him, "Rudolph Schleiden and the Visit to +Richmond, April 25, 1861," printed in the <i>Annual Report of the +American Historical Association</i> for 1915, pp. 207-216. Copies +of some of Schleiden's despatches are on deposit in the Library of +Congress among the papers of Carl Schurz. Through the courtesy of +Mr. Frederic Bancroft, who organized the Schurz papers, I have been +permitted to take copies of a few Schleiden dispatches relating to +the visit to Richmond, an incident apparently unknown to history +until Dr. Lutz called attention to it.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_201"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor201">[201]</a> This is Bancroft's expression. +<i>Seward</i>, II, p. 118.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_202"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor202">[202]</a> Lincoln, <i>Works</i>, II, +29.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_203"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor203">[203]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 30.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_204"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor204">[204]</a> For references to this whole matter of +Schleiden's visit to Richmond see <i>ante</i>, p. 116, note +1.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_205"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor205">[205]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>, +1861-2, p. 82. This, and other despatches have been examined at +length in the previous chapter in relation to the American protest +on the Queen's Proclamation of Neutrality. In the present chapter +they are merely noted again in their bearing on Seward's "foreign +war policy."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_206"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor206">[206]</a> Quoted by Lutz, <i>Am. Hist. Assn. +Rep</i>. 1915, p. 210.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_207"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor207">[207]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>, +1861-2, p. 80. This despatch was read by Seward on April 8 to W.H. +Russell, correspondent of the <i>Times</i>, who commented that it +contained some elements of danger to good relations, but it is +difficult to see to what he could have had objection.--Russell, +<i>My Diary</i>, I, p. 103.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_208"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor208">[208]</a> Russell Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_209"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor209">[209]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. +169.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_210"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor210">[210]</a> Yet at this very time Seward was +suggesting, May 14, to Prussia, Great Britain, France, Russia and +Holland a joint naval demonstration with America against Japan +because of anti-foreign demonstrations in that country. This has +been interpreted as an attempt to tie European powers to the United +States in such a way as to hamper any friendly inclination they may +have entertained toward the Confederacy (Treat, <i>Japan and the +United States</i>, 1853-1921, pp. 49-50. Also Dennet, "Seward's Far +Eastern Policy," in <i>Am. Hist. Rev</i>., Vol. XXVIII, No. 1. +Dennet, however, also regards Seward's overture as in harmony with +his determined policy in the Far East.) Like Seward's overture, +made a few days before, to Great Britain for a convention to +guarantee the independence of San Domingo (F.O., Am., Vol. 763, No. +196, Lyons to Russell, May 12, 1861) the proposal on Japan seems to +me to have been an erratic feeling-out of international attitude +while in the process of developing a really serious policy--the +plunging of America into a foreign war.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_211"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor211">[211]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>, +1861-2, p. 88. The exact facts of Lincoln's alteration of Despatch +No. 10, though soon known in diplomatic circles, were not published +until the appearance in 1890 of Nicolay and Hay's <i>Lincoln</i>, +where the text of a portion of the original draft, with Lincoln's +changes were printed (IV, p. 270). Gideon Welles, Secretary of the +Navy in Lincoln's Cabinet, published a short book in 1874, +<i>Lincoln and Seward</i>, in which the story was told, but without +dates and so vaguely that no attention was directed to it. +Apparently the matter was not brought before the Cabinet and the +contents of the despatch were known only to Lincoln, Seward, and +the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, +Sumner.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_212"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor212">[212]</a> C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of +Paris," p. 21. Reprint from <i>Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings</i>, +XLVI, pp. 23-81.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_213"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor213">[213]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 764, No. 206. +Confidential.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_214"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor214">[214]</a> Russell Papers. This letter has been +printed, in part, in Newton, <i>Lyons</i>, I, 41.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_215"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor215">[215]</a> Lyons Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_216"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor216">[216]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell, May 23, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_217"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor217">[217]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 764, No. 209, +Confidential, Lyons to Russell, May 23, 1861. A brief "extract" +from this despatch was printed in the British <i>Parliamentary +Papers</i>, 1862, <i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil +War in the United States," No. 48. The "extract" in question +consists of two short paragraphs only, printed, without any +indication of important elisions, in each of the +paragraphs.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_218"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor218">[218]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. +174.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_219"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor219">[219]</a> Lutz, "Notes." The source of Schleiden's +information is not given in his despatch. He was intimate with many +persons closely in touch with events, especially with Sumner, +Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and with +Blair, a member of the Cabinet.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_220"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor220">[220]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Schleiden to Republic of +Bremen, May 27, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_221"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor221">[221]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. 179, sets +the date as June 8 when Seward's instructions for England and +France show that he had "recovered his balance." This is correct +for the change in tone of despatches, but the acceptance of +Lincoln's policy must have been immediate. C.F. Adams places the +date for Seward's complete change of policy much later, describing +his "war mania" as lasting until the Northern defeat of Bull Run, +July 21. I think this an error, and evidence that it is such +appears later in the present chapter. See Charles Francis Adams, +"Seward and the Declaration of Paris," <i>Mass. Hist. Soc. +Proceedings</i>, XLVI, pp. 23-81.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_222"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor222">[222]</a> Russell Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_223"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor223">[223]</a> Lyons Papers, May 21, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_224"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor224">[224]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Russell to Lyons, May 25, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_225"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor225">[225]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 765, No. 253.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_226"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor226">[226]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 263, Lyons to Russell, +June 8, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_227"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor227">[227]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 106.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_228"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor228">[228]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 102. Bancroft, +<i>Seward</i>, II, p. 181, using Seward's description to Adams +<i>(U.S. Messages and Documents</i>, 1861-2, p. 106) of this +interview expands upon the Secretary's skill in thus preventing a +joint notification by England and France of their intention to act +together. He rightly characterizes Seward's tactics as "diplomatic +skill of the best quality." But in Lyons' report the emphasis is +placed upon Seward's courtesy in argument, and Lyons felt that the +knowledge of British-French joint action had been made sufficiently +clear by his taking Mercier with him and by their common though +unofficial representation to Seward.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_229"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor229">[229]</a> Russell Papers. To Russell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_230"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor230">[230]</a> <i>Ibid</i>, To Russell. Lyons' source of +information was not revealed.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_231"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor231">[231]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, To Russell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_232"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor232">[232]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1861-2</i>, p. 110.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_233"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor233">[233]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 118. To +Adams.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_234"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor234">[234]</a> C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of +Paris." p. 29, and so argued by the author throughout this +monograph. I think this an error.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_235"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor235">[235]</a> The <i>Spectator</i>, friend of the North, +argued, June 15, 1861, that the Queen's Proclamation was the next +best thing for the North to a definite British alliance. Southern +privateers could not now be obtained from England. And the United +States was surely too proud to accept direct British +aid.</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137"></a>[V1:pg 137]</span> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V</h2> +<h3>THE DECLARATION OF PARIS NEGOTIATION</h3> +<br> +<p>If regarded merely from the view-point of strict chronology +there accompanied Seward's "foreign war" policy a negotiation with +Great Britain which was of importance as the first effort of the +American Secretary of State to bring European nations to a definite +support of the Northern cause. It was also the first negotiation +undertaken by Adams in London, and as a man new to the diplomatic +service he attached to it an unusual importance, even, seemingly, +to the extent of permitting personal chagrin at the ultimate +failure of the negotiation to distort his usually cool and fair +judgment. The matter in question was the offer of the United States +to accede by a convention to the Declaration of Paris of 1856, +establishing certain international rules for the conduct of +maritime warfare.</p> +<p>This negotiation has received scant attention in history. It +failed to result in a treaty, therefore it has appeared to be +negligible. Yet it was at the time of very great importance in +affecting the attitude toward each other of Great Britain and the +United States, and of the men who spoke for their respective +countries. The bald facts of the negotiation appear with exactness +in Moore's <i>Digest of International Law</i><a name= +"FNanchor236"></a><a href="#Footnote_236">[236]</a>, but without +comment as to motives, and, more briefly, in Bernard's +<i>Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil +War</i><a name="FNanchor237"></a><a href="#Footnote_237">[237]</a>, +at the conclusion of which the author <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_138"></a>[V1:pg 138]</span> writes, with +sarcasm, "I refrain from any comment on this negotiation<a name= +"FNanchor238"></a><a href="#Footnote_238">[238]</a>." Nicolay and +Hay's <i>Lincoln</i>, and Rhodes' <i>United States</i>, give the +matter but passing and inadequate treatment. It was reviewed in +some detail in the American argument before the Geneva court of +arbitration in the case of the <i>Alabama</i>, but was there +presented merely as a part of the general American complaint of +British neutrality. In fact, but three historical students, so far +as the present writer has been able to discover, have examined this +negotiation in detail and presented their conclusions as to +purposes and motives--so important to an understanding of British +intentions at the moment when the flames of civil war were rapidly +spreading in America.</p> +<p>These three, each with an established historical reputation, +exhibit decided differences in interpretation of diplomatic +incidents and documents. The first careful analysis was presented +by Henry Adams, son of the American Minister in London during the +Civil War, and then acting as his private secretary, in his +<i>Historical Essays</i>, published in 1891; the second study is by +Bancroft, in his <i>Life of Seward</i>, 1900; while the third is by +Charles Francis Adams (also son of the American Minister), who, in +his <i>Life</i> of his father, published 1900, gave a chapter to +the subject and treated it on lines similar to those laid down by +his brother Henry, but who, in 1912, came to the conclusion, +through further study, that he had earlier been in error and +developed a very different view in a monograph entitled, "Seward +and the Declaration of Paris."</p> +<br> +<a name="image05.jpg"></a> +<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image05.jpg"><img src= +"images/image05.jpg" width="55%" alt=""></a><br> +<b>C.F. ADAMS</b><br> +(<i>From a photograph in the United States Embassy, London, by kind +permission</i>)</p> +<br> +<p>If these historiographic details seem unduly minute, partaking +as they do of the nature of a foot-note, in a work otherwise +general in treatment, the author's answer is that the personality +of two of the writers mentioned and their intimate knowledge of the +effect of the negotiation upon the mind of the American Minister in +London are themselves <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_139"></a>[V1:pg 139]</span> important historical data; a +further answer is the fact that the materials now available from +the British Foreign Office archives throw much new light both on +the course of the negotiation and on British purposes. It is here +planned, therefore, first to review the main facts as previously +known; second, to summarize the arguments and conclusions of the +three historians; third, to re-examine the negotiation in the light +of the new material; and, finally, to express an opinion on its +conduct and conclusions as an evidence of British policy.</p> +<p>In 1854, during the Crimean War, Great Britain and France, the +chief maritime belligerents engaged against Russia, voluntarily +agreed to respect neutral commerce under either the neutral's or +the enemy's flag. This was a distinct step forward in the practice +of maritime warfare, the accepted international rules of which had +not been formally altered since the Napoleonic period. The action +of Great Britain was due in part, according to a later statement in +Parliament by Palmerston, March 18, 1862, to a fear that unless a +greater respect were paid than formerly to neutral rights, the +Allies would quickly win the ill-will of the United States, then +the most powerful maritime neutral, and would run the danger of +forcing that country into belligerent alliance with Russia<a name= +"FNanchor239"></a><a href="#Footnote_239">[239]</a>. No doubt there +were other reasons, also, for the barbarous rules and practices of +maritime warfare in earlier times were by now regarded as +semi-civilized by the writers of all nations. Certainly the action +of the belligerents in 1854 met with general approval and in the +result was written into international law at the Congress of Paris +in 1856, where, at the conclusion of the war, the belligerents and +some leading neutrals were gathered.</p> +<p>The Declaration of Paris on maritime warfare covered four +points:</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140"></a>[V1:pg 140]</span> +<blockquote>"1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished.<br> +<br> +"2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of +contraband of war.<br> +<br> +"3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not +liable to capture under enemy's flag.<br> +<br> +"4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is +to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access +to the coast of the enemy<a name="FNanchor240"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_240">[240]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>This agreement was adopted by Austria, France, Great Britain, +Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey, and it was further agreed +that a general invitation to accede should be extended to all +nations, but with the proviso "that the powers which shall have +signed it, or which shall accede thereto, shall not in future enter +into any arrangement, concerning the application of the law of +neutrals in time of war, which does not rest altogether upon the +four principles embodied in the said declaration<a name= +"FNanchor241"></a><a href="#Footnote_241">[241]</a>." In other +words it must be accepted in whole, and not in part, and the powers +acceding pledging themselves not to enter into any subsequent +treaties or engagements on maritime law which did not stipulate +observance of all four points. Within a short time nearly all the +maritime nations of the world had given official adherence to the +Declaration of Paris.</p> +<p>But the United States refused to do so. She had long stood in +the advance guard of nations demanding respect for neutral rights. +Little by little her avowed principles of international law as +regards neutrals, first scoffed at, had crept into acceptance in +treaty stipulations. Secretary of State Marcy now declared, in +July, 1856, that the United <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_141"></a>[V1:pg 141]</span> States would accede to the +Declaration if a fifth article were added to it protecting all +private property at sea, when not contraband. This covered not only +cargo, but the vessel as well, and its effect would have been to +exclude from belligerent operations non-contraband enemy's goods +under the enemy's flag, if goods and ship were privately owned. +Maritime warfare on the high seas would have been limited to +battles between governmentally operated war-ships. Unless this rule +were adopted also, Secretary Marcy declared that "the United States +could not forgo the right to send out privateers, which in the past +had proved her most effective maritime weapon in time of war, and +which, since she had no large navy, were essential to her fighting +power."</p> +<p>"War on private property," said the Americans, "had been +abolished on land; why should it not be abolished also on the sea?" +The American proposal met with general support among the smaller +maritime nations. It was believed that the one great obstacle to +the adoption of Marcy's amendment lay in the naval supremacy of +Great Britain, and that obstacle proved insurmountable. Thus the +United States refused to accede to the Declaration, and there the +matter rested until 1861. But on April 17 Jefferson Davis +proclaimed for the Southern Confederacy the issue of privateers +against Northern commerce. On April 24 Seward instructed +representatives abroad, recounting the Marcy proposal and +expressing the hope that it still might meet with a favourable +reception, but authorizing them to enter into conventions for +American adherence to the Declaration of 1856 on the four points +alone. This instruction was sent to the Ministers in Great Britain, +France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Denmark; and +on May 10 to the Netherlands.</p> +<p>Having received this instruction, Adams, at the close of his +first meeting with Russell on May 18, after having <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_142"></a>[V1:pg 142]</span> developed at +length the American position relative to the issue of the British +Proclamation of Neutrality, briefly added that he was directed to +offer adherence by means of a convention, to the Declaration of +Paris. Russell replied that Great Britain was willing to negotiate, +but "seemed to desire to leave the subject in the hands of Lord +Lyons, to whom he intimated that he had already transmitted +authority<a name="FNanchor242"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_242">[242]</a>...." Adams therefore did not press the +matter, waiting further information and instruction from +Washington. Nearly two weeks earlier Russell had, in fact, +approached the Government of France with a suggestion that the two +leading maritime powers should propose to the American belligerents +adherence to the second and third articles of the Declaration of +Paris. France had agreed and the date of Russell's instruction to +Lyons was May 18, the day of the interview with Adams. Confusion +now arose in both London and Washington as to the place where the +arrangement was to be concluded. The causes of this confusion will +be considered later in this chapter; here it is sufficient to note +that the negotiation was finally undertaken at London.</p> +<p>On July 18 Russell informed Adams that Great Britain was ready +to enter into a convention with the United States, provided a +similar convention was signed with France at the same time. This +convention, as submitted by Adams, simply recorded an agreement by +the two powers to abide by the four points of the Declaration of +Paris, using the exact wording of that document<a name= +"FNanchor243"></a><a href="#Footnote_243">[243]</a>. Adams' draft +had been communicated to Russell on July 13. There then followed a +delay required by the necessity of securing similar action by +Dayton, the American Minister at Paris, but on July 29 Adams +reported to Russell that this had <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_143"></a>[V1:pg 143]</span> been done and that he was ready +to sign. Two days later, July 31, Russell replied that he, also, +was ready, but concluded his letter, "I need scarcely add that on +the part of Great Britain the engagement will be prospective, and +will not invalidate anything already done<a name= +"FNanchor244"></a><a href="#Footnote_244">[244]</a>." It was not +until August 8, however, that Cowley, the British Ambassador to +France, reported that Dayton had informed Thouvenel, French Foreign +Minister, that he was ready to sign the similar convention with +France<a name="FNanchor245"></a><a href="#Footnote_245">[245]</a>. +With no understanding, apparently, of the causes of further delay, +and professing complete ignorance of the meaning of Russell's +phrase, just quoted<a name="FNanchor246"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_246">[246]</a>, Adams waited the expected invitation to +an official interview for the affixing of signatures. Since it was +a condition of the negotiation that this should be done +simultaneously in London and Paris, the further delay that now +occurred caused him no misgivings.</p> +<p>On August 19 Russell requested Adams to name a convenient day +"in the course of this week," and prefaced this request with the +statement that he enclosed a copy of a Declaration which he +proposed to make in writing, upon signing the convention. "You will +observe," he wrote, "that it is intended to prevent any +misconception as to the nature of the engagement to be taken by Her +Majesty." The proposed Declaration read:</p> +<blockquote>"In affixing his signature to the Convention of this +day between Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and +the United States of America, the Earl Russell declares, by order +of Her Majesty, that Her Majesty does not intend thereby to +undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or +indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United +States<a name="FNanchor247"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_247">[247]</a>."</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144"></a>[V1:pg 144]</span> +<p>Under his instructions to negotiate a convention for a pure and +simple adherence to the Declaration of Paris, Adams could not now +go on to official signature. Nor was he inclined to do so. +Sincerely believing, as he stated to Russell in a communication of +August 23, that the United States was "acting with the single +purpose of aiding to establish a permanent doctrine for all time," +and with the object of "ameliorating the horrors of warfare all +over the globe," he objected "to accompany the act with a +proceeding somewhat novel and anomalous," which on the face of it +seemed to imply a suspicion on the part of Great Britain that the +United States was "desirous at this time to take a part in the +Declaration [of Paris], not from any high purpose or durable +policy, but with the view of securing some small temporary object +in the unhappy struggle which is going on at home<a name= +"FNanchor248"></a><a href="#Footnote_248">[248]</a>." He also +pointed out that Russell's proposed declaration either was or was +not a part of the convention. If it was a part then the Senate of +the United States must ratify it as well as the convention itself, +and he would have gone beyond his instructions in submitting it. If +not a part of the convention there could be no advantage in making +the Declaration since, unratified by the Senate, it would have no +force. Adams therefore declined to proceed further with the matter +until he had received new instructions from Washington.</p> +<p>To this Russell answered, August 28, with a very explicit +exposition of his reasons. Great Britain, he said, had declared her +neutrality in the American conflict, thereby recognizing the +belligerent rights of the South. It followed that the South "might +by the law of nations arm privateers," and that these "must be +regarded as the armed vessels of a belligerent." But the United +States had refused to recognize the status of belligerency, and +could therefore maintain that privateers issued by the Southern +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145"></a>[V1:pg 145]</span> +States were in fact pirates, and might argue that a European Power +signing a convention with the United States, embodying the +principles of the Declaration of Paris, "would be bound to treat +the privateers of the so-called Confederate States as pirates." +Hence Russell pointed out, the two countries, arguing from +contradictory premises as to the status of the conflict in America, +might become involved in charges of bad faith and of violation of +the convention. He had therefore merely intended by his suggested +declaration to prevent any misconception by the United States.</p> +<blockquote>"It is in this spirit that Her Majesty's Government +decline to bind themselves, without a clear explanation on their +part, to a Convention which, seemingly confined to an adoption of +the Declaration of Paris of 1856, might be construed as an +engagement to interfere in the unhappy dissensions now prevailing +in the United States; an interference which would be contrary to +Her Majesty's public declarations, and would be a reversal of the +policy which Her Majesty has deliberately sanctioned<a name= +"FNanchor249"></a><a href="#Footnote_249">[249]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Thus the negotiation closed. Seward in declining to accept the +proposed declaration gave varying reasons in his instructions to +Adams, in London, and to Dayton, in Paris, for an exactly similar +declaration had been insisted upon by France, but he did not argue +the question save in generalities. He told Dayton that the supposed +possible "intervention" which Great Britain and France seemed to +fear they would be called upon to make was exactly the action which +the United States desired to forestall, and he notified Adams that +he could not consent since the proposed Declaration "would be +virtually a new and distinct article incorporated into the +projected convention<a name="FNanchor250"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_250">[250]</a>." The first formal negotiation of the +United States during the Civil War, and of the new American +Minister in London, had come <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_146"></a>[V1:pg 146]</span> to an inglorious conclusion. +Diplomats and Foreign Secretaries were, quite naturally, disturbed, +and were even suspicious of each others' motives, but the public, +not at the moment informed save on the American offer and the +result, paid little attention to these "inner circle" +controversies<a name="FNanchor251"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_251">[251]</a>.</p> +<p>What then were the hidden purposes, if such existed, of the +negotiating powers. The first answer in historical writing was that +offered by Henry Adams<a name="FNanchor252"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_252">[252]</a>, in an essay entitled "The Declaration of +Paris, 1861," in the preparation of which the author studied with +care all the diplomatic correspondence available in print<a name= +"FNanchor253"></a><a href="#Footnote_253">[253]</a>. His treatment +presents Russell as engaged in a policy of deception with the view +of obtaining an ultimate advantage to Great Britain in the field of +commercial rivalry and maritime supremacy. Following Henry Adams' +argument Russell, on May 9, brought to the attention of France a +proposal for a joint request on the American belligerents to +respect the second and third articles of the Declaration of Paris, +and received an acquiescent reply. After some further exchanges of +proposed terms of instructions to the British and French Ministers +at Washington, Russell, on May 18, sent a despatch to Lyons with +instructions for his action. On this same day Russell, in his first +interview with Adams, "before these despatches [to Lyons] could +have left the Foreign Office," and replying to Adams' proposal to +negotiate <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147"></a>[V1:pg +147]</span> on the Declaration of Paris as a <i>whole</i>--that is +to say, on all four articles--intimated that instructions had +already gone to Lyons, with directions to assent to any +modification of the article on privateering that the United States +might desire. Adams understood Russell to prefer that the +negotiation (for such Adams thought it was to be) should take place +in Washington, and did not press the matter.</p> +<p>This was deliberate deceit; first in a statement of fact since +the interview with Adams took place at noon on May 18, at Russell's +country house nine miles from London, and in all reasonable +supposition the despatch to Lyons would not have been sent until +the Foreign Secretary's return to his office; second because Lyons +was not instructed to <i>negotiate</i> on the Declaration. The +interpretation is justified therefore that Russell "evaded the +offer of the United States Government." The result of this evasion +was delay, but when Seward learned from Lyons that he had no +authority to negotiate a convention and Adams received renewed +instructions to proceed, the latter "kept his temper, but the +affair made a lasting impression on his mind, and shook his faith +in the straightforwardness of the British Government." In renewing +his overtures at London, Adams made explanations of the previous +"misunderstanding" and to these Russell replied with further +"inaccuracies" as to what had been said at the first interview.</p> +<p>Thus beginning his survey with an assertion of British deceit +and evasion from the very outset, and incidentally remarking that +Lyons, at Washington, "made little disguise of his leanings" toward +the South, Henry Adams depicts Russell as leading France along a +line of policy distinctly unfriendly to the North. Examining each +point in the negotiation as already narrated, he summarized it as +follows:</p> +<blockquote>"The story has shown that Russell and his colleagues +... induced the French Government to violate the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_148"></a>[V1:pg 148]</span> pledge in the +protocol of the Declaration of Paris in order to offer to both +belligerents a partial adhesion, which must exclude the United +States from a simple adhesion, to the Declaration of Paris, while +it placed both belligerents on the same apparent footing. These +steps were taken in haste before Adams could obtain an interview. +When Adams by an effort unexpected to Russell obtained an interview +at Pembroke Lodge at noon of Saturday, May 18, and according to +Russell's report of May 21, said that the United States were +'disposed to adhere to the Declaration of Paris,' Russell evaded +the offer, saying that he had already sent sufficient instructions +to Lyons, although the instructions were not sufficient, nor had +they been sent. When this evasion was afterward brought to his +notice by Adams, Russell, revising his report to Lyons, made such +changes in it as should represent the first proposal as coming from +himself, and the evasion to have come from Adams. When at last +obliged to read the American offer, Russell declared that he had +never heard of it before, although he had himself reported it to +Lyons and Lyons had reported it to him. When compelled to take the +offer for consideration, Russell, though always professing to +welcome adhesion pure and simple, required the co-operation of +Dayton. When Adams overcame this last obstacle, Russell interposed +a written proviso, which as he knew from Lyons would prevent +ratification. When Adams paid no attention to the proviso but +insisted on signature of the treaty, Russell at last wrote a +declaration in the nature of an insult, which could not be +disregarded<a name="FNanchor254"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_254">[254]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>In this presentation of the case to the jury certain minor +points are insisted upon to establish a ground for suspicion--as +the question of who first made the proposal--that are not essential +to Henry Adams' conclusions. This conclusion is that "From the +delays interposed by Russell, Adams must conclude that the British +Cabinet was trying one device after another to evade the +proposition; and finally, from the written declaration of August +19, he could draw no other inference than that Russell had resorted +to <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149"></a>[V1:pg 149]</span> +the only defensive weapon left to him, in order to avoid the avowal +of his true motives and policy<a name="FNanchor255"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_255">[255]</a>." The <i>motive</i> of this tortuous +proceeding, the author believed to have been a deep-laid scheme to +revive, <i>after</i> the American War was ended, the earlier +international practice of Great Britain, in treating as subject to +belligerent seizure enemy's goods under the neutral flag. It was +the American stand, argues Henry Adams, that in 1854 had compelled +Great Britain to renounce this practice. A complete American +adherence, now, to the Declaration, would for ever tie Britain's +hands, but if there were no such complete adherence and only +temporary observation of the second article, after the war had +resulted in the disruption of the United States, thus removing the +chief supporter of that article, Great Britain would feel free to +resume her old-time practice when she engaged in war. If Great +Britain made a formal treaty with the United States she would feel +bound to respect it; the Declaration of Paris as it stood +constituted "a mere agreement, which was binding, as Lord +Malmesbury declared, only so long as it was convenient to respect +it<a name="FNanchor256"></a><a href="#Footnote_256">[256]</a>." +Thus the second article of the Declaration of Paris, not the first +on privateering, was in the eye of the British Cabinet in the +negotiation of 1861. Henry Adams ends his essay: "After the manner +in which Russell received the advances of President Lincoln, no +American Minister in London could safely act on any other +assumption than that the British Government meant, at the first +convenient opportunity, to revive the belligerent pretensions +dormant since the War of 1812<a name="FNanchor257"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_257">[257]</a>."</p> +<p>This analysis was published in 1891. Still more briefly +summarized it depicts an unfriendly, almost hostile attitude +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150"></a>[V1:pg 150]</span> on +the part of Russell and Lyons, deceit and evasion by the former, +selfish British policy, and throughout a blind following on by +France, yielding to Russell's leadership. The American proposal is +regarded merely as a simple and sincere offer to join in supporting +an improved international practice in war-times. But when Frederic +Bancroft, the biographer of Seward, examined the negotiation he was +compelled to ask himself whether this was all, indeed, that the +American Secretary of State had in view. Bancroft's analysis may be +stated more briefly<a name="FNanchor258"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_258">[258]</a>.</p> +<p>Seward's general instruction, Bancroft notes, bore date of April +24, nearly a month before any foreign Power had recognized Southern +belligerent rights; it indicates "a plan by which he hoped to +remove all excuse for such action." In despatches to Dayton, Seward +asserted a twofold motive: "a sincere desire to co-operate with +other progressive nations in the melioration of the rigours of +maritime war," and "to remove every cause that any foreign Power +could have for the recognition of the insurgents as a belligerent +Power<a name="FNanchor259"></a><a href="#Footnote_259">[259]</a>." +This last result was not so clear to Dayton at Paris, nor was the +mechanism of operation ever openly stated by Seward. But he did +write, later, that the proposal of accession to the Declaration of +Paris was tendered "as the act of this Federal Government, to be +obligatory equally upon disloyal as upon loyal citizens." "It did +not," writes Bancroft, "require the gift of prophecy to tell what +would result in case the offer of accession on the part of the +United States should be accepted<a name="FNanchor260"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_260">[260]</a>."</p> +<p>Seward's object was to place the European nations in a position +where they, as well as the United States, would be forced to regard +Southern privateers as pirates, and treat <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_151"></a>[V1:pg 151]</span> them as such. +This was a conceivable result of the negotiation before European +recognition of Southern belligerency, but even after that +recognition and after Dayton had pointed out the impossibility of +such a result, Seward pressed for the treaty and instructed Dayton +not to raise the question with France. He still had in mind this +main object. "If Seward," says Bancroft, "had not intended to use +the adherence of the United States to the declaration as a lever to +force the other Powers to treat the Confederates as pirates, or at +least to cease regarding them as belligerents, he might easily and +unofficially have removed all such suspicions<a name= +"FNanchor261"></a><a href="#Footnote_261">[261]</a>." In an +interview with Lyons on July 6 Seward urged a quick conclusion of +the treaty, arguing that its effect upon the revolted states could +be determined afterwards. Naturally Lyons was alarmed and gave +warning to Russell. "Probably it was this advice that caused +Russell to insist on the explanatory declaration<a name= +"FNanchor262"></a><a href="#Footnote_262">[262]</a>."</p> +<p>It would appear, then, that Seward much underestimated the +acuteness of Russell and Thouvenel, and expected them "to walk into +a trap." Nor could his claim "that there was no difference between +a nation entirely at peace and one in circumstances like those of +the United States at this time" be taken seriously. "He was +furnishing his opponent with evidences of his lack of candour." +This clouded the effect that would have followed "a wise and +generous policy toward neutrals, which had doubtless been in +Seward's mind from the beginning<a name="FNanchor263"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_263">[263]</a>." In the end he concluded the negotiation +gracefully, writing to Adams a pledge of American respect for the +second and third articles of the Declaration of Paris--exactly that +which Lyons had originally been instructed by Russell to +secure.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152"></a>[V1:pg 152]</span> +<blockquote>"We regard Great Britain as a friend. Her Majesty's +flag, according to our traditional principles, covers enemy's goods +not contraband of war. Goods of Her Majesty's subjects, not +contraband of war, are exempt from confiscation, though found under +a neutral or disloyal flag. No depredations shall be committed by +our naval forces or by those of any of our citizens, so far as we +can prevent it, upon the vessels or property of British subjects. +Our blockade, being effective, must be respected<a name= +"FNanchor264"></a><a href="#Footnote_264">[264]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Thus Bancroft regards Seward's proposals of April 24 as in part +the result of humanitarian motives and in part as having a +concealed purpose of Northern advantage. This last he calls a +"trap." And it is to be noted that in Seward's final pledge to +Adams the phrase "those of any of our citizens" reserves, for the +North, since the negotiation had failed, the right to issue +privateers on her own account. But Russell also, says Bancroft, was +not "altogether artless and frank." He had in view a British +commercial advantage during the war, since if the United States +respected the second and third articles of the Declaration of +Paris, and "if Confederate privateers should roam the ocean and +seize the ships and goods of citizens of the North, all the better +for other commercial nations; for it would soon cause the commerce +of the United States to be carried on under foreign flags, +especially the British and French<a name="FNanchor265"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_265">[265]</a>." Ulterior motive is, therefore, ascribed +to both parties in the negotiation, and that of Seward is treated +as conceived at the moment when a policy of seeking European +friendship was dominant at Washington, but with the hope of +securing at least negative European support. Seward's persistence +after European recognition of Southern belligerency is <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_153"></a>[V1:pg 153]</span> regarded as a +characteristic obstinacy without a clear view of possible resulting +dangerous complications.</p> +<p>This view discredits the acumen of the American Secretary of +State and it does not completely satisfy the third historian to +examine the incident in detail. Nor does he agree on the basis of +British policy. Charles Francis Adams, in his "Life" of his father, +writing in 1899, followed in the main the view of his brother, +Henry Adams. But in 1912 he reviewed the negotiation at great +length with different conclusions<a name="FNanchor266"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_266">[266]</a>. His thesis is that the Declaration of +Paris negotiation was an essential part of Seward's "foreign war +policy," in that in case a treaty was signed with Great Britain and +France and then those Powers refused to aid in the suppression of +Southern privateering, or at least permitted them access to British +and French ports, a good ground of complaint leading to war would +be established. <i>This</i> was the ultimate ulterior purpose in +Seward's mind; the negotiation was but a method of fixing a quarrel +on some foreign Power in case the United States should seek, as +Seward desired, a cementing of the rift at home by a foreign +war.</p> +<p>In the details of the negotiation C.F. Adams agrees with +Bancroft, but with this new interpretation. The opening +misunderstanding he ascribed, as did Lyons, to the simple fact that +Seward "had refused to see the despatch" in which Russell's +proposals were made<a name="FNanchor267"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_267">[267]</a>. Seward's instructions <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_154"></a>[V1:pg 154]</span> of July 6, +after the misunderstanding was made clear to him, pushing the +negotiation, were drawn when he was "still riding a very high +horse--the No. 10 charger, in fact, he had mounted on the 21st of +the previous May<a name="FNanchor268"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_268">[268]</a>," and this warlike charger he continued +to ride until the sobering Northern defeat at Bull Run, July 21, +put an end to his folly. If that battle had been a Northern victory +he would have gone on with his project. Now, with the end of a +period of brain-storm and the emergence of sanity in foreign +policy, "Secretary Seward in due time (September 7) pronounced the +proposed reservation [by Russell] quite 'inadmissible.' And here +the curtain fell on this somewhat prolonged and not altogether +creditable diplomatic farce<a name="FNanchor269"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_269">[269]</a>."</p> +<p>Incidentally C.F. Adams examined also British action and +intention. Lyons is wholly exonerated. "Of him it may be fairly +said that his course throughout seems to furnish no ground for +criticism<a name="FNanchor270"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_270">[270]</a>." And Lyons is quoted as having +understood, in the end, the real purpose of Seward's policy in +seeking embroilment with Europe. He wrote to Russell on December 6 +upon the American publication of despatches, accompanying the +President's annual message: "Little doubt can remain, after reading +the papers, that the accession was offered solely with the view to +the effect it would have on the privateering operations of the +Southern States; and that a refusal on the part of England and +France, after having accepted the accession, to treat the Southern +privateers as pirates, would have been made a serious grievance, if +not a ground of quarrel<a name="FNanchor271"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_271">[271]</a>...." As to <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_155"></a>[V1:pg 155]</span> Russell, combating Henry Adams' +view, it is asserted that it was the great good fortune of the +United States that the British Foreign Secretary, having declared a +policy of neutrality, was not to be driven from its honest +application by irritations, nor seduced into a position where the +continuation of that policy would be difficult.</p> +<p>Before entering upon an account of the bearing of the newly +available British materials on the negotiation--materials which +will in themselves offer sufficient comment on the theories of +Henry Adams, and in less degree of Bancroft--it is best to note +here the fallacy in C.F. Adams' main thesis. If the analysis given +in the preceding chapter of the initiation and duration of Seward's +"foreign war policy" is correct, then the Declaration of Paris +negotiation had no essential relation whatever to that policy. The +instructions to Adams were sent to eight other Ministers. Is it +conceivable that Seward desired a war with the whole maritime +world? The date, April 24, antedates any deliberate proposal of a +foreign war, whatever he may have been brooding, and in fact stamps +the offer as part of that friendly policy toward Europe which +Lincoln had insisted upon. Seward's frenzy for a foreign war did +not come to a head until the news had been received of England's +determination to recognize Southern belligerency. This was in the +second week of May and on the twenty-first Despatch No. 10 marked +the decline, not the beginning, of a belligerent policy, and by the +President's orders. By May 24 probably, by the twenty-seventh +certainly, Seward had yielded and was rapidly beginning to turn to +expressions of friendship<a name="FNanchor272"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_272">[272]</a>. Yet it was only on May 18 that Russell's +first instructions to Lyons were sent, and not until late in June +that the "misunderstanding" cleared away, instructions were +despatched by Seward to push the Declaration of Paris negotiations +at London and Paris. The battle of Bull Run <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_156"></a>[V1:pg 156]</span> had nothing to +do with a new policy. Thus chronology forbids the inclusion of this +negotiation, either in its inception, progress, or conclusion, as +an agency intended to make possible, on just grounds, a foreign +war.</p> +<p>A mere chronological examination of documents, both printed and +in archives, permits a clearer view of British policy on the +Declaration of Paris. Recalling the facts of the American situation +known in London it will be remembered that on May 1 the British +Government and Parliament became aware that a civil war was +inevitable and that the South planned to issue privateers. On that +day Russell asked the Admiralty to reinforce the British fleet in +West Indian waters that British commerce might be adequately +protected. Five days later, May 6, he announced in the Commons that +Great Britain must be strictly neutral, and that a policy of close +harmony with France was being matured; and on this day he proposed +through Cowley, in Paris, that Great Britain and France each ask +<i>both</i> the contending parties in America to abide by the +second and third articles of the Declaration of Paris<a name= +"FNanchor273"></a><a href="#Footnote_273">[273]</a>. If there was +ulterior motive here it does not appear in any despatch either then +or later, passing between any of the British diplomats +concerned--Russell, Cowley, and Lyons. The plain fact was that the +United States was not an adherent to the Declaration, that the +South had announced privateering, and the North a blockade, and +that the only portions of the Declaration in regard to which the +belligerents had as yet made no statement were the second and third +articles.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157"></a>[V1:pg 157]</span> +<p>It was, indeed, an anxious time for the British Government. On +May 9 Forster asked in the Commons what would be the Government's +attitude toward a British subject serving on a Southern +privateer<a name="FNanchor274"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_274">[274]</a>. The next day in the Lords there occurred +a debate the general burden of which was that privateering was in +fact piracy, but that under the conditions of the American previous +stand, it could not be treated as such<a name= +"FNanchor275"></a><a href="#Footnote_275">[275]</a>. Both in the +Commons and the Lords speakers were referred to the forthcoming +Proclamation of Neutrality, but the uncertainty developed in both +debates is very probably reflected in the new despatch now sent to +Cowley, on May 11<a name="FNanchor276"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_276">[276]</a>. By that despatch France was asked to +send an instruction to Mercier in Washington similar to a draft +instruction intended for Lyons, a copy of which was enclosed to +Cowley, the object being to secure from the American belligerents +adherence to <i>all</i> the articles, privateering included, of the +Declaration of Paris<a name="FNanchor277"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_277">[277]</a>.</p> +<p>Whatever Russell's purpose in thus altering his original +suggestion, it met with a prompt check from France. On May 9 +Thouvenel had agreed heartily to the proposal of May 6, adding the +practical advice that the best method of approach to the +Confederacy would be through the consuls in the South<a name= +"FNanchor278"></a><a href="#Footnote_278">[278]</a>. Now, on May +13, Russell was informed that Thouvenel feared that England and +France would get into serious trouble if the North agreed to accede +on privateering and the South did not. Cowley reported that he had +argued with Thouvenel that privateers were <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_158"></a>[V1:pg 158]</span> pirates and +ought to be treated as such, but that Thouvenel refused to do more +than instruct Mercier on the second and third articles<a name= +"FNanchor279"></a><a href="#Footnote_279">[279]</a>. For the moment +Russell appears to have yielded easily to this French advice. On +May 13 he had that interview with the Southern commissioners in +which he mentioned a communication about to be made to the +South<a name="FNanchor280"></a><a href="#Footnote_280">[280]</a>; +and on May 15 the London <i>Times</i>, presumably reflecting +governmental decision, in commenting on the Proclamation of +Neutrality, developed at some length the idea that British +citizens, if they served on Southern privateers, could claim no +protection from Great Britain if the North chose to treat them as +pirates. May 16, Cowley reported that Thouvenel had written Mercier +in the terms of Russell's draft to Lyons of the eleventh, but +omitting the part about privateering<a name= +"FNanchor281"></a><a href="#Footnote_281">[281]</a>, and on this +same day Russell sent to Cowley a copy of a <i>new</i> draft of +instructions to Lyons, seemingly in exact accord with the French +idea<a name="FNanchor282"></a><a href="#Footnote_282">[282]</a>. On +the seventeenth, Cowley reported this as highly satisfactory to +Thouvenel<a name="FNanchor283"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_283">[283]</a>. Finally on May 18 the completed +instruction was despatched.</p> +<p>It was on this same day, May 18, that Adams had his first +interview with Russell. All that had been planned by Great Britain +and France had been based on their estimate of the necessity of the +situation. They had no knowledge of Seward's instructions of April +24. When therefore Adams, toward the conclusion of his interview, +stated his authority to negotiate a convention, he undoubtedly took +Russell by surprise. So far as he was concerned a suggestion to the +North, the result of an agreement made with France <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_159"></a>[V1:pg 159]</span> after some +discussion and delay, was in fact completed, and the draft finally +drawn <i>two days before</i>, on the sixteenth. Even if not +actually sent, as Henry Adams thinks, it was a completed agreement. +Russell might well speak of it as an instruction already given to +Lyons. Moreover there were two points in Adams' conversation of the +eighteenth likely to give Russell cause for thought. The first was +Adams' protest against the British recognition of a status of +belligerency. If the North felt so earnestly about this, had it +been wise to instruct Lyons to make an approach to the South? This +required consideration. And in the second place did not Adams' +offer again open up the prospect of somehow getting from the North +at least a formal and permanent renunciation of privateering?</p> +<p>For if an examination is made of Russell's instruction to Lyons +of May 18 it appears that he had not, after all, dropped that +reference to privateering which Thouvenel had omitted in his own +instructions to Mercier. Adams understood Russell to have said that +he "had already transmitted authority [to Lyons] to assent to any +modification of the only point in issue which the Government of the +United States might prefer. On that matter he believed that there +would be no difficulty whatever<a name="FNanchor284"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_284">[284]</a>." This clearly referred to privateering. +Russell's instructions to Lyons took up the points of the +Declaration of Paris in reverse order. That on blockades was now +generally accepted by all nations. The principle of the third +article had "long been recognized as law, both in Great Britain and +in the United States." The second article, "sanctioned by the +United States in the earliest period of the history of their +independence," had been opposed, formerly, by Great Britain, but +having acquiesced in the Declaration of 1856, "she means to adhere +to the principle she then adopted." <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_160"></a>[V1:pg 160]</span> Thus briefly stating his +confidence that the United States would agree on three of the +articles, Russell explained at length his views as to privateering +in the American crisis.</p> +<blockquote>"There remains only to be considered Article I, namely, +that relating to privateering, from which the Government of the +United States withheld their assent. Under these circumstances it +is expedient to consider what is required on this subject by the +general law of nations. Now it must be borne in mind that +privateers bearing the flag of one or other of the belligerents may +be manned by lawless and abandoned men, who may commit, for the +sake of plunder, the most destructive and sanguinary outrages. +There can be no question, however, but that the commander and crew +of a ship bearing a letter of marque must, by the law of nations, +carry on their hostilities according to the established laws of +war. Her Majesty's Government must, therefore, hold any Government +issuing such letters of marque responsible for, and liable to make +good, any losses sustained by Her Majesty's subjects in consequence +of wrongful proceedings of vessels sailing under such letters of +marque.<br> +<br> +"In this way, the object of the Declaration of Paris may to a +certain extent be attained without the adoption of any new +principle.<br> +<br> +"You will urge these points upon Mr. Seward<a name= +"FNanchor285"></a><a href="#Footnote_285">[285]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>What did Russell mean by this cautious statement? The facts +known to him were that Davis had proclaimed the issue of letters of +marque and that Lincoln had countered by proclaiming Southern +privateering to be piracy<a name="FNanchor286"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_286">[286]</a>. He did not know that Seward was prepared +to renounce privateering, but he must have thought it likely from +Lincoln's proclamation, and have regarded this as a good time to +strike for an object desired by all the European maritime nations +since 1856. Russell could not, while Great Britain was neutral, +join the United States in treating Southern privateers as pirates, +but he here offered to come as close <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_161"></a>[V1:pg 161]</span> to it as he dared, by asserting +that Great Britain would use vigilance in upholding the law of +nations. This language might be interpreted as intended for the +admonition of the North also, but the <i>facts</i> of the then +known situation make it applicable to Southern activities alone. +Russell had desired to include privateering in the proposals to the +United States and to the South, but Thouvenel's criticisms forced +him to a half-measure of suggestion to the North, and a full +statement of the delicacy of the situation in the less formal +letter to Lyons accompanying his official instructions. This was +also dated May 18. In it Russell directed Lyons to transmit to the +British Consul at Charleston or New Orleans a copy of the official +instruction "to be communicated at Montgomery to the President of +the so-styled Confederate States," and he further explained his +purpose and the British position:</p> +<blockquote>"... You will not err in encouraging the Government to +which you are accredited to carry into effect any disposition which +they may evince to recognize the Declaration of Paris in regard to +privateering....<br> +<br> +"You will clearly understand that Her Majesty's Government cannot +accept the renunciation of privateering on the part of the +Government of the United States if coupled with the condition that +they should enforce its renunciation on the Confederate States, +either by denying their right to issue letters of marque, or by +interfering with the belligerent operations of vessels holding from +them such letters of marque, so long as they carry on hostilities +according to the recognized principles and under the admitted +liabilities of the law of nations<a name="FNanchor287"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_287">[287]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Certainly this was clear enough and was demanded by the British +policy of neutrality. Russell had guarded against the complication +feared by Thouvenel, but he still hoped by a half-pledge to the +North and a half-threat to the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_162"></a>[V1:pg 162]</span> South to secure from both +belligerents a renunciation of privateering. In short he was not +yet fully convinced of the wisdom of the French limitation. +Moreover he believed that Thouvenel might yet be won to his own +opinion, for in an unprinted portion of this same private letter to +Lyons of May 18 Russell wrote:</p> +<blockquote>"I have further to state to you, with reference to my +despatch of this day that H.M. Govt. were in the first instance +inclined to propose to both of the contending parties to adopt the +first clause of the Declaration of Paris, by which privateering is +renounced. But after communication with the French Govt. it +appeared best to limit our propositions in the manner explained in +my despatch.<br> +<br> +"I understand however from Lord Cowley that, although M. Mercier is +not absolutely instructed to advert to the abolition of +privateering, yet that some latitude of action is left to him on +that point should he deem it advisable to exercise it<a name= +"FNanchor288"></a><a href="#Footnote_288">[288]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Lyons and Mercier saw more clearly than did Russell what was in +Seward's mind. Lyons had been instructed in the despatch just cited +to use his own discretion as to joint action with the French +Minister so long only as the two countries took the same stand. He +was to pursue whatever method seemed most "conciliatory." His first +private comment on receiving Russell's instruction was, "Mr. Seward +will be furious when he finds that his adherence to the Declaration +of Paris will not stop the Southern privateering<a name= +"FNanchor289"></a><a href="#Footnote_289">[289]</a>," and in an +official confidential despatch of the same day, June 4, he gave +Russell clear warning of what Seward expected from his overture +through Adams<a name="FNanchor290"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_290">[290]</a>. So delicate did the matter appear to +Lyons and Mercier that <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_163"></a>[V1:pg 163]</span> they agreed to keep quiet for a +time at least about their instructions, hoping to be relieved by +the transfer of the whole matter to London and Paris<a name= +"FNanchor291"></a><a href="#Footnote_291">[291]</a>. But in London +Russell was at this moment taking up again his favoured purpose. On +June 6 he wrote to Grey (temporarily replacing Cowley at Paris) +that he understood a communication had been made in Paris, as in +London, for an American adherence to the Declaration of Paris; "... +it may open the way to the abolition of Privateering all over the +world. But ... we ought not to use any menace to the Confederate +States with a view of obtaining this desirable object<a name= +"FNanchor292"></a><a href="#Footnote_292">[292]</a>." Evidently, in +his opinion, the South would not dare to hold out and no "menace" +would be required<a name="FNanchor293"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_293">[293]</a>. Six days later, however, having learned +from the French Ambassador that Dayton in Paris had made clear to +Thouvenel the expectation of the United States that France would +treat Southern privateers as pirates, Russell wrote that England, +of course, could not agree to any such conclusion<a name= +"FNanchor294"></a><a href="#Footnote_294">[294]</a>. Nevertheless +this did not mean that Russell yet saw any real objection to +concluding a convention with the United States. Apparently he could +not believe that so obvious an inconsistency <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_164"></a>[V1:pg 164]</span> with the +declared neutrality of Great Britain was expected to be obtained by +the American Secretary of State.</p> +<p>Others were more suspicious. Lyons reported on June 13 that +Seward had specifically informed Mercier of his belief that a +convention signed would bind England and France to aid in +suppressing Southern privateering<a name="FNanchor295"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_295">[295]</a>. The effect of this on Lyons and Mercier +was to impress upon them the advisability of an <i>official</i> +notification to Seward, of English and French neutrality--a step +not yet taken and which was still postponed, awaiting further +instructions<a name="FNanchor296"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_296">[296]</a>. On June 15 the two Ministers finally +concluded they could no longer delay and made that joint visit to +Seward which resulted in his refusal to receive them as acting +together, or to receive officially their instructions, though he +read these for his private information. The remainder of June was +spent by Lyons in attempting to put matters on a more formal basis, +yet not pushing them unduly for fear of arousing Seward's anger. +June 17, Lyons told Seward, privately, and alone, that Great +Britain <i>must</i> have some intercourse with the South if only +for the protection of British interests. Seward's reply was that +the United States might "shut its eyes" to this, but that if +notified of what England and France were doing, the United States +would be compelled to make protest. Lyons thereupon urged Seward to +distinguish between his official and personal knowledge, but Lyons +and Mercier again postponed beginning the negotiation with the +Confederacy<a name="FNanchor297"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_297">[297]</a>. Yet while thus reporting this +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165"></a>[V1:pg 165]</span> +postponement in one letter, Lyons, in another letter of the same +date, indicated that the two Ministers thought that they had found +a solution of the problem of how to approach, yet not negotiate +with, the Confederacy. The idea was Mercier's. Their consuls in the +South were to be instructed to go, not to the Southern President, +but to the Governor of the State selected, thus avoiding any +overture to the Confederate Government<a name= +"FNanchor298"></a><a href="#Footnote_298">[298]</a>. Even with this +solution possible they still hesitated, feeling as Lyons wrote "a +little pusillanimous," but believing they had prevented an +explosion<a name="FNanchor299"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_299">[299]</a>. Moreover Lyons was a bit uneasy because +of an important difference, so it seemed to him, in his formal +instructions and those of Mercier. The latter had no orders, as had +Lyons, to notify Seward, if the agreement on maritime law was made +in Washington, that such agreement would not affect the belligerent +right of the South to issue privateers<a name= +"FNanchor300"></a><a href="#Footnote_300">[300]</a>. Apparently +Mercier had been given no instructions to make this clear--let +alone any "latitude" to deal with privateering--although, as a +matter of fact, he had already given Seward his personal opinion in +accord with Lyons' instructions; but this was not an official +French stand. Lyons was therefore greatly relieved, the +"misunderstanding" now cleared away, that new instructions were +being sent to Adams to go on with the convention in London. His +only subsequent comment of moment was sent to Russell on July 8, +when he learned from Seward that Dayton, in Paris, had been +directed to raise no further question as to what would or would not +be demanded of France in case a convention were signed for an +American adherence to the Declaration of Paris. Lyons now repeated +his former advice that under no circumstances should a convention +be signed without a distinct declaration of no <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_166"></a>[V1:pg 166]</span> British +responsibility or duty as regards Southern privateers<a name= +"FNanchor301"></a><a href="#Footnote_301">[301]</a>.</p> +<p>The entire matter was now transferred to London and Paris. +Lyons' report of the misunderstanding and that new instructions +were being sent to Adams was received on June 30. Russell replied +to Lyons on July 5 that Adams had "never made any proposition" on +the Declaration of Paris, and that he would now await one<a name= +"FNanchor302"></a><a href="#Footnote_302">[302]</a>. July 11, Adams +made his formal offer to sign a convention and communicated a draft +of it on the thirteenth. On the day intervening, the twelfth, +Russell took a very important step indicative of his sincerity +throughout, of his lack of any ulterior motive, and of his anxiety +to carry through the negotiation with no resulting irritations or +complications with the United States. He recalled his instructions +to Lyons about communicating with the Confederacy, stating that in +any case he had never intended that Lyons should act without first +officially notifying Seward. This recall was now made, he wrote, +because to go on might "create fresh irritation without any +adequate result," but if in the meantime Lyons had already started +negotiations with the South he might "proceed in them to the +end<a name="FNanchor303"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_303">[303]</a>."</p> +<p>Having taken this step in the hope that it might avert friction +with the United States, Russell, now distinctly eager to secure +American adherence to the Declaration in <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_167"></a>[V1:pg 167]</span> full, was ready +to conclude the convention at once. The warnings received from many +sources did not dismay him. He probably thought that no actual +difficulties would ensue, believing that the South would not +venture to continue privateering. Even if France were disinclined +to make a convention he appears to have been ready for signature by +Great Britain alone, for on July 15 he telegraphed Cowley, "I +conclude there can be no objection to my signing a Convention with +the U.S. Minister giving the adherence of the U.S. to the +Declaration of Paris so far as concerns Gt. Britain. Answer +immediately by telegraph<a name="FNanchor304"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_304">[304]</a>." Cowley replied on the sixteenth that +Thouvenel could not object, but thought it a wrong move<a name= +"FNanchor305"></a><a href="#Footnote_305">[305]</a>. Cowley in a +private letter of the same day thought that unless there were "very +cogent reasons for signing a Convention at once with Adams," it +would be better to wait until France could be brought in, and he +expressed again his fear of the danger involved in Adams' +proposal<a name="FNanchor306"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_306">[306]</a>. The same objection was promptly made by +Palmerston when shown the draft of a reply to Adams. Palmerston +suggested the insertion of a statement that while ready to sign a +convention Great Britain would do so only at the same time with +France<a name="FNanchor307"></a><a href="#Footnote_307">[307]</a>. +Thus advised Russell telegraphed in the late afternoon of the +sixteenth to Cowley that he would "wait for your despatches +to-morrow," and that no reply had yet been given Adams<a name= +"FNanchor308"></a><a href="#Footnote_308">[308]</a>, and on the +seventeenth he wrote enclosing a draft, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_168"></a>[V1:pg 168]</span> approved by +Palmerston and the Queen, stating that Great Britain had no desire +to act alone if Dayton really had instructions identical with those +of Adams. He added that if thought desirable Adams and Dayton might +be informed verbally, that the proposed Convention would in no way +alter the Proclamation of Neutrality<a name= +"FNanchor309"></a><a href="#Footnote_309">[309]</a>.</p> +<p>The remaining steps in the negotiation have already been +narrated<a name="FNanchor310"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_310">[310]</a>. Russell informed Adams of the +requirement of a similar French convention, Adams secured action by +Dayton, and in spite of continued French reluctance and +suspicion<a name="FNanchor311"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_311">[311]</a> all was ready in mid-August for the +affixing of signatures, when Russell, in execution of his previous +promise, and evidently now impressed with the need of an explicit +understanding, gave notice of his intended declaration in writing +to be attached to the convention<a name="FNanchor312"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_312">[312]</a>. On August 20 both Adams and Dayton +refused to sign, the former taking the ground, and with evident +sincerity, that the "exception" gave evidence of a British +suspicion that was insulting to his country, while Dayton had +"hardly concealed" from Thouvenel that this same "exception" was +the very object of the Convention<a name="FNanchor313"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_313">[313]</a>. While preparing his rejoinder to Adams' +complaint Russell wrote in a note to Palmerston "it all looks as if +a trap had been prepared<a name="FNanchor314"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_314">[314]</a>." He, too, at last, was forced to a +conclusion long since reached by every other diplomat, save Adams, +engaged in this negotiation.</p> +<p>But in reviewing the details of the entire affair it would +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169"></a>[V1:pg 169]</span> +appear that in its initiation by Seward there is no proof that he +then thought of any definite "trap". April 24 antedated any +knowledge by Seward of British or French policy on neutrality, and +he was engaged in attempting to secure a friendly attitude by +foreign Powers. One means of doing this was by giving assurances on +maritime law in time of war. True he probably foresaw an advantage +through expected aid in repressing privateering, but primarily he +hoped to persuade the maritime Powers not to recognize Southern +belligerency. It was in fact this question of belligerency that +determined all his policy throughout the first six months of the +American conflict. He was obstinately determined to maintain that +no such status existed, and throughout the whole war he returned +again and again to pressure on foreign Powers to recall their +proclamations of neutrality. Refusing to recognize foreign +neutrality as final Seward persisted in this negotiation in the +hope that if completed it would place Great Britain and France in a +position where they would be forced to reconsider their declared +policy. A demand upon them to aid in suppressing privateering might +indeed then be used as an argument, but the object was not +privateering in itself; that object was the recall of the +recognition of Southern belligerency. In the end he simply could +not agree to the limiting declaration for it would have constituted +an acknowledgment by the United States itself of the existence of a +state of war.</p> +<p>In all of this Adams, seemingly, had no share. He acted on the +simple and straightforward theory that the United States, pursuing +a conciliatory policy, was now offering to adhere to international +rules advocated by all the maritime powers. As a result he felt +both personally and patriotically aggrieved that suspicion was +directed toward the American overtures<a name= +"FNanchor315"></a><a href="#Footnote_315">[315]</a>. For him the +failure of the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170"></a>[V1:pg +170]</span> negotiation had temporarily, at least, an unfortunate +result: "So far as the assumed friendliness of Earl Russell to the +United States was concerned, the scales had fallen from his eyes. +His faith in the straightforwardness of any portion of the +Palmerston-Russell Ministry was gone<a name= +"FNanchor316"></a><a href="#Footnote_316">[316]</a>."</p> +<p>And for Russell also the affair spelled a certain +disillusionment, not, it is true, in the good faith of Adams, for +whom he still preserved a high regard. Russell felt that his policy +of a straightforward British neutrality, his quick acquiescence in +the blockade, even before actually effective, his early order +closing British ports to prizes of Confederate privateers<a name= +"FNanchor317"></a><a href="#Footnote_317">[317]</a>, were all +evidences of at least a friendly attitude toward the North. He may, +as did nearly every Englishman at the moment, think the re-union of +America impossible, but he had begun with the plan of strict +neutrality, and certainly with no thought of offensive action +against the North. His first thought in the Declaration of Paris +negotiation was to persuade both belligerents to acquiesce in a +portion of the rules of that Declaration, but almost at once he saw +the larger advantage to the world of a complete adherence by the +United States. This became Russell's fixed idea in which he +persisted against warnings and obstacles. Because of this he +attempted to recall the instruction to approach the South, was +ready even, until prohibited by Palmerston, to depart from a policy +of close joint action with France, and in the end was forced by +that prohibition to make a limiting declaration guarding British +neutrality. In it all there is no evidence of any hidden motive nor +of any other than a straightforward, even if obstinately blind, +procedure. The effect on Russell, at last grudgingly admitting that +there had been a "trap," <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_171"></a>[V1:pg 171]</span> was as unfortunate for good +understanding as in the case of Adams. He also was irritated, +suspicious, and soon less convinced that a policy of strict +neutrality could long be maintained<a name= +"FNanchor318"></a><a href="#Footnote_318">[318]</a>.</p> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_236"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor236">[236]</a> VII., pp. 568-583.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_237"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor237">[237]</a> Ch. 8.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_238"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor238">[238]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 181.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_239"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor239">[239]</a> Henry Adams, <i>Historical Essays</i>, p. +275.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_240"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor240">[240]</a> Text as given in Moore, <i>Digest</i>, +VII, p. 562.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_241"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor241">[241]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 563.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_242"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor242">[242]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1861-2</i>, p. 94. Adams to Seward, May 21, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_243"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor243">[243]</a> Text given in <i>Parliamentary Papers, +1862, Lords</i>, Vol XXV. "Correspondence respecting International +Maritime Law." No. 18.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_244"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor244">[244]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 25.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_245"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor245">[245]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 26.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_246"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor246">[246]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1861-2</i>, p. 124. Adams to Seward, Aug. 2, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_247"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor247">[247]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV, "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." +No. 28.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_248"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor248">[248]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 31.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_249"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor249">[249]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 32.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_250"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor250">[250]</a> Moore, <i>Digest</i>. VII, pp. 578 and +581.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_251"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor251">[251]</a> The point of Russell's Declaration was +made very early in the London press. Thus the <i>Saturday +Review</i>. June 8, 1861, commenting on the report that America was +ready to adhere to the Declaration of Paris, stated that this could +have no effect on the present war but would be welcomed for its +application after this war was over.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_252"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor252">[252]</a> In the general American argument before +the Geneva Arbitration Court it was stated that the practical +effect of British diplomacy in this connection was that "Great +Britain was thus to gain the benefit to its neutral commerce of the +recognition of the second and third articles, the rebel privateers +and cruisers were to be protected and their devastation legalized, +while the United States were to be deprived of a dangerous weapon +of assault upon Great Britain." Cited in Nicolay and Hay, +<i>Lincoln</i>, IV, p. 280.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_253"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor253">[253]</a> Henry Adams, <i>Historical Essays</i>, pp. +237-279.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_254"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor254">[254]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 271.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_255"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor255">[255]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 273.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_256"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor256">[256]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 277.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_257"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor257">[257]</a> This same view was maintained, though +without stating details, by Henry Adams, as late as 1907. See his +"Education of Henry Adams," Private Edition, p. 128.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_258"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor258">[258]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, Ch. +31.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_259"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor259">[259]</a> Cited by Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. +189.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_260"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor260">[260]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_261"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor261">[261]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 193.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_262"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor262">[262]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_263"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor263">[263]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_264"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor264">[264]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1861-2</i>, p. 1431 Seward to Adams, Sept. 7, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_265"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor265">[265]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. 196. This +speculation is not supported by any reference to documents +revealing such a purpose. While it may seem a reasonable +speculation it does not appear to be borne out by the new British +materials cited later in this chapter.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_266"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor266">[266]</a> C.F. Adams, "Seward and The Declaration of +Paris" <i>Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings</i>, XLVI, pp. +23-81.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_267"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor267">[267]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 57. The quotation is from +a despatch by Lyons of Dec. 6, 1861; but this is inexact language. +It is true that Seward had refused to receive officially this +despatch, but he had read and considered it in private. Hence he +knew <i>privately</i> the facts of Russell's proposal and that +Lyons had no instructions to negotiate. The incident of this +despatch has been treated by me in Chapter IV, where I regard +Seward's refusal to receive officially the despatch as primarily a +refusal to be notified of Great Britain's proclamation of +neutrality. Bancroft treats this incident as primarily a clever +refusal by Seward to be approached officially by Lyons and Mercier +in a joint representation, thus blocking a plan of joint action. +(Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. 181.) I agree with C.F. Adams that +the only effect of this, so far as the negotiation is concerned was +that "Seward, by what has always, for some reason not at once +apparent, passed for a very astute proceeding, caused a transfer of +the whole negotiation from Washington to London and Paris." +("Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p. 50.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_268"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor268">[268]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 51.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_269"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor269">[269]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 64.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_270"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor270">[270]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 60.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_271"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor271">[271]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 58.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_272"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor272">[272]</a> Bancroft says June 8. But see <i>ante</i>, +p. 130.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_273"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor273">[273]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." +No. 1. It was with reference to this that Palmerston, on May 5, +wrote to Russell: "If any step were thought advisable, perhaps the +best mode of our feeling our way would be to communicate +confidentially with the South by the men who have come over here +from thence, and with the North by Dallas, who is about to return +in a few days. Dallas, it is true, is not a political friend of +Lincoln, but on the contrary rather leans to the South; but still +he might be an organ, if it should be deemed prudent to take any +step." (Palmerston MS.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_274"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor274">[274]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, p. +1763.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_275"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor275">[275]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 1830-34.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_276"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor276">[276]</a> This instruction never got into the +printed Parliamentary papers, nor did any others of the many +containing the like suggestion, for they would have revealed a +persistence by Russell against French advice--to which he +ultimately was forced to yield--a persistence in seeking to bind +the belligerents on the first article of the Declaration of Paris, +as well as on articles two and three. The points at which Russell +returned to this idea are indicated in this chapter.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_277"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor277">[277]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1376. No. 563. +Draft.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_278"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor278">[278]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1390. No. 684. Cowley +to Russell, May 9, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_279"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor279">[279]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1391. No. 713. Cowley +to Russell, May 13, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_280"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor280">[280]</a> Richardson, <i>Messages and Papers of the +Confederacy</i>, II, p. 40.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_281"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor281">[281]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1391. No. +733.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_282"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor282">[282]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." +No. 5.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_283"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor283">[283]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 6. Note that this and +the preceding document are all that appeared in the Parliamentary +Papers. Thouvenel's amendment of Russell's plan did not +appear.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_284"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor284">[284]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1861-2</i>, Adams to Seward, May 21, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_285"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor285">[285]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." +No. 7.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_286"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor286">[286]</a> The text of these proclamations, +transmitted by Lyons, had been officially received in London on May +10.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_287"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor287">[287]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." +No. 8.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_288"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor288">[288]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 139. "Seen by Ld. +P. and the Queen."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_289"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor289">[289]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 4, +1861. (Printed in Newton, <i>Lyons</i>, I, 42.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_290"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor290">[290]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." +No. 12. Marked "Received," June 17.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_291"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor291">[291]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 765. No. 262. Lyons to +Russell, June 8, 1861. Also Russell Papers, June 10, 1861. This +disinclination to act extended also to the matter of getting in +touch with the South, which they also postponed. It appeared that +Mercier was instructed to order the French Consul at New Orleans to +go in person to President Davis. Both diplomats were very fearful +of an "outbreak" from Seward on this planned proposal to the +Confederacy.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_292"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor292">[292]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1376. No. 35. Draft. +"Seen by Ld. Palmerston and the Queen."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_293"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor293">[293]</a> In Washington, so different was the point +of view, Lyons and Mercier were now convinced they could not let +Seward know of the proposal to be made to the South. They feared he +would send them their passports. Mercier in informal talk had +explained to Seward his instructions on the Declaration of Paris in +so far as the North was concerned. Lyons and Mercier now planned a +joint visit and representation to Seward--that which was actually +attempted on June 15--but were decided to say nothing about the +South, until they learned the effect of this "joint proposal." +F.O., Am., Vol. 765. No. 262. Lyons to Russell, June 8, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_294"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor294">[294]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." +No. 10. Russell to Grey, June 12, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_295"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor295">[295]</a> Stoeckl was writing his Government that +the state to which the negotiation had come was full of danger and +might lead to a serious quarrel. He thought Russia should keep out +of it until results were clearer. On this report Gortchakoff +margined "C'est aussi mon avis." (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to +F.O., June 12-24, 1861. No. 1359.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_296"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor296">[296]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 766. No. 278.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_297"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor297">[297]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." +No. 14. Lyons to Russell, June 17, 1861. "Recd. June 30." It was in +this interview that Lyons discovered Seward's misconception as to +the position of the proposed negotiation, and made clear to Seward +that he had no instructions to sign a convention.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_298"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor298">[298]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 766. No. 284.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_299"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor299">[299]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 18, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_300"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor300">[300]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell, June 21, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_301"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor301">[301]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International +Maritime Law." No. 22. Writing privately on the same day Lyons +comments on Mercier's "extreme caution" in his relations with +Seward. Lyons implied that all this personal, rather than official +communication of documents to Seward was Mercier's idea, and that +he, Lyons, doubted the wisdom of this course, but had agreed to it +because of the desire to act in perfect harmony with France. +Russell Papers, Lyons to Russell, July 8, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_302"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor302">[302]</a> Lyons Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_303"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor303">[303]</a> F.O., Am., Vol 756. No. 227. On this same +day Russell was writing privately to Edward Everett, in Boston, a +clear statement of the British position, defending the Proclamation +of Neutrality and adding, "It is not our practice to treat five +millions of freemen as pirates, and to hang their sailors if they +stop our merchantmen. But unless we mean to treat them as pirates +and to hang them, we could not deny them belligerent rights." C.F. +Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," pp. +49-50.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_304"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor304">[304]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1377. No. 176. Draft. +Russell to Cowley, July 15, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_305"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor305">[305]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No. +871.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_306"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor306">[306]</a> Russell Papers. Also in a despatch of July +16 Cowley repeated his objections and stated that Dayton had not +yet approached France. (F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No. +871.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_307"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor307">[307]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 168. Enclosure. +Palmerston's Note to Russell was not sent to Adams but his exact +language is used in the last paragraph of the communication to +Adams, November 18, as printed in <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, +1862, <i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting +International Maritime Law." No. 19.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_308"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor308">[308]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1378. No. 730. Russell +to Cowley, July 17, 1861. Containing draft of telegram sent on 16th +at 4.30 p.m.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_309"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor309">[309]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 729.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_310"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor310">[310]</a> See <i>ante</i> pp. 142-45.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_311"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor311">[311]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No. 905. Cowley +to Russell, July 26, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_312"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor312">[312]</a> It should be noted that during this period +Russell learned that on July 5, Lyons, before receiving the recall +of instructions, had finally begun through Consul Bunch at +Charleston the overtures to the South. On July 24, Russell approved +this action (<i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. +23.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_313"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor313">[313]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1395. No. 1031. Cowley +to Russell, August 20, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_314"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor314">[314]</a> Palmerston MS., Russell to Palmerston, +August 26, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_315"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor315">[315]</a> See C.F. Adams, "Seward and the +Declaration of Paris," pp. 58 and 74.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_316"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor316">[316]</a> Adams, <i>Life of C.F. Adams</i>, p. +209.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_317"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor317">[317]</a> The Confederate Commissions on August 14, +1861, just before the critical moment in the Declaration of Paris +negotiation, had made vigorous protest against this British order, +characterizing it as giving a "favour" to the Government at +Washington, and thus as lacking in neutrality. Quoted by C.F. +Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p. 31.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_318"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor318">[318]</a> A few facts about Southern privateering +not directly pertinent to this chapter are yet not without +interest. There was no case during the Civil War of a vessel +actually going out as a privateer (i.e., a private vessel operating +under government letters of marque) from a foreign port. (Adams, +"Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p. 38.) No Southern +privateer ever entered a British port. (Bernard, <i>Neutrality of +Great Britain</i>, p. 181). As a result of Seward's general +instruction of April 24, a convention was actually signed with +Russia in August, but it was not presented by Seward for +ratification to the United States Senate. Schleiden in a report to +the Senate of Bremen at the time of the <i>Trent</i> affair, Nov. +14, 1861, stated that the Russian Ambassador, von Stoeckl, inquired +of Seward "whether the U.S. would equip privateers in case war +should break out with England and France. Seward replied 'that is a +matter of course.' Mr. Stoeckl thereupon remarked that in any case +no American privateer would be permitted to cruise in the northern +part of the Pacific because Russia, which is the only state that +has ports in those regions, would treat them as pirates in +accordance with the Convention of August 24. Mr. Seward then +exclaimed: 'I never thought of that. I must write to Mr. Clay about +it.'" (Schleiden MS.)</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172"></a>[V1:pg 172]</span> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI</h2> +<h3>BULL RUN; CONSUL BUNCH; COTTON AND MERCIER</h3> +<br> +<p>The diplomatic manoeuvres and interchanges recounted in the +preceding chapter were regarded by Foreign Secretaries and +Ministers as important in themselves and as indicative of national +policy and purpose. Upon all parties concerned they left a feeling +of irritation and suspicion. But the public knew nothing of the +details of the inconclusive negotiation and the Press merely gave a +hint now and then of its reported progress and ultimate failure. +Newspapers continued to report the news from America in +unaccustomed detail, but that news, after the attack on Fort +Sumter, was for some time lacking in striking incident, since both +sides in America were busily engaged in preparing for a struggle in +arms for which neither was immediately prepared. April 15, Lincoln +called for 75,000 volunteers, and three weeks later for 42,000 +additional. The regular army was increased by 23,000 and the navy +by 18,000 men. Naval vessels widely scattered over the globe, were +instructed to hasten their home-coming. By July 1 Lincoln had an +available land force, however badly trained and organized, of over +300,000, though these were widely scattered from the Potomac in the +east to the Missouri in the west.</p> +<p>In the South, Davis was equally busy, calling at first for +100,000 volunteers to wage defensive battle in protection of the +newly-born Confederacy. The seven states already in secession were +soon joined, between May 4 and June 24, by four others, Arkansas, +Virginia, North Carolina and <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_173"></a>[V1:pg 173]</span> Tennessee in order, but the +border states of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, though strongly +sympathetic with the rest of the South, were held to the Union by +the "border state policy" of Lincoln, the first pronouncement of +which asserted that the North had no purpose of attacking slavery +where it existed, but merely was determined to preserve the Union. +The Northern Congress, meeting in extra session on July 4, heartily +approved Lincoln's emergency measures. It authorized an army of +500,000, provided for a loan of $200,000,000, sanctioned the issue +of $50,000,000 in Treasury notes and levied new taxes, both direct +and by tariffs to meet these expenditures.</p> +<p>In the months preceding the attack on Sumter the fixed +determination of the South to secede and the uncertainty of the +North had led the British press to believe that the decision rested +wholly with the South. Now the North by its preparations was +exhibiting an equally fixed determination to preserve the Union, +and while the British press was sceptical of the permanence of this +determination, it became, for a short time, until editorial policy +was crystallized, more cautious in prophecy. The <i>Economist</i> +on May 4 declared that the responsibility for the "fatal step" +rested wholly on Southern leaders because of their passionate +desire to extend the shameful institution of which they were so +proud, but that the North must inevitably, by mere weight of +population and wealth, be the victor, though this could not +conceivably result in any real reunion, rather in a conquest +requiring permanent military occupation. Southern leaders were mad: +"to rouse by gratuitous insult the mettle of a nation three times +as numerous and far more than three times as powerful, to force +them by aggressive steps into a struggle in which the sympathy of +every free and civilized nation will be with the North, seems like +the madness of men whose eyes are blinded and hearts hardened by +the evil cause they defend."</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174"></a>[V1:pg 174]</span> +<p>Two weeks later, the <i>Economist</i>, while still maintaining +the justice of the Northern cause, though with lessened vigour, +appealed to the common sense of the North to refrain from a civil +war whose professed object was unattainable. "Everyone knows and +admits that the secession is an accomplished, irrevocable, fact.... +Even if the North were sure of an easy and complete victory--short, +of course, of actual subjugation of the South (which no one dreams +of)--the war which was to end in such a victory would still be, in +the eyes of prudence and worldly wisdom, an objectless and +unprofitable folly<a name="FNanchor319"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_319">[319]</a>." But by the middle of June the American +irritation at the British Proclamation of Neutrality, loudly and +angrily voiced by the Northern press, had caused a British press +resentment at this "wilful misrepresentation and misjudgment" of +British attitude. "We <i>do</i> believe the secession of the Slave +States to be a <i>fait accompli</i>--a completed and irreversible +transaction. We believe it to be impossible now for the North to +lure back the South into the Union by any compromise, or to compel +them back by any force." "If this is an offence it cannot be +helped<a name="FNanchor320"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_320">[320]</a>."</p> +<p>The majority of the London papers, though not all, passed +through the same shifts of opinion and expression as the +<i>Economist</i>; first upbraiding the South, next appealing to the +North not to wage a useless war, finally committing themselves to +the theory of an accomplished break-up of the Union and berating +the North for continuing, through pride alone, a bloody conflict +doomed to failure. Meanwhile in midsummer attention was diverted +from the ethical causes at issue by the publication in the +<i>Times</i> of Motley's letter analysing the nature of the +American constitution and defending the legal position of the North +in its resistance to secession. Motley wrote in protest against the +general <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175"></a>[V1:pg +175]</span> British press attitude: "There is, perhaps, a readiness +in England to prejudge the case; a disposition not to exult in our +downfall, but to accept the fact<a name="FNanchor321"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_321">[321]</a>...."</p> +<p>He argued the right and the duty of the North to force the South +into subjection. "The right of revolution is indisputable. It is +written on the record of our race. British and American history is +made up of rebellion and revolution.... There can be nothing +plainer, then, than the American right of revolution. But, then, it +should be called revolution." "It is strange that Englishmen should +find difficulty in understanding that the United States Government +is a nation among the nations of the earth; a constituted +authority, which may be overthrown by violence, as may be the fate +of any state, whether kingdom or republic, but which is false to +the people if it does not its best to preserve them from the +horrors of anarchy, even at the cost of blood."</p> +<p>Motley denied any <i>right</i> of <i>peaceful</i> secession, and +his constitutional argument presented adequately the Northern view. +But he was compelled also to refer to slavery and did so in the +sense of Lincoln's inaugural, asserting that the North had no +purpose of emancipating the slaves. "It was no question at all that +slavery within a state was sacred from all interference by the +general government, or by the free states, or by individuals in +those states; and the Chicago Convention [which nominated Lincoln] +strenuously asserted that doctrine." Coming at the moment when the +British press and public were seeking ground for a shift from +earlier pro-Northern expressions of sympathy to some justification +for the South, it may be doubted whether Motley's letter did not do +more harm than good to the Northern cause. His denial of a Northern +anti-slavery purpose gave excuse for a, professedly, more calm +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176"></a>[V1:pg 176]</span> and +judicial examination of the claimed <i>Southern right</i> of +secession, and his legal argument could be met, and was met, with +equally logical, apparently, pro-Southern argument as to the nature +of the American constitution. Thus early did the necessity of +Lincoln's "border state policy"--a policy which extended even to +warnings from Seward to American diplomats abroad not to bring into +consideration the future of slavery--give ground for foreign denial +that there were any great moral principles at stake in the American +conflict.</p> +<p>In the meantime the two sections in America were busily +preparing for a test of strength, and for that test the British +press, reporting preparations, waited with interest. It came on +July 21 in the first battle of Bull Run, when approximately equal +forces of raw levies, 30,000 each, met in the first pitched battle +of the war, and where the Northern army, after an initial success, +ultimately fled in disgraceful rout. Before Bull Run the few +British papers early taking strong ground for the North had +pictured Lincoln's preparations as so tremendous as inevitably +destined to crush, quickly, all Southern resistance. The <i>Daily +News</i> lauded Lincoln's message to Congress as the speech of a +great leader, and asserted that the issue in America was for all +free people a question of upholding the eternal principles of +liberty, morality and justice. "War for such a cause, though it be +civil war, may perhaps without impiety be called 'God's most +perfect instrument in working out a pure intent<a name= +"FNanchor322"></a><a href="#Footnote_322">[322]</a>.'" The disaster +to the Northern army, its apparent testimony that the North lacked +real fighting men, bolstered that British opinion which regarded +military measures against the South as folly--an impression +reinforced in the next few months by the long pause by the North +before undertaking any further great effort in the field. The North +was not really ready for determined war, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_177"></a>[V1:pg 177]</span> indeed, until +later in the year. Meanwhile many were the moralizations in the +British press upon Bull Run's revelation of Northern military +weakness.</p> +<p>Probably the most influential newspaper utterances of the moment +were the letters of W.H. Russell to the <i>Times</i>. This famous +war-correspondent had been sent to America in the spring of 1861 by +Delane, editor of the <i>Times</i>, his first letter, written on +March 29, appearing in the issue of April 16. He travelled through +the South, was met everywhere with eager courtesy as became a man +of his reputation and one representing the most important organ of +British public opinion, returned to the North in late June, and at +Washington was given intimate interviews by Seward and other +leaders. For a time his utterances were watched for, in both +England and America, with the greatest interest and expectancy, as +the opinions of an unusually able and thoroughly honest, +dispassionate observer. He never concealed his abhorrence of +slavery, terming apologists of that institution "the miserable +sophists who expose themselves to the contempt of the world by +their paltry theiscles on the divine origin and uses of +Slavery<a name="FNanchor323"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_323">[323]</a>...." and writing "day after day ... the +impression of my mind was strengthened that 'States Rights' meant +protection to slavery, extension of slave territory, and free-trade +in slave produce with the other world<a name= +"FNanchor324"></a><a href="#Footnote_324">[324]</a>." But at the +same time he depicted the energy, ability, and determination of the +South in high colours, and was a bit doubtful of similar virtues in +the North. The battle of Bull Run itself he did not see, but he +rode out from Washington to meet the defeated army, and his +description of the routed rabble, jostling and pushing, in frenzy +toward the Capitol, so ridiculed Northern fighting spirit as to +leave a permanent <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_178"></a>[V1:pg 178]</span> sting behind it. At the same time +it convinced the British pro-Southern reader that the Northern +effort was doomed to failure, even though Russell was himself +guarded in opinion as to ultimate result. "'What will England and +France think of it?' is the question which is asked over and over +again," wrote Russell on July 24<a name="FNanchor325"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_325">[325]</a>, expatiating on American anxiety and +chagrin in the face of probable foreign opinion. On August 22 he +recorded in his diary the beginnings of the American newspaper +storm of personal attack because of his description of the battle +in the <i>Times</i>--an attack which before long became the alleged +cause of his recall by Delane<a name="FNanchor326"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_326">[326]</a>. In fact Russell's letters added nothing +in humiliating description to the outpourings of the Northern +press, itself greedily quoted by pro-Southern foreign papers. The +impression of Northern military incapacity was not confined to +Great Britain--it was general throughout Europe, and for the +remainder of 1861 there were few who ventured to assert a Northern +success in the war<a name="FNanchor327"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_327">[327]</a>.</p> +<p>Official Britain, however, saw no cause for any change in the +policy of strict neutrality. Palmerston commented privately, "The +truth is, the North are fighting for an Idea chiefly entertained by +professional politicians, while the South are fighting for what +they consider rightly or wrongly vital interests," thus explaining +to his own satisfaction why a Northern army of brave men had +<i>chosen</i> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179"></a>[V1:pg +179]</span> to <i>run</i> away<a name="FNanchor328"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_328">[328]</a>, but the Government was careful to +refrain from any official utterances likely to irritate the North. +The battle served, in some degree, to bring into the open the +metropolitan British papers which hitherto professing neutrality +and careful not to reveal too openly their leanings, now each took +a definite stand and became an advocate of a cause. The Duke of +Argyll might write reassuringly to Mrs. Motley to have no fear of +British interference<a name="FNanchor329"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_329">[329]</a>, and to Gladstone (evidently +controverting the latter's opinion) that slavery was and would +continue to be an object in the war<a name= +"FNanchor330"></a><a href="#Footnote_330">[330]</a>, but the press, +certainly, was not united either as to future British policy or on +basic causes and objects of the war. The <i>Economist</i> believed +that a second Southern victory like Bull Run, if coming soon, would +"so disgust and dishearten the shouters for the Union that the +contest will be abandoned on the instant.... Some day, with +scarcely any notice, we may receive tidings that an armistice has +been agreed upon and preliminaries of peace have been +signed<a name="FNanchor331"></a><a href="#Footnote_331">[331]</a>." +John Bright's paper, the <i>Morning Star</i>, argued long and +feverishly that Englishmen must not lose sight of the fact that +slavery was an issue, and made appeal for expressions, badly needed +at the moment, of pro-Northern sympathy<a name= +"FNanchor332"></a><a href="#Footnote_332">[332]</a>. To this +<i>John Bull</i> retorted:</p> +<blockquote>"Nothing can be clearer than this, that black slavery +has nothing whatever to do with this Civil War in America.... The +people of America have erected a political idol. The Northerners +have talked and written and boasted so much about their Republic +that they have now become perfectly furious to find that their idol +can be overthrown, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_180"></a>[V1:pg 180]</span> and that the false principles +upon which the American Republic is built should be exhibited to +the world, that their vaunted democracy should be exposed as a mere +bubble or a piece of rotten timber, an abominable and worthless +tyranny of the sovereign mob<a name="FNanchor333"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_333">[333]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Here was an early hint of the future of democracy as at +issue<a name="FNanchor334"></a><a href="#Footnote_334">[334]</a>. +<i>John Bull</i>, the "country squire's paper," might venture to +voice the thought, but more important papers were still cautious in +expressing it. W.H. Russell, privately, wrote to Delane: "It is +quite obvious, I think, that the North will succeed in reducing the +South<a name="FNanchor335"></a><a href="#Footnote_335">[335]</a>." +But Delane permitted no such positive prophecy to appear in the +<i>Times</i>. Darwin is good testimony of the all-prevalent British +feeling: "I hope to God we English are utterly wrong in doubting +whether the North can conquer the South." "How curious it is that +you seem to think that you can conquer the South; and I never meet +a soul, even those who would most wish it, who think it +possible--that is, to conquer and retain it<a name= +"FNanchor336"></a><a href="#Footnote_336">[336]</a>."</p> +<p>In September, after the first interest in Bull Run had waned, +there appeared several books and articles on the American question +which gave opportunity for renewal of newspaper comment and +controversy. A Dr. Lempriere, "of the Inner Temple, law fellow of +St. John's College, Oxford," published a work, <i>The American +Crisis Considered</i>, chiefly declamatory, upholding the right of +Southern secession, stating that no one "who has the slightest +acquaintance with the political action of history would term the +present movement rebellion." With this the <i>Spectator</i> begged +leave to differ<a name="FNanchor337"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_337">[337]</a>. The <i>Saturday Review</i> <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_181"></a>[V1:pg 181]</span> acknowledged +that a prolonged war might force slavery and emancipation to the +front, but denied them as vital at present, and offered this view +as a defence against the recrimination of Mrs. Harriet Beecher +Stowe, who had accused the paper of unfair treatment in a review of +her pamphlet exhibiting emancipation as the object of the North. +Under the caption, "Mrs. Beecher Stowe's Wounded Feelings," the +<i>Saturday Review</i> avowed disbelief in the existence of a "Holy +War" in America. "The North does not proclaim abolition and never +pretended to fight for anti-slavery. The North has not hoisted for +its oriflamme the Sacred Symbol of Justice to the Negro; its <i>cri +de guerre</i> is not unconditional emancipation." "The Governmental +course of the British nation ... is not yet directed by small +novelists and their small talk<a name="FNanchor338"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_338">[338]</a>." Thomas Hughes also came in for +sarcastic reference in this article, having promptly taken up the +cudgels for Mrs. Stowe. He returned to the attack through the +columns of the <i>Spectator</i>, reasserting slavery as an issue +and calling on Englishmen to put themselves in the place of +Americans and realize the anger aroused by "deliberate imputations +of mean motives," and by the cruel spirit of the utterances. A +nation engaged in a life and death struggle should not be treated +in a tone of flippant and contemptuous serenity. The British press +had chosen "to impute the lowest motives, to cull out and exult +over all the meanness, and bragging, and disorder which the contest +has brought out, and while we sit on the bank, to make no +allowances for those who are struggling in the waves<a name= +"FNanchor339"></a><a href="#Footnote_339">[339]</a>."</p> +<p>Besides the <i>Spectator</i>, on the Northern side, stood the +<i>Daily News</i>, declaring that the South could not hold out, and +adding, "The Confederate States may be ten millions, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_182"></a>[V1:pg 182]</span> but they +<i>are</i> wrong--notoriously, flagrantly wrong<a name= +"FNanchor340"></a><a href="#Footnote_340">[340]</a>." The <i>Daily +News</i>, according to its "Jubilee" historians, stood almost alone +in steadfast advocacy of the Northern cause<a name= +"FNanchor341"></a><a href="#Footnote_341">[341]</a>. This claim of +unique service to the North is not borne out by an examination of +newspaper files, but is true if only metropolitan dailies of large +circulation are considered. The <i>Spectator</i> was a determined +and consistent friend of the North. In its issue of September 28 a +speech made by Bulwer Lytton was summarized and attacked. The +speaker had argued that the dissolution of the Union would be +beneficial to all Europe, which had begun to fear the swollen size +and strength of the young nation across the Atlantic. He hoped that +the final outcome would be not two, but at least four separate +nations, and stated his belief that the friendly emulation of these +nations would result for Americans in a rapid advance in art and +commerce such as had been produced in the old commonwealths of +Greece. The <i>Spectator</i> answered that such a breaking up of +America was much more likely to result in a situation comparable to +that in South America, inquired caustically whether Bulwer Lytton +had heard that slavery was in question, and asserted that his +speech presumably represented the official view of the Tories, and +embodied that of the English governing class<a name= +"FNanchor342"></a><a href="#Footnote_342">[342]</a>.</p> +<p>In press utterances during the autumn and early fall of 1861 +there is little on British policy toward America. Strict neutrality +is approved by all papers and public speakers. But as the months +passed without further important military engagements attention +began to be directed toward the economic effects on England of the +war <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183"></a>[V1:pg 183]</span> +in America and to the blockade, now beginning to be made effective +by the North. The <i>Saturday Review</i>, though pro-Southern, +declared for neutrality, but distinguished between strict +observance of the blockade and a reasonable recognition of the +<i>de facto</i> government of the Confederacy "as soon as the +Southern States had achieved for their independence that amount of +security with which Great Britain had been satisfied in former +cases<a name="FNanchor343"></a><a href="#Footnote_343">[343]</a>." +But another article in the same issue contained a warning against +forcibly raising the blockade since this must lead to war with the +North, and that would commend itself to no thoughtful Englishman. +Two weeks later appeared a long review of Spence's <i>American +Union</i>, a work very influential in confirming British +pro-Southern belief in the constitutional right of the South to +secede and in the certainty of Southern victory. Spence was "likely +to succeed with English readers, because all his views are taken +from a thoroughly English standpoint<a name= +"FNanchor344"></a><a href="#Footnote_344">[344]</a>." The week +following compliments are showered upon the "young professor" +Montague Bernard for his "Two Lectures on the Present American +War," in which he distinguished between recognition of belligerency +and recognition of sovereignty, asserting that the former was +inevitable and logical. The <i>Saturday Review</i>, without direct +quotation, treated Bernard as an advocate also of the early +recognition of Southern independence on the ground that it was <i>a +fait accompli</i>, and expressed approval<a name= +"FNanchor345"></a><a href="#Footnote_345">[345]</a>.</p> +<p>These few citations, taken with intent from the more sober and +reputable journals, summarize the prevailing attitude on one side +or the other throughout the months from June to December, 1861. All +publications had much <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_184"></a>[V1:pg 184]</span> to say of the American struggle +and varied in tone from dignified criticism to extreme +vituperation, this last usually being the resort of lesser +journals, whose leader writers had no skill in "vigorous" writing +in a seemingly restrained manner. "Vigorous" leader writing was a +characteristic of the British press of the day, and when combined +with a supercilious British tone of advice, as from a superior +nation, gave great offence to Americans, whether North or South. +But the British press was yet united in proclaiming as correct the +governmental policy of neutrality, and in any event Motley was +right in stating "the Press is not the Government," adding his +opinion that "the present English Government has thus far given us +no just cause of offence<a name="FNanchor346"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_346">[346]</a>." Meanwhile the Government, just at the +moment when the Declaration of Paris negotiation had reached an +inglorious conclusion, especially irritating to Earl Russell, was +suddenly plunged into a sharp controversy with the United States by +an incident growing out of Russell's first instructions to Lyons in +regard to that negotiation and which, though of minor importance in +itself, aroused an intensity of feeling beyond its merits. This was +the recall by Seward of the exequatur of the British consul Bunch, +at Charleston, South Carolina.</p> +<p>It will be remembered that in his first instruction to Lyons on +the Declaration of Paris Russell had directed that Bunch, at +Charleston, be commissioned to seek a Southern official acceptance +of the binding force of the second and third articles, but that +Lyons and Mercier, fearing Seward's irritation, had hesitated to +proceed in the matter. Later Russell had recalled his instructions, +but before this recall could reach Lyons the latter had decided to +act<a name="FNanchor347"></a><a href="#Footnote_347">[347]</a>. On +July 5 Lyons gave explicit directions to Bunch not to approach the +Confederate Government directly, but to go <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_185"></a>[V1:pg 185]</span> to Governor +Pickens of South Carolina and explain the matter to him verbally, +adding "you should act with great caution, in order to avoid +raising the question of the recognition of the new Confederation by +Great Britain." Unfortunately Lyons also wrote, "I am authorized by +Lord John Russell to confide the negotiation on this matter to +you," thus after all implying that a real <i>negotiation</i> with +the South was being undertaken. On the same day Mercier sent +similar instructions to St. André, the French Acting-Consul +at Charleston<a name="FNanchor348"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_348">[348]</a>. Bunch received Lyons' official letter on +July 19<a name="FNanchor349"></a><a href="#Footnote_349">[349]</a>, +together with a private one of July 5, emphasizing that Bunch was +to put nothing in writing, and that he and his French colleagues +were to keep the names of Lyons and Mercier out of any talk, even, +about the matter. Bunch was to talk as if his instructions came +directly from Russell. Lyons hoped the South would be wise enough +not to indulge in undue publicity, since if "trumpeted" it might +elicit "by such conduct some strong disavowal from France and +England." Both the official and the private letter must, however, +have impressed Bunch with the idea that this was after all a +negotiation and that he had been entrusted with it<a name= +"FNanchor350"></a><a href="#Footnote_350">[350]</a>.</p> +<p>Bunch, whose early reports had been far from sympathetic with +the Southern cause, had gradually, and quite naturally from his +environment, become more friendly to it<a name= +"FNanchor351"></a><a href="#Footnote_351">[351]</a>. He now acted +with promptness and with some <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_186"></a>[V1:pg 186]</span> evident exultation at the +importance given him personally. In place of Governor Pickens an +experienced diplomat, William Henry Trescott, was approached by +Bunch and Belligny, who, not St. André, was then the French +agent at Charleston<a name="FNanchor352"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_352">[352]</a>. Trescott went directly to President +Davis, who at once asked why the British proposal had not been made +through the Confederate Commissioners in London, and who somewhat +unwillingly yielded to Trescott's urging. On August 13 the +Confederate Congress resolved approval of the Declaration of Paris +except for the article on privateering<a name= +"FNanchor353"></a><a href="#Footnote_353">[353]</a>. Bunch took +great pride in the secrecy observed. "I do not see how any clue is +given to the way in which the Resolutions have been procured.... We +made a positive stipulation that France and England were not to be +alluded to in the event of the compliance of the Confederate +Govt.<a name="FNanchor354"></a><a href="#Footnote_354">[354]</a>," +he wrote Lyons on August 16. But he failed to take account either +of the penetrating power of mouth-to-mouth gossip or of the +efficacy of Seward's secret agents. On this same day, August 16, +Lyons reported the arrest in New York, on the fourteenth, of one +Robert Mure, just as he was about to take passage for Liverpool +carrying a sealed bag from the Charleston consulate to the British +Foreign Office, as well as some two hundred private letters. The +letters were examined and among them was one which related Bunch's +recent activities and stated that "Mr. B., on oath of secrecy, +communicated to me also that the first step of recognition was +taken<a name="FNanchor355"></a><a href="#Footnote_355">[355]</a>." +The sealed bag was sent unopened to be handed by Adams to Russell +with an <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187"></a>[V1:pg +187]</span> enquiry whether in fact it contained any papers on the +alleged "negotiation" with the South.</p> +<p>Bunch had issued to Mure a paper which the latter regarded as a +passport, as did the United States. This also was made matter of +complaint by Adams, when on September 3 the affair was presented to +Russell. America complained of Bunch on several counts, the three +principal ones being (1) that he had apparently conducted a +negotiation with the Confederacy, (2) that he had issued a +passport, not countersigned by the Secretary of State as required +by the United States rules respecting foreign consuls, (3) that he +had permitted the person to whom this passport was issued to carry +letters from the enemies of the United States to their agents +abroad. On these grounds the British Government was requested to +remove Bunch from his office. On first learning of Mure's arrest +Lyons expressed the firm belief that Bunch's conduct had been +perfectly proper and that the sealed bag would be found to contain +nothing supporting the suspicion of the American Government<a name= +"FNanchor356"></a><a href="#Footnote_356">[356]</a>. The language +used by Lyons was such as to provide an excellent defence in +published despatches, and it was later so used. But privately +neither Lyons nor Russell were wholly convinced of the correctness +of Bunch's actions. Bunch had heard of Mure's arrest on August 18, +and at once protested that no passport had been given, but merely a +"Certificate to the effect that he [Mure] was a British Merchant +residing in Charleston" on his way to England, and that he was +carrying official despatches to the Foreign Office<a name= +"FNanchor357"></a><a href="#Footnote_357">[357]</a>. In fact Mure +had long since taken out American citizenship papers, and the +distinction between passport and certificate seems an evasion. +Officially Lyons could report "it is clear that Mr. Robert Mure, in +taking charge <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188"></a>[V1:pg +188]</span> of the letters which have been seized, abused Mr. +Bunch's confidence, for Mr. Bunch had positive instructions from me +not to forward himself any letters alluding to military or +political events, excepting letters to or from British +officials<a name="FNanchor358"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_358">[358]</a>." This made good reading when put in the +published Parliamentary Papers. But in reality the sending of +private letters by messenger also carrying an official pouch was no +novelty. Bunch had explained to Lyons on June 23 that this was his +practice on the ground that "there is really no way left for the +merchants but through me. If Mr. Seward objects I cannot help it. I +must leave it to your Lordship and H.M.'s Government to support me. +My own despatch to Lord J. Russell I must send in some way, and so +I take the responsibility of aiding British interests by sending +the mercantile letters as well<a name="FNanchor359"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_359">[359]</a>." And in Bunch's printed report to Lyons +on Mure's arrest, his reply as to the private letters was, "I could +not consider him [Mure] as being disqualified from being the bearer +of a bag to Earl Russell, by his doing what everyone who left +Charleston was doing daily<a name="FNanchor360"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_360">[360]</a>...."</p> +<p>Officially Lyons, on September 2, had reported a conversation +with Belligny, the French Consul at Charleston, now in Washington, +writing, "I am confirmed in the opinion that the negotiation, which +was difficult and delicate, was managed with great tact and good +judgment by the two Consuls<a name="FNanchor361"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_361">[361]</a>." But this referred merely to the use of +Trescott and its results, not to Bunch's use of Mure. The British +Government was, indeed, prepared to defend the action of its agents +in securing, <i>indirectly</i>, from the South, an <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_189"></a>[V1:pg 189]</span> acknowledgment +of certain principles of international law. Russell did not believe +that Lincoln was "foolhardy enough to quarrel with England and +France," though Hammond (Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs) "is +persuaded that Seward wishes to pick a quarrel<a name= +"FNanchor362"></a><a href="#Footnote_362">[362]</a>." Enquiry was +promptly made of France, through Cowley, as to her stand in the +matter of the consuls at Charleston, Russell intimating by an +enquiry (later printed in the Parliamentary Papers), as to the +initiation of the Declaration of Paris negotiations, that it was +Thouvenel who had first suggested the approach to the South through +the Consuls<a name="FNanchor363"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_363">[363]</a>. This was an error of memory<a name= +"FNanchor364"></a><a href="#Footnote_364">[364]</a>, and Cowley was +perturbed by Thouvenel's reticence in reply to the main question. +The latter stated that if a like American demand were made on +France "undoubtedly he could not give up an Agent who had done no +more than execute the orders entrusted to him<a name= +"FNanchor365"></a><a href="#Footnote_365">[365]</a>." This looked +like harmony, but the situation for the two countries was not the +same as no demand had been made for the recall of Belligny. Cowley +was, in reality, anxious and suspicious, for Thouvenel, in +conversation, attributed Seward's anger to Bunch's alleged +indiscretions in talk, and made it clear that France would not +"stand by" unless Seward should protest to France against the fact +of a communication (not a <i>negotiation</i>) having been held with +the Confederacy<a name="FNanchor366"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_366">[366]</a>. Before the French reply was secured +Russell had prepared but not sent an answer to Adams, notifying him +that the bag from Bunch, on examination, was found not to contain +"correspondence of the enemies <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_190"></a>[V1:pg 190]</span> of the Government of the United +States" as had been suspected, and transmitting a copy of Bunch's +explanation of the reason for forwarding private letters<a name= +"FNanchor367"></a><a href="#Footnote_367">[367]</a>. In another +letter to Adams of the same date Russell avowed the Government's +responsibility for Bunch's action on the Declaration of Paris, and +declined to recall him, adding:</p> +<blockquote>"But when it is stated in a letter from some person not +named, that the first step to the recognition of the Southern +States by Great Britain has been taken, the Undersigned begs to +decline all responsibility for such a statement.<br> +<br> +"Her Majesty's Government have already recognized the belligerent +character of the Southern States, and they will continue to +recognize them as belligerents. But Her Majesty's Government have +not recognized and are not prepared to recognize the so-called +Confederate States as a separate and independent State<a name= +"FNanchor368"></a><a href="#Footnote_368">[368]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Adams received Russell's two notes on September 13<a name= +"FNanchor369"></a><a href="#Footnote_369">[369]</a>, and merely +stated that they would be despatched by the next steamer. That +Russell was anxious is shown by a careful letter of caution to +Lyons instructing him if sent away from Washington "to express in +the most dignified and guarded terms that the course taken by the +Washington Government must be the result of a misconception on +their part, and that you shall retire to Canada in the persuasion +that the misunderstanding will soon cease, and the former friendly +relations be restored<a name="FNanchor370"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_370">[370]</a>." Meantime Russell was far from satisfied +with Bunch, writing Lyons to inform him that the "statements made +in regard to his proceedings <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_191"></a>[V1:pg 191]</span> require explanation<a name= +"FNanchor371"></a><a href="#Footnote_371">[371]</a>." The failure +of Seward to demand Belligny's recall worried Russell. He wrote to +Palmerston on September 19, "I cannot believe that the Americans, +having made no demand on the French to disavow Belligny, or +Baligny, will send away Lyons," and he thought that Seward ought to +be satisfied as England had disavowed the offensive part of Bunch's +supposed utterances. He was not in favour of sending reinforcements +to the American stations: "If they do not quarrel about Bunch, we +may rest on our oars for the winter<a name= +"FNanchor372"></a><a href="#Footnote_372">[372]</a>." There was +nothing further to do save to wait Seward's action on receipt of +the British refusal to recall Bunch. At this moment Lyons at +Washington was writing in a hopeful view of "avoiding abstract +assertions of principles," but accustoming the North to the +<i>practice</i> of British recognition of Southern belligerent +rights<a name="FNanchor373"></a><a href="#Footnote_373">[373]</a>. +Lyons believed that Seward would not go further than to withdraw +Bunch's exequatur, but he was anxious for the return of Mercier +(long absent with Prince Napoleon), since "our position is +unluckily not exactly the same with that of France<a name= +"FNanchor374"></a><a href="#Footnote_374">[374]</a>." On October 12 +Lyons conferred at length with Seward on the Bunch matter, as +usual, privately and unofficially. Seward dwelt on a letter just +received from Motley assuring him that Great Britain was not +"unfriendly to the United States," and "appeared anxious not to +pick a quarrel, yet hardly knowing how to retract from his original +position." Lyons told <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_192"></a>[V1:pg 192]</span> Seward that it would be +"impossible to carry on the Diplomatic business ... on the false +hypothesis that the United States Government" did not <i>know</i> +England and France had recognized the belligerent rights of the +South, and he urged Russell to get from France an open +acknowledgment, such as England has made, that she "negotiated" +with the Confederacy. Lyons thought Mercier would try to avoid +this, thus seeking to bring pressure on the British Government to +adopt his plan of an early recognition of Southern independence. +Like Cowley, Lyons was disturbed at the French evasion of direct +support in the Bunch affair<a name="FNanchor375"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_375">[375]</a>.</p> +<p>Bunch's formal denial to Lyons of the charges made against him +by the United States was confined to three points; he asserted his +disbelief that Mure carried any despatches from the <i>de facto</i> +government at Richmond; he protested that "there was not one single +paper in my bag which was not entirely and altogether on Her +Majesty's service"; and he explained the alleged "passport" was not +intended as such, but was merely "a certificate stating that Mr. +Mure was charged by me with despatches," but he acknowledged that +in the certificate's description of Mure as a "British merchant" a +possible error had been committed, adding, however, that he had +supposed anyone would understand, since the words "British subject" +had not been used, that Mure was in reality a naturalized citizen +of America<a name="FNanchor376"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_376">[376]</a>. This explanation was received by Russell +on October 21. Lyons' comment on Bunch's explanation, made without +knowledge of what would be Seward's final determination, was that +if Bunch had any further excuses to make about the private letters +carried by Mure he should drop two weak points in his argument. "I +mean the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193"></a>[V1:pg +193]</span> distinction between B. merchant and B.S., and the +distinction between a document requesting that the bearer '<i>may +be permitted to pass freely and receive all proper protection and +assistance</i>' and a passport<a name="FNanchor377"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_377">[377]</a>." Russell, on receipt of Bunch's +explanation was also dissatisfied, first because Bunch had violated +Lyons' instructions against entrusting despatches to persons +carrying private correspondence, and second, because Bunch "gives +no distinct denial" to the newspaper stories that he had gossiped +about his activities and had stated them to be "a first step toward +recognition<a name="FNanchor378"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_378">[378]</a>." These criticisms were directed entirely +to Bunch's conduct subsequent to the overture to the South; on the +propriety of that act Russell supported Bunch with vigour<a name= +"FNanchor379"></a><a href="#Footnote_379">[379]</a>. October 26, +Seward read to Lyons the instruction to Adams on the revocation of +Bunch's exequatur. The ground taken for this, reported Lyons, was +an evasion of that charge of communicating with the South for which +Russell had avowed responsibility, and a turning to the charge that +Bunch was personally unacceptable longer to the United States +because of his partisanship to the South, as evidenced by various +acts and especially as shown by his reported assertion that Great +Britain had taken "a first step to recognition." "Never," wrote +Lyons, "were serious charges brought upon a slighter foundation." +"No one who has read Mr. Bunch's despatches to your Lordship and to +me can consider him as in the least degree a partisan of the +Southern cause." "When Mr. Seward had finished reading the despatch +I remained silent. After a <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_194"></a>[V1:pg 194]</span> short pause I took leave of him +courteously, and withdrew<a name="FNanchor380"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_380">[380]</a>."</p> +<p>As will have been noted, Lyons had foreseen the American +decision against Bunch on purely personal grounds, had been +relieved that this would be the issue, and had fore-warned Russell. +His despatch just cited may be regarded as a suggestion of the +proper British refutation of charges, but with acceptance of the +American decision. Nevertheless he wrote gloomily on the same day +of future relations with the United States<a name= +"FNanchor381"></a><a href="#Footnote_381">[381]</a>. At the same +time Russell, also foreseeing Seward's action, was not disturbed. +He thought it still "not off the cards that the Southern +Confederates may return to the Union.... Our conduct must be +strictly neutral, and it will be<a name="FNanchor382"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_382">[382]</a>." Upon receipt of Lyons' despatch and +letter of October 28 Russell wrote to Palmerston, "I do not attach +much importance to this letter of Lyons. It is the business of +Seward to feed the mob with sacrifices every day, and we happen to +be the most grateful food he can offer<a name= +"FNanchor383"></a><a href="#Footnote_383">[383]</a>." For Russell +saw clearly that Great Britain could not object to the removal of +Bunch on the purely personal grounds alleged by Seward. There +followed in <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195"></a>[V1:pg +195]</span> due course the formal notification by Adams on November +21, just six days before he learned of the <i>Trent</i> affair, +which had occurred on November 8. That alarming incident no doubt +coloured the later communications of both parties, for while both +Adams and Russell indulged in several lengthy argumentative papers, +such as are dear to the hearts of lawyers and diplomats, the only +point of possible further dispute was on the claim of Great Britain +that future occasions might arise where, in defence of British +interests, it would be absolutely necessary to communicate with the +Confederacy. Adams acknowledged a British duty to protect its +citizens, but reasserted the American right to dismiss any British +agent who should act as Bunch had done. On December 9, Russell +closed the matter by stating that he did "not perceive that any +advantage would be obtained by the continuance of this +correspondence<a name="FNanchor384"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_384">[384]</a>." Bunch was expected to leave Charleston +as soon as a safe conveyance could be provided for him, but this +was not immediately forthcoming. In fact he remained at Charleston +until February, 1863, actively engaged, but official papers were +signed by his vice-consul. In the excitement over the <i>Trent</i>, +he seems rapidly to have disappeared from the official as he did +from the public horizon<a name="FNanchor385"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_385">[385]</a>.</p> +<p>The Bunch controversy, seemingly of no great importance in so +far as the alleged personal grounds of complaint are concerned, had +its real significance in the effort of Great <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_196"></a>[V1:pg 196]</span> Britain to make +contact with the Southern Government--an effort incautiously +entered upon, and from which an attempt to withdraw had come too +late. The result was British assertion of a right in case of +necessity to make such contact, having recognized the South as a +belligerent, but a discontinuance of the practice, under the +American protest<a name="FNanchor386"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_386">[386]</a>. While this controversy was in progress +the attention of the British Government was directed to a proposal +urged by Mercier upon Lyons in Washington, which appeared to have +the support of the French Government. On September 30, Mercier, so +Lyons reported, had received a private letter from Thouvenel +expressing great concern over the prospective scarcity of cotton +from America, due to the blockade, and asking Mercier's advice. The +latter now informed Lyons that his reply had outlined the following +steps: first, complete harmony of action between England and +France; second, recognition of Southern independence; third, +refusal longer to recognize the blockade; fourth, England and +France to be alert to seize the "favourable moment," when the North +became disheartened, the present moment not being a good +one<a name="FNanchor387"></a><a href="#Footnote_387">[387]</a>. +This policy Mercier thought so "bold" that the North would be +deterred from declaring war. The two diplomats held long argument +over this suggestion. Lyons acknowledged the general pressure for +cotton, but thought there was no need of great alarm as yet and +also advanced the idea that in the end Europe would benefit by +being forced to develop other sources of <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_197"></a>[V1:pg 197]</span> supply, thus +being freed from such exclusive dependence on the United States. +Mercier answered that France was in dire need and could not wait +and he urged that mere recognition of the South would not secure +cotton--it was necessary also to break the blockade. In comment to +Russell, Lyons agreed that this was true, but thought the fact in +itself an argument against accepting Mercier's ideas: "The time is +far distant when the intervention of England and France in the +quarrel would be welcomed, or, unless under compulsion, tolerated +by the American peoples." The South had not yet "gone far enough in +establishing its independence to render a recognition of it either +proper or desirable for European powers," and he stated with +emphasis that recognition would <i>not</i> end the war unless there +was also an <i>alliance</i> with the South<a name= +"FNanchor388"></a><a href="#Footnote_388">[388]</a>.</p> +<p>In the British Cabinet also, at this same time, attention was +being directed to the question of cotton, not, primarily, by any +push from the British manufacturing interest, but because of +queries addressed to it by the French Minister in London. Russell +wrote to Palmerston, referring to the inquiry of Flahault, "I agree +with you that the cotton question may become serious at the end of +the year," but he added that Lindsay had informed him that in any +case cotton could not be brought in the winter-time from the +interior to the Southern ports<a name="FNanchor389"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_389">[389]</a>. In truth any serious thought given at +this time to the question of cotton appears to be the result of the +French arguments at London and Washington advocating a vigorous +American policy. October 19, Lyons and Mercier renewed debate on +exactly the same lines as previously, Mercier this time reading to +Lyons an instruction from Thouvenel and his reply. Lyons insisted +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198"></a>[V1:pg 198]</span> +that the North would most certainly declare war on any power that +recognized the South and asserted that such a war would cause more +suffering many times than all the suffering now caused by the +shortage of cotton. Yet Lyons felt compelled to use caution and +conciliation in dealing with Mercier, because of the desire to +preserve close harmony of attitude<a name= +"FNanchor390"></a><a href="#Footnote_390">[390]</a>. A few clays +later Lyons' comments seemed wholly justified when Mercier reported +to him the tone of a conversation with Seward, after having left +with him a copy of Thouvenel's instruction. Seward said plainly +that the United States would go to war with any foreign power that +tried to interfere and that the only way in which France could get +cotton was by a Northern conquest of the South. He acknowledged +that the United States might be defeated, but he informed Mercier +that France would at least know there had been a war. On his part +Mercier told Seward that in his opinion there was but one possible +outcome in America--separation--and that he had advised Thouvenel +that the true policy of England and France was to recognize the +South and "bring about a peaceful separation." Lyons' comment to +Russell is that Seward had certainly taken a "high" tone--evident +justification of Lyons' previously expressed opinion. Seward had +been very eager to learn whether England knew of Thouvenel's +instruction, to which Mercier replied "no," and was now anxious +that Russell should not reveal to Adams that Lyons had known the +contents before delivery to Seward--a caution with which Lyons was +very content<a name="FNanchor391"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_391">[391]</a>.</p> +<p>Lyons' first report of Mercier's ideas had been received in +London at a rather critical moment. On October 17, just after +Adams' complaint about Bunch and Russell's answer, while waiting to +see whether Seward would magnify <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_199"></a>[V1:pg 199]</span> that incident into a cause of +rupture, and four days before Bunch's "unsatisfactory explanation" +had been received, Russell wrote to Palmerston:</p> +<blockquote>"There is much good sense in Mercier's +observations.<br> +But we must wait. I am persuaded that if we do anything,<br> +it must be on a grand scale. It will not do for England<br> +and France to break a blockade for the sake of getting<br> +cotton. But, in Europe, powers have often said to belligerents,<br> +Make up your quarrels. We propose to give terms<br> +of pacification which we think fair and equitable. If you<br> +accept them, well and good. But, if your adversary accepts<br> +them and you refuse them, our mediation is at an end,<br> +and you may expect to see us your enemies. France would<br> +be quite ready to hold this language with us.<br> +<br> +"If such a policy were to be adopted the time for it<br> +would be the end of the year, or immediately before the<br> +meeting of Parliament<a name="FNanchor392"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_392">[392]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Apparently Russell under the irritations of the moment was +somewhat carried away by Mercier's suggestion. That it was but a +briefly held thought has been shown by expressions from him already +cited<a name="FNanchor393"></a><a href="#Footnote_393">[393]</a>. +Nor was he alone in ministerial uncertainty<a name= +"FNanchor394"></a><a href="#Footnote_394">[394]</a>, but Palmerston +was not inclined to alter British policy. October 18, he replied to +Russell:</p> +<blockquote>"As to North America, our best and true policy seems +to<br> +be to go on as we have begun, and to keep quite clear of the<br> +conflict between North and South.... The only<br> +excuse [for intervention] would be the danger to the +intervening<br> +parties if the conflict went on; but in the American<br> +case this can not be pleaded by the Powers of Europe.<br> +<br> +"I quite agree with you that the want of cotton would<br> +not justify such a proceeding, unless, indeed, the distress<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200"></a>[V1:pg 200]</span> +created by that want was far more serious than it is likely<br> +to be. The probability is that some cotton will find its way<br> +to us from America, and that we shall get a greater supply<br> +than usual from other quarters.<br> +<br> +"The only thing to do seems to be to lie on our oars<br> +and to give no pretext to the Washingtonians to quarrel<br> +with us, while, on the other hand, we maintain our rights<br> +and those of our fellow countrymen<a name= +"FNanchor395"></a><a href="#Footnote_395">[395]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>In Washington the result of Mercier's conversation with Seward, +outlining Thouvenel's suggestions, was a long and carefully +prepared despatch to Dayton, in Paris, which the biographer of +Seward thinks was one of his "great despatches; perhaps it was his +greatest, if we consider his perfect balance and the diplomatic way +in which he seemed to ignore what was menacing, while he adroitly +let Thouvenel see what the result would be if the implied threats +should be carried out<a name="FNanchor396"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_396">[396]</a>." Seward argued with skill the entire +matter of cotton, but he was none the less firm in diplomatic +defiance of foreign intervention. Since Great Britain had taken no +part in the French scheme--a point which Seward was careful to make +clear to Dayton--the despatch needs no expanded treatment here. Its +significance is that when reported to Lyons by Mercier (for Seward +had read it to the latter) the British Minister could pride himself +on having already pointed out to both Mercier and Russell that +Seward's line was exactly that which he had prophesied. Mercier +again was very anxious that his confidences to Lyons should not +become known, and Lyons was glad indeed to be wholly free from any +share in the discussion<a name="FNanchor397"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_397">[397]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201"></a>[V1:pg 201]</span> +<p>Two days after thus describing events, Lyons, on November 6, had +still another communication, and apparently a last on this topic, +with Mercier, in which the two men again went over the whole ground +of national policy toward America, and in which their divergent +views became very apparent. The arguments were the same, but +expressed with more vigour. Mercier seems, indeed, to have +attempted to "rush" Lyons into acquiescence in his policy. Lyons +finally observed to him that he "had no reason to suppose that Her +Majesty's Government considered the time was come for entertaining +at all the question of recognizing the South" and asked what good +such a step would do anyway. Mercier replied that he did not +believe that the North would declare war, and so it would be a step +toward settlement. To this Lyons took positive exception<a name= +"FNanchor398"></a><a href="#Footnote_398">[398]</a>. Lyons' report +of this conversation was written on November 8, a date which was +soon to stand out as that on which occurred an event more +immediately threatening to British-American relations than any +other during the Civil War.</p> +<p>The battle of Bull Run had left on British minds an impression +of Northern incapacity in war--even a doubt of Northern courage and +determination. On August 19 the Declaration of Paris negotiation, a +favourable result from which was eagerly desired by Russell, had +failed, as he well knew when he attached to the convention that +explanatory statement limiting its action in point of time. In the +end Russell felt that Britain had just escaped a "trap." Two weeks +after this Russell learned of the arrest of Mure, and soon of the +demand for Bunch's recall, finally and formally made by Adams on +November 21. Just six days later, on November 27, London heard of +the <i>Trent</i> affair of November 8. It is small wonder that +Russell <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202"></a>[V1:pg +202]</span> and his colleagues felt an increasing uncertainty as to +the intent of the United States, and also an increasing irritation +at having to guard their steps with such care in a situation where +they sincerely believed the only possible outcome was the +dissolution of the American Union. But up to the moment when the +news of the <i>Trent</i> affair was received they had pursued a +policy, so they believed, of strict and upright neutrality, and +were fixed in the determination not to permit minor controversies +or economic advantage to divert them from it.</p> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_319"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor319">[319]</a> <i>Economist</i>, May 18, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_320"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor320">[320]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, June 29, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_321"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor321">[321]</a> J.L. Motley, <i>The Causes of the American +Civil War</i>. Published as a pamphlet. N.Y., 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_322"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor322">[322]</a> <i>Daily News</i>, July 19, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_323"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor323">[323]</a> Russell, <i>My Diary, North and South</i>, +p. 159, Boston, 1863. This work is in effect a condensation of +Russell's letters to the <i>Times</i>, but contains many intimate +descriptions not given in the newspaper.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_324"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor324">[324]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 315.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_325"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor325">[325]</a> The <i>Times</i>, August 10, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_326"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor326">[326]</a> Russell, <i>My Diary</i>, London, 1863, +II, p. 296. This edition varies somewhat from that published at +Boston and previously cited. The <i>New York Times</i> became +Russell's most vicious critic, labelling him "Bull Run Russell," a +name which stuck, and beginning its first article on his sins "The +terrible epistle has been read with quite as much avidity as an +average President's message. We scarcely exaggerate the fact when +we say, the first and foremost thought on the minds of a very large +portion of our people after the repulse at <i>Bull's Run</i> was, +what will Russell say?" <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 297. As to his recall +Russell afterwards asserted that it was really due to a variance of +opinion with Delane, the former being really pro-Northern in +sympathy and in conviction of ultimate victory. This will be +examined later when Russell's position as an independent editor in +London becomes important.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_327"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor327">[327]</a> For similar German impressions see G.H. +Putnam, <i>Memories of My Youth</i>, N.Y., 1914, p. +187.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_328"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor328">[328]</a> Newton, <i>Lord Lyons</i>, I, p. 48. In +the same view Russell wrote to Lyons, August 16. "The defeat of +Manassas or Bull's Run seems to me to show a great want of zeal. +For I cannot believe the descendants of the men of 1776 and indeed +of 1815 to be totally wanting in courage." (Lyons +Papers.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_329"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor329">[329]</a> Motley, <i>Correspondence</i>, II, p. 31. +August 20, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_330"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor330">[330]</a> Gladstone Papers, August 29, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_331"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor331">[331]</a> <i>Economist</i>, Aug. 17, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_332"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor332">[332]</a> <i>Morning Star</i>, Sept. 10, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_333"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor333">[333]</a> <i>John Bull</i>, Sept. 14, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_334"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor334">[334]</a> To be discussed fully in Chapter +XVIII.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_335"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor335">[335]</a> Sept. 13, 1861. Dasent, <i>Delane</i>, II, +p. 34.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_336"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor336">[336]</a> Darwin to Asa Gray, Sept. 17 and Dec. 11, +1861. Cited in <i>Rhodes</i>, III, p. 510.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_337"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor337">[337]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, Sept. 14, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_338"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor338">[338]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, Sept. 14, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_339"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor339">[339]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, Sept. 21, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_340"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor340">[340]</a> <i>Daily News</i>, Sept. 17 and Oct. 10, +1861. The statement is in reply to an article in the <i>Times</i> +of October 9, arguing that even if the South were regarded as in +the wrong, they had ten millions, a fact that was +conclusive.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_341"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor341">[341]</a> <i>The Daily News Jubilee</i>. By Justin +McCarthy and John E. Robinson, pp. 69-77.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_342"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor342">[342]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, Sept. 28, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_343"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor343">[343]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, Nov. 2, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_344"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor344">[344]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Nov. 16. Spence's book +rapidly went through many editions, was widely read, and furnished +the argument for many a pro-Southern editorial. Spence himself soon +became the intimate friend and adviser of Mason, the Confederate +envoy to England.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_345"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor345">[345]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Nov. 23, 1861. The inference +from Bernard's la guage is perhaps permissible, but not +inevitable.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_346"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor346">[346]</a> Motley, <i>Correspondence</i>, II, p. 37. +To his mother, Oct. 18, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_347"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor347">[347]</a> See <i>ante</i>, Ch. V.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_348"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor348">[348]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." +No. 21 and Inclosure. Belligny was in fact the French agent at +Charleston who acted with Bunch.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_349"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor349">[349]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 768. No. 392. Lyons to +Russell, Aug. 2, 1861. It is interesting to note that fourteen days +were here required to transmit a letter that in ordinary times +would have reached its destination in two days. Lyons states that +he does not intend to inform Mercier of Russell's attempted recall +of instructions.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_350"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor350">[350]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 767. No. 324. Inclosure +No. 2. Private. Lyons to Bunch, July 5, 1861. Bunch in reporting to +Lyons, also used the word "negotiation."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_351"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor351">[351]</a> When Davis proclaimed privateering Bunch +had thought this indicated a "low morality" and that Southern +privateers would be in reality pirates. F.O., Am., Vol. 763. +Inclosure in No. 162. Bunch to Russell, April 18, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_352"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor352">[352]</a> Bancroft's account, <i>Seward</i>, II, pp. +197-203, states that Pickens was absent from Charleston. Bunch's +account privately was that he and Belligny thought Pickens "totally +unfit to be intrusted with anything in which judgment and +discretion are at all necessary." (Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons, +Aug. 16, 1861.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_353"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor353">[353]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. +198.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_354"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor354">[354]</a> Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_355"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor355">[355]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. +4. Adams to Russell, Sept. 3, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_356"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor356">[356]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 2. Lyons to Russell, +Aug. 19, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_357"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor357">[357]</a> Russell Papers. Bunch to Lyons, Aug. 18, +1861. Copy in Lyons to Russell, Aug. 31, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_358"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor358">[358]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." +No. 7. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 23, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_359"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor359">[359]</a> Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons, June 23, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_360"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor360">[360]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." +No. 15. Inclosures. Bunch to Lyons, Sept. 30, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_361"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor361">[361]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, "Correspondence respecting +International Maritime Law." No. 39. Lyons to Russell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_362"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor362">[362]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, +Sept. 6, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_363"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor363">[363]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." +No. 6. Russell to Cowley, Sept. 7, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_364"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor364">[364]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. +Private. Sept. 17, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_365"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor365">[365]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. +10. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 10, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_366"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor366">[366]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1396. No. 1112. Cowley +to Russell, Sept. 10, 1861. Also Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. +Private. Sept. 10, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_367"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor367">[367]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." +No. 9. Russell to Adams, Sept. 9, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_368"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor368">[368]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 8. Two days later, +September 11, Russell wrote to Palmerston that Motley was ignorant +of Seward's intentions, and that the Queen wished a modification of +the "phrase about not being prepared to recognize," but that he was +against any change. Palmerston MS.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_369"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor369">[369]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 12. Adams to +Russell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_370"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor370">[370]</a> Russell to Lyons, Sept. 13, 1861. (Cited +in Newton, <i>Lyons</i>, I, p. 52.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_371"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor371">[371]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." +No. 11. Russell to Lyons, Sept. 14, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_372"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor372">[372]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, +Sept. 19, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_373"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor373">[373]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. +<i>Private</i>. Sept. 24, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_374"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor374">[374]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Sept. 27, 1861. The facts +about Belligny were, as reported by Lyons and Cowley, that before +Bunch's activities became known, the French Consul had been +recalled and replaced by another man, St. André. It will +have been noted that when Lyons and Mercier sent their instructions +to the consuls at Charleston that of Mercier was addressed to St. +André. Apparently he had not reached Charleston. Thus there +was no opportunity to demand the recall of Belligny. Bancroft +(<i>Seward</i>, II, p. 203), unaware of this, presumes that Seward +"thought it important not to give them (England and France) a +common grievance."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_375"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor375">[375]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 14, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_376"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor376">[376]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." +No. 15. Inclosure. Bunch to Lyons, Sept. 30, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_377"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor377">[377]</a> Lyons Papers. Copy, Private and +Confidential, Lyons to Bunch, Oct. 24, 1861. Bunch was informed in +this letter that Mure had been set free.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_378"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor378">[378]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 757. No. 381. Russell to +Lyons. Draft. Oct. 26, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_379"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor379">[379]</a> The criticisms of Lyons and Russell were +not printed in the <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>. Bunch did later +deny specifically that he had told anyone of his activities. +<i>(Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 22. +Inclosure. Bunch to Lyons. Oct. 31, 1861.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_380"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor380">[380]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." +No. 17. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, 1861. There are two interesting +unindicated elisions in the printed text of this letter. Indicating +them in brackets the sentences run: first:--<br> +<br> +"It may seem superfluous to make any observations on the charges +brought against Mr. Bunch. [For it is plain that a high-handed +proceeding being deemed advisable with a view to gratify the +American Public, Mr. Bunch has merely been selected as a safer +object of attack than the British or French Government.] I can not +help saying that never were more serious charges, etc.," and +second:--<br> +<br> +"When Mr. Seward had finished reading the despatch I remained +silent. [I allowed the pain which the contents of it had caused me +to be apparent in my countenance, but I said nothing. From my +knowledge of Mr. Seward's character, I was sure that at the moment +nothing which I could say would make so much impression upon him as +my maintaining an absolute silence.] After a short pause, etc." +(F.O., America, Vol. 773. No. 607. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, +1861).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_381"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor381">[381]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_382"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor382">[382]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 2, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_383"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor383">[383]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Nov. +12. 1861. He added, "The dismissal of Bunch seems to me a singular +mixture of the bully and coward."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_384"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor384">[384]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." +No. 26. Russell to Adams, Dec. 9, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_385"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor385">[385]</a> Bonham, <i>British Consuls in the +Confederacy</i>, p. 45. Columbia University, <i>Studies in History, +Economics and Public Law</i>, XI-III. No. 3. Bonham shows that +Bunch was more pro-Southern than Lyons thought. Lyons had suggested +that Bunch be permitted to remain privately at Charleston. +(<i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, <i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 29. +Lyons to Russell, Dec. 31, 1861.) That Bunch was after all regarded +by the United States as a scapegoat may be argued from the "curious +circumstance that in 1875, Mr. Bunch, being then British Minister +resident at Bogota, acted as arbitrator in a case between the +United States and Colombia." (Moore, <i>Int. Law Digest</i>, V, p. +22.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_386"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor386">[386]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward, II</i>, p. 203, says +that if Great Britain ever attempted another negotiation "that +British representatives were careful to preserve perfect secrecy." +I have found no evidence of any similar communication with the +South.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_387"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor387">[387]</a> As early as April, 1861, Stoeckl reported +Mercier as urging Lyons and Stoeckl to secure from their respective +Governments authority to recognize the South whenever they thought +"the right time" had come. Lyons did not wish to have this +responsibility, arguing that the mere fact of such a decision being +left to him would embarrass him in his relations with the North. +Stoeckl also opposed Mercier's idea, and added that Russia could +well afford to wait until England and France had acted. Russia +could then also recognize the South without offending the North. +(Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., April 2-14, 1861. No. +863.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_388"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor388">[388]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 4, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_389"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor389">[389]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. +8, 1861. On Oct. 7, Lyons wrote to Head, "If we can get through the +winter and spring without American cotton, and keep the peace, we +shall attain a great object." (Lyons Papers.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_390"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor390">[390]</a> F.O., America, 772. No. 585. Lyons to +Russell, Oct. 21, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_391"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor391">[391]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 773. No. 606. Lyons to +Russell. Confidential. Oct. 28, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_392"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor392">[392]</a> Walpole, <i>Russell</i>, II, +344.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_393"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor393">[393]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 194.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_394"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor394">[394]</a> "The Americans certainly seem inclined to +pick a quarrel with us; but I doubt their going far enough even to +oblige us to recognize the Southern States. A step further would +enable us to open the Southern ports, but a war would nevertheless +be a great calamity." (Maxwell, <i>Clarendon</i>, II, 245. +Granville to Clarendon. No exact date is given but the context +shows it to have been in October, 1861.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_395"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor395">[395]</a> Ashley, <i>Palmerston</i>, II, 218-19. On +October 30, Russell wrote to Gladstone expressing himself as +worried about cotton but stating that the North was about to try to +take New Orleans and thus release cotton. (Gladstone +Papers).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_396"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor396">[396]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. 219. +Bancroft cites also a letter from Seward to his wife showing that +he appreciated thoroughly the probability of a foreign war if +France should press on in the line taken.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_397"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor397">[397]</a> F.O., America, Vol. 773. No. 623. +Confidential. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 4, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_398"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor398">[398]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 634. Confidential. Lyons +to Russell, Nov. 8, 1861. In truth Lyons felt something of that +suspicion of France indicated by Cowley, and for both men these +suspicions date from the moment when France seemed lukewarm in +support of England in the matter of Bunch.</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203"></a>[V1:pg 203]</span> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII</h2> +<h3>THE "TRENT"</h3> +<br> +<p>The <i>Trent</i> affair seemed to Great Britain like the climax +of American arrogance<a name="FNanchor399"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_399">[399]</a>. The Confederate agents sent to Europe at +the outbreak of the Civil War had accomplished little, and after +seven months of waiting for a more favourable turn in foreign +relations, President Davis determined to replace them by two +"Special Commissioners of the Confederate States of America." These +were James M. Mason of Virginia, for Great Britain, and John +Slidell of Louisiana, for France. Their appointment indicated that +the South had at last awakened to the need of a serious foreign +policy. It was publicly and widely commented on by the Southern +press, thereby arousing an excited apprehension in the North, +almost as if the mere sending of two new men with instructions to +secure recognition abroad were tantamount to the actual +accomplishment of their object.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204"></a>[V1:pg 204]</span> +<p>Mason and Slidell succeeded in running the blockade at +Charleston on the night of October 12, 1861, on the Confederate +steamer <i>Theodora</i><a name="FNanchor400"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_400">[400]</a>, and arrived at New Providence, Nassau, +on the fourteenth, thence proceeded by the same vessel to Cardenas, +Cuba, and from that point journeyed overland to Havana, arriving +October 22. In the party there were, besides the two envoys, their +secretaries, McFarland and Eustis, and the family of Slidell. On +November 7 they sailed for the Danish island of St. Thomas, +expecting thence to take a British steamer for Southampton. The +vessel on which they left Havana was the British contract +mail-packet <i>Trent</i>, whose captain had full knowledge of the +diplomatic character of his passengers. About noon on November 8 +the <i>Trent</i> was stopped in the Bahama Channel by the United +States sloop of war, <i>San Jacinto</i>, Captain Wilkes commanding, +by a shot across the bows, and a boarding party took from the +<i>Trent</i> Mason and Slidell with their secretaries, transferred +them to the <i>San Jacinto</i>, and proceeded to an American port. +Protest was made both by the captain of the <i>Trent</i> and by +Commander Williams, R.N., admiralty agent in charge of mails on +board the ship<a name="FNanchor401"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_401">[401]</a>. The two envoys also declared that they +would yield only to personal compulsion, whereupon hands were laid +upon shoulders and coat collars, and, accepting this as the +application of <i>force</i>, they were transferred to the <i>San +Jacinto's</i> boats. The scene on the <i>Trent</i>, as described by +all parties, both then and later, partakes of the nature of comic +opera, yet was serious enough to the participants. In fact, the +envoys, especially Slidell, were exultant in the conviction that +the action of Wilkes would inevitably result in the early +realization of the object of their <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_205"></a>[V1:pg 205]</span> journey--recognition of the +South, at least by Great Britain<a name="FNanchor402"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_402">[402]</a>. Once on board the <i>San Jacinto</i> +they were treated more like guests on a private yacht, having +"seats at the captain's table," than as enemy prisoners on an +American war-ship.</p> +<p>Captain Wilkes had acted without orders, and, indeed, even +without any recent official information from Washington. He was +returning from a cruise off the African coast, and had reached St. +Thomas on October 10. A few days later, when off the south coat of +Cuba, he had learned of the Confederate appointment of Mason and +Slidell, and on the twenty-eighth, in Havana harbour, he heard that +the Commissioners were to sail on the <i>Trent</i>. At once he +conceived the idea of intercepting the <i>Trent</i>, exercising the +right of search, and seizing the envoys, in spite of the alleged +objections of his executive officer, Lieutenant Fairfax. The result +was that quite without authority from the United States Navy +Department, and solely upon his own responsibility, a challenge was +addressed to Britain, the "mistress of the seas," certain to be +accepted by that nation as an insult to national prestige and +national pride not quietly to be suffered.</p> +<p>The <i>San Jacinto</i> reached Fortress Monroe on the evening of +November 15. The next day the news was known, but since it was +Saturday, few papers contained more than brief and inaccurate +accounts and, there being then few Sunday papers, it was not until +Monday, the eighteenth, that there broke out a widespread rejoicing +and glorification in the Northern press<a name= +"FNanchor403"></a><a href="#Footnote_403">[403]</a>. America, for a +few days, passed through a spasm of exultation hard to understand, +even by those who felt it, once the first emotion had subsided. +This had various causes, but among them is evident a quite +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206"></a>[V1:pg 206]</span> +childish fear of the acuteness and abilities of Mason and Slidell. +Both men were indeed persons of distinction in the politics of the +previous decades. Mason had always been open in his expressed +antipathy to the North, especially to New England, had long been a +leader in Virginia, and at the time of the Southern secession, was +a United States Senator from that State. Slidell, a Northerner by +birth, but early removed to Louisiana, had acquired fortune in +business there, and had for nearly twenty years been the political +"boss" of one faction of the Democratic Party in New Orleans and in +the State. With much previous experience in diplomacy, especially +that requiring intrigue and indirect methods (as in the +preliminaries of the Mexican War), and having held his seat in the +United States Senate until the withdrawal of Louisiana from the +Union, he was, of the two men, more feared and more detested, but +both were thoroughly obnoxious to the North. Merely on the personal +side their capture was cause for wide rejoicing<a name= +"FNanchor404"></a><a href="#Footnote_404">[404]</a>.</p> +<p>Surprise was also an element in the American elation, for until +the news of the capture was received no portion of the public had +given serious thought to any attempt to stop the envoys. Surprise +also played its part when the affair became known in England, +though in official circles there had been some warning. It had +already been reported in the British press that Mason and Slidell +had run the blockade at Charleston, were in Cuba, and were about to +set sail for England on the Confederate steamer <i>Nashville</i>, +but the British Government, considering that the envoys might +perhaps sail rather on the West India Mail Steamer for Southampton, +became much concerned over a possible American interference with +that vessel. On November 9 Hammond sent an urgent enquiry to the +Advocate-General stating the situation, calling attention to the +presence at <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207"></a>[V1:pg +207]</span> Southampton of an American war-vessel, and asking +whether this vessel, or any other American man-of-war, "would be +entitled to interfere with the mail steamer if fallen in with +beyond the territorial limits of the United Kingdom, that is beyond +three miles from the British Coast."</p> +<br> +<a name="image06.jpg"></a> +<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image06.jpg"><img src= +"images/image06.jpg" width="55%" alt=""></a><br> +<i>Photo: Handy, Washington</i><br> +<b>JAMES M. MASON</b></p> +<br> +<blockquote>"Whether for instance she might cause the West India +Mail Steamer to bring to, might board her, examine her Papers, open +the Mail Bags and examine the contents thereof, examine the luggage +of passengers, seize and carry away Messrs. Mason and Slidell in +person, or seize their Credentials and Instructions and Despatches, +or even put a Prize Crew on board the West India Steamer and carry +her off to a Port of the United States; in other words what would +be the right of the American Cruiser with regard to her passengers +and crew and lawful papers and correspondence on board our packet +on the assumption that the said packet was liable to capture and +confiscation on the ground of carrying enemies' despatches; would +the Cruiser be entitled to carry the packet and all and everything +in her back to America or would she be obliged to land in this +Country or in some near port all the people and all the unseizable +goods<a name="FNanchor405"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_405">[405]</a>?"</blockquote> +<p>Hammond further stated that Russell was anxious to have an +immediate reply, inasmuch as the mail packet was due to arrive in +Southampton on November 12. The opinion of the law officer +consulted is best given in Palmerston's own words in a letter to +Delane, Editor of the <i>Times</i>:</p> +<blockquote> +<blockquote>"<i>94 Piccadilly,<br> +November 11, 1861</i>.</blockquote> +<br> +"MY DEAR DELANE,<br> +<br> +"It may be useful to you to know that the Chancellor, Dr. +Lushington, the three Law Officers, Sir G. Grey, the Duke of +Somerset, and myself, met at the Treasury to-day to consider what +we could properly do about the American cruiser come, no doubt, to +search the West Indian packet <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_208"></a>[V1:pg 208]</span> supposed to be bringing hither +the two Southern envoys; and, much to my regret, it appeared that, +according to the principles of international law laid down in our +courts by Lord Stowell, and practised and enforced by us, a +belligerent has a right to stop and search any neutral not being a +ship of war, and being found on the high seas and being suspected +of carrying enemy's despatches; and that consequently this American +cruiser might, by our own principles of international law, stop the +West Indian packet, search her, and if the Southern men and their +despatches and credentials were found on board, either take them +out, or seize the packet and carry her back to New York for trial. +Such being the opinion of our men learned in the law, we have +determined to do no more than to order the <i>Phaeton</i> frigate +to drop down to Yarmouth Roads and watch the proceedings of the +American within our three-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction, +and to prevent her from exercising within that limit those rights +which we cannot dispute as belonging to her beyond that limit.<br> +<br> +"In the meanwhile the American captain, having got very drunk this +morning at Southampton with some excellent brandy, and finding it +blow heavily at sea, has come to an anchor for the night within +Calshot Castle, at the entrance of the Southampton river.<br> +<br> +"I mention these things for your private information.<br> +<br> +Yours sincerely,<br> +<br> +PALMERSTON<a name="FNanchor406"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_406">[406]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Not completely satisfied with this decision as reported to +Delane, and sincerely anxious to avert what he foresaw would be a +difficult situation, Palmerston took the unusual step of writing to +Adams on the next day, November 12, and asking for an interview. +His note took Adams by surprise, but he promptly waited upon +Palmerston, and was told of the latter's disturbance at the +presence of the American ship <i>James Adger</i>, Captain Marchand +commanding, in Southampton Harbour, with the alleged purpose of +stopping the British West India steamer and intercepting +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209"></a>[V1:pg 209]</span> the +journey of Mason and Slidell. Palmerston stated that he "did not +pretend to judge absolutely of the question whether we had a right +to stop a foreign vessel for such a purpose as was indicated," and +he urged on Adams the unwisdom of such an act in any case. "Neither +did the object to be gained seem commensurate with the risk. For it +was surely of no consequence whether one or two more men were added +to the two or three who had already been so long here. They would +scarcely make a difference in the action of the Government after +once having made up its mind<a name="FNanchor407"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_407">[407]</a>."</p> +<p>The interview with Adams, so Palmerston wrote to Delane on the +same day, November 12, was reassuring:</p> +<blockquote>"MY DEAR DELANE,<br> +<br> +"I have seen Adams to-day, and he assures me that the American +paddle-wheel was sent to intercept the <i>Nashville</i> if found in +these seas, but not to meddle with any ship under a foreign flag. +He said he had seen the commander, and had advised him to go +straight home; and he believed the steamer to be now on her way +back to the United States. This is a very satisfactory +explanation.<br> +<br> +Yours sincerely,<br> +<br> +PALMERSTON<a name="FNanchor408"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_408">[408]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>In fact, neither Adams' diary nor his report to Seward recorded +quite the same statement as that here attributed to him by +Palmerston, and this became later, but fortunately after the +question of the <i>Trent</i> had passed off the stage, a matter of +minor dispute. Adams' own statement was that he had told Palmerston +the <i>James Adger</i> was seeking to intercept the +<i>Nashville</i> and "had no instruction" to interfere with a +British Packet--which is not the same as saying that she already +had instructions "not to meddle with any ship <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_210"></a>[V1:pg 210]</span> under a foreign +flag<a name="FNanchor409"></a><a href="#Footnote_409">[409]</a>." +But in any case, it would appear that the British Government had +been warned by its legal advisers that if that which actually +happened in the case of the <i>Trent</i> should occur, English +practice, if followed, would compel acquiescence in it<a name= +"FNanchor410"></a><a href="#Footnote_410">[410]</a>. This is not to +say that a first legal advice thus given on a problematical case +necessarily bound the Government to a fixed line of action, but +that the opinion of the Government was one of "no help for it" if +the case should actually arise is shown by the instructions to +Lyons and by his reaction. On November 16, Hammond wrote to Lyons +stating the opinion of the Law Officers that "we could do nothing +to save the Packet being interfered with outside our three miles; +so Lord Palmerston sent for Adams, who assured him that the +American [the <i>James Adger</i>] had no instructions to meddle +with any ship under English colours ... that her orders were not to +endeavour to take Mason and Slidell out of any ship under +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211"></a>[V1:pg 211]</span> +foreign colours<a name="FNanchor411"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_411">[411]</a>." On receipt of this letter subsequent to +the actual seizure of the envoys, Lyons hardly knew what to expect. +He reported Hammond's account to Admiral Milne, writing that the +legal opinion was that "Nothing could be done to save the Packet's +being interfered with outside of the Marine league from the British +Coast"; but he added, "I am not informed that the Law Officers +decided that Mason and Slidell might be taken out of the Packet, +but only that we could not prevent the Packet's being interfered +with," thus previsioning that shift in British legal opinion which +was to come <i>after</i> the event. Meanwhile Lyons was so +uncertain as to what his instructions would be that he thought he +"ought to maintain the greatest reserve here on the matter of the +<i>Trent</i><a name="FNanchor412"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_412">[412]</a>."</p> +<p>This British anxiety and the efforts to prevent a dangerous +complication occurred after the envoys had been seized but some two +weeks before that fact was known in London. "Adams," wrote Russell, +"says it was all a false alarm, and wonders at our susceptibility +and exaggerated notions<a name="FNanchor413"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_413">[413]</a>." But Russell was not equally convinced +with Adams that the North, especially Seward, was so eager +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212"></a>[V1:pg 212]</span> for +continued British neutrality, and when, on November 27, the news of +Captain Wilkes' action was received, Russell and many others in the +Cabinet saw in it a continuation of unfriendly Northern policy now +culminating in a direct affront. Argyll, the most avowed friend of +the North in the Cabinet, was stirred at first to keen resentment, +writing "of this wretched piece of American folly.... I am all +against submitting to any clean breach of International Law, such +as I can hardly doubt this has been<a name= +"FNanchor414"></a><a href="#Footnote_414">[414]</a>." The Law +Officers now held that "Captain Wilkes had undertaken to pass upon +the issue of a violation of neutrality on the spot, instead of +sending the <i>Trent</i> as a prize into port for judicial +adjudication<a name="FNanchor415"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_415">[415]</a>." This was still later further expanded +by an opinion that the envoys could not be considered as +contraband, and thus subject to capture nor the <i>Trent</i> as +having violated neutrality, since the destination of the vessel was +to a neutral, not to an enemy port<a name= +"FNanchor416"></a><a href="#Footnote_416">[416]</a>. This opinion +would have prohibited even the carrying of the <i>Trent</i> into an +American port for trial by a prize court.</p> +<p>But the British Government did not argue the matter in its +demand upon the United States. The case was one for a quick demand +of prompt reparation. Russell's instruction to Lyons, sent on +November 30, was couched in coldly correct language, showing +neither a friendly nor an unfriendly attitude. The seizure of the +envoys was asserted to be a breach of international law, which, it +was hoped, had occurred without orders, and Lyons was to demand the +restoration of the prisoners with an apology. If Seward had not +already offered these terms Lyons was to propose them, but as a +preliminary step in making clear the British position, he might +read the instruction to Seward, leaving <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_213"></a>[V1:pg 213]</span> him a copy of +it if desired<a name="FNanchor417"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_417">[417]</a>. In another instruction of the same date +Russell authorized a delay of seven days in insisting upon an +answer by Seward, if the latter wished it, and gave Lyons liberty +to determine whether "the requirements of Her Majesty's Government +are substantially complied with<a name="FNanchor418"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_418">[418]</a>." And on December 1, Russell writing +privately to Lyons instructed him, while upholding English dignity, +to abstain from anything like menace<a name= +"FNanchor419"></a><a href="#Footnote_419">[419]</a>. On November +30, also, the Government hurriedly sent out orders to hold the +British Fleet in readiness, began preparations for the sending of +troops to Canada, and initiated munitions and supply activities. +Evidently there was at first but faint hope that a break in +relations, soon to be followed by war, was to be avoided<a name= +"FNanchor420"></a><a href="#Footnote_420">[420]</a>.</p> +<p>It has long been known to history, and was known to Adams almost +immediately, that the first draft of the instruction to Lyons was +softened in language by the advice of Prince Albert, the material +point being the expression of a hope that the action of Captain +Wilkes was unauthorized<a name="FNanchor421"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_421">[421]</a>. That instruction had been sent previous +to <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214"></a>[V1:pg 214]</span> +the receipt of a report from Lyons in which, very fearful of +results, he stated that, waiting instructions, he would preserve a +strict silence<a name="FNanchor422"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_422">[422]</a>. Equally anxious was Cowley at Paris, who +feared the realization of Seward's former "foreign war panacea." "I +wish I could divest myself of the idea that the North and South +will not shake hands over a war with us<a name= +"FNanchor423"></a><a href="#Footnote_423">[423]</a>." Considering +the bitterness of the quarrel in America this was a far-fetched +notion. The efforts promptly made by the Confederate agents in +London to make use of the <i>Trent</i> affair showed how little +Cowley understood the American temper. Having remained very quiet +since August when Russell had informed them that Great Britain +intended remaining strictly neutral<a name= +"FNanchor424"></a><a href="#Footnote_424">[424]</a>, they now, on +November 27 and 30, renewed their argument and application for +recognition, but received in reply a curt letter declining any +official communication with them "in the present state of +affairs<a name="FNanchor425"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_425">[425]</a>."</p> +<p>The delay of at least three weeks imposed by methods of +transportation before even the first American reaction to +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215"></a>[V1:pg 215]</span> the +British demand could be received in London gave time for a +lessening of excitement and a more careful self-analysis by British +statesmen as to what they really felt and desired. Gladstone wrote: +"It is a very sad and heart-sickening business, and I sincerely +trust with you that war may be averted<a name= +"FNanchor426"></a><a href="#Footnote_426">[426]</a>." Argyll +hurried home from the Continent, being much disturbed by the tone +of the British press, and stating that he was against standing on +technical grounds of international law. "War with America is such a +calamity that we must do all we can to avoid it. It involves not +only ourselves, but all our North American colonies<a name= +"FNanchor427"></a><a href="#Footnote_427">[427]</a>." But war +seemed to both men scarcely avoidable, an opinion held also by +Cornewall Lewis<a name="FNanchor428"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_428">[428]</a> and by Clarendon, the latter standing at +the moment in a position midway between the Whig and Tory +parties<a name="FNanchor429"></a><a href="#Footnote_429">[429]</a>. +Yet Russell, with more cause than others to mistrust Seward's +policy, as also believing that he had more cause, personally, to +resent it, was less pessimistic and was already thinking of at +least postponing immediate hostilities in the event of an American +refusal to make just recompense. On December 16 he wrote to +Palmerston: "I incline more and more to the opinion that if the +answer is a reasoning, and not a blunt offensive answer, we should +send once more across the Atlantic to ask compliance.... I do not +think the country would approve an immediate declaration of war. +But I think we must abide by our demand of a restoration of the +prisoners.... Lyons gives a sad account of Canada. Your foresight +of last year is amply justified<a name="FNanchor430"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_430">[430]</a>." And on December 20 he wrote, "Adams' +language yesterday was entirely in favour of yielding to us, if our +tone is not too peremptory.... If our demands are refused, we must, +of course, call Parliament <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_216"></a>[V1:pg 216]</span> together. The sixth of February +will do. In any other case we must decide according to +circumstances<a name="FNanchor431"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_431">[431]</a>."</p> +<p>Thus Russell would not have Great Britain go to war with America +without the sanction of Parliament, and was seeking reasons for +delay. He was reacting, in fact, to a more sobering second thought +which was experienced also by nearly everyone, save the eager +British "Southerner," in public and in newspaper circles. The first +explosion of the Press, on receipt of the news of the <i>Trent</i>, +had been a terrific one. The British lion, insulted in its chosen +field of supremacy, the sea, had pawed the air in frenzy though at +first preserving a certain slow dignity of motion. Customary +"strong leader-writing" became vigorous, indeed, in editorial +treatment of America and in demand for the prompt release of the +envoys with suitable apology. The close touch of leading papers +with Governmental opinion is well shown, as in the <i>Times</i>, by +the day-to-day editorials of the first week. On November 28 there +was solemn and anxious consideration of a grave crisis with much +questioning of international law, which was acknowledged to be +doubtful. But even if old British practice seemed to support +Captain Wilkes, the present was not to be controlled by a discarded +past, and "essential differences" were pointed out. This tone of +vexed uncertainty changed to a note of positive assurance and +militant patriotism on November 30 when the Government made its +demand. The <i>Times</i> up to December 2, thought it absolutely +certain that Wilkes had acted on authorization, and devoted much +space to Seward as the evil genius of American warlike policy +toward England. The old "Duke of Newcastle story" was revamped. But +on December 2 there reached London the first, very brief, American +news of the arrival of the <i>San Jacinto</i> at Fortress Monroe, +and this contained a positive statement by Wilkes that he had had +no orders. The <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217"></a>[V1:pg +217]</span> <i>Times</i> was sceptical, but printed the news as +having an important bearing, if true, and, at the same time, +printed communications by "Justicia" and others advising a "go +slowly" policy<a name="FNanchor432"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_432">[432]</a>. Yet all British papers indulged in sharp +reflections on American insults, displayed keen resentment, and +demanded a prompt yielding to the Governmental demand.</p> +<p>An intelligent American long resident in London, wrote to Seward +on November 29: "There never was within memory such a burst of +feeling as has been created by the news of the boarding of [the +Trent]. The people are frantic with rage, and were the country +polled, I fear 999 men out of a thousand would declare for +immediate war. Lord Palmerston cannot resist the impulse if he +would." And another American, in Edinburgh, wrote to his uncle in +New York: "I have never seen so intense a feeling of indignation +exhibited in my life. It pervades all classes, and may make itself +heard above the wiser theories of the Cabinet officers<a name= +"FNanchor433"></a><a href="#Footnote_433">[433]</a>." If such were +the British temper, it would require skilful handling by even a +pacific-minded Government to avoid war. Even without belligerent +newspaper utterances the tone of arrogance as in <i>Punch's</i> +cartoon, "You do what's right, my son, or I'll blow you out of the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218"></a>[V1:pg 218]</span> +water," portended no happy solution. Yet this cartoon at least +implied a hope of peaceful outcome, and that this was soon a +general hope is shown by the prompt publicity given to a statement +from the American General, Winfield Scott, in Paris, denying that +he had said the action of Captain Wilkes had been decided upon at +Washington before he sailed for Europe, and asserting that no +orders were given to seize the envoys on board any British or +foreign vessel<a name="FNanchor434"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_434">[434]</a>. Nevertheless, Adams, for the moment +intensely aroused, and suspicious of the whole purpose of British +policy, could write to his friend Dana in Boston: "The expression +of the past summer might have convinced you that she [Great +Britain] was not indifferent to the disruption of the Union. In May +she drove in the tip of the wedge, and now you can't imagine that a +few spiders' webs of a half a century back will not be strong +enough to hold her from driving it home. Little do you understand +of this fast-anchored isle<a name="FNanchor435"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_435">[435]</a>."</p> +<p>There can be no doubt that one cause of a more bitter and +sharper tone in the British press was the reception of the +counter-exultation of the American press on learning of the +detention and the exercise of "right of search" on a British ship. +The American public equally went "off its head" in its expressions. +Writing in 1911, the son of the American Minister to Great Britain, +Charles Francis Adams, jun., in 1861, a young law-student in +Boston, stated: "I do not remember in the whole course of the +half-century's retrospect ... any occurrence in which the American +people were so completely swept off their feet, for the moment +losing possession of their senses, as during the weeks which +immediately followed the seizure of Mason and Slidell<a name= +"FNanchor436"></a><a href="#Footnote_436">[436]</a>." There were +evident two principal causes for <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_219"></a>[V1:pg 219]</span> this elation. The North with much +emotion and high courage entering in April, 1861, upon the task of +restoring the Union and hoping for quick success, had now passed +through a wearisome six months with no evident progress towards its +object. Northern failure had developed a deep mortification when, +suddenly and unexpectedly, a bold naval captain, on his own +initiative, appeared to have struck a real blow at the South. His +action seemed to indicate that the fighting forces of the North, if +free from the trammels of Washington red tape, could, and would, +carry on energetic war. Certainly it was but a slight incident to +create such Northern emotion, yet the result was a sudden lifting +from despondency to elation.</p> +<p>But almost equally with this cause of joy there operated on +American minds the notion that the United States had at last given +to Great Britain a dose of her own medicine in a previous era--had +exercised upon a British ship that "right of search" which had been +so keenly resented by America as to have become almost a +<i>permanent</i> cause of a sense of injury once received and never +to be forgotten. There was no clear thinking about this; the +obnoxious right of search in times of peace for vagrant seamen, the +belligerent right exercised by Britain while America was a neutral, +the practice of a "right of visit" claimed by Britain as necessary +in suppression of the African Slave Trade--all were confused by the +American public (as they are still in many history textbooks to +this day), and the total result of this mixing of ideas was a +general American jubilation that the United States had now revenged +herself for British offences, in a manner of which Great Britain +could not consistently complain. These two main reasons for +exultation were shared by all classes, not merely by the uninformed +mob of newspaper readers. At a banquet tendered Captain Wilkes in +Boston on November 26, Governor Andrews of Massachusetts called +Wilkes' action <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220"></a>[V1:pg +220]</span> "one of the most illustrious services that had made the +war memorable," and added "that there might be nothing left [in the +episode] to crown the exultation of the American heart, Commodore +Wilkes fired his shot across the bows of the ship that bore the +British lion at its head<a name="FNanchor437"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_437">[437]</a>."</p> +<p>All America first applauded the act, then plunged into +discussion of its legality as doubts began to arise of its +defensibility--and wisdom. It became a sort of temporarily popular +"parlour game" to argue the international law of the case and +decide that Great Britain could have no cause of complaint<a name= +"FNanchor438"></a><a href="#Footnote_438">[438]</a>. Meanwhile at +Washington itself there was evidenced almost equal excitement and +approval--but not, fortunately, by the Department responsible for +the conduct of foreign relations. Secretary of the Navy Welles +congratulated Wilkes on his "great public service," though +criticizing him for not having brought the <i>Trent</i> into port +for adjudication. Congress passed a joint resolution, December 2, +thanking Wilkes for his conduct, and the President was requested to +give him a gold medal commemorative of his act. Indeed, no evidence +of approbation was withheld save the formal approval and avowal of +national responsibility by the Secretary of State, Seward. On him, +therefore, and on the wisdom of men high in the confidence of the +Cabinet, like Sumner, Lyons pinned his faint hope of a peaceful +solution. Thoroughly alarmed and <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_221"></a>[V1:pg 221]</span> despondent, anxious as to the +possible fate of Canada<a name="FNanchor439"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_439">[439]</a>, he advised against any public +preparations in Canada for defence, on the ground that if the +<i>Trent</i> affair did blow over it should not appear that we ever +thought it an insult which would endanger peace<a name= +"FNanchor440"></a><a href="#Footnote_440">[440]</a>. This was very +different from the action and attitude of the Government at home, +as yet unknown to Lyons. He wisely waited in silence, advising like +caution to others, until the receipt of instructions. Silence, at +the moment, was also a friendly service to the United States.</p> +<p>The earliest American reactions, the national rejoicing, became +known to the British press some six days after its own spasm of +anger, and three days after the Government had despatched its +demand for release of the prisoners and begun its hurried military +preparations. On December 3 the <i>Times</i> contained the first +summary of American press outpourings. The first effect in England +was astonishment, followed by renewed and more intense evidences of +a belligerent disposition. Soon, however, there began to appear a +note of caution and more sane judgment of the situation, though +with no lessening of the assertion that Britain had suffered an +injury that must be redressed. The American frenzy of delight +seemingly indicated a deep-seated hostility to Britain that gave +pause to British clamour for revenge. On December 4 John Bright +made a great speech at Rochdale, arguing a possible British +precedent for Wilkes' act, urging caution, lauding American +leadership in democracy, and stating his positive conviction that +the United States Government was as much astonished as was that of +Great Britain by the attack on the <i>Trent.</i><a name= +"FNanchor441"></a><a href="#Footnote_441">[441]</a> To this the +<i>Times</i> gave a full column of report on December 5 +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222"></a>[V1:pg 222]</span> and +the day following printed five close-type columns of the speech +itself. Editorially it attacked Bright's position, belittling the +speech for having been made at the one "inconspicuous" place where +the orator would be sure of a warm welcome, and asking why +Manchester or Liverpool had not been chosen. In fact, however, the +<i>Times</i> was attempting to controvert "our ancient enemy" +Bright as an apostle of democracy rather than to fan the flames of +irritation over the <i>Trent</i>, and the prominence given to +Bright's speech indicates a greater readiness to consider as +hopeful an escape from the existing crisis.</p> +<p>After December 3 and up to the ninth, the <i>Times</i> was more +caustic about America than previously. The impression of its +editorials read to-day is that more hopeful of a peaceful solution +it was more free to snarl. But with the issue of December 10 there +began a series of leaders and communications, though occasionally +with a relapse to the former tone, distinctly less irritating to +Americans, and indicating a real desire for peace<a name= +"FNanchor442"></a><a href="#Footnote_442">[442]</a>. Other +newspapers either followed the <i>Times</i>, or were slightly in +advance of it in a change to more considerate and peaceful +expressions. Adams could write to Seward on December 6 that he saw +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223"></a>[V1:pg 223]</span> no +change in the universality of the British demand for satisfaction +of the "insult and injury thought to be endured," but he recognized +in the next few days that a slow shift was taking place in the +British temper and regretted the violence of American utterances. +December 12, he wrote to his son in America: "It has given us here +an indescribably sad feeling to witness the exultation in America +over an event which bids fair to be the final calamity in this +contest...." Great Britain "is right in principle and only wrong in +point of consistency. Our mistake is that we are donning ourselves +in her cast-off suit, when our own is better worth wearing<a name= +"FNanchor443"></a><a href="#Footnote_443">[443]</a>." His +secretarial son was more vehement: "Angry and hateful as I am of +Great Britain, I still can't help laughing and cursing at the same +time as I see the accounts of the talk of our people. What a bloody +set of fools they are! How in the name of all that's conceivable +could you suppose that England would sit quiet under such an +insult. <i>We</i> should have jumped out of our boots at such a +one<a name="FNanchor444"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_444">[444]</a>."</p> +<p>The British Cabinet members were divided in sentiments of hope +or pessimism as to the outcome, and were increasingly anxious for +an honourable escape from a possible situation in which, if they +trusted the observations of Lyons, they might find themselves +aiding a slave as against a free State. On November 29, Lyons had +written a long account of the changes taking place in Northern +feeling as regards slavery. He thought it very probable that the +issue of emancipation would soon be forced upon Lincoln, and that +the American conflict would then take on a new and more ideal +character<a name="FNanchor445"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_445">[445]</a>. This letter, arriving in the midst of +uncertainty about the <i>Trent</i> solution, was in line with news +published in the British papers calling out <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_224"></a>[V1:pg 224]</span> editorials from +them largely in disapproval<a name="FNanchor446"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_446">[446]</a>. Certainly Russell was averse to war. If +the prisoners were not given up, what, he asked, ought England then +to do? Would it be wise to delay hostilities or to begin them at +once?</p> +<p>"An early resort to hostilities will enable us at once to raise +the blockade of the South, to blockade the North, and to prevent +the egress of numerous ships, commissioned as privateers which will +be sent against our commerce." But then, there was Canada, at +present not defensible. He had been reading Alison on the War of +1812, and found that then the American army of invasion had +numbered but 2,500 men. "We may now expect 40 or 50,000<a name= +"FNanchor447"></a><a href="#Footnote_447">[447]</a>." Two days +later he wrote to Gladstone that if America would only "let the +Commissioners free to go where they pleased," he would be +satisfied. He added that in that case, "I should be very glad to +make a treaty with the U.S., giving up our pretensions of 1812 and +securing immunity to persons not in arms on board neutral vessels +or to persons going bona fide from one neutral port to another. +This would be a triumph to the U.S. in principle while the +particular case would be decided in our favour<a name= +"FNanchor448"></a><a href="#Footnote_448">[448]</a>."</p> +<p>On Saturday, December 14, the Prince Consort died. It was +well-known that he had long been a brake upon the wheel of +Palmerston's foreign policy and, to the initiated, his last effort +in this direction--the modification of the instruction to Lyons on +the <i>Trent</i>--was no secret. There is no evidence that his +death made any change in the British <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_225"></a>[V1:pg 225]</span> position, but it was true, as the +American Minister wrote, that "Now they [the British public] are +beginning to open their eyes to a sense of his value. They discover +that much of their political quietude has been due to the judicious +exercise of his influence over the Queen and the Court, and they do +not conceal their uneasiness as to the future without him<a name= +"FNanchor449"></a><a href="#Footnote_449">[449]</a>." The nation +was plunged into deep mourning, but not to distraction from the +American crisis, for on the day when all papers were black with +mourning borders, December 16, they printed the news of the +approval of Wilkes by the United States Congress, and gave a +summary of Lincoln's message of December 2, which, to their +astonishment, made no mention of the <i>Trent</i> affair. The +Congressional approval caused "almost a feeling of consternation +among ourselves," but Lincoln's silence, it was argued, might +possibly be taken as a good omen, since it might indicate that he +had as yet reached no decision<a name="FNanchor450"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_450">[450]</a>. Evidently there was more real alarm +caused by the applause given Wilkes by one branch of the government +than by the outpourings of the American press. The next day several +papers printed Lincoln's message in full and the <i>Times</i> gave +a long editorial analysis, showing much spleen that he had ignored +the issue with Great Britain<a name="FNanchor451"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_451">[451]</a>. On the eighteenth this journal also +called attention, in a column and a half editorial, to the report +of the American Secretary of War, expressing astonishment, not +unmixed with anxiety, at the energy which had resulted in the +increase of the army to 700,000 men in less than nine months. The +<i>Times</i> continued, even increased, its "vigour" of utterance +on the <i>Trent</i>, but devoted most of its energy to combating +the suggestions, now being made very generally, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_226"></a>[V1:pg 226]</span> advocating a +recourse to arbitration. This would be "weak concession," and less +likely to secure redress and peace for the future, than an +insistence on the original demands.</p> +<p>Statesmen also were puzzled by Lincoln's silence. Milner Gibson +wrote that "even though Lyons should come away, I think the dispute +may after all be settled without war<a name= +"FNanchor452"></a><a href="#Footnote_452">[452]</a>." Cornewall +Lewis thought the "last mail from America is decidedly threatening, +not encouraging<a name="FNanchor453"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_453">[453]</a>." But on December 19, Adams was at last +able to give Russell official assurance that Wilkes had acted +without authorization. Russell at once informed Lyons of this +communication and that he had now told Adams the exact terms of his +two instructions to Lyons of November 30. He instructed Lyons to +accept in place of an apology an explanation that Wilkes' action +was unauthorized--a very important further British modification, +but one which did not reach Lyons until after the conclusion of the +affair at Washington<a name="FNanchor454"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_454">[454]</a>. Meanwhile a notable change had taken +place in American public expressions. It now regarded "the Wilkes +affair unfavourably, and would much prefer it had not occurred at +all<a name="FNanchor455"></a><a href="#Footnote_455">[455]</a>," a +reaction without question almost wholly caused by the knowledge of +the British demand and the unanimous <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_227"></a>[V1:pg 227]</span> support given it by the British +public<a name="FNanchor456"></a><a href="#Footnote_456">[456]</a>. +On Great Britain the alteration in the American tone produced less +effect than might have been expected, and this because of the +persistent fear and suspicion of Seward. His voice, it was felt, +would in the end be the determining one, and if British belief that +he had long sought an occasion for war was correct, this surely was +the time when he could be confident of popular support. Thurlow +Weed, Seward's most intimate political adviser, was now in London +and attempted to disabuse the British public through the columns of +the <i>Times</i>. His communication was printed, but his assertion +that Seward's unfriendly utterances, beginning with the "Newcastle +story," were misunderstood, did not convince the <i>Times</i>, +which answered him at length<a name="FNanchor457"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_457">[457]</a>, and asserted its belief "... that upon +his ability to involve the United States in a war with England, Mr. +Seward has staked his official, and, most probably, also his +political existence." The Duke of Newcastle's report of Seward's +remarks, wrote George Peabody later, "has strongly influenced the +Government in war preparations for several months past<a name= +"FNanchor458"></a><a href="#Footnote_458">[458]</a>." Adams +himself, though convinced that Seward's supposed animosity "was a +mistake founded on a bad joke of his to the Duke of Newcastle," +acknowledged <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228"></a>[V1:pg +228]</span> that: "The Duke has, however, succeeded in making +everybody in authority here believe it<a name= +"FNanchor459"></a><a href="#Footnote_459">[459]</a>." Surely no +"joke" to an Englishman ever so plagued an American statesman; but +British Ministers founded their suspicions on far more serious +reasons, as previously related<a name="FNanchor460"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_460">[460]</a>.</p> +<p>As time passed without an answer from America, British +speculation turned to estimates of the probable conditions of a +war. These were not reassuring since even though postulating a +British victory, it appeared inevitable that England would not +escape without considerable damage from the American navy and from +privateers. Americans were "a powerful and adventurous people, +strong in maritime resources, and participating in our own national +familiarity with the risks and dangers of the deep<a name= +"FNanchor461"></a><a href="#Footnote_461">[461]</a>." Englishmen +must not think that a war would be fought only on the shores of +America and in Canada. The legal question was re-hashed and +intelligent American vexation re-stated in three letters printed in +the <i>Daily News</i> on December 25, 26 and 27, by W.W. Story, an +artist resident in Rome, but known in England as the son of Justice +Story, whose fame as a jurist stood high in Great Britain<a name= +"FNanchor462"></a><a href="#Footnote_462">[462]</a>. By the last +week of the year Adams felt that the Ministry, at least, was eager +to find a way out: "The Government here will not press the thing to +an extreme unless they are driven to it by the impetus of the wave +they have themselves created<a name="FNanchor463"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_463">[463]</a>." He greatly regretted the death of the +Prince Consort who "believed in the policy of conciliating the +United States instead of repelling them." On December 27, Adams +wrote Seward: "I think the signs are clear of a <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_229"></a>[V1:pg 229]</span> considerable +degree of reaction." He also explained the causes of the nearly +unanimous European support of England in this contention: +"Unquestionably the view of all other countries is that the +opportunity is most fortunate for obtaining new and large +modifications of international law which will hereafter materially +restrain the proverbial tendency of this country on the +ocean<a name="FNanchor464"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_464">[464]</a>."</p> +<p>Adams' estimate was correct. Even the <i>Morning Post</i>, +generally accepted as Palmerston's organ<a name= +"FNanchor465"></a><a href="#Footnote_465">[465]</a>, and in the +<i>Trent</i> crisis the most 'vigorous' of all metropolitan +journals, commented upon the general public hope of a peaceful +solution, but asked on December 30, "... can a Government [the +American] elected but a few months since by the popular choice, +depending exclusively for existence on popular support, afford to +disappoint the popular expectation? The answer to this question +must, we fear, be in the negative...." The <i>Post</i> (thereby +Palmerston?) did indeed, as later charged, "prolong the +excitement," but not with its earlier animosity to America. The +very fact that the <i>Post</i> was accepted as Palmerston's organ +justified this attitude for it would have been folly for the +Government to announce prematurely a result of which there was as +yet no definite assurance. Yet <i>within</i> the Cabinet there was +a more hopeful feeling. Argyll believed Adams' statement to Russell +of December 19 was practically conclusive<a name= +"FNanchor466"></a><a href="#Footnote_466">[466]</a>, and Adams +himself now thought that the prevalent idea was waning of an +American plan to inflict persistent "indignities" on Britain: "at +least in this case nothing of the kind had been intended<a name= +"FNanchor467"></a><a href="#Footnote_467">[467]</a>." Everyone +wondered at and was vexed with the delay of an answer from America, +yet hopefully believed that this indicated <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_230"></a>[V1:pg 230]</span> ultimate +yielding. There could be no surety until the event. Russell wrote +to Palmerston on January 7, "I still incline to think Lincoln will +submit, but not until the clock is 59 minutes past 11. If it is +war, I fear we must summon Parliament forthwith<a name= +"FNanchor468"></a><a href="#Footnote_468">[468]</a>."</p> +<p>The last moment for reply was indeed very nearly taken advantage +of at Washington, but not to the full seven days permitted for +consideration by Russell's November thirtieth instructions to +Lyons. These were received on December 18, and on the next day +Lyons unofficially acquainted Seward with their nature<a name= +"FNanchor469"></a><a href="#Footnote_469">[469]</a>. The latter +expressed gratification with the "friendly and conciliatory manner" +of Lyons and asked for two days' time for consideration. On +Saturday, December 21, therefore, Lyons again appeared to make a +formal presentation of demands but was met with a statement that +the press of other business had prevented sufficient consideration +and was asked for a further two days' postponement until Monday. +Hence December 23 became the day from which the seven days +permitted for consideration and reply dated. In the meantime, +Mercier, on December 21, had told Seward of the strong support +given by France to the British position.</p> +<p>The month that had elapsed since the American outburst on first +learning of Wilkes' act had given time for a cooling of patriotic +fever and for a saner judgment. Henry Adams in London had written +to his brother that if the prisoners were not given up, "this +nation means to make war." To this the brother in America replied +"this nation doesn't<a name="FNanchor470"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_470">[470]</a>," an answer that sums up public +determination no matter how loud the talk or deep the feeling. +Seward understood <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_231"></a>[V1:pg 231]</span> the change and had now received +strong warnings from Adams and Weed in London, and from Dayton in +Paris<a name="FNanchor471"></a><a href="#Footnote_471">[471]</a>, +but these were not needed to convince him that America must yield. +Apparently, he had recognized from the first that America was in an +impossible situation and that the prisoners must be released <i>if +the demand were made</i>. The comment of those who were "wise after +the event" was that true policy would have dictated an immediate +release of the prisoners as seized in violation of international +law, before any complaint could be received from Great Britain. +This leaves out of consideration the political difficulties at home +of an administration already seriously weakened by a long-continued +failure to "press the war," and it also fails to recognize that in +the American Cabinet itself a proposal by Seward to release, made +immediately, would in all probability have been negatived. Blair, +in the Cabinet, and Sumner in the Senate, were, indeed, in favour +of prompt release, but Lincoln seems to have thought the prisoners +must be held, even though he feared they might become "white +elephants." All that Seward could do at first was to notify Adams +that Wilkes had acted without instructions<a name= +"FNanchor472"></a><a href="#Footnote_472">[472]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232"></a>[V1:pg 232]</span> +<p>On Christmas morning the Cabinet met to consider the answer to +Great Britain. Sumner attended and read letters from Bright and +Cobden, earnestly urging a yielding by America and depicting the +strength of British feeling. Bright wrote: "If you are resolved to +succeed against the South, <i>have no war with England</i>; make +every concession that can be made; don't even hesitate to tell the +world <i>that you will even concede what two years ago no Power +would have asked of you</i>, rather than give another nation a +pretence for assisting in the breaking up of your country<a name= +"FNanchor473"></a><a href="#Footnote_473">[473]</a>." Without doubt +Bright's letters had great influence on Lincoln and on other +Cabinet members, greatly aiding Seward, but that his task was +difficult is shown by the fact that an entire morning's discussion +brought no conclusion. Adjournment was taken until the next day and +after another long debate Seward had the fortune to persuade his +associates to a hearty unanimity on December 26. The American reply +in the form of a communication to Lyons was presented to him by +Seward on the 27th, and on that same day Lyons forwarded it to +Russell. It did not contain an apology, but Lyons wrote that since +the prisoners were to be released and acknowledgment was made that +reparation was due to Great Britain, he considered that British +demands were "so far substantially complied with" that he should +remain at his post until he received further orders<a name= +"FNanchor474"></a><a href="#Footnote_474">[474]</a>.</p> +<p>Seward's reply was immediately printed in the American papers. +Lyons reported that it was very well received and that the public +was calm and apparently contented with the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_233"></a>[V1:pg 233]</span> outcome<a name= +"FNanchor475"></a><a href="#Footnote_475">[475]</a>. He thought +that "thus the preparation for war ... has prevented war." Seward's +argument reviewed at great length all the conditions of the +incident, dilated on many points of international law both relevant +and irrelevant, narrated the past relations of the two nations on +"right of search," and finally took the ground that Mason and +Slidell were contraband of war and justly subject to capture, but +that Wilkes had erred in not bringing the <i>Trent</i>, with her +passengers, into port for trial by an American prize court. +Therefore the two envoys with their secretaries would be handed +over promptly to such persons as Lyons might designate. It was, +says Seward's biographer, not a great state paper, was defective in +argument, and contained many contradictions<a name= +"FNanchor476"></a><a href="#Footnote_476">[476]</a>, but, he adds, +that it was intended primarily for the American public and to meet +the situation at home. Another critic sums up Seward's +difficulties: he had to persuade a President and a reluctant +Cabinet, to support the naval idol of the day, to reconcile a +Congress which had passed resolutions highly commending Wilkes, and +to pacify a public earlier worked up to fever pitch<a name= +"FNanchor477"></a><a href="#Footnote_477">[477]</a>. Still more +important than ill-founded assertions about the nature of +contraband of war, a term not reconcilable with the <i>neutral +port</i> destination of the <i>Trent</i>, was the likening of Mason +and Slidell to "ambassadors of independent states." For eight +months Seward had protested to Europe "that the Confederates were +not belligerents, but insurgents," and now "his whole argument +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234"></a>[V1:pg 234]</span> +rested on the fact that they were belligerents<a name= +"FNanchor478"></a><a href="#Footnote_478">[478]</a>.... But this +did not later alter a return to his old position nor prevent +renewed arguments to induce a recall by European states of their +proclamations of neutrality.</p> +<p>On the afternoon of January 8, a telegram from Lyons was +received in London, stating that the envoys would be released and +the next day came his despatch enclosing a copy of Seward's answer. +The envoys themselves did not reach England until January 30, and +the delay in their voyage gave time for an almost complete +disappearance of public interest in them<a name= +"FNanchor479"></a><a href="#Footnote_479">[479]</a>. January 10, +Russell instructed Lyons that Great Britain was well satisfied with +the fact and manner of the American answer, and regarded the +incident as closed, but that it could not agree with portions of +Seward's argument and would answer these later. This was done on +January 23, but the reply was mainly a mere formality and is of +interest only as revealing a further shift in the opinion of the +legal advisers, with emphasis on the question of what constitutes +contraband<a name="FNanchor480"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_480">[480]</a>. Possibly the British Government was +embarrassed by the fact that while France had strongly supported +England at Washington, Thouvenel had told Cowley "... that the +conduct pursued by Capt. Wilkes, whether the United States claimed +to be considered as Belligerents, <i>or as a Government engaged in +putting down a rebellion</i>, was a violation of all those +principles of Maritime international law, which France had +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235"></a>[V1:pg 235]</span> +ever supported<a name="FNanchor481"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_481">[481]</a> ..." and had instructed Mercier to so +state to Seward. This implied a reflection on former British +practice, especially as regards the exercise of a right of search +to recover its own citizens and is indicative of the correctness of +Adams' judgment that one main reason for European support of Great +Britain in the <i>Trent</i> crisis, was the general desire to tie +her to a limitation of belligerent maritime power.</p> +<p>In notifying Russell of the release of the prisoners, Lyons had +stated that he would caution the Commander of the ship conveying +them that they were "not to be received with honours or treated +otherwise than as distinguished <i>private</i> gentlemen<a name= +"FNanchor482"></a><a href="#Footnote_482">[482]</a>." Russell was +equally cautious, seeing Mason, shortly after arrival in London, +"unofficially at my own house," on February 10, refusing to read +his credentials, and after listening to a statement of his +instructions, replying that "nothing had hitherto occurred which +would justify or induce" Great Britain to depart from a position of +neutrality<a name="FNanchor483"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_483">[483]</a>. Russell had already suggested that +Thouvenel use the same method with Slidell<a name= +"FNanchor484"></a><a href="#Footnote_484">[484]</a>. This procedure +does not necessarily indicate a change in governmental attitude, +for it is exactly in line with that pursued toward the Confederate +Commissioners before the <i>Trent</i>; but the <i>Trent</i> +controversy might naturally have been expected to have brought +about an <i>easier</i> relation between Russell and a Southern +representative. That it did not do so is evidence of Russell's care +not to give offence to Northern susceptibilities. Also, in relief +at the outcome of the <i>Trent</i>, he was convinced, momentarily +at least, that the general British suspicion of Seward was +unfounded. "I do not," he wrote to Gladstone, "believe that Seward +has any animosity <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_236"></a>[V1:pg 236]</span> to this country. It is all +buncom" (<i>sic</i>)<a name="FNanchor485"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_485">[485]</a>. Apparently it was beginning to be +realized by British statesmen that Seward's "high tone" which they +had interpreted, with some justification earlier, as especially +inimical to England, now indicated a foreign policy based upon one +object only--the restoration of the Union, and that in pursuit of +this object he was but seeking to make clear to European nations +that the United States was still powerful enough to resent foreign +interference. The final decision in the <i>Trent</i> affair, such +was the situation in the American Cabinet, rested on Seward alone +and that decision was, from the first, for peace.</p> +<p>Nor did Seward later hold any grudge over the outcome. America +in general, however, though breathing freely again as the war cloud +passed, was bitter. "The feeling against Great Britain is of +intense hatred and the conclusion of the whole matter is, that we +must give up the traitors, put down the rebellion, increase our +navy, perfect the discipline of the 600,000 men in the field, and +then fight Great Britain<a name="FNanchor486"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_486">[486]</a>." Lowell, in one of the most emotional of +his "Bigelow Papers," wrote, on January 6, 1862:</p> +<blockquote>"It don't seem hardly right, John,<br> +When both my hands was full,<br> +To stump me to a fight, John--<br> +Your cousin, tu, John Bull!<br> + Ole Uncle S., sez he, 'I guess<br> +We know it now,' sez he,<br> +'The lion's paw is all the law,<br> +Accordin' to J.B.,<br> +Thet's fit for you an' me<a name="FNanchor487"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_487">[487]</a>!'"</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237"></a>[V1:pg 237]</span> +<p>It was not the demand itself for the release of Mason and +Slidell that in the end so stirred America as the warlike tone of +the British press and the preparations of the Government. Even +after their surrender America was further incensed by British +boasting that America had yielded to a threat of war, as in the +<i>Punch</i> cartoon of a penitent small boy, Uncle Sam, who "says +he is very sorry and that he didn't mean to do it," and so escapes +the birching Britannia was about to administer. America had, in all +truth, yielded to a threat, but disliked being told so, and +regarded the threat itself as evidence of British ill-will<a name= +"FNanchor488"></a><a href="#Footnote_488">[488]</a>. This was long +the attitude of the American public.</p> +<p>In England the knowledge of America's decision caused a great +national sigh of relief, coupled with a determination to turn the +cold shoulder to the released envoys. On January 11, the +<i>Times</i> recounted the earlier careers of Mason and Slidell, +and stated that these two "more than any other men," were +responsible for the traditional American "insane prejudice against +England," an assertion for which no facts were offered in proof, +and one much overestimating the influence of Mason and Slidell on +American politics before secession. They were "about the most +worthless booty it would be possible to extract from the jaws of +the American lion ... So we do sincerely hope that our countrymen +will not give these fellows anything in the shape of an ovation." +Continuing, the <i>Times</i> argued:</p> +<blockquote>"What they and their secretaries are to do here passes +our conjecture. They are personally nothing to us. They must not +suppose, because we have gone to the very verge of a great war to +rescue them, that therefore they are <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_238"></a>[V1:pg 238]</span> precious in our eyes. We should +have done just as much to rescue two of their own Negroes, and, had +that been the object of the rescue, the swarthy Pompey and Caesar +would have had just the same right to triumphal arches and +municipal addresses as Messrs. Mason and Slidell. So, please, +British public, let's have none of these things. Let the +Commissioners come up quietly to town, and have their say with +anybody who may have time to listen to them. For our part, we +cannot see how anything they have to tell can turn the scale of +British duty and deliberation."</blockquote> +<p>This complete reversal, not to say somersault, by the leading +British newspaper, was in line with public expressions from all +sections save the extreme pro-Southern. Adams was astonished, +writing privately: "The first effect of the surrender ... has been +extraordinary. The current which ran against us with such extreme +violence six weeks ago now seems to be going with equal fury in our +favour<a name="FNanchor489"></a><a href="#Footnote_489">[489]</a>." +Officially on the same day he explained this to Seward as caused by +a late development in the crisis of a full understanding, +especially "among the quiet and religious citizens of the middle +classes," that if Great Britain did engage in war with the United +States she would be forced to become the ally of a "slave-holding +oligarchy<a name="FNanchor490"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_490">[490]</a>."</p> +<p>Here, in truth, lay the greatest cause of British anxiety during +the period of waiting for an answer and of relief when that answer +was received. If England and America became enemies, wrote Argyll, +"we necessarily became virtually the <i>Allies</i> of the +<i>Scoundrelism</i> of the South<a name="FNanchor491"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_491">[491]</a>." Robert Browning, attempting to explain +to his friend Story the British attitude, declared that early in +the war Britain was with the North, expecting "that the pure and +simple rights [of anti-slavery] in the case would be declared and +vigorously carried out without one let or stop," but <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_239"></a>[V1:pg 239]</span> that Lincoln's +denial of emancipation as an object had largely destroyed this +sympathy. Browning thought this an excusable though a mistaken +judgment since at least: "The <i>spirit</i> of all of Mr. Lincoln's +acts is altogether against Slavery in the end<a name= +"FNanchor492"></a><a href="#Footnote_492">[492]</a>." He assured +Story that the latter was in error "as to men's 'fury' here": "I +have not heard one man, woman or child express anything but dismay +at the prospect of being obliged to go to war on any grounds with +America<a name="FNanchor493"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_493">[493]</a>." And after the affair was over he +affirmed: "The purpose of the North is also understood at last; ... +there is no longer the notion that 'Slavery has nothing to do with +it<a name="FNanchor494"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_494">[494]</a>.'"</p> +<p>A few extreme pro-Northern enthusiasts held public meetings and +passed resolutions commending the "statesmanlike ability and +moderation of Seward," and rejoicing that Great Britain had not +taken sides with a slave power<a name="FNanchor495"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_495">[495]</a>. In general, however, such sentiments +were not <i>publicly</i> expressed. That they were keenly felt, +nevertheless, is certain. During the height of the crisis, Anthony +Trollope, then touring America, even while sharing fully in the +intense British indignation against Captain Wilkes, wrote:</p> +<blockquote>"These people speak our language, use our prayers, read +our books, are ruled by our laws, dress themselves in our image, +are warm with our blood. They have all our virtues; and their vices +are our own too, loudly as we call out against them. They are our +sons and our daughters, the source of our greatest pride, and as we +grow old they should be the staff of our age. Such a war as we +should now wage with the States would be an unloosing of hell upon +all that is best upon the world's surface<a name= +"FNanchor496"></a><a href="#Footnote_496">[496]</a>."</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240"></a>[V1:pg 240]</span> +<p>The expressions of men like Browning and Trollope may not +indeed, be regarded as typical of either governmental or general +public reactions. Much more exactly and with more authority as +representing that thoughtful opinion of which Adams wrote were the +conclusions of John Stuart Mill. In an article in <i>Fraser's +Magazine</i>, February, 1862, making a strong plea for the North, +he summarized British feeling about the <i>Trent</i>:</p> +<blockquote>"We had indeed, been wronged. We had suffered an +indignity, and something more than an indignity, which, not to have +resented, would have been to invite a constant succession of +insults and injuries from the same and from every other quarter. We +could have acted no otherwise than we have done; yet it is +impossible to think, without something like a shudder, from what we +have escaped. We, the emancipators of the slave--who have wearied +every Court and Government in Europe and America with our protests +and remonstrances, until we goaded them into at least ostensibly +co-operating with us to prevent the enslaving of the negro ... +<i>we</i> should have lent a hand to setting up, in one of the most +commanding positions of the world, a powerful republic, devoted not +only to slavery, but to pro-slavery propagandism...."</blockquote> +<p>No such protestations of relief over escape from a possible +alliance with the South were made officially by the Government, or +in a debate upon the <i>Trent</i>, February 6, when Parliament +reassembled. In the Lords the Earl of Shelburne thought that +America should have made a frank and open apology. The Earl of +Derby twitted the United States with having yielded to force alone, +but said the time "had not yet come" for recognizing the +Confederacy. Lord Dufferin expressed great friendship for America +and declared that Englishmen ought to make themselves better +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241"></a>[V1:pg 241]</span> +informed of the real merits of the Civil War. Earl Granville, +speaking for the Government, laid stress upon the difficulties at +home of the Washington administration in pacifying public opinion +and asserted a personal belief that strict neutrality was England's +best policy, "although circumstances may arise which may call for a +different course." On the same day in the Commons the debate was of +a like general tenor to that in the Lords, but Disraeli differed +from his chief (Derby) in that he thought America had been placed +in a very difficult position in which she had acted very +honourably. Palmerston took much credit for the energetic military +preparations, but stated "from that position of strict neutrality, +it is not our intention to depart "--an important declaration if +taken, as apparently it was not, as fixing a policy. In substance +all speakers, whether Whig or Tory, praised the Government's stand, +and expressed gratification with the peaceful outcome<a name= +"FNanchor497"></a><a href="#Footnote_497">[497]</a>.</p> +<p>A further debate on the <i>Trent</i> was precipitated by Bright +on February 17, in connection with the estimates to cover the cost +of the military contingents sent to Canada. He asserted that +England by generously trusting to American honour, might have won +her lasting friendship, and it is worthy of note that for the first +time in any speech made by him <i>in Parliament</i>, Bright +declared that the war was one for the abolition of slavery. +Palmerston in reply made no comment on the matter of slavery, but +energetically defended the military preparations as a necessary +precaution. Bright's speech was probably intended for American +consumption with the purpose of easing American ill-will, by +showing that even in Parliament there were those who disapproved of +that show of force to which America so much objected. He foresaw +that this would long be the basis of American bitterness. But +Palmerston was undoubtedly <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_242"></a>[V1:pg 242]</span> correct in characterizing +Bright's opinion as a "solitary one." And looked at from a distance +of time it would seem that a British Government, impressed as it +was with a sense of Seward's unfriendliness, which had not prepared +for war when making so strong a demand for reparation, would have +merited the heaviest condemnation. If Mill was right in stating +that the demand for reparation was a necessity, then so also were +the military preparations.</p> +<p>Upon the Government the <i>Trent</i> acted to bring to a head +and make more clear the British relation to the Civil War in +America. By November, 1861, the policy of strict neutrality adopted +in May, had begun to be weakened for various reasons already +recited--weakened not to the point of any Cabinet member's advocacy +of change, but in a restlessness at the slow development of a +solution in America. Russell was beginning to <i>think</i>, at +least, of recognition of the Confederacy. This was clear to Lyons +who, though against such recognition, had understood the drift, if +Schleiden is to be trusted, of Ministerial opinion. Schleiden +reported on December 31 that Lyons had expressed to him much +pleasure at the peaceful conclusion of the <i>Trent</i> affair, and +had added, "England will be too generous not to postpone the +recognition of the independence of the South as long as possible +after this experience<a name="FNanchor498"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_498">[498]</a>." But the <i>Trent</i> operated like a +thunder-storm to clear the atmosphere. It brought out plainly the +practical difficulties and dangers, at least as regards Canada, of +a war with America; it resulted in a weakening of the conviction +that Seward was unfriendly; it produced from the British public an +even greater expression of relief, when the incident was closed, +than of anger when it occurred; and it created in a section of that +public a fixed belief, shared by at least one member of the +Cabinet, that the issue in America was that of slavery, in support +of which England could not possibly take a stand.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243"></a>[V1:pg 243]</span> +<p>This did not mean that the British Government, nor any large +section of the public, believed the North could conquer the South. +But it did indicate a renewed vigour for the policy of neutrality +and a determination not to get into war with America. Adams wrote +to Seward, "I am inclined to believe that the happening of the +affair of the <i>Trent</i> just when it did, with just the issue +that it had, was rather opportune than otherwise<a name= +"FNanchor499"></a><a href="#Footnote_499">[499]</a>." Hotze, the +confidential agent of the Confederacy in London, stated, "the +<i>Trent</i> affair has done us incalculable injury," Russell is +now "an avowed enemy of our nationality<a name= +"FNanchor500"></a><a href="#Footnote_500">[500]</a>." Hotze was +over-gloomy, but Russell himself declared to Lyons: "At all events +I am heart and soul a neutral ... what a fuss we have had about +these two men<a name="FNanchor501"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_501">[501]</a>."</p> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_399"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor399">[399]</a> The <i>Trent</i> was the cause of the +outpouring of more contemporary articles and pamphlets and has been +the subject of more historical writing later, than any other +incident of diplomatic relations between the United States and +Great Britain during the Civil War--possibly more than all other +incidents combined. The account given in this chapter, therefore, +is mainly limited to a brief statement of the facts together with +such new sidelights as are brought out by hitherto unknown letters +of British statesman; to a summary of British public attitude as +shown in the press; and to an estimate of the <i>after effect</i> +of the <i>Trent</i> on British policy. It would be of no service to +list all of the writings. The incident is thoroughly discussed in +all histories, whether British or American and in works devoted to +international law. The contemporary American view is well stated, +though from a strongly anti-British point of view, in Harris, T.L., +<i>The Trent Affair</i>, but this monograph is lacking in exact +reference for its many citations and can not be accepted as +authoritative. The latest review is that of C.F. Adams in the +<i>Proceedings</i> of the Massachusetts Historical Society for +November, 1911, which called out a reply from R.H. Dana, and a +rejoinder by Mr. Adams in the <i>Proceedings</i> for March, +1912.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_400"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor400">[400]</a> C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent Affair</i>. +(<i>Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. 41-2.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_401"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor401">[401]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the <i>Trent</i>." No. 1. +Inclosure. Williams to Patey, Nov. 9, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_402"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor402">[402]</a> Harris, <i>The Trent Affair</i>, pp. +103-109, describes the exact <i>force</i> used.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_403"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor403">[403]</a> Dana, <i>The Trent Affair</i>. +(<i>Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. +509-22.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_404"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor404">[404]</a> C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent Affair</i>. +(<i>Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. +39-40.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_405"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor405">[405]</a> F.O., America, Vol. 805. Copy, E. Hammond +to Advocate-General, Nov. 9, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_406"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor406">[406]</a> C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent Affair</i>. +(<i>Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 54.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_407"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor407">[407]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 53-4. Adams' Diary MS. +Nov. 12, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_408"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor408">[408]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 55.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_409"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor409">[409]</a> A full year later, after the publication +of the American volume of despatches for the year 1862, Russell +took up this matter with Adams and as a result of an interview +wrote to Lyons, November 28, 1862:<br> +<br> +"Lord Palmerston stated to Mr. Adams on the occasion in question +that Her Majesty's Government could not permit any interference +with any vessel, British or Foreign, within British waters; that +with regard to vessels met with at sea, Her Majesty's Government +did not mean to dispute the Belligerent right of the United States +Ships of War to search them; but that the exercise of that right +and the right of detention in certain conditions must in each case +be dealt with according to the circumstances of the case, and that +it was not necessary for him to discuss such matters then because +they were not in point; but that it would not do for the United +States Ships of War to harass British Commerce on the High Seas +under the pretence of preventing the Confederates from receiving +things that are Contraband of War.<br> +<br> +"I took an opportunity of mentioning to Mr. Adams, the account +which Lord Palmerston had given me of the language which he had +thus held, and Mr. Adams agreed in its accuracy.<br> +<br> +"Nothing must be said on this Subject unless the false statements +as to Lord Palmerston's language should be renewed, when you will +state the real facts to Mr. Seward." (F.O., Am., Vol. 822. No. 295. +<i>Draft</i>.)<br> +<br> +This résumé by Russell contained still other +variations from the original reports of both Palmerston and Adams, +but the latter did not think it worth while to call attention to +them.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_410"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor410">[410]</a> Walpole, <i>Russell</i>, II, p. 357, is +evidently in error in stating that the law officers, while +admitting the right of an American war vessel to carry the British +Packet into an American port for adjudication, added, "she would +have no right to remove Messrs. Mason and Slidell and carry them +off as prisoners, leaving the ship to pursue her voyage." Certainly +Palmerston did not so understand the advice given.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_411"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor411">[411]</a> Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons. F.O., +Private. Nov. 16, 1861. This statement about explicit orders to +Captain Marchand "not to endeavour, etc.," is in line with +Palmerston's understanding of the conversation with Adams. But that +there was carelessness in reporting Adams is evident from Hammond's +own language for "no instructions to meddle," which Adams did +state, is not the same thing as "instructions not to meddle." Adams +had no intent to deceive, but was misunderstood. He was himself +very anxious over the presence of the <i>James Adger</i> at +Southampton, and hurried her Captain away. Adams informed Russell +that Palmerston had not understood him correctly. He had told +Palmerston, "I had seen the Captain's [Marchand's] instructions, +which directed him to intercept the <i>Nashville</i> if he could, +and in case of inability to do so, to return at once to New York, +keeping his eye on such British ships as might be going to the +United States with contraband of war. Lord Palmerston's +recollections and mine differed mainly in this last particular. +Lord Russell then remarked that this statement was exactly that +which he had recollected my making to him. Nothing had been said in +the instructions about other British ships." (State Dept., Eng., +Vol. 78. No. 80. Adams to Seward. Nov. 29. 1861.) Hammond's letter +mentions also the excitement of "the Southerners" in England and +that they had "sent out Pilot Boats to intercept and warn the +Packet...."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_412"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor412">[412]</a> Lyons Papers. Lyons to Milne, Dec. 1, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_413"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor413">[413]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Russell to Lyons, Nov. 16, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_414"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor414">[414]</a> Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, +Nov. 29, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_415"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor415">[415]</a> C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent Affair</i>. +(<i>Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 58.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_416"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor416">[416]</a> Moore, <i>Int. Law Digest</i>, VII, p. +772. The much argued international law points in the case of the +<i>Trent</i> are given <i>in extenso</i> by Moore.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_417"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor417">[417]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the +<i>Trent</i>." No. 2.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_418"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor418">[418]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 4.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_419"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor419">[419]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 29. +Inclosure.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_420"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor420">[420]</a> Troops were in fact shipped for Canada. +This resulted, after the <i>Trent</i> affair had blown over, in a +circumstance which permitted Seward, with keen delight, to extend a +courtesy to Great Britain. Bancroft (II, 245) states that these +troops "finding the St. Lawrence river full of ice, had entered +Portland harbour. When permission was asked for them to cross +Maine, Seward promptly ordered that all facilities should be +granted for 'landing and transporting to Canada or elsewhere +troops, stores, and munitions of war of every kind without +exception or reservation.'" It is true that the American press made +much of this, and in tones of derision. The facts, as reported by +Lyons, were that the request was merely "a superfluous application +from a private firm at Montreal for permission to land some +Officers' Baggage at Portland." (Russell Papers, Lyons to Russell, +Jan. 20, 1862.) Lyons was much vexed with this "trick" of Seward's. +He wrote to the Governor-General of Canada and the +Lieutenant-Governors of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, protesting +against an acceptance of Seward's permission, and finally informed +Russell that no English troops were marched across the State of +Maine. (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 14, 1862. Also Lyons +Papers. Lyons to Monck, Feb. 1, 1862.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_421"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor421">[421]</a> Martin, <i>Life of the Prince Consort</i>, +V, pp. 418-26.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_422"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor422">[422]</a> Still another letter from Russell to Lyons +on November 30, but not intended for Seward, outlined the points of +complaint and argument, (1) The <i>San Jacinto</i> did not happen +to fall in with the <i>Trent</i>, but laid in wait for her. (2) +"Unnecessary and dangerous Acts of violence" were used. (3) The +<i>Trent</i>, when stopped was not "searched" in the "ordinary +way," but "certain Passengers" were demanded and taken by force. +(4) No charge was made that the <i>Trent</i> was violating +neutrality, and no authority for his act was offered by Captain +Wilkes. (5) No force ought to be used against an +"<i>unresisting</i> Neutral Ship" except just so much as is +necessary to bring her before a prize court. (6) In the present +case the British vessel had done nothing, and intended nothing, +warranting even an inquiry by a prize court. (7) "It is essential +for British Interests, that consistently with the obligations of +neutrality, and of observing any <i>legal</i> and <i>effective</i> +blockade, there should be communication between the Dominions of +Her Majesty and the Countries forming the Confederate States." +These seven points were for Lyons' eye alone. They certainly add no +strength to the British position and reflect the uncertainty and +confusion of the Cabinet. The fifth and sixth points contain the +essence of what, on more mature reflection, was to be the British +argument. (F.O., Am., Vol. 758. No. 447. Draft. Russell to Lyons +Nov. 30, 1861).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_423"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor423">[423]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Dec. 2, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_424"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor424">[424]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States." No. 78. Russell to Yancey, Rost and Mann, Aug. 24, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_425"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor425">[425]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 124. Russell to Yancey, +Rost and Mann, Dec. 7, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_426"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor426">[426]</a> Gladstone Papers. Gladstone to Robertson +Gladstone, Dec. 7, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_427"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor427">[427]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Argyll to Gladstone, +Mentone. Dec. 10, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_428"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor428">[428]</a> Maxwell, <i>Clarendon</i>, II, p. 255. +Lewis to Clarendon, Dec. 18, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_429"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor429">[429]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 254. Clarendon to Duchess +of Manchester, Dec. 17, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_430"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor430">[430]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_431"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor431">[431]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Russell to Palmerston, Dec. +20, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_432"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor432">[432]</a> Many citations from the <i>Times</i> are +given in Harris, <i>The Trent Affair</i>, to show a violent, not to +say scurrilous, anti-Americanism. Unfortunately dates are not +cited, and an examination of the files of the paper shows that +Harris' references are frequently to communications, not to +editorials. Also his citations give but one side of these +communications even, for as many argued caution and fair treatment +as expressed violence. Harris apparently did not consult the +<i>Times</i> itself, but used quotations appearing in American +papers. Naturally these would print, in the height of American +anti-British feeling, the bits exhibiting a peevish and unjust +British temper. The British press made exactly similar quotations +from the American newspapers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_433"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor433">[433]</a> C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent Affair +(Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc. XLV, p. 43, note.) John Bigelow, +at Paris, reported that the London Press, especially the Tory, was +eager to make trouble, and that there were but two British papers +of importance that did not join the hue and cry--these being +controlled by friends of Bright, one in London and one in +Manchester (Bigelow, <i>Retrospections of An Active Life</i>, I, p. +384.) This is not exactly true, but seems to me more nearly so than +the picture presented by Rhodes (III, 526) of England as united in +a "calm, sorrowful, astonished determination."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_434"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor434">[434]</a> Cowley sent to Russell on December 3, a +letter from Percy Doyle recounting an interview with Scott in which +these statements were made. (F.O., France, Vol. 1399. No. 1404. +Inclosure.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_435"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor435">[435]</a> Dec. 13, 1861. C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent +Affair. (Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. +95.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_436"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor436">[436]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 37.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_437"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor437">[437]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 49. The <i>New York +Times</i>, November 19, stated, "We do not believe the American +heart ever thrilled with more genuine delight than it did +yesterday, at the intelligence of the capture of Messrs. Slidell +and Mason.... We have not the slightest idea that England will even +remonstrate. On the contrary, she will applaud the gallant act of +Lieut. Wilkes, so full of spirit and good sense, and such an exact +imitation of the policy she has always stoutly defended and +invariably pursued ... as for Commodore Wilkes and his command, let +the handsome thing be done, consecrate another <i>Fourth</i> of +July to him. Load him down with services of plate and swords of the +cunningest and costliest art. Let us encourage the happy +inspiration that achieved such a victory." Note the "<i>Fourth</i> +of July."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_438"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor438">[438]</a> Lyons Papers. Lousada to Lyons. Boston, +Nov. 17, 1861. "Every other man is walking about with a Law Book +under his arm and proving the <i>right</i> of the Ss. Jacintho to +stop H.M.'s mail boat."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_439"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor439">[439]</a> "Mr. Galt, Canadian Minister, is here. He +has frightened me by his account of the defencelessness of the +Province at this moment." (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. +Private. Dec. 3, 1861.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_440"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor440">[440]</a> Lyons Papers. Lyons to Monck, Dec. 9, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_441"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor441">[441]</a> Rogers, <i>Speeches by John Bright</i>, I, +p. 189 <i>seq</i>.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_442"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor442">[442]</a> Among the communications were several on +international law points by "Historicus," answering and belittling +American legal argument. W.V. Harcourt, under this pseudonym, +frequently contributed very acute and very readable articles to the +<i>Times</i> on the American civil war. The <i>Times</i> was +berated by English friends of the North. Cobden wrote Sumner, +December 12, "The <i>Times</i> and its yelping imitators are still +doing their worst." (Morley, <i>Cobden</i>, II, 392.) Cobden was +himself at one with the <i>Times</i> in suspicion of Seward. "I +confess I have not much opinion of Seward. He is a kind of American +Thiers or Palmerston or Russell--and talks Bunkum. Fortunately, my +friend Mr. Charles Sumner, who is Chairman of the Senate Committee +on Foreign Relations, and has really a kind of veto on the acts of +Seward, is a very peaceable and safe man." <i>(ibid.</i>, p. 386, +to Lieut.-Col. Fitzmayer, Dec. 3, 1861.) It is interesting that +Canadian opinion regarded the <i>Times</i> as the great cause of +American ill-will toward Britain. A letter to Gait asserted that +the "war talk" was all a "farce" (J.H. Pope to Gait, Dec. 26, 1861) +and the Toronto <i>Globe</i> attacked the <i>Times</i> for the +creation of bad feeling. The general attitude was that if +<i>British</i> policy resulted in an American blow at Canada, it +was a British, not a Canadian duty, to maintain her defence +(Skelton, <i>Life of Sir Alexander Tilloch Gait</i>, pp. 340, 348.) +Yet the author states that in the beginning Canada went through the +same phases of feeling on the <i>Trent</i> as did Great +Britain.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_443"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor443">[443]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, pp. +81-2.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_444"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor444">[444]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, I, p. 83. Henry Adams to +Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Dec. 13, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_445"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor445">[445]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. +Nov. 29, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_446"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor446">[446]</a> See the <i>Times</i>, Dec. 14, 1861. Here +for the first time the <i>Times</i> used the expression "the last +card" as applied to emancipation.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_447"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor447">[447]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Dec. +11, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_448"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor448">[448]</a> Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, +Dec. 13, 1861. On the same day Lady Russell wrote Lady Dumfermline: +"There can be no doubt that we have done deeds very like that of +Captain Wilkes.... but I wish we had not done them.... It is all +terrible and awful, and I hope and pray war may be averted--and +whatever may have been the first natural burst of indignation in +this country, I believe it would be ready to execrate the Ministry +if all right and honourable means were not taken to prevent so +fearful a calamity." (Dana, <i>The Trent Affair. (Proceedings</i>, +Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 528.))</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_449"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor449">[449]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, p. +87. Charles Francis Adams to his son, Dec. 20, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_450"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor450">[450]</a> The <i>Times</i>, Dec. 16, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_451"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor451">[451]</a> The <i>Times</i> twice printed the full +text of the message, on December 16 and 17.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_452"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor452">[452]</a> Gladstone Papers. Milner-Gibson to +Gladstone, Dec. 18, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_453"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor453">[453]</a> Maxwell, <i>Clarendon</i>, II, p. 225. +Lewis to Clarendon, Dec. 18, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_454"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor454">[454]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the +<i>Trent</i>." No 14. Russell to Lyons, Dec. 19, 1861. The +Government did not make public Adams' confirmation of "no +authorization of Wilkes." Possibly it saw no reason for doing so, +since this had been established already by Wilkes' own statements. +The point was later a matter of complaint by Americans, who +regarded it as indicating a peevish and unfriendly attitude. +(Willard, <i>Letter to an English Friend on the Rebellion in the +United States</i>, p. 23. Boston, 1862.) Also by English friends; +Cobden thought Palmerston had intentionally prolonged British +feeling for political purposes. "Seward's despatch to Adams on the +19th December [<i>communicated to Russell</i> on the 19th]... +virtually settled the matter. To keep alive the wicked passions in +this country as Palmerston and his <i>Post</i> did, was like the +man, and that is the worst that can be said of it." (Morley, +<i>Cobden</i>, II, p. 389. To Mr. Paulton, Jan., +1862.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_455"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor455">[455]</a> Davis to Adams. New York. Dec. 21, 1861. +C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent Affair, (Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. +Soc., XLV, p. 107.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_456"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor456">[456]</a> There has crept into American historical +writing of lesser authenticity a story that just at this juncture +there appeared, in the harbours of New York and San Francisco, +Russian fleets whose commanders let it be understood that they had +come under "sealed orders" not to be opened except in a certain +grave event and that their presence was, at least, not an +unfriendly indication of Russian sentiment in the <i>Trent</i> +crisis. This is asserted to have bolstered American courage and to +give warrant for the argument that America finally yielded to Great +Britain from no fear of consequences, but merely on a clearer +recognition of the justice of the case. In fact the story is wholly +a myth. The Russian fleets appeared two years later in the fall of +1863, not in 1861. Harris, <i>The Trent Affair,</i> pp. 208-10, is +mainly responsible for this story, quoting the inaccurate memory of +Thurlow Weed. (<i>Autobiography</i>, II, pp. 346-7.) Reliable +historians like Rhodes make no mention of such an incident. The +whole story of the Russian fleets with their exact instructions is +told by F.A. Colder, "The Russian Fleet and the Civil War," <i>Am. +Hist. Rev</i>., July, 1915.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_457"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor457">[457]</a> Weed, <i>Autobiography</i>, II, pp. +354-61.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_458"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor458">[458]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 365. Peabody to Weed, +Jan, 17, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_459"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor459">[459]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, p. +91. Charles Francis Adams to his son, Dec. 27, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_460"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor460">[460]</a> See <i>ante</i>. Ch. IV.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_461"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor461">[461]</a> The <i>Times</i>, Dec. 25, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_462"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor462">[462]</a> James, <i>William Wetmore Story and his +Friends</i>, II, pp. 108-9. The letters were sent to Robert +Browning, who secured their publication through Dicey.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_463"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor463">[463]</a> C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent Affair</i>. Adams +to Motley, Dec. 26, 1861. (<i>Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., +XLV, p. 109).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_464"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor464">[464]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 110.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_465"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor465">[465]</a> Palmerston had very close relations with +Delane, of the <i>Times</i>, but that paper carefully maintained +its independence of any party or faction.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_466"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor466">[466]</a> Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, +Dec. 30, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_467"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor467">[467]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 97. Adams +to Seward, Jan. 2, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_468"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor468">[468]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_469"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor469">[469]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. 233. Lyons +officially reported that he carried no papers with him +(<i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, <i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting the <i>Trent</i>." No. 19. Lyons to +Russell, Dec. 19, 1861). Newton (<i>Lyons</i>, I, pp. 55-78) shows +that Seward was, in fact, permitted to read the instructions on the +nineteenth.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_470"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor470">[470]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, p. +86. C.F. Adams, Jr., to Henry Adams, Dec. 19, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_471"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor471">[471]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. 234. +Adams' letter of December 3 was received on December 21; Dayton's +of December 3, on the 24th.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_472"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor472">[472]</a> Much ink has flowed to prove that +Lincoln's was the wise view, seeing from the first the necessity of +giving up Mason and Slidell, and that he overrode Seward, e.g., +Welles, <i>Lincoln and Seward</i>, and Harris, <i>The Trent +Affair</i>. Rhodes, III, pp. 522-24, and Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, +II, pp. 232-37, disprove this. Yet the general contemporary +suspicion of Seward's "anti-British policy," even in Washington, is +shown by a despatch sent by Schleiden to the Senate of Bremen. On +December 23 he wrote that letters from Cobden and Lyndhurst had +been seen by Lincoln.<br> +<br> +"Both letters have been submitted to the President. He returned +them with the remark that 'peace will not be broken if England is +not bent on war.' At the same time the President has assured my +informant that he would examine the answer of his Secretary of +State, word for word, in order that no expression should remain +which could create bad blood anew, because the strong language +which Mr. Seward had used in some of his former despatches seems to +have irritated and insulted England" (Schleiden Papers). No doubt +Sumner was Schleiden's informant. At first glance Lincoln's +reported language would seem to imply that he was putting pressure +on Seward to release the prisoners and Schleiden apparently so +interpreted them. But the fact was that at the date when this was +written Lincoln had not yet committed himself to accepting Seward's +view. He told Seward, "You will go on, of course, preparing your +answer, which, as I understood it, will state the reasons why they +ought to be given up. Now, I have a mind to try my hand at stating +the reasons why they ought <i>not</i> to be given up. We will +compare the points on each side." Lincoln's idea was, in short, to +return an answer to Great Britain, proposing arbitration (Bancroft, +<i>Seward</i>, II, 234).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_473"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor473">[473]</a> Mass. Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>, XLV, +155. Bright to Sumner, Dec. 14, 1861. The letters to Sumner on the +<i>Trent</i> are all printed in this volume of the +<i>Proceedings</i>. The originals are in the <i>Sumner Papers</i> +in the library of Harvard University.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_474"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor474">[474]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the +<i>Trent</i>." No. 24. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 27, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_475"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor475">[475]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 777. No. 807. Lyons to +Russell, Dec. 31, 1861. But he transmitted a few days later, a +"shocking prayer" in the Senate on December 30, by the Rev. Dr. +Sutherland, which showed a bitter feeling. "O Thou, just Ruler of +the world ... we ask help of Thee for our rulers and our people, +that we may patiently, resolutely, and with one heart abide our +time; for it is indeed a day of darkness and reproach--a day when +the high principle of human equity constrained by the remorseless +sweep of physical and armed force, must for the moment, succumb +under the plastic forms of soft diplomacy" (Russell Papers. Lyons +to Russell, Jan. 3, 1862).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_476"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor476">[476]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, +249-53.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_477"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor477">[477]</a> C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent Affair. +(Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV. p. 75).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_478"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor478">[478]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, +250.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_479"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor479">[479]</a> Mason, Slidell, Eustis and McFarland were +delivered to the British ship <i>Rinaldo</i>, January 1, 1862. +<i>En route</i> to Halifax the ship encountered a storm that drove +her south and finally brought her to St. Thomas, where the +passengers embarked on a packet for Southampton.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_480"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor480">[480]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the +<i>Trent</i>." Nos. 27 and 35. February 3, Lyons reported that +Sumner, in a fireside talk, had revealed that he was in possession +of copies of the Law Officers' opinions given on November 12 and 28 +respectively. Lyons was astounded and commented that the Law +Officers, before giving any more opinions, ought to know this fact +(F.O., Am., Vol. 824. No. 76. Lyons to Russell).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_481"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor481">[481]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1399. No. 1397. Cowley +to Russell, Dec. 3, 1861. The italics are mine.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_482"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor482">[482]</a> Newton, <i>Lyons</i>, I, 73.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_483"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor483">[483]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 817. No. 57. Draft. +Russell to Lyons, Feb. 11, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_484"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor484">[484]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1419. No. 73. Draft. +Russell to Cowley, Jan. 20, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_485"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor485">[485]</a> Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, +Jan. 26, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_486"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor486">[486]</a> Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, I, 424. +Bowen to Bigelow, Dec. 27, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_487"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor487">[487]</a> <i>Poems. Bigelow Papers</i>. "Jonathan to +John." After the release of the envoys there was much +correspondence between friends across the water as to the merits of +the case. British friends attempted to explain and to soothe, +usually to their astonished discomfiture on receiving angry +American replies. An excellent illustration of this is in a +pamphlet published in Boston in the fall of 1862, entitled, Field +and Loring, <i>Correspondence on the Present Relations between +Great Britain and the United States of America</i>. The American, +Loring, wrote, "The conviction is nearly if not quite universal +that we have foes where we thought we had friends," p. +7.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_488"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor488">[488]</a> Dana, <i>The Trent Affair. +(Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. 508-22).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_489"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor489">[489]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, 99. +To his son, Jan. 10, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_490"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor490">[490]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 99. Adams +to Seward, Jan. 10, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_491"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor491">[491]</a> Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, +Dec. 7, 1861, Also expressed again to Gladstone. <i>Ibid.</i>, Jan. +1, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_492"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor492">[492]</a> James, <i>William Wetmore Story and His +Friends</i>, II, 105. Browning to Story, Dec. 17, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_493"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor493">[493]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 109. To Story, Dec. 31, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_494"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor494">[494]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 110. To Story, Jan. 21, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_495"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor495">[495]</a> <i>Liberator</i>, Feb. 7, 1862. Giving an +account of a meeting at Bromley-by-Bow.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_496"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor496">[496]</a> Trollope, <i>North America</i> (Chapman +& Hall, London, 1862), I, p. 446. Trollope left England in +August, 1861, and returned in the spring of 1862. He toured the +North and the West, was a close observer, and his work, published +in midsummer 1862, was very serviceable to the North, since he both +stated the justice of the Northern cause and prophesied its +victory.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_497"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor497">[497]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXV, p. 12 +<i>seq</i>., though not consecutive as the speeches were made in +the course of the debate on the Address to the Throne.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_498"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor498">[498]</a> Schleiden Papers. Schleiden to the Senate +of Bremen.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_499"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor499">[499]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 114. Adams +to Seward, Feb. 13, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_500"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor500">[500]</a> Pickett Papers. Hotze to Hunter, March 11, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_501"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor501">[501]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Feb. 8, +1862.</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244"></a>[V1:pg 244]</span> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII</h2> +<h3>THE BLOCKADE</h3> +<br> +<p>The six months following the affair of the <i>Trent</i> +constituted a period of comparative calm in the relations of Great +Britain and America, but throughout that period there was steadily +coming to the front a Northern belligerent effort increasingly +effective, increasingly a cause for disturbance to British trade, +and therefore more and more a matter for anxious governmental +consideration. This was the blockade of Southern ports and coast +line, which Lincoln had declared <i>in intention</i> in his +proclamation of April 19, 1861.</p> +<p>As early as December, 1860, Lyons had raised the question of the +relation of British ships and merchants to the secession port of +Charleston, South Carolina, and had received from Judge Black an +evasive reply<a name="FNanchor502"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_502">[502]</a>. In March, 1861, Russell had foreseen the +possibility of a blockade, writing to Lyons that American precedent +would at least require it to be an effective one, while Lyons made +great efforts to convince Seward that <i>any</i> interference with +British trade would be disastrous to the Northern cause in England. +He even went so far as to hint at British intervention to preserve +trade<a name="FNanchor503"></a><a href="#Footnote_503">[503]</a>. +But on April 15, Lyons, while believing that no effective blockade +was possible, thought that the attempt to institute one was less +objectionable than legislation "closing the Southern Ports as Ports +of Entry," in reality a mere paper blockade and one which would +"justify Great Britain and France in recognizing the Southern +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245"></a>[V1:pg 245]</span> +Confederacy...." Thus he began to weaken in opposition to +<i>any</i> interference<a name="FNanchor504"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_504">[504]</a>. His earlier expressions to Seward were +but arguments, without committing his Government to a line of +policy, and were intended to make Seward step cautiously.</p> +<p>Possibly Lyons thought he could frighten the North out of a +blockade campaign. But when the Civil War actually began and +Lincoln, on April 19, declared he had "deemed it advisable to set +on foot a blockade," and that when a "competent force" had been +posted "so as to prevent entrance and exit of vessels," warning +would be given to any vessel attempting to enter or to leave a +blockaded port, with endorsement on her register of such warning, +followed by seizure if she again attempted to pass the blockade, +Lyons felt that: "If it be carried on, with reasonable +consideration for Foreign Flags, and in strict conformity with the +Law of Nations, I suppose it must be recognized<a name= +"FNanchor505"></a><a href="#Footnote_505">[505]</a>." The +Proclamation named the original seven seceding states, and on April +27 Virginia was added. The blockade was actually begun at certain +Virginia ports on April 30, and by the end of May there were a few +war-ships off all the more important Southern harbours<a name= +"FNanchor506"></a><a href="#Footnote_506">[506]</a>. This method of +putting a blockade into effect by warning at the port rather than +by a general notification communicated to European governments and +setting a date, involved a hardship on British merchants since they +were thereby made uncertain whether goods started for a Southern +port would be permitted to enter. In practice vessels on their +first departure from a blockaded harbour were warned and permitted +to go out, but those seeking to enter were warned and turned back. +In <i>effect</i>, while the blockade was being established, +Lincoln's Proclamation had something of the nature for <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_246"></a>[V1:pg 246]</span> the timid +British merchant, though not for the bold one, of a paper blockade. +This was not clearly understood by Lyons, who thought neutrals must +acquiesce, having "exhausted every possible means of opposition," +but who consoled himself with the idea that "for some time yet" +British trade could be carried on<a name="FNanchor507"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_507">[507]</a>.</p> +<p>Lyons was in fact sceptical, as he told Seward in a long +conversation on April 29 of the possibility of blockading a 3,000 +mile coast line, but Seward assured him it would be done and +effectively<a name="FNanchor508"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_508">[508]</a>. The British press was equally sceptical, +and in any case believed that the war would be of short duration, +so that there need be no anxiety over next year's supply of +cotton<a name="FNanchor509"></a><a href="#Footnote_509">[509]</a>. +In Parliament Russell took the stand that the blockade, if carried +on in accordance with international law and made effective, +required British recognition and respect. He also defended +Lincoln's "notification at the port" method, stating that it might +seem a hardship, but was perfectly legal<a name= +"FNanchor510"></a><a href="#Footnote_510">[510]</a>. Thus there was +early and easy acquiescence in the American effort, but when, in +June, there was revived a Northern plan to close Southern ports by +legislative action, Britain was stirred to quick and vigorous +opposition. Lyons learned that a Bill would be introduced in +Congress giving the President authority, among other powers, to +"proclaim" the ports closed, thus notifying foreign nations not to +attempt to use them. He saw in it an unexpected application of the +Northern theory that the South was not a belligerent and had no +rights as such, and he regarded it as in effect a paper +blockade<a name="FNanchor511"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_511">[511]</a>.</p> +<p>The fourth section of the Bill as introduced in Congress did not +direct the President to issue a proclamation closing Southern +ports--it merely gave him the power to do so. <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_247"></a>[V1:pg 247]</span> Almost from the +first Lyons thought that Lincoln and Seward were too wise to issue +such a proclamation<a name="FNanchor512"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_512">[512]</a>. Nevertheless it was his duty to be on +guard and to oppose the plan. For six weeks there was much +communication in regard to the "Southern Ports Bill," as all +parties called it, from Russell to Lyons, and also with Cowley in +France. The British Foreign Office interest in the matter, almost +rising to excitement, is somewhat astonishing in view of the small +importance evidently attached to the plan at Washington and the +reluctance of France to be as vigorous as Great Britain in protest. +Vigorous Russell certainly was, using a "high tone" in official +remonstrance to America not unlike that taken by Seward on British +recognition of Southern belligerency.</p> +<p>Immediately on learning of the introduction of the Bill Russell +addressed enquiries to Cowley asking what France intended and urged +a stiff protest. Thouvenel had not heard of the Bill and was +seemingly indifferent. At first he acquiesced in Russell's protest, +then drew back and on three separate occasions promised support +only to withdraw such promise. He was disinclined, said Cowley, to +join in a "friendly hint" to America because of the touchy +sensibilities lately shown by Seward, and feared a direct protest +might result in an American declaration of war. In any case why not +wait until the President <i>did</i> act, and even then the proper +method would be a protest rather than "reprisals." "I wish," wrote +Cowley, on July 28, "that the French were inclined to be more +<i>bumptious</i>, as they seemed to be at first. I would at all +times rather have the task of calming them, than of urging them +on<a name="FNanchor513"></a><a href="#Footnote_513">[513]</a>...." +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248"></a>[V1:pg 248]</span> +Nevertheless Russell on July 19 notified Lyons that England would +not observe a "legislative closing" of Southern ports<a name= +"FNanchor514"></a><a href="#Footnote_514">[514]</a>. On July 12 +Lyons telegraphed that the Bill had passed both Houses of Congress, +and on the sixteenth he wrote privately to Russell that he was much +disturbed over its possible consequences since "even Sumner was for +it<a name="FNanchor515"></a><a href="#Footnote_515">[515]</a>," as +this indicated a real intention to carry it into effect<a name= +"FNanchor516"></a><a href="#Footnote_516">[516]</a>. On August 8, +Russell sent formal instructions of protest, a copy of which was to +be handed to Seward, but the next day authorized Lyons to exercise +discretion as to communicating the despatch<a name= +"FNanchor517"></a><a href="#Footnote_517">[517]</a>.</p> +<p>The original form of this instruction, dated in June and revised +in July, concluded with language that might well draw out +Thouvenel's objection to a threat of "reprisals." It read that +"H.M.G. ... reserve ... the right of acting in concert with other +Nations in opposition to so violent an attack on the rights of +Commercial Countries and so manifest a violation of International +Law<a name="FNanchor518"></a><a href="#Footnote_518">[518]</a>." +This <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249"></a>[V1:pg +249]</span> high tone had been modified possibly by French +opposition, possibly by Lyons' early opinion that the Bill would +not be made operative. Indeed on July 24 Russell told Lyons that no +final instruction of protest would be sent him until the President +actually issued a proclamation<a name="FNanchor519"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_519">[519]</a>. Yet in spite of being fairly well +assured that there was no danger in the "Southern Ports Bill," +Russell did send the instruction of August 8, still distinctly +"vigorous" in tone, though with no threat of "reprisals." His +reason for doing so is difficult to understand. Certainly he was +hardly serious in arguing to Thouvenel that a stiff instruction +would strengthen the hands of the "moderate section" of the +American Cabinet<a name="FNanchor520"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_520">[520]</a>, or else he strangely misjudged American +temperament. Probably a greater reason was his wish to be able to +print a Parliamentary Paper indicating the watchful care he was +exercising in guarding British interests.</p> +<p>Before Russell's instruction could reach America Seward had +voluntarily reassured Lyons as to American intentions. Lyons +reported this, privately, on July 20<a name= +"FNanchor521"></a><a href="#Footnote_521">[521]</a>, but on the +same day also reported, officially, that two days earlier, that is +on the eighteenth, he and Mercier had discussed the "Southern +Ports" Bill and that as a result Mercier had then gone, that same +day, to Seward to state that France must regard such a measure as +merely a paper blockade<a name="FNanchor522"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_522">[522]</a>. "We were not very sanguine of success," +wrote Lyons, but Seward "had listened to him [Mercier] with +calmness," and personally seemed disinclined to issue the required +Proclamation. This despatch, making it appear that England +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250"></a>[V1:pg 250]</span> and +France were in close harmony and that Lyons and Mercier were having +a difficult time at Washington was printed, later, in the +Parliamentary Papers. It was received by Russell on August 5, and +in spite of the reassurances of Lyons' private letter (naturally +not for printing) presumably received in the same mail with the +official despatch, it furnished the basis of his "strong" +instruction of August 8.</p> +<p>At Washington also there were indications of an effort to +prepare a good case for the British public and Parliament. July 23, +so Lyons wrote privately, Seward had prevented the issue of the +"Southern Ports" Proclamation<a name="FNanchor523"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_523">[523]</a>, and on the next day he was shown by +Seward, confidentially, an instruction to Adams and other Ministers +abroad in which was maintained the right to close the ports by +proclamation, but stating the Government's decision not to exercise +the right. Lyons believed this was the end of the matter<a name= +"FNanchor524"></a><a href="#Footnote_524">[524]</a>. Yet on August +12, he presented himself formally at the Department of State and +stated that he had instructions to declare that "Her Majesty's +Government would consider a decree closing the ports of the South +actually in possession of the insurgent or Confederate States as +null and void, and that they would not submit to measures taken on +the high seas in pursuance of such decree."... "Mr. Seward thanked +me for the consideration I had shown; and begged me to confine +myself for the present to the verbal announcement I had just made. +He said it would be difficult for me to draw up a written +communication which would not have the air of a threat." To this +Lyons agreed<a name="FNanchor525"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_525">[525]</a>.</p> +<p>This permitted a warmth-creating impression to Englishmen of the +"forthright yet friendly" tone of British <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_251"></a>[V1:pg 251]</span> diplomats when +dealing with Seward. So also did Russell's instruction of August 8, +not yet received by Lyons when he took the stage at Washington. Yet +there is a possibility that Lyons was in fact merely playing his +part as Seward had asked him to play it. On the next day, August +13, he acknowledged the receipt of Russell's communication of July +24, in which it was stated that while Great Britain could not +acquiesce in the "Southern Ports" Bill <i>no final instructions</i> +would be sent until Lincoln issued a Proclamation. Lyons now +explained, "As Mr. Seward is undoubtedly at this moment opposed to +closing the Ports, I have thought it wiser to be guided by him for +the present as to the mode of communicating your decision about the +matter<a name="FNanchor526"></a><a href="#Footnote_526">[526]</a>." +Is it possible that Seward really wished to have a "strong," yet +not "too strong" statement from Lyons in order to combat the +advocates of the "Ports" Bill? There are many ramifications of +diplomatic policy--especially in a popular government. At any rate +on August 16 Lyons could assure Russell that there "was no question +now of issuing the Proclamation<a name="FNanchor527"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_527">[527]</a>." And on the nineteenth could write +officially that a Proclamation based on the Bill had indeed been +issued, but without the objectionable fourth section<a name= +"FNanchor528"></a><a href="#Footnote_528">[528]</a>.</p> +<p>The whole affair of the "Southern Ports" Bill occupies more +space in the British Parliamentary Papers, and excited more +attention from the British Government than it would seem to have +merited from the Washington attitude toward it. The Bill had been +drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury, and its other sections +related to methods of meeting a situation where former customs +houses and places for the collection of import duties were now in +the hands of the Confederacy. The fourth section alone <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_252"></a>[V1:pg 252]</span> implied a +purpose to declare a paper blockade. The idea of proclaiming closed +the Southern ports may have at first received the sanction of +Seward as consistent with his denial of the existence of a war; or +it may have been a part of his "high tone" foreign policy<a name= +"FNanchor529"></a><a href="#Footnote_529">[529]</a>, but the more +reasonable supposition is that the Bill was merely one of many +ill-considered measures put forth in the first months of the war by +the North in its spasm of energy seeking to use every and any +public means to attack the South. But the interest attached to the +measure in this work is the British attitude. There can be no doubt +that Russell, in presenting papers to Parliament was desirous of +making clear two points: first, the close harmony with +France--which in fact was not so close as was made to appear; +second, the care and vigour of the Foreign Secretary in guarding +British interests. Now in fact British trade was destined to be +badly hurt by the blockade, but as yet had not been greatly +hampered. Nor did Russell yet think an effective blockade feasible. +Writing to Lyons a week after his official protest on the "Southern +Ports" Bill, he expressed the opinion that a "<i>regular</i> +blockade" could not possibly prevent trade with the South:</p> +<blockquote>"If our ships can go in ballast for cotton to the +Southern Ports it will be well, but if this cannot be done by +agreement there will be surely, in the extent of 3,000 miles, +creeks and bays out of which small vessels may come, and run for +Jamaica or the Bahamas where the cargoes might be transhipped. But +it is not for Downing Street to suggest such plans to Cheapside and +Tooley Street<a name="FNanchor530"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_530">[530]</a>."</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253"></a>[V1:pg 253]</span> +<p>A better knowledge of American geography would have made clear +to Russell that if but seven Southern ports were effectively +blockaded the remaining 2,550 miles of coast line would be useless +for the export of cotton in any considerable amount. His bays and +creeks did indeed long provide access to small vessels, but these +were not adequate for the transport of a bulky export like +cotton<a name="FNanchor531"></a><a href="#Footnote_531">[531]</a>. +To Russell, however, the blockade appearing negligible in probable +effect and also not open to objection by neutrals if regularly +established, it seemed that any immediate danger to British trade +was averted by the final American action on the "Southern Ports" +Bill. It was not until the blockade did begin to be thoroughly +effective that either the British public or Government gave it +serious consideration.</p> +<p>Not again until late November did Russell return with any +interest to the subject of the blockade and then it was again on an +American effort which seemed to indicate the ineffectiveness of +blockading squadrons and a plan to remedy this by unusual, even +"uncivilized," if not illegal, methods. This was the "Stone Boat +Fleet" plan of blocking Charleston harbour by sinking vessels +across the entrance bar<a name="FNanchor532"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_532">[532]</a>. The plan was reported by Lyons and the +news received in England at the most uncertain moment as to the +outcome of the <i>Trent</i> controversy<a name= +"FNanchor533"></a><a href="#Footnote_533">[533]</a>. British press +and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254"></a>[V1:pg 254]</span> +Government at first placed no stress on it, presumably because of +the feeling that in view of the existing crisis it was a minor +matter. In the same week Lyons, having been asked by Russell for an +opinion on the blockade, answered:</p> +<blockquote>"I am a good deal puzzled as to how I ought to answer +your question whether I consider the Blockade effective. It is +certainly by no means strict or vigorous along the immense extent +of coast to which it is supposed to apply. I suppose the ships +which run it successfully both in and out are more numerous than +those which are intercepted. On the other hand it is very far from +being a mere Paper Blockade. A great many vessels are captured; it +is a most serious interruption to Trade; and if it were as +ineffective as Mr. Jefferson Davis says in his Message, he would +not be so very anxious to get rid of it<a name= +"FNanchor534"></a><a href="#Footnote_534">[534]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>This was a very fair description of the blockade situation. +Lyons, unaffected by irritations resulting from the <i>Trent</i>, +showed the frame of mind of a "determined neutral," as he was fond +of describing himself. His answer was the first given to Russell +indicating a possibility that the blockade might, after all, become +strictly effective and thus exceedingly harmful to British trade. +There is no direct <i>proof</i> that this influenced Russell to +denounce the plan of blocking Southern harbours with stone-laden +boats sunk in the channel, but the existence of such a motive seems +probable. Moreover his protest was not made until December 20, the +<i>day after</i> he had learned officially from Adams that Wilkes +was unauthorized in searching the <i>Trent</i>--a day on which +strain and uncertainty regarding American intentions were greatly +lessened. Russell then wrote to Lyons that he observed it to be +stated, "apparently on good authority," that the declared purpose +of the stone boat fleet was "of destroying these harbours for +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255"></a>[V1:pg 255]</span> +ever." He characterized this as implying "utter despair of the +restoration of the Union," and as being only "a measure of revenge +and irremediable injury against an enemy."</p> +<p>"But even in this view, as a scheme of embittered and sanguinary +war, such a measure is not justifiable. It is a plot against the +commerce of nations and the free intercourse of the Southern States +of America with the civilized world. It is a project worthy only of +times of barbarism."</p> +<p>Lyons was instructed to speak in this sense to Seward, who, it +was hoped, would disavow the project<a name= +"FNanchor535"></a><a href="#Footnote_535">[535]</a>.</p> +<br> +<p>There was nothing in Lyons' despatches, nor in the American +newspaper extracts accompanying them, to warrant such accusation +and expostulation. Lyons had merely commented that by some in +America the project had been characterized as "odious and +barbarous," adding, "The question seems to depend on the extent to +which the harbours will be permanently injured<a name= +"FNanchor536"></a><a href="#Footnote_536">[536]</a>." It will be +noted that Russell did not refer to information received from Lyons +(though it was already in hand), but to "apparently good authority" +in justification of his vigorous denunciation. But like vigour, and +like characterization of American "barbarism" did not appear in the +British press until after the news arrived of the release of Mason +and Slidell. Then the storm broke, well summed up in the Punch +cartoon entitled "Retrogression. (A Very Sad Picture.) War Dance of +the I.O.U. Indian," and showing Uncle Sam in war-feathers and with +war-club, in his hand a flag made of the <i>New York Herald</i>, +dancing in glee on the shores of a deserted harbour across which +stretched a row of sunken ships<a name="FNanchor537"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_537">[537]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256"></a>[V1:pg 256]</span> +<p>On January 13 the Liverpool Shipowners' Association called the +attention of the Foreign Office to the news that Charleston harbour +had been closed by stone boats and urged governmental +remonstrance<a name="FNanchor538"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_538">[538]</a>. Hammond at once replied quoting the +language of Russell's letter of December 20 and stating that +further representations would be made<a name= +"FNanchor539"></a><a href="#Footnote_539">[539]</a>. On the +sixteenth Russell again instructed Lyons to speak to Seward, but +now was much less rasping in language, arguing, rather, the injury +in the future to the United States itself in case the harbours were +permanently destroyed since "... the object of war is peace, and +the purposes of peace are mutual goodwill and advantageous +commercial intercourse<a name="FNanchor540"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_540">[540]</a>." To-day it seems absurd that any save +the most ignorant observer should have thought the North +contemplated a permanent and revengeful destruction of Southern +port facilities. Nor was there any just ground for such an extreme +British view of the Northern plan. Yet even Robert Browning was +affected by the popular outcry. "For what will you do," he wrote +Story, "if Charleston becomes loyal again<a name= +"FNanchor541"></a><a href="#Footnote_541">[541]</a>?" a query +expressive of the increasing English concern, even alarm, at the +intense bitterness, indicating a long war, of the American +belligerents. How absurd, not to say ridiculous, was this British +concern at an American "lapse toward barbarism" was soon made +evident. On January II Lyons, acting on the instructions of +December 20, brought up the matter with Seward and was promptly +assured that there was no plan whatever "to injure the harbours +permanently." Seward stated that there had never been any plan, +even, to sink boats in the main entrance channels, but merely the +lesser channels, because the Secretary of <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_257"></a>[V1:pg 257]</span> the Navy had +reported that with the blockading fleet he could "stop up the +'large holes,'" but "could not stop up the 'small ones.'" Seward +assured Lyons that just as soon as the Union was restored all +obstructions would be removed, and he added that the best proof +that the entrance to Charleston harbour had not been destroyed was +the fact that in spite of blockading vessels and stone boats "a +British steamer laden with contraband of war had just succeeded in +getting in<a name="FNanchor542"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_542">[542]</a>." Again, on February 10, this time +following Russell's instruction of January 16, Lyons approached +Seward and was told that he might inform Russell that "all the +vessels laden with stone, which had been prepared for obstructing +the harbours, had been already sunk, and that it is not likely that +any others will be used for that purpose<a name= +"FNanchor543"></a><a href="#Footnote_543">[543]</a>." This was no +yielding to Great Britain, nor even an answer to Russell's +accusation of barbarity. The fact was that the plan of obstruction +of harbours, extending even to placing a complete barrier, had been +undertaken by the Navy with little expectation of success, and, on +the first appearance of new channels made by the wash of waters, +was soon abandoned<a name="FNanchor544"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_544">[544]</a>.</p> +<p>The British outcry, Russell's assumption in protest that America +was conducting war with barbarity, and the protest itself, may seem +at first glance to have been merely manifestations of a British +tendency to meddle, as a "superior nation" in the affairs of other +states and to give unasked-for advice. A hectoring of peoples whose +civilization was presumably less advanced than that which stamped +the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258"></a>[V1:pg 258]</span> +Englishman was, according to Matthew Arnold, traditional--was a +characteristic of British public and Government alike<a name= +"FNanchor545"></a><a href="#Footnote_545">[545]</a>. But this is +scarcely a satisfactory explanation in the present case. For in the +first place it is to be remarked that the sinking of obstructions +in an enemy's harbours in order to render more effective a blockade +was no novelty in maritime warfare, as Russell must have well +known, and that there was no modern record of such obstructions +having permanently destroyed a harbour. A far more reasonable +explanation is that which connects the energy of the British +Government in opposing a proposed American closing of Southern +harbours by Presidential proclamation, with a like energy against +the stone boat project. The first method was indeed rightly +regarded as a violation of accustomed maritime belligerency, but +both methods were primarily objectionable in British eyes because +they were very evidently the result of efforts to find a way in +which an as yet ineffective blockade could be made more rigorous. +On the impossibility of an effective blockade, if conducted on +customary lines, the British people and Foreign Secretary had +pinned their faith that there would be no serious interruption of +trade. This was still the view in January, 1862, though doubts were +arising, and the "stone boat" protest must be regarded as another +evidence of watchful guardianship of commerce with the South. The +very thought that the blockade might become effective, in which +case all precedent would demand respect for it, possibly caused +Russell to use a tone not customary with him in upbraiding the +North for a planned "barbarity."</p> +<p>Within three months the blockade and its effectiveness was to be +made the subject of the first serious parliamentary discussion on +the Civil War in America. In another three months the Government +began to feel a pressure from its associate in "joint attitude," +France, to examine again <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_259"></a>[V1:pg 259]</span> with much care its asserted +policy of strict neutrality, and this because of the increased +effectiveness of the blockade. Meanwhile another "American +question" was serving to cool somewhat British eagerness to go hand +in hand with France. For nearly forty years since independence from +Spain the Mexican Republic had offered a thorny problem to European +nations since it was difficult, in the face of the American Monroe +Doctrine, to put sufficient pressure upon her for the satisfaction +of the just claims of foreign creditors. In 1860 measures were +being prepared by France, Great Britain and Spain to act jointly in +the matter of Mexican debts. Commenting on these measures, +President Buchanan in his annual message to Congress of December 3, +1860, had sounded a note of warning to Europe indicating that +American principles would compel the use of force in aid of Mexico +if debt-collecting efforts were made the excuse for a plan "to +deprive our neighbouring Republic of portions of her territory." +But this was at the moment of the break-up of the Union and +attracted little attention in the United States. For the same +reason, no longer fearing an American block to these plans, the +three European Governments, after their invitation to the United +States to join them had been refused, signed a convention, October +31, 1861, to force a payment of debts by Mexico. They pledged +themselves, however, to seek no accession of territory and not to +interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico.</p> +<p>In this pledge Great Britain and Spain were sincere. Napoleon +III was not--was indeed pursuing a policy not at first understood +even by his Ministers<a name="FNanchor546"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_546">[546]</a>. A joint expedition under the leadership +of the Spanish General Prim was despatched, and once in Mexico took +possession of customs houses and began to collect duties. It soon +became evident <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260"></a>[V1:pg +260]</span> to the British and Spanish agents on the spot that +France had far other objects than the mere satisfaction of debts. +The result was a clash of interests, followed by separate +agreements with Mexico and the withdrawal of forces by Great +Britain and Spain. This difference of view on Mexican policy had +become clear to Cowley, British Ambassador at Paris, by January, +1862, and from that month until the end of March his private +letters to Russell referring to American affairs in general are +almost wholly concerned with French designs on Mexico. Cowley +learned that earlier rumours of Napoleon's purpose to place the +Archduke Maximilian of Austria upon the <i>Throne</i> of Mexico, +far from being unfounded, were but faint indications of a great +French "colonial Empire" scheme, and he thought that there was +"some ill-will to the United States at the bottom of all +this<a name="FNanchor547"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_547">[547]</a>...." He feared that the Mexican question +would "give us a deal of trouble yet<a name= +"FNanchor548"></a><a href="#Footnote_548">[548]</a>," and by March +was writing of the "monstrous claims on the Mexican Govt." made by +France<a name="FNanchor549"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_549">[549]</a>.</p> +<p>These reactions of Cowley were fully shared by Russell, and he +hastened, in March, to withdraw British forces in Mexico, as also +did Spain. Great Britain believed that she had been tricked into a +false position in Mexico, hastened to escape from it, but in view +of the close relation of joint policy with France toward the Civil +War in America, undertook no direct opposition though prophesying +an evil result. This situation required France to refrain, for a +time, from criticism of British policy and action toward the +North--to pursue, in brief, a "follow on" policy, rather than one +based on its own initiative. On the British side <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_261"></a>[V1:pg 261]</span> the French +Mexican policy created a suspicion of Napoleon's hidden purposes +and objects in the Civil War and made the British Government slow +to accept French suggestions. The result was that in relation to +that war Great Britain set the pace and France had to keep step--a +very advantageous situation for the North, as the event was to +prove. On the purely Mexican question Lyons early took opportunity +to assure Seward that Great Britain was "entirely averse to any +interference in the internal affairs of Mexico, and that nothing +could be further from their wishes than to impose upon the Mexican +Nation any Government not of its own choice<a name= +"FNanchor550"></a><a href="#Footnote_550">[550]</a>."</p> +<p>British dislike of France's Mexican venture served to +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262"></a>[V1:pg 262]</span> +swell the breeze of amity toward America that had sprung up once +the <i>Trent</i> was beyond the horizon, and made, temporarily, for +smooth sailing in the relations of Great Britain and the North. +Lyons wrote on February 7 that the "present notion appears to be to +overwhelm us with demonstrations of friendship and +confidence<a name="FNanchor551"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_551">[551]</a>." Adams' son in London thought "our work +here is past its crisis," and that, "Our victory is won on this +side the water<a name="FNanchor552"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_552">[552]</a>," while the American Minister himself +believed that "the prospect of interference with us is growing more +and more remote<a name="FNanchor553"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_553">[553]</a>." Russell also was optimistic, writing to +Lyons, "Our relations have now got into a very smooth groove.... +There is no longer any excitement here upon the question of +America. I fear Europe is going to supplant the affairs of America +as an exciting topic<a name="FNanchor554"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_554">[554]</a>," meaning, presumably, disturbances +arising in Italy. On April 4 Adams described his diplomatic duties +as "almost in a state of profound calm<a name= +"FNanchor555"></a><a href="#Footnote_555">[555]</a>."</p> +<p>This quiet in relation to America is evidence that no matter +what anxiety was felt by British statesmen over the effects of the +blockade there was as yet no inclination seriously to question its +legality. That there was, nevertheless, real anxiety is shown by an +urgent letter from Westbury to Palmerston upon the blockade, +asserting that if cotton brought but four pence at Charleston and +thirteen pence at Liverpool there must be some truth in its alleged +effectiveness:</p> +<blockquote>"I am greatly opposed to any violent interference. Do +not let us give the Federal States any pretence for saying that +they failed thro' our interference.... Patience for <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_263"></a>[V1:pg 263]</span> a few more +weeks is I am satisfied the wiser and the more expedient +policy<a name="FNanchor556"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_556">[556]</a>."</blockquote> +<br> +<a name="image07.jpg"></a> +<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image07.jpg"><img src= +"images/image07.jpg" width="55%" alt=""></a><br> +<b>KING COTTON BOUND:</b><br> +Or, The Modern Prometheus.<br> +<i>Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"</i></p> +<br> +<p>This would indicate some Cabinet discussion, at least, on the +blockade and on British trade interests. But Westbury's "few more +weeks" had no place in Russell's thought, for on February 15 he +wrote to Lyons in regard to assertions being made that the blockade +was ineffective because certain vessels had eluded it:</p> +<blockquote>"Her Majesty's Government, however, are of opinion +that, assuming that the blockade is duly notified, and also that a +number of ships is stationed and remains at the entrance of a port, +sufficient really to prevent access to it or to create an evident +danger of entering or leaving it, and that these ships do not +voluntarily permit ingress or egress, the fact that various ships +may have successfully escaped through it (as in the particular +instances here referred to) will not of itself prevent the blockade +from being an effective one by international law<a name= +"FNanchor557"></a><a href="#Footnote_557">[557]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>From this view Russell never departed in official +instructions<a name="FNanchor558"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_558">[558]</a>. England's position as the leading +maritime Power made it inevitable that she should promptly approve +the Northern blockade effort and be cautious in criticizing its +legitimate operation. Both her own history and probable future +interests when a belligerent, required such a policy far more +important in the eyes of statesmen than any temporary injury to +British commerce. English merchants, if determined to trade with +the South, must take their own risks, and that Russell believed +they would do so is evidenced by his comment to Adams that it was a +tradition of the sea that Englishmen "would, if money were to be +made by it, send supplies even to hell at the risk of burning their +sails."</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264"></a>[V1:pg 264]</span> +<p>But trade problems with the South soon brought real pressure on +the Government. In January, while marking time until Mason should +arrive at his post, the Confederate commissioners already in London +very nearly took a step that might have prejudiced the new envoy's +position. They had now learned through public documents that +Russell had informed Adams he "had no intention of seeing them +again." Very angry they planned a formal protest to the British +Government, but in the end Mann and Rost counselled silence, +outvoting Yancey<a name="FNanchor559"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_559">[559]</a>. On his arrival Mason ignored this +situation and with cause for, warmly received socially in +pro-Southern circles, he felt confident that at least a private +reception would soon be given him by Russell. He became, indeed, +somewhat of a social lion, and mistaking this personal popularity +for evidence of parliamentary, if not governmental, attitude, was +confident of quick advantages for the South. On the day after his +arrival he wrote unofficially to Hunter, Confederate Secretary of +State "... although the Ministry may hang back in regard to the +blockade and recognition through the Queen's speech, at the opening +of Parliament next week the popular voice through the House of +Commons will demand both."... "I shall be disappointed if the +Parliament does not insist on definite action by the +Ministry<a name="FNanchor560"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_560">[560]</a>...."</p> +<p>Carefully considering the situation and taking the advice of +many English friends, Mason and Slidell agreed that the best line +to take was to lay aside for the moment the claim to recognition +and to urge European repudiation of the blockade. Slidell, arrived +in Paris, wrote Mason that in his coming interview with Thouvenel +he should "make only a passing allusion to the question of +recognition, intimating that on that point I am not disposed at +present <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265"></a>[V1:pg +265]</span> to press consideration. But I shall insist upon the +inefficiency of the blockade, the 'vandalism of the stone fleet,' +etc<a name="FNanchor561"></a><a href="#Footnote_561">[561]</a>." +Mason was urged to take a like course with Russell. Both men were +much excited by a document a copy of which had been secured by Mann +purporting to be a "confidential memorandum" addressed by England +to the Continental Powers, asking whether the time had not come to +raise the blockade. No such memorandum existed, but Slidell and +Mason believed it genuine<a name="FNanchor562"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_562">[562]</a>. They had great hopes of the opening of +Parliament, but when that event took place, February 6, and the +only references in debate were to the <i>Trent</i> and its +fortunate outcome, Mason was puzzled and chagrined. He wrote: "It +is thought that silence as to the blockade was intended to leave +that question open<a name="FNanchor563"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_563">[563]</a>." This, no doubt, was the consolatory +explanation of his friends, but the unofficial interview with +Russell, at his home, on February 10, chilled Mason's hopes.</p> +<p>As agreed with Slidell, emphasis in this interview was laid by +Mason on the blockade, though recognition was asked. His report to +Richmond shows that he proceeded with great caution, omitting +portions of his instructions on cotton for fear of arousing +antagonism, and venturing only a slight departure by expressing the +hope that if Great Britain wished to renew communication with the +Confederacy it might be made through him, rather than through the +British consuls at the South. Russell's "only reply was, he hoped I +might find my residence in London agreeable." He refused to see +Mason's credentials, stating this to be "unnecessary, our relations +being unofficial." He listened with courtesy, asked a few +questions, but "seemed utterly <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_266"></a>[V1:pg 266]</span> disinclined to enter into +conversation at all as to the policy of his Government, and only +said, in substance, they must await events." Certainly it was a +cool reception, and Mason departed with the conviction that +Russell's "personal sympathies were not with us, and his policy +inaction<a name="FNanchor564"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_564">[564]</a>." But Mason still counted on +parliamentary pressure on the Government, and he was further +encouraged in this view by a letter from Spence, at Liverpool, +stating that he had just received a request to come to London "from +a government quarter, of all the <i>most important</i><a name= +"FNanchor565"></a><a href="#Footnote_565">[565]</a>."</p> +<p>The summons of Spence to London shows that the Government itself +feared somewhat a pro-Southern move in Parliament. He reported to +Mason that interviews had taken place with Palmerston and with +Russell, that he had unfortunately missed one with Gladstone, and, +while not citing these men directly, declared the general "London +idea" to be that of "postponement"; since it was inevitable that +"the North will break down in a few months on the score of money," +and that "We have only to wait three months." Evidently Spence +believed he was being used as an intermediary and influential +adviser in pro-Southern circles to persuade them to a period of +quiet. <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267"></a>[V1:pg +267]</span> This, he thought, was unwise since delay would be +injurious<a name="FNanchor566"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_566">[566]</a>. Of like opinion were the two Members of +Parliament who were, throughout Mason's career in England, to be +his closest advisers. These were Gregory and Lindsay, the former +possessing somewhat of a following in the "gentleman-ruler" class, +the latter the largest shipowner in Great Britain. Their advice +also was to press on the blockade question<a name= +"FNanchor567"></a><a href="#Footnote_567">[567]</a>, as a matter of +primary British commercial interest, and they believed that France +was eager to follow a British lead. This was contrary to Slidell's +notion at the moment, but of this Mason was unaware<a name= +"FNanchor568"></a><a href="#Footnote_568">[568]</a>.</p> +<p>The Government did indeed feel compelled to lay before +Parliament the papers on the blockade. This was a bulky document of +one hundred and twenty-six pages and covered the period from May 3, +1861, to February 17, 1862. In it were the details of the +institution of the blockade, reports from British consuls on its +effectiveness, lists of vessels captured and of vessels evading it, +all together furnishing a very complete view of this, the principal +maritime belligerent effort of the North<a name= +"FNanchor569"></a><a href="#Footnote_569">[569]</a>. The Blockade +Papers gave opportunity for debate, if desired, and especially so +as almost at the end of this document appeared that instruction of +February 15 by Russell to Lyons, which clearly stated British +acceptance of the blockade as effective. Mason's interview with +Russell occurred on the tenth. Five days later, after Spence had +been urged vainly to use his influence for "postponement," Russell, +so it must appear, gave challenge to pro-Southern sentiment by +asserting the effectiveness of the blockade, a challenge almost +immediately made known to Parliament by the presentation of +papers.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268"></a>[V1:pg 268]</span> +<p>Unless Southern sympathizers were meekly to acquiesce, without +further protest, in governmental policy they must now make some +decided effort. This came in the shape of a debate in the Commons, +on March 7, of a motion by Gregory urging the Government to declare +the blockade ineffective<a name="FNanchor570"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_570">[570]</a>, and of a similar debate on March 10 in +the Lords. As is inevitable where many speakers participate in a +debate the arguments advanced were repeated and reiterated. In the +Commons important speeches for the motion were made by Gregory, +Bentinck, Sir James Ferguson, Lord Robert Cecil and Lindsay, while +against it appeared Forster and Monckton Milnes. The +Solicitor-General, Roundell Palmer, presented the Government view. +Gregory opened the debate by seeking to make clear that while +himself favourable to recognition of the South the present motion +had no essential bearing on that question and was directed wholly +to a <i>fact</i>--that the blockade was not in reality effective +and should not be recognized as such. He presented and analysed +statistics to prove the frequency with which vessels passed through +the blockade, using the summaries given by Mason to Russell in +their interview of February 10, which were now before Parliament in +the document on the blockade just presented, and he cited the +reports of Bunch at Charleston as further evidence. This was the +burden of Gregory's argument<a name="FNanchor571"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_571">[571]</a>, but he glanced in passing at many +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269"></a>[V1:pg 269]</span> +other points favourable to the South, commenting on its free trade +principles, depicting the "Stone Fleet" as a barbarity, asserting +the right of the South to secede, declaring that France regarded +British attitude as determined by a selfish policy looking to +future wars, and attacking Seward on the ground of American +inconsistency, falsely paraphrasing him as stating that "as for all +those principles of international law, which we have ever upheld, +they are as but dust in the balance compared with the exigencies of +the moment<a name="FNanchor572"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_572">[572]</a>." Gregory concluded with the statement +that the United States should be treated "with justice and nothing +more."</p> +<p>When presenting a cause in Parliament its advocates should agree +on a line of argument. The whole theory of this movement on the +blockade was that it was wise to minimize the question of +recognition, and Gregory had laboured to prove that this was not +related to a refusal longer to recognize the blockade. But +Bentinck, the second speaker for the motion, promptly undid him for +he unhappily <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270"></a>[V1:pg +270]</span> admitted that recognition and blockade questions were +so closely interwoven that they could not be considered separately. +This was promptly seized upon by Forster, who led in opposition. +Forster's main argument, however, was a very able tearing to pieces +of Gregory's figures, showing that nearly all the alleged blockade +runners were in reality merely small coasting steamers, which, by +use of shallow inner channels, could creep along the shore and then +make a dash for the West Indies. The effectiveness of the blockade +of main ports for ocean-going vessels carrying bulky cargoes was +proved, he declared, by the price of raw cotton in England, where +it was 100 per cent. greater than in the South, and of salt in +Charleston, where the importer could make a profit of 1,000 per +cent. To raise the blockade, he argued, would be a direct violation +by Britain of her neutrality. The real reason for this motion was +not the <i>ineffectiveness</i> of the blockade, but the +effectiveness, and the real object an English object, not a +Southern one. Gregory was taunted for changing a motion to +recognize the Confederacy into the present one because he knew the +former would fail while the present motion was deceitfully intended +to secure the same end. Forster strongly approved the conduct of +the Government in preserving strict neutrality, alleging that any +other conduct would have meant "a war in which she [England] would +have had to fight for slavery against her kinsmen."</p> +<p>Gregory's speech was cautious and attempted to preserve a +judicial tone of argument on fact. Forster's reads like that of one +who knows his cause already won. Gregory's had no fire in it and +was characterized by Henry Adams, an interested auditor, as +"listened to as you would listen to a funeral eulogy."... "The +blockade is now universally acknowledged to be +unobjectionable<a name="FNanchor573"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_573">[573]</a>." This estimate is <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_271"></a>[V1:pg 271]</span> borne out by +the speech for the Government by the Solicitor-General, who +maintained the effectiveness of the blockade and who answered +Gregory's argument that recognition was not in question by stating +that to refuse longer to recognize the blockade would result in a +situation of "armed neutrality"--that is of "unproclaimed war." He +pictured the disgust of Europe if England should enter upon such a +war in alliance "with a country ... which is still one of the last +strongholds of slavery"--an admission made in the fervour of debate +that was dangerous as tending to tie the Government's hands in the +future, but which was, no doubt, merely a personal and carelessly +ventured view, not a governmentally authorized one. In general the +most interesting feature of this debate is the hearty approval +given by friends of the North to the Government's entire line of +policy and conduct in relation to America. Their play at the +moment, feeling insecure as to the fixity of governmental policy, +was to approve heartily the neutrality now existing, and to make no +criticisms. Later, when more confident of the permanency of British +neutrality, they in turn became critics on the score of failure, in +specific cases, in neutral duty.</p> +<p>The Solicitor-General's speech showed that there was no hope for +the motion unless it could be made a party question. Of that there +was no indication, and the motion was withdrawn. Three days later a +similar debate in the Lords was of importance only as offering +Russell, since he was now a member of the upper chamber, an +opportunity to speak for himself. Lord Campbell had disavowed any +intention to attack the blockade since Russell, on February 15, had +officially approved it, but criticized the sending to Lyons of the +despatch itself. Russell upheld the strict legality and +effectiveness of the blockade, stated that if England sided with +the South in any way the North would appeal to a slave +insurrection--the first reference to an idea <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_272"></a>[V1:pg 272]</span> which was to +play a very important rôle with Russell and others later--and +concluded by expressing the opinion that three months would see the +end of the struggle on lines of separation, but with some form of +union between the two sovereignties<a name= +"FNanchor574"></a><a href="#Footnote_574">[574]</a>. Russell's +speech was an unneeded but emphatic negative of the pro-Southern +effort.</p> +<p>Clearly Southern sympathizers had committed an error in tactics +by pressing for a change of British policy. The rosy hopes of Mason +were dashed and the effect of the efforts of his friends was to +force the Government to a decided stand when they preferred, as the +summons of Spence to conference makes evident, to leave in abeyance +for a time any further declaration on the blockade. The refusal of +Mason and his Southern friends to wait compelled a governmental +decision and the result was Russell's instruction to Lyons of +February 15. The effect of the debate on Mason was not to cause +distrust of his English advisers, but to convince him that the +existing Government was more determined in unfriendliness than he +had supposed. Of the blockade he wrote: "... no step will be taken +by this Government to interfere with it<a name= +"FNanchor575"></a><a href="#Footnote_575">[575]</a>." He thought +the military news from America in part responsible as: "The late +reverses at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson have had an unfortunate +effect upon the minds of our friends <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_273"></a>[V1:pg 273]</span> here<a name= +"FNanchor576"></a><a href="#Footnote_576">[576]</a>...." Spence was +opposed to any further move in Parliament until some more definite +push on the Government from France should occur<a name= +"FNanchor577"></a><a href="#Footnote_577">[577]</a>. Slidell, +anxiously watching from Paris the effort in England, had now +altered his view of policy and was convinced there was no hope in +France until England gave the signal. Referring to his previous +idea that the Continent could be put in opposition to Great Britain +on the blockade he wrote:</p> +<blockquote>"I then supposed that the influence of the Emperor was +such that any view of the question which he might urge on the +British Cabinet would be adopted. I have since had reason to change +entirely this opinion. I am now satisfied that in all that concerns +us the initiative must be taken by England; that the Emperor sets +such value on her good will that he will make any sacrifice of his +own opinions and policy to retain it<a name= +"FNanchor578"></a><a href="#Footnote_578">[578]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>On March 28 he repeated this conviction to Mason<a name= +"FNanchor579"></a><a href="#Footnote_579">[579]</a>. It was a +correct judgment. Mason was thereby exalted with the knowledge that +his was to be the first place in importance in any and all +operations intended to secure European support for the Confederacy, +but he could not conceal from himself that the first steps +undertaken in that direction had been premature. From this first +failure dated his fixed belief, no matter what hopes were sometimes +expressed later, that only a change of Government in England would +help the Southern cause.</p> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_502"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor502">[502]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 52.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_503"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor503">[503]</a> See <i>ante</i>, pp. 61 and +65-66.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_504"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor504">[504]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April +15, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_505"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor505">[505]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell. Private. +April 23, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_506"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor506">[506]</a> Bernard, <i>Neutrality of Great +Britain</i>, pp. 80-1.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_507"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor507">[507]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April +27, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_508"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor508">[508]</a> Bernard, p. 229.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_509"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor509">[509]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, May 18, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_510"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor510">[510]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXIII, pp. +188-195.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_511"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor511">[511]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 24, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_512"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor512">[512]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell, July 2, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_513"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor513">[513]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. The +important correspondence on this subject is found in: F.O., France, +Vol. 1393. No. 796. Cowley to Russell, July 2, 1861. <i>Ibid.</i>, +No. 804. Cowley to Russell, July 4, 1861. <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 1377. +No. 704. Russell to Cowley, July 10, 1861. <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 1394. +No. 874. Cowley to Russell, July 17, 1861. <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 922. +Cowley to Russell, July 28, 1861. <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 923. +Confidential Cowley to Russell, July 29, 1861. Russell Papers. +Cowley to Russell, July 19, 1861. <i>Ibid.</i>, Cowley to Russell, +July 28, 1861. It is interesting that the promise of France to +support England in remonstrance against the "Southern Ports Bill" +appears, through Cowley's communications, in the printed +Parliamentary Papers. A study of these alone would lead to the +judgment that France <i>had been the first</i> to raise the +question with England and had heartily supported England. The facts +were otherwise, though Mercier, without exact instructions from +Thouvenel, aided Lyons in argument with Seward (<i>Parliamentary +Papers</i>, 1862, <i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil +War in the United States." No. 68. Lyons to Russell, July 20, +1861).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_514"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor514">[514]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States." No. 61.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_515"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor515">[515]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, July 16, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_516"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor516">[516]</a> Schleiden reported Seward as objecting to +the Bill and Sumner as "vainly opposing" it. Sumner had in fact +spoken publicly in favour of the measure. Probably he told +Schleiden that privately he was against it. Schleiden reported +Sumner as active in urging the Cabinet not to issue a Proclamation +closing the ports (Schleiden Papers. Schleiden to Senate of Bremen, +July 10 and 19, 1861). Mercier later informed Thouvenel that Sumner +declared the Bill intended for the Northern public only, to show +administration "energy," and that there was never any intention of +putting it into effect. F.O., France, 1394. No. 931. Cowley to +Russell, Aug. 1, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_517"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor517">[517]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States." Nos. 70 and 71. Thouvenel did finally consent to support +Russell's protest.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_518"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor518">[518]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 168.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_519"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor519">[519]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 756.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_520"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor520">[520]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1395. No. 967. Cowley +to Russell, Aug. 8, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_521"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor521">[521]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to +Russell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_522"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor522">[522]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States." No. 68. Lyons to Russell, July 20, 1861. Enclosed was a +copy of the six lines of Thouvenel's "instruction" to Mercier, +dated July 4, the very brevity of which shows that this was in fact +no instruction at all, but merely a comment by Thouvenel to +Mercier.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_523"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor523">[523]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, July 30, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_524"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor524">[524]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell, August 1, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_525"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor525">[525]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States." No. 81. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 12, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_526"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor526">[526]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. +Aug. 13, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_527"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor527">[527]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Russell Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_528"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor528">[528]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States." No. 83.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_529"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor529">[529]</a> Lyons thought this possible. Russell +Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. July 20, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_530"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor530">[530]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons. Private. +Aug. 16, 1861. And again he wrote the next day, "To prevent +smuggling over 3,000 miles of coast and 1,500 miles of land +frontier seems to me impossible" (<i>Ibid.</i>, Aug. 17, 1861). +Russell had received some two weeks earlier, a letter from Bunch at +Charleston, urging that England make no objection to the blockade +in order that the South might be taught the lesson that "King +Cotton," was not, after all, powerful enough to compel British +recognition and support. He stated that Southerners, angry at the +failure to secure recognition, were loudly proclaiming that they +both could and would humble and embarrass Great Britain (F.O., Am., +Vol. 781. No. 82. Bunch to Russell, July 8, 1861). Bunch wrote on +July 23 that the South planned to hold back its cotton until Great +Britain and France raised the blockade (<i>Ibid.</i>, No. 87). +Bunch was now impressed with Southern determination.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_531"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor531">[531]</a> The seven ports were Norfolk (Virginia), +Wilmington (North Carolina), Charleston (South Carolina), Savannah +(Georgia), Mobile (Alabama), New Orleans (Louisiana), and Galveston +(Texas).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_532"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor532">[532]</a> The first important reference to the +blockade after mid-August, 1861, is in an order to Bunch, conveyed +through Lyons, not to give advice to British merchants in +Charleston as to blockade runners that had gotten into port having +any "right" to go out again (F.O., Am., Vol. 757. No. 402. Russell +to Lyons, Nov. 8, 1861).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_533"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor533">[533]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States." No. 125. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 25, 1861. Received Dec. +9.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_534"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor534">[534]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 29, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_535"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor535">[535]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States." No. 127.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_536"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor536">[536]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 126. Lyons to Russell, +Nov. 29, 1861. Received Dec. 12.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_537"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor537">[537]</a> <i>Punch</i>, Feb. 1, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_538"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor538">[538]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States." No. 141.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_539"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor539">[539]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 142. Jan. 15, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_540"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor540">[540]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 143.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_541"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor541">[541]</a> James, <i>W.W. Story</i>, II, p. 111, Jan. +21, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_542"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor542">[542]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States." No. 153. Lyons to Russell, Jan. 14, 1862. Received Jan. +27.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_543"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor543">[543]</a> <i>Ibid., Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Despatch +from Lord Lyons respecting the Obstruction of the Southern +Harbours." Lyons to Russell, Feb. 11, 1862. Received Feb. +24.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_544"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor544">[544]</a> Thompson and Wainwright, <i>Confidential +Correspondence of G.V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy</i>, +1861-65, I, p. 79. Du Pont to Fox, Dec. 16, 1861. Hereafter cited +as <i>Fox, Confid. Corresp</i>. This letter shows clearly also that +the Navy had no thought of a <i>permanent</i> +obstruction.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_545"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor545">[545]</a> <i>Vide</i> Arnold, <i>Friendship's +Garland</i>.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_546"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor546">[546]</a> Thouvenel, <i>Le Secret de l'Empereur</i>, +II, 249. Thouvenel could mistakenly write to Mercier on March 13, +1862. "Nous ne voulons pas cependant imposer une forme de +gouvernement aux Mexicains..."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_547"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor547">[547]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. +Private. Jan. 17, 1862. On this same date Thouvenel, writing to +Flahault in London, hoped England would feel that she had a common +interest with France in preventing Mexico from falling under the +yoke of Americans either "unis ou secedes." (Thouvenel, <i>Le +Secret de l'Empereur</i>, II, 226).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_548"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor548">[548]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Jan. 24, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_549"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor549">[549]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, March 6, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_550"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor550">[550]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 825. No. 146. Lyons to +Russell, Feb. 28, 1862. The fact that Slidell arrived in France +just as Napoleon's plans for Mexico took clearer form has been made +the ground for assumptions that he immediately gave assurance of +Southern acquiescence and encouraged Napoleon to go forward. I have +found no good evidence of this--rather the contrary. The whole plan +was clear to Cowley by mid-January before Slidell reached Paris, +and Slidell's own correspondence shows no early push on Mexico. The +Confederate agents' correspondence, both official and private, will +be much used later in this work and here requires explanation. But +four historical works of importance deal with it extensively, (1) +Richardson, <i>Messages and Papers of the Confederacy</i>, 2 vols., +1905, purports to include the despatches of Mason and Slidell to +Richmond, but is very unsatisfactory. Important despatches are +missing, and elisions sometimes occur without indication. (2) +Virginia Mason, <i>The Public Life and Diplomatic Correspondence of +James M. Mason</i>, 1906, contains most of Mason's despatches, +including some not given by Richardson. The author also used the +<i>Mason Papers</i> (see below). (3) Callahan, <i>The Diplomatic +History of the Southern Confederacy</i>, 1901, is the most complete +and authoritative work on Southern diplomacy yet published. He used +the collection known as the "Pickett Papers," for official +despatches, supplementing these when gaps occurred by a study of +the <i>Mason Papers</i>, but his work, narrative in form, permits +no extended printing of documents. (4) L.M. Sears, <i>A Confederate +Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III</i>. (Am. Hist. Rev. Jan., +1921), is a study drawn from Slidell's private letters in the +<i>Mason Papers</i>. The Mason Papers exist in eight folios or +packages in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, and +in addition there is one bound volume of Mason's despatches to +Richmond. These contain the private correspondence of Mason and +Slidell while in Europe. Slidell's letters are originals. Mason's +letters are copies in Slidell's hand-writing, made apparently at +Mason's request and sent to him in May, 1865. A complete typed copy +of this correspondence was taken by me in 1913, but this has not +hitherto been used save in a manuscript Master's degree thesis by +Walter M. Case, "James M. Mason, Confederate Diplomat," Stanford +University, 1915, and for a few citations by C.F. Adams, <i>A +Crisis in Downing Street</i> (Mass. Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>, +May, 1914). The Mason Papers also contain many letters from Mason's +English friends, Spence, Lindsay, Gregory and others.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_551"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor551">[551]</a> Russell Papers. To Russell. Lyons thought +France also included in these demonstrations.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_552"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor552">[552]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, 113. +Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Feb. 14, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_553"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor553">[553]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 115. To his son, Feb. 21, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_554"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor554">[554]</a> Lyons Papers. March 1, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_555"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor555">[555]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, 123. +To his son.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_556"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor556">[556]</a> Palmerston MS. Feb. 9, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_557"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor557">[557]</a> Bernard, p. 245. The author agrees with +Russell but adds that Great Britain, in the early stages of the +blockade, was indulgent to the North, and rightly so considering +the difficulties of instituting it.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_558"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor558">[558]</a> He wrote to Mason on February 10, 1863, +that he saw "no reason to qualify the language employed in my +despatch to Lord Lyons of the 15th of February last." (Bernard, p. +293).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_559"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor559">[559]</a> Richardson, <i>Messages and Papers of the +Confederacy</i>, II, p. 155. Yancey and Mann to Hunter, Jan. 27, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_560"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor560">[560]</a> Mason, <i>Mason</i>, pp. 257-8, Jan. 30, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_561"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor561">[561]</a> Mason Papers. Feb. 5, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_562"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor562">[562]</a> Mann sent this "confidential memorandum" +to Jefferson Davis, Feb. 1, 1862 (Richardson, II, 160). There is no +indication of how he obtained it. It was a fake pure and simple. To +his astonishment Slidell soon learned from Thouvenel that France +knew nothing of such a memorandum. It was probably sold to Mann by +some enterprising "Southern friend" in need of money.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_563"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor563">[563]</a> Mason, <i>Mason</i>, p. 258. Mason to +Hunter, Feb. 7, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_564"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor564">[564]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 260-62. Mason's despatch +No. 4. Feb. 22, 1862. (This despatch is not given by Richardson.) +Slidell was more warmly received by Thouvenel. He followed the same +line of argument and apparently made a favourable impression. +Cowley reported Thouvenel, after the interview, as expressing +himself as "hoping that in two or three months matters would have +reached such a crisis in America that both parties would be willing +to accept a Mediation...."<br> +<br> +(F.O., France., Vol. 1432. No. 132. Confidential. Cowley to +Russell, Feb. 10, 1862.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_565"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor565">[565]</a> Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Feb. 13, +1862. This was that James Spence, author of <i>The American +Union</i>, a work strongly espousing the Southern cause. This book +was not only widely read in England but portions of it were +translated into other languages for use on the Continent. Spence +was a manufacturer and trader and also operated in the Liverpool +Cotton Exchange. He made a strong impression on Mason, was early +active in planning and administering Southern cotton loans in +England, and was in constant touch with Mason. By Slidell he was +much less favourably regarded and the impression created by his +frequent letters to Mason is that of a man of second-rate calibre +elated by the prominent part he seemed to be playing in what he +took to be the birth of a new State.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_566"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor566">[566]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Spence to Mason, Feb. 20, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_567"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor567">[567]</a> Mason, <i>Mason p</i>. 258.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_568"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor568">[568]</a> Slidell in France at first took the tack +of urging that Continental interests and British interests in the +blockade were "directly antagonistic," basing his argument on +England's forward look as a sea power (Slidell to Hunter, Feb. 26, +1862. Richardson, II, p. 186).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_569"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor569">[569]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Papers relating to the +Blockade."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_570"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor570">[570]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXV, pp. 1158-1230, +and pp. 1233-43.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_571"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor571">[571]</a> Mason's authenticated statistics, +unfortunately for his cause, only came down to Oct. 31, 1861, a +fact which might imply that after that date the blockade was +rapidly becoming effective and which certainly did indicate that it +was at least sufficiently effective to prevent regular and frequent +communications between the government at Richmond and its agents +abroad. Did Russell have this in mind when he promptly incorporated +Mason's figures in the papers presented to Parliament? These +figures showed that according to reports from four Southern ports, +sixty vessels had entered and cleared between April 29 and October +31, 1861; unauthenticated statistics extending to the date December +31, presented by Mason of vessels arrived at and departing from +Cuban ports showed forty-eight vessels, each way engaged in +blockade running. Seven of these were listed as "captured." Those +reaching Cuba were described as twenty-six British, 14 Confederate, +3 Spanish, 3 American and 2 Mexican, but in none of these +statistics were the names of the vessels given, for obvious +reasons, in the printed paper though apparently included in the +list submitted by Mason. These figures did in fact but reveal a +situation existing even after 1861. The American blockading fleets +had to be created from all sorts of available material and were +slow in getting under way. Regular ships of the old Navy could not +enforce it being too few in number, and also, at first, directing +their efforts to the capture of shore positions which would render +a large blockading squadron unnecessary. This proved an abortive +effort and it was not until 1862 that the development of a large +fleet of blockaders was seriously undertaken. (See <i>Fox, Confid. +Corresp.</i>, I, pp. 110, 115, 119 and especially 122, which, May +31, 1862, pays tribute to the energy with which the South for +"thirteen long months" had defended its important port shore +lines.) If Gregory had been able to quote a report by Bunch from +Charleston of April 5, 1862, he would have had a strong argument. +"The blockade runners are doing a great business.... Everything is +brought in in abundance. Not a day passes without an arrival or a +departure. The Richmond Government sent about a month ago an order +to Nassau for Medicines, Quinine, etc. It went from Nassau to New +York, was executed there, came back to Nassau, thence here, and was +on its way to Richmond in 21 days from the date of the order. +Nearly all the trade is under the British flag. The vessels are all +changed in Nassau and Havana. Passengers come and go freely and no +one seems to think that there is the slightest risk--which, indeed, +there is not." (Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons, April 5, +1862).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_572"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor572">[572]</a> I have nowhere found any such statement by +Seward. Gregory's reference is to a note from Seward to Lyons of +May 27, 1861, printed in the Blockade Papers. This merely holds +that temporary absence of blockading ships does not impair the +blockade nor render "necessary a new notice of its +existence."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_573"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor573">[573]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, pp. +119-20. Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., March 15, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_574"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor574">[574]</a> This "three months" statement returned to +plague Russell later, British merchants complaining that upon it +they had based plans in the belief that the Government had +something definite in view. Spence's reference to this "three +months" idea, after his conferences in London, would indicate that +Russell was merely indulging in a generalization due to the +expected financial collapse of the North. The Russian Ambassador in +London gave a different interpretation. He wrote that the Northern +victories in the West had caused Great Britain to think the time +near when the "border states," now tied to the Union by these +victories, would lead in a pacification on lines of separation from +the Southern slave states. "It is in this sense, and no other that +Russell's 'three months' speech in the Lords is to be taken." +(Brunow to F.O., March 3-15, 1862. No. 33). Brunow does not so +state, but his despatch sounds as if this were the result of a talk +with Russell. If so, it would indicate an attempt to interpret +Lincoln's "border state policy" in a sense that would appear +reasonable in the British view that there could be no real hope at +Washington of restoring the Union.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_575"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor575">[575]</a> Mason, <i>Mason</i>, p. 264. Despatch No. +6. March 11, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_576"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor576">[576]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 266. Fort Henry was taken +by Grant on February 6 and Fort Donelson on the 15th. The capture +of these two places gave an opening for the advance of the Western +army southwards into Tennessee and Mississippi.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_577"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor577">[577]</a> Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, March 18, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_578"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor578">[578]</a> Richardson, II, 207. Slidell to Hunter, +March 26, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_579"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor579">[579]</a> Mason Papers.</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274"></a>[V1:pg 274]</span> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX"></a>CHAPTER IX</h2> +<h3>ENTER MR. LINDSAY</h3> +<br> +<p>The friendly atmosphere created by the lifting of the +threatening <i>Trent</i> episode, appears to have made Secretary +Seward believe that the moment was opportune for a renewal of +pressure on Great Britain and France for the recall of their +Proclamations of Neutrality. Seizing upon the victories of Grant at +Forts Henry and Donelson, he wrote to Adams on February 28 +explaining that as a result the United States, now having access to +the interior districts of Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas, "had +determined to permit the restoration of trade upon our inland ways +and waters" under certain limitations, and that if this experiment +succeeded similar measures would be applied "to the country on the +sea-coast, which would be some alleviation of the rigour of the +blockade." He added that these "concessions" to foreign nations +would "go much further and faster" if those nations would withdraw +their "belligerent privileges heretofore so unnecessarily conceded, +as we conceive, to the insurgents<a name="FNanchor580"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_580">[580]</a>." This was large talk for a relatively +unchanged military situation. Grant had as yet but forced open the +door in the West and was still far from having "access to the +interior districts" of the states named. Lyons, being shown a copy +of this despatch to Adams, commented to Russell that while it might +be said the position and the spirit of the Northern armies were +greatly improved and notable successes probable, it could not be +maintained that hostilities were "so near <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_275"></a>[V1:pg 275]</span> their +conclusion or are carried on upon so small a scale as to disqualify +either party for the title of Belligerents<a name= +"FNanchor581"></a><a href="#Footnote_581">[581]</a>." Lyons and +Mercier were agreed that this was no time for the withdrawal of +belligerent rights to the South, and when the hint was received +that the purpose of making such a request was in Seward's mind, the +news quite took Thouvenel's breath away<a name= +"FNanchor582"></a><a href="#Footnote_582">[582]</a>. As yet, +however, Seward did no more than hint and Adams was quick to advise +that the moment had not yet come "when such a proceeding might seem +to me likely to be of use<a name="FNanchor583"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_583">[583]</a>."</p> +<p>Just at this time Seward was engaged in forwarding a measure no +doubt intended to secure British anti-slavery sympathy for the +North, yet also truly indicative of a Northern temper toward the +South and its "domestic institution." This was the negotiation of a +Slave-Trade treaty with Great Britain, by which America joined, at +last, the nations agreeing to unite their efforts in suppression of +the African Slave Trade. The treaty was signed by Seward and Lyons +at Washington on April 7. On the next day Seward wrote to Adams +that had such a treaty been ratified "in 1808, there would now have +been no sedition here, and no disagreement between the United +States and foreign nations<a name="FNanchor584"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_584">[584]</a>," a melancholy reflection intended to +suggest that the South alone had been responsible for the long +delay of American participation in a world humanitarian movement. +But the real purpose of the treaty, Lyons thought, was "to save the +credit of the President with the Party which elected him if he +should make concessions to the South, with a view of reconstructing +the Union<a name="FNanchor585"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_585">[585]</a>"--an erroneous view evincing a +misconception of <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_276"></a>[V1:pg 276]</span> the intensity of both Northern +and Southern feeling if regarded from our present knowledge, but a +view natural enough to the foreign observer at the moment. Lyons, +in this letter, correctly stated the rising determination of the +North to restore the Union, but underestimated the rapid growth of +an equal determination against a restoration with slavery. The real +motive for Seward's eagerness to sign the Slave Trade treaty was +the thought of its influence on foreign, not domestic, affairs. +Lyons, being confident that Russell would approve, had taken "the +risk of going a little faster" than his instructions had +indicated<a name="FNanchor586"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_586">[586]</a>.</p> +<p>In this same letter Lyons dwelt upon the Northern elation over +recent military successes. The campaign in the West had been +followed in the East by a great effort under McClellan to advance +on Richmond up the peninsula of the James river and using +Chesapeake Bay as a means of water transportation and supply. This +campaign had been threatened by the appearance of the iron-clad ram +<i>Merrimac</i> and her attack on the wooden naval vessels +operating in support of McClellan, but on March 9 the +<i>Monitor</i>, a slow-moving floating iron-clad fortress, drove +the <i>Merrimac</i> from her helpless prey, and removed the +Southern threat to McClellan's communications. More than any other +one battle of the Civil War the duel between the <i>Merrimac</i> +and the <i>Monitor</i> struck the imagination of the British +people, and justly so because of its significance in relation to +the power of the British Navy. It "has been the main talk of the +town," wrote Adams, "ever since the news came, in Parliament, in +the clubs, in the city, among the military and naval people. The +impression is that it dates the commencement of a new era in +warfare, and that Great Britain must consent to begin over +again<a name="FNanchor587"></a><a href="#Footnote_587">[587]</a>." +The victory of the <i>Monitor</i> was relatively unimportant in +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277"></a>[V1:pg 277]</span> +British eyes, but a fight between two completely armoured ships, +and especially the ease with which the <i>Merrimac</i> had +vanquished wooden ships on the day previous, were cause of anxious +consideration for the future. Russell was more concerned over the +immediate lessons of the battle. "Only think," he wrote, "of our +position if in case of the Yankees turning upon us they should by +means of iron ships renew the triumphs they achieved in 1812-13 by +means of superior size and weight of metal<a name= +"FNanchor588"></a><a href="#Footnote_588">[588]</a>."</p> +<p>This, however, was but early and hasty speculation, and while +American ingenuity and experiment in naval warfare had, indeed, +sounded the death-knell of wooden ships of war, no great change in +the character of navies was immediately possible. Moreover British +shipbuilders could surely keep pace in iron-clad construction with +America or any other nation. The success of the <i>Monitor</i> was +soon regarded by the British Government as important mainly as +indicative of a new energy in the North promising further and more +important successes on land. The Government hoped for such Northern +success not because of any belief that these would go to the extent +of forcing the South into submission, for they were still, and for +a long time to come, obsessed with the conviction that Southern +independence must ultimately be achieved. The idea was, rather, +that the North, having vindicated its fighting ability and +realizing that the South, even though losing battle after battle, +was stubborn in the will to independence, would reach the +conclusion that the game was not worth the price and would consent +to separation. Russell wrote in this vein to Lyons, even though he +thought that the "morale of the Southern army seems to be ruined +for the time<a name="FNanchor589"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_589">[589]</a>." He believed that the end of the war +would be hastened by Northern victories, and he therefore rejoiced +in them.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278"></a>[V1:pg 278]</span> +<p>Of somewhat like opinion up to the end of March, 1862, Lyons, in +April, began to doubt his previous analysis of Northern temper and +to write warnings that the end was not near. Grant's hard-won +victory in the West at Shiloh, April 6-7, the first great pitched +battle of the war, called out such a flood of Northern expressions +of determination to drive the war to the bitter end as to startle +Lyons and cause him, in a remarkably clear letter of survey, to +recast his opinions. He wrote:</p> +<blockquote>"The general opinion is that the Campaign of this +Spring will clear up most of the doubts as to the result of the +War. If the Military successes of the North continue, the +determination of the South, will (it is asserted) be at last really +put to the test. If notwithstanding great Military reverses, the +loss of the Border States, and the occupation of the most important +points on the Coast, the Southern men hold out, if they destroy as +they threaten to do, their cotton, tobacco and all other property +which cannot be removed and then retire into the interior with +their families and slaves, the Northern Conquests may prove to be +but barren. The climate may be a fatal enemy to the Federal Armies. +The Northern people may be unable or unwilling to continue the +enormous expenditure. They may prefer Separation to protracting the +War indefinitely. I confess, however, that I fear that a +protraction of the War during another year or longer, is a not less +probable result of the present posture of affairs, than either the +immediate subjugation of the South or the immediate recognition of +its independence<a name="FNanchor590"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_590">[590]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>This itemization of Southern methods of resistance was in line +with Confederate threats at a moment when the sky looked black. +There was indeed much Southern talk of "retiring" into a +hypothetical defensible interior which impressed Englishmen, but +had no foundation in geographical fact. Meanwhile British attention +was eagerly fixed on the Northern advance, and it was at least +generally hoped <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279"></a>[V1:pg +279]</span> that the projected attack on New Orleans and +McClellan's advance up the peninsula toward Richmond would bring to +a more definite status the conflict in America. Extreme Southern +sympathizers scouted the possibility of any conclusive Northern +success, ignoring, because ignorant, the importance of Grant's +western campaign. They "were quite struck aback" by the news of the +capture of New Orleans, April 25. "It took them three days to make +up their minds to believe it<a name="FNanchor591"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_591">[591]</a>," but even the capture of this the most +important commercial city of the South was not regarded as of great +importance in view of the eastern effort toward Richmond.</p> +<p>News of the operations in the peninsula was as slow in reaching +England as was McClellan's slow and cautious advance. It was during +this advance and previous to the capture of New Orleans that two +remarkable adventures toward a solution in America were made, +apparently wholly on individual initiative, by a Frenchman in +America and an Englishman in France. Mercier at Washington and +Lindsay at Paris conceived, quite independently, that the time had +come for projects of foreign mediation.</p> +<p>French opinion, like that expressed in England, appears to have +been that the Northern successes in the spring of 1862 might result +in such a rehabilitation of Northern self-esteem that suggestions +of now recognizing the <i>facts</i> of the situation and +acknowledging the independence of the South would not be +unfavourably received. In this sense Thouvenel wrote to Mercier, +privately, on March 13, but was careful to state that the word +"mediation" ought not to be uttered. His letter dilated, also, on +French manufacturing difficulties at home due to the lack of +cotton<a name="FNanchor592"></a><a href="#Footnote_592">[592]</a>. +This was in no way an instruction to Mercier, but the ideas +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280"></a>[V1:pg 280]</span> +expressed were broached by him in a conversation with Seward, only +to be met with such positive assertions of intention and ability +soon to recover the South as somewhat to stagger the French +Minister. He remarked, according to his report to Thouvenel, that +he wished it were possible to visit Richmond and assure himself +that there also they recognized the truth of Seward's statements, +upon which the latter at once offered to further such a trip. +Mercier asserted to Thouvenel that he was taken by surprise, having +foreseen no such eager acquiescence in a suggestion made <i>without +previous thought</i>, but that on consideration he returned to +Seward and accepted the proposal, outlining the substance of what +he intended to say at Richmond. He should there make clear that the +anxiety of France was above all directed toward peace as essential +to French commercial interests; that France had always regarded the +separation of North and South with regret; that the North was +evidently determined in its will to restore the Union; and, in +repetition, that France wished to aid in any way possible the early +cessation of war. Seward, wrote Mercier, told him to add that he, +personally, would welcome "the presence in the Senate" of any +persons whom the South wished to elect<a name= +"FNanchor593"></a><a href="#Footnote_593">[593]</a>.</p> +<p>Mercier, writes Bancroft, "from the first had been an impatient +sympathizer with the Confederacy, and he was quite devoid of the +balance and good judgment that characterized Lord Lyons." "Quite +unnecessarily, Seward <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_281"></a>[V1:pg 281]</span> helped him to make the +trip<a name="FNanchor594"></a><a href="#Footnote_594">[594]</a>." A +circumstance apparently not known to Bancroft was Mercier's +consultation with Lyons, before departure, in which were revealed +an initiative of the adventure, and a proposed representation to +the authorities in Richmond materially different from the report +made by Mercier to Thouvenel. These merit expanded treatment as new +light on a curious episode and especially as revealing the British +policy of the moment, represented in the person of the British +Minister in Washington<a name="FNanchor595"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_595">[595]</a>.</p> +<p>On April 10 Mercier came to Lyons, told him that he was about to +set out for Richmond and that he had "been for some little time +thinking of making this journey." He told of <i>making the +suggestion to Seward</i>, and that this "rather to his surprise" +had been "eagerly" taken up.</p> +<blockquote>"Monsieur Mercier observed that the object of vital +importance to France, and to England also, as he supposed, was to +put an end, as soon as possible, to the blockade, and generally to +a state of things which caused so grievous an interruption of the +trade between Europe and this country. It was, he said, possible +that he might hasten the attainment of this object by conferring +personally with the Secession leaders. He should frankly tell them +that to all appearances their cause was desperate; that their +Armies were beaten in all quarters; and that the time had arrived +when they ought to come to some arrangement, which would put an end +to a state of affairs ruinous to themselves and intolerable to +Europe. It was useless to expect any countenance from the European +Powers. Those Powers could but act on their avowed principles. They +would recognize any people which <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_282"></a>[V1:pg 282]</span> established its independence, but +they could not encourage the prolongation of a fruitless +struggle.<br> +<br> +"Monsieur Mercier thought that if the Confederates were very much +discouraged by their recent reverses, such language from the +Minister of a great European Power might be a knock-down blow +('Coup d'assommoir' was the expression he used) to them. It might +induce them to come to terms with the North. At all events it might +lead to an Armistice, under which trade might be immediately +resumed. He had (he told me) mentioned to Mr. Seward his notion of +using this language, and had added that of course as a Minister +accredited to the United States, and visiting Richmond with the +consent of the United States Government, he could not speak to the +Southern men of any other terms for ending the War than a return to +the Union.<br> +<br> +"Monsieur Mercier proceeded to say that Mr. Seward entirely +approved of the language he thus proposed to hold, and had +authorized him to say to the Southern leaders, not of course from +the United States Government, but from him Mr. Seward, personally, +that they had no spirit of vengeance to apprehend, that they would +be cordially welcomed back to their Seats in the Senate, and to +their due share of political influence. Mr. Seward added that he +had not said so much to any other person, but that he would tell +Monsieur Mercier that he was willing to risk his own political +station and reputation in pursuing a conciliatory course towards +the South, that he was ready to make this his policy and to stand +or fall by it."</blockquote> +<p>This was certainly sufficiently strong language to have pleased +the American Secretary of State, and if actually used at Richmond +to have constituted Mercier a valuable Northern agent. It cannot be +regarded as at all in harmony with Mercier's previous opinions, nor +as expressive of Thouvenel's views. Lyons was careful to refrain +from much comment on the matter of Mercier's proposed +representations at Richmond. He was more concerned that the trip +was to be made at all; was in fact much opposed to it, fearing that +it would appear like a break in that unity of French-British +attitude which was so desirable. Nor was <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_283"></a>[V1:pg 283]</span> he without +suspicion of a hidden French purpose to secure some special and +separate advantages in the way of prospective commercial relations +with the South. Mercier told Lyons that he knew he could not ask +Lyons to accompany him because of American "extreme susceptibility" +to any interference by Great Britain, but he thought of taking +Stoeckl, the Russian Minister, and that Stoeckl was "pleased with +the idea." Lyons frankly replied that he was glad to be relieved of +the necessity of declining to go and was sorry Mercier was +determined to proceed since this certainly looked like a break in +"joint policy," and he objected positively on the same ground to +Stoeckl's going<a name="FNanchor596"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_596">[596]</a>. Mercier yielded the latter point, but +argued that by informing Seward of his consultation with Lyons, +which he proposed doing, the former objection would be obviated. +Finding that Mercier "was bent on going," Lyons thought it best not +to object too much and confined his efforts to driving home the +idea that no opening should be given for a "separate agreement" +with the South.</p> +<blockquote>"I therefore entered with him into the details of his +plans, and made some suggestions as to his language and conduct. I +said that one delusion which he might find it desirable to remove +from the minds of men in the South, was that it would be possible +to inveigle France or any other great European Power into an +exclusive Alliance with them. I had reason to believe that some of +them imagine that this might be effected by an offer of great +commercial privileges to one Power, to the exclusion of others. I +hardly supposed that Mr. Jefferson Davis himself, or men of his +stamp could entertain so foolish a notion, but still it might be +well to eradicate it from any mind in which it had found +place<a name="FNanchor597"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_597">[597]</a>."</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284"></a>[V1:pg 284]</span> +<p>Lyons saw Mercier "two or three times" between the tenth and +fourteenth and on the twelfth spoke to Seward about the trip, +"without saying anything to lead him to suppose that I had any +objection to it." This was intended to preserve the impression of +close harmony with France, and Lyons wrote, "I consider that the +result of my communications with M. Mercier entitles him to say +that he makes his journey to Richmond with my acquiescence<a name= +"FNanchor598"></a><a href="#Footnote_598">[598]</a>." Nevertheless +he both believed, and declared to Mercier, that the views expressed +on Southern weakening of determination were wholly erroneous, and +that neither North nor South was ready for any efforts, still less +mediation, looking toward peace. He prophesied failure of Mercier's +avowed hopes. His prophecy proved well founded. On April 28 Lyons +reported Mercier's account to him of the results of the journey. +Mercier returned to Washington on April 24, reported at once to +Seward the results of his trip, and on the same day called on +Lyons. Having conversed with Benjamin, the new Confederate +Secretary of State, he was now wholly convinced of the settled +determination of the South to maintain its independence, even under +extreme reverses. Upon enquiry by Lyons whether the South expected +European assistance, Mercier "replied that the Confederate leaders +professed to have abandoned all hope of succour from Europe," and +that confident in their own power they "desired no aid." Cautiously +adverting to his suspicion that Mercier's trip might have had in +view French commercial advantage, Lyons asked whether France had +received any proposals of benefit in return for recognition. +Mercier answered with a simple negative. He then further developed +the interview with Benjamin<a name="FNanchor599"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_599">[599]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285"></a>[V1:pg 285]</span> +<blockquote>"He said that he had spoken while at Richmond as a +friend of the Union, and a friend of all parties, but that the +particular language which he had intended to hold was entirely +inapplicable to the state of mind in which he found the +Confederates one and all. It was idle to tell them that they were +worsted on all sides; that the time was come for making terms with +the North. What he had said to them about the recognition of their +Independence was that the principal inducement to France to +recognize it would be a hope that her doing so would have a great +moral effect towards hastening peace; that at this moment it would +certainly not have any such effect; that it would embroil France +with the United States, and that would be all<a name= +"FNanchor600"></a><a href="#Footnote_600">[600]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Thus none of the strong representations intended to be made by +Mercier to convince the South of the uselessness of further +resistance had, in fact, been made. In his report to Thouvenel, +Mercier stated that he had approached Benjamin with the simple +declaration "that the purpose of my journey was merely to assure +myself, for myself, of the true condition of things; and that I +called to beg him to aid me in attaining it." Since the proposed +strong representations were not reported to Thouvenel, either, in +the explanation given of the initiation of the trip, the doubt must +be entertained that Mercier ever intended to make them. They bear +the appearance of arguments to Seward--and in some degree also to +Lyons--made to secure acquiescence in his plan. The report to +Thouvenel omits also any reference to expressions, as narrated to +Lyons, about recognition of the Confederacy, or a "principal +inducement" thereto<a name="FNanchor601"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_601">[601]</a>. Mercier now declared to Lyons his own +views on recognition:</p> +<blockquote>"He was himself more than ever convinced that the +restoration of the old Union was impossible. He believed +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286"></a>[V1:pg 286]</span> +that, if the Powers of Europe exercised no influence, the War would +last for years. He conceived that the Independence of the South +must be recognized sooner or later; and in his opinion the +Governments of Europe should be on the watch for a favourable +opportunity of doing this in such a manner as to end the War. The +present opportunity would however, he thought, be particularly +unfavourable."</blockquote> +<p>Lyons writes:</p> +<blockquote>"I did not express any opinion as to the policy to be +eventually pursued by France or England, but I told Monsieur +Mercier that I entirely agreed with him in thinking that there was +nothing to do at the present moment but to watch +events."</blockquote> +<p>On the day following this interview, Lyons spoke to Seward of +Mercier's trip and was given a very different view of the situation +at Richmond. Seward said:</p> +<blockquote>"He himself was quite convinced, from Monsieur +Mercier's account of what had passed, that the Confederates were +about to make a last effort, that their last resources were brought +into play; that their last Armies were in the field. If they were +now defeated, they would accept the terms which would be offered +them. Their talking of retiring into the interior was idle. If the +United States were undisputed masters of the Border States and the +Sea Coast, there would be no occasion for any more fighting. Those +who chose to retire into the interior were welcome to do so, and to +stay there till they were tired."</blockquote> +<p>"The truth," wrote Lyons, "as to the state of feeling in the +South probably lies somewhere between Mr. Seward's views and those +of Monsieur Mercier." Lyons concluded his report of the whole +matter:</p> +<blockquote>"The result of Monsieur Mercier's journey has been to +bring him back precisely to the point at which he was three months +ago. The Federal successes which occurred afterwards had somewhat +shaken his conviction in the ultimate success of the South, and +consequently his opinions as to <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_287"></a>[V1:pg 287]</span> the policy to be adopted by +France. The sentiments he now expresses are exactly those which he +expressed at the beginning of the year<a name= +"FNanchor602"></a><a href="#Footnote_602">[602]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>In other words, Mercier was now again pressing for early +recognition of the South at the first favourable moment. On Lyons +the effect of the adventure to Richmond was just the reverse of +this; and on Russell also its influence was to cause some doubt of +Southern success. Appended to Lyons' report stands Russell's +initialled comment:</p> +<blockquote>"It is desirable to know what is the Interior to which +the Southern Confederates propose if beaten to retire. If in Arms +they will be pursued, if not in Arms their discontent will cause +but little embarrassment to their Conquerors. But can the country +be held permanently by the U.S. Armies if the Confederates have +small bodies in Arms resisting the authority of the U.S. +Congress?<br> +<br> +Any facts shewing the strength or weakness of the Union feeling in +the South will be of great value in forming a judgment on the final +issue."</blockquote> +<p>Seward, in conversation with Lyons, had said that to avoid +public misconceptions a newspaper statement would be prepared on +Mercier's trip. This appeared May 6, in the New York <i>Times</i>, +the paper more closely Seward's "organ" than any other throughout +the war, representing Mercier as having gone to Richmond by order +of Napoleon and with Lincoln's approval to urge the Confederates to +surrender and to encourage them to expect favourable terms. Lyons +commented on this article that the language attributed to Mercier +was "not very unlike that which he intended to hold," but that in +fact he had not used it<a name="FNanchor603"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_603">[603]</a>. Nor had Napoleon ordered the move. +Indeed everyone in London and Paris was much astonished, and many +were <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288"></a>[V1:pg +288]</span> the speculations as to the meaning of Mercier's unusual +procedure. Russell was puzzled, writing "Que diable allait il faire +dans cette galére<a name="FNanchor604"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_604">[604]</a>?" and Cowley, at Paris, could give no +light, being assured by Thouvenel on first rumours of Mercier's +trip to Richmond that "he had not a notion that this could be +true<a name="FNanchor605"></a><a href="#Footnote_605">[605]</a>." +May 1, Cowley wrote, "The whole thing is inexplicable unless the +Emperor is at the bottom of it, which Thouvenel thinks is not the +case<a name="FNanchor606"></a><a href="#Footnote_606">[606]</a>." +The next day Thouvenel, having consulted Napoleon, was assured by +the latter that "he could not account for Monsieur Mercier's +conduct, and that he greatly regretted it," being especially +disturbed by a seeming break in the previous "complete harmony with +the British Representative" at Washington<a name= +"FNanchor607"></a><a href="#Footnote_607">[607]</a>. This was +reassuring to Russell, yet there is no question that Mercier's +conduct long left a certain suspicion in British official circles. +On May 2, also, Thouvenel wrote to Flahault in London of the +Emperor's displeasure, evidently with the intention that this +should be conveyed to Russell<a name="FNanchor608"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_608">[608]</a>.</p> +<p>Naturally the persons most excited were the two Confederate +agents in Europe. At first they believed Mercier must have had +secret orders from Napoleon, and were delighted; then on denials +made to Slidell by Thouvenel they feared Mercier was acting in an +unfavourable sense as Seward's agent. Later they returned to the +theory of Napoleon's private manipulation, and being confident of +his friendship were content to wait events<a name= +"FNanchor609"></a><a href="#Footnote_609">[609]</a>. Slidell had +just received assurance from M. Billault, through whom most of his +information came, "that the Emperor and all <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_289"></a>[V1:pg 289]</span> the Ministers +are favourable to our cause, have been so for the last year, and +are now quite as warmly so as they have ever been. M. Thouvenel is +of course excepted, but then he has no hostility<a name= +"FNanchor610"></a><a href="#Footnote_610">[610]</a>." But a greater +source of Southern hope at this juncture was another "diplomatic +adventure," though by no accredited diplomat, which antedated +Mercier's trip to Richmond and which still agitated not only the +Confederate agents, but the British Ministry as well.</p> +<p>This was the appearance of the British Member of Parliament, +Lindsay, in the rôle of self-constituted Southern emissary to +Napoleon. Lindsay, as one of the principal ship-owners in England, +had long been an earnest advocate of more free commercial +intercourse between nations, supporting in general the principles +of Cobden and Bright, and being a warm personal friend of the +latter, though disagreeing with him on the American Civil War. He +had been in some sense a minor expert consulted by both French and +British Governments in the preparation of the commercial treaty of +1860, so that when on April 9 he presented himself to Cowley asking +that an audience with the Emperor be procured for him to talk over +some needed alterations in the Navigation Laws, the request seemed +reasonable, and the interview was arranged for April 11. On the +twelfth Lindsay reported to Cowley that the burden of Napoleon's +conversation, much to his surprise, was on American affairs<a name= +"FNanchor611"></a><a href="#Footnote_611">[611]</a>.</p> +<p>The Emperor, said Lindsay, expressed the conviction <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_290"></a>[V1:pg 290]</span> that re-union +between North and South was an impossibility, and declared that he +was ready to recognize the South "if Great Britain would set him +the example." More than once he had expressed these ideas to +England, but "they had not been attended to" and he should not try +again. He continued:</p> +<blockquote>"... that France ought not to interfere in the internal +affairs of the United States, but that the United States ought +equally to abstain from all interference in the internal concerns +of France; and that His Majesty considered that the hindrance +placed by the Northern States upon the exportation of cotton from +the South was not justifiable, and was tantamount to interference +with the legal commerce of France."</blockquote> +<p>He also "denied the efficiency of the blockade so established. +He had made observations in this sense to Her Majesty's Government, +but they had not been replied to." Then "His Majesty asked what +were the opinions of Her Majesty's Govt.; adding that if Her +Majesty's Govt. agreed with him as to the inefficiency of the +blockade, he was ready to send ships of war to co-operate with +others of Her Majesty to keep the Southern ports open." Finally +Napoleon requested Lindsay to see Cowley and find out what he +thought of these ideas.</p> +<p>Cowley told Lindsay he did not know of any "offer" whatever +having been made by France to England, that his (Cowley's) opinion +was "that it might be true that the North and the South would never +re-unite, but that it was not yet proved; that the efficiency of +the blockade was a legal and international question, and that upon +the whole it had been considered by Her Majesty's Govt. as +efficient, though doubtless many ships had been enabled to run it"; +and "that at all events there could not be a more inopportune +moment for mooting the question both of the recognition of the +South and of the efficiency of the blockade. <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_291"></a>[V1:pg 291]</span> The time was +gone by when such measures could, if ever, have been taken--for +every mail brought news of expeditions from the North acting with +success upon the South; and every day added to the efficiency of +the blockade"; and "that I did not think therefore that Her +Majesty's Govt. would consent to send a squadron to act as the +Emperor had indicated, but that I could only give a personal +opinion, which might be corrected if I was in error by Mr. Lindsay +himself seeing Lord Russell."</p> +<p>On April 13th a second interview took place between Lindsay and +Napoleon, of which Lindsay reported that having conveyed to +Napoleon Cowley's denial of any offer made to England, as well as a +contrary view of the situation, Napoleon:</p> +<blockquote>"... repeated the statement that two long despatches +with his opinion had been written to M. de Flahault, which had not +been attended to by Her Majesty's Government, and he expressed a +desire that Mr. Lindsay should return to London, lay His Majesty's +views before Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell, and bring their +answers direct to him as quickly as possible, His Majesty observing +that these matters were better arranged by private than official +hands.... Mr. Lindsay said that he had promised the Emperor to be +back in Paris on Thursday morning."</blockquote> +<p>In his letter to Russell, Cowley called all this a "nasty +intrigue." Cowley had asked Thouvenel for enlightenment, and +Thouvenel had denied all knowledge and declared that certainly no +such proposals as Lindsay reported the Emperor to have mentioned +had ever been sent to England. Cowley wrote:</p> +<blockquote>"My own conviction is, from Lindsay's conversations +with me, which are full of hesitations, and I fear much falsehood +hidden under apparent candour, that he has told the Emperor his own +views, and that those views are supported by the majority of the +people of England, and by the present Opposition in Parliament, who +would denounce <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292"></a>[V1:pg +292]</span> the blockade if in power; that he has found a willing +listener in the Emperor, who would gladly obtain cotton by any +means; and I am much mistaken if Lindsay will not attempt to make +political capital of his interviews with the Emperor with the +Opposition, and that you may hear of it in Parliament. I lose no +time therefore, in writing to you as Lindsay goes over to-night, +and will probably endeavour to see you and Lord Palmerston as soon +as possible<a name="FNanchor612"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_612">[612]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The close touch between Lindsay and the Southern agents is shown +by his conveyance to Slidell of the good news. Slidell was +jubilant, writing to Mason:</p> +<blockquote>"Mr. Lindsay has had a long interview with the Emperor +who is prepared to act at once decidedly in our favour; he has +always been ready to do so and has twice made representations to +England, but has received evasive responses. He has now for the +third time given them but in a more decided tone. Mr. Lindsay will +give you all the particulars. This is entirely confidential but you +can say to Lord Campbell, Mr. Gregory, etc., that I now have +positive and <i>authoritative</i> evidence that France now waits +the assent of England for recognition and other more cogent +measures<a name="FNanchor613"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_613">[613]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Two days later Slidell made a report to Benjamin, which was in +substance very similar to that given by Lindsay to Cowley, though +more highly coloured as favourable to the South, but he added an +important feature which, as has been seen, was suspected by Cowley, +but which had not been stated to him. Napoleon had asked Lindsay to +see Derby and Disraeli, the leaders of the parliamentary +opposition, and inform them of his views--a suggestion which if +known to the British Ministry as coming from Napoleon could not +fail to arouse resentment. Slidell even believed that, failing +British participation, the Emperor might act separately in +recognition of the South<a name="FNanchor614"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_614">[614]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293"></a>[V1:pg 293]</span> +<p>April 15, Cowley, having received, privately, Russell's approval +of the language used to Lindsay and believing that Thouvenel was +about to write to Flahault on the interviews, felt it "necessary to +bring them also on my part officially to your [Russell's] +notice<a name="FNanchor615"></a><a href="#Footnote_615">[615]</a>." +This official report does not differ materially from that in +Cowley's private letter of the thirteenth, but omitted, naturally, +aspersions on Lindsay and suspicions of the use to which he might +put his information<a name="FNanchor616"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_616">[616]</a>. Cowley had held a long conversation with +Thouvenel, in which it was developed that the source of the +Emperor's views was Rouher, Minister of Commerce, who was very +anxious over the future of cotton supply. It appeared that Lindsay +in conversation with Thouvenel had affirmed that "<i>I</i> [Cowley] +<i>coincided in his views</i>." This exasperated Cowley, and he +resented Lindsay's "unofficial diplomacy," telling Thouvenel that +he "was placed in a false position by Mr. Lindsay's interference. +M. Thouvenel exclaimed that his own position was still more false, +and that he should make a point of seeing the Emperor, on the +following morning, and of ascertaining the extent of His Majesty's +participation in the proceeding." This was done, with the result +that Napoleon acknowledged that on Lindsay's request he had +authorized him to recount to Russell and Palmerston the views +expressed, but asserted that "he had not charged him to convey +those opinions." Cowley concluded his despatch:</p> +<blockquote>"Monsieur Thouvenel said that the Emperor did not +understand the intricacies of this question--that His Majesty had +confounded remarks conveyed in despatches with deliberate +proposals--that no doubt the French Government was more preoccupied +with the Cotton question than Her Majesty's Government seemed to +be, and this he (Thouvenel) had shewn in his communications with M. +de <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294"></a>[V1:pg 294]</span> +Flahault, but that he knew too well the general opinions prevailing +in England to have made proposals. Nor, indeed, did he see what +proposals could have been made. He had endeavoured to shew both the +Emperor and M. Rouher, that to recognize the independence of the +South would not bring Cotton into the markets, while any +interference with the blockade would probably have produced a +collision. At the same time he could not conceal from me the just +anxiety he experienced to reopen the Cotton trade. Might not the +Northern States be induced to declare some one port Neutral, at +which the trade could be carried on?<br> +<br> +I said that the events which were now passing in America +demonstrated the prudence of the policy pursued by the two +Governments. The recognition of the South would not have prevented +the North from continuing its armaments and undertaking the +expedition now in progress, and a refusal to acknowledge the +blockade as efficient must have been followed by the employment of +force, on a question of extreme delicacy<a name= +"FNanchor617"></a><a href="#Footnote_617">[617]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Formal approval was given Cowley by Russell on April 16. In this +Russell stated that he agreed with Thouvenel the cotton situation +was alarming, but he added: "The evil is evident--not equally so +the remedy." He assured Cowley that "Her Majesty's Government wish +to take no step in respect to the Civil War in America except in +concert with France and upon full deliberation<a name= +"FNanchor618"></a><a href="#Footnote_618">[618]</a>." Meanwhile +Lindsay's diplomatic career had received a severe jolt in London. +Confidently addressing to Russell a request for an interview, he +received the reply "that I thought the best way for two Govts. to +communicate with each other was through their respective +Embassies.... He [Lindsay] rejoined that he feared you [Cowley] had +not stated the reason why the Emperor wished to make the proposal +through him rather than the usual channel, and again asked to see +me, but I declined to give any other answer, adding that you and +the French Ambassr. could make the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_295"></a>[V1:pg 295]</span> most Confidential as well as +Official Communications<a name="FNanchor619"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_619">[619]</a>." This rebuff was not regarded as final, +though exasperating, by Lindsay, nor by the Confederate agents, all +being agreed that Napoleon was about to take an active hand in +their favour. Lindsay returned to Paris accompanied by Mason, and +on April 18 had still another conversation with Napoleon. He +reported Russell's refusal of an interview, and that he had seen +Disraeli, but not Derby, who was ill. Disraeli had declared that he +believed Russell and Seward to have a "secret understanding" on the +blockade, but that if France should make a definite proposal it +would probably be supported by a majority in Parliament, and that +Russell would be compelled to assent in order to avoid a change of +Ministry. In this third interview with Lindsay expressions of +vexation with British policy were used by Napoleon (according to +Slidell), but he now intimated that he was waiting to learn the +result of the Northern effort to capture New Orleans, an event +which "he did not anticipate," but which, if it occurred, "might +render it inexpedient to act<a name="FNanchor620"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_620">[620]</a>."</p> +<p>Evidently the wedge was losing its force. Mason, returning to +London, found that the "pulsations" in Paris had no English +repetition. He wrote that Lindsay, failing to reach Russell, had +attempted to get at Palmerston, but <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_296"></a>[V1:pg 296]</span> with no success. Thereupon +Lindsay turning to the Opposition had visited Disraeli a second +time and submitted to him Palmerston's rebuff. The strongest +expression that fell from Disraeli was--"if it is found that the +Emperor and Russell are at issue on the question the session of +Parliament would not be as quiet as had been anticipated." This was +scant encouragement, for Disraeli's "if" was all important. Yet "on +the whole Lindsay is hopeful," wrote Mason in conclusion<a name= +"FNanchor621"></a><a href="#Footnote_621">[621]</a>. Within a +fortnight following arrived the news of the capture of New Orleans, +an event upon which Seward had postulated the relief of a European +scarcity of cotton and to Southern sympathizers a serious blow. May +13, Cowley reported that the Emperor had told him, personally, that +"he quite agreed that nothing was to be done for the moment but to +watch events<a name="FNanchor622"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_622">[622]</a>." Thouvenel asked Slidell as to the +effect of the loss of New Orleans, and received the frank answer, +"that it would be most disastrous, as it would give the enemy the +control of the Mississippi and its tributaries, [but] that it would +not in any way modify the fixed purpose of our people to carry on +the war even to an extermination<a name="FNanchor623"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_623">[623]</a>." Mason, a Virginian, and like nearly all +from his section, never fully realizing the importance of the +Confederate South-West, his eyes fixed on the campaigns about +Richmond, was telling the "nervous amongst our friends" that New +Orleans would "form a barren acquisition to the enemy, and will on +our side serve only as a stimulant<a name= +"FNanchor624"></a><a href="#Footnote_624">[624]</a>."</p> +<p>If the South needed such stimulants she was certainly getting +repeated doses in the three months from February to May, 1862. In +England, Lindsay might be hopeful of a movement by the Tory +opposition, but thought it wiser to postpone for a time further +pressure in that direction. <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_297"></a>[V1:pg 297]</span> May 8, Henry Adams could write to +his brother of British public opinion, "there is no doubt that the +idea here is as strong as ever that we must ultimately fail<a name= +"FNanchor625"></a><a href="#Footnote_625">[625]</a>," but on May +16, that "the effect of the news here [of New Orleans] has been +greater than anything yet ... the <i>Times</i> came out and gave +fairly in that it had been mistaken; it had believed Southern +accounts and was deceived by them. This morning it has an article +still more remarkable and intimates for the first time that it sees +little more chance for the South. There is, we think, a preparation +for withdrawing their belligerent declaration and acknowledging +again the authority of the Federal Government over all the national +territory to be absolute and undisputed. One more victory will +bring us up to this, I am confident<a name= +"FNanchor626"></a><a href="#Footnote_626">[626]</a>."</p> +<p>This was mistaken confidence. Nor did governmental reaction keep +pace with Southern depression or Northern elation; the British +Ministry was simply made more determined to preserve strict +neutrality and to restrain its French partner in a "wait for +events" policy. The "one more victory" so eagerly desired by Henry +Adams was not forthcoming, and the attention, now all focused on +McClellan's slow-moving campaign, waited in vain for the +demonstration of another and more striking evidence of Northern +power--the capture of the Confederate Capital, Richmond. +McClellan's delays coincided with a bruiting of the news at +Washington that foreign Powers were about to offer mediation. This +was treated at some length in the semi-official <i>National +Intelligencer</i> of May 16 in an article which Lyons thought +inspired by Seward, stating that mediation would be welcome if +offered for the purpose of re-union, but would otherwise be +resented, a view which Lyons thought fairly represented the +situation<a name="FNanchor627"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_627">[627]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298"></a>[V1:pg 298]</span> +<p>There can be little doubt that this Washington rumour was +largely the result of the very positive opinion held by Mercier of +ultimate Southern success and his somewhat free private +communications. He may, indeed, have been talking more freely than +usual exactly because of anxiety at Northern success, for +McClellan, so far as was then known, was steadily, if slowly, +progressing toward a victory. Mercier's most recent instruction +from Thouvenel gave him no authority to urge mediation, yet he +thought the moment opportune for it and strongly urged this plan on +Lyons. The latter's summary of this and his own analysis of the +situation were as follows:</p> +<blockquote>"M. Mercier thinks it quite within the range of +possibility that the South may be victorious both in the battle in +Virginia and in that in Tennessee. He is at all events quite +confident that whether victorious or defeated, they will not give +in, and he is certainly disposed to advise his Government to +endeavour to put an end to the war by intervening on the first +opportunity. He is, however, very much puzzled to devise any mode +of intervention, which would have the effect of reviving French +trade and obtaining cotton. I should suppose he would think it +desirable to go to great lengths to stop the war; because he +believes that the South will not give in until the whole country is +made desolate and that the North will very soon be led to proclaim +immediate emancipation, which would stop the cultivation of cotton +for an indefinite time.<br> +<br> +I listen and say little when he talks of intervention. It appears +to me to be a dangerous subject of conversation. There is a good +deal of truth in M. Mercier's anticipations of evil, but I do not +see my way to doing any good.<br> +<br> +If one is to conjecture what the state of things will be a month or +six weeks hence, one may "guess" that McClellan will be at +Richmond, having very probably got there without much real +fighting. I doubt his getting farther this summer, if so +far....<br> +<br> +The campaign will not be pushed with any vigour during the summer. +It may be begun again in the Autumn. Thus, so far as Trade and +Cotton are concerned, we may be next <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_299"></a>[V1:pg 299]</span> Autumn, just in the situation we +are now. If the South really defeated either or both the Armies +opposed to them I think it would disgust the North with the war, +rather than excite them to fresh efforts. If the armies suffer much +from disease, recruiting will become difficult. The credit of the +Government has hitherto been wonderfully kept up, but it would not +stand a considerable reverse in the field. It is possible, under +such circumstances that a Peace Party might arise; and perhaps just +<i>possible</i> that England and France might give weight to such a +Party<a name="FNanchor628"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_628">[628]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>In brief, Lyons was all against either intervention or mediation +unless a strong reaction toward peace should come in the North, and +even then regarded the wisdom of such a policy as only "just +<i>possible</i>." Nor was Russell inclined to depart from +established policy. He wrote to Lyons at nearly the same time:</p> +<blockquote>"The news from York Town, New Orleans, and Corinth +seems to portend the conquest of the South. We have now to see +therefore, whether a few leaders or the whole population entertain +those sentiments of alienation and abhorrence which were so freely +expressed to M. Mercier by the Confederate Statesmen at Richmond. I +know not how to answer this question. But there are other questions +not less important to be solved in the North. Will the +Abolitionists succeed in proclaiming freedom to the Slaves of all +those who have resisted? I guess not.<br> +<br> +But then the Union will be restored with its old disgrace and its +old danger. I confess I do not see any way to any fair solution +except separation--but that the North will not hear of--nor in the +moment of success would it be of any use to give them unpalatable +advice<a name="FNanchor629"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_629">[629]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Two days preceding this letter, Thouvenel, at last fully +informed of Mercier's trip to Richmond, instructed him that France +had no intention to depart from her attitude of strict neutrality +and that it was more than ever necessary to wait events<a name= +"FNanchor630"></a><a href="#Footnote_630">[630]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300"></a>[V1:pg 300]</span> +<p>Mercier's renewed efforts to start a movement toward mediation +were then wholly personal. Neither France nor Great Britain had as +yet taken up this plan, nor were they likely to so long as Northern +successes were continued. In London, Mason, suffering a reaction +from his former high hopes, summed up the situation in a few words: +"This Government passive and ignorant, France alert and mysterious. +The Emperor alone knows what is to come out of it, and he keeps his +own secret<a name="FNanchor631"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_631">[631]</a>." The Southern play, following the +ministerial rebuff to Lindsay, was now to keep quiet and extended +even to discouraging public demonstrations against governmental +inaction. Spence had prevented such a demonstration by cotton +operators in Liverpool. "I have kept them from moving as a matter +of judgment. If either of the Southern armies obtain such a victory +as I think probable, then a move of this kind may be made with +success and power, whilst at the wrong time for it havoc only would +have resulted<a name="FNanchor632"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_632">[632]</a>." The wrong time for Southern pressure on +Russell was conceived by Seward to be the right time for the North. +Immediately following the capture of New Orleans he gave positive +instructions to Dayton in Paris and Adams in London to propose the +withdrawal of the declaration admitting Southern belligerent +rights. Thouvenel replied with some asperity on the folly of +Seward's demand, and made a strong representation of the necessity +of France to obtain cotton and tobacco<a name= +"FNanchor633"></a><a href="#Footnote_633">[633]</a>. Adams, with +evident reluctance, writing, "I had little expectation of success, +but I felt it my duty at once to execute the orders," advanced with +Russell the now threadbare and customary arguments on the +Proclamation of Neutrality, and received the usual refusal to alter +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301"></a>[V1:pg 301]</span> +British policy<a name="FNanchor634"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_634">[634]</a>. If Seward was sincere in asking for a +retraction of belligerent rights to the South he much mistook +European attitude; if he was but making use of Northern victories +to return to a high tone of warning to Europe--a tone serviceable +in causing foreign governments to step warily--his time was well +chosen. Certainly at Washington Lyons did not regard very seriously +Seward's renewal of demand on belligerency. Satisfied that there +was no immediate reason to require his presence in America, ill and +fearing the heat of summer, he had asked on May 9 for permission to +take leave of absence for a trip home. On June 6 he received this +permission, evidence that Russell also saw no cause for anxiety, +and on June 13 he took leave of Lincoln.</p> +<blockquote>"I had quite an affectionate parting with the President +this morning. He told me, as is his wont, a number of stories more +or less decorous, but all he said having any bearing on political +matters was: 'I suppose my position makes people in England think a +great deal more of me than I deserve, pray tell 'em I mean 'em no +harm<a name="FNanchor635"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_635">[635]</a>.'"</blockquote> +<p>Fully a month had now elapsed in London since the arrival of +news on any striking military event in America. New Orleans was an +old story, and while in general it was believed that Richmond must +fall before McClellan's army, the persistence of Southern fervid +declarations that they would never submit gave renewed courage to +their British friends. Lindsay was now of the opinion that it might +be wise, after all, to make some effort in Parliament, and since +the Washington mediation rumours were becoming current in London +also, notice was given of a motion demanding of the Government +that, associating itself with France, an offer of mediation be made +to the contending <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page_302"></a>[V1:pg 302]</span> parties in America. Motions on +recognition and on the blockade had been tried and had failed. Now +the cry was to be "peaceful mediation" to put an end to a terrible +war. Friends of the South were not united in this adventure. Spence +advised Lindsay to postpone it, but the latter seemed determined to +make the effort<a name="FNanchor636"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_636">[636]</a>. Probably he was still smarting under his +reverse of April. Possibly also he was aware of a sudden sharp +personal clash between Palmerston and Adams that might not be +without influence on governmental attitude--perhaps might even +indicate a governmental purpose to alter its policy.</p> +<p>This clash was caused by a personal letter written by Palmerston +to Adams on the publication in the <i>Times</i> of General Butler's +famous order in New Orleans authorizing Federal soldiers to treat +as "women of the town" those women who publicly insulted Northern +troops. The British press indulged in an ecstasy of vicious writing +about this order similar to that on the Northern "barbarity" of the +Stone Fleet episode. Palmerston's letters to Adams and the replies +received need no further notice here, since they did not in fact +affect British policy, than to explain that Palmerston wrote in +extreme anger, apparently, and with great violence of language, and +that Adams replied with equal anger, but in very dignified if +irritating terms<a name="FNanchor637"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_637">[637]</a>. In British opinion Butler's order was an +incitement to his soldiers to commit atrocities; Americans +understood it as merely an authorization to return insult for +insult. In fact the order promptly put a stop to attacks on +Northern soldiers, whether by act or word, and all disorder ceased. +Palmerston was quick to accept the British view, writing to Adams, +"it is difficult if not impossible to express adequately the +disgust which must be excited in the mind of every honourable man +by the general order of General Butler...." <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_303"></a>[V1:pg 303]</span> "If the Federal +government chooses to be served by men capable of such revolting +outrages, they must submit to abide by the deserved opinion which +mankind will form of their conduct<a name= +"FNanchor638"></a><a href="#Footnote_638">[638]</a>." This +extraordinary letter was written on June 11. Adams was both angry +and perturbed, since he thought the letter might indicate an +intention to change British policy and that Palmerston was but +laying the ground for some "vigorous" utterance in Parliament, +after his wont when striking out on a new line. He was further +confirmed in this view by an editorial in the <i>Times</i> on June +12, hinting at a coming mediation, and by news from France that +Persigny was on his way to London to arrange such a step. But +however much personally aggrieved, Adams was cool as a diplomat. +His first step was to write a brief note to Palmerston enquiring +whether he was to consider the letter as addressed to him +"officially ... or purely as a private expression of sentiment +between gentlemen<a name="FNanchor639"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_639">[639]</a>."</p> +<p>There is no evidence that Palmerston and Russell were +contemplating a change of policy--rather the reverse. But it does +appear that Palmerston wished to be able to state in Parliament +that he had taken Adams to task for Butler's order, so that he +might meet an enquiry already placed on the question paper as to +the Ministry's intentions in the matter. This question was due for +the sitting of June 13, and on that day Russell wrote to Palmerston +that he should call Butler's order "brutal" and that Palmerston +might use the term "infamous" if preferred, adding, "I do not see +why we should not represent in a friendly way that the usages of +war do not sanction such conduct<a name="FNanchor640"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_640">[640]</a>." This was very different from the tone +used by Palmerston. His letter was certainly no "friendly way." +Again on the same day Russell wrote to Palmerston:</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304"></a>[V1:pg 304]</span> +<blockquote>"Adams has been here in a dreadful state about the +letter you have written him about Butler.<br> +<br> +I declined to give him any opinion and asked him to do nothing more +till I had seen or written to you.<br> +<br> +What you say of Butler is true enough, tho' he denies your +interpretation of the order.<br> +<br> +But it is not clear that the President approves of the order, and I +think if you could add something to the effect that you respect the +Government of President Lincoln, and do not wish to impute to them +the fault of Butler it might soothe him.<br> +<br> +If you could withdraw the letter altogether it would be the best. +But this you may not like to do<a name="FNanchor641"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_641">[641]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>It is apparent that Russell did not approve of Palmerston's move +against Adams nor of any "vigorous" language in Parliament, and as +to the last, he had his way, for the Government, while disapproving +Butler's order, was decidedly mild in comment. As to the letter, +Adams, the suspicion proving unfounded that an immediate change of +policy was intended, returned to the attack as a matter of personal +prestige. It was not until June 15 that Palmerston replied to Adams +and then in far different language seeking to smooth the Minister's +ruffled feathers, yet making no apology and not answering Adams' +question. Adams promptly responded with vigour, June 16, again +asking his question as to the letter being official or personal, +and characterizing Palmerston's previous assertions as "offensive +imputations." He also again approached Russell, who stated that he +too had written to Palmerston about his letter, but had received no +reply, and he acknowledged that Palmerston's proceeding was +"altogether irregular<a name="FNanchor642"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_642">[642]</a>." In the end Palmerston was brought, June +19, to write a long and somewhat rambling reply to Adams, in effect +still evading the question put him, though acknowledging that +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305"></a>[V1:pg 305]</span> the +"Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is the regular official +organ for communications...." In conclusion he expressed +gratification that reports from Lord Lyons showed Butler's +authority at New Orleans had been curtailed by Lincoln. The next +day Adams answered interpreting Palmerston as withdrawing his +"imputations" but stating plainly that he would not again submit +"to entertain any similar correspondence<a name= +"FNanchor643"></a><a href="#Footnote_643">[643]</a>."</p> +<p>Adams had been cautious in pushing for an answer until he knew +there was to be no change in British policy. Indeed Palmerston's +whole move may even have been intended to ease the pressure for a +change in that policy. On the very day of Adams' first talk with +Russell, friends of the South thought the <i>Times</i> editorial +indicated "that some movement is to be made at last, and I doubt +not we are to thank the Emperor for it<a name= +"FNanchor644"></a><a href="#Footnote_644">[644]</a>." But on this +day also Russell was advising Palmerston to state in Parliament +that "We have not received at present any proposal from France to +offer mediation and no intention at present exists to offer it on +our part<a name="FNanchor645"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_645">[645]</a>." This was the exact language used by +Palmerston in reply to Hopwood<a name="FNanchor646"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_646">[646]</a>. Mason again saw his hopes dwindling, but +was assured by Lindsay that all was not yet lost, and that he would +"still hold his motion under consideration<a name= +"FNanchor647"></a><a href="#Footnote_647">[647]</a>." Lindsay, +according to his own account, had talked very large in a letter to +Russell, but knew privately, and so informed Mason, that the +Commons would not vote for his motion if opposed by the Government, +and so intended to postpone it<a name="FNanchor648"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_648">[648]</a>. The proposed motion <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page_306"></a>[V1:pg 306]</span> was now one for +recognition instead of mediation, a temporary change of plan due to +Palmerston's answer to Hopwood on June 13. But whatever the terms +of the motion favourable to the South, it was evident the +Government did not wish discussion at the moment, and hesitancy +came over pro-Southern friends. Slidell, in despair, declared that +for his part he intended, no matter with what prospect of success, +to <i>demand</i> recognition from France<a name= +"FNanchor649"></a><a href="#Footnote_649">[649]</a>. This alarmed +Mason's English advisers, and he wrote at once strongly urging +against such a step, for if the demand were presented and refused +there would be no recourse but to depart for home<a name= +"FNanchor650"></a><a href="#Footnote_650">[650]</a>. He thought +Lindsay's motion dying away for on consultation with "different +parties, including Disraeli, Seymour Fitzgerald and Roebuck," it +"has been so far reduced and diluted ... as to make it only +expressive of the opinion of the House that the present posture of +affairs in America made the question of the recognition of the +Confederate States worth the serious consideration of the +Government. It was so modified to prevent the Ministry making an +issue upon it...." There was "no assurance that it would be +sustained ... even in that form." Lindsay had determined +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307"></a>[V1:pg 307]</span> to +postpone his motion "for a fortnight, so that all expectation from +this quarter for the present is dished, and we must wait for 'King +Cotton' to turn the screw still further<a name= +"FNanchor651"></a><a href="#Footnote_651">[651]</a>." On June, 20 +Lindsay gave this notice of postponement, and no parliamentary +comment was made<a name="FNanchor652"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_652">[652]</a>. It was a moment of extreme depression +for the Confederate agents in Europe. Slidell, yielding to Mason's +pleas, gave up his idea of demanding recognition and wrote:</p> +<blockquote>"The position of our representatives in Europe is +painful and almost humiliating; it might be tolerated if they could +be consoled by the reflection that their presence was in any way +advantageous to their cause but I am disposed to believe that we +would have done better to withdraw after our first interview with +Russell and Thouvenel<a name="FNanchor653"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_653">[653]</a>."</blockquote> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_580"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor580">[580]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1862-63</i>, Pt. I, p. 41.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_581"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor581">[581]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 826. Nos. 154 and 155. +March 3, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_582"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor582">[582]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1435. No. 362. Cowley +to Russell, March 18, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_583"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor583">[583]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1862-63</i>, Pt. I, p. 54. Adams to Seward, March 27, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_584"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor584">[584]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 65.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_585"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor585">[585]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. +April 8, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_586"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor586">[586]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_587"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor587">[587]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, 123. +To his son, April 4, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_588"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor588">[588]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, +March 31, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_589"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor589">[589]</a> Lyons Papers. March 22, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_590"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor590">[590]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 827. No. 244. Extract. +Lyons to Russell, April 11, 1802.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_591"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor591">[591]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, 143. +Adams to his son, May 16, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_592"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor592">[592]</a> Thouvenel, <i>Le Secret de l'Empereur</i>, +II, p. 247.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_593"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor593">[593]</a> <i>Documents Diplomatiques</i>, 1862, pp. +120-122. Mercicr to Thouvenel, April 13, 1862. A translation of +this despatch was printed, with some minor inaccuracies, in the New +York <i>Tribune</i>, Feb. 5, 1863, and of Mercier's report, April +28, on his return from Richmond, on Feb. 9, under the caption "The +Yellow Book." It is interesting that the concluding paragraphs of +this report of April 28, as printed in the <i>Tribune</i>, are not +given in the printed volume of <i>Documents Diplomatiques</i>, +1862. These refer to difficulties about cotton and to certain +pledges given by Seward as to cessation of illegal interferences +with French vessels. How the <i>Tribune</i> secured these +paragraphs, if authentic, is not clear. The whole purpose of the +publication was an attack by Horace Greeley, editor, on Seward in +an effort to cause his removal from the Cabinet. See Bancroft, +<i>Seward</i>, II, 371-2.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_594"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor594">[594]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>. II, 298-99. +Bancroft's account is based on the <i>Tribune</i> translation and +on Seward's own comments to Weed and Bigelow. <i>Ibid.</i>, +371-72.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_595"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor595">[595]</a> Newton. <i>Lord Lyons</i>, I, pp. 82-85, +gives an account of the initiation of Mercier's trip and prints +Lyons' private letter to Russell of April 25, describing the +results, but does not bring out sufficiently Lyons' objections and +misgivings. Newton thinks that Mercier "whether instructed from +home or not ... after the manner of French diplomatists of the +period ... was probably unable to resist the temptation of trying +to effect a striking <i>coup</i>...."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_596"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor596">[596]</a> Stoeckl's report does not agree with +Mercier's statement. He wrote that he had been asked to accompany +Mercier but had refused and reported a conversation with Seward in +which the latter declared the time had not yet come for mediation, +that in any case France would not be accepted in that rôle, +and that if ever mediation should become acceptable, Russia would +be asked to act (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., April 23-May 5, +1862. No. 927).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_597"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor597">[597]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 250. +Confidential. Lyons to Russell, April 14, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_598"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor598">[598]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_599"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor599">[599]</a> This suspicion was a natural one but that +it was unfounded is indicated by Benjamin's report to Slidell of +Mercier's visit, describing the language used in almost exactly the +same terms that Lyons reported to Russell. That little importance +was attached by Benjamin to Mercier's visit is also indicated by +the fact that he did not write to Slidell about it until July. +Richardson, II, 260. Benjamin to Slidell, July 19, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_600"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor600">[600]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 284. +Confidential. Lyons to Russell, April 24, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_601"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor601">[601]</a> <i>Documents Diplomatiques, 1862</i>, pp. +122-124.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_602"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor602">[602]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 284. +Confidential. Lyons to Russell, April 28, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_603"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor603">[603]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 829. No. 315. +Confidential. Lyons to Russell, May 9, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_604"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor604">[604]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, May 10, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_605"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor605">[605]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1427. No. 544. Cowley +to Russell, April 28, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_606"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor606">[606]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 1438. No. 563. To +Russell. Mercier's conduct appeared to Cowley as "want of courtesy" +and "tardy confidence" to Lyons. <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 566. May 1, +1862. To Russell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_607"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor607">[607]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 574. Cowley to Russell, +May 2, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_608"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor608">[608]</a> Thouvenel, <i>Le Secret de l'Empereur</i>, +II, p. 299.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_609"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor609">[609]</a> Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, May 3, 14 +and 16, 1862. Mason to Slidell, May 5, 14 and 16, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_610"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor610">[610]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Slidell to Mason, May 16, +1862. Billault was a member of the French Ministry, but without +portfolio.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_611"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor611">[611]</a> Several accounts have been given of this +episode. The two known to me treating it at greatest length are (1) +Callahan, <i>Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy</i> and +(2) Sears, <i>A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon +III</i>. Am. Hist. Rev., Jan., 1921. Both writers drew their +information wholly from Confederate documents, using, especially, +the private correspondence of Mason and Slidell, and neither treats +the matter from the English view point. I have therefore based my +account on the unused letters of British officials, citing other +materials only where they offer a side light. The principal new +sources are Cowley's private and official letters to +Russell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_612"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor612">[612]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. +Private. April 13, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_613"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor613">[613]</a> Mason Papers. April 12, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_614"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor614">[614]</a> Richardson, II, 239. April 14, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_615"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor615">[615]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. +Private.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_616"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor616">[616]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1437. No. 497. +<i>Confidential</i>. Cowley to Russell April 15, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_617"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor617">[617]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_618"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor618">[618]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1422. No. 403. Russell +to Cowley, April 16, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_619"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor619">[619]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 415. Russell to Cowley, +April 16, 1862. Whether Napoleon had in fact "charged" Lindsay with +a mission must remain in doubt. Cowley believed Lindsay to have +prevaricated--or at least so officially reported. He had<br> +<br> +<blockquote>"Le 20 Avril, 1862.<br> +<br> +<br> +Mon cher Lord Cowley:<br> +<br> +<br> +Je vous remercie de votre billet. J'espère comme vous +que<br> +bientôt nos manufactures auront du coton. Je n'ai pas de +tout<br> +été choqué de ce que Lord Russell n'ait pas +reçu Mr. Lindsay.<br> +Celui-ci m'avait demandé l'autorisation de rapporter au<br> +principal secretaire d'Etat notre conversation et j'y avais<br> +consenti et voilà tout.<br> +<br> +<br> +Croyez à mes sentiments d'amitié.<br> +<br> +<br> +Napoleon."</blockquote> +</blockquote> +<br> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_620"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor620">[620]</a> Richardson, II, 239. Slidell to Benjamin, +April 18, 1862. New Orleans was captured on April 25.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_621"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor621">[621]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 30, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_622"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor622">[622]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to +Russell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_623"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor623">[623]</a> Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, May 14, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_624"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor624">[624]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Mason to Slidell, May 14, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_625"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor625">[625]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, +139.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_626"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor626">[626]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 146.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_627"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor627">[627]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 830. No. 338. Lyons to +Russell, May 16, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_628"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor628">[628]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. +May 16, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_629"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor629">[629]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons. Private. +May 17, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_630"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor630">[630]</a> <i>Documents Diplomatiques</i>, 1862, p. +124. May 15.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_631"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor631">[631]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, May 21, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_632"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor632">[632]</a> Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, June 3, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_633"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor633">[633]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1439. No. 668. Cowley +to Russell, May 23, 1862, and <i>Documents Diplomatiques, 1862</i>, +p. 127. Thouvenel to Mercier, May 21, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_634"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor634">[634]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862</i>, +pp. 97-99. Adams to Seward, May 22, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_635"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor635">[635]</a> Newton, <i>Lord Lyons</i>, I, +88.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_636"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor636">[636]</a> Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, June 11, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_637"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor637">[637]</a> All the letters are given in Adams, +<i>C.F. Adams</i>, Ch. XIII.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_638"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor638">[638]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 248-9.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_639"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor639">[639]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 251.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_640"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor640">[640]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_641"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor641">[641]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_642"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor642">[642]</a> Adams, <i>C.F. Adams</i>, pp. +253-55.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_643"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor643">[643]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 256-60.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_644"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor644">[644]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 13, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_645"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor645">[645]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_646"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor646">[646]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p. 543. June +13, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_647"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor647">[647]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 14, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_648"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor648">[648]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lindsay to Mason, June 18, +1862. Lindsay wrote:<br> +<br> +<blockquote>"Lord Russell sent to me last night to get the words of +my<br> +motion. I have sent them to him to-night, and I have embraced<br> +the opportunity of opening my mind to his Lordship. I have<br> +told him that I have postponed my motion in courtesy to<br> +him--that the sympathy of nine-tenths of the members of the<br> +House was in favour of immediate recognition, and that even<br> +if the Government was not prepared to accept my motion, a<br> +majority of votes might have been obtained in its<br> +favour--that a majority of votes <i>would</i> be obtained +within<br> +the next fortnight, and I expressed the most earnest hope<br> +that the Government would move (as the country, and France,<br> +are most anxious for them to do so) and thus prevent the<br> +necessity of any private member undertaking a duty which<br> +belonged to the Executive.<br> +<br> +<br> +"I further told his Lordship that recognition was a +<i>right</i><br> +which no one would deny us the form of exercising, that the<br> +fear of war if we exercised it was a delusion. That the<br> +majority of the leading men in the Northern States would<br> +thank us for exercising it, and that even Seward himself<br> +might be glad to see it exercised so as to give him an excuse<br> +for getting out of the terrible war into which he had dragged<br> +his people. I further said, that if the question is settled<br> +<i>without</i> our recognition of the South, he might <i>rest<br> +certain</i> that the Northern Armies <i>would</i> be marched +into<br> +Canada. I hope my note may produce the desired results, and<br> +thus get the Government to take the matter in hand, for <i>sub<br> +rosa</i>, I saw that the House was not <i>yet</i> prepared to +vote,<br> +and the question is far too grave to waste time upon it in<br> +idle talk, even if talk, without action, did no harm."</blockquote> +</blockquote> +<br> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_649"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor649">[649]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Slidell to Mason, June 17, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_650"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor650">[650]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Mason to Slidell, June 19, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_651"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor651">[651]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_652"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor652">[652]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p. +810.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_653"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor653">[653]</a> Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, June 21, +1862.</blockquote> +<br> +<a name="image08.jpg"></a> +<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image08.jpg"><img src= +"images/image08.jpg" width="45%" alt=""></a><br> +<b>PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH</b><br> +(<i>From a photograph by Elliott & Fry, Ltd.</i>)</p> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_v"></a>[V2:pg v]</span> +<a name="VOLUME_II"></a> +<h2>CONTENTS<br> +OF<br> +VOLUME TWO</h2> +<center> +<table summary=""> +<tr> +<td align="center">CHAPTER</td> +<td> </td> +<td align="right">PAGE</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">X.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_X">KING COTTON</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">1</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">XI.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">RUSSELL'S MEDIATION PLAN</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">33</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">XII.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">75</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">XIII.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">THE LAIRD RAMS</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">116</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">XIV.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">ROEBUCK'S MOTION</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">152</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XV">XV.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XV">THE SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE +ASSOCIATION</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_XV">186</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVI">XVI.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XVI">BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE SOUTH</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVI">219</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVII">XVII.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XVII">THE END OF THE WAR</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVII">247</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVIII">XVIII.</a></td> +<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XVIII">THE KEY-NOTE OF BRITISH +ATTITUDE</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVIII">274</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> </td> +<td><a href="#INDEX">INDEX</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#INDEX">307</a></td> +</tr> +</table> +</center> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_vii"></a>[V2:pg vii]</span> +<h2>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</h2> +<h3>PART TWO</h3> +<center> +<table summary=""> +<tr> +<td><a href="#image08.jpg">PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href= +"#image08.jpg"><i>Frontispiece</i></a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> <i>From a photograph by Elliott +& Fry, Ltd</i>.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><a href="#image09.jpg">JOHN SLIDELL</a></td> +<td align="right"><i>facing p. <a href= +"#image09.jpg">24</a></i></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> <i>From Nicolay and Hay's "Life +of Abraham Lincoln," by permission of the Century Co., New +York.</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><a href="#image10.jpg">"ABE LINCOLN'S LAST CARD"</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image10.jpg">102</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> <i>Reproduced by permission of +the Proprietors of "Punch</i>"</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><a href="#image11.jpg">WILLIAM EDWARD FORSTER (1851)</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image11.jpg">134</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> <i>From Reid's "Life of Forster" +(Chapman & Hall, Ltd.</i>)</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><a href="#image12.jpg">"THE AMERICAN +GLADIATORS--HABET!"</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image12.jpg">248</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> <i>Reproduced by permission of +the Proprietors of "Punch</i>"</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><a href="#image13.jpg">"BRITANNIA SYMPATHIZES WITH +COLUMBIA"</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image13.jpg">262</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> <i>Reproduced by permission of +the Proprietors of "Punch</i>"</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><a href="#image14.jpg">JOHN BRIGHT</a></td> +<td align="right"><a href="#image14.jpg">294</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> <i>From Trevelyan's "Life of +John Bright" (Constable & Co., Ltd</i>.)</td> +</tr> +</table> +</center> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_1"></a>[V2:pg 1]</span> +<h1>GREAT BRITAIN<br> +AND THE<br> +AMERICAN CIVIL WAR</h1> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_X"></a>CHAPTER X</h2> +<h3>KING COTTON</h3> +<br> +<p>For two weeks there was no lightening of Southern depression in +England. But on June 28 McClellan had been turned back from his +advance on Richmond by Lee, the new commander of the Army of +Virginia, and the much heralded Peninsular campaign was recognized +to have been a disastrous failure. Earlier Northern victories were +forgotten and the campaigns in the West, still progressing +favourably for the North, were ignored or their significance not +understood. Again, to English eyes, the war in America approached a +stalemate. The time had come with the near adjournment of +Parliament when, if ever, a strong Southern effort must be made, +and the time seemed propitious. Moreover by July, 1862, it was +hoped that soon, in the cotton districts, the depression steadily +increasing since the beginning of the war, would bring an ally to +the Southern cause. Before continuing the story of Parliamentary +and private efforts by the friends of the South it is here +necessary to review the cotton situation--now rapidly becoming a +matter of anxious concern to both friend and foe of the North and +in less degree to the Ministry itself.</p> +<p>"King Cotton" had long been a boast with the South. "Perhaps no +great revolution," says Bancroft, "was ever begun with such +convenient and soothing theories as those <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_2"></a>[V2:pg 2]</span> that were +expounded and believed at the time of the organization of the +Confederacy.... In any case, hostilities could not last long, for +France and Great Britain must have what the Confederacy alone could +supply, and therefore they could be forced to aid the South, as a +condition precedent to relief from the terrible distress that was +sure to follow a blockade<a name="FNanchor654"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_654">[654]</a>." This confidence was no new development. +For ten years past whenever Southern threats of secession had been +indulged in, the writers and politicians of that section had +expanded upon cotton as the one great wealth-producing industry of +America and as the one product which would compel European +acquiescence in American policy, whether of the Union, before 1860, +or of the South if she should secede. In the financial depression +that swept the Northern States in 1857 <i>De Bow's Review</i>, the +leading financial journal of the South, declared: "The wealth of +the South is permanent and real, that of the North fugitive and +fictitious. Events now transpiring expose the fiction, as humbug +after humbug explodes<a name="FNanchor655"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_655">[655]</a>." On March 4, 1858, Senator Hammond of +South Carolina, asked in a speech, "What would happen if no cotton +was furnished for three years? I will not stop to depict what +everyone can imagine, but this is certain: England would topple +headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her save the +South. No, you dare not make war on cotton. No power on earth dares +make war upon it. Cotton <i>is</i> King<a name= +"FNanchor656"></a><a href="#Footnote_656">[656]</a>." Two years +later, writing before the elections of 1860 in which the main +question was that of the territorial expansion of slavery, this +same Southern statesman expressed himself as believing that "the +slave-holding South is now the controlling power of the world.... +Cotton, rice, tobacco and naval stores command the world; and we +have sense enough to know <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_3"></a>[V2:pg 3]</span> it, and are sufficiently Teutonic to +carry it out successfully<a name="FNanchor657"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_657">[657]</a>."</p> +<p>These quotations indicative of Southern faith in cotton might be +amplified and repeated from a hundred sources.</p> +<p>Moreover this faith in the possession of ultimate power went +hand in hand with the conviction that the South, more than any +other quarter of the world, produced to the benefit of mankind. "In +the three million bags of cotton," said a writer in <i>De Bow's +Review</i>, "the slave-labour annually throws upon the world for +the poor and naked, we are doing more to advance civilization ... +than all the canting philanthropists of New England and Old England +will do in centuries. Slavery is the backbone of the Northern +commercial as it is of the British manufacturing system<a name= +"FNanchor658"></a><a href="#Footnote_658">[658]</a>...." Nor was +this idea unfamiliar to Englishmen. Before the Civil War was under +way Charles Greville wrote to Clarendon:</p> +<blockquote>"Any war will be almost sure to interfere with the +cotton crops, and this is really what affects us and what we care +about. With all our virulent abuse of slavery and slave-owners, and +our continual self-laudation on that subject, we are just as +anxious for, and as much interested in, the prosperity of the +slavery interest in the Southern States as the Carolinan and +Georgian planters themselves, and all Lancashire would deplore a +successful insurrection of the slaves, if such a thing were +possible<a name="FNanchor659"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_659">[659]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>On December 20, 1860, South Carolina led the march in +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_4"></a>[V2:pg 4]</span> +secession. Fifteen days earlier the British consul at Charleston, +Bunch, reported a conversation with Rhett, long a leader of the +Southern cause and now a consistent advocate of secession, in which +Rhett developed a plan of close commercial alliance with England as +the most favoured nation, postulating the dependence of Great +Britain on the South for cotton--"upon which supposed axiom, I +would remark," wrote Bunch, "all their calculations are +based<a name="FNanchor660"></a><a href="#Footnote_660">[660]</a>." +Such was, indeed, Southern calculation. In January, 1861, <i>De +Bow's Review</i> contained an article declaring that "the first +demonstration of blockade of the Southern ports would be swept away +by the English fleets of observation hovering on the Southern +coasts, to protect English commerce, and especially the free flow +of cotton to English and French factories.... A stoppage of the raw +material ... would produce the most disastrous political +results--if not a revolution in England. This is the language of +English statesmen, manufacturers, and merchants, in Parliament and +at cotton associations' debates, and it discloses the truth<a name= +"FNanchor661"></a><a href="#Footnote_661">[661]</a>."</p> +<p>The historical student will find but few such British utterances +at the moment, and these few not by men of great weight either in +politics or in commerce. The South was labouring under an obsession +and prophesied results accordingly. So strong was this obsession +that governmental foreign policy neglected all other considerations +and the first Commission to Europe had no initial instructions save +to demand recognition<a name="FNanchor662"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_662">[662]</a>. The failure of that Commission, +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_5"></a>[V2:pg 5]</span> the +prompt British acquiescence in the blockade, were harsh blows to +Southern confidence but did not for a long time destroy the faith +in the power of cotton. In June, 1861, Bunch wrote that there was +still a firm belief that "Great Britain will make any sacrifice, +even of principle or of honour, to prevent the stoppage of the +supply of cotton," and he enclosed a copy of an article in the +<i>Charleston Mercury</i> of June 4, proclaiming: "The cards are in +our hands, and we intend to play them out to <i>the bankruptcy of +every cotton factory in Great Britain and France, or the +acknowledgment of our independence</i><a name= +"FNanchor663"></a><a href="#Footnote_663">[663]</a>." As late as +March, 1862, Bunch was still writing of this Southern faith in +cotton and described the newly-made appointment of Benjamin as +Secretary of State as partly due to the fact that he was the leader +of the "King Cotton" theory of diplomacy<a name= +"FNanchor664"></a><a href="#Footnote_664">[664]</a>. It was not +until the war was well nigh over that British persistence in +neutrality, in spite of undoubted hardships caused by the lack of +cotton, opened Southern eyes. Pollard, editor of a leading Richmond +newspaper, and soon unfriendly to the administration of Jefferson +Davis, summed up in <i>The Lost Cause</i> his earlier criticisms of +Confederate foreign policy:</p> +<blockquote>"'Cotton,' said the Charleston <i>Mercury</i>, 'would +bring England to her knees.' The idea was ludicrous enough that +England and France would instinctively or readily fling themselves +into a convulsion, which their great politicians <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_6"></a>[V2:pg 6]</span> saw was the most +tremendous one of modern times. But the puerile argument, which +even President Davis did not hesitate to adopt, about the power of +'King Cotton,' amounted to this absurdity: that the great and +illustrious power of England would submit to the ineffable +humiliation of acknowledging its dependency on the infant +Confederacy of the South, and the subserviency of its empire, its +political interests and its pride, to a single article of trade +that was grown in America<a name="FNanchor665"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_665">[665]</a>!"</blockquote> +<p>But irrespective of the extremes to which Southern confidence in +cotton extended the actual hardships of England were in all truth +serious enough to cause grave anxiety and to supply an argument to +Southern sympathizers. The facts of the "Lancashire Cotton Famine" +have frequently been treated by historians at much length<a name= +"FNanchor666"></a><a href="#Footnote_666">[666]</a> and need here +but a general review. More needed is an examination of some of the +erroneous deductions drawn from the facts and especially an +examination of the extent to which the question of cotton supply +affected or determined British governmental policy toward +America.</p> +<p>English cotton manufacturing in 1861 held a position of +importance equalled by no other one industry. Estimates based on +varying statistics diverge as to exact proportions, but all agree +in emphasizing the pre-eminent place of Lancashire in determining +the general prosperity of the nation. Surveying the English, not +the whole British, situation it is estimated that there were 2,650 +factories of which 2,195 were in Lancashire and two adjacent +counties. These employed 500,000 operatives and consumed a thousand +million pounds of cotton each year<a name= +"FNanchor667"></a><a href="#Footnote_667">[667]</a>. An editorial +in the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_7"></a>[V2:pg 7]</span> +<i>Times</i>, September 19, 1861, stated that one-fifth of the +entire English population was held to be dependent, either directly +or indirectly, on the prosperity of the cotton districts<a name= +"FNanchor668"></a><a href="#Footnote_668">[668]</a>, and therefore +also dependent on the source of supply, the Confederate South, +since statistics, though varying, showed that the raw cotton +supplied from America constituted anywhere from 78 to 84 per cent. +of the total English importation<a name="FNanchor669"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_669">[669]</a>.</p> +<p>The American crop of 1860 was the largest on record, nearly +4,000,000 bales, and the foreign shipments, without question +hurried because of the storm-cloud rising at home, had been +practically completed by April, 1861. Of the 3,500,000 bales sent +abroad, Liverpool, as usual, received the larger portion<a name= +"FNanchor670"></a><a href="#Footnote_670">[670]</a>. There was, +then, no immediate shortage of supply when war came in America, +rather an unusual accumulation of raw stocks, even permitting some +reshipment to the Northern manufacturing centres of America where +the scarcity then brought high prices. In addition, from December, +1860, to at least April, 1861, there had been somewhat of a slump +in demand for raw cotton by British manufacturers due to an +over-production of goods in the two previous years. There had been +a temporary depression in 1856-57 caused by a general financial +crisis, but early in 1858 restored confidence and a tremendous +demand from the Far East--India especially--set the mills running +again on full time, while many new mills were brought into +operation. But by May, 1860, the mills had caught up with the heavy +demands and the rest of the year saw uncertainty of operations and +brought expressions of fear that the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_8"></a>[V2:pg 8]</span> "plunge" to produce had been +overdone. Manufactured stocks began to accumulate, and money was +not easy since 1860 brought also a combination of events--deficient +grain harvest at home, withdrawal of gold from England to France +for investment in French public works, demand of America for gold +in place of goods, due to political uncertainties there--which +rapidly raised the discount rate from two and one half per cent. in +January, 1860, to six in December. By the end of April, 1861, the +Board of Trade Returns indicated that the cotton trade was in a +dangerous situation, with large imports of raw cotton and decreased +exports of goods<a name="FNanchor671"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_671">[671]</a>. The news of war actually begun in +America came as a temporary relief to the English cotton trade and +in the prospect of decreased supply prices rose, saving many +manufacturers from impending difficulties. A few mills had already +begun to work on part-time because of trade depression. The +<i>immediate</i> effect of Lincoln's blockade proclamation was to +check this movement, but by October it had again begun and this +time because of the rapid increase in the price of raw cotton as +compared with the slower advance of the price of goods<a name= +"FNanchor672"></a><a href="#Footnote_672">[672]</a>.</p> +<p>In substance the principal effect of the War on the English +cotton trade for the first seven or eight months was felt, not in +the manufacturing districts but in the Liverpool speculative and +importing markets of raw cotton. Prices rose steadily to over a +shilling a pound in October, 1861. On November 23 there was a near +panic caused by rumours of British intervention. These were +denounced as false and in five days the price was back above its +previous <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_9"></a>[V2:pg +9]</span> figure. Then on November 27 came the news of the +<i>Trent</i> and the market was thrown into confusion, not because +of hopes that cotton would come more freely but in fear that war +with America would cause it to do so. The Liverpool speculators +breathed freely again only when peace was assured. This speculative +British interest was no cause for serious governmental concern and +could not affect policy. But the manufacturing trade was, +presumably, a more serious anxiety and if cotton became hard, or +even impossible to obtain, a serious situation would demand +consideration.</p> +<p>In the generally accepted view of a "short war," there was at +first no great anticipation of real danger. But beginning with +December, 1861, there was almost complete stoppage of supply from +America. In the six months to the end of May, 1862, but 11,500 +bales were received, less than one per cent. of the amount for the +same six months of the previous year<a name= +"FNanchor673"></a><a href="#Footnote_673">[673]</a>. The blockade +was making itself felt and not merely in shipments from the South +but in prospects of Southern production, for the news came that the +negroes were being withdrawn by their masters from the rich sea +islands along the coast in fear of their capture by the Northern +blockading squadrons<a name="FNanchor674"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_674">[674]</a>. Such a situation seemed bound in the end +to result in pressure by the manufacturers for governmental action +to secure cotton. That it did not immediately do so is explained by +Arnold, whose dictum has been quite generally accepted, as +follows:</p> +<blockquote>"The immediate result of the American war was, at this +time, to relieve the English cotton trade, including the dealers in +the raw material and the producers and dealers in manufactures, +from a serious and impending difficulty. <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_10"></a>[V2:pg 10]</span> They had in hand +a stock of goods sufficient for the consumption of two-thirds of a +year, therefore a rise in the price of the raw material and the +partial closing of their establishments, with a curtailment of +their working expenses, was obviously to their advantage. But to +make their success complete, this rise in the price of cotton was +upon the largest stock ever collected in the country at this +season. To the cotton trade there came in these days an unlooked +for accession of wealth, such as even it had never known before. In +place of the hard times which had been anticipated, and perhaps +deserved, there came a shower of riches<a name= +"FNanchor675"></a><a href="#Footnote_675">[675]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>This was written of the situation in December, 1861. A similar +analysis, no doubt on the explanations offered by his English +friends, of "the question of cotton supply, which we had supposed +would speedily have disturbed the level of their neutral policy" +was made by Mason in March, 1862. "Thus," he concluded, "it is that +even in Lancashire and other manufacturing districts no open +demonstration has been made against the blockade<a name= +"FNanchor676"></a><a href="#Footnote_676">[676]</a>." Manufactures +other than cotton were greatly prospering, in particular those of +woollen, flax, and iron. And the theory that the cotton lords were +not, in reality, hit by the blockade--perhaps profited by it--was +bruited even during the war. <i>Blackwood's Magazine</i>, October, +1864, held this view, while the <i>Morning Post</i> of May 16, +1864, went to the extent of describing the "glut" of goods in 1861, +relieved just in the nick of time by the War, preventing a +financial crash, "which must sooner or later have caused great +suffering in Lancashire."</p> +<p>Arnold's generalization has been taken to prove that the +<i>immediate</i> effect of the Civil War was to save the cotton +industry from great disaster and that there <i>immediately</i> +resulted large profits to the manufacturers from the increased +price of stocks on hand. In fact his description of the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_11"></a>[V2:pg 11]</span> +situation in December, 1861, as his own later pages show, was not +applicable, so far as manufacturers' profits are concerned, until +the later months of 1862 and the first of 1863. For though prices +might be put up, as they were, goods were not sold in any large +quantities before the fall of 1862. There were almost no +transactions for shipments to America, China, or the Indies<a name= +"FNanchor677"></a><a href="#Footnote_677">[677]</a>. Foreign +purchasers as always, and especially when their needs had just been +abundantly supplied by the great output of 1858-60, were not keen +to place new orders in a rising and uncertain market. The English +producers raised their prices, but they held their goods, lacking +an effective market. The importance of this in British foreign +policy is that at no time, until the accumulated goods were +disposed of, was there likely to be any trade eagerness for a +British intervention in America. Their only fear, says Arnold, was +the sudden opening of Southern ports and a rush of raw +cotton<a name="FNanchor678"></a><a href="#Footnote_678">[678]</a>, +a sneer called out by the alleged great losses incurred and +patriotically borne in silence. Certainly in Parliament the members +from Lancashire gave no sign of discontent with the Government +policy of neutrality for in the various debates on blockade, +mediation, and cotton supply but one Member from Lancashire, +Hopwood, ever spoke in favour of a departure from neutrality, or +referred to the distress in the manufacturing districts as due to +any other cause than the shortage in cotton caused by the +war<a name="FNanchor679"></a><a href="#Footnote_679">[679]</a>.</p> +<p>But it was far otherwise with the operatives of Lancashire. +Whatever the causes of short-time operation in the mills or of +total cessation of work the situation was such that <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_12"></a>[V2:pg 12]</span> from October, +1861, more and more operatives were thrown out of employment. As +their little savings disappeared they were put upon public poor +relief or upon private charity for subsistence. The governmental +statistics do not cover, accurately, the relief offered by private +charity, but those of public aid well indicate the loss of +wage-earning opportunity. In the so-called "Distressed Districts" +of Lancashire and the adjoining counties it appears that poor +relief was given to 48,000 persons in normal times, out of a total +population of 2,300,000. In the first week of November, 1861, it +was 61,207, and for the first week of December, 71,593; thereafter +mounting steadily until March, 1862, when a temporary peak of +113,000 was reached. From March until the first week in June there +was a slight decrease; but from the second week of June poor relief +resumed an upward trend, increasing rapidly until December, 1862, +when it reached its highest point of 284,418. In this same first +week of December private relief, now thoroughly organized in a +great national effort, was extended to 236,000 people, making a +grand total at high tide of distress of over 550,000 persons, if +private relief was not extended to those receiving public funds. +But of this differentiation there is no surety--indeed there are +evidences of much duplication of effort in certain districts. In +general, however, these statistics do exhibit the great lack of +employment in a one-industry district heretofore enjoying unusual +prosperity<a name="FNanchor680"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_680">[680]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_13"></a>[V2:pg 13]</span> +<p>The manufacturing operative population of the district was +estimated at between 500,000 and 600,000. At the time of greatest +distress some 412,000 of these were receiving either public or +private aid, though many were working part-time in the mills or +were engaged on public enterprises set on foot to ease the crisis. +But there was no starvation and it is absurd to compare the crisis +to the Irish famine of the 'forties. This was a <i>cotton</i> +famine in the shortage of that commodity, but it was not a +<i>human</i> famine. The country, wrote John Bright, was passing +through a terrible crisis, but "our people will be kept alive by +the contributions of the country<a name="FNanchor681"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_681">[681]</a>." Nevertheless a rapid change from a +condition of adequate wage-earning to one of dependence on +charity--a change ultimately felt by the great bulk of those either +directly or indirectly dependent upon the cotton industry--might +have been expected to arouse popular demonstrations to force +governmental action directed to securing cotton that trade might +revive. That no such popular effect was made demands careful +analysis--to be offered in a later chapter--but here the +<i>fact</i> is alone important, and the fact was that the +operatives sympathized with the North and put no pressure on the +Cabinet. Thus at no time during the war was there any attempt from +Lancashire, whether of manufacturers or operatives, to force a +change of governmental policy<a name="FNanchor682"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_682">[682]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_14"></a>[V2:pg 14]</span> +<p>As the lack of employment developed in Lancashire public +discussion and consideration were inevitably aroused. But there was +little talk of governmental interference and such as did appear was +promptly met with opposition by the leading trade journals. July +13, 1861, the <i>Economist</i> viewed the cotton shortage as "a +<i>temporary</i> and an <i>immediate</i> one.... We have--on our +hypothesis--to provide against the stoppage of our supply for +<i>one</i> year, and that the very <i>next</i> year." Would it +<i>pay</i>, asked Bright, to break the blockade? "I don't think +myself it would be cheap ... at the cost of a war with the United +States<a name="FNanchor683"></a><a href="#Footnote_683">[683]</a>." +This was also the notion of the London <i>Shipping Gazette</i> +which, while acknowledging that the mill-owners of England and +France were about to be greatly embarrassed, continued: "<i>But we +are not going to add to the difficulty by involving ourselves in a +naval war with the Northern States</i><a name= +"FNanchor684"></a><a href="#Footnote_684">[684]</a>...." The +<i>Times</i> commented in substance in several issues in September, +1861, on the "wise policy of working short-time <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_15"></a>[V2:pg 15]</span> as a precaution +against the contingencies of the cotton supply, and of the glutted +state of distant markets for manufactured goods<a name= +"FNanchor685"></a><a href="#Footnote_685">[685]</a>." October 12, +the <i>Economist</i> acknowledged that the impatience of some +mill-owners was quite understandable as was talk of a European +compulsion on America to stop an "objectless and hopeless" quarrel, +but then entered upon an elaborate discussion of the principles +involved and demonstrated why England ought not to intervene. In +November Bright could write: "The notion of getting cotton by +interfering with the blockade is abandoned apparently by the +simpletons who once entertained it, and it is accepted now as a +fixed policy that we are to take no part in your +difficulties<a name="FNanchor686"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_686">[686]</a>." Throughout the fall of 1861 the +<i>Economist</i> was doing its best to quiet apprehensions, urging +that due to the "glut" of manufactured goods short-time must have +ensued anyway, pointing out that now an advanced price was +possible, and arguing that here was a situation likely to result in +the development of other sources of supply with an escape from the +former dependence on America. In view of the actual conditions of +the trade, already recounted, these were appealing arguments to the +larger manufacturers, but the small mills, running on short order +supplies and with few stocks of goods on hand were less easily +convinced. They were, however, without parliamentary influence and +hence negligible as affecting public policy. At the opening of the +new year, 1862, Bright declared that "with the spinners and +manufacturers and merchants, I think generally there is no wish for +any <i>immediate</i> change<a name="FNanchor687"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_687">[687]</a>."</p> +<p>Bright's letter of November, 1861, was written before news of +the <i>Trent</i> reached England: that of January, 1862, just after +that controversy had been amicably settled. The <i>Trent</i> had +both diverted attention from cotton and in <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_16"></a>[V2:pg 16]</span> its immediate +result created a general determination to preserve neutrality. It +is evident that even without this threat of war there was no real +cotton pressure upon the Government. With Northern successes in the +spring of 1862 hopes were aroused that the war would soon end or +that at least some cotton districts would be captured to the relief +of England. Seward held out big promises based on the capture of +New Orleans, and these for a time calmed governmental +apprehensions, though by midsummer it was clear that the inability +to secure the country back of the city, together with the Southern +determination to burn their cotton rather than see it fall into the +hands of the enemy, would prevent any great supply from the +Mississippi valley<a name="FNanchor688"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_688">[688]</a>. This was still not a matter of +<i>immediate</i> concern, for the Government and the manufacturers +both held the opinion that it was not lack of cotton alone that was +responsible for the distress and the manufacturers were just +beginning to unload their stocks<a name="FNanchor689"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_689">[689]</a>. But in considering and judging the +attitude of the British public on this question of cotton it should +always be remembered that the great mass of the people sincerely +believed that America was responsible for the distress in +Lancashire. The error in understanding was more important than the +truth.</p> +<p>In judging governmental policy, however, the truth as regards +the causes of distress in England is the more important element. +The "Cotton Lords" did not choose to reveal it. One must believe +that they intentionally dwelt upon the war as the sole responsible +cause. In the first important parliamentary debate on cotton, May +9, 1862, not a word <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_17"></a>[V2:pg 17]</span> was said of any other element in +the situation, and, it is to be noted, not a word advocating a +change in British neutral policy<a name="FNanchor690"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_690">[690]</a>. It is to be noted also that this debate +occurred when for two months past, the numbers on poor relief in +Lancashire were temporarily decreasing<a name= +"FNanchor691"></a><a href="#Footnote_691">[691]</a>, and the +general tone of the speakers was that while the distress was +serious it was not beyond the power of the local communities to +meet it. There was not, then, in May, any reason for grave concern +and Russell expressed governmental conviction when he wrote to +Gladstone, May 18, "We must, I believe, get thro' the cotton crisis +as we can, and promote inland works and railroads in India<a name= +"FNanchor692"></a><a href="#Footnote_692">[692]</a>." Moreover the +Southern orders to destroy cotton rather than permit its capture +and export by the North disagreeably affected British +officials<a name="FNanchor693"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_693">[693]</a>. Up to the end of August, 1862, Russell, +while writing much to Lyons on England's necessity for cotton, did +not do so in a vein indicative of criticism of Northern policy nor +in the sense that British distress demanded special official +consideration. Such demands on America as were made up to this time +came wholly from France<a name="FNanchor694"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_694">[694]</a>.</p> +<p>It was not then cotton, primarily, which brought a revival in +July of the Southern attack on the Government through +Parliament<a name="FNanchor695"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_695">[695]</a>. June had seen the collapse of Lindsay's +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_18"></a>[V2:pg 18]</span> +initial move, and Palmerston's answer to Hopwood, June 13, that +there was no intention, at present, to offer mediation, appeared +final. It was not cotton, but McClellan's defeat, that produced a +quick renewal of Lindsay's activities. June 30, Hopwood had +withdrawn his motion favouring recognition but in doing so asked +whether, "considering the great and increasing distress in the +country, the patient manner in which it has hitherto been borne, +and the hopelessness of the termination of hostilities, the +Government intend to take any steps whatever, either as parties to +intervention or otherwise, to endeavour to put an end to the Civil +War in America?" This was differently worded, yet contained little +variation from his former question of June 13, and this time +Palmerston replied briefly that the Government certainly would like +to mediate if it saw any hope of success but that at present "both +parties would probably reject it. If a different situation should +arise the Government would be glad to act<a name= +"FNanchor696"></a><a href="#Footnote_696">[696]</a>." This +admission was now seized upon by Lindsay who, on July 11, +introduced a motion demanding consideration of "the propriety of +offering mediation with the view of terminating hostilities," and +insisted upon a debate.</p> +<p>Thus while the first week of June seemed to have quieted rumours +of British mediation, the end of the month saw them revived. Adams +was keenly aware of the changing temper of opinion and on June 20 +presented to Russell a strong representation by Seward who wrote +"under the President's instructions" that such recurrent rumours +were highly injurious to the North since upon hopes of foreign aid +the South has been encouraged and sustained from the first day of +secession. Having developed this complaint at some length Seward +went on to a brief threat, containing the real meat of the +despatch, that if foreign nations did venture to intervene or +mediate in favour of the South, the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_19"></a>[V2:pg 19]</span> North would be forced to have +recourse to a weapon hitherto not used, namely to aid in a rising +of the slaves against their masters. This was clearly a threat of a +"servile war" if Great Britain aided the South--a war which would +place Britain in a very uncomfortable position in view of her +anti-slavery sentiments in the past. It is evidence of Adams' +discretion that this despatch, written May 28, was held back from +presentation to Russell until revived rumours of mediation made the +American Minister anxious<a name="FNanchor697"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_697">[697]</a>. No answer was given by Russell for over +a month, a fact in itself indicative of some hesitancy on policy. +Soon the indirect diplomacy of Napoleon III was renewed in the hope +of British concurrence. July 11, Slidell informed Mason that +Persigny in conversation had assured him "that this Government is +now more anxious than ever to take prompt and decided action in our +favour." Slidell asked if it was impossible to stir Parliament but +acknowledged that everything depended on Palmerston: "that august +body seems to be as afraid of him as the urchins of a village +school of the birch of their pedagogue<a name= +"FNanchor698"></a><a href="#Footnote_698">[698]</a>."</p> +<p>Unquestionably Persigny here gave Slidell a hint of private +instructions now being sent by Napoleon to Thouvenel who was on a +visit to London. The Emperor telegraphed "Demandez au gouvernement +anglais s'il ne croit pas le moment venu de reconnaître le +Sud<a name="FNanchor699"></a><a href="#Footnote_699">[699]</a>." +Palmerston had already answered this question in Parliament and +Thouvenel was personally very much opposed to the Emperor's +suggestion. There were press rumours that he was in London +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_20"></a>[V2:pg 20]</span> to +bring the matter to a head, but his report to Mercier was that +interference in America was a very dangerous matter and that he +would have been "badly received" by Palmerston and Russell if he +had suggested any change in neutral policy<a name= +"FNanchor700"></a><a href="#Footnote_700">[700]</a>.</p> +<p>In spite of this decided opposition by the French Minister of +Foreign Affairs it is evident that one ground for renewed Southern +hopes was the knowledge of the Emperor's private desires. Lindsay +chose his time well for on July 16 the first thorough report on +Lancashire was laid before Parliament<a name= +"FNanchor701"></a><a href="#Footnote_701">[701]</a>, revealing an +extremity of distress not previously officially authenticated, and +during this week the papers were full of an impending disaster to +McClellan's army. Lyons, now in London, on his vacation trip, was +concerned for the future mainly because of cotton, but did not +believe there was much danger of an immediate clash with +America<a name="FNanchor702"></a><a href="#Footnote_702">[702]</a>. +But the great Southern argument of the moment was the Northern +military failure, the ability of the South to resist indefinitely +and the hopelessness of the war. On the morning of July 18 all +London was in excitement over press statements that the latest news +from America was not of McClellan's retreat but of the capture of +his entire army.</p> +<p>Lindsay's motion was set for debate on this same July 18. Adams +thought the story of McClellan's surrender had been set afloat "to +carry the House of Commons off <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_21"></a>[V2:pg 21]</span> their feet in its debate +to-night<a name="FNanchor703"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_703">[703]</a>." The debate itself may be regarded as a +serious attempt to push the Ministry into a position more +favourable to the South, and the arguments advanced surveyed the +entire ground of the causes of secession and the inevitability of +the final separation of North and South. They need but brief +summary. Lindsay, refusing to accede to appeals for postponement +because "the South was winning anyway," argued that slavery was no +element in the conflict, that the Southern cause was just, and that +England, because of her own difficulties, should mediate and bring +to a conclusion a hopeless war. He claimed the time was opportune +since mediation would be welcomed by a great majority in the North, +and he quoted from a letter by a labouring man in Lancashire, +stating, "We think it high time to give the Southern States the +recognition they so richly deserve."</p> +<p>Other pro-Southern speakers emphasized Lancashire distress. +Gregory said: "We should remember what is impending over +Lancashire--what want, what woe, what humiliation--and that not +caused by the decree of God, but by the perversity of man. I leave +the statistics of the pauperism that is, and that is to be, to my +honourable friends, the representatives of manufacturing England." +No statistics were forthcoming from this quarter for not a +representative from Lancashire participated in the debate save +Hopwood who at the very end upbraided his fellow members from the +district for their silence and was interrupted by cries of "Divide, +Divide." Lindsay's quoted letter was met by opponents of mediation +with the assertion that the operatives were well known to be united +against <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_22"></a>[V2:pg +22]</span> any action and that they could be sustained "in luxury" +from the public purse for far less a cost than that of a war with +America.</p> +<p>But cotton did not play the part expected of it in this debate. +Forster in a very able speech cleverly keeping close to a +consideration of the effect of mediation on <i>England</i>, +advanced the idea that such a step would not end the war but would +merely intensify it and so prolong English commercial distress. He +did state, however, that intervention (as distinct from mediation) +would bring on a "servile war" in America, thus giving evidence of +his close touch with Adams and his knowledge of Seward's despatch +of May 28. In the main the friends of the North were content to be +silent and leave it to the Government to answer Lindsay. This was +good tactics and they were no doubt encouraged to silence by +evidence early given in the debate that there would be no positive +result from the motion. Gregory showed that this was a real +<i>attack</i> on the Government by his bitter criticisms of +Russell's "three months" speech<a name="FNanchor704"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_704">[704]</a>.</p> +<p>At the conclusion of Gregory's speech Lindsay and his friends, +their immediate purpose accomplished and fearing a vote, wished to +adjourn the debate indefinitely. Palmerston objected. He agreed +that everyone earnestly wished the war in America to end, but he +declared that such debates were a great mistake unless something +definite was to follow since they only served to create irritation +in America, both North and South. He concluded with a vigorous +assertion that if the Ministry were to administer the affairs of +the nation it ought to be trusted in foreign affairs and +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_23"></a>[V2:pg 23]</span> not +have its hands tied by parliamentary expressions of opinion at +inopportune moments. Finally, the South had not yet securely +established its independence and hence could not be recognized. +This motion, if carried, would place England on a definite side and +thus be fatal to any hope of successful mediation or intervention +in the future. Having now made clear the policy of the Government +Palmerston did not insist upon a division and the motion was +withdrawn<a name="FNanchor705"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_705">[705]</a>.</p> +<p>On the surface Lindsay's effort of July 18 had resulted in +ignominious failure. Lyons called it "ill-timed.... I do not think +we know here sufficiently the extent of the disaster [to McClellan] +to be able to come to any conclusion as to what the European Powers +should do." But the impression left by the debate that there was a +strong parliamentary opinion in favour of mediation made Lyons add: +"I suppose Mercier will open full cry on the scent, and be all for +mediation. I am still afraid of any attempt of the kind<a name= +"FNanchor706"></a><a href="#Footnote_706">[706]</a>." Very much the +same opinion was held by Henry Adams who wrote, "the pinch has +again passed by for the moment and we breathe more freely. But I +think I wrote to you some time ago that if July found us still in +Virginia, we could no longer escape interference. I think now that +it is inevitable." A definite stand taken by the North on slavery +would bring "the greatest strength in this running battle<a name= +"FNanchor707"></a><a href="#Footnote_707">[707]</a>."</p> +<p>In spite of surface appearances that the debate was "ill-timed" +the "pinch" was not in fact passed as the activities of Slidell and +Mason and their friends soon indicated. For a fortnight the +Cabinet, reacting to the repeated suggestions of Napoleon, the +Northern defeats, and the distress in Lancashire, was seriously +considering the possibility of taking some step toward mediation. +On July 16, two days before the debate in the Commons, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_24"></a>[V2:pg 24]</span> Slidell at last +had his first personal contact with Napoleon, and came away from +the interview with the conviction that "if England long persists in +her inaction he [Napoleon] would be disposed to act without her." +This was communicated to Mason on July 20<a name= +"FNanchor708"></a><a href="#Footnote_708">[708]</a>, but Slidell +did <i>not</i> as yet see fit to reveal to Mason that in the +interview with Napoleon he had made a definite push for separate +action by France, offering inducements on cotton, a special +commercial treaty, and "alliances, defensive, and offensive, for +Mexican affairs," this last without any authority from Benjamin, +the Confederate Secretary of State. On July 23 Slidell made a +similar offer to Thouvenel and left with him a full memorandum of +the Southern proposal<a name="FNanchor709"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_709">[709]</a>. He was cautioned that it was undesirable +his special offer to France should reach the ears of the British +Government--a caution which he transmitted to Mason on July 30, +when sending copies of Benjamin's instructions, but still without +revealing the full extent of his own overtures to Napoleon.</p> +<br> +<a name="image09.jpg"></a> +<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image09.jpg"><img src= +"images/image09.jpg" width="50%" alt=""></a><br> +<b>JOHN SLIDELL</b><br> +(<i>From Nicolay and Hay's "Life of Abraham Lincoln": The Century +Co. New York</i>)</p> +<br> +<p>In all this Slidell was still exhibiting that hankering to +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_25"></a>[V2:pg 25]</span> pull +off a special diplomatic achievement, characteristic of the man, +and in line, also, with a persistent theory that the policy most +likely to secure results was that of inducing France to act alone. +But he was repeatedly running against advice that France must +follow Great Britain, and the burden of his July 20 letter to Mason +was an urging that a demand for recognition be now made +simultaneously in Paris and London. Thouvenel, not at all +enthusiastic over Slidell's proposals, told him that this was at +least a prerequisite, and on July 23, Slidell wrote Mason the +demand should be made at once<a name="FNanchor710"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_710">[710]</a>. Mason, on the advice of Lindsay, +Fitzgerald, and Lord Malmesbury, had already prepared a request for +recognition, but had deferred making it after listening to the +debate of July 18<a name="FNanchor711"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_711">[711]</a>. Now, on July 24, he addressed Russell +referring to their interview of February, 1862, in which he had +urged the claims of the Confederacy to recognition and again +presented them, asserting that the subsequent failure of Northern +campaigns had demonstrated the power of the South to maintain its +independence. The South, he wrote, asked neither aid nor +intervention; it merely desired recognition and continuation of +British neutrality<a name="FNanchor712"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_712">[712]</a>. On the same day Mason also asked for an +interview<a name="FNanchor713"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_713">[713]</a>, but received no reply until July 31, +when Russell wrote that no definite answer could be sent until +"after a Cabinet" and that an interview did not seem +necessary<a name="FNanchor714"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_714">[714]</a>.</p> +<p>This answer clearly indicates that the Government was in +uncertainty. It is significant that Russell took this moment to +reply at last to Seward's protestations of May 28<a name= +"FNanchor715"></a><a href="#Footnote_715">[715]</a>, which had been +presented to him by Adams on June 20. He instructed Stuart at +Washington that his delay had <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_26"></a>[V2:pg 26]</span> been due to a "waiting for +military events," but that these had been indecisive. He gave a +résumé of all the sins of the North as a belligerent +and wrote in a distinctly captious spirit. Yet these sins had not +"induced Her Majesty's Government to swerve an inch from an +impartial neutrality<a name="FNanchor716"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_716">[716]</a>." Here was no promise of a continuance of +neutrality--rather a hint of some coming change. At least one +member of the Cabinet was very ready for it. Gladstone wrote +privately:</p> +<blockquote>"It is indeed much to be desired that this bloody and +purposeless conflict should cease. From the first it has been plain +enough that the whole question was whether the South was earnest +and united. That has now for some months been demonstrated; and the +fact thus established at once places the question beyond the region +even of the most brilliant military successes<a name= +"FNanchor717"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_717">[717]</a>...."</blockquote> +<p>Gladstone was primarily influenced by the British commercial +situation. Lyons, still in England, and a consistent opponent of a +change of policy, feared this commercial influence. He wrote to +Stuart:</p> +<blockquote>"...I can hardly anticipate any circumstances under +which I should think the intervention of England in the quarrel +between the North and South advisable....<br> +<br> +"But it is very unfortunate that no result whatever is apparent +from the nominal re-opening of New Orleans and other ports. And the +distress in the manufacturing districts threatens to be so great +that a pressure may be put upon the Government which they will find +it difficult to resist<a name="FNanchor718"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_718">[718]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>In Parliament sneers were indulged in by Palmerston at the +expense of the silent cotton manufacturers of Lancashire, much to +the fury of Cobden<a name="FNanchor719"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_719">[719]</a>. Of this period Arnold <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_27"></a>[V2:pg 27]</span> later +sarcastically remarked that, "The representatives of Lancashire in +the Houses of Parliament did not permit the gaieties of the +Exhibition season wholly to divert their attention from the +distress which prevailed in the home county<a name= +"FNanchor720"></a><a href="#Footnote_720">[720]</a>."</p> +<p>Being refused an interview, Mason transmitted to Russell on +August 1 a long appeal, rather than a demand, for recognition, +using exactly those arguments advanced by Lindsay in debate<a name= +"FNanchor721"></a><a href="#Footnote_721">[721]</a>. The answer, +evidently given after that "Cabinet" for whose decision Russell had +been waiting, was dated August 2. In it Russell, as in his reply to +Seward on July 28, called attention to the wholly contradictory +statements of North and South on the status of the war, which, in +British opinion, had not yet reached a stage positively indicative +of the permanence of Southern independence. Great Britain, +therefore, still "waited," but the time might come when Southern +firmness in resistance would bring recognition<a name= +"FNanchor722"></a><a href="#Footnote_722">[722]</a>. The tone was +more friendly than any expressions hitherto used by Russell to +Southern representatives. The reply does not reveal the decision +actually arrived at by the Ministry. Gladstone wrote to Argyll on +August 3 that "yesterday" a Cabinet had been held on the question +"to move or not to move, in the matter of the American Civil +War...." He had come away before a decision when it became evident +the prevailing sentiment would be "nothing shall be done until both +parties are desirous of it." Gladstone thought this very foolish; +he would have England approach France and Russia, but if they were +not ready, wait until they were. "Something, I trust, will be done +before the hot weather is over to stop these frightful +horrors<a name="FNanchor723"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_723">[723]</a>."</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_28"></a>[V2:pg 28]</span> +<p>All parties had been waiting since the debate of July 18 for the +Cabinet decision. It was at once generally known as "no step at +present" and wisdom would have decreed quiet acquiescence. +Apparently one Southern friend, on his own initiative, felt the +need to splutter. On the next day, August 4, Lord Campbell in the +Lords moved for the production of Russell's correspondence with +Mason, making a very confused speech. "Society and Parliament" were +convinced the war ought to end in separation. At one time Campbell +argued that reconquest of the South was impossible; at another that +England should interfere to prevent such reconquest. Again he urged +that the North was in a situation where she could not stop the war +without aid from Europe in extricating her. Probably the motion was +made merely to draw from Russell an official statement. Production +of the papers was refused. Russell stated that the Government still +maintained its policy of strict neutrality, that if any action was +to be taken it should be by all the maritime powers and that if, in +the parliamentary recess, any new policy seemed advisable he would +first communicate with those powers. He also declared very +positively that as yet no proposal had been received from any +foreign power in regard to America, laying stress upon the "perfect +accord" between Great Britain and France<a name= +"FNanchor724"></a><a href="#Footnote_724">[724]</a>.</p> +<p>Mason commented on this speech that someone was evidently lying +and naturally believed that someone to be Russell. He hoped that +France would promptly make this clear<a name= +"FNanchor725"></a><a href="#Footnote_725">[725]</a>. But France +gave no sign of lack of "perfect accord." On the contrary Thouvenel +even discouraged Slidell from following Mason's example of +demanding recognition and the formal communication was withheld, +Mason acquiescing<a name="FNanchor726"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_726">[726]</a>. Slidell thought new disturbances in +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_29"></a>[V2:pg 29]</span> +Italy responsible for this sudden lessening of French interest in +the South, but he was gloomy, seeing again the frustration of high +hopes. August 24 he wrote Benjamin:</p> +<blockquote>"You will find by my official correspondence that we +are still hard and fast aground here. Nothing will float us off but +a strong and continued current of important successes in the +field.<br> +<br> +I have no hope from England, because I am satisfied that she +desires an indefinite prolongation of the war, until the North +shall be entirely exhausted and broken down.<br> +<br> +Nothing can exceed the selfishness of English statesmen except +their wretched hypocrisy. They are continually casting about their +disinterested magnaminity and objection of all other considerations +than those dictated by a high-toned morality, while their entire +policy is marked by egotism and duplicity. I am getting to be +heartily tired of Paris<a name="FNanchor727"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_727">[727]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>On August 7 Parliament adjourned, having passed on the last day +of the session an Act for the relief of the distress in Lancashire +by authorizing an extension of powers to the Poor Law Guardians. +Like Slidell and Mason pro-Northern circles in London thought that +in August there had come to a disastrous end the Southern push for +a change in British policy, and were jubilant. To be sure, Russell +had merely declared that the time for action was "not yet" come, +but this was regarded as a sop thrown to the South. Neither in +informed Southern nor Northern circles outside the Cabinet was +there any suspicion, <i>except by Adams</i>, that in the six months +elapsed since Lindsay had begun his movement the Ministry had been +slowly progressing in thoughts of mediation.</p> +<p>In fact the sentiment of the Cabinet as stated by Gladstone had +been <i>favourable</i> to mediation when "both parties were ready +for it" and that such readiness would come soon most Members were +convinced. This was a <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_30"></a>[V2:pg 30]</span> convenient and reasonable ground +for postponing action but did not imply that if the conviction were +unrealized no mediation would be attempted. McClellan, driven out +of the Peninsula, had been removed, and August saw the Northern +army pressed back from Virginia soil. It was now Washington and not +Richmond that seemed in danger of capture. Surely the North must +soon realize the futility of further effort, and the reports early +in July from Washington dilated upon the rapid emergence of a +strong peace party.</p> +<p>But the first panic of dismay once past Stuart sent word of +enormous new Northern levies of men and of renewed courage<a name= +"FNanchor728"></a><a href="#Footnote_728">[728]</a>. By mid-August, +writing of cotton, he thought the prospect of obtaining any +quantity of it "seems hopeless," and at the same time reported the +peace party fast losing ground in the face of the great energy of +the Administration<a name="FNanchor729"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_729">[729]</a>. As to recognition, Stuart believed: +"There is nothing to be done in the presence of these enormous +fresh levies, but to wait and see what the next two months will +bring forth<a name="FNanchor730"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_730">[730]</a>." The hopes of the British Ministry based +on a supposed Northern weariness of the war were being shattered. +Argyll, having received from Sumner a letter describing the +enthusiasm and determination of the North, wrote to Gladstone:</p> +<blockquote>"It is evident, whatever may be our opinion of the +prospects of 'the North' that they do not yet, at least, feel any +approach to such exhaustion as will lead them to admit of +mediation<a name="FNanchor731"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_731">[731]</a>...."</blockquote> +<p>To this Gladstone replied:</p> +<blockquote>"I agree that this is not a state of mind favourable to +mediation; and I admit it to be a matter of great difficulty +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_31"></a>[V2:pg 31]</span> to +determine when the first step ought to be taken; but I cannot +subscribe to the opinion of those who think that Europe is to stand +silent without limit of time and witness these horrors and +absurdities, which will soon have consumed more men, and done ten +times more mischief than the Crimean War; but with the difference +that there the end was uncertain, here it is certain in the opinion +of the whole world except one of the parties. I should be puzzled +to point out a single case of dismemberment which has been settled +by the voluntary concession of the stronger party without any +interference or warning from third powers, and as far as principle +goes there never was a case in which warning was so proper and +becoming, because of the frightful misery which this civil conflict +has brought upon other countries, and because of the unanimity with +which it is condemned by the civilized world<a name= +"FNanchor732"></a><a href="#Footnote_732">[732]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The renewal of Northern energy, first reports of which were +known to Russell early in August, came as a surprise to the British +Ministry. Their progress toward mediation had been slow but steady. +Lindsay's initial steps, resented as an effort in indirect +diplomacy and not supported by France officially, had received +prompt rejection accompanied by no indication of a desire to depart +from strict neutrality. With the cessation in late June of the +Northern victorious progress in arms and in the face of increasing +distress in Lancashire, the second answer to Lindsay was less +dogmatic. As given by Palmerston the Government desired to offer +mediation, but saw no present hope of doing so successfully. +Finally the Government asked for a free hand, making no pledges. +Mason might be gloomy, Adams exultant, but when August dawned plans +were already on foot for a decided change. The secret was well +kept. Four days after the Cabinet decision to wait on events, two +days after Russell's refusal to produce the correspondence with +Mason, Russell, on the eve of departure for the Continent, was +writing to Palmerston:</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_32"></a>[V2:pg 32]</span> +<blockquote>"Mercier's notion that we should make some move in +October agrees very well with yours. I shall be back in England +before October, and we could then have a Cabinet upon it. Of course +the war may flag before that.<br> +<br> +"I quite agree with you that a proposal for an armistice should be +the first step; but we must be prepared to answer the question on +what basis are we to negotiate<a name="FNanchor733"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_733">[733]</a>?"</blockquote> +<p>The next movement to put an end to the war in America was to +come, not from Napoleon III, nor from the British friends of the +South, but from the British Ministry itself.</p> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_654"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor654">[654]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. +204.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_655"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor655">[655]</a> <i>De Bow's Review</i>, Dec., 1857, p. +592.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_656"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor656">[656]</a> Cited in Adams, <i>Trans-Atlantic +Historical Solidarity</i>, p. 66.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_657"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor657">[657]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 64.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_658"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor658">[658]</a> Cited in Smith, <i>Parties and +Slavery</i>, 68. A remarkable exposition of the "power of cotton" +and the righteousness of slavery was published in Augusta, Georgia, +in 1860, in the shape of a volume of nine hundred pages, entitled +<i>Cotton is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments</i>. This reproduced +seven separate works by distinguished Southern writers analysing +Slavery from the point of view of political economy, moral and +political philosophy, social ethics, political science, ethnology, +international law, and the Bible. The purpose of this united +publication was to prove the rightfulness, in every aspect, of +slavery, the prosperity of America as based on cotton, and the +power of the United States as dependent on its control of the +cotton supply. The editor was E.N. Elliot, President of Planters' +College, Mississippi.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_659"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor659">[659]</a> Jan. 26, 1861. Cited in Maxwell, +<i>Clarendon</i>, II, p. 237.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_660"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor660">[660]</a> <i>Am. Hist. Rev.</i>, XVIII, p. 785. +Bunch to Russell. No. 51. Confidential. Dec. 5, 1860. As here +printed this letter shows two dates, Dec. 5 and Dec. 15, but the +original in the Public Record Office is dated Dec. 5.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_661"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor661">[661]</a> pp. 94-5. Article by W.H. Chase of +Florida.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_662"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor662">[662]</a> Rhett, who advocated commercial treaties, +learned from Toombs that this was the case. "Rhett hastened to +Yancey. Had he been instructed to negotiate commercial treaties +with European powers? Mr. Yancey had received no intimation from +any source that authority to negotiate commercial treaties would +devolve upon the Commission. 'What then' exclaimed Rhett, 'can be +your instructions?' The President, Mr. Yancey said, seemed to be +impressed with the importance of the cotton crop. A considerable +part of the crop of last year was yet on hand and a full crop will +soon be planted. The justice of the cause and the cotton, so far as +he knew, he regretted to say, would be the basis of diplomacy +expected of the Commission" (Du Bose, <i>Life and Times of +Yancey</i>, 599).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_663"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor663">[663]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 780. No. 69. Bunch to +Russell, June 5, 1861. Italics by Bunch. The complete lack of the +South in industries other than its staple products is well +illustrated by a request from Col. Gorgas, Chief of Ordnance to the +Confederacy, to Mason, urging him to secure <i>three</i> +ironworkers in England and send them over. He wrote, "The reduction +of ores with coke seems not to be understood here" (Mason Papers. +Gorgas to Mason, Oct. 13, 1861).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_664"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor664">[664]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 48. Confidential. +Bunch to Russell, March 19, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_665"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor665">[665]</a> p. 130</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_666"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor666">[666]</a> The two principal British works are: +Arnold, <i>The History of the Cotton Famine</i>, London, 1864; and +Watts, <i>The Facts of the Cotton Famine</i>, Manchester, 1866. A +remarkable statistical analysis of the world cotton trade was +printed in London in 1863, by a Southerner seeking to use his study +as an argument for British mediation. George McHenry, <i>The Cotton +Trade</i>.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_667"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor667">[667]</a> Scherer, <i>Cotton as a World Power</i>, +pp. 263-4.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_668"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor668">[668]</a> Lack of authentic statistics on indirect +interests make this a guess by the <i>Times</i>. Other estimates +run from one-seventh to one-fourth.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_669"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor669">[669]</a> Schmidt, "Wheat and Cotton During the +Civil War," p. 408 (in <i>Iowa Journal of History and Politics</i>, +Vol. 16), 78.8 per cent. (Hereafter cited as Schmidt, <i>Wheat and +Cotton</i>.) Scherer, <i>Cotton as a World Power</i>, p. 264, +states 84 per cent, for 1860. Arnold, <i>Cotton Famine</i>, pp. +36-39, estimates 83 per cent.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_670"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor670">[670]</a> Great Britain ordinarily ran more than +twice as many spindles as all the other European nations combined. +Schmidt, <i>Wheat and Cotton</i>, p. 407, <i>note</i>.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_671"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor671">[671]</a> This Return for April is noteworthy as the +first differentiating commerce with the North and the +South.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_672"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor672">[672]</a> These facts are drawn from Board of Trade +Reports, and from the files of the <i>Economist</i>, London, and +<i>Hunt's Merchants Magazine</i>, New York. I am also indebted to a +manuscript thesis by T.P. Martin, "The Effects of the Civil War +Blockade on the Cotton Trade of the United Kingdom," Stanford +University. Mr. Martin in 1921 presented at Harvard University a +thesis for the Ph.D degree, entitled "The Influence of Trade (in +Cotton and Wheat) on Anglo-American Relations, 1829-1846," but has +not yet carried his more matured study to the Civil War +period.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_673"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor673">[673]</a> Adams, <i>Trans-Atlantic Historical +Solidarity</i>, p. 89.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_674"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor674">[674]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 10. Bunch to +Russell, Jan. 8, 1862. Bunch also reported that inland fields were +being transformed to corn production and that even the cotton on +hand was deteriorating because of the lack of bagging, shut off by +the blockade.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_675"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor675">[675]</a> Arnold, <i>Cotton Famine</i>, p. +81.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_676"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor676">[676]</a> Richardson, II, 198. Mason to Hunter, +March 11, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_677"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor677">[677]</a> Parliamentary Returns, 1861 and 1862. +<i>Monthly Accounts of Trade and Navigation</i> (in +<i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, <i>Commons</i>. Vol. LV, and +1863, <i>Commons</i>, Vol. LXV).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_678"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor678">[678]</a> Arnold, <i>Cotton Famine</i>, pp. 174 and +215.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_679"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor679">[679]</a> In 1861 there were 26 Members from +Lancashire in the Commons, representing 14 boroughs and 2 counties. +The suffrage was such that only 1 in every 27 of the population had +the vote. For all England the proportion was 1 in 23 (Rhodes, IV, +359). <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1867-8, <i>Lords</i>, Vol. +XXXII, "Report on Boundaries of Boroughs and Counties of +England."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_680"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor680">[680]</a> The figures are drawn from (1) Farnall's +"Reports on Distress in the Manufacturing Districts," 1862. +<i>Parliamentary Papers, Commons</i>, Vol. XLIX, Pt. I, 1863. +<i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. LII, 1864; and (2) from "Summary of the Number +of Paupers in the Distressed Districts," from November, 1861, to +December, 1863. <i>Commons</i>, Vol. LII. Farnall's reports are +less exact than the <i>Summary</i> since at times Liverpool is +included, at times not, as also six small poor-law unions which do +not appear in his reports until 1864. The <i>Summary</i> +consistently includes Liverpool, and fluctuates violently for that +city whenever weather conditions interfered with the ordinary +business of the port. It is a striking illustration of the narrow +margin of living wages among the dockers of Liverpool that an +annotation at the foot of a column of statistics should explain an +increase in one week of 21,000 persons thrown on poor relief to the +"prevalence of a strong east wind" which prevented vessels from +getting up to the docks.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_681"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor681">[681]</a> Trevelyan, <i>Bright</i>, p. 309. To +Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_682"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor682">[682]</a> The historians who see only economic +causes have misinterpreted the effects on policy of the "cotton +famine." Recently, also, there has been advanced an argument that +"wheat defeated cotton"--an idea put forward indeed in England +itself during the war by pro-Northern friends who pointed to the +great flow of wheat from the North as essential in a short-crop +situation in Great Britain. Mr. Schmidt in "The Influence of Wheat +and Cotton on Anglo-American Relations during the Civil War," a +paper read before the American Historical Association, Dec. 1917, +and since published in the <i>Iowa Journal of History and +Politics</i>, July, 1918, presents with much care all the important +statistics for both commodities, but his conclusions seem to me +wholly erroneous. He states that "Great Britain's dependence on +Northern wheat ... operated as a contributing influence in keeping +the British government officially neutral ..." (p. 423), a cautious +statement soon transformed to the positive one that "this fact did +not escape the attention of the English government," since leading +journals referred to it (p. 431). Progressively, it is asserted: +"But it was Northern wheat that may well be regarded as the +decisive factor, counterbalancing the influence of cotton, in +keeping the British government from recognizing the Confederacy" +(p. 437). "That the wheat situation must have exerted a profound +influence on the government ..." (p. 438). And finally: "In this +contest wheat won, demonstrating its importance as a world power of +greater significance than cotton" (p. 439). This interesting thesis +has been accepted by William Trimble in "Historical Aspects of the +Surplus Food Production of the United States, 1862-1902" (<i>Am. +Hist. Assoc. Reports</i>, 1918, Vol. I, p. 224). I think Mr. +Schmidt's errors are: (1) a mistake as to the time when recognition +of the South was in governmental consideration. He places it in +midsummer, 1863, when in fact the danger had passed by January of +that year. (2) A mistake in placing cotton and wheat supply on a +parity, since the former could not be obtained in quantity from +<i>any</i> source before 1864, while wheat, though coming from the +United States, could have been obtained from interior Russia, as +well as from the maritime provinces, in increased supply if Britain +had been willing to pay the added price of inland transport. There +was a real "famine" of cotton; there would have been none of wheat, +merely a higher cost. (This fact, a vital one in determining +influence, was brought out by George McHenry in the columns of +<i>The Index</i>, Sept. 18, 1862.) (3) The fact, in spite of all +Mr. Schmidt's suppositions, that while cotton was frequently a +subject of governmental concern in <i>memoranda</i> and in private +notes between members of the Cabinet, I have failed to find one +single case of the mention of wheat. This last seems conclusive in +negation of Mr. Schmidt's thesis.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_683"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor683">[683]</a> Speech at Rochdale, Sept. 1, 1861. Cited +in <i>Hunt's Merchants Magazine</i>, Vol. 45, pp. +326-7.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_684"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor684">[684]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 442.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_685"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor685">[685]</a> e.g., The <i>Times</i>, Sept. 19, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_686"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor686">[686]</a> To Sumner, Nov. 20, 1861. Mass Hist. Soc. +<i>Proceedings</i>, XLVI, p. 97.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_687"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor687">[687]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Jan. 11, 1862. Vol. XLV, p. +157.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_688"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor688">[688]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 85. Bunch to +Russell, June 25, 1862. He reported a general burning of cotton +estimating the amount so destroyed as nearly one million +bales.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_689"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor689">[689]</a> Rhodes, III, p. 503, leaves the impression +that England was at first unanimous in attributing the cotton +disaster to the War. Also, IV, p. 77. I think this an error. It was +the general public belief but not that of the well informed. +Rhodes, Vol. IV, p. 364, says that it was not until January, 1863, +that it was "begun to be understood" that famine was not wholly +caused by the War, but partly by glut.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_690"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor690">[690]</a> Hansard, 3d. Ser., CLXVI, pp. 1490-1520. +Debate on "The Distress in the Manufacturing Districts." The +principal speakers were Egerton, Potter, Villiers and Bright. +Another debate on "The Cotton Supply" took place June 19, 1862, +with no criticism of America. <i>Ibid.</i>, CLXVII, pp. +754-93.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_691"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor691">[691]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 12.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_692"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor692">[692]</a> Gladstone Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_693"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor693">[693]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 73. Bunch to +Russell, May 12, 1862. A description of these orders as inclusive +of "foreign owned" cotton of which Bunch asserted a great stock had +been purchased and stored, waiting export, by British citizens. +Molyneaux at Savannah made a similar report. <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. +849. No. 16. To Russell, May 10, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_694"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor694">[694]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, pp. +214-18.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_695"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor695">[695]</a> Arnold, <i>Cotton Famine</i>, p. 228, +quotes a song in the "improvised schoolrooms" of Ashton where +operatives were being given a leisure-time education. One verse +was:<br> +<br> +<blockquote>"Our mules and looms have now ceased work, the Yankees +are<br> +the cause. But we will let them fight it out and stand by<br> +English laws; No recognizing shall take place, until the war<br> +is o'er; Our wants are now attended to, we cannot ask for<br> +more."</blockquote> +</blockquote> +<br> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_696"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor696">[696]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p. +1213.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_697"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor697">[697]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Further Correspondence relating to the +Civil War in the United States." No. 1. Reed. June 21, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_698"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor698">[698]</a> Mason Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_699"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor699">[699]</a> Thouvenel, <i>Le Secret de l'Empereur</i>, +II, 352. The exact length of Thouvenel's stay in London is +uncertain, but he had arrived by July 10 and was back in Paris by +July 21. The text of the telegram is in a letter to Flahault of +July 26, in which Thouvenel shows himself very averse to any move +which may lead to war with America, "an adventure more serious than +that of Mexico" (<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 353).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_700"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor700">[700]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 349. July 24, 1862. See +also résumé in Walpole, <i>History of Twenty-five +Years</i>, II, 55.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_701"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor701">[701]</a> Farnall's First Report. <i>Parliamentary +Papers</i>, 1862, <i>Commons</i>, Vol. XLIX.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_702"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor702">[702]</a> Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 5, +1862.<br> +<br> +<blockquote>"Public opinion will not allow the Government to do +more for<br> +the North than maintain a strict neutrality, and it may not<br> +be easy to do that if there comes any strong provocation from<br> +the U.S. ..."<br> +<br> +<br> +"However, the real question of the day is cotton...."<br> +<br> +<br> +"The problem is of how to get over <i>this next</i> winter. The<br> +prospects of the manufacturing districts are very gloomy."<br> +<br> +<br> +"...If you can manage in any way to get a supply of cotton<br> +for England before the winter, you will have done a greater<br> +service than has been effected by Diplomacy for a century;<br> +but nobody expects it."</blockquote> +</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_703"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor703">[703]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, 166. +To his son, July 18, 1862. He noted that the news had come by the +<i>Glasgow</i> which had sailed for England on July 5, whereas the +papers contained also a telegram from McClellan's head-quarters, +dated July 7, but "the people here are fully ready to credit +anything that is not favourable." Newspaper headings were +"Capitulation of McClellan's Army. Flight of McClellan on a +steamer." <i>Ibid.</i>, 167. Henry Adams to C.F. Adams, Jr., July +19.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_704"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor704">[704]</a> Gregory introduced a ridiculous extract +from the <i>Dubuque Sun</i>, an Iowa paper, humorously advocating a +repudiation of all debts to England, and solemnly held this up as +evidence of the lack of financial morality in America. If he knew +of this the editor of the small-town American paper must have been +tickled at the reverberations of his humour.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_705"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor705">[705]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser. CLXVIII, pp. 511-549, +for the entire debate.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_706"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor706">[706]</a> Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 19, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_707"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor707">[707]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, pp. +168-9. To Charles Francis Adams, Jr., July 19, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_708"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor708">[708]</a> Mason Papers. The larger part of Slidell's +letter to Mason is printed in Sears, "A Confederate Diplomat at the +Court of Napoleon III," <i>Am. Hist. Rev.</i>, Jan., 1921, p. 263. +C.F. Adams, "A Crisis in Downing Street," Mass. Hist. Soc. +<i>Proceedings</i>, May, 1914, p. 379, is in error in dating this +letter April 21, an error for which the present writer is +responsible, having misread Slidell's difficult +hand-writing.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_709"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor709">[709]</a> Richardson, II, pp. 268-289. Slidell to +Benjamin, July 25, 1862. It is uncertain just when Mason learned +the details of Slidell's offer to France. Slidell, in his letter of +July 20, wrote: "There is an important part of our conversation +that I will give you through Mr. Mann," who, apparently, was to +proceed at once to London to enlighten Mason. But the Mason Papers +show that Mann did not go to London, and that Mason was left in the +dark except in so far as he could guess at what Slidell had done by +reading Benjamin's instructions, sent to him by Slidell, on July +30. These did <i>not</i> include anything on Mexico, but made clear +the plan of a "special commercial advantage" to France. In C.F. +Adams, "A Crisis in Downing Street," p. 381, it is stated that +Benjamin's instructions were written "at the time of Mercier's +visit to Richmond"--with the inference that they were a result of +Mercier's conversation at that time. This is an error. Benjamin's +instructions were written on April 12, and were sent on April 14, +while it was not until April 16 that Mercier reached Richmond. To +some it will no doubt seem inconceivable that Benjamin should not +have informed Mercier of his plans for France, just formulated. But +here, as in Chapter IX, I prefer to accept Mercier's positive +assurances to Lyons at their face value. Lyons certainly so +accepted them and there is nothing in French documents yet +published to cast doubt on Mercier's honour, while the chronology +of the Confederate documents supports it.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_710"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor710">[710]</a> Mason Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_711"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor711">[711]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Mason to Slidell, July 18 +and 19.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_712"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor712">[712]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1863, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXIX. "Correspondence with Mr. Mason respecting +Blockade and Recognition." No. 7.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_713"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor713">[713]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 8.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_714"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor714">[714]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 9.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_715"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor715">[715]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 18.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_716"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor716">[716]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Further Correspondence relating to the +Civil War in the United States." No. 2. Russell to Stuart, July 28, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_717"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor717">[717]</a> Gladstone Papers. To Col. Neville, July +26, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_718"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor718">[718]</a> Lyons Papers. July 29, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_719"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor719">[719]</a> Malmesbury, <i>Memoirs of an +Ex-Minister</i>, II, p. 276. July 31, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_720"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor720">[720]</a> Arnold, <i>Cotton Famine</i>, p. +175.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_721"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor721">[721]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1863, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXIX. "Correspondence with Mr. Mason respecting +Blockade and Recognition." No. 10.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_722"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor722">[722]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 11.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_723"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor723">[723]</a> Gladstone Papers. Also Argyll, +<i>Autobiography</i>, II, p. 191.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_724"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor724">[724]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVIII, p. 1177 +<i>seq</i>.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_725"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor725">[725]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Aug. 5, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_726"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor726">[726]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1443. No. 964. Cowley +to Russell, Aug. 8, 1862. Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, Aug. 20, +1862. Mason to Slidell, Aug. 21.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_727"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor727">[727]</a> Richardson, II, p. 315.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_728"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor728">[728]</a> Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July 7, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_729"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor729">[729]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, To Russell, Aug. 18, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_730"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor730">[730]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Aug. 26. Stuart's "nothing +to be done" refers, not to mediation, but to his idea in June-July +that the time was ripe for recognition. He was wholly at variance +with Lyons on British policy.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_731"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor731">[731]</a> Gladstone Papers. Aug. 26, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_732"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor732">[732]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Aug. 29, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_733"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor733">[733]</a> Palmerston MS. Aug. 6, 1862.</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_33"></a>[V2:pg 33]</span> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XI"></a>CHAPTER XI</h2> +<h3>RUSSELL'S MEDIATION PLAN</h3> +<br> +<p>The adjournment of Parliament on August 7 without hint of +governmental inclination to act in the American Civil War was +accepted by most of the British public as evidence that the +Ministry had no intentions in that direction. But keen observers +were not so confident. Motley, at Vienna, was keeping close touch +with the situation in England through private correspondence. In +March, 1862, he thought that "France and England have made their +minds up to await the issue of the present campaign"--meaning +McClellan's advance on Richmond<a name="FNanchor734"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_734">[734]</a>. With the failure of that campaign he +wrote: "Thus far the English Government have resisted his +[Napoleon's] importunities. But their resistance will not last +long<a name="FNanchor735"></a><a href="#Footnote_735">[735]</a>." +Meanwhile the recently established pro-Southern weekly, <i>The +Index</i>, from its first issue, steadily insisted on the wisdom +and necessity of British action to end the war<a name= +"FNanchor736"></a><a href="#Footnote_736">[736]</a>. France was +declared rapidly to be winning the goodwill of the South at the +expense of England; the British aristocracy were appealed to on +grounds of close sympathy with a "Southern Aristocracy"; mediation, +at first objected to, in view of the more reasonable demand for +recognition, was in the end the chief object of <i>The Index</i>, +after mid-July, when simple recognition seemed impossible of +attainment<a name="FNanchor737"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_737">[737]</a>. Especially British <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_34"></a>[V2:pg 34]</span> humiliation +because of the timidity of her statesmen, was harped upon and any +public manifestation of Southern sympathy was printed in great +detail<a name="FNanchor738"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_738">[738]</a>.</p> +<p>The speculations of Motley, the persistent agitation of <i>The +Index</i> are, however, no indication that either Northern fears or +Southern hopes were based on authoritative information as to +governmental purpose. The plan now in the minds of Palmerston and +Russell and their steps in furthering it have been the subject of +much historical study and writing. It is here proposed to review +them in the light of all available important materials, both old +and new, using a chronological order and with more citation than is +customary, in the belief that such citations best tell the story of +this, the most critical period in the entire course of British +attitude toward the Civil War. Here, and here only, Great Britain +voluntarily approached the danger of becoming involved in the +American conflict<a name="FNanchor739"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_739">[739]</a>.</p> +<p>Among the few who thought the withdrawal of Lindsay's motion, +July 18, and the Prime Minister's comments did <i>not</i> indicate +safety for the North stood Adams, the American Minister. Of +Palmerston's speech he wrote the next day in his diary: "It was +cautious and wise, but enough could be gathered from it to show +that mischief to us in some shape will only be averted by the +favour of Divine Providence or <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_35"></a>[V2:pg 35]</span> our own efforts. The anxiety +attending my responsibility is only postponed<a name= +"FNanchor740"></a><a href="#Footnote_740">[740]</a>." At this very +moment Adams was much disturbed by his failure to secure +governmental seizure of a war vessel being built at Liverpool for +the South--the famous <i>Alabama</i>--which was soon completed and +put to sea but ten days later, July 29. Russell's delay in +enforcing British neutrality, as Adams saw it, in this matter, +reinforcing the latter's fears of a change in policy, had led him +to explain his alarm to Seward. On August 16 Adams received an +instruction, written August 2, outlining the exact steps to be +taken in case the feared change in British policy should occur. As +printed in the diplomatic documents later presented to Congress +this despatch is merely a very interesting if somewhat discursive +essay on the inevitability of European ruminations on the +possibility of interference to end the war and argues the unwisdom +of such interference, especially for Great Britain's own interests. +It does not read as if Seward were alarmed or, indeed, as if he had +given serious consideration to the supposed danger<a name= +"FNanchor741"></a><a href="#Footnote_741">[741]</a>. But this +conveys a very erroneous impression. An unprinted portion of the +despatch very specifically and in a very serious tone, instructs +Adams that if approached by the British Government with +propositions implying a purpose:</p> +<blockquote>"To dictate, or to mediate, or to advise, or even to +solicit or persuade, you will answer that you are forbidden to +debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain or transmit, any +communication of the kind.... If you are asked an opinion what +reception the President would give to such a proposition, if made +here, you will reply that you are not instructed, but you have no +reason for supposing that it would be entertained."</blockquote> +<p>This was to apply either to Great Britain alone or acting in +conjunction with other Powers. Further, if the South <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_36"></a>[V2:pg 36]</span> should be +"acknowledged" Adams was immediately to suspend his functions. "You +will perceive," wrote Seward, "that we have approached the +contemplation of that crisis with the caution which great +reluctance has inspired. But I trust that you will also have +perceived that the crisis has not appalled us<a name= +"FNanchor742"></a><a href="#Footnote_742">[742]</a>."</p> +<p>This serious and definite determination by the North to resent +any intervention by Europe makes evident that Seward and Lincoln +were fully committed to forcible resistance of foreign meddling. +Briefly, if the need arose, the North would go to war with Europe. +Adams at least now knew where he stood and could but await the +result. The instruction he held in reserve, nor was it ever +officially communicated to Russell. He did, however, state its +tenor to Forster who had contacts with the Cabinet through +Milner-Gibson and though no proof has been found that the American +determination was communicated to the Ministry, the presumption is +that this occurred<a name="FNanchor743"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_743">[743]</a>. Such communication could not have taken +place before the end of August and possibly was not then made owing +to the fact that the Cabinet was scattered in the long vacation and +that, apparently, the plan to move <i>soon</i> in the American War +was as yet unknown save to Palmerston and to Russell.</p> +<p>Russell's letter to Palmerston of August 6, sets the date of +their determination<a name="FNanchor744"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_744">[744]</a>. Meanwhile they were depending much upon +advices from Washington for the exact moment. Stuart was +suggesting, with Mercier, that October should be selected<a name= +"FNanchor745"></a><a href="#Footnote_745">[745]</a>, and continued +his urgings even though his immediate chief, Lyons, was writing to +him from London strong personal objections to any European +intervention whatever and especially any by Great Britain<a name= +"FNanchor746"></a><a href="#Footnote_746">[746]</a>. Lyons +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_37"></a>[V2:pg 37]</span> +explained his objections to Russell as well, but Stuart, having +gone to the extent of consulting also with Stoeckl, the Russian +Minister at Washington, was now in favour of straight-out +recognition of the Confederacy as the better measure. This, thought +Stoeckl, was less likely to bring on war with the North than an +attempt at mediation<a name="FNanchor747"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_747">[747]</a>. Soon Stuart was able to give notice, a +full month in advance of the event, of Lincoln's plan to issue an +emancipation proclamation, postponed temporarily on the insistence +of Seward<a name="FNanchor748"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_748">[748]</a>, but he attached no importance to this, +regarding it as at best a measure of pretence intended to frighten +the South and to influence foreign governments<a name= +"FNanchor749"></a><a href="#Footnote_749">[749]</a>. Russell was +not impressed with Stuart's shift from mediation to recognition. "I +think," he wrote, "we must allow the President to spend his second +batch of 600,000 men before we can hope that he and his democracy +will listen to reason<a name="FNanchor750"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_750">[750]</a>." But this did not imply that Russell was +wavering in the idea that October would be a "ripe time." Soon he +was journeying to the Continent in attendance on the Queen and +using his leisure to perfect his great plan<a name= +"FNanchor751"></a><a href="#Footnote_751">[751]</a>.</p> +<p>Russell's first positive step was taken on September 13. +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_38"></a>[V2:pg 38]</span> On +that date he wrote to Cowley in Paris instructing him to sound +Thouvenel, <i>privately</i><a name="FNanchor752"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_752">[752]</a>, and the day following he wrote to +Palmerston commenting on the news just received of the exploits of +Stonewall Jackson in Virginia, "it really looks as if he might end +the war. In October the hour will be ripe for the Cabinet<a name= +"FNanchor753"></a><a href="#Footnote_753">[753]</a>." Similar +reactions were expressed by Palmerston at the same moment and for +the same reasons. Palmerston also wrote on September 14:</p> +<blockquote>"The Federals ... got a very complete smashing ... even +Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the +Confederates."<br> +<br> +<p>"If this should happen, would it not be time for us to consider +whether in such a state of things England and France might not +address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon +the basis of separation<a name="FNanchor754"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_754">[754]</a>?"</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Russell replied:</p> +<blockquote>"... I agree with you that the time is come for +offering mediation to the United States Government, with a view to +the recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I agree +further that, in case of failure, we ought ourselves to recognize +the Southern States as an independent State. For the purpose of +taking so important a step, I think we must have a meeting, of the +Cabinet. The 23rd or 30th would suit me for the meeting<a name= +"FNanchor755"></a><a href="#Footnote_755">[755]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The two elder statesmen being in such complete accord the result +of the unofficial overture to France was now awaited with interest. +This, considering the similar unofficial suggestions previously +made by Napoleon, was surprisingly lukewarm. Cowley reported that +he had held a long and serious conversation with Thouvenel on the +subject of mediation as instructed by Russell on the thirteenth and +found a disposition "to wait to see the result <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_39"></a>[V2:pg 39]</span> of the +elections" in the North. Mercier apparently had been writing that +Southern successes would strengthen the Northern peace party. +Thouvenel's idea was that "if the peace party gains the ascendant," +Lincoln and Seward, both of whom were too far committed to listen +to foreign suggestions, would "probably be set aside." He also +emphasized the "serious consequences" England and France might +expect if they recognized the South.</p> +<blockquote>"I said that we might propose an armistice without +mediation, and that if the other Powers joined with us in doing so, +and let it be seen that a refusal would be followed by the +recognition of the Southern States, the certainty of such +recognition by all Europe must carry weight with it."<br> +<br> +Thouvenel saw some difficulties, especially Russia.<br> +<br> +"...the French Government had some time back sounded that of Russia +as to her joining France and England in an offer of mediation and +had been met by an almost scornful refusal...."<br> +<br> +"It appears also that there is less public pressure here for the +recognition of the South than there is in England<a name= +"FNanchor756"></a><a href="#Footnote_756">[756]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Thouvenel's lack of enthusiasm might have operated as a check to +Russell had he not been aware of two circumstances causing less +weight than formerly to be attached to the opinions of the French +Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The first was the well-known +difference on American policy between Thouvenel and Napoleon III +and the well-grounded conviction that the Emperor was at any moment +ready to impose his will, if only England would give the signal. +The second circumstance was still more important. It was already +known through the French press that a sharp conflict had arisen in +the Government as to Italian policy and all signs pointed to a +reorganization of the Ministry which would exclude Thouvenel. Under +these <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_40"></a>[V2:pg +40]</span> circumstances Russell could well afford to discount +Thouvenel's opinion. The extent to which he was ready to go--much +beyond either the offer of mediation, or of armistice evidently in +Cowley's mind--is shown by a letter to Gladstone, September 26.</p> +<blockquote>"I am inclined to think that October 16 may be soon +enough for a Cabinet, if I am free to communicate the views which +Palmerston and I entertain to France and Russia in the interval +between this time and the middle of next month. These views had the +offer of mediation to both parties in the first place, and in the +case of refusal by the North, to recognition of the South. +Mediation on the basis of separation and recognition accompanied by +a declaration of neutrality<a name="FNanchor757"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_757">[757]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The perfected plan, thus outlined, had resulted from a +communication to Palmerston of Cowley's report together with a +memorandum, proposed to be sent to Cowley, but again +<i>privately</i><a name="FNanchor758"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_758">[758]</a>, addressed to France alone. Russell here +also stated that he had explained his ideas to the Queen. "She only +wishes Austria, Prussia and Russia to be consulted. I said that +should be done, but we must consult France first." Also enclosed +was a letter from Stuart of September 9, reporting Mercier as just +returned from New York and convinced that if advantage were not +taken of the present time to do exactly that which was in Russell's +mind, Europe would have to wait for the "complete exhaustion" of +the North<a name="FNanchor759"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_759">[759]</a>. Russell was now at home again and the +next day Palmerston approved the plans as "excellent"; but he asked +whether it would not be well to include Russia in the invitation as +a compliment, even though "she might probably decline." As to the +other European powers the matter could wait for an "after +communication." Yet that Palmerston still wished to go <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_41"></a>[V2:pg 41]</span> slowly is shown +by a comment on the military situation in America:</p> +<blockquote>"It is evident that a great conflict is taking place to +the north-west of Washington, and its issue must have a great +effect on the state of affairs. If the Federals sustain a great +defeat, they may be at once ready for mediation, and the iron +should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other hand, they +should have the best of it, we may wait awhile and see what may +follow<a name="FNanchor760"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_760">[760]</a>...."</blockquote> +<p>Thus through Palmerston's caution Russia had been added to +France in Russell's proposed memorandum and the communication to +Cowley had not been sent off immediately--as the letter to +Gladstone of September 26 indicates. But the plan was regarded as +so far determined upon that on September 24 Russell requested Lyons +not to fix, as yet, upon a date for his departure for America, +writing, "M. Mercier is again looking out for an opportunity to +offer mediation, and this time he is not so much out in his +reckoning<a name="FNanchor761"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_761">[761]</a>." Curiously Mercier had again changed his +mind and now thought a proposal of an armistice was the best move, +being "particularly anxious that there should be no mention of the +word <i>separation</i>," but of this Russell had, as yet, no +inkling<a name="FNanchor762"></a><a href="#Footnote_762">[762]</a>. +With full approval of the plan as now outlined, Palmerston wrote to +Gladstone, September 24, that he and Russell were in complete +agreement that an offer of mediation should be made by the three +maritime powers, but that "no actual step would be taken without +the sanction of the Cabinet<a name="FNanchor763"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_763">[763]</a>." Two days later Russell explained to +Gladstone the exact nature of the proposal<a name= +"FNanchor764"></a><a href="#Footnote_764">[764]</a>, but that there +was even now no thoroughly worked out agreement on the sequence of +steps necessary is shown by <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_42"></a>[V2:pg 42]</span> Palmerston's letter to Gladstone +of the twenty-fourth, in which is outlined a preliminary proposal +of an armistice, cessation of blockade, and negotiation on the +basis of separation<a name="FNanchor765"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_765">[765]</a>.</p> +<p>Other members of the Cabinet were likewise informed of the +proposed overture to France and Russia and soon it was clear that +there would be opposition. Granville had replaced Russell in +attendance upon the Queen at Gotha. He now addressed a long and +careful argument to Russell opposing the adventure, as he thought +it, summing up his opinion in this wise:</p> +<blockquote>"...I doubt, if the war continues long after our +recognition of the South, whether it will be possible for us to +avoid drifting into it."<br> +<br> +"...I have come to the conclusion that it is premature to depart +from the policy which has hitherto been adopted by you and Lord +Palmerston, and which, notwithstanding the strong antipathy to the +North, the strong sympathy with the South, and the passionate wish +to have cotton, has met with such general approval from Parliament, +the press, and the public<a name="FNanchor766"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_766">[766]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>But Granville had little hope his views would prevail. A few +days later he wrote to Lord Stanley of Alderley:</p> +<blockquote>"I have written to Johnny my reasons for thinking it +decidedly premature. I, however, suspect you will settle to do so! +Pam, Johnny, and Gladstone would be in favour of it; and probably +Newcastle. I do not know about the others. It appears to me a great +mistake<a name="FNanchor767"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_767">[767]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Opportunely giving added effect to Granville's letter +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_43"></a>[V2:pg 43]</span> +there now arrived confused accounts from America of the battles +about Washington and of a check to the Southern advance. On +September 17 there had been fought the battle of Antietam and two +days later Lee, giving up his Maryland campaign, began a retreat +through the Shenandoah valley toward the old defensive Southern +lines before Richmond. There was no pursuit, for McClellan, again +briefly in command, thought his army too shattered for an advance. +Palmerston had been counting on a great Southern victory and was +now doubtful whether the time had come after all for European +overtures to the contestants. October 2 he wrote Russell:</p> +<blockquote>"MY DEAR RUSSELL,<br> +<br> +"I return you Granville's letter which contains much deserving of +serious consideration. There is no doubt that the offer of +Mediation upon the basis of Separation would be accepted by the +South. Why should it not be accepted? It would give the South in +principle the points for which they are fighting. The refusal, if +refusal there was, would come from the North, who would be +unwilling to give up the principle for which they have been +fighting so long as they had a reasonable expectation that by going +on fighting they could carry their point. The condition of things +therefore which would be favourable to an offer of mediation would +be great success of the South against the North. That state of +things seemed ten days ago to be approaching. Its advance has been +lately checked, but we do not yet know the real course of recent +events, and still less can we foresee what is about to follow. Ten +days or a fortnight more may throw a clearer light upon future +prospects.<br> +<br> +"As regards possible resentment on the part of the Northerns +following upon an acknowledgment of the Independence of the South, +it is quite true that we should have less to care about that +resentment in the spring when communication with Canada was open, +and when our naval force could more easily operate upon the +American coast, than in winter when we are cut off from Canada and +the American coast is not so safe.<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_44"></a>[V2:pg 44]</span> "But +if the acknowledgment were made at one and the same time by +England, France and some other Powers, the Yankees would probably +not seek a quarrel with us alone, and would not like one against a +European Confederation. Such a quarrel would render certain and +permanent that Southern Independence the acknowledgment of which +would have caused it.<br> +<br> +"The first communication to be made by England and France to the +contending parties might be, not an absolute offer of mediation but +a friendly suggestion whether the time was not come when it might +be well for the two parties to consider whether the war, however +long continued, could lead to any other result than separation; and +whether it might not therefore be best to avoid the great evils +which must necessarily flow from a prolongation of hostilities by +at once coming to an agreement to treat upon that principle of +separation which must apparently be the inevitable result of the +contest, however long it may last.<br> +<br> +"The best thing would be that the two parties should settle details +by direct negotiation with each other, though perhaps with the +rancorous hatred now existing between them this might be difficult. +But their quarrels in negotiation would do us no harm if they did +not lead to a renewal of war. An armistice, if not accompanied by a +cessation of blockades, would be all in favour of the North, +especially if New Orleans remained in the hands of the North.<br> +<br> +"The whole matter is full of difficulty, and can only be cleared up +by some more decided events between the contending armies...."<br> +<br> +PALMERSTON<a name="FNanchor768"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_768">[768]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Very evidently Palmerston was experiencing doubts and was all in +favour of cautious delay. American military events more than +Granville's arguments influenced him, but almost immediately there +appeared a much more vigorous and determined opponent within the +Cabinet. Cornewall Lewis was prompt to express objections. October +2, Russell transmitted to Palmerston a letter of disapproval +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_45"></a>[V2:pg 45]</span> from +Lewis. Russell also, momentarily, was hesitating. He wrote:</p> +<blockquote>"This American question must be well sifted. I send you +a letter of G. Lewis who is against moving ..."<br> +<br> +"My only doubt is whether we and France should stir if Russia holds +back. Her separation from our move would ensure the rejection of +our proposals. But we shall know more by the 16th. I have desired a +cabinet to be summoned for that day, but the summons will not go +out till Saturday. So if you wish to stop it, write to +Hammond<a name="FNanchor769"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_769">[769]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>From this it would appear that Russia had been +approached<a name="FNanchor770"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_770">[770]</a> but that Russell's chief concern was the +attitude of France, that his proposed private communication to +Cowley had been despatched and that he was waiting an answer which +might be expected before the sixteenth. If so his expectations were +negatived by that crisis now on in the French Ministry over the +Italian question prohibiting consideration of any other matter. On +October 15 Thouvenel was dismissed, but his formal retirement from +office did not take place until October 24. Several Ministers +abroad, among them Flahault, at London, followed him into +retirement and foreign affairs were temporarily in +confusion<a name="FNanchor771"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_771">[771]</a>. The Emperor was away <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_46"></a>[V2:pg 46]</span> from Paris and +all that Cowley reported was that the last time he had seen +Thouvenel the latter had merely remarked that "as soon as the +Emperor came back the two Governments ought to enter into a serious +consideration of the whole question<a name= +"FNanchor772"></a><a href="#Footnote_772">[772]</a>...." Cowley +himself was more concerned that it was now becoming clear France, +in spite of previous protestations, was planning "colonizing" +Mexico<a name="FNanchor773"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_773">[773]</a>.</p> +<p>Up to the end of September, therefore, the British Government, +while wholly confident that France would agree in any effort +whatsoever that England might wish to make, had no recent +assurances, either official or private, to this effect. This did +not disturb Russell, who took for granted French approval, and soon +he cast aside the hesitation caused by the doubts of Granville, the +opposition of Lewis, and the caution of Palmerston. Public opinion +was certainly turning toward a demand for Ministerial +action<a name="FNanchor774"></a><a href="#Footnote_774">[774]</a>. +Two days of further consideration caused him to return to the +attack; October 4 he wrote Palmerston:</p> +<blockquote>"I think unless some miracle takes place this will be +the very time for offering mediation, or as you suggest, proposing +to North and South to come to terms.<br> +<br> +"Two things however must be made clear:<br> +<br> +(i) That we propose separation,<br> +<br> +(ii) That we shall take no part in the war unless attacked +ourselves<a name="FNanchor775"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_775">[775]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>How Russell proposed to evade a war with an angry North was not +made clear, but in this same letter notice was given that he was +preparing a memorandum for the Cabinet. Russell was still for a +mediation on lines of separation, but his uncertainty, even +confusion, of mind became evident <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_47"></a>[V2:pg 47]</span> but another two days later on +receipt of a letter from Stuart, written September 23, in which he +and Mercier were now all for a suggestion of armistice, with no +mention of separation<a name="FNanchor776"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_776">[776]</a>. Russell now thought:</p> +<blockquote>"If no fresh battles occur, I think the suggestion +might be adopted, tho' I am far from thinking with Mercier that the +North would accept it. But it would be a fair and defensible +course, leaving it open to us to hasten or defer recognition if the +proposal is declined. Lord Lyons might carry it over on the +25th<a name="FNanchor777"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_777">[777]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>British policy, as represented by the inclinations of the +Foreign Secretary, having started out on a course portending +positive and vigorous action, was now evidently in danger of +veering far to one side, if not turning completely about. But the +day after Russell seemed to be considering such an attenuation of +the earlier plan as to be content with a mere suggestion of +armistice, a bomb was thrown into the already troubled waters +further and violently disturbing them. This was Gladstone's speech +at Newcastle, October 7, a good third of which was devoted to the +Civil War and in which he asserted that Jefferson Davis had made an +army, was making a navy, and had created something still greater--a +nation<a name="FNanchor778"></a><a href="#Footnote_778">[778]</a>. +The chronology of shifts in opinion would, at first glance, +indicate that Gladstone made this speech with the intention of +forcing Palmerston and Russell to continue in the line earlier +adopted, thus hoping to bolster up a cause now losing ground. His +declaration, coming from a leading member of of the Cabinet, was +certain to be accepted by the public as a foreshadowing of +governmental action. If Jefferson Davis <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_48"></a>[V2:pg 48]</span> had in truth +created a nation then early recognition must be given it. But this +surmise of intentional pressure is not borne out by any discovered +evidence. On the contrary, the truth is, seemingly, that Gladstone, +in the north and out of touch, was in complete ignorance that the +two weeks elapsed since his letters from Palmerston and Russell had +produced any alteration of plan or even any hesitation. Himself +long convinced of the wisdom of British intervention in some form +Gladstone evidently could not resist the temptation to make the +good news known. His declaration, foreshadowing a policy that did +not pertain to his own department, and, more especially, that had +not yet received Cabinet approval was in itself an offence against +the traditions of British Cabinet organization. He had spoken +without authorization and "off his own bat."</p> +<p>The speculative market, sensitive barometer of governmental +policy, immediately underwent such violent fluctuations as to +indicate a general belief that Gladstone's speech meant action in +the war. The price of raw cotton dropped so abruptly as to alarm +Southern friends and cause them to give assurances that even if the +blockade were broken there would be no immediate outpouring of +cotton from Southern ports<a name="FNanchor779"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_779">[779]</a>. On the other hand, Bright, staunch +friend of the North, <i>hoped</i> that Gladstone was merely seeking +to overcome a half-hearted reluctance of Palmerston and Russell to +move. He was sore at heart over the "vile speech" of "your old +acquaintance and friend<a name="FNanchor780"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_780">[780]</a>." The leading newspapers while at first +accepting the Newcastle speech as an authoritative statement and +generally, though mildly, approving, were quick to feel that there +was still uncertainty of policy and became silent <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_49"></a>[V2:pg 49]</span> until it should +be made clear just what was in the wind<a name= +"FNanchor781"></a><a href="#Footnote_781">[781]</a>. Within the +Cabinet it is to be supposed that Gladstone had caused no small +stir, both by reason of his unusual procedure and by his +sentiments. On Russell, however much disliked was the incursion +into his own province, the effect was reinvigoration of a desire to +carry through at least some portion of the plan and he determined +to go on with the proposal of an armistice. Six days after +Gladstone's speech Russell circulated, October 13, a memorandum on +America<a name="FNanchor782"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_782">[782]</a>.</p> +<p>This memorandum asserted that the South had shown, conclusively, +its power to resist--had maintained a successful defensive; that +the notion of a strong pro-Northern element in the South had been +shown to be wholly delusive; that the emancipation proclamation, +promising a freeing of the slaves in the sections still in +rebellion on January 1, 1863, was no humanitarian or idealistic +measure (since it left slavery in the loyal or recognized +districts) and was but an incitement to servile war--a most +"terrible" plan. For these reasons Russell urged that the Great +Powers ought seriously to consider whether it was not their duty to +propose a "suspension of arms" for the purpose of "weighing calmly +the advantages of peace<a name="FNanchor783"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_783">[783]</a>." This was a far cry from mediation and +recognition, nor did Russell <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_50"></a>[V2:pg 50]</span> indicate either the proposed terms +of an armistice or the exact steps to be taken by Europe in +bringing it about and making it of value. But the memorandum of +October 13 does clearly negative what has been the accepted British +political tradition which is to the effect that Palmerston, angered +at Gladstone's presumption and now determined against action, had +"put up" Cornewall Lewis to reply in a public speech, thereby +permitting public information that no Cabinet decision had as yet +been reached. Lewis' speech was made at Hereford on October 14. +Such were the relations between Palmerston and Russell that it is +impossible the former would have so used Lewis without notifying +Russell, in which case there would have been no Foreign Office +memorandum of the thirteenth<a name="FNanchor784"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_784">[784]</a>. Lewis was, in fact, vigorously +maintaining his objections, already made known to Russell, to +<i>any</i> plan of departure from the hitherto accepted policy of +neutrality and his speech at Hereford was the opening gun of active +opposition.</p> +<p>Lewis did not in any sense pose as a friend of the North. Rather +he treated the whole matter, in his speech at Hereford and later in +the Cabinet as one requiring cool judgment and decision on the sole +ground of British interests. This was the line best suited to +sustain his arguments, but does not prove, as some have thought, +that his Cabinet acknowledgment of the impossibility of Northern +complete victory, was his private conviction<a name= +"FNanchor785"></a><a href="#Footnote_785">[785]</a>. At Hereford +Lewis argued that everyone must acknowledge a great war was in +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_51"></a>[V2:pg 51]</span> +progress and must admit it "to be undecided. Under such +circumstances, the time had not yet arrived when it could be +asserted in accordance with the established doctrines of +international law that the independence of the Southern States had +been established<a name="FNanchor786"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_786">[786]</a>." In effect Lewis gave public notice that +no Cabinet decision had yet been reached, a step equally opposed to +Cabinet traditions with Gladstone's speech, since equally +unauthorized, but excusable in the view that the first offence +against tradition had forced a rejoinder<a name= +"FNanchor787"></a><a href="#Footnote_787">[787]</a>. For the public +Lewis accomplished his purpose and the press refrained from +comment, awaiting results<a name="FNanchor788"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_788">[788]</a>. Meanwhile Palmerston, who must finally +determine policy, was remaining in uncertainty and in this +situation thought it wise to consult, indirectly, Derby, the leader +of the opposition in Parliament. This was done through Clarendon, +who wrote to Palmerston on October 16 that Derby was averse to +action.</p> +<blockquote>"He said that he had been constantly urged to <i>go in +for</i> recognition and mediation, but had always refused on the +ground that recognition would merely irritate the North without +advancing the cause of the South or procuring a single bale of +cotton, and that mediation in the present temper of the +Belligerents <i>must</i> be rejected even if the mediating Powers +themselves knew what to propose as a fair basis of compromise; for +as each party insisted upon having that which the other declared +was vitally essential to its existence, it was clear that the war +had not yet marked <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_52"></a>[V2:pg 52]</span> out the stipulations of a treaty +of peace.... The recognition of the South could be of no benefit to +England unless we meant to sweep away the blockade, which would be +an act of hostility towards the North<a name= +"FNanchor789"></a><a href="#Footnote_789">[789]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>More than any other member of the Cabinet Lewis was able to +guess, fairly accurately, what was in the Premier's mind for Lewis +was Clarendon's brother-in-law, and "the most intimate and esteemed +of his male friends<a name="FNanchor790"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_790">[790]</a>." They were in constant communication as +the Cabinet crisis developed, and Lewis' next step was taken +immediately after Palmerston's consultation of Derby through +Clarendon. October 17, Lewis circulated a memorandum in reply to +that of Russell's of October 13. He agreed with Russell's statement +of the facts of the situation in America, but added with +sarcasm:</p> +<blockquote>"A dispassionate bystander might be expected to concur +in the historical view of Lord Russell, and to desire that the war +should be speedily terminated by a pacific agreement between the +contending parties. But, unhappily, the decision upon any proposal +of the English Government will be made, not by dispassionate +bystanders, but by heated and violent partisans; and we have to +consider, not how the proposal indicated in the Memorandum ought to +be received, or how it would be received by a conclave of +philosophers, but how it is likely to be received by the persons to +whom it would be addressed."</blockquote> +<p>Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, Lewis admitted, presumably +was intended to incite servile war, but that very fact was an +argument against, not for, British action, since it revealed an +intensity of bitterness prohibitory of any "calm consideration" of +issues by the belligerents. And suppose the North did acquiesce in +an armistice the only peaceful solution would be an independent +slave-holding South for the establishment of which Great Britain +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_53"></a>[V2:pg 53]</span> +would have become intermediary and sponsor. Any policy except that +of the continuance of strict neutrality was full of dangers, some +evident, some but dimly visible as yet. Statesmanship required +great caution; "... looking to the probable consequences," Lewis +concluded, "of this philanthropic proposition, we may doubt whether +the chances of evil do not preponderate over the chances of good, +and whether it is not--</p> +<blockquote>'Better to endure the ills we have<br> +Than fly to others which we know not of<a name= +"FNanchor791"></a><a href="#Footnote_791">[791]</a>.'"</blockquote> +<p>At the exact time when Lewis thus voiced his objections, basing +them on the lack of any sentiment toward peace in America, there +were received at the Foreign Office and read with interest the +reports of a British special agent sent out from Washington on a +tour of the Western States. Anderson's reports emphasized three +points:</p> +<p>(1) Emancipation was purely a war measure with no thought of +ameliorating the condition of the slaves once freed;</p> +<p>(2) Even if the war should stop there was no likelihood of +securing cotton for a long time to come;</p> +<p>(3) The Western States, even more then the Eastern, were in +favour of vigorous prosecution of the war and the new call for men +was being met with enthusiasm<a name="FNanchor792"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_792">[792]</a>.</p> +<p>This was unpromising either for relief to a distressed England +or for Northern acceptance of an armistice, yet Russell, commenting +on Clarendon's letter to Palmerston, containing Derby's advice, +still argued that even if declined a suggestion of armistice could +do no harm and might open <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_54"></a>[V2:pg 54]</span> the way for a later move, but he +agreed that recognition "would certainly be premature at +present<a name="FNanchor793"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_793">[793]</a>." Russell himself now heard from +Clarendon and learned that Derby "had been constantly urged to +press for recognition and mediation but he had always refused on +the ground that the neutral policy hitherto pursued by the +Government was the right one and that if we departed from it we +should only meet with an insolent rejection of our offer<a name= +"FNanchor794"></a><a href="#Footnote_794">[794]</a>." A long +conference with Lyons gave cause for further thought and Russell +committed himself to the extent that he acknowledged "we ought not +to move <i>at present</i> without Russia<a name= +"FNanchor795"></a><a href="#Footnote_795">[795]</a>...." Finally, +October 22, Palmerston reached a decision for the immediate +present, writing to Russell:</p> +<blockquote>"Your description of the state of things between the +two parties is most comprehensive and just. I am, however, much +inclined to agree with Lewis that at present we could take no step +nor make any communication of a distinct proposition with any +advantage."<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 25%;"> +<br> +"All that we could possibly do without injury to our position would +be to ask the two Parties not whether they would agree to an +armistice but whether they might not turn their thoughts towards an +arrangement between themselves. But the answer of each might be +written by us beforehand. The Northerners would say that the only +condition of arrangement would be the restoration of the Union; the +South would say their only condition would be an acknowledgment by +the North of Southern Independence--we should not be more advanced +and should only have pledged each party more strongly to the object +for which they are fighting. I am therefore inclined to change the +opinion on which I wrote to you when the Confederates seemed to be +carrying all before them, and I am very much come back to our +original view of the matter, that we must <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_55"></a>[V2:pg 55]</span> continue merely +to be lookers-on till the war shall have taken a more decided +turn<a name="FNanchor796"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_796">[796]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>By previous arrangement the date October 23 had been set for a +Cabinet to consider the American question but Russell now postponed +it, though a few members appeared and held an informal discussion +in which Russell still justified his "armistice" policy and was +opposed by Lewis and the majority of those present. Palmerston did +not attend, no action was possible and technically no Cabinet was +held<a name="FNanchor797"></a><a href="#Footnote_797">[797]</a>. It +soon appeared that Russell, vexed at the turn matters had taken, +was reluctant in yielding and did not regard the question as +finally settled. Yet on the afternoon of this same day Adams, much +disturbed by the rumours attendant upon the speeches of Gladstone +and Lewis, sought an explanation from Russell and was informed that +the Government was not inclined at present to change its policy but +could make no promises for the future<a name= +"FNanchor798"></a><a href="#Footnote_798">[798]</a>. This appeared +to Adams to be an assurance against <i>any</i> effort by Great +Britain and has been interpreted as disingenuous on Russell's part. +Certainly Adams' confidence was restored by the interview. But +Russell was apparently unconvinced as yet that a suggestion of +armistice would necessarily lead to the evil consequences +prophesied by Lewis, or would, indeed, require any departure from a +policy of strict neutrality. On the one side Russell was being +berated by pro-Southerners as weakly continuing an outworn policy +and as having "made himself the laughing-stock of Europe and of +America<a name="FNanchor799"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_799">[799]</a>;" on the other he was regarded, for the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_56"></a>[V2:pg 56]</span> +moment, as insisting, through pique, on a line of action highly +dangerous to the preservation of peace with the North. October 23 +Palmerston wrote his approval of the Cabinet postponement, but +declared Lewis' doctrine of "no recognition of Southern +independence until the North had admitted it" was unsound<a name= +"FNanchor800"></a><a href="#Footnote_800">[800]</a>. The next day +he again wrote: "... to talk to the belligerents about peace at +present would be as useless as asking the winds during the last +week to let the waters remain calm<a name= +"FNanchor801"></a><a href="#Footnote_801">[801]</a>."</p> +<p>This expression by Palmerston on the day after the question +apparently had come to a conclusion was the result of the +unexpected persistence of Russell and Gladstone. Replying to +Palmerston's letter of the twenty-third, Russell wrote: "As no good +could come of a Cabinet, I put it off. But tho' I am quite ready to +agree to your conclusions for the present, I cannot do so for G. +Lewis' reasons...."</p> +<blockquote>"G. Lewis besides has made a proposition for me which I +never thought of making. He says I propose that England and France +and perhaps some one Continental power should ask America to +suspend the war. I never thought of making such a proposal.<br> +<br> +"I think if Russia agreed Prussia would. And if France and England +agreed Austria would. Less than the whole five would not do. I +thought it right towards the Cabinet to reserve any specific +proposition. I am not at all inclined to adopt G. Lewis' +invention.<br> +<br> +"I have sent off Lyons without instructions, at which he is much +pleased<a name="FNanchor802"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_802">[802]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Russell was shifting ground; first the proposal was to have been +made by England and France; then Russia was <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_57"></a>[V2:pg 57]</span> necessary; now +"less than five powers would not do." But whatever the number +required he still desired a proposal of armistice. On October 23, +presumably subsequent to the informal meeting of Cabinet members, +he drew up a brief memorandum in answer to that of Lewis on October +17, denying that Lewis had correctly interpreted his plan, and +declaring that he had always had "in contemplation" a step by the +five great powers of Europe. The advisability of trying to secure +such joint action, Russell asserted, was all he had had in mind. +<i>If</i> the Cabinet had approved this advisability, and the +powers were acquiescent, <i>then</i> (in answer to Lewis' +accusation of "no look ahead") he would be ready with definite +plans for the negotiation of peace between North and South<a name= +"FNanchor803"></a><a href="#Footnote_803">[803]</a>. Thus by letter +to Palmerston and by circulation of a new memorandum Russell gave +notice that all was not yet decided. On October 24, Gladstone also +circulated a memorandum in reply to Lewis, urging action by +England, France and Russia<a name="FNanchor804"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_804">[804]</a>.</p> +<p>Russell's second memorandum was not at first taken seriously by +his Cabinet opponents. They believed the issue closed and Russell +merely putting out a denial of alleged purposes. Clarendon, though +not a member of the Cabinet, was keeping close touch with the +situation and on October 24 wrote to Lewis:</p> +<blockquote>"Thanks for sending me your memorandum on the American +question, which I have read with great satisfaction. <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_58"></a>[V2:pg 58]</span> Johnny [Russell] +always loves to do something when to do nothing is prudent, and I +have no doubt that he hoped to get support in his meddling +proclivities when he called a Cabinet for yesterday; but its +postponement <i>sine die</i> is probably due to your memorandum. +You have made so clear the idiotic position we should occupy, +either in having presented our face gratuitously to the Yankee slap +we should receive, or in being asked what practical solution we had +to propose after an armistice had been agreed to at our suggestion, +that no discussion on the subject would have been possible, and the +Foreign Secretary probably thought it would be pleasanter to draw +in his horns at Woburn than in Downing Street<a name= +"FNanchor805"></a><a href="#Footnote_805">[805]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>On October 26, having received from Lewis a copy of Russell's +newly-circulated paper, Clarendon wrote again:</p> +<blockquote>"The Foreign Secretary's <i>blatt</i> exhibits +considerable soreness, for which you are specially bound to make +allowance, as it was you who procured abortion for him. He had +thought to make a great deal of his colt by Meddler out of Vanity, +and you have shown his backers that the animal was not fit to start +and would not run a yard if he did. He is therefore taken back to +the country, where he must have a deal more training before he can +appear in public again."<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 25%;"> +<br> +"I should say that your speech at Hereford was nearly as effective +in checking the alarm and speculation caused by Gladstone's speech, +as your memorandum was in smashing the Foreign Secretary's proposed +intervention, and that you did so without in the smallest degree +committing either the Government or yourself with respect to the +future<a name="FNanchor806"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_806">[806]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>In effect Clarendon was advising Lewis to pay no attention to +Russell's complaining rejoinder since the object desired had been +secured, but there was still one element of strength for Russell +and Gladstone which, if obtained, might easily cause a re-opening +of the whole question. <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_59"></a>[V2:pg 59]</span> This was the desire of France, +still unexpressed in spite of indirect overtures, a silence in part +responsible for the expression of an opinion by Palmerston that +Napoleon's words could not be depended upon as an indication of +what he intended to do<a name="FNanchor807"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_807">[807]</a>. On the day this was written the French +ministerial crisis--the real cause of Napoleon's silence--came to +an end with the retirement of Thouvenel and the succession of +Drouyn de Lhuys. Russell's reply to Palmerston's assertion of the +folly of appealing now to the belligerents was that "recognition" +was certainly out of the question for the present and that "it +should not take place till May Or June next year, when +circumstances may show pretty clearly whether Gladstone was +right<a name="FNanchor808"></a><a href="#Footnote_808">[808]</a>." +But this yielding to the Premier's decision was quickly withdrawn +when, at last, Napoleon and his new Minister could turn their +attention to the American question.</p> +<p>On October 27 Cowley reported a conversation with the Emperor in +which American affairs were discussed. Napoleon hoped that England, +France and Russia would join in an offer of mediation. Cowley +replied that he had no instructions and Napoleon then modified his +ideas by suggesting a proposal of armistice for six months "in +order to give time for the present excitement to calm down<a name= +"FNanchor809"></a><a href="#Footnote_809">[809]</a>...." The next +day Cowley reported that Drouyn de Lhuys stated the Emperor to be +very anxious to "put an end to the War," but that he was himself +doubtful whether it would not be better to "wait a little longer," +and in any case if overtures to America were rejected Russia +probably would not join Great Britain and France in going on to a +recognition of the South<a name="FNanchor810"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_810">[810]</a>. All this was exactly in line with that +plan to which <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_60"></a>[V2:pg +60]</span> Russell had finally come and if officially notified to +the British Government would require a renewed consideration by the +Cabinet. Presumably Napoleon knew what had been going on in London +and he now hastened to give the needed French push. October 28, +Slidell was summoned to an audience and told of the Emperor's +purpose, acting with England, to bring about an armistice<a name= +"FNanchor811"></a><a href="#Footnote_811">[811]</a>. Three days +later, October 31, Cowley wrote that he had now been officially +informed by Drouyn de Lhuys, "by the Emperor's orders" that a +despatch was about to be sent to the French Ministers in England +and Russia instructing them to request joint action by the three +powers in suggesting an armistice of six months <i>including a +suspension of the blockade</i>, thus throwing open Southern ports +to European commerce<a name="FNanchor812"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_812">[812]</a>.</p> +<p>Napoleon's proposal evidently took Palmerston by surprise and +was not regarded with favour. He wrote to Russell:</p> +<blockquote>"As to the French scheme of proposals to the United +States, we had better keep that question till the Cabinet meets, +which would be either on Monday 11th, or Wednesday 12th, as would +be most convenient to you and our colleagues. <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_61"></a>[V2:pg 61]</span> But is it likely +that the Federals would consent to an armistice to be accompanied +by a cessation of Blockades, and which would give the Confederates +means of getting all the supplies they may want?"<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 25%;"> +<br> +"Then comes the difficulty about slavery and the giving up of +runaway slaves, about which we could hardly frame a proposal which +the Southerns would agree to, and people of England would approve +of. The French Government are more free from the shackles of +principle and of right and wrong on these matters, as on all others +than we are. At all events it would be wiser to wait till the +elections in North America are over before any proposal is made. As +the Emperor is so anxious to put a stop to bloodshed he might try +his hand as a beginning by putting down the stream of ruffians +which rolls out from that never-failing fountain at Rome<a name= +"FNanchor813"></a><a href="#Footnote_813">[813]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>But Russell was more optimistic, or at least in favour of some +sort of proposal to America. He replied to Palmerston:</p> +<blockquote>"My notion is that as there is little chance of our +good offices being accepted in America we should make them such as +would be creditable to us in Europe. I should propose to answer the +French proposal therefore by saying,<br> +<br> +"That in offering our good offices we ought to require both parties +to consent to examine, first, whether there are any terms upon +which North and South would consent to restore the Union; and +secondly, failing any such terms, whether there are any terms upon +which both would consent to separate.<br> +<br> +"We should also say that if the Union is to be restored it would be +essential in our view, that after what has taken place all the +slaves should be emancipated, compensation being granted by +Congress at the rate at which Great Britain emancipated her slaves +in 1833.<br> +<br> +"If separation takes place we must be silent on the trend of +slavery, as we are with regard to Spain and Brazil.<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_62"></a>[V2:pg 62]</span> +"This is a rough sketch, but I will expand it for the Cabinet.<br> +<br> +"It will be an honourable proposal to make, but the North and +probably the South will refuse it<a name="FNanchor814"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_814">[814]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Here were several ideas quite impossible of acceptance by North +and South in their then frame of mind and Russell himself believed +them certain to be refused by the North in any case. But he was +eager to present the question for Cabinet discussion hoping for a +reversal of the previous decision. Whether from pique or from +conviction of the wisdom of a change in British policy, he proposed +to press for acceptance of the French plan, with modifications. The +news of Napoleon's offer and of Russell's attitude, with some +uncertainty as to that of Palmerston, again brought Lewis into +action and on November 7 he circulated another memorandum, this +time a very long one of some fifteen thousand words. This was in +the main an historical résumé of past British policy +in relation to revolted peoples, stating the international law of +such cases, and pointing out that Great Britain had never +recognized a revolted people so long as a <i>bona fide</i> struggle +was still going on. Peace was no doubt greatly to be desired. "If +England could, by legitimate means, and without unduly sacrificing +or imperilling her own interests, accelerate this consummation, she +would, in my opinion, earn the just gratitude of the civilized +world." But the question, as he had previously asserted, was full +of grave dangers. The very suggestion of a concert of Powers was +itself one to be avoided. "A conference of the five great Powers is +an imposing force, but it is a dangerous body to set in motion. A +single intervening Power may possibly contrive to satisfy both the +adverse parties; but five intervening Powers have first to satisfy +one another." Who could tell what divergence might arise on the +question <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_63"></a>[V2:pg +63]</span> of slavery, or on boundaries, or how far England might +find her ideals or her vital interests compromised<a name= +"FNanchor815"></a><a href="#Footnote_815">[815]</a>?</p> +<p>Here was vigorous resistance to Russell, especially effective +for its appeal to past British policy, and to correct practice in +international law. On the same day that Lewis' memorandum was +circulated, there appeared a communication in the <i>Times</i> by +"Historicus," on "The International Doctrine of Recognition," +outlining in briefer form exactly those international law arguments +presented by Lewis, and advocating a continuation of the policy of +strict neutrality. "Historicus" was William Vernon Harcourt, +husband of Lewis' stepdaughter who was also the niece of Clarendon. +Evidently the family guns were all trained on Russell<a name= +"FNanchor816"></a><a href="#Footnote_816">[816]</a>. "Historicus" +drove home the fact that premature action by a neutral was a +"hostile act" and ought to be resented by the "Sovereign State" as +a "breach of neutrality and friendship<a name= +"FNanchor817"></a><a href="#Footnote_817">[817]</a>."</p> +<p>Thus on receipt of the news of Napoleon's proposal the Cabinet +crisis was renewed and even more sharply than on October 23. The +French offer was not actually presented until November 10<a name= +"FNanchor818"></a><a href="#Footnote_818">[818]</a>. On the next +two days the answer to be made received long discussion in the +Cabinet. Lewis described this to Clarendon, prefacing his account +by stating that Russell had heard by telegram from Napier at St. +Petersburg to the effect that Russia would not join but would +support English-French proposals through her Minister at +Washington, "provided it would not cause irritation<a name= +"FNanchor819"></a><a href="#Footnote_819">[819]</a>."</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_64"></a>[V2:pg 64]</span> +<blockquote>"Having made this statement, Lord John proceeded to +explain his views on the question. These were, briefly, that the +recent successes of the Democrats afforded a most favourable +opportunity of intervention, because we should strengthen their +hands, and that if we refused the invitation of France, Russia +would reconsider her decision, act directly with France, and thus +accomplish her favourite purpose of separating France and England. +He therefore advised that the proposal of France should be +accepted. Palmerston followed Lord John, and supported him, but did +not say a great deal. His principal argument was the necessity for +showing sympathy with Lancashire, and of not throwing away any +chance of mitigating it [<i>sic</i>].<br> +<br> +"The proposal was now thrown before the Cabinet, who proceeded to +pick it to pieces. Everybody present threw a stone at it of greater +or less size, except Gladstone, who supported it, and the +Chancellor [Westbury] and Cardwell, who expressed no opinion. The +principal objection was that the proposed armistice of six months +by sea and land, involving a suspension of the commercial blockade, +was so grossly unequal--so decidedly in favour of the South, that +there was no chance of the North agreeing to it. After a time, +Palmerston saw that the general feeling of the Cabinet was against +being a party to the representation, and he capitulated. I do not +think his support was very sincere: it certainly was not hearty ... +I ought to add that, after the Cabinet had come to a decision and +the outline of a draft had been discussed, the Chancellor uttered a +few oracular sentences on the danger of refusing the French +invitation, and gave a strong support to Lord John. His support +came rather late ... I proposed that we should <i>tater le +terrain</i> at Washington and ascertain whether there was any +chance of the proposal being accepted. Lord John refused this. He +admitted there was no chance of an affirmative answer from +Washington. I think his principal motive was a fear of displeasing +France, and that Palmerston's principal motive was a wish to seem +to support him. There is a useful <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_65"></a>[V2:pg 65]</span> article in to-day's <i>Times</i> +throwing cold water on the invitation. I take for granted that +Delane was informed of the result of the Cabinet<a name= +"FNanchor820"></a><a href="#Footnote_820">[820]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Gladstone, writing to his wife, gave a similar though more brief +account:</p> +<blockquote>"Nov. 11. We have had our Cabinet to-day and meet again +to-morrow. I am afraid we shall do little or nothing in the +business of America. But I will send you definite intelligence. +Both Lords Palmerston and Russell are <i>right.</i> Nov. 12. The +United States affair has ended and not well. Lord Russell rather +turned tail. He gave way without resolutely fighting out his +battle. However, though we decline for the moment, the answer is +put upon grounds and in terms which leave the matter very open for +the future. Nov. 13. I think the French will make our answer about +America public; at least it is very possible. But I hope they may +not take it as a positive refusal, or at any rate that they may +themselves act in the matter. It will be clear that we concur with +them, that the war should cease. Palmerston gave to Russell's +proposal a feeble and half-hearted support<a name= +"FNanchor821"></a><a href="#Footnote_821">[821]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The reply to France was in fact immediately made public both in +France and in England. It was complimentary to the Emperor's +"benevolent views and humane intentions," agreed that "if the steps +proposed were to be taken, the concurrence of Russia would be +extremely desirable" but remarked that as yet Great Britain had not +been informed that Russia wished to co-operate, and concluded that +since there was no ground to hope the North was ready for the +proposal it seemed best to postpone any overture until there was a +"greater prospect than now exists of its being accepted +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_66"></a>[V2:pg 66]</span> by +the two contending parties<a name="FNanchor822"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_822">[822]</a>." The argument of Russell in the Cabinet +had been for acceptance without Russia though earlier he had +stipulated her assistance as essential. This was due to the +knowledge already at hand through a telegram from Napier at St. +Petersburg, November 8, that Russia would refuse<a name= +"FNanchor823"></a><a href="#Footnote_823">[823]</a>. But in the +answer to France it is the attitude of Russia that becomes an +important reason for British refusal as, indeed, it was the basis +for harmonious decision within the British Cabinet. This is not to +say that had Russia acceded England also would have done so, for +the weight of Cabinet opinion, adroitly encouraged by Palmerston, +was against Russell and the result reached was that which the +Premier wished. More important in his view than any other matter +was the preservation of a united Ministry and at the conclusion of +the American debate even Gladstone could write: "As to the state of +matters generally in the Cabinet, I have never seen it +smoother<a name="FNanchor824"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_824">[824]</a>."</p> +<p>Public opinion in England in the main heartily supported the +Cabinet decision. Hammond described it as "almost universal in this +country against interference<a name="FNanchor825"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_825">[825]</a>," an estimate justified if the more +important journals are taken into <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_67"></a>[V2:pg 67]</span> account but not true of all. The +<i>Times</i> of November 13 declared:</p> +<blockquote>"We are convinced that the present is not the moment +for these strong measures. There is now great reason to hope that +by means of their own internal action the Americans may themselves +settle their own affairs even sooner than Europe could settle them +for them. We have waited so long that it would be unpardonable in +us to lose the merit of our self-denial at such a moment as +this.... We quite agree with Mr. Cobden that it would be cheaper to +keep all Lancashire on turtle and venison than to plunge into a +desperate war with the Northern States of America, even with all +Europe at our back. In a good cause, and as a necessity forced upon +us in defence of our honour, or of our rightful interests, we are +as ready to fight as we ever were; but we do not see our duty or +our interest in going blindfold into an adventure such as this. We +very much doubt, more over, whether, if Virginia belonged to France +as Canada belongs to England, the Emperor of the French would be so +active in beating up for recruits in this American mediation +league."</blockquote> +<p>This was followed up two days later by an assertion that no +English statesman had at any time contemplated an offer of +mediation made in such a way as to lead to actual conflict with the +United States<a name="FNanchor826"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_826">[826]</a>. On the other hand the <i>Herald</i>, +always intense in its pro-Southern utterances, and strongly +anti-Palmerston in politics, professed itself unable to credit the +rumoured Cabinet decision. "Until we are positively informed that +our Ministers are guilty of the great crime attributed to them," +the <i>Herald</i> declared, "we must hope against hope that they +are innocent." If guilty they were responsible for the misery of +Lancashire (depicted in lurid colours):</p> +<blockquote>"A clear, a sacred, an all-important duty was imposed +upon them; to perform that duty would have been the pride and +delight of almost any other Englishmen; and they, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_68"></a>[V2:pg 68]</span> with the task +before them and the power to perform it in their hands--can it be +that they have shrunk back in craven cowardice, deserted their +ally, betrayed their country, dishonoured their own names to all +eternity, that they might do the bidding of John Bright, and +sustain for a while the infamous tyranny of a Butler, a Seward, and +a Lincoln<a name="FNanchor827"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_827">[827]</a>?"</blockquote> +<p>In the non-political <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i> the returned +editor, W.H. Russell, but lately the <i>Times</i> correspondent in +America, jeered at the American uproar that might now be expected +against France instead of England: "Let the Emperor beware. The +scarred veteran of the New York Scarrons of Plum Gut has set his +sinister or dexter eye upon him, and threatens him with the loss of +his throne," but the British public must expect no lasting change +of Northern attitude toward England and must be ready for a war if +the North were victorious<a name="FNanchor828"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_828">[828]</a>. <i>Blackwood's</i> for November, 1862, +strongly censured the Government for its failure to act. The +<i>Edinburgh</i> for January, 1863, as strongly supported the +Ministry and expanded on the fixed determination of Great Britain +to keep out of the war. <i>The Index</i> naturally frothed in angry +disappointment, continuing its attacks, as if in hopes of a +reversal of Ministerial decision, even into the next year. "Has it +come to this? Is England, or the English Cabinet, afraid of the +Northern States? Lord Russell might contrive so to choose his +excuses as not to insult at once both his country and her +ally<a name="FNanchor829"></a><a href="#Footnote_829">[829]</a>." +An editorial from the <i>Richmond</i> (Virginia) <i>Whig</i> was +quoted with approval characterizing Russell and Palmerston as "two +old painted mummies," who secretly were rejoiced at the war in +America as "threatening the complete annihilation" of both sides, +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_69"></a>[V2:pg 69]</span> and +expressing the conviction that if the old Union were restored both +North and South would eagerly turn on Great Britain<a name= +"FNanchor830"></a><a href="#Footnote_830">[830]</a>. The +explanation, said <i>The Index</i>, of British supineness was +simply the pusillanimous fear of war--and of a war that would not +take place in spite of the bluster of Lincoln's "hangers-on<a name= +"FNanchor831"></a><a href="#Footnote_831">[831]</a>." Even as late +as May of the year following, this explanation was still harped +upon and Russell "a statesman" who belonged "rather to the past +than to the present" was primarily responsible for British +inaction. "The nominal conduct of Foreign Affairs is in the hands +of a diplomatic Malaprop, who has never shown vigour, activity, or +determination, except where the display of these qualities was +singularly unneeded, or even worse than useless<a name= +"FNanchor832"></a><a href="#Footnote_832">[832]</a>."</p> +<p><i>The Index</i> never wavered from its assumption that in the +Cabinet Russell was the chief enemy of the South. Slidell, better +informed, wrote: "Who would have believed that Earl Russell would +have been the only member of the Cabinet besides Gladstone in +favour of accepting the Emperor's proposition<a name= +"FNanchor833"></a><a href="#Footnote_833">[833]</a>?" He had +information that Napoleon had been led to expect his proposal would +be accepted and was much irritated--so much so that France would +now probably act alone<a name="FNanchor834"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_834">[834]</a>. Gladstone's attitude was a sorrow to +many of his friends. Bright believed he was at last weaned from +desires for mediation and sympathetic with the answer to +France<a name="FNanchor835"></a><a href="#Footnote_835">[835]</a>, +but Goldwin Smith in correspondence with Gladstone on American +affairs knew that the wild idea now in the statesman's mind was of +offering <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_70"></a>[V2:pg +70]</span> Canada to the North if she would let the South +go<a name="FNanchor836"></a><a href="#Footnote_836">[836]</a>--a +plan unknown, fortunately for Gladstone's reputation for good +judgment, save to his correspondent.</p> +<p>In general, as the weeks passed, the satisfaction grew both with +the public and in the Government that England had made no adventure +of new policy towards America. This satisfaction was strongly +reinforced when the first reports were received from Lyons on his +arrival in America. Reaching New York on November 8 he found that +even the "Conservatives" were much opposed to an offer of mediation +at present and thought it would only do harm until there was a +change of Government in Washington--an event still remote. Lyons +himself believed mediation useless unless intended to be followed +by recognition of the South and that such recognition was likewise +of no value without a raising of the blockade for which he thought +the British Cabinet not prepared<a name="FNanchor837"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_837">[837]</a>. Lyons flatly contradicted Stuart's +reports, his cool judgment of conditions nowhere more clearly +manifested than at this juncture in comparison with his +subordinate's excited and eager pro-Southern arguments. Again on +November 28 Lyons wrote that he could not find a single Northern +paper that did not repudiate <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_71"></a>[V2:pg 71]</span> foreign intervention<a name= +"FNanchor838"></a><a href="#Footnote_838">[838]</a>. In the South, +when it was learned that France had offered to act and England had +refused, there was an outburst of bitter anti-British +feeling<a name="FNanchor839"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_839">[839]</a>.</p> +<p>The Northern press, as Lyons had reported, was unanimous in +rejection of European offers of aid, however friendly, in settling +the war. It expressed no gratitude to England, devoting its energy +rather to animadversions on Napoleon III who was held to be +personally responsible. Since there had been no European offer made +there was no cause for governmental action. Seward had given Adams +specific instructions in case the emergency arose but there had +been no reason to present these or to act upon them and the crisis +once past Seward believed all danger of European meddling was over +and permanently. He wrote to Bigelow: "We are no longer to be +disturbed by Secession intrigues in Europe. They have had their +day. We propose to forget them<a name="FNanchor840"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_840">[840]</a>." This was a wise and statesmanlike +attitude and was shared by Adams in London. Whatever either man +knew or guessed of the prelude to the answer to France, November +13, they were careful to accept that answer as fulfilment of +Russell's declaration to Adams, October 23, that Great Britain +intended no change of policy<a name="FNanchor841"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_841">[841]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_72"></a>[V2:pg 72]</span> +<p>So far removed was Seward's attitude toward England from that +ascribed to him in 1861, so calm was his treatment of questions now +up for immediate consideration, so friendly was he personally +toward Lyons, that the British Minister became greatly alarmed +when, shortly after his return to Washington, there developed a +Cabinet controversy threatening the retirement of the Secretary of +State. This was a quarrel brought on by the personal sensibilities +of Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, and directed at Seward's +conduct of foreign affairs. It was quieted by the tact and +authority of Lincoln, who, when Seward handed in his resignation, +secured from Chase a similar offer of resignation, refused both and +in the result read to Chase that lesson of Presidential control +which Seward had learned in May, 1861. Lyons wrote of this +controversy "I shall be sorry if it ends in the removal of Mr. +Seward. We are much more likely to have a man less disposed to keep +the peace than a man more disposed to do so. I should hardly have +said this two years ago<a name="FNanchor842"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_842">[842]</a>." After the event of Seward's retention +of office Russell wrote: "I see Seward stays in. I am very glad of +it<a name="FNanchor843"></a><a href="#Footnote_843">[843]</a>." +This is a remarkable reversal of former opinion. A better +understanding of Seward had come, somewhat slowly, to British +diplomats, but since his action in the <i>Trent</i> affair former +suspicion had steadily waned; his "high tone" being regarded as for +home consumption, until now there was both belief in Seward's basic +friendliness and respect for his abilities.</p> +<p>Thus Russell's ambitious mediation projects having finally +dwindled to a polite refusal of the French offer to join in a mere +suggestion of armistice left no open sores in the British relations +with America. The projects were unknown; the refusal seemed final +to Seward and was indeed destined to prove so. But of this there +was no clear <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_73"></a>[V2:pg +73]</span> conception in the British Cabinet. Hardly anyone yet +believed that reconquest of the South was even a remote possibility +and this foretold that the day must some time come when European +recognition would have to be given the Confederacy. It is this +unanimity of opinion on the ultimate result of the war in America +that should always be kept in mind in judging the attitude of +British Government and people in the fall of 1862. Their sympathies +were of minor concern at the moment, nor were they much in evidence +during the Cabinet crisis. All argument was based upon the +expediency and wisdom of the present proposal. Could European +nations <i>now</i> act in such a way as to bring to an early end a +war whose result in separation was inevitable? It was the hope that +such action promised good results which led Russell to enter upon +his policy even though personally his sympathies were +unquestionably with the North. It was, in the end, the conviction +that <i>now</i> was not a favourable time which determined +Palmerston, though sympathetic with the South, to withdraw his +support when Russell, through pique, insisted on going on. Moreover +both statesmen were determined not to become involved in the war +and as the possible consequences of even the "most friendly" offers +were brought out in discussion it became clear that Great Britain's +true policy was to await a return of sanity in the +contestants<a name="FNanchor844"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_844">[844]</a>.</p> +<p>For America Russell's mediation plan constitutes the most +dangerous crisis in the war for the restoration of the Union. Had +that plan been adopted, no matter how friendly in intent, there is +little question that Lewis' forebodings <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_74"></a>[V2:pg 74]</span> would have been +realized and war would have ensued between England and the North. +But also whatever its results in other respects the independence of +the South would have been established. Slavery, hated of Great +Britain, would have received a new lease of life--and by British +action. In the Cabinet argument all parties agreed that Lincoln's +emancipation proclamation was but an incitement to servile war and +it played no part in the final decision. Soon that proclamation was +to erect a positive barrier of public opinion against any future +efforts to secure British intervention. Never again was there +serious governmental consideration of meddling in the American +Civil War<a name="FNanchor845"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_845">[845]</a>.</p> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_734"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor734">[734]</a> Motley, <i>Correspondence</i>, II, 71. To +his mother, March 16, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_735"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor735">[735]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 81. Aug. 18, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_736"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor736">[736]</a> <i>The Index</i> first appeared on May 1, +1862. Nominally a purely British weekly it was soon recognized as +the mouthpiece of the Confederacy.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_737"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor737">[737]</a> <i>The Index</i>, May 15, 29, June 19 and +July 31, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_738"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor738">[738]</a> e.g., the issue of Aug. 14, 1862, +contained a long report of a banquet in Sheffield attended by +Palmerston and Roebuck. In his speech Roebuck asserted: "A divided +America will be a benefit to England." He appealed to Palmerston to +consider whether the time had not come to recognize the South. "The +North will never be our friends. (Cheers.) Of the South you can +make friends. They are Englishmen; they are not the scum and refuse +of Europe. (The Mayor of Manchester: 'Don't say that; don't say +that.') (Cheers and disapprobation.) I know what I am saying. They +are Englishmen, and we must make them our friends."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_739"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor739">[739]</a> All American histories treat this incident +at much length. The historian who has most thoroughly discussed it +is C.F. Adams, with changing interpretation as new facts came to +light. See his <i>Life of C.F. Adams</i>, Ch. XV; <i>Studies, +Military and Diplomatic</i>, pp. 400-412; <i>Trans-Atlantic +Historical Solidarity</i>, pp. 97-106; <i>A Crisis in Downing +Street</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>, May, 1914, pp. +372-424. It will be made clear in a later chapter why Roebuck's +motion of midsummer, 1863, was unimportant in considering +Ministerial policy.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_740"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor740">[740]</a> Adams, <i>A Crisis in Downing Street</i>, +p. 388.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_741"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor741">[741]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>, +1862-3. Pt. I, pp. 165-168.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_742"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor742">[742]</a> Adams, <i>A Crisis in Downing Street</i>, +p. 389. First printed in Rhodes, VI, pp. 342-3, in +1899.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_743"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor743">[743]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 390.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_744"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor744">[744]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 32.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_745"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor745">[745]</a> Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July +21, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_746"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor746">[746]</a> Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 25, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_747"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor747">[747]</a> Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 8, +1862. Stoeckl's own report hardly agrees with this. He wrote that +the newspapers were full of rumours of European mediation but, on +consultation with Seward, advised that any offer at present would +only make matters worse. It would be best to wait and see what the +next spring would bring forth (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., +Aug. 9-21, 1862. No. 1566). Three weeks later Stoeckl was more +emphatic; an offer of mediation would accomplish nothing unless +backed up by force to open the Southern ports; this had always been +Lyons' opinion also; before leaving for England, Lyons had told him +"we ought not to venture on mediation unless we are ready to go to +war." Mercier, however, was eager for action and believed that if +France came forward, supported by the other Powers, especially +Russia, the United States would be compelled to yield. To this +Stoeckl did not agree. He believed Lyons was right (<i>Ibid.</i>, +Sept. 16-28, 1862. No. 1776).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_748"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor748">[748]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Aug. 22, 1862. Sumner was +Stuart's informant.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_749"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor749">[749]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Sept. 26, 1862. When issued +on September 22, Stuart found no "humanity" in it. "It is cold, +vindictive and entirely political."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_750"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor750">[750]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Aug. +24, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_751"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor751">[751]</a> The ignorance of other Cabinet members is +shown by a letter from Argyll to Gladstone, September 2, 1862, +stating as if an accepted conclusion, that there should be no +interference and that the war should be allowed to reach its +"natural issue" (Gladstone Papers).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_752"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor752">[752]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Sept. +18, 1862, fixes the date of Russell's letter.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_753"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor753">[753]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_754"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor754">[754]</a> Walpole, <i>Russell</i>, II, p. +360.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_755"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor755">[755]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 361. Sept. 17, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_756"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor756">[756]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. +18, 1862. This is the first reference by Cowley in over three +months to mediation--evidence that Russell's instructions took him +by surprise.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_757"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor757">[757]</a> Gladstone Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_758"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor758">[758]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, +Sept. 22, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_759"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor759">[759]</a> Russell Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_760"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor760">[760]</a> Walpole, <i>Russell</i>, II, p. 362. Sept. +23, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_761"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor761">[761]</a> Lyons Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_762"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor762">[762]</a> Lyons Papers. Stuart to Lyons, Sept. 23, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_763"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor763">[763]</a> Morley, <i>Gladstone</i>, II, p. +76.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_764"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor764">[764]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 40.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_765"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor765">[765]</a> Adams, <i>A Crisis in Dooming Street</i>, +p. 393, giving the exact text paraphrased by Morley.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_766"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor766">[766]</a> Fitzmaurice, <i>Granville</i>, I, pp. +442-44, gives the entire letter. Sept. 27, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_767"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor767">[767]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 442. Oct. 1, 1862. +Fitzmaurice attributes much influence to Granville in the final +decision and presumes that the Queen, also, was opposed to the +plan. There is no evidence to show that she otherwise expressed +herself than as in the acquiescent suggestion to Russell. As for +Granville, his opposition, standing alone, would have counted for +little.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_768"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor768">[768]</a> Russell Papers. A brief extract from this +letter is printed in Walpole, <i>Russell</i>, II, p. +362.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_769"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor769">[769]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_770"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor770">[770]</a> Brunow reported Russell's plan October 1, +as, summarized, (1) an invitation to France and Russia to join with +England in offering good services to the United States looking +towards peace. (2) Much importance attached to the adhesion of +Russia. (3) Excellent chance of success. (4) Nevertheless a +possible refusal by the United States, in which case, (5) +recognition by Great Britain of the South if it seemed likely that +this could be done without giving the United States a just ground +of quarrel. Brunow commented that this would be "eventually" the +action of Great Britain, but that meanwhile circumstances might +delay it. Especially he was impressed that the Cabinet felt the +political necessity of "doing something" before Parliament +reassembled (Russian Archives, Brunow to F.O., London, Oct. 1, 1862 +(N.S.). No. 1698.) Gortchakoff promptly transmitted this to +Stoeckl, together with a letter from Brunow, dated Bristol, Oct. 1, +1862 (N.S.), in which Brunow expressed the opinion that one object +of the British Government was to introduce at Washington a topic +which would serve to accentuate the differences that were +understood to exist in Lincoln's Cabinet. (This seems very +far-fetched.) Gortchakoff's comment in sending all this to Stoeckl +was that Russia had no intention of changing her policy of extreme +friendship to the United States (<i>Ibid.</i>, F.O. to Stoeckl, +Oct. 3, 1862 (O.S.).)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_771"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor771">[771]</a> Thouvenel, <i>Le Secret de l'Empereur</i>, +II, pp. 438-9.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_772"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor772">[772]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. +30, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_773"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor773">[773]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Cowley to Russell, Oct. 3, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_774"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor774">[774]</a> Even the <i>Edinburgh Review</i> for +October, 1862, discussed recognition of the South as possibly near, +though on the whole against such action.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_775"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor775">[775]</a> Palmerston MS. Walpole makes Palmerston +responsible for the original plan and Russell acquiescent and +readily agreeing to postpone. This study reverses the +roles.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_776"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor776">[776]</a> Russell Papers. Also see <i>ante</i> p. +41. Stuart to Lyons. The letter to Russell was of exactly the same +tenor.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_777"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor777">[777]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. +6, 1862. Lyons' departure had been altered from October n to +October 25.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_778"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor778">[778]</a> Morley, <i>Gladstone</i>, II, p. 79. +Morley calls this utterance a great error which was long to +embarrass Gladstone, who himself later so characterized +it.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_779"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor779">[779]</a> Adams, <i>A Crisis in Downing Street</i>, +p. 402.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_780"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor780">[780]</a> Bright to Sumner, October 10, 1862. Mass. +Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>, XLVI, p. 108. Bright was wholly in +the dark as to a Ministerial project. Much of this letter is +devoted to the emancipation proclamation which did not at first +greatly appeal to Bright as a wise measure.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_781"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor781">[781]</a> The <i>Times</i>, October 9 and 10, while +surprised that Gladstone and not Palmerston, was the spokesman, +accepted the speech as equivalent to a governmental pronouncement. +Then the <i>Times</i> makes no further comment of moment until +November 13. The <i>Morning Post</i> (regarded as Palmerston's +organ) reported the speech in full on October 9, but did not +comment editorially until October 13, and then with much laudation +of Gladstone's northern tour but <i>with no mention whatever</i> of +his utterances on America.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_782"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor782">[782]</a> Gladstone wrote to Russell, October 17, +explaining that he had intended no "official utterance," and +pleaded that Spence, whom he had seen in Liverpool, did not put +that construction on his words (Gladstone Papers). Russell replied, +October 20. "... Still you must allow me to say that I think you +went beyond the latitude which all speakers must be allowed when +you said that Jeff Davis had made a nation. Negotiations would seem +to follow, and for that step I think the Cabinet is not prepared. +However we shall soon meet to discuss this very topic" +<i>(Ibid.)</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_783"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor783">[783]</a> Palmerston MS. Appended to the Memorandum +were the texts of the emancipation proclamation, Seward's circular +letter of September 22, and an extract from the <i>National +Intelligencer</i> of September 26, giving Lincoln's answer to +Chicago abolitionists.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_784"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor784">[784]</a> Morley, <i>Gladstone</i>, II, 80, narrates +the "tradition." Walpole, <i>Twenty-five Years</i>, II, 57, states +it as a fact. Also <i>Education of Henry Adams</i>, pp. 136, 140. +Over forty years later an anonymous writer in the <i>Daily +Telegraph</i>, Oct. 24, 1908, gave exact details of the +"instruction" to Lewis, and of those present. (Cited in Adams, <i>A +Crisis in Downing Street</i>, pp. 404-5.) C.F. Adams, +<i>Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity</i>, Ch. III, repeats the +tradition, but in <i>A Crisis in Downing Street</i> he completely +refutes his earlier opinion and the entire tradition. The further +narrative in this chapter, especially the letters of Clarendon to +Lewis, show that Lewis acted solely on his own +initiative.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_785"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor785">[785]</a> Anonymously, in the <i>Edinburgh</i>, for +April, 1861, Lewis had written of the Civil War in a pro-Northern +sense, and appears never to have accepted fully the theory that it +was impossible to reconquer the South.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_786"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor786">[786]</a> Cited in Adams, <i>A Crisis in Downing +Street</i>, p. 407.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_787"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor787">[787]</a> Derby, in conversation with Clarendon, had +characterized Gladstone's speech as an offence against tradition +and best practice. Palmerston agreed, but added that the same +objection could be made to Lewis' speech. Maxwell, +<i>Clarendon</i>, II, 267. Palmerston to Clarendon, Oct. 20, 1862. +Clarendon wrote Lewis, Oct. 24, that he did not think this called +for any explanation by Lewis to Palmerston, further proof of the +falsity of Palmerston's initiative. <i>Ibid.</i>, p. +267.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_788"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor788">[788]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Oct. 16, 1862, warned +against acceptance of Gladstone's Newcastle utterances as +indicating Government policy, asserted that the bulk of English +opinion was with him, but ignorantly interpreted Cabinet hesitation +to the "favour of the North and bitter enmity to the South, which +has animated the diplomatic career of Lord Russell...." Throughout +the war, Russell, to <i>The Index</i>, was the evil genius of the +Government.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_789"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor789">[789]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_790"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor790">[790]</a> Maxwell, <i>Clarendon</i>, II, +279.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_791"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor791">[791]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_792"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor792">[792]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1863. +<i>Commons</i>, Vol. I XII. "Correspondence relating to the Civil +War in the United States of North America." Nos. 33 and 37. Two +reports received Oct. 13 and 18, 1862. Anderson's mission was to +report on the alleged drafting of British subjects into the +Northern Army.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_793"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor793">[793]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. +18, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_794"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor794">[794]</a> Russell Papers. Clarendon to Russell, Oct. +19, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_795"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor795">[795]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. +20, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_796"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor796">[796]</a> Russell Papers. It is significant that +Palmerston's organ, the <i>Morning Post</i>, after a long silence +came out on Oct. 21 with a sharp attack on Gladstone for his +presumption. Lewis was also reflected upon, but less +severely.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_797"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor797">[797]</a> Maxwell, <i>Clarendon</i>, II, +265.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_798"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor798">[798]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>, +1862-3, Pt. I, p. 223. Adams to Seward, Oct. 24, 1862. C.F. Adams +in <i>A Crisis in Downing Street</i>, p. 417, makes Russell state +that the Government's intention was "to adhere to the rule of +perfect neutrality"--seemingly a more positive assurance, and so +understood by the American Minister.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_799"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor799">[799]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Oct. 23, 1862. "... +while our people are starving, our commerce interrupted, our +industry paralysed, our Ministry have no plan, no idea, no +intention to do anything but fold their hands, talk of strict +neutrality, spare the excited feelings of the North, and wait, like +Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_800"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor800">[800]</a> Russell Papers. To Russell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_801"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor801">[801]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, To Russell, Oct. 24, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_802"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor802">[802]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. +24, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_803"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor803">[803]</a> Palmerston MS. Marked: "Printed Oct. 24, +1862."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_804"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor804">[804]</a> Morley, <i>Gladstone</i>, II, 84. Morley +was the first to make clear that no final decision was reached on +October 23, a date hitherto accepted as the end of the Cabinet +crisis. Rhodes, IV, 337-348, gives a résumé of talk +and correspondence on mediation, etc., and places October 23 as the +date when "the policy of non-intervention was informally agreed +upon" (p. 343), Russell's "change of opinion" being also "complete" +(p. 342). Curiously the dictum of Rhodes and others depends in some +degree on a mistake in copying a date. Slidell had an important +interview with Napoleon on October 28 bearing on an armistice, but +this was copied as October 22 in Bigelow's <i>France and the +Confederate Navy</i>, p. 126, and so came to be written into +narratives of mediation proposals. Richardson, II, 345, gives the +correct date. Rhodes' supposition that Seward's instructions of +August 2 became known to Russell and were the determining factor in +altering his intentions is evidently erroneous.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_805"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor805">[805]</a> Maxwell, <i>Clarendon</i>, II, +265.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_806"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor806">[806]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 266.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_807"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor807">[807]</a> Russell Papers. Palmerston to Russell, +Oct. 24, 1862. Palmerston was here writing of Italian and American +affairs.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_808"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor808">[808]</a> Palmerston MS. Oct. 25, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_809"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor809">[809]</a> Russell Papers. To Russell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_810"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor810">[810]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1446. Cowley to +Russell, Oct. 28, 1862. Cowley, like Lyons, was against action. He +approved Drouyn de Lhuys' "hesitation." It appears from the Russian +archives that France approached Russia. On October 31, D'Oubril, at +Paris, was instructed that while Russia had always been anxious to +forward peace in America, she stood in peculiarly friendly +relations with the United States, and was against any appearance of +pressure. It would have the contrary effect from that hoped for. If +England and France should offer mediation Russia, "being too far +away," would not join, but might give her moral support. (Russian +Archives, F.O. to D'Oubril, Oct. 27, 1862 (O.S.). No. 320.) On the +same date Stoeckl was informed of the French overtures, and was +instructed not to take a stand with France and Great Britain, but +to limit his efforts to approval of any <i>agreement</i> by the +North and South to end the war. Yet Stoeckl was given liberty of +action if (as Gortchakoff did not believe) the time had assuredly +come when both North and South were ready for peace, and it needed +but the influence of some friendly hand to soothe raging passions +and to lead the contending parties themselves to begin direct +negotiations (<i>Ibid.</i>, F.O. to Stoeckl, Oct. 27, 1862 +(O.S.).)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_811"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor811">[811]</a> Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, Oct. 29, +1862. Slidell's full report to Benjamin is in Richardson, II, +345.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_812"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor812">[812]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1446, No. 1236. Cowley +thought neither party would consent unless it saw some military +advantage. (Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Oct. 31, 1862.) +Morley, <i>Gladstone</i>, II, 84-5, speaks of the French offer as +"renewed proposals of mediation." There was no renewal for this was +the <i>first</i> proposal, and it was not one of mediation though +that was an implied result.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_813"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor813">[813]</a> Russell Papers, Nov. 2, 1862. Monday, +November 1862, was the 10th not the 11th as Palmerston +wrote.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_814"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor814">[814]</a> Palmerston MS. Nov. 3, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_815"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor815">[815]</a> Gladstone Papers. The memorandum here +preserved has the additional interest of frequent marginal comments +by Gladstone.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_816"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor816">[816]</a> The letters of "Historicus" early +attracted, in the case of the <i>Trent</i>, favourable attention +and respect. As early as 1863 they were put out in book form to +satisfy a public demand: <i>Letters by Historicus on some questions +of International Law</i>, London, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_817"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor817">[817]</a> The <i>Times</i>, Nov. 7, 1862. The letter +was dated Nov. 4.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_818"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor818">[818]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1863, Lords, +Vol. XXIX. "Despatch respecting the Civil War in North America." +Russell to Cowley, Nov. 13, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_819"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor819">[819]</a> For substance of the Russian answer to +France see <i>ante</i>, p. 59, <i>note</i> 4. D'Oubril reported +Drouyn de Lhuys as unconvinced that the time was inopportune but as +stating he had not expected Russia to join. The French Minister of +Foreign Affairs was irritated at an article on his overtures that +had appeared in the <i>Journal de Petersbourg</i>, and thought +himself unfairly treated by the Russian Government. (Russian +Archives. D'Oubril to F.O., Nov. 15, 1862 (N.S.), Nos. 1908 and +1912.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_820"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor820">[820]</a> Maxwell, <i>Clarendon</i>, II, 268. The +letter, as printed, is dated Nov. 11, and speaks of the Cabinet of +"yesterday." This appears to be an error. Gladstone's account is of +a two-days' discussion on Nov. 11 and 12, with the decision reached +and draft of reply to France outlined on the latter date. The +article in the <i>Times</i>, referred to by Lewis, appeared on Nov. +13.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_821"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor821">[821]</a> Morley, <i>Gladstone</i>, II, +85.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_822"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor822">[822]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1863, +<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXIX. "Despatch respecting the Civil War in +North America." Russell to Cowley, Nov. 13, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_823"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor823">[823]</a> F.O., Russia, Vol. 609, No. 407. Napier to +Russell. The same day Napier wrote giving an account of an +interview between the French Minister and Prince Gortchakoff in +which the latter stated Russia would take no chances of offending +the North. <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 408.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_824"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor824">[824]</a> Morley, <i>Gladstone</i>, II ,85. To his +wife, Nov. 13, 1862. Even after the answer to France there was some +agitation in the Ministry due to the receipt from Stuart of a +letter dated Oct. 31, in which it was urged that this was the most +opportune moment for mediation because of Democratic successes in +the elections. He enclosed also an account of a "horrible military +reprisal" by the Federals in Missouri alleging that <i>ten</i> +Southerners had been executed because of <i>one</i> Northerner +seized by Southern guerillas. (Russell Papers.) The Russell Papers +contain a series of signed or initialled notes in comment, all +dated Nov. 14. "W." (Westbury?) refers to the "horrible +atrocities," and urges that, if Russia will join, the French offer +should be accepted. Gladstone wrote, "I had supposed the question +to be closed." "C.W." (Charles Wood), "This is horrible; but does +not change my opinion of the course to be pursued." "C.P.V." (C.P. +Villiers) wrote against accepting the French proposal, and +commented that Stuart had always been a strong partisan of the +South.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_825"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor825">[825]</a> Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons, Nov. 15, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_826"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor826">[826]</a> The <i>Times</i>, Nov. 15, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_827"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor827">[827]</a> The <i>Herald</i>, Nov. 14, 1862. This +paper was listed by Hotze of <i>The Index</i>, as on his "pay +roll." Someone evidently was trying to earn his +salary.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_828"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor828">[828]</a> Nov. 15, 1862. It is difficult to +reconcile Russell's editorials either with his later protestations +of early conviction that the North would win or with the belief +expressed by Americans that he was <i>constantly</i> pro-Northern +in sentiment, e.g., Henry Adams, in <i>A Cycle of Adams' +Letters</i>, I, 14l.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_829"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor829">[829]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Nov. 20, 1862, p. +56.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_830"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor830">[830]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Jan. 15, 1863, p. +191.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_831"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor831">[831]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Jan. 22, 1863, p. +201.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_832"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor832">[832]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, May 28, 1863, p. +72.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_833"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor833">[833]</a> Mason Papers. To Mason, Nov. 28, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_834"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor834">[834]</a> Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, Nov. +29, 1862. This despatch is not in Richardson, <i>Messages and +Papers of the Confederacy</i>, and illustrates the gaps in that +publication.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_835"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor835">[835]</a> Rhodes, IV, 347. Bright to Sumner, Dec. 6, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_836"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor836">[836]</a> Goldwin Smith told of this plan in 1904, +in a speech at a banquet in Ottawa. He had destroyed Gladstone's +letter outlining it. <i>The Ottawa Sun</i>, Nov. 16, +1904.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_837"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor837">[837]</a> Almost immediately after Lyons' return to +Washington, Stoeckl learned from him, and from Mercier, also, that +England and France planned to offer mediation and that if this were +refused the South would be recognized. Stoeckl commented to the +Foreign Office: "What good will this do?" It would not procure +cotton unless the ports were forced open and a clear rupture made +with the North. He thought England understood this, and still +hesitated. Stoeckl went on to urge that if all European Powers +joined England and France they would be merely tails to the kite +and that Russia would be one of the tails. This would weaken the +Russian position in Europe as well as forfeit her special +relationship with the United States. He was against any +<i>joint</i> European action. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., +Nov. 5-17, 1862, No. 2002.) Gortchakoff wrote on the margin of this +despatch: "Je trouve son opinion très sage." If Stoeckl +understood Lyons correctly then the latter had left England still +believing that his arguments with Russell had been of no effect. +When the news reached Washington of England's refusal of the French +offer, Stoeckl reported Lyons as much surprised (<i>Ibid.</i>, to +F.O., Nov. 19-Dec. 1, 1862, No. 2170).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_838"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor838">[838]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1832, +<i>Commons</i>, Vol. LXXII, "Correspondence relating to the Civil +War in the United States of North America." Nos. 47 and 50. +Received Nov. 30 and Dec. 11. Mercier, who had been Stuart's +informant about political conditions in New York, felt that he had +been deceived by the Democrats. F.O., Am., Vol. 784, No. 38. +Confidential, Lyons to Russell, Jan. 13, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_839"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor839">[839]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 840, No. 518. Moore +(Richmond) to Lyons, Dec. 4, 1862. Also F.O., Am., Vol. 844, No. +135. Bunch (Charleston) to Russell, Dec. 13, 1862. Bunch wrote of +the "Constitutional hatred and jealousy of England, which are as +strongly developed here as at the North. Indeed, our known +antipathy to Slavery adds another element to Southern +dislike."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_840"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor840">[840]</a> Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, I, 579, +Dec. 2, 1862. Bigelow was Consul-General at Paris, and was the most +active of the Northern confidential agents abroad. A journalist +himself, he had close contacts with the foreign press. It is +interesting that he reported the Continental press as largely +dependent for its American news and judgments upon the British +press which specialized in that field, so that Continental tone was +but a reflection of the British tone. <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 443. Bigelow +to Seward, Jan. 7, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_841"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor841">[841]</a> Lyons placed a high estimate on Adams' +abilities. He wrote: "Mr. Adams shows more calmness and good sense +than any of the American Ministers abroad." (Russell Papers. To +Russell, Dec. 12, 1862.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_842"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor842">[842]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 22. +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_843"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor843">[843]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Jan. 3, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_844"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor844">[844]</a> December 1, Brunow related an interview in +which Russell expressed his "satisfaction" that England and Russia +were in agreement that the moment was not opportune for a joint +offer to the United States. Russell also stated that it was +unfortunate France had pressed her proposal without a preliminary +confidential sounding and understanding between the Powers; the +British Government saw no reason for changing its attitude. +(Russian Archives. Brunow to F.O., Dec. 1, 1862 (N.S.), No. 1998.) +There is no evidence in the despatch that Brunow knew of Russell's +preliminary "soundings" of France.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_845"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor845">[845]</a> Various writers have treated Roebuck's +motion in 1863 as the "crisis" of intervention. In Chapter XIV the +error of this will be shown.</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_75"></a>[V2:pg 75]</span> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XII"></a>CHAPTER XII</h2> +<h3>THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION</h3> +<br> +<p>The finality of the British Cabinet decision in November, 1862, +relative to proposals of mediation or intervention was not accepted +at the moment though time was to prove its permanence. The British +press was full of suggestions that the first trial might more +gracefully come from France since that country was presumed to be +on more friendly terms with the United States<a name= +"FNanchor846"></a><a href="#Footnote_846">[846]</a>. Others, +notably Slidell at Paris, held the same view, and on January 8, +1863, Slidell addressed a memorandum to Napoleon III, asking +separate recognition of the South. The next day, Napoleon dictated +an instruction to Mercier offering friendly mediation in courteous +terms but with no hint of an armistice or of an intended +recognition of the South<a name="FNanchor847"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_847">[847]</a>. Meanwhile, Mercier had again approached +Lyons alleging that he had been urged by Greeley, editor of the +<i>New York Tribune</i>, to make an isolated French offer, but that +he felt this would be contrary to the close harmony hitherto +maintained in French-British relations. But Mercier added that if +Lyons was disinclined to a proposal of mediation, he intended to +advise his Government to give him authority to act alone<a name= +"FNanchor848"></a><a href="#Footnote_848">[848]</a>. Lyons made no +comment to Mercier but wrote to Russell, "I certainly desire that +the Settlement of the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_76"></a>[V2:pg 76]</span> Contest should be made without the +intervention of England."</p> +<p>A week later the Russian Minister, Stoeckl, also came to Lyons +desiring to discover what would be England's attitude if Russia +should act alone, or perhaps with France, leaving England out of a +proposal to the North<a name="FNanchor849"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_849">[849]</a>. This was based on the supposition that +the North, weary of war, might ask the good offices of Russia. +Lyons replied that he did not think that contingency near and +otherwise evaded Stoeckl's questions; but he was somewhat +suspicious, concluding his report, "I cannot quite forget that +Monsieur Mercier and Monsieur de Stoeckl had agreed to go to +Richmond together last Spring<a name="FNanchor850"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_850">[850]</a>." The day after this despatch was written +Mercier presented, February 3, the isolated French offer and on +February 6 received Seward's reply couched in argumentative, yet +polite language, but positively declining the proposal<a name= +"FNanchor851"></a><a href="#Footnote_851">[851]</a>. Evidently +Lyons was a bit disquieted by the incident; but in London, +Napoleon's overture to America was officially stated to be +unobjectionable, as indeed was required by the implications of the +reply of November 13, to France. Russell, on February 14, answered +Lyons' communications in a letter marked "Seen by Lord Palmerston +and the Queen":</p> +<blockquote>"Her Majesty's Government have no wish to interfere at +present in any way in the Civil War. If France were to offer good +offices or mediation, Her Majesty's Government would feel no +jealousy or repugnance to such a course on the part of France +alone<a name="FNanchor852"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_852">[852]</a>."</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_77"></a>[V2:pg 77]</span> +<p>The writing of this despatch antedated the knowledge that France +had already acted at Washington, and does not necessarily indicate +any governmental feeling of a break in previous close relations +with France on the American question. Yet this was indubitably the +case and became increasingly evident as time passed. Russell's +despatch to Lyons of February 14 appears rather to be evidence of +the effect of the debates in Parliament when its sessions were +resumed on February 5, for in both Lords and Commons there was +given a hearty and nearly unanimous support of the Government's +decision to make no overture for a cessation of the conflict in +America. Derby clearly outlined the two possible conditions of +mediation; first, when efforts by the North to subdue the South had +practically ceased; and second, if humane interests required action +by neutral states, in which case the intervening parties must be +fully prepared to use force. Neither condition had arrived and +strict neutrality was the wise course. Disraeli also approved +strict neutrality but caustically referred to Gladstone's Newcastle +speech and sharply attacked the Cabinet's uncertain and changeable +policy--merely a party speech. Russell upheld the Government's +decision but went out of his way to assert that the entire +subjugation of the South would be a calamity to the United States +itself, since it would require an unending use of force to hold the +South in submission<a name="FNanchor853"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_853">[853]</a>. Later, when news of the French offer at +Washington had been received, the Government was attacked in the +Lords by an undaunted friend of the South, Lord Campbell, on the +ground of a British divergence from close relations with France. +Russell, in a brief reply, reasserted old arguments that the time +had "not yet" come, but now declared that events seemed to show the +possibility of a complete Northern victory and added with emphasis +that recognition of the South <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_78"></a>[V2:pg 78]</span> could justly be regarded by the +North as an "unfriendly act<a name="FNanchor854"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_854">[854]</a>."</p> +<p>Thus Parliament and Cabinet were united against meddling in +America, basing this attitude on neutral duty and national +interests, and with barely a reference to the new policy of the +North toward slavery, declared in the emancipation proclamations of +September 22, 1862, and January 1, 1863, Had these great documents +then no favourable influence on British opinion and action? Was the +Northern determination to root out the institution of slavery, now +clearly announced, of no effect in winning the favour of a people +and Government long committed to a world policy against that +institution? It is here necessary to review early British opinion, +the facts preceding the first emancipation proclamation, and to +examine its purpose in the mind of Lincoln.</p> +<p>Before the opening of actual military operations, while there +was still hope of some peaceful solution, British opinion had been +with the North on the alleged ground of sympathy with a free as +against a slave-owning society. But war once begun the disturbance +to British trade interests and Lincoln's repeated declarations that +the North had no intention of destroying slavery combined to offer +an excuse and a reason for an almost complete shift of British +opinion. The abolitionists of the North and the extreme +anti-slavery friends in England, relatively few in number in both +countries, still sounded the note of "slavery the cause of the +war," but got little hearing. Nevertheless it was seen by +thoughtful minds that slavery was certain to have a distinct +bearing on the position of Great Britain when the war was +concluded. In May, 1861, Palmerston declared that it would be a +happy day when "we could succeed in putting an end to this +unnatural war between the two sections of our North American +cousins," but <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_79"></a>[V2:pg +79]</span> added that the difficulty for England was that +"<i>We</i> could not well mix ourselves up with the acknowledgment +of slavery<a name="FNanchor855"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_855">[855]</a>...."</p> +<p>Great Britain's long-asserted abhorrence of slavery caused, +indeed, a perplexity in governmental attitude. But this looked to +the final outcome of an independent South--an outcome long taken +for granted. Debate on the existing moralities of the war very soon +largely disappeared from British discussion and in its place there +cropped out, here and there, expressions indicative of anxiety as +to whether the war could long continue without a "servile +insurrection," with all its attendant horrors.</p> +<p>On July 6, 1861, the <i>Economist</i>, reviewing the progress of +the war preparations to date, asserted that it was universally +agreed no restoration of the Union was possible and answered +British fears by declaring it was impossible to believe that even +the American madness could contemplate a servile insurrection. The +friendly <i>Spectator</i> also discussed the matter and repeatedly. +It was a mistaken idea, said this journal, that there could be no +enfranchisement without a slave rising, but should this occur, "the +right of the slave to regain his freedom, even if the effort +involve slaughter, is as clear as any other application of the +right of self-defence<a name="FNanchor856"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_856">[856]</a>." Yet English abolitionists should not +urge the slave to act for himself, since "as war goes on and all +compromise fails the American mind will harden under the white heat +and determine that the <i>cause</i> of all conflict must cease." +That slavery, in spite of any declaration by Lincoln or Northern +denial of a purpose to attack it--denials which disgusted Harriet +Martineau--was in real fact the basic cause of the war, seemed to +her as clear as anything in reason<a name= +"FNanchor857"></a><a href="#Footnote_857">[857]</a>. She had no +patience with English <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_80"></a>[V2:pg 80]</span> anti-slavery people who believed +Northern protestations, and she did not express concern over the +horrors of a possible servile insurrection. Nevertheless this +spectre was constantly appearing. Again the <i>Spectator</i> sought +to allay such fears; but yet again also proclaimed that even such a +contingency was less fearful than the consolidation of the +slave-power in the South<a name="FNanchor858"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_858">[858]</a>.</p> +<p>Thus a servile insurrection was early and frequently an argument +which pro-Northern friends were compelled to meet. In truth the +bulk of the British press was constant in holding up this bogie to +its readers, even going to the point of weakening its argument of +the impossibility of a Northern conquest of the South by appealing +to history to show that England in her two wars with America had +had a comparatively easy time in the South, thus postulating the +real danger of some "negro Garibaldi calling his countrymen to +arms<a name="FNanchor859"></a><a href="#Footnote_859">[859]</a>." +Nor was this fear merely a pretended one. It affected all classes +and partisans of both sides. Even official England shared in it; +January 20, 1862, Lyons wrote, "The question is rapidly tending +towards the issue either of peace and a recognition of the +separation, or a Proclamation of Emancipation and the raising of a +servile insurrection<a name="FNanchor860"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_860">[860]</a>." At nearly the same time Russell, +returning to Gladstone a letter from Sumner to Cobden, expressed +his sorrow "that the President intends a war of emancipation, +meaning thereby, I fear, a war of greater desolation than has been +since the revival of letters<a name="FNanchor861"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_861">[861]</a>." John Stuart Mill, with that clear logic +which appealed to the more intelligent reader, in an able +examination of the underlying causes and probable results of the +American conflict, excused the Northern leaders for early denial of +a purpose to attack slavery, but expressed complete confidence that +even these <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_81"></a>[V2:pg +81]</span> leaders by now understood the "almost certain results of +success in the present conflict" (the extinction of slavery) and +prophesied that "if the writers who so severely criticize the +present moderation of the Free-soilers are desirous to see the war +become an abolition war, it is probable that if the war lasts long +enough they will be gratified<a name="FNanchor862"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_862">[862]</a>." John Bright, reaching a wider public, +in speech after speech, expressed faith that the people of the +North were "marching on, as I believe, to its [slavery's] entire +abolition<a name="FNanchor863"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_863">[863]</a>."</p> +<p>Pro-Southern Englishmen pictured the horrors of an "abolition +war," and believed the picture true; strict neutrals, like Lyons, +feared the same development; friends of the North pushed aside the +thought of a "negro terror," yet even while hoping and declaring +that the war would destroy slavery, could not escape from +apprehensions of an event that appeared inevitable. Everywhere, to +the British mind, it seemed that emancipation was necessarily a +provocative to servile insurrection, and this belief largely +affected the reception of the emancipation proclamation--a fact +almost wholly lost sight of in historical writing.</p> +<p>Nor did the steps taken in America leading up to emancipation +weaken this belief--rather they appeared to justify it. The great +advocate of abolition as a weapon in the war and for its own sake +was Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign +Relations. He early took the ground that a proclamation everywhere +emancipating the slaves would give to the Northern cause a moral +support hitherto denied it in Europe and would at the same time +strike a blow at Southern resistance. This idea was presented in a +public speech at Worcester, Massachusetts, in October, 1861, but +even Sumner's free-soil friends thought him mistaken and his +expressions "unfortunate." By December, however, he found at +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_82"></a>[V2:pg 82]</span> +Washington a change in governmental temper and from that date +Sumner was constant, through frequent private conversations with +Lincoln, in pressing for action. These ideas and his personal +activities for their realization were well known to English +friends, as in his letters to Cobden and Bright, and to the English +public in general through Sumner's speeches, for Sumner had long +been a well-known figure in the British press<a name= +"FNanchor864"></a><a href="#Footnote_864">[864]</a>.</p> +<p>Lincoln, never an "Abolitionist," in spite of his famous +utterance in the 'fifties that the United States could not +indefinitely continue to exist "half-slave and half-free," had, in +1861, disapproved and recalled the orders of some of the military +leaders, like Fremont, who without authority had sought to extend +emancipation to slaves within the lines of their command. But as +early as anyone he had foreseen the gradual emergence of +emancipation as a war problem, at first dangerous to that wise +"border state policy" which had prevented the more northern of the +slave states from seceding. His first duty was to restore the Union +and to that he gave all his energy, yet that emancipation, when the +time was ripe, was also in Lincoln's mind is evident from the +gradual approach through legislation and administrative act. In +February, 1862, a Bill was under discussion in Congress, called the +"Confiscation Bill," which, among other clauses, provided that all +slaves of persons engaged in rebellion against the United States, +who should by escape, or capture, come into the possession of the +military forces of the United States, should be for ever free; but +that this provision should not be operative until the expiration of +sixty days, thus giving slave-owners opportunity to cease their +rebellion and retain their slaves<a name="FNanchor865"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_865">[865]</a>. This measure did not at first have +Lincoln's approval for he feared its effect on the loyalists of the +border states. Nevertheless he <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_83"></a>[V2:pg 83]</span> realized the growing strength of +anti-slavery sentiment in the war and fully sympathized with it +where actual realization did not conflict with the one great object +of his administration. Hence in March, 1862, he heartily concurred +in a measure passed rapidly to Presidential approval, April 16, +freeing the slaves in the District of Columbia, a territory where +there was no question of the constitutional power of the national +Government.</p> +<p>From February, 1862, until the issue of the first emancipation +proclamation in September, there was, in truth, a genuine conflict +between Congress and President as to methods and extent of +emancipation. Congress was in a mood to punish the South; Lincoln, +looking steadily toward re-union, yet realizing the rising strength +of anti-slavery in the North, advocated a gradual, voluntary, and +compensated emancipation. Neither party spoke the word "servile +insurrection," yet both realized its possibility, and Seward, in +foreign affairs, was quick to see and use it as a threat. A brief +summary of measures will indicate the contest. March 6, Lincoln +sent a message to Congress recommending that a joint resolution be +passed pledging the pecuniary aid of the national Government to any +state voluntarily emancipating its slaves, his avowed purpose being +to secure early action by the loyal border states in the hope that +this might influence the Southern states<a name= +"FNanchor866"></a><a href="#Footnote_866">[866]</a>. Neither the +House of Representatives nor the Senate were really favourable to +this resolution and the border states bitterly opposed it in +debate, but it passed by substantial majorities in both branches +and was approved by Lincoln on April 10. In effect the extreme +radical element in Congress had yielded, momentarily, to the +President's insistence on an olive-branch offering of compensated +emancipation. Both as regards the border states and looking to the +restoration of the Union, Lincoln was determined to <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_84"></a>[V2:pg 84]</span> give this line +of policy a trial. The prevailing sentiment of Congress, however, +preferred the punitive Confiscation Bill.</p> +<p>At this juncture General Hunter, in command of the "Department +of the South," which theoretically included also the States of +South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, issued an order declaring the +slaves in these states free. This was May 9, 1862. Lincoln +immediately countermanded Hunter's order, stating that such action +"under my responsibility, I reserve to myself<a name= +"FNanchor867"></a><a href="#Footnote_867">[867]</a>." He renewed, +in this same proclamation, earnest appeals to the border states, to +embrace the opportunity offered by the Congressional resolution of +April 10. In truth, border state attitude was the test of the +feasibility of Lincoln's hoped-for voluntary emancipation, but +these states were unwilling to accept the plan. Meanwhile pressure +was being exerted for action on the Confiscation Bill; it was +pushed through Congress and presented to Lincoln for his signature +or veto. He signed it on July 12, <i>but did not notify that fact +to Congress until July 17.</i> On this same day of signature, July +12, Lincoln sent to Congress a proposal of an Act to give pecuniary +aid in voluntary state emancipation and held a conference with the +congressional representatives of the border states seeking their +definite approval of his policy. A minority agreed but the majority +were emphatically against him. The Confiscation Bill would not +affect the border states; they were not in rebellion. And they did +not desire to free the slaves even if compensated<a name= +"FNanchor868"></a><a href="#Footnote_868">[868]</a>.</p> +<p>Thus Lincoln, by the stubbornness of the border states, was +forced toward the Congressional point of view as expressed in the +Confiscation Bill. On the day following his failure to win the +border state representatives he told Seward and Welles who were +driving with him, that he had <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_85"></a>[V2:pg 85]</span> come to the conclusion that the +time was near for the issue of a proclamation of emancipation as a +military measure fully within the competence of the President. This +was on July 13<a name="FNanchor869"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_869">[869]</a>. Seward offered a few objections but +apparently neither Cabinet official did more than listen to +Lincoln's argument of military necessity. Congress adjourned on +July 17. On July 22, the President read to the Cabinet a draft of +an emancipation proclamation the text of the first paragraph of +which referred to the Confiscation Act and declared that this would +be rigorously executed unless rebellious subjects returned to their +allegiance. But the remainder of the draft reasserted the ideal of +a gradual and compensated emancipation and concluded with the +warning that for states still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, a +general emancipation of slaves would be proclaimed<a name= +"FNanchor870"></a><a href="#Footnote_870">[870]</a>. All of the +Cabinet approved except Blair who expressed fears of the effect on +the approaching November elections, and Seward who, while +professing sympathy with the indicated purpose, argued that the +time was badly chosen in view of recent military disasters and the +approach of Lee's army toward Washington. The measure, Seward said, +might "be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted government, a +cry for help; the government stretching forth its hands to +Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the +government. It will be considered our last <i>shriek</i> on the +retreat." He therefore urged postponement until after a Northern +victory. This appealed to Lincoln and he "put the draft of the +proclamation aside, waiting for victory<a name= +"FNanchor871"></a><a href="#Footnote_871">[871]</a>."</p> +<p>Victory came in September, with McClellan's defeat of Lee at +Antietam, and the retreat of the Southern army toward Richmond. +Five days later, September 22, Lincoln <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_86"></a>[V2:pg 86]</span> issued the +proclamation, expanded and altered in text from the draft of July +22, but in substance the same<a name="FNanchor872"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_872">[872]</a>. The loyal border states were not to be +affected, but the proclamation renewed the promise of steps to be +taken to persuade them to voluntary action. On January 1, 1863, a +second proclamation, referring to that of September 22, was issued +by Lincoln "by virtue of the power in me vested as +commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States in +time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and Government +of the United States...." The states affected were designated by +name and all persons held as slaves within them "are, and +henceforward shall be, free...." "I hereby enjoin upon the people +so declared to be free to abstain from all violence, unless in +necessary self-defence...." "And upon this act, sincerely believed +to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon +military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, +and the gracious favour of Almighty God<a name= +"FNanchor873"></a><a href="#Footnote_873">[873]</a>."</p> +<p>Such were the steps, from December, 1861, when the radical +Sumner began his pressure for action, to September, 1862, when +Lincoln's pledge of emancipation was made. Did these steps +indicate, as British opinion unquestionably held, an intention to +rouse a servile insurrection? Was the Confiscation Bill passed with +that purpose in view and had Lincoln decided to carry it into +effect? The failure of the slaves to rise is, indeed, the great +marvel of the Civil War and was so regarded not in England only, +but in America also. It was the expectation of the North and the +constant fear of the South. But was this, in truth, the +<i>purpose</i> of the emancipation proclamation?</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_87"></a>[V2:pg 87]</span> +<p>This purpose has been somewhat summarily treated by American +historians, largely because of lack of specific evidence as to +motives at the time of issue. Two words "military necessity" are +made to cover nearly the entire argument for emancipation in +September, 1862, but in just what manner the military prowess of +the North was to be increased was not at first indicated. In 1864, +Lincoln declared that after the failure of successive efforts to +persuade the border states to accept compensated emancipation he +had believed there had arrived the "indispensable necessity for +military emancipation and arming the blacks<a name= +"FNanchor874"></a><a href="#Footnote_874">[874]</a>." Repeatedly in +later defence of the proclamation he urged the benefits that had +come from his act and asserted that commanders in the field +"believe the emancipation policy and the use of coloured troops +constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the rebellion<a name= +"FNanchor875"></a><a href="#Footnote_875">[875]</a>." He added: +"negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do +anything for us, if we will do nothing for them? If they stake +their lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive, +even the promise of freedom."</p> +<p>There is no note here of stirring a servile insurrection; nor +did Lincoln ever acknowledge that such a purpose had been in his +mind, though the thought of such possible result must have been +present--was, indeed, present to most minds even without a +proclamation of emancipation. Lincoln's alleged purpose was simply +to draw away slaves, wherever possible, from their rebellious +masters, thus reducing the economic powers of resistance of the +South, and then to make these ex-slaves directly useful in winning +the war. But after the war, even here and there during it, a theory +was advanced that an impelling motive with the President had been +the hope of influencing favourably <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_88"></a>[V2:pg 88]</span> foreign governments and peoples by +stamping the Northern cause with a high moral purpose. In popular +opinion, Lincoln came to be regarded as a far-visioned statesman in +anticipating that which ultimately came to pass. This has important +bearing on the relations of the United States and Great +Britain.</p> +<p>There is no doubt that nearly every Northern American had +believed in 1860, that anti-slavery England would sympathize +strongly with the North. The event did not prove this to be the +case, nor could the North justly complain in the face of +administration denials of an anti-slavery purpose. The English +Government therefore was widely upheld by British opinion in +regarding the struggle from the point of view of British interests. +Yet any Northern step antagonistic to the institution of slavery +compelled British governmental consideration. As early as December, +1860, before the war began, Bunch, at Charleston, had reported a +conversation with Rhett, in which the latter frankly declared that +the South would expect to revive the African Slave Trade<a name= +"FNanchor876"></a><a href="#Footnote_876">[876]</a>. This was +limited in the constitution later adopted by the Confederacy which +in substance left the matter to the individual states--a condition +that Southern agents in England found it hard to explain<a name= +"FNanchor877"></a><a href="#Footnote_877">[877]</a>. As already +noted, the ardent friends of the North continued to insist, even +after Lincoln's denial, that slavery was the real cause of the +American rupture<a name="FNanchor878"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_878">[878]</a>. By September, 1861, John Bright was +writing to his friend Sumner that, all indications to the contrary, +England would warmly support the North <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_89"></a>[V2:pg 89]</span> if only it could +be shown that emancipation was an object<a name= +"FNanchor879"></a><a href="#Footnote_879">[879]</a>. Again and +again he urged, it is interesting to note, just those ideals of +gradual and compensated emancipation which were so strongly held by +Lincoln. In this same month the <i>Spectator</i> thought it was +"idle to strive to ignore the very centre and spring of all +disunion," and advised a "prudent audacity in striking at the cause +rather than at the effect<a name="FNanchor880"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_880">[880]</a>." Three weeks later the <i>Spectator</i>, +reviewing general British press comments, summed them up as +follows:</p> +<blockquote>"If you make it a war of emancipation we shall think +you madmen, and tell you so, though the ignorant instincts of +Englishmen will support you. And if you follow our counsel in +holding a tight rein on the Abolitionists, we shall applaud your +worldly wisdom so far; but shall deem it our duty to set forth +continually that you have forfeited all claim to the <i>popular</i> +sympathy of England."</blockquote> +<p>This, said the <i>Spectator</i>, had been stated in the most +objectionable style by the <i>Times</i> in particular, which, +editorially, had alleged that "the North has now lost the chance of +establishing a high moral superiority by a declaration against +slavery." To all this the <i>Spectator</i> declared that the North +must adopt the bold course and make clear that restoration of the +Union was not intended with the old canker at its roots<a name= +"FNanchor881"></a><a href="#Footnote_881">[881]</a>.</p> +<p>Official England held a different view. Russell believed that +the separation of North and South would conduce to the extinction +of slavery since the South, left to itself and fronted by a great +and prosperous free North, with a population united in ideals, +would be forced, ultimately, to abandon its "special system." He +professed that he could not understand Mrs. Stowe's support of the +war <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_90"></a>[V2:pg 90]</span> +and thought she and Sumner "animated by a spirit of +vengeance<a name="FNanchor882"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_882">[882]</a>." If the South did yield and the Union +were restored <i>with</i> slavery, Russell thought that "Slavery +would prevail all over the New World. For that reason I wish for +separation<a name="FNanchor883"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_883">[883]</a>." These views were repeated frequently by +Russell. He long had a fixed idea on the moral value of separation, +but was careful to state, "I give you these views merely as +speculations," and it is worthy of note that after midsummer of +1862 he rarely indulged in them. Against such speculations, whether +by Russell or by others, Mill protested in his famous article in +<i>Fraser's</i>, February, 1862<a name="FNanchor884"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_884">[884]</a>.</p> +<p>On one aspect of slavery the North was free to act and early did +so. Seward proposed to Lyons a treaty giving mutual right of search +off the African Coast and on the coasts of Cuba for the suppression +of the African Slave Trade. Such a treaty had long been urged by +Great Britain but persistently refused by the United States. It +could not well be declined now by the British Government and was +signed by Seward, April 8, 1862<a name="FNanchor885"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_885">[885]</a>, but if he expected any change in British +attitude as a result he was disappointed. The renewal by the South +of that trade might be a barrier to British goodwill, but the +action of the North was viewed as but a weak attempt to secure +British sympathy, and to mark the limits of Northern anti-slavery +efforts. Indeed, the Government was not eager for the treaty on +other grounds, since the Admiralty had never "felt any interest in +the suppression of the slave trade ... whatever they have done ... +they have done grudgingly and imperfectly<a name= +"FNanchor886"></a><a href="#Footnote_886">[886]</a>."</p> +<p>This was written at the exact period when Palmerston +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_91"></a>[V2:pg 91]</span> and +Russell were initiating those steps which were to result in the +Cabinet crisis on mediation in October-November, 1862. Certainly +the Slave Trade treaty with America had not influenced governmental +attitude. At this juncture there was founded, November, 1862, the +London Emancipation Society, with the avowed object of stirring +anti-slavery Englishmen in protest against "favouring the South." +But George Thompson, its organizer, had been engaged in the +preliminary work of organization for some months and the Society is +therefore to be regarded as an expression of that small group who +were persistent and determined in assertion of slavery as the cause +and object of the Civil War, before the issue of Lincoln's +proclamation<a name="FNanchor887"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_887">[887]</a>. Thus for England as a whole and for +official England the declarations of these few voices were regarded +as expressive of a wish rather than as consistent with the facts. +The moral uplift of an anti-slavery object was denied to the +North.</p> +<p>This being so did Lincoln seek to correct the foreign view by +the emancipation proclamation? There is some, but scant ground for +so believing. It is true that this aspect had at various times, +though rarely, been presented to the President. Carl Schurz, +American Minister at Madrid, wrote to Seward as early as September +14, 1861, strongly urging the declaration of an anti-slavery +purpose in the war and asserting that public opinion in Europe +would then be such in favour of the North that no government would +"dare to place itself, by declaration or act, upon the side of a +universally condemned institution<a name="FNanchor888"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_888">[888]</a>." There is no evidence that Seward showed +this despatch to Lincoln, but in January, 1862, Schurz returned to +America and in <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_92"></a>[V2:pg +92]</span> conversation with the President urged the "moral issue" +to prevent foreign intervention. The President replied: "You may be +right. Probably you are. I have been thinking so myself. I cannot +imagine that any European power would dare to recognize and aid the +Southern Confederacy if it became clear that the Confederacy stands +for slavery and the Union for freedom<a name= +"FNanchor889"></a><a href="#Footnote_889">[889]</a>." No doubt +others urged upon him the same view. Indeed, one sincere foreign +friend, Count Gasparin, who had early written in favour of the +North<a name="FNanchor890"></a><a href="#Footnote_890">[890]</a>, +and whose opinions were widely read, produced a second work in the +spring of 1862, in which the main theme was "slavery the issue." +The author believed emancipation inevitable and urged an instant +proclamation of Northern <i>intention</i> to free the +slaves<a name="FNanchor891"></a><a href="#Footnote_891">[891]</a>. +Presumably, Lincoln was familiar with this work. Meanwhile Sumner +pressed the same idea though adding the prevalent abolition +arguments which did not, necessarily, involve thought of foreign +effect. On the general question of emancipation Lincoln listened, +even telling Sumner that he "was ahead of himself only a month or +six weeks<a name="FNanchor892"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_892">[892]</a>."</p> +<p>Yet after the enactment of the "confiscation bill" in July, +1862, when strong abolitionist pressure was brought on the +President to issue a general proclamation of emancipation, he +reasserted in the famous reply to Greeley, August 22, 1862, his one +single purpose to restore the Union "with or without slavery."</p> +<blockquote>"If there be those who would not save the Union unless +they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with +them.<br> +<br> +"If there be those who would not save the Union unless <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_93"></a>[V2:pg 93]</span> they could at +the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them.<br> +<br> +"<i>My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to +save or to destroy slavery</i><a name="FNanchor893"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_893">[893]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Here seemed to be specific denial of raising a moral issue; yet +unknown to the public at the moment there had already been drafted +and discussed in Cabinet the emancipation proclamation. Greeley had +presented abolitionist demands essential to cement the North. A +month later, September 13, a delegation of Chicago clergymen came +to Washington, had an audience with Lincoln, presented similar +arguments, but also laid stress on the necessity of securing the +sympathy of Europe. This was but nine days before the first +proclamation was issued, but Lincoln replied much as to Greeley, +though he stated, "I will also concede that Emancipation would help +us in Europe, and convince them that we are incited by something +more than ambition<a name="FNanchor894"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_894">[894]</a>." Immediately after the event, September +24, making a short speech to a serenading party, Lincoln said, "I +can only trust in God I have made no mistake.... It is now for the +country and the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take action upon +it<a name="FNanchor895"></a><a href="#Footnote_895">[895]</a>." +Over a year later, December 8, 1863, in his annual message to +Congress, he noted a "much improved" tone in foreign countries as +resulting from the emancipation proclamation, but dwelt mainly on +the beneficial effects at home<a name="FNanchor896"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_896">[896]</a>.</p> +<p>Evidently there is slight ground for believing Lincoln to have +been convinced that foreign relations would be improved by the +proclamation. On the contrary, if he <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_94"></a>[V2:pg 94]</span> trusted Seward's judgment he may +have <i>feared</i> the effect on Europe, for such was Seward's +prophecy. Here may have lain the true meaning of Lincoln's speech +of September 24--that it was now for "the world to pass judgment +and, maybe, take action upon it." After all foreign policy, though +its main lines were subject to the President's control, was in the +hands of Seward and throughout this entire period of six months +since the introduction of the Confiscation Bill up to Lincoln's +presentation of his draft proclamation to the Cabinet in July, +Seward had been using the threat of a servile insurrection as a +deterrent upon French-British talk of intervention. At times Seward +connected servile insurrection with emancipation--at times not.</p> +<p>Seward had begun his career as Secretary of State with an appeal +to Europe on lines of old friendship and had implied, though he +could not state explicitly, the "noble" cause of the North. He had +been met with what he considered a "cold" and premature as well as +unjustifiable declaration of neutrality. From the first day of the +conflict Lyons and Mercier had been constant in representing the +hardships inflicted by the American war upon the economic interests +of their respective countries. Both men bore down upon the +interruption of the cotton trade and Seward kept repeating that +Northern victories would soon release the raw cotton. He expected +and promised much from the capture of New Orleans, but the results +were disappointing. As time went on Seward became convinced that +material interests alone would determine the attitude and action of +Great Britain and France. But the stored supplies were on hand in +the South, locked in by the blockade and would be available when +the war was over <i>provided</i> the war did not take on an +uncivilized and sanguinary character through a rising of the +slaves. If that occurred cotton would be burned and destroyed and +cotton supply to Europe would <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_95"></a>[V2:pg 95]</span> be not merely a matter of +temporary interruption, but one of long-continued dearth with no +certainty of early resumption. Fearing the growth in England, +especially, of an intention to intervene, Seward threatened a +Northern appeal to the slaves, thinking of the threat not so much +in terms of an uncivilized and horrible war as in terms of the +material interests of Great Britain. In brief, considering foreign +attitude and action in its relation to Northern advantage--to the +winning of the war--he would use emancipation as a threat of +servile insurrection, but did not desire emancipation itself for +fear it would cause that very intervention which it was his object +to prevent.</p> +<p>His instructions are wholly in line with this policy. In +February, 1862, the Confiscation Bill had been introduced in +Congress. In April, Mercier's trip to Richmond<a name= +"FNanchor897"></a><a href="#Footnote_897">[897]</a> had caused much +speculation and started many rumours in London of plans of +mediation<a name="FNanchor898"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_898">[898]</a>. On May 28, Seward wrote to Adams at +great length and especially emphasized two points: first that while +diplomats abroad had hitherto been interdicted from discussing +slavery as an issue in the war, they were now authorized to state +that the war was, in part at least, intended for the suppression of +slavery, and secondly, that the North if interfered with by foreign +nations would be forced to have recourse to a servile war. Such a +war, Seward argued, would be "completely destructive of all +European interests<a name="FNanchor899"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_899">[899]</a>...." A copy of this instruction Adams +gave to Russell on June 20. Eight days later Adams told Cobden in +reply to a query about mediation that it would result in a servile +war<a name="FNanchor900"></a><a href="#Footnote_900">[900]</a>. +Evidently Adams perfectly understood Seward's policy.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_96"></a>[V2:pg 96]</span> +<p>On July 13, Lincoln told Seward and Welles of the planned +emancipation proclamation and that this was his first mention of it +to anyone. Seward commented favourably but wished to consider the +proposal in all its bearings before committing himself<a name= +"FNanchor901"></a><a href="#Footnote_901">[901]</a>. The day +following he transmitted to agents abroad a copy of the Bill that +day introduced into Congress embodying Lincoln's plan for gradual +and compensated emancipation. This was prompt transmittal--and was +unusual. Seward sent the Bill without material comment<a name= +"FNanchor902"></a><a href="#Footnote_902">[902]</a>, but it is +apparent that this method and measure of emancipation would much +better fit in with his theory of the slavery question in relation +to foreign powers, than would an outright proclamation of +emancipation.</p> +<p>Meanwhile American anxiety as to a possible alteration in +British neutral policy was increasing. July 11, Adams reported that +he had learned "from a credible source" that the British Cabinet +might soon "take new ground<a name="FNanchor903"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_903">[903]</a>." This despatch if it reached Seward +previous to the Cabinet of July 22, presumably added strength to +his conviction of the inadvisability of now issuing the +proclamation. In that Cabinet, Seward in fact went much beyond the +customary historical statement that he advised postponement of the +proclamation until the occurrence of a Northern victory; he argued, +according to Secretary of War Stanton's notes of the meeting, "That +foreign nations will intervene to prevent the abolition of slavery +for the sake of cotton.... We break up our relations with foreign +nations and the production of cotton for sixty years<a name= +"FNanchor904"></a><a href="#Footnote_904">[904]</a>." These views +did not prevail; Lincoln merely postponed action. Ten days later +Seward sent that long instruction to Adams covering the whole +ground of feared European intervention, which, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_97"></a>[V2:pg 97]</span> fortunately, +Adams was never called upon to carry out<a name= +"FNanchor905"></a><a href="#Footnote_905">[905]</a>. In it there +was renewed the threat of a servile war if Europe attempted to aid +the South, and again it is the materialistic view that is +emphasized. Seward was clinging to his theory of correct +policy.</p> +<p>Nor was he mistaken in his view of first reactions in +governmental circles abroad--at least in England. On July 21, the +day before Lincoln's proposal of emancipation in the Cabinet, +Stuart in reviewing military prospects wrote: "Amongst the means +relied upon for weakening the South is included a servile +war<a name="FNanchor906"></a><a href="#Footnote_906">[906]</a>." To +this Russell replied: "... I have to observe that the prospect of a +servile war will only make other nations more desirous to see an +end of this desolating and destructive conflict<a name= +"FNanchor907"></a><a href="#Footnote_907">[907]</a>." This was but +brief reiteration of a more exact statement by Russell made in +comment on Seward's first hint of servile war in his despatch to +Adams of May 28, a copy of which had been given to Russell on June +20. On July 28, Russell reviewing Seward's arguments, commented on +the fast increasing bitterness of the American conflict, disturbing +and unsettling to European Governments, and wrote:</p> +<blockquote>"The approach of a servile war, so much insisted upon +by Mr. Seward in his despatch, only forewarns us that another +element of destruction may be added to the slaughter, loss of +property, and waste of industry, which already afflict a country so +lately prosperous and tranquil<a name="FNanchor908"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_908">[908]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>In this same despatch unfavourable comment was made also on the +Confiscation Bill with its punitive emancipation clauses. Stuart +presented a copy of the despatch to Seward <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_98"></a>[V2:pg 98]</span> on August +16<a name="FNanchor909"></a><a href="#Footnote_909">[909]</a>. On +August 22, Stuart learned of Lincoln's plan and reported it as +purely a manoeuvre to affect home politics and to frighten foreign +governments<a name="FNanchor910"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_910">[910]</a>. Where did Stuart get the news if not +from Seward, since he also reported the latter's success in +postponing the proclamation?</p> +<p>In brief both Seward and Russell were regarding emancipation in +the light of an incitement to servile insurrection, and both +believed such an event would add to the argument for foreign +intervention. The <i>threat</i> Seward had regarded as useful; the +<i>event</i> would be highly dangerous to the North. Not so, +however, did emancipation appear in prospect to American diplomats +abroad. Adams was a faithful servant in attempting to carry out the +ideas and plans of his chief, but as early as February, 1862, he +had urged a Northern declaration in regard to slavery in order to +meet in England Southern private representations that, independence +won, the South would enter upon a plan of gradual emancipation to +be applied "to all persons born after some specific date<a name= +"FNanchor911"></a><a href="#Footnote_911">[911]</a>." Motley, at +Vienna, frequently after February, 1862, in private letters to his +friends in America, urged some forward step on slavery<a name= +"FNanchor912"></a><a href="#Footnote_912">[912]</a>, but no such +advice in despatches found its way into the selected correspondence +annually sent to print by Seward. Far more important was the +determination taken by Adams, less than a month after he had +presented to Russell the "servile war" threat policy of Seward, to +give advice to his chief that the chances of foreign intervention +would be best met by the distinct avowal of an anti-slavery object +in the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_99"></a>[V2:pg +99]</span> war and that the North should be prepared to meet an +European offer of mediation by declaring that if made to extinguish +slavery such mediation would be welcome. This Adams thought would +probably put an end to the mediation itself, but it would also +greatly strengthen the Northern position abroad<a name= +"FNanchor913"></a><a href="#Footnote_913">[913]</a>.</p> +<p>This was no prevision of an emancipation proclamation; but it +was assertion of the value of a higher "moral issue." Meanwhile, on +July 24, Seward still fearful of the effects abroad of +emancipation, wrote to Motley, asking whether he was "sure" that +European powers would not be encouraged in interference, because of +material interests, by a Northern attempt to free the +slaves<a name="FNanchor914"></a><a href="#Footnote_914">[914]</a>. +Motley's answer began, "A thousand times No," and Adams repeated +his plea for a moral issue<a name="FNanchor915"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_915">[915]</a>. September 25, Adams met Seward's +"material interests" argument by declaring that for Great Britain +the chief difficulty in the cotton situation was not scarcity, but +uncertainty, and that if English manufacturers could but know what +to expect there would be little "cotton pressure" on the +Government<a name="FNanchor916"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_916">[916]</a>. Thus leading diplomats abroad did not +agree with Seward, but the later advices of Adams were not yet +received when the day, September 22, arrived on which Lincoln +issued the proclamation. On that day in sending the text to Adams +the comment of Seward was brief. The proclamation, he said, put +into effect a policy the approach of which he had "heretofore +indicated to our representatives abroad," and he laid emphasis on +the idea that the main purpose of the proclamation was to convince +the South that its true interests were in the preservation of the +Union--which is to say that the hoped-for result was the return of +the South <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_100"></a>[V2:pg +100]</span> <i>with its slaves</i><a name= +"FNanchor917"></a><a href="#Footnote_917">[917]</a>. Certainly this +was far from a truthful representation, but its purpose is evident. +Seward's first thought was that having held up the threat of +servile insurrection he must now remove that bogie. Four days later +his judgment was improved, for he began, and thereafter maintained +with vigour, the "high moral purpose" argument as evinced in the +emancipation proclamation. "The interests of humanity," he wrote to +Adams, "have now become identified with the cause of our +country<a name="FNanchor918"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_918">[918]</a>...."</p> +<p>That the material interests of Great Britain were still in +Seward's thought is shown by the celerity with which under +Lincoln's orders he grasped at an unexpected opening in relation to +liberated slaves. Stuart wrote in mid-September that Mr. Walker, +secretary of the colony of British Guiana, was coming from Demerara +to Washington to secure additional labour for the British colony by +offering to carry away ex-slaves<a name="FNanchor919"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_919">[919]</a>. This scheme was no secret and five days +after the issue of the proclamation Seward proposed to Stuart a +convention by which the British Government would be permitted to +transport to the West Indies, or to any of its colonies, the +negroes about to be emancipated. On September 30, Adams was +instructed to take up the matter at London<a name= +"FNanchor920"></a><a href="#Footnote_920">[920]</a>. Russell was at +first disinclined to consider such a convention and discussion +dragged until the spring of 1864, when it was again proposed, this +time by Russell, but now declined by Seward. In its immediate +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_101"></a>[V2:pg 101]</span> +influence in the fall of 1862, Seward's offer had no effect on the +attitude of the British Government<a name= +"FNanchor921"></a><a href="#Footnote_921">[921]</a>.</p> +<p>To Englishmen and Americans alike it has been in later years a +matter for astonishment that the emancipation proclamation did not +at once convince Great Britain of the high purposes of the North. +But if it be remembered that in the North itself the proclamation +was greeted, save by a small abolitionist faction, with doubt +extending even to bitter opposition and that British governmental +and public opinion had long dreaded a servile insurrection--even of +late taking its cue from Seward's own prophecies--the cool +reception given by the Government, the vehement and vituperative +explosions of the press do not seem so surprising. "This +Emancipation Proclamation," wrote Stuart on September 23, "seems a +brutum fulmen<a name="FNanchor922"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_922">[922]</a>." One of the President's motives, he +thought, was to affect public opinion in England. "But there is no +pretext of humanity about the Proclamation.... It is merely a +Confiscation Act, or perhaps worse, for it offers direct +encouragement to servile insurrections<a name= +"FNanchor923"></a><a href="#Footnote_923">[923]</a>." Received in +England during the Cabinet struggle over mediation the proclamation +appears not to have affected that controversy, though Russell +sought to use it as an argument for British action. In his +memorandum, circulated October 13, Russell strove to show that the +purpose and result would be servile war. He dwelt both on the +horrors of such a war, and on its destruction of industry:</p> +<blockquote>"What will be the practical effect of declaring +emancipation, not as an act of justice and beneficence, dispensed +by <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_102"></a>[V2:pg 102]</span> +the Supreme Power of the State, but as an act of punishment and +retaliation inflicted by a belligerent upon a hostile community, it +is not difficult to foresee. Wherever the arms of the United States +penetrate, a premium will be given to acts of plunder, of +incendiarism, and of revenge. The military and naval authorities of +the United States will be bound by their orders to maintain and +protect the perpetrators of such acts. Wherever the invasion of the +Southern States is crowned by victory, society will be +disorganized, industry suspended, large and small proprietors of +land alike reduced to beggary<a name="FNanchor924"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_924">[924]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The London newspaper press was very nearly a unit in treating +the proclamation with derision and contempt and no other one +situation in the Civil War came in for such vigorous denunciation. +Citations setting forth such comment have frequently been gathered +together illustrative of the extent of press condemnation and of +its unity in vicious editorials<a name="FNanchor925"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_925">[925]</a>. There is no need to repeat many of them +here, but a few will indicate their tone. The <i>Times</i> greeted +the news with an assertion that this was a final desperate play by +Lincoln, as hope of victory waned. It was his "last card<a name= +"FNanchor926"></a><a href="#Footnote_926">[926]</a>," a phrase that +caught the fancy of lesser papers and was repeated by them. October +21, appeared the "strongest" of the <i>Times</i> editorials:</p> +<br> +<a name="image10.jpg"></a> +<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image10.jpg"><img src= +"images/image10.jpg" width="100%" alt=""></a><br> +<b>ABE LINCOLN'S LAST CARD; OR, ROUGE-ET-NOIR.</b><br> +<i>Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"</i></p> +<br> +<blockquote>"... We have here the history of the beginning of the +end, but who can tell how the pages will be written which are yet +to be filled before the inevitable separation is accomplished? Are +scenes like those which we a short time since described from +Dahomey yet to interpose, and is the reign of the last PRESIDENT to +go out amid horrible massacres of <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_103"></a>[V2:pg 103]</span> white women and children, to be +followed by the extermination of the black race in the South? Is +LINCOLN yet a name not known to us as it will be known to +posterity, and is it ultimately to be classed among that catalogue +of monsters, the wholesale assassins and butchers of their +kind?<br> +<br> +"... We will attempt at present to predict nothing as to what the +consequence of Mr. Lincoln's new policy may be, except that it +certainly will not have the effect of restoring the Union. It will +not deprive Mr. Lincoln of the distinctive affix which he will +share with many, for the most part foolish and incompetent, Kings +and Emperors, Caliphs and Doges, that of being LINCOLN--'the +Last.'"</blockquote> +<p>The <i>Times</i> led the way; other papers followed on. The +<i>Liverpool Post</i> thought a slave rising inevitable<a name= +"FNanchor927"></a><a href="#Footnote_927">[927]</a>, as did also +nearly every paper acknowledging anti-Northern sentiments, or +professedly neutral, while even pro-Northern journals at first +feared the same results<a name="FNanchor928"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_928">[928]</a>. Another striking phrase, "Brutum +Fulmen," ran through many editorials. The <i>Edinburgh Review</i> +talked of Lincoln's "cry of despair<a name= +"FNanchor929"></a><a href="#Footnote_929">[929]</a>," which was +little different from Seward's feared "last shriek." +<i>Blackwood's</i> thought the proclamation "monstrous, reckless, +devilish." It "justifies the South in raising the black flag, and +proclaiming a war without quarter<a name="FNanchor930"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_930">[930]</a>." But there is no need to expand the +citation of the well-nigh universal British press pouring out of +the wrath of heaven upon Lincoln, and his emancipation +proclamation<a name="FNanchor931"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_931">[931]</a>.</p> +<p>Even though there can be no doubt that the bulk of England at +first expected servile war to follow the proclamation it is +apparent that here and there a part of this British wrath was due +to a fear that, in spite of denials of such influence, the +proclamation was intended to arouse public opinion against projects +of intervention and <i>might so arouse it</i>. The New York +correspondent of the <i>Times</i> wrote that it was "promulgated +evidently as a sop to keep <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_104"></a>[V2:pg 104]</span> England and France quiet<a name= +"FNanchor932"></a><a href="#Footnote_932">[932]</a>," and on +October 9, an editorial asserted that Lincoln had "a very important +object. There is a presentiment in the North that recognition +cannot be delayed, and this proclamation is aimed, not at the negro +or the South, but at Europe." <i>Bell's Weekly Messenger</i> +believed that it was now "the imperative duty of England and France +to do what they can in order to prevent the possible occurrence of +a crime which, if carried out, would surpass in atrocity any +similar horror the world has ever seen<a name= +"FNanchor933"></a><a href="#Footnote_933">[933]</a>." "Historicus," +on the other hand, asked: "What is that solution of the negro +question to which an English Government is prepared to affix the +seal of English approbation<a name="FNanchor934"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_934">[934]</a>?" Mason, the Confederate Agent in London, +wrote home that it was generally believed the proclamation was +issued "as the means of warding off recognition.... It was seen +through at once and condemned accordingly<a name= +"FNanchor935"></a><a href="#Footnote_935">[935]</a>."</p> +<p>This interpretation of Northern purpose in no sense negatives +the dictum that the proclamation exercised little influence on +immediate British governmental policy, but does offer some ground +for the belief that strong pro-Southern sympathizers at once saw +the need of combating an argument dangerous to the carrying out of +projects of mediation. Yet the new "moral purpose" of Lincoln did +not immediately appeal even to his friends. The <i>Spectator</i> +deplored the lack of a clean-cut declaration in <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_105"></a>[V2:pg 105]</span> favour of the +principle of human freedom: "The principle asserted is not that a +human being cannot justly own another, but that he cannot own him +unless he is loyal to the United States." ... "There is no morality +whatever in such a decree, and if approved at all it must be upon +its merits as a political measure<a name="FNanchor936"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_936">[936]</a>." Two weeks later, reporting a public +speech at Liverpool by ex-governor Morehead of Kentucky, in which +Lincoln was accused of treachery to the border states, the +<i>Spectator</i>, while taking issue with the speaker's statements, +commented that it was not to be understood as fully defending a +system of government which chose its executive "from the ranks of +half-educated mechanics<a name="FNanchor937"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_937">[937]</a>."</p> +<p>Similarly in America the emancipation proclamation, though +loudly applauded by the abolitionists, was received with +misgivings. Lincoln was disappointed at the public reaction and +became very despondent, though this was due, in part, to the +failure of McClellan to follow up the victory of Antietam. The +elections of October and November went heavily against the +administration and largely on the alleged ground of the President's +surrender to the radicals<a name="FNanchor938"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_938">[938]</a>. The army as a whole was not favourably +stirred by the proclamation; it was considered at best as but a +useless bit of "waste paper<a name="FNanchor939"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_939">[939]</a>." In England, John Bright, the most +ardent public advocate of the Northern cause, was slow to applaud +heartily; not until December did he give distinct approval, and +even then in but half-hearted fashion, though he thought public +interest was much aroused and that attention was now fixed on +January 1, the date set by Lincoln for actual enforcement of +emancipation<a name="FNanchor940"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_940">[940]</a>. In a speech at Birmingham, December 18, +Bright had little to <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_106"></a>[V2:pg 106]</span> say of emancipation; rather he +continued to use previous arguments against the South for +admitting, as Vice-President Stephens had declared, that slavery +was the very "corner-stone" of Southern institutions and +society<a name="FNanchor941"></a><a href="#Footnote_941">[941]</a>. +A few public meetings at points where favour to the North had been +shown were tried in October and November with some success but with +no great show of enthusiasm. It was not until late December that +the wind of public opinion, finding that no faintest slave-rising +had been created by the proclamation began to veer in favour of the +emancipation edict<a name="FNanchor942"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_942">[942]</a>. By the end of the year it appeared that +the Press, in holding up horrified hands and prophesying a servile +war had "overshot the mark<a name="FNanchor943"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_943">[943]</a>."</p> +<p>Soon the changing wind became a gale of public favour for the +cause of emancipation, nor was this lessened--rather increased--by +Jefferson Davis' proclamation of December 23, 1862, in which he +declared that Lincoln had approved "of the effort to excite a +servile insurrection," and that therefore it was now ordered "all +negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered over to the +executive authorities of the respective States to which they +belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of said State." This +by state laws meant death to the slave fighting for his freedom, +even as a regular soldier in the Northern armies, and gave a good +handle for accusations of Southern ferocity<a name= +"FNanchor944"></a><a href="#Footnote_944">[944]</a>.</p> +<p>Official opinion was not readily altered, Lyons writing in +December that the promised January proclamation might still mean +servile war. He hoped that neither Lincoln's proclamation nor +Davis' threat of retaliation would be <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_107"></a>[V2:pg 107]</span> carried into +effect<a name="FNanchor945"></a><a href="#Footnote_945">[945]</a>. +Russell regarded the January 1 proclamation as "a measure of war of +a very questionable kind<a name="FNanchor946"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_946">[946]</a>."</p> +<p>But the British anti-slavery public, now recovered from its +fears of an "abolition war" was of another temper. Beginning with +the last week of December, 1862, and increasing in volume in each +succeeding month, there took place meeting after meeting at which +strong resolutions were passed enthusiastically endorsing the issue +of the emancipation proclamation and pledging sympathy to the cause +of the North. The <i>Liberator</i> from week to week, listed and +commented on these public meetings, noting fifty-six held between +December 30, 1862, and March 20, 1863. The American Minister +reported even more, many of which sent to him engraved resolutions +or presented them in person through selected delegations. The +resolutions were much of the type of that adopted at Sheffield, +January 10:</p> +<blockquote>"<i>Resolved</i>: that this meeting being convinced +that slavery is the cause of the tremendous struggle now going on +in the American States, and that the object of the leaders of the +rebellion is the perpetuation of the unchristian and inhuman system +of chattel slavery, earnestly prays that the rebellion may be +crushed, and its wicked object defeated, and that the Federal +Government may be strengthened to pursue its emancipation policy +till not a slave be left on the American soil<a name= +"FNanchor947"></a><a href="#Footnote_947">[947]</a>."</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_108"></a>[V2:pg 108]</span> +<p>Adams quoted the <i>Times</i> as referring to these meetings as +made up of "nobodies." Adams commented:</p> +<blockquote>"They do not indeed belong to the high and noble class, +but they are just those nobodies who formerly forced their most +exalted countrymen to denounce the prosecution of the Slave Trade +by the commercial adventurers at Liverpool and Bristol, and who at +a later period overcame all their resistance to the complete +emancipation of the negro slaves in the British dependencies. If +they become once fully aroused to a sense of the importance of this +struggle as a purely moral question, I feel safe in saying there +will be an end of all effective sympathy in Great Britain with the +rebellion<a name="FNanchor948"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_948">[948]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Adams had no doubt "that these manifestations are the genuine +expression of the feelings of the religious dissenting and of the +working classes," and was confident the Government would be much +influenced by them<a name="FNanchor949"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_949">[949]</a>. The newspapers, though still editorially +unfavourable to the emancipation proclamation, accepted and printed +communications with increasing frequency in which were expressed +the same ideas as in the public meetings. This was even more +noticeable in the provincial press. Samuel A. Goddard, a merchant +of Birmingham, was a prolific letter writer to the <i>Birmingham +Post</i>, consistently upholding the Northern cause and he now +reiterated the phrase, "Mr. <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_109"></a>[V2:pg 109]</span> Lincoln's cause is just and +holy<a name="FNanchor950"></a><a href="#Footnote_950">[950]</a>." +In answer to Southern sneers at the failure of the proclamation to +touch slavery in the border states, Goddard made clear the fact +that Lincoln had no constitutional "right" to apply his edict to +states not in rebellion<a name="FNanchor951"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_951">[951]</a>. On the public platform no one equalled +the old anti-slavery orator, George Thompson, in the number of +meetings attended and addresses made. In less than a month he had +spoken twenty-one times and often in places where opposition was in +evidence. Everywhere Thompson found an aroused and encouraged +anti-slavery feeling, now strongly for the North<a name= +"FNanchor952"></a><a href="#Footnote_952">[952]</a>.</p> +<p>Eight years earlier five hundred thousand English women had +united in an address to America on behalf of the slaves. Harriet +Beecher Stowe now replied to this and asked the renewed sympathy of +her English sisters. A largely signed "round robin" letter assured +her that English women were still the foes of slavery and were +indignantly united against suggestions of British recognition of +the South<a name="FNanchor953"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_953">[953]</a>. Working class Britain was making its +voice heard in support of the North. To those of Manchester, +Lincoln, on January 19, 1863, addressed a special letter of thanks +for their earnest support while undergoing personal hardships +resulting from the disruption of industry caused by the war. "I +cannot" he wrote, "but regard your decisive utterances upon the +question [of human slavery] as an instance of sublime Christian +heroism which has not been surpassed in any age or in any +country<a name="FNanchor954"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_954">[954]</a>." Nonconformist England now came +vigorously to the support of the North. Spurgeon, in London, made +his great congregation pray with him: "God bless and strengthen +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_110"></a>[V2:pg 110]</span> +the North; give victory to their arms<a name= +"FNanchor955"></a><a href="#Footnote_955">[955]</a>." Further and +more general expression of Nonconformist church sympathy came as a +result of a letter received February 12, 1863, from a number of +French pastors and laymen, urging all the Evangelical churches to +unite in an address to Lincoln. The London and Manchester +Emancipation Societies combined in drawing up a document for +signature by pastors and this was presented for adoption at a +meeting in Manchester on June 3, 1863. In final form it was "An +Address to Ministers and Pastors of All Christian Denominations +throughout the States of America." There was a "noisy opposition" +but the address was carried by a large majority and two +representatives, Massie and Roylance, were selected to bear the +message in person to the brethren across the ocean<a name= +"FNanchor956"></a><a href="#Footnote_956">[956]</a>. Discussion +arose over the Biblical sanction of slavery. In the <i>Times</i> +appeared an editorial pleading this sanction and arguing the +<i>duty</i> of slaves to refuse liberty<a name= +"FNanchor957"></a><a href="#Footnote_957">[957]</a>. Goldwin Smith, +Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, replied in a +pamphlet, "Does the Bible sanction American Slavery<a name= +"FNanchor958"></a><a href="#Footnote_958">[958]</a>?" His position +and his skill in presentation made him a valuable ally to the +North.</p> +<p>Thus British anti-slavery circles, previously on the defensive, +became aroused and enthusiastic when Lincoln's January 1, 1863, +proclamation made good his pledge of the previous September: other +elements of opinion, and in all classes, were strengthened in like +measure, and everywhere the first expression of fear of a servile +insurrection largely disappeared. In truth, pro-Northern England +went to such <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_111"></a>[V2:pg +111]</span> lengths in its support of emancipation as to astound +and alarm the <i>Saturday Review</i>, which called these +demonstrations a "carnival of cant<a name= +"FNanchor959"></a><a href="#Footnote_959">[959]</a>." More neutral +minds were perplexed over the practical difficulties and might well +agree with Schleiden who wrote in January, 1863, quoting +Machiavelli: "What is more difficult, to make free men slaves, or +slaves free<a name="FNanchor960"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_960">[960]</a>?" But by the end of January the popular +approval of emancipation was in full swing. On the evening of the +twenty-ninth there took place in London at Exeter Hall, a great +mass meeting unprecedented in attendance and enthusiasm. The +meeting had been advertised for seven o'clock, but long before the +hour arrived the hall was jammed and the corridors filled. A second +meeting was promptly organized for the lower hall, but even so the +people seeking admission crowded Exeter Street and seriously +impeded traffic in the Strand. Outdoor meetings listened to reports +of what was going on in the Hall and cheered the speakers. The main +address was made by the Rev. Newman Hall, of Surrey Chapel. A few +Southern sympathizers who attempted to heckle the speakers were +quickly shouted down<a name="FNanchor961"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_961">[961]</a>.</p> +<p>The "carnival of cant," as the <i>Saturday Review</i> termed it, +was truly a popular demonstration, stirred by anti-slavery leaders, +but supported by the working and non-enfranchised classes. Its +first effect was to restore courage and confidence to Northern +supporters in the upper classes. Bright had welcomed emancipation, +yet with some misgivings. <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_112"></a>[V2:pg 112]</span> He now joined in the movement +and in a speech at Rochdale, February 3, on "Slavery and +Secession," gave full approval of Lincoln's efforts.</p> +<p>In 1862, shortly after the appearance of Spence's <i>American +Union</i>, which had been greeted with great interest in England +and had influenced largely upper-class attitude in favour of the +South, Cairnes had published his pamphlet, "Slave Power." This was +a reasoned analysis of the basis of slavery and a direct challenge +to the thesis of Spence<a name="FNanchor962"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_962">[962]</a>. England's "unnatural infatuation" for a +slave power, Cairnes prophesied, would be short-lived. His pamphlet +began to be read with more conviction by that class which until now +had been coldly neutral and which wished a more reassured faith in +the Northern cause than that stirred by the emotional reception +given the emancipation proclamation. Yet at bottom it was +emancipation that brought this reasoning public to seek in such +works as that of Cairnes a logical basis for a change of heart. +Even in official circles, utterances previously made in private +correspondence, or in governmental conversations only, were now +ventured in public by friends of the North. On April 1, 1863, at a +banquet given to Palmerston in Edinburgh, the Duke of Argyll +ventured to answer a reference made by Palmerston in a speech of +the evening previous in which had been depicted the horrors of +Civil War, by asking if Scotland were historically in a position to +object to civil wars having high moral purpose. "I, for one," +Argyll said, "have not learned to be ashamed of that ancient +combination of the Bible and the sword. Let it be enough for us to +pray and hope that the contest, whenever it may be brought to an +end, shall bring with it that great blessing to the white race +which shall consist in the final freedom of the black<a name= +"FNanchor963"></a><a href="#Footnote_963">[963]</a>."</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_113"></a>[V2:pg 113]</span> +<p>The public meetings in England raised high the hope in America +that governmental England would show some evidence of a more +friendly attitude. Lincoln himself drafted a resolution embodying +the ideas he thought it would be wise for the public meetings to +adopt. It read:</p> +<blockquote>"Whereas, while <i>heretofore</i> States, and Nations, +have tolerated slavery, <i>recently</i>, for the first time in the +world, an attempt has been made to construct a new Nation, upon the +basis of, and with the primary, and fundamental object to maintain, +enlarge, and perpetuate human slavery, therefore,<br> +<br> +<i>Resolved</i>: that no such embryo State should ever be +recognized by, or admitted into, the family of Christian and +civilized nations; and that all Christian and civilized men +everywhere should, by all lawful means, resist to the utmost, such +recognition or admission<a name="FNanchor964"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_964">[964]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>This American hope much disturbed Lyons. On his return to +Washington, in November, 1862, he had regarded the emancipation +proclamation as a political manoeuvre purely and an unsuccessful +one. The administration he thought was losing ground and the people +tired of the war. This was the burden of his private letters to +Russell up to March, 1863, but does not appear in his official +despatches in which there was nothing to give offence to Northern +statesmen. But in March, Lyons began to doubt the correctness of +these judgments. He notes a renewed Northern enthusiasm leading to +the conferring of extreme powers--the so-called "dictatorship +measures"--upon Lincoln. Wise as Lyons ordinarily was he was bound +by the social and educational traditions of his class, and had at +first not the slightest conception of the force or effect of +emancipation upon the public in middle-class England. He feared an +American reaction against England when it was understood +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_114"></a>[V2:pg 114]</span> +that popular meetings would have no influence on the British +Government.</p> +<blockquote>"Mr. Seward and the whole Party calculate immensely on +the effects of the anti-slavery meetings in England, and seem to +fancy that public feeling in England is coming so completely round +to the North that the Government will be obliged to favour the +North in all ways, even if it be disinclined to do so. This notion +is unlucky, as it makes those who hold it, unreasonable and +presumptuous in dealing with us<a name="FNanchor965"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_965">[965]</a>."</blockquote> +<hr style="width: 25%;"> +<p>Lincoln's plan of emancipation and his first proclamation had +little relation to American foreign policy. Seward's attitude +toward emancipation was that the <i>threat</i> of it and of a +possible servile war might be useful in deterring foreign nations, +especially Great Britain, from intervening. But he objected to the +carrying of emancipation into effect because he feared it would +<i>induce</i> intervention. Servile war, in part by Seward's own +efforts, in part because of earlier British newspaper speculations, +was strongly associated with emancipation, in the English view. +Hence the Government received the September, 1862, proclamation +with disfavour, the press with contempt, and the public with +apprehension--even the friends of the North. But no servile war +ensued. In January, 1863, Lincoln kept his promise of wide +emancipation and the North stood committed to a high moral object. +A great wave of relief and exultation <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_115"></a>[V2:pg 115]</span> swept over +anti-slavery England, but did not so quickly extend to governmental +circles. It was largely that England which was as yet without +direct influence on Parliament which so exulted and now upheld the +North. Could this England of the people affect governmental policy +and influence its action toward America? Lyons correctly +interpreted the North and Seward as now more inclined to press the +British Government on points previously glossed over, and in the +same month in which Lyons wrote this opinion there was coming to a +head a controversy over Britain's duty as a neutral, which both +during the war and afterwards long seemed to Americans a serious +and distinctly unfriendly breach of British neutrality. This was +the building in British ports of Confederate naval vessels of +war.</p> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_846"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor846">[846]</a> <i>Punch</i>, Nov. 22, 1862, has a cartoon +picturing Palmerston as presenting this view to Napoleon +III.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_847"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor847">[847]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 348.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_848"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor848">[848]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 875. No. 80. Confidential. +Lyons to Russell, Jan. 27, 1863. This date would have permitted +Mercier to be already in receipt of Napoleon's instructions, though +he gave no hint of it in the interview with Lyons.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_849"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor849">[849]</a> Mercier had in fact approached Stoeckl on +a joint offer of mediation without England. Evidently Stoeckl had +asked instructions and those received made clear that Russia did +not wish to be compelled to face such a question. She did not wish +to offend France, and an offer without England had no chance of +acceptance (Russian Archives, F.O. to Stoeckl, Feb. 16, 1863 +(O.S.)).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_850"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor850">[850]</a> F.O. Am., Vol. 876. No. 108. Confidential. +Lyons to Russell, Feb. 2, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_851"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor851">[851]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 348.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_852"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor852">[852]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 868, No. 86.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_853"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor853">[853]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXIX, pp. 5-53, and +69-152.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_854"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor854">[854]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 1714-41. March 23, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_855"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor855">[855]</a> Ashley, <i>Palmerston</i>, II, 208-9. To +Ellice, May 5, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_856"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor856">[856]</a> July 13, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_857"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor857">[857]</a> Harriet Martineau, <i>Autobiography</i>, +p. 508, To Mrs. Chapman, Aug. 8, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_858"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor858">[858]</a> Sept. 21, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_859"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor859">[859]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, Nov. 17, +1860.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_860"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor860">[860]</a> Russell Papers. To Russell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_861"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor861">[861]</a> Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, +Jan. 26, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_862"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor862">[862]</a> Article in <i>Fraser's Magazine</i>, Feb. +1862, "The Contest in America."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_863"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor863">[863]</a> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CXLV, p. 387, Feb. 17, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_864"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor864">[864]</a> Pierce, <i>Sumner</i>, IV, pp. 41-48, and +63-69.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_865"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor865">[865]</a> Raymond, <i>Life, Public Services and +State Papers of Abraham Lincoln</i>, p. 243.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_866"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor866">[866]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 229-32.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_867"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor867">[867]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 233, May 19, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_868"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor868">[868]</a> A Bill was in fact introduced July 16, +1862, on the lines of Lincoln's "pecuniary aid" proposal of July +12, but no action was taken on it.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_869"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor869">[869]</a> Welles, <i>Diary</i>, I, pp. +70-71.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_870"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor870">[870]</a> Abraham Lincoln, <i>Complete Works</i>, +II, p. 213.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_871"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor871">[871]</a> Rhodes, IV, pp. 71-2.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_872"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor872">[872]</a> As issued September 22, the first +paragraph refers to his plan of securing legislation to aid +compensated voluntary emancipation, the next sets the date January +1, 1863, for completed emancipation of slaves in states still in +rebellion and the remaining paragraphs concern the carrying out of +the confiscation law. Lincoln, <i>Complete Works</i>, II, pp. +237-8.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_873"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor873">[873]</a> Raymond, <i>State Papers of Lincoln</i>, +260-61.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_874"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor874">[874]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 214.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_875"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor875">[875]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 410. In letter, August +26, 1863, addressed to a Springfield mass meeting of "unconditional +Union men."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_876"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor876">[876]</a> American Hist. Rev., XVIII, pp. 784-7. +Bunch to Russell, Dec. 5, 1860.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_877"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor877">[877]</a> Southern Commissioners abroad early +reported that recognition of independence and commercial treaties +could not be secured unless the South would agree to "mutual right +of search" treaties for the suppression of the African Slave Trade. +Davis' answer was that the Confederate constitution gave him no +authority to negotiate such a treaty; indeed, denied him that +authority since the constitution itself prohibited the importation +of negroes from Africa. For Benjamin's instructions see Bigelow, +<i>Retrospections</i>, I, pp. 591-96.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_878"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor878">[878]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, May 4, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_879"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor879">[879]</a> Sept. 6, 1861. In Mass. Hist. Soc. +<i>Proceedings</i>, Vol. XLVI, p. 95.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_880"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor880">[880]</a> Sept. 14, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_881"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor881">[881]</a> October 5, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_882"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor882">[882]</a> Lyons Papers. To Lyons, Oct. 26, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_883"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor883">[883]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, To Lyons, Nov. 2, 1861. The +same ideas are officially expressed by Russell to Lyons, March 7, +1861, and May 1, 1862. (F.O., Am., Vol. 818, No. 104, Draft; and +<i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 819, No. 197, Draft.).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_884"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor884">[884]</a> See ante, p. 81.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_885"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor885">[885]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>, +1862-3, Pt. I, p. 65.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_886"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor886">[886]</a> Ashley, <i>Palmerston</i>, II, p. 227. +Palmerston to Russell, Aug. 13, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_887"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor887">[887]</a> Garrison, <i>Garrison</i>, IV, p. 66. Many +distinguished names were on the roster of the Society--Mill, +Bright, Cobden, Lord Houghton, Samuel Lucas, Forster, Goldwin +Smith, Justin McCarthy, Thomas Hughes, Cairns, Herbert Spencer, +Francis Newman, the Rev. Newman Hall, and others. Frederick W. +Chesson was secretary, and very active in the work.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_888"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor888">[888]</a> Schurz, <i>Speeches and +Correspondence</i>, I, 190.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_889"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor889">[889]</a> Schurz, <i>Reminiscences</i>, II, +309.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_890"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor890">[890]</a> Gasparin, <i>The Uprising of a Great +People</i>, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_891"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor891">[891]</a> Gasparin, <i>America before Europe</i>, +Pt. V, Ch. III. The preface is dated March 4, 1862, and the work +went through three American editions in 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_892"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor892">[892]</a> Pierce, <i>Sumner</i>, IV, p. 63. No exact +date, but Spring of 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_893"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor893">[893]</a> Raymond, <i>State Papers of Lincoln</i>, +p. 253.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_894"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor894">[894]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 256.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_895"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor895">[895]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 162.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_896"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor896">[896]</a> Lincoln's <i>Complete Works</i>, II, p. +454. But the <i>after-comment</i> by Lincoln as to purpose was +nearly always in line with an unfinished draft of a letter to +Charles D. Robinson, Aug. 17, 1864, when the specific object was +said to be "inducing the coloured people to come bodily over from +the rebel side to ours." <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 564.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_897"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor897">[897]</a> See <i>ante</i>, Ch. IX.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_898"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor898">[898]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1862-3</i>, Pt. I, p. 83. Adams to Seward, May 8, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_899"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor899">[899]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 101-105.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_900"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor900">[900]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 122. Adams to Seward, +July 3, 1862. In his despatch Adams states the conversation to have +occurred "last Saturday," and with an "unofficial person," who was +sounding him on mediation. This was Cobden.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_901"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor901">[901]</a> Welles, <i>Diary</i>, I, p. +70.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_902"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor902">[902]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1862-3</i>, Pt. I, p. 135.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_903"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor903">[903]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 133. To Seward. His +informant was Baring.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_904"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor904">[904]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. +333.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_905"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor905">[905]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 35.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_906"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor906">[906]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1863. Lords</i>, +Vol. XXIX. "Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United +States of North America." No. 8. To Russell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_907"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor907">[907]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 10. Russell to Stuart, +Aug. 7, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_908"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor908">[908]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 1863, <i>Lords</i>, Vol. +XXV. "Further correspondence relating to the Civil War in the +United States of North America." No. 2. To Stuart.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_909"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor909">[909]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 1863, <i>Lords</i>, Vol. +XXIX. "Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United +States of North America," No. 20. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 16, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_910"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor910">[910]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 37.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_911"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor911">[911]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 78, No. 119. +Adams to Seward, Feb. 21, 1862. This supplemented a similar +representation made on Jan. 17, 1862. (<i>U.S. Messages and +Documents, 1862-3</i>, Pt. I, p. 16.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_912"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor912">[912]</a> e.g., Motley, <i>Correspondence</i>, II, +pp. 64-5. To O.W. Holmes, Feb. 26, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_913"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor913">[913]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1862-3</i>, Pt. I, p. 140. Adams to Seward, July 17, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_914"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor914">[914]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. +336.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_915"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor915">[915]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1862-3</i>, Pt. I, p. 191. Adams to Seward, Sept. 12, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_916"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor916">[916]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 199.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_917"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor917">[917]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 195.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_918"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor918">[918]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 202. Seward to Adams, +Sept. 26, 1862. Lyons, on his return to Washington, wrote that he +found Seward's influence much lessened, and that he had fallen in +public estimation by his "signing the Abolition Proclamation, which +was imposed upon him, in opposition to all his own views, by the +Radical Party in the Cabinet." (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, +Nov. 14, 1862.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_919"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor919">[919]</a> Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept. +19, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_920"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor920">[920]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1862-3</i>, Pt. I, p. 202. The instruction went into great detail +as to conditions and means. A similar instruction was sent to +Paris, The Hague, and Copenhagen.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_921"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor921">[921]</a> There was much talk and correspondence on +this project from Sept., 1862, to March, 1864. Stuart was +suspicious of some "trap." Russell at one time thought the United +States was secretly planning to colonize ex-slaves in Central +America. Some of the Colonies were in favour of the plan. (Russell +Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept. 29, 1862. F.O., Am., Vol. 878, No. +177. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 24, 1863.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_922"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor922">[922]</a> Lyons Papers. To Lyons.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_923"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor923">[923]</a> Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept. +26, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_924"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor924">[924]</a> Gladstone Papers. British agents still +residing in the South believed the proclamation would have little +practical effect, but added that if actually carried out the +cultivation of cotton "would be as completely arrested as if an +edict were pronounced against its future growth," and pictured the +unfortunate results for the world at large. (F.O., Am., Vol. 846, +No. 34. Cridland to Russell, Oct. 29, 1862.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_925"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor925">[925]</a> See Rhodes, IV, 344, +<i>notes</i>.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_926"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor926">[926]</a> October 6, 1862. The <i>Times</i> had used +the "last card" phrase as early as Dec. 14, 1861, in speculations +on the effect of Sumner's agitation for emancipation.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_927"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor927">[927]</a> Oct. 6, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_928"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor928">[928]</a> e.g., <i>Dublin Nation</i>, Oct. 11, 1862. +<i>Manchester Guardian</i>, Oct. 7. <i>London Morning +Advertiser</i>, Oct. 9. <i>North British Review</i>, Oct., 1862. +<i>London Press</i>, Oct. 11. <i>London Globe</i>, Oct. 6. +<i>London Examiner</i>, Oct. 11, editorial: "The Black Flag," and +Oct. 18: "The Instigation to Servile War." <i>Bell's Weekly +Messenger</i>, Oct. 11.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_929"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor929">[929]</a> October, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_930"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor930">[930]</a> November, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_931"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor931">[931]</a> It is worthy of note that the French offer +of joint mediation made to Britain in October specified the danger +of servile war resulting from the proclamation as a reason for +European action. (France, <i>Documents Diplomatiques, 1862</i>, p. +142.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_932"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor932">[932]</a> The <i>Times</i>, Oct. 7, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_933"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor933">[933]</a> Oct. 18, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_934"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor934">[934]</a> Communication in the <i>Times</i>, Nov. 7, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_935"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor935">[935]</a> Richardson, II, 360. Mason to Benjamin, +Nov. 6, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_936"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor936">[936]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, Oct. 11, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_937"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor937">[937]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Oct. 25, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_938"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor938">[938]</a> Rhodes, IV, 162-64.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_939"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor939">[939]</a> Perry, <i>Henry Lee Higginson</i>, p. +175.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_940"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor940">[940]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 349, <i>note</i>. Bright to +Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_941"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor941">[941]</a> Rogers, <i>Speeches by John Bright</i>, I, +pp. 216 ff.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_942"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor942">[942]</a> <i>Liberator</i>, Nov. 28, 1862, reports a +meeting at Leigh, Oct. 27, expressing sympathy with the North. At +Sheffield, Dec. 31, 1862, an amended resolution calling for +recognition of the South was voted down and the original +pro-Northern resolutions passed. There were speakers on both sides. +<i>Liberator</i>, Jan. 23, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_943"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor943">[943]</a> Motley, <i>Correspondence</i>, II, p. 113. +J.S. Mill to Motley, Jan. 26, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_944"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor944">[944]</a> Richardson, I, p. 273. Davis' order +applied also to all Northern white officers commanding negro +troops. It proved an idle threat.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_945"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor945">[945]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 30, +1862. And again, Jan. 2, 1863. "If it do not succeed in raising a +servile insurrection, it will be a very unsuccessful political move +for its authors." Stoeckl in conference with Seward, expressed +regret that the emancipation proclamation had been issued, since it +set up a further barrier to the reconciliation of North and +South--always the hope of Russia. Seward replied that in executing +the proclamation, there would be, no doubt, many modifications. +Stoeckl answered that then the proclamation must be regarded as but +a futile menace. (Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 19-Dec. +1, 1862, No. 2171.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_946"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor946">[946]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 357.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_947"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor947">[947]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, +1863</i>, Pt. I, p. 55. Adams to Seward, Jan. 16, 1863, +transmitting this and other resolutions presented to him. Adams by +March 20 had reported meetings which sent resolutions to him, from +Sheffield, Chesterfield, Derbyshire, Crophills, Salford, Cobham, +Ersham, Weybridge, Bradford, Stroud, Bristol, Glasgow, Liverpool, +South London, Bath, Leeds, Bromley, Middleton, Edinburgh, +Birmingham, Aberdare, Oldham, Merthyr Tydfil, Paisley, Carlisle, +Bury, Manchester, Pendleton, Bolton, Newcastle-on-Tyne, +Huddersfield, Ashford, Ashton-under-Lyme, Mossley, Southampton, +Newark, and York. See also Rhodes, IV, 348-58, for +résumé of meetings and opinions +expressed.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_948"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor948">[948]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 81, No. 300. +Adams to Seward, Jan. 22, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_949"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor949">[949]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, +1863</i>, Pt. I, p. 100. Adams to Seward, Feb. 5, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_950"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor950">[950]</a> Goddard, <i>Letters on the American +Rebellion</i>, p. 287. Goddard contributed seventy letters before +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_951"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor951">[951]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 307. Letter to <i>Daily +Gazette</i>, May 2, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_952"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor952">[952]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, Feb. 27, 1863. At +Bristol the opposition element introduced a resolution expressing +abhorrence of slavery and the hope that the war in America might +end in total emancipation, but adding that "at the same time [this +meeting] cannot but regard the policy of President Lincoln in +relation to slavery, as partial, insincere, inhuman, revengeful and +altogether opposed to those high and noble principles of State +policy which alone should guide the counsels of a great people." +The resolution was voted down, and one passed applauding Lincoln. +The proposer of the resolution was also compelled to apologize for +slurring remarks on Thompson.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_953"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor953">[953]</a> <i>Atlantic Monthly</i>, XI, p. +525.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_954"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor954">[954]</a> Lincoln, <i>Complete Works</i>, II, p. +302.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_955"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor955">[955]</a> Trevelyan, <i>John Bright</i>, p. 306. +Also Rhodes, IV, p. 351.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_956"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor956">[956]</a> Massie, <i>America: the Origin of Her +Present Conflict</i>, London, 1864. This action and the tour of the +two delegates in America did much to soothe wounded feelings which +had been excited by a correspondence in 1862-3 between English, +French and American branches of similar church organizations. See +<i>New Englander</i>, April, 1863, p. 288.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_957"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor957">[957]</a> Jan. 6, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_958"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor958">[958]</a> Published Oxford and London, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_959"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor959">[959]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 355.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_960"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor960">[960]</a> Lutz, <i>Notes</i>. Schleiden's despatch, +No. 1, 1863. German opinion on the Civil War was divided; Liberal +Germany sympathized strongly with the North; while the aristocratic +and the landowning class stood for the South. The historian Karl +Friedrich Neumann wrote a three-volume history of the United States +wholly lacking in historical impartiality and strongly condemnatory +of the South. (Geschichte der Vereinigten Staaten, Berlin, +1863-66.) This work had much influence on German public opinion. +(Lutz, <i>Notes</i>.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_961"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor961">[961]</a> <i>Liberator</i>, Feb. 20, 1863. Letter of +J.P. Jewett to W.L. Garrison, Jan. 30, 1863. "The few oligarchs in +England who may still sympathize with slavery and the Southern +rebels, will be rendered absolutely powerless by these grand and +powerful uprisings of THE PEOPLE."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_962"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor962">[962]</a> Duffus, <i>English Opinion</i>, p. +51.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_963"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor963">[963]</a> Argyll, <i>Autobiography</i>, II, pp. +196-7.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_964"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor964">[964]</a> Trevelyan, <i>John Bright</i>. Facsimile, +opp. p. 303. Copy sent by Sunmer to Bright, April, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_965"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor965">[965]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, March +10, 1863. Lyons was slow to favour the emancipation proclamation. +The first favourable mention I have found was on July 26, 1864. +(Russell Papers. To Russell.) In this view his diplomatic +colleagues coincided. Stoeckl, in December, 1863, wrote that +slavery was dead in the Central and Border States, and that even in +the South its form must be altered if it survived. (Russian +Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 22-Dec. 4, 1863, No. 3358.) But +immediately after the second proclamation of January, 1863, Stoeckl +could see no possible good in such measures. If they had been made +of universal application it would have been a "great triumph for +the principle of individual liberty," but as issued they could only +mean "the hope of stirring a servile war in the South." +<i>(Ibid.</i>, Dec. 24, 1863-Jan. 5, 1864, No. 70.)</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_116"></a>[V2:pg 116]</span> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIII"></a>CHAPTER XIII</h2> +<h3>THE LAIRD RAMS</h3> +<br> +<p>The building in British ports of Confederate war vessels like +the <i>Alabama</i> and the subsequent controversy and arbitration +in relation thereto have been exhaustively studied and discussed +from every aspect of legal responsibility, diplomatic relations, +and principles of international law. There is no need and no +purpose here to review in detail these matters. The purpose is, +rather, to consider the development and effect at the time of their +occurrence of the principal incidents related to Southern +ship-building in British yards. The <i>intention</i> of the British +Government is of greater importance in this study than the +correctness of its action.</p> +<p>Yet it must first be understood that the whole question of a +belligerent's right to procure ships of war or to build them in the +ports of neutral nations was, in 1860, still lacking definite +application in international law. There were general principles +already established that the neutral must not do, nor permit its +subjects to do, anything directly in aid of belligerents. The +British Foreign Enlistment Act, notification of which had been +given in May, 1861, forbade subjects to "be concerned in the +equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or arming, of any ship or +vessel, with intent or in order that such ship or vessel shall be +employed in the service ..." of a belligerent, and provided for +punishment of individuals and forfeiture of vessels if this +prohibition were disobeyed. But the Act also declared that such +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_117"></a>[V2:pg 117]</span> +punishment, or seizure, would follow on due proof of the offence. +Here was the weak point of the Act, for in effect if secrecy were +maintained by offenders the proof was available only after the +offence had been committed and one of the belligerents injured by +the violation of the law. Over twenty years earlier the American +Government, seeking to prevent its subjects from committing +unneutral acts in connection with the Canadian rebellion of 1837, +had realized the weakness of its neutrality laws as they then +stood, and by a new law of March 10, 1838, hastily passed and +therefore limited to two years' duration, in the expectation of a +more perfect law, but intended as a clearer exposition of neutral +duty, had given federal officials power to act and seize <i>on +suspicion</i>, leaving the proof of guilt or innocence to be +determined later. But the British interpretation of her own +neutrality laws was that proof was required in advance of +seizure--an interpretation wholly in line with the basic principle +that a man was innocent until proved guilty, but fatal to that +preservation of strict neutrality which Great Britain had so +promptly asserted at the beginning of the Civil War<a name= +"FNanchor966"></a><a href="#Footnote_966">[966]</a>.</p> +<p>The South wholly lacking a navy or the means to create one, +early conceived the idea of using neutral ports for <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_118"></a>[V2:pg 118]</span> the +construction of war vessels. Advice secured from able British +lawyers was to the effect that if care were taken to observe the +strict letter of the Foreign Enlistment Act, by avoiding warlike +equipment, a ship, even though her construction were such as to +indicate that she was destined to become a ship of war, might be +built by private parties in British yards. The three main points +requiring careful observance by the South were concealment of +government ownership and destination, no war equipment and no +enlistment of crew in British waters.</p> +<p>The principal agent selected by the South to operate on these +lines was Captain J.D. Bullock, who asserts in his book descriptive +of his work that he never violated British neutrality law and that +prevailing legal opinion in England supported him in this +view<a name="FNanchor967"></a><a href="#Footnote_967">[967]</a>. In +March, 1862, the steamer <i>Oreto</i> cleared from Liverpool with a +declared destination of "Palermo, the Mediterranean, and Jamaica." +She was not heard of until three months later when she was reported +to be at Nassau completing her equipment as a Southern war vessel. +In June, Adams notified Russell "that a new and still more powerful +war-steamer was nearly ready for departure from the port of +Liverpool on the same errand<a name="FNanchor968"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_968">[968]</a>." He protested that such ships violated +the neutrality of Great Britain and demanded their stoppage and +seizure. From June 23 to July 28, when this second ship, "No. 290" +(later christened the <i>Alabama</i>) left Liverpool, Adams and the +United States consul at Liverpool, Dudley, were busy in securing +evidence and in renewing protests to the Government. To each +protest Russell replied in but a few lines that the matter had been +referred to the proper departments, and it was not until July 26, +when there was received from Adams an opinion by an eminent Queen's +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_119"></a>[V2:pg 119]</span> +Counsel, Collier, that the affidavits submitted were conclusive +against the "290," that Russell appears to have been seriously +concerned. On July 28, the law officers of the Crown were asked for +an immediate opinion, and on the thirty-first telegrams were sent +to Liverpool and to other ports to stop and further examine the +vessel. But the "290" was well away and outside of British +waters<a name="FNanchor969"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_969">[969]</a>.</p> +<p>The <i>Alabama</i>, having received guns and munitions by a +ship, the <i>Bahama</i>, sent out from England to that end, and +having enlisted in the Confederate Navy most of the British crews +of the two vessels, now entered upon a career of destruction of +Northern commerce. She was not a privateer, as she was commonly +called at the time, but a Government vessel of war specially +intended to capture and destroy merchant ships. In short her true +character, in terms of modern naval usage, was that of a "commerce +destroyer." Under an able commander, Captain Semmes, she traversed +all oceans, captured merchant ships and after taking coal and +stores from them, sank or burnt the captures; for two years she +evaded battle with Northern war vessels and spread so wide a fear +that an almost wholesale transfer of the flag from American to +British or other foreign register took place, in the mercantile +marine. The career of the <i>Alabama</i> was followed with +increasing anger and chagrin by the North; this, said the public, +was a British ship, manned by a British crew, using British guns +and ammunition, whose escape from Liverpool had been winked at by +the British Government. What further evidence was necessary of bad +faith in a professed strict neutrality?</p> +<p>Nor were American officials far behind the public in suspicion +and anger. At the last moment it had appeared <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_120"></a>[V2:pg 120]</span> as if the +Government were inclined to stop the "290." Was the hurried +departure of the vessel due to a warning received from official +sources? On November 21, Adams reported that Russell complained in +an interview of remarks made privately by Bright, to the effect +that warning had come from Russell himself, and "seemed to me a +little as if he suspected that Mr. Bright had heard this from +me<a name="FNanchor970"></a><a href="#Footnote_970">[970]</a>." +Adams disavowed, and sincerely, any such imputation, but at the +same time expressed to Russell his conviction that there must have +been from some source a "leak" of the Government's +intention<a name="FNanchor971"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_971">[971]</a>. The question of advance warning to +Bullock, or to the Lairds who built the <i>Alabama</i>, was not one +which was likely to be officially put forward in any case; the real +issue was whether an offence to British neutrality law had been +committed, whether it would be acknowledged as such, and still more +important, whether repetitions of the offence would be permitted. +The <i>Alabama</i>, even though she might, as the American +assistant-secretary of the Navy wrote, be "giving us a sick +turn<a name="FNanchor972"></a><a href="#Footnote_972">[972]</a>," +could not by herself greatly affect the issue of the war; but many +<i>Alabamas</i> would be a serious matter. The belated governmental +order to stop the vessel was no assurance for the future since in +reply to Adams' protests after her escape, and to a prospective +claim for damages, Russell replied that in fact the orders to stop +had been given merely for the purpose of further investigation, and +that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_121"></a>[V2:pg +121]</span> in strict law there had been no neglect of governmental +duty<a name="FNanchor973"></a><a href="#Footnote_973">[973]</a>. If +this were so similar precautions and secrecy would prohibit +official interference in the issue from British ports of a whole +fleet of Southern war-vessels. Russell might himself feel that a +real offence to the North had taken place. He might write, "I +confess the proceedings of that vessel [the <i>Alabama</i>] are +enough to <i>rile</i> a more temperate nation, and I owe a grudge +to the Liverpool people on that account<a name= +"FNanchor974"></a><a href="#Footnote_974">[974]</a>," but this was +of no value to the North if the governmental decision was against +interference without complete and absolute proof.</p> +<p>It was therefore the concern of the North to find some means of +bringing home to the British Ministry the enormity of the offence +in American eyes and the serious danger to good relations if such +offences were to be continued. An immediate downright threat of war +would have been impolitic and would have stirred British pride to +the point of resentment. Yet American pride was aroused also and it +was required of Seward that he gain the Northern object and yet +make no such threat as would involve the two nations in war--a +result that would have marked the success of Southern secession. +That Seward was able to find the way in which to do this is +evidence of that fertility of imagination and gift in expedient +which marked his whole career in the diplomacy of the Civil +War<a name="FNanchor975"></a><a href="#Footnote_975">[975]</a>.</p> +<p>In that same month when Adams was beginning his protests on the +"290," June, 1862, there had already been drawn the plans, and the +contracts made with the Laird <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_122"></a>[V2:pg 122]</span> Brothers at Liverpool, for the +building of two vessels far more dangerous than the <i>Alabama</i> +to the Northern cause. These were the so-called Laird Rams. They +were to be two hundred and thirty feet long, have a beam of forty +feet, be armoured with four and one-half inch iron plate and be +provided with a "piercer" at the prow, about seven feet long and of +great strength. This "piercer" caused the ships to be spoken of as +rams, and when the vessels were fully equipped it was expected the +"piercer" would be three feet under the surface of the water. This +was the distinguishing feature of the two ships; it was unusual +construction, nearly impossible of use in an ordinary battle at +sea, but highly dangerous to wooden ships maintaining a close +blockade at some Southern port. While there was much newspaper +comment in England that the vessels were "new <i>Alabamas</i>," and +in America that they were "floating fortresses," suitable for +attack upon defenceless Northern cities, their primary purpose was +to break up the blockading squadrons<a name= +"FNanchor976"></a><a href="#Footnote_976">[976]</a>.</p> +<p>Shortly before the escape of the <i>Alabama</i> and at a time +when there was but little hope the British Government would seize +her and shortly after the news was received in Washington that +still other vessels were planned for building in the Lairds' yards, +a Bill was introduced in Congress authorizing the President to +issue letters of marque and privateering. This was in July, 1862, +and on the twelfth, Seward wrote to Adams of the proposed measure +specifying that the purpose was to permit privateers to seek for +and capture or destroy the <i>Alabama</i> or other vessels of a +like type. He characterized this as a plan "to organize the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_123"></a>[V2:pg 123]</span> +militia of the seas by issuing letters of marque and +reprisal<a name="FNanchor977"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_977">[977]</a>." Neither here nor at any time did Seward +or Adams allege in diplomatic correspondence any other purpose than +the pursuit of <i>Alabamas</i>, nor is it presumable that in July, +1862, the construction plans of the Rams were sufficiently well +known to the North to warrant a conclusion that the later purpose +of the proposed privateering fleet was <i>at first</i> quite other +than the alleged purpose. Probably the Bill introduced in July, +1862, was but a hasty reaction to the sailing of the <i>Oreto</i> +(or <i>Florida</i>) and to the failure of early protests in the +case of the <i>Alabama</i>. Moreover there had been an earlier +newspaper agitation for an increase of naval power by the creation +of a "militia of the seas," though with no clear conception of +definite objects to be attained. This agitation was now renewed and +reinforced and many public speeches made by a General Hiram +Wallbridge, who had long advocated an organization of the +mercantile marine as an asset in times of war<a name= +"FNanchor978"></a><a href="#Footnote_978">[978]</a>. But though +introduced in the summer of 1862, the "privateering bill" was not +seriously taken up until February, 1863.</p> +<p>In the Senate discussion of the Bill at the time of +introduction, Senator Grimes, its sponsor, declared that the object +was to encourage privateers to pursue British ships when, as was +expected, they should "turn Confederate." Sumner objected that the +true business of privateers was to destroy enemy commerce and that +the South had no such <i>bona fide</i> commerce. Grimes agreed that +this was his opinion also, but explained that the administration +wanted <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_124"></a>[V2:pg +124]</span> the measure passed so that it might have in its hands a +power to be used if the need arose. The general opinion of the +Senate was opposed and the matter was permitted to lapse, but +without definite action, so that it could at any time be called up +again<a name="FNanchor979"></a><a href="#Footnote_979">[979]</a>. +Six months later the progress of construction and the purpose of +the rams at Liverpool were common knowledge. On January 7, 1863, +the privateering bill again came before the Senate, was referred to +the committee on naval affairs, reported out, and on February 17 +was passed and sent to the House of Representatives, where on March +2 it was given a third reading and passed without debate<a name= +"FNanchor980"></a><a href="#Footnote_980">[980]</a>. In the Senate, +Grimes now clearly stated that the Bill was needed because the +Confederates "are now building in England a fleet of vessels +designed to break our blockade of their coast," and that the +privateers were to "assist in maintaining blockades." There was no +thorough debate but a few perfunctory objections were raised to +placing so great a power in the hands of the President, while +Sumner alone appears as a consistent opponent arguing that the +issue of privateers would be dangerous to the North since it might +lead to an unwarranted interference with neutral commerce. No +speaker outlined the exact method by which privateers were to be +used in "maintaining blockades"; the bill was passed as an +"administration measure."</p> +<p>Coincidently, but as yet unknown in Washington, the chagrin of +Russell at the escape of the <i>Alabama</i> had somewhat lost its +edge. At first he had been impressed with the necessity of amending +the Foreign Enlistment Act so as to prevent similar offences and +had gained the approval of the law officers of the Crown. Russell +had even offered to take up with America an agreement by which both +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_125"></a>[V2:pg 125]</span> +countries were to amend their neutrality laws at the same moment. +This was in December, 1862, but now on February 14, 1863, he wrote +to Lyons that the project of amendment had been abandoned as the +Cabinet saw no way of improving the law<a name= +"FNanchor981"></a><a href="#Footnote_981">[981]</a>. While this +letter to Lyons was on its way to America, a letter from Seward was +<i>en route</i>, explaining to Adams the meaning of the +privateering bill.</p> +<p>"The Senate has prepared a Bill which confers upon the President +of the United States the power to grant letters of marque and +reprisal in any war in which the country may at any time be +engaged, and it is expected that the Bill will become a law. Lord +Lyons suggests that the transaction may possibly be misapprehended +abroad, if it come upon foreign powers suddenly and without any +explanations. You will be at liberty to say that, as the Bill +stands, the executive Government will be set at liberty to put the +law in force in its discretion, and that thus far the proper policy +in regard to the exercise of that discretion has not engaged the +President's attention. I have had little hesitation in saying to +Lord Lyons that if no extreme circumstances occur, there will be +entire frankness on the part of the Government in communicating to +him upon the subject, so far as to avoid any surprise on the part +of friendly nations, whose commerce or navigation it might be +feared would be incidentally and indirectly affected, if it shall +be found expedient to put the Act in force against the insurgents +of the United States<a name="FNanchor982"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_982">[982]</a>."</p> +<p>Certainly this was vague explanation, yet though the main object +might be asserted "to put the act in force against the insurgents," +the hint was given that the commerce of friendly neutrals might be +"incidentally and indirectly affected." And so both Lyons and +Seward understood the matter, for on February 24, Lyons reported a +long conversation with Seward in which after pointing out the +probable "bad effect" on Europe, Lyons received the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_126"></a>[V2:pg 126]</span> reply that +some remedy must be found for the fact that "the law did not appear +to enable the British Government to prevent" the issue of +Confederate "privateers<a name="FNanchor983"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_983">[983]</a>." On March 8, Seward followed this up by +sending to Lyons an autograph letter:</p> +<blockquote>"I am receiving daily such representations from our +sea-ports concerning the depredations on our commerce committed by +the vessels built and practically fitted out in England, that I do +most sincerely apprehend a new element is entering into the unhappy +condition of affairs, which, with all the best dispositions of your +Government and my own, cannot long be controlled to the +preservation of peace.<br> +<br> +<p>"If you think well of it, I should like that you should +confidentially inform Earl Russell that the departure of more armed +vessels under insurgent-rebel command from English ports is a thing +to be deprecated above all things."</p> +</blockquote> +<p>On March 9th, Lyons had a long talk with Seward about this, and +it appears that Lincoln had seen the letter and approved it. Seward +stated that the New York Chamber of Commerce had protested about +the <i>Alabama</i>, declaring:</p> +<blockquote>"That no American merchant vessels would get +freights--that even war with England was preferable to this--that +in that case the maritime enterprise of the country would at least +find a profitable employment in cruising against British +trade."</blockquote> +<p>Seward went on to show the necessity of letters of marque, and +Lyons protested vigorously and implied that war must result.</p> +<blockquote>"Mr. Seward said that he was well aware of the +inconvenience not to say the danger of issuing Letters of Marque: +that he should be glad to delay doing so, or to escape the +necessity altogether; but that really unless some intelligence came +from England to allay the public exasperation, the measure would be +unavoidable<a name="FNanchor984"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_984">[984]</a>."</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_127"></a>[V2:pg 127]</span> +<p>Lyons was much alarmed, writing that the feeling in the North +must not be underestimated and pointing out that the newspapers +were dwelling on the notion that under British interpretation of +her duty as a neutral Mexico, if she had money, could build ships +in British ports to cruise in destruction of French commerce, +adding that "one might almost suppose" some rich American would +give the funds to Mexico for the purpose and so seek to involve +England in trouble with France<a name="FNanchor985"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_985">[985]</a>. Lyons had also been told by Seward in +their conversation of March 9, that on that day an instruction had +been sent to Adams to present to Russell the delicacy of the +situation and to ask for some assurance that no further Southern +vessels of war should escape from British ports. This instruction +presented the situation in more diplomatic language but in no +uncertain tone, yet still confined explanation of the privateering +bill as required to prevent the "destruction of our national +navigating interest, unless that calamity can be prevented by ... +the enforcement of the neutrality law of Great Britain<a name= +"FNanchor986"></a><a href="#Footnote_986">[986]</a>...."</p> +<p>Lyons' reports reached Russell before Seward's instruction was +read to him. Russell had already commented to Adams that American +privateers would find no Confederate merchant ships and that if +they interfered with neutral commerce the United States Government +would be put in an awkward position. To this Adams replied that the +privateers would seek and capture, if possible, vessels like the +<i>Alabama</i>, but Russell asked Lyons to find out "whether in any +case they [privateers] will be authorized to interfere with neutral +commerce, and if in any case in what case, and to what +extent<a name="FNanchor987"></a><a href="#Footnote_987">[987]</a>." +Three days later, on March 26, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_128"></a>[V2:pg 128]</span> Adams presented his instructions +and these Russell regarded as "not unfriendly in tone," but in the +long conversation that ensued the old result was reached that Adams +declared Great Britain negligent in performance of neutral duty, +while Russell professed eagerness to stop Southern shipbuilding if +full evidence was "forthcoming." Adams concluded that "he had +worked to the best of his power for peace, but it had become a most +difficult task." Upon this Russell commented to Lyons, "Mr. Adams +fully deserves the character of having always laboured for peace +between our two Nations. Nor I trust will his efforts, and those of +the two Governments fail of success<a name= +"FNanchor988"></a><a href="#Footnote_988">[988]</a>."</p> +<p>In these last days of March matters were in fact rapidly drawing +to a head both in America and England. At Washington, from March +seventh to the thirty-first, the question of issuing letters of +marque and reprisal had been prominently before the Cabinet and +even Welles who had opposed them was affected by unfavourable +reports received from Adams as to the intentions of Great Britain. +The final decision was to wait later news from England<a name= +"FNanchor989"></a><a href="#Footnote_989">[989]</a>. This was +Seward's idea as he had not as yet received reports of the British +reaction to his communications through Lyons and Adams. March 27 +was the critical day of decision in London, as it was also the day +upon which public and parliamentary opinion was most vigorously +debated in regard to Great Britain's neutral duty. Preceding this +other factors of influence were coming to the front. In the first +days of March, Slidell, at Paris, had received semi-official +assurances that if the South wished to build ships in French yards +"we should be permitted to arm and equip them and proceed to +sea<a name="FNanchor990"></a><a href="#Footnote_990">[990]</a>." +This suggestion was permitted to percolate in England with the +intention, no <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_129"></a>[V2:pg +129]</span> doubt, of strengthening Bullock's position there. In +the winter of 1862-3, orders had been sent to the Russian Baltic +fleet to cruise in western waters and there was first a suspicion +in America, later a conviction, that the purpose of this cruise was +distinctly friendly to the North--that the orders might even extend +to actual naval aid in case war should arise with England and +France. In March, 1863, this was but vague rumour, by midsummer it +was a confident hope, by September-October, when Russian fleets had +entered the harbours of New York and San Francisco, the rumour had +become a conviction and the silence of Russian naval officers when +banqueted and toasted was regarded as discreet confirmation. There +was no truth in the rumour, but already in March curious surmises +were being made even in England, as to Russian intentions, though +there is no evidence that the Government was at all concerned. The +truth was that the Russian fleet had been ordered to sea as a +precaution against easy destruction in Baltic waters, in case the +difficulties developing in relation to Poland should lead to war +with France and England<a name="FNanchor991"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_991">[991]</a>.</p> +<p>In England, among the people rather than in governmental +England, a feeling was beginning to manifest itself that the +Ministry had been lax in regard to the <i>Alabama</i>, and as news +of her successes was received this feeling was given voice. +Liverpool, at first almost wholly on the side of the Lairds and of +Southern ship-building, became doubtful <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_130"></a>[V2:pg 130]</span> by the very +ease with which the <i>Alabama</i> destroyed Northern ships. +Liverpool merchants looked ahead and saw that their interests +might, after all, be directly opposed to those of the +ship-builders. Meetings were held and the matter discussed. In +February, 1863, such a meeting at Plaistow, attended by the gentry +of the neighbourhood, but chiefly by working men, especially by +dock labourers and by men from the ship-building yards at +Blackwall, resolved that "the Chairman be requested to write to the +Prime Minister of our Queen, earnestly entreating him to put in +force, with utmost vigilance, the law of England against such ships +as the <i>Alabama</i><a name="FNanchor992"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_992">[992]</a>." Such expressions were not as yet +widespread, nor did the leading papers, up to April, indulge in +much discussion, but British <i>doubt</i> was developing<a name= +"FNanchor993"></a><a href="#Footnote_993">[993]</a>.</p> +<p>Unquestionably, Russell himself was experiencing a renewed doubt +as to Britain's neutral duty. On March 23, he made a speech in +Parliament which Adams reported as "the most satisfactory of all +the speeches he has made <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_131"></a>[V2:pg 131]</span> since I have been at this +post<a name="FNanchor994"></a><a href="#Footnote_994">[994]</a>." +On March 26, came the presentation by Adams of Seward's instruction +of which Russell wrote to Lyons as made in no unfriendly tone and +as a result of which Adams wrote: "The conclusion which I draw ... +is, that the Government is really better disposed to exertion, and +feels itself better sustained for action by the popular sentiment +than ever before<a name="FNanchor995"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_995">[995]</a>." Russell told Adams that he had received +a note from Palmerston "expressing his approbation of every word" +of his speech three days before. In a portion of the despatch to +Seward, not printed in the Diplomatic Correspondence, Adams advised +against the issue of privateers, writing, "In the present +favourable state of popular mind, it scarcely seems advisable to +run the risk of changing the current in Great Britain by the +presentation of a new issue which might rally all national pride +against us as was done in the <i>Trent</i> case<a name= +"FNanchor996"></a><a href="#Footnote_996">[996]</a>." That Russell +was indeed thinking of definite action is foreshadowed by the +advice he gave to Palmerston on March 27, as to the latter's +language in the debate scheduled for that day on the Foreign +Enlistment Act. Russell wrote, referring to the interview with +Adams:</p> +<blockquote>"The only thing which Adams could think of when I asked +him what he had to propose in reference to the <i>Alabama</i> was +that the Government should declare their disapproval of the fitting +out of such ships of war to prey on American commerce.<br> +<br> +"Now, as the fitting out and escape of the <i>Alabama</i> and +<i>Oreto</i> was clearly an evasion of our law, I think you can +have no difficulty in declaring this evening that the Government +disapprove of all such attempts to elude our law with a view to +assist one of the belligerents<a name="FNanchor997"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_997">[997]</a>."</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_132"></a>[V2:pg 132]</span> +<p>But the tone of parliamentary debate did not bear out the +hopeful view of the American Minister. It was, as Bright wrote to +Sumner, "badly managed and told against us<a name= +"FNanchor998"></a><a href="#Footnote_998">[998]</a>," and Bright +himself participated in this "bad management." For over a year he +had been advocating the cause of the North in public speeches and +everywhere pointing out to unenfranchised England that the victory +of the North was essential to democracy in all Europe. Always an +orator of power he used freely vigorous language and nowhere more +so than in a great public meeting of the Trades Unions of London in +St. James' Hall, on March 26, the evening before the parliamentary +debate. The purpose of this meeting was to bring public pressure on +the Government in favour of the North, and the pith of Bright's +speech was to contrast the democratic instincts of working men with +the aristocratic inclinations of the Government<a name= +"FNanchor999"></a><a href="#Footnote_999">[999]</a>. Reviewing +"aristocratic" attitude toward the Civil War, Bright said:</p> +<blockquote>"Privilege thinks it has a great interest in this +contest, and every morning, with blatant voice, it comes into your +streets and curses the American Republic. Privilege has beheld an +afflicting spectacle for many years past. It has beheld thirty +millions of men, happy and prosperous, without emperor, without +king, without the surroundings of a court, without nobles, except +such as are made by eminence in intellect and virtue, without State +bishops and State priests.<br> +<br> +"'Sole venders of the lore which works salvation,' without great +armies and great navies, without great debt and without great +taxes.<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 25%;"> +<br> +"You wish the freedom of your country. You wish it for +yourselves.... Do not then give the hand of fellowship to the worst +foes of freedom that the world has ever seen.... You will not do +this. I have faith in you. Impartial history <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_133"></a>[V2:pg 133]</span> will tell +that, when your statesmen were hostile or coldly neutral, when many +of your rich men were corrupt, when your press--which ought to have +instructed and defended--was mainly written to betray, the fate of +a Continent and of its vast population being in peril, you clung to +freedom with an unfailing trust that God in his infinite mercy will +yet make it the heritage of all His children<a name= +"FNanchor1000"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1000">[1000]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The public meeting of March 26 was the most notable one in +support of the North held throughout the whole course of the war, +and it was also the most notable one as indicating the rising tide +of popular demand for more democratic institutions. That it +irritated the Government and gave a handle to Southern sympathizers +in the parliamentary debate of March 27 is unquestioned. In +addition, if that debate was intended to secure from the Government +an intimation of future policy against Southern shipbuilding it was +conducted on wrong lines for <i>immediate</i> effect--though +friends of the North may have thought the method used was wise for +<i>future</i> effect. This method was vigorous attack. Forster, +leading in the debate<a name="FNanchor1001"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1001">[1001]</a>, called on Ministers to explain the +"flagrant" violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and to offer +some pledge for the future; he asserted that the Government should +have been active on its own initiative in seeking evidence instead +of waiting to be urged to enforce the law, and he even hinted at a +certain degree of complicity in the escape of the <i>Alabama</i>. +The Solicitor-General answered in a legal defence of the +Government, complained of the offence of America in arousing its +citizens against Great Britain upon unjustifiable grounds, but did +not make so vigorous a reply as might, perhaps, have been expected. +Still he stood firmly on the ground that the Government could not +act without evidence to convict--in itself a statement that might +well preclude <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_134"></a>[V2:pg +134]</span> interference with the Rams. Bright accused the +Government of a "cold and unfriendly neutrality," and referred at +length to the public meeting of the previous evening:</p> +<blockquote>"If you had last night looked in the faces of three +thousand of the most intelligent of the artisan classes in London, +as I did, and heard their cheers, and seen their sympathy for that +country for which you appear to care so little, you would imagine +that the more forbearing, the more generous, and the more just the +conduct of the Government to the United States, the more it would +recommend itself to the magnanimous feelings of the people of this +country."</blockquote> +<p>This assumption of direct opposition between Parliament and the +people was not likely to win or to convince men, whether +pro-Southern or not, who were opponents of the speaker's +long-avowed advocacy of more democratic institutions in England. It +is no wonder then that Laird, who had been castigated in the +speeches of the evening, rising in defence of the conduct of his +firm, should seek applause by declaring, "I would rather be handed +down to posterity as the builder of a dozen <i>Alabamas</i> than as +a man who applies himself deliberately to set class against class, +and to cry up the institutions of another country which, when they +come to be tested, are of no value whatever, and which reduce the +very name of liberty to an utter absurdity." This utterance was +greeted with great cheering--shouted not so much in approval of the +<i>Alabama</i> as in approval of the speaker's defiance of +Bright.</p> +<br> +<a name="image11.jpg"></a> +<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image11.jpg"><img src= +"images/image11.jpg" width="45%" alt=""></a><br> +<b>WILLIAM EDWARD FORSTER (1851)</b></p> +<br> +<p>In short, the friends of the North, if they sought some +immediate pledge by the Government, had gone the wrong way about to +secure it. Vigour in attack was no way to secure a favourable +response from Palmerston. Always a fighting politician in public it +was inevitable that he should now fight back. Far from making the +statement recommended to him by Russell, he concluded the debate by +reasserting the correctness of governmental procedure in +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_135"></a>[V2:pg 135]</span> +the case of the <i>Alabama</i>, and himself with vigour accused +Forster and Bright of speaking in such a way as to increase rather +than allay American irritation. Yet a careful reading of the +speeches of both the Solicitor-General and of Palmerston, shows +that while vindicating the Government's conduct in the past, they +were avoiding <i>any</i> pledge of whatever nature, for the +future.</p> +<p>Adams was clearly disappointed and thought that the result of +the debate was "rather to undo in the popular mind the effect of +Lord Russell's speech than to confirm it<a name= +"FNanchor1002"></a><a href="#Footnote_1002">[1002]</a>." He and his +English advisers were very uneasy, not knowing whether to trust to +Russell's intimations of more active governmental efforts, or to +accept the conclusion that his advice had been rejected by +Palmerston<a name="FNanchor1003"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1003">[1003]</a>. Possibly if less anxious and alarmed +they would have read more clearly between the lines of +parliamentary utterances and have understood that their failure to +hurry the Government into public announcement of a new policy was +no proof that old policy would be continued. Disappointed at the +result in Parliament, they forgot that the real pressure on +Government was coming from an American declaration of an intention +to issue privateers unless something were done to satisfy that +country. Certainly Russell was unmoved by the debate for on April 3 +he wrote to Palmerston:</p> +<blockquote>"The conduct of the gentlemen who have contracted for +the ironclads at Birkenhead is so very suspicious that I have +thought it necessary to direct that they should be detained. The +Attorney-General has been consulted and concurs in the measure, as +one of policy, though not of strict law.<br> +<br> +"We shall thus test the law, and if we have to pay damages we have +satisfied the opinion which prevails here <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_136"></a>[V2:pg 136]</span> as well as in +America that this kind of neutral hostility should not be allowed +to go on without some attempt to stop it<a name= +"FNanchor1004"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1004">[1004]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Two days later, on April 5, the <i>Alexandra</i>, a vessel being +equipped to join the <i>Alabama</i> as a commerce destroyer, was +seized on the ground that she was about to violate the Enlistment +Act and a new policy, at least to make a test case in law, was +thereby made public. In fact, on March 30, but three days after the +debate of March 27, the case of the <i>Alexandra</i> had been taken +up by Russell, referred to the law officers on March 31, and +approved by them for seizure on April 4<a name= +"FNanchor1005"></a><a href="#Footnote_1005">[1005]</a>. Public +meetings were quickly organized in support of the Government's +action, as that in Manchester on April 6, when six thousand people +applauded the seizure of the <i>Alexandra</i>, demanded vigorous +prosecution of the Lairds and others, and urged governmental +activity to prevent any further ship-building for the South<a name= +"FNanchor1006"></a><a href="#Footnote_1006">[1006]</a>.</p> +<p>On April 7, Russell wrote to Lyons:</p> +<blockquote>"The orders given to watch, and stop when evidence can +be procured, vessels apparently intended for the Confederate +service will, it is to be hoped, allay the strong feelings which +have been raised in Northern America by the escape from justice of +the <i>Oreto</i> and <i>Alabama</i><a name= +"FNanchor1007"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1007">[1007]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>It thus appears that orders had been issued to stop, on +<i>evidence</i> to be sure, but on evidence of the vessels being +"<i>apparently</i> intended" for the South. This was far from being +the same thing as the previous assertion that conclusive evidence +was required. What, then, was the basic consideration in Russell's +mind leading to such a <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_137"></a>[V2:pg 137]</span> face-about on declared policy? +Chagrin at the very evident failure of existing neutrality law to +operate, recognition that there was just cause for the rising +ill-will of the North, no doubt influenced him, but more powerful +than these elements was the anxiety as to the real purpose and +intent in application of the American "privateering" Bill. How did +Russell, and Lyons, interpret that Bill and what complications did +they foresee and fear?</p> +<p>As previously stated in this chapter, the privateering Bill had +been introduced as an "administration measure" and for that reason +passed without serious debate. In the Cabinet it was opposed by +Welles, Secretary of the Navy, until he was overborne by the +feeling that "something must be done" because vessels were building +in England intended to destroy the blockade. The Rams under +construction were clearly understood to have that purpose. If +privateers were to offset the action of the Rams there must be some +definite plan for their use. Seward and Adams repeatedly complained +of British inaction yet in the same breath asserted that the +privateers were intended to chase and destroy <i>Alabamas</i>--a +plan so foolish, so it seemed to British diplomats, as to be +impossible of acceptance as the full purpose of Seward. How, in +short, <i>could</i> privateers make good an injury to blockade +about to be done by the Rams? If added to the blockading squadrons +on station off the Southern ports they would but become so much +more fodder for the dreaded Rams. If sent to sea in pursuit of +<i>Alabamas</i> the chances were that they would be the vanquished +rather than the victors in battle. There was no Southern mercantile +marine for them to attack and privateering against "enemy's +commerce" was thus out of the question since there was no such +commerce.</p> +<p>There remained but one reasonable supposition as to the intended +use of privateers. If the Rams compelled the relaxation of the +close blockade the only recourse of the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_138"></a>[V2:pg 138]</span> North would be +to establish a "cruising squadron" blockade remote from the shores +of the enemy. If conducted by government war-ships such a blockade +was not in contravention to British interpretation of international +law<a name="FNanchor1008"></a><a href="#Footnote_1008">[1008]</a>. +But the Northern navy, conducting a cruising squadron blockade was +far too small to interfere seriously with neutral vessels bringing +supplies to the Confederacy or carrying cotton from Southern ports. +A "flood of privateers," scouring the ocean from pole to pole +might, conceivably, still render effective that closing in of the +South which was so important a weapon in the Northern war +programme.</p> +<p>This was Russell's interpretation of the American plan and he +saw in it a very great danger to British commerce and an inevitable +ultimate clash leading to war. Such, no doubt, it was Seward's +desire should be Russell's reaction, though never specifically +explaining the exact purpose of the privateers. Moreover, +nine-tenths of the actual blockade-running still going on was by +British ships, and this being so it was to be presumed that +"privateers" searching for possible blockade runners would commit +all sorts of indignities and interferences with British merchant +ships whether on a blockade-running trip or engaged in ordinary +trade between non-belligerent ports.</p> +<p>Immediately on learning from Lyons details of the privateering +bill, Russell had instructed the British Minister at Washington to +raise objections though not formally making official protest, and +had asked for explanation of the exact nature of the proposed +activities of such vessels. Also he had prepared instructions to be +issued by the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_139"></a>[V2:pg +139]</span> Admiralty to British naval commanders as to their duty +of preventing unwarranted interference with legitimate British +commerce by privateers<a name="FNanchor1009"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1009">[1009]</a>. The alteration of governmental policy +as indicated in the arrest of the <i>Alexandra</i>, it might be +hoped, would at least cause a suspension of the American plan, but +assurances were strongly desired. Presumably Russell knew that +Adams as a result of their conversations, had recommended such +suspension, but at Washington, Lyons, as yet uninformed of the +<i>Alexandra</i> action, was still much alarmed. On April 13 he +reported that Seward had read to him a despatch to Adams, relative +to the ships building in England, indicating that this was "a last +effort to avert the evils which the present state of things had +made imminent<a name="FNanchor1010"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1010">[1010]</a>." Lyons had argued with Seward the +inadvisability of sending such a despatch, since it was now known +that Russell had "spoken in a satisfactory manner" about +Confederate vessels, but Seward was insistent. Lyons believed there +was real cause for anxiety, writing:</p> +<blockquote>"A good deal of allowance must be made for the evident +design of the Government and indeed of the people to intimidate +England, but still there can be little doubt that the exasperation +has reached such a point as to constitute a serious danger. It is +fully shared by many important members of the Cabinet--nor are the +men in high office exempt from the overweening idea of the naval +power of the United States, which reconciles the people to the +notion of a war with England. Mr. Seward for a certain time fanned +the flame in order to recover his lost popularity. He is now, I +believe, seriously anxious to avoid going farther. But if strong +measures against England were taken up as a Party cry by the +Republicans, Mr. Seward would oppose very feeble resistance to +them. If no military success be obtained within a short time, it +may become a Party necessity to resort to some means of producing +an excitement <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_140"></a>[V2:pg +140]</span> in the country sufficient to enable the Government to +enforce the Conscription Act, and to exercise the extra-legal +powers conferred by the late Congress, To produce such an +excitement the more ardent of the party would not hesitate to go, +to the verge of a war with England. Nay there are not a few who +already declare that if the South must be lost, the best mode to +conceal the discomfiture of the party and of the nation, would be +to go to war with England and attribute the loss of the South to +English interference<a name="FNanchor1011"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1011">[1011]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>On the same day Lyons wrote, privately:</p> +<blockquote>"I would rather the quarrel came, if come it must, upon +some better ground for us than this question of the ships fitted +out for the Confederates. The great point to be gained in my +opinion, would be to prevent the ships sailing, without leading the +people here to think that they had gained their point by +threats<a name="FNanchor1012"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1012">[1012]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>So great was Lyons' alarm that the next day, April 14, he +cipher-telegraphed Monck in Canada that trouble was brewing<a name= +"FNanchor1013"></a><a href="#Footnote_1013">[1013]</a>, but soon +his fears were somewhat allayed. On the seventeenth he could report +that Seward's "strong" despatch to Adams was not intended for +communication to Russell<a name="FNanchor1014"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1014">[1014]</a>, and on the twenty-fourth when +presenting, under instructions, Russell's protest against the +privateering plan he was pleased, if not surprised, to find that +the "latest advices" from England and the news of the seizure of +the <i>Alexandra</i>, had caused Seward to become very +conciliatory. Lyons was assured that the plan "was for the present +at rest<a name="FNanchor1015"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1015">[1015]</a>." Apparently Seward now felt more +security than did Lyons as to future British action for three days +later the British Minister wrote to Vice-Admiral Milne that an +American issue of letters of marque would surely come if +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_141"></a>[V2:pg 141]</span> +England did not stop Southern ship-building, and he wrote in such a +way as to indicate his own opinion that effective steps <i>must</i> +be taken to prevent their escape<a name="FNanchor1016"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1016">[1016]</a>.</p> +<p>The whole tone and matter of Lyons' despatches to Russell show +that he regarded the crisis of relations in regard to Southern +ship-building in British yards as occurring in March-April, 1863. +Seward became unusually friendly, even embarrassingly so, for in +August he virtually forced Lyons to go on tour with him through the +State of New York, thus making public demonstration of the good +relations of the two Governments. This sweet harmony and mutual +confidence is wholly contrary to the usual historical treatment of +the Laird Rams incident, which neglects the threat of the +privateering bill, regards American protests as steadily increasing +in vigour, and concludes with the "threat of war" note by Adams to +Russell just previous to the seizure of the Rams, in September. +Previously, however, American historians have been able to use only +American sources and have been at a loss to understand the +privateering plan, since Seward never went beyond a vague +generalization of its object in official utterances. It is the +British reaction to that plan which reveals the real "threat" made +and the actual crisis of the incident.</p> +<p>It follows therefore that the later story of the Rams requires +less extended treatment than is customarily given to it. The +correct understanding of this later story is the recognition that +Great Britain had in April given, a pledge and performed an act +which satisfied Seward and Adams that the Rams would not be +permitted to escape. It was their duty nevertheless to be on guard +against a British relaxation <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_142"></a>[V2:pg 142]</span> of the promise made, and the +delay, up to the very last moment, in seizing the Rams, caused +American anxiety and ultimately created a doubt of the sincerity of +British actions.</p> +<p>Public opinion in England was steadily increasing against +Southern ship-building. On June 9, a memorial was sent to the +Foreign Office by a group of ship-owners in Liverpool, suggesting +an alteration in the Foreign Enlistment Act if this were needed to +prevent the issue of Southern ships, and pointing out that the +"present policy" of the Government would entail a serious danger to +British commerce in the future if, when England herself became a +belligerent, neutral ports could be used by the enemy to build +commerce destroyers<a name="FNanchor1017"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1017">[1017]</a>. The memorial concluded that in any +case it was a disgrace that British law should be so publicly +infringed. To this, Hammond, under-secretary, gave the old answer +that the law was adequate "provided proof can be obtained of any +act done with the intent to violate it<a name= +"FNanchor1018"></a><a href="#Footnote_1018">[1018]</a>." Evidently +ship-owners, as distinguished from ship-builders, were now acutely +alarmed. Meanwhile attention was fixed on the trial of the +<i>Alexandra</i>, and on June 22, a decision was rendered against +the Government, but was promptly appealed.</p> +<p>This decision made both Northern and Southern agents anxious and +the latter took steps further to becloud the status of the Rams. +Rumours were spread that the vessels were in fact intended for +France, and when this was disproved that they were being built for +the Viceroy of Egypt. This also proved to be untrue. Finally it was +declared that the real owners were certain French merchants whose +purpose in contracting for such clearly warlike vessels was left in +mystery, but with the intimation that Egypt was to be <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_143"></a>[V2:pg 143]</span> the ultimate +purchaser. Captain Bullock had indeed made such a contract of sale +to French merchants but with the proviso of resale to him, after +delivery. On his part, Russell was seeking <i>proof</i> fully +adequate to seizure, but this was difficult to obtain and such as +was submitted was regarded by the law officers as inadequate. They +reported that there was "no evidence capable of being presented to +a court of justice." He informed Adams of this legal opinion at the +moment when the latter, knowing the Rams to be nearing completion, +and fearing that Russell was weakening in his earlier +determination, began that series of diplomatic protests which very +nearly approached a threat of war.</p> +<p>At Washington also anxiety was again aroused by the court's +decision in the <i>Alexandra</i> case, and shortly after the great +Northern victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg, Seward wrote a +despatch to Adams, July 11, which has been interpreted as a +definite threat of war. In substance Seward wrote that he still +felt confident the Government of Great Britain would find a way to +nullify the <i>Alexandra</i> decision, but renewed, in case this +did not prove true, his assertion of Northern intention to issue +letters of marque, adding a phrase about the right to "pursue" +Southern vessels even into neutral ports<a name= +"FNanchor1019"></a><a href="#Footnote_1019">[1019]</a>. But there +are two considerations in respect to this despatch that largely +negative the belligerent intent attributed to it: Seward did not +read or communicate it to Lyons, as was his wont when anything +serious was in mind; and he did not instruct Adams to communicate +it to Russell. The latter never heard of it until the publication, +in 1864, of the United States diplomatic correspondence<a name= +"FNanchor1020"></a><a href="#Footnote_1020">[1020]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_144"></a>[V2:pg 144]</span> +<p>In London, on July 11, Adams began to present to Russell +evidence secured by Consul Dudley at Liverpool, relative to the +Rams and to urge their immediate seizure. Adams here but performed +his duty and was in fact acting in accordance with Russell's own +request<a name="FNanchor1021"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1021">[1021]</a>. On July 16 he reported to Seward that +the Roebuck motion for recognition of the South<a name= +"FNanchor1022"></a><a href="#Footnote_1022">[1022]</a> had died +ingloriously, but expressed a renewal of anxiety because of the +slowness of the government; if the Rams were to escape, Adams wrote +to Russell, on July 11, Britain would herself become a participant +in the war<a name="FNanchor1023"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1023">[1023]</a>. Further affidavits were sent to +Russell on August 14, and on September 3, having heard from Russell +that the Government was legally advised "they cannot interfere in +any way with these vessels," Adams sent still more affidavits and +expressed his regret that his previous notes had not sufficiently +emphasized the grave nature of the crisis pending between the +United States and Great Britain. To this Russell replied that the +matter was "under serious and anxious consideration," to which, on +September 5, in a long communication, Adams wrote that if the Rams +escaped: "It would be superfluous in me to point out to your +Lordship that this is war."</p> +<p>The phrase was carefully chosen to permit a denial of a threat +of war on the explanation that Great Britain would herself be +participating in the war. There is no question that at the moment +Adams thought Russell's "change of policy" of April was now thrown +overboard, but the fact was that on September 1, Russell had +already <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_145"></a>[V2:pg +145]</span> given directions to take steps for the detention of the +Rams and that on September 3, positive instructions were given to +that effect<a name="FNanchor1024"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1024">[1024]</a>, though not carried out until some days +later. There had been no alteration in the "new policy" of April; +the whole point of the delay was governmental anxiety to secure +evidence sufficient to convict and thus to avoid attack for acting +in contradiction to those principles which had been declared to be +the compelling principles of non-interference in the case of the +<i>Alabama</i>. But so perfect were the arrangements of Captain +Bullock that complete evidence was not procurable and Russell was +forced, finally, to act without it<a name= +"FNanchor1025"></a><a href="#Footnote_1025">[1025]</a>.</p> +<p>It would appear from a letter written by Russell to Palmerston, +on September 3, the day on which he gave the order to stop, that no +Cabinet approval for this step had yet formally been given, since +Russell notified Palmerston of his purpose and asked the latter, if +he disapproved, to call a Cabinet at once<a name= +"FNanchor1026"></a><a href="#Footnote_1026">[1026]</a>. The +<i>plan</i> to stop the Rams must have long been understood for +Palmerston called no Cabinet. Moreover it is to be presumed that he +was preparing the public for the seizure, for on this same +September 3, the <i>Times</i>, in a long editorial, argued that the +law as it stood (or was interpreted), was not in harmony with true +neutrality, and pointed out future dangers to British commerce, as +had the Liverpool ship-owners. Delane of the <i>Times</i> was at +this period especially close to Palmerston, and it is at least +inferential that the editorial was an advance notice of +governmental intention to apply a policy known in intimate circles +to have been for some time matured. Four days <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_146"></a>[V2:pg 146]</span> later, while +governmental action was still unknown to the public another +editorial advocated seizure of the Rams<a name= +"FNanchor1027"></a><a href="#Footnote_1027">[1027]</a>. Russell had +acted under the fear that one of the Rams might slip away as had +the <i>Alabama</i>; he had sent orders to stop and investigate, but +he delayed final seizure in the hope that better evidence might yet +be secured, conducting a rapid exchange of letters with Lairds (the +builders), seeking to get admissions from them. It was only on +September 9 that Lairds was officially ordered not to send the +vessels on a "trial trip," and it was not until September 16 that +public announcement was made of the Government's action<a name= +"FNanchor1028"></a><a href="#Footnote_1028">[1028]</a>.</p> +<p>Russell has been regarded as careless and thoughtless in that it +was not until September 8 he relieved Adams' mind by assuring him +the Rams would be seized, even though three days before, on +September 5, this information had been sent to Washington. The +explanation is Russell's eager search for evidence to +<i>convict</i>, and his correspondence with Lairds which did not +come to a head until the eighth, when the builders refused to give +information. To the builders Russell was writing as if a +governmental decision had not yet been reached. He could take no +chance of a "leak" through the American Minister. Once informed, +Adams was well satisfied though his immediate reaction was to +criticize, not Russell, but the general "timidity and vacillation" +of the law officers of the Crown<a name="FNanchor1029"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1029">[1029]</a>. Two days later, having learned from +Russell himself just what was taking place, Adams described the +"firm stand" taken by the Foreign Secretary, noted the general +approval by the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_147"></a>[V2:pg 147]</span> public press and expressed the +opinion that there was now a better prospect of being able to +preserve friendly relations with England than at any time since his +arrival in London<a name="FNanchor1030"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1030">[1030]</a>. Across the water British officials +were delighted with the seizure of the Rams. Monck in Canada +expressed his approval<a name="FNanchor1031"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1031">[1031]</a>. Lyons reported a "great improvement" +in the feeling toward England and that Seward especially was highly +pleased with Russell's expressions, conveyed privately, of esteem +for Seward together with the hope that he would remain in +office<a name="FNanchor1032"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1032">[1032]</a>.</p> +<p>The actual governmental seizure of the Rams did not occur until +mid-October, though they had been placed under official +surveillance on September 9. Both sides were jockeying for position +in the expected legal battle when the case should be taken up by +the courts<a name="FNanchor1033"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1033">[1033]</a>. At first Russell even thought of +making official protest to Mason in London and a draft of such +protest was prepared, approved by the Law Officers and subsequently +revised by Palmerston, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_148"></a>[V2:pg 148]</span> but finally was not sent<a name= +"FNanchor1034"></a><a href="#Footnote_1034">[1034]</a>. Possibly it +was thought that such a communication to Mason approached too +nearly a recognition of him in his desired official capacity, for +in December the protest ultimately directed to be made through +Consul-General Crawford at Havana, instructed him to go to Richmond +and after stating very plainly that he was in no way recognizing +the Confederacy to present the following:</p> +<blockquote>"It appears from various correspondence the +authenticity of which cannot be doubted, that the Confederate +Government having no good ports free from the blockade of the +Federals have conceived the design of using the ports of the United +Kingdom for the purpose of constructing ships of war to be equipped +and armed to serve as cruisers against the commerce of the United +States of America, a State with which Her Majesty is at +peace...."<br> +<br> +"These acts are inconsistent with the respect and comity which +ought to be shewn by a belligerent towards a Neutral Power.<br> +<br> +"Her Majesty has declared her Neutrality and means strictly to +observe it.<br> +<br> +"You will therefore call upon Mr. Benjamin to induce his Government +to forbear from all acts tending to affect injuriously Her +Majesty's position<a name="FNanchor1035"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1035">[1035]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>To carry out this instruction there was required permission for +Crawford to pass through the blockade but Seward refused this when +Lyons made the request<a name="FNanchor1036"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1036">[1036]</a>.</p> +<p>Not everyone in Britain, however, approved the Government's +course in seizing the Rams. Legal opinion especially was very +generally against the act. Adams now pressed either for an +alteration of the British law or for a convention <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_149"></a>[V2:pg 149]</span> with America +establishing mutual similar interpretation of neutral duty. Russell +replied that "until the trials of the <i>Alexandra</i> and the +steam rams had taken place, we could hardly be said to know what +our law was, and therefore not tell whether it required alteration. +I said, however, that he might assure Mr. Seward that the wish and +intention of Government were to make our neutrality an honest and +bona-fide one<a name="FNanchor1037"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1037">[1037]</a>." But save from extreme and avowed +Southern sympathizers criticism of the Government was directed less +to the stoppage of the Rams than to attacks of a political +character, attempting to depict the weakness of the Foreign +Minister and his humiliation of Great Britain in having "yielded to +American threats." Thus, February II, 1864, after the reassembling +of Parliament, a party attack was made on Russell and the +Government by Derby in the House of Lords. Derby approved the +stopping of the Rams but sought to prove that the Government had +dishonoured England by failing to act of its own volition until +threatened by America. He cited Seward's despatch of July II with +much unction, that despatch now having appeared in the printed +American diplomatic correspondence with no indication that it was +not an instruction at once communicated to Russell. The attack fell +flat for Russell simply replied that Adams had never presented such +an instruction. This forced Derby to seek other ground and on +February 15 he returned to the matter, now seeking to show by the +dates of various documents that "at the last moment" Adams made a +threat of war and Russell had yielded. Again Russell's reply was +brief and to the effect that orders to stop the Rams had been given +before the communications from Adams were received. Finally, on +February 23, a motion in the Commons called for all correspondence +with Adams and with Lairds, The <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_150"></a>[V2:pg 150]</span> Government consented to the +first but refused that with Lairds and was supported by a vote of +187 to 153<a name="FNanchor1038"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1038">[1038]</a>.</p> +<p>Beginning with an incautious personal and petty criticism of +Russell the Tories had been driven to an attempt to pass what was +virtually a vote of censure on the Ministry yet they were as loud +as was the Government in praise of Adams and in approval of the +seizure of the Rams. Naturally their cause was weakened, and the +Ministry, referring to expressions made and intentions indicated as +far back as March, 1863, thus hinting without directly so stating +that the real decision had then been made, was easily the victor in +the vote<a href="#Footnote_1038">[1038]</a>. Derby had committed an +error as a party leader and the fault rankled for again in April, +1864, he attempted to draw Russell into still further discussion on +dates of documents. Russell's reply ignored that point +altogether<a name="FNanchor1039"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1039">[1039]</a>. It did not suit his purpose to +declare, flatly, the fact that in April assurances had been given +both to Adams and through Lyons to Seward, that measures would be +taken to prevent the departure of Southern vessels from British +ports. To have made this disclosure would have required an +explanation <i>why</i> such assurance had been given and this would +have revealed the effect on both Russell and Lyons of the Northern +plan to create a <i>cruising squadron blockade by privateers</i>. +<i>There</i> was the real threat. The later delays and seeming +uncertainties of British action made Adams anxious but there is no +evidence that Russell ever changed his purpose. He sought stronger +evidence before acting and he hoped for stronger support +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_151"></a>[V2:pg 151]</span> +from legal advisers, but he kept an eye on the Rams and when they +had reached the stage where there was danger of escape, he seized +them even though the desired evidence was still lacking<a name= +"FNanchor1040"></a><a href="#Footnote_1040">[1040]</a>. Seward's +"privateering bill" plan possibly entered upon in a moment of +desperation and with no clear statement from him of its exact +application had, as the anxiety of British diplomats became +pronounced, been used with skill to permit, if not to state, the +interpretation they placed upon it, and the result had been the +cessation of that inadequate neutrality of which America +complained.</p> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_966"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor966">[966]</a> In other respects, also, this question of +belligerent ship-building and equipping in neutral ports was, in +practice, vaguely defined. As late as 1843 in the then existing +Texan war of independence against Mexico, the British Foreign +Secretary, Aberdeen, had been all at sea. Mexico made a contract +for two ships of war with the English firm of Lizardi & +Company. The crews were to be recruited in England, the ships were +to be commanded by British naval officers on leave, and the guns +were to be purchased from firms customarily supplying the British +Navy. Aberdeen advised the Admiralty to give the necessary +authority to purchase guns. When Texas protested he at first seemed +to think strict neutrality was secured if the same privileges were +offered that country. Later he prohibited naval officers to go in +command. One Mexican vessel, the <i>Guadaloupe</i>, left England +with full equipment as originally planned; the other, the +<i>Montezuma</i>, was forced to strip her equipment. But both +vessels sailed under British naval officers for these were +permitted to resign their commissions. They were later reinstated. +In all this there was in part a temporary British policy to aid +Mexico, but it is also clear that British governmental opinion was +much in confusion as to neutral duty in the case of such ships. See +my book, <i>British Interests and Activities in Texas</i>, Ch. +IV.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_967"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor967">[967]</a> Bullock, <i>Secret Service under the +Confederacy</i>.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_968"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor968">[968]</a> Bernard, <i>Neutrality of Great Britain +during the American Civil War</i>, p. 338-9.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_969"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor969">[969]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1863, +<i>Commons</i>, LXXII. "Correspondence respecting the 'Alabama.'" +Also <i>ibid.</i>, "Correspondence between Commissioner of Customs +and Custom House Authorities at Liverpool relating to the +'Alabama.'" The last-minute delay was due to the illness of a Crown +adviser.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_970"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor970">[970]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 81, No. 264. +Adams to Seward, Nov. 21, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_971"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor971">[971]</a> Selborne, in his <i>Memorials: Family and +Personal</i>, II, p. 430, declared that in frequent official +communication with all members of the Cabinet at the time, "I never +heard a word fall from any one of them expressive of anything but +regret that the orders for the detention of the <i>Alabama</i> were +sent too late." Of quite different opinion is Brooks Adams, in his +"The Seizure of the Laird Rams" (<i>Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. +Soc., Vol. XLV, pp. 243-333). In 1865 his father, the American +Minister, made a diary entry that he had been shown what purported +to be a copy of a note from one V. Buckley to Caleb Huse, Southern +agent in England, warning him of danger to his "protegé." +"This Victor Buckley is a young clerk in the Foreign Office." +(<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 260, <i>note</i>.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_972"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor972">[972]</a> Fox, <i>Confidential Correspondence</i>, +I, p. 165. Fox to Dupont, Nov. 7, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_973"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor973">[973]</a> It is interesting that the opinion of many +Continental writers on international law was immediately expressed +in favour of the American and against the British contention. This +was especially true of German opinion. (Lutz, +<i>Notes</i>.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_974"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor974">[974]</a> Lyons Papers. To Lyons, Dec. 20, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_975"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor975">[975]</a> I am aware that Seward's use of the +"Privateering Bill," now to be recounted is largely a new +interpretation of the play of diplomacy in regard to the question +of Southern ship-building in England. Its significance became +evident only when British correspondence was available; but that +correspondence and a careful comparison of dates permits, and, as I +think, requires a revised statement of the incident of the Laird +Rams.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_976"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor976">[976]</a> Bullock dreamed also of ascending rivers +and laying Northern cities under contribution. According to a +statement made in 1898 by Captain Page, assigned to command the +rams, no instructions as to their use had been given him by the +Confederate Government, but his plans were solely to break the +blockade with no thought of attacking Northern cities. (Rhodes, IV. +385, <i>note</i>.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_977"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor977">[977]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>, +1862, p. 134.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_978"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor978">[978]</a> Wallbridge, <i>Addresses and +Resolutions</i>. Pamphlet. New York, n.d. He began his agitation in +1856, and now received much popular applause. His pamphlet quotes +in support many newspapers from June, 1862, to September, 1863. +Wallbridge apparently thought himself better qualified than Welles +to be Secretary of the Navy. Welles regarded his agitation as +instigated by Seward to get Welles out of the Cabinet. Welles +professes that the "Privateering Bill" slipped through Congress +unknown to him and "surreptitiously" (Diary, I, 245-50), a +statement difficult to accept in view of the Senate debates upon +it.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_979"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor979">[979]</a> Cong. Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, +Pt. IV, pp. 3271, 3325 and 3336.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_980"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor980">[980]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 3rd Session, Pt. I, pp. 220, +393, and Part II, pp. 960, 1028, 1489.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_981"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor981">[981]</a> Brooks Adams, "The Seizure of the Laird +Rams." (Mass. Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>, Vol. XLV, pp. +265-6.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_982"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor982">[982]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>, +1863, Pt. I, p. 116, Feb. 19, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_983"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor983">[983]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 878, No. 180. Lyons to +Russell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_984"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor984">[984]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 879, No. 227. Lyons to +Russell, March 10, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_985"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor985">[985]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 235. Lyons to Russell, +March 13, 1863. Privately Lyons also emphasized American anger. +(Russell Papers. To Russell, March 24, 1863.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_986"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor986">[986]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>, +1863, Pt. I, p. 141. Seward to Adams, March 9, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_987"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor987">[987]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. 147. Russell to +Lyons, March 24, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_988"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor988">[988]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 869, No. 155. Russell +to Lyons, March 27, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_989"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor989">[989]</a> Welles, <i>Diary</i>, I, pp. +245-50.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_990"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor990">[990]</a> Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, I, 634, +Slidell to Benjamin, March 4, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_991"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor991">[991]</a> For example of American contemporary +belief and later "historical tradition," see Balch, <i>The Alabama +Arbitration</i>, pp. 24-38. Also for a curious story that a large +part of the price paid for Alaska was in reality a repayment of +expenses incurred by Russia in sending her fleet to America, see +<i>Letters of Franklin K. Lane</i>, p. 260. The facts as stated +above are given by F.A. Golder, <i>The Russian Fleet and the Civil +War</i> (<i>Am. Hist. Rev</i>., July, 1915, pp. 801 <i>seq</i>.). +The plan was to have the fleet attack enemy commerce. The idea of +aid to the North was "born on American soil," and Russian officers +naturally did nothing to contradict its spread. In one case, +however, a Russian commander was ready to help the North. +Rear-Admiral Papov with six vessels in the harbour of San Francisco +was appealed to by excited citizens on rumours of the approach of +the <i>Alabama</i> and gave orders to protect the city. He acted +without instructions and was later reproved for the order by his +superiors at home.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_992"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor992">[992]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, March 6, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_993"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor993">[993]</a> American opinion knew little of this +change. An interesting, if somewhat irrational and irregular plan +to thwart Southern ship-building operations, had been taken up by +the United States Navy Department. This was to buy the Rams +outright by the offer of such a price as, it was thought, would be +so tempting to the Lairds as to make refusal unlikely. Two men, +Forbes and Aspinwall, were sent to England with funds and much +embarrassed Adams to whom they discreetly refrained from stating +details, but yet permitted him to guess their object. The plan of +buying ran wholly counter to Adams' diplomatic protests on +England's duty in international law and the agents themselves soon +saw the folly of it. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, wrote to +Dupont, March 26, 1863: "The Confederate ironclads in England, I +think, will be taken care of." (Correspondence, I, 196.) Thurlow +Weed wrote to Bigelow, April 16, of the purpose of the visit of +Forbes and Aspinwall. (Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, I, 632.) +Forbes reported as early as April 18 virtually against going on +with the plan. "We must keep cool here, and prepare the way; we +have put new fire into Mr. Dudley by furnishing <i>fuel</i>, and he +is hard at it getting evidence.... My opinion <i>to-day</i> is that +we can and shall stop by legal process and by the British +Government the sailing of ironclads and other war-ships." (Forbes +MS. To Fox.) That this was wholly a Navy Department plan and was +disliked by State Department representatives is shown by Dudley's +complaints (Forbes MS.). The whole incident has been adequately +discussed by C.F. Adams, though without reference to the preceding +citations, in his <i>Studies Military and Diplomatic</i>, Ch. IX. +"An Historical Residuum," in effect a refutation of an article by +Chittenden written in 1890, in which bad memory and +misunderstanding played sad havoc with historical +truth.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_994"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor994">[994]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>, +1863, Pt. I, p. 157. To Seward, March 24, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_995"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor995">[995]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 160. To Seward, March 27, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_996"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor996">[996]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 82, No. 356. +Adams to Seward, March 27, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_997"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor997">[997]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, +March 27, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_998"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor998">[998]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 369, <i>notes</i>, April 4, +1863. Bright was made very anxious as to Government intentions by +this debate.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_999"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor999">[999]</a> This topic will be treated at length in +Chapter XVIII. It is here cited merely in relation to its effect on +the Government at the moment.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1000"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1000">[1000]</a> Trevelyan, <i>John Bright</i>, +307-8.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1001"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1001">[1001]</a> Hansard, 3rd Series, CLXX, 33-71, for +entire debate.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1002"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1002">[1002]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>, +1863, Pt. I, p. 164. Adams to Seward, March 28, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1003"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1003">[1003]</a> Rhodes, IV, 369-72.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1004"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1004">[1004]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1005"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1005">[1005]</a> Bernard, p. 353. The case was heard in +June, and the seizure held unwarranted. Appealed by the Government +this decision was upheld by the Court of Exchequer in November. It +was again appealed, and the Government defeated in the House of +Lords in April, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1006"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1006">[1006]</a> <i>Manchester Examiner and Times</i>, +April 7, 1863. Goldwin Smith was one of the principal speakers. +Letters were read from Bright, Forster, R.A. Taylor, and +others.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1007"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1007">[1007]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. +183.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1008"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1008">[1008]</a> "Historicus," in articles in the +<i>Times</i>, was at this very moment, from December, 1862, on, +discussing international law problems, and in one such article +specifically defended the belligerent right to conduct a cruising +squadron blockade. See <i>Historicus on International Law</i>, pp. +99-118. He stated the established principle to be that search and +seizure could be used "not only" for "vessels actually intercepted +in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but those also which +shall be elsewhere met with and shall be found to have been +destined to such port, with knowledge of the fact and notice of the +blockade." (<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 108.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1009"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1009">[1009]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. 158. Russell to +Lyons, March 28, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1010"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1010">[1010]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 881, No. 309. To +Russell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1011"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1011">[1011]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 310. To Russell, April +13, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1012"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1012">[1012]</a> Russell Papers. To Russell, April 13, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1013"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1013">[1013]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 882, No. 324. Copy +enclosed in Lyons to Russell, April 17, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1014"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1014">[1014]</a> Russell Papers. To Russell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1015"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1015">[1015]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 882, No. 341. Lyons to +Russell, April 24, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1016"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1016">[1016]</a> Lyons Papers, April 27, 1863. Lyons +wrote: "The stories in the newspapers about an ultimatum having +been sent to England are untrue. But it is true that it had been +determined (or very nearly determined) to issue letters of marque, +if the answers to the despatches sent were not satisfactory. It is +very easy to see that if U.S. privateers were allowed to capture +British merchant vessels on charges of breach of blockade or +carrying contraband of war, the vexations would have soon become +intolerable to our commerce, and a quarrel must have +ensued."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1017"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1017">[1017]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1863, +<i>Commons</i>, LXXII. "Memorial from Shipowners of Liverpool on +Foreign Enlistment Act."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1018"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1018">[1018]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1019"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1019">[1019]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>, +1863, Pt. I, pp. 308-10.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1020"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1020">[1020]</a> The despatch taken in its entirety save +for a few vigorous sentences quite typical of Seward's +phrase-making, is not at all warlike. Bancroft, II, 385 +<i>seq</i>., makes Seward increasingly anxious from March to +September, and concludes with a truly warlike despatch to Adams, +September 5. This last was the result of Adams' misgivings reported +in mid-August, and it is not until these were received (in my +interpretation) that Seward really began to fear the "pledge" made +in April would not be carried out. Adams himself, in 1864, read to +Russell a communication from Seward denying that his July 11 +despatch was intended as a threat or as in any sense unfriendly to +Great Britain. (F.O., Am., Vol. 939, No. 159. Russell to Lyons, +April 3, 1864.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1021"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1021">[1021]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1864, +<i>Commons</i>, LXII. "Correspondence respecting iron-clad vessels +building at Birkenhead."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1022"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1022">[1022]</a> See next chapter.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1023"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1023">[1023]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 83, No. +452, and No. 453 with enclosure. Adams to Seward, July 16, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1024"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1024">[1024]</a> Rhodes, IV, 381.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1025"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1025">[1025]</a> Many of these details were unknown at +the time so that on the face of the documents then available, and +for long afterwards, there appeared ground for believing that +Adams' final protests of September 3 and 5 had forced Russell to +yield. Dudley, as late as 1893, thought that "at the crisis" in +September, Palmerston, in the absence of Russell, had given the +orders to stop the rams. (In <i>Penn. Magazine of History</i>, Vol. +17, pp. 34-54. "Diplomatic Relations with England during the Late +War.")</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1026"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1026">[1026]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 382.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1027"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1027">[1027]</a> The <i>Times</i>, Sept. 7, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1028"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1028">[1028]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Editorial, Sept. 16, 1863. +The Governmental correspondence with Lairds was demanded by a +motion in Parliament, Feb. 23, 1864, but the Government was +supported in refusing it. A printed copy of this correspondence, +issued privately, was placed in Adams' hands by persons unnamed and +sent to Seward on March 29, 1864. Seward thereupon had this printed +in the <i>Diplomatic Correspondence</i>, 1864-5, Pt. I, No. +633.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1029"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1029">[1029]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 84, No. +492. Adams to Seward, Sept. 8, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1030"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1030">[1030]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>, +1863, Pt. I, p. 370. To Seward, Sept. 10, 1863. Adams, looking at +the whole matter of the Rams and the alleged "threat of war" of +Sept. 5, from the point of view of his own anxiety at the time, was +naturally inclined to magnify the effects of his own efforts and to +regard the <i>crisis</i> as occurring in September. His notes to +Russell and his diary records were early the main basis of +historical treatment. Rhodes, IV, 381-84, has disproved the +accusation of Russell's yielding to a threat. Brooks Adams (Mass. +Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>, Vol. XLV, p. 293, <i>seq.</i>) +ignores Rhodes, harks back to the old argument and amplifies it +with much new and interesting citation, but not to conviction. My +interpretation is that the real crisis of Governmental decision to +act came in April, and that events in September were but final +applications of that decision.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1031"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1031">[1031]</a> Russell Papers. Monck to Stuart, Sept. +26, 1863. Copy in Stuart to Russell, Oct. 6, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1032"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1032">[1032]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 16, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1033"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1033">[1033]</a> Hammond wrote to Lyons, Oct. 17: "You +will learn by the papers that we have at last seized the Iron +Clads. Whether we shall be able to bring home to them legally that +they were Confederate property is another matter. I think we can, +but at all events no moral doubt can be entertained of the fact, +and, therefore, we are under no anxiety whether as to the public or +Parliamentary view of our proceeding. They would have played the +devil with the American ships, for they are most formidable ships. +I suppose the Yankees will sleep more comfortably in consequence." +(Lyons Papers.) The Foreign Office thought that it had thwarted +plans to seize violently the vessels and get them to sea. (F.O., +Am., Vol. 930. Inglefield to Grey, Oct. 25, and Romaine to Hammond, +Oct. 26, 1863.).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1034"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1034">[1034]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 929. Marked "September, +1863." The draft summarized the activities of Confederate +ship-building and threatened Southern agents in England with "the +penalities of the law...."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1035"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1035">[1035]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 932, No. 1. F.O. to +Consul-General Crawford, Dec. 16, 1863. The South, on October 7, +1863, had already "expelled" the British consuls. Crawford was to +protest against this also. (<i>Ibid.</i>, No. 4.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1036"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1036">[1036]</a> Bonham. <i>British Consuls in the +South</i>, p. 254. (Columbia Univ. Studies, Vol. 43.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1037"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1037">[1037]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Dec. 5, +1863. Bullock, <i>Secret Service</i>, declares the British +Government to have been neutral but with strong leaning toward the +North.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1038"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1038">[1038]</a> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXIII, pp. 430-41, +544-50, 955-1021. The Tory point of view is argued at length by +Brooks Adams, <i>The Seizure of the Laird Rams</i>, pp. +312-324.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1039"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1039">[1039]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXIV, pp. +1862-1913. <i>The Index</i>, naturally vicious in comment on the +question of the Rams, summed up its approval of Derby's +contentions: "Europe and America alike will inevitably believe that +it was the threat of Mr. Adams, and nothing else, which induced the +Foreign Secretary to retract his letter of the 1st September, and +they will draw the necessary conclusion that the way to extort +concessions from England is by bluster and menace." (Feb. 18, 1864, +p. 106.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1040"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1040">[1040]</a> Lairds brought suit for damages, but the +case never reached a decision, for the vessels were purchased by +the Government. This has been regarded as acknowledgment by the +Government that it had no case. In my view the failure to push the +case to a conclusion was due to the desire not to commit Great +Britain on legal questions, in view of the claim for damages +certain to be set up by the United States on account of the +depredations of the <i>Alabama</i>.</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_152"></a>[V2:pg 152]</span> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIV"></a>CHAPTER XIV</h2> +<h3>ROEBUCK'S MOTION</h3> +<br> +<p>In the mid-period during which the British Government was +seeking to fulfil its promise of an altered policy as regards +ship-building and while the public was unaware that such a promise +had been given, certain extreme friends of the South thought the +time had come for renewed pressure upon the Government, looking +toward recognition of the Confederacy. The <i>Alexandra</i> had +been seized in April, but the first trial, though appealed, had +gone against the Government in June, and there was no knowledge +that the Ministry was determined in its stand. From January to the +end of March, 1863, the public demonstrations in approval of the +emancipation proclamation had somewhat checked expressions of +Southern sympathy, but by the month of June old friends had +recovered their courage and a new champion of the South came +forward in the person of Roebuck.</p> +<p>Meanwhile the activities of Southern agents and Southern friends +had not ceased even if they had, for a time, adopted a less +vigorous tone. For four months after the British refusal of +Napoleon's overtures on mediation, in November, 1862, the friends +of the South were against "acting now," but this did not imply that +they thought the cause lost or in any sense hopeless. Publicists +either neutral in attitude or even professedly sympathetic with the +North could see no outcome of the Civil War save separation of +North and South. Thus the historian Freeman in the preface to the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_153"></a>[V2:pg 153]</span> +first volume of his uncompleted <i>History of Federal +Government</i>, published in 1863, carefully explained that his +book did not have its origin in the struggle in America, and argued +that the breaking up of the Union in no way proved any inherent +weakness in a federal system, but took it for granted that American +reunion was impossible. The novelist, Anthony Trollope, after a +long tour of the North, beginning in September, 1861, published +late in 1862 a two-volume work, <i>North America</i>, descriptive +of a nation engaged in the business of war and wholly sympathetic +with the Northern cause. Yet he, also, could see no hope of forcing +the South back into the Union. "The North and South are virtually +separated, and the day will come in which the West also will +secede<a name="FNanchor1041"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1041">[1041]</a>."</p> +<p>Such interpretations of conditions in America were not unusual; +they were, rather, generally accepted. The Cabinet decision in +November, 1862, was not regarded as final, though events were to +prove it to be so for never again was there so near an approach to +British intervention. Mason's friend, Spence, early began to think +that true Southern policy was now to make an appeal to the Tories +against the Government. In January, 1863, he was planning a new +move:</p> +<blockquote>"I have written to urge Mr. Gregory to be here in time +for a thorough organization so as to push the matter this time to a +vote. I think the Conservatives may be got to move as a body and if +so the result of a vote seems to me very certain. I have seen Mr. +Horsfall and Mr. Laird here and will put myself in communication +with Mr. Disraeli as the time approaches for action for this seems +to me now our best card<a name="FNanchor1042"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1042">[1042]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>That some such effort was being thought of is evidenced by the +attitude of the <i>Index</i> which all through the months from +November, 1862, to the middle of January, 1863, had <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_154"></a>[V2:pg 154]</span> continued to +harp on the subject of mediation as if still believing that +something yet might be done by the existing Ministry, but which +then apparently gave up hope of the Palmerstonian +administration:</p> +<blockquote>"But what the Government means is evident enough. It +does not mean to intervene or to interfere. It will not mediate, if +it can help it; it will not recognize the Confederate States, +unless there should occur some of those 'circumstances over which +they have no control,' which leave weak men and weak ministers no +choice. They will not, if they are not forced to it, quarrel with +Mr. Seward, or with Mr. Bright. They will let Lancashire starve; +they will let British merchantmen be plundered off Nassau and burnt +off Cuba; they will submit to a blockade of Bermuda or of +Liverpool; but they will do nothing which may tend to bring a +supply of cotton from the South, or to cut off the supply of eggs +and bacon from the North<a name="FNanchor1043"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1043">[1043]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>But this plan of 'turning to the Tories' received scant +encouragement and was of no immediate promise, as soon appeared by +the debate in Parliament on reassembling, February 5, 1863. Derby +gave explicit approval of the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_155"></a>[V2:pg 155]</span> Government's refusal to listen +to Napoleon<a name="FNanchor1044"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1044">[1044]</a>. By February, Russell, having recovered +from the smart of defeat within the Cabinet, declared himself weary +of the perpetual talk about mediation and wrote to Lyons, "... till +both parties are heartily tired and sick of the business, I see no +use in talking of good offices. When that time comes Mercier will +probably have a hint; let him have all the honour and glory of +being the first<a name="FNanchor1045"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1045">[1045]</a>." For the time being Spence's idea was +laid aside, Gregory writing in response to an inquiry from +Mason:</p> +<blockquote>"The House of Commons is opposed to taking any step at +present, feeling rightly or wrongly that to do so would be useless +to the South, and possibly embroil us with the North. Any motion on +the subject will be received with disfavour, consequently the way +in which it will be treated will only make the North more elated, +and will irritate the South against us. If I saw the slightest +chance of a motion being received with any favour I would not let +it go into other hands, but I find the most influential men of all +Parties opposed to it<a name="FNanchor1046"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1046">[1046]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Of like opinion was Slidell who, writing of the situation in +France, reported that he had been informed by his "friend at the +Foreign Office" that "It is believed that every possible thing has +been done here in your behalf--we must now await the action of +England, and it is through that you must aim all your efforts in +that direction<a name="FNanchor1047"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1047">[1047]</a>."</p> +<p>With the failure, at least temporary, of Southern efforts to +move the British Government or to stir Parliament, energies were +now directed toward using financial methods of winning support for +the Southern cause. The "Confederate Cotton Loan" was undertaken +with the double <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_156"></a>[V2:pg 156]</span> object of providing funds for +Southern agents in Europe and of creating an interested support of +the South, which might, it was hoped, ultimately influence the +British Government.</p> +<p>By 1863 it had become exceedingly difficult, owing to the +blockade, for the Government at Richmond to transmit funds to its +agents abroad. Bullock, especially, required large amounts in +furtherance of his ship-building contracts and was embarrassed by +the lack of business methods and the delays of the Government at +home. The incompetence of the Confederacy in finance was a weakness +that characterized all of its many operations whether at home or +abroad<a name="FNanchor1048"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1048">[1048]</a> and was made evident in England by the +confusion in its efforts to establish credits there. At first the +Confederate Government supplied its agents abroad with drafts upon +the house of Fraser, Trenholm & Company, of Liverpool, a branch +of the firm long established at Charleston, South Carolina, +purchasing its bills of exchange with its own "home made" money. +But as Confederate currency rapidly depreciated this method of +transmitting funds became increasingly difficult and costly. The +next step was to send to Spence, nominated by Mason as financial +adviser in England, Confederate money bonds for sale on the British +market, with authority to dispose of them as low as fifty cents on +the dollar, but these found no takers<a name= +"FNanchor1049"></a><a href="#Footnote_1049">[1049]</a>. By +September, 1862, Bullock's funds for ship-building were exhausted +and some new method of supply was required. Temporary relief was +found in adopting a suggestion from Lindsay whereby cotton was made +the basis for an advance of £60,000, a form of cotton bond +being devised which fixed the price of cotton at eightpence the +pound. These bonds were not put on the market but were privately +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_157"></a>[V2:pg 157]</span> +placed by Lindsay & Company with a few buyers for the entire +sum, the transaction remaining secret<a name= +"FNanchor1050"></a><a href="#Footnote_1050">[1050]</a>.</p> +<p>In the meantime this same recourse to cotton had occurred to the +authorities at Richmond and a plan formulated by which cotton +should be purchased by the Government, stored, and certificates +issued to be sold abroad, the purchaser being assured of "all +facilities of shipment." Spence was to be the authorized agent for +the sale of these "cotton certificates," but before any reached him +various special agents of the Confederacy had arrived in England by +December, 1862, with such certificates in their possession and had +disposed of some of them, calling them "cotton warrants." The +difficulties which might arise from separate action in the market +were at once perceived and following a conference with Mason all +cotton obligations were turned to Fraser, Trenholm & Company. +Spence now had in his hands the "money bonds" but no further +attempt was made to dispose of these since the "cotton warrants" +were considered a better means of raising funds.</p> +<p>It is no doubt true that since all of these efforts involved a +governmental guarantee the various "certificates" or "warrants" +partook of the nature of a government bond. Yet up to this point +the Richmond authorities, after the first failure to sell "money +bonds" abroad were not keen to attempt anything that could be +stamped as a foreign "government loan." Their idea was rather that +a certain part of the produce of the South was being set aside as +the property of those who in England should extend credit to the +South. The sole purpose of these earlier operations was to provide +funds for Southern agents. By July, 1862, Bullock had exhausted his +earlier credit of a million dollars. The £60,000 loan secured +through Lindsay then tided over an emergency demand and this had +been followed by a development on similar lines of the "cotton +certificates" <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_158"></a>[V2:pg +158]</span> and "warrants" which by December, 1862, had secured, +through Spence's agency, an additional million dollars or +thereabouts. Mason was strongly recommending further expansion of +this method and had the utmost confidence in Spence. Now, however, +there was broached to the authorities in Richmond a proposal for +the definite floating in Europe of a specified "cotton loan."</p> +<p>This proposal came through Slidell at Paris and was made by the +well-established firm of Erlanger & Company. First approached +by this company in September, 1862, Slidell consulted Mason but +found the latter strongly committed to his own plans with +Spence<a name="FNanchor1051"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1051">[1051]</a>. But Slidell persisted and Mason gave +way<a name="FNanchor1052"></a><a href="#Footnote_1052">[1052]</a>. +Representatives of Erlanger proceeded to Richmond and proposed a +loan of twenty-five million dollars; they were surprised to find +the Confederate Government disinclined to the idea of a foreign +loan, and the final agreement, cut to fifteen millions, was largely +made because of the argument advanced that as a result powerful +influences would thus be brought to the support of the +South<a name="FNanchor1053"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1053">[1053]</a>. The contract was signed at Richmond, +January 28, 1863, and legalized by a secret act of Congress on the +day following<a name="FNanchor1054"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1054">[1054]</a>. But there was no Southern enthusiasm +for the project. Benjamin wrote to Mason that the Confederacy +disclaimed the "desire or intention on our part to effect a loan in +Europe ... during the war we want only such very moderate sums as +are required abroad for the purchase of warlike supplies and for +vessels, and even that is not required because of our want of +funds, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_159"></a>[V2:pg +159]</span> but because of the difficulties of remittance"; as for +the Erlanger contract the Confederacy "would have declined it +altogether but for the political considerations indicated by Mr. +Slidell<a name="FNanchor1055"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1055">[1055]</a>...."</p> +<p>From Mason's view-point the prime need was to secure money; from +Slidell's (at least so asserted) it was to place a loan with the +purpose of establishing strong friends. It had been agreed to +suspend the operations of Spence until the result of Erlanger's +offer was learned, but pressure brought by Caleb Huse, purchasing +agent of the Confederacy, caused a further sale of "cotton +warrants<a name="FNanchor1056"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1056">[1056]</a>." Spence, fearing he was about to be +shelved, became vexed and made protest to Mason, while Slidell +regarded Spence<a name="FNanchor1057"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1057">[1057]</a> as a weak and meddlesome agent<a name= +"FNanchor1058"></a><a href="#Footnote_1058">[1058]</a>. But on +February 14, 1863, Erlanger's agents returned to Paris and +uncertainty was at an end. Spence went to Paris, saw Erlanger, and +agreed to co-operate in floating the loan<a name= +"FNanchor1059"></a><a href="#Footnote_1059">[1059]</a>. Then +followed a remarkable bond market operation, interesting, not so +much as regards the financial returns to the South, for these were +negligible, as in relation to the declared object of Slidell and +the Richmond Government--namely, the "strong influences" that would +accompany the successful flotation of a loan.</p> +<p>Delay in beginning operations was caused by the failure to +receive promptly the authenticated copy of the Act of Congress +authorizing the loan, which did not arrive until March 18. By this +contract Erlanger & Company, sole managers of the loan, had +guaranteed flotation of the entire $15,000,000 at not less than 77, +the profit of the Company to be five per cent., plus the difference +between 77 and the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_160"></a>[V2:pg 160]</span> actual price received, but the +first $300,000 taken was to be placed at once at the disposal of +the Government. The bonds were put on the market March 19, in +London, Liverpool, Paris, Amsterdam and Frankfurt, but practically +all operations were confined to England. The bid for the loan was +entitled "<i>Seven per Cent. Cotton Loan of the Confederate States +of America for</i> 3 <i>Millions Sterling at</i> 90 <i>per +Cent</i>." The bonds were to bear interest at seven per cent. and +were to be exchangeable for cotton at the option of the holder at +the price of sixpence "for each pound of cotton, at any time not +later than six months after the ratification of a treaty of peace +between the present belligerents." There were provisions for the +gradual redemption of the bonds in gold for those who did not +desire cotton. Subscribers were to pay 5 per cent. on application. +10 per cent. on allotment, 10 per cent. on each of the days, the +first of May, June and July, 1863, and 15 per cent. on the first of +August, September and October.</p> +<p>Since the price of cotton in England was then 21 pence per pound +it was thought here was a sufficiently wide margin to offer at +least a good chance of enormous profits to the buyer of the bonds. +True "the loan was looked upon as a wild cotton speculation<a name= +"FNanchor1060"></a><a href="#Footnote_1060">[1060]</a>," but odds +were so large as to induce a heavy gamblers' plunge, for it seemed +hardly conceivable that cotton could for some years go below +sevenpence per pound, and even that figure would have meant profit, +<i>if</i> the Confederacy were established. Moreover, even though +the loan was not given official recognition by the London stock +exchange, the financial columns of the <i>Times</i> and the +<i>Economist</i> favoured it and the subscriptions were so prompt +and so heavy that in two days the loan was reported as +over-subscribed three times in London alone<a name= +"FNanchor1061"></a><a href="#Footnote_1061">[1061]</a>. With the +closing of the subscription the bonds went up to 95-1/2. +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_161"></a>[V2:pg 161]</span> +Slidell wrote: "It is a financial recognition of our independence, +emanating from a class proverbially cautious, and little given to +be influenced by sentiment or sympathy<a name= +"FNanchor1062"></a><a href="#Footnote_1062">[1062]</a>." On Friday, +March 27, the allotment took place and three days later Mason +wrote, "I think I may congratulate you, therefore, on the +triumphant success of our infant credit--it shows, +<i>malgré</i> all detraction and calumny, that cotton is +king at last<a name="FNanchor1063"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1063">[1063]</a>."</p> +<p>"Alas for the King! Two days later his throne began to tremble +and it took all the King's horses and all the King's men to keep +him in state<a name="FNanchor1064"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1064">[1064]</a>." On April 1, the flurry of speculation +had begun to falter and the loan was below par; on the second it +dropped to 3-1/2 discount, and by the third the promoters and the +Southern diplomats were very anxious. They agreed that someone must +be "bearing" the bonds and suspected Adams of supplying Northern +funds for that purpose<a name="FNanchor1065"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1065">[1065]</a>. Spence wrote from Liverpool in great +alarm and coincidently Erlanger & Company urged that Mason +should authorize the use of the receipts already secured to hold up +the price of the bonds. Mason was very reluctant to do this<a name= +"FNanchor1066"></a><a href="#Footnote_1066">[1066]</a>, but finally +yielded when informed of the result of an interview between Spence, +Erlanger, and the latter's chief London agent, Schroeder. Spence +had proposed a withdrawal of a part of the loan from the market as +likely to have a stabilizing effect, and opposed the Erlanger plan +of using the funds already in hand. But <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_162"></a>[V2:pg 162]</span> Schroeder +coolly informed him that if the Confederate representative refused +to authorize the use of these funds to sustain the market, then +Erlanger would regard his Company as having "completed their +contract ... which was simply to issue the Loan." "Having issued +it, they did not and do not guarantee that the public would pay up +their instalments. If the public abandon the loan, the 15 per cent +sacrificed is, in point of fact, not the property of the Government +at all, but the profits of Messrs. Erlanger & Co., actually in +their hands, and they cannot be expected to take a worse position. +At any rate they will not do so, and unless the compact can be made +on the basis we name, matters must take their course<a name= +"FNanchor1067"></a><a href="#Footnote_1067">[1067]</a>."</p> +<p>In the face of this ultimatum, Spence advised yielding as he +"could not hesitate ... seeing that nothing could be so disastrous +politically, as well as financially, as the public break-down of +the Loan<a name="FNanchor1068"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1068">[1068]</a>." Mason gave the required authorization +and this was later approved from Richmond. For a time the "bulling" +of the loan was successful, but again and again required the use of +funds received from actual sales of bonds and in the end the loan +netted very little to the Confederacy. Some $6,000,000 was +squandered in supporting the market and from the entire operation +it is estimated that less than $7,000,000 was realized by the +Confederacy, although, as stated by the <i>Economist</i>, over +$12,000,000 of the bonds were outstanding and largely in the hands +of British investors at the end of the war<a name= +"FNanchor1069"></a><a href="#Footnote_1069">[1069]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_163"></a>[V2:pg 163]</span> +<p>The loan soon became, not as had been hoped and prophesied by +Slidell, a source of valuable public support, but rather a mere +barometer of Southern fortunes<a name="FNanchor1070"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1070">[1070]</a>. From first to last the Confederate +Cotton Loan bore to subscribers the aspect of a speculative venture +and lacked the regard attached to sound investment. This fact in +itself denied to the loan any such favourable influence, or +"financial recognition of the Confederacy," as Mason and Slidell, +in the first flush of success, attributed to it. The rapid +fluctuations in price further discredited it and tended to +emphasize the uncertainty of Southern victory. Thus "confidence in +the South" was, if anything, lessened instead of increased by this +turning from political to financial methods of bringing pressure +upon the Government<a name="FNanchor1071"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1071">[1071]</a>.</p> +<p>Southern political and parliamentary pressure had indeed been +reserved from January to June, 1863. Public attention was +distracted from the war in America by the Polish question, which +for a time, particularly during the months of March and April, +1863, disturbed the good relations existing between England and +France since the Emperor seemed bent on going beyond British +"meddling," even to pursuing a policy that easily might lead to war +with Russia. Europe diverted interest from America, and Napoleon +himself was for the moment more concerned over the Polish question +than with American affairs, even though the Mexican venture was +still a worry to him. It was no time for a British parliamentary +"push" and when a question was raised on the cotton famine in +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_164"></a>[V2:pg 164]</span> +Lancashire little attention was given it, though ordinarily it +would have been seized upon as an opportunity for a pro-Southern +demonstration. This was a bitter attack by one Ferrand in the +Commons, on April 27, directed against the cotton manufacturers as +lukewarm over employees' sufferings. Potter, a leading cotton +manufacturer, replied to the attack. Potter and his brother were +already prominent as strong partisans of the North, yet no effort +was made to use the debate to the advantage of the South<a name= +"FNanchor1072"></a><a href="#Footnote_1072">[1072]</a>.</p> +<p>In late May both necessity and fortuitous circumstance seemed to +make advisable another Southern effort in Parliament. The cotton +loan, though fairly strong again because of Confederate +governmental aid, was in fact a failure in its expected result of +public support for the South; something must be done to offset that +failure. In Polish affairs France had drawn back; presumably +Napoleon was again eager for some active effort. Best of all, the +military situation in America was thought to indicate Southern +success; Grant's western campaign had come to a halt with the +stubborn resistance of the great Mississippi stronghold at +Vicksburg, while in Virginia, Lee, on May 2-3, had overwhelmingly +defeated Hooker at Chancellorsville and was preparing, at last, a +definite offensive campaign into Northern territory. Lee's advance +north did not begin until June 10, but his plan was early known in +a select circle in England and much was expected of it. The time +seemed ripe, therefore, and the result was notification by Roebuck +of a motion for the recognition of the Confederacy--first step the +real purpose of which was to attempt that 'turning to the Tories' +which had been advocated by Spence in January, but postponed on the +advice of Gregory<a name="FNanchor1073"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1073">[1073]</a>. <i>The Index</i> clearly indicated +where lay the wind: "No one," it declared "now asks what will be +the policy of Great <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_165"></a>[V2:pg 165]</span> Britain towards America; but +everybody anxiously waits on what the Emperor of the French will +do."</p> +<blockquote>"... England to-day pays one of the inevitable +penalties of free government and of material prosperity, that of +having at times at the head of national affairs statesmen who +belong rather to the past than to the present, and whose skill and +merit are rather the business tact and knowledge of details, +acquired by long experience, than the quick and prescient +comprehension of the requirements of sudden emergencies....<br> +<br> +"The nominal conduct of Foreign Affairs is in the hands of a +diplomatic Malaprop, who has never shown vigour, activity, or +determination, except where the display of these qualities was +singularly unneeded, or even worse than useless.... From Great +Britain, then, under her actual Government, the Cabinet at +Washington has nothing to fear, and the Confederate States nothing +to expect<a name="FNanchor1074"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1074">[1074]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Of main interest to the public was the military situation. The +<i>Times</i> minimized the western campaigns, regarding them as +required for political effect to hold the north-western states +loyal to the Union, and while indulging in no prophecies as to the +fate of Vicksburg, expressing the opinion that, if forced to +surrender it, the South could easily establish "a new Vicksburg" at +some other point<a name="FNanchor1075"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1075">[1075]</a>. Naturally <i>The Index</i> was pleased +with and supported this view<a name="FNanchor1076"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1076">[1076]</a>. Such ignorance of the geographic +importance of Vicksburg may seem like wilful misleading of the +public; but professed British military experts were equally +ignorant. Captain Chesney, Professor of Military History at +Sandhurst College, published in 1863, an analysis of American +campaigns, centering all attention on the battles in Maryland and +Virginia and reaching the conclusion that the South could resist, +indefinitely, any Northern attack<a name= +"FNanchor1077"></a><a href="#Footnote_1077">[1077]</a>. He +dismissed <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_166"></a>[V2:pg +166]</span> the western campaigns as of no real significance. W.H. +Russell, now editor of the <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i>, better +understood Grant's objectives on the Mississippi but believed +Northern reconquest of the South to the point of restoration of the +Union to be impossible. If, however, newspaper comments on the +success of Southern armies were to be regarded as favourable to +Roebuck's motion for recognition, W.H. Russell was against it.</p> +<blockquote>"If we could perceive the smallest prospect of awaking +the North to the truth, or of saving the South from the loss and +trials of the contest by recognition, we would vote for it +to-morrow. But next to the delusion of the North that it can +breathe the breath of life into the corpse of the murdered Union +again, is the delusion of some people in England who imagine that +by recognition we would give life to the South, divide the nations +on each side of the black and white line for ever, and bring this +war to the end. There is probably not one of these clamourers for +recognition who could define the limits of the State to be +recognized.... And, over and above all, recognition, unless it +meant 'war,' would be an aggravation of the horrors of the contest; +it would not aid the South one whit, and it would add immensely to +the unity and the fury of the North<a name= +"FNanchor1078"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1078">[1078]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The British Foreign Secretary was at first little concerned at +Roebuck's motion, writing to Lyons, "You will see that Roebuck has +given notice of a motion to recognize the South. But I think it +certain that neither Lord Derby nor Cobden will support it, and I +should think no great number of the Liberal party. Offshoots from +all parties will compose the minority<a name= +"FNanchor1079"></a><a href="#Footnote_1079">[1079]</a>." Russell +was correct in this view but not so did it appear to Southern +agents who now became active at the request of Roebuck and Lindsay +in securing from the Emperor renewed expressions of willingness to +act, and promptly, if England would but give the word. There was no +real hope that Russell would change his policy, but <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_167"></a>[V2:pg 167]</span> there seemed +at least a chance of replacing the Whig Ministry with a Tory one. +The date for the discussion of the motion had been set for June 30. +On June 13, Lindsay, writing to Slidell, enclosed a letter from +Roebuck asking for an interview with Napoleon<a name= +"FNanchor1080"></a><a href="#Footnote_1080">[1080]</a>, and on June +16, Mason wrote that if Slidell saw the Emperor it was of the +greatest importance that he, Mason, should be at once informed of +the results and how far he might communicate them to "our friends +in the House<a name="FNanchor1081"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1081">[1081]</a>." Slidell saw the Emperor on June 18, +talked of the possibility of "forcing the English Cabinet to act or +to give way to a new ministry," asked that an interview be given +Lindsay and Roebuck, and hinted that Lord Malmesbury, a warm friend +of the Emperor, would probably be the Foreign Secretary in a Tory +cabinet. Napoleon made no comment indicating any purpose to aid in +upsetting the Palmerston Government; but consented to the requested +interview and declared he would go to the length of officially +informing the British Ministry that France was very ready to +discuss the advisability of recognizing the South<a name= +"FNanchor1082"></a><a href="#Footnote_1082">[1082]</a>.</p> +<p>This was good news. June 22, Slidell received a note from +Mocquard stating that Baron Gros, the French Ambassador at London, +had been instructed to sound Russell. Meanwhile, Roebuck and +Lindsay had hurried to Paris, June 20, saw Napoleon and on the +twenty-fifth, Slidell reported that they were authorized to state +in the House of Commons that France was "not only willing but +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_168"></a>[V2:pg 168]</span> +anxious to recognize the Confederate States with the co-operation +of England<a name="FNanchor1083"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1083">[1083]</a>." Slidell added, however, that Napoleon +had not promised Roebuck and Lindsay to make a formal proposal to +Great Britain. This rested on the assurances received by Slidell +from Mocquard, and when Mason, who had let the assurance be known +to his friends, wrote that Russell, replying to Clanricarde, on +June 26, had denied any official communication from France, and +asked for authority from Slidell to back up his statements by being +permitted to give Roebuck a copy of the supposed +instruction<a name="FNanchor1084"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1084">[1084]</a>, he received a reply indicating +confusion somewhere:</p> +<blockquote>"I called yesterday on my friend at the Affaires +Etrangeres on the subject of your note of Saturday: he has just +left me. M.D. de Lh. will not give a copy of his instructions to +Baron Gros--but this is the substance of it. On the 19th he +directed Baron Gros to take occasion to say to leading Members of +Parliament that the Emperor's opinions on the subject of American +affairs were unchanged. That he was disposed with the co-operation +of England immediately to recognize the Confederate States; this +was in the form of a draft letter, not a despatch. On the 22nd, he +officially instructed the Baron to sound <i>Palmerston</i> on the +subject and to inform him of the Emperor's views and wishes. This +was done in consequence of a note from the Emperor, to the +Minister, in which he said, 'Je me demande, s'il ne serait bien +d'avertir Lord Palmerston, que je suis décidé +à reconnaître le Sud.' This is by far the most +significant thing that the Emperor has said, either to me or to the +others. It renders me comparatively indifferent what England may do +or omit doing. At all events, let Mr. Roebuck press his motion and +make his statement of the Emperor's declaration. Lord Palmerston +will not dare to dispute it and the responsibility of the +continuance of the war will rest entirely upon him. M. Drouyn de +Lhuys has not heard from Baron Gros the result of his interview +with <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_169"></a>[V2:pg +169]</span> Palmerston. I see that the latter has been unwell and +it is probable that the former had not been able to see him. There +can be no impropriety in Mr. Roebuck's seeing Baron Gros, who will +doubtless give him information which he will use to advantage. I +write in great haste; will you do me the favour to let Lord +Campbell know the substance of this note, omitting that portion of +it which relates to the Emperor's inclination to act alone. Pray +excuse me to Lord Campbell for not writing to him, time not +permitting me to do so<a name="FNanchor1085"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1085">[1085]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>This did not satisfy Mason; he telegraphed on the twenty-ninth, +"Can I put in hands of Roebuck copy of Mocquard's note brought by +Corcoran<a name="FNanchor1086"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1086">[1086]</a>." To which Slidell replied by +letter:</p> +<blockquote>"For fear the telegraph may commit some blunder I write +to say that M. Mocquard's note, being confidential, cannot be +<i>used in any way</i>. I showed it to Messrs. Roebuck and Lindsay +when they were here and have no objection that they should again +see it confidentially<a name="FNanchor1087"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1087">[1087]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>On June 29, Roebuck went to Baron Gros and received the +information that no formal communication had been made to Russell. +The next day in an effort in some way to secure an admission of +what Mason and his friends believed to be the truth, Lord Campbell +asked Russell in the House of Lords if he had received either a +document or a verbal communication outlining Napoleon's desires. +Russell replied that Baron Gros had told him "an hour ago" that he +had not even received any instruction to deliver such a +communication<a name="FNanchor1088"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1088">[1088]</a>. This was in the hours preceding the +debate, now finally to occur in the Commons. Evidently there had +been an error in the understanding of Napoleon by Slidell, Roebuck +and Lindsay, or else there was a question of veracity between +Russell, Baron Gros and Napoleon.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_170"></a>[V2:pg 170]</span> +<p>Roebuck's motion was couched in the form of a request to the +Queen to enter into negotiations with foreign powers for +co-operation in recognition of the Confederacy. Roebuck argued that +the South had in fact established its independence and that this +was greatly to England's advantage since it put an end to the +"threatening great power" in the West. He repeated old arguments +based on suffering in Lancashire--a point his opponents brushed +aside as no longer of dangerous concern--attacked British +anti-slavery sentiment as mere hypocrisy and minimized the dangers +of a war with the North, prophesying an easy victory for Great +Britain. Then, warmed to the real attack on the Government Roebuck +related at length his interview with Napoleon, claiming to have +been commissioned by the Emperor to urge England to action and +asserting that since Baron Gros had been instructed to apply again +to the British Cabinet it must be evident that the Ministry was +concealing something from Parliament. Almost immediately, however, +he added that Napoleon had told him no formal French application +could be renewed to Great Britain since Russell had revealed to +Seward, through Lyons, the contents of a former application.</p> +<p>Thus following the usual pro-Southern arguments, now somewhat +perfunctorily given, the bolt against the Government had been shot +with all of Roebuck's accustomed "vigour" of utterance<a name= +"FNanchor1089"></a><a href="#Footnote_1089">[1089]</a>. Here was +direct attack; that it was a futile one early became evident in the +debate. Lord Robert Montagu, while professing himself a friend of +the South, was sarcastic at the expense of Roebuck's entrance into +the field of diplomacy, enlarged upon the real dangers of becoming +involved in the war, and moved an amendment in favour of continued +British neutrality. Palmerston was absent, being ill, but +Gladstone, for the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_171"></a>[V2:pg 171]</span> Government, while carefully +avoiding expressions of sympathy for either North or South, yet +going out of his way to pass a moral judgment on the disaster to +political liberty if the North should wholly crush the South, was +positive in assertion that it would be unwise to adopt either +Roebuck's motion or Montagu's amendment. Great Britain should not +<i>commit</i> herself to any line of policy, especially as military +events were "now occurring" which might greatly alter the whole +situation, though "the main result of the contest was not +doubtful." Here spoke that element of the Ministry still convinced +of ultimate Southern success.</p> +<p>If Gladstone's had been the only reply to Roebuck he and his +friends might well have thought they were about to secure a +ministerial change of front. But it soon appeared that Gladstone +spoke more for himself than for the Government. Roebuck had made a +direct accusation and in meeting this, Layard, for the Foreign +Office, entered a positive and emphatical denial, in which he was +supported by Sir George Grey, Home Secretary, who added sharp +criticism of Roebuck for permitting himself to be made the channel +of a French complaint against England. It early became evident to +the friends of the South that an error in tactics had been +committed and in two directions; first, in the assertion that a new +French offer had been made when it was impossible to present proof +of it; and second, in bringing forward what amounted to an attempt +to unseat the Ministry without previously committing the Tories to +a support of the motion. Apparently Disraeli was simply letting +Roebuck "feel out" the House. The only member of the Tory party +strongly supporting him was Lord Robert Cecil, in a speech so +clearly a mere party one that it served to increase the strength of +ministerial resistance. Friends of the North quickly appreciated +the situation and in strong speeches supported the neutrality +policy of the Government. Forster laid stress upon the danger of +war and the strength <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_172"></a>[V2:pg 172]</span> of British emancipation +sentiment as did Bright in what was, read to-day, the most powerful +of all his parliamentary utterances on the American war. In +particular Bright voiced a general disbelief in the accuracy of +Roebuck's report of his interview with Napoleon, called upon his +"friend" Lindsay for his version<a name="FNanchor1090"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1090">[1090]</a> of the affair, and concluded by +recalling former speeches by Roebuck in which the latter had been +fond of talking about the "perjured lips" of Napoleon. Bright +dilated upon the egotism and insolence of Roebuck in trying to +represent the Emperor of France on the floor of the House of +Commons. The Emperor, he asserted, was in great danger of being too +much represented in Parliament<a name="FNanchor1091"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1091">[1091]</a>.</p> +<p>The result of this first day's debate on June 30 was +disconcerting to Southern friends. It had been adjourned without a +vote, for which they were duly thankful. Especially disconcerting +was Slidell's refusal to permit the citation of Mocquard's note in +proof of Roebuck's assertions. Mason wrote:</p> +<blockquote>"I have your note of 29th ult. You will see in the +papers of to-day the debate in the House last night, at which I was +present, and will have seen what in the H.L. Lord Russell said in +reply to Lord Campbell. Thus the French affair remains in a 'muss,' +unless the Emperor will show his hand <i>on paper</i>, we shall +never know what he really means, or derive any benefit from his +private and individual revelations. As things now stand before the +public, there can be but one opinion, i.e., that he holds one +language in private communications, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_173"></a>[V2:pg 173]</span> though 'with liberty to +divulge,' and another to his ambassador here. The debate is +adjourned to to-morrow night, when Lindsay will give in his +explanation. It would be uncivil to say that I have no confidence +in the Emperor, but certainly what has come from him so far can +invite only distrust<a name="FNanchor1092"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1092">[1092]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>As in Parliament, so in the public press, immediate recognition +of the Confederacy received little support. The <i>Times</i>, while +sympathetic with the purpose was against Roebuck's motion, +considering it of no value unless backed up by force; to this the +<i>Times</i> was decidedly opposed<a name= +"FNanchor1093"></a><a href="#Footnote_1093">[1093]</a>. Of like +opinion was the <i>Economist</i>, declaring that premature +recognition was a justifiable ground for a declaration of war by +the North<a name="FNanchor1094"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1094">[1094]</a>. July 2, Roebuck asked when the debate +was to be renewed and was told that must wait on Palmerston's +recovery and return to the House. Bright pressed for an immediate +decision. Layard reaffirmed very positively that no communication +had been received from France and disclosed that Napoleon's alleged +complaint of a British revelation to Seward of French overtures was +a myth, since the document in question had been printed in the +<i>Moniteur</i>, thus attracting Seward's attention<a name= +"FNanchor1095"></a><a href="#Footnote_1095">[1095]</a>. Thus +Roebuck was further discredited. July 4, Spence wrote strongly +urging the withdrawal of the motion:</p> +<blockquote>"I have a letter from an eminent member of the House +and great friend of the South urging the danger of carrying Mr. +Roebuck's motion to a vote. It is plain it will be defeated by a +great majority and the effect of this will encourage the North and +distress our friends. It will also strengthen the minority of the +Cabinet in favour of the North....<br> +<br> +"The fact is the ground of the motion, which was action on the part +of France, has failed us--and taken shape which tells injuriously +instead of being the great support....<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_174"></a>[V2:pg 174]</span> +"If a positive engagement were made by Mr. Disraeli to support the +motion it would alter the question entirely. In the absence of this +I fear the vote would be humiliating and would convey an impression +wholly delusive, for the members are 10 to 1 in favour of the South +and yet on this point the vote might be 5 to 1 against Southern +interests<a name="FNanchor1096"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1096">[1096]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>On July 6, Palmerston was back in the House and Roebuck secured +an agreement for a resumption of the debate on "Monday next<a name= +"FNanchor1097"></a><a href="#Footnote_1097">[1097]</a>." Meantime +many powerful organs of the French press had taken up the matter +and were full of sharp criticism of Napoleon's supposed policy and +actions as stated by Roebuck. The effect in England was to create a +feeling that Napoleon might have difficulty in carrying out a +pro-Southern policy<a name="FNanchor1098"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1098">[1098]</a>. Palmerston, wishing to avoid further +discussion on Napoleon's share in providing fuel for the debate, +wrote in a very conciliatory and pleasant way to Roebuck, on July +9:</p> +<blockquote>"Perhaps you will allow me thus privately to urge upon +you, and through you upon Mr. Lindsay, the expediency of dropping +altogether, whether your debate goes on or not, all further mention +or discussion of what passed between you and Mr. Lindsay on the one +hand, and the Emperor of the French on the other. In truth the +whole proceeding on this subject the other day seems to me to have +been very irregular. The British Parliament receives messages and +communications from their own sovereign, but not from the +sovereigns of other countries...."<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_175"></a>[V2:pg 175]</span> +"No good can come of touching again upon this matter, nor from +fixing upon the Emperor a mistake which amid the multiplicity of +things he has to think of he may be excused for making. I am very +anxious that neither you nor Mr. Lindsay should mention those +matters any more, as any discussion about them must tend to impair +the good relations between the French and English Governments. +Might I ask you to show this note to Mr. Lindsay, your fellow +traveller<a name="FNanchor1099"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1099">[1099]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The next day, in the Commons, Sir James Ferguson appealed to +Roebuck to withdraw his motion altogether as inexpedient, because +of the uncertainty of events in America and as sure to be defeated +if pressed to a vote. Palmerston approved this suggestion and urged +that if the debate be continued speakers should refrain from all +further mention of the personal questions that had been raised, +since these were not proper matters for discussion in the House and +were embarrassing to the French Emperor. But Palmerston's skill in +management was unavailing in this case and the "muss" (as Mason +called it) was continued when Lindsay entered upon a long account +of the interview with Napoleon, renewed the accusations of +Russell's "revelations" to Seward and advised Roebuck not to +withdraw his motion but to postpone it "until Monday." The +<i>Scotia</i>, he said was due and any moment news from America +might change the governmental policy. Again the fat was in the +fire. Palmerston sharply disavowed that news would change policy. +Kinglake thought Roebuck's actions should be thoroughly +investigated. Forster eagerly pressed for continuation of the +debate. There was a general criticism of Roebuck's "diplomacy," and +of Lindsay's also. Northern friends were jubilant and those of the +South embarrassed and uncertain. Gregory believed that the motion +should be withdrawn "in the interest of the South," but Lord Robert +Cecil renewed Lindsay's advice <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_176"></a>[V2:pg 176]</span> to wait "until Monday" and this +was finally done<a name="FNanchor1100"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1100">[1100]</a>.</p> +<p>All England was in fact eagerly waiting for news from America. +Lee's advance was known to have passed by Washington, but no +reports were yet at hand of the battle which must determine this +first great offensive campaign by the South. July 9, the +<i>Times</i> predicted, editorially, that Lee was about to capture +Washington and that this event would be met by a great cry of joy +and relief in the North, now weary of the war and eager to escape +from the despotism of Lincoln's administration<a name= +"FNanchor1101"></a><a href="#Footnote_1101">[1101]</a>. +Nevertheless the <i>Times</i>, while still confident of Lee's +victorious advance and of the welcome likely to be accorded him in +the North, came out strongly on July 13 in an appeal to Roebuck to +withdraw his motion, arguing that even if he were successful Great +Britain ought to make no hurried change of policy<a name= +"FNanchor1102"></a><a href="#Footnote_1102">[1102]</a>. On this +day, the thirteenth, Roebuck moved the discharge <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_177"></a>[V2:pg 177]</span> of his motion +in a speech so mild as to leave the impression that "Tear 'em" had +his tail between his legs but, Lindsay, his feelings evidently +injured by the aspersions cast upon his own "amateur diplomacy," +spoke at much length of the interview with Napoleon and tried to +show that on a previous occasion he had been, in fact, "employed" +by the Government. Palmerston was pithy and sarcastic in reply. +Lindsay, he said, had "employed" himself. He hoped that this would +be the "last time when any member of this House shall think it his +duty to communicate to the British House of Commons that which may +have passed between himself and the Sovereign of a foreign +country<a name="FNanchor1103"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1103">[1103]</a>."</p> +<p>The entire debate on Roebuck's motion was a serious blow to the +cause of the South in Parliament. Undertaken on a complete +misunderstanding of the position of Tory leaders, begun with a +vehemence that led its mover into tactical error, it rapidly +dwindled to a mere question of personal veracity and concluded in +sharp reproof from the Government. No doubt the very success (so it +seemed at the moment) of Southern arms, upon which Roebuck counted +to support his motion was, in actual effect, a deterrent, since +many Southern sympathizers thought Great Britain might now keep +hands off since the South was "winning anyway." There is no +evidence that Russell thought this, or that he was moved by any +consideration save the fixed determination to remain neutral--even +to the extent of reversing a previous decision as to the powers of +the Government in relation to Southern ship-building.</p> +<p>Roebuck withdrew his motion, not because of any imminent +Southern victory, but because he knew that if pressed to a vote it +would be overwhelmingly defeated. <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_178"></a>[V2:pg 178]</span> The debate was the last one of +importance on the topics of mediation or recognition<a name= +"FNanchor1104"></a><a href="#Footnote_1104">[1104]</a>. News of +Lee's check at Gettysburg reached London on July 16, but was +described by the <i>Times</i> two days later as virtually a +Southern victory since the Northern army had been compelled to act +wholly on the defensive. In the same issue it was stated of +Vicksburg, "it is difficult to see what possible hope there can be +of reducing the city<a name="FNanchor1105"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1105">[1105]</a>." But on July 20, full news of the +events of July 4, when Vicksburg fell and Lee began his retreat +from Gettysburg, was received and its significance acknowledged, +though efforts were made to prove that these events simply showed +that neither side could conquer the other<a name= +"FNanchor1106"></a><a href="#Footnote_1106">[1106]</a>. In +contradiction of previous assertions that "another Vicksburg" might +easily be set up to oppose Northern advance in the west there was +now acknowledgment that the capture of this one remaining barrier +on the Mississippi was a great disaster to the South. <i>The +Index</i>, forgetful that it was supposedly a British publication, +declared: "The saddest news which has reached <i>us</i> since the +fall of New Orleans is the account of the surrender of Vicksburg. +The <i>very day</i> on which the capitulation took place renders +the blow heavier<a name="FNanchor1107"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1107">[1107]</a>."</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_179"></a>[V2:pg 179]</span> +<p>"The fall of Vicksburg," wrote Spence, "has made me ill all the +week, never yet being able to drive it off my mind<a name= +"FNanchor1108"></a><a href="#Footnote_1108">[1108]</a>." Adams +reported that the news had caused a panic among the holders of the +Cotton Loan bonds and that the press and upper classes were +exceedingly glad they had refused support of Roebuck's +motion<a name="FNanchor1109"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1109">[1109]</a>.</p> +<p>If July, 1863, may in any way be regarded as the "crisis" of +Southern effort in England, it is only as a despairing one doomed +to failure from the outset, and receiving a further severe set-back +by the ill-fortune of Lee's campaign into Pennsylvania. The real +crisis of governmental attitude had long since passed. Naturally +this was not acknowledged by the staunch friends of the South any +more than at Richmond it was acknowledged (or understood) that +Gettysburg marked the crisis of the Confederacy. But that the end +of Southern hope for British intervention had come at Richmond, was +made clear by the action of Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of +State. On August 4, he recalled Mason, writing that the recent +debates in Parliament showed the Government determined not to +receive him:</p> +<blockquote>"Under these circumstances, your continued residence in +London is neither conducive to the interests nor consistent with +the dignity of this Government, and the President therefore +requests that you consider your mission at an end, and that you +withdraw, with your secretary, from London<a name= +"FNanchor1110"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1110">[1110]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>A private letter accompanying the instruction authorized Mason +to remain if there were any "marked change" in governmental +attitude, but since the decision of the Ministry to seize the Laird +Rams had been made public at nearly the same moment when this +instruction was received, September <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_180"></a>[V2:pg 180]</span> 15, Mason could hardly fail to +retire promptly. Indeed, the very fact of that seizure gave +opportunity for a dramatic exit though there was no connection +between Benjamin's instruction and the stopping of Confederate +ship-building in England. The real connection was with the failure +of the Gettysburg campaign and the humiliating collapse of +Roebuck's motion. Even the <i>Times</i> was now expanding upon the +"serious reverses" of the South and making it clearly understood +that England "has not had and will not have the slightest +inclination to intervention or mediation, or to take any position +except that of strict neutrality<a name="FNanchor1111"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1111">[1111]</a>."</p> +<p>Mason at once notified Slidell of his receipt of the recall +instruction and secured the latter's approval of the communication +he proposed making to Russell<a name="FNanchor1112"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1112">[1112]</a>. A general consultation of Southern +agents took place and Mason would have been vexed had he known how +small was the regard for his abilities as a diplomat<a name= +"FNanchor1113"></a><a href="#Footnote_1113">[1113]</a>. <i>The +Index</i> hastened to join in a note already struck at Richmond of +warm welcome to France in her conquest of Mexico, reprinting on +September 17, an editorial from the <i>Richmond Enquirer</i> in +which it was declared, "France is the only Power in the world that +has manifested any friendly feeling towards the Confederacy in its +terrible struggle for independence." Evidently all hope was now +centred upon Napoleon, a conclusion without doubt distasteful to +Mason and one which he was loth to accept as final.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_181"></a>[V2:pg 181]</span> +<p>On September 21, Mason notified Russell of his withdrawal very +nearly in the words of Benjamin's instruction. The news was at once +made public, calling out from the <i>Times</i> a hectoring +editorial on the folly of the South in demanding recognition before +it had won it<a name="FNanchor1114"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1114">[1114]</a>. In general, however, the press took a +tone apparently intended to "let Mason down easily," acknowledging +that his act indicated a universal understanding that Great Britain +would not alter her policy of strict neutrality, but expressing +admiration for the courage and confidence of the South<a name= +"FNanchor1115"></a><a href="#Footnote_1115">[1115]</a>. September +25, Russell replied to Mason with courtesy but also with seeming +finality:</p> +<blockquote>"I have on other occasions explained to you the reasons +which have induced Her Majesty's Government to decline the +overtures you allude to, and the motives which have hitherto +prevented the British Court from recognizing you as the accredited +Minister of an established State.<br> +<br> +"These reasons are still in force, and it is not necessary to +repeat them.<br> +<br> +"I regret that circumstances have prevented my cultivating your +personal acquaintance, which, in a different state of affairs, I +should have done with much pleasure and satisfaction<a name= +"FNanchor1116"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1116">[1116]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Thus Mason took his exit. Brief entrances upon the stage in +England were still to be his, but the chief rôle there was +now assigned to others and the principal scenes transferred to +France. That Mason did not fully concur in this as final, easily as +it was accepted by Slidell, is evident from his later +correspondence with Lindsay and Spence. He regarded the question of +British recognition of the South as mainly an English political +question, pinning his hopes on a Tory overthrow of Palmerston's +Ministry. This he <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_182"></a>[V2:pg 182]</span> believed to depend on the life +of the Prime Minister and his anxious inquiries as to the health of +Palmerston were frequent. Nothing in his instructions indicated a +desired course of action and Mason after consulting Slidell and, +naturally, securing his acquiescence, determined to remain in +Europe waiting events.</p> +<p>If the South was indignant at British inaction the North was +correspondingly pleased and after the seizure of the Laird Rams was +officially very friendly--at least so Lyons reported<a name= +"FNanchor1117"></a><a href="#Footnote_1117">[1117]</a>. In this +same private letter, however, Lyons ventured a strong protest +against a notion which now seems to have occurred to Russell of +joint action by England, France and Spain to withdraw belligerent +rights <i>to the North</i>, unless the United States formally +"concede to their enemy the status of a Belligerent for all +<i>international</i> purposes." Why or how this idea came to be +taken up by Russell is uncertain. Possibly it was the result of +irritation created by the persistence of Seward in denying that the +war was other than an effort to crush rebellious subjects--theory +clearly against the fact yet consistently maintained by the +American Secretary of State throughout the entire war and +constantly causing difficulties in relations with neutral +countries. At any rate Lyons was quick to see the danger. He +wrote:</p> +<blockquote>"Such a declaration might produce a furious outburst of +wrath from Government and public here. It cannot, however, be +denied that the reasoning on which the Declaration would be founded +would be incontrovertible, and that in the end firmness answers +better with the Americans than coaxing. But then England, France +and Spain must be really firm, and not allow their Declaration to +be a <i>brutum fulmen</i>. If on its being met, as it very probably +would be, by a decided refusal on the part of the United States, +they did not proceed to break up the Blockade, or at all events to +resist by force the exercise of the right of visit on the high +seas, the United <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_183"></a>[V2:pg 183]</span> States Government and people +would become more difficult to deal with than ever. I find, +however, that I am going beyond my own province, and I will +therefore add only an excuse for doing so<a name= +"FNanchor1118"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1118">[1118]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Lyons followed this up a week later by a long description of +America's readiness for a foreign war, a situation very different +from that of 1861. America, he said, had steadily been preparing +for such a contingency not with any desire for it but that she +might not be caught napping<a name="FNanchor1119"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1119">[1119]</a>. This was written as if merely an +interesting general speculation and was accompanied by the +assurance, "I don't think the Government here at all desires to +pick a quarrel with us or with any European Power--but the better +prepared it is, the less manageable it will be<a name= +"FNanchor1120"></a><a href="#Footnote_1120">[1120]</a>." +Nevertheless, Lyons' concern over Russell's motion of withdrawing +belligerent rights to the North was great, and his representations +presumably had effect, for no more was heard of the matter. Russell +relieved Lyons' mind by writing, November 21:</p> +<blockquote>"I hope you continue to go on quietly with Seward. I +think this is better than any violent demonstrations of friendship +which might turn sour like beer if there should be a +thunder-storm.<br> +<br> +"But I am more and more persuaded that amongst the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_184"></a>[V2:pg 184]</span> Powers with +whose Ministers I pass my time there is none with whom our +relations ought to be so frank and cordial as the United +States<a name="FNanchor1121"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1121">[1121]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>If relations with the North were now to be so "frank and +cordial," there was, indeed, little remaining hope possible to +English friends of the South. Bright wrote to Sumner: "Neutrality +is agreed upon by all, and I hope a more fair and friendly +neutrality than we have seen during the past two years<a name= +"FNanchor1122"></a><a href="#Footnote_1122">[1122]</a>." George +Thompson, at Exeter Hall, lauding Henry Ward Beecher for his speech +there, commented on the many crowded open public meetings in favour +of the North as compared with the two pro-Southern ones in London, +slimly and privately attended<a name="FNanchor1123"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1123">[1123]</a>. Jefferson Davis, in addressing the +Confederate Congress, December 7, was bitter upon the "unfair and +deceptive conduct" of England<a name="FNanchor1124"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1124">[1124]</a>. Adams, by mid-December, 1863, was sure +that previous British confidence in the ultimate success of the +South was rapidly declining<a name="FNanchor1125"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1125">[1125]</a>.</p> +<p>Such utterances, if well founded, might well have portended the +cessation of further Southern effort in England. That a renewal of +activity soon occurred was due largely to a sudden shift in the +military situation in America and to the realization that the +heretofore largely negative support given to the Southern cause +must be replaced by organized and persistent effort. Grant's +victorious progress in the West had been checked by the disaster to +Rosencrans at Chicamauga, September 18, and Grant's army forced to +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_185"></a>[V2:pg 185]</span> +retrace its steps to recover Chattanooga. It was not until November +24 that the South was compelled to release its grip upon that city. +Meanwhile in the East, Lee, fallen back to his old lines before +Richmond, presented a still impregnable front to Northern advance. +No sudden collapse, such as had been expected, followed the +Southern defeats at Vicksburg and Gettysburg. Again the contest +presented the appearance of a drawn battle. Small wonder then that +McHenry, confident in his statistics, should now declare that at +last cotton was to become in truth King<a name= +"FNanchor1126"></a><a href="#Footnote_1126">[1126]</a>, and count +much upon the effect of the arguments advanced in his recently +published book<a name="FNanchor1127"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1127">[1127]</a>. Small wonder that Southern friends +should hurry the organization of the "Southern Independence +Association." Seeking a specific point of attack and again hoping +for Tory support they first fixed their attention on the new trial +of the <i>Alexandra</i>, on appeal from the decision by the Chief +Baron of the Court of Exchequer. On December 4, Lindsay wrote to +Mason that he had daily been "journeying to town" with the "old +Chief Baron" and was confident the Government would again be +defeated--in which case it would be very open to attack for the +seizure of the Rams also. Nevertheless he was emphatic in his +caution to Mason not to place too high a hope on any change in +Government policy or on any expectation that the Tories would +replace Palmerston<a name="FNanchor1128"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1128">[1128]</a>.</p> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1041"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1041">[1041]</a> Trollope, <i>North America</i>, I, p. +124.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1042"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1042">[1042]</a> Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 3, +1863. Liverpool.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1043"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1043">[1043]</a> The <i>Index</i>, Jan. 29, 1863, p. 217. +The active agent in control of the <i>Index</i> was Henry Hotze, +who, in addition to managing this journal, used secret service +funds of the Confederacy to secure the support of writers in the +London press. He was in close touch with all the Southern agents +sent to Europe at various times, but appears never to have been +fully trusted by either Mason or Slidell. In 1912-13 I made notes +from various materials originating with Hotze, these being then in +the possession of Mr. Charles Francis Adams. These materials were +(1) a letter and cash book marked "C.S.A. Commercial Agency, +London"; (2) a copy despatch book, January 6, 1862, to December 31, +1864; (3) a copy letter-book of drafts of "private" letters, May +28, 1864, to June 16, 1865. All these materials were secured by Mr. +Adams from Professor J.F. Jameson, who had received them from Henry +Vignaud. Since Mr. Adams' death in 1915 no trace of these Hotze +materials has been found. My references, then, to "Hotze Papers," +must rest on my notes, and transcripts of many letters, taken in +1912-13. Describing his activities to Benjamin, Hotze stated that +in addition to maintaining the <i>Index</i>, he furnished news +items and <i>editorials</i> to various London papers, had seven +paid writers on these papers, and was a pretty constant distributor +of "boxes of cigars imported from Havana ... American whiskey and +other articles." He added: "It is, of course, out of the question +to give vouchers." (Hotze Papers MS. Letter Book. Hotze to +Benjamin, No. 19, March 14, 1863.) In Hotze's cash book one of his +regular payees was Percy Gregg who afterwards wrote a history of +the Confederacy. Hotze complained that he could get no "paid +writer" on the <i>Times</i>.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1044"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1044">[1044]</a> See <i>ante</i>, Ch. XI.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1045"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1045">[1045]</a> Lyons Papers, Feb. 14, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1046"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1046">[1046]</a> Mason Papers, March 18, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1047"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1047">[1047]</a> Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, No. +34, May 3, 1863. This despatch is omitted by +Richardson.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1048"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1048">[1048]</a> Schwab, <i>The Confederate States of +America</i> gives the best analysis and history of Southern +financing.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1049"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1049">[1049]</a> It is possible that a few were disposed +of to contractors in payment for materials.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1050"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1050">[1050]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept. +27, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1051"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1051">[1051]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Slidell to Mason, Oct. 2, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1052"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1052">[1052]</a> Slidell's daughter was engaged to be +married to Erlanger's son.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1053"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1053">[1053]</a> Slidell himself wrote: "I should not +have gone so far in recommending these propositions ... had I not +the best reason to believe that even in anticipation of its +acceptance the very strongest influence will be enlisted in our +favour." (Richardson, II, p. 340. To Benjamin, Oct. 28, +1862.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1054"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1054">[1054]</a> Schwab, <i>The Confederate States of +America</i>, pp. 30-31. Schwab is in error in stating that Erlanger +himself went to Richmond, since it appears from Slidell's letters +that he was in constant contact with Erlanger in Paris during the +time the "agents" were in Richmond.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1055"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1055">[1055]</a> Richardson, II, 399-401, Jan. 15, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1056"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1056">[1056]</a> <i>Ibid</i>, p. 420. Mason to Benjamin, +Feb. 5, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1057"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1057">[1057]</a> Mason Papers, Jan. 23, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1058"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1058">[1058]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Slidell to Mason, Feb. 15, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1059"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1059">[1059]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Slidell to Mason, Feb. 23, +1863, and Mason to Slidell, Feb. 24, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1060"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1060">[1060]</a> Schwab, p. 33.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1061"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1061">[1061]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 33. In France +permission to advertise the loan was at first refused, but this was +changed by the intervention of the Emperor.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1062"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1062">[1062]</a> Richardson, II, p. 457. To Benjamin, +March 21, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1063"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1063">[1063]</a> Mason's <i>Mason</i>, p. 401. To +Benjamin, March 30, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1064"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1064">[1064]</a> MS. Thesis, by Walter M. Case, for M.A. +degree at Stanford University: <i>James M. Mason--Confederate +Diplomat</i> (1915). I am much indebted to Mr. Case's Chapter V: +"Mason and Confederate Finance."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1065"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1065">[1065]</a> No evidence has been found to support +this. Is not the real reason for the change to be found in British +Governmental intentions known or suspected? March 27 was the day of +the Parliamentary debate seemingly antagonistic to the North: while +March 31, on the other hand, the <i>Alexandra</i> case was referred +to the Law Officers, and April 4 they recommend her seizure, which +was done on April 5. It is to be presumed that rumours of this +seeming face-about by the Government had not failed to reach the +bond market.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1066"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1066">[1066]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 3, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1067"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1067">[1067]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Spence to Mason, May 9, +1863. This letter was written a month after the event at Mason's +request for an exact statement of what had occurred.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1068"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1068">[1068]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1069"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1069">[1069]</a> Schwab, pp. 39-44. Schwab believes that +Erlanger & Company "are certainly open to the grave suspicion +of having themselves been large holders of the bonds in question, +especially in view of the presumably large amount of lapsed +subscriptions, and of having quietly unloaded them on the +unsuspecting Confederate agents when the market showed signs of +collapsing" (p. 35). Schwab did not have access to Spence's report +which gives further ground for this suspicion.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1070"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1070">[1070]</a> A newspaper item that Northern ships had +run by Vicksburg sent it down; Lee's advance into Pennsylvania +caused a recovery; his retreat from Gettysburg brought it so low as +thirty per cent. discount.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1071"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1071">[1071]</a> After the war was over Bigelow secured +possession of and published an alleged list of important +subscribers to the loan in which appeared the name of Gladstone. He +repeated this accusation--a serious one if true, since Gladstone +was a Cabinet member--in his <i>Retrospections</i> (I, p. 620), and +the story has found place in many writings (e.g., G.P. Putnam, +<i>Memoirs</i>, p. 213). Gladstone's emphatic denial, calling the +story a "mischievous forgery," appears in Morley, <i>Gladstone</i>, +II, p. 83.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1072"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1072">[1072]</a> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXX, pp. +776-838.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1073"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1073">[1073]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 155.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1074"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1074">[1074]</a> The <i>Index</i>, May 28, 1863, pp. +72-3.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1075"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1075">[1075]</a> The <i>Times</i>, June 1, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1076"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1076">[1076]</a> The <i>Index</i>, June 4, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1077"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1077">[1077]</a> Chesney, <i>Military View of Recent +Campaigns in Maryland and Virginia</i>, London, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1078"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1078">[1078]</a> <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i>, June 6, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1079"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1079">[1079]</a> Lyons Papers, May 30, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1080"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1080">[1080]</a> Callahan, <i>Diplomatic History of the +Southern Confederacy</i>, p. 184. Callahan's Chapter VIII, "The +Crisis in England" is misnamed, for Roebuck's motion and the whole +plan of "bringing in the Tories" never had a chance of succeeding, +as, indeed, Callahan himself notes. His detailed examination of the +incident has unfortunately misled some historians who have derived +from his work the idea that the critical period of British policy +towards America was Midsummer, 1863, whereas it occurred, in fact, +in October-November, 1862 (e.g., Schmidt, "Wheat and Cotton during +the Civil War," pp. 413 <i>seq</i>. Schmidt's thesis is largely +dependent on placing the critical period in 1863).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1081"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1081">[1081]</a> Mason Papers. To Slidell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1082"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1082">[1082]</a> Callahan, pp. 184-5.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1083"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1083">[1083]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 186. To +Benjamin.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1084"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1084">[1084]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 27, +1863. Mason wrote: "The question of veracity is +raised."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1085"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1085">[1085]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Slidell to Mason, June 29, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1086"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1086">[1086]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, To Slidell.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1087"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1087">[1087]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, To Mason. "Monday eve." +(June 29, 1863.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1088"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1088">[1088]</a> Callahan, 186; and Hansard, 3rd Ser., +CLXXI, p. 1719.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1089"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1089">[1089]</a> Punch's favourite cartoon of Roebuck was +of a terrier labelled "Tear 'em," worrying and snarling at his +enemies.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1090"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1090">[1090]</a> Bright and Lindsay had, in fact, long +been warm friends. They disagreed on the Civil War, but this did +not destroy their friendship.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1091"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1091">[1091]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXI, pp. +1771-1842, for debate of June 30. Roebuck's egotism was later +related by Lamar, then in London on his way to Russia as +representative of the South. A few days before the debate Lamar met +Roebuck at Lindsay's house and asked Roebuck whether he expected +Bright to take part in the debate. "No, sir," said Roebuck +sententiously, "Bright and I have met before. It was the old +story--the story of the swordfish and the whale! No, sir! Mr. +Bright will not cross swords with me again." Lamar attended the +debate and saw Roebuck given by Bright the "most deliberate and +tremendous pounding I ever witnessed." (<i>Education of Henry +Adams</i>, pp. 161-2.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1092"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1092">[1092]</a> Mason Papers. To Slidell, July 1, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1093"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1093">[1093]</a> July 1, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1094"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1094">[1094]</a> July 4, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1095"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1095">[1095]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXII, pp. +67-73.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1096"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1096">[1096]</a> Mason Papers. To Mason, July 4, 1863. In +fact Disraeli, throughout the Civil War, favoured strict +neutrality, not agreeing with many of his Tory colleagues. He at +times expressed himself privately as believing the Union would not +be restored but was wise enough to refrain from such comment +publicly. (Monypenny, <i>Disraeli</i>, IV, p. 328.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1097"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1097">[1097]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXII, p. +252.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1098"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1098">[1098]</a> <i>The Index</i> felt it necessary to +combat this, and on July 9 published a "letter from Paris" stating +such criticisms to be negligible as emanating wholly from minority +and opposition papers. "All the sympathies of the French Government +have, from the outset, been with the South, and this, quite +independently of other reasons, dictated the line which the +opposition press has consistently followed; the Orleanist +<i>Debats</i>, Republican <i>Siècle</i>, The Palais Royal +<i>Opinion</i>, all join in the halloo against the +South."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1099"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1099">[1099]</a> Palmerston MS. July 9, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1100"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1100">[1100]</a> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXII, 554 +<i>seq</i>., July 10, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1101"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1101">[1101]</a> In the same issue appeared a letter from +the New York correspondent of the <i>Times</i>, containing a +similar prediction but in much stronger terms. For the last half of +the war the <i>Times</i> was badly served by this correspondent who +invariably reported the situation from an extreme anti-Northern +point of view. This was Charles Mackay who served the <i>Times</i> +in New York from March, 1862, to December, 1865. (Mackay, <i>Forty +Years' Recollections</i>, II, p. 412.) Possibly he had strict +instructions. During this same week Lyons, writing privately to +Russell, minimized the "scare" about Lee's advance. He reported +that Mercier had ordered up a war-ship to take him away if +Washington should fall. Lyons cannily decided such a step for +himself inadvisable, since it would irritate Seward and in case the +unexpected happened he could no doubt get passage on Mercier's +ship. When news came of the Southern defeat at Gettysburg and of +Grant's capture of Vicksburg, Lyons thought the complete collapse +of the Confederacy an imminent possibility. Leslie Stephen is a +witness to the close relations of Seward and Lyons at this time. He +visited Washington about a month after Gettysburg and met Seward, +being received with much cordiality as a <i>verbal</i> champion in +England of the North. (He had as yet published no signed articles +on the war.) In this conversation he was amused that Seward spoke +of the friendly services of "Monkton Mill," as a publicist on +political economy. (Maitland, <i>Leslie Stephen</i>, p. +120.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1102"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1102">[1102]</a> In this issue a letter from the New York +correspondent, dated July 1, declared that all of the North except +New England, would welcome Lee's triumph: "... he and Mr. Jefferson +Davis might ride in triumph up Broadway, amid the acclamations of a +more enthusiastic multitude than ever assembled on the Continent of +America." The New York city which soon after indulged in the "draft +riots" might give some ground for such writing, but it was far +fetched, nevertheless--and New York was not the North.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1103"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1103">[1103]</a> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXII, 661 +<i>seq</i>. Ever afterwards Roebuck was insistent in expressions of +dislike and fear of America. At a banquet to him in Sheffield in +1869 he delivered his "political testament": "Beware of Trades +Unions; beware of Ireland; beware of America." (Leader, +<i>Autobiography and Letters of Roebuck</i>, p. 330.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1104"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1104">[1104]</a> May 31, 1864, Lindsay proposed to +introduce another recognition motion, but on July 25 complained he +had had no chance to make it, and asked Palmerston if the +Government was not going to act. The reply was a brief +negative.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1105"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1105">[1105]</a> The <i>Times</i>, July 18, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1106"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1106">[1106]</a> The power of the <i>Times</i> in +influencing public opinion through its news columns was very great. +At the time it stood far in the lead in its foreign correspondence +and the information printed necessarily was that absorbed by the +great majority of the British public. Writing on January 23, 1863, +of the mis-information spread about America by the <i>Times</i>, +Goldwin Smith asserted: "I think I never felt so much as in this +matter the enormous power which the <i>Times</i> has, not from the +quality of its writing, which of late has been rather poor, but +from its exclusive command of publicity and its exclusive access to +a vast number of minds. The <i>ignorance</i> in which it has been +able to keep a great part of the public is astounding." (To E.S. +Beesly. Haultain, <i>Correspondence of Goldwin Smith</i>, p. +11.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1107"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1107">[1107]</a> <i>The Index</i>, July 23, 1863, p. 200. +The italics are mine. The implication is that a day customarily +celebrated as one of rejoicing has now become one for gloom. No +<i>Englishman</i> would be likely to regard July 4 as a day of +rejoicing.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1108"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1108">[1108]</a> Mason Papers. To Mason, July 25, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1109"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1109">[1109]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>, +1863, Pt. I, p. 329. Adams to Seward, July 30, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1110"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1110">[1110]</a> Mason, <i>Mason</i>, p. +449.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1111"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1111">[1111]</a> Sept. 4, 1863. The <i>Times</i> was now +printing American correspondence sharply in contrast to that which +preceded Gettysburg when the exhaustion and financial difficulties +of the North were dilated upon. Now, letters from Chicago, dated +August 30, declared that, to the writer's astonishment, the West +gave every evidence that the war had fostered rather than checked, +prosperity. (Sept. 15, 1863.).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1112"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1112">[1112]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept. 14 +and 15, 1863. Slidell to Mason, Sept. 16, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1113"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1113">[1113]</a> McRea wrote to Hotze, September 17, +1863, that in his opinion Slidell and Hotze were the only Southern +agents of value diplomatically in Europe (Hotze Correspondence). He +thought all others would soon be recalled. Slidell, himself, even +in his letter to Mason, had the questionable taste of drawing a +rosy picture of his own and his family's intimate social +intercourse with the Emperor and the Empress.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1114"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1114">[1114]</a> Sept. 23, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1115"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1115">[1115]</a> e.g., <i>Manchester Guardian</i>, Sept. +23, 1863, quoted in <i>The Index</i>, Sept. 24, p. +343.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1116"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1116">[1116]</a> Mason's <i>Mason</i>, p. +456.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1117"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1117">[1117]</a> Russell Papers. To Russell, Oct. 26, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1118"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1118">[1118]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons wrote after +receiving a copy of a despatch sent by Russell to Grey, in France, +dated October 10, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1119"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1119">[1119]</a> F.O., Am., 896. No. 788. Confidential. +Lyons to Russell, Nov. 3, 1863. "It seems, in fact, to be certain +that at the commencement of a war with Great Britain, the relative +positions of the United States and its adversary would be very +nearly the reverse of what they would have been if a war had broken +out three or even two years ago. Of the two Powers, the United +States would now be the better prepared for the struggle--the +coasts of the United States would present few points open to +attack--while the means of assailing suddenly our own ports in the +neighbourhood of this country, and especially Bermuda and the +Bahamas, would be in immediate readiness. Three years ago Great +Britain might at the commencement of a war have thrown a larger +number of trained troops into the British Provinces on the +continent than could have been immediately sent by the United +States to invade those provinces. It seems no exaggeration to say +that the United States could now without difficulty send an Army +exceeding in number, by five to one, any force which Great Britain +would be likely to place there."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1120"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1120">[1120]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Private. Lyons to Russell, +Nov. 3, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1121"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1121">[1121]</a> Lyons Papers. To Lyons.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1122"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1122">[1122]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 393. Nov. 20, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1123"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1123">[1123]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, Nov. 27, 1863. I +have not dwelt upon Beecher's tour of England and Scotland in 1863, +because its influence in "winning England" seems to me absurdly +over-estimated. He was a gifted public orator and knew how to +"handle" his audiences, but the majority in each audience was +friendly to him, and there was no such "crisis of opinion" in 1863 +as has frequently been stated in order to exalt Beecher's +services.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1124"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1124">[1124]</a> Dodd, <i>Jefferson Davis</i>, p. 319. +The words are Dodd's.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1125"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1125">[1125]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 84, No. +557. Adams to Seward, Dec. 17, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1126"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1126">[1126]</a> Hotze Correspondence. McHenry to Hotze, +Dec. 1, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1127"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1127">[1127]</a> McHenry, <i>The Cotton Trade</i>, +London, 1863. The preface in the form of a long letter to W.H. +Gregory is dated August 31, 1863. For a comprehensive note on +McHenry see C.F. Adams in Mass. Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>, +March, 1914, Vol. XLVII, 279 <i>seq</i>.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1128"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1128">[1128]</a> Mason Papers.</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_186"></a>[V2:pg 186]</span> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XV"></a>CHAPTER XV</h2> +<h3>THE SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE ASSOCIATION</h3> +<br> +<p>Northern friends in England were early active in organizing +public meetings and after the second emancipation proclamation of +January 1, 1863, these became both numerous and notable. Southern +friends, confident in the ultimate success of the Confederacy and +equally confident that they had with them the great bulk of +upper-class opinion in England, at first thought it unnecessary to +be active in public expressions aside from such as were made +through the newspapers. Up to November, 1862, <i>The Index</i> +records no Southern public meeting. But by the summer of 1863, the +indefatigable Spence had come to the conclusion that something must +be done to offset the efforts of Bright and others, especially in +the manufacturing districts where a strong Northern sympathy had +been created. On June 16, he wrote to Mason that on his initiative +a Southern Club had been organized in Manchester and that others +were now forming in Oldham, Blackburn and Stockport. In Manchester +the Club members had "smashed up the last Abolitionist meeting in +the Free Trade Hall":</p> +<blockquote>"These parties are not the rich spinners but young men +of energy with a taste for agitation but little money. It appears +to my judgment that it would be wise not to stint money in aiding +this effort to expose cant and diffuse the truth. Manchester is +naturally the centre of such a move and you will see there are here +the germs of important work--but they need to be tended and +fostered. I have supplied <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_187"></a>[V2:pg 187]</span> a good deal of money +individually but I see room for the use of £30 or £40 a +month or more<a name="FNanchor1129"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1129">[1129]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The appeal for funds (though Spence wrote that he would advance +the required amounts on the chance of reimbursement from the +Confederate secret service fund) is interesting in comparison with +the contributions willingly made by Bright's friends. "Young men of +energy with a taste for agitation but little money" reveals a +source of support somewhat dubious in persistent zeal and requiring +more than a heavy list of patrons' names to keep up a public +interest. Nevertheless, Spence succeeded, for a short time, in +arousing a show of energy. November 24, 1863, Mason wrote to Mann +that measures were "in progress and in course of execution" to hold +public meetings, memorialize Parliament, and form an association +for the promotion of Southern independence "under the auspices of +such men as the Marquis of Lothian, Lord Robert Cecil, M.P., Lord +Wharncliffe, Lord Eustace Cecil, Messrs. Haliburton, Lindsay, +Peacocke, Van Stittart, M.P., Beresford Hope, Robert Bourke, and +others<a name="FNanchor1130"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1130">[1130]</a>...." A fortnight later, Spence reported +his efforts and postulated that in them, leading to European +intervention, lay the principal, if not the only hope, of Southern +independence--a view never <i>publicly</i> acknowledged by any +devoted friend of the South:</p> +<blockquote>"The news is gloomy--very, and I really do not see how +the war is to be worked out to success without the action of +Europe. That is stopped by our Government but there is a power that +will move the latter, if it can only be stirred up, and that, of +course, is public opinion. I had a most agreeable and successful +visit to Glasgow upon a requisition signed by the citizens. The +enemy placarded the walls and brought all their forces to the +meeting, in which out of 4,000 I think they were fully 1,000 +strong, but we beat them completely, carrying a resolution which +embraced a memorial <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_188"></a>[V2:pg 188]</span> to Lord Palmerston. We have now +carried six public meetings, Sheffield, Oldham, Stockport, Preston, +Ashton, Glasgow. We have three to come off now ready, Burnley, +Bury, Macclesfield, and others in preparation. My plan is to work +up through the secondary towns to the chief ones and take the +latter, Liverpool, Manchester, London, etc., as we come upon the +assembling of Parliament.... By dint of perseverance I think we +shall succeed. The problem is simply to convert latent into active +sympathy. There is ample power on our side to move the +Cabinet--divided as it is, if we can only arouse that power. At any +rate the object is worth the effort<a name= +"FNanchor1131"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1131">[1131]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>In the month of November, <i>The Index</i> began to report these +meetings. In nearly all, Northern partisans were present, attempted +to heckle the speakers, and usually presented amendments to the +address which were voted down. Spence was given great credit for +his energy, being called "indefatigable":</p> +<blockquote>"The commencement of the session will see Parliament +flooded with petitions from every town and from every mill +throughout the North. A loud protest will arise against the +<i>faineant</i> policy which declines to interfere while men of +English blood are uselessly murdering each other by thousands, and +while England's most important manufacture is thereby ruined.... It +remains to be seen whether the voice of the North will have any +effect upon the policy of the Government<a name= +"FNanchor1132"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1132">[1132]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>By "the North" was meant the manufacturing districts and an +explanation was made of the difficulty of similar efforts in London +because it was really a "congeries of cities," with no such +solidarity of interests as characterized "the North<a name= +"FNanchor1133"></a><a href="#Footnote_1133">[1133]</a>." Without +London, however, the movement <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_189"></a>[V2:pg 189]</span> lacked driving force and it was +determined to create there an association which should become the +main-spring of further activities. Spence, Beresford Hope, and Lord +Eustace Cecil were made a committee to draft a plan and preliminary +address. Funds were now forthcoming from the big blockade-running +firms</p> +<blockquote>"Some time ago I saw friend Collie, who had made a +terrific sum of money, and told him he must come out for the cause +in proportion thereto. To this he responded like a brick, I was +near saying, but I mean Briton--by offering at once to devote a +percentage of cotton out of each steamer that runs the blockade, to +the good of the cause. He has given me at once £500 on +account of this--which I got to-day in a cheque and have sent on to +Lord Eustace Cecil, our treasurer. Thus, you see, we are fairly +afloat there<a name="FNanchor1134"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1134">[1134]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Yet Spence was fighting against fear that all this agitation was +too late:</p> +<blockquote>"Nevertheless it is not to be disguised that the evil +tidings make uphill work of it--very. Public opinion has quite +veered round to the belief that the South will be exhausted. The +<i>Times</i> correspondent's letters do great harm--more especially +Gallenga's--who replaced Chas. Mackay at New York. I have, however, +taken a berth for Mackay by Saturday's boat, so he will soon be out +again and he is dead for our side<a name= +"FNanchor1135"></a><a href="#Footnote_1135">[1135]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Again Spence asserted the one great hope to be in European +intervention:</p> +<blockquote>"I am now clear in my own mind that unless we get +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_190"></a>[V2:pg 190]</span> +Europe to move--or some improbable convulsion occur in the +North--the end will be a sad one. It seems to me therefore, +impossible that too strenuous an effort can be made to move our +Government and I cannot understand the Southerners who say: 'Oh, +what can you make of it?' I have known a man brought back to life +two hours after he seemed stone-dead--the efforts at first seemed +hopeless, but in case of life or death what effort should be +spared<a name="FNanchor1136"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1136">[1136]</a>?"</blockquote> +<p>The Manchester Southern Club was the most active of those +organized by Spence and was the centre for operations in the +manufacturing districts. On December 15, a great gathering (as +described by <i>The Index</i>) took place there with delegates from +many of the near-by towns<a name="FNanchor1137"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1137">[1137]</a>. Forster referred to this and other +meetings as "spasmodic and convulsive efforts being made by +Southern Clubs to cause England to interfere in American +affairs<a name="FNanchor1138"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1138">[1138]</a>," but the enthusiasm at Manchester was +unquestioned and plans were on foot to bombard with petitions the +Queen, Palmerston, Russell and others in authority, but more +especially the members of Parliament as a body. These petitions +were "in process of being signed in every town and almost in every +cotton-mill throughout the district<a name= +"FNanchor1139"></a><a href="#Footnote_1139">[1139]</a>." It was +high time for London, if it was desired that she should lead and +<i>control</i> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_191"></a>[V2:pg +191]</span> these activities, to perfect her own Club. "Next week," +wrote Lindsay, on January 8, 1864, it would be formally launched +under the name of "The Southern Independence Association<a name= +"FNanchor1140"></a><a href="#Footnote_1140">[1140]</a>," and would +be in working order before the reassembling of Parliament.</p> +<p>The organization of meetings by Spence and the formation of the +Southern Independence Association were attempts to do for the South +what Bright and others had done earlier and so successfully for the +North. Tardily the realization had come that public opinion, even +though but slightly represented in Parliament, was yet a powerful +weapon with which to influence the Government. Unenfranchised +England now received from Southern friends a degree of attention +hitherto withheld from it by those gentry who had been confident +that the goodwill of the bulk of their own class was sufficient +support to the Southern cause. Early in the war one little Southern +society had indeed been organized, but on so diffident a basis as +almost to escape notice. This was the <i>London Confederate States +Aid Association</i> which came to the attention of Adams and his +friends in December, 1862, through the attendance at an early +meeting of one, W.A. Jackson ("Jefferson Davis' ex-coachman"), who +reported the proceedings to George Thompson. The meeting was held +at 3 Devonshire Street, Portland Place, was attended by some fifty +persons and was addressed by Dr. Lempriere. A Mr. Beals, evidently +an unwelcome guest, interrupted the speaker, was forcibly ejected +by a policeman and got revenge by arranging a demonstration against +Mason (who was present), confronting him, on leaving the house, +with a placard showing a negro in chains<a name= +"FNanchor1141"></a><a href="#Footnote_1141">[1141]</a>. There was +no "public effort" contemplated in such a meeting, although funds +were to be <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_192"></a>[V2:pg +192]</span> solicited to aid the South. Adams reported the +Association as a sort of Club planning to hold regular Wednesday +evening meetings of its members, the dues being a shilling a week +and the rules providing for loss of membership for +non-attendance<a name="FNanchor1142"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1142">[1142]</a>.</p> +<p>Nothing more is heard of this Association after December, 1862. +Possibly its puerilities killed it and in any case it was not +intended to appeal to the public<a name="FNanchor1143"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1143">[1143]</a>. But the launching of the Southern +Independence Association betokened the new policy of constructive +effort in London to match and guide that already started in the +provinces. A long and carefully worded constitution and address +depicted the heroic struggles of the Confederates and the "general +sympathy" of England for their cause; dwelt upon the "governmental +tyranny, corruption in high places, ruthlessness in war, +untruthfulness of speech, and causeless animosity toward Great +Britain" of the North; and declared that the interests of America +and of the world would be best served by the independence of the +South. The effect of a full year's penetration in England of +Lincoln's emancipation proclamation is shown in the necessity felt +by the framers of this constitution to meet that issue. This +required delicate handling and was destined to cause some +heart-burnings. The concluding section of the constitution +read:</p> +<blockquote>"The Association will also devote itself to the +cultivation of kindly feelings between the people of Great Britain +and of the Confederate States; and it will, in particular, steadily +but kindly represent to the Southern States, that recognition by +Europe must necessarily lead to a revision of the system +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_193"></a>[V2:pg 193]</span> of +servile labour, unhappily bequeathed to them by England, in +accordance with the spirit of the age, so as to combine the gradual +extinction of slavery with the preservation of property, the +maintenance of the civil polity, and the true civilization of the +negro race<a name="FNanchor1144"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1144">[1144]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The Association was unquestionably armed with distinguished guns +of heavy calibre in its Committee and officers, and its membership +fee (one guinea annually) was large enough to attract the +élite, but it remained to be seen whether all this equipment +would be sent into action. As yet the vigour of the movement was +centred at Manchester and even there a curious situation soon +arose. Spence in various speeches, was declaring that the "Petition +to Parliament" movement was spreading rapidly. 30,000 at Ashton, he +said, had agreed to memoralize the Government. But on January 30, +1864, Mason Jones, a pro-Northern speaker in the Free Trade Hall at +Manchester, asked why Southern public meetings had come to a halt. +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_194"></a>[V2:pg 194]</span> +"The Southerners," he declared, "had taken the Free Trade Hall in +the outset with that intention and they were obliged to pay the +rent of the room, though they did not use it. They knew that their +resolutions would be outvoted and that amendments would pass +against them<a name="FNanchor1145"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1145">[1145]</a>." There must have been truth in the +taunt for while <i>The Index</i> in nearly every issue throughout +the middle of 1864 reports great activity there, it does not give +any account of a public meeting. The reports were of many +applications for membership "from all quarters, from persons of +rank and gentlemen of standing in their respective counties<a name= +"FNanchor1146"></a><a href="#Footnote_1146">[1146]</a>."</p> +<p>Just here lay the weakness of the Southern Independence +Association programme. It <i>did</i> appeal to "persons of rank and +gentlemen of standing," but by the very fact of the flocking to it +of these classes it precluded appeal to Radical and working-class +England--already largely committed to the cause of the North. +Goldwin Smith, in his "Letter to a Whig Member of the Southern +Independence Association," made the point very clear<a name= +"FNanchor1147"></a><a href="#Footnote_1147">[1147]</a>. In this +pamphlet, probably the strongest presentation of the Northern side +and the most severe castigation of Southern sympathizers that +appeared throughout the whole war, Smith appealed to old Whig ideas +of political liberty, attacked the aristocracy and the Church of +England, and attempted to make the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_195"></a>[V2:pg 195]</span> Radicals of England feel that +the Northern cause was their cause. Printing the constitution and +address of the Association, with the list of signers, he +characterized the movement as fostered by "men of title and +family," with "a good sprinkling of clergymen," and as having for +its object the plunging of Great Britain into war with the +North<a name="FNanchor1148"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1148">[1148]</a>.</p> +<p>It is significant, in view of Mason Jones' taunt to the Southern +Independence Association at Manchester, that <i>The Index</i>, from +the end of March to August, 1864, was unable to report a single +Southern public meeting. The London Association, having completed +its top-heavy organization, was content with that act and showed no +life. The first move by the Association was planned to be made in +connection with the <i>Alexandra</i> case when, as was expected, +the Exchequer Court should render a decision against the +Government's right to detain her. On January 8, 1864, Lindsay wrote +to Mason that he had arranged for the public launching of the +Association "next week," that he had again seen the Chief Baron who +assured him the Court would decide "that the Government is entirely +wrong":</p> +<blockquote>"I told him that if the judgment was clear, and if the +Government persisted in proceeding further, that our Association +(which he was pleased to learn had been formed) would take up the +matter in Parliament and out of it, for if we had no right to seize +these ships, it was most unjust that we should detain them by +raising legal quibbles for the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_196"></a>[V2:pg 196]</span> purpose of keeping them here +till the time arrived when the South might not require them. I +think public opinion will go with us on this point, for John +Bull--with all his failings--loves fair play<a name= +"FNanchor1149"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1149">[1149]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>It is apparent from the language used by Lindsay that he was +thinking of the Laird Rams and other ships fully as much as of the +<i>Alexandra</i><a name="FNanchor1150"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1150">[1150]</a>, and hoped much from an attack on the +Government's policy in detaining Southern vessels. Earl Russell was +to be made to bear the brunt of this attack on the reassembling of +Parliament. In an <i>Index</i> editorial, Adams was pictured as +having driven Russell into a corner by "threats which would not +have been endured for an hour by a Pitt or a Canning"; the Foreign +Secretary as invariably yielding to the "acknowledged mastery of +the Yankee Minister":</p> +<blockquote>"Mr. Adams' pretensions are extravagant, his logic is +blundering, his threats laughable; but he has hit his mark. We can +trace his influence in the detention of the <i>Alexandra</i> and +the protracted judicial proceedings which have arisen out of it; in +the sudden raid upon the rams at Birkenhead; in the announced +intention of the Government to alter the Foreign Enlistment Act of +this country in accordance with the views of the United States +Cabinet. When one knows the calibre of Mr. Adams one feels inclined +to marvel at his success. The astonishment ceases when one reflects +that the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs is Earl +Russell<a name="FNanchor1151"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1151">[1151]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>But when, on February 23, the debate on the Laird Rams +occurred<a name="FNanchor1152"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1152">[1152]</a>, the Tory leaders, upon whom Lindsay +and others depended to drive home the meaning of the +<i>Alexandra</i> decision, carefully avoided urging the Government +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_197"></a>[V2:pg 197]</span> to +change its policy and contented themselves with an effort, very +much in line with that initiated by <i>The Index</i>, to belittle +Russell as yielding to a threat. Adams was even applauded by the +Tories for his discretion and his anxiety to keep the two countries +out of war. The Southern Independence Association remained +quiescent. Very evidently someone, presumably Derby or Disraeli, +had put a quietus on the plan to make an issue of the stoppage of +Southern ship-building. Russell's reply to his accusers was but a +curt denial without going into details, in itself testimony that he +had no fear of a party attack on the <i>policy</i> of stopping the +ships. He was disgusted with the result of the <i>Alexandra</i> +trial and in conversation with Adams reflected upon "the +uncertainty and caprice incident everywhere to the administration +of justice<a name="FNanchor1153"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1153">[1153]</a>."</p> +<p>As between Russell and Seward the waters formerly troubled by +the stiff manner and tone of the one statesman and the flamboyance +of the other were now unusually calm. Russell was less officious +and less eager to protest on minor matters and Seward was less +belligerent in language. Seward now radiated supreme confidence in +the ultimate victory of the North. He had heard rumours of a +movement to be made in Parliament for interposition to bring the +war to an end by a reunion of North and South on a basis of +Abolition and of a Northern assumption of the Confederate debts. +Commenting on this to Lyons he merely remarked that the Northern +answer could be put briefly as: (1) determination to crush +rebellion by force of arms and resentment of any "interposition"; +(2) the slaves were already free and would not be made the subject +of any bargain; (3) "As to the Confederate debt the United States, +Mr. Seward said, would never pay a dollar of it<a name= +"FNanchor1154"></a><a href="#Footnote_1154">[1154]</a>." That there +was public animosity to Great Britain, Lyons <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_198"></a>[V2:pg 198]</span> did not deny +and reported a movement in Congress for ending the reciprocity +treaty with Canada but, on Seward's advice, paid no attention to +this, acknowledging that Seward was very wise in political +manipulation and depending on his opposition to the measure<a name= +"FNanchor1155"></a><a href="#Footnote_1155">[1155]</a>. Some alarm +was indeed caused through a recurrence by Seward to an idea dating +back to the very beginning of the war of establishing ships off the +Southern ports which should collect duties on imports. He told +Lyons that he had sent a special agent to Adams to explain the +proposal with a view to requesting the approval of Great Britain. +Lyons urged that no such request be made as it was sure to be +refused, interpreting the plan as intended to secure a British +withdrawal of belligerent rights to the South, to be followed by a +bold Northern defiance to France if she objected<a name= +"FNanchor1156"></a><a href="#Footnote_1156">[1156]</a>. Adams did +discuss the project with Russell but easily agreed to postpone +consideration of it and in this Seward quietly acquiesced<a name= +"FNanchor1157"></a><a href="#Footnote_1157">[1157]</a>. Apparently +this was less a matured plan than a "feeler," put out to sound +British attitude and to learn, if possible, whether the tie +previously binding England and France in their joint policy toward +America was still strong. Certainly at this same time Seward was +making it plain to Lyons that while opposed to current +Congressional expressions of antagonism to Napoleon's Mexican +policy, he was himself in favour, once the Civil War was ended, of +helping the republican Juarez drive the French from Mexico<a name= +"FNanchor1158"></a><a href="#Footnote_1158">[1158]</a>.</p> +<p>For nearly three years Russell, like nearly all Englishmen, had +held a firm belief that the South could not be conquered and that +ultimately the North must accept the bitter pill of Southern +independence. Now he began to doubt, yet still held to the theory +that even if conquered the South would never yield peaceful +obedience to the Federal Government. <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_199"></a>[V2:pg 199]</span> As a reasoning and reasonable +statesman he wished that the North could be made to see this.</p> +<blockquote>"... It is a pity," he wrote to Lyons, "the Federals +think it worth their while to go on with the war. The obedience +they are ever likely to obtain from the South will not be quiet or +lasting, and they must spend much money and blood to get it. If +they can obtain the right bank of the Mississippi, and New Orleans, +they might as well leave to the Confederates Charleston and +Savannah<a name="FNanchor1159"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1159">[1159]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>This was but private speculation with no intention of urging it +upon the United States. Yet it indicated a change in the view held +as to the warlike <i>power</i> of the North. Similarly the +<i>Quarterly Review</i>, long confident of Southern success and +still prophesying it, was acknowledging that "the unholy [Northern] +dream of universal empire" must first have passed<a name= +"FNanchor1160"></a><a href="#Footnote_1160">[1160]</a>. Throughout +these spring months of 1864, Lyons continued to dwell upon the now +thoroughly developed readiness of the United States for a foreign +war and urged the sending of a military expert to report on +American preparations<a name="FNanchor1161"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1161">[1161]</a>. He was disturbed by the arrogance +manifested by various members of Lincoln's Cabinet, especially by +Welles, Secretary of the Navy, with whom Seward, so Lyons wrote, +often had difficulty in demonstrating the unfortunate diplomatic +bearing of the acts of naval officers. Seward was as anxious as was +Lyons to avoid irritating incidents, "but he is not as much +listened to as he ought to be by his colleagues in the War and Navy +Departments<a name="FNanchor1162"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1162">[1162]</a>."</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_200"></a>[V2:pg 200]</span> +<p>Such an act by a naval officer, defiant of British authority and +disregardful of her law, occurred in connection with a matter +already attracting the attention of the British public and causing +some anxiety to Russell--the alleged securing in Ireland of +enlistments for the Northern forces. The war in America had taken +from the ranks of industry in the North great numbers of men and at +the same time had created an increased demand for labour. But the +war had also abruptly checked, in large part, that emigration from +Europe which, since the middle 'forties, had been counted upon as a +regular source of labour supply, easily absorbed in the steady +growth of productive enterprise. A few Northern emissaries of the +Government early sent abroad to revive immigration were soon +reinforced by private labour agents and by the efforts of steamship +companies<a name="FNanchor1163"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1163">[1163]</a>. This resulted in a rapid resumption of +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_201"></a>[V2:pg 201]</span> +emigration in 1863, and in several cases groups of Irishmen signed +contracts of such a nature (with non-governmental agents) that on +arrival in America they were virtually black-jacked into the army. +The agents thereby secured large profits from the sums offered +under the bounty system of some of the Eastern states for each +recruit. Lyons soon found himself called upon to protest, on appeal +from a few of these hoodwinked British citizens, and Seward did the +best he could to secure redress, though the process was usually a +long one owing to red-tape and also to the resistance of army +officers.</p> +<p>As soon as the scheme of "bounty profiteers" was discovered +prompt steps were taken to defeat it by the American Secretary of +State. But the few cases occurring, combined with the acknowledged +and encouraged agents of <i>bona fide</i> labour emigration from +Ireland, gave ground for accusations in Parliament that Ireland was +being used against the law as a place of enlistments. Russell had +early taken up the matter with Adams, investigation had followed, +and on it appearing that no authorized Northern agent was engaged +in recruiting in Ireland the subject had been dropped<a name= +"FNanchor1164"></a><a href="#Footnote_1164">[1164]</a>. There could +be and was no objection to encourage labour emigration, and this +was generally recognized as the basis of the sudden increase of the +numbers going to America<a name="FNanchor1165"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1165">[1165]</a>. But diplomatic and public quiescence +was disturbed when the United States war vessel <i>Kearsarge</i>, +while in port at Queenstown, November, 1863, took on board fifteen +Irishmen and sailed away with them. Russell at once received +indirectly from Mason (who was now in France), charges that these +men had been enlisted and in the presence of the American consul at +Queenstown; he was prompt in investigation but before this was well +under <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_202"></a>[V2:pg +202]</span> way the <i>Kearsarge</i> sailed into Queenstown again +and landed the men. She had gone to a French port and no doubt +Adams was quick to give orders for her return. Adams was soon able +to disprove the accusation against the consul but it still remained +a question whether the commander of the vessel was guilty of a bold +defiance of British neutrality. On March 31, 1864, the Irishmen, on +trial at Cork, pleaded guilty to violation of the Foreign +Enlistment Act, but the question of the commander's responsibility +was permitted to drop on Adams' promise, April 11, of further +investigation<a name="FNanchor1166"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1166">[1166]</a>.</p> +<p>The <i>Kearsarge</i> case occurred as Parliament was drawing to +a close in 1863, and at a time when Southern efforts were at low +ebb. It was not, therefore, until some months later when a +gentleman with a shady past, named Patrick Phinney, succeeded in +evading British laws and in carrying off to America a group of +Irishmen who found themselves, unwillingly, forced into the +Northern army, that the two cases were made the subject of a +Southern and Tory attack on Russell. The accusations were sharply +made that Russell was not sufficiently active in defending British +law and British honour<a name="FNanchor1167"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1167">[1167]</a>, but these were rather individual +accusations than concerted and do not indicate any idea of making +an issue with the Government<a name="FNanchor1168"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1168">[1168]</a>. Whenever opportunity arose some +inquiry up to July, 1864, would be made intended to bring out the +alleged timidity of Russell's policy towards the North--a method +then also being employed on many other matters with the evident +intention <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_203"></a>[V2:pg +203]</span> of weakening the Ministry for the great Tory attack now +being organized on the question of Danish policy.</p> +<p>In truth from the beginning of 1864, America had been pushed to +one side in public and parliamentary interest by the threatening +Danish question which had long been brewing but which did not come +into sharp prominence until March. A year earlier it had become +known that Frederick VII of Denmark, in anticipation of a change +which, under the operations of the Salic law, would come at his +death in the constitutional relations of Denmark to +Schleswig-Holstein, was preparing by a new "constitutional act" to +secure for his successor the retention of these districts. The law +was enacted on November 13, 1863, and Frederick VII died two days +later. His successor, Christian IX, promptly declared his intention +to hold the duchies in spite of their supposed desire to separate +from Denmark and to have their own Prince in the German +Confederation. The Federal Diet of the Confederation had early +protested the purpose of Denmark and Russell had at first upheld +the German arguments but had given no pledges of support to +anyone<a name="FNanchor1169"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1169">[1169]</a>. But Palmerston on various occasions +had gone out of his way to express in Parliament his favour for the +Danish cause and had used incautious language even to the point of +virtually threatening British aid against German ambitions<a name= +"FNanchor1170"></a><a href="#Footnote_1170">[1170]</a>. A distinct +crisis was thus gradually created, coming to a head when Prussia, +under Bismarck's guiding hand, dragging Austria in with her, thrust +the Federal Diet of the Confederation to one side, and assumed +command of the movement to wrest Schleswig-Holstein from +Denmark.</p> +<p>This occurred in February, 1864, and by this time Palmerston's +utterances, made against the wish of the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_204"></a>[V2:pg 204]</span> majority of +his Cabinet colleagues (though this was not known), had so far +aroused the British public as to have created a feeling, widely +voiced, that Great Britain could not sit idly by while Prussia and +Austria worked their will on Denmark. There was excellent ground +for a party attack to unseat the Ministry on the score of a +humiliating "Danish policy," at one time threatening vigorous +British action, then resorting to weak and unsuccessful diplomatic +manoeuvres. For three months the Government laboured to bring about +through a European council some solution that should both save +something for Denmark and save its own prestige. Repeatedly +Palmerston, in the many parliamentary debates on Denmark, broke +loose from his Cabinet colleagues and indulged in threats which +could not fail to give an excellent handle to opponents when once +it became clear that the Ministry had no intention of coming in +arms to the defence of the Danish King.</p> +<p>From February to June, 1864, this issue was to the fore. In its +earlier stages it did not appear to Southern sympathizers to have +any essential bearing on the American question, though they were +soon to believe that in it lay a great hope. Having set the +Southern Independence Association on its feet in London and hoping +much from its planned activities, Lindsay, in March, was +momentarily excited over rumours of some new move by Napoleon. +Being undeceived<a name="FNanchor1171"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1171">[1171]</a> he gave a ready ear to other rumours, +received privately through Delane of the <i>Times</i>, that an +important Southern victory would soon be forthcoming<a name= +"FNanchor1172"></a><a href="#Footnote_1172">[1172]</a>. +Donoughmore, the herald of this glad news also wrote:</p> +<blockquote>"Our political prospects here are still very uncertain. +The Conference on the Danish question will either make or +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_205"></a>[V2:pg 205]</span> +mar the Government. If they can patch up a peace they will remain +in office. If they fail, out they go<a name= +"FNanchor1173"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1173">[1173]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Here was early expressed the real hope of one faction of extreme +Southern friends in the Danish question. But Lindsay had not yet +made clear where he stood on a possible use of a European situation +to affect the cause of the South. Now, as always, he was the +principal confidant and friend of Mason in England, but he was on +ordinary political questions not in sympathy with Tory principles +or measures. He was soon disgusted with the apathy of the London +Independence Association and threatened to resign membership if +this organization, started with much trumpeting of intended +activity, did not come out boldly in a public demand for the +recognition of the South<a name="FNanchor1174"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1174">[1174]</a>. He had already let it be known that +another motion would be made in Parliament for mediation and +recognition and was indignant that the Association did not at once +declare its adherence. Evidently there were internal difficulties. +Lindsay wrote Mason that he retained membership only to prevent a +break up of the Association and had at last succeeded in securing a +meeting of the Executive Committee when his proposed parliamentary +resolution would be considered. The Manchester Association was much +more alert and ready to support him. "The question is quite ripe +<i>for fresh agitation</i> and from experience I find that that +agitation <i>must</i> be started by a debate in Parliament. No +notice is taken of lectures or speeches in the provinces<a name= +"FNanchor1175"></a><a href="#Footnote_1175">[1175]</a>."</p> +<p>Before any move was made in Parliament letters to the newspapers +began anew to urge that the Ministry should be pressed to offer +mediation in America. They met with little favourable response. The +<i>Times</i>, at the very end of Lindsay's effort, explained its +indifference, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_206"></a>[V2:pg +206]</span> and recited the situation of October-November, 1862, +stating that the question had then been decided once for all. It +declared that Great Britain had "no moral right to interfere" and +added that to attempt to do so would result in filling "the North +with the same spirit of patriotism and defiance as animated the +invaded Confederates<a name="FNanchor1176"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1176">[1176]</a>." Thus support to Lindsay was lacking +in a hoped-for quarter, but his conferences with Association +members had brought a plan of modified action the essential feature +of which was that the parliamentary motion must not be made a +<i>party</i> one and that the only hope of the South lay in the +existing Government. This was decidedly Lindsay's own view though +it was clearly understood that the opportuneness of the motion lay +in ministerial desire for and need of support in its Danish policy. +Lindsay expected to find Palmerston more complaisant than formerly +as regards American policy and was not disappointed. He wrote to +Mason on May 27:</p> +<blockquote>"I received in due course your note of the 23rd. In a +matter of so much importance I shall make no move in the House in +regard to American affairs without grave consideration. I am +therefore privately consulting the friends of the South. On this +subject we had a meeting of our lifeless association on Monday last +and on the same subject we are to have another meeting next Monday; +but differences of opinion exist there as well as elsewhere, as to +the advisability of moving at present. Some say 'move'--others, +'postpone'--but the news by the <i>Scotia</i> to-morrow will +regulate to a considerable extent our course of action. One thing +is now clear to me that the motion must <i>not</i> be a party one, +and that the main point will be to get the Government to go with +<i>whoever</i> brings forward the motion, for as you are aware I +would rather see the motion in other hands than mine, as my views +on the American question are so well known. As no competent member +however seems disposed to move or rather to incur the +responsibility, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_207"></a>[V2:pg 207]</span> I sent to inquire if it would be +agreeable to Lord Palmerston to see me on American affairs and on +the subject of a motion to be brought forward in the House. He sent +word that he would be very glad to see me, and I had, therefore, a +long meeting with him alone last night, the result of which was +that if I brought forward a motion somewhat as follows, on the +third of June, he would likely be prepared <i>to accept it</i>, +though he asked if I would see him again after the <i>Scotia</i> +arrived. The motion we talked about was to this +<i>effect</i>--'That the House of Commons deeply regretting the +great loss of life and the sufferings of the people of the United +States and the Confederate States of North America by the +continuance of the war which has been so long waged between them, +trust that Her Majesty's Government will avail itself of the +earliest opportunity of mediating in conjunction with the other +powers of Europe to bring about a cessation of +hostilities.'"</blockquote> +<p>Lindsay had suggested to Palmerston that it was desirable for +Mason to return to England and have a conference with the Premier. +To this Palmerston gave a ready consent but, of course, no +invitation. Lindsay strongly urged Mason to come over:</p> +<blockquote><i>I think much good will follow your meeting Lord +Palmerston. It will lead to other meetings</i>; and besides in +other matters I think if you came here, you might <i>at present</i> +prove of much service to the South<a name= +"FNanchor1177"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1177">[1177]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Meanwhile the difference within the Southern Independence +Association permitted the coming forward of a minor London +organization called <i>The Society for Promoting the Cessation of +Hostilities in America</i>. A letter was addressed by it to Members +of Parliament urging that the time had come for action:</p> +<blockquote>"215 <i>Regent Street,<br> +London, W.<br> +May 28th</i>, 1864.<br> +<br> +"SIR,</blockquote> +<blockquote>"The Society which has the honour to present to you +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_208"></a>[V2:pg 208]</span> +the accompanying pamphlet, begs to state that there now exists in +Great Britain and Ireland a strong desire to see steps taken by the +Government of this country in concert with other Powers, to bring +about peace on a durable basis between the belligerents in North +America.<br> +<br> +"I am directed by the Committee to express a hope that you will, +before the Session closes, support a motion in Parliament to this +effect; and should you desire to see evidence of the feeling of a +large portion of the country in this matter, I shall be most happy +to lay it before you<a name="FNanchor1178"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1178">[1178]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Whether Lindsay, vexed with the delays of the Association, had +stirred the Society to action, is not clear, but the date of this +letter, following on the day after the interview with Palmerston, +is suggestive. The pressure put on Mason to come to London was not +at first successful. Mason had become fixed in the opinion, arrived +at in the previous fall, that there was no favour to be expected +from Palmerston or Russell and that the only hope rested in their +overthrow. Against this idea Lindsay had now taken definite ground. +Moreover, Mason had been instructed to shake the dust of England +from off his shoes with no official authority to return. Carefully +explaining this last point to Lindsay he declined to hold an +interview with Palmerston, except on the latter's invitation, or at +least suggestion:</p> +<blockquote>"Had the suggestion you make of an interview and +conversation with Lord Palmerston originated with his Lordship I +might not have felt myself prohibited by my instructions from at +once acceding to it, but as it has the form only of his assent to a +proposition from you I must with all respect decline it.<br> +<br> +"Although no longer accredited by my Government as Special +Commissioner to Great Britain, I am yet in Europe with full powers, +and therefore, had Lord Palmerston expressed a desire to see me as +his own act (of course unofficially, and even without any reason +assigned for the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_209"></a>[V2:pg 209]</span> interview) I should have had +great pleasure in complying with his request<a name= +"FNanchor1179"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1179">[1179]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The explanation of disinclination to come was lengthy, but the +last paragraph indicated an itching to be active in London again. +Lindsay renewed his urgings and was not only hopeful but elated +over the seeming success of his overtures to the Government. He had +again seen Palmerston and had now pushed his proposal beyond the +timid suggestion of overtures when the opportune moment should +arrive to a definite suggestion of recognition of the +Confederacy:</p> +<blockquote>"I reasoned on the <i>moral</i> effect of recognition, +considering that the restoration of the Union, which was utterly +hopeless, was the object which the North had in view, etc., etc. +This reasoning appeared to produce a considerable effect, for he +appears now to be very open to conviction. He again said that in +his opinion the subjugation of the South could not be effected by +the North, and he added that he thought the people of the North +were becoming more and more alive to the fact every +day."</blockquote> +<p>Lindsay's next step was to be the securing of an interview with +Russell and if he was found to be equally acquiescent all would be +plain sailing:</p> +<blockquote>"Now, if by strong reasoning in a quiet way, and by +stern facts we can get Lord R. to my views, I think I may say that +all difficulty so far as our Cabinet is concerned, <i>is at an +end</i>. I hope to be able to see Lord Russell alone to-morrow. He +used to pay some little attention to any opinions I ventured to +express to him, and I am <i>not</i> without hope. I may add that I +was as frank with Lord Palmerston as he has been pleased to be with +me, and I told him at parting to-day, that my present intention was +not to proceed with the Motion at least for 10 days or a fortnight, +unless he was prepared to support me. He highly commended this +course, and seemed much gratified with what I said. The fact is, +<i>sub rosa</i>, it is clear to me that <i>no</i> motion will be +carried unless <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_210"></a>[V2:pg +210]</span> it is supported by the Government for it is clear that +Lord Derby is resolved to leave the responsibility with the +Executive, and therefore, <i>in the present state of matters</i>, +it would seriously injure the cause of the South to bring forward +any motion which would not be carried."</blockquote> +<p>Lindsay then urges Mason to come at once to London.</p> +<blockquote>"Now apart altogether from you seeing Lord Palmerston, +I must earnestly entreat you to come here. Unless you are much +wanted in Paris, your visit here, as a private gentleman, can do no +harm, and <i>may, at the present moment, be of great service to +your country</i><a name="FNanchor1180"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1180">[1180]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Palmerston's willingness to listen to suggestions of what would +have amounted to a complete face-about of British policy on +America, his "gratification" that Lindsay intended to postpone the +parliamentary motion, his friendly courtesy to a man whom he had +but recently rebuked for a meddlesome "amateur diplomacy," can be +interpreted in no other light than an evidence of a desire to +prevent Southern friends from joining in the attack, daily becoming +more dangerous, on the Government's Danish policy. How much of this +Lindsay understood is not clear; on the face of his letters to +Mason he would seem to have been hoodwinked, but the more +reasonable supposition is, perhaps, that much was hoped from the +governmental necessity of not alienating supporters. The Danish +situation was to be used, but without an open threat. In addition +the tone of the public press, for some time gloomy over Southern +prospects, was now restored to the point of confidence and in this +the <i>Times</i> was again leading<a name= +"FNanchor1181"></a><a href="#Footnote_1181">[1181]</a>. The Society +for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America quickly +issued another circular letter inviting Members of Parliament to +join in a deputation to call on Palmerston to urge action +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_211"></a>[V2:pg 211]</span> on +the lines of Lindsay's first overture. Such a deputation would +represent "more than 5,000 members and the feeling of probably more +than twenty millions of people." It should not be a deputation "of +parties" but representative of all groups in Parliament:</p> +<blockquote>"The Society has reason to believe that the Premier is +disposed to look favourably upon the attempt here contemplated and +that the weight of an influential deputation would strengthen his +hands<a name="FNanchor1182"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1182">[1182]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>This proposal from the Society was now lagging behind Lindsay's +later objective--namely, direct recognition. That this was felt to +be unfortunate is shown by a letter from Tremlett, Honorary +Secretary of the Society, to Mason. He wrote that the <i>Southern +Independence Association</i>, finally stirred by Lindsay's +insistence, had agreed to join the Society in a representation to +Palmerston but had favoured some specific statement on recognition. +Palmerston had sent word that he favoured the Society's resolution +but not that of the Association, and as a result the joint letter +of the two organizations would be on the mild lines of Lindsay's +original motion:</p> +<blockquote>"Although this quite expresses the object of our +Society, still I do not think the 'Independence Association' ought +to have 'ratted' from its principles. It ought not to have +consented to ignore the question which it was instituted to bring +before Parliament--that of the Independence of the Confederacy--and +more than that, the ambiguous ending of the resolution to be +submitted is not such as I think ought to be allowed. You know the +resolution and therefore I need only quote the obnoxious words +'That Her Majesty's Government will avail itself of the earliest +opportunity of mediating, etc.'<br> +<br> +"This is just leaving the Government where they have been all +along. They have always professed to take 'the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_212"></a>[V2:pg 212]</span> earliest +opportunity' but of which they are to be the judges<a name= +"FNanchor1183"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1183">[1183]</a>!"</blockquote> +<p>Evidently there was confusion in the ranks and disagreement +among the leaders of Southern friends. Adams, always cool in +judgment of where lay the wind, wrote to Seward on this same day +that Lindsay was delaying his motion until the receipt of +favourable news upon which to spring it. Even such news, Adams +believed, would not alter British policy unless it should depict +the "complete defeat and dispersion" of Northern forces<a name= +"FNanchor1184"></a><a href="#Footnote_1184">[1184]</a>. The day +following the <i>Times</i> reported Grant to be meeting fearful +reverses in Virginia and professed to regard Sherman's easy advance +toward Atlanta as but a trap set for the Northern army in the +West<a name="FNanchor1185"></a><a href="#Footnote_1185">[1185]</a>. +But in reality the gage of battle for Southern advantage in England +was fixed upon a European, not an American, field. Mason understood +this perfectly. He had yielded to Lindsay's insistence and had come +to London. There he listened to Lindsay's account of the interview +(now held) with Russell, and June 8 reported it to Slidell:</p> +<blockquote>"Of his intercourse with Lord Russell he reports in +substance that his Lordship was unusually gracious and seemed well +disposed to go into conversation. Lord Russell agreed that the war +on the part of the United States was hopeless and that neither +could union be restored nor the South brought under the yoke.... In +regard to Lindsay's motion Lord Russell said, that he could not +<i>accept</i> it, but if brought up for discussion his side would +<i>speak</i> favourably of it. That is to say they would commend it +if they could not vote for it."</blockquote> +<p>This referred to Lindsay's original motion of using the +"earliest opportunity of mediation," and the pleasant <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_213"></a>[V2:pg 213]</span> reception +given by Russell scarcely justified any great hope of decided +benefit for the South. It must now have been fairly apparent to +Lindsay, as it certainly was to Mason, that all this complaisance +by Palmerston and Russell was but political manipulation to retain +or to secure support in the coming contest with the Tories. The two +old statesmen, wise in parliamentary management, were angling for +every doubtful vote. Discussing with Lindsay the prospects for +governmental action Mason now ventured to suggest that perhaps the +best chances of success lay with the Tories, and found him +unexpectedly in agreement:</p> +<blockquote>"I told Lindsay (but for his ear only) that Mr. Hunter, +editor of the <i>Herald</i>, had written to Hotze about his +connection with Disraeli, and he said at once, that if the latter +took it up in earnest, it could not be in better hands and would +carry at the expense of the Ministry and that he would most +cheerfully and eagerly yield him the <i>pas</i>. Disraeli's +accession, as you remember, was contingent upon our success in +Virginia--and agreeing entirely with Lindsay that the movement +could not be in better hands and as there were but 10 days before +his motion could again come, I thought the better policy would be +for the present that he should be silent and to await +events<a name="FNanchor1186"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1186">[1186]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Slidell was less sceptical than was Mason but agreed that it +might best advantage the South to be rid of Russell:</p> +<blockquote>"If Russell can be trusted, which to me is very +doubtful, Lindsay's motion must succeed. Query, how would its being +brought forward by Disraeli affect Russell's action--if he can be +beaten on a fair issue it would be better for us perhaps than if it +appeared to be carried with his qualified assent<a name= +"FNanchor1187"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1187">[1187]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>But Mason understood that Southern expectation of a <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_214"></a>[V2:pg 214]</span> change in +British policy toward America must rest (and even then but +doubtfully) on a change of Government. By June 29 his personal +belief was that the Tory attack on the Danish question would be +defeated and that this would "of course postpone Lindsay's +projected motion<a name="FNanchor1188"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1188">[1188]</a>." On June 25, the Danish Conference had +ended and the Prussian war with Denmark was renewed. There was a +general feeling of shame over Palmerston's bluster followed by a +meek British inaction. The debate came on a vote of censure, July +8, in the course of which Derby characterized governmental policy +as one of "meddle and muddle." The censure was carried in the Lords +by nine votes, but was defeated in the Commons by a ministerial +majority of eighteen. It was the sharpest political crisis of +Palmerston's Ministry during the Civil War. Every supporting vote +was needed<a name="FNanchor1189"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1189">[1189]</a>.</p> +<p>Not only had Lindsay's motion been postponed but the interview +with Palmerston for which Mason had come to London had also been +deferred in view of the parliamentary crisis. When finally held on +July 14, it resolved itself into a proud and emphatic assertion by +Mason that the South could not be conquered, that the North was +nearly ready to acknowledge it and that the certainty of Lincoln's +defeat in the coming Presidential election was proof of this. +Palmerston appears to have said little.</p> +<blockquote>"At the conclusion I said to him in reply to his +remark, that he was gratified in making my acquaintance, that I +felt obliged by his invitation to the interview, but that the +obligation would be increased if I could take with me any +expectation that the Government of Her Majesty was prepared to +unite with France, in some act expressive of their sense that the +war should come to an end. He said, that perhaps, as I was of +opinion that the crisis was at hand, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_215"></a>[V2:pg 215]</span> it might be better to wait until +it had arrived. I told him that my opinion was that the crisis had +passed, at least so far as that the war of invasion would end with +the campaign<a name="FNanchor1190"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1190">[1190]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Reporting the interview to Slidell in much the same language, +Mason wrote:</p> +<blockquote>"My own impressions derived from the whole interview +are, that [while] P. is as well satisfied as I am, that the +separation of the States is final and the independence of the South +an accomplished fact, the Ministry fears to move under the menaces +of the North<a name="FNanchor1191"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1191">[1191]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Slidell's comment was bitter:</p> +<blockquote>"I am very much obliged for your account of your +interview with Lord Palmerston. It resulted very much as I had +anticipated excepting that his Lordship appears to have said even +less than I had supposed he would. However, the time has now +arrived when it is comparatively of very little importance what +Queen or Emperor may say or think about us. A plague, I say, on +both your Houses<a name="FNanchor1192"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1192">[1192]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Slidell's opinion from this time on was, indeed, that the South +had nothing to expect from Europe until the North itself should +acknowledge the independence of the Confederacy. July 21, <i>The +Index</i> expressed much the same view and was equally bitter. It +quoted an item in the <i>Morning Herald</i> of July 16, to the +effect that Mason had secured an interview with Palmerston and that +"the meeting was satisfactory to all parties":</p> +<blockquote>"The withdrawal of Mr. Lindsay's motion was, it is +said, the result of that interview, the Premier having given a sort +of implied promise to support it at a more opportune moment; that +is to say, when Grant and Sherman have <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_216"></a>[V2:pg 216]</span> been defeated, +and the Confederacy stand in no need of recognition."</blockquote> +<p>In the same issue <i>The Index</i> described a deputation of +clergymen, noblemen, Members of Parliament "and other distinguished +and influential gentlemen" who had waited upon Palmerston to urge +mediation toward a cessation of hostilities in America. Thus at +last the joint project of the Southern Independence Association and +of the Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in +America had been put in execution <i>after</i> the political storm +had passed and not before--when the deputation might have had some +influence. But the fact was that no deputation, unless a purely +party one, could have been collected before the conclusion of the +Danish crisis. When finally assembled it "had no party complexion," +and the smiling readiness with which it received Palmerston's +jocular reply indicating that Britain's safest policy was to keep +strictly to neutrality is evidence that even the deputation itself +though harassed by Lindsay and others into making this +demonstration, was quite content to let well enough alone. Not so +<i>The Index</i> which sneered at the childishness of +Palmerston:</p> +<blockquote>"... He proved incontestably to his visitors that, +though he has been charged with forgetting the vigour of his prime, +he can in old age remember the lessons of his childhood, by telling +them that<br> +<br> +<blockquote>They who in quarrels interpose<br> +Will often wipe a bloody nose (laughter)--</blockquote> +<br> +a quotation which, in the mouth of the Prime Minister of the +British Empire, and on such an occasion, must be admitted as not +altogether unworthy of Abraham Lincoln himself<a name= +"FNanchor1193"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1193">[1193]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Spence took consolation in the fact that Mason had at last come +into personal contact with Palmerston, "even <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_217"></a>[V2:pg 217]</span> now at his +great age a charming contrast to that piece of small human +pipe-clay, Lord Russell<a name="FNanchor1194"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1194">[1194]</a>." But the whole incident of Lindsay's +excited efforts, Mason's journey to London and interview with +Palmerston, and the deputation, left a bad taste in the mouth of +the more determined friends of the South--of those who were +Confederates rather than Englishmen. They felt that they had been +deceived and toyed with by the Government. Mason's return to London +was formally approved at Richmond but Benjamin wrote that the +argument for recognition advanced to Palmerston had laid too much +stress on the break-down of the North. All that was wanted was +recognition which was due the South from the mere facts of the +existing situation, and recognition, if accorded, would have at +once ended the war without intervention in any form<a name= +"FNanchor1195"></a><a href="#Footnote_1195">[1195]</a>. Similarly +<i>The Index</i> stated that mediation was an English notion, not a +Southern one. The South merely desired justice, that is, +recognition<a name="FNanchor1196"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1196">[1196]</a>. This was a bold front yet one not +unwarranted by the military situation in midsummer of 1864, as +reported in the press. Sherman's western campaign toward Atlanta +had but just started and little was known of the strength of his +army or of the powers of Southern resistance. This campaign was +therefore regarded as of minor importance. It was on Grant's +advance toward Richmond that British attention was fixed; Lee's +stiff resistance, the great losses of the North in battle after +battle and finally the settling down by Grant to besiege the +Southern lines at Petersburg, in late June, 1864, seemed to +indicate that once again an offensive in Virginia to "end the war" +was doomed to that failure which had marked the similar efforts of +each of the three preceding years.</p> +<p>Southern efforts in England to alter British neutrality +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_218"></a>[V2:pg 218]</span> +practically ended with Lindsay's proposed but undebated motion of +June, 1864, but British confidence in Southern ability to defend +herself indefinitely, a confidence somewhat shattered at the +beginning of 1864--had renewed its strength by July. For the next +six months this was to be the note harped upon in society, by +organizations, and in the friendly press.</p> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1129"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1129">[1129]</a> Mason Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1130"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1130">[1130]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1131"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1131">[1131]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Spence to Mason, Dec. 7, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1132"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1132">[1132]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Dec. 10, 1863, p. +518.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1133"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1133">[1133]</a> The success of pro-Northern meetings in +London was ignored. Lord Bryce once wrote to C.F. Adams, "My +recollection is that while many public meetings were held all over +Great Britain by those who favoured the cause which promised the +extinction of Slavery, no open (i.e., non-ticket) meeting ever +expressed itself on behalf of the South, much as its splendid +courage was admired." (Letter, Dec. 1, 1913, in Mass. Hist. Soc. +<i>Proceedings</i>, Vol. XLVII, p. 55.) No doubt many of these +pro-Southern meetings were by ticket, but that many were not is +clear from the reports in <i>The Index</i>.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1134"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1134">[1134]</a> Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Dec. 17, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1135"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1135">[1135]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, The <i>weight</i> of the +<i>Times</i> is here evident even though Goldwin Smith's statement, +made in a speech at Providence, R.I., in 1864, be true that the +London <i>Daily Telegraph</i>, a paper not committed to either side +in America, had three times the circulation of the <i>Times</i>. +(<i>The Liberator</i>, Sept. 30, 1864.) Smith's speech was made on +the occasion of receiving the degree of LL.D. from Brown +University.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1136"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1136">[1136]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, That Mason did contribute +Confederate funds to Spence's meetings comes out in later +correspondence, but the amount is uncertain.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1137"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1137">[1137]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Dec. 17, 1863, p. 532. +"The attendance of representatives was numerous, and the greatest +interest was manifested throughout the proceedings. Manchester was +represented by Mr. W.R. Callender (Vice-Chairman of the Central +Committee), and by Messrs. Pooley, J.H. Clarke, T. Briggs, Rev. +Geo. Huntington, Rev. W. Whitelegge, Messrs. Armstrong, Stutter, +Neild, Crowther, Stenhouse, Parker, Hough, W. Potter, Bromley, etc. +Mr. Mortimer Collins, the Secretary of the Association, was also +present. The districts were severally represented by the following +gentlemen: Stockport--Messrs. Constantine and Leigh; Rochdale--Mr. +Thos. Staley; Bradford--Mr. J. Leach; Hyde--Messrs. Wild and +Fletcher; Glossop--Mr. C. Schofield; Oldham--Messrs. Whittaker, +Steeple, and Councillor Harrop; Delf and Saddleworth--Mr. Lees, +J.P.; Macclesfield--Messrs. Cheetham and Bridge; Heywood--Mr. +Fairbrother; Middleton--Mr. Woolstencroft; Alderley (Chorley)---Mr. +J. Beesley, etc., etc."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1138"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1138">[1138]</a> So reported by <i>The Index</i>, Jan. +14, 1864, p. 20, in comment on speeches being made by Forster and +Massie throughout Lancashire.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1139"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1139">[1139]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Jan. 14, 1864, p. +22.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1140"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1140">[1140]</a> Mason Papers. To Mason.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1141"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1141">[1141]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, Dec. 26, 1862, +giving an extract from the London <i>Morning Star</i> of Dec. 4, +and a letter from George Thompson.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1142"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1142">[1142]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>, +1863, Pt. 1, p. 18. Adams to Seward, Dec. 18, 1862, enclosing a +pamphlet issued by the Association.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1143"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1143">[1143]</a> Its appeal for funds was addressed in +part to women. "Fairest and best of earth! for the sake of violated +innocence, insulted virtue, and the honour of your sex, come in +woman's majesty and omnipotence and give strength to a cause that +has for its object the highest human aims--the amelioration and +exaltation of humanity."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1144"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1144">[1144]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 23. +The committee of organization was as follows:--<br> +<br> +<blockquote>The Most Noble the Marquis of Lothian,<br> +The Most Noble the Marquis of Bath,<br> +The Lord Robert Cecil, M.P.,<br> +The Lord Eustace Cecil,<br> +The Right Honourable Lord Wharncliffe.<br> +The Right Honourable Lord Campbell,<br> +The Hon. C. Fitzwilliam, M.P.,<br> +The Honourable Robt. Bourke,<br> +Edward Akroyd, Esq., Halifax,<br> +Colonel Greville, M.P.,<br> +W.H. Gregory, Esq., M.P.,<br> +T.C. Haliburton, Esq., M.P.,<br> +A.J.B. Beresford Hope, Esq.,<br> +W.S.Lindsay, Esq., M.P.,<br> +G.M.W. Peacocke, Esq., M.P.,<br> +Wm. Scholefield, Esq., M.P.,<br> +James Spence, Esq., Liverpool,<br> +William Vansittart, Esq., M.P.<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 25%;"> +<br> +<br> +Chairman: A.J.B. Beresford Hope, Esq.<br> +Treasurer: The Lord Eustace Cecil.</blockquote> +</blockquote> +<br> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1145"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1145">[1145]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, Feb. 26, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1146"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1146">[1146]</a> <i>The Index</i>, March 17, 1864, p. +174. An amusing reply from an "historian" inclined to dodge is +printed as of importance. One would like to know his identity, and +what his "judicial situation" was. "An eminent Conservative +historian writes as follows: 'I hesitate to become a member of your +Association from a doubt whether I should take that open step to +which my inclinations strongly prompt me, or adhere to the +neutrality in public life to which, as holding a high and +responsible judicial situation in this country, I have hitherto +invariably confined myself. And after mature consideration I am of +opinion that it will be more decorous to abide in this instance by +my former rule. I am the more inclined to follow this course from +the reflection that by not appearing in public as an advocate of +the Southern States, I shall be able to serve their cause more +effectually in my literary character. And the printing of a new +edition of my 'History' (which is now going on) will afford me +several opportunities of doing so, of which I shall not fail gladly +to avail myself.'"</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1147"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1147">[1147]</a> Printed, London, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1148"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1148">[1148]</a> At the time a recently-printed work by a +clergyman had much vogue: "The South As It Is, or Twenty-one Years' +Experience in the Southern States of America." By Rev. T.D. Ozanne. +London, 1863. Ozanne wrote: "Southern society has most of the +virtues of an aristocracy, increased in zest by the democratic form +of government, and the freedom of discussion on all topics fostered +by it. It is picturesque, patriarchal, genial. It makes a landed +gentry, it founds families, it favours leisure and field sports; it +develops a special class of thoughtful, responsible, guiding, and +protecting minds; it tends to elevation of sentiment and refinement +of manners" (p. 61). Especially he insisted the South was intensely +religious and he finally dismissed slavery with the phrase: "The +Gospel of the Son of God has higher objects to attain than the mere +removal of one social evil" (p. 175).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1149"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1149">[1149]</a> Mason Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1150"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1150">[1150]</a> The <i>Alexandra</i>, as a result of the +Court's decision, was again appealed, but on an adverse decision +was released, proceeded to Nassau, where she was again libelled in +the Vice-Admiralty Court of the Bahamas, and again released. She +remained at Nassau until the close of the war, thus rendering no +service to the South. (Bernard, pp. 354-5.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1151"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1151">[1151]</a> Feb. 4, 1864, p. 73.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1152"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1152">[1152]</a> See Ch. XIII.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1153"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1153">[1153]</a> State Department, Eng. Adams to Seward, +April 7, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1154"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1154">[1154]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 944, No. 81. Lyons to +Russell, Feb. 1, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1155"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1155">[1155]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Feb. +9, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1156"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1156">[1156]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 944, No. 98. Lyons to +Russell, Feb. 12, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1157"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1157">[1157]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 946, No. 201. Lyons +to Russell, March 22, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1158"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1158">[1158]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 945, No. 121. Lyons +to Russell, Feb. 23, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1159"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1159">[1159]</a> Lyons Papers, April 23, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1160"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1160">[1160]</a> April, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1161"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1161">[1161]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April +19, 1864, and F.O., Am., Vol. 948, No. 284. Lyons to Russell, April +25, 1864. A Captain Goodenough was sent to America and fully +confirmed Lyons' reports.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1162"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1162">[1162]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, May 9, +1864. The tone of the <i>New York Herald</i> might well have given +cause for anxiety. "In six months at the furthest, this unhappy +rebellion will be brought to a close. We shall then have an account +to settle with the Governments that have either outraged us by a +recognition of what they call 'the belligerent rights' of the +rebels, or by the active sympathy and aid which they have afforded +them. Let France and England beware how they swell up this +catalogue of wrongs. By the time specified we shall have unemployed +a veteran army of close upon a million of the finest troops in the +world, with whom we shall be in a position not only to drive the +French out of Mexico and to annex Canada, but, by the aid of our +powerful navy, even to return the compliment of intervention in +European affairs." (Quoted by <i>The Index</i>, July 23, 1863, p. +203.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1163"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1163">[1163]</a> Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, I, p. +563, states that great efforts were made by the Government to +stimulate immigration both to secure a labour supply and to fill up +the armies. Throughout and even since the war the charge has been +made by the South that the foreign element, after 1862, +preponderated in Northern armies. There is no way of determining +the exact facts in regard to this for no statistics were kept. A +Memorandum prepared by the U.S. War Department, dated July 15, +1898, states that of the men examined for physical fitness by the +several boards of enrolment, subsequent to September 1, 1864 (at +which time, if ever, the foreign element should have shown +preponderance), the figures of nativity stood: United States, +341,569; Germany, 54,944; Ireland, 50,537; British-America, 21,645; +England, 16,196; and various other countries no one of which +reached the 3,500 mark. These statistics really mean little as +regards war-time immigration since they do not show <i>when</i> the +foreign-born came to America; further, from the very first days of +the war there had been a large element of American citizens of +German and Irish birth in the Northern armies. Moreover, the +British statistics of emigration, examined in relation to the +figures given above, negative the Southern accusation. In 1861, but +38,000 subjects of Great Britain emigrated to the United States; in +1862, 48,000; while in 1863 the number suddenly swelled to 130,000, +and this figure was repeated in 1864. In each year almost exactly +two-thirds were from Ireland. Now of the 94,000 from Ireland in +1863, considering the number of Irish-American citizens already in +the army, it is evident that the bulk must have gone into labour +supply.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1164"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1164">[1164]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1863, +<i>Commons</i>, LXXII. "Correspondence with Mr. Adams respecting +enlistment of British subjects."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1165"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1165">[1165]</a> The <i>Times</i>, Nov. 21, 1863. Also +March 31, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1166"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1166">[1166]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1864, +<i>Commons</i>, LXII. "Correspondence respecting the Enlistment of +British seamen at Queenstown." Also "Further Correspondence," +etc.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1167"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1167">[1167]</a> For facts and much correspondence on the +Phinney case see <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1864, <i>Commons</i>, +LXII. "Correspondence respecting the Enlistment of British subjects +in the United States Army." Also "Further Correspondence," +etc.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1168"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1168">[1168]</a> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXIV, p. 628, and +CLXXV, p. 353, and CLXXVI, p. 2161. In the last of these debates, +July 28, 1864, papers were asked for on "Emigration to America," +and readily granted by the Government.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1169"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1169">[1169]</a> Walpole, <i>History of Twenty-five +Years</i>, Vol. I, Ch. VI.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1170"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1170">[1170]</a> In the Cabinet, Palmerston (and to some +extent Russell) was opposed by Granville and Clarendon (the latter +of whom just at this time entered the Cabinet) and by the strong +pro-German influence of the Queen. (Fitzmaurice, <i>Granville</i>, +I, Ch. XVI.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1171"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1171">[1171]</a> Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, March +13, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1172"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1172">[1172]</a> This came through a letter from +Donoughmore to Mason, April 4, 1864, stating that it was private +information received by Delane from Mackay, the <i>Times</i> New +York correspondent. The expected Southern victory was to come "in +about fourteen days." (Mason Papers.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1173"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1173">[1173]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1174"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1174">[1174]</a> Mason Papers. Lindsay to Beresford Hope, +April 8, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1175"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1175">[1175]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lindsay to Mason, May 10, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1176"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1176">[1176]</a> July 18, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1177"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1177">[1177]</a> Mason Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1178"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1178">[1178]</a> Sample letter in Mason +Papers.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1179"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1179">[1179]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Lindsay, May 29, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1180"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1180">[1180]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lindsay to Mason, May 30, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1181"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1181">[1181]</a> Editorials of May 28 and 30, 1864, +painted a dark picture for Northern armies.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1182"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1182">[1182]</a> Mason Papers. Sample letter, June I, +1864. Signed by F.W. Tremlett, Hon. Sec.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1183"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1183">[1183]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Tremlett to Mason, June 2, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1184"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1184">[1184]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 86, No. +705. Adams to Seward, June 2, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1185"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1185">[1185]</a> June 3, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1186"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1186">[1186]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 8, +1864. Mason wrote to Benjamin that Disraeli had said "to one of his +friends and followers" that he would be prepared to bring forward +some such motion as that prepared by Lindsay. (Mason's +<i>Mason</i>, p. 500. To Benjamin, June 9, 1864.) Evidently the +friend was Hunter.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1187"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1187">[1187]</a> Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, June 9, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1188"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1188">[1188]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Mason to Slidell, June 29, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1189"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1189">[1189]</a> Walpole, <i>History of Twenty-five +Years</i>, Vol. I, Ch. VI.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1190"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1190">[1190]</a> Mason's <i>Mason</i>, p. 507. Mason to +Benjamin, July 14, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1191"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1191">[1191]</a> Mason Papers, July 16, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1192"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1192">[1192]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, To Mason, July 17, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1193"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1193">[1193]</a> <i>The Index</i>, July 21, 1864, p. +457.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1194"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1194">[1194]</a> Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, July 18, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1195"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1195">[1195]</a> Richardson, II, pp. 672-74. Benjamin to +Mason, Sept. 20, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1196"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1196">[1196]</a> July 21, 1864.</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_219"></a>[V2:pg 219]</span> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XVI"></a>CHAPTER XVI</h2> +<h3>BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE SOUTH</h3> +<br> +<p>After three years of great Northern efforts to subdue the South +and of Southern campaigns aimed, first, merely toward resistance, +but later involving offensive battles, the Civil War, to European +eyes, had reached a stalemate where neither side could conquer the +other. To the European neutral the situation was much as in the +Great War it appeared to the American neutral in December, 1916, at +the end of two years of fighting. In both wars the neutral had +expected and had prophesied a short conflict. In both, this had +proved to be false prophecy and with each additional month of the +Civil War there was witnessed an increase of the forces employed +and a psychological change in the people whereby war seemed to have +become a normal state of society. The American Civil War, as +regards continuity, numbers of men steadily engaged, resources +employed, and persistence of the combatants, was the "Great War," +to date, of all modern conflicts. Not only British, but nearly all +foreign observers were of the opinion by midsummer of 1864, after +an apparent check to Grant in his campaign toward Richmond, that +all America had become engaged in a struggle from which there was +scant hope of emergence by a decisive military victory. There was +little knowledge of the steady decline of the resources of the +South even though Jefferson Davis in a message to the Confederate +Congress in February, 1864, had spoken bitterly of Southern +disorganization<a name="FNanchor1197"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1197">[1197]</a>. Yet this belief in stalemate +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_220"></a>[V2:pg 220]</span> in +essence still postulated an ultimate Southern victory, for the +function of the Confederacy was, after all, to <i>resist</i> until +its independence was recognized. Ardent friends of the North in +England both felt and expressed confidence in the outcome, but the +general attitude of neutral England leaned rather to faith in the +powers of indefinite Southern resistance, so loudly voiced by +Southern champions.</p> +<p>There was now one element in the situation, however, that +hampered these Southern champions. The North was at last fully +identified with the cause of emancipation; the South with the +perpetuation of slavery. By 1864, it was felt to be impossible to +remain silent on this subject and even in the original constitution +and address of the Southern Independence Association a clause was +adopted expressing a hope for the gradual extinction of +slavery<a name="FNanchor1198"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1198">[1198]</a>. This brought Mason some heartburnings +and he wrote to Spence in protest, the latter's reply being that he +also agreed that the South ought not to be offered gratuitous +advice on what was purely "an internal question," but that the +topic was full of difficulties and the clause would have to stand, +at least in some modified form. At Southern public meetings, also, +there arose a tendency to insert in resolutions similar +expressions. "In Manchester," Spence wrote, "Mr. Lees, J.P., and +the strongest man on the board, brought forward a motion for an +address on this subject. I went up to Manchester purposely to quash +it and I did so effectually<a name="FNanchor1199"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1199">[1199]</a>."</p> +<p>Northern friends were quick to strike at this weakness in +Southern armour; they repeatedly used a phrase, "The Foul Blot," +and by mere iteration gave such currency to it that even in +Southern meetings it was repeated. <i>The Index</i>, as early as +February, 1864, felt compelled to meet the phrase and in an +editorial, headed "The Foul Blot," <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_221"></a>[V2:pg 221]</span> argued the error of Southern +friends. As long as they could use the word "blot" in +characterization of Southern slavery, <i>The Index</i> felt that +there could be no effective British push for Southern independence +and it asserted that slavery, in the sense in which England +understood it, did not exist in the Confederacy.</p> +<blockquote>"... It is truly horrible to reduce human beings to the +condition of cattle, to breed them, to sell them, and otherwise +dispose of them, as cattle. But is it defending such practices to +say that the South does none of these things, but that on the +contrary, both in theory and in practice, she treats the negro as a +fellow-creature, with a soul to be saved, with feelings to be +respected, though in the social order in a subordinate place, and +of an intellectual organization which requires guardianship with +mutual duties and obligations? This system is called slavery, +because it developed itself out of an older and very different one +of that name, but for this the South is not to blame.<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 25%;"> +<br> +"But of this the friends of the South may be assured, that so long +as they make no determined effort to relieve the Southern character +from this false drapery, they will never gain for it that respect, +that confidence in the rectitude of Southern motives, that active +sympathy, which can alone evoke effective assistance.... The best +assurance you can give that the destinies of the negro race are +safe in Southern hands is, not that the South will repent and +reform, but that she has consistently and conscientiously been the +friend and benefactor of that race.<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 25%;"> +<br> +"It is, therefore, always with pain that we hear such expressions +as 'the foul blot,' and similar ones, fall from the lips of earnest +promoters of Confederate Independence. As a concession they are +useless; as a confession they are untrue.... Thus the Southerner +may retort as we have seen that an Englishman would retort for his +country. He might say the South is proud, and of nothing more proud +than this--not that she has slaves, but that she has treated them +as slaves never were treated before, that she has used power +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_222"></a>[V2:pg 222]</span> as +no nation ever used it under similar circumstances, and that she +has solved mercifully and humanely a most difficult problem which +has elsewhere defied solution save in blood. Or he might use the +unspoken reflection of an honest Southerner at hearing much said of +'the foul blot': 'It was indeed a dark and damnable blot that +England left us with, and it required all the efforts of Southern +Christianity to pale it as it now is<a name= +"FNanchor1200"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1200">[1200]</a>.'"</blockquote> +<p>In 1862 and to the fall of 1863, <i>The Index</i> had declared +that slavery was not an issue in the war; now its defence of the +"domestic institution" of the South, repeatedly made in varying +forms, was evidence of the great effect in England of Lincoln's +emancipation edicts. <i>The Index</i> could not keep away from the +subject. In March, quotations were given from the <i>Reader</i>, +with adverse comments, upon a report of a controversy aroused in +scientific circles by a paper read before the Anthropological +Society of London. James Hunt was the author and the paper, +entitled "The Negro's Place in Nature," aroused the contempt of +Huxley who criticized it at the meeting as unscientific and placed +upon it the "stigma of public condemnation." The result was a fine +controversy among the scientists which could only serve to +emphasize the belief that slavery was indeed an issue in the +American War and that the South was on the defensive. Winding up a +newspaper duel with Hunt who emerged rather badly mauled, Huxley +asserted "the North is justified in any expenditure of blood or +treasure which shall eradicate a system hopelessly inconsistent +with the moral elevation, the political freedom, or the economical +progress of the American people<a name="FNanchor1201"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1201">[1201]</a>...."</p> +<p>Embarrassment caused by the "Foul Blot" issue, the impossibility +to many sincere Southern friends of accepting the view-point of +<i>The Index</i>, acted as a check upon the holding of public +meetings and prevented the carrying out of that <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_223"></a>[V2:pg 223]</span> intensive +public campaign launched by Spence and intended to be fostered by +the Southern Independence Association. By the end of June, 1864, +there was almost a complete cessation of Southern meetings, not +thereafter renewed, except spasmodically for a brief period in the +fall just before the Presidential election in America<a name= +"FNanchor1202"></a><a href="#Footnote_1202">[1202]</a>. Northern +meetings were continuous throughout the whole period of the war but +were less frequent in 1864 than in 1863. They were almost entirely +of two types--those held by anti-slavery societies and religious +bodies and those organized for, or by, working men. An analysis of +those recorded in the files of <i>The Liberator</i>, and in the +reports sent by Adams to Seward permits the following +classification<a name="FNanchor1203"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1203">[1203]</a>:</p> +<center> +<table summary="" border="1"> +<tr> +<th align="center" rowspan="2">YEAR.</th> +<th align="center" rowspan="2">NUMBER.</th> +<th align="center" colspan="2">CHARACTER.</th> +</tr> +<tr> +<th align="center">ANTI-SLAVERY<br> +AND RELIGIOUS</th> +<th align="center">WORKING-MEN.</th> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center">1860</td> +<td align="center">3</td> +<td align="center">3</td> +<td align="center">-</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center">1861</td> +<td align="center">7</td> +<td align="center">7</td> +<td align="center">-</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center">1862</td> +<td align="center">16</td> +<td align="center">11</td> +<td align="center">5</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center">1863</td> +<td align="center">82</td> +<td align="center">26</td> +<td align="center">56</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center">1864</td> +<td align="center">21</td> +<td align="center">10</td> +<td align="center">11</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td align="center">1865</td> +<td align="center">5</td> +<td align="center">4</td> +<td align="center">1</td> +</tr> +</table> +</center> +<br> +<p>Many persons took part in these meetings as presiding +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_224"></a>[V2:pg 224]</span> +officers or as speakers and movers of resolutions; among them those +appearing with frequency were George Thompson, Rev. Dr. Cheever, +Rev. Newman Hall, John Bright, Professor Newman, Mr. Bagley, M.P., +Rev. Francis Bishop, P.A. Taylor, M.P., William Evans, Thomas +Bayley Potter, F.W. Chesson and Mason Jones. While held in all +parts of England and Scotland the great majority of meetings were +held in London and in the manufacturing districts with Manchester +as a centre. From the first the old anti-slavery orator of the +'thirties, George Thompson, had been the most active speaker and +was credited by all with having given new life to the moribund +emancipation sentiment of Great Britain<a name= +"FNanchor1204"></a><a href="#Footnote_1204">[1204]</a>. Thompson +asserted that by the end of 1863 there was a "vigilant, active and +energetic" anti-slavery society in almost every great town or +city<a name="FNanchor1205"></a><a href="#Footnote_1205">[1205]</a>. +Among the working-men, John Bright was without question the most +popular advocate of the Northern cause, but there were many others, +not named in the preceding list, constantly active and +effective<a name="FNanchor1206"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1206">[1206]</a>. Forster, in the judgment of many, was +the most influential friend of the North in Parliament, but Bright, +also an influence in Parliament, rendered his chief service in +moulding the opinion of Lancashire and <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_225"></a>[V2:pg 225]</span> became to +American eyes their great English champion, a view attested by the +extraordinary act of President Lincoln in pardoning, on the appeal +of Bright, and in his honour, a young Englishman named Alfred +Rubery, who had become involved in a plot to send out from the port +of San Francisco, a Confederate "privateer" to prey on Northern +commerce<a name="FNanchor1207"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1207">[1207]</a>.</p> +<p>This record of the activities of Northern friends and +organizations, the relative subsidence of their efforts in the +latter part of 1864, thus indicating their confidence in Northern +victory, the practical cessation of public Southern meetings, are +nevertheless no proof that the bulk of English opinion had greatly +wavered in its faith in Southern powers of resistance. The +Government, it is true, was better informed and was exceedingly +anxious to tread gently in relations with the North, the more so as +there was now being voiced by the public in America a sentiment of +extreme friendship for Russia as the "true friend" in opposition to +the "unfriendly neutrality" of Great Britain and France<a name= +"FNanchor1208"></a><a href="#Footnote_1208">[1208]</a>. It was a +period of many minor irritations, arising out of the blockade, +inflicted by America on British interests, but to these Russell +paid little attention except to enter formal protests. He wrote to +Lyons:</p> +<blockquote>"I do not want to pick a quarrel out of our many just +causes of complaint. But it will be as well that Lincoln and Seward +should see that we are long patient, and do <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_226"></a>[V2:pg 226]</span> nothing to +distract their attention from the arduous task they have so +wantonly undertaken<a name="FNanchor1209"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1209">[1209]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Lyons was equally desirous of avoiding frictions. In August he +thought that the current of political opinion was running against +the re-election of Lincoln, noting that the Northern papers were +full of expressions favouring an armistice, but pointed out that +neither the "peace party" nor the advocates of an armistice ever +talked of any solution of the war save on the basis of re-union. +Hence Lyons strongly advised that "the quieter England and France +were just at this moment the better<a name= +"FNanchor1210"></a><a href="#Footnote_1210">[1210]</a>." Even the +suggested armistice was not thought of, he stated, as extending to +a relaxation of the blockade. Of military probabilities, Lyons +professed himself to be no judge, but throughout all his letters +there now ran, as for some time previously, a note of warning as to +the great power and high determination of the North.</p> +<p>But if the British Government was now quietly operating upon the +theory of an ultimate Northern victory, or at least with the view +that the only hope for the South lay in a Northern weariness of +war, the leading British newspapers were still indulging in +expressions of confidence in the South while at the same time +putting much faith in the expected defeat of Lincoln at the polls. +As always at this period, save for the few newspapers avowedly +friendly to the North and one important daily professing strict +neutrality--the <i>Telegraph</i>--the bulk of the metropolitan +press took its cue, as well as much of its war news, from the +columns of the <i>Times</i>. This journal, while early assuming a +position of belief in Southern success, had yet given both sides in +the war fair accuracy in its reports--those of the New York +correspondent, Mackay, always excepted. But from June, 1864, a +change came over the <i>Times</i>; it was either itself +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_227"></a>[V2:pg 227]</span> +deceived or was wilfully deceiving its readers, for steadily every +event for the rest of the year was coloured to create an impression +of the unlimited powers of Southern resistance. Read to-day in the +light of modern knowledge of the military situation throughout the +war, the <i>Times</i> gave accurate reports for the earlier years +but became almost hysterical; not to say absurd, for the last year +of the conflict. Early in June, 1864, Grant was depicted as meeting +reverses in Virginia and as definitely checked, while Sherman in +the West was being drawn into a trap in his march toward +Atlanta<a name="FNanchor1211"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1211">[1211]</a>. The same ideas were repeated +throughout July. Meanwhile there had begun to be printed a series +of letters from a Southern correspondent at Richmond who wrote in +contempt of Grant's army.</p> +<blockquote>"I am at a loss to convey to you the contemptuous tone +in which the tried and war-worn soldiers of General Lee talk of the +huddled rabble of black, white, and copper-coloured victims (there +are Indians serving under the Stars and Stripes) who are at times +goaded up to the Southern lines.... The truth is that for the first +time in modern warfare we are contemplating an army which is at +once republican and undisciplined<a name= +"FNanchor1212"></a><a href="#Footnote_1212">[1212]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>At the moment when such effusions could find a place in London's +leading paper the facts of the situation were that the South was +unable to prevent almost daily desertions and was wholly unable to +spare soldiers to recover and punish the deserters. But on this the +<i>Times</i> was either ignorant or wilfully silent. It was indeed +a general British sentiment during the summer of 1864, that the +North was losing its power and determination in the war<a name= +"FNanchor1213"></a><a href="#Footnote_1213">[1213]</a>, even though +it was unquestioned that the earlier "enthusiasm for the +slave-holders" <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_228"></a>[V2:pg +228]</span> had passed away<a name="FNanchor1214"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1214">[1214]</a>. One element in the influence of the +<i>Times</i> was its <i>seeming</i> impartiality accompanied by a +pretentious assertion of superior information and wisdom that at +times irritated its contemporaries, but was recognized as making +this journal the most powerful agent in England. Angry at a +<i>Times</i> editorial in February, 1863, in which Mason had been +berated for a speech made at the Lord Mayor's banquet, <i>The +Index</i> declared:</p> +<blockquote>"Our contemporary is all things to all men. It not only +shouts with the largest crowd, according to the Pickwickian +philosophy, but with a skill and daring that command admiration, it +shouts simultaneously with opposite and contending crowds. It is +everybody's <i>Times</i><a name="FNanchor1215"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1215">[1215]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Yet <i>The Index</i> knew, and frequently so stated, that the +<i>Times</i> was at bottom pro-Southern. John Bright's medium, the +<i>Morning Star</i>, said: "There was something bordering on the +sublime in the tremendous audacity of the war news supplied by the +<i>Times</i>. Of course, its prophecies were in a similar style. +None of your doubtful oracles there; none of your double-meaning +vaticinations, like that which took poor Pyrrhus in<a name= +"FNanchor1216"></a><a href="#Footnote_1216">[1216]</a>." In short, +the <i>Times</i> became for the last year of the war the Bible of +their faith to Southern sympathizers, and was frequent in its +preachments<a name="FNanchor1217"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1217">[1217]</a>.</p> +<p>There was one journal in London which claimed to have equal if +not greater knowledge and authority in military matters. This was +the weekly <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i>, and its editor, W.H. +Russell, in 1861 war correspondent in America of the <i>Times</i>, +but recalled shortly after his famous letter on the battle of Bull +Run, consistently maintained after the war had ended that he had +always asserted <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_229"></a>[V2:pg 229]</span> the ultimate victory of the +North and was, indeed, so pro-Northern in sentiment that this was +the real cause of his recall<a name="FNanchor1218"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1218">[1218]</a>. He even claimed to have believed in +Northern victory to the extent of re-union. These protestations +after the event are not borne out by the columns of the +<i>Gazette</i>, for that journal was not far behind the +<i>Times</i> in its delineation of incidents unfavourable to the +North and in its all-wise prophecies of Northern disaster. The +<i>Gazette</i> had no wide circulation except among those in the +service, but its <i>dicta</i>, owing to the established reputation +of Russell and to the specialist nature of the paper, were +naturally quite readily accepted and repeated in the ordinary +press. Based on a correct appreciation of man power and resources +the <i>Gazette</i> did from time to time proclaim its faith in +Northern victory<a name="FNanchor1219"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1219">[1219]</a>, but always in such terms as to render +possible a hedge on expressed opinion and always with the assertion +that victory would not result in reunion. Russell's most definite +prophecy was made on July 30, 1864:</p> +<blockquote>"The Southern Confederacy, like Denmark, is left to +fight by itself, without even a conference or an armistice to +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_230"></a>[V2:pg 230]</span> +aid it; and it will be strange indeed if the heroism, endurance, +and resources of its soldiers and citizens be not eventually +dominated by the perseverance and superior means of the Northern +States. Let us repeat our profession of faith in the matter. We +hold that the Union perished long ago, and that its component parts +can never again be welded into a Confederacy of self-governing +States, with a common executive, army, fleet, and central +government. Not only that. The principle of Union itself among the +non-seceding States is so shocked and shattered by the war which +has arisen, that the fissures in it are likely to widen and spread, +and to form eventually great gulfs separating the Northern Union +itself into smaller bodies. But ere the North be convinced of the +futility of its efforts to substitute the action of force for that +of free will, we think it will reduce the Southern States to the +direst misery<a name="FNanchor1220"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1220">[1220]</a>...."</blockquote> +<p>Such occasional "professions of faith," accompanied by sneers at +the "Confederate partisanship" of the <i>Times</i><a name= +"FNanchor1221"></a><a href="#Footnote_1221">[1221]</a> served to +differentiate the <i>Gazette</i> from other journals, but when it +came to description and estimate of specific campaigns there was +little to choose between them and consequently little variance in +the effect upon the public. Thus a fortnight before his "profession +of faith," Russell could comment editorially on Sherman's campaign +toward Atlanta:</p> +<blockquote>"The next great Federal army on which the hopes of the +North have so long been fixed promises to become a source of +fearful anxiety. Sherman, if not retreating, is certainly not +advancing; and, if the Confederates can interfere seriously with +his communications, he must fall back as soon as he has eaten up +all the supplies of the district.... All the enormous advantages +possessed by the Federals have been nullified by want of skill, by +the interference of Washington civilians, and by the absence of an +animating homogeneous spirit on the part of their soldiery<a name= +"FNanchor1222"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1222">[1222]</a>."</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_231"></a>[V2:pg 231]</span> +<p>Hand in hand with war news adverse to the North went comments on +the Presidential election campaign in America, with prophecies of +Lincoln's defeat. This was indeed but a reflection of the American +press but the citations made in <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_232"></a>[V2:pg 232]</span> British papers emphasized +especially Northern weariness of Lincoln's despotism and +inefficiency. Thus, first printed in <i>The Index</i>, an extract +from a New York paper, <i>The New Nation</i>, got frequent +quotation:</p> +<blockquote>"We have been imposed upon long enough. The ruin which +you have been unable to accomplish in four years, would certainly +be fully consummated were you to remain in power four years longer. +Your military governors and their provost-marshals override the +laws, and the <i>echo of the armed heel rings forth as dearly now +in America as in France or Austria. You have encroached upon our +liberty without securing victory, and we must have both</i><a name= +"FNanchor1223"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1223">[1223]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>It was clearly understood that Northern military efforts would +have an important bearing on the election. The <i>Times</i> while +expressing admiration for Sherman's boldness in the Atlanta +campaign was confident of his defeat:</p> +<blockquote>"... it is difficult to see how General Sherman can +escape a still more disastrous fate than that which threatened his +predecessor. He has advanced nearly one hundred and fifty miles +from his base of operations, over a mountainous country; and he has +no option but to retreat by the same line as he advanced. This is +the first instance of a Federal general having ventured far from +water communications. That Sherman has hitherto done so with +success is a proof of both courage and ability, but he will need +both these qualities in a far greater degree if he is forced to +retreat<a name="FNanchor1224"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1224">[1224]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>And W.H. Russell, in the <i>Gazette</i>, included Grant in the +approaching disaster:</p> +<blockquote>"The world has never seen anything in war so slow and +fatuous as Grant's recent movements, except it be those of Sherman. +Each is wriggling about like a snake in the presence of an +ichneumon. They both work round and round, now on one flank and +then on the other, and on each move meet the unwinking eye of the +enemy, ready for his spring and bite. <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_233"></a>[V2:pg 233]</span> In sheer +despair Grant and Sherman must do something at last. As to +shelling! Will they learn from history? Then they will know that +they cannot shell an army provided with as powerful artillery as +their own out of a position.... The Northerners have, indeed, lost +the day solely owing to the want of average ability in their +leaders in the field<a name="FNanchor1225"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1225">[1225]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>On the very day when Russell thus wrote in the <i>Gazette</i> +the city of Atlanta had been taken by Sherman. When the news +reached England the <i>Times</i> having declared this impossible, +now asserted that it was unimportant, believed that Sherman could +not remain in possession and, two days later, turned with vehemence +to an analysis of the political struggle as of more vital +influence. The Democrats, it was insisted, would place peace +"paramount to union" and were sure to win<a name= +"FNanchor1226"></a><a href="#Footnote_1226">[1226]</a>. Russell, in +the <i>Gazette</i>, coolly ignoring its prophecy of three weeks +earlier, now spoke as if he had always foreseen the fall of +Atlanta:</p> +<blockquote>"General Sherman has fully justified his reputation as +an able and daring soldier; and the final operations by which he +won Atlanta are not the least remarkable of the series which +carried him from Chattanooga ... into the heart of Georgia<a name= +"FNanchor1227"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1227">[1227]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>But neither of these political-military "expert" journals would +acknowledge any benefit accruing to Lincoln from Sherman's success. +Not so, however, Lyons, who kept his chief much better informed +than he would have been if credulous of the British press. Lyons, +who for some time had been increasingly in bad health, had sought +escape from the summer heat of Washington in a visit to Montreal. +He now wrote correctly interpreting a great change in Northern +attitude and a renewed determination to persevere in the war until +reunion was secured. Lincoln, he thought, was likely to be +re-elected:</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_234"></a>[V2:pg 234]</span> +<blockquote>"The reaction produced by the fall of Atlanta may be +taken as an indication of what the real feelings of the people in +the Northern States are. The vast majority of them ardently desire +to reconquer the lost territory. It is only at moments when they +despair of doing this that they listen to plans for recovering the +territory by negotiation. The time has not come yet when any +proposal to relinquish the territory can be publicly made<a name= +"FNanchor1228"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1228">[1228]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The <i>Times</i>, slowly convinced that Atlanta would have +influence in the election, and as always clever above its +contemporaries in the delicate process of face-about to save its +prestige, arrived in October at the point where it could join in +prediction of Lincoln's re-election. It did so by throwing the +blame on the Democratic platform adopted at the party convention in +Chicago, which, so it represented, had cast away an excellent +chance of success by declaring for union first and peace +afterwards. Since the convention had met in August this was late +analysis; and as a matter of fact the convention platform had +called for a "cessation of bloodshed" and the calling of a +convention to restore peace--in substance, for an armistice. But +the <i>Times</i><a name="FNanchor1229"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1229">[1229]</a> now assumed temporarily a highly moral +and disinterested pose and washed its hands of further +responsibility; Lincoln was likely to be re-elected:</p> +<blockquote>For ourselves we have no particular reason to wish it +otherwise. We have no very serious matter of complaint that we are +aware of against the present Government of America. Allowance being +made for the difficulties of their position, they are conducting +the war with a fair regard to the rights of neutral nations. The +war has swept American commerce from the sea, and placed it, in +great measure, in our hands; we have supplied the loss of the +cotton which was suddenly withdrawn from us; the returns of our +revenue and our trade are thoroughly satisfactory, and we +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_235"></a>[V2:pg 235]</span> +have received an equivalent for the markets closed to us in America +in the vast impulse that has been given towards the development of +the prosperity of India. We see a great nation, which has not been +in times past sparing of its menaces and predictions of our ruin, +apparently resolved to execute, without pause and without remorse, +the most dreadful judgments of Heaven upon itself. We see the +frantic patient tearing the bandages from his wounds and thrusting +aside the hand that would assuage his miseries, and every day that +the war goes on we see less and less probability that the great +fabric of the Union will ever be reconstructed in its original +form, and more and more likelihood that the process of +disintegration will extend far beyond the present division between +North and South.... Were we really animated by the spirit of +hostility which is always assumed to prevail among us towards +America, we should view the terrible spectacle with exultation and +delight, we should rejoice that the American people, untaught by +past misfortunes, have resolved to continue the war to the end, and +hail the probable continuance of the power of Mr. Lincoln as the +event most calculated to pledge the nation to a steady continuance +in its suicidal policy. But we are persuaded that the people of +this country view the prospect of another four years of war in +America with very different feelings. They are not able to divest +themselves of sympathy for a people of their own blood and language +thus wilfully rushing down the path that leadeth to +destruction<a name="FNanchor1230"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1230">[1230]</a>.</blockquote> +<p>Sherman's capture of Atlanta did indeed make certain that +Lincoln would again be chosen President, but the <i>Times</i> was +more slow to acknowledge its military importance, first hinting and +then positively asserting that Sherman had fallen into a trap from +which he would have difficulty in escaping<a name= +"FNanchor1231"></a><a href="#Footnote_1231">[1231]</a>. The +<i>Gazette</i> called this "blind partisanship<a name= +"FNanchor1232"></a><a href="#Footnote_1232">[1232]</a>," but itself +indulged in gloomy prognostications as to the character and results +of the Presidential election, regarding it as certain that election +day would see the use of "force, <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_236"></a>[V2:pg 236]</span> fraud and every mechanism known +to the most unscrupulous political agitation." "We confess," it +continued, "we are only so far affected by the struggle inasmuch as +it dishonours the Anglo-Saxon name, and diminishes its reputation +for justice and honour throughout the world<a name= +"FNanchor1233"></a><a href="#Footnote_1233">[1233]</a>." Again +official England was striking a note far different from that of the +press<a name="FNanchor1234"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1234">[1234]</a>. Adams paid little attention to +newspaper <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_237"></a>[V2:pg +237]</span> utterances, but kept his chief informed of opinions +expressed by those responsible for, and active in determining, +governmental policy. The autumn "season for speeches" by Members of +Parliament, he reported, was progressing with a very evident +unanimity of expressions, whether from friend or foe, that it was +inexpedient to meddle in American affairs. As the Presidential +election in America came nearer, attention was diverted from +military events. Anti-slavery societies began to hold meetings +urging their friends in America to vote for Lincoln<a name= +"FNanchor1235"></a><a href="#Footnote_1235">[1235]</a>. Writing +from Washington, Lyons, as always anxious to forestall frictions on +immaterial matters, wrote to Russell, "We must be prepared for +demonstrations of a '<i>spirited foreign policy</i>' by Mr. Seward, +during the next fortnight, for electioneering purposes<a name= +"FNanchor1236"></a><a href="#Footnote_1236">[1236]</a>." Possibly +his illness made him unduly nervous, for four days later he was +relieved to be asked by Seward to "postpone as much as possible all +business with him until after the election<a name= +"FNanchor1237"></a><a href="#Footnote_1237">[1237]</a>." By +November 1, Lyons was so ill that he asked for immediate leave, and +in replying, "You will come away at once," Russell added that he +was entirely convinced the United States wished to make no serious +difficulties with Great Britain.</p> +<blockquote>"... I do not think the U.S. Government have any +ill-intentions towards us, or any fixed purpose of availing +themselves of a tide of success to add a war with us to their +existing difficulties. Therefore whatever their bluster and buncome +may be at times, I think they will subside when the popular clamour +is over<a name="FNanchor1238"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1238">[1238]</a>."</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_238"></a>[V2:pg 238]</span> +<p>In early November, Lincoln was triumphantly re-elected receiving +212 electoral votes to 21 cast for McClellan. No disturbances such +as the <i>Gazette</i> had gloomily foretold attended the event, and +the tremendous majority gained by the President somewhat stunned +the press. Having prophesied disorders, the <i>Gazette</i> now +patted America on the back for her behaviour, but took occasion to +renew old "professions of faith" against reunion:</p> +<blockquote>"Abraham Lincoln II reigns in succession to Abraham +Lincoln I, the first Republican monarch of the Federal States, and +so far as we are concerned we are very glad of it, because the +measure of the man is taken and known.... It is most creditable to +the law-abiding habits of the people that the elections ... passed +off as they have done.... Mr. Lincoln has four long years of strife +before him; and as he seems little inclined to change his advisers, +his course of action, or his generals, we do not believe that the +termination of his second period of government will find him +President of the United States<a name="FNanchor1239"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1239">[1239]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The <i>Times</i> was disinclined, for once, to moralize, and was +cautious in comment:</p> +<blockquote>"Ever since he found himself firmly established in his +office, and the first effervescence of national feeling had begun +to subside, we have had no great reason to complain of the conduct +of Mr. Lincoln towards England. His tone has been less exacting, +his language has been less offensive and, due allowance being made +for the immense difficulties of his situation, we could have parted +with Mr. Lincoln, had such been the pleasure of the American +people, without any vestige of ill-will or ill-feeling. He has done +as regards this country what the necessities of his situation +demanded from him, and he has done no more<a name= +"FNanchor1240"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1240">[1240]</a>."</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_239"></a>[V2:pg 239]</span> +<p>This was to tread gently; but more exactly and more boldly the +real reaction of the press was indicated by <i>Punch's</i> cartoon +of a phoenix, bearing the grim and forceful face of Lincoln, rising +from the ashes where lay the embers of all that of old time had +gone to make up the <i>liberties</i> of America<a name= +"FNanchor1241"></a><a href="#Footnote_1241">[1241]</a>.</p> +<p>During the months immediately preceding Lincoln's re-election +English friends of the South had largely remained inactive. +Constantly twitted that at the chief stronghold of the <i>Southern +Independence Association</i>, Manchester, they did not dare to hold +a meeting in the great Free Trade Hall<a name= +"FNanchor1242"></a><a href="#Footnote_1242">[1242]</a>, they tried +ticket meetings in smaller halls, but even there met with +opposition from those who attended. At three other places, Oldham, +Ashton, and Stockport, efforts to break the Northern hold on the +manufacturing districts met with little success<a name= +"FNanchor1243"></a><a href="#Footnote_1243">[1243]</a>, and even, +as reported in the <i>Index</i>, were attended mainly by +"magistrates, clergy, leading local gentry, manufacturers, +tradesmen, and cotton operatives," the last named being also, +evidently, the last considered, and presumably the least +represented<a name="FNanchor1244"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1244">[1244]</a>. The Rev. Mr. Massie conducted "follow +up" Northern meetings wherever the Southern friends ventured an +appearance<a name="FNanchor1245"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1245">[1245]</a>. At one town only, Oldham, described by +<i>The Index</i> as "the most 'Southern' town in Lancashire," was a +meeting held at all comparable with the great demonstrations easily +staged by pro-Northern friends. Set for October 31, great efforts +were made to picture this meeting as an outburst of indignation +from the unemployed. Summoned by <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_240"></a>[V2:pg 240]</span> handbills headed "<i>The Crisis! +The Crisis! The Crisis!</i>" there gathered, according to <i>The +Index</i> correspondent, a meeting "of between 5,000 and 6,000 +wretched paupers, many of whom were women with children in their +arms, who, starved apparently in body and spirit as in raiment, had +met together to exchange miseries, and ask one another what was to +be done." Desperate speeches were made, the people "almost +threatening violence," but finally adopting a resolution now become +so hackneyed as to seem ridiculous after a description intended to +portray the misery and the revolutionary character of the +meeting:</p> +<blockquote>"That in consequence of the widespread distress that +now prevails in the cotton districts by the continuance of the war +in America, this meeting is desirous that Her Majesty's Government +should use their influence, together with France and other European +powers, to bring both belligerents together in order to put a stop +to the vast destruction of life and property that is now going on +in that unhappy country<a name="FNanchor1246"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1246">[1246]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>No doubt this spectacular meeting was organized for effect, but +in truth it must have overshot the mark, for by October, 1864, the +distress in Lancashire was largely alleviated and the public knew +it, while elsewhere in the cotton districts the mass of operative +feeling was with the North. Even in Ireland petitions were being +circulated for signature among the working men, appealing to +Irishmen in America to stand by the administration of Lincoln and +to enlist in the Northern armies on the ground of +emancipation<a name="FNanchor1247"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1247">[1247]</a>. Here, indeed, was the insuperable +barrier, in the fall of 1864, to public support of the South. Deny +as he might the presence of the "foul blot" in Southern society, +Hotze, of <i>The Index</i>, could not counteract that phrase. When +the Confederate Congress at Richmond began, in <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_241"></a>[V2:pg 241]</span> the autumn of +1864, seriously to discuss a plan of transforming slaves into +soldiers, putting guns in their hands, and thus replenishing the +waning man-power of Southern armies, Hotze was hard put to it to +explain to his English readers that this was in fact no evidence of +lowered strength, but rather a noble determination on the part of +the South to permit the negro to win his freedom by bearing arms in +defence of his country<a name="FNanchor1248"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1248">[1248]</a>.</p> +<p>This was far-fetched for a journal that had long insisted upon +the absolute incapacity of the black race. Proximity of dates, +however, permits another interpretation of Hotze's editorial of +November 10, and indeed of the project of arming the slaves, though +this, early in the spring of 1865, was actually provided for by +law. On November 11, Slidell, Mason and Mann addressed to the +Powers of Europe a communication accompanying a Confederate +"Manifesto," of which the blockade had long delayed transmissal. +This "Manifesto" set forth the objects of the Southern States and +flatly demanded recognition:</p> +<blockquote>"'All they ask is immunity from interference with their +internal peace and prosperity and to be left in the undisturbed +enjoyment of their inalienable rights of life, liberty and the +pursuit of happiness which their common ancestry declared to be the +equal heritage of all parties to the Social compact<a name= +"FNanchor1249"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1249">[1249]</a>.'"</blockquote> +<p>Russell replied, November 25:</p> +<blockquote>"Great Britain has since 1783, remained, with the +exception of a short period, connected by friendly relations with +both the Northern and the Southern States. Since the commencement +of the Civil War which broke out in 1861, Her Majesty's Government +have continued to entertain sentiments of friendship equally for +the North and for the <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_242"></a>[V2:pg 242]</span> South; of the causes of the +rupture Her Majesty's Government have never presumed to judge; they +deplored the commencement of this sanguinary struggle, and +anxiously look forward to the period of its termination. In the +meantime they are convinced that they best consult the interests of +peace, and respect the rights of all parties by observing a strict +and impartial Neutrality. Such a Neutrality Her Majesty has +faithfully maintained and will continue to maintain<a name= +"FNanchor1250"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1250">[1250]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>If <i>The Index</i> did indeed hope for results from the +"Manifesto," and had sought to bolster the appeal by dilating on a +Southern plan to "let the slaves win their freedom," the answer of +Russell was disappointing. Yet at the moment, in spite of the +effect of Lincoln's re-election, the current of alleged expert +military opinion was again swinging in favour of the South. The +<i>Times</i> scored Russell's answer, portraying him as attempting +to pose as "Our Mutual Friend":</p> +<blockquote>"The difficulty, of course, was to be polite to the +representatives of the Confederate States without appearing rude to +the United States; and, on the other hand, to acknowledge the +authority of the United States without affronting the dignity of +the Confederates. Between these two pitfalls Lord Russell +oscillates in his letter, and now puts his foot a little bit in the +hole on one side, and then, in recovering himself gets a little way +into the hole on the other side. In this way he sways to and fro +for a minute or two, but rights himself at last, and declares he +has hitherto stood upright between the two pitfalls, and he will +continue to do so.... Lord Russell seems to be in danger of +forgetting that <i>neuter</i> does not mean <i>both</i>, but +<i>neither</i>, and that if, therefore, he would maintain even in +words a strict neutrality it is necessary to avoid any +demonstrations of friendship to either belligerent<a name= +"FNanchor1251"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1251">[1251]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>This was harsh criticism, evincing a <i>Times</i> partisanship +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_243"></a>[V2:pg 243]</span> +justifying the allegations of the <i>Gazette</i>, but wholly in +line with the opinion to which the <i>Times</i> was now desperately +clinging that Grant had failed and that Sherman, adventuring on his +spectacular "march to the sea" from Atlanta, was courting +annihilation. Yet even Northern friends were appalled at Sherman's +boldness and discouraged by Grant's slowness. The son of the +American Minister could write, "Grant moves like the iron wall in +Poe's story. You expect something tremendous, and it's only a step +after all<a name="FNanchor1252"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1252">[1252]</a>."</p> +<p>The <i>Times</i> was at least consistent in prophecies until the +event falsified them; the <i>Gazette</i> less so. Some six weeks +after having acclaimed Sherman's generalship in the capture of +Atlanta<a name="FNanchor1253"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1253">[1253]</a>, the <i>Gazette's</i> summary of the +military situation was that:</p> +<blockquote>"... if the winter sees Grant still before Petersburg, +and Sherman unable to hold what he has gained in Georgia, the South +may be nearer its dawning day of independence than could have been +expected a few weeks ago, even though Wilmington be captured and +Charleston be ground away piecemeal under a distant cannonade. The +position of the Democrats would urge them to desperate measures, +and the wedge of discord will be driven into the ill-compacted body +which now represents the Federal States of North America<a name= +"FNanchor1254"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1254">[1254]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>But on December 17, W.H. Russell again changed his view and +foretold with accuracy Sherman's movements toward Savannah. Not so +the <i>Times</i>, privately very anxious as to what Sherman's +campaign portended, while publicly belittling it. December 2, it +was noted that Sherman had not been heard from for weeks, having +left Atlanta with 50,000 men. December 5, his objective was stated +to be Savannah, and while the difficulties to be encountered were +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_244"></a>[V2:pg 244]</span> +enumerated, no prophecy was indulged in. But on December 22, +Sherman's move was called a "desperate" one, forced by his +inability to retreat <i>northward</i> from Atlanta:</p> +<blockquote>"If we turn to military affairs, we are informed that +the great feature of the year is Sherman's expedition into Georgia. +We are not yet able to say whether Sherman will succeed in escaping +the fate of Burgoyne; but we know that his apparent rashness is +excused by the fact that Sherman was unable to return on the way by +which he came; so that the most remarkable feature of the war, +according to the President, is the wild and desperate effort of an +out-manoeuvred General to extricate himself from a position which, +whatever effect it may have had on the election, should never, on +mere military grounds, have been occupied at all<a name= +"FNanchor1255"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1255">[1255]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>This was followed up four days later by a long and careful +review of Sherman's whole western campaign, concluding with the +dictum that his sole object now was to escape to some undefended +point on the coast where he could be rescued by the Northern navy. +The war had taken a definite turn in favour of the South; it was +impossible to conceive that Sherman would venture to attack +Savannah:</p> +<blockquote>"For the escape or safety of Sherman and his army it is +essential he should reach Beaufort, or some neighbouring point on +the sea-coast as rapidly as possible. Delay would be equivalent to +ruin, and he will do nothing to create it<a name= +"FNanchor1256"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1256">[1256]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Rarely, if ever, did the <i>Times</i>, in its now eager and +avowed championship so definitely commit itself in an effort to +preserve British confidence in the Southern cause<a name= +"FNanchor1257"></a><a href="#Footnote_1257">[1257]</a>. Even +friends of the North were made doubtful <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_245"></a>[V2:pg 245]</span> by the +positiveness of prediction indulged in by that journal whose +opinions were supposed to be based on superior information. Their +recourse was to a renewal of "deputations" calling on the American +Minister to express steady allegiance to the Northern cause<a name= +"FNanchor1258"></a><a href="#Footnote_1258">[1258]</a>, and their +relief was great when the news was received that Savannah had +fallen, December 20, without a struggle. The <i>Times</i> recorded +the event, December 29, but with no comment save that Southern +prospects were less rosy than had been supposed. Then ensued a long +silence, for this time there was no possibility of that editorial +wiggling about the circle from excuses for misinterpretation to a +complacent resumption of authoritative utterance.</p> +<p>For the editor, Delane, and for wise Southern sympathizers the +fall of Savannah was a much harder blow than the mere loss of +prestige to the <i>Times</i><a name="FNanchor1259"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1259">[1259]</a>. Courage failed and confidence in the +South waned--momentarily almost vanished. Nearly two weeks passed +before the <i>Times</i> ventured to lift again the banner of hope, +and even then but half-heartedly.</p> +<blockquote>"The capture of the city completes the history of +Sherman's march, and stamps it as one of the ablest, certainly one +of the most singular military achievements of the war.<br> +<br> +"... The advantage gained for the Federal cause by the possession +of Savannah is yet to be shown. To Sherman and his army 'the change +of base' is indisputably a change for the better. Assuming that his +position at Atlanta was as <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_246"></a>[V2:pg 246]</span> desperate as shortness of +supplies and an interrupted line of retreat could make it, the +command of a point near the sea-coast and free communication with +the fleet is obviously an improvement. At the least the army +secures full means of subsistence, and a point from which further +operations may be commenced. On the other hand, the blow, as far as +the Confederate Government is concerned, is mitigated by the fact +that Savannah has been little used as a seaport since the capture +of Fort Pulaski by the Federals at an early stage of the war.<br> +<br> +"... But the fall of the city is a patent fact, and it would be +absurd to deny that it has produced an impression unfavourable to +the <i>prestige</i> of the Confederacy<a name= +"FNanchor1260"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1260">[1260]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Far more emphatic of ultimate Northern victory was the picture +presented, though in sarcasm, by the <i>Times</i> New York +correspondent, printed in this same issue:</p> +<blockquote>"No disappointments, however fast they may follow on +the heels of each other, can becloud the bright sunshine of conceit +and self-worship that glows in the heart of the Yankee. His country +is the first in the world, and he is the first man in it. Knock him +down, and he will get up again, and brush the dirt from his knees, +not a bit the worse for the fall. If he do not win this time, he is +bound to win the next. His motto is 'Never say die.' His manifest +destiny is to go on--prospering and to prosper--conquering and to +conquer."</blockquote> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1197"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1197">[1197]</a> Dodd, <i>Jefferson Davis</i>, p. +233.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1198"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1198">[1198]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 192.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1199"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1199">[1199]</a> Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 22, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1200"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1200">[1200]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Feb. 18, 1864, p. +105.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1201"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1201">[1201]</a> <i>The Index</i>, March 24, 1864, p. +189, quoting the <i>Reader</i> for March 19.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1202"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1202">[1202]</a> The first Southern meeting in England I +have found record of was one reported in the <i>Spectator</i>, Nov. +16, 1861, to honour Yancey on his arrival. It was held by the +<i>Fishmongers of London</i>. Yancey was warmly received and +appealed to his hosts on the ground that the South was the best +buyer of English goods.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1203"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1203">[1203]</a> The 134 meetings here listed represent +by no means all held, for Goldwin Smith estimated at least 500 +after the beginning of 1862. (<i>The Civil War in America</i>, +London, 1866.) The list may be regarded as an analysis of the more +important, attracting the attention of <i>The Liberator</i> and of +Adams.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1204"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1204">[1204]</a> At a banquet given to Thompson in 1863 +he was declared by Bright to have been the "real liberator of the +slaves in the English colonies," and by P.A. Taylor as, by his +courage "when social obloquy and personal danger had to be incurred +for the truth's sake," having rendered great services "to the cause +of Abolition in America."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1205"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1205">[1205]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, Jan. 15, 1864. +Letter to James Buffum, of Lynn, Dec. 10, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1206"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1206">[1206]</a> Goldwin Smith's pamphlet: "The Civil War +in America: An Address read at the last meeting of the Manchester +Union and Emancipation Society" (held on January 26, 1866), pays +especial tribute to Thomas Bayley Potter, M.P., stating "you boldly +allied yourself with the working-men in forming this association." +Smith gives a five-page list of other leading members, among whom, +in addition to some Northern friends already named, are to be noted +Thomas Hughes, Duncan McLaren, John Stuart Mill. There are eleven +noted "Professors," among them Cairnes, Thorold Rogers, and +Fawcett. The publicity committee of this society during three years +had issued and circulated "upwards of four hundred thousand books, +pamphlets, and tracts." Here, as previously, the activities of +Americans in England are not included. Thus George Francis Train, +correspondent of the <i>New York Herald</i>, made twenty-three +speeches between January, 1861, and March, 1862. ("Union Speeches +in England.")</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1207"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1207">[1207]</a> For text of Lincoln's pardon see +Trevelyan, <i>Bright</i>, p. 296. Lincoln gave the pardon +"especially as a public mark of the esteem held by the United +States of America for the high character and steady friendship of +the said John Bright...." The names of leading friends of the South +have been given in Chapter XV.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1208"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1208">[1208]</a> This was a commonplace of American +writing at the time and long after. A Rev. C.B. Boynton published a +book devoted to the thesis that England and France had united in a +"policy" of repressing the development of America and Russia +(<i>English and French Neutrality and the Anglo-French Alliance in +their relations to the United States and Russia</i>, Cincinnati, +C.F. Vest & Co., 1864). Boynton wrote: "You have not come to +the bottom of the conduct of Great Britain, until you have touched +that delicate and real foundation cause--we are too large and +strong a nation" (Preface, p. 3). The work has no historical +importance except that it was thought worth publication in +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1209"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1209">[1209]</a> Lyons Papers. July 16, 1864. +Copy.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1210"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1210">[1210]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Aug. +23, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1211"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1211">[1211]</a> June 3, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1212"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1212">[1212]</a> The <i>Times</i>, August 4, 1864. +Letters dated June 27 and July 5, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1213"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1213">[1213]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, II, p. +126. Henry Adams to his brother, May 13, 1864. "The current is dead +against us, and the atmosphere so uncongenial that the idea of the +possibility of our success is not admitted."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1214"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1214">[1214]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 136. Henry Adams to his +brother, June 3, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1215"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1215">[1215]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Feb. 19, 1863, p. +265.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1216"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1216">[1216]</a> This was written immediately after the +battles of Vicksburg and Gettysburg, but the tone complained of was +much more marked in 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1217"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1217">[1217]</a> The <i>Times</i> average of editorials +on the Civil War ran two in every three days until May, 1864, and +thereafter one in every three days.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1218"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1218">[1218]</a> Russell wrote to John Bigelow, March 8, +1865: "You know, perhaps, that, as I from the first maintained the +North must win, I was tabooed from dealing with American questions +in the <i>Times</i> even after my return to England, but <i>en +revanche</i> I have had my say in the <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i>, +which I have bought, every week, and if one could be weak and +wicked enough to seek for a morbid gratification amid such ruins +and blood, I might be proud of the persistence with which I +maintained my opinions against adverse and unanimous sentiment" +(Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, Vol. II, p. 361). Also on June 5, +1865, Russell wrote in his diary: "...had the <i>Times</i> followed +my advice, how different our position would be--not only that of +the leading journal, but of England. If ever I did State service, +it was in my letters from America." (Atkins, <i>Life of W.H. +Russell</i>, Vol. II, p. 115.) See also Bigelow, +<i>Retrospections</i>, I, pp. 344-45. Russell was editor of the +<i>Gazette</i> on its first appearance as a weekly, January 6, +1860, but left it to go to America. On his return he settled down +to his editorial task in November, 1862, and thereafter, throughout +the war, the <i>Gazette</i> may be regarded as reflecting his +views. His entire letters from America to the <i>Times</i> +constitute a most valuable picture of the months preceding the +outbreak of war, but the contempt poured on the Northern army for +its defeat at Bull Run made Russell much disliked in the North. +This dislike was bitterly displayed in a pamphlet by Andrew D. +White ("A Letter to William Howard Russell, LL.D., on passages in +his 'Diary North and South'"), published in London in +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1219"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1219">[1219]</a> June 25, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1220"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1220">[1220]</a> The <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i>, July +30, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1221"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1221">[1221]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, June 25, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1222"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1222">[1222]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, July 16, 1864. Similar +articles and editorials might be quoted from many of the more +important papers, but the <i>Times</i> and the <i>Gazette</i> will +suffice as furnishing the keynote. I have not examined in detail +the files of the metropolitan press beyond determining their +general attitude on the Civil War and for occasional special +references. Such examination has been sufficient, however, to +warrant the conclusion that the <i>weight</i> of the <i>Times</i> +in influencing opinion was very great. Collating statistics given +in:<br> +<br> +<blockquote> (1) Grant's <i>The +Newspaper Press</i>; (2) in a speech in<br> + Parliament by Edward Banes in 1864 +(Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXV,<br> + p. 295); and (3) in <i>Parliamentary +Papers</i>, 1861, <i>Commons</i>,<br> + Vol. XXXIV, "Return of the Registered +Newspapers in the<br> + United Kingdom ... from 30 June, +1860, to 30 June, 1861," the<br> + following facts of circulation are +derived:<br> +<br> +<br> +(A) <i>Daily Papers</i>:<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + (1) <i>The Telegraph</i> (evening), 150,000 +(neutral).<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + (2) <i>The Standard</i> (morning and evening), 130,000 +(Southern).<br> +Under the same management was also <i>The Herald</i> (morning), but +with<br> +small circulation (Southern).<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + (3) The <i>Times</i> (morning), 70,000 (Southern). +Grant says: "The<br> +prestige of the <i>Times</i> was remarkable. The same articles +appearing<br> +in other papers would not produce the same effect as in the +<i>Times</i>."<br> +Of Delane, the editor, Grant declared "His name is just as +well-known<br> +... throughout the civilized world as that of any of our<br> +European kings.... The <i>Times</i> may, indeed, be called the +Monarch<br> +of the Press." (Grant, II, p. 53.)<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + (4) <i>The Morning Advertiser</i> (circulation +uncertain, probably 50,000),<br> +but very largely taken in the trades, in public-houses, and in +the<br> +Clubs (neutral).<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + (5) <i>The Daily News</i> (morning), 6,000 +(Northern).<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + (6) <i>The Morning Star</i>, 5,500 (but with evening +edition 10,000)<br> +(Northern). Grant says that contrary to general belief, John +Bright<br> +was never a shareholder but at times raised money to meet +deficits.<br> +<i>The Star</i> was regarded as an <i>anti-British paper</i> and +was very unpopular.<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + (7) <i>The Morning Post</i>, 4,500 (Southern). It was +regarded as<br> +Palmerston's organ.<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + (8) <i>The Morning Chronicle</i>. Very small +circulation in the 'sixties<br> +(neutral).<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +(B) <i>Weekly Papers.</i>--No approximate circulation figures are +available,<br> +but these papers are placed by Grant in supposed order of +subscribers.<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + (1) <i>Reynolds' Weekly</i>. Circulation upwards of +350,000. A penny<br> +paper, extreme Liberal in politics, and very popular in the +manufacturing<br> +districts (Northern).<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + (2) <i>John Bull</i> (Southern). "The country squire's +paper."<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + (3) <i>The Spectator</i> (Northern).<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + (4) <i>The Saturday Review</i> (Southern).<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + (5) <i>The Economist</i> (Neutral).<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> + (6) <i>The Press and St. James' Chronicle</i>. Small +circulation (Southern).<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +In addition to British newspapers listed above as Northern in +sentiment<br> +<i>The Liberator</i> names for Great Britain as a whole +<i>Westminster<br> +Review, Nonconformist, British Standard, Birmingham Post, +Manchester<br> +Examiner, Newcastle Chronicle, Caledonian Mercury, Belfast +Whig</i>, and some<br> +few others of lesser importance. (<i>Liberator</i>, June 30, +1863.)<br> +The attitude of the <i>Manchester Guardian</i> seemed to <i>The +Liberator</i> to<br> +be like that of the <i>Times</i>.</blockquote> +</blockquote> +<br> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1223"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1223">[1223]</a> <i>The Index</i>, April 14, 1864, p. +231.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1224"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1224">[1224]</a> August 8, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1225"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1225">[1225]</a> Sept. 3, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1226"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1226">[1226]</a> Sept. 20 and 22, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1227"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1227">[1227]</a> Sept. 24, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1228"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1228">[1228]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Sept. +16, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1229"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1229">[1229]</a> General McClellan, the nominee of the +convention, modified this in his letter of acceptance.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1230"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1230">[1230]</a> Oct. 10, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1231"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1231">[1231]</a> Nov. 10, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1232"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1232">[1232]</a> Nov. 12, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1233"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1233">[1233]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1234"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1234">[1234]</a> According to <i>The Index</i>, the +French press was more divided than was the London press in +portrayal of military events in America. The <i>Siècle</i> +and the <i>Opinion Nationale</i> pictured Sherman as about to +capture Atlanta. Readers of the <i>Constitutionel, Patrie, +Moniteur</i>, and <i>La France</i> "know quite well that Sherman +has neither occupied the centre, the circumference, nor, indeed, +any part of the defences of Atlanta; and that he was completely +defeated by General Hood on July 22." (<i>Index</i>, Aug. 18, 1864, +p. 522.) The Paris correspondent wrote, October 19, after the news +was received of Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley:<br> +<br> +"The <i>Siècle</i> is triumphant. According to this +humanitarian journal, whose sole policy consists in the expression +of a double hatred, part of which it bestows on the priests, and +part on the slave-dealers, the American contest has assumed its +last phase, the Confederates are running in breathless haste to +demand pardon, and true patriotism is at last to meet with its +reward. This great and noble result will be due to the Northern +generals, <i>who have carried military glory to so high a pitch +without at the same time compromising American Democracy!</i><br> +<br> +"Your readers will doubtless consider that the writer of the above +lines undertakes to speak on a subject of which he knows nothing; +but what will they say of a writer who, in the same journal, thus +expresses himself relative to the issues of the coming +election?<br> +<br> +'Lincoln being elected, the following will be the results: The +South will lose courage and abandon the contest; the lands reduced +to barrenness by servile labour will be again rendered productive +by the labour of the freeman; the Confederates, <i>who know only +how to fight, and who are supported by the sweat of others</i>, +will purify and regenerate themselves by the exercise of their own +brains and of their own hands....'<br> +<br> +"These strange remarks conclude with words of encouragement to the +robust-shouldered, iron-fronted, firm-lipped Lincoln, and prayers +for the welfare of the American brethren.<br> +<br> +"You will not easily credit it, but this article--a very +masterpiece of delirium and absurdity--bears the signature of one +of the most eminent writers of the day, M. Henri Martin, the +celebrated historian of France. (<i>Index</i>, Oct. 20, 1864, p. +667.)<br> +<br> +A week later <i>The Index</i> was vicious in comment upon the "men +and money" pouring out of <i>Germany</i> in aid of the North. +German financiers, under the guise of aiding emigration, were +engaged in the prosperous business of "selling white-skinned +Germans to cut Southern throats for the benefit, as they say, of +the poor blacks." (Oct. 27, 1864, p. 685.) This bitter tone was +indulged in even by the Confederate Secretary of State. Benjamin +wrote to Slidell, September 20, 1864, that France was wilfully +deceiving the South by professions of friendship. The President, he +stated, "could not escape the painful conviction that the Emperor +of the French, knowing that the utmost efforts of this people are +engrossed in the defence of their homes against an atrocious +warfare waged by greatly superior numbers, has thought the occasion +opportune for promoting his own purposes, at no greater cost than a +violation of his faith and duty toward us." (Richardson, II, p. +577.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1235"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1235">[1235]</a> e.g., Meeting of Glasgow Union and +Emancipation Society, Oct. 11, 1864. (<i>The Liberator</i>, Nov. 4, +1864.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1236"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1236">[1236]</a> Russell Papers, Oct. 24, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1237"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1237">[1237]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1238"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1238">[1238]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 19, +1864. Lyons reached London December 27, and never returned to his +post in America. Lyons' services to the friendly relations of the +United States and Great Britain were of the greatest. He upheld +British dignity yet never gave offence to that of America; he +guarded British interests but with a wise and generous recognition +of the difficulties of the Northern Government. No doubt he was at +heart so unneutral as to hope for Northern success, even though at +first sharing in the view that there was small possibility of +reunion, but this very hope--unquestionably known to Seward and to +Lincoln--frequently eased dangerous moments in the relations with +Great Britain, and was in the end a decided asset to the Government +at home.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1239"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1239">[1239]</a> Nov. 26, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1240"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1240">[1240]</a> Nov. 22, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1241"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1241">[1241]</a> The gradual change in <i>Punch's</i> +representation of a silly-faced Lincoln to one which bore the stamp +of despotic ferocity is an interesting index of British opinion +during the war. By 1864 those who watched his career had come to +respect Lincoln's ability and power though as yet wholly +unappreciative of his still greater qualities.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1242"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1242">[1242]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, Sept. 23, 1864. +Letter from T.H. Barker to Garrison, August 27, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1243"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1243">[1243]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Nov. 4, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1244"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1244">[1244]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Sept. 29, 1864, p. +618, describing the meeting at Ashton.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1245"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1245">[1245]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, Nov. 4, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1246"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1246">[1246]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Nov. 3, 1864, p. +699.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1247"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1247">[1247]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, Nov. 4, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1248"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1248">[1248]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Nov. 10, 1864, p. +713.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1249"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1249">[1249]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 975. Slidell, Mason and +Mann to Russell, Nov. 11, 1864, Paris. Replies were received from +England, France, Sweden and the Papal States. (Mason Papers, Mason +to Slidell, Jan. 4, 1865).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1250"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1250">[1250]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 975. Draft. Russell to +the "Commissioners of the so-called Confederate States," Nov. 25, +1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1251"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1251">[1251]</a> Dec. 1, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1252"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1252">[1252]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, II, p. +207. Henry Adams to his brother, Oct. 21, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1253"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1253">[1253]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 233.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1254"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1254">[1254]</a> Nov. 12, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1255"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1255">[1255]</a> Dec. 22, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1256"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1256">[1256]</a> Dec. 26, 1864. But this was in reality a +mere "keeping up courage" editorial. See Ch. XVIII, p. +300.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1257"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1257">[1257]</a> That this was very effective +championship is shown by Henry Adams' letter to his brother, Dec. +16, 1864. (<i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, II, p. 232.) "Popular +opinion here declares louder than ever that Sherman is lost. People +are quite angry at his presumption in attempting such a wild +project. The interest felt in his march is enormous, however, and +if he arrives as successfully as I expect, at the sea, you may rely +upon it that the moral effect of his demonstration on Europe will +be greater than that of any other event of the war."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1258"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1258">[1258]</a> State Department, Eng, Adams to Seward, +Dec. 16, 1864. Adams expressed to Seward doubts as to the propriety +of his receiving such deputations and making replies to them. +<i>The Index</i> (Dec. 22, 1864, p. 808) was "indignant" that Adams +should presume to "hector and threaten" England through his +replies. But Adams continued to receive deputations.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1259"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1259">[1259]</a> Delane's position on the Civil War and +the reasons for the importance of Savannah to him, personally, are +described in Ch. XVIII.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1260"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1260">[1260]</a> Jan. 9, 1865.</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_247"></a>[V2:pg 247]</span> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XVII"></a>CHAPTER XVII</h2> +<h3>THE END OF THE WAR</h3> +<br> +<blockquote>"I think you need not trouble yourself about England. +At this moment opinion seems to have undergone a complete change, +and our people and indeed our Government is more moderately +disposed than I have ever before known it to be. I hear from a +member of the Government that it is believed that the feeling +between our Cabinet and the Washington Government has been steadily +improving<a name="FNanchor1261"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1261">[1261]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Thus wrote Bright to Sumner in the last week of January, 1865. +Three weeks later he again wrote in reassurance against American +rumours that Europe was still planning some form of intervention to +save the South: "<i>All parties and classes</i> here are resolved +on a strict neutrality<a name="FNanchor1262"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1262">[1262]</a>...." This was a correct estimate. In +spite of a temporary pause in the operations of Northern armies and +of renewed assertions from the South that she "would never submit," +British opinion was now very nearly unanimous that the end was +near. This verdict was soon justified by events. In January, 1865, +Wilmington, North Carolina, was at last captured by a combined sea +and land attack. Grant, though since midsummer, 1864, held in check +by Lee before Petersburg, was yet known to be constantly increasing +the strength of his army, while his ability to strike when the time +came was made evident by the freedom with which his cavalry scoured +the country about the Confederate <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_248"></a>[V2:pg 248]</span> capital, Richmond--in one raid +even completely encircling that city. Steadily Lee's army lost +strength by the attrition of the siege, by illness and, what was +worse, by desertion since no forces could be spared from the +fighting front to recover and punish the deserters. Grant waited +for the approach of spring, when, with the advance northwards of +the army at Savannah, the pincers could be applied to Lee, to end, +it was hoped, in writing <i>finis</i> to the war.</p> +<p>From December 20, 1864, to February 1, 1865, Sherman remained in +Savannah, renewing by sea the strength of his army. On the latter +date he moved north along the coast, meeting at first no resistance +and easily overrunning the country. Columbia, capital of South +Carolina, was burned. Charleston was evacuated, and it was not +until March, in North Carolina, that any real opposition to the +northward progress was encountered. Here on the sixteenth and the +nineteenth, Johnston, in command of the weak Southern forces in +North Carolina, made a desperate effort to stop Sherman, but +without avail, and on March 23, Sherman was at Goldsboro, one +hundred and sixty miles south of Richmond, prepared to cut off the +retreat of Lee when Grant should at last take up an energetic +offensive.</p> +<p>In the last week of March, Grant began cutting off supplies to +Richmond, thus forcing Lee, if he wished still to protect the +Southern capital, to come out of his lines at Petersburg and +present an unfortified front. The result was the evacuation of +Petersburg and the abandonment of Richmond, Jefferson Davis and his +Government fleeing from the city on the night of April 2. +Attempting to retreat southwards with the plan of joining +Johnston's army, Lee, on April 9, found his forces surrounded at +Appomattox and surrendered. Nine days later, on April 18, Johnston +surrendered to Sherman at Durham, North Carolina. It was the end of +the war and of the Confederacy.</p> +<br> +<a name="image12.jpg"></a> +<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image12.jpg"><img src= +"images/image12.jpg" width="100%" alt=""></a><br> +<b>THE AMERICAN GLADIATORS-HABET!</b><br> +<i>Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"</i></p> +<br> +<p>The rapidity with which Southern resistance in arms <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_249"></a>[V2:pg 249]</span> crumbled in +1865 when once Sherman and Grant were under way no doubt startled +foreign observers, but in British opinion, at least, the end had +been foreseen from the moment Sherman reached the sea at Savannah. +The desperate courage of the South was admired, but regarded as +futile. Equally desperate and futile was the last diplomatic effort +of the Confederate agents in Europe, taking the form of an offer to +abolish slavery in return for recognition. The plan originated with +Benjamin, Southern Secretary of State, was hesitatingly approved by +Davis<a name="FNanchor1263"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1263">[1263]</a>, and was committed to Mason for +negotiation with Great Britain. Mason, after his withdrawal from +London, had been given duplicate powers in blank for any point to +which emergencies might send him, thus becoming a sort of +Confederate Commissioner at Large to Europe. Less than any other +representative abroad inclined to admit that slavery was other than +a beneficent and humane institution, it was felt advisable at +Richmond not only to instruct Mason by written despatch, but by +personal messenger also of the urgency of presenting the offer of +abolition promptly and with full assurance of carrying it into +effect. The instruction was therefore entrusted to Duncan F. +Kenner, of Louisiana, and he arrived in Paris early in March, 1865, +overcame Mason's unwillingness to carry such an offer to England, +and accompanied the latter to London.</p> +<p>The time was certainly not propitious, for on the day Mason +reached London there came the news of the burning of Columbia and +the evacuation of Charleston. Mason hesitated to approach +Palmerston, but was pressed by Kenner who urged action on the +theory that Great Britain did not wish to see a reconstruction of +the Union<a name="FNanchor1264"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1264">[1264]</a>. Slidell, in Paris, on receiving +Mason's doubts, advised waiting until the Emperor had been +consulted, was granted an interview <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_250"></a>[V2:pg 250]</span> and reported Napoleon III as +ready as ever to act if England would act also, but as advising +delay until more favourable news was received from America<a name= +"FNanchor1265"></a><a href="#Footnote_1265">[1265]</a>. But Mason's +instructions did not permit delay; he must either carry them out or +resign--and Kenner was at his elbow pressing for action. On March +13, therefore, Mason wrote to Palmerston asking for a private +interview and was promptly granted one for the day following.</p> +<p>Both personal disinclination to the proposal of abolition and +judgment that nothing would come of it made Mason cautious in +expressing himself to Palmerston. Mason felt that he was +stultifying his country in condemning slavery. Hence in roundabout +language, "with such form of allusion to the <i>concession</i> we +held in reserve, as would make him necessarily comprehend +it<a name="FNanchor1266"></a><a href="#Footnote_1266">[1266]</a>," +and turning again and again to a supposed "latent, undisclosed +obstacle<a name="FNanchor1267"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1267">[1267]</a>" to British recognition, Mason yet made +clear the object of his visit. The word slavery was not mentioned +by him, but Palmerston promptly denied that slavery in the South +had ever been, or was now, a barrier to recognition; British +objections to recognition were those which had long since been +stated, and there was nothing "underlying" them. On March 26, Mason +called on the Earl of Donoughmore, a Tory friend of the South with +whom he had long been in close touch, and asked whether he thought +Palmerston's Government could be induced by a Southern abolition of +slavery to recognize the Confederacy. The reply was "that the time +had gone by now...." This time the words "slavery" and "abolition" +were spoken boldly<a name="FNanchor1268"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1268">[1268]</a>, and Donoughmore was positive that if, +in the midsummer of 1863, when Lee was invading Pennsylvania, the +South had made its present overture, nothing could have prevented +British recognition. <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_251"></a>[V2:pg 251]</span> The opinion clashed with Mason's +own conviction, but in any case no more was to be hoped, now, from +his overture. Only a favourable turn in the war could help the +South.</p> +<p>There was no public knowledge in London of this "last card" +Southern effort in diplomacy, though there were newspaper rumours +that some such move was on foot, but with a primary motive of +restoring Southern fighting power by putting the negroes in arms. +British public attention was fixed rather upon a possible +last-moment reconciliation of North and South and a restored Union +which should forget its domestic troubles in a foreign war. +Momentarily somewhat of a panic overcame London society and gloomy +were the forebodings that Great Britain would be the chosen enemy +of America. Like rumours were afloat at Washington also. The +Russian Minister, Stoeckl, reported to his Government that he had +learned from "a sure source" of representations made to Jefferson +Davis by Blair, a prominent Unionist and politician of the border +state of Maryland, looking to reconstruction and to the sending by +Lincoln of armies into Canada and Mexico. Stoeckl believed such a +war would be popular, but commented that "Lincoln might change his +mind<a name="FNanchor1269"></a><a href="#Footnote_1269">[1269]</a> +to-morrow." In London the <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i> declared +that Davis could not consent to reunion and that Lincoln could not +offer any other terms of peace, but that a truce might be patched +up on the basis of a common aggression against supposed foreign +enemies<a name="FNanchor1270"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1270">[1270]</a>. Adams pictured all British society as +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_252"></a>[V2:pg 252]</span> +now convinced that the end of the war was near, and bitter against +the previous tone and policy of such leaders of public opinion as +the <i>Times</i>, adding that it was being "whispered about that if +the feud is reconciled and the Union restored, and a great army +left on our hands, the next manifestation will be one of hostility +to this country<a name="FNanchor1271"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1271">[1271]</a>."</p> +<p>The basis of all this rumour was Blair's attempt to play the +mediator. He so far succeeded that on January 31, 1865, Lincoln +instructed Seward to go to Fortress Monroe to meet "commissioners" +appointed by Davis. But Lincoln made positive in his instructions +three points:</p> +<blockquote>(1) Complete restoration of the Union.<br> +<br> +(2) No receding on emancipation.<br> +<br> +(3) No cessation of hostilities "short of an end of the war, and +the disbanding of all forces hostile to the +Government."</blockquote> +<p>A few days later the President decided that his own presence was +desirable and joined his Secretary of State in the "Hampton Roads +Conference" of February 3. It quickly appeared that the +Confederates did indeed hope to draw the North into a foreign war +for a "traditional American object," using the argument that +<i>after</i> such a war restoration of the Union would be easily +accomplished. The enemy proposed was not Great Britain but France, +and the place of operations Mexico. There was much discussion of +this plan between Seward and Stephens, the leading Southern +Commissioner, but Lincoln merely listened, and when pressed for +comment stuck fast to his decision that no agreement whatever would +be entered into until the South had laid down its arms. The +Southerners urged that there was precedent for an agreement in +advance of cessation of hostilities in the negotiations between +Charles I and the Roundheads. Lincoln's reply was pithy: "I do not +profess to be posted in history. On all such matters I turn +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_253"></a>[V2:pg 253]</span> +you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollect about the case of +Charles I is that he lost his head in the end<a name= +"FNanchor1272"></a><a href="#Footnote_1272">[1272]</a>."</p> +<p>When news of the holding of this conference reached England +there occurred a panic on the Stock Exchange due to the uncertainty +created by the prospect of an immediate end of the American War. +"The consternation," wrote Adams, "was extraordinary<a name= +"FNanchor1273"></a><a href="#Footnote_1273">[1273]</a>." What did +the United States intend to do? "The impression is now very general +that peace and restoration at home are synonymous with war with +this country." There existed an "extraordinary uneasiness and +indefinite apprehension as to the future." So reported Adams to +Seward; and he advised that it might be well for the United States +"to consider the question how far its policy may be adapted to +quiet this disturbance"; due allowance should be made for the +mortification of those leaders who had been so confident of +Southern victory and for expressions that might now fall from their +lips; it was possible that reassurances given by the United States +might aid in the coming elections in retaining the Government in +power--evidently, in Adams' opinion, a result to be desired<a name= +"FNanchor1274"></a><a href="#Footnote_1274">[1274]</a>.</p> +<p>Adams' advice as to the forthcoming elections was but repetition +of that given earlier and with more emphasis<a name= +"FNanchor1275"></a><a href="#Footnote_1275">[1275]</a>. Apparently +Seward was then in no mood to act on it, for his reply was +distinctly belligerent in tone, recapitulating British and Canadian +offences in permitting the enemy to use their shores, and asserting +that the measures now proposed of abrogating the reciprocity treaty +of 1854 with Canada and the agreement of 1817 prohibiting armaments +on the Great Lakes, were but defensive measures required to protect +American soil<a name="FNanchor1276"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1276">[1276]</a>. These matters Adams had been +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_254"></a>[V2:pg 254]</span> +instructed to take up with Russell, but with discretion as to time +and he had ventured to postpone them as inopportune. Professing +entire agreement with the justice of Seward's complaints he +nevertheless wrote that to press them "at this moment would be only +playing into the hands of the mischief-makers, and disarming our +own friends<a name="FNanchor1277"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1277">[1277]</a>." The day before this was written home +Seward, at Washington, on March 8, recalled his instruction as to +the agreement of 1817, stating that Russell might be informed the +United States had no intention of increasing its armaments on the +Great Lakes<a name="FNanchor1278"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1278">[1278]</a>.</p> +<p>Thus there were incidents offering ground for a British +excitement over a prospective war with America, even though no such +intention was seriously entertained by the North. The British +Government did not share this fear, but Delane, of the +<i>Times</i>, kept it alive in the public mind, and indeed was +sincere in efforts to arouse his readers to the danger. "I do not +know what grounds Delane has for it," wrote W.H. Russell to his +American friend Bigelow, "but he is quite sure Uncle Samuel is +about to finish off the dreadful Civil War with another war with us +scarcely less horrible<a name="FNanchor1279"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1279">[1279]</a>." Governmental circles, however, +belittled the agitation. Burnley, temporarily representing England +at Washington, was assured by Seward, and so reported, that all +these rumours of a foreign war were of Southern origin, had in fact +been actually elaborated at the Hampton Roads Conference, but were +perfectly understood by the North as but part of the Southern game, +and that the Southern offer had been flatly refused<a name= +"FNanchor1280"></a><a href="#Footnote_1280">[1280]</a>. In a +parliamentary debate in the Commons on March 13, arising out of +governmental estimates for military expenditures in Canada, +opportunity was given for a discussion of relations with +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_255"></a>[V2:pg 255]</span> +America. A few Members gave voice to the fear of war, but the +general tone of the debate was one of confidence in the continuance +of peaceful relations. Bright, in a vigorous and witty speech, +threw right and left criticisms of Parliament, the Press, and +individuals, not sparing members of the Government, but expressed +the utmost confidence in the pacific policy of Lincoln. As one +known to be in close touch with America his words carried +weight<a name="FNanchor1281"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1281">[1281]</a>. Palmerston gave assurances that the +present relations between the two Governments were perfectly +friendly and satisfactory. The effect of the debate, reported +Adams, was to quiet the panic<a name="FNanchor1282"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1282">[1282]</a>, yet at the same time England was now +awake to and somewhat alarmed by, America's "prodigious development +of physical power during the war." To quiet this, Adams recommended +"prudence and moderation in tone<a name="FNanchor1283"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1283">[1283]</a>."</p> +<p>Thus the actual cessation of hostilities in America and the +possible effect of this event on foreign relations had been for +some time anticipated and estimated in Great Britain<a name= +"FNanchor1284"></a><a href="#Footnote_1284">[1284]</a>. The news of +Lee's surrender, therefore, caused no great surprise since the +<i>Times</i> and other papers had been preparing the public for +it<a name="FNanchor1285"></a><a href="#Footnote_1285">[1285]</a>. +Newspaper comment on the event followed closely that of the +<i>Times</i>, rendering honour to <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_256"></a>[V2:pg 256]</span> the militant qualities of the +South and to Lee, but writing <i>finis</i> to the war:</p> +<blockquote>"Such is the end of the great army which, organized by +the extraordinary genius of one man, aided by several other +commanders of eminent ability, has done such wonders in this war. +Not even the Grand Army of Napoleon himself could count a series of +more brilliant victories than the force which, raised chiefly from +the high-spirited population of Virginia, has defeated so many +invasions of the State, and crushed the hopes of so many Northern +generals. Chief and soldiers have now failed for the first and last +time. They were victorious until victory was no longer to be +achieved by human valour, and then they fell with honour<a name= +"FNanchor1286"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1286">[1286]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The people of the North, also, were complimented for their +slowly developed but ultimate ability in war, and especially for "a +patience, a fortitude, and an energy which entitle them to rank +among the very first of military nations<a name= +"FNanchor1287"></a><a href="#Footnote_1287">[1287]</a>." No one +remained to uphold the Southern banner in Europe save the +Confederate agents, and, privately, even they were hopeless. Mason, +it is true, asserted, as if bolstering his own courage, that "this +morning's" news did not mean an overwhelming disaster; it could not +be wholly true; even if true it must mean peace on the basis of +separation; finally, "5th. <i>I know</i> that no terms of peace +would be accepted that did not embrace independence." But at the +conclusion of this letter he acknowledged:</p> +<blockquote>"I confess that all this speculation rests on, what I +assume, that Lee surrendered only in expectation of a peace derived +from his interview with Grant--and that no terms of peace would be +entertained that did not rest on <i>independence</i><a name= +"FNanchor1288"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1288">[1288]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>But Slidell saw more clearly. He replied:</p> +<blockquote>"I cannot share your hopefulness. We have seen the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_257"></a>[V2:pg 257]</span> +beginning of the end. I, for my part, am prepared for the worst. +With Lee's surrender there will soon be an end to our regular +organized armies and I can see no possible good to result from a +protracted guerilla warfare. We are crushed and must submit to the +yoke. Our children must bide their time for vengeance, but you and +I will never revisit our homes under our glorious flag. For myself +I shall never put my foot on a soil from which flaunts the hated +Stars and Stripes.... I am sick, sick at heart<a name= +"FNanchor1289"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1289">[1289]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The news of Lee's surrender arrived at the same moment with that +of a serious injury to Seward in a runaway accident, and in its +editorial on the end of the war the <i>Times</i> took occasion to +pay a tribute to the statesman whom it had been accustomed to +berate.</p> +<blockquote>"There seems to be on the part of President Lincoln a +desire to conciliate vanquished fellow-citizens. Under the guidance +of Mr. Seward, who has creditably distinguished himself in the +Cabinet by his moderate counsels, and whose life will, we trust, be +spared at this crisis to the Union, he may by gentle measures +restore tranquillity, and perhaps, before his term of office +expires, calm in some degree the animosities which have been raised +by these years of war<a name="FNanchor1290"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1290">[1290]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Nor was this insincere, for Seward had, first in the estimate of +British statesmen, more slowly in the press and with the public, +come to be regarded in an aspect far different from that with which +he was generally viewed in 1861. There was real anxiety at the +reports of Seward's accident, but when, in less than a week, there +was received also the news of the assassination of Lincoln and of +the brutal attack on Seward, all England united in expressions of +sympathy and horror. "Few events of the present century," wrote +Adams, "have created such general consternation and +indignation<a name="FNanchor1291"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1291">[1291]</a>."</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_258"></a>[V2:pg 258]</span> +<p>In Ford's Theatre on the evening of April 14, Lincoln was shot +by Booth, a fanatical Southerner, who had gained entrance to the +box where the President was sitting. Lincoln died early the next +morning. On the same evening, at about ten o'clock, an unknown man +was admitted to Seward's house on the plea that he had a message +from the physician, passed upstairs, but was stopped by Seward's +son at the door of the sick room. Beating the son into +semi-unconsciousness with a revolver which had missed fire, the +stranger burst open the door, attacked the Secretary as he lay in +bed with a bowie-knife, slashing at his throat, until Seward rolled +off the bed to the floor. Seward's throat was "cut on both sides, +his right cheek nearly severed from his face"; his life was saved, +probably, because of an iron frame worn to support the jaw +fractured in the runaway accident nine days before<a name= +"FNanchor1292"></a><a href="#Footnote_1292">[1292]</a>. The +assailant fought his way out of the house and escaped. For some +days Seward's life was despaired of, whether from his injuries or +from shock.</p> +<p>These tragic occurrences were the outcome of a revengeful spirit +in the hearts of a few extreme Southerners, and in no sense +represented the feeling of the South. It was inevitable, however, +that abroad so horrible a crime should react both to the detriment +of the Confederacy and to the advantage of the North. Sympathy with +the North took the form of a sudden exaltation of the personality +of Lincoln, bringing out characterizations of the man far different +from those which had been his earlier in the war. The presence of a +"rural attorney" in the Presidential office had seemed like the +irony of fate in the great crisis of 1861. Even so acute an +observer as Lyons could then write, "Mr. Lincoln has not hitherto +given proof of his possessing any natural talents to compensate for +his ignorance of everything but Illinois village politics. He seems +to be well meaning <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_259"></a>[V2:pg 259]</span> and conscientious, in the +measure of his understanding, but not much more<a name= +"FNanchor1293"></a><a href="#Footnote_1293">[1293]</a>." But Lyons +was no more blind than his contemporaries, for nearly all +characterizations, whether American or foreign, were of like +nature.</p> +<p>But the slow progress of the years of war had brought a +different estimate of Lincoln--a curious blending of admiration for +the growth of his personal authority and for his steadiness of +purpose, with criticism of his alleged despotism. Now, with his +death, following so closely the collapse of the Confederacy, there +poured out from British press and public a great stream of +laudation for Lincoln almost amounting to a national recantation. +In this process of "whitening Abraham's tomb," as a few +dyed-in-the-wool Southern sympathizers called it, <i>Punch</i> led +the way in a poem by Tom Taylor:</p> +<blockquote>"<i>You</i> lay a wreath on murdered Lincoln's +bier,<br> +<i>You</i>, who with mocking pencil wont to trace,<br> +Broad for the self-complacent British sneer,<br> +His length of shambling limb, his furrowed face."<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 25%;"> +<br> +<br> +"Yes, he had lived to shame me from my sneer,<br> +To lame my pencil and confute my pen--<br> +To make me own this hind of princes peer,<br> +This rail-splitter a true-born king of men<a name= +"FNanchor1294"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1294">[1294]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Less emotional than most papers, but with a truer estimate of +Lincoln, stood the <i>Times</i>. Severely reprobating the act of +Booth and prophesying a disastrous effect in the treatment of the +conquered South, it proceeded:</p> +<blockquote>"Starting from a humble position to one of the greatest +eminence, and adopted by the Republican party as a make-shift, +simply because Mr. Seward and their other prominent <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_260"></a>[V2:pg 260]</span> leaders were +obnoxious to different sections of the party, it was natural that +his career should be watched with jealous suspicion. The office +cast upon him was great, its duties most onerous, and the obscurity +of his past career afforded no guarantee of his ability to +discharge them. His shortcomings moreover were on the surface. The +education of a man whose early years had been spent in earning +bread by manual labour had necessarily been defective, and faults +of manner and errors of taste repelled the observer at the outset. +In spite of these drawbacks, Mr. Lincoln slowly won for himself the +respect and confidence of all. His perfect honesty speedily became +apparent, and, what is, perhaps, more to his credit, amid the many +unstudied speeches which he was called upon from time to time to +deliver, imbued though they were with the rough humour of his early +associates, he was in none of them betrayed into any intemperance +of language towards his opponents or towards neutrals. His +utterances were apparently careless, but his tongue was always +under command. The quality of Mr. Lincoln's administration which +served, however, more than any other to enlist the sympathy of +bystanders was its conservative progress. He felt his way gradually +to his conclusions, and those who will compare the different stages +of his career one with another will find that his mind was growing +throughout the course of it."<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 25%;"> +<br> +"The gradual change of his language and of his policy was most +remarkable. Englishmen learnt to respect a man who showed the best +characteristics of their race in his respect for what is good in +the past, acting in unison with a recognition of what was made +necessary by the events of passing history<a name= +"FNanchor1295"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1295">[1295]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>This was first reaction. Two days later, commenting on the far +warmer expressions of horror and sympathy emanating from all +England, there appeared another and longer editorial:</p> +<blockquote>"If anything could mitigate the distress of the +American people in their present affliction, it might surely be the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_261"></a>[V2:pg 261]</span> +sympathy which is expressed by the people of this country. We are +not using the language of hyperbole in describing the manifestation +of feeling as unexampled. Nothing like it has been witnessed in our +generation.... But President Lincoln was only the chief of a +foreign State, and of a State with which we were not infrequently +in diplomatic or political collision. He might have been regarded +as not much more to us than the head of any friendly Government, +and yet his end has already stirred the feelings of the public to +their uttermost depths."<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 25%;"> +<br> +"... a space of twenty-four hours has sufficed not only to fill the +country with grief and indignation, but to evoke almost +unprecedented expressions of feeling from constituted bodies. It +was but on Wednesday that the intelligence of the murder reached +us, and on Thursday the Houses of Lords and Commons, the +Corporation of the City of London, and the people of our chief +manufacturing towns in public meeting assembled had recorded their +sentiments or expressed their views. In the House of Lords the +absence of precedent for such a manifestation was actually made the +subject of remark.<br> +<br> +"That much of this extraordinary feeling is due to the tragical +character of the event and the horror with which the crime is +regarded is doubtless true, nor need we dissemble the the fact that +the loss which the Americans have sustained is also thought our own +loss in so far as one valuable guarantee for the amity of the two +nations may have been thus removed. But, upon the whole, it is +neither the possible embarrassment of international relations nor +the infamous wickedness of the act itself which has determined +public feeling. The preponderating sentiment is sincere and genuine +sympathy--- sorrow for the chief of a great people struck down by +an assassin, and sympathy for that people in the trouble which at a +crisis of their destinies such a catastrophe must bring. Abraham +Lincoln was as little of a tyrant as any man who ever lived. He +could have been a tyrant had he pleased, but he never uttered so +much as an ill-natured speech.... In all America there was, +perhaps, not one man who less deserved to be the victim of this +revolution than he who has just fallen<a name= +"FNanchor1296"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1296">[1296]</a>."</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_262"></a>[V2:pg 262]</span> +<p>The Ministry did not wait for public pressure. Immediately on +receipt of the news, motions were made, April 27, in both Lords and +Commons for an address to the Queen, to be debated "Monday next," +expressing "sorrow and indignation" at the assassination of +Lincoln<a name="FNanchor1297"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1297">[1297]</a>. April 28, Russell instructed Bruce to +express at Washington that "the Government, the Parliament, and the +Nation are affected by a unanimous feeling of abhorrence of the +criminals guilty of these cowardly and atrocious crimes, and +sympathy for the Government and People of the United States<a name= +"FNanchor1298"></a><a href="#Footnote_1298">[1298]</a>...." Russell +wrote here of both Lincoln and Seward. The Queen wrote a personal +letter of sympathy to Mrs. Lincoln. Already Bruce had written from +Washington that Lincoln "was the only friend of the South in his +party<a name="FNanchor1299"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1299">[1299]</a>," and he was extremely anxious that +Seward's recovery might be hastened, fearing the possibility of +Sumner's assumption of the Secretaryship of State. "We miss +terribly the comparative moderation of Lincoln and Seward<a name= +"FNanchor1300"></a><a href="#Footnote_1300">[1300]</a>."</p> +<br> +<a name="image13.jpg"></a> +<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image13.jpg"><img src= +"images/image13.jpg" width="100%" alt=""></a><br> +<b>BRITANNIA SYMPATHISES WITH COLUMBIA.</b><br> +<i>Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"</i></p> +<br> +<p>The American Minister naturally became the centre toward which +the public outpouring of sympathy was directed. "The excitement in +this country has been deep and wide, spreading through all classes +of society. My table is piled high with cards, letters and +resolutions<a name="FNanchor1301"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1301">[1301]</a>...." Indeed all the old sources of +"addresses" to Adams on emancipation and many organizations having +no professed interest in that subject now sent to him +resolutions--the emancipation societies, of horror, indignation, +and even accusation against the South; the others of sympathy, +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_263"></a>[V2:pg 263]</span> +more moderate in tone, yet all evincing an appreciation of the +great qualities of Lincoln and of the justice of the cause of the +North, now victorious. Within two weeks Adams reported over four +hundred such addresses from Emancipation Societies, Chambers of +Commerce, Trades Unions, municipalities, boroughs, churches, indeed +from every known type of British organizations<a name= +"FNanchor1302"></a><a href="#Footnote_1302">[1302]</a>.</p> +<p>On May 1 the motion for the address to the Crown came up for +debate. In the Lords, Russell emphasized the kindly and forgiving +qualities of Lincoln as just those needed in America, and now lost +by his death. Derby, for the Opposition, expressed the horror of +the world at Booth's act, joined in expressions of sympathy to the +United States, but repeated the old phrase about the "North +fighting for empire, the South for independence," and hinted that +the unusual step now being taken by Parliament had in it a +"political object," meaning that the motion had been introduced in +the hope of easing American irritation with Great Britain<a name= +"FNanchor1303"></a><a href="#Footnote_1303">[1303]</a>. It was not +a tactful speech, but Derby's lieutenant in the Commons, Disraeli, +saved his party from criticism by what was distinctly the most +thoughtful and best-prepared utterance of the day. Palmerston was +ill. The Government speech was made by Grey, who incautiously began +by asserting that the majority of the people of Great Britain had +always been on the side of the North and was met by cries of "No, +no" and "Hear, hear." Disraeli concluded the debate. He said:</p> +<blockquote>"There are rare instances when the sympathy of a nation +approaches those tenderer feelings that generally speaking, are +supposed to be peculiar to the individual, and to form the happy +privilege of private life; and this is one. Under all circumstances +we should have bewailed the catastrophe at Washington; under all +circumstances we should have <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_264"></a>[V2:pg 264]</span> shuddered at the means by which +it was accomplished. But in the character of the victim, and even +in the accessories of his last moments there is something so homely +and so innocent that it takes as it were the subject out of all the +pomp of history and the ceremonial of diplomacy; it touches the +heart of nations, and appeals to the domestic sentiment of +mankind.<br> +<br> +"Sir, whatever the various and varying opinions in this House, and +in the country generally on the policy of the late President of the +United States, on this, I think, all must agree, that in one of the +severest trials which ever tested the moral qualities of man, he +fulfilled his duty with simplicity and strength. Nor is it possible +for the people of England, at such a moment, to forget that he +sprang from the same fatherland, and spoke the same mother +tongue.<br> +<br> +"When such crimes are perpetrated the public mind is apt to fall +into gloom and perplexity; for it is ignorant alike of the causes +and the consequences of such deeds. But it is one of our duties to +reassure the country under unreasoning panic or despondency. +Assassination has never changed the history of the world....<br> +<br> +"In expressing our unaffected and profound sympathy with the +citizens of the United States at the untimely end of their elected +Chief, let us not, therefore, sanction any feeling of depression, +but rather let us express a fervent hope that from out the awful +trials of the last four years, of which not the least is this +violent demise, the various populations of North America may issue +elevated and chastened; rich in that accumulated wisdom, and strong +in that disciplined energy which a young nation can only acquire in +a protracted and perilous struggle. Then they will be enabled not +merely to renew their career of power and prosperity, but they will +renew it to contribute to the general happiness of mankind. It is +with these feelings, Sir, that I second the Address to the +Crown<a name="FNanchor1304"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1304">[1304]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Lincoln's assassination served to bring out not only British +popular sympathy, but also the certitude that the war was over and +the North victorious. But officially the Government had not yet +recognized this. Even as early as January, 1865, Seward had +returned to the old proposal <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_265"></a>[V2:pg 265]</span> that the nations of Europe +should withdraw their recognition of Southern belligerent +rights<a name="FNanchor1305"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1305">[1305]</a>, and in March he had asked Stoeckl, the +Russian Minister, whether Russia would not lead in the suggestion +of this measure to England and France<a name= +"FNanchor1306"></a><a href="#Footnote_1306">[1306]</a>. Meanwhile +Sherman's army was rapidly advancing northward and reports were +arriving of its pillagings and burnings. March 20, Gregory asked in +the Commons whether the Government was taking any steps to prevent +the destruction of British property and received from Layard an +evasive reply. Merely a "confident hope" had been expressed to the +United States that "every facility will be given" to British +subjects to prove ownership of property<a name= +"FNanchor1307"></a><a href="#Footnote_1307">[1307]</a>. Evidently +the Government was not eager to raise irritating questions at a +moment when all eyes were strained to observe the concluding events +of the war.</p> +<p>Then came the news of Lee's surrender and of the assassination +of Lincoln, with the attack on Seward, already incapacitated from +active duties. Seward's illness delayed American pressure on +England--a fortunate circumstance in the relations with Great +Britain in that it gave time for a clearer appreciation of the +rapidity and completeness of the collapse of the South. May 15, +Lord Houghton asked whether the Government did not intend, in view +of recent events in America, "to withdraw the admission of +belligerent rights conceded to the so-called Confederate States." +Russell promptly objected to the form of the question: England had +not "conceded" any rights to the South--she had merely issued a +proclamation of neutrality after Lincoln had declared the existence +of a war by proclaiming a blockade. England had had no other +recourse, unless she chose to refuse recognition of the blockade, +and this would have drawn her into the war. As to a withdrawal +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_266"></a>[V2:pg 266]</span> of +the neutrality proclamation this must wait upon official +announcement from the United States that the war was at an end. +Texas was still in arms and Galveston still blockaded, and for this +section the United States would no doubt continue to exercise on +neutral vessels a belligerent right of search. It followed that if +Great Britain did prematurely withdraw her proclamation of +neutrality and the United States searched a British vessel, it +would be the exercise of a right of search in time of peace--an act +against which Great Britain would be bound to make vigorous +protest. Hence England must wait on American action proclaiming the +end of the war. Russell concluded by expressing gratification at +the prospect of peace<a name="FNanchor1308"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1308">[1308]</a>.</p> +<p>But matters were not to take this orderly and logical course. +Seward, though still extremely weak and confined to his home, was +eager to resume the duties of office, and on May 9 a Cabinet was +held at his house. A week later Bruce wrote to Russell in some +anxiety that America was about to <i>demand</i> the withdrawal by +Great Britain of belligerent rights to the South, that if Great +Britain would but act before such a demand was made it would serve +to continue the existing good feeling in America created by the +sympathy over Lincoln's death, and especially, that there was a +decided danger to good relations in the fact that Confederate +cruisers were still at large. He urged that orders should be sent +to stop their presence in British colonial ports securing coal and +supplies<a name="FNanchor1309"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1309">[1309]</a>. Three days later Bruce repeated his +warning<a name="FNanchor1310"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1310">[1310]</a>. This was, apparently, a complication +unforeseen at the Foreign Office. In any case Russell at once made +a complete face-about from the policy he had outlined in reply to +Lord Houghton. On May 30 he instructed Cowley in Paris to notify +France <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_267"></a>[V2:pg +267]</span> that England thought the time had arrived for +recognition that the war was ended and laid special stress upon the +question of Confederate cruisers still at sea and their proper +treatment in British ports<a name="FNanchor1311"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1311">[1311]</a>. Thus having given to France notice of +his intention, but without waiting for concurrent action, Russell, +on June 2, issued instructions to the Admiralty that the war was +ended and stated the lines upon which the Confederate cruisers were +to be treated<a name="FNanchor1312"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1312">[1312]</a>. Here was prompt, even hurried, action +though the only additional event of war in America which Russell +could at the moment cite to warrant his change of policy was the +capture of Jefferson Davis. On the same day Russell wrote to Bruce +stating what had been done and recognizing the "re-establishment of +peace within the whole territory of which the United States, before +the commencement of the civil war, were in undisturbed +possession<a name="FNanchor1313"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1313">[1313]</a>."</p> +<p>This sudden shift by the Government did not escape Derby's +caustic criticism. June 12, he referred in Parliament to Houghton's +previous inquiry and Russell's answer, asking why the Government +had not stuck to its earlier position and calling attention to the +fact that the United States, while now proclaiming certain ports +open to trade, yet specified others as still closed and threatened +with punishment as pirates, any vessel attempting to enter them. +Derby desired information as to what the Government had done about +this remarkable American proclamation. Russell, "who was very +imperfectly heard," answered that undoubtedly it was embarrassing +that no "regular communication" had been received from America +giving notice of the end of the war, but that the two Confederate +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_268"></a>[V2:pg 268]</span> +cruisers still at sea and the entrance of one of them to various +Australian ports had compelled some British action. He had +consulted Adams, who had no instructions but felt confident the +United States would soon formally declare the end of the war. The +"piracy proclamation" was certainly a strange proceeding. Derby +pushed for an answer as to whether the Government intended to let +it go by unnoticed. Russell replied that a despatch from Bruce +showed that "notice" had been taken of it. Derby asked whether the +papers would be presented to Parliament; Russell "was understood to +reply in the affirmative<a name="FNanchor1314"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1314">[1314]</a>." Derby's inquiry was plainly merely a +hectoring of Russell for his quick shift from the position taken a +month earlier. But the very indifference of Russell to this attack, +his carelessness and evasion in reply, indicate confidence that +Parliament was as eager as the Government to satisfy the North and +to avoid friction. The only actual "notice" taken by Bruce at +Washington of the "piracy proclamation" was in fact, to report it +to Russell, commenting that it was "unintelligible" and probably a +mere attempt to frighten foreign ship-owners<a name= +"FNanchor1315"></a><a href="#Footnote_1315">[1315]</a>. Russell +instructed Bruce not to ask for an explanation since Galveston had +been captured subsequent to the date of the proclamation and there +was presumably no port left where it could be applied<a name= +"FNanchor1316"></a><a href="#Footnote_1316">[1316]</a>.</p> +<p>In truth the actual events of the closing days of the war had +outrun diplomatic action by America. Scattered Southern forces +still in the field surrendered with an unexpected rapidity, while +at Washington all was temporarily in confusion upon the death of +Lincoln and the illness of Seward. Bruce's advice had been wise and +the prompt action of Russell fortunate. Seward at once accepted +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_269"></a>[V2:pg 269]</span> +Russell's notification of June 2 as ending British neutrality. +While again insisting upon the essential injustice of the original +concession of belligerent rights to the South, and objecting to +some details in the instructions to the Admiralty, he yet admitted +that normal relations were again established and acknowledged that +the United States could no longer exercise a right of +search<a name="FNanchor1317"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1317">[1317]</a>. July 4, Russell presented this paper +to Parliament, reading that portion in which Seward expressed his +pleasure that the United States could now enter again upon normal +relations with Great Britain<a name="FNanchor1318"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1318">[1318]</a>. Two days later Russell wrote to Bruce +that he had not expected Seward to acknowledge the rightfulness of +England's neutrality position, pointed out that his Admiralty +instructions were misunderstood and were less objectionable than +appeared and concluded by the expression of a hope for the +"establishment of a lasting and intimate friendship between the two +nations<a name="FNanchor1319"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1319">[1319]</a>."</p> +<hr style="width: 25%;"> +<p>Great Britain, wrote the Russian Minister in Washington in +January, 1860, was about to experience one of those "strokes of +fortune" which occurred but rarely in the history of nations, in +the approaching dissolution of the American Union. She alone, of +all the nations of the world, would benefit by it in the expansion +of her power, hitherto blocked by the might of the United States. +Broken into two or more hostile pieces America would be at the +mercy of England, to become her plaything. "The Cabinet of London +is watching attentively the internal dissensions of the Union and +awaits the result with an impatience which it has difficulty in +disguising." Great Britain would soon, <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_270"></a>[V2:pg 270]</span> in return for +cotton, give recognition to the South and, if required, armed +support. For this same cotton she would oppose emancipation of the +slaves. The break-up of the Union was no less than a disaster for +all nations save England, since hitherto the "struggle" between +England and the United States "has been the best guarantee against +the ambitious projects and political egotism of the Anglo-Saxon +race<a name="FNanchor1320"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1320">[1320]</a>."</p> +<p>This prophecy, made over a year in advance of events, was +repeated frequently as the crisis in America approached and during +the first two years of the war. Stoeckl was not solitary in such +opinion. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs held it also--and +the French Emperor puzzled himself in vain to discover why Great +Britain, in furtherance of her own interests, did not eagerly +accept his overtures for a vigorous joint action in support of the +South<a name="FNanchor1321"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1321">[1321]</a>.</p> +<p>The preceding chapters of this work will have shown how +unfounded was such prophecy. Stoeckl was behind the times, knowing +nothing, apparently, of that positive change in British policy in +the late 'fifties which resulted in a determination to cease +opposition to the expansion of American power. Such opposition was +then acknowledged to have been an error and in its place there +sprang into being a conviction that the might of America would tend +toward the greatness of England itself<a name= +"FNanchor1322"></a><a href="#Footnote_1322">[1322]</a>. In the +months preceding the outbreak of the Civil War all British +governmental effort was directed toward keeping clear of the +quarrel and toward conciliation of the two sections. No doubt there +were those in Great Britain who rejoiced at the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_271"></a>[V2:pg 271]</span> rupture +between North and South, but they were not in office and had no +control of British policy.</p> +<p>The war once begun, the Government, anxious to keep clear of it, +was prompt in proclaiming neutrality and hastened this step for +fear of maritime complications with that one of the belligerents, +the North, which alone possessed a naval force. But the British +Ministry, like that of every other European state, believed that a +revolution for independence when undertaken by a people so numerous +and powerful as that of the South, must ultimately succeed. Hence +as the war dragged on, the Ministry, pressed from various angles at +home, ventured, with much uncertainty, upon a movement looking +toward mediation. Its desire was first of all for the restoration +of world peace, nor can any other motive be discovered in Russell's +manoeuvres. This attempt, fortunately for America and, it may be +believed, for the world, was blocked by cool heads within the +Ministry itself. There was quick and, as it proved, permanent +readjustment of policy to the earlier decision not to meddle in the +American crisis.</p> +<p>This very failure to meddle was cause of great complaint by both +North and South, each expectant, from divergent reasons, of British +sympathy and aid. The very anger of the North at British "cold +neutrality" is evidence of how little America, feeling the ties of +race and sentiment, could have understood the mistaken view-point +of diplomats like Stoeckl, who dwelt in realms of "reasons of +state," unaffected by popular emotions. Aside from race, which +could be claimed also by the South, the one great argument of the +North in appeal to England lay in the cry of anti-slavery. But the +leaders of the North denied its pertinence. Itself unsympathetic +with the emotions of emancipation societies at home, the British +Government settled down by the end of 1862 to a fixed policy of +strict neutrality.</p> +<p>In all this the Government but pursued that line which +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_272"></a>[V2:pg 272]</span> is +the business of Governments--the preservation of the prosperity and +power of the state. With the unexpected prolongation of the war and +the British recognition of the Northern "will to conquer" there +came, as is evident from a scrutiny of Russell's diplomatic tone +and acts, a growing belief that the North might after all succeed +in its purpose, at least of subjugating the South. This would mean +the possibility of continuing that policy of friendship for a +united America which had been determined upon in the 'fifties. Here +was no special sympathy, but merely a cool calculation of benefits +to Great Britain, but there can be no question that the general +attitude of the Government by midsummer of 1863 was distinctly +favourable to a restored Union. A "friendly neutrality" began to +replace a "cold neutrality."</p> +<p>But it is the business of Governments not merely to guard +national interests and prosperity; they also must guard their own +authority and seek to remain in political power. Here emancipation, +never greatly stirring the leaders, whether Whig or Tory, exercised +an increasing pressure by the force of public approval. It made +impossible any attempt to overthrow the Ministry on the score of +non-interference in America, or of favouritism toward the North. It +gave to an enthusiastic and vociferous section of the British +public just ground for strong support of Lincoln and his cause, and +in some degree it affected governmental attitude.</p> +<p>There was, however, another question, much more vital than +emancipation in its relation to British home politics, that ran +like a constant thread through the whole pattern of British public +attitude toward America. It had always been so since the days of +the American revolution and now was accentuated by the American +war. This was the question of the future of democracy. Was its fate +bound up with the result of that war? And if so where lay British +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_273"></a>[V2:pg 273]</span> +interest? Always present in the minds of thoughtful Englishmen, +appearing again and again through each changing phase of the war, +this question was so much a constant that to have attempted +discussion of it while other topics were being treated, would have +resulted in repetition and confusion. It is therefore made the +subject of a separate and concluding chapter.</p> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1261"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1261">[1261]</a> Bright to Sumner, Jan. 26, 1865 (Mass. +Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>, XLVI, p. 132).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1262"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1262">[1262]</a> To Sumner, Feb. 17, 1865 (<i>Ibid.</i>, +p. 133).</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1263"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1263">[1263]</a> Dodd, <i>Jefferson Davis</i>, p. +343</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1264"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1264">[1264]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, March 4, +1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1265"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1265">[1265]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Slidell to Mason, March 5 +and 6, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1266"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1266">[1266]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Mason to Slidell, March +15, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1267"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1267">[1267]</a> Mason to Benjamin, March 31, 1865. +(Richardson, II, pp. 709-17.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1268"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1268">[1268]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 717.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1269"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1269">[1269]</a> Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., Jan. +24, 1865. No. 187. It is interesting that just at this time +Gortchakoff should have sent to Stoeckl the copy of a memorandum by +one, C. Catacazy, employé of the Foreign Office and +long-time resident in the United States, in which was outlined a +plan of a Russian offer of mediation. The memorandum specified that +such an offer should be based on the idea that the time had come +for a complete restoration of the Union and argued that both North +and South regarded Russia as a special friend; it was Russia's +interest to see the Union restored as a balance to Great Britain. +Gortchakoff's comment was favourable, but he left it wholly to +Stoeckl's judgment and discretion to act upon the plan. (Russian +Archives. F.O. to Stoeckl, Feb. 6, 1865.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1270"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1270">[1270]</a> Feb. 4, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1271"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1271">[1271]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, II, +254. To his son, Feb. 10, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1272"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1272">[1272]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, pp. +410-14.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1273"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1273">[1273]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, II, +256. To his son, Feb. 17, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1274"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1274">[1274]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>, +1865-66, Pt. I, p. 182. Adams to Seward, Feb. 23, +1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1275"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1275">[1275]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 112. Adams to Seward, +Feb. 2, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1276"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1276">[1276]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 180. Seward to Adams, +Feb. 21, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1277"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1277">[1277]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 199. Adams to Seward, +March 9, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1278"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1278">[1278]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 197. Seward to Adams, +March 8, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1279"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1279">[1279]</a> March 8, 1865. (Bigelow, +<i>Retrospections</i>, II, p. 361.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1280"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1280">[1280]</a> Russell Papers. Burnley to Russell, Feb. +23 and March 13, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1281"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1281">[1281]</a> "The speech of Mr. Bright is universally +admitted to have been one of the most brilliant specimens of his +peculiar style of oratory. In its reminiscences, equally unwelcome +to both sides of the House, it was yet received after the fashion +of an unpleasant medicine, which has the aid of a strong and +savoury medium to overwhelm the nauseous taste." (<i>U.S. Messages +and Documents</i>, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 246. Adams to Seward, March +16, 1865.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1282"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1282">[1282]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1283"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1283">[1283]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 262. Adams to Seward, +March 24, 1865. Adams wrote of his own situation that it "seems at +last to be getting easy and comfortable, so far as freedom from +anxiety is concerned." (<i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, II, p. +258. To his son, March 24, 1865.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1284"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1284">[1284]</a> Bruce, who succeeded Lyons at +Washington, reached New York on April 7. His first letter to +Russell from Washington, dated April 14, stated that America was +certainly preparing to oust Maximilian in Mexico, and that even the +Southern prisoners were eager to join the United States troops in +an expedition for this purpose. (Russell Papers.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1285"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1285">[1285]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>, +1865-66, Part II, p. 323. Adams to Seward, April 20, +1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1286"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1286">[1286]</a> April 24, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1287"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1287">[1287]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1288"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1288">[1288]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April +23, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1289"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1289">[1289]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Slidell to Mason, April +26, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1290"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1290">[1290]</a> April 24, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1291"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1291">[1291]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>, +1865-66, Pt. I, p. 331. Adams to Seward, April 28, +1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1292"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1292">[1292]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. +417.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1293"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1293">[1293]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April +9, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1294"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1294">[1294]</a> May 6, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1295"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1295">[1295]</a> April 27, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1296"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1296">[1296]</a> April 29, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1297"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1297">[1297]</a> Hansard, 3d. Ser., CLXXVIII, pp. 1073 +and 1081.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1298"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1298">[1298]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1865, +Commons</i>, Vol. LVII. "Correspondence respecting the +Assassination of the late President of the United +States."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1299"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1299">[1299]</a> Russell Papers. Bruce to Russell, April +18, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1300"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1300">[1300]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, April 24, +1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1301"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1301">[1301]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, II, +267. Charles Francis Adams to his son, April 28, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1302"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1302">[1302]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1865-66</i>, Pt. I, pp. 344, 361. Adams to Hunter, May 4 and May +11, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1303"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1303">[1303]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVIII, p. +1219.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1304"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1304">[1304]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 1242-46.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1305"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1305">[1305]</a> Russell Papers. Burnley to Russell, Jan. +16, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1306"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1306">[1306]</a> Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., March +1-13, 1865. No. 523. Stoeckl was opposed to this.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1307"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1307">[1307]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVII, p. +1922.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1308"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1308">[1308]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, CLXXIX, p. +286.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1309"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1309">[1309]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 1018. No. 297. Bruce to +Russell, May 16, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1310"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1310">[1310]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 303. Bruce to Russell, +May 19, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1311"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1311">[1311]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1865, +Commons</i>, Vol. LVII. "Further Correspondence respecting the +Cessation of Civil War in North America." No. 10.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1312"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1312">[1312]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, "Correspondence respecting +the Cessation of Civil War in North America."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1313"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1313">[1313]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, "Further Correspondence +respecting the Cessation of Civil War in North America." No. +9.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1314"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1314">[1314]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXX, pp. +1-6.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1315"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1315">[1315]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1865, +Commons</i>, Vol. LVII. "Correspondence respecting President's +Proclamation of 22nd May, 1865." Bruce to Russell, May 26, +1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1316"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1316">[1316]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, June 16, +1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1317"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1317">[1317]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, "Further Correspondence +respecting the Cessation of Civil War in North America." No. 9. +Seward to Bruce, June 19, 1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1318"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1318">[1318]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXX, p. +1143.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1319"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1319">[1319]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1865, +<i>Commons</i>, Vol. LVII. "Further Correspondence respecting the +Cessation of Civil War in North America." No. 10.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1320"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1320">[1320]</a> Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Dec. +23, 1859/Jan. 4, 1860. No. 146.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1321"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1321">[1321]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Stoeckl to F.O., Jan. +17-29, 1861. No. 267. He reports that he has seen a confidential +letter from Thouvenel to Mercier outlining exactly his own ideas as +to England being the sole gainer by the dissolution of the +Union.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1322"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1322">[1322]</a> For an analysis of this change see +<i>The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy</i>, Vol II, p. +277, which also quotes a remarkable speech by +Disraeli.</blockquote> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_274"></a>[V2:pg 274]</span> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XVIII"></a>CHAPTER XVIII</h2> +<h3>THE KEY-NOTE OF BRITISH ATTITUDE</h3> +<br> +<p>On May 8, 1865, the news was received in London of Johnston's +surrender to Sherman. On that same day there occurred in the +Commons the first serious debate in thirty-three years on a +proposed expansion of the electoral franchise. It was a dramatic +coincidence and no mere fortuitous one in the minds of thoughtful +Englishmen who had seen in the Civil War a struggle as fateful in +British domestic policy as in that of America herself. Throughout +all British political agitation from the time of the American +revolution in 1776, there had run the thread of the American +"example" as argument to some for imitation, to others for warning. +Nearly every British traveller in America, publishing his +impressions, felt compelled to report on American governmental and +political institutions, and did so from his preconceived notions of +what was desirable in his own country<a name= +"FNanchor1323"></a><a href="#Footnote_1323">[1323]</a>. In the ten +years immediately preceding the Civil War most travellers were +laudatory of American democracy, and one, the best in acute +analysis up to the time of Lord Bryce's great work, had much +influence on that class in England which was discontented with +existing political institutions at home. This was Mackay's +<i>Western World</i> which, first published in 1849, had gone +through four editions in 1850 and in succeeding years was +frequently reprinted<a name="FNanchor1324"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1324">[1324]</a>. Republicanism, Mackay asserted, was no +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_275"></a>[V2:pg 275]</span> +longer an experiment; its success and permanence were evident in +the mighty power of the United States; Canada would soon follow the +American example; the "injustice" of British aristocrats to the +United States was intentional, seeking to discredit democracy:</p> +<blockquote>"... Englishmen are too prone to mingle severity with +their judgments whenever the Republic is concerned. It is the +interest of aristocracy to exhibit republicanism, where-ever it is +found, in the worst possible light, and the mass of the people have +too long, by pandering to their prejudice, aided them in their +object. They recognize America as the stronghold of republicanism. +If they can bring it into disrepute here, they know that they +inflict upon it the deadliest blow in Europe<a name= +"FNanchor1325"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1325">[1325]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>On the opposing side were other writers. Tremenheere argued the +inapplicability of American institutions to Great Britain<a name= +"FNanchor1326"></a><a href="#Footnote_1326">[1326]</a>. The +theoretical bases of those institutions were in some respects +admirable but in actual practice they had resulted in the rule of +the mob and had debased the nation in the estimation of the world; +bribery in elections, the low order of men in politics and in +Congress, were proofs of the evils of democracy; those in England +who clamoured for a "numerical" rather than a class representation +should take warning from the American experiment. Occasionally, +though rarely, there appeared the impressions of some British +traveller who had no political axe to grind<a name= +"FNanchor1327"></a><a href="#Footnote_1327">[1327]</a>, but from +1850 to 1860, as in every previous decade, British writing on +America was coloured by the author's attitude on <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_276"></a>[V2:pg 276]</span> political +institutions at home. The "example" of America was constantly on +the horizon in British politics.</p> +<p>In 1860, the Liberal movement in England was at its lowest ebb +since the high tide of 1832. Palmerston was generally believed to +have made a private agreement with Derby that both Whig and Tory +parties would oppose any movement toward an expansion of the +franchise<a name="FNanchor1328"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1328">[1328]</a>. Lord John Russell, in his youth an +eager supporter of the Reform Bill of 1832, had now gained the name +of "Finality John" by his assertion that that Reform was final in +British institutions. Political reaction was in full swing much to +the discontent of Radicals like Bright and Cobden and their +supporters. When the storm broke in America the personal +characteristics of the two leaders North and South, Lincoln and +Davis, took on, to many British eyes, an altogether extreme +importance as if representative of the political philosophies of +the two sections. Lincoln's "crudity" was democratic; Davis' +"culture" was aristocratic--nor is it to be denied that Davis had +"aristocratic" views on government<a name= +"FNanchor1329"></a><a href="#Footnote_1329">[1329]</a>. But that +this issue had any vital bearing on the quarrel between the +American sections was never generally voiced in England. Rather, +British comment was directed to the lesson, taught to the world by +the American crisis, of the failure of democratic institutions in +<i>national power.</i> Bright had long preached to the +unenfranchised of England the prosperity and might of America and +these had long been denied by the aristocratic faction to be a +result of democratic institutions. At first the denial was now +repeated, the <i>Saturday Review</i>, February 23, 1861, protesting +that there was no essential connection between the "shipwreck" of +American institutions and the movement in England for an expanded +franchise. Even, the article <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_277"></a>[V2:pg 277]</span> continued, if an attempt were +made to show such a connection it would convince nobody since "Mr. +Bright has succeeded in persuading a great number of influential +persons that the admission of working-men into the constituencies +is chiefly, if not solely, desirable on the ground that it has +succeeded admirably in America and has proved a sovereign panacea +against the war, taxation and confusion which are the curses of old +Governments in Europe." Yet that the denial was not sincere is +shown by the further assertion that "the shallow demagogues of +Birmingham and other kindred platforms must bear the blame of the +inference, drawn nearly universally at the present moment, that, if +the United States become involved in hopeless difficulties, it +would be madness to lower the qualification for the suffrage in +England."</p> +<p>This pretended disclaimer of any essential relation between the +American struggle and British institutions was not long persisted +in. A month later the <i>Saturday Review</i> was strong in +contemptuous criticism of the "promiscuous democracy" of the +North<a name="FNanchor1330"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1330">[1330]</a>. Less political journals followed suit. +The <i>Economist</i> thought the people of England would now be +convinced of the folly of aping America and that those who had +advocated universal suffrage would be filled with "mingled alarm, +gratitude and shame<a name="FNanchor1331"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1331">[1331]</a>." Soon W.H. Russell could write, while +still at Washington "... the world will only see in it all, the +failure of republican institutions in time of pressure as +demonstrated by all history--that history which America vainly +thought she was going to set right and re-establish on new grounds +and principles<a name="FNanchor1332"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1332">[1332]</a>." "The English worshippers of American +institutions," said the <i>Saturday Review</i>, "are in danger of +losing their last pretext for preferring <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_278"></a>[V2:pg 278]</span> the Republic +to the obsolete and tyrannical Monarchy of England.... It now +appears that the peaceable completion of the secession has become +impossible, and it will be necessary to discover some new ground of +superiority by which Mr. Buchanan or Mr. Lincoln may be +advantageously contrasted with Queen Victoria<a name= +"FNanchor1333"></a><a href="#Footnote_1333">[1333]</a>."</p> +<p>These expressions antedated the news of the actual opening of +the war and may be regarded as jeers at Bright and his followers +rather than as attempts to read a lesson to the public. No such +expressions are to be found in the letters of leading officials +though minor ones occasionally indulged in them<a name= +"FNanchor1334"></a><a href="#Footnote_1334">[1334]</a>. As late as +June, 1861, Adams declared that while some in England welcomed +American disunion as a warning to their countrymen it was evident +that but a small number as yet saw the cause of the North as +identical with the world progress of free institutions<a name= +"FNanchor1335"></a><a href="#Footnote_1335">[1335]</a>. Evidently +he was disappointed that the followers of Bright were not +exhibiting more courage and demanding public support of the North +as fighting their battle at home. They were indeed strangely +silent, depressed no doubt by American events, and discouraged. It +required time also to arouse intensity of feeling on the American +question and to see clearly the issues involved. Aristocratic +Britain was first to declare a definite lesson to be learned, +thereby bringing out the fighting qualities of British democracy. +Throughout 1861, the comment was relatively mild. In July, +<i>Blackwood's</i> declared:</p> +<blockquote>"It is precisely because we do not share the admiration +of America for her own institutions and political tendencies that +we do not now see in the impending change an event <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_279"></a>[V2:pg 279]</span> altogether to +be deplored. In those institutions and tendencies we saw what our +own might be if the most dangerous elements of our Constitution +should become dominant. We saw democracy rampant, with no +restriction upon its caprices. We saw a policy which received its +impulses always from below ... nor need we affect particularly to +lament the exhibition of the weak point of a Constitution ... the +disruption of which leaves entirely untouched the laws and usages +which America owes to England, and which have contributed so +powerfully to her prosperity...."<br> +<br> +"With a rival Government on the frontier ... with great principles +to be not vapoured about but put to the proof we should probably +see the natural aristocracy rise from the dead level of the +Republic, raising the national character with its own +elevation<a name="FNanchor1336"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1336">[1336]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>In the same month the <i>Quarterly</i>, always more calm, +logical and convincing than <i>Blackwood's</i>, published +"Democracy on its Trial<a name="FNanchor1337"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1337">[1337]</a>." "The example of America kept alive, +as it had created, the party of progress"; now "it has sunk from +the decrepitude of premature old age." If England, after such an +example, permits herself to be led into democracy she "will have +perished by that wilful infatuation which no warning can +dispel."</p> +<p>Adams had complained that few British friends of progress +identified the cause of the North with their own, but this was true +of Americans also. The <i>Atlantic Monthly</i> for July 1861, +discussed British attitude wholly in terms of cotton supply. But +soon there appeared in the British press so many preachments on the +"lesson" of America that the aristocratic effort to gain an +advantage at home became apparent to all<a name= +"FNanchor1338"></a><a href="#Footnote_1338">[1338]</a>. The +<i>Economist</i> moralized on the "untried" <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_280"></a>[V2:pg 280]</span> character of +American institutions and statesmen, the latter usually as ignorant +as the "masses" whom they represented and if more intellectual +still more worthy of contempt because of their "voluntary moral +degradation" to the level of their constituents<a name= +"FNanchor1339"></a><a href="#Footnote_1339">[1339]</a>. "The upper +and ruling class" wrote Bright to Sumner, were observing with +satisfaction, "that democracy may get into trouble, and war, and +debt, and taxes, as aristocracy has done for this country<a name= +"FNanchor1340"></a><a href="#Footnote_1340">[1340]</a>." Thus +Bright could not deny the blow to democracy; nor could the +<i>Spectator</i>, upbraiding its countrymen for lack of sympathy +with the North: "New England will be justified in saying that Old +England's anti-slavery sympathies are mere hollow sentimental +pretences, since she can rest satisfied to stuff her ears with +cotton against the cries of the slaves, and to compensate her +gentle regret over the new impulse given to slavery by her lively +gratification over the paralyzing shock suffered by +Democracy<a name="FNanchor1341"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1341">[1341]</a>." This was no taking up of cudgels for +the North and "Progress" such as Adams had hoped for. Vigour rested +with the opposing side and increased when hopes of a short war +vanished. The <i>Saturday Review</i> asserted:</p> +<blockquote>"In that reconstruction of political philosophy which +the American calamities are likely to inaugurate, the value of the +popular element will be reduced to its due proportions.... The true +guarantee of freedom will be looked for more in the equilibrium of +classes than in the equality of individuals.... We may hope, at +last, that the delusive confusion between freedom and democracy is +finally banished from the minds of Englishmen<a name= +"FNanchor1342"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1342">[1342]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>"The real secret," wrote Motley, "of the exultation which +manifests itself in the <i>Times</i> and other organs over our +troubles and disasters, is their hatred, not to America, +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_281"></a>[V2:pg 281]</span> so +much as to democracy in England<a name="FNanchor1343"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1343">[1343]</a>." It was scarcely a secret in the +columns of the journals already quoted. But no similar +interpretation had as yet appeared in the <i>Times</i> and Motley's +implication was justified for it and other leading daily +newspapers. The Reviews and Weeklies were for the moment leading +the attack--possibly one reason for the slowness in reply of Bright +and his followers. Not all Reviews joined in the usual analysis. +The <i>Edinburgh</i> at first saw in slavery the sole cause of the +American dispute<a name="FNanchor1344"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1344">[1344]</a>, then attributed it to the inevitable +failure in power of a federal system of government, not mentioning +democracy as in question<a name="FNanchor1345"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1345">[1345]</a>. <i>Blackwood's</i> repeatedly pushed +home its argument:</p> +<blockquote>"Independent of motives of humanity, we are glad that +the end of the Union seems more likely to be ridiculous than +terrible.... But for our own benefit and the instruction of the +world we wish to see the faults, so specious and so fatal, of their +political system exposed, in the most effective way.... And the +venerable Lincoln, the respectable Seward, the raving editors, the +gibbering mob, and the swift-footed warriors of Bull's Run, are no +malicious tricks of fortune played off on an unwary nation, but are +all of them the legitimate offspring of the great Republic ... +dandled and nursed--one might say coddled--by Fortune, the spoiled +child Democracy, after playing strange pranks before high heaven, +and figuring in odd and unexpected disguises, dies as sheerly from +lack of vitality as the oldest of worn-out despotisms.... In the +hope that this contest may end in the extinction of mob rule, we +become reconciled to the much slighter amount of suffering that war +inflicts on America<a name="FNanchor1346"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1346">[1346]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Equally outspoken were a few public men who early espoused the +cause of the South. Beresford Hope, before a "distinguished +audience" used language insulting to the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_282"></a>[V2:pg 282]</span> North, fawning +upon the South and picturing the latter as wholly admirable for its +aristocratic tendencies. For this he was sharply taken to task by +the <i>Spectator</i><a name="FNanchor1347"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1347">[1347]</a>. More sedately the Earl of Shrewsbury +proclaimed, "I see in America the trial of Democracy and its +failure. I believe that the dissolution of the Union is inevitable, +and that men now before me will live to see an aristocracy +established in America<a name="FNanchor1348"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1348">[1348]</a>." In all countries and at all times +there are men over-eager in early prophecy on current events, but +in such utterances as these there is manifest not merely the +customary desire to stand in the limelight of assured knowledge and +wisdom, but also the happy conviction that events in America were +working to the undoing of the Radicals of Great Britain. If they +would not be supine the Radicals must strike back. On December 4, +at Rochdale where, as the <i>Times</i> asserted, he was sure of an +audience sympathetic on purely personal grounds, Bright renewed his +profession of faith in the American Republic and sang his +accustomed praises of its great accomplishments<a name= +"FNanchor1349"></a><a href="#Footnote_1349">[1349]</a>. The battle, +for England, on American democracy, was joined; the challenge +issued by aristocratic England, accepted.</p> +<p>But apart from extreme factions at either end of the scale there +stood a group holding a middle ground opinion, not yet sure of the +historical significance of the American collapse. To this group +belonged Gladstone, as yet uncertain of his political philosophy, +and regretful, though vainly, it would appear, of the blow to +democracy. He wrote his thought to Brougham, no doubt hoping to +influence the view-point of the <i>Edinburgh</i>.</p> +<blockquote>"This has without doubt been a deplorable year for poor +'Democracy' and never has the old woman been at a heavier discount +since 1793. I see no discredit to the founders of the <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_283"></a>[V2:pg 283]</span> American +constitution in the main fact of the rupture. On the contrary it +was a great achievement to strike off by the will and wit of man a +constitution for two millions of men scattered along a seaboard, +which has lasted until they have become more than thirty millions +and have covered a whole continent. But the freaks, pranks, and +follies, not to say worse, with which the rupture has been met in +the Northern States, down to Mr. Chase's financial (not exposition +but) exposure have really given as I have said the old lady in +question such a heavy blow and great discouragement that I hope you +will in the first vigour of your action be a little merciful and +human lest you murder her outright<a name= +"FNanchor1350"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1350">[1350]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>On this middle group of Englishmen and their moral conceptions +the American Minister, Adams, at first pinned his faith, not +believing in 1861 that the issues of democracy or of trade +advantage would lead Great Britain from just rules of conduct. Even +in the crisis of the <i>Trent</i> affair he was firm in this +opinion:</p> +<blockquote>"Much as the commercial and manufacturing interests may +be disposed to view the tariff as the source of all our evils, and +much as the aristocratic classes may endeavour to make democracy +responsible for them, the inexorable logic of events is +contradicting each and every assertion based on these notions, and +proving that the American struggle is, after all, the +ever-recurring one in human affairs between right and wrong, +between labour and capital, between liberty and absolutism. When +such an issue comes to be presented to the people of Great Britain, +stripped of all the disguises which have been thrown over it, it is +not difficult to predict at least which side it will <i>not</i> +consent to take<a name="FNanchor1351"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1351">[1351]</a>.</blockquote> +<p>April, 1861, saw the beginning of the aristocratic challenge on +American democracy and December its acceptance by Bright. +Throughout 1862 he practically deserted his seat in Parliament and +devoted himself to <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_284"></a>[V2:pg 284]</span> stirring up labour and radical +sentiment in favour of the North. In January, 1862, a mass meeting +at New Hall, Edgware Road, denounced the daily press and was +thought of sufficient moment to be reported by Adams. A motion was +carried:</p> +<blockquote>"That in the opinion of this meeting, considering the +ill-disguised efforts of the <i>Times</i> and other misleading +journals to misrepresent public opinion here on all American +questions ... to decry democratic institutions under the trials to +which the Republic is exposed, it is the duty of the working-men +especially as unrepresented in the National Senate to express their +sympathy with the United States in their gigantic struggle for the +preservation of the Union<a name="FNanchor1352"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1352">[1352]</a>...."</blockquote> +<p>The daily press was, in fact, now joining more openly in the +controversy. The <i>Morning Post</i>, stating with conviction its +belief that there could be no re-union in America, added:</p> +<blockquote>"... if the Government of the United States should +succeed in reannexing them [the Southern States] to its still +extensive dominions, Democracy will have achieved its grandest +triumph since the world began. It will have demonstrated to the +ample satisfaction of its present and future proselytes that it is +even more puissant in war than in peace; that it can navigate not +only the smooth seas of unendangered prosperity, but can ride +safely through the fiercest tempests that would engulf every other +craft laden with human destinies; that it can descend to the +darkest depths of adversity, and rise from them all the stronger +for the descent.... And who can doubt that Democracy will be more +arrogant, more aggressive, more levelling and vulgarizing, if that +be possible, than it ever had been before<a name= +"FNanchor1353"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1353">[1353]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>By midsummer, 1862, Adams was more convinced than in 1861 that +the political controversy in England had an important bearing on +the attitude toward America. Even the alleged neutrality of +<i>Fraser's Magazine</i> seemed turning <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_285"></a>[V2:pg 285]</span> to one-sided +presentation of the "lesson" of America. Mill's defence of the +North, appearing in the February number, was soon followed in July +by the first of a series of articles, "Universal Suffrage in the +United States and Its Consequences," depicting the war as the +result of mob rule and predicting a military despotism as its +inevitable consequence. The Liberals were losing strength, wrote +Adams:</p> +<blockquote>"That the American difficulties have materially +contributed to this result cannot be doubted. The fact that many of +the leading Liberals are the declared friends of the United States +is a decided disadvantage in the contest now going on. The +predominating passion here is the desire for the ultimate +subdivision of America into many separate States which will +neutralize each other. This is most visible among the conservative +class of the Aristocracy who dread the growth of liberal opinions +and who habitually regard America as the nursery of them<a name= +"FNanchor1354"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1354">[1354]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>From all this controversy Government leaders kept carefully +aloof at least in public expression of opinion. Privately, Russell +commented to Palmerston, "I have been reading a book on Jefferson +by De Witt, which is both interesting and instructive. It shows how +the Great Republic of Washington degenerated into the Democracy of +Jefferson. They are now reaping the fruit<a name= +"FNanchor1355"></a><a href="#Footnote_1355">[1355]</a>." Was it +mere coincidence or was there significance in an editorial in +Palmerston's alleged "organ," the <i>Morning Post</i>:</p> +<blockquote>"That any Englishman has looked forward with pleasure +to the calamities of America is notoriously and demonstrably +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_286"></a>[V2:pg 286]</span> +false. But we have no hesitation in admitting that many thoughtful +Englishmen who have watched, in the policy of the United States +during the last twenty years, the foreshadowing of a democratic +tyranny compared with which the most corrupt despotisms of the Old +World appear realms of idyllic happiness and peace, have gratefully +recognized the finger of Providence in the strife by which they +have been so frightfully rent asunder<a name= +"FNanchor1356"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1356">[1356]</a>...."</blockquote> +<p>In October the heavy artillery of the Conservatives was again +brought into action and this time with more explicit diagnosis than +heretofore. "For a great number of years," said the +<i>Quarterly</i>, "a certain party among us, great admirers of +America ... have chosen to fight their English battles upon +American soil." Now the American Government "has disgracefully and +ignominiously failed" at all points. It is evident that "political +equality is not merely a folly, it is a chimera<a name= +"FNanchor1357"></a><a href="#Footnote_1357">[1357]</a>." At last, +in November, the <i>Times</i> openly took the position which its +accusers declared to have been the basis of its editorial +utterances almost from the beginning of the Civil War.</p> +<blockquote>"These are the consequences of a cheap and simple form +of government, having a rural attorney for Sovereign and a city +attorney for Prime Minister. We have already said that if such a +terrible exposure of incapacity had happened in England we should +at the earliest moment possible have sent the incapables about +their business, and put ourselves in the hands of better +men...."<br> +<br> +"This Republic has been so often proposed to us as a model for +imitation that we should be unpardonable not to mark how it works +now, when for the first time it has some work to do. We believe +that if the English system of Parliamentary action had existed in +America, the war could not have occurred, but we are quite sure +that such Ministers would have long since been changed<a name= +"FNanchor1358"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1358">[1358]</a>."</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_287"></a>[V2:pg 287]</span> +<p>In addition to a Conservative ringing the changes upon the +failure of democracy, the open friends of the South dilated also +upon the "gentlemanly" characteristics of Southern leaders and +society. This was the frequent burden of articles in <i>The +Index</i> in the early weeks of its publication. To this was soon +added a picture of Northern democracy as composed of and controlled +by the "immigrant element" which was the source of "the enormous +increase of population in the last thirty years" from revolutionary +areas in Europe. "Germans, Hungarians, Irish carried with them more +than their strong arms, they imported also their theories of +equality.... The revolutionary party which represents them is at +this moment master in the States of the North, where it is +indulging in all its customary licence<a name= +"FNanchor1359"></a><a href="#Footnote_1359">[1359]</a>." This fact, +complained <i>The Index</i>, was not sufficiently brought out in +the English press. Very different was the picture painted by +Anthony Trollope after a tour of the Western states:</p> +<blockquote>"... this man has his romance, his high poetic feeling, +and above all his manly dignity. Visit him, and you will find him +without coat or waistcoat, unshorn, in ragged blue trousers and old +flannel shirt, too often bearing on his lantern jaws the signs of +ague and sickness; but he will stand upright before you and speak +to you with all the ease of a lettered gentleman in his own +library. All the odious incivility of the republican servant has +been banished. He is his own master, standing on his own threshold, +and finds no need to assert his equality by rudeness. He is +delighted to see you, and bids you sit down on his battered bench, +without dreaming of any such apology as an English cotter offers to +a Lady Bountiful when she calls. He has worked out his +independence, and shows it in every easy movement of his body. He +tells you of it unconsciously in every tone of his voice. You will +always find in his cabin some newspaper, some book, some token of +advance in education. When he questions you about the old country +he astonishes you by the extent of his knowledge. <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_288"></a>[V2:pg 288]</span> I defy you not +to feel that he is superior to the race from whence he has sprung +in England or in Ireland."<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 25%;"> +<br> +"It is always the same story. With us there is no level of society. +Men stand on a long staircase, but the crowd congregates near the +bottom, and the lower steps are very broad. In America men stand +upon a common platform, but the platform is raised above the +ground, though it does not approach in height the top of our +staircase. If we take the average altitude in the two countries, we +shall find that the American heads are the more elevated of the +two<a name="FNanchor1360"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1360">[1360]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>A comparison of dates shows that the unanimity of conservative +and aristocratic expression on the failure of American democracy +and its lesson to England was most marked and most open at the +moment when the Government was seriously considering an offer of +mediation in the war. Meanwhile the emancipation proclamation of +September, 1862, had appeared. It did not immediately affect +governmental attitude, save adversely to the North, and it gave a +handle for pro-Southern outcry on the score of a "servile war." +Indeed, the radicals were at first depressed by it; but when months +passed with no appearance of a servile war and when the second +emancipation proclamation of January, 1863, further certified the +moral purpose of the North, a great element of strength was added +to the English advocates of democracy. The numerous "addresses" to +Lincoln exhibited both a revived moral enthusiasm for the cause of +anti-slavery and were frequently combined with a laudation of +American political institutions. The great mass-meeting at Exeter +Hall, January 29, 1863, was described by the correspondent of an +American paper as largely deriving its strength from the universal +dissatisfaction <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_289"></a>[V2:pg 289]</span> of the lower orders of the +English people with their existing conditions under the Crown:</p> +<blockquote>"The descendants of the Roundhead commoners, chafing +under the limitations of the franchise, burdensome taxation, the +contempt with which they are regarded by the lords of the soil, the +grievous effects of the laws of entail and primogeniture, whereby +they are kept poor and rendered liable to starvation and +pauperism--these have looked to America as the model democracy +which proves the poor man's capacity for self-government." The +meeting was called for seven o'clock but at half after five the +hall was filled, and at six crowded. A second hall was filled and +outdoor meetings of two thousand people organized in Exeter Street. +"All working-class England was up in arms, not so much against +slavery as against British oligarchy<a name= +"FNanchor1361"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1361">[1361]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The correspondent further reported rumours that this meeting had +caused anxious consideration to the managers of the <i>Times</i>, +and the decision to step more warily. No doubt this was +exaggeration of the political character and effect of the meeting, +but certain it is that the political element was present joining +hands with anti-slavery enthusiasm. Also it is noteworthy that the +last confident and vigorous expression of the "failure" of +democracy, from sources professedly neutral, appeared immediately +after the St. James' Hall meeting, but was necessarily written +before that meeting took place. <i>Blackwood's</i>, in its issue of +February, 1863, declared, as before: "Every sensible man in this +country now acknowledges ... that we have already gone as far +toward democracy as is safe to go.... This is the great moral +benefit which we have derived from the events in America." John +Blackwood was an intimate friend of Delane, editor of the +<i>Times</i>, holding similar views on political questions; but the +<i>Times</i> was suddenly grown cautious in reading English +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_290"></a>[V2:pg 290]</span> +political lessons from America. In truth, attack now rested with +the Radicals and Bright's oratory was in great demand<a name= +"FNanchor1362"></a><a href="#Footnote_1362">[1362]</a>. He now +advanced from the defensive position of laudation of the North to +the offensive one of attacking the Southern aristocracy, not merely +because it wished to perpetuate African slavery, but because it +desired to make all the working-classes as subservient to it as was +the negro<a name="FNanchor1363"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1363">[1363]</a>. It was now Radical purpose to keep the +battle raging and they were succeeding. Bigelow believed that the +United States might well recognize its opportunity in this +controversy and give aid to its friends:</p> +<blockquote>"After all, this struggle of ours both at home and +abroad is but a struggle between the principle of popular +government and government by a privileged class. The people +therefore all the world over are in a species of solidarity which +it is our duty and interest to cultivate to the utmost<a name= +"FNanchor1364"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1364">[1364]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>But Adams gave contrary advice. Wholly sympathetic with the +democratic movement in England as now, somewhat to his surprise, +developed, he yet feared that the extremes to which Bright and +others were going in support of the North might create unfortunate +reactions in the Government. Especially he was anxious that the +United States should not offer opportunity for accusation of +interference in a British political quarrel. It is noteworthy that +while many addresses to Lincoln were forwarded by him and many were +printed in the annual publication of diplomatic correspondence, +those that thus appeared dealt almost exclusively with <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_291"></a>[V2:pg 291]</span> emancipation. +Yet Adams was also forwarding addresses and speeches harping on +American democracy. A meeting at Edinburgh, February 19, found +place, in its emancipation aspect in the United States +documents<a name="FNanchor1365"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1365">[1365]</a>, but the burden of that meeting, +democracy, did not. It was there proclaimed that the British press +misrepresented conditions in America, "because the future of free +political institutions, as sketched in the American Declaration of +Independence and in the State Constitutions of the Northern States, +would be a standing argument against the expansion of the franchise +and the enjoyment of just political rights among us, as well as a +convenient argument in favour of the continued domination of our +aristocratic parties<a name="FNanchor1366"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1366">[1366]</a>." The tide of democratic feeling was +rising rapidly in England. On March 26, Adams wrote to Seward of a +recent debate in Parliament that that body was much more judicious +in expressions on America than it had been before 1862. "It will +not escape your observation that the question is now felt to be +taking a shape which was scarcely anticipated by the managers [of +the <i>Times</i>] when they first undertook to guide the British +mind to the overthrow of free institutions in America<a name= +"FNanchor1367"></a><a href="#Footnote_1367">[1367]</a>."</p> +<p>On the evening of the day on which this was written there +occurred the greatest, most outspoken, and most denunciatory to the +aristocracy, of the meetings held to support the cause of the +North. This was the spectacular gathering of the Trades Unions of +London at St. James' Hall, on March 26, usually regarded as the +culminating effort in Bright's tour of England for the cause of +democracy, but whose origin is somewhat shrouded in mystery. +Socialist tradition claims that Karl Marx conceived the idea +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_292"></a>[V2:pg 292]</span> of +the meeting and was responsible for its organization<a name= +"FNanchor1368"></a><a href="#Footnote_1368">[1368]</a>. The press +generally reported it as a "Bright Meeting." Adams wrote to Seward +of the pressure put on him by Professor Beesly, of the University +of London, to send a representative from the American Ministry, +Beesly expanding upon the importance and high standing of the +Trades Unions. To this Adams demurred but finally sent his son to +sit in the audience and report the proceedings.</p> +<p>Whatever its origin there can be no doubt that this was the most +important of all pro-Northern meetings held in England during the +Civil War, nor that its keynote was "America fighting the battle of +democracy." Save for some distinguished speakers those in +attendance consisted almost wholly of three thousand picked +representatives of the Trades Unions of London. Adams transmitted +to Seward his son's report of the meeting, its character, +composition, names of speakers and their emphatic expressions of +friendship for the North<a name="FNanchor1369"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1369">[1369]</a>, but it is again noteworthy that Henry +Adams' clear analysis of the real significance of the meeting was +not printed in the published diplomatic correspondence. Giving due +praise to the speeches of Bright and Beesly, and commenting on +press assertions that "the extraordinary numbers there were only +brought together by their curiosity to hear Mr. Bright," Henry +Adams continued: "That this was not the case <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_293"></a>[V2:pg 293]</span> must have been +evident to every person present. In fact, it was only after he +closed that the real business of the evening began." Then followed +speeches and the introduction of resolutions by "Mr. Howell, a +bricklayer ... Mr. Odgers, a shoemaker ... Mr. Mantz, a compositor +... Mr. Cremer, a joiner, who was bitter against Lord Palmerston +... Mr. Conolly, a mason...." and other labouring men, all +asserting "that the success of free institutions in America was a +political question of deep consequence in England and that they +would not tolerate any interference unfavourable to the North." No +one, the report emphasized, "could doubt what was intended."</p> +<blockquote>"The meeting was a demonstration of democratic strength +and no concealment of this fact was made. If it did not have a +direct political bearing on internal politics in England it needed +little of doing so. There was not even a profession of faith in the +government of England as at present constituted. Every hostile +allusion to the Aristocracy, the Church, the opinions of the +'privileged classes,' was received with warm cheers. Every allusion +to the republican institutions of America, the right of suffrage, +the right of self-taxation, the 'sunlight' of republican influence, +was caught up by the audience with vehement applause. It may +therefore be considered as fairly and authoritatively announced +that the class of skilled workmen in London--that is the leaders of +the pure popular movement in England--have announced by an act +almost without precedent in their history, the principle that they +make common cause with the Americans who are struggling for the +restoration of the Union and that all their power and influence +shall be used on behalf of the North<a name= +"FNanchor1370"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1370">[1370]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Bright's words of most scarifying indictment of "Privilege," and +his appeal to workers to join hands with their fellows in America +have been given in a previous <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_294"></a>[V2:pg 294]</span> chapter<a name= +"FNanchor1371"></a><a href="#Footnote_1371">[1371]</a>. Evidently +that appeal, though enthusiastically received for its oratorical +brilliance, was unneeded. His was but an eloquent expression of +that which was in the minds of his audience. Upon the American +Minister the effect was to cause him to renew warnings against +showing too keen an appreciation of the support of political +radicalism in England. The meeting, he wrote, had at once stirred +anxiety in Parliament and verged:</p> +<blockquote>"... much too closely upon the minatory in the domestic +politics of this Kingdom to make it easy to recognize or sympathize +with by Foreign Governments.... Hence it seems to me of the +greatest consequence that the treatment of all present questions +between the two nations should be regulated by a provident forecast +of what may follow it [the political struggle in England] +hereafter. I am not sure that some parties here would not now be +willing even to take the risk of a war in order the more +effectually to turn the scale against us, and thus, as they think, +to crush the rising spirit of their own population. That this is +only a feeling at present and has not yet risen to the dignity of a +policy may be true enough; but that does not the less impose upon +the Government at home a duty so to shape its actions as, if +possible, to defeat all such calculations and dissipate such +hopes.... We owe this duty not less to the great body of those who +in this kingdom are friends to us and our institutions, than to +ourselves<a name="FNanchor1372"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1372">[1372]</a>."</blockquote> +<br> +<a name="image14.jpg"></a> +<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image14.jpg"><img src= +"images/image14.jpg" width="55%" alt=""></a><br> +<b>JOHN BRIGHT</b><br> +(<i>From a photograph taken of him in the attitude in which he +usually spoke</i>)<br> +(<i>From Trevelyan's "Life of John Bright</i>")</p> +<br> +<p>Thus Adams advised his Government to tread lightly in respect to +democratic agitation in England. Over a month later he received a +deputation headed by Bright, come to present to him the resolutions +passed at the Trades Unions' meeting. The deputation expressed +fears that a rupture was imminent in the relations of Great Britain +and America, and that this would have a disastrous influence on the +aspirations of working-class Europe. Adams replied in general terms +of appreciation for the sympathies expressed <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_295"></a>[V2:pg 295]</span> by the meeting +but carefully avoided specific comment on its democratic purpose. +"He was too prudent," said the <i>Times</i> in reporting the +deputation, "to appraise the importance of the particular +demonstration to which his notice was invited ..." and his reply +was given favourable comment<a name="FNanchor1373"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1373">[1373]</a>. This reply, wrote Adams, "appears to +have had a sedative effect<a name="FNanchor1374"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1374">[1374]</a>." Meanwhile, Bright continued his +preachment to the English people though modifying his tone of +fierce accusation against "privilege," and confining himself to +declaring the interest of the unenfranchised in the American +conflict. In a speech before the Union and Emancipation Society of +London, on June 16, he asserted for the "twenty millions of people +in this country" as yet without representation in Parliament, "I +say that these have an interest, almost as great and direct as +though they were living in Massachusetts or New York, in the +tremendous struggle for freedom which is now shaking the whole +North American Continent<a name="FNanchor1375"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1375">[1375]</a>." Like utterances were repeated at +further public meetings and so insistent were they as to require +reply by the conservative faction, even if, as was supposed, the +effect of the Trades' Union attitude had been to give a halt to the +vehemence of those who had been sounding the "lesson" of American +failure in democracy. Bright became the centre of attack. The +<i>Times</i> led.</p> +<blockquote>"His is a political fanaticism. He used to idolize the +Constitution of the United States as the one great dominant +Democracy of the world. He believes in it still, and, if it must +go, he is ready to idolize its memory. For this he gives up all his +most cherished notions and all his less absorbing +principles...."<br> +<br> +"Yet Mr. Bright is consistent. He has one master passion +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_296"></a>[V2:pg 296]</span> +and his breast, capacious as it is, can hold no more. That master +passion is the love of that great dominant Democracy. He worshipped +it while rising to its culminating point, and he is obliged to turn +right round to worship it while setting. He did not himself know, +until tested by this great trial, how entirely his opinions as to +war and peace, and slavery and freedom, and lust of conquest and +hatred of oppression, were all the mere accidents which hung +loosely upon him, and were capable of being detached at once in the +interest of the ruling passion of his soul for that great dominant +Democracy. Nor need we wonder; for if that great Democracy has been +a failure, then men will say that the life of Mr. John Bright up to +this time has been but a foolish dream<a name= +"FNanchor1376"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1376">[1376]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Evidently Bright's speeches were causing anxiety and bitterness; +but an "if" had crept into the estimate of the future of American +democracy, caused less by the progress of the war than by the +rising excitement of democratic England. The <i>Times</i> editorial +just quoted appeared when the faith was generally professed that +Lee was about to end the war through the invasion of Pennsylvania. +In the reaction created by the arrival of the news of Gettysburg +and Vicksburg, Adams still again warned his Government against +either a belligerent or interfering attitude toward Great Britain, +but stated plainly that Northern victory was of supreme importance +in Europe itself. "We have a mission to fulfill. It is to show, by +our example to the people of England in particular, and to all +nations in general, the value of republican institutions." There +was still a general belief in the incompetency of those +institutions. "The greatest triumph of all would be to prove these +calculations vain. In comparison with this, what would be the gain +to be derived from any collision with the powers of Europe<a name= +"FNanchor1377"></a><a href="#Footnote_1377">[1377]</a>?"</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_297"></a>[V2:pg 297]</span> +<p>It is strange that with so clearly-expressed a division of +English opinion on American democracy few in America itself +appreciated the significance of the British controversy. J.M. +Forbes, who had been on a special mission to England, wrote to +Lincoln, on his return<a name="FNanchor1378"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1378">[1378]</a>:</p> +<blockquote>"Our friends abroad see it! John Bright and his +glorious band of English Republicans see that we are fighting for +Democracy or (to get rid of the technical name) for liberal +institutions; the Democrats and the liberals of the old world are +as much and as heartily with us as any supporters we have on this +side.<br> +<br> +Our enemies too see it in the same light; the Aristocrats and the +Despots of the old world see that our quarrel is that of the People +against an Aristocracy<a name="FNanchor1379"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1379">[1379]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>But there are few similar expressions and these few nearly +always came from men who had been abroad and had thus come into +direct contact with British political movements. Meanwhile, Lee's +retreat from Pennsylvania had produced a like retreat in the +opinions on the failure of democracy earlier confidently held by +the professedly neutral press. In September, having arrived at the +point by the usual process of gradually facing about, the +<i>Times</i> was bold enough to deny that England had any personal +feeling or concern about democracy in America or that this had +anything to do with English attitude on the war<a name= +"FNanchor1380"></a><a href="#Footnote_1380">[1380]</a>. Thenceforth +neither the <i>Times</i> nor any of the leading papers saw fit to +revive with vigour the cry of "democracy's failure," no matter how +persistent in proclaiming ultimate victory for the South. +Aristocratic exultation had given place to alarm and it seemed +wiser, if possible, to quiet the issue<a name= +"FNanchor1381"></a><a href="#Footnote_1381">[1381]</a>. Not so the +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_298"></a>[V2:pg 298]</span> +Radicals, who made every effort to keep the issue alive in the +minds of the British public, and whose leaders with less violence +but increased firmness debated the question in every public meeting +favourable to the North<a name="FNanchor1382"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1382">[1382]</a>. Many Conservatives, Adams reported, +were now anxiously sitting on the fence yet finding the posture a +difficult one because of their irritation at Bright's +taunts<a name="FNanchor1383"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1383">[1383]</a>. Bright's star was rising. "The very +moment the war comes to an end," wrote Adams, "and a restoration of +the Union follows, it will be the signal for a reaction that will +make Mr. Bright perhaps the most formidable public man in +England<a name="FNanchor1384"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1384">[1384]</a>."</p> +<p>The continuation of the controversy was not, however, wholly +one-sided. In the silence of the daily press it seemed incumbent +upon the more eager and professed friends of the South to take up +the cudgels. Hence, in part, came the organization of the Southern +Independence Association and the attempt to hold public meetings +favourable to the South, in the early months of 1864. Much talk had +been spent on the "British issue" involved in the war; there was +now to be vigorous work to secure it<a name= +"FNanchor1385"></a><a href="#Footnote_1385">[1385]</a>. <i>The +Index</i> plunged into vigorous denunciation of "The Manchester +School, which, for convenience and truth, we had better for the +future call the American School." Even the Government was attacked +for its complacence under the "American danger" and for retaining +as a member Milner-Gibson, who, in a recent speech, had shown that +he shared Bright's views on democracy:</p> +<blockquote>"That gentleman [Bright] could not be asked to enter +the Cabinet in person. The country abhorred him; Parliament +despised him; his inveterate habits of slander and vituperation, +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_299"></a>[V2:pg 299]</span> +his vulgarity, and his incurable want of veracity, had made him so +hateful to the educated classes that it would have required no +common courage to give him office; his insolent sneers at royalty +would have made his appointment little less than a personal insult +to the Queen; and his bad temper would have made him an intolerable +colleague in the Council. But Mr. Bright had another self; a +faithful shadow, which had no ideas, no soul, no other existence +but what it borrowed from him, while its previous life and +education had accustomed it to the society of statesmen and of +gentlemen<a name="FNanchor1386"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1386">[1386]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>Such expressions gained nothing for the Conservative cause; they +were too evidently the result of alarm at the progress of Radical +and pro-Northern sentiment. Goldwin Smith in a "Letter" to the +Southern Independence Association, analysed with clarity the +situation. Answering criticisms of the passionate mob spirit of +Northern press and people, he accused the <i>Times</i> of +having</p> +<blockquote>"... pandered to the hatred of America among the upper +classes of this country during the present war. Some of us at least +had been taught by what we have lately seen not to shrink from an +extension of the suffrage, if the only bad consequence of that +measure of justice would be a change in government from the +passions of the privileged class to the passions of the people.... +History will not mistake the meaning of the loud cry of triumph +which burst from the hearts of all who openly or secretly hated +liberty and progress, at the fall, as they fondly supposed, of the +Great Republic." British working men "are for the most part as well +aware that the cause of those who are fighting for the right of +labour is theirs, as any nobleman in your Association can be that +the other cause in his<a name="FNanchor1387"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1387">[1387]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The question of democracy as a political philosophy and as an +institution for Great Britain was, by 1864, rapidly coming to the +front in politics. This was very largely a result of the American +Civil War. Roebuck, after the failure of his <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_300"></a>[V2:pg 300]</span> effort for +mediation in 1863, was obsessed with a fear of the tendency in +England. "I have great faith in my countrymen," he wrote, "but the +experience of America frightens me. I am not ashamed to use the +word <i>frightened</i>. During my whole life I have looked to that +country as about to solve the great problem of self-government, and +now, in my old age, the hopes of my youth and manhood are +destroyed, and I am left to reconstruct my political philosophy, +and doubt and hesitation beset me on every point<a name= +"FNanchor1388"></a><a href="#Footnote_1388">[1388]</a>." More +philosophically Matthew Arnold, in 1864, characterized the rule of +aristocracy as inevitably passing, but bent his thought to the +discovery of some middle ground or method--some "influence [which] +may help us to prevent the English people from becoming, with the +growth of democracy, <i>Americanized</i><a name= +"FNanchor1389"></a><a href="#Footnote_1389">[1389]</a>." "There is +no longer any sort of disguise maintained," wrote Adams, "as to the +wishes of the privileged classes. Very little genuine sympathy is +entertained for the rebels. The true motive is apparent enough. It +is the fear of the spread of democratic feeling at home in the +event of our success<a name="FNanchor1390"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1390">[1390]</a>."</p> +<p>The year 1864 had witnessed a rapid retreat by wiser +Conservative elements in proclaming the "lesson" of American +democracy--a retreat caused by alarm at the vigour with which +Radicals had taken up the challenge. Conservative hopes were still +fixed upon Southern success and Conservative confidence loudly +voiced. Even the pride of the <i>Times</i> in the accuracy of its +news and in its military forecasts was subordinated to the purpose +of keeping up the courage of the faction it represented<a name= +"FNanchor1391"></a><a href="#Footnote_1391">[1391]</a>. Small +wonder, then, that Delane, on receiving the news of Sherman's +arrival before Savannah, should be made physically ill and write to +Dasent: "The American news is a heavy blow <span class= +"pagenum"><a name="Page2_301"></a>[V2:pg 301]</span> to us as well +as to the South." The next day he added: "I am still sore vexed +about Sherman, but Chenery did his best to attenuate the +mischief<a name="FNanchor1392"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1392">[1392]</a>." "Attenuation" of Northern progress in +arms was, indeed, attempted, but the facts of the military +situation were too strong for continued concealment. From January, +1865, only the most stubborn of Southern friends could remain blind +to the approaching Northern victory. Lord Acton, a hero-worshipper +of the great Confederate military leader, "broke his heart over the +surrender of Lee," but was moved also by keen insight as to the +political meaning of that surrender<a name= +"FNanchor1393"></a><a href="#Footnote_1393">[1393]</a>.</p> +<p>So assured were all parties in England that the great Civil War +in America was closing in Northern victory that the final event was +discounted in advance and the lines were rapidly being formed for +an English political struggle on the great issue heralded as +involved in the American conflict. Again, on the introduction of a +motion in Parliament for expansion of the franchise the +ultra-Conservatives attempted to read a "lesson" from America. The +<i>Quarterly</i> for April, 1865, asserted that even yet "the mass +of educated men in England retain the sympathy for the South which +they have nourished ever since the conflict assumed a decided +shape." America was plainly headed in the direction of a military +despotism. Her example should warn England from a move in the same +direction. "The classes which govern this country are in a +minority," and should beware of majority rule. But events +discredited the prophecy of a military despotism. The assassination +of Lincoln gave opportunity not merely for a general outpouring of +expressions of sympathy but also to the Radicals a chance to exalt +Lincoln's leadership in democracy<a name= +"FNanchor1394"></a><a href="#Footnote_1394">[1394]</a>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_302"></a>[V2:pg 302]</span> +<p>In July Great Britain was holding elections for a new +Parliament. Not a single member who had supported the cause of the +North failed of re-election, several additional Northern "friends" +were chosen, and some outspoken members for the South were +defeated. Adams thought this a matter deserving special notice in +America, and prophesied a new era approaching in England:</p> +<blockquote>"As it is, I cannot resist the belief that this period +marks an era in the political movement of Great Britain. Pure +old-fashioned conservatism has so far lost its hold on the +confidence of the country that it will not appear in that guise any +more. Unless some new and foreign element should interpose, I look +for decided progress in enlarging the popular features of the +constitution, and diminishing the influence of the aristocracy.... +It is impossible not to perceive traces of the influence of our +institutions upon all these changes.... The progress of the liberal +cause, not in England alone, but all over the world, is, in a +measure, in our hands<a name="FNanchor1395"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1395">[1395]</a>."</blockquote> +<p>The "Liberal progress" was more rapid, even, than Adams +anticipated. Palmerston, ill for some months past, died on October +18, 1865. Russell succeeded him as head of the Ministry, and almost +immediately declared himself in favour of Parliamentary reform even +though a majority in both Houses was still opposed to such a +measure. Russell's desertion of his earlier attitude of "finality" +on franchise expansion correctly represented the acceptance, though +unwillingly, by both political parties of the necessity of reform. +The battle, long waged, but reaching its decisive moment during the +American Civil War, had finally gone <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_303"></a>[V2:pg 303]</span> against Conservatism when Lee +surrendered at Appomatox. Russell's Reform Bill of 1866 was +defeated by Tory opposition in combination with a small Whig +faction which refused to desert the "principle" of aristocratic +government--the "government by the wise," but the Tories who came +into power under Derby were forced by the popular demand voiced +even to the point of rioting, themselves to present a Reform Bill. +Disraeli's measure, introduced with a number of "fancy franchises," +which, in effect, sought to counteract the giving of the vote to +British working-men, was quickly subjected to such caustic +criticism that all the planned advantages to Conservatism were soon +thrown overboard, and a Bill presented so Radical as to permit a +transfer of political power to the working classes<a name= +"FNanchor1396"></a><a href="#Footnote_1396">[1396]</a>. The Reform +Bill of 1867 changed Great Britain from a government by aristocracy +to one by democracy. A new nation came into being. The friends of +the North had triumphed.</p> +<p>Thus in addition to the play of diplomatic incidents, the +incidental frictions, the effect on trade relations, the +applications of British neutrality, and the general policy of the +Government, there existed for Great Britain a great issue in the +outcome of the Civil War--the issue of the adoption of democratic +institutions. It affected at every turn British public attitude, +creating an intensity and bitterness of tone, on both sides, +unexampled in the expressions of a neutral people. In America this +was little understood, and American writers both during the war and +long afterwards, gave little attention to it<a name= +"FNanchor1397"></a><a href="#Footnote_1397">[1397]</a>. Immediately +upon the conclusion of the war, Goldwin Smith, whose words during +the conflict were bitter toward the aristocracy, declared that +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_304"></a>[V2:pg 304]</span> +"the territorial aristocracy of this country and the clergy of the +Established Church" would have been excusable "if they could only +have said frankly that they desired the downfall of institutions +opposed to their own, instead of talking about their sympathy for +the weak, and their respect for national independence, and their +anxiety for the triumph of Free Trade<a name= +"FNanchor1398"></a><a href="#Footnote_1398">[1398]</a>." This was +stated before the democratic hope in England had been realized. +Three years later the same staunch friend of the North, now removed +to America and occupying a chair of history at Cornell University, +wrote of the British aristocracy in excuse of their attitude: "I +fought these men hard; I believed, and believe now, that their +defeat was essential to the progress of civilization. But I daresay +we should have done pretty much as they did, if we had been born +members of a privileged order, instead of being brought up under +the blessed influence of equality and justice<a name= +"FNanchor1399"></a><a href="#Footnote_1399">[1399]</a>."</p> +<p>Such judgment and such excuses will appear to the historian as +well-founded. But to Americans who conceived the Civil War as one +fought first of all for the preservation of the nation, the issue +of democracy in England seemed of little moment and little to +excuse either the "cold neutrality" of the Government or the tone +of the press. To Americans Great Britain appeared friendly to the +dissolution of the Union and the destruction of a rival power. +Nationality was the issue for the North; that democracy was an +issue in America was denied, nor could it, in the intensity of the +conflict, be conceived as the vital question determining British +attitude. The Reform Bill of 1867 brought a new British nation into +existence, the nation decrying American institutions was dead and a +"sister democracy" holding <span class="pagenum"><a name= +"Page2_305"></a>[V2:pg 305]</span> out hands to the United States +had replaced it, but to this the men who had won the war for the +North long remained blind. Not during the generation when +Americans, immersed in a life and death struggle for national +existence, felt that "he who is not for me is against me," could +the generally correct neutrality of the British Government and the +whole-hearted support of Radical England be accepted at their true +value to the North. For nearly half a century after the American +Civil War the natural sentiments of friendship, based upon ties of +blood and a common heritage of literature and history and law, were +distorted by bitter and exaggerated memories.</p> +<br> +<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1323"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1323">[1323]</a> See my article, "The Point of View of +the British Traveller in America," <i>Pol. Sci. Quarterly</i>, +June, 1914.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1324"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1324">[1324]</a> Alexander Mackay, <i>The Western World; +or Travels in the United States in</i> 1846-47.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1325"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1325">[1325]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Fourth Edition, London, +1850, Vol. III, p. 24.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1326"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1326">[1326]</a> Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, <i>The +Constitution of the United States compared with Our Own</i>, +London, 1854.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1327"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1327">[1327]</a> e.g., William Kelly, <i>Across the Rocky +Mountains from New York to California</i>, London, 1852. He made +one acute observation on American democracy. "The division of +parties is just the reverse in America to what it is in England. In +England the stronghold of democracy is in the large towns, and +aristocracy has its strongest supporters in the country. In America +the ultra-democrat and leveller is the western farmer, and the +aristocratic tendency is most visible amongst the manufacturers and +merchants of the eastern cities." (p. 181.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1328"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1328">[1328]</a> Monypenny, <i>Disraeli</i>, IV, pp. +293-4, states a Tory offer to support Palmerston on these +lines.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1329"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1329">[1329]</a> Dodd, <i>Jefferson Davis</i>, p. +217.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1330"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1330">[1330]</a> March, 30, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1331"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1331">[1331]</a> March 16, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1332"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1332">[1332]</a> To John Bigelow, April 14, 1861. +(Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, I, p. 347.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1333"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1333">[1333]</a> April 27, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1334"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1334">[1334]</a> Bunch wrote to Russell, May 15, 1861, +that the war in America was the "natural result of the much vaunted +system of government of the United States"; it had "crumbled to +pieces," and this result had long been evident to the public mind +of Europe. (F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 58.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1335"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1335">[1335]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 77, No. 9. +Adams to Seward, June 21, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1336"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1336">[1336]</a> I have made an effort to identify +writers in <i>Blackwood's</i>, but am informed by the editors that +it is impossible to do this for the period before 1870, old +correspondence having been destroyed.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1337"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1337">[1337]</a> July, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1338"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1338">[1338]</a> The <i>Atlantic Monthly</i> for +November, 1861, takes up the question, denying that democracy is in +any sense "on trial" in America, so far as the permanence of +American institutions is concerned. It still does not see clearly +the real nature of the controversy in England.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1339"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1339">[1339]</a> Aug. 17, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1340"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1340">[1340]</a> Sept. 6, 1861. (Mass. Hist. Soc. +<i>Proceedings</i>, XLVI, p. 94.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1341"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1341">[1341]</a> Sept. 7, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1342"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1342">[1342]</a> Sept. 14, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1343"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1343">[1343]</a> Motley, <i>Correspondence</i>, II, p. +35. To his mother, Sept. 22, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1344"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1344">[1344]</a> April, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1345"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1345">[1345]</a> Oct., 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1346"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1346">[1346]</a> Oct., 1861. Article, "Democracy teaching +by Example."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1347"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1347">[1347]</a> Nov. 23, 1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1348"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1348">[1348]</a> Cited by Harris, <i>The Trent +Affair</i>, p. 28.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1349"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1349">[1349]</a> Robertson, <i>Speeches of John +Bright</i>, I, pp. 177 <i>seq.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1350"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1350">[1350]</a> Gladstone Papers, Dec. 27, +1861.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1351"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1351">[1351]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78, No. 95. +Adams to Seward, Dec. 27, 1861. As printed in <i>U.S. Messages and +Documents, 1862-63</i>, Pt. I, p. 14. Adams' emphasis on the word +"<i>not</i>" is unindicated, by the failure to use +italics.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1352"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1352">[1352]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 110. Enclosure. Adams +to Seward, Jan. 31, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1353"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1353">[1353]</a> Feb. 22, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1354"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1354">[1354]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 80, No. 206. +Adams to Seward, Aug. 8, 1862. Of this period in 1862, Rhodes (IV, +78) writes that "the most significant and touching feature of the +situation was that the cotton operative population was frankly on +the side of the North." Lutz, <i>Die Beziehungen zwischen +Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten während des +Sezessionskrieges</i>, pp. 49-53, makes an interesting analysis of +the German press, showing it also determined in its attitude by +factional political idealisms in Germany.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1355"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1355">[1355]</a> Palmerston MS., Aug. 24, +1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1356"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1356">[1356]</a> Aug. 30, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1357"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1357">[1357]</a> October, 1862. "The Confederate Struggle +and Recognition."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1358"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1358">[1358]</a> Nov. 4, 1862.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1359"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1359">[1359]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Nov. 20, 1862, p. 63. +(Communication.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1360"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1360">[1360]</a> Anthony Trollope, <i>North America</i>, +London, 1862, Vol. I, p. 198. The work appeared in London in 1862, +and was in its third edition by the end of the year. It was also +published in New York in 1862 and in Philadelphia in +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1361"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1361">[1361]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, March 13, 1863, +quoting a report in the <i>New York Sunday +Mercury</i>.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1362"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1362">[1362]</a> Lord Salisbury is quoted in Vince, +<i>John Bright</i>, p. 204, as stating that Bright "was the +greatest master of English oratory that this generation--I may say +several generations--has seen. I have met men who have heard Pitt +and Fox, and in whose judgment their eloquence at its best was +inferior to the finest efforts of John Bright. At a time when much +speaking has depressed, has almost exterminated, eloquence, he +maintained that robust, powerful and vigorous style in which he +gave fitting expression to the burning and noble thoughts he +desired to utter."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1363"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1363">[1363]</a> Speech at Rochdale, Feb. 3, 1863. +(Robertson, <i>Speeches of John Bright</i>, I, pp. 234 +<i>seq.</i>)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1364"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1364">[1364]</a> Bigelow to Seward, Feb. 6, 1863. +(Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, I, p. 600.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1365"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1365">[1365]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>, +1863, Pt. I, p. 123.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1366"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1366">[1366]</a> State Dept., Eng., Adams to Seward. No. +334. Feb. 26, 1863. enclosing report of the Edinburgh meeting as +printed in <i>The Weekly Herald, Mercury and News</i>, Feb. 21, +1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1367"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1367">[1367]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>, +1863, Pt. I, p. 157.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1368"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1368">[1368]</a> Spargo, <i>Karl Marx,</i> pp. 224-5. +Spargo claims that Marx bent every effort to stir working men to a +sense of class interest in the cause of the North and even went so +far as to secure the presence of Bright at the meeting, as the most +stirring orator of the day, though personally he regarded Bright +"with an almost unspeakable loathing." On reading this statement I +wrote to Mr. Spargo asking for evidence and received the reply that +he believed the tradition unquestionably well founded, though +"almost the only testimony available consists of a reference or two +in one of his [Marx's] letters and the ample corroborative +testimony of such friends as Lessner, Jung and others." This is +scant historical proof; but some years later in a personal talk +with Henry Adams, who was in 1863 his father's private secretary, +and who attended and reported the meeting, the information was +given that Henry Adams himself had then understood and always since +believed Marx's to have been the guiding hand in organizing the +meeting.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1369"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1369">[1369]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>, +1863, Pt. I, p. 162. (Adams to Seward, March 27, +1863.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1370"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1370">[1370]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 82, No. 358. +Adams to Seward, March 27, 1863, enclosing report by Henry Adams. +There was also enclosed the printed report, giving speeches at +length, as printed by <i>The Bee Hive</i>, the organ of the London +Trades Unions.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1371"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1371">[1371]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 132.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1372"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1372">[1372]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 82, No. 360. +Adams to Seward, April 2, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1373"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1373">[1373]</a> May 5, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1374"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1374">[1374]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>, +1863, Pt. I, p. 243. Adams to Seward, May 7, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1375"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1375">[1375]</a> Robertson, <i>Speeches of John +Bright</i>, I, p. 264. In a letter to Bigelow, March 16, 1863, +Bright estimated that there were seven millions of men of +twenty-one years of age and upward in the United Kingdom, of whom +slightly over one million had the vote. (Bigelow, +<i>Retrospections</i>, I, p. 610.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1376"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1376">[1376]</a> July 2, 1863. The editorial was written +in connection with Roebuck's motion for mediation and is otherwise +interesting for an attempt to characterize each of the speakers in +the Commons.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1377"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1377">[1377]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, +1863</i>, Part I, p. 319. To Seward, July 23, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1378"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1378">[1378]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 130, <i>note</i> +2.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1379"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1379">[1379]</a> MS. letter, Sept. 8, 1863, in possession +of C.F. Adams, Jr.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1380"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1380">[1380]</a> Sept. 24, 1863.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1381"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1381">[1381]</a> Even the friendly Russian Minister in +Washington was at this time writing of the "rule of the mob" in +America and trusting that the war, "the result of democracy," would +serve as a warning to Europe. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., +Nov. 29-Dec. 11, 1864, No. 1900.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1382"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1382">[1382]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 84, Nos. 557 and +559. Adams to Seward, Dec. 17, 1863. Adams repeated his advice to +"keep out of it."</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1383"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1383">[1383]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 85, No. 587. Adams to +Seward, Jan. 29, 1864. Adams here expressed the opinion that it was +partly the aristocratic antipathy to Bright that had +<i>produced</i> the ill-will to the United States.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1384"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1384">[1384]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1385"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1385">[1385]</a> See Ch. XV.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1386"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1386">[1386]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Jan. 28, 1864, p. +58.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1387"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1387">[1387]</a> Goldwin Smith, <i>A Letter to a Whig +Member of the Southern Independence Association</i>, London, 1864, +pp. 14, 68, and 71.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1388"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1388">[1388]</a> Leader, <i>Roebuck</i>, p. 299. To +William Ibbitt, April 26, 1864.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1389"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1389">[1389]</a> Arnold, <i>Mixed Essays</i>, p. 17. +N.Y., Macmillan, 1883.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1390"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1390">[1390]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 86, No. 709. +Adams to Seward, June 9, 1864</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1391"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1391">[1391]</a> See <i>ante</i>, Ch. XVI.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1392"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1392">[1392]</a> Dasent, <i>Delane</i>, II, pp. 135-6. +Delane to Dasent, Dec. 25 and 26, 1864. The <i>Times</i> on +December 26 pictured Sherman as having <i>escaped</i> to the sea, +but on the 29th acknowledged his achievements.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1393"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1393">[1393]</a> <i>Lord Acton's Letters to Mary +Gladstone</i>, p. 183.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1394"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1394">[1394]</a> These were not confined to Great +Britain. The American Legation in Berlin received addresses of +sympathy from many organizations, especially labour unions. One +such, drawn by W. Liebknecht, A. Vogt, and C. Schilling read in +part: "Members of the working-class, we need not affirm to you the +sincerity of these our sympathies; for with pride we can point to +the fact, that, while the aristocracy of the Old World took openly +the part of the southern slaveholder, and while the middle class +was divided in its opinions, the working-men in all countries of +Europe have unanimously and firmly stood on the side of the Union." +(<i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865</i>, Pt. IV, p. +500.)</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1395"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1395">[1395]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, +1865</i>, Pt. I, p. 417. Adams to Hunter, July 13, +1865.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1396"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1396">[1396]</a> Disraeli was less disturbed by this than +were other Tory leaders. He had long before, in his historical +novels, advocated an aristocratic leadership of democracy, as +against the middle class. Derby called the Bill "a leap in the +dark," but assented to it.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1397"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1397">[1397]</a> Pierce, <i>Sumner</i>, IV, pp. 151-153, +summarizes the factors determining British attitude and places +first the fear of the privileged classes of the example of America, +but his treatment really minimizes this element.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1398"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1398">[1398]</a> Goldwin Smith, "The Civil War in +America: An Address read at the last meeting of the Manchester +Union and Emancipation Society." (Jan. 26, 1866.) London, 1866, pp. +71-75.</blockquote> +<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1399"></a><a href= +"#FNanchor1399">[1399]</a> Goldwin Smith, <i>America and England in +their present relations</i>, London, 1869, p. 30.</blockquote> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_306"></a>[V2:pg +306]</span><br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_307"></a>[V2:pg 307]</span> +<h2><a name="INDEX"></a>INDEX</h2> +<br> +<div class="indx"> +<div class="letter"> +<p>Aberdeen, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href= +'#Page_13'>13</a>, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href= +'#Page_15'>15</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_117'>117</a> <i>note</i> +[<a href="#Footnote_966">1</a>]</p> +<p>Acton, Lord, ii. <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a></p> +<p>Adams, Brooks, <i>The Seizure of the Laird Rams</i>, cited, ii. +<a href='#Page2_120'>120</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_125'>125</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_147'>147</a> +<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_150'>150</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Adams, Charles Francis, i. <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>, <a href= +'#Page_62'>62</a>-<a href='#Page_63'>3</a>, <a href= +'#Page_80'>80</a>-<a href='#Page_81'>1</a>; attitude in the early +days of the American crisis, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a> <i>and +note</i>, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>; +appointed American Minister in London, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a>, +<a href='#Page_80'>80</a>-<a href='#Page_81'>1</a>, <a href= +'#Page_96'>96</a>; impressions of English opinion on the crisis, +<a href='#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>, <a href= +'#Page_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>; alarm at Seward's +Despatch No. 10, i. <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>; attitude of, to +the Palmerston-Russell ministry, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>; +controversy on General Butler's order, <a href= +'#Page_302'>302</a>-<a href='#Page_305'>5</a>; reports to Seward on +British public meetings on Emancipation Proclamation, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_107'>107</a> <i>and note</i>[3], <a href= +'#Page2_223'>223</a>; view of the popular manifestations on +Emancipation, <a href='#Page2_108'>108</a>; view as to decline of +British confidence in the South, <a href='#Page2_184'>184</a>; and +the London Confederate States Aid Association, <a href= +'#Page2_191'>191</a>, <a href='#Page2_192'>192</a>; receives +deputations of allegiance during rumours before the fall of +Savannah, <a href='#Page2_245'>245</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; quoted +on rumours in Britain of possible reunion and foreign war, ii. +<a href='#Page2_251'>251</a>-<a href='#Page2_252'>2</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_253'>253</a>; on effect in England of the Hampton Roads +Conference, <a href='#Page2_253'>253</a>; advice of, to Seward on +attitude to be observed to Britain, <a href= +'#Page2_253'>253</a>-<a href='#Page2_255'>255</a>; attitude to +Seward's complaints of British and Canadian offences, <a href= +'#Page2_253'>253</a>-<a href='#Page2_254'>4</a>; comments of, on +parliamentary debate and Bright's speech of confidence in Lincoln, +<a href='#Page2_255'>255</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; on feeling in +Britain over Lincoln's assassination and the attempt on Seward, +<a href='#Page2_257'>257</a>, <a href='#Page2_262'>262</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_263'>3</a>; receives addresses of sympathy from British +organizations, <a href='#Page2_262'>262</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_263'>3</a>; and formal declaration of the end of the war, +<a href='#Page2_268'>268</a>; faith of, in ultimate British opinion +on the issues in the Civil War, ii. <a href='#Page2_283'>283</a>; +views of, on the political controversy in England as influencing +attitude to America <a href='#Page2_284'>284</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_285'>285</a>; advice to Seward on the political position in +relation to democracy, <a href='#Page2_290'>290</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_294'>294</a>, <a href='#Page2_296'>296</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_298'>298</a> <i>note</i>[1]; quoted on the rising of +democratic feeling in Britain, <a href='#Page2_291'>291</a>; +disappointed in attitude of British friends of progress, <a href= +'#Page2_278'>278</a>, <a href='#Page2_279'>279</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_280'>280</a>; report of, on London mass meeting in favour +of the North, <a href='#Page2_284'>284</a>; and the Trades Unions +of London meeting, <a href='#Page2_292'>292</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_294'>294</a>-<a href='#Page_295'>5</a>; quoted on John +Bright, <a href='#Page2_298'>298</a>; on the attitude of the +privileged classes to democracy, <a href='#Page2_298'>298</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_300'>300</a>; on the influence of +American institutions on the political movement in Great Britain, +<a href='#Page2_302'>302</a> <i>Diplomatic action and views of, in +regard to:</i> <i>Alabama case</i>: ii. <a href='#Page2_35'>35</a>, +<a href='#Page2_120'>120</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_121'>121</a>, <a href='#Page2_131'>131</a> British Foreign +Enlistment Act, i. <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>, <a href= +'#Page_148'>148</a>-<a href='#Page_149'>9</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_201'>201</a>-<a href='#Page2_202'>2</a> Bunch controversy, +i. <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>, +<a href='#Page_190'>190</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href= +'#Page_195'>195</a> Confederate Commissioners: representations on +intercourse with, i. <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>-<a href= +'#Page_106'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a> Confederate Cotton +Loan: reported connection with, ii. <a href='#Page2_161'>161</a> +<i>and note</i>[4]; views on, <a href='#Page2_179'>179</a> +Confederate Shipbuilding in England: protests against, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page2_128'>128</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_131'>131</a>, <a href='#Page2_137'>137</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_143'>143</a>, <a href='#Page2_145'>145</a> <i>note</i>[2]; +and U.S. Navy Department plan to stop, <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a> +<i>note</i>[2]; Laird Rams incident, <a href='#Page2_144'>144</a>, +<a href='#Page2_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page2_147'>147</a> +<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_150'>150</a> Cotton: report on +British position, ii. <a href='#Page2_99'>99</a> Declaration of +Paris negotiation: action on proposed convention, i. <a href= +'#Page_141'>141</a>-<a href='#Page_169'>69</a> <i>passim</i>; view +of American intention, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>, <a href= +'#Page_169'>169</a>; failure of his negotiation, <a href= +'#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>-<a href= +'#Page_146'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>-<a href= +'#Page_171'>71</a> Gladstone and Lewis speeches, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_55'>55</a> Irish emigrants, enlistment of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_201'>201</a>-<a href='#Page2_202'>2</a> Lindsay's efforts +for mediation, ii. <a href='#Page2_34'>34</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_35'>5</a>, <a href='#Page2_212'>212</a> Mediation: presents +the "servile war" threat against, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_18'>18</a>-<a href='#Page2_19'>19</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_95'>95</a>; view of England's reply to French proposals on, +<a href='#Page2_71'>71</a>; advantages of an anti-slavery avowal, +<a href='#Page2_98'>98</a>-<a href='#Page2_99'>9</a> Neutrality +Law, <i>See</i> British Foreign Enlistment Act <i>supra</i> +Privateering Bill, ii. <a href='#Page2_122'>122</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_123'>3</a>, <a href='#Page2_125'>125</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_127'>127</a>; advises against issue of privateers, <a href= +'#Page2_131'>131</a> Proclamation of Neutrality, The: +representations on, i. <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>-<a href= +'#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>, <a href= +'#Page_105'>105</a>, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a> <i>and +note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_300'>300</a>-<a href='#Page_301'>1</a>; +despatch on settlement of peaceful policy, <a href= +'#Page_134'>134</a>; protests against British recognition of +belligerency, <a href='#Page_159'>159</a>; advice to Seward on, +<a href='#Page_275'>275</a> Roebuck's motion: report on, ii. +<a href='#Page2_144'>144</a> "Servile War" threat, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_18'>18</a>-<a href='#Page2_19'>19</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_95'>95</a> <i>and note</i>[4] Slavery: urges Northern +declaration on, ii. <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_99'>9</a>; comments on <i>Times</i> criticism of +anti-slavery meetings, <a href='#Page2_108'>108</a> Southern Ports: +plan of collecting duties at, ii. <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a> +<i>Trent</i> Affair, the: interviewed by Palmerston, i. <a href= +'#Page_208'>208</a>-<a href='#Page_209'>9</a>; statement on the +<i>James Adger</i>, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>-<a href= +'#Page_210'>10</a>; suspicion of British policy in, <a href= +'#Page_218'>218</a>; views on public opinion in, <a href= +'#Page_222'>222</a>-<a href='#Page_223'>3</a>; officially states +Wilkes acted without authorization, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>; +report on English hope of peaceful settlement, <a href= +'#Page_228'>228</a>, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>; on British +opinion after settlement of, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>, <a href= +'#Page_240'>240</a>; on effect of, in Great Britain, <a href= +'#Page_243'>243</a>; view of popular attitude in Britain in the +crisis of, ii. <a href='#Page2_283'>283</a> Appreciation and +criticisms on: Characterized in <i>The Index</i>, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_196'>196</a> Lord Lyons', report on, i. <a href= +'#Page_62'>62</a>-<a href='#Page_63'>3</a>; opinion on, ii. +<a href='#Page2_71'>71</a> <i>note</i>[4] Lord Russell's view of +his diplomacy, ii. <a href='#Page2_128'>128</a> Tory approval of, +ii. <a href='#Page2_197'>197</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page_1'>1</a>, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a>, <a href= +'#Page_129'>129</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href= +'#Page_263'>263</a>, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>, <a href= +'#Page_276'>276</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_31'>31</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_100'>100</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_308"></a>[V2:pg 308]</span> +<p>Adams, C.F., Jun., view of British attitude and the Proclamation +of Neutrality, i. <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>, <a href= +'#Page_110'>110</a>; view of the delay in his father's journey to +England, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a> <i>note</i>; view on Seward's +attitude in Declaration of Paris negotiation, <a href= +'#Page_138'>138</a>, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a>-<a href= +'#Page_156'>6</a>; examination of British action in the +negotiation, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>-<a href='#Page_155'>5</a>; +review of the <i>Trent</i> affair, cited, <a href= +'#Page_203'>203</a> <i>note, et seq. passim</i>; on American +feeling over seizure of Mason and Slidell, <a href= +'#Page_218'>218</a>; and the Hotze materials, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_154'>154</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Adams, E.D.: <i>British Interests and Activities in Mexico</i>, +cited ii. <a href='#Page2_117'>117</a> <i>note</i>[1] "The Point of +View of the British Traveller in America," cited, i. <a href= +'#Page_23'>23</a> <i>note</i>; ii. <a href='#Page2_274'>274</a> +<i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Adams, Henry, i. <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_292'>292</a> <i>note</i>[1]; view of, on W.E. Forster, i. +<a href='#Page_58'>58</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on British Proclamation +of Neutrality, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>; on American exultation +in <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>; on British +attitude in <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>; view +of Gregory's speech on the blockade, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>; +on British view of prospects in the War, <a href= +'#Page_297'>297</a>; on possibility of intervention, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_23'>23</a>; on advantage of a Northern declaration on +slavery, <a href='#Page2_23'>23</a>; on the Trades Unions of London +meeting, <a href='#Page2_292'>292</a> <i>and note</i>[1] <a href= +'#Page2_293'>293</a> "Declaration, The, of Paris," 1861 ... +reviewed, <a href='#Page2_146'>146</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href= +'#Page2_153'>153</a>; view of Russell's policy in, <a href= +'#Page2_146'>146</a>-<a href='#Page2_150'>150</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_159'>159</a>; view of Lyons, <a href='#Page2_147'>147</a>, +<a href='#Page2_150'>150</a> <i>Education of Henry Adams</i> +quoted, i. <a href='#Page_149'>149</a> <i>note</i>[3]; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_172'>172</a> <i>note</i>[2]; cited, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_50'>50</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Adams, John (Second President of the U.S.), i. <a href= +'#Page_62'>62</a>, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a></p> +<p>Adams, John Quincy, i. <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>, <a href= +'#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a>, <a href= +'#Page_81'>81</a></p> +<p>African Slave Trade, attitude of the South to, i. <a href= +'#Page_85'>85</a>-<a href='#Page_86'>6</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_88'>88</a>; suppression of, international efforts for, i. +<a href='#Page_8'>8</a>-<a href='#Page_10'>10</a>; punishment to +slave traders in American law, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>; American +attitude to right of search, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>, <a href= +'#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a>; British +anti-slavery policy, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>-<a href= +'#Page_32'>2</a>; wane of British interest in, <a href= +'#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_90'>90</a>; Slave Trade Treaty signed, i. <a href= +'#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a>, <a href= +'#Page_276'>276</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_90'>90</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_91'>91</a></p> +<p>Agassiz, L., i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> <i>note</i>.</p> +<p>Akroyd, Edward, ii. <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a> +<i>note</i>.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_309"></a>[V2:pg 309]</span> +<p><i>Alabama</i>, The, ii. <a href='#Page2_35'>35</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_116'>116</a>, <a href='#Page2_119'>119</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_120'>120</a>; departure of, from Liverpool, <a href= +'#Page2_118'>118</a>; British order to stop departure, <a href= +'#Page2_119'>119</a>, <a href='#Page2_120'>120</a> <i>and +note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_133'>133</a>; Russell's private +feelings as to, <a href='#Page2_121'>121</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_124'>124</a>; public opinion in Great Britain on, <a href= +'#Page2_129'>129</a>-<a href='#Page2_130'>130</a>; Palmerston's +defence of Government action on, <a href= +'#Page2_134'>134</a>-<a href='#Page2_135'>5</a>; American anger +over, <a href='#Page2_119'>119</a>, <a href='#Page2_127'>127</a>; +measures against, <a href='#Page2_121'>121</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_123'>3</a>, <a href='#Page2_127'>127</a>; New York Chamber +of Commerce protest on, <a href='#Page2_126'>126</a>; claim for +damages on account of, <a href='#Page2_151'>151</a> <i>note</i>[1]; +mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_129'>129</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_131'>131</a>, +<a href='#Page2_134'>134</a>, <a href='#Page2_136'>136</a>, +<a href='#Page2_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page2_146'>146</a></p> +<p><i>Alexandra</i>, case, The: Seizure of the vessel, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_136'>136</a>, <a href='#Page2_139'>139</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page2_152'>152</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_161'>161</a> <i>note</i>[4]; public approval, <a href= +'#Page2_136'>136</a>; law actions on, <a href='#Page2_136'>136</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_142'>142</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_149'>149</a>, <a href='#Page2_152'>152</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page2_195'>195</a>; American +anxiety at Court decision, <a href='#Page2_143'>143</a>; final +result, <a href='#Page2_196'>196</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>America, Central: British-American disputes in, i. <a href= +'#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a></p> +<p>American: Civil War: i. <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href= +'#Page_87'>87</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>; +British public and official views at the commencement of, <a href= +'#Page_40'>40</a>-<a href='#Page_60'>60</a>; origins of; American +and British views, i. <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>-<a href= +'#Page_48'>8</a>; efforts at compromise, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>; +British official attitude on outbreak of, <a href= +'#Page_73'>73</a>; European opinion of, after duration of three +years, ii. <a href='#Page2_219'>219</a>; compared with the Great +War in Europe, <a href='#Page2_219'>219</a>; British attitude to +democracy as determining attitude to the War, i. <a href= +'#Page_77'>77</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_303'>303</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_305'>5</a>; bearing of, on democracy in Great Britain, +<a href='#Page2_299'>299</a> Union, The: British views of, i. +<a href='#Page_15'>15</a>; prognostications of its dissolution, +<a href='#Page_36'>36</a>, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> War of +Independence, i. <a href='#Page_2'>2</a>-<a href='#Page_3'>3</a>, +<a href='#Page_17'>17</a>; adjustments after the Treaty of Peace, +<a href='#Page_3'>3</a>; as fostering militant patriotism, <a href= +'#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a> <i>note</i>; commercial +relations after, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>-<a href= +'#Page_18'>18</a> "War of 1812" i. <a href='#Page_4'>4</a>, +<a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>; causes leading +to, <a href='#Page_5'>5</a>-<a href='#Page_7'>7</a>; New England +opposition to, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>; +effect of, on American National unity, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a> +<i>See also under</i> United States</p> +<p>Anderson, Major, Northern Commander at Fort Sumter, i. <a href= +'#Page_117'>117</a></p> +<p>Anderson's Mission, ii. <a href='#Page2_53'>53</a> +<i>note</i>[3]; reports, ii. <a href='#Page2_53'>53</a> <i>and +note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Andrews, Governor of Massachusetts, i. <a href= +'#Page_219'>219</a>-<a href='#Page_220'>20</a></p> +<p>Anthropological Society of London, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_222'>222</a></p> +<p>Antietam, defeat of Lee by McClellan at, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page2_85'>85</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_105'>105</a>; effect of, on Lord Palmerston, <a href= +'#Page2_43'>43</a></p> +<p>Archibald, British Consul at New York, i. <a href= +'#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a></p> +<p>Argyll, Duke of, i. <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href= +'#Page_212'>212</a>; anti-slavery attitude of, i. <a href= +'#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_112'>112</a>; views of, in <i>Trent</i> crisis, i. <a href= +'#Page_212'>212</a>, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>, <a href= +'#Page_229'>229</a>, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>; on calamity of +war with America, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>, <a href= +'#Page_238'>238</a>; on Northern determination, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_30'>30</a></p> +<p>Arkansas joins Confederate States, i. <a href= +'#Page_172'>172</a> <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i>, The, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_228'>228</a>, <a href='#Page2_229'>229</a>; attitude in the +conflict, <a href='#Page2_229'>229</a>-<a href='#Page2_230'>30</a>, +<a href='#Page2_236'>236</a>; on the Presidential election, +<a href='#Page2_235'>235</a>-<a href='#Page2_236'>6</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_238'>238</a>; summary of military situation after Atlanta, +<a href='#Page2_243'>243</a>; on "foreign war" rumours, <a href= +'#Page2_251'>251</a>; cited or quoted, <a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>, +<a href='#Page2_166'>166</a>, <a href='#Page2_232'>232</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_233'>3</a>, <a href='#Page2_243'>243</a>. (<i>See also +under</i> Russell, W.H.)</p> +<p>Arnold, Matthew, views on the secession, i. <a href= +'#Page_47'>47</a>; on British "superiority," <a href= +'#Page_258'>258</a>; on the rule of aristocracy and growth of +democracy, ii. <a href='#Page2_300'>300</a></p> +<p>Arnold, <i>The History of the Cotton Famine</i>, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_6'>6</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_10'>10</a>, +<a href='#Page2_11'>11</a>; quoted: first effects of the war on the +cotton trade, <a href='#Page2_9'>9</a>-<a href='#Page2_10'>10</a>; +cotton operatives' song, <a href='#Page2_17'>17</a> <i>note</i>[6]; +on the members for Lancashire, <a href='#Page2_26'>26</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_27'>7</a></p> +<p>Ashburton, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>; Ashburton +Mission, i. <a href='#Page_13'>13</a></p> +<p>Aspinwall and Forbes, Mission of, in England, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_130'>130</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Atlanta, captured by Sherman, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_233'>233</a>-<a href='#Page2_235'>5</a>; effect of, on +Northern attitude, <a href='#Page2_233'>233</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_234'>4</a>; effect of, on Lincoln's re-election, <a href= +'#Page2_235'>235</a></p> +<i>Atlantic Monthly</i>, The, ii. <a href='#Page2_109'>109</a> +<i>note</i>[3]; <a href='#Page_279'>279</a> <i>and +note</i>[3]</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>Bagley, Mr., ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a></p> +<p>Balch, <i>The Alabama Arbitration</i>, cited, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_129'>129</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Baligny. <i>See</i> Belligny</p> +<p>Bancroft, Frederic, cited, i. <a href='#Page_117'>117</a> +<i>note</i>; analysis of Seward's object in Declaration of Paris +negotiation, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>-<a href='#Page_153'>3</a>; +view on Russell's aims in, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a> <i>and +note</i>[2] <i>Life of Seward</i>, cited or quoted, i. <a href= +'#Page_106'>106</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_118'>118</a> +<i>note</i>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a> <i>note</i>[3]; <a href= +'#Page_132'>132</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>, +<a href='#Page_150'>150</a>-<a href='#Page_153'>3</a>, <a href= +'#Page_186'>186</a> <i>notes</i>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a> +<i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page_196'>196</a> <i>note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page_200'>200</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page_213'>213</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page_231'>231</a> +<i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_280'>280</a> <i>and note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page_281'>281</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_1'>1</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_2'>2</a>, <a href='#Page2_96'>96</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_99'>99</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_143'>143</a> +<i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page2_258'>258</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_310"></a>[V2:pg 310]</span> +<p>Banks, Governor, i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Baring, ii. <a href='#Page2_96'>96</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Bath, Marquis of, ii. <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a> +<i>note</i></p> +<p>Beals, Mr., ii. <a href='#Page2_191'>191</a></p> +<p>Bedford, Duke of, i. <a href='#Page_96'>96</a> <i>and +note</i>[3]</p> +<p><i>Bee Hive, The,</i> cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_293'>293</a> +<i>note</i></p> +<p>Beecher, Henry Ward, ii. <a href='#Page2_184'>184</a> <i>and +note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Beesly, Professor, speech of, at Trades Unions of London +Meeting, ii. <a href='#Page2_292'>292</a></p> +<p><i>Belfast Whig</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; <a href='#Page_231'>231</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Belligny, French Consul at Charleston, i. <a href= +'#Page_185'>185</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, +<a href='#Page_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>, <a href= +'#Page_191'>191</a> <i>and note</i>[4]</p> +<p><i>Bell's Weekly Messenger</i>, quoted, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_104'>104</a></p> +<p>Benjamin, Confederate Secretary of State, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_5'>5</a>; Mercier's interview with, i. <a href= +'#Page_284'>284</a>, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>; report of, to +Slidell on Mercier's visit, <a href='#Page_284'>284</a> +<i>note</i>[2]; instructions of, to Slidell offering commercial +advantages for French intervention, ii. <a href='#Page2_24'>24</a> +<i>and note</i>[2]; on idea of Confederate loan, <a href= +'#Page2_158'>158</a>-<a href='#Page2_159'>9</a>; recalls Mason, +<a href='#Page2_179'>179</a>; and recognition of the Confederacy, +<a href='#Page2_217'>217</a>; on the attitude of France to the +Confederacy, <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2]; plan of +offering abolition of slavery in return for recognition, <a href= +'#Page2_249'>249</a>; otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page_292'>292</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_88'>88</a> <i>note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page2_148'>148</a>, <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a> +<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_213'>213</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Bentinck, i. <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>, <a href= +'#Page_269'>269</a></p> +<p>Bernard, Montague: <i>Neutrality, The, of Great Britain during +the American Civil War</i>, quoted, i., <a href='#Page_100'>100</a> +<i>and note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_137'>137</a>-<a href= +'#Page_138'>8</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_118'>118</a>; cited, i. +<a href='#Page_171'>171</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page_245'>245</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_246'>246</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_263'>263</a> <i>notes</i>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_136'>136</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on the American +representations on the British Proclamation of Neutrality, i. +<a href='#Page_100'>100</a>; on Declaration of Paris negotiations, +<a href='#Page_137'>137</a>-<a href='#Page_138'>8</a>; on the +Blockade, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a> <i>and notes</i> "Two +Lectures on the Present American War": on recognition, cited, i. +<a href='#Page_183'>183</a></p> +<p>Bigelow, John, ii. <a href='#Page2_71'>71</a> <i>note</i>[3]: +<i>France and the Confederate Navy</i>, cited, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_57'>57</a> <i>note</i>[2] <i>Retrospections of an Active +Life</i>, cited, i. <a href='#Page_56'>56</a> <i>note</i>, <a href= +'#Page_217'>217</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href='#Page2_71'>71</a> +<i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_88'>88</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_128'>128</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a> +<i>note</i>[2]; Gladstone and the Cotton Loan, <a href= +'#Page2_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[2]; U.S. stimulation of +immigration, <a href='#Page2_200'>200</a> <i>note</i>[1]; cited, +<a href='#Page2_229'>229</a> <i>note</i>[1]; Quoted, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_254'>254</a>; advice of, on the political position in +Britain; quoted, <a href='#Page2_290'>290</a>; cited, <a href= +'#Page2_295'>295</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Billault, M., i. <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>, <a href= +'#Page_289'>289</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Birkbeck, Morris, <i>Letters from Illinois</i>, quoted, i. +<a href='#Page_25'>25</a></p> +<p><i>Birmingham Post</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>; +letters of S.A. Goddard in support of emancipation in, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_108'>108</a>-<a href='#Page2_109'>9</a></p> +<p>Bishop, Rev. Francis, ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a></p> +<p>Bismarck, ii. <a href='#Page2_203'>203</a></p> +<p>Black, Judge, American Secretary of State, i. <a href= +'#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a></p> +<p>Blackwood, John, political views of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_289'>289</a></p> +<p><i>Blackwood's Magazine</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_279'>279</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; on cotton and the blockade, <a href= +'#Page2_10'>10</a>; on French mediation proposals, <a href= +'#Page2_68'>68</a>; on the Emancipation Proclamation, <a href= +'#Page2_103'>103</a>; on democracy as cause of the war, <a href= +'#Page2_278'>278</a>-<a href='#Page2_279'>9</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_281'>281</a>, <a href='#Page2_289'>289</a></p> +<p>Blair, member of the United States Cabinet, i, <a href= +'#Page_130'>130</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>; +ii. <a href='#Page2_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page2_251'>251</a>, +<a href='#Page2_252'>252</a></p> +<p>Blockade of Southern Ports, the: Lincoln's declaration on, i. +<a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>, <a href= +'#Page_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>, <a href= +'#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>, <a href= +'#Page_122'>122</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>, <a href= +'#Page_245'>245</a>; commencement of, i. <a href= +'#Page_245'>245</a>; method of warning at the port, <a href= +'#Page_245'>245</a>, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>; as involving +hardship to British merchants, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>-<a href= +'#Page_246'>6</a>; effectiveness of, <a href= +'#Page_252'>252</a>-<a href='#Page_271'>71</a> <i>passim</i>; +effect on British Trade, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a>, <a href= +'#Page_254'>254</a>, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a>; effect on Cotton +Trade, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_8'>8</a>, +<a href='#Page2_9'>9</a>; statistics as to effectiveness, i. +<a href='#Page_268'>268</a> <i>note</i>[3] Southern Ports Bill, i. +<a href='#Page_246'>246</a> <i>et seq.</i> Stone Boat Fleet +Blockade, i. <a href='#Page_253'>253</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href= +'#Page_269'>269</a>, <a href='#Page_302'>302</a> British attitude +to, i. <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>, +<a href='#Page_245'>245</a>, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>, <a href= +'#Page_263'>263</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_5'>5</a>, <a href='#Page2_265'>265</a>; Parliamentary +debate on, i. <a href='#Page_267'>267</a> <i>et seq.</i>; Gregory's +motion <a href='#Page_268'>268</a> <i>et seq.</i>; press attitude, +<a href='#Page_246'>246</a>; Bright's view, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page2_15'>15</a> Confederate +representations on, i. <a href='#Page_265'>265</a> Napoleon's view +of, i. <a href='#Page_290'>290</a></p> +<p>Booth, assassinator of Lincoln, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_258'>258</a>, <a href='#Page2_259'>259</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_263'>263</a></p> +<p>Border States, The: efforts at compromise, i. <a href= +'#Page_49'>49</a>; sympathies in, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>; the +"Border State policy" of Lincoln, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>, +<a href='#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href='#Page_272'>272</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_82'>82</a>; and Confiscation +Bill, Lincoln's fears, <a href='#Page2_82'>82</a>; attitude of, to +emancipation, ii. <a href='#Page2_83'>83</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page2_87'>87</a>; not affected in +Proclamation of Emancipation, <a href='#Page2_86'>86</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_311"></a>[V2:pg 311]</span> +<p>Bourke, Hon. Robert, ii. <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_193'>193</a></p> +<p>Boynton, Rev. C.B., <i>English and French Neutrality, etc.</i>, +cited and quoted, ii. <a href='#Page2_225'>225</a> +<i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Bright, John, i. <a href='#Page_58'>58</a> <i>note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page_77'>77</a>; quoted on <i>Times</i> attitude towards +the United States, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a> <i>note</i>[3]; view +of the Northern attempt at reconquest, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>; +views of, on the Proclamation of Neutrality, <a href= +'#Page_108'>108</a>, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>; speech on +<i>Trent</i> affair, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>-<a href= +'#Page_222'>2</a>; letter to Sumner on <i>Trent</i> affair, +influence on Lincoln, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>; speech on +Britain's attitude on conclusion of <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href= +'#Page_241'>241</a>-<a href='#Page_242'>2</a>; view on the war as +for abolition, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>; on distress in +Lancashire, ii. <a href='#Page2_13'>13</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_14'>14</a>; view of the blockade, <a href= +'#Page2_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page2_15'>15</a>; on the cotton +shortage, <a href='#Page2_15'>15</a>; and Gladstone's Newcastle +speech, <a href='#Page2_48'>48</a>; view of Emancipation +Proclamation, <a href='#Page2_48'>48</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_105'>105</a>-<a href='#Page2_106'>6</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_111'>111</a>-<a href='#Page2_112'>12</a>; on England's +support if emancipation an object in the war, <a href= +'#Page2_88'>88</a>-<a href='#Page2_89'>9</a>; the escape of the +<i>Alabama</i>, <a href='#Page2_120'>120</a>; at Trades Unions of +London meeting, <a href='#Page2_132'>132</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_133'>3</a>, <a href='#Page2_134'>134</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_291'>291</a>-<a href='#Page2_293'>3</a>; support of the +North, <a href='#Page2_132'>132</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_283'>283</a>-<a href='#Page2_284'>4</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_290'>290</a>, <a href='#Page2_291'>291</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_295'>295</a>; on the interests of the unenfranchised in the +American conflict, <a href='#Page2_132'>132</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_295'>295</a>; on the unfriendly neutrality of the +Government, <a href='#Page2_134'>134</a>; rebuked by Palmerston, +<a href='#Page2_135'>135</a>; trouncing of Roebuck, <a href= +'#Page2_172'>172</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; on Britain's neutrality +(Nov., 1863), <a href='#Page2_184'>184</a>; championship of +democratic institutions, i. <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>-<a href= +'#Page_222'>2</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_132'>132</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_133'>3</a>, <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_277'>7</a>, <a href='#Page2_282'>282</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_283'>283</a>; popularity of, as advocate of Northern cause, +<a href='#Page2_224'>224</a>, <a href='#Page2_225'>225</a>; +influence of, for the North, i. <a href='#Page_58'>58</a> +<i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a>; Lincoln's pardon +of Alfred Rubery in honour of, <a href='#Page2_225'>225</a> <i>and +note</i>[1]; quoted on feeling of the British Government and people +towards United States in Jan., 1865, etc., <a href= +'#Page2_247'>247</a>; confidence of, in pacific policy of Lincoln, +<a href='#Page2_255'>255</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; quoted on the +ruling class and democracy, <a href='#Page2_280'>280</a>; attack on +Southern aristocracy by, <a href='#Page2_290'>290</a>; heads +deputation to Adams, <a href='#Page2_294'>294</a>; eulogy of George +Thompson by, <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[1] Adams' +opinion on, ii. <a href='#Page2_298'>298</a>; view of, in <i>The +Index</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_298'>298</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_299'>9</a>; Laird's view of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_134'>134</a>; Karl Marx's view of, <a href= +'#Page2_292'>292</a> <i>note</i>[1]; Lord Salisbury, quoted on the +oratory of, <a href='#Page2_290'>290</a> <i>note</i>[1], the +<i>Times</i> attack on, <a href='#Page2_295'>295</a>-<a href= +'#Page_296'>6</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href= +'#Page_289'>289</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page2_132'>132</a> <i>note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page2_172'>172</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page2_186'>186</a>, <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_191'>191</a>, <a href='#Page2_278'>278</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_281'>281</a>. (See also under <i>Morning Star</i>)</p> +<p>British, <i>See also under</i> Great Britain</p> +<p>British emigration to America, i. <a href='#Page_23'>23</a> +<i>et seq</i>, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>; effect of American +political ideals on, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>, <a href= +'#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <a href= +'#Page_26'>26</a></p> +<p>British Foreign Enlistment Act, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_116'>116</a>-<a href='#Page_117'>7</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_118'>118</a>; application of, in American crisis, question +in Commons, i. <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>; Russell's idea of +amending, ii. <a href='#Page2_124'>124</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_196'>196</a>; Russell's advice to Palmerston on, <a href= +'#Page2_131'>131</a>; debate in Parliament on, <a href= +'#Page2_132'>132</a>, <a href='#Page2_133'>133</a>-<a href= +'#Page_134'>4</a>, <a href='#Page2_135'>135</a>; Forster and the +violation of, <a href='#Page2_133'>133</a>; Government reply to +Liverpool shipowners on, <a href='#Page2_142'>142</a>; +<i>Kearsarge</i> incident, <a href='#Page2_202'>202</a></p> +<p>British Press. <i>See under names of Papers and under subject +headings</i></p> +<p><i>British Standard</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a> +<i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>British travellers' views on America, i. <a href= +'#Page_23'>23</a> <i>and note</i>, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, +<a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_274'>274</a>-<a href='#Page2_275'>5</a></p> +<p>Brooks, i. <a href='#Page_80'>80</a></p> +<p>Brougham, i. <a href='#Page_94'>94</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. +<a href='#Page2_282'>282</a></p> +<p>Brougham, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_19'>19</a></p> +<p>Brown, John, raid of, i. <a href='#Page_33'>33</a> +<i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Browning, Robert, pro-Northern sentiment of, i. <a href= +'#Page_70'>70</a>; on stone-boat blockade, <a href= +'#Page_256'>256</a>; on Slavery a factor in the struggle, <a href= +'#Page_238'>238</a>-<a href='#Page_239'>9</a>; on British dismay at +prospect of war in <i>Trent</i> crisis, <a href= +'#Page_240'>240</a>; mentioned, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a> +<i>note</i>[4]</p> +<p>Bruce,--, British Ambassador in Washington, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_255'>255</a> <i>note</i>[4]; report of American intentions +against France in Mexico, <a href='#Page2_255'>255</a> +<i>note</i>[4]; comment of, on Lincoln, Seward and Sumner, <a href= +'#Page2_262'>262</a>; warns Russell of probable American demands at +end of war, <a href='#Page2_266'>266</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_268'>268</a>; attitude to "piracy" proclamation, <a href= +'#Page2_268'>268</a>. Otherwise mentioned, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_262'>262</a>, <a href='#Page2_269'>269</a>.</p> +<p>Brunow, Baron de, Russian Ambassador: on British policy, i. +<a href='#Page_50'>50</a>-<a href='#Page_51'>1</a>, <a href= +'#Page_74'>74</a>; interpretation of Russell's "three months" +statement, <a href='#Page_272'>272</a> <i>note</i>[1]; report of, +on Russell's mediation plan, ii. <a href='#Page2_45'>45</a> +<i>note</i>[3]; interview of, with Russell on joint mediation +offer, <a href='#Page2_73'>73</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_312"></a>[V2:pg 312]</span> +<p>Bryce, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_188'>188</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href= +'#Page2_274'>274</a></p> +<p>Buchanan, President, i. <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href= +'#Page_49'>49</a>, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href= +'#Page_117'>117</a>, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_278'>278</a></p> +<p>Buckingham, James Silk, <i>America, Historical, Statistic and +Descriptive</i>, cited, i. <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></p> +<p>Buckley, Victor, ii. <a href='#Page2_120'>120</a> +<i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Bull Run, Northern defeat at, i. <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>, +<a href='#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href= +'#Page_201'>201</a>; as affecting Seward's policy, considered, +<a href='#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>-<a href= +'#Page_156'>6</a>; effect of, in Great Britain: press views, +<a href='#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>-<a href= +'#Page_178'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>; official views, +<a href='#Page_178'>178</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a> <i>and +note</i>[1]; public opinion, <a href='#Page_201'>201</a></p> +<p>Bullock, Captain J.D., Confederate Agent in Britain, ii. +<a href='#Page2_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page2_129'>129</a>, +<a href='#Page2_145'>145</a>; on the proposed use of the Laird +rams, <a href='#Page2_122'>122</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page2_143'>143</a>; shipbuilding contracts of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_156'>156</a>, <a href='#Page2_157'>157</a>; <i>Secret +Service under the Confederacy</i>, cited, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page2_149'>149</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Bunch,--, British Consul at Charleston, description of Jockey +Club dinner, i. <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>; on Southern anti-British +sentiment, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a> <i>note</i>[2], ii. <a href= +'#Page2_71'>71</a> <i>note</i>[2]; instructions to, on the +secession, i. <a href='#Page2_53'>53</a> <i>note</i>[1]; appeal of, +to Judge Black on seizure of Federal customs house, <a href= +'#Page2_52'>52</a>; characterizations of Southern leaders, <a href= +'#Page2_59'>59</a>; view of President Davis, <a href= +'#Page2_59'>59</a>; views on the South and secession, <a href= +'#Page2_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page2_93'>93</a>; characterizations +of Southern Commissioners, <a href='#Page2_63'>63</a>; negotiations +of, with the Confederates on Declaration of Paris, <a href= +'#Page2_168'>168</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href= +'#Page2_184'>184</a>-<a href='#Page2_186'>6</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a>; attitude of, to +the South, <a href='#Page2_185'>185</a> <i>and note</i>[4], +<a href='#Page2_103'>103</a>, <a href='#Page2_195'>195</a> +<i>note</i>[2]; American complaints of, <a href= +'#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page2_189'>189</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_193'>193</a>-<a href='#Page2_194'>4</a>; recall of +exequatur of, <a href='#Page2_184'>184</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_187'>187</a> <i>et seq</i>., <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a>, +<a href='#Page2_194'>194</a>-<a href='#Page2_195'>5</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_201'>201</a>; defence of his action in the Mure case, +<a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page2_188'>188</a>, +<a href='#Page2_192'>192</a>, <a href='#Page2_199'>199</a>; +subsequent history of, <a href='#Page2_195'>195</a> <i>note</i>[2]; +view of, as scapegoat, <a href='#Page2_195'>195</a> <i>note</i>[2]; +on attitude to the Blockade, <a href='#Page2_252'>252</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page2_268'>268</a>; on Southern intentions, <a href= +'#Page2_252'>252</a> <i>note</i>[2]; view of Southern +determination, <a href='#Page2_252'>252</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on +Southern views of England's necessity for cotton, <a href= +'#Page2_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page2_252'>252</a> <i>note</i>[2]; +ii. <a href='#Page2_4'>4</a>, <a href='#Page2_5'>5</a>; on effect +of the blockade on Southern cotton industry, <a href= +'#Page2_9'>9</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on burning of Mississippi cotton, +<a href='#Page2_16'>16</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page2_17'>17</a> <i>note</i>[4]; on the American system of +government as the cause of the Civil War, <a href= +'#Page2_278'>278</a> <i>note</i>[2] British attitude to the +controversy over, i. <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>-<a href= +'#Page_189'>9</a>, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>, <a href= +'#Page_191'>191</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a>; French attitude, +i. <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a> <i>and +note</i>[4], <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href= +'#Page_201'>201</a> <i>note</i> Lyons' views on Bunch controversy, +i. <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, +<a href='#Page_194'>194</a> <i>and note</i>[1] Russell's views, i. +<a href='#Page_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>, <a href= +'#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a> <i>and note</i>[4] +Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_88'>88</a></p> +<p>Burnley, British Ambassador, report of, on prospective war with +America, ii. <a href='#Page2_254'>254</a></p> +<p>Butler, General, order to Federal soldiers in New Orleans, i. +<a href='#Page_302'>302</a>-<a href='#Page_304'>4</a>, <a href= +'#Page_305'>305</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>; Palmerston and +Adams controversy on, i. <a href='#Page_302'>302</a>-<a href= +'#Page_305'>5</a>; Lord Russell's advice to Palmerston, <a href= +'#Page_303'>303</a>, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>Cairnes, Professor, ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> +<i>note</i>[3]; pamphlet by, on "Slave Power," <a href= +'#Page2_112'>112</a></p> +<p><i>Caledonian Mercury</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>California, acquisition of, by U.S., i. <a href= +'#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></p> +<p>Callahan,--, <i>Diplomatic History of the Southern +Confederacy</i>, cited, i. <a href='#Page_261'>261</a> <i>note</i>, +<a href='#Page_289'>289</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_167'>167</a> <i>notes</i>, <a href='#Page2_169'>169</a> +<i>note</i>[4]</p> +<p>Campbell, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_271'>271</a>, <a href= +'#Page_292'>292</a>; ii, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <a href= +'#Page_77'>77</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>, <a href= +'#Page_172'>172</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a></p> +<p>Canada: Rebellion of 1837 in, i. +<a href='#Page_4'>4</a>, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_117'>117</a>; British fear of American attack on, i. +<a href='#Page_4'>4</a>; sentiment in, as affected by the American +Wars against England, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a> <i>note</i>; +suggestions of annexation to Northern States of the U.S., <a href= +'#Page_54'>54</a>-<a href='#Page_55'>5</a>; "compensation" in, idea +in British press, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>-<a href= +'#Page_55'>5</a>; and in views of American political leaders, +<a href='#Page_55'>55</a>; Gladstone's idea regarding, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_69'>69</a>-<a href='#Page2_70'>70</a>; military defence of, +in <i>Trent</i> crisis, i. <a href='#Page_213'>213</a>, <a href= +'#Page_241'>241</a>-<a href='#Page_242'>2</a>; views in, on +<i>Trent</i> affair, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i>; on +British policy and defence, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a> +<i>note</i>; view of the <i>Times</i> in, <a href= +'#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i> Free Trade policy and, a Southern +premonition as to, i. <a href='#Page_22'>22</a> Reciprocity Treaty +of, with U.S., ii. <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_253'>253</a>-<a href='#Page2_254'>4</a> Otherwise +mentioned, ii. <a href='#Page2_251'>251</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_254'>254</a>, <a href='#Page2_275'>275</a></p> +<p>Canning, i. II, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href= +'#Page_20'>20</a></p> +<p>Cardwell, ii. <a href='#Page2_64'>64</a></p> +<p>Carolina, North, joins Confederate States, i. <a href= +'#Page_172'>172</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_313"></a>[V2:pg 313]</span> +<p>Carolina, South, secession of, i. <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, +<a href='#Page_43'>43</a>-<a href='#Page_44'>44</a>, <a href= +'#Page_55'>55</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_3'>3</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_4'>4</a>; seizes Federal customs at Charleston, i. <a href= +'#Page_52'>52</a>; requests Federal relinquishment of Fort Sumter, +<a href='#Page_117'>117</a></p> +<p>"Caroline" affair, The, i. <a href='#Page_109'>109</a></p> +<p>Case, Walter M., <i>James M. Mason--Confederate Diplomat</i>, +cited and quoted, i. <a href='#Page_261'>261</a> <i>note</i>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_161'>161</a> <i>and note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Catacazy, C., and mediation by Russia, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_251'>251</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Cecil, Lord Eustace, ii. <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_189'>189</a>, <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a></p> +<p>Cecil, Lord Robert, supports Gregory's motion on blockade, i. +<a href='#Page_268'>268</a>; supports Roebuck's motion, ii. +<a href='#Page2_171'>171</a>, <a href='#Page2_175'>175</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_176'>6</a>; on Committee of Southern Independence +Association, <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_193'>193</a></p> +<p>Charleston, S.C.: Sentiment to Great Britain in, i. <a href= +'#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a> <i>note</i>; seizure +of customs house at, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>; British appeal on +question of port dues at, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href= +'#Page_244'>244</a>; "Stone Boat" blockade of harbour at, <a href= +'#Page_253'>253</a>; evacuation of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_248'>248</a>, <a href='#Page2_249'>249</a></p> +<p>Charleston <i>Mercury</i>, "King Cotton" theory of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_5'>5</a></p> +<p>Chase, Secretary of Treasury, i. <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>, +<a href='#Page_121'>121</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>, +<a href='#Page2_283'>283</a>; quarrel with Seward, <a href= +'#Page2_72'>72</a></p> +<p>Chase, W.H. (of Florida), quoted, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_4'>4</a></p> +<p>Chattanooga, ii. <a href='#Page2_185'>185</a></p> +<p>Cheever, Rev. Dr., ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a></p> +<p>Chenery, ii. <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a></p> +<p>Chesney, Captain, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_165'>165</a></p> +<p>Chesson, F.W., ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a></p> +<p>Chicago Convention, the, i. <a href='#Page_175'>175</a></p> +<p>Chicago abolitionists, Lincoln and, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_49'>49</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Chicamauga, Rosencrans defeated at, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_184'>184</a></p> +<p>Chittenden, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a> +<i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Christian IX, of Denmark, ii. <a href='#Page2_203'>203</a></p> +<p>Clanricarde, Lord, ii. <a href='#Page2_168'>168</a></p> +<p>Clarendon, Earl of, i. <a href='#Page_199'>199</a> +<i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_3'>3</a>, <a href='#Page2_51'>51</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_58'>8</a> <i>passim</i>, <a href='#Page2_63'>63</a>, +<a href='#Page2_203'>203</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on Russell's mediation +project and Lewis' Hereford speech, quoted, <a href= +'#Page2_57'>57</a>-<a href='#Page2_58'>8</a></p> +<p>Clayton-Bulwer Treaty: Seward's attack on British interpretation +of, i. <a href='#Page_113'>113</a></p> +<p>Cobden, i. <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>; quoted, on the +<i>Times</i>, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i>; opinion of +Seward, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i>; and Sumner, +<a href='#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i>; on Palmerston's action in +<i>Trent</i> affair, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a> <i>note</i>[3]; +letter to Sumner read at American Cabinet meeting, <a href= +'#Page_232'>232</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page_289'>289</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_26'>26</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page2_80'>80</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_95'>95</a> <i>and note</i>[4], <a href= +'#Page2_166'>166</a>, <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a></p> +<p>Collie, ii. <a href='#Page2_189'>189</a></p> +<p>Collier, legal advice of, on <i>Alabama</i>, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_118'>118</a>-<a href='#Page2_119'>9</a></p> +<p>Columbia District, freeing of slaves in, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_83'>83</a></p> +<p>Columbia, S.C., burning of, ii. <a href='#Page2_248'>248</a>, +<a href='#Page2_249'>249</a></p> +<p>Combe, George, <i>Notes on the United States, etc.</i>, cited, +i. <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></p> +<p>Confederate Commissioners to Europe, the: Bunch's +characterization of, i. <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>; unofficial +interview with Russell, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>-<a href= +'#Page_86'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>, <a href= +'#Page_158'>158</a>; protest against closing of British ports, +<a href='#Page_170'>170</a> <i>note</i>[2]; replaced by "Special +Commissioners," <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>; attempt to make use of +the <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>; British +attitude to, not modified by <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href= +'#Page_235'>235</a>; policy of, with regard to recognition and the +blockade, i. <a href='#Page_264'>264</a>-<a href='#Page_265'>5</a>, +<a href='#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>, <a href= +'#Page_300'>300</a>; acquire a "confidential" document, <a href= +'#Page_265'>265</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; hopes of, from Parliament, +<a href='#Page_265'>265</a>, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>, <a href= +'#Page_272'>272</a>; instructions of the first Commissioners, ii. +<a href='#Page2_4'>4</a> <i>and note</i>[3]; failure of the first +Commission, <a href='#Page2_4'>4</a>-<a href='#Page2_5'>5</a>; +suggest a treaty on African Slave Trade, <a href='#Page2_88'>88</a> +<i>note</i>[2]; slavery abolition offer, <a href= +'#Page2_249'>249</a> Confederate Agents' correspondence, +collections of, i. <a href='#Page_261'>261</a> <i>note</i>[1] +<i>See also under personal names</i></p> +<p>Confederates, <i>See under</i> Southern States</p> +<p>Confiscation Bill, The, ii. <a href='#Page2_82'>82</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page2_85'>85</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page2_92'>92</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_95'>95</a>; Lincoln's attitude to, <a href= +'#Page2_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page2_84'>84</a>; Lord Russell's +comment on, <a href='#Page2_97'>97</a></p> +<p><i>Constitutionel</i>, The, cited, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Continental Press and American News, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_71'>71</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Corcoran, ii. <a href='#Page2_169'>169</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_314"></a>[V2:pg 314]</span> +<p>Cotton supplies and slavery, i. <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>; in +British-American commercial relations, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, +<a href='#Page_22'>22</a>; British manufacturers' dependence on, +<a href='#Page_22'>22</a>; effect of the Civil War on, <a href= +'#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_53'>53</a>; the crop of 1860 ... ii. <a href= +'#Page2_7'>7</a> Blockade, The, and, i. <a href='#Page_252'>252</a> +<i>and note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_9'>9</a>; effect of, on price, i. <a href= +'#Page_262'>262</a>, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>; Napoleon's views +on, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a> England, need of, for, i. <a href= +'#Page_196'>196</a>-<a href='#Page_197'>7</a>, <a href= +'#Page_200'>200</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>, +<a href='#Page_296'>296</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_17'>17</a>, +<a href='#Page2_99'>99</a>; cotton famine in, <a href= +'#Page_294'>294</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_6'>6</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_11'>11</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page2_16'>16</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; cotton manufacturing industry of, in 1860-1, ii. +<a href='#Page2_6'>6</a>-<a href='#Page2_7'>7</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_8'>8</a>; first effects of the war on, <a href= +'#Page2_8'>8</a>, <a href='#Page2_9'>9</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_10'>10</a>. <i>See also under</i> Lancashire. France, +necessity of, for cotton, i. <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>, <a href= +'#Page_290'>290</a>, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a>, <a href= +'#Page_294'>294</a>, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>, <a href= +'#Page_300'>300</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_17'>17</a>; Mercier's plan +to relieve, i. <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>-<a href= +'#Page_201'>201</a> Gladstone's Newcastle speech, effect of, on +price of, ii. <a href='#Page2_48'>48</a>; "King Cotton" theory, i. +<a href='#Page_63'>63</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_1'>1</a> <i>et +seq.</i>; belief of the South in cotton as a weapon of diplomacy, +<a href='#Page2_2'>2</a>-<a href='#Page2_3'>3</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_4'>4</a>, <a href='#Page2_5'>5</a> Southern orders for +destruction of, ii. <a href='#Page2_16'>16</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_17'>17</a> <i>note</i>[4]; effect of, on British officials, +<a href='#Page2_17'>17</a></p> +<p>Cowley, Lord, British Ambassador in Paris, i. <a href= +'#Page_88'>88</a>; reports French agreement with British policy on +Southern belligerent rights, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>; in the +Declaration of Paris negotiations, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, +<a href='#Page_143'>143</a>, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>, <a href= +'#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>, <a href= +'#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>; conversations +with Thouvenel in Bunch affair, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>; +disturbed at French evasion of direct support, <a href= +'#Page_189'>189</a>, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href= +'#Page_201'>201</a> <i>note</i>[1]; in <i>Trent</i> affair fears +war with America, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>; communications on +Southern Ports Bill, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a> <i>and +note</i>[2]; view of French attitude on Southern Ports Bill, +<a href='#Page_247'>247</a>; on French policy in Mexico, <a href= +'#Page_260'>260</a>, <a href='#Page_261'>261</a> <i>note</i>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_46'>46</a>; quoted, on Thouvenel's view on +mediation in Feb., 1862 ... i. <a href='#Page_266'>266</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; on Mercier's Richmond visit, i. <a href= +'#Page_288'>288</a>; statement of, to Lindsay, after interview with +Napoleon, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>; on the possibility of +reunion, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>; on the blockade, <a href= +'#Page_290'>290</a>-<a href='#Page_291'>1</a>; denial of Napoleon's +"offer" to England, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>, <a href= +'#Page_291'>291</a>; reports of, on Lindsay's mission, <a href= +'#Page_291'>291</a>-<a href='#Page_292'>2</a>, <a href= +'#Page_293'>293</a>, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a> <i>note</i>[1]; +conversations with Thouvenel on Lindsay, <a href= +'#Page_291'>291</a>, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a>-<a href= +'#Page_294'>4</a>; Napoleon's letter to, on Lindsay, quoted, +<a href='#Page_295'>295</a> <i>note</i>[2]; interview with +Thouvenel on Russell's mediation plan, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_38'>38</a>, <a href='#Page2_39'>39</a> <i>and note</i>, +<a href='#Page2_46'>46</a>; on Napoleon's suggestion of joint +mediation, <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>; instructed to notify France +of England's view of the war as ended and of attitude to +Confederate cruisers, <a href='#Page2_266'>266</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_267'>7</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page_218'>218</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Crawford, Consul-General at Havana, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_148'>148</a></p> +<p>Crimean War: Anglo-French agreement regarding neutral commerce, +i. <a href='#Page_139'>139</a></p> +<p>Crittenden, i. <a href='#Page_49'>49</a></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p><i>Daily Gazette</i>, The, cited, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_109'>109</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p><i>Daily News</i>, attitude of, during the American Civil War, +i. <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>-<a href='#Page_70'>70</a> <i>and +note</i> <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>, +<a href='#Page_181'>181</a>-<a href='#Page_182'>2</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_230'>230</a> <i>note</i>[3], on Lincoln's message to +Congress, i. <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>; letters of W.W. Story in, +<a href='#Page_228'>228</a></p> +<p><i>Daily Telegraph</i>, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_50'>50</a> +<i>note</i>[1], attitude and circulation of, <a href= +'#Page2_189'>189</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>, +<a href='#Page2_230'>230</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Dallas, American Minister to Great Britain, i. <a href= +'#Page_62'>62</a>; lack of instructions on American intentions, +<a href='#Page_62'>62</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <a href= +'#Page_112'>112</a>; communications with Lord Russell, <a href= +'#Page_62'>62</a>, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>, <a href= +'#Page_74'>74</a>; despatches to Seward on Russell's intentions, +<a href='#Page_66'>66</a>-<a href='#Page_67'>7</a>; Russell's +pledge of delay to, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href= +'#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href= +'#Page_107'>107</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>; report on +proposed British joint action with France, <a href= +'#Page_84'>84</a>-<a href='#Page_85'>5</a>, <a href= +'#Page_86'>86</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href= +'#Page_156'>156</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Dana, R.H., cited, i. <a href='#Page_218'>218</a>; <i>The Trent +Affair</i>, cited, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a> <i>note</i>, +<a href='#Page_205'>205</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page_237'>237</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Danish question, The, ii. <a href='#Page2_203'>203</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_205'>5</a>, <a href='#Page2_214'>214</a></p> +<p>Darwin, Charles, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_180'>180</a> <i>and +note</i>[4]</p> +<p>Davis, Bancroft, <i>Times</i> correspondent in New York, i. +<a href='#Page_56'>56</a></p> +<p>Davis, Jefferson, personal characteristics of, i. <a href= +'#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <a href= +'#Page_82'>82</a>: ii. <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a>; attitude of, +in the opening of the crisis, i. <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>; elected +President of the Southern Government, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, +<a href='#Page_81'>81</a>; foreign policy of, <a href= +'#Page_81'>81</a>-<a href='#Page_82'>2</a>; aristocratic views of, +on government, ii. <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a>; proclamation of, +on marque and privateering, i. <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href= +'#Page_89'>89</a>, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>, <a href= +'#Page_92'>92</a>, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href= +'#Page_121'>121</a>, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>, <a href= +'#Page_141'>141</a>, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a>; defensive +measures of, in the South, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a>; on Bunch's +negotiations on Declaration of Paris, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>; +replaces Confederate agents to Europe, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>; +and the African Slave Trade, ii. <a href='#Page2_88'>88</a> +<i>note</i>[2]; proclamation of retaliation against Lincoln's +Emancipation Proclamation, <a href='#Page2_106'>106</a> <i>and +note</i>[4]; on England's conduct towards the South, <a href= +'#Page2_184'>184</a>; on Southern disorganization, <a href= +'#Page2_219'>219</a>; flight of, from Richmond, <a href= +'#Page2_248'>248</a>; approves plan of offering abolition of +slavery in return for recognition, <a href='#Page2_249'>249</a>; +capture of, <a href='#Page2_267'>267</a> British views on, ii. +<a href='#Page2_276'>276</a> Bunch's characterization of, i. +<a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a> +<i>note</i>[4] Gladstone's Newcastle speech on, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_47'>47</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page2_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_185'>185</a> +<i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_254'>254</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_265'>265</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_283'>283</a>; +ii. <a href='#Page2_5'>5</a>, <a href='#Page2_6'>6</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_176'>176</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_251'>251</a>, +<a href='#Page2_252'>252</a>, <a href='#Page2_285'>285</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_315"></a>[V2:pg 315]</span> +<p>Dayton, American Minister at Paris, i. <a href= +'#Page_129'>129</a>, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>, <a href= +'#Page_143'>143</a>, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href= +'#Page_150'>150</a>, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a>, <a href= +'#Page_163'>163</a>, <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href= +'#Page_167'>167</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, +<a href='#Page_200'>200</a>, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>, <a href= +'#Page_300'>300</a></p> +<p>de Brunow, Russian Ambassador. <i>See under</i> Brunow</p> +<p>de Flahault, French Ambassador. <i>See under</i> Flahault</p> +<p><i>Debats</i>: French press views on military situation, cited, +ii. <a href='#Page2_174'>174</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p><i>De Bow's Review</i>, eulogies of the South in, quoted, ii. +<a href='#Page2_2'>2</a>, <a href='#Page2_3'>3</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_4'>4</a>; on cotton and slavery, <a href='#Page2_3'>3</a>; +view of England's action on blockade, <a href='#Page2_4'>4</a></p> +<p>Declaration of Paris, The, i. <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, +<a href='#Page_139'>139</a>-<a href='#Page_140'>40</a>; attitude of +United States to, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>-<a href= +'#Page_141'>1</a>, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>; American offer of +adherence during the Civil War, <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>, +<a href='#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>-<a href= +'#Page_142'>2</a>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>, <a href= +'#Page_151'>151</a></p> +<p>Declaration of Paris Negotiation, The, i. <a href= +'#Page_137'>137</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>, +<a href='#Page_201'>201</a>; British suggestion to France in, i. +<a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>, <a href= +'#Page_142'>142</a>, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>-<a href= +'#Page_147'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>, <a href= +'#Page_157'>157</a> <i>and note</i>[3]; American offer of +adherence, <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>, <a href= +'#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>-<a href= +'#Page_142'>2</a>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>, <a href= +'#Page_151'>151</a>; convention agreed between Britain, France, and +America, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>-<a href='#Page_143'>3</a>; +addition of a declaration in support of British neutrality proposed +by Lord Russell, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>-<a href= +'#Page_146'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>, <a href= +'#Page_151'>151</a>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href= +'#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>, <a href= +'#Page_201'>201</a>; American rejection of convention, <a href= +'#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href= +'#Page_201'>201</a> American argument at Geneva on effect of +British diplomacy in, i. <a href='#Page_146'>146</a> <i>note</i>[2] +Confederates: approach of, in the negotiation, i. <a href= +'#Page_161'>161</a>, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href= +'#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>, <a href= +'#Page_168'>168</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href= +'#Page_184'>184</a>-<a href='#Page_186'>6</a>, <a href= +'#Page_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href= +'#Page_193'>193</a>; Confederate Congress resolution of approval +in, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a> Convention, the, proposed by U.S. +Cowley's opinion on, i. <a href='#Page_167'>167</a> <i>and +note</i>[3]; Thouvenel's opinion on, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>; +Palmerston's suggestion on, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a> <i>and +note</i>[4] Seward's motives in, <i>See under</i> Seward</p> +<p>Delane, editor of the <i>Times:</i> Palmerston's letters to, on +American rights in interception of Confederate Commissioners, i. +<a href='#Page_207'>207</a>-<a href='#Page_208'>8</a>, <a href= +'#Page_209'>209</a>; close relations of, with Palmerston, <a href= +'#Page_229'>229</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_145'>145</a>; anticipations of Southern victory, ii. +<a href='#Page2_204'>204</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; on prospective war +with America, <a href='#Page2_254'>254</a>; effect of Sherman's +arrival at Savannah on, <a href='#Page2_245'>245</a> <i>and +note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_300'>300</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_301'>1</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page_177'>177</a>, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>, <a href= +'#Page_180'>180</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_65'>65</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_289'>289</a></p> +<p>de Lhuys, M. Drouyn, French Premier, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_59'>59</a> <i>and note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_60'>60</a>, +<a href='#Page2_63'>63</a> <i>note</i>[5], <a href= +'#Page2_168'>168</a></p> +<p>Democratic element in British Society: lack of press +representation, i. <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href= +'#Page_41'>41</a></p> +<p>Democracy: British views on American institutions, i. <a href= +'#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <a href= +'#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_274'>274</a>-<a href='#Page2_275'>5</a>; view of the +American struggle as a failure of, <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a> +<i>et seq. passim;</i> Press comments on the lesson from failure of +American democratic institutions, <a href='#Page2_279'>279</a>, +<a href='#Page2_280'>280</a>, <a href='#Page2_281'>281</a>, +<a href='#Page2_285'>285</a>, <a href='#Page2_286'>286</a>, +<a href='#Page2_297'>297</a>; bearing of the Civil War on, <a href= +'#Page2_299'>299</a>; aristocratic and conservative attitude to, +<a href='#Page2_286'>286</a>, <a href='#Page2_287'>287</a>, +<a href='#Page2_297'>297</a>, <a href='#Page2_298'>298</a>, +<a href='#Page2_300'>300</a>, <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a>; rise of +democratic feeling in Great Britain, <a href='#Page2_291'>291</a>; +effect of the Reform Bill of 1867, <a href='#Page2_304'>304</a></p> +<p>Derby, Lord (Leader of the Opposition), i. <a href= +'#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>, <a href= +'#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a> <i>and note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page_240'>240</a>, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>; attitude +to recognition and mediation, i. <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_51'>51</a>, <a href='#Page2_52'>52</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page2_54'>54</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_77'>77</a>; attacks governmental policy in relation to +Laird Rams and Southern shipbuilding, <a href= +'#Page2_149'>149</a>-<a href='#Page2_150'>50</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_197'>197</a>; approves attitude to Napoleon's mediation +proposals, <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a>-<a href='#Page2_155'>5</a>; +speech in motion for address to the Crown on Lincoln's +assassination, <a href='#Page2_263'>263</a>; attacks Government on +American "piracy proclamation" at end of the war, <a href= +'#Page2_267'>267</a>-<a href='#Page2_268'>8</a>; attitude to +expansion of the franchise, i. <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_276'>276</a>, <a href='#Page2_303'>303</a> <i>and +note</i>[1] Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>, +<a href='#Page_295'>295</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_51'>51</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_166'>166</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_210'>210</a>, <a href='#Page2_214'>214</a></p> +<p><i>Dial</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a> +<i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Disraeli, Benjamin (Tory leader in the Commons), i. <a href= +'#Page_79'>79</a>; on <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href= +'#Page_241'>241</a>; connection with Lindsay's motion, <a href= +'#Page_292'>292</a>, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>, <a href= +'#Page_296'>296</a>, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_213'>213</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; approval of neutrality, +ii. <a href='#Page2_77'>77</a>, <a href='#Page2_174'>174</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; in Roebuck's motion, <a href='#Page2_153'>153</a>, +<a href='#Page2_171'>171</a>, <a href='#Page2_174'>174</a>; +attitude to stoppage of Southern shipbuilding, <a href= +'#Page2_197'>197</a>; speech, of, on the motion for the Address to +the Crown on Lincoln's assassination, <a href= +'#Page2_263'>263</a>-<a href='#Page2_264'>4</a>; Reform Bill of +(1867) ... <a href='#Page2_303'>303</a> <i>and note</i>[1] +Mentioned, ii. <a href='#Page2_270'>270</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_316"></a>[V2:pg 316]</span> +<p>Donoughmore, Earl of, ii. <a href='#Page2_204'>204</a> <i>and +note</i>[2]; reply to Mason, <a href='#Page2_250'>250</a>-<a href= +'#Page_251'>1</a></p> +<p>D'Oubril, ii. <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a> <i>note</i>[4], +<a href='#Page2_62'>62</a> <i>note</i>[5]</p> +<p>Doyle, Percy, i. <a href='#Page_218'>218</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p><i>Dublin News</i>, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>, +<a href='#Page_46'>46</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p><i>Dubuque Sun</i>, The, ii. <a href='#Page2_22'>22</a> +<i>note</i></p> +<p>Dudley, U.S. Consul at Liverpool, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a> <i>note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page2_144'>144</a>, <a href='#Page2_145'>145</a> +<i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Dufferin, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_240'>240</a></p> +<p>Duffus, R.L., "Contemporary English Popular Opinion on the +American Civil War," i. <a href='#Page_41'>41</a> <i>note</i>[1]; +quoted, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>; +cited, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_112'>112</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Dumfermline, Lady, i. <a href='#Page_224'>224</a> +<i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Dumping of British goods: effect on American feeling, i. +<a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p><i>Economist</i>, The: attitude in the struggle, i. <a href= +'#Page_41'>41</a>, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href= +'#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>-<a href= +'#Page_174'>4</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_15'>15</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_173'>173</a>, <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>; +cited or quoted: on Lincoln's election, i. <a href= +'#Page_39'>39</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; on impossibility of Northern +reconquest, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>; on secession an accomplished +fact, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_79'>79</a>; +on Bull Run, i. <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>; on cotton shortage, i. +<a href='#Page_55'>55</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_14'>14</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_15'>15</a>; on servile insurrection, <a href= +'#Page2_79'>79</a>; on Cotton Loan, <a href='#Page2_160'>160</a>, +<a href='#Page2_162'>162</a>; on Roebuck's motion, <a href= +'#Page2_173'>173</a>; on extension of the franchise, <a href= +'#Page2_277'>277</a>; on American institutions and statesmen, +<a href='#Page2_279'>279</a>-<a href='#Page2_280'>80</a></p> +<p><i>Edinburgh Review</i>, The: attitude to slavery, i. <a href= +'#Page_33'>33</a>, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_281'>281</a>; attitude in the conflict, i. <a href= +'#Page_42'>42</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_50'>50</a> <i>note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>; on recognition, <a href= +'#Page2_46'>46</a> <i>note</i>[3]; on the Emancipation +Proclamation, <a href='#Page2_103'>103</a>; on the causes of the +war, <a href='#Page2_281'>281</a></p> +<p>Elliot, chargé, i. <a href='#Page_14'>14</a></p> +<p>Elliott, E.N., editor of <i>Cotton is King and Pro-Slavery +Arguments</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_3'>3</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Emancipation, Proclamation of: ii. <a href='#Page2_74'>74</a>, +<a href='#Page2_78'>78</a>, <a href='#Page2_80'>80</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_86'>86</a> <i>and note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_91'>91</a>; +idea of military necessity for, <a href='#Page2_81'>81</a>, +<a href='#Page2_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page2_85'>85</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_87'>87</a>; Lincoln's alleged purpose in, <a href= +'#Page2_87'>87</a>; purpose of, according to Seward, <a href= +'#Page2_99'>99</a>-<a href='#Page2_100'>100</a>; viewed as an +incitement to servile insurrection, <a href='#Page2_49'>49</a>, +<a href='#Page2_74'>74</a>, <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_101'>101</a>, <a href='#Page2_103'>103</a> <i>note</i>[6] +American reception of, ii. <a href='#Page2_101'>101</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_105'>105</a> British attitude to, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_101'>101</a> <i>et seq.</i>; Press denunciation of, +<a href='#Page2_102'>102</a>-<a href='#Page2_105'>5</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_106'>106</a>; public meetings in favour of, <a href= +'#Page2_106'>106</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_107'>107</a>, <a href='#Page2_108'>108</a>; English women's +support of, <a href='#Page2_109'>109</a>; Nonconformist support, +<a href='#Page2_109'>109</a>, <a href='#Page2_110'>110</a>; +Emancipation societies support of, <a href='#Page2_110'>110</a> +Confiscation Bill, <i>See that heading</i> <i>See also</i> Border +States <i>and sub-heading under</i> Lincoln</p> +<p>Emigration, British, to America, i. <a href= +'#Page_23'>23</a>-<a href='#Page_24'>4</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_200'>200</a>-<a href='#Page2_201'>1</a>; <i>Kearsarge</i> +incident, <a href='#Page2_200'>200</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_201'>1</a></p> +<p>England: cotton famine. <i>See under</i> Cotton. <i>See</i> +Great Britain</p> +<p>Erlanger & Co. and Confederate Cotton Loan, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_158'>158</a>-<a href='#Page_160'>60</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_161'>161</a>, <a href='#Page2_162'>162</a> <i>and +note</i>[3]</p> +<p>European opinion of the Civil War after duration of three years, +ii. <a href='#Page2_219'>219</a></p> +<p>Eustis, i. <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>, <a href= +'#Page_234'>234</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Evans, William, ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a></p> +<p>Everett, Edward, Russell's letter to, on Proclamation of +Neutrality, i. <a href='#Page_166'>166</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Ewart, question by, in the House of Commons, on Privateers, i. +<a href='#Page_90'>90</a></p> +<p>Expatriation, American and British views on, i. <a href= +'#Page_16'>16</a></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>Fairfax, Lieut., of the <i>San Jacinto</i>, i. <a href= +'#Page_205'>205</a></p> +<p>Farnall's "Reports on Distress in the Manufacturing Districts," +ii. <a href='#Page2_12'>12</a> <i>note</i>, <a href= +'#Page2_20'>20</a></p> +<p>Fawcett, Prof., ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> +<i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Featherstonaugh, G.W., <i>Excursion through the Slave +States</i>, cited, i. <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></p> +<p>Federals. <i>See under</i> Northern</p> +<p>Ferguson, Sir James, i. <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_175'>175</a></p> +<p>Ferrand, attack by, on cotton manufacturers in the Commons, ii. +<a href='#Page2_164'>164</a></p> +<p><i>Fishmongers of London</i>: Meeting in honour of Yancey, ii. +<a href='#Page2_223'>223</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Fitzgerald, Seymour, i. <a href='#Page_306'>306</a>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_25'>25</a></p> +<p>Fitzwilliam, Hon. C., ii. <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a></p> +<p>Flahault, M. de, French Ambassador, i. <a href= +'#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>, <a href= +'#Page_260'>260</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>, +<a href='#Page_291'>291</a>, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_19'>19</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href= +'#Page2_45'>45</a></p> +<p>Forbes, J.M., and Aspinwall, Mission of, in England, ii. +<a href='#Page2_130'>130</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_297'>297</a></p> +<p>Forbes, J.M., quoted on the Civil War viewed as a fight for +Democracy, ii. <a href='#Page2_297'>297</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_317"></a>[V2:pg 317]</span> +<p>Forster, William E., i. <a href='#Page_58'>58</a> <i>and +note</i>[2]; a friend of the North, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a> +<i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a>; quoted, on +Harriet Martineau, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[3]; +question in Commons on privateering, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>, +<a href='#Page_157'>157</a>; speech against Gregory's motion on +blockade, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>; +speech on mediation and intervention in debate on Lindsay's motion, +ii. <a href='#Page2_22'>22</a>; close touch with Adams, <a href= +'#Page2_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page2_36'>36</a>; attacks Government +in debate on Southern shipbuilding, <a href='#Page2_133'>133</a>; +rebuked by Palmerston, <a href='#Page2_135'>135</a>; in Roebuck's +motion, <a href='#Page2_171'>171</a>-<a href='#Page2_172'>2</a>, +<a href='#Page2_175'>175</a>; comment on Southern meetings, +<a href='#Page2_190'>190</a> <i>and note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Fort Donelson, Confederate reverse at, i. <a href= +'#Page_272'>272</a>, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a> <i>note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page_274'>274</a></p> +<p>Fort Henry, Confederate reverse at, i. <a href= +'#Page_272'>272</a>, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a> <i>note[1]</i>, +<a href='#Page_274'>274</a></p> +<p>Fox, G.V.: <i>Confidential Correspondence</i>, cited, i. +<a href='#Page_257'>257</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href= +'#Page_268'>268</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_120'>120</a> <i>note</i>[3]; quoted, on Confederate +ironclads in England, <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a> +<i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>France: Naval right of search exercised by, i. <a href= +'#Page_6'>6</a>; and American contentions on neutral rights, +<a href='#Page_18'>18</a>; Confederate Cotton Loan, attitude to, +ii. <a href='#Page2_160'>160</a> <i>note</i>[2] Cotton: lack of, i. +<a href='#Page_279'>279</a>, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>, <a href= +'#Page_293'>293</a>-<a href='#Page_294'>4</a>, <a href= +'#Page_296'>296</a>, <a href='#Page_300'>300</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_17'>17</a> Mediation and armistice, attitude to British +unofficial overture on, ii. <a href='#Page2_38'>38</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_39'>9</a>, <a href='#Page2_45'>45</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_46'>6</a>, <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_60'>60</a> Ministerial crisis, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_39'>39</a>, <a href='#Page2_45'>45</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_59'>59</a> Neutrality of, i. <a href='#Page_299'>299</a>; +Northern sentiment on, ii. <a href='#Page2_225'>225</a> <i>and +note</i>[2] Policy in the Civil War: joint action of, with Great +Britain, i. <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, +<a href='#Page_156'>156</a>, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a> +<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>, <a href= +'#Page_249'>249</a>-<a href='#Page_250'>50</a>, <a href= +'#Page_252'>252</a>, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>, <a href= +'#Page_260'>260</a>, <a href='#Page_284'>284</a>, <a href= +'#Page_294'>294</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_28'>28</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_75'>75</a>, <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a>; break in, +<a href='#Page2_77'>77</a> Press of, and the events in U.S., ii. +<a href='#Page2_174'>174</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href= +'#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2] <i>See also under</i> Mercier, +Napoleon, Thouvenel, <i>and under subject-headings</i></p> +<p><i>Fraser's Magazine</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_284'>284</a>; J.S. +Mill's articles in, i. <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>, <a href= +'#Page_242'>242</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_81'>81</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page2_285'>285</a></p> +<p>Fraser, Trenholm & Company: Confederate financial agents in +Liverpool, ii. <a href='#Page2_156'>156</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_157'>157</a></p> +<p>Frederick VII of Denmark: and Schleswig-Holstein, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_203'>203</a></p> +<p>Free Trade, i. <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_304'>304</a></p> +<p>Freeman, E.A., <i>History of Federal Government</i>, cited, ii. +<a href='#Page2_152'>152</a>-<a href='#Page2_153'>3</a></p> +<p>Fremont, ii. <a href='#Page2_82'>82</a></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>Gallenga,----, <i>Times</i> correspondent in New York, ii. +<a href='#Page2_189'>189</a></p> +<p>Gait, Sir J.T., i. <a href='#Page_221'>221</a> <i>note</i>[1]; +<a href='#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Galveston, Tex. i. <a href='#Page_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[1]; +ii. <a href='#Page2_266'>266</a>, <a href='#Page2_268'>268</a></p> +<p>Garrison, W.L., American abolitionist, editor of the +<i>Liberator</i>, i. <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href= +'#Page_33'>33</a>, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Garrison, <i>Garrison</i>, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_91'>91</a> +<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_111'>111</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Gasparin, Count, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_92'>92</a> +<i>notes</i></p> +<p>Geneva Arbitration Court: American complaint of British +Neutrality, in, i. <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>; American argument +before, on Declaration of Paris, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a> +<i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>German opinion on the Civil War, i. <a href='#Page_178'>178</a> +<i>note</i>[3]; ii. <a href='#Page2_111'>111</a> <i>note</i>[2]; +press attitude, <a href='#Page2_285'>285</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Germany: the <i>Index</i> quoted on "aid given by, to the +North," ii. <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Gettysburg, Battle of, ii. <a href='#Page2_143'>143</a>, +<a href='#Page2_176'>176</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page2_296'>296</a></p> +<p>Gladstone, Thomas, letters of, to the <i>Times</i>, i. <a href= +'#Page_32'>32</a>, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a> <i>The Englishman in +Kansas</i>, i. <a href='#Page_32'>32</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Gladstone, W.E., i. <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href= +'#Page_78'>78</a>; fear of war with America in <i>Trent</i> affair, +<a href='#Page_215'>215</a>; influence of the commercial situation +on, ii. <a href='#Page2_26'>26</a>; attitude to intervention, +<a href='#Page2_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page2_27'>27</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_30'>30</a>-<a href='#Page2_31'>1</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page2_57'>57</a>; Newcastle speech, +<a href='#Page2_47'>47</a> <i>and note</i>[3], <a href= +'#Page2_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page2_49'>49</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_50'>50</a> <i>and note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_51'>51</a> +<i>and notes</i>, <a href='#Page2_55'>55</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_58'>58</a>; memorandum in reply to Lewis, <a href= +'#Page2_57'>57</a>; supports Napoleon's suggestion on armistice and +blockade, ii. <a href='#Page2_64'>64</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_69'>69</a>; account of Cabinet discussion on Napoleon's +suggestion, <a href='#Page2_65'>65</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; idea of +offering Canada to the North, <a href='#Page2_69'>69</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_70'>70</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; and the Confederate Cotton +Loan, <a href='#Page2_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[2]; reply of, in +Roebuck's motion, <a href='#Page2_170'>170</a>-<a href= +'#Page_171'>1</a>; quoted, on the American dispute as a blow to +democracy, <a href='#Page2_282'>282</a>-<a href='#Page2_283'>3</a> +Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href= +'#Page_200'>200</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>, +<a href='#Page_266'>266</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>, +<a href='#Page2_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page2_77'>77</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_80'>80</a></p> +<p>Goddard, S.A., ii. <a href='#Page2_108'>108</a> <i>Letters on +the American Rebellion</i>, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_108'>108</a> +<i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_109'>109</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Godkin, E.L., <i>Daily News</i> correspondent, i. <a href= +'#Page_70'>70</a> <i>and note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Golder, Dr. F.A., cited, i. <a href='#Page_53'>53</a> +<i>note</i>[3]. "The Russian Fleet and the Civil War," cited, i. +<a href='#Page_227'>227</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_129'>129</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_318"></a>[V2:pg 318]</span> +<p>Goodenough, Captain, report of, on American readiness for +foreign war, ii. <a href='#Page2_199'>199</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Gorgas, Col., ii. <a href='#Page2_5'>5</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Gortchakoff, comment of, on Russell's mediation plan, ii. +<a href='#Page2_45'>45</a> <i>note</i>[2]; and idea of Russian +mediation, <a href='#Page2_251'>251</a> <i>note</i>[1]; mentioned, +i. <a href='#Page_164'>164</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_59'>59</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_66'>66</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Grant, General, capture of Forts Henry and Donelson by, i. +<a href='#Page_273'>273</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page_274'>274</a>; victory at Shiloh, <a href= +'#Page_278'>278</a>; captures New Orleans, <a href= +'#Page_279'>279</a>; Western campaign of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page2_166'>166</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_184'>184</a>-<a href='#Page2_185'>5</a>; capture of +Vicksburg by, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_185'>185</a>; advance to Richmond, <a href= +'#Page2_217'>217</a>, <a href='#Page2_219'>219</a>; siege of +Southern lines at Petersburg, <a href='#Page2_217'>217</a>; capture +of Petersburg and Richmond by, <a href= +'#Page2_247'>247</a>-<a href='#Page2_248'>8</a>; <i>Times</i> +report of reverses to, <a href='#Page2_212'>212</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_227'>227</a>, <a href='#Page2_243'>243</a>; condition of +his army, Southern account in <i>Times</i>, <a href= +'#Page2_227'>227</a>; W.H. Russell's comment on Grant's campaign, +<a href='#Page2_232'>232</a>-<a href='#Page2_233'>3</a>; Henry +Adams, quoted, on, <a href='#Page2_243'>243</a> Otherwise +mentioned, ii. <a href='#Page2_215'>215</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page2_256'>256</a></p> +<p>Grant's <i>The Newspaper Press</i>, cited and quoted, ii. +<a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Granville, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, quoted, <a href= +'#Page_199'>199</a> <i>note</i>[3]; on difficulties in Washington +and attitude of neutrality, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>; opposition +of, to Russell's mediation plan, ii. <a href='#Page2_42'>42</a> +<i>and note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_43'>43</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_44'>44</a>, <a href='#Page2_46'>46</a>; mentioned, i. +<a href='#Page_94'>94</a> <i>note</i>[3]; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_203'>203</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Grattan, Thomas Colley, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>; +<i>Civilized America</i>, i. <a href='#Page_36'>36</a> +<i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Great Britain: Citizenship, theory of, i. <a href= +'#Page_5'>5</a>-<a href='#Page_6'>6</a> Colonial system: trade +basis of, i. <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, +<a href='#Page_21'>21</a> Commercial relations with America after +independence, i. <a href='#Page_17'>17</a> <i>et seq</i>., <a href= +'#Page_22'>22</a> Franchise, expansion of the, in, i. <a href= +'#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_274'>274</a>, <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_277'>7</a>, <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_302'>302</a>, <a href='#Page2_303'>303</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_304'>304</a>; effect of the American example on political +agitation in, <a href='#Page2_274'>274</a>; connection of the +American struggle with the franchise movement in, <a href= +'#Page2_276'>276</a>, <a href='#Page2_277'>277</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_278'>278</a>, <a href='#Page2_286'>286</a>; Radical +acceptance of the challenge on democracy, <a href= +'#Page2_282'>282</a>, <a href='#Page2_283'>283</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_290'>290</a>, <a href='#Page2_298'>298</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_300'>300</a>; aristocratic and conservative attitude to +democracy, <a href='#Page2_286'>286</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_287'>287</a>, <a href='#Page2_298'>298</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_300'>300</a>, <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a> Policy toward +America: conditions affecting, i. <a href='#Page_2'>2</a> <i>et +seq</i>. <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_270'>270</a>; the right of search controversy, i. <a href= +'#Page_6'>6</a>-<a href='#Page_10'>10</a>; territorial expansion +<a href='#Page_13'>13</a>-<a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href= +'#Page_16'>16</a>; extension of slavery, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>, +<a href='#Page_15'>15</a>; Mexican War, <a href= +'#Page_15'>15</a>-<a href='#Page_16'>16</a>; commercial interests, +<a href='#Page_19'>19</a>-<a href='#Page_22'>22</a>; in the Civil +War, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>-<a href='#Page_54'>4</a>, <a href= +'#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href= +'#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href= +'#Page_136'>136</a>, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>, <a href= +'#Page_199'>199</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_270'>270</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_272'>2</a>; influence of democracy in determining, ii. +<a href='#Page2_303'>303</a>-<a href='#Page_305'>5</a>; policy of +joint action with France. <i>see under</i> France. <i>See also +under</i> Lyons, Russell, <i>and subject-headings.</i> Public +opinion and governmental policy of, in relation to America, i. +<a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>, <a href= +'#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href= +'#Page_28'>28</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a> Public opinion and +official views in, at the opening of the Civil War, i. <a href= +'#Page_40'>40</a>-<a href='#Page_60'>60</a>; doubts of Northern +cause, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>; +attitude to recognition of the South, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a> +<i>note</i>[1], on secession, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href= +'#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a> Trade: exclusive basis +in, i. <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, +<a href='#Page_21'>21</a>; effect of American retaliatory system +on, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>; free trade theory, <a href= +'#Page_21'>21</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_304'>304</a>; hopes from +cotton interests, i. <a href='#Page_22'>22</a> Working classes in: +Northern sympathies of, ii. <a href='#Page2_284'>284</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_285'>285</a> <i>note</i>[1] <i>See also +subject-headings</i></p> +<p>Great Lakes: Armaments agreement, i. <a href='#Page_4'>4</a>; +ii. <a href='#Page2_253'>253</a>, <a href='#Page2_254'>254</a></p> +<p>Greeley, Horace, editor of <i>New York Times</i>, attack on +Seward by, i. <a href='#Page_280'>280</a> <i>note</i>[1]; and +Mercier's proposal of mediation, ii. <a href='#Page2_75'>75</a>; +Lincoln's reply to, on emancipation, <a href= +'#Page2_92'>92</a>-<a href='#Page_93'>3</a></p> +<p>Gregg, Percy, ii. <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a> +<i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Gregory (Liberal-Conservative, friend of the South), i. <a href= +'#Page_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a> <i>note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page_267'>267</a>; motion of, for recognition of the +South, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>, +<a href='#Page_108'>108</a>; advice to Mason on blockade question, +<a href='#Page_267'>267</a>; motion to urge the blockade +ineffective, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>-<a href= +'#Page_272'>72</a>; speech in Parliament on distress in Lancashire, +ii. <a href='#Page2_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page2_22'>22</a> <i>and +note</i>; quoted on attitude of Parliament to intervention and +recognition, <a href='#Page2_155'>155</a>; view of Roebuck's +motion, <a href='#Page2_175'>175</a>; question of, on the +destruction of British property in America, <a href= +'#Page2_265'>265</a>; mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>; +ii. <a href='#Page2_153'>153</a>, <a href='#Page2_164'>164</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_319"></a>[V2:pg 319]</span> +<p>Greville, Charles, quoted, ii. <a href='#Page2_3'>3</a></p> +<p>Greville. Colonel, ii. <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a> +<i>note</i></p> +<p>Grey, Sir George, i. <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>, <a href= +'#Page_207'>207</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_171'>171</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_263'>263</a></p> +<p>Grimes, Senator, on the purpose of the Privateering Bill, ii. +<a href='#Page2_123'>123</a>-<a href='#Page_124'>4</a></p> +<p>Gros, Baron, ii. <a href='#Page2_167'>167</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_168'>168</a>-<a href='#Page2_169'>9</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_170'>170</a></p> +<p>Grote, George, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_1'>1</a></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>Haliburton, T.C., ii. <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_193'>193</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Hall, Capt. Basil, <i>Travels in North America</i>, cited, i. +<a href='#Page_26'>26</a>-<a href='#Page_27'>7</a></p> +<p>Hall, Rev. Newman, ii. <a href='#Page2_111'>111</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_224'>224</a></p> +<p>Hamilton, R.C., "The English Press and the Civil War," i. +<a href='#Page_38'>38</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Hamilton, Capt. Thomas, <i>Men and Manners in America</i>, +quoted, i. <a href='#Page_27'>27</a></p> +<p>Hammond, E., Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, i. <a href= +'#Page_189'>189</a>; enquiry as to possible action of American Navy +to intercept Southern Commissioners, <a href= +'#Page_206'>206</a>-<a href='#Page_207'>7</a>, <a href= +'#Page_210'>210</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a> <i>and +note</i>[1]; on Foreign Enlistment Act, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_142'>142</a>; letter of, to Lyons, on seizure of Laird +Rams, <a href='#Page2_147'>147</a> <i>note</i>[4]; quoted, on +public opinion and Napoleon's proposal of mediation, <a href= +'#Page2_66'>66</a>; mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_256'>256</a>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_45'>45</a></p> +<p>Hammond, Senator, of S. Carolina, quoted, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_2'>2</a>-<a href='#Page2_3'>3</a></p> +<p>"Hampton Roads Conference," The, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_252'>252</a>-<a href='#Page_253'>3</a></p> +<p>Harcourt, Sir William, quoted, on Lord Russell's statesmanship +during the American Civil War, i. <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>; letters +of, in the <i>Times</i> on questions of International Law, i. +<a href='#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_63'>63</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; <i>and see under</i> +"Historicus"</p> +<p>Hardwicke, Earl, i. <a href='#Page_94'>94</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Harris, T.L., <i>The Trent Affair</i>, cited, i. <a href= +'#Page_203'>203</a> <i>note</i>, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a> +<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_217'>217</a> <i>note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page_227'>227</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_282'>282</a> <i>note</i>[2]; citations of anti-Americanism +in <i>Times</i>, i. <a href='#Page2_217'>217</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Hawthorne, Julian, cited, i. <a href='#Page_47'>47</a></p> +<p>Head, Sir Edmund, Governor of Canada, i. <a href= +'#Page_129'>129</a>, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Hertslet, <i>Map of Europe by Treaty</i>, cited, i. <a href= +'#Page_94'>94</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>"Historicus," Letters of, to the <i>Times</i>, cited and quoted, +i. <a href='#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page2_104'>104</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_138'>138</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Holmes, O.W., i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Hood, General, ii. <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> +<i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Hope, A.J. Beresford, ii. <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_189'>189</a>, <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a> <i>note</i>, +<a href='#Page2_281'>281</a>-<a href='#Page2_282'>2</a></p> +<p>Hopwood, i. <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_11'>11</a>, <a href='#Page2_18'>18</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_21'>21</a></p> +<p>Horsfall, Mr., ii. <a href='#Page2_153'>153</a></p> +<p>Horton, Wilmot, i. <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>; Committee on +Emigration to America, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>, <a href= +'#Page_24'>24</a></p> +<p>Hotze, H., Confederate agent, quoted on effect of <i>Trent</i> +affair, i. <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>; descriptive account of his +activities, ii. <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a> <i>note</i>[1]; and +the "foul blot" phrase, <a href='#Page2_240'>240</a>; and the +Southern arming of negroes, <a href='#Page2_241'>241</a>; +mentioned, ii. <a href='#Page2_68'>68</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page2_180'>180</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_213'>213</a> +Hotze Papers, The, ii. <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a> <i>note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page2_180'>180</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_185'>185</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Houghton, Lord, ii. <a href='#Page2_265'>265</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_266'>6</a>, <a href='#Page2_267'>267</a></p> +<p>Hughes, Thomas, i. <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Hunt, James, <i>The Negro's Place in Nature</i>, cited, ii. +<a href='#Page2_222'>222</a></p> +<p>Hunt's Merchants Magazine, cited ii. <a href='#Page2_8'>8</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_14'>14</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Hunter, Confederate Secretary of State, i. <a href= +'#Page_264'>264</a></p> +<p>Hunter, General, issues order freeing slaves, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_84'>84</a></p> +<p>Hunter, Mr., editor of the <i>Herald,</i> ii. <a href= +'#Page2_213'>213</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Huse, Caleb, ii. <a href='#Page2_120'>120</a> <i>note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page2_159'>159</a></p> +<p>Huskisson, cited, i. <a href='#Page_20'>20</a></p> +<p>Huxley's criticism of Hunt's <i>The Negro's Place in Nature</i>, +ii. <a href='#Page2_222'>222</a></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>Impressment by Britain: a cause of irritation to America, i. +<a href='#Page_6'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href= +'#Page_8'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></p> +<p><i>Index, The</i>, ii., <a href='#Page2_33'>33</a> <i>and +note</i>[3]; agitation of, for recognition of the South and +mediation, <a href='#Page2_33'>33</a>-<a href='#Page_34'>4</a>, +<a href='#Page2_153'>153</a>-<a href='#Page_154'>4</a>; on +Gladstone's Newcastle speech, <a href='#Page2_51'>51</a> +<i>note</i>[3]; views of, on Lord Russell and his policy, <a href= +'#Page2_51'>51</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_55'>55</a> +<i>and note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page2_165'>165</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_196'>196</a>, <a href='#Page2_197'>197</a>; on reply to +French joint mediation offer, <a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_69'>9</a>; on Laird Rams, <a href='#Page2_150'>150</a> +<i>note</i>[2]; quoted on Government attitude to the belligerents, +<a href='#Page2_154'>154</a>, <a href='#Page2_164'>164</a>-<a href= +'#Page_165'>5</a>; connection with Hotze, <a href= +'#Page2_154'>154</a> <i>note</i>[1]; and the fall of Vicksburg, +<a href='#Page2_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page2_178'>178</a> <i>and +note</i>[1]; on French press and policy of France, <a href= +'#Page2_174'>174</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_180'>180</a>; +reports of, on Southern meetings and associations, <a href= +'#Page2_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page2_190'>190</a> <i>and +notes</i>, <a href='#Page2_194'>194</a> <i>and note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page2_195'>195</a>, <a href='#Page2_239'>239</a> <i>and +note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_240'>240</a>; comments on the +Palmerston-Mason interview, <a href='#Page2_215'>215</a>-<a href= +'#Page_216'>6</a>; criticism of Palmerston's reply to deputation on +mediation, <a href='#Page2_216'>216</a>; view of mediation, +<a href='#Page2_217'>217</a>; defence of slavery in the South, +<a href='#Page2_220'>220</a>-<a href='#Page_222'>2</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_240'>240</a>-<a href='#Page_241'>1</a>; criticism of the +<i>Times</i>, <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a>; quotations from the +French press on the war, <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> +<i>note</i>[2]; and the Presidential election, <a href= +'#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on Germany's aid to the North, +<a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on reception of +Northern deputations by Adams, <a href='#Page2_245'>245</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; on characteristics of Southern leaders and society, +<a href='#Page2_287'>287</a>; view of Northern democracy, <a href= +'#Page2_287'>287</a>; denunciation of the Manchester School +<a href='#Page2_298'>298</a>-<a href='#Page_299'>9</a>; cited, ii. +<a href='#Page2_181'>181</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_186'>186</a>, <a href='#Page2_190'>190</a> <i>note</i>[3], +<a href='#Page2_199'>199</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href= +'#Page2_232'>232</a>, <a href='#Page2_241'>241</a> <i>note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page2_242'>242</a>; quoted, <a href='#Page2_192'>192</a>, +<a href='#Page2_193'>193</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_320"></a>[V2:pg 320]</span> +<p>Ionian Islands, control of, i. <a href='#Page_79'>79</a></p> +<p>Ireland: Irish emigration to America, i. <a href= +'#Page_29'>29</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_200'>200</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_201'>201</a>; enlistments in, for Northern forces, <a href= +'#Page2_200'>200</a>, <a href='#Page2_201'>201</a>; the +<i>Kearsarge</i> incident, <a href='#Page2_201'>201</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_202'>2</a>; petitions circulated in, in support of the +North, <a href='#Page2_240'>240</a></p> +<p>Italy, disturbances in, ii. <a href='#Page2_29'>29</a></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>Jackson, Stonewall, exploits of, in Virginia: effect of, on +Russell and Palmerston, ii. <a href='#Page2_38'>38</a></p> +<p>Jackson, W.A., ii. <a href='#Page2_191'>191</a></p> +<p>James, <i>William Wetmore Story and his Friends</i>, quoted, i. +<a href='#Page_228'>228</a> <i>and note</i>[4]; cited, <a href= +'#Page_256'>256</a> <i>note</i>[4]</p> +<p><i>James Adger</i>, The, American war-ship, i. <a href= +'#Page_208'>208</a>, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>, <a href= +'#Page_210'>210</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Jameson, Professor J.F., ii. <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a> +<i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Japan: Seward's suggestion of a naval demonstration against, i. +<a href='#Page_126'>126</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Jefferson, President, i. <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href= +'#Page_11'>11</a>, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a></p> +<p>Jewett, J.P., quoted, ii. <a href='#Page2_111'>111</a> +<i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p><i>John Bull</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>; +quoted, on slavery not an issue, i. <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>; +Bull Run, a blow to democracy, i. <a href= +'#Page_179'>179</a>-<a href='#Page_180'>80</a></p> +<p>Johnston, General: campaign against Sherman, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_248'>248</a>, <a href='#Page2_274'>274</a></p> +<p>Jones, Mason, pro-Northern speaker, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_193'>193</a>-<a href='#Page2_194'>4</a>. <a href= +'#Page2_195'>195</a>. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a></p> +<p>Juarez (Mexican leader), ii. <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a></p> +<p>"Justicia," letters of, in the <i>Times</i>, i. <a href= +'#Page_217'>217</a></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>Kansas border struggles, i. <a href='#Page_32'>32</a></p> +<p><i>Kearsarge</i> incident, The, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_201'>201</a>-<a href='#Page2_202'>2</a></p> +<p>Kelly, William, <i>Across the Rocky Mountains, etc.</i>, cited +and quoted, ii. <a href='#Page2_275'>275</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Kennedy, William, <i>Texas, etc.</i>, cited, i. <a href= +'#Page_29'>29</a></p> +<p>Kenner, Duncan F., Confederate Commissioner, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_249'>249</a>-<a href='#Page2_250'>50</a></p> +<p>Kentucky, effect of "border state policy" on, i. <a href= +'#Page_173'>173</a></p> +<p>Kinglake, views of, on Roebuck's motion, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_175'>175</a></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p><i>La France</i>, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> +<i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Laird Brothers: builders of the <i>Alabama</i> and <i>Laird +Rams</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_120'>120</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_121'>121</a>-<a href='#Page2_122'>2</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_129'>129</a>; prosecution of, demanded, <a href= +'#Page2_136'>136</a>; officially ordered not to send Rams on trial +trip, <a href='#Page2_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page2_149'>149</a>; +Government's correspondence with, <a href='#Page2_146'>146</a> +<i>and note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_149'>149</a>-<a href= +'#Page_150'>50</a></p> +<p>Laird, speech of, in reply to Bright's attack on the Government, +ii. <a href='#Page2_134'>134</a></p> +<p>Laird Rams, the, ii. <a href='#Page2_121'>121</a>-<a href= +'#Page_122'>2</a>, <a href='#Page2_123'>123</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_124'>124</a>, <a href='#Page2_137'>137</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_140'>140</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page2_196'>196</a>; +description and purpose of, <a href='#Page2_122'>122</a> <i>and</i> +<i>note</i>[1]; British Government position, <a href= +'#Page2_133'>133</a>, <a href='#Page2_134'>134</a>; rumours +regarding, <a href='#Page2_142'>142</a>-<a href='#Page_143'>3</a>; +seizure of, <a href='#Page2_145'>145</a>-<a href= +'#Page_150'>50</a>, <a href='#Page2_179'>179</a>-<a href= +'#Page_180'>80</a>, <a href='#Page2_182'>182</a>; suit for damages, +<a href='#Page2_151'>151</a> <i>note</i>[1]; British Government +purchase of, <a href='#Page2_151'>151</a> <i>note</i>[1]; U.S. Navy +plan to purchase, <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a> <i>note</i>[2]; +usual historical treatment of the incident, <a href= +'#Page2_141'>141</a>, <a href='#Page2_147'>147</a> <i>and +note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Lamar, Confederate representative: account of Roebuck and +Bright, ii. <a href='#Page2_172'>172</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Lancashire: Cotton trade, distress in, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_6'>6</a>, <a href='#Page2_11'>11</a> <i>et seq.</i>, +<a href='#Page2_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page2_26'>26</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page2_31'>31</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_240'>240</a>; attitude in, to Government policy, <a href= +'#Page2_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page2_11'>11</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_13'>13</a>-<a href='#Page2_15'>15</a>; attitude of the +"Cotton Lords" to, <a href='#Page2_10'>10</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_16'>16</a>; Farnall report on, <a href='#Page2_12'>12</a>, +<a href='#Page2_20'>20</a>; Northern sympathies of cotton +operatives, <a href='#Page2_13'>13</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_285'>285</a> <i>note</i>[1] Cotton factories, statistics, +ii. <a href='#Page2_6'>6</a> Cotton manufacturers, attack on in +Commons, ii. <a href='#Page2_163'>163</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_164'>4</a></p> +<p><i>Lane, Franklin K., Letters of</i>, cited ii. <a href= +'#Page2_129'>129</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Layard, reply of, on Roebuck's motion, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_171'>171</a>, <a href='#Page2_173'>173</a>; on destruction +of British property in America, <a href='#Page2_265'>265</a></p> +<p><i>Le Siècle</i>, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_174'>174</a> +<i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_321"></a>[V2:pg 321]</span> +<p>Lee, General, turns back McClellan's advance on Richmond, ii. +<a href='#Page2_1'>1</a>; defeated at Antietam, <a href= +'#Page2_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page2_85'>85</a>; retreat of, through +Shenandoah valley, <a href='#Page2_43'>43</a>; advance in +Pennsylvania, <a href='#Page2_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page2_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a>; defeats Hooker +at Chancellorsville, <a href='#Page2_164'>164</a>; retreat from +Gettysburg, <a href='#Page2_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page2_178'>178</a>, <a href='#Page2_179'>179</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_297'>297</a>; defence of Richmond, <a href= +'#Page2_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page2_217'>217</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_247'>247</a>, <a href='#Page2_248'>248</a>; surrender, +<a href='#Page2_248'>248</a>, <a href='#Page2_255'>255</a>, +<a href='#Page2_256'>256</a>-<a href='#Page2_257'>7</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_265'>265</a>, <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_303'>303</a> <i>Times</i>, quoted or cited, on his +campaign, ii. <a href='#Page2_227'>227</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_256'>256</a>, <a href='#Page2_296'>296</a></p> +<p>Lees, Mr., ii, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a></p> +<p>Lempriere, Dr., i. <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_191'>191</a></p> +<p>Lewis, Sir George Cornewall, i. <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, +<a href='#Page_78'>78</a> <i>and note</i>, <a href= +'#Page_94'>94</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_52'>52</a>; views of, on the +Civil War, ii. <a href='#Page2_50'>50</a> <i>and note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page2_51'>51</a>; article on "The Election of President +Lincoln and its Consequences," i. <a href='#Page_78'>78</a> +<i>note</i>; fears war with America in <i>Trent</i> affair, +<a href='#Page_215'>215</a>, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>; +objections of, to mediation, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_44'>44</a>-<a href='#Page2_46'>6</a>; Hereford speech of, +in reply to Gladstone, <a href='#Page2_50'>50</a> <i>and +note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_51'>51</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page2_58'>58</a>; view of the +Emancipation Proclamation, <a href='#Page2_52'>52</a>; action of, +on Russell's proposed intervention, <a href='#Page2_52'>52</a> +<i>et seq</i>., <a href='#Page2_73'>73</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_74'>4</a>; memorandum of, on British policy in opposition +to Russell, <a href='#Page2_62'>62</a>-<a href='#Page2_63'>3</a>; +account of Cabinet discussion on Napoleon's armistice suggestion, +<a href='#Page2_63'>63</a>-<a href='#Page2_65'>5</a>; Hereford +speech, effect on Adams, ii. <a href='#Page2_55'>55</a>; +Palmerston's views on Lewis' attitude to recognition, <a href= +'#Page2_56'>56</a>; Russell's reply to Lewis, <a href= +'#Page2_56'>56</a>, <a href='#Page2_57'>57</a></p> +<p><i>Liberator, The</i>, Garrison's abolition organ, i. <a href= +'#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a> <i>and note</i>[3]; +<a href='#Page_46'>46</a> <i>and note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page_47'>47</a>; cited or quoted, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_106'>106</a> <i>note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page2_107'>107</a>, <a href='#Page2_109'>109</a> +<i>note</i>[2]; III <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a>, +<a href='#Page2_184'>184</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href= +'#Page2_189'>189</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_191'>191</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_194'>194</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_223'>223</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_237'>237</a> +<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_239'>239</a> <i>notes</i>, <a href= +'#Page2_240'>240</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_289'>289</a></p> +<p>Liebknecht, W., ii. <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a> +<i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Lincoln, President, i. <a href='#Page_115'>115</a> +Characteristics of, i. <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href= +'#Page_119'>119</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href= +'#Page_127'>127</a>-<a href='#Page_128'>8</a>; influence of, in +Britain, ii. <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a> Election and +inauguration, i. <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>, <a href= +'#Page_38'>38</a>, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href= +'#Page_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <a href= +'#Page_64'>64</a>, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href= +'#Page_110'>110</a>, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>; inaugural +address, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a>, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>, +<a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>; personal +view of terms of election, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>; popular views +on <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href= +'#Page_115'>115</a> Decision to reinforce Fort Sumter, i. <a href= +'#Page_117'>117</a>, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>, <a href= +'#Page_119'>119</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>; and defend +Federal forts, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>; attitude to Seward's +foreign war policy, <a href='#Page_119'>119</a>-<a href= +'#Page_120'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>; reply to Seward's +"Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration," <a href= +'#Page_119'>119</a>-<a href='#Page_120'>20</a>, <a href= +'#Page_124'>124</a>; modifies Despatch No. <a href= +'#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a>-<a href= +'#Page_127'>7</a>; attitude to Schleiden's Richmond visit, <a href= +'#Page_121'>121</a> 122; emergency measures of, <a href= +'#Page_172'>172</a>, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a> <i>Policy and +views of, on:</i>-- Blockade proclamation, i. <a href= +'#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>, <a href= +'#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>. <i>See +heading</i> Blockade Border State policy of, i. <a href= +'#Page_173'>173</a>, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href= +'#Page_272'>272</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_82'>82</a> +Confiscation Bill, attitude to, ii. <a href='#Page2_82'>82</a>, +<a href='#Page2_84'>84</a> Emancipation Proclamation of, <i>See +that heading</i> Hampton Roads, Conference at, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_252'>252</a>-<a href='#Page2_253'>3</a> Intervention, on, +ii. <a href='#Page2_36'>36</a> Piracy proclamation, i. <a href= +'#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href= +'#Page_160'>160</a> Servile insurrection, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_83'>83</a> Slavery: inaugural address on, i. <a href= +'#Page_38'>38</a>. <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>, <a href= +'#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>; view of the terms +of his election regarding, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>; denial of +emancipation as an issue, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_88'>88</a>; reply to Chicago abolitionists on, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_49'>49</a> <i>note</i>[3]; declarations on, <a href= +'#Page2_78'>78</a>; conversations with Sumner on, <a href= +'#Page2_82'>82</a>; attitude to emancipation, <a href= +'#Page2_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page2_83'>83</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_84'>4</a>, <a href='#Page2_96'>96</a>; and anti-slavery +sentiment, <a href='#Page2_83'>83</a>; denial of, as a cause of the +war, <a href='#Page2_88'>88</a>; reply to Schurz on emancipation, +<a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>; reply to Greeley, <a href= +'#Page2_93'>93</a>, <a href='#Page2_94'>94</a>; orders of, as to +liberated slaves, <a href='#Page2_100'>100</a> <i>Trent</i> affair; +attitude to release of envoys, i. <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> +<i>and note</i>[2], British view of, in, i. <a href= +'#Page_225'>225</a>, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>, <a href= +'#Page_230'>230</a> Union, the: efforts to preserve, i. <a href= +'#Page_49'>49</a>, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>; efforts to restore, +ii. <a href='#Page2_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page2_83'>83</a>, +<a href='#Page2_93'>93</a>-<a href='#Page2_95'>5</a>; reply to +Greeley on, <a href='#Page2_92'>92</a>-<a href='#Page2_93'>3</a> +Attitude of, to England, i. <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>; curtails +authority of General Butler, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>; settles +quarrel between Seward and Chase; ii. <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>; +letter to Manchester supporters of the North, <a href= +'#Page2_109'>109</a>; drafts resolution for use in British public +meetings on slavery, <a href='#Page2_113'>113</a>; British +addresses to, <a href='#Page2_288'>288</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_290'>290</a>-<a href='#Page2_191'>1</a> Re-election, ii. +<a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>, <a href='#Page2_234'>234</a>, +<a href='#Page2_235'>235</a>, <a href='#Page2_238'>238</a>; +expectations of his defeat, <a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_231'>231</a>; British Press views on, <a href= +'#Page2_234'>234</a>-<a href='#Page2_235'>5</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_238'>238</a>; <i>Punch</i> cartoon, <a href= +'#Page2_239'>239</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; complaints of his +despotism and inefficiency in press, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_176'>176</a>, <a href='#Page2_232'>232</a>; his terms to +the South, <a href='#Page2_251'>251</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_252'>252</a> Assassination of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_257'>257</a>-<a href='#Page2_258'>8</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_265'>265</a>; political effect of, in Britain, <a href= +'#Page2_301'>301</a>, and in Germany, <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a> +<i>note</i>[3]; British sympathy, <a href= +'#Page2_259'>259</a>-<a href='#Page2_264'>64</a> Appreciations of, +ii. <a href='#Page2_258'>258</a>-<a href='#Page2_261'>61</a> +British opinion of, during the War, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_239'>239</a> <i>note</i>[1] Bright's confidence in, ii. +<a href='#Page2_255'>255</a> <i>and note</i>[1] Lyons' view on, i. +<a href='#Page_51'>51</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_258'>258</a>-<a href='#Page2_259'>9</a> Press views, i. +<a href='#Page_38'>38</a>-<a href='#Page_39'>9</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_102'>102</a>-<a href='#Page2_105'>5</a> <i>passim</i> +Schleiden's view of, i. <a href='#Page_116'>116</a> Influence of +Bright's letters on, i. <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>; pardons Rubery +in honour of Bright, ii. <a href='#Page2_225'>225</a> <i>and +note</i>[1] Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, +<a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>, <a href= +'#Page_223'>223</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_39'>39</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page2_91'>91</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_109'>109</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_126'>126</a>, +<a href='#Page2_225'>225</a>, <a href='#Page2_251'>251</a>, +<a href='#Page2_278'>278</a>, <a href='#Page2_281'>281</a>, +<a href='#Page2_297'>297</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_322"></a>[V2:pg 322]</span> +<p>Lindsay, William Schaw: descriptive account of, i. <a href= +'#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>; on the blockade +and French attitude to intervention, <a href='#Page_267'>267</a>; +project of mediation of, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>; account of +interview with Napoleon III, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>-<a href= +'#Page_290'>90</a>; interview with Cowley, <a href= +'#Page_290'>290</a>-<a href='#Page_291'>1</a>; second interview +with Napoleon, <a href='#Page_291'>291</a>; effect of interviews on +Confederate Commissioners, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>; refused an +interview by Russell and Palmerston, <a href= +'#Page_294'>294</a>-<a href='#Page_295'>5</a>, <a href= +'#Page_296'>296</a>; third interview with Napoleon, <a href= +'#Page_295'>295</a>; interview with Disraeli, <a href= +'#Page_295'>295</a>, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>; proposed motion +in Parliament, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>-<a href= +'#Page_302'>2</a>, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>-<a href= +'#Page_306'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>; account of a letter +to Russell in explanation of his proposed motion, <a href= +'#Page_305'>305</a> <i>and note</i>[5]; introduces motion in +Parliament on mediation, ii. <a href='#Page2_18'>18</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page2_21'>21</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_23'>23</a>; withdrawal of, <a href='#Page2_23'>23</a>, +<a href='#Page2_34'>34</a>; with Roebuck interviews Napoleon on +recognition, <a href='#Page2_166'>166</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_167'>167</a>, <a href='#Page2_168'>168</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_169'>169</a>, <a href='#Page2_172'>172</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_173'>173</a>, <a href='#Page2_174'>174</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_175'>5</a>, <a href='#Page2_177'>177</a>; suggestion by, on +Confederate finance, <a href='#Page2_156'>156</a>; proposes a +further recognition motion, <a href='#Page2_178'>178</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; connection with Southern Independence Association, +<a href='#Page2_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page2_195'>195</a>, +<a href='#Page2_204'>204</a>, <a href='#Page2_205'>205</a>, +<a href='#Page2_206'>206</a>, <a href='#Page2_211'>211</a>; hopes +of, from attack on Government policy in detaining Southern vessels, +<a href='#Page2_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page2_195'>195</a>, +<a href='#Page2_196'>196</a>; hopes from Napoleon and from Southern +victory, <a href='#Page2_204'>204</a>; fresh agitation for +mediation and recognition, <a href='#Page2_205'>205</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_206'>6</a>, <a href='#Page2_209'>209</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_210'>210</a>; interviews Palmerston, <a href= +'#Page2_206'>206</a>-<a href='#Page2_207'>7</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_209'>209</a>; urges Mason to interview Palmerston, <a href= +'#Page2_207'>207</a>, <a href='#Page2_208'>208</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_209'>209</a>; interview with Lord Russell <a href= +'#Page2_209'>209</a>-<a href='#Page2_210'>10</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_212'>212</a>-<a href='#Page2_213'>13</a>; use of the Danish +question, <a href='#Page2_206'>206</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_210'>210</a>; hopes from Disraeli, <a href= +'#Page2_213'>213</a>; postponement of his motion, <a href= +'#Page2_214'>214</a>, <a href='#Page2_215'>215</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_218'>218</a> Friendship with John Bright, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_172'>172</a> <i>note</i>[1]; otherwise mentioned, i. +<a href='#Page_197'>197</a>, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page2_181'>181</a></p> +<p>Lindsay & Co., ii. <a href='#Page2_157'>157</a></p> +<p>Liverpool: change of feeling in, over the <i>Alabama</i>, ii. +<a href='#Page2_129'>129</a>-<a href='#Page2_130'>30</a></p> +<p><i>Liverpool Post</i>, The, cited on the Emancipation +Proclamation, ii. <a href='#Page2_103'>103</a></p> +<p>Liverpool Shipowners' Association, urges remonstrance on closing +of Charleston Harbour by "Stone Boats," i. <a href= +'#Page_256'>256</a></p> +<p><i>London Chronicle</i>, The, quoted, i. <a href= +'#Page_46'>46</a></p> +<p>London Confederate States Aid Association, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_191'>191</a>, <a href='#Page2_192'>192</a> <i>and +note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_195'>195</a></p> +<p>London Emancipation Society, ii. <a href='#Page2_91'>91</a>, +<a href='#Page2_110'>110</a>; distinguished members of, <a href= +'#Page2_91'>91</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p><i>London Gazette</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_94'>94</a></p> +<p><i>London Press</i>, The, quoted i. <a href= +'#Page_54'>54</a>-<a href='#Page_55'>5</a>, <a href= +'#Page_68'>68</a></p> +<p><i>London Review</i>, The, cited, i. <a href='#Page_46'>46</a> +<i>and note</i>[4]</p> +<p>Longfellow, H.W., i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> <i>note</i>, +<a href='#Page_55'>55</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Lothian, Marquis of, ii. <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_193'>193</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Lousada, letter to Lyons on <i>Trent</i> affair, quoted, i. +<a href='#Page_220'>220</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Lowell, J.R., i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> <i>note</i>, <a href= +'#Page_236'>236</a></p> +<p>Lushington, Dr., i. <a href='#Page_207'>207</a></p> +<p>Lutz, Dr. Ralph H., cited, i. <a href='#Page_117'>117</a> +<i>note</i>; ii. <a href='#Page2_111'>111</a> <i>note</i>[2]; +<a href='#Page2_121'>121</a> <i>note</i>[1] <i>Die Beziehungen +zwischen Deutschland</i>, etc., cited, i. <a href= +'#Page_117'>117</a> <i>note</i>; ii. <a href='#Page2_285'>285</a> +<i>note</i>[1]</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_323"></a>[V2:pg 323]</span> +<p>Lyons, Lord, British Minister in Washington, i. <a href= +'#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <a href= +'#Page_114'>114</a>; attitude in the American dispute, <a href= +'#Page_51'>51</a>, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href= +'#Page_88'>88</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_93'>93</a> <i>and +note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_254'>254</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_237'>237</a> <i>note</i>[4]; on Southern clamour at +Lincoln's election, i. <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>; views on the +personnel of the Northern Government, i. <a href= +'#Page_59'>59</a>-<a href='#Page_60'>60</a>; view of Seward, +<a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href= +'#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href= +'#Page_129'>129</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>; fears from +Seward's foreign war policy, i. <a href='#Page2_60'>60</a>, +<a href='#Page2_128'>128</a>-<a href='#Page_136'>36</a> +<i>passim</i>; efforts to prevent interruption of commerce with the +South, i. <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, +<a href='#Page_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href= +'#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>; views on the +American controversy, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href= +'#Page_73'>73</a>; advises joint action with France, <a href= +'#Page_84'>84</a>; receives instructions on British policy, +<a href='#Page_87'>87</a>; and course of action if disavowed by +America, i. <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>; suspicion of French +policy, <a href='#Page_201'>201</a> <i>and note</i>; survey of the +situation after Shiloh, <a href='#Page_278'>278</a>; farewell +interview with Lincoln, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>; opinion of +Adams, ii. <a href='#Page2_71'>71</a> <i>note</i>[4]; views on +Lincoln and Davis' proclamations, <a href='#Page2_106'>106</a>; +friendliness of Seward to, <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_141'>141</a>, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a> <i>note</i>[2]; +report of improved relations on seizure of Laird Rams, <a href= +'#Page2_147'>147</a>, <a href='#Page2_182'>182</a>; report on +"scare" at Lee's advance, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a> +<i>note</i>[2]; view after Gettysburg, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a> +<i>note</i>[2]; protests against Russell's motion to withdraw +belligerent rights to the North, <a href='#Page2_182'>182</a>, +<a href='#Page2_183'>183</a>; attitude to American public animosity +towards Great Britain, <a href='#Page2_197'>197</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_198'>198</a>; on Seward's plan to collect import duties at +Southern ports, <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a>; description of +American readiness for foreign war, <a href='#Page2_183'>183</a> +<i>and note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_199'>199</a>; on arrogance of +American ministers, <a href='#Page2_199'>199</a>; advises quiet +attitude towards the North, <a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>; view of +Northern determination <a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_233'>233</a>; view of Lincoln's chances of re-election, +<a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>, <a href='#Page2_233'>233</a>; on +effect of the fall of Atlanta, <a href='#Page2_234'>234</a>; advice +on Seward's demonstrations for electioneering purposes, <a href= +'#Page2_237'>237</a>; illness of, <a href='#Page2_233'>233</a>, +<a href='#Page2_237'>237</a>; return to London, <a href= +'#Page2_237'>237</a> <i>note</i>[4]; appreciation of diplomatic +service of, <a href='#Page2_237'>237</a> <i>note</i>[4] +<i>Diplomatic action and views of, in regard to</i>: Belligerent +rights to the South, i. <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>; attitude to +request for withdrawal, i. <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>-<a href= +'#Page_275'>5</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a> Blockade, i. +<a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href= +'#Page_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href= +'#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>-<a href= +'#Page_245'>5</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>; and +legislative closing of Southern ports, i. <a href= +'#Page_244'>244</a>, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>; communications +with Seward on, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>, <a href= +'#Page_245'>245</a>, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>, <a href= +'#Page_250'>250</a>, <a href='#Page_257'>257</a>; opinion on, +<a href='#Page_254'>254</a> Southern Ports Bill, i. <a href= +'#Page_246'>246</a>-<a href='#Page_250'>50</a> <i>passim</i> Bunch +controversy, i. <a href='#Page_184'>184</a> <i>et seq.</i>; view on +Bunch's conduct, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>; conferences with +Seward in, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a>-<a href='#Page_192'>2</a>, +<a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a> <i>and +note</i>[1]; comment on Bunch's explanation, <a href= +'#Page_192'>192</a>-<a href='#Page_193'>3</a>; attitude to American +decision in, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href= +'#Page_194'>194</a> Cotton, i. <a href='#Page_54'>54</a> +<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <a href= +'#Page_196'>196</a>-<a href='#Page_197'>7</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_20'>20</a> <i>and note</i>[3] Declaration of Paris +negotiations: alarmed by Seward's attitude, i. <a href= +'#Page_151'>151</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a> <i>notes</i>; view +of Seward's refusal to see the despatch, <a href= +'#Page_153'>153</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; communications with +Confederates in, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>, <a href= +'#Page_163'>163</a> <i>notes</i>, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, +<a href='#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>, <a href= +'#Page_168'>168</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>, +<a href='#Page_188'>188</a>; view on the American proposal, +<a href='#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href= +'#Page_164'>164</a> Emancipation, as an issue, i. <a href= +'#Page_223'>223</a> Emancipation proclamation, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_106'>106</a>, <a href='#Page2_113'>113</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_114'>114</a> <i>and note</i> Intervention, i. <a href= +'#Page_197'>197</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_26'>26</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_36'>36</a>; fears commercial influence on policy, <a href= +'#Page2_26'>26</a>; <i>See also</i> Mediation <i>infra</i> Irish +emigrants: enlistment of, ii. <a href='#Page2_201'>201</a> +Mediation, i. <a href='#Page_284'>284</a>, <a href= +'#Page_286'>286</a>, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a>, <a href= +'#Page_298'>298</a>-<a href='#Page_299'>9</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_23'>23</a>, <a href='#Page2_37'>37</a> <i>note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page2_70'>70</a>; summary of Mercier's plan of, i. +<a href='#Page_298'>298</a>-<a href='#Page_299'>9</a>; report on +French isolated offer of, ii. <a href='#Page2_75'>75</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_76'>6</a>; on Russian suggestion of, <a href= +'#Page2_76'>76</a> Mercier's Richmond visit, i. <a href= +'#Page_281'>281</a> <i>et seq. passim</i>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_24'>24</a> <i>note</i>[2]; comment on the result of, i. +<a href='#Page_286'>286</a>; effect of, on, <a href= +'#Page_287'>287</a>; comment on newspaper report of, <a href= +'#Page_287'>287</a> Privateering Bill, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_125'>125</a>, <a href='#Page2_126'>126</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_127'>127</a> Proclamation of Neutrality, presentation of, +to Seward, i. <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href= +'#Page_103'>103</a>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a>, <a href= +'#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[3], +<a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a> +Recognition of the South, i. <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href= +'#Page_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href= +'#Page_197'>197</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_70'>70</a> Seward's foreign war policy, i. <a href= +'#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>-<a href= +'#Page_129'>9</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>, <a href= +'#Page_132'>132</a>, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href= +'#Page_136'>136</a>; advice to Russell on, <a href= +'#Page_128'>128</a>-<a href='#Page_129'>9</a>, <a href= +'#Page_131'>131</a>; anxiety as to Canada, <a href= +'#Page_128'>128</a>, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>, <a href= +'#Page_131'>131</a> Slave Trade Treaty, i. <a href= +'#Page_276'>276</a> Slavery, i. <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href= +'#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a> <i>and note</i>[3]; +account of changes in Northern feeling on, <a href= +'#Page_223'>223</a> Southern Commissioners, i. <a href= +'#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a> Southern shipbuilding, +ii. <a href='#Page2_127'>127</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_139'>139</a>-<a href='#Page2_141'>141</a>; on American War +feeling over, <a href='#Page2_139'>139</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_140'>40</a> <i>Trent</i> affair, i. <a href= +'#Page_210'>210</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>, <a href= +'#Page_221'>221</a>; instructions in, <a href= +'#Page_212'>212</a>-<a href='#Page_214'>4</a>; anxiety for Canada +in, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href= +'#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href= +'#Page_242'>242</a>, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_147'>147</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href= +'#Page2_170'>170</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_324"></a>[V2:pg 324]</span> +<p>Lytton, Bulwer, on dissolution of the Union, cited, i. <a href= +'#Page_182'>182</a></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>McClellan, General: advance of, on Richmond, i. <a href= +'#Page_276'>276</a>, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>, <a href= +'#Page_297'>297</a>, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>, <a href= +'#Page_301'>301</a>; ii. i, <a href='#Page2_33'>33</a>; defeat of, +by Lee, <a href='#Page2_1'>1</a>, <a href='#Page2_18'>18</a>, +<a href='#Page2_33'>33</a>; rumoured capture of, <a href= +'#Page2_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page2_21'>21</a> <i>note</i>; Adams' +opinion on rumours, <a href='#Page2_20'>20</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_21'>21</a> <i>note</i>; British newspaper reports of +capture of, <a href='#Page2_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page2_21'>21</a> +<i>note</i>; removal of, <a href='#Page2_30'>30</a>; defeats Lee at +Antietam, <a href='#Page2_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page2_85'>85</a>; +fails to follow up his victory, <a href='#Page2_43'>43</a>, +<a href='#Page2_105'>105</a>; as candidate in Presidential +election, <a href='#Page2_234'>234</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_238'>238</a></p> +<p>McFarland, i. <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>, <a href= +'#Page_234'>234</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>McHenry, George, <i>The Cotton Trade</i>, cited, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_6'>6</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_13'>13</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_185'>185</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Mackay, Alexander, <i>The Western World,</i> cited and quoted, +i. <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_274'>274</a>-<a href='#Page2_275'>5</a></p> +<p>Mackay, Charles, i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> <i>and note</i>, +<a href='#Page_46'>46</a> <i>note</i>[4]; as <i>Times</i> +correspondent in New York, ii. <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a> +<i>notes</i>; <a href='#Page2_189'>189</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_226'>226</a> <i>Forty Years' Recollections</i>, cited, ii. +<a href='#Page2_176'>176</a> <i>note</i>[2] "John and Jonathan" +poem, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> <i>note</i> <i>Life and +Liberty in America</i>, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> +<i>note</i></p> +<p>Mackay, Dr., editor of the <i>London Review</i>, i. <a href= +'#Page_46'>46</a> <i>note</i>[4]</p> +<p>McKenzie, (Canadian Rebellion, 1837), +i. <a href='#Page_4'>4</a></p> +<p>McLaren, Duncan, ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> +<i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>McRea, opinion of, on Hotze and Slidell, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_180'>180</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Madison, President, i. <a href='#Page_11'>11</a></p> +<p>"Madison's War," i. <a href='#Page_4'>4</a></p> +<p>Maine, State of: boundary controversy, i. <a href= +'#Page_4'>4</a>, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a></p> +<p>Malmesbury, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href= +'#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page2_167'>167</a></p> +<p>Manchester Emancipation Society, The, ii. no, <a href= +'#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p><i>Manchester Examiner and Times</i>, i. <a href= +'#Page_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> +<i>note</i>; cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_136'>136</a> +<i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p><i>Manchester Guardian</i>, The, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>; cited, <a href= +'#Page2_181'>181</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Manchester Southern Club, The: meeting of, and list of +delegates, ii. <a href='#Page2_190'>190</a> <i>and note</i>[2]</p> +<p>"Manchester Union and Emancipation Society," The, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_110'>110</a>; leading members and activities of, ii. +<a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Mann, Southern Commissioner to London, i. <a href= +'#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href= +'#Page_85'>85</a> <i>notes</i>; <a href='#Page_264'>264</a>, +<a href='#Page_265'>265</a>, ii. <a href='#Page2_24'>24</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_241'>241</a> <i>See also under +heading</i> Confederate Commissioners</p> +<p>Marchand, Captain, of the American ship, <i>James Adger</i>, i. +<a href='#Page_208'>208</a>; instructions of, to intercept the +<i>Nashville</i>, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>, <a href= +'#Page_210'>210</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Marcy, Secretary of State, and the Declaration of Paris, i. +<a href='#Page_140'>140</a>-<a href='#Page_141'>1</a></p> +<p>Marryat, Captain Frederick: <i>A Diary in America</i>, etc., +cited and quoted, i. <a href='#Page_27'>27</a></p> +<p>Martin, M. Henri, ii. <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> +<i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Martin, T.P., theses of, on Anglo-American trade relations, ii. +<a href='#Page2_8'>8</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Martineau, Harriet: faith of, in democracy, i. <a href= +'#Page_27'>27</a>; ardent advocate of the North, <a href= +'#Page_70'>70</a> <i>and note</i>[3]; view of slavery as cause of +the Civil War, ii. <a href='#Page2_79'>79</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_80'>80</a></p> +<p>Marx, Karl, and the Trades Unions of London meeting, ii. +<a href='#Page2_291'>291</a>, <a href='#Page2_292'>292</a> <i>and +note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Maryland, and the Union: effect of "border state" policy, i. +<a href='#Page_173'>173</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_325"></a>[V2:pg 325]</span> +<p>Mason, James M., Special Commissioner of the Confederates to +Britain, i. <a href='#Page_183'>183</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page_203'>203</a>; relations with Spence, <a href= +'#Page_183'>183</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_266'>266</a> +<i>note</i>[3]; captured in the <i>Trent</i>, <a href= +'#Page_204'>204</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a> +<i>and note</i>[2]; reception of, in England, <a href= +'#Page_264'>264</a>; interview with Russell, <a href= +'#Page_265'>265</a>-<a href='#Page_266'>6</a>, <a href= +'#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>; statistics of, on +the blockade, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; +effect of the failure of Gregory's motion on, <a href= +'#Page_272'>272</a>, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>; hope in a change +of Government, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>; views of, on capture of +New Orleans, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>; comment of, on mediation +after the Northern successes, <a href='#Page_300'>300</a>, and +Lindsay's motion, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>, <a href= +'#Page_306'>306</a>-<a href='#Page_307'>7</a>; on the state of the +cotton trade in England, ii. <a href='#Page2_10'>10</a>; request to +Lord Russell for recognition of the South, <a href= +'#Page2_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page2_28'>28</a>; and Slidell's offer +to France, <a href='#Page2_24'>24</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; refused +an interview: appeals to Russell for recognition, <a href= +'#Page2_27'>27</a>; view of the Emancipation Proclamation, <a href= +'#Page2_104'>104</a>; nominates Spence as financial adviser in +England, <a href='#Page2_156'>156</a>; and Confederate cotton +obligations, <a href='#Page2_157'>157</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_158'>158</a>, <a href='#Page2_159'>159</a>; and Confederate +Cotton Loan, <a href='#Page2_161'>161</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_162'>162</a>; in Roebuck's motion, <a href= +'#Page2_167'>167</a>, <a href='#Page2_168'>168</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_169'>9</a>, <a href='#Page2_172'>172</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_173'>3</a>; opinion of Napoleon, <a href= +'#Page2_172'>172</a>-<a href='#Page2_173'>3</a>; recall of, +<a href='#Page2_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page2_181'>181</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_182'>2</a>; determines to remain in Europe, <a href= +'#Page2_182'>182</a>; hope from a change of Government, <a href= +'#Page2_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page2_213'>213</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_214'>4</a>; demonstration against, after a Southern +meeting, <a href='#Page2_191'>191</a>; representations on +<i>Kearsarge</i> enlistment of Irishmen, <a href= +'#Page2_201'>201</a>; interview with Palmerston suggested to, +<a href='#Page2_207'>207</a>, <a href='#Page2_208'>208</a>-<a href= +'#Page_209'>9</a>, <a href='#Page2_214'>214</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_215'>5</a>; returns to London, <a href= +'#Page2_212'>212</a>; opinion of Palmerston and Russell's attitude +in interview with Lindsay, <a href='#Page2_213'>213</a>; suggests +Disraeli to handle Lindsay's motion, <a href='#Page2_213'>213</a>; +protests against clause in Southern Independence Association +address, <a href='#Page2_220'>220</a>; attitude of, to slavery, +<a href='#Page2_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page2_250'>250</a>; +interview of, with Palmerston, on Confederate offer to abolish +slavery, <a href='#Page2_250'>250</a>; interview with Earl of +Donoughmore, <a href='#Page2_250'>250</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_251'>1</a>; quoted on Lee's surrender, <a href= +'#Page2_256'>256</a> Correspondence of, i. <a href= +'#Page_261'>261</a> <i>note</i> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page_255'>255</a>, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a> <i>note</i>[3], +<a href='#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page2_31'>31</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_147'>147</a>, <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a> <i>note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page2_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page2_186'>186</a>, +<a href='#Page2_195'>195</a>, <a href='#Page2_206'>206</a>, +<a href='#Page2_241'>241</a></p> +<p>Mason Papers, cited, i. <a href='#Page_261'>261</a> +<i>note</i>[1]: ii. <a href='#Page2_24'>24</a>, <i>et +passim</i></p> +<p>Massie, Rev., ii. no, <a href='#Page2_190'>190</a> +<i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_239'>239</a></p> +<p>Maximilian, Archduke, i. <a href='#Page_260'>260</a>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_255'>255</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Melish, John, <i>Travels</i>, quoted, i. <a href= +'#Page_25'>25</a></p> +<p>Mercier, French Minister in Washington: with Lyons attempts +official presentation to Seward of Proclamations of Neutrality, i. +<a href='#Page_96'>96</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>, <a href= +'#Page_132'>132</a>, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>; in Declaration of +Paris negotiations <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href= +'#Page_158'>158</a>, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href= +'#Page_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>; +negotiations with Confederates, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a> +<i>notes</i>, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href= +'#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>, <a href= +'#Page_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a> <i>note</i>[4]; +plan for recognition of Southern independence, <a href= +'#Page_192'>192</a>; plan to relieve French need for cotton, +<a href='#Page_196'>196</a>-<a href='#Page_201'>201</a>; supports +British demands in <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href= +'#Page_230'>230</a>; on withdrawal of belligerent rights to South, +<a href='#Page_275'>275</a>; efforts for mediation, <a href= +'#Page_279'>279</a>, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>, <a href= +'#Page_300'>300</a>; ii, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>, <a href= +'#Page_37'>37</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, +<a href='#Page_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_71'>71</a> +<i>note</i>[1] <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; idea of an armistice, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, +<a href='#Page_47'>47</a> Richmond visit, i. <a href= +'#Page_280'>280</a> <i>ct seq.</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_24'>24</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_95'>95</a>; Seward's acquiescence +in, i. <a href='#Page_280'>280</a>, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a>, +<a href='#Page_282'>282</a>; consultation with Lyons on, <a href= +'#Page_281'>281</a>-<a href='#Page_282'>2</a>, <a href= +'#Page_283'>283</a>; result of, <a href= +'#Page_284'>284</a>-<a href='#Page_285'>5</a>; report to Thouvenel +on, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>; effect of, on Lyons and Russell, +<a href='#Page_287'>287</a>; <i>New York Times</i> report of, +<a href='#Page_287'>287</a>; effect of, in Paris and London, +<a href='#Page_287'>287</a>-<a href='#Page_288'>8</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_95'>95</a>; effect of, on Confederate agents, i. <a href= +'#Page_288'>288</a> Southern Ports Bill, attitude to, i. <a href= +'#Page_247'>247</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_248'>248</a> +<i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>; views of, on +recognition, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>-<a href='#Page_286'>6</a>; +belief of, in ultimate Southern success, <a href= +'#Page_298'>298</a>; and isolated French offer of mediation, ii. +<a href='#Page2_75'>75</a>; proposes Russo-French mediation, +<a href='#Page2_76'>76</a> <i>note</i>[1]; precautions of, during +Lee's northern advance, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a> <i>note</i>[2] +Bancroft quoted on, i. <a href='#Page_280'>280</a> Otherwise +mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_166'>166</a> <i>note</i>[1] <a href= +'#Page_191'>191</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_23'>23</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_40'>40</a>, <a href='#Page2_155'>155</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_270'>270</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p><i>Merrimac</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_276'>276</a>, <a href= +'#Page_277'>277</a></p> +<p>Mexican War of 1846, i. <a href= +'#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href= +'#Page_206'>206</a></p> +<p>Mexico, British influence in, i. <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>; +revolt of Texas from, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>-<a href= +'#Page_15'>15</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_117'>117</a> <i>note</i>[1]; +contract of, for ships and equipment in Britain, <a href= +'#Page2_117'>117</a> <i>note</i>[1]; British policy towards, after +revolt of Texas, i. <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>-<a href= +'#Page_14'>14</a>; war with United States, 1846 ... <a href= +'#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href= +'#Page_206'>206</a>; expectation in, of British aid, <a href= +'#Page_15'>15</a>; loss of California by, <a href= +'#Page_15'>15</a>; joint action of France, Great Britain and Spain +against, for recovery of debts, <a href= +'#Page_259'>259</a>-<a href='#Page_260'>60</a>; designs of France +in, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_46'>46</a>; +American idea to oust France from, <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a>, +<a href='#Page2_251'>251</a>, <a href='#Page2_252'>252</a>, +<a href='#Page2_255'>255</a> <i>note</i>[4]</p> +<p>Mill, J.S., ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[3]; +article in defence of the North contributed to <i>Fraser's +Magazine</i>, cited or quoted, i. <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>, +<a href='#Page_242'>242</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_80'>80</a>-<a href='#Page2_81'>1</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page2_285'>285</a>; on <i>Trent</i> +affair, i. <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>, <a href= +'#Page_242'>242</a>; on slavery, i. <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>; +ii. <a href='#Page2_80'>80</a>-<a href='#Page2_81'>1</a></p> +<p>Milne, Admiral, i. <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>; Lyons' letter +to, on Southern shipbuilding in Britain and American letters of +marque, ii. <a href='#Page2_140'>140</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_141'>141</a> <i>and note</i></p> +<p>Milner-Gibson, i. <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_36'>36</a>; attack on, by <i>The Index</i>, <a href= +'#Page2_298'>298</a></p> +<p>Milnes, Monckton, i. <a href='#Page_268'>268</a></p> +<p>Missouri, State of, and the Union: effect of the "border state" +policy, i. <a href='#Page_173'>173</a></p> +<p>Mobile, Ala., i. <a href='#Page_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Mocquard: note of, on Napoleon's proposal on recognition in +Roebuck's motion, ii. <a href='#Page2_167'>167</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page2_169'>169</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_172'>172</a></p> +<p>Monck, Viscount, ii. <a href='#Page2_140'>140</a>; approves +seizure of Laird Rams, <a href='#Page2_147'>147</a></p> +<p><i>Monitor</i>, The: duel of with the <i>Merrimac</i>, i. +<a href='#Page_276'>276</a>; effect of, in Great Britain, <a href= +'#Page_276'>276</a>, <a href='#Page_277'>277</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_326"></a>[V2:pg 326]</span> +<p>Monroe Doctrine, The, i. <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>, <a href= +'#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>; as a medium for +American territorial expansion, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a></p> +<p>Monroe, President, i. <a href='#Page_11'>11</a></p> +<p>Monson, cited, i. <a href='#Page_93'>93</a></p> +<p>Montagu, Lord Robert, ii. <a href='#Page2_170'>170</a>; +amendment of, on Roebuck's motion, <a href='#Page2_170'>170</a>, +<a href='#Page2_171'>171</a></p> +<p>Montgomery, Ala., i. <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <a href= +'#Page_82'>82</a></p> +<p>Moore, <i>Digest of International Law</i>, cited, i. <a href= +'#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href= +'#Page_195'>195</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_212'>212</a> +<i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Morehead, ex-Governor of Kentucky: speech of, at Liverpool, +accusing Lincoln of treachery, ii. <a href='#Page2_105'>105</a></p> +<p><i>Morning Herald</i>, The, ii. <a href='#Page2_67'>67</a>, +<a href='#Page2_68'>68</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>; quoted, <a href= +'#Page2_67'>67</a>-<a href='#Page_68'>8</a>; cited, <a href= +'#Page2_215'>215</a></p> +<p><i>Morning Post</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>; in <i>Trent</i> crisis, +i. <a href='#Page_226'>226</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href= +'#Page_229'>229</a>; views on the conflict and democratic tyranny, +<a href='#Page_229'>229</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_284'>284</a>, +<a href='#Page2_285'>285</a>-<a href='#Page2_286'>6</a>; on the war +and the cotton industry, ii. <a href='#Page2_10'>10</a>; on +Gladstone's Newcastle speech, <a href='#Page2_49'>49</a> +<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_55'>55</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p><i>Morning Star</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <a href= +'#Page_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_191'>191</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>; criticism of <i>Times</i> war +news in, <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a></p> +<p>Motley, J.L., United States Minister at Vienna: letter of, +analysing nature of the American constitution, i. <a href= +'#Page_174'>174</a>-<a href='#Page_176'>6</a>; urges forward step +on slavery, ii. <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a>; reply to Seward on +effect of Northern attempt to free slaves, <a href= +'#Page2_99'>99</a>; quoted on the hatred of democracy as shown in +the British Press, <a href='#Page2_280'>280</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_281'>1</a>; otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page_190'>190</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_191'>191</a> +<i>Causes, The, of the American Civil War</i>, i. <a href= +'#Page_174'>174</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a> +<i>Correspondence</i>, i. <a href='#Page_179'>179</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_33'>33</a>, <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a> <i>note</i>[4], +<a href='#Page2_106'>106</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href= +'#Page2_280'>280</a>-<a href='#Page2_281'>1</a></p> +<p>Motley, Mrs., i. <a href='#Page_179'>179</a></p> +<p>Mure, Robert: arrest of, i. <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>-<a href= +'#Page_188'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href= +'#Page_193'>193</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_201'>201</a>; +Lyons' views on, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>-<a href= +'#Page_188'>8</a></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>Napier, Lord, ii. <a href='#Page2_63'>63</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_66'>66</a></p> +<p>Napoleon I., Emperor, i. <a href='#Page_4'>4</a>, <a href= +'#Page_8'>8</a>; and American contentions on neutral rights, i. +<a href='#Page_18'>18</a> Napoleonic Wars, i. <a href= +'#Page_4'>4</a>-<a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href= +'#Page_23'>23</a></p> +<p>Napoleon III., Emperor: American policy of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_39'>39</a>; differences with Thouvenel on, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_19'>19</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_39'>39</a> +Blockade, view of, on the, i. <a href='#Page_290'>290</a> British +policy: vexation at, i. <a href='#Page_295'>295</a> Confederate +Cotton Loan, attitude to, ii. <a href='#Page2_160'>160</a> +<i>note</i>[2] Mediation: hopes for, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_23'>23</a>, <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>; suggests an +armistice for six months, <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_60'>60</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page2_69'>69</a>; +request for joint action by Russia and Britain with France on, +<a href='#Page2_60'>60</a>; British views on, <a href= +'#Page2_60'>60</a>-<a href='#Page2_65'>65</a>; British reply, +<a href='#Page2_65'>65</a> <i>and</i> <i>note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page2_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page2_152'>152</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_155'>155</a>; Russian attitude to, <a href= +'#Page2_59'>59</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_63'>63</a> +<i>and</i> [3], <a href='#Page2_64'>64</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_66'>66</a>; offers friendly mediation, <a href= +'#Page2_75'>75</a>-<a href='#Page2_76'>6</a> Interview with Lindsay +on, i. <a href='#Page_289'>289</a> <i>et seq.</i>; reported offer +on, to England, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>, <a href= +'#Page_291'>291</a> Interviews with Slidell on, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page2_57'>57</a> <i>note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page2_60'>60</a> Mercier's Richmond visit, connection of +with, i. <a href='#Page_287'>287</a>, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>; +displeasure at, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a> Mexican policy of, i. +<a href='#Page_259'>259</a>-<a href='#Page_261'>61</a>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_163'>163</a>, <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a> Polish +question, ii. <a href='#Page2_163'>163</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_164'>164</a> Recognition: private desires for, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_20'>20</a>; endeavours to secure British concurrence, +<a href='#Page2_19'>19</a>-<a href='#Page2_20'>20</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_38'>38</a>; reported action and proposals in Roebuck's +motion, <a href='#Page2_166'>166</a>-<a href='#Page2_177'>77</a> +<i>passim</i>; interview with Slidell on abolition in return for +recognition, <a href='#Page2_249'>249</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_250'>50</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_32'>32</a>, <a href='#Page2_54'>54</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page2_180'>180</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_204'>204</a>, <a href='#Page2_270'>270</a> Benjamin's view +of, ii. <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[1] Mason's opinion +of, ii. <a href='#Page2_172'>172</a>-<a href='#Page2_173'>3</a> +Palmerston's views of, ii. <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a></p> +<p><i>National Intelligencer</i>, The, i. <a href= +'#Page_297'>297</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_49'>49</a> +<i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Neumann, Karl Friedrich: History of the United States by, cited, +ii. <a href='#Page2_111'>111</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Neutrality, Proclamations of: British i. <a href= +'#Page_93'>93</a>, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>-<a href= +'#Page_96'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href= +'#Page_110'>110</a>, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href= +'#Page_134'>134</a>, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href= +'#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>; statements on +British position, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>, <a href= +'#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[3]; +ii. <a href='#Page2_265'>265</a>; British Press views on, i. +<a href='#Page_136'>136</a> <i>note</i> French, i. <a href= +'#Page_96'>96</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_102'>102</a> +American attitude to, i. <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>-<a href= +'#Page_110'>110</a> <i>passim</i>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a>, +<a href='#Page_135'>135</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>, <a href= +'#Page_142'>142</a>, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>; British-French +joint action, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href= +'#Page_132'>132</a> <i>and</i> <i>note</i>[2]; Seward's refusal to +receive officially, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href= +'#Page_103'>103</a>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a> <i>and +note</i>[2]; <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href= +'#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>; view of, as hasty +and premature, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>-<a href= +'#Page_108'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>, <a href= +'#Page_110'>110</a>, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>; Seward's view of, +<a href='#Page_134'>134</a>-<a href='#Page_135'>5</a>; modern +American judgment on, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_327"></a>[V2:pg 327]</span> +<p>New England States, The, i. <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href= +'#Page_18'>18</a>; opposition of, to war of 1812 ... i. <a href= +'#Page_7'>7</a></p> +<p><i>New Nation</i>, The (New York), quoted on Lincoln's +despotism, ii. <a href='#Page2_232'>232</a></p> +<p>New Orleans, i. <a href='#Page_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[1]; +capture of, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>, <a href= +'#Page_296'>296</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_16'>16</a>; effect of, on +Confederates, i. <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>; Seward's promises +based on, ii. <a href='#Page2_16'>16</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_26'>26</a></p> +<p>New York, rumour of Russian fleet in harbour of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_129'>129</a></p> +<p>New York Chamber of Commerce, The, protest by, on the +<i>Alabama</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_126'>126</a></p> +<p>New York City: anti-British attitude of, i. <a href= +'#Page_29'>29</a>; idea of separate secession, <a href= +'#Page_83'>83</a></p> +<p><i>New York Herald,</i> The, i. <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, +<a href='#Page_255'>255</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_199'>199</a> +<i>note</i>[4]</p> +<p><i>New York Times,</i> The, attack on W.H. Russell in, i. +<a href='#Page_178'>178</a> <i>note</i>[2]; quoted on <i>Trent</i> +affair, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a> <i>note</i>[1]; report of +Mercier's Richmond visit, <a href='#Page_287'>287</a></p> +<p>Newcastle, Duke of, Seward's statement to, i. <a href= +'#Page_80'>80</a>, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href= +'#Page_216'>216</a>, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></p> +<p><i>Newcastle Chronicle</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Newfoundland fisheries controversy, i. <a href= +'#Page_4'>4</a></p> +<p>Newman, Professor, ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a></p> +<p>Newton, Dr., in <i>Cambridge History of British Foreign +Policy</i>, cited, i. <a href='#Page_35'>35</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Nicaragua, i. <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></p> +<p>Nicolay and Hay, <i>Lincoln</i>, cited, i. <a href= +'#Page_126'>126</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>, +<a href='#Page_146'>146</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p><i>Nonconformist</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Nonconformist sympathy with emancipation proclamations, ii. +<a href='#Page2_109'>109</a>-<a href='#Page2_110'>10</a></p> +<p>Norfolk, Va., i. <a href='#Page_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[1] "No +<a href='#Page_290'>290</a>," Confederate War Vessel. See +<i>Alabama</i></p> +<p>Northern States: Army, foreign element in, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_200'>200</a> <i>note</i>[1] Emancipation: identified with, +ii. <a href='#Page2_220'>220</a> Immigration and recruiting in, ii. +<a href='#Page2_200'>200</a> "Insurgent" Theory, of the Civil War, +i. <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href= +'#Page_103'>103</a> <i>and note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a> Intervention: +determination to resist, ii. <a href='#Page2_35'>35</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_36'>6</a>, <a href='#Page2_71'>71</a> "Piracy" declaration, +ii. <a href='#Page2_267'>267</a>-<a href='#Page2_268'>8</a> Public +and Press views in, at the outbreak of the struggle, i. <a href= +'#Page_42'>42</a> Union, the: determination to preserve, i. +<a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href= +'#Page_173'>173</a>, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_226'>226</a> Western and Eastern States attitude to the +War, compared, ii. <a href='#Page2_53'>53</a></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p><i>Opinion Nationale</i>, The, cited, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_174'>174</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> +<i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Oregon territory controversy, i. <a href='#Page_15'>15</a></p> +<p><i>Oreto</i>, The, Confederate steamer, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page2_123'>123</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_131'>131</a>, <a href='#Page2_136'>136</a></p> +<p><i>Ottawa Sun</i>, The, cited, ii, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a> +<i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Ozanne Rev. T.D., <i>The South as</i> <i>it is, etc.</i>, +quoted, ii. <a href='#Page2_195'>195</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>Page, Captain, instructions to, on the use of the Laird Rams, +ii. <a href='#Page2_122'>122</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Pakenham, British Minister to Mexico, i. <a href= +'#Page_13'>13</a>-<a href='#Page_14'>14</a></p> +<p>Palmer, Roundell, Solicitor-General, i. <a href= +'#Page_268'>268</a>, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a></p> +<p>Palmerston, Lord: Coalition Government of, in 1859 ... i. +<a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>, <a href= +'#Page_78'>78</a>; on Seward's attitude, <a href= +'#Page_130'>130</a>; on reinforcement of Canada, <a href= +'#Page_130'>130</a>-<a href='#Page_131'>1</a>; statement of reasons +for participation in Declaration of Paris, <a href= +'#Page_139'>139</a>; suggests method of approach in Declaration of +Paris negotiations, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a> <i>note</i>[1]; on +the object of the belligerents, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>; on +British policy and the cotton shortage, <a href= +'#Page_199'>199</a>-<a href='#Page_200'>200</a>; on possible +interception of Mason and Slidell, <a href= +'#Page_207'>207</a>-<a href='#Page_208'>8</a>, <a href= +'#Page_209'>209</a>; action of, in <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href= +'#Page_226'>226</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>, +<a href='#Page_241'>241</a>; statement of, on British neutrality, +<a href='#Page_241'>241</a>; interview with Spence, <a href= +'#Page_266'>266</a>; refusal to interview Lindsay, <a href= +'#Page_295'>295</a>-<a href='#Page_296'>6</a>; letters to Adams on +General Butler's order, <a href='#Page_302'>302</a>-<a href= +'#Page_305'>5</a>; reply to Hopwood on mediation, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_18'>18</a>; definition of British policy in debate on +Lindsay's motion, <a href='#Page2_22'>22</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_23'>3</a>; sneers at the silent cotton manufacturers, +<a href='#Page2_26'>26</a>; views of, on mediation, <a href= +'#Page2_31'>31</a>; participates in Russell's mediation plan, +<a href='#Page2_34'>34</a>, <a href='#Page2_36'>36</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_40'>40</a>-<a href='#Page_44'>44</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_46'>46</a>, <a href='#Page2_51'>51</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page2_56'>56</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_73'>73</a>; traditional connection with Lewis' Hereford +speech, <a href='#Page2_50'>50</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; <a href= +'#Page2_51'>51</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on the folly of appealing to the +belligerents, <a href='#Page2_56'>56</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page2_73'>73</a>; opinion of +Napoleon, <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>; views on French proposals for +armistice, <a href='#Page2_60'>60</a>-<a href='#Page2_61'>1</a>; on +British position in regard to slavery, <a href='#Page2_61'>61</a>, +<a href='#Page2_78'>78</a>-<a href='#Page2_79'>9</a>; approves +Russell's speech on Confederate shipbuilding, <a href= +'#Page2_131'>131</a>; defends Government procedure in +<i>Alabama</i> case, <a href='#Page2_134'>134</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_135'>5</a>; accusation of, against Forster and Bright, +<a href='#Page2_135'>135</a>; attitude to seizure of Laird Rams, +<a href='#Page2_145'>145</a>; on the use of Napoleon's name in +Roebuck's motion, <a href='#Page2_174'>174</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_175'>5</a>, <a href='#Page2_177'>177</a>; the crisis over +Danish policy of, <a href='#Page2_203'>203</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_204'>4</a>, <a href='#Page2_210'>210</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_214'>214</a>, <a href='#Page2_216'>216</a>; interviews with +Lindsay, <a href='#Page2_206'>206</a>-<a href='#Page2_208'>8</a>, +<a href='#Page2_209'>209</a>, <a href='#Page2_210'>210</a>, +<a href='#Page2_213'>213</a>; consents to interview Mason, <a href= +'#Page2_207'>207</a>; opinion of, on the ultimate result of the +Civil War, <a href='#Page2_209'>209</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_215'>215</a>; attitude to resolution of Southern Societies, +<a href='#Page2_211'>211</a>; interview with Mason, <a href= +'#Page2_214'>214</a>-<a href='#Page2_215'>5</a>; reply to joint +deputation of Southern Societies, <a href='#Page2_216'>216</a>; +reply to Mason's offer on abolition, <a href='#Page2_250'>250</a>; +assurances on relations with America after Hampton Roads +Conference, <a href='#Page2_255'>255</a>; attitude to expansion of +the franchise, <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; +death of, <a href='#Page2_302'>302</a> Characteristics of, as +politician, ii. <a href='#Page2_134'>134</a> Cobden quoted on, i. +<a href='#Page2_226'>226</a> <i>note</i>[2] Delane, close relations +with, i. <a href='#Page_229'>229</a> <i>note</i>[2] <i>Index</i>: +criticism of, in the, ii. <a href='#Page2_216'>216</a> Press organ +of, i, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href= +'#Page_194'>194</a>, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page2_112'>112</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page2_170'>170</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_173'>173</a>, <a href='#Page2_185'>185</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page2_190'>190</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page2_263'>263</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_285'>285</a>, <a href='#Page2_293'>293</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_328"></a>[V2:pg 328]</span> +<p>Papineau, Canadian rebellion, 1837 ... i. <a href= +'#Page_4'>4</a></p> +<p>Papov, Rear-Admiral, ii. <a href='#Page2_129'>129</a> +<i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Paris, Congress of (1856), i. <a href='#Page_139'>139</a></p> +<p>Peabody, George, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></p> +<p>Peacocke, G.M.W. ii. <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_193'>193</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Persigny, i. <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>; conversation with +Slidell on intervention, ii. <a href='#Page2_19'>19</a></p> +<p>Petersburg, evacuation of, ii. <a href='#Page2_248'>248</a></p> +<p>Phinney, Patrick, and the enlistment of Irishmen in the Northern +army, ii. <a href='#Page2_202'>202</a> <i>and note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Pickens, Governor of S. Carolina, i. <a href= +'#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>, <a href= +'#Page_186'>186</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Pickett Papers quoted, i. <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_155'>155</a>; cited, i. <a href='#Page_261'>261</a> +<i>note</i>; ii. <a href='#Page2_69'>69</a> <i>note</i>[5]</p> +<p>Poland: France, Russia, Great Britain and the Polish question, +ii. <a href='#Page2_129'>129</a>, <a href='#Page2_163'>163</a>, +<a href='#Page2_164'>164</a></p> +<p>Pollard, <i>The Lost Cause</i>, quoted on attitude of England on +the cotton question, ii. <a href='#Page2_5'>5</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_6'>6</a></p> +<p>Potter, Thomas Bayley, ii. <a href='#Page2_164'>164</a>, +<a href='#Page2_224'>224</a>, <i>and note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Prescott, i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Press, British, the attitude of, in the American Civil War. +<i>See under Names of Newspapers, Reviews, etc.</i></p> +<p>Prim, Spanish General, commanding expedition to Mexico, i. +<a href='#Page_259'>259</a></p> +<p>Prince Consort, The, i. <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href= +'#Page_213'>213</a>, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>-<a href= +'#Page_225'>5</a>; influence of, on Palmerston's foreign policy, +<a href='#Page_224'>224</a>; policy of conciliation to United +States, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a>; Adams, C.F., quoted on, +<a href='#Page_225'>225</a>, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a></p> +<p>Privateering, i. <a href='#Page_83'>83</a> <i>et seq</i>., +<a href='#Page_153'>153</a> <i>et seq. passim</i> Russian +convention with U.S. on, i. <a href='#Page_171'>171</a> +<i>note</i>[1] Southern Privateering, i. <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, +<a href='#Page_89'>89</a>, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a>, <a href= +'#Page_156'>156</a>, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href= +'#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>, <a href= +'#Page_171'>171</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>. +Proclamation on, <i>see under</i> Davis. British attitude to, i. +<a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>-<a href= +'#Page_92'>92</a>, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>, <a href= +'#Page_158'>158</a>, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a>, <a href= +'#Page_161'>161</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>, <a href= +'#Page_166'>166</a>; Parliamentary discussion on, <a href= +'#Page_94'>94</a>, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>, <a href= +'#Page_157'>157</a>; closing of British ports to, <a href= +'#Page_170'>170</a> <i>and note</i>[2] French attitude to, i. +<a href='#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>, <a href= +'#Page_159'>159</a>, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>, <a href= +'#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href='#Page_165'>165</a> Northern attitude +to, i. <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>, +<a href='#Page_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>, <a href= +'#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>; Seward's motive +against in Declaration of Paris negotiation, <a href= +'#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href= +'#Page_169'>169</a>; Northern accusations against Britain on, +<a href='#Page_91'>91</a> United States policy on, i. <a href= +'#Page_141'>141</a>, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>. <i>See</i> +Privateering Bill, <i>infra</i> <i>See also under</i> Declaration +of Paris negotiation</p> +<p>Privateering Bill, The, ii. <a href='#Page2_122'>122</a> <i>et +seq</i>.; purpose of, <a href='#Page2_122'>122</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_123'>3</a>, <a href='#Page2_125'>125</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_137'>137</a>; discussion in Senate on, <a href= +'#Page2_123'>123</a>-<a href='#Page2_124'>4</a>; passed as an +administrative measure, <a href='#Page2_124'>124</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_137'>137</a>; influence of, on Russell's policy, <a href= +'#Page2_137'>137</a>; British view of American intentions, <a href= +'#Page2_137'>137</a>-<a href='#Page2_138'>8</a>; historical view, +<a href='#Page2_141'>141</a>; Seward's use of, <a href= +'#Page2_121'>121</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Prussia and Schleswig-Holstein, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_203'>203</a>-<a href='#Page2_204'>4</a></p> +<p><i>Punch</i>, cartoons of, cited: on <i>Trent</i> affair, i. +<a href='#Page_217'>217</a>-<a href='#Page_218'>8</a>, <a href= +'#Page_237'>237</a>; on Stone Boat Blockade, <a href= +'#Page_255'>255</a>; suggesting intervention by France, ii. +<a href='#Page2_75'>75</a> <i>note</i>[1]; on Roebuck, <a href= +'#Page2_170'>170</a> <i>note</i>[1]; on Lincoln's re-election, +<a href='#Page2_239'>239</a> <i>and note</i>[1] Poem in, on the +death of Lincoln, ii. <a href='#Page2_259'>259</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_329"></a>[V2:pg 329]</span> +<p>Putnam, G.H., <i>Memories of My Youth</i>, cited, i. <a href= +'#Page_178'>178</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Putnam, G.P., <i>Memoirs</i>, cited, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p><i>Quarterly Review</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>; +views on the Southern secession, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>; on the +lesson from the failure of Democracy in America, <a href= +'#Page_47'>47</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_279'>279</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_286'>286</a>, <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a>; attitude in the +conflict, <a href='#Page2_199'>199</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_301'>301</a>; on British sympathy for the South, <a href= +'#Page2_301'>301</a></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p><i>Reader</i>, The, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_222'>222</a>, +<i>and note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Reform Bill of 1832 ... i. <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href= +'#Page_28'>28</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a>; of 1867 ... +<a href='#Page2_303'>303</a>, <a href='#Page2_304'>304</a></p> +<p>Republican Party, The, i. <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href= +'#Page_115'>115</a></p> +<p>Rhett, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_4'>4</a> <i>and note</i>[3], +<a href='#Page2_88'>88</a></p> +<p>Rhodes, <i>United States</i>, cited or quoted, i. <a href= +'#Page_110'>110</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>, +<a href='#Page_217'>217</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href='#Page2_16'>16</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_57'>57</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_147'>147</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_285'>285</a> +<i>note</i>[1] <i>et passim</i>.</p> +<p>Richardson, <i>Messages and Papers of the Confederacy</i>, cited +or quoted, i. <a href='#Page_261'>261</a> <i>note</i>, <a href= +'#Page_266'>266</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_57'>57</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_69'>69</a> <i>note</i>[5], <a href= +'#Page2_155'>155</a> <i>note</i>[6], <i>et passim</i>.</p> +<p>Richmond, Va., Southern Government head-quarters at, i. <a href= +'#Page_81'>81</a>; capture of, by Grant, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_248'>248</a></p> +<p><i>Richmond Enquirer</i>, The, quoted on attitude of France to +the Confederacy, ii. <a href='#Page2_180'>180</a></p> +<p><i>Richmond Whig</i>, The, cited, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_68'>68</a></p> +<p>Right of Search controversy, i. <a href='#Page_6'>6</a>-<a href= +'#Page_10'>10</a> <i>passim</i>, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>; +recrudescence of, in <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href= +'#Page_218'>218</a>, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a>, <a href= +'#Page_233'>233</a>, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a></p> +<p>Robinson, Chas. D., Lincoln's draft letter to, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_93'>93</a> <i>note</i>[4]</p> +<p>Roebuck, speech of, on recognition, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_34'>34</a> <i>note</i>[1]; motion of, for recognition of +the Confederacy, <a href='#Page2_74'>74</a> <i>note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page2_144'>144</a>, <a href='#Page2_152'>152</a>, +<a href='#Page2_164'>164</a> <i>et seq.</i>; <a href= +'#Page2_296'>296</a> <i>note</i>[1]; W.H. Russell's views on, +<a href='#Page2_166'>166</a>; Lord Russell's opinion on, <a href= +'#Page2_166'>166</a>; interview of, with Napoleon, <a href= +'#Page2_167'>167</a>; Parliamentary debate on, <a href= +'#Page2_170'>170</a>-<a href='#Page2_172'>2</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_176'>176</a>-<a href='#Page2_178'>8</a>; withdrawal of +motion, <a href='#Page2_175'>175</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_176'>176</a>-<a href='#Page2_177'>7</a>; subsequent +attitude of, to America, <a href='#Page2_177'>177</a> +<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_299'>299</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_300'>300</a>; opinion on the failure of democracy in +America, <a href='#Page2_299'>299</a>-<a href='#Page2_300'>300</a>; +<i>Punch</i> cartoon on, <a href='#Page2_170'>170</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page_306'>306</a></p> +<p>Rogers, Prof. Thorold, ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> +<i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Rosencrans, defeat of, at Chicamauga, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_184'>184</a></p> +<p>Rost, Southern Commissioner to London, i. <a href= +'#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href= +'#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href= +'#Page_264'>264</a></p> +<p>Rouher, M., French Minister of Commerce, i. <a href= +'#Page_293'>293</a>, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a></p> +<p>Roylance, ii. <a href='#Page2_110'>110</a></p> +<p>Rubery, Alfred: Lincoln's pardon of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_225'>225</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Russell, Lord John, i. <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href= +'#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>, <a href= +'#Page_78'>78</a>-<a href='#Page_79'>9</a>, <a href= +'#Page_81'>81</a>; attitude of, in the early days of the American +struggle, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, +<a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href= +'#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>-<a href= +'#Page_74'>4</a>, <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href= +'#Page_84'>84</a>; views on the secession, <a href= +'#Page_52'>52</a>-<a href='#Page_53'>3</a>; views and action in +anticipation of war, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>-<a href= +'#Page_58'>8</a>; instruction on possible jingo policy toward +England, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>-<a href='#Page_61'>1</a>; +recommends conciliation, i. <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href= +'#Page_74'>74</a>; refusal to make a pledge as to British policy, +<a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href= +'#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href= +'#Page_101'>101</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <a href= +'#Page_125'>125</a>; promise of delay to Dallas, <a href= +'#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href= +'#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>, <a href= +'#Page_108'>108</a>; plan of joint action with France, <a href= +'#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>; advises Parliament to +keep out of the Civil War, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a> <i>and +note</i>[3]; uncertainty as to American intention, <a href= +'#Page_201'>201</a>-<a href='#Page_202'>2</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_237'>237</a>; interview with Spence, i. <a href= +'#Page_266'>266</a>; "three months" statement, <a href= +'#Page_272'>272</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_22'>22</a>; effect of Stonewall Jackson's exploits on, ii. +<a href='#Page2_38'>38</a>; effect of Gladstone's Newcastle speech +on, <a href='#Page2_49'>49</a>; idea of withdrawal of belligerent +rights to the North, <a href='#Page2_182'>182</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_183'>183</a>; on relations with United States and Seward, +<a href='#Page2_183'>183</a>-<a href='#Page2_184'>4</a>; attitude +to Seward's plan of collecting import duties at Southern ports, +<a href='#Page2_198'>198</a>; views on the conflict: belief in +ultimate Southern independence, <a href= +'#Page2_198'>198</a>-<a href='#Page2_199'>9</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_212'>212</a>, <a href='#Page2_271'>271</a>; and the Danish +question, <a href='#Page2_203'>203</a>; action in withdrawing +neutrality proclamation, and belligerent rights, <a href= +'#Page2_266'>266</a>-<a href='#Page2_267'>7</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_268'>268</a>, <a href='#Page2_269'>269</a>; attitude to +piracy proclamation, <a href='#Page2_267'>267</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_268'>8</a>, and the Reform Bill, <a href= +'#Page2_276'>276</a>, <a href='#Page2_302'>302</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_303'>303</a>; quoted on the degeneration of the American +Republic, <a href='#Page2_285'>285</a>; succeeds to Premiership, +<a href='#Page2_302'>302</a></p> +<br> +<p class="i2"><i>Diplomatic action and views of, in regard +to</i>:</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_330"></a>[V2:pg 330]</span> +<p class="i3"><i>Alabama</i>, the, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page2_121'>121</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_124'>124</a>; interview with Adams on, <a href= +'#Page2_128'>128</a>, <a href='#Page2_131'>131</a>; private +feelings on <a href='#Page2_121'>121</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_124'>124</a>, <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a></p> +<p class="i3">Belligerent rights to the South, i. <a href= +'#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <i>and note</i>[3]; +reply to Houghton on, ii. <a href='#Page2_265'>265</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_266'>6</a>, <a href='#Page2_267'>267</a></p> +<p class="i3">Blockade, the: views on, i. <a href= +'#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>, <a href= +'#Page_246'>246</a>, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a>-<a href= +'#Page_253'>3</a>; instructions to Lyons on, <a href= +'#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>, <a href= +'#Page_248'>248</a>, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a>, <a href= +'#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a>, <a href= +'#Page_272'>272</a>; instructions to Bunch, <a href= +'#Page_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[2]; view on notification at the +port method, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>; on British Trade under, +<a href='#Page_252'>252</a>, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>; aim in +presenting Parliamentary Papers on, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a>, +<a href='#Page_267'>267</a>; on irritation caused by, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_225'>225</a>-<a href='#Page2_226'>6</a> Southern Ports +Bill, protests against, i. <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>-<a href= +'#Page_251'>51</a>; instructions to Lyons on, <a href= +'#Page_248'>248</a>, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a> Stone Boat Fleet, +i. <a href='#Page_254'>254</a>-<a href='#Page_255'>5</a>, <a href= +'#Page_256'>256</a></p> +<p class="i3">Bunch controversy, i. <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, +<a href='#Page_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>-<a href= +'#Page_195'>5</a>; letter of caution to Lyons on possible rupture, +<a href='#Page_190'>190</a>; anxiety in, <a href= +'#Page_190'>190</a>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a></p> +<p class="i3">Butler's, General, order to troops: advice to +Palmerston on, i. <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>-<a href= +'#Page_304'>4</a>; reply to Adams, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a></p> +<br> +<p class="i3">Confederate Commissioners: attitude to, i. <a href= +'#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>; interviews with, i. +<a href='#Page_85'>85</a>-<a href='#Page_86'>6</a>, <a href= +'#Page_158'>158</a>; declines official communication with, <a href= +'#Page_214'>214</a> <i>and note</i>[4], <a href= +'#Page_265'>265</a>-<a href='#Page_266'>6</a>; reception of Mason, +<a href='#Page_235'>235</a>, <a href='#Page_265'>265</a>-<a href= +'#Page_266'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href= +'#Page_268'>268</a>; suggestion to Thouvenel on reception of +Slidell, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>; reply to Mason's notification +of his recall, ii. <a href='#Page2_181'>181</a>; reply to +Confederate "Manifesto," <a href='#Page2_241'>241</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_242'>2</a></p> +<p class="i3">Confederate Shipbuilding: reply to Adams' protests, +ii. <a href='#Page2_118'>118</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_120'>120</a>-<a href='#Page2_121'>1</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_127'>127</a>; advice to Palmerston on, <a href= +'#Page2_131'>131</a>; orders detention of contractors, <a href= +'#Page2_135'>135</a>; seizure of <i>Alexandra</i>, <a href= +'#Page2_136'>136</a>; stoppage of, <a href='#Page2_197'>197</a>; +result of <i>Alexandra</i> trial, <a href='#Page2_197'>197</a>. +<i>See also sub-headings</i> Alabama, Laird Rams</p> +<p class="i3">Confederates: negotiations with, i. <a href= +'#Page_161'>161</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>, <a href= +'#Page_166'>166</a>, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a> <i>note</i>[4], +<a href='#Page_170'>170</a>, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>; attitude +to Thouvenel's initiation of negotiations with, <a href= +'#Page_189'>189</a>; explanation to Adams of British attitude to, +<a href='#Page_190'>190</a></p> +<p class="i3">Cotton supply: attitude to French proposals on, i. +<a href='#Page_197'>197</a>, <a href='#Page_199'>199</a>, <a href= +'#Page_294'>294</a></p> +<br> +<p class="i3">Declaration of Paris negotiation: request to France +in, i. <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>, <a href= +'#Page_146'>146</a>-<a href='#Page_147'>7</a>, <a href= +'#Page_156'>156</a>, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a> <i>and +note</i>[3]; instructions to Lyons on, <a href= +'#Page_146'>146</a>-<a href='#Page_162'>62</a> <i>passim</i>, +<a href='#Page_184'>184</a>; interviews with Adams, <a href= +'#Page_141'>141</a>-<a href='#Page_148'>8</a>, <a href= +'#Page_158'>158</a>; proposals to the United States, <a href= +'#Page_153'>153</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page_170'>170</a>; instructions to Cowley, <a href= +'#Page_156'>156</a>-<a href='#Page_159'>9</a> <i>passim</i>; +suggested declaration in proposed convention, <a href= +'#Page_143'>143</a>-<a href='#Page_146'>6</a>, <a href= +'#Page_146'>146</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>, +<a href='#Page_151'>151</a>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href= +'#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>, <a href= +'#Page_201'>201</a></p> +<p class="i3">Emancipation Proclamation: views on, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_101'>101</a>-<a href='#Page2_102'>2</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_107'>107</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p> +<br> +<p class="i3">Foreign Enlistment Act: idea of amending, ii. +<a href='#Page2_124'>124</a>; offer to United States on, <a href= +'#Page2_124'>124</a>-<a href='#Page2_125'>5</a>; reply to Adams' +pressure for alteration of, <a href='#Page2_149'>149</a></p> +<br> +<p class="i3">Gregory's motion, i. <a href='#Page_108'>108</a></p> +<br> +<p class="i3">Irishmen: recruiting of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_201'>201</a>-<a href='#Page2_202'>2</a></p> +<br> +<p class="i3">Laird Rams: conversations with Adams on, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_144'>144</a>; orders detention of, <a href= +'#Page2_144'>144</a>-<a href='#Page2_145'>5</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page2_150'>150</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_151'>151</a>; correspondence with the Lairds, <a href= +'#Page2_146'>146</a>; drafts protest to Mason, <a href= +'#Page2_147'>147</a>, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a> <i>and +note</i>[1]; reply to attack on Government policy on, <a href= +'#Page2_149'>149</a>-<a href='#Page2_150'>50</a></p> +<p class="i3">Lindsay: approval of Cowley's statement to, i. +<a href='#Page_293'>293</a>, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>; reply to +request of, for an interview, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>-<a href= +'#Page_295'>5</a>; interview with, on motion for mediation and +recognition, ii. <a href='#Page2_212'>212</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_213'>13</a></p> +<br> +<p class="i3">Mediation: advice to Palmerston on reported French +offer, i. <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>; reply to Seward's protest, +ii. <a href='#Page2_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page2_25'>25</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_26'>6</a>, <a href='#Page2_27'>27</a>; project of, with +Palmerston, ii. <a href='#Page2_31'>31</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_32'>2</a>, <a href='#Page2_34'>34</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_36'>36</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page2_91'>91</a>, +<a href='#Page2_271'>271</a>; instructs Cowley to sound Thouvenel, +<a href='#Page2_38'>38</a>; letters to Gladstone on, <a href= +'#Page2_40'>40</a>, <a href='#Page2_41'>41</a>; points of, <a href= +'#Page2_46'>46</a>; responsibility for, <a href='#Page2_46'>46</a> +<i>note</i>[4]; Russia approached, <a href='#Page2_45'>45</a>; +memorandum on America, <a href='#Page2_49'>49</a> <i>and +note</i>[3]; proposal of an armistice, <a href= +'#Page2_31'>31</a>-<a href='#Page2_32'>2</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_49'>49</a>, <a href='#Page2_53'>53</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_55'>5</a>, <a href='#Page2_56'>56</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_57'>7</a>; comments on Napoleon's Armistice suggestion, +<a href='#Page2_61'>61</a>-<a href='#Page2_62'>2</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_64'>64</a>; wish for acceptance, <a href= +'#Page2_62'>62</a>, <a href='#Page2_64'>64</a>; declaration of no +change in British policy, <a href='#Page2_71'>71</a>; end of the +project, <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>, <a href='#Page2_155'>155</a>; +motive in, <a href='#Page2_73'>73</a>; viewed as a crisis, <a href= +'#Page2_73'>73</a>; comments of, to Brunow on joint mediation offer +<a href='#Page2_73'>73</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p class="i3">Mercier's Richmond visit, i. <a href= +'#Page_287'>287</a>, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a></p> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_331"></a>[V2:pg 331]</span> +<p class="i3">Privateering, i. <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>, <a href= +'#Page_91'>91</a>, <a href='#Page_159'>159</a>-<a href= +'#Page_163'>63</a> <i>passim</i>; possible interference of, with +neutrals, ii. <a href='#Page2_127'>127</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_138'>138</a>-<a href='#Page2_150'>150</a>; opinion of, on +intended use of privateers, <a href='#Page2_138'>138</a> +Proclamation of Neutrality. British position in, i. <a href= +'#Page_166'>166</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_265'>265</a>-<a href='#Page2_266'>6</a></p> +<br> +<p class="i3">Recognition of the Confederacy: attitude to, i. +<a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href= +'#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href= +'#Page_101'>101</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <a href= +'#Page_242'>242</a>, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_77'>77</a>-<a href='#Page2_78'>8</a>; influence of +<i>Trent</i> affair on, i. <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>; reply to +Mason's requests for, ii. <a href='#Page2_25'>25</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_27'>27</a>; opinion of Roebuck's motion on, <a href= +'#Page2_166'>166</a>, <a href='#Page2_177'>177</a>; denies receipt +of proposal from France on <a href='#Page2_168'>168</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_169'>9</a>, <a href='#Page2_172'>172</a></p> +<br> +<p class="i3">Servile War, ii. <a href='#Page2_80'>80</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_97'>97</a>, <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a></p> +<p class="i3">Slavery, ii. <a href='#Page2_89'>89</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_90'>90</a>; view of Seward's proposal for transport of +emancipated slaves, <a href='#Page2_100'>100</a></p> +<br> +<p class="i3"><i>Trent</i> affair, view of, i. <a href= +'#Page_212'>212</a>; letter to Lord Palmerston on War with America +over, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>; on possible ways of settlement +of, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>; instructions to Lyons on learning +officially that Wilkes acted without authorization, <a href= +'#Page_226'>226</a></p> +<p class="i3">Policy of, in the American Civil War: i. <a href= +'#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a>, <a href= +'#Page_243'>243</a>, <a href='#Page_299'>299</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_271'>271</a>-<a href='#Page2_272'>2</a>; declaration to +Adams on, <a href='#Page2_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page2_71'>71</a> +Attitude to Adams, i. <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>; view of, i. +<a href='#Page_131'>131</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_128'>128</a> View +of Lincoln, i. <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_263'>263</a> View of Seward, i. <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, +<a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>, <a href= +'#Page_235'>235</a>-<a href='#Page_236'>6</a>; improved relations +with, ii. <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_197'>197</a></p> +<p class="i3">Criticism and view of, in <i>The Index</i>, ii. +<a href='#Page2_51'>51</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page2_69'>69</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_196'>196</a></p> +<p class="i3">Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>, +<a href='#Page_101'>101</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>, <a href= +'#Page_277'>277</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_190'>190</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_208'>208</a>, <a href='#Page2_254'>254</a></p> +<p>Russell, Lady, quoted on <i>Trent</i> affair, i. <a href= +'#Page_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Russell, W.H., <i>Times</i> correspondent, i. <a href= +'#Page_44'>44</a>, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, <a href= +'#Page_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>; letters of, to the +<i>Times</i>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href= +'#Page_177'>177</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_229'>229</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; on the secession, i. <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, +<a href='#Page_177'>177</a>; impression of Lincoln, <a href= +'#Page_61'>61</a> <i>note</i>[2]; description of Bull Run, <a href= +'#Page_177'>177</a>-<a href='#Page_178'>8</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_229'>229</a> <i>note</i>[1]; abhorrence of slavery, i. +<a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>; American +newspaper attacks on <a href='#Page_178'>178</a> <i>and +note</i>[2]; recall of, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a> <i>and +note</i>[2]; ii. <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_229'>229</a> <i>note</i>[1]; on Napoleon's mediation offer, +<a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>; on recognition, <a href= +'#Page2_166'>166</a>; editor of <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i>, ii. +<a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_229'>229</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; belief of, in ultimate +Northern victory, i. <a href='#Page_178'>178</a> <i>note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page_180'>180</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_68'>68</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_229'>229</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; view of the ending of the +War, <a href='#Page2_229'>229</a>-<a href='#Page2_230'>30</a>; on +campaigns of Grant and Sherman, <a href='#Page2_230'>230</a>, +<a href='#Page2_232'>232</a>-<a href='#Page2_233'>3</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_243'>243</a>; quoted on Delane, <a href= +'#Page2_254'>254</a>; on prospective war with America, <a href= +'#Page2_254'>254</a>; on failure of republican institutions, +<a href='#Page2_277'>277</a> <i>My Diary North and South</i>, i. +<a href='#Page_177'>177</a> <i>notes</i>; quoted <a href= +'#Page_44'>44</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>, +<a href='#Page_71'>71</a>; cited, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>, +<a href='#Page_178'>178</a>, ii. <a href='#Page2_229'>229</a> +<i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Russia: attitude in Declaration of Paris negotiation, i. +<a href='#Page_164'>164</a> <i>note</i>[1]; convention with United +States on privateering, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a> <i>note</i>[1]; +attitude to recognition of the South, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a> +<i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>; and mediation, i. +<a href='#Page_283'>283</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_37'>37</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_39'>39</a>, +<a href='#Page2_45'>45</a> <i>note</i>[2]; British approach to, on +mediation, <a href='#Page2_40'>40</a>, <a href='#Page2_45'>45</a>, +<i>and note</i>[2]; attitude to joint mediation, <a href= +'#Page2_59'>59</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_63'>63</a> +<i>and note</i>[5], <a href='#Page2_66'>66</a> <i>and note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page2_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on joint mediation +without Britain, <a href='#Page2_76'>76</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; +plan of separate mediation, <a href='#Page2_251'>251</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; Seward's request to, on withdrawal of Southern +belligerent rights, <a href='#Page2_265'>265</a> <i>and +note</i>[2]; policy of friendship to United States, <a href= +'#Page2_45'>45</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a> +<i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[2]; United +States friendship for, <a href='#Page2_225'>225</a> Polish +question, ii. <a href='#Page2_129'>129</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_163'>163</a> Fleets of, in Western waters: story of, in +<i>Trent</i> affair, i. <a href='#Page_227'>227</a> <i>note</i>[1]; +ii. <a href='#Page2_129'>129</a> <i>and note</i> <i>See also +under</i> Brunow, Gortchakoff, Stoeckl</p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>St. Andre, French Acting-Consul at Charleston, i. <a href= +'#Page_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, <a href= +'#Page_191'>191</a> <i>note</i>[4]</p> +<p>Salisbury, Lord, quoted on John Bright's oratory, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_290'>290</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Salt, price of, in Charleston: effect of the blockade, i. +<a href='#Page_270'>270</a></p> +<p>San Domingo, Seward's overture to Great Britain for a convention +to guarantee independence of, i. <a href='#Page_126'>126</a> +<i>note</i>[1]</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_332"></a>[V2:pg 332]</span> +<p>San Francisco, Russian vessels in harbour of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_129'>129</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p> +<p><i>San Jacinto</i>, the, i. <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>, +<a href='#Page_205'>205</a>, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a></p> +<p><i>Saturday Review</i>, The: views of, on Lincoln's election, i. +<a href='#Page_39'>39</a>; judgment of Seward, <a href= +'#Page_39'>39</a>; views at outbreak of war, <a href= +'#Page_41'>41</a>, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a>; on Southern right of +secession, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>; on Proclamation of +Neutrality, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>-<a href='#Page_101'>1</a>; +on reported American adhesion to Declaration of Paris, <a href= +'#Page_146'>146</a> <i>note</i>[1]; on slavery as an issue: attack +on Mrs. H.B. Stowe, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>-<a href= +'#Page_181'>1</a>; on blockade and recognition, <a href= +'#Page_183'>183</a>; on duration of war and cotton supply, <a href= +'#Page_246'>246</a> <i>note</i>[3]; on servile insurrection, ii. +<a href='#Page2_80'>80</a>; and the relation between the American +struggle and British institutions, <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a>, +<a href='#Page2_277'>277</a>-<a href='#Page2_278'>8</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_280'>280</a>; on the promiscuous democracy of the North, +<a href='#Page2_277'>277</a>; on the Republic and the British +Monarchy, <a href='#Page2_277'>277</a>-<a href='#Page2_278'>8</a>; +cited, <a href='#Page2_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> +<i>note</i></p> +<p>Savannah, Ga., i. <a href='#Page_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[1]; +captured by Sherman, ii. <a href='#Page2_245'>245</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page2_300'>300</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_301'>1</a></p> +<p>Scherer, <i>Cotton as a World Power</i>, cited, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_6'>6</a></p> +<p>Schilling, C., ii. <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a> +<i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Schleiden, Rudolph, Minister of Republic of Bremen, i. <a href= +'#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a> <i>note</i>, +<a href='#Page_130'>130</a>; views of, on Seward and Lincoln, +<a href='#Page_115'>115</a>-<a href='#Page_116'>6</a>; offers +services as mediator: plan of an armistice, <a href= +'#Page_121'>121</a>, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>; visit of, to +Richmond, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>-<a href='#Page_123'>3</a>; +failure of his mediation, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>-<a href= +'#Page_123'>3</a>; report of Russian attitude to privateers, +<a href='#Page_171'>171</a> <i>note</i>[1]; on <i>Trent</i> affair, +<a href='#Page_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page_242'>242</a>; on Lincoln and Seward's attitude to release of +envoys, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on attitude of +Seward and Sumner to Southern Ports Bill, <a href= +'#Page_248'>248</a> <i>note</i>[3]; quoted, on slavery, ii. +<a href='#Page2_111'>111</a> <i>and note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Schleswig-Holstein question, i. <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_203'>203</a>-<a href='#Page2_204'>4</a></p> +<p>Schmidt, <i>Wheat and Cotton during the Civil War</i>, cited, +ii. <a href='#Page2_7'>7</a> <i>notes</i>; <a href= +'#Page2_167'>167</a> <i>note</i>[1]; arguments in, examined, +<a href='#Page2_13'>13</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Scholefield, Wm., ii. <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a> +<i>note</i></p> +<p>Schouler,----, on diplomatic controversies between England and +America, cited, i. <a href='#Page_35'>35</a></p> +<p>Schroeder, quoted on Erlanger's contract to issue Confederate +Cotton Loan, ii. <a href='#Page2_161'>161</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_162'>2</a></p> +<p>Schurz, Carl, papers of, in library of Congress, cited, i. +<a href='#Page_117'>117</a> <i>note</i>; advocates declaration of +an anti-slavery purpose in the war, ii. <a href='#Page2_91'>91</a>, +<a href='#Page2_92'>92</a>; cited i. <a href='#Page_83'>83</a> +<i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Schwab, <i>The Confederate States of America</i>, cited, ii. +<a href='#Page2_156'>156</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page2_158'>158</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_160'>160</a> +<i>notes</i>, <a href='#Page2_162'>162</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Scott, Winfield, American General, on Wilkes' action in +<i>Trent</i> affair, i. <a href='#Page_218'>218</a></p> +<p>Sears, <i>A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon +III</i>, cited, i. <a href='#Page_261'>261</a> <i>note</i>, +<a href='#Page_289'>289</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_24'>24</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Secession States, ports of, i. <a href='#Page_253'>253</a> +<i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Semmes, captain of the <i>Alabama</i>, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_119'>119</a></p> +<p>Senior, Nassau W., article on "American Slavery," i. <a href= +'#Page_33'>33</a>; quoted, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a> +<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_34'>34</a></p> +<p>Servile insurrection, i. <a href='#Page_271'>271</a>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page2_87'>87</a>; British +apprehension of, i. <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_49'>49</a>, <a href='#Page2_79'>79</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_80'>80</a>, <a href='#Page2_81'>81</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_101'>101</a>, <a href='#Page2_110'>110</a>; emancipation +viewed as provocative of, <a href='#Page2_49'>49</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_81'>81</a>, <a href='#Page2_86'>86</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page2_101'>101</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_114'>114</a>; as an argument for intervention, <a href= +'#Page2_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page2_101'>101</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_103'>103</a> <i>note</i>[6]; use of as a threat, <a href= +'#Page2_18'>18</a>-<a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page2_94'>94</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_95'>95</a>, <a href='#Page2_97'>97</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page2_100'>100</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_114'>114</a></p> +<p>Seward, W.H., American Secretary of State, i. <a href= +'#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>, <a href= +'#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href= +'#Page_64'>64</a>, <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href= +'#Page_80'>80</a>, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>; British view of, +<a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, view of, as +unfriendly to Great Britain, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href= +'#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href= +'#Page_113'>113</a>-<a href='#Page_114'>4</a>, <a href= +'#Page_125'>125</a> <i>et seq.</i> <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>; +reputation as a politician, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, <a href= +'#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>; efforts of, to +secure European support for the North, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, +<a href='#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>; view of +his relation to Lincoln, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href= +'#Page_115'>115</a>-<a href='#Page_116'>6</a>, <a href= +'#Page_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href= +'#Page_127'>127</a>-<a href='#Page_128'>8</a>, <a href= +'#Page_130'>130</a>; document "Some Thoughts for the President's +Consideration," <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>-<a href= +'#Page_119'>9</a>, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>, <a href= +'#Page_124'>124</a>; advice on Fort Sumter, <a href= +'#Page_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>; his "Despatch No. +<a href='#Page_10'>10</a>", <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>-<a href= +'#Page_130'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href= +'#Page_155'>155</a>; reversal of his policy, <a href= +'#Page_130'>130</a>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a>; action on +Britain's necessity of intercourse with the South, <a href= +'#Page_164'>164</a>; instructions to American diplomats on slavery +as issue, i. <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_95'>95</a>; offers facilities for transport of British +troops, i. <a href='#Page_213'>213</a> <i>note</i>[4]; change of +attitude to England, ii. <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>; quarrel with +Chase, <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>; influence of, lessened by +signing Abolition Proclamation, <a href='#Page2_100'>100</a> +<i>note</i>[2]; friendliness to Lyons, <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>, +<a href='#Page2_141'>141</a>; appreciation of Russell's expression +of esteem, <a href='#Page2_147'>147</a>; attitude to Russell, +<a href='#Page2_197'>197</a>; policy in regard to reunion, <a href= +'#Page2_197'>197</a>; plan of collecting import duties at Southern +ports, <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a>; tests British-French harmony, +<a href='#Page2_198'>198</a>; anxiety to avoid irritating +incidents, <a href='#Page2_199'>199</a>; considers abrogation of +treaties with Canada, <a href='#Page2_253'>253</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_254'>4</a>; denies rumours of prospective foreign war, +<a href='#Page2_254'>254</a>; accepts notification of ending of +British neutrality, <a href='#Page2_268'>268</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_269'>9</a>; meets with an accident, <a href= +'#Page2_257'>257</a>; attempted murder of, <a href= +'#Page2_257'>257</a>-<a href='#Page2_258'>8</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_265'>265</a></p> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_333"></a>[V2:pg 333]</span> +<p class="i2"><i>Diplomatic action and views of, with regard +to:</i></p> +<p class="i3">Belligerent rights to South denial of, i. <a href= +'#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href= +'#Page_169'>169</a>, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_182'>182</a>; remonstrance on concession of, i. <a href= +'#Page_247'>247</a>, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>, proposes +withdrawal of, ii. <a href='#Page2_264'>264</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_265'>5</a>, <a href='#Page2_266'>266</a>; <i>See also +under</i> Declaration of Paris <i>and</i> Neutrality +<i>infra</i>.</p> +<p class="i3">Blockade, i. <a href='#Page_54'>54</a> +<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href= +'#Page_246'>246</a>, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>; interviews with +Lyons on, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>, +<a href='#Page_246'>246</a>, <a href='#Page_251'>251</a>, <a href= +'#Page_256'>256</a>, <a href='#Page_257'>257</a>; suggested +alleviation of, i. <a href='#Page_274'>274</a> Southern Ports Bill: +reassures Lord Lyons' on American intentions in, i. <a href= +'#Page_249'>249</a>; attitude to issue of, <a href= +'#Page_248'>248</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>, +<a href='#Page_251'>251</a>, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a>; on +closing of ports by proclamation, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>, +<a href='#Page_252'>252</a> Stone Boat Fleet blockade: statement +on, i. <a href='#Page_256'>256</a>-<a href='#Page_257'>7</a></p> +<p class="i3">Bunch affair, i. <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>, +<a href='#Page_189'>189</a>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a> <i>and +note</i>[4], <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href= +'#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a> <i>and +note</i>[1]</p> +<p class="i3">Confederate debts: statement on, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_197'>197</a></p> +<p class="i3">Confederate envoys: British intercourse with, i. +<a href='#Page_105'>105</a></p> +<p class="i3">Confederate shipbuilding in Britain: ii. <a href= +'#Page2_121'>121</a>, <a href='#Page2_139'>139</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_140'>140</a>; effect of seizure of the <i>Alexandra</i> on, +<a href='#Page2_140'>140</a>; despatch on <i>Alexandra</i> case +decision, <a href='#Page2_143'>143</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; refuses +to allow British Consul through the blockade, <a href= +'#Page2_148'>148</a></p> +<p class="i3">Cotton: on proposed French intervention to secure, i. +<a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>; promises +of, based on capture of New Orleans, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_16'>16</a></p> +<p class="i3">Declaration of Paris negotiation, i. <a href= +'#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>, <a href= +'#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>, <a href= +'#Page_150'>150</a> <i>et seq.</i>; statement in refusing +convention as modified by Russell, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>; +motives in, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>-<a href='#Page_152'>2</a>, +<a href='#Page_153'>153</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>; hope to +influence foreign attitude to Southern belligerent rights, <a href= +'#Page_150'>150</a>-<a href='#Page_151'>1</a>, <a href= +'#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href= +'#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>; as part of +foreign war policy: considered, <a href= +'#Page_153'>153</a>-<a href='#Page_154'>4</a>, <a href= +'#Page_155'>155</a>-<a href='#Page_156'>6</a></p> +<p class="i3">Emancipation Proclamation: urges postponement of, ii. +<a href='#Page2_37'>37</a>. <a href='#Page2_85'>85</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_95'>95</a>, <a href='#Page2_96'>96</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page2_114'>114</a>; informed as to +effect of, on intervention, <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_99'>99</a> comments on purpose of, <a href= +'#Page2_99'>99</a>-<a href='#Page2_100'>100</a> the "high moral +purpose" argument, ii. <a href='#Page2_100'>100</a>; proposes +convention for transport of emancipated slaves, <a href= +'#Page2_100'>100</a></p> +<p class="i3">Hampton Roads Conference, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_252'>252</a>; attitude to Britain after, <a href= +'#Page2_253'>253</a>-<a href='#Page2_254'>4</a></p> +<p class="i3">Intervention: attitude to, i. <a href= +'#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>, <a href= +'#Page_200'>200</a>; threat of servile war and, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_18'>18</a>-<a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page2_95'>95</a>; instructions to +Adams on, <a href='#Page2_35'>35</a>-<a href='#Page2_36'>6</a>, +<a href='#Page2_96'>96</a>-<a href='#Page2_97'>7</a>; view of the +effect of emancipation, on, <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_114'>114</a>. <i>See also</i> Mediation <i>infra</i>.</p> +<p class="i3">Irish Emigrants: enlistment of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_201'>201</a></p> +<p class="i3">Mediation: attitude to, i. <a href= +'#Page_283'>283</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_297'>297</a>; +ii. <a href='#Page2_18'>18</a>, <a href='#Page2_57'>57</a> +<i>note</i>[2]; by France, i. <a href='#Page_283'>283</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; by Russia, <a href='#Page_283'>283</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; view of England's refusal to act with France in, +ii. <a href='#Page2_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>; +declines French offer of, <a href='#Page2_76'>76</a> <i>See +also</i> Intervention <i>supra</i>.</p> +<p class="i3">Mercier's Richmond visit, i. <a href= +'#Page_280'>280</a>-<a href='#Page_284'>4</a>, <a href= +'#Page_286'>286</a>; statement to Lyons: view of Confederate +position, <a href='#Page_286'>286</a>; newspaper statement on, +<a href='#Page_287'>287</a></p> +<p class="i3">Napoleon's Mexican policy: attitude to, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_198'>198</a></p> +<p class="i3">Neutrality Proclamations: representations on, i. +<a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>; despatch +on American view of, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>, <a href= +'#Page_103'>103</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_134'>134</a>; +refusal to receive officially, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>-<a href= +'#Page_103'>3</a>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a>, <a href= +'#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a> <i>and +note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>; efforts to secure recall +of, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>-<a href='#Page_153'>3</a>, <a href= +'#Page_169'>169</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href= +'#Page_234'>234</a>, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>-<a href= +'#Page_275'>5</a>, <a href='#Page_300'>300</a>, <a href= +'#Page_301'>301</a></p> +<p class="i3">Privateering, i. <a href='#Page_160'>160</a>; +convention with Russia, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a> <i>note</i>. +<i>See also</i> Southern Privateering <i>infra</i>.</p> +<p class="i3">"Privateering Bill:" use of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_121'>121</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_141'>141</a>, +<a href='#Page2_151'>151</a>; on the purpose and use of the +privateers, <a href='#Page2_122'>122</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_123'>3</a>, <a href='#Page2_125'>125</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page2_143'>143</a>; conversations +with Lyons on, <a href='#Page2_125'>125</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_126'>126</a>; on necessity for issuing letters of marque, +<a href='#Page2_126'>126</a>, <a href='#Page2_143'>143</a>; advised +by Adams against issue of privateers, <a href='#Page2_131'>131</a>, +<a href='#Page2_139'>139</a></p> +<p class="i3">Recognition of Southern Independence, i. <a href= +'#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href= +'#Page_198'>198</a></p> +<p class="i3">Servile War threat, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_18'>18</a>-<a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page2_83'>83</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_95'>95</a>, <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a></p> +<p class="i3">Slave Trade Treaty with Great Britain, i. <a href= +'#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a>, <a href= +'#Page_276'>276</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_90'>90</a></p> +<p class="i3">Southern privateering: view of, i. <a href= +'#Page_104'>104</a>, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>; efforts to +influence European attitude to, i. <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>, +<a href='#Page_150'>150</a>-<a href='#Page_151'>1</a>, <a href= +'#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href= +'#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>; attitude on issue +of privateers from British ports, ii. <a href='#Page2_126'>126</a>, +<a href='#Page2_127'>127</a></p> +<p class="i3"><i>Trent</i> affair: reception of British demands in, +i. <a href='#Page2_230'>230</a>, <a href='#Page2_232'>232</a>, +<a href='#Page2_233'>233</a>; on Wilkes' action, <a href= +'#Page2_231'>231</a>; attitude to release of envoys, <a href= +'#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_232'>232</a>, <a href='#Page2_233'>233</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_234'>234</a>, <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a>; British opinion +on Seward in, <a href='#Page2_239'>239</a></p> +<br> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_334"></a>[V2:pg 334]</span> +<p class="i2">Foreign Policy: high tone, i. <a href= +'#Page_236'>236</a>, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a> <i>and +note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>; restoration of the Union +as basis of, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>; influences affecting, ii. +<a href='#Page2_95'>95</a>, <a href='#Page2_100'>100</a></p> +<p class="i2">Foreign war panacea, i. <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, +<a href='#Page_113'>113</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href= +'#Page_123'>123</a>-<a href='#Page_124'>4</a>, <a href= +'#Page_125'>125</a>, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a> <i>note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>, <a href= +'#Page_132'>132</a>, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a>-<a href= +'#Page_135'>5</a>, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href= +'#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>, <a href= +'#Page_214'>214</a>; appreciation of, <a href= +'#Page_136'>136</a>.</p> +<p class="i2">Southern conciliation policy of, i. <a href= +'#Page_49'>49</a>, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href= +'#Page_117'>117</a>, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>, <a href= +'#Page_120'>120</a>-<a href='#Page_121'>1</a>, <a href= +'#Page_123'>123</a>, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>; expectations from +Union sentiment in the South, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href= +'#Page_117'>117</a>; aids Schieiden's Richmond visit, <a href= +'#Page_121'>121</a>-<a href='#Page_123'>3</a>; communications with +Confederate Commissioners, <a href='#Page_117'>117</a>-<a href= +'#Page_118'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a></p> +<p class="i2">Appreciation and criticism of: by British statesmen +and press in 1865.... ii. <a href='#Page2_257'>257</a>; +<i>Times</i> tribute to, <a href='#Page2_257'>257</a>; Horace +Greeley's attack on, i. <a href='#Page_280'>280</a> <i>note</i>[1]; +Gregory's attack on, i. <a href='#Page_269'>269</a>; Lyons' view +of, i. <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>; Adams' +admiration for i. <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, <a href= +'#Page_127'>127</a></p> +<p class="i2">British suspicion of, i. <a href='#Page_113'>113</a>, +<a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>, <a href= +'#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>, <a href= +'#Page_227'>227</a>, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>-<a href= +'#Page_236'>6</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_101'>101</a> <i>note</i>[1]; +the Newcastle story, <a href='#Page2_80'>80</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_114'>114</a>, <a href='#Page2_216'>216</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_227'>227</a>; Thurlow Weeds' efforts to remove, <a href= +'#Page2_227'>227</a>; Adams' view, <a href='#Page2_227'>227</a></p> +<p class="i2">Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>, +<a href='#Page_163'>163</a> <i>notes</i>, <a href= +'#Page_177'>177</a>, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, <a href= +'#Page_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>, <a href= +'#Page_212'>212</a>, <a href='#Page_213'>213</a>, <a href= +'#Page_217'>217</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_39'>39</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page2_123'>123</a> <i>note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page2_170'>170</a>, <a href='#Page2_173'>173</a>, +<a href='#Page2_175'>175</a>, <a href='#Page2_223'>223</a>, +<a href='#Page2_225'>225</a>, <a href='#Page2_245'>245</a> +<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_259'>259</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_281'>281</a></p> +<p>Shelburne, Earl of, i. <a href='#Page_240'>240</a></p> +<p>Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah, views in French press on, +ii. <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Sherman, General: Atlanta campaign of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_217'>217</a>; captures Atlanta, <a href= +'#Page2_233'>233</a>; march to the sea, <a href= +'#Page2_243'>243</a>-<a href='#Page2_245'>5</a>; captures Savannah, +<a href='#Page2_245'>245</a>, <a href='#Page2_249'>249</a>, +<a href='#Page2_300'>300</a>-<a href='#Page2_301'>1</a>; campaign +against Johnston, <a href='#Page2_248'>248</a>; reports of +pillaging and burning by his army, <a href='#Page2_265'>265</a>; +mentioned, <a href='#Page2_215'>215</a> Russell, W.H., views of, on +Sherman's campaigns, ii. <a href='#Page2_230'>230</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_232'>232</a>-<a href='#Page2_233'>3</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_243'>243</a> <i>Times</i> view of his campaigns, ii. +<a href='#Page2_212'>212</a>, <a href='#Page2_227'>227</a>, +<a href='#Page2_232'>232</a>, <a href='#Page2_243'>243</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_246'>6</a></p> +<p>Shiloh, General Grant's victory at, i. <a href= +'#Page_278'>278</a></p> +<p>Shipbuilding by Confederates in neutral ports, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_116'>116</a>, <a href='#Page2_117'>117</a> <i>note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page2_128'>128</a>; Continental opinion of international +law on, <a href='#Page2_121'>121</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p><i>Shipping Gazette</i>, quoted, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_14'>14</a></p> +<p>Shrewsbury, Earl of, cited on democracy in America and its +failure, ii. <a href='#Page2_282'>282</a></p> +<p>Slavery: cotton supplies and, i. <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>; +controversy in America on, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>, <a href= +'#Page_36'>36</a>; English opinion on, <a href= +'#Page_31'>31</a>-<a href='#Page_35'>5</a>, <a href= +'#Page_37'>37</a>-<a href='#Page_38'>8</a>, <a href= +'#Page_40'>40</a>; as an issue in the Civil War, <a href= +'#Page_45'>45</a>, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a>, <a href= +'#Page_173'>173</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>, <a href= +'#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href= +'#Page_181'>181</a>, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>, <a href= +'#Page_242'>242</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_78'>78</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_88'>88</a>-<a href='#Page2_93'>93</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_222'>222</a>; Confederates identified with, i. <a href= +'#Page_71'>71</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_220'>220</a>; Southern +arguments for, <a href='#Page2_3'>3</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; +attitude of the North to, <a href='#Page2_78'>78</a>; growth of +anti-slavery sentiment, <a href='#Page2_83'>83</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_84'>84</a>; failure of the slaves to rise, <a href= +'#Page2_86'>86</a>; Northern declaration on, urged, <a href= +'#Page2_98'>98</a>-<a href='#Page2_99'>9</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_107'>107</a>; British public meetings on, <a href= +'#Page2_109'>109</a> <i>note</i>[2]; Southern declaration on, +<a href='#Page2_106'>106</a>. <i>See also</i> African Slave Trade, +Emancipation, Servile Insurrection, etc.</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_335"></a>[V2:pg 335]</span> +<p>Slidell, John, "Special Commissioner of the Confederates" to +France, i. <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>; captured on the +<i>Trent</i>, <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>-<a href= +'#Page_205'>5</a>, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; +connection of with Napoleon's Mexican policy, <a href= +'#Page_261'>261</a> <i>note</i>[1]; plan of action of, <a href= +'#Page_264'>264</a>-<a href='#Page_265'>5</a>; received by +Thouvenel, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a> <i>note</i>[1]; view on +Continental and British interests in the blockade, <a href= +'#Page_267'>267</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>; +view of Mercier's Richmond visit, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a>; on +Lindsay's interviews with Napoleon, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>; +views of, on the capture of New Orleans, <a href= +'#Page_296'>296</a>; idea to demand recognition from France, +<a href='#Page_306'>306</a>, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>; ii. +<a href='#Page2_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page2_28'>28</a>; hopes of +mediation by France, ii. <a href='#Page2_19'>19</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_25'>25</a>; interview of, with Napoleon, <a href= +'#Page2_23'>23</a>, <a href='#Page2_24'>24</a>; makes offers to +Napoleon and to Thouvenel, <a href='#Page2_24'>24</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_25'>25</a>; letter to Benjamin on failure to secure +intervention, <a href='#Page2_29'>29</a>; interview with Napoleon +on Armistice, <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a> <i>and note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page2_60'>60</a>; memorandum of, to the Emperor, asking +for separate recognition, <a href='#Page2_75'>75</a>; on +shipbuilding for Confederates in France, <a href= +'#Page2_128'>128</a>; quoted on position of France in relation to +mediation, <a href='#Page2_155'>155</a>; and Confederate Cotton +Loan, <a href='#Page2_158'>158</a> <i>and note</i>[3], <a href= +'#Page2_159'>159</a>, <a href='#Page2_161'>161</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_163'>163</a>; interview of, with Napoleon, on recognition, +<a href='#Page2_167'>167</a>; and Napoleon's instruction on +recognition in Roebuck's motion, <a href= +'#Page2_168'>168</a>-<a href='#Page2_169'>9</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_172'>172</a>; and Mason's recall, <a href= +'#Page2_180'>180</a>, <a href='#Page2_181'>181</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_182'>182</a>; opinion of Russell, <a href= +'#Page2_213'>213</a>; suggestion on Lindsay's motion, <a href= +'#Page2_213'>213</a>; disappointment at result of Mason's interview +with Palmerston, <a href='#Page2_215'>215</a>; opinion on European +attitude to the South, <a href='#Page2_215'>215</a>; interview with +Napoleon on the abolition of slavery in return for recognition, +<a href='#Page2_249'>249</a>-<a href='#Page2_250'>50</a>; quoted on +Lee's surrender <a href='#Page2_256'>256</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_257'>7</a>; appreciation of as diplomatic agent, ii. +<a href='#Page2_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page2_180'>180</a> +<i>note</i>[3]; correspondence of, i. <a href='#Page_261'>261</a> +<i>note</i>; otherwise mentioned, ii. <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a> +<i>note</i>[1]. <i>See also under heading</i> Confederate +Commissioners</p> +<p>Smith, Goldwin, ii. <a href='#Page2_136'>136</a> <i>note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page2_189'>189</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on Gladstone and +Canada, <a href='#Page2_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page2_70'>70</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; quoted on the influence of the <i>Times</i>, +<a href='#Page2_178'>178</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href= +'#Page2_189'>189</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on the <i>Daily Telegraph</i>, +<a href='#Page2_189'>189</a> <i>note</i>[2]; tribute of, to T.B. +Potter, <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[3]; view of the +<i>Times</i> attitude to democracy, <a href='#Page2_299'>299</a>; +criticism of the privileged classes of Great Britain, <a href= +'#Page2_303'>303</a>-<a href='#Page2_304'>4</a> <i>America and +England in their present relations</i>, quoted, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_304'>304</a>, <i>and note</i>[2] <i>Civil War, The, in +America</i>, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_223'>223</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[3]; +quoted, <a href='#Page2_304'>304</a> <i>note</i>[1] Does the Bible +sanction American Slavery?" ii. <a href='#Page2_110'>110</a> +<i>Letter, A, to a Whig Member of the Southern Independence +Association</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_194'>194</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_195'>5</a>; quoted, <a href='#Page2_299'>299</a></p> +<p>Smith, T.C., <i>Parties and Slavery</i>, cited, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_3'>3</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America, +ii. <a href='#Page2_207'>207</a>; letters of, to Members of +Parliament, <a href='#Page2_207'>207</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_208'>8</a>, <a href='#Page2_210'>210</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_211'>11</a>; deputation of, to Palmerston, <a href= +'#Page2_216'>216</a></p> +<p>Somerset, Duke of, i. <a href='#Page_207'>207</a></p> +<p>South Carolina, secession of, i. <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, +<a href='#Page_44'>44</a>; <i>Times</i> view on, <a href= +'#Page_55'>55</a>; and restoration of Colonial relations: some +British misconceptions on, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href= +'#Page_44'>44</a> <i>and note</i></p> +<p>Southern Independence Association, The, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page2_189'>189</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_191'>191</a>-<a href='#Page2_195'>5</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_204'>204</a>, <a href='#Page2_220'>220</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_298'>298</a>; cessation of meetings of, <a href= +'#Page2_193'>193</a>-<a href='#Page2_194'>4</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_222'>222</a>-<a href='#Page2_223'>3</a>; apathy and +dissension in, <a href='#Page2_205'>205</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_207'>207</a>, <a href='#Page2_208'>208</a>; resolution and +deputation to Palmerston, <a href='#Page2_210'>210</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_212'>2</a>, <a href='#Page2_216'>216</a>; ticket meetings, +<a href='#Page2_239'>239</a>; Oldham meeting, <a href= +'#Page2_239'>239</a>, <a href='#Page2_240'>240</a></p> +<p>Southern Ports Bill. <i>See</i> Blockade</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_336"></a>[V2:pg 336]</span> +<p>Southern States: attitude of, to protection policy, i. <a href= +'#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>; and reciprocity +treaty with British-American provinces, <a href= +'#Page_21'>21</a>-<a href='#Page_22'>2</a>; influences directing +British trade to, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>; British press attitude +to, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>-<a href='#Page_48'>48</a> +<i>passim</i>; characterization of, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>; +right of secession, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href= +'#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>, <a href= +'#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href='#Page_269'>269</a>; tariff as a cause +for secession, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>; question of recognition +considered, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>; secession, <a href= +'#Page_172'>172</a>-<a href='#Page_173'>3</a>; preparations for +war, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a>; recognized as belligerents, +<a href='#Page_190'>190</a>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a>, <a href= +'#Page_172'>172</a>; expulsion of British Consuls, by, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_148'>148</a> <i>note</i>[2]; activities of British friends +of, <a href='#Page2_152'>152</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_187'>187</a>-<a href='#Page2_188'>8</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_190'>190</a>, <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_194'>4</a>, <a href='#Page2_239'>239</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_298'>298</a>; Conservative hopes for success of, <a href= +'#Page2_300'>300</a>; views on French attitude, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2]; effect of the fall of Savannah +on, <a href='#Page2_246'>246</a>; end of the Confederacy, <a href= +'#Page2_248'>248</a>, <a href='#Page2_259'>259</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_268'>268</a>; hope of, from "foreign war," <a href= +'#Page2_252'>252</a>; effect on, of Lincoln's assassination +<a href='#Page2_258'>258</a>; withdrawal of belligerent rights to, +<a href='#Page2_264'>264</a>-<a href='#Page2_266'>6</a>; end of the +war; naval policy towards, <a href='#Page2_266'>266</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_267'>7</a> Belligerent rights, recognition of, i. <a href= +'#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href= +'#Page_95'>95</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <a href= +'#Page_109'>109</a>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>, <a href= +'#Page_151'>151</a>, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>, <a href= +'#Page_166'>166</a> <i>note</i>[3]. <i>See</i> Neutrality +Proclamations. Commissioners of, <i>See under</i> Confederate +Commissioners Cotton, obsession as to, i. <a href= +'#Page_252'>252</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href='#Page2_4'>4</a>, +<a href='#Page2_5'>5</a> Cotton Loan, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_155'>155</a> <i>et seq.</i> <a href='#Page2_179'>179</a>; +reception of, in England, <a href='#Page2_160'>160</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_161'>1</a>; amounts realized by, <a href= +'#Page2_162'>162</a> Declaration of Paris negotiation: attitude to, +i. <a href='#Page_186'>186</a> Finance, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_156'>156</a> <i>et seq.</i> Hampton Roads Conference: +suggestions in, ii. <a href='#Page2_252'>252</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_253'>3</a> Leaders of: British information on, i. <a href= +'#Page_58'>58</a>-<a href='#Page_59'>9</a> Manifesto to Europe, ii. +<a href='#Page2_241'>241</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_242'>242</a> Mediation: feeling in, on England's refusal +of, ii. <a href='#Page2_71'>71</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; hope of +change in British policy on, <a href='#Page2_213'>213</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_214'>4</a> Military resources: decline of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_219'>219</a>; desertions from the Army, <a href= +'#Page2_222'>222</a> Negroes, arming of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_240'>240</a>-<a href='#Page2_241'>1</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_251'>251</a> Privateering. <i>See that heading.</i> +Recognition of independence: anger at failure to secure, i. +<a href='#Page_252'>252</a> <i>note</i>[2]; desire for, without +mediation, ii. <a href='#Page2_217'>217</a> Secret service funds, +ii. <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a> <i>note</i>[1] Shipbuilding in +British ports for, ii. <a href='#Page2_115'>115</a> <i>et seq.</i>; +British protest to, on, <a href='#Page2_148'>148</a>. <i>See also +under</i> Alabama, Laird Rams, Oreto, etc. Slavery attitude, ii. +<a href='#Page2_88'>88</a> <i>and note</i>[3]; intention of gradual +emancipation, <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a>; British views on, +<a href='#Page2_220'>220</a>; offer of abolition in return for +recognition, <a href='#Page2_249'>249</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_251'>51</a></p> +<p>Spain, and Mexican debts, i. <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>, +<a href='#Page_260'>260</a></p> +<p>Spargo, <i>Karl Marx</i>, cited, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_292'>292</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p><i>Spectator</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>; +constant advocacy of Northern cause, i. <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>; +on Lincoln's election, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>; views on the +Civil War, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, +<a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>; on +secession, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>; on Proclamation of +Neutrality, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href= +'#Page_136'>136</a> <i>note</i>[1]; attacks Bulwer Lytton's speech +on dissolution of the Union, <a href='#Page_182'>182</a>; on +servile insurrection and emancipation, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_79'>79</a>, <a href='#Page2_80'>80</a>; on British Press +attitude to emancipation, <a href='#Page2_89'>89</a>; on +declaration of anti-slavery purpose in the war, <a href= +'#Page2_89'>89</a>; on the Emancipation Proclamation, <a href= +'#Page2_104'>104</a>-<a href='#Page2_105'>5</a>; on British lack of +sympathy with the North, <a href='#Page2_280'>280</a>; on +anti-slavery sympathies and view of democracy in England, <a href= +'#Page2_280'>280</a>; otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page_180'>180</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_105'>105</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_223'>223</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page2_282'>282</a></p> +<p>Spence, James, i. <a href='#Page_183'>183</a> <i>note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page_266'>266</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; conferences of, in +London, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>, <a href='#Page_267'>267</a>, +<a href='#Page_272'>272</a> <i>and note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page_273'>273</a>; prevents demonstration by cotton operatives, +<a href='#Page_300'>300</a>; plan to appeal to the Tories, ii. +<a href='#Page2_153'>153</a>, <a href='#Page2_155'>155</a>, +<a href='#Page2_164'>164</a>; as Confederate financial adviser, +<a href='#Page2_156'>156</a>, <a href='#Page2_157'>157</a>, +<a href='#Page2_158'>158</a>; and Confederate Cotton Loan, <a href= +'#Page2_159'>159</a>, <a href='#Page2_161'>161</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_162'>2</a>; urges withdrawal of Roebuck's motion, <a href= +'#Page2_173'>173</a>-<a href='#Page2_174'>4</a>; effect of the fall +of Vicksburg on, <a href='#Page2_179'>179</a>; organization of +Southern Clubs by, <a href='#Page2_186'>186</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_187'>7</a>, <a href='#Page2_188'>188</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_189'>189</a>, <a href='#Page2_190'>190</a>; hopes for +intervention, <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_188'>8</a>, <a href='#Page2_189'>189</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_190'>90</a>; organization of Southern Independence +Association by, <a href='#Page2_191'>191</a>; organization of +meetings by, <a href='#Page2_191'>191</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_222'>222</a>-<a href='#Page2_223'>3</a>; organizes +petitions to Parliament, <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a>; comments of, +on the Palmerston-Mason interview, <a href= +'#Page2_216'>216</a>-<a href='#Page2_217'>7</a>; on slavery clause +in Southern Independence Association's address, <a href= +'#Page2_220'>220</a> Slidell's opinion of, i. <a href= +'#Page_266'>266</a> <i>note</i>[3]; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_159'>159</a>; Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page_302'>302</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_49'>49</a> <i>note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page2_181'>181</a>, <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a> <i>The +American Union</i>, i. <a href='#Page_183'>183</a> <i>and +note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_266'>266</a> <i>note</i>[3]; ii. +<a href='#Page2_112'>112</a></p> +<p>Spencer, Herbert, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_38'>38</a></p> +<p>Spurgeon, C.H., prayer of, for victory of the North, ii. +<a href='#Page2_109'>109</a>-<a href='#Page2_110'>110</a></p> +<p>Stanley of Alderley, Lord, ii. <a href='#Page2_42'>42</a></p> +<p>Stephen, Leslie, meeting of, with Seward, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_176'>176</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Stephens, Alexander H., Vice-President of Southern Government, +i. <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <a href= +'#Page_121'>121</a>; interview of, with Schleiden, <a href= +'#Page_122'>122</a>, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>; discussion of, +with Seward on Confederate foreign war plan, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_252'>252</a></p> +<p>Stevenson, American Minister to London, letter of, to +Palmerston, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>-<a href= +'#Page_110'>10</a></p> +<p>Stoeckl, Russian Minister at Washington: view of the secession, +i. <a href='#Page_53'>53</a> <i>note</i>[3]; on Russian policy in +Declaration of Paris negotiations, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; on privateers in Northern Pacific, <a href= +'#Page_171'>171</a> <i>note</i>[1]; and recognition of the South, +<a href='#Page_196'>196</a> <i>note</i>[3], and Mercier's Richmond +visit, <a href='#Page_283'>283</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; on +mediation, <a href='#Page_283'>283</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_37'>37</a> <i>and note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a> +<i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_76'>76</a>; comments of, on Emancipation Proclamation, +<a href='#Page2_107'>107</a> <i>note</i>[1]; on the reconciliation +of North and South followed by a foreign war, <a href= +'#Page2_251'>251</a>; Seward's request to, on withdrawal of +Southern belligerent rights, <a href='#Page2_265'>265</a>; views on +probable policy of Britain at the beginning of the Civil War, +<a href='#Page2_269'>269</a>-<a href='#Page_270'>70</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_271'>271</a>; on the Civil War as a warning against +democracy, <a href='#Page2_297'>297</a> <i>note</i>[4]; Otherwise +mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_54'>54</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. +<a href='#Page2_45'>45</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_337"></a>[V2:pg 337]</span> +<p>Stone Boat Fleet. <i>See</i> Blockade.</p> +<p>Story, William Wetmore, i. <a href='#Page_228'>228</a>, <a href= +'#Page_256'>256</a>; letters of, in <i>Daily News</i>, <a href= +'#Page_228'>228</a> <i>and note</i>[4]</p> +<p>Stowe, Mrs. Harriet Beecher, and the <i>Saturday Review</i>, i. +<a href='#Page_181'>181</a>; mentioned, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_89'>89</a>-<a href='#Page2_90'>90</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_109'>109</a> <i>Uncle Tom's Cabin</i>, i. <a href= +'#Page_33'>33</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Stowell, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_208'>208</a></p> +<p>Stuart--, British Minister at Washington: report of new Northern +levies of men, ii. <a href='#Page2_30'>30</a>; on recognition, +<a href='#Page2_30'>30</a> <i>and note</i>[3]; views on British +policy, <a href='#Page2_30'>30</a> <i>note</i>[3]; attitude to +intervention and recognition, <a href='#Page2_36'>36</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_37'>37</a>, <a href='#Page2_66'>66</a> <i>note</i>[3]; +report of Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, <a href= +'#Page2_37'>37</a>, <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a>; suggestion of +armistice, <a href='#Page2_47'>47</a>; account of Federal +"reprisals," <a href='#Page2_66'>66</a> <i>note</i>[3]; on servile +insurrection, <a href='#Page2_97'>97</a>; describes Emancipation +proclamation as a <i>brutum fulmen</i>, <a href= +'#Page2_101'>101</a> Otherwise mentioned, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page2_26'>26</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_66'>66</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_70'>70</a>, +<a href='#Page2_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page2_101'>101</a> +<i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Sturge, Joseph, <i>A Visit to the United States in</i> 1841, +cited, i. <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></p> +<p>Sumner, Charles, i. <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href= +'#Page_80'>80</a>; Brooks' attack on, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a>, +<a href='#Page_80'>80</a>; hope of, for appointment as Minister to +England, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; views on +annexation of Canada, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>; in <i>Trent</i> +affair, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>, +<a href='#Page_234'>234</a> <i>note</i>[3]; attitude to Southern +Ports Bill, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a> <i>and note</i>[3]; +advocacy of abolition, ii. <a href='#Page2_81'>81</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_90'>90</a>; conversations with Lincoln on abolition, +<a href='#Page2_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page2_86'>86</a>; attitude to +Privateering Bill, <a href='#Page2_123'>123</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_124'>124</a>; otherwise mentioned, i. <a href= +'#Page_49'>49</a> <i>note</i>, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href= +'#Page_130'>130</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_220'>220</a>; +ii. <a href='#Page2_80'>80</a>, <a href='#Page2_132'>132</a>, +<a href='#Page2_184'>184</a>, <a href='#Page2_247'>247</a>, +<a href='#Page2_262'>262</a>, <a href='#Page2_280'>280</a></p> +<p>Sumter, Fort, fall of, i. <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href= +'#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href= +'#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href= +'#Page_172'>172</a>, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>; Seward's policy +on reinforcement of, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a></p> +<p>Sutherland, Rev. Dr., prayer of in American Senate, i. <a href= +'#Page_233'>233</a> <i>note</i></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>Tariff Bill (U.S.) of 1816, i. <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>; of +1828, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a></p> +<p>Taylor, P.A., abolitionist, ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a>; +eulogy of George Thompson, <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> +<i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Taylor, Tom, poem by, in <i>Punch</i>, on the death of Lincoln, +ii. <a href='#Page2_259'>259</a></p> +<p>Tennessee joins Confederate States, i. <a href= +'#Page_173'>173</a></p> +<p>Texas, State of: revolts from Mexico, i. <a href= +'#Page_12'>12</a>; Great Britain sends diplomatic and consular +agents to, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>; independence of, as affecting +British policy, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>-<a href= +'#Page_16'>16</a>; enters the American Union, <a href= +'#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href= +'#Page_16'>16</a>; in War of Independence against Mexico protests +against shipbuilding for Mexico in Britain, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_117'>117</a> <i>note</i>[1]; mentioned, <a href= +'#Page2_266'>266</a></p> +<p>Thompson and Wainwright, <i>Confidential Correspondence of G.V. +Fox, etc.</i>, cited, i. <a href='#Page_257'>257</a> +<i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Thompson, George, organizer of the London Emancipation Society, +ii. <a href='#Page2_91'>91</a>; work of, for emancipation, <a href= +'#Page2_109'>109</a>, <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>and +note</i>[1]; mentioned, <a href='#Page2_109'>109</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_184'>184</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_191'>191</a></p> +<p>Thouvenel, M., French Foreign Minister, i. <a href= +'#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>; in the Declaration +of Paris negotiations, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a>, <a href= +'#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>, <a href= +'#Page_159'>159</a>, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>, <a href= +'#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>; initiates +negotiations with Confederates, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>, +<a href='#Page_189'>189</a>; policy of, for relief of French need +for cotton, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>, <a href= +'#Page_197'>197</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>; attitude of, in +Charleston consuls case, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>; and Southern +Ports Bill, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>, <a href= +'#Page_248'>248</a> <i>and notes</i>, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a> +<i>and note</i>[4]; interview with Slidell, <a href= +'#Page_266'>266</a> <i>note</i>[1]; attitude of, to mediation, +<a href='#Page_266'>266</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page_279'>279</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_19'>19</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page2_28'>28</a>; on difficulties due +to lack of cotton, i. <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>, <a href= +'#Page_293'>293</a>-<a href='#Page_294'>4</a>; conversations on +Lindsay's interview with Napoleon, <a href='#Page_291'>291</a>, +<a href='#Page_293'>293</a>; and Mercier's Richmond visit, <a href= +'#Page_280'>280</a>, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a>, <a href= +'#Page_282'>282</a>, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>, <a href= +'#Page_288'>288</a>, <a href='#Page_299'>299</a>; conversation with +Napoleon on the blockade and recognition of the South, <a href= +'#Page_294'>294</a>; on French neutrality, <a href= +'#Page_299'>299</a>; opposition to Napoleon on American policy, ii. +<a href='#Page2_19'>19</a> <i>and note</i>[3], <a href= +'#Page2_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page2_39'>39</a>; Slidell's offer to, +on mediation, <a href='#Page2_24'>24</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_25'>25</a>; reply of, to Russell's unofficial suggestion of +mediation, <a href='#Page2_38'>38</a>-<a href='#Page2_39'>9</a>, +<a href='#Page2_46'>46</a>; retirement of, <a href= +'#Page2_45'>45</a>, <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>; view of England's +advantage from dissolution of the Union, <a href= +'#Page2_270'>270</a> <i>note</i>[2]; otherwise mentioned, i. +<a href='#Page_275'>275</a>, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_338"></a>[V2:pg 338]</span> +<p><i>Times</i>, The: characteristics of, as newspaper, i. <a href= +'#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. +<a href='#Page2_178'>178</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_228'>228</a>, <a href='#Page2_230'>230</a> <i>note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page2_234'>234</a>; influence on public opinion, <a href= +'#Page2_178'>178</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_189'>189</a> +<i>and note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a>; influence on +public press, <a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_230'>230</a> <i>note</i>[3]; accuracy of reports in, +<a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>; pro-Southern attitude in last year of +the conflict, <a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_228'>8</a>, <a href='#Page2_242'>242</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_244'>244</a> <i>and note</i>[3]; attitude to Hotze, +<a href='#Page2_154'>154</a> <i>note</i>[1]; relations of, with +W.H. Russell, i. <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>, <a href= +'#Page_178'>178</a>, ii. <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_229'>229</a> <i>and note</i>[1] Criticisms of: John +Bright's view of, i. <a href='#Page_55'>55</a> <i>note</i>[3]; +citations of anti-Americanism in, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a> +<i>note</i>[1]; Cobden, on, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a> +<i>note</i>; Canadian opinion on, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a> +<i>note</i>; in <i>Index</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a>; in +<i>Morning Star</i>, <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a>; Goldwin Smith's +attack on, <a href='#Page2_299'>299</a> "Historicus," articles by, +in. <i>See under</i> "Historicus." <i>Views expressed in, on:</i> +Civil War: non-idealistic, i. <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>, <a href= +'#Page_97'>97</a>; prints Motley's letter on causes of, <a href= +'#Page_174'>174</a>-<a href='#Page_175'>5</a> Confederate +Manifesto, ii. <a href='#Page2_242'>242</a> Cotton, i. <a href= +'#Page_55'>55</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_7'>7</a> <i>and note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page2_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page2_15'>15</a> Democracy: +attitude to, i. <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_280'>280</a>-<a href='#Page2_281'>1</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_284'>284</a>, <a href='#Page2_289'>289</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_297'>297</a>, <a href='#Page2_300'>300</a>; change of view +on, <a href='#Page2_289'>289</a>-<a href='#Page2_290'>90</a>, +<a href='#Page2_291'>291</a>, <a href='#Page2_297'>297</a>; +comparison of British and United States Governments, <a href= +'#Page2_286'>286</a>; attack on John Bright, <a href= +'#Page2_295'>295</a>-<a href='#Page2_296'>6</a> Foreign war plans +of America on, ii. <a href='#Page2_252'>252</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_254'>254</a> Gladstone's speech, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_49'>49</a> <i>note</i>[1] Laird Rams, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_146'>146</a> Lincoln: on Slavery speech of, i. <a href= +'#Page_38'>38</a>; on re-election of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_234'>234</a>-<a href='#Page2_235'>5</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_238'>238</a>; appreciations of, after his death, ii. +<a href='#Page2_259'>259</a>-<a href='#Page2_261'>61</a> Lindsay's +proposed motion: ii. <a href='#Page2_205'>205</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_206'>6</a> Mediation, i. <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>, +<a href='#Page_305'>305</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_67'>67</a> +Military situation, ii. <a href='#Page2_165'>165</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_176'>176</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_178'>178</a>, <a href='#Page2_297'>297</a>; after +Gettysburg, ii. <a href='#Page2_180'>180</a> <i>and note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page2_228'>228</a> <i>note</i>[3]; Lee's Northern +advance, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a>; on Grant's reverses and +Sherman's march on Atlanta, <a href='#Page2_212'>212</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_227'>227</a>, <a href='#Page2_232'>232</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_243'>243</a>; capture of Atlanta, <a href= +'#Page2_233'>233</a>, <a href='#Page2_234'>234</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_235'>235</a>; fall of Savannah, <a href= +'#Page2_245'>245</a>-<a href='#Page2_246'>6</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_300'>300</a>-<a href='#Page2_301'>1</a>; Lee's surrender, +<a href='#Page2_255'>255</a>-<a href='#Page2_256'>6</a>; +appreciation of Lee's campaign, <a href='#Page2_256'>256</a>; +Northern ability in war, <a href='#Page2_256'>256</a>; Sherman's +campaign, <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a> <i>note</i>[1] Neutrality in +non-idealistic war i. <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>, <a href= +'#Page_97'>97</a> Northern ability in war, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_256'>256</a> Privateers, i. <a href='#Page_158'>158</a> +Proclamation of Neutrality, i. <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>-<a href= +'#Page_104'>4</a>, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a> Roebuck's motion, +ii. <a href='#Page2_173'>173</a>, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a>, +<a href='#Page2_296'>296</a> <i>note</i>[2] Secession, i. <a href= +'#Page_45'>45</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a> Seward, i. <a href= +'#Page_216'>216</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_257'>257</a> Slavery: +attitude to controversy on, i. <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>, <a href= +'#Page_55'>55</a>; condemnation of, <a href= +'#Page_38'>38</a>-<a href='#Page_39'>9</a>, <a href= +'#Page_40'>40</a>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>; on Northern attitude +to, ii. <a href='#Page2_89'>89</a>; Emancipation Proclamation, +<a href='#Page2_102'>102</a>-<a href='#Page2_103'>3</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_104'>104</a>; criticism of anti-slavery meetings, <a href= +'#Page2_108'>108</a>; on Biblical sanction of, <a href= +'#Page2_110'>110</a> South, The: condemnation of, i. <a href= +'#Page_38'>38</a>-<a href='#Page_39'>9</a>, <a href= +'#Page_40'>40</a>; lawless element in, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>, +<a href='#Page_41'>41</a>; changing views on, at opening of the +war, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a> <i>and note</i>[3], <a href= +'#Page_56'>56</a>-<a href='#Page_57'>7</a>, <a href= +'#Page_68'>68</a>-<a href='#Page_69'>9</a>; demand of, for +recognition, ii. <a href='#Page2_181'>181</a>; renewed confidence +in, ii. <a href='#Page2_210'>210</a> <i>and note</i>[2] Southern +shipbuilding, ii. <a href='#Page2_145'>145</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_146'>146</a> <i>Trent</i> affair, i. <a href= +'#Page_216'>216</a>-<a href='#Page_217'>7</a>, <a href= +'#Page_225'>225</a>-<a href='#Page_226'>6</a>, <a href= +'#Page_237'>237</a> War of 1812 ... i. <a href='#Page_8'>8</a> +"Yankee," The, ii. <a href='#Page2_246'>246</a> Otherwise +mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_65'>65</a> <i>and note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page2_160'>160</a>, <a href='#Page2_201'>201</a> <i>and +note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_204'>204</a> <i>and note</i>[2], +<a href='#Page2_295'>295</a></p> +<p>Toombs (Confederate Secretary of State), i. <a href= +'#Page_129'>129</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_4'>4</a> +<i>note</i>[3]</p> +<p>Toronto <i>Globe</i>, the, cited, i. <a href='#Page_222'>222</a> +<i>note</i></p> +<p>Trades Unions of London, meeting of, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_132'>132</a>-<a href='#Page2_133'>3</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_134'>134</a>, <a href='#Page2_291'>291</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_293'>3</a></p> +<p>Train, George Francis, of the <i>New York Herald</i>, speeches +of, in England, ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Treaty of Washington (1842) i. <a href='#Page_4'>4</a>, <a href= +'#Page_9'>9</a></p> +<p>Tremenheere, H.S., <i>The Constitution of the United States</i>, +etc., cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_275'>275</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Tremlett, F.W., quoted, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_211'>211</a>-<a href='#Page2_212'>12</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_339"></a>[V2:pg 339]</span> +<p><i>Trent</i> affair. The, i. <a href='#Page_195'>195</a>, +<a href='#Page_203'>203</a> <i>and note</i>, <a href= +'#Page_204'>204</a> <i>et seq.</i> British demands in, i. <a href= +'#Page_212'>212</a>-<a href='#Page_213'>3</a>, <a href= +'#Page_226'>226</a>, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>, points of the +complaint, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a> <i>note</i>[1]; American +reply, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a> +British views on, i. <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>, <a href= +'#Page_216'>216</a>, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a>-<a href= +'#Page_218'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>-<a href= +'#Page_224'>4</a>, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a>, <a href= +'#Page_226'>226</a>-<a href='#Page_227'>7</a>; American exultation +in, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>-<a href='#Page_206'>6</a>, <a href= +'#Page_218'>218</a>, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a>; effect of in +Canada, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i>; Cabinet members' +sentiments on, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>; change in American +views, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>, <a href= +'#Page_230'>230</a>-<a href='#Page_231'>1</a>; British speculation +on probable war, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a>, <a href= +'#Page_229'>229</a>; European support of Britain in, <a href= +'#Page_229'>229</a>, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>; French views on, +<a href='#Page_230'>230</a>, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a>-<a href= +'#Page_235'>5</a>; release of envoys, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>; +American feeling after settlement of, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a> +<i>and note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_237'>237</a>; Parliamentary +debate on conclusion of, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>-<a href= +'#Page_241'>1</a>, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>, <a href= +'#Page_265'>265</a>, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>; influence of, on +British policy in relation to the Civil War, <a href= +'#Page_242'>242</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_15'>15</a>-<a href= +'#Page2_16'>16</a>; Southerners' action in, i. <a href= +'#Page_211'>211</a> <i>note</i>[1]; effect of, on British cotton +trade, ii. <a href='#Page2_9'>9</a><br> +Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_171'>171</a> <i>note</i>[1], +<a href='#Page_201'>201</a>, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a>, <a href= +'#Page_244'>244</a>, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>, <a href= +'#Page_254'>254</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_131'>131</a></p> +<p>Trescott, William Henry, i. <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, +<a href='#Page_188'>188</a></p> +<p><i>Tribune</i>, The New York, cited, i. <a href= +'#Page_280'>280</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Trimble, W., "Surplus Food Production of the United States," +cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_13'>13</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Trollope, Anthony, i. <a href='#Page_239'>239</a> <i>and +note</i>[5], <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_153'>153</a>; description of the United States citizen by, +ii. <a href='#Page2_287'>287</a>-<a href='#Page2_288'>8</a> +<i>North America</i>, i. <a href='#Page_239'>239</a>; ii. <a href= +'#Page2_153'>153</a>, <a href='#Page2_287'>287</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_288'>288</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Trollope, Mrs., i. <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href= +'#Page_48'>48</a></p> +<p>Tyler, President, i. <a href='#Page_10'>10</a></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>Union and Emancipation Society of London, The: Bright's speech +to, ii. <a href='#Page2_295'>295</a></p> +<p>United Empire Loyalists, i. <a href='#Page_8'>8</a> +<i>note</i></p> +<p>United States: Citizenship: theory of, i. <a href= +'#Page_5'>5</a>-<a href='#Page_6'>6</a> <i>and note</i> Commercial +relations with Great Britain, i. <a href='#Page_17'>17</a> <i>et +seq.</i> Democracy in, <i>See under</i> Democracy. International +law, influence of U.S. on, belligerent and neutral rights in, i. +<a href='#Page_5'>5</a>-<a href='#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href= +'#Page_140'>140</a> Naval power: agitation for increase of, i. +<a href='#Page_123'>123</a> Policy in the Civil War, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_197'>197</a> <i>See under</i> Adams, Lincoln, Seward, +<i>and subject-headings</i> Political principles of: British +sympathy for, i. <a href='#Page_3'>3</a>, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a> +Political institutions in: views of travellers and writers, i. +<a href='#Page_30'>30</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_274'>274</a> <i>et +seq.</i> Population, growth of, i. <a href='#Page_12'>12</a> +Protection policy: beginnings of, i. <a href= +'#Page_18'>18</a>-<a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href= +'#Page_20'>20</a>-<a href='#Page_21'>1</a>; reaction against in the +South, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a> Territorial expansion, i. <a href= +'#Page_12'>12</a> <i>et seq.</i><br> +<i>See also under subject-headings.</i></p> +United States Supreme Court: decision on Lincoln's blockade +proclamations, i. <a href='#Page_110'>110</a> <i>note</i>[3]</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>Van Buren, President, i. <a href='#Page_109'>109</a></p> +<p>Vansittart, William, ii. <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_193'>193</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Vicksburg, capture of, ii. <a href='#Page2_143'>143</a>, +<a href='#Page2_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a> +<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_178'>178</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_228'>228</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_296'>296</a>; +Southern defence of, <a href='#Page2_164'>164</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page2_178'>178</a>; importance of, +in the military situation, <a href='#Page2_165'>165</a></p> +<p>Victoria, Queen, i. <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href= +'#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href= +'#Page_190'>190</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href='#Page2_40'>40</a>, +<a href='#Page2_190'>190</a>, <a href='#Page2_262'>262</a>; +pro-German influence of, <a href='#Page2_203'>203</a> +<i>note</i>[3]; writes personal letter of sympathy to Mrs. Lincoln, +<a href='#Page2_262'>262</a></p> +<p>Vignaud, Henry, ii. <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a> +<i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Virginia, State of, i. <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>, <a href= +'#Page_122'>122</a>, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a>, <a href= +'#Page_245'>245</a></p> +<p>Vogt, A., ii. <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>Wales, Prince of, visit to United States in 1860, ... i. +<a href='#Page_80'>80</a></p> +<p>Walker, Mr., and employment of ex-slaves in British Guiana, ii. +<a href='#Page2_100'>100</a></p> +<p>Wallbridge, General Hiram, ii. <a href='#Page2_123'>123</a> +<i>and note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Warburton, George <i>Hochelaga</i>: i. <a href= +'#Page_29'>29</a></p> +<p>Washington, President, i. <a href='#Page_11'>11</a></p> +<p>Watts, <i>Cotton, Famine</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_6'>6</a> +<i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Weed, Thurlow, i. <a href='#Page_114'>114</a> <i>and notes</i>, +<a href='#Page_129'>129</a>, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a>, <a href= +'#Page_231'>231</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a> +<i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Welles, United States Secretary of the Navy, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_199'>199</a>; in <i>Trent</i> affair, congratulates Wilkes, +i. <a href='#Page_220'>220</a>; attitude to the "Privateering +Bill," ii. <a href='#Page2_123'>123</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href= +'#Page2_128'>128</a>, <a href='#Page2_137'>137</a>; mentioned, +<a href='#Page2_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page2_96'>96</a></p> +<p>West Indian Colonies, i. <a href='#Page_3'>3</a>; American trade +with, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, +<a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>; slavery in, +<a href='#Page_31'>31</a></p> +<p>Westbury, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>-<a href= +'#Page_263'>3</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_64'>64</a></p> +<p><i>Westminster Review</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>, +<a href='#Page_70'>70</a> <i>and note</i>[1], <a href= +'#Page_71'>71</a></p> +<p>Wharncliffe, Lord, ii. <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href= +'#Page2_193'>193</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Wheat and cotton in the Civil War, ii. <a href= +'#Page2_13'>13</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p> +<p>Whig sympathy for American political principles, i. <a href= +'#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a></p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_340"></a>[V2:pg 340]</span> +<p>White, Andrew D., "A Letter to W.H. Russell," etc. cited, ii. +<a href='#Page2_229'>229</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Whittier, J.G., i. <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href= +'#Page_47'>47</a></p> +<p>Wilberforce, Samuel, i. <a href='#Page_31'>31</a></p> +<p>Williams, Commander, R.N., i. <a href='#Page_204'>204</a></p> +<p>Wilkes, Captain, of the <i>San Jacinto</i>, intercepts the +<i>Trent</i>, i. <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>, <a href= +'#Page_216'>216</a>, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a>-<a href= +'#Page_220'>20</a>; American national approbation of, <a href= +'#Page_219'>219</a>-<a href='#Page_220'>20</a>; Seward on, <a href= +'#Page_233'>233</a>; his action officially stated to be +unauthorized, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>, <a href= +'#Page_254'>254</a></p> +<p>Wilmington, N.C., i. <a href='#Page_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[1]; +ii. <a href='#Page2_247'>247</a></p> +<p>Wilson, President, i. <a href='#Page_90'>90</a> <i>note</i></p> +<p>Wodehouse, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_84'>84</a></p> +</div> +<div class="letter"> +<p>Yancey, Southern Commissioner, i. <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>, +<a href='#Page_82'>82</a> <i>and note</i>, <a href= +'#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href= +'#Page_264'>264</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_4'>4</a> <i>note</i>[3], +<a href='#Page2_223'>223</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p> +<p>Yeomans, cited, i. <a href='#Page_38'>38</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<br> +<br> +<hr style="width: 35%;"> +<br> +<br> + +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 13789 ***</div> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/13789-h/images/image01.jpg b/13789-h/images/image01.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f597b25 --- /dev/null +++ b/13789-h/images/image01.jpg diff --git a/13789-h/images/image02.jpg b/13789-h/images/image02.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..51e1d58 --- /dev/null +++ b/13789-h/images/image02.jpg diff --git a/13789-h/images/image03.jpg b/13789-h/images/image03.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb315ec --- /dev/null +++ b/13789-h/images/image03.jpg diff --git a/13789-h/images/image04.jpg b/13789-h/images/image04.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..28faee0 --- /dev/null +++ b/13789-h/images/image04.jpg diff --git a/13789-h/images/image05.jpg b/13789-h/images/image05.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..fcd3865 --- /dev/null +++ b/13789-h/images/image05.jpg diff --git a/13789-h/images/image06.jpg b/13789-h/images/image06.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef20eac --- /dev/null +++ b/13789-h/images/image06.jpg diff --git a/13789-h/images/image07.jpg b/13789-h/images/image07.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..cc96ec0 --- /dev/null +++ b/13789-h/images/image07.jpg diff --git a/13789-h/images/image08.jpg b/13789-h/images/image08.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..20f421c --- /dev/null +++ b/13789-h/images/image08.jpg diff --git a/13789-h/images/image09.jpg b/13789-h/images/image09.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..c300132 --- /dev/null +++ b/13789-h/images/image09.jpg diff --git a/13789-h/images/image10.jpg b/13789-h/images/image10.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..12a7e3d --- /dev/null +++ b/13789-h/images/image10.jpg diff --git a/13789-h/images/image11.jpg b/13789-h/images/image11.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..dccb050 --- /dev/null +++ b/13789-h/images/image11.jpg diff --git a/13789-h/images/image12.jpg b/13789-h/images/image12.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a4d19b --- /dev/null +++ b/13789-h/images/image12.jpg diff --git a/13789-h/images/image13.jpg b/13789-h/images/image13.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..83ed0c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/13789-h/images/image13.jpg diff --git a/13789-h/images/image14.jpg b/13789-h/images/image14.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..040d5ea --- /dev/null +++ b/13789-h/images/image14.jpg |
